Produced by Ed Brandon








ARISTOTLE.

BY GEORGE GROTE, F.R.S.,

D.C.L. OXFORD, AND LL.D. CAMBRIDGE;
LATE VICE-CHANCELLOR OF THE UNIVERSITY OF LONDON;
PRESIDENT OF UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, LONDON;
AND FOREIGN MEMBER OF THE INSTITUTE OF FRANCE.


EDITED BY

ALEXANDER BAIN, LL.D.,

PROFESSOR OF LOGIC IN THE UNIVERSITY OF ABERDEEN,


AND


G. CROOM ROBERTSON, M.A.,

PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY OF MIND AND LOGIC IN UNIVERSITY COLLEGE,
LONDON.

_SECOND EDITION, WITH ADDITIONS._

LONDON: JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET.

1880.

_The right of Translation is reserved._


PRINTED BY WILLIAM CLOWES AND SONS,
LONDON:
STAMFORD STREET AND CHARING CROSS.




NOTICE TO THE SECOND EDITION.


This Edition is an exact reprint of the First Edition, with the
addition of two important Essays on the Ethics and Politics of
Aristotle, which were found among the author's posthumous papers.
They were originally published in 1876, in 'Fragments on Ethical
Subjects, by the late George Grote,' but would have been included in
the First Edition of this Work, had they been discovered in time.
These Essays are the fruit of long and laborious study, and, so far
as they extend, embody the writer's matured views upon the Ethics and
the Politics: the two treatises whose omission from his published
exposition of the Aristotelian philosophy has been most regretted.

The Essay on 'The Ethics of Aristotle' falls naturally into two
divisions; the first treats of Happiness; the second of what,
according to Aristotle, is the chief ingredient of Happiness, namely.
Virtue. On Aristotle's own conception of Happiness, Mr. Grote dwells
very minutely; turning it over on all sides, and looking at it from
every point of view. While fully acknowledging its merits, he gives
also the full measure of its defects. His criticisms on this head are
in the author's best style and are no less important as regards
Ethical discussion than as a commentary on Aristotle.

His handling of Aristotle's doctrine of Virtue is equally subtle and
instructive. Particularly striking are the remarks on the _Voluntary_
and the _Involuntary_, and on [Greek: proai/resis], or _deliberate
preference_.

The treatment of the Virtues in detail is, unhappily, more
fragmentary; but what he does say regarding Justice and Equity has a
permanent interest.

The Essay on 'The Politics of Aristotle' must be studied in
connection with the preceding. Although but a brief sketch, it is
remarkable for the insight which it affords us into the most
consummate political ideal of the ancient world.




PREFACE BY THE EDITORS

TO THE FIRST EDITION.


The Historian of Greece, when closing his great narrative in the year
1856, promised to follow out in a separate work that speculative
movement of the fourth century B.C. which upheld the supremacy of the
Hellenic intellect long after the decline of Hellenic liberty. He had
traced the beginnings of the movement in the famous chapter on
Sokrates, but to do justice to its chief heroes--Plato and

Aristotle--proved to be impossible within the limits of the History.
When, however, the promised work appeared, after nine laborious years,
it was found to compass only Plato and the other immediate companions
of Sokrates, leaving a full half of the appointed task unperformed.
Mr. Grote had already passed his 70th year, but saw in this only a
reason for turning, without a moment's pause, to the arduous labour
still before him. Thenceforth, in spite of failing strength and the
increasing distraction of public business, he held steadily on till
death overtook him in the middle of the course. What he was able to
accomplish, though not what study he had gone through towards the
remainder of his design, these volumes will show. The office of
preparing and superintending their publication was entrusted to the
present editors by Mrs. Grote, in the exercise of her discretion as
sole executrix under his last Will. As now printed, the work has its
form determined by the author himself up to the end of Chapter XI.
The first two chapters, containing a biography of Aristotle and a
general account of his works, are followed by a critical analysis, in
eight chapters, of all the treatises included under the title
'Organon;' and in the remaining chapter of the eleven the handling of
the Physica and Metaphysica (taken together for the reasons given) is
begun. What now stand as Chapters III., IV., &c., were marked,
however, as Chapters VI., VII., &c., by the author; his design
evidently being to interpolate before publication three other
chapters of an introductory cast. Unfortunately no positive
indication remains as to the subject of these; although there is
reason to believe that, for one thing, he intended to prefix to the
detailed consideration of the works a key to Aristotle's perplexing
terminology. Possibly also he designed to enter upon a more
particular discussion of the Canon, after having viewed it externally
in Chapter II.; citations and references bearing on such a discussion
being found among his loose notes.

What might have been the course of the work from the point where it
is broken off, is altogether matter of inference, beyond an
indication of the subject of the chapter next to follow; but the
remarks at the beginning of Chapter III. point to some likely
conclusions. After the metaphysical discussions, which must have been
prolonged through several chapters, there would probably have been
taken in order the treatises De Coelo, De Generatione et Corruptione,
the Meteorologica, and next the various Biological works; though with
what detail in each case it is impossible to guess. Then must have
followed the De Animâ with the minor Psychological treatises summed
up as Parva Naturalia, and next, without doubt, the Ethica and
Politica; last of all, the Rhetorica and Poetica. That Mr. Grote had
carefully mastered all these works is evident from his marginal
annotations in the various copies which he read. With the Ethica and
Politica in particular he had early been familiar, and most there is
reason to regret that he has left nothing worked out upon this field
so specially his own.[1] Fortunately it happens that on the
psychological field next adjoining there is something considerable to
show.

[Footnote 1: It has been already stated that two important Essays on
these subjects have been discovered among Mr. Grote's posthumous
papers since the publication of the First Edition. They are printed
in this Edition after the chapter De Animâ.--Second Edition.]

In the autumn of 1867 Mr. Grote undertook to write a short account of
Aristotle's striking recognition of the physical aspect of mental
phenomena, to be appended to the third edition of the senior editor's
work, 'The Senses and the Intellect;' but, on following out the
indications relative to that point, he was gradually led by his
interest in the subject to elaborate a full abstract of the De Animâ
and the other psychological treatises. Several months were spent on
this task, and at the end he declared that it had greatly deepened
his insight into Aristotle's philosophy as a whole. He also expressed
his satisfaction at having thus completed an exposition of the
Psychology, fitted to stand as his contribution to that part of
Aristotle, in case he should never reach the subject in the regular
course of his general work. The exposition was printed in full at the
time (1868), and drew the attention of students. It is now reprinted,
with the prominence due to its literary finish and intrinsic value,
as a chapter--the last--in the body of the present work. The long
Appendix coming after is composed of elements somewhat heterogeneous;
but the different sections were all written in the period since 1865,
and all, not excepting the last two (treating briefly of Epikurus and
the Stoics), have a bearing upon the author's general design.

The first section--an historical account of ancient theories of
Universals--has already seen the light.[2] It brings together, as
nowhere else, all the chief references to the doctrine of Realism in
Plato, and exhibits the directly antagonistic position taken up by
Aristotle towards his master. This it does so impressively that there
could be no question of excluding it, even although it reproduces in
part some of the matter of Chapter III., on the Categories. Being
composed, in 1867, later than this Chapter, it is on that account
written with all the firmer a grasp. On finishing it as it stands,
Mr. Grote, in a private letter, expressed himself in terms that
deserve to be quoted:--"I never saw before so clearly the extreme
importance of Aristotle's speculations as the guides and stimulants
of mediæval philosophy. If I had time to carry the account further, I
should have been able to show how much the improved views of the
question of Universals depended on the fact that more and more of the
works of Aristotle, and better texts, became known to Albertus
Magnus, Thomas Aquinas, and their successors. During the centuries
immediately succeeding Boëthius, nothing of Aristotle except the
Categories and the treatise De Interpretatione was known, and these
in a Latin translation. Most fortunately the Categories was never put
out of sight; and it is there that the doctrine of _Substantia Prima_
stands clearly proclaimed."

[Footnote 2: In the Appendix to the senior editor's 'Manual of Mental
and Moral Science' (1867).]

The second section, or, rather, the part therein treating of
Aristotle's doctrine of First Principles, is also a reprint. It was
composed (in 1867) at the same time as the section on Universals, and
was printed along with that; shorn, however, of the critical
examination of Sir William Hamilton's views on Aristotle, which is
now prefixed to the statement of the Aristotelian doctrine. Hamilton
having (in Note A, appended to his edition of Reid's Works) claimed
Aristotle as a supporter of the Philosophy of Common Sense, basing
upon a long list of passages quoted, these were subjected by Mr.
Grote to a searching criticism, the pointed vigour of which will be
duly appreciated. The statement of his own view of Aristotle's
doctrine, though containing little that may not be found at more
places than one in the body of the present work, is yet reprinted,
because iteration was his favourite art for impressing anything to
which he attached as much importance as he did attach to this
conviction of his, regarding the very heart of Aristotle's thought.

The long abstracts of six books of the Metaphysica and two books of
the De Coelo, next following in the Appendix, are sections of a
character altogether different from the foregoing. Evidently not
intended for publication, they have been included, partly as
furnishing some indication of the labour the author underwent in
seeking to lay hold of his subject, partly because of their inherent
value. From the first motive, they are here reproduced as nearly as
possible in the guise they wore as preliminary drafts, bestrewed with
references. Their value consists in the fact that they give Mr.
Grote's interpretation of the text of treatises at once exceedingly
difficult and important: difficult, as is proved by the great
divergence, among commentators at many points; important, not more
for the deeper aspects of Aristotle's own system, than for the
speculations of the earlier Greek philosophers on which they are the
classical authority. What relation, in the case of each treatise, the
books abstracted (often translated) hold to the other books left
untouched, is specially indicated at the beginning of the third
section and at the end of the fourth. Here let it suffice to mention
that each abstract has a certain completeness in itself, and at the
same time a bond of connection with the other. The abstract of the
Metaphysica closes where Aristotle descends to speak of the concrete
heavenly bodies, and just as much of the De Coelo is given as treats
specially of these. This connection, whether or not it was present to
the author's mind, enhances the value of the abstracts as here
presented.[3]

[Footnote 3: The author carried the abstract of De Coelo a little
farther, and then abruptly broke it off; probably finding himself
borne too far away from the logical treatises with which he was at
the time dealing.]

In the remaining sections of the Appendix, not dealing with
Aristotle, the short account of Epikurus aims at setting in its true
light a much-maligned system of thought. On writing it, in 1867, Mr.
Grote remarked that the last word had not yet been said on Epikurus.
The ethical part of the sketch was printed at the time:[4] the whole
is now given. More fragmentary is the notice of the Stoics, as merely
replacing passages that he considered inadequate in a sketch
submitted to him. Since it formed part of his entire design to add to
the treatment of Aristotle a full exposition both of Stoic and
Epikurean doctrines, considered as the outgrowth of the Cynic and
Kyrenaic theories already handled at the end of the 'Plato,' the two
fragments may not unfitly close the present work.

[Footnote 4: Also in the 'Manual of Mental and Moral Science,' among
'Ethical Systems.']

Taken altogether, the two volumes are undoubtedly a most important
contribution to the history of ancient thought. As regards Aristotle,
the author's design must be gathered chiefly from the first eleven
chapters,--begun as these were in 1865, and proceeded with in their
order, till he was overtaken, in the act of composing the last, by
the insidious malady which, after six months, finally carried him
off. Perhaps the most striking feature in the exposition of the
Organon, is the very full analysis given of the long treatise called
Topica. While the other treatises have all, more or less, been drawn
upon for the ordinary theory of Logic, the Topica, with its mixed
logical and rhetorical bearings, has ceased to be embodied in modern
schemes of discipline or study. Mr. Grote's profound interest in
everything pertaining to Dialectic drew him especially to this work,
as the exhibition in detail of that habit of methodized discussion so
deep rooted in the Hellenic mind. And in the same connection it may
be noted how the natural course of his work brought him, in the last
months of his intellectual activity, to tread again old and familiar
ground. A plea--this time against Aristotle--for the decried
Sophists, and, once more, a picture of that **dialectical mission of
Sokrates which for him had an imperishable charm, were among the very
last efforts of his pen.

. . . . . . .

Besides making up the Second Volume from the end of Chapter XI., the
editors have, throughout the whole work, bestowed much attention on
the notes and references set down by the author with his usual
copious minuteness. It was deemed advisable to subject these
everywhere to a detailed verification; and, though the editors speak
on the matter with a diffidence best understood by those who may have
undergone a similar labour, it is hoped that a result not unworthy of
the author has been attained. In different places additional
references have been supplied, either where there was an obvious
omission on the author's part, or in farther confirmation of his
views given in the text: such references, mostly to the works of
Aristotle himself, it has not been thought necessary to signalize.
Where, as once or twice in the Appendix, a longer note in explanation
seemed called for, this has been printed within square brackets.

From the text some passages, where the iterations seemed excessive,
have been withheld, but only such as it was thought the author would
himself have struck out upon revision: wherever there was evidence
that revision had been made, the iterations, freely employed for
emphasis, have been allowed to stand. On rare occasions,
interpolations and verbal changes have been made with the view of
bringing out more clearly the meaning sought to be conveyed. It is
impossible to be more deeply sensible than the editors are, of the
responsibility they have thus incurred; but they have been guided by
their very respect for the venerable author, and they were fortunate
in the many opportunities they enjoyed of learning from his own lips
the cast of his views on Aristotle.[5]

[Footnote 5: It is but due to the younger editor to state that the
heaviest part of all the work here indicated has been done by
him.--A. B.]

An index has been drawn up with some care; as was needful, if meant
to be of real service to the readers of so elaborate a work.

It only remains to add that in printing the Greek of the notes, &c.,
the text of Waitz has been followed for the Organon (everywhere short
of the beginning); the text of Bonitz, for the Metaphysica; and for
other works of Aristotle, generally the Berlin edition. Regard was
had, as far as the editors' knowledge went, to the author's own
preferences in his reading.




CONTENTS.

CHAPTER I.
LIFE OF ARISTOTLE                                    1

CHAPTER II.
ARISTOTELIAN CANON                                  27

CHAPTER III.
CATEGORIÆ                                           54

CHAPTER IV.
DE INTERPRETATIONE                                 108

CHAPTER V.
ANALYTICA PRIORA I.                                139

CHAPTER VI.
ANALYTICA PRIORA II.                               171

CHAPTER VII.
ANALYTICA POSTERIORA I.                            207

CHAPTER VIII.
ANALYTICA POSTERIORA II.                           238

CHAPTER IX.
TOPICA (I.-VIII.)                                  262

CHAPTER X.
SOPHISTICI ELENCHI                                 376

CHAPTER XI.
PHYSICA AND METAPHYSICA                            422

CHAPTER XII.
DE ANIMÂ, ETC.                                     446

CHAPTER XIII.
ETHICA                                             494

CHAPTER XIV.
POLITICA                                           539

APPENDIX.

I. THE DOCTRINE OF UNIVERSALS                      551

II. FIRST PRINCIPLES:
  A. Sir William Hamilton on Aristotle's Doctrine  565
  B. Aristotle's Doctrine                          573

III. METAPHYSICA:
  Book [Greek: G].                                 583
  Book [Greek: E].                                 592
  Book [Greek: Z].                                 594
  Book [Greek: Ê].                                 609
  Book [Greek: Th].                                613
  Book [Greek: L].                                 619

IV. DE COELO:
  Book I.                                          630
  Book II.                                         639

V. EPIKURUS                                        654

VI. THE STOICS.--A FRAGMENT                        660





ARISTOTLE.




CHAPTER I.

LIFE OF ARISTOTLE.


In my preceding work, 'Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates,' I
described a band of philosophers differing much from each other, but
all emanating from Sokrates as common intellectual progenitor; all
manifesting themselves wholly or principally in the composition of
dialogues; and all living in an atmosphere of Hellenic freedom, as
yet untroubled by any over-ruling imperial ascendancy from without.
From that band, among whom Plato is _facilè princeps_, I now proceed
to another, among whom the like pre-eminence belongs to Aristotle.
This second band knew the Sokratic stimulus only as an historical
tradition; they gradually passed, first from the Sokratic or Platonic
dialogue--dramatic, colloquial, cross-examining--to the Aristotelian
dialogue, semi-dramatic, rhetorical, counter-expository; and next to
formal theorizing, ingenious solution and divination of special
problems, historical criticism and abundant collections of detailed
facts: moreover, they were witnesses of the extinction of freedom in
Hellas, and of the rise of the Macedonian kingdom out of comparative
nullity to the highest pinnacle of supremacy and mastership. Under
the successors of Alexander, this extraneous supremacy, intermeddling
and dictatorial, not only overruled the political movements of the
Greeks, but also influenced powerfully the position and working of
their philosophers; and would have become at once equally
intermeddling even earlier, under Alexander himself, had not his
whole time and personal energy been absorbed by insatiable thirst for
eastern conquest, ending with an untimely death.

Aristotle was born at Stageira, an unimportant Hellenic colony in
Thrace, which has obtained a lasting name in history from the fact of
being his birthplace. It was situated in the Strymonic Gulf, a little
north of the isthmus which terminates in the mountainous promontory
of Athos; its founders were Greeks from the island of Andros,
reinforced afterwards by additional immigrants from Chalkis in
Euboea. It was, like other Grecian cities, autonomous--a distinct,
self-governing community; but it afterwards became incorporated in
the confederacy of free cities under the presidency of Olynthus. The
most material feature in its condition, at the period of Aristotle's
birth, was, that it lay near the frontier of Macedonia, and not far
even from Pella, the residence of the Macedonian king Amyntas (father
of Philip). Aristotle was born, not earlier than 392 B.C., nor later
than 385-384 B.C. His father, Nikomachus, was a citizen of Stageira,
distinguished as a physician, author of some medical works, and
boasting of being descended from the heroic _gens_ of the Asklepiads;
his mother, Phaestis, was also of good civic family, descended from
one of the first Chalkidian colonists.[1] Moreover, Nikomachus was
not merely learned in his art, but was accepted as confidential
physician and friend of Amyntas, with whom he passed much of his
time--a circumstance of great moment to the future career of his son.
We are told that among the Asklepiads the habit of physical
observation, and even manual training in dissection, were imparted
traditionally from father to son, from the earliest years, thus
serving as preparation for medical practice when there were no
written treatises to study.[2] The mind of Aristotle may thus have
acquired that appetite for physiological study which so many of his
treatises indicate.

[Footnote 1: Diog. L. v. 10. This was probably among the reasons
which induced Aristotle to prefer Chalkis as his place of temporary
retirement, when he left Athens after the death of Alexander.]

[Footnote 2: Galen, De Anatomicis Administr. ii. 1. T. ii. pp.
280-281, ed. Kühn. [Greek: para\ toi=s goneu=sin e)k pai/dôn
a)skoume/nois, ô(/sper a)naginô/skein kai\ gra/phein, ou(/tôs
a)nate/mnein]--(compare Plato--Protagoras, p. 328 A, p. 311 C).

Diog. L. v. 1. [Greek: O( de\ Niko/machos ê)=n a)po\ Nikoma/chou tou=
Macha/nos tou= A)sklêpiou=, katha/ phêsin E(/rmippos e)n tô=| peri\
A)ristote/lous kai\ sunebi/ô A)mu/nta| tô=| Makedo/nôn basilei=
i)atrou= kai\ phi/lou chrei/a|.]

We here learn that in the heroic genealogy of the Asklepiads, the son
of Machaon himself bore the name of Nikomachus. I do not think that
Will. v. Humboldt and Bernays are warranted in calling Aristotle "ein
Halbgrieche," "kein vollbürtiger Hellene"--(Die Dialoge des
Aristoteles, pp. 2-56-134). An Hellenic family which migrated from
Athens, Chalkis, Corinth, etc., to establish a colony on the coast of
Thrace, or Asia Minor, did not necessarily lose its Hellenism. One
cannot designate Demokritus, Xenokrates, Anaxagoras, Empedokles, &c.,
half Greeks.

Diogenes here especially cites Hermippus (B.C. 220-210), from whom
several of his statements in this and other biographies appear to
have been derived. The work of Hermippus seems to have been entitled
"Lives of the Philosophers" (v. 2), among which lives that of
Aristotle was one.

Hermippus mentioned, among other matters, communications made to
Aristotle by Stroebus (a person engaged in the service of
Kallisthenes as reader) respecting the condemnation and execution of
Kallisthenes in Baktria, by order of Alexander (Plutarch, Alex. c.
54). From what source did Hermippus derive these statements made by
Stroebus to Aristotle?]

Respecting the character of his youth, there existed, even in
antiquity, different accounts. We learn that he lost his father and
mother while yet a youth, and that he came under the guardianship of
Proxenus, a native of Atarneus who had settled at Stageira. According
to one account, adopted apparently by the earliest witnesses
preserved to us,[3] he was at first an extravagant youth, spent much
of his paternal property, and then engaged himself to military
service; of which he soon became weary, and went back to Stageira,
turning to account the surgical building, apparatus, and medicines
left by his father as a medical practitioner. After some time, we
know not how long, he retired from this profession, shut up the
building, and devoted himself to rhetoric and philosophy. He then
went to Athens, and there entered himself in the school of Plato, at
the age of thirty.[4] The philosophical life was thus (if this
account be believed) a second choice, adopted comparatively late in
life.[5] The other account, depending also upon good witnesses,
represents him as having come to Athens and enlisted as pupil of
Plato, at the early age of seventeen or eighteen: it omits all
mention of an antecedent period, occupied by military service and a
tentative of medical profession.[6] In both the two narratives,
Aristotle appears as resident at Athens, and devoting himself to
rhetoric and philosophy, from some period before 360 B.C. down to the
death of Plato in 347 B.C.; though, according to the first of the two
narratives, he begins his philosophical career at a later age, while
his whole life occupied seventy years instead of sixty-two
years.

[Footnote 3: Epikurus and Timæus. [Greek: E)pi/kouros e)n tê=| peri\
e)pitêdeuma/tôn e)pistolê=|] (Eusebius, Præp. Ev. xv. 5)--Diogen. L.
x. 8; Ælian. V. H. v. 9.]

[Footnote 4: An author named Eumêlus (cited by Diogenes, v. 6, [Greek
e)n tê=| pe/mptê| tô=n i(storiô=n], but not otherwise known) stated
that Aristotle came to Plato at the age of thirty, and that he lived
altogether to seventy years of age, instead of sixty-three, as
Hermippus and Apollodorus affirmed. Eumêlus conceived Aristotle as
born in 392 B.C., and coming to Plato in 362 B.C. His chronological
data are in harmony with the statements of Epikurus and Timæus
respecting the early life of Aristotle. The [Greek: Bi/os A)nô/numos]
given by Ménage recognizes two distinct accounts as to the age at
which Aristotle died: one assigning to him 70 years, the other only
63.]

[Footnote 5: See the Fragments of Timæus in Didot, Fragmenta
Historicorum Græcorum, Fr. 70-74; also Aristokles, ap. Eusebium,
Præp. Evang. xv. 2; Diogenes, L. x. 8; Athenæus, viii. p. 354. Timæus
called Aristotle [Greek: _sophistê\n o)psimathê=_ kai\ misêto/n, kai\
to\ poluti/mêton i)atrei=on a)rti/ôs a)pokekeiko/ta]. The speaker in
Athenæus designates him as [Greek: o( pharmakopô/lês]. The terms used
by these writers are illtempered and unbecoming in regard to so great
a man as Aristotle; but this is irrelevant to the question, whether
they do not describe, in perverted colouring, some real features in
his earlier life, or whether there was not, at least, a chronological
basis of possibility for them. That no such features were noticed by
other enemies of Aristotle, such as Eubulides and Kephisodôrus, is a
reason as far as it goes for not believing them to be real, yet not
at all a conclusive reason; nor is the speaker in Athenæus exact when
he says that Epikurus is the _only_ witness, for we find Timæus
making the same statements. The [Greek: i)atrei=on] (see Antiphanes,
apud Polluc. iv. 183--Fragmenta Comic. cxxv., Meineke) of a Greek
physician (more properly we should call the [Greek: i)atro\s] _a
general practitioner and chemist_) was the repository of his
materials and the scene of his important operations; for many of
which instructions are given in the curious Hippokratic treatise
entitled [Greek: Kat' I)êtrei=on], vol. iii. pp. 262-337 of the
edition of M. Littré, who in his preface to the treatise, p. 265,
remarks about Aristotle:--"Il paraît qu'Aristote, qui était de
famille médicale, avoit renoncé à une officine de ce genre, d'une
grande valeur." Stahr speaks of this [Greek: i)atrei=on] as if
Aristotle had set up one _at Athens_ (Aristotelia, p. 38), which the
authorities do not assert; it was probably at Stageira. Ideler (Comm.
**ad Aristot. Meteorol. iv. 3, 16, p. 433) considers this story about
Aristotle's [Greek: i)atrei=on] to have been a fiction arising out of
various expressions in his writings about the preparation of
drugs--[Greek: ta\ pha/rmaka e(/psein], &c. I think this is
far-fetched. And when we find Aristokles rejecting the allegation
about the [Greek: i)atrei=on], by speaking of it as an [Greek:
a)/doxon i)atrei=on], we can admit neither the justice of the epithet
nor the ground of rejection.]

[Footnote 6: This account rested originally (so far as we know) upon
the statement of Hermippus (B.C. 220), and was adopted by Apollodôrus
in his Chronology (B.C. 150), both of them good authorities, yet
neither of them so early as Epikurus and Timæus. Diogenes Laertius
and Dionysius of Halikarnassus alike follow Hermippus. Both the life
of Aristotle ascribed to Ammonius, and the Anonymous Life first
edited by Robbe (Leyden, 1861, p. 2), include the same strange
chronological blunder: they affirm Aristotle to have come to Athens
at the age of seventeen, and to have frequented the society of
_Sokrates_ (who had been dead more than thirty years) for three
years; then to have gone to Plato at the age of twenty. Zeller
imagines, and I think it likely, that Aristotle may have been for a
short time pupil with _Isokrates_, and that the story of his having
been pupil with _Sokrates_ has arisen from confusion of the two
names, which confusion has been seen on several occasions (Zeller,
Gesch. der Philos. der Griechen, ii. 2, p. 15.)]

During the interval, 367-360 B.C., Plato was much absent from Athens,
having paid two separate visits to Dionysius the younger at Syracuse.
The time which he spent there at each visit is not explicitly given;
but as far as we can conjecture from indirect allusions, it cannot
have been less than a year at each, and may possibly have been
longer. If, therefore, Aristotle reached Athens in 367 B.C. (as
Hermippus represents) he cannot have enjoyed continuous instructions
from Plato for the three or four years next ensuing.

However the facts may stand as to Aristotle's early life, there is no
doubt that in or before the year 362 B.C. he became resident at
Athens, and that he remained there, profiting by the society and
lectures of Plato, until the death of the latter in 347 B.C. Shortly
after the loss of his master, he quitted Athens, along with his
fellow-pupil Xenokrates, and went to Atarneus, which was at that time
ruled by the despot Hermeias. That despot was a remarkable man, who
being a eunuch through bodily hurt when a child, and having become
slave of a prior despot named Eubulus, had contrived to succeed him
in the supreme power, and governed the towns of Atarneus and Assos
with firmness and energy. Hermeias had been at Athens, had heard
Plato's lectures, and had contracted friendship with Aristotle; which
friendship became farther cemented by the marriage of Aristotle,
during his residence at Atarneus, with Pythias the niece of
Hermeias.[7] For three years Aristotle and Xenokrates remained at
Assos or Atarneus, whence they were then forced to escape by reason
of the despot's death; for Mentor the Rhodian, general of the
Persians in those regions, decoyed Hermeias out of the town under
pretence of a diplomatic negociation, then perfidiously seized him,
and sent him up as prisoner to the Persian king, by whose order he
was hanged. Mentor at the same time seized the two towns and other
possessions of Hermeias,[8] while Aristotle with his wife retired to
Mitylene. His deep grief for the fate of Hermeias was testified in a
noble hymn or pæan which he composed, and which still remains, as
well as by an epigram inscribed on the statue of Hermeias at Delphi.
We do not hear of his going elsewhere, until, two or three years
afterwards (the exact date is differently reported), he was invited
by Philip into Macedonia, to become preceptor to the young prince
Alexander, then thirteen or fourteen years old. The reputation, which
Aristotle himself had by this time established, doubtless coincided
with the recollection of his father Nikomachus as physician and
friend of Amyntas, in determining Philip to such a choice. Aristotle
performed the duties required from him,[9] enjoying the confidence
and favour both of Philip and Alexander, until the assassination of
the former and the accession of the latter in 336 B.C. His principle
residence during this period was in Macedonia, but he paid occasional
visits to Athens, and allusion is made to certain diplomatic services
which he rendered to the Athenians at the court of Philip; moreover
he must have spent some time at his native city Stageira,[10] which
had been among the many Greek cities captured and ruined by Philip
during the Olynthian war of 349-347 B.C. Having obtained the consent
and authority of Philip, Aristotle repaired to Stageira for the
purpose of directing the re-establishment of the city. Recalling such
of its dispersed inhabitants as could be collected, either out of the
neighbouring villages or from more distant parts, he is said to have
drawn up laws, or framed regulations for the returned citizens, and
new comers. He had reason to complain of various rivals who intrigued
against him, gave him much trouble, and obstructed the complete
renovation of the city; but, notwithstanding, his services were such
that an annual festival was instituted to commemorate them.[11] It is
farther stated, that at some time during this period he had a school
(analogous to the Academy at Athens) in the Nymphæum of the place
called Mieza; where stone seats and shady walks, ennobled by the name
of Aristotle, were still shown even in the days of Plutarch.[12]

[Footnote 7: Strabo, xiii. 610; Diodor. xvi. 52. It appears that
Aristotle incurred censure, even from contemporary rivals, for this
marriage with Pythias. On what ground we cannot exactly make out
(Aristokles ap. Eusebium Præp. Ev. xv. 2), unless it be from her
relationship to Hermeias. She died long before Aristotle, but he
mentions her in his will in terms attesting the constant affection
which had reigned between them until her death. Aristotle thought it
right to reply to the censure in one of his letters to Antipater.
Aristokles (ap. Euseb. Præp. Ev. xv. 2) says that Aristotle did not
marry Pythias until after the death of Hermeias, when she was
compelled to save herself by flight, and was in distress and poverty.
Mr. Blakesley (Life of Aristotle, p. 36) and Oncken (Die Staatslehre
des Aristoteles, p. 158) concur in thinking that the departure of
Aristotle from Athens had nothing to do with the death of Plato, but
was determined by the capture of Olynthus, and by the fear and
dislike of Philip which that event engendered at Athens.

But the fact that Xenokrates left Athens along with Aristotle
disproves this supposition, and proves that the death of Plato was
the real cause.]

[Footnote 8: Diog. Laert. v. 7-8. Diodorus ascribes this proceeding
to Mentor the Rhodian: Strabo, to his brother Memnon. I think
Diodorus is right. A remarkable passage in the Magna Moralia (genuine
or spurious) of Aristotle, seems to me to identify the proceeding
with Mentor (Aristot. Magn. Mor. i. 35, p. 1197, b. 21; as also the
spurious second book of the OEkonomica, p. 1351, a. 33).]

[Footnote 9: It was probably during this period that Aristotle
introduced to Alexander his friend the rhetor Theodektês of Phasêlis.
Alexander took delight in the society of Theodektês, and testified
this feeling, when he conquered Phasêlis, by demonstrations of
affection and respect towards the statue of the rhetor, who had died
during the intervening years--[Greek: a)podidou\s timê\n tê=|
genome/nê| di' A)ristote/lên kai\ philosophi/an o(mili/a| pro\s to\n
a)/ndra] (Plutarch, Alex. c. 17).]

[Footnote 10: It is to this period of Aristotle's life that the
passage extracted from his letters in Demetrius (so-called [Greek:
peri\ E(rmênei/as]) refers. [Greek: ô(s A)ristote/lês phêsi/n--e)gô\
e)k me\n A)thênô=n ei)s Sta/geira ê)=lthon dia\ to\n basile/a to\n
me/gan, e)k de\ Stagei/rôn ei)s A)thê/nas dia\ to\n cheimô=na to\n
me/gan]--s. 29.

We shall hardly consider this double employment of the epithet
[Greek: **me/gan] as an instance of that success in epistolary style,
which Demetrius ascribes to Aristotle (s. 239); but the passage
proves Aristotle's visits both to Stageira and to Athens. The very
cold winters of the Chalkidic peninsula were severely felt by the
Greeks (Plato--Symposion, p. 220), and may well have served as motive
to Aristotle for going from Stageira to Athens.]

[Footnote 11: Ammonius, Vit. Aristot. See the curious statements
given by Dion Chrysostom, out of the epistles of Aristotle; Orat. ii.
p. 100, xlvii. p. 225, Reiske.

Respecting the allusions made in these statements to various persons
who were reluctant to return out of the separate villages into the
restored city, compare what Xenophon says about the [Greek:
dioi/kisis], and subsequent restitution, of Mantineia; Hellenica, v.
2, 1-8, vi. 5, 3-6.]

[Footnote 12: Plutarch, Alexander, c. 7. What Plutarch calls the
_Nymphæum_, is considered by Stahr (Aristotelia, i. p. 93 n.) to be
probably the same as what Pliny denominates the _Museum_ at Stageira
(N. H. xvi. c. 23); but Zeller (p. 23, n.), after Geier, holds that
Mieza lay S.W. of Pella, in Emathia, far from Stageira. Plutarch
seems to imply that Aristotle was established along with Alexander at
Meiza by Philip.

Compare, for these facts of the biography of Aristotle, Stahr,
Aristotelia, Part I., pp. 86-94, 103-106.

I conceive that it was during this residence in Macedonia and at
Pella, that Aristotle erected the cenotaph in honour of Hermeias,
which is so contemptuously derided by the Chian poet Theokritus in
his epigram, Diog. L. v. 11. The epigram is very severe on Aristotle,
for preferring Pella to the Academy as a residence; ascribing such
preference to the exigencies of an ungovernable stomach.]

In 336 B.C. Alexander became king of Macedonia, and his vast projects
for conquest, first of Persia, next of other peoples known and
unknown, left him no leisure for anything but military and imperial
occupations. It was in the ensuing year (335 B.C. when the
preparations for the Persian expedition were being completed, ready
for its execution in the following spring, that Aristotle transferred
his residence to Athens. The Platonic philosophical school in which
he had studied was now conducted by Xenokrates as Scholarch, having
passed at the death of Plato, in 347 B.C., to his nephew Speusippus,
and from the latter to Xenokrates in 339 B.C. Aristotle established
for himself a new and rival school on the eastern side of Athens, in
the gymnasium attached to the temple of Apollo Lykeius, and deriving
from thence the name by which it was commonly known--the Lykeium. In
that school, and in the garden adjoining, he continued to lecture or
teach, during the succeeding twelve years, comprising the life and
the brilliant conquests of Alexander. Much of his instruction is said
to have been given while walking in the garden, from whence the
students and the sect derived the title of Peripatetics. In the
business of his school and the composition of his works all his time
was occupied; and his scholars soon became so numerous that he found
it convenient to desire them to elect from themselves every ten days
a rector to maintain order, as Xenokrates had already done at the
Academy.[13] Aristotle farther maintained correspondence, not merely
with Alexander and Antipater but also with Themison, one of the
princes of Cyprus, as Isokrates had corresponded with Nikokles, and
Plato with Dionysius of Syracuse.[14]

[Footnote 13: Diog. L. v. 4. Brandis notes it as a feature in
Aristotle's character (p. 65), that he abstained from meddling with
public affairs at Athens. But we must remember, that, not being a
citizen of Athens, Aristotle was not competent to meddle personally.
His great and respected philosophical competitor, Xenokrates (a
non-citizen or metic as well as he), was so far from being in a
condition to meddle with public affairs, that he was once even
arrested for not having paid in due season his [Greek: metoi/kion],
or capitation-tax imposed upon metics. He was liberated, according
to one story, by Lykurgus (Plutarch, Vit. x. Oratt. p. 842);
according to another story (seemingly more probable), by Demetrius
Phalereus (Diog. La. iv. 14). The anonymous life of Aristotle
published by Robbe (Leyden, 1861, p. 3), takes due notice of
Aristotle's position at Athens as a metic.]

[Footnote 14: Aristotle addressed to Themison a composition now lost,
but well known in antiquity, called [Greek: Protreptiko/s]. It was
probably a dialogue; and was intended as an encouragement to the
study of philosophy. See Rose, Aristot. Pseud. pp. 69-72, who gives a
very interesting fragment of it out of Stobæus.

We have the titles of two lost works of Aristotle--[Greek: Peri\
Basilei/as], and [Greek: A)le/xandros, ê)\ u(pe\r a)poi/kôn] (or
[Greek: a)poikiô=n]). Both seem to have been dialogues. In one, or in
both, he gave advice to Alexander respecting the manner of ruling his
newly acquired empire in Asia; and respecting the relations proper to
be established between Hellenes and native Asiatics (see Rose, Arist.
Pseud. pp. 92-96; Bernays, Die Dialoge des Aristot. pp. 51-57).]

In June, 323 B.C., occurred the premature and unexpected decease of
the great Macedonian conqueror, aged 32 years and 8 months, by a
violent fever at Babylon. So vast was his power, and so unmeasured
his ambition, that the sudden removal of such a man operated as a
shock to the hopes and fears of almost every one, both in Greece and
Asia. It produced an entire change in the position of Aristotle at
Athens.

To understand what that position really was, we must look at it in
connection with his Macedonian sympathies, and with the
contemporaneous political sentiment at Athens. It was in the middle
of the year 335 B.C., that Alexander put down by force the revolt of
the Thebans, took their city by assault, demolished it altogether
(leaving nothing but the citadel called Kadmeia, occupied by a
Macedonian garrison), and divided its territory between two other
Boeotian towns. Immediately after that terror-striking act, he
demanded from the Athenians (who had sympathized warmly with Thebes,
though without overt acts of assistance) the surrender of their
principal anti-Macedonian politicians. That demand having been
refused, he at first prepared to extort compliance at the point of
the sword, but was persuaded, not without difficulty, to renounce
such intention, and to be content with the voluntary exile of
Ephialtes and Charidemus from Athens. Though the unanimous vote of
the Grecian Synod at Corinth constituted him Imperator, there can be
no doubt that the prevalent sentiment in Greece towards him was that
of fear and dislike; especially among the Athenians, whose dignity
was most deeply mortified, and to whom the restriction of free speech
was the most painful.[15]

[Footnote 15: See History of Greece, chap. xci. pp. 18, 41, 64.]

Now it was just at this moment (in 335 B.C.) that Aristotle came to
Athens and opened his school. We cannot doubt that he was already
known and esteemed as the author of various published writings. But
the prominent mark by which every one now distinguished him, was,
that he had been for several years confidential preceptor of
Alexander, and was still more or less consulted by that prince, as
well as sustained by the friendship of Antipater, viceroy of
Macedonia during the king's absence. Aristotle was regarded as
philo-Macedonian, and to a certain extent, anti-Hellenic--the
sentiment expressed towards him in the unfriendly epigram of the
contemporary Chian poet Theokritus.[16] His new school, originally
opened under the protection and patronage of Alexander and Antipater,
continued to be associated with their names, by that large proportion
of Athenian citizens who held anti-Macedonian sentiments. Alexander
caused the statue of Aristotle to be erected in Athens,[17] and sent
to him continual presents of money, usefully employed by the
philosopher in the prosecution of his physical and zoological
researches,[18] as well as in the purchase of books. Moreover,
Aristotle remained in constant and friendly correspondence with
Antipater, the resident viceroy at Pella,[19] during the absence of
Alexander in Asia. Letters of recommendation from Aristotle to the
Macedonian rulers were often given and found useful: several of them
were preserved and published afterwards. There is even reason to
believe that the son of Antipater--Kassander, afterwards viceroy or
king of Macedonia, was among his pupils.[20]

[Footnote 16: Diog. L. v. 11.

  [Greek: E(rmi/ou eu)nou/chou ê)/d' Eu)bou/lou a(/ma dou/lou
    Sê=ma keno\n keno/phrôn teu=xen A)ristote/lês;
  O(\s dia\ tê\n a)kratê= gastro\s phu/sin ei)/leto nai/ein
    A)nt' A)kadêmei/as Borbo/rou e)n prochoai=s.]

Cf. Plutarch, De Exilio, p. 603.]

[Footnote 17: Stahr, Aristotelia, vol. ii. p. 290.]

[Footnote 18: Athenæus, ix. 398; Pliny, H. N. viii. c. 16. Athenæus
alludes to 800 talents as having been given by Alexander to Aristotle
for this purpose. Pliny tells us that Alexander put thousands of men
at his service for enquiry and investigation. The general fact is all
that we can state with confidence, without pretending to verify
amounts.]

[Footnote 19: Vit. Aristotelis, Leyden, 1861, Robbe, pp. 4-6;
Aristokles ap. Eusebium Præp. Evang. xv. 2. Respecting the Epistles
of Aristotle, and the collection thereof by Artemon, see Rose,
Aristoteles Pseudepigr. pp. 594-598.]

[Footnote 20: We may infer this fact from the insulting reply made by
Alexander, not long before his death, to Kassander, who had just then
joined him for the first time at Babylon, having been sent by
Antipater at the head of a reinforcement. Some recent comers from
Greece complained to Alexander of having been ill-used by Antipater.
Kassander being present at the complaint, endeavoured to justify his
father and to invalidate their testimony, upon which Alexander
silenced him by the remark that he was giving a specimen of
sophistical duplicity learnt from Aristotle. [Greek: Tau=ta e)kei=na
sophi/smata tô=n A)ristote/lous ei)s e(ka/teron tô=n lo/gôn,
oi)môxome/nôn, a)\n kai\ mikro\n a)dikou=ntes tou\s a)nthrô/pous
phanê=te] (Plutarch, Alex. 74).]

I have recounted elsewhere how the character of Alexander became
gradually corrupted by unexampled success and Asiatic influences;[21]
how he thus came to feel less affection and esteem for Aristotle, to
whom he well knew that his newly acquired imperial and semi-divine
pretensions were not likely to be acceptable; how, on occasion of the
cruel sentence passed on Kallisthenes, he threatened even to punish
Aristotle himself, as having recommended Kallisthenes, and as
sympathizing with the same free spirit; lastly, how Alexander became
more or less alienated, not only from the society of Hellenic
citizens, but even from his faithful viceroy, the Macedonian
Antipater. But these changed relations between Aristotle and
Alexander did not come before the notice of the Athenians, nor alter
the point of view in which they regarded the philosopher; the rather,
since the relations of Aristotle with Antipater continued as intimate
as ever.

[Footnote 21: Histor. of Greece, ch. xciv. pp. 291, 301, 341;
Plutarch, Alexand. c. lv.; Dion Chrysostom. Orat. 64, p. 338,
Reiske.]

It will thus appear, that though all the preserved writings of
Aristotle are imbued with a thoroughly independent spirit of
theorizing contemplation and lettered industry, uncorrupted by any
servility or political bias--yet his position during the twelve years
between 335-323 B.C. inevitably presented him to the Athenians as the
macedonizing philosopher, parallel with Phokion as the macedonizing
politician, and in pointed antithesis to Xenokrates at the Academy,
who was attached to the democratical constitution, and refused kingly
presents. Besides that enmity which he was sure to incur, as an acute
and self-thinking philosopher, from theology and the other
anti-philosophical veins in the minds of ordinary men, Aristotle thus
became the object of unfriendly sentiment from many Athenian
patriots,[22] who considered the school of Plato generally as hostile
to popular liberty, and who had before their eyes examples of
individual Platonists, ruling their respective cities with a sceptre
forcibly usurped.[23]

[Footnote 22: The statement of Aristokles (ap. Eusebium, Præp. Ev.
xv. 2) is doubtless just--[Greek: phanero\n ou)=n, o(/ti katha/per
polloi=s kai\ a)/llois, ou(/tô kai\ A)ristote/lei sune/bê, dia/ te
ta\s pro\s tou\s basilei=s phili/as kai\ dia\ tê\n e)n toi=s lo/gois
u(perochê/n, u(po\ tô=n to/te sophistô=n phthonei=sthai.] The like is
said by the rhetor Aristeides--Or. xii. p. 144, Dindorf. I have
already observed that the phrase of "Halbgrieche" applied by Bernays
and W. v. Humboldt to Aristotle (Bernays, Die Dialoge des
Aristoteles, p. 2, p. 134) is not accurate literally, unless we
choose to treat all the Hellenic colonies as half-Greek. His ancestry
was on both sides fully Hellenic. But it is true of him, in the same
metaphorical sense in which it is true of Phokion. Aristotle was
semi-Macedonian in his sympathies. He had no attachment to Hellas as
an organized system autonomous, self-acting, with an Hellenic city as
president: which attachment would have been considered, by Perikles,
Archidamus, and Epameinondas, as one among the constituents
indispensable to Hellenic patriotism.]

[Footnote 23: Quintilian--Declamat. 268. "Quis ignorat, ex ipsâ
Socratis (quo velut fonte omnis philosophia manasse creditur) scholâ
evasisse tyrannos et hostes patriæ suæ?" Compare Athenæus, xi.
508-509.]

Such sentiment was probably aggravated by the unparalleled and
offensive Macedonian demonstration at the Olympic festival of 324
B.C. It was on that occasion that Alexander, about one year prior to
his decease, sent down a formal rescript, which was read publicly to
the assembled crowd by a herald with loud voice; ordering every
Grecian city to recall all exiles who had been banished by judicial
sentence, and intimating, that if the rescript were not obeyed
spontaneously, Antipater would be instructed to compel the execution
of it by force. A large number of the exiles whose restitution was
thus ordered, were present on the plain of Olympia, and heard the
order proclaimed, doubtless with undisguised triumph and exultation.
So much the keener must have been the disgust and humiliation among
the other Grecian hearers, who saw the autonomy of each separate city
violently trampled down, without even the pretence of enquiry, by
this high-handed sentence of the Macedonian conqueror. Among the
Athenians especially, the resentment felt was profound; and a vote
was passed appointing deputies to visit Alexander in person, for the
purpose of remonstrating against it. The orator Demosthenes, who
happened to be named Archi-Theôrus of Athens (chief of the solemn
legation sent to represent Athens) at this Olympic festival, incurred
severe reproach from his accuser Deinarchus, for having even been
seen in personal conversation with the Macedonian officer who had
arrived from Asia as bearer of this odious rescript.[24]

[Footnote 24: See the description of this event in History of Greece,
ch. xcv. p. 416.

There is reason for supposing that Hypereides also (as well as
Deinarchus) inveighed against Demosthenes for having publicly sought
the company of Nikanor at this Olympic festival. At least we know
that Hypereides, in his oration against Demosthenes, made express
allusion to Nikanor. See Harpokration _v._ [Greek: Nika/nôr].

The exordium prefixed to the Pseud-Aristotelian Rhetorica ad
Alexandrum, announces that discourse to have been composed pursuant
to the desire of Alexander; and notices especially one message
transmitted by him to Aristotle through Nikanor (p. 1420 a. 6, 1421
a. 26-38, [Greek: katha/per ê(mi=n e)dê/lôse Nika/nôr], &c.).]

Now it happened that this officer, the bearer of the rescript, was
Nikanor of Stageira;[25] son of Proxenus who had been Aristotle's
early guardian, and himself the cherished friend or ward, ultimately
the son-in-law, of the philosopher. We may be certain that Aristotle
would gladly embrace the opportunity of seeing again this attached
friend, returning after a long absence on service in Asia; that he
would be present with him at the Olympic festival, perhaps receive a
visit from him at Athens also. And the unpopularity of Aristotle at
Athens, as identified with Macedonian imperial authority, would thus
be aggravated by his notorious personal alliance with his
fellow-citizen Nikanor, the bearer of that rescript in which such
authority had been most odiously manifested.

[Footnote 25: Diodor. xviii. 8. [Greek: dio/per u(pogu/ôn o)/ntôn
tô=n O)lumpi/ôn e)xe/pempsen] (Alexander) [Greek: ei)s tê\n E(lla/da
Nika/nora to\n Stageiri/tên, dou\s e)pistolê\n peri\ tê=s katho/dou.]

Antipater, when re-distributing the satrapies of the Macedonian
empire, after the death both of Alexander and of Perdikkas, appointed
Nikanor prefect or satrap of Kappadokia (Arrian, [Greek: Ta\ meta\
A)le/xandron], apud Photium, cod. 92, s.37, Didot).

Ammonius, in the life of Aristotle, mentions Nikanor as son of
Proxenus of Atarneus. Sextus Empiricus alludes to Nikanor as
son-in-law of Aristotle (adv. Mathematicos, sect. 258. p. 271, Fabr.).
See Ménage ad Diogen. Laert. v. 12. Robbe's Life of Aristotle also
(Leyden, 1861, p. 2) mentions Nikanor as son of Proxenus.

Nikanor was appointed afterwards (in 318 B.C., five years later than
the death of Aristotle) by Kassander, son of Antipater, to be
commander of the Macedonian garrison which occupied Munychia, as a
controlling force over Athens (Diodor. xviii. 64). It will be seen in
my History of Greece (ch. xcvi. p. 458) that Kassander was at that
moment playing a difficult game, his father Antipater being just
dead; that he could only get possession of Munychia by artifice, and
that it was important for him to entrust the mission to an officer
who already had connections at Athens; that Nikanor, as adopted son
of Aristotle, possessed probably beforehand acquaintance with Phokion
and the other macedonizing leaders at Athens; so that the ready way
in which Phokion now fell into co-operation with him is the more
easily explained.

Nikanor, however, was put to death by Kassander himself, some months
afterwards.]

During the twelve or thirteen years[26] of Aristotle's teaching and
Alexander's reign, Athens was administered by macedonizing citizens,
with Phokion and Demades at their head. Under such circumstances, the
enmity of those who hated the imperial philosopher could not pass
into act; nor was it within the contemplation of any one, that only
one year after that rescript which insulted the great Pan-Hellenic
festival, the illustrious conqueror who issued it would die of fever,
in the vigour of his age and at the height of his power (June, 323
B.C.). But as soon as the news of his decease, coming by surprise
both on friends and enemies, became confirmed, the suppressed
anti-Macedonian sentiment burst forth in powerful tide, not merely at
Athens, but also throughout other parts of Greece. There resulted
that struggle against Antipater, known as the Lamian war:[27] a
gallant struggle, at first promising well, but too soon put down by
superior force, and ending in the occupation of Athens by Antipater
with a Macedonian garrison in September, 322 B.C., as well as in the
extinction of free speech and free citizenship by the suicide of
Demosthenes and the execution of Hypereides.

[Footnote 26: There remain small fragments of an oration of Demades
in defence of his administration, or political activity, for twelve
years--[Greek: u(pe\r tê=s dôdekaeti/as] (Demad. Fragm. 179, 32). The
twelve years of Demades, however, seem to be counted from the battle
of Chæroneia in 338 B.C.; so that they end in B.C. 326. See Clinton,
Fast. Hellen. B.C. 326.]

[Footnote 27: For the account of the Lamian war, see History of
Greece, ch. xcv. pp. 420-440. As to the **anti-Macedonian sentiment
prevalent at Athens, see Diodorus, xviii. 10.]

During the year immediately succeeding the death of Alexander, the
anti-Macedonian sentiment continued so vehemently preponderant at
Athens, that several of the leading citizens, friends of Phokion,
left the city to join Antipater, though Phokion himself remained,
opposing ineffectually the movement. It was during this period that
the enemies of Aristotle found a favourable opportunity for assailing
him. An indictment on the score of impiety was preferred against him
by Eurymedon the Hierophant (chief priest of the Eleusinian Demeter),
aided by Demophilus, son of the historian Ephorus. The Hymn or Pæan
(still existing), which Aristotle had composed in commemoration of
the death, and in praise of the character, of the eunuch
Hermeias,[28] was arraigned as a mark of impiety; besides which
Aristotle had erected at Delphi a statue of Hermeias with an
honorific inscription, and was even alleged to have offered
sacrifices to him as to a god. In the published writings of
Aristotle, too, the accusers found various heretical doctrines,
suitable for sustaining their indictment; as, for example, the
declaration that prayer and sacrifices to the gods were of no
avail.[29] But there can be little doubt that the Hymn, Ode, or Pæan,
in honour of Hermeias, would be more offensive to the feelings of an
ordinary Athenian than any philosophical dogma extracted from the
cautious prose compositions of Aristotle. It is a hymn, of noble
thought and dignified measure, addressed to Virtue ([Greek:
A)retê\]--masculine or military Virtue), in which are extolled the
semi-divine or heroic persons who had fought, endured, and perished
in her service. The name and exploits of Hermeias are here introduced
as the closing parallel and example in a list beginning with Hêraklês,
the Dioskûri, Achilles, and Ajax. Now the poet Kallistratus, in his
memorable Skolion, offers a like compliment to Harmodius and
Aristogeiton; and Pindar, to several free Greeks of noble family, who
paid highly for his epinician Odes now remaining. But all the persons
thus complimented were such as had gained prizes at the sacred
festivals, or had distinguished themselves in other ways which the
public were predisposed to honour; whereas Hermeias was a eunuch, who
began by being a slave, and ended by becoming despot over a free
Grecian community, without any exploit conspicuous to the eye. To
many of the Athenian public it would seem insult, and even impiety,
to couple Hermeias with the greatest personages of Hellenic
mythology, as a successful competitor for heroic honours. We need
only read the invective of Claudian against Eutropius, to appreciate
the incredible bitterness of indignation and contempt, which was
suggested by the spectacle of a eunuch and a slave exercising high
public functions.[30] And the character of a despot was, to the
anti-macedonizing Athenians, hardly less odious than either of the
others combined with it in Hermeias.

[Footnote 28: Diogen. L. v. 5; Athenæus, xv. 696. The name of
Demophilus was mentioned by Favorinus as also subscribed to the
indictment: this Demophilus was probably son of the historian
Ephorus. See Val. Rose, Aristoteles Pseudepigraphus, p. 582. He took
part afterwards in the indictment against Phokion. As an historian,
he completed the narrative of the Sacred War, which his father
Ephorus had left unfinished (Diodor. xvi. 14). The words of Athenæus,
as far as I can understand them, seem to imply that he composed a
speech for the Hierophant Eurymedon.]

[Footnote 29: See the passages from Origen advers. Celsum, cited in
Stahr's Aristotelia, vol. i. p. 146.

Among the titles of the lost works of Aristotle (No. 14 in the
Catalogue of Diogenes Laertius, No. 9 in that of the Anonymous; see
Rose, Aristoteles Pseudepigraphus, pp. 12-18), one is [Greek: Peri\
Eu)chê=s]. From its position in the Catalogue, it seems plainly to
have been a dialogue; and the dialogues were the most popular and
best-known writings of Aristotle. Now we know from the Nikomach.
Ethica (x. 8, 1178, b. 6-32) that Aristotle declared all constructive
effort, and all action with a view to external ends, to be
inconsistent with the Divine Nature, which was blest exclusively in
theorizing and contemplation. If he advocated the same doctrine in
the dialogue [Greek: Peri\ Eu)chê=s], he must have contended that
persons praying could have no additional chance of obtaining the
benefits which they prayed for; and this would have placed him in
conflict with the received opinions.

Respecting the dialogue [Greek: Peri\ Eu)chê=s], see Bernays, Die
Dialoge des Aristoteles, pp. 120-122; and Rose, Arist. Pseudepigr.
pp. 67, 68.]

[Footnote 30: "Omnia cesserunt, eunucho consule, monstra:" this is
among the bitter lines of Claudian, too numerous to cite; but they
well deserve to be read in the original. Compare also, about the
ancient sentiment towards eunuchs, Herodotus, viii. 106; Xenophon,
Cyropæd. viii. 3. 15.

Apellikon thought it worth while to compose a special treatise, for
the purpose of vindicating Aristotle from the aspersions circulated
in regard to his relations with Hermeias. Aristokles speaks of the
vindication as successful (ap. Euseb. P. E. xv. 2).]

Taking these particulars into account, we shall see that a charge
thus sustained, when preferred by a venerable priest, during the
prevalence of strong anti-Macedonian feeling, against a notorious
friend of Antipater and Nikanor, was quite sufficient to alarm the
prudence of the accused. Aristotle bowed to the storm (if indeed he
had not already left Athens, along with other philo-Macedonians) and
retired to Chalkis (in Euboea),[31] then under garrison by Antipater.
An accused person at Athens had always the option of leaving the
city, at any time before the day of trial; Sokrates might have
retired, and obtained personal security in the same manner, if he had
chosen to do so. Aristotle must have been served, of course, with due
notice: and according to Athenian custom, the indictment would be
brought into court in his absence, as if he had been present; various
accusers, among them Demochares,[32] the nephew of Demosthenes, would
probably speak in support of it; and Aristotle must been found guilty
in his absence. But there is no ground for believing that he intended
to abandon Athens, and live at Chalkis, permanently; the rather,
inasmuch as he seems to have left not only his school, but his
library, at Athens under the charge of Theophrastus. Aristotle knew
that the Macedonian chiefs would not forego supremacy over Greece
without a struggle; and, being in personal correspondence with
Antipater himself, he would receive direct assurance of this
resolution, if assurance were needed. In a question of military
force, Aristotle probably felt satisfied that Macedonian arms must
prevail; after which the affairs of Athens would be again
administered, at least in the same spirit, as they had been before
Alexander's death, if not with more complete servility. He would then
have returned thither to resume his school, in competition with that
of Plato under Xenokrates at the Academy; for he must have been well
aware that the reputation of Athens, as central hearth of Hellenic
letters and philosophy, could not be transferred to Chalkis or to any
other city.[33]

[Footnote 31: That Chalkis was among the Grecian towns then occupied
by a Macedonian garrison is the statement of Brandis (Entwickelungen
der Griechischen Philosophie, i. p. 391, 1862). Though I find no
direct authority for this statement, I adopt it as probable in the
highest degree.]

[Footnote 32: Aristokles (ap. Eusebium Præp. Ev. xv. 2) takes notice
of the allegations of Demochares against Aristotle: That letters of
Aristotle had been detected or captured ([Greek: a(lô=nai]), giving
information injurious to Athens: That Aristotle had betrayed Stageira
to Philip: That when Philip, after the capture of Olynthus, was
selling into slavery the Olynthian prisoners, Aristotle was present
at the auction ([Greek: e)pi\ tou= laphuropôlei/ou]), and pointed out
to him which among the prisoners were men of the largest property.

We do not know upon what foundation of fact (if upon any) these
allegations were advanced by a contemporary orator. But they are
curious, as illustrating the view taken of Aristotle by his enemies.
They must have been delivered as parts of one of the accusatory
speeches on Aristotle's trial _par contumace_: for this was the
earliest occasion on which Aristotle's enemies had the opportunity of
publicly proclaiming their antipathy against him, and they would
hardly omit to avail themselves of it. The Hierophant, the principal
accuser, would be supported by other speakers following him; just as
Melêtus, the accuser of Sokrates, was supported by Anytus and Lykon.
The [Greek: i(stori/ai] of Demochares were not composed until
seventeen years after this epoch--certainly not earlier than 306
B.C.--sixteen years after the death of Aristotle, when his character
was not prominently before the public. Nevertheless Demochares may
possibly have included these accusatory allegations against the
philosopher in his [Greek: i(stori/ai], as well as in his published
speech. His invectives against Antipater, and the friends of
Antipater, were numerous and bitter:--Polybius. xii. 13, 9; Cicero,
Brutus, 83; compare Democharis Fragmenta, in Didot's Fragm.
Historicorum Græcorum, vol. ii. p. 448. Philôn, who indicted
Sophokles (under the [Greek: graphê\ parano/môn]) for the law which
the latter had proposed in 306 B.C. against the philosophers at
Athens, had been a friend of Aristotle, [Greek: A)ristote/lous
gnô/rimos]. Athenæus, xiii. 610.]

[Footnote 33: We may apply here the same remark that Dionysius makes
about Deinarchus as a speech-maker; when Deinarchus retired to
Chalkis, no one would send to Chalkis for a speech: [Greek: Ou) ga\r
ei)s Chalki/da a)/n tines e)/pleon lo/gôn cha/rin, ê)\ i)di/ôn, ê)\
dêmosi/ôn; ou) ga\r te/leon ê)po/roun ou(/tô lo/gôn.] Dionys. Halic.
Dinar. p. 639.]

This is what would probably have occurred, when the Lamian war was
finished and the Macedonian garrison installed at Athens, in Sept.
322 B.C.--had Aristotle's life lasted longer. But in or about that
very period, a little before the death of Demosthenes, he died at
Chalkis of illness; having for some time been troubled with
indigestion and weakness of stomach.[34] The assertion of Eumêlus and
others that he took poison, appears a mere fiction suggested by the
analogy of Sokrates.[35] One of his latest compositions was a defence
of himself against the charge of impiety, and against the allegations
of his accusers (as reported to him, or published) in support of it.
A sentence of this defence remains,[36] wherein he points out the
inconsistency of his accusers in affirming that he intended to honour
Hermeias as an immortal, while he had notoriously erected a tomb, and
had celebrated funeral ceremonies to him as a mortal. And in a letter
to Antipater, he said (among other things) that Athens was a
desirable residence, but that the prevalence of sycophancy or false
accusation was a sad drawback to its value; moreover that he had
retired to Chalkis, in order that the Athenians might not have the
opportunity of sinning a second time against philosophy, as they had
already done once, in the person of Sokrates.[37] In the same or
another letter to Antipater, he adverted to an honorific tribute
which had been voted to him at Delphi before the death of Alexander,
but the vote for which had been since rescinded. He intimated that
this disappointment was not indifferent to him, yet at the same time
no serious annoyance.[38]

[Footnote 34: Censorinus, De Die Natali--Ménage ad Diogen. Laert. v.
16.]

[Footnote 35: Diogenes L. however (v. 8) gave credit to this story,
as we may see by his Epigram.]

[Footnote 36: Athenæus xv. p. 696, 697. Probably this reply of
Aristotle (though Zeller, p. 33, declares it to be spurious, in my
judgment very gratuitously), may have been suited to the words of the
speech (not preserved to us) which it was intended to answer. But the
reply does not meet what I conceive to have been the real feeling in
the minds of those who originated the charge. The logical
inconsistency which he points out did not appear an inconsistency to
Greeks generally. Aristotle had rendered to the deceased Hermeias the
same honours (though less magnificent in degree) as Alexander to the
deceased Hephæstion, and the Amphipolitans to the deceased Brasidas
(Thucyd. v. 11; Aristotel. Ethic. Nikom. v. 7. 1). In both these
cases a tomb was erected to the deceased, implying mortality; and
permanent sacrifices were offered to him, implying immortality: yet
these two proceedings did not appear to involve any logical
contradiction, in the eyes of the worshippers. That which offended
the Athenians, really, in the case of Aristotle, was the
worthlessness of Hermeias, to whom he rendered these prodigious
honours--eunuch, slave, and despot; an assemblage of what they
considered mean attributes. The solemn measure and character of a
Pæan was disgraced by being applied to such a vile person.]

[Footnote 37: Ammonius, Vit. Aristotelis, p. 48, in Buhle's Aristot.
vol. i.; Ménage ad Diog. Laert. v. 5, with the passage from Origen
(adv. Celsum) there cited; Ælian, V. H. iii. 36.

We learn from Diogenes that Theophrastus was indicted for impiety by
Agnonides; but such was the esteem in which Theophrastus was held,
that the indictment utterly failed; and Agnonides was very near
incurring the fine which every accuser had to pay, if he did not
obtain one-fifth of the suffrages of the Dikasts (Diog. L. v. 37).
Now Agnonides comes forward principally as the vehement accuser of
Phokion four years after the death of Aristotle, during the few
months of democratical reaction brought about by the edicts and
interference of Polysperchon (318 B.C.) after the death of Antipater
(History of Greece, ch. xcvi. p. 477). Agnonides must have felt
himself encouraged by what had happened five years before with
Aristotle, to think that he would succeed in a similar charge against
Theophrastus. But Theophrastus was personally esteemed; he was not
intimately allied with Antipater, or directly protected by him;
moreover, he had composed no hymn to a person like Hermeias.
Accordingly, the indictment recoiled upon the accuser himself.]

[Footnote 38: Ælian, V. H. xiv. 1. [Greek: A)ristote/lês, e)pei/ tis
au)tou= a)phei/leto ta\s psêphisthei/sas e)n Delphoi=s tima/s,
e)piste/llôn pro\s A)nti/patron peri\ tou/tôn, phêsi/n--U(pe\r tô=n
e)n Delphoi=s psêphisthe/ntôn moi, kai\ ô(=n a)phê/|rêmai nu=n,
ou(/tôs e)/chô ô(s mê/te moi spho/dra me/lein au)tô=n, mê/te moi
mêde\n me/lein.] The statue of Aristotle at Athens was before the
eyes of Alexander of Aphrodisias about A.D. 200. See Zumpt,
Scholarchen zu Athen, p. 74.]

In regard to the person and habits of Aristotle, we are informed that
he had thin legs and small eyes; that in speech he was somewhat
lisping; that his attire was elegant and even showy; that his table
was well-served--according to his enemies, luxurious above the
measure of philosophy. His pleasing and persuasive manners are
especially attested by Antipater, in a letter, apparently of marked
sympathy and esteem, written shortly after the philosopher's
death.[39] He was deeply attached to his wife Pythias, by whom he had
a daughter who bore the same name. His wife having died after some
years, he then re-married with a woman of Stageira, named Herpyllis,
who bore him a son called Nikomachus. Herpyllis lived with him until
his death; and the constant as well as reciprocal attachment between
them is attested by his last will.[40] At the time of his death, his
daughter Pythias had not yet attained marriageable age; Nikomachus
was probably a child.

[Footnote 39: Plutarch--Alkibiad. et Coriolan. Comp. c. 3; Aristeid.
cum Caton. maj. Comp. c. 2. The accusation of luxury and dainty
feeding was urged against him by his contemporary assailant
Kephisodorus (Eusebius, Pr. Ev. xv. 2); according to some statements,
by Plato also, Ælian, V. H. iii. 19. Contrast the epigram of the
contemporary poet Theokritus of Chios, who censures Aristotle [Greek:
dia\ tê\n a)kratê= gastro\s phu/sin], with the satirical drama of the
poet Lykophron (ap. Athenæum, ii. p. 55), in which he derided the
suppers of philosophers, for their coarse and unattractive food:
compare the verses of Antiphanes, ap. Athenæ. iii. p. 98 F.; and
Diog. L. vii. 27; Timæus ap. Athenæum, viii. 342. The lines of
Antiphanes ap. Athenæ. iv. 1346, seem to apply to Aristotle,
notwithstanding Meineke's remarks, p. 59.]

[Footnote 40: Diog. L. v. 1, 13; Aristokles ap. Euseb. Pr. Ev. xv.
2.]

The will or testament of the philosopher is preserved.[41] Its first
words constitute Antipater his general executor in the most
comprehensive terms,[42] words well calculated to ensure that his
directions should be really carried into effect; since not only was
Antipater now the supreme potentate, but Nikanor, the chief
beneficiary under the will, was in his service and dependent on his
orders. Aristotle then proceeds to declare that Nikanor shall become
his son-in-law, by marriage with his daughter Pythias as soon as she
shall attain suitable age; also, his general heir, subject to certain
particular bequests and directions, and the guardian of his infant
son Nikomachus. Nikanor being at that time on service, and perhaps in
Asia, Aristotle directs that four friends (named Aristomenes,
Timarchus, Hipparchus, Diotelês) shall take provisional care of
Herpyllis, his two children, and his effects, until Nikanor can
appear and act: Theophrastus is to be conjoined with these four if he
chooses, and if circumstances permit him.[43] The daughter Pythias,
when she attains suitable age, is to become the wife of Nikanor, who
will take the best care both of her and her son Nikomachus, being in
the joint relation of father and brother to them.[44] If Pythias
shall die, either before the marriage or after it, but without
leaving offspring, Nikanor shall have discretion to make such
arrangements as may be honourable both for himself and for the
testator respecting Nikomachus and the estate generally. In case of
the death of Nikanor himself, either before the marriage or without
offspring, any directions given by him shall be observed; but
Theophrastus shall be entitled, if he chooses, to become the husband
of Pythias, and if Theophrastus does not choose, then the executors
along with Antipater shall determine what they think best both for
her and for Nikomachus.[45] The will then proceeds as follows:--"The
executors (here Antipater is not called in to co-operate) with
Nikanor, in faithful memory of me and of the steady affection of
Herpyllis towards me, shall take good care of her in every way, but
especially if she desires to be married, in giving her away to one
not unworthy of me. They shall assign to her, besides what she has
already received, a talent of silver, and three female slaves chosen
by herself, out of the property, together with the young girl and the
Pyrrhæan slave now attached to her person. If she prefers to reside
at Chalkis, she may occupy the lodging near the garden; if at
Stageira, she may live at my paternal house. Whichever of the two she
may prefer, the executors shall provide it with all such articles of
furniture as they deem sufficient for her comfort and dignity."[46]

[Footnote 41: Diog. L. v. 11. [Greek: E)/stai men eu)=; e)a\n de/ ti
sumbai/nê|, ta/de die/theto A)ristote/lês; e)pi/tropon me\n ei)=nai
pa/ntôn kai\ dia\ panto\s A)nti/patron], &c. The testament of
Aristotle was known to Hermippus (Athenæus, xiii. p. 589) about a
century later than Aristotle, and the most ancient known authority
respecting the facts of his life. Stahr (Aristotelia, vol. i. 159)
and Brandis (Arist. p. 62) suppose that what Diogenes gives is only
an extract from the will; since nothing is said about the library,
and Aristotle would not omit to direct what should be done with a
library which he so much valued. But to this I reply, that there was
no necessity for his making any provision about the library; he had
left it at Athens along with his school, in the care of Theophrastus.
He wished it to remain there, and probably considered it as an
appendage to the school; and it naturally would remain there, if he
said nothing about it in his testament. We must remember (as I have
already intimated) that when Aristotle left Athens, he only
contemplated being absent for a time; and intended to come back and
resume his school, when Macedonian supremacy should be
re-established.]

[Footnote 42: Pausanias (vi. 4, 5) describes a statue of Aristotle
which he saw at Olympia: the fact by which Aristotle was best known
both to him and to the guides, seems to have been the friendship
first of Alexander, next of Antipater.]

[Footnote 43: Diog. L. v. 12. [Greek: e(/ôs d' a)\n Nika/nôr
katala/bê|, e)pimelei=sthai A)ristome/nên, Ti/marchon, I(/pparchon,
Diote/lên, Theo/phraston, e)a\n bou/lêtai kai\ e)nde/chêtai au)tô=|,
tô=n te paidi/ôn kai\ E(rpulli/dos kai\ tô=n kataleleimme/nôn.] The
four persons here named were probably present at Chalkis, so that
Aristotle could count upon them; but at the time when this will was
made, Theophrastus was at Athens, conducting the Aristotelian school;
and in the critical condition of Grecian politics, there was room for
doubt how far he could securely or prudently act in this matter.

The words of Diogenes--[Greek: e(/ôs d' a)\n Nika/nôr
katala/bê|]--are rendered in the improved translation of the edition
by Firmin Didot, "_quoad vero Nicanor adolescat," &c. I cannot think
this a correct understanding, either of the words or of the fact.
Nikanor was not a minor under age, but an officer on active service.
The translation given by Ménage appears to me more true--"_tantisper
dum redux sit Nicanor:_" (ad. D. L. v. 12.)]

[Footnote 44: Diog. L. v. 12. [Greek: ô(s kai\ patê\r ô)\n kai\
a)delpho/s].]

[Footnote 45: Diog. L. v. 13. In following the phraseology of this
testament, we remark that when Aristotle makes allusion to these
inauspicious possibilities--the death of Nikanor or of Pythias, he
annexes to them a deprecatory phrase: [Greek: e)a\n de\ tê=| paidi\
sumbê=|--o(\ mê\ ge/noito ou)de\ e)/stai], &c.]

[Footnote 46: Diog. L. v. 14. [Greek: kai\ e)a\n me\n e)n Chalki/di
bou/lêtai oi)kei=n, to\n xenô=na to\n pro\s tô=| kê/pô|; e)a\n de\
e)n Stagei/rois, tê\n patrô/|an oi)ki/an.] The "lodging near the
garden" may probably have been the residence occupied by Aristotle
himself, during his temporary residence at Chalkis. The mention of
his paternal house, which he still possessed at Stageira, seems to
imply that Philip, when he destroyed that town, respected the house
therein which had belonged to his father's physician.

We find in the will of Theophrastus (Diog. L. v. 52) mention made of
a property ([Greek: chôri/on]) at Stageira belonging to Theophrastus,
which he bequeaths to Kallinus. Probably this is the same property
which had once belonged to Aristotle; for I do not see how else
Theophrastus (who was a native of Eresus in Lesbos) could have become
possessed of property at Stageira.]

Aristotle proceeds to direct that Nikanor shall make comfortable
provision for several persons mentioned by name, male and female,
most of them slaves, but one (Myrmex), seemingly, a free boarder or
pupil, whose property he had undertaken to manage. Two or three of
these slaves are ordered to be liberated, and to receive presents, as
soon as his daughter Pythias shall be married. He strictly enjoins
that not one of the youthful slaves who attended him shall be sold.
They are to be brought up and kept in employment; when of mature age,
they are to be liberated according as they shew themselves
worthy.[47]

[Footnote 47: Diog. L. v. 15. [Greek: mê\ pôlei=n de\ tô=n pai/dôn
mêde/na tô=n e)me\ therapeuo/ntôn, **a)lla\ chrê=sthai au)toi=s;
o(/tan d' e)n ê(liki/a| ge/nôntai, e)leuthe/rous a)phei=nai kat'
a)xi/an.]]

Aristotle had in his lifetime ordered, from a sculptor named
Gryllion, busts of Nikanor and of the mother of Nikanor; he intended
farther to order from the same sculptor a bust of Proxenus, Nikanor's
father. Nikanor is instructed by the will to complete these orders,
and to dedicate the busts properly when brought in. A bust of the
mother of Aristotle is to be dedicated to Demeter at Nemea, or in any
other place which Nikanor may prefer; another bust of Arimnêstus
(brother of Aristotle) is to be dedicated as a memento of the same,
since he has died childless.[48]

[Footnote 48: Diog. L. v. 15.]

During some past danger of Nikanor (we do not know what) Aristotle
had made a vow of four marble animal figures, in case the danger were
averted, to Zeus the Preserver and Athênê the Preserver. Nikanor is
directed to fulfil this vow and to dedicate the figures in
Stageira.[49]

[Footnote 49: Diog. L. v. 16. [Greek: a)nathei=nai de\ kai\ Nika/nora
sôthe/nta, ê(\n eu)chê\n u(pe\r au)tou= êu)xa/mên, zô=|a li/thina
tetrapê/chê Dii+\ Sô/têri kai\ A)thê/na| Sôtei/ra| e)n Stagei/rois.]

Here is a vow, made by Aristotle to the gods under some unknown
previous emergency, which he orders his executor to fulfil. I presume
that the last words of direction given by Sokrates before his death
to Kriton were of the same nature: "We owe a cock to Æsculapius: pay
the debt, and do not fail." (See my preceding work, Plato and the
other Companions of Sokrates, vol. ii. ch. 23, p. 195.)]

Lastly, wherever Aristotle is buried, the bones of his deceased wife
Pythias are to be collected and brought to the same spot, as she had
commanded during her lifetime.[50]

[Footnote 50: Diog. L. v. 16.]

This testament is interesting, as it illustrates the personal
circumstances and sentiments of the philosopher, evincing an
affectionate forethought and solicitude for those who were in
domestic relations with him. As far as we can judge, the
establishment and property which he left must have been an ample
one.[51] How the provisions of the will were executed, or what became
of most persons named in it, we do not know, except that Pythias the
daughter of Aristotle was married three times: first, to Nikanor
(according to the will); secondly, to Proklês, descendant of
Demaratus (the king of Sparta formerly banished to Asia) by whom she
had two sons, Proklês and Demaratus, afterwards pupils in the school
of Theophrastus; thirdly, to a physician named Metrodôrus, by whom
she had a son named Aristotle.[52]

[Footnote 51: The elder Pliny (H. N. xxxv. 12, 46; compare also
Diogen. L. v. 1, 16) mentions that in the sale of Aristotle's effects
by his heirs there were included seventy dishes or pans (_patinas_,
earthenware). Pliny considered this as a mark of luxurious living;
since (according to Fenestella) "tripatinium appellabatur summam
coenarum lautitia."]

[Footnote 52: Sextus Empiric. adv. Mathematicos, i. p. 271 F. sect.
258. About the banishment, or rather voluntary exile, of Demaratus to
Asia, in the reign of Darius I. king of Persia, see Herodot. vi. 70.
Some towns and lands were assigned to him in Æolis, where Xenophon
found his descendant Prokles settled, after the conclusion of the
Cyreian expedition (Xen. Anab. vii. 8, 17).

Respecting this younger Aristotle--son of Metrodorus and grandson of
the great philosopher--mention is made in the testament of
Theophrastus, and directions are given for promoting his improvement
in philosophy (Diog. La. v. 53). Nikomachus was brought up chiefly by
Theophrastus, but perished young in battle (Aristokles ap. Euseb.
Præp. Ev. xv. 2).]

There existed in antiquity several works, partly by contemporaries
like the Megaric Eubulides, partly by subsequent Platonists, in which
Aristotle was reproached with ingratitude to Plato,[53] servility to
the Macedonian power, love of costly display and indulgences, &c.
What proportion of truth may lie at the bottom of these charges we do
not know enough to determine confidently; but we know that he had
many enemies, philosophical as well as political;[54] and controversy
on those grounds (then as now) was rarely kept free from personal
slander and invective.

[Footnote 53: Euseb. Præp. Ev. xv. 2; Diog. La. ii. 109.]

[Footnote 54: The remarkable passage of Themistius (Orat. xxiii.
p. 346) attests the number and vehemence of these opponents. [Greek:
Kêphisodô=rous te kai\ Eu)bouli/das kai\ Timai/ous kai\
Dikaia/rchous, kai\ stra/ton o(/lon tô=n e)pitheme/nôn A)ristote/lei
tô=| Stageiri/tê|, po/t' a)\n katale/xaimi eu)petô=s, ô(=n kai\
lo/goi e)xiknou=ntai ei)s to/nde to\n chro/non, diatêrou=ntes tê\n
a)pe/chtheian kai\ philoneiki/an?]]

The accusation of ingratitude or unbecoming behaviour to Plato is no
way proved by any evidence now remaining. It seems to have been
suggested to the Platonists mainly, if not wholly, by the direct
rivalry of Aristotle in setting up a second philosophical school at
Athens, alongside of the Academy; by his independent, self-working,
philosophical speculation; and by the often-repeated opposition which
he made to some capital doctrines of Plato, especially to the
so-called Platonic Ideas.[55] Such opposition was indeed expressed,
as far as we can judge, in terms of respectful courtesy, and
sometimes even of affectionate regret; examples of which we shall
have to notice in going through the Aristotelian writings. Yet some
Platonists seem to have thought that direct attack on the master's
doctrines was undutiful and ungrateful in the pupil, however
unexceptionable the language might be. They also thought, probably,
that the critic misrepresented what he sought to refute. Whether
Aristotle really believed that he had superior claims to be made
Scholarch of the Platonic school at the death of Plato in 347 B.C.,
or at the death of Speusippus in 339 B.C., is a point which we can
neither affirm nor deny. But we can easily understand that the act of
setting up a new philosophical school at Athens, though perfectly
fair and admissible on his part, was a hostile competition sure both
to damage and offend the pre-established school, and likely enough to
be resented with unbecoming asperity. Ingratitude towards the great
common master Plato, with arrogant claims of superiority over
fellow-pupils, were the allegations which this resentment would
suggest, and which many Platonists in the Academy would not scruple
to advance against their macedonizing rival at the Lykeium.

[Footnote 55: This is what lies at the bottom of the charges advanced
by Eubulides, probably derived from the Platonists, [Greek: kai\
Eu)bouli/dês prodê/lôs e)n tô=| kat' au)tou= bibli/ô| pseu/detai,
pha/skôn, teleutô=nti Pla/tôni mê\ paragene/sphai, ta/ te bi/blia
au)tou= diaphthei=rai] (Aristokles ap. Euseb. Præp. Ev. xv. 2). There
can be no possible basis for this last charge--destroying or
corrupting the books of Plato--except that Aristotle had sharply
criticized them, and was supposed to have mis-stated or unfairly
discredited them.

The frequently recurring protest of Aristotle against the Platonic
doctrine of Ideas may be read now in the Analytica, Topica,
Metaphysica, and Ethica Nikomachea, but was introduced even in the
lost Dialogues. See Plutarch adv. Kolôten, c. 14; and Proklus adv.
Joann. Philoponum ap. Bernays, Die Dialoge des Aristoteles, not. 22,
p. 151.]

Such allegations moreover would find easy credence from other men of
letters, whose enmity Aristotle had incurred, and to a certain extent
even provoked--Isokrates and his numerous disciples.

This celebrated rhetor was an elderly man at the zenith of his glory
and influence, during those earlier years which Aristotle passed at
Athens before the decease of Plato. The Isokratean school was then
the first in Greece, frequented by the most promising pupils from
cities near and far, perhaps even by Aristotle himself. The political
views and handling, as well as the rhetorical style of which the
master set the example, found many imitators. Illustrious statesmen,
speakers, and writers traced their improvement to this teaching. So
many of the pupils, indeed, acquired celebrity--among them
Theodektês, Theopompus, Ephorus, Naukrates, Philiskus, Kephisodôrus,
and others--that Hermippus[56] thought it worth his while to draw up
a catalogue of them: many must have been persons of opulent family,
highly valuing the benefit received from Isokrates, since each of
them was required to pay to him a fee of 1000 drachmæ.[57] During the
first sojourn of Aristotle in Athens (362-347 B.C.), while he was
still attached to and receiving instruction from Plato, he appears to
have devoted himself more to rhetoric than to philosophy, and even to
have given public lessons or lectures on rhetoric. He thus entered
into rivalry with Isokrates, for whom, as a teacher and author, he
contracted dislike or contempt.

[Footnote 56: Athenæus x. p. 451; Dionys. Hal., De Isæo Judic. pp.
588, 625. [Greek: ou)de\ ga\r o( tou\s I)sokra/tous mathêta\s
a)nagra/phas E(/rmippos, a)kribê\s e)n toi=s a)/llois geno/menos,
u(pe\r tou=de tou= r(ê/toros ou)de\n ei)/rêken, e)/xô duoi=n
tou/toin, o(/ti diê/kouse me\n I)sokra/tous, kathêgê/sato de\
Dêmosthe/nous, sunege/neto de\ toi=s a)ri/stois tô=n philoso/phôn.]
See Hermippi Fragmenta ed. Lozinski, Bonn, 1832, pp. 42-43. Cicero,
De Oratore, ii. 22, 94. "Ecce tibi exortus est Isocrates, magister
istorum omnium, cujus è ludo, tanquam ex equo Trojano, meri principes
exierunt: sed eorum partim in pompâ, partim in acie, illustres esse
voluerunt. Atqui et illi--Theopompi, Ephori, Philiski, Naucratæ,
multique alii--ingeniis differunt," &c. Compare also Cicero, Brutus,
8, 32; and Dionys. Hal., De Isocrate Judicium, p. 536. [Greek:
e)piphane/statos de\ geno/menos tô=n kata\ to\n aou)to\n a)kmasa/ntôn
chro/non, kai\ tou\s krati/stous tô=n e)n A)thê/nê|si/ te kai\ e)n
tê=| a)/llê| E(lla/di ne/ôn paideu/sas; ô(=n oi( me\n e)n toi=s
dikanikoi=s e)ge/nonto a)/ristoi lo/gois, oi( d' e)n tô=|
politeu/esthai kai\ ta\ koina\ pra/ttein diênegkan, kai\ a)/lloi de\
ta\s koina\s tô=n e(llê/nôn te kai\ barba/rôn pra/xeis a)ne/grapsan],
&c.]

[Footnote 57: See Demosthenes, adv. Lakritum, pp. 928, 938. Lakritus
was a citizen of Phasêlis--[Greek: me/ga pra=gma, I)sokra/tous
mathêtê/s]. To have gone through a course of teaching from Isokrates,
was evidently considered as a distinction of some importance.]

The composition of Isokrates was extremely elegant: his structure of
sentences was elaborate even to excess, his arrangement of words
rhythmical, his phrases nicely balanced in antithetical equipoise,
like those of his master Gorgias; the recital of his discourses
proved highly captivating to the ear.[58] Moreover, he had composed a
book of rhetorical precepts known and esteemed by Cicero and
Quintilian. Besides such technical excellence, Isokrates strove to
attain, and to a certain extent actually attained, a higher order of
merit. He familiarized his pupils with thoughts and arguments of
lofty bearing and comprehensive interest; not assisting them to gain
victory either in any real issue tried before the Dikasts, or in any
express motion about to be voted on by the public assembly, but
predisposing their minds to prize above all things the great
Pan-hellenic aggregate--its independence in regard to external force,
and internal harmony among its constituent cities, with a reasonable
recognition of presidential authority, equitably divided between
Athens and Sparta, and exercised with moderation by both. He
inculcated sober habits and deference to legal authority on the part
of the democrats of Athens; he impressed upon princes, like Philip
and Nikokles, the importance of just and mild bearing towards
subjects.[59] Such is the general strain of the discourses which we
now possess from Isokrates; though he appears to have adopted it only
in middle life, having begun at first in the more usual track of the
logographer--composing speeches to be delivered before the Dikastery
by actual plaintiffs or defendants,[60] and acquiring thus both
reputation and profit. His reputation as a teacher was not only
maintained but even increased when he altered his style; and he made
himself peculiarly attractive to foreign pupils who desired to
acquire a command of graceful expressions, without special reference
to the Athenian Assembly and Dikastery. But his new style being
midway between Demosthenes and Plato--between the practical advocate
and politician on one side, and the generalizing or speculative
philosopher on the other--he incurred as a semi-philosopher,
professing to have discovered the _juste milieu_, more or less of
disparagement from both extremes;[61] and Aristotle, while yet a
young man in the Platonic school, raised an ardent controversy
against his works, on the ground both of composition and teaching.
Though the whole controversy is now lost, there is good ground for
believing that Aristotle must have displayed no small acrimony. He
appears to have impugned the Isokratean discourses, partly as
containing improper dogmas, partly as specimens of mere unimpressive
elegance, intended for show, pomp, and immediate admiration from the
hearer--_ad implendas aures_--but destitute both of comprehensive
theory and of applicability to any useful purpose.[62] Kephisodôrus,
an intimate friend and pupil of Isokrates, defended him in an express
reply, attacking both Aristotle the scholar and Plato the master.
This reply was in four books, and Dionysius characterizes it by an
epithet of the highest praise.[63]

[Footnote 58: Dionysius, while admiring Isocrates, complains of him,
and complains still more of his imitators, as somewhat monotonous,
wanting in flexibility and variety (De Compos. Verborum, p. 134). Yet
he pronounces Isokrates and Lysias to be more natural, shewing less
of craft and art than Isæus and Demosthenes (De Isæo Judicium, p.
592). Isokrates [Greek: to\n o)/gkon tê=s poiêtikê=s kataskeuê=s
e)pi\ lo/gous ê)/gage philoso/phous, zêlô/sas tou\s peri\ Forgi/an.]
(Dionys. Hal. ad Pompeium de Platone, p. 764; also De Isæo Judicium,
p. 592; besides the special chapter, p. 534, seq., which he has
devoted to Isokrates.)

Cicero, De Oratore, iii. 44, 173: "Idque princeps Isocrates
instituisse fertur, ut inconditam antiquorum dicendi consuetudinem
delectationis atque aurium causâ, quemadmodum scribit discipulus ejus
Naucrates, numeris adstringeret." Compare Cicero, Orator. 52, 175,
176.

The reference to Naucrates (whose works have not been preserved,
though Dionysius commends his [Greek: Lo/gos E)pita/phios], Ars.
Rhet. p. 259) is interesting, as it shews what was said of Isokrates
by his own disciples. Cicero says of the doctrines in his own
dialogue De Oratore (Epist. ad Famil. i. 9, 23), "Abhorrent a
communibus præceptis, et omnem antiquorum, et _Aristoteleam et
Isocrateam_, rationem oratoriam complectuntur." About the [Greek:
Te/chnê] of Isokrates, see Spengel, [Greek: Sunagôgê\ Technô=n]
(Munich), pp. 155-170.]

[Footnote 59: Dionysius Hal. dwells emphatically on the lofty
morality inculcated in the discourses of Isokrates, and recommends
them as most improving study to all politicians (De Isocrate Judic.
pp. 536, 544, 555, seq.)--more improving than the writers purely
theoretical, among whom he probably numbered Plato and Aristotle.]

[Footnote 60: Dionysius Hal. De Isocrate Judicium, pp. 576, 577,
Reiske: [Greek: de/smas pa/nu polla\s dikanikô=n lo/gôn I)sokratei/ôn
periphe/resthai/ phêsin u(po\ tô=n bibliopôlô=n A)ristote/lês.] It
appears that Aphareus, the adopted son of Isokrates, denied that
Isokrates had ever written any judicial orations; while Kephisodôrus,
the disciple of Isokrates, in his reply to Aristotle's accusations,
admitted that Isokrates had composed a few, but only a few. Dionysius
accepts the allegation of Kephisodôrus and discredits that of
Aristotle: I, for my part, believe the allegation of Aristotle, upon
a matter of fact which he had the means of knowing. Cicero also
affirms (Brutus, xii. 46-48), on the authority of Aristotle, that
Isokrates distinguished himself at first as a composer of speeches
intended to be delivered by actual pleaders in the Dikastery or
Ekklesia; and that he afterwards altered his style. And this is what
Aristotle says (respecting Isokrates) in Rhetoric. i. 9, 1368, a. 20,
[Greek: o(/per I)sokra/tês e)poi/ei dia\ tê\n sunê/theian tou=
dikologei=n], where Bekker has altered the substantive to [Greek:
tê\n a)sunê/theian]; in my judgment, not wisely. I do not perceive
the meaning or pertinence of [Greek: a)sunê/theian] in that
sentence.]

[Footnote 61: See Plato, Euthydemus, p. 305; also 'Plato and the
Other Companions of Sokrates,' vol. i. ch. xix. pp. 557-563.

It is exactly this _juste milieu_ which Dionysius Hal. extols as the
most worthy of being followed, as being [Greek: ê( a)lêthinê\
philosophi/a]. De Isocrate Jud. pp. 543, 558.]

[Footnote 62: Cicero, De Oratore, iii. 35, 141. "Itaque ipse
Aristoteles quum florere Isocratem nobilitate discipulorum videret,
quod ipse suas disputationes a causis forensibus et civilibus ad
inanem sermonis elegantiam transtulisset, mutavit repente totam
formam prope disciplinæ suæ, versumque quendam Philoctetæ paulo secus
dixit. Ille enim 'turpe sibi ait esse tacere, quum barbaros'--hic
autem, 'quum Isocratem'--'pateretur dicere'" See **Quintilian, Inst.
Or. iv. 2, 196; and Cicero, Orator. 19, 62: "Aristoteles Isocratem
ipsum lacessivit." Also, ib. 51, 172: "Omitto Isocratem discipulosque
ejus Ephorum et Naucratem; quanquam orationis faciendæ et ornandæ
auctores locupletissimi summi ipsi oratores esse debebant. Sed quis
omnium doctior, quis acutior, quis in rebus vel inveniendis vel
judicandis acrior Aristotele fuit? _Quis porro Isocrati adversatus
est infensius?_" That Aristotle was the first to assail Isokrates,
and that Kephisodôrus wrote only in reply, is expressly stated by
Numenius, ap. Euseb. Pr. Ev. xiv. 6: [Greek: o( Kêphiso/dôros,
e)peidê\ u(p' A)ristote/lous ballo/menon e(autô=| to\n dida/skalon
I)sokra/tên e(ô/ra], &c. Quintilian also says, Inst. Or. iii. 1, p.
126: "Nam et Isocratis præstantissimi discipuli fuerunt in omni
studiorum genere; eoque jam seniore (octavum enim et nonagesimum
implevit annum) pomeridianis scholis Aristoteles præcipere artem
oratoriam coepit; noto quidem illo (ut traditur) versu ex Philoctetâ
_frequenter usus_: [Greek: Ai)schro\n siôpa=|n me/n, kai\ I)sokra/tên
e)a=|n le/gein]."

Diogenes La. (v. 3) maintains that Aristotle turned the parody not
against _Isokrates_, but against _Xenokrates_: [Greek: Ai)schro\n
siôpa=|n, Xenokra/tên d' e)a=|n le/gein]. But the authority of Cicero
and Quintilian is decidedly preferable. When we recollect that the
parody was employed by a young man, as yet little known, against a
teacher advanced in age, and greatly frequented as well as admired by
pupils, it will appear sufficiently offensive. Moreover, it does not
seem at all pertinent; for the defects of Isokrates, however great
they may have been, were not those of analogy with [Greek:
ba/rbaroi], but the direct reverse. Dionysius must have been forcibly
struck with the bitter _animus_ displayed by Aristotle against
Isokrates, when he makes it a reason for rejecting the explicit
averment of Aristotle as to a matter of fact: [Greek: kai\ ou)/t'
A)ristote/lei pei/thomai _r(upai/nein to\n a)/ndra boulome/nô|_] (De
Isocr. Jud. p. 577).

Mr. Cope, in his Introduction to Aristotle's Rhetoric (p. 39, seq.),
gives a just representation of the probable relations between
Aristotle and Isokrates; though I do not concur in the unfavourable
opinion which he expresses about "the malignant influence exercised
by Isokrates upon education in general" (p. 40). Mr. Cope at the same
time remarks, that "Aristotle in the Rhetorica draws a greater number
of illustrations of excellences of style from Isokrates than from any
other author" (p. 41); and he adds, very truly, that the absence of
any evidence of ill feeling towards Isokrates in Aristotle's later
work, and the existence of such ill feeling as an actual fact at an
earlier period, are perfectly reconcileable in themselves (p. 42).

That the Rhetorica of Aristotle which we now possess is a work of his
later age, certainly published, perhaps composed, during his second
residence at Athens, I hold with Mr. Cope and other antecedent
critics.]

[Footnote 63: Athenæus, ii. 60, iii. 122; Euseb. Pr. E. xiv. 6;
Dionys. H. de Isocrate Judic. p. 577: [Greek: i(kano\n ê(gêsa/menos
ei)=nai tê=s a)lêthei/as bebaiôtê\n to\n A)thênai=on Kêphiso/dôron,
o(\s kai\ sunebi/ôsen I)sokra/tei, kai\ gnêsiô/tatos a)koustê\s
e)ge/neto, kai\ tê\n a)pologi/an tê\n pa/nu thaumastê\n e)n tai=s
pro\s A)ristote/lê a)ntigraphai=s e)poiê/sato], &C. Kephisodôrus, in
this defence, contended that you might pick out, even from the very
best poets and sophists, [Greek: e(\n ê)\ du/o ponêrô=s ei)rême/na].
This implies that Aristotle, in attacking Isokrates, had cited
various extracts which he denounced as exceptionable.]

These polemics of Aristotle were begun during his first residence at
Athens, prior to 347 B.C., the year of Plato's decease, and at the
time when he was still accounted a member of the Platonic school.
They exemplify the rivalry between that school and the Isokratean,
which were then the two competing places of education at Athens: and
we learn that Aristotle, at that time only a half-fledged Platonist,
opened on his own account not a new philosophical school in
competition with Plato, as some state, but a new rhetorical school in
opposition to Isokrates.[63] But the case was different at the latter
epoch, 335 B.C., when Aristotle came to reside at Athens for the
second time. Isokrates was then dead, leaving no successor, so that
his rhetorical school expired with him. Aristotle preferred
philosophy to rhetoric: he was no longer trammelled by the living
presence and authority of Plato. The Platonic school at the Academy
stood at that time alone, under Xenokrates, who, though an earnest
and dignified philosopher, was deficient in grace and in
persuasiveness, and had been criticized for this defect even by Plato
himself. Aristotle possessed those gifts in large measure, as we know
from the testimony of Antipater. By these circumstances, coupled with
his own established reputation and well-grounded self-esteem, he was
encouraged to commence a new philosophical school; a school, in which
philosophy formed the express subject of the morning lecture, while
rhetoric was included as one among the subjects of more varied and
popular instruction given in the afternoon.[64] During the twelve
ensuing years, Aristotle's rivalry was mainly against the Platonists
or Xenokrateans at the Academy; embittered on both sides by
acrimonious feelings, which these expressed by complaining of his
ingratitude and unfairness towards the common master, Plato.

[Footnote 64: That Aristotle had a school at Athens before the death
of Plato we may see by what Strabo (xiii. 610) says about Hermeias:
[Greek: geno/menos d' A)thê/nê|sin ê)kroa/sato kai\ Pla/tônos kai\
A)ristote/lous]. Compare Cicero, Orator. 46; also Michelet, Essai sur
la Métaphys. d'Aristote, p. 227. The statement that Aristotle during
Plato's lifetime tried to set up a rival school against him, is
repeated by all the biographers, who do not however believe it to be
true, though they cite Aristoxenus as its warrant. I conceive that
they have mistaken what Aristoxenus said; and that they have
confounded the school which Aristotle first set up as a rhetor,
against Isokrates, with that which he afterwards set up as a
philosopher, against Xenokrates.]

[Footnote 65: Aulus Gellius, N. A. xx. 5. Quintilian (see note on p.
35) puts the rhetorical "pomeridianæ scholæ" within the lifetime of
Isokrates; but Aristotle did not then lecture on philosophy in the
morning.]

There were thus, at Athens, three distinct parties inspired with
unfriendly sentiment towards Aristotle: first, the Isokrateans;
afterwards, the Platonists; along with both, the anti-Macedonian
politicians. Hence we can account for what Themistius entitles the
"army of assailants" ([Greek: stra/ton o(/lon]) that fastened upon
him, for the unfavourable colouring with which his domestic
circumstances are presented, and for the necessity under which he lay
of Macedonian protection; so that when such protection was nullified,
giving place to a reactionary fervour, his residence at Athens became
both disagreeable and insecure.




CHAPTER II.

ARISTOTELIAN CANON.


In the fourth and fifth chapters of my work on 'Plato and the Other
Companions of Sokrates,' I investigated the question of the Platonic
Canon, and attempted to determine, upon the best grounds open to us,
the question, What are the real works of Plato? I now propose to
discuss the like question respecting Aristotle.

But the premisses for such a discussion are much less simple in
regard to Aristotle than in regard to Plato. As far as the testimony
of antiquity goes, we learn that the Canon of Thrasyllus, dating at
least from the time of the Byzantine Aristophanes, and probably from
an earlier time, was believed by all readers to contain the authentic
works of Plato and none others; an assemblage of dialogues, some
unfinished, but each undivided and unbroken. The only exception to
unanimity in regard to the Platonic Canon, applies to ten dialogues,
which were received by some (we do not know by how many, or by whom)
as Platonic, but which, as Diogenes informs us, were rejected by
agreement of the most known and competent critics. This is as near to
unanimity as can be expected. The doubts, now so multiplied,
respecting the authenticity of various dialogues included in the
Canon of Thrasyllus, have all originated with modern scholars since
the beginning of the present century, or at least since the earlier
compositions of Wyttenbach. It was my task to appreciate the value of
those doubts; and, in declining to be guided by them, I was at least
able to consider myself as adhering to the views of all known ancient
critics.

Very different is the case when we attempt to frame an Aristotelian
Canon, comprising all the works of Aristotle and none others. We find
the problem far more complicated, and the matters of evidence at once
more defective, more uncertain, and more contradictory.

The different works now remaining, and published in the Berlin
edition of Aristotle, are forty-six in number. But, among these,
several were disallowed or suspected even by some ancient critics,
while modern critics have extended the like judgment yet farther. Of
several others again, the component sections (either the _books_, in
our present phraseology, or portions thereof) appear to have existed
once as detached rolls, to have become disjointed or even to have
parted company, and to have been re-arranged or put together into
aggregates, according to the judgment of critics and librarians.
Examples of such doubtful aggregates, or doubtful arrangements, will
appear when we review the separate Aristotelian compositions (the
Metaphysica, Politica, &c.). It is, however, by one or more of these
forty-six titles that Aristotle is known to modern students, and was
known to mediæval students.

But the case was very different with ancient _literati_, such as
Eratosthenes, Polybius, Cicero, Strabo, Plutarch, &c., down to the
time of Alexander of Aphrodisias, Athenæus, Diogenes Laertius, &c.,
towards the close of the second century after the Christian era. It
is certain that these ancients perused many works of Aristotle, or
generally recognized as his, which we do not now possess; and among
those which we do now possess, there are many which it is not certain
that they perused, or even knew.

Diogenes Laertius, after affirming generally that Aristotle had
composed a prodigious number of books ([Greek: pa/mpleista bi/blia]),
proceeds to say, that, in consequence of the excellence of the author
in every variety of composition, he thinks it proper to indicate them
briefly.[1] He then enumerates one hundred and forty-six distinct
titles of works, with the number of books or sections contained in
each work. The subjects are exceedingly heterogeneous, and the form
of composition likewise very different; those which come first in the
list being Dialogues,[2] while those which come last are Epistles,
Hexameters, and Elegies. At the close of the list we read: "All of
them together are 445,270 lines, and this is the number of books
(works) composed by Aristotle."[3] A little farther on, Diogenes
adds, as an evidence of the extraordinary diligence and inventive
force of Aristotle, that the books (works) enumerated in the
preceding list were nearly four hundred in number, and that these
were not contested by any one; but that there were many other
writings, and _dicta_ besides, ascribed to Aristotle--ascribed (we
must understand him to mean) erroneously, or at least so as to leave
much doubt.[4]

[Footnote 1: Diog. La. v. 21. [Greek: Sune/grapse de\ pa/mpleista
bi/blia, a(/per a)ko/louthon ê(gêsa/mên u(pogra/psai, dia\ tê\n peri\
pa/ntas lo/gous ta)ndro\s a)retê/n.]]

[Footnote 2: Bernays has pointed out (in his valuable treatise, Die
Dialoge des Aristoteles, p. 133) that the first in order, nineteen in
number, among the titles enumerated by Diogenes, designate Dialogues.
The longest of them, those which included more than one book or
section, are enumerated first of all. Some of the dialogues appear to
have coincided, either in title or in subject, with some of the
Platonic:--[Greek: Peri\ Dikaiosu/nês], in four books (comparable
with Plato's Republic); [Greek: Politikou=], in two books; [Greek:
Sophistê\s, Mene/xenos, Sumpo/sion], each in one book; all similar in
title to works of Plato; perhaps also another, [Greek: Peri\
r(êtorikê=s ê)\ Gru/llos], the analogue of Plato's Gorgias.]

[Footnote 3: Diog. La. v. 27. [Greek: gi/gnontai ai( pa=sai muria/des
sti/chôn te/ttares kai\ tettara/konta pro\s toi=s pentakischili/ois
kai\ diakosi/ois e(bdomê/konta. Kai\ tosau=ta me\n au)tô=|
pepragma/teutai bi/blia.]]

[Footnote 4: Diog. La. v. 34. Heitz (Die Verlorenen Schriften des
Aristoteles, p. 17) notices, as a fact invalidating the
trustworthiness of the catalogue given by Diogenes, that Diogenes, in
other places, alludes to Aristotelian compositions which are not
mentioned in his own catalogue. For example, though Diogenes, in the
catalogue, allows only five books to the Ethica, yet he himself
alludes (v. 21) to the seventh book of the Ethica. But this example
can hardly be relied upon, because [Greek: e)n tô=| e(bdo/mô| tô=n
ê)thikô=n] is only a conjecture of H. Stephens or Ménage. The only
case which Heitz really finds to sustain his remark, is the passage
of the Prooemium (i. 8), where Diogenes cites Aristotle [Greek: e)n
tô=| Magikô=|], that work not being named in his catalogue. But there
is another case (not noticed by Heitz) which appears to me still
stronger. Diogenes cites at length the Hymn or Pæan composed by
Aristotle in honour of Hermeias. Now there is no general head of his
catalogue under which this hymn could fall. Here Anonymus (to be
presently mentioned) has a superiority over Diogenes; for he
introduces, towards the close of his catalogue, one general
head--[Greek: e)gkô/mia ê)\ u(/mnous], which is not to be found in
Diogenes.]

We have another distinct enumeration of the titles of Aristotle's
works, prepared by an anonymous biographer cited in the notes of
Ménage to Diogenes Laertius.[5] This anonymous list contains only one
hundred and twenty-seven titles, being nineteen less than the list in
Diogenes. The greater number of titles are the same in both; but
Anonymus has eight titles which are not found in Diogenes, while
Diogenes has twenty-seven titles which are not given by Anonymus.
There are therefore thirty-five titles which rest on the evidence of
one alone out of the two lists. Anonymus does not specify any total
number of lines; nevertheless he gives the total number of _books_
composed by Aristotle as being nearly four hundred--the same as
Diogenes. This total number cannot be elicited out of the items
enumerated by Anonymus; but it may be made to coincide pretty nearly
with the items in Diogenes,[6] provided we understand by _books_,
sections or subdivisions of one and the same title or work.

[Footnote 5: Ménage ad Diog. tom. ii. p. 201. See the very
instructive treatise of Professor Heitz, Die Verlorenen Schriften des
Aristoteles, p. 15 (Leipzig, 1865).]

[Footnote 6: Heitz, Die Verl. Schrift. des Aristot. p. 51. Such
coincidence assumes that we reckon the [Greek: Politei=ai] and the
Epistles each as one book.

I think it unnecessary to transcribe these catalogues of the titles
of works mostly lost. The reader will find them clearly printed in
the learned work of Val. Rose, Aristoteles Pseudepigraphus, pp.
12-20.]

The two catalogues just mentioned, agreeing as they do in the total
number of books and in the greater part of the items, may probably be
considered not as original and copy, but as inaccurate transcripts
from the same original authority. Yet neither of the two transcribers
tells us what that original authority was. We may, however, be
certain that each of them considered his catalogue to comprehend all
that Aristotle could be affirmed on good authority to have published;
Diogenes plainly signifies thus much, when he gives not only the
total number of books, but the total number of lines. Such being the
case, we expect to find in it, of course, the titles of the forty-six
works composing the Berlin edition of Aristotle now before us. But
this expectation is disappointed. The far greater number of the
Aristotelian works which we now peruse are not specified either in
the list of Diogenes, or in that of Anonymus.[7] Moreover, the lists
also fail to specify the titles of various works which are not now
extant, but which we know from Aristotle himself that he really
composed.[8]

[Footnote 7: Heitz, Verl. Schr. Aristot. p. 18, remarks that "In
diesem Verzeichnisse (that of Diogenes) die bei weitem grösste Zahl
derjenigen Schriften fehlt, welche wir heute noch besitzen, und die
wir als den eigentlichen Kern der aristotelischen Lehre enthaltend zu
betrachten gewohnt sind." Cf. p. 32. Brandis expresses himself
substantially to the same effect (Aristoteles, Berlin, 1853, pp. 77,
78, 96); and Zeller also (Gesch. der Phil. 2nd ed. Aristot.
Schriften, p. 43).]

[Footnote 8: Heitz, Verl. Schr. des Aristoteles, p. 56, seq.]

The last-mentioned fact is in itself sufficiently strange and
difficult to explain, and our difficulty becomes aggravated when we
combine it with another fact hardly less surprising. Both Cicero, and
other writers of the century subsequent to him (Dionysius Hal.,
Quintilian, &c.), make reference to Aristotle, and especially to his
dialogues, of which none have been preserved, though the titles of
several are given in the two catalogues mentioned above. These
writers bestow much encomium on the style of Aristotle; but what is
remarkable is, that they ascribe to it attributes which even his
warmest admirers will hardly find in the Aristotelian works now
remaining. Cicero extols the sweetness, the abundance, the variety,
the rhetorical force which he discovered in Aristotle's writings: he
even goes so far as to employ the phrase "flumen orationis aureum" (a
golden stream of speech), in characterizing the Aristotelian
style.[9] Such predicates may have been correct, indeed were
doubtless correct, in regard to the dialogues, and perhaps other lost
works of Aristotle; but they describe exactly the opposite[10] of
what we find in all the works preserved. With most of these (except
the History of Animals) Cicero manifests no acquaintance; and some of
the best modern critics declare him to have been ignorant of
them.[11] Nor do other ancient authors, Plutarch, Athenæus, Diogenes
Laertius, &c., give evidence of having been acquainted with the
principal works of Aristotle known to us. They make reference only to
works enumerated in the Catalogue of Diogenes Laertius.[12]

[Footnote 9: Cicero, Acad. Prior. ii. 38, 119: "Quum enim tuus iste
Stoicus sapiens syllabatim tibi ista dixerit, veniet flumen orationis
aureum fundens Aristoteles, qui illum desipere dicat." Also Topica,
i. 3. "Quibus (_i.e._ those who were ignorant of Aristotle) eo minus
ignoscendum est, quod non modo rebus iis, quæ ab illo dictæ et
inventæ sunt, adlici debuerunt, sed dicendi quoque incredibili quâdam
quum copiâ, tum suavitate." Also De Oratore, i. 11, 49; Brutus, 31,
121; De Nat. Deor. ii. 37; De Inventione, ii. 2; De Finibus, i. 5,
14; Epistol. ad Atticum, ii. 1, where he speaks of the "Aristotelia
pigmenta," along with the [Greek: murothê/kion] of Isokrates.
Dionysius Hal. recommends the style of Aristotle in equal terms of
admiration: [Greek: paralêpte/on de\ kai\ A)ristote/lê ei)s mi/mêsin
tê=s te peri\ tê\n e(rmênei/an deino/têtos kai\ tê=s saphênei/as,
kai\ tou= ê(de/os kai\ polumathou=s] (De Veter. Script. Censurâ, p.
430, R.; De Verb. Copiâ, p. 187). Quintilian extols the "eloquendi
suavitas" among Aristotle's excellences (Inst. Or. X. i. p. 510).
Demetrius Phalereus (or the author who bears that title), De
Eloquentiâ, s. 128, commends [Greek: ai( A)ristote/lous cha/rites].
David the Armenian, who speaks of him (having reference to the
dialogue) as [Greek: A)phrodi/tês e)nno/mou ge/môn] (the correction
of Bernays, Dial. des Arist. p. 137) [Greek: kai\ chari/tôn
a)na/mestos], probably copies the judgment of predecessors (Scholia
ad Categor. p. 26, b. 36, Brandis).

Bernays (Die Dialoge des Aristoteles, pp. 3-5) points out how little
justice has been done by modern critics to the literary merits,
exhibited in the dialogues and other works now lost, of one whom _we_
know only as a "dornichten und wortkargen Systematiker."]

[Footnote 10: This opinion is insisted on by Ravaisson, Essai sur la
Métaphysique d'Aristote, pp. 210, 211.]

[Footnote 11: Valentine Rose, Aristoteles Pseudepigraphus, p. 23:
"Cicero philosophicis certe ipsius Aristotelis libris nunquam usus
est." Heitz, Die Verlor. Schrift. des Aristot. pp. 31, 158, 187:
"Cicero, dessen Unbekanntschaft mit beinahe sämmtlichen heute
vorhandenen Werken des Aristoteles eine unstreitige Thatsache bildet,
deren Bedeutung man sich umsonst bemüht hat abzuschwächen." Madvig,
Excursus VII. ad Ciceron. De Finibus, p. 855: "Non dubito profiteri,
Ciceronem mihi videri dialogos Aristotelis populariter scriptos, et
Rhetorica (quibus hic Topica adnumero) tum [Greek: politei/as]
legisse; difficiliora vero, quibus omnis interior philosophia
continebatur, aut omnino non attigisse, aut si aliquando attigerit,
non longe progressum esse, ut ipse de subtilioribus Aristotelis
sententiis aliquid habere possit explorati." The language here used
by Madvig is more precise than that of the other two; for Cicero must
be allowed to have known, and even to have had in his library, the
Topica of Aristotle.]

[Footnote 12: See this point enforced by Heitz, pp. 29-31. Athenæus
(xiv. 656) refers to a passage of Philochorus, in which Philochorus
alludes to Aristotle, that is, as critics have hitherto supposed, to
Aristot. Meteorol. iv. 3, 21. Bussemaker (in his Præfat. ad Aristot.
Didot, vol. iv. p. xix.) has shewn that this supposition is
unfounded, and that the passage more probably refers to one of the
Problemata Inedita (iii. 43) which Bussemaker has first published in
Didot's edition of Aristotle.]

Here, then, we find several embarrassing facts in regard to the
Aristotelian Canon. Most of the works now accepted and known as
belonging to Aristotle, are neither included in the full Aristotelian
Catalogue given by Diogenes, nor were they known to Cicero; who,
moreover, ascribes to Aristotle attributes of style not only
different, but opposite, to those which _our_ Aristotle presents.
Besides, more than twenty of the compositions entered in the
Catalogue are dialogues, of which form _our_ Aristotle affords not a
single specimen: while others relate to matters of ancient exploit or
personal history; collected proverbs; accounts of the actual
constitution of many Hellenic cities; lists of the Pythian victors
and of the scenic representations; erotic discourses; legendary
narratives, embodied in a miscellaneous work called 'Peplus'--a title
perhaps borrowed from the _Peplus_ or robe of Athênê at the
Panathenaic festival, embroidered with various figures by Athenian
women; a symposion or banquet-colloquy; and remarks on intoxication.
All these subjects are foreign in character to those which _our_
Aristotle treats.[13]

[Footnote 13: Brandis and Zeller, moreover, remark, that among the
allusions made by Aristotle in the works which we possess to other
works of his own, the majority relate to other works actually extant,
and very few to any of the lost works enumerated in the Catalogue
(Brand. Aristoteles, pp. 97-101; Zeller, Phil. der Griech. ii. 2, p.
79, ed. 2nd). This however is not always the case: we find (_e.g._)
in Aristotle's notice of the Pythagorean tenets (Metaphys. A. p. 986,
a. 12) the remark, [Greek: diô/ristai de\ peri\ tou/tôn e)n e(te/rois
ê(mi=n a)kribe/steron]; where he probably means to indicate his
special treatises, [Greek: Peri\ tô=n Puthagorei/ôn] and [Greek:
Pro\s tou\s Puthagorei/ous], enumerated by Diog. L. v. 25, and
mentioned by Alexander, Porphyry, and Simplikius. See Alexander,
Schol. ad Metaphys. p. 542, b. 5, 560, b. 25, Br.; and the note of
Schwegler on Metaphys. i. 5, p. 47.]

The difficulty of harmonizing _our_ Aristotle with the Aristotle of
the Catalogue is thus considerable. It has been so strongly felt in
recent years, that one of the ablest modern critics altogether
dissevers the two, and pronounces the works enumerated in the
Catalogue not to belong to _our_ Aristotle. I allude to Valentine
Rose, who in his very learned and instructive volume, '_Aristoteles
Pseudepigraphus_,' has collected and illustrated the fragments which
remain of these works. He considers them all pseudo-Aristotelian,
composed by various unknown members of the Peripatetic school, during
the century or two immediately succeeding the death of Aristotle, and
inscribed with the illustrious name of the master, partly through
fraud of the sellers, partly through carelessness of purchasers and
librarians.[14] Emil Heitz, on the other hand, has argued more
recently, that upon the external evidence as it stands, a more
correct conclusion to draw would be (the opposite of that drawn by
Rose, viz.): That the works enumerated in the Catalogue are the true
and genuine; and that those which we possess, or most of them, are
not really composed by Aristotle.[15] Heitz thinks this conclusion
better sustained than that of Rose, though he himself takes a
different view, which I shall presently mention.

[Footnote 14: Valent. Rose, Aristoteles Pseudepigr. pp. 4-10. The
same opinion is declared also in the earlier work of the same author,
De Aristotelis Librorum Ordine et Auctoritate.]

[Footnote 15: Heitz, Die Verlor. Schrift. des **Ar. pp. 29, 30.]

It will be seen from the foregoing observations how much more
difficult it is to settle a genuine Canon for Aristotle than for
Plato. I do not assent to either of the two conclusions just
indicated; but I contend that, if we applied to this question the
same principles of judgment as those which modern Platonic critics
often apply, when they allow or disallow dialogues of Plato, we
should be obliged to embrace one or other of them, or at least
something nearly approaching thereto. If a critic, after attentively
studying the principal compositions now extant of _our_ Aristotle,
thinks himself entitled, on the faith of his acquired
"_Aristotelisches Gefühl_," to declare that no works differing
materially from them (either in subject handled, or in manner of
handling, or in degree of excellence), can have been composed by
Aristotle--he will assuredly be forced to include in such rejection a
large proportion of those indicated in the Catalogue of Diogenes.
Especially he will be forced to reject the Dialogues--the very
compositions by which Aristotle was best known to Cicero and his
contemporaries. For the difference between them and the known
compositions of Aristotle, not merely in form but in style (the style
being known from the epithets applied to them by Cicero), must have
been more marked and decisive than that between the Alkibiades,
Hippias, Theages, Erastæ, Leges, &c.--which most Platonic critics now
set aside as spurious--and the Republic, Protagoras, Gorgias,
Philêbus, &c., which they treat as indisputably genuine.[16]

[Footnote 16: Thus (for example) in Bernays, who has displayed great
acuteness and learning in investigating the Aristotelian Canon, and
in collecting what can be known respecting the lost dialogues of
Aristotle, we read the following observations:--"In der That mangelt
es auch nicht an den bestimmtesten Nachrichten über die vormalige
Existenz einer grossen aristotelischen Schriftenreihe, die von der
jetzt erhaltenen _durch die tiefste formale Verschiedenheit_ getrennt
war. Das Verzeichniss aristotelischer Werke führt an seiner Spitze
sieben und zwanzig Bände jetzt verlorener Schriften auf, die alle in
der künstlerischen Gesprächsform abgefasst waren," &c. (Bernays, Die
Dialoge des Aristoteles, p. 2; compare ibid. p. 30).

If, as Bernays justly contends, we are to admit these various
writings, notwithstanding "the profound difference of form," as
having emanated from the same philosopher Aristotle, how are we to
trust the Platonic critics when they reject about one-third of the
preserved dialogues of Plato, though there is no difference of form
to proceed upon, but only a difference of style, merit, and, to a
certain extent, doctrine?

Zeller (Die Phil. der Griechen, ii. 2, pp. 45, 46, 2nd ed.) remarks
that the dialogues composed by Aristotle are probably to be ascribed
to the earlier part of his literary life, when he was still (or had
recently been) Plato's scholar.]

In discussing the Platonic Canon, I have already declared that I
consider these grounds of rejection to be unsafe and misleading. Such
judgment is farther confirmed, when we observe the consequences to
which they would conduct in regard to the Aristotelian Canon. In
fact, we must learn to admit among genuine works, both of Plato and
Aristotle, great diversity in subject, in style, and in excellence.

I see no ground for distrusting the Catalogue given by Diogenes, as
being in general an enumeration of works really composed by
Aristotle. These works must have been lodged in some great
library--probably the Alexandrine--where they were seen and counted,
and the titles of them enrolled by some one or more among the
_literati_, with a specification of the sum total obtained on adding
together the lines contained in each.[17] I do not deny the
probability, that, in regard to some, the librarians may have been
imposed upon, and that pseudo-Aristotelian works may have been
admitted; but whether such was partially the fact or not, the general
goodness of the Catalogue seems to me unimpeachable. As to the author
of it, the most admissible conjecture seems that of Brandis and
others, recently adopted and advocated by Heitz: that the Catalogue
owes its origin to one of the Alexandrine _literati_; probably to
Hermippus of Smyrna, a lettered man and a pupil of Kallimachus at
Alexandria, between 240-210 B.C.. Diogenes does not indeed tell us
from whom he borrowed the Catalogue; but in his life of Aristotle, he
more than once cites Hermippus, as having treated of Aristotle and
his biography in a work of some extent; and we know from other sources
that Hermippus had devoted much attention to Aristotle as well as to
other philosophers. If Hermippus be the author of this Catalogue, it
must have been drawn up about the same time that the Byzantine
Aristophanes arranged the dialogues of Plato. Probably, indeed,
Kallimachus the chief librarian, had prepared the way for both of them.
We know that he had drawn up comprehensive tables, including, not only
the principal orators and dramatists, with an enumeration of their
discourses and dramas, but also various miscellaneous authors, with the
titles of their works. We know, farther, that he noticed Demokritus and
Eudoxus, and we may feel assured that, in a scheme thus large, he
would not omit Plato or Aristotle, the two great founders of the
first philosophical schools, nor the specification of the works of
each contained in the Alexandrine library.[18] Heitz supposes that
Hermippus was the author of most of the catalogues (not merely of
Aristotle, but also of other philosophers) given by Diogenes;[19] yet
that nevertheless Diogenes himself had no direct acquaintance with
the works of Hermippus, but copied these catalogues at second-hand
from some later author, probably Favorinus. This last supposition is
noway made out.

[Footnote 17: Stahr, who in the first volume of his work Aristotelia
(p. 194), had expressed an opinion that the Catalogue given by
Diogenes is the Catalogue "der eigenen Schritten des Stageiriten, wie
sie sich in seinem Nachlasse befanden," retracts that opinion in the
second volume of the same work (pp. 68-70), and declares the
Catalogue to be an enumeration of the Aristotelian works in the
library of Alexandria. Trendelenburg concurs in this later opinion
(Prooemium ad Commentar. in Aristot. De Animâ, p. 123).]

[Footnote 18: [Greek: E(/rmippos o( Kallima/cheios e)n tô=| prô/tô|
peri\ A)ristote/lous], is cited by Athenæus, xv. 696; also v. 213.

Among the Tables prepared by Kallimachus, one was [Greek: Pantoda/pôn
Suggramma/tôn Pi/nax]; and in it were included the [Greek:
Plakountopoii+ka\ suggra/mmata Ai)gimi/ou, kai\ Ê(gêsi/ppou, kai\
Mêtrobi/ou, e)/ti de\ Phai/tou] (Athenæus, xiv. 644). If Kallimachus
carried down his catalogue of the contents of the library to works so
unimportant as these, we may surely believe that he would not omit to
catalogue such works of Aristotle as were in it. He appears to have
made a list of the works of Demokritus (_i.e._ such as were in the
library) with a glossary. See Brandis (Aristoteles, Berlin, 1853, p.
74); also Suidas _v._ [Greek: Kalli/machos], Diogen. Laert. viii. 86;
Dionys. Hal. De Dinarcho, pp. 630, 652 R.; Athenæus, viii. 336, xv.
669.]

[Footnote 19: Heitz, Die Verl. Schr. des Aristot. pp. 45-48.

Patricius, in his Discuss. Peripatetic. (t. i. pp. 13-18), had
previously considered Hermippus as having prepared a Catalogue of the
works of Aristotle, partly on the authority of the Scholion annexed
to the conclusion of the Metaphysica of Theophrastus. Hermippus
recited the testament of Aristotle (Athenæus, xiii. 589).

Both Valentine Rose and Bernays regard Andronikus as author of the
Catalogue of Aristotle in Diogenes. But I think that very sufficient
reasons to refute this supposition have been shown by Heitz, pp.
49-52. The opinion given by Christ, respecting the Catalogue which we
find in Diogenes Laertius--"illum catalogum non Alexandrinæ
bibliothecæ, sed exemplarium Aristotelis ab Apelliconte Athenas
translatorum fuisse equidem censeo"--is in substance the same as that
of Rose and Bernays. I do not concur in it. (Christ, Studia in
Aristotelis Libros Metaphysicos, Berlin, 1853, p. 105).]

It seems thus probable that the Catalogue given by Diogenes derives
its origin from Hermippus or Kallimachus, enumerating the titles of
such works of Aristotle as were contained in the Alexandrine library.
But the aggregate of works composing _our_ Aristotle is noway in
harmony with that Catalogue. It proceeds from a source independent
and totally different, viz., the edition and classification first
published by the Rhodian Andronikus, in the generation between the
death of Cicero and the Christian era. To explain the existence of
these two distinct and independent sources and channels, we must have
recourse to the remarkable narrative (already noticed in my chapter
on the Platonic Canon), delivered mainly by Strabo and less fully by
Plutarch, respecting the fate of the Aristotelian library after
Aristotle's death.

At the decease of Aristotle, his library and MSS. came to
Theophrastus, who continued chief of the Peripatetic school at Athens
for thirty-five years, until his death in 287 B.C. Both Aristotle and
Theophrastus not only composed many works of their own, but also laid
out much money in purchasing or copying the works of others;[20]
especially we are told that Aristotle, after the death of Speusippus,
expended three talents in purchasing his books. The entire library of
Theophrastus, thus enriched from two sources, was bequeathed by his
testament to a philosophical friend and pupil, Neleus;[21] who left
Athens, and carried away the library with him to his residence at the
town of Skêpsis, in the Asiatic region known as Æolis, near Troad. At
Skêpsis the library remained for the greater part of two centuries,
in possession of the descendants of Neleus, men of no accomplishments
and no taste for philosophy. It was about thirty or forty years after
the death of Theophrastus that the kings of Pergamus began to occupy
themselves in collecting their royal library, which presently reached
a magnitude second only to that of Alexandria. Now Skêpsis was under
their dominion, and it would seem that the kings seized the books
belonging to their subjects for the use of the royal library; for we
are told that the heirs of Neleus were forced to conceal their
literary treasures in a cellar, subject to great injury, partly from
damp, partly from worms. In this ruinous hiding-place the manuscripts
remained for nearly a century and a half--"_blattarum ac tinearum
epulæ_,"--until the Attalid dynasty at Pergamus became extinct. The
last of these kings, Attalus, died in 133 B.C., bequeathing his
kingdom to the Romans. All fear of requisitions for the royal library
being thus at end, the manuscripts were in course of time withdrawn
by their proprietors from concealment, and sold for a large sum to
Apellikon, a native of Teos, a very rich resident at Athens, and
attached to the Peripatetic sect. Probably this wealthy Peripatetic
already possessed a library of his own, with some Aristotelian works;
but the new acquisitions from Skêpsis, though not his whole stock,
formed the most rare and precious ingredients in it. Here, then, the
manuscripts and library both of Aristotle and Theophrastus became,
for the first time since 287 B.C., open to the inspection of the
Athenian Peripatetics of the time (about 100 B.C.), as well as of
other learned men. Among the stock were contained many compositions
which the Scholarchs, successors of **Theophrastus at Athens, had
neither possessed nor known.[22] But the manuscripts were found
imperfect, seriously damaged, and in a state of disorder. Apellikon
did his best to remedy that mischief, by causing new copies to be
taken, correcting what had become worm-eaten, and supplying what was
defective or illegible. He appears to have been an erudite man, and
had published a biography of Aristotle, refuting various calumnies
advanced by other biographers; but being (in the words of Strabo) a
lover of books rather than a philosopher, he performed the work of
correction so unskilfully, that the copies which he published were
found full of errors.[23] In the year 86 B.C., Sylla besieged Athens,
and captured it by storm; not long after which he took to himself as
a perquisite the library of Apellikon, and transported it to
Rome.[24] It was there preserved under custody of a librarian, and
various literary Greeks resident at Rome obtained access to it,
especially Tyrannion, the friend of Cicero and a warm admirer of
Aristotle, who took peculiar pains to gain the favour of the
librarian.[25] It was there also that the Rhodian Andronikus obtained
access to the Aristotelian works.[26] He classified them to a great
degree anew, putting in juxtaposition the treatises most analogous in
subject;[27] moreover, he corrected the text, and published a new
edition of the manuscripts, with a tabulated list. This was all the
more necessary, because some booksellers at Rome, aiming only at sale
and profit, had employed bad writers, and circulated inaccurate
copies, not collated with the originals.[28] These originals,
however, were so damaged, and the restitutions made by Apellikon were
so injudicious, that the more careful critics who now studied them
were often driven to proceed on mere probable evidence.

[Footnote 20: Diog. L. iv. 5; Aulus Gellius, N. A. iii. 17.]

[Footnote 21: From a passage of Lucian (De Parasito, c. xxxv.) we
learn that Aristoxenus spoke of himself as friend and guest of
Neleus: [Greek: kai\ ti/s peri\ tou/tou le/gei? Polloi\ me\n kai\
a)/lloi, A)risto/xenos de\ o( mousiko/s, pollou= lo/gou a)/xios kai\
au)to\s de\ para/sitos Nê/leôs ê)=n.]]

[Footnote 22: Strabo, xiii. 608, 609; Athenæus, v. 214. The narrative
of Strabo has been often misunderstood and impugned, as if he had
asserted that none of the main works of Aristotle had ever been
published until they were thus exhumed by Apellikon. This is the
supposed allegation which Stahr, Zeller, and others have taken so
much pains to refute. But in reality Strabo says no such thing. His
words affirm or imply the direct contrary, viz., that many works of
Aristotle, not merely the exoteric works but others besides, _had_
been published earlier than the purchase made by Apellikon. What
Strabo says is, that few of these works were in possession of the
Peripatetic Scholarchs at Athens before the time of that purchase;
and he explains thus how it was that these Scholarchs, during the
century intervening, had paid little attention to the profound and
abstruse speculations of Aristotle; how it was that they had confined
themselves to dialectic and rhetorical debate on special problems. I
see no ground for calling in question the fact affirmed by
Strabo--the poverty of the Peripatetic school-library at Athens;
though he may perhaps have assigned a greater importance to that fact
than it deserves, as a means of explaining the intellectual working
of the Peripatetic Scholarchs from Lykon to Kritolaus. The
philosophical impulse of that intervening century seems to have
turned chiefly towards ethics and the _Summum Bonum_, with the
conflicting theories of Platonists, Peripatetics, Stoics, and
Epikureans thereupon.]

[Footnote 23: Strabo, xiii. 609. [Greek: ê)=n de\ o( A)pellikô=n
philo/biblos ma=llon ê)\ philo/sophos, dio\ kai\ zêtô=n
e)pano/othôsin tô=n diabrôma/tôn, ei)s a)nti/grapha kaina\ metê/negke
tê\n graphê\n a)naplêrô=n ou)k eu)=, kai\ e)xe/dôken a(marta/dôn
plê/rê ta\ bi/blia.]]

[Footnote 24: Strabo, xiii. 609; Plutarch, Sylla, c. xxvi.]

[Footnote 25: Strabo, xiii. 609. [Greek: Turanni/ôn, o( grammatiko\s
diecheiri/sato philaristote/lês ô)/n, therapeu/sas to\n e)pi\ tê=s
biblothê/kês.] Tyrannion had been the preceptor of Strabo (xii. 548);
and Boêthus, who studied Aristotle along with Strabo, was a disciple
of the Rhodian Andronikus. See Ammonius ad Categorias, f. 8; and
Ravaisson, Essai sur la Métaphysique d'Aristote, Introduction, p.
10.]

[Footnote 26: Plutarch, Sylla, c. xxvi.]

[Footnote 27: The testimony of Porphyry in respect to Andronikus, and
to the real service performed by Andronikus, is highly valuable.
Porphyry was the devoted disciple and friend, as well as the literary
executor, of Plotinus; whose writings were left in an incorrect and
disorderly condition. Porphyry undertook to put them in order and
publish them; and he tells us that, in fulfilling this promise, he
followed the example of what Andronikus had done for the works of
Aristotle and Theophrastus. [Greek: E)pei\ de\ au)to\s] (Plotinus)
[Greek: tê\n dio/rthôsin kai\ tê\n dia/taxin tô=n bibli/ôn
poiei=sthai ê(mi=n e)pe/trepsen, e)gô\ de\ e)kei/nô| zô=nti
u(pescho/mên kai\ toi=s a)/llois e(tai/rois e)pêggeila/mên poiê=sai
tou=to, prô=ton me\n ta\ bi/blia ou) kata\ chro/nous e)a=sai phu/rdên
e)kdedome/na e)dikai/ôsa, mimêsa/menos d' A)pollo/dôron to\n
A)thênai=on kai\ A)ndro/nikon to\n Peripatêtiko/n, ô(=n o( me\n
E)pi/charmon to\n kômô|diogra/phon ei)s de/ka to/mous phe/rôn
sunê/gagen, o( de\ ta\ A)ristote/lous kai\ Theophra/stou ei)s
pragmatei/as diei=le, ta\s oi)kei/as u(pothe/seis ei)s tau)to\n
sunagagô/n, ou(/tô dê\ kai\ e)gô\ pentê/konta te/ssarau)/nta e)/chôn
ta\ tou= Plôti/nou bi/blia diei=lon me\n ei)s e(\x e)nnea/das, tê=|
teleio/têti tou= e(\x a)rithmou= kai\ tai=s e)nnea/sin a)sme/nôs
e)pituchô/n, e(ka/stê| de\ e)nnea/di ta\ oi)kei=a phe/rôn
sunepho/rêsa, dou\s kai\ ta/xin prô/tên toi=s e)laphrote/rois
problê/masin.] (Porphyry, Vita Plotini, p. 117, Didot.) Porphyry here
distinctly affirms that Andronikus rendered this valuable service not
merely to the works of Aristotle, but also to those of Theophrastus.
This is important, as connecting him with the library conveyed by
Sylla to Rome; which library we know to have contained the
manuscripts of both these philosophers. And in the Scholion appended
to the Metaphysica of Theophrastus (p. 323, Brandis) we are told that
Andronikus and Hermippus had made a catalogue of the works of
Theophrastus, in which the Metaphysics was not included.]

[Footnote 28: Strabo, xiii. 609: [Greek: bibliopô=lai/ tines
grapheu=si phau/lois chrô/menoi kai\ ou)k a)ntiba/llontes], &c.]

This interesting narrative--delivered by Strabo, the junior
contemporary of Andronikus, and probably derived by him either from
Tyrannion his preceptor or from the Sidonian Boêthus[29] and other
philosophical companions jointly, with whom he had prosecuted the
study of Aristotle--appears fully worthy of trust. The proceedings
both of Apellikon and of Sylla prove, what indeed we might have
presumed without proof, that the recovery of these long-lost original
manuscripts of Aristotle and Theophrastus excited great sensation in
the philosophical world of Athens and of Rome. With such
newly-acquired materials, a new epoch began for the study of these
authors. The more abstruse philosophical works of Aristotle now came
into the foreground under the auspices of a new Scholarch; whereas
Aristotle had hitherto been chiefly known by his more popular and
readable compositions. Of these last, probably, copies may have been
acquired to a certain extent by the previous Peripatetic Scholarchs
or School at Athens; but the School had been irreparably impoverished,
so far as regarded the deeper speculations of philosophy, by the loss
of those original manuscripts which had been transported from Athens
to Skêpsis. What Aristotelian Scholarchs, prior to Andronikus, chiefly
possessed and studied, of the productions of their illustrious
founder, were chiefly the _exoteric_ or extra-philosophical and
comparatively popular:--such as the dialogues; the legendary and
historical collections; the facts respecting constitutional history
of various Hellenic cities; the variety of miscellaneous problems
respecting Homer and a number of diverse matters; the treatises on
animals and on anatomy, &c.[30] In the Alexandrine library (as we see
by the Catalogue of Diogenes) there existed all these and several
philosophical works also; but that library was not easily available
for the use of the Scholarchs at Athens, who worked upon their own
stock, confining themselves mainly to smooth and elegant discourses
on particular questions, and especially to discussions, with the
Platonists, Stoics, and Epikureans, on the _principia_ of Ethics,
without any attempt either to follow up or to elucidate the more
profound speculations (logical, physical, metaphysical, cosmical) of
Aristotle himself. A material change took place when the library of
Apellikon came to be laid open and studied, not merely by lecturers
in the professorial chair at Athens, but also by critics like
Tyrannion and Andronikus at Rome. These critics found therein the
most profound and difficult philosophical works of Aristotle in the
handwriting of the philosopher himself; some probably, of which
copies may have already existed in the Alexandrine library, but some
also as yet unpublished. The purpose of Andronikus, who is described
as Peripatetic Scholarch, eleventh in succession from Aristotle, was
not simply to make a Catalogue (as Hermippus had made at Alexandria),
but to render a much greater service, which no critic could render
without having access to original MSS., namely, to obtain a correct
text of the books actually before him, to arrange these books in
proper order, and then to publish and explain them,[31] but to take
no account of other Aristotelian works in the Alexandrine library or
elsewhere. The Aristotelian philosophy thus passed into a new phase.
Our editions of Aristotle may be considered as taking their date from
this critical effort of Andronikus, with or without subsequent
modifications by others, as the case may be.

[Footnote 29: Strabo, xvi. 757. Stahr, in his minor work, Aristoteles
unter den Römern, p. 32, considers that this circumstance lessens the
credibility of Strabo. I think the contrary. No one was so likely to
have studied the previous history of the MSS. as the editors of a new
edition.]

[Footnote 30: Strabo, xiii. 609: [Greek: sune/bê de\ toi=s e)k tô=n
peripa/tôn toi=s me\n pa/lai toi=s meta\ Theo/phraston, o(/lôs ou)k
e)/chousi ta\ bi/blia plê\n o)li/gôn kai\ ma/lista tô=n e)xôterikô=n,
mêde\n e)/chein philosophei=n pragmatikô=s, a)lla\ the/seis
lêkuthi/zein; toi=s d' u(/steron, a)ph' ou)= ta\ bi/blia tau=ta
proê=lthen, a)/meinon me\n e)kei/nôn philosophei=n kai\
a)ristoteli/zein, a)nagka/zesthai me/ntoi ta\ polla\ ei)ko/ta le/gein
dia\ to\ plê=thos tô=n a(martiô=n.] Also Plutarch, Sylla, c. xxvi.

The passage of Strabo is so perspicuous and detailed, that it has all
the air of having been derived from the best critics who frequented
the library at Rome, where Strabo was when he wrote ([Greek: kai\
_e)/nthade_ kai\ e)n A)lexandrei/a|], xiii. 609). The Peripatetic
Andronikus, whom he names among the celebrated Rhodians (xiv. 655),
may have been among his informants. His statements about the bad
state of the manuscripts; the unskilful emendations of Apellikon; the
contrast between the vein of Peripatetic study, as it had stood
before the revelation of the manuscripts, and as it came to stand
afterwards; the uncertain evidences upon which careful students, even
with the manuscripts before them, were compelled to proceed; the tone
of depreciation in which he speaks of the carelessness of booksellers
who sought only for profit,--all these points of information appear
to me to indicate that Strabo's informants were acute and diligent
critics, familiar with the library, and anxious both for the real
understanding of these documents, and for philosophy as an end.]

[Footnote 31: Plutarch, Sylla, c. xxvi. Spengel ("Ueber die
Reihenfolge der naturwissenschaftlichen Schriften des Aristoteles,"
München. philol. Abhandl. 1848,) remarks justly that the critical
arrangement of Aristotle's writings, for collective publication,
begins from the library of Apellikon at Rome, not from that of
Alexandria. See p. 146: "Mehr als zweihundert Jahre lang fehlt uns
alle nähere Kunde über die peripatetische Schule. Erst mit der viel
besprochenen Auffindung der Bibliothek des Aristoteles in Athen und
deren Wegführung nach Rom durch Sulla wird ein regeres Studium für
die Schriften des Philosophen bemerkbar--_und zwar jetzt eigentlich
der Schriften, weniger der Lehre und Philosophie im Allgemeinen,
welche früher allein beachtet worden ist_. Wir möchten sagen, von
jetzt an beginne das philologische Studium mit den Werken des
Aristoteles, die kritische und exegetische Behandlung dieser durch
Tyrannion, Andronikus, Adrastus und viele andre nachlfolgende," &c.]

The explanation just given, coinciding on many points with Brandis
and Heitz, affords the most probable elucidation of that obscurity
which arises about the Aristotelian Canon, when we compare _our_
Aristotle with the Catalogue of Diogenes--the partial likeness, but
still greater discrepancy, between the two. It is certain that
neither Cicero[32] nor the great Alexandrine _literati_, anterior to
and contemporary with him, knew Aristotle from most of the works
which we now possess. They knew him chiefly from the dialogues, the
matters of history and legend, some zoological books, and the
problems; the dialogues, and the historical collections respecting
the constitutions of Hellenic cities,[33] being more popular and
better known than any other works. While the Republic of Plato is
familiar to them, they exhibit no knowledge of our Aristotelian
Politica, in which treatise the criticism upon the Platonic Republic
is among the most interesting parts. When we look through the
contents of our editions of Aristotle the style and manner of
handling is indeed pretty much the same throughout, but the subjects
will appear extremely diverse and multifarious; and the
encyclopedical character of the author, as to science and its
applications, will strike us forcibly. The entire and real Aristotle,
however, was not only more encyclopedical as to subjects handled, but
also more variable as to style and manner of handling; passing from
the smooth, sweet, and flowing style--which Cicero extols as
characterizing the Aristotelian dialogues--to the elliptical brevity
and obscurity which we now find so puzzling in the De Animâ and the
Metaphysica.[34]

[Footnote 32: This is certain, from the remarks addressed by Cicero
to Trebatius at the beginning of the Ciceronian Topica, that in his
time Aristotle was little known and little studied at Rome, even by
philosophical students. Trebatius knew nothing of the Topica, until
he saw the work by chance in Cicero's library, and asked information
about the contents. The reply of Cicero illustrates the little notice
taken of Aristotle by Roman readers. "Cum autem ego te, non tam
vitandi laboris mei causâ, quam quia tua id interesse arbitrarer, vel
ut eos per te ipse legeres, vel ut totam rationem a doctissimo quodam
rhetore acciperes, hortatus essem, utrumque ut ex te audiebam, es
expertus. Sed a libris te obscuritas rejecit: rhetor autem ille
magnus, ut opinor, _Aristotelia se ignorare_ respondit. Quod quidem
minime sum admiratus, eum philosophum rhetori non esse cognitum, _qui
ab ipsis philosophis, præter admodum paucos, ignoraretur._" Compare
also Cicero, Academ. Post. i. 3, 10.]

[Footnote 33: Even the philosophical commentators on Aristotle, such
as David the Armenian, seem to have known the lost work of Aristotle
called [Greek: Politei=ai] (the history of the constitutions of 250
Hellenic cities), better than the theoretical work which we possess,
called the Politica; though they doubtless knew both. (See Scholia ad
Categorias, Brandis, p. 16, b. 20; p. 24, a. 25; p. 25, b. 5.)--We
read in Schneider's Preface to the Aristotelian Politica (p. x.):
"Altum et mirabile silentium est apud antiquitatem Græcam et Romanam
de novâ Aristotelis Republicâ, cum omnes ferè scriptores Græci et
Romani, mentione Reipublicæ Platonicæ pleni, vel laudibus vel
vituperiis ejus abundant."--There is no clear reference to the
Aristotelian Politica earlier than Alexander of Aphrodisias. Both
Hildenbrand (Geschichte der Staats- und Rechts-Philosophen, t. i. pp.
358-361), and Oncken (Staatslehre des Aristot. pp. 65-66), think that
the Aristotelian Politica was not published until after the purchase
of the library by Apellikon.]

[Footnote 34: What Strabo asserts about the Peripatetic Scholarchs
succeeding Theophrastus (viz., [Greek: mêde\n e)/chein philosophei=n
pragmatikô=s, a)lla\ the/seis lêkuthi/zein]: that they could not
handle philosophy in a businesslike way--with those high generalities
and that subtle analysis which was supposed to belong to
philosophy--but gave smooth and ornate discourses on set problems or
theses) is fully borne out by what we read in Cicero about these same
Peripatetics. The Stoics (immediate successors and rivals) accused
their Peripatetic contemporaries even of being ignorant of Dialectic:
which their founder, Aristotle, in his works that we now possess, had
been the first to raise into something like a science. Cicero says
(De Finibus, iii. 12, 41): "His igitur ita positis (inquit Cato)
sequitur magna contentio: quam tractatam à Peripateticis mollius
(_est enim eorum consuetudo dicendi non satis acuta, propter
ignorationem Dialecticæ_), Carneades tuus, egregiâ quâdam
exercitatione in dialecticis summâque eloquentiâ, rem in summum
discrimen adduxit." Also Cicero, in Tuscul. Disput. iv. 5. 9: "Quia
Chrysippus et Stoici, quum de animi perturbationibus disputant,
magnam partem in iis partiendis et definiendis occupati sunt, illa
eorum perexigua oratio est, quâ medeantur animis nec eos turbulentos
esse patiantur. Peripatetici autem _ad placandos animos multa
afferunt, spinas partiendi et definiendi prætermittunt_." This last
sentence is almost an exact equivalent of the words of Strabo:
[Greek: mêde\n e)/chein philosophei=n pragmatikô=s, a)lla\ the/seis
lêkuthi/zein.] Aristotle himself, in the works which we possess,
might pass as father of the Stoics rather than of the Peripatetics;
for he abounds in classification and subdivision (spinas partiendi et
dividendi), and is even derided on this very ground by opponents (see
Atticus ap. Euseb. Præp. Ev. xv. 4); but he has nothing of the
polished amplification ascribed to the later Peripatetics by Strabo
and Cicero. Compare, about the Peripatetics from Lykon to Kritolaus,
Cicero, De Finibus, v. 5: "Lyco, oratione locuples, rebus ipsis
jejunior." Plutarch (Sylla, c. xxvi.) calls these later Peripatetics
[Greek: charie/ntes kai\ philo/logoi], &c.]

I shall assume this variety, both of subject and of handling, as a
feature to be admitted and allowed for in Aristotle, when I come to
discuss the objections of some critics against the authenticity of
certain treatises among the forty-six which now pass under his name.
But in canvassing the Aristotelian Canon I am unable to take the same
ground as I took in my former work, when reviewing the Platonic
Canon. In regard to Plato, I pointed out a strong antecedent
presumption in favour of the Canon of Thrasyllus--a canon derived
originally from the Alexandrine librarians, and sustained by the
unanimous adhesion of antiquity. In regard to Aristotle, there are no
similar grounds of presumption to stand upon. We have good reason for
believing that the works both of Plato and Aristotle--if not all the
works, at least many of them, and those the most generally
interesting--were copied and transmitted early to the Alexandrine
library. Now _our_ Plato represents that which was possessed and
accredited as Platonic by the Byzantine Aristophanes and the other
Alexandrine librarians; but _our_ Aristotle does not, in my judgment,
represent what these librarians possessed and accredited as
Aristotelian. That which they thus accredited stands recorded in the
Catalogue given by Diogenes, probably the work of Hermippus, as I
have already stated; while _our_ Aristotle is traceable to the
collection at Athens, including that of Apellikon, with that which he
bought from the heirs of Neleus, and to the sifting, correction, and
classification, applied thereto by able critics of the first century
B.C. and subsequently; among whom Andronikus is best known. We may
easily believe that the library of Apellikon contained various
compositions of Aristotle, which had never been copied for the
Alexandrine library--perhaps never prepared for publication at all,
so that the task of arranging detached sections or morsels into a
whole, with one separate title, still remained to be performed. This
was most likely to be the case with abstruser speculations, like the
component books of the Metaphysica, which Theophrastus may not have
been forward to tender, and which the library might not be very eager
to acquire, having already near four hundred other volumes by the
same author. These reserved works would therefore remain in the
library of Theophrastus, not copied and circulated (or at least
circulated only to a few private philosophical brethren, such as
Eudêmus), so that they never became fully published until the days of
Apellikon.[35]

[Footnote 35: The two Peripatetic Scholarchs at Athens, Straton and
Lykon, who succeeded (after the death of Theophrastus and the
transfer of his library to Skêpsis) in the conduct of the school,
left at their decease collections of books, of which each disposes by
his will (Diogen. L. v. 62; v. 73). The library of Apellikon, when
sent by Sylla to Rome, contained probably many other Aristotelian
MSS., besides those purchased from Skêpsis.

Michelet, in his Commentary on the Nikomachean Ethica, advances a
theory somewhat analogous but bolder, respecting the relation between
the Catalogue given by Diogenes, and the works contained in _our_
Aristotle. Comm. p. 2. "Id solum addam, hoc Aristotelis opus (the
Nikomachean Ethica), ut reliqua omnia, ex brevioribus
commentationibus consarcinatum fuisse, quæ quidem vivo Aristotele in
lucem prodierint, cum unaquæque disciplina, e quâ excerpta fuerint in
admirabilem illum quem habemus ordinem jam ab ipso Aristotele sive
quodam ejus discipulo redacta, in libris Aristotelis manu scriptis
latitaverit, qui hereditate ad Nelei prolem, ut notum est,
transmissi, in cellâ illâ subterraneâ Scepsiâ absconditi fuerunt,
donec Apellicon Teius et Rhodius Andronicus eos ediderint. Leguntur
autem commentationum illarum de Moribus tituli in elencho librorum
Aristotelis apud Diogenem (v. 22-26): [Greek: peri\ a)retô=n] (Lib.
ii., iii. c. 6-fin. iv. nostrorum Ethicorum); [Greek: peri\
e(kousi/ou] (Lib. iii. c. 1-5); &c. Plerumque enim non integra
volumina, sed singulos libros vel singula volumina diversarum
disciplinarum, Diogenes in elencho suo enumeravit."

In his other work (Essai sur la Métaphysique d'Aristote, pp. 202,
205, 225) Michelet has carried this theory still farther, and has
endeavoured to identify separate fragments of the Aristotelian works
now extant, with various titles in the Catalogue given by Diogenes.
The identification is not convincing.]

But though the edition published by Andronikus would thus contain
many genuine works of Aristotle not previously known or edited, we
cannot be sure that it would not also include some which were
spurious. Reflect what the library of Apellikon, transported to Rome
by Sylla, really was. There was in it the entire library of
Theophrastus; probably, also, that of Neleus, who must have had some
books of his own, besides what he inherited from Theophrastus. It
included all the numerous manuscript works composed by Aristotle and
Theophrastus, and many other manuscript works purchased or acquired
by them, but composed by others--the whole in very bad order and
condition; and, moreover, the books which Apellikon possessed before,
doubtless as many Aristotelian books as he could purchase. To
distinguish, among this heterogeneous mass of manuscripts, which of
them were the manuscripts composed by Aristotle; to separate these
from the writings of Theophrastus, Eudêmus, or other authors, who
composed various works of their own upon the same subjects and with
the same titles as those of Aristotle--required extreme critical
discernment and caution; the rather, since there was no living
companion of Aristotle or Theophrastus to guide or advise, more than
a century and a half having elapsed since the death of Theophrastus,
and two centuries since that of Aristotle. Such were the difficulties
amidst which Apellikon, Tyrannion, and Andronikus had to decide, when
they singled out the manuscripts of Aristotle to be published. I will
not say that they decided wrongly; yet neither can I contend (as I
argued in the case of the Platonic dialogues) that the presumption is
very powerful in favour of that Canon which their decision made
legal. The case is much more open to argument, if any grounds against
the decision can be urged.

Andronikus put in, arranged, and published the treatises of Aristotle
(or those which he regarded as composed by Aristotle) included in the
library conveyed by Sylla to Rome. I have already observed, that
among these treatises there were some, of which copies existed in the
Alexandrine library (as represented by the Catalogue of Diogenes),
but a still greater number which cannot be identified with the titles
remaining of works there preserved. As to the works common to both
libraries, we must remember that Andronikus introduced a
classification of his own, analogous to the Enneads applied by
Porphyry to the works of Plotinus, and to the Tetralogies adopted by
Thrasyllus in regard to the Dialogues of Plato; so that even these
works might not be distributed in the same partitions under each of
the two arrangements. And this is what we actually see when we
compare the Catalogue of Diogenes with _our_ Aristotle. Rhetoric,
Ethics, Physics, Problems, &c., appear in both as titles or subjects,
but distributed into a different number of books or sections in one
and in the other; perhaps, indeed, the compositions are not always
the same.

Before I proceed to deal with the preserved works of Aristotle--those
by which alone he is known to us, and was known to mediæval readers,
I shall say a few words respecting the import of a distinction which
has been much canvassed, conveyed in the word _exoteric_ and its
opposite. This term, used on various occasions by Aristotle himself,
has been also employed by many ancient critics, from Cicero
downwards; while by mediæval and modern critics, it has not merely
been employed, but also analysed and elucidated. According to Cicero
(the earliest writer subsequent to Aristotle in whom we find the
term), it designates one among two classes of works composed by
Aristotle: _exoteric_ works were those composed in a popular style
and intended for a large, indiscriminate circle of readers: being
contrasted with other works of elaborated philosophical reasoning,
which were not prepared for the public taste, but left in the
condition of memorials for the instruction of a more select class of
studious men. Two points are to be observed respecting Cicero's
declaration. First, he applies it to the writings not of Aristotle
exclusively, but also to those of Theophrastus, and even of
succeeding Peripatetics; secondly, he applies it directly to such of
their writings only as related to the discussion of the _Summum
Bonum_.[36] Furthermore, Cicero describes the works which Aristotle
called exoteric, as having _proems_ or introductory prefaces.[37]

[Footnote 36: Cicero, De Finibus, v. 5, 12. "De summo autem bono,
quia duo genera librorum sunt, unum populariter scriptum, quod
[Greek: e)xôteriko\n] appellabant, alterum limatius, quod in
commentariis reliquerunt, non semper idem dicere videntur: nec in
summâ tamen ipsâ aut varietas est ulla, apud hos quidem quos
nominavi, aut inter ipsos dissensio."

The word _limatius_ here cannot allude to high polish and ornament of
style (nitor orationis), but must be equivalent to [Greek:
a)kribe/steron], _doctius_, _subtilius_, &c. (as Buhle and others
have already remarked, Buhle, De Libris Aristot. Exoter. et Acroam.
p. 115; Madvig, ad Cicero de Finib. v. 12; Heitz, p. 134), applied to
profound reasoning, with distinctions of unusual precision, which it
required a careful preparatory training to apprehend. This employment
of the word _limatius_ appears to me singular, but it cannot mean
anything else here. The _commentarii_ are the general heads--plain
unadorned statements of facts or reasoning--which the orator or
historian is to employ his genius in setting forth and decorating, so
that it may be heard or read with pleasure and admiration by a
general audience. Cicero, in that remarkable letter wherein he
entreats Lucceius to narrate his (Cicero's) consulship in an
historical work, undertakes to compose "commentarios rerum omnium" as
materials for the use of Lucceius (Ep. ad Famil. v. 12. 10). His
expression, "in commentariis reliquerunt," shows that he considered
the exoteric books to have been prepared by working up some naked
preliminary materials into an ornate and interesting form.]

[Footnote 37: Cicero, Ep. ad Att. iv. 16.]

In the main, the distinction here drawn by Cicero, understood in a
very general sense, has been accepted by most following critics as
intended by the term _exoteric_: something addressed to a wide,
indiscriminate circle of general readers or hearers, and intelligible
or interesting to them without any special study or training--as
contrasted with that which is reserved for a smaller circle of
students assumed to be specially qualified. But among those who agree
in this general admission, many differences have prevailed. Some have
thought that the term was not used by Aristotle to designate any
writings either of his own or of others, but only in allusion to
informal oral dialogues or debates. Others again, feeling assured
that Aristotle intended by the term to signify some writings of his
own, have searched among the works preserved, as well as among the
titles of the works lost, to discriminate such as the author
considered to be exoteric: though this search has certainly not ended
in unanimity; nor do I think it has been successful. Again, there
have not been wanting critics (among them, Thomas Aquinas and
Sepulveda), who assign to the term a meaning still more vague and
undefined; contending that when Aristotle alludes to "exoteric
discourses," he indicates simply some other treatise of his own,
distinct from that in which the allusion occurs, without meaning to
imply anything respecting its character.[38]

[Footnote 38: Sepulveda, p. 125 (cited by Bernays, Dialoge des
Aristoteles, p. 41): "Externos sermones sive exotericos solet
Aristoteles libros eos appellare, quicunque sunt extra id opus in quo
tunc versatur, ut jure pontificio periti consueverunt: non enim
exoterici sermones seu libri certo aliquo genere continentur, ut est
publicus error."

Zeller lends his high authority to an explanation of _exoteric_ very
similar to the above. (Gesch. der Philos. ii. 2, p. 100, seq.:--"dass
unter exoterischen Reden nicht eine eigene Klasse populär
geschriebener Bücher, sondern nur überhaupt solche Erörterungen
verstanden werden, welche nicht in den Bereich der vorliegenden
Untersuchung gehören.") He discusses the point at some length; but
the very passages which he cites, especially Physica, iv. 10, appear
to me less favourable to his view than to that which I have stated in
the text, according to which the word means _dialectic_ as contrasted
with _didactic_.]

To me it appears that this last explanation is untenable, and that
the term _exoteric_ designates matter of a certain character,
assignable to some extent by positive marks, but still more by
negative; matter, in part, analogous to that defined by Cicero and
other critics. But to conceive clearly or fully what its character
is, we must turn to Aristotle himself, who is of course the final
authority, wherever he can be found to speak in a decisive manner.
His preserved works afford altogether eight passages (two of them
indeed in the Eudemian Ethics, which, for the present at least, I
shall assume to be his work), wherein the phrase "exoteric
discourses" ([Greek: e)xôterikoi\ lo/goi]) occurs. Out of these eight
passages, there are seven which present the phrase as designating
some unknown matter, not farther specified, but distinct from the
work in which the phrase occurs: "Enough has been said (or is said,
Aristotle intimates) about this subject, even in the exoteric
discourses." To what it is that he here alludes--whether to other
writings of his own or oral discussions of his own, or writing and
speech of a particular sort by others--we are left to interpret as we
best may, by probable reason or conjecture. But there is one among
the eight passages, in which Aristotle uses the term _exoteric_ as
describing, not what is to be looked for elsewhere, but what he is
himself about to give in the treatise in hand. In the fourth book of
the Physica, he discusses the three high abstractions, Place, Vacuum,
Time. After making an end of the first two, he enters upon the third,
beginning with the following words:--"It follows naturally on what
has been said, that we should treat respecting Time. But first it is
convenient to advert to the difficulties involved in it, by _exoteric
discourse also_--whether Time be included among entities or among
non-entities; then afterwards, what is its nature. Now a man might
suspect, from the following reasons, that Time either absolutely does
not exist, or exists scarcely and dimly," &c. Aristotle then gives a
string of dialectic reasons, lasting through one of the columns of
the Berlin edition, for doubting whether Time really exists. He
afterwards proceeds thus, through two farther columns:--"Let these be
enumerated as the difficulties accompanying the attributes of Time.
What Time is, and what is its nature, is obscure, as well from what
has been handed down to us by others, as from what we ourselves have
just gone through;"[39] and this question also he first discusses
dialectically, and then brings to a solution.

[Footnote 39: Aristot. Physic. iv. 10, p. 217, b. 29. [Greek:
E)cho/menon de\ tô=n ei)rême/nôn e)sti\n e)pelthei=n peri\ chro/nou;
prô=ton de\ kalô=s e)/chei diaporê=sai peri\ au)tou= _kai\ dia\ tô=n
e)xôterikô=n lo/gôn_, po/teron tô=n o)/ntôn e)sti\n ê)\ tô=n mê\
o)/ntôn, ei)=ta ti/s ê( phu/sis au)tou=. O(/ti me\n ou)=n ê)\ o(/lôs
e)/stin, ê)\ mo/lis kai\ a)mudrô=s, e)k tô=nde/ tis a)\n
u(popteu/seien.] Then, after a column of text urging various [Greek:
a)pori/as] as to whether Time is or is not, he goes on, p. 218, a.
31:--[Greek: Peri\ me\n ou)=n tô=n u(parcho/ntôn au)tô=| tosau=t'
e)/stô diêporême/na. Ti/ d' e)sti\n o( chro/nos, kai\ ti/s au)tou= ê(
phu/sis, o(moi/ôs e)/k te tô=n paradedome/nôn a)/dêlo/n e)sti, kai\
peri\ ô(=n tugcha/nomen dielêlutho/tes pro/teron]--thus taking up the
questions, What Time is? What is the nature of Time? Upon this he
goes through another column of [Greek: a)pori/ai], difficulties and
counter-difficulties, until p. 219, a. 1, when he approaches to a
positive determination, as the sequel of various negatives--[Greek:
o(/ti me\n ou)=n ou)/te ki/nêsis ou)/t' a)/neu kinê/seôs o( chro/nos
e)sti/, phanero/n. _lêpte/on_ de/, e)pei\ zêtou=men ti/ e)stin o(
chro/nos, _e)nteu=then a)rchome/nois_, ti/ tê=s kinê/seô/s e)stin.]
He pursues this positive determination throughout two farther columns
(see [Greek: u(pokei/sthô], a. 30), until at length he arrives at his
final definition of Time--[Greek: a)rithmo\s kinê/seôs kata\ to\
pro/teron kai\ u(/steron, kai\ sunechê/s (sunechou=s ga\r)]--which he
declares to be [Greek: phanero/n], p. 220, a. 25.

It is plain that the phrase [Greek: e)xôterikoi\ lo/goi] here
designates the preliminary dialectic tentative process, before the
final affirmative is directly attempted, as we read in De Gener. et
Corr. i. 3, p. 317, b. 13: [Greek: peri\ me\n ou)=n tou/tôn e)n
a)/llois _te diêpo/rêtai kai\ diô/ristai_ toi=s lo/gois e)pi\
plei=on]--first, [Greek: to\ _diaporei=n_], next, [Greek: to\
_diori/zein_].]

Now what is it that Aristotle here means by "exoteric discourse?" We
may discover by reading the matter comprised between the two
foregoing citations. We find a string of perplexing difficulties
connected with the supposition that Time exists: such as, "That all
Time is either past or future, of which the former no longer exists,
and the latter does not yet exist; that the Now is no part of Time,
for every Whole is composed of its Parts, and Time is not composed of
Nows," &c. I do not go farther here into these subtle suggestions,
because my present purpose is only to illustrate what Aristotle calls
"exoteric discourse," by exhibiting what he himself announces to be a
specimen thereof. It is the process of noticing and tracing out all
the doubts and difficulties ([Greek: a)pori/as]) which beset the
enquiry in hand, along with the different opinions entertained about
it either by the vulgar, or by individual philosophers, and the
various reasons whereby such opinions may be sustained or impugned.
It is in fact the same process as that which, when performed (as it
was habitually and actively in his age) between two disputants, he
calls _dialectic debate_; and which he seeks to encourage as well as
to regulate in his treatise entitled Topica. He contrasts it with
philosophy, or with the strictly didactic and demonstrative
procedure: wherein the teacher lays down principles which he requires
the learner to admit, and then deduces from them, by syllogisms
constructed in regular form, consequences indisputably binding on all
who have admitted the principles. But though Aristotle thus
distinguishes Dialectic from Philosophy, he at the same time declares
it to be valuable as an auxiliary towards the purpose of philosophy,
and as an introductory exercise before the didactic stage begins. The
philosopher ought to show his competence as a dialectician, by
indicating and handling those various difficulties and controversies
bearing on his subject, which have already been made known, either in
writings or in oral debate.[40]

[Footnote 40: See Aristot. Topic. i. p. 100, b. 21, p. 101, a. 25,
34-36, b. 2. [Greek: Pro\s de\ ta\s kata\ philosophi/an e)pistê/mas
(chrê/simos ê( pragmatei/a), o(/ti duna/menoi pro\s a)mpho/tera
diaporê=sai r(a=|on e)n e(ka/stois katopso/metha ta)lêthe/s te kai\
to\ pseu=dos], p. 105, b. 30. [Greek: Pro\s me\n ou)=n philosophi/an
kat' a)lêtheian peri\ **au)tô=n pragmateue/on, _**dialektikô=s de\
pro\s do/xan_.]

Compare also the commencement of book B. in the Metaphysica, p. 995,
a. 28 seq., and, indeed, the whole of book B., which contains a
dialectic discussion of numerous [Greek: a)pori/ai]. Aristotle
himself refers to it afterwards ([Greek: G]. p. 1004, a. 32) in the
words [Greek: u(/per e)n tai=s a)pori/ais e)lechthê].

The Scholia of Alexander on the beginning of the Topica (pp. 251,
252, Brandis) are instructive; also his Scholia on p. 105, b. 30, p.
260, a. 24. [Greek: _dialektikô=s de\ pro\s do/xan_, ô(s e)n tau/tê|
tê=| pragmatei/a|] (_i.e._ the Topica) [Greek: kai\ e)n toi=s
r(êtorikoi=s, kai\ _e)n toi=s e)xôterikoi=s_. kai\ ga\r e)n
e)kei/nois plei=sta kai\ peri\ tô=n** ê)thikô=n kai\ peri\ tô=n
phusikô=n _e)ndo/xôs_ le/getai.]

We see here that Alexander understands by the _exoteric_ the
dialectic handling of opinions on physics and ethics.

In the Eudemian Ethica also (i. 8, p. 1217, b. 16) we find [Greek:
e)pe/skeptai de\ polloi=s peri\ au)tou= tro/pois, kai\ e)n toi=s
e)xôterikoi=s lo/gois kai\ e)n toi=s kata\ philosophi/an], where we
have the same antithesis in other words--Exoteric or Dialectic
_versus_ Philosophical or Didactic. Compare a clear statement in
Simplikius (Schol. ad Physic. p. 364, b. 19). [Greek: Prô=ton me\n
logikô=s e)picheirei=, tou/testi pithanô=s kai\ e)ndo/xôs, kai\ e)/ti
koino/tero/n pôs kai\ dialektikô/teron. Ê( ga\r dialektikê\ ê(
A)ristote/lous koinê/ e)sti me/thodos peri\ panto\s tou=
protethe/ntos e)x e)ndo/xôn sullogizome/nê--to\ ga\r logiko\n ô(s
koino\n ei)/ôthen a)ntidiaste/llein ta| oi)kei/ô| kai\ kata\ phu/sin
tou= pra/gmatos kai\ a)podeiktikô=|.]]

We thus learn, from the example furnished by Aristotle himself, what
he means by "exoteric discourses." The epithet means literally,
_extraneous to_, _lying on the outside of_; in the present case, on
the outside of philosophy, considered in its special didactic and
demonstrative march.[41] Yet what thus lies outside philosophy, is
nevertheless useful as an accompaniment and preparation for
philosophy. We shall find Aristotle insisting upon this in his Topica
and Analytica; and we shall also find him introducing the exoteric
treatment into his most abstruse philosophical treatises (the Physica
is one of the most abstruse) as an accompaniment and auxiliary--a
dialectic survey of opinions, puzzles, and controverted points,
before he begins to lay down and follow out affirmative principles of
his own. He does this not only throughout the Physica (in several
other passages besides that which I have just cited),[42] but also in
the Metaphysica, the treatises De Animâ, De Generatione et
Corruptione, &c.

[Footnote 41: We find the epithet [Greek: e)xôteriko\s] used once by
Aristotle, not in conjunction with [Greek: lo/goi], but with [Greek:
pra/xeis], designating those acts which are performed with a view to
some ulterior and extraneous end ([Greek: tô=n a)pobaino/ntôn
cha/rin], as contrasted with [Greek: pra/xeis
au)totelei=s--oi)kei=ai]): Polit. vii. p. 1325, b. 22-29.
[Greek: scholê=| **ga\r a)\n o( theo\s e)/choi kalô=s kai\ pa=s o(
ko/smos, oi(=s ou)k ei)si\n e)xôterikai\ pra/xeis para\ ta\s
oi)kei/as ta\s au)tô=n.] In the Eudemian Ethics the phrase [Greek:
_toi=s a)llotri/ois lo/gois_ sophi/zontai] is used much in the same
sense as [Greek: _toi=s e)xôterikoi=s_ lo/gois]: _i.e._ opposed to
[Greek: toi=s oi)kei/ois]--to that which belongs specially to the
scientific determination of the problem (Ethic. Eudem. i. p. 1218,
b. 18).

The phrase [Greek: dia\ tô=n e)xôterikô=n lo/gôn], in Aristot.
Physic. iv. 10, p. 217, b. 31, and the different phrase [Greek: e)k
tô=n ei)ôtho/tôn lo/gôn le/gesthai], in Phys. vi. 2, p. 233, a. 13,
appear to have the same meaning and reference. Compare Prantl not. ad
Arist. Phys. p. 501.]

[Footnote 42: If we turn to the beginning of book iv. of the Physica,
where Aristotle undertakes to examine [Greek: To/pos], _Place_, we
shall see that he begins by a dialectic handling of [Greek:
a)pori/ai], exactly analogous to that which he himself calls [Greek:
e)xôterikoi\ lo/goi], when he proceeds to examine [Greek: Chro/nos],
_Time_: see Physica, iv. pp. 208, a. 32-35, 209, a. 30; 210, a. 12,
b. 31. He does the like also about [Greek: Keno/n], _Vacuum_, p. 213,
a. 20, b. 28, and about [Greek: A)/peiron], _Infinitum_, iii. p. 204,
b. 4 (with the Scholia of Simplikius, p. 364, b. 20, Br.).

Compare the Scholion of Simplikius ad Physica (i. p. 329, b. 1,
Br.)--[Greek: _i)/sôs_ de\] (Simplikius uses this indecisive word
[Greek: i)/sôs]) [Greek: o(/ti ê( e)ph' e(ka/tera a)pori/a tou=
lo/gou e)xôterikê/ tis ê)=n, ô(s Eu)/dêmo/s phêsi, dialektikê\ ma=llon
ou)=sa], with this last Scholion, on p. 364, b. 20, which describes
the same dialectic handling, though without directly calling it
_exoteric_.]

Having thus learnt to understand, from one distinct passage of
Aristotle himself, what he means by "exoteric discourses," we must
interpret by the light of this analogy the other indistinct passages
in which the phrase occurs. We see clearly that in using the phrase,
he does not of necessity intend to refer to any other writings of his
own--nor even to any other writings at all. He may possibly mean
this; but we cannot be sure of it. He means by the phrase, a
dialectic process of turning over and criticizing diverse opinions
and probabilities: whether in his own writings, or in those of
others, or in no writings at all, but simply in those oral debates
which his treatise called Topica presupposes--this is a point which
the phrase itself does not determine. He _may_ mean to allude, in
some cases where he uses the phrase, to his own lost dialogues; but
he may also allude to Platonic and other dialogues, or to colloquies
carried on orally by himself with his pupils, or to oral debates on
intellectual topics between other active-minded men. When Bernays
refers "exoteric discourse" to the lost Aristotelian Dialogues; when
Madvig, Zeller, Torstrick, Forchhammer, and others, refer it to the
contemporary oral dialectic[43]--I think that neither of these
explanations is in itself inadmissible. The context of each
particular passage must decide which of the two is the more probable.
We cannot go farther, in explaining the seven doubtful passages where
Aristotle alludes to the "exoteric discourses," than to understand
the general character and scope of the reasonings which he thus
designates. Extra-philosophical, double-sided, dialectic, is in
general (he holds) insufficient by itself, and valuable only as a
preparation and auxiliary to the didactic process. But there are some
particular points on which such dialectic leaves a result sufficient
and satisfactory, which can be safely accepted as the basis of future
deduction. These points he indicates in the passages above cited;
without informing us more particularly whether the dialectic was
written or spoken, and whether by himself or by others.[44]

[Footnote 43: Ueberweg (Geschichte der Philos. des Alterthums, vol.
i. § 46, p. 127, 2nd ed.) gives a just and accurate view of [Greek:
e)xôterikoi\ lo/goi], as conceived by Aristotle. See also the
dissertation of Buhle, prefixed to his unfinished edition of
Aristotle, De Aristotelis Libris Exotericis et Acroamaticis, pp.
107-152--which discusses this subject copiously, and gives a
collection both of the passages and comments which bear upon it.
It is instructive, though his opinion leans too much towards the
supposition of a double doctrine. Bernays, in his dissertation, Die
Dialoge des Aristoteles, maintains that by _exoteric books_ are
always meant the lost dialogues of Aristotle; and he employs much
reasoning to refute the supposition of Madvig (Excurs. VII. ad
Cicero, de Fin. p. 861), of Torstrick (ad Aristotel. de Animâ, p.
123), and also of Zeller, that by exoteric discourses are not meant
any writings at all, but simply the colloquies and debates of
cultivated men, apart from the philosophical schools. On the other
hand, Forchhammer has espoused this last-mentioned opinion, and has
defended it against the objections of Bernays (Forchhammer,
Aristoteles und die exoterischen Reden, p. 16, seq.). The question is
thus fully argued on both sides. To me it seems that each of these
two opinions is partially right, and neither of them exclusively
right. "Exoteric discourse," as I understand it, might be found both
in the Aristotelian dialogues, and in the debates of cultivated men
out of the schools, and also in parts of the Aristotelian akroamatic
works. The argument of Bernays (p. 36, seq.), that the points which
Aristotle alludes to as having been debated and settled in exoteric
discourses, were too abstruse and subtle to have been much handled by
cultivated men out of the schools, or (as he expresses it) in the
_salons_ or coffee-houses (or what corresponded thereto) at
Athens--this argument seems to me untenable. We know well, from the
Topica of Aristotle, that the most abstruse subjects were handled
dialectically, in a manner which he called extra-philosophical; and
that this was a frequent occupation of active-minded men at Athens.
To discuss these matters in the way which he calls [Greek: pro\s
do/xan], was more frequent than to discuss them [Greek: pro\s
a)lê/theian].

Zell remarks (ad Ethica Nikom. i. 13), after referring to the passage
in Aristotle's Physica, iv. 10 (to which I have called attention in a
previous note), "quo loco, à Buhlio neglecto, [Greek: e)xôterikoi\
lo/goi] idem significant quod alibi [Greek: koinai\ do/xai,
ei)ôtho/tes lo/goi], vel [Greek: ta\ lego/mena]: quæ semper,
priusquam suas rationes in disputando proponat, disquirere solet
Aristoteles. Vide supra, ad cap. viii. 1." I find also in Weisse
(Translation of and Comment on the Physica of Aristotle, p. 517) a
fair explanation of what Aristotle really means by _exoteric_; an
explanation, however, which Ritter sets aside, in my judgment
erroneously (Geschichte der Philosophie, vol. iii. p. 23).]

[Footnote 44: Thus, for example, the passage in the Ethica Nikom. i.
13, p. 1102, a. 26. [Greek: le/getai de\ peri\ au)tô=n kai\ e)n toi=s
e)xôterikoi=s lo/gois a)rkou/ntôs e)/nia, kai\ chrêste/on au)toi=s],
is explained in the Paraphrase of the Pseudo-Andronikus as referring
to oral colloquy of Aristotle himself with pupils or interlocutors;
and this _may_ possibly be a correct explanation.]

From the time of Cicero downward, a distinction has been drawn
between some books of Aristotle which were exoteric, and others that
were not so; these last being occasionally designated as
_akroamatic_. Some modern critics have farther tried to point out
which, among the preserved works of Aristotle, belonged to each of
these heads. Now there existed, doubtless, in the days of Cicero,
Strabo, Plutarch, and Gellius, books of Aristotle properly called
_exoteric_, _i.e._ consisting almost entirely of exoteric discourse
and debate; though whether Aristotle himself would have spoken of an
exoteric _book_, I have some doubt. Of such a character were his
Dialogues. But all the works designated as akroamatic (or
non-exoteric) must probably have contained a certain admixture of
"exoteric discourse"; as the Physica ([Greek: Phusikê\ A)kro/asis])
and the Metaphysica are seen to contain now. The distinction
indicated by Cicero would thus be really between one class of works,
wherein "exoteric discourse" was exclusive or paramount,--and
another, in which it was partially introduced, subordinate to some
specified didactic purpose.[45] To this last class belong all the
works of Aristotle that we possess at present. Cicero would have
found none of them corresponding to his notion of an exoteric book.

[Footnote 45: To this extent I go along with the opinion expressed by
Weisse in his translation of the Physica of Aristotle, p. 517: "Dass
dieser Gegensatz kein absoluter von zwei durchaus getrennten
Bücherclassen ist, sondern dass ein und dasselbe Werk zugleich
_exoterisch_ und _esoterisch_ sein konnte; und zweitens, dass
_exoterisch_ überhaupt dasjenige heisst, was nicht in den
positiv-dogmatischen Zusammenhang der Lehre des Philosophen
unmittelbar als Glied eintritt." But Weisse goes on afterwards to
give a different opinion (about the meaning of _exoteric_ books),
conformable to what I have cited in a previous note from Sepulveda;
and in that I do not concur. However, he remarks that the manner in
which Aristotle handled the Abstracta, _Place_ and _Infinite_, is
just the same as that which he declares to be _exoteric_ in the case
of _Time_. The distinction drawn by Aulus Gellius (xx. 5) is not
accurate: "[Greek: E)xôterika\] dicebantur, quæ ad rhetoricas
meditationes, facultatem argutiarum, civiliumque rerum notitiam
conducebant. [Greek: A)kroatika\] autem vocabantur, in quibus
philosophia remotior subtiliorque agitabatur; quæque ad naturæ
contemplationes, disceptationesque dialecticas pertinebant." It
appears to me that _disceptationes dialecticæ_ ought to be
transferred to the department [Greek: e)xôterika/], and that
_civilium rerum notitia_ belongs as much to [Greek: a)kroatika\] as
to [Greek: e)xôterika/]. M. Ravaisson has discussed this question
very ably and instructively, Essai sur la Métaphysique d'Aristote,
pp. 224-244. He professes indeed to defend the opinion which I have
cited from Sepulveda, and which I think erroneous; but his reasonings
go really to the support of the opinion given in my text. He remarks,
justly, that the dialogues of Plato (at least all the dialogues of
Search) are specimens of exoteric handling; of which attribute
Forchhammer speaks as if it were peculiar to the Charmides (Aristot.
Exot. Reden. p. 22). Brandis (Aristoteles, p. 105) thinks that when
Aristotle says in the Politica, vii. 1, p. 1323, a. 21: [Greek:
nomi/santas ou)=n i(kanô=s polla\ le/gesthai kai\ tô=n e)n toi=s
e)xôterikoi=s lo/gois peri\ tê=s a)ri/stês zô/ês, kai\ nu=n
chrêste/on au)toi=s], he intends to designate the Ethica. It may be
so; yet the Politica seems a continuation of the Ethica: moreover,
even in the Ethica, we find reference made to previous discussions,
[Greek: e)n toi=s e)xôterikô=s lo/gois] (Eth. N. I. 13).]

To understand fully the extent comprehended by the word _exoteric_,
we must recollect that its direct and immediate meaning is negative--
_extraneous to philosophy_, and suitable to an audience not specially
taught or prepared for philosophy. Now this negative characteristic
belongs not merely to dialectic (as we see it in the example above
cited from the Aristotelian Physica), but also to rhetoric or
rhetorical argument. We know that, in Aristotle's mind, the
rhetorical handling and the dialectical handling, are placed both of
them under the same head, as dealing with opinions rather than with
truth.[46] Both the one and the other are parted off from the
didactic or demonstrative march which leads to philosophical truth;
though dialectic has a distant affinity with that march, and is
indeed available as an auxiliary skirmisher. The term _exoteric_ will
thus comprehend both rhetorical argument and dialectical
argument.[47] Of the latter, we have just seen a specimen extracted
from the Physica; of the former, I know no specimen remaining, but
there probably were many of them in the Aristotelian dialogues now
lost--that which was called 'Eudemus,' and others. With these
dialogues Cicero was probably more familiar than with any other
composition of Aristotle. I think it highly probable that Aristotle
alludes to the dialogues in some of the passages where he refers to
"exoteric discourses." To that extent I agree with Bernays; but I see
no reason to believe (as he does) that the case is the same with all
the passages, or that the epithet is to be understood _always_ as
implying one of these lost Aristotelian dialogues.[48]

[Footnote 46: See the first two chapters of Aristotle's Rhetorica,
especially pp. 1355 a. 24-35, 1358 a. 5, 11, 25, also p. 1404 a. 1.:
[Greek: o(/lôs ou)/sês _pro\s do/xan_ tê=s pragmatei/as tê=s peri\
tê\n r(êtorikê/n], which is exactly what he says also about
Dialectic, in the commencement of the Topica.]

[Footnote 47: Octavianus Ferrarius observes, in his treatise De
Sermonibus Exotericis (Venet. 1575), p. 24: "Quod si Dialecticus et
Rhetor inter se mutant, ut aiunt, ita ut Dialecticus Rhetorem et
Rhetor Dialecticum vicissim induat--de his ipsis veteribus
Dialecticis minime nobis dubitandum est, quin iidem dialectice simul
et rhetorice loqui in utramque partem potuerint. Nec valde mirum
debet hoc videri; libros enim exotericos prope solos habuerunt: qui
cum scripti essent (ut posterius planum faciam) dialectico more,
illorum lectio cum libris peperit philosophos congruentes"--Ferrari
adverts well to the distinction between the philosopher and the
dialectician (_sensu Aristotelico_), handling often the same
subjects, but in a different way: between the [Greek: oi)kei=ai
a)rchai/], upon which didactic method rested, and the [Greek: do/xai]
or diverse opinions, each countenanced by more or less authority,
from which dialectic took its departure (pp. 36, 86, 89).]

[Footnote 48: I agree very much with the manner in which Bernays puts
his case, pp. 79, 80, 92, 93: though there is a contradiction between
p. 80 and p. 92, in respect to the taste and aptitude of the exterior
public for dialectic debate; which is affirmed in the former page,
denied in the latter. But the doctrine asserted in the pages just
indicated amounts only to this--that the dialogues were _included in_
Aristotle's phrase, [Greek: e)xôterikoi\ lo/goi]; which appears to me
true.]

There grew up, in the minds of some commentators, a supposition of
"exoteric doctrine" as denoting what Aristotle promulgated to the
public, contrasted with another secret or mystic doctrine reserved
for a special few, and denoted by the term _esoteric_; though this
term is not found in use before the days of Lucian.[49] I believe the
supposition of a double doctrine to be mistaken in regard to
Aristotle; but it is true as to the Pythagoreans, and is not without
some colour of truth even as to Plato. That Aristotle employed one
manner of explanation and illustration, when discussing with advanced
pupils, and another, more or less different, when addressing an
unprepared audience, we may hold as certain and even unavoidable; but
this does not amount to a double positive doctrine. Properly
speaking, indeed, the term "exoteric" (as I have just explained it
out of Aristotle himself) does not designate, or even imply, any
positive doctrine at all. It denotes a many-sided controversial
debate, in which numerous points are canvassed and few settled; the
express purpose being to bring into full daylight the perplexing
aspects of each. There are indeed a few exceptional cases, in which
"exoteric discourse" will itself have thrown up a tolerably
trustworthy result: these few (as I have above shown) Aristotle
occasionally singles out and appeals to. But as a general rule, there
is no _doctrine_ which can properly be called _exoteric_: the
"exoteric discourse" suggests many new puzzles, but terminates
without any solution at all. The doctrine, whenever any such is
proved, emerges out of the didactic process which follows.

[Footnote 49: Luc. Vit. Auct. 26.]




CHAPTER III.

CATEGORIÆ.


Of the prodigious total of works composed by Aristotle, I have
already mentioned that the larger number have perished. But there
still remain about forty treatises, of authenticity not open to any
reasonable suspicion, which attest the grandeur of his intelligence,
in respect of speculative force, positive as well as negative,
systematizing patience, comprehensive curiosity as to matters of
fact, and diversified applications of detail. In taking account of
these treatises, we perceive some in which the order of sequence is
determined by assignable reasons; as regards others, no similar
grounds of preference appear. The works called 1. De Coelo; 2. De
Generatione et Corruptione; 3. Meteorologica,--are marked out as
intended to be studied in immediate succession, and the various
Zoological treatises after them. The cluster entitled Parva Naturalia
is complementary to the treatise De Animâ. The Physica Auscultatio is
referred to in the Metaphysica, and discusses many questions
identical or analogous, standing in the relation of prior to a
posterior, as the titles indicate; though the title 'Metaphysica' is
not affixed or recognized by Aristotle himself, and the treatise so
called includes much that goes beyond the reach of the Physica. As to
the treatises on Logic, Rhetoric, Ethics, Politics, Poetics,
Mechanics, &c., we are left to fix for ourselves the most convenient
order of study. Of no one among them can we assign the date of
composition or publication. There are indeed in the Rhetorica,
Politics, and Meteorologica, various allusions which must have been
written later than some given events of known date; but these
allusions may have been later additions, and cannot be considered as
conclusively proving, though they certainly raise a presumption, that
the entire work was written subsequently to those events.

The proper order in which the works of Aristotle ought to be studied
(like the order proper for studying the Platonic dialogues),[1] was
matter of debate from the time of his earliest editors and
commentators, in the century immediately preceding the Christian era.
Boêthus the Sidonian (Strabo's contemporary and fellow-student)
recommended that the works on natural philosophy and physiology
should be perused first; contending that these were the easiest, the
most interesting, and, on the whole, the most successful among all
the Aristotelian productions. Some Platonists advised that the
ethical treatises should be put in the front rank, on the ground of
their superior importance for correcting bad habits and character;
others assigned the first place to the mathematics, as exhibiting
superior firmness in the demonstrations. But Andronikus himself, the
earliest known editor of Aristotle's works, arranged them in a
different order, placing the logical treatises at the commencement of
his edition. He considered these treatises, taken collectively, to be
not so much a part of philosophy as an _Organon_ or instrument, the
use of which must be acquired by the reader before he became
competent to grasp or comprehend philosophy; as an exposition of
method rather than of doctrine.[2] From the time of Andronikus
downward, the logical treatises have always stood first among the
written or printed works of Aristotle. They have been known under the
collective title of the 'Organon,' and as such it will be convenient
still to regard them.[3]

[Footnote 1: Scholia, p. 25, b. 37, seq. Br.; p. 321, b. 30; Diogen.
L. iii. 62. The order in which the forty-six Aristotelian treatises
stand printed in the Berlin edition, and in other preceding editions,
corresponds to the tripartite division, set forth by Aristotle
himself, of sciences or cognitions generally: 1. Theoretical; [Greek:
theôrêtikai/] 2. Practical; [Greek: praktikai/]. 3. Constructive or
Technical; [Greek: poiêtikai/].

Patricius, in his Discussiones Peripateticæ, published in 1581 (tom.
i. lib. xiii. p. 173), proclaims himself to be the first author who
will undertake to give an account of Aristotle's philosophy _from
Aristotle himself_ (instead of taking it, as others before him had
done, from the Aristotelian expositors, Andronikus, Alexander,
Porphyry, or Averroes); likewise, to be the first author who will
consult _all_ the works of Aristotle, instead of confining himself,
as his predecessors had done, to a select few of the works. Patricius
then proceeds to enumerate those works upon which alone the
professors "in Italicis scholis" lectured, and to which the attention
of all readers was restricted. 1. The Predicabilia, or Eisagoge of
Porphyry. 2. The Categoriæ. 3. The De Interpretatione. 4. The
Analytica Priora; but only the four first chapters of the first book.
5. The Analytica Posteriora; but only a few chapters of the first
book; nothing of the second. 6. The Physica; books first and second;
then parts of the third and fourth; lastly, the eighth book. 7. The
De Coelo; books first and second. 8. The De Generatione et
Corruptione; books first and second. 9. The De Animâ; all the three
books. 10. The Metaphysica; books Alpha major, Alpha minor, third,
sixth, and eleventh. "Idque, quadriennio integro, quadruplicis
ordinis Philosophi perlegunt auditoribus. De reliquis omnibus tot
libris, mirum silentium." Patricius expressly remarks that neither
the Topica nor the De Sophisticis Elenchis was touched in this full
course of four years. But he does not remark--what to a modern reader
will seem more surprising--that neither the Ethica, nor the Politica,
nor the Rhetorica, is included in the course.]

[Footnote 2: Aristot. Topica, i. p. 104, b. 1, with the Scholia of
Alexander, p. 259, a. 48 Br.; Scholia ad Analyt. Prior. p. 140, a.
47, p. 141, a. 25; also Schol. ad Categor. p. 36, a., p. 40, a., 8.
This conception of the Organon is not explicitly announced by
Aristotle, but seems quite in harmony with his views. The
contemptuous terms in which Prantl speaks of it (Gesch. der Logik, i.
136), as a silly innovation of the Stoics, are unwarranted.

Aristotle (Metaph. E. i. p. 1025, b. 26) classifies the sciences as
[Greek: theôrêtikai/, praktikai/, poiêtikai/]; next he subdivides the
first of the three into [Greek: phusikê/, mathêmatikê/, prô/tê
philosophi/a]. Brentano, after remarking that no place in this
distribution is expressly provided for Logic, explains the omission
as follows: "Diese auffallende Erscheinung erklärt sich daraus, dass
diese [the three above-named theoretical sciences] allein das reelle
Sein betrachten, und nach den drei Graden der Abstraktion in ihrer
Betrachtungsweise verschieden, geschieden werden; während die Logik
das bloss rationelle Sein, das [Greek: o(\n ô(s a)lêthe/s],
behandelt." (Ueber die Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles, p.
39.)--Investigations [Greek: peri\ tê=s a)lêthei/as, o(\n tro/pon
dei= a)pode/chesthai] are considered by Aristotle as belonging to
[Greek: ta\ A)naluktika]; enquiries into method in the first
instance, and into doctrine chiefly with a view to method (Metaphys.
[Greek: G]. p. 1005, b. 2. In Metaphys. ]Greek: G]. 1005, b. 7, he
declares that these enquiries into method, or analysis of the
_principia_ of syllogistic reasoning, belong to the Philosophia Prima
(compare Metaphys. Z. 12, p. 1037, b. 8). Schwegler in his Commentary
(p. 161) remarks that this is one of the few passages in which
Aristotle indicates the relation in which Logic stands to
Metaphysics, or First Philosophy. The question has been started among
his [Greek: A)pori/ai] Metaph. B. 2, p. 999, b. 30.]

[Footnote 3: Respecting the title of Organon which was sometimes
applied to the Analytica Posteriora only, see Waitz ad Organ, ii. p.
294.]

These treatises are six in number:--1. Categoriæ;[4] 2. De
Interpretatione, or De Enunciatione; 3. Analytica Priora; 4.
Analytica Posteriora; 5. Topica; 6. De Sophisticis Elenchis. This
last short treatise--De Sophisticis Elenchis--belongs naturally to
the Topica which precedes it, and of which it ought to be ranked as
the ninth or concluding book. Waitz has printed it as such in his
edition of the Organon; but as it has been generally known with a
separate place and title, I shall not depart from the received
understanding.

[Footnote 4: Some eminent critics, Prantl and Bonitz among them,
consider the treatise Categoriæ not to be the work of Aristotle. The
arguments on which this opinion rests are not convincing to me; and
even if they were, the treatise could not be left out of
consideration, since the _doctrine_ of the Ten Categories is
indisputably Aristotelian. See Zeller, Die Phil. der Griech. ii. 2,
pp. 50, 51, 2nd ed.]

Aristotle himself does not announce these six treatises as forming a
distinct aggregate, nor as belonging to one and the same department,
nor as bearing one comprehensive name. We find indeed in the Topica
references to the Analytica, and in the Analytica references to the
Topica. In both of them, the ten Categories are assumed and
presupposed, though the treatise describing them is not expressly
mentioned: to both also, the contents of the treatise De
Interpretatione or Enunciatione, though it is not named, are
indispensable. The affinity and interdependence of the six is
evident, and justifies the practice of the commentators in treating
them as belonging to one and the same department. To that department
there belonged also several other treatises of Aristotle, not now
preserved, but specified in the catalogue of his lost works; and
these his disciple Theophrastus, Eudemus, and Phanias, had before
them. As all these three disciples composed treatises of their own on
the same or similar topics,[5] amplifying, elucidating, or
controverting the views of their master, the Peripatetics immediately
succeeding them must have possessed a copious logical literature, in
which the six treatises now constituting the Organon appeared as
portions, but not as a special aggregate in themselves.

[Footnote 5: Ammonius ap. Schol. p. 28, a. 41; p. 33, b. 27, Br.]

Of the two treatises which stand first in the Aristotelian
Organon--the Categoriæ and the De Interpretatione--each forms in a
certain sense the complement of the other. The treatise De
Interpretatione handles Propositions (combinations of terms in the
way of Subject and Predicate), with prominent reference to the
specific attribute of a Proposition--the being true or false, the
object of belief or disbelief; the treatise Categoriæ deals with
these same Terms (to use Aristotle's own phrase) pronounced without
or apart from such combination. In his definition of the simple
Term, the Proposition is at the same time assumed to be foreknown
as the correlate or antithesis to it.[6]

[Footnote 6: [Greek: Ta\ a)/neu sumplokê=s lego/mena--tô=n kata\
mêdemi/an sumplokê\n legome/nôna] Categ. p. 1, a. 16, b. 25). See
Schol. ad Aristot. Physica, p. 323, b. 25, Br.; and Bonitz ad
Aristotel. Metaph. (A. p. 987) p. 90.

The Categories of Aristotle appear to formed one of the most
prominent topics of the teaching of Themistius: rebutting the charge,
advanced both against himself, and, in earlier days, against Sokrates
and the Sophists, of rendering his pupils presumptuous and conceited,
he asks, [Greek: ê)kou/sate de\ au)= tinos tô=n e)mô=n e)pitêdei/ôn
u(psêlogoume/nou kai\ brenthuome/nou _e)pi\ toi=s sunônu/mois ê)\
o(mônu/moi=s ê)\ parônu/mois_]; (Orat. xxiii. p. 351.)

Reference is made (in the Scholia on the Categoriæ, p. 43, b. 19) to
a classification of names made by Speusippus, which must have been at
least as early as that of Aristotle; perhaps earlier, since
Speusippus died in 339 B.C. We do not hear enough of this to
understand clearly what it was. Boêthus remarked that Aristotle had
omitted to notice some distinctions drawn by Speusippus on this
matter, Schol. p. 43, a. 29. Compare a remark in Aristot. De Coelo,
i. p. 280, b. 2.]

The first distinction pointed out by Aristotle among simple,
uncombined Terms, or the things denoted thereby, is the Homonymous,
the Synonymous, and the Paronymous. _Homonymous_ are those which are
called by the same name, used in a different sense or with a
different definition or rational explanation. _Synonymous_ are those
called by the same name in the same sense. _Paronymous_ are those
called by two names, of which the one is derived from the other by
varying the inflexion or termination.[7]

[Footnote 7: Aristot. Categor. p. 1, a. 1-15.]

We can hardly doubt that it was Aristotle who first gave this
peculiar distinctive meaning to the two words Homonymous and
Synonymous, rendered in modern phraseology (through the Latin)
_Equivocal_ and _Univocal_. Before his time this important
distinction between different terms had no technical name to
designate it. The service rendered to Logic by introducing such a
technical term, and by calling attention to the lax mode of speaking
which it indicated, was great. In every branch of his writings
Aristotle perpetually reverts to it, applying it to new cases, and
especially to those familiar universal words uttered most freely and
frequently, under the common persuasion that their meaning is not
only thoroughly known but constant and uniform. As a general fact,
students are now well acquainted with this source of error, though
the stream of particular errors flowing from it is still abundant,
ever renewed and diversified. But in the time of Aristotle the source
itself had never yet been pointed out emphatically to notice, nor
signalized by any characteristic term as by a beacon. The natural
bias which lead us to suppose that one term always carries one and
the same meaning, was not counteracted by any systematic warning or
generalized expression. Sokrates and Plato did indeed expose many
particular examples of undefined and equivocal phraseology. No part
of the Platonic writings is more valuable than the dialogues in which
this operation is performed, forcing the respondent to feel how
imperfectly he understands the phrases constantly in use. But it is
rarely Plato's practice to furnish generalized positive warnings or
systematic distinctions. He has no general term corresponding to
homonymous or equivocal; and there are even passages where (under the
name of Prodikus) he derides or disparages a careful distinctive
analysis of different significations of the same name. To recognize a
class of equivocal terms and assign thereto a special class-name, was
an important step in logical procedure; and that step, among so many
others, was made by Aristotle.[8]

[Footnote 8: In the instructive commentary of Dexippus on the
Categoriæ (contained in a supposed dialogue between Dexippus and his
pupil Seleukus, of which all that remains has been recently published
by Spengel, Munich, 1859), that commentator defends Aristotle against
some critics who wondered why he began with these Ante-predicaments
([Greek: o(mô/numa, sunô/numa], &c.), instead of proceeding at once
to the Predicaments or Categories themselves. Dexippus remarks that
without understanding this distinction between _equivoca_ and
_univoca_, the Categories themselves could not be properly
appreciated; for Ens--[Greek: to\ o)\n]--is homonymous in reference
to all the Categories, and not a Summum Genus, comprehending the
Categories as distinct species under it; while each Category is a
Genus in reference to its particulars. Moreover, Dexippus observes
that this distinction of homonyms and synonyms was altogether unknown
and never self-suggested to the ordinary mind ([Greek: o(/sôn ga\r
e)/nnoian ou)k e)/chomen, tou/tôn pro/lêpsin ou)k e)/chomen], p. 20),
and therefore required to be brought out first of all at the
beginning; whereas the Post-predicaments (to which we shall come
later on) were postponed to the end, because they were cases of
familiar terms loosely employed, (See Spengel, Dexipp. pp. 19, 20,
21.)]

Though Aristotle has professed to distinguish between terms
implicated in predication, and terms not so implicated,[9] yet when
he comes to explain the functions of the latter class, he considers
them in reference to their functions as constituent members of
propositions. He immediately begins by distinguishing four sorts of
matters (_Entia_): That which is affirmable of a Subject, but is not
in a Subject; That which is in a Subject, but is not affirmable of a
Subject; That which is both in a Subject, and affirmable of a
Subject; That which is neither in a Subject, nor affirmable of a
Subject.[10]

[Footnote 9: Aristot. Categor. p. 1, a. 16. [Greek: tô=n legome/nôn
ta\ me\n kata\ sumplokê\n le/getai, ta\ d' a)/neu sumplokê=s; ta\
me\n ou)=n kata\ sumplokê\n oi(=on a)/nthrôpos tre/chei, a)/nthrôpos
nika=|; ta\ d' a)/neu sumplokê=s oi)=on a)/nthrôpos, bou=s, tre/chei,
nika=|.]

It will be seen that the meaning and function of the single word can
only explained relatively to the complete proposition, which must be
assumed as foreknown. That which Aristotle discriminates in this
treatise, in the phrases--[Greek: le/gesthai kata\ sumplokê\n] and
[Greek: le/gesthai a)/neu sumplokê=s] is equivalent to what we read
in the De Interpretatione (p. 16, b. 27, p. 17, a. 17) differently
expressed, [Greek: phônê\ sêmantikê\ ô(s kata/phasis] and [Greek:
phônê\ sêmantikê\ ô(s pha/sis].]

[Footnote 10: Aristot. Categor. p. 1, a. 20.]

This fundamental quadruple distinction of _Entia_, which serves as an
introduction to the ten Categories or Predicaments, belongs to words
altogether according to their relative places or functions in the
proposition; the meanings of the words being classified accordingly.
That the learner may understand it, he ought properly to be master of
the first part of the treatise De Interpretatione, wherein the
constituent elements of a proposition are explained: so intimate is
the connection between that treatise and this.

The classification applies to _Entia_ (Things or Matters)
universally, and is thus a first step in Ontology. He here looks at
Ontology in one of its several diverse aspects--as it enters into
predication, and furnishes the material for Subjects and Predicates,
the constituent members of a proposition.

Ontology, or the Science of _Ens quatenus Ens_, occupies an important
place in Aristotle's scientific programme; bearing usually the title
of First Philosophy, sometimes Theology, though never (in his works)
the more modern title of Metaphysica. He describes it as the
universal and comprehensive Science, to which all other sciences are
related as parts or fractions. Ontology deals with _Ens_ in its
widest sense, as an _Unum_ not generic but analogical--distinguishing
the derivative varieties into which it may be distributed, and
setting out the attributes and accompaniments of _Essentia_
universally; while other sciences, such as Geometry, Astronomy, &c.,
confine themselves to distinct branches of that whole;[11] each
having its own separate class of _Entia_ for special and exclusive
study. This is the characteristic distinction of Ontology, as
Aristotle conceives it; he does not set it in antithesis to
Phenomenology, according to the distinction that has become current
among modern metaphysicians.

[Footnote 11: Aristot. Metaphys. [Greek: G]. p. 1003, a. 21, 25-33,
E. p. 1025, b. 8. [Greek: e)/stin e)pistê/mê tis ê)\ theôrei= to\
o)\n ê(=| o)\n kai\ ta\ tou/tô| u(pa/rchonta kath' au(to/; au(/tê d'
e)sti\n ou)demia=| tô=n a)/llôn e)piskopei= _katho/lou peri\ tou=
o)/ntos ê(=| o(/n, a)lla\ me/ros au)tou= ti a)potemo/menai peri\
tou/tou theôrou=si to\ sumbebêko/s], &c. Compare p. 1005, a. 2-14.]

Now _Ens_ (or _Entia_), in the doctrine of Aristotle, is not a
synonymous or univocal word, but an homonymous or equivocal word; or,
rather, it is something between the two, being equivocal, with a
certain qualification. Though not a _Summum Genus_, _i.e._ not
manifesting throughout all its particulars generic unity, nor
divisible into species by the addition of well-marked essential
_differentiæ_, it is an analogical aggregate, or a _Summum Analogon_,
comprehending under it many subordinates which bear the same name
from being all related in some way or other to a common root or
_fundamentum_, the relationship being both diverse in kind and nearer
or more distant in degree. The word _Ens_ is thus homonymous, yet in
a qualified sense. While it is not univocal, it is at the same time
not absolutely equivocal. It is _multivocal_ (if we may coin such a
word), having many meanings held together by a multifarious and
graduated relationship to one common _fundamentum_.[12] _Ens_ (or
_Entia_), in this widest sense, is the theme of Ontology or First
Philosophy, and is looked at by Aristotle in four different principal
aspects.[13]

[Footnote 12: Simplikius speaks of these Analoga as [Greek: to\
me/son tô=n te sunônu/môn kai\ tô=n o(mônu/môn, to\ a)ph' e(no/s],
&c. Schol. ad Categor. p. 69, b. 29, Brand. See also Metaphys. Z. p.
1030, a. 34.

Dexippus does not recognize, formally and under a distinct title,
this intermediate stage between [Greek: sunô/numa] and [Greek:
o(mô/numa]. He states that Aristotle considered Ens as [Greek:
o(mô/numon], while other philosophers considered it as [Greek:
sunô/numon] (Dexippus, p. 26, book i. sect. 19, ed. Spengel). But he
intimates that the ten general heads called Categories have a certain
continuity and interdependence ([Greek: sune/cheian kai\
a)llêlouchi/an]) each with the others, branching out from [Greek:
ou)si/a] in ramifications more or less straggling (p. 48, book ii.
sects. 1, 2, Spengel). The list (he says, p. 47) does not depend upon
[Greek: diai/resis] (generic division), nor yet is it simple
enumeration ([Greek: a)pari/thmêsis] of incoherent items. In the
Physica, vii. 4, p. 249, a. 23, Aristotle observes: [Greek: ei)si\
de\ tô=n o(mônumiôn ai( me\n polu\ a)pe/chousi ai( de\ e)/chousai/
tina o(moio/têta, ai( d' e)ggu\s ê)\ ge/nei ê)\ a)nalogi/a|, dio\ ou)
dokou=sin o(mônumi/ai ei)=nai ou)=sai.]]

[Footnote 13: Aristot. Metaphys. [Greek: D]. p. 1017, a. 7, E. p.
1025, a. 34, p. 1026, a. 33, b. 4; upon which last passage see the
note of Bonitz.]

1. [Greek: To\ o)\n kata\ sumbebêko/s]--_Ens per Accidens_--_Ens_
accidental, or rather concomitant, either as rare and exceptional
attribute to a subject, or along with some other accident in the same
common subject.

2. [Greek: To\ o)\n ô(s a)lêthe/s, kai\ to\ mê\ o)\n ô(s
pseu=dos]--_Ens_, in the sense /of Truth, _Non-Ens_, in the sense of
Falsehood. This is the _Ens_ of the Proposition; a true affirmation
or denial falls under _Ens_ in this mode, when the mental conjunction
of terms agrees with reality; a false affirmation or denial, where no
such agreement exists, falls under _Non-Ens_.[14]

[Footnote 14: Aristot. Metaph. E. 4, p. 1027, b. 18,--p. 1028, a. 4.
[Greek: ou) ga\r e)sti to\ pseu=dos kai\ to\ a)lêthe\s e)n toi=s
pra/gmasin--a)ll' e)n dianoi/a|--ou)k e)/xô dêlou=sin ou)=sa/n tina
phu/sin tou= o)/ntos.] Also [Greek: Th]. 10, p. 1051, b. 1: [Greek:
to\ kuriô/tata o)\n a)lêthes kai\ pseu=dos]. In a Scholion, Alexander
remarks: [Greek: to\ de\ ô(s a)lêthô=s o)\n pa/thos e)sti\ kai\
bou/lêma dianoi/as, to\ de\ zêtei=n to\ e(ka/stô| dokou=n ou)
spho/dra a)nagkai=on.]]

3. [Greek: To\ o)\n duna/mei kai\ to\ o)\n e)nergei/a|]--_Ens_,
potential, actual.

4. [Greek: To\ o)\n kata\ ta\ schê/mata tô=n katêgoriô=n]--_Ens_,
according to the ten varieties of the Categories, to be presently
explained.

These four are the principal aspects under which Aristotle looks at
the aggregate comprised by the equivocal or multivocal word _Entia_.
In all the four branches, the varieties comprised are not species
under a common genus, correlating, either as co-ordinate or
subordinate, one to the other; they are _analoga_, all having
relationship with a common term, but having no other necessary
relationship with each other. Aristotle does not mean that these four
modes of distributing this vast aggregate, are the only modes
possible; for he himself sometimes alludes to other modes of
distributions.[15] Nor would he maintain that the four distributions
were completely distinguished from each other, so that the same
subordinate fractions are not comprehended in any two; for on the
contrary, the branches overlap each other and coincide to a great
degree, especially the first and fourth. But he considers the four as
discriminating certain distinct aspects of _Entia_ or _Entitas_, more
important than any other aspects thereof that could be pointed out,
and as affording thus the best basis and commencement for the Science
called Ontology.

[Footnote 15: Aristot. Metaph. [Greek: G]. p. 1003, a. 33, b. 10.
Compare the able treatise of Brentano, "Ueber die Bedeutung des
Seienden nach Aristoteles," pp. 6, 7.]

Of these four heads, however, the first and second are rapidly
dismissed by Aristotle in the Metaphysica,[16] being conceived as
having little reference to real essence, and therefore belonging more
to Logic than to Ontology; _i.e._ to the subjective processes of
naming, predicating, believing, and inferring rather than to the
objective world of Perceivables and Cogitables.[17] It is the third
and fourth that are treated in the Metaphysica; while it is the
fourth only (_Ens_ according to the ten figures of the Categories)
which is set forth and elucidated in this first treatise of the
Organon, where Aristotle appears to blend Logic and Ontology into
one.

[Footnote 16: Aristot. Metaph. E. p. 1027, b. 16, p. 1028. a. 6.]

[Footnote 17: Aristot. Metaph. [Greek: Th]. 10, p. 1051, b. 2-15,
with Schwegler's Comment, p. 186. This is the distinction drawn by
Simplikius (Schol. ad Categ. p. 76, b. 47) between the Organon and
the Metaphysica: [Greek: Ai( ga\r a)rchai\ kata\ me\n tê/n
sêmantikê\n au)tô=n le/xin e)n tê=| logikê=| pragmatei/a| dêlou=ntai,
kata\ de\ ta\ sêmaino/mena e)n tê=| Meta\ ta\ Phusika\ oi)kei/ôs.]

[Greek: Ta\ o)/nta] are equivalent to [Greek: ta\ lego/mena], in this
and the other logical treatises of Aristotle. Categ. p. 1, a. 16-20,
b. 25; Analyt. Prior. i. p. 43, a. 25.

This is the logical aspect of Ontology; that is, Entia are considered
as Objects to be named, and to serve as Subjects or Predicates for
propositions: every such term having a fixed denotation, and (with
the exception of proper names) a fixed connotation, known to speakers
and hearers.

[Greek: Ta\ lego/mena] (or Entia considered in this aspect) are
distinguished by Aristotle into two classes: 1. [Greek: Ta\ lego/mena
_kata\ sumplokê/n_, oi(=on a)/nthrôpos tre/chei, a)/nthropos nika=|.]
2. [Greek: Ta\ lego/mena _a)/neu sumplokê=s_] (or [Greek: kata\
mêdemi/an sumplokê/n]) [Greek: oi(=on a)/nthrôpos, bou=s, tre/chei,
nika=|.]

We are to observe here, that in Logic the Proposition or Enunciation
is the Prius Naturâ, which must be presupposed as known before we can
understand what the separate terms are (Analytic. Prior. i. p. 24, a.
16): just as the right angle must be understood before we can explain
what is an acute or an obtuse angle (to use an illustration of
Aristotle; see Metaphys. Z. p. 1035, b. 7). We must understand the
entire logical act, called Affirming or Denying, before we can
understand the functions of the two factors or correlates with which
that act is performed. Aristotle defines the Term by means of the
Proposition, [Greek: o(/ron de\ kalô= ei) o)\n dialu/etai ê(
pro/tasis] (Anal. Pr. i. 24, b. 16).

[Greek: Ta\ lego/mena], as here used by Aristotle, coincides in
meaning with what the Stoics afterwards called [Greek: Ta\
lekta/]--of two classes: 1. [Greek: _lekta\ au)totelê=_], one branch
of which, [Greek: ta\ a)xiô/mata], are equivalent to the Aristotelian
[Greek: ta\ kata\ sumplokê\n lego/mena]. 2. [Greek: _lekta\
e)llipê=_], equivalent to [Greek: ta\ a)/neu sumplokê=s lego/mena]
(Diogen. Laert. vii. 43, 44, 63, 64; Sext. Emp. adv. Mathemat. viii.
69, 70, 74): equivalent also, seemingly, to [Greek: ta\ dianoêta\] in
Aristotle: [Greek: o( dianoêto\s A)ristome/nês] (Anal. Pr. I. p. 47,
b. 22).

Hobbes observes (Computation or Logic, part i. 2, 5): "Nor is it at
all necessary that every name should be the name of something. For as
these, _a man_, _a tree_, _a stone_, are the names of the things
themselves, so the images of a man, of a tree, of a stone, which are
represented to men sleeping, have their names also, though they be
not things, but only fictions and phantasms of things. For we can
remember these; and therefore it is no less necessary that they have
names to mark and signify them, than the things themselves. Also this
word _future_ is a name; but no future thing has yet any being.
Moreover, that which neither is, nor has been, nor ever shall or ever
can be, has a name--_impossible_. To conclude, this word _nothing_ is
a name, which yet cannot be name of any thing; for when we subtract
two and three from five, and, so nothing remaining, we would call
that subtraction to mind, this speech _nothing remains_, and in it
the word _nothing_, is not unuseful. And for the same reason we say
truly, _less than nothing_ remains, when we subtract more from less;
for the mind feigns such remains as these for doctrine's sake, and
desires, as often as is necessary, to call the same to memory. But
seeing every name has some relation to that which is named, though
that which we name be not always a thing that has a being in nature,
yet is lawful for doctrine's sake to apply the word _thing_ to
whatsoever we name; as it were all one whether that thing truly
existent, or be only feigned."

The Greek neuter gender ([Greek: to\ lego/menon] or [Greek: to\
lekto/n, ta\ lego/mena] or [Greek: ta\ lekta/]) covers all that
Hobbes here includes under the word _thing_.--Scholia ad Aristot.
Physic. I. i. p. 323, a. 21, Brand.: [Greek: o)noma/zontai me\n kai\
ta\ mê\ o)/nta, o(ri/zontai de\ mo/na ta\ o)/nta.]]

Of this mixed character, partly logical, partly ontological, is the
first distinction set forth in the Categoriæ--the distinction between
matters _predicated of_ a Subject, and matters which are _in_ a
Subject--the Subject itself being assumed as the _fundamentum_
correlative to both of them. The definition given of that which is
_in_ a Subject is ontological: viz., "_In_ a Subject, I call that
which is in anything, not as a part, yet so that it cannot exist
separately from that in which it is."[18] By these two negative
characteristics, without any mark positive, does Aristotle define
what is meant by being _in_ a Subject. Modern logicians, and Hobbes
among them, can find no better definition for an Accident; though
Hobbes remarks truly, that Accident cannot be properly defined, but
must be elucidated by examples.[19]

[Footnote 18: Aristot. Categ. p. 1, a. 24.]

[Footnote 19: Hobbes, Computation or Logic, part i. 3, 3, i. 6, 2,
ii. 8, 2-3.]

The distinction here drawn by Aristotle between being _predicated of_
a Subject, and being in a Subject, coincides with that between
essential and non-essential predication: all the predicates
(including the _differentia_) which belong to the essence, fall under
the first division;[20] all those which do not belong to the essence,
under the latter. The Subjects--what Aristotle calls the First
Essences or Substances, those which are essences or substances in the
fullest and strictest meaning of the word--are concrete individual
things or persons; such as Sokrates, this man, that horse or tree.
These are never employed as predicates at all (except by a distorted
and unnatural structure of the proposition, which Aristotle indicates
as possible, but declines to take into account); they are always
Subjects of different predicates, and are, in the last analysis, the
Subjects of all predicates. But besides these First Essences, there
are also Second Essences--Species and Genus, which stand to the first
Essence in the relation of predicates to a Subject, and to the other
Categories in the relation of Subjects to predicates.[21] These
Second Essences are less of Essences than the First, which alone is
an Essence in the fullest and most appropriate sense. Among the
Second Essences, Species is more of an Essence than Genus, because it
belongs more closely and specially to the First Essence; while Genus
is farther removed from it. Aristotle thus recognizes a graduation of
_more or less_ in Essence; the individual is more Essence, or more
complete as an Essence, than the Species, the Species more than the
Genus. As he recognizes a First Essence, _i.e._ an individual object
(such as Sokrates, this horse, &c.), so he also recognizes an
individual accident (this particular white colour, that particular
grammatical knowledge) which is _in_ a Subject, but is not
_predicated of_ a Subject; this particular white colour exists _in_
some given body, but is not _predicable of_ any body.[22]

[Footnote 20: Aristot. Categ. p. 3, a. 20. It appears that Andronikus
did not draw the line between these two classes of predicates in same
manner as Aristotle: he included many non-essential predicates in
[Greek: ta\ kath' u(pokeime/nou]. See Simplikius, ad Categorias,
Basil. 1551, fol. 13, 21, B. Nor was either Alexander or Porphyry
careful to observe the distinction between the two classes. See
Schol. ad Metaphys. p. 701. b. 23, Br.; Schol. ad De Interpret. p.
106, a. 29, Br. And when Aristotle says, Analyt. Prior. i. p. 24, b.
26, [Greek: to\ de\ e)n o(/lô| ei)nai e(/teron e(te/rô|, kai\ to\
kata\ panto\s katêgorei=sthai thate/rou tha/teron, tau)to/n e)stin],
he seems himself to forget the distinction entirely.]

[Footnote 21: Categor. p. 2, a. 15, seq. In Aristotle phraseology it
is not said that Second Essences are contained in First Essences, but
that First Essences are contained in Second Essences, _i.e._ in the
species which Second Essences signify. See the Scholion to p. 3, a.
9, in Waitz, vol. i. p. 32.]

[Footnote 22: Arist. Categ. p. 1, a. 26; b. 7: [Greek: A)nplô=s de\
ta\ a)/toma kai\ e(\n a)rithmô=| kat' ou)deno\s u(pokeime/nou
le/getai, e)n u(pokeime/nô| de\ e(/nia ou)de\n kôlu/ei ei)=nai; ê(
ga/r tis grammatikê\ tô=n e)n u(pokeime/nô| e)sti/n.] Aristotle here
recognizes an attribute as "individual and as numerically one;" and
various other logicians have followed him. But is it correct to say,
that an attribute, when it cannot be farther divided specifically,
and is thus the lowest in its own predicamental series, is _Unum
Numero_? The attribute may belong to an indefinite number of
different objects; and can we count it as _One_, in the same sense in
which we count each of these objects as _One_? I doubt whether _Unum
Numero_ be applicable to attributes. Aristotle declares that the
[Greek: deute/ra ou)si/a] is not _Unum Numero_ like the [Greek:
prô/tê ou)si/a--ou) ga\r e)n e)sti to\ u(pokei/menon Ô(/sper ê(
prô/tê ou)si/a, a)lla\ kata\ pollô=n o( a)/nthrôpos le/getai kai\ to\
zô=|on (Categ. p. 3, b. 16). Upon the same principle, I think, he
ought to declare that the attribute is not _Unum Numero_; for though
it is not (in his language) _predicable of_ many Subjects, yet it is
_in_ many Subjects. It cannot correctly be called _Unum Numero_,
according to the explanation which he gives of that phrase in two
passages of the Metaphysica, B. p. 999, b. 33; [Greek: D]. p. 1016,
b. 32: [Greek: a)rithmô=| me\n ô(=n ê( u(/lê mi/a], &c.]

Respecting the logical distinction, which Aristotle places in the
commencement of this treatise on the Categories--between predicates
which are _affirmed of_ a Subject, and predicates which are _in_ a
Subject[23]--we may remark that it turns altogether upon the name by
which you describe the predicate. Thus he tells us that the Species
and Genus (man, animal), and the Differentia (rational), may be
_predicated of_ Sokrates, but are not _in_ Sokrates; while knowledge
is _in_ Sokrates, but cannot be _predicated of_ Sokrates; and may be
_predicated of_ grammar, but is not _in_ grammar. But if we look at
this comparison, we shall see that in the last-mentioned example, the
predicate is described by an abstract word (knowledge); while in the
preceding examples it is described by a concrete word (man, animal,
rational).[24] If, in place of these three last words, we substitute
the abstract words corresponding to them--humanity, animality,
rationality--we shall have to say that these are _in_ Sokrates,
though they cannot (in their abstract form) be _predicated of_
Sokrates, but only in the form of their concrete paronyms, which
Aristotle treats as a distinct predication. So if, instead of the
abstract word knowledge, we employ the concrete word knowing or wise,
we can no longer say that this is _in_ Sokrates, and that it may be
_predicated of_ grammar. Abstract alone can be _predicated of_
abstract; concrete alone can be _predicated of_ concrete; if we
describe the relation between Abstract and Concrete, we must say, The
Abstract is _in_ the Concrete--the Concrete contains or embodies the
Abstract. Indeed we find Aristotle referring the same predicate, when
described by the abstract name, to one Category; and when described
by the concrete paronymous adjective, to another and different
Category.[25] The names Concrete and Abstract were not in the
philosophical vocabulary of his day. In this passage of the
Categoriæ, he establishes a distinction between predicates essential
and predicates non-essential; the latter he here declares to be _in_
the Subject, the former not to be in it, but to be _co-efficients of_
its essence. But we shall find that he does not adhere to this
distinction even throughout the present treatise, still less in other
works. It seems to be a point of difference between the Categoriæ on
one side, and the Physica and Metaphysica on the other, that in the
Categoriæ he is more disposed to found supposed real distinctions on
verbal etiquette, and on precise adherence to the syntactical
structure of a proposition.[26]

[Footnote 23: The distinction is expressed by Ammonius (Schol. p. 51,
b. 46) as follows:--[Greek: ai( prô=tai ou)si/ai u(pokeu=ntai pa=sin,
a)ll' ou)ch o(moi/ôs; toi=s me\n ga\r _pro\s u(/parxin_, tou/testi
toi=s sumbebêko/sin, toi=s de\ _pro\s katêgori/an_, tou/testi tai=s
katho/lou ou)si/ais.]]

[Footnote 24: Ueberweg makes a remark similar to this.--System der
Logik, sect. 56, note, p. 110, ed. second.]

[Footnote 25: The difference of opinion as to the proper mode of
describing the Differentia--whether by the concrete word [Greek:
pezo\n], or by the abstract [Greek: pezo/tês]--gives occasion to an
objection against Aristotle's view, and to a reply from Dexippus not
very conclusive (Dexippus, book ii. s. 22, pp. 60, 61, ed. Spengel).]

[Footnote 26: Categor. p. 3, a. 3. In the Physica, iv. p. 210, a.
14-30, Aristotle enumerates nine different senses of the phrase
[Greek: e(/n tini]. His own use of the phrase is not always uniform
or consistent. If we compare the Scholia on the Categoriæ, pp. 44, 45,
53, 58, 59, Br., with the Scholia on the Physica, pp. 372, 373, Br.,
we shall see that the Commentators were somewhat embarrassed by his
fluctuation. The doctrine of the Categoriæ was found especially
difficult in its application to the Differentia.

In Analyt. Post. i. p. 83, a. 30, Aristotle says, [Greek: o(/sa de\
mê\ ou)si/an sêmai/nei, dei= kata/ tinos u(pokeime/nou
katêgorei=sthai], which is at variance with the language of the
Categoriæ, as the Scholiast remarks, p. 228, a. 33. The like may be
said about Metaphys. B. p. 1001, b. 29; [Greek: D]. p. 1017, b. 13.
See the Scholia of Alexander, p. 701, b. 25, Br.

See also De Gener. et Corrupt. p. 319, b. 8; Physic. i. p. 185, a.
31: [Greek: ou)the\n ga\r tô=n a)/llôn chôristo/n e)sti para\ tê\n
ou)si/an; pa/nta ga\r kath' u(pokeime/nou tê=s ou)si/as le/getai],
where Simplikius remarks that the phrase is used [Greek: a)nti\ tou=
e)n u(pokeime/nô|] (Schol. p. 328, b. 43).]

Lastly, Aristotle here makes one important observation respecting
those predicates which he describes as (not _in a Subject_ but)
_affirmed_ or _denied of_ a Subject--_i.e._ the essential predicates.
In these (he says) whatever predicate can be truly affirmed or denied
of the predicate, the same can be truly affirmed or denied of the
Subject.[27] This observation deserves notice, because it is in fact
a brief but distinct announcement of his main theory of the
Syllogism; which theory he afterwards expands in the Analytica
Priora, and traces into its varieties and ramifications.

[Footnote 27: Categor. p. 1, b. 10-15.]

After such preliminaries, Aristotle proceeds[28] to give the
enumeration of his Ten Categories or Predicaments; under one or other
of which, every subject or predicate, considered as capable of
entering into a proposition, must belong: 1. _Essence_ or
_Substance_; such as, man, horse. 2. _How much_ or _Quantity_; such
as, two cubits long, three cubits long. 3. _What manner of_ or
_Quality_; such as, white, erudite. 4. _Ad aliquid_--_To something_
or _Relation_; such as, double, half, greater. 5. _Where_; such as,
in the market-place, in the Lykeium. 6. _When_; such as, yesterday,
last year. 7. _In what posture_; such as, he stands up, he is sitting
down. 8. _To have_; such as, to be shod, to be armed. 9. _Activity_;
such as, he is cutting, he is turning. 10. _Passivity_; such as, he
is being cut, he is being burned.

[Footnote 28: Ibid. p. 1, b. 25, seq.]

_Ens_ in its complete state--concrete, individual, determinate--
includes an embodiment of all these ten Categories; the First _Ens_
being the Subject of which the rest are predicates. Whatever question
be asked respecting any individual Subject, the information given in
the answer must fall, according to Aristotle, under one or more of
these ten general heads; while the full outfit of the individual will
comprise some predicate under each of them. Moreover, each of the ten
is a _Generalissimum_; having more or fewer species contained under
it, but not being itself contained under any larger genus (_Ens_ not
being a genus) So that Aristotle does not attempt to define or
describe any one of the ten; his only way of explaining is by citing
two or three illustrative examples of each. Some of the ten are even
of wider extent than _Summa Genera_; thus, Quality cannot be
considered as a true genus, comprehending generically all the cases
falling under it. It is a _Summum Analogon_, reaching beyond the
comprehension of a genus; an analogous or multivocal name, applied to
many cases vaguely and remotely akin to each other.[29] And again the
same particular predicate may be ranked both under Quality and under
Relation; it need not belong exclusively to either one of them.[30]
Moreover, Good, like _Ens_ or _Unum_, is common to all the
Categories, but is differently represented in each.[31]

[Footnote 29: Aristot. Categor. p. 8, b. 26. [Greek: e)/sti de\ ê(
poio/tês tô=n pleonachô=s legome/nôn], &c.

See the Scholia, p. 68, b. 69 a., Brandis. Ammonius gives the true
explanation of this phrase, [Greek: tô=n pleonachô=s legome/nôn] (p.
69, b. 7). Alexander and Simplikius try to make out that it implies
here a [Greek: sunô/nomon].]

[Footnote 30: Aristot. Categor. p. 11, a. 37. Compare the Scholion of
Dexippus, p. 48, a. 28-37.]

[Footnote 31: Aristot. Ethic. Nikomach. i. p. 1096, a. 25; Ethic.
Eudem. i. p. 1217, b. 25.]

Aristotle comments at considerable length upon the four first of the
ten Categories. 1. Essence or Substance. 2. Quantity. 3. Quality. 4.
Relation. As to the six last, he says little upon any of them; upon
some, nothing at all.

His decuple partition of _Entia_ or _Enunciata_ is founded entirely
upon a logical principle. He looks at them in their relation to
Propositions; and his ten classes discriminate the relation which
they bear to each other as parts or constituent elements of a
proposition. Aristotle takes his departure, not from any results of
scientific research, but from common speech; and from the dialectic,
frequent in his time, which debated about matters of common life and
talk, about received and current opinions.[32] We may presume him to
have studied and compared a variety of current propositions, so as to
discover what were the different relations in which Subjects and
Predicates did stand or could stand to each other; also the various
questions which might be put respecting any given subject, with the
answers suitable to be returned.[33]

[Footnote 32: Waitz, ad Aristot. Categor. p. 284: "Id Categoriis non
de ipsâ rerum natura et veritate exponit, sed res tales capit, quales
apparent in communi vita homini philosophia non imbuto, unde fit, ut
in Categoriis alia sit [Greek: prô/tê ou)si/a] et in prima
philosophia: illa enim partes habet, hæc vero non componitor ex
partibus."

Compare Metaphys. Z. p. 1032, b. 2, and the [Greek: a)pori/a] in Z.
p. 1029, a., p. 1037, a. 28.

The different meaning of [Greek: prô/tê ou)si/a] in the Categoriæ and
in the Metaphysica, is connected with various difficulties and
seeming discrepancies in the Aristotelian theory of cognition, which
I shall advert to in a future chapter. See Zeller, Philos. der
Griech. ii. 2, pp. 234, 262; Heyder, Aristotelische und Hegelsche
Dialektik, p. 141, seq.]

[Footnote 33: Thus he frequently supposes a question put, an answer
given, and the proper mode of answering. Categor. p. 2, b. 8: [Greek:
e)a\n ga\r a)podidô=| tis tê\n prô/tên ou)si/an ti/ e)sti,
gnôrimô/teron kai\ oi)keio/teron a)podô/sei], &c.; also ibid. p. 2,
b. 32; p. 3, a. 4, 20.]

Aristotle ranks as his first and fundamental Category Substance or
Essence--[Greek: Ou)si/a]; the abstract substantive word
corresponding to [Greek: To\ o)/n]; which last is the vast aggregate,
not generically One but only analogically One, destined to be
distributed among the ten Categories as _Summa Genera_. The First
_Ens_ or First Essence--that which is _Ens_ in the fullest sense--is
the _individual_ concrete person or thing in nature; Sokrates,
Bukephalus, this man, that horse, that oak-tree, &c. This First _Ens_
is indispensable as Subject or _Substratum_ for all the other
Categories, and even for predication generally. It is a Subject only;
it never appears as a predicate of anything else. As _Hic Aliquis_ or
_Hoc Aliquid_, it lies at the bottom (either expressed or implied) of
all the work of predication. It is _Ens_ or Essence most of all, _par
excellence_; and is so absolutely indispensable, that if all First
_Entia_ were supposed to be removed, neither Second _Entia_ nor any
of the other Categories could exist.[34]

[Footnote 34: Aristot. Categ. p. 2, a. 11, b. 6. [Greek: Ou)si/a ê(
kuriô/tata kai\ prô/tôs kai\ ma/lista legome/nê--mê\ ou)sô=n ou)=n
tô=n prô/tôn ou)siô=n, a)du/naton tô=n a)/llôn ti ei)=nai.]]

The Species is recognized by Aristotle as a Second _Ens_ or Essence,
in which these First Essences reside; it is less (has less completely
the character) of Essence than the First, to which it serves as
Predicate. The Genus is (strictly speaking) a Third Essence,[35] in
which both the First and the Second Essence are included; it is
farther removed than the Species from the First Essence, and has
therefore still less of the character of Essence. It stands as
predicate both to the First and to the Second Essence. While the
First Essence is more Essence than the Second, and the Second more
than the Third, all the varieties of the First Essence are in this
respect upon an equal footing with each other. This man, this horse,
that tree, &c., are all Essence, equally and alike.[36] The First
Essence admits of much variety, but does not admit graduation, or
degrees of more or less.

[Footnote 35: Aristotle here, in the Categoriæ, ranks Genus and
Species as being, both of them, [Greek: deu/terai ou)si/ai]. Yet
since he admits Genus to be farther removed from [Greek: prô/tê
ou)si/a] than Species is, he ought rather to have called Genus a
Third Essence. In the Metaphysica he recognizes a gradation or
ordination of [Greek: ou)si/a] into First, Second, and Third, founded
upon a totally different principle: the Concrete, which in the
Categoriæ ranks as [Greek: prô/tê ou)si/a], ranks as [Greek: tri/tê
ou)si/a] in the Metaphysica. See Metaphys. [Greek: Ê]. p. 1043. a.
18-28.]

[Footnote 36: Aristot. Categ. p. 2, b. 20; p. 3, b. 35.

Nothing else except Genera and Species can be called Second Essences,
or said to belong to the Category Essence; for they alone declare
what the First Essence is. If you are asked respecting Sokrates,
_What_ he _is_? and if you answer by stating the Species or the Genus
to which he belongs--that he is a man or an animal--your answer will
be appropriate to the question; and it will be more fully understood
if you state the Species than if you state the Genus. But if you
answer by stating what belongs to any of the other Categories (viz.,
that he is white, that he is running), your answer will be
inappropriate, and foreign to the question; it will not declare
_what_ Sokrates _is_.[37] Accordingly, none of these other Categories
can be called Essences. All of them rank as predicates both of First
and of Second Essence; just as Second Essences rank as predicates of
First Essences.[38]

[Footnote 37: Ibid. p. 2, b. 29-37. [Greek: ei)ko/tôs de\ meta\ ta\s
prô/tas ou)si/as mo/na tô=n a)/llôn ta\ ei)/dê kai\ ta\ ge/nê
deu/terai ou)si/ai le/gontai; mo/na ga\r dêloi= tê\n prô/tên ou)si/an
tô=n katêgoroume/nôn. to\n ga/r tina a)/nthrôpon e)a\n a)podidô=| tis
ti/ e)sti, to\ me\n ei)=dos ê)\ to\ ge/nos a)podidou\s _oi)kei/ôs
a)podô/sei_, kai\ gnôrimô/teron poiê/sei a)/nthrôpon ê)\ zô=|on
a)podidou/s; tô=n de\ a)/llôn o(/, ti a)\n a)podidô=| tis,
_a)llotri/ôs e)/stai a)podedôkô/s_, oi(=on leuko/n ê)\ tre/chei ê)\
o(tiou=n tô=n toiou/tôn a)podidou/s. Ô(/ste ei)ko/tôs tô=n a)/llôn
tau=ta mo/na ou)si/ai le/gontai.]]

[Footnote 38: Ibid. p. 3, a. 2.]

Essence or Substance is not _in_ a Subject; neither First nor Second
Essence. The First Essence is neither _in_ a Subject nor _predicated
of_ a Subject; the Second Essences are not _in_ the First, but are
_predicated of_ the First. Both the Second Essence, and the
definition of the word describing it, may be _predicated of_ the
First; that is, the predication is synonymous or univocal; whereas,
of that which is _in_ a Subject, the name may often be predicated,
but never the definition of the name. What is true of the Second
Essence, is true also of the Differentia; that it is not _in_ a
Subject, but that it may be _predicated_ univocally _of_ a Subject--
not only its name, but also the definition of its name.[39]

[Footnote 39: Ibid. p. 3, a. 7, 21, 34. [Greek: koino\n de\ kata\
pa/sês ou)si/as to\ mê\ e)n u(pokeime/nô| ei)=nai--ou)k i)/dion de\
tê=s tou=to ou)si/as, a)lla\ kai\ ê( diaphora\ tô=n mê\ e)n
u(pokeime/nô| e)sti/n--u(pa/rchei de\ tai=s ou)si/ais kai\ tai\s
diaphorai=s to\ pa/nta sunônu/môs a)p' au)tô=n le/gesthai.]]

All Essence or Substance seems to signify _Hoc Aliquid Unum Numero_.
The First Essence really does so signify, but the Second Essence does
not really so signify: it only seems to do so, because it is
enunciated by a substantive name, like the First.[40] It signifies
really _Tale Aliquid_, answering to the enquiry _Quale Quid_? for it
is said not merely of one thing numerically, but of many things each
numerically one. Nevertheless, a distinction must be drawn. The
Second Essence does not (like the Accident, such as white) signify
_Tale Aliquid_ simply and absolutely, or that and nothing more. It
signifies _Talem Aliquam Essentiam_; it declares what the Essence is,
or marks off the characteristic feature of various First Essences,
each _Unum Numero_. The Genus marks off a greater number of such than
the Species.[41]

[Footnote 40: Aristot. Categ. p. 3, b. 10-16: [Greek: Pa=sa de\
ou)si/a _dokei=_ to/de ti sêmai/nein. e)pi\ me\n ou)=n tô=n prô/tôn
ou)siô=n a)namphisbê/têton kai\ a)lêthe/s e)stin o(/ti to/de ti
sêmai/nei; a)/tomon ga\r kai\ e(\n a)rithmô=| to\ dêlou/meno/n
e)stin; e)pi\ de\ tô=n deute/rôn ou)siô=n _phai/netai me\n o(moi/ôs
tô=| schê/mati tê=s prosêgori/as to/de ti sêmai/nein_, o(/tan ei)/pê|
a)/nthrôpon ê)\ zô=|on, _ou) mê\n a)lêthe/s ge_, a)lla\ ma=llon
poio/n ti sêmai/nei.]]

[Footnote 41: Ibid. p. 3, b. 18-24.]

Again, Essences have no contraries.[42] But this is not peculiar to
Essences, for _Quanta_ also have no contraries; there is nothing
contrary to ten, or to that which is two cubits long. Nor is any one
of the varieties of First Essence more or less Essence than any other
variety. An individual man is as much Essence as an individual horse,
neither more nor less. Nor is he at one time more a man than he was
at another time; though he may become more or less white, more or
less handsome.[43]

[Footnote 42: Ibid. b. 24-30.]

[Footnote 43: Ibid. b. 34, seq.]

But that which is most peculiar to Essence, is, that while remaining
_Unum et Idem Numero_, it is capable by change in itself of receiving
alternately contrary Accidents. This is true of no other Category.
For example, this particular colour, being one and the same in
number, will never be now black, and then white; this particular
action, being one and the same in number, will not be at one time
virtuous, at another time vicious. The like is true respecting all
the other Categories. But one and the same man will be now white,
hot, virtuous; at another time, he will be black, cold, vicious. An
objector may say that this is true, not merely of Essence, but also
of Discourse and of Opinion; each of which (he will urge) remains
_Unum Numero_, but is nevertheless recipient of contrary attributes;
for the proposition or assertion, Sokrates is sitting, may now be
true and may presently become false. But this case is different,
because there is no change in the proposition itself, but in the
person or thing to which the proposition refers; while one and the
same man, by new affections in himself, is now healthy, then sick;
now hot, then cold.[44]

[Footnote 44: Aristot. Categ. p. 4, a. 10-b. 20.]

Here Aristotle concludes his first Category or Predicament--Essence
or Substance. He proceeds to the other nine, and ranks Quantity first
among them.[45] _Quantum_ is either Continual or Discrete; it
consists either of parts having position in reference to each other,
or of parts not having position in reference to each other. Discrete
_Quanta_ are Number and Speech; Continual _Quanta_ are Line, Surface,
Body, and besides these, Time and Place. The parts of Number have no
position in reference to each other; the parts of Line, Surface,
Body, have position in reference to each other. These are called
_Quanta_, primarily; other things are called _Quanta_ in a secondary
way, [Greek: kata\ sumbebêko/s].[46] Thus we say _much white_, when
the surface of white is large; we say, _the action is long_, because
much time and movement have been consumed in it. If we are asked,
_how long the action_ is? we must answer by specifying its length in
time--a year or a month.

[Footnote 45: Ibid. b. 21, seq.]

[Footnote 46: Ibid. p. 5, a. 38, seq.]

To _Quantum_ (as to Essence or Substance) there exists no
contrary.[47] There is nothing contrary to a length of three cubits
or an area of four square feet. Great, little, long, short, are more
properly terms of Relation than terms of Quantity; thus belonging to
another Category. Nor is _Quantum_ ever more or less _Quantum_; it
does not admit of degree. The _Quantum_ a yard is neither more nor
less _Quantum_ than that called a foot. That which is peculiar to
_Quanta_ is to be equal or unequal:[48] the relations of equality and
inequality are not properly affirmed of anything else except of
_Quanta_.

[Footnote 47: Ibid. b. 11, seq.]

[Footnote 48: Ibid. p. 6, a. 26-35.]

From the Category of Quantity, Aristotle proceeds next to that of
Relation;[49] which he discusses in immediate sequence after
Quantity, and before Quality, probably because in the course of his
exposition about Quantity, he had been obliged to intimate how
closely Quantity was implicated with Relation, and how essential it
was that the distinction between the two should be made clear.

[Footnote 49: Ibid. a. 36, seq.]

_Relata_ ([Greek: ta\ pro/s ti]--_ad Aliquid_) are things such, that
what they are, they are said to be _of other things_, or are said to
in some other manner _towards something else_ ([Greek: o(/sa au)ta\
a(/per e)sti\n **e(te/rôn ei)=nai le/getai, ê)\ o(pôstou=n a)/llôs
pro\s e(/teron]). Thus, that which is greater, is said to be greater
_than another_; that which is called double is called also double _of
another_. Habit, disposition, perception, cognition, position, &c.,
are all _Relata_. Habit, is habit _of something_; perception and
cognition, are always _of something_; position, is position _of
something_. The Category of Relation admits contrariety in some
cases, but not always; it also admits, in some cases, graduation, or
the more or less in degree; things are more like or less like to each
other.[50] All _Relata_ are so designated in virtue of their relation
to other _Correlata_; the master is master _of a servant_--the
servant is servant _of a master_. Sometimes the _Correlatum_ is
mentioned not in the genitive case but in some other case; thus
cognition is cognition _of_ the _cognitum_, but _cognitum_ is
_cognitum by_ cognition; perception is perception _of_ the
_perceptum_, but the _perceptum_ is _perceptum by_ perception.[51]
The correlation indeed will not manifestly appear, unless the
Correlate be designated by its appropriate term: thus, if the wing be
declared to be wing _of a bird_, there is no apparent correlation; we
ought to say, the wing is wing _of the winged_, and the winged is
winged _through_ or _by_ the wing; for the wing belongs to the bird,
not _quâ bird_, but _quâ winged_,[52] since there are many things
winged, which are not birds. Sometimes there is no current term
appropriate to the Correlate, so that we are under the necessity of
coining one for the occasion: we must say, to speak with strict
accuracy, [Greek: ê( kephalê/, tou= kephalôtou= kephalê/] not [Greek:
ê( kephalê/, tou= zô=|ou kephalê/]; [Greek: to\ pêda/lion, tou=
pêdaliôtou= pêda/lion], not [Greek: to\ pêda/lion, ploi/ou
pêda/lion].[53]

[Footnote 50: Aristot. Categ. p. 6, b. 20.]

[Footnote 51: Ibid. b. 28-37.]

[Footnote 52: Ibid. b. 36; p. 7, a. 5. [Greek: ou) mê\n a)ll'
e)ni/ote ou) do/xei a)ntistre/phein, e)a\n mê\ oi)kei/ôs pro\s o(\
le/getai a)podothê=|, a)lla\ diama/rtê| o( a)podidou/s, oi(=on to\
ptero\n e)a\n a)podothê=| o)/rnithos, ou)k a)ntistre/phei o)/rnis
pterou=; ou) ga\r oi)kei/ôs to\ prô=ton a)pode/dotai ptero\n
o)/rnithos; ou) ga\r ê(=| o)/rnis, tau/tê| to\ ptero\n au)tou=
le/getai, a)ll' ê(=| pterôto/n e)sti; pollô=n ga\r kai\ a)/llôn
ptera/ e)stin, a(\ ou)k ei)si\n o)/rnithes.]]

[Footnote 53: Ibid. p. 7, a. 6-25. [Greek: e)ni/ote de\ kai\
o)nomatopoiei=n I)/sôs a)nagkai=on, e)a\n mê\ kei/menon ê)=| o)/noma
pro\s o(\ oi)kei/ôs a)\n a)podothei/ê], &c.]

The _Relatum_ and its Correlate seem to be _simul naturâ_. If you
suppress either one of the pair, the other vanishes along with it.
Aristotle appears to think, however, that there are many cases in
which this is not true. He says that there can be no _cognoscens_
without a _cognoscibile_, nor any _percipiens_ without a
_percipibile_; but that there may be _cognoscibile_ without any
_cognoscens_, and _percipibile_ without any _percipiens_. He says
that [Greek: to\ ai)sthêto\n] exists [Greek: pro\ tou= ai)/sthêsin
ei)=nai].[54] Whether any Essence or Substance can be a _Relatum_ or
not, he is puzzled to say; he seems to think that the Second Essence
may be, but that the First Essence cannot be so. He concludes,
however, by admitting that the question is one of doubt and
difficulty.[55]

[Footnote 54: Ibid. b. 15; p. 8, a. 12. The Scholion of Simplikius on
this point (p. 65, a. 16, b. 18, Br.) is instructive. He gives his
own opinion, and that of some preceding commentators, adverse to
Aristotle. He says that [Greek: e)pistê/mê] and [Greek: to\
e)pistêto/n, ai)sthêsis] and [Greek: to\ ai)sthêto/n], are not
properly correlates. The actual correlates with the actual, the
potential with the potential. Now, in the above pairs, [Greek: to\
e)pistêto\n] and [Greek: to\ ai)sthêto\n] are potentials, while
[Greek: **e)pistê/mê] and [Greek: ai)/sthêsis] are actuals; therefore
it is correct to say that [Greek: to\ e)pistêto\n] and [Greek: to\
ai)sthêto\n] will not cease to exist if you take away [Greek:
e)pistê/mê] and [Greek: ai)/sthêsis]. But the real and proper
correlate to [Greek: to\ e)pistêto\n] would be [Greek: to\
e)pistêmoniko/n]: the proper correlate to [Greek: to\ ai)sthêto\n]
would be [Greek: to\ ai)sthêtiko\n]. And when we take these two
latter pairs, it is perfectly correct to say, [Greek: sunanairei=
tau=ta a)/llêla].

In the treatise, De Partibus Animalium, i. p. 641, b. 2, where
Aristotle makes [Greek: nou=s] correlate with [Greek: ta\ noêta/], we
must understand [Greek: nou=s] as equivalent to [Greek: to\
noêtiko/n], and as different from [Greek: ê( no/êsis].]

[Footnote 55: Aristot. Categ. p. 8, b. 22.]

Quality is that according to which Subjects are called Such and Such
([Greek: poioi/ tines]). It is, however, not a true genus, but a
vague word, of many distinct, though analogous, meanings including an
assemblage of particulars not bound together by any generic tie.[56]
The more familiar varieties are--1. Habits or endowments ([Greek:
e(/xeis]) of a durable character, such as, wise, just, virtuous; 2.
Conditions more or less transitory, such as, hot, cold, sick,
healthy, &c. ([Greek: diathe/seis]); 3. Natural powers or
incapacities, such as hard, soft, fit for boxing, fit for running,
&c. 4. Capacities of causing sensation, such as sweet of honey, hot
and cold of fire and ice. But a person who occasionally blushes with
shame, or occasionally becomes pale with fear, does not receive the
designation of _such or such_ from this fact; the occasional emotion
is a passion, not a quality.[57]

[Footnote 56: See the first note on p. 66. Aristot. Categ. p. 8, b.
26: [Greek: e)/sti de\ ê( poio/tês tô=n pleonachô=s legome/nôn], &c.
Compare Metaphys. [Greek: D]. p. 1020, a. 33, and the Scholion of
Alexander, p. 715, a. 5, Br.

The abstract term [Greek: Poio/tês] was a new coinage in Plato's
time; he introduces it with an apology (Theætet. p. 182 A.).]

[Footnote 57: Aristot. Categ. p. 9, b. 20-33.]

A fifth variety of Quality is figure or circumscribing form,
straightness or crookedness. But dense, rare, rough, smooth, are not
properly varieties of Quality; objects are not denominated _such and
such_ from these circumstances. They rather declare position of the
particles of an object in reference to each other, near or distant,
evenly or unevenly arranged.[58]

[Footnote 58: Ibid. p. 10, a. 11-24.]

Quality admits, in some cases but not in all, both contrariety and
graduation. Just is contrary to unjust, black to white; but there is
no contrary to red or pale. If one of two contraries belongs to
Quality, the other of the two will also belong to Quality. In regard
to graduation, we can hardly say that Quality in the abstract is
capable of more and less; but it is indisputable that different
objects have more or less of the same quality. One man is more just,
healthy, wise, than another; though justice or health in itself
cannot be called more or less. One thing cannot be more a triangle,
square, or circle than another; the square is not more a circle than
the oblong.[59]

[Footnote 59: Aristot. Categ. p. 10, b. 12; p. 11, a. 10, 11-24.]

What has just been said is not peculiar to Quality; but one
peculiarity there is requiring to be mentioned. Quality is the
foundation of Similarity and Dissimilarity. Objects are called _like_
or _unlike_ in reference to qualities.[60]

[Footnote 60: Ibid. p. 11, a. 15.]

In speaking about Quality, Aristotle has cited many illustrations
from _Relata_. Habits and dispositions, described by their generic
names, are _Relata_; in their specific varieties they are Qualities.
Thus cognition is always cognition _of something_, and is therefore a
_Relatum_; but _grammatiké_ (grammatical cognition) is not
_grammatiké of any thing_, and is therefore a Quality. It has been
already intimated[61] that the same variety may well belong to two
distinct Categories.

[Footnote 61: Ibid. a. 20-38. [Greek: e)/ti ei) tu/gchanoi to\ au)to\
pro/s ti kai\ poio\n o)/n, ou)de\n a)/topon e)n a)mphote/rois toi=s
ge/nesin au)to\ katarithmei=sthai.]]

After having thus dwelt at some length on each of the first four
Categories, Aristotle passes lightly over the remaining six.
Respecting _Agere_ and _Pati_, he observes that they admit (like
Quality) both of graduation and contrariety. Respecting _Jac[=e]re_
he tells us that the predicates included in it are derived from the
fact of positions, which positions he had before ranked among the
_Relata_. Respecting _Ubi_, _Quando_, and _Habere_, he considers them
all so manifest and intelligible, that he will say nothing about
them; he repeats the illustrations before given--_Habere_, as, to be
shod, or to be armed (to have shoes or arms); _Ubi_, as, in the
Lykeium; _Quando_, as, yesterday, last year.[62]

[Footnote 62: Ibid. b. 8-15. [Greek: dia\ to\ prophanê= ei)=nai,
ou)de\n u(pe\r au)tô=n a)/llo le/getai ê)\ o(/sa e)n a)rchê=|
e)rre/thê], &c.]

. . . . . .


No part of the Aristotelian doctrine has become more incorporated
with logical tradition, or elicited a greater amount of comment and
discussion,[63] than these Ten Categories or Predicaments. I have
endeavoured to give the exposition as near as may be in the words and
with the illustrations of Aristotle; because in many of the comments
new points of view are introduced, sometimes more just than those of
Aristotle, but not present to his mind. Modern logicians join the
Categories side by side with the five Predicables, which are
explained in the Eisagoge of Porphyry, more than five centuries after
Aristotle's death. As expositors of Logic they are right in doing
this; but my purpose is to illustrate rather the views of Aristotle.
The mind of Aristotle was not altogether exempt from that
fascination[64] which particular numbers exercised upon the
Pythagoreans and after them upon Plato. To the number Ten the
Pythagoreans ascribed peculiar virtue and perfection. The fundamental
Contraries, which they laid down as the Principles of the Universe,
were ten in number.[65] After them, also, Plato carried his ideal
numbers as far as the Dekad, but no farther. That Aristotle
considered Ten to be the suitable number for a complete list of
general heads--that he was satisfied with making up the list of ten,
and looked for nothing beyond--may be inferred from the different
manner in which he deals with the different items. At least, such was
his point of view when he composed this treatise. Though he
recognizes all the ten Categories as co-ordinate in so far that
(except _Quale_) each is a distinct Genus, not reducible under either
of the others, yet he devotes all his attention to the first four,
and gives explanations (copious for him) in regard to these. About
the fifth and sixth (_Agere_ and _Pati_)[66] he says a little, though
much less than we should expect, considering their extent and
importance. About the last four, next to nothing appears. There are
even passages in his writings where he seems to drop all mention of
the two last (_Jacere_ and _Habere_), and to recognize no more than
eight Predicaments. In the treatise Categoriæ where his attention is
fastened on Terms and their signification, and on the appropriate way
of combining these terms into propositions, he recites the ten
_seriatim_; but in other treatises, where his remarks bear more upon
the matter and less upon the terms by which it is signified, he
thinks himself warranted in leaving out the two or three whose
applications are most confined to special subjects. If he had thought
fit to carry the total number of Predicaments to twelve or fifteen
instead of ten,[67] he would probably have had little difficulty in
finding some other general heads not less entitled to admission than
_Jacere_ and _Habere_; the rather, as he himself allows, even in
regard to the principal Categories, that particulars comprised under
one of them may also be comprised under another, and that there is no
necessity for supposing each particular to be restricted to one
Category exclusively.

[Footnote 63: About the prodigious number of these comments, see the
Scholion of Dexippus, p. 39, a. 34, Br.; p. 5, ed. Spengel.]

[Footnote 64: See Simpl. in Categ. Schol. p. 78, b. 14, Br.; also the
two first chapters of the Aristotelian treatise De Coelo; compare
also, about the perfection of the [Greek: tri/tê su/stasis], De
Partibus Animalium, ii. p. 646, b. 9; De Generat. Animal. iii. p.
760, a. 34.]

[Footnote 65: Aristot. Metaph. A. p. 986, a. 8. There existed, in the
time of the later Peripatetics, a treatise in the Doric dialect by
Archytas--[Greek: Peri\ tou= Panto/s]--discriminating Ten Categories,
and apparently the same ten Categories as Aristotle. By several
Aristotelian critics this treatise was believed to have been composed
by Archytas the Tarentine, eminent both as a Pythagorean philosopher
and as the leading citizen of Tarentum--the contemporary and friend
of Plato, and, therefore, of course, earlier than Aristotle. Several
critics believed that Aristotle had borrowed his Ten Categories from
this work of Archytas; and we know that the latter preserved the
total number of Ten. See Schol. ad Categor. p. 79, b. 3, Br.

But other critics affirmed, apparently with better reason, that the
Archytas, author of this treatise, was a Peripatetic philosopher
later than Aristotle; and that the doctrine of Archytas on the
Categories was copied from Aristotle in the same manner as the Doric
treatise on the Kosmos, ascribed to the Lokrian Timæus, was copied
from the Timæus of Plato, being translated into a Doric dialect.

See Scholia of Simplikius and Boëthius, p. 33, a. 1, n.; p. 40, a.
43, Brandis. The fact that this treatise was ascribed to the
Tarentine Archytas, indicates how much the number Ten was consecrated
in men's minds as a Pythagorean canon.]

[Footnote 66: Trendelenburg thinks (Geschichte der Kategorienlehre,
p. 131) that Aristotle must have handled the Categories _Agere_, and
_Pati_ more copiously in other treatises; and there are some passages
in his works which render this probable. See De Animâ, ii. p. 416, b.
35; De Generat. Animal. iv. p. 768, b. 15. Moreover, in the list of
Aristotle's works given by Diogenes Laertius, one title appears--
[Greek: Peri\ tou= poiei=n kai\ peponthe/nai] (Diog. L. v. 22).]

[Footnote 67: Prantl expresses this view in his Geschichte der Logik
(p. 206), and I think it just.]

These remarks serve partly to meet the difficulties pointed out by
commentators in regard to the Ten Categories. From the century
immediately succeeding Aristotle, down to recent times, the question
has always been asked, why did Aristotle fix upon Ten Categories
rather than any other number? and why upon these Ten rather than
others? And ancient commentators[68] as well as modern have insisted,
that the classification is at once defective and redundant; leaving
out altogether some particulars, while it enumerates others twice
over or more than twice. (This last charge is, however, admitted by
Aristotle himself, who considers it no ground of objection that the
same particular may sometimes be ranked under two distinct heads.)
The replies made to the questions, and the attempts to shew cause for
the selection of these Ten classes, have not been satisfactory;
though it is certain that Aristotle himself treats the classification
as if it were real and exhaustive,[69] obtained by comparing many
propositions and drawing from them an induction. He tries to
determine, in regard to some particular enquiries, under which of the
Ten _Summa Genera_ the subject of the enquiry is to be ranged; he
indicates some predicate of extreme generality (_Unum_, _Bonum_,
&c.), which extend over all or several Categories, as equivocal or
analogous, representing no true _Genera_. But though Aristotle takes
this view of the completeness of his own classification, he never
assigns the grounds of it, and we are left to make them out in the
best way we can.

[Footnote 68: Schol. p. 47, b. 14, seq., 49, a. 10, seq. Br.; also
Simplikius ad Categor. fol. 15, 31 A, 33 E. ed. Basil., 1551.]

[Footnote 69 Scholia ad Analyt. Poster. (I. xxiii. p. 83, a. 21) p.
227, b. 40, Br. [Greek: O(/ti de\ tosau=tai mo/nai ai( katêgori/ai
ai( kata\ tô=n ou)siô=n lego/menai, e)k tê=s e)pagôgê=s lamba/nei.]

Brentano (in his treatise, Ueber die Bedeutung des Seienden in
Aristoteles, Sects. 12 and 13, pp. 148-177) attempts to draw out a
scheme of systematic deduction for the Categories. He quotes (pp.
181, 182) a passage from Thomas Aquinas, in which such a scheme is
set forth acutely and plausibly. But if Aristotle had had any such
system present to his mind, he would hardly have left it to be
divined by commentators.

Simplikius observes (Schol. ad Categ. p. 44, a. 30) that the last
nine Categories coincide in the main (excepting such portion of
_Quale_ as belongs to the Essence) with [Greek: to\ o)/n kata\
sumbebêko/s]: which latter, according to Aristotle's repeated
declarations, can never be the matter of any theorizing or scientific
treatment--[Greek: ou)demi/a e)sti\ peri\ au)to\ theôri/a], Metaphys.
E. p. 1026, b. 4; K. p. 1064, b. 17. This view of Aristotle
respecting [Greek: to\ sumbebêko/s], is hardly consistent with a
scheme of intentional deduction for the accidental predicates.]

We cannot safely presume, I think, that he followed out any deductive
principle or system; if he had done so, he would probably have
indicated it. The decuple indication of general heads arose rather
from comparison of propositions and induction therefrom. Under each
of these ten heads, some predicate or other may always be applied to
every concrete individual object, such as a man or animal. Aristotle
proceeded by comparing a variety of propositions, such as were
employed in common discourse or dialectic, and throwing the different
predicates into _genera_, according as they stood in different
logical relation to the Subject. The analysis applied is not
metaphysical but logical; it does not resolve the real individual
into metaphysical [Greek: a)rchai\] or Principles, such as Form and
Matter; it accepts the individual as he stands, with his full complex
array of predicates embodied in a proposition, and analyses that
proposition into its logical constituents.[70] The predicates derive
their existence from being attached to the First Subject, and have a
different manner of existence according as they are differently
related to the First Subject.[71] What is this individual, Sokrates?
He is an _animal_. What is his Species? _Man_. What is the
Differentia, limiting the Genus and constituting the Species?
_Rationality_, _two-footedness_. What is his height and bulk? He is
_six feet_ high, and is of _twelve stone_ weight. What manner of man
is he? He is _flat-nosed_, _virtuous_, _patient_, _brave_. In what
relation does he stand to others? He is a _father_, a _proprietor_, a
_citizen_, a _general_. What is he doing? He is _digging his garden_,
_ploughing his field_. What is being done to him? He is _being rubbed
with oil_, he is _having his hair cut_. Where is he? _In the city_,
_at home_, _in bed_. When do you speak of him? _As he is, at this
moment_, _as he was, yesterday_, _last year_. In what posture is he?
He is _lying down_, _sitting_, _standing up_, _kneeling_, _balancing
on one leg_. What is he wearing? He _has a tunic_, _armour_, _shoes_,
_gloves_.

[Footnote 70: Aristot. Metaphys. Z. p. 1038, b. 15. [Greek: dichô=s
u(pokei=tai, ê)\ to/de ti o)/n, ô(/sper to\ zô=|on toi=s pa/thesin,
ê)\ ô(s ê( u(/lê tê=| e)ntelechei/a|.] The first mode of [Greek:
u(pokei/menon] is what is in the Categories. For the second, which is
the metaphysical analysis, see Aristot. Metaph. Z. p. 1029, a. 23:
[Greek: ta\ me\n ga\r a)/lla tê=s ou)si/as katêgorei=tai, au(/tê de\
tê=s u(/lês. ô(/ste to\ e)/schaton kath' au(to\ ou)/te ti\ ou)/te
poso\n ou)/te a)/llo ou)the/n e)sti.]

Porphyry and Dexippus tell us (Schol. ad Categ. p. 45, a. 6-30) that
both Aristotle and the Stoics distinguished [Greek: prô=ton
u(pokei/menon] and [Greek: deu/teron u(pokei/menon]. The [Greek:
prô=ton u(pokei/menon] is [Greek: ê( a)/poios u(/lê--to\ duna/mei
sô=ma], which Aristotle insists upon in the Physica and Metaphysica,
the [Greek: deu/teron u(pokei/menon, o(\ koinô=s poio\n ê)\ i)di/ôs
u(phi/statai], coincides with the [Greek: prô/tê ou)si/a] of the
Categories, already implicated with [Greek: ei)=dos] and stopping
short of metaphysical analysis.

The remarks of Boêthus and Simplikius upon this point deserve
attention. Schol. pp. 50-54, Br.; p. 54, a. 2: [Greek: ou) peri\ tê=s
a)sche/tou u(/lês e)sti\n o( parô\n lo/gos, a)lla\ tê=s ê)/dê
sche/sin e)chou/sês pro\s to\ ei)=dos. to\ de\ su/ntheton dêlo/noti,
o(/per e)sti\ to\ a)/tomon, e)pide/chetai to\ to/de.] They point out
that the terms Form and Matter are not mentioned in the Categories,
nor do they serve to illustrate the Categories, which do not carry
analysis so far back, take their initial start from [Greek: to/de
ti], the [Greek: su/ntheton] of Form and Matter,--[Greek: ou)si/a
kuriô/tata kai\ prô/tôs kai\ ma/lista legome/nê].

Simplikius says (p. 50, a. 17):--[Greek: dunato\n de\ tou= mê\
mnêmoneu=sai tou= ei)/dous kai\ tê=s u(/lês ai)/tion le/gein, kai\
to\ tê\n tô=n Katêgoriô=n pragmatei/an _kata\ tê\n pro/cheiron kai\
koinê\n tou= lo/gou chrê=sin_ poiei=sthai; to\ de\ tê=s u(/lês kai\
tou= ei)/dous o)/noma kai\ ta\ u(po\ tou/tôn sêmaino/mena ou)k ê)=n
toi=s polloi=s sunê/thê], &c. Compare p. 47, a. 27. This what
Dexippus says also, that the Categories bear only upon [Greek: tê\n
prô/tên chrei/an tou= lo/gou kath' ê(\n ta\ pra/gmata dêlou=n
a)llêlois e)phie/metha] (p. 13, ed. Spengel; also p. 49).

Waitz, ad Categor. p. 284. "In Categoriis, non de ipsâ rerum naturâ
et veritate exponit, sed res tales capit, quales apparent in communi
vitâ homini philosophiâ non imbuto."

We may add, that Aristotle applies the metaphysical analysis--Form
and Matter--not only to the Category [Greek: ou)si/a] but also to
that of [Greek: poio\n] and [Greek: poso/n] (De Coelo, iv. 312, a.
14.)]

[Footnote 71: Aristot. Metaph. [Greek: D]. 1017, a. 23. [Greek:
o(sachô=s ga\r le/getai, tosautachô=s to\ ei)=nai sêmai/nei].]

Confining ourselves (as I have already observed that Aristotle does
in the Categories) to those perceptible or physical subjects which
every one admits,[72] and keeping clear of metaphysical entities, we
shall see that respecting any one of these subjects the nine
questions here put may all be put and answered; that the two last are
most likely to be put in regard to some living being; and that the
last can seldom be put in regard to any other subject except a person
(including man, woman, or child). Every individual person falls
necessarily under each of the ten Categories; belongs to the Genus
animal, Species man; he is of a certain height and bulk; has certain
qualities; stands in certain relations to other persons or things; is
doing something and suffering something; is in a certain place; must
be described with reference to a certain moment of time; is in a
certain attitude or posture; is clothed or equipped in a certain
manner. Information of some kind may always be given respecting him
under each of these heads; he is always by necessity _quantus_, but
not always of any particular quantity. Until such information is
given, the concrete individual is not known under conditions
thoroughly determined.[73] Moreover each head is separate and
independent, not resolvable into any of the rest, with a reservation,
presently to be noticed, of Relation in its most comprehensive
meaning. When I say of a man, that he is at home, lying down, clothed
with a tunic, &c., I do not predicate of him any quality, action, or
passion. The information which I give belongs to three other heads
distinct from these last, and distinct also from each other. If you
suppress the two last of the ten Categories and leave only the
preceding eight, under which of these eight are you to rank the
predicates, Sokrates is _lying down_, Sokrates is _clothed with a
tunic_, &c.? The necessity for admitting the ninth and tenth
Categories (_Jacere_ and _Habere_) as separate general heads in the
list, is as great as the necessity for admitting most of the
Categories which precede. The ninth and tenth are of narrower
comprehension,[74] and include a smaller number of distinguishable
varieties, than the preceding; but they are not the less separate
heads of information. So, among the chemical elements enumerated by
modern science, some are very rarely found; yet they are not for that
reason the less entitled to a place in the list.

[Footnote 72: Ibid. Z. p. 1028, b. 8, seq.: p. 1042, a. 25. [Greek:
ai( ai)sthêtai\ ou)si/ai--ai( o(mologou/menai ou)si/ai].]

[Footnote 73: Prantl observes, Geschichte der Logik, p. 208:--"Fragen
wir, wie Aristoteles überhaupt dazu gekommen sei, von Kategorien zu
sprechen, und welche Geltung dieselben bei ihm haben, so ist unsere
Antwort hierauf folgende: Aristoteles geht, im Gegensatze gegen
Platon, davon aus, dass die Allgemeinheit in der Concretion des
Seienden sich verwirkliche und in dieser Realität von dem
menschlichen Denken und Sprechen ergriffen werde; der
Verwirklichungsprocess des concret Seienden ist der Uebergang vom
Unbestimmten, jeder Bestimmung aber fähigen, zum allseitig
Bestimmten, welchem demnach die Bestimmtheit überhaupt als eine
selbst concret gewordene einwohnt und ebenso in des Menschen Rede von
ihm ausgesagt wird. Das grundwesentliche Ergebniss der Verwirklichung
ist sonach: die zeitlich-räumlich concret auftretende und hiemit
individuell gewordene Substanzialität, in einer dem Zustande der
Concretion entsprechenden Erscheinungsweise; diese letztere umfasst
das ganze habituelle Dasein und Wirken der concreten Substanz, welche
in der Welt der räumlichen Ausdehnung numerären Vielheit erscheint.
Die ontologische Basis demnach der Kategorien ist der in die
Concretion führende Verwirklichungsprocess der Bestimmtheit
überhaupt."]

[Footnote 74: Plotinus, among his various grounds of exception to the
ten Aristotelian Categories, objects to the ninth and tenth on the
ground of their narrow comprehension (Ennead. vi. 1, 23, 24).

Boêthus expressly vindicated the title of [Greek: e)/chein] to be
recognized as a separate Category, against the Stoic
objectors.--Schol. ad Categ. p. 81, a. 5.]

If we seek not to appreciate the value of the Ten Categories as a
philosophical classification, but to understand what was in the mind
of Aristotle when he framed it, we shall attend, not much to the
greater features, which it presents in common with every other scheme
of classification, as to the minor features which constitute its
peculiarity. In this point of view the two last Categories are more
significant than the first four, and the tenth is the most
significant of all; for every one is astonished when he finds
_Habere_ enrolled as a tenth _Summum Genus_, co-ordinate with
_Quantum_ and _Quale_. Now what is remarkable about the ninth and
tenth Categories is, that individual persons or animals are the only
Subjects respecting whom they are ever predicated, and are at the
same time Subjects respecting whom they are constantly (or at least
frequently) predicated. An individual person is habitually clothed in
some particular way in all or part of his body; he (and perhaps his
horse also) are the only Subjects that are ever so clothed. Moreover
animals are the only Subjects, and among them man is the principal
Subject, whose changes of posture are frequent, various, determined
by internal impulses, and at the same time interesting to others to
know. Hence we may infer that when Aristotle lays down the Ten
Categories, as _Summa Genera_ for all predications which can be made
about any given Subject, the Subject which he has wholly, or at least
principally, in his mind is an individual Man. We understand, then,
how it is that he declares _Habere_ and _Jacere_ to be so plain as to
need no farther explanation. What is a man's posture? What is his
clothing or equipment? are questions understood by every one.[75] But
when Aristotle treats of _Habere_ elsewhere, he is far from
recognizing it as narrow and plain _per se_. Even in the
Post-Predicamenta (an appendix tacked on to the Categoriæ, either by
himself afterwards, or by some follower) he declares _Habere_ to be a
predicate of vague and equivocal signification; including portions of
_Quale_, _Quantum_, and _Relata_. And he specifies the personal
equipment of an individual as only one among these many varieties of
signification. He takes the same view in the fourth book ([Greek:
D].) of the Metaphysica, which book is a sort of lexicon of
philosophical terms.[76] This enlargement of the meaning of the word
_Habere_ seems to indicate an alteration of Aristotle's point of
view, dropping that special reference to an individual man as
Subject, which was present to him when he drew up the list of Ten
Categories. The like alteration carried him still farther, so as to
omit the ninth and tenth almost entirely, when he discusses the more
extensive topics of philosophy. Some of his followers, on the
contrary, instead of omitting _Habere_ out of the list of Categories,
tried to procure recognition for it in the larger sense which it
bears in the Metaphysica. Archytas ranked it fifth in the series,
immediately after _Relata_.[77]

[Footnote 75: In the thirteenth and fourteenth chapters of Mr. James
Harris's Philosophical Arrangements, there is a learned and valuable
illustration of these two last Aristotelian Categories. I think,
however, that he gives to the Predicament [Greek: Kei=sthai]
(_Jacere_) a larger and more comprehensive meaning than it bears in
the treatise Categoriæ; and that neither he, nor the commentators
whom he cites (p. 317), take sufficient notice of the marked
distinction drawn in that treatise between [Greek: kei=sthai] and
[Greek: the/sis] (Cat. p. 6, b. 12). Mr. Harris ranks the arrangement
of words in an orderly discourse, and of propositions in a valid
syllogism, as cases coming under the Predicament [Greek Kei=sthai];
which is travelling far beyond the meaning of that word in the
Aristotelian Categories. At the same time he brings out strongly the
fact, that living beings, and especially _men_, are the true and
special subjects of predicates belonging to [Greek: Kei=sthai] and
[Greek: E)/chein]. The more we attend to this, the nearer approach
shall we make to the state of Aristotle's mind when he drew up the
list of Categories; as indeed Harris himself seems to recognize
(chap. ii. p. 29).]

[Footnote 76: Aristot. Categor. p. 15, b. 17; Metaphys. [Greek: D].
p. 1023, a. 8.]

[Footnote 77: See the Scholia of Simplikius, p. 80, b. 7, seq.; p.
92, b. 41, Brand.; where the different views of Archytas, Plotinus,
and Boêthus, are given; also p. 59, b. 43: [Greek: proêgei=tai ga\r
ê( sumphuê\s tô=n pro/s ti sche/sis tô=n e)piktê/tôn sche/seôn, ô(s
kai\ tô\| A)rchu/ta| dokei=.] In the language of Archytas, [Greek:
ai( e)pi/ktêtoi sche/seis] were the equivalent of the Aristotelian
[Greek: e)/chein].]

The narrow manner in which Aristotle conceives the Predicament
_Habere_ in the treatise Categoriæ, and the enlarged sense given to
that term both in the Post-Predicaments and in the Metaphysica, lead
to a suspicion that the Categoriæ is comparatively early, in point of
date, among his compositions. It seems more likely that he should
begin with the narrower view, and pass from thence to the larger,
rather than _vice versâ_. Probably the predicates specially
applicable to Man would be among his early conceptions, but would by
later thought be tacitly dropped,[78] so as to retain those only
which had a wider philosophical application.

[Footnote 78: Respecting the paragraph (at the close of the
Categoriæ) about [Greek: to\ e)/chein], see the Scholion in Waitz's
ed. of the Organon, p. 38.

The fact that Archytas in his treatise presented the Aristotelian
Category [Greek: e)/chein] under the more general phrase of [Greek:
ai( e)pi/ktêtoi sche/seis] (see the preceding note), is among the
reasons for believing that treatise to be later than Aristotle.]

I have already remarked that Aristotle, while enrolling all the Ten
Predicaments as independent heads, each the _Generalissimum_ of a
separate descending line of predicates, admitted at the same time
that various predicates did not of necessity belong to one of these
lines exclusively, but might take rank in more than one line. There
are some which he enumerates under all the different heads of
Quality, Relation, Action, Passion. The classification is evidently
recognized as one to which we may apply a remark which he makes
especially in regard to Quality and Relation, under both of which
heads (he says) the same predicates may sometimes be counted.[79] And
the observation is much more extensively true than he was aware; for
he both conceives and defines the Category of Relation or Relativity
(_Ad Aliquid_) in a way much narrower than really belongs to it. If
he had assigned to this Category its full and true comprehension, he
would have found it implicated with all the other nine. None of them
can be isolated from it in predication.

[Footnote 79: Aristot. Categ. p. 11, a. 37.

Simplikius says that what Aristotle admits about [Greek: poio/tês],
is true about all the other Categories also, viz.: that it is not a
strict and proper [Greek: ge/nos]. Each of the ten Categories is
(what Aristotle says about [Greek: to\ o(\n]) [Greek: me/son tô=n te
sunôno/môn kai\ o(mônu/môn.--ou)de\ ga\r e)kei=na kuri/ôs e)sti\
ge/nê, ou)de\ ô(s ge/nê tô=n u(p' au)ta\ katêgorei=tai, _ta/xeôs
ou)/sês pantachou= prô/tôn kai\ deute/rôn_.] (Scholia ad Categor. p.
69, b. 30, Br.) This is a remarkable observation, which has been
sufficiently adverted to, I think, by Brentano in his treatise on
Aristotle's Ontology.]

That _Agere_ and _Pati_ (with the illustrations which he himself
gives thereof--_urit_, _uritur_) may be ranked as varieties under the
generic Category of Relation or Relativity, can hardly be overlooked.
The like is seen to be true about _Ubi_ and _Quando_, when we advert
to any one of the predicates belonging to either; such as, _in the
market-place_, _yesterday_.[80] Moreover, not merely the last six of
the ten Categories, but also the second and fourth (_Quantum_ and
_Quale_) are implicated with and subordinated to Relation. If we look
at _Quantum_, we shall find that the example which Aristotle gives of
it is [Greek: tripê=chus], tricubital, or three cubits long; a term
quite as clearly relative as the term [Greek: dipla/sios] or double,
which he afterwards produces as instance of the Category _Ad
Aliquid_.[81] When we are asked the questions, How much is the
height? How large is the field? we cannot give the information
required except by a relative predicate--_it is three feet_--_it is
four acres_; we thereby carry back the mind of the questioner to some
unit of length or superficies already known to him, and we convey our
meaning by comparison with such unit. Again, if we turn from
_Quantum_ to _Quale_, we find the like Relativity implied in all the
predicates whereby answer is made to the question [Greek: Poio\s ti/s
e)sti?] _Qualis est_? What manner of man is he? _He is such as A, B,
C_--persons whom we have previously seen, or heard, or read of.[82]

[Footnote 80: The remarks of Plotinus upon these four last-mentioned
Categories are prolix and vague, but many of them go to shew how much
[Greek: to\ pro/s ti] is involved in all of the four (Ennead. vi. 1,
14-18).]

[Footnote 81: Trendelenburg (Kategorienlehre, p. 184) admits a
certain degree of interference and confusion between the Categories
of _Quantum_ and _Ad Aliquid_; but in very scanty measure, and much
beneath the reality.]

[Footnote 82: The following passages from Mr. James Mill (Analysis of
the Phenomena of the Human Mind, vol. ii. ch. xiv. sect. ii. pp. 48,
49, 56, 1st ed.) state very clearly the Relativity of the predicates
of Quantity and Quality:--

"It seems necessary that I should say something of the word
_Quantus_, from which the word Quantity is derived. _Quantus_ is the
correlate of _Tantus_. _Tantus_, _Quantus_, are relative terms,
applicable to all the objects to which we apply the terms Great,
Little."--"Of two lines, we call the one _tantus_, the other
_quantus_. The occasions on which we do so, are when the one is as
long as the other."--"When we say that one thing is _tantus_,
_quantus_ another, or one so great, as the other is great; the first
is referred to the last, the _tantus_ to the _quantus_. The first is
distinguished and named by the last. The _Quantus_ is the
standard."--"On what account, then, is it that we give to any thing
the name _Quantus_? As a standard by which to name another thing,
_Tantus_. The thing called _Quantus_ is the previously known thing,
the ascertained amount, by which we can mark and define the other
amount."

"_Talis_, _Qualis_, are applied to objects in the same way, on one
account, as _Tantus_, _Quantus_, on another; and the explanation we
gave of _Tantus_, _Quantus_, may be applied, _mutatis mutandis_, to
the pair of relatives which we have now named. _Tantus_, _Quantus_,
are names applied to objects on account of dimension. _Talis_,
_Qualis_, are names applied to objects on account of all other
sensations. We apply _Tantus_, _Quantus_, to a pair of objects when
they are equal; we apply _Talis_, _Qualis_, to a pair of objects when
they are alike. One of the objects is then the standard. The object
_Qualis_ is that to which the reference is made."

Compare the same work, vol. i. ch. ix. p. 225:--"The word _Such_ is a
relative term, and always connotes so much of the meaning of some
other term. When we call a thing _such_, it is always understood that
it is such _as_ some other thing. Corresponding with our words _such
as_, the Latins had _Talis_, _Qualis_."]

We thus see that all the predicates, not only under the Category
which Aristotle terms _Ad Aliquid_, but also under all the last nine
Categories, are relative. Indeed the work of predication is always
relative. The express purpose, as well as the practical usefulness,
of a significant predicate is, to carry the mind of the hearer either
to a comparison or to a general notion which is the result of past
comparisons. But though each predicate connotes Relation, each
connotes a certain _fundamentum_ besides, which gives to the Relation
its peculiar character. Relations of Quantity are not the same as
relations of Quality; the predicates of the former connote a
_fundamentum_ different from the predicates of the latter, though in
both the meaning conveyed is relative. In fact, every predicate or
concrete general name is relative, or connotes a Relation to
something else, actual or potential, beyond the thing named. The only
name not relative is the Proper name, which connotes no attributes,
and cannot properly be used as a predicate (so Aristotle remarks),
but only as a Subject.[83] Sokrates, Kallias, Bukephalus &c., denotes
the _Hoc Aliquid_ or _Unum Numero_, which, when pronounced alone,
indicates some concrete aggregate (as yet unknown) which may manifest
itself to my senses, but does not, so far as the name is concerned,
involve necessary reference to anything besides; though even these
names, when one and the same name continues to be applied to the same
object, may be held to connote a real or supposed continuity of past
or future existence, and become thus to a certain extent relative.

[Footnote 83: You may make Sokrates a predicate, in the proposition,
[Greek: to\ leuko\n e)kei=no Sôkra/tês e)sti/n], but Aristotle
dismisses this as an irregular or perverse manner of speaking (see
Analytic. Priora, i. p. 43, a. 35; Analyt. Poster. i. p. 83,
a. 2-16).

Alexander calls these propositions [Greek: ai( para\ phu/sin
prota/seis] (see Schol. ad Metaphys. [Greek: D]. p. 1017, a. 23).

Mr. James Harris observes (Philosophical Arrangements, ch. x. p. 214;
also 317, 348):--"Hence too we may see why Relation stands next to
Quantity; for in strictness the Predicaments which follow are but
different modes of Relation, marked by some peculiar character over
their own, over and above the relative character, which is common to
them all." To which I would add, that the first two Categories,
Substance and Quantity, are no less relative or correlative than the
eight later Categories; as indeed Harris himself thinks; see the same
work, pp. 90, 473: "Matter and Attribute are essentially distinct,
yet, like _convex_ and _concave_, they are by nature inseparable. We
have already spoken as to the inseparability of attributes; we now
speak as to that of matter. [Greek: Ê(mei=s de\ phame\n me\n ei)=nai/
tina u(/lên tô=n sôma/tôn tô=n ai)sthêtô=n, a)lla\ tau/tên ou)
chôristê\n a)ll' a)ei\ met' e)nantiô/seôs--u(/lên tê\n a)chô/riston
me\n, u(pokeime/nên de\ toi=s e)nanti/ois (Aristot. De Gen. et Corr.
p. 329, a. 24). By contraries, Aristotle means here the several
attributes of matter, hot, cold, &c.; from some one or other of which
matter is always inseparable."]

We must observe that what the proper name denotes is any certain
concrete One and individual,[84] with his attributes essential and
non-essential, whatever they may be, though as yet undeclared, and
with his capacity of receiving other attributes different and even
opposite. This is what Aristotle indicates as the most special
characteristic of Substance or Essence, that while it is _Unum et
Idem Numero_, it is capable of receiving contraries. This
potentiality of contraries, described as characterizing the _Unum et
Idem Numero_,[85] is relative to something about to come; the First
Essence is doubtless logically First, but it is just as much relative
to the Second, as the Second to the First. We know it only by two
negations and one affirmation, all of which are relative to
predications _in futuro_. It is neither in a Subject, nor predicable
of a Subject. It is itself the ultimate Subject of all predications
and all inherencies. Plainly, therefore, we know it only relatively
to these predications and inherencies. Aristotle says truly, that if
you take; away the First Essences, everything else, Second Essences
as well as Accidents, disappears along with them. But he might have
added with equal truth, that if you take away all Second Essences and
all Accidents, the First Essences will disappear equally. The
correlation and interdependence is reciprocal.[86] It may be
suitable, with a view to clear and retainable philosophical
explanation, to state the Subject first and the predicates
afterwards; so that the Subject may thus be considered as logically
_prius_. But in truth the Subject is only a _substratum_ for
predicates,[87] as much as the predicates are _superstrata_ upon the
Subject. The term _substratum_ designates not an absolute or a _per
se_, but a _Correlatum_ to certain _superstrata_, determined or
undetermined: now the _Correlatum_ is one of the pair implicated
directly or indirectly in all Relation; and it is in fact specified
by Aristotle as one variety of the Category _Ad Aliquid_.[88] We see
therefore that the idea of Relativity attaches to the first of the
ten Categories, as well as to the nine others. The inference from
these observations is, that Relation or Relativity, understood in the
large sense which really belongs to it, ought to be considered rather
as an Universal, comprehending and pervading all the Categories, than
as a separate Category in itself, co-ordinate with the other nine. It
is the condition and characteristic of the work of predication
generally; the last analysis of which is into Subject and Predicate,
in reciprocal implication with each other. I remark that this was the
view taken of it by some well-known Peripatetic commentators of
antiquity;[89] by Andronikus, for example, and by Ammonius after him.
Plato, though he makes no attempt to draw up a list of Categories,
has an incidental passage respecting Relativity;[90] conceiving it in
a very extended sense, apparently as belonging more or less to all
predicates. Aristotle, though in the Categoriæ he gives a narrower
explanation of it, founded upon grammatical rather than real
considerations, yet intimates in other places that predicates ranked
under the heads of _Quale_, _Actio_, _Passio_, _Jacere_, &c., may
also be looked at as belonging to the head of _Ad Aliquid_.[91] This
latter, moreover, he himself declares elsewhere to be _Ens_ in the
lowest degree, farther removed from the _Prima Essentia_ than any of
the other Categories; to be more in the nature of an appendage to
some of them, especially to _Quantum_ and _Quale_;[92] and to
presuppose, not only the _Prima Essentia_ (which all the nine later
Categories presuppose), but also one or more of the others,
indicating the particular mode of comparison or Relativity in each
case affirmed. Thus, under one aspect, Relation or Relativity may be
said to stand _prius naturâ_, and to come first in order before all
the Categories, inasmuch as it is implicated with the whole business
of predication (which those Categories are intended to resolve into
its elements), and belongs not less to the mode of conceiving what we
call the Subject, than to the mode of conceiving what we call its
Predicates, each and all. Under another aspect, Relativity may be
said to stand last in order among the Categories--even to come after
the adverbial Categories _Ubi et Quando_; because its _locus standi_
is dim and doubtful, and because every one of the subordinate
predicates belonging to it may be seen to belong to one or other of
the remaining Categories also. Aristotle remarks that the Category
_Ad Aliquid_ has no peculiar and definite mode of generation
corresponding to it, in the manner that Increase and Diminution
belong to _Quantum_, Change to _Quale_, Generation, simple and
absolute, to Essence or Substance.[93] New relations may become
predicable of a thing, without any change in the thing itself, but
simply by changes in other things.[94]

[Footnote 84: Simplikius ap. Schol. p. 52, a. 42: [Greek: pro\s o(/
phasin oi( spoudaio/teroi tô=n e)xêgêtô=n, o(/ti ê( ai)sthêtê\
ou)si/a sumpho/rêsi/s ti/s e)sti poiotê/tôn kai\ u(/lês, kai\ o(mou=
me\n pa/nta sumpage/nta mi/an poiei= tê\n ai)sthêtê\n ousi/an,
chôri\s de\ e(/kaston lambano/menon to\ me\n poio\n to\ de\ poso/n
e)sti lambano/menon, ê)/ ti a)/llo.]]

[Footnote 85: Aristot. Categ. p. 4, a. 10: [Greek: Ma/lista de\
I)/dion tou=to tê=s ou)si/as dokei= ei)=nai, to\ tau)to\n kai\ e(\n
a)rithmô=| o)\n tô=n e)nanti/ôn ei)=nai dektiko/n.] See Waitz, note,
p. 290: [Greek: dektiko\n] dicitur [Greek: to\ e)n ô(=| pe/phuken
u(pa/rchein ti].

Dexippus, and after him Simplikius, observe justly, that the
characteristic mark of [Greek: prô/tê ou)si/a] is this very
circumstance of being _unum numero_, which belongs in common to all
[Greek: prô=|tai ou)si/ai], and is indicated by the Proper name:
[Greek: lu/sis de\ touo/tou, o(/ti au)to\ to\ mi/an ei)=nai
a)rithmô=|, koino/s e)sti lo/gos]. (Simpl. in Categor., fol. 22
[Greek: D]].; Dexippus, book ii. sect. 18, p. 57, ed. Spengel.)]

[Footnote 86: Aristot. Categ. p. 2, b. 5. [Greek: mê\ ou)sô=n ou)=n
tô=n prô/tôn ou)siô=n a)du/naton tô=n a)/llôn ti ei)=nai.]

Mr. John Stuart Mill observes: "As to the self-existence of
Substance, it is very true that a substance may be conceived to exist
without any other substance; but so also may an attribute without any
other attributes. And we can no more imagine a substance without
attributes, than we can imagine attributes without a substance."
(System of Logic, bk. i. ch. iii. p. 61, 6th ed.)]

[Footnote 87: Aristot. Physic. ii. p. 194, b. 8. [Greek: e)/ti tô=n
pro/s ti ê( u(/lê; a)/llô| ga\r ei)/dei a)/llê u(/lê.]

Plotinus puts this correctly, in his criticisms on the Stoic
Categories; criticisms which on this point equally apply to the
Aristotelian: [Greek: pro/s ti ga\r to\ u(pokei/menon, ou) pro\s to\
e)n au)tô=|, a)lla\ pro\s to\ poiou=n ei)s au)to/, kei/menon. Kai\
to\ u(pokei/menon u(pokei=tai pro\s to\ ou)ch u(pokei/menon; ei)
tou=to, pro\s ta\ to\ e)/xô], &c. Also Dexippus in the Scholia ad
Categor. p. 45, a. 26: [Greek: to\ ga\r u(pokei/menon kata\ pro/s ti
le/gesthai e)do/kei, tini\ ga\r u(pokei/menon.]]

[Footnote 88: Aristot. Metaphys. [Greek: D]. p. 1020, b. 31, p. 1021,
a. 27, seq.]

[Footnote 89: Schol. p. 60, a. 38, Br.; p. 47, b. 26. Xenokrates and
Andronikus included all things under the two heads [Greek: to\ kath'
au(to\] and [Greek: to\ pro/s ti]. [Greek: A)ndro/nikos me\n ga\r o(
R(o/dios teleutai/an a)pone/mei toi=s pros ti ta/xin, le/gôn ai)ti/an
toiau/tên. ta\ pro/s ti oi)kei/an u(/lê ou)k e)/chei; _paraphua/di
ga\r e)/oiken oi)kei/an phu/sin mê\ e)chou/sê| a)lla\ periplekome/nê|
toi=s e)/chousin oi)kei/an r(i/zan; ai( de\ e)/nnea katêgori/ai
oi)kei/an u(/lên e)/chousin_; ei)ko/tôs ou)=n teleutai/an ô)/pheilon
e)/chein ta/xin.] Again, Schol. p. 60, a. 24 (Ammonius): [Greek:
kalô=s de/ tines a)peika/zousi ta\ pro/s ti paraphua/sin], &c. Also
p. 59, b. 41; p. 49, a. 47; p. 61, b. 29: [Greek: i)/sôs de\ kai\
o(/ti ta\ pro/s ti e)n toi=s a)/llois ge/nesin u(phe/stêke, dia\
tou=to su\n au)toi=s theôrei=tai, ka)\n mê\ proêgoume/nês e)/tuche
mnê/mês (and the Scholia ad p. 6, a. 36, prefixed to Waitz's edition,
p. 33). Also p. 62, a. 37: [Greek: dia\ tau=ta de\ ô(s paraphuome/nên
tai=s a)/llais katêgori/ais tê\n tou= pro/s ti e)peisodiô/dê
nomi/zousi, kai/toi proêgoume/nên ou)=san kai\ kata\ diaphora\n
oi)kei/an theôroume/nên.] Boêthus had written an entire book upon
[Greek: ta\ pro/s ti], Schol. p. 61, b. 9.]

[Footnote 90: Plato, Republic, iv. 437 C. to 439 B. (compare also
Sophistes, p. 255 C., and Politicus, p. 285). [Greek: Kai\ ta\ plei/ô
dê\ pro\s ta\ e)la/ttô kai\ ta\ dipla/sia pro\s ta\ ê(mi/sea kai\
pa/nta ta\ toiau=ta, kai\ au)= baru/tera pro\s koupho/tera kai\
tha/ttô pro\s bradu/tera, _kai\ e)/ti ge ta\ therma\ pro\s ta\
psuchra\_ kai\ pa/nta ta\ tou/tois o(/moia, a)=r' ou)ch ou(/tôs
e)/chei?] (438 C.)]

[Footnote 91: See Metaphysic. [Greek: D]. p. 1020, b. 26, p. 1021, b.
10. Trendelenburg observes (Gesch. der Kategorienlehre, pp. 118-122,
seq.) how much more the description given of [Greek: pro/s ti] in the
Categoriæ is determined by verbal or grammatical considerations, than
in the Metaphysica and other treatises of Aristotle.]

[Footnote 92: See Ethic. Nikomach. i. p. 1096, a. 20: [Greek: to\ de\
kath' au(to\ kai\ ê( ou)si/a pro/teron tê=| phu/sei tou= pro/s ti;
paraphua/di ga\r tou=t' e)/oike kai\ sumbebêko/ti tou= o)/ntos,
ô(/ste ou)k a)\n ei)/ê koinê/ tis e)pi\ tou/tôn i)de/a.] (The
expression [Greek: paraphua/di] was copied by Andronikus; see a note
on the preceding page.) Metaphys. N. p. 1088, a. 22-26: [Greek: to\
de\ pro/s ti pa/ntôn ê(/kista phu/sis tis ê)\ ou)si/a tô=n katêgoriôn
e)sti/, kai\ u(ste/ra tou= poiou= kai\ posou=; kai\ _pa/thos ti tou=
posou= to\ pro/s ti_, ô(/sper e)le/chthê, a)ll' ou)ch u(/lê, ei)/ ti
e(/teron kai\ tô=| o(/lôs koinô=| pro/s ti kai\ toi=s me/resin
au)tou= kai\ ei)/desin.] Compare Bonitz in his note on p. 1070, a.
33.

The general doctrine laid down by Aristotle, Metaphys. N. p. 1087, b.
34, seq., about the universality of [Greek: me/tron] as pervading all
the Categories, is analogous to the passage above referred to in the
Politicus of Plato, and implies the Relativity involved more or less
in all predicates.]

[Footnote 93: Aristot. Metaph. N. p. 1088, a. 29: [Greek: sêmei=on
de\ o(/ti ê(/kista ou)si/a tis kai\ o)/n ti _to\ pro\/s ti_ to\
mo/non mê\ ei)=nai ge/nesin au)tou= mêde\ phthora\n mêde\ ki/nêsin,
ô(/sper kata\ to\ poso\n au)/xêsis kai\ phthi/sis, kata\ to\ poio\n
a)lloi/ôsis, kata\ to/pon phora/, kata\ tê\n ou)si/an ê( a(plê=
ge/nesis kai\ phthora/.] Compare K. p. 1068, a. 9: [Greek: a)na/gkê
trei=s ei)=nai kinê/seis, poiou=, posou=, to/pou. kat' ou)si/an d'
ou)/, dia\ to\ mêthe\n ei)=nai ou)si/a| e)nanti/on, ou)de\ tou= pro/s
ti.] Also Physica, v. p. 225, b. 11: [Greek: e)nde/chetai ga\r
thate/rou metaba/llontos a)lêtheu/esthai tha/teron mêde\n
meta/ballon.] See about this passage Bonitz and Schwegler's notes on
Metaphys. p. 1068.]

[Footnote 94: Hobbes observes (First Philosophy, part ii. ch. xi. 6):
"But we must not so think of Relation as if it were an accident
differing from all the other accidents of the relative; but one of
them, namely, that by which the comparison is made. For example, the
likeness of one white to another white, or its unlikeness to black,
is the same accident with its whiteness." This may be true about the
relations Like and Unlike (see Mr. John Stuart Mill, Logic, ch. iii.
p. 80, 6th ed.) But, in Relations generally, the _fundamentum_ may be
logically distinguished from the Relation itself.

Aristotle makes the same remarks upon [Greek: to\ sumbebêko\s] as
upon [Greek: to\ pro/s ti]:--That it verges upon Non-ens; and that it
has no special mode of being generated or destroyed. [Greek:
phai/netai ga\r to\ sumbebêko\s e)ggu/s ti tou= mê\ o)/ntos; tô=n
me\n ga\r a)/llon tro/pon o)/ntôn e)/sti ge/nesis kai\ phthora/, tô=n
de\ kata\ sumbebêko\s ou)k e)/stin.] (Metaphys. E. p. 1026, b. 21.)]

Those among the Aristotelian commentators who denied the title of _Ad
Aliquid_ to a place among the Categories or _Summa Genera_ of
predicates, might support their views from passages where Aristotle
ranks the Genus as a _Relatum_, though he at the same time declares
that the Species under it are not _Relata_. Thus _scientia_ is
declared by him to be a _Relatum_; because it must be _of
something--alicujus scibilis_; while the _something_ thus implied is
not specified.[95] But (_scientia_) _musica_, _grammatica_, _medica_,
&c., are declared not to be _Relata_; the indeterminate _something_
being there determined, and bound up in one word with the predication
of Relativity. Now the truth is that both are alike _Relata_, though
both also belong to the Category of Quality; a man is called _Talis_
from being _sciens_, as well as from being _grammaticus_. Again, he
gives as illustrative examples of the Category _Ad Aliquid_, the
adjectives double, triple. But he ranks in a different Category (that
of _Quantum_) the adjectives bicubital, tricubital ([Greek:
dipê=chus, tripê=chus]. It is plain that the two last of these
predicates are species under the two first, and that all four
predicates are alike relative, under any real definition that can be
given of Relativity, though all four belong also to the Category of
_Quantum_. Yet Aristotle does not recognize any predicates as
belonging to _Ad Aliquid_, except such as are logically and
grammatically elliptical; that is, such as do not include in
themselves the specification of the Correlate, but require to be
supplemented by an additional word in the genitive or dative case,
specifying the latter. As we have already seen, he lays it down
generally, that all _Relata_ (or _Ad Aliquid_) imply a _Correlatum_;
and he prescribes that when the _Correlatum_ is indicated, care shall
be taken to designate it by a precise and specific term, not of wider
import than the _Relatum_,[96] but specially reciprocating therewith:
thus he regards _ala_ (a wing) as _Ad Aliquid_, but when you specify
its correlate in order to speak with propriety ([Greek: oi)kei/ôs]),
you must describe it as _ala alati_ (not as _ala avis_), in order
that the _Correlatum_ may be strictly co-extensive and reciprocating
with the _Relatum_. Wing, head, hand, &c., are thus _Ad Aliquid_,
though there may be no received word in the language to express their
exact _Correlata_; and though you may find it necessary to coin a new
word expressly for the purpose.[97] In specifying the _Correlatum_ of
servant, you must say, servant _of a master_, not servant of a man or
of a biped; both of which are in this case accompaniments or
accidents of the master, being still accidents, though they may be in
fact constantly conjoined. Unless you say master, the terms will not
reciprocate; take away master, the servant is no longer to be found,
though the man who was called _servant_ is still there; but take away
man or biped, and the servant may still continue.[98] You cannot know
the _Relatum_ determinately or accurately, unless you know the
_Correlatum_ also; without the knowledge of the latter, you can only
know the former in a vague and indefinite manner.[99] Aristotle
raises, also, the question whether any Essence or Substance can be
described as _Ad Aliquid_.[100] He inclines to the negative, though
not decisively pronouncing. He seems to think that Simo and Davus,
when called men, are Essences or Substances; but that when called
master and slave, they are not so; this, however, is surprising, when
he had just before spoken of the connotation of man as accidents
([Greek: sumbebêko/ta]) belonging to the connotation of master. He
speaks of the members of an organized body (wing, head, foot) as
examples of _Ad Aliquid_; while in other treatises, he determines
very clearly that these members presuppose, as a _prius naturâ_, the
complete organism whereof they are parts, and that the name of each
member connotes the performance of, or aptitude to perform, a certain
special function: now, such aptitude cannot exist unless the whole
organism be held together in co-operative agency, so that if this
last condition be wanting, the names, head, eye, foot, can no longer
be applied to the separate members, or at least can only be applied
equivocally or metaphorically.[101] It would seem therefore that the
functioning _something_ is here the Essence, and that all its
material properties are accidents ([Greek: sumbebêko/ta]).

[Footnote 95: Categor. p. 6, b. 12, p. 11, a. 24; Topic. iv. p. 124,
b. 16. Compare also Topica, iv. p. 121, a. 1, and the Scholia
thereupon, p. 278, b. 12-16, Br.; in which Scholia Alexander feels
the difficulty of enrolling a generic term as [Greek: pro/s ti],
while the specific terms comprised under it are not [Greek: pro/s
ti]; and removes the difficulty by suggesting that [Greek:
e)pistê/mê] may be at once both [Greek: poio/tês] and [Greek: pro/s
ti]; and that as [Greek: poio/tês] (not as [Greek: pro/s ti]) it may
be the genus including [Greek: mousikê\] and [Greek: geômetri/a],
which are not [Greek: pro/s ti], but [Greek: poio/têtes].]

[Footnote 96: Categor. p. 6, b. 30, p. 7, b. 12.]

[Footnote 97: Categor. p. 7, a. 5. [Greek: e)ni/ote de\
o)nomatopoiei=n I)/sôs a)nagkai=on, e)a\n mê\ kei/menon ê)=| o)/noma
pro\s o(\ _oi)kei/ôs_ a)\n a)podothei/ê.]]

[Footnote 98: Categor. p. 7, a. 31. [Greek: e)/ti d' e)a\n me/n ti
oi)kei/ôs a)podido/menon ê)=| pro\s o(\ le/getai, pa/ntôn
periairoume/nôn tô=n a)/llôn o(/sa _sumbebêko/ta_ e)sti/,
kataleipome/nou de\ mo/nou tou/tou pro\s o(\ a)pedo/thê oi)kei/ôs,
a)ei\ pro\s au)to\ r(êthê/setai, oi(=on o( dou=los e)a\n pro\s
despo/tên le/gêtai, periairoume/nôn tô=n _a)/llôn a(pa/ntôn o(/sa
sumbebêko/ta_ e)sti\ _tô=| despo/tê|_ oi(=on to\ di/podi ei)=nai kai\
to\ e)pistê/mês dektikô=| kai\ _to\ a)nthrô/pô|_, kataleipome/nou de\
mo/nou tou= despo/tên ei)=nai, a)ei\ o( dou=los pro\s au)to\
r(êthêsetai.]

This is not only just and useful in regard to accuracy of
predication, but deserves attention also in another point of view. In
general, it would be said that _man_ and _biped_ belonged to the
Essence ([Greek: ou)si/a]); and the being a master to the Accidents
or Accompaniments ([Greek: sumbebêko/ta]). Here the case is reversed;
man and biped are the accidents or accompaniments; master is the
Essence. What is connoted by the term _master_ is here the essential
idea, that which is bound up with the idea connoted by _servant_;
while the connotation of _man_ or _biped_ sinks into the character of
an accessory or accompaniment. The master might possibly not be a
man, but a god; the Delphian Apollo (Euripid. Ion, 132), and the
Corinthian Aphrodité, had each many slaves belonging to them.
Moreover, even if every master were a man, the qualities connoted by
_man_ are here accidental, as not being included in those connoted by
the term master. Compare Metaphysica, [Greek: D]. p. 1025, a. 32;
Topica, i. p. 102, a. 18.]

[Footnote 99: That Plato was fully sensible to the necessity of
precision and appropriateness in designating the _Correlatum_
belonging to each _Relatum_, may be seen by the ingenious reasoning
in the Platonic Parmenides, pp. 133-134, where [Greek: despo/tês] and
[Greek: dou=los] are also the illustrative examples employed.]

[Footnote 100: Categor. p. 8, a. 35, b. 20.]]

[Footnote 101: See Politica, i. p. 1253, a. 18: [Greek: kai\ pro/tero
dê\ tê=| phu/sei po/lis ê)\ oi)ki/a kai\ e(/kastos ê(mô=n e)sti/n;
to\ ga\r o(/lon pro/teron a)nagkai=on ei)=nai tou= me/rous;
a)nairoume/nou ga\r tou= o(/lou ou)k e)/stai pou=s ou)de\ chei\r, ei)
mê\ o(mônu/môs, ô(/sper ei)/ tis le/gei **tê\n lithi/nên;
diaphtharei=sa ga\r e)/stai toiau/tê. pa/nta de\tô=| e)/rgô|
ô(/ristai kai\ tê=| duna/mei, ô/ste _mêke/ti toiau=ta o)/nta ou)
lekte/on ta\ au)ta ei)=nai_ a)ll' o(mô/numa]; also p. 1254, a. 9:
[Greek: to/ te ga\r mo/rion ou) mo/non a)/llou e)sti\ mo/rion, a)lla\
kai\ a)/llou].

Compare De Animâ, ii. 1, p. 412, b. 20; Meteorologic. iv. p. 390, a.
12.

The doctrine enunciated in these passages is a very important one, in
the Aristotelian philosophy.

Trendelenburg (Kategorienlehre, p. 182) touches upon this confusion
of the Categories, but faintly and partially.]

In the fourth book of the Metaphysica, Aristotle gives an explanation
of _Ad Aliquid_ different from, and superior to, that which we read
in the Categoriæ; treating it, not as one among many distinct
Categories, but as implicated with all the Categories, and taking a
different character according as it is blended with one or the
other--_Essentia_, _Quantum_, _Quale_, _Actio_, _Passio_, &c.[102] He
there, also, enumerates as one of the varieties of _Relata_, what
seems to go beyond the limit, or at least beyond the direct
denotation, of the Categories; for, having specified, as one variety,
_Relata Numero_, and, as another, _Relata secundum actionem et
passionem ([Greek: to\ thermantiko\n pro\s to\ thermanto/n], &c.), he
proceeds to a third variety, such as the _mensurabile_ with reference
to _mensura_, the _scibile_ with reference to _scientia_, the
_cogitabile_ with reference to _cogitatio_; and in regard to this
third variety, he draws a nice distinction. He says that _mensura_
and _cogitatio_ are _Ad Aliquid_, not because they are themselves
related to _mensurabile_ and _cogitabile_, but because _mensurabile_
and _cogitabile_ are related to them.[103] You cannot say (he thinks)
that mensura is referable to the _mensurabile_, or _cogitatio_ to the
_cogitabile_, because that would be repeating the same word twice
over--_mensura est illius cujus est mensura_--_cogitatio est illius
cujus est cogitatio._ So that he regards _mensura_ and _cogitatio_ as
_Correlata_, rather than as _Relata_; while _mensurabile_ and
_cogitabile_ are the _Relata_ to them. But in point of fact, the
distinction is not important; of the relative pair there may be one
which is more properly called the _Correlatum_; yet both are alike
relative.

[Footnote 102: Metaphys. [Greek: D]. p. 1020, b. 27-32. At the same
time we must remark, that while Aristotle enumerates [Greek: to\
u(pe/rechon] and [Greek: to\ u(perecho/menon] under [Greek: Pro/s
ti], he had just before (a. 25) ranked [Greek: to\ me/ga kai\ to\
mikro/n, to\ mei=zon kai\ to\ e(/latton], under the general head
[Greek: Poso/n]--as [Greek: posou= pa/thê kath' au(ta/].]

[Footnote 103: Metaphys. [Greek: D]. p. 1021, a. 26, b. 3; also I. p.
1056, b. 34. Bonitz in his note (p. 262) remarks that the distinction
here drawn by Aristotle is not tenable; and I agree with him that it
is not. But it coincides with what Aristotle asserts in other words
in the Categoriæ; viz., that to be _simul naturâ_ is not true of
_all_ Relata, but only of the greater part of them; that [Greek: to\
ai)sthêto\n] is [Greek: pro/teron tê=s ai)sthê/seôs], and [Greek: to\
e)pistêto\n pro/teron tê=s e)pistê/mês] (Categor. p. 7, b. 23; p. 8,
a. 10). As I have mentioned before (p. 71 n.), Simplikius, in the
Scholia (p. 65, b. 14), points out that Aristotle has not been
careful here to observe his own precept of selecting [Greek:
oi)kei/ôs] the correlative term. He ought to have stated the
potential as correlating with the potential, the actual with the
actual. If he had done this, the [Greek: sunu/parxis tô=n pro/s ti]
would have been seen to be true in all cases. Eudorus noticed a
similar inadvertence of Aristotle in the case of [Greek: pte/ron] and
[Greek: pterôto/n] (Schol. 63, a. 43). See 'Plato and the Other
Companions of Sokrates,' vol. ii. p. 330, note x.

I transcribe a curious passage of Leibnitz, bearing on the same
question:--"On réplique maintenant, que la vérité du mouvement est
indépendante de l'observation: et qu'un vaisseau peut avancer, sans
que celui qui est dedans s'en aperçoive. Je réponds, que le mouvement
est indépendant de l'observation: mais qu'il _n'est point indépendant
de l'observabilité_. Il n'y a point de mouvement, quand il n'y a
point de changement _observable_. Et même quand il n'y a point de
changement observable, il n'y a point de changement du tout. Le
contraire est fondé sur la supposition d'un Espace réel absolu, que
j'ai réfuté demonstrativement par le principe du besoin d'une Raison
suffisante des choses." (Correspondence with Clarke, p. 770.
Erdmann's edition.)]

If we compare together the various passages in which Aristotle cites
and applies the Ten Categories (not merely in the treatise before us,
but also in the Metaphysica, Physica, and elsewhere), we shall see
that he cannot keep them apart steadily and constantly; that the same
predicate is referred to one head in one place, and to another head
in another: what is here spoken of as belonging to _Actio_ or
_Passio_, will be treated in another place as an instance of _Quale_
or _Ad Aliquid_; even the derivative noun [Greek: e(/xis] (_habitus_)
does not belong to the Category [Greek: e)/chein] (_Habere_), but
sometimes to _Quale_, sometimes to _Ad Aliquid_.[104] This is
inevitable; for the predicates thus differently referred have really
several different aspects, and may be classified in one way or
another, according as you take them in this or that aspect. Moreover,
this same difficulty of finding impassable lines of demarcation would
still be felt, even if the Categories, instead of the full list of
Ten, were reduced to the smaller list of the four principal
Categories--Substance, Quantity, Quality, and Relation; a reduction
which has been recommended by commentators on Aristotle as well as by
acute logicians of modern times. Even these four cannot be kept
clearly apart: the predicates which declare Quantity or Quality must
at the same time declare or imply Relation; while the predicates
which declare Relation must also imply the _fundamentum_ either of
Quantity or of Quality.[105]

[Footnote 104: Aristot. Categor. p. 6, b. 2; p. 8, b. 27.]

[Footnote 105: See Trendelenburg, Kategorienlehre, p. 117, seq. The
remarks made by Mr. John Stuart Mill (in his System of Logic, book i.
ch. iii.) upon the Aristotelian Categories, and the enlarged
philosophical arrangement which he introduces in their place, well
deserve to be studied. After enumerating the ten Predicaments, Mr.
Mill says:--"It is a mere catalogue of the distinctions rudely marked
out by the language of familiar life, with little or no attempt to
penetrate, by philosophic analysis, to the _rationale_ even of these
common distinctions. Such an analysis would have shewn the
enumeration to be both redundant and defective. Some objects are
omitted, and others repeated several times under different heads."
(Compare the remarks of the Stoic commentators, and Porphyry, Schol.
p. 48, b. 10 Br.: [Greek: a)thetou=ntes tê\n diai/resin ô(s polla\
pariei=san kai\ mê\ perilamba/nousan, ê)\ kai\ pa/lin pleona/zousan.]
And Aristotle himself observes that the same predicates might be
ranked often under more than one head.) "That could not be a very
comprehensive view of the nature of Relation, which could exclude
action, passivity, and local situation from that category. The same
objection applies to the categories Quando (or position in time), and
Ubi (or position in space); _while the distinction between the latter
and Situs ([Greek: Kei=sthai]) is merely verbal_. The incongruity of
erecting into a _summum genus_ the tenth Category is manifest. On the
other hand, the enumeration takes no notice of any thing but
Substances and Attributes. In what Category are we to place
sensations, or any other feelings and states of mind? as hope, joy,
fear; sound, smell, taste; pain, pleasure; thought, judgment,
conception, and the like? Probably all these would have been placed
by the Aristotelian school in the Categories of Actio and Passio; and
the relation of such of them as are active, to their objects, and of
such of them as are passive, to their causes, would have been rightly
so placed; but the things themselves, the feelings or states of mind,
wrongly. Feelings, or states of consciousness, are assuredly to be
counted among realities; but they cannot be reckoned either among
substances or among attributes." Among the many deficiencies of the
Aristotelian Categories, as a complete catalogue, there is none more
glaring than the imperfect conception of [Greek: Pro/s ti] (the
Relative), which Mr. Mill here points out. But the Category [Greek:
Kei=sthai] (badly translated by commentators _Situs_, from which
Aristotle expressly distinguishes it, Categor. p. 6, b. 12: [Greek:
to\ de\ a)nakei=sthai ê)\ e(sta/nai ê)\ kathê=sthai au)ta\ me\n ou)k
ei)si\ the/seis]) appears to be hardly open to Mr. Mill's remark,
that it is only verbally distinguished from [Greek: Pou=], _Ubi_.
[Greek: Kei=sthai] is intended to mean _posture_, _attitude_, &c. It
is a reply to the question, In what posture is Sokrates? Answer.--He
is lying down, standing upright, kneeling, [Greek: pu\x protei/nôn],
&c. This is quite different from the question, Where is Sokrates? In
the market-place, in the palæstra, &c. [Greek: Kei=sthai] (as
Aristotle himself admits, Categ. p. 6, b. 12) is not easily
distinguished from [Greek: Pro/s ti]: for the abstract and general
word [Greek: _the/sis_] (_position_) is reckoned by Aristotle under
Greek: Pro/s ti], though the _paronyma_ [Greek: a)nakei=sthai,
e(sta/nai, kathê=sthai] are affirmed not to be [Greek: the/seis], but
to come under the separate Category [Greek: _Kei=sthai_]. But [Greek:
Kei=sthai] is clearly distinguishable from [Greek: Pou=] _Ubi_.

Again, to Mr. Mill's question, "In what Category are we to place
sensations or other states of mind--hope, fear, sound, smell, pain,
pleasure, thought, judgment," &c.? Aristotle would have replied (I
apprehend) that they come under the Category either of _Quale_ or of
_Pati_--[Greek: Poio/têtes] or [Greek: Pa/thê]. They are attributes
or modifications of Man, Kallias, Sokrates, &c. If the condition of
which we speak be temporary or transitory, it is a [Greek: pa/thos],
and we speak of Kallias as [Greek: pa/schôn ti]; if it be a durable
disposition or capacity likely to pass into repeated manifestations,
it is [Greek: poio/tês], and we describe Kallias as [Greek: poio/s
tis] (Categ. p. 9, a. 28-p. 10 a. 9). This equally applies to mental
and bodily conditions ([Greek: o(moi/ôs de\ tou/tois kai\ kata\ tê\n
psuchê\n pathêtikai\ poio/têtes kai\ pa/thê le/getai.]--p. 9, b. 33).
The line is dubious and difficult between [Greek: pa/thos] and
[Greek: poio/tês], but one or other of the two will comprehend all
the mental states indicated by Mr. Mill. Aristotle would not have
admitted that "feelings are to be counted among realities," except as
they are now or may be the feelings of Kallias, Sokrates, or some
other _Hic Aliquis_--one or many. He would consider feelings as
attributes belonging to these [Greek: Prô=tai Ou)si/ai]; and so in
fact Mr. Mill himself considers them (p. 83), after having specified
the Mind (distinguished from Body or external object) as the
Substance to which they belong.

Mr. Mill's classification of Nameable Things is much better and more
complete than the Aristotelian Categories, inasmuch as it brings into
full prominence the distinction between the subjective and objective
points of view, and, likewise, the all-pervading principle of
Relativity, which implicates the two; whereas, Aristotle either
confuses the one with the other, or conceives them narrowly and
inadequately. But we cannot say, I think, that Aristotle, in the
Categories, assigns no room for the mental states or elements. He has
a place for them, though he treats them altogether objectively. He
takes account of _himself_ only as an object--as one among the
[Greek: prô=tai ou)si/ai], or individuals, along with Sokrates and
Kallias.]

The most capital distinction, however, which is to be found among the
Categories is that of Essence or Substance from all the rest. This is
sometimes announced as having a standing _per se_; as not only
logically distinguishable, but really separable from the other nine,
if we preserve the Aristotelian list of ten,[106] or from the other
three, if we prefer the reduced list of four. But such real
separation cannot be maintained. The _Prima Essentia_ (we are told)
is indispensable as a Subject, but cannot appear as Predicate; while
all the rest can and do so appear. Now we see that this definition is
founded upon the function enacted by each of them in predication, and
therefore presupposes the fact of predication, which is in itself a
Relation. The Category of Relation is thus implied, in declaring what
the First Essence is, together with some _predicabilia_ as
correlates, though it is not yet specified what the _predicabilia_
are. But besides this, the distinction drawn by Aristotle, between
First and Second Essence or Substance, abolishes the marked line of
separation between Substance and Quality, making the former shade
down into the latter. The distinction recognizes a more or less in
Substance, which graduation Aristotle expressly points out, stating
that the Species is _more_ Substance or Essence, and that Genus
_less_ so. We see thus that he did not conceive Substance (apart from
attributes) according to the modern view, as that which exists
_without_ the mind (excluding _within_ the mind or _relation_ to the
mind); for in that there can be no graduation. That which is without
the mind, must also be within; and that which is within must also be
without; the subject and the object correlating. This implication of
within and without understood, there is then room for graduation,
according as the one or the other aspect may be more or less
prominent. Aristotle, in point of fact, confines himself to the
mental or logical work of predication, to the conditions thereof, and
to the component terms whereby the mind accomplishes that act. When
he speaks of the First Essence or Substance, without the Second, all
that he can say about it positively is to call it _Unum numero_ and
indivisible:[107] even thus, he is compelled to introduce unity,
measure, and number, all of which belong to the two Categories of
Quantity and Relation; and yet still the First Essence or Substance
remains indeterminate. We only begin to determine it when we call it
by the name of the Second Substance or Essence; which name connotes
certain attributes, the attributes thus connoted being of the essence
of the Species; that is, unless they be present, no individual would
be considered as belonging to the Species, or would be called by the
specific name.[108] When we thus, however, introduce attributes, we
find ourselves not merely in the Category of _Substantia_
(_Secunda_), but also in that of _Qualitas_. The boundary between
_Substantia_ and _Qualitas_ disappears; the latter being partially
contained in the former. The Second Substance or Essence includes
attributes or Qualities belonging to the Essence. In fact, the Second
Substance or Essence, when distinguished from the First, is both here
and elsewhere characterized by Aristotle, as being not Substance at
all, but Quality,[109] though when considered as being in implication
with the First, it takes on the nature of Substance and becomes
substantial or essential Quality. The Differentia belongs thus both
to Substance and to Quality (_quale quid_), making up as complement
that which is designated by the specific name.[110]

[Footnote 106: Aristotle sometimes speaks of it as [Greek:
chôristo/n], the other Categories being not [Greek: chôrista/]
(Metaphys. Z. p. 1028, a. 34). It is not easy, however, always to
distinguish whether he means by the term [Greek: chôrista\]
"_sejuncta re_", or "_sejuncta notione solâ_." See Bonitz ad
Metaphysic. ([Greek: D]. p. 1017), p. 244.]

[Footnote 107: Categor. p. 3, b. 12: [Greek: a)/tomon ga\r kai\ e(\n
a)rithmô=| to\ dêlou/meno/n e)stin.] Compare Metaphysic. N. p. 1087,
b. 33; p. 1088, a. 10.]

[Footnote 108: Hobbes says:--"Now that accident (_i.e._ attribute)
for which we give a certain name to any body, or the accident which
denominates its Subject, is commonly called the Essence thereof; as
rationality is the essence of a man, whiteness of any white thing,
and extension the essence of a body" (Hobbes, Philosophy, ch. viii.
s. 23). This topic will be found discussed, most completely and
philosophically, in Mr. John Stuart Mill's System of Logic, Book I.
ch. vi. ss. 2-3; ch. vii. s. 5.]

[Footnote 109: Categor. p. 3, b. 13: [Greek: e)pi\ de\ tô=n deute/rôn
ou)siô=n phai/netai me\n o(moi/ôs tô=| schê/mati tê=s prosêgori/as
to/de ti sêmai/nein, o(/tan ei)/pê| a)/nthrôpon ê)\ zô=on, ou) mê\n
a)lêthe/s ge, a)lla\ ma=llon _poio/n ti sêmai/nei--poia\n ga/r tina
ou)si/an_ sêmai/nei] (b. 20).

Metaphysic. Z. p. 1038, b. 35: [Greek: phanero\n o(/ti ou)the\n tô=n
katho/lou u(parcho/ntôn ou)si/a e)sti/, kai\ o(/ti ou)the\n sêmai/nei
tô=n koinê=| katêgoroume/nôn to/de ti, a)lla\ toio/nde.] Compare
Metaphys. M. p. 1087, a. 1; Sophistic. Elench. p. 178, b. 37; 179, a.
9.

That which is called [Greek: prô/tê ou)si/a] in the Categoriæ is
called [Greek: tri/tê ou)si/a] in Metaphys. [Greek: Ê]. p. 1043, a.
18. In Ethic. Nikom. Z. p. 1143, a. 32, seq., the _generalissima_ are
called [Greek: prô=ta], and particulars are called [Greek:
e)/schata]. Zell observes in his commentary (p. 224), "[Greek: ta\
e)/schata] sunt res singulæ, quæ et ipsæ sunt extremæ, ratione mentis
nostræ, ab universis ad singula delabentis." Patricius remarks upon
the different sense of the terms [Greek: Prô/tê Ou)si/a] in the
Categoriæ and in the De Interpretatione (Discuss. Peripatetic. p.
21).]

[Footnote 110: Metaphysic. [Greek: D]. p. 1020, b. 13: [Greek:
schedo\n dê\ kata\ du/o tro/pous le/goit' a)\n to\ poio/n, kai\
tou/tôn e(/na to\n kuriô/taton; prô/tê me\n ga\r poiotê\s ê( tê=s
ou)si/as diaphora/.] Compare Physic. v. p. 226, a. 27. See
Trendelenburg, Kategorienlehre, pp. 56, 93.

The remarks of the different expositors (contained in Scholia, pp.
52, 53, 54, Brand.), are interesting upon the ambiguous position of
Differentia, in regard to Substance and Quality. It comes out to be
Neither and Both--[Greek: ou)de/tera kai\ a)mpho/tera] (Plato,
Euthydemus, p. 300 C.). Dexippus and Porphyry called it something
intermediate between [Greek: ou)si/a] and [Greek: poio/tês], or
between [Greek: ou)si/a] and [Greek: sumbebêko/s].]

We see, accordingly, that neither is the line of demarcation between
the Category of Substance or Essence and the other Categories so
impassable, nor the separability of it from the others so marked as
some thinkers contend. Substance is represented by Aristotle as
admitting of more and less, and as graduating by successive steps
down to the other Categories; moreover, neither in its complete
manifestation (as First Substance), nor in its incomplete
manifestation (as Second Substance), can it be explained or
understood without calling in the other Categories of Quantity,
Quality, and Relation. It does not correspond to the definition of
_Substantia_ given by Spinoza--"_quod in se est et per se
concipitur_." It can no more be conceived or described without some
of the other Categories, than they can be conceived or described
without it. Aristotle defines it by four characteristics, two
negative, and two positive. It cannot be predicated of a Subject: it
cannot inhere in a Subject: it is, at bottom, the **Subject of all
Predicates: it is _Unum numero_ and indivisible.[111] Not one of
these four determinations can be conceived or understood, unless we
have in our minds the idea of other Categories and its relation to
them. Substance is known only as the Subject of predicates, that is,
relatively to them; as they also are known relatively to it. Without
the Category of Relation, we can no more understand what is meant by
a Subject than what is meant by a Predicate. The Category of
Substance, as laid out by Aristotle, neither exists by itself, nor
can be conceived by itself, without that of Relation and the generic
notion of Predicate.[112] All three lie together at the bottom of the
analytical process, as the last findings and residuum.

[Footnote 111: Categor. p. 2, a. 14, b. 4; p. 3, b. 12.]

[Footnote 112: Aristotle gives an explanation of what he means by
[Greek: kath' au(to/--kath' au(ta/], in the Analytic. Post. I. iv. p.
73, a. 34, b. 13. According to that explanation it will be necessary
to include in [Greek: to\ kath' au(to\] of the Category [Greek:
Ou)si/a], all that is necessary to make the definition or explanation
of that Category understood.

M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire, in the valuable Preface introducing his
translation of the Organon, gives what I think a just view of the
Categories generally, and especially of [Greek: prô/tê ou)si/a], as
simply naming (_i.e._ giving a proper name), and doing nothing more.
I transcribe the passage, merely noting that the terms _anterior_ and
_posterior_ can mean nothing more than _logical_ anteriority and
posteriority.

"Mais comment classer les mots?--C'est à la réalité seule qu'il faut
le demander; à la réalité dont le langage n'est que le réflet, dont
les mots ne sont que le symbole. Que nous présente la réalité? Des
individus, rien que des individus, existant par eux-mêmes, et se
groupant, par leurs ressemblances et leurs différences, sous des
espèces et sous des genres. Ainsi donc, en étudiant l'individu,
l'être individuel, et en analysant avec exactitude tout ce qu'il est
possible d'en dire en tant qu'être, on aura les classes les plus
générales des mots; les catégories, ou pour prendre le terme
français, les attributions, qu'il est possible de lui appliquer.
Voilà tout le fondement des Catégories.--Ce n'est pas du reste, une
classification des choses à la manière de celles de l'histoire
naturelle, qu'il s'agit de faire en logique: c'est une simple
énumération de tous les points de vue, d'**où l'esprit peut
considérer les choses, non pas, il est vrai, par rapport à l'esprit
lui-même, mais par rapport à leur réalité et à leurs
appellations.--Aristote distingue ici dix points de vue, dix
significations principales des mots.--La Catégorie de la Substance
est à la tête de toutes les autres, précisément parceque la première,
la plus essentielle, marque d'un être, c'est d'être. Cela revient à
dire qu'avant tout, l'être est, l'être existe. Par suite les mots qui
expriment la substance sont antérieurs à tous les autres et sont les
plus importants. Il faut ajouter que ces mots là participeront en
quelque sorte à cet isolement que les individus nous offrent dans la
nature. Mais de même que, dans la réalité, les individus subsistant
par eux seuls forment des espèces et des genres, qui ont bien aussi
une existence substantielle, la substance se divisera de même en
substance première et substance seconde.--Les espèces et les genres,
s'ils expriment la substance, ne l'expriment pas dans toute sa
pureté; c'est **déjà de la substance qualifié, comme le dit
Aristote.--Il n'y a bien dans la réalité que des individus et des
espèces ou genres. Mais ces individus en soi et pour soi n'existent
pas seulement; ils existent sous certaines conditions; leur existence
se produit sous certaines modifications, que les mots expriment aussi,
tout comme ils expriment l'existence absolue. Ces nouvelles classes
de mots formeront les autres Catégories.--Ces modifications, ces
accidents, de l'individu sont au nombre de neuf: Aristote n'en
reconnaît pas davantage.--**Voilà donc les dix Catégories: les dix
seules attributions possibles. _Par la première, on nomme les
individus, sans faire plus que les nommer: par les autres, on les
qualifie._ On dit d'abord ce qu'est l'individu, et ensuite quel il
est." Barthélemy St. Hilaire, Logique d'Aristote, Preface, pp.
lxxii.-lxxvii.]

Aristotle, taking his departure from an analysis of the complete
sentence or of the act of predication, appears to have regarded the
Subject as having a natural priority over the Predicate. The
noun-substantive (which to him represents the Subject), even when
pronounced alone, carries to the hearer a more complete conception
than either the adjective or the verb when pronounced alone; these
make themselves felt much more as elliptical and needing
complementary adjuncts. But this is only true in so far as the
conception, raised by the substantive named alone ([Greek: a)/neu
sumplokê=s]), includes by anticipation what would be included, if we
added to it some or all of its predicates. If we could deduct from
this conception the meaning of all the applicable predicates, it
would seem essentially barren or incomplete, awaiting something to
come; a mere point of commencement or departure,[113] known only by
the various lines which may be drawn from it; a _substratum_ for
various attributes to lie upon or to inhere in. That which is known
only as a _substratum_, is known only relatively to a superstructure
to come; the one is _Relatum_, the other _Correlatum_, and the
mention of either involves an implied assumption of the other. There
may be a logical priority, founded upon expository convenience,
belonging to the _substratum_, because it remains numerically one and
the same, while the superstructure is variable. But the priority is
nothing more than logical and notional; it does not amount to an
ability of prior independent existence. On the contrary, there is
simultaneity _by nature_ (according to Aristotle's own definition of
the phrase) between Subject, Relation, and Predicate; since they all
imply each other as reciprocating correlates, while no one of them is
the cause of the others.[114]

[Footnote 113: Plato would not admit the point as as anything more
than [Greek: a)rchê\n grammê=s] (Aristot. Metaphys. A. p. 992, a.
21).]

[Footnote 114: Aristot. Categor. p. 14, b. 27: [Greek: phu/sei de\
a(/ma, o(/sa a)ntistre/phei kata\ tê\n tou= ei)=nai a)kolou/thêsin,
mêdamô=s de\ ai)/tion tha/teron thate/rô| tou= ei)=nai e)stin, oi(=on
e)pi\ tou= diplasi/ou kai\ tou= ê(mi/seos;] &c.]

When Aristotle says, very truly, that if the First Substances were
non-existent, none of the other Predicaments could exist, we must
understand what he means by the term _first_. That term bears, in
this treatise, a sense different from what it bears elsewhere: here
it means the extreme concrete and individual; elsewhere it means the
extreme abstract and universal. The First Substance or First Essence,
in the Categories, is a _Hoc Aliquid_ ([Greek: to/de ti]),
illustrated by the examples _hic homo_, _hic equus_. Now, as thus
explained and illustrated, it includes not merely the Second
Substance, but various accidental attributes besides. When we talk of
This man, Sokrates, Kallias, &c., the hearer conceives not only the
attributes for which he is called a man, but also various accidental
attributes, ranking under one or more of the other Predicaments. The
First Substance thus (as explained by Aristotle) is not conceived as
a mere _substratum_ without Second Substance and without any
Accidents, but as already including both of them, though as yet
indeterminately; it waits for specializing words, to determine what
its Substance or Essence is, and what its accompanying Accidents are.
Being an individual (_Unum numero_), it unites in itself both the
essential attributes of its species, and the unessential attributes
peculiar to itself.[115] It is already understood as including
attributes of both kinds; but we wait for predicates to declare
([Greek: dêlou=n--a)podido/nai][116]) what these attributes are. The
First or Complete _Ens_ embodies in itself all the Predicaments,
though as yet potential and indeterminate, until the predicating
adjuncts are specified. There is no priority, in the order of
existence, belonging to Substance over Relation or Quality; take away
either one of the three, and the First _Ens_ disappears. But in
regard to the order of exposition, there is a natural priority,
founded on convenience and facility of understanding. The _Hoc
Aliquid_ or _Unum Numero_, which intimates in general outline a
certain concretion or co-existence of attributes, though we do not
yet know what they are--being as it were a skeleton--comes naturally
as Subject before the predicates, whose function is declaratory and
specifying as to those attributes: moreover, the essential
attributes, which are declared and connoted when we first bestow a
specific name on the subject, come naturally before the unessential
attributes, which are predicated of the subject already called by a
specific name connoting other attributes.[117] The essential
characters are native and at home; the accidental attributes are
domiciliated foreigners.[118]

[Footnote 115: Aristot. Metaphys. Z. p. 1033, b. 24; p. 1034, a. 8.
[Greek: To\ d' a)/pan to/de Kalli/as ê)\ Sôkra/tês e)sti\n ô(/sper ê(
sphai=ra ê( chalkê= ê(di/, o( d' a)/nthrôpos kai\ to\ zô=|on ô(/sper
sphai=ra chalkê= o(lôs.--to\ d' a(/pan ê)/dê to\ toio/nde ei)=dos e)n
tai=sde tai=s sarxi\ kai\ o)stoi=s Kalli/as kai\ Sôkra/tês; kai\
e(/teron me\n dia\ tê\n u(/lên, e(/tera ga/r, tau)to\ de\ tô=|
ei)/dei; a)/tomon ga\r to\ ei)=dos.]]

[Footnote 116: Categor. p. 2, b. 29, seq. [Greek: ei)ko/tôs de\ meta\
ta\s prô/tas ou)si/as mo/na tô=n a)/llôn ta\ ei)/dê kai\ ta\ ge/nê
deu/terai ou)si/ai le/gontai; mo/na _ga\r dêloi=_ tê\n prô/tên
ou)si/an tô=n katêgoroume/nôn.] &c.

[Footnote 117: Analyt. Poster. i. p. 73, b. 6: [Greek: oi(=on to\
badi/zon e(/tero/n ti o(\n badi/zon e)sti\ kai\ leuko/n, ê( d'
ou)si/a, kai\ o(/sa to/de ti sêmai/nei, ou)ch e(/tero/n ti o)/nta
o(/per e)sti/n.] Also p. 83, a. 31. [Greek: kai\ mê\ ei)=nai/ ti
leuko/n, o(\ ou)ch e(/tero/n ti o(\n leuko/n e)stin]: also p. 83, b.
22.]

[Footnote 118: Categor. p. 2, b. 31: [Greek: to\n ga/r tina
a)nthrôpon e)a\n a)podidô=| tis ti/ e)sti, to\ me\n ei)=dos ê)\ to\
ge/nos a)podidou\s _oi)kei/ôs_ a)podô/sei--tô=n d' a)/llôn o(/ ti
a)\n a)podidô=| tis, _a)llotri/ôs_ e)stai a)podedôkô/s], &c.]

It is thus that Aristotle has dealt with Ontology, in one of the four
distinct aspects thereof, which he distinguishes from each other;
that is, in the distribution of _Entia_ according to their logical
order, and the reciprocal interdependence, in predication. _Ens_ is a
multivocal word, neither strictly univocal nor altogether equivocal.
It denotes (as has been stated above) not a generic aggregate,
divisible into species, but an analogical aggregate, starting from
one common terminus and ramifying into many derivatives, having no
other community except that of relationship to the same
terminus.[119] The different modes of _Ens_ are distinguished by the
degree or variety of such relationship. The _Ens Primum_, _Proprium_,
_Completum_, is (in Aristotle's view) the concrete individual; with a
defined essence or essential constituent attributes ([Greek: ti/ ê(/n
ei)=nai]), and with unessential accessories or accidents also--all
embodied and implicated in the One _Hoc Aliquid_. In the Categoriæ
Aristotle analyses this _Ens Completum_ (not metaphysically, into
Form and Matter, as we shall find him doing elsewhere, but) logically
into Subject and Predicates. In this logical analysis, the Subject
which can never be a Predicate stands first; next, come the near
kinsmen, Genus and Species (expressed by substantive names, as the
First Substance is), which are sometimes Predicates--as applied to
_Substantia Prima_, sometimes Subjects--in regard to the extrinsic
accompaniments or accidents;[120] in the third rank, come the more
remote kinsmen, Predicates pure and simple. These are the logical
factors or constituents into which the _Ens Completum_ may be
analysed, and which together make it up as a logical sum-total. But
no one of these logical constituents has an absolute or independent
_locus standi_, apart from the others. Each is relative to the
others; the Subject to its Predicates, not less than the Predicates
to their Subject. It is a mistake to describe the Subject as having a
real standing separately and alone, and the Predicates as something
afterwards tacked on to it. The Subject _per se_ is nothing but a
general potentiality or receptivity for Predicates to come; a
relative general conception, in which the two, Predicate and Subject,
are jointly implicated as _Relatum_ and _Correlatum_.[121]

[Footnote 119: Aristot. Metaphys. [Greek: D]. p. 1017, a. 22. [Greek:
kath' au(ta\ de\ ei)=nai le/getai o(/saper sêmai/nei ta\ schê/mata
tê=s katêgori/as; o)sachô=s ga\r le/getai, tosautachô=s to\ ei)=nai
sêmai/nei.]]

[Footnote 120: Categor. p. 3, a. 1: [Greek: ô(s de/ ge ai( prô=tai
ou)si/ai pro\s ta\ a)/lla pa/nta e)/chousin, ou(/tô ta\ ei)/dê kai\
ta\ ge/nê pro\s ta\ loipa\ pa/nta e)/chei; kata\ tou/tôn ga\r pa/nta
ta\ loipa\ katêgorei=tai.]]

[Footnote 121: Bonitz has an instructive note upon Form and Matter,
the _metaphysical_ constituents of _Prima Substantia_, _Hoc Aliquid_,
Sokrates, Kallias (see Aristot. Metaphys. Z. p. 1033, b. 24), which
illustrates pertinently the relation between Predicate and Subject,
the _logical_ constituents of the same [Greek: su/nolon]. He observes
(not. p. 327, **ad Aristot. Metaph. Z. p. 1033, b. 19). "Quoniam ex
duabus substantiis, quæ quidem actu sint, nunquam una existit
substantia, si et formam et materiem utrumque per se esse poneremus,
nunquam ex utroque existeret res definita ac sensibilis, [Greek:
to/de ti]. Ponendum potius, si recte assequor Aristotelis sententiam,
utrumque (Form and Matter) ita ut alterum exspectet, materia ut formæ
definitionem, forma ut materiam definiendam, exspectet, neutra vero
per se et absolute sit." What Bonitz says here about Matter and Form
is no less true about Subject and Predicate: each is relative to the
other--neither of them is absolute or independent of the other. In
fact, the explanation given by Aristotle of _Materia_ (Metaph. Z. p.
1028, b. 36) coincides very much with the _Prima Essentia_ of the
Categories, if abstracted from the _Secunda Essentia_. _Materia_ is
called there by Aristotle [Greek: to\ u(pokei/menon, kath' ou(= ta\
a)/lla le/getai. e)kei=no d' au)to\ mêke/ti kat' a)/llo--le/gô d'
u(/lên ê(\ kath' au(tê\n mê/te ti\ mê/te poso\n mê/te a)/llo mêthe\n
le/getai oi(=s ô(/ristai to\ o)/n] (p. 1029, a. 20). [Greek: e)/sti
ga/r ti kath' ou(= katêgorei=tai tou/tôn e(/kaston, ô(=| _to\ ei)=nai
e(/teron_ kai\ tô=n katêgoriô=n e(ka/stê|; ta\ me\n ga\r a)/lla tê=s
ou)si/as katêgorei=tai, au(/tê de\ tê=s u(/lês.]

Aristotle proceeds to say that this Subject--the Subject for all
Predicates, but never itself a Predicate--cannot be the genuine
[Greek: ou)si/a], which must essentially be [Greek: chôristo\n kai\
to\ to/de ti] (p. 1029, a. 28), and which must have a [Greek: ti/
ê)=n ei)=nai] (1029, b. 2). The Subject is in fact not true [Greek:
ou)si/a], but is one of the constituent elements thereof, being
relative to the Predicates as _Correlata_: it is the potentiality for
Predicates generally, as _Materia_ is the potentiality for Forms.]

The logical aspect of Ontology, analysing _Ens_ into a common Subject
with its various classes of Predicates, appears to begin with
Aristotle. He was, as far as we can see, original, in taking as the
point of departure for his theory, the individual man, horse, or
other perceivable object; in laying down this Concrete Particular
with all its outfit of details, as the type of _Ens_ proper, complete
and primary; and in arranging into classes the various secondary
modes of _Ens_, according to their different relations to the primary
type and the mode in which they contributed to make up its
completeness. He thus stood opposed to the Pythagoreans and
Platonists, who took their departure from the Universal, as the type
of full and true Entity;[122] while he also dissented from
Demokritus, who recognized no true _Ens_ except the underlying,
imperceptible, eternal atoms and vacuum. Moreover Aristotle seems to
have been the first to draw up a logical analysis of Entity in its
widest sense, as distinguished from that metaphysical analysis which
we read in his other works; the two not being contradictory, but
distinct and tending to different purposes. Both in the one and in
the other, his principal controversy seems to have been with the
Platonists, who disregarded both individual objects and accidental
attributes; dwelling upon Universals, Genera and Species, as the only
real _Entia_ capable of being known. With the Sophists, Aristotle
contends on a different ground, accusing them of neglecting
altogether the essential attributes, and confining themselves to the
region of accidents, in which no certainty was to be found;[123] in
Plato, he points out the opposite mistake, of confining himself to
the essentials, and ascribing undue importance to the process of
generic and specific subdivision.[124] His own logical analysis takes
account both of the essential and accidental, and puts them in what
he thinks their proper relation. The Accidental ([Greek:
sumbebêko/s]), concomitant, _i.e._ of the essence) is _per se_ not
knowable at all (he contends), nor is ever the object of study
pursued in any science; it is little better than a name, designating
the lowest degree of _Ens_, bordering on _Non-Ens_.[125] It is a term
comprehending all that he includes under his nine last Categories;
yet it is not a term connoting either generic communion, or even so
much as analogical relation.[126] In the treatise now before us, he
does not recognize either that or any other general term as common to
all those nine Categories; each of the nine is here treated as a
_Summum Genus_, having its own mode of relationship, and clinging by
its own separate thread to the Subject. He acknowledges the Accidents
in his classification, not as a class by themselves, but as
subordinated to the Essence, and, as so many threads of distinct,
variable, and irregular accompaniments, attaching themselves to this
constant root, without uniformity or steadiness.[127]

[Footnote 122: Simplikius ad Categ. p. 2, b. 5; Schol. p. 52, a. 1,
Br: [Greek: A)rchu/tas o( Puthagorei=os ou) prosi/etai tê\n nuni\
prokeime/nên tô=n ou)si/ôn diai/resin, a)ll' a)/llên a)nti\ tau/tês
e)kei=nos e)gkri/nei--tô=n me/ntoi Puthagorei/ôn ou)dei\s a)\n
pro/soito tau/tên tê\n diai/resin tô=n prô/tôn kai\ deute/rôn
ou)siô=n, o(/ti toi=s katho/lou to\ prô/tôs u(pa/rchein marturou=si,
to\ de\ e)/schaton e)n toi=s meristoi=s a)polei/pousi, kai\ dio/ti
e)n toi=s a(plousta/tois tê\n prô/tên kai\ kuriôta/tên ou)si/an
a)poti/thentai, a)ll' ou)ch ô(s nu=n le/getai e)n toi=s sunthe/tois
kai\ ai)sthêtoi=s, kai\ dio/ti ta\ ge/nê kai\ ta\ ei)/dê o)/nta
nomi/zousin, a)ll' ou)chi\ sugkephalaiou/mena tai=s chôristai=s
e)pinoi/ais.]]

[Footnote 123: Metaphys. E. p. 1026, b. 15: [Greek: ei)si\ ga\r oi(
tô=n sophistô=n lo/goi peri\ to\ sumbebêko\s ô(s ei)pei=n ma/lista
pa/ntôn], &c.; also K. p. 1061, b. 8; Analytic. Poster. i. p. 71, b.
10.]

[Footnote 124: Analytic. Priora, i. p. 46, a. 31.]

[Footnote 125: Aristot. Metaph. E. p. 1026, b. 13-21. [Greek: ô(/sper
ga\r o)no/mati mo/non to\ sumbebêko/s--phai/netai ga\r to\
sumbebêko\s e)ggu/s ti tou= mê\ o)/ntos.]]

[Footnote 126: Physica, iii. 1, p. 200, b. 34. [Greek: koino\n d'
e)pi\ tou/tôn ou)de/n e)sti labei=n], &c.]

[Footnote 127: See the explanation given of [Greek: to\ o)\n kata\
sumbebêko\s] in Metaphys. E. pp. 1026 b., 1027 a. This is the sense
in which Aristotle most frequently and usually talks of [Greek:
sumbebêko/s], though he sometimes uses it to include also a constant
and inseparable accompaniment or Accident, if it be not included in
the Essence (_i. e._ not connoted by the specific name); thus, to
have the three angles equal to two right angles is a [Greek:
sumbebêko\s] of the triangle, Metaph. [Greek: D]. p. 1025, a. 80. The
proper sense in which he understands [Greek: to\ sumbebêko\s] is as
opposed to [Greek: to\ a)ei\ e)x a)na/gkês], as well as [Greek: to\
ô(s e)pi\ to\ polu/]. See Metaphys. K. p. 1065, a. 2; Analyt. Poster.
i. p. 74, b. 12, p. 75, a. 18.

It is that which is by its nature irregular and unpredictable. See
the valuable chapter (ii) in Brentano, Von der Bedeutung des Seienden
nach Aristoteles (pp. 8-21), in which the meaning of [Greek: to\
sumbebêko\s] in Aristotle is clearly set forth.]

In discriminating and arranging the Ten Categories, Trendelenburg
supposes that Aristotle was guided, consciously or unconsciously, by
grammatical considerations, or by a distinction among the parts of
speech. It should be remembered that what are now familiarly known as
the eight parts of speech, had not yet been distinguished or named in
the time of Aristotle, nor did the distinction come into vogue before
the time of the Stoic and Alexandrine grammarians, more than a
century after him. _Essentia_ or _Substantia_, the first Category,
answers (so Trendelenburg thinks[128]) to the Substantive; _Quantum_
and _Quale_ represent the Adjective; _Ad Aliquid_, the comparative
Adjective, of which _Quantum_ and _Quale_ are the positive degree;
_Ubi_ and _Quando_ the Adverb; _Jacere_, _Habere_, _Agere_, _Pati_
the Verb. Of the last four, _Agere_ and _Pati_ correspond to the
active and passive voices of the Verb; _Jacere_ to the neuter or
intransitive Verb; and _Habere_ to the peculiar meaning of the Greek
perfect--the present result of a past action.

[Footnote 128: Trendelenburg, Kategorienlehre, pp. 23, 211.]

This general view, which Trendelenburg himself conceives as having
been only guiding and not decisive or peremptory in the mind of
Aristotle,[129] appears to me likely and plausible, though Bonitz and
others have strongly opposed it. We see from Aristotle's own
language, that the grammatical point of view had great effect upon
his mind; that the form (_e.g._) of a substantive implied in his view
a mode of signification belonging to itself, which was to be taken
into account in arranging and explaining the Categories.[130] I
apprehend that Aristotle was induced to distinguish and set out his
Categories by analysing various complete sentences, which would of
course include substantives, adjectives, verbs, and adverbs. It is
also remarkable that Aristotle should have designated his four last
Categories by the indication of verbs, the two immediately preceding
by adverbs, the second and third by adjectives, and the first by a
substantive. There remains the important Category _Ad Aliquid_, which
has no part of speech corresponding to it specially. Even this
Category, though not represented by any part of speech, is
nevertheless conceived and defined by Aristotle in a very narrow way,
with close reference to the form of expression, and to the
requirement of a noun immediately following, in the genitive or
dative case. And thus, where there is no special part of speech, the
mind of Aristotle still seems to receive its guidance from
grammatical and syntactic forms.

[Footnote 129: Ibid. p. 209: "Gesichtspunkte der Sprache leiteten den
erfindenden Geist, um sie (die Kategorien) zu bestimmen. Aber die
grammatischen Beziehungen leiten nur und entscheiden nicht." P. 216:
"der grammatische Leitfaden der Satzzergliederung wird anerkannt."]

[Footnote 130: Categor. p. 3, b. 13: [Greek: e)pi\ de\ tô=n deute/rôn
ou)siô=n phai/netai me\n o(moi/ôs tô=| _schê/mati tê=s prosêgori/as_
to/de ti sêmai/nein, o(/tan ei)/pê| a)/nthrôpon ê)\ zô=|on, ou) mê\n
a)lêthe/s ge, a)lla\ ma=llon poio/n ti sêmai/nei.] &c.]

We may illustrate the ten Categories of Aristotle by comparing them
with the four Categories of the Stoics. During the century succeeding
Aristotle's death, the Stoics, Zeno and Chrysippus (principally the
latter), having before them what he had done, proposed a new
arrangement for the complete distribution of Subject and Predicates.
Their distribution was quadruple instead of decuple. Their first
Category was [Greek: ti/], _Aliquid_ or _Quiddam_--[Greek: to\
u(pokei/menon], the _Substratum_ or Subject. Their second was [Greek:
poio/n], _Quale_ or Quality. Their third was [Greek: pô\s e)/chon],
_certo Modo se habens_. Their fourth was, [Greek: pro/s ti pô\s
e)/chon], _Ad Aliquid certo Modo se habens_.[131]

[Footnote 131: Plotinus, Ennead. vi. 1, 25; vi. 1, 30: [Greek: ta\
pô\s e)/chonta tri/ta ti/thesthai]. Simplikius ad Categor. f. 7, p.
48, a. 13, Brand. Schol.: [Greek: Oi( Stôi+koi\ ei)s e)la/ttona
suste/llein a)xiou=si to\n tô=n prô/tôn genô=n a)rithmo/n kai/ tina
e)n toi=s a)la/ttosin u(pêllagme/na paralamba/nousi. poiou=ntai ga\r
tê\n tomê\n ei)s te/ssara, ei)s u(pokei/mena, kai\ poia\, kai\ pô\s
e)/chonta, kai\ pro/s ti pô\s e)/chonta.]

It would seem from the adverse criticisms of Plotinus, that the
Stoics recognized one grand [Greek: **ge/nos] comprehending all the
above four as distinct species: see Plotinus, Ennead., vi. 2, 1; vi.
1, 25. He charges them with inconsistency and error for doing so. He
admits, however, that Aristotle did not recognize any one supreme
[Greek: ge/nos] comprehending all the ten Categories (vi. 1, 1), but
treated all the ten as [Greek: prô=ta ge/nê], under an analogous
aggregate. I cannot but think that the **Stoics looked upon their
four [Greek: ge/nê] in the same manner; for I do not see what they
could find more comprehensive to rank generically above [Greek:
ti/].]

We do not possess the advantage (which we have in the case of
Aristotle) of knowing this quadruple scheme as stated and enforced by
its authors. We know it only through the abridgment of Diogenes
Laertius, together with incidental remarks and criticisms, chiefly
adverse, by Plutarch, Sextus Empiricus, Plotinus, and some
Aristotelian commentators. As far as we can make out upon this
evidence, it appears that the first Stoic Category corresponded with
the [Greek: Prô/tê Ou)si/a], First Essence or Substance of Aristotle.
It was exclusively Subject, and could never become Predicate; but it
was indispensable as Subject, to the three other Predicates. Its
meaning was concrete and particular; for we are told that all general
notions or conceptions were excluded by the Stoics from this
Category,[132] and were designated as [Greek: Ou)/tina],
Non-Individuals, or Non-Particulars. _Homo_ was counted by them, not
under the Category [Greek: ti/], _Quid_, but under the Category
[Greek: _poio/n_], _Quale_; in its character of predicate determining
the Subject [Greek: ti/s] or [Greek: ti/]. The Stoic Category _Quale_
thus included the Aristotelian Second Essences or Substances, and
also the Aristotelian _differentia_. _Quale_ was a _species_-making
Category ([Greek: ei)dopoio/s]).[133] It declared what was the
Essence of the Subject [Greek: ti/]--the essential qualities or
attributes, but also the derivative manifestations thereof,
coinciding with what is called the _proprium_ in Porphyry's Eisagoge.
It therefore came next in order immediately after [Greek: ti/]: since
the Essence of the Subject must be declared, before you proceed to
declare its Accidents.

[Footnote 132: Simpl. ad Categ., p. 54, a. 12, Schol. Brand.: [Greek:
sumparalêpte/on de\ kai\ tê\n sunê/theian tô=n Stôi+kô=n peri\ tô=n
genikô=n poiô=n, pô=s ai( ptô/seis kat' au)tou\s prophe/rontai, kai\
pô=s _ou)/tina_ ta\ koina\ par' au)toi=s le/getai, kai\ o(/pôs para\
tê\n a)/gnoian tou= mê\ pa=san ou)si/an to/de ti sêmai/nein kai\ to\
_para\ to\n ou)/tina_ so/phisma gi/netai para\ to\ schê=ma tê=s
le/xeôs; oi(=on ei)/ ti/s e)stin e)n A)thê/nais, ou)k e)/stin e)n
Mega/rois; _ o( ga\r a)/nthrôpos ou)/tis e)sti/n, ou) ga/r e)sti/ tis
o( koino/s_, ô(s tina\ de\ au)to\n e)la/bomen e)n tô=| lo/gô|, kai\
para\ tou=to to\ o)/noma tou=to e)/schen o( lo/gos ou)/tis
klêthei/s.]

Compare Schol. p. 45**, a. 7, where Porphyry says that the Stoics, as
well as Aristotle, in arranging Categories, took as their point of
departure [Greek: to\ **deu/teron u(pokei/menon], not [Greek: to\
prô=ton u(pokei/menon ( = tê\n a)/poion u(/lên)].]

[Footnote 133: Trendelenburg, Kategorienlehre p. 222; Plutarch, De
Stoicor. Repugnantiis, p. 1054 a.; Simpl. ad Categor. Schol. p. 67.
Br. [Greek: Poia\] were distributed by the Stoics into three
varieties; and the abstract word [Greek: Poio/tês], in the Stoic
sense, corresponded only to the highest and most complete of these
three varieties, not to the second or third variety, so that [Geek:
poio/tês] had a narrower extension than [Greek: poio/n]: there were
[Greek: poia\] without any [Greek: poiotê\s] corresponding to them.
To the third Category, [Greek: Pô\s e)/chonta], which was larger and
more varied than the second, they had no abstract term corresponding;
nor to the fourth Category, [Greek: Pro/s ti]. Hence, we may see one
reason why the Stoics, confining the abstract term [Greek:
poio/têtes] to durable attributes, were disposed to maintain that the
[Greek: poio/têtes tô=n sôma/tôn] were themselves [Greek: sô/mata] or
[Greek: sômatika/]: which Galen takes much pains to refute (vol. xix.
p. 463, seq. ed. Kühn). The Stoics considered these qualities as
[Greek: a)e/ras tina/s], or [Greek: pneu/mata], &c., spiritual or
gaseous agents pervading and holding together the solid substance.

It is difficult to make out these Stoic theories clearly from the
evidence before us. From the statements of Simplikius in Scholia, pp.
67-69, I cannot understand the line of distinction between [Greek:
poia\] and [Greek: pô\s e)/chonta]. The Stoics considered [Greek:
poio/tês] to be [Greek: du/namis plei/stôn e)poistikê\ sumptôma/tôn,
ô(s ê( phro/nêsis tou= te phroni/môs peripatei=n kai\ tou= phron/môs
diale/gesthai] (p. 69, b. 2); and if all these [Greek: sumptô/mata]
were included under [Greek: poio/n], so that [Greek: o( phroni/môs
peripatô=n, o( pu\x protei/nôn] and [Greek: o( tre/chôn], were
[Greek: poioi/ tines] (p. 67, b. 34). I hardly see what was left for
the third Category [Greek: pô\s e)/chonta] to comprehend; although,
according to the indications of Plotinus, it would be the most
comprehensive. The Stoic writers seem both to have differed among
themselves and to have written inconsistently.

Neither Trendelenburg (Kategorienlehre, pp. 223-226), nor even
Prantl, in his more elaborate account (Gesch. der Logik,
pp. 429-437), clears up this obscurity.]

The Third Stoic Category ([Greek: pô\s e)/chon]) comprised a portion
of what Aristotle ranked under _Quale_, and all that he ranked under
_Quantum_, _Ubi_, _Quando_, _Agere_, _Pati_, _Jacere_, _Habere_. The
fourth Stoic Category coincided with the Aristotelian _Ad Aliquid_.
The third was thus intended to cover what were understood as absolute
or non-relative Accidents; the fourth included what were understood
as Relative Accidents.

The order of arrangement among the four was considered as fixed and
peremptory. They were not co-ordinate species under one and the same
genus, but superordinate and subordinate,[134] the second
presupposing and attaching to the first; the third, presupposing and
attaching to the first, _plus_ the second; the fourth, presupposing
and attaching to the first, _plus_ the second and third. The first
proposition to be made is, in answer to the question _Quale Quid_?
You answer _Tale Aliquid_, declaring the essential attributes. Upon
this, the next question is put, _Quali Modo se habens_? You answer by
a term of the third Category, declaring one or more of the accidental
attributes non-relative, _Tale Aliquid, tali Modo se habens_. Upon
this, the fourth and last question follows, _Quali Modo se habens ad
alia_? Answer is made by the predicate of the fourth Category, _i.e._
a Relative. _Hic Aliquis--homo_ (1), _niger_ (2), _servus_ (3).

[Footnote 134: Prantl, Geschichte der Logik, vol. i. pp. 428, 429;
Simplikius ad Categor. fol. 43, A: [Greek: ka)kei=no a)/topon to\
su/ntheta poiei=n ta\ ge/nê e)k prote/rôn tinô=n kai\ deute/rôn ô(s
to\ pro/s ti e)k poiou= kai\ pro/s ti.] Cf. Plotinus, Ennead. vi. 1,
25-29.

Porphyry appears to include all [Greek: sumbebêko/ta] under [Greek:
poio\n] and [Greek: pô\s e)/chon]: he gives as examples of the
latter, what Aristotle would have assigned to the Category [Greek:
kei=sthai] (Eisagoge, cc. 2, 10; Schol. Br. p. 1, b. 32, p. 5, a.
30).]

In comparing the ten Aristotelian with the four Stoic Categories we
see that the first great difference is in the extent and
comprehension of _Quale_, which Aristotle restricts on one side (by
distinguishing from it _Essentia Secunda_), and enlarges on the other
(by including in it many attributes accidental and foreign to the
Essence). The second difference is, that the Stoics did not subdivide
their third Category, but included therein all the matter of six
Aristotelian Categories,[135] and much of the matter of the
Aristotelian _Quale_. Both schemes agree on two points:--1. In taking
as the point of departure the concrete, particular, individual,
Substance. 2. In the narrow, restricted, inadequate conception formed
of the Relative--_Ad Aliquid_.

[Footnote 135: Plotinus (Ennead. vi. 1. 80) disapproves greatly the
number of disparates ranked under [Greek: to\ pô\s e)/chon], which
has (he contends) no discoverable unity as a generic term. It is
curious to see how he cites the Aristotelian Categories, as if the
decuple distinction which they marked out were indefeasible.

Simplikius says that the Stoics distinguished between [Greek: to\
pro/s ti] and [Greek: to\ pro/s ti pô\s e)/chon]; and Trendelenburg,
(pp. 228, 229) explains and illustrate this distinction, which,
however, appears to be very obscure.]

Plotinus himself recognizes five _Summa_ or _Prima Genera_,[136] (he
does not call them Categories) _Ens_, _Motus_, _Quies_, _Idem_,
_Diversum_; the same as those enumerated in the Platonic Sophistes.
He does not admit _Quantum_, _Quale_, or _Ad Aliquid_, to be _Prima
Genera_; still less the other Aristotelian Categories. Moreover, he
insists emphatically on the distinction between the intelligible and
the sensible world, which distinction he censures Aristotle for
neglecting. His five _Genera_ he applies directly and principally to
the intelligible world. For the sensible world he admits ultimately
five Catgories; _Substantia_ or _Essentia_ (though he conceives this
as fluctuating between Form, Matter, and the Compound of the two),
_Ad Aliquid_, _Quantum_, _Quale_, _Motus_. But he doubts whether
_Quantum_, _Quale_, and _Motus_, are not comprehended in _Ad
Aliquid_.[137] He considers, moreover, that Sensible Substance is not
Substance, properly speaking, but only an imitation thereof; a
congeries of non-substantial elements, qualities and matter.[138]
Dexippus,[139] in answering the objections of Plotinus, insists much
on the difference between Aristotle's point of view in the Categoriæ,
in the Physica, and in the Metaphysica. In the Categoriæ, Aristotle
dwells mainly on sensible substances (such as the vulgar understand)
and the modes of naming and describing them.

[Footnote 136: Plotinus, Ennead. vi. 2, 8, 14, 16.]

[Footnote 137: Plotinus, Ennead. vi. 3. 3. [Greek: ê)\ kai\ tau=ta
ei)s ta\ pro/s ti; periektiko\n ga\r ma=llon.] His idea of Relation
is more comprehensive than that of Aristotle, for he declares that
terms, propositions, discourse, &c., are [Greek: pro/s ti; kath' o(\
sêmantika/] (vi. 3. 19).]

[Footnote 138: Ibid. vi. 3. 8-15.]

[Footnote 139: The second and third books of Dexippus's Dialogue
contain his answers to many of the objections urged by Plotinus.
Aristotle, in the Categoriæ (Dexippus says), accommodates himself
both to the received manner of speaking and to the simple or ordinary
conception of [Greek: ou)si/a] entertained by youth or
unphilosophical men--[Greek: ou)/te ga\r peri\ tô=n o)/ntôn, ou)/te
peri\ tô=n genô=n tê=s prô/tês ou)si/as nu=n au)tô=| pro/keitai
le/gein; stocha/zetai ga\r tô=n ne/ôn toi=s a(plouste/rois
e)pakolouthei=n duname/nôn] (p. 49). Compare also pp. 50-54, where
Dexippus contrasts the more abstruse handling which we read in the
Physica and Metaphysica, with the more obvious and unpretending
thoughts worked out by Aristotle in the Categoriæ. Dexippus gives an
interesting piece of advice to his pupil, that he should vary his
mode of discussing these topics, according as his companions are
philosophical or otherwise--[Greek: e)gô\ me\n ou)=n, ô)= kale\
ka)gathe\ Se/leuke, dogmatikô/teron pro\s Plôti=non a)pantô=, su\
de/, e)pei\ bathu/terai/ pôs ei)si\n ai( lu/seis au(=tai, pro\s me\n
tou=s e)k philosophi/as o(rmôme/nous tai=s toiau/tais a)pantê/sesi
chrô=, pro\s de\ tou\s o)li/ga e)pistame/nous tô=n dogma/tôn tai=s
prochei/rois chrô= dialu/sesin, e)kei=no le/gôn, _o(/ti peri\ po/da
poiei=sthai e)/thos ta\s a)kroa/seis A)ristote/lei;_ dio\ kai\ nu=n
ou)de\n e)/xôthen e)peisa/gei tô=n a)nôte/rô keime/nôn
philosophêma/tôn], &c. (pp. 50, 51).]

Galen also recognizes five Categories; but not the same five as
Plotinus. He makes a new list, formed partly out of the Aristotelian
ten, partly out of the Stoic four:--[Greek: Ou)si/a, poso/n, poio/n,
_pro/s ti_, pro/ ti pô\s e)/chon].[140]

[Footnote 140: Schol. ad Categor. p. 49 a. 30.]

. . . . . .

The latter portion of this Aristotelian treatise, on the Categories
or Predicaments, consists of an Appendix, usually known under the
title of 'Post-Predicamenta;'[141] wherein the following terms or
notions are analysed and explained--_Opposita_, _Prius_, _Simul_,
_Motus_, _Habere_.

[Footnote 141: Andronikus and other commentators supposed the
Post-Predicamenta to have been appended to the Categoriæ by some
later hand. Most of the commentators dissented from this view. The
distinctions and explanations seem all Aristotelian.]

Of _Opposita_, Aristotle reckons four modes, analogous to each other,
yet not different species under the same genus:[142]--1.
_Relative-Opposita_--_Relatum_ and _Correlatum_. 2. _Contraria_.
3. _Habitus_ and _Privatio_. 4. _Affirmatio_ and _Negatio_.

[Footnote 142: Categ. p. 11, b. 16: [Greek: peri\ de\ tô=n
a)ntikeime/nôn, posachô=s ei)/ôthen a)ntikei=sthai r(ête/on.] See
Simpl. in Schol. p. 81, a. 37-b. 24. Whether Aristotle reckoned
[Greek: ta\ a)ntikei/mena] a true genus or not, was debated among the
commentators. The word [Greek: posachô=s] implies that he did not;
and he treats even the term [Greek: e)nanti/a] as a [Greek:
pollachô=s lego/menon], though it is less wide in its application
than [Greek: a)ntikei/mena], which includes _Relata_ (Metaphys. I. p.
1055, a. 17). He even treats [Greek: ste/rêsis] as a [Greek:
pollachô=s lego/menon] (p. 1055, a. 34).

[Greek: Ai( a)ntithe/seis te/ssares], the four distinct varieties of
[Greek: ta\ a)ntikei/mena] are enumerated by Aristotle in various
other places:--Topic. ii. p. 109, b. 17; p. 113, b. 15; Metaphys. I.
p. 1055, a. 38. In Metaphys. [Greek: D]. p. 1018, a. 20, two other
varieties are added. Bonitz observes (ad Metaph. p. 247) that
Aristotle seems to treat this quadripartite distribution of
_Opposita_, "tanquam certum et exploratum, pariter ac causarum
numerum," &c.]

These four modes of opposition have passed from the Categoriæ of
Aristotle into all or most of the modern treatises on Logic. The
three last of the four are usefully classed together, and illustrated
by their contrasts with each other. But as to the first of the four,
I cannot think that Aristotle has been happy in the place which he
has assigned to it. To treat _Relativa_ as a variety of _Opposita_,
appears to me an inversion of the true order of classification;
placing the more comprehensive term in subordination to the less
comprehensive. Instead of saying that Relatives are a variety of the
Opposite, we ought rather to say that Opposites are varieties of the
Relative. We have here another proof of what has been remarked a few
pages above; the narrow and inadequate conception which Aristotle
formed of his _Ad Aliquid_ or the Relative; restricting it to cases
in which the describing phrase is grammatically elliptical.[143] The
three classes last-mentioned by Aristotle (1. _Contraria_, 2.
_Habitus_ and _Privatio_, 3. _Affirmatio_ and _Negatio_) are truly
_Opposita_; in each there is a different mode of opposition, which it
is good to distinguish from the others. But the _Relatum_ and its
_Correlatum_, as such, are not necessarily _Opposite_ at all; they
are compared or conceived in conjunction with each other; while a
name, called relative, which connotes such comparison, &c., is
bestowed upon each. _Opposita_ fall under this general description,
as parts (together with other parts not _Opposita_) of a larger
whole. They ought properly to be called _Opposite-Relativa_: the
phrase _Relative-Opposita_, as applied to Relatives generally, being
discontinued as incorrect.[144]

[Footnote 143: Categ. p. 11, b. 24.

Ammonius and Simplikius inform us that there was much debate among
the commentators about these four alleged varieties of [Greek:
a)ntikei/mena]; also, that even Aristotle himself had composed a
special treatise (not now extant), [Greek: Peri\ tô=n
A)ntikeime/nôn], full of perplexing [Greek: a)pori/ai], which the
Stoics afterwards discussed without solving (Schol. p. 83, a. 15-48).
Herminus and others seem to have felt the difficulty of calling all
Relatives [Greek: a)ntikei/mena]; for they admitted that the
antithesis between the Relative and its Correlate was of gentler
character, not conflicting, but reciprocally sustaining. Alexander
ingeniously compared _Relatum_ and its _Correlatum_ to the opposite
rafters of a roof, each supporting the other ([Greek: malakô/tera
kai\ ê(=tton macho/mena e)n toi=s a)ntikeime/nois, ô(s _ kai\
a)mphiba/lesthai ei) ei)si\n a)ntikei/mena sô/zonta a)/llêla;_ a)lla\
tou=to me\n dei/knusin A)le/xandros o(/ti a)ntikei/mena, o(\s kai\
ta\ labdoeidê= xu/la paradei=gma lamba/nei], &c., Schol. p. 81, b.
32; p. 82, a. 15, b. 20). This is an undue enlargement of the meaning
of _Opposita_, by taking in the literal material sense as an adjunct
to the logical. On the contrary, the Stoics are alleged to have
worked out the views of Aristotle about [Greek: e)nanti/a], but to
have restricted the meaning of [Greek: **a)ntikei/mena] to
contradictory opposition, _i. e._ to Affirmative and Negative
Propositions with the same subject and predicate (Schol. p. 83, b.
11; p. 87, a. 29). In Metaphysica, A. 983, a. 31, Aristotle calls the
final cause ([Greek: to\ ou(= e(/neka kai\ ta)gatho/n) tê\n
a)ntikeime/nên ai)ti/an] to the cause (among his four), [Greek: to\
**o(/then ê( ki/nêsis]. This is a misleading phrase; the two
are not opposed, but mutually implicated and correlative.]

[Footnote 144: See the just and comprehensive definition of Relative
Names given by Mr. John Stuart Mill, in his System of Logic, Book I.
chap. ii. § 7, p. 46.

After reading that definition, the inconvenience of ranking Relatives
as a species or variety of Opposites, will be seen at once.]

From _Opposita_ Aristotle passes to _Prius_ and _Simul_; with the
different modes of each.[145] _Successive_ and _Synchronous_, are the
two most general classes under which facts or events can be cast.
They include between them all that is meant by Order in Time. They
admit of no definition, and can be explained only by appeal to
immediate consciousness in particular cases. Priority and
Simultaneity, in this direct and primary sense, are among the
clearest and most impressive notions of the human mind. But Aristotle
recognizes four additional meanings of these same words, which he
distinguishes from the primary, in the same way as he distinguishes
(in the ten Categories) the different meanings of _Essentia_, in a
gradually descending scale of analogy. The secondary _Prius_ is that
which does not reciprocate according to the order of existence with
its _Posterius_; where the _Posterius_ presupposes the _Prius_, while
the _Prius_ does not presuppose the _Posterius_: for example, given
two, the existence of one is necessarily implied; but given one, the
existence of two is not implied.[146] The tertiary _Prius_ is that
which comes first in the arrangements of science or discourse: as, in
geometry, point and line are prior as compared with the diagrams and
demonstrations; in writing, letters are prior as compared with
syllables; in speeches, the proem is prior as compared with the
exposition. A fourth mode of _Prius_ (which is the most remote and
far-fetched) is, that the better and more honourable is _prius
naturâ_. Still a fifth mode is, when, of two Relatives which
reciprocate with each other as to existence, one is cause and the
other effect: in such a case, the cause is said to be prior by nature
to the effect.[147] For example, if it be a fact that Caius exists,
the proposition "Caius exists," is a true proposition; and _vice
versâ_, if the proposition "Caius exists" is a true proposition, it
is a fact that Caius exists. But though from either **of these you
can infer the other, the truth of the proposition is the effect, and
not the cause, of the reality of the fact. Hence it is correct to say
that the latter is _prius naturâ_, and the former _posterius naturâ_.

[Footnote 145: Categ. p. 14, a. 26, seq.]

[Footnote 146: Ibid. p. 14, a. 29, seq. This second mode of _Prius_
is entitled by Alexander (see Schol. (ad Metaphys. [Greek: D].) p.
707, b. 7, Brandis) [Greek: pro/teron tê=| phu/sei]. But Aristotle
does not so call it here; he reserves that title for the fourth and
fifth modes.

It appears that debates, [Greek: Peri\ Prote/rou kai\ U(ste/rou] were
frequent in the dialectic schools of Aristotle's day as well as
debates, [Greek: Peri\ Tau)tou= kai\ E(te/rou, Peri\ O(moi/ou kai\
A)nomoi/ou, Peri\ Tau)to/têtos kai\ E)nantio/têtos] (Arist. Metaph.
B. p. 995, b. 20).]

[Footnote 147: Aristot. Categ. p. 14, b. 10.]

This is a sort of article in a Philosophical Dictionary, tracing the
various derivative senses of two very usual correlative phrases; and
there is another article in the fourth book of the Metaphysica, where
the derivations of the same terms are again traced out, though by
roads considerably different.[148] The two terms are relatives;
_Prius_ implies a _Posterius_, as _Simul_ implies another _Simul_;
and it is an useful process to discriminate clearly the various
meanings assigned to each. Aristotle has done this, not indeed
clearly nor consistently with himself, but with an earnest desire to
elucidate what he felt to be confused and perplexing. Yet there are
few terms in his philosophy which are more misleading. Though he sets
out, plainly and repeatedly the primary and literal sense of
Priority, (the temporal or real), as discriminated from the various
secondary and metaphorical senses, nevertheless when he comes to
employ the term _Prius_ in the course of his reasonings, he often
does so without specifying in which sense he intends it to be
understood. And as the literal sense (temporal or real priority) is
the most present and familial to every man's mind, so the term is
often construed in this sense when it properly bears only the
metaphorical sense. The confusion of logical or emotional priority
(priority either in logical order of conception, or in esteem and
respect) with priority in the order of time, involving separability
of existence, is a frequent source of misunderstanding in the
Aristotelian Physics and Metaphysics. The order of logical
antecedence and sequence, or the fact of logical coexistence, is of
great importance to be understood, with a view to the proof of truth,
to the disproof of error, or to the systematization of our processes
of thought; but we must keep in mind that what is prior in the
logical order is not for that reason prior in temporal order, orf
separable in real existence, or fit to be appealed to as a real Cause
or Agent.[149]

[Footnote 148: Aristot. Metaphys. [Greek: D]. p. 1018, b. 11-p. 1019,
a. 12. The article in the Metaphysica is better and fuller than that
in the Categoriæ. In this last, _Order in Place_ receives no special
recognition, while we find such recognition in the Metaphysica, and
we find also fuller development of the varieties of the logical or
intellectual _Prius_.]

[Footnote 149: In the language of Porphyry, [Greek: prou+phe/stêke]
(priority in real existence) means nothing more than [Greek:
proe+pinoei=tai] (priority in the order of conception), Eisagoge, cc.
xv., xvi.; Schol. Br. p. 6, a. 7-21.]




CHAPTER IV.

DE INTERPRETATIONE.


In the preceding chapter I enumerated and discussed what Aristotle
calls the Categories. We shall now proceed to the work which stands
second in the aggregate called the Organon--the treatise De
Interpretatione.

We have already seen that the Aristotelian Ontology distinguishes one
group of varieties of _Ens_ (or different meanings of the term _Ens_)
as corresponding to the diversity of the ten Categories; while
recognizing also another variety of _Ens_ as _Truth_, with its
antithesis _Non-Ens_ as _Falsehood_.[1] The former group was dealt
with in the preceding chapter; the latter will form the subject of
the present chapter. In both, indeed, Ontology is looked at as
implicated with Logic; that is, _Ens_ is considered as distributed
under significant names, fit to be coupled in propositions. This is
the common basis both of the Categoriæ and of the treatise De
Interpretatione. The whole classification of the Categories rests on
the assumption of the proposition with its constituent parts, and on
the different relation borne by each of the nine _genera_ of
predicates towards their common Subject. But in the Categoriæ no
account was taken of the distinction between truth and falsehood, in
the application of these predicates to the Subject. If we say of
Sokrates, that he is fair, pug-nosed, brave, wise, &c., we shall
predicate truly; if we say that he is black, high-nosed, cowardly,
stupid, &c., we shall predicate falsely; but in each case our
predicates will belong to the same Category--that of _Quale_. Whether
we describe him as he now is, standing, talking, in the market-place
at Athens; or whether we describe him as he is not, sitting down,
singing, in Egypt--in both speeches, our predicates rank under the
same Categories, _Jacere_, _Agere_, _Ubi_. No account is taken in the
Categoriæ of the distinction between true and false application of
predicates; we are only informed under what number of general heads
all our predicates must be included, whether our propositions be true
or false in each particular case.

[Footnote 1: See above in the preceding chapter, p. 60.]

But this distinction between _true_ and _false_, which remained
unnoticed in the Categoriæ, comes into the foreground in the treatise
De Interpretatione. The Proposition, or enunciative speech,[2] is
distinguished from other varieties of speech (interrogative,
precative, imperative) by its communicating what is true or what is
false. It is defined to be a complex significant speech, composed of
two terms at least, each in itself significant, yet neither of them,
separately taken, communicating truth or falsehood. The terms
constituting the Proposition are declared to be a Noun in the
nominative case, as Subject, and a Verb, as Predicate; this latter
essentially connoting time, in order that the synthesis of the two
may become the enunciation of a fact or quasi-fact, susceptible of
being believed or disbelieved. All this mode of analysing a
proposition, different from the analysis thereof given or implied in
the Categoriæ, is conducted with a view to bring out prominently its
function of imparting true or false information. The treatise called
the Categoriæ is a theory of significant names subjicible and
predicable, fit to serve as elements of propositions, but not yet
looked at as put together into actual propositions; while in the
treatise De Interpretatione they are assumed to be put together, and
a theory is given of Propositions thus completed.

[Footnote 2: Aristot. De Interpret. p. 17, a. 1: [Greek: lo/gos
a)pophantiko/s].]

Words spoken are marks significant of mental impressions associated
with them both by speaker and hearer; words written are symbols of
those thus uttered. Both speech and writing differ in different
nations, having no natural connection with the things signified. But
these last, the affections or modifications of the mind, and the
facts or objects of which they are representations or likenesses, are
the same to all. Words are marks primarily and directly of the first,
secondarily and indirectly of the second.[3] Aristotle thus
recognizes these two aspects--first, the subjective, next the
objective, as belonging, both of them conjointly, to significant
language, yet as logically distinguishable; the former looking to the
proximate _correlatum_, the latter to the ultimate.

[Footnote 3: Ibid. p. 16, a. 3, seq. [Greek: ô(\n me/ntoi tau=ta
sêmei=a prô/tôs, tau)ta\ pa=si pathê/mata tê=s psuchê=s, kai\ ô(=n
tau=ta o(moiô/mata, pra/gmata ê)/dê tau)ta/.]]

For this doctrine, that the mental affections of mankind, and the
things or facts which they represent, are the same everywhere, though
the marks whereby they are signified differ, Aristotle refers us to
his treatise De Animâ, to which he says that it properly belongs.[4]
He thus recognizes the legitimate dependence of Logic on Psychology
or Mental Philosophy.

[Footnote 4: Aristot. De Interpret. p. 16, a. 8: [Greek: peri\ me\n
ou)=n tau/tôn ei)/rêtai e)n toi=s peri\ psuchê=s; a)/llês ga\r
pragmatei/as.] It was upon this reference, mainly, that Andronikus
the Rhodian rested his opinion, that the treatise De Interpretatione
was not the work of Aristotle. Andronikus contended that there was
nothing in the De Animâ to justify the reference. But Ammonius in his
Scholia (p. 97, Brand.) makes a sufficient reply to the objection of
Andronikus. The third book De Animâ (pp. 430, 431) lays down the
doctrine here alluded to. Compare Torstrick's Commentary, p. 210.]

That which is signified by words (either single or in combination) is
some variety of these mental affections or of the facts which they
represent. But the signification of a single Term is distinguished,
in an important point, from the signification of that conjunction of
terms which we call a Proposition. A noun, or a verb, belonging to
the aggregate called a language, is associated with one and the same
phantasm[5] or notion, without any conscious act of conjunction or
disjunction, in the minds of speakers and hearers: when pronounced,
it arrests for a certain time the flow of associated ideas, and
determines the mind to dwell upon that particular group which is
called its meaning.[6] But neither the noun nor the verb, singly
taken, does more than this; neither one of them affirms, or denies,
or communicates any information true or false. For this last purpose,
we must conjoin the two together in a certain way, and make a
Proposition. The signification of the Proposition is thus
specifically distinct from that of either of its two component
elements. It communicates what purports to be matter of fact, which
may be either true or false; in other words, it implies in the
speaker, and raises in the hearer, the state of belief or disbelief,
which does not attach either to the noun or to the verb separately.
Herein the Proposition is discriminated from other significant
arrangements of words (precative, interrogative, which convey no
truth or falsehood), as well as from its own component parts. Each of
these parts, noun and verb, has a significance of its own; but these
are the ultimate elements of speech, for the parts of the noun or of
the verb have no significance at all. The Verb is distinguished from
the Noun by connoting time, and also by always serving as predicate
to some noun as subject.[7]

[Footnote 5: Ibid. p. 16, a. 13: [Greek: ta\ me\n ou)=n o)no/mata
au)ta\ kai\ ta\ r(ê/mata e)/oike tô=| a)/neu diaire/seôs kai\
sunthe/seôs noê/mati, oi(=on to\ a)/nthrôpos kai\ to\ leuko/n, o(/tan
mê\ proste/thê| ti; ou)/te ga\r pseu=dos ou)/te a)lêthe/s pô.]]

[Footnote 6: Ibid. p. 16, b. 19: [Greek: au)ta\ me\n kath' e(auta\
lego/mena ta\ r(ê/mata o)no/mata/ e)sti kai\ sêmai/nei ti (_i(/stêsi
ga\r o( le/gôn tê\n dia/noian_, kai\ _o( a)kou/sas ê)re/mêsen_) a)ll'
ei) e)sti\n ê)\ mê/, ou)/pô sêmai/nei], &c.

Compare Analyt. Poster. II. xix. pp. 99, 100, where the same doctrine
occurs: the movement of association is stopped, and the mind is
determined to dwell upon a certain idea; one among an aggregate of
runaways being arrested in flight, another halts also, and so the
rest in succession, until at length the Universal, or the sum total,
is detained, or "stands still" as an object of attention. Also
Aristot. Problem. p. 956, b. 39.]

[Footnote 7: Aristot. De Interpr. p. 16, b. 2, seq.]

Aristotle intimates his opinion, distinctly and even repeatedly, upon
the main question debated by Plato in the Kratylus. He lays it down
that all significant speech is significant by convention only, and
not by nature or as a natural instrument.[8] He tells us also that,
in this treatise, he does not mean to treat of all significant
speech, but only of that variety which is known as _enunciative_.
This last, as declaring truth or falsehood, is the only part
belonging to Logic as he conceives it; other modes of speech, the
precative, imperative, interrogative, &c., belong more naturally to
Rhetoric or Poetic.[9] Enunciative speech may be either simple or
complex; it may be one enunciation, declaring one predicate (either
in one word or in several words) of one subject; or it may comprise
several such.[10] The conjunction of the predicate with the subject
constitutes the variety of proposition called Affirmation; the
disjunction of the same two is Negation or Denial.[11] But such
conjunction or disjunction, operated by the cogitative act, between
two mental states, takes place under the condition that, wherever
conjunction may be enunciated, there also disjunction may be
enunciated, and _vice versâ_. Whatever may be affirmed, it is
possible also to deny; whatever may be denied, it is possible also to
affirm.[12]

[Footnote 8: Ibid. p. 16, a. 26; p. 17, a. 2.]

[Footnote 9: Ibid. p. 17, a. 6: [Greek: _o( de\ a)pophantiko\s tê=s
nu=n theôri/as_]. See the **Scholion of Ammonius, pp. 95, 96, 108, a.
27. In the last passage, Ammonius refers to a passage in one of the
lost works of Theophrastus, wherein that philosopher distinguished
[Greek: to\n a)pophantiko\n lo/gon] from the other varieties of
[Greek: lo/gos], by the difference of [Greek: sche/sis]: the [Greek:
a)pophantiko\s lo/gos] was [Greek: pro\s ta\ pra/gmata], or
_objective_; the others were [Greek: pro\s tou\s a)kroôme/nous],
_i.e._ varying with the different varieties of hearers, or
_subjective_.]

[Footnote 10: Ibid. p. 17, a. 25.]

[Footnote 11: Ibid. p. 17, a. 25.]

[Footnote 12: Ibid. p. 17, a. 30: [Greek: a(/pan a)\n e)nde/choito
kai\ o(\ kate/phêse/ tis a)pophê=sai, kai\ o(\ a)pe/phêse/ tis
kataphê=sai.]]

To every affirmative proposition there is thus opposed a
contradictory negative proposition; to every negative a contradictory
affirmative. This pair of contradictory opposites may be called an
_Antiphasis_; always assuming that the predicate and subject of the
two shall be really the same, without equivocation of terms--a
proviso necessary to guard against troublesome puzzles started by
Sophists.[13] And we must also distinguish these propositions
opposite as _Contradictories_, from propositions opposite as
_Contraries_. For this, it has to be observed that there is a
distinction among things ([Greek: pra/gmata]) as universal or
singular, according as they are, in their nature, predicable of a
number or not: _homo_ is an example of the first, and _Kallias_ is an
example of the second. When, now, we affirm a predicate universally,
we must attach the mark of universality to the subject and not to the
predicate; we must say, Every man is white, No man is white. We
cannot attach the mark of universality to the predicate, and say,
Every man is every animal; this would be untrue.[14] An affirmation,
then, is _contradictorily_ opposed to a negation, when one indicates
that the subject is universally taken, and the other, that the
subject is taken not universally, _e.g. Omnis homo est albus_, _Non
omnis homo est albus_; _Nullus homo est albus_, _Est aliquis homo
albus_. The opposition is _contrary_, when the affirmation is
universal, and the negation is also universal, _i.e._, when the
subject is marked as universally taken in each: for example, _Omnis
homo est albus_, _Nullus homo est albus_. Of these contrary
opposites, both cannot be true, but both may be false. Contradictory
opposites, on the other hand, while they cannot both be true, cannot
both be false; one must be false and the other true. This holds also
where the subject is a singular term, as Sokrates.[15] If, however,
an universal term appear as subject in the proposition
_indefinitely_, that is, without any mark of universality whatever,
_e.g._, Est albus homo_, _Non est albus homo_, then the affirmative
and negative are not necessarily either contrary or contradictory,
though they may be so sometimes: there is no opposition, properly
speaking, between them; both may alike be true. This last observation
(says Aristotle) will seem strange, because many persons suppose that
_Non est homo albus_ is equivalent to _Nullus homo est albus_; but
the meaning of the two is not the same, nor does the truth of the
latter follow from that of the former,[16] since _homo_ in the former
may be construed as not universally taken.

[Footnote 13: Ibid. p. 17, a. 33: [Greek: _kai\ e)/stô a)nti/phasis
tou=to_, kata/phasis kai\ a)po/phasis ai( a)ntikei/menai.]

It seems (as Ammonius observes, Schol. p. 112, a. 33) that [Greek:
a)nti/phasis] in this sense was a technical term, introduced by
Aristotle.]

[Footnote 14: Aristot. De Interpr. p. 17, a. 37-b. 14: [Greek: e)pei\
d' e)sti\ ta\ me\n katho/lou tô=n pragma/tôn, ta\ de\ kath' e(/kaston
(le/gô de\ katho/lou me\n o(\ e)pi\ pleio/nôn pe/phuke
katêgorei=sthai, kath' e(/kaston de\ o(\ mê\, oi(=on a)/nthrôpos me\n
tô=n katho/lou, Kalli/as de\ tô=n kath' e(/kaston);] &c. Ammonius (in
Schol. p. 113, a. 38) says that what is predicated, either of many
subjects or of one, must be [Greek: mi/a phu/sis].

The warning against quantifying the predicate appears in this logical
treatise of Aristotle, and is repeated in the Analytica Priora, I.
xxvii. p. 43, b. 17. Here we have: [Greek: ou)demi/a kata/phasis
a)lêthê\s e)/stai, e)n ê(=| tou= katêgoroume/nou katho/lou to\
katho/lou katêgorei=tai, oi(=on e)/sti pa=s a)/nthrôpos pa=n zô=|on]
(b. 14).]

[Footnote 15: Ibid. b. 16-29.]

[Footnote 16: Ibid. p. 17, b. 29-37. Mr. John Stuart Mill (System of
Logic, Bk. I. ch. iv. s. 4) cites and approves Dr. Whately's
observation, that the recognition of a class of Propositions called
_indefinite_ "is a solecism, of the same nature as that committed by
grammarians when in their list of genders they enumerate the
_doubtful_ gender. The speaker _must mean_ to assert the proposition
either as an universal or as a particular proposition, though he has
failed to declare which."

But Aristotle would not have admitted Dr. Whately's doctrine,
declaring what the speaker "_must mean_." Aristotle fears that his
class, _indefinite_, will appear impertinent, because many speakers
are not conscious of any distinction or transition between the
particular and the general. The looseness of ordinary speech and
thought, which Logic is intended to bring to view and to guard
against, was more present to his mind than to that of Dr. Whately:
moreover, the forms of Greek speech favoured the ambiguity.

Aristotle's observation illustrates the deficiencies of common
speaking, as to clearness and limitation of meaning, at the time when
he began to theorize on propositions.

I think that Whately's assumption--"the speaker _must mean_"--is
analogous to the assumption on which Sir W. Hamilton founds his
proposal for explicit quantification of the predicate, viz., that the
speaker _must_, implicitly or mentally, quantify the predicate; and
that his speech ought to be such as to make such quantification
explicit. Mr. Mill has shewn elsewhere that this assumption of Sir.
W. Hamilton's is incorrect.]

It thus appears that there is always one negation corresponding to
one and the same affirmation; making up together the _Antiphasis_, or
pair of contradictory opposites, quite distinct from contrary
opposites. By _one_ affirmation we mean, that in which there is one
predicate only, and one subject only, whether taken universally or
not universally:--

 _E.g._ Omnis homo est albus  ...  ... Non omnis homo est albus.
        Est homo albus   ...  ...  ... Non est homo albus.
        Nullus homo est albus ...  ... Aliquis homo est albus.

But this will only hold on the assumption that _album_ signifies one
and the same thing. If there be one name signifying two things not
capable of being generalized into one nature, or not coming under the
same definition, then the affirmation is no longer one.[17] Thus if
any one applies the term _himation_ to signify both horse and man,
then the proposition, _Est himation album_, is not one affirmation,
but two; it is either equivalent to _Est homo albus_ and _Est equus
albus_--or it means nothing at all; for this or that individual man
is not a horse. Accordingly, in this case also, as well as in that
mentioned above, it is not indispensable that one of the two
propositions constituting the _Antiphasis_ should be true and the
other false.[18]

[Footnote 17: Aristot. De Interpr. p. 18, a. 13, seq.: [Greek: mi/a
de/ e)sti kata/phasis kai\ a)po/phasis ê( e(\n kath' e(no\s
sêmai/nousa, ê)\ katho/lou o)/ntos katho/lou ê)\ mê\ o(moi/ôs, oi(=on
pa=s a)/nthrôpos leuko/s e)stin . . . _ei) to\ leuko\n e(\n
sêmai/nei_. ei) de\ duoi=n e(\n o)/noma kei=tai, e)x ô(=n _mê/ e)stin
e(/n_, ou) mi/a kata/phasis], &c., and the Scholion of Ammonius, p.
116, b. 6, seq.]

[Footnote 18: Aristot. De Interpr. p. 18, a. 26. The example which
Aristotle here gives is one of a _subject_ designated by an equivocal
name; when he had begun with the _predicate_. It would have been more
pertinent if he had said at first, [Greek: ei) o( a)/nthrôpos e(\n
sêmai/nei].]

With these exceptions Aristotle lays it down, that, in every
_Antiphasis_, one proposition must be true and the other must be
false. But (he goes on to say) this is only true in regard to matters
past or present; it is not true in regard to events particular and
future. To admit it in regard to these latter, would be to affirm
that the sequences of events are all necessary, and none of them
casual or contingent; whereas we know, by our own personal
experience, that many sequences depend upon our deliberation and
volition, and are therefore not necessary. If all future sequences
are necessary, deliberation on our part must be useless. We must
therefore (he continues) recognize one class of sequences which are
not uniform--not predetermined by antecedents; events which _may_
happen, but which also _may not_ happen, for they will not happen.
Thus, my coat _may_ be cut into two halves, but it never _will_ be so
cut; it will wear out without any such bisection occurring.[19]

[Footnote 19: Aristot. De Interpr. p. 18, a. 28-p. 19, b. 4.]

If you affirm the reality of a fact past or present, your affirmation
is of necessity determinately true, or it is determinately false,
_i.e._ the contradictory negation is determinately true. But if you
affirm the reality of a fact to come, then your affirmation is not by
necessity determinately true, nor is the contradictory negation
determinately true. Neither the one nor the other separately is true:
nothing is true except the disjunctive antithesis as a whole,
including both. If you say, To-morrow there will either be a
sea-fight, or there will not be a sea-fight, this disjunctive or
indeterminate proposition, taken as a whole, will be true. Yet
neither of its constituent parts will be determinately true; neither
the proposition, To-morrow there will be a sea-fight, nor the
proposition, To-morrow there will not be a sea-fight. But if you
speak with regard to past or present--if you say, Yesterday either
there was a sea-fight or there was not a sea-fight--then not only
will the disjunctive as a whole be true, but also one or other of its
parts will be determinately true.[20]

[Footnote 20: Ibid. p. 18, b. 29. Ammonius (Scholia ad De Interpret.
p. 119, bb. 18, 28, seq.) expresses Aristotle's meaning in terms more
distinct than Aristotle himself: [Greek: mê\ pa/ntôs e)/chein to\
e(/teron mo/rion tê=s a)ntipha/seôs _a)phôrisme/nôs a)lêtheu=on_],
&c. (b. 43).]

This remarkable logical distinction is founded on Aristotle's
ontological or physical doctrines respecting the sequence and
conjunction of events. He held (as we shall see more fully in the
Physica and other treatises) that sequences throughout the Kosmos
were to a certain extent regular, to a certain extent irregular. The
exterior sphere of the Kosmos (the _Aplan=es_) with the countless
number of fixed stars fastened into it, was a type of regularity and
uniformity; eternal and ever moving in the same circular orbit, by
necessity of its own nature, and without any potentiality of doing
otherwise. But the earth and the elemental bodies, organized and
unorganized, below the lunar sphere and in the interior of the
Kosmos, were of inferior perfection and of very different nature.
They were indeed in part governed and pervaded by the movement and
influence of the celestial substance within which they were
comprehended, and from which they borrowed their Form or constituent
essence; but they held this Form implicated with Matter, _i.e._ the
principle of potentiality, change, irregularity, generation, and
destruction, &c. There are thus in these sublunary bodies both
constant tendencies and variable tendencies. The _constant_ Aristotle
calls 'Nature;' which always aspires to Good, or to perpetual
renovation of Forms as perfect as may be, though impeded in this work
by adverse influences, and therefore never producing any thing but
individuals comparatively defective and sure to perish. The
_variable_ he calls 'Spontaneity' and 'Chance,' forming an
independent agency inseparably accompanying Nature--always modifying,
distorting, frustrating, the full purposes of Nature. Moreover, the
different natural agencies often interfere with each other, while the
irregular tendency interferes with them all. So far as Nature acts,
in each of her distinct agencies, the phenomena before us are regular
and predictable; all that is uniform, and all that (without being
quite uniform) recurs usually or frequently, is her work. But,
besides and along with Nature, there is the agency of Chance and
Spontaneity, which is essentially irregular and unpredictable. Under
this agency there are possibilities both for and against; either of
two alternative events may happen.

It is with a view to this doctrine about the variable kosmical
agencies or potentialities that Aristotle lays down the logical
doctrine now before us, distinguishing propositions affirming
particular facts past or present, from propositions affirming
particular facts future. In both cases alike, the disjunctive
antithesis, as a whole, is necessarily true. Either there was a
sea-fight yesterday, or there was not a sea-fight yesterday: Either
there will be a sea-fight to-morrow, or there will not be a sea-fight
to-morrow--both these disjunctives alike are necessarily true. There
is, however, a difference between the one disjunctive couple and the
other, when we take the affirmation separately or the negation
separately. If we say, There will be a sea-fight to-morrow, that
proposition is not necessarily true nor is it necessarily false; to
say that it is either the one or the other (Aristotle argues) would
imply that every thing in nature happened by necessary agency--that
the casual, the potential, the _may be or may not be_, is stopped out
and foreclosed. But this last is really the case, in regard to a past
fact. There was a sea-fight yesterday, is a proposition either
necessarily true or necessarily false. Here the antecedent agencies
have already spent themselves, blended, and become realized in one or
other of the two alternative determinate results. There is no
potentiality any longer open; all the antecedent potentiality has
been foreclosed. The proposition therefore is either necessarily true
or necessarily false; though perhaps we may not know whether it is
the one or the other.

In defending his position regarding this question, Aristotle denies
(what he represents his opponents as maintaining) that all events
happen by necessity. He points to the notorious fact that we
deliberate and take counsel habitually, and that the event is
frequently modified, according as we adopt one mode of conduct or
another; which could not be (he contends), if the event could be
declared beforehand by a proposition necessarily or determinately
true. What Aristotle means by _necessity_, however, is at bottom
nothing else than constant sequence or conjunction, conceived by him
as necessary, because the fixed ends which Nature is aiming at can
only be attained by certain fixed means. To this he opposes
Spontaneity and Chance, disturbing forces essentially inconstant and
irregular; admitting, indeed, of being recorded when they _have_
produced effects in the past, yet defying all power of prediction as
to those effects which they _will_ produce in the future. Hence
arises the radical distinction that he draws in Logic, between the
truth of propositions relating to the past (or present) and to the
future.

But this logical distinction cannot be sustained, because his
metaphysical doctrine (on which it is founded) respecting the
essentially irregular or casual, is not defensible. His opponents
would refuse to grant that there is any agency essentially or in
itself irregular, casual, and unpredictable.[21] The aggregate of
Nature consists of a variety of sequences, each of them constant and
regular, though intermixed, co-operating, and conflicting with each
other, in such manner that the resulting effects are difficult to
refer to their respective causes, and are not to be calculated
beforehand except by the highest scientific efforts; often, not by
any scientific efforts. We must dismiss the hypothesis of Aristotle,
assuming agencies essentially irregular and unpredictable, either as
to the past or as to the future. The past has been brought about by
agencies all regular, however multifarious and conflicting, and the
future will be brought about by the like: there is no such
distinction of principle as that which Aristotle lays down between
propositions respecting the past and propositions respecting the
future.

[Footnote 21: The Stoics were opposed to Aristotle on this point.
They recognized no logical difference in the character of the
Antiphasis, whether applied to past and present, or to future.
Nikostratus defended the thesis of Aristotle against them. See the
Scholia of Simplikius on the Categoriæ, p. 87, b. 30-p. 88, a. 24.
[Greek: ai( ga\r ei)s to\n me/llonta chro/non e)gklino/menai
prota/seis ou)/te a)lêthei=s ei)si\n ou)/te pseudei=s dia\ tê\n tou=
e)ndechome/nou phu/sin.]

The remarks of Hobbes, upon the question here discussed by Aristotle,
well deserve to be transcribed (De Corpore, part II. ch. X. s. 5):--

"But here, perhaps, some man may ask whether those future things,
which are called _contingents_, are necessary. I say, therefore, that
generally all contingents have their necessary causes, but are called
contingents in respect of other events, upon which they do not
depend; as the rain, which shall be to-morrow, shall be necessary,
that is, from necessary causes; but we think and say, it happens by
chance, because we do not yet perceive the causes thereof, though
they exist now. For men commonly call that _casual_ or _contingent_,
whereof they do not perceive the necessary cause; and in the same
manner they use to speak of things past, when not knowing whether a
thing be done or no, they say, it is possible it never was done.

"Wherefore, all propositions concerning future things, contingent or
not contingent--as this, _It will rain to-morrow_, or this,
_To-morrow the sun will rise_--are either necessarily true, or
necessarily false; but we call them contingent, because we do not yet
know whether they be true or false; whereas their verity depends not
upon our knowledge, but upon the foregoing of their causes. But there
are some, who, though they confess this whole proposition, _To-morrow
it will either rain or not rain_, to be true, yet they will not
acknowledge the parts of it, as _To-morrow it will rain_, or
_To-morrow it will not rain_, to be either of them true by itself;
because they say neither this nor that is true _determinately_. But
what is this _determinately true_, but true _upon our knowledge_, or
evidently true? And therefore they say no more, but that it is not
yet known whether it be true or no; but they say it more obscurely,
and darken the evidence of the truth with the same words with which
they endeavour to hide their own ignorance."

Compare also the fuller elucidation of the subject given by Mr. John
Stuart Mill, in his System of Logic, Bk. III. ch. xvii. s. 2:--"An
event occurring by chance may be better described as a coincidence
from which we have no ground to infer an uniformity; the occurrence
of an event in certain circumstances, without our having reason on
that account to infer that it will happen again in those
circumstances. This, however, when looked closely into, implies that
the enumeration of the circumstances is not complete. Whatever the
fact was, since it has occurred once, we may be sure that if all the
circumstances were repeated, it would occur again; and not only if
all, but there is some particular portion of those circumstances, on
which the phenomenon is invariably consequent. With most of them,
however, it is not connected in any permanent manner: its conjunction
with those is said to be the effect of chance, to be merely casual.
Facts casually conjoined are separately the effect of causes, and
therefore of laws; but of different causes, and causes not connected
by any law. It is incorrect then to say that any phenomenon is
produced by chance; but we may say that two or more phenomena are
conjoined by chance, that they co-exist or succeed one another only
by chance."]

There is, indeed, one distinction between inferences as to the past
and inferences as to the future, which may have contributed to
suggest, though it will not justify, the position here laid down by
Aristotle. In regard to the disjunctive--To-morrow there will be a
sea-fight, or there will not be a sea-fight--nothing more trustworthy
than inference or anticipation is practicable: the anticipation of a
sagacious man with full knowledge is more likely to prove correct
than that of a stupid man with little knowledge; yet both are alike
anticipations, unverifiable at the present moment. But if we turn to
the other disjunctive--Yesterday there was a sea-fight, or there was
not a sea-fight--we are no longer in the same position. The two
disputants, supposed to declare thus, may have been far off, and may
have no other means of deciding the doubt than inference. But the
inference here is not unverifiable: there exist, or may exist,
witnesses or spectators of the two fleets, who can give direct
attestation of the reality, and can either confirm or refute the
inference, negative or affirmative, made by an absentee. Thus the
proposition, Yesterday there was a sea-fight, or the other, Yesterday
there was not a sea-fight, will be verifiable or determinably true.
There are indeed many inferences as to the past, in regard to which
no direct evidence is attainable. Still this is an accident; for such
direct evidence may always be supposed or imagined as capable of
being brought into court. But, in respect to the future, verification
is out of the question; we are confined to the region of inference,
well or ill-supported. Here, then, we have a material distinction
between the past and the future. It was probably present to the mind
of Aristotle, though he misconceives its real extent of operation,
and makes it subservient to his still more comprehensive
classification of the different contemporaneous agencies (regular and
irregular) which he supposes to pervade the Kosmos.

In the treatise before us, he next proceeds to state what collocation
of the negative particle constitutes the special or legitimate
negation to any given affirmation, or what are the real forms of
proposition, standing in contradictory opposition to certain other
forms, so as to make up one _Antiphasis_.[22] The simplest
proposition must include a noun and a verb, either definite or
indefinite: _non homo_ is a specimen of an indefinite noun--_non
currit_, of an indefinite verb. There must be, in any one
proposition, one subject and one predicate; even the indefinite noun
or verb signifies, in a certain sense, one thing. Each affirmation
comprises a noun, or an indefinite noun, with a verb; the special
corresponding or contradictory negation (making up the _Antiphasis_
along with the former) comprises a noun (or an indefinite noun) with
an indefinite verb. The simplest proposition is--

     _Affirmative_.          _Contradictory Negative_.

      Est homo     ... ... ... ... Non est homo.
      Est non homo ... ... ... ... Non est non homo.

Here are only two pairs of antithetic propositions, or one
quaternion. The above is an indefinite proposition (which may be
either universal or not). When we universalize it, or turn it an
universal proposition, we have--

     _Affirmative_.          _Contradictory Negative_.

      Est omnis homo ... ... ... Non est omnis homo.
      Est omnis non homo ... ... Non est omnis non homo.

[Footnote 22: Aristot. De Interpr. p. 19, b. 5, seq.]

The above are specimens of the smallest proposition; but when we
regard larger propositions, such as those (called _tertii
adjacentis_) where there are two terms besides _est_, the collocation
of the negative particle becomes more complicated, and requires
fuller illustration. Take, as an example, the affirmative _Est justus
homo_, the true negation of this is, _Non est justus homo_. In these
two propositions, _homo_ is the subject; but we may join the negative
with it, and we may consider _non homo_, not less than _homo_, as a
distinct subject for predication, affirmative or negative. Farther,
we may attach _est_ and _non est_ either to _justus_ or to _non
justus_ as the predicate of the proposition, with either _homo_, or
_non homo_, as subject. We shall thus obtain a double mode of
antithesis, or two distinct quaternions, each containing two pairs of
contradictory propositions. The second pair of the first quaternion
will not be in the same relation as the second pair of the second
quaternion, to the proposition just mentioned, viz.--(A) _Est justus
homo_; with its negative, (B) _Non est justice homo_.[23]

[Footnote 23: Aristot. De Interpr. p. 19, b. 19. [Greek: o(/tan de\
to\ e)/sti tri/ton proskatêgorê=tai, ê)/dê dichô=s le/gontai ai(
a)ntithe/seis; le/gô de\ oi(=on _e)/sti di/kaios a)/nthrôpos_; to\
_e)/sti_ tri/ton phêmi\ sugkei=sthai o)/noma ê)\ r(ê=ma e)n tê=|
katapha/sei. ô(/ste dia\ tou=to te/ttara e)/stai tau=ta, ô(=n ta\
me\n du/o pro\s tê\n kata/phasin kai\ a)po/phasin e(/xei kata\ to\
stoichou=n ô(s ai( sterê/seis, ta\ de\ du/o, ou)/. [le/gô de\ o(/ti
to\ _e)/stin_ ê)\ tô=| dikai/ô| proskei/setai ê)\ tô=| ou) dikai/ô|],
ô(/ste kai\ ê( a)po/phasis. te/ttara ou)=n e)/stai. noou=men de\ to\
lego/menon e)k tô=n u(pogegramme/nôn.] In this passage the words
which I have enclosed between brackets are altered by Waitz: I shall
state presently what I think of his alteration. Following upon these
words there ought to be, and it seems from Ammonius (Schol. p. 121,
a. 20) that there once was, a scheme or table arranging the four
propositions in the order and disposition which we read in the
Analytica Priora, I. xlvi. p. 51, b. 37, and which I shall here
follow. But no such table now appears in our text; we have only an
enumeration of the four propositions, in a different order, and then
a reference to the Analytica.]

First, let us assume _homo_ as subject. We have then

                              (QUATERNION I.)

 (A) Est justus homo  ...    ... ... ... (B) Non est justus homo.
 (D) Non est non justus homo ... ... ... (C) Est non justus homo.

Examining the relation borne by the last two among these four
propositions (C and D), to the first two (A and B), the simple
affirmative and negative, we see that B is the legitimate negative of
A, and D that of C. We farther see that B is a consequence of C, and
D a consequence of A, but not _vice versâ_: that is, if C is true, B
must certainly be true; but we cannot infer, because B is true, that
C must also be true: while, if A is true, D must also be true; but D
may perhaps be true, though A be not true. In other words, the
relation of D to A and of C to B, is the same as it would be if the
privative term _injustus_ were substituted in place of _non justus_;
_i.e._ if the proposition C (_Est injustus homo_) be true, the other
proposition B (_Non est justus homo_) must certainly be true, but the
inference will not hold conversely; while if the proposition A (_Est
justus homo_) be true, it must also be true to say D (_Non est
injustus homo_), but not _vice versâ_.[24]

[Footnote 24: Referring to the words cited in the preceding note, I
construe [Greek: ta\ de\ du/o, ou)/] as Boethius does (II. pp.
384-385), and not in agreement with Ammonius (Schol. p. 122, a. 26,
Br.), who, however, is followed both by Julius Pacius and Waitz (p.
344). I think it impossible that these words, [Greek: ta\ de\ du/o,
ou)/], can mean (as Ammonius thinks) the [Greek: kata/phasis] and
[Greek: a)po/phasis] themselves, since the very point which Aristotle
is affirming is the relation of these words, [Greek: pro\s tê\n
kata/phasin kai\ a)po/phasin], _i.e._ to the affirmative and negative
started from--

 (A) Est justus homo ... ... ... ... (B) Non est justus homo.

As the words [Greek: ta\ me\n du/o] refer to the second contradictory
pair (that is, C and D) in the _first_ Quaternion, so the words
[Greek: ta\ de\ du/o, ou)/] designate the second contradictory pair
(G and H) in the _second_ Quaternion. Though G and H are included in
the second Quaternion, they are here designated by the negative
relation ([Greek: ta\ de\ du/o, ou)/]) which they bear to A and B,
the first contradictory pair of the _first_ Quaternion. [Greek:
dichô=s le/gontai ai( a)ntithe/seis] (line 20) is explained and
illustrated by line 37--[Greek: au(=tai me\n ou)=n du/o
a)nti/keintai, a)/llai de\ du/o pro\s to\ _ou)k a)/nthrôpos_ ô(s
u(pokei/meno/n ti prostethe/n]. Lastly, Aristotle expressly states
that the second Quaternion will stand independently and by itself (p.
20, a. 1), having noticed it in the beginning only in relation to the
first.]

Such is the result obtained when we take _homo_ as the subject of the
proposition; we get four propositions, of which the two last (C and
D) stand to the two first (B and A) in the same relation as if they
(C and D) were privative propositions. But if, instead of _homo_, we
take _non homo_ as Subject of the proposition (_justus_ or _non
justus_ being predicates as before), we shall then obtain two other
pairs of contradictory propositions; and the second pair of this new
quaternion will not stand in that same relation to these same
propositions B and A. We shall then find that, instead of B and A, we
have a different negative and a different affirmative, as the
appropriate correlates to the third and fourth propositions. The new
quaternion of propositions, with _non homo_ as subject, will stand
thus--

                              (QUATERNION II.)

 (E) Est justus non homo ... ... ... (F) Non est justus non homo.
 (H) Non est non justus non homo ... (G) Est non justus non homo.[25]

Here we see that propositions G and H do not stand to B and A in the
same relations as C and D stand to B and A; but that they stand in
that same relation to two perfectly different propositions, F and E.
That is, if in place of _non **justus_, in propositions G and H, we
substitute the privative term _injustus_ (thus turning G into _Est
injustus non homo_, and turning H into _Non est injustus non homo_),
the relation of G, when thus altered, to F, and the relation of H,
when thus altered, to E, will be the same as it was before. Or, in
other words, if G be true, F will certainly be true, but not _vice
versâ_; and if E be true, H will certainly be true, but not _vice
versâ_.

[Footnote 25: Aristot. De Interpr. p. 19, b. 36. [Greek: au(=tai me\n
ou)=n du/o a)nti/keintai] (the two pairs--A B and C D--of the first
quaternion), [Greek: a)/llai de\ du/o pro\s to\ _ou)k a)/nthrôpos_
ô(s u(pokei/meno/n ti prostethe/n;]

 (E) [Greek: e)/sti di/kaios ou)k a)/nthrôpos] ... ... ... (F)
[Greek: ou)k e)/sti di/kaios ou)k a)/nthrôpos.]
 (H) [Greek: ou)k e)/stin ou) di/kaios ou)k a)/nthrôpos] ... (G)
[Greek: e)/stin ou) di/kaios ou)k a)/nthrôpos.]

[Greek: plei/ous de\ tou/tôn ou)k e)/sontai a)ntithe/seis. au(=tai
de\ chôri\s e)kei/nôn au)tai\ kath' e(auta\s e)/sontai, ô(s o)no/mati
tô=| _ou)k a)/nthrôpos_ chrô/menai.] The second [Greek: au(=tai]
alludes to this last quaternion, [Greek: e)kei/nôn] to the first. I
have, as in the former case, transposed propositions three and four
of this second quaternion, in order that the relation of G to F and
of H to E may be more easily discerned.

There are few chapters in Aristotle more obscure and puzzling than
the tenth chapter of the De Interpretatione. It was found so by
Alexander, Herminus, Porphyry, Ammonius, and all the Scholiasts.
Ammonius (Schol. pp. 121, 122, Br.) reports these doubts, and
complains of it as a riddle almost insolvable. The difficulties
remain, even after the long note of Waitz, and the literal
translation of M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire.]

The propositions which we have hitherto studied have been indefinite;
that is, they might be universal or not. But if we attach to them the
sign of universality, and construe them as universals, all that we
have said about them would still continue to be true, except that the
propositions which are diametrically (or diagonally) opposed would
not be both true in so many instances. Thus, let us take the first
quaternion of propositions, in which _est_ is attached to _homo_, and
let us construe these propositions as universal. They will stand
thus--

 (A) Omnis est homo justus  ... ... (B) Non omnis est homo justus.
 (D) Non omnis est homo non justus  (C) Omnis est homo non justus.

In these propositions, as in the others before noticed, the same
relation prevails between C and B, and between A and D; if C be true,
B also is true, but not _vice versâ_; if A be true, D also will be
true, but not _vice versâ_. But the propositions diagonally opposed
will not be so often alike true:[26] thus, if A be true (_Omnis est
homo justus_), C cannot be true (_Omnis est homo non justus_);
whereas in the former quaternion of propositions (indefinite, and
therefore capable of being construed as not universal) A and C might
both be alike true.[27]

[Footnote 26: Aristot. De Interpret. p. 19, b. 35. [Greek: plê\n
ou)ch o(moi/ôs ta\s kata\ dia/metron e)nde/chetai sunalêtheu/ein;
e)nde/chetai de\ pote/.] The "diameter" or "diagonal" is to be
understood with reference to the scheme or square mentioned p. 119,
note, the related propositions standing at the angles, as above.]

[Footnote 27: The Scholion of Ammonius, p. 123, a. 17, Br., explains
this very obscure passage: [Greek: a)ll' e)pi\ me\n tô=n
a)prosdiori/stôn] (indefinite propositions, such as may be construed
either as universal or as particular), [Greek: kata\ tê\n
e)ndechome/nên u(/lên ta/s te katapha/seis] (of the propositions
diagonally opposite), [Greek: sunalêtheu/ein a)llê/lais sumbai/nei
kai\ ta\s a)popha/seis, _a(/te tai=s merikai=s i)sodunamou/sas_.
e)pi\ de\ tô=n prosdiôrisme/nôn] (those propositions where the mark
of universality is tacked to the Subject), [Greek: peri\ ô(=n nuni\
au)tô=| o( lo/gos, tê=s katho/lou katapha/seôs kai\ tê=s e)pi\
me/rous a)popha/seôs, ta\s me\n katapha/seis a)du/naton
sunalêtheu=sai kath' oi(andê/pote u(/lên, ta\s me/ntoi a)popha/seis
sumbai/nei sunalêtheu/ein kata\ mo/nên tê\n e)ndechome/nên;] &c.]

It is thus that Aristotle explains the distinctions of meaning in
propositions, arising out of the altered collocation of the negative
particle; the distinction between (1) _Non est justus_, (2) _Est non
justus_, (3) _Est injustus_. The first of the three is the only true
negative, corresponding to the affirmative _Est Justus_. The second
is not a negative at all, but an affirmative ([Greek: e)k
metathe/seôs], or by transposition, as Theophrastus afterwards called
it). The third is an affirmative, but privative. Both the second and
the third stand related in the same manner to the first; that is, the
truth of the first is a necessary consequence either of the second or
of the third, but neither of these can be certainly inferred from the
first. This is explained still more clearly in the Prior Analytics;
to which Aristotle here makes express reference.[28]

[Footnote 28: Aristot. De Interpr. p. 19, b. 31. [Greek: tau=ta me\n
ou)=n, ô(/sper e)n toi=s A)nalutikoi=s le/getai, ou(/tô te/taktai.]

Waitz in his note suggests that instead of [Greek: te/taktai] we
ought to read [Greek: teta/chthô]. But if we suppose that the formal
table once existed in the text, in an order of arrangement agreeing
with the Analytica, this conjectural change would be unnecessary.

Waitz has made some changes in the text of this chapter, which appear
to me partly for the better, partly not for the better. Both Bekker
and Bussemaker (Firmin Didot) retain the old text; but this old text
was a puzzle to the ancient commentators, even anterior to Alexander
of Aphrodisias. I will here give first the text of Bekker, next the
changes made by Waitz: my own opinion does not wholly coincide with
either. I shall cite the text from p. 19, b. 19, leaving out the
portion between lines 30 and 36, which does not bear upon the matter
here discussed, while it obscures the legitimate sequence of
Aristotle's reasoning.

(Bekker.)--[Greek: O(/tan de\ to\ _e)/sti_ tri/ton proskatêgorê=tai,
ê)/dê dichô=s le/gontai ai( a)ntithe/seis. le/gô de\ oi(=on _e)/sti
di/kaios a)/nthrôpos_; to\ _e)/sti_ tri/ton phêmi\ sugkei=sthai
o)/noma ê)\ r(ê=ma e)n tê=| katapha/sei. ô(/ste dia\ tou=to te/ttara
e)/stai tau=ta, ô(=n ta\ me\n du/o pro\s tê\n kata/phasin kai\
a)po/phasin e(/xei kata\ to\ stoichou=n ô(s ai( sterê/seis, ta\ de\
du/o, ou)/. le/gô d' o(/ti to\ _e)/stin_ ê)\ _tô=| dikai/ô|
proskei/setai_ ê)\ tô=| _ou) dikai/ô|_] (25), [Greek: ô(/ste kai\ ê(
a)po/phasis. te/ttara ou)=n e)/stai.] (Here follow the first pairs of
Antitheses, or the first Quaternion of propositions in the order as
given)--

 (A) [Greek: e)/sti di/kios a)/nthrôpos]   ... ... (B) [Greek: ou)k
e)/sti di/kios a)/nthrôpos.]y
 (C) [Greek: e)/stin ou) di/kaios a)/nthrôpos] ... (D) [Greek: ou)k
e)/stin ou) di/kaios a)/nthrôpos.]

[Greek: to\ ga\r _e)/stin_ e)ntau=tha kai\ to\ _ou)k e)/sti tô=|
dikai/ô| proskei/setai kai\ tô=| ou) dikai/ô|]_ (30).--[Greek:
Au(=tai me\n ou)=n du/o a)nti/keintai, a)/llai de\ du/o pro\s to\
ou)k _a)/nthrôpos_ ô(s u(pokei/meno/n ti] (38) [Greek:
_prostethe/n_.] (Here follow the second pairs of Antitheses, or the
second Quaternion of propositions, again in the order from which I
have departed above)--

 (E) [Greek: e)/sti di/kaios ou)k a)/nthrôpos]  ... ... (F) [Greek:
Ou)k e)/sti di/kaios ou)k a)/nthrôpos.]
 (G) [Greek: e)/stin ou) di/kaios ou)k a)/nthrôpos] ... (H) [Greek:
Ou)k e)/stin ou) di/kaios ou)k a)/nthrôpos.]

[Greek: plei/ous de\ tou/tôn ou)k e)/sontai a)ntithe/seis. au(=tai
de\] (the second Quaternion) [Greek: chôri\s e)kei/nôn] (first
Quaternion) [Greek: au)tai\ kath' e(auta\s e)/sontai, ô(s o)no/mati
tô=| _ou)k a)/nthrôpos_ chrô/menai.]

In this text Waitz makes three alterations:--1. In line 24, instead
of [Greek: ê)\ tô=| dikai/ô| proskei/setai ê)\ tô=| ou) dikai/ô|]--he
reads, [Greek: ê)\ tô=| a)nthrô/pô| proskei/setai ê)\ tô=| ou)k
a)nthrô/pô|].

2. In line 30 he makes a similar change; instead of [Greek: tô=|
dikai/ô| proskei/setai kai\ tô=| ou) dikai/ô|]--he reads, [Greek:
tô=| a)nthrô/pô| proskei/setai kai\ tô=| ou)k a)nthrô/pô|].

In line 38, instead of [Greek: prostethe/n], he reads [Greek:
prostethe/ntos].

Of these three alterations the first appears to me good, but
insufficient; the second not good, though the passage as it stands in
Bekker requires amendment; and the third, a change for the worse.

The purpose of Aristotle is here two-fold. First, to give the reason
why, when the propositions were _tertii adjacentis_, there were two
Quaternions or four couples of antithetical propositions; whereas in
propositions _secundi adjacentis_, there was only one Quaternion or
two couples of antithetical propositions. Next, to assign the
distinction between the first and the second Quaternion in
propositions _tertii adjacentis_.

Now the first of these two purposes is marked out in line 25, which I
think we ought to read not by substituting the words of Waitz in
place of the words of Bekker, but by retaining the words of Bekker
and inserting the words of Waitz as an addition to them. The passage
after such addition will stand thus--[Greek: le/gô d' o(/ti to\
_e)/stin_ ê)\ tô=| dikai/ô| proskei/setai ê)\ tô=| ou) dikai/ô|, kai\
ê)\ tô=| a)nthrô/pô| ê)\ tô=| ou)k a)nthrô/pô|, ô(/ste kai\ ê(
a)po/phasis. te/ttara _ou)=n_ e)/stai.] Here Aristotle declares the
_reason why_ ([Greek: ou)=n]) there come to be four couples of
propositions; that reason is, because [Greek: e)/sti] and [Greek:
ou)k e)/sti] may be joined either with [Greek: di/kaios] or [Greek:
ou) di/kaios] and either with [Greek: a)/nthrôpos] or with [Greek:
ou)k a)/nthrôpos]. Both these alternatives must be specified in order
to make out a reason why there are two Quaternions or four couples of
antithetical propositions. But the passage, as read by Bekker, gives
only one of these alternatives, while the passage, as read by Waitz,
gives only the other. Accordingly, neither of them separately is
sufficient; but both of them taken together furnish the reason
required, and thus answer Aristotle's purpose.

Aristotle now proceeds to enunciate the first of the two Quaternions,
and then proceeds to line 30, where the reading of Bekker is
irrelevant and unmeaning; but the amendment of Waitz appears to me
still worse, being positively incorrect in statement of fact. Waitz
reads [Greek: to\ ga\r _e)/stin_ e)ntau=tha] (in the first
Quaternion, which has just been enunciated) [Greek: kai\ to\ _ou)k
e)/stin_ tô=| a)nthrô/pô| proskei/setai kai\ _tô=| ou)k
a)nthrô/pô|_]. These last words are incorrect in fact, for [Greek:
ou)k a)/nthrôpos] does not appear in the first Quaternion, but is
reserved for the second. While the reading of Waitz is thus evidently
wrong, that of Bekker asserts nothing to the purpose. It is useless
to tell us merely that [Greek: e)/sti] and [Greek: ou)k e)/stin]
attach both to [Greek: di/kaios] and to [Greek: ou) di/kaios] in this
first Quaternion ([Greek: e)ntau=tha]), because that characteristic
is equally true of the second Quaternion (presently to follow), and
therefore constitutes no distinction between the two. To bring out
the meaning intended by Aristotle I think we ought here also to
retain the words of Bekker, and to add after them some, though not
all, of the words of Waitz. The passage would then stand
thus--[Greek: to\ ga\r e)/stin e)ntau=tha kai\ to\ ou)k e)/sti tô=|
dikai/ô| proskei/setai kai\ tô=| ou) dikai/ô|, kai\ tô=| a)nthrô/pô|,
_a)ll' ou)_ tô=| ou)k a)nthrô/pô|.] Or perhaps [Greek: _kai\ ou)_
tô=| ou)k a)nthrô/pô|] might suffice in the last clause (being a
smaller change), though [Greek: a)ll' ou)] seem the proper terms to
declare the meaning. In the reading which I propose, the sequence
intended by Aristotle is clear and intelligible. Having first told us
that [Greek: e)/stin] and [Greek: ou)k e)/sti] being joined
alternately with [Greek: di/kaios] and with [Greek: ou) di/kaios] and
also with [Greek: a)/nthrôpos] and [Greek: ou)k a)/nthrôpos], make up
two Quaternions, he proceeds to enunciate the distinctive character
belonging to the first Quaternion of the two, viz., that in it
[Greek: e)/sti] and [Greek: ou)k e)/stin] are joined both with
[Greek: di/kaios] and [Greek: ou) di/kaios], and also with [Greek:
a)/nthrôpos] _but not with_ [Greek: _ou)k a)/nthrôpos_], This is
exactly the truth.

Aristotle next proceeds to the second Quaternion, where he points
out, as the characteristic distinction, that [Greek: ou)k
a)/nthrôpos] comes in and [Greek: a)/nthrôpos] disappears, while
[Greek: di/kaios] and [Greek: ou) di/kaios] remain included, as in
the first. This is declared plainly by Aristotle in line 37:--[Greek:
au(=tai me\n ou)=n du/o a)nti/keintai] (referring to the two pairs of
antithetical propositions in the first Quaternion), [Greek: _a)/llai
de\ pro\s to\ ou)k a)/nthrôpos_ ô(s u(pokei/meno/n ti prostethe/n;
e)/sti di/kaios ou)k a)/nthrôpos, e)/stin ou) di/kaios ou)k
a)/nthrôpos-ou)k e)/sti di/kaios ou)k a)/nthrôpos, e)/stin ou)
di/kaios ou)k a)/nthrôpos-ou)k e)/stin ou) di/kaios ou)k
a)/nthrôpos.] When we read these words, [Greek: a)/llai de\ du/o
pro\s to\ ou)k a)/nthrôpos ô(s u(pokei/meno/n ti prostethe/n], as
applied to the second Quaternion, we see that there must have been
some words preceding which excluded [Greek: _ou)k a)/nthrôpos_] from
the first Quaternion. Waitz contends for the necessity of changing
[Greek: prostethe/n] into [Greek: prostethe/ntos]. I do not concur
with his reasons for the change; the words that follow, p. 20, line
2, [Greek: ô(s o)no/mati tô=| _ou)k a)/nthrôpos_ chrô/menai
(proschrô/menai)], are a reasonable justification of [Greek:
prostethe/n--_ou)k a)/nthrôpos_ ô(s _u(pokei/meno/n ti_ prostethe/n]
being very analogous to [Greek: ou)k a)/nthrôpos ô(s o)/noma].

This long note, for the purpose of restoring clearness to an obscure
text, will appear amply justified if the reader will turn to the
perplexities and complaints of the ancient Scholiasts, revealed by
Ammonius and Boethius. Even earlier than the time of Alexander
(Schol. p. 122**, b. 47) there was divergence in the MSS. of
Aristotle; several read [Greek: tô=| dikai/ô|] (p. 19, b. 25),
several others read [Greek: tô=| a)nthrô/pô|]. I think that all of
them were right in what they retained, and wrong by omission only
or mainly.]

After this very subtle and obscure distinction between propositions
_secundi adjacentis_, and those _tertii adjacentis_, in respect to
the application of the negative, Aristotle touches on the relation of
_contrariety_ between propositions. The universal affirmation _Omne
est animal justum_ has for its contrary _Nullum est animal justum_.
It is plain that both these propositions will never be true at once.
But the negatives or contradictories of both may well be true at
once: thus, _Non omne animal est justum_ (the contradictory of the
first) and _Est aliquid animal justum_ (the contradictory of the
second) may be and are both alike true. If the affirmative
proposition _Omnis homo est non justus_ be true, the negative _Nullus
est homo justus_ must also be true; if the affirmative _Est aliquis
homo justus_ be true, the negative _Non omnis homo est non justus_
must also be true. In singular propositions, wherever the negative or
denial is true, the indefinite affirmative ([Greek: e)k
metathe/seôs], in the language of Theophrastus) corresponding to it
will also be true; in universal propositions, the same will not
always hold. Thus, if you ask, Is Sokrates wise? and receive for
answer No, you are warranted in affirming, Sokrates is not wise (the
indefinite affirmation). But if you ask, Are all men wise? and the
answer is No, you are not warranted in affirming, All men are not
wise. This last is the contrary of the proposition, All men are wise;
and two contraries may both be false. You are warranted in declaring
only the contradictory negative, Not all men are wise.[29]

[Footnote 29: Aristot. De Interpret. p. 20, a. 16-30.]

Neither the indefinite noun ([Greek: ou)k a)/nthrôpos]) nor the
indefinite verb ([Greek: ou) tre/chei--ou) di/kaios]) is a real and
true negation, though it appears to be such. For every negation ought
to be either true or false; but _non homo_, if nothing be appended to
it, is not more true or false (indeed less so) than _homo_.[30]

[Footnote 30: Ibid. a. 31, seq.]

The transposition of substantive and adjective makes no difference in
the meaning of the phrase; _Est albus homo_ is equivalent to _Est
homo albus_. If it were not equivalent, there would be two negations
corresponding to the same affirmation; but we have shown that there
can be only one negation corresponding to one affirmation, so as to
make up an _Antiphasis_.[31]

[Footnote 31: Ibid. b. 1-12. That [Greek: e)sti\ leuko\s
a)/nthrôpos], and [Greek: e)sti\n a)/nthrôpos leuko/s], mean exactly
the same, neither more nor less--we might have supposed that
Aristotle would have asserted without any proof; that he would have
been content [Greek: a)po\ tô=n pragma/tôn pistou=sthai] (to use the
phrase of Ammonius in a portion of the Scholia, p. 121, a. 27). But
he prefers to deduce it as a corollary from a general doctrine much
less evident than the statement itself; and after all, his deduction
is not conclusive, as Waitz has already remarked (ad Organ. I. p.
351).]

In one and the same proposition, it is indispensable that the subject
be one and the predicate one; if not, the proposition will not be
one, but two or more. Both the subject and the predicate indeed may
consist of several words; but in each case the several words must
coalesce to make one total unity; otherwise the proposition will not
be one. Thus, we may predicate of man--_animal_, _bipes_,
_mansuetum_; but these three coalesce into one, so that the
proposition will be a single one. On the other hand the three terms
_homo_, _albus_, _ambulans_, do not coalesce into one; and therefore,
if we predicate all respecting the same subject, or if we affirm the
same predicate respecting all three, expressing them all by one word,
the proposition will not be one, but several.[32]

[Footnote 32: Aristot. De Interpr. p. 20, b. 13-22.]

Aristotle follows this up by a remark interesting to note, because we
see how much his generalities were intended to bear upon the actual
practice of his day, in regard to dialectical disputation. In
dialectic exercise, the respondent undertook to defend a thesis, so
as to avoid inconsistency between one answer and another, against any
questions which might be put by the opponent. Both the form of the
questions, and the form of the answers, were determined beforehand.
No question was admissible which tended to elicit information or a
positive declaration from the respondent. A proposition was tendered
to him, and he was required to announce whether he affirmed or denied
it. The question might be put in either one of two ways: either by
the affirmative alone, or by putting both the affirmative and the
negative; either in the form, Is Rhetoric estimable? or in the form,
Is Rhetoric estimable or not? To the first form the respondent
answered Yes or No: to the second form, he replied by repeating
either the affirmative or the negative, as he preferred. But it was
not allowable to ask him, _What_ is Rhetoric? so as to put him under
the necessity of enunciating an explanation of his own.[33]

[Footnote 33: See the Scholia of Ammonius, p. 127, Br.]

Under these canons of dialectic debate, each question was required to
be really and truly one, so as to admit of a definite answer in one
word. The questioner was either unfair or unskilful, if he wrapped up
two questions really distinct in the same word, and thus compelled
the respondent either to admit them both, or to deny them both, at
once. Against this inconvenience Aristotle seeks to guard, by
explaining what are the conditions under which one and the same word
does in fact include more than one question. He had before brought to
view the case of an equivocal term, which involves such duplication:
if _himation_ means both horse and man, it will often happen that
questions respecting _himation_ cannot be truly answered either by
Yes or No. He now brings to view a different case in which the like
ambiguity is involved. To constitute one proposition, it is essential
both that the subject should be one, and that the predicate should be
one; either of them indeed may be called by two or three names, but
these names must coalesce into one. Thus, _animal_, _bipes_,
_mansuetum_, coalesce into _homo_, and may be employed either as one
subject or as one predicate; but _homo_, _albus_, _ambulans_, do not
coalesce into one; so that if we say, _Kallias est homo, albus,
ambulans_, the proposition is not one but three.[34] Accordingly, the
respondent cannot make one answer to a question thus complicated. We
thus find Aristotle laying down principles--and probably no one had
ever attempted to do so before him--for the correct management of
that dialectical debate which he analyses so copiously in the Topica.

[Footnote 34: Aristot. De Interpret. p. 20, b. 2. seq.; Ammonius,
Schol. pp. 127-128, a. 21, Br. Compare De Sophist. Elench. p. 169, a.
6-15.]

There are cases (he proceeds to state) in which two predicates may be
truly affirmed, taken separately, respecting a given subject, but in
which they cannot be truly affirmed, taken together.[35] Kallias is a
_currier_, Kallias is _good_--both these propositions may be true;
yet the proposition, Kallias is a _good currier_, may not be true.
The two predicates are both of them accidental co-inhering in the
same individual; but do not fuse themselves into one. So, too, we may
truly say, Homer _is a poet_; but we cannot truly say, Homer
_is_.[36] We see by this last remark,[37] how distinctly Aristotle
assigned a double meaning to _est_: first, _per se_, as meaning
existence; next, relatively, as performing the function of copula in
predication. He tells us, in reply either to Plato or to some other
contemporaries, that though we may truly say, _Non-Ens est
opinabile_, we cannot truly say _Non-Ens est_, because the real
meaning of the first of these propositions is, **_Non-Ens est
opinabile non esse_.[38]

[Footnote 35: Aristot. De Interpr. p. 21, a. 7, seq.]

[Footnote 36: Ibid. a. 27.]

[Footnote 37: Compare Schol. (ad Anal. Prior. I.) p. 146, a. 19-27;
also Eudemi Fragment. cxiv. p. 167, ed. Spengel.

Eudemus considered [Greek: e)/stin] as one term in the proposition.
Alexander dissented from this, and regarded it as being only a copula
between the terms, [Greek: sunthe/seôs mênutiko\n mo/rion tô=n e)n
tê=| prota/sei o(/rôn.]]

[Footnote 38: Aristot. De Interpr. p. 21, a. 32; compare Rhetorica,
ii. p. 1402, a. 5. The remark of Aristotle seems to bear upon the
doctrine laid down by Plato in the Sophistes, p. 258--the close of
the long discussion which begins, p. 237, about [Greek: to\ mê\
o)/n], as Ammonius tells us in the Scholia, p. 112, b. 5, p. 129, b.
20, Br. Ammonius also alludes to the Republic; as if Plato had
delivered the same doctrine in both; which is not the fact. See
'Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates,' vol. II. ch. xxvii. pp.
447-458, seq.]

Aristotle now discusses the so-called Modal Propositions--the
Possible and the Necessary. What is the appropriate form of
_Antiphasis_ in the case of such propositions, where _possible to
be_, or _necessary to be_, is joined to the simple _is_. After a
chapter of some length, he declares that the form of _Antiphasis_
suitable for the Simple proposition will not suit for a Modal
proposition; and that in the latter the sign of negation must be
annexed to the modal adjective--_possible_, _not possible_, _&c._ His
reasoning here is not merely involved, but substantially incorrect;
for, in truth, both in one and in the other, the sign of
contradictory negation ought to be annexed to the copula.[39] From
the _Antiphasis_ in Modals Aristotle proceeds to legitimate sequences
admissible in such propositions, how far any one of them can be
inferred from any other.[40] He sets out four tables, each containing
four modal determinations interchangeable with each other.

     1.

1. Possible (physically) to be.
2. Possible (logically) to be.
3. Not impossible to be.
4. Not necessary to be.

     2.

1. Possible (physically) not to be.
2. Possible (logically) not to be.
3. Not impossible not to be.
4. Not necessary not to be.

     3.

1. Not possible (physically) to be.
2. Not possible (logically) to be.
3. Impossible to be.
4. Necessary not to be.

     4.

1. Not possible (physically) not to be.
2. Not possible (logically) not to be.
3. Impossible not to be.
4. Necessary to be.

Aristotle canvasses these tables at some length, and amends them
partly by making the fourth case of the second table change place
with the fourth of the first.[41] He then discusses whether we can
correctly say that the _necessary to be_ is also _possible to be_. If
not, then we might say correctly that the _necessary to be_ is _not
possible to be_; for one side or other of a legitimate _Antiphasis_
may always be truly affirmed. Yet this would be absurd: accordingly
we must admit that the _necessary to be_ is also _possible to be_.
Here, however, we fall seemingly into a different absurdity; for the
_possible to be_ is also _possible not to be_; and how can we allow
that what is _necessary to be_ is at the same time _possible not to
be_? To escape from such absurdities on both sides, we must
distinguish two modes of the Possible: one, in which the affirmative
and negative are alike possible; the other in which the affirmative
alone is possible, because it is always and constantly realized. If a
man is actually walking, we know that it is possible for him to walk;
and even when he is not walking, we say the same, because we believe
that he may walk if he chooses. He is not always walking; and in his
case, as in all other intermittent realities, the affirmative and the
negative are alike possible. But this is not true in the case of
necessary, constant, and sempiternal realities. With them there is no
alternative possibility, but only the possibility of their doing or
continuing to do. The celestial bodies revolve, sempiternally and
necessarily; it is therefore possible for them to revolve; but there
is no alternative possibility; it is not possible for them not to
revolve. Perpetual reality thus includes the unilateral, but not the
bilateral, possibility.[42]

[Footnote 39: Aristot. De Interpret. p. 21, a. 34-p. 22, a. 13. See
the note of Waitz, ad Organ. I. p. 359, who points out the error of
Aristotle, partly indicated by Ammonius in the Scholia.

The rule does not hold in propositions with the sign of universality
attached to the subject; but it is at least the same for Modals and
Non-modals.]

[Footnote 40: Aristot. De Interpr. p. 22, a. 14-b. 28.]

[Footnote 41: Aristot. De Interpr. p. 22, b. 22, [Greek: lei/petai
toi/nun] &c.; Ammonius, Schol. p. 133, b. 5-27-36.

Aristotle also intimates (p. 23, a. 18) that it would be better to
reverse the order of the propositions in the tables, and to place the
Necessary before the Possible. M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire has inserted
(in the note to his Translation, p. 197) tables with this reversed
order.]

[Footnote 42: Aristot. De Interpret. p. 22, b. 29-p. 23, a. 15.]

Having thus stated that _possible to be_, in this unilateral and
equivocal sense but in no other, is a legitimate consequence of
_necessary to be_, Aristotle proceeds to lay down a tripartite
distinction which surprises us in this place. "It is plain from what
has been said that that which is by Necessity, is in Act or
Actuality; so that if things sempiternal are prior, Actuality is
prior to Possibility. Some things, like the first (or celestial)
substances, are Actualities without Possibility; others (the
generated and perishable substances) which are prior in nature but
posterior in generation, are Actualities along with Possibility;
while a third class are Possibilities only, and never come into
Actuality" (such as the largest number, or the least magnitude).[43]

[Footnote 43: Ibid. p. 23, a. 21-26.]

Now the sentence just translated (enunciating a doctrine of
Aristotle's First Philosophy rather than of Logic) appears decidedly
to contradict what he had said three lines before, viz., that in one
certain sense, the _necessary to be_ included and implied the
_possible to be_; that is, a possibility or potentiality unilateral
only, not bilateral; for we are here told that the celestial
substance is Actuality without Possibility (or Potentiality), so that
the unilateral sense of this last term is disallowed. On the other
hand, a third sense of the same term is recognized and distinguished;
a sense neither bilateral nor unilateral, but the negation of both.
This third sense is hardly intelligible, giving as it does an
_impossible_ Possible; it seems a self-contradictory description.[44]
At best, it can only be understood as a limit in the mathematical
sense; a terminus towards which potentiality may come constantly
nearer and nearer, but which it can never reach. The first, or
bilateral potentiality, is the only sense at once consistent,
legitimate, and conformable to ordinary speech. Aristotle himself
admits that the second and third are equivocal meanings,[45]
departing from the first as the legitimate meaning; but if equivocal
departure to so great an extent were allowed, the term, put to such
multifarious service, becomes unfit for accurate philosophical
reasoning. And we find this illustrated by the contradiction into
which Aristotle himself falls in the course of a few lines. The
sentence of First Philosophy (which I translated in the last page) is
a correction of the logical statement immediately preceding it, in so
far as it suppresses the _necessary_ Possible, or the unilateral
potentiality. But on the other hand the same sentence introduces a
new confusion by its third variety--the _impossible_ Potential,
departing from all clear and consistent meaning of potentiality, and
coinciding only with the explanation of _Non-Ens_, as given by
Aristotle elsewhere.[46]

[Footnote 44: M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire, in the note to his
translation (p. 197) calls it justly--"le possible qui n'est jamais;
et qui par cela même, porte en lui une sorte d'impossibilité." It
contradicts both the two explanations of [Greek: dunato\n] which
Aristotle had given a few lines before. 1. [Greek: dunato\n o(/ti
e)nergei=]. 2. [Greek: dunato\n o(/ti e)nergê/seien a)/n] (p. 23, a.
10).]

[Footnote 45: Aristot. De Interpr. p. 23, a. 5. [Greek: tou=to me\n
tou/tou cha/rin ei)/rêtai, o(/ti ou) pa=sa du/namis tô=n
a)ntikeime/nôn, ou)d' o(/sai le/gontai kata\ to\ au)to\ ei)=dos.
e)/niai de\ duna/meis o(mô/numoi/ ei)sin; to\ ga\r dunato\n ou)ch
a(plô=s le/getai, a)lla\ to\ me\n o(/ti a)lêthe\s ô(s e)nergei/a|
o)/n], &c.

If we read the thirteenth chapter of Analytica Priora I. (p. 32, a.
18-29) we shall see that [Greek: to\ e)ndecho/menon] is declared to
be [Greek: ou)k a)nagkai=on], and that in the definition of [Greek:
to\ e)ndecho/menon], the words [Greek: ou(= mê\ o)/ntos a)nagkai/ou]
are expressly inserted. When [Greek: to\ a)nagkai=on] is said [Greek:
e)nde/chesthai], this is said only in an _equivocal_ sense of [Greek:
e)nde/chesthai--to\ ga\r a)nagkai=on _o(mônu/môs_ e)nde/chesthai
le/gomen.]

On the meaning of [Greek: to\ e)ndecho/menon], translated above, in
the table, "possible (logically) to be," and its relation to [Greek:
to\ dunato/n], see Waitz, ad Organ. I. pp. 375-8. Compare Prantl.
Gescht. der Logik, I. pp. 166-8.]

[Footnote 46: Aristot. De Interpr. p. 21, a. 32: [Greek: to\ de\ mê\
o)/n, o(/ti doxasto/n, ou)k a)lêthe\s ei)pei=n o)/n ti; do/xa ga\r
au)tou= ou)k e)/stin o(/ti e)/stin, a)ll' o(/ti ou)k e)/stin. To\ mê\
o)/n] is the true description of that which Aristotle improperly
calls [Greek: du/namis ê(\ ou)de/pote e)ne/rgeia/ e)stin].

The triple enumeration given by Aristotle (1. Actuality without
Potentiality. 2. Actuality with Potentiality. 3. Potentiality without
Actuality) presents a neat symmetry which stands in the place of
philosophical exactness.]

The contrast of Actual and Potential stands so prominently forward in
Aristotle's First Philosophy, and is, when correctly understood, so
valuable an element in First Philosophy generally, that we cannot be
too careful against those misapplications of it into which he himself
sometimes falls. The sense of Potentiality, as including the
alternative of either affirmative or negative--_may be or may not
be_--is quite essential in comprehending the ontological theories of
Aristotle; and when he professes to drop the _may not be_ and leave
only the _may be_, this is not merely an equivocal sense of the word,
but an entire renunciation of its genuine sense. In common parlance,
indeed, we speak elliptically, and say, _It may be_, when we really
mean, _It may or may not be_. But the last or negative half, though
not expressly announced, is always included in the thought and belief
of the speaker and understood by the hearer.[47]

[Footnote 47: See Trendelenburg ad Aristot. De Animâ, pp. 303-307.]

Many logicians, and Sir William Hamilton very emphatically, have
considered the Modality of propositions as improper to be included in
the province of Logic, and have treated the proceeding of Aristotle
in thus including it, as one among several cases in which he had
transcended the legitimate boundaries of the science.[48] This
criticism, to which I cannot subscribe, is founded upon one peculiar
view of the proper definition and limits of Logic. Sir W. Hamilton
lays down the limitation peremptorily, and he is warranted in doing
this for himself; but it is a question about which there has been
great diversity of view among expositors, and he has no right to
blame others who enlarge it. My purpose in the present volume is to
explain how the subject presented itself to Aristotle. He was the
first author that ever attempted to present Logic in a scientific
aspect; and it is hardly fair to try him by restrictions emanating
from critics much later. Yet, if he is to be tried upon this point, I
think the latitude in which he indulges preferable to the restricted
doctrine of Sir W. Hamilton.

[Footnote 48: See pp. 143-5 of the article, "Logic," in Sir William
Hamilton's Discussions on Philosophy--a very learned and instructive
article, even for those who differ from most of its conclusions.
Compare the opposite view, as advocated by M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire,
Logique d'Aristote, Préface, pp. **lxii.-lxviii.]

In the treatise now before us (De Interpretatione) Aristotle
announces his intention to explain the Proposition or Enunciative
Speech, the conjunction of a noun and a verb; as distinguished,
first, from its two constituents (noun and verb) separately taken;
next, from other modes of speech, also combining the two (precative,
interrogative, &c.). All speech (he says), the noun or verb
separately, as well as the proposition conjointly, is, in the first
instance, a sign of certain mental states common to the speaker with
his hearers; and, in the second instance, a sign of certain things or
facts, resembling (or correlating with) these mental states.[49] The
noun, pronounced separately, and the verb, pronounced separately, are
each signs of a certain thought in the speaker's mind, without either
truth or falsehood; the Proposition, or conjunction of the two, goes
farther and declares truth or falsehood. The words pronounced (he
says) follow the thoughts in the mind, expressing an opinion (_i.e._
belief or disbelief) entertained in the mind; the verbal affirmation
or negation gives utterance to a mental affirmation or negation--a
feeling of belief or disbelief--that something _is_, or that
something _is not_.[50] Thus, Aristotle intends to give a theory of
the Proposition, leaving other modes of speech to Rhetoric or
Poetry:[51] the Proposition he considers under two distinct aspects.
In its first or _subjective_ aspect, it declares the state of the
speaker's mind, as to belief or disbelief. In its second or
_objective_ aspect, it declares a truth or falsehood correlating with
such belief or disbelief, for the information of the hearer. Now the
Mode belonging to a proposition of this sort, in virtue of its
_form_, is to be _true_ or _false_. But there are also other
propositions--other varieties of speech enunciative--which differ
from the Simple or Assertory Proposition having the form _is_ or _is
not_, and which have distinct modes belonging to them, besides that
of being true or false. Thus we have the Necessary Proposition,
declaring that a thing _is_ so _by necessity_, that it _must be_ so,
or _cannot but be_ so; again, the Problematical Proposition,
enunciating that a thing _may or may not be so_. These two modes
attach to the _form_ of the proposition, and are quite distinct from
those which attach to its _matter_ as simply affirmed or denied; as
when, instead of saying, John is sick, we say, John is sick _of a
fever_, John is _dangerously_ sick, with a merely material
modification. Such adverbs, modifying the _matter_ affirmed or
denied, are numerous, and may be diversified almost without limit.
But they are not to be placed in the same category with the two just
mentioned, which modify the _form_ of the proposition, and correspond
to a state of mind distinct from simple belief or disbelief,
expressed by a simple affirmation or negation.[52] In the case of
each of the two, Aristotle has laid down rules (correct or incorrect)
for constructing the legitimate _Antiphasis_, and for determining
other propositions equipollent to, or following upon, the
propositions given; rules distinct from those applying to the simple
affirmation. When we say of anything, _It may be or may not be_, we
enunciate here only one proposition, not two; we declare a state of
mind which is neither belief nor disbelief, as in the case of the
Simple Proposition, but something wavering between the two; yet which
is nevertheless frequent, familiar to every one, and useful to be
made known by a special form of proposition adapted to it--the
Problematical. On the other hand, when we say, _It is by
necessity--must be--cannot but be_--we declare our belief, and
something more besides; we declare that the supposition of the
opposite of what we believe, would involve a contradiction--I would
contradict some definition or axiom to which we have already sworn
adherence. This again is a state of mind known, distinguishable, and
the same in all, subjectively; though as to the objective
correlate--what constitutes the Necessary, several different
opinions have been entertained.

[Footnote 49: Aristot. De Interpr. p. 16, a. 3-8: [Greek: e)/sti me\n
ou)=n ta\ e)n tê=| phônê=| tô=n e)n tê=| psuchê=| pathêma/tôn
su/mbola--ô(=n me/ntoi tau=ta sêmei=a _prô/tôs_, tau)ta\ pa=si
pathê/mata tê=s psuchê=s, kai\ ô(=n tau=ta o(moiô/mata, pra/gmata
ê)/dê tau)ta/.] Ibid. a. 13: [Greek: ta\ me\n ou)=n o)no/mata au)ta\
kai\ ta\ r(ê/mata e)/oike tô=| a)/neu sunthe/seôs kai\ diaire/seôs
noê/mati--ou)/te ga\r pseu=dos ou)/t' a)lêthe/s pô.] Ib. p. 17, a. 2:
[Greek: lo/gos a)pophantiko\s, e)n ô(=| to\ a)lêtheu/ein ê)\
pseu/desthai u(pa/rchei]. Compare p. 20, a. 34.]

[Footnote 50: Aristot. De Interpret. p. 23, a. 32: [Greek: ta\ me\n
e)n tê=| phônê=| a)kolouthei= toi=s e)n tê=| dianoi/a|, e)kei= de\
e)nanti/a do/xa ê( tou= e)nanti/ou], &c. Ib. p. 24, b. 1: [Greek:
ô(/ste ei)/per e)pi\ do/xês ou(/tôs e)/chei, ei)si\ de\ ai( e)n tê=|
phônê=| katapha/seis kai\ a)popha/seis su/mbola tô=n e)n tê=|
psuchê=|, dê=lon o(/ti kai\ katapha/sei e)nanti/a me\n a)po/phasis
ê(/ peri\ tou= au)tou= katho/lou], &c. Ib. p. 17, a. 22: [Greek:
e)/sti de\ ê( a(plê= a)po/phansis phônê\ sêmantikê\ peri\ tou=
u(pa/rchein ti ê)\ mê\ u(pa/rchein], &c.]

[Footnote 51: Ibid. p. 17, a. 5. [Greek: oi( me\n ou)=n a)/lloi
(lo/goi) a)phei/sthôsan; r(êtorikê=s ga\r ê)\ poiêtikê=s oi)keiote/ra
ê( ske/psis; o( de\ a)pophantiko\s tê=s nu=n theôri/as.]]

[Footnote 52: Ammonius (in the Scholia on De Interpret. p. 130, a.
16, seq., Brand.) ranks all modal propositions under the same
category, and considers the number of them to be, not indeed
infinite, but very great. He gives as examples: "The moon changes
_fast_; Plato loves Dion _vehemently_." Sir W. Hamilton adopts the
same view as Ammonius: "Modes may be conceived without end--all must
be admitted, if any are; the line of distinction attempted to be
drawn is futile." (Discussions on Phil. ut sup. p. 145.) On the other
hand, we learn from Ammonius that most of the Aristotelian
interpreters preceding him reckoned the simple proposition [Greek:
to\ u(pa/rchein] as a modal; and Aristotle himself seems so to
mention it (Analytica Priora, I. ii. p. 25, a. 1); besides that he
enumerates _true_ and _false_, which undoubtedly attach to [Greek:
to\ u(pa/rchein], as examples of modes (De Interpret. c. 12, p. 22,
a. 13). Ammonius himself protests against this doctrine of the former
interpreters.

Mr. John Stuart Mill (System of Logic, Bk. I. ch. iv. s. 2) says:--"A
remark of a similar nature may be applied to most of those
distinctions among propositions which are said to have reference to
their _modality_; as difference of tense or time; the sun _did_ rise,
_is_ rising, _will_ rise. . . . The circumstance of time is properly
considered as attaching to the copula, which is the sign of
predication, and not to the predicate. If the same cannot be said of
such modifications as these, Cæsar is _perhaps_ dead; it is
_possible_ that Cæsar is dead; it is only because these fall together
under another head; being properly assertions not of anything
relating to the fact itself, but of the state of our own mind in
regard to it; namely, our absence of disbelief of it. Thus, _Cæsar
may be dead_, means, _I am not sure that Cæsar is alive_."

I do not know whether Mr. Mill means that the function of the copula
is different in these problematical propositions, from what it is in
the categorical propositions: I think there is no difference. But his
remark that the problematical proposition is an assertion of the
state of our minds in regard to the fact, appears to me perfectly
just. Only, we ought to add, that this is equally true about the
categorical proposition. It is equally true about all the three
following propositions:--1. The three angles of a triangle may or may
not be equal to two right angles. 2. The three angles of a triangle
are equal to two right angles. 3. The three angles of a triangle are
necessarily equal to two right angles. In each of these three
propositions, an assertion of the state of our minds is involved, and
a different state of mind in each. This is the subjective aspect of
the proposition; it belongs to the form rather than to the matter,
and may be considered as a mode. The commentators preceding Ammonius
did so consider it, and said that the categorical proposition had its
mode as well as the others. Ammonius differed from them, treating the
categorical as having no mode--as the standard unit or point of
departure.

The propositions now known as Hypothetical and Disjunctive, which may
also be regarded as in a certain sense Modals, are not expressly
considered by Aristotle. In the Anal. Prior. I. xliv. p. 50 a. 16-38,
he adverts to hypothetical syllogisms, and intimates his intention of
discussing them more at length: but this intention has not been
executed, in the works that we possess.]

In every complete theory of enunciative speech, these modal
propositions deserve to be separately explained, both in their
substantive meaning and in their relation to other propositions.
Their characteristic property as Modals belongs to _form_ rather than
to _matter_; and Aristotle ought not to be considered as
unphilosophical for introducing them into the Organon, even if we
adopt the restricted view of Logic taken by Sir W. Hamilton, that it
takes no cognizance of the matter of propositions, but only of their
form. But though I dissent from Hamilton's criticisms on this point,
I do not concur with the opposing critics who think that Aristotle
has handled the Modal Propositions in a satisfactory manner. On the
contrary, I think that the equivocal sense which he assigns to the
Potential or Possible, and his inconsistency in sometimes admitting,
sometimes denying, a Potential that is always actual, and a Potential
that is never actual--are serious impediments to any consistent
Logic. The Problematical Proposition does not admit of being cut in
half; and if we are to recognize a _necessary_ Possible, or an
_impossible_ Possible, we ought to find different phrases by which to
designate them.

We must observe that the distinction of Problematical and Necessary
Propositions corresponds, in the mind of Aristotle, to that capital
and characteristic doctrine of his Ontology and Physics, already
touched on in this chapter. He thought, as we have seen, that in the
vast circumferential region of the Kosmos, from the outer sidereal
sphere down to the lunar sphere, celestial substance was a necessary
existence and energy, sempiternal and uniform in its rotations and
influence; and that through its beneficent influence, pervading the
concavity between the lunar sphere and the terrestrial centre (which
included the four elements with their compounds) there prevailed a
regularizing tendency called Nature: modified, however, and partly
counteracted by independent and irregular forces called Spontaneity
and Chance, essentially unknowable and unpredictable. The irregular
sequences thus named by Aristotle were the objective correlate of the
Problematical Proposition in Logic. In these sublunary sequences, as
to future time, _may or may not_ was all that could be attained, even
by the highest knowledge; certainty, either of affirmation or
negation, was out of the question. On the other hand, the necessary
and uniform energies of the celestial substance, formed the objective
correlate of the Necessary Proposition in Logic; this substance was
not merely an existence, but an existence necessary and unchangeable.
I shall say more on this when I come to treat of Aristotle as a
kosmical and physical philosopher; at present it is enough to remark
that he considers the Problematical Proposition in Logic to be not
purely subjective, as an expression of the speaker's ignorance, but
something more, namely, to correlate with an objective essentially
unknowable to all.

The last paragraph of the treatise De Interpretatione discusses the
question of Contraries and Contradictories, and makes out that the
greatest breadth of opposition is that between a proposition and its
contradictory (Kallias is just--Kallias is not just), not that
between, a proposition and what is called its contrary (Kallias is
just--Kallias is unjust); therefore, that according to the definition
of contrary, the true contrary of a proposition is its
contradictory.[53] This paragraph is not connected with that which
precedes; moreover, both the reasoning and the conclusion differ from
what we read as well in this treatise as in other portions of
Aristotle. Accordingly, Ammonius in the Scholia, while informing us
that Porphyry had declined to include it in his commentary, intimates
also his own belief that it is not genuine, but the work of another
hand. At best (Ammonius thinks), if we must consider it as the work
of Aristotle, it has been composed by him only as a dialectical
exercise, to debate an unsettled question.[54] I think the latter
hypothesis not improbable. The paragraph has certainly reference to
discussions which we do not know, and it may have been composed when
Aristotle had not fully made up his mind on the distinction between
Contrary and Contradictory. Considering the difficult problems that
he undertook to solve, we may be sure that he must have written down
several trains of thought merely preliminary and tentative. Moreover,
we know that he had composed a distinct treatise 'De Oppositis,'[55]
which is unfortunately lost, but in which he must have included this
very topic--the distinction between Contrary and Contradictory.

[Footnote 53: Aristot. De Interpr. p. 23, a. 27, seq.]

[Footnote 54: Scholia ad Arist. pp. 135-139, Br. [Greek: gumna/sai
mo/non boulêthe/ntos tou\s e)ntugcha/nontas pro\s tê\n e)pi/krisin
tô=n pithanô=s me\n ou) me/ntoi a)lêthô=s legome/nôn lo/gôn] &c. (p.
135, b. 15; also p. 136, a. 42).]

[Footnote 55: Scholia ad Categorias, p. 83, a. 17-19, b. 10, p. 84,
a. 29, p. 86, b. 42, p. 88, a. 30. It seems much referred to by
Simplikius, who tells us that the Stoics adopted most of its
principles (p. 83, a. 21, b. 7).]

Whatever may have been the real origin and purpose of this last
paragraph, I think it unsuitable as a portion of the treatise De
Interpretatione. It nullifies, or at least overclouds, one of the
best parts of that treatise, the clear determination of _Anaphasis_
and its consequences.

If, now, we compare the theory of the Proposition as given by
Aristotle in this treatise, with that which we read in the Sophistes
of Plato, we shall find Plato already conceiving the proposition as
composed indispensably of noun and verb, and as being either
affirmative or negative, for both of which he indicates the technical
terms.[56] He has no technical term for either subject or predicate;
but he conceives the proposition as belonging to its subject:[57] we
may be mistaken in the predicates, but we are not mistaken in the
subject. Aristotle enlarges and improves upon this theory. He not
only has a technical term for affirmation and negation, and for
negative noun and verb, but also for subject and predicate; again,
for the mode of signification belonging to noun and verb, each
separately, as distinguished from the mode of signification belonging
to them conjointly, when brought together in a proposition. He
follows Plato in insisting upon the characteristic feature of the
proposition--aptitude for being true or false; but he gives an ampler
definition of it, and he introduces the novel and important
distribution of propositions according to the quantity of the
subject. Until this last distribution had been made, it was
impossible to appreciate the true value and bearing of each
_Antiphasis_ and the correct language for expressing it, so as to say
neither more nor less. We see, by reading the Sophistes, that Plato
did not conceive the _Antiphasis_ correctly, as distinguished from
Contrariety on the one hand, and from mere Difference on the other.
He saw that the negative of any proposition does not affirm the
contrary of its affirmative; but he knew no other alternative except
to say, that it affirms only something different from the
affirmative. His theory in the Sophistes recognizes nothing but
affirmative propositions, with the predicate of contrariety on one
hand, or of difference on the other;[58] he ignores, or jumps over,
the intermediate station of propositions affirming nothing at all,
but simply denying a pre-understood affirmative. There were other
contemporaries, Antisthenes among them, who declared contradiction to
be an impossibility;[59] an opinion coinciding at bottom with what I
have just cited from Plato himself. We see, in the Theætêtus, the
Euthydêmus, the Sophistes, and elsewhere, how great was the
difficulty felt by philosophers of that age to find a proper _locus
standi_ for false propositions, so as to prove them theoretically
possible, to assign a legitimate function for the negative, and to
escape from the interdict of Parmenides, who eliminated _Non-Ens_ as
unmeaning and incogitable. Even after the death of Aristotle, the
acute disputation of Stilpon suggested many problems, but yielded few
solutions; and Menedêmus went so far as to disallow negative
propositions altogether.[60]

[Footnote 56: Plato, Sophistes, pp. 261-262. [Greek: pha/sin kai\
a)po/phasin].--ib. p. 263 E. In the so-called Platonic 'Definitions,'
we read [Greek: e)n katapha/sei kai\ a)popha/sei] (p. 413 C); but
these are probably after Aristotle's time. In another of these
Definitions (413 D.) we read [Greek: a)po/phasis], where the word
ought to be [Greek: a)po/phansis].]

[Footnote 57: Plato, Sophist. p. 263 A-C.]

[Footnote 58: Ibid. p. 257, B: [Greek: Ou)k a)r', e)nanti/on o(/tan
a)po/phasis le/gêtai sêmai/nein, sugchôrêso/metha, tosou=ton de\
mo/non, o(/ti _tô=n a)/llôn ti mênu/ei to\ mê\ kai\ to\ ou)/_
protithe/mena tô=n e)pio/ntôn o)noma/tôn, ma=llon de\ tô=n
pragma/tôn, peri\ a(/tt' a)\n ke/êtai ta\ e)piphtheggo/mena u(/steron
tê=s a)popha/seôs o)no/mata.]

The term [Greek: a)nti/phasis], and its derivative [Greek:
a)ntiphatikô=s], are not recognized in the Platonic Lexicon. Compare
the same dialogue, Sophistes, p. 263; also Euthydêmus, p. 298, A.
Plato does not seem to take account of negative propositions as such.
See 'Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates,' vol. II. ch. xxvii.
pp. 446-455.]

[Footnote 59: Aristot. Topica, I. xi. p. 104, b. 20; Metaphys.
[Greek: D]. p. 1024, b. 32; Analytic. Poster. I. xxv. p. 86, b. 34.]

[Footnote 60: Diogon. Laert. ii. 134-135. See the long discussion in
the Platonic Theætêtus (pp. 187-196), in which Sokrates in vain
endeavours to produce some theory whereby [Greek: pseudê\s do/xa] may
be rendered possible. Hobbes, also, in his Computation or Logic (De
Corp. c. iii. § 6), followed by Destutt Tracy, disallows the negative
proposition _per se_, and treats it as a clumsy disguise of the
affirmative [Greek: e)k metathe/seôs], to use the phrase of
Theophrastus. Mr. John Stuart Mill has justly criticized this part of
Hobbes's theory (System of Logic, Book I. ch. iv. § 2).]

Such being the conditions under which philosophers debated in the age
of Aristotle, we can appreciate the full value of a positive theory
of propositions such as that which we read in his treatise De
Interpretatione. It is, so far as we know, the first positive theory
thereof that was ever set out; the first attempt to classify
propositions in such a manner that a legitimate _Antiphasis_ could be
assigned to each; the first declaration that to each affirmative
proposition there belonged one appropriate negative, and to each
negative proposition one appropriate counter-affirmative, and one
only; the earliest effort to construct a theory for this purpose,
such as to hold ground against all the puzzling questions of acute
disputants.[61] The clear determination of the _Antiphasis_ in each
case--the distinction of Contradictory antithesis from Contrary
antithesis between propositions--this was an important logical
doctrine never advanced before Aristotle; and the importance of it
becomes manifest when we read the arguments of Plato and Antisthenes,
the former overleaping and ignoring the contradictory opposition, the
latter maintaining that it was a process theoretically indefensible.
But in order that these two modes of antithesis should be clearly
contrasted, each with its proper characteristic, it was requisite
that the distinction of quantity between different propositions
should also be brought to view, and considered in conjunction with
the distinction of quality. Until this was done, the Maxim of
Contradiction, denied by some, could not be shown in its true force
or with its proper limits. Now, we find it done,[62] for the first
time, in the treatise before us. Here the Contradictory antithesis
(opposition both in quantity and quality) in which one proposition
must be true and the other false, is contrasted with the Contrary
(propositions opposite in quality, but both of them universal).
Aristotle's terminology is not in all respects fully developed; in
regard, especially, to the quantity of propositions it is less
advanced than in his own later treatises; but from the theory of the
De Interpretatione all the distinctions current among later
logicians, take their rise.

[Footnote 61: Aristot. De Interpr. p. 17, a. 36: [Greek: pro\s ta\s
sophistika\s e)nochlê/seis].]

[Footnote 62: We see, from the argument in the Metaphysica of
Aristotle, that there were persons in his day who denied or refused
to admit the Maxim of Contradiction; and who held that contradictory
propositions might both be true or both false (Aristot. Metaph.
[Greek: G]. p. 1006, a. 1; p. 1009, a. 24). He employs several pages
in confuting them.

See the Antinomies in the Platonic Parmenides (pp. 154-155), some of
which destroy or set aside the Maxim of Contradiction ('Plato and the
Other Companions of Sokrates,' vol. II. ch. xxv. p. 306).]

The distinction of Contradictory and Contrary is fundamental in
ratiocinative Logic, and lies at the bottom of the syllogistic theory
as delivered in the Analytica Priora. The precision with which
Aristotle designates the Universal proposition with its exact
contradictory antithesis, is remarkable in his day. Some, however, of
his observations respecting the place and functions of the negative
particle ([Greek: ou)]), must be understood with reference to the
variable order of words in a Greek or Latin sentence; for instance,
the distinction between _Kallias non est justus_ and _Kallias est non
justus_ does not suggest itself to one speaking English or
French.[63] Moreover, the Aristotelian theory of the Proposition is
encumbered with various unnecessary subtleties; and the introduction
of the Modals (though they belong, in my opinion, legitimately to a
complete logical theory) renders the doctrine so intricate and
complicated, that a judicious teacher will prefer, in explaining the
subject, to leave them for second or ulterior study, when the simpler
relations between categorical propositions have been made evident and
familiar. The force of this remark will be felt more when we go
through the Analytica Priora. The two principal relations to be
considered in the theory of Propositions--Opposition and
Equipollence--would have come out far more clearly in the treatise De
Interpretatione, if the discussion of the Modals had been reserved
for a separate chapter.

[Footnote 63: The diagram or parallelogram of logical antithesis,
which is said to have begun with Apuleius, and to have been
transmitted through Boethius and the Schoolmen to modern times
(Ueberweg, System der Logik, sect. 72, p. 174) is as follows:--

 A. Omnis homo est justus.   --- E. Nullus homo est justus.
                             |X|
 I. Aliquis homo est justus. --- O. Aliquis homo non est justus.

But the parallelogram set out by Aristotle in the treatise De
Interpretatione, or at least in the Analytica Priora, is different,
and intended for a different purpose. He puts it thus:--

1. Omnis homo est justus . . . .  . 2. Non omnis homo est justus.
4. Non omnis homo est non justus  . 3. Omnis homo est non justus.

Here Proposition (1) is an affirmative, of which (2) is the direct
and appropriate negative: also Proposition (3) is an affirmative
(Aristotle so considers it), of which (4) is the direct and
appropriate negative. The great aim of Aristotle is to mark out
clearly what is the appropriate negative or [Greek: A)po/phasis] to
each [Greek: Kata/phasis (mi/a a)po/phasis mia=s katapha/seôs], p.
17, b. 38), making up together the pair which he calls [Greek:
A)nti/phasis], standing in Contradictory Opposition; and to
distinguish this appropriate negative from another proposition which
comprises the particle of negation, but which is really a new
affirmative.

The true negatives of _homo est justus--Omnis homo est justus_ are,
_Homo non est justus--Non omnis homo est justus_. If you say, _Homo
est non justus--Omnis homo est non justus_, these are not negative
propositions, but new affirmatives ([Greek: e)k metathe/seôs] in the
language of Theophrastus).]




CHAPTER V.

ANALYTICA PRIORA I.


Reviewing the treatise De Interpretatione, we have followed Aristotle
in his first attempt to define what a Proposition is, to point out
its constituent elements, and to specify some of its leading
varieties. The characteristic feature of the Proposition he stated to
be--That it declares, in the first instance, the mental state of the
speaker as to belief or disbelief, and, in its ulterior or final
bearing, a state of facts to which such belief or disbelief
corresponds. It is thus significant of truth or falsehood; and this
is its logical character (belonging to Analytic and Dialectic), as
distinguished from its rhetorical character, with other aspects
besides. Aristotle farther indicated the two principal discriminative
attributes of propositions as logically regarded, passing under the
names of quantity and quality. He took great pains, in regard to the
quality, to explain what was the special negative proposition in true
contradictory antithesis to each affirmative. He stated and enforced
the important separation of contradictory propositions from contrary;
and he even parted off (which the Greek and Latin languages admit,
though the French and English will hardly do so) the true negative
from the indeterminate affirmative. He touched also upon equipollent
propositions, though he did not go far into them. Thus commenced with
Aristotle the systematic study of propositions, classified according
to their meaning and their various interdependences with each other
as to truth and falsehood--their mutual consistency or
incompatibility. Men who had long been talking good Greek fluently
and familiarly, were taught to reflect upon the conjunctions of words
that they habitually employed, and to pay heed to the conditions of
correct speech in reference to its primary purpose of affirmation and
denial, for the interchange of beliefs and disbeliefs, the
communication of truth, and the rectification of falsehood. To many
of Aristotle's contemporaries this first attempt to theorize upon the
forms of locution familiar to every one would probably appear hardly
less strange than the interrogative dialectic of Sokrates, when he
declared himself not to know what was meant by justice, virtue,
piety, temperance, government, &c.; when he astonished his hearers by
asking them to rescue him from this state of ignorance, and to
communicate to him some portion of their supposed plenitude of
knowledge.

Aristotle tells us expressly that the theory of the Syllogism, both
demonstrative and dialectic, on which we are now about to enter, was
his own work altogether and from the beginning; that no one had ever
attempted it before; that he therefore found no basis to work upon,
but was obliged to elaborate his own theory, from the very rudiments,
by long and laborious application. In this point of view, he
contrasts Logic pointedly with Rhetoric, on which there had been a
series of writers and teachers, each profiting by the labours of his
predecessors.[1] There is no reason to contest the claim to
originality here advanced by Aristotle. He was the first who
endeavoured, by careful study and multiplied comparison of
propositions, to elicit general truths respecting their ratiocinative
interdependence, and to found thereupon precepts for regulating the
conduct of demonstration and dialectic.[2]

[Footnote 1: See the remarkable passage at the close of the
Sophistici Elenchi, p. 183, b. 34-p. 184, b. 9: [Greek: tau/tês de\
tê=s pragmatei/as ou) to\ me\n ê)=n to\ de\ ou)k ê)=n
proexeirgasme/non, a)ll' ou)de\n pantelô=s u(pê=rche--kai\ peri\ me\n
tô=n r(êtorikô=n u(pê=rche polla\ kai\ palaia\ ta\ lego/mena, peri\
de\ tou= sullogi/zesthai pantelô=s ou)de\n ei)/chomen pro/teron
a)/llo le/gein, a)ll' ê)\ tribê=| zêtou=ntes polu\n chro/non
e)ponou=men.]]

[Footnote 2: Sir Wm. Hamilton, Lectures on Logic, Lect. v. pp. 87-91,
vol. III.:--"The principles of Contradiction and Excluded Middle can
both be traced back to Plato, by whom they were enounced and
frequently applied; though it was not till long after, that either of
them obtained a distinctive appellation. To take the principle of
Contradiction first. This law Plato frequently employs, but the most
remarkable passages are found in the Phædo (p. 103), in the Sophista
(p. 252), and in the Republic (iv. 436, vii. 525). This law was
however more distinctively and emphatically enounced by Aristotle. .
. . . Following Aristotle, the Peripatetics established this law as
the highest principle of knowledge. From the Greek Aristotelians it
obtained the name by which it has subsequently been denominated, the
_principle_, or _law_, or _axiom_, of _Contradiction_ ([Greek:
a)xi/ôma tê=s a)ntipha/seôs]). . . . . The law of Excluded Middle
between two contradictories remounts, as I have said, also to Plato;
though the Second Alcibiades, in which it is most clearly expressed
(p. 139; also Sophista, p. 250), must be admitted to be spurious. . .
. . This law, though universally recognized as a principle in the
Greek Peripatetic school, and in the schools of the middle ages, only
received the distinctive appellation by which it is now known at a
comparatively modern date."

The passages of Plato, to which Sir W. Hamilton here refers, will not
be found to bear out his assertion that Plato "enounced and
frequently applied the principles of Contradiction and Excluded
Middle." These two principles are both of them enunciated,
denominated, and distinctly explained by Aristotle, but by no one
before him, as far as our knowledge extends. The conception of the
two maxims, in their generality, depends upon the clear distinction
between Contradictory Opposition and Contrary Opposition; which is
fully brought out by Aristotle, but not adverted to, or at least
never broadly and generally set forth, by Plato. Indeed it is
remarkable that the word [Greek: A)nti/phasis], the technical term
for Contradiction, never occurs in Plato; at least it is not
recognized in the _Lexicon Platonicum_. Aristotle puts it in the
foreground of his logical exposition; for, without it, he could not
have explained what he meant by Contradictory Opposition. See
Categoriæ, pp. 13-14, and elsewhere in the treatise De
Interpretatione and in the Metaphysica. Respecting the idea of the
Negative as put forth by Plato in the Sophistes (not coinciding
either with Contradictory Opposition or with Contrary Opposition),
see 'Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates,' vol. II. ch. xxvii.
pp. 449-459. I have remarked in that chapter, and the reader ought to
recollect, that the philosophical views set out by Plato in the
Sophistes differ on many points from what we read in other Platonic
dialogues.]

He begins the Analytica Priora by setting forth his general purpose,
and defining his principal terms and phrases. His manner is one of
geometrical plainness and strictness. It may perhaps have been common
to him with various contemporary geometers, whose works are now lost;
but it presents an entire novelty in Grecian philosophy and
literature. It departed not merely from the manner of the
rhetoricians and the physical philosophers (as far as we know them,
not excluding even Demokritus), but also from Sokrates and the
Sokratic school. For though Sokrates and Plato were perpetually
calling for definitions, and did much to make others feel the want of
such, they neither of them evinced aptitude or readiness to supply
the want. The new manner of Aristotle is adapted to an undertaking
which he himself describes as original, in which he has no
predecessors, and is compelled to dig his own foundations. It is
essentially didactic and expository, and contrasts strikingly with
the mixture of dramatic liveliness and dialectical subtlety which we
find in Plato.

The terminology of Aristotle in the Analytica is to a certain extent
different from that in the treatise De Interpretatione. The
Enunciation ([Greek: A)po/phanis]) appears under the new name of
[Greek: Pro/tasis], _Proposition_ (in the literal sense) or
_Premiss_; while, instead of Noun and Verb, we have the word _Term_
([Greek: O(/ros]), applied alike both to Subject and to Predicate.[3]
We pass now from the region of _declared_ truth, into that of
_inferential_ or _reasoned_ truth. We find the proposition looked at,
not merely as communicating truth in itself, but as generating and
helping to guarantee certain ulterior propositions, which communicate
something additional or different. The primary purpose of the
Analytica is announced to be, to treat of Demonstration and
demonstrative Science; but the secondary purpose, running parallel
with it and serving as illustrative counterpart, is, to treat also of
Dialectic; both of them[4] being applications of the inferential or
ratiocinative process, the theory of which Aristotle intends to
unfold.

[Footnote 3: Aristot. Analyt. Prior. I. i. p. 24, b. 16: [Greek:
o(/ron de\ kalô= ei)s o(\n dialu/etai ê( pro/tasis, oi(=on to/ te
katêgorou/menon kai\ to\ kath' ou(= katêgorei=tai], &c.

[Greek: O(/ros]--_Terminus_--seems to have been a technical word
first employed by Aristotle himself to designate subject and
predicate as the _extremes_ of a proposition, which latter he
conceives as the _interval_ between the _termini_--[Greek:
_dia/stêma_]. (Analyt. Prior. I. xv. p. 35, a. 12. [Greek:
sterêtikô=n diastêma/tôn], &c. See Alexander, Schol. pp. 145-146.)

In the Topica Aristotle employs [Greek: o(/ros] in a very different
sense--[Greek: lo/gos o( to\ ti/ ê)=n ei)=nai sêmai/nôn] (Topic. I.
v. p. 101, b. 39)--hardly distinguished from [Greek: o(rismo/s]. The
Scholia take little notice of this remarkable variation of meaning,
as between two treatises of the Organon so intimately connected (pp.
256-257, Br.).]

[Footnote 4: Analyt. Prior. I. i. p. 24, a. 25.]

The three treatises--1, Analytica Priora, 2, Analytica Posteriora, 3,
Topica with Sophistici Elenchi--thus belong all to one general
scheme; to the theory of the Syllogism, with its distinct
applications, first, to demonstrative or didactic science, and, next,
to dialectical debate. The scheme is plainly announced at the
commencement of the Analytica Priora; which treatise discusses the
Syllogism generally, while the Analytica Posteriora deals with
Demonstration, and the Topica with Dialectic. The first chapter of
the Analytica Priora and the last chapter of the Sophistici Elenchi
(closing the Topica), form a preface and a conclusion to the whole.
The exposition of the Syllogism, Aristotle distinctly announces,
precedes that of Demonstration (and for the same reason also precedes
that of Dialectic), because it is more general: every demonstration
is a sort of syllogism, but every syllogism is not a
demonstration.[5]

[Footnote 5: Ibid. I. iv. p. 25, b. 30.]

As a foundation for the syllogistic theory, propositions are
classified according to their quantity (more formally than in the
treatise De Interpretatione) into Universal, Particular, and
Indefinite or Indeterminate;[6] Aristotle does not recognize the
Singular Proposition as a distinct variety. In regard to the
Universal Proposition, he introduces a different phraseology
according as it is looked at from the side of the Subject, or from
that of the Predicate. The Subject is, or is not, in the whole
Predicate; the Predicate is affirmed or denied respecting all or
every one of the Subject.[7] The minor term of the Syllogism (in the
first mode of the first figure) is declared to be in the whole middle
term; the major is declared to belong to, or to be predicable of, all
and every the middle term. Aristotle says that the two are the same;
we ought rather to say that each is the concomitant and correlate of
the other, though his phraseology is such as to obscure the
correlation.

[Footnote 6: Ibid. I. i. p. 24, a. 17. The Particular ([Greek: e)n
me/rei]), here for the first time expressly distinguished by
Aristotle, is thus defined:--[Greek: e)n me/rei de\ to\ tini\ ê)\ mê\
tini\ ê)\ mê\ panti\ u(pa/rchein.]]

[Footnote 7: Ibid. b. 26: [Greek: to\ d' e)n o(/lô| ei)nai e(/teron
e(te/rô|, kai\ to\ kata\ panto\s katêgorei=sthai thate/rou tha/teron,
tau)to/n e)sti--tau)to\n], _i.e._ [Greek: _a)ntestramme/nôs_], as
Waitz remarks in note. Julius Pacius says:--"Idem re, sed ratione
differunt ut ascensus et descensus; nam subjectum dicitur esse vel
non esse in toto attributo, quia attributum dicitur de omni vel de
nullo subjecto" (p. 128).]

The definition given of a Syllogism is very clear and
remarkable:--"It is a speech in which, some positions having been
laid down, something different from these positions follows as a
necessary consequence from their being laid down." In a _perfect_
Syllogism nothing additional is required to make the necessity of the
consequence obvious as well as complete. But there are also
_imperfect_ Syllogisms, in which such necessity, though equally
complete, is not so obviously conveyed in the premisses, but requires
some change to be effected in the position of the terms in order to
render it conspicuous.[8]

[Footnote 8: Aristot. Anal. Prior. I. i. p. 24, b. 18-26. The same,
with a little difference of wording, at the commencement of Topica,
p. 100, a. 25. Compare also Analyt. Poster. I. x. p. 76, b. 38:
[Greek: o(/sôn o)/ntôn tô=| e)kei=na ei)=nai gi/netai to\
sumpe/rasma.]]

The term Syllogism has acquired, through the influence of Aristotle,
a meaning so definite and technical, that we do not easily conceive
it in any other meaning. But in Plato and other contemporaries it
bears a much wider sense, being equivalent to reasoning generally, to
the process of comparison, abstraction, generalization.[9] It was
Aristotle who consecrated the word, so as to mean exclusively the
reasoning embodied in propositions of definite form and number.
Having already analysed propositions separately taken, and
discriminated them into various classes according to their
constituent elements, he now proceeds to consider propositions in
combination. Two propositions, if properly framed, will conduct to a
third, different from themselves, but which will be necessarily true
if they are true. Aristotle calls the three together a Syllogism.[10]
He undertakes to shew how it must be framed in order that its
conclusion shall be necessarily true, if the premisses are true. He
furnishes schemes whereby the cast and arrangement of premisses,
proper for attaining truth, may be recognized; together with the
nature of the conclusion, warrantable under each arrangement.

[Footnote 9: See especially Plato, Theætêt. p. 186, B-D., where
[Greek: o( sullogismo\s] and [Greek: ta\ a)nalogi/smata] are
equivalents.]

[Footnote 10: Julius Pacius (ad Analyt. Prior. I. i.) says that it is
a mistake on the part of most logicians to treat the Syllogism as
including three propositions (ut vulgus logicorum putat). He
considers the premisses alone as constituting the Syllogism; the
conclusion is not a part thereof, but something distinct and
superadded. It appears to me that the _vulgus logicorum_ are here in
the right.]

In the Analytica Priora, we find ourselves involved, from and after
the second chapter, in the distinction of Modal propositions, the
necessary and the possible. The rules respecting the simple Assertory
propositions are thus, even from the beginning, given in conjunction
and contrast with those respecting the Modals. This is one among many
causes of the difficulty and obscurity with which the treatise is
beset. Theophrastus and Eudemus seem also to have followed their
master by giving prominence to the Modals:[11] recent expositors
avoid the difficulty, some by omitting them altogether, others by
deferring them until the simple assertory propositions have been
first made clear. I shall follow the example of these last; but it
deserves to be kept in mind, as illustrating Aristotle's point of
view, that he regards the Modals as principal varieties of the
proposition, co-ordinate in logical position with the simple
assertory.

[Footnote 11: Eudemi Fragmenta, cii.-ciii. p. 145, ed. Spengel.]

Before entering on combinations of propositions, Aristotle begins by
shewing what can be done with single propositions, in view to the
investigation or proving of truth. A single proposition may be
_converted_; that is, its subject and predicate may be made to change
places. If a proposition be true, will it be true when thus
converted, or (in other words) will its converse be true? If false,
will its converse be false? If this be not always the case, what are
the conditions and limits under which (assuming the proposition to be
true) the process of conversion leads to assured truth, in each
variety of propositions, affirmative or negative, universal or
particular? As far as we know, Aristotle was the first person that
ever put to himself this question; though the answer to it is
indispensable to any theory of the process of proving or disproving.
He answers it before he enters upon the Syllogism.

The rules which he lays down on the subject have passed into all
logical treatises. They are now familiar; and readers are apt to
fancy that there never was any novelty in them--that every one knows
them without being told. Such fancy would be illusory. These rules
are very far from being self-evident, any more than the maxims of
Contradiction and of the Excluded Middle. Not one of the rules could
have been laid down with its proper limits, until the discrimination
of propositions, both as to quality (affirmative or negative), and as
to quantity (universal or particular), had been put prominently
forward and appreciated in all its bearings. The rule for trustworthy
conversion is different for each variety of propositions. The
Universal Negative may be converted simply; that is, the predicate
may become subject, and the subject may become predicate--the
proposition being true after conversion, if it was true before. But
the Universal Affirmative cannot be thus converted simply. It admits
of conversion only in the manner called by logicians _per accidens_:
if the predicate change places with the subject, we cannot be sure
that the proposition thus changed will be true, unless the new
subject be lowered in quantity from universal to particular; _e.g._
the proposition, All men are animals, has for its legitimate converse
not, _All_ animals are men, but only, _Some_ animals are men. The
Particular Affirmative may be converted simply: if it be true that
Some animals are men, it will also be true that Some men are animals.
But, lastly, if the true proposition to be converted be a Particular
Negative, it cannot be converted at all, so as to make sure that the
converse will be true also.[12]

[Footnote 12: Aristot. Analyt. Prior. I. ii. p. 25, a. 1-26.]

Here then are four separate rules laid down, one for each variety of
propositions. The rules for the second and third variety are proved
by the rule for the first (the Universal Negative), which is thus the
basis of all. But how does Aristotle prove the rule for the Universal
Negative itself? He proceeds as follows: "If A cannot be predicated
of any one among the B's, neither can B be predicated of any one
among the A's. For if it could be predicated of any one among them
(say C), the proposition that A cannot be predicated of any B would
not be true; since C is one among the B's."[13] Here we have a proof
given which is no proof at all. If I disbelieved or doubted the
proposition to be proved, I should equally disbelieve or doubt the
proposition given to prove it. The proof only becomes valid, when you
add a farther assumption which Aristotle has not distinctly
enunciated, viz.: That if some A (_e.g._ C) is B, then some B must
also be A; which would be contrary to the fundamental supposition.
But this farther assumption cannot be granted here, because it would
imply that we already know the rule respecting the convertibility of
Particular Affirmatives, viz., that they admit of being converted
simply. Now the rule about Particular Affirmatives is afterwards
itself proved by help of the preceding demonstration respecting the
Universal Negative. As the proof stands, therefore, Aristotle
demonstrates each of these by means of the other; which is not
admissible.[14]

[Footnote 13: Ibid. p. 25, a. 15: [Greek: ei) ou)=n mêdeni\ tô=n B
to\ A u(pa/rchei, ou)de\ tô=n A ou)deni\ u(pa/rxei to\ B. ei) ga\r
tini, oi(=on tô=| G, ou)k a)lêthe\s e)/stai to\ mêdeni\ tô=n B to\ A
u(pa/rchein; to\ ga\r G tô=n B ti/ e)stin.]

Julius Pacius (p. 129) proves the Universal Negative to be
convertible _simpliciter_, by a _Reductio ad Absurdum_ cast into a
syllogism in the First figure. But it is surely unphilosophical to
employ the rules of Syllogism as a means of proving the legitimacy of
Conversion, seeing that we are forced to assume conversion in our
process for distinguishing valid from invalid syllogisms. Moreover
the _Reductio ad Absurdum_ assumes the two fundamental Maxims of
Contradiction and Excluded Middle, though these are less obvious, and
stand more in need of proof than the simple conversion of the
Universal Negative, the point that they are brought to establish.]

[Footnote 14: Waitz, in his note (p. 374), endeavours, but I think
without success, to show that Aristotle's proof is not open to the
criticism here advanced. He admits that it is obscurely indicated,
but the amplification of it given by himself still remains exposed to
the same objection.]

Even the friends and companions of Aristotle were not satisfied with
his manner of establishing this fundamental rule as to the conversion
of propositions. Eudêmus is said to have given a different proof; and
Theophrastus assumed as self-evident, without any proof, that the
Universal Negative might always be converted simply.[15] It appears
to me that no other or better evidence of it can be offered, than the
trial upon particular cases, that is to say, Induction.[16] Nothing
is gained by dividing (as Aristotle does) the whole A into parts, one
of which is C; nor can I agree with Theophrastus in thinking that
every learner would assent to it at first hearing, especially at a
time when no universal maxims respecting the logical value of
propositions had ever been proclaimed. Still less would a Megaric
dialectician, if he had never heard the maxim before, be satisfied to
stand upon an alleged _à priori_ necessity without asking for
evidence. Now there is no other evidence except by exemplifying the
formula, No A is B, in separate propositions already known to the
learner as true or false, and by challenging him to produce any one
case, in which, when it is true to say No A is B, it is not equally
true to say, No B is A; the universality of the maxim being liable to
be overthrown by any one contradictory instance.[17] If this proof
does not convince him, no better can be produced. In a short time,
doubtless, he will acquiesce in the general formula at first hearing,
and he may even come to regard it as self-evident. It will recall to
his memory an aggregate of separate cases each individually
forgotten, summing up their united effect under the same aspect, and
thus impressing upon him the general truth as if it were not only
authoritative but self-authorized.

[Footnote 15: See the Scholia of Alexander on this passage, p. 148,
a. 30-45, Brandis; Eudemi Fragm. ci.-cv. pp. 145-149, ed. Spengel.]

[Footnote 16: We find Aristotle declaring in Topica, II. viii. p.
113, b. 15, that in converting a true Universal Affirmative
proposition, the negative of the Subject of the convertend is always
true of the negative of the Predicate of the convertend; _e.g._ If
every man is an animal, every thing which is not an animal is not a
man. This is to be assumed (he says) upon the evidence of
Induction--uncontradicted iteration of particular cases, extended to
all cases universally--[Greek: lamba/nein d' e)x e)pagôgê=s, oi(=on
ei) o( a)/nthrôpos zô=|on, to\ mê\ zô=|on ou)k a)/nthrôpos; o(moi/ôs
de\ kai\ e)pi\ tô=n a)/llôn. . . . . e)pi\ pa/ntôn ou)=n to\
toiou=ton a)xiôte/on.]

The rule for the simple conversion of the Universal Negative rests
upon the same evidence of Induction, never contradicted.]

[Footnote 17: Dr. Wallis, in one of his acute controversial treatises
against Hobbes, remarks upon this as the process pursued by Euclid in
his demonstrations:--"You tell us next that an Induction, without
enumeration of all the particulars, is not sufficient to infer a
conclusion. Yes, Sir, if after the enumeration of some particulars,
there comes a general clause, _and the like in other cases_ (as here
it doth), this may pass for a proofe till there be a possibility of
giving some instance to the contrary, which here you will never be
able to doe. And if such an Induction may not pass for proofe, there
is never a proposition in Euclid demonstrated. For all along he takes
no other course, or at least grounds his Demonstrations on
Propositions no otherwise demonstrated. As, for instance, he
proposeth it in general (i. c. 1.)--_To make an equilateral triangle
on a line given_. And then he shows you how to do it upon the line A
B, which he there shows you, and leaves you to supply: _And the same,
by the like means, may be done upon any other strait line_; and then
infers his general conclusion. Yet I have not heard any man object
that the Induction was not sufficient, because he did not actually
performe it in all lines possible."--(Wallis, Due Correction to Mr.
Hobbes, Oxon. 1656, sect. v. p. 42.) This is induction by _parity of
reasoning_.

So also Aristot. Analyt. Poster. I. iv. p. 73, b. 32: [Greek: to\
katho/lou de\ u(pa/rchei to/te, o(/tan e)pi\ tou= tucho/ntos kai\
prô/tou deiknu/êtai.]]

Aristotle passes next to Affirmatives, both Universal and Particular.
First, if A can be predicated of all B, then B can be predicated of
_some_ A; for if B cannot be predicated of any A, then (by the rule
for the Universal Negative) neither can A be predicated of any B.
Again, if A can be predicated of some B, in this case also, and for
the same reason, B can be predicated of some A.[18] Here the rule for
the Universal Negative, supposed already established, is applied
legitimately to prove the rules for Affirmatives. But in the first
case, that of the Universal, it fails to prove _some_ in the sense of
_not-all_ or _some-at-most_, which is required; whereas, the rules
for both cases can be proved by Induction, like the formula about the
Universal Negative. When we come to the Particular Negative,
Aristotle lays down the position, that it does not admit of being
necessarily converted in any way. He gives no proof of this, beyond
one single exemplification: If some animal is not a man, you are not
thereby warranted in asserting the converse, that some man is not an
animal.[19] It is plain that such an exemplification is only an
appeal to Induction: you produce one particular example, which is
entering on the track of Induction; and one example alone is
sufficient to establish the negative of an universal proposition.[20]
The converse of a Particular Negative is not in all cases true,
though it may be true in many cases.

[Footnote 18: Aristot. Analyt. Prior. I. ii. p. 25, a. 17-22.]

[Footnote 19: Ibid. p. 25, a. 22-26.]

[Footnote 20: Though some may fancy that the rule for converting the
Universal Negative is intuitively known, yet every one must see that
the rule for converting the Universal Affirmative is not thus
self-evident, or derived from natural intuition. In fact, I believe
that every learner at first hears it with great surprise. Some are
apt to fancy that the Universal Affirmative (like the Particular
Affirmative) may be converted _simply_. Indeed this error is not
unfrequently committed in actual reasoning; all the more easily,
because there is a class of cases (with subject and predicate
co-extensive) where the converse of the Universal Affirmative _is_
really true. Also, in the case of the Particular Negative, there are
many true propositions in which the simple converse is true. A novice
might incautiously generalize upon those instances, and conclude that
both were convertible simply. Nor could you convince him of his error
except by producing examples in which, when a true proposition of
this kind is converted simply, the resulting converse is notoriously
false. The appeal to various separate cases is the only basis on
which we can rest for testing the correctness or incorrectness of all
these maxims proclaimed as universal.]

From one proposition taken singly, no new proposition can be
inferred; for purposes of inference, two propositions at least are
required.[21] This brings us to the rules of the Syllogism, where two
propositions as premisses conduct us to a third which necessarily
follows from them; and we are introduced to the well-known three
Figures with their various Modes.[22] To form a valid Syllogism,
there must be three terms and no more; the two, which appear as
Subject and Predicate of the conclusion, are called the _minor_ term
(or minor extreme) and the _major_ term (or major extreme)
respectively; while the third or _middle_ term must appear in each of
the premisses, but not in the conclusion. These terms are called
_extremes_ and _middle_, from the position which they occupy in every
perfect Syllogism--that is in what Aristotle ranks as the First among
the three figures. In _his_ way of enunciating the Syllogism, this
middle position formed a conspicuous feature; whereas the modern
arrangement disguises it, though the denomination _middle_ term is
still retained. Aristotle usually employs letters of the alphabet,
which he was the first to select as abbreviations for exposition;[23]
and he has two ways (conforming to what he had said in the first
chapter of the present treatise) of enunciating the modes of the
First figure. In one way, he begins with the major extreme (Predicate
of the conclusion): A may be predicated of all B, B may be predicated
of all C; therefore, A may be predicated of all C (Universal
Affirmative). Again, A cannot be predicated of any B, B can be
predicated of all C; therefore, A cannot be predicated of any C
(Universal Negative). In the other way, he begins with the minor term
(Subject of the conclusion): C is in the whole B, B is in the whole
A; therefore, C is in the whole A (Universal Affirmative). And, C is
in the whole B, B is not in the whole A; therefore, C is not in the
whole A (Universal Negative). We see thus that in Aristotle's way of
enunciating the First figure, the middle term is really placed
between the two extremes,[24] though this is not so in the Second and
Third figures. In the modern way of enunciating these figures, the
middle term is never placed between the two extremes; yet the
denomination _middle_ still remains.

[Footnote 21: Analyt. Prior. I. xv. p. 34, a. 17; xxiii. p. 40, b.
35; Analyt. Poster. I. iii. p. 73, a. 7.]

[Footnote 22: Aristot. Analyt. Prior. I. iv. p. 25, b. 26, seq.]

[Footnote 23: M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire (Logique d'Aristote, vol. ii.
p. 7, n.), referring to the examples of Conversion in chap. ii.,
observes:--"Voici le prémier usage des lettres représentant des
idées; c'est un procédé tout à fait algébrique, c'est à dire, de
généralisation. Déjà, dans l'Herméneia, ch. 13, § 1 et suiv.,
Aristote a fait usage de tableaux pour représenter sa pensée
relativement à la consécution des modales. Il parle encore
spécialement de figures explicatives, liv. 2. des Derniers
Analytiques, ch. 17, § 7. Vingt passages de l'Histoire des Animaux
attestent qu'il joignait des dessins à ses observations et à ses
théories zoologiques. Les illustrations pittoresques datent donc de
fort loin. L'emploi symbolique des lettres a été appliqué aussi par
Aristote à la Physique. Il l'avait emprunté, sans doute, aux procédés
des mathématiciens."

We may remark, however, that when Aristotle proceeds to specify those
combinations of propositions which _do not_ give a valid conclusion,
he is not satisfied with giving letters of the alphabet; he superadds
special illustrative examples (Analyt. Prior. I. v. p. 27, a. 7, 12,
34, 38).]

[Footnote 24: Aristot. Analyt. Prior. I. iv. p. 25, b. 35: [Greek:
kalô= de\ _me/son_, o(\ kai\ au)to\ e)n a)/llô| kai\ a)/llo e)n
tou/tô| e)sti/n, o(\ kai\ tê=| the/sei gi/netai me/son.]]

The Modes of each figure are distinguished by the different character
and relation of the two premisses, according as these are either
affirmative or negative, either universal or particular. Accordingly,
there are four possible varieties of each, and sixteen possible modes
or varieties of combinations between the two. Aristotle goes through
most of the sixteen modes, and shows that in the first Figure there
are only four among them that are legitimate, carrying with them a
necessary conclusion. He shows, farther, that in all the four there
are two conditions observed, and that both these conditions are
indispensable in the First figure:--(1) The major proposition must be
universal, either affirmative or negative; (2) The minor proposition
must be affirmative, either universal or particular or indefinite.
Such must be the character of the premisses, in the first Figure,
wherever the conclusion is valid and necessary; and _vice versâ_, the
conclusion will be valid and necessary, when such is the character of
the premisses.[25]

[Footnote 25: Aristot. Analyt. Prior. I. iv. p. 26, b. 26, et sup.]

In regard to the four valid modes (_Barbara_, _Celarent_, _Darii_,
_Ferio_, as we read in the scholastic Logic) Aristotle declares at
once in general language that the conclusion follows necessarily;
which he illustrates by setting down in alphabetical letters the
skeleton of a syllogism in _Barbara_. If A is predicated of all B,
and B of all C, A must necessarily be predicated of all C. But he
does not justify it by any real example; he produces no special
syllogism with real terms, and with a conclusion known beforehand to
be true. He seems to think that the general doctrine will be accepted
as evident without any such corroboration. He counts upon the
learner's memory and phantasy for supplying, out of the past
discourse of common life, propositions conforming to the conditions
in which the symbolical letters have been placed, and for not
supplying any contradictory examples. This might suffice for a
treatise; but we may reasonably believe that Aristotle, when teaching
in his school, would superadd illustrative examples; for the doctrine
was then novel, and he is not unmindful of the errors into which
learners often fall spontaneously.[26]

[Footnote 26: Analyt. Poster. I. xxiv. p. 85, b. 21.]

When he deals with the remaining or invalid modes of the First
figure, his manner of showing their invalidity is different, and in
itself somewhat curious. "If (he says) the major term is affirmed of
all the middle, while the middle is denied of all the minor, no
necessary consequence follows from such being the fact, nor will
there be any syllogism of the two extremes; for it is equally
possible, either that the major term may be affirmed of all the
minor, or that it may be denied of all the minor; so that no
conclusion, either universal or particular, is necessary in all
cases."[27] Examples of such double possibility are then exhibited:
first, of three terms arranged in two propositions (A and E), in
which, from the terms specially chosen, the major happens to be truly
affirmable of all the minor; so that the third proposition is an
universal Affirmative:--

Major and  }
           } Animal is predicable of every Man;
  Middle.  }

Middle and }
           } Man is not predicable of any Horse;
  Minor    }

Major and  }
           } Animal is predicable of every Horse.
  Minor    }

Next, a second example is set out with new terms, in which the major
happens not to be truly predicable of any of the minor; thus
exhibiting as third proposition an universal Negative:--

Major and  }
           } Animal is predicable of every Man;
  Middle.  }

Middle and }
           } Man is not predicable of any Stone;
  Minor    }

Major and  }
           } Animal is not predicable of any Stone.
  Minor    }

Here we see that the full exposition of a syllogism is indicated with
real terms common and familiar to every one; alphabetical symbols
would not have sufficed, for the learner must himself recognize the
one conclusion as true, the other as false. Hence we are taught that,
after two premisses thus conditioned, if we venture to join together
the major and minor so as to form a pretended conclusion, we may in
some cases obtain a true proposition universally Affirmative, in
other cases a true proposition universally Negative. Therefore
(Aristotle argues) there is no one necessary conclusion, the same in
all cases, derivable from such premisses; in other words, this mode
of syllogism is invalid and proves nothing. He applies the like
reasoning to all the other invalid modes of the first Figure; setting
them aside in the same way, and producing examples wherein double and
opposite conclusions (improperly so called), both true, are obtained
in different cases from the like arrangement of premisses.

[Footnote 27: Analyt. Prior. I. iv. p. 26, a. 2, seq.]

This mode of reasoning plainly depends upon an appeal to prior
experience. The validity or invalidity of each mode of the First
figure is tested by applying it to different particular cases, each
of which is familiar and known to the learner _aliunde_; in one case,
the conjunction of the major and minor terms in the third proposition
makes an universal Affirmative which he knows to be true; in another
case, the like conjunction makes an universal Negative, which he also
knows to be true; so that there is no one _necessary_ (_i.e._ no one
uniform and trustworthy) conclusion derivable from such
premisses.[28] In other words, these modes of the First figure are
not valid or available in form; the negation being sufficiently
proved by one single undisputed example.

[Footnote 28: Though M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire (note, p. 19) declares
Aristotle's exposition to be a model of analysis, it appears to me
that the grounds for disallowing this invalid mode of the First
figure (A--E--A, or A--E--E) are not clearly set forth by Aristotle
himself, while they are rendered still darker by some of his best
commentators. Thus Waitz says (p. 381): "Per exempla allata probat
(Aristoteles) quod demonstrare debebat ex ipsâ ratione quam singuli
termini inter se habeant: est enim proprium artis logicæ, ut
terminorum rationem cognoscat, dum res ignoret. Num de Caio
prædicetur animal nescit, scit de Caio prædicari animal, si animal de
homine et homo de Caio prædicetur."

This comment of Waitz appears to me founded in error. Aristotle had
no means of shewing the invalidity of the mode A E in the First
figure, except by an appeal to particular examples. The invalidity of
the invalid modes, and the validity of the valid modes, rest alike
upon this ultimate reference to examples of propositions known to be
true or false, by prior experience of the learner. The valid modes
are those which will stand this trial and verification; the invalid
modes are those which will not stand it. Not till such verification
has been made, is one warranted in generalizing the result, and
enunciating a formula applicable to unknown particulars (rationem
terminorum cognoscere, dum res ignoret). It was impossible for
Aristotle to do what Waitz requires of him. I take the opposite
ground, and regret that he did not set forth the fundamental test of
appeal to example and experience, in a more emphatic and
unmistakeable manner.

M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire (in the note to his translation, p. 14)
does not lend any additional clearness, when he talks of the
"_conclusion_" from the propositions A and E in the First figure.
Julius Pacius says (p. 134): "Si tamen _conclusio_ dici debet, quæ
non colligitur ex propositionibus," &c. Moreover, M. St. Hilaire (p.
19) slurs over the legitimate foundation, the appeal to experience,
much as Aristotle himself does: "Puis prenant des exemples où la
_conclusion est de toute évidence_, Aristote les applique
successivement à chacune de ces combinaisons; celles qui donnent la
_conclusion fournie d'ailleurs par le bon sens_, sont concluantes ou
syllogistiques, les autres sont asyllogistiques."]

We are now introduced to the Second figure, in which each of the two
premisses has the middle term as Predicate.[29] To give a legitimate
conclusion in this figure, one or other of the premisses must be
negative, and the major premiss must be universal; moreover no
affirmative conclusions can ever be obtained in it--none but negative
conclusions, universal or particular. In this Second figure too,
Aristotle recognizes four valid modes; setting aside the other
possible modes as invalid[30] (in the same way as he had done in the
First figure), because the third proposition or conjunction of the
major term with the minor, might in some cases be a true universal
affirmative, in other cases a true universal negative. As to the
third and fourth of the valid modes, he demonstrates them by assuming
the contradictory of the conclusion, together with the major premiss,
and then showing that these two premisses form a new syllogism, which
leads to a conclusion contradicting the minor premiss. This method,
called _Reductio ad Impossibile_, is here employed for the first
time; and employed without being ushered in or defined, as if it were
familiarly known.[31]

[Footnote 29: Analyt. Prior. I. v. p. 26, b. 34. As Aristotle
enunciates a proposition by putting the predicate before the subject,
he says that in this Second figure the middle term comes [Greek:
prô=ton tê=| the/sei]. In the Third figure, for the same reason, he
calls it [Greek: e)/schaton tê=| the/sei], vi. p. 28, a. 15.]

[Footnote 30: Analyt. Prior. I. v. p. 27, a. 18. In these invalid
modes, Aristotle says there is no _syllogism_; therefore we cannot
properly speak of a _conclusion_, but only of a third proposition,
conjoining the major with the minor.]

[Footnote 31: Ibid. p. 27, a. 15, 26, seq. It is said to involve
[Greek: u(po/thesis], p. 28, a. 7; to be [Greek: e)x u(pothe/seôs]
xxiii. p. 41, a. 25; to be [Greek: tou= e)x u(pothe/seôs], as opposed
to [Greek: deiktiko/s], xxiii. p. 40, b. 25.

M. B. St. Hilaire remarks justly, that Aristotle might be expected to
define or explain what it is, on first mentioning it (note, p. 22).]

Lastly, we have the Third figure, wherein the middle term is the
Subject in both premisses. Here one at least of the premisses must be
universal, either affirmative or negative. But no universal
conclusions can be obtained in this figure; all the conclusions are
particular. Aristotle recognizes six legitimate modes; in all of
which the conclusions are particular, four of them being affirmative,
two negative. The other possible modes he sets aside as in the two
preceding figures.[32]

[Footnote 32: Ibid. I. vi. p. 28, a. 10-p. 29, a. 18.]

But Aristotle assigns to the First figure a marked superiority as
compared with the Second and Third. It is the only one that yields
perfect syllogisms; those furnished by the other two are all
imperfect. The cardinal principle of syllogistic proof, as he
conceives it, is--That whatever can be affirmed or denied of a whole,
can be affirmed or denied of any part thereof.[33] The major
proposition affirms or denies something universally respecting a
certain whole; the minor proposition declares a certain part to be
included in that whole. To this principle the four modes of the First
figure manifestly and unmistakably conform, without any
transformation of their premisses. But in the other figures such
conformity does not obviously appear, and must be demonstrated by
reducing their syllogisms to the First figure; either ostensively by
exposition of a particular case, and conversion of the premisses, or
by _Reductio ad Impossibile_. Aristotle, accordingly, claims
authority for the Second and Third figures only so far as they can be
reduced to the First.[34] We must, however, observe that in this
process of reduction no new evidence is taken in; the matter of
evidence remains unchanged, and the form alone is altered, according
to laws of logical conversion which Aristotle has already laid down
and justified. Another ground of the superiority and perfection which
he claims for the First figure, is, that it is the only one in which
every variety of conclusion can be proved; and especially the only
one in which the Universal Affirmative can be proved--the great aim
of scientific research. Whereas, in the Second figure we can prove
only _negative_ conclusions, universal or particular; and in the
Third figure only _particular_ conclusions, affirmative or
negative.[35]

[Footnote 33: Ibid. I. xli. p. 49, b. 37: [Greek: o(/lôs ga\r o(\ mê/
e)stin ô(s o(/lon pro\s me/ros kai\ a)/llo pro\s tou=to ô(s me/ros
pro\s o(/lon, e)x ou)deno\s tô=n toiou/tôn dei/knusin o( deiknu/ôn,
ô(/ste ou)de\ gi/netai sullogismo/s.]

He had before said this about the relation of the three terms in the
Syllogism, I. iv. p. 25, b. 32: [Greek: o(/tan o(/roi trei=s ou(/tôs
e)/chôsi pro\s a)llê/lous ô(/ste to\n e)/schaton e)n o(/lô| ei)=nai
tô=| me/sô| kai\ to\n me/son e)n o(/lô| tô=| prô/tô| ê)\ ei)=nai ê)\
mê\ ei)=nai, a)na/gkê tô=n a)/krôn ei)=nai sullogismo\n te/leion]
(_Dictum de Omni et Nullo_).]

[Footnote 34: Analyt. Prior. I. vii. p. 29, a. 30-b. 25.]

[Footnote 35: Ibid. I. iv. p. 26, b. 30, p. 27, a. 1, p. 28, a. 9, p.
29, a. 15. An admissible syllogism in the Second or Third figure is
sometimes called [Greek: dunato\s] as opposed to [Greek: te/leios],
p. 41, b. 33. Compare Kampe, Die Erkenntniss-Theorie des Aristoteles,
p. 245, Leipzig, 1870.]

Such are the main principles of syllogistic inference and rules for
syllogistic reasoning, as laid down by Aristotle. During the mediæval
period, they were allowed to ramify into endless subtle
technicalities, and to absorb the attention of teachers and studious
men, long after the time when other useful branches of science and
literature were pressing for attention. Through such prolonged
monopoly--which Aristotle, among the most encyclopedical of all
writers, never thought of claiming for them--they have become so
discredited, that it is difficult to call back attention to them as
they stood in the Aristotelian age. We have to remind the reader,
again, that though language was then used with great ability for
rhetorical and dialectical purposes, there existed as yet hardly any
systematic or scientific study of it in either of these branches. The
scheme and the terminology of any such science were alike unknown,
and Aristotle was obliged to construct it himself from the
foundation. The rhetorical and dialectical teaching as then given (he
tells us) was mere unscientific routine, prescribing specimens of art
to be committed to memory: respecting syllogism (or the conditions of
legitimate deductive inference) absolutely nothing had been said.[36]
Under these circumstances, his theory of names, notions, and
propositions as employed for purposes of exposition and
ratiocination, is a remarkable example of original inventive power.
He had to work it out by patient and laborious research. No way was
open to him except the diligent comparison and analysis of
propositions. And though all students have now become familiar with
the various classes of terms and propositions, together with their
principal characteristics and relations, yet to frame and designate
such classes for the first time without any precedent to follow, to
determine for each the rules and conditions of logical
convertibility, to put together the constituents of the Syllogism,
with its graduation of Figures and difference of Modes, and with a
selection, justified by reasons given, between the valid and the
invalid modes--all this implies a high order of original
systematizing genius, and must have required the most laborious and
multiplied comparisons between propositions in detail.

[Footnote 36: Aristot. Sophist. Elench. p. 184, a. 1, b. 2: [Greek:
dio/per tachei=a me\n a)/technos d' ê)=n ê( didaskali/a toi=s
mantha/nousi par' au)tô=n; ou) ga\r te/chnên a)lla\ ta\ a)po\ tê=s
te/chnês dido/ntes paideu/ein u(pela/mbanon . . . . _peri\ de\ tou=
sullogi/zesthai pantelô=s ou)de\n ei)/chomen pro/teron a)/llo
le/gein, a)ll' ê)\ tribê=| zêtou=ntes polu\n chro/non e)ponou=men_.]]

The preceding abridgment of Aristotle's exposition of the Syllogism
applies only to propositions simply affirmative or simply negative.
But Aristotle himself, as already remarked, complicates the
exposition by putting the Modal propositions (Possible, Necessary)
upon the same line as the above-mentioned Simple propositions. I have
noticed, in dealing with the treatise De Interpretatione, the
confusion that has arisen from thus elevating the Modals into a line
of classification co-ordinate with propositions simply Assertory. In
the Analytica, this confusion is still more sensibly felt, from the
introduction of syllogisms in which one of the premisses is
necessary, while the other is only possible. We may remark, however,
that, in the Analytica, Aristotle is stricter in defining the
Possible than he has been in the De Interpretatione; for he now
disjoins the Possible altogether from the Necessary, making it
equivalent to the Problematical (not merely _may be_, but _may be or
may not be_).[37] In the middle, too, of his diffuse exposition of
the Modals, he inserts one important remark, respecting universal
propositions generally, which belongs quite as much to the preceding
exposition about propositions simply assertory. He observes that
universal propositions have nothing to do with time, present, past,
or future; but are to be understood in a sense absolute and
unqualified.[38]

[Footnote 37: Analyt. Prior. I. viii. p. 29, a. 32; xiii. p. 32, a.
20-36: [Greek: to\ ga\r a)nagkai=on o(mônu/môs e)nde/chesthai
le/gomen]. In xiv. p. 33, b. 22, he excludes this equivocal meaning
of [Greek: to\ e)ndecho/menon--dei= de\ to\ e)nde/chestha lamba/nein
mê\ e)n toi=s a)nagkai/ois, a)lla\ kata\ to\n ei)rême/non
diorismo/n.] See xiii. p. 32, a. 33, where [Greek: to\ e)nde/chesthai
u(pa/rchein] is asserted to be equivalent to or convertible with
[Greek: to\ e)nde/chesthai mê\ u(pa/rchein]; and xix. p. 38, a. 35:
[Greek: to\ e)x a)na/gkês ou)k ê)=n _e)ndecho/menon_]. Theophrastus
and Eudemus differed from Aristotle about his theory of the Modals in
several points (Scholia ad Analyt. Priora, pp. 161, b. 30; 162, b.
23; 166, a. 12, b. 15, Brand.). Respecting the want of clearness in
Aristotle about [Greek: to\ e)ndecho/menon], see Waitz's note **ad p.
32, b. 16. Moreover, he sometimes uses [Greek: u(pa/rchon] in the
widest sense, including [Greek: e)ndecho/menon] and [Greek:
a)nagkai=on], xxiii. p. 40, b. 24.]

[Footnote 38: Analyt. Prior. I. xv. p. 34, b. 7.]

Having finished with the Modals, Aristotle proceeds to lay it down,
that all demonstration must fall under one or other of the three
figures just described; and therefore that all may be reduced
ultimately to the two first modes of the First figure. You cannot
proceed a step with two terms only and one proposition only. You must
have two propositions including three terms; the middle term
occupying the place assigned to it in one or other of the three
figures.[39] This is obviously true when you demonstrate by direct or
ostensive syllogism; and it is no less true when you proceed by
_Reductio ad Impossibile_. This last is one mode of syllogizing from
an hypothesis or assumption:[40] your conclusion being disputed, you
prove it indirectly, by assuming its contradictory to be true, and
constructing a new syllogism by means of that contradictory together
with a second premiss admitted to be true; the conclusion of this new
syllogism being a proposition obviously false or known beforehand to
be false. Your demonstration must be conducted by a regular
syllogism, as it is when you proceed directly and ostensively. The
difference is, that the conclusion which you obtain is not that which
you wish ultimately to arrive at, but something notoriously false.
But as this false conclusion arises from your assumption or
hypothesis that the contradictory of the conclusion originally
disputed was true, you have indirectly made out your case that this
contradictory must have been false, and therefore that the conclusion
originally disputed was true. All this, however, has been
demonstration by regular syllogism, but starting from an hypothesis
assumed and admitted as one of the premisses.[41]

[Footnote 39: Ibid. xxiii. p. 40, b. 20, p. 41, a. 4-20.]

[Footnote 40: Ibid. p. 40, b. 25: [Greek: e)/ti ê)\ deiktikô=s ê)\
e)x u(pothe/seôs; tou= d' _e)x u(pothe/seôs_ me/ros to\ dia\ tou=
a)duna/tou.]]

[Footnote 41: Ibid. p. 41, b. 23: [Greek: pa/ntes ga\r oi( dia\ tou=
a)duna/tou perai/nontes to\ me\n pseu=dos sullogi/zontai, to\ d' e)x
a)rchê=s _e)x u(pothe/seôs_ deiknu/ousin, o(/tan a)du/nato/n ti
sumbai/nê| tê=s a)ntipha/seôs tethei/sês.]

It deserves to be remarked that Aristotle uses the phrase [Greek:
sullogismo\s _e)x u(pothe/seôs_], not [Greek: sullogismo\s
u(pothetiko/s]. This bears upon the question as to his views upon
what subsequently received the title of _hypothetical syllogisms_;
a subject to which I shall advert in a future note.]

Aristotle here again enforces what he had before urged--that in every
valid syllogism, one premiss at least must be affirmative, and one
premiss at least must be universal. If the conclusion be universal,
both premisses must be so likewise; if it be particular, one of the
premisses may not be universal. But without one universal premiss at
least, there can be no syllogistic proof. If you have a thesis to
support, you cannot assume (or ask to be conceded to you) that very
thesis, without committing _petitio principii,_ (_i.e._ _quæsiti_ or
_probandi_); you must assume (or ask to have conceded to you) some
universal proposition containing it and more besides; under which
universal you may bring the subject of your thesis as a minor, and
thus the premisses necessary for supporting it will be completed.
Aristotle illustrates this by giving a demonstration that the angles
at the base of an isosceles triangle are equal; justifying every step
in the reasoning by an appeal to some universal proposition.[42]

[Footnote 42: Analyt. Prior. I. xxiv. p. 41, b. 6-31. The
demonstration given (b. 13-22) is different from that which we read
in Euclid, and is not easy to follow. It is more clearly explained by
Waitz (p. 434) than either by Julius Pacius or by M. Barth. St.
Hilaire (p. 108).]

Again, every demonstration is effected by two propositions (an _even_
number) and by three terms (an _odd_ number); though the same
proposition may perhaps be demonstrable by more than one pair of
premisses, or through more than one middle term;[43] that is, by two
or more distinct syllogisms. If there be more than three terms and
two propositions, either the syllogism will no longer be one but
several; or there must be particulars introduced for the purpose of
obtaining an universal by induction; or something will be included,
superfluous and not essential to the demonstration, perhaps for the
purpose of concealing from the respondent the real inference
meant.[44] In the case (afterwards called _Sorites_) where the
ultimate conclusion is obtained through several mean terms in
continuous series, the number of terms will always exceed by one the
number of propositions; but the numbers may be odd or even, according
to circumstances. As terms are added, the total of intermediate
conclusions, if drawn out in form, will come to be far greater than
that of the terms or propositions, multiplying as it will do in an
increasing ratio to them.[45]

[Footnote 43: Ibid. I. xxv. p. 41, b. 36, seq.]

[Footnote 44: Ibid. xxv. p. 42, a. 23: [Greek: ma/tên e)/stai
ei)lêmme/na, ei) mê\ e)pagôgê=s ê)\ kru/pseôs ê)/ tinos a)/llou tô=n
toiou/tôn cha/rin.] Ib. a. 38: [Greek: ou(=tos o( lo/gos ê)\ ou)
sullelo/gistai ê)\ plei/ô tô=n a)nagkai/ôn ê)rô/têke pro\s tê\n
the/sin.]]

[Footnote 45: Ibid. p. 42, b. 5-26.]

It will be seen clearly from the foregoing remarks that there is a
great difference between one thesis and another as to facility of
attack or defence in Dialectic. If the thesis be an Universal
Affirmative proposition, it can be demonstrated only in the First
figure, and only by one combination of premisses; while, on the other
hand, it can be impugned either by an universal negative, which can
be demonstrated both in the First and Second figures, or by a
particular negative, which can be demonstrated in all the three
figures. Hence an Universal Affirmative thesis is at once the hardest
to defend and the easiest to oppugn: more so than either a Particular
Affirmative, which can be proved both in the First and Third figures;
or a Universal Negative, which can be proved either in First or
Second.[46] To the opponent, an universal thesis affords an easier
victory than a particular thesis; in fact, speaking generally, his
task is easier than that of the defendant.

[Footnote 46: Analyt. Prior. I. xxvi. p. 42, b. 27, p. 43, a. 15.]

In the Analytica Priora, Aristotle proceeds to tell us that he
contemplates not only theory, but also practice and art. The reader
must be taught, not merely to understand the principles of Syllogism,
but likewise where he can find the matter for constructing syllogisms
readily, and how he can obtain the principles of demonstration
pertinent to each thesis propounded.[47]

[Footnote 47: Ibid. I. xxvii. p. 43, a. 20: [Greek: pô=s d'
eu)porê/somen au)toi\ pro\s to\ tithe/menon a)ei\ sullogismô=n, kai\
dia\ poi/as o(dou= lêpso/metha ta\s peri\ e(/kaston a)rcha/s, nu=n
ê)/dê lekte/on; ou) ga\r mo/non i)/sôs dei= tê\n ge/nesin theôrei=n
tô=n sullogismô=n, a)lla\ kai\ tê\n du/namin e)/chein tou= poiei=n.]
The second section of Book I. here begins.]

A thesis being propounded in appropriate terms, with subject and
predicate, how are you the propounder to seek out arguments for its
defence? In the first place, Aristotle reverts to the distinction
already laid down at the beginning of the Categoriæ.[48] Individual
things or persons are subjects only, never appearing as
predicates--this is the lowest extremity of the logical scale: at
the opposite extremity of the scale, there are the highest
generalities, predicates only, and not subjects of any predication,
though sometimes supposed to be such, as matters of dialectic
discussion.[49] Between the lowest and highest we have intermediate
or graduate generalities, appearing sometimes as subjects, sometimes
as predicates; and it is among these that the materials both of
problems for debate, and of premisses for proof, are usually
found.[50]

[Footnote 48: Ibid. I. xxvii. p. 43, a. 25, seq.]

[Footnote 49: Ibid. p. 43, a. 39: [Greek: plê\n ei) mê\ kata\
do/xan]. Cf. Schol. of Alexander, p. 175, a. 44, Br.: [Greek:
e)ndo/xôs kai\ dialektikô=s, ô(/sper ei)=pen e)n toi=s Topikoi=s],
that even the _principia_ of science may be debated; for example, in
book B. of the Metaphysica. Aristotle does not recognize either
[Greek: to\ o)/n] or [Greek: to\ e(/n] as true genera, but only as
predicates.]

[Footnote 50: Ibid. a. 40-43.]

You must begin by putting down, along with the matter in hand itself,
its definition and its _propria_; after that, its other predicates;
next, those predicates which _cannot_ belong to it; lastly, those
other subjects, of which it may itself be predicated. You must
classify its various predicates distinguishing the essential, the
_propria_, and the accidental; also distinguishing the true and
unquestionable, from the problematical and hypothetical.[51] You must
look out for those predicates which belong to it as subject
universally, and not to certain portions of it only; since universal
propositions are indispensable in syllogistic proof, and indefinite
propositions can only be reckoned as particular. When a subject is
included in some larger genus--as, for example, man in animal--you
must not look for the affirmative or negative predicates which belong
to animal universally (since all these will of course belong to man
also) but for those which distinguish man from other animals; nor
must you, in searching for those lower subjects of which man is the
predicate, fix your attention on the higher genus animal; for animal
will of course be predicable of all those of which man is predicable.
You must collect what pertains to man specially, either as predicate
or subject; nor merely that which pertains to him necessarily and
universally, but also usually and in the majority of cases; for most
of the problems debated belong to this latter class, and the worth of
the conclusion will be co-ordinate with that of the premisses.[52]**
Do not select predicates that are predicable[53] both of the
predicate and subject; for no valid affirmative conclusion can be
obtained from them.

[Footnote 51: Analyt. Prior. I. xxvii. p. 43, b. 8: [Greek: kai\
tou/tôn poi=a doxastikô=s kai\ poi=a kat' a)lê/theian.]]

[Footnote 52: Ibid. I. xxvii. p. 43, b. 10-35.]

[Footnote 53: Ibid. b. 36: [Greek: e)/ti ta\ pa=sin e(po/mena ou)k
e)klekte/on; ou) ga\r e)/stai sullogismo\s e)x au)tô=n.] The phrase
[Greek: ta\ pa=sin e(po/mena], as denoting predicates applicable both
to the predicate and to the subject, is curious. We should hardly
understand it, if it were not explained a little further on, p. 44,
b. 21. Both the Scholiast and the modern commentators understand
[Greek: ta\ pa=sin e(po/mena] in this sense; and I do not venture to
depart from them. At the same time, when I read six lines afterwards
(p. 44, b. 26) the words [Greek: oi(=on ei) ta\ e(po/mena e(kate/rô|
tau)ta/ e)stin]--in which the same meaning as that which the
commentators ascribe to [Greek: ta\ pa=sin e(po/mena] is given in its
own special and appropriate terms, and thus the same supposition
unnecessarily repeated--I cannot help suspecting that Aristotle
intends [Greek: ta\ pa=sin e(po/mena] to mean something different; to
mean such wide and universal predicates as [Greek: to\ e(\n] and
[Greek: to\ o)/n] which soar above the Categories and apply to every
thing, but denote no real _genera_.]

Thus, when the thesis to be maintained is an universal affirmative
(_e.g._ A is predicable of all E), you will survey all the subjects
to which A will apply as predicate, and all the predicates applying
to E as subject. If these two lists coincide in any point, a middle
term will be found for the construction of a good syllogism in the
First figure. Let B represent the list of predicates belonging
universally to A; D, the list of predicates which cannot belong to
it; C, the list of subjects to which A pertains universally as
predicate. Likewise, let F represent the list of predicates belonging
universally to E; H, the list of predicates that cannot belong to E;
G, the list of subjects to which E is applicable as predicate. If,
under these suppositions, there is any coincidence between the list C
and the list F, you can construct a syllogism (in _Barbara_, Fig. 1),
demonstrating that A belongs to _all_ E; since the predicate in F
belongs to all E, and A universally to the subject in C. If the list
C coincides in any point with the list G, you can prove that A
belongs to _some_ E, by a syllogism (in _Darapti_, Fig. 3). If, on
the other hand, the list F coincides in any point with the list D,
you can prove that A cannot belong to any E: for the predicate in D
cannot belong to any A, and therefore (by converting simply the
universal negative) A cannot belong as predicate to any D; but D
coincides with F, and F belongs to all E; accordingly, a syllogism
(in _Celarent_, Fig. 1) may be constructed, shewing that A cannot
belong to any E. So also, if B coincides in any point with H, the
same conclusion can be proved; for the predicate in B belongs to all
A, but B coincides with H, which belongs to no E; whence you obtain a
syllogism (in _Camestres_, Fig. 2), shewing that no A belongs to
E.[54] In collecting the predicates and subjects both of A and of E,
the highest and most universal expression of them is to be preferred,
as affording the largest grasp for the purpose of obtaining a
suitable middle term.[55] It will be seen (as has been declared
already) that every syllogism obtained will have three terms and two
propositions; and that it will be in one or other of the three
figures above described.[56]

[Footnote 54: Analyt. Prior. I. xxviii. p. 43, b. 39-p. 44, a. 35.]

[Footnote 55: Ibid. p. 44, a. 39. Alexander and Philoponus (Scholia,
p. 177, a. 19, 39, Brandis) point out an inconsistency between what
Aristotle says here and what he had said in one of the preceding
paragraphs, dissuading the inquirer from attending to the highest
generalities, and recommending him to look only at both subject and
predicate in their special place on the logical scale. Alexander's
way of removing the inconsistency is not successful: I doubt if there
be an inconsistency. I understand Aristotle _here_ to mean only that
the universal expression KZ ([Greek: to\ katho/lou Z]) is to be
preferred to the indefinite or indeterminate (simply Z, [Greek:
a)dio/riston]), also K[Greek: G] ([Greek: to\ katho/lou G]) to simple
[Greek: G (a)dio/riston)]. This appears to me not inconsistent with
the recommendation which Aristotle had given before.]

[Footnote 56: Ibid. p. 44, b. 6-20.]

The way just pointed out is the only way towards obtaining a suitable
middle term. If, for example, you find some predicate applicable both
to A and E, this will not conduct you to a valid syllogism; you will
only obtain a syllogism in the Second figure with two affirmative
premisses, which will not warrant any conclusion. Or if you find some
predicate which cannot belong either to A or to E, this again will
only give you a syllogism in the Second figure with two negative
premisses, which leads to nothing. So also, if you have a term of
which A can be predicated, but which cannot be predicated of E, you
derive from it only a syllogism in the First figure, with its minor
negative; and this, too, is invalid. Lastly, if you have a subject,
of which neither A nor E can be predicated, your syllogism
constructed from these conditions will have both its premisses
negative, and will therefore be worthless.[57]

[Footnote 57: Analyt. Prior. I. xxviii. p. 44, b. 25-37.]

In the survey prescribed, nothing is gained by looking out for
predicates (of A and E) which are different or opposite: we must
collect such as are identical, since our purpose is to obtain from
them a suitable middle term, which must be the same in both
premisses. It is true that if the list B (containing the predicates
universally belonging to A) and the list F (containing the predicates
universally belonging to E) are incompatible or contrary to each
other, you will arrive at a syllogism proving that no A can belong to
E. But this syllogism will proceed, not so much from the fact that B
and F are incompatible, as from the other fact, distinct though
correlative, that B will to a certain extent coincide with H (the
list of predicates which cannot belong to E). The middle term and the
syllogism constituted thereby, is derived from the coincidence
between B and H, not from the opposition between B and F. Those who
derive it from the latter, overlook or disregard the real source, and
adopt a point of view merely incidental and irrelevant.[58]

[Footnote 58: Ibid. p. 44, b. 38-p. 45, a. 22. [Greek: sumbai/nei dê\
toi=s ou(/tôs e)piskopou=si prosepible/pein a)/llên o(do\n tê=s
a)nagkai/as, dia\ to\ lantha/nein tê\n tau)to/têta tô=n B kai\ tô=n
Th.]]

The precept here delivered--That in order to obtain middle terms and
good syllogisms, you must study and collect both the predicates and
the subjects of the two terms of your thesis--Aristotle declares to
be equally applicable to all demonstration, whether direct or by way
of _Reductio ad Impossibile_. In both the process of demonstration is
the same--involving two premisses, three terms, and one of the three
a suitable middle term. The only difference is, that in the direct
demonstration, both premisses are propounded as true, while in the
_Reductio ad Impossibile_, one of the premisses is assumed as true
though known to be false, and the conclusion also.[59] In the other
cases of hypothetical syllogism your attention must be directed, not
to the original _quæsitum_, but to the condition annexed thereto; yet
the search for predicates, subjects, and a middle term, must be
conducted in the same manner.[60] Sometimes, by the help of a
condition extraneous to the premisses, you may demonstrate an
universal from a particular: _e.g._, Suppose C (the list of subjects
to which A belongs as predicate) and G (the list of subjects to which
E belongs as predicate) to be identical; and suppose farther that the
subjects in G are the _only_ ones to which E belongs as predicate
(this seems to be the _extraneous_ or _extra-syllogistic_ condition
assumed, on which Aristotle's argument turns); then, A will be
applicable to all E. Or if D (the list of predicates which cannot
belong to A) and G (the list of subjects to which E belongs as
predicate) are identical; then, assuming the like extraneous
condition, A will not be applicable to any E.[61] In both these
cases, the conclusion is more universal than the premisses; but it is
because we take in an hypothetical assumption, in addition to the
premisses.

[Footnote 59: Ibid. I. xxix. p. 45, a. 25-b. 15.]

[Footnote 60: Ibid. I. xxix. p. 45, b. 15-20. This paragraph is very
obscure. Neither Alexander, nor Waitz, nor St. Hilaire clears it up
**completely. See Schol. pp. 178, b., 179, a. Brandis.

Aristotle concludes by saying that syllogisms from an hypothesis
ought to be reviewed and classified into varieties--[Greek:
e)piske/psasthai de\ dei= kai\ dielei=n posachô=s oi( e)x
u(pothe/seôs] (b. 20). But it is doubtful whether he himself ever
executed this classification. It was done in the Analytica of his
successor Theophrastus (Schol. p. 179, a. 6, 24). Compare the note of
M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire, p. 140.]


[Footnote 61: Analyt. Prior. I. xxix. p. 45, b. 21-30.]

Aristotle has now shown a method of procedure common to all
investigations and proper for the solution of all problems, wherever
soluble. He has shown, first, all the conditions and varieties of
probative Syllogism, two premisses and three terms, with the place
required for the middle term in each of the three figures; next, the
quarter in which we are to look for all the materials necessary or
suitable for constructing valid syllogisms. Having the two terms of
the thesis given, we must study the predicates and subjects belonging
to both, and must provide a large list of them; out of which list we
must make selection according to the purpose of the moment. Our
selection will be different, according as we wish to prove or to
refute, and according as the conclusion that we wish to prove is an
universal or a particular. The lesson here given will be most useful
in teaching the reasoner to confine his attention to the sort of
materials really promising, so that he may avoid wasting his time
upon such as are irrelevant.[62]

[Footnote 62: Ibid. b. 36-xxx. p. 46, a. 10.]

This method of procedure is alike applicable to demonstration in
Philosophy or in any of the special sciences,[63] and to debate in
Dialectic. In both, the premisses or _principia_ of syllogisms must
be put together in the same manner, in order to make the syllogism
valid. In both, too, the range of topics falling under examination is
large and varied; each topic will have its own separate premisses or
_principia_, which must be searched out and selected in the way above
described. Experience alone can furnish these _principia_, in each
separate branch or department. Astronomical experience--the observed
facts and phenomena of astronomy--have furnished the data for the
scientific and demonstrative treatment of astronomy. The like with
every other branch of science or art.[64] When the facts in each
branch are brought together, it will be the province of the logician
or analytical philosopher to set out the demonstrations in a manner
clear and fit for use. For if nothing in the way of true matter of
fact has been omitted from our observation, we shall be able to
discover and unfold the demonstration, on every point where
demonstration is possible; and, wherever it is not possible, to make
the impossibility manifest.[65]

[Footnote 63: Ibid. p. 46, a. 8**: [Greek: kata\ me\n a)lê/theian e)k
tô=n kat' a)lê/theian _diagegramme/nôn_ u(pa/rchein, ei)s de\ tou\s
dialektikou\s sullogismou\s e)k tô=n kata\ do/xan prota/seôn.]

Julius Pacius (p. 257) remarks upon the word [Greek: diagegramme/nôn]
as indicating that Aristotle, while alluding to special sciences
distinguishable from philosophy on one side, and from dialectic on
the other, had in view geometrical demonstrations.]

[Footnote 64: Analyt. Prior. I. xxx. p. 46, a. 10-20**: [Greek: ai(
d' a)rchai\ tô=n sullogismô=n katho/lou me\n ei)/rêntai--i)/diai de\
kath' e(ka/stên ai( plei=stai. dio\ ta\s me\n a)rcha\s ta\s peri\
e(/kaston e)mpeiri/as e)/sti paradou=nai. le/gô d' oi(=on tê\n
a)strologikê\n me\n e)mpeiri/an tê=s a)strologikê=s e)pistê/mês;
lêphthe/ntôn ga\r i(kanô=s tô=n phainome/nôn ou(/tôs eu(re/thêsan ai(
a)strologikai\ a)podei/xeis. o(moi/ôs de\ kai\ peri\ a)/llên
o(poianou=n e)/chei te/chnên te kai\ e)pistê/mên.]

What Aristotle says here--of astronomical observation and experience
as furnishing the basis for astronomical science--stands in marked
contrast with Plato, who rejects this basis, and puts aside, with a
sort of contempt, astronomical observation (Republic, vii. pp.
530-531); treating acoustics also in a similar way. Compare Aristot.
Metaphys. [Greek: L]. p. 1073, a. 6, seq., with the commentary of
Bonitz, p. 506.]

[Footnote 65: Analyt. Prior. I. xxx. p. 46, a. 22-27**: [Greek:
ô(/ste a)\n lêphthê=| ta\ u(pa/rchonta peri\ e(/kaston, ê(me/teron
ê)/dê ta\s a)podei/xeis e(toi/môs e)mphani/zein. ei) ga\r mêde\n
_kata\ tê\n i(stori/an_ paraleiphthei/ê tô=n a)lêthô=s u(parcho/ntôn
toi=s pra/gmasin, e(/xomen peri\ a(/pantos ou(= me\n e)/stin
a)po/deixis, tau/tên eu(rei=n kai\ a)podeiknu/nai, ou(= de\ mê\
pe/phuken a)po/deixis, tou=to poiei=n phanero/n.]

Respecting the word [Greek: i(stori/a]--investigation and record of
matters of fact--the first sentence of Herodotus may be compared with
Aristotle, Histor. Animal. p. 491, a. 12; also p. 757, b. 35;
Rhetoric. p. 1359, b. 32.]

For the fuller development of these important principles, the reader
is referred to the treatise on Dialectic, entitled Topica, which we
shall come to in a future chapter. There is nothing in all
Aristotle's writings more remarkable than the testimony here
afforded, how completely he considered all the generalities of
demonstrative science and deductive reasoning to rest altogether on
experience and inductive observation.

We are next introduced to a comparison between the syllogistic
method, as above described and systematized, and the process called
logical Division into _genera_ and _species_; a process much relied
upon by other philosophers, and especially by Plato. This logical
Division, according to Aristotle, is a mere fragment of the
syllogistic procedure; nothing better than a feeble syllogism.[66]
Those who employed it were ignorant both of Syllogism and of its
conditions. They tried to demonstrate--what never can be
demonstrated--the essential constitution of the subject.[67] Instead
of selecting a middle term, as the Syllogism requires, more universal
than the subject but less universal (or not more so) than the
predicate, they inverted the proper order, and took for their middle
term the highest universal. What really requires to be demonstrated,
they never demonstrated but assume.[68]

[Footnote 66: Analyt. Prior. I. xxxi. p. 46, a. 33. Alexander, in
Scholia, p. 180, a. 14. The Platonic method of [Greek: diai/resis] is
exemplified in the dialogues called Sophistês and Politicus; compare
also Philêbus, c. v., p. 15.]

[Footnote 67: Ibid. p. 46, a. 34: [Greek: prô=ton d' au)to\ tou=to
e)lelê/thei tou\s chrôme/nous au)tê=| pa/ntas, kai\ pei/thein
e)pechei/roun ô(s o)/ntos dunatou= peri\ ou)si/as a)po/deixin
gi/nesthai kai\ tou= ti/ e)stin.]]

[Footnote 68: Ibid. p. 46, b. 1-12.]

Thus, they take the subject man, and propose to prove that man is
mortal. They begin by laying down that man is an animal, and that
every animal is either mortal or immortal. Here, the most universal
term, animal, is selected as middle or as medium of proof; while
after all, the conclusion demonstrated is, not that man is mortal,
but that man is either mortal or immortal. The position that man is
mortal, is assumed but not proved.[69] Moreover, by this method of
logical division, all the steps are affirmative and none negative;
there cannot be any refutation of error. Nor can any proof be given
thus respecting _genus_, or _proprium_, or _accidens_; the _genus_ is
assumed, and the method proceeds from thence to _species_ and
_differentia_. No doubtful matter can be settled, and no unknown
point elucidated by this method; nothing can be done except to
arrange in a certain order what is already ascertained and
unquestionable. To many investigations, accordingly, the method is
altogether inapplicable; while even where it is applicable, it leads
to no useful conclusion.[70]

[Footnote 69: Ibid. p. 46, b. 1-12.]

[Footnote 70: Ibid. b. 26-37. Alexander in Schol. p. 180, b. 1.]

We now come to that which Aristotle indicates as the third section of
this First Book of the Analytica Priora. In the first section he
explained the construction and constituents of Syllogism, the
varieties of figure and mode, and the conditions indispensable to a
valid conclusion. In the second section he tells us where we are to
look for the premisses of syllogisms, and how we may obtain a stock
of materials, apt and ready for use when required. There remains one
more task to complete his plan--that he should teach the manner of
reducing argumentation as it actually occurs (often invalid, and even
when valid, often elliptical and disorderly), to the figures of
syllogism as above set forth, for the purpose of testing its
validity.[71] In performing this third part (Aristotle says) we shall
at the same time confirm and illustrate the two preceding parts; for
truth ought in every way to be consistent with itself.[72]

[Footnote 71: Analyt. Prior. I. xxxii. p. 47, a. 2: [Greek: loipo\n
ga\r e)/ti tou=to tê=s ske/pseôs; ei) ga\r tê/n te ge/nesin tô=n
sullogismô=n theôroi=men kai\ tou= eu(ri/skein e)/choimen du/namin,
e)/ti de\ tou\s gegenême/nous a)nalu/oimen ei)s ta\ proeirême/na
schê/mata, te/los a)\n e)/choi ê( e)x a)rchê=s pro/thesis.]]

[Footnote 72: Ibid. a. 8.]

When a piece of reasoning is before us, we must first try to
disengage the two syllogistic premisses (which are more easily
disengaged than the three terms), and note which of them is universal
or particular. The reasoner, however, may not have set out both of
them clearly: sometimes he will leave out the major, sometimes the
minor, and sometimes, even when enunciating both of them, he will
join with them irrelevant matter. In either of these cases we must
ourselves supply what is wanting and strike out the irrelevant.
Without this aid, reduction to regular syllogism is impracticable;
but it is not always easy to see what the exact deficiency is.
Sometimes indeed the conclusion may follow necessarily from what is
implied in the premisses, while yet the premisses themselves do not
form a correct syllogism; for though every such syllogism carries
with it necessity, there may be necessity without a syllogism. In the
process of reduction, we must first disengage and set down the two
premisses, then the three terms; out of which three, that one which
appears twice will be the middle term. If we do not find one term
twice repeated, we have got no middle and no real syllogism. Whether
the syllogism when obtained will be in the first, second, or third
figure, will depend upon the place of the middle term in the two
premisses. We know by the nature of the conclusion which of the three
figures to look for, since we have already seen what conclusions can
be demonstrated in each.[73]

[Footnote 73: Ibid. a. 10-b. 14.]

Sometimes we may get premisses which look like those of a true
syllogism, but are not so in reality; the major proposition ought to
be an universal, but it may happen to be only indefinite, and the
syllogism will not in all cases be valid; yet the distinction between
the two often passes unnoticed.[74] Another source of fallacy is,
that we may set out the terms incorrectly; by putting (in modern
phrase) the abstract instead of the concrete, or abstract in one
premiss and concrete in the other.[75] To guard against this, we
ought to use the concrete term in preference to the abstract. For
example, let the major proposition be, Health cannot belong to any
disease; and the minor. Disease can belong to any man; _Ergo_, Health
cannot belong to any man. This conclusion seems valid, but is not
really so. We ought to substitute concrete terms to this effect:--It
is impossible that the sick can be well; Any man may be sick; _Ergo_,
It is impossible that any man can be well. To the syllogism, now, as
stated in these concrete terms, we may object, that the major is not
true. A person who is at the present moment sick may at a future time
become well. There is therefore no valid syllogism.[76] When we take
the concrete man, we may say with truth that the two contraries,
health-sickness, knowledge-ignorance, _may_ both alike belong to him;
though not to the same individual at the same time.

[Footnote 74: Ibid. I. xxxiii. p. 47, b. 16-40: [Greek: au(/tê me\n
ou)=n ê( a)pa/tê gi/netai e)n tô=| para\ mikro/n; ôs ga\r ou)de\n
diaphe/ron ei)pei=n _to/de tô=|de u(pa/rchein, ê)\ to/de tô=|de
panti\ u(pa/rchein_, sugchôrou=men.]

M. B. St. Hilaire observes in his note (p. 155): "L'erreur vient
uniquement de ce qu'on confond l'universel et l'indeterminé séparés
par une nuance très faible d'expression, qu'on ne doit pas cependant
negliger." Julius Pacius (p. 264) gives the same explanation at
greater length; but the example chosen by Aristotle ([Greek: o(
A)ristome/nês e)sti\ dianoêto\s A)ristome/nês]) appears open to other
objections besides.]

[Footnote 75: Analyt. Prior. I. xxxiv. p. 48, a. 1-28.]

[Footnote 76: Ibid. a. 2-23. See the Scholion of Alexander, p. 181,
b. 16-27, Brandis.]

Again, we must not suppose that we can always find one distinct and
separate name belonging to each term. Sometimes one or all of the
three terms can only be expressed by an entire phrase or proposition.
In such cases it is very difficult to reduce the reasoning into
regular syllogism. We may even be deceived into fancying that there
are syllogisms without any middle term at all, because there is no
single word to express it. For example, let A represent equal to two
right angles; B, triangle; C, isosceles. Then we have a regular
syllogism, with an explicit and single-worded middle term; A belongs
first to B, and then to C through B as middle term (triangle). But
how do we know that A belongs to B? We know it by demonstration; for
it is a demonstrable truth that every triangle has its three angles
equal to two right angles. Yet there is no other more general truth
about triangles from which it is a deduction; it belongs to the
triangle _per se_, and follows from the fundamental properties of the
figure.[77] There is, however, a middle term in the demonstration,
though it is not single-worded and explicit; it is a declaratory
proposition or a fact. We must not suppose that there can be any
demonstration without a middle term, either single-worded or
many-worded.

[Footnote 77: Ibid. I. xxxv. p. 48, a. 30-39: [Greek: phanero\n o(/ti
to\ me/son ou)ch ou(/tôs a)ei\ lêpte/on ô(s to/de ti, a)ll' e)ni/ote
lo/gon, o(/per sumbai/nei ka)pi\ tou= lechthe/ntos.] A good Scholion
of Philoponus is given, p. 181, b. 28-45, Brand.]

When we are reducing any reasoning to a syllogistic form, and tracing
out the three terms of which it is composed, we must expose or set
out these terms in the nominative case; but when we actually
construct the syllogism or put the terms into propositions, we shall
find that one or other of the oblique cases, genitive, dative, &c.,
is required.[78] Moreover, when we say, 'this belongs to that,' or
'this may be truly predicated of that,' we must recollect that there
are many distinct varieties in the relation of predicate to subject.
Each of the Categories has its own distinct relation to the subject;
predication _secundum quid_ is distinguished from predication
_simpliciter_, simple from combined or compound, &c. This applies to
negatives as well as affirmatives.[79] There will be a material
difference in setting out the terms of the syllogism, according as
the predication is qualified (_secundum quid_) or absolute
(_simpliciter_). If it be qualified, the qualification attaches to
the predicate, not to the subject: when the major proposition is a
qualified predication, we must consider the qualification as
belonging, not to the middle term, but to the major term, and as
destined to re-appear in the conclusion. If the qualification be
attached to the middle term, it cannot appear in the conclusion, and
any conclusion that embraces it will not be proved. Suppose the
conclusion to be proved is. The wholesome is knowledge _quatenus
bonum_ or _quod bonum est_; the three terms of the syllogism must
stand thus:--

 _Major_--_Bonum_ is knowable, _quatenus bonum_ or _quod bonum est_.

 _Minor_--The wholesome is _bonum_.

 _Ergo_--The wholesome is knowable, _quatenus bonum_, &c.

For every syllogism in which the conclusion is qualified, the terms
must be set out accordingly.[80]

[Footnote 78: Analyt. Prior. I. xxxvi. p. 48, a. 40-p. 49, a. 5.
[Greek: a(plô=s le/gomen ga\r tou=to kata\ pa/ntôn, o(/ti tou\s me\n
o(/rous a)/ei thete/on kata\ ta\s klê/seis tô=n o)noma/tôn--ta\s de\
prota/seis lêpte/on kata\ ta\s e(ka/stou ptô/seis.] Several examples
are given of this precept.]

[Footnote 79: Ibid. I. xxxvii. p. 49, a. 6-10. Alexander remarks in
the Scholia (p. 183, a. 2) that the distinction between simple and
compound predication has already been adverted to by Aristotle in De
Interpretatione (see p. 20, b. 35); and that it was largely treated
by Theophrastus in his work, [Greek: Peri\ Katapha/seôs], not
preserved.]

[Footnote 80: Ibid. I. xxxviii. p. 49, a. 11-b. 2. [Greek: phanero\n
ou)=n o(/ti e)n toi=s e)n me/rei sullogismoi=s ou(/tô lêpte/on tou\s
o(/rous.] Alexander explains [Greek: oi( e)n me/rei sullogismoi/]
(Schol. p. 183, b. 32, Br.) to be those in which the predicate has a
qualifying adjunct tacked to it.]

We are permitted, and it is often convenient, to exchange one phrase
or term for another of equivalent signification, and also one word
against any equivalent phrase. By doing this, we often **facilitate
the setting out of the terms. We must carefully note the different
meanings of the same substantive noun, according as the definite
article is or is not prefixed. We must not reckon it the same term,
if it appears in one premiss with the definite article, and in the
other without the definite article.[81] Nor is it the same
proposition to say B is predicable of C (indefinite), and B is
predicable of _all_ C (universal). In setting out the syllogism, it
is not sufficient that the major premiss should be indefinite; the
major premiss must be universal; and the minor premiss also, if the
conclusion is to be universal. If the major premiss be universal,
while the minor premiss is only affirmative indefinite, the
conclusion cannot be universal, but will be no more than indefinite,
that is, counting as particular.[82]

[Footnote 81: Analyt. Prior. I. xxxix.-xl. p. 49, b. 3-13. [Greek:
ou) tau)to\n e)sti to\ ei)=nai tê\n ê(donê\n a)gatho\n kai\ to\
ei)=nai tê\n ê(donê\n to\ a)gatho/n], &c.]

[Footnote 82: Ibid. I. xli. p. 49, b. 14-32. The Scholion of
Alexander (Schol. p. 184, a. 22-40) alludes to the peculiar mode,
called by Theophrastus [Greek: kata\ pro/slêpsin], of stating the
premisses of the syllogism: two terms only, the major and the middle,
being enunciated, while the third or minor was included potentially,
but not enunciated. Theophrastus, however, did not recognize the
distinction of meaning to which Aristotle alludes in this chapter. He
construed as an universal minor, what Aristotle treats as only an
indefinite minor. The liability to mistake the Indefinite for an
Universal is here again adverted to.]

There is no fear of our being misled by setting out a particular case
for the purpose of the general demonstration; for we never make
reference to the specialties of the particular case, but deal with it
as the geometer deals with the diagram that he draws. He calls the
line A B, straight, a foot long, and without breadth, but he does not
draw any conclusion from these assumptions. All that syllogistic
demonstration either requires or employs, is, terms that are related
to each other either as whole to part or as part to whole. Without
this, no demonstration can be made: the exposition of the particular
case is intended as an appeal to the senses, for facilitating the
march of the student, but is not essential to demonstration.[83]

[Footnote 83: Ibid. I. xli. p. 50, a. 1: [Greek: tô=| d'
e)kti/thesthai ou(/tô chrô/metha ô(/sper kai\ tô=| ai)stha/nesthai
to\n mantha/nonta le/gontes; ou) ga\r ou(/tôs ô(s a)/neu tou/tôn
ou)ch oi(=o/n t' a)podeichthê=nai, ô(/sper e)x ô(=n o(
sullogismo/s.]

This chapter is a very remarkable statement of the Nominalistic
doctrine; perceiving or conceiving all the real specialties of a
particular case, but attending to, or reasoning upon, only a portion
of them.

Plato treats it as a mark of the inferior scientific value of
Geometry, as compared with true and pure Dialectic, that the geometer
cannot demonstrate through Ideas and Universals alone, but is
compelled to help himself by visible particular diagrams or
illustrations. (Plato, Repub. vi. pp. 510-511, vii. p. 533, C.)]

Aristotle reminds us once more of what he had before said, that in
the Second and Third figures, not all varieties of conclusion are
possible, but only some varieties; accordingly, when we are reducing
a piece of reasoning to the syllogistic form, the nature of the
conclusion will inform us which of the three figures we must look
for. In the case where the question debated relates to a definition,
and the reasoning which we are trying to reduce turns upon one part
only of that definition, we must take care to look for our three
terms only in regard to that particular part, and not in regard to
the whole definition.[84] All the modes of the Second and Third
figures can be reduced to the First, by conversion of one or other of
the premisses; except the fourth mode (_Baroco_) of the Second, and
the fifth mode (_Bocardo_) of the Third, which can be proved only by
_Reductio ad Absurdum_.[85]

[Footnote 84: Analyt. Prior. I. xlii., xliii. p. 50, a. 5-15. I
follow here the explanation given by Philoponus and Julius Pacius,
which M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire adopts. But the illustrative example
given by Aristotle himself (the definition of _water_) does not
convey much instruction.]

[Footnote 85: Ibid. xlv. p. 50, b. 5-p. 51, b. 2.]

No syllogisms from an Hypothesis, however, are reducible to any of
the three figures; for they are not proved by syllogism alone: they
require besides an extra-syllogistic assumption granted or understood
between speaker and hearer. Suppose an hypothetical proposition
given, with antecedent and consequent: you may perhaps prove or
refute by syllogism either the antecedent separately, or the
consequent separately, or both of them separately; but you cannot
directly either prove or refute by syllogism the conjunction of the
two asserted in the hypothetical. The speaker must ascertain
beforehand that this will be granted to him; otherwise he cannot
proceed.[86] The same is true about the procedure by _Reductio ad
Absurdum_, which involves an hypothesis over and above the syllogism.
In employing such _Reductio ad Absurdum_, you prove syllogistically a
certain conclusion from certain premisses; but the conclusion is
manifestly false; therefore, one at least of the premisses from which
it follows must be false also. But if this reasoning is to have
force, the hearer must know _aliunde_ that the conclusion is false;
your syllogism has not shown it to be false, but has shown it to be
hypothetically true; and unless the hearer is prepared to grant the
conclusion to be false, your purpose is not attained. Sometimes he
will grant it without being expressly asked, when the falsity is
glaring: _e.g._ you prove that the diagonal of a square is
incommensurable with the side, because if it were taken as
commensurable, an odd number might be shown to be equal to an even
number. Few disputants will hesitate to grant that this conclusion is
false, and therefore that its contradictory is true; yet this last
(viz. that the contradictory is true) has not been proved
syllogistically; you must assume it by hypothesis, or depend upon the
hearer to grant it.[87]

[Footnote 86: Ibid. xliv. p. 50, a. 16-28.]

[Footnote 87: Analyt. Prior. I. xliv. p. 50, a. 29-38. See above,
xxiii. p. 40, a. 25.

M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire remarks in the note to his translation of
the Analytica Priora (p. 178): "Ce chapitre suffit à prouver
qu'Aristote a distingué très-nettement les syllogismes par l'absurde,
des syllogismes hypothétiques. Cette dernière dénomination est tout à
fait pour lui ce qu'elle est pour nous." Of these two statements, I
think the _latter_ is more than we can venture to affirm, considering
that the general survey of hypothetical syllogisms, which Aristotle
intended to draw up, either never was really completed, or at least
has perished: the _former_ appears to me incorrect. Aristotle
decidedly reckons the _Reductio ad Impossibile_ among hypothetical
proofs. But he understands by _Reductio ad Impossibile_ something
rather wider than what the moderns understand by it. It now means
only, that you take the contradictory of the conclusion together with
one of the premisses, and by means of these two demonstrate a
conclusion contradictory or contrary to the other premiss. But
Aristotle understood by it this, and something more besides, namely,
whenever, by taking the contradictory of the conclusion, together
with some other incontestable premiss, you demonstrate, by means of
the two, some new conclusion notoriously false. What I here say, is
illustrated by the very example which he gives in this chapter. The
incommensurability of the diagonal (with the side of the square) is
demonstrated by _Reductio ad Impossibile_; because if it be supposed
commensurable, you may demonstrate that an odd number is equal to an
even number; a conclusion which every one will declare to be
inadmissible, but which is not the contradictory of either of the
premisses whereby the true proposition was demonstrated.]

Here Aristotle expressly reserves for separate treatment the general
subject of Syllogisms from Hypothesis.[88]

[Footnote 88: The expressions of Aristotle here are remarkable,
Analyt. Prior. I. xliv. p. 50, a. 39-b. 3: [Greek: polloi\ de\ kai\
e(/teroi perai/nontai e)x u(pothe/seôs, ou(\s e)piske/psasthai dei=
kai\ diasêmê=nai katharô=s. ti/nes me\n ou)=n ai( diaphorai\ tou/tôn,
kai\ posachô=s gi/netai to\ e)x u(pothe/seôs, u(/steron e)rou=men;
nu=n de\ tosou=nton ê(mi=n e)/stô phanero/n, o(/ti ou)k e)/stin
a)nalu/ein ei)s ta\ schê/mata tou\s toiou/tous sullogismou/s. kai\
di' ê(\n ai)ti/an, ei)rê/kamen.]

Syllogisms from Hypothesis were many and various, and Aristotle
intended to treat them in a future treatise; but all that concerns
the present treatise, in his opinion, is, to show that none of them
can be reduced to the three Figures. Among the Syllogisms from
Hypothesis, two varieties recognized by Aristotle (besides [Greek:
oi) dia\ tou= a)duna/tou]) were [Greek: oi( kata\ meta/lêpsin] and
[Greek: oi( kata\ poio/têta]. The same proposition which Aristotle
entitles [Greek: kata\ meta/lêpsin], was afterwards designated by the
Stoics [Greek: kata\ pro/slêpsin] (Alexander ap. Schol. p. 178,
b. 6-24).

It seems that Aristotle never realized this intended future treatise
on Hypothetical Syllogisms; at least Alexander did not know it. The
subject was handled more at large by Theophrastus and Eudêmus after
Aristotle (Schol. p. 184, b. 45. Br.; Boethius, De Syllog.
Hypothetico, pp. 606-607); and was still farther expanded by
Chrysippus and the Stoics.

Compare Prantl, Geschichte der Logik, I. pp. 295, 377, seq. He treats
the Hypothetical Syllogism as having no logical value, and commends
Aristotle for declining to develop or formulate it; while Ritter
(Gesch. Phil. iii. p. 93), and, to a certain extent, Ueberweg (System
der Logik, sect. 121, p. 326), consider this to be a defect in
Aristotle.]

In the last chapter of the first book of the Analytica Priora,
Aristotle returns to the point which we have already considered in
the treatise De Interpretatione, viz. what is really a _negative_
proposition; and how the adverb of negation must be placed in order
to constitute one. We must place this adverb immediately before the
copula and in conjunction with the copula: we must not place it after
the copula and in conjunction with the predicate; for, if we do so,
the proposition resulting will not be negative but affirmative
([Greek: e)k metathe/seôs], by transposition, according to the
technical term introduced afterwards by Theophrastus). Thus of the
four propositions:

  1. Est bonum.          2. Non est bonum.
  4. Non est non bonum.  3. Est non bonum.

No. 1 is affirmative; No. 3 is affirmative ([Greek: e)k
metathe/seôs]); Nos. 2 and 4 are negative. Wherever No. 1 is
predicable, No. 4 will be predicable also; wherever No. 3 is
predicable, No. 2 will be predicable also--but in neither case _vice
versâ_.[89] Mistakes often flow from incorrectly setting out the two
contradictories.

[Footnote 89: Analyt. Prior. I. xlvi. p. 51, b. 5, ad finem. See
above, Chap. IV. p. 118, seq.]




CHAPTER VI.

ANALYTICA PRIORA II.


The Second Book of the Analytica Priora seems conceived with a view
mainly to Dialectic and Sophistic, as the First Book bore more upon
Demonstration.[1] Aristotle begins the Second Book by shortly
recapitulating what he had stated in the First; and then proceeds to
touch upon some other properties of the Syllogism. Universal
syllogisms (those in which the conclusion is universal) he says, have
always more conclusions than one; particular syllogisms sometimes,
but not always, have more conclusions than one. If the conclusion be
universal, it may always be converted--_simply_, when it is negative,
or _per accidens_, when it is affirmative; and its converse thus
obtained will be proved by the same premisses. If the conclusion be
particular, it will be convertible simply when affirmative, and its
converse thus obtained will be proved by the same premisses; but it
will not be convertible at all when negative, so that the conclusion
proved will be only itself singly.[2] Moreover, in the universal
syllogisms of the First figure (_Barbara_, _Celarent_), any of the
particulars comprehended under the minor term may be substituted in
place of the minor term as subject of the conclusion, and the proof
will hold good in regard to them. So, again, all or any of the
particulars comprehended in the middle term may be introduced as
subject of the conclusion in place of the minor term; and the
conclusion will still remain true. In the Second figure, the change
is admissible only in regard to those particulars comprehended under
the subject of the conclusion or minor term, and not (at least upon
the strength of the syllogism) in regard to those comprehended under
the middle term. Finally, wherever the conclusion is particular, the
change is admissible, though not by reason of the syllogism in regard
to particulars comprehended under the middle term; it is not
admissible as regards the minor term, which is itself particular.[3]

[Footnote 1: This is the remark of the ancient Scholiasts. See Schol.
p. 188, a. 44, b. 11.]

[Footnote 2: Analyt. Prior. II. i. p. 53, a. 3-14.]

[Footnote 3: Analyt. Prior. II. i. p. 53, a. 14-35. M. Barthélemy St.
Hilaire, following Pacius, justly remarks (note, p. 203 of his
translation) that the rule as to particulars breaks down in the cases
of _Baroco_, _Disamis_, and _Bocardo_.

On the chapter in general he remarks (note, p. 204):--"Cette théorie
des conclusions diverses, soit patentes soit cachées, d'un même
syllogisme, est surtout utile en dialectique, dans la discussion; où
il faut faire la plus grande attention à ce qu'on accorde à
l'adversaire, soit explicitement, soit implicitement." This
illustrates the observation cited in the preceding note from the
Scholiasts.]

Aristotle has hitherto regarded the Syllogism with a view to its
_formal_ characteristics: he now makes an important observation which
bears upon its _matter_. Formally speaking, **the two premisses are
always assumed to be true; but in any real case of syllogism (form
and matter combined) it is possible that either one or both may be
false. Now, Aristotle remarks that if both the premisses are true
(the syllogism being correct in form), the conclusion must of
necessity be true; but that if either or both the premisses are
false, the conclusion need not necessarily be false likewise. The
premisses being false, the conclusion may nevertheless be true; but
it will not be true because of or by reason of the premisses.[4]

[Footnote 4: Analyt. Prior. II. ii. p. 53, b. 5-10: [Greek: e)x
a)lêthô=n me\n ou)=n ou)k e)/sti pseu=dos sullogi/sasthai, e)k
pseudô=n d' e)/stin a)lêthe/s, plê\n ou) dio/ti a)ll' o(/ti; tou=
ga\r dio/ti ou)k e)/stin e)k pseudô=n sullogismo/s; di' ê(\n d'
ai)ti/an, e)n toi=s e(pome/nois lechthê/setai.]

The true conclusion is not true by reason of these false premisses,
but by reason of certain other premisses which are true, and which
may be produced to demonstrate it. Compare Analyt. Poster. I. ii. p.
71, b. 19.]

First, he would prove that if the premisses be true, the conclusion
must be true also; but the proof that he gives does not seem more
evident than the _probandum_ itself. Assume that if A exists, B must
exist also: it follows from hence (he argues) that if B does not
exist, neither can A exist; which he announces as a _reductio ad
absurdum_, seeing that it contradicts the fundamental supposition of
the existence of A.[5] Here the _probans_ is indeed equally evident
with the _probandum_, but not at all more evident; one who disputes
the latter, will dispute the former also. Nothing is gained in the
way of proof by making either of them dependent on the other. Both of
them are alike self-evident; that is, if a man hesitates to admit
either of them, you have no means of removing his scruples except by
inviting him to try the general maxim upon as many particular cases
as he chooses, and to see whether it does not hold good without a
single exception.

[Footnote 5: Ibid. II. ii. p. 53, b. 11-16.]

In regard to the case here put forward as illustration, Aristotle has
an observation which shows his anxiety to maintain the characteristic
principles of the Syllogism; one of which principles he had declared
to be--That nothing less than three terms and two propositions, could
warrant the inferential step from premisses to conclusion. In the
present case he assumed, If A exists, then B must exist; giving only
one premiss as ground for the inference. This (he adds) does not
contravene what has been laid down before; for A in the case before
us represents two propositions conceived in conjunction.[6] Here he
has given the type of hypothetical reasoning; not recognizing it as a
variety _per se_, nor following it out into its different forms (as
his successors did after him), but resolving it into the categorical
syllogism.[7] He however conveys very clearly the cardinal principle
of all hypothetical inference--That if the antecedent be true, the
consequent must be true also, but not _vice versâ_; if the consequent
be false, the antecedent must be false also, but not _vice versâ_.

[Footnote 6: Analyt. Prior. II. ii. p. 53, b. 16-25. [Greek: to\
ou)=n A ô(/sper e(\n kei=tai, du/o prota/seis sullêphthei=sai.]]

[Footnote 7: Aristotle, it should be remarked, uses the word [Greek:
katêgoriko/s], not in the sense which it subsequently acquired, as
the antithesis of [Greek: u(pothetiko/s] in application to the
proposition and syllogism, but in the sense of affirmative as opposed
to [Greek: sterêtiko/s].]

Having laid down the principle, that the conclusion may be true,
though one or both the premisses are false, Aristotle proceeds, at
great length, to illustrate it in its application to each of the
three syllogistic figures.[8] No portion of the Analytica is traced
out more perspicuously than the exposition of this most important
logical doctrine.

[Footnote 8: Analyt. Prior. II. ii.-iv. p. 53, b. 26-p. 57, b. 17. At
the close (p. 57, a. 36-b. 17), the general doctrine is summed up.]

It is possible (he then continues, again at considerable length) to
invert the syllogism and to demonstrate _in a circle_. That is, you
may take the conclusion as premiss for a new syllogism, together with
one of the old premisses, transposing its terms; and thus you may
demonstrate the other premiss. You may do this successively, first
with the major, to demonstrate the minor; next, with the minor, to
demonstrate the major. Each of the premisses will thus in turn be
made a demonstrated conclusion; and the circle will be complete. But
this can be done perfectly only in _Barbara_, and when, besides, all
the three terms of the syllogism reciprocate with each other, or are
co-extensive in import; so that each of the two premisses admits of
being simply converted. In all other cases, the process of circular
demonstration, where possible at all, is more or less imperfect.[9]

[Footnote 9: Ibid. II. v.-viii. p. 57, b. 18-p. 59, a. 35.]

Having thus shown under what conditions the conclusion can be
employed for the demonstration of the premisses, Aristotle proceeds
to state by what transformation it can be employed for the refutation
of them. This he calls _converting_ the syllogism; a most
inconvenient use of the term _convert_ ([Greek: a)ntistre/phein]),
since he had already assigned to that same term more than one other
meaning, distinct and different, in logical procedure.[10] What it
here means is _reversing_ the conclusion, so as to exchange it either
for its contrary, or for its contradictory; then employing this
reversed proposition as a new premiss, along with one of the previous
premisses, so as to disprove the other of the previous
premisses--_i.e._ to prove its contrary or contradictory. The result
will here be different, according to the manner in which the
conclusion is reversed; according as you exchange it for its contrary
or its contradictory. Suppose that the syllogism demonstrated is: A
belongs to all B, B belongs to all C; _Ergo_, A belongs to all C
(_Barbara_). Now, if we reverse this conclusion by taking its
_contrary_, A belongs to no C, and if we combine this as a new premiss
with the major of the former syllogism, A belongs to all B, we shall
obtain as a conclusion B belongs to no C; which is the _contrary_ of
the minor, in the form _Camestres_. If, on the other hand, we reverse
the conclusion by taking its _contradictory_, A does not belong to all
C, and combine this with the same major, we shall have as conclusion,
B does not belong to all C; which is the _contradictory_ of the minor,
and in the form _Baroco_: though in the one case as in the other the
minor is disproved. The major is _contradictorily_ disproved, whether
it be the contrary or the contradictory of the conclusion that is
taken along with the minor to form the new syllogism; but still the
form varies from _Felapton_ to _Bocardo_. Aristotle shows farther how
the same process applies to the other modes of the First, and to the
modes of the Second and Third figures.[11] The new syllogism,
obtained by this process of reversal, is always in a different figure
from the syllogism reversed. Thus syllogisms in the First figure are
reversed by the Second and Third; those in the second, by the First
and Third; those in the Third, by the First and Second.[12]

[Footnote 10: Schol. (ad Analyt. Prior. p. 59, b. 1), p. 190, b. 20,
Brandis. Compare the notes of M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire, pp. 55,
242.]

[Footnote 11: Analyt. Prior. II. viii.-x. p. 59, b. 1-p. 61, a. 4.]

[Footnote 12: Ibid. x. p. 61, a. 7-15.]

Of this reversing process, one variety is what is called the
_Reductio ad Absurdum_; in which the conclusion is reversed by taking
its contradictory (never its contrary), and then joining this last
with one of the premisses, in order to prove the contradictory or
contrary of the other premiss.[13] The _Reductio ad Absurdum_ is
distinguished from the other modes of reversal by these
characteristics: (1) That it takes the contradictory, and not the
contrary, of the conclusion; (2) That it is destined to meet the case
where an opponent declines to admit the conclusion; whereas the other
cases of reversion are only intended as confirmatory evidence towards
a person who already admits the conclusion; (3) That it does not
appeal to or require any concession on the part of the opponent; for
if he declines to admit the conclusion, you presume, as a matter of
course, that he must adhere to the contradictory of the conclusion;
and you therefore take this contradictory for granted (without asking
his concurrence) as one of the bases of a new syllogism; (4) That it
presumes as follows:--When, by the contradictory of the conclusion
joined with one of the premisses, you have demonstrated the opposite
of the other premiss, the original conclusion itself is shown to be
beyond all impeachment on the score of form, _i.e._ beyond
impeachment by any one who admits the premisses. You assume to be
true, for the occasion, the very proposition which you mean finally
to prove false; your purpose in the new syllogism is, not to
demonstrate the original conclusion, but to prove it to be true by
demonstrating its contradictory to be false.[14]**

[Footnote 13: Analyt. Prior. II. xi. p. 61, a. 18, seq.]

[Footnote 14: Ibid. p. 62, a. 11: [Greek: phanero\n ou)=n o(/ti ou)
to\ e)nanti/on, a)lla\ to\ a)ntikei/menon, u(pothete/on e)n a(/pasi
toi=s sullogismoi=s. ou(/tô ga\r to\ a)nagkai=on e)/stai kai\ to\
a)xi/ôma e)/ndoxon. ei) ga\r kata\ panto\s ê)\ kata/phasis ê)\
a)po/phasis, deichthe/ntos o(/ti ou)ch ê( a)po/phasis, a)na/gkê tê\n
kata/phasin a)lêtheu/esthai.] See Scholia, p. 190, b. 40, seq.,
Brand.]

By the _Reductio ad Absurdum_ you can in all the three figures
demonstrate all the four varieties of conclusion, universal and
particular, affirmative and negative; with the single exception, that
you cannot by this method demonstrate in the First figure the
Universal Affirmative.[15] With this exception, every true conclusion
admits of being demonstrated by either of the two ways, either
directly and ostensively, or by reduction to the impossible.[16]

[Footnote 15: Ibid. p. 61, a. 35-p. 62, b. 10; xii. p. 62, a. 21.
Alexander, ap. Schol. p. 191, a. 17-36, Brand.]

[Footnote 16: Ibid. xiv. p. 63, b. 12-21.]

In the Second and Third figures, though not in the First, it is
possible to obtain conclusions even from two premisses which are
contradictory or contrary to each other; but the conclusion will, as
a matter of course, be a self-contradictory one. Thus if in the
Second figure you have the two premisses--All Science is good; No
Science is good--you get the conclusion (in _Camestres_), No Science
is Science. In opposed propositions, the same predicate must be
affirmed and denied of the same subject in one of the three different
forms--All and None, All and Not All, Some and None. This shows why
such conclusions cannot be obtained in the First figure; for it is
the characteristic of that figure that the middle term must be
predicate in one premiss, and subject in the other.[17] In dialectic
discussion it will hardly be possible to get contrary or
contradictory premisses conceded by the adversary immediately after
each other, because he will be sure to perceive the contradiction:
you must mask your purpose by asking the two questions not in
immediate succession, but by introducing other questions between the
two, or by other indirect means as suggested in the Topica.[18]

[Footnote 17: Analyt. Prior. II. xv. p. 63, b. 22-p. 64, a. 32.
Aristotle here declares _Subcontraries_ (as they were later
called),--Some men are wise, Some men are not wise,--to be opposed
only in expression or verbally ([Greek: kata\ tê\n le/xin mo/non]).]

[Footnote 18: Ibid. II. xv. p. 64, a. 33-37. See Topica, VIII. i. p.
155, a. 26; Julius Pacius, p. 372, note. In the Topica, Aristotle
suggests modes of concealing the purpose of the questioner and
driving the adversary to contradict himself: [Greek: e)n de\ tô=s
Topikoi=s paradi/dôsi metho/dous tô=n kru/pseôn di' a(\s tou=to
dothê/setai] (Schol. p. 192, a. 18, Br.). Compare also Analyt. Prior.
II. xix. p. 66, a. 33.]

Aristotle now passes to certain general heads of Fallacy, or general
liabilities to Error, with which the syllogizing process is beset.
What the reasoner undertakes is, to demonstrate the conclusion before
him, and to demonstrate it in the natural and appropriate way; that
is, from premisses both more evident in themselves and logically
prior to the conclusion. Whenever he fails thus to demonstrate, there
is error of some kind; but he may err in several ways: (1) He may
produce a defective or informal syllogism; (2) His premisses may be
more unknowable than his conclusion, or equally unknowable; (3) His
premisses, instead of being logically prior to the conclusion, may be
logically posterior to it.[19]

[Footnote 19: Ibid. II. xvi. p. 64, b. 30-35: [Greek: kai\ ga\r ei)
o(/lôs mê\ sullogi/zetai, kai\ ei) di' a)gnôstote/rôn ê)\ o(moi/ôs
a)gnô/stôn, kai\ ei) dia\ tô=n u(ste/rôn to\ pro/teron; ê( ga\r
a)po/deixis e)k pistote/rôn te kai\ prote/rôn e)stin.... ta\ _me\n
di' au(tô=n pe/phuke gnôri/zesthai, ta\ de\ di' a)/llôn_.]]

Distinct from all these three, however, Aristotle singles out and
dwells upon another mode of error, which he calls _Petitio
Principii_. Some truths, the _principia_, are by nature knowable
through or in themselves, others are knowable only through other
things. If you confound this distinction, and ask or assume something
of the latter class as if it belonged to the former, you commit a
_Petitio Principii_. You may commit it either by assuming at once
that which ought to be demonstrated, or by assuming, as if it were a
_principium_, something else among those matters which in natural
propriety would be demonstrated by means of a _principium_. Thus,
there is (let us suppose) a natural propriety that C shall be
demonstrated through A; but you, overlooking this, demonstrate B
through C, and A through B. By thus inverting the legitimate order,
you do what is tantamount to demonstrating A through itself; for your
demonstration will not hold unless you assume A at the beginning, in
order to arrive at C. This is a mistake made not unfrequently, and
especially by some who define parallel lines; for they give a
definition which cannot be understood unless parallel lines be
presupposed.[20]

[Footnote 20: Analyt. Prior. II. xvi. p. 64, b. 33-p. 65, a. 9.
_Petere principium_ is, in the phrase of Aristotle, not [Greek: tê\n
a)rchê\n ai)tei=sthai], but [Greek: to\ e)n a)rchê=| ai)tei=sthai] or
[Greek: to\ e)x a)rchê=s ai)tei=sthai] (xvi. p. 64, b. 28, 34).]

When the problem is such, that it is uncertain whether A can be
predicated either of C or of B, if you then assume that A is
predicable of B, you may perhaps not commit _Petitio Principii_, but
you certainly fail in demonstrating the problem; for no demonstration
will hold where the premiss is equally uncertain with the conclusion.
But if, besides, the case be such, that B is identical with C, that
is, either co-extensive and reciprocally convertible with C, or
related to C as genus or species,--in either of these cases you
commit _Petitio Principii_ by assuming that A may be predicated of
B.[21] For seeing that B reciprocates with C, you might just as well
demonstrate that A is predicable of B, because it is predicable of C;
that is, you might demonstrate the major premiss by means of the
minor and the conclusion, as well as you can demonstrate the
conclusion by means of the major and the minor premiss. If you cannot
so demonstrate the major premiss, this is not because the structure
of the syllogism forbids it, but because the predicate of the major
premiss is more extensive than the subject thereof. If it be
co-extensive and convertible with the subject, we shall have a
circular proof of three propositions in which each may be alternately
premiss and conclusion. The like will be the case, if the _Petitio
Principii_ is in the minor premiss and not in the major. In the First
syllogistic figure it may be in either of the premisses; in the
Second figure it can only be in the minor premiss, and that only in
one mode (_Camestres_) of the figure.[22] The essence of _Petitio
Principii_ consists in this, that you exhibit as true _per se_ that
which is not really true _per se_.[23] You may commit this fault
either in Demonstration, when you assume for true what is not really
true, or in Dialectic, when you assume as probable and conformable to
authoritative opinion what is not really so.[24]**

[Footnote 21: Ibid. p. 65, a. 1-10.]

[Footnote 22: Ibid. p. 65, a. 10: [Greek: ei) ou)=n tis, a)dê/lou
o)/ntos o(/ti to\ A u(pa/rchei tô=| G, o(moi/ôs de\ kai\ o(/ti tô=|
B, ai)toi=to tô=| B u(pa/rchein to\ A, ou(/pô dê=lon ei) to\ e)n
a)rchê=| ai)tei=tai, a)ll' o(/ti ou)k a)podei/knusi, dê=lon; ou) ga\r
a)rchê\ a)podei/xeôs to\ o(moi/ôs a)/dêlon. ei) me/ntoi to\ B pro\s
to\ G ou(/tôs e)/chei ô(/ste tau)to\n ei)=nai, ê)\ dê=lon o(/ti
a)ntistre/phousin, ê)\ u(pa/rchei tha/teron thate/rô|, to\ e)n
a)rchê=| ai)tei=tai. kai\ ga\r a)/n, o(/ti tô=| B to\ A u(pa/rchei,
di' e)kei/nôn deiknu/oi, ei) a)ntistre/phoi. nu=n de\ tou=to kôlu/ei,
a)ll' ou)ch o( tro/pos. ei) de\ tou=to poioi=, to\ ei)rême/non a)\n
poioi= kai\ a)ntistre/phoi ô(s dia\ triô=n.]

This chapter, in which Aristotle declares the nature of Petitio
Principii, is obscure and difficult to follow. It has been explained
at some length, first by Philoponus in the Scholia (p. 192, a. 35, b.
24), afterwards by Julius Pacius (p. 376, whose explanation is
followed by M. B. St. Hilaire, p. 288), and by Waitz, (I. p. 514).
But the translation and comment given by Mr. Poste appear to me the
best: "Assuming the conclusion to be affirmative, let us examine a
syllogism in Barbara:--

      All B is A.
  .   All C is B.
 . .  All C is A.

And let us first suppose that the major premiss is a Petitio
Principii; _i.e._ that the proposition _All B is A_ is identical with
the proposition _All C is A_. This can only be because the terms B
and C are identical. Next, let us suppose that the minor premiss is a
Petitio Principii: _i.e._ that the proposition _All C is B_ is
identical with the proposition _All C is A_. This can only be because
B and A are identical. The identity of the terms is, their
convertibility or their sequence ([Greek: u(pa/rchei, e(/petai]).
This however requires some limitation; for as the major is always
predicated ([Greek: u(pa/rchei, e(/petai]) of the middle, and the
middle of the minor, if this were enough to constitute Petitio
Principii, every syllogism with a problematical premiss would be a
Petitio Principii." (See the Appendix A, pp. 178-183, attached to Mr.
Poste's edition of Aristotle's Sophistici Elenchi.)

Compare, about Petitio Principii, Aristot. Topic. VIII. xiii. p. 162,
b. 34, in which passage Aristotle gives to the fallacy called Petitio
Principii a still larger sweep than what he assigns to it in the
Analytica Priora. Mr. Poste's remark is perfectly just, that
according to the above passage in the Analytica, every syllogism with
a problematical (_i.e._ real as opposed to verbal) premiss would be a
Petitio Principii; that is, all real deductive reasoning, in the
syllogistic form, would be a Petitio Principii. To this we may add,
that, from the passage above referred to in the Topica, all inductive
reasoning also (reasoning from parts to whole) would involve Petitio
Principii.

Mr. Poste's explanation of this difficult passage brings into view
the original and valuable exposition made by Mr. John Stuart Mill of
the Functions and Logical Value of the Syllogism.--System of Logic,
Book II. ch. iii. sect 2:--"It must be granted, that in every
syllogism, considered as an argument to prove the conclusion, there
is a Petitio Principii," &c.

Petitio Principii, if ranked among the Fallacies, can hardly be
extended beyond the first of the five distinct varieties enumerated
in the Topica, VIII. xiii.]

[Footnote 23: Analyt. Prior. II. xvi. p. 65, a. 23-27: [Greek: to\
ga\r e)x a)rchê=s ti/ du/natai, ei)/rêtai ê(mi=n, o(/ti to\ di'
au(tou= deiknu/nai to\ mê\ di' au(tou= dê=lon.--tou=to d' e)/sti, to\
mê\ deiknu/nai.]

The meaning of some lines in this chapter (p. 65, a. 17-18) is to me
very obscure, after all the explanations of commentators.]

[Footnote 24: Ibid. p. 65, a. 35; Topic. VIII. xiii. p. 162, b. 31.]

We must be careful to note, that when Aristotle speaks of a
_principium_ as knowable in itself, or true in itself, he does not
mean that it is innate, or that it starts up in the mind ready made
without any gradual building up or preparation. What he means is,
that it is not demonstrable deductively from anything else prior or
more knowable by nature than itself. He declares (as we shall see)
that _principia_ are acquired, and mainly by Induction.

Next to _Petitio Principii_, Aristotle indicates another fallacious
or erroneous procedure in dialectic debate; misconception or
misstatement of the real grounds on which a conclusion rests--_Non
per Hoc_. You may impugn the thesis (set up by the respondent)
directly, by proving syllogistically its contrary or contradictory;
or you may also impugn it indirectly by _Reductio ad Absurdum_;
_i.e._ you prove by syllogism some absurd conclusion, which you
contend to be necessarily true, if the thesis is admitted. Suppose
you impugn it in the first method, or directly, by a syllogism
containing only two premisses and a conclusion: _Non per Hoc_ is
inapplicable here, for if either premiss is disallowed, the
conclusion is unproved; the respondent cannot meet you except by
questioning one or both of the premisses of your impugning
syllogism.[25] But if you proceed by the second method or indirectly,
_Non per Hoc_ may become applicable; for there may then be more than
two premisses, and he may, while granting that the absurd conclusion
is correctly made out, contend that the truth or falsehood of his
thesis is noway implicated in it. He declares (in Aristotle's phrase)
that the absurdity or falsehood just made out does not follow as a
consequence from his thesis, but from other premisses independent
thereof; that it would stand equally proved, even though his thesis
were withdrawn.[26] In establishing the falsehood or absurdity you
must take care that it shall be one implicated with or dependent upon
his thesis. It is this last condition that he (the respondent)
affirms to be wanting.[27]

[Footnote 25: Analyt. Prior. II. xvii. p. 65, b. 4: [Greek: o(/tan
a)naire/thê| ti deiktikôs dia\ tô=n A, B, G], &c.; xviii. 66, a. 17:
[Greek: ê)\ ga\r e)k tô=n du/o prota/seôn ê)\ e)k pleio/nôn pa=s
e)sti\ sullogismo/s; ei) me\n ou)=n e)k tô=n du/o, tou/tôn a)na/gkê
tê\n me\n e(te/ran ê)\ kai\ a)mphote/ras ei)=nai pseudei=s;] &c.
Whoever would understand this difficult chapter xvii., will do well
to study it with the notes of Julius Pacius (p. 360), and also the
valuable exposition of Mr. Poste, who has extracted and illustrated
it in Appendix B. (p. 190) of the notes to his edition of the
Sophistici Elenchi. The six illustrative diagrams given by Julius
Pacius afford great help, though the two first of them appear to me
incorrectly printed, as to the brackets connecting the different
propositions.]

[Footnote 26: Ibid. II. xvii. p. 65, b. 38, b. 14, p. 66, a. 2, 7:
[Greek: to\ mê\ _para\ tou=to_ sumbai/nein to\ pseu=dos--tou= mê\
_para\ tê\n the/sin_ ei)=nai to\ pseu=dos--ou) _para\ tê\n the/sin_
sumbai/nei to\ pseu=dos--ou)k a)\n ei)/ê _para\ tê\n the/sin_.]

Instead of the preposition [Greek: para/], Aristotle on two occasions
employs [Greek: dia/--ou(/tô ga\r e)/stai _dia\ tê\n
u(po/thesin_]--p. 65, b. 33, p. 66, a. 3.

The preposition [Greek: para/], with acc. case, means _on account
of_, _owing to_, &c. See Matthiæ and Kühner's Grammars, and the
passage of Thucydides i. 141; [Greek: kai\ e(/kastos _ou) para\ tê\n
e(autou= a)me/leian_ oi)etai bla/psein, me/lein de/ tini kai\ a)/llô|
u(pe\r e(autou= ti proi+dei=n], &c., which I transcribe partly on
account of Dr. Arnold's note, who says about [Greek: para\]
here:--"This is exactly expressed in vulgar English, _all along of_
his own neglect, _i. e._ owing to his own neglect."]

[Footnote 27: Ibid. II. xvii. p. 65, b. 33: [Greek: dei= pro\s tou\s
e)x a)rchê=s o(/rous suna/ptein to\ a)du/naton; ou(/tô ga\r e)/stai
dia\ tê\n u(po/thesin.]]

Aristotle tells us that this was a precaution which the defender of a
thesis was obliged often to employ in dialectic debate, in order to
guard against abuse or misapplication of _Reductio ad Absurdum_ on
the part of opponents, who (it appears) sometimes took credit for
success, when they had introduced and demonstrated some absurd
conclusion that had little or no connection with the thesis.[28] But
even when the absurd conclusion is connected with the thesis
continuously, by a series of propositions each having a common term
with the preceding, in either the ascending or the descending scale,
we have here more than three propositions, and the absurd conclusion
may perhaps be proved by the other premisses, without involving the
thesis. In this case the respondent will meet you with _Non per
Hoc_:[29] he will point out that his thesis is not one of the
premisses requisite for demonstrating your conclusion, and is
therefore not overthrown by the absurdity thereof. Perhaps the thesis
may be false, but you have not shown it to be so, since it is not
among the premisses necessary for proving your _absurdum_. An
_absurdum_ may sometimes admit of being demonstrated by several lines
of premisses,[30] each involving distinct falsehood. Every false
conclusion implies falsity in one or more syllogistic or
prosyllogistic premisses that have preceded it, and is _owing to_ or
occasioned by this first falsehood.[31]

[Footnote 28: Analyt. Prior. II. xvii. p. 65, a. 38: [Greek: o(\
polla/kis e)n toi=s lo/gois ei)ô/thamen le/gein], &c. That the
_Reductio ad Absurdum_ was sometimes made to turn upon matters wholly
irrelevant, we may see from the illustration cited by Aristotle, p.
65, b. 17.]

[Footnote 29: In this chapter of the Analytica, Aristotle designates
the present fallacy by the title, _Non per Hoc_, [Greek: ou) para\
tou=to--ou) para\ tê\n the/sin sumbai/nei to\ pseu=dos]. He makes
express reference to the Topica (_i.e._ to the fifth chapter of
Sophist. Elenchi, which he regards as part of the Topica), where the
same fallacy is designated by a different title, _Non Causa pro
Causâ_, [Greek: to\ a)nai/tion ô(s ai)/tion tithe/nai]. We see
plainly that this chapter of the Anal. Priora was composed later than
the fifth chapter of Soph. El.; whether this is true of the two
treatises as wholes is not so certain. I think it probable that the
change of designation for the same fallacy was deliberately adopted.
It is an improvement to dismiss the vague term Cause.]

[Footnote 30: Ibid. II. xvii. p. 66, a. 11: [Greek: e)pei\ tau)to/ ge
pseu=dos sumbai/nein dia\ pleio/nôn u(pothe/seôn ou)de\n i)/sôs
a)/topon, oi(=on ta\s parallê/lous sumpi/ptein], &c.]

[Footnote 31: Ibid. II. xviii. p. 66, a. 16-24: [Greek: o( de\
pseudê\s lo/gos gi/netai para\ to\ prô=ton pseu=dos], &c.]

In impugning the thesis and in extracting from your opponent the
proper concessions to enable you to do so, you will take care to put
the interrogations in such form and order as will best disguise the
final conclusion which you aim at establishing. If you intend to
arrive at it through preliminary syllogisms (prosyllogisms), you will
ask assent to the necessary premisses in a confused or inverted
order, and will refrain from enunciating at once the conclusion from
any of them. Suppose that you wish to end by showing that A may be
predicated of F, and suppose that there must be intervening steps
through B, C, D, E. You will not put the questions in this regular
order, but will first ask him to grant that A may be predicated of B;
next, that D may be predicated of E; afterwards, that B may be
predicated of C, &c. You will thus try to obtain all the concessions
requisite for your final conclusion, before he perceives your drift.
If you can carry your point by only one syllogism, and have only one
middle term to get conceded, you will do well to put the middle term
first in your questions. This is the best way to conceal your purpose
from the respondent.[32]

[Footnote 32: Analyt. Prior. II. xix. p. 66, a. 33-b. 3: [Greek:
chrê\ d' o(/per phila/ttesthai paragge/llomen a)pokrinome/nous,
au)tou\s e)picheirou=ntas peira=sthai lantha/nein.--ka)\n di' e(no\s
me/sou gi/nêtai o( sullogismo/s, a)po\ tou= me/sou a)/rchesthai;
ma/lista ga\r a)\n ou(/tô la/nthanoi to\n a)pokrino/menon.] See the
explanation of Pacius, p. 385. Since the middle term does not appear
in the conclusion, the respondent is less likely to be prepared for
the conclusion that you want to establish. To put the middle term
first, in enunciating the Syllogism, is regarded by Aristotle as a
perverted and embarrassing order, yet it is the received practice
among modern logicians.]

It will be his business to see that he is not thus tripped up in the
syllogistic process.[33] If you ask the questions in the order above
indicated, without enunciating your preliminary conclusions, he must
take care not to concede the same term twice, either as predicate, or
as subject, or as both; for you can arrive at no conclusion unless he
grants you a middle term; and no term can be employed as middle,
unless it be repeated twice. Knowing the conditions of a conclusion
in each of the three figures, he will avoid making such concessions
as will empower you to conclude in any one of them.[34] If the thesis
which he defends is affirmative, the _elenchus_ by which you impugn
it must be a negative; so that he will be careful not to concede the
premisses for a negative conclusion. If his thesis be negative, your
purpose will require you to meet him by an affirmative; accordingly
he must avoid granting you any sufficient premisses for an
affirmative conclusion. He may thus make it impossible for you to
prove syllogistically the contrary or contradictory of his thesis;
and it is in proving this that the _elenchus_ or refutation consists.
If he will not grant you any affirmative proposition, nor any
universal proposition, you know, by the rules previously laid down,
that no valid syllogism can be constructed; since nothing can be
inferred either from two premisses both negative, or from two
premisses both particular.[35]

[Footnote 33: Analyt Prior. II. xix. p. 66, a. 25-32: [Greek: pro\s
de\ to\ mê\ katasullogi/zesthai paratêrête/on, o(/tan a)/neu tô=n
sumperasma/tôn e)rôta=| to\n lo/gon], &c.

Waitz (p. 520) explains [Greek: katasullogi/zesthai], "disputationum
et interrogationum laqueis aliquem irretire." This is, I think, more
correct than the distinction which M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire seeks to
draw, "entre le Catasyllogisme et la Réfutation," in the valuable
notes to his translation of the Analytica Priora, p. 303.]

[Footnote 34: Ibid. II. xix. p. 66, a. 25-32.]

[Footnote 35: Ibid. xx. p. 66, b. 4-17. The reader will observe how
completely this advice given by Aristotle is shaped for the purpose
of obtaining victory in the argument and how he leaves out of
consideration both the truth of what the opponent asks to be
conceded, and the belief entertained by the defendant. This is
exactly the procedure which he himself makes a ground of contemptuous
reproach against the Sophists.]

We have already seen that error may arise by wrong enunciation or
arrangement of the terms of a syllogism, that is, defects in its
form; but sometimes also, even when the form is correct, error may
arise from wrong belief as to the matters affirmed or denied.[36]
Thus the same predicate may belong, immediately and essentially,
alike to several distinct subjects; but you may believe (what is the
truth) that it belongs to one of them, and you may at the same time
believe (erroneously) that it does not belong to another. Suppose
that A is predicable essentially both of B and C, and that A, B, and
C, are all predicable essentially of D. You may know that A is
predicable of all B, and that B is predicable of all D; but you may
at the same time believe (erroneously) that A is not predicable of
any C, and that C is predicable of all D. Under this state of
knowledge and belief, you may construct two valid syllogisms; the
first (in _Barbara_, with B for its middle term) proving that A
belongs to _all_ D; the second (in _Celarent_, with C for its middle
term) proving that A belongs to _no_ D. The case will be the same,
even if all the terms taken belong to the same ascending or
descending logical series. Here, then, you _know_ one proposition;
yet you _believe_ the proposition contrary to it.[37] How can such a
mental condition be explained? It would, indeed, be an impossibility,
if the middle term of the two syllogisms were the same, and if the
premisses of the one syllogism thus contradicted directly and in
terms, the premisses of the other: should that happen, you cannot
know one side of the alternative and believe the other. But if the
middle term be different, so that the contradiction between the
premisses of the one syllogism and those of the other, is not direct,
there is no impossibility. Thus, you know that A is predicable of all
B, and B of all D; while you believe at the same time that A is
predicable of _no_ C, and C of _all_ D; the middle term being in one
syllogism B, in the other, C.[38] This last form of error is
analogous to what often occurs in respect to our knowledge of
particulars. You know that A belongs to all B, and B to all C; you
know, therefore, that A belongs to all C. Yet you may perhaps be
ignorant of the existence of C. Suppose A to denote equal to two
right angles; B, to be the triangle generally; C, a particular
visible triangle. You know A B the universal proposition; yet you may
at the same time believe that C does not exist; and thus it may
happen that you know, and do not know, the same thing at the same
time. For, in truth, the knowledge, that every triangle has its three
angles equal to two right angles, is not (as a mental fact) simple
and absolute, but has two distinct aspects; one as concerns the
universal, the other as concerns the several particulars. Now,
assuming the case above imagined, you possess the knowledge in the
first of these two aspects, but not in the second; so that the
apparent contrariety between knowledge and no knowledge is not
real.[39] And in this sense the doctrine of Plato in the Menon is
partially true--that learning is reminiscence. We can never know
beforehand particular cases _per se_; but in proportion as we extend
our induction to each case **successively, we, as it were, recognize
that, which we knew beforehand as a general truth, to be realized in
each. Thus when we ascertain the given figure before us to be a
triangle, we know immediately that its three angles are equal to two
right angles.[40]

[Footnote 36: Analyt. Prior. II. xxi. p. 66, b. 18: [Greek:
sumbai/nei d' e)ni/ote, katha/per e)n tê=| the/sei tô=n o(/rôn
a)patô/metha, kai\ kata\ tê\n u(po/lêpsin gi/nesthai tê\n a)pa/tên.]

The vague and general way in which Aristotle uses the term [Greek:
u(po/lêpsis], seems to be best rendered by our word _belief_. See
Trendelenburg ad Aristot. De Animâ, p. 469; Biese, Philos. des
Aristot. i. p. 211.]

[Footnote 37: Ibid. II. xxi. p. 66, b. 33: [Greek: ô(/ste o(/ pôs
e)pi/statai, tou=to o(/lôs a)xioi= mê\ u(polamba/nein; o(/per
a)du/naton.]]

[Footnote 38: Ibid. II. xxi. p. 67, a. 5-8.]

[Footnote 39: Analyt. Prior. II. xxi. p. 67, a. 19: [Greek: ou(/tô
me\n ou)=n ô(s tê=| katho/lou ou)=de to G o(/ti du/o o)rthai/, ô(s
de\ tê=| kath' e(/kaston ou)k oi)=den, ô(/st' ou)ch e(/xei ta\s
e)nanti/as] (sc. [Greek: e)pistê/mos]).]

[Footnote 40: Ibid. a. 22: [Greek: ou)damou= ga\r sumbai/nei
proepi/stasthai to\ kath' e(/kaston, a)ll' a(/ma tê=| e)pagôgê=|
lamba/nein tê\n tô=n kata\ me/ros e)pistê/mên _ô(/sper
a)nagnôri/zontas_], &c. Cf. Anal. Post. I. ii. p. 71, b. 9, seq.;
Plato, Menon, pp. 81-82.]

We thus, by help of the universal, acquire a theoretical knowledge of
particulars, but we do not know them by the special observation
properly belonging to each particular case: so that we may err in
respect to them without any positive contrariety between our
cognition and our error; since what we know is the universal, while
what we err in is the particular. We may even know that A is
predicable of all B, and that B is predicable of all C; and yet we
may believe that A is not predicable of C. We may know that every
mule is barren, and that the animal before us is a mule, yet still we
may believe her to be in foal; for perhaps we may never have combined
in our minds the particular case along with the universal
proposition.[41] _A fortiori_, therefore, we may make the like
mistake, if we know the universal only, and do not know the
particular. And this is perfectly possible. For take any one of the
visible particular instances, even one which we have already
inspected, so soon as it is out of sight we do not know it by actual
and present cognition; we only know it, partly from the remembrance
of past special inspection, partly from the universal under which it
falls.[42] We may know in one, or other, or all, of these three
distinct ways: either by the universal; or specially (as remembered):
or by combination of both--actual and present cognition, that is, by
the application of a foreknown generality to a case submitted to our
senses. And as we may know in each of these three ways, so we may
also err or be deceived in each of the same three ways.[43] It is
therefore quite possible that we may know, and that we may err or be
deceived about the same thing, and that, too, without any
contrariety. This is what happens when we know both the two premisses
of the syllogism, but have never reflected on them before, nor
brought them into conjunction in our minds. When we believe that the
mule before us is in foal, we are destitute of the actual knowledge;
yet our erroneous belief is not for that reason contrary to
knowledge; for an erroneous belief, contrary to the universal
proposition, must be represented by a counter-syllogism.[44]

[Footnote 41: Ibid. II. xxi. p. 67, a. 36: [Greek: ou) ga\r
e)pi/statai o(/ti to\ A tô=| G, _mê\ suntheôrô=n_ to\ kath'
e(ka/teron.]]

[Footnote 42: Analyt. Prior. II. xxi. p. 67, a. 39: [Greek: ou)de\n
ga\r tô=n ai)sthêtô=n e)/xô tê=s ai)sthê/seôs geno/menon i)/smen,
ou)/d' a)\n ê)|sthême/noi tugcha/nômen, ei) mê\ ô(s tô=| katho/lou
kai\ tô=| e)/chein tê\n oi)kei/an e)pistê/mên, a)ll' _ou)ch ô(s tô=|
e)nergei=n_.]

Complete cognition ([Greek: to\ e)nergei=n], according to the view
here set forth) consists of one mental act corresponding to the major
premiss; another corresponding to the minor; and a third including
both the two in conscious juxta-position. The third implies both the
first and the second; but the first and the second do not necessarily
imply the third, nor does either of them imply the other; though a
person cognizant of the first is _in a certain way, and to a certain
extent_, cognizant of _all_ the particulars to which the second
applies. Thus the person who knows Ontology (the most universal of
all sciences, [Greek: tou= o)/ntos ê(=| o)/n]), knows _in a certain
way_ all _scibilia_. Metaphys. A., p. 982, a. 21: [Greek: tou/tôn de\
to\ me\n pa/nta e)pi/stasthai tô=| ma/lista e)/chonti tê\n katho/lou
e)pistê/mên a)nagkai=on u(pa/rchein; ou(/tos ga\r _oi)=de/ pôs_
pa/nta ta\ u(pokei/mena.] Ib. a. 8: [Greek: u(polamba/nomen dê\
prô=ton me\n e)pi/stasthai pa/nta to\n sopho\n ô(s _e)nde/chetai, mê\
kath' e(/kaston e)/chonta e)pistê/mên au)tô=n_.] See the Scholia of
Alexander on these passages, pp. 525, 526, Brandis; also Aristot.
Analyt. Post. I. xxiv. p. 86, a. 25; Physica, VII. p. 247, a. 5.
Bonitz observes justly (Comm. **ad Metaphys. p. 41) as to the doctrine
of Aristotle: "Scientia et ars versatur in notionibus universalibus,
solutis ac liberis à conceptu singularum rerum; ideoque, _etsi orta
est à principio et experientiâ_, tradi tamen etiam iis potest qui
careant experientiâ."]

[Footnote 43: Analyt. Prior. II. xxi. p. 67, b. 3: [Greek: to\ ga\r
e)pi/stasthai le/getai trichô=s, ê)\ ô(s tê=| katho/lou, ê)\ ô(s tê=|
oi)kei/a|, ê)\ ô(s tô=| e)nergei=n; ô(/ste kai\ to\ ê)patê=sthai
tosautachô=s.]]

[Footnote 44: Ibid. b. 5: [Greek: ou)de\n ou)=n kôlu/ei kai\
ei)de/nai kai\ ê)patê=sthai peri\ au)to/, plê\n ou)k e)nanti/ôs.
o(/per sumbai/nei kai\ tô=| kath' e(kate/ran ei)do/ti tê\n pro/tasin
kai\ mê\ e)peskemme/nô| pro/teron. u(polamba/nôn ga\r ku/ein tê\n
ê(mi/onon ou)k e)/chei tê\n kata\ to\ e)nergei=n e)pistê/mên, ou)d'
au)= dia\ tê\n u(po/lêpsin e)nanti/an a)pa/tên tê=| e)pistê/mê|;
sullogismo\s ga\r ê( e)nanti/a a)pa/tê tê=| katho/lou.] About
erroneous belief, where a man believes the contrary of a true
conclusion, adopting a counter-syllogism, compare Analyt. Post. I.
xvi. p. 79, b. 23: [Greek: a)/gnoia kata\ dia/thesin].]

It is impossible, however, for a man to believe that one contrary is
predicable of its contrary, or that one contrary is identical with
its contrary, essentially and as an universal proposition; though he
may believe that it is so by accident (_i.e._ in some particular
case, by reason of the peculiarities of that case). In various ways
this last is possible; but this we reserve for fuller
examination.[45]

[Footnote 45: Analyt. Prior. II. xxi. p. 67, b. 23: [Greek: a)ll'
i)/sôs e)kei=no pseu=dos, to\ u(polabei=n tina\ kakô=| ei)=nai to\
a)gathô=| ei)=nai, ei) mê\ kata\ sumbebêko/s; pollachô=s ga\r
e)gchôrei= tou=th' u(polamba/nein. e)piskepte/on de\ tou=to
be/ltion.] This distinction is illustrated by what we read in Plato,
Republic, v. pp. 478-479. The impossibility of believing that one
contrary is identical with its contrary, is maintained by Sokrates in
Plato, Theætetus, p. 190, B-D, as a part of the long discussion
respecting [Greek: pseudê\s do/xa]: either there is no such thing as
[Greek: pseudê\s do/xa], or a man may know, and not know, the same
thing, ibid. p. 196 C. Aristotle has here tried to show in what sense
this last-mentioned case is possible.]

Whenever (Aristotle next goes on to say) the extremes of a syllogism
reciprocate or are co-extensive with each other (_i.e._ when the
conclusion being affirmative is convertible simply), the middle term
must reciprocate or be co-extensive with both.[46] If there be four
terms (A, B, C, D), such that A reciprocates with B, and C with D,
and if either A or C must necessarily be predicable of every subject;
then it follows that either B or D must necessarily also be
predicable of every subject. Again, if either A or B must necessarily
be predicable of every subject, but never both predicable of the same
at once; and if, either C or D must be predicable of every subject,
but never both predicable of the same at once; then, if A and C
reciprocate, B and D will also reciprocate.[47] When A is predicable
of all B and all C, but of no other subject besides, and when B is
predicable of all C, then A and B must reciprocate with each other,
or be co-extensive with each other; that is, B may be predicated of
every subject of which A can be predicated, though B cannot be
predicated of A itself.[48] Again, when A and B are predicable of all
C, and when C reciprocates with B, then A must also be predicable of
all B.[49]

[Footnote 46: Ibid. II. xxii. p. 67, b. 27, seq. In this chapter
Aristotle introduces us to affirmative universal propositions
convertible _simpliciter_; that is, in which the predicate must be
understood to be distributed as well as the subject. Here, then, the
quantity of the predicate is determined in thought. This is (as
Julius Pacius remarks, p. 371) in order to lay down principles for
the resolution of Induction into Syllogism, which is to be explained
in the next chapter. In these peculiar propositions, the reason urged
by Sir W. Hamilton for his favourite precept of verbally indicating
the quantity of the predicate, is well founded as a fact: though _he_
says that in _all_ propositions the quantity of the predicate is
understood in thought, which I hold to be incorrect.

We may remark that this recognition by Aristotle of a class of
universal affirmative propositions in which predicate and subject
reciprocate, contrived in order to force Induction into the
syllogistic framework, is at variance with his general view both of
reciprocating propositions and of Induction. He tells us (Analyt.
Post. I. iii. p. 73, a. 18) that such reciprocating propositions are
very rare, which would not be true if they are taken to represent
every Induction; and he forbids us emphatically to annex the mark of
universality to the predicate; which he has no right to do, if he
calls upon us to reason on the predicate as distributed (Analyt.
Prior. I. xxvii., p. 43, b. 17; De Interpret. p. 17, b. 14).]

[Footnote 47: Ibid. II. xxii. p. 68, a. 2-15.]

[Footnote 48: Ibid. a. 16-21. [Greek: plê\n au)tou= tou= A]. Waitz
explains these words in his note (p. 531): yet I do not clearly make
them out; and Alexander of Aphrodisias declared them to assert what
was erroneous ([Greek: e)spha/lthai le/gei], Schol. p. 194, a. 40,
Brandis).]

[Footnote 49: Ibid. II. xxii. p. 68, a. 21-25.]

Lastly, suppose two pairs of opposites, A and B, C and D; let A be
more eligible than B, and D more eligible than C. Then, if A C is
more eligible than B D, A will also be more eligible than D. For A is
as much worthy of pursuit as B is worthy of avoidance, they being two
opposites; the like also respecting C and D. If then A and D are
equally worthy of pursuit, B and C are equally worthy of avoidance;
for each is equal to each. Accordingly the two together, A C, will be
equal to the two together, B D. But this would be contrary to the
supposition; since we assumed A to be more eligible than B, and D to
be more eligible than C. It will be seen that on this supposition A
is more worthy of pursuit than D, and that C is less worthy of
avoidance than B; the greater good and the lesser evil being more
eligible than the lesser good and the greater evil. Now apply this to
a particular case of a lover, so far forth as lover. Let A represent
his possession of those qualities which inspire reciprocity of love
towards him in the person beloved; B, the absence of those qualities;
D, the attainment of actual sexual enjoyment; C, the non-attainment
thereof. In this state of circumstances, it is evident that A is more
eligible or worthy of preference than D. The being loved is a greater
object of desire to the lover _qua_ lover than sexual gratification;
it is the real end or purpose to which love aspires; and sexual
gratification is either not at all the purpose, or at best only
subordinate and accessory. The like is the case with our other
appetites and pursuits.[50]

[Footnote 50: Analyt. Prior. II. xxii. p. 68, a. 25-b. 17. Aristotle
may be right in the conclusion which he here emphatically asserts;
but I am surprised that he should consider it to be proved by the
reasoning that precedes.

It is probable that Aristotle here understood the object of [Greek:
e)/rôs] (as it is conceived through most part of the Symposion of
Plato) to be a beautiful youth: (see Plato, Sympos. pp. 218-222; also
Xenophon, Sympos. c. viii., Hiero, c. xi. 11, Memorab. I. ii. 29,
30). Yet this we must say--what the two women said when they informed
Simætha of the faithlessness of Delphis (Theokrit. Id. ii.
149)--[Greek: Kê)=|pe/ moi a)/lla te polla/, kai\ ô(s a)/ra De/lphis
e)/ratai;
Kê)/|te min au)=te gunaiko\s e)/chei po/thos, ei)/te kai\ a)ndro/s,
Ou)k e)/phat' a)treke\s i)/dmen.]]

Such is the relation of the terms of a syllogism in regard to
reciprocation and antithesis. Let it next be understood that the
canons hitherto laid down belong not merely to demonstrative and
dialectic syllogisms, but to rhetorical and other syllogisms also;
all of which must be constructed in one or other of the three
figures. In fact, every case of belief on evidence, whatever be the
method followed, must be tested by these same canons. We believe
everything either through Syllogism or upon Induction.[51]

[Footnote 51: Ibid. II. xxiii. p. 68, b. 13: [Greek: a(/panta ga\r
pisteu/omen ê)\ dia\ sullogismou= ê)\ e)x e)pagôgê=s.]]

Though Aristotle might seem, even here, to have emphatically
contrasted Syllogism with Induction as a ground of belief, he
proceeds forthwith to indicate a peculiar form of Syllogism which may
be constructed out of Induction. Induction, and the Syllogism from or
out of Induction (he says) is a process in which we invert the order
of the terms. Instead of concluding from the major through the middle
to the minor (_i.e._ concluding that the major is predicable of the
minor), we now begin from the minor and conclude from thence through
the middle to the major (_i.e._ we conclude that the major is
predicable of the middle).[52] In Syllogism as hitherto described, we
concluded that A the major was predicable of C the minor, through the
middle B; in the Syllogism from Induction we begin by affirming that
A the major is predicable of C the minor; next, we affirm that B the
middle is also predicable of C the minor. The two premisses, standing
thus, correspond to the Third figure of the Syllogism (as explained
in the preceding pages) and would not therefore by themselves justify
anything more than a _particular_ affirmative conclusion. But we
reinforce them by introducing an extraneous assumption:--That the
minor C is co-extensive with the middle B, and comprises the entire
aggregate of individuals of which B is the universal or class-term.
By reason of this assumption the minor proposition becomes
convertible simply, and we are enabled to infer (according to the
last preceding chapter) an universal affirmative conclusion, that the
major term A is predicable of the middle term B. Thus, let A (the
major term) mean the class-term, long-lived; let B (the middle term)
mean the class-term, bile-less, or the having no bile; let C (the
minor term) mean the individual animals--man, horse, mule, &c.,
coming under the class-term B, bile-less.[53] We are supposed to
know, or to have ascertained, that A may be predicated of all C;
(_i.e._ that all men, horses, mules, &c., are long-lived); we farther
know that B is predicable of all C (_i.e._ that men, horses, mules,
&c., belong to the class bile-less). Here, then, we have two
premisses in the Third syllogistic figure, which in themselves would
warrant us in drawing the particular affirmative conclusion, that A
is predicable of _some_ B, but no more. Accordingly, Aristotle
directs us to supplement these premisses[54] by the extraneous
assumption or postulate, that C the minor comprises all the
individual animals that are bile-less, or all those that correspond
to the class-term B; in other words, the assumption, that B the
middle does not denote any more individuals than those which are
covered by C the minor--that B the middle does not stretch beyond or
overpass C the minor.[55] Having the two premisses, and this
postulate besides, we acquire the right to conclude that A is
predicable of _all_ B. But we could not draw that conclusion from the
premisses alone, or without the postulate which declares B and C to
be co-extensive. The conclusion, then, becomes a particular
exemplification of the general doctrine laid down in the last
chapter, respecting the reciprocation of extremes and the
consequences thereof. We thus see that this very peculiar Syllogism
from Induction is (as indeed Aristotle himself remarks) the opposite
or antithesis of a genuine Syllogism. It has no proper middle term;
the conclusion in which it results is the first or major proposition,
the characteristic feature of which it is to be _immediate_, or not
to be demonstrated through a middle term. Aristotle adds that the
genuine Syllogism, which demonstrates through a middle term, is by
nature prior and more effective as to cognition; but that the
Syllogism from Induction is _to us_ plainer and clearer.[56]

[Footnote 52: Analyt. Prior. II. xxiii. p. 68, b. 15: [Greek:
e)pagôgê\ me\n ou)=n e)sti\ kai\ o( e)x e)pagôgê=s sullogismo\s to\
dia\ tou= e(te/rou tha/teron a)/kron tô=| me/sô| sullogi/sasthai;
oi(=on ei) tô=n AG me/son to\ B, dia\ tou= G dei=xai to\ A tô=| B
u(pa/rchon; ou(/tô ga\r poiou/metha ta\s e)pagôga/s.]

Waitz in his note (p. 532) says: "Fit Inductio, cum per minorem
terminum demonstratur _medium prædicari de majore_." This is an
erroneous explanation. It should have been: "demonstratur _majorem
prædicari de medio_." Analyt. Prior. II. xxiii. 68, b. 32: [Greek:
kai\ tro/pon tina\ a)ntikei=tai ê( e)pagôgê\ tô=| sullogismô=|; o(
me\n ga\r dia\ tou= me/sou to\ a)/kron tô=| tri/tô| dei/knusin, ê(
de\ dia\ tou= tri/tou to\ a)/kron tô=| me/sô|.]]

[Footnote 53: Ibid. II. xxiii. p. 68, b. 18: [Greek: oi(=on e)/stô
to\ A makro/bion, to\ d' e)ph' ô(=| B, to\ cholê\n mê\ e)/chon, e)ph'
ô(=| de\ G, to\ kath' e(/kaston _makro/bion_, oi(=on a)/nthrôpos kai\
i(/ppos kai\ ê(mi/onos. tô=| dê\ G o(/lô| u(pa/rchei to\ A; pa=n ga\r
to\ a)/cholon makro/bion; a)lla\ kai\ to\ B, to\ mê\ e)/chein
cholê/n, panti\ u(pa/rchei tô=| G. ei) ou)=n a)ntistre/phei to\ G
tô=| B kai\ mê\ u(pertei/nei to\ me/son, a)na/gkê to\ A tô=| B
u(pa/rchein.]

I have transcribed this Greek text as it stands in the editions of
Buhle, Bekker, Waitz, and F. Didot. Yet, notwithstanding these high
authorities, I venture to contend that it is not wholly correct; that
the word [Greek: _makro/bion_], which I have emphasized, is neither
consistent with the context, nor suitable for the point which
Aristotle is illustrating. Instead of [Greek: _makro/bion_], we ought
in that place to read [Greek: a)/cholon]; and I have given the sense
of the passage in my English text as if it did stand [Greek:
a)/cholon] in that place.

I proceed to justify this change. If we turn back to the edition by
Julius Pacius (1584, p. 377), we find the text given as follows after
the word [Greek: ê(mi/onos] (down to that word the text is the same):
[Greek: tô=| dê\ G o(/lô| u(pa/rchei to\ A; pa=n ga\r to\ G
makro/bion; a)lla\ kai\ to\ B, to\ mê\ e)/chon cholê/n, panti\
u(pa/rchei tô=| G. ei) ou)=n a)ntistre/phei to\ G tô=| B, kai\ mê\
u(pertei/nei to\ me/son, a)na/gkê to\ A tô=| B u(pa/rchein.] Earlier
than Pacius, the edition of Erasmus (Basil. 1550) has the same text
in this chapter.

Here it will be seen that in place of the words given in Waitz's
text, [Greek: pa=n ga\r to\ _a)/cholon_ makro/bion], Pacius gives
[Greek: pa=n ga\r _to\ G_ makro/bion]: annexing however to the letter
[Greek: G] an asterisk referring to the margin, where we find the
word [Greek: a)/cholon] inserted in small letters, seemingly as a
various reading not approved by Pacius. And M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire
has accommodated his French translation (p. 328) to the text of
Pacius: "Donc A est à C tout entier, car tout C est longève."
Boethius in his Latin translation (p. 519) recognizes as his original
[Greek: pa=n ga\r to\ a)/cholon makro/bion], but he alters the text
in the words immediately preceding:--"Ergo _toti B_ (instead of _toti
C_) inest A, omne enim quod sine cholera est, longævum," &c. (p.
519). The edition of Aldus (Venet. 1495) has the text conformable to
the Latin of Boethius: [Greek: tô=| dê\ B o(/lô| u(pa/rchei to\ A;
pa=n ga\r to\ a)/cholon makro/bion]. Three distinct Latin
translations of the 16th century are adapted to the same text, viz.,
that of Vives and Valentinus (Basil. 1542); that published by the
Junta (Venet. 1552); and that of Cyriacus (Basil. 1563). Lastly, the
two Greek editions of Sylburg (1587) and Casaubon (Lugduni 1590),
have the same text also: [Greek: tô=| dê\ B o(/lô| u(pa/rchei to\ A;
pa=n ga\r [to\ G] to\ a)/cholon makro/bion]. Casaubon prints in
brackets the words [Greek: [to\ G]] before [Greek: to\ a)/cholon].

Now it appears to me that the text of Bekker and Waitz (though Waitz
gives it without any comment or explanation) is erroneous; neither
consisting with itself, nor conforming to the general view enunciated
by Aristotle of the Syllogism from Induction. I have cited two
distinct versions, each different from this text, as given by the
earliest editors; in both the confusion appears to have been felt,
and an attempt made to avoid it, though not successfully.

Aristotle's view of the Syllogism from Induction is very clearly
explained by M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire in the instructive notes of
his translation, pp. 326-328; also in his Preface, p.
lvii.:--"L'induction n'est au fond qu'un syllogisme dont le mineur et
le moyen sont d'extension égale. Du reste, il n'est qu'une seule
manière dont le moyen et le mineur puissent être d'égale extension;
c'est que le mineur se compose de toutes les parties dont le moyen
représente la totalité. D'une part, tous les individus: de l'autre,
l'espèce totale qu'ils forment. L'intelligence fait aussitôt
équation entre les deux termes égaux."

According to the Aristotelian text, as given both by Pacius and the
others, A, the major term, represents _longævum_ (long-lived, the
class-term or total); B, the middle term, represents _vacans bile_
(bile-less, the class-term or total); C, the minor term, represents
the aggregate individuals of the class _longævum_, man, horse, mule,
&c.

Julius Pacius draws out the Inductive Syllogism, thus:--

  1. Omnis homo, equus, asinus, &c., est longævus.
  2. Omnis homo, equus, asinus, &c., vacat bile.
       Ergo:
  3. Quicquid vacat bile, est longævum.

Convertible into a Syllogism in Barbara:--

  1. Omnis homo, equus, asinus, &c., est longævus.
  2. Quicquid vacat bile, est homo, equus, asinus, &c.
       Ergo:
  3. Quicquid vacat bile, est longævum.

Here the force of the proof (or the possibility, in this exceptional
case, of converting a syllogism in the Third figure into another in
_Barbara_ of the First figure) depends upon the equation or
co-extensiveness (not enunciated in the premisses, but assumed in
addition to the premisses) of the minor term C with the middle term
B. But I contend that this is _not_ the condition peremptorily
required, or sufficient for proof, if we suppose C the minor term to
represent _omne longævum_. We must understand C the minor term to
represent _omne vacans bile_, or _quicquid vacat bile_: and unless we
understand this, the proof fails. In other words, _homo, equus,
asinus, &c._ (the aggregate of individuals), must be co-extensive
with the class-term bile-less or _vacans bile_: but they need not be
co-extensive with the class-term long-lived or _longævum_. In the
final conclusion, the subject _vacans bile_ is distributed; but the
predicate _longævum_ is not distributed; this latter may include,
besides all bile-less animals, any number of other animals, without
impeachment of the syllogistic proof.

Such being the case, I think that there is a mistake in the text as
given by all the editors, from Pacius down to Bekker and Waitz. What
they give, in setting out the terms of the Aristotelian Syllogism
from Induction, is: [Greek: e)/stô to\ A makro/bion, to\ d' e)ph'
ô(=| B, to\ cholên mê\ e)/chon, e)ph' ô(=| de\ G, _to\ kath'
e(/kaston makro/bion_, oi(=on a)/nthrôpos kai\ i(/ppos kai\
ê(mi/onos.] Instead of which the text ought to run, [Greek: e)ph'
ô(=| de\ G, _to\ kath' e(/kaston a)/cholon_, oi(=on a)/nthr. k. i(/p.
k. ê(mi/]. That these last words were the original text, is seen by
the words immediately following: [Greek: tô=| dê\ G o(/lô| u(pa/rchei
to\ A. _pa=n ga\r to\ a)/cholon makro/bion_]. For the reason thus
assigned (in the particle [Greek: ga/r]) is irrelevant and unmeaning
if [Greek: G] designates [Greek: to\ kath' e(/kaston _makro/bion_ ],
while it is pertinent and even indispensable if [Greek: G] designates
[Greek: to\ kath' e(/kaston _a)/cholon_]. Pacius (or those whose
guidance he followed in his text) appears to have perceived the
incongruity of the reason conveyed in the words [Greek: pa=n ga\r to\
a)/cholon makro/bion]; for he gives, instead of these words, [Greek:
pa=n ga\r _to\ G_ makro/bion]. In this version the reason is indeed
no longer incongruous, but simply useless and unnecessary; for when
we are told that A designates the class _longævum_, and that [Greek:
G] designates the individual _longæva_, we surely require no reason
from without to satisfy us that A is predicable of all [Greek: G].
The text, as translated by Boethius and others, escapes that
particular incongruity, though in another way, but it introduces a
version inadmissible on other grounds. Instead of [Greek: tô=| _dê\
G_ o(/lô| u(pa/rchei to\ A, pa=n ga\r to\ a)/cholon makro/bion],
Boethius has [Greek: tô=| _dê\ B_ o(/lô| u(pa/rchei to\ A, pa=n ga\r
to\ a)/cholon makro/bion]. This cannot be accepted, because it
enunciates the conclusion of the syllogism as if it were one of the
premisses. We must remember that the conclusion of the Aristotelian
Syllogism from Induction is, that A is predicable of B, one of the
premisses to prove it being that A is predicable of the minor term C.
But obviously we cannot admit as one of the premisses the proposition
that A may be predicated of B, since this proposition would then be
used as premiss to prove itself as conclusion.

If we examine the Aristotelian Inductive Syllogism which is intended
to conduct us to the final _probandum_, we shall see that the terms
of it are incorrectly set out by Bekker and Waitz, when they give the
minor term [Greek: G] as designating [Greek: to\ kath' e(/kaston
makro/bion]. This last is not one of the three terms, nor has it any
place in the syllogism. The three terms are:

1. A--major--the class-term or class [Greek: makro/bion]--_longævum_.
2. B--middle--the class term or class [Greek: a)/cholon]--bile-less.
3. C--minor--the individual bile-less animals, man, horse, &c.

There is no term in the syllogism corresponding to the individual
_longæva_ or long-lived animals; this last (I repeat) has no place in
the reasoning. We are noway concerned with the totality of long-lived
animals; all that the syllogism undertakes to prove is, that in and
among that totality all bile-less animals are included; whether there
are or are not other long-lived animals besides the bile-less, the
syllogism does not pretend to determine. The equation or
co-extensiveness required (as described by M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire
in his note) is not between the individual long-lived animals and the
class, bile-less animals (middle term), but between the aggregate of
individual animals known to be bile-less and the class, bile-less
animals. The real minor term, therefore, is (not the individual
_long-lived_ animals, but) the individual _bile-less_ animals. The
two premisses of the Inductive Syllogism will stand thus:--

 Men, Horses, Mules, &c., are long-lived (major).
 Men, Horses, Mules, &c., are bile-less (minor).

And, inasmuch as the subject of the minor proposition is co-extensive
with the predicate (which, if quantified according to Hamilton's
phraseology, would be, _All_ bile-less animals), so that the
proposition admits of being converted simply,--the middle term will
become the subject of the conclusion, All bileless animals are
long-lived.]

[Footnote 54: Analyt. Prior. II. xxiii. p. 68, b. 27: [Greek: dei=
de\ noei=n to\ G to\ e)x a(pa/ntôn tô=n kath' e(/kaston sugkei/menon;
ê( ga\r e)pagôgê\ dia\ pa/ntôn.]]

[Footnote 55: Analyt. Prior. II. **xxiii. p. 68, p. 23: [Greek: ei)
ou)=n a)ntistre/phei to\ G tô=| B, kai\ mê\ u(pertei/nei to\ me/son,
a)na/gkê to\ A tô=| B u(pa/rchein.]

Julius Pacius translates this: "Si igitur convertatur [Greek: to\ G]
cum B, nec medium excedat, necesse est [Greek: to\ A tô=| B] inesse."
These Latin words include the same grammatical ambiguity as is found
in the Greek original: _medium_, like [Greek: to\ me/son], may be
either an accusative case governed by _excedat_, or a nominative case
preceding _excedat_. The same may be said of the other Latin
translations, from Boethius downwards.

But M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire in his French translation, and Sir W.
Hamilton in his English translation (Lectures on Logic, Vol. II. iv.
p. 358, Appendix), steer clear of this ambiguity. The former says:
"Si donc C est réciproque à B, et qu'il ne dépasse pas le moyen, il
est nécessaire alors que A soit à B:" to the same purpose, Hamilton,
_l. c._ These words are quite plain and unequivocal. Yet I do not
think that they convey the meaning of Aristotle. In my judgment,
Aristotle meant to say: "If then C reciprocates with B, and if the
middle term (B) does not stretch beyond (the minor C), it is
necessary that A should be predicable of B." To show that this must
be the meaning, we have only to reflect on what C and B respectively
designate. It is assumed that C designates the sum of individual
bile-less animals; and that B designates the class or class-term
bile-less, that is, the totality thereof. Now the sum of individuals
included in the minor (C) cannot upon any supposition overpass the
totality: but it may very possibly fall short of totality; or (to
state the same thing in other words) the totality may possibly
surpass the sum of individuals under survey, but it cannot possibly
fall short thereof. B is here the limit, and may possibly stretch
beyond C; but cannot stretch beyond B. Hence I contend that the
translations, both by M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire and Sir W. Hamilton,
take the wrong side in the grammatical alternative admissible under
the words [Greek: kai\ mê\ u(pertei/nei to\ me/son]. The only doubt
that could possibly arise in the case was, whether the aggregate of
individuals designated by the minor did, or did not, reach up to the
totality designated by the middle term; or (changing the phrase)
whether the totality designated by the middle term did, or did not,
stretch beyond the aggregate of individuals designated by the minor.
Aristotle terminates this doubt by the words: "And if the middle term
does _not_ stretch beyond (the minor)." Of course the middle term
does not stretch beyond, when the terms reciprocate; but when they do
not reciprocate, the middle term must be the _more_ extensive of the
two; it can _never_ be the _less_ extensive of the two, since the
aggregate of individuals cannot possibly exceed totality, though it
may fall short thereof.

I have given in the text what I think the true meaning of Aristotle,
departing from the translations of M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire and
Sir** W. Hamilton.]

[Footnote 56: Analyt. Prior. II. xxiii. p. 68, b. 30-38: [Greek:
e)/sti d' o( toiou=tos sullogismo\s tê=s prô/tês kai\ a)me/sou
prota/seôs; ô(=n me\n ga/r e)sti me/son, dia\ tou= me/sou o(
sullogismo/s, ô(=n de\ mê/ e)sti, di' e)pagôgê=s.--phu/sei me\n ou)=n
pro/teros kai\ gnôrimô/teros o( dia\ tou= me/sou sullogismo/s, ê(mi=n
d' e)narge/steros o( dia\ tê=s e)pagôgê=s.]]

From Induction he proceeds to Example. You here take in (besides the
three terms, major, middle, and minor, of the Syllogism) a fourth
term; that is, a new particular case analogous to the minor. Your
purpose here is to show--not, as in the ordinary Syllogism, that the
major term is predicable of the minor, but, as in the Inductive
Syllogism--that the major term is predicable of the middle term; and
you prove this conclusion, not (as in the Inductive Syllogism)
through the minor term, but through the new case or fourth term
analogous to the minor.[57] Let A represent evil or mischievous; B,
war against neighbours, generally; C, war of Athens against Thebes,
an event to come and under deliberation; D, war of Thebes against
Phokis, a past event of which the issue is known to have been
signally mischievous. You assume as known, first, that A is
predicable of D, _i.e._ that the war of Thebes against Phokis has
been disastrous; next, that B is predicable both of C and of D,
_i.e._ that each of the two wars, of Athens against Thebes, and of
Thebes against Phokis, is a war of neighbours against neighbours, or
a conterminous war. Now from the premiss that A is predicable of D,
along with the premiss that B is predicable of D, you infer that A is
predicable of the class B, or of conterminous wars generally; and
hence you draw the farther inference, that A is also predicable of C,
another particular case under the same class B. The inference here
is, in the first instance, from part to whole; and finally, through
that whole, from the one part to another part of the same whole.
_Induction_ includes in its major premiss all the particulars,
declaring all of them to be severally subjects of the major as
predicate; hence it infers as conclusion, that the major is also
predicable of the middle or class-term comprising all these
particulars, but comprising no others. _Example_ includes not all,
but only one or a few particulars; inferring from it or them, first,
to the entire class, next, to some new analogous particular belonging
to the class.[58]

[Footnote 57: Ibid. II. xxiv. p. 68, b. 38: [Greek: paradei=gma d'
e)sti\n o(/tan tô=| me/sô| to\ a)/kron u(pa/rchon deichthê=| dia\
tou= o(moi/ou tô=| tri/tô|.]]

[Footnote 58: Analyt. Prior. II. xxiv. p. 69, a. 1-19**.
Julius Pacius (p. 400) notes the unauthorized character of
this so-called Paradeigmatic Syllogism, contradicting the rules of
the figures laid down by Aristotle, and also the confused manner in
which the scope of it is described: first, to infer from a single
example to the universal; next, to infer from a single example
_through_ the universal to another parallel case. To which we may add
the confused description in p. 69, a. 17, 18, where [Greek: to\
a)/kron] in the first of the two lines signifies the _major_
extreme--in the second of the two the _minor_ extreme. See Waitz's
note, p. 533.

If we turn to ch. xxvii. p. 70, a. 30-34, we shall find Aristotle on
a different occasion disallowing altogether this so-called Syllogism
from Example.]

These chapters respecting Induction and Example are among the most
obscure and perplexing in the Aristotelian Analytica. The attempt to
throw both Induction and Example into the syllogistic form is alike
complicated and unfortunate; moreover, the unsatisfactory reading and
diversities in the text, among commentators and translators, show
that the reasoning of Aristotle has hitherto been imperfectly
apprehended.[59] From some of his phrases, we see that he was aware
of the essential antithesis between Induction and Syllogism; yet the
syllogistic forms appear to have exercised such fascination over his
mind, that he could not be satisfied without trying to find some
abnormal form of Syllogism to represent and give validity to
Induction. In explaining generally what the Syllogism is, and what
Induction is, he informs us that the Syllogism presupposes and rests
upon the process of Induction as its postulate. For there can be no
valid Syllogism without an universal proposition in one (at least) of
the premisses; and he declares, unequivocally, that universal
propositions are obtained only through Induction. How Induction
operates through the particular facts of sense, remembered, compared,
and coalescing into clusters held together by associating similarity,
he has also told us; it is thus that Experience, with its universal
notions and conjunctions, is obtained. But this important process is
radically distinct from that of syllogizing, though it furnishes the
basis upon which all syllogizing is built.

[Footnote 59: Sir W. Hamilton (Lectures on Logic, vol. i. p. 319)
says justly, that Aristotle has been very brief and unexplicit in his
treatment of Induction. Yet the objections that Hamilton makes to
Aristotle are very different from those which I should make. In the
learned and valuable Appendix to his Lectures (vol. iv. pp. 358-369),
he collects various interesting criticisms of logicians respecting
Induction as handled by Aristotle. Ramus (in his Scholæ Dialecticæ,
VIII. xi.) says very truly:--"Quid vero sit Inductio, perobscure ab
Aristotele declaratur; nec ab interpretibus intelligitur, quo modo
_syllogismus_ per medium concludat majus extremum de minore;
_inductio_, majus de medio per minus."

The Inductive Syllogism, as constructed by Aristotle, requires a
reciprocating minor premiss. It may, indeed, be cited (as I have
already remarked) in support of Hamilton's favourite precept of
quantifying the predicate. The predicate of this minor must be
assumed as _quantified in thought_, the subject being taken as
co-extensive therewith. Therefore Hamilton's demand that it shall be
_quantified in speech_ has really in this case that foundation which
he erroneously claims for it in all cases. He complains that Lambert
and some other logicians dispense with the necessity of quantifying
the predicate of the minor by making it disjunctive; and adds the
remarkable statement that "the recent German logicians, Herbart,
Twesten, Drobisch, &c., following Lambert, make the Inductive
Syllogism a byeword" (p. 366). I agree with them in thinking the
attempted transformation of Induction into Syllogism very
unfortunate, though my reasons are probably not the same as theirs.

Trendelenburg agrees with those who said that Aristotle's doctrine
about the Inductive Syllogism required that the minor should be
disjunctively enunciated (Logische Untersuchungen, xiv. p. 175, xvi.
pp. 262, 263; also Erläuterungen zu den Elementen der Aristotelischen
Logik, ss. 34-36, p. 71). Ueberweg takes a similar view (System der
**Logik, sect. 128, p. 367, 3rd ed.). If the Inductive Inference
is to be twisted into Syllogism, it seems more naturally to fall into
an _hypothetical_ syllogism, _e. g._:--

If this, that, and the other magnet attract iron, all magnets attract
iron;
But this, that, and the other magnet do attract iron: _Ergo_,
&c.]

The central idea of the Syllogism, as defined by Aristotle, is that
of a conclusion following from given premisses by _necessary_
sequence;[60] meaning by the term _necessary_ thus much and no
more--that you cannot grant the premisses, and deny the conclusion,
without being inconsistent with yourself, or falling into
contradiction. In all the various combinations of propositions, set
forth by Aristotle as the different figures and modes of Syllogism,
this property of necessary sequence is found. But it is a property
which no Induction can ever possess.[61] When Aristotle professes to
point out a particular mode of Syllogism to which Induction conforms,
he can only do so by falsifying the process of Induction, and by not
accurately distinguishing between what is observed and what is
inferred. In the case which he takes to illustrate the Inductive
Syllogism--the inference from all particular bile-less animals to the
whole class bile-less--he assumes that we have ascertained the
attribute to belong to _all_ the particulars, and that the inductive
inference consists in passing from all of them to the class-term; the
passage from premisses to conclusion being here necessary, and thus
falling under the definition of Syllogism; since, to grant the
premisses, and yet to deny the conclusion, involves a contradiction.
But this doctrine misconceives what the inductive inference really is.
We never can observe _all_ the particulars of a class, which is
indefinite as to number of particulars, and definite only in respect
of the attributes connoted by the class-term. We can only observe
_some_ of the particulars, a greater or smaller proportion. Now it is
in the transition from these _to_ the totality of particulars, that
the real inductive inference consists; not in the transition _from_
the totality to the class-term which denotes that totality and
connotes its determining common attribute. In fact, the distinction
between the totality of particulars and the meaning of the
class-term, is one not commonly attended to; though it is worthy of
note in an analysis of the intellectual process, and is therefore
brought to view by Aristotle. But he employs it incorrectly as an
intermediate step to slur over the radical distinction between
Induction and Syllogism. He subjoins:[62]--"You must conceive the
minor term C (in the Inductive Syllogism) as composed of all the
particulars; for Induction is through all of them." You may say that
Induction is _through_ all the particulars, if you distinguish this
totality from the class-term, and if you treat the class-term as the
ultimate _terminus ad quem_. But the Induction must first travel _to_
all the particulars; being forced to take start from a part only, and
then to jump onward far enough to cover the indefinite unobserved
remainder. This jump is the real Induction; and this can never be
brought under the definition of Syllogism; for in the best and most
certain Induction the sequence is never a necessary one: you may
grant the premisses and deny the conclusion without contradicting
yourself.

[Footnote 60: Alexander intimates that Aristotle enunciated
"necessary sequence" as a part of his definition of Syllogism, for
the express purpose of distinguishing it from Induction, which is a
sequence _not necessary_ (Schol. ad Top. p. 253, a. 19, Br.): [Greek:
to\ d' _e)x a)na/gkês_ proskei/menon e)n tô=| o(/rô|, tê=s
**e)pagôgê=s chôri/zei to\n sullogismo/n; **e)/sti me\n ga\r kai\
e)pagôgê\ lo/gos e)n ô(=| tethe/ntôn tinô=n e(/tero/n ti tô=n
keime/nôn sumbai/nei, a)ll' _ou)k_ e)x a)na/gkês.]]

[Footnote 61: Alexander (in his Scholia on the Metaphysica, E. i. p.
406**, ed. Bonitz) observes truly: [Greek: a)ll' ei) e)k tê=s
ai)sthê/seôs kai\ tê=s e)pagôgê=s pi/stis, ou)k e)/stin a)po/deixis,
pro\s pa=san ga\r e)pagôgê\n du/natai/ tis e)ni/stasthai kai\ mê\
e)a=|n to\ katho/lou sumperai/nein.]]

[Footnote 62: Analyt. Prior. II. xxiii. p. 68, b. 27: [Greek: dei=
de\ noei=n to\ G to\ e)x a(pa/ntôn tô=n kath' e(/kaston sugkei/menon;
ê( ga\r e)pagôgê\ dia\ pa/ntôn.] See Professor Bain's 'Inductive
Logic,' chap. i. s. 2, where this process is properly criticised.]

Aristotle states very clearly:--"We believe everything either through
Syllogism, or from Induction."[63] Here, as well as in several other
passages, he notes the two processes as essentially distinct. The
Syllogism requires in its premisses at least one general proposition;
nor does Aristotle conceive the "generalities as the original
data:"[64] he derives them from antecedent Induction. The two
processes are (as he says) opposite in a certain way; that is, they
are complementary halves of the same whole; Induction being the
establishment of those universals which are essential for the
deductive march of the Syllogism; while the two together make up the
entire process of scientific reasoning. But he forgets or
relinquishes this antithesis, when he presents to us the Inductive
process as a given variety of Syllogism. And the objection to such a
doctrine becomes the more manifest, since in constructing his
Inductive Syllogism, he is compelled to admit either that there is no
middle term, or that the middle term is subject of the conclusion, in
violation of the syllogistic canons.[65]

[Footnote 63: Ibid. II. xxiii. p. 68, b. 13: [Greek: a(/panta ga\r
pisteu/omen ê)\ dia\ sullogismou= ê)\ e)x e)pagôgê=s]. Here Induction
includes Example, though in the next stage he puts the two apart.
Compare Anal. Poster. I. i. p. 71, a. 9.]

[Footnote 64: See Mr. John Stuart Mill's System of Logic, Bk. II. ch.
iii. a. 4, p. 219, 5th ed.]

[Footnote 65: Aldrich (Artis Log. Rudim. ch. iii. 9, 2, p. 175) and
Archbishop Whately (Elem. of Logic, ch. i. p. 209) agree in treating
the argument of Induction as a defective or informal Syllogism: see
also to the same purpose Sir.** W. Hamilton, Lectures on Logic, vol.
i. p. 322. Aldrich treats it as a Syllogism in _Barbara_, with the
minor suppressed; but Whately rejects this, because the minor
necessary to be supplied is false. He maintains that the premiss
suppressed is the major, not the minor. I dissent from both. It
appears to me that the opinion which Whately pronounces to be a
fallacy is the real truth: "Induction is a distinct kind of argument
from the Syllogism" (p. 208). It is the essential property of the
Syllogism, as defined by Aristotle and by every one after him, that
the truth of the conclusion follows _necessarily_ from the truth of
its premisses: that you cannot admit the premisses and reject the
conclusion without contradicting yourself. Now this is what the best
Induction never attains; and I contend that the presence or absence
of this important characteristic is quite enough to constitute "two
_distinct kinds_ of argument." Whately objects to Aldrich (whom
Hamilton defends) for supplying a suppressed _minor_, because it is
"manifestly false" (p. 209). I object to Whately's supplied _major_,
because it is uncertified, and therefore cannot be used to prove any
conclusion. By clothing arguments from Induction in syllogistic form,
we invest them with a character of necessity which does not really
belong to them. The establishment of general propositions, and the
interpretation of them when established (to use the phraseology of
Mr. Mill), must always be distinct mental processes; and the forms
appropriate to the latter, involving necessary sequence, ought not to
be employed to disguise the want of necessity--the varying and
graduated probability, inherent in the former. Mr. Mill says (Syst.
Log. Bk. III. ch. iii. s. 1, p. 343, 5th ed.:)--"As Whately remarks,
every induction is a syllogism with the major premiss suppressed; or
(as I prefer expressing it) every induction may be thrown into the
form of a syllogism, by supplying a major premiss." Even in this
modified phraseology, I cannot admit the propriety of throwing
Induction into syllogistic forms of argument. By doing this we efface
the special character of Induction, as the jump from particular
cases, more or fewer, to an universal proposition comprising them and
an indefinite number of others besides. To state this in forms which
imply that it is a necessary step, involving nothing more than the
interpretation of a higher universal proposition, appears to me
unphilosophical. Mr. Mill says with truth (in his admirable chapter
explaining the real function of the major premiss in a Syllogism, p.
211), that the individual cases are all the evidence which we
possess; the step from them to universal propositions ought not to be
expressed in forms which suppose universal propositions to be already
attained.

I will here add that, though Aldrich himself (as I stated at the
beginning of this note) treats the argument from Induction as a
defective or informal Syllogism, his anonymous Oxonian editor and
commentator takes a sounder view. He says (pp. 176, 177, 184, ed.
1823. Oxon.):--

"The principles acquired by human powers may be considered as
twofold. Some are _intuitive_, and are commonly called Axioms; the
other class of general principles are those acquired by Induction.
But it may be doubted whether this distinction is correct. It is
highly probable, if not certain, that those primary Axioms generally
esteemed _intuitive_, are in fact acquired by an inductive process;
although that process is less discernible, because it takes place
long before we think of tracing the actings of our own minds. It is
often found necessary to facilitate the understanding of those
Axioms, when they are first proposed to the judgment, by
illustrations drawn from individual cases. But whether it is, as is
generally supposed, the mere _enunciation_ of the principle, or the
_principle itself_, which requires the illustration, may admit of a
doubt. It seems probable, however that, such illustrations are
nothing more than a recurrence to the original method by which the
knowledge of those principles was acquired. Thus, the repeated trial
or observation of the necessary connection between mathematical
coincidence and equality, first authorizes the general position or
Axiom relative to that subject. If this conjecture is founded in
fact, it follows that both _primary_ and _ultimate_ principles have
the same nature and are alike acquired by the exercise of the
inductive faculty." "Those who acquiesce in the preceding
observations will feel a regret to find _Induction_ classed among
defective or informal Syllogisms. It is in fact prior in its order to
Syllogism; nor can syllogistic reasoning he carried on to any extent
without previous Induction" (p. 184).]

We must presume Syllogisms without a middle term, when we read:--"The
Syllogism through a middle term is _by nature_ prior, and of greater
cognitive efficacy; but _to us_ the Syllogism through Induction is
plainer and clearer."[66] Nor, indeed, is the saying, when literally
taken, at all well-founded; for the pretended Syllogisms from
Induction and Example, far from being clear and plain, are more
involved and difficult to follow than _Barbara_ and _Celarent_. Yet
the substance of Aristotle's thought is true and important, when
considered as declaring the antithesis (not between varieties of
Syllogisms, but) between Induction and Example on the one part, and
Syllogism (Deduction) on the other. It is thus that he sets out the
same antithesis elsewhere, both in the Analytica Posteriora and the
Topica.[67] Prior and more cognizable _by nature_ or _absolutely_,
prior and more cognizable _to us_ or _in relation to us_--these two
are not merely distinct, but the one is the correlate and antithesis
of the other.

[Footnote 66: Analyt. Prior. II. xxiii. p. 68, b. 35: [Greek: phu/sei
me\n ou)=n pro/teros kai\ gnôrimô/teros o( dia\ tou= me/sou
sullogismo/s, ê(mi=n d' e)narge/steros o( dia\ tê=s e)pagôgê=s.]]

[Footnote 67: Analyt. Post. I. ii. p. 72, a. 2, b. 29; Ethic. Nik.
VI. iii**. p. 1139, b. 28: [Greek: ê( me\n dê\ e)pagôgê\ a)rchê/
e)sti kai\ tou= katho/lou=, o( de\ sullogismo\s e)k tô=n katho/lou.
ei)si\n a)/ra a)rchai\ e)x ô(=n o( sullogismo/s, ô(=n ou)k e)/sti
sullogismo/s; e)pagôgê\ a)/ra.] Compare Topica, I. xii. p. 105, a.
11; VI. iv. pp. 141, 142**; Physica, I. i. p. 184, a. 16; Metaphysic.
E. iv. p. 1029, b**. 4-12. Compare also Trendelenburg's explanation
of this doctrine, Erläuterungen zu den Elementen der Aristotelischen
Logik, sects. 18, 19, 20, p. 33, seq.]

_To us_ the particulars of sense stand first, and are the earliest
objects of knowledge. _To us_, means to the large variety of
individual minds, which grow up imperceptibly from the simple
capacities of infancy to the mature accomplishments of adult years;
each acquiring its own stock of sensible impressions, remembered,
compared, associated; and each learning a language, which both
embodies in general terms and propositions the received
classification of objects, and communicates the current emotional
beliefs. We all begin by being learners; and we ascend by different
paths to those universal notions and beliefs which constitute the
common fund of the advanced intellect; developed in some minds into
_principia_ of philosophy with their consequences. _By nature_, or
_absolutely_, these _principia_ are considered as prior, and as
forming the point of departure: the advanced position is regarded as
gained, and the march taken is not that of the novice, but that of
the trained adult, who having already learnt much, is doubly equipped
either for learning more or for teaching others; who thus stands on a
summit from whence he surveys nature as a classified and coherent
whole, manifesting herself in details which he can interpret and
sometimes predict. The path of knowledge, seen _relatively to us_, is
one through particulars, by way of example to fresh particulars, or
by way of induction to universals. The path of knowledge, _by nature_
or _absolutely_, is from universals by way of deduction either to new
universals or to new particulars. By the cognitive _nature_ of man,
Aristotle means the full equipment, of and for cognition, which our
mature age exhibits; _notiora naturâ_ are the acquisitions, points of
view, and processes, familiar in greater or less perfection to such
mature individuals and societies. _Notiora nobis_ are the facts and
processes with which all of us begin, and which belong to the
intellect in its highest as well as its lowest stage; though, in the
higher stages, they are employed, directed, and modified, by an
acquired intellectual capital, and by the permanent machinery of
universal significant terms in which that capital is invested.

Such is the antithesis between _notiora naturâ_ (or _simpliciter_)
and _notiora nobis_ (or _quoad nos_), which Aristotle recognizes as a
capital point in his philosophy, and insists upon in many of his
writings. The antithesis is represented by Example and Induction, in
the point of view--_quoad nos_--last mentioned; by Syllogism or
Deduction, in the other point of view--_naturâ_. Induction (he
says),[68] or the rising from particulars to universals, is plainer,
more persuasive, more within the cognizance of sensible perception,
more within the apprehension of mankind generally, than Syllogism;
but Syllogism is more cogent and of greater efficacy against
controversial opponents. What he affirms here about Induction is
equally true about the inference from Example, that is, the inference
from one or some particulars, to other analogous particulars; the
rudimentary intellectual process, common to all human and to many
animal minds, of which Induction is an improvement and an exaltation.
While Induction will be more impressive, and will carry assent more
easily with an ordinary uncultivated mind, an acute disputant may
always deny the ultimate inference, for the denial involves no
contradiction. But the rightly constructed Syllogism constrains
assent;[69] the disputant cannot grant the premisses and deny the
conclusion without contradicting himself. The constraining force,
however, does not come into accurate and regulated working until the
principles and conditions of deductive reasoning have been set
forth--until the Syllogism has been analysed, and the characteristics
of its validity, as distinguished from its invalidity, have been
marked out. This is what Aristotle teaches in the Analytica and
Topica. It admits of being set out in regular figure and mode--forms
of premisses with the conclusion appropriate to each; and the lesson
must be learnt before we can know how far the force of deductive
reasoning, which begins with the _notiora naturâ_, is legitimately
binding and trustworthy.

[Footnote 68: Aristot. Topica, I. xii. p. 105, a. 13-19: [Greek:
e)pagôgê\ de\ ê( a)po\ tô=n kath' e(/kaston e)pi\ ta\ katho/lou
e)/phodos; oi(=on ei) e)/sti kubernê/tês o( e)pista/menos kra/tistos
kai\ ê(ni/ochos, kai\ o(/lôs e)sti\n o( e)pista/menos peri\ e(/kaston
a)/ristos. e)/sti d' ê( me\n e)pagôgê\ pithanô/teron kai\
saphe/steron kai\ kata\ tê\n ai)/sthêsin gnôrimô/teron, _kai\ toi=s
polloi=s koino/n_; o( de\ sullogismo\s biastikô/teron kai\ pro\s
tou\s a)ntilogikou\s e)nerge/steron.] Also the same treatise. VI. iv.
p. 141, b. 17.

The inductive interrogations of Sokrates relating to matters of
common life, and the way in which they convinced ordinary hearers,
are strikingly illustrated in the Memorabilia of Xenophon, especially
IV. vi.: [Greek: polu\ ma/lista ô(=n e)gô\ oi)=da, o(/te le/goi,
tou\s a)kou/ontas o(mologou=ntas parei=chen] (15). The same can
hardly be said of the Platonic dialogues.]

[Footnote 69: Bacon, Novum Organ. I. Aphor. 13:--"Syllogismus
assensum constringit, non res."]

Both the two main points of Aristotle's doctrine--the antithesis
between Induction and Deduction, and the dependence of the latter
process upon premisses furnished by the former, so that the two
together form the two halves of complete ratiocination and
authoritative proof--both these two are confused and darkened by his
attempt to present the Inductive inference and the Analogical or
Paradeigmatic inference as two special forms of Syllogistic
deduction.[70] But when we put aside this attempt, and adhere to
Aristotle's main doctrine--of Induction as a process antithetical to
and separate from Deduction, yet as an essential preliminary
thereto,--we see that it forms the basis of that complete and
comprehensive System of Logic, recently elaborated in the work of Mr.
John Stuart Mill. The inference from Example (_i.e._ from some
particulars to other similar particulars) is distinguished by
Aristotle from Induction, and is recognized by him as the primitive
intellectual energy, common to all men, through which Induction is
reached; its results he calls Experience ([Greek: e)mpeiri/a]), and
he describes it as the real guide, more essential than philosophical
generalities, to exactness of performance in detail.[71] Mr. John
Mill has been the first to assign to Experience, thus understood, its
full value and true position in the theory of Ratiocination; and to
show that the Paradeigmatic process exhibits the prime and ultimate
reality of all Inference, the real premisses and the real conclusion
which Inference connects together. Between these two is interposed
the double process of which Induction forms the first half and
Deduction the second; neither the one nor the other being
indispensable to Inference, but both of them being required as
securities for Scientific inference, if we desire to have its
correctness tested and its sufficiency certified; the real evidence,
whereby the conclusion of a Syllogism is proved, being the minor
premiss, together with (not the major premiss itself, but) the
assemblage of particular facts from which by Induction the major
premiss is drawn. Now Aristotle had present to his mind the
conception of Inference as an entire process, enabling us from some
particular truths to discover and prove other particular truths: he
considers it as an unscientific process, of which to a limited extent
other animals besides man are capable, and which, as operative under
the title of Experience in mature practical men, is a safer guide
than Science amidst the doubts and difficulties of action. Upon this
foundation he erects the superstructure of Science; the universal
propositions acquired through Induction, and applied again to
particulars or to lower generalities, through the rules of the
deductive Syllogism. He signalizes, with just emphasis, the
universalizing point of view called Science or Theory; but he regards
it as emerging from particular facts, and as travelling again
downwards towards particular facts. The misfortune is, that he
contents himself with barely recognizing, though he distinctly
proclaims the necessity of, the inductive part of this complex
operation; while he bestows elaborate care upon the analysis of the
deductive part, and of the rules for conducting it. From this
disproportionate treatment, one half of Logic is made to look like
the whole; Science is disjoined from Experience, and is presented as
consisting in Deduction alone; every thing which is not Deduction, is
degraded into unscientific Experience; the major premiss of the
Syllogism being considered as part of the proof of the conclusion,
and the conclusion being necessarily connected therewith, we appear
to have acquired a _locus standi_ and a binding cogency such as
Experience could never supply; lastly, when Aristotle resolves
Induction into a peculiar variety of the Syllogism, he appears
finally to abolish all its separate dignity and jurisdiction. This
one-sided view of Logic has been embraced and perpetuated by the
Aristotelian expositors, who have carefully illustrated, and to a
certain extent even amplified, the part which was already in
comparative excess, while they have added nothing to the part that
was in defect, and have scarcely even preserved Aristotle's
recognition of it as being not merely legitimate but essential. The
vast body of Inductive Science, accumulated during the last three
centuries, has thus, until recently, been allowed to grow up, as if
its proofs and processes had nothing to do with Logic.

[Footnote 70: Heyder (in his learned treatise, Darstellung der
Aristotelischen und Hegelschen Dialektik, p. 226), after having
considered the unsatisfactory process whereby Aristotle attempts to
resolve Induction into a variety of Syllogism, concludes by a remark
which I think just:--"Aus alle dem erhellt zur Genüge, dass sich
Aristoteles bei dem Versuch die Induction auf eine Schlussform
zurückzuführen, selbst sich nicht recht befriedigt fühlte, und
derselbe wohl nur aus seinem durchgängigen Bestreben zu erklären ist,
alles wissenschaftliche Verfahren in die Form des Schlusses zu
bringen; dass dagegen, seiner eigentlichen Meinung und der strengen
Consequenz seiner Lehre zu Folge, die Induction zum syllogistischen
und beweisenden Verfahren einen in dem Begriff der beiden
Verfahrungsweisen liegenden Gegensatz bildete, was sich ihm dann auch
auf das Verhältniss der Induction zur Begriffsbestimmung ausdehnen
musste."]

[Footnote 71: Aristot. Analyt. Prior. II. xxiii. p. 68, b. 12; xxvi.
p. 69, a. 17. Analyt. Post. II. xix. p. 99, b. 30, seq**.; xiii. p.
97, b. 7. Topica, VIII. i. p. 155, b. 35; p. 156, b. 10; p. 157, a.
14-23; p. 160, a. 36. Metaphys. A. i. p. 980, b. 25-p. 981, a. 30.
This first chapter of the Metaphysica is one of the most remarkable
passages of Aristotle, respecting the analytical philosophy of mind.]

But though this restricted conception of Logic or the theory of
Reasoning has arisen naturally from Aristotle's treatment, I maintain
that it does not adequately represent his view of that theory. In his
numerous treatises on other subjects, scarcely any allusion is made
to the Syllogism; nor is appeal made to the rules for it laid down in
the Analytica. His conviction that the formalities of Deduction were
only one part of the process of general reasoning, and that the value
of the final conclusion depended not merely upon their being
correctly performed, but also upon the correctness of that initial
part whereby they are supplied with matter for premisses--is
manifested as well by his industry (unrivalled among his
contemporaries) in collecting multifarious facts, as by his specific
declarations respecting Induction. Indeed, a recent most erudite
logician, Sir William Hamilton, who insists upon the construction of
Logic in its strictest sense as purely formal, blames Aristotle[72]
for having transgressed this boundary, and for introducing other
considerations bearing on diversities of matter and of material
evidence. The charge so made, to whatever extent it is well-founded,
does rather partake of the nature of praise; inasmuch as it evinces
Aristotle's larger views of the theory of Inference, and confirms his
own statement that the Deductive process was only the last half of
it, presupposing a prior Induction. It is only this last half that
Aristotle has here analysed, setting forth its formal conditions with
precepts founded thereupon; while he claims to have accomplished the
work by long and patient investigation, having found not the smallest
foundation laid by others, and bespeaks indulgence[73] as for a first
attempt requiring to be brought to completion by others. He made this
first step for himself; and if any one would make a second step, so
as to apply the same analysis to the other half, and to bring out in
like manner the formal conditions and principles of Induction, we may
fairly believe that Aristotle would have welcomed the act, as filling
up what he himself recognized to be a gap in the entire compass of
Reasoning. As to his own achievement, it is certain that he could not
have composed the Analytica and Topica, if he had not had before him
many specimens of the deductive process to study and compare. Neither
could the inductive process have been analysed, until after the
examples of successful advance in inductive science which recent
years have furnished. Upon these examples, mainly, has been based the
profound System of Mr. John Stuart Mill, analysing and discriminating
the formalities of Induction in the same way as those of Deduction
had before been handled by Aristotle; also fusing the two together as
co-operative towards one comprehensive scheme of Logic--the Logic of
Evidence generally, or of Truth as discoverable and proveable. In
this scheme the Syllogistic Theory, or Logic of Consistency between
one proposition and others, is recognized as an essential part, but
is no longer tolerated as an independent whole.[74]

[Footnote 72: See his Discussions on Philosophy, p. 139, seq.;
Lectures on Logic, vol. i. p. 27.]

[Footnote 73: See the remarkable paragraph at the close of the
Sophistici Elenchi, already quoted (supra, p. 140, note).]

[Footnote 74: Mr. John Stuart Mill says (Bk. II. ch. i. sect. 3):
**"Induction is inferring a proposition from premisses _less general_
than itself, and Ratiocination is inferring a proposition from
premisses _equally or more general_." Again in another passage: "We
have found that all Inference, consequently all Proof, and all
discovery of truths not self-evident, consists of inductions, and the
interpretation of inductions; that all our knowledge, not intuitive,
comes to us exclusively from that source. What Induction is,
therefore, and what conditions render it legitimate, cannot but be
deemed the main question of logic--the question which includes all
others. It is however one which professed writers on logic have
almost entirely passed over. The generalities of the subject, indeed,
have not been altogether neglected by metaphysicians; but, for want
of sufficient acquaintance with the processes by which science has
actually succeeded in establishing general truths, their analysis of
the inductive operation, even when unexceptionable as to correctness,
has not been specific enough to be made the foundation of practical
rules, which might be for Induction itself what the rules of the
Syllogism are for interpretation of Induction" (Bk. III. ch. i. s. 1.
p. 313.)--"The business of Inductive Logic is to provide rules and
models (such as the Syllogism and its rules are for ratiocination) to
which if inductive arguments conform, those arguments are conclusive,
and not otherwise. This is what the Four Methods profess to be, and
what I believe they are universally considered to be by experimental
philosophers, who had practised all of them long before any one
sought to reduce the practice to theory" (Bk. III. ch. ix. s. 5, p.
471, 5th ed.)--See also the same point of view more copiously set
forth, in Mr. Mill's later work, 'Examination of Sir W. Hamilton's
Philosophy' (ch. xx. pp. 454-462, 3rd ed.): "It is only as a means to
material truth that the formal (or to speak more clearly, the
conditional) validity of an operation of thought is of any value; and
even that value is only negative: we have not made the smallest
positive advance towards right thinking, by merely keeping ourselves
consistent in what is perhaps systematic error. This by no means
implies that Formal Logic, even in its narrowest sense, is not of
very great, though purely negative value."--"Not only however is it
indispensable that the larger Logic, which embraces all the general
conditions of the ascertainment of truth, should be studied in
addition to the smaller Logic, which only concerns itself with the
conditions of consistency; but the smaller Logic ought to be (at
least, finally) studied as part of the greater--as a portion of the
means to the same end; and its relation to the other parts--to the
other means--should be distinctly displayed."]

After adverting to another variety of ratiocinative procedure, which
he calls _Apagoge_ or Abduction (where the minor is hardly more
evident than the conclusion, and might sometimes conveniently become
a conclusion first to be proved),[75] Aristotle goes on to treat of
Objection generally--the function of the dialectical respondent. The
_Enstasis_ or Objection is a proposition opposed not to a conclusion,
but to the proposition set up by the defendant. When the proposition
set up by him is universal, as it must be if he seeks to establish an
universal conclusion, your objection may be either universal or
particular: you may deny either the whole of his proposition, or only
one portion of the particulars contained under it; the denial of one
single particular, when substantiated, being enough to overthrow his
universal. Accordingly, your objection, being thus variously opposed
to the proposition, will lie in the syllogistic figures which admit
opposite conclusions; that is, either in the First or Third; for the
Second figure admits only negative conclusions not opposed to each
other. If the defendant has set up an Universal Affirmative, you may
deny the whole and establish a contrary negative, in the First
figure; or you may deny a part only, and establish a contradictory
negative, in the Third figure. The like, if he has set up an
Universal Negative: you may impugn it either by an universal contrary
affirmative, in the First figure; or by a particular contradictory
affirmative, in the Third figure.[76]

[Footnote 75: Analyt. Prior. II. xxv. p. 69, a. 20-36.]

[Footnote 76: Ibid. II. xxvi. p. 69, a. 37-b. 37.

In objecting to A _universally_, you take a term comprehending the
original subject; in objecting _particularly_, a term comprehended by
it. Of the new term in each case you deny the original predicate, and
have thus, as a major premiss, E. For a minor premiss, you affirm, in
the first case, the new term as predicate of the original subject
(less comprehensive); in the second case, the original subject (more
comprehensive) as predicate of the new term. This gives you, in the
first case, a conclusion in _Celarent_ (Fig. I.), and, in the second,
a conclusion in _Felapton_ (Fig. III.); opposed, the one universally
or contrarily, the other particularly or contradictorily, to the
original proposition.]

The Enthymeme is a syllogism from Probabilities or Signs;[77] the two
being not exactly the same. _Probabilities_ are propositions commonly
accepted, and true in the greater number of cases; such as, Envious
men hate those whom they envy, Persons who are beloved look with
affection on those who love them. We call it a _Sign_, when one fact
is the antecedent or consequent of another, and therefore serves as
mark or evidence thereof. The conjunction may be either constant, or
frequent, or merely occasional: if constant, we obtain for the major
premiss of our syllogism a proposition approaching that which is
universally or necessarily true; if not constant but only frequent or
occasional, the major premiss of our syllogism will at best only be
probable. The constant conjunction will furnish us with a Syllogism
or Enthymeme in the First figure; the significant mark being here a
genuine middle term--subject in the major premiss, and predicate in
the minor. We can then get a conclusion both affirmative and
universally true. In other cases, we cannot obtain premisses for a
syllogism in the First figure, but only for a syllogism in the Second
or Third. In the Third figure, since we get by right no universal
conclusions at all, but only particular conclusions, the conclusion
of the Enthymeme, though it may happen to be true, is open to
refutation. Where by the laws of Syllogism no affirmative conclusion
whatever is possible, as in the Second figure, the conclusion
obtained by Enthymeme is altogether suspicious. In contrast with the
Sign in these figures, that which enters as an effective middle term
into the First figure, should be distinguished under the name of
_Proof_ ([Greek: tekmê/rion].)[78]

[Footnote 77: Ibid. II. xxvii. p. 70, a. 10: [Greek: e)nthu/mêma me\n
ou)=n e)sti\ sullogismo\s e)x ei)ko/tôn ê)\ sêmei/ôn; lamba/netai de\
to\ sêmei=on trichô=s, o(sachô=s kai\ to\ me/son e)n toi=s
schê/masi.]]

[Footnote 78: Analyt. Prior. II. xxvii. p. 70, a. 31-b. 6.

Aristotle throws in the remark (a. 24), that, when one premiss only
of the Enthymeme is enunciated, it is a Sign; when the other is
added, it becomes a Syllogism. In the examples given to illustrate
the description of the Enthymeme, that which belongs to the First
figure has its three terms and two propositions specified like a
complete and regular Syllogism; but when we come to the Third and
Second figures, Aristotle gives two alternate ways of stating each:
one way in full, with both premisses enunciated, constituting a
normal, though invalid, Syllogism; the other way, with only one of
the premisses enunciated, the other being suppressed as well-known
and familiar.

Among logicians posterior to Aristotle, the definition given of the
Enthymeme, and supposed to be derived from Aristotle was, that it was
a Syllogism with one of the premisses suppressed--[Greek:
monolê/mmatos]. Sir W. Hamilton has impugned this doctrine, and has
declared the definition to be both absurd in itself, and not
countenanced by Aristotle. (Lectures on Logic, Vol. I. Lect. xx. p.
386, seq.) I think Hamilton is mistaken on this point. (See Mr.
Cope's Introd. to Arist. Rhetoric, p. 103, seq.) Even in the present
chapter Aristotle distinctly alludes to the monolemmatic enunciation
of the Enthymeme as one mode of distinguishing it from a full
Syllogism; and in the Rhetorica he brings out this characteristic
still more forcibly. The distinction is one which belongs to Rhetoric
more than to Logic; the rhetor, in enunciating his premisses, must be
careful not to weary his auditors; he must glance at or omit reasons
that are familiar to them; logical fulness and accuracy would be
inconsistent with his purpose. The writers subsequent to Aristotle,
who think much of the rhetorical and little of the logical point of
view, bring out the distinction yet more forcibly. But the rhetorical
mode of stating premisses is often not so much an omission either of
major or minor, as a confused blending or packing up of both into
one.]

Aristotle concludes his Analytica Priora by applying this doctrine of
Signs to determine the limits within which Physiognomy as a science
is practicable. The basis upon which it rests is this general fact or
postulate: That in all natural affections of the animal, bodily
changes and mental changes accompany each other. The former,
therefore, may become signs or proofs of the latter,[79] if, in each
class of animals, we can discriminate the one specific bodily
phenomenon which attaches to each mental phenomenon. Thus, the lion
is a courageous animal. What is the bodily sign accompanying a
courageous disposition? It is (we assume here) the having extremities
of great size. This belongs to all lions, as a _proprium_; in the
sense that, though it may or does belong also to some individuals of
other races (as men), it does not belong to any other entire race.
Physiognomy as a science will, then, be possible, if we can find
races of animals which have only one characteristic mental attribute,
and if we can discover what is the physical attribute correlating
with it.[80] But the difficulties are greater when the same race has
two characteristic mental attributes (_e.g._ lions are both
courageous and generous), each with its correlative physical
attribute; for how can we tell which belongs to which? We have then
to study individuals of other races possessing one of these
attributes without the other; thus, if we find that courageous men,
who are not generous, agree in having large extremities, we may infer
that this last circumstance is, in the lion, the correlative mark of
his courage and not of his generosity. The physiognomonic inference
will be expressed by a syllogism in the First figure, in which the
major term (A) reciprocates and is convertible with the middle term
(B), while B stretches beyond (or is more extensive than) the minor
(C); this relation of the terms being necessary, if there is to be a
single mark for a particular attribute.[81]

[Footnote 79: Analyt. Prior. II. xxvii. p. 70, b. 7-16: [Greek: ei)/
tis di/dôsin a(/ma metaba/llein to\ sô=ma kai\ tê\n psuchê/n, o(/sa
phusika/ e)sti pathê/mata;--sumpa/schein ga\r a)llê/lois
u(pokei=tai.] See the Aristotelian treatise entitled [Greek:
Phusiognômonika/], pp. 808-809, Bekk.]

[Footnote 80: Ibid. II. xxvii. p. 70, b. 22. About the
characteristics of the lion see Aristot. Physiognom. p. 809, b.
14-36: [Greek: ta\ peri\ tê\n psuchê\n dotiko\n kai\ e)leu/theron,
megalo/psuchon kai\ philo/nikon, kai\ prau+\ kai\ di/kaion kai\
philo/storgon pro\s a(\ a)\n o(milê/sê|.]]

[Footnote 81: Ibid. II. xxvii. p. 70, b. 31-36.]

Here the treatise ends; but the reader will remember that, in
describing the canons laid down by Aristotle for the Syllogism with
its three Figures and the Modes contained therein, I confined myself
to the simple Assertory syllogism, postponing for the moment the long
expositions added by him about Modal syllogisms, involving the
Possible and the Necessary. What is proper to be said about this
complicated and useless portion of the Analytica Priora, may well
come in here; for, in truth, the doctrines just laid down about
Probabilities, Signs, and Proofs, bring us back to the Modals under a
different set of phrases. The Possible or Problematical is that, of
the occurrence or reality of which we doubt, neither believing nor
disbelieving it, not being prepared to assert either that it is, or
that it is not; _that which may be or may not be_. It is our manner
of speaking, when we have only signs or probabilities to guide us,
and not certain proofs. The feeling of doubt is, as a psychological
phenomenon, essentially distinct from the feeling of belief which, in
its objective aspect, correlates with certainty or matter of fact; as
well as from the feeling of disbelief, the correlate of which can
only be described negatively. Every man knows these feelings by his
own mental experience. But in describing the feeling of doubt, as to
its matter or in its objective aspect, we must take care to use
phrases which declare plainly both sides of its disjunctive or
alternative character. The Possible is, _That which either may be or
may not be_. As _That which may be_, it stands opposed to the
Impossible; as _That which may not be_, it stands opposed to the
Necessary. It thus carries with it negation both of impossibility and
of necessity; but, in common parlance, the first half of this meaning
stands out prominently, and is mistaken for the whole. Aristotle, as
we saw previously, speaks equivocally on this point, recognizing a
double signification of the term: he sometimes uses it in the sense
opposed only to impossible, maintaining that what is necessary must
also be possible; sometimes in the truer sense, opposed both to
necessity and to impossibility.[82]

[Footnote 82: Aristot. De Interpret. xiii. p. 22. Analyt. Prior. I.
xiii. p. 32, a. 21, 29, 36, xiv. p. 33, b. 22; xix. p. 38, a. 35.]

The Possible or Problematical, however, in this latter complete
sense--_What may or may not be_--exhibits various modifications or
gradations. 1. The chances on either side may be conceived as
perfectly equal, so that there is no probability, and we have no more
reason for expecting one side of the alternative than the other; the
sequence or conjunction is indeterminate. Aristotle construes this
indeterminateness in many cases (not as _subjective_, or as depending
upon our want of complete knowledge and calculating power, but) as
_objective_, insuperable, and inherent in many phenomenal agencies;
characterizing it, under the names of Spontaneity and Chance, as the
essentially unpredictable. 2. The chances on both sides may be
conceived as unequal and the ratio between them as varying
infinitely: the usual and ordinary tendency of phenomena--what
Aristotle calls Nature--prevails in the majority of cases, but not in
all; being liable to occasional counteraction from Chance and other
forces. Thus, between Necessity and perfect constancy at one extreme
(such as the rotation of the sidereal sphere), and Chance at the
other, there may be every shade of gradation; from natural agency
next below the constant, down to the lowest degree of
probability.[83]

[Footnote 83: Analyt. Prior. I. xiii. p. 32, b. 5-19. [Greek: to\ d'
a)o/riston tô=| mêde\n ma=llon ou(/tôs ê)\ e)kei/nôs]. Compare
Metaphys. K. p. 1064, b. 32.]

Now, within the range of these limits lie what Aristotle describes as
Signs and Probabilities; in fact, all the marks which we shall
presently come to as distinguishing the _dialectical_ syllogism from
the _demonstrative_. But here is involved rather the matter of the
Syllogism than its form. The form indeed is so far implicated, that
(as Aristotle justly remarks at the end of the Analytica Priora[84]),
the First figure is the only one that will prove both conjunctions
and disjunctions, as well constant as occasional; the Third figure
proves only occasional conjunctions and occasional disjunctions, not
constant; the Second figure will prove no conjunctions at all, but
only disjunctions, constant as well as occasional. Here a difference
of form is properly pointed out as coupled with and founded on a
difference of matter. But the special rules given by Aristotle, early
in the present treatise, for the conversion of Modal Propositions,
and the distinctions that he draws as to the modal character of the
conclusion according as one or other of the premisses belongs to one
or other of the different modes,--are both prolix and of little
practical value.[85]

[Footnote 84: Analyt. Prior. II. xxvii. p. 70, a. 2-38. Compare what
is said here about [Greek: ei)ko/s, sêmei=on, tekmê/rion], with the
first chapter of the Topica, and the dialectic syllogism as there
described: [Greek: o( e)x e)ndo/xôn sullogizo/menos].]

[Footnote 85: Ibid. I. viii.-xxii. p. 29, b. 29-p. 40, b. 16.]

What he calls the Necessary might indeed, from the point of view now
reached, cease to be recognized as a separate mode at all. The
Certain and the Problematical are real modes of the Proposition;
objective correlates to the subjective phases called Belief and
Doubt. But no proposition can be more than certain: the word
_necessary_, in strictness, implies only a peculiarity of the
evidence on which our belief is grounded. Granting certain given
premisses to be true, a given conclusion must be true also, if we
would avoid inconsistency and contradiction.




CHAPTER VII.

ANALYTICA POSTERIORA I.

In the two books of Analytica Priora, Aristotle has carried us
through the full doctrine of the functions and varieties of the
Syllogism; with an intimation that it might be applied to two
purposes--Demonstration and Dialectic. We are now introduced to these
two distinct applications of the Syllogism: first, in the Analytica
Posteriora, to Demonstration; next, in the Topica, to Dialectic. We
are indeed distinctly told that, as far as the forms and rules of
Syllogism go, these are alike applicable to both;[1] but the
difference of matter and purpose in the two cases is so considerable
as to require a distinct theory and precepts for the one and for the
other.

[Footnote 1: Analyt. Prior. I. xxx. p. 46, a. 4-10; Analyt. Post. I.
ii. p. 71, a. 23.]

The contrast between Dialectic (along with Rhetoric) on the one hand
and Science on the other is one deeply present to the mind of
Aristotle. He seems to have proceeded upon the same fundamental
antithesis as that which appears in the Platonic dialogues; but to
have modified it both in meaning and in terminology, dismissing at
the same time various hypotheses with which Plato had connected it.

The antithesis that both thinkers have in view is Opinion or Common
Sense _versus_ Science or Special Teaching and Learning; those
aptitudes, acquirements, sentiments, antipathies, &c., which a man
imbibes and appropriates insensibly, partly by his own doing and
suffering, partly by living amidst the drill and example of a given
society--as distinguished from those accomplishments which he derives
from a teacher already known to possess them, and in which both the
time of his apprenticeship and the steps of his progress are alike
assignable.

Common Sense is the region of Opinion, in which there is diversity of
authorities and contradiction of arguments without any settled truth;
all affirmations being particular and relative, true at one time and
place, false at another. Science, on the contrary, deals with
imperishable Forms and universal truths, which Plato regards, in
their subjective aspect, as the innate, though buried, furniture of
the soul, inherited from an external pre-existence, and revived in it
out of the misleading data of sense by a process first of the
cross-examining _Elenchus_, next of scientific Demonstration. Plato
depreciates altogether the untaught, unexamined, stock of
acquirements which passes under the name of Common Sense, as a mere
worthless semblance of knowledge without reality; as requiring to be
broken up by the scrutinizing _Elenchus_, in order to impress a
painful but healthy consciousness of ignorance, and to prepare the
mind for that process of teaching whereby alone Science or Cognition
can be imparted.[2] He admits that Opinion may be right as well as
wrong. Yet even when right, it is essentially different from Science,
and is essentially transitory; a safe guide to action while it lasts,
but not to be trusted for stability or permanence.[3] By Plato,
Rhetoric is treated as belonging to the province of Opinion,
Dialectic to that of Science. The rhetor addresses multitudes in
continuous speech, appeals to received common places, and persuades:
the dialectician, conversing only with one or a few, receives and
imparts the stimulus of short question and answer; thus awakening the
dormant capacities of the soul to the reminiscence of those universal
Forms or Ideas which are the only true Knowable.

[Footnote 2: Plato, Sophistes, pp. 228-229; Symposion, pp. 203-204;
Theætetus, pp. 148, 149, 150. Compare also 'Plato and the Other
Companions of Sokrates,' Vol. I. chs. vi.-vii. pp. 245-288; II. ch.
xxvi. p. 376, seq.]

[Footnote 3: Plato, Republic, v. pp. 477-478; Menon, pp. 97-98.]

Like Plato, Aristotle distinguishes the region of Common Sense or
Opinion from that of Science, and regards Universals as the objects
of Science. But his Universals are very different from those of
Plato: they are not self-existent realities, known by the mind from a
long period of pre-existence, and called up by reminiscence out of
the chaos of sensible impressions. To operate such revival is the
great function that Plato assigns to Dialectic. But in the philosophy
of Aristotle Dialectic is something very different. It is placed
alongside of Rhetoric in the region of Opinion. Both the rhetor and
the dialectician deal with all subjects, recognizing no limit; they
attack or defend any or all conclusions, employing the process of
ratiocination which Aristotle has treated under the name of
Syllogism; they take up as premisses any one of the various opinions
in circulation, for which some plausible authority may be cited; they
follow out the consequences of one opinion in its bearing upon
others, favourable or unfavourable, and thus become well furnished
with arguments for and against all. The ultimate foundation here
supposed is some sort of recognized presumption or authoritative
sanction[4]--law, custom, or creed, established among this or that
portion of mankind, some maxim enunciated by an eminent poet, some
doctrine of the Pythagoreans or other philosophers, current proverb,
answer from the Delphian oracle, &c. Any one of these may serve as a
dialectical authority. But these authorities, far from being
harmonious with each other, are recognized as independent,
discordant, and often contradictory. Though not all of equal
value,[5] each is sufficient to warrant the setting up of a thesis
for debate. In Dialectic, one of the disputants undertakes to do
this, and to answer all questions that may be put to him respecting
the thesis, without implicating himself in inconsistencies or
contradiction. The questioner or assailant, on the other hand, shapes
his questions with a view to refute the thesis, by eliciting answers
which may furnish him with premisses for some syllogism in
contradiction thereof. But he is tied down by the laws of debate to
syllogize only from such premisses as the respondent has expressly
granted; and to put questions in such manner that the respondent is
required only to give or withhold assent, according as he thinks
right.

[Footnote 4: Aristot. Topica, I. x. p. 104, a. 8, xi. p. 104, b. 19.
Compare Metaphysica, A. p. 995, a. 1-10.]

[Footnote 5: Analyt. Post. I. xix. p. 81, b. 18: [Greek: kata\ me\n
ou)=n do/xan sullogizome/nois kai\ mo/non dialektikô=s dê=lon o(/ti
tou=to mo/non skepte/on, ei) e)x ô(=n e)nde/chetai e)ndoxota/tôn
gi/netai o( sullogismo/s, ô(/st' ei) kai\ e)/sti ti tê=| a)lêthei/a|
tô=n AB me/son, dokei= de\ mê/, o( dia\ tou/tou sullogizo/menos
sullelo/gistai dialektikô=s, pro\s d' a)lê/theian e)k tô=n
u(parcho/ntôn dei= skopei=n.] Compare Topica, VIII. xii. p. 162, b.
27.]

We shall see more fully how Aristotle deals with Dialectic, when we
come to the Topica: here I put it forward briefly, in order that the
reader may better understand, by contrast, its extreme antithesis,
viz., Demonstrative Science and Necessary Truth as conceived by
Aristotle. First, instead of two debaters, one of whom sets up a
thesis which he professes to understand and undertakes to maintain,
while the other puts questions upon it,--Demonstrative Science
assumes a teacher who knows, and a learner conscious of ignorance but
wishing to know. The teacher lays down premisses which the learner is
bound to receive; or if they are put in the form of questions, the
learner must answer them as the teacher expects, not according to his
own knowledge. Secondly, instead of the unbounded miscellany of
subjects treated in Dialectic, Demonstrative Science is confined to a
few special subjects, in which alone appropriate premisses can be
obtained, and definitions framed. Thirdly, instead of the several
heterogeneous authorities recognized in Dialectic, Demonstrative
Science has _principia_ of its own, serving as points of departure;
some _principia_ common to all its varieties, others special or
confined to one alone. Fourthly, there is no conflict of authorities
in Demonstrative Science; its propositions are essential, universal,
and true _per se_, from the commencement to the conclusion; while
Dialectic takes in accidental premisses as well as essential.
Fifthly, the _principia_ of Demonstrative Science are obtained from
Induction only; originating in particulars which are all that the
ordinary growing mind can at first apprehend (_notiora nobis_), but
culminating in universals which correspond to the perfection of our
cognitive comprehension (_notiora naturâ_.)[6]

[Footnote 6: Aristot. Topica, VI. iv. p. 141, b. 3-14. [Greek: oi(
polloi\ ga\r ta\ toiau=ta prognôri/zousin; ta\ me\n ga\r tê=s
tuchou/sês, ta\ d' a)kribou=s kai\ perittê=s dianoi/as katamathei=n
e)sti/n.] Compare in Analyt. Post. I. xii. pp. 77-78, the contrast
between [Greek: ta\ mathê/mata] and [Greek: oi( dia/logoi].]

Amidst all these diversities, Dialectic and Demonstrative Science
have in common the process of Syllogism, including such assumptions
as the rules of syllogizing postulate. In both, the conclusions are
hypothetically true (_i.e._ granting the premisses to be so). But, in
demonstrative syllogism, the conclusions are true universally,
absolutely, and necessarily; deriving this character from their
premisses, which Aristotle holds up as the cause, reason, or
condition of the conclusion. What he means by Demonstrative Science,
we may best conceive, by taking it as a small [Greek: te/menos] or
specially cultivated enclosure, subdivided into still smaller
separate compartments--the extreme antithesis to the vast common land
of Dialectic. Between the two lies a large region, neither
essentially determinate like the one, nor essentially indeterminate
like the other; an intermediate region in which are comprehended the
subjects of the treatises forming the very miscellaneous Encyclopædia
of Aristotle. These subjects do not admit of being handled with equal
exactness; accordingly, he admonishes us that it is important to know
how much exactness is attainable in each, and not to aspire to
more.[7]

[Footnote 7: Aristot. Ethic. Nikom. I. p. 1094, b. 12-25; p. 1098, a.
26-b. 8; Metaphys. A. p. 995, a. 15; Ethic. Eudem. I. p. 1216, b.
30-p. 1217, a. 17; Politic. VII. p. 1328, a. 19; Meteorolog. I. p. 338,
a. 35. Compare Analyt. Post. I. xiii. p. 78, b. 32 (with Waitz's
note, II. p. 335); and I. xxvii. p. 87, a. 31.

The passages above named in the Nikomachean Ethica are remarkable:
[Greek: le/goito d' a)\n i(kanô=s, ei) kata\ tê\n u(pokeime/nên
u(/lên diasaphêthei/ê; to\ ga\r a)kribe\s ou)ch o(moi/ôs e)n a(/pasi
toi=s lo/gois e)pizêtête/on, ô(/sper ou)d' e)n toi=s
dêmiourgoume/nois. tê\n a)kri/beian mê\ o(moi/ôs e)n a(/pasin
e)pizêtei=n (chrê/), a)ll' e)n e(ka/stois kata\ tê\n u(pokeime/nên
u(/lên, kai\ e)pi\ tosou=ton e)ph' o(/son oi)kei=on tê=| methodô=|.]
Compare Metaphys. E. p. 1025, b. 13: [Greek: a)podeiknu/ousin ê)\
a)nagkai/oteron ê)\ malakô/teron.]

The different degrees of exactness attainable in different
departments of science, and the reasons upon which such difference
depends are well explained in the sixth book of Mr. John Stuart
Mill's System of Logic, vol. II. chap. iii. pp. 422-425, 5th ed.
Aristotle says that there can be no scientific theory or cognition
about [Greek: to\ sumbebêko/s] which he defines to be that which
belongs to a subject neither necessarily, nor constantly, nor
usually, but only on occasion (Metaphys. E. p. 1026, b. 3, 26, 33; K.
p. 1065, a. 1, meaning [Greek: to\ sumbebêko\s mê\ kath'
au(to/],--Analyt. Post. I. 6, 75, a. 18; for he uses the term in two
different senses--Metaph. [Greek: D]. p. 1025, a. 31). In his view,
there can be no science except about constant conjunctions; and we
find the same doctrine in the following passage of Mr. Mill:--"Any
facts are fitted, in themselves, to be a subject of science, which
follow one another according to constant laws; although those laws
may not have been discovered, nor even be discoverable by our
existing resources. Take, for instance, the most familiar class of
meteorological phenomena, those of rain and sunshine. Scientific
inquiry has not yet succeeded in ascertaining the order of antecedence
and consequence among these phenomena, so as to be able, at least in
our regions of the earth, to predict them with certainty, or even with
any high degree of probability. Yet no one doubts that the phenomena
depend on laws. . . . . Meteorology not only has in itself every
requisite for being, but actually is, a science; though from the
difficulty of observing the facts upon which the phenomena depend (a
difficulty inherent in the peculiar nature of those phenomena), the
science is extremely imperfect; and were it perfect, might probably be
of little avail in practice, since the data requisite for applying its
principles to particular instances would rarely be procurable.

"A case may be conceived of an intermediate character between the
perfection of science, and this its extreme imperfection. It may
happen that the greater causes, those on which the principal part of
the phenomena depends, are within the reach of observation and
measurement; so that, if no other causes intervened, a complete
explanation could be given, not only of the phenomenon in general,
but of all the variations and modifications which it admits of. But
inasmuch as other, perhaps many other, causes, separately
insignificant in their effects, co-operate or conflict in many or in
all cases with those greater causes, the effect, accordingly,
presents more or less of aberration from what would be produced by
the greater causes alone. Now if these minor causes are not so
constantly accessible, or not accessible at all, to accurate
observation, the principal mass of the effect may still, as before,
be accounted for, and even predicted; but there will be variations
and modifications which we shall not be competent to explain
thoroughly, and our predictions will not be fulfilled accurately, but
only approximately.

"It is thus, for example, with the theory of the Tides. . . . . And
this is what is or ought to be meant by those who speak of sciences
which are not exact sciences. Astronomy was once a science, without
being an exact science. It could not become exact until not only the
general course of the planetary motions, but the perturbations also,
were accounted for and referred to their causes. It has become an
exact science because its phenomena have been brought under laws
comprehending the whole of the causes by which the phenomena are
influenced, whether in a great or only in a trifling degree, whether
in all or only in some cases, and assigning to each of those causes
the share of effect that really belongs to it. . . . . The science of
human nature falls far short of the standard of exactness now
realized in Astronomy; but there is no reason that it should not be
as much a science as Tidology is, or as Astronomy was when its
calculations had only mastered the main phenomena, but not the
perturbations."]

In setting out the process of Demonstration, Aristotle begins from
the idea of teaching and learning. In every variety thereof some
_præcognita_ must be assumed, which the learner must know before he
comes to be taught, and upon which the teacher must found his
instruction.[8] This is equally true, whether we proceed (as in
Syllogism) from the more general to the less general, or (as in
Induction) from the particular to the general. He who comes to learn
Geometry must know beforehand the figures called circle and triangle,
and must have a triangular figure drawn to contemplate; he must know
what is a unit or monad, and must have, besides, exposed before him
what is chosen as the unit for the reasoning on which he is about to
enter. These are the _præcognita_ required for Geometry and
Arithmetic. Some _præcognita_ are also required preparatory to any
and all reasoning: _e.g._, the maxim of Identity (fixed meaning of
terms and propositions), and the maxims of Contradiction and of
Excluded Middle (impossibility that a proposition and its
contradictory can either be both true or both false.)[9] The learner
must thus know beforehand certain Definitions and Axioms, as
conditions without which the teacher cannot instruct him in any
demonstrative science.

[Footnote 8: Analyt. Post. I. i. pp. 71-72; Metaphys. A. IX. p. 992,
b. 30.]

[Footnote 9: Aristot. Analyt. Post. I, i. p. 71, a. 11-17. [Greek:
a(/pan ê)\ phê=sai ê)\ a)pophê=sai a)lêthe/s].]

Aristotle, here at the beginning, seeks to clear up a difficulty
which had been raised in the time of Plato as between knowledge and
learning. How is it possible to _learn_ at all? is a question started
in the Menon.[10] You either know a thing already, and, on this
supposition, you do not want to learn it; or you do not know it, and
in this case you cannot learn it, because, even when you have learnt,
you cannot tell whether the matter learnt is what you were in search
of. To this difficulty, the reply made in the Menon is, that you
never _do_ learn any thing really new. What you are said to learn, is
nothing more than reminiscence of what had once been known in an
anterior life, and forgotten at birth into the present life; what is
supposed to be learnt is only the recall of that which you once knew,
but had forgotten. Such is the Platonic doctrine of Reminiscence.
Aristotle will not accept that doctrine as a solution; but he
acknowledges the difficulty, and intimates that others had already
tried to solve it without success. His own solution is that there are
two grades of cognition: (1) the full, complete, absolute; (2) the
partial, incomplete, qualified. What you already know by the first of
these grades, you cannot be said to learn; but you may learn that
which you know only by the second grade, and by such learning you
bring your incomplete cognition up to completeness.

[Footnote 10: Plato, Menon. p. 80.]

Thus, you have learnt, and you know, the universal truth, that every
triangle has its three angles equal to two right angles; but you do
not yet know that A B C, D E F, G H I, &c., have their two angles
equal to two right angles; for you have not yet seen any of these
figures, and you do not know that they _are_ triangles. The moment
that you see A B C, or hear what figure it is, you learn at one and
the same time two facts: first, that it is a triangle; next, by
virtue of your previous cognition, that it possesses the
above-mentioned property. You knew this _in a certain way_ or
incompletely before, by having followed the demonstration of the
universal truth, and by thus knowing that _every_ triangle had its
three angles equal to two right angles; but you did not know it
absolutely, being ignorant that A B C was a triangle.[11]

[Footnote 11: Aristot. Analyt. Post. I. i. p. 71, a. 17-b. 8: [Greek:
e)/sti de\ gnôri/zein ta\ me\n pro/teron gnôri/zonta, tô=n de\ kai\
a)/ma lamba/nonta tê\n gnô=sin, oi(=on o(/sa tugcha/nei o)/nta u(po\
to\ katho/lou, ô(=n e)/chei tê\n gnô=sin. o(/ti me\n ga\r pa=n
tri/gônon e)/chei dusi\n o)rthai=s i)/sas, proê/|dei; o(/ti de\ to/de
to\ e)n tô=| ê(mikukli/ô| tri/gôno/n e)stin, a(/ma e)pago/menos
e)gnô/risen.--pri\n d' e)pachthê=nai ê)\ labei=n sullogismo/n,
tro/pon me/n tina i)/sôs phate/on e)pi/stasthai, tro/pon d' a)/llon
ou)/. o(\ ga\r mê\ ê)/|dei ei) e)/stin a(plô=s, tou=to pô=s ê)/|dei
o(/ti du/o o)rtha\s e)/chei a(plô=s? a)lla\ dê=lon ô(s _ô(di\ me\n
e)pi/statai, o(/ti katho/lou e)pi/statai, a(plô=s d' ou)k
e)pi/statai_.--ou)de\n (oi)=mai) kôlu/ei, o(\ mantha/nei, e)/stin ô(s
e)pi/stasthai, e)/sti d' ô(s a)gnoei=n; a)/topon ga\r ou)k ei)
oi)=de/ pôs o(\ mantha/nei, a)ll' ei) ô(di/, oi(=on ê(=| mantha/nei
kai\ ô(/s.] Compare also Anal. Post. I. xxiv. p. 86, a. 23, and
Metaph. A. ii. p. 982, a. 8; Anal. Prior. II. xxi. p. 67, a. 5-b.
10.)

Aristotle reports the solution given by others, but from which he
himself dissented, of the Platonic puzzle. The respondent was asked,
Do you know that every Dyad is even?--Yes. Some Dyad was then
produced, which the respondent did not know to be a Dyad; accordingly
he did not know it to be even. Now the critics alluded to by
Aristotle said that the respondent made a wrong answer; instead of
saying I know every Dyad is even, he ought to have said. Every Dyad
_which I know to be a Dyad_ is even. Aristotle pronounces that this
criticism is incorrect. The respondent knows the conclusion which had
previously been demonstrated to him; and that conclusion was, Every
triangle has its three angles equal to two right angles; it was not,
Every thing _which I know_ to be a triangle has its three angles
equal to two right angles. This last proposition had never been
demonstrated, nor even stated: [Greek: ou)demi/a ga\r pro/tasis
lamba/netai toiau/tê, o(/ti _o(\n su\ oi)=das_ a)rithmo/n, _ê)\ o(\
su\ oi)=das_ eu)thu/grammon, a)lla\ _kata\ panto/s_] (b. 3-5).

This discussion, in the commencement of the Analytica Posteriora
(combined with Analyt. Priora, II. xxi.), is interesting, because it
shows that even then the difficulties were felt, about the major
proposition of the Syllogism, which Mr. John Stuart Mill has so ably
cleared up, for the first time, in his System of Logic. See Book II.
ch. iii. of that work, especially as it stands in the sixth edition,
with the note there added, pp. 232-233. You affirm, in the major
proposition of the Syllogism, that every triangle has its three
angles equal to two right angles; does not this include the triangle
A, B, C, and is it not therefore a _petitio principii_? Or, if it be
not so, does it not assert more than you know? The Sophists (upon
whom both Plato and Aristotle are always severe, but who were
valuable contributors to the theory of Logic by fastening upon the
weak points) attacked it on this ground, and raised against it the
puzzle described by Aristotle (in this chapter), afterwards known as
the Sophism entitled [Greek: o( e)gkekalumme/nos] (see Themistius
Paraphras. I. i.; also 'Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates,'
Vol. III. ch. xxxviii. p. 489). The critics whom Aristotle here cites
and disapproves, virtually admitted the pertinence of this puzzle by
modifying their assertion, and by cutting it down to "Everything
_which we know to be a triangle_ has its three angles equal to two
right angles." Aristotle finds fault with this modification, which,
however, is one way of abating the excess of absolute and peremptory
pretension contained in the major, and of intimating the want of a
minor to be added for interpreting and supplementing the major; while
Aristotle himself arrives at the same result by admitting that the
knowledge corresponding to the major proposition is not yet absolute,
but incomplete and qualified; and that it is only made absolute when
supplemented by a minor.

The very same point, substantially, is raised in the discussion
between Mr. John Stuart Mill and an opponent, in the note above
referred to. "A writer in the 'British Quarterly Review' endeavours
to show that there is no _petitio principii_ in the Syllogism, by
denying that the proposition All men are mortal, asserts or assumes
that Socrates is mortal. In support of this denial, he argues that we
may, and in fact do, admit the general proposition without having
particularly examined the case of Socrates, and even without knowing
whether the individual so named is a man or something else. But this
of course was never denied. That we can and do draw inferences
concerning cases specifically unknown to us, is the datum from which
all who discuss this subject must set out. The question is, in what
terms the evidence or ground on which we draw these conclusions may
best be designated--whether it is most correct to say that the
unknown case is proved by known cases, or that it is proved by a
general proposition including both sets of cases, the known and the
unknown? I contend for the former mode of expression. I hold it an
abuse of language to say, that the proof that Socrates is mortal, is
that all men are mortal. Turn it in what way we will, this seems to
me asserting that a thing is the proof of itself. Whoever pronounces
the words, All men are mortal, has affirmed that Socrates is mortal,
though he may never have heard of Socrates; for since Socrates,
whether known to be a man or not, really is a man, he is included in
the words, All men, and in every assertion of which they are the
subject. . . . . The reviewer acknowledges that the maxim (Dictum de
Omni et Nullo) as commonly expressed--'Whatever is true of a class is
true of everything included in the class,' is a mere identical
proposition, since the class _is_ nothing but the things included in
it. But he thinks this defect would be cured by wording the maxim
thus: 'Whatever is true of a class is true of everything which can be
shown to be a member of the class:' as if a thing could be shown to
be a member of the class without being one."

The qualified manner in which the maxim is here enunciated by the
reviewer (what _can be shown_ to be a member of the class)
corresponds with the qualification introduced by those critics whom
Aristotle impugns ([Greek: lu/ousi ga\r ou) pha/skontes ei)de/nai
pa=san dua/da a)rti/an ou)=san, a)ll' _ê(\n i)/sasin o(/ti dua/s_]);
and the reply of Mr. Mill would have suited for these critics as well
as for the reviewer. The puzzle started in the Platonic Menon is, at
bottom, founded on the same view as that of Mr. Mill, when he states
that the major proposition of the Syllogism includes beforehand the
conclusion. "The general principle, (says Mr. Mill, p. 205), instead
of being given as evidence of the particular case, cannot itself be
taken for true without exception, until every shadow of doubt which
could affect any case comprised in it is dispelled by evidence
_aliunde_; and then what remains for the syllogism to prove? From a
general principle we cannot infer any particulars but those which the
principle itself assumes as known."

To enunciate this in the language of the Platonic Menon, we learn
nothing by or through the evidence of the Syllogism, except a part of
what we have already professed ourselves to know by asserting the
major premiss.]

Aristotle proceeds to tell us what is meant by knowing a thing
_absolutely_ or completely ([Greek: a(plô=s]). It is when we believe
ourselves to know the cause or reason through which the matter known
exists, so that it cannot but be as it is. That is what
Demonstration, or Scientific Syllogism, teaches us;[12] a Syllogism
derived from premisses true, immediate, prior to, and more knowable
than the conclusion--causes of the conclusion, and specially
appropriate thereto. These premisses must be known beforehand without
being demonstrated (_i.e._ known not through a middle term); and must
be known not merely in the sense of understanding the signification
of the terms, but also in that of being able to affirm the truth of
the proposition. _Prior_ or _more knowable_ is understood here as
prior or more knowable _by nature_ (not _relatively to us_, according
to the antithesis formerly explained); first, most universal,
undemonstrable _principia_ are meant. Some of these are Axioms, which
the learner must "bring with him from home," or know before the
teacher can instruct him in any special science; some are Definitions
of the name and its essential meaning; others, again, are Hypotheses
or affirmations of the existence of the thing defined, which the
learner must accept upon the authority of the teacher.[13] As these
are the _principia_ of Demonstration, so it is necessary that the
learner should know them, not merely as well as the conclusions
demonstrated, but even better; and that among matters contradictory
to the _principia_ there should be none that he knows better or
trusts more.[14]

[Footnote 12: Aristot. Analyt. Post I. ii. p. 71, b. 9-17. Julius
Pacius says in a note, ad c. ii. p. 394: "Propositio demonstrativa
est prima, immediata, et indemonstrabilis. His tribus verbis
significatur una et eadem conditio; nam propositio prima est, quæ,
quod medio caret, demonstrari nequit."

So also Zabarella (In lib. I. Post. Anal. Comm., p. 340, Op. ed.
Venet. 1617): "Duæ illæ dictiones (_primis_ et _immediatis_) unam
tantum significant conditionem ordine secundam, non duas; idem namque
est, principia esse medio carentia, ac esse prima."]

[Footnote 13: Aristot. Analyt. Post. I. ii. p. 72, a. 1-24;
Themistius, Paraphr. I. ii. p. 10, ed. Spengel; Schol. p. 199, b. 44.
Themistius quotes the definition of an Axiom as given by
Theophrastus: [Greek: A)xi/ôma/ e)sti _do/xa_ tis], &c. This shows
the difficulty of adhering precisely to a scientific terminology.
Theophrastus explains an axiom to be a sort of [Greek: do/xa], thus
lapsing into the common loose use of the word. Yet still both he and
Aristotle declare [Greek: do/xa] to be of inferior intellectual worth
as compared with [Greek: e)pistê/mê] (Anal. Post. I. xxiii.), while
at the same time they declare the Axiom to be the very maximum of
scientific truth. Theophrastus gave, as examples of Axioms, the
**maxim of Contradiction, universally applicable, and, "If
equals be taken from equals the remainders will be equal," applicable
to homogeneous quantities. Even Aristotle himself sometimes falls
into the same vague employment of [Greek: do/xa], as including the
Axioms. See Metaphys. B. ii. p. 996, b. 28; [Greek: G]. iii. p. 1005,
b. 33.]

[Footnote 14: Aristot. Anal. Post. I. ii. p. 72, a. 25, b. 4. I
translate these words in conformity with Themistius, pp. 12-13, and
with Mr. Poste's translation, p. 43. Julius Pacius and M. Barthélemy
St. Hilaire render them somewhat differently. They also read [Greek:
a)meta/ptôtos], while Waitz and Firmin Didot read [Greek:
a)meta/peistos], which last seems preferable.]

In Aristotle's time two doctrines had been advanced, in opposition to
the preceding theory: (1) Some denied the necessity of any
indemonstrable _principia_, and affirmed the possibility of,
demonstrating backwards _ad infinitum_; (2) Others agreed in denying
the necessity of any indemonstrable _principia_, but contended that
demonstration in a circle is valid and legitimate--_e.g._ that A may
be demonstrated by means of B, and B by means of A. Against both
these doctrines Aristotle enters his protest. The first of them--the
supposition of an interminable regress--he pronounces to be obviously
absurd: the second he declares tantamount to proving a thing by
itself; the circular demonstration, besides, having been shown to be
impossible, except in the First figure, with propositions in which
the predicate reciprocates or is co-extensive with the subject--a
very small proportion among propositions generally used in
demonstrating.[15]

[Footnote 15: Aristot. Analyt. Post. I. iii. p. 72, b. 5-p. 73, a.
20: [Greek: ô(/st' e)peidê\ _o)li/ga toiau=ta_ e)n tai=s
a)podei/xesin], &c.]

Demonstrative Science is attained only by syllogizing from necessary
premisses, such as cannot possibly be other than they are. The
predicate must be (1) _de omni_, (2) _per se_, (3) _quatenus ipsum_,
so that it is a _Primum Universale_; this third characteristic not
being realized without the preceding two. First, the predicate must
belong, and belong at all times, to everything called by the name of
the subject. Next, it must belong thereunto _per se_, or essentially;
that is, either the predicate must be stated in the definition
declaring the essence of the subject, or the subject must be stated
in the definition declaring the essence of the predicate. The
predicate must not be extra-essential to the subject, nor attached to
it as an adjunct from without, simply concomitant or accidental. The
like distinction holds in regard to events: some are accidentally
concomitant sequences which may or may not be realized (_e.g._, a
flash of lightning occurring when a man is on his journey); in
others, the conjunction is necessary or causal (as when an animal
dies under the sacrificial knife).[16] Both these two characteristics
(_de omni_ and _per se_) are presupposed in the third (_quatenus
ipsum_); but this last implies farther, that the predicate is
attached to the subject in the highest universality consistent with
truth; _i.e._, that it is a First Universal, a primary predicate and
not a derivative predicate. Thus, the predicate of having its three
angles equal to two right angles, is a characteristic not merely _de
omni_ and _per se_, but also a First Universal, applied to a
triangle. It is applied to a triangle, _quatenus_ triangle, as a
primary predicate. If applied to a subject of higher universality
(_e.g._, to every geometrical figure), it would not be always true.
If applied to a subject of lower universality (_e.g._, to a
right-angled triangle or an isosceles triangle), it would be
universally true and would be true _per se_, but it would be a
derivative predicate and not a First Universal; it would not be
applied to the isosceles _quatenus_ isosceles, for there is a still
higher Universal of which it is predicable, being true respecting
any triangle you please. Thus, the properties with which
Demonstration, or full and absolute Science, is conversant, are _de
omni_, _per se_, and _quatenus ipsum_, or _Universalia Prima_;[17]
all of them necessary, such as cannot but be true.]

[Footnote 16: Aristot. Analyt. Post. I. iv. p. 73, a. 21, b. 16.

[Greek: Ta\ a)/ra lego/mena e)pi\ tô=n a(plô=s e)pistêtô=n kath'
au(ta\ ou(/tôs ô(s e)nupa/rchein toi=s katêgoroume/nois ê)\
e)nupa/rchesthai di' au(ta/ te/ e)sti kai\ e)x a)na/gkês] (b. 16,
seq.). _Line_ must be included in the definition of the opposites
_straight_ or _curve_. Also it is essential to every line that it is
either straight or curve. _Number_ must be included in the definition
of the opposites _odd_ or _even_; and to be either odd or even is
essentially predicable of every number. You cannot understand what is
meant by _straight_ or _curve_ unless you have the notion of a
_line_.

The example given by Aristotle of _causal_ conjunction (the death of
an animal under the sacrificial knife) shows that he had in his mind
the perfection of Inductive Observation, including full application
of the Method of Difference.]

[Footnote 17: Aristot. Analyt. Post. I. iv. p. 73, b. 25-p. 74, a. 3.
[Greek: o(\ toi/nun _to\ tucho\n prô=ton_ dei/knutai du/o o)rtha\s
e)/chon ê)\ o(tiou=n a)/llo, tou/tô| prô/tô| u(pa/rchei katho/lou,
kai\ ê( _a)po/deixis kath' au(to\_ tou/tou katho/lou e)sti\, tô=n d'
a)/llôn tro/pon tina\ ou) kath' au(to/; ou)de\ tou= i)soske/lous ou)k
e)/sti katho/lou a)ll' e)pi\ ple/on.]

About the precise signification of [Greek: katho/lou] in Aristotle,
see a valuable note of Bonitz (ad Metaphys. Z. iii.) p. 299; also
Waitz (ad Aristot. De Interpr. c. vii.) I. p. 334. Aristotle gives it
here, b. 26: [Greek: katho/lou de\ le/gô o(\ a)\n kata\ panto/s te
u(pa/rchê| kai\ kath' au(to\ kai\ ê(=| au)to/.] Compare Themistius,
Paraphr. p. 19, Spengel. [Greek: To\ kath' au(to/] is described by
Aristotle confusedly. [Greek: To\ katho/lou], is that which is
predicable of the subject as a whole or _summum genus_: [Greek: to\
kata\ panto/s], that which is predicable of every individual, either
of the _summum genus_ or of any inferior species contained therein.
Cf. Analyt. Post. I. xxiv. p. 85, b. 24: [Greek: ô(=| ga\r kath'
au(to\ u(pa/rchei ti, tou=to au)to\ au(tô=| ai)/tion]--the subject is
itself the cause or _fundamentum_ of the properties _per se_. See the
explanation and references in Kampe, Die Erkenntniss-theorie des
Aristoteles, ch. v. pp. 160-165.]

Aristotle remarks that there is great liability to error about these
_Universalia Prima_. We sometimes demonstrate a predicate to be true,
universally and _per se_, of a lower species, without being aware
that it might also be demonstrated to be true, universally and _per
se_, of the higher genus to which that species belongs; perhaps,
indeed, that higher genus may not yet have obtained a current name.
That proportions hold by permutation, was demonstrated severally for
numbers, lines, solids, and intervals of time; but this belongs to
each of them, not from any separate property of each, but from what
is common to all: that, however, which is common to all had received
no name, so that it was not known that one demonstration might
comprise all the four.[18] In like manner, a man may know that an
equilateral and an isosceles triangle have their three angles equal
to two right angles, and also that a scalene triangle has its three
angles equal to two right angles; yet he may not know (except
sophistically and by accident[19]) that a triangle _in genere_ has
its three angles equal to two right angles, though there be no other
triangles except equilateral, isosceles, and scalene. He does not
know that this may be demonstrated of every triangle _quatenus_
triangle. The only way to obtain a certain recognition of _Primum
Universale_, is, to abstract successively from the several conditions
of a demonstration respecting the concrete and particular, until the
proposition ceases to be true. Thus, you have before you a brazen
isosceles triangle, the three angles whereof are equal to two right
angles. You may eliminate the condition brazen, and the proposition
will still remain true. You may also eliminate the condition
isosceles; still the proposition is true. But you cannot eliminate
the condition triangle, so as to retain only the higher genus,
geometrical figure; for the proposition then ceases to be always
true. Triangle is in this case the _Primum Universale_.[20]

[Footnote 18: Aristot. Analyt. Post I. v. p. 74, a. 4-23. [Greek:
a)lla\ dia\ to\ mê\ ei)=nai ô)nomasme/non ti pa/nta tau=ta e(/n,
a)rithmoi/, mê/kê, chro/nos, sterea/, kai\ ei)/dei diaphe/rein
a)llê/lôn, chôri\s e)lamba/neto.] What these four have in common is
that which he himself expresses by [Greek: Poso/n]--_Quantum_--in the
Categoriæ and elsewhere. (Categor. p. 4, b. 20, seq.; Metaph. [Greek:
D]. p. 1020, a. 7, seq.)]

[Footnote 19: Aristot. Analyt. Post. I. v. p. 74, a. 27: [Greek:
ou)/pô oi)=de to\ tri/gônon o(/ti du/o o)rthai=s, ei) mê\ _to\n
sophistiko\n tro/pon_ ou)de\ katho/lou tri/gônon, ou)/d' ei) mêde/n
e)sti para\ tau=ta tri/gônon e(/teron.] The phrase [Greek: to\n
sophistiko\n tro/pon] is equivalent to [Greek: to\n sophistiko\n
**tro/pon to\n kata\ sumbebêko/s], p. 71, b. 10. I see nothing
in it connected with Aristotle's characteristic of a Sophist (special
professional life purpose--[Greek: tou= bi/ou tê=| proaire/sei],
Metaphys. [Greek: G]. p. 1004, b. 24): the phrase means nothing more
than _unscientific_.]

[Footnote 20: Aristot. Analyt Post I. v. p. 74, a. 32-b. 4.]

In every demonstration the _principia_ or premisses must be not only
true, but necessarily true; the conclusion also will then be
necessarily true, by reason of the premisses, and this constitutes
Demonstration. Wherever the premisses are necessarily true, the
conclusion will be necessarily true; but you cannot say, _vice
versâ_, that wherever the conclusion is necessarily true, the
syllogistic premisses from which it follows must always be
necessarily true. They may be true without being necessarily true, or
they may even be false: if, then, the conclusion be necessarily true,
it is not so by reason of these premisses; and the syllogistic proof
is in this case no demonstration. Your syllogism may have true
premisses and may lead to a conclusion which is true by reason of
them; but still you have not demonstrated, since neither premisses
nor conclusion are _necessarily_ true.[21] When an opponent contests
your demonstration, he succeeds if he can disprove the _necessity_ of
your conclusion; if he can show any single case in which it either is
or may be false.[22] It is not enough to proceed upon a premiss which
is either probable or simply true: it may be true, yet not
appropriate to the case: you must take your departure from the first
or highest universal of the genus about which you attempt to
demonstrate.[23] Again, unless you can state the _why_ of your
conclusion; that is to say, unless the middle term, by reason of
which the conclusion is necessarily true, be itself necessarily
true,--you have not demonstrated it, nor do you know it absolutely.
Your middle term not being necessary may vanish, while the conclusion
to which it was supposed to lead abides: in truth no conclusion was
known through that middle.[24] In the complete demonstrative or
scientific syllogism, the major term must be predicable essentially
or _per se_ of the middle, and the middle term must be predicable
essentially or _per se_ of the minor; thus alone can you be sure that
the conclusion also is _per se_ or necessary. The demonstration
cannot take effect through a middle term which is merely a Sign; the
sign, even though it be a constant concomitant, yet being not, or at
least not known to be, _per se_, will not bring out the _why_ of the
conclusion, nor make the conclusion necessary. Of non-essential
concomitants altogether there is no demonstration; wherefore it might
seem to be useless to put questions about such; yet, though the
questions cannot yield necessary premisses for a demonstrative
conclusion, they may yield premisses from which a conclusion will
necessarily follow.[25]

[Footnote 21: Ibid. vi. p. 74, b. 5-18. [Greek: e)x a)lêthô=n me\n
ga\r e)/sti kai\ mê\ a)podeiknu/nta sullogi/sthai, e)x a)nagkai/ôn d'
ou)k e)/stin a)ll' ê)\ a)podeiknu/nta; tou=to ga\r ê)/dê
a)podei/xeô/s e)stin.] Compare Analyt. Prior. I. ii. p. 53, b. 7-25.]

[Footnote 22: Aristot. Analyt. Post. I. vi. p. 74, b. 18: [Greek:
sêmei=on d' o(/ti ê( a)po/deixis e)x a)nagkai/ôn, o(/ti kai\ ta\s
e)nsta/seis ou(/tô phe/romen pro\s tou\s oi)ome/nous a)podeiknu/nai,
o(/ti ou)k a)na/gkê], &c.]

[Footnote 23: Ibid. vi. p. 74, b. 21-26: [Greek: dê=lon d' e)k
tou/tôn kai\ o(/ti eu)ê/theis oi( lamba/nein oi)o/menoi kalô=s ta\s
a)rcha/s, e)a\n e)/ndoxos ê)=| ê( pro/tasis kai\ a)lêthê/s, oi(=on
oi( sophistai\ o(/ti to\ e)pi/stasthai to\ e)pistê/mên e)/chein;],
&c.]

[Footnote 24: Aristot. Analyt. Post. I. vi. p. 74, b. 26-p. 75, a.
17.]

[Footnote 25: Ibid. vi. p. 75, a. 8-37.

On the point last mentioned, M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire observes in
his note, p. 41: "Dans les questions de dialectique, la conclusion
est nécessaire en ce sens, qu'elle suit nécessairement des prémisses;
elle n'est pas du tout nécessaire en ce sens, que la chose qu'elle
exprime soit nécessaire. Ainsi il faut distinguer la nécessité de la
forme et la nécessité de la matière: ou comme disent les
scholastiques, _necessitas illationis et necessitas materiæ_. La
dialectique se contente de la première, mais la demonstration a
essentiellement besoin des deux."]

In every demonstration three things may be distinguished: (1) The
demonstrated conclusion, or Attribute essential to a certain genus;
(2) The Genus, of which the attributes _per se_ are the matter of
demonstration; (3) The Axioms, out of which, or through which, the
demonstration is obtained. These Axioms may be and are common to
several genera: but the demonstration cannot be transferred from one
genus to another; both the extremes as well as the middle term must
belong to the same genus. An arithmetical demonstration cannot be
transferred to magnitudes and their properties, except in so far as
magnitudes are numbers, which is partially true of some among them.
The demonstrations in arithmetic may indeed be transferred to
harmonics, because harmonics is subordinate to arithmetic; and, for
the like reason, demonstrations in geometry may be transferred to
mechanics and optics. But we cannot introduce into geometry any
property of lines, which does not belong to them _quâ_ lines; such,
for example, as that a straight line is the most beautiful of all
lines, or is the contrary of a circular line; for these predicates
belong to it, not _quâ_ line, but _quâ_ member of a different or more
extensive genus.[26] There can be no complete demonstration about
perishable things, or about any individual line, except in regard to
its attributes as member of the genus line. Where the conclusion is
not eternally true, but true at one time and not true at another,
this can only be because one of its premisses is not universal or
essential. Where both premisses are universal and essential, the
conclusion must be eternal or eternally true. As there is no
demonstration, so also there can be no definition, of perishable
attributes.[27]

[Footnote 26: Ibid. vii. p. 75, a. 38-b. 20. Mr. Poste, in his
translation, here cites (p. 50) a good illustrative passage from Dr.
Whewell's Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, Book II. ii.:--"But,
in order that we may make any real advance in the discovery of truth,
our ideas must not only be clear; they must also be _appropriate_.
Each science has for its basis a different class of ideas; and the
steps which constitute the progress of one science can never be made
by employing the ideas of another kind of science. No genuine advance
could ever be obtained in Mechanics by applying to the subject the
ideas of space and time merely; no advance in Chemistry by the use of
mere mechanical conceptions; no discovery in Physiology by referring
facts to mere chemical and mechanical principles." &c.]

[Footnote 27: Aristot. Analyt. Post. I. viii. p. 75, b. 21-36.
Compare Metaphys. Z. p. 1040, a. 1: [Greek: dê=lon o(/ti ou)k a)\n
ei)/ê au)tô=n (tô=n phthartô=n) ou)/th' o(rismo\s ou)/t'
a)po/deixis]. Also Biese, Die Philosophie des Aristoteles, ch. iv. p.
249.]

For complete demonstration, it is not sufficient that the premisses
be true, immediate, and undemonstrable; they must, furthermore, be
essential and appropriate to the class in hand. Unless they be such,
you cannot be said to know the conclusion _absolutely_; you know it
only by accident. You can only know a conclusion when demonstrated
from its own appropriate premisses; and you know it best when it is
demonstrated from its highest premisses. It is sometimes difficult to
determine whether we really know or not; for we fancy that we know,
when we demonstrate from true and universal _principia_, without
being aware whether they are, or are not, the _principia_ appropriate
to the case.[28] But these _principia_ must always be assumed without
demonstration--the class whose essential constituent properties are
in question, the universal Axioms, and the Definition or meaning of
the attributes to be demonstrated. If these definitions and axioms
are not always formally enunciated, it is because we tacitly presume
them to be already known and admitted by the learner.[29] He may
indeed always refuse to grant them in express words, but they are
such that he cannot help granting them by internal assent in his
mind, to which every syllogism must address itself. When you assume a
premiss without demonstrating it, though it be really demonstrable,
this, if the learner is favourable and willing to grant it, is an
assumption or Hypothesis, valid relatively to him alone, but not
valid absolutely: if he is reluctant or adverse, it is a Postulate,
which you claim whether he is satisfied or not.[30] The Definition by
itself is not an hypothesis; for it neither affirms nor denies the
existence of anything. The pupil must indeed understand the terms of
it; but this alone is not an hypothesis, unless you call the fact
that the pupil comes to learn, an hypothesis.[31] The Hypothesis or
assumption is contained in the premisses, being that by which the
reason of the conclusion comes to be true. Some object that the
geometer makes a false hypothesis or assumption, when he declares a
given line drawn to be straight, or to be a foot long, though it is
neither one nor the other. But this objection has no pertinence,
since the geometer does not derive his conclusions from what is true
of the visible lines drawn before his eyes, but from what is true of
the lines conceived in his own mind, and signified or illustrated by
the visible diagrams.[32]

[Footnote 28: Ibid. ix. p. 75, b. 37-p. 76, a. 30.]

[Footnote 29: Ibid. x. p. 76, a. 31-b. 22.]

[Footnote 30: Aristot. Analyt. Post. I. x. p. 76, b. 29-34: [Greek:
e)a\n me\n dokou=nta lamba/nê| tô=| mantha/nonti, u(poti/thetai, kai\
e)/stin ou)/ch a(plô=s u(po/thesis, a)lla\ pro\s e)kei=non mo/non,
a)\n de\ ê)\ mêdemi/a=s e)nou/sês do/xês ê)\ kai\ e)nanti/as
e)nou/sês lamba/nê| to\ au)to/, ai)tei=tai. kai\ tou/tô| diaphe/rei
_u(po/thesis_ kai\ _ai)/têma_], &c. Themistius, Paraphras. p. 37,
Spengel.]

[Footnote 31: Ibid. p. 76, b. 36: [Greek: tou=to d' ou)ch
u(po/thesis, ei) mê\ kai\ _to\ a)kou/ein_ u(po/thesi/n tis ei)=nai
phê/sei]. For the meaning of [Greek: _to\ a)kou/ein_], compare
[Greek: o( a)kou/ôn], infra, Analyt. Post. I. xxiv. p. 85, b. 22.]

[Footnote 32: Ibid. p. 77, a. 1: [Greek: o( de\ geôme/três ou)de\n
sumperai/netai tô=| tê/nde ei)=nai tê\n grammê\n ê(\n au)to\s
e)/phthegktai, a)lla\ ta\ dia\ tou/tôn dêlou/mena.]

Themistius, Paraphr. p. 37: [Greek: ô(/sper ou)d' oi( geôme/trai
ke/chrêntai tai=s grammai=s u(pe\r ô(=n diale/gontai kai\
deiknu/ousin, a)ll' a(\s e)/chousin e)n tê=| psuchê=|, ô(=n ei)si\
su/mbola ai( grapho/menai.]

A similar doctrine is asserted, Analyt. Prior. I. xli. p. 49, b. 35,
and still more clearly in De Memoria et Reminiscentia, p. 450,
a. 2-12.]

The process of Demonstration neither requires, nor countenances, the
Platonic theory of Ideas--universal substances beyond and apart from
particulars. But it does require that we should admit universal
predications; that is, one and the same predicate truly applicable in
the same sense to many different particulars. Unless this be so,
there can be no universal major premiss, nor appropriate middle term,
nor valid demonstrative syllogism.[33]

[Footnote 33: Aristot. Analyt. Post. I. xi. p. 77, a. 5-9.]

The Maxim or Axiom of Contradiction, in its most general enunciation,
is never formally enunciated by any special science; but each of them
assumes the Maxim so far as applicable to its own purpose, whenever
the _Reductio ad Absurdum_ is introduced.[34] It is in this and the
other common principles or Axioms that all the sciences find their
point of contact and communion; and that Dialectic also comes into
communion with all of them, as also the science (First Philosophy)
that scrutinizes the validity or demonstrability of the Axioms.[35]
The dialectician is not confined to any one science, or to any
definite subject-matter. His liberty of interrogation is unlimited;
but his procedure is essentially interrogatory, and he is bound to
accept the answer of the respondent--whatever it be, affirmative or
negative--as premiss for any syllogism that he may construct. In this
way he can never be sure of demonstrating any thing; for the
affirmative and the negative will not be equally serviceable for that
purpose. There is indeed also, in discussions on the separate
sciences, a legitimate practice of scientific interrogation. Here the
questions proper to be put are limited in number, and the answers
proper to be made are determined beforehand by the truths of the
science--say Geometry; still, an answer thus correctly made will
serve to the interrogator as premiss for syllogistic
demonstration.[36] The respondent must submit to have such answer
tested by appeal to geometrical _principia_ and to other geometrical
propositions already proved as legitimate conclusions from the
_principia_; if he finds himself involved in contradictions, he is
confuted _quâ_ geometer, and must correct or modify his answer. But
he is not bound, _quâ_ geometer, to undergo scrutiny as to the
geometrical _principia_ themselves; this would carry the dialogue out
of the province of Geometry into that of First Philosophy and
Dialectic. Care, indeed, must be taken to keep both questions and
answers within the limits of the science. Now there can be no
security for this restriction, except in the scientific competence of
the auditors. Refrain, accordingly, from all geometrical discussions
among men ignorant of geometry and confine yourself to geometrical
auditors, who alone can distinguish what questions and answers are
really appropriate. And what is here said about geometry, is equally
true about the other special sciences.[37] Answers may be improper
either as foreign to the science under debate, or as appertaining to
the science, yet false as to the matter, or as equivocal in middle
term; though this last is less likely to occur in Geometry, since the
demonstrations are accompanied by diagrams, which help to render
conspicuous any such ambiguity.[38] To an inductive proposition,
bringing forward a single case as contributory to an ultimate
generalization, no general objection should be offered; the objection
should be reserved until the generalization itself is tendered.[39]
Sometimes the mistake is made of drawing an affirmative conclusion
from premisses in the Second figure; this is formally wrong, but the
conclusion may in some cases be true, if the major premiss happens to
be a reciprocating proposition, having its predicate co-extensive
with its subject. This, however, cannot be presumed; nor can a
conclusion be made to yield up its principles by necessary
reciprocation; for we have already observed that, though the truth of
the premisses certifies the truth of the conclusion, we cannot say
_vice versâ_ that the truth of the conclusion certifies the truth of
the premisses. Yet propositions are more frequently found to
reciprocate in scientific discussion than in Dialectic; because, in
the former, we take no account of accidental properties, but only of
definitions and what follows from them.[40]

[Footnote 34: Ibid. a. 10, seq.]

[Footnote 35: Ibid. a. 26-30: [Greek: kai\ ei)/ tis katho/lou
peirô=|to deiknu/nai ta\ koina/, oi(=on o(/ti a(/pan pha/nai ê)\
a)popha/nai, ê)\ o(/ti i)/sa a)po\ i)/sôn, ê)\ tô=n toiou/tôn
a)/tta.] Compare Metaph. K. p. 1061**, b. 18.]

[Footnote 36: Aristot. Analyt. Post. I. xii, p. 77, a. 36-40;
Themistius, p. 40.

The text is here very obscure. He proceeds to distinguish Geometry
especially (also other sciences, though less emphatically) from
[Greek: ta\ e)n toi=s dialo/gois] (I. xii. p. 78, a. 12).

Julius Pacius, ad Analyt. Post. I. viii. (he divides the chapters
differently), p. 417, says:--"Differentia interrogationis dialecticæ
et demonstrativæ hæc est. Dialecticus ita interrogat, ut optionem det
adversario, utrum malit affirmare an negare. Demonstrator vero
interrogat ut rem evidentiorem faciat; id est, ut doceat ex
principiis auditori notis."]

[Footnote 37: Ibid. I. xii. p. 77, b. 1-15; Themistius, p. 41:
[Greek: ou) ga\r ô(/sper tô=n e)ndo/xôn oi( polloi\ kritai/, ou(/tô
kai\ tô=n kat' e)pistê/mên oi( a)nepistê/mones].]

[Footnote 38: Analyt. Post. I. xii. p. 77, b. 16-33. Propositions
within the limits of the science, but false as to matter, are styled
by Aristotle [Greek: pseudographê/mata]. See Aristot. Sophist.
Elench. xi. p. 171, b. 14; p. 172, a. 1.

"L'interrogation syllogistique se confondant avec la proposition, il
s'ensuit que l'interrogation doit être, comme la proposition, propre
à la science dont il s'agit." (Barthélemy St Hilaire, note, p. 70).
Interrogation here has a different meaning from that which it bears
in Dialectic.]

[Footnote 39: Ibid. I. xii. p. 77**, b. 34 seq. This passage is to
me hardly intelligible. It is differently understood by commentators
and translators. John Philoponus in the Scholia (p. 217, b. 17-32,
Brandis), cites the explanation of it given by Ammonius, but rejects
that explanation, and waits for others to supply him with a better.
Zabarella (Comm. in Analyt. Post. pp. 426, 456, ed. Venet 1617)
admits that as it stands, and where it stands, it is unintelligible,
but transposes it to another part of the book (to the end of cap.
xvii., immediately before the words [Greek: phanero\n de\ kai\
o(/ti], &c., of c. xviii.), and gives an explanation of it in this
altered position. But I do not think he has succeeded in clearing it
up.]

[Footnote 40: Ibid. I. xii. p. 77, b. 40-p. 78, a. 13.]

Knowledge of Fact and knowledge of the Cause must be distinguished,
and even within the same Science.[41] In some syllogisms the
conclusion only brings out [Greek: to\ o(/ti]--the reality of certain
facts; in others, it ends in [Greek: to\ dio/ti]--the affirmation of
a cause, or of the _Why_. The syllogism of the _Why_ is, where the
middle term is not merely the cause, but the proximate cause, of the
conclusion. Often, however, the effect is more notorious, so that we
employ it as middle term, and conclude from it to its reciprocating
cause; in which case our syllogism is only of the [Greek: o(/ti]; and
so it is also when we employ as middle term a cause not proximate but
remote, concluding from that to the effect.[42] Sometimes the
syllogisms of the [Greek: o(/ti] may fall under one science, those of
the [Greek: dio/ti] under another, namely, in the case where one
science is subordinate to another, as optics to geometry, and
harmonics to arithmetic; the facts of optics and harmonics belonging
to sense and observation, the causes thereof to mathematical
reasoning. It may happen, then, that a man knows [Greek: to\ dio/ti]
well, but is comparatively ignorant [Greek: tou= o(/ti]: the geometer
may have paid little attention to optical facts.[43] Cognition of the
[Greek: dio/ti] is the maximum, the perfection, of all cognition; and
this, comprising arithmetical and geometrical theorems, is almost
always attained by syllogisms in the First figure. This figure is the
most truly scientific of the three; the other two figures depend upon
it for expansion and condensation. It is, besides, the only one in
which universal affirmative conclusions can be obtained; for in the
Second figure we get only negative conclusions; in the Third, only
particular. Accordingly, propositions declaring Essence or
Definition, obtained only through universal affirmative conclusions,
are yielded in none but the First figure.[44]

[Footnote 41: Ibid. I. xiii. p. 77, a. 22 seq.]

[Footnote 42: Themistius, p. 45: [Greek: polla/kis sumbai/nei kai\
a)ntistre/phein a)llê/lois to\ ai)tion kai\ to\ sêmei=on kai\ a)/mphô
dei/knusthai di' a)llê/lôn, dia\ tou= sêmei/ou me\n ô(s to\ o(/ti,
dia\ thate/rou de\ ô(s to\ dio/ti.]

"Cum enim vera demonstratio, id est [Greek: tou= dio/ti], fiat per
causam proximam, consequens est, ut demonstratio vel per effectum
proximum, vel per causam remotam, sit demonstratio [Greek: tou=
o(/ti]" (Julius Pacius, Comm. p. 422).

M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire observes (Note, p. 82):--"La cause éloignée
non immédiate, donne un syllogisme dans la seconde figure.--Il est
vrai qu'Aristote n'appelle cause que la cause immédiate; et que la
cause éloignée n'est pas pour lui une véritable cause."

See in Schol. p. 188, a. 19, the explanation given by Alexander of
the syllogism [Greek: tou= dio/ti].]

[Footnote 43: Analyt. Post. I. xiii. p. 79, a. 2, seq.: [Greek:
e)ntau=tha ga\r to\ me\n o(/ti tô=n ai)sthêtikô=n ei)de/nai, to\ de\
dio/ti tô=n mathêmatikô=n], &c. Compare Analyt. Prior. II. xxi. p.
67, a. 11; and Metaphys. A. p. 981, a. 15.]

[Footnote 44: Analyt. Post. I. xiv. p. 79, a. 17-32.]

As there are some affirmative propositions that are indivisible,
_i.e._, having affirmative predicates which belong to a subject at
once, directly, immediately, indivisibly,--so there are also some
indivisible negative propositions, _i.e._, with predicates that
belong negatively to a subject at once, directly, &c. In all such
there is no intermediate step to justify either the affirmation of
the predicate, or the negation of the predicate, respecting the given
subject. This will be the case where neither the predicate nor the
subject is contained in any higher genus.[45]

[Footnote 45: Ibid. I. xv. p. 79, a. 33-b. 22. The point which
Aristotle here especially insists upon is, that there may be and are
immediate, undemonstrable, _negative_ (as well as affirmative)
predicates: [Greek: phanero\n ou)=n o(/ti e)nde/chetai/ te a)/llo
a)/llô| _mê\ u(pa/rchein_ a)to/môs]. (Themistius, Paraphr. p. 48,
Spengel: [Greek: a)/mesoi de\ prota/seis ou) katapha/seis mo/non
ei)si/n, a)lla\ kai\ a)popha/seis o(moi/ôs ai(\ mê\ du/nantai dia\
sullogismou= deichthê=nai, au(=tai d' ei)si\n e)ph' ô(=n ou)dete/rou
tô=n o(/rôn a)/llos tis o(/lou katêgorei=tai.]) It had been already
shown, in an earlier chapter of this treatise (p. 72, b. 19), that
there were _affirmative_ predicates immediate and undemonstrable.
This may be compared with that which Plato declares in the Sophistes
(pp. 253-254, seq.) about the intercommunion [Greek: tô=n genô=n kai\
tô=n ei)dô=n] with each other. Some of them admit such
intercommunion, others repudiate it.]

In regard both to these propositions immediate and indivisible, and
to propositions mediate and deducible, there are two varieties of
error.[46] You may err simply, from ignorance, not knowing better,
and not supposing yourself to know at all; or your error may be a
false conclusion, deduced by syllogism through a middle term, and
accompanied by a belief on your part that you do know. This may
happen in different ways. Suppose the negative proposition, No B is
A, to be true immediately or indivisibly. Then, if you conclude the
contrary of this[47] (All B is A) to be true, by syllogism through
the middle term C, your syllogism must be in the First figure; it
must have the minor premiss false (since B is brought under C, when
it is not contained in any higher genus), and it may have both
premisses false. Again, suppose the affirmative proposition, All B is
A, to be true immediately or indivisibly. Then if you conclude the
contrary of this (No B is A) to be true, by syllogism through the
middle term C, your syllogism may be in the First figure, but it may
also be in the Second figure, your false conclusion being negative.
If it be in the First figure, both its premisses may be false, or one
of them only may be false, either indifferently.[48] If it be in the
Second figure, either premiss singly may be wholly false, or both may
be partly false.[49]

[Footnote 46: Analyt. Post. I. xvi. p. 79, b. 23: [Greek: a)/gnoia
kat' a)po/phasin--a)/gnoia kata\ dia/thesin]. See Themistius, p. 49,
Spengel. In regard to simple and uncombined ideas, ignorance is not
possible as an erroneous combination, but only as a mental blank. You
either have the idea and thus know so much truth, or you have not the
idea and are thus ignorant to that extent; this is the only
alternative. Cf. Aristot. Metaph. [Greek: Th]. p. 1051, a. 34; De
Animâ, III. vi. p. 430, a. 26.]

[Footnote 47: Analyt. Post. I. xvi. p. 79, b. 29. M. Barthélemy St.
Hilaire remarks (p. 95, n.):--"Il faut remarquer qu'Aristote ne
s'occupe que des modes universels dans la première et dans la seconde
figure, parceque, la démonstration étant toujours universelle, les
propositions qui expriment l'erreur opposée doivent l'être comme
elle. Ainsi ce sont les propositions contraires, et non les
contradictoires, dont il sera question ici."

For the like reason the Third figure is not mentioned here, but only
the First and Second: because in the Third figure no universal
conclusion can be proved (Julius Pacius, p. 431).]

[Footnote 48: Analyt. Post. I. xvi. p. 80, a. 6-26.]

[Footnote 49: Ibid. a. 27-b. 14: [Greek: e)n de\ tô=| me/sô|
schê/mati o(/las me\n ei)=nai ta\s prota/seis a)mphote/ras pseudei=s
ou)k e)nde/chetai--e)pi/ ti d' e(kate/ran ou)de\n kôlu/ei pseudê=
ei)=nai.]]

Let us next assume the affirmative proposition, All B is A, to be
true, but mediate and deducible through the middle term C. If you
conclude the contrary of this (No B is A) through the same middle
term C, in the First figure, your error cannot arise from falsity in
the minor premiss, because your minor (by the laws of the figure)
must be affirmative; your error must arise from a false major,
because a negative major is not inconsistent with the laws of the
First figure. On the other hand, if you conclude the contrary in the
First figure through a different middle term, D, either both your
premisses will be false, or your minor premiss will be false.[50] If
you employ the Second figure to conclude your contrary, both your
premisses cannot be false, though either one of them singly may be
false.[51]

[Footnote 50: Analyt. Post. I. xvi. p. 80, b. 17-p. 81, a. 4.]

[Footnote 51: Ibid. p. 81, a. 5-14.]

Such will be the case when the deducible proposition assumed to be
true is affirmative, and when therefore the contrary conclusion which
you profess to have proved is negative. But if the deducible
proposition assumed to be true is negative, and if consequently the
contrary conclusion must be affirmative,--then, if you try to prove
this contrary through the same middle term, your premisses cannot
both be false, but your major premiss must always be false.[52] If,
however, you try to prove the contrary through a different and
inappropriate middle term, you cannot convert the minor premiss to
its contrary (because the minor premiss must continue affirmative, in
order that you may arrive at any conclusion at all), but the major
can be so converted. Should the major premiss thus converted be true,
the minor will be false; should the major premiss thus converted be
false, the minor may be either true or false. Either one of the
premisses, or both the premisses, may thus be false.[53]

[Footnote 52: Ibid. xvii. p. 81, a. 15-20.]

[Footnote 53: Ibid. a. 20-34. Mr. Poste's translation (pp. 65-70) is
very perspicuous and instructive in regard to these two difficult
chapters.]

Errors of simple ignorance (not concluded from false syllogism) may
proceed from defect or failure of sensible perception, in one or
other of its branches. For without sensation there can be no
induction; and it is from induction only that the premisses for
demonstration by syllogism are obtained. We cannot arrive at
universal propositions, even in what are called abstract sciences,
except through induction of particulars; nor can we demonstrate
except from universals. Induction and Demonstration are the only two
ways of learning; and the particulars composing our inductions can
only be known through sense.[54]

[Footnote 54: Analyt. Post. I. xviii. p. 81, a. 38-b. 9. In this
important chapter (the doctrines of which are more fully expanded in
the last chapter of the Second Book of the Analyt. Post.), the text
of Waitz does not fully agree with that of Julius Pacius. In Firmin
Didot's edition the text is the same as in Waitz; but his Latin
translation remains adapted to that of Julius Pacius. Waitz gives the
substance of the chapter as follows (ad Organ. II. p. 347):--
"Universales propositiones omnes inductione comparantur, quum etiam
in iis, quæ a sensibus maxime aliena videntur et quæ, ut mathematica
([Greek: ta\ e)x a)phaire/seôs]), cogitatione separantur à materia
quacum conjuncta sunt, inductione probentur ea quæ de genero (e. g.,
de linea vel de corpore mathematico), ad quod demonstratio pertineat,
prædicentur [Greek: kath' au(ta/] et cum ejus natura conjuncta sint.
Inductio autem iis nititur quæ sensibus percipiuntur; nam res
singulares sentiuntur, scientia vero rerum singularium non datur sine
inductione, non datur inductio sine sensu."]

Aristotle next proceeds to show (what in previous passages he had
assumed)[55] that, if Demonstration or the syllogistic process be
possible--if there be any truths supposed demonstrable, this implies
that there must be primary or ultimate truths. It has been explained
that the constituent elements assumed in the Syllogism are three
terms and two propositions or premisses; in the major premiss, A is
affirmed (or denied) of all B; in the minor, B is affirmed of all C;
in the conclusion, A is affirmed (or denied) of all C.[56] Now it is
possible that there may be some one or more predicates higher than A,
but it is impossible that there can be an infinite series of such
higher predicates. So also there may be one or more subjects lower
than C, and of which C will be the predicate; but it is impossible
that there can be an infinite series of such lower subjects. In like
manner there may perhaps be one or more middle terms between A and B,
and between B and C; but it is impossible that there can be an
infinite series of such intervening middle terms. There must be a
limit to the series ascending, descending, or intervening.[57] These
remarks have no application to reciprocating propositions, in which
the predicate is co-extensive with the subject.[58] But they apply
alike to demonstrations negative and affirmative, and alike to all
the three figures of Syllogism.[59]

[Footnote 55: Analyt. Prior. I. xxvii. p. 43, a. 38; Analyt. Post. I.
ii. p. 71, b. 21.]

[Footnote 56: Analyt. Post. I. xix. p. 81, b. 10-17.]

[Footnote 57: Ibid. p. 81, b. 30-p. 82, a. 14.]

[Footnote 58: Ibid. p. 82, a. 15-20. M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire, p.
117:--"Ceci ne saurait s'appliquer aux termes réciproques, parce que
dans les termes qui peuvent être attribués réciproquement l'un à
l'autre, on ne peut pas dire qu'il y ait ni premier ni dernier
rélativement à l'attribution."]

[Footnote 59: Analyt. Post. I. xx., xxi. p. 82, a. 21-b. 36.]

In Dialectical Syllogism it is enough if the premisses be admitted or
reputed as propositions immediately true, whether they are so in
reality or not; but in Scientific or Demonstrative Syllogism they
must be so in reality: the demonstration is not complete unless it
can be traced up to premisses that are thus immediately or directly
true (without any intervening middle term).[60] That there are and
must be such primary or immediate premisses, Aristotle now undertakes
to prove, by some dialectical reasons, and other analytical or
scientific reasons.[61] He himself thus distinguishes them; but the
distinction is faintly marked, and amounts, at most, to this, that
the analytical reasons advert only to essential predication, and to
the conditions of scientific demonstration, while the dialectical
reasons dwell upon these, but include something else besides, viz.,
accidental predication. The proof consists mainly in the declaration
that, unless we assume some propositions to be true immediately,
indivisibly, undemonstrably,--Definition, Demonstration, and Science
would be alike impossible. If the ascending series of predicates is
endless, so that we never arrive at a highest generic predicate; if
the descending series of subjects is endless, so that we never reach
a lowest subject,--no definition can ever be attained. The essential
properties included in the definition, must be finite in number; and
the accidental predicates must also be finite in number, since they
have no existence except as attached to some essential subject, and
since they must come under one or other of the nine later
Categories.[62] If, then, the two extremes are thus fixed and
finite--the highest predicate and the lowest subject--it is
impossible that there can be an infinite series of terms between the
two. The intervening terms must be finite in number. The
Aristotelian theory therefore is, that there are certain
propositions directly and immediately true, and others derived from
them by demonstration through middle terms.[63] It is alike an error
to assert that every thing can be demonstrated, and that nothing can
be demonstrated.

[Footnote 60: Ibid. xix. p. 81, b. 18-29.]

[Footnote 61: Ibid. xxi. p. 82, b. 35; xxii. p. 84, a. 7: [Greek:
_logikô=s_ me\n ou)=n e)k tou/tôn a)/n tis pisteu/seie peri\ tou=
lechthe/ntos, _a)nalutikô=s_ de\ dia\ tô=nde phanero\n
suntomô/teron.] In Scholia, p. 227, a. 42, the same distinction is
expressed by Philoponus in the terms [Greek: logikô/tera] and [Greek:
pragmatôde/stera]. Compare Biese, Die Philosophie des Aristoteles,
pp. 134, 261; Bassow, De Notionis Definitione, pp. 19, 20; Heyder,
Aristot. u. Hegel. Dialektik, pp. 316, 317.

Aristotle, however, does not always adhere closely to the
distinction. Thus, if we compare the _logical_ or _dialectical_
reasons given, p. 82, b. 37, seq., with the _analytical_, announced
as beginning p. 84, a. 8, seq., we find the same main topic dwelt
upon in both, namely, that to admit an infinite series excludes the
possibility of Definition. Both Alexander and Ammonius agree in
announcing this as the capital topic on which the proof turned; but
Alexander inferred from hence that the argument was purely
_dialectical_ ([Greek: logiko\n e)pichei/rêma]), while Ammonius
regarded it as a reason thoroughly convincing and evident: [Greek: o(
me/ntoi philo/sophos] (Ammonius) [Greek: e)/lege mê\ dia\ tou=to
le/gein _logika\_ ta\ e)picheirê/mata; e)narge\s ga\r o(/ti ei)si\n
o(rismoi/, ei) mê\ a)katalêpsi/an ei)saga/gômen] (Schol. p. 227, a.
40, seq., Brand.).]

[Footnote 62: Analyt. Post. I. xxii. p. 83, a. 20, b. 14. Only eight
of the ten Categories are here enumerated.]

[Footnote 63: Ibid. I. xxii. p. 84, a. 30-35. The paraphrase of
Themistius (pp. 55-58, Spengel) states the Aristotelian reasoning in
clearer language than Aristotle himself. Zabarella (Comm. in Analyt.
Post. I. xviii.; context. 148, 150, 154) repeats that Aristotle's
proof is founded upon the undeniable fact that there _are_
definitions, and that without them there could be no demonstration
and no science. This excludes the supposition of an infinite series
of predicates and of middle terms:--"Sumit rationem à definitione; si
in _predicatis in quid_ procederetur ad infinitum, sequeretur auferri
definitionem et omnino essentiæ cognitionem; sed hoc dicendum non
est, quum omnium consensioni adversetur" (p. 466, Ven. 1617).]

It is plain from Aristotle's own words[64] that he intended these
four chapters (xix.-xxii.) as a confirmation of what he had already
asserted in chapter iii. of the present treatise, and as farther
refutation of the two distinct classes of opponents there indicated:
(1) those who said that everything was demonstrable, demonstration in
a circle being admissible; (2) those who said that nothing was
demonstrable, inasmuch as the train of predication upwards,
downwards, and intermediate, was infinite. Both these two classes of
opponents agreed in saying, that there were no truths immediate and
indemonstrable; and it is upon this point that Aristotle here takes
issue with them, seeking to prove that there are and must be such
truths. But I cannot think the proof satisfactory; nor has it
appeared so to able commentators either of ancient or modern
times--from Alexander of Aphrodisias down to Mr. Poste.[65] The
elaborate amplification added in these last chapters adds no force to
the statement already given at the earlier stage; and it is in one
respect a change for the worse, inasmuch as it does not advert to the
important distinction announced in chapter iii., between universal
truths known by Induction (from sense and particulars), and universal
truths known by Deduction from these. The truths immediate and
indemonstrable (not known through a middle term) are the inductive
truths, as Aristotle declares in many places, and most emphatically
at the close of the Analytica Posteriora. But in these chapters, he
hardly alludes to Induction. Moreover, while trying to prove that
there must be immediate universal truths, he neither gives any
complete list of them, nor assigns any positive characteristic
whereby to identify them. Opponents might ask him whether these
immediate universal truths were not ready-made inspirations of the
mind; and if so, what better authority they had than the Platonic
Ideas, which are contemptuously dismissed.

[Footnote 64: Analyt. Post. I. xxii. p. 84, a. 32: [Greek: o(/per
e)/phame/n tinas le/gein kat' a)rcha/s], &c.]

[Footnote 65: See Mr. Poste's note, p. 77, of his translation of this
treatise. After saying that the first of Aristotle's _dialectical_
proofs is faulty, and that the second is a _petitio principii_, Mr.
Poste adds, respecting the so-called _analytical_ proof given by
Aristotle:--"It is not so much a proof, as a more accurate
determination of the principle to be postulated. This postulate, the
existence of first principles, as concerning the constitution of the
world, appears to belong properly to Metaphysics, and is merely
borrowed by Logic. See Metaph. ii. 2, and Introduction." In the
passage of the Metaphysica ([Greek: a]. p. 994) here cited the main
argument of Aristotle is open to the same objection of _petitio
principii_ which Mr. Poste urges against Aristotle's second
_dialectical_ argument in this place.

Mr. John Stuart Mill, in his System of Logic, takes for granted that
there _must_ be immediate, indemonstrable truths, to serve as a basis
for deduction; "that there cannot be a chain of proof suspended from
nothing;" that there must be ultimate laws of nature, though we
cannot be sure that the laws now known to us are ultimate.

On the other hand, we read in the recent work of an acute
contemporary philosopher, Professor Delboeuf (Essai de Logique
Scientifique, Liège, 1865, Pref. pp. v, vii, viii, pp. 46, 47:)--"Il
est des points sur lesquels je crains de ne m'être pas expliqué assez
nettement, entre autres la question du fondement de la certitude. Je
suis de ceux qui repoussent de toutes leurs forces l'axiome si
spécieux qu'on ne peut tout démontrer; cette proposition aurait, à
mes yeux, plus besoin que toute autre d'une démonstration. Cette
démonstration ne sera en partie donnée que quand on aura une bonne
fois énuméré toutes les propositions indémontrables; et quand on aura
bien défini le caractère auquel on les reconnait. Nulle part on ne
trouve ni une semblable énumération, ni une semblable définition. On
reste à cet égard dans une position vague, et par cela même facile à
défendre."

It would seem, by these words, that M. Delboeuf stands in the most
direct opposition to Aristotle, who teaches us that the [Greek:
a)rchai\] or _principia_ from which demonstration starts cannot be
themselves demonstrated. But when we compare other passages of M.
Delboeuf's work, we find that, in rejecting all undemonstrable
propositions, what he really means is to reject all _self-evident
universal truths_, "C'est donc une véritable illusion d'admettre des
vérités évidentes par elles-mêmes. Il n'y a pas de proposition fausse
que nous ne soyons disposés d'admettre comme axiome, quand rien ne
nous a encore autorisés à la repousser" (p. ix.). This is quite true
in my opinion; but the immediate indemonstrable truths for which
Aristotle contends as [Greek: a)rchai\] of demonstration, are not
announced by him as _self-evident_, they are declared to be results
of sense and induction, to be raised from observation of particulars
multiplied, compared, and permanently formularized under the
intellectual _habitus_ called Noûs. By Demonstration Aristotle means
deduction in its most perfect form, beginning from these [Greek:
a)rchai\] which are inductively known but not demonstrable (_i. e._
not knowable deductively). And in this view the very able and
instructive treatise of M. Delboeuf mainly coincides, assigning even
greater preponderance to the inductive process, and approximating in
this respect to the important improvements in logical theory advanced
by Mr. John Stuart Mill.

Among the universal propositions which are not derived from
Induction, but which serve as [Greek: a)rchai\] for Deduction and
Demonstration, we may reckon the religious, ethical, æsthetical,
social, political, &c., beliefs received in each different community,
and impressed upon all newcomers born into it by the force of
precept, example, authority. Here the major premiss is felt by each
individual as carrying an authority of its own, stamped and enforced
by the sanction of society, and by the disgrace or other penalties in
store for those who disobey it. It is ready to be interpreted and
diversified by suitable minor premisses in all inferential
applications. But these [Greek: a)rchai\] for deduction, differing
widely at different times and places, though generated in the same
manner and enforced by the same sanction, would belong more properly
to the class which Aristotle terms [Greek: ta\ e)/ndoxa].]

We have thus recognized that there exist immediate (ultimate or
primary) propositions, wherein the conjunction between predicate and
subject is such that no intermediate term can be assigned between
them. When A is predicated both of B and C, this may perhaps be in
consequence of some common property possessed by B and C, and such
common property will form a middle term. For example, equality of
angles to two right angles belongs both to an isosceles and to a
scalene triangle, and it belongs to them by reason of their common
property--triangular figure; which last is thus the middle term. But
this need not be always the case.[66] It is possible that the two
propositions--A predicated of B, A predicated of C--may both of them
be immediate propositions; and that there may be no community of
nature between B and C. Whenever a middle term can be found,
demonstration is possible; but where no middle term can be found,
demonstration is impossible. The proposition, whether affirmative or
negative, is then an immediate or indivisible one. Such propositions,
and the terms of which they are composed, are the ultimate elements
or _principia_ of Demonstration. Predicate and subject are brought
constantly into closer and closer conjunction, until at last they
become one and indivisible.[67] Here we reach the unit or element of
the syllogizing process. In all scientific calculations there is
assumed an unit to start from, though in each branch of science it is
a different unit; _e.g._ in barology, the pound-weight; in harmonics,
the quarter-tone; in other branches of science, other units.[68]
Analytical research teaches us that the corresponding unit in
Syllogism is the affirmative or negative proposition which is
primary, immediate, indivisible. In Demonstration and Science it is
the Noûs or Intellect.[69]

[Footnote 66: Analyt. Post. I. xxiii. p. 84, b. 3-18. [Greek: tou=to
d' ou)k a)ei\ ou(/tôs e)/chei.]]

[Footnote 67: Ibid. b. 25-37. [Greek: a)ei\ to\ me/son puknou=tai,
e(/ôs a)diai/reta ge/nêtai kai\ e(/n. e)/sti d' e(/n, o(/tan a)/meson
ge/nêtai kai\ mi/a pro/tasis a(plô=s ê( a)/mesos.]]

[Footnote 68: Analyt. Post. I. xxiii. p. 84, b. 37: [Greek: kai\
ô(/sper e)n toi=s a)/llois ê( a)rchê\ a(plou=n, tou=to d' ou) tau)to\
pantachou=, a)ll' e)n barei= me\n mna=, e)n de\ me/lei di/esis,
a)/llo d' e)n a)/llô|, ou(/tôs e)n sullogismô=| to\ e(\n pro/tasis
a)/mesos, e)n d' a)podei/xei kai\ e)pistê/mê| o( nou=s.]]

[Footnote 69: Ibid. b. 35-p. 85, a. 1.]

Having thus, in the long preceding reasoning, sought to prove that
all demonstration must take its departure from primary undemonstrable
_principia_--from some premisses, affirmative and negative, which are
directly true in themselves, and not demonstrable through any middle
term or intervening propositions, Aristotle now passes to a different
enquiry. We have some demonstrations in which the conclusion is
Particular, others in which it is Universal: again, some Affirmative,
some Negative, Which of the two, in each of these alternatives, is
the best? We have also demonstrations Direct or Ostensive, and
demonstrations Indirect or by way of _Reductio ad Absurdum_. Which of
these two is the best? Both questions appear to have been subjected
to debate by contemporary philosophers.[70]

[Footnote 70: Ibid. xxiv. p. 85, a. 13-18. [Greek: a)mphisbêtei=tai
pote/ra belti/ôn; ô(s d' au(/tôs kai\ peri\ tê=s a)podeiknu/nai
legome/nês kai\ tê=s ei)s to\ a)du/naton a)gou/sês a)podei/xeôs.]]

Aristotle discusses these points dialectically (as indeed he points
out in the Topica that the comparison of two things generally, as to
better and worse, falls under the varieties of
**dialectical enquiry[71]), first stating and next refuting
the arguments on the weaker side. Some persons may think (he says)
that demonstration of the Particular is better than demonstration of
the Universal: first, because it conducts to fuller cognition of that
which the thing is in itself, and not merely that which it is
_quatenus_ member of a class; secondly, because demonstrations of the
Universal are apt to generate an illusory belief, that the Universal
is a distinct reality apart from and independent of all its
particulars (_i.e._, that figure in general has a real existence
apart from all particular figures, and number in general apart from
all particular numbers, &c.), while demonstrations of the Particular
do not lead to any such illusion.[72]

[Footnote 71: Aristot. Topic. III. i. p. 116, a. 1, seq.]

[Footnote 72: Analyt. Post. I. xxiv. p. 85, a. 20-b. 3. Themistius,
pp. 58-59, Spengel: [Greek: ou) ga\r o(mô/numon to\ katho/lou
e)sti/n, ou)de\ phônê\ mo/non, a)ll' u(po/stasis, ou) chôristê\ me\n
ô(/sper ou)de\ ta\ sumbebêko/ta, e)nargô=s d' ou)=n emphainome/nê
toi=s pra/gmasin.] The Scholastic doctrine of _Universalia in re_ is
here expressed very clearly by Themistius.]

To these arguments Aristotle replies:--1. It is not correct to say
that cognition of the Particular is more complete, or bears more upon
real existence, than cognition of the Universal. The reverse would be
nearer to the truth. To know that the isosceles, _quatenus_ triangle,
has its three angles equal to two right angles, is more complete
cognition than knowing simply that the isosceles has its three angles
equal to two right angles. 2. If the Universal be not an equivocal
term--if it represents one property and one definition common to many
particulars, it then has a real existence as much or more than any
one or any number of the particulars. For all these particulars are
perishable, but the class is imperishable. 3. He who believes that
the universal term has one meaning in all the particulars, need not
necessarily believe that it has any meaning _apart_ from all
particulars; he need not believe this about Quiddity, any more than
he believes it about Quality or Quantity. Or if he does believe so,
it is his own individual mistake, not imputable to the demonstration.
4. We have shown that a complete demonstration is one in which the
middle term is the cause or reason of the conclusion. Now the
Universal is most of the nature of Cause; for it represents the First
Essence or the _Per Se_, and is therefore its own cause, or has no
other cause behind it. The demonstration of the Universal has thus
more of the Cause or the _Why_, and is therefore better than the
demonstration of the Particular. 5. In the Final Cause or End of
action, there is always some ultimate end for the sake of which the
intermediate ends are pursued, and which, as it is better than they,
yields, when it is known, the only complete explanation of the
action. So it is also with the Formal Cause: there is one highest
form which contains the _Why_ of the subordinate forms, and the
knowledge of which is therefore better; as when, for example, the
exterior angles of a given isosceles triangle are seen to be equal to
four right angles, not because it is isosceles or triangle, but
because it is a rectilineal figure. 6. Particulars, as such, fall
into infinity of number, and are thus unknowable; the Universal tends
towards oneness and simplicity, and is thus essentially knowable,
more fully demonstrable than the infinity of particulars. The
demonstration thereof is therefore better. 7. It is also better, on
another ground; for he that knows the Universal does in a certain
sense know also the Particular;[73] but he that knows the Particular
cannot be said in any sense to know the Universal. 8. The
_principium_ or perfection of cognition is to be found in the
immediate proposition, true _per se_. When we demonstrate, and thus
employ a middle term, the nearer the middle term approaches to that
_principium_, the better the demonstration is. The demonstration of
the Universal is thus better and more accurate than that of the
Particular.[74]

[Footnote 73: Compare Analyt. Post. I. i. p. 71, a. 25; also
Metaphys. A. p. 981, a. 12.]

[Footnote 74: Analyt. Post. I. xxiv. p. 85, b. 4-p. 86, a. 21. Schol.
p. 233, b. 6: [Greek: o(moi/ôs de\ o)/ntôn gnôri/môn, ê( di'
e)latto/nôn me/sôn ai(retôte/ra; ma=llon ga\r e)ggute/rô tê=s tou=
nou= e)nergei/as.]]

Such are the several reasons enumerated by Aristotle in refutation of
the previous opinion stated in favour of the Particular. Evidently he
does not account them all of equal value: he intimates that some are
purely dialectical ([Greek: logika/]); and he insists most upon the
two following:--1. He that knows the Universal knows in a certain
sense the Particular; if he knows that every triangle has its three
angles equal to two right angles, he knows potentially that the
isosceles has its three angles equal to the same, though he may not
know as yet that the isosceles _is_ a triangle. But he that knows the
Particular does not in any way know the Universal, either actually or
potentially.[75] 2. The Universal is apprehended by Intellect or
Noûs, the highest of all cognitive powers; the Particular terminates
in sensation. Here, I presume, he means, that, in demonstration of
the Particular, the conclusion teaches you nothing more than you
might have learnt from a direct observation of sense; whereas in that
of the Universal the conclusion teaches you more than you could have
learnt from direct sensation, and comes into correlation with the
highest form of our intellectual nature.[76]

[Footnote 75: Analyt. Post. I. xxiv. p. 86**, a. 22: [Greek: a)lla\
tô=n me\n ei)rême/nôn e)/nia logika/ e)sti; _ma/lista_ de\ dê=lon
o(/ti ê( katho/lou kuriôte/ra, o(/ti--o( de\ tau/tên e)/chôn tê\n
pro/tasin] (the Particular) [Greek: _to\ katho/lou ou)damô=s oi)=den,
ou)/te duna/mei ou)/t' e)nergei/a|_.]]

[Footnote 76: Ibid. a. 29: [Greek: kai\ ê( me\n katho/lou noêtê/, ê(
de\ kata\ me/ros ei)s ai)/sthêsin teleuta=|.] Compare xxiii. p. 84,
b. 39, where we noticed the doctrine that [Greek: Nou=s] is the
_unit_ of scientific demonstration.]

Next, Aristotle compares the Affirmative with the Negative
demonstration, and shows that the Affirmative is the better. Of two
demonstrations (he lays it down) that one which proceeds upon a
smaller number of postulates, assumptions, or propositions, is better
than the other; for, to say nothing of other reasons, it conducts you
more speedily to knowledge than the other, and that is an advantage.
Now, both in the affirmative and in the negative syllogism, you must
have three terms and two propositions; but in the affirmative you
assume only that something _is_; while in the negative you assume
both that something _is_, and that something _is not_. Here is a
double assumption instead of a single; therefore the negative is the
worse or inferior of the two.[77] Moreover, for the demonstration of
a negative conclusion, you require one affirmative premiss (since
from two negative premisses nothing whatever can be concluded); while
for the demonstration of an affirmative conclusion, you must have two
affirmative premisses, and you cannot admit a negative. This, again,
shows that the affirmative is logically prior, more trustworthy, and
better than the negative.[78] The negative is only intelligible and
knowable through the affirmative, just as _Non-Ens_ is knowable only
through _Ens_. The affirmative demonstration therefore, as involving
better principles, is, on this ground also, better than the
negative.[79] _A fortiori_, it is also better than the demonstration
by way of _Reductio ad Absurdum_, which was the last case to be
considered. This, as concluding only indirectly and from
impossibility of the contradictory, is worse even than the negative;
much more therefore is it worse than the direct affirmative.[80]

[Footnote 77: Analyt. Post. I. xxv. p. 86, a. 31-b. 9.]

[Footnote 78: Ibid. b. 10-30.]

[Footnote 79: Ibid. b. 30-39.]

[Footnote 80: Ibid. I. xxvi. p. 87, a. 2-30. Waitz (II. p. 370),
says: "deductio (ad absurdum), quippe quæ per ambages cogat, post
ponenda, est demonstrationi rectæ."

Philoponus says (Schol. pp. 234-235**, Brand.) that the
Commentators all censured Aristotle for the manner in which he here
laid out the Syllogism [Greek: di' a)duna/tou]. I do not, however,
find any such censure in Themistius. Philoponus defends Aristotle
from the censure.]

If we next compare one Science with another, the prior and more
accurate of the two is, (1) That which combines at once the [Greek:
o(/ti] and the [Greek: dio/ti]; (2) That which is abstracted from
material conditions, as compared with that which is immersed
therein--for example, arithmetic is more accurate than harmonics;
(3) The more simple as compared with the more complex: thus,
arithmetic is more accurate than geometry, a monad or unit is a
substance without position, whereas a point (more concrete) is a
substance with position.[81] One and the same science is that which
belongs to one and the same generic subject-matter. The premisses of
a demonstration must be included in the same genus with the
conclusion; and where the ultimate premisses are heterogeneous, the
cognition derived from them must be considered as not one but a
compound of several.[82] You may find two or more distinct middle
terms for demonstrating the same conclusion; sometimes out of the
same logical series or table, sometimes out of different tables.[83]

[Footnote 81: Analyt. Post. I. xxvii. p. 87, a. 31-37. Themistius,
Paraphras. p. 60, ed. Speng.: [Greek: kat' a)/llon de\ (tro/pon),
e)a\n ê( me\n peri\ u(pokei/mena/ tina kai\ ai)sthêta\
pragmateu/êtai, ê( de\ peri\ noêta\ kai\ katho/lou.]

Philoponus illustrates this (Schol. p. 235, b. 41, Br.): [Greek:
oi(=on ta\ Theodosi/ou sphairika\ a)kribe/stera/ e)stin e)pistê/mê|
tê=s tô=n Au)tolu/kou peri\ kinoume/nês sphai/ras.] &c.]

[Footnote 82: Analyt. Post. I. xxviii. p. 87, a. 38-b. 5. Themistius,
p. 61: [Greek: dê=lon de\ tou=to gi/netai proi+ou=sin e)pi\ ta\s
a)napodei/ktous a)rcha/s; au(=tai ga\r ei) mêdemi/an e)/choien
sugge/neian, e(/terai ai( e)pistê=mai.]]

[Footnote 83: Analyt. Post. I. xxix. p. 87, b. 5-18. Aristotle gives
an example to illustrate this general doctrine: [Greek: ê(/desthai,
to\ kinei=sthai, to\ ê)remi/zesthai, to\ metaba/llein]. As he
includes these terms und this subject among the topics for
demonstration, it is difficult to see where he would draw a distinct
line between topics for Demonstration and topics for Dialectic.]

There cannot be demonstrative cognition of fortuitous events,[84] for
all demonstration is either of the necessary or of the customary. Nor
can there be demonstrative cognition through sensible perception. For
though by sense we perceive a thing as such and such (through its
sensible qualities), yet we perceive it inevitably as _hoc aliquid_,
_hic_, _et nunc_. But the Universal cannot be perceived by sense; for
it is neither _hic_ nor _nunc_, but _semper et ubique_.[85] Now
demonstrations are all accomplished by means of the Universal, and
demonstrative cognition cannot therefore be had through sensible
perception. If the equality of the three angles of a triangle to two
right angles were a fact directly perceivable by sense, we should
still have looked out for a demonstration thereof: we should have no
proper scientific cognition of it (though some persons contend for
this): for sensible perception gives us only particular cases, and
Cognition or Science proper comes only through knowing the
Universal.[86] If, being on the surface of the moon, we had on any
one occasion seen the earth between us and the sun, we could not have
known from that single observation that such interposition is the
cause universally of eclipses. We cannot directly by sense perceive
the Universal, though sense is the _principium_ of the Universal. By
multiplied observation of sensible particulars, we can hunt out and
elicit the Universal, enunciate it clearly and separately, and make
it serve for demonstration.[87] The Universal is precious, because it
reveals the Cause or [Greek: dio/ti], and is therefore more precious,
not merely than sensible observation, but also than intellectual
conception of the [Greek: o(/ti] only, where the Cause or [Greek:
dio/ti] lies apart, and is derived from a higher genus. Respecting
First Principles or _Summa Genera_, we must speak elsewhere.[88] It
is clear, therefore, that no demonstrable matter can be known,
properly speaking, from direct perception of sense; though there are
cases in which nothing but the impossibility of direct observation
drives us upon seeking for demonstration. Whenever we can get an
adequate number of sensible observations, we can generalize the fact;
and in some instances we may perhaps not seek for any demonstrative
knowledge (_i.e._ to explain it by any higher principle). If we could
see the pores in glass and the light passing through them, we should
learn through many such observations why combustion arises on the
farther side of the glass; each of our observations would have been
separate and individual, but we should by intellect generalize the
result that all the cases fall under the same law.[89]

[Footnote 84: Analyt. Post. I. xxx. p. 87, b. 19-27.]

[Footnote 85: Ibid. xxxi. p. 87, b. 28: [Greek: ei) ga\r kai\ e)/stin
ê( ai)/sthêsis tou= toiou=de kai\ mê\ tou=de/ tinos, a)ll'
ai)stha/nesthai/ ge a)nagkai=on to/de ti kai\ pou= kai\ nu=n.]]

[Footnote 86: Ibid. b. 35: [Greek: dê=lon o(/ti kai\ ei) ê)=n
ai)stha/nesthai to\ tri/gônon o(/ti dusi\n o)rthai=s i)/sas e)/chei
ta\s gôni/as, e)zêtou=men a)\n a)po/deixin, kai\ ou)ch (_ô(/sper
phasi/ tines_) ê)pista/metha; ai)stha/nesthai me\n ga\r a)na/gkê
kath' e(/kaston, ê( d' e)pistê/mê tô=| to\ katho/lou gnôri/zein
e)sti/n.]

Euclid, in the 20th Proposition of his first Book, demonstrates that
any two sides of a triangle are together greater than the third side.
According to Proklus, the Epikureans derided the demonstration of
such a point as absurd; and it seems that some contemporaries of
Aristotle argued in a similar way, judging by the phrase [Greek:
ô(/sper phasi/ tines].]

[Footnote 87: Analyt. Post. I. xxxi. p. 88, a. 2: [Greek: ou) mê\n
a)ll' e)k tou= theôrei=n tou=to polla/kis sumbai=non, to\ katho/lou
a)\n thêreu/santes a)po/deixin ei)/chomen; e)k ga\r tô=n kath'
e(/kasta pleio/nôn to\ katho/lou dê=lon.] Themistius, p. 62, Sp.:
[Greek: a)rchê\ me\n ga\r a)podei/xeôs ai)/sthêsis, kai\ to\
katho/lou e)nnoou=men dia\ to\ polla/kis ai)sthe/sthai.]]

[Footnote 88: Analyt. Post. I. xxxi. p. 88, a. 6: [Greek: to\ de\
katho/lou ti/mion, o(/ti dêloi= to\ ai)/tion; ô(/ste peri\ tô=n
toiou/tôn ê( katho/lou timiôte/ra tô=n ai)sthê/seôn kai\ tê=s
noê/seôs, o(/sôn e(/teron to\ ai)/tion; peri\ de\ tô=n prô/tôn
a)/llos lo/gos.]

By [Greek: ta\ prô=ta], he means the [Greek: a)rchai\] of
Demonstration, which are treated especially in II. xix. See Biese,
Die Philos. des Aristoteles, p. 277.]

[Footnote 89: Analyt. Post. I. xxxi. p. 88, a. 9-17. [Greek: e)/sti
me/ntoi e)/nia a)nago/mena ei)s ai)sthê/seôs e)/kleipsin e)n toi=s
problê/masin; e)/nia ga\r ei) e(ô/rômen, ou)k a)\n e)zêtou=men, ou)ch
ô(s ei)do/tes tô=| o(ra=|n, a)ll' ô(s e)/chontes to\ katho/lou e)k
tou= o(ra=|n.]

The text of this and the succeeding words seems open to doubt, as
well as that of Themistius (p. 63). Waitz in his note (p. 374)
explains the meaning clearly:--"non ita quidem ut ipsa sensuum
perceptio scientiam afferat; sed ita ut quod in singulis accidere
videamus, idem etiam in omnibus accidere coniicientes universe
intelligamus."]

Aristotle next proceeds to refute, at some length, the supposition,
that the _principia_ of all syllogisms are the same. We see at once
that this cannot be so, because some syllogisms are true, others
false. But, besides, though there are indeed a few Axioms essential
to the process of demonstration, and the same in all syllogisms, yet
these are not sufficient of themselves for demonstration. There must
farther be other premisses or matters of evidence--propositions
immediately true (or established by prior demonstrations) belonging
to each branch of Science specially, as distinguished from the
others. Our demonstration relates _to_ these special matters or
premisses, though it is accomplished _out of_ or by means of the
common Axioms.[90]

[Footnote 90: Analyt. Post. I. xxxii. p. 88, a. 18-b. 29. [Greek: ai(
ga\r a)rchai\ dittai/, e)x ô(=n te kai\ peri\ o(\; ai( me\n ou)=n e)x
ô(=n koinai/, ai( de\ peri\ o(/ i)/diai, oi(=on a)rithmo/s,
me/gethos.] Compare xi. p. 77, a. 27. See Barthélemy St. Hilaire,
Plan Général des Derniers Analytiques, p. lxxxi.]

Science or scientific Cognition differs from true Opinion, and the
_cognitum_ from the _opinatum_, herein, that Science is of the
Universal, and through necessary premisses which cannot be otherwise;
while Opinion relates to matters true, yet which at the same time may
possibly be false. The belief in a proposition which is immediate
(_i. e._, undemonstrable) yet not necessary, is Opinion; it is not
Science, nor is it Noûs or Intellect--the _principium_ of Science or
scientific Cognition. Such beliefs are fluctuating, as we see every
day; we all distinguish them from other beliefs, which we cannot
conceive not to be true and which we call cognitions.[91] But may
there not be Opinion and Cognition respecting the same matters? There
may be (says Aristotle) in different men, or in the same man at
different times; but not in the same man at the same time. There may
also be, respecting the same matter, true opinion in one man's mind,
and false opinion in the mind of another.[92]

[Footnote 91: Analyt. Post. I. xxxiii. p. 88, b. 30-p. 89, a. 10.]

[Footnote 92: Ibid. p. 89, a. 11-b. 6. That eclipse of the sun is
caused by the interposition of the moon was to the astronomer
Hipparchos scientific Cognition; for he saw that it _could not_ be
otherwise. To the philosopher Epikurus it was Opinion; for he thought
that it _might_ be otherwise (Themistius, p. 66, Spengel).]

With some remarks upon Sagacity, or the power of divining a middle
term in a time too short for reflection (as when the friendship of
two men is on the instant referred to the fact of their having a
common enemy), the present book is brought to a close.[93]

[Footnote 93: Ibid. xxxiv. p. 89, b. 10-20.]




CHAPTER VIII.

ANALYTICA POSTERIORA II.

Aristotle begins the Second Book of the Analytica Posteriora by an
enumeration and classification of Problems or Questions suitable for
investigation. The matters knowable by us may be distributed into
four classes:--

[Greek: O(/ti]. [Greek: Dio/ti]. [Greek: Ei) e)/sti]. [Greek: Ti/
e)sti].

1. Quod. 2. Cur. 3. An sit. 4. Quid sit.

Under the first head come questions of Fact; under the second head,
questions of Cause or Reason; under the third, questions of
Existence; under the fourth, questions of Essence. Under the first
head we enquire, Whether a fact or event is so or so? Whether a given
subject possesses this or that attribute, or is in this or that
condition? enumerating in the question the various supposable
alternatives. Under the second head, we assume the first question to
have been affirmatively answered, and we proceed to enquire, What is
the cause or reason for such fact, or such conjunction of subject and
attribute? Under the third head, we ask, Does a supposed subject
exist? And if the answer be in the affirmative, we proceed to
enquire, under the fourth head, What is the essence of the
subject?[1]

[Footnote 1: Analyt. Post. II. i. p. 89, b. 23, seq. Themistius
observes, p. 67, Speng.: [Greek: zêtou=men ti/nun ê)\ peri\ a(plou=
tino\s kai\ a)sunthe/tou, ê)\ peri\ sunthe/tou kai\ e)n prota/sei.]
Themistius has here changed Aristotle's order, and placed the third
and fourth heads before the first and second. Compare Schol. p. 240,
b. 30; p. 241, a. 18. The Scholiast complains of the enigmatical
style of Aristotle: [Greek: tê=| griphô/dei tou= r(êtou= e)paggeli/a]
(p. 240, b. 25).]

We have here two distinct pairs of _Quæsita_: Obviously the second
head presupposes the first, and is consequent thereupon; while the
fourth also presupposes the third. But it might seem a more suitable
arrangement (as Themistius and other expositors have conceived) that
the third and fourth heads should come first in the list, rather than
the first and second; since the third and fourth are simpler, and
come earlier in the order of philosophical exposition, while the
first and second are more complicated, and cannot be expounded
philosophically until after the philosophical exposition of the
others. This is cleared up by adverting to the distinction, so often
insisted on by Aristotle, between what is first in order of cognition
relatively to us (_nobis notiora_), and what is first in order of
cognition by nature (_naturâ notiora_). _To us_ (that is to men taken
individually and in the course of actual growth) the phenomena of
nature[2] present themselves as particulars confused and complicated
in every way, with attributes essential and accidental implicated
together: we gradually learn first to see and compare them as
particulars, next to resolve them into generalities, bundles,
classes, and partially to explain the _Why_ of some by means of
others. Here we start from facts embodied in propositions, that
include subjects clothed with their attributes. But in the _order of
nature_ (that is, in the order followed by those who know the
_scibile_ as a whole, and can expound it scientifically) that which
comes first is the Universal or the simple Subject abstracted from
its predicates or accompaniments: we have to enquire, first, whether
a given subject exists; next, if it does exist, what is its real
constituent essence or definition. We thus see the reason for the
order in which Aristotle has arranged the two co-ordinate pairs of
_Quæsita_ or Problems, conformable to the different processes
pursued, on the one hand, by the common intellect, growing and
untrained--on the other, by the mature or disciplined intellect,
already competent for philosophical exposition and applying itself to
new _incognita_.

[Footnote 2: **Schol. Philopon. p. 241, a. 18-24: [Greek:
tou/tôn to\ ei) e)/sti kai\ to\ ti/ e)stin ei)si\n a(pla=, to\ de\
o(/ti kai\ to\ dio/ti su/ntheta--pro/tera ga\r ê(mi=n kai\
gnôrimô/tera ta\ su/ntheta, ô(s tê=| phu/sei ta\ a(pla=.]

Mr. Poste observes upon this quadruple classification by Aristotle
(p. 96):--"The two last of these are problems of Inductive, but first
principles of Deductive, Science; the one being the hypothesis, the
other the definition. The **attribute as well as the subject
must be defined (I. x.), so that to a certain degree the second
problem also is assumed among the principles of Demonstration."]

Comparing together these four _Quæsita_, it will appear that in the
first and third (_Quod_ and _An_), we seek to find out whether there
is or is not any middle term. In the second and fourth (_Cur_ and
_Quid_), we already know or assume that there is a middle term; and
we try to ascertain what that middle term is.[3] The enquiry _Cur_,
is in the main analogous to the enquiry _Quid_; in both cases, we aim
at ascertaining what the cause or middle term is. But, in the enquiry
_Cur_, what we discover is perhaps some independent fact or event,
which is the cause of the event _quæsitum_; while, in the enquiry
_Quid_, what we seek is the real essence or definition of the
substance--the fundamental, generating, immanent cause of its
concomitant attributes. Sometimes, however, the _Quid_ and the _Cur_
are only different ways of stating the same thing. _E.g._, _Quid est
eclipsis lunæ_? Answer: The essence of an eclipse is a privation of
light from the moon, through intervention of the earth between her
and the sun. _Cur locum habet eclipsis lunæ_? Answer: Because the
light of the sun is prevented from reaching the moon by intervention
of the earth. Here it is manifest that the answers to the enquiries
_Quid_ and _Cur_ are really and in substance the same fact, only
stated in different phrases.[4]

[Footnote 3: Analyt. Post. II. i. p. 889, b. 37-p. 90, a. 7. [Greek:
sumbai/nei a)/ra e)n a(pa/sais tai=s zêtê/sesi zêtei=n ê)\ ei) e)/sti
me/son, ê)\ ti/ e)sti to\ me/son; to\ me\n ga\r ai)/tion to\ me/son,
e)n a(/pasi de\ tou=to zêtei=tai.] Compare Schol. p. 241, b. 10, Br.]

[Footnote 4: Analyt. Post. II. ii. p. 90, a. 14-23, 31: [Greek: to\
ti/ e)stin ei)de/nai tau)to/ e)sti kai\ dia\ ti/ e)stin.]]

That the _quæsitum_ in all these researches is a middle term or
medium, is plain from those cases wherein the medium is perceivable
by sense; for then we neither require nor enter upon research. For
example, if we were upon the moon, we should see the earth coming
between us and the sun, now and in each particular case of eclipse.
Accordingly, after many such observations, we should affirm the
universal proposition, that such intervention of the earth was the
cause of eclipses; the universal becoming known to us through
induction of particular cases.[5] The middle term, the Cause, the
_Quid_, and the _Cur_, are thus all the same enquiry, in substance;
though sometimes such _quæsitum_ is the quiddity or essential nature
of the thing itself (as the essence of a triangle is the cause or
ground of its having its three angles equal to two right angles, as
well as of its other properties), sometimes it is an extraneous
fact.[6]

[Footnote 5: Ibid. a. 24-30. [Greek: e)k ga\r tou= ai)sthe/sthai kai\
to\ katho/lou e)ge/neto a)\n ê(mi=n ei)de/nai; ê( me\n ga\r
ai)/sthêsis o(/ti nu=n a)ntiphra/ttei; kai\ ga\r dê=lon o(/ti nu=n
e)klei/pei; e)k de\ tou/tou to\ katho/lou a)\n e)ge/neto.]

The purport and relation of this quadruple classification of problems
is set forth still more clearly in the sixth book of the Metaphysica
(Z. p. 1041) with the explanations of Bonitz, Comm. pp. 358, 359.]

[Footnote 6: Analyt. Post. II. ii. p. 90, a. 31.]

But how or by what process is this _quæsitum_ obtained and made
clear? Is it by Demonstration or by Definition? What is Definition,
and what matters admit of Definition?[7] Aristotle begins by treating
the question dialectically; by setting out a series of doubts and
difficulties. First, Is it possible that the same cognition, and in
the same relation, can be obtained both by Definition and by
Demonstration? No; it is not possible. It is plain that much that is
known by Demonstration cannot be known by Definition; for we have
seen that conclusions both particular and negative are established by
Demonstration (in the Third and Second figures), while every
Definition is universal and affirmative. But we may go farther and
say, that even where a conclusion universal and affirmative is
established (in the First figure) by Demonstration, that same
conclusion can never be known by Definition; for if it could be known
by Definition, it might have been known without Demonstration. Now we
are assured, by an uncontradicted induction, that this is not the
fact; for that which we know by Demonstration is either a proprium of
the subject _per se_, or an accident or concomitant; but no
Definition ever declares either the one or the other: it declares
only the essence.[8]

[Footnote 7: Ibid. iii. p. 90, a. 37: [Greek: ti/ e)stin o(rismo/s,
kai\ ti/nôn, ei)/pômen, diaporê/santes prô=ton peri\ au)tô=n.]]

[Footnote 8: Analyt. Post. II. iii. p. 90, b. 13: [Greek: i(kanê\ de\
pi/stis kai\ e)k tê=s e)pagôgê=s; ou)de\n ga\r pô/pote o(risa/menoi
e)/gnômen, ou)/te tô=n kath' au(to\ u(parcho/ntôn ou)/te tô=n
sumbebêko/tôn. e)/ti ei) o( o(rismo\s ou)si/as tis gnôrismo/s, ta\ ge
toiau=ta phanero\n o(/ti ou)k ou)si/ai.]]

Again, let us ask, _vice versâ_, Can everything that is declared by
Definition, or indeed anything that is declared by Definition, be
known also by Demonstration? Neither is this possible. One and the
same _cognitum_ can be known only by one process of cognition.
Definitions are the _principia_ from which Demonstration departs; and
we have already shown that in going back upon demonstrations, we must
stop somewhere, and must recognize some _principia_
undemonstrable.[9] The Definition can never be demonstrated, for it
declares only the essence of the subject, and does not predicate
anything concerning the subject; whereas Demonstration assumes the
essence to be known, and deduces from such assumption an attribute
distinct from the essence.[10]

[Footnote 9: Ibid. b. 18-27.]

[Footnote 10: Ibid. b. 33, seq.: [Greek: e)/ti pa=sa a)po/deixis ti\
kata/ tinos dei/knusin, oi(=on o(/ti e)/stin ê)\ ou)k e)/stin; e)n
de\ tô=| o(rismô=| ou)de\n e(/teron e(te/rou katêgorei=tai, oi(=on
ou)/te to\ zô=|on kata\ tou= di/podos ou)de\ tou=to kata\ tou=
zô=|ou--o( me\n ou)=n o(rismo\s ti/ e)sti dêloi=, ê( de\ a)po/deixis
o(/ti ê)\ e)/sti to/de kata\ tou=de ê)\ ou)k e)/stin.]

Themistius (p. 71, Speng.) distinguishes the [Greek: o(rismo/s]
itself from [Greek: ê( pro/tasis ê( to\n o(rismo\n katêgorou/menon
e)/chousa].]

Prosecuting still farther the dialectical and dubitative
treatment,[11] Aristotle now proceeds to suggest, that the Essence
(that is, the entire Essence or Quiddity), which is declared by
Definition, can never be known by Demonstration. To suppose that it
could be so known, would be inconsistent with the conditions of the
syllogistic proof used in demonstrating. You prove by syllogism,
through a middle term, some predicate or attribute; _e.g._ because A
is predicable of all B, and B is predicable of all C, therefore A is
predicable of all C. But you cannot prove, through the middle term B,
that A is the essence or quiddity of C, unless by assuming in the
premisses that B is the essence of C, and that A is the essence of B;
accordingly, that the three propositions, AB, BC, AC, are all
co-extensive and reciprocate with each other. Here, then, you have
assumed as your premisses two essential propositions, AB, BC, in
order to prove as an essential proposition the conclusion AC. But
this is inadmissible; for your premisses require demonstration as
much as your conclusion. You have committed a _Petitio
Principii_;[12] you have assumed in your minor premiss the very point
to be demonstrated.

[Footnote 11: Analyt. Post. II. iv. p. 91, a. 12: [Greek: tau=ta me\n
ou)=n me/chri tou/tou diêporê/sthô]. One would think, by these words,
that [Greek: to\ diaporei=n] (or the dubitative treatment) finished
here. But the fact is not so: that treatment is continued for four
chapters more, to the commencement of ch. viii. p. 93.]

[Footnote 12: Analyt. Post. II. iv. p. 91, a. 12-32: [Greek: tau=ta
d' a)na/gkê antistre/phein; ei) ga\r to\ A tou= G i)/dion, dê=lon
o(/ti kai\ tou= B kai\ tou=to tou= G, ô(/ste pa/nta
a)llê/lôn.--lamba/nei ou)=n o(\ dei= dei=xai; kai\ ga\r to\ B e)/sti
ti/ e)stin a)/nthrôpos.] Themistius, pp. 72, 73: [Greek: to\n
a)podeiknu/nta to\ ti/ ê)=n ei)=nai tou= a)nthrô/pou, a)/llo ti dei=
prolabei=n tou= au)tou= to\ ti/ ê)=n ei)=nai.--ou(= ga\r bou/letai
to\n o(rismo\n a)podei=xai, tou/tou prolamba/nei tina\ o(rismo\n
ei)=nai chôti\s a)podei/xeôs.]

M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire, notes, p. 205:--"Il faut donc, pour
conclure par syllogisme que A est la définition essentielle de C, que
A soit la définition essentielle de B, et que B soit lui-même la
définition essentielle de C. Mais alors la définition de la chose
sera dans le moyen terme lui-même, avant d'être dans la conclusion;
en effet, la mineure: B est la définition essentielle de C, donne la
définition essentielle de C, sans qu'il soit besoin d'aller jusqu'**à
la conclusion. Donc la démonstration de l'essence ainsi entendue est
absurde."]

If you cannot obtain Definition as the conclusion of syllogistic
Demonstration, still less can you obtain it through the method of
generic and specific Division; which last method (as has been already
shown in the Analytica Priora) is not equal even to the Syllogism in
respect of usefulness and efficacy.[13] You cannot in this method
distinguish between propositions both true and essential, and
propositions true but not essential; you never obtain, by asking
questions according to the method of generic subdivision, any
premisses from which the conclusion follows by necessity. Yet this is
what you ought to obtain for the purpose of Demonstration; for you
are not allowed to enunciate the full actual conclusion among the
premisses, and require assent to it. Division of a genus into its
species will often give useful information, as Induction also
will;[14] but neither the one nor the other will be equivalent to a
demonstration. A definition obtained only from subdivisions of a
genus, may always be challenged, like a syllogism without its middle
term.

[Footnote 13: Analyt. Post. II. v. p. 91, b. 12, seq.; Analyt. Prior.
I. xxxi. p. 46, a. 31. Aristotle here alludes to the method pursued
by Plato in the Sophistes and Politicus, though he does not name
Plato: [Greek: ê( dia\ tô=n diaire/seôn o(do/s], &c.]

[Footnote 14: Analyt. Post. II. v. p. 91, b. 15-33: [Greek: ou)de\
ga\r o( e)pa/gôn i)/sôs a)podei/knusin, a)ll' o(/môs dêloi= ti.]
Compare Themistius, p. 74.]

Again, neither can you arrive at the definition of a given subject,
by assuming in general terms what a definition ought to be, and then
declaring a given form of words to be conformable to such assumption;
because your minor premiss must involve _Petitio Principii_. The same
logical fault will be committed, if you take your departure from an
hypothesis in which you postulate the definition of a certain
subject, and then declare inferentially what the definition of its
contrary must be. The definition which you here assume requires proof
as much as that which you infer from it.[15] Moreover, neither by
this process, nor by that of generic subdivision, can you show any
reason why the parts of the definition should coalesce into one
essential whole. If they do not thus coalesce--if they be nothing
better than distinct attributes conjoined in the same subject, like
_musicus_ and _grammaticus_--the real essence is not declared, and
the definition is not a good one.[16]

[Footnote 15: Analyt. Post. II. vi. p. 92, a. 6-28. Themist. p. 76.

Rassow renders [Greek: e)x u(pothe/seôs]--"assumptâ generali
definitionis notione;" and also says: "[Greek: to\ ti/ ê)=n
ei)=nai]--generalem definitionis notionem; [Greek: to\ ti/
e)stin]--certam quandam definitionem, significare perspicuum est."
(Aristotelis de Notionis Definitione Doctrina, p. 65).]

[Footnote 16: Analyt. Post. II. vi. p. 92, a. 32. That the parts of
the definition must coalesce into one unity is laid down again in the
Metaphysica, Z. pp. 1037, 1038, where Aristotle makes reference to
the Analytica as haying already treated the same subject, and
professes an intention to complete what has been begun in the
Analytica; [Greek: e)ph' o(/son e)n toi=s A)nalutikoi=s peri\
o(rismou= mê\ ei)/rêtai.]]

After stating some other additional difficulties which seem to leave
the work of Definition inexplicable, Aristotle relinquishes the
dubitative treatment, and looks out for some solution of the puzzle:
How may it be possible that the Definition shall become known?[17] He
has already told us that to know the essence of a thing is the same
as to know the cause or reason of its existence; but we must first
begin by knowing that the _definiendum_ exists; for there can be no
definition of a non-entity, except a mere definition of the word, a
nominal or verbal definition. Now sometimes we know the existence of
the subject by one or other of its accidental attributes; but this
gives us no help towards finding the definition.[18] Sometimes,
however, we obtain a partial knowledge of its essence along with the
knowledge of its existence; when we know it along with some constant
antecedent, or through some constant, though derivative, consequent.
Knowing thus much, we can often discover the cause or fundamental
condition thereof, which is the essence or definition of the
subject.[19] Indeed, it may happen that the constant derivative, and
the fundamental essence on which it depends, become known both
together; or, again, the cause or fundamental condition may perhaps
not be the essence of the subject alone, but some fact including
other subjects also; and this fact may then be stated as a middle
term. Thus, in regard to eclipse of the moon, we know the constant
phenomenal fact about it, that, on a certain recurrence of the time
of full moon, the moon casts no light and makes no shadow. Hence we
proceed to search out the cause. Is it interposition of the earth, or
conversion of the moon's body, or extinction of her light, &c.? The
new fact when shown, must appear as a middle term, throwing into
syllogistic form (in the First figure) the cause or rational
explanation of a lunar eclipse; showing not merely that there is an
eclipse, but what an eclipse is, or what is its definition.[20]

[Footnote 17: Analyt. Post. II. vii. p. 92, a. 34, seq. The [Greek:
a)po/riai] continue to the end of ch. vii. He goes on, ch. viii. p.
93, a. 1-2: [Greek: pa/lin de\ skepte/on ti/ tou/tôn le/getai kalô=s,
kai\ ti/ ou) kalô=s], &c. "Tout ce qui précède ne représente pas la
théorie proprement dite; ce n'est qu'une discussion préliminaire"
(Barth. St. Hilaire, not. p. 222). These difficult chapters are well
illustrated by Hermann Rassow, ch, i. pp. 9-14.]

[Footnote 18: Analyt. Post. II. viii. p. 93, a. 3: [Greek: e)pei\ d'
e)sti/n, ô(s e)/phamen, tau)to\n to\ ei)de/nai ti/ e)sti kai\ to\
ei)de/nai to\ ai)/tion tou= ei) e)/sti;] Ibid. a. 24: [Greek: o(/sa
me\n ou)=n kata\ sumbebêko\s oi)/damen o(/ti e)/stin, a)nagkai=on
mêdamô=s e)/chein pro\s to\ ti/ e)stin; **ou)de\ ga\r o(/ti
e)/stin i)/smen; to\ de\ zêtei=n ti/ e)sti mê\ e)/chontas o(/ti
e)/sti, mêde\n zêtei=n e)sti/n. kath' o(/sôn d' e)/chome/n ti,
r(a=|on; ô(/ste ô(s e)/chomen o(/ti e)/stin, ou(/tôs e)/chomen kai\
pro\s to\ ti/ e)stin.] Compare Brentano, Ueber die Bedeutung des
Seienden nach Aristoteles, p. 17.]

[Footnote 19: Analyt. Post. II. viii. p. 93, a. 21. Themistius, p.
79, Speng.: [Greek: o(/sa de\ a)po\ tô=n oi)kei/ôn te kai\ e)x
au)tou= tou= pra/gmatos, a)po\ tou/tôn ê)/dê r(a=|on ei)s to\ ti/
e)sti metabai/nomen.]]

[Footnote 20: Ibid. p. 93, a. 30-b. 14.]

Aristotle has thus shown how the Essence or Quiddity ([Greek: ti/
e)sti]) may become known in this class of cases. There is neither
syllogism nor demonstration thereof, yet it is declared through
syllogism and demonstration: though no demonstration thereof is
possible, yet you cannot know it without demonstration, wherever
there is an extraneous cause.[21]

[Footnote 21: Ibid. b. 15-20: [Greek: ô(/ste sullogismo\s me\n tou=
ti/ e)stin ou) gi/netai ou)d' a)po/deixis, dê=lon me/ntoi dia\
sullogismou= kai\ di' a)podei/xeôs.]

Mr. Poste translates an earlier passage (p. 93, a. 5) in this very
difficult chapter as follows (p. 107): "If one cause is demonstrable,
another indemonstrable cause must be the intermediate; and the proof
is in the first figure, and the conclusion affirmative and universal.
In this mode of demonstrating the essence, we prove one definition by
another, for the intermediate that proves an essence or a peculiar
predicate must itself be an essence or a peculiar predicate. Of two
definitions, then, one is proved and the other assumed; and, as we
said before, this is not a demonstration but a dialectical proof of
the essence." Mr. Poste here translates [Greek: logiko\s
sullogismo/s] "dialectical proof." I understand it rather as meaning
a syllogism, [Greek: tou= u(pa/rchein] simply (Top. I. v. p. 102, b.
5), in which all that you really know is that the predicate belongs
to the subject, but in which you _assume_ besides that it belongs to
the subject _essentially_. It is not a demonstration because, in
order to obtain Essence in the conclusion, you are obliged to
postulate Essence in your premiss. (See Alexander ad Topic. I. p.
263, Br.). You have therefore postulated a premiss which required
proof as much as the conclusion.]

But the above doctrine will hold only in cases where there _is_ a
distinct or extraneous cause; it will not hold in cases where there
is none. It is only in the former (as has been said) that a middle
term can be shown; rendering it possible that Quiddity or Essence
should be declared by a valid formal syllogism, though it cannot be
demonstrated by syllogism. In the latter, where there is no distinct
cause, no such middle term can be enunciated: the Quiddity or Essence
must be assumed as an immediate or undemonstrable principium, and
must be exposed or set out in the best manner practicable as an
existent reality, on Induction or on some other authority. The
arithmetician makes his first steps by assuming both what a monad is
and that there exists such a monad.[22]

[Footnote 22: Analyt. Post. II. ix. p. 93, b. 21. [Greek: e)/sti de\
tô=n me\n e(/tero/n ti ai)/tion, tô=n d' ou)k e)/stin. ô(/ste dê=lon
o(/ti kai\ tô=n ti/ e)sti ta\ me\n a)/mesa kai\ a)rchai/ ei)sin, a(\
kai\ ei)=nai kai\ ti/ e)stin u(pothe/sthai dei= ê)\ a)/llon tro/pon
phanera\ poiê=sai. o(/per o( a)rithmêtiko\s poiei=; kai\ ga\r ti/
e)sti tê\n mona/da u(poti/thetai, kai\ o(/ti e)/stin.]

Themistius, p. 80: [Greek: a(\ kai\ ei)=nai kai\ ti/ e)stin
u(pothe/sthai dei=, ê)\ a)/llon tro/pon phanera\ poiê=sai e)x
e)pagôgê=s ê)\ pi/steôs ê)\ e)mpeiri/as.] Rassow, De Notionis
Definitione, pp. 18-22.]

We may distinguish three varieties of Definition. 1. Sometimes it is
the mere explanation what a word signifies; in this sense, it has
nothing to do with essence or existence; it is a nominal definition
and nothing more.[23] 2. Sometimes it enunciates the Essence, cause,
or reason of the _definitum_; this will happen where the cause is
distinct or extraneous, and where there is accordingly an intervening
middle term: the definition will then differ from a demonstration
only by condensing into one enunciation the two premisses and the
conclusion which together constitute the demonstration.[24] 3.
Sometimes it is an immediate proposition, an indemonstrable
hypothesis, assuming Essence or Quiddity; the essence itself being
cause, and no extraneous cause--no intervening middle term--being
obtainable.[25]

[Footnote 23: Analyt. Post. II. x. p. 93, b. 29-37.]

[Footnote 24: Ibid. p. 93, b. 38, seq. [Greek: oi(=on a)po/deixis
tou= ti/ e)stin, tê=| the/sei diaphe/rôn tê=s
a)podei/xeôs;--sullogismo\s tou= ti/ e)sti, ptô/sei diaphe/rôn tê=s
a)podei/xeôs]--differing "situ et positione terminorum" (Julius
Pacius, p. 493).]

[Footnote 25: Ibid. p. 94, a. 9: [Greek: o( de\ tô=n a)me/sôn
o(rismo/s, the/sis e)sti\ tou= ti/ e)stin a)napo/deiktos.] Compare I.
xxiv. p. 85, b. 24: [Greek: ô(=| ga\r kath' au(to\ u(pa/rchei ti,
tou=to au)to\ au(tô=| ai)/tion.] See Kampe, Die Erkenntniss-theorie
des Aristoteles, p. 212, seq.]

To know or cognize is, to know the Cause; when we know the Cause, we
are satisfied with our cognition. Now there are four Causes, or
varieties of Cause:--

1. The Essence or Quiddity (Form)--[Greek: to\ ti/ ê)=n ei)=nai].

2. The necessitating conditions (Matter)--[Greek: to/ ti/nôn o)/ntôn
a)na/gkê tou=t' ei)=nai].

3. The proximate mover or stimulator of change (Efficient)--[Greek:
ê( ti/ prô=ton e)ki/nêse].

4. That for the sake of which (Final Cause or End)--[Greek: to\
ti/nos e(/neka].

All these four Causes (Formal, Material, Efficient, Final) appear as
middle terms in demonstrating. We can proceed through the medium
either of Form, or of Matter, or of Efficient, or of End. The first
of the four has already been exemplified--the demonstration by Form.
The second appears in demonstrating that the angle in a semi-circle
is always a right angle; where the middle term (or matter of the
syllogism, ([Greek: to\ e)x ou(=]) is, that such angle is always the
half of two right angles.[26] The Efficient is the middle term, when
to the question, Why did the Persians invade Athens? it is answered
that the Athenians had previously invaded Persia along with the
Eretrians. (All are disposed to attack those who have attacked them
first; the Athenians attacked the Persians first; _ergo_, the
Persians were disposed to attack the Athenians.) Lastly, the Final
Cause serves as middle term, when to the question, Why does a man
walk after dinner? the response is, For the purpose of keeping up his
health. In another way, the middle term here is digestion: walking
after dinner promotes digestion; digestion is the efficient cause of
health.[27]

[Footnote 26: Analyt. Post. II. xi. p. 94, a. 21-36. Themistius, p.
83: [Greek: ma/lista me\n ga\r e)pi\ pa/sês a)podei/xeôs o( me/sos
e)/stin oi(=on ê( u(/lê tô=| sullogismô=|; ou(/tos ga\r o( poiô=n
ta\s du/o prota/seis, e)ph' ai(=s to\ sumpe/rasma.]]

[Footnote 27: Analyt. Post. II. xi. p. 94, a. 36-b. 21.]

The Final Cause or End is prior in the order of nature, but posterior
to the terms of the conclusion in the order of time or generation;
while the Efficient is prior in the order of time or generation. The
Formal and Material are simultaneous with the effect, neither prior
nor posterior.[28] Sometimes the same fact may proceed both from a
Final cause, and from a cause of Material Necessity; thus the light
passes through our lantern for the purpose of guiding us in the dark,
but also by reason that the particles of light are smaller than the
pores in the glass. Nature produces effects of finality, or with a
view to some given end; and also effects by necessity, the necessity
being either inherent in the substance itself, or imposed by
extraneous force. Thus a stone _falls_ to the ground by necessity of
the first kind, but _ascends_ by necessity of the second kind. Among
products of human intelligence some spring wholly from design without
necessity; but others arise by accident or chance and have no final
cause.[29]

[Footnote 28: Analyt. Post. II. xi. p. 94, a. 21-26. Themistius, p.
83: [Greek: ê( ge/nesis ou)=n tou= me/sou kai\ ai)ti/ou tê\n au)tê\n
ou)k e)/chei ta/xin e)ph' a(pa/ntôn, a)ll' ou(= me\n prô/tên ô(s
e)pi\ tô=n kinêtikô=n, ou(= de\ teleutai/an ô(s e)pi\ tô=n telô=n
kai\ ô(=n e(/neka, ou(= d' a(/ma ô(s e)pi\ tô=n o(rismô=n kai\ tou=
ti/ ê)=n ei)=nai.]]

[Footnote 29: Analyt. Post. II. p. 94, b. 27-p. 95, a. 9.]

That the middle term is the Cause, is equally true in respect to
_Entia_, _Fientia_, _Præterita_, and _Futura_; only that in respect
to _Entia_, the middle term or Cause must be an _Ens_; in respect to
_Fientia_ it must be a _Fiens_; in respect to _Præterita_, a
_Præteritum_; and in respect to _Futura_, a _Futurum_; that is, in
each case, it must be generated at the corresponding time with the
major and minor terms in the conclusion.[30] What is the cause of an
eclipse of the moon? The cause is, that the earth intervenes between
moon and sun; and this is true alike of eclipses past, present, and
future. Such an intervention is the essence or definition of a lunar
eclipse: the cause is therefore Formal, and cause and effect are
simultaneous, occurring at the same moment of time. But in the other
three Causes--Material, Efficient, Final--where phenomena are
successive and not simultaneous, can we say that the antecedent is
cause and the consequent effect, time being, as seems to us, a
_continuum_? In cases like this, we can syllogize from the consequent
backward to the antecedent; but not from the antecedent forward to
the consequent. If the house has been built, we can infer that the
foundations have been laid; but, if the foundations have been laid,
we cannot infer that the house has been built.[31] There must always
be an interval of time during which inference from the antecedent
will be untrue; perhaps, indeed, it may never become true. Cause and
_causatum_ in these three last varieties of Cause, do not universally
and necessarily reciprocate with each other, as in the case of the
Formal cause. Though time is continuous, events or generations are
distinct points marked in a continuous line, and are not continuous
with each other.[32] The number of these points that may be taken is
indeed infinite; yet we must assume some of them as ultimate and
immediate _principia_, in order to construct our syllogism, and
provide our middle term.[33] Where the middle term reciprocates and
is co-extensive with the major and the minor, in such cases we have
generation of phenomena in a cycle; _e.g._, after the earth has been
made wet, vapour rises of necessity: hence comes a cloud, hence
water; which again falls, and the earth again becomes wet.[34]
Finally, wherever our conclusion is not universally and necessarily
true, but true only in most cases, our immediate _principia_ must
also be of the same character, true in most cases, but in most cases
only.[35]

[Footnote 30: Analyt. Post. II. xii. p. 95, a. 10, 36: [Greek: to\
ga\r me/son o(mo/gonon dei= ei)=nai], &c.]

[Footnote 31: Ibid. a. 24 seq., b. 32; Julius Pacius, ad loc.; Biese,
Die Philosophie des Aristot. pp. 302-303.]

[Footnote 32: Analyt. Post. II. xii. p. 95, a. 39-b. 8; Themistius,
p. 86.]

[Footnote 33: Analyt. Post. II. xii. p. 95, b. 14-31: [Greek: a)rchê\
de\ kai\ e)n tou/tois a)/mesos lêpte/a].]

[Footnote 34: Ibid. b. 38-p. 96, a**. 7.]

[Footnote 35: Ibid. p. 96, a. 8-19.]

How are we to proceed in hunting out those attributes that are
predicated _in Quid_,[36] as belonging to the Essence of the subject?
The subject being a lowest species, we must look out for such
attributes as belong to all individuals thereof, but which belong
also to individuals of other species under the same genus. We shall
thus find one, two, three, or more, attributes, each of which,
separately taken, belongs to various individuals lying out of the
species; but the assemblage of which, collectively taken, does not
belong to any individual lying out of the species. The Assemblage
thus found is the Essence; and the enunciation thereof is the
Definition of the species. Thus, the triad is included in the genus
number; in searching for its definition, therefore, we must not go
beyond that genus, nor include any attributes (such as _ens_, &c.)
predicable of other subjects as well as numbers. Keeping within the
limits of the genus, we find that every triad agrees in being an odd
number. But this oddness belongs to other numbers also (pentad,
heptad, &c.). We therefore look out for other attributes, and we find
that every triad agrees in being a prime number, in two distinct
senses; first, that it is not measured by any other number; secondly,
that it is not compounded of any other numbers. This last attribute
belongs to no other odd number except the triad. We have now an
assemblage of attributes, which belong each of them to every triad,
universally and necessarily, and which, taken all together, belong
_exclusively_ to the triad, and therefore constitute its essence or
definition. The triad is a number, odd, and prime in the two
senses.[37] The _definitum_ and the definition are here exactly
co-extensive.

[Footnote 36: Ibid. xiii. p. 96, a. 22: [Greek: pô=s dei=
_thêreu/ein_ ta\ e)n tô=| ti/ e)sti katêgorou/mena?]]

[Footnote 37: Analyt. Post. II. xiii. p. 96, a. 24-b. 14. [Greek: ei)
toi/nun mêdeni\ u(pa/rchei a)/llô| ê)\ tai=s a)to/mois tria/si,
tou=t' a)\n ei)/ê to\ tria/di ei)=nai. u(pokei/sthô ga\r kai\ tou=to,
ê( ou)si/a ê( e(ka/stou ei)=nai ê( e)pi\ tai=s a)to/mois e)/schatos
toiau/tê katêgori/a. ô(/ste o(moi/ôs kai\ a)/llô| o(tô|ou=n tô=n
ou(/tô deichthe/ntôn to\ _au)tô=| ei)=nai_ e)/stai.]]

Where the matter that we study is the entire genus, we must begin by
distributing it into its lowest species; _e.g._ number into dyad,
triad, &c.; in like manner, taking straight line, circle, right
angle, &c.[38] We must first search out the definitions of each of
these lowest species; and these having been ascertained, we must next
look above the genus, to the Category in which it is itself
comprised, whether _Quantum_, _Quale_, &c. Having done thus much we
must study the derivative attributes or propria of the lowest species
through the common generalities true respecting the larger. We must
recollect that these derivative attributes are derived from the
essence and definition of the lowest species, the complex flowing
from the simple as its _principium_: they belong _per se_ only to the
lowest species thus defined; they belong to the higher genera only
through those species.[39] It is in this way, and not in any other,
that the logical Division of genera, according to specific
differences, can be made serviceable for investigation of essential
attributes; that is, it can only be made to demonstrate what is
derivative from the essence. We have shown already that it cannot
help in demonstrating essence or Definition itself. We learn to
marshal in proper order the two constituent elements of our
definition, and to attach each specific difference to the genus to
which it properly belongs. Thus we must not attempt to distribute the
genus animal according to the difference of having the wing divided
or undivided: many animals will fall under neither of the two heads;
the difference in question belongs to the lower genus winged animal,
and distributes the same into two species. The characteristic or
specific difference must be enunciated and postulated by itself, and
must be attached to its appropriate genus in order to form the
definition. It is only by careful attention to the steps of
legitimate logical Division that we can make sure of including all
the particulars and leaving out none.[40]

[Footnote 38: Ibid. b. 18. The straight line is the first or lowest
of all lines: no other line can be understood, unless we first
understand what is meant by a straight line. In like manner the right
angle is the first of all angles, the circle the first of all
curvilinear figures (Julius Pacius, ad loc. p. 504).]

[Footnote 39: Analyt. Post. II. xiii. p. 96, b. 19-25: [Greek: meta\
de\ tou=to, la/bo/nta ti/ to\ ge/nos, oi(=on po/teron tô=n posô=n ê)\
tô=n poiô=n, ta\ i)/dia pa/thê theôrei=n dia\ tô=n koinô=n prô/tôn.
toi=s ga\r suntitheme/nois e)k tô=n a)to/môn] (speciebus infimis)
[Greek: ta\ sumbai/nonta e)k tô=n o(rismô=n e)/stai dê=la, dia\ to\
a)rchê\n ei)=nai pa/ntôn to\n o(rismo/n kai\ to\ a(plou=n, kai\ toi=s
a(ploi=s kath' au(ta\ u(pa/rchein ta\ sumbai/nonta mo/nois, toi=s d'
a)/llois kat' e)kei=na.]

Themistius illustrates this obscure passage, p. 89. The definitions
of [Greek: eu)thei=a grammê/, keklasme/nê grammê/, peripherê\s
grammê/], must each of them contain the definition of [Greek: grammê/
(= mê=kos a)plate/s)], since it is in the Category [Greek: Poso/n
(poso\n mê=kos a)plate/s)]. But the derivative properties of the
circle ([Greek: peripherê\s grammê/]) are deduced from the definition
of a circle, and belong to it in the first instance _quâ_ [Greek:
peripherê\s grammê/], in a secondary way _quâ_ [Greek: grammê/].]

[Footnote 40: Analyt. Post. II. xiii. p. 96, b. 25-p. 97, a. 6.]

Some contemporaries of Aristotle, and among them Speusippus,
maintained that it was impossible either to define, or to divide
logically, unless you knew all particulars without exception. You
cannot (they said) know any one thing, except by knowing its
differences from all other things; which would imply that you knew
also all these other things.[41] To these reasoners Aristotle
replies: It is not necessary to know _all_ the differences of every
thing; you know a thing as soon as you know its essence, with the
properties _per se_ which are derivative therefrom. There are many
differences not belonging to the essence, but distinguishing from
each other two things having the same essence: you may know the
thing, without knowing these accidental differences.[42] When you
divide a genus into two species, distinguished by one proximate
specific difference, such that there cannot be any thing that does
not fall under one or other of these _membra condividentia_, and when
you have traced the subject investigated under one or other of these
members, you can always follow this road until no lower specific
difference can be found, and you have then the final essence and
definition of the subject; even though you may not know how many
_other_ subjects each of the two members may include.[43] Thus does
Aristotle reply to Speusippus, showing that it is not necessary, for
the definition of one thing, that you should know _all_ other things.
His reply, as in many other cases, is founded on the distinction
between the Essential and the Accidental.

[Footnote 41: Ibid. p. 97, a. 6-10; Themistius, p. 92. Aristotle does
not here expressly name Speusippus, but simply says [Greek: phasi/
tines]. It is Themistius who names Speusippus; and one of the
Scholiasts refers to Eudemus as having expressly indicated Speusippus
(Schol. p. 248, a. 24, Br.).]

[Footnote 42: Analyt. Post. II. xiii. p. 97, a. 12: [Greek: pollai\
ga\r diaphorai\ u(pa/rchousi toi=s au)toi=s tô=| ei)/dei, a)ll' ou)
kat' ou)si/an ou)de\ kath' au(ta/.]]

[Footnote 43: Ibid. a. 18-22: [Greek: phanero\n ga\r o(/ti a)\n
ou(/tô badi/zôn e)/lthê| ei)s tau=ta ô(=n mêke/ti e)sti\ diaphora/,
e(/xei to\n lo/gon tê=s ou)si/as.]]

To obtain or put together a definition through logical Division,
three points are to be attended to.[44] Collect the predicates _in
Quid_; range them in the proper order; make sure that there are no
more, or that you have collected all. The essential predicates are
genera, to be obtained not otherwise than by the method (dialectical)
used in concluding accidents. As regards order, you begin with the
highest genus, that which is predicable of all the others, while none
of these is predicable of it, determining in like fashion the
succession of the rest respectively. The collection will be complete,
if you divide the highest genus by an exhaustive specific difference,
such that every thing must be included in one or other of the two
proximate and opposed portions; and then taking the species thus
found as your _dividendum_, subdivide it until no lower specific
difference can be found, or you obtain from the elements an exact
equivalent to the subject.[45]

[Footnote 44: Ibid. a. 23: [Greek: ei)s de\ to\ kataskeua/zein o(/ron
dia\ diaire/seôn]. The Scholiast, p. 248, a. 41, explains [Greek:
kataskeua/zein] by [Greek: eu(rei=n, sunthei=nai, a)podou=nai]. He
distinguishes it from [Greek: a)podeiknu/nai]; demonstration of the
definition being impracticable.]

[Footnote 45: Analyt. Post. II. xiii. p. 97, a. 23 seq. See Waitz,
Comm. p. 418.]

When the investigation must proceed by getting together a group of
similar particulars, you compare them, and note what is the same in
all; then turn to another group which are the same _in genere_ yet
differ _in specie_ from the first group, and have a different point
of community among themselves. You next compare the point of
community among the members of the first group, and that among the
members of the second group. If the two points of community can be
brought under one rational formula, that will be the definition of
the subject; but if at the end of the process, the distinct points of
community are not found resolvable into any final one, this proves
that the supposed _definiendum_ is not one but two or more.[46] For
example, suppose you are investigating, What is the essence or
definition of magnanimity? You must study various magnanimous
individuals, and note what they have in common _quâ_ magnanimous.[47]
Thus, Achilles, Ajax, Alkibiades were all magnanimous. Now, that
which the three had in common was, that they could not endure to be
insulted; on that account Alkibiades went to war with his countrymen,
Achilles was angry and stood aloof from the Greeks, Ajax slew
himself. But, again, you find two other magnanimous men, Sokrates and
Lysander. These two had in common the quality, that they maintained
an equal and unshaken temper both in prosperity and adversity. Now
when you have got thus far, the question to be examined is, What is
the point of identity between the temper that will not endure insult,
and the temper that remains undisturbed under all diversities of
fortune? If an identity can be found, this will be the essence or
definition of magnanimity; to which will belong equanimity as one
variety, and intolerance of insult as another. If, on the contrary,
no identity can be found, you will then have two distinct mental
dispositions, without any common definition.[48]

[Footnote 46: Analyt. Post. II. xiii. p. 97, b. 7-15. [Greek: pa/lin
skopei=n ei) tau)to\n e(/ôs a)\n ei)s e(/na e)/lthê| lo/gon; ou(=tos
ga\r e)/stai tou= pra/gmatos o(rismo/s. e)a\n de\ mê\ badi/zê| ei)s
e(/na a)ll' ei)s du/o ê)\ plei/ô, dê=lon o(/ti ou)k a)\n ei)/ê e(/n
ti ei)=nai to\ zêtou/menon, a)lla\ plei/ô.]]

[Footnote 47: Ibid. b. 16: [Greek: skepte/on e)pi/ tinôn
megalopsu/chôn, ou(\s i)/smen, ti/ e)/chousin e(\n pa/ntes ê(=|
_toiou=toi_.]]

[Footnote 48: Ibid. b. 17-25. [Greek: tau=ta du/o labô\n skopô= ti/
to\ au)to\ e)/chousin ê(/ te a)pa/theia ê( peri\ ta\s tu/chas kai\ ê(
mê\ u(pomonê\ a)timazome/nôn. ei) de\ mêde/n, du/o ei)/dê a)\n ei)/ê
tê=s megalopsuchi/as.]

  Æquam memento rebus in arduis
  Servare mentem: non secus in bonis
    Ab insolenti temperatam
      Lætitiâ.--Horace. _Ode_, ii. 3.

Aristotle says that there will be two species of magnanimity. But
surely if the two so-called species connote nothing in common they
are not rightly called species, nor is magnanimity rightly called a
genus. Equanimity would be distinct from magnanimity; Sokrates and
Lysander would not properly be magnanimous but equanimous.]

Every definition must be an universal proposition, applicable, not
exclusively to one particular object, but to a class of greater or
less extent. The lowest species is easier to define than the higher
genus; this is one reason why we must begin with particulars, and
ascend to universals. It is in the higher genera that equivocal terms
most frequently escape detection.[49] When you are demonstrating,
what you have first to attend to is, the completeness of the form of
syllogizing: when you are defining, the main requisite is to be
perspicuous and intelligible; _i.e._ to avoid equivocal or
metaphorical terms.[50] You will best succeed in avoiding them, if
you begin with the individuals, or with examples of the lowest
species, and then proceed to consider not their resemblances
generally, but their resemblances in certain definite ways, as in
colour or figure. These more definite resemblances you will note
first; upon each you will found a formula of separate definition;
after which you will ascend to the more general formula of less
definite resemblance common to both. Thus, in regard to the acute or
sharp, you will consider the acute in sound, and in other matters
(tastes, pains, weapons, angles, &c.), and you will investigate what
is the common point of identity characterizing all. Perhaps there may
be no such identity; the transfer of the term from one to the other
may be only a metaphor: you will thus learn that no common definition
is attainable. This is an important lesson; for as we are forbidden
to carry on a dialectical debate in metaphorical terms, much more are
we forbidden to introduce metaphorical terms in a definition.[51]

[Footnote 49: Analyt. Post. II. xiii. p. 97, b. 29: [Greek: kai\ ga\r
ai( o(mônumi/ai **lantha/nousi ma=llon e)n toi=s katho/lou
ê)\ e)n toi=s a)diapho/rois.]]

[Footnote 50: Analyt. Post. II. xiii. p. 97, b. 31: [Greek: ô(/sper
de e)n tai=s a)podei/xesi dei= to/ ge sullelogi/sthai u(pa/rchein,
ou(/tô kai\ e)n toi=s o(/rois _to\ saphe/s_.]

By [Greek: to\ saphe/s], he evidently means the avoidance of
equivocal or metaphorical terms, and the adherence to true genera and
species. Compare Biese, Die Philosophie des Aristot. pp. 308-310.]

[Footnote 51: Analyt. Post. II. xiii. p. 97, b. 35-39.--([Greek:
diale/gesthai/ phêsi, to\ dialektikô=s o(milei=n].--Schol. p. 248, b.
23, Brand.). Aristotle considers it metaphorical when the term
_acute_ is applied both to a sound and to an angle.

The treatment of this portion of the Aristotelian doctrine by Prantl
(Geschichte der Logik, vol. I. ch. iv. pp. 246, 247, 338), is
instructive. He brings out, in peculiar but forcible terms, the idea
of "notional causality" which underlies Aristotle's Logic. "So also
ist die Definition das Aussprechen _des schöpferischen
Wesensbegriffes_. . . . . Soweit der schöpferische Wesensbegriff
erreicht werden kann, ist durch denselben die begriffliche Causalität
erkannt; und die Einsicht in diese _primitive Ursächlichkeit_ wird in
dem Syllogismus vermittelst des Mittelbegriffes erreicht. Ueber den
schöpferischen Wesensbegriff hinauszugehen, ist nicht möglich. . . .
. Sobald die Definition mehr als eine blosse Namenserklärung ist--und
sie muss mehr seyn--erkennt sie den Mittelbegriff als schöpferische
Causalität. . . . . Die ontologische Bedeutung des Mittelbegriffes
ist, dass er schöpferischer Wesensbegriff ist." Rassow (pp. 51, 63,
&c.) adopts a like metaphorical phrase:--"Definitionem est, explicare
notionem; quæ quidem est _creatrix rerum causa_."]

To obtain and enunciate correctly the problems suitable for
discussion in each branch of science, you must have before you tables
of dissection and logical division, and take them as guides;[52]
beginning with the highest genus and proceeding downward through the
successively descending scale of sub-genera and species. If you are
studying animals, you first collect the predicates belonging to all
animals; you then take the highest subdivision of the genus animal,
such as bird, and you collect the predicates belonging to all birds;
and so on to the next in the descending scale. You will be able to
show cause why any of these predicates must belong to the man
Sokrates, or to the horse Bukephalus; because it belongs to the genus
animal, which includes man and horse. Animal will be the middle term
in the demonstration.[53] This example is taken from the class-terms
current in vulgar speech. But you must not confine yourself to these;
you must look out for new classes, bound together by the possession
of some common attribute, yet not usually talked of as classes, and
you must see whether other attributes can be found constantly
conjoined therewith. Thus you find that all animals having horns,
have also a structure of stomach fit for rumination, and teeth upon
one jaw only. You know, therefore, what is the cause that oxen and
sheep have a structure of stomach fit for rumination. It is because
they have horns. Having-horns is the middle term of the
demonstration.[54] Cases may also be found in which several objects
possess no common nature or attribute to bind them into a class, but
are yet linked together, by analogy, in different ways, to one and
the same common term.[55] Some predicates will be found to accompany
constantly this analogy, or to belong to all the objects _quâ_
analogous, just as if they had one and the same class-nature.
Demonstration may be applied to these, as to the former cases.

[Footnote 52: Analyt. Post. II. xiv. p. 98**, a. 1. [Greek: pro\s de\
to\ e)/chein ta\ problê/mata, le/gein dei= ta/s te _a)natoma\s_ kai\
ta\s diaire/seis, ou(/tô de\ diale/gein, u(pothe/menon to\ ge/nos to\
koino\n a(pa/ntôn.] This is Waitz's text, which differs from Julius
Pacius and from Firmin Didot.

Themistius (pp. 94-95) explains [Greek: ta\s a)natoma\s] to be
anatomical drawings or exercises prepared by Aristotle for teaching:
[Greek: kai\ ta\s a)natoma\s e)/chein dei= prochei/rôs, o(/sai
pepoi/êntai A)ristote/lei].

The collection of Problems or questions for investigation was much
prosecuted, not merely by Aristotle but by Theophrastus (Schol. p.
249, a. 12, Br.).]

[Footnote 53: Analyt. Post. II. xiv. p. 98, a. 5-12.]

[Footnote 54: Ibid. a. 13-19. Aristotle assumes that the material
which ought to have served for the upper teeth, is appropriated by
Nature for the formation of horns.]

[Footnote 55: Ibid. a. 20-23: [Greek: e)/ti d' a)/llos tro/pos e)sti\
_kata\ to\ a)na/logon_ e)kle/gein]. He gives as examples, [Greek:
sê/pion, a)/kantha, o)stou=n].]

Problems must be considered to be the same, when the middle term of
the demonstration is the same for each, or when the middle term in
the one is a subordinate or corollary to that in the other. Thus, the
cause of echo, the cause of images in a mirror, the cause of the
rainbow, all come under the same general head or middle term
(refraction), though with a specific difference in each case. Again,
when we investigate the problem, Why does the Nile flow with a more
powerful current in the last half of the (lunar) month? the reason is
that the month is then more wintry. But why _is_ the month then more
wintry? Because the light of the moon is then diminishing. Here are
two middle terms, the one of which depends upon the other. The
problem for investigation is therefore the same in both.[56]

[Footnote 56: Analyt. Post. II. xv. p. 98, a. 24-34. Theophrastus is
said to have made collections of "_like problems_," problems of which
the solution depended upon the same middle term (Schol. p. 249, a.
11**, Brand.).]

Respecting _Causa_ and _Causatum_ question may be made whether it is
necessary that when the _causatum_ exists, the _causa_ must exist
also? The answer must be in the affirmative, if you include the cause
in the definition of _causatum_. Thus, if you include in the
definition of a lunar eclipse, the cause thereof, viz., intervention
of the earth between moon and sun--then, whenever an eclipse occurs,
such intervention must occur also. But it must not be supposed that
there is here a perfect reciprocation, and that as the _causatum_ is
in this case demonstrable from the cause, so there is the like
demonstration of the cause from the _causatum_. Such a demonstration
is never a demonstration of [Greek: dio/ti]; it is only a
demonstration of [Greek: o(/ti]. The _causatum_ is not included in
the definition of the cause; if you demonstrate that because the moon
is eclipsed, therefore the earth is interposed between the moon and
the sun, you prove the fact of the interposition, but you learn
nothing about the cause thereof. Again, in a syllogism the middle
term is the cause of the conclusion (_i.e._, it is the reason why the
major term is predicated of the minor, which predication is the
conclusion); and in this sense the cause and _causatum_ may sometimes
reciprocate, so that either may be proved by means of the other. But
the _causatum_ here reciprocates with the _causa_ only as premiss and
conclusion (_i.e._, we may know either by means of the other), not as
cause and effect; the _causatum_ is not cause of the _causa_ as a
fact and reality, as the _causa_ is cause of the _causatum_.[57]

[Footnote 57: Analyt. Post. II. xvi. p. 98, a. 35, seq. Themistius,
pp. 96-97: [Greek: ou) ga/r e)stin ai)/tion tou= tê\n gê=n e)n me/sô|
ei)=nai to\ tê\n selê/nên e)klei/pein, a)lla\ me/son tou=
sullogismou=; kai\ tou= sumpera/smatos i)/sôs ai)/tion, _tou=
pra/gmatos de\ ou)damô=s_.] Themistius here speaks with a precision
which is not always present to the mind of Aristotle; for he
discriminates the cause of _the fact_ from the cause of the _affirmed
fact_ or _conclusion_. M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire says (Plan Général
des Derniers Analytiques, p. cxl.):--"Ainsi, la démonstration de
l'effet par la cause apprend pourquoi la chose est; la démonstration
par l'effet apprend seulement que la chose est. On sait que la terre
s'interpose, mais on ne sait pas pourquoi elle s'interpose: et ce qui
le montre bien, c'est que l'idée de l'interposition de la terre est
indispensable à la définition essentielle de l'éclipse tandis que
l'idée de l'éclipse n'a que faire dans la définition de
l'interposition. L'interposition de la terre fait donc comprendre
l'éclipse; tandis que l'éclipse ne fait pas du tout comprendre
l'interposition de la terre."]

The question then arises, Can there be more than one cause of the
same _causatum_? Is it necessary that the same effect should be
produced in all cases by the same cause? In other words, when the
same predicate is demonstrated to be true of two distinct minors, may
it not be demonstrated in one case by one middle term, and in the
other case by a different middle term?[58] Answer: In genuine and
proper scientific problems the middle term is the rational account
(definition, interpretation) of the major extreme; this middle term
therefore, or the cause, must in all cases be one and the same. The
demonstration in these cases is derived from the same essence; it is
_per se_, not _per accidens_. But there are other problems, not
strictly and properly scientific, in which cause and _causatum_ are
connected merely _per accidens_; the demonstration being operated by
a middle term which is not of the essence of the major, but is only a
sign or concomitant.[59] According as the terms of the conclusion are
related to each other, so also will the middle term be related to
both. If the conclusion be equivocal, the middle term will be
equivocal also; if the predicate in the conclusion be in generic
relation to the subject, the major also will be in generic relation
to the middle. Thus, if you are demonstrating that one triangle is
similar to another, and that one colour is similar to another, the
word similar in these two cases is not univocal, but equivocal;
accordingly, the middle term in the demonstration will also be
equivocal. Again, if you are demonstrating that four proportionals
will also be proportionals alternately, there will be one cause or
middle term, if the subject of the conclusion be lines; another, if
the subject be numbers. Yet the middle term or cause in both is the
same, in as far as both involve a certain fact of increment.[60]

[Footnote 58: Analyt. Post. II. xvi. p. 98, b. 25.]

[Footnote 59: Ibid. xvii. p. 99, a. 4: [Greek: e)/sti de\ kai\ ou(=
ai)/tion kai\ ô(=| skopei=n kata\ sumbebêko/s; ou) mê\n dokei=
problê/mata ei)=nai.]

"Veluti si probemus grammaticum esse aptum ad ridendum, quia homo est
aptus ad ridendum." (Julius Pacius, p. 514.)]

[Footnote 60: Analyt. Post. II. xvii. p. 99, a. 8-16.]

The major term of the syllogism will in point of extension be larger
than any particular minor, but equal or co-extensive with the sum
total of the particulars. Thus the predicate deciduous, affirmable of
all plants with broad leaves, is greater in extension than the
subject vines, also than the subject fig-trees; but it is equal in
extension to the sum total of vines and fig-trees (the other
particular broad-leaved plant). The middle also, in an universal
demonstration, reciprocates with the major, being its definition.
Here the true middle or cause of the effect that vines and fig-trees
shed their leaves, is not that they are broad-leaved plants, but
rather a coagulation of sap or some such fact.[61]

[Footnote 61: Ibid. a. 16 seq.]

The last chapter of the present treatise is announced by Aristotle as
the appendix and completion of his entire theory of Demonstrative
Science, contained in the Analytica Priora, which treats of
Syllogism, and the Analytica Posteriora, which treats of
Demonstration. After formally winding up the whole enquiry, he
proceeds to ask regarding the _principia_ of Demonstrative Science:
What are they? How do they become known? What is the mental habit or
condition that is cognizant of them?[62]

[Footnote 62: Analyt. Post. II. xix. p. 99, b. 15-19: [Greek: peri\
me\n ou)=n sullogismou= kai\ a)podei/xeôs, ti/ te e(ka/tero/n e)sti
kai\ pô=s gi/netai, phanero/n, a(/ma **de\ kai\ peri\ e)pistê/mês
a)podeiktikê=s; tau)to\n ga/r e)stin. peri\ de\ tô=n a)rchô=n, pô=s
te gi/nontai gnô/rimoi, kai\ _ti/s ê( gnôri/zousa e(/xis_,
e)nteu=the/n e)sti dê=lon proaporê/sasi prô=ton.]

Bekker and Waitz, in their editions, include all these words in ch.
xix.: the older editions placed the words preceding [Greek: peri\
de\] in ch. xviii. Zabarella observes the transition to a new subject
(Comm. ad Analyt. Post. II. ch. xv. p. 640):--"Postremum hoc caput
(beginning at [Greek: peri\ de\]) extra primariam tractationem
positum esse manifestum est: quum præcesserit epilogus respondens
prooemio quod legitur in initio primi libri Priorum Analyticorum."]

Aristotle has already laid down that there can be no Demonstration
without certain _præcognita_ to start from; and that these
_præcognita_ must, in the last resort, be _principia_ undemonstrable,
immediately known, and known even more accurately than the
conclusions deduced from them. Are they then cognitions, or cognizant
habits and possessions, born along with us, and complete from the
first? This is impossible (Aristotle declares); we cannot have such
valuable and accurate cognitions from the first moments of childhood,
and yet not be at all aware of them. They must therefore be acquired;
yet how is it possible for us to acquire them?[63] The fact is, that,
though we do not from the first possess any such complete and
accurate cognitions as these, we have from the first an inborn
capacity or potentiality of arriving at them. And something of the
same kind belongs to all animals.[64] All of them possess an
apprehending and discriminating power born with them, called Sensible
Perception; but, though all possess such power, there is this
difference, that with some the act of perception dwells for a longer
or shorter time in the mind; with others it does not. In animals with
whom it does not dwell, there can be no knowledge beyond perception,
at least as to all those matters wherein perception is evanescent;
but with those that both perceive and retain perceptions in their
minds, ulterior knowledge grows up.[65] There are many such retentive
animals, and they differ among themselves: with some of them reason
or rational notions arise out of the perceptions retained; with
others, it is not so. First, out of perception arises memory; next,
out of memory of the same often repeated, arises experience, since
many remembrances numerically distinct are summed up into one
experience. Lastly, out of experience, or out of the universal
notion, the _unum et idem_ which pervades and characterizes a
multitude of particulars, when it has taken rest and root in the
mind, there arises the _principium_ of art and science: of science,
in respect to objects existent; of art, in respect to things
generable.[66] And thus these mental habits or acquirements neither
exist in our minds determined from the beginning, nor do they spring
from other acquirements of greater cognitive efficacy. They spring
from sensible perception; and we may illustrate their growth by what
happens in the panic of a terrified host, where first one runaway
stops in his flight, then a second, then a third, until at last a
number docile to command is collected. One characteristic feature of
the mind is to be capable of this process.[67]

[Footnote 63: Analyt. Post. II. xix. p. 99, b. 25-30: [Greek:
po/teron ou)k e)nou=sai ai( e(/xeis e)ggi/nontai, ê)\ e)nou=sai
lelê/thasin. ei) me\n dê\ e)/chomen au)ta/s, a)/topon; sumbai/nei
ga\r a)kribeste/ras e)/chontas gnô/seis a)podei/xeôs lantha/nein; ei)
de\ lamba/nomen mê\ e)/chontes pro/teron, pô=s a)\n gnôri/zoimen kai\
mantha/noimen e)k mê\ prou+parchou/sês gnô/seôs?] Compare, supra,
Analyt. Post. I. iii. p. 72, b. 20-30; Metaphys. A. ix. p. 993, a. 1,
with the Comment. of Alexander, p. 96, Bonitz.]

[Footnote 64: Analyt. Post. II. xix. p. 99, b. 30: [Greek: phanero\n
toi/nun ou)/t' e)/chein oi(=o/n te, ou)/t' a)gnoou=si kai\ mêdemi/an
e)/chousin e(/xin e)ggi/nesthai; a)na/gkê a)/ra e)/chein me/n tina
du/namin, mê\ toiau/tên d' e)/chein ê)\ e)/stai tou/tôn timiôte/ra
kat' a)kri/beian. phai/netai de\ tou=to/ ge pa=sin u(pa/rchon toi=s
zô/|ois.]]

[Footnote 65: Analyt. Post II. xix. p. 99, b. 37: [Greek: o(/sois
me\n ou)=n mê\ e)ggi/netai, ê)\ o(/lôs ê)\ peri\ a(\ mê\ e)ggi/netai,
ou)k e)/sti tou/tois gnô=sis e)/xô tou= ai)stha/nesthai; e)n oi(=s d'
e)/nestin ai)sthanome/nois e)/chein e)/ti e)n tê=| psuchê=|. pollô=n
de\ toiou/tôn ginome/nôn ê)/dê diaphora/ tis gi/netai, ô(/ste toi=s
me\n gi/nesthai lo/gon e)k tê=s tô=n toiou/tôn monê=s, toi=s de\
mê/.] Compare Analyt. Poster. I. p. 81, a. 38, seq., where the
dependence of Induction on the perceptions of sense is also affirmed.
See Themistius, pp. 50-51, ed. Spengel. The first chapter of the
Metaphysica (p. 981), contains a striking account of this generation
of universal notions from memory and comparison of sensible
particulars: [Greek: gi/netai de\ te/chnê, o(/tan e)k pollô=n tê=s
e)mpeiri/as e)nnoêma/tôn mi/a katho/lou ge/nêtai peri\ tô=n o(moi/ôn
u(po/lêpsis] ("_intellecta similitudo"_). Also in the Physica VII. p.
247, b. 20 (in the Paraphrase of Themistius, as printed in the Berlin
edition, at bottom of page): [Greek: e)k ga\r tê=s kata\ me/ros
e)mpeiri/as tê\n katho/lou lamba/nomen e)pistê/mên.]]

[Footnote 66: Analyt Post II. xix. p. 100, a. 3-10: [Greek: e)k me\n
ou)=n ai)sthê/seôs gi/netai mnê/mê, ô(/sper le/gomen, e)k de\ mnê/mês
polla/kis tou= au)tou= ginome/nês e)mpeiri/a; ai( ga\r pollai\
mnê=mai tô=| a)rithmô=| e)mpeiri/a mi/a e)sti/n. e)k d' e)mpeiri/as,
ê)\ e)k panto\s ê)remê/santos tou= katho/lou e)n tê=| psuchê=|, tou=
e(no\s para\ ta\ polla/, o(\ a)\n e)n a(/pasin e(\n e)nê=| e)kei/nois
to\ au)to/, te/chnês a)rchê\ kai\ e)pistê/mês; e)a\n me\n peri\
ge/nesin, te/chnês, e)a\n de\ peri\ to\ o)/n, e)pistê/mês.]

A theory very analogous to this (respecting the gradual generation of
scientific universal notions in the mind out of the particulars of
sense) is stated in the Phædon of Plato, ch. xlv. p. 96, B., where
Sokrates reckons up the unsuccessful tentatives which he had made in
philosophy: [Greek: kai\ po/teron to\ ai(=ma/ e)stin ô(=|
phronou=men, ê)\ o( a)ê\r, ê)\ to\ pu=r, ê)\ tou/tôn me\n ou)de/n, o(
de\ e)gke/phalo/s e)stin o( ta\s ai)sthê/seis pare/chôn tou=
a)kou/ein kai\ o(pa=n kai\ o)sphrai/nesthai, e)k _tou/tôn de\
gi/gnoito mnê/mê kai\ do/xa_, e)k _de\ mnê/mês kai\ do/xês, labou/sês
to\ ê)remei=n, kata\ tau=ta gi/gnesthai e)pistê/mên_.]

Boethius says, Comm. in Ciceronis Topica, p. 805:--"Plato ideas
quasdam esse ponebat, id est, species incorporeas, substantiasque
constantes et per se ab aliis naturæ ratione separatas, ut hoc ipsum
_homo_, quibus participantes cæteræ res homines vel animalia fierent.
At vero Aristoteles nullas putat extra esse substantias; sed
_intellectam similitudinem plurimorum inter se differentium
substantialem_, genus putat esse vel speciem. Nam cum homo et equus
differunt rationabilitate et irrationabilitate, horum _intellecta
similitudo_ efficit genus. Ergo communitas quædam et plurimorum inter
se differentium similitudo _notio_ est; cujus notionis aliud _genus_
est, aliud _forma_. Sed quoniam _similium intelligentia_ est omnis
notio, in rebus vero similibus necessaria est differentiarum
discretio, idcirco indiget notio quadam enodatione ac divisione;
velut ipse intellectus animalis sibi ipsi non sufficit," &c.

The phrase _intellecta similitudo plurimorum_ embodies both Induction
and Intellection in one. A like doctrine appears in the obscure
passages of Aristotle, De Animâ, III. viii. p. 429, b. 10; also p.
432, a. 3: [Greek: o( nou=s, ei)=dos ei)dô=n, kai\ ê( ai)/sthêsis,
ei)=dos ai)sthêtô=n. e)pei\ de\ ou)de\ pra=gma ou)the/n e)sti para\
ta\ mege/thê, ô(s dokei=, ta\ ai)sthêta\ kechôrisme/non, e)n toi=s
ei)/desi toi=s ai)sthêtoi=s ta\ noêta/ e)stin.]]

[Footnote 67: Analyt. Post. II. xix. p. 100, a. 10-14: [Greek: ou)/te
dê\ e)nupa/rchousin a)phôrisme/nai ai( e(/xeis, ou)/t' a)p' a)/llôn
e(/xeôn gi/nontai gnôrimôte/rôn, a)ll' a)po\ ai)sthê/seôs,--ê( de\
psuchê\ u(pa/rchei toiau/tê ou)=sa oi(/a du/nasthai pa/schein
tou=to.]

The varieties of intellectual [Greek: e(/xeis] enumerated by
Aristotle in the sixth book of the Nikomachean Ethica, are elucidated
by Alexander in his Comment. on the Metaphysica. (A. p. 981) pp. 7,
8, Bonitz. The difference of [Greek: e(/xis] and [Greek: dia/thesis],
the durable condition as contrasted with the transient, is noted in
Categoriæ, pp. 8, 9. See also Eth. Nikom. II. i. ii. pp 1103, 4.]

Aristotle proceeds to repeat the illustration in clearer terms--at
least in terms which he thinks clearer.[68] We perceive the
particular individual; yet sensible perception is of the universal in
the particular (as, for example, when Kallias is before us, we
perceive man, not the man Kallias). Now, when one of a set of
particulars dwells some time in the mind, first an universal notion
arises; next, more particulars are perceived and detained, and
universal notions arise upon them more and more comprehensive, until
at last we reach the highest stage--the most universal and simple.
From Kallias we rise to man; from such and such an animal, to animal
_in genere_; from animal _in genere_, still higher, until we reach
the highest or indivisible genus.[69] Hence it is plain that the
first and highest _principia_ can become known to us only by
Induction; for it is by this process that sensible perception builds
up in us the Universal.[70] Now among )those intellective habits or
acquirements, whereby we come to apprehend truth, there are some
(Science and Noûs) that are uniformly and unerringly true, while
others (Opinion and Ratiocination) admit an alternative of
falsehood.[71] Comparing Science with Noûs, the latter, and the
latter only, is more accurate and unerring than Science. But all
Science implies demonstration, and all that we know by Science is
conclusions deduced by demonstration. We have already said that the
_principia_ of these demonstrations cannot be themselves
demonstrated, and therefore cannot be known by Science; we have also
said that they must be known more accurately than the conclusions.
How then can these _principia_ themselves be known? They can be known
only by Noûs, and from particulars. It is from the _principia_ known
by Noûs, with the maximum of accuracy, that Science demonstrates her
conclusions. Noûs is the great _principium_ of Science.[72]

[Footnote 68: Analyt. Post. II. xix. p. 100, a. 14: [Greek: o(\ d'
_e)le/chthê me\n pa/lai_, ou) saphô=s de\ e)le/chthê, pa/lin
ei)/pômen.]

Waitz supposes that Aristotle here refers to a passage in the first
book of the Analytica Posteriora, c. xxxi. p. 87, b. 30. M.
Barthélemy St. Hilaire thinks (p. 290) that reference is intended to
an earlier sentence of this same chapter. Neither of these
suppositions seems to suit (least of all the last) with the meaning
of [Greek: pa/lai]. But whichever he meant, Aristotle has not done
much _to clear up_ what was obscure in the antecedent statements.]

[Footnote 69: Analyt. Post. II. xix. p. 100, a. 15: [Greek: sta/ntos
ga\r tô=n a)diapho/rôn e(no/s, prô=ton me\n e)n tê=| psuchê=|
katho/lou (kai\ ga\r ai)sthêsis tou= katho/lou e)sti/n, oi(=on
a)nthrô/pou, a)ll' ou) Kalli/ou a)nthrô/pou) pa/lin d' e)n tou/tois
i(/statai, _e(/ôs a)\n ta\ a)merê= stê=| kai\ ta\ katho/lou_, oi(=on
toiondi\ zô=|on, e(/ôs zô=|on; kai\ e)n tou/tô| ô(sau/tôs.]

These words are obscure: [Greek: ta\ a)merê=] must mean the highest
genera; indivisible, _i.e._ being a _minimum_ in respect of
_comprehension_. Instead of [Greek: ta\ katho/lou], we might have
expected [Greek: ta\ ma/lista katho/lou], or, perhaps, that [Greek:
kai\] should be omitted. Trendelenburg comments at length on this
passage, Arist. De Animâ Comment. pp. 170-174.]

[Footnote 70: Analyt. Post. II. xix. p. 100, b. 3: [Greek: dê=lon dê\
o(/ti ê(mi=n ta\ prô=ta e)pagôgê=| gnôri/zein a)nagkai=on; kai\ ga\r
kai\ ai)/sthêsis ou(/tô to\ katho/lou e)mpoiei=.] Compare, supra,
Analyt. Post. I. xviii. p. 81, b. 1. Some commentators contended that
Aristotle did not mean to ascribe an inductive origin to the common
Axioms properly so called, but only to the special _principia_
belonging to each science. Zabarella refutes this doctrine, and
maintains that the Axioms (Dignitates) are derived from Induction
(Comm. in Analyt. Post. II. xix. p. 649, ed. Venet., 1617):--"Quum
igitur inductio non sit proprie discursus, nec ratio, jure dicit
Aristoteles principiorum notitiam non esse cum ratione, quia non ex
aliis innotescunt, sed ex seipsis dum per inductionem innotescunt.
Propterea in illa propositione, quæ in initio **primi libri
legitur, sub doctrina discursiva cognitio principiorum non
comprehenditur, quia non est dianoëtica. Hoc, quod modo diximus, si
nonnulli advertissent, fortasse non negassent principia communia, quæ
dicuntur Dignitates, inductione cognosci. Dixerunt enim Aristotelem
hic de principiis loquentem sola principia propria considerasse, quæ
cum non proprio lumine cognoscantur, inductione innotescunt; at
Dignitates (inquiunt) proprio lumine ab intellectu nostro
cognoscuntur per solam terminorum intelligentiam, ut quod omne totum
majus est suâ parte; hoc enim non magis est evidens sensui in
particulari, quam intellectui in universali, proinde inductione non
eget. Sed hanc sententiam hic Averroes refutat, dicens hæc quoque
inductione cognosci, sed non animadverti nobis tempus hujus
inductionis; id enim omnino confitendum est, omnem intellectualem
doctrinam à sensu originem ducere, et nihil esse in intellectu quod
prius in sensu non fuerit, ut ubique asserit Aristoteles."

To the same purpose Zabarella expresses himself in an earlier portion
of his Commentary on the Analyt. Post., where he lays it down that
the truth of the proposition, Every whole is greater than its part,
is known from antecedent knowledge of particulars by way of
Induction. Compare the Scholion of Philoponus, ad Analyt. Post. p.
225, a. 32, Brand., where the same is said about the Axiom, Things
equal to the same are equal to each other.]

[Footnote 71: Analyt. Post. II. xix. p. 100, b. 5: [Greek: e)pei\ de\
tô=n peri\ tê\n dia/noian e(/xeôn, ai(=s a)lêtheu/omen, ai( me\n
a)ei\ a)lêthei=s ei)si/n, ai( de\ e)pide/chontai to\ pseu=dos], &c.]

[Footnote 72: Ibid. fin. p. 100.]

The manner in which Aristotle here describes how the _principia_ of
Syllogism become known to the mind deserves particular attention. The
march up to _principia_ is not only different from, but the reverse
of, the march down from _principia_; like the athlete who runs first
to the end of the stadium, and then back.[73] Generalizing or
universalizing is an acquired intellectual habit or permanent
endowment; growing out of numerous particular acts or judgments of
sense, remembered, compared, and coalescing into one mental group
through associating resemblance. As the ethical, moral, practical
habits, are acquirements growing out of a repetition of particular
acts, so also the intellectual, theorizing habits are mental results
generated by a multitude of particular judgments of sense, retained
and compared, so as to imprint upon the mind a lasting stamp of some
identity common to all. The Universal (_notius naturâ_) is thus
generated in the mind by a process of Induction out of particulars
which are _notiora nobis_; the potentiality of this process, together
with sense and memory, is all that is innate or connatural.

[Footnote 73: Aristot. Eth. Nikom. I. iv. p. 1095, b. 1.]

The _principia_, from which the conclusions of Syllogism are deduced,
being thus obtained by Induction, are, in Aristotle's view,
appreciated by, or correlated with, the infallible and unerring Noûs
or Intellect.[74] He conceives repeated and uncontradicted Induction
as carrying with it the maximum of certainty and necessity: the
syllogistic deductions constituting Science he regards as also
certain; but their certainty is only derivative, and the _principia_
from which they flow he ranks still higher, as being still more
certain.[75] Both the one and the other he pointedly contrasts with
Opinion and Calculation, which he declares to be liable to error.

[Footnote 74: The passages respecting [Greek: a)rchai\] or
_principia_, in the Nikomachean Ethica (especially Books I. and VI.),
are instructive as to Aristotle's views. The _principia_ are
universal notions and propositions, not starting up ready-made nor as
original promptings of the intellect, but gradually built up out of
the particulars of sense and Induction, and repeated particular acts.
They are judged and sanctioned by [Greek: Nou=s] or Intellect, but it
requires much care to define them well. They belong to the [Greek:
o(/ti], while demonstration belongs to the [Greek: dio/ti]. Eth. Nik.
I. vii. p. 1098, a. 33: [Greek: ou)k a)paitête/on d' ou)de\ tê\n
ai)ti/an e)n a(/pasin o(moi/ôs, a)ll' i(kano\n e)/n tisi to\ o(/ti
deichthê=nai kalô=s, oi(=on kai\ peri\ ta\s a)rcha/s; to\ d' o(/ti
prô=ton kai\ a)rchê/. tô=n a)rchô=n d' ai( me\n e)pagôgê=|
theôrou=ntai, ai( d' ai)sthê/sei, ai( d' e)thismô=| tini, kai\
a)/llai d' a)llô=s. metie/nai de\ peirate/on e(ka/stas ê(=|
pephu/kasin, kai\ spoudaste/on o(/pôs o(risthô=si kalô=s; mega/lên
ga\r e)/chousi r(opê\n pro\s ta\ e(po/mena.]

Compare Eth. Nik. VI. iii. p. 1139, b. 25, where the Analytica is
cited by name--[Greek: ê( me\n dê\ e)pagôgê\ a)rchê/ e)sti kai\ tou=
katho/lou, o( de\ sullogismo\s e)k tô=n katho/lou; ei)si\n a)/ra
a)rchai\ e)x ô(=n o( sullogismo/s, ô(=n ou)/k e)sti sullogismo/s;
e)pagôgê\ a)/ra.]--ib. p. 1141, a. 7: [Greek: lei/petai nou=n ei)=nai
tô=n a)rchô=n.]--p. 1142, a. 25: [Greek: o( me\n ga\r nou=s tô=n
o(/rôn, ô(=n ou)/k e)sti lo/gos].--p. 1143, b. 1.]

[Footnote 75: Analyt. Post. I. ii. p. 72, a. 37: [Greek: to\n de\
me/llonta e(/xein tê\n e)pistê/mên tê\n di' a)podei/xeôs ou) mo/non
dei= ta\s a)rcha\s gnôri/zein kai\ ma=llon au)tai=s pisteu/ein ê)\
tô=| deiknume/nô|, a)lla\ mêd' a)/llo au)tô=| pisto/teron ei)=nai
mêde\ gnôrimô/teron tô=n a)ntikeime/nôn tai=s a)rchai=s, e)x ô(=n
e)/stai sullogismo\s o( tê=s e)nanti/as a)pa/tês, ei)/per dei= to\n
e)pista/menon a(plô=s a)meta/peiston ei)=nai.]]

Aristotle had inherited from Plato this doctrine of an infallible
Noûs or Intellect, enjoying complete immunity from error. But,
instead of connecting it (as Plato had done) with reminiscences of an
anterior life among the Ideas, he assigned to it a position as
terminus and correlate to the process of Induction.[76] The like
postulate and pretension passed afterwards to the Stoics, and various
other philosophical sects: they could not be satisfied without
finding infallibility somewhere. It was against this pretension that
the Academics and Sceptics entered their protest; contending, on
grounds sometimes sophistical but often very forcible, that it was
impossible to escape from the region of fallibility, and that no
criterion of truth, at once universal and imperative, could be set
up.

[Footnote 76: Ibid. iii. p. 72, b. 20-30. [Greek: kai\ ou) mo/non
e)pistê/mên a)lla\ kai\ a)rchê\n e)pistê/mês ei)=nai tina/ phamen,
ê(=| tou\s o(/rous gnôri/zomen.]

Themistius, p. 14: [Greek: ô(=n dê\ a)/rchei pa/lin o( nou=s ô(=|
tou\s o(/rous thêreu/omen, e)x ô(=n sugkei\tai ta\ a)xiô/mata.]

The Paraphrase of Themistius (pp. 100-104) is clear and instructive,
where he amplifies the last chapter, and explains [Greek: Nou=s] as
the generalizing or universalizing aptitude of the soul, growing up
gradually out of the particulars furnished by Sense and Induction.]

It is to be regretted that Aristotle should have contented himself
with proclaiming this Inductive process as an ideal, culminating in
the infallible Noûs; and that he should only have superficially
noticed those conditions under which it must be conducted in reality,
in order to avoid erroneous or uncertified results. This is a
deficiency however which has remained unsupplied until the present
century.[77]

[Footnote 77: Sir W. Hamilton, Lectures on Logic, Vol. III. Lect.
xix. p. 380, says:--"In regard to simple syllogisms, it was an
original dogma of the Platonic School, and an early dogma of the
Peripatetic, that philosophy (science strictly so-called) was only
conversant with, and was exclusively contained in, universals; and
the doctrine of Aristotle, which taught that all our general
knowledge is only an induction from an observation of particulars,
was too easily forgotten or perverted by his followers. It thus
obtained almost the force of an acknowledged principle, that
everything to be known must be known under some general form or
notion. Hence the exaggerated importance attributed to definition and
deductions, it not being considered that we only take out of a
general notion what we had previously placed therein, and that the
amplification of our knowledge is not to be sought for from above but
from below,--not from speculation about abstract generalities, but
from the observation of concrete particulars. But however erroneous
and irrational, the persuasion had its day and influence, and it
perhaps determined, as one of its effects, the total neglect of one
half, and that not the least important half, of the reasoning
process. For while men thought only of looking upward to the more
extensive notions, as the only objects and the only media of science,
they took little heed of the more comprehensive notions, and
absolutely contemned individuals, as objects which could neither be
scientifically known in themselves nor supply the conditions of
scientifically knowing aught besides. The Logic of Comprehension and
of Induction was therefore neglected or ignored,--the Logic of
Extension and Deduction exclusively cultivated, as alone affording
the rules by which we might evolve higher notions into their
subordinate concepts."

(Hamilton, in this passage, considers the Logic of _Induction_ to be
the same as the Logic of _Comprehension_.)]




CHAPTER IX.

TOPICA.


I.

In treating of the Analytica Posteriora I have already adverted, in
the way of contrast, to the Topica; and, in now approaching the
latter work, I must again bring the same contrast before the mind of
the reader.

The treatise called Topica (including that which bears the separate
title De Sophisticis Elenchis, but which is properly its Ninth or
last Book, winding up with a brief but memorable recapitulation of
the Analytica and Topica considered as one scheme) is of considerable
length, longer than the Prior and Posterior Analytics taken together.
It contains both a theory and precepts of Dialectic; also, an
analysis of the process called by Aristotle Sophistical Refutation,
with advice how to resist or neutralize it.

All through the works of Aristotle, there is nothing which he so
directly and emphatically asserts to be his own original performance,
as the design and execution of the Topica: _i.e._, the deduction of
Dialectic and Sophistic from the general theory of Syllogism. He had
to begin from the beginning, without any model to copy or any
predecessor to build upon: and in every sort of work, he observes
justly, the first or initial stages are the hardest.[1] In regard to
Rhetoric much had been done before him; there were not only masters
who taught it, but writers who theorized well or ill, and laid down
precepts about it; so that, in his treatise on that subject, he had
only to enlarge and improve upon pre-existing suggestions. But in
regard to Dialectic as he conceives it--in its contrast with
Demonstration and Science on the one hand, and in its analogy or
kinship with Rhetoric on the other--nothing whatever had been done.
There were, indeed, teachers of contentious dialogue, as well as of
Rhetoric;[2] but these teachers could do nothing better than
recommend to their students dialogues or orations ready made, to be
learnt by heart. Such a mode of teaching (he says), though speedy,
was altogether unsystematic. The student acquired no knowledge of the
art, being furnished only with specimens of art-results. It was as if
a master, professing to communicate the art of making the feet
comfortable, taught nothing about leather-cutting or shoe-making, but
furnished his pupils with different varieties of ready-made shoes;
thus supplying what they wanted for the protection of the feet, but
not imparting to them any power of providing such protection for
themselves.[3] "In regard to the process of syllogizing (says
Aristotle, including both Analytic and Dialectic) I found positively
nothing said before me: I had to work it out for myself by long and
laborious research."[4]

[Footnote 1: Aristot. Sophist. Elench. xxxiv. p. 183, b. 22: [Greek:
me/giston ga\r i)/sôs a)rchê\ panto/s, ô(/sper le/getai; dio\ kai\
chalepô/taton. o(/sô| ga\r kra/tiston tê=| duna/mei, tosou/tô|
mikro/taton o)\n tô=| mege/thei chalepô/tato/n e)stin o)phthê=nai.]]

[Footnote 2: Sophist. Elench. xxxiv. p. 183, b. 34: [Greek: tau/tês
de\ tê=s pragmatei/as ou) to\ me\n ê)=n to\ d' ou)k ê)=n
proexeirgasme/non, a)ll' ou)de\n pantelô=s u(pê=rchen. kai\ ga\r tô=n
peri\ tou\s e)ristikou\s lo/gous mistharnou/ntôn o(moi/a tis ê)=n ê(
pai/deusis tê=| Gorgi/ou pragmatei/a|; lo/gous ga\r oi( me\n
r(êtorikou\s oi( de\ e)rôtêti/kous e)di/dosan e)kmantha/nein, ei)s
ou(\s pleista/kis e)mpi/ptein ô)ê/thêsan e(ka/teroi tou\s a)llê/lôn
lo/gous.]]

[Footnote 3: Ibid. xxxiv. p. 184, a. 2.]

[Footnote 4: Ibid. a. 7: [Greek: kai\ peri\ me\n tô=n r(êtorikô=n
polla\ kai\ palaia\ ta\ lego/mena, peri\ de\ tou= sullogi/zesthai
pantelô=s ou)de\n ei)/chomen pro/teron a)/llo le/gein, a)ll' ê)\
tribê=| zêtou=ntes polu\n chro/non e)ponou=men.]]

This is one of the few passages, throughout the philosopher's varied
and multitudinous works, in which he alludes to his own speciality of
method. It is all the more interesting on that account. If we turn
back to Sokrates and Plato, we shall understand better what the
innovation operated by Aristotle was; what the position of Dialectic
had been before his time, and what it became afterwards.

In the minds of Sokrates and Plato, the great antithesis was between
Dialectic and Rhetoric--interchange of short question and answer
before a select audience, as contrasted with long continuous speech
addressed to a miscellaneous crowd with known established sentiments
and opinions, in the view of persuading them on some given
interesting point requiring decision. In such Dialectic Sokrates was
a consummate master; passing most of his long life in the
market-place and palæstra, and courting disputation with every one.
He made formal profession of ignorance, disclaimed all power of
teaching, wrote nothing at all, and applied himself almost
exclusively to the cross-examining _Elenchus_ by which he exposed and
humiliated the ablest men not less than the vulgar. Plato, along with
the other companions of Sokrates, imbibed the Dialectic of his master,
and gave perpetuity to it in those inimitable dialogues which are still
preserved to us from his pen. He composed nothing but dialogues; thus
giving expression to his own thoughts only under borrowed names, and
introducing that of Sokrates very generally as chief spokesman. But
Plato, though in some dialogues he puts into the mouth of his
spokesman the genuine Sokratic disclaimer of all power and all
purpose of teaching, yet does not do this in all. He sometimes
assumes the didactic function; though he still adheres to the form of
dialogue, even when it has become inconvenient and unsuitable. In the
Platonic Republic Sokrates is made to alternate his own peculiar vein
of cross-examination with a vein of dogmatic exposition not his own;
but both one and the other in the same style of short question and
answer. In the Leges becomes still more manifest the inconvenience of
combining the substance of dogmatic exposition with the form of
dialogue: the same remark may also be made about the Sophistes and
Politicus; in which two dialogues, moreover, the didactic process is
exhibited purely and exclusively as a logical partition,
systematically conducted, of a genus into its component species.
Long-continued speech, always depreciated by Plato in its rhetorical
manifestations, is foreign to his genius even for purposes of
philosophy: the very lecture on cosmogony which he assigns to Timæus,
and the mythical narrative (unfinished) delivered by Kritias, are
brought into something like the form of dialogue by a prefatory
colloquy specially adapted for that end.

It thus appears that, while in Sokrates the dialectic process is
exhibited in its maximum of perfection, but disconnected altogether
from the didactic, which is left unnoticed,--in Plato the didactic
process is recognized and postulated, but is nevertheless confounded
with or absorbed into the dialectic, and admitted only as one
particular, ulterior, phase and manifestation of it. At the same
time, while both Sokrates and Plato bring out forcibly the side of
antithesis between Rhetoric and Dialectic, they omit entirely to
notice the side of analogy or parallelism between them. On both these
points Aristotle has corrected the confusion, and improved upon the
discrimination, of his two predecessors. He has pointedly
distinguished the dialectic process from the didactic; and he has
gone a step farther, furnishing a separate theory and precepts both
for the one and for the other. Again, he has indicated the important
feature of analogy between Dialectic and Rhetoric, in which same
feature both of them contrast with Didactic--the point not seized
either by Sokrates or by Plato.

Plato, in his Sokratic dialogues or dialogues of Search, has given
admirable illustrative specimens of that which Sokrates understood
and practised orally as Dialectic. Aristotle, in his Topica, has in
his usual vein of philosophy theorized on this practice as an art. He
had himself composed dialogues, which seem as far as we can judge
from indirect and fragmentary evidence, to have been Ciceronian or
rhetorical colloquies--a long pleading _pro_ followed by a long
pleading _con_, rather than examples of Sokratic brachylogy and
cross-examination. But his theory given in the Topica applies to
genuine Sokratic fencing, not to the Ciceronian alternation of set
speeches. He disallows the conception of Plato, that Dialectic is a
process including not merely dispute but all full and efficacious
employment of general terms and ideas for purposes of teaching: he
treats this latter as a province by itself, under the head of
Analytic: and devotes the Topica to the explanation of argumentative
debate, pure and simple. He takes his departure from the Syllogism,
as the type of deductive reasoning generally; the conditions under
which syllogistic reasoning is valid and legitimate, having been
already explained in his treatise called Analytica Priora. So
obtained, and regulated by those conditions, the Syllogism may be
applied to one or other of two distinct and independent
purposes:--(1) To Demonstration or Scientific Teaching, which we
have had before us in the last two chapters, commenting on the
Analytica Posteriora; (2) To Dialectic, or Argumentative Debate,
which we are now about to enter on in the Topica.

The Dialectic Syllogism, explained in the Topica, has some points in
common with the Demonstrative Syllogism, treated in the Analytica
Posteriora. In both, the formal conditions are the same, and the
conclusions will certainly be true, if the premisses are true; in
both, the axioms of deductive reasoning are assumed, namely, the
maxims of Contradiction and Excluded Middle. But, in regard to the
subject-matter, the differences between them are important. The
Demonstrative Syllogism applies only to a small number of select
sciences, each having special _principia_ of its own, or primary,
undemonstrable truths, obtained in the first instance by induction
from particulars. The premisses being thus incontrovertibly certain,
the conclusions deduced are not less certain; there is no necessary
place for conflicting arguments or counter-syllogisms, although in
particular cases paralogisms may be committed, and erroneous
propositions or majors for syllogism may be assumed. On the contrary,
the Dialectic Syllogism applies to all matters without exception; the
premisses on which it proceeds are neither obtained by induction, nor
incontrovertibly certain, but are borrowed from some one among the
varieties of accredited or authoritative opinion. They may be
opinions held by the multitude of any particular country, or by an
intelligent majority, or by a particular school of philosophers or
wise individuals, or from transmission as a current proverb or dictum
of some ancient poet or seer. From any one of these sources the
dialectician may borrow premisses for syllogizing. But it often
happens that the premisses which they supply are disparate, or in
direct contradiction to each other; and none of them is entitled to
be considered as final or peremptory against the rest. Accordingly,
it is an essential feature of Dialectic as well as of Rhetoric that
they furnish means of establishing conclusions contrary or
contradictory, by syllogisms equally legitimate.[5] The dialectic
procedure is from its beginning intrinsically contentious, implying a
debate between two persons, one of whom sets up a thesis to defend,
while the other impugns it by interrogation: the assailant has gained
his point, if he can reduce the defendant to the necessity of
contradicting himself; while the defendant on his side has to avoid
giving any responses which may drive him to the necessity of such
contradiction.

[Footnote 5: Aristot. Rhetoric. I. i. p. 1355, a. 29: [Greek: e)/ti
de\ ta)nanti/a dei= du/nasthai pei/thein, katha/per kai\ e)n toi=s
sullogismoi=s, ou)ch o(/pôs a)mpho/tera pra/ttômen, (ou) ga\r dei=
ta\ phau=la pei/thein), a)ll' i(/na mê/te lantha/nê| pô=s e)/chei,
kai\ o(/pôs a)/llou chrôme/nou toi=s lo/gois mê\ dikai/ôs au)toi\
lu/ein e)/chômen. tô=n me\n ou)=n a)/llôn technô=n ou)demi/a
ta)nanti/a sullogi/zetai; ê( de\ dialektikê\ kai\ ê( r(êtorikê\
mo/nai tou=to poiou=sin; o(moi/ôs ga/r ei)sin a)mpho/terai tô=n
e)nanti/ôn.]]

Aristotle takes great pains to enforce the separation both of
Dialectic and Rhetoric from Science or Instruction with its purpose
of teaching or learning. He disapproves of those (seemingly intending
Plato) who seek to confound the two. Dialectic and Rhetoric (he says)
have for their province words and discourse, not facts or things:
they are not scientific or didactic processes, but powers or
accomplishments of discourse; and whoever tries to convert them into
means of teaching or learning particular subjects, abolishes their
characteristic feature and restricts their universality of
application.[6] Both of them deal not with scientific facts, but with
the sum total of accredited opinions, though each for its own
purpose: both of them lay hold of any one among the incoherent
aggregate of accepted generalities, suitable for the occasion; the
Dialectician trying to force his opponent into an inconsistency, the
Rhetor trying to persuade his auditors into a favourable decision.
Neither the one nor the other goes deeper than opinion for his
premisses, nor concerns himself about establishing by induction
primary or special _principia_, such as may serve for a basis of
demonstration.

[Footnote 6: Ibid. iv. 2, p. 1359, b. 12: [Greek: o(/sô| d' a)/n tis
ê)\ tê\n dialektikê\n ê)\ tau/tên (tê\n r(êtorikê\n) mê\ katha/per
a)\n duna/meis, a)ll' e)pistê/mas, peira=tai kataskeua/zein, lê/setai
tê\n phu/sin au)tô=n a)phani/sas, tô=| metabai/nein e)piskeua/zôn
ei)s e)pistê/mas u(pokeime/nôn tinô=n pragma/tôn, a)lla\ mê\ mo/non
lo/gôn.]]

In every society there are various floating opinions and beliefs,
each carrying with it a certain measure of authority, often
inconsistent with each other, not the same in different societies,
nor always the same even in the same society. Each youthful citizen,
as he grows to manhood, imbibes these opinions and beliefs insensibly
and without special or professional teaching.[7] The stock of
opinions thus transmitted would not be identical even at Athens and
Sparta: the difference would be still greater, if we compared Athens
with Rome, Alexandria, or Jerusalem. Such opinions all carry with
them more or less of authority, and it is from them that the
reasonings of common life, among unscientific men, are supplied. The
practice of dialectical discussion, prevalent in Athens during and
before the time of Aristotle, was only a more elaborate, improved,
and ingenious exhibition of this common talk; proceeding on the same
premisses, but bringing them together from a greater variety of
sources, handling them more cleverly, and having for its purpose to
convict an opponent of inconsistency. The dialecticians dwelt
exclusively in the region of these received opinions; and the purpose
of their debates was to prove inconsistency, or to repel the proof of
inconsistency, between one opinion and another.

[Footnote 7: For an acute and interesting description of this
unsystematic transmission of opinions, see, in the Protagoras of
Plato, the speech put into the mouth of Protagoras, pp. 323-325. See
also 'Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates,' Vol. II. ch. xxi.
p. 45, seq.]

This dialectic debate, which Aristotle found current at Athens, he
tries in the Topica to define and reduce to system. The dialectician
must employ Syllogism; and we are first taught to distinguish the
Syllogism that he employs from others. The Dialectic syllogism is
discriminated on one side from the Demonstrative, on the other from
the Eristic (or litigious); also from the scientific Paralogism or
Pseudographeme. This discrimination is founded on the nature of the
evidence belonging to the premisses. The Demonstrative syllogism
(which we have already gone through in the Analytica Posteriora) has
premisses noway dependent upon opinion: it deduces conclusions from
true first principles, obtained by Induction in each science, and
different in each different science. The Dialectic syllogism does not
aspire to any such evidence, but borrows its premisses from Opinion
of some sort; accredited either by numbers, or by wise individuals,
or by some other authoritative holding. As this evidence is very
inferior to that of the demonstrative syllogism, so again it is
superior to that of the third variety--the Eristic syllogism. In this
third variety,[8] the premisses do not rest upon any real opinion,
but only on a fallacious appearance or simulation of opinion;
insomuch that they are at once detected as false, by any person even
of moderate understanding; whereas (according to Aristotle) no real
opinion ever carries with it such a merely superficial semblance, or
is ever so obviously and palpably false. A syllogism is called
Eristic also when it is faulty in form, though its premisses may be
borrowed from real opinion, or when it is both faulty in form and
false in the matter of the premisses. Still a fourth variety of
syllogism is the scientific Paralogism: where the premisses are not
borrowed from any opinion, real or simulated, but belong properly to
the particular science in which they are employed, yet nevertheless
are false or erroneous.[9]

[Footnote 8: Topic. I. p. 100, b. 23: [Greek: e)ristiko\s d' e)/sti
sullogismo\s o( e)k phainome/nôn e)ndo/xôn, mê\ o)/ntôn de/, kai\ o(
e)x e)ndo/xôn ê)\ phainome/nôn e)ndo/xôn phaino/menos. ou) ga\r pa=n
to\ phaino/menon e)/ndoxon kai\ e)/stin e)/ndoxon. ou)the\n ga\r tô=n
legome/nôn e)ndo/xôn e)pipo/laion e)/chei pantelô=s tê\n phantasi/an,
katha/per peri\ ta\s tô=n e)ristikô=n lo/gôn a)rcha\s sumbe/bêken
e)/chein; parachrê=ma ga\r kai\ ô(s e)pi\ to\ polu\ toi=s kai\ mikra\
sunora=n duname/nois kata/dêlos e)n au)toi=s ê( tou= pseu/dous e)sti\
phu/sis.]]

[Footnote 9: Ibid. i. p. 101, a. 5-17.]

Upon the classification of syllogisms here set forth by Aristotle, we
may remark that the distinction between the Demonstrative and the
Dialectic is true and important; but that between the Dialectic and
the Eristic is faint and unimportant; the class called Eristic
syllogisms being apparently introduced merely to create a difference,
real or supposed, between the Dialectician and the Sophist, and thus
to serve as a prelude to the last book of this treatise, entitled
Sophistici Elenchi. The class-title Eristic (or litigious) is founded
upon a supposition of dishonest intentions on the part of the
disputant; but it is unphilosophical to make this the foundation of a
class, and to rank the same syllogism in the class, or out of it,
according as the intentions of the disputant who employs it are
honest or dishonest. Besides, a portion of Aristotle's definition
tells us that the Eristic syllogism is one of which the premisses can
impose upon no one; being such that a very ordinary man can at once
detect their falsity. The dishonest disputant, surely, would argue to
little purpose, if he intentionally employed such premisses as these.
Lastly, according to another portion of Aristotle's definition, every
syllogism faulty in form, or yielding no legitimate conclusion at
all, will fall under the class Eristic, and this he himself in
another place explicitly states;[10] which would imply that the bad
syllogism must always emanate from litigious or dishonest intentions.
But in defining the Pseudographeme, immediately afterwards, Aristotle
does not imply that the false scientific premiss affords presumption
of litigious disposition on the part of those who advance it; nor
does there seem any greater propriety in throwing all bad dialectic
syllogisms under the general head of Eristic.

[Footnote 10: Topic. VIII. xii. p. 162, b. 4.]

The dialectician, then, will carry on debate only by means of
premisses sustained by real opinion; which not only always carry some
authority, but are assumed as being never obviously fallacious;
though often inconsistent with each other, and admitting of
argumentation _pro_ and _con_. These are what Aristotle calls
_Endoxa_; opposed to _Adoxa_, or propositions which are
discountenanced, or at least not countenanced, by opinion, and to
_Paradoxa_ (a peculiar variety of _Adoxa_),[11] or propositions
which, though having ingenious arguments in their favour, yet are
adverse to some proclaimed and wide-spread opinions, and thus have
the predominant authority of opinion against them.

[Footnote 11: Ibid. I. xi. p. 104, b. 24: [Greek: peri\ ô(=n lo/gon
e)/chomen e)nanti/on tai=s do/xais.]]

Of these three words, _Paradox_ is the only one that has obtained a
footing in modern languages, thanks to Cicero and the Latin authors.
If the word _Endox_ had obtained the like footing, we should be able
to keep more closely to the thought and views of Aristotle. As it is,
we are obliged to translate the Greek _Endoxon_ as Probable, and
_Adoxon_ as Improbable:[12] which, though not incorrect, is neither
suitable nor exactly coincident. Probable corresponds more nearly to
what Aristotle (both in this treatise and in the Analytica) announces
sometimes as [Greek: to\ ô(s e)pi\ to\ polu/]--that which happens in
most cases but not in all, as distinguished from the universal and
necessary on one side, and from the purely casual on the other;[13]
sometimes, also, as [Greek: to\ ei)ko/s] or [Greek: to\ sêmei=on].
Now this is a different idea from (though it has a point of analogy
with) the _Endoxon_: which is not necessarily true even in part, but
may be wholly untrue; which always has some considerations against
it, though there may be more in its favour; and which, lastly, may be
different, or even opposite, in different ages and different states
of society. When Josephus distinguished himself as a disputant in the
schools of Jerusalem on points of law and custom,[14] his arguments
must have been chiefly borrowed from the _Endoxa_ or prevalent
opinions of the time and place; but these must have differed widely
from the _Endoxa_ found and argued upon by the contemporaries of
Aristotle at Athens. The _Endoxon_ may indeed be rightly called
probable, because, whenever a proposition is fortified by a certain
body of opinion, Aristotle admits a certain presumption (greater or
less) that it is true. But such probability is not essential to the
_Endoxon_: it is only an accident or accompaniment (to use the
Aristotelian phrase), and by no means an universal accompaniment. The
essential feature of the _Endoxon_ is, that it has acquired a certain
amount of recognition among the mass of opinions and beliefs floating
and carrying authority at the actual time and place. The English word
whereby it is translated ought to express this idea, and nothing
more; just as the correlative word Paradox does express its
implication, approached from the other side. Unfortunately, in the
absence of Endox, we have no good word for the purpose.

[Footnote 12: Aristotle gives a double meaning of [Greek: a)/doxon]
(Topic. VIII. ix. ix. 160, b. 17):-- 1. That which involves absurd or
strange consequences ([Greek: a)/topa]). 2. That which affords
presumption of a bad disposition, such as others will
disapprove--[Greek: oi(=on o(/ti ê(donê\ ta)gatho\n kai\ to\
a)dikei=n be/ltion tou= a)dikei=sthai].]

[Footnote 13: Topic. II. vi. p. 112, b. 1: [Greek: e)pei\ de\ tô=n
pragma/tôn ta\ me\n e)x a)na/gkês e)sti/, ta\ d' ô(s e)pi\ to\ polu/,
ta\ d' o(po/ter' e)/tuchen], &c. Compare also Analyt. Post. I. xxx.,
et alib.]

[Footnote 14: See Josephus, De Vitâ Suâ, c. ii.]

It is within this wide field of floating opinions that dialectical
debate and rhetorical pleading are carried on. Dialectic supposes a
questioner or assailant, and a respondent or defendant. The
respondent selects and proclaims a problem or thesis, which he
undertakes to maintain: the assailant puts to him successive
questions, with the view of obtaining concessions which may serve as
premisses for a counter-syllogism, of which the conclusion is
contradictory or contrary to the thesis itself, or to some other
antecedent premiss which the respondent has already conceded. It is
the business of the respondent to avoid making any answers which may
serve as premisses for such a counter-syllogism. If he succeeds in
this, so as not to become implicated in any contradiction with
himself, he has baffled his assailant, and gained the victory. There
are, however, certain rules and conditions, binding on both parties,
under which the debate must be carried on. It is the purpose of the
Topica to indicate these rules; and, in accordance therewith, to
advise both parties as to the effective conduct of their respective
cases--as to the best thrusts and the best mode of parrying. The
assailant is supplied with a classified catalogue of materials for
questions, and with indications of the weak points which he is to
look out for in any new subject which may turn up for debate. He is
farther instructed how to shape, marshal, and disguise his questions,
in such a way that the respondent may least be able to foresee their
ultimate bearing. The respondent, on his side, is told what he ought
to look forward to and guard against. Such is the scope of the
present treatise; the entire process being considered in the large
and comprehensive spirit customary with Aristotle, and distributed
according to the Aristotelian terminology and classification.

It is plain that neither the direct purpose of the debaters, nor the
usual result of the debate, is to prove truth or to disprove
falsehood. Such may indeed be the result occasionally; but the only
certain result is, that an inconsistency is exposed in the
respondent's manner of defending his thesis, or that the assailant
fails in his purpose of showing up such inconsistency. Whichever way
the debate may turn, no certain inference can be drawn as to the
thesis itself: not merely as to whether it is true or false, but even
as to whether it consists or does not consist with other branches of
received opinions. Such being the case, what is the use or value of
dialectic debate, or of a methodized procedure for conducting it?
Aristotle answers this question, telling us that it is useful for
three purposes.[15] First, the debate is a valuable and stimulating
mental exercise; and, if a methodized procedure be laid down, both
parties will be able to conduct it more easily as well as more
efficaciously. Secondly, it is useful for our intercourse with the
multitude;[16] for the procedure directs us to note and remember the
opinions of the multitude, and such knowledge will facilitate our
intercourse with them: we shall converse with them out of their own
opinions, which we may thus be able beneficially to modify. Thirdly,
dialectic debate has an useful though indirect bearing even upon the
processes of science and philosophy, and upon the truths thereby
acquired.[17] For it accustoms us to study the difficulties on both
sides of every question, and thus assists us in detecting and
discriminating truth and falsehood. Moreover, apart from this mode of
usefulness, it opens a new road to the scrutiny of the first
_principia_ of each separate science. These _principia_ can never be
scrutinized through the truths of the science itself, which
presuppose them and are deduced from them. To investigate and verify
them, is the appropriate task of First Philosophy. But Dialectic
also, carrying investigation as it does everywhere, and familiarized
with the received opinions on both sides of every subject, suggests
many points of importance in regard to these _principia_.

[Footnote 15: Topic. I. ii. p. 101, a. 26: [Greek: e)/sti dê\ pro\s
tri/a, pro\s gumnasi/an, pro\s ta\s e)nteu/xeis, pro\s ta\s kata\
philosophi/an e)pistê/mas.]]

[Footnote 16: Ibid. a. 30: [Greek: pro\s de\ ta\s e)nteu/xeis, dio/ti
ta\s tô=n pollô=n katêrithmême/noi do/xas ou)k e)k tô=n a)llotri/ôn
a)ll' e)k tô=n oi)kei/ôn dogma/tôn o(milê/somen pro\s au)tou/s,
metabiba/zontes o(/ ti a)\n mê\ kalô=s phai/nôntai le/gein ê(mi=n.]]

[Footnote 17: Ibid. a. 34: [Greek: pro\s de\ ta\s kata\ philosophi/an
e)pistê/mas], &c.]

The three heads just enumerated illustrate the discriminating care of
Aristotle. The point of the first head is brought out often in the
Platonic Dialogues of Search: the stimulus brought to bear in
awakening dormant intellectual power, and in dissipating that false
persuasion of knowledge which is the general infirmity of mankind, is
frequently declared by Plato to be the most difficult, but the
indispensable, operation of the teacher upon his pupil. Under the
third head, Aristotle puts this point more justly than Plato, not as
a portion of teaching, nor as superseding direct teaching, but as a
preliminary thereunto; and it is a habit of his own to prefix this
antecedent survey of doubts and difficulties on both sides, as a
means of sharpening our insight into the dogmatic exposition which
immediately follows.

Under the second head, we find exhibited another characteristic
feature of Aristotle's mind--the value which he sets upon a copious
acquaintance with received opinions, whether correct or erroneous.
The philosophers of his day no longer talked publicly in the
market-place and with every one indiscriminately, as Sokrates had
done: scientific study, and the habit of written compositions
naturally conducted them into a life apart, among select companions.
Aristotle here indicates that such estrangement from the multitude
lessened their means of acting beneficially on the multitude, and in
the way of counteraction he prescribes dialectical exercise. His own
large and many-sided observation, extending to the most vulgar
phenomena, is visible throughout his works, and we know that he drew
up a collection of current proverbs.[18]

[Footnote 18: Diog. Laert. v. 26. Kephisodorus, the disciple of
Isokrates, in defending his master, depreciated this Aristotelian
collection; see in Athenæus II. lvi., comparing Schweighäuser's
Animadversiones I. p. 406.]

Again, what we read under the third head shows that, while Aristotle
everywhere declares Demonstration and teaching to be a process apart
from Dialectic, he at the same time recognizes the legitimate
function of the latter, for testing and verifying the _principia_ of
Demonstration:[19] which _principia_ cannot be reached by
Demonstration itself, since every demonstration presupposes them. He
does not mean that these _principia_ can be proved by Dialectic, for
Dialectic does not prove any thing; but it is necessary as a test or
scrutinizing process to assure us that all the objections capable of
being offered against them can be met by sufficient replies. In
respect of universal competence and applicability, Dialectic is the
counterpart, or rather the tentative companion and adjunct, of what
Aristotle calls First Philosophy or Ontology; to which last he
assigns the cognizance of _principia_, as we shall see when we treat
of the Metaphysica.[20] Dialectic (he repeats more than once) is not
a definite science or body of doctrine, but, like rhetoric or
medicine, a practical art or ability of dealing with the ever varying
situations of the dialogue; of imagining and enunciating the question
proper for attack, or the answer proper for defence, as the case may
be. As in the other arts, its resources are not unlimited. Nor can
the dialectician, any more than the rhetor or the physician, always
guarantee success. Each of them has an end to be accomplished; and if
he employs for its accomplishment the best means that the situation
permits, he must be considered a master of his own art and
procedure.[21] To detect truth, and to detect what is like truth,
belong (in Aristotle's judgment) to the same mental capacity. Mankind
have a natural tendency towards truth, and the common opinions
therefore are, in most cases, coincident with truth. Accordingly, the
man who divines well in regard to verisimilitude, will usually divine
well in regard to truth.[22]

[Footnote 19: Topic. I. ii. p. 101, b. 3: [Greek: e)xetastikê\ ga\r
ou)=sa pro\s ta\s a(pasô=n tô=n metho/dôn a)rcha\s o(do\n e)/chei.]]

[Footnote 20: Metaphys. [Greek: G]. iii. p. 1005, a. 20-b. 10;
[Greek: G]. ii. p. 1004, b. 15-30.]

[Footnote 21: Topic. I. iii. p. 101, b. 5: [Greek: e(/xomen de\
tele/ôs tê\n me/thodon, o(/tan o(moi/ôs e)/chômen ô(/sper e)pi\
r(êtorikê=s kai\ i)atrikê=s kai\ tô=n toiou/tôn duna/meôn. tou=to d'
e)sti\ to\ e)k tô=n e)ndechome/nôn poiei=n a(\ proairou/metha. ou)/te
ga\r o( r(êtoriko\s e)k panto\s tro/pou pei/sei, ou)/th' o(
i)atriko\s u(gia/sei; a)ll' e)a\n tô=n e)ndechome/nôn mêde\n
parali/pê|, i(kanô=s au)to\n e)/chein tê\n e)pistê/mên phê/somen.]

The word [Greek: e)pistê/mên] in the last line is used loosely, since
Aristotle, in the Rhetorica (p. 1369, b. 12), explicitly states that
Rhetoric and Dialectic are not to be treated as [Greek: e)pistê/mas]
but as mere [Greek: duna/meis].]

[Footnote 22: Rhetoric. I. i. p. 1355, a. 17.]

The subject-matter of dialectic debate, speaking generally, consists
of Propositions and Problems, to be propounded as questions by the
assailant and to be admitted or disallowed by the defendant. They
will relate either to _Expetenda_ and _Fugienda_, or they must bear,
at least indirectly, upon some point of scientific truth or observed
cognition.[23] They will be either ethical, physical, or logical;
class-terms which Aristotle declines to define, contenting himself
with giving an example to illustrate each of them, while adding that
the student should collect other similar examples, and gradually
familiarize himself with the full meaning of the general term,
through such inductive comparison of particulars.[24]

[Footnote 23: Topic. I, xi. p. 104, b. 2.]

[Footnote 24: Topic. I. xiv. p. 105, b. 20-29: [Greek: ai( me\n ga\r
ê)thikai\ prota/seis ei)si/n, ai( de\ phusikai/, ai( de\
logikai/.--poi=ai d' e(/kastai tô=n proeirême/nôn, o(rismô=| me\n
ou)k eu)pete\s a)podou=nai peri\ au)tô=n, tê=| de\ _dia\ tê=s
e)pagôgê=s sunêthei/a|_ peirate/on gnôri/zein e(ka/stên au)tô=n,
kata\ ta\ proeirême/na paradei/gmata e)piskopou=nta.]

This illustrates Aristotle's view of the process of Induction and its
results; the acquisition of the import of a general term, through
comparison of numerous particulars comprehended under it.

The term _logical_ does not exactly correspond with Aristotle's
[Greek: logikai/], but on the present occasion no better term
presents itself.]

But it is not every problem coming under one of these three heads
that is fit for dialectic debate. If a man propounds as subject for
debate, Whether we ought to honour the gods or to love our parents,
he deserves punishment instead of refutation: if he selects the
question, Whether snow is white or not, he must be supposed deficient
in perceptive power.[25] What all persons unanimously believe, is
unsuitable:[26] what no one believes is also unsuitable, since it
will not be conceded by any respondent. The problem must have some
doubts and difficulties, in order to afford scope for discussion; yet
it must not be one of which the premisses are far-fetched or
recondite, for that goes beyond the limits of dialectic exercise.[27]
It ought to be one on which opinions are known to be held, both in
the affirmative and in the negative; on which either the multitude
differ among themselves, the majority being on one side, while yet
there is an adverse minority; or some independent authority stands
opposed to the multitude, such as a philosopher of eminence, a
professional man or artist speaking on his own particular craft, a
geometer or a physician on the specialities of his department.
Matters such as these are the appropriate subjects for dialectic
debate; and new matters akin to them by way of analogy may be
imagined and will be perfectly admissible.[28] Even an ingenious
paradox or thesis adverse to prevailing opinions may serve the
purpose, as likely to obtain countenance from some authority, though
as yet we know of none.[29]

[Footnote 25: Ibid. xi. p. 105, a. 67: [Greek:
kola/seôs--ai)sthê/seôs, de/ontai]. Yet he considers the question,
Whether we ought rather to obey the laws of the state or the commands
of our parents, in case of discrepancy between the two,--as quite fit
for debate (xiv. p. 105, b. 22).]

[Footnote 26: Ibid. x. p. 104, a. 5.]

[Footnote 27: Ibid. xi. p. 105, a. 7: [Greek: ou)de\ dê\ ô(=n
su/neggus ê( a)po/deixis, ou)/d' ô(=n li/an po/r)r(ô; ta\ me\n ga\r
ou)k e)/chei a)pori/an, ta\ de\ **plei/on ê)\ kata\
gumnastikê/n.] The loose use of the word [Greek: a)po/deixis]
deserves note here: it is the technical term of the Analyt. Post.,
denoting that application of the syllogism which contrasts with
Dialectic altogether.

Aristotle here means only that problems falling within these limits
are the best for dialectic discussion; but, in his suggestions later
on, he includes problems for discussion involving the utmost
generalities of philosophy. For example, he often adverts to
dialectic debate on the Platonic Ideas or Forms (Topic. II. vii. p.
113, a. 25; V. vii. p. 137, b. 7; VI. vi. p. 143, b. 24. Compare also
I. xi. p. 104, b. 14.)]

[Footnote 28: Topic. I. x. p. 104, a. 11-37.]

[Footnote 29: Ibid. xi. p. 104, b. 24-28: [Greek: ê)\ peri\ ô(=n
lo/gon e)/chomen e)nanti/on tai=s do/xais--tou=to ga/r, ei) kai/ tini
mê\ dokei=, do/xeien a)\n dia\ to\ lo/gon e)/chein.]]

These conditions apply both to problems propounded for debate, and to
premisses tendered on either side during the discussion. Both the
interrogator and the respondent--the former having to put appropriate
questions, and the latter to make appropriate answers--must know and
keep in mind these varieties of existing opinion among the multitude
as well as among the special dissident authorities above indicated.
The dialectician ought to collect and catalogue such _Endoxa_, with
the opinions analogous to them, out of written treatises and
elsewhere;[30] distributing them under convenient heads, such as
those relating to good and evil generally, and to each special class
of good, &c. Aristotle, however, admonishes him that he is debating
problems not scientifically, but dialectically: having reference not
to truth, but to opinion.[31] If the interrogator were proceeding
scientifically and didactically, he would make use of all true and
ascertained propositions, whether the respondent conceded them or
not, as premisses for his syllogism. But in Dialectic he is dependent
on the concession of the respondent, and can construct his syllogisms
only from premisses that have been conceded to him.[32] Hence he must
keep as closely as he can to opinions carrying extrinsic authority,
as being those which the respondent will hesitate to disallow.[33]

[Footnote 30: Topic. I. xiv. p. 105, b. 1-18. [Greek: e)kle/gein de\
chrê\ kai\ e)k tô=n gegramme/nôn lo/gôn.]]

[Footnote 31: Ibid. b. 30: [Greek: pro\s me\n ou)=n philosophi/an
kat' a)lê/theian peri\ au)tô=n pragmateute/on, dialektikô=s de\ pro\s
do/xan.]]

[Footnote 32: Ibid. VIII. i. p. 155, b. 10: [Greek: pro\s e(/teron
ga\r pa=n to\ toiou=ton, tô=| de\ philoso/phô| kai\ zêtou=nti kath'
e(auto\n ou)de\n me/lei, e)a\n a)lêthê= me\n ê)=| kai\ gnô/rima di'
ô(=n o( sullogismo/s, mê\ thê=| d' au)ta\ o( a)pokrino/menos], &c.]

[Footnote 33: Ibid. i. p. 156, b. 20: [Greek: chrê/simon de\ kai\ to\
e)pile/gein o(/ti su/nêthes kai\ lego/menon to\ toiou=ton; _o)knou=si
ga\r kinei=n to\ ei)ôtho/s_, e)/nstasin mê\ e)/chontes.]]

Moreover, the form of the interrogation admissible in dialectic
debate is peculiar. The respondent is not bound to furnish any
information in his answer: he is bound only to admit, or to deny, a
proposition tendered to him. You must not ask him, What is the genus
of man? You must yourself declare the genus, and ask whether he
admits it, in one or other of the two following forms--(1) Is animal
the genus of man? (2) Is animal the genus of man, or not? to which
the response is an admission or a denial.[34]

[Footnote 34: Ibid. I. iv. p. 101, b. 30. The first of these two
forms Aristotle calls a [Greek: pro/tasis], the second he calls a
[Greek: pro/blêma]. But this distinction between these two words is
not steadily adhered to: it is differently declared in Topic. I. x.,
xi. p. 104, as Alexander has remarked in the Scholia, p. 258, b. 4,
Brand. Compare also De Interpretat. p. 20, b. 26; and Topic. VIII.
ii. p. 158, a. 14: [Greek: ou) dokei= de\ pa=n to\ katho/lou
dialektikê\ pro/tasis ei)=nai, oi(=on ti/ e)stin a)/nthrôpos, ê)\
posachô=s le/getai ta)gatho/n? e)/sti ga\r pro/tasis dialektikê\
pro\s ê(\n e)/stin a)pokri/nasthai nai\ ê)\ ou)/; pro\s de\ ta\s
ei)rême/nas ou)k e)/stin. dio\ ou) dialektika/ e)sti ta\ toiau=ta
tô=n e)rôtêma/tôn, a)\n mê\ au)to\s diori/sas ê)\ dielo/menos
ei)/pê|.]]

Dialectic procedure, both of the assailant and of the defendant, has
to do with propositions and problems; accordingly, Aristotle
introduces a general distribution of propositions under four heads.
The predicate must either be Genus, or Proprium, or Accident, of its
subject. But the Proprium divides itself again into two. It always
reciprocates with, or is co-extensive with, its subject; but
sometimes it declares the essence of the subject, sometimes it does
not. When it declares the essence of the subject, Aristotle calls it
the Definition; when it does not declare the essence of the subject,
although reciprocating therewith, he reserves for it the title of
Proprium. Every proposition, and every problem, the entire material
of Dialectic, will declare one of these four--Proprium, Definition,
Genus, or Accident.[35] The Differentia, as being attached to the
Genus, is ranked along with the Genus.[36]

[Footnote 35: Topic. I. iv. p. 101, b. 17-36.]

[Footnote 36: Ibid. b. 18: [Greek: tê\n diaphora\n ô(s ou)=san
genikê\n o(mou= tô=| ge/nei takte/on.]]

The above four general heads include all the Predicables, which were
distributed by subsequent logicians (from whom Porphyry borrowed)
into five heads instead of four--Genus, Species, Differentia,
Proprium, Accident; the Differentia being ranked as a separate item
in the quintuple distribution, and the Species substituted in place
of the Definition. It is under this quadruple classification that
Aristotle intends to consider propositions and problems as matters
for dialectic procedure: he will give argumentative suggestions
applicable to each of the four successively. It might be practicable
(he thinks) to range all the four under the single head of
Definition; since arguments impugning Genus, Proprium, and Accident,
are all of them good also against Definition. But such a
simplification would be perplexing and unmanageable in regard to
dialectic procedure.[37]

[Footnote 37: Topic. I. vi. p. 102, b. 27-38. [Greek: a)ll' ou) dia\
tou=to mi/an e)pi\ pa/ntôn katho/lou me/thodon zêtête/on; ou)/te ga\r
r(a/|dion eu(rei=n tou=t' e)sti/n, ei)/ th' eu(rethei/ê, pantelô=s
a)saphê\s kai\ du/schrêstos a)\n ei)/ê pro\s tê\n prokeime/nên
pragmatei/an.]]

That the quadruple classification is exhaustive, and that every
proposition or problem falls under one or other of the four heads,
may be shown in two ways. First, by Induction: survey and analyse as
many propositions as you will, all without exception will be found to
belong to one of the four.[38] Secondly, by the following Deductive
proof:--In every proposition the predicate is either co-extensive and
reciprocating with the subject, or it is not. If it does reciprocate,
it either declares the essence of the subject, or it does not: if the
former, it is the Definition; if the latter, it is a Proprium. But,
supposing the predicate not to reciprocate with the subject, it will
either declare something contained in the Definition, or it will not.
If it does contain a part of the Definition, that part must be either
a Genus or a Differentia, since these are the constituents of the
Definition. If it does not contain any such part, it must be an
Accident.[39] Hence it appears that every proposition must belong to
one or other of the four, and that the classification is exhaustive.

[Footnote 38: Ibid. viii. p. 103, b. 3: [Greek: mi/a me\n pi/stis ê(
dia\ tê=s e)pagôgê=s; ei) ga/r tis e)piskopoi/ê e(ka/stên tô=n
prota/seôn kai\ tô=n problêma/tôn, phai/noit' a)\n ê)\ a)po\ tou=
o(/rou ê)\] &c.]

[Footnote 39: Topic. I. **viii. p. 103, b. 6-19:
[Greek: a)/llê de\ pi/stis ê( dia\ sullogismou=].

It will be observed that Aristotle here resolves Definition into
Genus and Differentiæ--[Greek: e)peidê\ o( o(rismo\s e)k ge/nous kai\
diaphorô=n e)sti/n]. Moreover, though he does not recognize Species
as a separate head, yet in his definition of Genus he implies Species
as known--[Greek: ge/nos e)sti\ to\ kata\ pleio/nôn kai\
_diaphero/ntôn tô=| ei)/dei_ e)n tô=| ti/ e)sti katêgorou/menon] (p.
102, a. 31).

It thus appears that the quintuple classification is the real and
logical one; but the quadruple may perhaps be more suitable for the
Topica, with a view to dialectic procedure, since debates turn upon
the attack and defence of a Definition.]

Moreover, each of the four Predicables must fall under one or other
of the ten Categories or Predicaments. If the predicate be either of
Genus or Definition, declaring the essence of the subject, it may
fall under any one of the ten Categories; if of Proprium or Accident,
not declaring essence, it cannot belong to the first Category
([Greek: Ou)si/a]), but must fall under one of the remaining
nine.[40]

[Footnote 40: Ibid. ix. p. 103, b. 20-39.]

The notion of Sameness or Identity occurs so often in dialectic
debate, that Aristotle discriminates its three distinct senses or
grades: (1) _Numero_; (2) _Specie_; (3) _Genere_. Water from the same
spring is only _idem specie_, though the resemblance between two cups
of water from the same spring is far greater than that between water
from different sources. Even _Idem Numero_ has different
significations: sometimes there are complete synonyms; sometimes an
individual is called by its proprium, sometimes by its peculiar
temporary accident.[41]

[Footnote 41: Ibid. vii. p. 103, a. 6-39.]

Having thus classified dialectic propositions, Aristotle proceeds to
the combination of propositions, or dialectic discourse and argument.
This is of two sorts, either Induction or Syllogism; of both which we
have already heard in the Analytica. Induction is declared to be
plainer, more persuasive, nearer to sensible experience, and more
suitable to the many, than Syllogism; while this latter carries
greater compulsion and is more irresistible against professed
disputants.[42] A particular example is given to illustrate what
Induction is. But we remark that though it is always mentioned as an
argumentative procedure important and indispensable, yet neither here
nor elsewhere does Aristotle go into any discriminative analysis of
the conditions under which it is valid, as he does about Syllogism in
the Analytica Priora.

[Footnote 42: Ibid. xii. p. 105, a. 10-19: [Greek: po/sa tô=n lo/gôn
ei)/dê tô=n dialektikô=n], &c.]

What helps are available to give to the dialectician a ready and
abundant command of syllogisms? Four distinct helps may be named:[43]
(1) He must make a large collection of Propositions; (2) He must
study and discriminate the different senses in which the Terms of
these propositions are used; (3) He must detect and note Differences;
(4) He must investigate Resemblances.

[Footnote 43: Topic. I. xiii. p. 105, a. 21: [Greek: ta\ d' o)/rgana,
di' ô(=n eu)porê/somen tô=n sullogismô=n, e)sti\ te/ttara, e(/n me\n
to\ prota/seis labei=n, deu/teron de\ posachô=s e(/kaston le/getai
du/nasthai dielei=n, tri/ton ta\s diaphora\s eu(rei=n, te/tarton de\
ê( tou= o(moi/ou ske/psis.]

The term [Greek: o)/rgana], properly signifying _instruments_,
appears here by a strained metaphor. It means simply _helps_ or
_aids_, as may be seen by comparing Top. VIII. xiv. p. 163, b. 9.
Waitz says truly (Prolegg. ad Analyt. Post. p. 294): "unde fit, ut
[Greek: o)/rgana] dicat quæcunque ad aliquam rem faciendam adiumentum
afferant."]

1. About collecting Propositions, Aristotle has already indicated
that those wanted are such as declare _Endoxa_, and other modes of
thought cognate or **analogous to the _Endoxa_:[44] opinions
of the many, and opinions of any small sections or individuals
carrying authority. All such are to be collected (out of written
treatises as well as from personal enquiry); nor are individual
philosophers (like Empedokles) to be omitted, since a proposition is
likely enough to be conceded when put upon the authority of an
illustrious name.[45] If any proposition is currently admitted as
true in general or in most cases, it must be tendered with confidence
to the respondent as an universal principle; for he will probably
grant it, not being at first aware of the exceptions.[46] All
propositions must be registered in the most general terms possible,
and must then be resolved into their subordinate constituent
particulars, as far as the process of subdivision can be carried.[47]

[Footnote 44: Topic. I. xiv. p. 105, b. 4: [Greek: e)kle/gein mê\
mo/non ta\s ou)/sas e)ndo/xous, a)lla\ kai\ ta\s o(moi/as tau/tais.]]

[Footnote 45: Ibid. b. 17: [Greek: thei/ê ga\r a)/n tis to\ u(po/
tinos ei)rême/non e)ndo/xou].]

[Footnote 46: Ibid. b. 10: [Greek: o(/sa e)pi\ pa/ntôn ê)\ tô=n
plei/stôn phai/netai, lêpte/on ô(s a)rchê\n kai\ dokou=san the/sin;
tithe/asi ga\r oi( mê\ sunorô=ntes e)pi\ ti/nos ou)ch ou(/tôs.]]

[Footnote 47: Ibid. b. 31-37: [Greek: lêpte/on d' o(/ti ma/lista
katho/lou pa/sas ta\s prota/seis, kai\ tê\n mi/an polla\s
poiête/on--diairete/on, e(/ôs a)\n e)nde/chêtai diairei=n], &c.]

2. The propositions having been got together, they must be examined
in order to find out Equivocation or double meaning of terms. There
are various ways of going about this task. Sometimes the same
predicate is applied to two different subjects, but in different
senses; thus, courage and justice are both of them good, but in a
different way. Sometimes the same predicate is applied to two
different classes of subjects, each admitting of being defined; thus,
health is good in itself, and exercise is good as being among those
things that promote health.[48] Sometimes the equivocal meaning of a
term is perceived by considering its contrary; if we find that it has
two or more distinct contraries, we know at once that it has
different meanings. Sometimes, though there are not two distinct
contraries, yet the mere conjunction of the same adjective with two
substantives shows us at once that it cannot mean the same in
both[49] ([Greek: leukê\ phônê/--leuko\n chrô=ma]). In one sense, the
term may have an assignable contrary, while in another sense it may
have no contrary; showing that the two senses are distinct: for
example, the pleasure of drinking has for its contrary the pain of
thirst; but the pleasure of scientifically contemplating that the
diagonal of a square is incommensurable with the side, has no
contrary; hence, we see that pleasure is an equivocal term.[50] In
one sense, there may be a term intermediate between the two
contraries; in another sense, there may be none; or there may be two
distinct intermediate terms for the two distinct senses; or there may
be several intermediate terms in one of the senses, and only one or
none in the other: in each of these ways the equivocation is
revealed.[51] We must look also to the contradictory opposite (of a
term), which may perhaps have an obvious equivocation of meaning;
thus, [Greek: mê\ ble/pein] means sometimes to be blind, sometimes
not to be seeing actually, whence we discover that [Greek: ble/pein]
also has the same equivocation.[52] If a positive term is equivocal,
we know that the privative term correlating with it must also be
equivocal; thus, [Greek: to\ ai)stha/nesthai] has a double sense,
according as we speak with reference to mind or body; and this will
be alike true of the correlating privative--[Greek: to\ a)nai/sthêton
ei)=nai].[53] Farther, an equivocal term will have its derivatives
equivocal in the same manner; and conversely, if the derivative be
equivocal, the radical will be so likewise.[54] The term must also be
looked at in reference to the ten Categories: if its meanings fall
under more than one Category, we know that it is equivocal.[55] If it
comprehends two subjects which are not in the same genus, or in
genera not subordinate one to the other, this too will show that it
is equivocal.[56] The contrary, also, of the term must be looked at
with a view to the same inference.[57]

[Footnote 48: Topic. I. xv. p. 106, a. 1-8: [Greek: to\ de\
posachô=s, pragmateute/on mê\ mo/non o(/sa le/getai kath' e(/teron
tro/pon, a)lla\ kai\ tou\s lo/gous au)tôn peirate/on a)podido/nai.]]

[Footnote 49: Ibid. a. 9-35.]

[Footnote 50: Ibid. a. 36.]

[Footnote 51: Ibid. b. 4.]

[Footnote 52: Ibid. b. 13-20.]

[Footnote 53: Ibid. b. 21-28.]

[Footnote 54: Ibid. b. 28.]

[Footnote 55: Ibid. p. 107, a. 3-17.]

[Footnote 56: Ibid. a. 18.]

[Footnote 57: Ibid. a. 32-35.]

Again, it will be useful to bring together the same term in two
different conjunctions, and to compare the definitions of the two.
Define both of them, and then deduct what is peculiar to each
_definitum_: if the remainder be different, the term will be
equivocal; if the remainder be the same, the term will be univocal.
Thus, [Greek: leuko\n sô=ma] will be defined, a body having such and
such a colour: [Greek: leukê\ phônê/], a voice easily and distinctly
heard: deduct [Greek: sô=ma] from the first definition, and [Greek:
phônê\] from the second, the remainder will be totally disparate;
therefore, the term [Greek: leuko/n] is equivocal.[58] Sometimes,
also, the ambiguity may be found in definitions themselves, where the
same term is used to explain subjects that are not the same; whether
such use is admissible, has to be considered.[59] If the term be
univocal, two conjunctions of it may always be compared as to greater
or less, or in respect of likeness; whenever this cannot be, the term
is equivocal.[60] If, again, the term is used as a differentia for
two genera quite distinct and independent of each other, it must be
equivocal; for genera that are unconnected and not subordinate one to
the other, have their differentiæ also disparate.[61] And,
conversely, if the term be such that the differentiæ applied to it
are disparate, we may know it to be an equivocal term. The like, if
the term be used as a species in some of its conjunctions, and as a
differentia in others.[62]

[Footnote 58: Topic. I. xv. p. 107, a. 36-b. 3.]

[Footnote 59: Ibid. b. 8.]

[Footnote 60: Ibid. b. 13-18: [Greek: e)/ti ei) mê\ sumblêta\ kata\
to\ ma=llon ê)\ o(moi/ôs,--to\ ga\r sunô/numon pa=n sumblêto/n.]]

[Footnote 61: Ibid. b. 19-26.]

[Footnote 62: Ibid. b. 27-37.]

3. Aristotle has thus indicated, at considerable length, the points
to be looked for when we are examining whether a term is univocal or
equivocal. He is more concise when he touches on the last two out of
the four helps ([Greek: o)/rgana]) enumerated for supplying
syllogisms when needed,--viz. the study of Differences and of
Resemblances. In regard to the study of Differences, standing third,
while he remarks that, where these are wide and numerous, they are
sure without any precept to excite our attention, he advises that we
should study the differences of subjects that are nearly
allied,--those within the same genus, or comprehended in genera not
much removed from one another, such as, the distinction between
sensible perception and science. But he goes into no detail.[63]

[Footnote 63: Ibid. xvi. p. 107, b. 39.]

4. In regard to the study of Resemblances, he inverts the above
precept, and directs us to note especially the points of resemblance
between subjects of great apparent difference.[64] We must examine
what is the quality common to all species of the same genus--man,
horse, dog, &c.; for it is in this that they are similar. We may also
compare different genera with each other, in respect to the analogies
that are to be found in each: _e.g._, as science is to the
cognizable, so is perception to the perceivable; as sight is in the
eye, so is intellection in the soul; as [Greek: galê/nê] is in the
sea, so is [Greek: nênemi/a] in the air.[65]

[Footnote 64: Ibid. xvii. p. 108, a. 12: [Greek: ma/lista d' e)n
toi=s polu\ diestô=si gumna/zesthai dei=; r(a=|on ga\r e)pi\ tô=n
loipô=n dunêso/metha ta\ o(/moia sunora=n.]]

[Footnote 65: Topic. I. xvii. p. 108, a. 7.]

Such are the four distinct helps, towards facility of syllogizing,
enumerated by Aristotle. It will be observed that the third and
fourth (study of Resemblances and Differences) bear more upon matters
of fact and less upon words; while the second ([Greek: to\
posachô=s]), though doubtless also bearing on matters of fact and
deriving from thence its main real worth, yet takes its departure
from terms and propositions, and proceeds by comparing multiplied
varieties of these in regard to diversity of meaning. Upon this
ground it is, apparently, that Aristotle has given so much fuller
development to the second head than to the third and fourth; for, in
the Topica, he is dealing with propositions and
counter-propositions--with opinions and counter-opinions, not with
science and truth.

He proceeds to indicate the different ways in which these three helps
(the second, third, and fourth) further the purpose of the
dialectician--respondent as well as assailant. Unless the different
meanings of the term be discriminated, the respondent cannot know
clearly what he admits or what he denies; he may be thinking of
something different from what the assailant intends, and the
syllogisms constructed may turn upon a term only, not upon any
reality.[66] The respondent will be able to protect himself better
against being driven into contradiction, if he can distinguish the
various meanings of the same term; for he will thus know whether the
syllogisms brought against him touch the real matter which he has
admitted.[67] On the other hand, the assailant will have much
facility in driving his opponent into contradiction, if he (the
assailant) can distinguish the different meanings of the term, while
the respondent cannot do so; in those cases at least where the
proposition is true in one sense of the term and false in
another.[68] This manner of proceeding, however, is hardly consistent
with genuine Dialectic. No dialectician ought ever to found his
interrogations and his arguments upon a mere unanalysed term, unless
he can find absolutely nothing else to say in the debate.[69]

[Footnote 66: Ibid. xviii. p. 108, a. 22.]

[Footnote 67: Ibid. a. 26: [Greek: chrê/simon de\ kai\ pro\s to\ mê\
paralogisthê=nai kai\ pro\s to\ paralogi/sasthai. ei)do/tes ga\r
posachô=s le/getai ou) mê\ paralogisthô=men, a)ll' ei)dê/somen e)a\n
mê\ pro\s to\ au)to\ to\n lo/gon poiê=tai o( e)rôtô=n.]]

[Footnote 68: Ibid. a. 29: [Greek: au)toi/ te e)rôtô=ntes
dunêso/metha paralogi/sasthai e)a\n mê\ tugcha/nê| ei)dô\s o(
a)pokrino/menos posachô=s le/getai; tou=to d' ou)k e)pi\ pa/ntôn
dunato/n, a)ll' o(/tan ê)=| tô=n pollachô=s legome/nôn ta\ me\n
a)lêthê=, ta\ de\ pseudê=.]]

[Footnote 69: Topic. I. xviii. p. 108, a. 34: [Greek: dio\ pantelô=s
eu)labête/on toi=s dialektikoi=s to\ toiou=nton, to\ pro\s tou)/noma
diale/gesthai, _e)a\n mê/ tis a)/llôs e)xadunatê=| peri\ tou=
prokeime/nou diale/gesthai_.]]

The third help (an acquaintance with Differences) will be of much
avail on all occasions where we have to syllogize upon Same and
Different, and where we wish to ascertain the essence or definition
of any thing; for we ascertain this by exclusion of what is foreign
thereunto, founded on the appropriate differences in each case.[70]

[Footnote 70: Ibid. b. 2.]

Lastly, the fourth help (the intelligent survey of Resemblances)
serves us in different ways:--(1) Towards the construction of
inductive arguments; (2) Towards syllogizing founded upon assumption;
(3) Towards the declaration of definitions. As to the inductive
argument, it is founded altogether on a repetition of similar
particulars, whereby the universal is obtained.[71] As to the
syllogizing from an assumption, the knowledge of resemblances is
valuable, because we are entitled to assume, as an _Endoxon_ or a
doctrine conformable to common opinion, that what happens in any one
of a string of similar cases will happen also in all the rest. We lay
down this as the major proposition of a syllogism; and thus, if we
can lay hold of any one similar case, we can draw inference from it
to the matter actually in debate.[72] Again, as to the declaration of
definitions, when we have once discovered what is the same in all
particular cases, we shall have ascertained to what genus the subject
before us belongs;[73] for that one of the common predicates which is
most of the essence, will be the genus. Even where the two matters
compared are more disparate than we can rank in the same genus, the
knowledge of resemblances will enable us to discover useful
analogies, and thus to obtain a definition at least approximative.
Thus, as the point is in a line, so is the unit in numbers; each of
them is a _principium_; this, therefore, is a common genus, which
will serve as a tolerable definition. Indeed this is the definition
of them commonly given by philosophers; who call the unit
_principium_ of number, and the point _principium_ of a line, thus
putting one and the other into a genus common to both.[74]

[Footnote 71: Ibid. b. 9.]

[Footnote 72: Ibid. b. 12: [Greek: pro\s de\ tou\s e)x u(pothe/seôs
sullogsismou/s, _dio/ti e)/ndoxo/n e)stin_, ô(/s pote e)ph' e(no\s
tô=n o(moi/ôn e)/chei, ou(/tôs kai\ e)i\ tô=n loipô=n; ô(/ste pro\s
o(/ ti a)\n au)tô=n eu)porô=men diale/gesthai,
_prodiomologêso/metha_, ô(/s pote e)pi\ tou/tôn e)/chei, ou(/tô kai\
e)pi\ tou= prokeime/nou e)/chein. dei/xantes de\ e)kei=no kai\
**to\ prokei/menon _e)x u(pothe/seôs dedeicho/tes e)so/metha;
u(pothe/menoi_ ga/r, ô(/s pote e)pi\ tou/tôn e)/chei,
ou(/tô kai\ e)pi\ tou= prokeime/nou e)/chein, tê\n a)po/deixin
pepoiê/metha.] For [Greek: to\ e)x u(pothe/seôs], compare Topic. III.
vi. p. 119, b. 35.]

[Footnote 73: Topic. I. xviii. p. 108, b. 19.]

[Footnote 74: Topic. I. xviii. p. 108, b. 27: [Greek: ô(/ste to\
koino\n e)pi\ pa/ntôn ge/nos a)podi/dontes _do/xomen ou)k a)llotri/ôs
o(ri/zesthai_.] It will be recollected that all the work of Dialectic
(as Aristotle tells us often) has reference to [Greek: do/xa] and not
to scientific truth. "We shall _seem to define_ not in a manner
departing from the reality of the subject" is, therefore, an
appropriate dialectic artifice.]


II.

The First Book of the Topica, which we have thus gone through, was
entitled by some ancient commentators [Greek: ta\ pro\ tô=n
To/pôn]--matters preliminary to the _Loci_. This is quite true, as a
description of its contents; for Aristotle in the last words of the
book, distinctly announces that he is about to enumerate the _Loci_
towards which the four above-mentioned _Organa_ will be useful.[75]

[Footnote 75: Ibid. p. 108, b. 32: [Greek: oi( de\ to/poi pro\s ou(\s
chrê/sima ta\ lechthe/nta oi(/de ei)si/n.]]

_Locus_ ([Greek: to/pos]) is a place in which many arguments
pertinent to one and the same dialectical purpose, may be found--
_sedes argumentorum_. In each _locus_, the arguments contained
therein look at the thesis from the same point of view; and the
_locus_ implies nothing distinct from the arguments, except this
manner of view common to them all. In fact, the metaphor is a
convenient one for designating the relation of every Universal
generally to its particulars: the Universal is not a new particular,
nor any adjunct superimposed upon all its particulars, but simply a
_place_ in which all known similar particulars may be found grouped
together, and in which there is room for an indefinite number of new
ones. If we wish to arm the student with a large command of
dialectical artifices, we cannot do better than discriminate the
various groups of arguments, indicating the point of view common to
each group, and the circumstances in which it becomes applicable. By
this means, whenever he is called upon to deal with a new debate, he
will consider the thesis in reference to each one of these different
_loci_, and will be able to apply arguments out of each of them,
according as the case may admit.

The four _Helps_ ([Greek: o)/rgana]) explained in the last book
differ from the _Loci_ in being of wider and more undefined bearing:
they are directions for preparatory study, rather than for dealing
with any particular situation of a given problem; though it must be
confessed that, when Aristotle proceeds to specify the manner in
which the three last-mentioned helps are useful, he makes
considerable approach towards the greater detail and
particularization of the _Loci_. In entering now upon these, he
reverts to that quadruple classification of propositions and problems
(according to the four Predicables), noted at the beginning of the
treatise, in which the predicate is either Definition, Proprium,
Genus, or Accident, of the subject. He makes a fourfold distribution
of _Loci_, according as they bear upon one or other of these four. In
the Second and Third Books, we find those which bear upon
propositions predicating Accident; in the Fourth Book, we pass to
Genus; in the Fifth, to Proprium; in the Sixth and Seventh, to
Definition.

The problem or thesis propounded for debate may have two faults on
which it may be impugned: either it may be untrue; or it may be
expressed in a way departing from the received phraseology.[76] It
will be universal, or particular, or indefinite; and either
affirmative or negative; but, in most cases, the respondent propounds
for debate an affirmative universal, and not a negative or a
particular.[77] Aristotle therefore begins with those _loci_ that are
useful for refuting an Affirmative Universal; though, in general, the
same arguments are available for attack and defence both of the
universal and of the particular; for if you can overthrow the
particular, you will have overthrown the universal along with it,
while if you can defend the universal, this will include the defence
of the particular. As the thesis propounded is usually affirmative,
the assailant undertakes the negative side or the work of refutation.
And this indeed (as Eudemus, the pupil of Aristotle, remarked, after
his master[78]) is the principal function and result of dialectic
exercise; which refutes much and proves very little, according to the
analogy of the Platonic Dialogues of Search.

[Footnote 76: Topic. II. i. p. 109, a. 27: [Greek: diori/sasthai de\
dei= kai\ ta\s a(marti/as ta\s e)n toi=s problê/masin, o(/ti ei)si\
dittai/, ê)\ tô=| pseu/desthai, ê)\ tô=| parabai/nein tê\n keime/nên
le/xin.]

Alexander remarks (Schol. p. 264, b. 23, Br.) that [Greek: pro/blêma]
here means, not the interrogation, but [Greek: to\ ô(risme/non ê)/dê
kai\ kei/menon--ou(= proi+/statai/ tis, o(/n o( dialektiko\s
e)le/gchein e)picheirei=].]

[Footnote 77: Topic. II. i. p. 109, a. 8: [Greek: dia\ to\ ma=llon
ta\s the/seis komi/zein e)n tô=| u(pa/rchein ê)\ mê/, tou\s de\
dialegome/nous a)naskeua/zein.]]

[Footnote 78: Alexander ap. Schol. p. 264, a. 27, Br.: [Greek: o(/ti
de\ oi)keio/teron tô=| dialektikô=| to\ a)naskeua/zein tou=
kataskeua/zein, e)n tô=| prô/tô| tô=n e)pigraphome/nôn Eu)dêmei/ôn
A)nalutikô=n (e)pigra/phetai de\ au)to\ kai\ Eu)dê/mou u(pe\r tô=n
A)nalutikô=n) ou(/tôs le/getai, o(/ti o( dialektiko\s a(\ me\n
kataskeua/zei mikra/ e)sti, to\ de\ polu\ tê=s duna/meôs au)tou=
pro\s to\ a)nairei=n ti e)sti/n.]]

Aristotle takes the four heads--Accident, Genus, Proprium, and
Definition, in the order here enumerated. The thesis of which the
predicate is enunciated as Accident, affirms the least, is easiest to
defend, and hardest to upset.[79] When we enunciate Genus or
Proprium, we affirm, not merely that the predicate belongs to the
subject (which is all that is affirmed in the case of Accident), but,
also something more--that it belongs to the subject in a certain
manner and relation. And when we enunciate Definition, we affirm all
this and something reaching yet farther--that it declares the whole
essence of the _definitum_, and is convertible therewith.
Accordingly, the thesis of Definition, affirming as it does so very
much, presents the most points of attack and is by far the hardest to
defend.[80] Next in point of difficulty, for the respondent, comes
the Proprium.

[Footnote 79: Topic. VII. v. p. 155, a. 27: [Greek: r(a=|ston de\
pa/ntôn kataskeua/sai to\ sumbebêko/s--a)naskeua/zein de\
chalepô/taton to\ sumbebêko/s, o(/ti e)la/chista e)n au)tô=|
de/dotai; ou) ga\r prossêmai/nei e)n tô=| sumbebêko/ti pô=s
u(pa/rchei, ô(/st' e)pi\ me\n tô=n a)/llôn dichô=s e)/stin a)nelei=n,
ê)\ dei/xanta o(/ti ou)ch u(pa/rchei ê)\ o(/ti ou)ch ou(/tôs
u(parchei, e)pi\ de\ tou= sumbebêko/tos ou)k e)/stin a)nelei=n a)ll'
ê)\ dei/xanta o(/ti ou)ch u(pa/rchei.]]

[Footnote 80: Topic. VII. v. p. 155, a. 3. [Greek: pa/ntôn r(a=|ston
o(/ron a)naskeua/sai; plei=sta ga\r e)n au)tô=| ta\ dedome/na pollô=n
ei)rême/nôn.] a. 23: [Greek: tô=n d' a)/llôn to\ i)/dion ma/lista
toiou=ton.]]

Beginning thus with the thesis enunciating Accident, Aristotle
enumerates no less than thirty-seven distinct _loci_ or argumentative
points of view bearing upon it. Most of them suggest modes of
assailing the thesis; but there are also occasionally intimations to
the respondent how he may best defend himself. In this numerous list
there are indeed some items repetitions of each other, or at least
not easily distinguishable.[81] As it would be tedious to enumerate
them all, I shall select some of the most marked and illustrative.

[Footnote 81: Aristotle himself admits the repetition in some cases,
Topic. II. ii. p. 110, a. 12: the fourth _locus_ is identical
substantially with the second _locus_.

Theophrastus distinguished [Greek: para/ggelma] as the general
precept, from [Greek: to/pos] or _locus_, as any proposition
specially applying the precept to a particular case (Schol. p. 264,
b. 38).]

1. The respondent has enunciated a certain predicate as belonging in
the way of accident, to a given subject. Perhaps it may belong to the
subject; yet not as accident, but under some one of the other three
Predicables. Perhaps he may have enunciated (either by explicit
discrimination, or at least by implication contained in his
phraseology) the genus as if it were an accident,--an error not
unfrequently committed.[82] Thus, if he has said, To be a colour is
an accident of white, he has affirmed explicitly the genus as if it
were an accident. And he has affirmed the same by implication, if he
has said, White (or whiteness) is coloured. For this is a form of
words not proper for the affirmation of a genus respecting its
species, in which case the genus itself ought to stand as a literal
predicate (White is a colour), and not to be replaced by one of its
derivatives (White is coloured). Nor can the proposition be intended
to be taken as affirming either proprium or definition; for in both
these the predicate would reciprocate and be co-extensive with the
subject, whereas in the present case there are obviously many other
subjects of which it may be predicated that they are coloured.[83] In
saying, White is coloured, the respondent cannot mean to affirm
either genus, proprium, or definition; therefore he must mean to
affirm _accident_. The assailant will show that this is erroneous.

[Footnote 82: Topic. II. ii. p. 109, a. 34: [Greek: ei(=s me\n dê\
to/pos to\ e)pible/pein ei) to\ kat' a)/llon tina\ tro/pon u(pa/rchon
ô(s sumbebêko\s a)pode/dôken. a(marta/netai de\ ma/lista tou=to peri\
ta\ ge/nê, oi(=on ei)/ tis tô=| leukô=| phai/ê sumbebêke/nai
chrô/mati ei)=nai; ou) ga\r sumbe/bêke tô=| leukô=| chrô/mati
ei)=nai, a)lla\ ge/nos au)tou= to\ chrô=ma/ e)stin.]]

[Footnote 83: We may find cases in which Aristotle has not been
careful to maintain the strict logical sense of [Greek: sumbebêko/s]
or [Greek: sumbe/bêken] where he applies these terms to Genus or
Proprium: _e.g._ Topic. II. iii. p. 110, b. 24; Soph. El. vi. p. 168,
b. 1.]

2. Suppose the thesis set up by the respondent to be an universal
affirmative, or an universal negative. You (the interrogator or
assailant) should review the particulars contained under these
universals. Review them not at once as separate individuals, but as
comprised in subordinate genera and species; beginning from the
highest, and descending down to the lowest species which is not
farther divisible except into individuals. Thus, if the thesis
propounded be, The cognition of opposites is one and the same
cognition; you will investigate whether this can be truly predicated
respecting all the primary species of _Opposita_: respecting _Relata_
and _Correlata_, respecting Contraries, respecting Contradictories,
respecting _Habitus_ and _Privatio_. If, by going thus far, you
obtain no result favourable to your purpose,[84] you must proceed
farther, and subdivide until you come to the lowest species:--Is the
cognition of just and unjust one and the same? that of double and
half? of sight and blindness? of existence and non-existence? If in
all, or in any one, of these cases you can show that the universal
thesis does not hold, you will have gained your point of refuting it.
On the other hand, if, when you have enumerated many particulars, the
thesis is found to hold in all, the respondent is entitled to require
you to grant it as an universal proposition, unless you can produce a
satisfactory counter-example. If you decline this challenge, you will
be considered an unreasonable debater.[85]

[Footnote 84: Topic. II. ii. p. 109, b. 20: [Greek: ka)\n e)pi\
tou/tôn mê/pô phanero\n ê)=|, pa/lin tau=ta diairete/on me/chri tô=n
a)to/môn, oi(=on ei) tô=n dikai/ôn kai\ a)di/kôn], &c.]

[Footnote 85: Ibid. b. 25-30. [Greek: e)a\n ga\r mêde/teron tou/tôn
poiê=|, a)/topos phanei=tai mê\ tithei/s.]]

3. You will find it useful to define both the accident predicated in
the thesis, and the subject respecting which it is predicated, or at
least one of them: you will see then whether these definitions reveal
anything false in the affirmation of the thesis. Thus, if the thesis
affirms that it is possible to do injustice to a god, you will define
what is meant by doing injustice. The definition is--hurting
intentionally: you can thus refute the thesis by showing that no
injustice to a god can possibly be done; for a god cannot be
hurt.[86] Or let the thesis maintained be, The virtuous man is
envious. You define envy, and you find that it is--vexation felt by
reason of the manifest success of some meritorious man. Upon this
definition it is plain that the virtuous man cannot feel envy: he
would be worthless, if he did feel it. Perhaps some of the terms
employed in your definition may themselves require definition; if so,
you will repeat the process of defining until you come to something
plain and clear.[87] Such an analysis will often bring out some error
at first unperceived in the thesis.

[Footnote 86: Topic. II. ii. p. 109, b. 34: [Greek: ou) ga\r
e)nde/chetai bla/ptesthai to\n theo/n.]]

[Footnote 87: Ibid. p. 110, a. 4: [Greek: lamba/nein de\ kai\ a)nti\
tô=n e)n toi=s lo/gois o)noma/tôn lo/gous, kai\ mê\ a)phi/stasthai
e(/ôs a)\n ei)s gnô/rimon e)/lthê|.]]

4. It will be advisable, both for assailant and respondent, to
discriminate those cases in which the authority of the multitude is
conclusive from those in which it is not. Thus, in regard to the
meaning of terms and in naming objects, we must speak like the
multitude; but, when the question is as to what objects deserve to be
denominated so and so, we must not feel bound by the multitude, if
there be any special dissentient authority.[88] That which produces
good health we must call wholesome, as the multitude do; but, in
calling this or that substance wholesome, the physician must be our
guide.

[Footnote 88: Ibid. a. 14-22.]

5. Aristotle gives more than one suggestion as to those cases in
which the terms of the thesis have a double or triple sense, yet in
which the thesis is propounded either as an universal affirmative or
as an universal negative. If the respondent is himself not aware of
the double sense of his thesis, while you (the questioner) are aware
of it, you will prove the point which you are seeking to establish
against him in one or other of the two senses, if you cannot prove it
in both. If he is aware of it in the double sense, he will insist
that you have chosen the sense which he did not intend.[89] This mode
of procedure will be available to the respondent as well as to you;
but it will be harder to him, since his thesis is universal. For, in
order to make good an universal thesis, he must obtain your assent to
a preliminary assumption or convention, that, if he can prove it in
one sense of the terms, it shall be held proved in both; and, unless
the proposition be so plausible that you are disposed to grant him
this, he will not succeed in the procedure.[90] But you on your side,
as refuting, do not require any such preliminary convention or
acquiescence; for, if you prove the negative in any single case, you
succeed in overthrowing the universal affirmative, while, if you
prove the affirmative in any single case, you succeed in overthrowing
the universal negative.[91] Such procedure, however, is to be adopted
only when you can find no argument applicable to the equivocal thesis
in all its separate meanings; this last sort of argument, wherever it
can be found, being always better.[92]

[Footnote 89: Topic. II. iii. p. 110, a. 24.]

[Footnote 90: Ibid. a. 37: [Greek: kataskeua/zousi de\
prodiomologête/on o(/ti ei) o(tô|ou=n u(pa/rchei, panti\ u(pa/rchei,
a)\n pithano\n ê)=| to\ a)xi/ôma; ou) ga\r a)po/chrê pro\s to\
dei=xai o(/ti panti\ u(pa/rchei to\ e)ph' e(no\s dialechthê=nai.]]

[Footnote 91: Topic. II. iii. p. 110, a. 32: [Greek: plê\n
a)naskeua/zonti me\n ou)de\n dei= e)x o(mologi/as diale/gesthai].]

[Footnote 92: Ibid. b. 4.]

In cases where the double meaning is manifest, the two meanings must
be distinguished by both parties, and the argument conducted
accordingly. Where the term has two or more meanings (not equivocal
but) related to each other by analogy, we must deal with each of
these meanings distinctly and separately.[93] If our purpose is to
refute, we select any one of them in which the proposition is
inadmissible, neglecting the others: if our purpose is to prove, we
choose any one in which the proposition is true, neglecting the
others.[94]

[Footnote 93: Topic. II. iii. p. 110, b. 16-p. 111, a. 7. This
_locus_ is very obscurely stated by Aristotle.]

[Footnote 94: Ibid. p. 110, b. 29-32: [Greek: e)a\n boulô/metha
kataskeua/sai, ta\ toiau=ta prooiste/on o(/sa e)nde/chetai, kai\
diairete/on _ei)s tau=ta mo/non_ o(/sa kai\ chrê/sima pro\s to\
kataskeua/sai; a)\n d' a)naskeua/sai, o(/sa mê\ e)nde/chetai, _ta\
de\ loipa\ paraleipte/on_.]

Aristotle's precepts indicate the way of managing the debate _with a
view to success._]

6. Observe that a predicate which belongs to the genus does not
necessarily belong to any one of its species, but that any predicate
which belongs to one of the species does belong also to the genus; on
the other hand, that any predicate which can be denied of the genus
may be denied also of all its contained species, but that any
predicate which can be denied of some one or some portion of the
contained species cannot for that reason be denied of the genus. You
may thus prove from one species to the genus, and disprove from the
genus to each one species; but not _vice versâ_. Thus, if the
respondent grants that there exist cognitions both estimable and
worthless, you are warranted in inferring that there exist habits of
mind estimable and worthless; for cognition is a species under the
genus habit of mind. But if the negative were granted, that there
exist no cognitions both estimable and worthless, you could not for
that reason infer that there are no habits of mind estimable and
worthless. So, if it were granted to you that there are judgments
correct and erroneous, you could not for that reason infer that there
were perceptions of sense correct and erroneous; perceiving by sense
being a species under the genus judging. But, if it were granted that
there were no judgments correct and erroneous, you might thence infer
the like negative about perceptions of sense.[95]

[Footnote 95: Topic. II. iv. p. 111, a. 14-32. [Greek: nu=n me\n
ou)=n e)k tou= ge/nous peri\ to\ ei)=dos ê( a)po/deixis; to\ ga\r
kri/nein ge/nos tou= ai)stha/nesthai; o( ga\r ai)sthano/menos kri/nei
pôs--o( me\n ou)=n pro/teros to/pos pseudê/s e)sti pro\s to\
kataskeua/sai, o( de\ deu/teros a)lêthê/s.--pro\s de\ to\
a)naskeua/zein o( me\n pro/teros a)lêthê/s, o( de\ deu/teros
pseudê/s.]

It is here a point deserving attention, that Aristotle ranks [Greek:
to\ ai)stha/nesthai] as a species under the genus [Greek: to\
kri/nein]. This is a notable circumstance in the Aristotelian
psychology.]

7. Keep in mind also that if there be any subject of which you can
affirm the genus, of that same subject you must be able to affirm one
or other of the species contained under the genus. Thus, if science
be a predicate applicable, grammar, music, or some other of the
special sciences must also be applicable: if any man can be called
truly a scientific man, he must be a grammarian, a musician, or some
other specialist. Accordingly, if the thesis set up by your
respondent be, The soul is moved, you must examine whether any one of
the known varieties of motion can be truly predicated of the soul,
_e.g._, increase, destruction, generation, &c. If none of these
special predicates is applicable to the soul, neither is the generic
predicate applicable to it; and you will thus have refuted the
thesis. This _locus_ may serve as a precept for proof as well as for
refutation; for, equally, if the soul be moved in any one species of
motion, it is moved, and, if the soul be not moved in any species of
motion, it is not moved.[96]

[Footnote 96: Topic. II. iv. p. 111, a. 33-b. 11.]

8. Where the thesis itself presents no obvious hold for
interrogation, turn over the various definitions that have been
proposed of its constituent terms; one or other of these definitions
will often afford matter for attack.[97] Look also to the antecedents
and consequents of the thesis--what must be assumed and what will
follow, if the thesis be granted. If you can disprove the consequent
of the proposition, you will have disproved the proposition itself.
On the other hand, if the antecedent of the proposition be proved,
the proposition itself will be proved also.[98] Examine also whether
the proposition be not true at some times, and false at other times.
The thesis, What takes nourishment grows necessarily, is true not
always, but only for a certain time: animals take nourishment during
all their lives, but grow only during a part of their lives. Or, if a
man should say that knowing is remembering, this is incorrect; for we
remember nothing but events past, whereas we know not only these, but
present and future also.[99]

[Footnote 97: Ibid. b. 12-16.]

[Footnote 98: Ibid. b. 17-23.]

[Footnote 99: Topic. II. iv. p. 111, b. 24-31.]

9. It is a sophistical procedure (so Aristotle terms it) to transfer
the debate to some point on which we happen to be well provided with
arguments, lying apart from the thesis defended. Such transfer,
however, may be sometimes necessary. In other cases it is not really
but only apparently necessary; in still other cases it is purely
gratuitous, neither really nor apparently necessary. It is really
necessary, when the respondent, having denied some proposition
perfectly relevant to his thesis, stands to his denial and accepts
the debate upon it, the proposition being one on which a good stock
of arguments may be found against him; also, when you are
endeavouring to disprove the thesis by an induction of negative
analogies.[100] It is only apparently, and not really, necessary, when
the proposition in debate is not perfectly relevant to the thesis,
but merely has the semblance of being so. It is neither really nor
apparently necessary, when there does not exist even this semblance
of relevance, and when some other way is open of bringing
bye-confutation to bear on the respondent. You ought to avoid
entirely such a procedure in this last class of cases; for it is an
abuse of the genuine purpose of Dialectic. If you do resort to it,
the respondent should grant your interrogations, but at the same time
notify that they are irrelevant to the thesis. Such notification will
render his concessions rather troublesome than advantageous for your
purpose.[101]

[Footnote 100: Ibid. v. p. 111, b. 32-p. 112, a. 2: [Greek: e)/ti o(
sophistiko\s tro/pos, to\ a)/gein ei)s toiou=ton pro\s o(\
eu)porê/somen e)picheirêma/tôn], &c.]

[Footnote 101: Ibid. p. 112, a. 2-15. [Greek: dei= d' eu)labei=sthai
to\n e)/schaton tô=n r(êthe/ntôn tro/pôn; pantelô=s ga\r
a)pêrtême/nos kai\ a)llo/trios e)/oiken ei)=nai tê=s dialektikê=s.]

The epithet [Greek: sophistiko\s tro/pos] is probably intended by
Aristotle to apply only to this last class of cases.

This paragraph is very obscure, and is not much elucidated by the
long Scholion of Alexander (pp. 267-268, Br.).]

10. You will recollect that every proposition laid down or granted by
the respondent carries with it by implication many other
propositions; since every affirmation has necessary consequences,
more or fewer. Whoever says that Sokrates is a man, has said also
that he is an animal, that he is a living creature, biped, capable of
acquiring knowledge. If you can disprove any of these necessary
consequences, you will have disproved the thesis itself. You must
take care, however, that you fix upon some one of the consequences
which is really easier, and not more difficult, to refute than the
thesis itself.[102]

[Footnote 102: Topic. II. v. p. 112, a. 16-23.]

11. Perhaps the thesis set up by the respondent may be of such a
nature that one or other of two contrary predicates must belong to
the subject; _e.g._, either health or sickness. In that case, if you
are provided with arguments bearing on one of the two contraries, the
same arguments will also serve indirectly for proof, or for disproof,
of the other. Thus, if you show that one of the two contraries does
belong to the subject, the same arguments prove that the other does
not; _vice versâ_, if you show that one of them does not belong, it
follows that the other does.[103]

[Footnote 103: Topic. II. vi. p. 112, a. 25-31. [Greek: dê=lon ou)=n
o(/ti pro\s a)mphô chrê/simos o( to/pos.]]

12. You may find it advantageous, in attacking the thesis, to
construe the terms in their strict etymological sense, rather than in
the sense which common **usage gives them.[104]

[Footnote 104: Ibid. a. 32-38: [Greek: e)/ti to\ e)picheirei=n
metaphe/ronta tou)/noma e)pi\ to\n lo/gon, ô(s ma/lista prosê=kon
e)klamba/nein ê)\ ô(s kei=tai tou)/noma.]

The illustrative examples which follow prove that [Greek: lo/gon]
here means the etymological origin, and not the definition, which is
its more usual meaning.]

13. The predicate may belong to its subject either necessarily, or
usually, or by pure hazard. You will take notice in which of these
three ways the respondent affirms it, and whether that which he
chooses is conformable to the fact. If he affirms it as necessary,
when it is really either usual or casual, the thesis will be open to
your attacks. If he affirms it without clearly distinguishing in
which of the three senses he intends it to be understood, you are at
liberty to construe it in that one of the three senses which best
suits your argument.[105]

[Footnote 105: Ibid. b. 1-20. This _locus_ seems unsuitable in that
part of the Topica where Aristotle professes to deal with theses
[Greek: tou= symbebêko/tos], or theses affirming or denying
_accidental_ predicates. It is one of the suppositions here that the
respondent affirms the predicate as _necessary_.]

14. Perhaps the thesis may have predicate and subject exactly
synonymous, so that the same thing will be affirmed as an accident of
itself. On this ground it will be assailable.[106]

[Footnote 106: Ibid. b. 21-26.]

15. Sometimes the thesis will have more than one proposition contrary
to it. If so, you may employ in arguing against it that one among its
various contraries which is most convenient for your purpose.[107]
Perhaps the predicate (accidental) of the thesis may have some
contrary: if it has, you will examine whether that contrary belongs
to the subject of the thesis; and, should such be the case, you may
use it as an argument to refute the thesis itself.[108] Or the
predicate of the thesis may be such that, if the thesis be granted,
it will follow as a necessary consequence that contrary predicates
must belong to the same subject. Thus, if the thesis be that the
Platonic Ideas exist _in us_, it follows necessarily that they are
both in motion and at rest; both perceivable by sense, and cogitable
by intellect.[109] As these two predicates (those constituting the
first pair as well as the second pair) are contrary to each other,
and cannot both belong to the same subject, this may be used as an
argument against the thesis from which such consequence follows.

[Footnote 107: Ibid. vii. p. 112, b. 28-p. 113, a. 19. [Greek: dê=lon
ou)=n e)k tô=n ei)rême/nôn o(/ti tô=| au)tô=| plei/ona e)nanti/a
sumbai/nei gi/nesthai.--lamba/nein ou)=n tô=n e)nanti/ôn o(po/teron
a)\n ê)=| pro\s tê\n the/sin chrê/simon.]]

[Footnote 108: Ibid. viii. p. 113, a. 20-23.]

[Footnote 109: Topic. II. viii. p. 113, a. 24-32: [Greek: ê)\ ei)/ ti
toiou=ton ei)/rêtai kata/ tinos, ou(= o)/ntos a)na/gkê ta\ e)nanti/a
u(pa/rchein; oi(=on ei) ta\s i)de/as e)n ê(mi=n e)/phêsen ei)=nai;
kinei=sthai/ te ga\r kai\ ê)remei=n au)ta\s sumbê/setai, e)/ti de\
ai)sthêta\s kai\ noêta\s ei)=nai.] Aristotle then proceeds to state
how this consequence arises. Those who affirm the Platonic Ideas,
assign to them as fundamental characteristic, that they are at rest
and cogitable. But, if the Ideas exist _in us_, they must be
moveable, because _we_ are moved; they must also be perceivable by
sense, because it is through vision only that we discriminate and
know differences of form. Waitz observes (in regard to the last pair,
[Greek: kai\ ai)sthêtai/]): "Nam singulæ ideæ certam quandam rerum
speciem et formam exprimunt: species autem et forma oculis cernitur."
I do not clearly see, however, that this is a consequence of
affirming Ideas to be [Greek: e)n ê(mi=n]; it is equally true if they
are _not_ [Greek: e)n ê(mi=n].]

16. We know that whatever is the recipient of one of two contraries,
is capable also of becoming recipient of the other. If, therefore,
the predicate of the thesis has any contrary, you will examine
whether the subject of the thesis is capable of receiving such
contrary. If not, you have an argument against the thesis. Let the
thesis be, The appetitive principle is ignorant. If this be true,
that principle must be capable of knowledge.[110] Since this last is
not generally admitted, you have an argument against the thesis.

[Footnote 110: Topic. II. vii. p. 113, a. 33-b. 10.]

17. We recognize four varieties of _Opposita_: (1) Contradictory; (2)
Contrary; (3) _Habitus_ and _Privatio_; (4) _Relata_. You will
consider how the relation in each of these four varieties bears upon
the thesis in debate.

In regard to Contradictories, you are entitled, converting the terms
of the thesis, to deny the predicate of the converted proposition
respecting the negation of the subject. Thus, if man is an animal,
you are entitled to infer, What is not an animal is not a man. You
will prove this to be an universal rule by Induction; that is, by
citing a multitude of particular cases in which it is indisputably
true, without possibility of finding any one case in which it does
not apply. If you can prove or disprove the converted obverse of the
thesis--What is not an animal is not a man--you will have proved or
disproved, the thesis itself, Man is an animal. This _locus_ is
available both for assailant and respondent.[111]

[Footnote 111: Ibid. viii. p. 113, b. 15-26: [Greek: e)pei\ d' ai(
a)ntithe/sis te/ssares, skopei=n e)k me\n tô=n a)ntipha/seôn e)k tê=s
a)kolouthê/seôs kai\ a)nairou=nti kai\ kataskeua/zonti; _lamba/nein
d' e)x e)pagôgê=s_, oi(=on ei) o( a)/nthrôpos zô=|on, to\ mê\ zô=|on
ou)k a)/nthrôpos; _o(moi/ôs de\ kai\ e)pi\ tô=n a)/llôn--e)pi\
pa/ntôn ou)=n to\ toiou=ton a)xiôte/on_.]

Aristotle's declaration, that this great logical rule can only be
proved by Induction, deserves notice. I have remarked the same thing
about his rules for the conversion of propositions, in the beginning
of the Analytica Priora. See above, p. 145, seq.]

In regard to Contraries, you will study the thesis, to see whether
the contrary of the predicate can be truly affirmed respecting the
contrary of the subject, or whether the contrary of the subject can
be truly affirmed respecting the contrary of the predicate. This last
alternative occurs sometimes, but not often; in general the first
alternative is found to be true. You must make good your point here
also by Induction, or by repetition of particular examples. This
_locus_ will serve either for the purpose of refutation or for that
of defence, according to circumstances. If neither of the two
alternatives above-mentioned is found correct, this is an argument
against the thesis.[112]

[Footnote 112: Topic. II. viii. p. 113, b. 27-p. 114, a. 6. [Greek:
lamba/nein de\ kai\ ta\ toiau=ta e)x e)pagôgê=s, e)ph' o(/son
chrê/simon.--spa/nion de\ to\ a)na/palin e)pi\ tô=n e)nanti/ôn
sumbai/nei, a)lla\ toi=s plei/stois e)pi\ tau)ta ê( a)kolou/thêsis.
ei) ou)=n mêt' e)pi\ tau)ta\ tô=| e)nanti/ô| to\ e)nanti/on
a)kolouthei= mê/te a)na/palin, dê=lon o(/ti ou)de\ tô=n r(êthe/ntôn
a)kolouthei= to\ e(/teron tô=| e(te/rô|.]]

In regard to _Habitus_ and _Privatio_, the rule is the same as about
Contraries; only that the first of the two above alternatives always
holds, and the second never occurs.[113] If sensible perception can
be predicated of vision, insensibility also can be predicated of
blindness; otherwise, the thesis fails.

[Footnote 113: Ibid. p. 114, a. 7-12.]

In regard to _Relata_, the inference holds from the correlate of the
subject to the correlate of the predicate. If knowledge is belief,
that which is known is believed; if vision is sensible perception,
that which is visible is sensibly perceivable. Some say that there
are cases in which the above does not hold; _e.g._, That which is
sensibly perceivable is knowable; yet sensible perception is not
knowledge. But this objection is not valid; for many persons dispute
the first of the two propositions. This _locus_ will be equally
available for the purpose of refutation--thus, you may argue--That
which is sensibly perceivable is not knowable, because sensible
perception is not knowledge.[114]

[Footnote 114: Ibid. a. 13-25.]

18. You will look at the terms of the proposition, also, in regard to
their Derivatives, Inflections, &c., and to matters associated with
them in the way of production, preservation, &c. This _locus_ serves
both for proof and for refutation. What is affirmable of the subject,
is affirmable also of its derivatives: what is not affirmable of the
derivatives, is not affirmable of the subject itself.[115]

[Footnote 115: Ibid. ix. p. 114, a. 26-b. 5. [Greek: du/stoicha,
ptô/seis, ta\ poiêtika\ kai\ phulaktika/--dê=lon ou)=n o(/ti e(no\s
o(poiouou=n deichthe/ntos tô=n kata\ tê\n au)tê\n sustoichi/an
a)gathou= ê)\ e)painetou=, kai\ ta\ loipa\ pa/nta dedeigme/na
gi/netai.]--b. 23: [Greek: ô(=n me\n ga\r ta\ poiêtika\ a)gatha/,
kai\ au)ta\ tô=n a)gathô=n, ô(=n de\ ta\ phthartika\ a)gatha/, au)ta\
tô=n kakô=n.]]

19. Arguments may often be drawn, both for proof and for refutation,
from matters Similar or Analogous to the subject or predicate of the
thesis. Thus, if one and the same cognition comprehends many things,
one and the same opinion will also comprehend many things. If to
possess vision is to see, then also to possess audition is to hear.
If to possess audition is _not_ to hear, then neither is to possess
vision to see. The argument may be urged whether the resemblance is
real or only generally supposed. Sometimes, however, the inference
will not hold from one to many. Thus, if to know is to cogitate, then
to know many things should be to cogitate many things. But this last
is impossible. A man may know many things, but he cannot cogitate
many things; therefore, to know is _not_ to cogitate.[116]

[Footnote 116: Topic. II. x. p. 114, b. 25-36: [Greek: pa/lin e)pi\
tô=n o(moi/ôn, ei) o(moi/ôs e)/chei,--kai\ e)pi\ tô=n o)/ntôn kai\
tô=n dokou/ntôn; chrê/simos d' o( to/pos pro\s a)/mphô;--skopei=n de\
kai\ ei) e)ph' e(no\s kai\ ei) e)pi\ pollô=n o(moi/ôs e)/chei;
e)niachou= ga\r diaphônei=.]]

20. There are various _loci_ for argument, arising from degrees of
Comparison--more, less, equally. One is the argument from concomitant
variations, which is available both for proof and for disproof. If to
do injustice is evil, to do more injustice is more evil. If an
increase in degree of the subject implies an increase in degree of
the predicate, then the predicate is truly affirmed; if not, not.
This may be shown by Induction, or repetition of particular
instances.[117] Again, suppose the same predicate to be affirmable of
two distinct subjects A and B, but to be more probably affirmable of
A than of B. Then, if you can show that it does _not_ belong to A,
you may argue (_à fortiori_) that it does _not_ belong to B; or, if
you can show that it belongs to B, you may argue (_à fortiori_) that
it belongs also to A. Or, if two distinct predicates be affirmable
respecting the same subject but with unequal degrees of probability,
then, if you can disprove the more probable of the two, you may argue
from thence in disproof of the less probable; and, if you can prove
the less probable, you may argue from thence in proof of the more
probable. Or, if two distinct predicates be affirmable respecting two
distinct subjects but with unequal degrees of probability, then, if
you can disprove the more probable you may argue from thence against
the less probable; and, if you can prove the less probable, you are
furnished with an argument in proof of the more probable.[118] If the
degrees of probability, instead of being unequal, are equal or alike,
you may still, in the cases mentioned, argue in like manner from
proof or disproof of the one to proof or disproof of the other.[119]

[Footnote 117: Ibid. b. 37-p. 115, a. 5: [Greek: ei)si\ de\ tou=
ma=llon to/poi te/ssares, ei(=s me\n ei) a)kolouthei= to\ ma=llon
tô=| ma=llon,--chrê/simos de\ pro\s a)/mphô o( to/pos; ei) me\n ga\r
a)kolouthei= tê=| tou= u(pokeime/nou e)pido/sei ê( tou= sumbebêko/tos
e)pi/dosis, katha/per ei)/rêtai, dê=lon o(/ti sumbe/bêken, ei) de\
mê\ a)kolouthei=, ou) sumbe/bêken. tou=to d' e)pagôgê=| lêpte/on.]]

[Footnote 118: Topic. II. x. p. 115, a. 5-14.]

[Footnote 119: Ibid. a. 15-24: [Greek: e)k tou= o(moi/ôs u(pa/rchein
ê)\ dokei=n u(pa/rchein], &c.]

21. Another _locus_ for argument is, that _ex adjuncto_. If the
subject, prior to adjunction of the attribute, be not white or good,
and if adjunction of the attribute makes it white or good, then, you
may argue that the adjunct must itself be white or good. And you
might argue in like manner, if the subject prior to adjunction were
to a certain extent white or good, but became more white or more good
after such adjunction.[120] But this _locus_ will not be found
available for the negative inference or refutation. You cannot argue,
because the adjunction does not make the subject white or good, that
therefore the adjunct itself is not white or not good.[121]

[Footnote 120: Ibid. xi. p. 115, a. 26-33.]

[Footnote 121: Ibid. a. 32-b. 2.]

22. If the predicate be affirmable of the subject in greater or less
degree, it must be affirmable of the subject simply and absolutely.
Unless the subject be one that can be called white or good, you can
never call it more white or more good. This _locus_ again, however,
cannot be employed in the negative, for the purpose of refutation.
Because the predicate cannot be affirmed of the subject in greater or
less degree, you are not warranted in inferring that it cannot be
affirmed of the subject at all. Sokrates cannot be called in greater
or less degree a man; but you cannot thence infer that he is not
called a man simply.[122] If the predicate can be denied of the
subject simply and absolutely, it can be denied thereof with every
sort of qualification: if it can be affirmed of the subject with
qualification, it can also be affirmed thereof simply and absolutely,
as a possible predicate.[123] This, however, when it comes to be
explained, means only that it can be affirmed of some among the
particulars called by the name of the subject. Aristotle recognizes
that the same predicate may often be affirmed of the subject
_secundum quid_, and denied of the subject simply and absolutely. In
some places (as among the Triballi), it is honourable to sacrifice
your father; simply and absolutely, it is not honourable. To one who
is sick, it is advantageous to undergo medical treatment; speaking
simply and absolutely (_i.e._, to persons generally in the ordinary
state of health), it is not advantageous. It is only when you can
truly affirm the proposition, without adding any qualifying words,
that the proposition is true simply and absolutely.[124]

[Footnote 122: Ibid. b. 3-10.]

[Footnote 123: Ibid. b. 11-35. [Greek: ei) ga\r kata/ ti
e)nde/chetai, kai\ a(plô=s e)nde/chetai.]]

[Footnote 124: Topic. II. xi. p. 115, b. 33: [Greek: ô(/ste o(\ a)\n
mêdeno\s prostitheme/nou dokê=| ei)=nai kalo\n ê)\ ai)schro\n ê)\
a)/llo ti tô=n toiou=tôn, a(plô=s r(êthê/setai.]]


III.

Such are the chief among the thirty-seven _Loci_ which Aristotle
indicates for debating dialectically those theses in which the
predication is only of Accident--not of Genus, or Proprium, or
Definition. He proceeds (in the Third Book of the Topica) to deal
separately with one special branch of such theses, respecting
_Expetenda_ and _Fugienda_: where the question put is, Of two or more
distinct subjects, which is the more desirable or the better? The
cases supposed are those in which the difference of value between the
two subjects compared is not conspicuous and unmistakeable, but where
there is a tolerably near approximation of value between them, so as
to warrant doubt and debate.[125]

[Footnote 125: Ibid. III. i. p. 116, a. 1-12: [Greek: Po/teron d'
ai(retô/teron ê)\ be/ltion duei=n ê)\ pleio/nôn, e)k tô=nde
skepte/on.] &c.]

We must presume that questions of this class occurred very frequently
among the dialectical debates of Aristotle's contemporaries; so that
he thinks it necessary to give advice apart for conducting them in
the best manner.

1. Of two good subjects compared, that is better and more desirable
which is the more lasting; or which is preferred by the wise and good
man; or by the professional artist in his own craft; or by right law;
or by the multitude, all or most of them. That is absolutely or
simply better and more desirable, which is declared to be such by the
better cognition; that is better to any given individual, which is
declared to be better by his own cognition.[126]

[Footnote 126: Topic. III. i. p. 116, a. 13-22.]

2. That is more desirable which is included in the genus good, than
what is not so included; that which is desirable on its own account
and _per se_, is better than what is desirable only on account of
something else and _per accidens_; the cause of what is good in
itself is more desirable than the cause of what is good by
accident.[127]

[Footnote 127: Ibid. a. 23-b. 7.]

3. What is good absolutely and simply (_i.e._, to all and at all
times) is better than what is good only for a special occasion or
individual; thus, to be in good health is better than being cut for
the stone. What is good by nature is better than what is good not by
nature; _e.g._, justice (good by nature), than the just individual,
whose character must have been acquired.[128] What is good, or what
is peculiarly appurtenant, to the more elevated of two subjects is
better than what is good or peculiar to the less elevated. Good,
having its place in the better, prior, and more exalted elements of
any subject, is more desirable than good belonging to the derivative,
secondary, and less exalted; thus, health, which has its seat in
proper admixture and proportion of the fundamental constituents of
the body (wet, dry, hot, cold), is better than strength or
beauty--strength residing in the bones and muscles, beauty in proper
symmetry of the limbs.[129] Next, an end is superior to that which is
means thereunto; and, in comparing two distinct means, that which is
nearer to the end is the better. That which tends to secure the great
end of life is superior to that which tends towards any other end;
means to happiness is better than means to intelligence; also the
possible end, to the impossible. Comparing one subject as means with
another subject as end, we must examine whether the second end is
more superior to the end produced by the first subject, than the end
produced by the first subject is superior to the means or first
subject itself. For example, in the two ends, happiness and health,
if happiness as an end surpasses health as an end in greater
proportion than health surpasses the means of health, then the means
producing happiness is better than the end health.[130]

[Footnote 128: Topic. III. i. p. 116, b. 7-12.]

[Footnote 129: Ibid. b. 12-22: [Greek: kai\ to\ e)n belti/osin ê)\
prote/rois ê)\ timiôte/rois be/ltion, oi(=on u(gi/eia i)schu/os kai\
ka/llous. ê( me\n ga\r e)n u(groi=s kai\ xêroi=s kai\ thermoi=s kai\
psuchroi=s, a(plô=s d' ei)pei=n e)x ô(=n prô/tôn sune/stêke to\
zô=|on, ta\ d' e)n toi=s u(ste/rois; ê( me\n ga\r i)schu\s e)n toi=s
neu/rois kai\ o)stoi=s, to\ de\ ka/llos tô=n melô=n tis summetri/a
dokei= ei)=nai.]

The reason given in this _locus_ for superior estimation is a very
curious one: the fundamental or primary constituents rank higher than
compounds or derivatives formed by them or out of them. Also, the
definition of beauty deserves attention: the Greeks considered beauty
to reside more in proportions of form of the body than in features of
the face.]

[Footnote 130: Ibid. b. 22-36.]

Again, that which is more beautiful, honourable, and praiseworthy
_per se_, is better than what possesses these same attributes in
equal degree but only on account of some other consequence. Thus,
friendship is superior to wealth, justice to strength; for no one
values wealth except for its consequences, whereas we esteem
friendship _per se_, even though no consequences ensue from it.[131]

[Footnote 131: Ibid. b. 33-p. 117, a. 4.]

Where the two subjects compared are in themselves so nearly equal
that the difference of merit can hardly be discerned, we must look to
the antecedents or consequents of each, especially to the
consequents; and, according as these exhibit most of good or least of
evil, we must regulate our estimation of the two subjects to which
they respectively belong.[132] The larger lot of good things is
preferable to the smaller. Sometimes what is not in itself good, if
cast into the same lot with other things very good, is preferable to
another thing that is in itself good. Thus, what is not _per se_
good, if it goes along with happiness, is preferable even to justice
and courage. The same things, when taken along with pleasure or with
the absence of pain, are preferable to themselves without pleasure or
along with pain.[133] Everything is better, at the season when it
tells for most, than itself at any other season; thus, intelligence
and absence of pain are to be ranked as of more value in old age than
in youth; but courage and temperance are more indispensably required,
and therefore more to be esteemed, in youth than in old age. What is
useful on all or most occasions is more to be esteemed than what is
useful only now and then; _e.g._, justice and moderation, as compared
with courage: also that which being possessed by every one, the other
would not be required; _e.g._, justice is better than courage, for,
if every one were just, courage would not be required.[134]

[Footnote 132: Topic. III. i. p. 117, a. 5-15.]

[Footnote 133: Ibid. a. 16-25.]

[Footnote 134: Ibid. a. 26-b. 2.]

Among two subjects the more desirable is that of which the generation
or acquirement is more desirable; that of which the destruction or
the loss is more to be deplored; that which is nearer or more like to
the _Summum Bonum_ or to that which is better than itself (unless
indeed the resemblance be upon the ridiculous side, in the nature of
a caricature, as the ape is to man[135]); that which is the more
conspicuous; the more difficult to attain; the more special and
peculiar; the more entirely removed from all bad accompaniments; that
which we can best share with friends; that which we wish to do to our
friends, rather than to ordinary strangers (_e.g._, doing justice or
conferring benefit, than seeming to do so; for towards our friends we
prefer doing this in reality, while towards strangers we prefer
seeming to do so[136]); that which we cannot obtain from others, as
compared with that which can be hired; that which is unconditionally
desirable, as compared with that which is desirable only when we have
something else along with it; that of which the absence is a ground
of just reproach against us and ought to make us ashamed;[137] that
which does good to the proprietor, or to the best parts of the
proprietor (to his mind rather than his body);[138] that which is
eligible on its own ground, rather than from opinion of others; that
which is eligible on both these accounts jointly, than either.[139]
Acquisitions of supererogation are better than necessaries, and are
sometimes more eligible: thus, to live well is better than life
simply; philosophizing is better than money-making; but sometimes
necessaries are more eligible, as, _e.g._, to a starving man.
Speaking generally, necessaries are more eligible; but the others are
better.[140]

[Footnote 135: Ibid. p. 117, b. 2-17. [Greek: skopei=n de\ kai\ ei)
e)pi\ ta\ geloio/tera ei)/ê o(/moion, katha/per o( pi/thêkos tô=|
a)nthrô/pô|, tou= i(/ppou mê\ o)/ntos o(moi/ou; ou) ga\r ka/llion o(
pi/thêkos, o(moio/teron de\ tô=| a)nthrô/pô|.]]

[Footnote 136: Ibid. b. 20-p. 118, a. 5. [Greek: a(\ pro\s to\n
phi/lon pra=xai ma=llon boulo/metha ê)\ a(\ pro\s to\n tucho/nta,
tau=ta ai(retô/tera, oi(=on to\ dikaiopragei=n kai\ eu)= poiei=n
ma=llon ê)\ to\ dokei=n; tou\s ga\r phi/lous eu)= poiei=n boulo/metha
ma=llon ê)\ dokei=n, _tou\s de\ tucho/ntas a)na/palin_.]]

[Footnote 137: Topic. III. ii. p. 118, a. 16-26.]

[Footnote 138: Ibid. iii. p. 118, a. 29.]

[Footnote 139: Ibid. b. 20. The definition of this last condition
is--that we should not care to possess the thing if no one knew that
we possessed it: [Greek: o(/ros de\ tou= pro\s do/xan, to\ mêdeno\s
suneido/tos mê\ a)\n spouda/sai u(pa/rchein.]]

[Footnote 140: Ibid. p. 118, a. 6-14. [Greek: ou) ga\r ei) belti/ô,
a)nagkai=on kai\ ai(retô/tera; to\ gou=n philosophei=n be/ltion tou=
chrêmati/zesthai, a)ll' ou)ch ai(retô/teron tô=| e)ndeei= tô=n
a)nagkai/ôn. to\ d' e)k periousi/as e)sti/n, o(/tan u(parcho/ntôn
tô=n a)nagkai/ôn a)/lla tina\ proskataskeua/zêtai/ tis tô=n kalô=n.
schedo\n d' i)/sôs ai(retô/teron to\ a)nagkai=o/n e)sti, be/ltion de\
to\ e)k periousi/as.]]

Among many other _loci_, applicable to this same question of
comparative excellence between two different subjects, one more will
suffice here. You must distinguish the various ends in relation to
which any given subject is declared to be eligible: the advantageous,
the beautiful, the agreeable. That which conduces to all the three is
more eligible than that which conduces to one or two of them only. If
there be two subjects, both of them conducive to the same end among
the three, you must examine which of them conduces to it most. Again,
that which conduces to the better end (_e.g._, to virtue rather than
to pleasure) is the more eligible. The like comparison may be applied
to the _Fugienda_ as well as to the _Expetenda_. That is most to be
avoided which shuts us out most from the desirable acquisitions:
_e.g._, sickness is more to be avoided than ungraceful form; for
sickness shuts us out more completely both from virtue and from
pleasure.[141]

[Footnote 141: Ibid. iii. p. 118, b. 27-36.]

The same _loci_ which are available for the question of comparison
will also be available in the question of positive eligibility or
positive ineligibility.[142] Further, it holds for all cases of the
kind that you should enunciate the argument in the most general terms
that each case admits: in this way it will cover a greater number of
particulars. Slight mutations of language will often here strengthen
your case: that which is (good) by nature is more (good) than that
which is (good) not by nature; that which makes the subject to which
it is better than that which does not make the subject good.[143]

[Footnote 142: Ibid. iv. p. 119, a. 1.]

[Footnote 143: Topic. III. v. p. 119, a. 12: [Greek: lêpte/on d'
o(/ti ma/lista katho/lou tou\s to/pous peri\ tou= ma=llon kai\ tou=
mei/zonos; lêphthe/ntes ga\r ou(/tôs pro\s plei/ô chrê/simoi a)\n
ei)/êsan.]]

The _loci_ just enumerated are Universal, and applicable to the
debate of theses propounded in universal terms; but they will also be
applicable, if the thesis propounded be a Particular proposition.

If you prove the universal affirmative, you will at the same time
prove the particular; if you prove the universal negative, you prove
the particular negative also. The universal _loci_ from Opposites,
from Conjugates, from Inflections, will be alike applicable to
particular propositions. Thus, if we look at the universal _locus_
from Contraries, If all pleasure is good, then all pain is
evil,--this will apply also to the particular, If some pleasure is
good, then some pain is evil: in the particular as in the universal
form the proposition is alike an _Endox_ or conformable to common
received opinion. The like may be said about the _loci_ from
_Habitus_ and _Privatio_; also about those from Generation and
Destruction;[144] again, from More, Less, and Equally--this last,
however, with some restriction, for the _locus_ from Less will
serve only for proving an affirmative. Thus, if some capacity is a
less good than science, while yet some capacity is a good, then, _à
fortiori_, some science is a good. But, if you take the same _locus_
in the negative and say that the capacity is a good, you will not be
warranted in saying, for that reason, that no science is a good.[145]
You may apply this same _locus_ from Less to compare, not merely two
subjects in different genera, but also two subjects of different
degrees under the same genus. Thus, let the thesis be, Some science
or cognition is a good. You will disprove this thesis, if you can show
that prudence ([Greek: phro/nêsis]) is not a good; for, if prudence,
which in common opinion is most confidently held to be a good, be
really not so, you may argue that, _à fortiori_ no other science can
be so. Again, let the thesis be propounded with the assumption that,
if it can be proved true or false in any one case, it shall be
accepted as true or false in all universally (for example, that, if
the human soul is immortal, all other souls are immortal also; or if
not that, then none of the others): evidently, the propounder of such
a thesis extends the particular into an universal. If he propounds
his thesis affirmatively, you must try to prove the negative in some
particular case; for this, under the conditions supposed, will be
equivalent to proving an universal negative. If, on the other hand,
he puts his thesis negatively, you will try to prove some particular
affirmative; which (always under the given conditions) will carry
the universal affirmative also.[146]

[Footnote 144: Ibid. vi. p. 119, a. 32-b. 16. [Greek: o(moi/ôs ga\r
e)/ndoxon to\ a)xiô=sai, ei) pa=sa ê(donê\ a)gatho/n, kai\ lu/pên
pa=san ei)=nai kako/n, tô=| ei)/ tis ê(donê\ a)gatho/n, kai\ lu/pên
ei)=nai/ tina kako/n--e)n a(/pasi ga\r o(moi/ôs to\ e)/ndoxon.]]

[Footnote 145: Ibid. b. 17-30. [Greek: dê=lon ou)=n o(/ti
kataskeua/zein mo/non e)k tou= ê(=tton e)/stin.]]

[Footnote 146: Topic. III. vi. p. 119, b. 31-p. 120, a. 5.]

Suppose the respondent to propound his thesis indefinitely, not
carrying the indication either of universal or particular; _e.g._,
Pleasure is good. This can be proved by showing either that all
pleasure is good, or that some pleasure is good; while it can be
refuted only through the universal negative--by showing that no
pleasure is good.[147] But, if the thesis be divested of its
indefinite character and propounded either as universal or as
particular, there will then be two distinct ways of refuting it. If
it be farther specialized--_e.g._, One pleasure only is good--there
will be three ways of refuting: you may show either that all
pleasures are good; or that no pleasure is good; or that more
pleasures than one are good. If the proposition be specialized
farther still--_e.g._, Prudence alone among all the virtues is
science,--there are four lines of argument open for refuting it: you
may prove either that all virtue is science; or that no virtue is
science; or that some other virtue (such as justice) is science; or
that prudence is not science.[148]

[Footnote 147: Ibid. p. 120, a. 6-20: [Greek: a)diori/stou me\n ou)=n
o)/ntos tou= problê/matos monachô=s a)naskeua/zein
e)nde/chetai--a)nairei=n me\n monachô=s e)nde/chetai, kataskeua/zein
de\ dichô=s.] &c.]

[Footnote 148: Ibid. a. 15-31.]

In dealing with a particular proposition as thesis, still other
_loci_ already indicated for dealing with universal propositions will
be available. You will run through the particulars comprised in the
subject, distributed into genera and species. When you have produced
a number of particulars successively to establish the universal,
affirmative or negative, you are warranted in calling on the
respondent either to admit the universal, or to produce on his side
some adverse particular.[149] You will also (as was before
recommended) distribute the predicate of the thesis into the various
species which it comprehends. If no one of these species be truly
affirmable of the subject, then neither can the genus be truly
affirmable; so that you will have refuted the thesis, supposing it to
be affirmative. If, on the contrary, any one of the species be truly
affirmable of the subject, then the genus will also be truly
affirmable; so that you will have refuted the thesis, supposing it to
be negative. Thus, if the thesis propounded be, The soul is a number:
you divide number into its two species, odd and even, and prove that
the soul is neither odd nor even; wherefore, it is not a number.[150]

[Footnote 149: Ibid. a. 32-38: [Greek: a)/n te ga\r panti\ phai/nêtai
u(pa/rchon a)/n te mêdeni/, polla\ proene/gkanti a)xiôte/on katho/lou
o(mologei=n, ê)\ phe/rein e)/nstasin e)pi\ ti/nos ou)ch ou(/tôs.]]

[Footnote 150: Topic. III. vi. p. 120, a. 37-b. 6. It would appear
from the examples here given by Aristotle--[Greek: o( chro/nos ou)
kinei=tai, o( chro/nos ou)/k e)sti ki/nêsis, ê( psuchê\ ou)/k e)stin
a)rithmo/s], that he considers these propositions as either
indefinite or particular.]


IV.

After this long catalogue of _Loci_ belonging to debate on
propositions of Accident, Aristotle proceeds to enumerate those
applicable to propositions of Genus and of Proprium. Neither Genus
nor Proprium is often made subject of debate as such; but both of
them are constituent elements of the debate respecting Definition,
which is of frequent occurrence.[151] For that reason, both deserve
to be studied.

[Footnote 151: Ibid. IV. i. p. 120, b. 12: [Greek: meta\ de\ tau=ta
peri\ tô=n pro\s to\ ge/nos kai\ to\ i)/dion e)piskepte/on; e)/sti
de\ tau=ta stoichei=a tô=n pro\s tou\s o(/rous; peri\ au)tô=n de\
tou/tôn o)liga/kis ai( ske/pseis gi/nontai toi=s dialegome/nois.]]

When the thesis propounded affirms that A is genus of B, you will run
over all the cognates of B, and see whether there is any one among
them respecting which A cannot be affirmed as genus. If there be,
this is a good argument against the thesis; for the genus ought to be
predicable of all. Next, whether what is really no more than an
accident is affirmed as genus, which ought to belong to the essence
of the subject. Perhaps (_e.g._) white is affirmed in the thesis as
being genus of snow; but white cannot be truly so affirmed; for it is
not of the essence of snow, but is only a quality or accident.[152]
Examine whether the predicate A comes under the definition already
given of an Accident,--that which may or may not be predicated of the
subject; also, whether A and B both fall under the same one out of
the ten Categories or Predicaments. If B the subject comes under
_Essentia_, or _Quale_, or _Ad Aliquid_, the predicate ought also to
belong to _Essentia_, or _Quale_, or _Ad Aliquid_: the species and
the genus ought to come under the same Category.[153] If this be not
the case in a thesis of Genus, the thesis cannot be maintained.

[Footnote 152: Ibid. b. 23-29.]

[Footnote 153: Ibid. p. 120, b. 36-p. 121, a. 9. [Greek: katho/lou d'
ei)pei=n u(po\ tê\n au)tê\n diai/resin dei= to\ ge/nos tô=| ei)/dei
ei)=nai.]

Aristotle here enunciates this as universally true, whereas if we
turn to Categor. p. 11, a. 24, seq. we shall find him declaring it
not to be universally true. Compare also Topic. IV. iv. p. 124, b.
15.]

You are aware that the species always partakes of the genus, while
the genus never partakes of the species; to _partake_ meaning that
the species includes the essence or definition of the genus, but the
genus never includes the essence or definition of the species. You
will examine, therefore, whether in the thesis propounded to you this
condition is realized; if not, the thesis may be refuted. Suppose,
_e.g._, that it enunciates some superior genus as including _Ens_ or
_Unum_. If this were true, the genus so assigned would still partake
of _Ens_ and _Unum_; for _Ens_ and _Unum_ maybe predicated of all
existences whatever. Therefore what is enunciated in the thesis as a
genus, cannot be a real genus.[154]

[Footnote 154: Topic. IV. i. p. 121, a. 10-19.]

Perhaps you may find something respecting which the subject (species)
may be truly affirmed, while the predicate (genus) cannot be truly
affirmed. If so, the predicate is not a real genus. Thus, the thesis
may enunciate _Ens_ or _Scibile_ as being the genus of _Opinabile_.
But this last, the species or subject _Opinabile_, may be affirmed
respecting _Non-Ens_ also; while the predicates _Ens_ or _Scibile_
(given as the pretended genus of _Opinabile_) cannot be affirmed
respecting _Non-Ens_. You can thus show that _Ens_ or _Scibile_ is
not the real genus of _Opinabile_.[155] The pretended species
_Opinabile_ (comprising as it does both _Ens_ and _Non-Ens_)
stretches farther than the pretended genus _Ens_ or _Scibile_:
whereas every real genus ought to stretch farther than any one or any
portion of its constituent species.[156] The thesis may thus be
overthrown, if there be any one species which stretches even equally
far or is co-extensive with the pretended genus.[157]

[Footnote 155: Ibid. a. 20-26.]

[Footnote 156: Ibid. b. 1-14. [Greek: stoichei=on de\ pro\s a(/panta
ta\ toiau=ta, to\ e)pi\ ple/on to\ ge/nos ê)\ to\ ei)=dos kai\ tê\n
diaphora\n le/gesthai; e)p' e)/latton ga\r kai\ ê( diaphora\ tou=
ge/nous le/getai.]]

[Footnote 157: Ibid. b. 4.]

It is a general truth that the same species cannot belong to two
distinct genera, unless one of the two be subordinate to the other,
or unless both of them be comprehended under some common higher
genus. You will examine, therefore, whether there is any other genus,
besides the predicate of the thesis, to which the subject of the
thesis can be referred. If there be some other genus, not under
either of the two conditions above indicated, the predicate
enunciated by the thesis cannot be the real genus of the subject.
Thus, if the thesis declares justice to be science (or to belong to
the genus science), you may remark that there is another distinct
genus (virtue) to which justice also belongs. In this particular
case, however, it would be replied that science and virtue can both
be referred to one and the same higher genus, viz., habit and
disposition. Therefore the thesis, Justice is science, will not be
truly open to objection on this ground.[158]

[Footnote 158: Topic. IV. ii. p. 121, b. 24, seq.]

Again, if the predicate of the thesis be the true genus of the
subject, all the higher genera in which the predicate is contained
must also be predicated _in Quid_ (as the predicate itself is**)
respecting the subject. This you must show by an induction of
particular instances, no counter-instance being producible.[159] If
the thesis enunciated does not conform to this condition, you will
have a good argument against it. You will also run over the
sub-species that are comprehended in the subject of the thesis,
considered as a genus; and you will examine whether the predicate of
the thesis (together with all its superior genera) is predicable
essentially or _in Quid_ of all these sub-species. If you can find
any one among these sub-species, of which it is not essentially
predicable, the predicate of the thesis is not the true genus of the
subject;[160] the like also, if the definitions of those genera are
not predicable of the subject or its sub-species.[161]

[Footnote 159: Ibid. p. 122, a. 5-19. [Greek: o(/ti de\ e(no\s e)n
tô=| ti/ e)sti katêgoroume/nou pa/nta ta\ loipa/, a)/nper
katêgorê=tai, e)n tô=| ti/ e)sti katêgorêthê/setai, di' e)pagôgê=s
lêpte/on.]]

[Footnote 160: Ibid. a. 21-b. 6.]

[Footnote 161: Ibid. b. 7-11. [Greek: ei) ou)=n diaphônei=, dê=lon
o(/ti ou) ge/nos to\ a)podothe/n.]]

Perhaps the thesis may enunciate as a genus what is really nothing
more than a differentia. It may also enunciate the differentia either
as a part of the genus or as a part of the species; or it may
enunciate the genus either as a part of the differentia or as a part
of the species. All these are attackable. The differentia is not a
genus, nor does it respond to the question _Quid est_, but to the
question _Quale quid est_. It is always either **more
extensive than the species, or co-extensive therewith.[162] If none
of the differentiæ belonging to a genus can be predicated of a
species, neither can the genus itself be predicated thereof. Thus,
neither odd nor even can be predicated of the soul; accordingly,
neither can the genus (number) be predicated of the soul.[163] If the
species be _prius naturâ_, so that when it disappears the enunciated
genus disappears along with it, this cannot be the real genus; nor,
if the enunciated genus or differentia can be supposed to disappear
and yet the species does not disappear along with them.[164] If the
species partakes of (includes in its essence) something contrary to
the enunciated genus, this last cannot be the real genus; nor, if the
species includes something which cannot possibly belong to what is in
that genus. Thus, if the soul partakes of (or includes in its
essence) life, and if no number can possibly live, the soul cannot be
a species of number.[165]

[Footnote 162: Ibid. b. 12-p. 123, a. 10. [Greek: ou)de\ dokei=
mete/chein ê( diaphora\ tou= ge/nous; pa=n ga\r to\ mete/chon tou=
ge/nous ê)\ ei)=dos ê)\ a)/tomo/n e)stin. a)ei\ ga\r ê( diaphora\
e)p' i)/sês ê)\ e)pi\ plei=on tou= ei)/dous le/getai.--e)pi\ ple/on
te ga\r to\ ge/nos tê=s diaphora=s dei= le/gesthai, kai\ mê\
mete/chein tê=s diaphora=s.]

As an example to illustrate the enclosing of the genus within the
species ([Greek: ei) to\ ge/nos ei)s to\ ei)=dos e)/thêken]),
Aristotle cites a definition given by Plato, who defined [Greek: tê\n
kata\ to/pon ki/nêsin], as [Greek: phora/n]. Now [Greek: phora\] is
less extensive in its meaning than [Greek: ê( kata\ to/pon ki/nêsis],
which includes [Greek: ba/disis] and other terms of motion apart from
or foreign to [Greek: phora/].--Example of enunciating differentia as
a genus is, if immortal be given as the genus to which a god belongs.
Immortal is the differentia belonging to [Greek: zô=|on], and
constituting therewith the species god.--Example of enclosing the
differentia in the genus is, if odd be given as the essence of number
([Greek: o(/per a)rithmo/n]).--Example of enclosing differentia in
the species is, if immortal be put forward as the essence of a god
([Greek: o(/per theo/n]).--Example of enclosing the genus in the
differentia is, number given as the essence of the odd.--Example of
enunciating the genus as a differentia is, when change of place is
given as the differentia of [Greek: phora/].]

[Footnote 163: Topic. IV. ii. p. 123, a. 11-14.]

[Footnote 164: Ibid. a. 14-19.]

[Footnote 165: Ibid. iii. a. 20-26.]

Again, the generic term and the specific term ought to be univocal in
signification. You must examine (according to the tests indicated in
the First Book of the Topica) whether it be taken equivocally in the
thesis. If it be so, you have a ground of attack, and also if it be
taken metaphorically; for every genus ought to be enunciated in the
proper sense of the term, and no metaphor can be allowed to pass as a
genus.[166] Note farther that every true genus has more than one
distinct species. You will, therefore, examine whether any other
species, besides the subject of the thesis, can be suggested as
belonging to the predicate of the thesis. If none, that predicate
cannot be the true genus of the subject.[167]

[Footnote 166: Ibid. a. 27-37. [Greek: skopei=n de\ kai\ ei) to\
metaphora=| lego/menon ô(s ge/nos a)pode/dôken, oi(=on tê\n
sôphrosu/nên sumphôni/an; pa=n ga\r ge/nos kuri/ôs kata\ tô=n ei)dô=n
katêgorei=tai, ê( de\ sumphôni/a kata\ tê=s sôphrosu/nês ou) kuri/ôs
a)lla\ metaphora=|; pa=sa ga\r sumphôni/a e)n phtho/ggois.]]

[Footnote 167: Topic. IV. iii. p. 123, a. 30.]

Several _loci_ are furnished by Contraries, either to the species or
the genus. If there be something contrary to the species, but nothing
contrary to the genus, then that which is contrary to the species
ought to be included under the same genus as the species itself; but,
if there be something contrary to the species, and also something
contrary to the genus, then that which is contrary to the species
ought to be included in that which is contrary to the genus. Each of
these doctrines you will have to make good by induction of particular
cases.[168] If that which is contrary to the species be a genus
itself (_e.g._, _bonum_) and not included in any superior genus, then
the like will be true respecting the species itself: it will not be
included in any genus; and the predicate of the thesis will not be a
true genus. _Bonum_ and _malum_ are not included in any common
superior genus; each is a genus _per se_.[169] Or suppose that the
subject (species) of the thesis, and the predicate (genus) of the
thesis, have both of them contraries; but that in the one there is an
intermediate between the two contraries, and in the other, not. This
shows that the predicate cannot be the true genus of the species;
for, wherever there is an intermediate between the two contraries of
the species, there also is an intermediate between the two contraries
of the genus; and _vice versâ_.[170] If there be an intermediate
between the two contraries of the species, and also an intermediate
between the two contraries of the genus, you will examine whether
both intermediates are of like nature, designated by analogous terms.
If it be not so (if, _e.g._, the one intermediate is designated by a
positive term, and the other only by a negative term), you will have
ground for contending against the thesis, that the predicate
enunciated therein is not the true genus of the subject. At any rate,
this is a probable ([Greek: e)/ndoxon]) dialectical argument--to
insist upon analogy between the two intermediates; though there are
some particular cases in which the doctrine does not hold.[171]

[Footnote 168: Ibid. b. 1-8. [Greek: phanero\n de\ tou/tôn e(/kaston
dia\ tê=s e)pagôgê=s].]

[Footnote 169: Ibid. b. 8-12.]

[Footnote 170: Topic. IV. iii. p. 123, b. 12, seq.]

[Footnote 171: Ibid. b. 17-23: [Greek: e)/nstasis tou/tou o(/ti
u(giei/as kai\ no/sou ou)de\n metaxu/, kakou= de\ kai\ a)gathou=; ê)\
ei) e)/sti me/n ti a)mphoi=n a)na\ me/son, kai\ tô=n ei)dô=n kai\
tô=n genô=n, mê\ o(moi/ôs de/, a)lla\ tô=n me\n kat' a)po/phasin,
tô=n d' ô(s u(pokei/menon. _e)/ndoxon ga\r to\ o(moi/ôs a)mphoi=n_,
katha/per e)p' a)retê=s kai\ kaki/as, kai\ dikaiosu/nês kai\
a)diki/as; a)mphoi=n ga\r kata\ a)po/phasin ta\ a)na\ me/son.]]

Again, suppose different conditions: that there is no contrary to the
genus, but that there is a contrary to the species. You will examine
whether not merely the contrary of the species, but also the
intermediate between its two contraries, is included in the same
genus; for, if the two contraries are included therein, the
intermediate ought also to be included. This is a line of argument
_probable_ (_i.e._, conformable to general presumption, and
recommendable in a dialectical debate), though there are not wanting
examples adverse to it: thus, excess and defect are included in the
same genus evil, but the moderate or measured ([Greek: to\ me/trion])
is not in the genus evil, but in the genus good.[172] We must remark,
moreover, that though it be a probable dialectical argument, that,
wherever the genus has a contrary, the species will also have a
contrary, yet there are cases adverse to this principle. Thus,
sickness in general has for its contrary health in general; but
particular species of sickness (such as fever, ophthalmia, gout, &c.)
have no contrary.[173]

[Footnote 172: Ibid. b. 23-30.]

[Footnote 173: Ibid. b. 30-37.]

Such will be your way of procedure, if the thesis propounded be
Affirmative, and if you have to make out a negative against it. But
if, on the contrary, the thesis be Negative, so that you have to make
out an affirmative against it, you have then three lines of procedure
open. 1. The genus may have no contrary, while the species has a
contrary: in that case, you may perhaps be able to show that the
contrary of the species (subject) is included in the predicate of the
thesis (genus); if so, then the species also will be included
therein. 2. Or, if you can show that the intermediate between the
species and its contrary is included in the predicate (genus), then
that same genus will also include the species and its contrary; for,
wherever the intermediate is, there also are the two extremes between
which it is intermediate. 3. Lastly, if the genus has a contrary as
well as the species, you may be able to show that the contrary of the
species is included in the contrary of the genus; assuming which to
be the case, then the species itself will be included in the
genus.[174] These are the three modes of procedure, if your task is
to make out the negative.

[Footnote 174: Topic. IV. iii. p. 124, a. 1-9.]

If the genus enunciated by the thesis be a true one, all the
Derivatives and Collaterals of the predicate will be fit and suitable
for those of the subject. Thus, if justice be a sort of science,
justly will be scientifically, and the just man will be a scientific
man. This _locus_ is useful to be kept in mind, whether you have to
make out an affirmative or a negative.[175] You may reason in the
same way about the _Analoga_ of the predicate and the subject; about
the productive and destructive causes of each; the manifestations
present, past, and future, of each, &c.[176]

[Footnote 175: Ibid. a. 10-14.]

[Footnote 176: Ibid. iv. p. 124, a. 15-34.]

When the opposite of the species (subject) is Privative, the thesis
will be open to attack in two ways. 1. If the privative opposite be
contained in the predicate, the subject itself will not be contained
therein; for it is a general truth that a subject and its privative
opposite are never both of them contained in the same lowest genus:
thus, if vision is sensible perception, blindness is not sensible
perception. 2. If both the species and the genus have privative
opposites, then if the privative opposite of the species be contained
in the privative opposite of the genus, the species itself will also
be contained in the genus; if not, not. Thus, if blindness be an
inability of sensible perception, vision will be a sensible
perception. This last _locus_ will be available, whether you are
making out an affirmative or a negative.[177]

[Footnote 177: Ibid. a. 35-b. 6.]

If the predicate of the thesis be a true genus, you may convert the
thesis simply, having substituted for the predicate the denial of its
Contradictory; if not, not. _Vice versâ_, if the new proposition so
formed be true, the predicate of the thesis will be a true genus; if
not, not. Thus, if good be the true genus of pleasurable, nothing
that is not good will be pleasurable. This _locus_ also will serve
both for making out an affirmative and for making out a
negative.[178]

[Footnote 178: Topic. IV. iv. p. 124, b. 7-14: [Greek: pa/lin e)pi\
tô=n a)popha/seôn skopei=n a)na/palin], &c.]

If the subject (species) of the thesis be a Relative, you will
examine whether the predicate (genus) be relative also; if not, it
will not be the true genus of the subject. The converse of this rule,
however, will not hold; and indeed the rule itself is not absolutely
universal.[179] You may also argue that, if the correlate of the
genus be not the same as the correlate of the species, the genus
cannot be truly predicated of that species: thus, half is the
correlate of double, but half is not the proper correlate of
multiple; therefore, multiple is not the true genus of double. But
your argument may here be met by contradictory instances; thus,
cognition has reference to the _cognitum_, but _habitus_ and
_dispositio_ (the genera to which _cognitio_ belongs) do not refer to
_cognitum_ but to _anima_.[180] You may also examine whether the
correlate, when applied to the genus, is put in the same case
(_e.g._, genitive, dative, &c.) as when it is applied to the species:
if it be put into a different case, this affords presumption that the
genus is not a true genus; though here again instances may be
produced showing that your presumption will not hold universally.
Farther, you will observe whether the correlates thus similarly
inflected reciprocate like the species and genus; if not, this will
furnish you with the same adverse presumption.[181]

[Footnote 179: Ibid. b. 15-22.]

[Footnote 180: Ibid. b. 23-34.]

[Footnote 181: Ibid. b. 35, seq.]

Again, examine whether the correlate of the genus is genus to the
correlate of the species; if it be not so, you may argue that the
genus is not truly predicated. Thus, if the thesis affirms that
_perceptio_ is the genus of _cognitio_, it will follow that
_percipibile_ is the genus of _cognoscibile_. Now this cannot be
maintained; for there are some _cognoscibilia_ which are not
perceivable, _e.g._, some _cogitabilia_ (_intelligibilia_, [Greek:
noêta/]). Since therefore _percipibile_ is not the true genus of
_cognoscibile_, neither can _perceptio_ be the true genus of
_cognitio_.[182]

[Footnote 182: Ibid. p. 125, a. 25-32: [Greek: o(ra=n de\ kai\ ei)
tou= a)ntikeime/nou to\ a)ntikei/menon ge/nos, oi(=on ei) tou=
diplasi/ou to\ pollapla/sion kai\ tou= ê(mi/seos to\ pollostêmo/rion;
dei= ga\r to\ a)ntikei/menon tou= a)ntikeime/nou ge/nos ei)=nai.]

We must take note here of the large sense in which Aristotle uses
[Greek: A)ntikei/mena]--_Opposita_, including as one of the four
varieties _Relata_ and _Correlata_ = _Relativé-Opposita_ (to use a
technical word familiar in logical manuals). I have before (_supra_,
p. 105) remarked the inconvenience of calling the Relative _opposite_
to its Correlate; and have observed that it is logically incorrect to
treat _Relata_ as a species or mode of the genus _Opposita_. The
reverse would be more correct: we ought to rank _Opposita_ or a
species or mode under the genus _Relata_. Since Aristotle numbers
_Relata_ among the ten Categories, he ought to have seen that it
cannot be included as a subordinate under any superior genus.]

Suppose the thesis predicates of memory that it is--a continuance of
cognition. This will be open to attack, if the predicate be affirmed
as the genus (or even as the accident) of the subject. For every
continuance must be _in_ that which continues. But memory is of
necessity _in_ the soul; it cannot therefore be _in_ cognition.[183]
There is another ground on which the thesis will be assailable, if it
defines memory to be--a habit or acquirement retentive of belief.
This will not hold, because it confounds habit or disposition with
act; which last is the true description of memory. The opposite error
will be committed if the respondent defines perceptivity to be
a--movement through or by means of the body. Here perceptivity, which
is a habit or disposition, is ranked under movement, which is the act
exercising the same, _i.e._, perceptivity in actual exercise.[184]
Or, the mistake may be made of ranking some habit or disposition
under the power consequent on the possession thereof, as if this
power were the superior genus: thus the respondent may define
gentleness to be a continence of anger; courage, a continence of
fears; justice, a continence of appetite of lucre. But the genus here
assigned is not a good one: for a man who feels no anger is called
gentle; a man who feels no fear is called courageous; whereas the
continent man is he who feels anger or fear, but controls them. Such
controlling power is a natural consequence of gentleness and courage,
insomuch that, if the gentle man happened to feel anger, or the
courageous man to feel fear, each would control these impulses; but
it is no part of the essence thereof, and therefore cannot be the
genus under which they fall.[185] A like mistake is made if pain be
predicated as the genus of anger, or supposition as the genus of
belief. The angry man doubtless feels pain, but his pain precedes his
anger in time, and is the antecedent cause thereof; now the genus can
never precede its species in time. So also a man may have the same
supposition sometimes with belief, sometimes without it; accordingly,
supposition cannot be the genus of belief any more than the same
animal can be sometimes a man, sometimes a brute.[186] And indeed the
same negative conclusion would follow, even if we granted that every
supposition was always attended with belief. For, in that case,
supposition and belief would be co-extensive terms; but the generic
term must always be more extensive than its specific.[187]

[Footnote 183: Topic. IV. iv. p. 125, b. 6: [Greek: oi(=on ei) tê\n
mnê/mên _monê\n e)pistê/mês_ ei)=pen. pa=sa ga\r monê\ e)n tô=|
me/nonti kai\ peri\ e)kei=no, ô(/ste kai\ ê( tê=s e)pistê/mês monê\
e)n tê=| e)pistê/mê|. ê( mnê/mê a)/ra e)n tê=| e)pistê/mê|, e)peidê\
monê\ tê=s e)pistê/mês e)sti/n. tou=to d' ou)k e)nde/chetai; mnê/mê
ga\r pa=sa e)n psuchê=|.] A definition similar to this is found in
the Kratylus of Plato, p. 437, B.: [Greek: e)/peita de\ ê( mnê/mê
panti/ pou mênu/ei o(/ti monê/ e)stin e)n tê=| psuchê=|, a)ll' ou)
phora/.]]

[Footnote 184: Ibid. v. p. 125, b. 15-19. [Greek: oi(=on tê\n
ai)/sthêsin _ki/nêsin dia\ sô/matos_; ê( me\n ga\r ai)/sthêsis
e(/xis, ê( de\ ki/nêsis e)ne/rgeia.] This, too, seems to allude to
Plato's explanation of [Greek: ai)/sthêsis] in the Timæus, pp. 43, C,
64, B; compare also the Platonic or pseudo-Platonic Definitiones, p.
414, C.]

[Footnote 185: Topic. IV. v. p. 125, b. 20-27.]

[Footnote 186: Waitz, in his notes (p. 478), says that Aristotle is
here in the wrong. But I do not agree with Waitz. Aristotle considers
[Greek: pi/stis] to be an accidental accompaniment of [Greek:
u(po/lêpsis], not a species thereof. It may be present or absent
without determining any new specific name to [Greek: u(po/lêpsis],
which term has reference only to the intellectual or conceptive part
of the mental supposition. At least there seems to be nothing
contradictory or erroneous in what Aristotle here says, though he
does not adhere everywhere to this restricted meaning of [Greek:
u(po/lêpsis]]

[Footnote 187: Topic. IV. v. p. 125, b. 28-p. 126, a. 2.]

You will farther examine whether the predicate of the thesis be of a
nature to inhere in the same substance as the subject. If it be not,
it cannot be truly predicated thereof, either as genus or even as
accident. White (species) and colour (genus) are of a nature to
inhere or belong to the same substance. But, if the thesis declares
that shame is a species of fear, or that anger is a species of pain,
you may impugn it on the ground that shame belongs to the reasoning
element in man, fear to the courageous or energetic element; and that
pain belongs to the appetitive element, anger to the courageous. This
proves that fear can neither be the genus nor the accident of shame;
that pain can neither be the genus nor the accident of anger.[188]

[Footnote 188: Ibid. p. 126, a. 3-16. Compare V. iv. p. 133, a. 31.
Aristotle appears here to recognize the Platonic doctrine as laid
down in the Republic and Timæus, asserting either three distinct
parts of the soul, or, rather, three distinct souls. In the treatise
De Animâ (III. ix. p. 432, a. 25; I. v. p. 411, b. 25), he dissents
from and impugns this same doctrine.]

Suppose the thesis declares that animal is a species under the genus
_visibile_ or _percepibile_. You may oppose it by pointing out that
animal is only _visibile secundum quid_, or partially; that is, only
so far as regards body, not as regards mind. But the species always
partakes of its genus wholly, not partially or _secundum quid_; thus,
man is not partially animal, but wholly or essentially animal. If
what is predicated as the genus be not thus essentially partaken, it
cannot be a true genus; hence neither _visibile_ nor _percepibile_ is
a true genus of animal.[189]

[Footnote 189: Topic. IV. v. p. 126, a. 17-25.]

Sometimes what is predicated as the genus is, when compared to its
species, only as a part to the whole; which is never the case with a
true genus. Some refer animal to the genus living body; but body is
only part of the whole animal, and therefore cannot be the true genus
thereof.[190] Sometimes a species which is blameworthy and hateful,
or a species which is praiseworthy and eligible, may be referred to
the power or capacity from which it springs, as genus; thus, the
thief, a blameworthy and hateful character, may be referred to the
predicate--capable of stealing another man's property. But this,
though true as a predicate, is not the true genus; for the honest man
is also capable of so acting, but he is distinguished from the thief
by not acting so, nor having the disposition so to act. All power and
capacity is eligible; if the above were the true genus of thief, it
would be a case in which power and capacity is blameworthy and
hateful. Neither, on the other hand, can any thing in its own nature
praiseworthy and eligible, be referred to power and capacity as its
genus; for all power and capacity is praiseworthy and eligible not in
itself or its own nature, but by reason of something else, namely,
its realizable consequences.[191]

[Footnote 190: Ibid. a. 26-29.]

[Footnote 191: Topic. IV. v. p. 126, a. 30-b. 6: [Greek: o(ra=n de\
kai\ ei)/ ti tô=n psektô=n ê)\ pheutô=n ei)s du/namin ê)\ to\
dunato\n e)/thêken, oi(=on to\n sophistê\n ê)\ dia/bolon ê)\ kle/ptên
to\n duna/menon la/thra ta\ a)llo/tria kle/ptein.]

The general drift of Aristotle is here illustrated better by taking
the thief separately, apart from the other two. But we must notice
here the proof of his temper or judgment concerning the persons
called Sophists, when we find him grouping them in the bunch of
[Greek: psekta\] and [Greek: pheukta\] along with thieves. The
majority of his uninstructed contemporaries would probably have
agreed in this judgment, but they would certainly have enrolled
Aristotle himself among the Sophists thus depreciated.]

Again, you may detect in the thesis sometimes the mistake of putting
under one genus a species which properly comes under two genera
conjointly, not subalternate one to the other; sometimes, the mistake
of predicating the genus as a differentia, or the differentia as a
genus.[192] Sometimes, also, the subject in which the attribute or
affection resides is predicated as if it were the genus of such
affection; or, _è converso_, the attribute or affection is predicated
as the genus of the subject wherein it resides; _e.g._, when breath
or wind, which is really a movement of air, is affirmed to be air put
in motion, and thus constituted as a species under the genus air; or
when snow is declared to be water congelated; or mud, to be earth
mixed with moisture.[193] In none of these cases is the predicate a
true genus; for it cannot be always affirmed of the subject.

[Footnote 192: Ibid. b. 7-33.]

[Footnote 193: Ibid. b. 34-p. 127, a. 19.]

Or perhaps the predicate affirmed as genus may be no genus at all;
for nothing can be a genus unless there are species contained under
it; _e.g._, if the thesis declare white to be a genus, this may be
impugned, because white objects do not differ _in specie_ from each
other. Or a mere universal predicate (such as _Ens_ or _Unum_) may be
put forward as a genus or differentia; or a simple concomitant
attribute, or an equivocal term, may be so put forward.[194]

[Footnote 194: Topic. IV. vi. p. 127, a. 20-b. 7.]

Perhaps it may happen that the subject (species) and the predicate
(genus) of the thesis may each have a contrary term; and that in each
pair of contrary terms one may be better, the other worse. If, in
that case, the better species be referred to the worse genus, or
_vice versâ_, this will render the thesis assailable. Or perhaps the
species may be fit to be referred equally to both the contrary
genera; in which case, if the thesis should refer it to the worse of
the two, that will be a ground of objection. Thus, if the soul be
referred to the genus _mobile_, you are at liberty to object that it
is equally referable to the genus _stabile_: and that, as the latter
is the better of the two, it ought to be referred to the better in
preference to the worse.[195]

[Footnote 195: Ibid. b. 8-17.]

There is a _locus_ of More and Less, which may be made available in
various ways. Thus, if the genus predicated admits of being graduated
as more or less, while the species of which it is predicated does not
admit of such graduation, you may question the applicability of the
genus to the species.[196] You may raise the question also, if there
be any thing else which looks equally like the true genus, or more
like it than the genus predicated by the thesis. This will happen
often, when the essence of the species includes several distinct
elements; _e.g._, in the essence of anger, there is included both
pain (an emotional element), and the supposition or belief of being
undervalued (an intellectual element); hence, if the thesis ranks
anger under the genus pain, you may object that it equally belongs to
the genus supposition[197] This _locus_ is useful for raising a
negative question, but will serve little for establishing an
affirmative. Towards the affirmative, you will find advantage in
examining the subject (species) respecting which the thesis
predicates a given genus; for, if it can be shown that this supposed
species is no real species but a genus, the genus predicated thereof
will be _à fortiori_ a genus.[198]

[Footnote 196: Ibid. b. 18-25: [Greek: e)/ti e)k tou= ma=llon kai\
ê(=tton, a)naskeua/zonti me/n, ei) to\ ge/nos de/chetai to\ ma=llon,
to\ d' ei)=dos mê\ de/chetai mê/t' au)to\ mê/te to\ kat' e)kei=no
lego/menon.]]

[Footnote 197: Ibid. b. 26-37: [Greek: chrê/simos d' o( to/pos e)pi\
tô=n toiou/tôn ma/lista e)ph' ô(=n plei/ô phai/netai tou= ei)/dous
e)n tô=| ti/ e)sti katêgorou/mena, kai\ mê\ diô/ristai, mê/d'
e)/chomen ei)pei=n poi=on au)tô=n ge/nos,] &c.]

[Footnote 198: Ibid. b. 38-p. 128, a. 12.]

Some think (says Aristotle)[199] that Differentia as well as Genus is
predicated essentially respecting the Species. Accordingly, Genus
must be discriminated from Differentia. For such discrimination the
following characteristics are pointed out:--1. Genus has greater
extent in predication than Differentia. 2. In replying to the
enquiry, _Quid est?_ it is more suitable and significant to declare
the Genus than the Differentia. 3. Differentia declares a quality of
Genus, and therefore presupposes Genus as already known; but Genus
does not in like manner presuppose Differentia. If you wish to show
that belief is the genus to which cognition belongs, you must examine
whether the _cognoscens_ believes _quâ cognoscens_. If he does so,
your point is made out.[200]

[Footnote 199: Ibid. a. 20, seq.: [Greek: e)pei\ de\ dokei= tisi\
kai\ ê( diaphora\ e)n tô=| ti/ e)sti tô=n ei)dô=n katêgorei=sthai,
chôriste/on to\ ge/nos a)po\ tê=s diaphora=s], &c.]

[Footnote 200: Topic. IV. vi. p. 128, a. 35. If you are trying to
show [Greek: tê\n e)pistê/mên o(/per pi/stin], you must examine
[Greek: ei) o( e)pista/menos ê(=| e)pi/statai pisteu/ei; dê=lon ga\r
o(/ti ê( e)pistê/mê pi/stis a)/n tis ei)/ê.]]

Wherever a predicate is universally true of its subject, while the
proposition is not true if simply converted (_i.e._, wherever the
predicate is of larger extension than the subject), there is
difficulty in distinguishing it from a genus. Accordingly, when you
are respondent, maintaining the affirmative side, you will use such
predicate as if it were a genus; but, when you are assailant, you
will not allow the respondent to do so. You may quote against him the
instance of _Non-Ens_; which is predicable of every thing generated,
but which is not a genus, since it has no species under it.[201]

[Footnote 201: Ibid. a. 38-b. 9.]


V.

Aristotle passes, in the Fifth book of the Topica, to those debates
in which the thesis set up declares the predicate as Proprium of the
subject.

A Proprium may belong to its subject either _per se_ and _semper_, or
relatively to something else and occasionally or sometimes. It is a
proprium _per se_ of man to be an animal by nature tractable. It is a
relative proprium of the soul in regard to the body, to exercise
command; of the body in regard to the soul, to obey command. It is a
proprium _semper_ of a god, to be immortal; it is an occasional
_proprium_ (_i.e._, sometimes) of this or that man, to be walking in
the market-place.[202] When the proprium is set out relatively to
something else, the debate must involve two questions, and may
involve four. Thus, if the thesis affirms that it is a proprium of
man relatively to horse (discriminating man from horse) to be by
nature two-footed, you may (as opponent) either deny that man is
two-footed, or affirm that horse is two-footed; or you may go farther
and affirm that man is by nature four-footed, or deny that horse is
by nature four-footed. If you can succeed in showing any one of these
four, you will have refuted the thesis.[203]

[Footnote 202: Ibid. V. i. p. 128, b. 14-21. That which Aristotle
calls Proprium _per se_ is a proprium of the subject as much
_relative_ as what he calls specially the _relative_ Proprium. The
Proprium _per se_ discriminates the subject from everything else; the
_relative_ Proprium discriminates it from some given correlate.]

[Footnote 203: Topic. V. i. p. 128, b. 22-33.]

The Proprium _per se_ discriminates its subject from everything else,
and is universally true thereof; the _relative_ Proprium
discriminates its subject only from some other assignable subject.
The relative Proprium may be either constant and universally true, or
true with exceptions--true and applicable in the ordinary course of
things: it may be tested through those _Loci_ which have been
enumerated as applicable to the Accident. The Proprium _per se_, and
the _constant_ Proprium, have certain _Loci_ of their own, which we
shall now indicate. These are the most logical (_sensu Aristotelico_)
or suitable for Dialectic; furnishing the most ample matter for
debates.[204]

[Footnote 204: Ibid. b. 34-p. 129, a. 35. [Greek: tô=n d' i)di/ôn
e)sti\ _lo/gika\_ ma/lista;] &c. He explains presently what he means
by [Greek: logika/--logiko\n de\ tou=t' e)sti\ pro/blêma, pro\s o(\
lo/goi ge/noit' a)\n kai\ suchnoi\ kai\ kaloi/]. The distinctions in
this paragraph are not very sharply drawn.]

Aristotle distinguishes (1) those cases in which the alleged proprium
is a true proprium, but is incorrectly or informally set out in the
thesis, from those (2) in which it is untruly predicated, or is no
proprium at all.

To set out a proprium well, that which is predicated ought to be
clearer and better known than the subject of which it is predicated,
since the purpose of predicating the proprium is to communicate
knowledge.[205] If it be more obscure or less known, you may impugn
the thesis as bad in form, or badly set out. Thus, if the thesis
declare, as a proprium of fire, that fire is of all things the most
like to the soul, this is not well set out, because the essence of
the soul is not so well known as the essence of fire. Moreover, the
fact that the predicate belongs to the subject, ought to be better
known even than the subject itself; for whoever is ignorant that A
belongs to B at all, cannot possibly know that A is the proprium of
B.[206] Thus, if the thesis declare, as proprium of fire, that it is
the first or most universal subject in which it is the nature of soul
to be found, the predicate is here doubly unknowable: first, the
hearer does not know that the soul is found in fire at all; next, he
does not know that fire is the _first_ subject in which soul is
found. On the other hand, the respondent will repel your attack if he
can show that his proprium is more knowable in both the two
above-mentioned ways. If, for example, he declares as thesis, To have
sensible perception is the proprium of an animal, here the proprium
is both well known in itself, and well known as belonging to the
given subject. Accordingly, it is well set out, as far as this
condition is concerned.[207]

[Footnote 205: Ibid. p. 129, b. 7: [Greek: gnô/seôs ga\r e(/neka to\
i)/dion poiou/metha; dia\ gnôrimôte/ron ou)=n a)podote/on; ou(/tô
ga\r e)/stai katanoei=n i(kanô=s ma=llon.]


He repeats the same dictum, substantially, in the next page, p. 130,
a. 4: [Greek: to\ ga\r i)/dion tou= mathei=n cha/rin a)podi/dotai];
and, again, p. 131, a. 1.]

[Footnote 206: Ibid. b. 15: [Greek: o( mê\ ga\r ei)dô\s ei) tô=|d'
u(pa/rchei, ou)d' ei) tô=|d' u(pa/rchei mo/nô| gnôriei=.]]

[Footnote 207: Topic. V. ii. p. 129, b. 21-29.]

A second condition of its being well set out is, that it shall
contain neither equivocal term nor equivocal or amphibolical
proposition. Thus, if the thesis declares, To perceive is the
proprium of an animal, it is equivocal; for it may mean either to
have sensible perception, or to exercise sensible perception
actually. You may apply the test to such a thesis, by syllogizing
from one or both of these equivocal meanings. The respondent will
make good his defence, if he shows that there is no such
equivocation: as, for example, if the thesis be, It is a proprium of
fire to be the body most easily moved into the upper region; where
there is no equivocation, either of term or proposition.[208]
Sometimes the equivocation may be, not in the name of the proprium
itself, but in the name of the subject to which it is applied. Where
this last is not _unum et simplex_ but equivocal, the thesis must
specify which among the several senses is intended; and, if that be
neglected, the manner of setting out is incorrect.[209]

[Footnote 208: Ibid. b. 30-p. 130, a. 13.]

[Footnote 209: Ibid. p. 130, a. 15-28.]

Another form of the like mistake is, where the same term is repeated
both in the predicate and in the subject; which is often done, both
as to Proprium and as to Definition, though it is a cause of
obscurity, as well as a tiresome repetition.[210] The repetition may
be made in two ways: either directly, by the same term occurring
twice; or indirectly, when the second term given is such that it
cannot be defined without repeating the first. An example of direct
repetition is, Fire is a _body_ the rarest among _bodies_ (for
proprium of fire). An example of indirect repetition is, Earth is a
_substance_ which tends most of all _bodies_ downwards to the lowest
region (as proprium of earth); for, when the respondent is required
to define _bodies_, he must define them--such and such
_substances_.[211] An example free from objection on this ground is,
Man is an animal capable of receiving cognition (as proprium of man).

[Footnote 210: Ibid. a. 30-34. [Greek: tara/ttei ga\r to\n a)kou/onta
pleona/kis lechthe/n--kai\ pro\s tou/tois a)doleschei=n dokou=sin.]]

[Footnote 211: Ibid. a. 34-b. 5. [Greek: e(/n ga\r kai\ tau)to/n
e)sti sô=ma kai\ ou)si/a toiadi/; e)/stai **ga\r ou(=tos to\
_ou)si/a_ pleona/kis ei)rêkô/s.]]

Another mode of bad or incorrect setting out is, when the term
predicated as proprium belongs not only to the subject, but also to
all other subjects. Such a proposition is useless; for it furnishes
no means of discriminating the subject from anything; whereas
discrimination is one express purpose of the Proprium as well as of
the Definition.[212] Again, another mode is, when the thesis declares
several propria belonging to the same subject, without announcing
that they are several. As the definer ought not to introduce into his
definition any words beyond what are required for declaring the
essence of the subject, so neither should the person who sets out a
proprium add any words beyond those requisite for constituting the
proprium. Thus, if the thesis enunciates, as proprium of fire, that
it is the thinnest and lightest body, here are two propria instead of
one. Contrast with this another proprium, free from the objection
just pointed out--Moist is that which may assume every variety of
figure.[213]

[Footnote 212: Topic. V. ii. p. 130, b. 12: [Greek: a)chrei=on
**ga\r e)/stai to\ mê\ chôri/zon a)po/ tinôn, **to\ d' e)n
toi=s i)di/ois lego/menon chôri/zein dei=, katha/per kai\ ta\ e)n
toi=s o(/rois.]]

[Footnote 213: Ibid. b. 23-37.]

A farther mistake is, when the predicate declaring the proprium
includes either the subject itself or some species comprehended under
the subject; for example, when we are told, as a proprium of animal,
that animal is a substance of which man is a species. We have already
seen that the proprium ought to be better known than its subject; but
man is even less known (posterior in respect to cognition) than
animal, because it is a species under the genus animal.[214]

[Footnote 214: Ibid. iii. p. 130, b. 38.]

Again, our canon--That the Proprium should be better known than its
subject, or should make the subject better known--will be violated in
another way, if the proprium enunciated be something opposite to the
subject, or in any other way _simul naturâ_ as compared with the
subject; and still more, if it be _posterius naturâ_ as compared with
the subject. Thus, if a man enunciates, as proprium of good, that
good is that which is most opposite to evil, his proprium will not be
well or correctly set out.[215]

[Footnote 215: Ibid. p. 131, a. 12-26. This _locus_ is not clear or
satisfactory, as Alexander remarks in Scholia (p. 284, b. 12-23,
Br.). He says that it may pass as an [Greek: e)/ndoxon]--something
sufficiently plausible to be employed in Dialectic. In fact,
Alexander virtually controverts this _locus_ in what he says a little
farther down (Schol. p. 285, a. 31), that the Proprium is always
_simul naturâ_ with its subject.]

Perhaps, again, the thesis may enunciate as proprium what is not
constantly appurtenant to the subject, but is sometimes absent
therefrom; or, intending to enunciate an occasional proprium, it may
omit to specify the qualifying epithet _occasional_. In either case
the proprium is not well set out, and a ground is furnished for
censure, which ought always to be avoided.[216]

[Footnote 216: Topic. V. iii. p. 131, a. 27-b. 18. [Greek: ou)k
e)/stai kalô=s kei/menon to\ i)/dion--ou)/koun dote/on e)sti\n
e)pitimê/seôs skê=psin.]]

Moreover, the proprium will not be well set out, if it be such as
does not necessarily belong to the subject, but is only shown by the
evidence of sense to belong thereunto. In this case, when the subject
is out of the reach of sensible perception, no one knows whether the
supposed proprium still continues as its attribute. Thus, suppose the
thesis to enunciate as a proprium of the sun, that it is the
brightest star borne in movement above the earth: the fact that it is
so borne in movement above the earth is one that we know by sensible
perception only; accordingly, after the sun sets and we cease to see
it, we cannot be sure that it continues to be borne in movement. If a
proprium knowable as such by sense be chosen, it ought to be one
which is also knowable independently, as belonging to the subject by
necessity. Thus, if a man enunciates, as proprium of superficies,
that superficies is what first becomes coloured or first receives
colour, this is a proprium well set out. For we know clearly that it
must always belong to a superficies; though we may also obtain the
additional evidence of sense, by looking at some perceivable
body.[217]

[Footnote 217: Ibid. b. 19-36. [Greek: oi(=on e)pei\ o( the/menos
e)piphanei/as i)/dion o(\ prô=ton ke/chrôstai, ai)sthêtô=| me/n tini
_proske/chrêtai_ tô=| kechrô=sthai, _toiou/tô| d' o(\ phanero/n
e)stin u(pa/rchon a)ei/_, ei)/ê a)\n kata\ tou=to kalô=s
a)podedome/non to\ tê=s e)piphanei/as i)/dion.]

Aristotle means that we know clearly, _by evidence independent of
sense_, that the superficies must be the first portion of the body
that becomes coloured, though we may attain the additional evidence
of our senses ([Greek: _proske/chrêtai_]) to the same fact.]

Perhaps too the thesis may enunciate the Definition as if it were a
Proprium; which is another ground for objecting that the proprium is
not well set out. Thus, the thesis may enunciate, as proprium of man,
that man is a land animal walking on two feet. Here what is given as
proprium is the essence of man, which never ought to be affirmed in
the proprium. To set out the proprium well, the predicate ought to
reciprocate and to be co-extensive with the subject, but it ought not
to affirm the essence thereof. A good specimen of proprium well set
out is the following, Man is an animal by nature gentle; for here the
predicate is co-extensive with the subject, yet does not declare the
essence of the subject.[218]

[Footnote 218: Ibid. b. 37-p. 132, a. 9.]

Lastly, the proprium, to be well set out, though it does not declare
the essence of the subject, yet ought to begin by presupposing the
generic portion of the essence, and to attach itself thereunto as a
constant adjunct or concomitant. Thus, suppose the thesis to
enunciate, as proprium, Animal is that which has a soul; this will
not be well set out, for the predicate is not superadded or attached
to the declared generic essence of animal. But, if the thesis
enunciates, as proprium of man, Man is an animal capable of acquiring
cognition,--this will be a proprium well set out, so far as the
present objection is concerned. For here the predicate declares first
the generic essence of the subject, and then superinduces the
peculiar adjunct thereupon.[219]

[Footnote 219: Topic. V. iii. p. 131, a. 10-21.]

Thus far Aristotle has pointed out certain conditions to be attended
to in determining whether a Proprium is well set out or described,
without determining whether it be really a Propium or not. It may
perhaps be truly predicated of the subject, and may even admit of a
better description which would show it to be a proprium of the
subject; but the description actually set out is defective, and the
assailant is entitled to impeach it on that ground. He now proceeds
to a larger discussion: What are the conditions for determining
whether the supposed Proprium be really a Proprium at all, in respect
to the subject of which it is predicated? Assuming that the
description of it is not open to impeachment on any of the grounds
above enumerated, are there not other real grounds of objection,
disproving its title to the character of Proprium?[220]

[Footnote 220: Ibid. p. 132, a. 22-27. [Greek: po/teron me\n ou)=n
kalô=s ê)\ ou) kalô=s a)pode/dotai to\ i)/dion, dia\ tô=nde
skepte/on; po/teron d' _i)/dio/n e)stin_ o(/lôs to\ ei)rême/non ê)\
ou)k i)/dion, e)k tô=nde theôrête/on.]

The distinction here noted by Aristotle (between the two
questions:--(1) Whether the alleged Proprium is well set out or
clearly described? (2) Whether the alleged Proprium is a Proprium at
all?) is not carried out, nor indeed capable of being carried out,
with strict precision. The two heads of questions run together and
become confounded. Alexander remarks (Scholia, p. 284, b. 24-46, Br.)
that the three or four last-mentioned _loci_ under the first head
embrace the second head also. He allows only three _loci_ as belonging
peculiarly to the first head--[Greek: tou= mê\ kalô=s a)podedo/sthai
to\ i)/dion]:--(1) Equivocal terms; (2) Predicate not reciprocating
or co-extensive with subject; (3) Predicate not more knowable than
subject. The other _loci_ (besides these three) enumerated by
Aristotle under the first head, Alexander considers as belonging
equally to the second head. But he commends Aristotle for making a
distinction between the two heads: [Greek: ou) ga\r pa=n to\
a)pêllotriôme/non tou/tôn, kai\ mê\ e)/chon o(mônu/mous phôna\s ê)/
ti tô=n ei)rême/nôn, kai\ i)/dion r(ête/on e)x a)na/gkês.] The manner
in which M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire explains this nice distinction is
not clear to me (Note to his translation of Topica, p. 177).]

1. Suppose your respondent to set up A as a proprium of B: you will
examine first whether A can be truly predicated of B at all; next, if
it can so be, whether it is truly predicable of B _quâ_ B, or of
every thing that comes under B _quâ_ B. Thus, if he contends that not
to be deceived by reason is a proprium of scientific men, you will be
able to show that this does not hold in geometry, since geometricians
are deceived by pseudographemes or scientific paralogisms. Or, should
the respondent deny that A is a proprium of B, you will succeed in
refuting him, if you can prove that A is truly predicable of every B
and _quâ_ B. Thus, it is a proprium of man to be an animal capable of
acquiring knowledge; because that attribute is truly predicable of
every man _quâ_ man.[221]

[Footnote 221: Topic. V. iv. p. 132, a. 27, seq.]

2. Again, suppose your respondent affirms a given proprium A of B:
you will examine whether A can be truly predicated of every thing
called B, and whether B can be truly predicated of every thing called
A; if not, the alleged proprium will not hold. Thus the affirmation,
A god is an animal participant of knowledge, is a true affirmation;
but it would not be true to say, A god is a man: wherefore, to be
participant of knowledge is not proprium of man; and, if this be the
proprium which the respondent undertakes to maintain, you will be
able to refute him. On the other hand, if what he undertakes is the
negation of a proprium (A is not a proprium of B), you will establish
the affirmative against him by showing that of every thing respecting
which A can be truly affirmed B can be affirmed also, and _vice
versâ_. You will thus show that A is a true proprium of B.[222]

[Footnote 222: Ibid. b. 8-18.]

3. Again, the respondent may perhaps affirm the subject itself as a
proprium of something inherent in the subject. You may refute this by
showing that, if it were so, the same thing would be a proprium of
several things differing from each other in species. On the other
hand, the respondent may perhaps deny that something inherent in the
subject is a proprium: you may then refute him by showing that it is
truly predicable of the subject only, and not truly predicable of any
thing else.[223]

[Footnote 223: Ibid. b. 19-34. Alexander, in the Scholia (p. 285, a.
14, Br.) has stated this _locus_ more clearly than Aristotle--[Greek:
to\ ga\r i)/dion u(pa/rchein dei= e)n e(te/rô|, ou)ch e(/teron e)n
au)tô=|.]]

4. The respondent may perhaps affirm as a proprium something
contained in the essence of the subject: if so, you will refute him
by showing this. On the other hand, if he denies something to be a
proprium, you will refute him by showing that, though it is not
contained in the essence of the subject, it is nevertheless
predicable co-extensively therewith.[224]

[Footnote 224: Topic. V. iv. p. 132, b. 35-p. 133, a. 11.]

5. The respondent may affirm as a proprium that which is not a
necessary concomitant of the subject, but may either precede or
follow it. Or, on the other hand, he may deny something to be a
proprium which you can show to be a constant and necessary
concomitant of the subject, without being included either in its
definition or differentia. In each case you will have a ground for
refuting him.[225]

[Footnote 225: Topic. V. iv. p. 133, a. 12-23.]

6. The respondent may affirm as a proprium of the subject what he has
already denied of the same subject under some other name; or he may
deny of it what he has already affirmed of it under some other name.
You will have grounds for refuting him.[226]

[Footnote 226: Ibid. a. 24-32.]

7. If there be two subjects (_e.g._, man and horse) the same with
each other in species, the respondent may affirm respecting one of
them a proprium which is not the same in species with the proprium of
the other. Thus, it is not a constant proprium of horse to stand
still spontaneously; accordingly neither is it a constant proprium of
man to move spontaneously; these two propria being the same in
species, and belonging both to man and to horse _quatenus_
animal.[227] If, therefore, the respondent affirms the one while he
denies the other, you have an argument in refutation. On the other
hand, he may propound as thesis the denial of the one proprium, while
he affirms or admits the other. Here too you will be able to make
good the counter-affirmation against his denial, on the ground of
that which he admits. Thus, if it be proprium of man to be a
walking-biped, it must also be proprium of bird to be a flying-biped.
The two pairs, man and bird, walking and flying, are the same in
species with each other, since both pairs are subordinates under the
same genus: man and bird are species, flying and walking are
differentiæ, under the same genus animal. This _locus_, however, is
not universally applicable; for perhaps one of the two predicates may
not be of exclusive application to the subject, but may belong to
other subjects also. Thus walking-biped designates only one
variety--man; but walking-quadruped designates several--horse, ass,
dog, &c. Walking-quadruped therefore is not a proprium of horse.[228]

[Footnote 227: Ibid. a. 35-b. 5. [Greek: oi(=on e)pei\ tau)to/n e)sti
tô=| ei)/dei a)/nthrôpos kai\ i(/ppos, ou)k a)ei\ de\ tou= i(/ppou
e)sti\n i)/dion to\ e(sta/nai u(ph' au(tou=, ou)k a)n ei)/ê tou=
a)nthrô/pou i)/dion to\ kinei=sthai u(ph' au(tou=; tau)to\n ga/r
e)sti tô=| ei)/dei to\ kinei=sthai kai\ e(sta/nai u(ph' au(tou=, ê(=|
zô/|ô| e)sti\n e(kate/rô| au)tô=n to\ sumbebêke/nai.] The last words
are very obscure: they are explained by Waitz (p. 486)--"[Greek: ê(=|
to\ sumbebêke/nai e(ka/teron (to\ kinei=sthai kai\ e(sta/nai u(ph'
au(tou=] intell.) [Greek: e(kate/rô| au)tô=n e)sti\ sumbebêke/nai
ê(=| zô/|ô|], quatenus utrumque de utroque, quatenus animal est,
prædicatur."]

[Footnote 228: Topic. V. iv. p. 133, b. 5-14. Alexander declares this
_locus_ to be obscure. He comments, not without reason, on the loose
manner in which Aristotle uses the term [Greek: ei)=dos]; and he
observes that Aristotle himself admits the _locus_ to be [Greek:
kata/ ti pseudê/s] (Schol. p. 285, a. 40-45, Br.). It is strange to
read that man and horse, man and bird, are [Greek: tau)to\n ei)/dei],
the same in _species_.]

8. There is some difficulty in discussing the proprium, when the
respondent is assailed by a sophistical dialectician who avails
himself of the equivocal application of _Idem_ and _Diversum_:
contending that Subject with an Accident becomes a different
subject--_e.g._, _homo albus_, a subject different from _homo_ (so
that, when a proprium has been shown to belong to _homo_, it has not
been shown that the same proprium belongs to _homo albus_); and that
the Abstract is a different subject from the Concrete--_e.g._
cognition, from the cognizing man (so that what has been shown as
proprium of cognition has not been shown as proprium of the cognizing
man). If the respondent shall himself set up these negatives, leaving
to you the task of establishing the proprium against him, you will
meet him by saying that _homo_ is not a subject absolutely different
and distinct from _homo albus_, but that there is only a notional
distinction, the same subject having here two names each with a
distinct connotation: _homo_ has its own connotation; _homo albus_
has also its own connotation, embodying in one total that which each
of the terms connotes. And, when the Sophist remarks that what is a
proprium of _scientia_ cannot be predicated also as a proprium of
_homo sciens_, you will reply that it may be so predicated, only with
a slight change of inflection. For you need not scruple to employ
sophistical refutation against those who debate with you in a
sophistical way.[229]

[Footnote 229: Topic. V. iv. p. 133, b. 15-p. 134, a. 4. [Greek:
pro\s ga\r to\n pa/ntôs e)nista/menon, pa/ntôs a)ntitakte/on
e)sti/n]. It appears to me that Aristotle is not entitled to treat
this objection as sophistical (_i.e._ as unfair Dialectic). He is
here considering predication as Proprium, contrasted with predication
as Accident. What is true as an accident respecting _homo albus_,
will also be true as an accident respecting _homo_: but what is true
as a proprium respecting _homo albus_, will not be true as a proprium
respecting _homo_--nor _vice versâ_. This is a good _locus_ for
objections in predication of Proprium. There is a real distinction
between _homo_ and _homo albus_; between Koriskus and Koriskus
_albus_: and one of the ways of elucidating that distinction is by
pointing out that the proprium of one is not the same as the proprium
of the other. Aristotle treats those who dwelt upon this distinction
as Sophists: what their manner of noticing it may have been he does
not clearly tell us; but if we are to have that logical accuracy of
speech which _his_ classification and theory demand, this distinction
must undoubtedly be brought to view among the rest.]

9. The respondent may perhaps intend to affirm as proprium something
which by nature belongs to the subject; but he may err in his mode of
stating it, and may predicate it as always belonging to the subject.
Thus, he may predicate biped as a proprium always belonging to man.
Under this mode of expression, you will be able to show that he is
wrong; for there are some men who have not two feet. On the other
hand, if the respondent denies biped to be a proprium of man, relying
upon the statement that it is not actually true of every individual,
you will be able to show against him that it is so in the correct
phraseology of belonging to man by nature.[230]

[Footnote 230: Topic. V. v. p. 131, a. 5-17. This _locus_ is a
question rather of phraseology than of real fact, and seems therefore
rather to belong to the former class of _Loci_ respecting the
Proprium--[Greek: po/teron kalô=s ê)\ ou) kalô=s a)pode/dotai to\
i)/dion]--than to the present class, which Aristotle declares (V. iv.
p. 132, a. 25) to relate to the question [Greek: po/teron i)/dio/n
e)stin o(/lôs to\ **ei)rême/non ê)\ ou)k i)/dion].]

10. That which is affirmed as a proprium may belong to its subject
either primarily and immediately, or in a secondary way--relatively
to some prior denomination of the same subject. In such cases it is
difficult to set out the proprium in terms thoroughly
unobjectionable. Thus, the superficies of a body is what is _first_
coloured: when we speak of _corpus album_, this is by reason of its
white superficies. _Album_ is a proprium true both of body and of
superficies; but the explanation usually given of Proprium will not
hold here--that, wherever the predicate can be affirmed, the subject
can be affirmed also. _Album_ is proprium of superficies; and _album_
can be truly affirmed as also proprium of body; but superficies
cannot be truly affirmed of body.[231]

[Footnote 231: Topic. V. v. p. 134, a. 18-25. This is a very obscure
and difficult _locus_. I am not sure that I understand it.]

11. The respondent who is affirming a Proprium may sometimes err by
not clearly distinguishing in what mode, and in respect to what
precise subject, he intends to affirm it. There are ten different
modes, in one or other of which he always proposes to affirm
it:--[232]

_a._ As belonging to the subject by nature. _E.g._, Biped is by
nature a proprium of man.

_b._ As belonging to the subject simply--in some way or other.
_E.g._, To have four fingers, belongs to Koriskus or some other
individual man.

_c._ As belonging to the _species_. _E.g._, It belongs to fire to be
the most subtle of all bodies.

_d._ As belonging absolutely ([Greek: a(plô=s, katha/per zô/|ou to\
zê=n])--in virtue of the essence of the subject--_per se_.[233]

_e._ As belonging to the subject by reason of some primary
intervening aspect or attribute thereof. _E.g._, Prudence is a
proprium of the soul, looked at _quatenus_ reasonable or
intellectual.

_f._ As belonging to that primary attribute or special aspect,
logically distinguished and named separately from the subject.
_E.g._, Prudence is a proprium of the _logistikon_ or _rationale_.

_g._ As belonging to the subject viewed as possessing or holding in
possession. _E.g._, The scientific man possesses that acquired mental
habit which renders him incapable of having his convictions farther
altered by discussion.

_h._ As belonging to some possession held by a possessing person.
_E.g._, Science is unalterable by discussion; where science, a
possession of the scientific man, is assigned as subject of the
proprium, unalterable by discussion.

_i._ As belonging to a subject which is partaken or held in
participation by another subject lying behind. _E.g._, Sensible
perception is a proprium of the genus animal which genus is partaken
or held in participation by this individual man, that individual
horse, &c.; whence it may be predicated not only of animal but also
of man, as thus participant.

_k._ As belonging to the ultimate subject partaking. _E.g._, To live
is a proprium of this particular man or horse, participant in the
genus animal, in the way just indicated.

[Footnote 232: Ibid. a. 26-b. 4: [Greek: sumbai/nei d' e)n e)ni/ois
tô=n i)di/ôn ô(s e)pi\ to\ polu\ gi/nesthai/ tina a(marti/an para\
to\ mê\ diori/zesthai pô=s kai\ ti/nôn ti/thêsi to\ i)/dion.
a(/pantes ga\r e)picheirou=sin a)podido/nai to\ i)/dion ê)\ to\
phu/sei u(pa/rchon], &c.

He then proceeds to enumerate the ten diversities of Proprium which I
have given in the text: this paragraph also is very obscure.

I cannot but repeat the remark here (which I made _supra_ p. 318),
that the contents of this paragraph also belong to the former
investigation (_viz._, How ought the Proprium to be set out and
described?) rather than to the present investigation (_viz._, Whether
the alleged Proprium is really a Proprium of the assigned subject or
not?).]

[Footnote 233: Topic. V. v. p. 134, a. 32: [Greek: ê)\ a(plô=s,
katha/per zô/|ou to\ zê=n.] Is not [Greek: to\ zê=n] included in the
_essentia_ ([Greek: to\ ti\ ê)=n ei)=nai]) of [Greek: zô=|on]? If so,
how can it be admitted as a _proprium_ thereof?]

Now each of these varieties of the Proprium is liable to its own mode
of erroneous setting out or description. Thus the corresponding
errors will be:--[234]

_a._ Not to add the qualifying words _by nature_.

_b._ Not to state the proprium as simply belonging, when it does only
belong to the subject now, and may presently cease to belong.

_c._ Not to state the proprium as belonging _to the species_. If he
omits these words, he may be told that it belongs to one variety
alone among the species (_e.g._, should it be a superlative) and not
to others: perhaps it may belong to some conspicuously, and to others
faintly. Or perhaps, if he does add the express words--_to the
species_, he may err, inasmuch as there exists no real species
properly so called.

_e._ _f._ Not to distinguish whether he means to affirm it of B by
reason of A, or of A directly: he will lay himself open to the
objection that his proprium, and the subject term of which he
declares it to be a proprium, are not co-extensive in predication.

_g._ _h._ Not to distinguish whether he intends as subject the person
possessing, or the possession. If he leaves this undetermined, the
objector may attack him on one ground or the other.

_i._ _k._ Not to distinguish whether he means as subject the
partaker, or the genus which is partaken. Here too the objector will
have ground for attack either from one side or from the other.

[Footnote 234: Topic. V. v. p. 134, b. 5-p. 135, a. 5. For the fourth
head (_d._), no corresponding error is assigned. It should be noted
that the illustration given of it, and remarked upon at the foot of
the last page, is repeated for the concluding head of the list.]

In case the respondent should enunciate his proprium in any one of
the above defective ways, you will thus know where to find objections
against him. But, if you undertake yourself to enunciate a proprium,
you will avoid laying yourself open to the objections, by
discriminating under which of these heads you intend to affirm
it.[235]

[Footnote 235: Topic. V. v. p. 135, a. 5: [Greek: a)/llou me\n ou)=n
ou(/tôs a)podido/ntos to\ i)/dion e)picheirête/on, au)tô=| d' ou)
dote/on e)sti\ tau/tên tê\n e)/nstasin, a)ll' eu)thu\s tithe/menon
to\ i)/dion dioriste/on o(\n tro/pon ti/thêsi to\ i)/dion.]]

12. Again, the respondent may perhaps affirm as proprium a predicate
really identical with the subject, though under a different name.
Thus, he may declare to [Greek: to\ pre/pon] to be a proprium [Greek:
tou= kalou=]: you may then refute him by showing that [Greek:
pre/pon] is identical with [Greek: kalo/n]. If he is on the negative
side, denying A to be a proprium of B on the ground that A is
identical with B, you will make out the affirmative against him by
showing that A is not identical with B, but only co-extensive and
reciprocating therewith. Thus, you may show that animated substance
is not identical with animal, but a proprium of animal.[236]

[Footnote 236: Ibid. a. 11-19.]

13. Where the subject is _homoeomeric_, the respondent may declare as
proprium of the whole what cannot be truly affirmed as proprium of a
part separately; or he may declare as proprium of a part separately
what cannot be truly declared as proprium of the whole. In either
case, you have a plausible argument for refuting him; but your
refutation will not be always conclusive, because there are various
cases in which what is true of each homoeomeric part is not true of
the whole; and _vice versâ_. If your position in the debate is
affirmative, you will select as illustration some case in which what
is by nature true of the whole is also true of each separate part:
_e.g._, The earth as a whole, and each of its parts, tend by nature
downwards. This is a proprium of the earth.[237]

[Footnote 237: Topic. V. v. p. 135, a. 20-b. 6.]

14. Respecting _Opposita_, there are different _loci_ for different
varieties.

_a._ _Contraria_.--Suppose the respondent to affirm A as proprium of
B: you will examine whether the contrary of A is proprium of the
contrary of B. If it be not, then neither is A proprium of B. Thus,
if best is not a proprium of justice, neither can worst be a proprium
of injustice. If the respondent is on the negative side, you may
prove the affirmative against him by showing that the contrary of the
alleged proprium is a proprium of the contrary of the alleged
subject.[238]

[Footnote 238: Ibid. vi. p. 135, b. 7-16.]

_b._ _Relata_.--Suppose the respondent to affirm a _relatum_ A as
proprium of a _relatum_ B, you may refute him by showing that the
correlate of A is not proprium of the correlate of B. Suppose him to
deny the same, you will refute him by proving the affirmative between
correlate and correlate.[239]

[Footnote 239: Ibid. vi. p. 135, b. 17-26.]

_c._ _Habitus et Privatio_.--Suppose the respondent to affirm an
attribute of the _habitus_ B, as proprium thereof: you may refute him
by showing that the corresponding attribute of the _privatio_
correlating with _habitus_ B, is not proprium of that _privatio_.
Suppose him to take the negative side, you will refute him by proving
the affirmative of this latter proposition.[240]

[Footnote 240: Ibid. b. 27-p. 136, a. 4.]

15. Respecting Contradictory Propositions (affirmation and negation
of the same), more than one mode of dealing may be stated. Wherever
the affirmation is a proprium of the subject, the negation cannot
also be a proprium thereof; and _vice versâ_. If the affirmative
predicate be not a proprium of the affirmative subject, neither can
the negative predicate be proprium of the negative subject; and _vice
versâ_. If the affirmative predicate be proprium of the affirmative
subject, the negative predicate will also be proprium of the negative
subject. The same predicate cannot be proprium both of the
affirmative subject and of the negative subject.[241]

[Footnote 241: Ibid. p. 136, a. 5-b. 2. This _locus_ is declared by
Aristotle to furnish arguments for refutation only, and not for
proof.]

16. Respecting two or more Contra-Specific Terms under the same genus
and exhausting the whole genus:--Suppose A and B contra-specific
terms used as subjects; C and D contra-specific terms used as
predicates. If C be not a proprium of A, neither will D be a proprium
of B; thus, if perceivable ([Greek: ai)sthêto/n]) is not a proprium
of any other species (except gods) included under the genus animal,
neither will intelligible ([Greek: noêto/n]) be proprium of a god.
Again, if C be a proprium of A, D also will be a proprium of B. Thus,
if it be a proprium of prudence to be by its own nature the
excellence of the rational or calculating soul ([Greek:
logistikou=]), we must also affirm as proprium of temperance that it
is the excellence of the appetitive soul ([Greek:
e)pithumêtikou=]).[242]

[Footnote 242: Topic. V. vi. p. 136, b. 3-13. "Il faut supposer ici
quatre termes, qui sont deux à deux les membres d'une division: si le
premier n'est pas le propre du troisième, le second ne le sera pas du
quatrième; et réciproquement pour la négation d'abord. Les quatre
termes sont ici: sensible, intelligible, membres d'une même division:
mortel, divinité, membres d'une autre division." (Barthélemy St.
Hilaire, p. 197.)]

17. Respecting Cases or Inflections, either of the subject B, or the
predicate A:--If the case or inflection of the predicate be not a
proprium of the corresponding case or inflection of the subject,
neither will the predicate be proprium of the subject. If the case or
inflection of the predicate be a proprium of the corresponding case
or inflection of the subject, then the predicate itself will also be
proprium of the subject. _Pulchré_ is not proprium of _justé_;
therefore, _pulchrum_ is not proprium of _justum_.

This _locus_ will be found available in combination with the
preceding _locus_ bearing on _Opposita_. Not only _opposita_
themselves, but also the cases and inflections of _opposita_, may be
adduced as arguments, following the rules above laid down.[243]

[Footnote 243: Topica, V. vii. p. 136, b. 15-32.]

18. Analogous cases or propositions:--If the respondent affirms A as
proprium of B, you have an argument against him by showing that
something analogous to A is not proprium of a subject analogous to B.
Thus, the builder, in relation to house-making, is analogous to the
physician, in relation to health-making; now health-making is not the
proprium of the physician, and therefore neither is house-making the
proprium of the builder. If the respondent has advanced a negative,
you will apply this same _locus_ in the affirmative against him:
_e.g._, as it is the proprium of the gymnast to impart a good habit
of body, so it is the proprium of the physician to impart
health.[244]

[Footnote 244: Ibid. b. 33-p. 137, a. 7.]

19. _Esse_, and _Generari_ or _Fieri_:--If A considered as _Ens_ is
not the proprium of B considered as _Ens_, then neither will A
considered as _Fiens_ be the proprium of B considered as _Fiens_.
_Vice versâ_, on the affirmative side: if the former of these two be
the fact, you may argue that the latter is the fact also.[245]

[Footnote 245: Topic. V. vii. p. 137, a. 21-b. 2.]

20. Comparison with the Idea:--If the respondent sets up A as
proprium of B, you will turn your mind to the Idea of B, and note
whether A is proprium of this Idea, in the same sense and under the
same aspect as it is affirmed to be proprium of B. If it be not so,
you will have an argument in refutation of the respondent. Thus, if
he maintains that it is a proprium of man to be at rest, you will
argue that this cannot be so, because to be at rest is not the
proprium of the Self-man ([Greek: au)toa/nthrôpos]) _quatenus_ man,
but _quatenus_ Idea. _Vice versâ_, you will have an affirmative
argument, if you can show that it is the proprium of the Idea. Thus,
since it is a proprium of the self-animal _quatenus_ animal to be
composed of soul and body, you may infer that to be composed of soul
and body is really a proprium of animal.[246]

[Footnote 246: Ibid. b. 3-13.]

21. _Locus_ from More and Less:--Suppose the respondent to affirm A
as proprium of B: you will have an argument against him, if you can
show that what is more A is not proprium of that which is more B.
Thus, if to be more coloured is not proprium of that which is more
body, neither is to be less coloured proprium of that which is less
body; nor is to be coloured proprium of body simply. _Vice versâ_, if
you can show that what is more A is proprium of what is more B, you
will have an affirmative argument to establish that A is proprium of
B. Thus, to perceive more is proprium of that which is more living.
Hence, to perceive simply is proprium of that which is living simply;
also, to perceive most, least, or less, is proprium of that which is
most, least, or less living, respectively.[247]

[Footnote 247: Ibid. viii. p. 137, b. 14-27.]

If you can show that A simply is not proprium of B simply, you have
an argument to establish that what is more or less A is not proprium
of that which is more or less B. If, on the other land, you show the
affirmative of the first, this will be an argument sustaining the
affirmative of the last.[248] Perhaps you can show that what is more
A is not proprium of what is more B: this will be an argument to show
that A is not proprium of B. Thus, to perceive is more proprium of
animal than to know is proprium of man; but to perceive is not
proprium of animal; therefore, to know is not proprium of man. Or
again, if you can show that what is less A is proprium of what is
less B, this will form an argument to show that A is proprium of B.
Thus, natural mansuetude is less proprium of man than life is
proprium of animal; but natural mansuetude _is_ proprium of man:
therefore life is proprium of animal.[249] Farther, if you can show
that A is more a proprium of C than it is a proprium of B, yet
nevertheless that it is not a proprium of C you may thence argue that
A is not a proprium of B. Thus, to be coloured is more a proprium of
superficies than it is a proprium of body; yet it is not a proprium
of superficies; therefore, it is _not_ a proprium of body. This last
variety of the _locus_ of More and Less (Aristotle remarks) affords
no corresponding affirmative plea;[250] for the same predicate cannot
be a proprium of many subjects. If A be really a proprium of
superficies, it cannot be also proprium of body. Lastly, you may
perhaps be able to show that C is more a proprium of B than A is a
proprium of B; yet, if C is _not_ a proprium of B, you will infer
negatively that neither is A proprium of B. Thus, to be perceivable
is more proprium of animal, than to be divisible is proprium of
animal; yet to be perceivable is _not_ proprium of animal, and,
therefore, neither is to be divisible proprium of animal. You may
invert this argument for the affirmative, if you can show that C is
less a proprium of B than A is a proprium of B, yet still that C _is_
a proprium of B; hence you will infer, _à fortiori_, that A is a
proprium thereof. _E.g._, If to perceive is less a proprium of animal
than to live is a proprium thereof, yet to perceive _is_ a proprium
of animal; then, to live is so likewise.[251]

[Footnote 248: Ibid. b. 28-p. 138, a. 3.]

[Footnote 249: Topica, V. viii. p. 138, a. 4-12.]

[Footnote 250: Ibid. p. 138, a. 13-20: [Greek: kataskeua/zonti de\ o(
to/pos ou(=tos ou)/k e)sti chrê/simos; a)du/naton ga/r e)sti tau)to\
pleio/nôn i)/dion ei)=nai.]]

[Footnote 251: Ibid. a. 21-30.]

22. _Locus_ from Equal Relation:--Arguments both negative and
affirmative may in like manner be obtained by comparing different
things which are (not more or less propria, but) alike or equally
propria of some other subject. If A is as much a proprium of B as C
is proprium of D, while yet A is _not_ a proprium of B, you may hence
infer that C is not a proprium of D. If, under this hypothesis, A
_is_ a proprium of B, you may infer affirmatively that C is a
proprium of D.[252] Or, if A and C be, alike and equally, propria of
the same subject B, then, if you show that A is not proprium thereof,
you will infer negatively that C is not so; if you show that A _is_
proprium of B, you will infer affirmatively that C is so likewise.
Or, thirdly, if A be, alike and equally, a proprium of B and of E,
then, if you can show that A is _not_ a proprium of E, you may infer
negatively that it is _not_ a proprium of B. Here, however, the
counter-inference affirmatively is not allowable; for the same
proprium cannot belong as proprium to two distinct subjects, as was
stated before.[253]

[Footnote 252: Ibid. a. 30-b. 15.]

[Footnote 253: Ibid. b. 16-22.]

23. _Locus_ from Potentiality:--No potentiality whatever can belong
to _Non-Ens_. Accordingly, if A, the proprium affirmed of a subject
B, is a potentiality, this must imply some real _Ens_ in which it
inheres, and which is correlate to the subject. But, if in the
specification of the proprium no allusion is made to such correlate,
you will attack it as a bad proprium--as a potentiality inhering in
_Non-Ens_ or nothing. _E.g._, if the case be, It is a proprium of air
to be respirable, you will refute this by pointing out that this is
true only when there exist animals in whom the potentiality of
breathing resides; that no mention is made by the respondent of this
correlate or of any other correlate; in other words, that, so far as
the specification is concerned, the correlate is passed over as
_Non-Ens_ or a non-entity. Therefore the proprium is not a good
proprium.[254] Again, suppose the affirmation to be, It is a proprium
of _Ens_ to be capable of doing or suffering something; this will be
defensible because it is only when the subject _is Ens_, that it is
declared to have such proprium.[255]

[Footnote 254: Topica, V. ix. p. 138, b. 27-37. [Greek: oi(=on e)pei\
o( ei)/pas a)e/ros i)/dion to\ a)napneusto/n tê=| duna/mei me\n
a)pe/dôke to\ i)/dion (to\ ga\r toiou=ton i)/dion _oi(=on
a)napnei=sthai_ a)napneusto/n e)stin), a)pode/dôke de\ kai\ pro\s to\
mê\ o(\n to\ i)/dion; kai\ ga\r mê\ o)/ntos zô/|ou, oi(=on a)napnei=n
pe/phuke to\n a)e/ra, e)nde/chetai a)e/ra ei)=nai; ou) me/ntoi mê\
o)/ntos zô/|ou dunato/n e)stin a)napnei=n; ô(/st' ou)d' a)e/ros
e)/stai i)/dion to\ toiou=ton oi(=on a)napnei=sthai, _to/te o(/te_
zô/|on ou)k e)/stai toiou=ton oi(=on a)napnei=n. ou)k a)\n ou)=n
ei)/ê a)e/ros i)/dion to\ a)napneusto/n.]

_Respirability_ (the proprium here discussed) being a relative term,
Aristotle demands that the correlate thereof shall be named and
included in setting out the proprium. If this be not done, a
refutative argument may be drawn from such omission--that the
respondent was not aware of the relativity. We may remark here that
this objection is founded on a bad or incomplete specification of the
proprium in question: it is not an objection against the reality of
that proprium itself, if carefully described. The objection belongs
to that class which Aristotle had discussed before, at the
commencement of Book V.]

[Footnote 255: Ibid. p. 139, a. 1-8.]

24. _Locus_ from the Superlative:--Suppose the affirmation to be, It
is a proprium of fire to be the lightest of all bodies: this you may
refute by showing that, if fire ceased to exist, there would still be
some other body the lightest of all bodies. Therefore the proprium
may still be predicated of something else, when its alleged subject
has ceased to exist. The proprium and its subject are not
reciprocating and co-extensive; therefore it is not a true
proprium.[256]

[Footnote 256: Ibid. a. 9-20.]


VI.

We now enter on the Sixth Book, containing the _Loci_ bearing on
Definition. In debates respecting Definition, there are five points
on any of which the attack and defence may turn:--[257]

1. That which the definer enunciates as a definition may not be true
at all, even as a predicate of the definiend or subject to be
defined; or at least not true of everything that bears the name of
the subject.

2. The definiend may have been included in a genus, but not in that
genus to which it rightly and specially belongs.

3. The definition given may not be specially appropriate to the
definiend (_i.e._, it may include, not only that but, other matters
besides).

4. The definition, though unobjectionable on any of the above three
grounds, may nevertheless not declare the Essence of the definiend.

5. Lastly, the definition may be good in substance, but badly
expressed or set out.

[Footnote 257: Topic. VI. i. p. 139, a. 24-35: [Greek: tê=s de\ peri\
tou\s o(/rous pragmatei/as me/rê pe/nte e)sti/n.]]

As to the first of these five heads, the _Loci_ bearing thereupon
have already been enumerated in the Third Book, on Accident: in
accidental predications the question raised is always about the truth
or falsehood of the predication.[258] As to the second and third of
the five heads, these have been dealt with in the Fourth and Fifth
Books, enumerating the _Loci_ on Genus and Proprium.[259]

[Footnote 258: Topic. VI. i. p. 139, a. 36.]

[Footnote 259: Ibid. b. 3.]

There remain the fourth and fifth heads, on which we are about to
enter: (1) Whether the definition is well expressed or set out (the
fifth head); (2) Whether it has any right to be called a definition
at all, _i.e._, whether it declares the Essence of the subject (the
fourth).[260] The fifth is taken first, because to do a thing well is
always more difficult than to do it simply, and is therefore likely
to afford greater opening for argumentative attack.

[Footnote 260: Ibid. b. 6.]

The definition, while unobjectionable in substance, may be badly set
out in two ways. First, it may be indistinct in terms--not plain nor
clear. Next, it may be redundant: the terms may include more than is
required for the definition. Under each of these defects of
expression several _loci_ may be indicated.[261]

[Footnote 261: Ibid. b. 12-18.]

1. Indistinctness may arise from the employment of equivocal terms in
the definition. Or it may arise from the term to be defined being
itself equivocal; while the definer, taking no notice of such
equivocation, has tried to comprehend all its senses under one and
the same definition. You may attack him either by denying that the
definition as given covers all the different meanings of the
definiend; or you may yourself distinguish (which the definer has
omitted to do) these different meanings, and show that none of them
or few of them are covered by the definition.[262]

[Footnote 262: Topic. VI. ii. p. 139, b. 19. [Greek: o(moi/ôs de\
kai\ ei) tou= o(rizome/nou pleonachô=s legome/nou mê\ dielô\n
ei)=pen; a)/dêlon ga\r o(pote/rou to\n o(/ron a)pode/dôken,
e)nde/chetai/ te _sukophantei=n_ ô(s ou)k e)pharmo/ttontos tou=
lo/gou e)pi\ pa/nta ô(=n to\n o(rismo\n a)pode/dôken.]

The term [Greek: sukophantei=n] surprises us here, because the point
under consideration is indicated by Aristotle himself as a real
mistake; accordingly he ought not to characterize the procedure
whereby such mistake is exposed as _mere cavil_--[Greek:
sukophanti/a]. Alexander, in the Scholia (p. 287, b. 1, Br.), says
that Aristotle intends to apply the term [Greek: sukophantei=n] to
the respondent who advances this bad definition, not to the assailant
who impeaches it. But the text of Aristotle does not harmonize with
this interpretation.]

2. Indistinctness may arise from defining by means of a metaphor; but
Aristotle treats you as a caviller if you impugn this metaphor as
though it were _proprio sensu_.[263] He declares it to be wrong, but
he seems to think that you ought to object to it at once as a
metaphor, without troubling yourself to prove it inappropriate.

[Footnote 263: Ibid. b. 32: [Greek: e)nde/chetai de\ kai\ tê\n
metaphora\n ei)po/nta _sukophantei=n_ ô(s kuri/ôs ei)rêko/ta.] Here
again we have the word [Greek: sukophantei=n] to designate what seems
a legitimate mode of argumentative attack.]

3. Indistinctness will arise if the terms of the definition are rare
or far-fetched or founded upon some fact very little known.[264]
Definitions given by Plato are cited to illustrate this.

[Footnote 264: Ibid. p. 140, a. 3: [Greek: pa=n ga\r a)saphe\s to\
mê\ ei)ôtho/s].]

4. Indistinctness arises from the employment of a poetical image,
which is even worse than a professed metaphor: as where law is
defined to be--a measure or image of things by nature just.[265]

[Footnote 265: Ibid. a. 6-17. [Greek: chei=ron o(poiouou=s tô=n kata\
metaphora\n legome/nôn].]

5. The definition is indistinct, if it does not, while making known
the definiend, make clear at the same time its contrary.[266]

[Footnote 266: Ibid. a. 18.]

6. The definition is also indistinct if it does not, when enunciated,
make known what the definiend is, without requiring that the
definiend itself shall be expressly enunciated. The definition by
itself ought to suggest at once the name of the definiend. Otherwise,
the definer is no better than those archaic painters, who, when
painting a dog or a horse, were compelled to write the name alongside
in order that the animal might be recognized.[267]

[Footnote 267: Ibid. a. 20. This last condition is a high measure of
perfection to exact from a definition. Assuredly Aristotle's own
definitions often fall lamentably short of it.]

Such are the _Loci_ regarding Indistinctness in the setting out of
the definition. The second defect is Redundancy.

1. Redundancy will arise if the terms of the definition include
either all things absolutely, or all things contained in the same
genus as the definiend; since the definition ought to consist of a
generic term to discriminate the definiend from all extra-generic
things, and a differential term to discriminate it from other things
within the same genus. A definition of the kind mentioned will be
useless through redundancy.[268] It will also be open to the like
objection, if it includes what is merely a proprium of the definiend,
over and above the essential attributes; or, indeed, if it includes
any thing else except what is required for clearly bringing out the
definiend.[269] It will be still worse, if it comprises any attribute
not belonging to all individuals of the species; for then it will not
even be a proprium or a reciprocating predication.[270]

[Footnote 268: Topic. VI. iii. p. 140, a. 23-32. Alexander, however,
remarks very pertinently, that the defects of such a definition are
defects of substance rather than of expression. Aristotle has passed
unconsciously from the latter to the former: [Greek: e)n me\n tê=|
prô/tê| tô=n e)pho/dôn do/xeien a)\n o( A)ristote/lês meta/gein ei)s
ta\s pragmatika\s e)xeta/seis] (Schol. p. 287, b. 27, Br.).]

[Footnote 269: Ibid. a. 37: [Greek: a(plô=s d' ei)pei=n, a(/pan
peri/ergon ou(= a)phairethe/ntos to\ loipo\n dê=lon poiei= to\
o(rizo/menon.]]

[Footnote 270: Ibid. b. 16.]

2. Repetition is another fault sometimes committed. The same
attribute may be predicated twice over. Or a particular and narrow
attribute may be subjoined, in addition to a more general and
comprehensive attribute in which it has already been included.[271]

[Footnote 271: Ibid. b. 27-p. 141, a. 22.]

So much for the faults which belong to the manner of expressing the
definition tendered. Next, as bearing on the matter and substance of
the definition, the following _loci_ are distinguishable.

1. The first of these _loci_ is, if the matter of the definition is
not _prius_ and _notius_ as compared with the definiend. It is one of
the canons of Definition, the purpose of which is to impart knowledge
of the definiend, to introduce nothing except what is prior by nature
and better known than the latter. The essence of each definiend--the
being what it is--is one and only one. If a definition be given,
other than that by means of what is _prius_ and _notius_, it would
follow that the same definiend might have two distinct essences;
which is impossible. Accordingly, any proposition tendered as a
definition but enunciating what is not prior by nature and better
known than the definiend sins against this canon, and is to be held
as no true definition at all.[272]

[Footnote 272: Ibid. iv. p. 141, a. 24-b. 2.]

The _locus_ here indicated by this general feature is one, but it
includes a number of varieties.[273] More known, or less known, it
should first be observed, has two distinct meanings: either more or
less known _absolutely_ (_by nature_); or more or less known _to us_.
Absolutely, or by nature, the point is better known than the line;
the line, than the superficies; the superficies, than the solid; the
_prius_, than the _posterius_. But _to us_ the reverse is true. The
solid, as object of sensible perception, is earlier known and more
known than the superficies; the superficies, than the line; the line,
than the point; the _posterius_, than the _prius_. _To us_ means to
the bulk of mankind: _absolutely_ or _by nature_ refers to the
instructed, superior, teaching and expository, intellects.[274] There
may be some cases in which the _notius nobis_ coincides and is
identical with the _notius naturâ_;[275] but, as a rule, the two are
distinct, and the one is the inverse of the other. A genuine and
perfect definition is one which enunciates the essence of the Species
through Genus and Differentiæ, which are both of them absolutely
prior and more knowable than the Species, since, if they be supposed
non-existent, the Species is nowhere to be found. No man can know the
Species without knowing its Genus and Differentiæ; but you may know
the Genus and Differentiæ without knowing the Species; hence the
Species is more unknowable than they are.[276] This is the true
scientific definition; but there are persons incapable of acquiring
knowledge by means of it. To these persons, an imperfect explanation
or quasi-definition must be given, by means of matters knowable to
them.[277] Those, however, who regard such imperfect explanations as
true definitions, must be reminded that, upon that hypothesis, we
should be compelled to admit many distinct definitions of the same
definiend. For individuals differ from each other in respect to what
is more knowable: what is more so to one man is not more so to
another. Indeed the same man differs from himself on this point at
different periods: to the early and untrained mind objects of
sensible perception are the most knowable; but, when a man has been
improved by training and instruction, the case is reversed, and the
objects of intellect become the most familiar to his mind.[278] To
define properly, therefore, we must enunciate, not the _notiora
nobis_ but, the _notiora naturâ_ or _simpliciter_; understanding by
this last phrase, not what is more knowable to all actual men but,
what is more knowable to men of well-trained and well-constituted
intellect; just as, when we speak of the wholesome, we mean what is
wholesome to the well-constituted body.[279] These conditions of
Definition you must thoroughly master, and apply to each debate as
the occasion may require. Your task in refuting an alleged definition
will be the easiest in those cases where it conforms to neither of
the above conditions; that is, when it enunciates neither what is
_notius naturâ_ nor what is _notius nobis_.[280]

[Footnote 273: Ibid. v. p. 142, b. 20.]

[Footnote 274: Topic. VI. iv. p. 141, b. 3-14.]

[Footnote 275: Ibid. b. 22.]

[Footnote 276: Ibid. b. 25.]

[Footnote 277: Ibid. b. 16.]

[Footnote 278: Ibid. b. 34.

The general mental fact here noticed by Aristotle may be seen
philosophically stated and explained in the volume of Professor Bain
on the Emotions and the Will. (Chapter on Consciousness, sect. 19, p.
581, 2nd ed.)

"A sensation is, under any view of it, a conscious element of the
mind. As pleasure or pain, we are conscious in one way; as
discrimination, we are conscious in the other way, namely, in a mode
of neutral excitement.--But this is not all. After much contact with
the sensible world, a new situation arises, and a new variety of the
consciousness, which stands in need of some explanation. When a child
experiences for the first time the sensation of scarlet, there is
nothing but the sensibility of a new impression more or less intense.
. . . It is very difficult for us to realize or define this original
shock, our position in mature life being totally altered. It is the
rarest thing for us _then_ to come under a radically new impression;
and we can only, by help of imperfect analogies, form an approximate
conception of what happens at the first shock of a discriminative
sensation. The process of engraining these impressions on the mind
after repetition, gives to subsequent sensations quite a different
character as compared with the first. The second shock of scarlet, if
it stood alone, would doubtless resemble the preceding; but such is
the nature of the mind, that the new shock will not stand alone, but
restores the notion or idea or trace that survived the former. The
sensation is no longer the primitive stroke of surprise, but a
coalition of a present shock with all that remains of the previous
occasions. Hence it may properly be said, when we see, or hear, or
touch, or move, that what comes before us is really contributed more
by the mind itself than by the object present. The consciousness is
complicated by three concurring elements--the new shock, the flash of
agreement with the sum total of the past, and the feeling of that
past as revived in the present. In truth, the new sensation is apt to
be entirely over-ridden by the old; and, in place of discriminating
by virtue of our susceptibility to what is characteristic in it, our
discrimination follows another course. For example, if I have before
me two shades of colour, instead of feeling the difference exactly as
I am struck at the moment, my judgment resorts to the round-about
process of first identifying each with some reiterated series of past
impressions; and, having two sum-totals in my mind, the difference
that I feel is between those totals. If I made a mistake, it may be
attributed not so much to a wrong act of discrimination, as to a
wrong act of identification.--All sensations, therefore, after the
first of each kind, involve a flash of recovery from the past, which
is what really determines their character. The present shock is
simply made use of as a means of reviving some one past in preference
to all others; the new impression of scarlet is in itself almost
insignificant, serving only as the medium of resuscitating the
cerebral condition resulting from the united force of all the
previous scarlets.--Sensation thus calls into operation the two great
intellectual laws, in addition to the primitive sensibility of
difference.--When we consider ourselves as performing the most
ordinary act of seeing or hearing, we are bringing into play those
very functions of the intellect that make its development and its
glory in its highest manifestations."]

[Footnote 279: Topic. VI. iv. p. 142, a. 10.]

[Footnote 280: Ibid. a. 12; also, a. 32.]

The canon being, That what is _posterius_ must be defined by its
_prius_,--the definer may sin against this in defining the _prius_ by
its _posterius_; _e.g._, if he defines the stationary and the
determinate by means of the moveable and the variable.[281] Also,
when his definition is neither _prius_, nor _posterius_, but of equal
position with the definiend, he is at fault. This may happen (1) when
he defines by an Opposite (for, according to some, the science of
Opposites is one and the same, and it is impossible that either one
of a pair can be absolutely more knowable than the other; though it
is true that no relative can be understood or explained without the
knowledge of its correlative, _e.g._, double and half); or (2) when
he includes the definiend itself in his definition, either under its
proper name or any other name;[282] or (3) when he defines by means
of a contra-specific to the definiend--by something of equal specific
rank or position, which is therefore _simul naturâ_ therewith
(_e.g._, Odd is that which is greater than even by unity); or (4)
when he defines by something specifically subordinate (_e.g._, An
even number is that which may be bisected, where bisected means
divisible by two, itself one among the even numbers[283]).

[Footnote 281: Ibid. a. 20: [Greek: pro/teron ga\r to\ me/non kai\
to\ ô(risme/non tou= a)ori/stou kai\ e)n kinê/sei o)/ntos.]]

[Footnote 282: Topic. VI. iv. p. 142, a. 22-b. 6.]

[Footnote 283: Ibid. b. 7-19: [Greek: pa/lin, ei) tô=|
a)ntidiê|rême/nô| to\ a)ntidiê|rême/non ô(/ristai--o(moi/ôs de\ kai\
ei) dia\ tô=n u(poka/tô to\ e)pa/nô ô(/ristai.]]

2. The second _locus_ (after that bearing on the _Prius et Notius_)
of argument for **impugning a definition is, where it does not
enunciate the genus in which the definiend is really included.
The mention of the genus, as enunciating the fundamental essence of
the definiend, ought to stand first in the definition. If your
opponent defines body--that which has three dimensions, or man--that
which knows how to count, you attack him by asking, What is it that
has three dimensions? What is it that knows how to count? No genus
has been assigned.[284]

[Footnote 284: Ibid. v. p. 142, b. 22-29.]

3. A third _locus_ is, where the definiend is a complex whole having
reference to several distinct facts or phenomena, while the
definition indicates only one of them. Thus, if grammar be
defined--the knowing how to write from dictation, you will object
that it is just as much--the knowing how to read. The definition is
incomplete unless it includes both.[285]

[Footnote 285: Ibid. b. 30.]

4. A fourth _locus_ is, where the definiend admits both of a better
and a worse construction, and where the definition enunciates only
the worse. You may impugn it, on the ground that every cognition and
every power must be understood as tending to its best results.[286]

[Footnote 286: Ibid. p. 143, a. 9.]

6. A fifth _locus_ is, where the definiend is enunciated as ranking,
not in the lowest and nearest species to which it belongs but, in
some higher and more distinct genus. Here the real essence will not
be declared, and the definition will thus be incomplete; unless
indeed it includes, along with the highest genus, the superadded
mention of all the differentiæ descending down to the lowest species.
It will then be complete, because it will include, in circumlocutory
phrase, all that would be declared by enunciating the specific
name.[287]

[Footnote 287: Ibid. a. 15-28.]

6. Assuming the genus to be truly declared in the definition you will
examine whether the differentiæ enunciated are differentiæ at all?
whether they really belong to the definiend? what is it which they
serve to contrast with and exclude,--since, if there be nothing such,
they cannot be truly differentiæ? whether the differential term and
its counter-differential apply to and cover the whole genus? whether,
granting the differentia to be real, it be such, when taken along
with the genus, as to constitute a true species, and whether its
counter-differentia be such also? This is a _locus_ furnishing many
possibilities of impugning the definition.[288]

[Footnote 288: Topic. VI. vi. p. 143, a. 29-b. 10.]

7. Perhaps the definition may enunciate a differentia which is merely
negative; _e.g._, A line is length without breadth. If you are
debating with a respondent who holds the (Platonic) doctrine of
Ideas, and who considers each Idea or genus to be something
numerically one, distinct from all its participants, you will find
here a _locus_ for attacking them.[289] He asserts the existence of a
Self-long or generical long, a Self-animal or generic animal, each
numerically one. Now, upon this hypothesis, since of all long you may
predicate either in the affirmative or the negative (_i.e._, either
it is broad or it is not broad), so this alternative may be
predicated of the Self-long or generical long; and thus the genus
will coincide with, or fall under the definition of, one among its
own species. Or, if this be denied, it will follow that the generic
long must be both broad and not broad; which is a contradiction still
more inadmissible. Accordingly, against one who holds the doctrine of
Ideas, declaring the genus to be _unum numero_, the negative
differentia will furnish grounds for attack; but not against any
other respondent.[290] For there are various cases in which the
negative must be employed as a part of the differentia: _e.g._, in
privative terms, blind is one whose nature it is to see but who does
not see. And, even when the differentia enunciated is affirmative, it
may have for its condivident member only a negative term, _e.g._,
length having-breadth has for its condivident member only the
negative, length not-having-breadth.[291]

[Footnote 289: Ibid. b. 11-30.]

[Footnote 290: Ibid. b. 29: [Greek: ô(/ste _pro\s e)kei/nous mo/nous_
chrê/simos o( to/pos, o(/soi to\ ge/nos e(\n a)rithmô=| phasi\n
ei)=nai. tou=to de\ poiou=sin oi( ta\s i)de/as tithe/menoi; au)to\
ga\r mê=kos kai\ au)to\ zô=|on ge/nos phasi\n ei)=nai.]]

[Footnote 291: Ibid. b. 33.]

8. Perhaps the definition may enunciate as a differentia what is
really a subordinate species; or what is really the genus itself
under another name; or what is not _Quale_, but _Quid_; or what
belongs to the definiend as an accident only. Each of these is a
_locus_ for arguments against the definition.[292]

[Footnote 292: Topica, VI. vi. p. 144, a. 5-27.]

9. Perhaps also, in the definition given, the differentia or the
species may be found predicable of the entire genus; or the genus may
be found predicable of the differentia itself, and not of objects
under it; or the species (sometimes even one of its sub-species) may
be found predicable of the differentia; or perhaps the differentia
may not be a _prius_ as regards the species (which it ought to be,
while it is a _posterius_ as regards the genus). Arguments against
the definition may be drawn from any one of these loci.[293]

[Footnote 293: Ibid. a. 28-b. 11.]

10. Recollect that the same differentia cannot belong to two distinct
genera neither of which comprehends the other, unless both are
comprehended under some higher genus. Examine whether this is
observed in the definition tendered to you.[294]

[Footnote 294: Ibid. b. 12.]

11. No genuine differentia can be derived either from the Category
_Ubi_ or from the Category _Passio_; for neither of them furnishes
characteristics essential to the subject. All _Passio_ when
intensified to a certain degree destroys the essence of the subject
and removes it from its own appropriate species; but the differentia
is inseparable from its subject; accordingly, nothing by virtue of
which the subject is called [Greek: a)lloi=on] can be a true
differentia. If the definition sins against this rule, it will be
open to question.[295]

[Footnote 295: Ibid. b. 31-p. 145, a. 12: [Greek: o(ra=n de\ kai\ ei)
to\ e)/n tini diaphora\n a)pode/dôken ou)si/as; ou) dokei= ga\r
diaphe/rein ou)si/a ousi/as tô=| _pou_ ei)=nai.--pa/lin ei) to\
pa/thos diaphora\n a)pode/dôken.--a(plô=s d' ei)pei=n, kath' o(/sa
a)lloiou=tai to\ e)/chon, ou)de\n tou/tôn diaphora\
e)kei/nou;--a(plô=s ga\r ou)k a)lloiou/metha kata\ ta\s diaphora/s.]]

12. If the subject be relative, its true differentia ought to be
relative also; thus, science or cognition is a _relatum_, and
accordingly its three differentiæ--theoretical, practical,
constructive--are all _relata_ also.[296] The definition must conform
to this; and it must also, in cases where the relative subject has
more than one correlate, declare that correlate which is the ordinary
and natural one, not any other which is rare and realized only on
occasion.[297] You must watch to see whether this condition is
observed; and also whether the correlative enunciated in the
definition is the one strictly proximate. Thus, if the definition
given of prudence be, It is an excellence of man or an excellence of
the soul, this will not be a good definition. It ought to be--an
excellence of the rational department of the soul; for it is through
and by reason of this department that both man and soul are
denominated prudent.[298]

[Footnote 296: Ibid. a. 13.]

[Footnote 297: Ibid. a. 19-26.]

[Footnote 298: Topic. VI. vi. p. 145, a. 28-32. [Greek: prô/ton ga\r
tou= logistikou= a)retê\ ê( phro/nêsis; kata\ ga\r tou=to kai\ ê(
psuchê\ kai\ o( a)/nthrôpos phronei=n le/getai.]]

13. When the definiend is given as an affection or lasting condition
of some subject, you must examine whether it really resides or can
reside (as by nature it ought to do) in the subject to which it is
referred in the definition. If it cannot, the **definition is
untenable; and this mistake is sometimes made, the producing
conditions of a phenomenon being confounded with the phenomenon
itself, or _vice versâ_.[299] Thus, some persons have
defined sleep--incapacity of sensible perception; doubt--equality of
contrary reasonings; pain--breach of continuity violently made in
parts of the organism which naturally grow together. Now sleep does
not reside in perception, nor doubt in reasonings. Sleep is that
which produces or occasions incapacity of sensible perception; doubt
is a state of mind produced by equality of contrary reasonings.[300]
This will be a _locus_ for arguing against the definition.

[Footnote 299: Ibid. b. 11: [Greek: to\ poiou/menon ei)s to\
poiêtiko\n ê)\ a)na/palin sumbai/nei tithe/nai toi=s ou(/tôs
o(rizome/nois.]]

[Footnote 300: Ibid. a. 33-b. 20.]

14. Another _locus_ is, when the definiend has direct bearing and
reference to something different from what is enunciated in the
definition. Thus, if the respondent defines justice--a power tending
to make equal distribution, you may remark hereupon, that the just
man is he who is deliberately resolved to make equal distribution,
not he who has the power to do so. If this definition were allowed,
the justest man would be he who has the greatest power of so
distributing.[301]

[Footnote 301: Ibid. vii. p. 145, b. 34-p. 146, a. 2.]

15. Again, the definition will be assailable, if the definiend admits
graduation of More or Less, while that which is enunciated in the
definition does not admit it, or _vice versâ_; also, if both of them
admit graduation, but the variations of the two are not corresponding
and concomitant. The defining phrase ought to be identical in
signification with the term defined.[302] If both of them agree in
reference to some common correlate, but one is to this in the
relation of more while the other is in the relation of less, the
definition is faulty.[303]

[Footnote 302: Ibid. p. 146, a. 3-12. [Greek: ei)/per dê\ tau)to/n
e)sti to\ kata\ to\n lo/gon a)podothe\n tô=| pra/gmati.]

Here we have a principle of Concomitant Variations analogous to that
which is so well unfolded, as one of the Four Inductive Methods, in
Mr. J. S. Mill's 'System of Logic.' See Book III. ch. viii. sect. 6.]

[Footnote 303: Topic. VI. vii. p. 146, a. 6-20: [Greek: e)/dei d'
a)mpho/tera ma=llon tô=| au)tô=| u(pa/rchein, ei)/per tau)ta\ ê)=n],
&c.]

16. Again, you will be able to object, if the definition enunciate
references to two distinct correlates, severally or alternately:
_e.g._, The beautiful is that which affords pleasure either through
the eye or through the ear; _Ens_ is that which is capable either of
suffering or acting. You may show that, according to this definition,
beautiful and not beautiful, or that _Ens_ and Non-Ens, will coincide
and be predicable of the same subjects.[304]

[Footnote 304: Topic. VI. vii. p. 146, a. 21-32.

The definition here given of _Ens_ appears in the Sophistes of Plato,
p. 247, E. The definition of the beautiful ([Greek: to\ kalo/n])
appears in the Hippias Major of Plato (p. 298, E, seq.), where it is
criticized by Sokrates.]

17. When the definition is tendered, you ought to examine and define
its own terms, which, of course, profess to enunciate genus and
differentia of the definiend.[305] You will see whether the
definitions of those defining terms are in any way inapplicable to
the definiend.

[Footnote 305: Ibid. a. 33-35.]

18. If the definiend be a _Relatum_, the definition ought to
enunciate its true correlate, or the true correlate of the genus to
which it belongs. You must examine whether this is done, and whether
the correlate enunciated be an ultimate end, as it ought to be
(_i.e._ not merely a means towards something ulterior). If the
correlate enunciated is a generation or a process, this will afford
you an argument against the definition; for all generation or process
is a means towards some ulterior end.[306]

[Footnote 306: Ibid. viii. p. 146, a. 36-b. 19. This is a subtle
distinction. He says that desire must be defined (not desire of _the
pleasurable_, but) desire of _pleasure_: we desire _the pleasurable_
for the sake of _pleasure_. He admits, however, that there are cases
in which the argument will not hold: [Greek: schedo\n ga\r oi(
plei=stoi ê(/desthai ma=llon bou/lontai ê)\ pepau=sthai ê(do/menoi;
ô(/ste to\ e)nergei=n ma=llon te/los a)\n poioi=nto tou=
e)nêrgêke/nai.]]

19. The definition ought not to omit any of the differentiæ of the
definiend; if any be omitted, the real essence is not declared. Here
then is a defect in the definition, which it is your business always
to assail on its defective side.[307] Thus, if the definiend be a
_relatum_ corresponding, not to some correlate absolutely but, to
some correlate specially quantified or qualified, the definition
ought to enunciate such quantification or qualification; if it does
not, it is open to attack.

[Footnote 307: Ibid. b. 20: [Greek: pa/lin e)p' e)ni/ôn ei) mê\
diô/rike tou= po/sou, ê)\ poi/ou, ê)\ pou=, ê)\ kata\ ta\s a)/llas
diaphora/s,--a)polei/pôn ga\r diaphora\n ê(ntinou=n ou) le/gei to\ ti
ê)=n ei)=nai; _dei= d' a)ei\ pro\s to\ e)ndee\s e)picheirei=n_.]]

20. Suppose that the definiend is one of the appetites, relative to
an _appetitum_ as correlate, a mode of the good or agreeable. You
will take notice whether the definition given thereof enunciates the
correlate as only an apparent mode of good: if it does not, you have
a _locus_ for attacking it. But if it does, and if the definer be one
who believes in the Platonic Ideas, you may attack him by showing
that his definition will not square with that doctrine. For the
definition as so given will not suit for the ideal or generic
appetite--the Self-appetite; which correlates with the ideal or
generic good--the Self-good. In this no distinction is admissible of
real and apparent: a Self-apparent-good is an absurdity.[308]

[Footnote 308: Topic. VI. viii. p. 146, b. 36-p. 147, a. 11. [Greek:
e)a\n de\ kai\ a)podô=| to\ ei)rême/non, e)pi\ ta\ ei)/dê a)kte/on
to\n tithe/menon i)de/as ei)=nai; ou) ga/r e)stin i)de/a phainome/nou
ou)deno/s, to\ d' ei)=dos pro\s to\ ei)=dos dokei= le/gesthai, oi(=on
au)tê\ e)pithumi/a au)tou= ê(de/os kai\ au)tê\ bou/lêsis au)tou=
a)gathou=. ou)k e)/stai ou)=n phainome/nou a)gathou= ou)de\
phainome/nou ê(de/os; a)/topon ga\r to\ ei)=nai au)to\ phaino/menon
a)gatho\n ê)\ ê(du/.]

Compare Plato, Parmenides, pp. 133-134, where this doctrine that if
the _relatum_ be an Idea (_sensu Platonico_), the _correlatum_ must
also be an Idea, is enunciated and pushed to its consequences:
[Greek: o(/sai tô=n i)deô=n pro\s a)llê/las ei)si\n ai(/ ei)sin,
au)tai\ pro\s au(ta\s tê\n ou)si/an e)/chousin, a)ll' ou) pro\s ta\
par' ê(mi=n ei)/te o(moiô/mata ei)/te o(/pê| dê/ tis au)ta\
ti/thetai], &c.--[Greek: au)tê\ de\ despotei/a au)tê=s doulei/as
e)sti\n o(/ e)sti], &c. (133, C-E.)]

21. Again, suppose that the definiend is a habit or disposition. You
will examine how far the definition fits as applied to the individual
person who has the habit; and how far it fits when taken in
comparison with subjects contrary or congeneric. Every such
definition, if good, implies in a certain way the definition of the
contrary: he who defines cognition furnishes by implication the
definition of ignorance.[309]

[Footnote 309: Topic. VI. ix. p. 147, a. 12-22.]

22. Or suppose the definiend to be a generic _relatum_, and the
definition to enunciate its generic correlate. You must call to mind
the specific terms comprehended under these two generic terms, and
observe whether they fit on to each other respectively. If they do
not, the definition is faulty.[310]

[Footnote 310: Ibid. a. 23-28.]

23. You will farther examine whether the Opposite of the definition
will serve as definition to the Opposite of the definiend, as the
definition of half is opposite to the definition of double; thus, if
double is that which exceeds equality, half is that which is exceeded
by equality. The like is true of Contraries: if the profitable be
that which is productive of good, the hurtful will be that which is
productive of evil or destructive of good. If, on trying the
contraries, you find that this will not hold, the definition
originally given will be found unsatisfactory.[311] In defining the
privative contrary of any term, a man cannot avoid enunciating in the
definition the term of which it is the privative: but he is not
allowed to define the term itself by means of its privative. To
define equality--that which is contrary to inequality, is improper.
You will require him at once to define inequality; and his definition
must be--the privation of equality. Substitute this definition of the
term inequality, in place of that term itself, in the above-named
definition of equality: and the last definition will then run as
follows: Equality is that which is contrary to the privation of
equality. Here the definiend is enunciated as a part of the
definition of itself; a proof that the original definition--Equality
is the contrary of inequality--is itself wrong.[312]

[Footnote 311: Topic. VI. ix. p. 147, a. 29-b. 4.

We most remember that Aristotle, classifying _Relata_ as one species
under the genus _Opposita_, treats double and half as _Opposita_,
_i.e._ _Relative-Opposita_. I have already said that I think this
classification improper, and that _Opposita_ ought to be ranked as a
species under the genus _Relata_.]

[Footnote 312: Topic. VI. ix. p. 147, b. 4-25.]

24. When the definiend is a Privative Term, the definition given
ought to enunciate that which it is, and that of which it is the
privation; also that subject in which it resides naturally and in the
first instance. In defining ignorance, the definition must enunciate
not privation only, but privation of knowledge; nor will this be
sufficient unless it be added that the privation of knowledge is in
the rational department of the soul ([Greek: e)n tô=| logistikô=|]).
Privation of knowledge in the soul or in the man, will not suffice;
because neither of these subjects is that in which the attribute
resides in the first instance: the rational department of the soul
must be named by itself, as being the primary subject of the
attribute. If the definition be wanting in any of these conditions,
you will have an argument for impeaching it.[313]

[Footnote 313: Ibid. b. 26-p. 148, a. 2.]

25. A term that is privative in form may sometimes be used in the
sense of mere negation, not in that of privation. If this term be
defined generally by privation, the definition will not include the
merely negative sense, and will therefore be impeachable. The only
general explanation attainable is that by pure negation, which is
common both to the negative and the privative. Thus, if the
respondent defines ignorance--privation of knowledge, such privation
can be predicated only of subjects whose nature it is to have
knowledge or who might be expected to have it: such privation cannot
be predicated of infants, or of inanimate objects like stones. To
include these, ignorance must be explained as the mere negation or
non-existence of knowledge; the definition thereof by privation is
inadequate.[314]

[Footnote 314: Ibid. p. 148, a. 3-9: [Greek: o(ra=n de\ kai\ ei) mê\
legome/nou kata\ ste/rêsin sterê/sei ô(ri/sato, oi(=on kai\ e)pi\
tê=s a)gnoi/as do/xeien a)\n u(pa/rchein ê( toiau/tê a(marti/a toi=s
mê\ kat' a)po/phasin tê\n a)/gnoian le/gousin.]

Waitz says in note, p. 503:--"Sensus loci hic est. Peccant qui per
privationem ignorantiam definientes non eam ignorantiam definire
voluerunt quæ est [Greek: kat' a)po/phasin], sed eam quæ est [Greek:
kata\ dia/thesin]." Compare Analyt. Poster. I. xvi. p. 79, b. 23.]

26. If you are debating with one who holds the Platonic doctrine of
Ideas, you will note whether any definition that he may give fits not
only the definiend itself but also the Idea of the definiend. Thus,
Plato in defining animal introduces mortality as a part of his
definition;[315] but mortality cannot be predicated of the Idea or
generic animal--the Self-animal; therefore, you will have an argument
against his definition. In like manner, if any active or passive
attribute is brought into his definition, you will object that this
cannot apply to the Ideas; which are avowedly impassive and
unchangeable.[316]

[Footnote 315: Topic. VI. x. p. 148, a. 15: [Greek: oi(=on ô(s
Pla/tôn o(ri/zetai to\ thnêto\n prosa/ptôn e)n toi=s tô=n zô/|ôn
o(rismoi=s.]

This may perhaps allude to Plato's manner of speaking of [Greek:
zô=|a] in Sophistes, p. 246, E., p. 265, C.; Timæus, p. 69, C.]

[Footnote 316: Topica, VI. x. p. 148, a. 14-22. [Greek: a)pathei=s
ga\r kai\ a)ki/nêtoi dokou=sin ai( i)de/ai toi=s le/gousin i)de/as
ei)=nai].]

27. Another _locus_ for counter-argument is, where the definiend is
Equivocal or Analogous, while one and the same definition is made to
apply to all its distinct meanings. Such a definition, pretending to
fit all, will in reality fit none; nothing but an univocal term can
come under one and the same definition. It is wrong to attempt to
define an equivocal term.[317] When its equivocation is not obvious,
the respondent will put it forward confidently as univocal; while you
as assailant will expose the equivocation. Sometimes, indeed, a
respondent may pretend that an univocal word is equivocal, or that an
equivocal word is univocal, in the course of the debate. To obviate
such misconception, you will do well to come to an agreement with him
prior to the debate, or to determine by special antecedent reasonings
what terms are univocal or equivocal; for at that early stage, when
he does not foresee the consequence of your questions, he is more
likely to concede what will facilitate your attack. In the absence of
such preliminary agreement, if the respondent, when you have shown
that his bad definition will not apply universally, resorts to the
pretence that the definiend, though really univocal, is equivocal,
you will press him with the true definition of the part not included
under his definition, and you will show that this true definition
suits also for the remaining parts of the definiend. You will thus
confute him by showing that, upon his original hypothesis, it must
follow that there are two distinct definitions for the same
definiend--the bad one which he has given, and the true one which you
have constrained him to admit.[318] Perhaps, however, the term which
he has undertaken to define may be really equivocal, and therefore
indefinable; nevertheless, when you have shown the insufficiency of
his definition, he may refuse to admit that the term is equivocal,
but will deny a portion of its real meaning. You will then remind him
that, as to the meaning of names, we must recognize tradition and
custom without presuming to disturb it; but that, when we combine
these names in our own discourse, we must beware of those
equivocations which mislead the multitude.[319]

[Footnote 317: Ibid. a. 23-37: [Greek: e)/ti ei) tô=n kath'
o(mônumi/an legome/nôn e(/na lo/gon a(pa/ntôn koino\n
a)pe/dôken.--a)ll' ou)de\n ê(=tton, ei) o(poterôsou=n pepoi/êken,
ê(ma/rtêken.]

Aristotle here cites and censures the definition of life given by a
philosopher named Dionysius; he remarks that life is an equivocal
term, having one meaning in animals, another and a different one in
plants. Dr. Whewell has remarked that even at the present day a good
definition of life is matter of dispute, and still a desideratum with
philosophers.

Mr. John S. Mill adverts, in more than one portion of his 'System of
Logic' (Bk. IV. ch. iii. s. 5, p. 222, seq.; Bk. V. ch. v. s. 8, p.
371), to the mistake and confusion arising from attempts to define
Equivocal Terms. "The inquiries of Plato into the definitions of some
of the most general terms of moral speculation, are characterized by
Bacon as a far nearer approach to a true inductive method than is
elsewhere to be found among the ancients, and are, indeed, almost
perfect examples of the preparatory process of comparison and
abstraction; but, from being unaware of the law just mentioned, he
often wasted the powers of this great logical instrument on inquiries
in which it could realize no result, since the phenomena, whose
common properties he so elaborately endeavoured to detect, had not
really any common properties. Bacon himself fell into the same error
in his speculations on the nature of heat, in which he evidently
confounded, under the name hot, classes of phenomena which had no
property in common."--"He occasionally proceeds like one who seeking
for the cause of hardness, after examining that quality in iron,
flint, and diamond, should expect to find that it is something that
can be traced also in hard water, a hard knot, and a hard heart."]

[Footnote 318: Topic. VI. x. p. 148, a. 37, seq. [Greek: e)pei\ d'
e)/nia lantha/nei tô=n o(mônu/môn, _e)rôtô=nti me\n ô(s sunônu/mois
chrêste/on, au)tô=| d' a)pokrinome/nô| diairete/on_. e)pei\ d'
e)/nioi tô=n a)pokrinome/nôn to\ me\n sunô/numon o(mô/numo/n phasin
ei)=nai, o(/tan mê\ e)pharmo/ttê| e)pi\ pa=n o( a)podothei\s
lo/gos,--prodiomologête/on u(pe\r tô=n toiou/tôn ê)\ prosullogiste/on
o(/ti o(mô/numon ê)\ sunô/numon, o(po/teron a)\n ê)=|; _ma=llon ga\r
sugchôrou=sin ou) proorô=ntes to\ sumbêso/menon_.]

These counsels of Aristotle are remarkable, as bearing on the
details, and even the artifices, of dialectical debate.]

[Footnote 319: Topic. VI. x. p. 148, b. 16-22. [Greek: r(ête/on pro\s
to\n toiou=ton o(/ti tê=| me\n o)nomasi/a| dei= chrê=sthai tê=|
paradedome/nê| kai\ parepome/nê| kai\ mê\ kinei=n ta\ toiau=ta,
e)/nia d' ou) lekte/on o(moi/ôs toi=s polloi=s.]]

28. If the definiend, of which a definition is tendered to you, is a
compound, you may subtract from this definition the definition of one
of the parts of the definiend, and then examine whether the remainder
will suit as a definition of the remaining part of the definiend. If
the remainder should not suit, this will show that the entire
definition tendered is not tenable. Thus, if the definiend be a
finite straight line, and if the definition tendered be, It is the
boundary of a finite plane, of which (boundary) the middle covers or
stands in the way of the extremities; you may subtract from this
definition the definition of a finite line, viz., the boundary of a
plane surface having boundaries, and the remainder of the definition
ought then to suit for the remainder of the definiend. Now the
remainder of the definiend is--straight; and the remainder of the
definition is--that of which the middle covers or stands in the way
of the extremities. But these two will _not_ suit; for a line may be
straight, yet infinite, in which case it will have neither middle nor
extremities. Accordingly, since the remainder of the definition will
not suit for the remainder of the definiend, this will serve as an
argument that the entire definition tendered is not a good one.[320]

[Footnote 320: Topic. VI. xi. p. 148, b. 23-32.]

If the definiend be a compound, and if the definition contain no
greater number of words than the definiend, the definition must be
faulty; it will be nothing better than a substitution of words. Still
more faulty will it be, if it substitutes rare and strange words in
place of others which are known and familiar; or if it introduces a
new word which signifies something different from that which it
replaces.[321]

[Footnote 321: Ibid. b. 32-p. 149, a. 13.]

The definiend, being compound, will contain both a generic and a
differential term. In general, the generic term will be the better
known of the two; yet sometimes the other is the better known.
Whichever of the two is the better known, the definer ought to choose
that, if all that he aims at is a mere substitution of one name in
place of another. But, if he aims at something more or at the
substitution of an explanatory proposition in place of a name
(without which there can be no true definition), he ought then to
choose the differentia in preference to the genus; for the definition
is produced for the purpose of imparting knowledge, and the
differentia, being usually less known than the genus, stands most in
need of extraneous help to cognition.[322] When the definition of the
differentia has thus been tendered, you will examine whether it will
be equally suitable for any other definiend also. If it be, you have
an argument against the goodness of the definition. For example, the
definition of odd number tendered to you may be--number having a
middle. Here, since number is common both to the definiend and to the
definition, having-a-middle is evidently put forward as the
equivalent of odd. But this cannot stand as equivalent to odd; since
various other subjects which are not odd (such, for example, as a
body or a line), nevertheless have a middle. Since, then, we see that
having-a-middle would be suitable in defining definiends which are
not odd, it cannot be admitted, without some qualifying adjunct, as a
good definition of odd. The adjunct annexed must declare in what
sense middle is intended, since it is an equivocal phrase.[323]

[Footnote 322: Ibid. p. 149, a. 14-28.]

[Footnote 323: Ibid. a. 29-37.]

29. If the definiend be a something really existent, the definition
given of it ought not to be a proposition declaring an incompatible
combination, such as neither does nor can exist. Some, for example,
define white--colour mingled with fire; which is incompatible, since
that which is incorporeal (colour) cannot be mingled with a body
(fire).[324]

[Footnote 324: Topic. VI. xii. p. 149, a. 38-b. 3.]

30. Again, suppose the definiend to be a _Relatum_: the correlate
thereof must of course be declared in the definition. Care, however,
must be taken that it shall be declared, not in vague generality but,
distinctly and with proper specialization; otherwise, the definition
will be incorrect either entirely or partially. Thus, if the
respondent defines medicine--the science of the really existent, he
is incorrect either wholly or partially. The _relatum_ ought to
reciprocate or to be co-extensive with its correlate.[325] When the
correlate, however, is properly specialized in the definition, it may
be declared under several different descriptions; for the same real
thing may be at once _ens_, _album_, _bonum_. None of these
descriptions will be incorrect. Yet, if the correlate is thus
described in the definition of a _relatum_, the definition cannot be
considered good or sufficient. For it applies to more things besides
the definiend; and a good definition ought to reciprocate or to be
co-extensive with its definiend.[326]

[Footnote 325: Ibid. b. 4, seq.: [Greek: e)/ti o(/soi mê\ diairou=sin
e)n toi=s pro/s ti pro\s o(\ le/getai, a)ll' e)n plei/osi
perilabo/ntes ei)=pan, ê)\ o(/lôs ê)\ e)pi/ ti pseu/dontai, oi(=on
ei)/ tis tê\n i)atrikê\n e)pistê/mên o)/ntos ei)=pen--o(moi/ôs de\
kai\ e)pi\ tô=n a)/llôn, e)peidê\ a)ntistre/phei pa/nta ta\ pro/s
ti.]]

[Footnote 326: Ibid. b. 12-23. [Greek: e)/ti d' a)du/naton to\n
toiou=ton lo/gon i)/dion tou= a)podothe/ntos ei)=nai;--dê=lon ou)=n
o(/ti o( toiou=tos ou)demia=s e)sti\n e)pistê/mês o(rismo/s; i)/dion
ga\r kai\ ou) koino\n dei= to\n o(rismo\n ei)=nai.]]

31. Another mistake in defining is committed, when a man defines, not
the subject purely and simply but, the subject in a high measure of
excellence. Sometimes the rhetor (_e.g._) is defined--one who can
perceive and produce without omission all that there is plausible in
any cause; the thief is defined--one who takes away secretly what
belongs to another. But these are the definitions, not of a rhetor
and a thief generally but, of a skilful rhetor and skilful thief. The
thief is one who is bent on taking away secretly, not one who _does_
take away secretly.[327]

[Footnote 327: Ibid. b. 24-30. [Greek: ou) ga\r o( la/thra|
lamba/nôn, a)ll' o( boulo/menos la/thra| lamba/nein, kle/ptês
e)sti/n.]]

32. Again, another error consists in defining what is desirable in
itself and on its own account, as if it were desirable as a means
towards some other end--as productive or preservative thereof. For
example, if a man defines justice--that which is preservative of the
laws; or wisdom--that which is productive of happiness, he presents
them as if they were desirable, not for themselves but, with
reference to something different from themselves. This is a mistake;
and it is not less a mistake, though very possibly the same subject
may be desirable both for itself and for the sake of something else.
For the definition ought to enunciate what is best in the definiend;
and the best of everything resides most in its essence, not in what
it is relatively to something else. It is better to be desirable _per
se_, than _alterius causâ_.[328]

[Footnote 328: Topic. VI. xii. p. 149, b. 31-39. [Greek: e(ka/stou
ga\r to\ be/ltiston e)n tê=| ou)si/a| ma/lista, be/ltion de\ to\ di'
au(to\ ai(reto\n ei)=nai tou= di' e(/teron, ô(/ste tou=to kai\ to\n
o(rismo\n e)/dei ma=llon sêmai/nein.]]

33. Perhaps the definition tendered may be a complex proposition,
enunciating two terms either jointly or severally, in one or other of
three combinations. Either the definiend is A and B; or it is that
which springs out of A and B; or it is A with B.[329] In each of
these three cases you may find arguments for impugning the
definition.

[Footnote 329: Ibid. xiii. p. 150, a. 1-4: [Greek: skopei=n de\ kai\
ei)/ tinos o(rismo\n a)podidou\s ta/de, ê)\ to\ e)k tou/tôn, ê)\
to/de meta\ tou=de ô(ri/sato.]]

_a._ Thus, take the first of the three. Suppose the respondent to
define justice by saying, It is temperance and courage. You may urge
against him, that two men, one of whom is temperate without being
courageous, while the other is courageous without being temperate,
will be just together, though neither of them separately is just;
nay, that each of them separately (the one being temperate and
cowardly, the other courageous and intemperate), will be both just
and unjust; since, if justice is temperance and courage, injustice
will be intemperance and cowardice.[330] The definer is open to the
farther objection that he treats enumeration of parts as identical
with the whole; as if he defined a house--bricks and mortar,
forgetting the peculiar mode of putting them together. Bricks and
mortar may exist, and yet there may be no house.[331]

[Footnote 330: Ibid. a. 4-14.]

[Footnote 331: Ibid. a. 15-21. [Greek: dê=lon ga\r o(/ti tô=n merô=n
o)/ntôn ou)de\n kôlu/ei to\ o(/lon mê\ ei)=nai; ô(/ste ou) tau)to\n
ta\ me/rê tô=| o(/lô|.]]

_b._ Next, suppose the definition to declare, that the definiend is
that which springs from A and B--is a result or compound of A and B.
You will then examine whether A and B are such as to yield any
result; for some couples (as a line and a number) yield no result.
Or, perhaps, the definiend may by its own nature inhere in some first
subject, while A and B do not inhere in any one first subject, but
one in the other; in which case the definition is assailable.[332]
Or, even granting that it is the nature of A and B to inhere in the
same first subject, you may find that that first subject is not the
same as the one in which the definiend inheres. Now the whole cannot
thus inhere in one, and the parts in another: you will here have a
good objection. Or, perhaps, it may appear that, if the whole be
destroyed, the parts will be destroyed also; which ought not to be,
but the reverse; for, when the parts are destroyed, the whole must
necessarily vanish. Or, perhaps, the definiend may be good or bad,
while the parts of the definition (A and B) are neither one nor the
other. (Yet this last is not a conclusive objection; for it will
sometimes happen in compound medicines that each of the ingredients
is good, while they are bad if given in conjunction.)[333] Or,
perhaps, the whole may bear the same name as one of its parts: this,
also, will render the definition impeachable. Still more will it be
impeachable, if it enunciates simply a result or compound of A and B,
without specifying the manner of composition; it ought to declare not
merely the parts of the compound, but also the way in which they are
put together to form the compound.[334]

[Footnote 332: Ibid. a. 22-30. [Greek: e)/ti ei) to\ me\n ô(risme/non
e)n e(ni/ tini pe/phuke tô=| prô/tô| gi/nesthai, e)x ô(=n d'
e)/phêsen au)to\ ei)=nai, mê\ e)n e(ni/ tini tô=| prô/tô|, all'
e(ka/teron e)n e(kate/rô|.]]

[Footnote 333: Topic. VI. xiii. p. 150, a. 30-b. 13.]

[Footnote 334: Ibid. b. 14-26. [Greek: e)/ti ei) mê\ ei)/rêke to\n
tro/pon tê=s sunthe/seôs;] &c.]

_c._ Lastly, suppose the definition to declare that the definiend is
A along with B. You will note, first, that this third head must be
identical either with the first or with the second (_e.g._, honey
_with_ water means either honey and water, or the compound of honey
with water); it will therefore be open to impeachment on one or other
of the above-named grounds of objection, according as the respondent
may admit.[335] You may also distinguish all the different senses in
which one thing may be said to be _with_ another (_e.g._, when the
two are in the same recipient, justice and courage together in the
soul; or in the same place; or in the same time), and you may be able
to show that in none of these senses can the two parts of the
definition be truly said to be one along with the other.[336] Or, if
it be true that these two parts are co-existent in time, you may
enquire whether they are not affirmed with relation to different
correlates. _E.g._, The definition of courage may be tendered thus:
Courage is daring along with right intelligence; upon which you may
remark that daring may have reference to an act of spoliation, and
that right intelligence may have reference to the preservation of
health. Now a man who has both daring and right intelligence in
_these_ senses, cannot be termed courageous, and thus you will have
an argument against the definition. And, even if they be affirmed
with reference to the same correlate (_e.g._, the duties of a
physician), a man who has both daring and right intelligence in
reference to these duties will hardly be styled courageous; the term
courage must be so defined as to have reference to its appropriate
end; _e.g._, the dangers of war, or any still more public-spirited
end.[337] Another mistake may, perhaps, be committed in this same
sort of definition--A along with B; as when, for example, the
definition tendered of anger is--pain along with the belief of being
treated with contempt. What the definer really intends here is, that
the pain arises from the belief of being treated with contempt. But
this is not expressed by the terms of his definition, in any one of
their admissible meanings.[338]

[Footnote 335: Ibid. b. 27-32. [Greek: ô(/st' e)a\n o(poterô|ou=n
tô=n ei)rême/nôn tau)to\n _o(mologê/sê|_ ei)=nai to\ to/de meta\
tou=de, tau)ta\ a(rmo/sei le/gein a(/per pro\s e(ka/teron tou/tôn
e)/mprosthen ei)/rêtai.]]

[Footnote 336: Ibid. b. 32-39. [Greek: ê)\ ô(s e)/n tini tau)tô=|
dektikô=|], &c.]

[Footnote 337: Topic. VI. xiii. p. 151, a. 1-13. [Greek: ou)/te ga\r
pro\s e(/teron au)tôn e(ka/teron dei= le/gesthai ou)/te pro\s
tau)to\n to\ tucho/n, a)lla\ pro\s to\ tê=s a)ndrei/as te/los, oi(=on
pro\s tou\s polemikou\s kindu/nous ê)\ ei)/ ti ma=llon tou/tou
te/los.]]

[Footnote 338: Ibid. a. 14-19.]

34. Perhaps the definition, while including two or more distinct
parts, may be tendered in this form: The definiend is the composition
of A and B; _e.g._, animal is the composition of soul and body. You
will first note that the definer has not declared what sort of
composition. There is a great difference between one mode of
composition and another; the mode must be specialized. Both flesh and
bone may be defined--a composition of fire, earth, and water; but one
mode of composition makes flesh, another makes bone, out of these
same elements. You may also take the farther objection that to define
a compound as composition is erroneous; the two are essentially
disparate, one of them being abstract, the other concrete.[339]

[Footnote 339: Ibid. a. 20-31.]

35. If the definiend be in its nature capable of receiving two
contrary attributes, and if the respondent define it by one or other
of them, you have an argument against him. If one of them is
admissible, the other must be equally so; and upon this supposition
there would be two distinct definitions of the same subject; which
has been already declared impossible. Thus, it is wrong to define the
soul as a substance which is recipient of knowledge; the soul is also
recipient of ignorance.[340]

[Footnote 340: Ibid. a. 32-b. 2.]

36. Perhaps the definiend is not sufficiently well known to enable
you to attack the definition as a whole, but you may find arguments
against one or other of its parts; this is sufficient to upset it. If
it be obscure and unintelligible, you should help to correct and
re-model it until it becomes clear; you will then see what are the
really assailable points in it. When you indicate and expose the
obscurity, the respondent must either substitute some clearer
exposition of his own meaning, or else he must acquiesce in that
which you propose as substitute.[341] If the improved definition
which you propose is obviously clearer and better, his previous
definition is of course put out of court; since there cannot be
several definitions of the same subject.[342]

[Footnote 341: Topic. VI. xiv. p. 151, b. 3-11. [Greek: o(/soi t'
a)saphei=s tô=n o(rismô=n, sundiorthô/santa kai\ suschêmati/santa
pro\s to\ dêlou=n ti kai\ e)/chein e)pichei/rêma, ou(/tôs
e)piskopei=n; a)nagkai=on ga\r tô=| a)pokrinome/nô| ê)\ de/chesthai
to\ e)klambano/menon u(po\ tou= e)rôtô=ntos, ê)\ au)to\n diasaphê=sai
ti/ pote tugcha/nei to\ dêlou/menon u(po\ tou= lo/gou.]]

[Footnote 342: Ibid. b. 12-17.]

To conclude, one suggestion may be given bearing upon all the
arguments that you have to carry on against definitions tendered by
respondents:--Reflect on the definiend, and frame a definition of it
for yourself, as cleverly as you can at the moment; or call to mind
any good definition of it which you may have heard before. This will
serve you as a standard with which to compare the definition
tendered, so that you will see at once what there is in it either
defective or redundant, and where you can find arguments against
it.[343]

[Footnote 343: Ibid. b. 18-23. [Greek: a)na/gkê ga\r, ô(/sper pro\s
para/deigma theô/menon, to/ t' e)llei=pon ô(=n prosê=ken e)/chein
to\n o(rismo\n kai\ to\ proskei/menon perie/rgôs kathora=n, ô(/ste
ma=llon e)picheirêma/tôn eu)porei=n.]]


VII.

In the Seventh Book of the Topica Aristotle continues his review of
the manner of debating theses which profess to define, but enters
also on a collateral question connected with that discussion: viz.,
By what arguments are we to determine whether two Subjects or
Predicates are the same _Numero_ (_modo maxime proprio_), as
distinguished from being the same merely _Specie_ or _Genere_? To
measure the extent of identity between any two subjects, is important
towards the attack and defence of a definition.[344]

[Footnote 344: Ibid. VII. i. p. 151, b. 28: [Greek: po/teron de\
tau)to\n ê)\ e(/teron kata\ to\n kuriô/taton tô=n r(êthe/ntôn peri\
tau)tou= tro/pôn (e)le/geto de\ kuriô/tata tau)to\n to\ tô=|
a)rithmô=| e(/n)] &c.]

Two subjects (A and B) being affirmed as the same _numero_, you may
test this by examining the Derivatives, the Co-ordinates, and the
Opposites, of each. Thus, if courage is identical with justice, the
courageous man will be identical with the just man; courageously will
be identical with justly. Likewise, the opposite of courage (in all
the four modes of Opposition) will be identical with the opposite of
justice. Then, again, the generators and destroyers, the generations
and destructions, of courage, will be identical with those of
justice.[345] If there be any predicate applied to courage in the
superlative degree, the same predicate will also be applied to
justice in the superlative degree.[346] If there be a third subject C
with which A is identical, B also will be identical therewith. The
same attributes predicable of A will also be predicable of B; and, if
the two be attributes, each will be predicable of the same subjects
of which the other is predicable. Both will be comprised in the same
Category, and will have the same genus and differentia. Both will
increase or diminish under the same circumstances. Each, when added
to or subtracted from any third subject, will yield the same
result.[347]

[Footnote 345: Ibid. p. 152, a. 2.]

[Footnote 346: Topic. VII. p. 152, a. 5-30: [Greek: skopei=n de\ kai\
ô(=n tha/teron ma/lista le/getai o(tiou=n, ei) kai\ tha/teron tô=n
au)tôn tou/tôn kata\ to\ au)to\ ma/lista le/getai, katha/per
Xenokra/tês to\n eu)dai/mona bi/on kai\ to\n spoudai=on a)podei/knusi
to\n au)to/n, e)peidê\ pa/ntôn tô=n bi/ôn ai(retô/tatos o( spoudai=os
kai\ o( eu)dai/môn; e(\n ga\r to\ ai(retô/taton kai\ to\ me/giston;]
&c.

Aristotle remarks that Xenokrates here carried his inference too far:
that the application of the same superlative predicate to A and B
affords indeed a presumption that they are _Idem numero_, but not a
conclusive proof thereof; that the predicate might be applied in like
manner, if B were a species comprised in A as genus.

Xenokrates made the mistake of drawing an affirmative conclusion from
syllogistic premisses in the Second figure.]

[Footnote 347: Topic. VII. i. p. 152, a. 31-b. 16.]

Farther, in examining the thesis (A is identical _numero_ with B) you
must look not merely whether it involves actually any impossible
consequences, but also whether any cases can be imagined in which it
would involve such;[348] whether the identity is not merely _specie_
or _genere_; finally, whether the one can exist without the
other.[349]

[Footnote 348: Ibid. b. 17-24. Aristotle illustrates this _locus_ as
follows:--Some say that to be _void_, and to be _full of air_, are
the same. But suppose the air to be drawn away; then the place will
no longer be full of air, yet it will still be void, even more than
it was before. One of the two terms declared to be identical is thus
withdrawn, while the other remains. Accordingly, the two are not
really identical. This illustration fits better to the principle laid
down, b. 34: [Greek: ei) du/naton tha/teron a)/neu thate/rou ei)=nai;
ou) ga\r a)\n ei)/ê tau)to/n.]]

[Footnote 349: Ibid. b. 25-35.]

Such are the various _loci_ available for argument against the thesis
affirming the equivocal predicate _same_. All of them may be useful
when you are impugning a definition; for the characteristic of this
is to declare that the defining proposition is equivalent or
identical with the defined name; and, if you can disprove such
identity, you upset the definition. But these _loci_ will be of
little avail, if your task is to defend or uphold a definition; for,
even if you succeed in establishing the above-mentioned identity, the
definition may still be open to attack for other weaknesses or
defects.[350]

[Footnote 350: Ibid. ii. p. 152, b. 36-p. 158, a. 5. [Greek:
a(/pantes oi( pro\s tau)to\n a)naskeuastikoi\ to/poi kai\ pro\s
o(/ron chrê/simoi--tô=n de\ kataskeuastikô=n to/pôn ou)dei\s
chrê/simos pro\s o(/ron;] &c.]

To uphold, or prove by way of syllogism, requires a different
procedure. It is a task hard, but not impossible. Most disputants
assume without proving their definition, in the same way as the
teachers of Geometry and Arithmetic do in their respective sciences.
Aristotle tells us that he does not here intend to give a didactic
exposition of Definition, nor of the proper way of defining
accurately or scientifically. To do this (he says) belongs to the
province of Analytic; while in the present treatise he is dealing
merely with Dialectic. For the purposes, then, of Dialectic, he
declares that syllogistic proof of a definition is practicable,
inasmuch as the definition is only a proposition declaring what is
essential to the definiend; and nothing is essential except genus (or
genera) and differentiæ.[351]

[Footnote 351: Topic. VII. iii. p. 153, a. 6-22. Compare Analyt.
Post. II. iii.-x., where the theory of Scientific Definition is
elaborately worked out; supra, Vol. I. ch. viii. pp. 346-353.]

Towards the establishment of the definition which you have to defend,
you may find arguments by examining the Contraries and Opposites of
the component terms, and of the defining proposition. If the opposite
of the definition is allowed as defining properly the opposite of the
definiend, you may argue from hence that your own definition is a
good one.[352] If you can show that there is declared in your
definition a partial correspondence of contraries either separately
in the genus, or separately in the differentia, you have a certain
force of argument in your favour; and, if you can make out both the
two separately, this will suffice for your entire definition.[353]
You may also draw arguments from the Derivatives, or Co-ordinates of
your own terms; from Analogous Terms, or from Comparates (More or
Less). If the definition of any one of these is granted to you, an
argument is furnished for the defence of an analogous definition in
the case of your own term. If it is conceded as a good definition
that forgetfulness is--the casting away of knowledge, then the
definition must also hold good that to forget is--to cast away
knowledge. If destruction is admitted to be well defined--dissolution
of essence, then to be destroyed is well defined--to be dissolved as
to essence. If the wholesome may be defined--that which is productive
of health, then also the profitable may be defined--that which is
productive of good; that is, if the declaration of the special end
makes a good definition in one case, so it will also in the
other.[354]

[Footnote 352: Ibid. a. 28: [Greek: ei) ga\r o( a)ntikei/menos tou=
a)ntikeime/nou, kai\ to\n ei)rême/nou tou= prokeime/nou a)na/gkê
ei)=nai (o(/ron).]]

[Footnote 353: Ibid. b. 14: [Greek: katho/lou d' ei)pei=n, e)pei\ o(
o(rismo/s e)stin e)k ge/nous kai\ diaphorô=n, a)\n o( tou= e)nanti/ou
o(rismo\s phanero\s ê)=|, kai\ o( tou= prokeime/nou o(rismo\s
phanero\s e)/stai.]]

[Footnote 354: Topic. VII. iii. p. 153, b. 25-p. 154, a. 11: [Greek:
e)/ti e)k tô=n ptô/seôn kai\ tô=n sustoi/chôn; a)na/gkê a)kolouthei=n
ta\ ge/nê toi=s ge/nesin kai\ tou\s o(/rous toi=s o(/rois.--e(no\s
ou)=n o(poiouou=n tô=n ei)rême/nôn o(molêthe/ntos, a)na/gkê ki\ ta\
loipa\ o(mologei=sthai.--kai\ e)k tô=n o(moi/ôs e)cho/ntôn pro\s
a)/llêla--o(moi/ôs ga\r e(/kaston tô=n ei)rême/nôn pro\s to\
oi)kei=on te/los e)/chei.]]

These _loci_, from _Analoga_, from Derivatives, from Conjugates, are
of the most frequent avail in dialectical debates or definitions. The
disputant must acquire promptitude in the employment of them. He must
learn, moreover, to test a definition tendered to him by calling to
mind particulars and sub-species, so as to determine whether the
definition fits them all. Such a procedure will be found especially
serviceable in debate with one who upholds the Platonic Ideas. Care
must also be taken to see whether the definiend is distorted from its
proper signification, or whether it is used in defining itself.[355]

[Footnote 355: Topic. VII. iv. p. 154, a. 12-22.]

These last observations are addressed to the questioner or assailant
of the definition. We have already seen however that his task is
comparatively easy; the grand difficulty is to defend a definition.
The respondent cannot at once see what he ought to aim at; and, even
when he does see it, he has farther difficulty in obtaining the
requisite concessions from his opponent, who may decline to grant
that the two parts of the definition tendered are really the genus
and differentia of the definiend; while, if there be any thing
besides these two parts contained in the essence of the definiend,
there is an excuse for declining to grant it.[356] The opponent
succeeds, if he can establish one single contradictory instance;
accordingly, a syllogism with particular conclusion will serve his
purpose. The respondent on the other hand, must meet each one of
these instances, must establish an universal conclusion, and must
show that his definition reciprocates with the definiend, so that,
wherever the latter is predicable, the former is predicable likewise,
and not in any other case whatever.[357]

[Footnote 356: Topic. VII. v. p. 154, a. 23, seq. [Greek: kai\ ga\r
i)dei=n au)to\n kai\ labei=n para\ tô=n e)rôtôme/nôn ta\s toiau/tas
prota/seis ou)k eu)pete/s], &c.]

[Footnote 357: Ibid. a. 32-b. 12.]

So much greater are the difficulties belonging to the defence of a
Definition, as compared with the attack upon it; and the same may be
said about attack and defence of a Proprium, and of a Genus. In both
cases, the assailant will carry his point, if he can show that the
predicate in question is not predicable, in this relation, of all, or
that it is not predicable, in this relation, of any one. But the
defendant is required to make good the universal against every
separate objection advanced against any one of the particulars. It is
a general rule, that the work of destruction is easier than that of
construction; and the present cases come under that rule.[358] The
hardest of all theses to defend, and the easiest to overthrow, is
where Definition is affirmed; for the respondent in this case is
required to declare well the essence of his subject, and he stands in
need of the greatest number of auxiliary data; while all the _Loci_
for attack, even those properly belonging to the Proprium, the Genus,
and the Accident, are available against him.[359] Next in order, as
regards difficulty of defence, comes the theses affirming Proprium;
where the respondent has to make out, not merely that the predicate
belongs to the subject, but that it belongs thereunto exclusively and
reciprocally: here also all the _Loci_ for attack, even those
properly belonging to Accident, are available.[360] Easiest of all
theses to defend, while it is the hardest to impugn, is that in which
Accident alone is affirmed--the naked fact, that the predicate A
belongs to the Subject B, without investing it with the character
either of Genus or Proprium. Here what is affirmed is a minimum,
requiring the smallest array of data to be conceded; moreover, the
_Loci_ available for attack are the fewest, since many of those which
may be employed against Genus, Proprium, and Definition, have no
application against a thesis affirming merely Accident.[361] Indeed,
if the thesis affirmed be only a proposition particular (and not
universal), affirming Accident (and nothing more), the task of
refuting it will be more difficult than that of maintaining it.[362]

[Footnote 358: Ibid. b. 13-32. [Greek: e)/oike d', ô(/sper kai\ e)n
toi=s a)/llois to\ diaphthei=rai toi= poiê=sai r(a=|on, ou(/tô kai\
e)pi\ tou/tôn to\ a)naskeua/sai tou= kataskeua/sai.]]

[Footnote 359: Topic. VII. v. p. 155, a. 3-21: [Greek: phanero\n de\
kai\ dio/ti pa/ntôn r(a=|ston o(/ron a)naskeua/sai.]]

[Footnote 360: Ibid. a. 23-27. Aristotle has in view the most
complete Proprium: belonging _omni_, _soli_, _et semper_.]

[Footnote 361: Ibid. a. 28-36: [Greek: r(a=|ston de\ pa/ntôn
kataskeua/sai to\ sumbebêko/s;--a)naskeua/zein de\ chalepô/taton to\
sumbebêko/s, o(/ti e)la/chista e)n au)tô=| de/dotai], &c.]

[Footnote 362: Ibid. p. 154, b. 36-p. 155, a. 2: [Greek: to\ d' e)pi\
me/rous a)na/palin r(a=|on kataskeua/sai ê)\ a)naskeua/sai;
kataskeua/zonti me\n ga\r a)po/chrê dei=xai tini\ u(pa/rchon,
a)naskeua/zonti de\ deikte/on o(/ti ou)deni\ u(pa/rchei.]]


VIII.

The Eighth Book of the Topica brings our attention back to the
general considerations contained in the First. In the intervening
part of the treatise we have had the quadruple distribution of
dialectical problems, with the enumeration of those _Loci_ of
argument which bear upon each or all: we are now invited to study the
application of these distinctions in practice, and with this view to
look once more both at the persons and the purposes of dialectical
debate. What is the order of procedure most suitable, first, for the
questioner or assailant; next, for the respondent or defender?[363]
This order of procedure marks the distinctive line of separation
between the dialectician and the man of science or philosopher: to
both of them the _Loci_ of arguments are alike available, though each
of them deals with those arguments in his own way, and in an
arrangement suitable for his purpose.[364] The dialectician, being
engaged in debate, must shape his questions, and regulate his march
as questioner, according to the concessions obtained or likely to be
obtained from his respondent; who, if a question be asked having an
obvious refutative bearing on the thesis, will foresee the
consequences of answering in the affirmative, and will refuse to
grant what is asked. On the contrary, the philosopher, who pursues
investigation with a view to his own satisfaction alone, is under no
similar restriction. He looks out at once for such premisses as
conduct straight to a conclusion; and, the more obvious their bearing
on the conclusion is, the more scientific will the syllogism be, and
the better will he be pleased.[365]

[Footnote 363: Ibid. VIII. i. p. 155, b. 3: [Greek: meta\ de\ tau=ta
peri\ ta/xeôs, kai\ pô=s dei= e)rôta=n, lekte/on.]]

[Footnote 364: Topic. VIII. i. p. 155, b. 7: [Greek: me/chri me\n
ou)=n tou= eu(rei=n to\n to/pon, o(moi/ôs tou= philoso/phou kai\ tou=
dialektikou= ê( ske/psis, to\ d' ê)/dê tau=ta ta/ttein kai\
e)rôtêmati/zein i)/dion tou= dialektikou=.]]

[Footnote 365: Ibid. b. 10-16.]

In the _praxis dialectica_ (as has already been stated) two talkers
are assumed--the respondent who sets up a thesis which he undertakes
to defend, and a questioner who interrogates with a view to impugn
it; or at least with a view to compel the other to answer in an
inconsistent or contradictory manner. We are to assume, farther, a
circle of listeners, who serve to a certain extent as guarantees
against any breach of the rules of debate.[366] Three distinct
purposes may be supposed in the debate. 1. You as a questioner may be
a teacher, and the respondent a learner; your purpose is to teach
what you know, while he wishes to learn from you what he does not
know. 2. You engage in an intellectual contest or duel with the
respondent, each of you seeking only victory over the other, though
subject on both sides to observance of the rules of debate. 3. You
neither seek to teach, nor to conquer; you and the respondent have
both the same purpose--to test the argumentative consequences of
different admissions, and to acquire a larger command of the chains
of reasoning _pro_ and _con_, bearing on some given topic.[367]

[Footnote 366: Ibid. ii. p. 158, a. 10.]

[Footnote 367: Ibid. v. p. 159, a. 26: [Greek: ou) ga\r oi( au)toi\
skopoi\ toi=s dida/skousin ê)\ mantha/nousi kai\ toi=s
a)gnônizome/nois, ou)de\ tou/tois te kai\ toi=s diatri/bousi met'
a)llê/lôn ske/psis cha/rin.]]

According as the aim of the talkers is one or other of these three,
the good or bad conduct of the dialogue, on the part both of
questioner and of respondent, must be differently appreciated. Of
each of the three, specimens may be found in Plato, though not
carefully severed but running one into the other. Aristotle appears
to have been the first to formulate the distinction theoretically,
and to prescribe for the practice of each separately. He tells us
particularly that no one before him had clearly distinguished the
third head, and prescribed for it apart from the second. The merit of
having first done this he expressly claims for the Topica.[368]

[Footnote 368: Topic. VIII. v. p. 159, a. 25-37: [Greek: e)pei\ d'
e)sti\n a)dio/rista toi=s gumnasi/as kai\ pei/ras e(/neka tou\s
lo/gous poioume/nois--e)n de\ tai=s dialektikai=s suno/dois toi=s mê\
a)gô=nos cha/rin a)lla\ pei/ras kai\ ske/pseôs tou\s lo/gous
**poioume/nois, ou) **diê/rthrôtai/ pô ti/nos dei= stocha/zesthai
to\n a)pokrino/menon kai\ o(poi=a dido/nai kai\ poi=a mê/, pro\s to\
kalô=s ê)\ mê\ kalô=s phula/ttein tê\n the/sin. _e)pei\ ou)=n ou)de\n
e)/chomen paradedome/non u(p' a)/llôn, au)toi/ ti peirathô=men
ei)pei=n_.]]

Both the questioner and the respondent have a duty towards the
dialogue; their common purpose is to conduct it well, not only
obeying the peremptory rules, but displaying, over and above, skill
for the attainment of their separate ends. Under the first and third
heads, both may be alike successful. Under the second or contentious
head, indeed, one only of the two can gain the victory; yet, still,
even the defeated party may exhibit the maximum of skill which his
position admits. This is sufficient for his credit; so that the
common work will still be well performed.[369] But a partner who
performs his own part so as to obstruct instead of forwarding this
common work--who conducts the debate in a spirit of ill-tempered
contention rather than of regular Dialectic--deserves censure.[370]

[Footnote 369: Ibid. xi. p. 161, a. 19-b. 10: [Greek: ou) ga\r
e)/stin e)pi\ thate/rô| mo/non to\ lalô=s e)pitelesthê=nai to\
koino\n e)/rgon--e)pei\ de\ phau=los koinôno\s o( e)mpodi/zôn to\
koino\n e)/rgon, dê=lon o(/ti kai\ e)n lo/gô|.] Compare Topica, I.
iii. p. 101, b. 8.]

[Footnote 370: Ibid. a. 33: [Greek: dialektikô=s kai\ _mê\_
e)ristikô=s].--b. 2-18.]

Having thus in view the dialogue as a partnership for common profit,
Aristotle administers counsel to the questioning as well as to the
responding partner. You as questioner have to deal with a thesis set
up by the respondent. You see at once what the syllogism is that is
required to prove the contrary or contradictory of that thesis; and
your business is so to shape your questions as to induce the
respondent to concede the premisses necessary towards that syllogism.
If you ask him at once and directly to concede these premisses, he
sees your drift and answers in the negative. You must therefore begin
your approaches from a greater distance. You must ask questions
bearing only indirectly and remotely upon your ultimate
conclusion.[371] These outlying and preparatory questions will fall
under four principal heads. Either (1) they will be inductive
particulars, multiplied in order that you may obtain assent to an
universal comprising them all; or (2) they will be put for the
purpose of giving dignity to your discourse; or (3) they will be
shaped with a view to conceal or keep out of sight the ultimate
conclusion that you aim at; or (4), lastly, they will be introduced
to make your whole argument clearer.[372] The third of these four
general heads--the head of questions for the purpose of
concealment--comes out principally in dialectical contests for
victory. In those it is of supreme importance, and the result depends
much on the employment of it; but even in other dialectical debates
you must employ it to a certain extent.[373]

[Footnote 371: Topic. VIII. i. p. 155, b. 29: [Greek: ta\s me\n ou)=n
a)nagkai/as, di' ô(=n o( sullogismo/s, ou)k eu)thu\s au)ta\s
protate/on, a)ll' a)postate/on o(/ti a)nôta/tô], &c.]

[Footnote 372: Topic. VIII. i. p. 155, b. 20.]

[Footnote 373: Ibid. b. 26.]

Aristotle goes at great length into the means of Concealment. Suppose
the proposition which you desire to get conceded is, The science of
two contraries is the same. You will find it useful to commence by a
question more general: _e.g._, Is the science of two opposites the
same? If the respondent answers in the affirmative, you will deduce
from his concession, by syllogism, the conclusion which you desire.
If he answers in the negative, you must then try to arrive at your
end by a string of questions respecting particular contraries or
opposites; which if the respondent grants successively, you will
bring in your general question ultimately as the inductive result
from those concessions.[374] Your particulars must be selected from
obvious matters of sense and notoriety. You are likely to obtain in
this way admissions which will serve as premisses for several
different prosyllogisms, not indeed sufficient by themselves, yet
valuable as conditions and preliminaries to the final syllogism
whereby the thesis is refuted. For, when the questions are put in
this way, the respondent will not see your drift nor the consequences
of his own concessions; so that he will more readily concede what you
want.[375] The better to conceal your purpose, you will refrain from
drawing out any of these prosyllogisms clearly at once; you will not
even put the major and minor premiss of any one of them in immediate
sequence; but you will confound the order of them intentionally,
stating first a premiss belonging to one, and next a premiss
belonging to another.[376] The respondent, thus kept in the dark,
answers in the affirmative to each of your questions successively. At
length you find that you have obtained a sufficient number of
concessions from him, to enable you to prove the syllogism
contradictory of his thesis. You inform him of this; and it shows the
perfect skill and success of your procedure, when he expresses
surprise at the announcement, and asks on what premisses you
reckon.[377]

[Footnote 374: Ibid. b. 34: [Greek: a)\n de\ mê\ tithê=|, di'
e)pagôgê=s lêpte/on, protei/nanta e)pi\ tô=n kata\ me/ros
e)nanti/ôn.]]

[Footnote 375: Ibid. p. 156, a. 7: [Greek: kru/ptonta de\
prosullogi/zesthai di' ô(=n o( sullogismo\s tou= e)x a)rchê=s me/llei
gi/nesthai, kai\ tau=ta ô(s plei=sta.]]

[Footnote 376: Ibid. a. 23: [Greek: chrê/simon de\ kai\ to\ mê\
sunechê= ta\ a)xiô/mata lamba/nein e)x ô(=n oi( sullogismoi/, a)ll'
e)nalla\x to\ pro\s e(/teron kai\ e(/teron sumpe/rasma.]]

[Footnote 377: Topic. VIII. i. p. 156, a. 13: [Greek: katho/lou d'
ei)pei=n, ou(/tô dei= e)rôta=n to\n kruptikô=s punthano/menon, ô(/st'
ê)rôtême/nou tou= panto\s lo/gou kai\ ei)po/ntos to\ sumpe/rasma
zêtei=sthai to\ dia\ ti/.]]

There are also other manoeuvres serving your purpose of concealment,
and preventing the respondent from seeing beforehand the full
pertinence of your questions. Thus, if you wish to obtain the
definition of your major, you will do well to ask the definition, not
of the term itself but, of some one among its conjugates. You will
put your question, as if the answer were of little importance in
itself, and as if you did not care whether it was given in the
affirmative or in the negative;[378] you will sometimes even suggest
objections to that which you are seeming to aim at. All this will
give you the air of a candid disputant; it will throw the respondent
off his guard, and make him more ready to answer as he really thinks,
without alarm for the consequences.[379] When you wish to get a
certain premiss conceded, you will put the question first upon a
different premiss analogous to it. In putting your question, you will
add that the answer which you desire is a matter of course, familiar
and admitted by every one; for respondents are shy of contradicting
any received belief, unless they have present to their minds a clear
instance adverse to it.[380] You will never manifest apparent
earnestness about an answer; which would make the respondent less
willing to concede it.[381] You will postpone until the last the
premiss which you wish to obtain, and will begin by putting questions
the answers to which serve as remote premisses behind it, only in the
end conducting to it as consequence. Generally speaking, questioners
do the reverse, putting first the questions about which they are most
anxious; while most respondents, aware of this habit, are most
intractable in regard to the first questions, except some
presumptuous and ill-tempered disputants, who concede what is asked
at first but afterwards become obstinate in denegation.[382] You will
throw in some irrelevant questions with a view to lengthen the
procedure, like fallacious geometers who complicate a diagram by
drawing unnecessary lines. Amidst a multitude of premisses falsehood
is more likely to escape detection; and thus, also, you may perhaps
be able to slip in, unperceived and in a corner, some important
premiss, which, if put as a separate question by itself, would
certainly not have been granted.[383]

[Footnote 378: Ibid. b. 6: [Greek: a(plô=s d' ei)pei=n, o(/ti
ma/lista poiei=n a)/dêlon, po/teron to\ proteino/menon ê)\ to\
a)ntikei/menon bou/letai labei=n; a)dê/lou ga\r o)/ntos tou= pro\s
to\n lo/gon chrêsi/mou, ma=llon to\ dokou=n au(toi=s tithe/asin.]]

[Footnote 379: Ibid. b. 18: [Greek: dei= de\ kai\ au)to/n pote
au(tô=| e)/nstasin phe/rein; a)nupo/ptôs ga\r e)/chousin oi(
a)pokrino/menoi pro\s tou\s dokou=ntas dikai/ôs e)picheirei=n.]]

[Footnote 380: Ibid. b. 10, 20: [Greek: chrê/simon de\ kai\ to\
e)pile/gein o(/ti su/nêthes kai\ lego/menon to\ toiou=ton; o)knou=si
ga\r kinei=n to\ ei)ôtho/s, e)/nstasin mê\ e)/chontes.]]

[Footnote 381: Ibid. b. 23: [Greek: e)/ti to\ mê\ spouda/zein].]

[Footnote 382: Ibid. b. 30-39: [Greek: kai\ to\ e)p' e)scha/tô|
e)rôta=n o(\ ma/lista bou/letai labei=n;] &c.]

[Footnote 383: Topic. VIII. i. p. 157, a. 1-5: [Greek: e)/ti to\
mêku/nein kai\ paremba/llein ta\ mêde\n chrê/sima pro\s to\n lo/gon,
katha/per oi( pseudographou=ntes; pollô=n ga\r o)/ntôn a)/dêlon e)n
o(poi/ô| to\ pseu=dos. dio\ kai\ lantha/nousin e)ni/ote oi(
e)rôtô=ntes e)n parabu/stô| prostithe/ntes a(\ kath' au(ta\
proteino/mena ou)k a)\n tethei/ê.]]

Such are the multifarious suggestions addressed by Aristotle to the
questioner for concealing his method of attack;[384] Concealment
being the third of the four general heads relating to the treatment
of premisses not immediately necessary for proof of the final
refutative conclusion. On the other three general heads--Induction
from particulars to an universal, Dignity, Clearness--Aristotle goes
into less detail. For Clearness, he recommends that examples should
be introduced; especially familiar examples, taken from well-known
poets like Homer, not from obscure poets like Choerilus.[385]

[Footnote 384: Ibid. a. 6: [Greek: ei)s me\n ou)=n pru/psin toi=s
ei)rême/nois chrêste/on], &c.]

[Footnote 385: Ibid. a. 14.]

In regard to Induction, Aristotle points out an embarrassment often
arising from the want of suitable universal names. When, after having
obtained an affirmative answer about several similar particulars, you
wish to put a question generalizing the result, you will sometimes
find no universal term fitting the position. You are obliged to say:
Will it not be so in all such cases? and this lets in a serious
difficulty, how to know what other cases are like, and what are not.
Here the respondent will often dispute your right to include this or
that other particular.[386] You will do well to coin a new universal
term fitting the situation.

[Footnote 386: Ibid. ii. p. 157, a. 18-33. [Greek: dio\ peirate/on
e)pi\ pa/ntôn tô=n toiou/tôn o)nomatopoiei=n au)to/n], &c.]

If the respondent answers in the affirmative to several questions of
similar particulars, but answers in the negative when you sum them up
in an universal comprehending all similar cases,--you may require him
to cite some particular case justifying his denial; though you cannot
require him to do this before he has made the affirmative
answers.[387] It is not sufficient that he should cite, as the single
case of exception, the express case which forms the subject of the
thesis: He ought to produce some distinct and independent instance,
really comprised within the genus, and not merely connected with it
by the link of an equivocal term.[388] If he produces an adverse
instance really comprised within the genus, you may perhaps be able
to re-model your question, so as to make reserve for the basis on
which this objection is founded. The respondent will then be
compelled (unless he can foresee some new case of objection) to
concede the universal with this special qualification; so that you
will have gained all that you really require. Should the respondent
continue to refuse, without producing any new case, he will
transgress the rules of Dialectic; which recognize an universal
affirmative, wherever there are numerous affirmative particulars
without one assignable negative.[389] Indeed, if you know the
universal to hold in many particular cases, and do not know of any
others adverse, you may boldly put your question at once in reference
to the universal (without going first through the series of
particulars). The respondent will hardly venture to deny it, not
having in his mind any negative particulars.[390]

[Footnote 387: Ibid. a. 34-37.]

[Footnote 388: Ibid. a. 37-b. 8.]

[Footnote 389: Topic. VIII. ix. p. 1577, b. 8-33. [Greek: dialektikê\
ga/r e)sti pro/tasis pro\s ê(\n ou(/tôs e)pi\ pollô=n e)/chousan mê\
e)/stin e)/nstasis.]]

[Footnote 390: Ibid. p. 158, a. 3-6.]

You must however keep in mind what a dialectic universal premiss
really is. Not every question requiring an universal answer is
allowed to be put. You must not ask for positive information, nor put
such questions as the following: What is man? In how many different
senses is good employed? A dialectic question is one to which the
respondent makes sufficient reply by saying, Yes or No.[391] You must
ask in this form: Is the definition of man so and so? Is good
enunciated in this or that different sense? To these questions the
respondent may answer Yes or No. But if he persists in negative
answers to your multiplied questions as to this or that sense of the
term good, you may perhaps stand excused for asking him: "In how many
different senses, then, do you yourself use the term good?"[392]

[Footnote 391: Ibid. p. 158, a. 14, seq. [Greek: e)/sti ga\r
pro/tasis dialektikê\ pro\s ê(\n e)/stin a)pokri/nasthai nai\ ê)\
ou)/.]]

[Footnote 392: Ibid. a. 21-24.]

When you have obtained concessions which furnish premisses for a
formal syllogism, you will draw out and propound that syllogism and
its conclusion forthwith, without asking any farther question from
the respondent or any leave from him to do so. He may indeed deny
your right to do this, in spite of the concessions which he has made;
and the auditors around, not fully appreciating all his concessions,
may perhaps think that he is entitled to deny it. But, if you ask his
leave to draw out the syllogism and he refuses to give leave, the
auditors are much more likely to think that your syllogism is not
allowable.[393] If you have the choice between an ostensive syllogism
and a _Reductio ad Absurdum_, you ought always to prefer the former,
as plainer and more incontestable.[394]

[Footnote 393: Ibid. a. 7-12: [Greek: ou) dei= de\ to\ sumpe/rasma
e)rô/têma poiei=n; ei) de\ mê/, a)naneu/santos ou) dokei= gegone/nai
sullogismo/s.]]

[Footnote 394: Topic. VIII. ii. p. 158, b. 34-p. 158, a. 2.]

You must not persevere long in the same line of questions. For, if
the respondent answers them all, it will soon appear that you are in
the wrong course, since your syllogism, if you can get one at all,
will always be obtained from a small number of premisses; and, if the
respondent will not answer them, you have no alternative except to
protest and desist.[395]

[Footnote 395: Ibid. p. 158, a. 25-30.]

The theses that are most difficult to attack are also most easy to
defend; and these are the highest universals, and the lowest
particulars. The highest you cannot deal with, unless you can get a
definition of them; which is sometimes impossible and always
difficult; since the respondent will neither define them himself nor
accept your definitions. Those which are next to the highest are also
difficult to impugn, because there are few intermediate steps of
proof. Again, the lowest particulars are also difficult for the
contrary reason, that there are so many intermediate steps, and it is
tedious to enumerate them all continuously; while, if any are
omitted, the demonstration is incomplete, and the procedure will
appear sophistical.[396] The most difficult of all to impugn are
definitions framed in vague and unintelligible terms, where you do
not know whether they are univocal or equivocal, literal or
metaphorical. When the thesis tendered to you presents such
difficulty, you may presume that it is affected with the obscurity of
terms here indicated; or, at any rate, that its terms stand in need
of definition.[397] In geometrical construction, as well as in
dialectical debate, it is indispensable that the _principia_ or
primary terms should be defined, and defined properly; without this,
neither the one nor the other can be pursued.[398]

[Footnote 396: Ibid. iii. p. 158, a. 31, seq. [Greek: ê)\
sophismatô/dê phai/netai ta\ e)picheirê/mata.]]

[Footnote 397: Ibid. iii. p. 158, b. 8-23; p. 159, a. 3: [Greek:
ou)/koun dei= lantha/nein, o(/tan dusepichei/rêtos ê)=| ê( the/sis,
o(/ti pe/ponthe/ ti tô=n ei)rême/nôn.]]

[Footnote 398: Ibid. p. 158, b. 24-p. 159, a. 2.]

Sometimes the major and minor premisses of your syllogistic
conclusion are more difficult to establish--more beyond the level of
average intelligence--than the thesis itself. In such a case some may
think that the respondent ought to grant these premisses, because, if
he refuses and requires them to be proved, he will be imposing upon
the questioner a duty more arduous than the thesis itself imposes;
others may say that he ought not to grant them, because, if he did,
he would be acknowledging a conclusion derived from premisses
requiring proof as much or more than itself.[399] A distinction must
here be made. If you are putting questions with a view to teach, the
learner ought not to grant such premisses as those above described,
because he is entitled to require that in every step of the process
he shall be inducted from what is more knowable to what is less
knowable. Accordingly, when you attempt to demonstrate to him
something which he knows little, by requiring him to concede
something which he knows still less, he cannot be advised to grant
what you ask. But, if you are debating with a companion for the
purpose of dialectical exercise, he ought to grant what you ask
whenever the affirmative really appears to him true.[400]

[Footnote 399: Topic. VIII. iii. p. 159, a. 4-11. [Greek: o(/tan d'
ê)=| pro\s to\ a)xi/ôma kai\ tê\n pro/tasin mei=zon e)/rgon
dialegê=nai ê)\ tê\n the/sin, diaporê/seien a)/n tis po/teron
thete/on ta\ toiau=ta ê)\ ou)/;] &c.]

[Footnote 400: Ibid. a. 11-14: [Greek: ê)\ tô=| me\n mantha/nonti ou)
thete/on, a)\n mê\ gnôrimô/teron ê)=|, tô=| de\ gumnazome/nô|
thete/on, a)\n a)lêthe\s mo/non phai/nêtai. ô(/ste phanero\n o(/ti
ou)ch o(moi/ôs e)rôtô=nti/ te ki\ dida/skonti a)xiôte/on tithe/nai.]

This section is obscure and difficult. I am not sure that I
understand it. It seems doubtful whether the verb [Greek: tithe/nai]
is intended to apply to the questioner or to the respondent.]

We have now said enough for the purpose of instructing the questioner
how to frame and marshal his interrogations. We must turn to the
respondent, and point out how _he_ must answer in order to do well
and perform his duty to the common work of dialogue. Speaking
generally, the task of the questioner is to conduct the dialogue so
as to make the respondent enunciate the most improbable and absurd
replies which follow necessarily from the thesis that he has
undertaken to defend; while the task of the respondent is to make it
appear that these absurdities follow from the thesis itself, and not
from his manner of defending it. The respondent may err in one of two
ways, or indeed in both together: either he may set up an
indefensible thesis; or he may fail to defend it in the best manner
that it really admits; or he may do both. The second is a worse error
than the first, in reference to the general purpose of
Dialectic.[401]

[Footnote 401: Ibid. iv. p. 159, a. 15-24: [Greek: tou= d'
a)pokrinome/nou to\ mê\ di' au)to\n phai/nesthai sumbai/nein to\
a)du/naton ê)\ to\ para/doxon, a)lla\ dia\ tê\n the/sin; e(te/ra ga\r
i)/sôs a(marti/a to\ the/sthai prô=ton o(\ mê\ dei= kai\ to\
the/menon mê\ phula/xai kata\ tro/pon.]]

Aristotle distinguishes (as has been already stated) three purposes
in the dialogue:--(1) Teaching and Learning; (2) Contention, where
both questioner and respondent strive only for victory; (3)
Investigating and Testing the consequences of some given
doctrine.[402] The first two of these three are dismissed rapidly. In
the first, the teaching questioner has no intention of deceiving, and
the pupil respondent has only to answer by granting all that appears
to him true.[403] In the second, Aristotle tells us only that the
questioner must always appear as if he were making some point of his
own; while the respondent, on his side, must always appear as if no
point were made against him.[404] But in regard to the third
head--dialogues of Search, Testing, Exercise--he is more copious in
suggestions: he considers these as the proper field of Dialectic,
and, as we saw, claims to have been the first who treated them apart
from the didactic dialogues on one side, and the contentious on the
other.[405]

[Footnote 402: Ibid. v. p. 159, a. 24-28.]

[Footnote 403: Ibid. a. 29: [Greek: tô=| me\n ga\r mantha/nonti
thete/on a)ei\ ta\ dokou=nta; kai\ ga\r ou)/d' e)picheirei= pseu=dos
ou)dei\s dida/skein.]]

[Footnote 404: Topic. VIII. iv. p. 159,. a. 30: [Greek: tô=n d'
a)gnônizome/nôn to\n me\n e)rôtô=nta phai/nesthai/ ti dei= poiei=n
pa/ntôs, to\n d' a)pokrino/menon mêde\n phai/nesthai pa/schein.]]

[Footnote 405: Ibid. a. 32-37; xi. p. 161, a. 23-25: [Greek:
duskolai/nontes ou)=n a)gnônistika\s kai\ ou) dialektika\s poiou=ntai
ta\s diatriba/s; e)/ti d' e)pei\ gumnasi/as kai\ pei/ras cha/rin
a)ll' ou) didaskali/as oi( toiou=toi tô=n lo/gôn], &c.]

The thesis which the respondent undertakes to defend (in a dialogue
of Search or Testing) must be either probable, or improbable, or
neither one nor the other. The probability or improbability may be
either simple and absolute, or special and relative--in the
estimation of the respondent himself or of some one or more persons.
Now, if the thesis be improbable, the opposite thereof, which you the
questioner try to prove, must be probable; if the thesis be probable,
the opposite thereof must be improbable; if the thesis be neither,
its opposite will also be neither. Suppose, first, that the thesis is
improbable absolutely. In that case, its opposite, which you the
questioner must fish for premisses to prove, will be probable; the
respondent therefore ought not to grant you any demand which is
either simply improbable or less probable than the conclusion which
you aim at proving; for no such concessions can really serve your
purpose, since you are bound to prove your conclusion from premisses
more probable than itself.[406] Suppose, next, that the thesis is
probable absolutely. In that case, the opposite conclusion, which you
have to make out, will be improbable absolutely. Accordingly,
whenever you ask concessions that are probable, the respondent ought
to grant them; whenever you ask for concessions that are less
improbable than your intended conclusion, he ought to grant these
also; but, if you ask for any thing more improbable than your
intended conclusion, he ought to refuse it.[407] Suppose, thirdly,
that the thesis is neither probable nor improbable. Here, too, the
respondent ought to grant all concessions that appear to him
probable, as well as all that he thinks more probable than the
opposite conclusion which you are seeking to arrive at; but no
others. This is sufficient for the purpose of Dialectic, and for
keeping open the lines of probable argument.[408]

[Footnote 406: Ibid. v. p. 159, b. 9: [Greek: phanero\n ô(s a)do/xou
me\n o)/ntos a(plô=s tou= keime/nou ou) dote/on tô=| a)pokrinome/nô|
ou)/th' o(\ mê\ dokei= a(plô=s, ou)/th' o(\ dokei= me/n ê(=tton de\
tou= sumpera/smatos dokei=. a)do/xou ga\r ou)/sês tê=s the/seôs
e)/ndoxon to\ sumpe/rasma, ô(/ste dei= ta\ lambano/mena e)ndoxa
pa/nt' ei)=nai kai\ ma=llon e)/ndoxa tou= prokeime/nou, ei) me/llei
dia\ tô=n gnôrimôte/rôn to\ ê(=tton gnô/rimon perai/nesthai. ô(/st'
ei)/ ti mê\ toiou=to/n e)sti tô=n e)rôtôme/nôn, ou) thete/on tô=|
a)pokrinome/nô|.]]

[Footnote 407: Ibid. b. 16.]

[Footnote 408: Topic. VIII. v. p. 159, b. 19-23: [Greek: i(kanô=s
ga\r a)\n do/xeie dieile/chthai--ou(/tô ga\r e)ndoxote/rous
sumbê/setai tou\s lo/gous gi/nesthai.]]

When the probability or improbability of the thesis is considered
simply and absolutely, the respondent ought to measure his
concessions by the standard of opinion received usually.[409] When
the probability or improbability of the thesis is considered as
referable to the respondent himself, he has only to consult his own
judgment and estimation in granting or refusing what is asked. When
he undertakes to defend a thesis avowedly as the doctrine of some
known philosopher, such as Herakleitus, he must, in giving his
answers, measure probability and improbability according to what
Herakleitus would determine.[410]

[Footnote 409: Ibid. b. 24: [Greek: pro\s ta\ dokou=nta a(plô=s tê\n
**su/gkrisin poiête/on].]

[Footnote 410: Ibid. b. 25-35. [Greek: pro\s tê\n e)kei/nou dia/noian
a)poble/ponta thete/on e(/kasta kai\ a)rnête/on].]

Since all the questions that you ask must be either probable,
improbable, or neuter, and either relevant[411] or not relevant to
your purpose of refuting the thesis, let us first suppose that you
ask for a concession which is in itself probable, but not relevant.
The respondent ought to grant it, adding that he thinks it probable.
If what you ask is neither probable nor relevant, he ought even then
to grant it; but annexing a notification that he is aware of its
improbability, in order to save his own credit for intelligence.[412]
If it be both probable and relevant, he ought to say that he is aware
of its probability, but that it is too closely connected with the
thesis, and that, if he grants it, the thesis will stand refuted. If
it be relevant, yet at the same time very improbable, he must reply
that, if he grants it, the thesis will be refuted, but that it is too
silly to be propounded. If, being neutral, it is also not relevant,
he ought to grant it without comment; but if, being neutral, it is
relevant, he ought to notify that he is aware that by granting it his
thesis will be refuted.[413]

[Footnote 411: Ibid. vi. p. 159, b. 39: [Greek: ê)\ pro\s to\n
lo/gon, ê)\ mê\ pro\s to\n lo/gon]. By this phrase Aristotle seems to
mean, not simply relevant, but closely, directly, conspicuously
relevant--equivalent to [Greek: li/an suneggu\s tou= e)n a)rchê=|]
(p. 160, a. 5).]

[Footnote 412: Ibid. b. 36-p. 160, a. 2. [Greek: e)a\n de\ mê\
dokou=n kai\ mê\ pro\s to\n lo/gon, dote/on me/n, e)pisêmante/on de\
to\ mê\ dokou=n pro\s eu)la/beian eu)êthei/as.]

How is this to be reconciled with what Aristotle says in the
preceding chapter, p. 159, b. 11-18, that the respondent ought not to
grant such improbabilities at all?]

[Footnote 413: Ibid. p. 160, a. 6-11.]

In this way of proceeding, the march of the dialogue on both sides
will be creditable. The respondent, signifying plainly that he
understands the full consequences of his own concessions, will not
appear to be worsted through any short-comings of his own, but only
through what is inherent in his thesis; while you the questioner,
having asked for such premisses as are really more probable than the
conclusion to be established, and having had them granted, will have
made out your point. It must be understood that you ought not to try
to prove your conclusion from premisses less probable than itself;
and that, if you put questions of this sort, you transgress the rules
of dialectical procedure.[414]

[Footnote 414: Topic. VIII. vi. p. 160, a. 11-16. [Greek: ou(/tô ga\r
o(/ t' a)pokrino/menos ou)de\n do/xei di' au(to\n pa/schein, e)a\n
proorô=n e(/kasta tithê=|, o(/ t' e)rôtô=n teu/xetai sullogismou=
titheme/nôn au)tô=| pa/ntôn e)ndoxote/rôn tou= sumpera/smatos. o(/soi
d' e)x a)doxote/rôn tou= sumpera/smatos e)picheirou=si
sullogi/zesthai, dê=lon ô(s ou) kalô=s sullogi/zontai; dio\ toi=s
e)rôtô=sin ou) thete/on.]]

If you ask a dialectical question in plain and univocal language, the
respondent is bound to answer Yes or No. But if you ask it in terms
obscure or equivocal, he is not obliged to answer thus directly. He
is at liberty to tell you that he does not understand the question;
he ought to have no scruple in telling you so, if such is really the
fact. Suppose the terms of your question to be familiar, but
equivocal; the answer to it may perhaps be either true or false,
alike in all the different senses of the terms. In that case, the
respondent ought to answer Yes or No directly. But, if the answer
would be an affirmation in one sense of the terms and a negation in
another, he must take care to signify that he is aware of the
equivocation, and to distinguish at once the two-fold meaning; for,
if the distinction is not noticed till afterwards, he cannot clearly
show that he was aware of it from the first. If he really was not at
first aware of the equivocation, and gave an affirmative answer
looking only to one among the several distinct meanings, you will try
to convict him of error by pushing him on the other meaning. The best
thing that he can then do will be to confess his oversight, and to
excuse himself by saying that misconception is easy where the same
term or the same proposition may mean several different things.[415]

[Footnote 415: Ibid. vii. p. 160, a. 17-34.]

Suppose you put several particular questions (or several analogous
questions) with the view of arriving ultimately by induction at the
concession of an universal, comprising them all. If they are all both
true and probable, the respondent must concede them all severally;
yet he may still intend to answer No, when the universal is tendered
to him after them. He has no right to answer thus, however, unless he
can produce some contradictory particular instance, real or apparent,
to justify him; and, if he does so without such justification, he is
a perverse dialectician.[416] Perhaps he may try to sustain his
denegation of the universal, after having conceded many particulars,
by a counter-attack founded on some chain of paradoxical reasoning
such as that of Zeno against motion; there being many such paradoxes
contradictory of probabilities, yet hard to refute. But this is no
sufficient justification for refusing to admit the universal, when,
after having admitted many particulars, he can produce no particular
adverse to them. The case will be still worse, if he refuses to admit
the universal, having neither any adverse instance, nor any
counter-ratiocinative attack. It is then the extreme of perverse
Dialectic.[417]

[Footnote 416: Topic. VIII. viii. p. 160, b. 2-5: [Greek: to\ ga\r
a)/neu e)nsta/seôs, ê)\ ou)/sês ê)\ dokou/sês, kôlu/ein to\n lo/gon
duskolai/nein e)sti/n. ei) ou)=n e)pi\ pollô=n phainome/nou mê\
di/dôsi to\ katho/lou mê\ e)/chôn e)/nstasin, phanero\n o(/ti
duskolai/nei.]]

[Footnote 417: Ibid. b. 5, seq. [Greek: e)/ti ei) mêd'
a)ntepicheirei=n e)/chei o(/ti ou)k a)lêthe/s, pollô=| ma=llon a)\n
do/xeie duskolai/nein. kai/toi ou)de\ tou=th' i(kano/n; pollou\s ga\r
lo/gous e)/chomen e)nanti/ous tai=s do/xais, ou(\s chalepo\n lu/ein,
katha/per to\n Zê/nônos o(/ti ou)k e)nde/chetai kinei=sthai ou)de\
to\ sta/dion dielthei=n; _a)ll' ou) dia\ tou=to ta)ntikei/mena
tou/tois ou) thete/on_.]]

Before the respondent undertakes to defend any thesis or definition,
he ought to have previously studied the various modes attacking it,
and to have prepared himself for meeting them.[418] He must also be
cautious of taking up improbable theses, in either of the senses of
improbable. For a thesis is so called when it involves strange and
paradoxical developments, as if a man lays down either that every
thing is in motion or that nothing is in motion; and also, when it
implies a discreditable character and is contrary to that which men
wish to be thought to hold, as, for example, the doctrine that
pleasure is the good, or that it is better to do wrong than to suffer
wrong. If a man defends such theses as these, people hate him because
they presume that he is not merely propounding them as matter for
dialectical argument, but advocating them as convictions of his
own.[419]

[Footnote 418: Ibid. ix. p. 160, b. 14.]

[Footnote 419: Ibid. b. 17-22: [Greek: a)/doxon d' u(po/thesin
eu)labête/on u(pe/chein; ei)/ê d' a)\n a)/doxos dichô=s;] &c.]

The respondent must farther be able, if you bring against him a false
syllogistic reasoning, to distinguish upon which among your premisses
the false conclusion really turns, and to refute that one. Your
reasoning may have more than one false premiss; but he must not
content himself with refuting any one or any other: he must single
out that one which is the chief determining cause of the falsehood.
Thus, if your syllogism be:--Every man in a sitting position is
writing, Sokrates is a man in a sitting position; therefore, Sokrates
is writing,--it will not suffice that the respondent should refute
your minor premiss, though this may be false;[420] because such a
refutation will not apply to the number of other cases in which men
are sitting but not writing; and therefore it will not expose the
full bearing of the falsehood. Your major premiss is that upon which
the full bearing of the falsehood depends; and the respondent must
show that he is aware of this by refuting your major.[421]

[Footnote 420: Topic. VIII. x. p. 160, b. 23-26. [Greek: ou) ga\r o(
o(tiou=n a)nelô\n le/luken, ou)/d' ei) pseu=do/s e)sti to\
a)nairou/menon; e)/choi ga\r a)\n plei/ô pseudê= o( lo/gos.]]

[Footnote 421: Ibid. b. 30-39. [Greek: oi)=de de\ tê\n lu/sin o(
ei)dô\s o(/ti para\ tou=to o( lo/gos--ou) ga\r a)po/chrê to\
e)nstê=nai, ou)/d' a)\n pseu=dos ê)=| to\ a)nairou/menon, a)lla\ kai\
dio/ti pseu=dos a)podeikte/on; _ou(/tô ga\r a)\n ei)/ê phanero\n
po/teron proorô=n ti ê)\ ou)\ poiei=tai tê\n e)/nstasin_.]]

This last-mentioned proceeding--refutation of that premiss upon which
your false conclusion in its full bearing really turns--is the only
regular, valid, and complete objection whereby the respondent can
stop out your syllogistic approaches. There are indeed three other
modes of objection to which he may resort; but these are all either
inconclusive or unfair. He may turn his objection against you
personally; and, without refuting any of your premisses, he may thus
perplex and confuse you, so that you are disqualified from pursuing
the thread of your questions. Or he may turn his objections against
portions of your questions; not refuting any one of your premisses,
but showing that, as they stand, they are insufficient to warrant the
conclusion which you seek to establish; when, if you are master of
your subject, and retain your calmness, you will at once supply the
deficiency by putting additional questions, so that his objection
thus vanishes. Or, lastly, he may multiply irrelevant objections
against time, for the purpose of prolonging the discussion and tiring
you out.[422] Of these four modes of objection open to the respondent
the first is the only one truly valid and conclusive; the three
others are obstructions either surmountable or unfair, and the last
is the most discreditable of all.[423]

[Footnote 422: Ibid. p. 161, a. 1-12: [Greek: e)/sti de\ lo/gon
kôlu=sai sumpera/nasthai tetrachô=s. ê)\ ga\r a)nelo/nta par' o(\
gi/netai to\ pseu=dos. ê)\ pro\s to\n e)rôtô=nta e)/nstasin
ei)po/nta;--tri/ton de\ pro\s ta\ ê)rôtême/na;--teta/rtê de\ kai\
cheiri/stê tô=n e)nsta/seôn ê( pro\s to\n chro/non.]]

[Footnote 423: Ibid. a. 13-15: [Greek: ai( me\n ou)=n e)nsta/seis,
katha/per ei)/pamen, tetrachô=s gi/nontai; lu/sis d' e)sti\ tô=n
ei)rême/nôn ê( prô/tê mo/non, ai( de\ loipai\ kôlu/seis tine\s kai\
e)mpodismoi\ tô=n sumperasma/tôn.]]

To blame the argumentative procedure and to blame the questioner are
two distinct things. Perhaps your manner of conducting the
interrogation, preparatory to your final syllogism, may be open to
censure; yet nevertheless you the questioner may deserve no censure;
for it may be the respondent's fault, not yours. He may refuse to
grant the very premisses which are essential to the good conduct of
your case; he may resort to perverse evasions and contradictions for
the mere purpose of thwarting you; so that you are forced to adapt
yourself to his unworthy manoeuvres rather than to aim at the thesis
itself. Dialectic cannot be well conducted unless both the partners
do their duty to the common purpose; the bad conduct of your
respondent puts you out, and the dialectic presently degenerates on
both sides into angry contention.[424] Apart from this, too, it must
be remembered that the express purpose of Dialectic is not to teach,
but to search and test consequences and to exercise the intellect of
both parties. Accordingly you are not always restricted to true
syllogistic premisses and conclusions. You are allowed to resort
occasionally to false premisses and false conclusions; for, if what
the respondent advances be true, you have no means of refuting it
except by falsehood; and, if what he advances be false, the best way
of refuting it may be through some other falsehood.[425] You render
service to him by doing so; for, since his beliefs are contrary to
truth, if the dialogue is confined to his beliefs, the result may
perhaps contribute to persuade him, but it will not instruct or
profit him.[426] It is your business to bring him round and
emancipate him from these erroneous beliefs; but you must accomplish
this in a manner truly dialectical, and not contentious; whether you
proceed by true or by false conclusions.[427] If you on your side,
indeed, put questions in a contentious spirit, it is you that are to
blame. But often the respondent is most to blame, when he refuses to
grant what he thinks probable, and when he does not apprehend what
you really intend to ask.[428] He is sometimes also to blame for
granting what he ought to refuse; such as _Petitio Principii_ or
Affirmation of Contraries. It is often difficult to distinguish what
questions involve _Petitio Principii_ or Affirmation of Contraries:
they are asked and granted without either party being aware, and the
like mistake is committed by men in private talk, not merely in
formal dialogue. When this happens, the argument will inevitably be a
bad one; but the fault is with the respondent who, having before
refused what he ought to have granted, now grants what he ought to
refuse.[429]

[Footnote 424: Topic. VIII. xi. p. 161, a. 16-24. [Greek:
duskolai/nontes ou)=n a)gônistika\s kai\ ou) dialektika\s poiou=ntai
ta\s diatriba/s.] a. 37: [Greek: phau=los koinôno\s o( e)mpodi/zôn
to\ koino\n e)/rgon.]]

[Footnote 425: Ibid. a. 24-31: [Greek: e)/ti d' e)pei\ gumnasi/as
kai\ pei/ras cha/rin a)ll' ou) didaskali/as oi( toiou=toi tô=n
lo/gôn, dê=lon ô(s ou) mo/non ta)lêthê= sullogiste/on a)lla\ kai\
pseu=dos, ou)de\ di' a)lêthô=n a)ei\ a)ll' e)ni/ote kai\ pseudô=n.
polla/kis ga\r a)lêthou=s tethe/ntos a)nairei=n a)na/gkê to\n
dialego/menon, ô(/ste protate/on ta\ pseudê=. e)ni/ote de\ kai\
pseu/dous tethe/ntos a)nairete/on dia\ pseudô=n.]]

[Footnote 426: Ibid. a. 30: [Greek: ou)de\n ga\r kôlu/ei tini\
dokei=n ta\ mê\ o)/nta ma=llon tô=n a)lêthô=n, ô(/st' e)k tô=n
e)kei/nô| dokou/ntôn tou= lo/gou genome/nou ma=llon e)/stai
pepeisme/nos ê)\ ô)phelême/nos.]]

[Footnote 427: Ibid. a. 33: [Greek: dei= de\ to\n kalô=s
metabiba/zonta dialektikô=s kai\ mê\ e)ristikô=s metabiba/zein.]
About [Greek: to\ metabiba/zein], compare Topica, I. ii. p. 101, a.
23.]

[Footnote 428: Ibid. b. 2: [Greek: o(/ te ga\r e)ristikô=s e)rôtô=n
phau/lôs diale/getai, o(/ t' e)n tô=| a)pokri/nesthai mê\ didou\s ta\
phaino/menon mêd' e)kdecho/menos o(/ ti/ pote bou/letai o( e)rôtô=n
puthe/sthai.]]

[Footnote 429: Topic. VIII. xi. p. 161, b. 11-18: [Greek: e)pei\ d'
e)sti\n a)dio/riston po/te ta)nanti/a kai\ po/te ta\ e)n a)rchê=|
lamba/nousin oi( a)/nthrôpoi (polla/kis ga\r kath' au(tou\s le/gontes
ta)nanti/a le/gousi, kai\ a)naneu/santes pro/teron dido/asin
u(/steron; dio/per e)rôtô/menoi ta)nanti/a kai\ to\ e)n a)rchê=|
polla/kis u(pakou/ousin)--a)na/gkê phau/lous gi/nesthai tou\s
lo/gous; ai)/tios d' o( a)pokrino/menos, ta\ me\n ou) didou/s, ta\
de\ toiau=ta didou/s.]

This passage is not very clear.]

Such then are the cases in which the conduct of the dialogue is open
to censure, without any fault on your part as questioner. But there
are other cases in which the fault is really yours. These are five in
number:--(1) When all or most of your questions are so framed as to
elicit premisses either false or improbable, so that neither the
conclusion which you seek to obtain, nor any other conclusion at all,
follows from them; (2) When, from similar defects, the proper
conclusion that you seek to obtain cannot be drawn from your
premisses; (3) When the proper conclusion would follow, if certain
additions were made to your premisses, but such additions are of a
character worse than the premisses already obtained, and are even
less probable than the conclusion itself; (4) When you have
accumulated a superfluous multitude of premisses, so that the proper
conclusion does not follow from all of them but from a part of them
only (5) When your premisses are more improbable and less trustworthy
than the proper conclusion, or when, though true, they are harder and
more troublesome to prove than the problem itself.[430]

[Footnote 430: Ibid. b. 19-33: [Greek: kath' au(to\n de\ tô=| lo/gô|
pe/nte ei)si\n e)pitimê/seis].]

In regard to the last item, however, the fault may sometimes be in
the problem itself rather than in you as questioner. Some problems,
being in their own nature hard and not to be settled from probable or
plausible data, ought not to be admitted into Dialectic. All that can
be required from you as questioner is that you shall know and obtain
the most probable premisses that the problem admits: your procedure
may be thus in itself blameable, yet it may even deserve praise,
having regard to the problem, if this last be very intractable; or it
may be in itself praiseworthy, yet blameable in regard to the
problem, if the problem admit of being settled by premisses still
more probable.[431] You may even be more blameable, if you obtain
your conclusion but obtain it from improbable premisses, than if you
failed to obtain it; the premisses required to make it complete being
true and probable and not of capital importance, but being refused by
the respondent.[432] However, you ought not to be blamed if you
obtain your true and proper conclusion but obtain it through
premisses in themselves false; for this is recognized in analytical
theory as possible: if the conclusion is false, the premisses (one or
both) must be false, but a true conclusion may be drawn from false
premisses.[433]

[Footnote 431: Ibid. b. 34-p. 162, a. 3.]

[Footnote 432: Ibid. p. 162, a. 3-8.]

[Footnote 433: Topic. VIII. xi. p. 162, a. 8-11: [Greek: toi=s de\
dia\ pseudô=n a)lêthe\s sumperainome/nois ou) di/kaion e)pitima=n--
phanero\n d' e)k tô=n A)nalutikô=n.]]

When you have obtained your premisses and proved a conclusion, these
same premisses will not serve as proof of any other proposition
separate and independent of the conclusion; such may sometimes seem
to be the case, but it is a mere sophistical delusion. If your
premisses are both of them probable, your conclusion may in some
cases be more probable than either.[434]

[Footnote 434: Ibid. a.12-24.

Aristotle here introduces four definitions of terms, which are useful
in regard to his thoughts but have no great pertinence in the place
where they occur: [Greek: e)/sti de\ _philoso/phêma_ me\n
sullogismo\s a)podeiktiko/s, _e)pichei/rêma_ de\ sullogismo\s
dialektiko/s, _so/phisma_ de\ sullogismo\s e)ristiko/s, _a)po/rêma_
de\ sullogismo\s dialektiko\s a)ntipha/seôs.]]

One other matter yet remains in which your procedure as questioner
may be blameable. The premisses through which you prove your
conclusion may be long and unnecessarily multiplied; the conclusion
may be such that you ought to have obtained it through fewer, yet
equally pertinent premisses.[435]

[Footnote 435: Ibid. a. 24-34.

The example whereby Aristotle illustrates this position is obscure
and difficult to follow. It is borrowed from the Platonic theory of
Ideas. The point which you are supposed to be anxious to prove is,
that one opinion is more opinion than another ([Greek: o(/ti e)sti\
do/xa ma=llon e(te/ra e(te/ras]). To prove it you ask as premisses:
(1) That the Idea of every class of things is more that thing than
any one among the particulars of the class; (2) That there is an Idea
of _matter of opinion_, and that this Idea is more opinion than any
one of the particular matters of opinion. If this Idea is more
opinion, it must also be more true and accurate than any particular
matter of opinion. And it is this last conclusion that Aristotle
seems to indicate as the conclusion to be proved: [Greek: ô(/ste
au(tê\ ê( do/xa a)kribeste/ra e)sti/n] (a. 32).

As I understand it, Aristotle supposes that the doctrine which you
are here refuting is, that all [Greek: e)/ndoxa] are on an equal
footing as to truth and accuracy; and that the doctrine which you are
proving against it is, that one [Greek: e)/ndoxon] is more true and
accurate than another. If you attempt to prove this last by invoking
the Platonic theory of Ideas, you will introduce premisses
far-fetched and unnecessary, even if true; whereas you might prove
your conclusion from premisses easier and more obvious.

The fault is (he says) that such roundabout procedure puts out of
sight the real ground of the proof: [Greek: ti/s de\ ê( mochthêri/a?
ê)\ o(/ti poiei=, par' o(\ o( lo/gos, lantha/nein to\ ai)/tion] (a.
33). The dubitative and problematical form here is remarkable. How
would Aristotle himself have proved the above conclusion? By
Induction? He does not tell us.]

The cases in which your argument will carry the clearest evidence,
impressing itself even on the most vulgar minds, are those in which
you obtain such premisses as will enable you to draw your final
conclusion without asking any farther concessions. But this will
rarely happen. Even after you have obtained all the premisses
substantially necessary to your final conclusion, you will generally
be forced to draw out two or more prosyllogisms or preliminary
syllogisms, and to ask the assent of the respondent to these, before
you can venture to enunciate the final conclusion. This second grade
of evidence is however sufficient, even if the premisses fall short
of the highest probability.[436]

[Footnote 436: Topic. VIII. xii. p. 162, a. 35-b. 2.]

On the other hand, your argument may deserve to be pronounced false
on four distinct grounds:--(1) If your syllogism appears to prove the
conclusion but does not really prove it, being then an _eristic_ or
_contentious_ syllogism; (2) If the conclusion be good but not
**relevant to the thesis, which is most likely to happen
where you employ _Reductio ad Impossible_; (3) If your conclusion
though valid and even relevant, is not founded on the premisses and
_principia_ appropriate to the thesis; (4) If your premisses are
false, even though the conclusion in itself may prove true, since it
has already been said that a true conclusion may sometimes be
obtained from false premisses.[437]

[Footnote 437: Ibid. b. 3-15: [Greek: pseudê\s de\ lo/gos kalei=tai
tetrachô=s], &c.]

Falsehood in your argument will be rather your own fault than that of
your argument, especially if you yourself are not aware of its
falsehood. Indeed, there are some false arguments which are more
valuable in Dialectic than many true ones; where, for example, from
highly probable premisses you refute some recognized truth. Such an
argument is sure to serve as a demonstration of other truths; at the
very least, it shows that some one of the propositions concerned is
altogether untrue.[438] On the other hand, if you prove a true
conclusion by premisses false and improbable, your argument will be
more worthless than many others in which the conclusion is false;
from such premisses, indeed, the conclusion may well be really
false.[439]

[Footnote 438: Ibid. b. 16-22: [Greek: to\ me\n ou)=n pseudê= to\n
lo/gon ei)=nai tou= le/gontos a(ma/rtêma ma=llon ê)\ tou= lo/gou,
kai\ ou)de\ tou= le/gontos a)ei\ to\ a(ma/rtêma, a)ll' o(/tan
lantha/nê| au)to/n, e)pei\ kath' au(to/n _ge pollô=n a)lêthô=n
a)podecho/metha ma=llon, a)\n e)x o(/ti ma/lista dokou/ntôn a)nairê=|
ti tô=n a)lêthô=n; toiou=tos ga\r ô)\n e(te/rôn a)lêthô=n
a)po/deixi/s e)stin_; dei= ga\r tô=n keime/nôn ti mê\ ei)=nai
pantelô=s, ô(/st' e)/stai _tou/tou_ a)po/deixis.]]

[Footnote 439: Ibid. b. 22-24.]

In estimating the dialectical value of an argument, therefore, we
must first look whether the conclusion is formally valid; next,
whether the conclusion is true or false; lastly, what are the
premisses from whence it is derived.[440] For, if it be derived from
premisses false yet probable, it has logical or dialectical value;
while, if derived from premisses true yet improbable, it has
none.[441] If derived from premisses both false and improbable, it
will of course be worthless; either absolutely in itself, or with
reference to the thesis under debate.

[Footnote 440: Ibid. b. 24: [Greek: ô(/ste dê=lon o(/ti prô/tê me\n
e)pi/skepsis lo/gou kath' au(to\n ei) sumperai/netai, deute/ra de\
po/teron a)lêthe\s ê)\ pseu=dos; tri/tê d' e)k poi/ôn tinô=n.]]

[Footnote 441: Topic. VIII. xii. p. 162, b. 27: [Greek: ei) me\n ga\r
e)k pseudô=n e)ndo/xôn de/, logiko/s, ei) d' e)x o)/ntôn me\n
a)do/xôn de/, phau=los], &c.]

Two faults of questioners in Dialectic are dealt with specially by
Aristotle:--(1) _Petitio Principii_; (2) _Petitio Contrariorum_. He
had touched upon both of them (in the Analytica Priora) as they
concerned the demonstrative process, or the proving of truth: he now
deals with them as they concern the dialectical process, or the
setting out of opinions and probabilities.[442]

[Footnote 442: Ibid. xiii. p. 162, b. 31: [Greek: to\ d' e)n a)rchê=|
kai\ ta\ e)nanti/a pô=s ai)tei=tai o( e)rôtô=n, _kat' a)lê/theian_
me\n e)n toi=s A)nalutikoi=s] (Priora, II. xvi.) [Greek: ei)/rêtai,
_kata\ do/xan_ de\ nu=n lekte/on.]]

Five distinct modes may be enumerated of committing the fault called
_Petitio Principii_:--

1. You may put as a question the very conclusion which it is
incumbent on you to prove, in refutation of the thesis of the
respondent. If this is done in explicit terms, your opponent can
hardly fail to perceive it; but he possibly may fail, if you
substitute an equivalent term or the definition in place of the
term.[443]

[Footnote 443: Ibid. b. 34. [Greek: prô=ton ei)/ tis au)to\ to\
dei/knusthai de/on ai)tê/sei; tou=to d' e)p' au)tou= me\n ou)
r(a/|dion lantha/nein, e)n de\ toi=s sunônu/mois, kai\ e)n o(/sois
to\ o)/noma kai\ o( lo/gos to\ au)to\ sêmai/nei, ma=llon.]]

2. If the conclusion which you are seeking to prove is a particular
one, you may put as a question the universal in which it is
comprised. Thus, if you are to prove that the knowledge of Contraries
is one and the same, you may put as a question, Is not the knowledge
of Opposites one and the same? You are asking the very point which it
was your business to show; but you are asking along with it much more
besides.[444]

[Footnote 444: Ibid. p. 163, a. 1.]

3. If you are seeking to prove an universal conclusion, **you
may put as a question one of the particulars comprised therein. Thus,
if you are to prove that the knowledge of Contraries is one and the
same, you may put as a question, Is not the knowledge of white and
black, good and evil, or any other pair of particular contraries, one
and the same? It was your business to prove this particular, along
with many others besides; but you are now asking it as a question
separately.[445]

[Footnote 445: Ibid. a. 5.]

4. If the conclusion which you are seeking to prove has two terms
conjointly, you may put as a question one or the other of these
separately. Thus, when you are trying to show that the healing art is
knowledge of what is wholesome and unwholesome, you may ask, Is it a
knowledge of the wholesome?[446]

[Footnote 446: Ibid. a. 8.]

5. Suppose there are two conclusions necessarily implicated with each
other, and that it is your business to prove one of them: you may put
as a question the other of the two. Thus, if you are seeking to prove
that the diagonal is incommensurable with the side, you may put as a
question, Is not the side incommensurable with the diagonal?[447]

[Footnote 447: Topic. VIII. xiii. p. 163, a. 10.]

There are also five distinct modes of _Petitio Contrariorum_:--

1. You may ask the respondent, in plain terms, to grant first the
affirmative, next, the negative, of a given proposition.[448]

[Footnote 448: Ibid. a. 14: [Greek: prô=ton me\n ga\r ei)/ tis ta\s
a)ntikeime/nas ai)tê/saito pha/sin kai\ a)nti/phasin.]]

2. You may ask him to grant, first, that a given subject is, _e.g._,
good, next, that the same subject is bad.[449]

[Footnote 449: Ibid. a. 16: [Greek: deu/teron de\ ta)nanti/a kata\
tê\n a)nti/thesin, oi(=on a)gatho\n kai\ kako\n tau)to/n.]]

3. After he has granted to you the affirmative universally, you may
ask him to grant the negative in some particular case under the
universal: _e.g._, after he has granted that the knowledge of
Contraries is one and the same, you ask him to grant that the
knowledge of wholesome and unwholesome is not one and the same. Or
you may proceed by the way of reversing this process.[450]

[Footnote 450: Ibid. a. 17-21.]

4. You may ask the contrary of that which follows necessarily from
the premisses admitted.[451]

[Footnote 451: Ibid. a. 21.]

5. Instead of asking the two contraries in plain and direct terms,
you may ask the two contraries in different propositions, yet
necessarily implicated with the first two.[452]

[Footnote 452: Ibid. a. 22.]

There is this difference between _Petitio Principii_, and _Petitio
Contrariorum_: the first has reference to the conclusion which you
have to prove, and the wrong procedure involved in it is relative to
that conclusion; but in the second the wrong procedure affects only
the two propositions themselves and the relation subsisting between
them.[453]

[Footnote 453: Ibid. a. 24: [Greek: diaphe/rei de\ to\ ta)nanti/a
lamba/nein tou= e)n a)rchê=|, o(/ti tou= me/n e)stin ê( a(marti/a
pro\s to\ sumpe/rasma (pro\s ga\r e)kei=no ble/pontes to\ e)n
a)rchê=| le/gomen ai)tei=sthai), ta\ d' e)nanti/a e)sti\n e)n tai=s
prota/sesi tô=| e)/chein pôs tau/tas pro\s a)llê/las.]]

Aristotle now, finally, proceeds to give some general advice for
exercise and practice in Dialectic. You ought to accustom yourself to
treat arguments by converting the syllogisms of which they consist;
that is, by applying to them the treatment of which the _Reductio ad
Absurdum_ is one case.[454] You ought to test every thesis by first
assuming it to be true, then assuming it to be false, and following
out the consequences on both sides.[455] When you have hunted out
each train of arguments, look out at once for the counter-arguments
available against it. This will strengthen your power both as
questioner and as respondent. It is indeed an exercise so valuable,
that you will do well to go through it by yourself, if you have no
companion.[456] Put the different trains of argument, bearing on the
same thesis, into comparison with each other. A wide command of
arguments affirmative as well as negative will serve you well both
for attack and for defence.[457]

[Footnote 454: Ibid. xiv. p. 163, a. 29: [Greek: pro\s de\ gumnasi/an
kai\ mele/tên tô=n toiou/tôn lo/gôn prô=ton me\n a)ntistre/phein
e)thi/zesthai chrê\ tou\s lo/gous.] For _Conversion_ of Syllogism,
see p. 174.]

[Footnote 455: Topic. VIII. xiv. p. 163, a. 36: [Greek: pro\s
a(/pasa/n te the/sin kai\ o(/ti ou(/tôs kai\ o(/ti ou)ch ou(/tôs to\
e)pichei/rêma skepte/on.]]

[Footnote 456: Ibid. b. 3: [Greek: ka)\n pro\s mêde/na a)/llon
e)/chômen, pro\s au(tou/s.]]

[Footnote 457: Ibid. b. 5: [Greek: tou=to ga\r _pro/s te to\
bia/zesthai_ pollê\n eu)pori/an poiei= kai\ pro\s to\ e)le/gchein
mega/lên e)/chei boê/theian, o(/tan eu)porê=| tis kai\ o(/ti ou(/tôs
kai\ o(/ti ou)ch ou(/tôs; pro\s ta\ e)nanti/a ga\r sumbai/nei
poiei=sthai tê\n phulakê/n.]

Instead of [Greek: pro/s te to\ bia/zesthai], ought we not to read
here [Greek: pro/s te to\ mê bia/zesthai], taking this verb in the
passive sense? Surely [Greek: bia/zesthai] in the active sense gives
the same meaning substantially as [Greek: e)le/gchein], which comes
afterwards, both of them referring to the assailant or questioner,
whereas Aristotle intends here to illustrate the usefulness of the
practice to _both_ parties.]

This same accomplishment will be of use, moreover, for acquisitions
even in Science and Philosophy. It is a great step to see and grasp
in conjunction the trains of reasoning on both sides of the question;
the task that remains--right determination which of the two is the
better--becomes much easier. To do this well, however,--to choose the
true and to reject the false correctly--there must be conjoined a
good natural predisposition. None but those who are well constituted
by nature, who have their likings and dislikes well set in regard to
each particular conjuncture, can judge correctly what is best and
what is worst.[458]

[Footnote 458: Ibid. b. 12-16: [Greek: dei= de\ pro\s to\ toiou=to
u(pa/rchein eu)phua=; kai\ tou=t' e)/stin ê( kat' a)lê/theian
eu)phui+/a, to\ du/nasthai kalô=s e(le/sthai ta)lêthe\s kai\ phugei=n
to\ pseu=dos; o(/per oi( pephuko/tes eu)= du/nantai poiei=n; eu)=
ga\r philou=ntes kai\ misou=ntes to\ prosphero/menon eu)= kri/nousi
to\ be/ltiston.]]

In regard to the primary or most universal theses, and to those
problems which are most frequently put in debate, you will do well to
have reasonings ready prepared, and even to get them by heart. It is
on these first or most universal theses that respondents become often
reluctant and disgusted. To be expert in handling primary doctrines
and probabilities, and to be well provided with the definitions from
which syllogisms must start, is to the dialectician an acquisition of
the highest moment; like familiarity with the Axioms to a geometer,
and ready application of the multiplication table to an arithmetical
calculator.[459] When you have these generalities and major
propositions firmly established in your mind, you will recall, in a
definite order and arrangement, the particular matters falling under
each of them, and will throw them more easily into syllogisms. They
will assist you in doing this, just as the mere distribution of
places in a scheme for topical memory makes you recollect what is
associated with each. You should lodge in your memory, however,
universal major premisses rather than complete and ready-made
reasonings; for the great difficulty is about the _principia_.[460]

[Footnote 459: Ibid. b. 17-26.]

[Footnote 460: Topic. VIII. xiv. p. 163, b. 27-33: [Greek: o(moi/ôs
kai\ e)n toi=s lo/gois to\ pro/cheiron ei)=nai peri\ ta\s a)rcha\s
kai\ ta\s prota/seis a)po\ sto/matos e)xepi/stasthai; katha/per ga\r
e)n tô=| mnêmonikô=| mo/non oi( to/poi tethe/ntes eu)thu\s poiou=sin
au)ta\ mnêmoneu/ein, kai\ tau=ta poiê/sei sullogistikô/teron dia\ to\
pro\s ô(risme/nas au)ta\s ble/pein kat' a)rithmo/n; pro/tasi/n te
koinê\n ma=llon ê)\ lo/gon ei)s mnê/mên thete/on; a)rchê=s ga\r kai\
u(pothe/seôs eu)porê=sai metri/ôs chalepo/n.]]

You ought also to accustom yourself to break down one reasoning into
many; which will be done most easily when the theme of the reasoning
is most universal. Conceal this purpose as well as you can; and in
this view begin with those particulars which lie most remote from the
subject in hand.[461] In recording arguments for your own
instruction, you will generalize them as much as possible, though
perhaps when spoken they may have been particular; for this is the
best way to break down one into several. In conducting your own case
as questioner you will avoid the higher generalities as much as you
can.[462] But you must at the same time take care to keep up some
common or general premisses throughout the discourse; for every
syllogistic process, even where the conclusion is particular, implies
this, and no syllogism is valid without it.[463]

[Footnote 461: Ibid. b. 34.]

[Footnote 462: Ibid. p. 164, a. 2-7: [Greek: dei= de\ kai\ ta\s
a)pomnêmoneu/seis katho/lou poiei=sthai tô=n lo/gôn, ka)\n ê)=|
dieilegme/nos e)pi\ me/rous;--au)to\n de\ o(/ti ma/lista pheu/gein
e)pi\ to\ katho/lou phe/rein tou\s sullogismou/s.]

This passage is to me obscure. I have given the best meaning which it
seems to offer.]

[Footnote 463: Ibid. a. 8.]

Exercise in inductive discourse is most suitable for a young
beginner; exercise in deductive or syllogistic discourse, for skilful
veterans. From those who are accomplished in the former you can learn
the art of multiplying particular comparisons; from those who are
accomplished in the latter you derive universal premisses; such being
the strong points of each. When you go through a dialectical
exercise, try to bring away with you for future use either some
complete syllogism, or some solution of an apparent refutation, or a
major premiss, or a well-sustained exceptional example ([Greek:
e)/nstasin]); note also whether either you or your respondent
question correctly or otherwise, and on what reason such correctness
or incorrectness turned.[464] It is the express purpose of
dialectical exercise to acquire power and facility in this procedure,
especially as regards universal premisses and special exceptions.
Indeed the main characteristic of the dialectician is to be apt at
universal premisses, and apt at special exceptions. In the first of
these two aptitudes he groups many particulars into one universal,
without which he cannot make good his syllogism; in the second of the
two he breaks up the one universal into many, distinguishing the
separate constituents, and denying some while he affirms others.[465]

[Footnote 464: Ibid. a. 12-19. [Greek: o(/lôs d' e)k tou=
gumna/zesthai dialego/menon peirate/on a)pophe/resthai ê)\
sullogismo\n peri\ tinos, ê)\ lu/sin ê)\ pro/tasin ê)\ e)/nstasin],
&c.]

[Footnote 465: Topic. VIII. xiv. p. 164, b. 2-6: [Greek: e)/sti ga\r
ô(s a(plô=s ei)pei=n dialektiko\s o( protatiko\s kai\ e)nstatiko/s;
e)/sti de\ to\ me\n protei/nesthai e(\n poiei=n ta\ plei/ô (dei=
**ga\r e(\n o(/lôs lêphthê=nai pro\s o(\ o( lo/gos), to\ d'
e)ni/stasthai to\ e(\n polla/; ê)\ ga\r diairei= ê)\ a)nairei=, to\
me\n didou\s to\ d' ou)\ tô=n **proteinome/nôn.]]

You must take care however not to carry on this exercise with every
one, especially with a vulgar-minded man. With some persons the
dispute cannot fail to take a discreditable turn. When the respondent
tries to make a show of escaping by unworthy manoeuvres, the
questioner on his part must be unscrupulous also in syllogizing; but
this is a disgraceful scene. To keep clear of such abusive discourse,
you must be cautious not to discourse with commonplace, unprepared,
respondents.[466]

[Footnote 466: Ibid. b. 8-15: [Greek: pro\s ga\r to\n pa/ntôs
peirô/menon phai/nesthai diapheu/gein, di/kaion me\n pa/ntôs
peira=sthai sullogi/sasthai, ou)k eu)/schêmon de/.]]




CHAPTER X.

SOPHISTICI ELENCHI.


The Sophist (according to Aristotle) is one whose professional
occupation it is to make money by a delusive show of wisdom without
the reality--by contriving to make others believe falsely that he
possesses wisdom and knowledge. The abstract substantive noun
_Sophistic_, with the verb _to practice as a Sophist_ ([Greek:
sophisteu/ein]), expresses such profession and purpose.[1] This
application of the term is derived from Plato, who has in various
dialogues (Protagoras, Hippias, Euthydêmus, &c.) introduced Sokrates
conversing with different professional Sophists, and who has, in a
longer dialogue called Sophistes, attempted an elaborate definition
of the intellectual peculiarities of the person so named. It is the
actual argumentative procedure of the Sophist that Aristotle proposes
to himself as the theme of this little treatise, appended to his
general theory of the Syllogism; a treatise which, though forming
properly the Ninth and concluding Book of the Topica, is commonly
known as a separate appendix thereto, under the title of Sophistici
Elenchi, or Sophistical Refutations.

[Footnote 1: Soph. El. i. p. 165, a. 21, 28, 32: [Greek: e)/sti ga\r
ê( sophistikê\ phainome/nê sophi/a ou)=sa d' ou)/, kai\ o( sophistê\s
chrêmatistê\s a)po\ phainome/nês sophi/as a)ll' ou)k
ou)/sês;--a)na/gkê ou)=n _tou\s boulome/nous sophisteu/ein to\_ tô=n
ei)rême/nôn lo/gôn ge/nos zêtei=n;--o(/ti me\n ou)=n e)/sti ti
toiou=ton lo/gôn ge/nos, kai\ o(/ti toiau/tês e)phi/entai duna/meôs
_ou(\s kalou=men sophista/s_, dê=lon.] Also xi. p. 171, b. 27.]

The Sophistical Elenchus or Refutation, being a delusive semblance of
refutation which imposes on ordinary men and induces them to accept
it as real, cannot be properly understood without the theory of
Elenchus in general; nor can this last be understood without the
entire theory of the Syllogism, since the Elenchus is only one
variety of Syllogism.[2] The Elenchus is a syllogism with a
conclusion contradictory to or refutative of some enunciated thesis
or proposition. Accordingly we must first understand the conditions
of a good and valid Syllogism, before we study those of a valid
Elenchus; these last, again, must be understood, before we enter on
the distinctive attributes of the Pseudo-elenchus--the sophistical,
invalid, or sham, refutation. In other words, an enumeration and
classification of Fallacies forms the closing section of a treatise
on Logic--according to the philosophical arrangement originating with
Aristotle, and copied by most logicians after him.

[Footnote 2: Ibid. x. p. 171, a. 1-5.]

Aristotle begins by distinguishing reality and mere deceptive
appearance; and by stating that this distinction is found to prevail
not less in syllogisms than in other matters. Next he designates a
notorious class of persons, called Sophists, who made it their
profession to study and practise the deceptive appearance of
syllogizing; and he then proceeds to distinguish four species of
debate:--(1) Didactic; (2) Dialectic; (3) Peirastic; (4) Eristic or
Sophistic.[3] In this quadruple arrangement, however, he is not
consistent with his own definitions, when he ranks the four as
distinct and co-ordinate species. The marked and special antithesis
is between Didactic and Dialectic. Both Peirastic and Eristic fall as
varieties or sub-species under the species Dialectic; and there is
under the species Didactic a variety called Pseudo-graphic or
Pseudo-didactic, which stands to Didactic in the same relation in
which Eristic stands to Dialectic.[4]

[Footnote 3: Soph. El. ii. p. 165, a. 38: [Greek: e)/sti dê\ tô=n e)n
tô=| diale/gesthai lo/gôn te/ttara ge/nê, didaskalikou\ kai\
dialektikoi\ kai\ peirastikoi\ kai\ e)ristikoi/.]]

[Footnote 4: Ibid. xi. p. 171, b. 34.]

Didactic discourse is not applicable to all matters indiscriminately,
but only to certain special sciences; each of which has its own
separate, undemonstrable _principia_, from which its conclusions, so
far as true and valid, must be deduced. It supposes a teacher
acquainted with these _principia_ and deductions, talking with some
one who being ignorant of them wishes to learn. The teacher puts
questions, to which the learner makes the best answers that he can;
and, if the answers are wrong, corrects them and proceeds to draw,
according to syllogistic canons, conclusions from premisses which he
himself knows to be the truth. These premisses the learner must
believe upon the teacher's authority. Properly speaking, indeed, the
didactic process is not interrogative (in the same sense that
Dialectic is): the teacher does not accept the learner's answer and
reason from it, if he thinks it wrong.[5]

[Footnote 5: Ibid. xi. p. 172, a. 11: [Greek: nu=n d' ou)k e)/stin o(
dialektio\s peri\ ge/nos ti ô(risme/non, ou)de\ deiktiko\s ou)deno/s,
ou)de\ toiou=tos oi(=os o( katho/lou. ou)/te ga/r e)stin a(/panta e)n
e(ni/ tini ge/nei, ou)/te ei) ei)/ê, oi(=o/n te u(po\ ta\s au)ta\s
a)rcha\s ei)=nai ta\ o)/nta. ô(/st' ou)demi/a te/chnê tô=n
deiknuousô=n tina\ phu/sin e)rôtêtikê/ e)stin; ou) ga\r e)/xestin
o(poteronou=n tô=n mori/ôn dou=nai; sullogismo\s ga\r ou) gi/netai
e)x a)mphoi=n. ê( de\ dialektikê\ e)rôtêrikê/ e)stin; ei) d'
e)dei/knuen, ei) kai\ mê\ pa/nta, a)lla\ ta/ ge prô=ta kai\ ta\s
oi)kei/as a)rcha/s, ou)k a)\n ê)rô/ta. mê\ dido/ntos ga\r ou)k a)\n
e)/ti ei)=chen e)x ô(=n e)/ti diale/xetai pro\s tê\n e)/nstasin.]

When Aristotle, therefore, reckons [Greek: lo/gous didaskalikou/s] as
one of the four species [Greek: tô=n e)n tô=| diale/gesthai lo/gôn]
(Soph. El. ii. p. 165, a. 38), we must understand [Greek: to\
diale/gesthai] in a very wide and vague sense, going much beyond the
derivative noun [Greek: dialektikê/].]

Dialectic, on the contrary, is applicable to all matters universally
and indiscriminately, including even the undemonstrable _principia_
which the teacher assumes as the highest premisses of his didactic
syllogisms. It supposes, in place of teacher and learner, an
interrogator (or opponent) and a respondent. The respondent declares
a problem or thesis, which he undertakes to defend; while the other
puts questions to him respecting it, with the purpose of compelling
him either to contradict the thesis, or to contradict himself on some
other point. The interrogator is allowed only to ask questions, and
to deduce legitimate conclusions from the premisses granted by the
respondent in answer: he is not permitted to introduce any other
premisses. The premisses upon which the debate turns are understood
all to be probable--opinions accredited either among an ordinary
multitude or among a few wise men, but to have no higher authority.
Accordingly there is often a conflict of arguments _pro_ and _con_,
much diversified. The process is essentially controversial; and, if
the questioner does not succeed in exposing a contradiction, the
respondent is victorious, and remains in possession of the field.

Such is the capital antithesis, much dwelt upon by Aristotle, between
Didactic and Dialectic. But that which he calls Peirastic, and that
which he calls Eristic, are not species co-ordinate with and
distinguished from Dialectic: they are peculiar aspects, subordinate
varieties or modes, of Dialectic itself. Aristotle himself, indeed,
admits Peirastic to be a mode or variety of Dialectic;[6] and the
like is equally true respecting what he terms Eristic or Sophistic.

[Footnote 6: Soph. El. xi. p. 171, b. 4-9: [Greek: ê( ga\r
peirastikê/ e)sti dialektikê/ tis], &c.--p. 172, a. 35: [Greek: o(
te/chnê| sullogistikê=| peirastiko/s, dialektiko/s].--viii. p. 169,
b. 25: [Greek: e)/sti d' ê( peirastikê\ me/ros tê=s dialektikê=s.]]

These subordinate distinctions turn upon the manner, the limitations,
and the purpose, for and under which the dialectical process is
conducted. Dialectic is essentially gymnastic and peirastic:[7] it
may be looked at either as gymnastic, in reference to the two
debaters, or as peirastic, in reference to the arguments and
doctrines brought forward; intellectual exercise and stimulation of
the two speakers and the auditors around being effected by testing
and confronting various probable doctrines. It is the common purpose
([Greek: koino\n e)/rgon])[8] of the two champions, to improve and
enlarge this exercise for the instruction of all, by following out a
variety of logical consequences and logical repugnancies, bearing
more or less directly on the thesis which the respondent chooses and
undertakes to defend against a testing cross-examination. Certain
rules and limitations are prescribed both for questioner and
respondent; but, subject to these rules, each of them is bound to
exert all his acuteness for the purpose of gaining victory; and,
though one only can gain it, the debate may be well and creditably
conducted on both sides. If the rules are not observed, if the
assailing champion, bent upon victory at all cost, has recourse to
dishonest interrogative tricks, or the defensive champion to perverse
and obstructive negations, beyond the prescribed boundary, in that
case the debate is called by Aristotle _eristic_ or _contentious_,
from the undue **predominance of the controversial spirit and
purpose; also _sophistic_, from the fact that there existed (as
he asserts) a class or profession of persons called Sophists, who
regularly studied and practised these culpable manoeuvres, first with
a view to reputation, and ultimately with a view to pecuniary profit,
being pretenders to knowledge and wisdom without any reality to
justify them.[9]

[Footnote 7: Topic. I. ii. p. 101, a. 26, b. 2: [Greek: pro\s
gumnasi/an--e)xetastikê\ ga\r ou)=sa], &c. Compare also Topica, VIII.
xi. p. 161, a. 25; xiv. p. 163, a. 29, p. 164, b. 1: [Greek: to\ de\
gumna/zesthai duna/meôs cha/rin, kai\ ma/lista peri\ ta\s prota/seis
kai\ e)nsta/seis; e)/sti ga\r ô(s a(plô=s ei)pei=n dialektiko\s o(
protatiko\s kai\ e)nstatiko/s.]]

[Footnote 8: Topic. VIII. xi. p. 161, a. 20, 37.]

[Footnote 9: Soph. El. xi. p. 171, b. 25-35: [Greek: oi( me\n ou)=n
tê=s ni/kês au)tê=s cha/rin toiou=toi e)ristikoi\ a)/nthrôpoi kai\
phile/rides dokou=sin ei)=nai, oi( de\ do/xês cha/rin tê=s ei)s
chrêmatismo\n sophistikoi/;--kai\ tô=n lo/gôn tô=n au)tô=n me/n
ei)sin oi( phile/rides kai\ sophistai/, a)ll' ou) tô=n au)tô=n
e(/neken. kai\ lo/gos o( au)to\s me\n e)/stai sophistiko\s kai\
e)ristiko/s, a)ll' ou) kata\ tauto/n, a)ll' ê(=| me\n ni/kês
phainome/nês, e)ristiko/s, ê(=| de\ sophi/as, sophistiko/s.] &c.]

We thus see plainly that Peirastic and Eristic are not to be ranked
as two distinct species of discourse, co-ordinate with Didactic and
Dialectic; but that _peirastic_ is in fact an epithet applicable
generally to Dialectic, bringing to view one of its useful and
appropriate functions; while _eristic_ designates only a peculiar
mode of conducting the process, the essential feature of which is
that it is abusive or that it transgresses the rules and regulations.
Still less ought Sophistic to be ranked as a distinct species; since
it involves no intrinsic or intellectual _differentia_, but connotes
only ethical and personal peculiarities ascribed to the Sophist, who
is treated as an impostor practising dishonest tricks for the sake of
pecuniary profit.[10]

[Footnote 10: Aristot. Rhetoric. I. i. p. 1355, b. 17: [Greek: o(
ga\r sophistiko\s ou)k e)n tê=| duna/mei, a)ll' e)n tê=|
proaire/sei;--sophistê\s me\n kata\ tê\n proai/resin, dialektiko\s d'
ou) kata\ tê\n proai/resin a)lla\ kata\ tê\n du/namin.] To the same
purpose he speaks in Metaphys. [Greek: G]. ii. p. 1004, b. 25,
distinguishing the Sophist by his [Greek: proai/resis] from the
Dialectician, but recognizing that in point of [Greek: du/namis] both
are alike. Mr. Poste observes justly (in Transl. of the Soph. El.,
notes, p. 99):--"[Greek: du/namis], capacity, is in the intellect;
[Greek: proai/resis], purpose, in the will. The antithesis between
these terms may throw light on what Aristotle conceived to be the
relation between Sophistic and Dialectic. . . The power _plus_ the
will to deceive is called Sophistic; the power without the will,
Dialectic (p. 100)."]

While, however, we recognize as main logical distinctions only the
two heads Didactic and Dialectic, we note another way that Aristotle
has of bringing in what he calls Sophistic as a variety of the
latter. Both in Didactic and Dialectic (he tells us) the speakers
enunciate and prove their propositions by Syllogism; the didactic
syllogism is derived from the _principia_ belonging specially to one
particular science, and proceeds from premisses that are true to
conclusions that are true; while the dialectic syllogism starts from
probable premisses (_i.e._, accredited by the ordinary public or by a
few wise men), and marches in correct form to conclusions that are
probable. Now, corresponding to each of these two, Aristotle
recognizes farther a sort of degenerate counterpart. To the didactic
syllogism there corresponds the _pseudographic_ syllogism or the
_paralogism_: which draws its premisses (as the didactic syllogism
does) from the special matters of some given science,[11] yet which
nevertheless has only the appearance of truth without the reality;
either because it is incorrect in syllogistic form, or because the
matter of the premisses (the major, the minor, or both) is untrue. To
the dialectic syllogism in like manner, there corresponds the
_eristic_ or _sophistic_ syllogism: which is a good syllogism in
appearance, but not in reality; either because it is incorrect in
form, or because its premisses, in respect of their matter, appear to
be probable without being really probable.[12]

[Footnote 11: Topic. I. i. p. 101, a. 5-15. [Greek: oi( e)k tô=n
peri/ tinas e)pistê/mas oi)kei/ôn gino/menoi paralogismoi/, katha/per
e)pi\ tê=s geômetri/as kai\ tô=n tau/tê| suggenô=n sumbe/bêken
e)/chein;--e)k tô=n oi)kei/ôn me\n tê=| e)pistê/mê| lêmma/tôn, ou)k
a)lêthô=n de/, to\n sullogismo\n poiei=tai.]]

[Footnote 12: Ibid. p. 100, a. 31-p. 101, a. 16; Soph. El. i. p. 164,
a. 20-b. 21.]

One would suppose that the relation between the pseudo-didactic and
the didactic syllogism, was the same as that between the
pseudo-dialectic and the dialectic; so that, if the pseudo-dialectic
deserved to be called sophistic or eristic, the pseudo-didactic would
deserve these appellations also; especially, since the formal
conditions of the syllogism are alike for both. This Aristotle does
not admit, but draws instead a remarkable distinction. The Sophist
(he says) is a dishonest man, making it his professional purpose to
deceive; the pseudo-graphic man of science is honest always, though
sometimes mistaken. So long as the pseudo-graphic syllogism keeps
within the limits belonging to its own special science, it may be
false, since the geometer may be deceived even in his own science
geometry,[13] but it cannot be sophistic or eristic; yet, whenever it
transgresses those limits, even though it be true and though it
solves the problem proposed, it deserves to be called by those two
epithets. Thus, there were two distinct methods proposed for the
quadrature of the circle--one by Hippokrates, on geometrical
principles, the other by Bryson, upon principles extra-geometrical.
Both demonstrations were false and unsuccessful; yet that of
Hippokrates was not sophistic or eristic, because he kept within the
sphere of geometry; while that of Bryson was so, because it travelled
out of geometry. Nay more, this last would have been equally
sophistic and eristic, and on the same ground, even if it had
succeeded in solving the problem.[14] If indeed the pseudo-graphic
syllogism be invalid in form, it must be considered as sophistic,
even though within the proper scientific limits as to matter; but, if
it be correct in form and within these same limits, then, however
untrue its premisses may be, it is to be regarded as not sophistic or
eristic.[15]

[Footnote 13: Topic. V. iv. p. 132, a. 32.]

[Footnote 14: Soph. El. xi. p. 171, b. 12-20: [Greek: ta\ ga\r
pseudographê/mata ou)k e)ristika/ (kata\ ga\r ta\ u(po\ tê\n te/chnên
oi( paralogismoi/), ou)de/ g' ei)/ ti/ e)sti pseudogra/phêma peri\
a)lêthe/s, oi(=on to\ I(ppokra/tous ê)\ o( tetragônismo\s o( dia\
tô=n mêni/skôn. a)ll' ô(s Bru/sôn e)tetragô/nize to\n ku/klon, _ei)
kai\ tetragôni/zetai o( ku/klos, a)ll' o(/ti ou) kata\ to\ pra=gma,
dia\ tou=to sophistiko/s_.] Also p. 172, a. 1-8.]

[Footnote 15: Ibid. xi. p. 171, b. 19-20. Compare Topic. VIII. xi. p.
161, a. 33: [Greek: dei= de\ to\n kalô=s metabiba/zonta dialektikô=s
kai\ mê\ e)ristikô=s metabiba/zein, katha/per to\n geôme/trên
geômetrikô=s, a)/n te pseu=dos a)/n t' a)lêthe\s ê)=| to\
sumperaino/menon.] Also Topic. VIII. xii. p. 162, b. 10.]

Such is the test whereby Aristotle distinguishes the sophistication
of the didactic process from the legitimate working of that process.
Now this same test cannot be applied to Dialectic, which has no
appropriate or exclusive specialty of matters, but deals with _Omne
Scibile_, universally and indiscriminately. Aristotle therefore puts
the analogy in another way. Both in Didactic and in Dialectic the
Sophist is one who sins against the fundamental conditions of the
task which he undertakes; these conditions being, that in Didactic he
shall confine himself to the matters and premisses of a given
science,--in Dialectic, to matters probable of whatever kind they may
be. Transgression of these conditions constitutes unfair and
dishonest manoeuvre, whether of teacher or questioner; like breach of
the regulations on the part of competitors, bent on victory at all
price, in the Olympic games. Aristotle ranks this dishonesty as a
species, under the name of Sophistic or Eristic, admitting of being
analysed and defined;[16] and his treatise on Sophistical Refutations
is intended to describe and illustrate the _Loci_ belonging to it,
and contributing to its purpose.[17]

[Footnote 16: Soph. El. xi. p. 171, b. 22: [Greek: ô(/sper ga\r ê(
e)n a)gô=ni a)diki/a ei)=do/s ti e)/chei kai\ e)/stin a)dikomachi/a
tis, ou(/tôs e)n a)ntilogi/a| a)dikomachi/a ê( e)ristikê/ e)stin;
e)kei= te ga\r oi( pa/ntôs nika=n proairou/menoi pa/ntôn a(/ptontai,
kai\ e)ntau=tha oi( e)ristikoi/.]]

[Footnote 17: Soph. El. ix. p. 170, a. 34: [Greek: dê=lon ou)=n o(/ti
ou) pa/ntôn tô=n e)/legchôn a)lla\ tô=n para\ tê\n dialektikê\n
lêpte/on tou\s to/pous.]]

Fallacious dialectical refutation being thus referred altogether to
dishonesty of purpose (either contentious or profit-seeking) and
being assumed as unknown in fair dialectical debate, we have to see
by what characteristic Aristotle discriminates fallacious premisses
from fair and admissible premisses. Dialectic (he tells us) has for
its appropriate matter probable premisses--beliefs accredited either
by the multitude or by a wise few. But (he goes on to say) not
everything which appears probable is really probable. Nothing that is
really probable is a mere superficial fancy; wherever this last is
the case, the _probabilia_ are apparent only and not real; they have
the character of falsehood stamped upon them, so as to be immediately
manifest and obvious, even to persons of very narrow intelligence. It
is such apparent _probabilia_ as these, which make up the premisses
of eristic or sophistic discourse, and upon which the sophistical or
fallacious refutations turn.[18]

[Footnote 18: Topic. I. i. p. 100, b. 23: [Greek: e)ristiko\s d'
e)/sti sullogismo\s o( e)k phainome/nôn e)ndo/xôn mê\ o)/ntôn de/,
kai\ o( e)x e)ndo/xôn ê)\ phainome/nôn e)ndo/xôn phaino/menos. ou)
ga\r pa=n to\ phaino/menon e)/ndoxon, kai\ e)/stin e)/ndoxon.
ou)the\n ga\r tô=n legome/nôn e)ndo/xôn e)pipo/laion e)/chei
pantelô=s tê\n phantasi/an, katha/per peri\ ta\s tô=n e)ristikô=n
lo/gôn a)rcha\s sumbe/bêken e)/chein; parachrê=ma ga\r kai\ ô(s e)pi\
to\ polu/ toi=s kai\ mikra\ sunora=n duname/nois kata/dêlos e)n
au)toi=s ê( tou= pseu/dous e)sti\ phu/sis.] Compare Soph. El. ii. p.
165, b. 7.]

Aristotle thus draws a broad and marked line between Dialectic on the
one hand, and Eristic or Sophistic on the other; and he treats the
whole important doctrine of Logical Fallacies as coming under this
latter department. The distinction that he draws between them is
two-fold: first as to purpose, next as to subject-matter. On the part
of the litigious or sophistical debater there is the illicit purpose
of victory at all cost, or for profit; and probabilities merely
apparent--such as any one may see not to be real
probabilities--constitute the matter of his syllogisms.

Now, as to the distinction of purpose, we may put aside the idea of
profit as having no essential connection with the question. It is
quite possible to suppose the fair Dialectician, not less than the
Sophist, as exhibiting his skill for pecuniary reward; while the
eagerness for victory on both sides is absolutely indispensable even
in well-conducted debate, in order that the appropriate stimulus and
benefit of dialectical exercise may be realized. But, if the
distinction of purpose and procedure, between the Dialectician and
the Sophist, is thus undefined and unsatisfactory, still more
unsatisfactory is the distinction of subject-matter. To discriminate
between what is really probable (_i.e._, accredited either by the
multitude or by a wise few), and what is only probable in appearance
and not in reality--is a task of extreme difficulty. The explanation
given by Aristotle himself[19]--when he describes the apparently
probable as that which has only superficial show, and which the most
ordinary intelligence discerns at once to be false--includes only the
more gross and obvious fallacies, but leaves out all the rest.
Nothing can be more incorrect than the assumption, in regard to
fallacies generally, that the appearance of probability is too faint
to impose upon any ordinary man. If all fallacies could be supposed
to come under this definition, the theory of Fallacies would
undoubtedly be worthless (as Mr. Poste suggests that it is, in the
Preface to his translation of the Sophistici Elenchi); and the most
dishonest Sophist would at any rate be harmless. But, in fact,
Aristotle himself departs from this definition even in the beginning
of the Sophistici Elenchi; for he there treats the sophistic
syllogism and refutation as having a semblance of validity plausible
enough to impose upon many persons, and to be difficult of detection;
like base metals having the exterior appearance of gold and silver,
and like men got up for the purpose of looking finer and stronger
than they really are.[20] Here we have the eristic or sophistic
syllogism presented as fallacious, yet as very likely to be mistaken
for truth, by unprepared auditors, unless warning and precaution be
applied; not (as it was set forth in the definition above cited) as
bearing the plain and obvious stamp of falsehood, recognizable even
by the vulgar. At the time when Aristotle constructed that
definition, he probably had present to his mind such caricatures of
dialectical questions as Plato (in the dialogue Euthydêmus) puts into
the mouth of the Sophists Euthydêmus and Dionysodorus. And, since
Aristotle chose to connect fallacious reasoning with dishonest
purposes, and to announce it as employed exclusively by dishonest
debaters, he seems to have found satisfaction in describing it as
something which no honest man of ordinary understanding could accept
as true: the Sophist being thus presented not merely as a knave but
as a fool.

[Footnote 19: Topic. I. i. p. 100, b. 24, seq.]

[Footnote 20: Soph. El. i. p. 164, a. 23-b. 27. [Greek: to\n au)to\n
de\ tro/pon kai\ sullogismo\s kai\ e)/legchos o( me\n e)/stin, o( d'
ou)k e)/sti me/n, phai/netai de\ dia\ tê\n a)peiri/an; oi( ga\r
a)/peiroi ô(/sper a)\n a)pe/chontes po/r)r(ôthen theôrou=sin.]]

I think it a mistake on the part of Aristotle to treat the fallacies
incidental to the human intellect as if they were mere traps laid by
Sophists and litigants; and as if they would never show themselves,
assuming dialectical debate to be conducted entirely with a view to
its legitimate purposes of testing a thesis and following out
argumentative consequences. It is true that, if there are infirmities
incident to the human intellect, a dishonest disputant will be likely
to take advantage of them. So far it may be well to note his
presence. But the dishonest disputant does not originate these
infirmities: he finds them already existing, and manifested
undesignedly not merely in dialectical debate, but even in ordinary
discourse. It is the business of those who theorize on the
intellectual processes to specify and discriminate the Fallacies as
liabilities to intellectual error among mankind in general, honest or
dishonest, with a view to precaution against their occurrence, or
correction if they do occur; not to present them as inventions of a
class of professional cheats,[21] or as tares sown by the enemy in a
field where the natural growth would be nothing but pure wheat.

[Footnote 21: Soph. El. i. p. 165, a. 19, seq.]

In point of fact the actual classification of Fallacies given by
Aristotle is far sounder than his announcement would lead us to
expect. Though he entitles them Sophistical Refutations, describing
them as intentionally cultivated and exclusively practised by
professional Sophists for gain, or by unprincipled litigants for
victory, yet he recognises them as often very difficult of detection,
and as an essential portion of the theory of Dialectic generally.[22]
The various general heads under which he distributes them are each
characterized by intellectual or logical marks.

[Footnote 22: Ibid. xi. p. 172, b. 7.]

His first and most general observation is, that language is the usual
medium and instrument through which fallacies are operated.[23] Names
and propositions are of necessity limited in number; but things named
or nameable are innumerable; hence it happens inevitably that the
same name or the same proposition must have several different
meanings. Since we cannot talk of things except by means of their
names, the equivocation inseparable from these names is a constant
source of false conclusions.[24]

[Footnote 23: Ibid. i. p. 165, a. 5.]

[Footnote 24: Ibid. a. 10: [Greek: ta\ me\n ga\r o)no/mata
pepe/rantai kai\ to\ tô=n lo/gôn plê=thos, ta\ de\ pra/gmata to\n
a)rithmo\n a)/peira/ e)stin. a)nagkai=on ou)=n plei/ô to\n au)to\n
lo/gon kai\ tou)/noma to\ e(\n sêmai/nein.]]

In dialectical procedure, the Sophist and the litigious debater aim
at the accomplishment of five distinguishable ends:--(1) To refute,
or obtain the false appearance of refuting, the thesis; (2) To catch,
or appear to catch, the opponent in affirming something false or
contradictory; (3) Or in affirming something paradoxical; (4) Or in
uttering incorrect and ungrammatical speech; (5) Or in tautological
repetition. The first of these five ends is what the Sophist most
desires; where that cannot be had, then, as secondary purposes, the
succeeding four, in the order in which they are enumerated.[25]

[Footnote 25: Soph. El. iii. p. 165, b. 12-22.]

The syllogism whereby the Sophist appears to refute without really
refuting, is either faulty in form, or untrue in matter, or
irrelevant to the purpose. The Fallacies that he employs to bring
about this deceitful appearance of refutation are various, and may be
distributed first under two great divisions:--

I. _Fallaciæ Dictionis_.
II. _Fallaciæ Extra Dictionem_.

I. The first division--_Fallaciæ Dictionis_--includes all those cases
wherein, under the same terms or propositions, more than one meaning
is expressed. Six heads may be distinguished:--

1. Homonymy (Equivocation): where the double meaning resides in one
single term--noun or verb.
2. Amphiboly: where the double meaning resides, not in a single word
but, in a combination of words--proposition, phrase, or sentence.
3. Conjunction (hardly distinguishable from that immediately
preceding--Amphiboly).
4. Disjunction: where what is affirmed conjunctively is not true
disjunctively, or the reverse. (_E.g._, Five are two and three; but
you cannot say, Five are even and odd. The greater is equal and
something besides; but you cannot say, The greater is equal.)
5. Accentuation: where the same word differently accentuated has a
different meaning.
6. _Figura Dictionis_: where two words, from being analogous in form,
structure, or conjugation, are erroneously supposed to be analogous
in meaning also.[26]

[Footnote 26: Ibid. iv. p. 165, b. 23-p. 166, b. 19.]

Such are the six heads of _Fallaciæ Dictionis_--Fallacies or
Paralogisms arising from words as such, or something directly
appertaining to them.

II. Under the second division--Fallacies or Paralogisms _Extra
Dictionem_--there are seven heads:

1. _Fallacia Accidentis_.
2. _Fallacia a dicto Secundum Quid ad dictum Simpliciter_.
3. _Ignoratio Elenchi_.
4. _Fallacia Consequentis_
5. _Petitio Principii_.
6. _Non Causa pro Causâ_.
7. _Fallacia Plurium Interrogationum_.[27]

[Footnote 27: Soph. El. v. p. 166, b. 20-27.]

1. The first of these varieties, called _Fallacia Accidentis_, arises
when a syllogism is made to conclude that, because a given predicate
may be truly affirmed of a given subject, the same predicate may also
be truly affirmed respecting all the accidents of that subject: as
when Koriskus is denied to be a man, because he is not Sokrates, who
is a man; or is denied to be Koriskus, because he is a man, while a
man is not Koriskus.

In the title given to this general head of Fallacy,[28] we must
understand Accident, not in its special logical sense as opposed to
Essence, but in a far larger sense, including both Genus when
predicated separately from Differentia, and Differentia when
predicated separately from Genus; including, in fact, every thing
which is distinguishable from the subject in any way, and at the same
time predicable of it--every thing except the Definition, which
conjoins Genus and Differentia together, and is thus identical and
convertible with the _definitum_.

[Footnote 28: Ibid. b. 29: [Greek: oi( para\ to\ sumbebêko\s
paralogismoi/]. Every man is an animal; but, because a predicate is
true of the subject man, you cannot infer that the same predicate is
true of the subject animal. This title comprehends within its range
another, which is presently announced as distinct and
separate--_Fallacia Consequentis_.]

2. The second general variety arises when a proposition is affirmed
with qualification or limitation in the premisses, but is affirmed
without qualification, simply and absolutely, in the conclusion. The
Ethiopian is white in his teeth and black in his skin; therefore, he
is both white and not white--both white and black. In this example
the fallacy is obvious, and can hardly escape any one; but there are
many other cases in which the distinction is not so conspicuous, and
in which the respondent will hesitate whether he ought to grant or
refuse a question simply and absolutely.[29] One example given by
Aristotle deserves notice on its own account: _Non-Ens est
opinabile_, therefore _Non-Ens est_; or, again, _Ens non est homo_,
therefore, _Ens non est_. This is one among Aristotle's ways of
bringing to view what modern logicians describe as the double
function of the substantive verb--to serve as copula in predication,
and to predicate existence.[30] He regards the confusion between
these two functions as an example of the Fallacy now before us--of
passing _a dicto Secundum Quid ad dictum Simpliciter_.[31]

[Footnote 29: Ibid. b. 37, seq. [Greek: o(/tan to\ e)n me/rei
lego/menon ô(s a(plô=s ei)rême/non lêphthê=|--to\ de\ toiou=ton e)p'
e)ni/ôn me\n panti\ theôrê=sai r(a/|dion--e)p' e)ni/ôn de\ lantha/nei
polla/kis.]]

[Footnote 30: The same double or multiple meaning of _Est_ is
discriminated by Aristotle in the Metaphysica, but in a different
way--[Greek: to\ o)\n ô(s a)lêthe/s, kai\ to\ mê\ o)\n ô(s
pseu=dos]--[Greek: D].] vii. p. 1017, a. 31; E. iv. p. 1027, b. 18-36.
Bonitz (ad. Metaphys. Z. iv. p. 310) says:--"Quid quod etiam illud
_esse_ huc refert, quo non existentiam significamus, sed predicati
cum subjecto conjunctionem." Aristotle is even more precise than
modern logicians in analysing the different meanings of [Greek: to\
o)/n]: he distinguishes _four_ of them.]

[Footnote 31: Soph. El. v. p. 167, a. 1: [Greek: oi(=on ei) to\ mê\
o)/n e)sti doxasto/n, o(/ti to\ mê\ o)\n e)/stin; ou) ga\r tau)to\n
ei)=nai te/ ti kai\ ei)=nai a(plô=s.]

Compare Metaphys. Z. iv. p. 1030, a. 25, and De Interpretatione, p.
21, a. 25-34: [Greek: ô(/sper O(/mêro/s e)sti/ ti, oi(=on poiêtê/s;
a)=r' ou)=n kai\ e)/stin, ê) ou)/? kata\ sumbebêko\s ga\r
katêgorei=tai tou= O(mê/rou to\ e)/stin; o(/ti ga\r poiêtê/s e)stin,
a)ll' ou) kath' au(to/, katêgorei=tai kata\ tou= O(mê/rou to\
e)/stin.]

It is clear from the above passages that Aristotle was thoroughly
aware of the logical fact which Hobbes, James Mill, and Mr. John
Stuart Mill, have more fully brought out and illustrated, as the
confusion between the two distinct functions of the substantive verb.
Many excellent remarks on the subject will be found in the 'System of
Logic,' by Mr. J. S. Mill (Bk. I. ch. iv. s. 1); also in the
'Analysis of the Human Mind,' by James Mill, especially in the recent
edition of that work, containing the explanatory notes by Mr. J. S.
Mill and Dr. Findlater (Vol. I. ch. iv. p. 174, seq.). Mr. J. S.
Mill, however, speaks too unreservedly of this confusion as having
escaped the notice of Aristotle, and as having been brought to light
only by or since Hobbes. He says (in a note on the 'Analysis,' p.
183):--"As in the case of many other luminous thoughts, an approach
is found to have been made to it by previous thinkers. Hobbes, though
he did not reach it, came very close to it; and it was still more
distinctly anticipated by Laromiguière, though without any sufficient
perception of its value . . . in the following words:--'Quand on dit,
l'être est, &c., le mot _est_, ou le verbe, n'exprime pas la même
chose que le mot _être_, sujet de la définition. Si j'énonce la
proposition suivante: Dieu est existant, je ne voudrais pas dire
assurément, Dieu existe existant: cela ne ferait pas un sens: de
même, si je dis que Virgile est poète, je ne veux pas donner à
entendre que Virgile existe. Le verbe _est_ dans la proposition
n'exprime dont pas l'existence réelle; il n'exprime qu'un rapport
spécial entre le sujet et l'attribut, &c.'" The passages above cited
from Aristotle show that he had not only enunciated the same truth as
Laromiguière, but even illustrated it by the same example (Homer
instead of Virgil). I shall in another place state more fully the
views of Aristotle respecting _Existence_.]

3. The third of these heads of Fallacy--_Ignoratio Elenchi_--is, when
the speaker, professing to contradict the thesis, advances another
proposition which contradicts it in appearance only but not in
reality, because he does not know what are the true and sufficient
conditions of a valid Elenchus. In order to be valid, it must be
real, not merely verbal; it must be proved by good syllogistic
premisses, without any _Petitio Principii_; and it must deny the same
matter, in the same relations, and at the same time, as that which
the thesis affirmed. Thus, it is no contradiction to affirm and deny
doubleness of the same body; both affirmation and denial may be true,
if you take the comparison against different numbers or different
bodies, or at different times. Sometimes persons neglect some of
these conditions, and fancy that they have contradicted the thesis,
when they have not: this is _Ignoratio Elenchi_.[32] (If the thesis
be an affirmative universal, it _is_ sufficient contradiction if you
prove a negative particular against it.)

[Footnote 32: Soph. El. v. p. 167, a. 21-35: [Greek: oi( de\ para\
to\ mê\ diôri/sthai ti/ e)sti sullogismo\s ê)\ ti/ e)/legchos, a)lla\
para\ tê\n e)/lleipsin gi/nontai tou= lo/gou.]

We may remark, by the way, that it is not very consistent in
Aristotle to recognize one general head of Sophistical Refutation
called _Ignoratio Elenchi_, after the definition that he has given of
the Sophist at the beginning of this treatise. He had told us that
the Sophist was a dishonest man, who made it his profession to study
and practise these tricks, for the purpose of making himself pass for
a clever man, and of getting money. According to this definition,
there is no _Ignoratio Elenchi_ in the Sophist, though there may be
in the person who supposes himself refuted. The Sophist is assumed to
know what he is about, and to be aware that his argument is a
fallacious one.]

4. The fourth head includes what are called _Fallaciæ Consequentis_:
when a man inverts the relation between predicate and subject in a
categorical proposition affirmative and universal, thinking that it
may be simply converted or that the subject may be truly affirmed of
the predicate; or when, in an hypothetical proposition, he inverts
the relation between antecedent and consequent, arguing that, because
the consequent is true, the antecedent must for that reason be true
also. Honey is of yellow colour; you see a yellow substance, and you
infer for that reason that it must be honey. Thieves generally walk
out by night; you find a man walking out by night, and you infer that
he must be a thief. These are inferences from Signs, opinions founded
on facts of sense, such as are usually employed in Rhetoric; often or
usually true, but not necessarily or universally true, and therefore
fallacious when used as premisses in a syllogism.[33]

[Footnote 33: Soph. El. v. p. 167, b. 1-18. This head (_Fallacia
Consequentis_) is not essentially distinguishable from the first
(_Fallacia Accidentis_), being nothing more than a peculiar species
or variety thereof, as Aristotle himself admits a little farther
on--vi. p. 168, a. 26; vii. p. 169, b. 7; viii. p. 170, a. 3. Compare
also xxviii. p. 181, a. 25.]

5. The fifth head is that of _Petitio Principii_: a man sometimes
assumes for his premiss what is identical with the conclusion to be
proved, without being aware of the identity.[34]

[Footnote 34: Ibid. v. p. 167, a. 38: [Greek: dia\ to\ mê\ du/nasthai
sunora=n to\ tau)to\n kai\ to\ e(/teron].]

6. The sixth head of Fallacy--_Non Causa pro Causâ_--is, when we
mistake for a cause that which is not really a cause; or, to drop the
misleading word _cause_, and to adopt the clearer terms in which this
same fallacy is announced in the Analytica Priora[35]--_Non per
Hoc_--_Non propter Hoc_, it arises when we put forward, as an essential
premiss of a given conclusion, something that is not really an
essential premiss thereof. When you intend to refute a given thesis
by showing, that, if admitted, it leads to impossible or absurd
conclusions, you must enunciate that thesis itself among the
premisses that lead to such absurdities.[36] But, though enunciated
in this place, it may often happen that the thesis may be an
unnecessary adjunct--not among the premisses really pertinent and
essential: and that the impossible conclusion may be sufficiently
proved, even though the thesis were omitted. Still, since the thesis
is declared along with the rest, it will appear falsely to be a part
of the real proof. It will often appear so even to yourself the
questioner; you not detecting the fallacy.[37] Under such
circumstances the respondent meets you by _Non propter Hoc_. He
admits your conclusion to be impossible, and at the same time to be
duly proved, but he shows you that it is proved by evidence
independent of his thesis, and not by reason or means of his thesis.
Accordingly you have advanced a syllogism good in itself, but not
good for the purpose which you aimed at;[38] viz., to refute the
thesis by establishing that it led to impossible consequences. You
will fail, even if the impossible consequence which you advance is a
proposition conjoined with the thesis through a continuous series of
intermediate propositions, each of them having one common term with
the next. Much more will you fail, if your impossible consequence is
quite foreign and unconnected with the thesis; as we sometimes find
in Dialectic.

[Footnote 35: Ibid. b. 21; vii. p. 169, b. 13. Compare Analyt. Prior.
II. xvii. p. 65.

In commenting on the above chapter of the Analytica Priora, I have
already remarked (Vol. I. p. 258, note) how much better is the
designation there given of the present fallacy--_Non per Hoc_
([Greek: ou) para\ tê\n the/sin to\ pseu=dos])--than the designation
here given of the same fallacy--_Non Causa pro Causâ_. Aristotle is
speaking of a syllogistic process, consisting of premisses and a
conclusion; the premisses being the _reasons_ or grounds of the
conclusion, not the _cause_ thereof, as that term is commonly
understood. The term _cause_ is one used in so many different senses
that we cannot be too careful in reasoning upon it. See Whately's
remarks on this subject, Bk. iii. Sect. 14, of his Logic: also his
Appendix I. to that work, under article _Reason_.]

[Footnote 36: Soph. El. v. p. 167, b. 24: [Greek: e)a\n ou)=n
e)gkatarithmê/thê| e)n toi=s a)nagkai/ois e)rôtê/masi pro\s to\
sumbai=non a)du/naton, do/xei para\ tou=to gi/nesthai polla/kis o(
e)/legchos.]]

[Footnote 37: Ibid. b. 35: [Greek: kai\ lantha/nei polla/kis ou)ch
ê(=tton au)tou\s tou\s e)rôtô=ntas to\ toiou=ton.]]

[Footnote 38: Ibid. b. 34: [Greek: a)sullo/gistoi me\n ou)=n a(plô=s
ou)k ei)si\n oi( toiou=toi lo/goi, pro\s de\ to\ prokei/menon
a)sullo/gistoi.]]

7. The seventh and last of these heads of Fallacy is, when the
questioner puts two distinct questions in the same form of words, as
if they were one--_Fallacia Plurium Interrogationum ut Unius_. In
well-conducted Dialectic the respondent was assumed to reply either
Yes or No to the question put; or, if it was put in the form of an
alternative, he accepted distinctly one term of the alternative.
Under such conditions he could not reply to one of these
double-termed questions without speaking falsely or committing himself.
Are the earth and the sea liquid? Is the heaven or the earth sea? The
questions are improperly put, and neither admits of any one correct
answer. You ought to confine yourself to one question at a time, with
one subject and one predicate, making what is properly understood by
one single proposition. The two questions here stated as examples
ought properly to be put as four.[39]

[Footnote 39: Ibid. b. 38-p. 168, a. 16; vi. p. 169, a. 6-12. [Greek:
ê( ga\r pro/tasi/s e)stin e(\n kath' e(no/s.--ei) ou)=n mi/a
pro/tasis ê( e(\n kath' e(no\s a)xiou=sa, kai\ a(plô=s e)/stai
pro/tasis ê( toiau/tê e)rô/têsis.]

The examples given of this fallacy by Aristotle are so palpable--the
expounder of every fallacy _must_ make it clear by giving examples
that every one sees through at once--that we are tempted to imagine
that no one can be imposed on by it. But Aristotle himself remarks,
very justly, that there occur many cases in which we do not readily
see whether one question only, or more than one, is involved; and in
which one answer is made, though two questions are concerned. To set
out distinctly all the separate debateable points is one of the most
essential precautions for ensuring correct decision. The importance
of such discriminating separation is one of the four rules prescribed
by Descartes in his Discours de la Méthode. The present case comes
under Mr. Mill's Fallacies of Confusion.]

Aristotle has thus distinguished and classified Fallacies under
thirteen distinct heads in all--six _In Dictione_, and seven _Extra
Dictionem_; among which last one is _Ignoratio Elenchi_. He now
proceeds to show that, in another way of looking at the matter, all
the Fallacies ranged under the thirteen heads, may be shown to be
reducible to this single one--_Ignoratio Elenchi_. Every Fallacy,
whatever it be, transgresses or fails to satisfy, in some way or
other, the canons or conditions which go to constitute a valid
Elenchus,[40] or a valid Syllogism. For a true Elenchus is only one
mode of a true Syllogism; namely, that of which the conclusion is
contradictory to some given thesis or proposition.[41] With this
particular added, the definition of a valid Syllogism will also be
the definition of a good Elenchus. And thus _Ignoratio
Elenchi_--misconception or neglect of the conditions of a good
Elenchus--understood in its largest meaning, is rather a
characteristic common to all varieties of Fallacy, than one variety
among others.[42]

[Footnote 40: Soph. El. vi. p. 168, a. 19: [Greek: e)/sti ga\r
a(/pantas a)nalu=sai tou\s lechthe/ntas tro/pous ei)s to\n tou=
e)le/gchou diorismo/n.]]

[Footnote 41: Ibid. a. 35.]

[Footnote 42: Ibid. p. 169, b. 15.]

In regard to two among the thirteen heads--_Fallacia Accidentis_ and
_Fallacia Consequentis_ (which however ought properly to rank as only
one head, since the second is merely a particular variety of the
first)--Aristotle's observations are remarkable. After having pointed
out that a Syllogism embodying this fallacy will not be valid or
conclusive (thus showing that it involves _Ignoratio Elenchi_), he
affirms that even scientific men were often not aware of it, and
conceived themselves to be really refuted by an unscientific opponent
urging against them such an inconclusive syllogism. To take an
example:--Every triangle has its three angles equal to two right
angles; every triangle is a figure; therefore, every figure has its
three angles equal to two right angles.[43] Here we have an invalid
syllogism; for it is in the Third figure, and sins against the
conditions of that figure, by exhibiting an universal affirmative
conclusion: it is a syllogism properly concluding in _Darapti_, but
with conclusion improperly generalized. Yet Aristotle intimates that
a scientific geometer of his day, in argument with an unscientific
opponent, would admit the conclusion to be well proved, not knowing
how to point out where the fallacy lay: he would, if asked, grant the
premisses necessary for constructing such a syllogism; and, even if
not asked, would suppose that he had already granted them, or that
they ought to be granted.[44]

[Footnote 43: Ibid. p. 168, a. 40: [Greek: ou)d' ei) to\ tri/gônon
duoi=n o)rthai=n i)/sas e)/chei, _sumbe/bêke d' au)tô=| schê/mati
ei)=nai_ ê)\ prô/tô| ê)\ a)rchê=|, o(/ti _schê=ma_ ê)\ a)rchê\ ê)\
prô=ton tou=to.]

Here we have Figure reckoned as an _accident_ of Triangle. This is a
specimen of Aristotle's occasional laxity in employing the word
[Greek: sumbebêko/s]. He commonly uses it as contrasted with
_essential_, of which last term Mr. Poste says very justly (notes, p.
129):--"To complete the statement of Aristotle's view, it should be
added, that essential propositions are those whose predicate cannot
be defined without naming the subject, or whose subject cannot be
defined without naming the predicate." Now figure is the genus to
which triangle belongs, and triangle cannot be defined without naming
its genus figure. But to include Genus as a predicable under the head
of [Greek: sumbebêko/s]or Accident, is in marked opposition to
Aristotle's own doctrine elsewhere: see Topic. I. v. p. 102, b. 4;
iv. p. 101, b. 17; Analyt. Post. I. ii. p. 71, b. 9; Metaphys. E. p.
1026, b. 32. It is a misfortune that Aristotle gave to this general
head of Fallacy the misleading title of _Fallacia
Accidentia_--[Greek: para\ to\ sumbebêko/s]. When he gave this title,
he probably had present to his mind only such examples as he indicates
in Soph. El. v. p. 166, b. 32. Throughout the Topica and elsewhere,
Genus is distinguished pointedly from [Greek: sumbebêko/s], though
examples occur occasionally in which the distinction is neglected. The
two Fallacies called _Accidentis_ and _Consequentis_, would both be
more properly ranked under one common logical title--_Supposed
convertibility or interchangeableness between Subject and
Predicate_--[Greek: ei) to/de a)po\ tou=de mê\ chôri/zetai, mêd' a)po\
thate/rou chôri/zesthai tha/teron] (vii. p. 169, b. 8).]

[Footnote 44: Soph. El. vi. p. 168, b. 6: [Greek: a)lla\ para\ tou=to
kai\ oi( techni=tai kai\ o(/lôs oi( e)pistê/mones u(po\ tô=n
a)nepistêmo/nôn e)le/gchontai; kata\ sumbebêko\s ga\r poiou=ntai
tou\s sullogismou\s pro\s tou\s ei)do/tas; oi( d' ou) duna/menoi
diairei=n ê)\ e)rôtô/menoi dido/asin ê)\ ou) do/ntes oi)/ontai
dedôke/nai.]]

The passage affords us a curious insight into the intellectual grasp
of the scientific men contemporary with Aristotle. Most of them were
prepared to admit fallacious inferences (such as the above) which
assumed the interchangeability of subject and predicate. They had
paid little or no attention to the logical relations between one
proposition and another, and between the two different terms of the
same proposition. The differences of essential from accidental
predication, and of each among the five Predicables from the others,
must have been practically familiar to them, as to others, from the
habit of correct speaking in detail; but they had not been called
upon to consider correct speaking and reasoning in theory, nor to
understand upon what conditions it depended whether the march of
their argumentative discourse landed them in true or false results.
And, if even the scientific men were thus unaware of logical
fallacies, we may be sure that this must have been still more the
case with unscientific men, of ordinary intelligence and education.
Aristotle tells us here, in more than one passage, how widespread
such illogical tendencies were: to fancy that two subjects which had
one predicate the same must be the same with each other in all
respects;[45] to understand each predicate applied to a subject as
being itself an independent subject, implying a new _Hoc Aliquid_ or
_Unum_;[46] to treat the universal, not as a common epithet but, as a
substantive and singular apart;[47] to use equivocal words or
phrases, even the most wide and vague, without any attempt to
discriminate their various meanings.[48] Such insensibility to the
conditions of accurate reasoning prevailed alike among ordinary men
and among the men of special science. A geometer would be imposed
upon by the inconclusive syllogism stated in the last paragraph,
which, as being founded on the _Fallacia Accidentia_ (or
interchangeability of subject and predicate), Aristotle numbers among
Sophistical Refutations. Such a refutation, however, even when
successful, would not at all prove that the geometer was deficient in
knowledge of his own science;[49] for it would puzzle the really
scientific man as well as the pretender.

[Footnote 45: Soph. El. vi. p. 168, b. 31: [Greek: ta\ ga\r e(ni\
tau)ta/, kai\ a)llê/lois a)xiou=men ei)=nai tau)ta/.]--vii. p. 169,
b. 7: [Greek: e)/ti kai\ e)pi\ pollô=n phai/netai _kai\ a)xiou=tai
ou(/tôs_, ei) to/de a)po\ tou=de mê\ chôri/zetai, mêd' a)po\
thate/rou chôri/zesthai tha/teron.]]

[Footnote 46: Ibid. vii. p. 169, a. 33: [Greek: o(/ti _pa=n to\
katêgorou/meno/n tinos u(polamba/nomen to/de ti kai\ ô(s e(\n
u(pakou/omen_; tô=| ga\r e(ni\ kai\ tê=| ou)si/a| ma/lista dokei=
pare/pesthai to\ to/de ti kai\ to\ o)/n.]]

[Footnote 47: Ibid. xxii. p. 178, b. 37-p. 179, a. 10.]

[Footnote 48: Ibid. vii. p. 169, a. 22.]

[Footnote 49: Ibid. viii. p. 169, b. 27: [Greek: oi( de\ sophistikoi\
e)/legchoi, a)\n kai\ sullogi/zôntai tê\n a)nti/phasin, ou) poiou=si
dê=lon ei) a)gnoei=; kai\ ga\r to\n ei)do/ta e)mpodi/zousi tou/tois
toi=s lo/gois.] Compare vi. p. 168, b. 6.]

We must always recollect that Aristotle was the first author who
studied the logical relations between Terms and Propositions, with a
view to theory and to general rules founded thereupon. The
distinctions which he brought to view were in his time novelties;
even the simplest rules, such as those relating to the Conversion of
propositions, or to Contraries and Contradictories, had never been
stated in general terms before. Up to a certain point, indeed,
acquired habit, even without these generalities, would doubtless lead
to correct speech and reasoning; yet liable to be perverted in many
cases by erroneous tendencies, requiring to be indicated and guarded
against by a logician. When we are told that even a professed
geometer was imposed upon by these fallacies, we learn at once how
deep-seated were such illogical deficiencies, how useful was
Aristotle's theoretical study in marking them out, and how
insufficient was his classification when he described the Fallacies
as obvious frauds, broached only by dishonest professional Sophists.
As he himself states, the cause of deceit turns upon a quite trifling
difference; having its root in the imperfection of language and in
our frequent habit of using words without much attention to logical
distinctions.[50]

[Footnote 50: Soph. El. vii. p. 169, b. 14: [Greek: e)n a(/pasi ga\r
ê( a)pa/tê dia\ to\ para\ mikro/n; ou) ga\r diakribou=men ou)/te tê=s
prota/seôs ou)/te tou= sullogismou= to\n o(/ron dia\ tê\n ei)rême/nên
ai)ti/an.] Compare v. p. 167, a. 5-14; i. p. 165, a. 6-19.]

Under one or other, then, of the thirteen general heads above
enumerated, all Paralogisms must be included--merely apparent
syllogisms, or refutations, which are not real and valid;[51] and all
of them designated by Aristotle as sophistic or eristic. Besides
these, moreover, he includes, as we saw, under the same designation,
syllogisms or refutations valid in form, and true as to conclusion,
yet founded on premisses not suited to the matter in debate; _i.e._,
not suited to Dialectic. Now, here it is that difficulty arises.
Dialectic and Rhetoric are carefully distinguished by Aristotle from
all the special sciences (such as Geometry, Astronomy, Medicine,
&c.); and are construed as embracing every variety of authoritative
_dicta_, current beliefs, and matters of opinion, together with all
the most general maxims and hypotheses of Ontology and Metaphysics,
of Physics and Ethics, and the common Axioms assumed in all the
sciences, as discriminated from what is special and peculiar to each.
Construed in this way, we might imagine that the subject-matter of
Dialectic was all-comprehensive, and that every thing without
exception belonged to it, except the specialties of Geometry and of
the other sciences; and such is the usual language of Aristotle. Yet
in the treatise before us we find him exerting himself to establish
another classification, and to part off Dialectic from a certain
other science or art which he acknowledges under the title of
Sophistic or Eristic.[52] Elsewhere he describes Sophistic as
occupied in the study of accidents or occasional conjunctions; and
this characteristic feature parts it off from Demonstration and
Science. But there is greater difficulty when he tries to part it off
from Dialectic. Where are we to find a clear line of distinction
between the matter of dialectic debate (gymnastic or testing) on the
one hand, and the matter of debate sophistic or litigious, on the
other? At the beginning of the Topica Aristotle assigned, as the
distinction, that the Dialectician argues upon premisses _really_
probable, while the litigious Sophist takes up premisses which are
probable _in appearance only_, and not in reality; such apparent
_probabilia_ (he goes on to say) having only the most superficial
semblance of truth, and being seen immediately to be manifest
falsehoods by persons of very ordinary intelligence.[53] But I have
already pointed out that this description of apparent _probabilia_,
if considered as applying to fallacious reasoning generally, is both
untenable in itself, and contradicted by Aristotle himself elsewhere.
The truth is, that there is no clear distinction between the matter
of Dialectic and the matter of Sophistic. And so, indeed, Aristotle
must be understood to admit, when he falls back upon an alleged
distinction of aim and purpose between the practitioners of one and
the other. The litigious man (he tells us) is bent upon nothing but
victory in debate, _per fas et nefas_: the Sophist aims at passing
himself off falsely for a wise or clever man, and making money
thereby.[54]

[Footnote 51: Ibid. viii. p. 170, a. 10.]

[Footnote 52: Metaphys. K. viii. p. 1064, b. 26: [Greek: tou=to de\
(to\ sumbebêko/s) ou)demi/a zêtei= tô=n o(mologoume/nôs ou)sô=n
e)pistêmô=n, _plê\n ê( sophistikê/_; peri\ to\ sumbebêko\s ga\r
au(/tê mo/nê pragmateu/etai.] Compare Analyt. Poster. I. ii. p. 71,
b. 10.]

[Footnote 53: Topic. I, i. p. 100, b. 26: [Greek: ou) ga\r pa=n to\
phaino/menon e)/ndoxon kai\ e)/stin e)/ndoxon. ou)the\n ga\r tô=n
legome/nôn e)/ndoxôn e)pipo/laion e)/chei pantelô=s tê\n phantasi/an,
katha/per peri\ ta\s tô=n e)ristikô=n lo/gôn a)rcha\s sumbe/bêken
e)/chein; parachrê=ma ga\r kai\ ô(s e)pi\ to\ polu\ toi=s kai\ mikra\
sunora=n duname/nois kata/dêlos e)n au)toi=s ê( tou= pseudou=s e)sti\
phu/sis.] It is by reference to this distinction between [Greek:
e)/ndoxa] which are genuine and [Greek: e)/ndoxa] which are only such
in appearance that the Scholiast (p. 306, b. 40) explains the meaning
of Aristotle in the eleventh chapter of Sophistici Elenchi: [Greek:
o( me\n ou)=n kata\ to\ pra=gma theôrô=n ta\ koina\ dialektiko/s, o(
de\ tou=to phainome/nôs poiô=n sophistiko/s] (p. 171, b. 6-20). I
confess that I attach no distinct meaning to the words [Greek: kata\
to\ pra=gma theôrô=n ta\ koina\], which characterizes the
Dialectician as contrasted with the Sophist; nor can I learn much
from the notes either of Waitz, or of Mr. Poste (p. 129, seq.) on the
passage. Take for example the last half of the Parmenides of Plato,
or Book B. of the Metaphysics of Aristotle. Are we to say that in
these two compositions Plato and Aristotle speculate on to [Greek:
ta\ koina\ kata\ to\ pra=gma], or that they do so only in
appearance?]

[Footnote 54: Soph. El. xi. p. 171, b. 25-35; i. p. 165, a. 21-31.]

Now, in regard to the distinction of aim or disposition drawn by
Aristotle between the dialectical disputant and the litigious or
sophistic disputant, we see at once, as was before suggested, that it
lies apart from the critical estimate of art, science, or philosophy;
and that it belongs, so far as it is well founded, to the estimate of
individuals ethically and politically, as worthy men or patriotic
citizens. Whether Euripides or Sophokles composed finer tragedies (as
we find argued in the Ranæ of Aristophanes), must be decided by
examining the tragedies themselves, not by enquiring whether one of
them was vain and greedy of money, the other free from these
blemishes. A theorist who is laying down general principles of
Rhetoric, and illustrating them by the study of Æschines and
Demosthenes, will appreciate the oration against Ktesiphon and the
oration De Coronâ in their character of compositions intended for a
particular purpose. For Rhetoric it is of no moment whether Æschines
was venal or disinterested--a malignant rival or an honest patriot;
this is an enquiry important indeed, but belonging to the historian
and not to the rhetorical theorist. Whether Aristotle was or was not
guided, in his animadversions on Plato, by an unworthy and captious
jealousy of his master, is an interesting question in reference to
his character; but our appreciation of his philosophy must proceed
upon an examination, not of his motives but, of his doctrines and
reasonings as we find them. A good argument is not deprived of its
force when enunciated by a knave, nor is a bad argument rendered good
because it proceeds from a virtuous man. Indeed, so far as the
character of the speaker counts at all, in falsifying the fair
logical estimate of an argument, it operates in a direction opposite
to that here indicated by Aristotle. The same argument in the mouth
of one who is esteemed and admired counts for more than its worth; in
the mouth of a person of low character it counts for less than it is
worth.[55] To distribute arguments into two classes--those employed
by persons of dishonourable character and those employed by
honourable men--is a departure from the scientific character of
Logic.

[Footnote 55: Eurip. Hecub. 293.

  [Greek: to\ d' a)xi/ôma, ka)\n kaô=s le/gê|s, to\ so\n
  pei/sei; lo/gos ga\r e)/k t' a)doxou/ntôn i)ô\n
  ka)\k tô=n dokou/ntôn au)to\s ou) tau)to\n sthe/nei.]

Aristot. Rhetoric. I. ii. p. 1356, a. 5-15.]

As to the other part of the case (if it is still necessary to recur
to it), touching the peculiarity of the matter of sophistical
arguments, the inconsistency of Aristotle is most apparent. In
enumerating the Sophistical Refutations he tells us that these
fallacies are indeed sometimes palpable and easily detected, but that
they are often very difficult to detect and very misleading; that an
unprepared hearer will generally be imposed upon by several of them,
and even a scientific hearer by some; and that, even where the
fallacy does not actually deceive, the proper mode of meeting and
exposing it will not occur unless to one previously exercised in
Dialectic.[56] That Fallacies _In Dictione_, taken as a class (though
these are what he declares to be the most usual _modus operandi_ of
the sham dialecticians called Sophists[57]), often passed
unperceived, and were hard to solve and elucidate even when
perceived--we know to have been his opinion; for it is not only in
the Topica and Sophistici Elenchi, but also in the Metaphysica and
other works,[58] that he takes pains to analyse and discriminate the
several distinct meanings borne by terms familiar to every one, such
as _idem_, _unum_, _pulchrum_, _bonum_, _amare_, _album_, _acutum_,
&c., which terms therefore, when employed in argument, were always
liable to introduce a fallacy of Equivocation or Amphiboly. He tells
us the like in specifying the seven Fallacies _Extra Dictionem_: that
they also were often unnoticed, and required vigilant practice to see
through and solve. The description in detail, therefore, which
Aristotle gives (in Sophistici Elenchi) of the working process
peculiar to the litigious Sophist, is completely at variance with the
definition which he had given of the sophistic syllogism at the
commencement of the Topica. That definition is indeed suitable for
the _type-specimens_ which he and other logicians give to illustrate
this or that class of Fallacies: the type-specimen produced must
carry absurdity on the face of it, so that the reader may at first
sight recognize it as a fallacy; and he may even find difficulty in
believing that any one can really be imposed upon by such trifling.
But, though suitable for the type-specimen taken separately, this
definition fails in the essential character which Aristotle
postulates for a definition, since it is quite untrue and unsuitable
for numerous instances of the class intended to be illustrated.[59]
Aristotle was the first who attempted to distribute Fallacies into
classes, such that, while in each class there were certain specimens
palpably stamped with the fallacious character, there were also in
each class an indefinite multitude of analogous cases wherein the
fallacious character did not reveal itself openly or easily, but
required attentive consideration to detect it, often indeed remaining
undetected, and producing its natural fruit of error and confusion.
This was one of his many great merits in regard to Logic; and the
classification of Fallacies (modified as to details) has passed to
all subsequent logicians, so that we find difficulty in understanding
that the contemporaries of Sokrates and Plato had no idea of it. But
the value of his service to Logic would be much lessened, if all
fallacies were sophistic syllogisms, intended to deceive but never
really deceiving, corresponding to his definition at the beginning of
the Topica; if (as he tells us in the Sophistici Elenchi) they were
only impudent forgeries put in circulation by a set of professional
knaves called Sophists; and if all non-sophistical dialecticians, and
all the world without, could be trusted as speaking correctly by
nature and as never falling into them.

[Footnote 56: Soph. El. v. p. 167, a. 5-15, b. 5-35. [Greek: kai\
lantha/nei polla/kis ou)ch ê(=tton au)tou\s tou\s e)rôtô=ntas to\
toiou=ton.]--vii. p. 169, a. 22-30, b. 8-15: [Greek: e)n a(/pasi ga\r
ê( a)pa/tê dia\ to\ para\ mikro/n].--xv. p. 175, a. 20.]

[Footnote 57: Ibid. i. p. 165, a. 2-20.]

[Footnote 58: Topic. I. vii. p. 103, a. 6-39; p. 106, b. 3-9; p. 107,
a. 12, b. 7: [Greek: polla/kis de\ kai\ e)n au)toi=s toi=s lo/gois
lantha/nei parakolouthou=n to\ o(mô/numon.] Cf. Topic. II. iii. p.
110, b. 33; V. ii. p. 129, b. 30, seq.; VI. x. p. 148, a. 23, seq.
Soph. El. x. p. 171, a. 17.

Compare also Book [Greek: D]. of the Metaphysica, and the frequent
recognition and analysis [Greek: tô=n polla/kô=s legome/nôn]
throughout the other Books of the Metaphysica.]

[Footnote 59: Topic. VI. i. p. 139, a. 26: [Greek: dei= ga\r to\n
tou= a)nthrô/pou o(rismo\n kata\ panto\s a)nthrô/pou
a)lêtheu/esthai.]--VI. x. p. 148, x. p. 148, b. 2: [Greek: dei= ga\r
e)pi\ pa=n to\ sunô/numon e)pharmo/ttein.]

Whoever reads the Sixth Book of the Topica, wherein Aristotle
indicates to the questioner _Loci_ for impugning a definition, will
see how little this definition of the Sophistic Syllogism will stand
such attacks.]

The appeal made by Aristotle to a difference of character and motives
as the distinction between the Dialectician and the Sophist is all
the more misplaced, because he himself lays down as the essential
feature of Dialectic generally, that it is a match or contention
between two rivals, each anxious to obtain the victory. It is like a
match at chess between two expert players, or a fencing-match between
two celebrated masters at arms. Its very nature is to be an attack
and defence, in which each combatant resorts to stratagem, and each
outwits the other if he can. Whether the match is played for money or
for nothing--whether the contentious spirit is more or less
intense--does not concern the theorist on dialectical procedure. It
is indispensable that both the questioner and the respondent should
exert their full force, the one in thrusting, the other in parrying:
if they do not, the purpose of Dialectic, which is the common
business of both, will not be attained. That purpose is clearly
declared by Aristotle. It is not didactic: he distinguishes it
expressly from teaching,[60] where one man who knows communicates
such knowledge to an ignorant pupil. It is gymnastic, exercising the
promptitude and invention of both parties; or peirastic, testing
whether the respondent knows a given thesis in such manner as to
avoid being driven into answers inconsistent with each other or
notoriously false.[61] Each party seeks, not to help or enlighten
but, to puzzle and defeat the other. As at chess or in fencing, to
mask one's projects and deceive the adversary is essential to the
work and to its purpose; each expects it from the other, and
undertakes to meet and parry it. The theses debated were always such
that arguments might be found both for the affirmative and for the
negative.

[Footnote 60: Soph. El. ii. p. 165, b. 1-5; x. p. 171, a. 32-b. 2.
Cf. Topic. VIII. xi. p. 161, a. 25.]

[Footnote 61: Topic. I. i. p. 100, a. 20; VIII. i. p. 155, b. 10-28.]

According to Aristotle himself, therefore, the Dialectician is
agonistic and eristic, just as much as the Sophist. If the one tries
to entrap his opponent for the purpose of victory, so also does the
other: the line which Aristotle draws between them is one not founded
upon any real distinction between two purposes and modes of
procedure, but is merely verbal and sentimental; putting aside under
a discredited title what he himself disliked. He admits that the
dialectical questioner, whenever the thesis which he undertakes to
refute is true, can never refute it except by inducing the respondent
to concede what is false; that, even where the thesis is false, he
often can only refute it by some other incompatible falsehood,
because he cannot obtain from the respondent better premisses; that,
where the thesis is probable and conformable to received opinion, his
only way of refuting it is by entrapping the respondent into
concessions paradoxical and contrary to received opinion.[62] But
these ends--fallacious refutation, falsehood, and paradox--are the
very same as those which Aristotle (in the Sophistici Elenchi)[63]
sets forth as the peculiar characteristics of the litigious Sophist.
And the improving intellectual tendencies which he ascribes to
Sophistic, are almost identical with those attributed to Dialectic,
being declared in very similar words.[64] That there were
dialecticians of every degree of merit, in the time of Aristotle,
cannot be doubted; some clever and ready, others stupid and destitute
of invention. But that there were any two classes of dialecticians
such as he describes and contrasts--one heretical class, called
Sophists, who purposely and habitually employed the thirteen
fallacious refutations, and another orthodox class who purposely
avoided or habitually abstained from them--we may most reasonably
doubt. If the argument in the Sophistici Elenchi is good at all, it
is good against all Dialectic. The Sophist, as Aristotle describes
him, is only the Dialectician looked at on the unfavourable side and
painted by an enemy. We know that there were in Greece many enemies
of Dialectic generally; the intense antipathy inspired by the
cross-examining colloquy of Sokrates, and attested by his own
declarations, is a sufficient proof of this. The enemies of Sokrates
depicted him--as Aristotle depicts the Sophist in the Sophistici
Elenchi--as a clever fabricator of fallacious contradictions and
puzzles; to which Aristotle adds the farther charge (advanced by
Plato before him) against the Sophist, of arguing for lucre--which
is an irrelevant charge, travelling out of the region of art, and
bearing on the personal character of the individual. If the
sophistical stratagems were discreditable and mischievous when
exhibited for money, they would be no less such if exhibited
gratuitously. The sophistical discourse is not (as Aristotle would
have us believe) generically distinguishable from the dialectical;[65]
nor is Sophistic an art distinct from Dialectic while adjoining to it,
but an inseparable portion of the tissue of Dialectic itself.[66] If
the Sophist passed himself off as knowing what he did not really know,
so also did the Dialectician; as we know from the testimony of
Sokrates, the most consummate master of the art. The conflict of two
minds each taking advantage of the misconceptions, short-comings, and
blindness of the other, is the essential feature of Dialectic as
Aristotle conceives it; to which the eight books of his Topica are
adapted, with their multiplicity of distinctions and precepts both
for attack and defence. There cannot be a game of chess without
stratagems, nor a fencing-match without feints; the power of such
aggressive deception is one characteristic mark of a good player.
Those who teach or theorize on the game do not seek to exclude
stratagem, but furnish precautions to prevent it from succeeding.
Mastery of the art assumes skill in defence as well as in attack.

[Footnote 62: Topic. VIII. xi. p. 161, a. 24.]

[Footnote 63: Soph. El. iii. p. 165, b. 14.]

[Footnote 64: Compare Topic. I. ii. p. 101, a. 26-b. 4, with Soph.
El. xvi. p. 175, a. 5-16.]

[Footnote 65: Soph. El. ii. p. 165, a. 32; xxxiv. p. 183, b. 1.]

[Footnote 66: Plato, Apol. Sokrat. p. 23, A.

Compare this with Aristot. Soph. El. i. p. 165, a. 30.]

Doubtless there are rules that require to be observed in the
dialectical attack and defence, as there are rules for all other
matches such as chess or fencing. I should have been glad if
Aristotle had given a precise and tenable explanation what these
rules were. He describes the Sophist as one who plays the game
unfairly; but we have already seen that the ends pursued by the
Dialectician generally are hardly at all distinguishable from those
aimed at by the Sophist. If we look to the account of the means
employed by one and the other, we shall in like manner fail to see
how any real line can be drawn between them.

Thus, one proceeding declared to be characteristic of the Sophist
is--that he puts multiplied questions apparently at random, without
any visible bearing on the thesis; practising a sort of fishing
examination, in order to obtain some answer of which he may take
advantage.[67] But, when we turn to the Eighth Book of the Topica, we
find Aristotle expressly recommending the like manoeuvre to the
Dialectician; advising him to conceal as much as possible the scheme
and intended series of his questions--to begin as far as possible
apart from the thesis, to put the questions in a succession
designedly incoherent and unintelligible, and to obtain (what, if
obtained, ensured complete success) the full extent of premisses
necessary for his final refutative syllogism, without the respondent
being aware that he had conceded them.[68] The questioner is farther
advised to throw the respondent off his guard by affecting
indifference whether each question is answered affirmatively or
negatively, and by occasionally taking objection against himself, in
order that he may create the impression of a strictly honest
purpose.[69] If we compare the interrogative procedure which
Aristotle recommends to the Dialectician with that which he blames in
the Sophist, we shall find that the former is even a greater
refinement of deception than the latter.

[Footnote 67: Soph. El. xii. p. 172, b. 9-25.

Aristotle treats the Sophists as guilty of dishonourable proceeding
herein--[Greek: du/nantai de\ nu=n ê(=tton _katourgei=n_ dia\ tou/tôn
ê)\ pro/teron.] The very same charge was urged against the dialectic
of Sokrates by his opponents: Plato, Hippias Minor, p. 373--[Greek:
a)lla\ Sôkra/tês a)ei\ tara/ttei e)n toi=s lo/gois kai\ e)/oiken
ô(/sper kakourgou=nti.] Compare Plato, Gorgias, pp. 461, B., 482, E.,
483, A.]

[Footnote 68: Topic. VIII. i. p. 155, b. 1.-p. 155, b. 30; p. 156, a.
5-22. Compare Analyt. Priora, II. xix. p. 66, a. 33.]

[Footnote 69: Topic. VIII. i. p. 156, b. 3, 17. Compare VIII. i. pp.
155-156, with Soph. El. xv. p. 174, a. 28.]

The next trick which we find ascribed to the Sophist is--that he
conducts the train of interrogation in such manner as to bring it
upon a ground on which his memory is abundantly furnished with
topics. Aristotle adds that this may be done well and honourably, or
ill and dishonourably.[70] From his own admission we see that this
practice was not peculiar to Sophists, but was common also to those
whom he calls Dialecticians: like every other part of the procedure,
it might be done well or ill; but wherein this difference consisted
he does not further explain. Indeed, when we recollect that the
elaborate details and classification of the Topica are mainly
intended to furnish the memory with an abundant store of premisses
well-arranged and ready for interrogation,[71] we may be sure that
every Dialectician who had gone through the trouble of learning them
would be impatient to apply them; and would make an opportunity for
doing so, if none were spontaneously tendered to him. But, if the
answers obtained were totally irrelevant to his final purpose of
refuting the thesis, they would be nothing but embarrassment to
him.[72] We must, therefore, understand that the questions put would
be such as tended ultimately to introduce that refutative Syllogism
which the questioner was bound to conclude with. If they were not, he
was of course punished by failure.

[Footnote 70: Soph. El. xii. p. 172, b. 26. In Topic. III. i. p. 116,
a. 20, Aristotle prescribes the same procedure to the Dialectician.
See also Waitz's note on the passage.

Alexander (in Scholia, p. 267, b. 8) tells us that it was customary
for the Sophists to put questions lying away from the thesis, and he
shows this by mentioning the Platonic Protagoras, in which he says
that the Sophist Protagoras does so. But the illustration here
produced does not serve Alexander's purpose. The Sophist Protagoras
(in the Platonic dialogue so called) is represented, not as shifting
dialectic from one point to another, but as running away from it
altogether into long discourse and continuous rhetoric (Plato,
Protagor. pp. 333, 334, 335). In respect to the thesis started for
debate, the dialectic of Sokrates departs from it as widely as that
of Protagoras, and this is acknowledged at the close of the dialogue,
p. 361. Compare 'Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates', Vol.
II. pp. 53, 59, 70.]

[Footnote 71: Topic. I. v. p. 102, a. 13; I. xiii. p. 105, a. 22;
VIII. xiv. p. 163, a. 31-b. 2.]

[Footnote 72: Aristotle himself observes this, Topic. II. v. p. 112,
a. 14.]

A third manoeuvre treated as peculiar to the Sophist is--that he
takes account of the particular philosophical sect to which the
respondent belongs, and endeavours to bring out by interrogations
whatever there may be paradoxical in the tenets of that sect.[73] But
would not any expert Dialectician do just the same? What else would
be done by Sokrates, if cross-examining an Anaxagorean or a
Herakleitean? or by Aristotle himself, if interrogating a Platonist?

[Footnote 73: Soph. El. xii. p. 172, b. 29.]

Another proceeding treated as peculiar to the Sophist is--that he
seeks to drive the respondent into a paradox, by bringing out in
cross-examination certain well-known antitheses or contradictions
which subsist together in the opinions of mankind. Thus, men profess
in their public talk high principles of virtue; but secretly and at
the bottom of their hearts they desire to get wealth or power _per
fas et nefas_. Again, there are two kinds of justice: one, that which
is just by nature and in truth, such as wise men or philosophers
approve; the other, that which is just according to law or custom,
such as the multitude in this or in in some other society approve.
There is, also, conflict between the authority of a father, and that
of the wise; between justice and expediency; and as to whether it is
more eligible to suffer wrong or to do wrong.[74] All these
antitheses are presented to us in the Platonic Gorgias, to which
(_i.e._, to the speech of Kallikles therein) Aristotle here makes
reference; and he numbers it among the vices distinguishing the
Sophist from the genuine Dialectician--to dwell upon such antitheses
for the purpose of forcing the respondent into paradoxical answers.
But, surely, the antitheses here fastened upon that obnoxious name
are of a class utterly opposed to the class of _pseudo-probabilia_,
which he tells us are the peculiar game of the litigious Sophist,
though every man of ordinary intelligence detects them at first sight
as fallacies. They are all real and serious issues,[75] having
plausible arguments _pro_ and _con_, debateable without end, and
settled by every man for himself according to his own sentiment and
predisposition. They are exactly the subject-matter best fitted for
the acute Dialectician. No man would be allowed by Aristotle to
deserve that title, if he omitted to raise and argue them, the thesis
being supposed suitable.[76] Aristotle himself speaks often of the
equivocal sense of the term justice--of the distinction between what
is just by nature and what is just according to some local or
peculiar sentiment.[77] The manoeuvre which Aristotle imputes to the
Sophist being exactly the same as that which Kallikles imputes to
Sokrates in the Platonic Gorgias,[78] it is Sokrates, and not
Kallikles, who serves here as illustrating what Aristotle calls a
Sophist. Indeed, if we read the Gorgias, we shall find the Platonic
Sokrates there represented as neglecting the difference between what
is probable (conformable to received opinion) and what is
paradoxical. He admits that he stands alone in his opinion, against
all the world, and his opponents even imagine that he is bantering
them; but he confides in his own individual reason and consistency,
so as to be able to reduce all opponents dialectically to proved
contradiction with themselves.[79] Himself maintaining a paradox, he
constrains his respondent by acute dialectic to assent to it; which
is exactly what Aristotle imputes to the Sophists of his day as a
reproach.

[Footnote 74: Ibid. b. 36-p. 173, a. 30.]

[Footnote 75: Rhetoric. II. xxv. p. 1402, a. 33: [Greek: oi( me\n
ga\r sullogismoi\ e)k tô=n e)ndo/xôn, dokou=nta de\ polla\ e)nanti/a
a)llê/lois e)sti/n.]

A disputant who argued about these memorable ethical antitheses, must
be allowed [Greek: kata\ to\ pra=gma theôrei=n ta\ koina/], which is
the characteristic feature assigned by Aristotle to the Dialectician,
as contrasted with the Sophist (Soph. El. xi. p. 171, b. 5), in so
far us I can understand the words [Greek: kata\ to\ pra=gma]. See
note b p. 394 supra.]

[Footnote 76: Topic. I. iii. p. 101, a. 5-10. [Greek: e)k tô=n
e)ndechome/nôn poiei=n a(\ proairou/metha.]]

[Footnote 77: Topic. II. xi. p. 115, b. 25. Ethic. Nikom. V. x. p.
1134, b. 18; I. i. p. 1094, b. 15. Rhetoric. I. xiii. p. 1373,
b. 5.]

[Footnote 78: Plato, Gorgias, pp. 482-483. [Greek: o(\ dê\ kai\ su\]
(Sokrates) [Greek: tou=to to\ sopho\n katanenoêkô\s kakourgei=s e)n
toi=s lo/gois, e)a\n me/n tis kata\ no/mon le/gê|, kata\ phu/sin
u(perôtô=n, e)a\n de\ ta\ tê=s phu/seôs, ta\ tou= no/mou.]]

[Footnote 79: Plato, Gorgias, pp. 470, 472, 481, 482.]

Some predecessors of Aristotle had distinguished arguments or
discourses into two separate classes--those addressed to the name,
and those addressed to the thought.[80] This distinction Aristotle
disapproves, denying certainly its pertinence and almost its reality.
There can be no arguments addressed to the thought only, apart from
the name: all of them must be addressed to the name, and through it
to the thought.[81] Whether an argument is addressed to the thought
or not, depends not upon any thing in the argument itself, but upon
the meaning which one respondent or other may happen to attach to the
words: if the respondent understands it as the questioner intended,
it is addressed to the thought; if not, not.[82] To require that the
questioner shall distinguish accurately the sense in which he puts
the question, would, according to Aristotle, convert him into a
teacher--would confound the line between Dialectic and Didactic.[83]
And this may be granted; but not less, if Dialecticians are to
refrain from all those proceedings which Aristotle notes and condemns
as peculiar to the Sophist, must they be held to pass into the
attitude of teacher and learner; the questioner doing what he can,
not to embarrass but, to enlighten and assist the respondent. The
purpose of victory, and the stimulus of competition in the double
function of question and answer (while entirely absent from
Didactic), are quite as essential to the Dialectician as to the
Sophist. That the Sophist seeks victory unscrupulously and at all
cost, while the Dialectician respects certain rules and limits of the
procedure--is a difference well deserving to be noticed; yet not a
_differentia_ giving name and essence to a new species. The unfair
Dialectician is a Dialectician still; all his purposes remain the
same, though the means whereby he pursues them are altered. This
distinction of means between the two, Aristotle has taken very
insufficient pains to point out. Rude and provocative manner, either
on the part of questioner or respondent, and impudent assumption of
concessions which have neither been asked nor granted,--these are
justly enumerated as illustrations of unfair Dialectic.[84] But the
enumeration is most incompletely performed; because Aristotle, in his
anxiety to erect Sophistic into an art or procedure by itself,
distinct from and alongside of Dialectic, has transferred to it much
that belongs to fair and and admissible Dialectic. Hence the really
unfair and objectionable means are not often brought into the
foreground.

[Footnote 80: Soph. El. x. p. 170, b. 12: [Greek: ou)k e)/sti de\
diaphora\ tô=n _ê(\n le/gousi tines_, to\ ei)=nai tou\s me\n pro\s
tou)/noma lo/gous, e(te/rous de\ pro\s tê\n dia/noian.]

From this allusion (and other allusions also xvii. p. 176, a. 6; xx.
p. 177, b. 8; xxii. p. 178, b. 10) to the doctrines of predecessors,
we see that the assertion made by Aristotle (in the last chapter of
Sophistici Elenchi) of his own originality, and of the absence of
prior researches, must be taken with some indulgence.]

[Footnote 81: Soph. El. x. p. 170, b. 23.]

[Footnote 82: Ibid. b. 28: [Greek: ou) ga\r e)n tô=| lo/gô| e)/sti
to\ pro\s tê\n dia/noian ei)=nai, a)ll' e)n tô=| to\n a)pokrino/menon
e)/chein pôs pro\s ta\ dedome/na.]]

[Footnote 83: Ibid. p. 171, a. 28, seq.]

[Footnote 84: Soph. El. xv. p. 174, a. 22, b. 10.]

Though Aristotle speaks so contemptuously about Sophistic, he
nevertheless indicates _Loci_ (or general heads of subjects) to
assist the sophistical questioner in attacking, and precepts to the
sophistical respondent for warding off attack. On the whole, these
precepts are not materially different from those laid out in the
Topica for Dialectic; except that he gives greater prominence to
Solecism and Tautology, as thrusts practised by the sophistical
questioner. He insists upon the intellectual usefulness of practice
in sophistical debate, hardly less than in what he calls dialectical,
and, as was remarked, upon similar grounds.[85] He recommends it as
valuable not only for imparting readiness and abundance in argument,
but also for solitary meditation and for investigation of scientific
truths. Without it (he declares) we cannot become familiar with the
equivocations of terms and propositions, nor acquire the means of
escaping them. If we allow ourselves to be entangled in them, without
being aware of it, by others, we shall also be entangled in them when
we pursue reflections of our own.[86] It is not enough to see
generally that there _is_ a fallacy; we must farther learn to detect
at once the precise seat of the fallacy, and to point out rapidly how
it may be cleared up. This is the more difficult to do, because
fallacies that we are thoroughly aware of will often escape our
notice under inversion and substitution of words.[87] Unless we
acquire promptitude by frequent exercise in such debates, we shall
find ourselves always unprepared and behind-hand in each particular
case of confusion. If we complain and condemn such debates generally,
we shall appear to do so upon no better grounds than our own
stupidity and incompetence.[88]

[Footnote 85: Ibid. xvi. p. 175, a. 5-16. Compare Topica**, I. ii. p.
101, a. 30, seq.]

[Footnote 86: Soph. El. xvi. p. 175, a. 9: [Greek: deu/teron de\
pro\s ta\s kath' au(to\n zêtê/seis (chrê/simoi); o( ga\r u(ph'
e(te/rou r(a|diôs paralogizo/menos kai\ tou=to mê\ ai)sthano/menos
ka)\n au)to\s u(ph' au(tou= tou=to pa/thoi polla/kis.]]

[Footnote 87: Ibid. a. 20: [Greek: ou) tau)to\ d' e)sti\ labo/nta te
to\n lo/gon i)dei=n kai\ lu=sai tê\n mochthêri/an, kai\ e)rôtô/menon
a)panta=n du/nasthai tache/ôs. o(\ ga\r i)/smen, polla/kis
metatithe/menon a)gnoou=men.] Compare xxxiii. p. 182, b. 7.]

[Footnote 88: Soph. El. xvi. p. 175, a. 25: [Greek: ô(/ste, a)\n
dê=lon me\n ê(mi=n ê)=|, a)mele/têtoi d' ô)=men, u(sterou=men tô=n
kairô=n polla/kis.]]

Accordingly the Sophistici Elenchi contains precepts, at considerable
length,[89] to the respondent in a sophistical debate, how reply or
solution is to be given to the fallacies involved in the questions;
all the thirteen Fallacies, (the six _In Dictione_, and the seven
_Extra Dictionem_) being treated in succession. In conducting his
defensive procedure, the respondent must keep constantly in mind what
the Sophistical Refutation really is. He must treat it not as a real
or genuine refutation, but as a mere simulation of such; and he must
so arrange his reply as to bring into full evidence this fact of
simulation. What he has to guard against is, not the being really
refuted but, the seeming to be refuted.[90] The refutative syllogism
constructed by the sophistical questioner, including as it does
Equivocation, Amphiboly, or some other verbal fallacy, and therefore
yielding no valid conclusion, does not settle whether the respondent
is really refuted or not. If indeed the questioner, in putting his
interrogation, discriminates the double meaning of his words, where
they have a double meaning, the respondent ought to answer plainly
and briefly Yes, or No; either affirming or denying what is tendered.
But, if the questioner does not so discriminate, the respondent
cannot reply simply Yes, or No: he must himself discriminate the two
meanings, and affirm or deny accordingly.[91] Unless he guards
himself by such discrimination, he cannot avoid falling into a
contradiction, at least in appearance. The equivocal wording of the
question will be tantamount to the fallacy of putting two questions
as one.[92]

[Footnote 89: From xvi. p. 175, to xxxiii. p. 183, of Soph. El.]

[Footnote 90: Soph. El. xvii. p. 175, a. 33: [Greek: o(/lôs ga\r
pro\s tou\s e)ristikou\s machete/on, ou)k ô(s e)le/gchontas, a)ll'
ô(s phainome/nous; ou) ga/r phamen sullogi/zesthai/ ge au)tou/s,
ô(/ste pro\s to\ mê\ dokei=n diorthôte/on.]]

[Footnote 91: Ibid. b. 1-14. Compare Topica, VIII. vii. p. 160, a.
29.

Aristotle tells us that this demand for a reply brief and direct,
without any qualifying additions or distinctions, was advanced by
dialecticians in former days much more emphatically than in his
own--[Greek: o(/ t' e)pizêtou=si nu=n me\n ê(=tton pro/teron de\
ma=llon oi( e)ristikoi/, to\ ê)\ nai\ ê)\ ou)\ a)pokri/nesthai to\n
e)rôtô/menon, e)gi/net' a)/n.] I presume that he makes comparison
with the Platonic dialogues--Euthydemus, p. 295; Gorgias,
pp. 448-449; Protagoras, pp. 334-335.]

[Footnote 92: Soph. El. xvii. 175, b. 15-p. 176, a. 18.]

As the questioner may propound as refutation what seems to be such
but is not so in reality, so the respondent may meet it by what is an
apparent solution but no solution in reality, There occur various
cases, in sophistic or agonistic debate, wherein a simulated solution
of this kind is even preferable to a real one.[93] If the question is
plausible, the respondent may answer, "Be it so"; but, if it involves
any paradox in answering, he will answer by saying, "So it would
appear": he will thus not be supposed to have granted what amounts to
refutation or paradox.[94] Where the question put is such that, while
involving falsehood or paradox if answered in the affirmative, it is
at the same time closely or immediately connected with the thesis set
up,--the respondent may treat it as equivalent to a _Petitio
Principii_, and make answer in the negative. Also, where the
questioner, trying to establish an universal proposition by
Induction, puts the final question, not under an universal term but,
as the general result of the particulars conceded (and such
like),--the respondent may refuse to admit this last step, and may
say that his antecedent concessions have been misunderstood.[95]

[Footnote 93: Ibid. p. 176, a. 21.]

[Footnote 94: Ibid. a. 25.]

[Footnote 95: Ibid. a. 27-35.]

If a question is put in plain and appropriate language, answer must
be made plainly or with some clear distinction; but, where the
question is put obscurely and elliptically, leaving part of the
meaning unexpressed, the respondent must not concede it unreservedly.
If he does, fallacious refutation may very possibly be the
result:[96] he may appear to be refuted by that which is no real
refutation. If, of two propositions, the second follows upon the
first, but the first does not follow upon the second, the respondent,
where he has the choice, ought to grant the second only, and not the
first. He ought not to make a greater concession when he can escape
with a less;[97] _e.g._, he ought to concede the particular rather
than the universal.

[Footnote 96: Ibid. a. 38-b. 7.]

[Footnote 97: Ibid. b. 8-13.]

Again, among opinions generally received, there are some which the
public recognize as matters of more or less doubt and uncertainty;
others, on which they are firmly assured that every one who
contradicts them speaks falsely. When it is uncertain to which of
these two classes the question put is referable, the respondent will
be safer in answering neither affirmatively nor negatively, but
simply, "I go with the received opinions."[98] In cases where
opinions are divided, he may find opportunity for changing the terms,
and for substituting a metaphorical equivalent as what he concedes.
Such change of terms may pass without protest, in consequence of the
doubtful character of the matter; while it will embarrass the
questioner in constructing his refutation.[99] The respondent may
further embarrass him by anticipating questions that seem likely to
be put, and by objecting against them beforehand.[100]

[Footnote 98: Soph. El. **xvii. p. 176, b. 14-20.

Both the text and the meaning of this difficult clause are
differently given by various commentators. The text and construction
of Waitz appears to me the best, and I have followed him. I cannot
agree with Mr. Poste when he declares (notes, p. 143) [Greek:
a)popha/neis] to be the true reading, instead of [Greek:
a)popha/seis], which last is adopted both by Bekker and in the
edition of **Firmin Didot.]

[Footnote 99: Ibid. b. 20-25.]

[Footnote 100: Ibid. b. 26.]

When the questioner has obtained the premisses which he thinks
necessary, and has drawn from them a refutative syllogism, the
respondent must see whether he can properly solve that syllogism or
not.[101] A good and proper solution is, to point out on which
premiss the fallacy of the conclusion depends. First, he must examine
whether it is formally correct, or whether it has only a false
appearance of being so: if the last be the case, he must distinguish
in which of the premisses and in what way such false appearance has
arisen. If on the other hand the syllogism is formally correct, he
must look whether the conclusion is true or false. Should it be true,
he cannot solve the syllogism except by controverting one or both of
the premisses; but should the conclusion be false, two modes of
solution are open to him. One mode is, if he can point out an
equivocation or amphiboly in the terms of the conclusion; another
mode will be, to controvert, or exhibit a fallacy in, one of the
premisses.[102] The respondent, however, must learn to apply this
examination rapidly and unhesitatingly: to do so at once is very
difficult, though it may be easily done if he has leisure to
reflect.[103]

[Footnote 101: Soph. El. xviii. p. 176, b. 29: [Greek: ê( me/n
o)rthê\ lu/sis e)mpha/nisis pseudou=s sullogismou=, par' o(poi/an
e)rô/têsin sumbai/nei to\ pseu=dos.]]

[Footnote 102: Soph. El. xviii. p. 176, b. 38: [Greek: tou\s me\n
kata\ to\ sumpe/rasma pseudei=s dichô=s e)nde/chetai lu/ein; kai\
ga\r tô=| a)nelei=n ti tô=n ê)rôtême/nôn, kai\ tô=| dei=xai to\
sumpe/rasma e)/chon ou)ch ou(/tôs.]

Mr. Poste translates these last words--"or by a counterproof directed
against the conclusion:" and he remarks in his note (pp. 145-147),
"that this assertion--disproof of the conclusion of the refutative
syllogism is one mode of _solution_--is both manifestly
inadmissible, and flatly contradicted by Aristotle himself
elsewhere." The words of Aristotle doubtless seem to countenance Mr.
Poste's translation; yet the contradiction pointed out by Mr. Poste
(and very imperfectly explained, p. 147) ought to make us look out
for another meaning; which is suggested by the chapter immediately
following (xix. p. 177, a. 9), where Aristotle treats of the
Fallacies of Equivocation and Amphiboly. He tells us that
equivocation may be found either in the conclusion or in the
premisses; and that to show it in the conclusion is one mode of
solving or invalidating the refutation. This is what Aristotle means
by the words cited at the beginning of this note: [Greek: tô=|
dei=xai to\ sumpe/rasma e)/chon ou)ch o)rthô=s]. In Mr. Poste's
translation these words mean the same as [Greek: a)nelei=n] used just
before, which Aristotle obviously does not intend.]

[Footnote 103: Soph. El. xviii. p. 177, a. 7.]

Aristotle then proceeds to indicate the modes in which the respondent
may provide solutions for each of the thirteen heads of fallacious
refutation above enumerated. For these thirteen classes, he
pronounces that one and the same solution will be found applicable to
all fallacies contained in one and the same class.[104]

[Footnote 104: Scholia, p. 312, a. 4, Br.; Soph. El. 20, p. 177, b.
31: [Greek: tô=n ga\r para\ tau)to\n lo/gôn ê( au)tê\ lu/sis], &c.]

Thus, in the two first of them--Equivocation of Terms and Amphiboly
of Propositions--duplicity of meaning must be either in the
conclusion, or in the premisses, of the refutative syllogism. If it
be in the conclusion, the refutation must at once be rejected, unless
the respondent has previously admitted some proposition containing
the equivocal word as one of its terms, so that the refutation may
appear to contradict it expressly and distinctly. But, if it be in
the premisses, then there is no necessity that the respondent should
have previously admitted such a proposition; for the equivocal word
may form the middle term of the refutative syllogism, and may thus
not appear in the conclusion thereof.[105] The proper way for the
respondent to deal with these questions, involving equivocation or
amphiboly, is to answer them, at the outset, with a reserve for the
double meaning, thus: "In one sense, it is so; in another sense, it
is not." If he does not perceive the double meaning until he has
already answered the first question, he must recover himself, when he
answers the second, by pointing out the equivocation more distinctly,
and by specifying how much he is prepared to concede.[106] Even if he
has been taken unawares, and has not perceived the equivocation until
the refutative syllogism has been constructed simply and absolutely,
he should still contend that he never meant to concede what has been
apparently refuted, and that the refutation tells only against the
name, not against the thing meant;[107] so that there is no genuine
refutation at all.

[Footnote 105: Soph. El. xix. p. 177, a. 18: [Greek: o(/sois d' e)n
toi=s e)rôtê/masin, ou)k a)na/gkê proapophê=sai to\ ditto/n; ou) ga\r
pro\s tou=to a)lla\ dia\ tou=to o( lo/gos.]]

[Footnote 106: Ibid. a. 24: [Greek: e)a\n de\ la/thê|, e)pi\ te/lei
prostithe/nta tê=| e)rôtê/sei diorthôte/on;] &c.]

[Footnote 107: Ibid. a. 30: [Greek: o(/lôs te machete/on, a)\n kai\
a(plô=s sullogi/zêtai, o(/ti ou)ch o(\ e)/phêsen a)pe/phêse pra=gma,
a)ll' o)/noma; ô(/st' ou)k e)/legchos.]

Instead of [Greek: a)\n kai/], Julius Pacius reads [Greek: ka)/n]:
the meaning is much the same.]

In the next two Fallacies--those of Composition and Division, or
Conjunction and Disjunction--when the questioner draws up his
refutative syllogism as if one of the two had been conceded, the
respondent will retort by saying that his concession was intended
only in the other construction of the words. This fallacy is distinct
from Equivocation; and it is a mistake to try (as some have tried) to
reduce all fallacies to Equivocation or Amphiboly.[108] The
respondent will distinguish, in each particular case, that
construction of the words which he intended in his admission, from
that which the questioner assumes in his pretended refutation.[109]

[Footnote 108: Soph. El. xx. p. 177, a. 33-b. 9. [Greek: ou) pa/ntes
oi( e)/legchoi para\ to\ ditto/n, katha/per tine/s phasin.]

This is another of the evidences showing that there were theorists
prior to Aristotle on logical proof; and that his declaration of
originality (in the concluding chapter of Sophist. Elenchi) must be
taken with reserve.]

[Footnote 109: Soph. El. xx. p. 177, b. 10-26: [Greek: diairete/on
ou)=n tô=| a)pokrinome/nô|;] &c.]

The Fallacies of Accent rarely furnish sophistical refutations,[110]
but those of _Figura Dictionis_ furnish a great many. When two words
have the like form and structure, it may naturally be imagined that
the signification of one belongs to the same Category as that of the
other. But this is often an illusion; and in such cases a sophistical
refutation may be founded thereupon. The respondent will solve it by
denying the inference from similarity of form to similarity of
meaning, and by distinguishing accurately to which among the ten
Categories the meaning of each several word or each proposition
belongs. When two words thus seem, by their form, to belong to the
same Category, the questioner will often take it for granted, without
expressly asking, that they do belong to the same, and will found a
confutation thereupon; but the respondent must not admit the
confutation to be valid, unless this question has been explicitly put
to him and conceded.[111] A question is put which, in its direct and
obvious meaning, bears only on the category of Quantity, of Quality,
of Relation, of Action, or of Passion; but the respondent, not aware
of the equivocation, answers it in such a manner as to comprehend the
Category of Substance, and is so understood by the questioner when he
constructs his refutative syllogism. The respondent will secure
himself from being thus confuted, by keeping constantly in view to
which of the Categories his answer is intended to refer.[112]

[Footnote 110: Ibid. xxi. p. 177, b. 35.]

[Footnote 111: Ibid. xxii. p. 178, a. 4-28. [Greek: to\ ga\r loipo\n
au)to\s prosti/thêsin o( a)kou/ôn ô(s o(moi/ôs lego/menon; to\ de\
le/getai me\n ou)ch o(moi/ôs, phai/netai de\ dia\ tê\n le/xin.]]

[Footnote 112: Several illustrative examples of this mode of
sophistical refutation, founded on the Fallacy called _Figura
Dictionis_, are indicated in this chapter by Aristotle. The
indication however, is often so brief and elliptical, that there is
great difficulty in restoring the fallacies in full, and still
greater difficulty in translating them into any modern language.

1. Is it possible at the same time to do and to have done the same
thing?--No. To see something is to do something; to have seen
something is to have done something?--Yes. Is it possible at the same
time to see and to have seen the same thing?--Yes.

The respondent has thus contradicted himself. The form of the word
[Greek: o(ra=n] appears to rank it under the Category [Greek:
poiei=n]. However, I think that the mistake really made here was,
that the respondent returned an answer universally negative to the
first question.

2. Does anything coming under the Category _Pati_ come under the
Category _Agere_?--No. But [Greek: te/mnetai, kai/etai,
ai)stha/netai], all show by their form that they belong to the
Category _Pati_?--Yes. Again, [Greek: le/gein, tre/chein, o(ra=n],
show by their form that they belong to the Category _Agere_?--Yes.
You will admit, however, that [Greek: to\ o(ra=n] is [Greek:
ai)stha/nesthai/ ti]?--Certainly. Therefore something that belongs to
the Category _Agere_ belongs also to that of _Pati_.

If we turn back to Aristot. Categ. viii. p. 11, a. 37, we shall find
that he admits the possibility that the same subject may belong to
two distinct Categories.

3. Did any one write that which stands here written?--Yes. It stands
here written that you are standing up--a false statement; but when it
was written the statement was true?--Yes. Therefore the writer has
written a statement both true and false?--Yes.

Here _true_ and _false_ belong to the Category Quality; the statement
or matter written belongs to that of Substance. What the writer wrote
had nothing to do with the former of the two Categories; and no
contradiction has been made out by admitting that the statement _was_
once true and _is_ now false.

4. Does a man tread that which he walks?--Yes. But he walks the whole
day?--Yes. Therefore he treads the whole day.

Here the Category of _Quando_ is confused with that of Substance.

5. But the most interesting illustration of this confusion of one
Category with another, is furnished by Aristotle in respect of the
difference between himself and Plato as to Ideas or Universals.
According to Plato the universal term denoted a separate something
apart from the particulars, yet of which each of these particulars
partook. According to Aristotle it denoted nothing separate from the
particulars, but something belonging (essentially or non-essentially)
to all and each of the particulars. In the Platonic theory it was an
_Hoc Aliquid_ ([Greek: to/de ti]), or had an existence substantive
and separate: in the Aristotelian it was a _Quale_ or _Quale Quid_
([Greek: poio/n]), having an existence merely adjective or
predicative. Aristotle maintains that Plato or the Platonists placed
it in the wrong Category--in the Category of Substance instead of in
that of Quality.

Now it is by rectifying this confusion of Categories that Aristotle
solves two argumentative puzzles which he ranks as sophistical:--(1)
The argument concluding in what was called the 'Third Man;' (2) The
following question: Koriskus, and the musical Koriskus--are these the
same, or is the second different from the first?

What is called the 'Third Man' was a refutation of the Platonic
theory of Ideas. Because Plato recognized a substantive existence,
corresponding to each common denomination connoting likeness, apart
from all the similar particulars denominated, _e.g._, a Self-man, or
separate self-existent man, corresponding to the Idea, and apart from
all individual men, Caius, &c.--opponents argued against him,
saying:--If this is recognized, you must also recognize that the
Self-man, and the individual man called Caius, have also a common
denomination and similarity, which (upon your principles) corresponds
to another Ideal Man, or a Third Man. You must, therefore, go on
inferring upwards to a Fourth Man, a Fifth Man, &c., and so onwards
to an indefinite number of Ideal Men, one above the other. This was
intended as a refutation, by _Reductio ad Impossibile_, of the
Platonic view of Ideas as separate Entities, each of them One and
Universal. But Aristotle here treats it as a Sophistical Refutation;
and he indicates what he calls the solution of it by saying that it
confounds the Categories of Substance and Quality, putting the
Universal (which ought to be under the Category of Quality) under the
Category of Substance. He has no right, however, to include this
among Sophistical Refutations, which are (as he himself defines them)
not real but fallacious refutations, invented by a dishonest
money-getting profession called Sophists, and which are solved by
pointing out the precise seat of the fallacy. The refutation called
the 'Third Man' is so far from being fallacious, that it is valid,
and is recited as such elsewhere by Aristotle himself (Metaphs. A. ix.
p. 990, b. 17**); while the solution tendered by Aristotle, instead of
being a solution, is a confirmation, pointing out, not where the
fallacy of the refutation resides but, where the fallacy of the
doctrine refuted resides. Moreover, if we are to treat the refutation
called the 'Third Man' as sophistical, we must number Plato himself
among the dishonest class called Sophists. Here is one among the many
proofs that the strong line drawn by Aristotle between the
Dialectician and the Sophist is quite untenable. The argument is
distinctly enunciated in the Platonic Parmenides (pp. 131-133).

The meaning of the Universal (Aristotle maintains) must be considered
as predicative only, tacked on to some _Hoc Aliquid_, and belonging
to _Quale_ or some other of the nine latter Categories. It may be set
out as a distinct subject for logical consideration and reasoning:
but it cannot be set out as a distinct existence beyond and apart
from its particulars ([Greek: para\ tou\s pollou\s e(/n ti]). It is
[Greek: poio/n], and it cannot even be recognized as [Greek: o(/per
poio/n] or [Greek: au)to-poio/n], for this would put it apart from
all the other [Greek: poia/], and would be open to the refutation
above noticed called the 'Third Man.' Such is the drift of the very
difficult passage of the Sophistici Elenchi (xxii. p. 178, b. 37-p.
179, a. 10**). I differ from Mr. Poste's translation (p. 71) of part
of this passage, and still more from the explanation given in the
latter part of his note (p. 155). I think that the doctrine of
[Greek: to\ e(\n para\ ta\ polla/] is produced by Aristotle here and
elsewhere in his work as untrue and inadmissible, not as his own
doctrine. Mr. Poste understands this passage differently from the
previous translators, with whom I agree for the most part, though M.
Barthélemy St. Hilaire appears to me to have missed the hinge upon
which Aristotle's argument turns, by translating [Greek: o(/per
poio/n]--id ipsum, quod quale est (J. Pacius)--"une qualité:" the
argument turns upon the distinction between [Greek: o(/per poio/n]
and [Greek: poio/n].

I come now to the second sophistical refutation given by Aristotle:
Koriskus, and the musician Koriskus--are the two the same or
different? This is what Aristotle calls a sophistical or fallacious
argument (compare Metaphys. E. ii. p. 1026, b. 15); but it can hardly
be so called with propriety, for the only solution that Aristotle
himself gives of it is, that the two are _idem numero_, but in an
improper or secondary sense (Topic. I. vii. p. 103, a. 30); _i. e._,
that they are in one point of view the same, in another point of view
different--they are [Greek: e(\n kata\ sumbebêko/s]. See Arist.
Metaph. [Greek: D]. vi. p. 1015, b. 16; Scholia, p. 696, a. 22, seq.;
and Alexand. Aphrodis. ad Metaph. pp. 321, 322, 414, 415, ed. Bonitz.
I understand Aristotle to say that [Greek: Ko/riskos mousiko/s]
cannot be properly _set out_ or abstracted ([Greek: ou)k e)/stin
au)to\ e)kthe/sthai]), because it includes two Categories (Substance
and Quality) in one; wherefore it cannot be properly compared either
with [Greek: Ko/riskos] simply (Category of Substance) or with
[Greek: mousiko/s] simply (Category of Quality). It seems strange
that Aristotle does not notice this argumentative difficulty in the
discussion which he bestows on [Greek: tau)to/n] in the Seventh Book
of the Topica. The subtle reasonings, very hard to follow, which
Aristotle employs (Physic. V. iv. p. 227) might have made him
cautious in treating the difficulties of opponents as so many
dishonest cavils. It is curious that Alexander, in reciting the
sophistical argument, assumes as a matter of course that [Greek: o(
grammatiko\s Sôkra/tês] is [Greek: o( au)to\s tô=| Sôkra/tei] (Schol.
ad Metaphys. p. 736, b. 26, Brand.).]

As a general rule, in all the refutations founded on the seven
Fallacies _In Dictione_, the respondent will solve the refutation by
distinguishing the double meaning of the words or of the phrase, and
by adopting as his own the one opposite to that which the questioner
proceeds upon. If the Fallacy is of Conjunction and Disjunction, and
if the questioner assumes Conjunction, the respondent will adopt
Disjunction; if it be a Fallacy of Accent, and if the questioner
assumes the grave accent, the respondent will adopt the acute.[113]

[Footnote 113: Soph. El. xxiii. p. 179, a. 11-25.]

Passing to the Fallacies _Extra Dictionem_, where the sophistical
refutation is founded upon a Fallacy of Accident, the respondent
ought to apply one and the same solution to all. He will say: "The
conclusion does not necessarily follow from the premisses"; and he
will be prepared with an example, in which the conclusion obtained
under this fallacy is notoriously untrue.[114] "Do you know
Koriskus?"--"Yes." "Do you know the distant person coming this
way?"--"No." "That distant person is Koriskus: therefore you know,
and you do not know, the same person." The inference here is not
necessary. To be coming this way--is an accident of Koriskus; and,
because you do not know the accident, we cannot infer that you do
not know the subject; such may or may not be the case.[115]

[Footnote 114: Soph. El. xxiv. p. 179, a. 30: [Greek: r(ête/on ou)=n
sumbibasthe/ntas o(moi/ôs pro\s a(/pantas o(/ti ou)k a)nagkai=on;
e)/chein de\ dei= prophe/rein to\ oi(=on.]]

[Footnote 115: Ibid. a. 35-b. 7.]

The major premiss upon which the preceding sophistical refutation
must rest, is, That it is impossible both to know and not to know the
same thing. This must be put as a direct question by the questioner,
and must be conceded by the respondent, before the intended
refutation can be made good. Now there are some persons who solve the
refutation by answering this question in the negative, and by saying
that it is possible both to know and not to know the same thing, only
not in the same respect: such is the case when we know Koriskus, but
do not know Koriskus approaching from a distance.[116] Aristotle
disapproves this mode of solution, as well as another mode which
refers the fallacy to equivocation of terms. He points out that there
are many other sophistical refutations, coming under the general head
of _Fallaciæ Accidentis_, to which such solution will not apply; and
that there ought to be one uniform mode of solution applicable to
every fallacy coming under the same general head; though he admits at
the same time that particular sophistical refutations may be vicious
in more than one way. He says, moreover, that this contradiction or
negation of the premiss is no true solution; for a solution ought to
bring to view clearly the reason why the fallacious refutation
appears to be a real refutation. Thus the _Fallacia Accidentis_
consists in an inference that what is true of an accident is true
also of the subject thereof: you explain that such inference, though
apparently cogent, has no real cogency, and in that explanation
consists the only proper solution of the fallacy.[117]

[Footnote 116: Ibid. b. 7, 18, 37: [Greek: lu/ousi de/ tines
a)nairou=ntes tê\n e)rô/têsin; phasi\ ga\r e)nde/chesthai tau)to\
pra=gma ei)de/nai kai\ a)gnoei=n, a)lla\ mê\ kata\ tau)to/.]

Mr. Poste (pp. 152-157) translates [Greek: a)nairou=ntes tê\n
e)rô/têsin]--"contradicting the thesis," and he expresses his
surprise at the assertion, observing (very truly) that contradiction
of the thesis is the very opposite of a solution; it helps in the
very work which the refutation aims at accomplishing. But I cannot
think that [Greek: e)rô/têsis] does mean "the thesis," either here or
in the other passage to which Mr. Poste refers (xxii. p. 178, b. 14).
I think it means a premiss which the respondent has conceded, or must
be presumed to have conceded, essential to the validity of the
refutation. The term [Greek: e)rô/têsis] cannot surely, with any
propriety, be applied to the thesis. It means either a question, or
what is conceded in reply to a question; and the _thesis_ cannot come
under either one meaning or the other, being the proposition which
the respondent sets out by affirming and undertakes to defend.]

[Footnote 117: Soph. El. xxiv. p. 179, b. 23: [Greek: ê)=n ga\r ê(
lu/sis e)mpha/nisis pseudou=s sullogismou=, par' o(\ pseudê/s.]]

In like manner, all those Fallacies which come under the general head
of _A dicto Secundum Quid ad dictum Simpliciter_, can only be solved
by pointing out, in each particular case, in what terms this
confusion is concealed--wherein resides the inference apparently
cogent which is mistaken for one really cogent. The respondent is
driven to an apparent contradiction, by having granted premisses from
which the inference is derivable that both sides of the _Antiphasis_
are true--that the same predicate A may be both affirmed and denied
of the same subject B. He solves the contradiction by analysing the
_Antiphasis_, and by showing that affirmation is _secundum quid_,
while denial is _simpliciter_; and that there is a contradiction not
real, but only apparent, between the two.[118]

[Footnote 118: Ibid. xxv. p. 180, a. 23-31.]

In like manner, the Fallacy _Ignoratio Elenchi_ will be solved by
analysing the two supposed counter-propositions of the _Antiphasis_,
and by showing that there is no real contradiction or inconsistency
between them.[119]

[Footnote 119: Ibid. xxvi. p. 181, a. 1-14.]

In regard to the Fallacies under _Petitio Principii_, the respondent
if he perceives that the premiss asked of him involves such a
fallacy, must refuse to grant it, however probable it may be in
itself. If he does not perceive this until after he has granted it,
he must throw back the charge of mal-procedure upon the questioner;
declaring that an Elenchus involving assumption of the matter in
question is null, and that the concession was made under the
supposition that some separate and independent syllogism was in
contemplation.[120]

[Footnote 120: Ibid. xxvii. p. 181, a. 15-21.]

There are two distinct ways in which the _Fallacia Consequentis_ may
be employed. The predicate may be an universal, comprehending the
subject: because animal always goes along with man, it is falsely
inferred that man always goes along with animal; or it is falsely
inferred that not-animal always goes along with not-man. The fallacy
is solved when this is pointed out. The last inference is only valid
when the terms are inverted; if animal always goes along with man,
not-man will always go along with not-animal.[121]

[Footnote 121: Ibid. xxviii. p. 181, a. 22-30. [Greek: a)na/palin
ga\r ê( a)kolou/thêsis].]

If the sophistical refutation includes more premisses than are
indispensable to the conclusion, the respondent, after having
satisfied himself that this is the fact, will point out the
mal-procedure of the questioner, and will say that he conceded the
superfluous premiss, not because it was in itself probable but,
because it seemed relevant to the debate; while nevertheless the
questioner has made no real or legitimate application of it towards
that object.[122] This is the mode of solution applicable in the case
of the Fallacies coming under the head _Non Causa pro Causâ_.[123]

[Footnote 122: Soph. El. xxix. p. 181, a. 31-35.]

[Footnote 123: Schol. p. 318, a. 36, Br.]

Where the sophistical questioner tries to refute by the _Fallacia
Plurium Interrogationum_ (_i.e._, by putting two or more questions as
one), the respondent should forthwith divide the complex question
into its component simple questions, and make answer accordingly. He
must not give one answer, either affirmative or negative, to that
which is more than one question. Even if he does give one answer, he
may sometimes not involve himself in any contradiction; for it may
happen that the same predicate is truly affirmable, or truly
deniable, of two or more distinct and independent subjects. Often,
however, the contrary is the case: no one true answer, either
affirmative or negative, can be given to one of these complex
questions: the one answer given, whatever it be, must always be
partially false or inconsistent.[124] Suppose two subjects, A and B,
one good, the other bad: if the question be, Whether A and B are good
or bad, it will be equally true to say--Both are good, or, Both are
bad, or, Both are neither good nor bad. There may indeed be other
solutions for this fallacy: Both or All may signify two or more items
taken individually, or taken collectively; but the only sure
precaution is--one answer to one question.[125]

[Footnote 124: Soph. El. xxx. p. 181, a. 38: [Greek: ou)/te plei/ô
kath' e(no\s ou)/te e(\n kata\ pollô=n, a)ll' e(\n kath' e(no\s
phate/on ê)\ a)pophate/on.]]

[Footnote 125: Ibid. b. 6-25.]

Suppose that, instead of aiming at a seeming refutation, the Sophist
tries to convict the respondent of Tautology. The source of this
embarrassment is commonly the fact that a relative term is often used
and conveys clear meaning without its correlate, though the correlate
is always implied and understood. The respondent must avoid this trap
by refusing to grant that the relative has any meaning at all without
its correlate; and by requiring that the correlate shall be
distinctly enunciated along with it. He ought to treat the relative
without its correlate as merely a part of the whole significant
expression--as merely syncategorematic; just as ten is in the
phrase--ten minus one, or as the affirmative word is in a negative
proposition.[126] Thus he will not recognize double as significant by
itself without its correlate half, nor half without its correlate
double; although in common parlance such correlate is often
understood without being formally enunciated.

[Footnote 126: Soph. El. Xxxi. p. 181, b. 26: [Greek: ou) dote/on
tô=n pro/s ti legome/nôn sêmai/nein ti chôrizome/nas kath' au(ta\s
ta\s katêgori/as.]

Mr. Poste observes in his note:--"The sophistic locus of tautology
may be considered as a caricature of a dialectic locus. One fault
which dialectic criticism finds with a definition is the introduction
of superfluous words." He then cites Topic. VI. ii. (p. 141, a. 4,
seq.); but in this passage we find that the repetition of the same
word is declared not to be an argumentative impropriety, so that the
Sophist would gain nothing by driving his opponent into tautology.]

Lastly, another purpose which Aristotle ascribes to the Sophist, is
that of driving the respondent into a Solecism--into some grammatical
or syntactical impropriety, such as, using a noun in the wrong case
or gender, using a pronoun with a different gender or number from the
noun to which it belongs, &c. He points out that the solution of
these verbal puzzles must be different for each particular case; in
general, when thrown into a regular syllogistic form, even the
questioner himself will be found to speak bad Greek. The examples
given by Aristotle do not admit of being translated into a modern
language, so as to preserve the solecism that constitutes their
peculiarity.[127]

[Footnote 127: Soph. El. xxxii. p. 182, a. 7-b. 5.]

After having thus gone through the different artifices ascribed to
the Sophist, and the ways of solving or meeting them, Aristotle
remarks that there are material distinctions between the different
cases which fall under one and the same general head of Sophistical
Paralogism. Some cases there are in which both the fallacy itself,
and the particular point upon which it turns, are obvious and
discernible at first sight. In other cases, again, an ordinary person
does not perceive that there is any fallacy at all; or, if he does
perceive it, he often does not detect the seat of the fallacy, so
that one man will refer the case to one general head, and another, to
a different one.[128] Thus, for example, Fallacies of Equivocation
are perhaps the most frequent and numerous of all fallacies; some of
them are childish and jocular, not really imposing upon any one; but
there are others again in which the double meaning of a word is at
first unnoticed, and is disputed even when pointed out, so that it
can only be brought to light by the most careful and subtle analysis.
This happens especially with terms that are highly abstract and
general: which are treated by many, including even **philosophers
like Parmenides and Zeno, as if they were not equivocal at all, but
univocal.[129] Again, the _Fallaciæ Accidentis_, and the other
classes _Extra Dictionem_, are also often hard to detect. On the
whole, it is often hard to determine, not merely to which of the
classes any case of fallacy belongs, but even whether there is any
fallacy at all--whether the refutation is, or is not, a valid one.[130]

[Footnote 128: Ibid. xxxiii. p. 182, b. 6-12.]

[Footnote 129: Soph. El. xxxiii. p. 182, b. 13-25: [Greek: ô(/sper
ou)=n e)n toi=s para\ tê\n o(mônumi/an, o(/sper dokei= tro/pos
eu)êthe/statos ei)=nai tô=n paralogismô=n, ta\ me\n kai\ toi=s
tuchou=si/n e)sti dê=la--ta\ de\ kai\ tou\s e)mpeirota/tous
phai/netai lantha/nein; sêmei=on de\ tou/tôn o(/ti ma/chontai
polla/kis peri\ o)noma/tôn, oi(=on po/teron tau)to\ sêmai/nei kata\
pa/ntôn to\ o)\n kai\ to\ e(\n ê)\ e(/teron.]]

[Footnote 130: Ibid. b. 27: [Greek: o(moi/ôs de\ kai\ peri\ tou=
sumbebêko/tos kai\ peri\ tô=n a)/llôn e(/kaston, oi( me\n e)/sontai
r(a/|ous i)dei=n oi( de\ chalepô/teroi tô=n lo/gôn; kai\ labei=n e)/n
tini ge/nei, kai\ po/teron e)/legchos ê)\ ou)k e)/legchos, ou)
r(a/|dion o(moi/ôs peri\ pa/ntôn.]]

The pungent arguments in debate are those which bite most keenly, and
create the greatest amount of embarrassment and puzzle.[131] In
dialectical debate a puzzle arises, when the respondent finds that a
correct syllogism has been established against him, and when he does
not at once see which among its premisses he ought to controvert, in
order to overthrow the conclusion. In the eristic or sophistic debate
the puzzle of the respondent is, in what language to enunciate his
propositions so as to keep clear of the subtle objections which will
be brought against him by the questioner.[132] It is these pungent
arguments that most effectually stimulate the mind to investigation.
The most pungent of all is, where the syllogistic premisses are
highly probable, yet where they nevertheless negative a conclusion
which is also highly probable. Here we have an equal antithesis as to
presumptive credibility, between the premisses taken together on one
side and the conclusion on the other.[133] We do not know whether it
is in the premisses only, or in the conclusion, that we are to look
for untruth: the conclusion, though improbable, may yet be true,
while we may find that the true conclusion has been obtained from
untrue premisses; or the conclusion may be both improbable and
untrue, in which case we must look for untruth in one of the
premisses also--either the major or the minor. This is the most
embarrassing position of all. Another, rather less embarrassing, is,
where our thesis will be confuted unless we can show the confuting
conclusion to be untrue, but where each of the premisses on which the
conclusion depends is equally probable, so that we do not at once see
in which of them the cause of its untruth is to be sought. These two
are the most pungent and perplexing argumentative conjunctures of
dialectical debate.

[Footnote 131: Ibid. 32: [Greek: e)/sti de\ drimu\s lo/gos o(/stis
a)porei=n poiei= ma/lista; da/knei ga\r ou(=tos ma/lista.]]

[Footnote 132: Soph. El. xxxiii. p. 182, b. 33: [Greek: a)pori/a d'
e)sti\ dittê/, ê( me\n e)n toi=s sullelogisme/nois, o(/ ti a)ne/lê|
tis tô=n e)rôtêma/tôn, ê( d' e)n toi=s e)ristikoi=s, pô=s ei)/pê| tis
to\ protathe/n.] The difficulty here pointed out, of finding language
not open to some logical objection by an acute Sophist, is
illustrated by what he himself states about the caution required for
guarding his definitions against attack; see De Interpret. vi. p. 17,
a. 34: [Greek: le/gô de\ a)ntikei=sthai tê\n tou= au)tou= kata\ tou=
au)tou=, mê\ o(mônu/môs de/, _kai\ o(/sa a)/lla prosdiorizo/metha
pro\s ta\s sophistika\s e)nochlê/seis_.] What is here meant by
[Greek: sophistikai\ e)nochlê/seis] is expressed elsewhere by [Greek:
pro\s ta\s logika\s duscherei/as]--Metaphys. [Greek: G]. iii. p.
1005, b. 21; N. i. p. 1087, b. 20. See the Scholia (pp. 112, 651,
Br.) of Ammonius and Alexander upon the above passages of De Interpr.
and Metaphys.]

[Footnote 133: Soph. El. xxxiii. p. 182, b. 37-p. 183, a. 4: [Greek:
e)/sti de\ sullogistiko\s me\n lo/gos drimu/tatos, a)\n e)x o(/ti
ma/lista dokou/ntôn o(/ti ma/lista e)/ndoxon a)nairê=|; ei(=s ga\r
ô)\n o( lo/gos, metatitheme/nês tê=s a)ntipha/seôs, a(/pantas
o(moi/ous e(/xei tou\s sullogismou/s; a)ei\ ga\r e)x e)ndo/xôn
o(moi/ôs e)/ndoxon a)nairê/sei [ê)\ kataskeua/sei]; dio/per a)porei=n
a)nagkai=on. ma/lista me\n ou)=n o( toiou=tos drimu/s, o( e)x i)/sou
to\ sumpe/rasma poiô=n toi=s e)rôtê/masi.] I transcribe this text as
it is given by Bekker, Waitz, Bussemaker, and Mr. Poste. The editions
anterior to Bekker had the additional words [Greek: ê)\
kataskeua/zê|] after [Greek: a)nairê=|] in the fourth line; and M.
Barthélemy St. Hilaire in his translation defends and retains them.
Bekker and the subsequent editors have omitted them, but have
retained the last words [Greek: ê)\ kataskeua/sei] in the seventh
line. To me this seems inconsistent: the words ought either to be
retained in both places or omitted in both. I think they ought to be
omitted in both. I have enclosed them in brackets in the fifth line.

This difficult passage (not well explained by Alexander, Schol. p.
320, b. 9) requires the explanations of Waitz and Mr. Poste. The note
of Mr. Poste is particularly instructive, because he expands in full
(p. 164) the three "similar syllogisms" to which Aristotle here
briefly alludes. The phrase [Greek: metatitheme/nês tê=s
a)ntipha/seôs] is determined by a passage in Analyt. Priora, II.
viii. p. 59, b. 1: it means "employment of the contradictory of the
conclusion, in combination with either one of the premisses, to upset
the other." The original syllogism is assumed to have two premisses,
each highly probable, while the conclusion is highly improbable,
being the negation of a highly probable proposition. The original
syllogism will stand thus: All M is P; All S is M; _Ergo_, All S is
P: the two premisses being supposed highly probable, and the
conclusion highly improbable. Of course, therefore, the contradictory
of the conclusion will be highly probable--Some S is not P. We take
this contradictory and employ it to construct two new syllogisms as
follows:--"All M is P; Some S is not P; _Ergo_ Some S is not M. And
again, Some S is not P: All S is M; _Ergo_, Some M is not P. All
these three syllogisms are similar in this respect: that each has two
highly probable premisses, while the conclusion is highly
improbable.]

But in eristic or sophistic debate our greatest embarrassment as
respondents will arise when we do not at once see whether the
refutative syllogism brought against us is conclusive or not, and
whether it is to be solved by negation or by distinction.[134] Next
in order as to embarrassment stands the case, where we see in which
of the two processes (negation or distinction) we are to find our
solution, yet without seeing on which of the premisses we are to
bring the process to bear; or whether, if distinction be the process
required, we are to apply it to the conclusion, or to one of the
premisses.[135] A defective syllogistic argument is silly, when the
deficient points are of capital importance--relating to the minor or
to the middle term, or when the assumptions are false and strange;
but it will sometimes be worthy of attention, if the points deficient
are outlying and easily supplied; in which cases it is the
carelessness of the questioner that is to blame, rather than the
argument itself.[136] Both the line of argument taken by the
questioner, and the mode of solution adopted by the respondent, may
be directed towards any one of three distinct purposes: either to the
thesis and main subject discussed; or to the adversary personally
(_i.e._, to the particular way in which he has been arguing); or to
neither of these, but simply to prolong the discussion (_i.e._,
against time). The solution may thus be sometimes such that it would
take more time to argue upon it than the patience of the auditors
will allow.[137]

[Footnote 134: Soph. El. xxxiii. p. 183, a. 7.]

[Footnote 135: Ibid. a. 9: [Greek: deu/teros de\ tô=n a)/llôn o(
dê=los me\n o(/ti para\ diai/resin ê)\ a)nai/resi/n e)sti, mê\
phanero\s d' ô)\n dia\ ti/nos tô=n ê)rôtême/nôn a)nai/resin ê)\
diai/resin lute/os e)sti/n, a)lla\ po/teron au(/tê para\ to\
sumpe/rasma ê)\ para/ ti tô=n e)rôtêma/tôn e)sti/n.]

Mr. Poste translates these last words very correctly:--"Whether it is
one of the premisses or the conclusion that requires distinction."
Here Aristotle again speaks of a mode of solution furnished by
applying _distinction_ ([Greek: diai/resis]) to _the conclusion_ as
well as to the premisses, though he does not say that solution can be
furnished by applying _disproof_ ([Greek: a)nai/resis]) to _the
conclusion_. See my remarks, a few pages above, on Mr. Poste's note
respecting ch. xviii. (supra, p. 406).]

[Footnote 136: Soph. El. xxxiii. p. 183, a. 14-20.]

[Footnote 137: Ibid. a. 21.]

The last chapter of the Sophistici Elenchi is employed by Aristotle
in recapitulating the scope and procedure of the nine Books of Topica
(reckoning the Sophistici Elenchi as the Ninth, as we ought in
propriety to do); and in appreciating the general bearing and value
of that treatise, having regard to the practice and theory of the
day.

The business of Dialectic and Peirastic is to find and apply the
syllogizing process to any given thesis, with premisses the most
probable that can be obtained bearing on the thesis. This Aristotle
treats as the proper function of Dialectic _per se_ and of Peirastic;
considering both--the last, of course--as referring wholly to the
questioner. His purpose is to investigate and impart this syllogizing
power--the power of questioning and cross-examining a respondent who
sets up a given thesis, so as to drive him into inconsistent answers.
It appears that Aristotle would not have cared to teach the
respondent how he might defend himself against this procedure, if
there had not happened to be another art--Sophistic, closely
bordering on Dialectic and Peirastic. He considers it indispensable
to furnish the respondent with defensive armour against sophistical
cross-examination; and this could not be done without teaching him at
the same time modes of defence against the cross-examination of
Dialectic and Peirastic. For this reason it is (Aristotle **tells
us[138]) that he has included in the Topica precepts on the best mode
of defending the thesis by the most probable arguments, as well as of
impugning it. The respondent professes to know (while the questioner
does not), and must be taught how to maintain his thesis like a man
of knowledge. Sokrates, the prince of dialecticians, did nothing but
question and cross-examine: he would never be respondent at all; for
he explicitly disclaimed knowledge. And if it were not for the
neighbourhood of Sophistic, Aristotle would have thought it
sufficient to teach a procedure like that of Sokrates. It was the
danger from sophistical cross-examination that led him to enlarge his
scheme--to unmask the Sophists by enumerating the paralogisms
peculiar to them, and to indicate the proper scheme of the responses
and solutions whereby the respondent might defend himself against
them. We remember that Aristotle treats all paralogisms and fallacies
as if they belonged to a peculiar art or profession called Sophistic,
and as if they were employed by Sophists exclusively; as if the
Dialecticians and the Peirasts, including among them Sokrates and
Plato, put all their questions without ever resorting to or falling
into paralogisms.

[Footnote 138: Ibid. xxxiv. p. 183, a. 37-b. 8: [Greek: proeilo/metha
me\n ou)=n eu(rei=n du/nami/n tina sullogistikê\n peri\ tou=
problêthe/ntos e)k tô=n u(parcho/ntôn ô(s e)ndoxota/tôn; _tou=to ga\r
e)/rgon e)sti\_ tê=s _dialektikê=s kath' au(tê\n kai\ tê=s
peirastikê=s_. e)pei\ de\ _proskataskeua/zetai pro\s au)tê\n dia\
tê\n tê=s sophistikê=s geitni/asin_, ô(s ou) mo/non pei=ran du/natai
labei=n dialektikô=s, a)lla\ kai\ ô(s ei)dô/s, _dia\ tou=to ou)
mo/non to\ lechthe\n_ e)/rgon u(pethe/metha tê=s pragmatei/as to\
lo/gon du/nasthai labei=n, a)lla\ kai\ o(/pôs lo/gon u(pe/chontes
phula/xomen tê\n the/sin ô(s di' e)ndoxota/tôn o(motro/pôs. tê\n d'
ai)ti/an ei)rê/kamen tou/tou, e)pei\ kai\ dia\ tou=to Sôkra/tês
ê)rô/ta a)ll' ou)k a)pekri/neto; ô(molo/gei ga\r ou)k ei)de/nai.]

It appears to me that in one line of this remarkable passage a word
has dropped out which is necessary to the sense. We now read (about
the middle) [Greek: ô(s ou) mo/non pei=ran du/natai labei=n
dialektikô=s, a)lla\ kai\ ô(s ei)dô/s]. Now the words [Greek: pei=ran
labei=n] as the passage stands, must be construed along with [Greek:
ô(s ei)dô/s], and this makes no meaning at all, or an inadmissible
meaning. I think it clear that the word [Greek: u(pe/chein] or
[Greek: dou=nai] has dropped out before [Greek: ei)dô/s]. The passage
will then stand:--[Greek: ô(s ou) mo/non pei=ran du/natai labei=n
dialektikô=s, a)lla\ kai\ _u(pe/chein_] (or [Greek: _dou=nai_) ô(s
ei)dô/s]. When this verb is supplied the sense will be quite in
harmony with what follows, which at present it is not. [Greek:
Pei=ran labei=n] applies to the questioner, but not to the
respondent; [Greek: ô(s ei)dô/s] applies to the respondent, but not
to the questioner; [Greek: pei=ran u(pe/chein] applies to the
respondent, and is therefore the fit concomitant of [Greek: ô(s
ei)dô/s]. The translation given by Mr. Poste _first_
(p. 93):--"professing not only to test knowledge with the resources
of Dialectic, but also to maintain any thesis with the infallibility
of science" appears to me (excepting the word _infallibility_, which
is unsuitable) to render Aristotle's thought, though not his words as
they now stand; but Mr. Poste has given what he thinks an amended
translation (p. 175):--"Since it claims the power of catechizing or
cross-examining not only dialectically but also scientifically." This
second translation may approach more nearly to the present words of
Aristotle, but it departs more widely from his sense and doctrine.
Aristotle does not claim for either Dialecticians or Sophists the
power of cross-examining scientifically. He ascribes to the Sophists
nothing but cavil and fallacy--verbal and extra-verbal--the pretence
and sham of being wise or knowing (Soph. El. i., ii. p. 165).]

Aristotle, we have already more than once seen, asserts emphatically
his claim to originality as having been the first to treat these
subjects theoretically, and to suggest precepts founded on the
theory. On all important subjects (he remarks) the elaboration of any
good theory is a gradual process, the work of several successive
authors. The first beginnings are very imperfect and rudimentary;
upon these, however, subsequent authors build, both correcting and
enlarging, until, after some considerable time, a tolerably complete
scheme or system comes to be constructed. Such has been the case with
Rhetoric and other arts. Tisias was the first writer and preceptor on
Rhetoric, yet with poor and insufficient effect. To him succeeded
Thrasymachus, next Theodorus, and various others; from each of whom
partial improvements and additions were derived, until at length we
have now (it is Aristotle that speaks) a copious body of rhetorical
theory and precept, inherited from predecessors and accumulated by
successive traditions. Compared with this, the earliest attempt at
theory was indeed narrow and imperfect; but it was nevertheless the
first step in a great work, and, as such, it was the most difficult
and the most important. The task of building on a foundation already
laid, is far easier.[139]

[Footnote 139: Soph. El. xxxiv. p. 183, b. 17-26: [Greek: tô=n ga\r
eu(riskome/nôn a(pa/ntôn ta\ me\n par' e(te/rôn lêphthe/nta pro/teron
peponême/na kata\ me/ros e)pide/dôken u(po\ tô=n paralabo/ntôn
u(/steron; ta\ d' e)x u(parchê=s eu(risko/mena mikra\n to\ prô=ton
e)pi/dosin lamba/nein ei)/ôthe, chrêsimôte/ran me/ntoi pollô=| tê=s
u(/steron e)k tou/tôn au)xê/seôs; me/giston ga\r i)/sôs a)rchê\
panto/s, ô(/sper le/getai; dio\ kai\ chalepô/taton; o(/sô| ga\r
kra/tiston tê=| duna/mei, tosou/tô| mikro/taton o(\n tô=| mege/thei
chalepô/tato/n e)stin o)phthê=nai; tau/tês d' eu(rême/nês r(a=|on
prostithe/nai kai\ sunau/xein to\ loipo/n e)stin.]]

While rhetorical theory has thus been gradually worked up to
maturity, the case has been altogether different with Dialectic. In
this I (Aristotle) found no basis prepared; no predecessor to follow;
no models to copy. I had to begin from the beginning, and to make
good the first step myself. The process of syllogizing had never yet
been analysed or explained by any one; much less had anything been
set forth about the different applications of it in detail. I worked
it out for myself, without any assistance, by long and laborious
application.[140] There existed indeed paid teachers, both in
Dialectic and in Eristic (or Sophistic); but their teaching has been
entirely without analysis, or theory, or system. Just as rhetoricians
gave to their pupils orations to learn by heart, so these dialectical
teachers gave out dialogues to learn by heart upon those subjects
which they thought most likely to become the topics of discourse.
They thus imparted to their pupils a certain readiness and fluency;
but they communicated no art, no rational conception of what was to
be sought or avoided, no skill or power of dealing with new
circumstances.[141] They proceeded like men, who, professing to show
how comfortable covering might be provided for the feet, should not
teach the pupil how he could make shoes for himself, but should
merely furnish him with a good stock of ready-made shoes--a present
valuable indeed for use, but quite unconnected with any skill as an
artificer. The syllogism as a system and theory, with precepts
founded on that theory for Demonstration and Dialectic, has
originated first with me (Aristotle). Mine is the first step, and
therefore a small one, though worked out with much thought and hard
labour: it must be looked at as a first step, and judged with
indulgence. You, my readers, or hearers of my lectures, if you think
that I have done as much as can fairly be required for an initiatory
start, compared with other more advanced departments of theory, will
acknowledge what I have achieved, and pardon what I have left for
others to accomplish.[142]

[Footnote 140: Soph. El. xxxiv. p. 184, a. 8: [Greek: kai\ peri\ me\n
tô=n r(êtorikô=n u(pê=rche polla\ kai\ palaia\ ta\ lego/mena, peri\
_de\ tou= sullogi/zesthai pantelô=s ou)de\n ei)/chomen pro/teron
a)/llo le/gein_, a)ll' ê)\ tribê=| zêtou=ntes polu\n chro/non
e)ponou=men.]]

[Footnote 141: Ibid. a. 1: [Greek: dio/per tachei=a me\n a)/technos
d' ê)=n ê( didaskali/a toi=s mantha/nousi par' au)tô=n; ou) ga\r
te/chnên a)lla\ ta\ a)po\ tê=s te/chnês dido/ntes paideu/ein
u(pela/mbanon.]

Cicero, in describing his own treatise De Oratore, insists upon the
marked difference between his mode of treatment and the common
rhetorical precepts; he claims to have followed the manner of the
Aristotelian Dialogues:--"Scripsi Aristoteleo more, quemadmodum
quidem volui, tres libros in disputatione ac dialogo de Oratore, quos
arbitror Lentulo tuo fore non inutiles. Abhorrent enim a communibus
præceptis, atque omnem antiquorum et Aristoteleam et Isocrateam
rationem oratoriam complectuntur" (Cicero, Epist. ad Famill. i. 9).]

[Footnote 142: Soph. El. xxxiv. p. 184, b. 3: [Greek: ei) de\
phai/netai theasame/nois u(mi=n ô(s e)k toiou/tôn e)x a)rchê=s
u(parcho/ntôn e)/chein ê( metho/dos i(kanô=s para\ ta\s a)/llas
pragmatei/as ta\s e)k parado/seôs ê)uxême/nas, loipo\n a)\n ei)/ê
pa/ntôn u(mô=n ê)\ tô=n ê)kroame/nôn e)/rgon toi=s me\n
paraleleimme/nois tê=s metho/dou suggnô/mên toi=s d' eu(rême/nois
pollê\n e)/chein cha/rin.]

It would seem that by [Greek: toi=s theasame/nois] Aristotle means to
address the readers of the present treatise, while by [Greek: tô=n
ê)kroame/nôn] he designates those who had heard his oral expositions
on the same subject.]

Such is the impressive closing chapter of the Sophistici Elenchi. It
is remarkable in two ways: first, that Aristotle expressly addresses
himself to hearers and readers in the second person; next, that he
asserts emphatically his own claim to originality as a theorist on
Logic, and declares himself to have worked out even the first
beginnings of such theory by laborious application. I understand his
claim to originality as intended to bear, not simply on the treatise
called Sophistici Elenchi and on the enumeration of Fallacies therein
contained, but, in a larger sense, on the theory of the Syllogism; as
first unfolded in the Analytica Priora, applied to Demonstration in
the Analytica Posteriora, applied afterwards to Dialectic in the
Topica, applied lastly to Sophistic (or Eristic) in the Sophistici
Elenchi. The phrase, "Respecting the _process of syllogizing_,[143] I
found absolutely nothing prepared, but worked it out by laborious
application for myself"--seems plainly to denote this large
comprehension. And, indeed, in respect to Sophistic separately, the
remark of Aristotle that nothing whatever had been done before him,
would not be well founded: we find in his own treatise of the
Sophistici Elenchi allusion to various prior doctrines, from which he
dissents.[144] In these prior doctrines, however, his predecessors
had treated the sophistical modes of refutation without reference to
the Syllogism and its general theory.[145] It is against such
separation that Aristotle distinctly protests. He insists upon the
necessity of first expounding the Syllogism, and of discussing the
laws of good or bad Refutation as a corollary or dependant of the
syllogistic theory. Accordingly he begins this treatise by intimating
that he intends to deduce these laws from the first and highest
generalities of the subject;[146] and he concludes it by claiming
this method of philosophizing as original with himself.

[Footnote 143: Soph. El. xxxiv. p. 184, b. 1: [Greek: peri\ de\ tou=
sullogi/zesthai pantelô=s ou)de\n ei)/chomen pro/teron a)/llo
le/gein], &c. (cited in a preceding note).]

[Footnote 144: See note p. 402.]

[Footnote 145: Soph. El. x. p. 171, a. 1: [Greek: o(/lôs te a)/topon,
to\ peri\ e)le/gchou diale/gesthai, a)lla' mê\ pro/teron peri\
sullogismou=; _ o( ga\r e)/legchos sullogismo/s e)stin, ô(/ste chrê\
kai\ peri\ sullogismou= pro/teron ê)\ peri\ pseudou=s e)le/gchou_.]]

[Footnote 146: Ibid. i. p. 164, a. 21: [Greek: le/gômen, a)rxa/menoi
kata\ phu/sin a)po\ tô=n prô/tôn.]]




CHAPTER XI.

PHYSICA AND METAPHYSICA.


Aristotle distinguishes, in clear and explicit language, a science
which he terms Wisdom, Philosophy, or First Philosophy; the
subject-matter of which he declares to be _Ens quatenus _Ens__,
together with the concomitants belonging to it as such. With this
Ontology the treatise entitled Metaphysica purports to deal, and the
larger portion of it does really so deal. At the same time, the line
that parts off Ontology from Logic (Analytic and Dialectic) on the
one hand, and from Physics on the other, is not always clearly marked.
For, though the whole process of Syllogism, employed both in Analytic
and Dialectic, involves and depends upon the Maxim of Contradiction,
yet the discussion of this Maxim is declared to belong to First
Philosophy;[1] while not only the four Aristotelian varieties of
Cause or Condition, and the distinction between Potential and Actual,
but also the abstractions Form, Matter and Privation, which play so
capital a part in the Metaphysica, are equally essential and equally
appealed to in the Physica.[2]

[Footnote 1: Metaphys. [Greek: G]. iii. p. 1005, a. 19-b. 11. Whether
that discussion properly belongs to _Philosophia Prima_, or not,
stands as the first [Greek: A)pori/a] enumerated in the list which
occupies Book B. in that treatise, p. 995, b. 4-13; compare K. i. p.
1059, a. 24.]

[Footnote 2: Physica, I. pp. 190-191; II. p. 194, b. 20, seq.;
Metaph. A. p. 983, a. 33; Alexander ad Metaphys. [Greek: D]. p. 306,
ed. Bonitz; p. 689, b. Schol. Br.]

If we include both what is treated in the Analytica Posteriora (the
scientific explanation of Essence and Definition) and what is treated
in the Physica, we shall find that nearly all the expository
processes employed in the Metaphysica are employed also in these two
treatises. To look upon the general notion as a cause, and to treat
it as a creative force (_der schöpferische Wesensbegriff_, to use the
phrase of Prantl and other German logicians[3]), belongs alike to the
Physica and to the Analytica Posteriora. The characteristic
distinction of the treatise entitled Metaphysica is, that it is
all-comprehensive in respect to the ground covered; that the
expository process is applied, not exclusively to any separate branch
of _Ens_, but to _Ens_ as a whole _quatenus Ens_--to all the varieties
of _Ens_ that admit of scientific treatment at all;[4] that the same
abstractions and analytical distinctions, which, both in the
Analytica and in the Physica, are indicated and made to serve an
explanatory purpose, up to a certain point--are in the Metaphysica
sometimes assumed as already familiar, sometimes followed out with
nicer accuracy and subtlety.[5] Indeed both the Physica and the
Metaphysica, as we read them in Aristotle, would be considered in
modern times as belonging alike to the department of Metaphysics.

[Footnote 3: See ch. viii. pp. 240 seq. of the present work, with the
citations in note b, p. 252, from Prantl and Rassow.]

[Footnote 4: Metaphys. [Greek: G]. i. p. 1003, a. 21: [Greek: e)/stin
e)pistê/mê tis ê(\ theôrei= to\ o)\n ê(=| o)\n kai\ ta\ tou/tô|
u(pa/rchonta kath' au(to/. Au(/tê d' e)sti\n ou)demi/a| tô=n e)n
me/rei legome/nôn ê( au)tê/. ou)demi/a ga\r tô=n a)/llôn
e)piskopei= _katho/lou_ peri\ tou= o)/ntos ê(=| o)/n, a)lla\ me/ros
au)tou= ti a)potemo/menai], &c.]

[Footnote 5: Metaphys. [Greek: L]. vii. p. 1073, a. with Bonitz's
Comment. pp. 504-505. Physica, I. ix. p. 192, a. 34: [Greek: peri\
de\ tê=s kata\ to\ ei)=dos a)rchê=s, po/teron mi/a ê)\ pollai\ kai\
ti/s ê)\ ti/nes ei)si/, di' a)kribei/as tê=s prô/tês philosophi/as
e)/rgon e)sti\ diori/sai, ô(/st' ei)s e)kei=non to\n kairo\n
a)pokei/sthô.] Compare Physic. I. viii. p. 191, b. 29, and Weisse,
Aristoteles Physik, p. 285.

About the Metaphysica, as carrying out and completing the exposition
of the Analytica Posteriora, see Metaphys. Z. xii. p. 1037, b. 8:
[Greek: nu=n de\ le/gômen prô=ton, e)ph' o(/son e)n toi=s
A)nalutikoi=s peri\ o(rismou= mê\ ei)/rêtai] (Analyt. Post. II. vi.
p. 92, a. 32; see note b, p. 243).]

The primary distinction and classification recognized by Aristotle
among Sciences or Cognitions, is, that of (1) Theoretical, (2)
Practical, (3) Artistic or Constructive.[6] Of these three divisions,
the second and third alike comprise both intelligence and action, but
the two are distinguished from each other by this--that in the
Artistic there is always some assignable product which the agency
leaves behind independent of itself, whereas in the Practical no such
independent result remains,[7] but the agency itself, together with
the purpose (or intellectual and volitional condition) of the agent,
is every thing. The division named Theoretical comprises intelligence
alone--intelligence of _principia_, causes and constituent elements.
Here again we find a tripartite classification. The highest and most
universal of all Theoretical Sciences is recognized by Aristotle as
Ontology (First Philosophy, sometimes called by him Theology) which
deals with all _Ens_ universally _quatenus Ens_, and with the _Prima
Moventia_, themselves immoveable, of the entire Kosmos. The two other
heads of Theoretical Science are Mathematics and Physics; each of
them special and limited, as compared with Ontology. In Physics we
scientifically study natural bodies with their motions, changes, and
phenomena; bodies in which Form always appears implicated with
Matter, and in which the principle of motion or change is immanent
and indwelling (_i.e._, dependent only on the universal _Prima
Moventia_, and not impressed from without by a special agency, as in
works of human art). In Mathematics, we study immoveable and
unchangeable numbers and magnitudes, apart from the bodies to which
they belong; not that they can ever be really separated from such
bodies, but we intellectually abstract them, or consider them
apart.[8]

[Footnote 6: Metaphys. E. i. p. 1025, b. 25.]

[Footnote 7: Ibid. b. 22.]

[Footnote 8: Metaphys. E. i. p. 1026; K. vii. p. 1064, a. 28-b. 14;
M. iii. pp. 1077-1078; Bonitz, Commentar. p. 284.]

Such is Aristotle's tripartite distribution of Theoretical or
Contemplative Science. In introducing us to the study of First
Philosophy, he begins by clearing up the meaning of the term _Ens_.
It is a term of many distinct significations; being neither univocal,
nor altogether equivocal, but something intermediate between the two,
or multivocal. It is not a generic whole, distributed exhaustively
among correlative species marked off by an assignable difference:[9]
it is an analogical whole, including several genera distinct from
each other at the beginning, though all of them branches derivative
from one and the same root; all of them connected by some sort of
analogy or common relation to that one root, yet not necessarily
connected with each other by any direct or special tie.

[Footnote 9: Metaphys. [Greek: G]. ii. p. 1003, a. 33-p. 1004, a. 5:
[Greek: to\ d' o)\n le/getai me\n pollachô=s, a)lla\ pro\s e(\n kai\
mi/an tina\ phu/sin, kai\ ou)ch o(mônu/m ôs--u(pa/rchei ga\r
eu)thu\s ge/nê e)/chonta to\ o)\n kai\ to\ e(/n.]

Compare K. iii. p. 1060, b. 32. See also above, ch. iii. p. 60, of
the present work.]

Of these various significations, he enumerates, as we have already
seen, four:--(1) _Ens_ which is merely concomitant with, dependent
upon, or related to, another _Ens_ as terminus; (2) _Ens_ in the
sense of the True, opposed to _Non-Ens_ in the sense of the False;
(3) _Ens_ according to each of the Ten Categories; (4) _Ens_
potentially, as contrasted with _Ens_ actually. But among these four
heads, the two last only are matters upon which science is
attainable, in the opinion of Aristotle. To these two, accordingly,
he **confines Ontology or First Philosophy. They are the only
two that have an objective, self-standing, independent, nature.

That which falls under the first head (_Ens per Accidens_) is
essentially indeterminate; and its causes, being alike indeterminate,
are out of the reach of science. So also is that which falls under
the second head--_Ens tanquam verum_, contrasted with _Non-Ens
tanquam falsum_. This has no independent standing, but results from
an internal act of the judging or believing mind, combining two
elements, or disjoining two elements, in a way conformable to, or
non-conformable to, real fact. The true combination or disjunction is
a variety of _Ens_; the false combination or disjunction is a variety
of _Non-Ens_. This mental act varies both in different individuals,
and at different times with the same individual, according to a
multitude of causes often unassignable. Accordingly, it does not fall
under Ontological Science, nor can we discover any causes or
principles determining it.[10] When Aristotle says that the two first
heads are out of the reach of science, or not proper subjects of
science, he means that their first _principia_, causes, or deepest
foundations, cannot be discovered and assigned; for it is in
determining these _principia_ and causes that true scientific
cognition consists.[11]

[Footnote 10: Aristot. Met. E. iv. p. 1027, b. 17; [Greek: Th]. p.
1051, b. 2; p. 1052, a. 17-30; K. viii. p. 1065, a. 21.

There remains much obscurity about this meaning of _Ens_ (_Ens_
[Greek: ô(s a)lêthe/s]), even after the Scholia of Alexander (p. 701,
a. 10, Sch. Brand.), and the instructive comments of Bonitz,
Schwegler, and Brentano (Ueber die Bedeutung des Seienden nach
Aristoteles, ch. iii. pp. 21-39).

The foundation of this meaning of _Ens_ lies in the legitimate
_Antiphasis_, and the proper division thereof ([Greek: to\ de\
su/nolon peri\ merismo\n a)ntipha/seôs], p. 1027, b. 20). It is a
first principle (p. 1005, b. 30) that, if one member of the
_Antiphasis_ must be affirmed as true, the other must be denied as
false. If we fix upon the right combination to affirm, we say _the
thing that is_: if we fix upon the wrong combination and affirm it,
we say _the thing that is not_ (p. 1012, b. 10). "Falsehood and Truth
(Aristotle says, E. iv. p. 1027, b. 25) are not in things but in our
mental combination; and as regards simple (uncombined) matters and
essences, they are not even in our mental combination:" [Greek: ou)
ga/r e)sti to\ pseu=dos kai\ to\ a)lêthe\s e)n toi=s pra/gmasin,
oi(=on to\ me\n a)gatho\n a)lêthe/s, to\ de\ kako\n eu)thu\s
pseu=dos, a)ll' e)n dianoi/a|; peri\ de\ ta\ a(pla= kai\ ta\ ti/
e)stin ou)d' e)n tê=| dianoi/a|.] Compare Bonitz (ad Ar. Metaph. Z.
iv. p. 1030, a.), p. 310, Comm.

In regard to _cogitabilia_--simple, indivisible, uncompounded--there
is no combination or disjunction; therefore, strictly speaking,
neither truth nor falsehood (Aristot. De Animâ, III. vi. p. 430, a.
26; also Categor. x. p. 13, b. 10). The intellect either apprehends
these simple elements, or it does not apprehend them; there is no
[Greek: dia/noia] concerned. Not to apprehend them is ignorance,
[Greek: a)/gnoia], which sometimes loosely passes under the title of
[Greek: pseu=dos] (Schwegler, Comm. Pt. II., p. 32).]

[Footnote 11: Metaphys. E. i. p. 1025, b. 3: [Greek: ai( a)rchai\
kai\ ta\ ai)/tia zêtei=tai tô=n o)/ntôn, dê=lon d' o(/ti ê(=|
o)/nta.--o(/lôs de\ pa=sa e)pistê/mê dianoêtikê\ ê)\ mete/chousa/ ti
dianoi/as peri\ ai)ti/as kai\ a)rcha/s e)stin ê)\ a)kribeste/ras ê)\
a(plouste/ras.]

Compare Metaph. K. vii. p. 1063, b. 36; p. 1065, a. 8-26. Analyt.
Post. I. ii. p. 71, b. 9.]

There remain, as matter proper for the investigation of First
Philosophy, the two last-mentioned heads of _Ens_; viz., _Ens_
according to the Ten Categories, and _Ens_ potential and actual. But,
along with these, Aristotle includes another matter also; viz., the
critical examination of the Axioms and highest generalities of
syllogistic proof or Demonstration. He announces as the first
principle of these Axioms--as the highest and firmest of all
Principles--the Maxim of Contradiction:[12] The same predicate cannot
both belong and not belong to the same subject, at the same time and
in the same sense; or, You cannot both truly affirm, and truly deny,
the same predicate respecting the same subject; or, The same
proposition cannot be at once true and false. This Axiom is by nature
the beginning or source of all the other Axioms. It stands first in
the order of knowledge; and it neither rests upon nor involves any
hypothesis.[13]

[Footnote 12: Metaph. [Greek: G]. iii. p. 1005, b. 7, 17, 22, 34:
[Greek: au(/tê dê\ pasô=n e)sti\ bebaiota/tê tô=n
a)rchô=n--phu/sei ga\r a)rchê\ kai\ tô=n a)/llôn a)xiôma/tôn au(/tê
pa/ntôn.]--p. 1011, b. 13: [Greek: bebaiota/tê _do/xa_ pasô=n to\ mê\
ei)=nai a)lêthei=s a(/ma ta\s a)ntikeime/nas pha/seis]--(He here
applies the term [Greek: do/xa] to designate this fundamental maxim.
This deserves notice, because of the antithesis, common with him
elsewhere, between [Greek: do/xa] and [Greek: e)pistê/mê]).]

[Footnote 13: Metaph. [Greek: G]. iii. p. 1005, b. 13-14: [Greek:
gnôrimôta/tên--a)nupo/theton].]

The Syllogism is defined by Aristotle as consisting of premisses and
a conclusion: if the two propositions called premisses be granted as
true, a third as conclusion must for that reason be granted as true
also.[14] The truth of the conclusion is affirmed conditionally on
the truth of the premisses; and the rules of Syllogism set out those
combinations of propositions in which such affirmation may be made
legitimately. The rules of the Syllogism being thus the rules for
such conditional affirmation, the Principle or Axiom thereof
enunciates in the most general terms what is implied in all those
rules, as essential to their validity. And, since the syllogistic or
deductive process is applicable without exception to every variety of
the _Scibile_, Aristotle considers the Axioms or Principles thereof
to come under the investigation of Ontology or First Philosophy. Thus
it is, that he introduces us to the Maxim of Contradiction, and its
supplement or correlative, the Maxim of the Excluded Middle.

[Footnote 14: Analyt. Prior. I. i. p. 24, b. 18-20, et alib.]

His vindication of these Axioms is very illustrative of the
philosophy of his day. It cannot be too often impressed that he was
the first either to formulate the precepts; or to ascend to the
theory, of deductive reasoning; that he was the first to mark by
appropriate terms the most important logical distinctions and
characteristic attributes of propositions; that before his time,
there was abundance of acute dialectic, but no attempt to set forth
any critical scheme whereby the conclusions of such dialectic might
be tested. Anterior to Sokrates, the cast of Grecian philosophy had
been altogether either theological, or poetical, or physical, or at
least some fusion of these three varieties into one. Sokrates was the
first who broke ground for Logic--for testing the difference between
good and bad ratiocination. He did this by enquiry as to the
definition of general terms,[15] and by dialectical exposure of the
ignorance generally prevalent among those who familiarly used them.
Plato in his Sokratic dialogues followed in the same negative track;
opening up many instructive points of view respecting the erroneous
tendencies by which reasoners were misled, but not attempting any
positive systematic analysis, nor propounding any intelligible scheme
of his own for correction or avoidance of the like. If Sokrates and
Plato, both of them active in exposing ratiocinative error and
confusion, stopped short of any wide logical theory, still less were
the physical philosophers likely to supply that deficiency. Aristotle
tells us that several of them controverted the Maxim of
Contradiction.[16] Herakleitus and his followers maintained the
negative of it, distinctly and emphatically;[17] while the disciples
of Parmenides, though less pronounced in their negative, could not
have admitted it as universally true. Even Plato must be reckoned
among those who, probably without having clearly stated to himself
the Maxim in its universal terms, declared doctrines quite
incompatible with it: the Platonic Parmenides affords a conspicuous
example of contradictory conclusions deduced by elaborate reasoning
and declared to be both of them firmly established.[18] Moreover, in
the Sophistes,[19] Plato explains the negative proposition as
expressing what is different from that which is denied, but nothing
beyond; an explanation which, if admitted, would set aside the Maxim
of Contradiction as invalid.

[Footnote 15: Aristot. Metaph. A. vi. p. 987, b. 1: [Greek: S
ôkra/tous de\ peri\ me\n ta\ ê)thika\ pragmateuome/nou, peri\ de\
tê=s o(/lês phu/seôs ou)the/n, e)n me/ntoi tou/tois to\ katho/lou
zêtou=ntos, kai\ peri\ o(rismô=n e)pistê/santos _prô/tou_ tê\n
dia/noian.]]

[Footnote 16: Aristot. Metaph. [Greek: G]. iv. p. 1005, b. 35:
[Greek: ei)si\ de/ tines, oi(/, katha/per ei)/pomen, au)toi/ te
e)nde/chesthai/ phasi to\ au)to\ ei)=nai kai\ mê\ ei)=nai, kai\
u(polamba/nein ou(/tôs. chrô=ntai de\ tô=| lo/gô| tou/tô|
polloi\ kai\ tô=n peri\ phu/seôs.]]

[Footnote 17: Ibid. iii. p. 1005, b. 25; v. p. 1010, a. 13; vi. p.
1011, a. 24.]

[Footnote 18: Plato, Republic. v. p. 479, A.; vii. p. 538, E. Compare
also the conclusion of the Platonic Parmenides, and the elaborate
dialectic or antinomies by which the contradictions involved in it
are proved.]

[Footnote 19: Plato, Sophistes, p. 257, B.]

While Aristotle mentions these various dissentients, and especially
Herakleitus, he seems to imagine that they were not really in
earnest[20] in their dissent. Yet he nevertheless goes at length into
the case against them, as well as against others, who agreed with him
in affirming the Maxim, but who undertook also to demonstrate it. Any
such demonstration Aristotle declares to be impossible. The Maxim is
assumed in all demonstrations; unless you grant it, no demonstration
is valid; but it cannot be itself demonstrated. He had already laid
down in the Analytica that the premisses for demonstration could not
be carried back indefinitely, and that the attempt so to carry them
back was unphilosophical.[21] There must be some primary,
undemonstrable truths; and the Maxim of Contradiction he ranks among
the first. Still, though in attempting any formal demonstration of
the Maxim you cannot avoid assuming the Maxim itself and thus falling
into _Petitio Principii_, Aristotle contends that you can demonstrate
it in the way of refutation,[22] relatively to a given opponent,
provided such opponent will not content himself with simply denying
it, but will besides advance some affirmative thesis of his own, as a
truth in which he believes; or provided he will even grant the fixed
meaning of words, defining them in a manner significant alike to
himself and to others,--each word to have either one fixed meaning,
or a limited number of different meanings, clear and well
defined.[23] It is impossible for two persons to converse, unless
each understands the other. A word which conveys to the mind not one
meaning, but a multitude of unconnected meanings, is for all useful
purposes unmeaning.[24] If, therefore, the opponent once binds
himself to an affirmative definition of any word, this definition may
be truly predicated of the _definitum_ as subject; while he must be
considered as interdicting himself from predicating of the same
subject the negative of that definition. But when you ask for the
definition, your opponent must answer the question directly and _bonâ
fide_. He must not enlarge his definition so as to include both the
affirmative and negative of the same proposition; nor must he tack on
to the real essence (declared in the definition) a multitude of
unessential attributes. If he answers in this confused and perplexing
manner, he must be treated as not answering at all, and as rendering
philosophical discussion impossible.[25] Such a mode of speaking goes
to disallow any ultimate essence or determinate subject, and shuts
out all predication; for there cannot be an infinite regress of
predicates upon predicates, and accidents upon accidents, without
arriving at an ultimate substratum--Subject or Essence.[26] If,
wherever you can truly affirm a predicate of any subject, you can
also truly deny the same predicate of the same subject, it is
manifest that all subjects are one: there is nothing to discriminate
man, horse, ship, wall, &c., from each other; every one speaks truth,
and every one at the same time speaks falsehood; a man believes and
disbelieves the same thing at the same time; or he neither believes
nor disbelieves, and then his mind is blank, like a vegetable.[27]

[Footnote 20: Aristot. Metaph. [Greek: G]. iii. p. 1005, b. 26; K. v.
p. 1062, a. 32. Here Aristotle intimates that Herakleitus may have
asserted what he did not believe; though we find him in another place
citing Herakleitus as an example of those who adhered as obstinately
to their opinions as other persons adhered to demonstrated truth
(Ethic. Nik. VII. v. p. 1146, b. 30.).]

[Footnote 21: Aristot. Metaph. [Greek: G]. iv. p. 1006, a. 5: [Greek:
a)xiou=si dê\ kai\ tou=to a)podeiknu/nai tine\s di' a)paideusi/an;
e)/sti ga\r a)paideusi/a to\ mê\ gignô/skein ti/nôn dei= zêtei=n
a)po/deixin kai\ ti/nôn ou) dei=.]]

[Footnote 22: Aristot. Metaph. [Greek: G]. iv. p. 1006, a. 11:
[Greek: e)/sti d' a)podei=xai e)legktikô=s kai\ peri\ tou/tou o(/ti
a)du/naton, a)\n mo/non ti le/gê| o( a)mphisbêtô=n.]--K. v. p. 1062,
a. 2: [Greek: kai\ peri\ tô=n toiou/tôn a(plô=s me\n ou)k e)/stin
a)po/deixis, pro\s to/nde d' e)/stin.]--p. 1062, a. 30.]

[Footnote 23: Ibid. Metaph. [Greek: G]. iv. p. 1006, a. 18-34.
[Greek: diaphe/rei d' ou)the\n ou)/d' ei) plei/ô tis phaiê/
sêmai/nein, mo/non de\ ô(risme/na.]--K. v. p. 1062, a. 12.]

[Footnote 24: Ibid. [Greek: G]. iv. p. 1006, b. 7: [Greek: to\ ga\r
mê\ e(/n ti sêmai/nein ou)the\n sêmai/nein e)sti/n, mê\ sêmaino/ntôn
de\ tô=n o)noma/tôn a)nê/|rêtai to\ diale/gesthai pro\s a)llê/lous,
kata\ de\ tê\n a)lê/theian kai\ pro\s au(to/n; ou)the\n **ga\r
e)nde/chetai noei=n mê\ noou=nta e(/n.]--K. v. p. 1062, a. 20.]

[Footnote 25: Ibid. [Greek: G]. iv. p. 1006, b. 30-p. 1007, a. 20.
[Greek: sumbai/nei to\ lechthe/n, a)\n a)pokri/nêtai to\
e)rôtô/menon. e)a\n de\ prostithê=| e)rôtô=ntos a(plô=s kai\ ta\s
a)popha/seis, ou)k a)pokri/netai to\ e)rôtô/menon.--e)a\n de\
tou=to poiê=|, ou) diale/getai.]]

[Footnote 26: Ibid. p. 1007, a. 20-b. 19: [Greek: o(/lôs d'
a)nairou=sin oi( tou=to le/gontes ou)si/an kai\ to\ ti/ ê)=n
ei)=nai.--ei) de\ pa/nta kata\ sumbebêko\s le/getai, ou)the\n e)/stai
prô=ton to\ kath' ou(=, ei) a)ei\ to\ sumbebêko\s kath'
u(pokeime/nou tino\s sêmai/nei tê\n katêgori/an; a)na/gkê a)/ra ei)s
a)/peiron i)e/nai; a)ll' a)du/naton.]]

[Footnote 27: Aristot. Met. [Greek: G]. iv. p. 1008, a. 18-b. 12:
[Greek: ei) de\ o(moi/ôs kai\ o(/sa a)pophê=sai pha/nai
a)na/gkê--pa/nta d' a)\n ei)/ê e(/n--ou)the\n dioi/sei e(/teron
e(te/rou--ei) de\ mêthe\n u(polamba/nei a)ll' o(moi/ôs oi)/etai kai\
ou)k oi)/etai, ti/ a)\n diaphero/ntôs e)/choi tô=n phutô=n?] K. v. p.
1062, a. 28.]

The man who professes this doctrine, however (continues
Aristotle[28]), shows plainly by his conduct that his mind is not
thus blank; that**, in respect of the contradictory alternative, he
does not believe either both sides or neither side, but believes one
and disbelieves the other. When he feels hungry, and seeks what he
knows to be palatable and wholesome, he avoids what he knows to be
nasty and poisonous. He knows what is to be found in the
market-place, and goes there to get it; he keeps clear of falling into
a well or walking into the sea; he does not mistake a horse for a man.
He may often find himself mistaken; but he shows by his conduct that
he believes certain subjects to possess certain definite attributes,
and not to possess others. Though we do not reach infallible truth,
we obtain an approach to it, sometimes nearer, sometimes more remote;
and we thus escape the extreme doctrine which forbids all definite
affirmation.[29]

[Footnote 28: Ibid. [Greek: G]. iv. p. 1008, b. 12-31; K. vi. p.
1063, a. 30.]

[Footnote 29: Ibid. [Greek: G]. iv. p. 1008, b. 36: [Greek: ei) ou)=n
to\ ma=llon e)ggu/teron, ei)/ê ge a)/n ti a)lêthe\s ou(= e)ggu/teron
to\ ma=llon a)lêthe/s; ka)\n ei) mê/ e)stin, a)ll' ê)/dê ge/ ti
e)sti\ bebaio/teron kai\ a)lêthinô/teron, kai\ tou= lo/gou
a)pêllagme/noi a)\n ei)/êmen tou= a)kra/tou kai\ kôlu/onto/s ti tê=|
dianoi/a| o(ri/sai.]]

It is in this manner that Aristotle, vindicating the Maxims of
Contradiction and of Excluded Middle as the highest _principia_ of
syllogistic reasoning, disposes of the two contemporaneous dogmas
that were most directly incompatible with these Maxims:--(1) The
dogma of Herakleitus, who denied all duration or permanence of
subject, recognizing nothing but perpetual process, flux, or change,
each successive moment of which involved destruction and generation
implicated with each other: _Is_ and _is not_ are both alike and
conjointly true, while neither is true separately, to the exclusion
of the other;[30] (2) The dogma of Anaxagoras, who did not deny
fixity or permanence of subject, but held that everything was mixed
up with everything; that every subject had an infinite assemblage of
contrary predicates, so that neither of them could be separately
affirmed or separately denied: The truth lies in a third alternative
or middle, between affirmation and denial.[31]

[Footnote 30: Aristot. Met. A. vi. p. 987, a. 34; [Greek: G]. v. p.
1010, a. 12: [Greek: Kra/tulos--o(\s to\ teleutai=on ou)the\n ô/|eto
dei=n le/gein a)lla\ to\n da/ktulon e)ki/nei mo/non, kai\
Ê(raklei/tô| e)peti/ma ei)po/nti o(/ti di\s tô=| au)tô=| pota/mô| ou)k
e)/stin e)mbê=nai; au)to\s ga\r ô)/|eto ou)/d' a(pa/x.] Herakleitus
adopted as his one _fundamentum_ Fire or Heat, as being the principle
of mobility or change: [Greek: chrô=ntai ga\r ô(s kinêtikê\n
e)/chonti tô=| puri\ tê\n phu/sin]--Metaph. A. iii. p. 984, b. 5.
Ibid. K. v. p. 1062, a. 31-b. 10; K. x. p. 1067, a. 5; M. iv. p.
1078, b. 15.]

[Footnote 31: Aristot. Met. K. vi. p. 1063, b. 25; A. viii. p. 989,
a. 31-b. 16. [Greek: o(/te ga\r ou)the\n ê)=n a)pokekrime/non, dê=lon
ô(s ou)the\n ê)=n a)lêthe\s ei)pei=n kata\ tê=s ou)si/as e)kei/nês,
le/gô d' oi(=on o(/ti ou)/te leuko\n ou)/te me/lan ê)\ phaio\n ê)\
a)/llo chrô=ma, a)ll' a)/chrôn ê)=n e)x a)na/gkês; o(moi/ôs de\
kai\ a)/chumon tô=| au)tô=| lo/gô| tou/tô|, ou)de\ a)/llo tô=n
o(moi/ôn ou)the/n; ou)/te ga\r poio/n ti oi(=o/n te au)to\ ei)=nai
ou)/te poso\n ou)/te ti/.]--[Greek: G]. iv. b. 1007, b. 25: [Greek:
kai\ gi/gnetai dê\ to\ tou= A)naxago/rou, o(mou= pa/nta chrê/mata;
ô(/ste mêthe\n a)lêthô=s u(pa/rchein.]--[Greek: G]. viii. p. 1012,
a. 24: [Greek: e)/oike d' o( me\n Ê(raklei/tou lo/gos, le/gôn pa/nta
ei)=nai kai\ mê\ ei)=nai, a(/panta a)lêthê= poiei=n, o( d'
A)naxago/rou ei)=nai/ ti metaxu\ tê=s a)ntipha/seôs, ô(/ste pa/nta
pseudê=; o(/tan ga\r michthê=|, ou)/t' a)gatho\n ou)/t' ou)k
a)gatho\n to\ mi=gma, ô(/st' ou)the\n ei)pei=n a)lêthe/s.]]

Having thus refuted these dogmas to his own satisfaction, Aristotle
proceeds to impugn a third doctrine which he declares to be analogous
to these two and to be equally in conflict with the two syllogistic
_principia_ which he is undertaking to vindicate. This third doctrine
is the "_Homo Mensura_" of Protagoras: Man is the measure of all
things--the measure of things existent as well as of things
non-existent: To each individual that is true or false which he
believes to be such, and for as long as he believes it. Aristotle
contends that this doctrine is homogeneous with those of Herakleitus
and Anaxagoras, and must stand or fall along with them; all three being
alike adverse to the Maxim of Contradiction.[32] Herein he follows
partially the example of Plato, who (in his Theætêtus[33]), though
not formally enunciating the Maxim of Contradiction, had declared the
tenets of Protagoras to be coincident with or analogous to those of
Herakleitus, and had impugned both one and the other by the same line
of arguments. Protagoras agreed with Herakleitus (so Plato and
Aristotle tell us) in declaring both affirmative and negative (in the
contradictory alternative) to be at once and alike true; for he
maintained that what any person believed was true, and that what any
person disbelieved was false. Accordingly, since opinions altogether
opposite and contradictory are held by different persons or by the
same person at different times, both the affirmative and the negative
of every _Antiphasis_ must be held as true alike;[34] in other words,
all affirmations and all negations were at once true and false. Such
co-existence or implication of contradictions is the main doctrine of
Herakleitus.

[Footnote 32: Aristot. Met [Greek: G]. v. p. 1009, a. 6: [Greek:
e)/sti d' a)po\ tê=s au)tê=s do/xês kai\ o( Prôtago/rou lo/gos, kai\
a)na/gkê o(moi/ôs a)/mphô au)tou\s ê)\ ei)=nai ê)\ mê\ ei)=nai.]]

[Footnote 33: Aristotle refers here to Plato by name, Metaphys.
[Greek: G]. v. p. 1010, b. 12.]

[Footnote 34: Ibid. p. 1009, a. 8-20. [Greek: a)na/gkê pa/nta a(/ma
a)lêthê= kai\ pseudê= ei)=nai.]--p. 1011, a. 30.]

I have already in another work,[35] while analysing the Platonic
dialogues Theætêtus and Kratylus, criticized at some length the
doctrine here laid down by Plato and Aristotle. I have endeavoured to
show that the capital tenet of Protagoras is essentially distinct
from the other tenets with which these two philosophers would
identify it: distinct both from the dogma of Herakleitus, That
everything is in unceasing flux and process, each particular moment
thereof being an implication of contradictions both alike true; and
distinct also from the other dogma held by others, That all cognition
is sensible perception. The Protagorean tenet "_Homo Mensura_" is
something essentially distinct from either of these two; though
possibly Protagoras himself may have held the second of the two,
besides his own. His tenet is nothing more than a clear and general
declaration of the principle of universal Relativity. True belief and
affirmation have no meaning except in relation to some believer, real
or supposed; true disbelief and negation have no meaning except in
relation to some disbeliever, real or supposed. When a man affirms
any proposition as true, he affirms only what he (perhaps with some
other persons also) believes to be true, while others may perhaps
disbelieve it as falsehood. Object and Subject are inseparably
implicated: we may separate them by abstraction, and reason about
each apart from the other; but, as reality, they exist only locked up
one with the other.

[Footnote 35: 'Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates,' Vol. II.
c. xxvi. pp. 325-363: "The Protagorean doctrine--Man is the measure
of all things--is simply the presentation in complete view of a
common fact; uncovering an aspect of it which the received
phraseology hides. Truth and Falsehood have reference to some
believing subject--and the words have no meaning except in that
relation. Protagoras brings to view this subjective side of the same
complex fact, of which Truth and Falsehood denote the objective side.
He refuses to admit the object absolute--the pretended _thing in
itself_--Truth without a believer. His doctrine maintains the
indefeasible and necessary involution of the percipient mind in every
perception--of the concipient mind in every conception--of the
cognizant mind in every cognition. Farther, Protagoras acknowledges
many distinct believing or knowing Subjects: and affirms that every
object known must be relative to (or in his language, _measured by_)
the knowing Subject: that every _cognitum_ must have its
_cognoscens_, and every _cognoscibile_ its _cognitionis capax_; that
the words have no meaning unless this be supposed; that these two
names designate two opposite poles or aspects of the indivisible fact
of cognition--actual or potential--not two factors, which are in
themselves separate or separable, and which come together to make a
compound product. A man cannot in any case get clear of or discard
his own mind as a Subject. Self is necessarily omnipresent, concerned
in every moment of consciousness, &c." Compare also c. xxiv. p. 261.]

That such is and always has been the state of the fact, in regard to
truth and falsehood, belief and disbelief, is matter of notoriety:
Protagoras not only accepts it as a fact, but formulates it as a
theory. Instead of declaring that what he (or the oracle which he
consults and follows) believes to be true, is absolute truth, while
that which others believe, is truth relatively to them,--he lowers
his own pretensions to a level with theirs. He professes to be a
measure of truth only for himself, and for such as may be satisfied
with the reasons that satisfy him. Aristotle complains that this
theory discourages the search for truth as hopeless, not less than
the chase after flying birds.[36] But, however serious such
discouragement may be, we do not escape the real difficulty of the
search by setting up an abstract idol and calling it Absolute Truth,
without either relativity or referee; while, if we enter, as sincere
and _bonâ fide_ enquirers, on the search for reasoned truth or
philosophy, we shall find ourselves not departing from the
Protagorean canon, but involuntarily conforming to it. Aristotle,
after having declared that the Maxim of Contradiction was true beyond
the possibility of deception,[37] but yet that there were several
eminent philosophers who disallowed it, is forced to produce the best
reasons in his power to remove their doubts and bring them round to
his opinion. His reasons must be such as to satisfy not his own mind
only, but the minds of opponents and indifferent auditors as
referees. This is an appeal to other men, as judges each for himself
and in his own case: it is a tacit recognition of the autonomy of
each individual enquirer as a measure of truth to himself. In other
words, it is a recognition of the Protagorean canon.

[Footnote 36: Aristot. Metaph. [Greek: G]. v. p. 1009, b. 38.]

[Footnote 37: Ibid. [Greek: G]. iii. p. 1005, b. 11: [Greek:
bebaiota/tê d' a)rchê\ pasô=n, peri\ ê(\n diapseusthê=nai
a)du/naton.]]

We know little about the opinions of Protagoras; but there was
nothing in this canon necessarily at variance either with the Maxim
of Contradiction or with that of Excluded Middle. Both Aristotle and
Plato would have us believe that Protagoras was bound by his canon to
declare every opinion to be alike false and true, because every
opinion was believed by some and disbelieved by others.[38] But
herein they misstate his theory. He did not declare any thing to be
_absolutely_ true, or to be _absolutely_ false. Truth and Falsehood
were considered by him as always relative to some referee, and he
recognized no universal or infallible referee. In his theory the
necessity of _some_ referee was distinctly enunciated, instead of
being put out of sight under an ellipsis, as in the received theories
and practice. And this is exactly what Plato and Aristotle omit, when
they refute him. He proclaimed that each man was a measure for
himself alone, and that every opinion was true _to the believer_,
false _to the disbeliever_; while they criticize him as if he had
said--Every opinion is alike true and false; thus leaving out the
very qualification which forms the characteristic feature of his
theory. They commit that fallacy which Plato shows up in the
Euthydêmus, and which Aristotle[39] numbers in his list of _Fallaciæ
Extra Dictionem_, imputing it as a vice to the Sophists: they slide
_à dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter_. And it is remarkable
that Aristotle, in one portion of his argument against "_Homo
Mensura_," expressly admonishes the Protagoreans that they must take
care to adhere constantly to this qualified mode of enunciation;[40]
that they must not talk of apparent truth generally, but of truth as
it appears _to themselves_ or _to some other persons_, now or at a
different time. Protagoras hardly needed such an admonition to keep
to what is the key-note and characteristic peculiarity of his own
theory; since it is only by suppressing this peculiarity that his
opponents make the theory seem absurd. He would by no means have
disclaimed that consequence of his theory, which Aristotle urges
against it as an irrefragable objection; viz., that it makes every
thing relative, and recognizes nothing as absolute. This is perfectly
true, and constitutes its merit in the eyes of its supporters.

[Footnote 38: Plato, Theætêt. pp. 171-179. Aristot. Met. [Greek: G].
iv. p. 1007, b. 21: [Greek: ei) kata\ panto/s ti ê)\ kataphê=sai ê)\
a)pophê=sai e)nde/chetai, katha/per a)na/gkê toi=s to\n Prôtago/rou
le/gousi lo/gon.] Compare v. p. 1009, a. 6; viii. p. 1012, b. 15.]

[Footnote 39: Aristot. Soph. El. p. 167, a. 3; Rhetoric. II. xxiv. p.
1402, a. 2-15. [Greek: ô(/sper kai\ e)pi\ tô=n e)ristikô=n to\
_kata/ ti_ kai\ _pro/s ti_ kai\ _pê=|_ ou) prostithe/mena poiei= tê\n
sukophanti/an.]]

[Footnote 40: Aristot. Metaph. [Greek: G]. vi. p. 1011, a. 21:
[Greek: dio\ kai\ phulakte/on toi=s tê\n bi/an e)n tô=| lo/gô|
zêtou=sin, a(/ma de\ kai\ u(pe/chein lo/gon a)xiou=sin, o(/ti ou) to\
phaino/menon e)/stin, a)lla\ to\ phaino/menonô(=| phai/netai kai\
o(/te phai/netai kai\ ê(=| kai\ ô(/s.]--b. 1: [Greek: a)ll' i)/sôs
dia\ tou=t' a)na/gkê le/gein toi=s mê\ di' a)pori/an a)lla\ lo/gou
cha/rin le/gousin, o(/ti ou)k e)/stin a)lêthe\s tou=to, a)lla\
tou/tô| a)lêthe/s.]]

Another argument of Aristotle[41] against the Protagorean "_Homo
Mensura_"--That it implies in every affirming Subject an equal
authority and equal title to credence, as compared with every other
affirming Subject--I have already endeavoured to combat in my review
of the Platonic Theætêtus, where the same argument appears fully
developed. The antithesis between Plato and Aristotle on one side,
and Protagoras on the other, is indeed simply that between Absolute
and Relative. The Protagorean doctrine is quite distinct from the
other doctrines with which they jumble it together--from those of
Herakleitus and Anaxagoras, and from the theory that Knowledge is
sensible perception. The real opponents of the Maxim of Contradiction
were Herakleitus, Anaxagoras, Parmenides, and Plato himself as
represented in some of his dialogues, especially the Parmenides,
Timæus, Republic, Sophistes. Each of these philosophers adopted a
First Philosophy different from the others: but each also adopted one
completely different from that of Aristotle, and not reconcileable
with his logical canons. None of them admitted determinate and
definable attributes belonging to determinate particular subjects,
each with a certain measure of durability.

[Footnote 41: Ibid. v. p. 1010, b. 11.]

Now the common speech of mankind throughout the Hellenic world was
founded on the assumption of such fixed subjects and predicates.
Those who wanted information for practical guidance or security,
asked for it in this form; those who desired to be understood by
others, and to determine the actions of others, adopted the like mode
of speech. Information was given through significant propositions,
which the questioner sought to obtain, and which the answer, if
cognizant, enunciated: _e.g._, Theætêtus **is sitting down[42]--to
repeat the minimum or skeleton of a proposition as given by Plato,
requiring both subject and predicate in proper combination, to convey
the meaning. Now the logical analysis, and the syllogistic precepts
of Aristotle,--as well as his rhetorical and dialectical suggestions
for persuading, for refuting, or for avoiding refutation--are all
based upon the practice of common speech. In conversing (he says) it
is impossible to produce and exhibit the actual objects signified;
the speaker must be content with enunciating, instead thereof, the
name significant of each.[43] The first beginning of rhetorical
diction is, to speak good Greek;[44] the rhetor and the dialectician
must dwell upon words, propositions, and opinions, not peculiar to
such as have received special teaching, but common to the many and
employed in familiar conversation; the auditors, to whom they address
themselves, are assumed to be commonplace men, of fair average
intelligence, but nothing beyond.[45] Thus much of acquirement is
imbibed by almost every one as he grows up, from the ordinary
intercourse of society. The men of special instruction begin with it,
as others do; but they also superadd other cognitions or
accomplishments derived from peculiar teachers. Universally--both in
the interior of the family, amidst the unscientific multitude, and by
the cultivated few--habitual speech was carried on through terms
assuming fixed subjects and predicates. It was this recognized
process in its two varieties of Analytic and Dialectic, which
Aristotle embraced in his logical theory, and to which he also
adapted his First Philosophy.

[Footnote 42: Plato, Sophistes, pp. 262-263.]

[Footnote 43: Aristot. Soph. El. p. 165, a. 5: [Greek: e)pei\ ga\r
ou)k e)/stin au)ta\ ta\ pra/gmata diale/gesthai phe/rontas, a)lla\
toi=s o)no/masin a)nti\ tô=n pragma/tôn chrô/metha sumbo/lois.]]

[Footnote 44: Aristot. Rhet. III. v. p. 1407, b. 19: [Greek: e)/sti
d' a)rchê\ tê=s le/xeôs to\ E(llêni/zein.]]

[Footnote 45: Aristot. Rhet. I. i. p. 1354, a. 1: [Greek: ê(
r(êtorikê\ a)nti/stropho/s e)sti tê=| dialektikê=|; a)mpho/terai ga\r
peri\ toiou/tôn tinô=n ei)si\n a(\ koina\ tro/pon tina\ a(pa/ntôn
e)sti\ gnôri/zein kai\ ou)demia=s e)pistê/mês a)phôrisme/nês; dio\
kai\ pa/ntes tro/pon tina\ mete/chousin a)mphoi=n.]--p. 1355, a. 25:
[Greek: didaskali/as ga/r e)stin o( kata\ tê\n e)pistê/mên lo/gos,
tou=to de\ a)du/naton, a)ll' a)na/gkê dia\ tô=n koinô=n poiei=sthai
ta\s pi/steis kai\ tou\s lo/gous, ô(/sper kai\ e)n toi=s Topikoi=s
e)le/gomen peri\ tê=s pro\s tou\s pollou\s e)nteu/xeôs.]--p. 1357,
a. 1: [Greek: e)/sti de\ to\ e)/rgon au)tê=s peri/ te toiou/tôn
peri\ ô(=n bouleuo/metha kai\ te/chnas mê\ e)/chomen, kai\ e)n toi=s
toiou/tois a)kroatai=s oi(\ ou) du/nantai dia\ pollô=n sunora=n
ou)de\ logi/zesthai po/r)r(ôthen.]--p. 1357, a. 11: [Greek: o( ga\r
kri/tês u(pokei=tai ei)=nai a(plou=s.] Compare Topica, I. ii. p. 101,
a. 26-36; Soph. El. p. 172, a. 30.]

But the First Philosophy that preceded his, had not been so adapted.
The Greek philosophers, who flourished before dialectical discussion
had become active, during the interval between Thales and Sokrates,
considered Philosophy as one whole--_rerum divinarum et humanarum
scientia_--destined to render Nature or the Kosmos more or less
intelligible. They took up in the gross all those vast problems,
which the religious or mythological poets had embodied in divine
genealogies and had ascribed to superhuman personal agencies.

Thales and his immediate successors (like their predecessors the
poets) accommodated their hypotheses to intellectual impulses and
aspirations of their own; with little anxiety about giving
satisfaction to others,[46] still less about avoiding inconsistencies
or meeting objections. Each of them fastened upon some one grand and
imposing generalization (set forth often in verse) which he stretched
as far as it would go by various comparisons and illustrations, but
without any attention or deference to adverse facts or reasonings.
Provided that his general point of view was impressive to the
imagination,[47] as the old religious scheme of personal agencies was
to the vulgar, he did not concern himself about the conditions of
proof or disproof. The data of experience were altogether falsified
(as by the Pythagoreans)[48] in order to accommodate them to the
theory; or were set aside as deceptive and inexplicable from the
theory (as by both Parmenides and Herakleitus).[49]

[Footnote 46: Aristot. Met. B. iv. p. 1000, a. 9: [Greek: oi( me\n
ou)=n peri\ Ê(si/odon kai\ pa/ntes o(/soi theo/logoi mo/non
e)phro/ntisan tou= pithanou= tou= pro\s au)tou/s, ê(mô=n d'
ô)ligô/rêsan;--kai\ ga\r o(/nper oi)êthei/ê le/gein a)/n tis ma/lista
o(mologoume/nôs au(tô=|, E)mpedoklê=s, kai\ ou(to\s tau)to\n
pe/ponthen.]--Metaph. N. iv. p. 1091, b. 1-15.]

[Footnote 47: This is strikingly expressed by a phrase of Aristotle
about the Platonic theory, Metaph. N. iii. p. 1090, a. 35: [Greek:
oi( de\ chôristo\n poiou=ntes, o(/ti e)pi\ tô=n ai)sthêtô=n ou)k
e)/stai ta\ a)xiô/mata, a)lêthê= de\ ta\ lego/mena kai\ sai/nei tê\n
psuchê/n, ei)=nai/ te u(polamba/nousi kai\ chôrista\ ei)=nai.]]

[Footnote 48: Metaph. N. iii. p. 1090, a. 34: [Greek: e)oi/kasi peri\
a)/llou ou)ra/nou le/gein kai\ sôma/tôn a)ll' ou) tô=n ai)sthêt
ô=n.]--Metaph. A. v. p. 986, a. 5; and De Coelo, II. xiii. p. 293, a.
25.]

[Footnote 49: Physic. I. ii.-iii. pp. 185-186.]

But these vague hypotheses became subjected to a new scrutiny, when
the dialectical age of Zeno and Sokrates supervened. Opponents of
Parmenides impugned his theory of _Ens Unum Continuum Immobile_, as
leading to absurdities; while his disciple Zeno replied, not by any
attempt to disprove such allegations but, by showing that the
counter-theory of _Entia Plura Discontinua Moventia_, or _Mutabilia_,
involved consequences yet more absurd.[50] In the acute dialectical
warfare, to which the old theories thus stood exposed, the means of
attack much surpassed those of defence; moreover, the partisans of
Herakleitus despised all coherent argumentation, confining themselves
to obscure oracular aphorisms and multiplied metaphors.[51] In point
of fact, no suitable language could be found, consistently with
common speech or common experience, for expanding in detail either
the Herakleitean[52] or the Parmenidean theory; the former
suppressing all duration and recognizing nothing but events--a
perpetual stream of _Fientia_ or interchange of _Ens_ with _Non-Ens_;
the latter discarding _Non-Ens_ as unmeaning, and recognizing no real
events or successions, but only _Ens Unum_ perpetually lasting and
unchangeable. The other physical hypotheses, broached by Pythagoras,
Empedokles, Anaxagoras, and Demokritus, each altogether discordant
with the others, were alike imposing in their general enunciation and
promise, alike insufficient when applied to common experience and
detail.

[Footnote 50: Plato, Parmenid. p. 128, D.]

[Footnote 51: Plato, Theætêt. p. 179, E: [Greek: peri\ tou/tôn tô=n
Ê(rakleitei/ôn,--to\ e)pimei=nai e)pi\ lo/gô| kai\ e)rôtê/mati
kai\ ê(suchi/ôs e)n me/rei a)pokri/nasthai kai\ e)re/sthai ê(=tton
au)toi=s e)/ni ê)\ to\ mêde/n;--ô(/sper e)k phare/tras r(êmati/skia
ai)nigmatô/dê a)naspô=ntes a)potoxeu/ousi, ka)\n tou/tou zêtê=|s
lo/gon labei=n, ti/ ei)/rêken, e(te/rô| peplê/xei kainô=s
metônomasme/nô|, peranei=s de\ ou)de/pote ou)de\n pro\s ou)de/na au)t
ô=n.]]

[Footnote 52: Ibid. p. 183, B: [Greek: a)lla/ tin' a)/llên phônê\n
thete/on toi=s to\n lo/gon tou=ton le/gousin, ô(s nu=n ge pro\s tê\n
au(tô=n u(po/thesin ou)k e)/chousi r(ê/mata, ei) mê\ a)/ra to\
ou)/d' o(/pôs; ma/lista d' ou(/tôs a)\n au)toi=s a(/rmottoi,
a)/peiron lego/menon.]

Plato applies this remark to the theory of Protagoras; but the remark
belongs properly to that of Herakleitus.]

But the great development of Dialectic during the Sokratic age,
together with the new applications made of it by Sokrates and the
unrivalled acuteness with which he wielded it, altered materially the
position of these physical theories. Sokrates was not ignorant of
them;[53] but he discouraged such studies, and turned attention to
other topics. He passed his whole life in public and in
indiscriminate conversation with every one. He deprecated astronomy
and physics as unbecoming attempts to pry into the secrets of the
gods; who administered the general affairs of the Kosmos according to
their own pleasure, and granted only, through the medium of prophecy
or oracles, such special revelations as they thought fit. In his own
discussions Sokrates dwelt only on matters of familiar conversation
and experience--social, ethical, political, &c., such as were in
every one's mouth, among the daily groups of the market-place. These
he declared to be the truly _human_ topics[54]--the proper study of
mankind--upon which it was disgraceful to be ignorant, or to form
untrue and inconsistent judgments. He found, moreover, that upon
these topics no one supposed himself to be ignorant, or to require
teaching. Every one gave confident opinions, derived from intercourse
with society, embodied in the familiar words of the language, and
imbibed almost unconsciously along with the meaning of these words.
Now Sokrates not only disclaimed all purpose of teaching, but made
ostentatious profession of his own ignorance. His practice was to ask
information from others who professed to know; and with this view, to
question them about the import of vulgar words with the social
convictions contained in them.[55] To the answers given he applied an
acute cross-examination, which seldom failed to detect so much
inconsistency and contradiction as to cover the respondent with
shame, and to make him sensible that he was profoundly ignorant of
matters which he had believed himself to know well. Sokrates
declared, in his last speech before condemnation by the Athenian
Dikasts, that such false persuasion of knowledge, combined with real
ignorance, was universal among mankind; and that the exposure
thereof, as the great misguiding force of human life, had been
enjoined upon him as his mission by the Delphian God.[56]

[Footnote 53: Xenophon, Mem. IV. vii. 5: [Greek: kai/toi ou)de\ tou/t
ôn ge a)nê/koos ê)=n].]

[Footnote 54: Xenophon, Mem. I. i. 12-16: [Greek: kai\ prô=ton me\n
au)tô=n e)sko/pei po/tera/ pote nomi/santes i(kanô=s ê)/dê ta)nthr
ô/peia ei)de/nai e)/rchontai e)pi\ to\ peri\ tô=n toiou/tôn
phronti/zein, ê)\ ta\ me\n a)nthrô/peia pare/ntes, ta\ de\ daimo/nia
skopou=ntes, ê(gou=ntai ta\ prosê/konta pra/ttein.--au)to\s de\ peri\
tô=n a)nthrôpei/ôn a)ei\ diele/geto, skopô=n ti/ eu)sebe/s, ti/
a)sebe/s, ti/ kalo/n, ti/ ai)schro/n, ti/ di/kaion, ti/ a)/dikon, ti/
sôphrosu/nê, ti/ mani/a, ti/ po/lis, ti/ politiko/s, ti/ a)rchê\
a)nthrô/pôn, ti/ a)rchiko\s a)nthrô/pôn], &c.

Compare IV. vii. 2-9.]

[Footnote 55: Xenoph. Memor. I. ii. 26-46; III. vi. 2-15; IV. ii.;
IV. vi. 1: [Greek: skopô=n su\n toi=s sunoi=si ti/ e(/kaston ei)/ê
tô=n o)/ntôn ou)de/pot' e)/lêge.]--IV. iv. 9: [Greek: a)rkei= ga\r
o(/ti tô=n a)/llôn katagela=|s, e)rôtô=n me\n kai\ e)le/gchôn
pa/ntas, au)to\s d' ou)deni\ the/lôn u(pe/chein lo/gon ou)de\
gnô/mên a)pophai/nesthai perei\ ou)deno/s.]--Plato, Republic I. pp.
336-337; Theætêt. p. 150 C.]

[Footnote 56: Plato, Apol. Sokrat. pp. 22, 28, 33: [Greek: e)moi\ de\
tou=to, ô(s e)gô/ phêmi, proste/taktai u(po\ tou= theou= pra/ttein
kai\ e)k manteiô=n kai\ e)x e)nupni/ôn kai\ panti\ tro/pô|,
ô(=|pe/r ti/s pote kai\ a)/llê thei/a moi=ra a)nthrô/pô| kai\
o(tiou=n prose/taxe pra/ttein.]--Plato, Sophist. pp. 230-231; Menon,
pp. 80, A., 84, B.

Compare the analysis of the Platonic Apology in my work, 'Plato and
the Other Companions of Sokrates,' Vol. I. c. vii.]

The peculiarities which Aristotle ascribes to Sokrates are--that he
talked upon ethical topics instead of physical, that he fastened
especially on the definitions of general terms, and that his
discussions were inductive, bringing forward many analogous
illustrative or probative particulars to justify a true general
proposition, and one or a few to set aside a false one.[57] This
Sokratic practice is copiously illustrated both by Plato in many of
his dialogues, and by Xenophon throughout all the Memorabilia.[58] In
Plato, however, Sokrates is often introduced as spokesman of
doctrines not his own; while in Xenophon we have before us the real
man as he talked in the market-place, and apparently little besides.
Xenophon very emphatically exhibits to us a point which in Plato's
Dialogues of Search is less conspicuously marked, though still
apparent: viz., the power possessed by Sokrates of accommodating
himself to the ordinary mind in all its varieties--his habit of
dwelling on the homely and familiar topics of the citizen's daily
life--his constant appeal to small and even vulgar details, as the
way of testing large and imposing generalities.[59] Sokrates
possessed to a surprising degree the art of selecting arguments
really persuasive to ordinary non-theorizing men; so as often to
carry their assent along with him, and still oftener to shake their
previous beliefs, if unwarranted, or even if adopted by mere passive
receptivity without preliminary reflection and comparison.

[Footnote 57: Aristot. Metaph. M. iv. p. 1078, b. 28: [Greek: du/o
ga/r e)stin a(/ tis a)\n a)podoi/ê Sôkra/tei dikai/ôs, tou/s t'
e)paktikou\s lo/gous kai\ to\ o(ri/zesthai katho/lou; tau=ta ga/r
e)stin a)/mphô peri\ a)rchê\n e)pistê/mês.]--ib. A. p. 987, b. 1:
[Greek: Sôkra/tous de\ peri\ me\n ta\ ê)thika\ pragmateuome/nou,
peri\ de\ tê=s o(/lês phu/seôs ou)the/n, e)n me/ntoi tou/tois to\
katho/lou zêtou=ntos kai\ peri\ o(rismô=n e)pistê/santos prô/tou
tê\n dia/noian.]]

[Footnote 58: No portion of the Memorabilia illustrates this point
better than the dialogue with Euthydêmus, IV. vi.]

[Footnote 59: Xenophon, Memor. IV. vi. 15: [Greek: o(/pote de\
au)to/s ti tô=| lo/gô| diexi/oi, dia\ tô=n ma/lista o(mologoume/n
ôn e)poreu/eto, nomi/zôn tau/tên tê\n a)spha/leian ei)=nai lo/gou;
toigarou=n polu\ ma/lista ô(=n e)gô\ oi)=da, o(/te le/goi, tou\s
a)kou/ontas o(mologou=ntas parei=chen; e)/phê de\ kai\ O(/mêron tô=|
O)dussei= a)nathei=nai to\ a)sphalê= r(ê/tora ei)=nai, ô(s i(kano\n
au)to\n o)/nta dia\ tô=n dokou/ntôn toi=s a)nthrô/pois a)/gein
tou\s lo/gous.]

Compare ib. I. ii. 38; IV. iv. 6; also Plato, Theætêtus, p. 147, A,
B; Republic I. p. 338, C.]

Without departing from Aristotle's description, therefore, we may
conceive the change operated by Sokrates in philosophical discussion
under a new point of view. In exchanging Physics for Ethics, it
vulgarized both the topics and the talk of philosophy. Physical
philosophy as it stood in the age of Sokrates (before Aristotle had
broached his peculiar definition of Nature) was merely an obscure,
semi-poetical, hypothetical _Philosophia Prima_,[60] or rather
_Philosophia Prima_ and _Philosophia Secunda_ blended in one. This is
true of all its varieties,--of the Ionic philosophers as well as of
Pythagoras, Parmenides, Herakleitus, Anaxagoras, Empedokles, and even
Demokritus. Such philosophy, dimly enunciated and only half
intelligible,[61] not merely did not tend to explain or clear up
phenomenal experiences, but often added new difficulties of its own.
It presented itself sometimes even as discrediting, overriding, and
contradicting experience; but never as opening any deductive road
from the Universal down to its particulars.[62] Such theories, though
in circulation among a few disciples and opponents, were foreign and
unsuitable to the talk of ordinary men. To pass from these cloudy
mysteries to social topics and terms which were in every one's mouth,
was the important revolution in philosophy introduced in the age of
Sokrates, and mainly by him.

[Footnote 60: Aristot. Metaph. [Greek: G]. iii. p. 1005, a. 31.]

[Footnote 61: Ibid. A. x. p. 993, a. 15: [Greek: psellizome/nê| ga\r
e)/oiken ê( prô/tê philosophi/a peri\ pa/ntôn, a(/te ne/a te kat'
a)rcha\s ou)=sa kai\ to\ prô=ton.]]

[Footnote 62: Aristot. Metaph. [Greek: a.] i. p. 993, b. 6: [Greek:
to\ o(/lon ti e)/chein kai\ me/ros mê\ du/nasthai dêloi= to\
chalepo\n au)tê=s (tê=s peri\ tê=s a)lêthei/as theôri/as).]

Alexander ap. Schol. p. 104, Bonitz: [Greek: ei)s e)/nnoian me\n tou=
o(/lou kai\ e)pi/stasin pa/ntas e)lthei=n, mêde\n de\ me/ros au)tê=s
e)xakribô/sasthai dunêthê=nai, dêloi= to\ chalepo\n au)tê=s.]

Aristotle indicates how much the _Philosophia Prima_ of his earlier
predecessors was uncongenial to and at variance with phenomenal
experience--Metaphys. A. v. p. 986, b. 31.

To shape their theories in such a way--[Greek: ta\ phaino/mena ei)
me/llei tis a)podô/sein] (Metaphys. [Greek: L]. viii. p. 1073, b.
36), was an obligation which philosophers hardly felt incumbent on
them prior to the Aristotelian age. Compare Simplikius (ad. Aristot.
Physic. I.), p. 328, a. 1-26, Schol. Br.; Schol. (ad. Aristot. De
Coelo III. I.) p. 509, a. 26-p. 510, a. 13.]

The drift of the Sokratic procedure was to bring men into the habit
of defining those universal terms which they had hitherto used
undefined, the definitions being verified by induction of particulars
as the ultimate authority. It was a procedure built upon common
speech, but improving on common speech; the talk of every man being
in propositions, each including a subject and predicate, but neither
subject nor predicate being ever defined. It was the mission of
Sokrates to make men painfully sensible of that deficiency, as well
as to enforce upon them the inductive evidence by which alone it
could be rectified. Now the Analytic and Dialectic of Aristotle grew
directly out of this Sokratic procedure, and out of the Platonic
dialogues in so far as they enforced and illustrated it. When
Sokrates had supplied the negative stimulus and indication of what
was amiss, together with the appeal to Induction as final authority,
Aristotle furnished, or did much to furnish, the positive analysis
and complementary precepts, necessary to clear up, justify, and
assure the march of reasoned truth.[63] What Aristotle calls the
syllogistic _principia_, or the principles of syllogistic
demonstration, are nothing else than the steps towards reasoned
truth, and the precautions against those fallacious appearances that
simulate it. The steps are stated in their most general terms, as
involving both Deduction and Induction; though in Aristotle we find
the deductive portion copiously unfolded and classified, while
Induction, though recognized as the only verifying foundation of the
whole, is left without expansion or illustration.

[Footnote 63: Though the theorizing and the analysis of Aristotle
presuppose and recognize the Sokratic procedure, yet, if we read the
Xenophontic Memorabilia, IV. vii., and compare therewith the first
two chapters of Aristotle's Metaphysica, in which he describes and
extols _Philosophia Prima_, we shall see how radically antipathetic
were the two points of view: Sokrates confining himself to practical
results--[Greek: me/chri tou= ô)phelimou=]; Aristotle extolling
_Philosophia Prima_, because it soars above practical results, and
serves as its own reward, elevating the philosopher to a partial
communion with the contemplative self-sufficiency of the Gods. Indeed
the remark of Aristotle, p. 983, a. 1-6, denying altogether the
jealousy ascribed to the Gods, &c., is almost a reply to the opinion
expressed by Sokrates, that a man by such overweening researches
brought upon himself the displeasure of the Gods, as prying into
their secrets (Xen. Mem. IV. vii. 6; I. i. 12).]

If we go through the Sokratic conversations as reported in the
Memorabilia of Xenophon, we shall find illustration of what has been
just stated: we shall see Sokrates recognizing and following the
common speech of men, in propositions combining subject and
predicate; but trying to fix the meaning of both these terms, and to
test the consistency of the universal predications by appeal to
particulars. The syllogizing and the inductive processes are
exhibited both of them in actual work on particular points of
discussion. Now on these processes Aristotle brings his analysis to
bear, eliciting and enunciating in general terms their _principia_
and their conditions. We have seen that he expressly declares the
analysis of these _principia_ to belong to First Philosophy.[64] And
thus it is that First Philosophy as conceived by Aristotle,
acknowledges among its _fundamenta_ the habits of common Hellenic
speech; subject only to correction and control by the Sokratic
cross-examining and testing discipline. He stands distinguished among
the philosophers for the respectful attention with which he collects
and builds upon the beliefs actually prevalent among mankind.[65]
Herein as well as in other respects his First Philosophy not only
differed from that of all the pre-Sokratic philosophers (such as
Herakleitus, Parmenides, Anaxagoras, &c.) by explaining the
_principia_ of Analytic and Dialectic as well as those of Physics and
Physiology, but it also differed from that of the post-Sokratic and
semi-Sokratic Plato, by keeping up a closer communion both with
Sokrates and with common speech. Though Plato in his Dialogues of
Search appears to apply the inductive discipline of Sokrates, and to
handle the Universal as referable to and dependent upon its
particulars; yet the Platonic _Philosophia Prima_ proceeds upon a
view totally different. It is a fusion of Parmenides with
Herakleitus;[66] divorcing the Universal altogether from its
particulars; treating the Universal as an independent reality and as
the only permanent reality; negating the particulars as so many
unreal, evanescent, ever-changing copies or shadows thereof.
Aristotle expressly intimates his dissent from the divorce or
separation thus introduced by Plato. He proclaims his adherence to
the practice of Sokrates, which kept the two elements together, and
which cognized particulars as the ultimate reality and test for the
Universal.[67] Upon this doctrine his First Philosophy is built:
being distinguished hereby from all the other varieties broached by
either his predecessors or contemporaries.

[Footnote 64: Aristot. Metaph. [Greek: G]. iii. p. 1005, a. 19-b.
11.]

[Footnote 65: See Aristot. De Divinat. per Somnum, i. p. 462, b. 15;
De Coelo, I. iii. p. 270, b. 3, 20; Metaphys. A. ii. p. 982, a. 4-14.
Alexander ap. Scholia, p. 525, b. 36, Br.: [Greek: e)n pa=sin e)/thos
a)ei\ tai=s koinai=s kai\ phusikai=s tô=n a)nthrô/pôn prolê/psesin
a)rchai=s ei)s ta\ deiknu/mena pro\s au)tou= chrê=sthai.]]

[Footnote 66: Aristot. Metaph. A. vi. p. 987, a. 32; M. iv. p. 1078,
b. 12. That Plato's _Philosophia Prima_ involved a partial
coincidence with that of Herakleitus is here distinctly announced by
Aristotle: that it also included an intimate conjunction or fusion of
Parmenides with Herakleitus is made out in the ingenious Dissertation
of Herbart, De Platonici Systematis Fundamento, Göttingen (1805),
which winds up with the following epigrammatic sentence as result (p.
50):--"Divide Heracliti [Greek: ge/nesin ou)si/a|] Parmenidis, et
habebis Ideas Platonicas." Compare Plato, Republic VII. p. 515, seq.]

[Footnote 67: Aristot. Metaph. M. iv. p. 1078, b. 17, seq.; ix. p.
1086, a. 37: [Greek: ta\ me\n ou)=n e)n toi=s ai)sthêtoi=s kath'
e(/kasta r(ei=n e)no/mizon] (Platonici) [Greek: kai\ me/nein ou)the\n
au)tô=n, to\ de\ katho/lou para\ tau=ta ei)=nai/ te kai\ e(/tero/n
ti ei)=nai. tou=to d', ô(/sper e)n toi=s e)/mprosthen e)le/gomen,
e)ki/nêse me\n Sôkra/tês dia\ tou\s o(rismou/s, ou) mê\n e)chô/rise/
ge tô=n kath' e(/kaston. kai\ tou=to o)rthô=s e)no/êsen ou)
chôri/sas.]]

The Maxim of Contradiction, which Aristotle proclaims as the first
and firmest _principium_ of syllogizing, may be found perpetually
applied to particular cases throughout the Memorabilia of Xenophon
and the Sokratic dialogues of Plato. Indeed the Elenchus for which
Sokrates was so distinguished, is nothing more than an ever-renewed
and ingenious application of it; illustrating the painful and
humiliating effect produced even upon common minds by the shock of a
plain contradiction, when a respondent, having at first confidently
laid down some universal affirmative, finds himself unexpectedly
compelled to admit, in some particular case, the contradictory
negative. As against a Herakleitean, who saw no difficulty in
believing both sides of the contradiction to be true at once, the
Sokratic Elenchus would have been powerless. What Aristotle did was,
to abstract and elicit the general rules of the process; to classify
propositions according to their logical value, in such manner that he
could formulate clearly the structure of the two propositions between
which an exact contradictory antitheses subsisted. The important
logical distinctions between propositions _contradictory_ and
propositions _contrary_, was first clearly enunciated by Aristotle;
and, until this had been done, the Maxim of Contradiction could not
have been laid down in a defensible manner. Indeed we may remark
that, while this Maxim is first promulgated as a formula of First
Philosophy in Book [Greek: G]. of the Metaphysica, it had already
been tacitly assumed and applied by Aristotle throughout the De
Interpretatione, Analytica, and Topica, as if it were obvious and
uncontested. The First Philosophy of Aristotle was adapted to the
conditions of ordinary colloquy as amended and tested by Sokrates,
furnishing the theoretical basis of his practical Logic.

But, as Aristotle tells us, there were several philosophers and
dialecticians who did not recognize the Maxim; maintaining that the
same proposition might be at once true and false--that it was
possible for the same thing both to be and not to be. How is he to
deal with these opponents? He admits that he cannot demonstrate the
Maxim against them, and that any attempt to do this would involve
_Petitio Principii_. But he contends for the possibility of
demonstrating it in a peculiar way--_refutatively_ or _indirectly_;
that is, provided that the opponents can be induced to grant (not
indeed the truth of any proposition, to the exclusion of its
contradictory antithesis, which concession he admits would involve
_Petitio Principii_, but) the fixed and uniform signification of
terms and propositions. Aristotle contends that the opponents ought
to grant thus much, under penalty of being excluded from discussion
as incapables or mere plants.[68] I do not imagine that the opponents
themselves would have felt obliged to grant as much as he here
demands. The _onus probandi_ lay upon him, as advancing a positive
theory; and he would have found his indirect or refutative
demonstration not more available in convincing them than a direct or
ordinary demonstration. Against respondents who proclaim as their
thesis the negative of the Maxim of Contradiction, refutation and
demonstration are equally impossible. No dialectical discussion could
ever lead to any result; for you can never prove more against them
than what their own thesis unequivocally avows.[69] As against
Herakleitus and Anaxagoras, I do not think that Aristotle's qualified
vindication of the Maxim has any effective bearing.

[Footnote 68: Aristot. Metaph. [Greek: G]. iv. p. 1006, a. 11, seq.]

[Footnote 69: Ibid. a. 26: [Greek: a)nairô=n ga\r lo/gon u(pome/nei
lo/gon.]--p. 1008, a. 30.]

But Aristotle is quite right in saying that neither dialectical
debate nor demonstration can be carried on unless terms and
propositions be defined, and unless to each term there be assigned
one special signification, or a limited number of special
significations--excluding a certain number of others. This demand for
definitions, and also the multiplied use of inductive interrogations,
keeping the Universal implicated with and dependent upon its
particulars--are the innovations which Aristotle expressly places to
the credit of Sokrates. The Sokratic Elenchus operated by first
obtaining from the respondent a definition, and then testing it
through a variety of particulars: when the test brought out a
negative as against the pre-asserted affirmative, the contradiction
between the two was felt as an intellectual shock by the respondent,
rendering it impossible to believe both at once; and the unrivalled
acuteness of Sokrates was exhibited in rendering such shock
peculiarly pungent and humiliating. But the Sokratic Elenchus
presupposes this psychological fact, common to most minds, ordinary
as well as superior,--the intellectual shock felt when incompatible
beliefs are presented to the mind at once. If the collocutors of
Sokrates had not been so constituted by nature, the magic of his
colloquy would have been unfelt and inoperative. Against a
Herakleitean, who professed to feel no difficulty in believing both
sides of a contradiction at once, he could have effected nothing: and
if not he, still less any other dialectician. Proof and disproof, as
distinguished one from the other, would have had no meaning;
dialectical debate would have led to no result.

Thus, then, although Aristotle was the first to enunciate the Maxim
of Contradiction in general terms, after having previously originated
that logical distinction of contrary and contradictory Propositions
and doctrine of legitimate _Antiphasis_ which rendered such
enunciation possible,--yet, when he tries to uphold it against
dissentients, it cannot be said that he has correctly estimated the
logical position of those whom he was opposing, or the real extent to
which the defence of the Maxim can be carried without incurring the
charge of _Petitio Principii_. As against Protagoras, no defence was
needed, for the Protagorean "_Homo Mensura_" is not incompatible with
the Maxim of Contradiction; while, as against Herakleitus,
Anaxagoras, Parmenides, &c., no defence was practicable, and the
attempt of Aristotle to construct one appears to me a failure. All
that can be really done in the way of defence is, to prove the Maxim
in its general enunciation by an appeal to particular cases: if your
opponent is willing to grant these particular cases, you establish
the general Maxim against him by way of Induction; if he will not
grant them, you cannot prove the general Maxim at all. Suppose you
are attempting to prove to an Herakleitean that an universal
affirmative and its contradictory particular negative cannot be both
true at once. You begin by asking him about particular cases, Whether
it is possible that the two propositions--All men are mortal, and,
Some men are not mortal--can both be true at once? If he admits that
these two propositions cannot both be true at once, if he admits the
like with regard to other similar pairs of contradictories, and if he
can suggest no similar pair in which both propositions are true at
once, then you may consider yourself as having furnished a sufficient
inductive proof, and you may call upon him to admit the Maxim of
Contradiction in its general enunciation. But, if he will not admit
it in the particular cases which you tender, or if, while admitting
it in these, he himself can tender other cases in which he considers
it inadmissible, then you have effected nothing sufficient to
establish the general Maxim against him. The case is not susceptible
of any other or better proof. It is in vain that Aristotle tries to
diversify the absurdity, and to follow it out into collateral absurd
consequences. If the Herakleitean does not feel any repulsive shock
of contradiction in a definite particular case, if he directly
announces that he believes the two propositions to be both at once
true, then the collateral inconsistencies and derivative absurdities,
which Aristotle multiplies against him, will not shock him more than
the direct contradiction in its naked form. Neither the general
reasoning of Aristotle, nor the Elenchus of Sokrates brought to bear
in particular cases, would make any impression upon him; since he
will not comply with either of the two conditions required for the
Sokratic Elenchus: he will neither declare definitions, nor give
suitable point and sequence to inductive interrogatories.

Nor is anything gained, as Aristotle supposes, by reminding the
Herakleitean of his own practice in the daily concerns of life and in
conversation with common persons: that he feeds himself with bread
to-day, in the confidence that it has the same properties as it had
yesterday;[70] that, if he wishes either to give or to obtain
information, the speech which he utters or that which he acts upon
must be either affirmative or negative. He will admit that he acts in
this way, but he will tell you that he has no certainty of being
right; that the negative may be true as well as the affirmative. He
will grant that there is an inconsistency between such acts of detail
and the principles of the Herakleitean doctrine, which recognize no
real stability of any thing, but only perpetual flux or process; but
inconsistency in detail will not induce him to set aside his
principles. The truth is, that neither Herakleitus, nor Parmenides,
nor Anaxagoras, nor Pythagoras, gave themselves much trouble to
reconcile Philosophy with facts of detail. Each fastened upon some
grand and impressive primary hypothesis, illustrated it by a few
obvious facts in harmony therewith, and disregarded altogether the
mass of contradictory facts. That a favourite hypothesis should
contradict physical details, was noway shocking to them. Both the
painful feeling accompanying that shock, and the disposition to test
the value of the hypothesis by its consistency with inductive
details, became first developed and attended to in the dialectical
age, mainly through the working of Sokrates. The Analytic and the
First Philosophy of Aristotle were constructed after the time of
Sokrates, and with regard, in a very great degree, to the Sokratic
tests and conditions--to the indispensable necessity for definite
subjects and predicates, capable of standing the inductive scrutiny
of particulars. In this respect the _Philosophia Prima_ of Aristotle
stands distinguished from that of any of the earlier philosophers,
and even from that of Plato. He departed from Plato by recognizing
the _Hoc Aliquid_ or the definite Individual, with its essential
Predicates, as the foundation of the Universal, and by applying his
analytical factors of Form and Matter to the intellectual generation
of the Individual ([Greek: to\ su/nolon--to\ sunampho/teron]); and
thus he devised a First Philosophy conformable to the habits of
common speech as rectified by the critical scrutiny of Sokrates. We
shall see this in the next Chapter. * * * *

[Footnote 70: Aristot. Metaph. K. vi. p. 1063, a. 31.]

[The Author's MS. breaks off here. What follows on the next page, as
Chapter XII, is the exposition of Aristotle's Psychology, originally
contributed to the third edition of Professor Bain's work 'The Senses
and the Intellect,' in 1868.]




CHAPTER XII.

DE ANIMÂ, ETC.


To understand Aristotle's Psychology, we must look at it in
comparison with the views of other ancient Greek philosophers on the
same subject, as far as our knowledge will permit. Of these ancient
philosophers, none have been preserved to us except Plato, and to a
certain extent Epikurus, reckoning the poem of Lucretius as a
complement to the epistolary remnants of Epikurus himself. The
predecessors of Aristotle (apart from Plato) are known only through
small fragments from themselves, and imperfect notices by others;
among which notices the best are from Aristotle himself.

In the Timæus of Plato we find Psychology, in a very large and
comprehensive sense, identified with Kosmology. The Kosmos, a scheme
of rotatory spheres, has both a soul and a body: of the two, the soul
is the prior, grander, and predominant, though both of them are
constructed or put together by the Divine Architect or Demiurgus. The
kosmical soul, rooted at the centre, and stretched from thence
through and around the whole, is endued with self-movement, and with
the power of initiating movement in the kosmical body; moreover,
being cognitive as well as motive, it includes in itself three
ingredients mixed together:--(1) The Same--the indivisible and
unchangeable essence of Ideas; (2) The Diverse--the Plural--the
divisible bodies or elements; (3) A Compound, formed of both these
ingredients melted into one. As the kosmical soul is intended to know
all the three--_Idem_, _Diversum_, and _Idem_ with _Diversum_ in one,
so it must comprise in its own nature all the three ingredients,
according to the received Axiom--Like knows like--Like is known by
Like. The ingredients are blended together according to a scale of
harmonic proportion. The element _Idem_ is placed in an even and
undivided rotation of the outer or sidereal sphere of the Kosmos; the
element _Diversum_ is distributed among the rotations, all oblique,
of the seven interior planetary spheres, that is, the five planets,
with the Sun and Moon. Impressions of identity and diversity, derived
either from the ideal and indivisible, or from the sensible and
divisible, are thus circulated by the kosmical soul throughout its
own entire range, yet without either voice or sound. Reason and
Science are propagated by the circle of _Idem_: Sense and Opinion, by
those of _Diversum_. When these last-mentioned circles are in right
movement, the opinions circulated are true and trustworthy.[1]

[Footnote 1: See this doctrine of the Timæus more fully expounded in
'Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates,' III. xxxvi.
pp. 250-256, seq.]

It is thus that Plato begins his Psychology with Kosmology: the
Kosmos is in his view a divine immortal being or animal, composed of
a spherical rotatory body and a rational soul, cognitive as well as
motive. Among the tenants of this Kosmos are included, not only gods,
who dwell in the peripheral or celestial regions, but also men,
birds, quadrupeds, and fishes. These four inhabit the more central or
lower regions of air, earth, and water. In describing men and the
inferior animals, Plato takes his departure from the divine Kosmos,
and proceeds downwards by successive stages of increasing degeneracy
and corruption. The cranium of man was constructed as a little
Kosmos, including in itself an immortal rational soul, composed of
the same materials, though diluted and adulterated, as the kosmical
soul; and moving with the like rotations, though disturbed and
irregular, suited to a rational soul. This cranium, for wise purposes
which Plato indicates, was elevated by the gods upon a tall body,
with attached limbs for motion in different directions--forward,
backward, upward, downward, to the right and left.[2] Within this
body were included two inferior and mortal souls: one in the thoracic
region near the heart, the other lower down, below the diaphragm, in
the abdominal region; but both of them fastened or rooted in the
spinal marrow or cord, which formed a continuous line with the brain
above. These two souls were both emotional; the higher or _thoracic_
soul being the seat of courage, energy, anger, &c., while to the
lower or _abdominal_ soul belonged appetite, desires, love of gain,
&c. Both of them were intended as companions and adjuncts, yet in the
relation of dependence and obedience, to the _rational_ soul in the
cranium above; which, though unavoidably debased and perturbed by
such unworthy companionship, was protected partially against the
contagion by the difference of location, the neck being built up as
an isthmus of separation between the two. The thoracic soul, the seat
of courage, was placed nearer to the head, in order that it might be
the medium for transmitting influence from the cranial soul above, to
the abdominal soul below; which last was at once the least worthy and
the most difficult to control. The heart, being the initial point of
the veins, received the orders and inspirations of the cranial soul,
transmitting them onward through its many blood-channels to all the
sensitive parts of the body; which were thus rendered obedient, as
far as possible, to the authority of man's rational nature.[3] The
unity or communication of the three souls was kept up through the
continuity of the cerebro-spinal column.

[Footnote 2: Plato, Timæus, p. 44, E.; 'Plato and Other Comp. of
Sokr.', III. xxxvi. p. 264.]

[Footnote 3: Plato, Timæus, p. 70; 'Plato and Other Comp. of Sokr.',
III. pp. 271-272.]

But, though by these arrangements the higher soul in the cranium was
enabled to control to a certain extent its inferior allies, it was
itself much disturbed and contaminated by their reaction. The
violence of passion and appetite, the constant processes of nutrition
and sensation pervading the whole body, the multifarious movements of
the limbs and trunk, in all varieties of direction,--these causes all
contributed to agitate and to confuse the rotations of the cranial
soul, perverting the arithmetical proportions and harmony belonging
to them. The circles of Same and Diverse were made to convey false
information; and the soul, for some time after its first junction
with the body, became destitute of intelligence.[4] In mature life,
indeed, the violence of the disturbing causes abates, and the man may
become more and more intelligent, especially if placed under
appropriate training and education. But in many cases no such
improvement took place, and the rational soul of man was
irrecoverably spoiled; so that new and worse breeds were formed, by
successive steps of degeneracy. The first stage, and the least amount
of degeneracy, was exhibited in the formation of woman; the original
type of man not having included diversity of sex. By farther steps of
degradation, in different ways, the inferior animals were
formed--birds, quadrupeds, and fishes.[5] In each of these, the
rational soul became weaker and worse; its circular rotations ceased
with the disappearance of the spherical cranium, and animal appetites
with sensational agitations were left without control. As man, with
his two emotional souls and body joined on to the rational soul and
cranium, was a debased copy of the perfect rational soul and
**spherical body of the divine Kosmos, so the other inhabitants of
the Kosmos proceeded from still farther debasement and
disrationalization of the original type of man.

[Footnote 4: Plato, Timæus, pp. 43-44; 'Plato and Other Comp. of
Sokr.', III. pp. 262-264.]

[Footnote 5: Plato, Timæus, p. 91; 'Plato and Other Comp. of Sokr.',
pp. 281-282.]

Such is the view of Psychology given by Plato in the Timæus;
beginning with the divine Kosmos, and passing downwards from thence
to the triple soul of man, as well as to the various still lower
successors of degenerated man. It is to be remarked that Plato,
though he puts soul as prior to body in dignity and power, and as
having for its functions to control and move body, yet always
conceives soul as attached to body, and never as altogether detached,
not even in the divine Kosmos. The soul, in Plato's view, is
self-moving and self-moved: it is both _Primum Mobile_ in itself,
and _Primum Movens_ as to the body; it has itself the corporeal
properties of being extended and moved, and it has body implicated
with it besides.

The theory above described, in so far as it attributes to the soul
rational constituent elements (_Idem_, _Diversum_), continuous
magnitude, and circular rotations, was peculiar to Plato, and is
criticized by Aristotle as the peculiarity of his master.[6] But
several other philosophers agreed with Plato in considering
self-motion, together with motive causality and faculties perceptive
and cognitive, to be essential characteristics of soul. Alkmæon
declared the soul to be in perpetual motion, like all the celestial
bodies; hence it was also immortal, as they were.[7] Herakleitus
described it as the subtlest of elements, and as perpetually fluent;
hence it was enabled to know other things, all of which were in flux
and change. Diogenes of Apollonia affirmed that the element
constituent of soul was air, at once mobile, all-penetrating, and
intelligent. Demokritus declared that among the infinite diversity of
atoms those of spherical figure were the constituents both of the
element fire and of the soul: the spherical atoms were by reason of
their figure the most apt and rapid in moving; it was their nature
never to be at rest, and they imparted motion to everything else.[8]
Anaxagoras affirmed soul to be radically and essentially distinct from
every thing else, but to be the great primary source of motion, and to
be endued with cognitive power, though at the same time not suffering
impressions from without.[9] Empedokles considered soul to be a
compound of the four elements--fire, water, air, earth; with love and
hatred as principles of motion, the former producing aggregation of
elements, the latter, disgregation: by means of each element the soul
became cognizant of the like element in the Kosmos. Some Pythagoreans
looked upon the soul as an aggregate of particles of extreme
subtlety, which pervaded the air and were in perpetual agitation.
Other Pythagoreans, however, declared it to be an harmonious or
proportional mixture of contrary elements and qualities; hence its
universality of cognition, extending to all.[10]

[Footnote 6: Aristot. De Animâ, I. iii. p. 407, a. 2.]

[Footnote 7: Ibid. ii. p. 405, a. 29.]

[Footnote 8: Ibid. p. 404, a. 8; p. 405, a. 22; p. 406, b. 17.]

[Footnote 9: Ibid. p. 405, a. 13, b. 19.]

[Footnote 10: Aristot. De Animâ, I. ii. p. 404, a. 16; p. 407, b.
27.]

A peculiar theory was delivered by Xenokrates (who, having been
fellow-pupil with Aristotle under Plato, afterwards conducted the
Platonic School, during all the time that Aristotle taught at the
Lykeium), which Aristotle declares to involve greater difficulty than
any of the others. Xenokrates described the soul as "a number (a
monad or indivisible unit) moving itself."[11] He retained the
self-moving property which Plato had declared to be characteristic of
the soul, while he departed from Plato's doctrine of a soul with
continuous extension. He thus fell back upon the Pythagorean idea of
number as the fundamental essence. Aristotle impugns, as alike
untenable, both the two properties here alleged--number and
self-motion. If the monad both moves and is moved (he argues), it
cannot be indivisible; if it be moved, it must have position, or must
be a point; but the motion of a point is a line, without any of that
variety that constitutes life. How can the soul be a monad? or, if it
be, what difference can exist between one soul and another, since
monads cannot differ from each other except in position? How comes it
that some bodies have souls and others not? and how, upon this
theory, can we explain the fact that many animated bodies, both
plants and animals, will remain alive after being divided, the
monadic soul thus exhibiting itself as many and diverse? Besides, the
monad set up by Xenokrates is hardly distinguishable from the highly
attenuated body or spherical atom recognized by Demokritus as the
origin or beginning of bodily motion.[12]

[Footnote 11: Ibid. iv. p. 408, b. 32.]

[Footnote 12: Ibid. p. 409, b. 12.]

These and other arguments are employed by Aristotle to refute the
theory of Xenokrates. In fact, he rejects all the theories then
current. After having dismissed the self-motor doctrine, he proceeds
to impugn the views of those who declared the soul to be a compound
of all the four elements, in order that they might account for its
percipient and cognitive faculties upon the maxim then very generally
admitted[13]--That like is perceived and known by like. This theory,
the principal champion of which was Empedokles, appears to Aristotle
inadmissible. You say (he remarks) that like knows like; how does
this consist with your other doctrine, that like cannot act upon, or
suffer from, like, especially as you consider that both in perception
and in cognition the percipient and cognizant suffers or is acted
upon?[14] Various parts of the cognizant subject, such as bone, hair,
ligaments, &c., are destitute of perception and cognition; how then
can we know anything about bone, hair, and ligaments, since we cannot
know them by like?[15] Suppose the soul to be compounded of all the
four elements; this may explain how it comes to know the four
elements, themselves, but not how it comes to know all the
combinations of the four; now innumerable combinations of the four
are comprised among the _cognita_. We must assume that the soul
contains in itself not merely the four elements, but also the laws or
definite proportions wherein they can combine; and this is affirmed
by no one.[16] Moreover, _Ens_ is an equivocal, or at least a
multivocal, term; there are _Entia_ belonging to each of the ten
Categories. Now the soul cannot include in itself all the ten, for
the different Categories have no elements in common; in whichever
Category you rank the soul, it will know (by virtue of likeness) the
_cognita_ belonging to that category, but it will not know the
_cognita_ belonging to the other nine.[17] Besides, even if we grant
that the soul includes all the four elements, where is the cementing
principle that combines all the four into one? The elements are
merely matter; and what holds them together must be the really potent
principle of soul; but of this no explanation is given.[18]

[Footnote 13: Ibid. v. p. 409, b. 29.]

[Footnote 14: Aristot. De Animâ, I. v. p. 410, a. 25.]

[Footnote 15: Ibid. a. 30.]

[Footnote 16: Ibid. p. 409, b. 28; p. 410, a. 12.]

[Footnote 17: Ibid. p. 410, a. 20.]

[Footnote 18: Ibid. p. 410, b. 10.]

Some philosophers have assumed (continues Aristotle) that soul
pervades the whole Kosmos and its elements; and that it is inhaled by
animals in respiration along with the air.[19] They forget that all
plants, and even some animals, live without respiring at all;
moreover, upon this theory, air and fire also, as possessing soul,
and what is said to be a better soul, ought (if the phrase were
permitted) to be regarded as animals. The soul of air or fire must be
homogeneous in its parts; the souls of animals are not homogeneous,
but involve several distinct parts or functions.[20] The soul
perceives, cogitates, opines, feels, desires, repudiates; farther, it
moves the body locally, and brings about the growth and decay of the
body. Here we have a new mystery:[21]--Is the whole soul engaged in
the performance of each of these functions, or has it a separate part
exclusively consecrated to each? If so, how many are the parts? Some
philosophers (Plato among them) declare the soul to be divided, and
that one part cogitates and cognizes, while another part desires. But
upon that supposition what is it that holds these different parts
together? Certainly not the body (which is Plato's theory); on the
contrary, it is the soul that holds together the body; for, as soon
as the soul is gone, the body rots and disappears.[22] If there be
anything that keeps together the divers parts of the soul as one,
that something must be the true and fundamental soul; and we ought
not to speak of the soul as having parts, but as essentially one and
indivisible, with several distinct faculties. Again, if we are to
admit parts of the soul, does each part hold together a special part
of the body, as the entire soul holds together the entire body? This
seems impossible; for what part of the body can the Noûs or Intellect
(_e.g._) be imagined to hold together? And, besides, several kinds of
plants and of animals may be divided, yet so that each of the
separate parts shall still continue to live; hence it is plain that
the soul in each separate part is complete and homogeneous.[23]

[Footnote 19: Ibid. ii. p. 404, a. 9: [Greek: tou= zê=n o(/ron
ei)=nai tê\n a)napnoê/n], &c. Compare the doctrine of Demokritus.]

[Footnote 20: Ibid. v. p. 411, a. 1, 8, 16.]

[Footnote 21: Ibid. a. 30.]

[Footnote 22: Aristot. De Animâ, I. v. p. 411, b. 8.]

[Footnote 23: Ibid. b. 15-27.]

Aristotle thus rejects all the theories proposed by antecedent
philosophers, but more especially the two following:--That the soul
derives its cognitive powers from the fact of being compounded of the
four elements; That the soul is self-moved. He pronounces it
incorrect to say that the soul is moved at all.[24] He farther
observes that none of the philosophers have kept in view either the
full meaning or all the varieties of soul; and that none of these
defective theories suffices for the purpose that every good and
sufficient theory ought to serve, viz., not merely to define the
essence of the soul, but also to define it in such a manner that the
concomitant functions and affections of the soul shall all be
deducible from it.[25] Lastly, he points out that most of his
predecessors had considered that the prominent characteristics of
soul were--to be motive and to be percipient:[26] while, in his
opinion, neither of these two characteristics is universal or
fundamental.

[Footnote 24: Ibid. a. 25.]

[Footnote 25: Ibid. i. p. 402, b. 16, seq.; v. p. 409, b. 15.]

[Footnote 26: Ibid. ii. p. 403, b. 30.]

Aristotle requires that a good theory of the soul shall explain alike
the lowest vegetable soul, and the highest functions of the human or
divine soul. And, in commenting on those theorists who declared that
the essence of soul consisted in movement, he remarks that their
theory fails altogether in regard to the Noûs (or cogitative and
intellective faculty of the human soul); the operation of which bears
far greater analogy to rest or suspension of movement than to
movement itself.[27]

[Footnote 27: Aristot. De Animâ, I. iii. p. 407, a. 32: [Greek: e)/ti
d' ê( no/êsis e)/oiken ê)remê/sei tini\ ê)\ e)pista/sei ma=llon ê)\
kinê/sei.]]

We shall now proceed to state how Aristotle steers clear (or at least
believes himself to steer clear) of the defects that he has pointed
out in the psychological theories of his predecessors. Instead of
going back (like Empedokles, Plato, and others) to a time when the
Kosmos did not yet exist, and giving us an hypothesis to explain how
its parts came together or were put together, he takes the facts and
objects of the Kosmos as they stand, and distributes them according
to distinctive marks alike obvious, fundamental, and pervading; after
which he seeks a mode of explanation in the principles of his own
First Philosophy or Ontology. Whoever had studied the Organon and the
Physica of Aristotle (apparently intended to be read prior to the
treatise De Animâ) would be familiar with his distribution of _Entia_
into ten Categories, of which Essence or Substance was the first and
the fundamental. Of these Essences or Substances the **most
complete and recognized were physical or natural bodies; and among
such bodies one of the most striking distinctions, was between those
that had life and those that had it not. By life, Aristotle means
keeping up the processes of nutrition, growth, and decay.[28]

[Footnote 28: Ibid. II i. p. 412, a. 11: [Greek: ou)si/ai de\
ma/list' ei)=nai dokou=si ta\ sô/mata, kai\ tou/tôn ta\ phusika/;
tô=n de\ phusikô=n ta\ me\n e)/chei zôê/n, ta\ d' ou)k e)/chei; zôê\n
de\ le/gô, tê\n di' au)tou= trophê\n kai\ au)/xêsin kai\ phthi/sin.]]

"To live" (Aristotle observes) is a term used in several different
meanings; whatever possesses any one of the following four properties
is said to live:[29] (1) Intellect, (2) Sensible perception, (3)
Local movement and rest, (4) Internal movement of nutrition, growth,
and decay. But of these four the last is the only one common to all
living bodies without exception; it is the foundation presupposed by
the other three. It is the only one possessed by plants,[30] and
common to all plants as well as to all animals--to all animated
bodies.

[Footnote 29: Ibid. ii. p. 413, a. 22: [Greek: pleonachô=s de\ tou=
zê=n legome/nou, ka)\n e(/n ti tou/tôn e)nupa/rchê| mo/non, zê=n
au)to/ phamen], &c.]

[Footnote 30: Ibid. I. v. p. 411, b. 27, ad fin.]

What is the animating principle belonging to each of these bodies,
and what is the most general definition of it? Such is the problem
that Aristotle states to himself about the soul.[31] He explains it
by a metaphysical distinction first introduced (apparently) by
himself into _Philosophia Prima_. He considers Substance or Essence
as an ideal compound; not simply as clothed with all the accidents
described in the nine last Categories, but also as being analysable
in itself, even apart from these accidents, into two abstract,
logical, or notional elements or _principia_--Form and Matter. This
distinction is borrowed from the most familiar facts of the sensible
world--the shape of solid objects. When we see or feel a cube of wax,
we distinguish the cubic shape from the waxen material;[32] we may
find the like shape in many other materials--wood, stone, &c.; we may
find the like material in many different shapes--sphere, pyramid,
&c.; but the matter has always some shape, and the shape has always
some matter. We can name and reason about the matter, without
attending to the shape, or distinguishing whether it be cube or
sphere; we can name and reason about the shape, without attending to
the material shaped, or to any of its various peculiarities. But
this, though highly useful, is a mere abstraction or notional
distinction. There can be no real separation between the two: no
shape without some solid material; no solid material without some
shape. The two are correlates; each of them implying the other, and
neither of them admitting of being realized or actualized without the
other.

[Footnote 31: Ibid. II. p. 413, b. 11: [Greek: ê( psuchê\ tô=n
ei)rême/nôn tou/tôn a)rchê/].--Ibid. I. p. 412, a. 5: [Greek: ti/s
a)\n ei)/ê koino/tatos lo/gos au)tê=s].]

[Footnote 32: Aristot. De Animâ, II. i. p. 412, b. 7: [Greek: to\n
kêro\n kai\ to\ schê=ma].]

This distinction of Form and Matter is one of the capital features of
Aristotle's _Philosophia Prima_. He expands it and diversifies it in
a thousand ways, often with subtleties very difficult to follow; but
the fundamental import of it is seldom lost--two correlates
inseparably implicated in fact and reality in every concrete
individual that has received a substantive name, yet logically
separable and capable of being named and considered apart from each
other. The Aristotelian analysis thus brings out, in regard to each
individual substance (or _Hoc Aliquid_, to use his phrase), a triple
point of view: (1) The Form; (2) The Matter; (3) The compound or
aggregate of the two--in other words, the inseparable _Ens_, which
carries us out of the domain of logic or abstraction into that of the
concrete or reality.[33]

[Footnote 33: Aristot. Metaphys. Z. iii. p. 1029, a. 1-34; De Animâ,
II. i. p. 412, a. 6; p. 414, a. 15.

In the first book of the Physica, Aristotle pushes this analysis yet
further, introducing three _principia_ instead of two:--(1) Form,
(2) Matter, (3) Privation (of Form); he gives a distinct general name
to the negation as well as to the affirmation; he provides a sign
_minus_ as counter-denomination to the sign _plus_. But he intimates
that this is only the same analysis more minutely discriminated, or
in a different point of view: [Greek: dio\ e)/sti me\n ô(s du/o
lekte/on ei)=nai ta\s a)rcha/s, e)/sti d' ô(s trei=s] (Phys. I. vii.
p. 190, b. 29).

_Materia Prima_ (Aristotle says, Phys. I. vii. p. 191, a. 8) is
"knowable only by analogy"--_i.e._, explicable only by illustrative
examples: as the brass is to the statue, as the wood is to the couch,
&c.; natural substances being explained from works of art, as is
frequent with Aristotle.]

Aristotle farther recognizes, between these two logical correlates, a
marked difference of rank. The Form stands first, the Matter
second,--not in time, but in notional presentation. The Form is higher,
grander, prior in dignity and esteem, more _Ens_, or more nearly
approaching to perfect entity; the Matter is lower, meaner, posterior
in dignity, farther removed from that perfection. The conception of
wax, plaster, wood, &c., without amy definite or determinate shape,
is confused and unimpressive; but a name, connoting some definite
shape, at once removes this confusion, and carries with it mental
pre-eminence, alike as to phantasy, memory, and science. In the
logical hierarchy of Aristotle, Matter is the inferior and Form the
superior;[34] yet neither of the two can escape from its relative
character: Form requires Matter for its correlate, and is nothing in
itself or apart,[35] just as much as Matter requires Form; though
from the inferior dignity of Matter we find it more frequently
described as the second or correlate, while Form is made to stand
forward as the _relatum_. For complete reality, we want the concrete
individual having the implication of both; while, in regard to each
of the constituents _per se_, no separate real existence can be
affirmed, but only a nominal or logical separation.

[Footnote 34: Aristot. De Gener. Animal. II. i. p. 729, a. 10. Matter
and Form are here compared to the female and the male--to mother and
father. Form is a cause operative, Matter a cause co-operative,
though both are alike indispensable to full reality. Compare Physic.
I. ix. p. 192, a. 13: [Greek: ê( me\n ga\r u(pome/nousa sunaiti/a
tê=| morphê=| tô=n ginome/nôn e)sti/n, ô(/sper mê/têr;--a)lla\ tou=t'
e)/stin ê( u(/lê, ô(/sper a)\n ei) thê=lu a)/r)r(enos kai\ ai)schro\n
kalou= (e)phi/eto).]--De Partibus Animalium, I. i. p. 640, b. 28:
[Greek: ê( ga\r kata\ tê\n morphê\n phu/sis kuriôte/ra tê=s u(likê=s
phu/seôs].

Metaphys. Z. iii. p. 1029, a. 5: [Greek: to\ ei)=dos tê=s u(/lês
pro/teron kai\ ma=llon o)/n]--p. 1039, a. 1.

See in Schwegler, pp. 13, 42, 83, Part II. of his Commentary on the
Aristotelian Metaphysica.]

[Footnote 35: Aristot. Metaph. Z. viii. p. 1033, b. 10, seq.]

This difference of rank between Matter and Form--that the first is
inferior and the last the superior--is sometimes so much put in the
foreground, that the two are conceived in a different manner and
under other names, as Potential and Actual. Matter is the potential,
imperfect, inchoate, which the supervening Form actualizes into the
perfect and complete; a transition from half-reality to entire
reality or act. The Potential is the undefined or
indeterminate[36]--what may be or may not be--what is not yet actual,
and may perhaps never become so, but is prepared to pass into
actuality when the energizing principle comes to aid. In this way of
putting the antithesis, the Potential is not so much implicated with
the Actual as merged and suppressed to make room for the Actual: it
is as a half-grown passing into a full-grown; being itself essential
as a preliminary stage in the order of logical generation.[37] The
three logical divisions--Matter, Form, and the resulting Compound or
Concrete ([Greek: to\ su/nolon, to\ suneilêmme/non]), are here
compressed into two--the Potential and the Actualization thereof.
Actuality ([Greek: e)ne/rgeia, e)ntele/cheia]) coincides in meaning
partly with the Form, partly with the resulting Compound; the Form
being so much exalted, that the distinction between the two is almost
effaced.[38]

[Footnote 36: Ibid. [Greek: Th]. viii. p. 1050, b. 10. He says, p.
1048, a. 35, that this distinction between Potential and Actual
cannot be defined, but can only be illustrated by particular
examples, several of which he proceeds to enumerate. Trendelenburg
observes (Note **ad Aristot. De Animâ, p. 307):--"[Greek: Du/namis]
contraria adhuc in se inclusa tenet, ut in utrumque abire possit:
[Greek: e)ne/rgeia] alterum excludit." Compare also ib. p. 302. This
_May or May not be_ is the widest and most general sense of the terms
[Greek: du/namis] and [Greek: dunato/n], common to all the analogical
or derivative applications that Aristotle points out as belonging to
them. It is more general than that which he gives as the [Greek:
ku/rios o(/ros tê=s prô/tês duna/meôs--a)rchê/ metablêtikê\ e)n
a)/llô| ê)\ ê(=| a)/llo], and ought seemingly to be itself considered
as the [Greek: ku/rios o(/ros]. Cf. Arist. Metaphys. [Greek: D]. xii.
p. 1020, a. 5, with the comment of Bonitz, who remarks upon the loose
language of Aristotle in this chapter but imputes to Aristotle a
greater amount of contradiction than he seems to deserve (Comm. ad
Metaphys. pp. 256, 393).]

[Footnote 37: _Ens potentiâ_ is a variety of _Ens_ (Arist. Metaph.
[Greek: D]. vii. p. 1017, b. 6), but an imperfect variety: it is
[Greek: o)\n a)tele/s], which may become matured into [Greek: o)\n
te/leion, o)\n e)ntelechei/a|] or [Greek: e)nergei/a|] (Metaphys.
[Greek: Th]. i. p. 1045, a. 34).

Matter is either remote or proximate, removed either by one stage or
several stages from the [Greek: su/nolon] in which it culminates.
Strictly speaking, none but proximate matter is said to exist [Greek:
duna/mei]. Alexander Schol. (ad Metaph. [Greek: Th]. p. 1049, a. 19)
p. 781, b. 39: [Greek: ê( po/r)r(ô u(/lê ou) le/getai duna/mei. ti/
dê/ pote? o(/ti ou) parônumia/zomen ta\ pra/gmata e)k tê=s po/r)r(ô
a)ll' e)k tê=s prosechou=s; le/gomen ga\r to\ kibô/tion xu/linon e)k
tê=s prosechou=s, a)ll' ou) gê/i+non e)k tê=s po/r)r(ô.]]

[Footnote 38: Aristot. Metaphys. [Greek: Ê]. i. p. 1042, a. 25, seq.
He scarcely makes any distinction here between [Greek: u(/lê] and
[Greek: du/namis], or between [Greek: morphê\] and [Greek:
e)ne/rgeia] (cf. [Greek: Th]. viii. p. 1050, a. 15).

Alexander in his Commentary on this book ([Greek: Th]. iii. p. 1047,
a. 30) p. 542, Bonitz's edit., remarks that [Greek: e)ne/rgeia] is
used by Aristotle in a double sense; sometimes meaning [Greek:
ki/nêsis pro\s to\ te/los], sometimes meaning the [Greek: te/los]
itself. Comp. [Greek: Ê]. iii. p. 1043, a. 32; also the commentary of
Bonitz, p. 393.]

Two things are to be remembered respecting Matter, in its
Aristotelian (logical or ontological) sense: (1) It may be Body, but
it is not necessarily Body;[39] (2) It is only intelligible as the
correlate of Form: it can neither exist by itself, nor can it be
known by itself (_i.e._, when taken out of that relativity). This
deserves notice, because to forget the relativity of a relative word,
and to reason upon it as if it were an absolute, is an oversight not
unfrequent. Furthermore, each variety of Matter has its appropriate
Form, and each variety of Form its appropriate Matter, with which it
correlates. There are various stages or gradations of Matter; from
_Materia Prima_, which has no Form at all, passing upwards through
successive partial developments to _Materia Ultima_; which last is
hardly[40] distinguishable from Form or from _Materia Formata_.

[Footnote 39: Aristot. Metaph. Z. xi. p. 1036, a. 8: [Greek: ê( d'
u(/lê a)/gnôstos kath' au(tê/n. u(/lê d' ê( me\n ai)sthêtê/, ê( de\
noêtê/; ai)sthêtê\ me\n oi(=on chalko\s kai\ xu/lon kai\ o(/sê
kinêtê\ u(/lê, noêtê\ de\ ê( e)n toi=s ai)sthêtoi=s u(pa/rchousa mê\
ê(=| ai)sthêta/, oi(=on ta\ mathêmatika/.]--p. 1035, a. 7.

Physica, III. vi. p. 207, a. 26; De Generat. et Corrupt. I. v. p.
320, b. 14-25.]

[Footnote 40: Aristot. De Animâ, II. ii. p. 414, a. 25: [Greek:
e(ka/stou ga\r ê( e)ntele/cheia e)n tô=| duna/mei u(pa/rchonti kai\
tê=| oi)kei/a| u(/lê pe/phuken e)ggi/nesthai.]--Physica, II. ii. p.
194, b. 8: [Greek: e)/ti tô=n pro/s ti ê( u(/lê; a)/llô| ga\r ei)/dei
a)/llê u(/lê.]--Metaph. [Greek: Ê]. vi. p. 1045, b. 17: [Greek:
e)/sti d', ô(/sper ei)/rêtai, kai\ ê( e)scha/tê u(/lê kai\ ê( morphê\
tau)to/ kai\ duna/mei, to\ de\ e)nergei/a|.] See upon this doctrine
Schwegler's Commentary, pp. 100, 154, 173, 240, Pt. 2nd. Compare also
Arist. De Gener. Animal. II. i. p. 735, a. 9; also De Coelo, IV. iii.
p. 310, b. 14.]

The distinction above specified is employed by Aristotle in his
exposition of the Soul. The soul belongs to the Category of Substance
or Essence (not to that of Quantity, Quality, &c.); but of the two
points of view under which Essence may be presented, the soul ranks
with Form, not with Matter--with the Actual, not with the Potential.
The Matter to which (as correlate) soul stands related, is a natural
body (_i.e._, a body having within it an inherent principle of motion
and rest) organized in a certain way, or fitted out with certain
capacities and preparations to which soul is the active and
indispensable complement. These capacities would never come into
actuality without the soul; but, on the other hand, the range of
actualities or functions in the soul depends upon, and is limited by,
the range of capacities ready prepared for it in the body. The
implication of the two constitutes the living subject, with all its
functions, active and passive. If the eye were an animated or living
subject, seeing would be its soul; if the carpenter's axe were
living, cutting would be its soul;[41] the matter would be the lens
or the iron in which this soul is embodied. It is not indispensable,
however, that all the functions of the living subject should be at
all times in complete exercise: the subject is still living, even
while asleep; the eye is still a good eye, though at the moment
closed. It is enough if the functional aptitude exist as a dormant
property, ready to rise into activity, when the proper occasions
present themselves. This minimum of Form suffices to give living
efficacy to the potentialities of body; it is enough that a man,
though now in a dark night and seeing nothing, will see as soon as
the sun rises; or that he knows geometry, though he is not now
thinking of a geometrical problem. This dormant possession is what
Aristotle calls the First Entelechy or Energy, _i.e._, the lowest
stage of Actuality, or the minimum of influence required to transform
Potentiality into Actuality. The Aristotelian definition of Soul is
thus: The first entelechy of a natural organized body, having life in
potentiality.[42] This is all that is essential to the soul; the
second or higher entelechy (actual exercise of the faculties) is not
a constant or universal property.[43]

[Footnote 41: Aristot. De Animâ, II. i. p. 412, b. 18: [Greek: ei)
ga\r ê)=n o( o)phthalmo\s zô|o/n, psuchê\ a)\n ê)=n au)tou= ê(
o)/psis; au(/tê ga\r ou)si/a o)phthalmou= ê( kata\ to\n lo/gon. o( d'
o)phthalmo\s u(/lê o)/pseôs, ê(=s a)poleipou/sês ou)ke/t'
o)phthalmo/s, plê\n o(mônu/môs, katha/per o( li/thinos kai\ o(
gegramme/nos.]]

[Footnote 42: Aristot. De Animâ, II. i. p. 412, a. 27: [Greek: dio\
psuchê/ e)stin e)ntele/cheia ê( prô/tê sô/matos phusikou= duna/mei
zôê\n e)/chontos; toiou=to de\ o(\ a)\n ê)=| o)rganiko/n.] Compare
Metaphysica, Z. x. p. 1035, b. 14-27.]

[Footnote 43: Aristot. De Animâ, II. ii. p. 414, a. 8-18. The
distinction here taken between the first or lower stage of Entelechy,
and the second or higher stage, coincides substantially with the
distinction in the Nikomachean Ethica and elsewhere between [Greek:
e(/xis] and [Greek: e)ne/rgeia]. See Topica, IV. v. p. 125, b. 15;
Ethic. Nikom. II. i.-v. p. 1103 seq.]

In this definition of Soul, Aristotle employs his own _Philosophia
Prima_ to escape the errors committed by prior philosophers. He does
not admit that the soul is a separate entity in itself; or that it is
composed (as Empedokles and Demokritus had said) of corporeal
elements, or (as Plato had said) of elements partly corporeal, partly
logical and notional. He rejects the imaginary virtues of number,
invoked by the Pythagoreans and Xenokrates; lastly, he keeps before
him not merely man, but all the varieties of animated objects, to
which his definition must be adapted. His first capital point is to
put aside the alleged identity, or similarity, or sameness of
elements, between soul and body; and to put aside equally any
separate existence or substantiality of soul. He effects both these
purposes by defining them as essentially _relatum_ and correlate; the
soul, as the _relatum_, is unintelligible and unmeaning without its
correlate, upon which accordingly its definition is declared to be
founded.

The real animated subject may be looked at either from the point of
view of the _relatum_ or from that of the correlate; but, though the
two are thus logically separable, in fact and reality they are
inseparably implicated; and, if either of them be withdrawn, the
animated subject disappears. "The soul (says Aristotle) is not any
variety of body, but it cannot be without a body; it is not a body,
but it is something belonging to or related to a body; and for this
reason it is in a body, and in a body of such or such
potentialities."[44] Soul is to body (we thus read), not as a
compound of like elements, nor as a type is to its copy, or _vice
versâ_, but as a _relatum_ to its correlate; dependent upon the body
for all its acts and manifestations, and bringing to consummation
what in the body exists as potentiality only. Soul, however, is
better than body; and the animated being is better than the inanimate
by reason of its soul.[45]

[Footnote 44: Aristot. De Animâ, II. ii. p. 414, a. 19: [Greek: kai\
dia\ tou=to kalô=s u(polamba/nousin oi(=s dokei= mêt' a)/neu sô/matos
ei)=nai mê/te sô/ma/ ti ê( psuchê/; sô=ma me\n ga\r _ou)k e)/sti,
sô/matos de/ ti_, kai\ dia\ tou=to e)n sô/mati u(pa/rchei, kai\ e)n
sô/mati toiou/tô|.] Compare Aristot. De Juventute et Senectute, i. p.
467, b. 14.]

[Footnote 45: Aristot. De Generat. Animal. II. i. p. 731, b. 29.]

The animated subject is thus a form immersed or implicated in matter;
and all its actions and passions are so likewise.[46] Each of these
has its formal side, as concerns the soul, and its material side, as
concerns the body. When a man or animal is angry, for example, this
emotion is both a fact of the soul and a fact of the body: in the
first of these two characters, it may be defined as an appetite for
hurting some one who has hurt us; in the second of the two, it may be
defined as an ebullition of the blood and heat round the heart.[47]
The emotion, belonging to the animated subject or aggregate of soul
and body, is a complex fact having two aspects, logically
distinguishable from each other, but each correlating and implying
the other. This is true not only in regard to our passions, emotions,
and appetites, but also in regard to our perceptions, phantasms,
reminiscences, reasonings, efforts of attention in learning, &c. We
do not say that the soul weaves or builds (Aristotle observes[48]):
we say that the animated subject, the aggregate of soul and body,
_the man_, weaves or builds. So we ought also to say, not that the
soul feels anger, pity, love, hatred, &c., or that the soul learns,
reasons, recollects, &c., but that the man with his soul does these
things. The actual movement throughout these processes is not in the
soul, but in the body; sometimes going _to_ the soul (as in sensible
perception), sometimes proceeding _from_ the soul to the body (as in
the case of reminiscence). All these processes are at once corporeal
and psychical, pervading the whole animated subject, and having two
aspects coincident and inter-dependent, though logically
distinguishable. The perfect or imperfect discrimination by the
sentient soul depends upon the good or bad condition of the bodily
sentient organs; an old man that has become shortsighted would see as
well as before, if he could regain his youthful eye. The defects of
the soul arise from defects in the bodily organism to which it
belongs, as in cases of drunkenness or sickness; and this is not less
true of the Noûs, or intellective soul, than of the sentient
soul.[49] Intelligence, as well as emotion, are phenomena, not of the
bodily organism simply, nor of the Noûs simply, but of the community
or partnership of which both are members; and, when intelligence
gives way, this is not because the Noûs itself is impaired, but
because the partnership is ruined by the failure of the bodily
organism.

[Footnote 46: Aristot. De Animâ, I. i. p. 403, a. 25: [Greek: ta\
pa/thê lo/goi e)/nuloi/ ei)sin.] Compare II. p. 412, b. 10-25; p.
413, a. 2.]

[Footnote 47: Ibid. I. i. p. 403, a. 30.]

[Footnote 48: Ibid. iv. p. 408, b. 12. [Greek: to\ de\ le/gein
o)rgi/zesthai tê\n psuchê\n o(/moion ka)\n ei)/ tis le/goi tê\n
psuchê\n u(phai/nein ê)\ oi)kodomei=n; be/ltion ga\r i)/sôs mê\
le/gein tê\n psuchê\n _e)leei=n ê)\ mantha/nein ê)\ dianoei=sthai_,
a)lla\ _to\n a)/nthrôpon_ tê=| psuchê=|; tou=to de\ mê\ ô(s e)n
e)kei/nê| tê=s kinê/seôs ou)/sês, a)ll' o(/te me\n me/chri e)kei/nês,
o(/te d' a)p' e)kei/nês], &c. Again, b. 30: [Greek: o(/ti me\n ou)=n
ou)ch oi(=o/n te kinei=sthai tê\n psuchê/n, phanero\n e)k tou/tôn.]]

[Footnote 49: Ibid. b. 26. Compare a similar doctrine in the Timæus
of Plato, p. 86, B.-D.]

Respecting the Noûs (the theorizing Noûs), we must here observe that
Aristotle treats it as a separate kind or variety of soul, with
several peculiarities. We shall collect presently all that he says
upon that subject, which is the most obscure portion of his
psychology.

In regard to soul generally, the relative point of view with body as
the correlate is constantly insisted on by Aristotle; without such
correlate his assertions would have no meaning. But the relation
between them is presented in several different ways. The soul is the
cause and principle of a living body;[50] by which is meant, not an
independent and pre-existent something that brings the body into
existence but, an immanent or indwelling influence which sustains the
unity and guides the functions of the organism. According to the
quadruple classification of Cause recognized by Aristotle--Formal,
Material, Movent, and Final--the body furnishes the Material Cause,
while the soul comprises all the three others. The soul is (as we
have already seen) the Form in relation to the body as Matter, but it
is, besides, the Movent, inasmuch as it determines the local
displacement as well as all the active functions of the
body--nutrition, growth, generation, sensation, &c.; lastly, it is
also the Final Cause, since the maintenance and perpetuation of the
same Form, in successive individuals, is the standing purpose aimed
at by each body in the economy of Nature.[51] Under this diversity of
aspect, soul and body are reciprocally integrant and complementary of
each other, the real integer (the Living or Animated Body) including
both.

[Footnote 50: Aristot. De Animâ, II. iv. p. 415, b. 7: [Greek: e)/sti
d' ê( psuchê\ tou= zô=ntos sô/matos ai)ti/a kai\ a)rchê/; tau=ta de\
pollachô=s le/getai.]]

[Footnote 51: Ibid. b. 1.]

Soul, in the Aristotelian point of view--what is common to all living
bodies, comprises several varieties. But these varieties are not
represented as forming a genus with co-ordinate species under it, in
such manner that the counter-ordinate species, reciprocally excluding
each other, are, when taken together, co-extensive with the whole
genus; like man and brute in regard to animal. The varieties of soul
are distributed into successive stages gradually narrowing in
extension and enlarging in comprehension; the first or lowest stage
being co-extensive with the whole, but connoting only two or three
simple attributes; the second, or next above, connoting all these and
more besides, but denoting only part of the individuals denoted by
the first; the third connoting all this and more, but denoting yet
fewer individuals; and so on forward. Thus the concrete individuals,
called living bodies, include all plants as well as all animals; but
the soul, called Nutritive by Aristotle, corresponding thereto
connotes only nutrition, growth, decay, and generation of another
similar individual.[52] In the second stage, plants are left out, but
all animals remain: the Sentient soul, belonging to animals, but not
belonging to any plants, connotes all the functions and unities of
the Nutritive soul, together with sensible perception (at least in
its rudest shape) besides.[53] We proceed onward in the same
direction, taking in additional faculties--the Movent, Appetitive,
Phantastic (Imaginative), Noëtic (Intelligent) soul, and thus
diminishing the total of individuals denoted. But each higher variety
of soul continues to possess all the faculties of the lower. Thus the
Sentient soul cannot exist without comprehending all the faculties of
the Nutritive, though the Nutritive exists (in plants) without any
admixture of the Sentient. Again, the Sentient soul does not
necessarily possess either memory, imagination, or intellect (Noûs);
but no soul can be either Imaginative or Noëtic, without being
Sentient as well as Nutritive. The Noëtic Soul, as the highest of
all, retains in itself all the lower faculties; but these are found
to exist apart from it.[54]

[Footnote 52: In the Aristotelian treatise De Plantis, p. 815, b. 16,
it is stated that Empedokles, Anaxagoras, and Demokritus, all
affirmed that plants had both intellect and cognition up to a certain
moderate point. We do not cite this treatise as the composition of
Aristotle, but it is reasonably good evidence in reference to the
doctrine of those other philosophers.]

[Footnote 53: Aristot. De Animâ, I. v. p. 411, b. 28.]

[Footnote 54: Ibid. II. ii. p. 413, a. 25-30, b. 32; iii. p. 414, b.
29; p. 415, a. 10.]

We may remark here that the psychological classification of Aristotle
proceeds in the inverse direction to that of Plato. In the Platonic
Timæus we begin with the grand soul of the Kosmos, and are conducted
by successive steps of degradation to men, animals, plants; while
Aristotle lays his foundation in the largest, most multiplied, and
lowest range of individuals, carrying us by successive increase of
conditions to the fewer and the higher.

The lowest or Nutritive soul, in spite of the small number of
conditions involved in it, is the indispensable basis whereon all the
others depend. None of the other souls can exist apart from it.[55]
It is the first constituent of the living individual--the implication
of Form with Matter in a natural body suitably organized; it is the
preservative of the life of the individual, with its aggregate of
functions and faculties, and with the proper limits of size and shape
that characterize the species;[56] it is, moreover, the preservative
of perpetuity to the species, inasmuch as it prompts and enables each
individual to generate and leave behind a successor like himself;
which is the only way that an individual can obtain
quasi-immortality, though all aspire to become immortal.[57] This
lowest soul is the primary cause of digestion and nutrition. It is
cognate with the celestial heat, which is essential also as a
co-operative cause; accordingly, all animated bodies possess an
inherent natural heat.[58]

[Footnote 55: Ibid. iv. p. 415, a. 25: [Greek: prô/tê kai\ koinota/tê
du/nami/s e)sti psuchê=s, kath' ê(\n u(pa/rchei to\ zê=n
a(/pasin.]--p. 415, b. 8: [Greek: tou= zô=ntos sô/matos ai)ti/a kai\
a)rchê/].--III. xii. p. 434, a. 22-30, b. 24. Aristot. De
Respiratione, viii. p. 474, a. 30, b. 11.]

[Footnote 56: Aristot. De Animâ, II. iv. p. 416, a. 17.]

[Footnote 57: Ibid. p. 415, b. 2; p. 416, b. 23: [Greek: e)pei\ d'
a)po\ tou= te/lous a(/panta prosagoreu/ein di/kaion, te/los de\ to\
gennê=sai oi(=on au)to/, a)\n ê( prô/tê psuchê\ gennêtikê\ oi(=on
au)to/.] Also De Generat. Animal. II. i. p. 731, b. 33.]

[Footnote 58: Aristot. De Animâ, II. iv. p. 416, a. 10-18, b. 29.]

We advance upwards now from the nutritive soul to that higher soul
which is at once nutritive and Sentient; for Aristotle does not
follow the example of Plato in recognizing three souls to one body,
but assigns only one and the same soul, though with multiplied
faculties and functions, to one and the same body. Sensible
perception, with its accompaniments, forms the characteristic
privilege of the animal as contrasted with the plant.[59] Sensible
perception admits of many diversities, from the simplest and rudest
tactile sensation, which even the lowest animals cannot be without,
to the full equipment of five senses which Aristotle declares to be a
maximum not susceptible of increase.[60] But the sentient faculty,
even in its lowest stage, indicates a remarkable exaltation of the
soul in its character of form. The soul, _quâ_ sentient and
percipient, receives the form of the _perceptum_ without the matter;
whereas the nutritive soul cannot disconnect the two, but receives
and appropriates the nutrient substance, form and matter in one and
combined.[61] Aristotle illustrates this characteristic feature of
sensible perception by recurring to his former example of the wax and
the figure. Just as wax receives from a signet the impression
engraven thereon, whether the matter of the signet be iron, gold,
stone, or wood; as the impression stamped has no regard to the
matter, but reproduces only the figure engraven on the signet, the
wax being merely potential and undefined, until the signet comes to
convert it into something actual and definite;[62] so the percipient
faculty in man is impressed by the substances in nature, not
according to the matter of each but, according to the qualitative
form of each. Such passive receptivity is the first and lowest form
of sensation,[63] not having any magnitude in itself, but residing in
bodily organs which have magnitude, and separable from them only by
logical abstraction. It is a potentiality, correlating with, and in
due proportion to, the exterior _percipibile_, which, when acting
upon it, brings it into full actuality. The actuality of both
(_percipiens_ and _perceptum_) is one and the same, and cannot be
disjoined in fact, though the potentialities of the two are distinct
yet correlative; the _percipiens_ is not like the _percipibile_
originally, but becomes like it by being thus actualized.[64]

[Footnote 59: Aristot. De Sensu et Sensili, i. p. 436, b. 12. He
considers sponges to have some sensation (Hist. Animal. I. i. p. 487,
b. 9).]

[Footnote 60: Aristot. De Animâ, II. iii. p. 414, b. 2; p. 415, a. 3;
III. i. p. 424, b. 22; xiii. p. 435, b. 15.]

[Footnote 61: Ibid. II. xii. p. 424, a. 32-b. 4: [Greek: dia\ ti/
pote ta\ phuta\ ou)k ai)stha/netai, e)/chonta/ ti mo/rion psuchiko\n
kai\ pa/schonta/ ti u(po\ tô=n a(ptô=n? kai\ ga\r psu/chetai kai\
thermai/netai; ai)/tion ga\r to\ mê\ e)/chein meso/têta, mêde\
toiau/tên a)rchê\n oi(/an ta\ ei)/dê de/chesthai tô=n ai)sthêtô=n,
a)lla\ pa/schein meta\ tê=s u(/lês.]

Themistius ad loc. p. 144, ed. Spengel: [Greek: pa/schei (ta\ phuta/)
suneisiou/sês tê=s u(/lês tou= poiou=ntos], &c.]

[Footnote 62: Aristot. De Animâ, II. xii. p. 424, a. 19.]

[Footnote 63: Ibid. a. 24: [Greek: ai)sthêtê/rion de\ prô=ton e)n
ô(=| ê( toiau/tê du/namis], &c.--III. xii. p. 434, a. 29.]

[Footnote 64: Ibid. III. ii. p. 425, b. 25: [Greek: ê( de\ tou=
ai)sthêtou= e)ne/rgeia kai\ tê=s ai)sthê/seôs ê( au)tê\ me/n e)sti
kai\ mi/a, to\ d' ei)=nai ou) tau)to\n au)tai=s.]--II. v. p. 418, a.
3: [Greek: to\ d' ai)sthêtiko\n duna/mei e)sti\n oi(=on to\
ai)sthêto\n ê)/dê e)ntelechei/a|,--pa/schei me\n ou)=n ou)ch o(/moion
o)/n, pepontho\s d' ô(moi/ôtai kai\ e)/stin oi(=on e)kei=no.] Also p.
417, a. 7, 14, 20.

There were conflicting doctrines current in Aristotle's time: some
said that, for an agent to act upon a patient, there must be
_likeness_ between the two; others said that there must be
_unlikeness_. Aristotle dissents from both, and adopts a sort of
intermediate doctrine.]

The sentient soul is communicated by the male parent in the act of
generation,[65] and is complete from the moment of birth, not
requiring a process of teaching after birth; the sentient subject
becomes at once and instantly, in regard to sense, on a level with
one that has attained a certain actuality of cognition, but is not at
the moment reflecting upon the _cognitum_. Potentiality and Actuality
are in fact distinguishable into lower and higher degrees; the
Potential that has been actualized in a first or lower stage, is
still a Potential relatively to higher stages of Actuality.[66] The
Potential may be acted upon in two opposite ways; either by deadening
and extinguishing it, or by developing and carrying it forward to
realization. The sentient soul, when asleep or inert, requires a
cause to stimulate it into actual seeing or hearing; the noëtic or
cognizant soul, under like circumstances, must also be stimulated
into actual meditation on its _cognitum_. But there is this
difference between the two. The sentient soul communes with
particulars; the noëtic soul with universals. The sentient soul
derives its stimulus from without, and from some of the individual
objects, tangible, visible, or audible; but the noëtic soul is put
into action by the abstract and universal, which is in a certain
sense _within_ the soul itself; so that a man can at any time
meditate on what he pleases, but he cannot see or hear what he
pleases, or anything except such visible or audible objects as are at
hand.[67]

[Footnote 65: Aristot. De Gener. Animal. II. v. p. 741, a. 13, b. 7;
De Animâ, II. v. p. 417, b. 17.]

[Footnote 66: Aristot. De Animâ, II. v. p. 417, b. 18-32. See above,
p. 457, note a.

The extent of Potentiality, or the partial Actuality, which Aristotle
claims for the sentient soul even at birth, deserves to be kept in
mind; we shall contrast it presently with what he says about the
Noûs.]

[Footnote 67: Aristot. De Animâ, II. v. p. 417, b. 22: [Greek:
ai)/tion de\ o(/ti, tô=n kath' e(/kaston ê( kat' e)ne/rgeian
ai)/sthêsis, ê( d' e)pistê/mê tô=n katho/lou; tau=ta d' e)n au)tê=|
pô/s e)sti tê=| psuchê=|.] III. iii. p. 427, b. 18.]

We have already remarked, that in many animals the sentient soul is
little developed; being confined in some to the sense of touch (which
can never be wanting),[68] and in others to touch and taste. But even
this minimum of sense--though small, if compared with the variety of
senses in man--is a prodigious step in advance of plants; it
comprises a certain cognition, and within its own sphere it is always
critical, comparing, discriminative.[69] The sentient soul possesses
this discriminative faculty in common with the noëtic soul or
Intelligence, though applied to different objects and purposes; and
possesses such faculty, because it is itself a mean or middle term
between the two sensible extremes of which it takes cognizance,--hot
and cold, hard and soft, wet and dry, white and black, acute and
grave, bitter and sweet, light and darkness, visible and invisible,
tangible and intangible, &c. We feel no sensation at all when the
object touched is exactly of the same temperature with ourselves,
neither hotter nor colder; the sentient soul, being a mean between
the two extremes, is stimulated to assimilate itself for the time to
either of them, according as it is acted upon from without. It thus
makes comparison of each with the other, and of both with its own
mean.[70] Lastly, the sentient faculty in the soul is really one and
indivisible, though distinguishable logically or by abstraction into
different genera and species.[71] Of that faculty the central
physical organ is the heart, which contains the congenital or animal
spirit. The Aristotelian psychology is here remarkable, affirming as
it does the essential relativity of all phenomena of sense to the
appreciative condition of the sentient; as well as the constant
implication of intellectual and discriminative comparison among them.

[Footnote 68: Ibid. III. xii. p. 434, b. 23: [Greek: phanero\n o(/ti
ou)ch oi(=o/n te a)/neu a(phê=s ei)=nai zô=|on.]]

[Footnote 69: Ibid. ix. p. 432, a. 16: [Greek: tô=| kritikô=|, o(\
dianoi/as e)/rgon e)sti\ kai\ ai)sthê/seôs.]--III. iii. p. 427, a.
20; p. 426, b. 10-15. De Generat. Animal. I. xxiii. p. 731, a. 30-b.
5; De Somno et Vigil. i. p. 458**, b. 2. The sentient faculty is
called [Greek: du/namin su/mphuton kritikê/n] in Analyt. Poster.
II. xix. p. 99, b. 35.]

[Footnote 70: Aristot. De Animâ, II. x. p. 422, a. 20; ix. p. 421, b.
4-11; xi. p. 424, a. 5: [Greek: kai\ dia\ tou=to kri/nei ta\
ai)sthêta/--to\ ga\r me/son kritiko/n]. III. vii. p. 431, a. 10:
[Greek: e)/sti to\ ê(/desthai kai\ lupei=sthai to\ e)nergei=n tê=|
ai)sthêtikê=| meso/têti pro\s to\ a)gatho\n ê)\ kako/n, ê(=|
toiau=ta.] III. xiii. p. 435, a. 21.

He remarks that plants have no similar [Greek: meso/tês]--II. xii. p.
424, b. 1.]

[Footnote 71: Aristot. De Sensu et Sensili, vii. p. 449, a. 8, 17. De
Motu Animal. x. p. 703, a. 15. De Somno et Vigil. ii. p. 455, a. 15,
21, 35; p. 456, a. 5. De Juventute et Senect. p. 467, b. 27; p. 469,
a. 4-12.]

All the objects generating sensible perception, are magnitudes.[72]
Some perceptions are peculiar to one sense alone, as colour to the
eye, &c. Upon these we never make mistakes directly; in other words,
we always judge rightly what is the colour or what is the sound,
though we are often deceived in judging what the thing coloured is,
or where the sonorous object is.[73] There are, however, some
perceivables not peculiar to any one sense alone, but appreciable by
two or more; though chiefly and best by the sense of vision; such are
motion, rest, number, figure, magnitude. Here the appreciation
becomes less accurate, yet it is still made directly by sense.[74]
But there are yet other matters that, though not directly affecting
sense, are perceived indirectly, or by way of accompaniment to what
is directly perceived. Thus we see a white object; nothing else
affecting our sense **except its whiteness. Beyond this,
however, we judge and declare, that the object so seen is the son of
Kleon. This is a judgment obtained indirectly, or by way of
accompaniment; by _accident_, so to speak, inasmuch as the same does
not accompany all sensations of white. It is here that we are most
liable to error.[75]

[Footnote 72: Aristot. De Sensu et Sensili, vii. p. 449, a. 20:
[Greek: to\ ai)sthêto\n pa=n e)sti\ me/gethos.]]

[Footnote 73: Aristot. De Animâ, II. vi. p. 418, a. 10-16.]

[Footnote 74: Aristot. De Sensu et Sensili, i. p. 437, a. 8; iv. p.
442, b. 4-12. He says in this last passage, that the common
perceivables are appreciable _at least by both sight and touch_--if
not by all the senses.]

[Footnote 75: Aristot. De Animâ, II. vi. p. 418, a. 7-25: [Greek:
le/getai de\ to\ ai)sthêto\n trichô=s, ô(=n du/o me\n kath' au(ta/
phamen ai)stha/nesthai, to\ de\ e(\n kata\ sumbebêko/s.] Also, III.
i. p. 425, b. 24; iii. p. 428, b. 18-25.]

Among the five senses, Aristotle distinguishes two as operating by
direct contact between subject and object (touch, taste); three as
operating through an external intervening medium (vision, smell,
taste). He begins with Vision, which he regards as possessing most
completely the nature and characteristics of a sense.[76] The direct
and proper object of vision is colour. Now colour operates upon the
eye not immediately (for, if the coloured object be placed in contact
with the eye, there will be no vision), but by causing movements or
perturbations in the external intervening medium, air or water, which
affect the sense through an appropriate agency of their own.[77] This
agency is, according to Aristotle, the Diaphanous or Transparent.
When actual or in energy, the transparent is called light; when
potential or in capacity only, it is called darkness. The eye is of
watery structure, apt for receiving these impressions.[78] It is the
presence either of fire, or of something analogous to the celestial
body, that calls forth the diaphanous from the state of potentiality
into that of actuality or light; in which latter condition it is
stimulated by colour. The diaphanous, whether as light or as
darkness, is a peculiar nature or accompaniment, not substantive in
itself, but inherent chiefly in the First or Celestial Body, yet also
in air, water, glass, precious stones, and in all bodies to a greater
or less degree.[79] The diaphanous passes at once and simultaneously,
in one place as well as in another, from potentiality to
actuality--from darkness to light. Light does not take time to travel
from one place to another, as sound and smell do.[80] The diaphanous
is not a body, nor effluvium from a body, nor any one of the elements:
it is of an adjective character--a certain agency or attribute
pervading or belonging to bodies, along with their extension.[81]
Colour marks and defines the surface of the body _quâ_ diaphanous, as
figure defines it _quâ_ extended. Colour makes the diaphanous itself
visible, and its own varieties visible through the diaphanous. Air
and water are transparent throughout, though with an ill-defined
superficial colour. White and black, as colours in solid bodies,
correspond to the condition of light or darkness in air. There are
some luminous objects visible in the dark, as fire, fungous matter,
eyes, and scales of fish, &c., though they have no appropriate
colour.[82] There are seven species or varieties of colours, but all
of them proceed from white and black, blended in different
proportions, or seen one through another; white and black are the
two extremes, the other varieties being intermediate between them.

[Footnote 76: Aristot. De Animâ, III. iii. p. 429, a. 2: [Greek: ê(
o)/psis ma/lista ai)sthêsi/s e)stin.] Also Metaphysica, A. init.]

[Footnote 77: Aristot. De Animâ, II. vii. p. 419, a. 12, 14, 19;
Aristot. De Sensu et Sensili, iii. p. 440, a. 18: [Greek: ô(/st'
eu)thu\s krei=tton pha/nai, tô=| kinei=sthai to\ metaxu\ tê=s
ai)sthê/seôs u(po\ tou= ai)sthêtou= gi/nesthai tê\n ai)/sthêsin,
a(phê=| kai\ mê\ tai=s a)por)r(oi/ais.]--Ib. ii. p. 438, b. 3:
[Greek: ei)/te phô=s ei)/t' a)ê/r e)sti to\ metaxu\ tou= o(rôme/nou
kai\ tou= o)/mmatos, ê( dia\ tou/tou ki/nêsi/s e)stin ê( poiou=sa to\
o(ra=n.]]

[Footnote 78: Aristot. De Animâ, II. vii. p. 419, a. 9: [Greek:
tou=to ga\r ê)=n au)tô=| to\ chrô/mati ei)=nai, to\ kinêtikô=|
ei)=nai tou= kat' e)ne/rgeian diaphanou=s phô=s e)sti/n.]--Ib. ii. p.
418, b. 11-17: [Greek: o(/tan ê)=| e)ntelechei/a| diaphane\s u(po\
puro\s ê)\ toiou/tou oi(=on to\ a)/nô sô=ma;--puro\s ê)\ toiou/tou
tino\s parousi/a e)n tô=| diaphanei=.]]

[Footnote 79: Aristot. De Animâ, II. vii. p. 418, b. 4. De Sensu et
Sensili, ii. p. 438, a. 14, b. 7; iii. p. 439, a. 21, seq.: [Greek:
o(\ de\ le/gomen diaphane/s, ou)k e)/stin i)/dion a)e/ros ê)\
u(/datos, ou)d' a)/llou tô=n ou(/tô legome/nôn sôma/tôn, a)lla/ ti/s
e)sti\ koinê\ phu/sis kai\ du/namis, ê(\ chôristê\ me\n ou)k e)/stin,
e)n tou/tois d' e)sti/, kai\ toi=s a)/llois sô/masin e)nupa/rchei,
toi=s me\n ma=llon toi=s d' ê(=tton.]]

[Footnote 80: Aristot. De Sensu et Sensili, vi. p. 446, a. 23, seq.,
b. 27: [Greek: tô=| ei)=nai ga/r ti phô=s e)sti/n, a)ll' ou)
ki/nêsi/s tis.] Empedokles affirmed that light travelling from the
Sun reached the intervening space before it came to the earth;
Aristotle contradicts him.]

[Footnote 81: Aristot. De Animâ, II. vii. p. 418, b. 18: [Greek:
e)/sti de\ to\ sko/tos ste/rêsis tê=s toiau/tês e(/xeôs e)k
diaphanou=s, ô(/ste dê=lon o(/ti kai\ ê( _tou/tou parousi/a_ phô=s
e)sti/n.]--Aristot. De Sensu et Sensili, iii. p. 439, a. 26: [Greek:
ê( me\n ou)=n tou= phôto\s phu/sis e)n ao)ri/stô| tô=| diaphanei=
e)sti/n; tou= d' e)n toi=s sô/masi diaphanou=s to\ e)/schaton, o(/ti
me\n ei)/ê a)/n ti, dê=lon; o(/ti de\ tou=to e)sti\ to\ chrô=ma, e)/k
tô=n sumbaino/ntôn phanero/n.--e)/sti me\n ga\r e)n tô=| tou=
sô/matos pe/rati, a)ll' ou)/ ti to\ tou= sô/matos pe/ras, a)lla\ tê\n
au)tê\n phu/sin dei= nomi/zein, ê(/per kai\ e)/xô chrômati/zetai,
tau/tên kai\ e)nto/s.]]

[Footnote 82: Aristot. De Animâ, II. vii. p. 419, a. 2-25; Aristot.
De Sensu et Sensili, iv. p. 442, a. 20,--seven colours.]

The same necessity for an intervening medium external to the subject,
as in the case of vision, prevails also in the senses of hearing and
smell. If the audible or odorous object be placed in contact with its
organ of sense, there will be no hearing or smell. Whenever we hear
or smell any object, there must be interposed between us and the
object a suitable medium that shall be affected first; while the
organ of sense will be affected secondarily through that medium. Air
is the medium in regard to sound, both air and water in regard to
smell; but there seems besides (analogous to the transparent in
regard to vision) a special agency called the Trans-Sonant, which
pervades air and enables it to transmit sound; and certainly another
special agency called the Trans-Olfacient, which pervades both air
and water, and enables them to transmit smell.[83] (It seems thus
that something like a luminiferous ether--extended, mobile, and
permeating bodies, yet still incorporeal in itself--was an hypothesis
as old as Aristotle; and one other ether besides, analogous in
property and purpose--an odoriferous ether; perhaps a third or
soniferous ether, but this is less distinctly specified by
Aristotle.)

[Footnote 83: Aristot. De Animâ, II. vii. p. 419, a. 25-35; De Sensu
et Sensili, v. p. 442, b. 30; Themistius ad Aristot. De Animâ, II.
vii., viii. p. 115, Spengel. Of the three names, [Greek: to\
diaphane/s--to\ diêche/s--to\ di/osmon], the last two are not
distinctly stated by Aristotle, but are said to have been first
applied by Theophrastus after him. See the notes of Trendelenburg and
Torstrick; the latter supposes Themistius to have had before him a
fuller and better text of Aristotle than that which we now possess,
which seems corrupt. In our present text, the transparent as well as
the trans-olfacient ether are clearly indicated, the trans-sonant not
clearly.]

Sound, according to Aristotle, arises from the shock of two or more
solid bodies communicated to the air. It implies local movement in
one at least of those bodies. Many soft bodies are incapable of
making sound; those best suited for it are such as metals, hard in
structure, smooth in surface, hollow in shape. The blow must be smart
and quick, otherwise the air slips away and dissipates itself before
the sound can be communicated to it.[84] Sound is communicated
through the air to the organ of hearing; the air is one _continuum_
(not composed of adjacent particles with interspaces), and a wave is
propagated from it to the internal ear, which contains some air
enclosed in the sinuous ducts within the membrane of the tympanum,
congenitally attached to the organ itself, and endued with a certain
animation.[85] This internal air within the ear, excited by the
motion propagated from the external ear, causes hearing. The ear is
enabled to appreciate accurately the movements of the external air,
because it has itself little or no movement within. We cannot hear
with any other part of the body; because it is only in the ear that
nature has given us this stock of internal air. If water gets into
the ear, we cannot hear at all; because the wave generated in the air
without, cannot propagate itself within. Nor can we hear, if the
membrane of the ear be disordered; any more than we can see, when the
membrane of the eye is disordered.[86]

[Footnote 84: Aristot. De Animâ, **II. viii. p. 419, b. 4 seq. He
calls air [Greek: psathuro/s, eu)/thruptos] (p. 420,
a. 1-8),--[Greek: eu)diai/retos, eu)o/listhos] (Themistius, pp. 116,
117, Sp.)--"quod facilé diffluit" (Trendelenburg, Comm. p. 384). He
says that for sonorous purposes air ought to be [Greek:
a)throu=n]--compact or dense: sound reverberates best from metals
with smooth surface, p. 420, a. 25.]

[Footnote 85: Aristot. De Animâ, II. viii. p. 419, b. 34 seq.:
[Greek: ou(=tos d' (o( a)ê\r) e)sti\n o( poiô=n a)kou/ein, o(/tan
kinêthê=| sunechê\s kai\ ei(=s;--psophêtiko\n me\n ou)=n to\
kinêtiko\n e(no\s a)e/ros sunechei/a| me/chris a)koê=s. a)koê=| de\
sumphuê\s a)ê/r; dia\ de\ to\ e)n a)e/ri ei)=nai, kinoume/nou tou=
e)/xô to\ ei)/sô kinei=. dio/per ou) pa/ntê| to\ zô=|on a)kou/ei,
ou)de\ pa/ntê| die/rchetai o( a)ê/r; ou) ga\r pa/ntê| e)/chei a)e/ra
to\ kinêso/menon me/ros kai\ e)/mpsuchon.--dia\ ta\s e(/likas] (p.
420, a. 13).

The text of this passage is not satisfactory. It has been much
criticised as well as amended by Torstrick; see his Comment. p. 148
seq. I cannot approve his alteration of [Greek: e)/mpsuchon] into
[Greek: e)/mpsophon].]

[Footnote 86: Aristot. De Animâ, II. viii. p. 420, a. 9: [Greek: o(
d' e)n toi=s ô)si\n e)gkatô|kodo/mêtai pro\s to\ a)ki/nêtos ei)=nai,
o(/pôs a)kribô=s ai)stha/nêtai pa/sas ta\s diaphora\s tê=s
kinê/seôs.]--p. 420, a. 14. [Greek: ou)d' (a)kou/omen) a)\n ê(
mê/nigx ka/mê|, ô(/sper to\ e)pi\ tê=| ko/rê| de/rma o(/tan ka/mê|.]]

Voice is a kind of sound peculiar to animated beings; yet not
belonging to all of them, but only to those that inspire the air.
Nature employs respiration for two purposes: the first, indispensable
to animal life,--that of cooling and tempering the excessive heat of
the heart and its adjacent parts; the second, not indispensable to
life, yet most valuable to the higher faculties of man,--significant
speech. The organ of respiration is the larynx; a man cannot speak
either when inspiring or expiring, but only when retaining and using
the breath within. The soul in those parts, when guided by some
phantasm or thought, impels the air within against the walls of the
trachea, and this shock causes vocal sounds.[87]

[Footnote 87: Aristot. De Animâ, II. viii. p. 420, b. 5-p. 421, a. 6.
[Greek: ô(/ste ê( plêgê\ tou= a)napneome/nou a)e/ros u(po\ tê=s e)n
tou/tois toi=s mori/ois psuchê=s pro\s tê\n kaloume/nên a)rtêri/an
phônê/ e)stin. ou) ga\r pa=s zô/|ou pso/phos phônê/, katha/per
ei)/pomen (e)/sti ga\r kai\ tê=| glô/ttê| psophei=n kai\ ô(s oi(
bê/ttontes) a)lla\ dei= e)/mpsucho/n te ei)=nai to\ tu/pton kai\
meta\ phantasi/as tino/s; sêmantiko\s ga\r dê/ tis pso/phos e)sti\n
ê( phônê/; kai\ ou) tou= a)napneome/nou a)e/ros, ô(/sper ê( bê/x,
a)lla\ tou/tô| tu/ptei to\n e)n tê=| a)rtêri/a| pro\s au)tê/n.]]

Aristotle seems to have been tolerably satisfied with the above
explanation of sight and hearing; for, in approaching the sense of
Smell with the olfacients, he begins by saying that it is less
definable and explicable. Among the five senses, smell stands
intermediate between the two (taste and touch) that operate by direct
contact, and the other two (sight and hearing) that operate through
an external medium. Man is below other animals in this sense; he
discriminates little in smells except the pleasurable and the
painful.[88] His taste, though analogous in many points to smell, is
far more accurate and discriminating, because taste is a variety of
touch; and in respect to touch, man is the most discriminating of all
animals. Hence his great superiority to them in practical wisdom.
Indeed the marked difference of intelligence between one man and
another, turns mainly upon the organ of touch: men of hard flesh (or
skin) are by nature dull in intelligence, men of soft flesh are apt
and clever.[89] The classifying names of different smells are
borrowed from the names of the analogous tastes to which they are
analogous--sweet, bitter, tart, dry, sharp, smooth, &c.[90] Smells
take effect through air as well as through water; by means of a
peculiar agency or accompaniment (mentioned above, called the
Trans-Olfacient) pervading both one and the other. It is peculiar to
man that he cannot smell except when inhaling air in the act of
inspiration; any one may settle this for himself by making the
trial.[91] But fishes and other aquatic animals, which never inhale
air, can smell in the water; and this proves that the trans-olfacient
agency is operative to transmit odours not less in water than in
air.[92] We know that the sense of smell in these aquatic animals is
the same as it is in man, because the same strong odours that are
destructive to man are also destructive to them.[93] Smell is the
parallel, and in a certain sense the antithesis of taste; smell is of
the dry, taste is of the moist: the olfactory matter is a juicy or
sapid dryness, extracted or washed out from both air and water by the
trans-olfacient agency, and acting on the sensory potentialities of
the nostrils.[94] This olfactory inhalation is warm as well as dry.
Hence it is light, and rises easily to the brain, the moisture and
coldness of which it contributes to temper; this is a very salutary
process, for the brain is the wettest and coldest part of the body,
requiring warm and dry influences as a corrective. It is with a view
to this correction that Nature has placed the olfactory organ in such
close proximity to the brain.[95] There are two kinds of olfactory
impressions. One of them is akin to the sense of taste--odour and
savour going together--an affection (to a great degree) of the
nutritive soul; so that the same odour is agreeable when we are
hungry, disagreeable when our hunger is fully satisfied. This first
kind of impression is common to men with other animals; but there is
a second, peculiar to man, and disconnected from the sense of taste,
viz., the scent of flowers, unguents, &c., which are agreeable or
disagreeable constantly and _per se_.[96] Nature has assigned this
second kind of odours as a privilege to man, because his brain, being
so large and moist, requires to be tempered by an additional stock of
drying and warming olfactory influence.

[Footnote 88: Aristot. De Animâ, II. ix. p. 421, a. 7. De Sensu et
Sensili, v. p. 445, a. 6; iv. p. 441, a. 1. De Partibus Animal. II.
xii. p. 656, a. 31; p. 657, a. 9.]

[Footnote 89: Aristot. De Animâ, II. ix. p. 421, a. 21: [Greek: kata\
de\ tê\n a(phê\n pollô=| tô=n a)/llôn zô/|ôn diaphero/ntôs a)kriboi=
(o( a)/nthrôpos). dio\ kai\ phronimô/tato/n e)sti tô=n zô/|ôn.
sêmei=on de\ to\ kai\ e)n tô=| ge/nei tô=n a)nthrô/pôn para\ to\
ai)sthêtê/rion tou=to ei)=nai eu)phuei=s kai\ a)phuei=s, _par' a)/llo
de\ mêde/n_; oi( me\n ga\r sklêro/sarkoi a)phuei=s tê\n dia/noian,
oi( de\ malako/sarkoi eu)phuei=s.]]

[Footnote 90: Ibid. a. 26.]

[Footnote 91: Ibid. b. 9-19. [Greek: to\ a)/neu tou= a)napnei=n mê\
ai)stha/nesthai _i)/dion_ e)pi\ tô=n a)nthrô/pôn; dê=lon de\
peirôme/nois.] He seems to think that this is not true of any animal
other than man.]

[Footnote 92: Aristot. De Sensu et Sensili, v. p. 443, a. 3-31; p.
444, b. 9.]

[Footnote 93: Aristot. De Animâ, II. ix. p. 421, b. 23. He instances
brimstone, [Greek: a)/sphaltos], &c.]

[Footnote 94: This is difficult to understand, but it seems to be
what Aristotle here means.--De Animâ, II. ix. p. 422, a. 6: [Greek:
e)/sti d' ê( o)smê\ tou\ xêrou=, ô(/sper o( chumo\s tou= u(grou=; to\
d' o)sphrantiko\n ai)sthêtê/rion duna/mei toiou=ton.]--De Sensu et
Sensili, v. p. 443, a. 1-9: [Greek: e)/sti d' o)sphranto\n ou)ch ê(=|
diaphane/s, a)ll' ê)=| pluntiko\n ê)\ r(uptiko\n e)gchu/mou
xêro/têtos;--ê( e)n u(grô=| tou= e)gchu/mou xêrou= phu/sis o)smê/,
kai\ o)sphranto\n to\ pa/thos, dê=lon e)k tô=n e)cho/ntôn kai\ mê\
e)cho/ntôn o)smê/n], &c. Also p. 443, b. 3-7.

In the treatise De Sensu et Sensili, there is one passage (ii. p.
438, b. 24), wherein Aristotle affirms that smell is [Greek:
kapnô/dês a)nathumi/asis, e)k puro/s]; but we also find a subsequent
passage (v. p. 443, a. 21, seq.) where he cites that same doctrine as
the opinion of others, but distinctly refutes it.]

[Footnote 95: Aristot. De Sensu et Sensili, v. p. 444, a. 10, 22, 24:
[Greek: ê( ga\r tê=s o)smê=s du/namis thermê\ tê\n phu/sin e)sti/n.]]

[Footnote 96: Ibid. p. 443, b. 17; p. 444, a. 6. 15, 28: [Greek:
i)/dion de\ tê=s tou= a)nthrô/pou phu/seô/s e)sti to\ tê=s o)smê=s
tê=s toiau/tês ge/nos dia\ to\ plei=ston e)gke/phalon kai\
u(gro/taton e)/chein tô=n zô/|ôn ô(s kata\ me/gethos.]

Plato also reckons the pleasures of smell among the pure and
admissible pleasures (Philebus, p. 51, E.; Timæus, p. 65, A., p. 67,
A.).]

Taste is a variety of touch, and belongs to the lower or nutritive
soul, as a guide to the animal in seeking or avoiding different sorts
of food. The object of taste is essentially liquid, often strained
and extracted from dry food by warmth and moisture. The primary
manifestation of this sensory phenomenon is the contrast of drinkable
and undrinkable.[97] The organ of taste, the tongue, is a mean
between dryness and moisture; when either of these is in excess, the
organ is disordered. Among the varieties of taste, there are two
fundamental contraries (as in colour, sound, and the objects of the
other senses except touch) from which the other contrasts are
derived. These fundamentals in taste are sweet and bitter;
corresponding to white and black, acute and grave, in colours and
sounds. The sense of taste is potentially sweet or bitter; the
gustable object is what makes it sweet or bitter in actuality.[98]

[Footnote 97: Aristot. De Animâ, II. x. p. 422, a. 30-33. De Sensu et
Sensili, i. p. 436, b. 15; iv. p. 441, b. 17: [Greek: dia\ tou=
xêrou= kai\ geô/dous diêthou=sa (ê( phu/sis) kai\ kinou=sa tô=|
thermô=| poio/n ti to\ u(gro\n paraskeua/zei. kai\ e)/sti tou=to
chumo\s to\ gigno/menon u(po\ tou= ei)rême/nou xêrou= pa/thos e)n
tô=| u(grô=|.]--Ib. b. 24: [Greek: ou) panto\s xêrou= a)lla\ tou=
trophi/mou].]

[Footnote 98: Aristot. De Animâ, II. x. p. 422, b. 5-16; II. xi. p.
422, b. 23: [Greek: pa=sa/ te ga\r ai)/sthêsis mia=s e)nantiô/seôs
ei)=nai dokei=], &c.]

The sense of touch, in which man surpasses all other animals, differs
from the other senses by not having any two fundamental contraries
giving origin to the rest, but by having various contraries alike
fundamental. It is thus hardly one sense, but an aggregate of several
senses. It appreciates the elementary differences of body _quâ_
body--hot, cold, dry, moist, hard, soft, &c. It is a mean between
each of these two extremes; being potentially either one of them, and
capable of being made to assimilate itself actually to either.[99] In
this sense, the tangible object operates when in contact with the
skin; and, as has been already said, much of the superiority of man
depends upon his superior fineness and delicacy of skin.[100] Still
Aristotle remarks that the true organ of touch is not the skin or
flesh, but something interior to the flesh. This last serves only as
a peculiar medium. The fact that the sensation arises when the object
touches our skin, does not prove that the skin is the true organ; for,
if there existed a thin exterior membrane surrounding our bodies, we
should still feel the same sensation. Moreover, the body is not in
real contact with our skin, though it appears to be so; there is a
thin film of air between the two, though we do not perceive it; just
as, when we touch an object under water, there is a film of water
interposed between, as is seen by the wetness of the finger.[101] The
skin is, therefore, not the true organ of touch, but a medium between
the object and the organ; and this sense does in reality agree with
the other senses in having a certain medium interposed between object
and organ. But there is this difference: in touch the medium is close
to and a part of ourselves; in sight and hearing it is exterior to
ourselves, and may extend to some distance. In sight and hearing the
object does not affect us directly; it affects the external medium,
which again affects us. But in touch the object affects, at the same
time and by the same influence, both the medium and the interior
organ; like a spear that, with the same thrust, pierces the warrior's
shield and wounds the warrior himself.[102] Apparently, therefore,
the true organ of touch is something interior, and skin and flesh is
an interposed medium.[103] But what this interior organ is, Aristotle
does not more particularly declare. He merely states it to be in
close and intimate communication with the great central focus and
principle of all sensation--the heart;[104] more closely connected
with the heart (he appears to think) than any of the other organs of
sense, though all of them are so connected more or less closely.

[Footnote 99: Ibid. xi. p. 422, b. 17 seq.]

[Footnote 100: Aristot. Histor. Animal. I. xv. p. 494, b. 17. Man is
[Greek: leptodermo/tatos tô=n zô=|ôn] (Aristot. De Partib. Animal.
ii. p. 657, b. 2), and has the tongue also looser and softer than any
of them, most fit for variety of touch (p. 660, a. 20) as well as for
articulate speech.]

[Footnote 101: Aristot. De Animâ, II. xi. p. 423, a. 25-32.]

[Footnote 102: Ibid. p. 423, b. 12-17: [Greek: diaphe/rei to\ a(pto\n
tô=n o(ratô=n kai\ tô=n psophêtikô=n o(/ti e)kei/nôn me\n
ai)sthano/metha tô=| to\ metaxu\ poiei=n ti ê(ma=s, tô=n de\ a(ptô=n
ou)ch u(po\ tou= metaxu\ a)ll' a(/ma tô=| metaxu/, ô(/sper o( di'
a)spi/dos plêgei/s; ou) ga\r ê( a)spi\s plêgei=sa e)pa/taxen, a)ll'
a(/m' a)/mphô sune/bê plêgê=nai.]

This analogy of the warrior pierced at the same time with his shield
illustrates Aristotle's view of the eighth Category--_Habere_: of
which he gives [Greek: ô(/plistai] as the example. He considers a
man's clothes and defensive weapons as standing in a peculiar
relation to him like a personal appurtenance and almost as a part of
himself. It is under this point of view that he erects _Habere_ into
a distinct Category.]

[Footnote 103: Aristot. De Animâ, II. xi. p. 423, b. 22-26: [Greek:
ê(=| kai\ dê=lon o(/ti e)nto\s to\ tou= a(ptou= ai)sthêtiko/n.--to\
metaxu\ tou= a(ptikou= ê( sa/rx.]]

[Footnote 104: Aristot. De Partibus Animal. II. x. p. 656, a. 30; De
Vitâ et Morte, iii. p. 469, a. 12: De Somno et Vigil. ii. p. 455, a.
23; De Sensu et Sensili, ii. p. 439, a. 2.]

Having gone through the five senses _seriatim_, Aristotle offers
various reasons to prove that there neither are, nor can be, more
than five; and then discusses some complicated phenomena of sense. We
perceive _that_ we see or hear;[105] do we perceive this by sight or
by hearing? and if not, by what other faculty?[106] Aristotle replies
by saying that the act of sense is one and the same, but that it may
be looked at in two different points of view. We see a coloured
object; we hear a sound: in each case the act of sense is one; the
energy or actuality of the _visum_, and _videns_, of the _sonans_ and
_audiens_, is implicated and indivisible. But the potentiality of the
one is quite distinct from the potentiality of the other, and may be
considered as well as named apart.[107] When we say: I perceive
_that_ I see--we look at the same act of vision from the side of the
_videns_; the _visum_ being put out of sight as the unnoticed
correlate. This is a mental fact distinct from, though following
upon, the act of vision itself. Aristotle refers it rather to that
general sentient soul or faculty, of which the five senses are
partial and separate manifestations, than to the sense of vision
itself.[108] He thus considers what would now be termed
_consciousness of a sensation_, as being merely the subjective view
of the sensation, distinguished by abstraction from the objective.

[Footnote 105: In modern psychology the language would be--"We _are
conscious_ that we see or hear." But Sir William Hamilton has
remarked that the word Consciousness has no equivalent usually or
familiarly employed in the Greek psychology.]

[Footnote 106: Aristot. De Animâ, III. ii. p. 425, b. 14.]

[Footnote 107: Ibid. b. 26; p. 426, a. 16-19.]

[Footnote 108: Aristot. De Somno et Vigil. ii. p. 455, a. 12-17; De
Animâ, III. ii. with Torstrick's note, p. 166, and the exposition of
Alexander of Aphrodisias therein cited. These two passages of
Aristotle are to a certain extent different yet not contradictory,
though Torstrick supposes them to be so.]

It is the same general sentient faculty, though diversified and
logically distinguishable in its manifestations, that enables us to
conceive many sensations as combined into one; and to compare or
discriminate sensations belonging to different senses.[109]

[Footnote 109: Aristot. De Sensu et Sensili, vii. p. 449, a. 8-20.]

White and sweet are perceived by two distinct senses, and at two
distinct moments of time; but they must be compared and discriminated
by one and the same sentient or cogitant act, and at one moment of
time.[110] This mental act, though in itself indivisible, has yet two
aspects, and is thus in a certain sense divisible; just as a point
taken in the middle of a line, while indivisible in itself, may be
looked upon as the closing terminus of one-half of the line, and as
the commencing terminus of the other half. The comparison of two
different sensations or thoughts is thus one and the same mental
fact, with two distinguishable aspects.[111]

[Footnote 110: Aristot. De Animâ, III. ii. p. 426, b. 17-29: [Greek:
ou)/te dê\ kechôrisme/nois e)nde/chetai kri/nein o(/ti e(/teron to\
gluku\ tou= leukou=, a)lla\ dei= e(ni/ tini a)/mphô dê=la
ei)=nai.--dei= de\ to\ e(\n le/gein o(/ti e(/teron; e(/teron ga\r
to\ gluku\ tou= leukou=.--a)chô/riston kai\ e)n a)chôri/stô|
chro/nô|.] III. vii. p. 431, a. 20.]

[Footnote 111: Aristot. De Animâ, III. ii. p. 427, a. 10-14: [Greek:
ô(/sper ê(\n kalou=si/ tines stigmê/n, ê(=| mia\ kai\ ê(=| du/o,
tau/tê| kai\ a)diai/retos kai\ diaire/tê; ê(=| me\n ou)=n
a)diai/reton, e(\n to\ kri=no/n e)sti kai\ a(/ma, ê(=| de\ diai/reton
u(pa/rchei, ou)ch e(/n; di\s ga\r tô=| au)tô=| chrê=tai sêmei/ô|
a(/ma.]

It is to be remarked that, in explaining this mental process of
comparison, Aristotle three several times applies it both to [Greek:
ai)/sthêsis] and to [Greek: no/êsis], p. 426, b. 22-31; p. 427, a.
9.]

Aristotle devotes a chapter to the enquiry: whether we can perceive
two distinct sensations at once (_i.e._ in one and the same moment of
time). He decides that we cannot; that the sentient soul or faculty
is one and indivisible, and can only have a single energy or
actuality at once.[112] If two causes of sensation are operative
together, and one of them be much superior in force, it will render
us insensible to the other. He remarks that, when we are pre-occupied
with loud noise, or with deep reflection, or with intense fright,
visual objects will often pass by us unseen and unnoticed.[113] Often
the two simultaneous sensations will combine or blend into one
compound, so that we shall feel neither of them purely or
separately.[114] One single act of sensational energy may however
have a double aspect; as the same individual object may be at once
white and sweet, though its whiteness and its sweetness are logically
separable.[115]

[Footnote 112: Aristot. De Sensu et Sensili, vii. p. 447, a. 12.]

[Footnote 113: Ibid. a. 15.]

[Footnote 114: Ibid. b. 12-20.]

[Footnote 115: Ibid. p. 449, a. 14.]

To the sentient soul, even in its lowest manifestations, belong the
feelings of pleasure and pain, appetite and aversion.[116] The
movements connected with these feelings, as with all sensation, begin
and close with the central organ--the heart.[117] Upon these are
consequent the various passions and emotions; yet not without certain
faculties of memory and phantasy accompanying or following the facts
of sense.

[Footnote 116: Aristot. De Animâ, II. iii. p. 414, b. 3-16; III. vii.
p. 431, a. 9; De Somno et Vigil. i. p. 454, b. 29.]

[Footnote 117: Aristot. De Partibus Animalium, III. iv. p. 666, a.
12.]

Aristotle proceeds by gradual steps upward from the Sentient soul to
the Noëtic (Cogitant or Intelligent) soul, called in its highest
perfection Noûs. While refuting the doctrine of Empedokles,
Demokritus, and other philosophers, who considered cogitation or
intelligence to be the same as sensible perception, and while
insisting upon the distinctness of the two as mental phenomena, he
recognizes the important point of analogy between them, that both of
them include judgment and comparison;[118] and he describes an
intermediate stage called Phantasy or Imagination, forming the
transition from the lower of the two to the higher. We have already
observed that, in the Aristotelian psychology, the higher functions
of the soul presuppose and are built upon the lower as their
foundation, though the lower do not necessarily involve the higher.
Without nutrition, there is no sense; without sense, there is no
phantasy; without phantasy, there is no cogitation or
intelligence.[119] The higher psychical phenomena are not identical
with the lower, yet neither are they independent thereof; they
presuppose the lower as a part of their conditions. Here, and indeed
very generally elsewhere, Aristotle has been careful to avoid the
fallacy of confounding or identifying the conditions of a phenomenon
with the phenomenon itself.[120]

[Footnote 118: Aristot. De Animâ, III. iii. p. 427, a. 20.]

[Footnote 119: Ibid. b. 14: [Greek: phantasi/a ga\r e(/teron kai\
ai)sthê/seôs kai\ dianoi/as].--Ib. vii. p. 431, a. 16: [Greek:
ou)de/pote noei= a)/neu phanta/smatos ê( psuchê/].--De Memoriâ et
Reminiscent. i. p. 449, b. 31: [Greek: noei=n ou)k e)/stin a)/neu
phanta/smatos.]]

[Footnote 120: Mill's System of Logic, Book V. ch. 3, s. 8.]

He proceeds to explain Phantasy or the Phantastic department of the
soul, with the phantasms that belong to it. It is not sensible
perception, nor belief, nor opinion, nor knowledge, nor cogitation.
Our dreams, though affections of the sentient soul, are really
phantasms in our sleep, when there is no visual sensation; even when
awake, we have a phantasm of the sun, as of a disk one foot in
diameter, though we _believe_ the sun to be larger than the
earth.[121] Many of the lower animals have sensible perception
without any phantasy: even those among them that have phantasy have
no opinion; for opinion implies faith, persuasion, and some rational
explanation of that persuasion, to none of which does any animal
attain.[122] Phantasy is an internal movement of the animated being
(body and soul in one); belonging to the sentient soul, not to the
cogitant or intelligent; not identical with the movement of sense,
but continued from or produced by that, and by that alone;
accordingly, similar to the movement of sense and relating to the
same matters.[123] Since our sensible perceptions may be either true
or false, so also may be our phantasms. And, since these phantasms
are not only like our sensations, but remain standing in the soul
long after the objects of sense have passed away, they are to a great
degree the determining causes both of action and emotion. They are
such habitually to animals, who are destitute of Noûs; and often even
to intelligent men, if the Noûs be overclouded by disease or
drunkenness.[124]

[Footnote 121: Aristot. De Animâ, III. iii. p. 428, a. 5, b. 3; De
Somno et Vig. ii. p. 456, a. 24: [Greek: kinou=ntai d' e)/nioi
katheu/dontes kai\ poiou=si polla\ e)grêgorika/, ou) me/ntoi a)/neu
phanta/smatos kai\ ai)sthê/seô/s tinos; to\ ga\r e)nu/pnio/n e)stin
ai)/sthêma tro/pon tina/.]--Ibid. i. p. 454, b. 10.]

[Footnote 122: Aristot. De Animâ, III. iii. p. 428, a. 10, 22, 25.]

[Footnote 123: Ibid. b. 10-15; De Somniis, i. p. 459, a. 15.]

[Footnote 124: Aristot. De Animâ, III. iii. p. 428, b. 16: [Greek:
kai\ polla\ kat' au)tê\n] (_i.e._ [Greek: kata\ tê\n phantasi/an)
kai\ poiei=n kai\ pa/schein to\ e)/chon.]--Ibid. p. 429, a. 4:
[Greek: kai\ dia\ to\ e)mme/nein kai\ o(moi/as ei)=nai (ta\s
phantasi/as) tai=s ai)sthê/sesi, polla\ kat' au)ta\s pra/ttei ta\
zô=|a], &c.]

In the chapter now before us, Aristotle is careful to discriminate
phantasy from several other psychological phenomena wherewith it is
liable to be confounded. But we remark with some surprise, that
neither here, nor in any other part of his general Psychology, does
he offer any exposition of Memory, the phenomenon more nearly
approaching than any other to phantasy. He supplied the deficiency
afterwards by a short but valuable tract on Memory and Reminiscence;
wherein he recognizes, and refers to, the more general work on
Psychology. Memory bears on the past, as distinguished both from the
present and future. Memory and phantasy are in some cases so alike,
that we cannot distinguish clearly whether what is in our minds is a
remembrance or a phantasm.[125] Both of them belong to the same
psychological department--to the central sentient principle, and not
to the cogitant or intelligent Noûs. Memory as well as phantasy are
continuations, remnants, or secondary consequences, of the primary
movements of sense; what in itself is a phantasm, may become an
object of remembrance directly and _per se_; matters of cogitation,
being included or implicated in phantasms, may also become objects of
remembrance, indirectly and by way of accompaniment.[126] We can
remember our prior acts of cogitation and demonstration; we can
remember that, a month ago, we demonstrated the three angles of a
triangle to be equal to two right angles; but, as the original
demonstration could not be carried on without our having before our
mental vision the phantasm of some particular triangle, so neither
can the remembrance of the demonstration be made present to us
without a similar phantasm.[127] In acts of remembrance we have a
conception of past time, and we recognize what is now present to our
minds as a copy of what has been formerly present to us, either as
perception of sense or as actual cognition;[128] while in phantasms
there is no conception of past time, nor any similar recognition, nor
any necessary reference to our own past mental states; the phantasm
is looked at by itself, and not as a copy. This is the main point of
distinction between phantasm and remembrance:[129] what is remembered
is a present phantasm assimilated to an impression of the past. Some
of the superior animals possess both memory and phantasy. But other
animals have neither; their sensations disappear, they have no
endurance; while endurance is the basis both of phantasy and
memory.[130]

[Footnote 125: Aristot. De Memor. et Remin. i. p. 451, a. 5; p. 449,
a. 10.]

[Footnote 126: Ibid. p. 450, a. 22: [Greek: ti/nos me\n ou)=n tô=n
tê=s psuchê=s e)sti\n ê( mnê/mê, phanero\n o(/ti ou(=per kai\ ê(
phantasi/a; kai\ e)/sti mnêmoneuta\ kath' au(ta\ me\n o(/sa e)sti\
phantasta/, kata\ sumbebêko\s d' o(/sa mê\ a)/neu phantasi/as.]]

[Footnote 127: Aristot. De Memor. et. Rem. i. p. 449, b. 18.]

[Footnote 128: Ibid. b. 22: [Greek: a)ei\ ga\r o(/tan e)nergê=| kata\
to\ mnêmoneu/ein, ou(/tôs e)n tê=| psuchê=| le/gei, o(/ti pro/teron
tou=to ê)/kousen ê)\ ê)/|stheto ê)\ e)no/êsen.]--Ibid. p. 452, b.
28.]

[Footnote 129: Ibid. p. 450, a. 30; p. 451, a. 15: [Greek: to\
mnêmoneu/ein, ô(s ei)ko/nos ou(= pha/ntasma, e(/xis]. Themistius
**ad Aristot. De Memoriâ, p. 240, ed. Spengel.]

[Footnote 130: Aristot. Analyt. Poster. ii. p. 99, b. 36: [Greek:
monê\ tou= ai)sthê/matos]. It may be remarked that in the Topica
Aristotle urges a dialectical objection against this or a similar
doctrine (Topic. IV. iv. v. p. 125, b. 6-19), and against his own
definition cited in the preceding note, where he calls [Greek:
mnê/mê] an [Greek: e(/xis]. Compare the first chapter of the
Metaphysica.]

But though some animals have memory, no animal except man has
Reminiscence. Herein man surpasses them all.[131] Aristotle draws a
marked distinction between the two; between the (memorial) retentive
and reviving functions, when working unconsciously and instinctively,
and the same two functions, when stimulated and guided by a
deliberate purpose of our own--which he calls reminiscence. This last
is like a syllogism or course of ratiocinative inference, performable
only by minds capable of taking counsel and calculating. He considers
memory as a movement proceeding from the centre and organs of sense
to the soul, and stamping an impression thereupon; while reminiscence
is a counter-movement proceeding from the soul to the organs of
sense.[132] In the process of reminiscence, movements of the soul and
movements of the body are conjoined,[133] more or less perturbing and
durable according to the temperament of the individual. The process
is intentional and deliberate, instigated by the desire to search for
and recover some lost phantasm or cognition; its success depends upon
the fact that there exists by nature a regular observable order of
sequence among the movements of the system, physical as well as
psychical. The consequents follow their antecedents either
universally, or at least according to customary rules, in the
majority of cases.[134]

[Footnote 131: Aristot. De Memor. et Rem. ii. p. 453, a. 8. He draws
the same distinction in Hist. Animal. I. i. p. 488, b. 26.]

[Footnote 132: Aristot. De Animâ, I. iv. p. 408, b. 17. De Memor. et
Remin. i. p. 450, a. 30; ii. p. 453, a. 10: [Greek: to\
a)namimnê/skesthai/ e)stin oi(=on sullo/gismo/s tis.]]

[Footnote 133: Aristot. De Memor. et Rem. ii. p. 453, a. 14-23.]

[Footnote 134: Aristot. De Memor. et Rem. ii. p. 451, b. 10: [Greek:
sumbai/nousi d' ai( a)namnê/seis, e)peidê\ pe/phuken ê( ki/nêsis
ê(/de gene/sthai meta\ tê/nde.]]

The consequent is either (1) like its antecedent, wholly or
partially; or (2) contrary to it; or (3) has been actually felt in
juxtaposition with it. In reminiscence, we endeavour to regain the
forgotten consequent by hunting out some antecedent whereupon it is
likely to follow; taking our start either from the present moment or
from some other known point.[135] We run over many phantasms until we
hit upon the true antecedent; the possibility of reminiscence depends
upon our having this within our mental reach, among our accessible
stock of ideas: if such be not the case, reminiscence is
impracticable, and we must learn over again.[136] We are most likely
to succeed, if we get upon the track or order wherein events actually
occurred; thus, if we are trying to recollect a forgotten verse or
sentence, we begin to repeat it from the first word; the same
antecedent may indeed call up different consequents at different
times, but it will generally call up what has habitually followed it
before.[137]

[Footnote 135: Ibid. b. 18: [Greek: dio\ kai\ to\ e)phexê=s
thêreu/omen noê/santes a)po\ tou= nu=n ê)\ a)/llou tino/s, kai\ a)ph'
o(moi/ou ê)\ e)nanti/ou ê)\ tou= su/neggus.]

About the associative property of Contraries see also De Somno et
Vigil. i. p. 453, b. 27.]

[Footnote 136: Aristot. De Memor. et Rem. ii. p. 452, a. 7: [Greek:
polla/kis d' ê)/dê me\n a)dunatei= a)namnêsthê=nai, zêtei=n de\
du/natai kai\ eu(ri/skei. tou=to de\ gi/netai kinou=nti polla/, e(/ôs
a)\n toiau/tên kinê/sê| ki/nêsin, ê(=| a)kolouthê/sei to\ pra=gma.
to\ ga\r memnê=sthai/ e)sti to\ e)nei=nai duna/mei **tê\n
kinou=san; tou=to de/, ô(st' e)x au)tou= kai\ ô(=n e)/chei kinê/seôn
kinêthê=nai, ô(/sper ei)/rêtai.]]

[Footnote 137: Ibid. ii. p. 452, a. 2.]

The movements of Memory and of Reminiscence are partly corporeal and
partly psychical, just as those of Sensation and Phantasy are. We
compare in our remembrance greater and less (either in time or in
external magnitudes) through similar internal movements differing
from each other in the same, proportion, but all on a miniature
scale.[138] These internal movements often lead to great discomfort,
when a person makes fruitless efforts to recover the forgotten
phantasm that he desires; especially with excitable men, who are much
disturbed by their own phantasms. They cannot stop the movement once
begun; and, when their sensitive system is soft and flexible, they
find that they have unwittingly provoked the bodily movements
belonging to anger or fear, or some other painful emotion.[139] These
movements, when once provoked, continue in spite of the opposition of
the person that experiences them. He brings upon himself the reality
of the painful emotion; just as we find that, after we have very
frequently pronounced a sentence or sung a song, the internal
movements left in our memories are sometimes so strong and so
persistent, that they act on our vocal organs even without any
volition on our parts, and determine us to sing the song or pronounce
the sentence over again in reality.[140] Slow men are usually good in
memory, quick men and apt learners are good in reminiscence: the two
are seldom found together.[141]

[Footnote 138: Ibid. b. 12: [Greek: e)/sti ga\r e)n au)tê=| ta\
o(/moia schê/mata kai\ kinê/seis.--pa/nta ga\r ta\ e)nto\s e)la/ttô,
ô(/sper a)na/logon kai\ ta\ e)kto/s.]]

[Footnote 139: Aristot. De Memor. et Rem. ii. p. 453, a. 22: [Greek:
o( a)namimnêsko/menos kai\ thêreu/ôn sômatiko/n ti kinei=, e)n ô(=|
to\ pa/thos.]]

[Footnote 140: Ibid. p. 453, a. 28: [Greek: e)/oike to\ pa/thos toi=s
o)no/masi kai\ me/lesi kai\ lo/gois, o(/tan dia\ sto/matos ge/nêtai/
ti au)tô=n spho/dra; pausame/nois ga\r kai\ ou) boulome/nois
e)pe/rchetai pa/lin a)/|dein ê)\ le/gein.]]

[Footnote 141: Ibid. i. p. 449, b. 7.]

In this account of Memory and Reminiscence, Aristotle displays an
acute and penetrating intelligence of the great principles of the
Association of Ideas. But these principles are operative not less in
memory than in reminiscence: and the exaggerated prominence that he
has given to the distinction between the two (determined apparently
by a wish to keep the procedure of man apart from that of animals)
tends to perplex his description of the associative process. At the
same time, his manner of characterizing phantasy, memory, and
reminiscence, as being all of them at once corporeal and
psychical--involving, like sensation, internal movements of the body
as well as phases of the consciousness, sometimes even passing into
external movements of the bodily organs without our volition--all
this is a striking example of psychological observation, as well as
of consistency in following out the doctrine laid down at the
commencement of his chief treatise: Soul as the Form implicated with
Body as the Matter,--the two being an integral concrete separable
only by abstraction.

We come now to the highest and (in Aristotle's opinion) most
honourable portion of the soul--the Noûs or noëtic faculty, whereby
we cogitate, understand, reason, and believe or opine under the
influence of reason.[142] According to the uniform scheme of
Aristotle, this highest portion of the soul, though distinct from all
the lower, presupposes them all. As the sentient soul presupposes the
nutrient, so also the cogitant soul presupposes the nutrient, the
sentient, the phantastic, the memorial, and the reminiscent.
Aristotle carefully distinguishes the sentient department of the soul
from the cogitant, and refutes more than once the doctrine of those
philosophers that identified the two. But he is equally careful to
maintain the correlation between them, and to exhibit the sentient
faculty not only as involving in itself a certain measure of
intellectual discrimination, but also as an essential and fundamental
condition to the agency of the cogitant, as a portion of the human
soul. We have already gone through the three successive
stages--phantastic, memorial, reminiscent--whereby the interval
between sensation and cogitation is bridged over. Each of the three
is directly dependent on past sensation, either as reproduction or as
corollary; each of them is an indispensable condition of man's
cogitation; moreover, in the highest of the three, we have actually
slid unperceived into the cogitant phase of the human soul; for
Aristotle declares the reminiscent process to be of the nature of a
syllogism.[143] That the soul cannot cogitate or reason without
phantasms--that phantasms are required for the actual working of the
human Noûs--he affirms in the most explicit manner.[144]

[Footnote 142: Aristot. De Animâ, III. iv. p. 429, a. 10: [Greek:
peri\ de\ tou= mori/ou tou= tê=s psuchê=s ô(=| ginô/skei te ê(
psuchê\ kai\ phronei=.] He himself defines what he means by [Greek:
nou=s] a few lines lower; and he is careful to specify it as [Greek:
o( tê=s psuchê=s nou=s--o( a)/ra kalou/menos tê=s psuchê=s nou=s
(le/gô de\ nou=n, ô(=| dianoei=tai kai\ u(polamba/nei ê(
psuchê/)]--a. 22.

In the preceding chapter he expressly discriminates [Greek: no/êsis]
from [Greek: u(po/lêpsis]. This last word [Greek: u(po/lêpsis] is the
most general term for _believing_ or _opining_ upon reasons good or
bad; the varieties under it are [Greek: e)pistê/mê, do/xa, phro/nêsis
kai\ ta)nanti/a tou/tôn] (p. 427, b. 16-27).]

[Footnote 143: Aristot. De Memor. et Rem. ii. p. 453 a. 10.]

[Footnote 144: Ibid. p. 449, b. 31-p. 450, a. 12: [Greek: noei=n ou)k
e)/stin a)/neu phanta/smatos--ê( de\ mnê/mê kai\ ê( tô=n noêtô=n ou)k
a)/neu phanta/smato/s e)stin.]--De Animâ, III. vii. p. 431, a. 16.]

The doctrine of Aristotle respecting Noûs has been a puzzle, even
from the time of his first commentators. Partly from the obscurity
inherent in the subject, partly from the defective condition of his
text as it now stands, his meaning cannot be always clearly
comprehended, nor does it seem that the different passages can be
completely reconciled.

Anaxagoras, Demokritus, and other philosophers, appear to have spoken
of Noûs or Intellect in a large and vague sense, as equivalent to
Soul generally. Plato seems to have been the first to narrow and
specialize the meaning; distinguishing pointedly (as we have stated
above) the rational or encephalic soul, in the cranium, with its
circular rotations, from the two lower souls, **thoracic and
abdominal. Aristotle agreed with him in this distinction (either of
separate souls or of separate functions in the same soul); but he
attenuated and divested it of all connexion with separate corporeal
lodgment, or with peculiar movements of any kind. In his psychology,
the brain no longer appears as the seat of intelligence, but simply
as a cold, moist, and senseless organ, destined to countervail the
excessive heat of the heart: which last is the great centre of animal
heat, of life, and of the sentient soul. Aristotle declares Noûs not
to be connected with, or dependent on, any given bodily organs or
movements appropriated to itself: this is one main circumstance
distinguishing it from the nutrient soul as well as from the sentient
soul, each of which rests indispensably upon corporeal organs and
agencies of its own.

It will be remembered that we stated the relation of Soul to Body (in
Aristotle's view) as that of Form to Matter; the two together
constituting a concrete individual, numerically one; also that Form
and Matter, each being essentially relative to the other, admitted of
gradations, higher and lower; _e.g._ a massive cube of marble is
already _materia formata_, but it is still purely _materia_, relative
to the statue that may be obtained from it. Now, the grand region of
Form is the Celestial Body--the vast, deep, perceivable, circular
mass circumscribing the Kosmos, and enclosing, in and around its
centre, Earth with the other three elements, tenanted by substances
generated and perishable. This Celestial Body is the abode of
divinity, including many divine beings who take part in its eternal
rotations, viz. the Sun, Moon, Stars, &c., and other Gods. Now, every
soul, or every form that animates the matter of a living being,
derives its vitalizing influence from this celestial region. All
seeds of life include within them a spiritual or gaseous heat, more
divine than the four elements, proceeding from the sun, and in nature
akin to the element of the stars. Such solar or celestial heat
differs generically from the heat of fire. It is the only source from
whence the principle of life, with the animal heat that accompanies
it, can be obtained. Soul, in all its varieties, proceeds from
hence.[145]

[Footnote 145: Aristot. De Generat. Animal. II. iii. p. 736, b. 29:
[Greek: pa/sês me\n ou)=n psuchê=s du/namis e(te/rou sô/matos e)/oike
kekoinônêke/nai kai\ theiote/rou tô=n kaloume/nôn stoichei/ôn; ô(s
de\ diaphe/rousi timio/têti ai( psuchai\ kai\ a)timi/a| a)llê/lôn,
ou(/tô kai\ ê( toiau/tê diaphe/rei phu/sis; pa/ntôn me\n ga\r e)n
tô=| spe/rmati e)nupa/rchei, o(/per poiei= go/nima ei)=nai ta\
spe/rmata, to\ kalou/menon thermo/n.]]


But though all varieties of Soul emanate from the same celestial
source, they possess the divine element in very different degrees,
and are very unequal in comparative worth and dignity. The lowest
variety, or nutritive soul--the only one possessed by plants, among
which there is no separation of sex[146]--is contained potentially in
the seed, and is thus transmitted when that seed is matured into a
new individual. In animals, which possess it along with the sensitive
soul and among which the sexes are separated, it is also contained
potentially in the generative system of the female separately; and
the first commencement of life in the future animal is thus a purely
vegetable life.[147] The sensitive soul, the characteristic of the
complete animal, cannot be superadded except by copulation and the
male semen. The female, being comparatively impotent and having less
animal heat, furnishes only the matter of the future offspring; form,
or the moving, fecundating, cause, is supplied by the male. Through
the two together the new individual animal is completed, having not
merely the nutritive soul, but also the sentient soul along with
it.[148]

[Footnote 146: Ibid. I. xxiii. p. 731, a. 27.]

[Footnote 147: Aristot. De Generat. Animal. II. iii. p. 736, b. 12.]

[Footnote 148: Ibid. I. ii. p. 716, a. 4-17; xix. p. 726, b. 33; xx.
p. 728, a. 17; xxi. p. 729, b. 6-27.]

Both the nutritive and the sentient souls have, each of them
respectively, a special bodily agency and movement belonging to them.
But the Noûs, or the noëtic soul, has no partnership with any similar
bodily agency. There is no special corporeal potentiality (to speak
in Aristotelian language) which it is destined to actualize. It
enters from without, and emanates from a still more exalted influence
of that divine celestial substance from which all psychical or
vitalizing heat proceeds.[149] It is superinduced upon the nutritive
and sentient souls, and introduces itself at an age of the individual
later than both of them. Having no part of the bodily organism
specially appropriated to it, this variety of soul--what is called
the Noûs--stands distinguished from the other two in being perfectly
separable from the body;[150] that is, separable from the organized
body which it is the essential function of the two lower souls to
actualize, and with which both of them are bound up. The Noûs is not
separable from the body altogether; it belongs essentially to the
divine celestial body, and to those luminaries and other divine
beings by whom portions of it are tenanted. Theorizing
contemplation--the perfect, unclouded, unembarrassed, exercise of
the theoretical Noûs--is the single mental activity of these
divinities; contemplation of the formal regularity of the Kosmos,
with its eternal and faultless rotations, and with their own
perfection as participating therein. The celestial body is the body
whereto Noûs, or the noëtic soul, properly belongs;[151] quite apart
from the two other souls, sentient and nutritive, upon which it is
grafted in the animal body; and apart also from all the necessities
of human action, preceded by balanced motives and deliberate
choice.[152]

[Footnote 149: Ibid. II. iii. p. 736, b. 27: [Greek: lei/petai de\
to\n nou=n mo/non thu/rathen e)peisie/nai, kai\ thei=on ei)=nai
mo/non; ou)the\n ga\r au)tou= tê=| e)nergei/a| koinônei= sômatikê\
e)ne/rgeia.] The words [Greek: thei=on ei)=nai _mo/non_] must not be
construed strictly, for in the next following passage he proceeds to
declare that _all_ [Greek: psuchê/, psuchikê\ du/namis] or [Greek:
a)rchê/], partakes of the divine element, and that in this respect
there is only a difference of degree between one [Greek: psuchê\] and
another.]

[Footnote 150: Ibid. p. 737, a. 10: [Greek: o( kalou/menos nou=s]. De
Animâ, II. ii. p. 413, b. 25; iii. p. 415, a. 11.]

[Footnote 151: Respecting [Greek: to\ a)/nô sô=ma], see the copious
citations in Trendelenburg's note ad Aristot. De Animâ, II. vii.;
Comm. p. 373.]

[Footnote 152: Aristot. Ethic. Nikom. X. viii. p. 1178, b. 20:
[Greek: tô=| dê\ zô=nti tou= pra/ttein a)phê|rême/nô|, e)/ti de\
ma=llon tou= poiei=n, ti/ lei/petai plê\n theôri/as? ô(/ste ê( tou=
theou= e)ne/rgeia, makario/têti diaphe/rousa, theôrêtikê\ a)\n
ei)/ê.]--See also Metaphysic. [Greek: L]. v. p. 1074, b. 26-35.]

From this celestial body, a certain influence of Noûs is transferred
to some of the mortal inhabitants of earth, water, and air. Thus a
third or noëtic soul--or rather a third noëtic function--is added to
the two existing functions, sensitive and nutrient, of the animal
soul, which acquires thereby an improved aptitude for, and
correlation with, the Formal and Universal. We have already stated
that the sensitive soul possesses this aptitude to a certain extent;
it receives the impression of sensible forms, without being impressed
by the matter accompanying them. The noëtic function strengthens and
sharpens the aptitude; the soul comes into correlation with those
cogitable or intellective forms which are involved in the sensible
forms;[153] it rises from the lower generalities of the Second
Philosophy, to the higher generalities of the First Philosophy.

[Footnote 153: Aristot. De Animâ, III. viii. p. 432, a. 6: [Greek:
e)n toi=s ei)/desi toi=s ai)sthêtoi=s ta\ noêta/ e)stin.]]

As the sentient or percipient soul is the form or correlate of all
perceivables, and thus identified with them in nature, all of them
having existence only in relation to it,--so the cogitant or
intellective soul is the form or correlate of all cogitables, all of
which exist relatively to it, and only relatively.[154] It is in fact
the highest of all forms--the Form of Forms; the mental or subjective
aspect of all formal reality.

[Footnote 154: Ibid. p. 432, b. 2: [Greek: o( nou=s ei)/dos ei)dô=n
kai\ ê( ai)/sthêsis ei)=dos ai)sthêtô=n.]]

Such at least is the tendency and purpose of that noëtic influence
which the celestial substance imparts to the human soul; but it is
realized only to a very small degree. In its characteristic
theorizing efficacy, the godlike Noûs counts for a small fraction of
the whole soul, though superexcellent in quality.[155] There are but
few men in whom it is tolerably developed, and even in those few it
is countervailed by many other agencies.[156] The noëtic function in
men and animals exists only in companionship with the two other
psychical functions. It is subservient to the limits and conditions
that they impose, as well as to the necessities of individual and
social action; to all that is required for "acting like a man,"
according to the Aristotelian phrase. Man's nature is complex, and
not self-sufficing for a life of theorizing contemplation, such as
that wherein the celestial inmates pass their immortality of
happiness.[157]

[Footnote 155: Aristot. Ethic. Nikom. X. vii. p. 1177, b. 34: [Greek:
ei) ga\r kai\ tô=| o)/gkô| mikro/n e)sti, duna/mei kai\ timio/têti
polu\ ma=llon pa/ntôn u(pere/chei.]

[Footnote 156: Aristot. De Memor. et Remin. i. p. 450, a. **18.]

[Footnote 157: Aristot. Ethic. Nikom. X. vii. p. 1177, b. 26: [Greek:
o( de\ toiou=tos a)\n ei)/ê bi/os krei/ttôn ê)\ kat'
a)/nthrôpon].--viii. p. 1178, b. 6: [Greek: deê/setai ou)=n toiou/tôn
pro\s to\ a)nthrôpeu/esthai.]--ix. p. 1178, b. 33: [Greek: ou)k
au)ta/rkês ê( phu/sis pro\s to\ theôrei=n]. Compare similar
sentiments in Aristot. Metaphys. A. ii. p. 983, a. 1.]

We have thus to study the noëtic function according to the
manifestations of it that we find in man, and to a certain extent in
some other privileged animals. Bees, for example, partake in the
divine gift to a certain extent; being distinguished in this respect
from their analogues--wasps and hornets.[158]

[Footnote 158: Aristot. De Gen. Animal. III. x. p. 760, a. 4: [Greek:
o)/ntos de\ _perittou= tou=_ ge/nous kai\ i)di/ou tou= tô=n
melittô=n].--p. 761, a. 4: [Greek: ou) ga\r e)/chousin] (wasps and
hornets) [Greek: ou)de\n thei=on, ô(/sper to\ ge/nos tô=n melittô=n.]
It is remarkable that [Greek: peritto/s], the epithet here applied by
Aristotle to bees, is the epithet that he also applies to men of
theoretical and speculative activity, as contrasted with men prudent
and judicious in action (see Metaphys. A. ii. p. 983, a. 2; also
Ethic. Nikom. VI. vii. p. 1141, b. 6). Elsewhere he calls bees
[Greek: phro/nima] (Metaphys. A. i. p. 980, b. 22). See a good note
of Torstrick (on Aristot. De Animâ, III. p. 428, a. 10), p. 172 of
his Commentary. Aristotle may possibly have been one among the
philosophers that Virgil had in his mind, in Georgics, iv. 219:--
  "His quidam signis, atque hæc exempla secuti,
  Esse apibus partem divinæ mentis, et haustus
  Æthereos dixere: Deum namque ire per omnes
  Terrasque, tractusque maris, coelumque profundum," &c.]

In these and other animals, and in man to a still greater degree, the
theorizing activity exists; but it is either starved, or at least has
to deal with materials obscure, puzzling, conflicting; while, on the
other hand, the practical intellect becomes largely developed,
through the pressure of wants and desires, combined with the teaching
of experience. In Aristotle's view, sensible perception is a separate
source of knowledge, accompanied with judgment and discrimination,
independent of the noëtic function. Occasionally, he refers the
intellectual superiority of man to the properly attempered
combination and antagonism of heat in the heart with cold in the
brain, each strong and pure;[159] all the highly endowed animals (he
says) have greater animal heat, which is the essential condition of a
better soul;[160] he reckons the finer sense of touch possessed by
man as an essential condition of the same intellectual result.[161]
Sensible perception in its five diverse manifestations, together with
its secondary psychical effects--phantasy and memory, accumulates in
the human mind (and in some animals) a greater or less experience of
particular facts; from some of which inferences are drawn as to
others unknown, directing conduct as well as enlarging
knowledge.[162]

[Footnote 159: Aristot. De Generat. Animal. II. vi. p. 744, a. 11-31:
[Greek: dêloi= de\ tê\n eu)krasi/an ê( dia/noia; phronimô/taton ga/r
e)sti tô=n zô=|ôn a)/nthrôpos.] We may remark that Aristotle
considers cold as in some cases a positive property, not simply as
the absence or privation of heat (De Partibus Animal. II. ii. p. 649,
a. 18). The heart is the part wherein the psychical fire (as it were)
is kept burning: [Greek: tê=s psuchê=s ô(/sper e)mpepureume/nês e)n
toi=s mori/ois tou/tois] (Aristot. De Vitâ et Morte, iv. p. 469, b.
16). Virgil, in the beautiful lines of his Second Georgic (483),
laments that he is disqualified for deep philosophical studies by the
want of heat round his heart:--&P "Sin, has ne possim naturæ accedere
partes, Frigidus obstiterit circum præcordia sanguis," &c.]

[Footnote 160: Aristot. De Respirat. xiii. p. 477, a. 16.]

[Footnote 161: Aristot. De Animâ, II. ix. p. 421, a. 21.]

[Footnote 162: Aristot. Metaphys. A. i. pp. 980-1.]

All this process--a perpetual movement of sense and memory--begins
from infancy, and goes on independently of Noûs or the noëtic
function properly so called; which grows up gradually at a later age,
aided by the acquisition of language and by instruction conveyed
through language. The supervening Noûs presupposes and depends upon
what has been thus treasured up by experience. Though, in the
celestial body. Noûs exists separately from human beings, and though
it there operates _proprio motu_ apart from sense, such is not the
case with the human Noûs; which depends upon the co-operation, and is
subject to the restrictions, of the complicated soul and body
wherewith it is domiciled--restrictions differing in each individual
case. Though the noëtic process is distinct from sense, yet without
sense it cannot take place in man. Aristotle expressly says: "You
cannot cogitate without a phantasm or without a continuous image."
Now the phantasm has been already explained as a relic of movements
of sense--or as those movements themselves, looked at in another
point of view.[163] "When we cogitate" (he says), "our mental
affection is the same as when we draw a triangle for geometrical
study; for there, though we do not make use of the fact that the
triangle is determinate in its magnitude, we still draw it of a
determinate magnitude. So in cogitation, even when we are not
cogitating a determinate _quantum_, we nevertheless set before our
eyes a determinate _quantum_, but we do not cogitate it _quatenus_
determinate."[164] We cannot even (he goes on to say) remember the
_cogitabilia_ without "a phantasm or sensible image; so that our
memory of them is only by way of concomitance" (indirect and
secondary).[165] Phantasy is thus absolutely indispensable to
cogitation: first to carrying on the process at all; next to
remembering it after it is past. Without either the visible phantasm
of objects seen and touched, or the audible phantasm of words heard
and remembered, the Noûs in human beings would be a nullity.[166]

[Footnote 163: Aristot. De Somniis, i. p. 459, a. 15; De Animâ, III.
vii. p. 431, a. 17; iii. p. 428, b. 12.]

[Footnote 164: Aristot. De Memor. et Remin. i. p. 449, b. 30: [Greek:
e)pei\ de\ peri\ phantasi/as ei)/rêtai pro/teron e)n toi=s peri\
psuchê=s, kai\ noei=n ou)k e)/stin a)/neu phanta/smatos; sumbai/nei
ga\r to\ au)to\ pa/thos e)n tô=| noei=n o(/per kai\ e)n tô=|
diagra/phein; e)kei= te ga\r ou)the\n proschrô/menoi tô=| to\ poso\n
ô(risme/non ei)=nai to\ trigô/nou, o(/môs gra/phomen ô(risme/non
kata\ to\ poso/n; kai\ o( noô=n ô(sau/tôs, ka)\n mê\ poso\n noê=|,
ti/thetai pro\ o)mma/tôn poso/n, noei= d' ou)ch ê(=| poso/n.]

This passage appears to be as clear a statement of the main doctrine
of Nominalism as can be found in Hobbes or Berkeley. In the sixteenth
section of the Introduction to the Principles of Human Knowledge,
Berkeley says:--"And here it must be acknowledged that a man may
consider a figure merely as triangular, without attending to the
particular qualities of the angles or relations of the sides.--In
like manner we may consider Peter to far forth as man, or so far
forth as animal, without framing the forementioned idea, either of
man or animal, _inasmuch as all that is perceived is not
considered_." Berkeley has not improved upon the statement of
Aristotle.]

[Footnote 165: Aristot. De Memor. et Remin. i. p. 450, a. 13.]

[Footnote 166: About sense and hearing, as the _fundamenta_ of
intellect, see Aristot. De Sensu et Sensili, i. p. 437, a. 1-17.]

We see that, though Aristotle recognizes a general distinction
between phantasy and cogitation, and alludes to many animals as
having the former without attaining to the latter, yet he also
declares that in man, who possesses both, not only is cogitation
dependent upon phantasy, but phantasy passes into cogitation by
gradations almost imperceptible. In regard to the practical
application of Noûs (_i.e._ to animal movements determined either by
appetite or by reason), he finds a great difficulty in keeping the
distinction clearly marked. Substantially, indeed, he lets it drop.
When he speaks of phantasy as being either calculating or perceptive,
we are unable to see in what respect _calculating phantasy_ (which he
states not to belong to other animals) differs from an effort of
cogitation.[167] Indeed, he speaks with some diffidence respecting
any distribution of parts in the same soul, suspecting that such
distribution is not real but logical: you may subdivide as much as
you choose.[168]

[Footnote 167: Aristot. De Animâ, III. x. p. 433, a. 9-b. 30: [Greek:
ei)/ tis tê\n phantasi/an tithei/ê ô(s no/êsi/n tina--phantsi/a de\
pa=sa ê)\ logistikê\ ê)\ ai)sthêtikê/; tau/tês me\n ou)=n kai\ ta\
a)/lla zô=|a mete/chei.] Also vii. p. 431, b. 7.]

[Footnote 168: Ibid. ix. p. 432, a. 23.]

It thus appears clear that Aristotle restricts the Noûs or noëtic
function _in man_ to the matters of sense and experience, physical or
mental, and that he considers the phantasm to be an essential
accompaniment of the cogitative act. Yet this does not at all detract
from his view of the grandeur, importance, and wide range of survey,
belonging to the noëtic function. It is the portion of man's nature
that correlates with the abstract and universal; but it is only a
portion of his nature, and must work in conjunction and harmony with
the rest. The abstract cannot be really separated from the concrete,
nor the universal from one or other of its particulars, nor the
essence from that whereof it is the essence, nor the attribute from
that of which it is the attribute, nor the genus and species from the
individuals comprehended therein; nor, to speak in purely
Aristotelian language, the Form from some Matter, or the Matter from
some Form. In all these cases there is a _notional_ or _logical_
distinction, impressing the mind as the result of various
comparisons, noted by an appropriate term, and remembered afterwards
by means of that term (that is, by means of an audible or visible
phantasm); but real separation there neither is nor can be. This is
the cardinal principle of Aristotle, repeated in almost all his
works--his marked antithesis against Plato. Such logical distinctions
as those here noticed (they might be multiplied without number) it
belongs to Noûs or the noëtic function to cognize. But the real
objects, in reference to which alone the distinctions have a meaning,
are concrete and individual; and the cognizing subject is really the
entire man, employing indeed the noëtic function, but employing it
with the aid of other mental forces, phantasms and remembrances, real
and verbal.

The noëtic soul is called by Aristotle "the place of Forms," "the
potentiality of Forms," "the correlate of things apart from
Matter."[169] It cogitates these Forms in or along with the
phantasms: the cogitable Forms are contained in the sensible Forms;
for there is nothing really existent beyond or apart from visible or
tangible magnitudes, with their properties and affections, and with
the so-called abstractions considered by the geometer. Hence, without
sensible perception, a man can neither learn nor understand anything;
in all his theoretical contemplations, he requires some phantasm to
contemplate along with them.[170]

[Footnote 169: Aristot. De Animâ, III. iv. p. 429, a. 27, b. 22.]

[Footnote 170: Ibid. vii. p. 431, b. 2: [Greek: ta\ me\n ou)=n ei)/dê
to\ noêtiko\n e)n toi=s phanta/smasi noei=.]--viii. p. 432, a. 3:
[Greek: e)pei\ de\ ou)de\ pra=gma ou)the/n e)sti para\ ta\ mege/thê,
ô(s dokei=, ta\ ai)sthêta\ kechôrisme/non, e)n toi=s ei)/desi toi=s
ai)sthêtoi=s ta\ noêta/ e)sti, ta/ te e)n a)phaire/sei lego/mena,
kai\ o(/sa tô=n ai)sthêtô=n e(/xeis kai\ pa/thê; kai\ dia\ tou=to
ou)/te mê\ ai)sthano/menos mêthe\n ou)the\n a)\n ma/thoi ou)de\
xunei/ê; o(/tan de\ theôrê=|, a)na/gkê a(/ma pha/ntasma/ ti
theôrei=n.]]

Herein lies one of the main distinctions between the noëtic and the
sentient souls. The sentient deals with particulars, and correlates
with external bodies; the noëtic apprehends universals, which in a
certain sense are within the soul: hence a man can cogitate whenever
or whatever he chooses, but he can see or touch only what is
present.[171] Another distinction is, that the sentient soul is
embodied in special organs, each with determinate capacities, and
correlating with external objects, themselves alike determinate,
acting only under certain conditions of locality. The possibilities
of sensation are thus from the beginning limited; moreover, a certain
relative proportion must be maintained between the percipient and the
perceivable; for extreme or violent sounds, colours, &c., produce no
sensation; on the contrary, they deaden the sentient organ.[172] But
the noëtic soul (what is called the "Noûs of the soul," to use
Aristotle's language)[173] is nothing at all in actuality before its
noëtic function commences, though it is everything in potentiality.
It is not embodied in any corporeal organ of its own, nor mingled as
a new elementary ingredient with the body; it does not correlate with
any external objects; it is not so specially attached to some
particulars as to make it antipathetic to others. Accordingly its
possibilities of cogitation are unlimited; it apprehends with equal
facility what is most cogitable and what is least cogitable. It is
thoroughly indeterminate in its nature, and is in fact at first a
mere unlimited cogitative potentiality;[174] like a tablet, upon
which no letters have as yet been written, but upon which all or any
letters _may be_ written.[175]

[Footnote 171: Ibid. II. v. p. 417, b. 22.]

[Footnote 172: Aristot. De Animâ, III. iv. p. 429, a. 31.]

[Footnote 173: Ibid. a. 22: [Greek: o( a)/ra kalou/menos tê=s
psuchê=s nou=s (le/gô de\ nou=n ô(=| dianoei=tai kai\ u(polamba/nei
ê( psuchê/) ou)the/n e)stin e)nergei/a| tô=n o)/ntôn pri\n noei=n.]]

[Footnote 174: Ibid. a. 21: [Greek: ô(/ste mêd' au)tou= ei)=nai
phu/sin mêdemi/an a)ll' ê)\ tau/tên, o(/ti dunato/n.]]

[Footnote 175: Ibid. p. 430, a. 1.]

We have already said that the Noûs of the human soul emanates from a
peculiar influence of the celestial body, which is the special region
of Form in the Kosmos. Through it we acquire an enlarged power of
apprehending the abstract and universal; we can ascend above sensible
forms to the cogitable forms contained therein; we can consider all
forms in themselves, without paying attention to the matter wherein
they are embodied. Instead of considering the concrete solid or
liquid before us, we can mentally analyse them, and thus study
solidity in the abstract, fluidity in the abstract. While our senses
judge of water as hot and cold, our noëtic function enables us to
appreciate water in the abstract--to determine its essence, and to
furnish a definition of it.[176] In all these objects, as
combinations of Form with Matter, the cogitable form exists
potentially; and is abstracted or considered abstractedly, by the
cogitant Noûs.[177] Yet this last (as we have already seen) cannot
operate except along with and by aid of phantasms--of impressions
revived or remaining from sense. It is thus immersed in the materials
of sense, and has no others. But it handles them in a way of its own,
and under new points of view; comparing and analysing; recognizing
the abstract in the concrete, and the universal in the particular;
discriminating mentally and logically the one from the other; and
noting the distinction by appropriate terms. Such distinctions are
the _noümena_, generated in the process of cogitation by Noûs itself.
The Noûs, as it exists in any individual, gradually loses its
original character of naked potentiality, and becomes an actual
working force, by means of its own acquired materials.[178] It is an
aggregate of _noümena_, all of them in nature identical with itself;
and, while cogitating them, the Noûs at the same time cogitates
itself. Considered abstractedly, apart from matter, they exist only
in the mind itself; in theoretical speculation, the _cognoscens_ and
the _cognitum_ are identical. But they are not really separable from
matter, and have no reality apart from it.

[Footnote 176: Ibid. p. 429, b. 10.]

[Footnote 177: Ibid. p. 430, a. 2-9.]

[Footnote 178: Aristot. De Animâ, II. v. p. 417, b. 23. Ibid. III.
iv. p. 429, b. 7: [Greek: o(/tan du/nêtai e)nergei=n di' au(tou=.]]

The distinction, yet at the same time correlation, between Form and
Matter, pervades all nature (Aristotle affirms), and will be found in
the Noûs as elsewhere. We must recognize an _Intellectus Agens_ or
constructive, and an _Intellectus Patiens_ or receptive.[179] The
_Agens_ is the great intellectual energy pervading the celestial
body, and acting upon all the animals susceptible of its operation;
analogous to light, which illuminates the diaphanous medium, and
elevates what was mere potential colour into colour actual and
visible.[180] The _Patiens_ is the intellectual receptivity acted
upon in each individual, and capable of being made to cogitate every
thing; anterior to the _Agens_, in time, so far as regards the
individual, yet as a general fact (when we are talking of man as a
species) not anterior even in time, but correlative. Of the two, the
_Intellectus Agens_ is the more venerable; it is pure intellectual
energy, unmixed, unimpressible from without, and separable from all
animal body. It is this, and nothing more, when considered apart from
animal body; but it is then eternal and immortal, while the
_Intellectus Patiens_ perishes with the remaining soul and with the
body. Yet though the _Intellectus Agens_ is thus eternal, and though
_we_ have part in it, we cannot remember any of its operations
anterior to our own maturity; for the concurrence of the _Intellectus
Patiens_, which begins and ends with us, is indispensable both to
remembrance and to thought.[181]

[Footnote 179: Ibid. III. v. p. 430, a. 10.]

[Footnote 180: Ibid. a. 14: [Greek: kai\ e)/stin o( me\n toiou=tos
nou=s tô=| pa/nta gi/nesthai, o( de\ tô=| pa/nta poiei=n, ô(s e(/xis
tis, oi(=on to\ phô=s; tro/pon ga/r tina kai\ to\ phô=s poiei= ta\
duna/mei o)/nta chrô/mata e)nergei/a| chrô/mata.] Aristotle here
illustrates [Greek: nou=s poiêtiko/s] by [Greek: phô=s] and [Greek:
e(/xis]; and we know what view he takes of [Greek: phô=s] (De Animâ,
II. vii. p. 418, b. 9) as the [Greek: e)ne/rgeia] or [Greek: e(/xis
tou= diaphanou=s]--which _diaphanous_ he explains to be a [Greek:
phu/sis tis e)nupa/rchousa e)n a)e/ri kai\ u(/dati kai\ e)n tô=|
a)i+di/ô| tô=| a)/nô sô/mati]. Judging by this illustration, it seems
proper to couple the [Greek: nou=s poiêtiko/s] here with his
declaration in De Generat. Animal. II. p. 736, b. 28: [Greek: to\n
nou=n mo/non thu/rathen e)peise/nai kai\ thei=on ei)=nai mo/non]: he
cannot consider the [Greek: nou=s poiêtiko/s], which is of the nature
of Form, as belonging to each individual man like the [Greek: nou=s
pathêtiko/s].]

[Footnote 181: Aristot. De Animâ, III. v. p. 430, a. 17: [Greek: kai\
ou(=tos o( nou=s] (_i. e._ [Greek: poiêtiko/s) chôristo\s kai\
a)pathê\s kai\ a)migê/s, tê=| ou)si/a| ô)\n e)ne/rgeia; a)ei\ ga\r
timiô/teron to\ poiou=n tou= pa/schontos, kai\ ê( a)rchê\ tê=s
u(/lês.]--Ibid. a. 22: [Greek: chôristhei\s d' e)sti\ mo/non tou=th'
o(/per e)sti/, kai\ tou=to mo/non a)tha/naton kai\ a)i+/dion; ou)
mnêmoneu/omen de/, o(/ti tou=to me\n a)pathe/s, o( de\ pathêtiko\s
nou=s phtharto/s, kai\ a)/neu tou/tou ou)the\n noei=.] In this
obscure and difficult chapter (difficult even to Theophrastus the
friend and pupil of the author), we have given the best meaning that
the words seem to admit.]

We see here the full extent of Aristotle's difference from the
Platonic doctrine, in respect to the immortality of the soul. He had
defined soul as the first actualization of a body having potentiality
of life with a determinate organism. This of course implied, and he
expressly declares it, that soul and body in each individual case
were one and indivisible, so that the soul of Sokrates perished of
necessity with the body of Sokrates.[182] But he accompanied that
declaration with a reserve in favour of Noûs, and especially of the
theorizing Noûs; which he recognized as a different sort of soul, not
dependent on a determinate bodily organism, but capable of being
separated from it, as the eternal is from the perishable.[183] The
present chapter informs us how far such reserve is intended to go.
That the theorizing Noûs is not limited, like the sentient soul, to a
determinate bodily organism, but exists apart from that organism and
eternally--is maintained as incontestable: it is the characteristic
intellectual activity of the eternal celestial body and the divine
inmates thereof. But the distinction of Form and Matter is here
pointed out, as prevailing in Noûs and in Soul generally, not less
than throughout all other Nature. The theorizing Noûs, as it exists
in Sokrates, Plato, Demokritus, Anaxagoras, Empedokles, Xenokrates,
&c., is individualized in each, and individualized differently in
each. It represents the result of the _Intellectus Agens_ or Formal
Noûs, universal and permanent, upon the _Intellectus Patiens_ or
noëtic receptivity peculiar to each individual; the co-operation of
the two is indispensable to sustain the theorizing intellect of any
individual man. But the _Intellectus Patiens_, or _Receptivus_,
perishes along with the individual. Accordingly, the intellectual
life of Sokrates cannot be continued farther. It cannot be prolonged
after his sensitive and nutritive life has ceased; the noëtic
function, as it exists in him, is subject to the same limits of
duration as the other functions of the soul. The intellectual man is
no more immortal than the sentient man.

[Footnote 182: Ibid. II. i. p. 413, a. 3.]

[Footnote 183: Ibid. ii. p. 413, b. 24: [Greek: peri\ de\ tou= nou=
kai\ tê=s theôrêtikê=s duna/meôs ou)de/n pô phanero/n, a)ll' e)/oike
psuchê=s ge/nos e(/teron ei)=nai, kai\ tou=to mo/non e)nde/chetai
chôri/zesthai, katha/per to\ a)i+/dion tou= phthartou=.]]

Such is the opinion here delivered by Aristotle. And it follows
indeed as a distinct corollary from his doctrine respecting animal
and vegetable procreation in general. Individuality (the being _unum
numero_ in a species) and immortality are in his view incompatible
facts; the one excludes the other. In assigning (as he so often does)
a final cause or purpose to the wide-spread fact of procreation of
species by animals and vegetables, he tells us that every individual
living organism, having once attained the advantage of existence,
yearns and aspires to prolong this for ever, and to become immortal.
But this aspiration cannot be realized; Nature has forbidden it, or
is inadequate to it; no individual can be immortal. Being precluded
from separate immortality, the individual approaches as near to it as
is possible, by generating a new individual like itself, and thus
perpetuating the species. Such is the explanation given by Aristotle
of the great fact pervading the sublunary, organized
world[184]--immortal species of plants, animals, and men, through a
succession of individuals each essentially perishable. The general
doctrine applies to Noûs as well as to the other functions of the
soul. Noûs is immortal; but the individual Sokrates, considered as
noëtic or intellectual, can no more be immortal than the same
individual considered as sentient or reminiscent.

[Footnote 184: Aristot. De Generat. Animal. II. i. p. 731, b. 20,
seq.; De Animâ, II. iv. p. 415, a. 26, seq.; OEconomica, I. iii. p.
1343, b. 23.]

We have already stated that Noûs--Intellect--the noëtic function--is
that faculty of the soul that correlates with the abstract and
universal; with Form apart from Matter. Its process is at once
analytical, synthetical, and retentive. Nature presents to us only
concretes and particulars, in a perpetual course of change and
reciprocal action; in these the abstract and universal are immersed,
and out of these they have to be disengaged by logical analysis. That
the abstract is a derivative from the concrete, and the universal
from particulars--is the doctrine of Aristotle. Ascending from
particulars, the analysis is carried so far that at length it can go
no farther. It continues to divide until it comes to _indivisibles_,
or simple notions, the highest abstractions, and the largest
universals. These are the elements out of which universal
propositions are formed, the first premisses or _principia_ of
demonstration. Unphilosophical minds do not reach these indivisibles
at all: but it is the function of the theorizing Noûs to fasten on
them, and combine them into true propositions. In so far as regards
the indivisibles themselves, falsehood is out of the question, and
truth also, since they affirm nothing. The mind either apprehends
them, or it does not apprehend them: there is no other
alternative.[185] But, when combined into affirmative propositions,
they then are true or false, as the case may be. The formal essence
of each object is among these indivisibles, and is apprehended as
such by the intellect; which, while confining itself to such essence,
is unerring, as each sense is in regard to its own appropriate
perceivables.[186] But, when the intellect goes father, and proceeds
to predicate any attribute respecting the essence, then it becomes
liable to error, as sense is when drawing inferences.

[Footnote 185: Aristot. De Animâ, III. vi. p. 430, a. 26: [Greek: ê(
me\n ou)=n tô=n a)diaire/tôn no/êsis e)n tou/tois peri\ a(\ ou)k
e)/sti to\ pseu=dos; e)n oi(=s de\ kai\ to\ pseu=dos kai\ to\
a)lêthe/s, su/nthesi/s tis ê)/dê noêma/tôn ô(/sper e(\n
o)/ntôn.]--Metaphysica, [Greek: Th]. x. p. 1051, b. 31: [Greek:
peri\ tau=ta ou)k e)/stin a)patêthê=nai, a)ll' ê)\ noei=n ê)\ mê/.]]

[Footnote 186: Aristot. De Animâ, III. vi. p. 430, b. 29. This
portion of the treatise is peculiarly confused and difficult to
understand.]

One of the chief functions that Aristotle assigns to Noûs, or the
noëtic function, is that the _principia_ of demonstration and
knowledge belong to it; and not merely the _principia_, but also, in
cases of action preceded by deliberation and balance of motives, the
ultimate application of _principia_ to action. So that he styles Noûs
both beginning and end; also the beginning of the beginning; and,
moreover, he declares it to be always right and unerring--equal to
Science and even more than Science.[187] These are high praises,
conveying little information, and not reconcilable with other
passages wherein he speaks of the exercise of the noëtic function
([Greek: to\ noei=n]) as sometimes right, sometimes wrong.[188] But,
for the question of psychology, the point to be determined is, in
what sense he meant that _principia_ belonged to Noûs. He certainly
did not mean that the first principles of reasoning were novelties
originated, suggested, or introduced into the soul by noëtic
influence. Not only he does not say this, but he takes pains to
impress the exact contrary. In passages cited a few pages back, he
declares that Noûs in entering the soul brings nothing whatever with
it; that it is an universal potentiality--a capacity in regard to
truth, but nothing more;[189] that it is in fact a capacity not
merely for comparing and judging (to both of which he recognizes even
the sentient soul as competent), but also for combining many into
one, and resolving the apparent one into several; for abstracting,
generalizing, and selecting among the phantasms present, which of
them should be attended to, and which should be left out of
attention.[190] Such is his opinion about the noëtic function; and he
states explicitly that the abstract and universal not only arise from
the concrete and particular, but are inseparable from the same
really--separable only logically.

[Footnote 187: Aristot. Ethic. Nikomach. VI. xii. p. 1143, a. 25, b.
10: [Greek: dio\ kai\ a)rchê\ kai\ te/los nou=s].--Analyt. Post. II.
xviii. p. 100, b. 5.]

[Footnote 188: Aristot. De Animâ, III. iii. p. 427, b. 8: [Greek:
a)ll' ou)de\ to\ noei=n, e)n ô(=| e)/sti to\ o)rthô=s kai\ mê\
o)rthô=s--dianoei=sthai d' e)nde/chetai kai\ pseudô=s.]]

[Footnote 189: Ibid. I. ii. p. 404, a. 30, where he censures
Demokritus: [Greek: ou) dê\ chrê=tai tô=| nô=| ô(s duna/mei tini\
peri\ tê\n a)lê/theian, a)lla\ tau)to\ le/gei psuchê\n kai\
nou=n.]--Compare ibid. III. iv. p. 429, a. 21, b. 30.]

[Footnote 190: Aristot. De Animâ, III. vi. p. 430, b. 5: [Greek: to\
de\ e(\n poiou=n, tou=to o( nou=s e(/kaston].--Ibid. xi. p. 434, a.
9.]

He describes, at the end of the Analytica Posteriora and elsewhere,
the steps whereby the mind ascends gradually from sense, memory, and
experience, to general principles. And he indicates a curious
contrast between these and the noëtic functions. Sense, memory,
phantasy, reminiscence, are movements of the body as well as of the
soul; our thoughts and feelings come and go, none of them remaining
long. But the noëtic process is the reverse of this; it is an arrest
of all this mental movement, a detention of the fugitive thoughts, a
subsidence from perturbation--so that the attention dwells steadily
and for some time on the same matters.[191] Analysis, selection, and
concentration of attention, are the real characteristics of the
Aristotelian Noûs. It is not (as some philosophers have thought) a
source of new general truths, let into the soul by a separate door,
and independent of experience as well as transcending experience.

[Footnote 191: Aristot. Physica, VII. iii. p. 247, b. 9: [Greek: ê(
d' e)x a)rchê=s lê=psis tê=s e)pistê/mês ge/nesis ou)k e)/stin; tô=|
ga\r ê)remê=sai kai\ stê=nai tê\n dia/noian e)pi/stasthai kai\
phronei=n le/gomen.]--Also De Animâ, I. iii. p. 407, b. 32, and the
remarkable passage in the Analytica Poster. II. xviii. p. 100,
a. 3-b. 5.]

Passing now to the Emotions, we find that these are not
systematically classified and analysed by Aristotle, as belonging to
a scheme of Psychology; though he treats them incidentally, with
great ability and acuteness, both in his Ethics, where he regards
them as auxiliaries or impediments to a rational plan of life, and in
his Rhetoric, where he touches upon their operation as it bears on
oratorical effect. He introduces however in his Psychology some
answer to the question, What is it that produces local movement in
the animal body? He replies that movement is produced both by Noûs
and by Appetite.

Speaking strictly, we ought to call Appetite alone the direct
producing cause, acted upon by the _appetitum_, which is here the
_Primum Movens Immobile_. But this _appetitum_ cannot act without
coming into the intellectual sphere, as something seen, imagined,
cogitated.[192] In this case the Noûs or Intellect is stimulated
through appetite, and operates in subordination thereto. Such is the
Intellect, considered as Practical, the principle or determining
cause of which is the _appetitum_ or object of desire; the Intellect
manifesting itself only for the sake of some end, to be attained or
avoided. Herein it is distinguished altogether from the Theoretical
Noûs or Intellect, which does not concern itself with any _expetenda_
or _fugienda_ and does not meddle with conduct. The _appetitum_ is
good, real or apparent, in so far as it can be achieved by our
actions. Often we have contradictory appetites; and, in such cases,
the Intellect is active generally as a force resisting the present
and caring for the future. But Appetite or Desire, being an energy
including both soul and body, is the real and appropriate cause that
determines us to local movement, often even against strong opposition
from the Intellect.[193]

[Footnote 192: Aristot. De Animâ, III. x. p. 433, b. 11: [Greek:
prô=ton de\ pa/ntôn to\ o)rekto/n (tou=to ga\r kinei= ou) kinou/menon
tô=| noêthê=nai ê)\ phantasthê=nai).]]

[Footnote 193: Aristot. De Animâ, III. x. p. 433, a. 25, b. 19:
[Greek: dio\ e)n toi=s koinoi=s sô/matos kai\ psuchê=s e)/rgois],
&c.]

Aristotle thus concludes his scheme of Psychology, comprehending all
plants as well as all animals; a scheme differing in this respect, as
well as in others, from the schemes of those that had preceded him,
and founded upon the peculiar principles of his own First Philosophy.
Soul is to organized body as Form to Matter, as Actualizer to the
Potential; not similar or homogeneous, but correlative; the two being
only separable as distinct logical points of view in regard to one
and the same integer or individual. Aristotle recognizes many
different varieties of Soul, or rather many distinct functions of the
same soul, from the lowest or most universal, to the highest or most
peculiar and privileged; but the higher functions presuppose or
depend upon the lower, as conditions; while the same principle of
Relativity pervades them all. He brings this principle prominently
forward, when he is summing up[194] in the third or last book of the
treatise De Animâ:--"The Soul is in a certain way all existent
things; for all of them are either Perceivables or Cogitables; and
the Cogitant Soul is in a certain way the matters cogitated, while
the Percipient Soul is in a certain way the matters perceived." The
Percipient and its _Percepta_--the Cogitant and its _Cogitata_--each
implies and correlates with the other: the Percipient is the highest
Form of all _Percepta_; the Cogitant is the Form of Forms, or the
highest of all Forms, cogitable or perceivable.[195] The Percipient
or Cogitant Subject is thus conceived only in relation to the Objects
perceived or cogitated, while these Objects again are presented as
essentially correlative to the Subject. The realities of Nature are
particulars, exhibiting Form and Matter in one: though, for purposes
of scientific study--of assimilation and distinction--it is necessary
to consider each of the two abstractedly from the other.

[Footnote 194: Ibid. viii. p. 431, b. 20, seq.: [Greek: nu=n de\
peri\ psuchê=s ta\ lechthe/nta sugkephalaiô/santes, ei)/pômen pa/lin
o(/ti ê( psuchê\ ta\ o)/nta pô/s e)sti pa/nta. ê)\ ga\r ai)sthêta\
ta\ o)/nta ê)\ noêta/, e)/sti de\ ê( e)pistê/mê me\n ta\ e)pistêta/
pôs, ê( d' ai)/sthêsis ta\ ai)sthêta/.]]

[Footnote 195: Ibid. p. 432, a. 2: [Greek: o( nou=s ei)=dos ei)dô=n,
kai\ ê( ai)/sthêsis ei)=dos ai)sthêtô=n.]]




CHAPTER XIII.

ETHICA.


I.

The Ethics of Aristotle presuppose certain conditions in the persons
to whom they are addressed, without which they cannot be read with
profit. They presuppose a certain training, both moral and
intellectual, in the pupil.

First, the reason of the pupil must be so far developed, as that he
shall be capable of conceiving the idea of a scheme of life and
action, and of regulating his momentary impulses more or less by a
reference to this standard. He must not live by passion, obeying
without reflection the appetite of the moment, and thinking only of
grasping at this immediate satisfaction. The habit must have been
formed of referring each separate desire to some rational measure,
and of acting or refraining to act according as such a comparison may
dictate. Next, a certain experience must have been acquired
concerning human affairs, and concerning the actions of men with
their causes and consequences. Upon these topics all the reasonings
and all the illustrations contained in every theory of Ethics must
necessarily turn: so that a person thoroughly inexperienced would be
incompetent to understand them.

For both these two reasons, no youthful person, nor any person of
mature years whose mind is still tainted with the defects of youth,
can be a competent learner of Ethics or Politics (Eth. Nic. i. 7.
Compare vii. 8). Such a pupil will neither appreciate the reasonings,
nor obey the precepts (i. 3).

Again, a person cannot receive instruction in Ethics with advantage
unless he has been subjected to a good practical discipline, so as to
have acquired habits of virtuous action, and to have been taught to
feel pleasure and pain on becoming occasions and in reference to
becoming objects. Unless the circumstances by which he has been
surrounded and the treatment which he has received, have been such as
to implant in him a certain vein of sentiment and to give a certain
direction to his factitious pleasures and pains--unless obedience to
right precepts has to a certain degree been made habitual with
him--he will not be able to imbibe, still less to become attached to,
even the _principia_ of ethical reasoning (Eth. Nic. i. 4. 7). The
well-trained man, who has already acquired virtuous habits, has within
himself the [Greek: a)rchê\], or beginning, from which happiness
proceeds: he may do very well, even though the reason on which these
habits were formed should never become known to him: but he will at
least readily apprehend and understand the reason when it is
announced. The [Greek: a)rchai\] or beginnings to which ethical
philosophy points and from whence the conduct which it enjoins is
derived, are obtained only by habituation, not by induction nor by
perception, like other [Greek: a)rchai/]: and we ought in all our
investigations to look after the [Greek: a)rchê\] in the way which
the special nature of the subject requires, and to be very careful to
define it well (i. 4, i. 7).

In considering Aristotle's doctrine respecting the [Greek: a)rchai\]
of ethical and political science, and the way in which they are to be
discovered and made available, we should keep in mind that he
announces the end and object of these sciences to be, not merely the
enlargement of human knowledge, but the determination of human
conduct towards certain objects: not theory, but practice: not to
teach us what virtue is, but to induce us to practise it--"Since then
the present science is not concerned with speculation, _like the
others_. For here we enquire, not in order that we may know what
virtue is, but in order that we may become good, otherwise there
would be no profit in the enquiry" (ii. 2. _See_ also i. 2, i. 5, vi.
5).

The remarks which Aristotle makes about the different ways of finding
out and arriving at [Greek: a)rchai\], are curious. Some principles
or beginnings are obtained by _induction_--others by
_perception_--others by habituation in a certain way--others again in
other ways. Other modes of arriving at [Greek: a)rchai\] are noticed
by the philosopher himself in other places. For example, the [Greek:
a)rchai\] of demonstrative science are said to be discovered by
intellect ([Greek: nou=s])--vi. 6-7. There is a passage however in
vi. 8 in which he seems to say that the [Greek: a)rchai\] of the wise
man ([Greek: so/phos]) and the natural man ([Greek: phusiko\s]) are
derived from experience: which I find it difficult to reconcile with
the preceding chapters, where he calls wisdom a compound of intellect
and science ([Greek: e)pistê/mê]), and where he gives Thales and
Anaxagoras as specimens of wise men. By vi. 6--it seems that wisdom
has reference to matters of demonstrative science: how then can it be
true that a youth may be a mathematician without being a wise man?

Moreover, Aristotle takes much pains, at the commencement of his
treatise on Ethics, to set forth the inherent intricacy and obscurity
of the subject, and to induce the reader to be satisfied with
conclusions not absolutely demonstrative. He repeats this observation
several times--a sufficient proof that the evidence for his own
opinions did not appear to himself altogether satisfactory (Eth. Nic.
i. 3, i. 7, ii. 2). The completeness of the proof (he says) must be
determined by the subject-matter: a man of cultivated mind will not
ask for better proof than the nature of the case admits: and human
action, to which all ethical theory relates, is essentially
fluctuating and uncertain in its consequences, so that every general
proposition which can be affirmed or denied concerning it, is subject
to more or less of exception. If this degree of uncertainty attaches
even to general reasonings on ethical subjects, the particular
applications of these reasonings are still more open to mistake: the
agent must always determine for himself at the moment, according to
the circumstances of the case, without the possibility of sheltering
himself under technical rules of universal application: just as the
physician or the pilot is obliged to do in the course of his
profession. "Now the actions and the interests of men exhibit no
fixed rule, just like the conditions of health. And if this is the
case with the universal theory, still more does the theory that
refers to particular acts present nothing that can be accurately
fixed; for it falls not under any art or any system, but the actors
themselves must always consider what suits the occasion, just as
happens in the physician's and the pilot's art. But though this is
the case with the theory at present, _we must try to give it some
assistance_" ([Greek: peirati/on boêthei=n ]).--Eth. Nic. 2.

The last words cited are remarkable. They seem to indicate, that
Aristotle regarded the successful prosecution of ethical enquiries as
all but desperate. He had previously said (i. 3)--"There is so much
difference of opinion and so much error respecting what is honourable
and just, of which political science treats, that these properties of
human action seem to exist merely by positive legal appointment, and
not by nature. And there is the same sort of error respecting what
things are good, because many persons have sustained injury from
them, some having already been brought to destruction through their
wealth, others through their courage."

One cannot but remark how entirely this is at variance with the
notion of a moral sense or instinct, or an intuitive knowledge of
what is right and wrong. Aristotle most truly observes that the
details of our daily behaviour are subject to such an infinite
variety of modifications, that no pre-established rules can be
delivered to guide them: we must act with reference to the occasion
and the circumstances. Some few rules may indeed be laid down,
admitting of very few exceptions: but the vast majority of our
proceedings cannot be subjected to any rule whatever, except to the
grand and all-comprehensive rule, if we are indeed so to call it, of
conforming to the ultimate standard of morality.

Supposing the conditions above indicated to be realized--supposing a
certain degree of experience in human affairs, of rational
self-government, and of habitual obedience to good rules of action,
to be already established in the pupil's mind, the theory of ethics
may then be unfolded to him with great advantage (i. 3). It is not
meant to be implied that a man must have previously acquired the
perfection of practical reason and virtue before he acquaints himself
with ethical theory; but he must have proceeded a certain way towards
the acquisition.

Ethics, as Aristotle conceives them, are a science closely analogous
to if not a subordinate branch of Politics. (I do not however think
that he employs the word [Greek: Ê)thikê\] in the same distinct and
substantive meaning as [Greek: politikê\ (e)pistê/mê)], although he
several times mentions [Greek: ta\ ê)thika\] and [Greek: ê)thikoi\
lo/goi].) Ethical science is for the individual what political
science is for the community (i. 2).

In every variety of human action, in each separate art and science,
the agents, individual or collective, propose to themselves the
attainment of some _good_ as the end and object of their proceedings.
Ends are multifarious, and good things are multifarious: but good,
under one shape or another, is always the thing desired by every one,
and the determining cause of human action ([Greek: ou(= pa/nta
e)phi/etai])--i. 1.

Sometimes the action itself, or the exercise of the powers implied in
the action, is the end sought, without anything beyond. Sometimes
there is an ulterior end, or substantive business, to be accomplished
by means of the action and lying beyond it. In this latter class of
cases, the ulterior end is the real good: better than the course of
action used to accomplish it--"the external results are naturally
([Greek: pe/phuke]) better than the course of action" (i. 1). Taking
this as a general position, it is subject to many exceptions: but the
word [Greek: pe/phuke] seems to signify only that such is naturally
and ordinarily the case, not that the reverse never occurs.

Again some ends are comprehensive and supreme; others, partial and
subordinate. The subordinate ends are considered with reference to
the supreme, and pursued as means to their accomplishment. Thus the
end of the bridle-maker is subservient to that of the horseman, and
the various operations of war to the general scheme of the commander.
The supreme, or _architectonic_, ends, are superior in eligibility to
the subordinate, or _ministerial_, which, indeed, are pursued only
for the sake of the former.

One end (or one _good_), as subordinate, is thus included in another
end (or another good) as supreme. The same end may be supreme with
regard to one end different from itself, and subordinate with regard
to another. The end of the general is supreme with reference to that
of the soldier or the maker of arms, subordinate with reference to
that of the statesman. In this scale of comprehensiveness of ends
there is no definite limit; we may suppose ends more and more
comprehensive as we please, and we come from thence to form the idea
of one most comprehensive and sovereign end, which includes under it
every other without exception--with reference to which all other ends
stand in the relation either of parts or of means--and which is
itself never in any case pursued for the sake of any other or
independent end. The end thus conceived is the _Sovereign Good of
man_, or _The Good_--_The Summum Bonum_--[Greek: Ta)gatho\n--To\
a)/riston--Ta)nthrô/pinon a)gatho/n] (i. 2).

To comprehend, to define, and to prescribe means for realizing the
Sovereign Good, is the object of _Political Science_, the paramount
and most architectonic Science of all, with regard to which all other
Sciences are simply ministerial. It is the business of the political
ruler to regulate the application of all other Sciences with
reference to the production of this his End--to determine how far
each shall be learnt and in what manner each shall be brought into
practice--to enforce or forbid any system of human action according
as it tends to promote the accomplishment of his supreme purpose--the
Sovereign Good of the Community. Strategical, rhetorical, economical,
science, are all to be applied so far as they conduce to this purpose
and no farther: they are all simply ministerial; political science is
supreme and self-determining (i. 2).

What _Political Science_ is for the community, _Ethical Science_ is
for the individual citizen. By this it is not meant that the
individual is to be abstracted from society or considered as living
apart from society: but simply that human action and human feeling is
to be looked at from the point of view of the individual, mainly and
primarily--and from the point of view of the society, only in a
secondary manner: while in political science, the reverse is the
case--our point of view is, first as regards the society;--next, and
subordinate to that, as regards the individual citizen (_See_ Eth.
Nic. vii. 8).

The object of the Ethical Science is, the Supreme Good of the
individual citizen--the End of all Ends, with reference to his
desires, his actions, and his feelings--the end which he seeks for
itself and without any ulterior aim--the end which comprehends all
his other ends as merely partial or instrumental and determines their
comparative value in his estimation (i. 2, i. 4).

It is evident that this conception of an End of all Ends is what Kant
would call an _Idea_--nothing precisely conformable to it, in its
full extent, can ever exist in reality. No individual has ever been
found, or ever will be found, with a mind so trained as to make every
separate and particular desire subservient to some general
preconceived End however comprehensive. But it is equally certain
that this subordination of Ends one to another is a process performed
to a greater or less degree in every one's mind, even in that of the
rudest savage. No man can blindly and undistinguishingly follow every
immediate impulse: the impulse, whatever it be, when it arises, must
be considered more or less as it bears upon other pursuits and other
objects of desire. This is an indispensable condition even of the
most imperfect form of social existence. In civilized society, we
find the process carried very far indeed in the minds of the greater
number of individuals. Every man has in his view certain leading
Ends, such as the maintenance of his proper position in society, the
acquisition of professional success, the making of his fortune, the
prosecution of his studies, &c., each of which is essentially
paramount and architectonic, and with reference to which a thousand
other ends are simply subordinate and ministerial. Suppose this
process to be pushed farther, and you arrive at the idea of an End
still more comprehensive, embracing every other end which the
individual can aspire to, and forming the central point of an
all-comprehensive scheme of life. Such a maximum, never actually
attainable, but constantly approachable, in reality, forms the Object
of Ethical Science. _Quorsum victuri gignimur_!

What is the Supreme Good--the End of all Ends? How are we to
determine wherein it consists, or by what means it is to be
attained--at least, as nearly attained as the limitations of human
condition permit? Ethical Science professes to point out what the end
ought to be--Ethical precepts are suggestions for making the closest
approaches to it which are practicable. Even to understand what the
end is, is a considerable acquisition: since we thus know the precise
point to aim at, even if we cannot hit it (i. 2).

The approaches which different men make towards forming this idea, of
an End of Ends or of a Supreme Good, differ most essentially:
although there seems a verbal agreement between them. Every man
speaks of _Happiness_ as his End of Ends ([Greek: o)no/mati
o(mologei=tai], i. 4): he wishes to live well or to do well, which he
considers to be the same as being happy. But men disagree exceedingly
in their opinions as to that which constitutes happiness: nay the
same man sometimes places it in one thing, sometimes in another--in
health or in riches, according as he happens to be sick or poor.

There are however three grand divisions, in one or other of which the
opinions of the great majority of mankind may be distributed. Some
think that happiness consists in a life of bodily pleasure ([Greek:
bi/os a)polaustiko/s]): others, in a life of successful political
action or ambition ([Greek: bi/os politiko/s]): others again, in a
life of speculative study and the acquisition of knowledge ([Greek:
bi/os theôrêtiko/s]). He will not consent to number the life of the
([Greek: chrêmatistê\s]) money-maker among them because he attains
his end at the expense of other people and by a force upon their
inclinations (this at least seems the sense of the words--[Greek: o(
ga\r chrêmatistê\s bi/aio/s ti/s e)sti]), and because wealth can
never be the good, seeing that it is merely useful for the sake of
ulterior objects.

(The reason which Aristotle gives for discarding from his catalogue
the life of the _money-seeker_, while he admits that of the
_pleasure-seeker_ and the _honour-seeker_, appears a very
inconclusive one. He believed them to be all equally mistaken in
reference to real happiness: the two last just as much as the first:
and certainly, if we look to prevalence in the world and number of
adherents, the creed of the first is at least equal to that of the
two last.)

The first of the three is the opinion of the mass, countenanced by
many Sovereigns such as Sardanapalus--it is more suitable to animals
than to men, in the judgment of Aristotle (i. 5).

Honour and glory--the reward of political ambition, cannot be the
sovereign good, because it is a possession which the person honoured
can never be sure of retaining: for it depends more upon the persons
by whom he is honoured than upon himself, while the ideas which we
form of the sovereign good suppose it to be something intimately
belonging to us and hard to be withdrawn (i. 5). Moreover those who
aspire to honour, desire it not so much on its own account as in
order that they may have confidence in their own virtue: so that it
seems even in their estimation as if virtue were the higher aim of
the two. But even virtue itself (meaning thereby the simple
possession of virtue as distinguished from the active habitual
exercise of it) cannot be the sovereign good: for the virtuous man
may pass his life in sleep or in inaction--or he may encounter
intolerable suffering and calamity (i. 5).

Besides, Happiness as we conceive it, is an End perfect, final,
comprehensive and all-sufficient--an end which we always seek on its
own account and never with a view to anything ulterior. But neither
honour, nor pleasure, nor intelligence, nor virtue, deserves these
epithets: each is an end special, insufficient, and not final--for
each is sought partly indeed on its own account, but partly also on
account of its tendency to promote what we suppose to be our
happiness (i. 7). The latter is the only end always sought
exclusively for itself: including as it always does and must do, the
happiness of a man's relatives, his children and his countrymen, or
of all with whom he has sympathies; so that if attained, it would
render his life desirable and wanting for nothing--[Greek: o(\
monou/menon, ai(reto\n poiei= to\n bi/on, kai\ mêdeno\s e)ndea=] (i.
7).

The remark which Aristotle here makes in respect to the final aim or
happiness of an individual--viz., that it includes the happiness of
his family and his countrymen and of those with whom he has
sympathies--deserves careful attention. It shows at once the
largeness and the benevolence of his conceptions. We arrive thus at
the same end as that proposed by political science--the happiness of
the community: but we reach it by a different road, starting from the
point of view of the individual citizen.

Having shown that this Happiness, which is "our being's end and aim,"
does not consist in any special acquisition such as pleasure, or
glory, or intelligence, or virtue, Aristotle adopts a different
method to show wherein it does consist. Every artist and every
professional man (he says--i. 7), the painter, the musician, &c., has
his peculiar business to do, and the _Good_ of each artist consists
in doing his business well and appropriately. Each separate portion
of man, the eye, the hand and the foot, has its peculiar function:
and in analogy with both these, man as such has his business and
function, in the complete performance of which human Good consists.
What is the business and peculiar function of Man, as Man? Not simply
Life, for that he has in common with the entire vegetable and animal
world: nor a mere sensitive Life, for that he has in common with all
Animals: it must be something which he has, apart both from plants
and animals--viz., an active life in conformity with reason ([Greek:
praktikê/ tis tou= lo/gon e)/chontos]); or the exercise of Reason as
a directing and superintending force, and the exercise of the
appetites, passions, and capacities, in a manner conformable to
Reason. This is the special and peculiar business of man: it is what
every man performs either well or ill: and the _virtue_ of a man is
that whereby he is enabled to perform it well. The Supreme Good of
humanity, therefore, consisting as it does in the due performance of
this special business of man, is to be found in the virtuous activity
of our rational and appetitive soul: assuming always a life of the
ordinary length, without which no degree of mental perfection would
suffice to attain the object. The full position will then stand
thus--"Happiness, or the highest good of a human being, consists in
the working of the soul and in a course of action, pursuant to reason
and conformable to virtue, throughout the full continuance of life."

(The argument respecting a man's proper business ([Greek: e)/rgon])
and virtue ([Greek: a)retê\]) seems to be borrowed from
Plato--Republic, i. c. 23, p. 352; c. 24, p. 353. Compare also
Xenophon--Memorabilia, iv. 2, 14.)

This explanation is delivered by Aristotle as a mere outline, which
he seems to think that any one may easily fill up (i. 7). And he
warns us not to require a greater degree of precision than the
subject admits of: since we ought to be content with a rough
approximation to the truth, and with conclusions which are not
universally true, but only true in the majority of instances, such
being the nature of the premisses with which we deal (i. 3).

Having determined in this manner what Happiness or the Supreme Good
consists in, Aristotle next shows that the explanation which he gives
of it conforms in a great degree to the opinions previously delivered
by eminent philosophers, and fulfils at least all the requisite
conditions which have ever been supposed to belong to Happiness (i.
8). All philosophers have from very early times agreed in
distributing good things into three classes--_Mental_, _Corporeal_,
and _External_. Now the first of these classes is incomparably the
highest and most essentially _good_ of the three: and the explanation
which Aristotle gives of happiness ranks it in the first class.

Again, various definitions of happiness have been delivered by
eminent authorities more or less ancient ([Greek: polloi\ kai\
palaioi/]). Eudoxus laid down the principle that happiness consists
in pleasure: others have maintained the opinion that it is entirely
independent both of pleasure and pain--that the former is no good,
and the latter no evil (i. 12, vii. 11-13, x. 1. 2). Some have placed
happiness in virtue: others in prudence: others in a certain sort of
wisdom ([Greek: sophi/a tis]): others have added to the definition
this condition, that pleasure or external prosperity should be
coupled with the above-mentioned objects (i. 8). The moral doctrines
propounded by Zeno and Epicurus were therefore in no way new: how far
the reasonings by which these philosophers sustained them were new we
cannot judge accurately, from the loss of the treatises of Eudoxus
and others to which Aristotle makes reference.

Now, in so far as virtue is introduced, the explanation of Happiness
given by Aristotle coincides with these philosophers and improves
upon them by substituting the active exercise of virtuous habits in
place of the mere possession of virtue. And in regard to pleasure,
the man who has once acquired habits of virtuous agency stands in no
need of pleasure from without, as a foreign accessory: for he finds
pleasure in his own behaviour, and he would not be denominated
virtuous unless he did so: "Now (he says) their life stands in no
need of pleasure, like an extraneous appendage, but has pleasure in
itself" (ii. 8). Again, ii. 3, he says that "the symptom of a perfect
habit is the pleasure or pain which ensues upon the performance of
the acts in which the habit consists: for the man who abstains from
bodily pleasures and rejoices in doing so, is temperate, while he who
does it reluctantly and painfully, is intemperate. And the man who
sustains dangers with pleasure, or at least without pain, is
courageous: if with pain, he is a coward. For ethical virtue has
reference to our pleasures and pains: it is on account of pleasure
that we commit vicious acts, and on account of pain that we shrink
from virtuous performances. Wherefore, as Plato directs, we ought to
be trained at once from our infancy by some means or other so as to
feel pleasure and pain from the proper sources: for that is the right
education."

Moreover, the man who is in the active exercise of virtue derives his
pleasure from the performance of that which is the appropriate
business of humanity, so that all his pleasures are _conformable to
the pleasures natural to man_ and therefore consistent with each
other: whereas the pleasures of most people are contradictory and
inconsistent with each other, because they are not conformable to our
nature (i. 8).

It is not easy to understand perfectly what Aristotle means by saying
that the things agreeable to the majority of mankind are not things
agreeable by nature. The construction above put upon this expression
seems the only plausible one--that those pleasures which inhere in
the performance of the appropriate business of man, are to be
considered as our natural pleasures; those which do not so inhere, as
not natural pleasures: inasmuch as they arise out of circumstances
foreign to the performance of our appropriate business.

This however hardly consists with the explanation which Aristotle
gives of [Greek: to\ phu/sei]--in another place and with reference to
another subject. In the Magna Moralia (i. 34, pp. 1194-1195 Bek.), in
distinguishing between _natural_ justice ([Greek: to\ di/kaion
phu/sei]) and _conventional_ justice ([Greek: to\ di/kaion no/mô|]),
he tells us that _the naturally just_ is that which most commonly
remains just. (Similarly Ethic. Eudem. iv. 14, p. 1217 Bek.) That
which exists by nature (he says) may be changed by art and practice;
the left hand may by these means be rendered as strong as the right
in particular cases, but if in the greater number of cases and for
the longer portion of time the left remains left and the right
remains right, this is to be considered as existing by nature.

If we are to consider that arrangement as natural which we find to
prevail in the greatest number of cases and for the greatest length
of time, then undoubtedly the pleasures arising out of virtuous
active behaviour must be regarded as less natural than those other
pleasures which Aristotle admits to form the enjoyment of the
majority of mankind.

But again there is a third passage, respecting nature and natural
arrangements, which appears scarcely reconcilable with either of the
two opinions just noticed. In Eth. Nicom. ii. 1: "Ethical virtue is a
result of habit, whence it is evident that not one of the ethical
virtues exists in us by nature. For none of those things which exist
by nature is altered by habit. For example, the stone which naturally
moves downwards cannot be habituated to move upwards, not even if a
man should endeavour so to habituate it by throwing it upwards ten
thousand times; nor in like manner fire downwards: nor can any other
of the things formed by nature in one way be changed by habit to any
other than that natural way. Virtues therefore are not generated in
us either _by_ nature, or _contrary_ to nature; but we are formed by
nature so as to be capable of receiving them, and we are perfected in
them through the influence of habit."

If it be true that nothing which exists in one manner by nature can
be changed by habit so as to exist in another manner, I do not see
how the assertion contained in the passage above cited out of the
Magna Moralia can be reconciled with it, where we are told--"For even
things which exist _by nature partake of change_. Thus if we all
should practise throwing with the left hand, we should become
ambidextrous: but still it is the left hand by nature, and the right
hand is not the less better by nature than the left, although we
should do everything with the left as we do with the right." (Mag.
Mor. i. 34, _ut sup._) In the one case he illustrates the meaning of
natural properties by the comparative aptitudes of the right and left
hand: in the other by the downward tendency of the stone. The idea is
plainly different in the one case and in the other.

On the other hand, there seems to be not less variance between the
one passage quoted out of the Nicomacheian Ethics and the other. For
in the passage last quoted, we are told that none of the ethical
virtues is generated in us by nature--neither by nature, nor contrary
to nature: nature makes us fit to receive them, habit introduces and
creates them--an observation perfectly true and accurate. But if this
was the sentiment of Aristotle, how could he also believe that the
pleasures arising out of the active manifestation of ethical virtue
were the natural pleasures of man? If ethical virtue does not come by
nature, the pleasures belonging to it cannot come by nature either.

On the whole, these three passages present a variance which I am
unable to reconcile in the meaning which Aristotle annexes to the
very equivocal word--_nature_.

Although Aristotle tells us that the active exercise of the functions
of the soul according to virtue confers happiness, yet he admits that
a certain measure of external comfort and advantages must be
superadded as an indispensable auxiliary and instrument. Disgusting
ugliness, bad health, low birth, loss of friends and relatives or
vicious conduct of friends and relatives, together with many other
misfortunes, are sufficient to sully the blessed condition of the
most virtuous man ([Greek: r(upai/nousi to\ maka/rion]--i. 8)--for
which reason it is that some persons have ranked both virtue and good
fortune as co-ordinate ingredients equally essential to happiness:
and have doubted also whether it can ever be acquired either by
teaching, or by training, or by any other method except chance or
Divine inspiration. To suppose that so magnificent a boon is
conferred by chance, would be an absurdity: it is a boon not unworthy
indeed of the Divine nature to confer; but still the magnificence of
it will appear equally great and equally undeniable, if we suppose it
to be acquired by teaching or training. And this is really the proper
account to give of the way in which Happiness is acquired: for the
grand and primary element in it, is the virtuous agency of the soul,
which is undoubtedly acquired by training: while external advantages,
though indispensable up to a certain limit, are acquired only as
secondary helps and instruments. The creation of these virtuous
habits among the citizens is one of the chief objects of political
science and legislation: when once acquired, they are the most
lasting and ineffaceable of all human possessions: and as they are
created by special training, they may be imparted to every man not
disqualified by some natural defect of organization, and may thus be
widely diffused throughout the community (i. 9).

This is an important property. If happiness be supposed to be derived
from the possession of wealth or honour or power, it can only be
possessed by a small number of persons. For these three considered as
objects of human desire, are essentially comparative. A man does not
think himself rich, or honoured, or powerful, unless he becomes so to
a degree above the multitude of his companions and neighbours.

Aristotle insists most earnestly that the only way of acquiring the
character proper for happiness is by a course of early and incessant
training in virtuous action. Moral teaching, he says, will do little
or nothing, unless it be preceded by, or at least coupled with, moral
training. Motives must be applied sufficient to ensure performance of
what is virtuous and abstinence from what is vicious, until such a
course of conduct becomes habitual, and until a disposition is
created to persevere in them. It is the business of the politician
and the legislator to employ their means of working upon the citizens
for the purpose of enforcing this training. It is not with virtue (he
says) as it is with those faculties which we receive ready-made from
nature, as for example, the external senses. We do not acquire the
faculty of sight by often seeing, but we have it from nature and then
exercise it: whereas with regard to virtue, we obtain our virtues by
means of a previous course of virtuous action, just as we learn other
arts. For those things which we must learn in order to do, we learn
by actually doing: thus by building we become builders, and by
harping we become harpers: by doing just and temperate and courageous
actions, we become just and temperate and courageous. All legislators
try, some in a better and others in a worse manner, to _ethise_
([Greek: e)thi/zontes])--to create habits among--the citizens for the
purpose of making them good. "In one word habits are created by
repeated action, wherefore our actions must be determined in a
suitable way, for according as they differ, so will our habits
differ. Nor is the difference small whether we are _ethised_ in one
way or in another, from our youth upwards: the difference is very
great, or rather it _is everything_" (ii. 1).

Neither an ox, nor a horse, can acquire such habits, and therefore
neither of them can be called happy: even a child cannot be called
so, except from the hope and anticipation of what he will become in
future years.

It may appear somewhat singular that Aristotle characterises a child
as incapable of happiness, since in common language a child when
healthy and well treated is described as peculiarly happy. But
happiness, as Aristotle understands it, is something measured more by
the estimate of the judicious spectator than by the sentiment of the
man in whose bosom it resides. No person is entitled to be called
_happy_, whom the intelligent and reflective observer does not
_macarise_ (or **_eudæmonise_), or whose condition he would
not desire more or less to make his own. Now the life of a child,
even though replete with all the enjoyments belonging to childhood,
is not such as any person in the state of mind of a mature citizen
could bring himself to accept (i. 10, x. 3). The test to which
Aristotle appeals, either tacitly or openly, seems always to be the
judgment of the serious man (i. 8, x. 5). It is no sufficient proof
of happiness that the person who feels it is completely satisfied
with his condition and does not desire anything beyond. Such
self-satisfaction is indeed necessary, but is not by itself
sufficient: it must be farther confirmed by the judgment of persons
without--not of the multitude, who are apt to judge by a wrong
standard--nor of princes, who are equally incompetent, _and who have
never tasted the relish of pure and liberal pleasures_ (x. 6)--but
of the virtuous and worthy, who have arrived at the most perfect
condition attainable by human beings (x. 5, x. 6, x. 8).

The different standard adopted by the many and by the more discerning
few, in estimating human happiness, is again touched upon in
Politica, vii. 1. It is in some respects treated more clearly and
simply in this passage than in the Ethics. Both the Many and the Few
(he says) agree that in order to constitute Happiness, there must be
a coincidence of the three distinct kinds of Good things--The
Mental--The Corporeal--The External. But with respect to the
proportions in which the three ought to be intermingled, a difference
of opinion arises. Most persons are satisfied with a very moderate
portion of mental excellence, while they are immoderate in their
desire for wealth and power ("For of virtue they think that they have
a sufficiency, whatever be the quantity they have; but of wealth and
possessions they seek the excess without bound."--Pol. vii. 1). On
the other hand, the opinion sanctioned by the few of a higher order
of mind, and adopted by Aristotle, was, that Happiness was possessed
in a higher degree by those who were richly set forth with moral and
intellectual excellence and only moderately provided with external
advantages, than by those in regard to whom the proportion was
reversed (_ib._). The same difference of estimate, between the few
and the many, is touched upon Polit. vii. 13, where he says that men
in general esteem external advantages to be the causes of happiness:
which is just as if they were to say that the cause why a musician
played well was his lyre, and not his proficiency in the art.

In this chapter of the Politica (vii. 13), he refers to the Ethica in
a singular manner. Having stated that the point of first importance
is, to determine wherein happiness consists, he proceeds to say--"We
have said also in the Ethics, _if there be any good in that treatise_
([Greek: ei)/ ti tô=n lo/gôn e)kei/nôn o)/phelos]), that it
(happiness) is the active exertion and perfected habit of
virtue."--This is a singular expression--"if there be any good in the
Ethics"--it seems rather to fall in with the several passages in that
treatise in which he insists upon the inherent confusion and darkness
of the subject-matter.

The definition of what happiness really is seems to be one of the
weak points of Aristotle's treatise. In a work addressed to the
public, it is impossible to avoid making the public judges of the
pleasure and pain, the happiness and unhappiness of individuals. A
certain measure of self-esteem on the part of the individual, and a
certain measure of esteem towards him on the part of persons without,
come thus to be regarded as absolutely essential to existence.
Without these, life would appear intolerable to any spectator
without, though the individual himself might be degraded enough to
cling to it. But these are secured by the ordinary morality of the
age and of the locality. The question arises as to degrees of virtue
beyond the ordinary level: Are we sure that such higher excellence
contributes to the happiness of the individual who possesses it?
Assuming that it does so contribute, are we certain that the
accession of happiness which he thereby acquires is greater than he
would have acquired by an increase of his wealth and power, his
virtue remaining still at the ordinary level? These are points which
Aristotle does not establish satisfactorily, although he professes to
have done so: nor do I think that they are capable of being
established. The only ground on which a moralist can inculcate
aspirations after the higher degrees of virtue, is, the gain which
thereby accrues to the happiness of others, not to that of the
individual himself.

Aristotle appeals to God as a proof of the superiority of an internal
source of happiness to an external source--vii. 1, "using God as a
witness who is happy and blessed, yet not through any external good,
but through Himself and from His own nature." Again, vii. 3, "For at
leisure God would be happy, and the whole universe ([Greek:
ko/smos]), who have no external actions except such as are proper to
themselves"--in proof of the superiority of a life of study and
speculation to a life of ambition and political activity. The same
argument is insisted upon in Eth. Nic. x. 8. It is to be observed
that the [Greek: Ko/smos] as well as God is here cited as
experiencing happiness.

The analogy to which Aristotle appeals here is undoubtedly to a
certain extent a just one. The most perfect happiness which we can
conceive--our Idea, to use Kant's phrase, of perfect happiness--is
that of a being who is happy in and for his own nature, with the
least possible aid from external circumstances--a being whose nature
or habits dispose him only to acts, the simple performance of which
confers happiness. But is this true of the perfectly virtuous nature
and habits? Does the simple performance of the acts to which they
dispose us, always confer happiness? Is not the existence of a very
high standard of virtuous exigency in a man's mind, a constant source
of self-dissatisfaction, from the difficulty of acting up to his own
ideas of what is becoming and commendable?

That the most virtuous nature is in itself and essentially the most
happy nature, is a point highly questionable--to say the least of it:
and even if we admit the fact, we must at the same time add that it
cannot appear to be so to ordinary persons without. The internal
pleasures of a highly virtuous man cannot be properly appreciated by
any person not of similar character. So that unless a person be
himself disposed to believe it, you could find no means of proving it
to him. To a man not already virtuous, you cannot bring this argument
persuasively home for the purpose of inducing him to become so.

In regard to prudence and temperance, indeed, qualities in the first
instance beneficial to himself, it is clear that the more perfectly
he possesses them, the greater and more assured will be his
happiness. But in regard to virtuous qualities, beneficial in the
first instance to others and not to himself, it can by no means be
asserted that the person who possesses these qualities in the highest
degree is happier than one who possesses them in a more moderate and
ordinary degree.

Aristotle indeed says that _the being just_ necessarily includes the
having pleasure in such behaviour: for we do not call a man just or
liberal unless he has a pleasure in justice or liberality (Eth. Nic.
i. 8). But this does not refute the supposition, that another man,
less just or liberal than he, may enjoy _greater happiness_ arising
out of other tastes and other conduct.

In order to sustain the conclusion of Aristotle respecting the
superior happiness of the virtuous man, it is necessary to assume
that the pleasures of self-esteem and self-admiration are generically
distinguished from other pleasures and entitled to a preference in
the eyes of every right judging person. And Aristotle does seem to
assume something of this nature. He says--x. 3--"Or that pleasures
differ in kind? For the pleasures arising from the honourable are
different from those arising from the base; and it is not the case
that the unjust man experiences the pleasure of the just, or he that
is unmusical that of the musician." The inherent difference between
various pleasures is again touched upon x. 5--"And since the
functions differ in goodness and badness--some of them being objects
of desire, others of them to be eschewed, and others of them
neither--so is it likewise with the pleasures: for each function has
its own pleasures. The pleasure then that is proper to the function
of good is good, and that which is proper to the function of bad is
bad; for the desires of things honourable are praiseworthy, those of
things base are to be blamed. And the pleasures attaching to them are
more proper to the functions than are the appetencies themselves." In
the next chapter, in that remarkable passage where he touches upon the
predilections of men in power for the society of jesters and amusing
companions ("The many have recourse to the amusements of those that
are accounted happy")--"For it is not in kingly power that you find
either virtue or intellect, on which the higher functions of man
depend. Nay, not if princes _who have never tasted the relish of pure
and liberal pleasure_, have recourse to the pleasures of the body, on
which account these must be thought the more desirable. For children
consider those things to be best that are held in honour among
themselves."

Here we have a marked distinction drawn between the different classes
of pleasures--some being characterised as good, some bad, some
indifferent. The best of all are those which the virtuous man enjoys,
and which _he_ considers the best: the pleasures inseparably annexed
to virtuous agency. These pleasures are thus assumed to be of a purer
and more exalted character, and to deserve a decided preference over
every other class of pleasures. And if this be assumed, the superior
happiness of the virtuous man follows as a matter of course.

I should observe that Aristotle considers happiness to consist in the
exercise of the faculties agreeably to virtue ([Greek: e)ne/rgeia
kat' a)retê\n])--the _pleasure_ ([Greek: ê(donê\]) is something
different from the exercise ([Greek: e)ne/rgeia])--inseparably
attending it, indeed, yet not the same--"conjoined with the functions
([Greek: e)nergei/ais]), and the two are so inseparable as to raise a
question whether the function is not identical with the pleasure" (x.
5). And he says, x. 7--"We think that pleasure should be mixed up
([Greek: paramemi/chthai]) with happiness."

It seems to be in the sense of self-esteem, which constitutes the
distinctive mark of virtuous agency, that Aristotle supposes
happiness to consist: the pleasure he supposes to be an inseparable
concomitant, but yet not the same. The self-esteem is doubtless often
felt in cases where a man is performing a painful duty--where the sum
total of feelings accompanying the performance of the act is the very
reverse of pleasurable. But still the self-esteem, or testimony of an
approving conscience, is _per se_ always pleasurable, and is in fact
the essential pleasure inherent in virtuous behaviour. I do not see
the propriety of the distinction here taken by Aristotle. He puts it
somewhat differently, Polit. vii. 1--"Living happily consists either
in joy or in virtue to men, or in both." And Polit. viii. 5--"For
happiness is a compound of both these (honour and pleasure)." So
Polit. viii. 3.

Happiness (again he says--Polit. vii. 13, p. 440 E. p. 286) consists
in the perfect employment and active exercise of virtue: and that
_absolutely_ (or under the most favourable external conditions)--not
under limitation ([Greek: e)x u(pothe/seôs]) or subject to very
trying and difficult circumstances. For a man of virtue may be so
uncomfortably placed that he has no course open to him except a
choice of evils, and can do nothing but make the best of a bad
position. Such a man will conduct himself under the pressure of want
or misfortune as well as his case admits: but happiness is out of his
reach. (Compare Eth. Nic. i. 10.) To be happy, it is necessary that
he should be so placed as to be capable of aspiring to the
accomplishment of positive good and advantage--he must be admitted to
contend for the great prizes, and to undertake actions which lead to
new honours and to benefits previously unenjoyed: he must be relieved
from the necessity of struggling against overwhelming calamities.

Aristotle tells us in the beginning of the Ethics (Eth. Nic. i.
3)--"But there is so much difference of opinion and so much error
respecting what is honourable and just, of which political science
treats, that these properties of human action seem to exist merely by
positive legal appointment, and not by nature. And there is the same
sort of error respecting what things are good." If there be this
widespread error and dissension among mankind with respect to the
determining of what is good and just, what standard has Aristotle
established for the purpose of correcting it? I do not find that he
has established any standard, nor even that he has thought it
necessary to make the attempt. There are indeed a great number of
observations, and many most admirable observations in his Treatise,
on the various branches of Virtue and Vice: many which tend to
conduct the mind of the reader unconsciously to the proper standard:
but no distinct announcement of any general principle, whereby a
dispute between two dissentient moralists may be settled. When he
places virtue in a certain mediocrity between excess on one side and
defect on the other, this middle point is not in any way marked or
discoverable: it is a point not fixed, but variable according to the
position of the individual agent, and is to be determinable in every
case by right reason and according to the judgment of the prudent
man--"in the mean _with reference to ourselves_, as _it has been
determined by reason_, and _as the prudent man_ ([Greek: o(
phro/nimos]) _would determine it_" (Eth. Nic. ii. 6). But though the
decision is thus vested in the prudent man, no mention is made of the
principle which the appointed arbiter would follow in delivering his
judgment, assuming a dispute to arise.

In a previous part of Chapter II., he defines "the mean with
reference to ourselves" to be "that which neither exceeds, nor falls
short of, _the rule of propriety_ ([Greek: tou= de/ontos]). But this
is not one, nor is it the same to all."

To render this definition sufficient and satisfactory, Aristotle
ought to have pointed out to us how we are to find out that _rule of
propriety_ ([Greek: to\ de/on]) which marks and constitutes the
medium point, of actions and affections, _in relation to
ourselves_--this medium point being in his opinion _virtue_. To
explain what is meant by a medium _in relation to ourselves_, by the
words [Greek: to\ de/on], _the rule of propriety_, is only a change
of language, without any additional information.

Thus the capital problem of moral philosophy still remains unsolved.

It is remarkable that Aristotle in some parts of his treatise states
very distinctly what this problem is, and what are the points
essential to its solution: he speaks as if he were fully aware of
that which was wanting to his own treatise, and as if he were
preparing to supply the defect: but still the promise is never
realized. Take for example the beginning of Book VI. Eth. Nic.

"Since it has been already laid down, that we ought to choose the
middle point and not either the excess or the defect--and since the
middle point is that which right reason determines--let us
distinguish what that is. For in all the mental habits which have
been described, as well as in all others also, there is a certain
aim, by a reference to which the rational being is guided either in
relaxing or in restricting: and there is a certain definite boundary
of those medial points, which we affirm to exist between excess and
defect, determinable according to right reason. To speak thus,
however, is indeed correct enough, but it gives no distinct
information ([Greek: ou)the\n de\ saphe/s]): for in all other modes
of proceeding which are governed by scientific principles it is quite
just to say that you ought neither to work nor to rest more than is
sufficient nor less than is sufficient, but to a degree midway
between the two and agreeably to right reason. But a man who has only
this information would be no wiser than he was before it, any more
than he would know what things he ought to apply to his body, by
being simply told that he must apply such things as medical science
and as the medical practitioner directed. Wherefore, with respect
also to the habits of the soul we must not be content with merely
giving a general statement in correct language, but we must farther
discriminate what right reason is, and what is its definition."

This is a very clear and candid statement of the grand and
fundamental defect in Aristotle's theory of Ethics. He says very
truly that "there is a certain end and aim ([Greek: sko/pos]), to
which a rational being has reference when he either restricts or
relaxes any disposition." It was incumbent on Aristotle to explain
what this [Greek: sko/pos] was; but this he never does, though he
seems so clearly to have felt the want of it. We might have supposed
that after he had pointed out what was required to impart specific
meaning to correct but vague generalities, he would have proceeded at
once to fill up the acknowledged chasm in his theory: but instead of
this, he enters into an analysis of the intellect, speculative and
practical, and explains the varieties of intellectual, as
contradistinguished from moral, excellence. This part of his work is
highly valuable and instructive: but I cannot find that he ever again
touches upon the [Greek: sko/pos], which had been admitted to be as
yet undetermined. In a certain sense, it is indeed true that he
endeavours "to discriminate what right reason is, and what is its
definition:" for he classifies the intellectual functions into
intellect ([Greek: nou=s]), science ([Greek: e)pistê/mê]), wisdom
([Greek: sophi/a]), art ([Greek: te/chnê]), prudence ([Greek:
phro/nêsis]): he states the general nature of each of these
attributes, and the range of subjects to which it applies. He tells
us that intellect and prudence have reference to human conduct--that
prudence is "concerned with things just and honourable and good for
man" (vii. 12)--"with the things of man, and those things regarding
which we deliberate" (vii. 7)--"prudence must needs be a true habit
according to reason, concerned with the good of man" (vii. 5). In
explaining what prudence is, he tells us that it is _according to
reason_: in explaining what is _right reason_, he tells us that it is
_according to prudence_. He thus seems to make use of each as a part
of the definition of the other. But however this may be, certain it
is that he never fulfils the expectation held out in the beginning of
the Sixth Book, nor ever clears up the [Greek: ou)de\n saphe\s] there
acknowledged.

There is one sentence at the beginning of vi. 5, which looks as if it
conveyed additional information upon the difficulty in question--"Now
it seems to belong to the prudent man to be able to deliberate aright
concerning the things that are good and profitable to himself--not in
part, as concerning the things that have a reference to health or
strength--but concerning the things that refer to the whole of
_living well_" ([Greek: pro\s to\ eu)= zê=|n]). But this in point of
fact explains nothing. For _living well_ is the same as _happiness_:
happiness is _the active exercise of the soul according to virtue_:
therefore _virtue_ must be known, before we can know what _living
well_ is.

I think that this [Greek: sko/pos] or end, which Aristotle alludes to
in the beginning of the Sixth Book as not having been yet made clear,
appears to be more distinctly brought out in a previous passage than
it is in any portion of the Treatise after the beginning of the Sixth
Book. In Book IV. 6, Aristotle treats of the virtues and defects
connected with behaviour in social intercourse: the _obsequious_ at
one extreme, the _peevish_ or _quarrelsome_ at the other: and the
becoming medium, though it had no special name, which lay between
them. Speaking of the person who adopts this becoming medium, he
says--"We have said generally, then, that he will associate with
people as he ought; and having, moreover, a constant reference to
what is honourable and what is expedient, he will aim at not giving
pain or at contributing pleasure."

Again in regard to Temperance--iii. 11--he states the [Greek:
sko/pos] of the temperate man--"What things have a reference to
health or vigour, and are agreeable, these he desires in measure and
as he ought; as well as the other agreeable things that are not
opposed to these, either as being contrary to what is honourable or
as being beyond his fortune. For he that desires things agreeable,
which yet are contrary to what is honourable or beyond his fortune,
loves these pleasures more than they are worth. But not so with the
temperate man who lives according to right reason."

These passages are not very distinct, as an explanation of the proper
[Greek: sko/pos]: but I cannot find any passages after the beginning
of the Sixth Book which are more distinct than they: or perhaps,
equally distinct.

In one passage of the Seventh Book, Aristotle refers, though somewhat
obscurely, to the average degree of virtue exhibited by the mass of
mankind as the standard to be consulted when we pronounce upon excess
or defect (vii. 7).

Aristotle seems in some passages to indicate pleasure and pain as the
end with reference to which actions or dispositions are denominated
_good_ and _evil_. He says--vii. 11--"To theorise respecting pleasure
and pain, is the business of the political philosopher: for he is the
architect of that end with reference to which we call each matter
either absolutely good or absolutely evil. Moreover, it is
indispensable to institute an enquiry respecting them: for we have
explained ethical virtue and vice as referring to pleasures and
pains: and most people affirm happiness to be coupled with pleasure:
for which reason they have named [Greek: to\ maka/rion a)po\ tou=
chai/rein]."

In Book VIII. 9-10, the [Greek: sko/pos] is indeed stated very
clearly, but _not as such_--not as if Aristotle intended to make it
serve as such, or thought that it ought to form the basis upon which
our estimate of what is the proper middle point should be found. In
viii. 9-10, he tells us that all justice and benevolence ([Greek: to\
di/kaion kai\ ê( phili/a]) is a consequence and an incident of
established communion among human beings ([Greek: koinôni/a])--that
the grand communion of all, which comprehends all the rest, is the
_Political Communion_--that the end and object of the _Political
Communion_, as well that for which it was originally created as that
for which it subsists and continues, is _the common and lasting
advantage_ ([Greek: to\ koinê=| su/mpheron])--that all other
communions, of relations, friends, fellow-soldiers, neighbours, &c.,
are portions of the all-comprehensive political communion, and aim at
realizing some partial advantage to the constituent members. These
chapters are very clear and very important, and they announce plainly
enough _the common and lasting interest_ as the foundation and
measure of justice as well as of benevolence. But they do not apply
the same measure, to the qualities which had been enumerated in the
Books prior to the Sixth, as a means of ascertaining where the middle
point is to be found which is alleged to constitute virtue.
Nevertheless, Aristotle tells us that it is in the highest degree
difficult to find the middle point which constitutes virtue (ii. 9).

It might seem at first sight not easy for Aristotle, consistently
with the plan of his treatise, to point out any such standard or
measure. For none can be mentioned, with any tolerable pretensions to
admissibility, except that of _tendency to promote happiness_--the
happiness both of the individual agent and of the society to which he
belongs. But as he had begun by introducing the ideas of reason and
virtue as media for explaining what happiness was, there would have
been at least an apparent incongruity in reverting back to the latter
as a means of clearing up what was obscure in the former. I say--_at
least an apparent incongruity_--because after all the incongruity is
more apparent than real. If we carefully preserve the distinction
between the happiness of the individual agent and the happiness of
the Society to which he belongs, it will appear that Aristotle might
without any inconsistency have specified the latter as being the
object to which reason has regard, in regulating and controlling the
various affections of each individual.

Wherein consists the happiness of an individual man? In a course of
active exertion of the soul conformably to virtue: _virtue_ being
understood to consist in a certain mediocrity of our various
affections as determined by _right reason_.

When we next enquire, to what standard does _right reason_ look in
making this determination? it may without inconsistency be
answered--_Right reason_ determines the proper point of mediocrity by
a reference to _happiness generally_--that is, to the happiness of
society at large, including that of the individual agent in
question--in other words, to _the common and lasting advantage_,
which Aristotle describes as the grand object of the statesman. There
is no inconsistency in reverting to happiness, thus explained, as the
standard by which right reason judges in controlling our different
affections.

In all moral enquiries, it is of the greatest importance to keep in
view the happiness of the individual, and the happiness of the
society at large, as two distinct and separate objects--which
coincide indeed [Greek: ô(s e)pi\ to\ polu/], in the majority of
instances and with regard to the majority of individuals--but which
do not coincide necessarily and universally, nor with regard to every
individual. A particular man may be placed in such a position, or
animated with such feelings, that his happiness may be promoted by
doing what is contrary to the happiness of the society. He will under
these circumstances do what is _good_ for himself but _bad_ for
others: he will do what is morally wrong, and will incur the blame of
society. In speaking of _good_ and _evil_ it is always necessary to
keep in mind, that what is _good_ for an individual may be _bad_ for
the society: I mean, understanding the words _good for an individual_
in the most comprehensive sense, as including all that he has to
suffer from the unfavourable sentiments of society. Much confusion
has arisen from moralists speaking of good and evil absolutely,
without specifying whether they meant _good_ for the individual or
for the society: more particularly in the writings of the ancient
philosophers.

From the manner in which Aristotle arrives at his definition of what
constitutes happiness, we might almost suppose that he would have
been led to the indication of the happiness of society at large as
the standard for right reason to appeal to. For in examining what is
the proper business of man in general, he has recourse to the analogy
of the various particular arts and professions--the piper, the
statuary, the carpenter, the carrier, &c. Each has his particular
business and walk of action, and in the performance of that business
consists _the good and the well_ in his case (i. 7). So in like
manner there is a special business for man in general, in the
performance of which we are to seek human good.

Now this analogy of particular artists and professional men might
have conducted Aristotle to the idea of the general happiness of
society as a standard. For the business of every artist or artisan
consists in conducing to the comfort, the protection, or the
gratification of the public, each in his particular walk:
professional excellence for them consists in accomplishing this
object perfectly. For every special profession therefore the
happiness of society at large, under one form or another, is
introduced as the standard by which good and excellence are to be
measured.

Apply this analogy to man in general, taken apart from any particular
craft or profession. If each man, considered simply as such, has his
appropriate business, in the good performance of which happiness for
him consists, the standard of excellence in respect to such
**performance is to be found in its conduciveness to the
happiness of society at large. It can be found nowhere else, if we
are to judge according to the analogy of special arts and
professions.

Until this want of a standard or measure is supplied, it is clear
that the treatise of Aristotle is defective in a most essential
point--a defect which is here admitted by himself in the first
chapter of the Sixth Book. Nor is there any other way of supplying
what is wanting except by reference to the general happiness of
society, the end and object (as he himself tells us) of the
statesman.

"What then," says Aristotle," prevents our calling him happy who is
in the active exercise of his soul agreeably to perfect virtue, and
is sufficiently well furnished with external goods, not for a casual
period but for a complete lifetime?" (i. 10). He thinks himself
obliged to add, however, that this is not quite sufficient--for that
after death a man will still be affected with sympathy for the good
or bad fortunes and conduct of his surviving relatives, affected
however faintly and slightly, so as not to deprive him of the title
to be called _happy_, if on other grounds he deserves it. The
deceased person sees the misfortunes of his surviving friends with
something of the same kind of sympathetic interest, though less in
degree, as is felt by a living person in following the representation
of a tragedy (i. 11). The difference between a misfortune, happening
during a man's life or after his death, is much greater than that
between scenic representation of past calamities and actual reality
(_ib._).

It seems as if Aristotle was reluctantly obliged to make this
admission--that deceased persons were at all concerned in the
calamities of the living--more in deference to the opinions of others
than in consequence of any conviction of his own. His language in the
two chapters wherein he treats of it is more than usually hesitating
and undecided: and in the beginning of Chapter XI., he says--"To have
no interest whatever in the fortunes of their descendants and
friends, seems exceedingly heartless and contrary to what we should
expect"--he then, farther on, states it to be a great matter of doubt
whether the dead experience either good or evil--but if anything of
the kind does penetrate to them, it must be feeble and insignificant,
so as to make no sensible difference to them.


II.

Aristotle distributes _good things_ into three classes--the
_admirable_ or worshipful--the _praiseworthy_--the _potential_.

1. _Good_--as an End: that which is worthy of being honoured and
venerated in itself and from its own nature, without regard to
anything ulterior: that which comes up to our idea of perfection.

2. _Good_--as a means: that which is good, not on its own account nor
in its own nature, but on account of certain ulterior consequences
which flow from it.

3. _Good_--as a means, but not a certain and constant means: that
which produces _generally_, but _not always_, ulterior consequences
finally good: that which, in order to produce consequences in
themselves good, requires to be coupled with certain concomitant
conditions.

1. _Happiness_ belongs to the first of these classes: it is put along
with _the divine_, _the better_, _soul_, _intellect_, _the more
ancient_, _the principle_, _the cause_, &c. (Mag. Moral. i. 2). Such
objects as these, we contemplate with awe and reverence.

2. _Virtue_ belongs to the second of the classes: it is good from the
acts to which it gives birth, and from the end (happiness) which
those acts, when sufficiently long continued, tend to produce.

3. _Wealth_, _power_, _beauty_, _strength_, &c., belong to the third
class: these are generally good because under most circumstances they
tend to produce happiness: but they may be quite otherwise, if a
man's mind be so defectively trained as to dispose him to abuse them.

It is remarkable that this classification is not formally laid down
and explained, but is assumed as already well known and familiar, in
the Nicom. Ethics, i. 12: whereas it is formally stated and explained
in the Magna Moralia, i. 2.

_Praise_, according to Aristotle, "does not belong to the best
things, but only to the second-best. The Gods are to be _macarised_,
not _praised_:" the praise of the Gods must have reference to
ourselves, and must be taken in comparison with ourselves and our
acts and capacities: and this is ridiculously degrading, when we
apply it to the majesty of the Gods. In like manner the most divine
and perfect men deserve to be macarised rather than praised. "No man
praises happiness, as he praises justice, but _macarises_ (_blesses_)
it as something more divine and better."

Happiness is to be numbered amongst the perfect and worshipful
objects--it is the [Greek: a)rchê\] for the sake of which all of us
do everything: and we consider the principle and the cause of all
good things to be something divine and venerable (i. 12).

Since then Happiness is the action of the soul conformably to perfect
virtue, it is necessary to examine what human virtue is: and this is
the most essential mark to which the true politician will direct his
attention (i. 13).

There are two parts of the soul--the rational and the irrational.
Whether these two are divisible in fact, like the parts of the body,
or whether they are inseparable in fact, and merely susceptible of
being separately dealt with in reasoning, like the concavity and
convexity of a circle, is a matter not necessary to be examined in
the present treatise. Aristotle speaks as if he considered this as
really a doubtful point.

Of the irrational soul, one branch is, the nutritive and vegetative
faculty, common to man with animals and plants. The virtue of this
faculty is not special to man, but common to the vegetable and animal
world: it is in fact most energetic during sleep, at the period when
all virtue special to man is for the time dormant (i. 13).

But the irrational soul has also another branch, the appetites,
desires, and passions: which are quite distinct from reason, but may
either resist reason, or obey it, as the case may happen. It may thus
in a certain sense be said to partake of reason, which the vegetative
and nutritive faculty does not in any way. The virtue of this
department of the soul consists in its due obedience to reason, as to
the voice of a parent (i. 13).

Human virtue, then, distributes itself into two grand divisions--1.
The virtue of the rational soul, or Intellectual Virtue. 2. The
virtue of the semi-rational soul, or Ethical Virtue.

Perhaps the word _Excellence_ more exactly corresponds to [Greek:
a)retê\], than _Virtue_.

Intellectual excellence is both generated and augmented by teaching
and experience. Ethical excellence by practical training. The
excellence is not natural to us: but we are susceptible of being
trained, and the training creates it. By training, according as it is
either good or bad, all excellence is either created or destroyed:
just as a man becomes a good or a bad musician, according as he has
been subjected to a good or a bad mode of practice.

It is by doing the same thing many times that we acquire at last the
habit of doing it--"For what things we have to learn to do, these we
learn by doing" (ii. 1): according as the things we are trained to do
are good or bad, we acquire good habits or bad habits. By building we
become builders, by playing on the harp we become harpers--good or
indifferent, according to the way in which we have practised. All
legislators wish and attempt to make their citizens good, by means of
certain habits: some succeed in the attempt, others fail: and this is
the difference between a good and a bad government. It is by being
trained to do acts of justice and courage that we become at last just
and courageous--"In one word, habits are generated by (a succession
of) like operations: for this reason it is the character of the
operations performed which we ought chiefly to attend to: for
according to the difference of these will be the habits which ensue.
It is therefore not a matter of slight difference whether immediately
from our earliest years we are _ethised_ in one way or in another--it
makes a prodigious difference--or rather, it makes the whole
difference" (ii. 1).

Uniform perseverance in action, then, creates a habit: but of what
nature is the required action to be? In every department of our
nature, where any good result is to be produced, we may be
disappointed of our result by two sorts of error: either an excess or
on the side of defect. To work or eat too much, or too little,
prevents the good effects of training upon the health and strength:
so with regard to temperance, courage and the other virtues--the man
who is trained to fear everything and the man who is trained to fear
nothing, will alike fail in acquiring the genuine habit of courage.
The acquisition of the habit makes the performance of the action
easy: by a course of abstinent acts, we acquire the habit of
temperance: and having acquired this habit, we can with the greater
ease perform the act of abstinence (ii. 2).

The symptom which indicates that the habit has been perfectly
acquired, is the facility or satisfaction with which the act comes to
be performed (ii. 3). The man who abstains from bodily pleasures, and
who performs this contentedly ([Greek: au)tô=| tou/tô| chai/rôn]), is
the _temperate_ man: the man who does the same thing but reluctantly
and with vexation ([Greek: a)chtho/nimos]) is _intemperate_: the like
with courage. Ethical excellence, or ethical badness, has reference
to our pleasures and pains: whenever we do any thing mean, or shrink
from any thing honourable, it is some pleasure or some pain which
determines our conduct: for which reason Plato rightly prescribes
that the young shall be educated even from the earliest moment so as
to give a proper direction to their pleasures and pains (ii. 3). By
often pursuing pleasure and pain under circumstances in which we
ought not to do so, we contract bad habits, by a law similar to that
which under a good education would have imparted to us good habits.
Ethical virtue then consists in such a disposition of our pleasures
and pains as leads to performance of the best actions. Some persons
have defined it to consist in apathy and imperturbability of mind:
but this definition is erroneous: the mind ought to be affected under
proper circumstances (ii. 3). (This seems to be the same doctrine
which was afterwards preached by the Stoic school.)

There are three ingredients which determine our choice, _the
honourable_--_the expedient_--_the agreeable_: and as many which
occasion our rejection--_the base_--_the inexpedient_--_the painful_
or _vexatious_. In respect to all these three the good man judges
rightly, the wicked man wrongly, and especially in regard to the
latter. Pleasure and pain are familiar to us from our earliest
childhood, and are ineffaceable from human nature: all men measure
and classify actions ([Greek: kanoni/zomen ta\s pra/xeis]) by
pleasure and pain: some men to a greater degree, others to a less
degree.

All ethical excellence, and all the political science, turns upon
pleasure and pain (ii. 3).

A man becomes just and temperate by doing just and temperate actions,
thus by degrees acquiring the habit. But how (it is asked) can this
be true? for if a man performs just and temperate actions, he must
already start by being just and temperate.

The objection is not well founded. A man may do just and temperate
actions, and yet not be just and temperate. If he does them, knowing
what he does, intending what he does, and intending to do the acts
for their own sake, then indeed he is just and temperate, but not
otherwise. The productions of art carry their own merit along with
them: a work of art is excellent or defective, whatever be the state
of mind of the person who has executed it. But the acts of a man
cannot be said to be justly or temperately done, unless there be a
certain state of mind accompanying their performance by the doer:
they may indeed be called just and temperate acts, meaning thereby
that they are such as a just and temperate man would do, but the man
who does them does not necessarily deserve these epithets. It is only
by frequent doing of acts of this class that a man can acquire the
habit of performing them intentionally and for themselves, in which
consists the just and temperate character. To know what such acts
are, is little or nothing: you must obey the precepts, just as you
follow the prescriptions of a physician. Many men think erroneously
that philosophy will teach them to be virtuous, without any course of
action adopted by themselves (ii. 4).

Aristotle classifies the phenomena of the soul (the non-rational
soul) into three--Passions--Capacities or Faculties--States. The
first are the occasional affections--anger, fear, envy, joy,
aversion--"in short, everything that is accompanied by pleasure or
pain" (ii. 5). The second are, the capacities of being moved by such
affections--the affective faculties, if one may so call them (_ib._
So Eth. Eudem. ii. 2). The third are, those habits according to which
we are said to be well or ill disposed towards this or that
particular affection: to be disposed to violent anger or violent
fear, is a bad habit. Virtues and vices are neither affections, nor
faculties, but habits, either good or bad. This is the genus to which
the virtues belong ([Greek: tô=| ge/nei]--Eth. Nic. ii. 5). Virtue is
that habit from the possession of which a man is called good, and by
which he performs well his appropriate function (ii. 6). It consists
in a certain medium between two extremes, the one of excess, the
other of defect--a medium not positive and absolute, but variable and
having reference to each particular person and each particular
case--neither exceeding nor falling short of what is proper (ii. 6).
All ethical virtue aims at the attainment of this middle point in
respect to our affections and actions--to exhibit each on the proper
occasions, in the proper degree, towards the proper persons, &c. This
middle point is but one, but errors on both sides of it are
numberless: it must be determined by reason and by the judgment of
the prudent man (ii. 6).

Virtue therefore, according to its essence and generic definition
([Greek: kata\ me\n tê\n ousi/an, kai\ to\n lo/gon to\n ti/ ê)n
ei)=nai le/gonta]), is a _certain mediocrity_.

But there are some actions and some affections which do not admit of
mediocrity, and which imply at once in their names evil and
culpability (ii. 6)--such as impudence, envy, theft, &c. Each of
these names implies in its meaning a certain excess and defect, and
does not admit of mediocrity: just as _temperance_ and _courage_
imply in their meaning the idea of mediocrity, and exclude both
excess and defect.

Aristotle then proceeds to apply his general doctrine--that virtue or
excellence consists in a medium between two extremes, both
defects--to various different virtues. He again insists upon the
extreme difficulty of determining where this requisite medium is, in
each individual instance: either excess or defect is the easy and
natural course. In finding and adhering to the middle point consists
the _well_, the _rare_, the _praiseworthy_, the _honourable_ (ii. 9).
The extremes, though both wrong, are not always equally wrong: that
which is the most wrong ought at any rate to be avoided: and we ought
to be specially on our guard against the seductions of pleasure
(_ib._), since our natural inclinations carry us in that direction.

Aristotle so often speaks of the propriety of following _nature_, and
produces _nature_ so constantly as an authority and an arbiter, that
it seems surprising to find him saying--"We must be on our guard with
reference to the things whereto we ourselves are prone. For some of
us are by nature disposed towards some things, others towards
others."--"But we must drag ourselves away in the opposite direction"
(ii. 9).

There is a singular passage in the same chapter with respect to our
moral judgments. After having forcibly insisted on the extreme
difficulty of hitting the proper medium point of virtue, he says that
a man who commits only small errors on one side or on the other side
of this point, is not censured, but only he who greatly deviates from
it--he then proceeds--"But it is not easy to define in general
language at what point a man becomes deserving of censure: nor indeed
is it easy to do this with regard to any other matter of perception.
Questions of this sort depend upon the circumstances of the
particular case, and the judgment upon each _resides in our
perception_" (ii. 9).

The first five chapters, of the third Book of the Ethics, are devoted
to an examination of various notions involved in our ideas of virtue
and vice--_Voluntary_ and _Involuntary_--[Greek: e(kou/sion kai\
a)kou/sion]--_Ignorance_--[Greek: a)/gnoia]--Choice or resolution,
consequent upon previous deliberation--[Greek: proai/resis].

Those actions are _involuntary_, which are done either by compulsion,
or through ignorance. An action is done by compulsion when the
proximate cause of it (or beginning--[Greek: a)rchê\]) is something
foreign to the will of the agent--the agent himself neither
concurring nor contributing. Actions done from the fear of greater
evils are of a mixed character, as where a navigator in a storm
throws his goods overboard to preserve the ship. Such actions as
this, taken as a class, and apart from particular circumstances, are
what no one would do voluntarily: but in the particular circumstances
of the supposed case, the action is done voluntarily. Every action is
_voluntary_, wherein the beginning of organic motion is, the will of
the agent (iii. 1).

Men are praised if under such painful circumstances they make a right
choice--if they voluntarily undergo what is painful or dishonourable
for the purpose of accomplishing some great and glorious result
(_ib._): they are censured, if they shrink from this course, or if
they submit to the evil without some sufficient end. If a man is
induced to do what is unbecoming by the threat of evils surpassing
human endurance, he is spoken of with forbearance: though there are
some crimes of such magnitude as cannot be excused even by the
greatest possible apprehension of evil, such as death and torture. In
such trying circumstances, it is difficult to make a right choice,
and still more difficult to adhere to the choice when it is made.

What is done _through ignorance_, can never be said to be done
_voluntarily_: if the agent shall be afterwards grieved and repentant
for what he has done, it is _involuntary_. If he be not repentant,
though he cannot be said to have done the deed _voluntarily_, yet
neither ought it to be called involuntary.

A distinction however is to be taken in regard to ignorance,
considered as a ground for calling the action _involuntary_, and for
excusing the agent. A man drunk or in a violent passion, misbehaves,
_ignorantly_ but not _through ignorance_: that is, ignorance is not
the cause of his misbehaviour, but drunkenness or rage. In like
manner, every depraved person may be ignorant of his true interest,
or the rule which he ought to follow, but this sort of ignorance does
not render his behaviour _involuntary_, nor entitle him to any
indulgence. It must be ignorance with regard to some particular
circumstance connected with the special action which he is
committing--ignorance of the person with whom, or the instrument with
which, or the subject matter in regard to which he is dealing.
Ignorance of this special kind, if it be accompanied with subsequent
sorrow and repentance, constitutes an action involuntary, and forms a
reasonable ground for indulgence (**iii. 1).

A _voluntary action_, then, is that of which the beginning is in the
agent--he knowing the particular circumstances under which he is
acting. Some persons have treated actions, performed through passion
or through desire, as _involuntary_; but this is an error. If this
were true, neither children nor animals would be capable of voluntary
action. Besides, it is proper, on some occasions, to follow the
dictates both of anger and of desire: and we cannot be said to act
involuntarily in these cases when we do exactly what we ought to do.
Moreover sins from passions and sins from bad reasoning are alike
voluntary or alike involuntary: both of them ought to be avoided: and
the nonrational affections are just as much a part of human nature as
reason is (**iii. 1).

Having explained the proper meaning of voluntary and involuntary as
applied to actions, Aristotle proceeds to define [Greek:
_proai/resis_] (deliberate choice); which is most intimately
connected with excellence, and which indeed affords a better test of
disposition than actions themselves can do (**iii. 2).

All premeditated choice is voluntary, but all voluntary action is not
preconcerted. Children and animals are capable of voluntary action,
but not of preconcerted action: sudden deeds, too, are voluntary, but
not preconcerted. Premeditated choice is different from desire--from
passion--from wishing--and from opinion. Desire and passion are
common to animals, who are nevertheless incapable of _deliberate
preference_. The incontinent man acts from desire, but not from
deliberate preference: the continent man acts from deliberate
preference, but not from desire. Nor is premeditated choice the same
as wishing: for we often wish for what is notoriously impracticable
or unattainable, but we do not deliberately prefer any such thing:
moreover we _wish_ for the end, but we _deliberately choose_ the
means conducting to the end. We wish to be happy: but it cannot with
propriety be said that we deliberately choose to be happy. Deliberate
choice has reference to what it is or seems in our own power to
achieve.

Again, deliberate choice is not to be regarded as a simple
modification of opinion. Opinions extend to everything: deliberate
choice belongs exclusively to matters within our grasp. Opinion is
either true or false: deliberate choice is either good or evil. We
are good or bad, according to the turn which our deliberate choice
takes: not according to our opinions. We deliberately choose to seek
something or to avoid something, and our choice is praised when it
falls upon what is proper: the points upon which we form an opinion
are, what such or such a thing is, whom it will benefit, and how: and
our opinion is praised when it happens to be true. It often occurs,
too, that men who form the truest opinions are not the best in their
deliberate preferences. Opinion may precede or accompany every
deliberate choice, but still the latter is something distinct in
itself. It is in fact a determination of the will, preceded by
deliberate counsel, and thus including or presupposing the employment
of reason (**iii. 2). It is an appetency, determined by previous
counsel, of some matter within our means, either really or seemingly,
to accomplish--[Greek: bouleutikê\ o(/rexis tô=n e)ph' ê(mi=n]
(**iii. 3).

It seems from the language of Aristotle that the various explanations
of [Greek: Proai/resis] which he has canvassed and shown to be
inadmissible, had all been advanced by various contemporary
philosophers.

[Greek: Proai/resis], or _deliberate preference_, includes the idea
of _deliberation_. A reasonable man does not deliberate upon all
matters--he does not deliberate respecting mathematical or physical
truths, or respecting natural events altogether out of his reach, or
respecting matters of pure accident, or even respecting matters of
human design carried on by distant foreign nations. He only
deliberates respecting matters which are more or less within his own
agency and control: respecting matters which are not certain, but of
doubtful issue. He does not deliberate about the end, but about the
means towards the end: the end itself is commonly assumed, just as
the physician assumes the necessity of establishing good health and
the orator that of persuading his hearers. If there be more than one
way of accomplishing the end, he deliberates by which out of these
several means he can achieve it best and most easily: proceeding from
the end itself first to the proximate cause of that end, then to the
cause immediately preceding that cause, and so backwards until he
arrives at the primary cause, which is either an action of his own,
within his own means, or something requiring implements and
assistance beyond his power to procure. This is a process of
analysis, similar to that which is pursued by geometricians in
seeking the way of solving a problem: they assume the figure with the
required conditions to be constructed: they then take it to pieces,
following back the consequences of each separate condition which it
has been assumed to possess. If by this way of proceeding they arrive
at some known truth, their problem is solved; if they arrive at some
known untruth, the problem is insoluble. That step which is last
arrived at in the analysis, is the first in the order of production
(iii. 3). When a man in carrying back mentally this deliberative
analysis arrives at something manifestly impracticable, he desists
from farther deliberation: if he arrives at something within his
power to perform, he begins action accordingly. The subject of
_deliberation_, and the subject of _deliberate preference_, are the
same, but the latter represents the process as accomplished and the
result of deliberation decided.

We take counsel and deliberation (as has been said), not about the
end, but about the means or the best means towards the end assumed.
We _wish for the end_ ([Greek: ê( bou/lêsis tou= te/lous
e)/sti]--iii. 4). Our wish is for good, real or apparent: whether for
the one or the other, is a disputed question. Speaking generally, and
without reference to peculiar idiosyncrasies, the real good or _the
good_ is the object of human wishes: speaking with reference to any
particular individual, it is his own supposed or apparent good. On
this matter, the virtuous man is the proper judge and standard of
reference: that which is really good appears good to him. Each
particular disposition has its own peculiar sentiment both of what is
honourable and of what is agreeable (iii. 4): the principal
excellence of the virtuous man is, that he in every variety of
circumstances perceives what is truly and genuinely good; whereas to
most men, pleasure proves a deception, and appears to be good, not
being so in reality.

Both virtue and vice consists in _deliberate preference_, of one or
of another course of action. Both therefore are voluntary and in our
own power: both equally so. It is not possible to refer virtuous
conduct or vicious conduct to any other beginning except to
ourselves: the man is the cause of his own actions, as he is the
father of his own children. It is upon this assumption that all legal
reward and punishment is founded: it is intended for purposes of
encouragement and prevention, but it would be absurd to think either
of encouraging or preventing what is involuntary, such as the
appetite of hunger and thirst. A man is punished for ignorance, when
he is himself the cause of his own ignorance, or when by reasonable
pains he might have acquired the requisite knowledge. Every man above
the limit of absolute fatuity ([Greek: komidê=| a)naisthê/tou]) must
know that any constant repetition of acts tends to form a habit: if
then by repetition of acts he allows himself to form a bad habit, it
is his own fault. When once the bad habit is formed, it is true that
he cannot at once get rid of it: but the formation of such a habit
originally was not the less imputable to himself (iii. 5). Defects of
body also which we bring upon ourselves by our own negligence or
intemperance, bring upon us censure: if they are constitutional and
unavoidable, we are pitied for them. Some persons seem to have
contended at that time, that no man could justly be made responsible
for his bad conduct: because (they said) the end which he proposed to
himself was good or bad according to his natural disposition, not
according to any selection of his own. Aristotle seems to be somewhat
perplexed by this argument: nevertheless he maintains, that whatever
influence we may allow to original and uncontrollable nature, still
the formation of our habits is more or less under our own concurrent
control; and therefore the end which we propose to ourselves being
dependent upon those habits, is also in part at least dependent upon
ourselves (iii. 5)--our virtues and our vices are both voluntary.

The first five chapters of the third Book (in which Aristotle
examines the nature of [Greek: to\ e(kou/sion, to\ a)kou/sion,
proai/resis, bou/lêsis], &c.) ought perhaps to constitute a Book by
themselves. They are among the most valuable parts of the Ethics. He
has now established certain points with regard to our virtues
generally.

1. They are mediocrities ([Greek: meso/têtes]).2. They are habits,
generated by particular actions often repeated.3. When generated,
they have a specific influence of their own in facilitating the
performance of actions of the same class. 4. They are in our own
power originally, and voluntary.5. They are under the direction of
right reason.

It is to be observed that our actions are voluntary from the
beginning to the end--the last of a number of repeated actions is no
less voluntary than the first. But our habits are voluntary only at
the beginning--they cease to be voluntary after a certain time--but
the permanent effect left by each separate repetition of the action
is inappreciable (iii. 5).

Aristotle then proceeds to an analysis of the separate
virtues--Courage, Temperance, Liberality, Magnificence, Magnanimity,
Gentleness, Frankness, Simplicity, Elegant playfulness, Justice,
Equity, &c. He endeavours to show that each of these is a certain
mediocrity--excess lying on one side of it, defect on the other.

There are various passages of Aristotle which appear almost identical
with the moral doctrine subsequently maintained by the Stoic school:
for example--iii. 6--"In like manner he ought not to fear penury, nor
sickness, nor in any way such things as arise not from moral baseness
nor are dependent on himself."

The courageous man is afraid of things such as it befits a man to
fear, but of no others: and even these he will make head against on
proper occasions, when reason commands and for the sake of _honour_,
which is the end of virtue (iii. 7). To fear nothing, or too little,
is rashness or insanity: to fear too much, is timidity: the
courageous man is the mean between the two, who fears what he ought,
when he ought, as he ought, and with the right views and purposes
(_ib._). The [Greek: moicho\s] (adulterer) exposes himself often to
great dangers for the purpose of gratifying his passion: but
Aristotle does not hold this to be courage. Neither does he thus
denominate men who affront danger from passion, or from the thirst of
revenge, or from a sanguine temperament--there must be deliberate
preference and a proper motive, to constitute courage--the motive of
honour (iii. 8).

The end of courage (says Aristotle) is in itself pleasant, but it is
put out of sight by the circumstances around it: just as the prize
for which the pugilist contends is in itself pleasurable, but being
of small moment and encompassed with painful accessories, it appears
to carry with it no pleasure whatever. Fatigue, and wounds and death
are painful to the courageous man--death is indeed more painful to
him, inasmuch as his life is of more value: but still he voluntarily
and knowingly affronts these pains for the sake of honour.

This is painful: "but pleasure is not to be anticipated in the
exercise of all the different virtues, except in so far as the
attainment of the end is concerned" (iii. 9).

(This is perfectly true: but it contradicts decidedly the remark
which Aristotle had made before in his first Book (i. 8) respecting
the inherent pleasure of virtuous agency.)

Courage and Temperance are the virtues of the instincts ([Greek: tô=n
a)lo/gôn merô=n]--iii. 10). Temperance is the observance of a
rational medium with respect to the pleasures of eating, drinking,
and sex. Aristotle seems to be inconsistent when he makes it to
belong to those pleasures in which animals generally partake (iii.
10); for other animals do not relish intoxicating liquors: unless
indeed these are considered as ranking under drink generally. The
temperate man desires these pleasures as he ought, when he ought,
within the limits of what is honourable, and having a proper
reference to the amount of his own pecuniary means: just as right
reason prescribes (iii. 11). To pursue them more, is excess: to
pursue them less, is defect. There is however, in estimating excess
and defect, a certain tacit reference to the average dispositions of
the many.

"Wherefore the desires of the temperate man ought to harmonize with
reason; for the aim of both is the honourable. And the temperate man
desires what he ought, and as he ought, and when: and this too is the
order of reason" (iii. 12).

All virtuous acts are to be _on account of the honourable_--thus
Aristotle says that the donations of the [Greek: a)/sôtos] (prodigal)
are not to be called liberal--"Neither are their gifts liberal, for
they are not honourable, nor on account of this, nor as they ought to
be" (iv. 1). Again about the [Greek: megaloprepê\s] or _magnificent_
man--"Now the magnificent man will expend such things on account of
the honourable; for this is a condition shared in by all the virtues:
and still he will do so pleasantly and lavishly" (iv. 2). On the
contrary, the [Greek: ba/nausos] or _vulgar_ man, who differs from
the magnificent man in the way of [Greek: u(perbolê\] or _excess_, is
said to spend--"Not for the sake of the honourable, but for the
purpose of making a display of his wealth" (iv. 2).

With respect to those epithets which imply praise or blame, there is
always a tacit comparison with some assumed standard. Thus with
regard to the [Greek: philo/timos] (lover of honour), Aristotle
observes--"It is evident that, as the term 'lover of such and such
things' is used in various senses, we do not always apply 'lover of
honour' to express the same thing; but when we praise, we praise that
ambition which is more than most men's, and blame that which is
greater than it ought to be" (iv. 4).

In the fifth Book, Aristotle proceeds to explain wherein consist
_Justice_ and _Injustice_.

These words are used in two senses--a larger sense and a narrower
sense.

In the larger sense, _just behaviour_ is equivalent to the observance
of law, generally: unjust behaviour is equivalent to the violation of
law generally. But the law either actually does command, or may be
understood to command, that we should perform towards others the acts
belonging to each separate head of virtue: it either actually
prohibits, or may be understood to prohibit, us from performing
towards others any of the acts belonging to each separate head of
vice. In this larger sense, therefore, _justice_ is synonymous
generally with perfect virtue--_injustice_, with perfect wickedness:
there is only this difference, that _just_ or _unjust_ are
expressions applied to behaviour in so far as it affects other
persons besides the agent: whereas _virtuous_ or _wicked_ are
expressions applied simply to the agent without connoting any such
ulterior reference to other persons. _Just_ or _unjust_, is
necessarily towards somebody else: and this reference is implied
distinctly in the term. Virtuous and vicious do not in the force of
the term connote any such relations, but are employed with reference
to the agent simply--"This justice then is perfect virtue; yet not
absolutely, but with reference to one's neighbour.--In one sense we
call those things _just_ that are productive and preservative of
happiness and its parts to the political communion" (v. 1).

Justice in this sense, is the very fulness of virtue, because it
denotes the actual exercise of virtuous behaviour towards others:
"there are many who behave virtuously in regard to their own personal
affairs, but who are incapable of doing so in what regards others"
(_ib._). For this reason, justice has been called by some _the good
of another and not our own_--justice alone of all the virtues,
because it necessarily has reference to another: the just man does
what is for the interest of some one else, either the magistrate, or
the community (v. 1).

_Justice_ in the narrower sense, is that mode of behaviour whereby a
man, in his dealings with others, aims at taking to himself his fair
share and no more of the common objects of desire: and willingly
consents to endure his fair share of the common hardships.
_Injustice_ is the opposite--that by which a man tries to appropriate
more than his fair share of the objects of desire, while he tries to
escape his fair share of the objects of aversion. To aim at this
unfair distribution of the benefits of the society, either in one's
own favour or in favour of any one else, is injustice in _the narrow
sense_ (v. 2).

Justice in this narrower sense is divided into two branches--1.
Distributive Justice. 2. Corrective Justice.

Distributive Justice has reference to those occasions on which
positive benefits are to be distributed among the members of the
community, wealth and honours, &c. (v. 2). In this case, the share of
each citizen is to be a share not absolutely of equality, but one
proportional to his personal worth ([Greek: a)xi/an]): and it is in
the estimation of this personal worth that quarrels and dissension
arise.

_Corrective Justice_ has reference to the individual dealings, or
individual behaviour, between man and man: either to the dealings
implying mutual consent and contract, as purchase, sale, loan, hire,
suretyship, deposit, &c.: or such as imply no such mutual
consent,--such as are on the contrary proceedings either by fraud or
by force--as theft, adultery, perjury, poisoning, assassination,
robbery, beating, mutilation, murder, defamation, &c.

In regard to transactions of this nature, the citizens are considered
as being all upon a par--no account is taken of the difference
between them in point of individual worth. Each man is considered as
entitled to an equal share of good and evil: and if in any dealings
between man and man, one man shall attempt to increase his own share
of good or to diminish his own share of evil at the expense of
another man, corrective justice will interpose and re-establish the
equality thus improperly disturbed. He who has been made to lose or
to suffer unduly, must be compensated and replaced in his former
position: he who has gained unduly, must be mulcted or made to
suffer, so as to be thrown back to the point from which he started.
The judge, who represents this _corrective justice_, is a kind of
mediator, and the point which he seeks to attain in directing
redress, is _the middle point between gain and loss_--so that neither
shall the aggressive party be a gainer, nor the suffering party a
loser--"So that justice is a mean between a sort of gain and loss in
voluntary things,--it is the having the same after as before" (v. 4).
Aristotle admits that the words _gain_ and _loss_ are not strictly
applicable to many of the transactions which come within the scope of
interference from _corrective justice_--that they properly belong to
voluntary contracts, and are strained in order to apply them to acts
of aggression, &c. (_ib._).

The Pythagoreans held the doctrine that justice universally speaking
consisted in simple retaliation--in rendering to another the precise
dealing which that other had first given. This definition will not
suit either for distributive justice or corrective justice: the
treatment so prescribed would be sometimes more, sometimes less, than
justice: not to mention that acts deserve to be treated differently
according as they are intentional or unintentional. But the doctrine
is to a certain extent true in regard to the dealings between man and
man ([Greek: e)n tai=s a)llaktikai=s koinôni/ais])--if it be applied
in the way of general analogy and not with any regard to exact
similarity--it is of importance that the man who has been well
treated, and the man who has been illtreated, should each show his
sense of the proceeding by returning the like usage: "for by
proportionate requital the State is held together" (v. 5). The whole
business of exchange and barter, of division of labour and
occupation,--the co-existence of those distinct and heterogeneous
ingredients which are requisite to constitute the political
communion--the supply of the most essential wants of the citizens--is
all founded upon the continuance and the expectation of this assured
requital for acts done. Money is introduced as an indispensable
instrument for facilitating this constant traffic: it affords a
common measure for estimating the value of every service--"And thus
if there were no possibility of retaliation, there would be no
communion" (v. 5).

Justice is thus a mediocrity--or consists in a just medium--between
two extremes, but not in the same way as the other virtues. The just
man is one who awards both to himself and to every one else the
proper and rightful share both of benefit and burthen. Injustice, on
the contrary, consists in the excess or defect which lie on one side
or the other of this medium point (v. 5).

_Distributive justice_ is said by Aristotle to deal with individuals
according to geometrical ratio; _corrective justice_, according to
arithmetical proportion. _Justice_, strictly and properly so called,
is _political justice_: that reciprocity of right and obligation
which prevails between free and equal citizens in a community, or
between citizens who, if not positively equal, yet stand in an
assured and definite ratio one to the other (v. 6). This relation is
defined and maintained by law, and by judges and magistrates to
administer the law. Political justice implies a state of law--a
community of persons qualified by nature to obey and sustain the
law--and a definite arrangement between the citizens in respect to
the alternation of command and obedience--"For this is, as we have
said ([Greek: ê)=n]), according to law, and among those who can
naturally have law; those, namely, as we have said ([Greek: ê)=san]),
who have an equality of ruling and being ruled." As the law arises
out of the necessity of preventing injustice, or of hindering any
individual from appropriating more than his fair share of good things,
so it is felt that any person invested with sovereign authority may
and will commit this injustice. Reason therefore is understood to hold
the sovereign authority, and the archon acts only as the guardian of
the reciprocal rights and obligations--of the constitutional
equality--between the various citizens: undertaking a troublesome duty
and paid for his trouble by honour and respect (v. 6).

The relation which subsists between master and slave, or father and
son, is not properly speaking that of justice, though it is somewhat
analogous. Both the slave, and the non-adult son, are as it were
parts of the master and father: there can therefore be no injustice
on his part towards them, since no one deliberately intends to hurt a
part of himself. Between husband and wife there subsists a sort of
justice--_household justice_ ([Greek: to\ oi)konomiko\n
di/kaion])--but this too is different from political justice (v. 6).

Political justice is in part _natural_--in part _conventional_. That
which is _natural_ is everywhere the same: that which is conventional
is different in different countries, and takes its origin altogether
from positive and special institution. Some persons think that _all_
political justice is thus conventional, and none natural: because
they see that rights and obligations ([Greek: ta\ di/kaia]) are
everywhere changeable, and nowhere exhibit that permanence and
invariability which mark the properties of natural objects. "This is
true to a certain extent, but not wholly true: probably among the
Gods it is not true at all: but with us that which is natural is in
part variable, though not in every case: yet there is a real
distinction between what is natural and what is not natural. Both
natural justice and conventional justice, are thus alike contingent
and variable: but there is a clear mode of distinguishing between the
two, applicable not only to the case of justice but to other cases in
which the like distinction is to be taken. For by nature the right
hand is the stronger: but nevertheless it may happen that there are
ambidextrous men.--And in like manner those rules of justice which
are not natural, but of human establishment, are not the same
everywhere: nor indeed does the same mode of government prevail
everywhere, though there is but one mode of government which is
everywhere agreeable to nature--the best of all" (v. 7).

(The commentary of Andronicus upon this passage is clearer and more
instructive than the passage of Aristotle itself: and it is
remarkable as a distinct announcement of the principle of utility.
"Since both natural justice, and conventional justice, are
changeable, in the way just stated, how are we to distinguish the one
of these fluctuating institutions from the other? The distinction is
plain. Each special precept of justice is to be examined on its own
ground to ascertain whether it be for the advantage of all that it
should be maintained unaltered, or whether the subversion of it would
occasion mischief. If this be found to be the fact, the precept in
question belongs to natural justice: if it be otherwise, to
conventional justice" (Andronic. Rh. v. c. 10).

The just, and the unjust, being thus defined, a man who does,
willingly and knowingly, either the one or the other, acts justly or
unjustly: if he does it unwillingly or unknowingly, he neither acts
justly nor unjustly, except by accident--that is, he does what is not
essentially and in its own nature unjust, but is only so by accident
(v. 8). Injustice will thus have been done, but no unjust act will
have been committed, if the act be done involuntarily. The man who
restores a deposit unwillingly and from fear of danger to himself,
does not act justly, though he does what by accident is just: the man
who, anxious to restore the deposit, is prevented by positive
superior force from doing so, does not act unjustly, although he does
what by accident is unjust. When a man does mischief, it is either
done contrary to all reasonable expectation, in such manner that
neither he nor any one else could have anticipated from his act the
mischief which has actually ensued from it ([Greek: paralo/gôs]), and
in this case it is a pure misfortune ([Greek: a)tu/chêma]): or he
does it without intention or foreknowledge, yet under circumstances
in which mischief might have been foreseen, and ought to have been
foreseen; in this case it is a fault ([Greek: a(ma/rtêma]): or he
does it intentionally and with foreknowledge, yet without any
previous deliberation, through anger, or some violent momentary
impulse; in this case it is an unjust act ([Greek: a)di/kêma]), but
the agent is not necessarily an _unjust or wicked_ man for having
done it: or he does it with intention and deliberate choice, and in
this case he is an unjust and wicked man.

The man who does a just thing, or an unjust thing, is not necessarily
a just or an unjust man. Whether he be so or not, depends upon the
state of his mind and intention at the time (v. 8).

Equity, [Greek: to\ e)pieike\s], is not at variance with justice, but
is an improvement upon justice. It is a correction and supplement to
the inevitable imperfections in the definitions of legal justice. The
law wishes to comprehend all cases, but fails in doing so: the words
of its enactment do not fully and exactly express its real
intentions, but either something more or something less. When the
lawgiver speaks in general terms, a particular case may happen which
falls within the rule as he lays it down, but which he would not have
wished to comprehend if he had known how to avoid it. It is then
becoming conduct in the individual to whose advantage the law in this
special case turns, that he should refrain from profiting by his
position, and that he should act as the legislator himself would
wish, if consulted on the special case. The general rules laid down
by the legislator are of necessity more or less defective: in fact,
the only reason why everything is not determined by law, is, that
there are some matters respecting which it is impossible to frame a
law (v. 10). Such is the conduct of the equitable man--"the man who
refrains from pushing his legal rights to the extreme, to the injury
of others, but who foregoes the advantage of his position, although
the law is in his favour" ([Greek: o( mê\ a)kribodi/kaios e)pi\
chei=ron, a)ll' e)lattôtiko\s, kai/per e)/chôn to\n no/mon
boêtho/n]).

A man may hurt himself, but he cannot act unjustly towards himself.
No injustice can be done to a man except against his own consent.
Suicide is by implication forbidden by the law: to commit suicide is
wrong, because a man in so doing acts unjustly towards the city, not
towards himself, which is impossible (v. 12).

To act unjustly--and to be the object of unjust dealing by
others--are both bad: but which is the worst? It is the least of the
two evils to be the object of unjust dealing by others. Both are bad,
because in the one case a man gets more than his share, in the other
less than his share: in both cases the just medium is departed from.
To act unjustly is blameable, and implies wickedness: to be the
object of unjust dealing by others is not blameable, and implies no
wickedness: the latter is therefore in itself the least evil,
although by accident it may perhaps turn out to be the greater evil
of the two. In the same manner a pleurisy is in itself a greater evil
than a trip and a stumble: but by accident it may turn out that the
latter is the greater evil of the two, if it should occur at the
moment when a man is running away from the enemy, so as to cause his
being taken prisoner and slain.

The question here raised by Aristotle--which is the greater evil--to
act unjustly or to be the object of unjust dealing--had been before
raised by Plato in the Gorgias. Aristotle follows out his theory
about virtue, whereby he makes it consist in the observance of a
medium point. The man that acts unjustly sins on one side of this
point, the object of unjust dealing misses it on the other side: the
one is comparable to a man who eats or works too much for his health,
the other to a man who eats or works too little. The question is one
which could hardly arise, according to the view taken by modern
ethical writers of the principles of moral science. The two things
compared are not in point of fact commensurable. Looking at the
question from the point of view of the moralist, the person injured
has incurred no moral guilt, but has suffered more or less of
misfortune: the unjust agent on the contrary has suffered no
misfortune--perhaps he has reaped benefit--but at any rate he has
incurred moral guilt. Society on the whole is a decided loser by the
act: but the wrong done implies the suffering inflicted: the act is
considered and called _wrong_ because it does inflict suffering, and
for no other reason. It seems an inadmissible question therefore, to
ask which of the two is the greater evil--the suffering undergone by
A--or the wrong by which B occasioned that suffering: at least so far
as society is concerned.

But the ancient moralists, in instituting this comparison, seem to
have looked, not at society, but at the two individuals--the wrong
doer and the wrong sufferer--and to have looked at them too from a
point of view of their own. If we take the feelings of these two
parties themselves as the standard by which to judge, the sentence
must be obviously contrary to the opinion delivered by Aristotle: the
sufferer, according to his own feeling, is worse off than he was
before: the doer is better off. And it is for this reason that the
act forms a proper ground for judicial punishment or redress. But the
moralist estimates the condition of the two men by a standard of his
own, not by the feelings which they themselves entertain. He decides
for himself that a virtuous frame of mind is the primary and
essential ingredient of individual happiness--a wicked frame of mind
the grand source of misery: and by this test he tries the comparative
happiness of every man. The man who manifests evidence of a guilty
frame of mind is decidedly worse off than he who has only suffered an
unmerited misfortune.




CHAPTER XIV.

POLITICA.


The scheme of government proposed by Aristotle, in the two last books
of his Politics, as representing his own ideas of something like
perfection, is evidently founded upon the Republic of Plato: from
whom he differs in the important circumstance of not admitting either
community of property or community of wives and children.

Each of these philosophers recognises one separate class of
inhabitants, relieved from all private toil and all money-getting
employments, and constituting exclusively the citizens of the
commonwealth. This small class is in effect _the city_--_the
commonwealth_: the remaining inhabitants are not a part of the
commonwealth, they are only appendages to it--indispensable indeed,
but still appendages, in the same manner as slaves or cattle (vii.
8). In the Republic of Plato this narrow aristocracy are not allowed
to possess private property or separate families, but form one
inseparable brotherhood. In the scheme of Aristotle, this aristocracy
form a distinct caste of private families each with its separate
property. The whole territory of the State belongs to them, and is
tilled by dependent cultivators, by whom the produce is made over and
apportioned under certain restrictions. A certain section of the
territory is understood to be the common property of the body of
citizens (_i.e._ of the aristocracy), and the produce of it is handed
over by the cultivators into a common stock, partly to supply the
public tables at which all the citizens with their wives and families
are subsisted, partly to defray the cost of religious solemnities.
The remaining portion of the territory is possessed in separate
properties by individual citizens, who consume the produce as they
please (vii. 9): each citizen having two distinct lots of land
assigned to him, one near the outskirts of the territory, the other
near the centre. This latter regulation also had been adopted by
Plato in the treatise de Legibus, and it is surprising to observe
that Aristotle himself had censured it, in his criticisms on that
treatise, as incompatible with a judicious and careful economy (ii.
3. 8). The syssitia or public tables are also adopted by Plato, in
conformity with the institutions actually existing in his time in
Crete and elsewhere.

The dependent cultivators, in Aristotle's scheme, ought to be slaves,
not united together by any bond of common language or common country
(vii. 9, 9): if this cannot be, they ought to be a race of subdued
foreigners, degraded into perioeci, deprived of all use of arms, and
confined to the task of labouring in the field. Those slaves who till
the common land are to be considered as the property of the
collective body of citizens: the slaves on land belonging to
individual citizens, are the property of those citizens.

When we consider the scanty proportion of inhabitants whom Aristotle
and Plato include in the benefits of their community, it will at once
appear how amazingly their task as political theorists is simplified.
Their **commonwealth is really an aristocracy on a very narrow scale.
The great mass of the inhabitants are thrust out altogether from all
security and good government, and are placed without reserve at the
disposal of the small body of armed citizens.

There is but one precaution on which Aristotle and Plato rely for
ensuring good treatment from the citizens towards their inferiors:
and that is, the finished and elaborate education which the citizens
are to receive. Men so educated, according to these philosophers,
will behave as perfectly in the relation of superior to inferior, as
in that of equal to equal--of citizen to citizen.

This supposition would doubtless prove true, to a certain extent,
though far short of that extent which would be requisite to assure
the complete comfort of the inferior. But even if it were true to the
fullest extent, it would be far from satisfying the demands of a
benevolent theorist. For though the inferior should meet with
kindness and protection from his superior, still his mind must be
kept in a degradation suitable to his position. He must be deprived
of all moral and intellectual culture: he must be prevented from
imbibing any ideas of his own dignity: he must be content to receive
whatever is awarded, to endure whatever treatment is vouchsafed,
without for an instant imagining that he has a right to benefits or
that suffering is wrongfully inflicted upon him. Both Plato and
Aristotle acknowledge the inevitable depravation and moral abasement
of all the inhabitants excepting their favoured class. Neither of
them seems solicitous either to disguise or to mitigate it.

But if they are thus indifferent about the moral condition of the
mass, they are in the highest degree exact and careful respecting
that of their select citizens. This is their grand and primary
object, towards which the whole force of their intellect, and the
full fertility of their ingenious imagination, is directed. Their
plans of education are most elaborate and comprehensive: aiming at
every branch of moral and intellectual improvement, and seeking to
raise the whole man to a state of perfection, both physical and
mental. You would imagine that they were framing a scheme of public
education, not a political constitution: so wholly are their thoughts
engrossed with the training and culture of their citizens. It is in
this respect that their ideas are truly instructive.

Viewed with reference to the general body of inhabitants in a State,
nothing can be more defective than the plans of both these great
philosophers. Assuming that their objects were completely attained,
the mass of the people would receive nothing more than that degree of
physical comfort and mild usage which can be made to consist with
subjection and with the extortion of compulsory labour.

Viewed with reference to the special class recognized as citizens,
the plans of both are to a high degree admirable. A better provision
is made for the virtue as well as for the happiness of this
particular class than has ever been devised by any other political
projector. The intimate manner in which Aristotle connects virtue
with happiness, is above all remarkable. He in fact defines happiness
to consist in _the active exertion and perfected habit of virtue_
([Greek: a)retê=s e)ne/rgeia kai\ chrê=si/s tis te/leios]--vi. 9.
3.): and it is upon this disposition that he founds the necessity of
excluding the mass of inhabitants from the citizenship. For the
purpose to be accomplished by the political union, is, the assuring
of happiness to every individual citizen, which is to be effected by
implanting habits of virtue in every citizen. Whoever therefore is
incapable of acquiring habits of virtue, is disqualified from
becoming a citizen. But every man whose life is spent in laborious
avocations, whether of husbandry, of trade, or of manufacture,
becomes thereby incapable of acquiring habits of virtue, and cannot
therefore be admitted to the citizenship. No man can be capable of
the requisite mental culture and tuition, who is not exempted from
the necessity of toil, enabled to devote his whole time to the
acquisition of virtuous habits, and subjected from his infancy to a
severe and systematic training. The exclusion of the bulk of the
people from civil rights is thus founded, in the mind of Aristotle,
on the lofty idea which he forms of individual human perfection,
which he conceives to be absolutely unattainable unless it be made
the sole object of a man's life. But then he takes especial care that
the education of his citizens shall be really such as to compel them
to acquire that virtue on which alone their pre-eminence is built. If
he exempts them from manual or money-getting labours, he imposes upon
them an endless series of painful restraints and vexatious duties for
the purpose of forming and maintaining their perfection of character.
He allows no luxury or self-indulgence, no misappropriation of time,
no ostentatious display of wealth or station. The life of his select
citizens would be such as to provoke little envy or jealousy, among
men of the ordinary stamp. Its hard work and its strict discipline
would appear repulsive rather than inviting: and the pre-eminence of
strong and able men, submitting to such continued schooling, would
appear well deserved and hardly earned.

Oligarchical reasoners in modern times employ the bad part of
Aristotle's principle without the good. They represent the rich and
great as alone capable of reaching a degree of virtue consistent with
the full enjoyment of political privileges: but then they take no
precautions, as Aristotle does, that the men so preferred shall
really answer to this exalted character. They leave the rich and
great to their own self-indulgence and indolent propensities, without
training them by any systematic process to habits of superior virtue.
So that the select citizens on this plan are at the least no better,
if indeed they are not worse, than the remaining community, while
their unbounded **indulgences excite either undue envy or
undue admiration, among the excluded multitude. The select citizens
of Aristotle are both better and wiser than the rest of their
community: while they are at the same time so hemmed in and
circumscribed by severe regulations, that nothing except the
perfection of their character can appear worthy either of envy or
admiration. Though therefore these oligarchical reasoners concur with
Aristotle in sacrificing the bulk of the community to the
pre-eminence of a narrow class, they fail of accomplishing the end for
which alone he pretends to justify such a sacrifice--the formation of
a few citizens of complete and unrivalled virtue.

The arrangements made by Aristotle for the good government of his
aristocratical citizens among themselves, are founded upon principles
of the most perfect equality. He would have them only limited in
number, for in his opinion, personal and familiar acquaintance among
them all is essentially requisite to good government (vii. 4. 7). The
principal offices of the State are all to be held by the aged
citizens: the military duties are to be fulfilled by the younger
citizens. The city altogether, with the territory appertaining to it,
must be large enough to be [Greek: au)ta/rkês]: but it must not be so
extensive as to destroy personal intimacy among the citizens. A very
large body are, in Aristotle's view, incapable of discipline or
regularity.

To produce a virtuous citizen, _nature_, _habit_, and _reason_ must
coincide. They ought to be endued with virtues qualifying them both
for occupation and for leisure: with courage, self-denial ([Greek:
karteri/a]), and fortitude, to maintain their independence: with
justice and temperance, to restrain them from abusing the means of
enjoyment provided for them: and with philosophy or the love of
contemplative wisdom and science, in order to banish ennui, and
render the hours of leisure agreeable to them (vii. 13. 17). They are
to be taught that their hours of leisure are of greater worth and
dignity than their hours of occupation. Occupation is to be submitted
to for the sake of the quiet enjoyment of leisure, just as war is
made for the sake of procuring peace, and useful and necessary
employments undertaken for the sake of those which are honourable
(vii. 13. 8). Aristotle greatly censures (see vii. 2. 5) (as indeed
Plato had done before him) the institutions of Lacedæmon, as being
directed exclusively to create excellent warriors, and to enable the
nation to rule over foreigners. This (he says) is not only not the
right end, but is an end absolutely pernicious and culpable. To
maintain a forcible sovereignty over free and equal foreigners, is
unjust and immoral: and if the minds of the citizens be corrupted
with this collective ambition and love of power, it is probable that
some individual citizen, taught by the education of the State to
consider power as the first of all earthly ends, will find an
opportunity to aggrandize himself by force or fraud, and to establish
a tyranny over his countrymen themselves (viii. 13. 13). The
Lacedæmonians conducted themselves well and flourished under their
institutions, so long as they were carrying on war for the
enlargement of their dominion: but they were incapable of tasting or
profiting by peace: they were not educated by their legislator so as
to be able to turn leisure to account ([Greek: ai)/tios d' o(
nomothe/tês, ou) paideu/sas du/nasthai schola/zein]--vii. 13. 15).

The education of the citizen is to commence with the body: next the
irrational portion of the soul is to be brought under
discipline--that is, the will and the appetites, the concupiscent and
irascible passions: thirdly, the rational portion of the soul is to
be cultivated and developed. The habitual desires are to be so moulded
and tutored as to prepare them for the sovereignty of reason, when
the time shall arrive for bringing reason into action (vii. 13. 23).
They are to learn nothing until five years old (vii. 15. 4), their
diversions are to be carefully prepared and presented to them,
consisting generally of a mimicry of subsequent serious occupations
(vii. 15. 15): and all the fables and tales which they hear recited
are to be such as to pave the way for moral discipline (_ib._); all
under the superintendence of the Pædonom. No obscene or licentious
talk is to be tolerated in the city (vii. 15. 7), nor any indecent
painting or statue, except in the temples of some particular Deities.
No youth is permitted to witness the recitation either of iambics or
of comedy (vii. 15. 9), until he attains the age which qualifies him
to sit at the public tables. Immense stress is laid by the
philosopher on the turn of ideas to which the tender minds of youth
become accustomed, and on the earliest combinations of sounds or of
visible objects which meet their senses (vii. 15. 10). [Greek: Pro\s
pa/sas duna/meis kai\ te/chnas e)stin a(\ dei= propaideu/esthai kai\
proethi/zesthai pro\s ta\s e(ka/stôn e)rgasi/as, ô(/ste dê=lon o(/ti
kai\ pro\s ta\s tê=s a)retê=s pra/xeis] (viii. 1. 2).

All the citizens in Aristotle's republic are to be educated according
to one common system: each being regarded as belonging to the
commonwealth more than to his own parents. This was the practice at
Lacedæmon, and Aristotle greatly eulogizes it (viii. 1. 3).

Aristotle does not approve of extreme and violent bodily training,
such as would bring the body into the condition of an athlete: nor
does he even sanction the gymnastic labours imposed by the
Lacedæmonian system, which had the effect of rendering the Spartans
"brutal of soul," for the purpose of exalting their courage ([Greek:
oi( La/kônes--thêriô/deis a)perga/zontai toi=s po/nois, ô(s tou=to
ma/lista pro\s a)ndrei/an su/mpheron]). He remarks, first, that
courage is not the single or exclusive end to be aimed at in a civil
education: next, that a savage and brutal soul is less compatible
with exalted courage than a gentle soul, trained so as to be
exquisitely sensible to the feelings of shame and honour (viii. 3.
3-5). The most sanguinary and unfeeling among the barbarous tribes,
he remarks, were very far from being the most courageous. A man
trained on the Lacedæmonian system, in bodily exercises alone,
destitute even of the most indispensable mental culture (see below),
was a real [Greek: ba/nausos]--useful only for one branch of
political duties, and even for that less useful than if he had been
trained in a different manner.

Up to the age of 14, Aristotle prescribes ([Greek: ê(/bê] means 14
years of age--see vii. 15. 11) that boys shall be trained in gentle
and regular exercises, without any severe or forced labour. From 14
to 17 they are to be instructed in various branches of knowledge:
after 17, they are to be put to harder bodily labour and to be
nourished with a special and peculiar diet ([Greek:
a)nagkophagi/ais]). For how long this is to continue, is not stated.
But Aristotle insists on the necessity of not giving them at the same
time intellectual instruction and bodily training, for the one of
these, he says, counteracts and frustrates the other (viii. 4. 2-3).

The Lacedæmonians made music no part of their education: Isocrat.
Panathen. Or. xii. p. 375, B.; they did not even learn 'letters'
([Greek: gra/mmata]), but they are said to have been good judges of
music (viii. 4. 6). Aristotle himself however seems to think it next
to impossible that men who have not learned music can be good judges
(viii. 6. 1).

Aristotle admits that music may be usefully learnt as an innocent
pleasure and relaxation: but he chiefly considers it as desirable on
account of its moral effects, on the dispositions and affections. A
right turn of the pleasurable and painful emotions is, in his
opinion, essential to virtue: particular strains and particular
rhythms are naturally associated with particular dispositions of
mind: by early teaching, those strains and those rhythms which are
associated with temperate and laudable dispositions may be made more
agreeable to a youth than any others. He will like best those which
he hears earliest, and which he finds universally commended and
relished by those about him. A relish for the [Greek: o(moiô/mata] of
virtuous dispositions will tend to increase in him the love of virtue
itself (viii. 6. 5. 8).

Aristotle enjoins that the youth be taught to execute music
instrumentally and vocally, because it is only in this way that they
can acquire a good taste or judgment in music: besides which, it is
necessary to furnish boys with some occupation, to absorb their
restless energies, and there is none more suitable than music. Some
persons alleged that the teaching music as a manual art was banausic
and degrading, lowering the citizen down to the station of a hired
professional singer. Aristotle meets this objection by providing that
youths shall be instructed in the musical art, but only with the view
of correcting and cultivating their taste: they are to be forbidden
from making any use of their musical acquisitions, in riper years, in
actual playing or singing (viii. 6. 3). Aristotle observes, that
music more difficult of execution had been recently introduced into
the agones, and had found its way from the agones into the ordinary
education. He decidedly disapproves and excludes it (viii. 6. 4). He
forbids both the flute and the harp, and every other instrument
requiring much art to play upon it: especially the flute, which he
considers as not ethical, but orgiastical--calculated to excite
violent and momentary emotions. The flute obtained a footing in
Greece after the Persian invasion; in Athens at that time it became
especially fashionable; but was discontinued afterwards (Plutarch
alleges, through the influence of Alcibiades).

The suggestions of Aristotle for the education of his citizens are
far less copious and circumstantial than those of Plato in his
Republic. He delivers no plan of study, no arrangement of sciences to
be successively communicated, no reasons for preferring or rejecting.
We do not know what it was precisely which Aristotle comprehended in
the term "philosophy," intended by him to be taught to his citizens
as an aid for the proper employment of their leisure. It must
probably have included the moral, political, and metaphysical
sciences, as they were then known--those sciences to which his own
voluminous works relate.

By means of the public table, supplied from the produce of the public
lands, Aristotle provides for the full subsistence of every citizen.
Yet he is well aware that the citizens will be likely to increase in
numbers too rapidly, and he suggests very efficient precautions
against it. No child at all deformed or imperfect in frame is to be
brought up: children beyond a convenient number, if born, are to be
exposed: but should the law of the State forbid such a practice, care
must be taken to forestall consciousness and life in them, and to
prevent their birth by [Greek: a)/mblôsis] (vii. 14. 10).

Aristotle establishes two _agora_ in his city: one situated near to
the harbour, adapted to the buying, selling, and storing of goods,
under the surveillance of the agoranomus: the other called the _free
agora_, situated in the upper parts of the city, set apart for the
amusement and conversation of the citizens, and never defiled by the
introduction of any commodities for sale. No artisan or husbandman is
ever to enter the latter unless by special order from the
authorities. The temples of the Gods, the residences of the various
boards of government functionaries, the gymnasia of the older
citizens, are all to be erected in this free agora (vii. 11). The
Thessalian cities had an agora of this description where no traffic
or common occupations were permitted.

The moral tendency of Aristotle's reflections is almost always useful
and elevating. The intimate union which he formally recognizes and
perpetually proclaims between happiness and virtue, is salutary and
instructive: and his ideas of what virtue is, are perfectly just, so
far as relates to the conduct of his citizens towards each other:
though they are miserably defective as regards obligation towards
non-citizens. He always assigns the proper pre-eminence to wisdom and
virtue: he never overvalues the advantages of riches, nor deems them
entitled on their own account, to any reverence or submission: he
allows no title to the obedience of mankind, except that which arises
from superior power and disposition to serve them. Superior power and
station, as he considers them, involve a series of troubles--some
obligations which render them objects of desire only to men of virtue
and beneficence. What is more rare and more creditable still, he
treats all views of conquest and aggrandizement by a State as immoral
and injurious, even to the conquerors themselves.




APPENDIX.




APPENDIX.

I.

THE DOCTRINE OF UNIVERSALS.


The controversy respecting Universals first obtained its place in
philosophy from the colloquies of Sokrates, and the writings and
teachings of Plato. We need not here touch upon their predecessors,
Parmenides and Herakleitus, who, in a confused and unsystematic
manner, approached this question from opposite sides, and whose
speculations worked much upon the mind of Plato in determining both
his aggressive dialectic, and his constructive theories. Parmenides
of Elea, improving upon the ruder conceptions of Xenophanes, was the
first to give emphatic proclamation to the celebrated Eleatic
doctrine, Absolute Ens as opposed to Relative Fientia: _i.e._ the
Cogitable, which Parmenides conceived as the One and All of reality,
[Greek: e(\n kai\ pa=n], enduring and unchangeable, of which the
negative was unmeaning,--and the Sensible or Perceivable, which was
in perpetual change, succession and multiplicity, without either
unity, or reality, or endurance. To the last of these two departments
Herakleitus assigned especial prominence. In place of the permanent
underlying Ens, which he did not recognize, he substituted a
cogitable process of _change_, or generalized concept of what was
common to all the successive phases of change--a perpetual stream of
generation and destruction, or implication of contraries, in which
everything appeared only that it might disappear, without endurance
or uniformity. In this doctrine of Herakleitus, the world of sense
and particulars could not be the object either of certain knowledge
or even of correct probable opinion; in that of Parmenides, it was
recognized as an object of probable opinion, though not of certain
knowledge. But in both doctrines, as well as in the theories of
Demokritus, it was degraded, and presented as incapable of yielding
satisfaction to the search of a philosophizing mind, which could find
neither truth nor reality except in the world of Concepts and
Cogitables.

Besides the two theories above-mentioned, there were current in the
Hellenic world, before the maturity of Sokrates, several other veins
of speculation about the Kosmos, totally divergent one from the
other, and by that very divergence sometimes stimulating curiosity,
sometimes discouraging all study as though the problems were
hopeless. But Parmenides and Herakleitus, together with the
arithmetical and geometrical hypotheses of the Pythagoreans, are
expressly noticed by Aristotle as having specially contributed to
form the philosophy of Plato.

Neither Parmenides, nor Herakleitus, nor the Pythagoreans were
dialecticians. They gave out their own thoughts in their own way,
with little or no regard to dissentients. They did not cultivate the
art of argumentative attack or defence, nor the correct application
and diversified confrontation of universal terms, which are the great
instruments of that art. It was Zeno, the disciple of Parmenides,
that first employed dialectic in support of his master's theory, or
rather against the counter-theories of opponents. He showed by
arguments memorable for their subtlety, that the hypothesis of an
Absolute, composed of Entia Plura Discontinua, led to consequences
even more absurd than those that opponents deduced from the
Parmenidean hypothesis of Ens Unum Continuum. The dialectic, thus
inaugurated by Zeno, reached still higher perfection in the
colloquies of Sokrates; who not only employed a new method, but also
introduced new topics of debate--ethical, political, and social
matters instead of physical things and the Kosmos.

The peculiar originality of Sokrates is well known: a man who wrote
nothing, but passed his life in indiscriminate colloquy with every
one; who professed to have no knowledge himself, but interrogated
others on matters that they talked about familiarly and professed to
know well; whose colloquies generally ended by puzzling the
respondents, and by proving to themselves that they neither knew nor
could explain even matters that they had begun by affirming
confidently as too clear to need explanation. Aristotle tells us[1]
that Sokrates was the first that set himself expressly and
methodically to scrutinize the definitions of general or universal
terms, and to confront them, not merely with each other, but also, by
a sort of inductive process, with many particular cases that were, or
appeared to be, included under them. And both Xenophon and Plato give
us abundant examples of the terms to which Sokrates applied his
interrogatories: What is the Holy? What is the Unholy? What is the
Beautiful or Honourable? What is the Ugly or Base? What is
Justice--Injustice--Temperance--Madness--Courage--Cowardice--A City--A
man fit for civil life? What is the Command of Men? What is the
character fit for commanding men? Such are the specimens, furnished
by a hearer,[2] of the universal terms whereon the interrogatories of
Sokrates bore. All of them were terms spoken and heard familiarly by
citizens in the market-place, as if each understood them perfectly;
but when Sokrates, professing his own ignorance, put questions asking
for solutions of difficulties that perplexed his own mind, the answers
showed that these difficulties were equally insoluble by respondents,
who had never thought of them before. The confident persuasion of
knowledge, with which the colloquy began, stood exposed as a false
persuasion without any basis of reality. Such illusory semblance of
knowledge was proclaimed by Sokrates to be the chronic, though
unconscious, intellectual condition of his contemporaries. How he
undertook, as the mission of a long life, to expose it, is
impressively set forth in the Platonic Apology.

[Footnote 1: Metaphysica, A. p. 987, b. 2; M. p. 1078, b. 18.]

[Footnote 2: Xenophon Memorab. I. i. 16; IV. vi. 1-13.]

It was thus by Sokrates that the meaning of universal terms and
universal propositions, and the relation of each respectively to
particular terms and particular propositions were first made a
subject of express enquiry and analytical interrogation. His
influence was powerful in imparting the same dialectical impulse to
several companions; but most of all to Plato, who not only enlarged
and amplified the range of Sokratic enquiry, but also brought the
meaning of universal terms into something like system and theory, as
a portion of the conditions of trustworthy science. Plato was the
first to affirm the doctrine afterwards called Realism, as the
fundamental postulate of all true and proved cognition. He affirmed
it boldly, and in its most extended sense, though he also produces
(according to his frequent practice) many powerful arguments and
unsolved objections against it. It was he (to use the striking phrase
of Milton[3]) that first imported into the schools the portent of
Realism. The doctrine has been since opposed, confuted, curtailed,
transformed, diversified in many ways; but it has maintained its
place in logical speculation, and has remained, under one phraseology
or another, the creed of various philosophers, from that time down to
the present.

[Footnote 3: See the Latin verses 'De Ideâ Platonicâ quemadmodum
Aristoteles intellexit'--
  "At tu, perenne ruris Academi decus,
  Hæc monstra si tu primus induxti scholis," &c.]

The following account of the problems of Realism was handed down to
the speculations of the mediæval philosophers by Porphyry (between
270-300 A.D.), in his Introduction to the treatise of Aristotle on
the Categories. After informing Chrysaorius that he will prepare for
him a concise statement of the doctrines of the old philosophers
respecting Genus, Differentia, Species, Proprium, Accidens,
"abstaining from the deeper enquiries, but giving suitable
development to the more simple,"--Porphyry thus proceeds:--"For
example, I shall decline discussing, in respect to Genera and
Species, (1) Whether they have a substantive existence, or reside
merely in naked mental conceptions; (2) Whether, assuming them to
have substantive existence, they are bodies or incorporeals; (3)
Whether their substantive existence is in and along with the objects
of sense, or apart and separable. Upon this task I shall not enter,
since it is of the greatest depth, and requires another larger
investigation; but shall try at once to show you how the ancients
(especially the Peripatetics), with a view to logical discourse,
dealt with the topics now propounded."[4]

[Footnote 4: Porphyry, Introd. in Categor. init. p. 1, a. 1, Schol.
Br.]

Before Porphyry, all these three problems had been largely debated,
first by Plato, next by Aristotle against Plato, again by the Stoics
against both, and lastly by Plotinus and the Neo-Platonists as
conciliators of Plato with Aristotle. After Porphyry, problems the
same, or similar, continued to stand in the foreground of
speculation, until the authority of Aristotle became discredited at
all points by the influences of the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries. But in order to find the beginning of them, as questions
provoking curiosity and opening dissentient points of view to
inventive dialecticians, we must go back to the age and the dialogues
of Plato.

The real Sokrates (_i.e._ as he is described by Xenophon) inculcated
in his conversation steady reverence for the invisible, as apart from
and overriding the phenomena of sensible experience; but he
interpreted the term in a religious sense, as signifying the agency
of the personal gods, employed to produce effects beneficial or
injurious to mankind.[5] He also puts forth his dialectical acuteness
to prepare consistent and tenable definitions of familiar general
terms (of which instances have already been given), at least so far
as to make others feel, for the first time, that they did not
understand these terms, though they had been always talking like
persons that _did_ understand. But the Platonic Sokrates (_i.e._ as
spokesman in the dialogues of Plato) enlarges both these discussions
materially. Plato recognizes, not simply the invisible persons or
gods, but also a separate world of invisible, impersonal entities or
objects; one of which he postulates as the objective reality, though
only a cogitable reality, correlating with each general term. These
Entia he considers to be not merely distinct realities, but the only
true and knowable realities: they are eternal and unchangeable,
manifested by the fact that particulars partake in them, and
imparting a partial show of stability to the indeterminate flux of
particulars: unless such separate Universal Entia be supposed, there
is nothing whereon cognition can fasten, and consequently there can
be no cognition at all.[6] These are the substantive, self-existent
Ideas, or Forms that Plato first presented to the philosophical
world; sometimes with logical acuteness, oftener still with rich
poetical and imaginative colouring. They constitute the main body and
characteristic of the hypothesis of Realism.

[Footnote 5: Xenophon, Memorab. I. iv. 9-17; IV. iii. 14.]

[Footnote 6: Aristot. Metaphys. A. vi. p. 987, b. 5; M. iv. p. 1078,
b. 15.]

But, though the main hypothesis is the same, the accessories and
manner of presentation differ materially among its different
advocates. In these respects, indeed, Plato differs not only from
others, but also from himself. Systematic teaching or exposition is
not his purpose, nor does he ever give opinions in his own name. We
have from him an aggregate of detached dialogues, in many of which
this same hypothesis is brought under discussion, but in each
dialogue, the spokesmen approach it from a different side; while in
others (distinguished by various critics as the Sokratic dialogues)
it does not come under discussion at all, Plato being content to
remain upon the Sokratic platform, and to debate the meaning of
general terms without postulating in correlation with them an
objective reality, apart from their respective particulars.

At the close of the Platonic dialogue called Kratylus, Sokrates is
introduced as presenting the hypothesis of self-existent, eternal,
unchangeable Ideas (exactly in the way that Aristotle ascribes to
Plato) as the counter-proposition to the theory of universal flux and
change announced by Herakleitus. Particulars are ever changing (it is
here argued) and are thus out of the reach of cognition; but, unless
the Universal Ideas above them, such as the Self-beautiful, the
Self-good, &c., be admitted as unchangeable, objective realities,
there can be nothing either nameable or knowable: cognition becomes
impossible.

In the Timæus, Plato describes the construction of the Kosmos by a
Divine Architect, and the model followed by the latter in his work.
The distinction is here again brought out, and announced as capital,
between the permanent, unalterable Entia, and the transient,
ever-fluctuating Fientia, which come and go, but never really _are_.
Entia are apprehended by the cogitant or intelligent soul of the
Kosmos, Fientia by the sentient or percipient soul; the cosmical
soul as a whole, in order to suffice for both these tasks, is made
up of diverse component elements--Idem, correlating with the first of
the two, Diversum, correlating with the second, and Idem implicated
with Diversum, corresponding to both in conjunction. The Divine
Architect is described as constructing a Kosmos, composed both of
soul and body, upon the pattern of the grand pre-existent
Idea--[Greek: au)tozô=|on] or the Self-Animal; which included in
itself as a genus the four distinct species--celestial (gods, visible
and invisible), terrestrial, aerial, and aquatic.

The main point that Plato here insists upon is--the eternal and
unchangeable reality of the cogitable objects called Ideas, prior
both in time and in logical order to the transient objects of sight
and touch, and serving as an exemplar to which these latter are made
to approximate imperfectly. He assumes such priority, without proof,
in the case of the Idea of Animal; but, when he touches upon the four
elements--Fire, Air, Water, Earth--he hesitates to make the same
assumption, and thinks himself required to give a reason for it. The
reason that he assigns (announced distinctly as his own) is as
follows: If Intellection (Cogitation, [Greek: Nou=s]) and true
Opinion are two genera distinct from each other, there must clearly
exist Forms or Ideas imperceptible to our senses, and apprehended
only by cogitation or intellection; but if, as some persons think,
true opinion is noway different from intellection, then we must admit
all the objects perceived by our senses as firm realities. Now the
fact is (he proceeds to say) that true opinion is not identical with
intellection, but quite distinct, separate, and unlike to it.
Intellection is communicated by teaching, through true reasoning, and
is unshakeable by persuasion; true opinion is communicated by
persuasion and removed by counter-persuasion, without true reasoning.
True opinion may belong to any man; but intellection is the privilege
only of gods and of a small section of mankind. Accordingly, since
the two are distinct, the objects correlating with each of them must
also be distinct from each other. There must exist, first, primary,
eternal, unchangeable Forms, apprehended by intellect or cogitation,
but imperceptible by sense; and, secondly, resemblances of these
bearing the same name, generated and destroyed each in some place,
and apprehended first by sense, afterwards by opinion. Thirdly, there
must be the place wherein such resemblances are generated; a place
itself imperceptible by sense, yet postulated, as a receptacle
indispensable for them, by a dreamy kind of computation.

We see here that the proof given by Plato, in support of the
existence of Forms as the primary realities, is essentially
psychological: resting upon the fact that there is a distinct mental
energy or faculty called Intellection (apart from Sense and Opinion),
which must have its distinct objective correlate; and upon the
farther fact, that intellection is the high prerogative of the gods,
shared only by a few chosen men. This last point of the case is more
largely and emphatically brought out in the Phædrus, where Sokrates
delivers a highly poetical effusion respecting the partial
intercommunion of the human soul with these eternal intellectual
realities. To contemplate them is the constant privilege of the gods;
to do so is also the aspiration of the immortal soul of man
generally, in the pre-existent state, prior to incorporation with the
human body; though only in a few cases is such aspiration realized.
Even those few human souls, that have succeeded in getting sight of
the intellectual Ideas (essences without colour, figure, or tactile
properties), lose all recollection of them when first entering into
partnership with a human body; but are enabled gradually to recall
them, by combining repeated impressions and experience of their
resemblances in the world of sense. The revival of these divine
elements is an inspiration of the nature of madness; though it is a
variety of madness as much better than uninspired human reason as
other varieties are worse. The soul, becoming insensible to ordinary
pursuits, contracts a passionate devotion to these Universal Ideas,
and to that dialectical communion, especially with some pregnant
youthful mind, that brings them into clear separate contemplation
disengaged from the limits and confusion of sense.

Here philosophy is presented as the special inspiration of a few,
whose souls during the period of pre-existence have sufficiently
caught sight of the Universal Ideas or Essences; so that these last,
though overlaid and buried when the soul is first plunged in a body,
are yet revivable afterwards under favourable circumstances, through
their imperfect copies in the world of sense; especially by the sight
of personal beauty in an ingenuous and aspiring youth, in which case
the visible copy makes nearest approach to the perfection of the
Universal Idea or Type. At the same time, Plato again presents to us
the Cogitable Universals as the only objects of true cognition, the
Sensible Particulars being objects merely of opinion.

In the Phædon, Sokrates advances the same doctrine, that the
**perceptions of sense are full of error and confusion, and can
at best suggest nothing higher than opinion; that true
cogitation can never be attained except when the cogitant mind
disengages itself from the body and comes into direct contemplation
of the Universal Entia, objects eternal and always the same--The
Self-beautiful, Self-good, Self-just, Self-great, Healthy, Strong,
&c., all which objects are invisible, and can be apprehended only by
the cogitation or intellect. It is this Cogitable Universal that is
alone real; Sensible Particulars are not real, nor lasting, nor
trustworthy. None but a few philosophers, however, can attain to such
pure mental energy during this life; nor even they fully and
perfectly. But they will attain it fully after death (their souls
being immortal), if their lives have been passed in sober
philosophical training. And their souls enjoyed it before birth
during the period of pre-existence; having acquired, before junction
with the body, the knowledge of these Universals, which are forgotten
during childhood, but recalled in the way of Reminiscence, by
sensible perceptions that make a distant approach to them. Thus,
according to the Phædon and some other dialogues, all learning is
merely reminiscence; the mind is brought back, by the laws of
association, to the knowledge of Universal Realities that it had
possessed in its state of pre-existence. Particulars of sense
participate in these Universals to a certain extent, or resemble them
imperfectly; and they are therefore called by the same name.

In the Republic, we have a repetition and copious illustration of
this antithesis between the world of Universals or Cogitables, which
are the only unchangeable realities and the only objects of
knowledge,--and the world of Sensible Particulars, which are
transitory and confused shadows of these Universals, and are objects
of opinion only. Full and real Ens is knowable, Non-Ens is altogether
unknowable; what is midway between the two is matter of opinion, and
in such midway are the Particulars of sense.[7] Respecting these
last, no truth is attainable: whenever you affirm a proposition
respecting any of them, you may with equal truth affirm the contrary
at the same time. Nowhere is the contrast between the Universals or
real Ideas (among which the Idea of Good is the highest, predominant
over all the rest), and the unreal Particulars, or Percepta, of
Sense, more forcibly insisted upon than in the Republic. Even the
celestial bodies and their movements, being among these Percepta of
sense, are ranked among phantoms interesting but useless to observe;
they are the best of all Percepta, but they fall very short of the
perfection that the mental eye contemplates in the Ideal--in the true
Figures and Numbers, in the real Velocity and the real Slowness. In
the simile commencing the seventh book of the Republic, Plato
compares mankind to prisoners in a cave, chained in one particular
attitude, so as to behold only an ever-varying multiplicity of
shadows, projected, through the opening of the cave upon the wall
before them, by certain unseen realities behind. The philosopher is
one among a few, who by training or inspiration, have been enabled to
face about from this original attitude, and to contemplate with his
mind the real unchangeable Universals, instead of having his eye
fixed upon their particular manifestations, at once shadowy and
transient. By such mental revolution he comes round from the
Perceivable to the Cogitable, from Opinion to Knowledge.

[Footnote 7: Plato, Republic. v. pp. 477, 478.]

The distinction between these two is farther argued in the elaborate
dialogue called Theætetus, where Sokrates, trying to explain what
Knowledge or Cognition is, refutes three proposed explanations and
shows, to his own satisfaction, that it is not sensible perception,
that it is not true opinion, that it is not true opinion coupled with
rational explanation. But he confesses himself unable to show what
Knowledge or Cognition is, though he continues to announce it as
correlating with Realities Cogitable and Universal only.[8]

[Footnote 8: Plato, Theætêt. pp. 173, 176, 186. Grote's Plato, II.
xxvi. pp. **320-395.]

In the passages above noticed, and in many others besides, we find
Plato drawing a capital distinction between Universals eternal and
unchangeable (each of them a Unit as well as a Universal),[9] which
he affirms to be the only real Entia,--and Particulars transient and
variable, which are not Entia at all, but are always coming or going;
the Universals being objects of cogitation and of a psychological
fact called Cognition, which he declares to be infallible; and the
Particulars being objects of Sense, and of another psychological fact
radically different, called Opinion, which he pronounces to be
fallible and misleading. Plato holds, moreover, that the Particulars,
though generically distinct and separate from the Universals, have
nevertheless a certain communion or participation with them, by
virtue of which they become half existent and half cognizable, but
never attain to full reality or cognizability.

[Footnote 9: Plato, Philêbus, p. 15, A. B.; Republic, x. p. 596, A.
The phrase of Milton, "unus et universus," expresses this idea; also
the lines:--

  "Sed quamlibet natura sit communior,
  Tamen seorsus extat ad modum unius," &c.]

This is the first statement of the theory of complete and unqualified
Realism, which came to be known in the Middle Ages under the phrase
_Universalia ante rem_ or _extra rem_, and to be distinguished from
the two counter-theories _Universalia in re_ (Aristotelian), and
_Universalia post rem_ (Nominalism). Indeed, the Platonic theory goes
even farther than the phrase _Universalia ante rem_, which recognizes
the particular as a reality, though posterior and derivative; for
Plato attenuates it into phantom and shadow. The problem was now
clearly set out in philosophy--What are the objects correlating with
Universal terms, and with Particular terms? What is the relation
between the two? Plato first gave to the world the solution called
Realism, which lasted so long after his time. We shall presently find
Aristotle taking issue with him on both the affirmations included in
his theory.

But though Plato first introduced this theory into philosophy, he was
neither blind to the objections against it, nor disposed to conceal
them. His mind was at once poetically constructive and dialectically
destructive; to both these impulses the theory furnished ample scope,
while the form of his compositions (separate dialogues, with no
mention of his own name) rendered it easy to give expression either
to one or to the other. Before Aristotle arose to take issue with
him, we shall find him taking issue with himself, especially in the
dialogues called Sophistes and Parmenides, not to mention the
Philêbus, wherein he breaks down the unity even of his sovereign
Idea, which in the Republic governs the Cogitable World,--the Idea of
Good.[10]

[Footnote 10: Plato, Philêbus, pp. 65, 66. See Grote's Plato, II.
xxx. pp. 584, 585.]

Both in the Sophistes and in the Parmenides, the leading disputant
introduced by Plato is not Sokrates, but Parmenides and another
person (unnamed) of the Eleatic school. In both dialogues objections
are taken against the Realistic theory elsewhere propounded by Plato,
though the objections adduced in the one are quite distinct from
those noticed in the other. In the Sophistes, the Eleatic reasoner
impugns successfully the theories of two classes of philosophers, one
the opposite of the other: first, the Materialists, who recognized no
Entia except the Percepta of Sense; next, the Realistic Idealists,
who refused to recognize these last as real Entia, or as anything
more than transient and mutable Generata or Fientia, while they
confined the title of Entia to the Forms, cogitable, incorporeal,
eternal, immutable, neither acting on anything, nor acted upon by
anything. These persons are called in the Sophistes "Friends of
Forms," and their theory is exactly what we have already cited out of
so many other dialogues of Plato, drawing the marked line of
separation between Entia and Fientia; between the Immutable, which
alone is real and cognizable, and the Mutable, neither real nor
cognizable. The Eleate in the Sophistes controverts this Platonic
theory, and maintains that among the Universal Entia there are
included items mutable as well as immutable; that both are real and
both cognizable; that Non-Ens (instead of being set in glaring
contrast with Ens, as the totally incogitable against the infallibly
cognizable)[11] is one among the multiplicity of Real Forms, meaning
only what is different from Ens, and therefore cognizable not less
than Ens; that Percepta and Cogitata are alike real, yet both only
relatively real, correlating with minds percipient and cogitant.
Thus, the reasoning in the Sophistes, while it sets aside the
doctrine of _Universalia ante rem_, does not mark out any other
relation between Universals and Particulars (neither _in re_ nor
_post rem_). It discusses chiefly the intercommunion or reciprocal
exclusion of Universals with respect to each other; and upon this
point, far from representing them as objects of infallible Cognition
as contrasted with Opinion, it enrolls both Opinion and Discourse
among the Universals themselves, and declares both of them to be
readily combinable with Non-Ens and Falsehood. So that we have here
error and fallibility recognized in the region of Universals, as well
as in that of Particulars.

[Footnote 11: Plato, Republic, v. pp. 478, 479.]

But it is principally in the dialogue Parmenides that Plato discusses
with dialectical acuteness the relation of Universals to their
Particulars; putting aside the intercommunion (affirmed in the
Sophistes) or reciprocal exclusion between one Universal and another,
as an hypothesis at least supremely difficult to vindicate, if at all
admissible.[12] In the dialogue, Sokrates is introduced in the
unusual character of a youthful and ardent aspirant in philosophy,
defending the Platonic theory of Ideas as we have seen it proclaimed
in the Republic and in the Timæus. The veteran Parmenides appears as
the opponent to cross-examine him; and not only impugns the theory by
several interrogatories which Sokrates cannot answer, but also
intimates that there remain behind other objections equally serious
requiring answer. Yet at the same time he declares that, unless the
theory be admitted, and unless _Universalia ante rem_ can be
sustained as existent, there is no trustworthy cognition attainable,
nor any end to be served by philosophical debate. Moreover,
Parmenides warns Sokrates that, before he can acquire a mental
condition competent to defend the theory, he must go through numerous
preliminary dialectical exercises; following out both the affirmative
and the negative hypotheses in respect to a great variety of
Universals severally. To illustrate the course prescribed, Parmenides
gives a long specimen of this dialectic in handling his own doctrine
of Ens Unum. He takes first the hypothesis _Si Unum est_, next the
hypothesis _Si Unum non est_; and he deduces from each, by ingenious
subtleties, double and contradictory conclusions. These he sums up at
the end, challenging Sokrates to solve the puzzles before affirming
his thesis.

[Footnote 12: Plato, Parmenid. p. 129, E.; with Stallbaum's
Prolegomena to that dialogue, pp. 38-42.]

Apart from these antinomies at the close of the dialogue, the
cross-examination of Sokrates by Parmenides, in the middle of it,
brings out forcibly against the Realistic theory objections such as
those urged against it by the Nominalists of the Middle Ages. In the
first place, we find that Plato conceived the theory itself
differently from Porphyry and the philosophers that wrote subsequently
to the Peripatetic criticism. Porphyry and his successors put the
question, Whether Genera and Species had a separate existence, apart
from the Individuals composing them? Now, the world of Forms (the
Cogitable or Ideal world as opposed to the Sensible) is not here
conceived by Plato as peopled in the first instance by Genera and
Species. Its first tenants are _Attributes_, and attributes distinctly
_relative_--Likeness, One and Many, Justice, Beauty, Goodness, &c.
Sokrates, being asked by Parmenides whether he admits Forms
corresponding with these names, answers unhesitatingly in the
affirmative. He is next asked whether he admits forms corresponding
to the names Man, Fire, Water, &c., and, instead of replying in the
affirmative, intimates that he does not feel sure. Lastly, the
question is put whether there are Forms corresponding to the names
of mean objects--Mud, Hair, Dirt, &c. At first he answers
emphatically in the negative, and treats the affirmative as
preposterous; there exist no cogitable Hair, &c., but only the object
of sense that we so denominate. Yet, on second thoughts, he is not
without misgiving that there may be Forms even of these; though the
supposition is so repulsive to him that he shakes it off as much as
he can. Upon this last expression of sentiment Parmenides comments,
ascribing it to the juvenility of Sokrates, and intimating that, when
Sokrates has become more deeply imbued with philosophy, he will cease
to set aside any of these objects as unworthy.

Here we see that, in the theory of Realism as conceived by Sokrates,
the Self-Existent Universals are not Genera and Species as such, but
Attributes--not Second Substances or Essences, but Accidents or
Attributes, _e.g._ Quality, Quantity, Relation, &c., to use the
language afterwards introduced in the Aristotelian Categories; that
no Genera or Species are admitted except with hesitation; and that
the mean and undignified among them are scarcely admissible at all.
This sentiment of dignity, associated with the _Universalia ante
rem_, and emotional necessity for tracing back particulars to an
august and respected origin, is to be noted as a marked and lasting
feature of the Realistic creed; and it even passed on to the
_Universalia in re_, as afterwards affirmed by Aristotle. Parmenides
here takes exception to it (and so does Plato elsewhere[13]) as
inconsistent with faithful adherence to scientific analogy.

[Footnote 13: Plato, Sophist. p. 227, A. Politikus, p. 266, D.]

Parmenides then proceeds (interrogating Sokrates) first to state what
the Realistic theory is (Universals apart from
Particulars--Particulars apart from Universals, yet having some
participation in them, and named after them), next to bring out the
difficulties attaching to it. The Universal or Form (he argues) cannot
be entire in each of its many separate particulars; nor yet is it
divisible, so that a part can be in one particular, and a part in
another. For take the Forms Great, Equal, Small; Equal magnitudes are
equal because they partake in the Form of Equality. But how can a part
of the Form Equality, less than the whole Form, cause the magnitudes
to be equal? How can the Form Smallness have any parts less than
itself, or how can it be greater than anything?

The Form cannot be divided, nor can it co-exist undivided in each
separate particular; accordingly, particulars can have no
participation in it at all.

Again, you assume a Form of Greatness, because you see many
particular objects, each of which appears to you great; this being
the point of resemblance between them. But if you compare the Form of
Greatness with any or all of the particular great objects, you will
perceive a resemblance between them; this will require you to assume
a higher Form, and so on upward without limit.

Sokrates, thus embarrassed, starts the hypothesis that perhaps each
of these Forms may be a cogitation, and nothing more, existing only
within the mind. How? rejoins Parmenides. Can there be a cogitation
of nothing at all? Must not each cogitation have a real _cogitatum_
correlating with it,--in this case, the one Form that is identical
throughout many particulars? If you say that particulars partake in
the Form, and that each Form is nothing but a cogitation, does not
this imply that each particular is itself cogitant?

Again Sokrates urges that the Forms are constant, unalterable,
stationary in nature; that particulars resemble them, and participate
in them only so far as to resemble them. But (rejoins Parmenides), if
particulars resemble the Form, the Form must resemble them;
accordingly, you must admit another and higher Form, as the point of
resemblance between the Form and its particulars; and so on, upwards.

And farther (continues Parmenides), even when admitting these
Universal Forms as self-existent, how can we know anything about
them? Forms can correlate only with Forms, Particulars only with
Particulars. Thus, if I, an individual man, am master, I correlate
with another individual man, who is my servant, and he on his side
with me. But the Form of mastership, the Universal self-existent
Master, must correlate with the Form of servantship, the Universal
Servant. The correlation does not subsist between members of the two
different worlds, but between different members of the same world
respectively. Thus the Form of Cognition correlates with the Form of
Truth; and the Form of each variety of Cognition, with the Form of
the corresponding variety of Truth. But we, as individual subjects,
do not possess in ourselves the Form of Cognition; our cognition is
our own, correlating with such truth as belongs to it and to
ourselves. Our cognition cannot reach to the Form of Truth, nor
therefore to any other Form; we can know nothing of the Self-good,
Self-beautiful, Self-just, &c., even supposing such Forms to exist.

These acute and subtle arguments are nowhere answered by Plato. They
remain as unsolved difficulties, embarrassing the Realistic theory;
they are reinforced by farther difficulties no less grave, included
in the dialectical antinomies of Parmenides at the close of the
dialogue, and by an unknown number of others indicated as producible,
though not actually produced. Yet still Plato, with full
consciousness of these difficulties, asserts unequivocally that,
unless the Realistic theory can be sustained, philosophical research
is fruitless, and truth cannot be reached. We see thus that the
author of the theory has also left on record some of the most
forcible arguments against it. It appears from Aristotle (though we
do not learn the fact from the Platonic dialogues), that Plato, in
his later years, symbolized the Ideas or Forms under the denomination
of Ideal Numbers, generated by implication of The One with what he
called The Great and Little, or the Indeterminate Dyad. This last,
however, is not the programme wherein the Realistic theory stands
opposed to Nominalism.

But the dialogue Parmenides, though full of acuteness on the negative
side, not only furnishes no counter-theory, but asserts continued
allegiance to the Realistic theory, which passes as Plato's doctrine
to his successors. To impugn, forcibly and even unanswerably, a
theory at once so sweeping and so little fortified by positive
reasons, was what many dialecticians of the age could do. But to do
this, and at the same time to construct a counter-theory, was a task
requiring higher powers of mind. One, however, of Plato's disciples
and successors was found adequate to the task--Aristotle.

The Realistic Ontology of Plato is founded (as Aristotle himself
remarks) upon mistrust and contempt of perception of sense, as
bearing entirely on the flux of particulars, which never stand still
so as to become objects of knowledge. All reality, and all
cognoscibility, were supposed to reside in the separate world of
Cogitable Universals (_extra rem_ or _ante rem_), of which, in some
confused manner, particulars were supposed to partake. The Universal,
apart from its particulars, was clearly and fully knowable,
furnishing propositions constantly and infallibly true: the Universal
as manifested in its particulars was never fully knowable, nor could
ever become the subject of propositions, except such as were
sometimes true and sometimes false.

Against this separation of the Universal from its Particulars,
Aristotle entered a strong protest; as well as against the subsidiary
hypothesis of a participation of the latter in the former; which
participation, when the two had been declared separate, appeared to
him not only untenable and uncertified, but unintelligible. His
arguments are interesting, as being among the earliest objections
known to us against Realism.

1. Realism is a useless multiplication of existences, serving no
purpose. Wherever a number of particulars--be they substances,
eternal or perishable, or be they qualities, or relations--bear the
same name, and thus have a Universal _in re_ predicable of them in
common, in every such case Plato assumes a Universal _extra rem_, or
a separate self-existent Form; which explains nothing, and merely
doubles the total to be summed up.[14]

[Footnote 14: Aristot. Metaph. A. ix. p. 990, a. 34; M. iv. p. 1079,
a. 2. Here we have the first appearance of the argument that William
of Ockham, the Nominalist, put in the foreground of his case against
Realism: "Entia non sunt multiplicanda præter necessitatem."]

2. Plato's arguments in support of Realism are either inconclusive,
or prove too much. Wherever there is cognition (he argues), there
must exist an eternal and unchangeable object of cognition, apart
from particulars, which are changeable and perishable. No, replies
Aristotle: cognition does not require the _Universale extra rem_; for
the _Universale in re_, the constant predicate of all the
particulars, is sufficient as an object of cognition. Moreover, if
the argument were admitted, it would prove that there existed
separate Forms or Universals of mere negations; for many of the
constant predicates are altogether negative. Again, if Self-existent
Universals are to be assumed corresponding to all our cogitations, we
must assume Universals of extinct particulars, and even of fictitious
particulars, such as hippocentaurs or chimeras; for of these, too, we
have phantasms or concepts in our minds.[15]

[Footnote 15: Aristot. Metaphys. A. ix. p. 990, b. 14; Scholia, p.
565, b. 9, Br.]

3. The most subtle disputants on this matter include Relata, among
the Universal Ideas or Forms. This is absurd, because these do not
constitute any Genus by themselves. These disputants have also urged
against the Realistic theory that powerful and unsolved objection,
entitled "The Third Man."[16]

[Footnote 16: Aristot. Metaph. A. ix. p. 990, b. 15: [Greek: oi(
a)kribe/steroi tô=n lo/gôn]. Both the points here noticed appear in
the Parmenides of Plato.

The objection called "The Third Man" is expressed by saying that, if
there be a Form of man, resembling individual men, you must farther
postulate some higher Form, marking the point of resemblance between
the two; and so on higher, without end.

The authenticity of the Platonic Parmenides is disputed by Ueberweg
(Untersuchungen über die Echtheit und Zeitfolge der Platonischen
Schriften, pp. 176-181), upon the ground (among others) that, while
Aristotle never cites the dialogue by its title, nor ever makes
probable allusion to it, the Parmenides advances against the theory
of the Platonic Ideas this objection of Aristotle's, known under the
name of "The Third Man." Aristotle (says Ueberweg), if he had known
the Parmenides, would not have advanced this objection as his own. We
must therefore suppose that the Parmenides was composed later than
Aristotle, and borrowed this objection from Aristotle.

In reply to this argument I transcribe the passage of Aristotle
(Metaphys. A. ix. p. 990, b. 15) to which Ueberweg himself refers:
[Greek: e)/ti de\ oi( a)kribe/steroi tô=n lo/gôn oi( me\n tô=n pro/s
ti poiou=sin i)de/as, ô(=n ou)/ phamen ei)=nai kath' au(to\ ge/nos,
oi( de\ to\n tri/ton a)/nthrôpon le/gousin.] The same words (with the
exception of [Greek: phasi/n] in place of [Greek: phame/n]) are
repeated in M. p. 1079, a. 11.

Now these words plainly indicate that Aristotle does not profess to
advance the objection, called [Greek: o( tri/tos a)/nthrôpos], as his
own, or as broached by himself. He derives it from what he calls
[Greek: oi( a)kribe/steroi tô=n lo/gôn]. The charge against
Aristotle, therefore, of advancing as his own an objection which had
already been suggested by Plato himself in the Parmenides, is
unfounded. And it is the more unfounded, because Aristotle, in the
first book of the Metaphysica, speaks in the language of a Platonist,
and considers himself as partly responsible for the doctrine of
Ideas: [Greek: dei/knumen, phame/n, oi)o/metha], &c. (Alexand. in
Schol. p. 563, b. 27, Brand.)

But what are we to understand by these words--[Greek: oi(
a)kribe/steroi tô=n lo/gôn]--from which Aristotle derives the
objection? The words refer to certain expositions or arguments (oral,
or written, or both) which were within the knowledge of Aristotle,
and were of a peculiarly subtle and analytical character. Among them
is very probably included the Platonic Parmenides itself,
distinguished as it is for extreme subtlety. (See Stallbaum's
Prolegg. pp. 249, 277, 337, who says, "In uno ferè Parmenide idearum
doctrina subtilius investigatur.") I see no reason why it should not
be included within the fair and reasonable meaning of the words. And
such being the case, I cannot go along with Ueberweg (and other
critics) who say that Aristotle has not even made an indirect
allusion to the Parmenides.

But why did not Aristotle specify the Parmenides directly and by
name? I do not know what was his reason. We may feel surprise (as
Stallbaum feels, p. 337) that he does not; but, when critics infer
from the omission that he did not know the dialogue as a work of
Plato, I contest the inference. We see that Alexander, in his
elaborate commentary (p. 566, Schol. Brand.) makes no allusion to the
Parmenides, though he alludes to Eudêmus, to Diodôrus, Kronus, and to
the manner in which the objection called [Greek: o( tri/tos
a)/nthrôpos] was handled by various Sophists. Now we are fully
assured that the Parmenides was acknowledged as a work of Plato, long
before the time of Alexander (since it is included in the catalogue
of Thrasyllus); yet he, the most instructed of all the commentators,
makes no allusion to it. Why he did not, I cannot say, but his
omission affords no ground for concluding that he did not know it, or
did not trust its authenticity.]

4. The supporters of these Self-existent Universals trace them to two
_principia_--The One, and the Indeterminate Dyad; which they affirm
to be prior in existence even to the Universals themselves. But this
cannot be granted; for the Idea of Number must be logically prior to
the Idea of the Dyad; but the Idea of Number is relative, and the
Relative can never be prior to the Absolute or Self-existent.

5. If we grant that, wherever there is one constant predicate
belonging to many particulars, or wherever there is stable and
trustworthy cognition, in all such cases a Self-existent Universal
Correlate _extra rem_ is to be assumed, we shall find that this
applies not merely to Substances or Essences, but also to the other
Categories--Quality, Quantity, Relation, &c. But hereby we exclude
the possibility of participation in them by Particulars; since from
such participation the Particular derives its Substance or Essence
alone, not its accidental predicates. Thus the Self-existent
Universal Dyad is eternal: but a particular pair, which derives its
essential property of doubleness from partaking in this Universal
Dyad, does not at the same time partake of eternity, unless by
accident. Accordingly, there are no Universal Ideas, except of
Substances or Essences: the common name, when applied to the world of
sense and to that of cogitation, signifies the same thing--Substance
or Essence. It is unmeaning to talk of anything else as
signified--any other predicate common to many. Well then, if the Form
of the Universals and the Form of those Particulars that participate
in the Universals be the same, we shall have something common to both
the one and the other, so that the objection called "The Third Man"
will become applicable, and a higher Form must be postulated. But, if
the Form of the Universals and the Form of the participating
Particulars, be not identical, then the same name, as signifying both,
will be used equivocally; just as if you applied the same denomination
man to Kallias and to a piece of wood, without any common property to
warrant it.

6. But the greatest difficulty of all is to understand how these
Cogitable Universals, not being causes of any change or movement,
contribute in any way to the objects of sense, either to the eternal
or to the perishable; or how they assist us towards the knowledge
thereof, being not in them, and therefore not their substance or
essence; or how they stand in any real relation to their
participants, being not immanent therein. Particulars certainly do
not proceed from these Universals, in any intelligible sense. To say
that the Universals are archetypes, and that Particulars partake in
them, is unmeaning, and mere poetic metaphor. For where is the
working force to mould them in conformity with the Universals? Any
one thing may _be_ like, or may _become_ like, to any other
particular thing, by accident, or without any regular antecedent
cause to produce such assimilation. The same particular substance,
moreover, will have not one universal archetype only, but several.
Thus, the same individual man will have not only the Self-animal and
the Self-biped, but also the Self-man, as archetype. Then again,
there will be universal archetypes, not merely for particular
sensible objects, but also for Universals themselves; thus the genus
will be an archetype for its various species; so that the same which
is now archetype will, under other circumstances, be copy.

7. Furthermore, it seems impossible that what is Substance or Essence
can be separate from that whereof it is the substance or essence. How
then can the Universals, if they be the essences of sensible things,
have any existence apart from those sensible things? Plato tells us
in the Phædon, that the Forms or Universals are the causes why
particulars both exist at all, and come into such or such modes of
existence. But even if we assume Universals as existing, still the
Particulars participant therein will not come into being, unless
there be some efficient cause to produce movement; moreover, many
other things come into being, though there be no Universals
correlating therewith, _e.g._ a house, or a ring. The same causes
that were sufficient to bring these last into being, will be
sufficient to bring all particulars into being, without assuming any
Universals _extra rem_ at all.

8. Again, if the Universals or Forms are Numbers, how can they ever
be causes? Even if we suppose Particulars to be Numbers also, how can
one set of Numbers be causes to the others? There can be no such
causal influence, even if one set be eternal, and the other
perishable.[17]

[Footnote 17: Aristot. Metaph. A. p. 991, b. 13. Several other
objections are made by Aristotle against that variety of the Platonic
theory wherein the Ideas were commuted into Ideal Numbers. These
objections do not belong to the controversy of Realism against
Nominalism.]

Out of the many objections raised by Aristotle against Plato, we have
selected such as bear principally upon the theory of Realism; that
is, upon the theory of _Universalia ante rem_ or _extra
rem_--self-existent, archetypal, cogitable substances, in which
Particulars faintly participate. The objections are not superior in
acuteness, and they are decidedly inferior, in clearness of enunciation,
to those that Plato himself produces in the Parmenides. Moreover,
several of them are founded upon Aristotle's point of view, and would
have failed to convince Plato. The great merit of Aristotle is, that
he went beyond the negative of the Parmenides, asserted this new
point of view of his own, and formulated it into a counter-theory. He
rejected altogether the separate and exclusive reality which Plato
had claimed for his Absolutes of the cogitable world, as well as the
derivative and unreal semblance that alone Plato accorded to the
sensible world. Without denying the distinction of the two, as
conceivable and nameable, he maintained that truth and cognition
required that they should be looked at in implication with each
other. And he went even a step farther, in antithesis to Plato, by
reversing the order of the two. Instead of considering the Cogitable
Universals alone as real and complete in themselves, and the Sensible
Particulars as degenerate and confused semblances of them, he placed
complete reality in the Sensible Particulars alone,[18] and treated
the Cogitable Universals as contributory appendages thereto; some
being essential, others non-essential, but all of them relative, and
none of them independent integers. His philosophy was a complete
revolution as compared with Parmenides and Plato; a revolution, too,
the more calculated to last, because he embodied it in an elaborate
and original theory of Logic, Metaphysics, and Ontology. He was the
first philosopher that, besides recognizing the equivocal character
of those general terms whereon speculative debate chiefly turns,
endeavoured methodically to set out and compare the different
meanings of each term, and their relations to each other.

[Footnote 18: Aristotle takes pains to vindicate against both Plato
and the Herakleiteans the dignity of the Sensible World. They that
depreciate sensible objects as perpetually changing, unstable, and
unknowable, make the mistake (he observes) of confining their
attention to the sublunary interior of the Kosmos, where, indeed,
generation and destruction largely prevail. But this is only a small
portion of the entire Kosmos. In the largest portion--the visible,
celestial, superlunary regions--there is no generation or destruction
at all, nothing but permanence and uniformity. In appreciating the
sensible world (Aristotle says) philosophers ought to pardon the
shortcomings of the smaller portion on account of the excellences of
the larger; and not condemn both together on account of the smaller
(Metaphys. [Greek: G]. v. p. 1010, a. 30).]

However much the Ontology of Aristotle may fail to satisfy modern
exigencies, still, as compared with the Platonic Realism, it was a
considerable improvement. Instead of adopting Ens as a
self-explaining term, contrasted with the Generated and Perishable
(the doctrine of Plato in the Republic, Phædon, and Timæus), he
discriminates several distinct meanings of Ens; a discrimination not
always usefully pursued, but tending in the main towards a better
theory. The distinction between Ens potential, and Ens actual, does
not belong directly to the question between Realism and Nominalism,
yet it is a portion of that philosophical revolution wrought by
Aristotle against Plato--displacement of the seat of reality, and
transfer of it from the Cogitable Universal to the Sensible
Particular. The direct enunciation of this change is contained in his
distinction of Ens into Fundamental and Concomitant ([Greek:
sumbebêko/s]), and his still greater refinement on the same principle
by enumerating the ten varieties of Ens called Categories or
Predicaments.[19] He will not allow Ens (nor Unum) to be a genus,
partible into species: he recognizes it only as a word of many
analogous meanings, one of them principal and fundamental, the rest
derivative and subordinate thereto, each in its own manner. Aristotle
thus establishes a graduated scale of Entia, each having its own
value and position, and its own mode of connexion with the common
centre. That common centre Aristotle declared to be of necessity some
individual object--Hoc Aliquid, That Man, This Horse, &c. This was
the common subject, to which all the other Entia belonged as
predicates, and without which none of them had any reality. We here
fall into the language of Logic, the first theory of which we owe to
Aristotle. His ontological classification was adapted to that theory.

[Footnote 19: In enumerating the Ten Categories, Aristotle takes his
departure from the Proposition--_Homo currit_--_Homo vincit_. He
assumes a particular individual as subject; and he distributes, under
ten general heads, all the information that can be asked or given
about that subject--all the predicates that can be affirmed or denied
thereof. [See Ch. iii., especially p. 73, seq.]]

As we are here concerned only with the different ways of conceiving
the relation between the Particular and the Universal, we are not
called on to criticize the well-known decuple enumeration of
Categories or Predicaments given by Aristotle, both in his treatise
called by that name and elsewhere. For our purpose it is enough to
point out that the particular sensible Hoc Aliquid is declared to be
the ultimate subject, to which all Universals attach, as determinants
or accompaniments; and that, if this condition be wanting, the
unattached Universal cannot rank among complete Entia. The subject or
First Substance, which can never become a predicate, is established
as the indispensable ultimate subject for all predicates; if that
disappears, all predicates disappear along with it. The Particular
thus becomes the keystone of the arch whereon all Universals rest.
Aristotle is indeed careful to point out a gradation in these
predicates: some are essential to the subject, and thus approach so
near to the First Substance that he calls them Second Substances;
others, and the most in number, are not thus essential; these last
are Concomitants or Accidents, and some of them fall so much short of
complete Entity that he describes them as near to Non-Entia.[20] But
all of them, essential or unessential, are alike constituents or
appendages of the First Substance or Particular Subject, and have no
reality in any other character.

[Footnote 20: Aristot. Metaph. E. p. 1026, b. 21: [Greek: phai/netas
ga/r to/ sumbebêko\s e)ggu/s ti tou= mê\ o)/ntos].

There cannot be a stronger illustration of the difference between the
Platonic and the Aristotelian point of view, than the fact that Plato
applies the same designation to all particular objects of sense--that
they are only midway between Entia and Non-Entia (Republic, v. pp.
478-479).]

We thus have the counter-theory of Aristotle against the Platonic
Realism. Instead of separate Universal Substances, containing in
themselves full reality, and forfeiting much of that reality when
they faded down into the shadowy copies called Particulars, he
inverts the Platonic order, announces full reality to be the
privilege of the Particular Sensible, and confines the function of
the Universal to that of a predicate, in or along with the
Particular. There is no doctrine that he protests against more
frequently than the ascribing of separate reality to the Universal.
The tendency to do this, he signalizes as a natural but unfortunate
illusion, lessening the beneficial efficacy of universal
demonstrative reasoning.[21] And he declares it to be a corollary
from this view of the Particular as indispensable subject along with
the Universal as its predicate--That the first principles of
Demonstration in all the separate theoretical sciences must be
obtained by Induction from particulars: first by impressions of sense
preserved in the memory; then by multiplied remembrances enlarged
into one experience; lastly, by many experiences generalized into one
principle by the Noûs.[22]

[Footnote 21: Aristot. Analyt. Poster. I. xxiv. p. 85, a. 31, b. 19.]

[Footnote 22: See the concluding chapter of the Analytica Posteriora.

A similar doctrine is stated by Plato in the Phædon (p. 96, B) as one
among the intellectual phases that Sokrates had passed through in the
course of his life, without continuing in them.]

While Aristotle thus declares Induction to be the source from whence
Demonstration in these separate sciences draws its first principles,
we must at the same time acknowledge that his manner of treating
Science is not always conformable to this declaration, and that he
often seems to forget Induction altogether. This is the case not only
in his First Philosophy, or Metaphysics, but also in his Physics. He
there professes to trace out what he calls beginnings, causes,
elements, &c., and he analyses most of the highest generalities. Yet
still these analytical enquiries (whatever be their value) are
usually, if not always, kept in subordination to the counter-theory
that he had set up against the Platonic Realism. Complete reality
resides (he constantly repeats) only in the particular sensible
substances and sensible facts or movements that compose the aggregate
Kosmos: which is not generated, but eternal, both as to substance and
as to movement. If these sensible substances disappear, nothing
remains. The beginnings and causes exist only relatively to these
particulars. Form, Matter, Privation, are not real Beings, antecedent
to the Kosmos, and pre-existent generators of the substances
constituting the Kosmos; they are logical fragments or factors,
obtained by mental analysis and comparison, assisting to methodize
our philosophical point of view or conception of those substances,
but incapable of being understood, and having no value of their own,
apart from the substances. Some such logical analysis (that of
Aristotle or some other) is an indispensable condition even of the
most strictly inductive philosophy.

There are some portions of the writings of Aristotle (especially the
third book De Animâ and the twelfth book of the Metaphysica) where he
appears to lose sight of the limit here indicated; but, with few
exceptions, we find him constantly remembering, and often repeating,
the great truth formulated in his Categories: that full or
substantive reality resides only in the Hoc Aliquid, with its
predicates implicated with it, and that even the highest of these
predicates (Second Substances) have no reality apart from some one of
their particulars. We must recollect that, though Aristotle denies to
the predicates a _separate_ reality, he recognizes in them an
_adjective_ reality, as accompaniments and determinants: he
contemplates all the ten Categories as distinct varieties of
existence.[23] This is sufficient as a basis for abstraction, whereby
we can name them and reason upon them as distinct objects of thought
or points of view, although none of them come into reality except as
implicated with a sensible particular. Of such reasoning Aristotle's
First Philosophy chiefly consists; and he introduces peculiar phrases
to describe this distinction of reason between two different points
of view, where the real object spoken of is one and the same. The
frequency of the occasions taken to point out that distinction marks
his anxiety to keep the First Philosophy in harmony with the theory
of Reality announced in his Categories.

[Footnote 23: Aristot. Metaphys. [Greek: D]. p. 1017, a. 23: [Greek:
o)sachô=s ga\r le/getai (ta\ schê/mata tê=s katêgori/as),
tosautachô=s to\ ei)=nai sêmai/nei.]]

The Categories of Aristotle appear to have become more widely known
than any other part of his philosophy. They were much discussed by
the sects coming after him; and, even when not adopted, were present
to speculative minds as a scheme to be amended.[24] Most of the
arguments turned upon the nine later Categories: it was debated
whether these were properly enumerated and discriminated, and whether
the enumeration as a whole was exhaustive.

[Footnote 24: This is the just remark of Trendelenburg,
Kategorienlehre, p. 217.]

With these details, however, the question between Realism and its
counter-theory (whether Conceptualism or Nominalism) is not
materially concerned. The standard against Realism was raised by
Aristotle in the First Category, when he proclaimed the Hoc Aliquid
to be the only complete Ens, and the Universal to exist only along
with it as a predicate, being nothing in itself apart; and when he
enumerated Quality as one among the predicates, and nothing beyond.
In the Platonic Realism (Phædon, Timæus, Parmenides) what Aristotle
called Quality was the highest and most incontestable among all
Substances--the Good, the Beautiful, the Just, &c.; what Aristotle
called Second Substance was also Substance in the Platonic Realism,
though not so incontestably; but what Aristotle called First
Substance was in the Platonic Realism no Substance at all, but only
one among a multitude of confused and transient shadows. It is in the
First and Third Categories that the capital antithesis of Aristotle
against the Platonic Realism is contained. As far as that antithesis
is concerned, it matters little whether the aggregate of predicates
be subdivided under nine general heads (Categories) or under three.

In the century succeeding Aristotle, the Stoic philosophers altered
his Categories, and drew up a new list of their own, containing only
four distinct heads instead of ten. We have no record or explanation
of the Stoic Categories from any of their authors; so that we are
compelled to accept the list on secondary authority, from the
comments of critics, mostly opponents. But, as far as we can make
out, they retained in their First Category the capital feature of
Aristotle's First Category--the primacy of the First Substance or Hoc
Aliquid and its exclusive privilege of imparting reality to all the
other Categories. Indeed, the Stoics seem not only to have retained
this characteristic, but to have exaggerated it. They did not
recognize so close an approach of the Universal to the Particular, as
is implied by giving to it a second place in the same Category, and
calling it Second Substance. The First Category of the Stoics
(Something or Subject) included only particular substances; all
Universals were by them ranked in the other Categories, being
regarded as negations of substances, and designated by the term
Non-Somethings--Non-Substances.[25]

[Footnote 25: Prantl, Gesch. der Logik, I. vi. p. 420: [Greek:
_ou)/tina_ ta)koina\ par' au)toi=s le/getai]. &c.]

The Neo-Platonist Plotinus, in the third century after the Christian
era, agreed with the Stoics (though looking from the opposite point
of view) in disapproving Aristotle's arrangement of Second Substance
in the same Category with First Substance.[26] He criticizes at some
length both the Aristotelian list of Categories, and the Stoic list;
but he falls back into the Platonic and even the Parmenidean point of
view. His capital distinction is between Cogitables and Sensibles.
The Cogitables are in his view the most real (_i.e._ the Aristotelian
Second Substance is more real than the First); among them the
highest, Unum or Bonum, is the grand fountain and sovereign of all
the rest. Plotinus thus departed altogether from the Aristotelian
Categories, and revived the Platonic or Parmenidean Realism; yet not
without some Aristotelian modifications. But it is remarkable that in
this departure his devoted friend and scholar Porphyry did not follow
him. Porphyry not only composed an Introduction to the Categories of
Aristotle, but also vindicated them at great length, in a separate
commentary, against the censures of Plotinus; Dexippus, Jamblichus,
and Simplikius, followed in the same track.[27] Still, though
Porphyry stood forward both as admirer and champion of the
Aristotelian Categories, he did not consider that the question raised
by the First Category of Aristotle against the Platonic Realism was
finally decided. This is sufficiently proved by the three problems
cited above out of the Introduction of Porphyry; where he proclaims
it to be a deep and difficult enquiry, whether Genera and Species had
not a real substantive existence apart from the individuals composing
them. Aristotle, both in the Categories and in many other places, had
declared his opinion distinctly in the negative against Plato; but
Porphyry had not made up his mind between the two, though he insists,
in language very Aristotelian, on the distinction between First and
Second Substance.[28]

[Footnote 26: Plotinus, Ennead. vi. 1, 2.]

[Footnote 27: Simplikius, Schol. in Aristotel. Categ. p. 40, a, b,
Brandis.]

[Footnote 28: Prantl, Geschichte der Logik, I. xi. p. 634, n. 69.
Upon this account Prantl finds Porphyry guilty of "empiricism in its
extreme crudeness"--"jene äusserste Rohheit des Empirismus."]

Through the translations and manuals of Boëthius and others, the
Categories of Aristotle were transmitted to the Latin Churchmen, and
continued to be read even through the darkest ages, when the
Analytica and the Topica were unknown or neglected. The Aristotelian
discrimination between First and Second Substance was thus always
kept in sight, and Boëthius treated it much in the same manner as
Porphyry had done before him.[29] Alcuin, Rhabanus Maurus, and Eric
of Auxerre,[30] in the eighth and ninth centuries, repeated what they
found in Boëthius, and upheld the Aristotelian tradition unimpaired.
But Scotus Erigena (_d._ 880 A.D.) took an entirely opposite view,
and reverted to the Platonic traditions, though with a large
admixture of Aristotelian ideas. He was a Christian Platonist,
blending the transcendentalism of Plato and Plotinus with theological
dogmatic influences (derived from the Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagita and
others) and verging somewhat even towards Pantheism. Scotus Erigena
revived the doctrine of Cogitable _Universalia extra rem_ and _ante
rem_. He declared express opposition to the arrangement of the First
Aristotelian Category, whereby the individual was put first, in the
character of subject; the Universal second, in the character only of
predicate; complete reality belonging to the two in conjunction.
Scotus maintained that the Cogitable or Incorporeal Universal was the
first, the true and complete real; from whence the sensible
individuals were secondary, incomplete, multiple, derivatives.[31]
But, though he thus adopts and enforces the Platonic theory of
Universals _ante rem_ and _extra rem_, he does not think himself
obliged to deny that Universals may be _in re_ also.

[Footnote 29: Prantl, Geschichte der Logik, I. xii. p. 685;
Trendelenburg, Kategorienlehre, p. 245.]

[Footnote 30: Ueberweg, Geschichte der Philosophie der scholastischen
Zeit, p. 13.]

[Footnote 31: Prantl, Gesch. der Logik, II. xiii, pp. 29-35.]

The contradiction of the Aristotelian traditions, so far as concerns
the First Category, thus proclaimed by Scotus Erigena, appears to
have provoked considerable opposition among his immediate successors.
Nevertheless he also obtained partizans. Remigius of Auxerre and
others not only defended the Platonic Realism, but carried it as far
as Plato himself had done; affirming that not merely Universal
Substances, but also Universal Accidents, had a real separate
existence, apart from and anterior to individuals.[32] The
controversy for and against the Platonic Realism was thus distinctly
launched in the schools of the Middle Ages. It was upheld both as a
philosophical revival, and as theologically orthodox, entitled to
supersede the traditional counter-theory of Aristotle.

[Footnote 32: Prantl, Gesch. der Logik, II. xiii, pp. 44, 45-47.]




II.

FIRST PRINCIPLES.


A.--_Sir William Hamilton on Aristotle's Doctrine._

In reading attentively Hamilton's "Dissertation on the Philosophy of
Common Sense" (Note A, annexed to ed. of Reid's Works, p. 742, seq.),
I find it difficult to seize accurately what he means by the term. It
seems to me that he unsays in one passage what he says in another;
and that what he tells us (p. 750, b.), viz. that "philosophers have
rarely scrupled, on the one hand, quietly to supersede the data of
consciousness, so often as these did not fall in with their
pre-adopted opinions; and on the other clamorously to appeal to them
as irrecusable truths, so often as they could allege them in
corroboration of their own, or in refutation of a hostile,
doctrine"--is illustrated by his own practice.

On page 752, a., he compares Common Sense to Common Law, and regards
it as consisting in certain elementary feelings and beliefs, which,
though in possession of all, can only be elicited and declared by
philosophers, who declare it very differently. This comparison,
however, sets aside unassisted Common Sense as an available
authority. To make it so we must couple with it the same supplement
that Common Law requires; that is, we must agree on some one
philosopher as authoritative exponent of Common Sense. The Common Law
of one country is different from that of another. Even in the same
country, it is differently construed and set forth by different
witnesses, advocates, and judges. In each country, a supreme tribunal
is appointed to decide between these versions and to declare the law.
The analogy goes farther than Hamilton wishes.

On the same page, he remarks:--"In saying (to use the words of
Aristotle) simply and without qualification, that this or that _is a
known truth_, we do not mean that it is in fact recognized by all,
but only by such as are of a sound understanding; just as, in saying
absolutely that a thing is wholesome, we must be held to mean, to
such as are of a hale constitution." The passage of Aristotle's
Topica here noticed will be found to have a different bearing from
that which Hamilton gives it.

Aristotle is laying down (Topica, VI. iv. p. 141, a. 23-p. 142, a.
16) the various lines of argument which may be followed out, when you
are testing in dialectical debate a definition given or admitted by
the opponent. There cannot be more than one definition of the same
thing: the definition ought to declare the essence of the thing,
which can only be done by means of _priora_ and _notiora_. But
_notiora_ admits of two meanings: (1) _notiora simpliciter_; (2)
_notiora nobis_ or _singulis hominibus_. Under the first head, that
which is _prius_ is absolutely more knowable than that which is
_posterius_; thus, a point more than a line, a line more than a
plane, a plane more than a solid. But under the second head this
order is often reversed: to most men the solid (as falling more under
sense) is more knowable than the plane, the plane than the line, the
line than the point. The first (_notiora simpliciter_) is the truly
scientific order, suited to superior and accurate minds, employed in
teaching, learning, and demonstration (p. 141, a. 29: [Greek:
katha/per e)n tai=s a)podei/xesin, ou(/tô ga\r pa=sa didaskali/a
kai\ ma/thêsis e)/chei],--b. 16: [Greek: e)pistêmonikô/teron ga\r to\
toiou=to/n e)stin]). The second (_notiora nobis_) is adapted to
ordinary minds, who cannot endure regular teaching, nor understand a
definition founded on the first order. But definitions founded on the
second alone (Aristotle says) are not satisfactory, nor do they
reveal the true essence of the thing defined: there can be no
satisfactory definition unless what is _notius simpliciter_ coincides
with what is _notius nobis_ (p. 141, b. 24). He then proceeds to
explain what is meant by _notius simpliciter_; and this is the
passage quoted by Hamilton. After having said that the _notiora
nobis_ are not fixed and uniform, but vary with different
individuals, and even in the same individual at different times, he
goes on: "It is plain therefore that we ought not to define by such
characteristics as these (the _notiora nobis_), but by the _notiora
simpliciter_: for it is only in this way that we can obtain a
definition one and the same at all times. Perhaps, too, the _notius
simpliciter_ is not that which is knowable to all, but that which is
knowable to those who are well trained in their intelligence; just as
the absolutely wholesome is that which is wholesome to those who are
well constituted in their bodies" ([Greek: i)/sôs de\ kai\ to\
a(plô=s gnô/rimon ou) to\ pa=si gnô/rimo/n e)stin, a)lla\ to\ toi=s
eu)= diakeime/nois tê\n dia/noian, katha/per kai\ to\ a(plô=s
u(gieino\n to\ toi=s eu)= e)/chousi to\ sô=ma]--p. 142, a. 9).

Hamilton's translation misses the point of Aristotle, who here
repeats what he frequently also declares in other parts of his
writings (see Analyt. Post. I. i. p. 71, b. 33), namely, the contrast
and antithesis between _notius simpliciter_ (or _naturâ_) and _notius
nobis_. This is a technical distinction of his own, which he had
explained very fully in the page preceding the words translated by
Hamilton; and the words are intended as a supplementary caution, to
guard against a possible misunderstanding of the phrase. Hamilton's
words--"saying simply, and without qualification, that this or that
is a known truth," do not convey Aristotle's meaning at all; again,
the words--"such as are of a sound understanding," fail equally in
rendering what Aristotle means by [Greek: toi=s eu)= diakeime/nois
tê\n dia/noian]. Aristotle tells us distinctly (in the preceding part
of the paragraph) that he intends to contrast the few minds
scientific or prepared for scientific discipline, with the many minds
unscientific or unprepared for such discipline: he does not intend to
contrast "men of sound understanding" with men "not of sound
understanding."

It appears to me that Hamilton has here taken a passage away from its
genuine sense in the Aristotelian context, and has pressed it into
his service to illustrate a view of his own, foreign to that of
Aristotle. He has done the like with some other passages, to which I
will now advert.

What he says, pp. 764-766, about Aristotle's use of the term [Greek:
a)xi/ôma] is quite opposed to the words of Aristotle himself, who
plainly certifies it as being already in his time a technical term
with mathematicians (Met. [Greek: G]. p. 1005, a. 20). On p. 766, a.,
Hamilton says that the word [Greek: a)xi/ôma] is not used in any work
extant prior to Aristotle in a logical sense. This is true as to any
_work_ remaining to us, but Aristotle himself talks of previous
philosophers or reasoners who had so used it; thus he speaks of
[Greek: kata\ to\ Zê/nônos a)xi/ôma] (Metaph. B. p. 1001, b.
7)--"according to the assumption laid down by Zeno as authoritative."
Of this passage Hamilton takes no notice: he only refers to the Topica,
intimating a doubt (in my judgment groundless and certainly professed
by few modern critics, if any) whether the Topica is a genuine work
of Aristotle. In the time of Aristotle, various mathematical teachers
laid down Axioms, such as, If equals be taken from equals, the
remainders will be equal; In all propositions, either the affirmative
or the negative must be true, &c. But the case of Zeno shows us that
other philosophers also laid down Axioms of their own, which were not
universally accepted by others. What Hamilton here says, about
Axioms, has little pertinence as a contribution to the Philosophy of
Common Sense.

Again, Hamilton says, p. 770, a.: "The native contributions by the
mind itself to our concrete cognitions have, prior to their
elicitation into consciousness through experience, only a
_potential_, and in actual experience only an _applied_, _engaged_,
or _implicate_, existence."


These words narrow the line of distinction between the two opposite
schools so much, that I cannot see where it is drawn. Every germ has
in it the _potentialities_ of that which it will afterwards become.
No one disputes that a baby just born has mental _potentialities_ not
possessed by a puppy, a calf, or an acorn. What is the difference
between cognitions _elicited through experience_, and cognitions
_derived from experience_? To those who hold the doctrine of
Relativity, both our impressions of sense and our mental activities
(such as memory, discrimination, comparison, abstraction, &c.) are
alike indispensable to experience. The difference, so far as I can
see, between Hamilton and the Inductive School, is not so much about
the process whereby cognitions are acquired, as about the mode of
testing and measuring the authority of those cognitions when
acquired. Hamilton will not deny that many of the cognitions which he
describes as elicited by experience are untrue or exaggerated. How
are we to discriminate these from the true? The Inductive School
would reply: "By the test of experience, and by that alone: if these
cognitions, which have been elicited in your mind through experience,
are refuted or not confirmed when tested by subsequent experience
carefully watched and selected for the purpose, they are not true or
trustworthy cognitions." But Hamilton would not concur in this
answer: he would say that the cognitions, though elicited _through_
experience, did not derive their authority or trustworthiness _from_
experience, but were binding and authoritative in themselves, whether
confirmed by experience or not. In speaking about Axioms, p. 764, b.,
he says: "Aristotle limited" (this is not correct: Aristotle did not
_limit_ as here affirmed) "the expression Axiom to those judgments
which, on occasion of experience, arise naturally and necessarily in
the conscious mind, and which are therefore virtually prior to
experience." That they are not prior to experience in _order of
time_, is admitted in the words just cited from Hamilton himself: he
means, therefore, prior in _logical authority_--carrying with them
the quality of _necessity_, even though experience may afford no
confirmation of them. This is what he says, on pp. 753-754, about
causality: metaphysical causality _must_ be believed, as a necessary
and subjective law of the observer--though there is no warrant for it
in experience.

The question between Hamilton and the Inductive School, I repeat, is
not so much about the psychological genesis of beliefs, as about the
test for distinguishing true from false or uncertified beliefs, among
those beliefs which arise, often and usually, in the minds of most
men. Is there any valid test other than experience itself, as
intentionally varied by experiments and interpreted by careful
Induction? Are we ever warranted in affirming what transcends
experience, except to the extent to which the inference from
Induction (from some to all) always transcends actual observation?
This seems to me the real question at issue between the contending
schools of Metaphysics. Hamilton, while he rejects experience as the
test, furnishes no other test whereby we can discriminate the
erroneous beliefs "which are elicited into consciousness through
experience," from the true beliefs which are elicited in like manner.

In discussing the doctrine which Hamilton and other philosophers
entitle Common Sense (in the metaphysical import which they assign to
it), it is proper to say a few words on the legitimate meaning of
this phrase, before it was pressed into service by a particular
school of metaphysicians. Every one who lives through childhood and
boyhood up to man's estate will unavoidably acquire a certain amount
of knowledge and certain habits of believing, feeling, judging, &c.;
differing materially in different ages and countries, and varying to
a less degree in different individuals of the same age and country,
yet still including more or less which is common to the large
majority. That fire burns; that water quenches thirst and drowns;
that the sun gives light and heat; that animals are all mortal and
cannot live long without nourishment,--these and many other beliefs
are not possessed by a very young child, but are acquired by every
man as he grows up, though he cannot remember how or when he learnt
them. The sum total of the beliefs thus acquired, by the impressions
and influences under which every growing mind might pass, constitutes
the Common Sense of a particular age and country. A person wanting in
any of them would be considered, by the majority of the inhabitants,
as deficient in Common Sense. If I meet an adult stranger, I presume
as a matter of course that he has acquired them, and I talk to him
accordingly. I also presume (being in England) that he has learnt the
language of the country; and that he is familiar with the forms of
English speech whereby such beliefs and their correlative disbeliefs
are enunciated. If I affirm to him any one of these beliefs, he
assents to it at once: it appears to him self-evident--that is,
requiring no farther or extraneous evidence to support it. Though it
appears to him self-evident, however, the proposition may possibly be
false. To a Greek of the Aristotelian age, no proposition could
appear more self-evident than that of the earth being at rest. No
term can be more thoroughly relative than the term _self-evident_:
that which appears so to one man, will often not appear so to
another, and may sometimes appear altogether untrue.

But, if we suppose an individual to whom one of these beliefs does
not appear self-evident, and who requires proof, he will not be
satisfied to be told that every one else believes it, and that it is
a dictate of Common Sense. He probably knows that already, and yet,
nevertheless, he is not convinced. Aristarchus of Samos was told
doubtless, often enough, that the doctrine of the earth being at rest
was the plain verdict of Common Sense; but he did not the less
controvert it. You must produce the independent proof which the
recusant demands; and, if your doctrine is true and trustworthy, such
proof can be produced. I will here remark that, in so far as Common
Sense can properly be quoted as an authority or presumptive
authority, it is such only in the sense proclaimed by Herakleitus and
La Mennais, as cited by Hamilton, pp. 770-771: "as a magazine of
ready-fabricated dogmas." Hamilton finds fault with both of them; but
it appears to me that they rightly interpret, and that he wrongly
interprets, what Common Sense, as generally understood, is; and
moreover, that most of the other authorities whom he himself quotes
understand the phrase as these two understand it. Common Sense is "a
magazine of ready-fabricated dogmas," as La Mennais (see p. 771, a.)
considers it--dogmas assumed as self-evident, and as requiring no
proof. It only becomes "a source of elementary truths" when analysed
and remodelled by philosophers. Now philosophers differ much in their
mode of analysing it (as Hamilton himself declares emphatically), and
bring out of it different elementary truths; each of them professing
to follow Common Sense and quoting Common Sense as warranty. It is
plain that Common Sense is no authority for either one of two
discrepant modes of analysis. Its authority counts for those dogmas
out of which the analysis is made, in so far as Common Sense is
authoritative at all.

Hamilton cites or indicates thirteen different Aristotelian passages,
in order to support his view that Aristotle is to be numbered among
the champions of authoritative Common Sense. It will be seen that
most of the passages prove nothing, and that only one proves much, in
favour of that view. I shall touch upon them _seriatim_.

(_a_) "First truths are such as are believed, not through aught else"
(say rather _through other truths_) "but through themselves alone.
For, in regard to the first principles of science, we ought not to
require the reason _Why_; for each such principle behoves to be
itself a _belief_ in and of itself."[1] After the words _reason Why_,
Hamilton inserts the following additional words of his own in
brackets--"but only the fact _That_ they are given."

[Footnote 1: Aristot. Topic. I. i. p. 100, a. 30; Hamilton's Reid, p.
772, a.]

I demur to the words in brackets, as implying an hypothesis not
contained in Aristotle; who says only that the truth affirmed by the
teacher must be such as the learner is prepared to believe without
asking any questions. It may be an analytical truth (_sensu
Kantiano_), in which the predicate asserts only what the learner
knows to be already contained in the definition of the subject. It
may be a synthetical truth; yet asserting only what he is familiar
with by constant, early, uncontradicted, obvious, experience. In
either case, he is prepared to believe it at once; and thus the
conditions of a First Scientific Truth are satisfied, as here
described by Aristotle; who says nothing about the truth _being
given_.

The next passage cited (_b_) is from the Analytica Posteriora (the
reference is printed by mistake _Priora_). According to Hamilton,
Aristotle says:--"We assert not only that science does exist, but also
that there is given a certain beginning or principle of science, _in
so far as_ (or, on another interpretation of the term [Greek:
ê(=|]--_by which_) we recognize the import of the terms."[2] I think
Hamilton has not exactly rendered the sense of the original when he
translates it--"we recognize the import of the terms;" and he
proceeds to add expository words of his own which carry us still
farther away from what I understand in Aristotle. If Hamilton's
rendering is correct, all the _principia_ of Science would be
analytical propositions (_sensu Kantiano_), which I do not think that
Aristotle intended to affirm or imply. In the last chapter of the
Analytica Posteriora, Aristotle not only affirmed that there were
First Principles of Science, but described at length the inductive
process by which we reached them: referring them ultimately to the
cognizance and approval of Noûs or Intellect. What Aristotle means
is, that, in ascending from propositions of lower to propositions of
higher universality, we know when we have reached the extreme term of
ascent; and this forms the _principium_.

[Footnote 2: Aristot. Anal. Post. I. iii. p. 72, b. 23: [Greek:
tau=ta/ t' ou)=n ou(/tô le/gomen, kai\ ou) mo/non e)pistê/mên a)lla\
kai\ a)rchê\n e)pistê/mês ei)=nai/ tina/ phamen, ê(=| tou\s o(/rous
gnôri/zomen.]

Neither Philoponus, nor Buhle, nor M. Barthélemy St.-Hilaire,
translate the words [Greek: tou\s o(/rous gnôri/zomen] in the same
way as Sir W. Hamilton. It rather seems to me that the words mean
_terms or limits of regress_, which coincides with the paraphrase of
Philoponus: [Greek: tou/tô| ga\r (tô=| nô=|) ta\s a)rchoeidesta/tas
kai\ oi(onei\ o(/rous ou)/sas gnôri/zomen] (Schol. p. 201, b. 13,
Br.), as well as substantially with the note of M. St.-Hilaire.]

Sir W. Hamilton next gives us another passage (_c_) from the
Analytica Posteriora, in which Aristotle affirms that the First
Principles must be believed in a superlative degree, because we know
and believe all secondary truths through them:[3] a doctrine which
appears to me to require both comment and limitation; but about which
I say nothing, because, even granting it to be true, I do not see how
it assists the purpose--to prove that Aristotle is the champion of
authoritative Common Sense. Nor do I find any greater proof in
another passage previously (p. 764, b.) produced from Aristotle: "Of
the immediate principles of syllogism, that which cannot be
demonstrated, but which it is not necessary to possess as the
pre-requisite of all learning, I call _Thesis_: and that _Axiom_,
which he who would learn aught, must himself bring (and not receive
from his instructor). For some such principles there are; and it is to
these that we are accustomed to apply the name."[4] Such principles
there doubtless are, which the learner must bring with him; but
Aristotle does not assert, much less prove, that they are intuitions
given by authoritative Common Sense. Nay, in the passage cited in my
former page, he both asserted and proved that the _principia_ of
Science were raised from Sense by Induction. The learner, when he
comes to be taught, must bring some of these _principia_ with him, if
he is to learn Science from his teacher; just as he must also bring
with him a knowledge of the language, of the structure of sentences,
of the forms for affirmation and denial, &c., and various other
requisites. A recruit, when first coming to be drilled, must bring
with him a certain power of walking and of making other movements of
the limbs. But these pre-requisites, on the part of the learner as
well as on that of the recruit, are not intuitive products or
inspirations of the mind: they are acquirements made by long and
irksome experience, though often forgotten in its details. We are not
to reason upon the learner or the recruit as if they were children
just born.

[Footnote 3: Analyt. Poster. I. ii. p. 72, a. 27.]

[Footnote 4: Analyt. Poster. I. iii. p. 72, a. 17: [Greek: tou=to
ga\r _ma/list'_ e)pi\ toi=s toiou/tois ei)ô/thamen o)/noma
le/gein]--"we are for the most part accustomed:" Hamilton has not
translated the word [Greek: ma/lista], which it would have been
better for him to do, because he founds upon the passage an argument
to prove that Aristotle limited in a certain way the sense of the
word Axiom.]

The passages out of the Rhetorica and the Metaphysica (cited on p.
772, b., and marked _d_ and _e_) are hardly worth notice. But that
which immediately follows (marked _f_), out of the Nikomachean
Ethica, is the most pertinent of all that are produced. Hamilton
writes:--"Arguing against a paradox of certain Platonists in regard
to the Pleasurable, Aristotle says--'But they who oppose themselves
to Eudoxus, as if what all nature desiderates were not a good, talk
idly. For what _appears to all_, that we affirm _to be_; and he who
would subvert this belief, will himself assuredly advance nothing
more deserving of credit.'[5] Compare also L. vii. c. 13 (14). In his
paraphrase of the above passage, the Pseudo-Andronicus in one place
uses the expression _common opinion_, and in another all but uses
(what indeed he could hardly do in this meaning as an Aristotelian,
if indeed in Greek at all) the expression _common sense_, which D.
Heinsius in his Latin version actually employs." Thus far Hamilton;
but the words of Aristotle which immediately follow are even
stronger:--"For, in so far as foolish creatures desire pleasure, the
objection taken would be worth something; but, when intelligent
creatures desire it also, how can the objectors make out their case?
Even in mean and foolish creatures, moreover, there is perhaps a
certain good natural appetite, superior to themselves, which aims at
their own good."[6] Or as Aristotle (according to some critics, the
Aristotelian Eudemus) states it in the Seventh Book of the
Nikomachean Ethica, referred to by Sir W. Hamilton without citing
it:--"Perhaps all creatures (brutes as well as men) pursue, not that
pleasure which they think they are pursuing, nor what they would
declare themselves to be pursuing, but all of them the same pleasure;
for all creatures have by nature something divine."[7]

[Footnote 5: Aristot. Ethic. Nik. X. ii. p. 1172, b. 36: [Greek: o(\
ga\r pa=si dokei=, tou=t' ei)=nai/ phamen; o( d' a)nairô=n tau/tên
tê\n pi/stin, ou) pa/nu pisto/tera e)rei=.]]

[Footnote 6: Aristot. Ethic. Nik. X. ii. p. 1173, a. 2: [Greek: ê(=|
me\n ga\r ta\ a)no/êta o)re/getai au)tô=n, ê)=n a)/n ti to\ lego/men;
ei) de\ kai\ ta\ phro/nima, pô=s a)\n le/goie/n ti? i)/sôs de\ kai\
e)n toi=s phau/lois e)sti/ ti _phusiko\n_ a)gatho\n _krei=tton ê)\
kath' au(ta/, o(\ e)phi/etai tou= oikei/ou a)gathou=_.] (I adopt here
the text as given by Michelet, [Greek: **ê(=| me\n] in place of
[Greek: ei) me\n], but not in leaving out [Greek: to\] before [Greek:
lego/menon].) I think the sentence would stand better if [Greek:
a)gatho\n] were omitted after [Greek: phusiko/n].]

[Footnote 7: Eth. Nikom. VII. xiv. p. 1153, b. 31: [Greek: i)/sôs de\
kai\ diô/kousin ou)ch ê)\n oi)/ontai (ê(donê/n) ou)d' ê)\n a)\n
phai=en, a)lla\ tê\n au)tê/n; _pa/nta ga\r phu/sei e)/chei ti
thei=on_.] The sentiment is here declared even more strongly
respecting the appetency of all animals--brutes as well as men.]

In this passage, Aristotle does really appear as the champion of
authoritative Common Sense. He enunciates the general principle: That
which appears to all, that we affirm to be. And he proceeds to claim
(with the qualification of _perhaps_) for this universal belief a
divine or quasi-divine authority; like Hesiod in the verses cited by
Sir W. Hamilton, p. 770, b., and like Dr. Reid in the motto prefixed
to his 'Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common
Sense.' If Aristotle had often spoken in this way, he would have been
pre-eminently suitable to figure in Sir W. Hamilton's list of
authorities. But the reverse is the fact. In the Analytica and
Topica, Aristotle is so far from accepting the opinion and belief of
all as a certificate of truth and reality, that he expressly ranks
the matters so certified as belonging to the merely probable, and
includes them in his definition thereof. Universal belief counts for
more or less, as a certificate of the truth of what is believed,
according to the matter to which it refers; and there are few matters
on which it is of greater value than pleasure and pain. Yet even upon
this point Aristotle rejects the authority of the many, and calls
upon us to repose implicit confidence in the verdict of the just and
intelligent individual, whom he enthrones as the measure. "Those
alone are pleasures" (says Aristotle) "which appear pleasures to this
man; those alone are pleasant things in which he takes delight. If
things which are revolting to him appear pleasurable to others, we
ought not to wonder, since there are many corruptions and
degenerations of mankind; yet these things are not really
pleasurable, except to these men and to men of like disposition."[8]
This declaration, repeated more than once in the Nikomachean Ethica,
and supported by Analytica and Topica, more than countervails the
opposite opinion expressed by Aristotle, in the passage where he
defends Eudoxus.

[Footnote 8: Aristot. Ethic. Nik. X. v. p. 1176, a. 15: [Greek:
dokei= d' e)n a(/pasi toiou/tois ei)=nai to\ phaino/menon tô=|
spoudai/ô|. ei) de\ tou=to kalô=s le/getai, katha/per dokei=, kai\
e)/stin e(ka/stou me/tron ê( a)retê\ kai\ o( a)gatho\s ê(=|
toiou=tos, kai\ ê(donai\ ei)=en a)\n ai( tou/tô| phaino/menai, kai\
ê(de/a oi(=s ou(=tos chai/rei] &c. Ib. vi. p. 1176, b. 24: [Greek:
_katha/per ou)=n polla/kis ei)/rêtai_, kai\ ti/mia kai\ ê(de/a e)sti\
ta\ tô=| spoudai/ô| toiau=ta o)/nta.]]

The next passage (_g_) produced by Sir W. Hamilton is out of the
Eudemian Ethica. But this passage, when translated more fully and
exactly than we read it in his words, will be found to prove nothing
to the point which he aims at. He gives it as follows, p. 773,
a.:--"But of all these we must endeavour to seek out rational grounds
of belief, by adducing manifest testimonies and authorities. For it
is the strongest evidence of a doctrine, if all men can be adduced as
the manifest confessors of its positions; because every individual
has in him a kind of private organ of the truth. Hence we ought not
always to look to the conclusions of reasoning, but frequently rather
to what appears [and is believed] to be." The original is given
below.[9]

[Footnote 9: Aristot. Eth. Eud. I. vi. p. 1218, b. 26: [Greek:
peirate/on de\ peri\ tou/tôn pa/ntôn zêtei=n tê\n pi/stin dia\ tô=n
lo/gôn, marturi/ois kai\ paradei/gmasi chrô/menon toi=s
phainome/nois. kra/tiston me\n ga\r pa/ntas a)nthrô/pous phai/nesthai
sunomologou=ntas toi=s pa/ntôs, o(/per metabibazo/menoi poiê/sousin;
e)/chei ga\r e(/kastos oi)kei=o/n ti pro\s tê\n a)lê/theian, e)x ô(=n
a)nagkai=on deiknu/nai pôs peri\ au)tô=n. e)k ga\r tô=n a)lêthô=s
me\n legome/nôn, ou) saphô=s de/, proi+ou=sin e)/stai kai\ to\
saphô=s, metalamba/nousin a)ei\ ta\ gnôrimô/tera tô=n ei)ôtho/tôn
le/gesthai sugkechume/nôs.] Then after an interval of fifteen lines:
[Greek: kalô=s d' e)/chei kai\ to\ chôri\s kri/nein to\n tê=s
ai)ti/as lo/gon kai\ to\ deiknu/menon, dia/ te to\ r(êthe\n a)rti/ôs,
o(/ti prose/chein ou) dei= pa/nta toi=s dia\ tô=n lo/gôn, a)lla\
polla/kis ma=llon toi=s phainome/nois (nu=n d' o(/pot' a)\n lu/ein
mê\ e)/chôsin, a)nagka/zontai pisteu/ein toi=s ei)rême/nois), kai\
dio/ti polla/kis to\ me\n u(po\ tou= lo/gou dedei=chthai dokou=n
a)lêthe\s me/n e)stin, ou) me/ntoi dia\ tau/tên tê\n ai)ti/an di'
ê(/n phêsin o( lo/gos. e)/sti ga\r dia\ pseu/dous a)lêthe\s dei=xai;
dê=lon d' e)k tô=n A)nalutikô=n.]]

The following is a literal translation, restoring what Sir W.
Hamilton omits:--"But, respecting all these matters, we must
endeavour to seek belief through general reasoning, employing the
appearances before us (_i.e._ the current _dicta_ and _facta_ of
society) as testimonies and examples. For it is best that all mankind
should be manifestly in agreement with what we are about to say; but,
if that cannot be, that at all events they should be in some sort of
agreement with us; which they will come to be when brought round (by
being addressed in the proper style). For every man has in him some
tendencies favourable to the truth, and it is out of these that we
must somehow or other prove our conclusions. By taking our departure
from what is said around us truly but not clearly, we shall by
gradual advance introduce clearness, taking along with us such
portion of the confused common talk as is most congruous to Science.
. . . It is well also to consider apart the causal reasoning
(syllogistic, deductive premisses), and the conclusion shown: first,
upon the ground just stated, that we must not pay exclusive attention
to the results of deductive reasoning, but often rather to apparent
facts, whereas it often happens now that, when men cannot refute the
reasoning, they feel constrained to believe in the conclusion; next,
because the conclusion, shown by the reasoning, may often be true in
itself, but not from the cause assigned in the reasoning. For a true
conclusion may be shown by false premisses; as we have seen in the
Analytica."

Whoever reads the original words of Aristotle (or Eudemus) will see
how much Sir W. Hamilton's translation strains their true meaning.
[Greek: Kra/tiston] does not correspond to the phrase--"it is the
strongest evidence of a doctrine." [Greek: Kra/tiston] is the
equivalent of [Greek: a)/riston], as we find in chap. iii. of this
Book of the Eudemian Ethica (p. 1215, a. 3): [Greek: e)pei\ d'
ei)si\n a)pori/ai peri\ e(ka/stên pragmatei/an oi)kei=ai, dê=lon
o(/ti kai\ peri\ _bi/ou tou= krati/stou_ kai\ zôê=s tê=s a)ri/stês
ei)si/n.] Nor ought the words [Greek: oi)kei=o/n ti pro\s tê\n
a)lê/theian] to be translated--"a kind of private organ of the
truth:" they mean simply--"something in him favourable or tending
towards the truth," as we read in chap. ii. of this same
Book--[Greek: oi)kei=on pro\s eu)exi/an] (p. 1214, b. 22). Moreover,
Hamilton has omitted to translate both the words preceding and the
words following; accordingly he has missed the real sense of the
passage. Aristotle inculcates upon the philosopher never to neglect
the common and prevalent opinions, but to acquaint himself with them
carefully; because, though these opinions are generally full of
confusion and error ([Greek: ei)kê=| ga\r le/gousi schedo\n peri\
a(pa/ntôn (oi( polloi/)]--Ethic. Eudem. I. iii. p. 1215, a. 1), he
will find in them partial correspondences with the truth, of which he
may avail himself to bring the common minds round to better views;
but, unless he knows pretty well what the opinions of these common
minds are, he will not be able to address them persuasively. This is
the same reasonable view which Aristotle expresses at the beginning
of the Topica (in a passage already cited, above), respecting the
manner of dealing proper for a philosopher towards current opinion.
But it does not at all coincide with the representation given by
Hamilton.

The next piece of evidence (_h_) which we find tendered is another
passage out of the Eudemian Ethica. It will be seen that this passage
is strained with even greater violence than the preceding. Hamilton
writes as follows, first translating the words of Aristotle, then
commenting on them:--"The problem is this--What is the beginning or
principle of motion in the soul? Now it is evident, as God is in the
universe, and the universe in God, that [I read [Greek: kinei=n
kai/]--W. H.] the divinity in us is also, in a certain sort, the
universal mover of the mind. For the principle of Reason is not
Reason but something better. Now what can we say is better than even
Science, except God?"[10] So far Hamilton's translation; now follows
his comment:--"The import of this singular passage is very obscure.
It has excited, I see, the attention, and exercised the ingenuity, of
Pomponatius, J. C. Scaliger, De Raei, Leibnitz, Leidenfrost, Jacobi,
&c. But without viewing it as of pantheistic tendency, as Leibnitz is
inclined to do, it may be interpreted as a declaration, that
Intellect, which Aristotle elsewhere allows to be pre-existent and
immortal, is a spark of the Divinity; whilst its data (from which as
principles more certain than their deductions, Reason, Demonstration,
Science, must depart) are to be reverenced as the revelation of
truths which would otherwise lie hid from man: That, in short,

"'The voice of Nature is the voice of God.'

By the bye, it is remarkable that this text was not employed by any
of those Aristotelian philosophers who endeavoured to identify the
Active Intellect with the Deity."

[Footnote 10: Ethic. Eud. VII. xiv. p. 1248, a. 24: [Greek: to\ de\
zêtou/menon tou=t' e)sti/, ti/s ê( tê=s kinê/seôs a)rchê\ e)n tê=|
psuchê=|? dê=lon dê/, ô(/sper e)n tô=| o(/lô| theo/s, kai\ pa=n]
(Fritzsche reads [Greek: e)n) e)kei/nô|. kinei= ga/r pôs pa/nta to\
e)n ê(mi=n thei=on. lo/gou d' a)rchê\ ou) lo/gos a)lla\ ti krei=tton.
ti/ ou)=n a)\n krei=tton kai\ e)pistê/mês ei)/poi plê\n theo/s?]
Instead of [Greek: ei)/poi] (the last word but two) Fritzsche reads
[Greek: ei)/ê kai\ nou=].

This is the passage translated by Sir W. Hamilton. The words of the
original immediately following are these: [Greek: ê( ga\r a)retê\
tou= nou= o)/rganon; kai\ dia\ tou=to oi( pa/lai
e)/legon--"eu)tuchei=s kalou=ntai, oi( a)\n o(rê/sôsi katopthou=sin
a)/logoi o)/ntes, kai\ bouleu/esthai ou) sumphe/rei
au)toi=s"--e)/chousi ga\r a)rchê\n toiou/tên ê( krei/ttôn tou= nou=
kai\ bouleu/seôs. oi( de\ to\n lo/gon; tou=to d' ou)k e)/chousi. kai\
e)nthousismoi/; tou=to d' ou) du/nantai; a)/logoi ga\r o)/ntes
e)pitugcha/nousi] (so Fritzsche reads in place of
[Greek: a)potugcha/nousi]).]

I maintain that this passage noway justifies the interpretation
whereby Sir W. Hamilton ascribes to Aristotle a doctrine so large and
important. The acknowledged obscurity of the passage might have
rendered any interpreter cautious of building much upon it: but this
is not all: Sir W. Hamilton has translated it separately, without any
allusion to the chapter of which it forms part. This is a sure way of
misunderstanding it; for it cannot be fairly construed except as
bearing on the problem enunciated and discussed in that chapter.
Aristotle (or Eudemus) propounds for discussion explicitly in this
chapter a question which had been adverted to briefly in the earlier
part of the Eudemian Ethica (I. i. p. 1214, a. 24)--What is the
relation between good fortune and happiness? Upon what does good
fortune depend? Is it produced by special grace or inspiration from
the Gods? This question is taken up and debated at length in the
chapter from which Sir W. Hamilton has made his extract. It is
averred, as a matter of notoriety, that some men are fortunate.
Though fools, they are constantly successful--more so than wiser men;
and this characteristic is so steady, that men count upon it and
denominate them accordingly. (See this general belief illustrated in
the debate at Athens recorded by Thukydides, vi. 17, the good fortune
of Nikias being admitted even by his opponents.) Upon what does this
good fortune depend? Upon nature? Upon intelligence? Upon fortune
herself as a special agent? Upon the grace and favour of the gods to
the fortunate individual? Aristotle (or Eudemus) discusses the
problem in a long and perplexed chapter, stating each hypothesis,
together with the difficulties and objections attaching to it. As far
as we can make out from an obscure style and a corrupt text, the
following is the result arrived at. There are two varieties of the
fortunate man: one is, he who succeeds through a rightly directed
impulse, under special inspiration of the divine element within him
and within all men; the other is, he who succeeds without any such
impulse, through the agency of Fortune proper. The good fortune of
the first is more constant than that of the second; but both are
alike irrational or extra-rational.[11] Now the divine element in the
soul is the beginning or principle of motion for all the
manifestations in the soul--for reason as well as feeling: that which
calls reason into operation, is something more powerful than reason.
But in the intelligent man this divine mover only calls reason into
operation, leaving reason, when once in operation, to its own force
and guidance, of course liable to err; whereas in the fortunate man
(first variety) the divine element inspires all his feelings and
volitions, without any rational deliberation, so that he executes
exactly the right thing at the right time and place, and accordingly
succeeds.[12]

[Footnote 11: Eth. Eudem. VII. xiv. p. 1248, b. 3: [Greek: phanero\n
de\ o(/ti du/o ei)/dê eu)tuchi/as, ê( me\n thei/a, dio\ kai\ dokei=
o( eu)tuchê\s dia\ theo\n katorthou=n; ou(=tos d' e)sti\n o( kata\
tê\n o(rmê\n diorthôtiko/s, o( d' e(/teros o( para\ tê\n o(rmê\n;
a)/logoi d' a)mpho/teroi. kai\ ê( me\n sunechê\s eu)tuchi/a ma=llon,
au(/tê d' ou) sunechê/s.]

The variety [Greek: o( para\ tê\n o(rmê\n diorthôtiko/s] is
exemplified in the Physica (II. iv. p. 196, a. 4), where Aristotle
again discusses [Greek: tu/chê]: the case of a man who comes to the
market-place on his ordinary business, and there by accident meets a
friend whom he particularly wished to see, but whom he never dreamt
of seeing there and then.]

[Footnote 12: Eth. Eud. VII. xiv. p. 1248, a. 27-32: [Greek:
eu)tuchei=s kalou=ntai], &c. Compare also ib. p. 1247, b. 18.]

Aristotle (or Eudemus) thus obtains a psychological explanation (good
or bad) of the fact, that there are fools who constantly succeed in
their purposes, and wise men who frequently fail. He tells us that
there is in the soul a divine principle of motion, which calls every
thing--reason as well as appetite or feeling--into operation. But he
says nothing of what Sir W. Hamilton ascribes to him--about Intellect
as a spark of the Divinity, or about data of Intellect to be
reverenced as the revelation of hidden truths. His drift is quite
different and even opposite: to account for the success of
individuals _without intellect_ or reason--to bring forward a divine
element in the soul, which dispenses with intellect, and which
conducts these unintelligent men to success, solely by infusing the
most opportune feelings and impulses. Sir W. Hamilton has
misunderstood this passage, by taking no notice of the context and
general argument to which it belongs.

Besides, when Hamilton represents Aristotle here as declaring: "That
the data of Intellect are to be reverenced as the revelation of
truths which would otherwise lie hid from man"--how are we to
reconcile this with what we read two pages before (p. 771, a.) as the
view of Aristotle about these same data of Intellect, that "they are
themselves pre-eminently certain; and, if denied in words, they are
still always mentally admitted"? Is it reasonable to say that the
Maxim of Contradiction, and the proposition, That if equals be
subtracted from equals, the remainders will be equal--are data "to be
reverenced as the revelation of truths which would otherwise lie hid
from man"? At any rate, I protest against the supposition that
Aristotle has ever declared this.

The next two passages cited from Aristotle have really no bearing
upon the authority of Common Sense in its metaphysical meaning: they
are (_i_) from Physic. VIII. iii. and (_k_) from De Gen. Animal. III.
x. Both passages assert the authority of sensible perception against
general reasoning, where the two are conflicting. They assert, in
other words, that general reasoning ought to be tested by experience
and observation, and is not to be accepted when disallowed by these
tests. (The only condition is, that the observation be exact and
complete.) This is just, and is often said, though often disregarded
in fact, by Aristotle. But it has no proper connexion with the
problem about the trustworthiness of Common Sense.

Next Sir W. Hamilton refers us to (without citing) three other places
of Aristotle. Of these, the first (De Coelo, I. iii. p. 270, b. 4-13,
marked _l_) is one which I am much surprised to find in a modern
champion of Common Sense: since it represents Common Sense as giving
full certificate to errors now exploded and forgotten. Aristotle had
begun by laying down and vindicating his doctrine of the First or
Celestial Body, forming the exterior portion of the Kosmos, radically
distinct from the four elements; revolving eternally in uniform,
perfect, circular motion, eternal, unchangeable, &c. Having stated
this, he proceeds to affirm that the results of these reasonings
coincide with the common opinions of mankind, that is, with Common
Sense; and that they are not contradicted by any known observations
of perceptive experience. This illustrates what I have before
observed about Aristotle's position in regard to Common Sense. He
does not extol it as an authority, or tell us that "it is to be
reverenced as a revelation"; but, when he has proved a conclusion on
what he thinks good grounds, he is glad to be able to show that it
tallies with common opinions; especially when these opinions have
some alliance with the received religion.

The next passage (_m_) referred to (De Coelo, III. vii. p. 306, a.
13) has nothing to do with Common Sense, but embodies a very just
protest by Aristotle against those philosophers who followed out
their theories consistently to all possible consequences, without
troubling themselves to enquire whether those consequences were in
harmony with the results of observation.

There follows one other reference (_n_) which was hardly worth Sir W.
Hamilton's notice. In Meteorologic. I. xiii. p. 349, a. 25,
Aristotle, after reciting a theory of some philosophers (respecting
the winds) which he considers very absurd, then proceeds to
say:--"The many, without going into any enquiry at all, talk better
sense than those who after enquiry bring forward such conclusions as
these." It is not saying much for the authority of Common Sense, to
affirm that there have been occasionally philosophical theories so
silly as to be worse than Common Sense.

. . . . . .

B.--_Aristotle's Doctrine._

In regard to Aristotle, there are two points to be examined--

I. What position does he take up in respect to the authority of
Common Sense?

II. What doctrine does he lay down about the first _principia_ or
beginnings of scientific reasoning--the [Greek: a)rchai\
sullogistikai/]?

I.--That Aristotle did not regard Cause, Substance, Time, &c., as
Intuitions, is shown by the subtle and elaborate reasonings that he
employs to explain them, and by the censure that he bestows on the
erroneous explanations and shortcomings of others. Indeed, in regard
to Causality, when we read the great and perplexing diversity of
meaning which Aristotle (and Plato before him in the Phædon)
recognizes as belonging to this term, we cannot but be surprised to
find modern philosophers treating it as enunciating a simple and
intuitive idea. But as to Common Sense--taking the term as above
explained, and as it is usually understood by those that have no
particular theory to support--Aristotle takes up a position at once
distinct and instructive; a position (to use the phraseology of Kant)
not dogmatical, but critical. He constantly notices and reports the
affirmations of Common Sense; he speaks of it with respect, and
assigns to it a qualified value, partly as helping us to survey the
subject on all sides, partly as a happy confirmation, where it
coincides with what has been proved otherwise; but he does not appeal
to it as an authority in itself trustworthy or imperative.

Common Sense belongs to the region of Opinion. Now the distinction
between matters of Opinion on the one hand, and matters of Science or
Cognition on the other, is a marked and characteristic feature of
Aristotle's philosophy. He sets, in pointed antithesis,
Demonstration, or the method of Science--which divides itself into
special subjects, each having some special _principia_ of its own,
then proceeds by legitimate steps of deductive reasoning from such
_principia_, and arrives at conclusions sometimes universally true,
always true for the most part--against Rhetoric and Dialectic, which
deal with and discuss opinions upon all subjects, comparing opposite
arguments, and landing in results more or less probable. Contrasting
them as separate lines of intellectual procedure, Aristotle lays down
a theory of both. He recognizes the procedure of Rhetoric and
Dialectic as being to a great degree the common and spontaneous
growth of society; while Demonstration is from the beginning special,
not merely as to subject, but as to persons, implying teacher and
learner.

Rhetoric and Dialectic are treated by Aristotle as analogous
processes. Of the matter of opinion and belief, with which both of
them deal, he distinguishes three varieties: (1) Opinions or beliefs
entertained by all; (2) By the majority; (3) By a minority of
superior men, or by one man in respect to a science wherein he has
acquired renown. It is these opinions or beliefs that the rhetorician
and the dialectician attack and defend; bringing out all the
arguments available for or against each.

The Aristotelian treatise on Rhetoric opens with the following
words:--"Rhetoric is the counterpart of Dialectic; for both of them
deal with such matters as do not fall within any special science, but
belong in a certain way to the common knowledge of all. Hence every
individual has his share of both, greater or less; for every one can,
up to a certain point, both examine others and stand examination from
others; every one tries to defend himself and to accuse others."[13]
To the same purpose Aristotle speaks about Dialectic, in the
beginning of the Topica:--"The dialectical syllogism takes its
premisses from matters of opinion, that is, from matters that seem
good to (or are believed by) all, or the majority, or the
wise--either all the wise, or most of them, or the most celebrated."
Aristotle distinguishes these matters of common opinion or belief
from three distinct other matters:--(1) From matters that are not
really such, but only in appearance; in which the smallest attention
suffices to detect the false pretence of probability, while no one
except a contentious Sophist ever thinks of advancing them; on the
contrary, the real matters of common belief are never thus palpably
false, but have always something deeper than a superficial show; (2)
From the first truths or _principia_, upon which scientific
demonstration proceeds; (3) From the paralogisms, or fallacious
assumptions ([Greek: pseudographê/mata]), liable to occur in each
particular science.

Now what Aristotle here designates and defines as "matters of common
opinion and belief" ([Greek: ta\ e)/ndoxa]) includes all that is
usually meant, and properly meant, by Common Sense--what is believed
by all men or by most men. But Aristotle does not claim any warrant
or authority for the truth of these beliefs, on the ground of their
being deliverances of Common Sense, and accepted (by all or by the
majority) always as indisputable, often as self-evident. On the
contrary, he ranks them as mere probabilities, some in a greater,
some in a less degree; as matters whereon something may be said both
_pro_ and _con_, and whereon the full force of argument on both sides
ought to be brought out, notwithstanding the supposed self-evidence
in the minds of unscientific believers. Though, however, he
encourages this dialectical discussion on both sides as useful and
instructive, he never affirms that it can by itself lead to certain
scientific conclusions, or to anything more than strong probability
on a balance of the countervailing considerations. The language that
he uses in speaking of these deliverances of Common Sense is measured
and just. After distinguishing the real Common Opinion from the
fallacious simulations of Common Opinion set up (according to him) by
some pretenders, he declares that in all cases of Common Opinion
there is always something more than a mere superficial appearance of
truth. In other words, wherever any opinion is really held by a large
public, it always deserves the scrutiny of the philosopher to
ascertain how far it is erroneous, and, if it be erroneous, by what
appearances of reason it has been enabled so far to prevail.

[Footnote 13: Aristot. Rhetor. I. i. p. 1354, a. 1. Compare Sophist.
Elench. xi. p. 172, a. 30.]

Again, at the beginning of the Topica (in which he gives both a
theory and precepts of dialectical debate), Aristotle specifies four
different ends to be served by that treatise. It will be useful (he
says)--

1. For our own practice in the work of debate. If we acquire a method
and system, we shall find it easier to conduct a debate on any new
subject, whenever such debate may arise.

2. For our daily intercourse with the ordinary public. When we have
made for ourselves a full collection of the opinions held by the
many, we shall carry on our conversation with them out of their own
doctrines, and not out of doctrines foreign to their minds; we shall
thus be able to bring them round on any matter where we think them in
error.

3. For the sciences belonging to philosophy. By discussing the
difficulties on both sides, we shall more easily discriminate truth
and falsehood in each separate scientific question.

4. For the first and highest among the _principia_ of each particular
science. These, since they are the first and highest of all, cannot
be discussed out of _principia_ special and peculiar to any separate
science; but must be discussed through the opinions commonly received
on the subject-matter of each. This is the main province of
Dialectic; which, being essentially testing and critical, is
connected by some threads with the _principia_ of all the various
scientific researches.

We see thus that Aristotle's language about Common Opinion or Common
Sense is very guarded; that, instead of citing it as an authority, he
carefully discriminates it from Science, and places it decidedly on a
level lower than Science, in respect of evidence; yet that he
recognizes it as essential to be studied by the scientific man, with
full confrontation of all the reasonings both for and against every
opinion; not merely because such study will enable the scientific man
to study and converse intelligibly and efficaciously with the vulgar,
but also because it will sharpen his discernment for the truths of
his own science, and because it furnishes the only materials for
testing and limiting the first _principia_ of that science.

II. We will next advert to the judgment of Aristotle respecting these
_principia_ of science: how he supposes them to be acquired and
verified. He discriminates various special sciences (geometry,
arithmetic, astronomy, &c.), each of which has its own appropriate
matter, and special _principia_ from which it takes its departure.
But there are also certain _principia_ common to them all; and these
he considers to fall under the cognizance of one grand comprehensive
science, which includes all the rest; First Philosophy or
Ontology--the science of Ens in its most general sense, _quatenus_ Ens;
while each of the separate sciences confines itself to one exclusive
department of Ens. The geometer does not debate nor prove the first
_principia_ of his own science; neither those that it has in common
with other sciences, nor those peculiar to itself. He takes these for
granted, and demonstrates the consequences that logically follow from
them. It belongs to the First Philosopher to discuss the _principia_
of all. Accordingly, the province of the First Philosopher is
all-comprehensive, co-extensive with all the sciences. So also is the
province of the Dialectician alike all-comprehensive. Thus far the
two agree; but they differ as to method and purpose. The Dialectician
seeks to enforce, confront, and value all the different reasons _pro_
and _con_, consistent and inconsistent; the First Philosopher
performs this too, or supposes it to be performed by others, but
proceeds farther: namely, to determine certain Axioms that may be
trusted as sure grounds (along with certain other _principia_) for
demonstrative conclusions in science.

Aristotle describes in his Analytica the process of Demonstration,
and the conditions required to render it valid. But what is the point
of departure for this process? Aristotle declares that there cannot
be a regress without end, demonstrating one conclusion from certain
premisses, then demonstrating those premisses from others, and so on.
You must arrive ultimately at some premisses that are themselves
undemonstrable, but that may be trusted as ground from whence to
start in demonstrating conclusions. All demonstration is carried on
through a middle term, which links together the two terms of the
conclusion, though itself does not appear in the conclusion. Those
undemonstrable propositions, from which demonstration begins, must be
known without a middle term, that is, _immediately_ known; they must
be known in themselves, that is, not through any other propositions;
they must be better known than the conclusions derived from them;
they must be propositions first and most knowable. But these two last
epithets (Aristotle often repeats) have two meanings: first and most
knowable _by nature_ or _absolutely_, are the most universal
propositions; first and most knowable _to us_, are those propositions
declaring the particular facts of sense. These two meanings designate
truths correlative to each other, but at opposite ends of the
intellectual line of march.

Of these undemonstrable _principia_, indispensable as the grounds of
all Demonstration, some are peculiar to each separate science, others
are common to several or to all sciences. These common principles
were called Axioms, in mathematics, even in the time of Aristotle.
Sometimes, indeed, he designates them as Axioms, without any special
reference to mathematics; though he also uses the same name to denote
other propositions, not of the like fundamental character. Now, how
do we come to know these undemonstrable Axioms and other immediate
propositions or _principia_, since we do not knew them by
demonstration? This is the second question to be answered, in
appreciating Aristotle's views about the Philosophy of Common Sense.

He is very explicit in his way of answering this question. He
pronounces it absurd to suppose that these immediate _principia_ are
innate or congenital,--in other words, that we possess them from the
beginning, and yet that we remain for a long time without any
consciousness of possessing them; seeing that they are the most
accurate of all our cognitions. What we possess at the beginning
(Aristotle says) is only a mental power of inferior accuracy and
dignity. We, as well as all other animals, begin with a congenital
discriminative power called sensible perception. With many animals,
the data of perception are transient, and soon disappear altogether,
so that the cognition of such animals consists in nothing but
successive acts of sensible perception. With us, on the contrary, as
with some other animals, the data of perception are preserved by
memory; accordingly our cognitions include both perceptions and
remembrances. Farthermore, we are distinguished even from the better
animals by this difference--that with us, but not with them, a
rational order of thought grows out of such data of perception, when
multiplied and long preserved. And thus out of perception grows
memory; out of memory of the same matter often repeated grows
experience, since many remembrances of the same thing constitute one
numerical experience. Out of such experience, a farther consequence
arises, that what is one and the same in all the particulars, (the
Universal or the One alongside of the Many), becomes fixed or rests
steadily within the mind. Herein lies the _principium_ of Art, in
reference to Agenda or Facienda--of Science, in reference to Entia.

Thus these cognitive _principia_ are not original and determinate
possessions of the mind, nor do they spring from any other mental
possessions of a higher cognitive order, but simply from data of
sensible perception; which data are like runaway soldiers in a panic,
first one stops his flight and halts, then a second follows the
example, afterwards a third and fourth, until at length an orderly
array is obtained. Our minds are so constituted as to render this
possible. If a single individual impression is thus detained, it will
presently acquire the character of a Universal in the mind; for,
though we perceive the particular, our perception is of the Universal
(_i.e._, when we perceive Kallias, our perception is of man
generally, not of the man Kallias). Again the fixture of these lowest
Universals in the mind will bring in those of the next highest order;
until at length the Summa Genera and the absolute Universals acquire
a steady establishment therein. Thus, from this or that particular
animal, we shall rise as high as Animal universally; and so on from
Animal upwards.

We thus see clearly (Aristotle says) that only by Induction can we
come to know the first _principia_ of Demonstration; for it is by
this process that sensible perception engraves the Universal on our
minds.[14] We begin by the _notiora nobis_ (Particulars), and ascend
to the _notiora naturâ_ or _simpliciter_ (Universals). Some among our
mental habits that are conversant with truth, are also capable of
falsehood (such as Opinion and Reasoning): others are not so capable,
but embrace uniformly truth and nothing but truth; such are Science
and Intellect ([Greek: Nou=s]). Intellect is the only source more
accurate than Science. Now the _principia_ of Demonstration are more
accurate than the demonstrations themselves, yet they cannot (as we
have already observed) be the objects of Science. They must therefore
be the object of what is more accurate than Science, namely, of
Intellect. Intellect and the objects of Intellect will thus be the
_principia_ of Science and of the objects of Science. But these
principles are not intuitive data or revelations. They are
acquisitions gradually made; and there is a regular road whereby we
travel up to them, quite distinct from the road whereby we travel
down from them to scientific conclusions.

[Footnote 14: Aristot. Anal. Post. II. p. 100, b. 3: [Greek: dê=lon
dê\ o(/ti ê(mi=n ta\ prô=ta e)pagôgê=| gnôri/zein a)nagkai=on; kai\
ga\r kai\ ai)/sthêsis ou(/tô to\ katho/lou e)mpoiei=]; also ibid. I.
xviii., p. 81, b. 3, upon which passage Waitz, in his note, explains
as follows (p. 347):--"Sententia nostri loci hæc est. Universales
propositiones omnes inductione comparantur, quum etiam in iis, quæ a
sensibus maxime aliena videntur, et quæ, ut mathematica ([Greek: ta\
e)x a)phaire/seôs]), cogitatione separantur a materia quacum
conjuncta sunt, inductione probentur ea quæ de genere (_e.g._, de
linea vel de corpore mathematico), ad quod demonstratio pertineat,
prædicentur [Greek: kath' au(ta/] et cum ejus natura conjuncta sint.
Inductio autem iis nititur quæ sensibus percipiuntur: nam res
singulares sentiuntur, scientia vero rerum singularium non datur sine
inductione, non datur inductio sine sensu."]

The chapter just indicated in the Analytica Posteriora, attesting the
growth of those universals that form the _principia_ of demonstration
out of the particulars of sense, may be illustrated by a similar
statement in the First Book of the Metaphysica. Here, after stating
that sensible perception is common to all animals, Aristotle
distinguishes the lowest among animals, who have this alone; then, a
class next above them, who have it along with phantasy and memory,
and some of whom are intelligent (like bees), yet still cannot learn,
from being destitute of hearing; farther another class, one stage
higher, who hear, and therefore can be taught something, yet arrive
only at a scanty sum of experience; lastly, still higher, the class
men, who possess a large stock of phantasy, memory, and experience,
fructifying into science and art.[15] Experience (Aristotle says) is
of particular facts; Art and Science are of Universals. Art is
attained, when out of many conceptions of experience there arises one
universal persuasion respecting phenomena similar to each other. We
may know that Kallias, sick of a certain disease--that Sokrates,
likewise sick of it--that A, B, C, and other individuals besides,
have been cured by a given remedy; but this persuasion respecting
ever so many individual cases, is mere matter of experience. When,
however, we proceed to generalize these cases, and then affirm that
the remedy cures all persons suffering under the same disease,
circumscribed by specific marks--fever or biliousness--this is Art or
Science. One man may know the particular cases empirically, without
having generalized them into a doctrine; another may have learnt the
general doctrine, with little or no knowledge of the particular
cases. Of these two, the last is the wiser and more philosophical
man; but the first may be the more effective and successful as a
practitioner.

[Footnote 15: Aristot. Metaphys. A. i. p. 980, a. 26, seq.: [Greek:
phro/nima me\n a)/neu tou= mantha/nein, o(/sa mê\ du/natai tô=n
pso/phôn a)kou/ein, oi(=on me/litta, kai\ ei)/ ti toiou=ton a)/llo
ge/nos zô/|ôn e)/stin.]

We remark here the line that he draws between the intelligence of
bees--depending altogether upon sense, memory, and experience--and
the higher intelligence which is superadded by the use of language;
when it becomes possible to teach and learn, and when general
conceptions can be brought into view through appropriate names.]

In the passage above noticed, Aristotle draws the line of
intellectual distinction between man and the lower animals. If he had
considered that it was the prerogative of man to possess a stock of
intuitive general truths, ready-made, and independent of experience,
this was the occasion for saying so. He says the exact contrary. No
modern psychologist could proclaim more fully than Aristotle here
does the derivation of all general concepts and general propositions
from the phenomena of sense, through the successive stages of memory,
association, comparison, abstraction. No one could give a more
explicit acknowledgment of Induction from particulars of sense, as
the process whereby we reach ultimately those propositions of the
highest universality, as well as of the highest certainty; from
whence, by legitimate deductive syllogism, we descend to demonstrate
various conclusions. There is nothing in Aristotle about generalities
originally inherent in the mind, connate although dormant at first
and unknown, until they are evoked or elicited by the senses; nothing
to countenance that nice distinction eulogized so emphatically by
Hamilton (p. 772, a. note): "Cognitio nostra omnis à mente primam
originem, à sensibus exordium habet primum." In Aristotle's view, the
senses furnish both _originem_ and _exordium_: the successive stages
of mental procedure, whereby we rise from sense to universal
propositions, are multiplied and gradual, without any break. He even
goes so far as to say that we have _sensible perception_ of the
Universal. His language undoubtedly calls for much criticism here. We
shall only say that it discountenances altogether the doctrine that
represents the Mind or Intellect as an original source of First or
Universal Truths peculiar to itself. That opinion is mentioned by
Aristotle, but mentioned only to be rejected. He denies that the mind
possesses any such ready-made stores, latent until elicited into
consciousness. Moreover, it is remarkable that the ground whereon he
denies it is much the same as that whereon the advocates of
intuitions affirm it, viz., the supreme accuracy of these axioms.
Aristotle cannot believe that the mind includes cognitions of such
value, without being conscious thereof. Nor will he grant that the
mind possesses any native and inherent power of originating these
inestimable _principia_.[16] He declares that they are generated in
the mind only by the slow process of induction, as above described;
beginning from the perceptive power (common to man with animals),
together with that first stage of the intelligence (judging or
discriminative) which he combines or identifies with perception,
considering it to be alike congenital. From this humble basis men can
rise to the highest grades of cognition, though animals cannot. We
even become competent (Aristotle says) to have sensible perception of
the Universal; in the man Kallias, we see Man; in the ox feeding near
us, we see Animal.

[Footnote 16: Aristot. Anal. Post. II. xix. p. 99, b. 26: [Greek: ei)
me\n dê\ e)/chomen au)ta/s, a)/topon; sumbai/nei ga\r a)kribeste/ras
e)/chontas gnô/seis a)podei/xeôs lantha/nein.--phanero\n toi/nun
o(/ti ou)/t' e)/chein oi(=o/n te, ou)/t' a)gnoou=si kai\ mêdemi/an
e)/chousin e(/xin e)ggi/nesthai. a)na/gkê a)/ra e)/chein me/n tina
du/namin, mê\ toiau/tên d' e)/chein ê(\ e)/stai tou/tôn timiôte/ra
kat' a)kri/beian.] See Metaphys. A. ix. p. 993, a. 1.

Some modern psychologists, who admit that general propositions of a
lower degree of universality are raised from induction and sense,
contend that propositions of the highest universality are not so
raised, but are the intuitive offspring of the intellect. Aristotle
does not countenance such a doctrine: he says (Metaphys. A. ii. p.
982, a. 25) that these truths furthest removed from sense are the
most difficult to know of all. If they were intuitions they would be
the common possession of the race.]

It must be remembered that, when Aristotle, in this analysis of
cognition, speaks of Induction, he means induction completely and
accurately performed; just as, when he talks of Demonstration, he
intends a good and legitimate demonstration; and just as (to use his
own illustration in the Nikomachean Ethica), when he reasons upon a
harper, or other professional artist, he always tacitly implies a
good and accomplished artist. Induction thus understood, and
Demonstration, he considers to be the two processes for obtaining
scientific faith or conviction; both of them being alike cogent and
necessary, but Induction even more so than Demonstration; because, if
the _principia_ furnished by the former were not necessary, neither
could the conclusions deduced from them by the latter be necessary.
Induction may thus stand alone without Demonstration, but
Demonstration pre-supposes and postulates Induction. Accordingly,
when Aristotle proceeds to specify those functions of mind wherewith
the inductive _principia_ and the demonstrated conclusions correlate,
he refers both of them to functions wherein (according to him) the
mind is unerring and infallible--Intellect ([Greek: Nou=s]) and
Science. But, between these two he ranks Intellect as the higher, and
he refers the inductive _principia_ to Intellect. He does not mean
that Intellect ([Greek: Nou=s]) generates or produces these
principles. On the contrary, he distinctly negatives such a
supposition, and declares that no generative force of this high order
resides in the Intellect; while he tells us, with equal distinctness,
that they are generated from a lower source--sensible perception, and
through the gradual upward march of the inductive process. To say
that they originate from Sense through Induction, and nevertheless to
refer them to Intellect ([Greek: Nou=s]) as their subjective
correlate,--are not positions inconsistent with each other, in the
view of Aristotle. He expressly distinguishes the two points, as
requiring to be separately dealt with. By referring the _principia_
to Intellect ([Greek: Nou=s]), he does not intend to indicate their
generating source, but their evidentiary value and dignity when
generated and matured. They possess, in his view, the maximum of
dignity, certainty, cogency, and necessity, because it is from them
that even Demonstration derives the necessity of its conclusions;
accordingly (pursuant to the inclination of the ancient philosophers
for presuming affinity and commensurate dignity between the
_cognitum_ and the _cognoscens_), they belong as objective correlates
to the most unerring cognitive function--the Intellect ([Greek:
Nou=s]). It is the Intellect that grasps these principles, and
applies them to their legitimate purpose of scientific demonstration;
hence Aristotle calls Intellect not only the _principium_ of Science,
but the _principium principii_.

In the Analytica, from which we have hitherto cited, Aristotle
explains the structure of the Syllogism and the process of
Demonstration. He has in view mainly (though not exclusively) the
more exact sciences, arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, &c. But he
expressly tells us that all departments of inquiry are not capable of
this exactness; that some come nearer to it than others; that we must
be careful to require no more exactness from each than the subject
admits; and that the method adopted by us must be such as will attain
the admissible maximum of exactness. Now each subject has some
_principia_, and among them definitions, peculiar to itself; though
there are also some _principia_ common to all, and essential to the
march of each. In some departments of study (Aristotle says) we get
our view of _principia_ or first principles by induction; in others,
by sensible perception; in others again, by habitual action in a
certain way; and by various other processes also. In each, it is
important to look for first principles in the way naturally
appropriate to the matter before us; for this is more than half of
the whole work; upon right first principles will mainly depend the
value of our conclusions. For what concerns Ethics, Aristotle tells
us that the first principles are acquired through a course of
well-directed habitual action; and that they will be acquired easily,
as well as certainly, if such a course be enforced on youth from the
beginning. In the beginning of the Physica, he starts from that
antithesis, so often found in his writings, between what is more
knowable to us and what is more knowable absolutely or by nature. The
natural march of knowledge is to ascend from the first of these two
termini (particulars of sense) upward to the second or opposite,[17]
and then to descend downward by demonstration or deduction. The fact
of motion he proves (against Melissus and Parmenides) by an express
appeal to induction, as sufficient and conclusive evidence. In
physical science (he says) the final appeal must be to the things and
facts perceived by sense. In the treatise De Coelo he lays it down
that the _principia_ must be homogeneous with the matters they belong
to: the _principia_ of perceivable matters must be themselves
perceivable; those of eternal matters must be eternal; those of
perishable matters, perishable.

[Footnote 17: See also Aristot. Metaphys. Z. iv. p. 1029, b. 1-14.]

The treatises composing the Organon stand apart among Aristotle's
works. In them he undertakes (for the first time in the history of
mankind) the systematic study of significant propositions enunciative
of truth and falsehood. He analyses their constituent elements; he
specifies the conditions determining the consistency or inconsistency
of such propositions one with another; he teaches to arrange the
propositions in such ways as to detect and dismiss the inconsistent,
keeping our hold of the consistent. Here the signification of terms
and propositions is never out of sight: the facts and realities of
nature are regarded as so signified. Now all language becomes
significant only through the convention of mankind, according to
Aristotle's express declaration: it is used by speakers to
communicate what they mean to hearers that understand them. We see
thus that in these treatises the subjective point of view is brought
into the foreground--the enunciation of what we see, remember,
believe, disbelieve, doubt, anticipate, &c. It is not meant that the
objective point of view is eliminated, but that it is taken in
implication with, and in dependence upon, the subjective. Neither the
one nor the other is dropped or hidden. It is under this double and
conjoint point of view that Aristotle, in the Organon, presents to
us, not only the processes of demonstration and confutation, but also
the fundamental _principia_ or axioms thereof; which axioms in the
Analytica Posteriora (as we have already seen) he expressly declares
to originate from the data of sense, and to be raised and generalized
by induction.

Such is the way that Aristotle represents the fundamental principles
of syllogistic Demonstration, when he deals with them as portions of
Logic. But we also find him dealing with them as portions of Ontology
or First Philosophy (this being his manner of characterizing his own
treatise, now commonly known as the Metaphysica). To that science he
decides, after some preliminary debate, that the task of formulating
and defending the axioms belongs, because the application of these
axioms is quite universal, for all grades and varieties of Entia.
Ontology treats of Ens in its largest sense, with all its properties
_quatenus_ Ens, including Unum, Multa, Idem, Diversum, Posterius,
Prius, Genus, Species, Totum, Partes, &c. Now Ontology is with
Aristotle a purely objective science; that is, a science wherein the
subjective is dropt out of sight and no account taken of it, or
wherein (to state the same fact in the language of relativity) the
believing and reasoning subject is supposed constant. Ontology is the
most comprehensive among all the objective sciences. Each of these
sciences singles out a certain portion of it for special study. In
treating the logical axioms as portions of Ontology, Aristotle
undertakes to show their objective value; and this purpose, while it
carries him away from the point of view that we remarked as
prevailing in the Organon, at the same time brings him into conflict
with various theories, all of them in his time more or less current.
Several philosophers--Herakleitus, Anaxagoras, Demokritus,
Protagoras--had propounded theories which Aristotle here impugns. We
do not mean that these philosophers expressly denied his fundamental
axioms (which they probably never distinctly stated to themselves,
and which Aristotle was the first to formulate), but their theories
were to a certain extent inconsistent with these axioms, and were
regarded by Aristotle as wholly inconsistent.

The two Axioms announced in the Metaphysica, and vindicated by
Aristotle, are--

1. The Maxim of Contradiction: It is impossible for the same thing to
be and not to be; It is impossible for the same to belong and not to
belong to the same, at the same time and in the same sense. This is
the statement of the Maxim as a formula of Ontology. Announced as a
formula of Logic, it would stand thus: The same proposition cannot be
both true and false at the same time; You cannot both believe and
disbelieve the same proposition at the same time; You cannot believe,
at the same time, propositions contrary or contradictory. These
last-mentioned formulae are the logical ways of stating the axiom. They
present it in reference to the believing or disbelieving (affirming
or denying) subject, distinctly brought to view along with the matter
believed; not exclusively in reference to the matter believed, to the
omission of the believer.

2. The Maxim of Excluded Middle: A given attribute either does
belong, or does not belong to a subject (_i.e._, provided that it has
any relation to the subject at all)--there is no medium, no real
condition intermediate between the two. This is the ontological
formula; and it will stand thus, when translated into Logic: Between
a proposition and its contradictory opposite there is no tenable
halting ground; If you disbelieve the one, you must pass at once to
the belief of the other--you cannot at the same time disbelieve the
other.

These two maxims thus teach--the first, that we cannot at the same
time _believe_ both a proposition and its contradictory opposite; the
second, that we cannot at the same time _disbelieve_ them both.[18]

[Footnote 18: We have here discussed these two maxims chiefly in
reference to Aristotle's manner of presenting them, and to the
conceptions of his predecessors and contemporaries. An excellent view
of the Maxims themselves, in their true meaning and value, will be
found in Mr. John Stuart Mill's Examination of the Philosophy of Sir
W. Hamilton, ch. xxi. pp. 406-421.]

Now, Herakleitus, in his theory (a theory propounded much before the
time of Protagoras and the persons called Sophists), denied all
permanence or durability in nature, and recognized nothing except
perpetual movement and change. He denied both durable substances and
durable attributes; he considered nothing to be lasting except the
universal law or principle of change--the ever-renewed junction or
co-existence of contraries and the perpetual transition of one
contrary into the other. This view of the facts of nature was adopted
by several other physical philosophers besides.[19] Indeed it lay at
the bottom of Plato's new coinage--Rational Types or Forms, at once
universal and real. The Maxim of Contradiction is intended by
Aristotle to controvert Herakleitus, and to uphold durable substances
with definite attributes.

[Footnote 19: See 'Plato and other Comp. of Sokr.' I. i. pp. 28-38.]

Again, the theory of Anaxagoras denied all simple bodies (excepting
Noûs) and all definite attributes. He held that everything was
mingled with everything else, though there might be some one or other
predominant constituent. In all the changes visible throughout
nature, there was no generation of anything new, but only the coming
into prominence of some constituent that had before been
comparatively latent. According to this theory, you could neither
wholly affirm, nor wholly deny, any attribute of its subject. Both
affirmation and denial were untrue: the real relation between the two
was something half-way between affirmation and denial. The Maxim of
Excluded Middle is maintained by Aristotle as a doctrine in
opposition to this theory of Anaxagoras.[20]

[Footnote 20: Ibid. pp. 49-57.]

Both the two above-mentioned theories are objective. A third, that of
Protagoras--"Homo Mensura"--brings forward prominently the
subjective, and is quite distinct from either. Aristotle does indeed
treat the Protagorean theory as substantially identical with that of
Herakleitus, and as standing or falling therewith. This seems a
mistake: the theory of Protagoras is as much opposed to Herakleitus
as to Aristotle.

We have now to see how Aristotle sustains these two Axioms (which he
calls "the firmest of all truths and the most assuredly known")
against theories opposed to them. In the first place, he repeats here
what he had declared in the Analytica Posteriora--that they cannot
be directly demonstrated, though they are themselves the _principia_
of all demonstration. Some persons indeed thought that these Axioms
were demonstrable; but this is an error, proceeding (he says) from
complete ignorance of analytical theory. How, then, are these Axioms
to be proved against Herakleitus? Aristotle had told us in the
Analytica that axioms were derived from particulars of sense by
Induction, and apprehended or approved by the [Greek: Nou=s]. He does
not repeat that observation here; but he intimates that there is only
one process available for defending them, and that process amounts to
an appeal to Induction. You can give no ontological reason in support
of the Axioms, except what will be condemned as a _petitio
principii_; you must take them in their logical aspect, as enunciated
in significant propositions. You must require the Herakleitean
adversary to answer some question affirmatively, in terms significant
both to himself and to others, and in a proposition declaring his
belief on the point. If he will not do this, you can hold no
discussion with him: he might as well be deaf and dumb: he is no
better than a plant (to use Aristotle's own comparison). If he does
it, he has bound himself to something determinate: first, the
signification of the terms is a fact, excluding what is contrary or
contradictory; next, in declaring his belief, he at the same time
declares that he does not believe in the contrary or contradictory,
and is so understood by the hearers. We may grant what his theory
affirms--that the subject of a proposition is continually under some
change or movement; yet the identity designated by its name is still
maintained,[21] and many true predications respecting it remain true
in spite of its partial change. The argument in defence of the Maxim
of Contradiction is, that it is a postulate implied in all the
particular statements as to matters of daily experience, that a man
understands and acts upon when heard from his neighbours; a postulate
such that, if you deny it, no speech is either significant or
trustworthy to inform and guide those who hear it. If the speaker
both affirms and denies the same fact at once, no information is
conveyed, nor can the hearer act upon the words. Thus, in the
Acharnenses of Aristophanes, Dikæopolis knocks at the door of
Euripides, and inquires whether the poet is within; Kephisophon, the
attendant, answers--"Euripides is within and not within." This answer
is unintelligible; Dikæopolis cannot act upon it; until Kephisophon
explains that "not within" is intended metaphorically. Then, again,
all the actions in detail of a man's life are founded upon his own
belief of some facts and disbelief of other facts: he goes to Megara,
believing that the person whom he desires to see is at Megara, and at
the same time disbelieving the contrary: he acts upon his belief both
as to what is good and what is not good, in the way of pursuit and
avoidance. You may cite innumerable examples both of speech and
action in the detail of life, which the Herakleitean must go through
like other persons; and when, if he proceeded upon his own theory, he
could neither give nor receive information by speech, nor ground any
action upon the beliefs which he declares to co-exist in his own
mind. Accordingly, the Herakleitean Kratylus (so Aristotle says)
renounced the use of affirmative speech, and simply pointed with his
finger.[22]

[Footnote 21: This argument is given by Aristotle, Metaph. [Greek:
G]. v. p. 1010, a. 7-25, contrasting change [Greek: kata\ to\ poso/n]
and change [Greek: kata\ to\ poio/n].]

[Footnote 22: Aristot. Metaph. [Greek: G]. v. p. 1010, a. 12. Compare
Plato, Theætêt. pp. 179-180, about the aversion of the Herakleiteans
for clear issues and propositions.]

The Maxim of Contradiction is thus seen to be only the general
expression of a postulate implied in all such particular speeches as
communicate real information. It is proved by a very copious and
diversified Induction, from matters of experience familiar to every
individual person. It is not less true in regard to propositions
affirming changes, motions, or events, than in regard to those
declaring durable states or attributes.

In the long pleading of Aristotle on behalf of the Maxim of
Contradiction against the Herakleiteans, the portion of it that
appeals to Induction is the really forcible portion; conforming as it
does to what he had laid down in the Analytica Posteriora about the
inductive origin of the _principia_ of demonstration. He employs,
however, besides, several other dialectical arguments built more or
less upon theories of his own, and therefore not likely to weigh much
with an Herakleitean theorist; who--arguing, as he did argue, that
(because neither subject nor predicate was ever unchanged or stable
for two moments together) no true proposition could be framed but was
at the same time false, and that contraries were in perpetual
co-existence--could not by any general reasoning be involved in
greater contradiction and inconsistency than he at once openly
proclaimed.[23] It can only be shown that such a doctrine cannot be
reconciled with the necessities of daily speech, as practised by
himself, as well as by others. We read, indeed, one ingenious
argument whereby Aristotle adopts this belief in the co-existence of
contraries, but explains it in a manner of his own, through his much
employed distinction between potential and actual existence. Two
contraries cannot co-exist (he says) in actuality; but they both may
and do co-exist in different senses--one or both of them being
potential. This, however, is a theory totally different from that of
Herakleitus; coincident only in words and in seeming. It does indeed
eliminate the contradiction; but that very contradiction formed the
characteristic feature and keystone of the Herakleitean theory. The
case against this last theory is, that it is at variance with
psychological facts, by incorrectly assuming the co-existence of
contradictory beliefs in the mind; and that it conflicts both with
postulates implied in the daily colloquy of detail between man and
man, and with the volitional preferences that determine individual
action. All of these are founded on a belief in the regular sequence
of our sensations, and in the at least temporary durability of
combined potential aggregates of sensations, which we enunciate in
the language of definite attributes belonging to definite substances.
This language, the common medium of communication among
non-theorizing men, is accepted as a basis, and is generalized and
regularized, in the logical theories of Aristotle.

[Footnote 23: This is stated by Aristotle himself, Metaph. [Greek:
G]. vi. p. 1011, a. 15: [Greek: oi( d' e)n tô=| lo/gô| tê\n bi/an
mo/non zêtou=ntes a)du/naton zêtou=sin; e)nanti/a ga\r ei)pei=n
a)xiou=sin, eu)thu\s e)nanti/a le/gontes.] He here, indeed, applies
this observation immediately to the Protagoreans, against whom it
does not tell, instead of the Herakleiteans, against whom it does
tell. The whole of the reasoning in this part of the Metaphysica is
directed indiscriminately, and in the same words, against
Protagoreans and Herakleiteans.]

The doctrine here mentioned is vindicated by Aristotle, not only
against Herakleitus, by asserting the Maxim of Contradiction, but
also against Anaxagoras, by asserting the Maxim of Excluded Middle.
Here we have the second _principium_ of Demonstration, which, if it
required to be defended at all, can only be defended (like the first)
by a process of Induction. Aristotle adduces several arguments in
support of it, some of which involve an appeal to Induction, though
not broadly or openly avowed; but others of them assume what
adversaries, and Anaxagoras especially, were not likely to grant. We
must remember that both Anaxagoras and Herakleitus propounded their
theories as portions of Physical Philosophy or of Ontology; and that
in their time no such logical principles and distinctions as those
that Aristotle lays down in the Organon, had yet been made known or
pressed upon their attention. Now, Aristotle, while professing to
defend these Axioms as data of Ontology, forgets that they deal with
the logical aspect of Ontology, as formulated in methodical
propositions. His view of the Axioms cannot be properly appreciated
without a classification of propositions, such as neither Herakleitus
nor Anaxagoras found existing or originated for themselves. Aristotle
has taught us what Herakleitus and Anaxagoras had not been taught--to
distinguish separate propositions as universal, particular and
singular; and to distinguish pairs of propositions as contrary,
sub-contrary, and contradictory. To take the simplest case, that of
a singular proposition, in regard to which the distinction between
contrary and contradictory has no application,--such as the answer
(cited above) of Kephisophon about Euripides. Here Aristotle would
justly contend that the two propositions--Euripides is within,
Euripides is not within--could not be either both of them true, or
both of them false; that is, that we could neither believe both, nor
disbelieve both. If Kephisophon had answered, Euripides is neither
within nor not within, Dikæopolis would have found himself as much at
a loss with the two negatives as he was with the two affirmatives. In
regard to singular propositions, neither the doctrine of Herakleitus
(to believe both affirmation and negation) nor that of Anaxagoras (to
disbelieve both) is admissible. But, when in place of singular
propositions we take either universal or particular propositions, the
rule to follow is no longer so simple and peremptory. The universal
affirmative and the universal negative are _contrary_; the particular
affirmative and the particular negative are _sub-contrary_; the
universal affirmative and the particular negative, or the universal
negative and the particular affirmative, are _contradictory_. It is
now noted in all manuals of Logic, that of two contrary propositions,
both cannot be true, but both may be false; that of two
sub-contraries, both may be true, but both cannot be false; and that
of two contradictories, one must be true and the other false.




III.

METAPHYSICA.


[The following Abstract--when not translation--of six books ([Greek:
G], E, Z, Ê, [Greek: Th], [Greek: L]) out of the fourteen included
under the title 'Metaphysica,' may be said to cover the whole of
Aristotle's dogmatic exposition of First Philosophy. According to the
view of Brandis, now in its main features generally accepted, the
exposition continued through Books [Greek: G], E, Z, Ê, reaches back
to Books A and B, and comes to an end with Book [Greek: Th]. Still it
is only with Book [Greek: G] that the properly didactic treatment
begins, Book A being a historical review of previous opinion, and
Book B a mere collection of [Greek: a)pori/ai] subjected to a
preliminary dialectical handling; while, at the other end, Book
[Greek: L], though it has no direct connection with Book [Greek: Th],
is, especially in its latter part, of undeniable importance for
Aristotle's metaphysical doctrine.

The remaining books are known as [Greek: a], [Greek: D], I, K, M, N.
The short Book [Greek: a] is entirely unconnected with any of the
others, and most probably is not the work of Aristotle. Book [Greek:
D] ([Greek: peri\ tô=n posachô=s legome/nôn])--a vocabulary of
philosophical terms--is Aristotelian beyond question, being referred
to occasionally in the chief books; but it lies quite apart from the
exposition proper. Book I--dealing with Unity and Opposites--though
it also has no place in the actual line of treatment, is truly
ontological in character, and probably was intended to fall within
some larger scheme of metaphysical doctrine; the like, as far as can
be judged, being true of Books M and N, containing together a
criticism of Pythagorean and Platonic theories. Finally, Book K,
consisting in part of an epitomized excerpt from the Physica--hardly
from the hand of Aristotle, gives otherwise only a sketch in outline
of the argument of Books B, [Greek: G], E, and thus, although
Aristotelian, is to be discounted.

The author nowhere states the principle upon which he selected the
six books for a preliminary Abstract; but the actual selection,
joined to various indications in the Abstract and marginal notes in
his copies of the Metaphysica, leaves no doubt that he accepted the
view of Brandis, more especially as set forth by Bonitz. On the whole
question of the Canon of the Metaphysica, Bonitz's Introduction to
his Commentary may with advantage be consulted.]

Book [Greek: G].

In this First Philosophy, Aristotle analyses and illustrates the
meaning of the _generalissima_ of language--the most general and
abstract words which language includes. All these are words in common
and frequent use; in the process of framing or putting together
language, they have become permanently stamped and circulated as the
result of many previous comparisons, gone through but afterwards
forgotten, or perhaps gone through at first without any distinct
consciousness. Men employ these words familiarly in ordinary speech,
and are understood by others when they do so. For the most part, they
employ the words correctly and consistently, in the affirmation of
particular propositions relating to topics of daily life and
experience. But this is not always or uniformly the case. Sometimes,
more or less often, men fall into error and inconsistency in the
employment of these familiar general terms. The First Philosophy
takes up the generalities and established phrases in this condition;
following back analytically the synthetical process which the framers
of language have pursued without knowing or at least without
recording it, and bringing under conscious attention the different
meanings, more or fewer, in which these general words are used.

Philosophia Prima devotes itself, specially and in the first
instance, to Ens _quatenus_ Ens in all its bearings; being thus
distinguished from mathematics and other particular sciences, each of
which devotes itself to a separate branch of Ens (p. 1003, a. 25). It
searches into the First Causes or Elements of Ens _per se_, not _per
accidens_ (a. 31). But Ens is a commune, not generically, but
analogically; constituted by common relationship to one and the same
terminus, as everything healthy is related to health. The Principle
([Greek: a)rchê/]) of all Entia is Essence ([Greek: ou)si/a]); but
some Entia are so called as being affections of Essence; others, as
being a transition to Essence, or as destruction, privation, quality,
efficient or generative cause, of Essence or its _analoga_; others,
again, as being negations ([Greek: a)popha/seis]) thereof, whence,
for example, we say that Non-Ens _is_ Non-Ens (b. 6-10). There is one
science of all these primary, secondary, tertiary, &c., Entia; just
as there is one science of all things healthy, of the primary, the
secondary, the tertiary, &c., _quatenus_ healthy. But, in all such
matters, that science bears in the first instance and specially
([Greek: kuri/ôs]) on the Primum Aliquid, from which all the
secondary and other derivatives take their departure, and upon which
they depend (b. 16). Accordingly, in the present case, since Essence
is the Primum Aliquid, the province of First Philosophy is to
investigate the causes and principles of Essences in all their
varieties (b. 18-22). Now whatever varieties there are of Ens, the
like varieties there are of Unum; for the two are always implicated
together, though the words are not absolutely the same in meaning (b.
24-35). Accordingly both Ens and Unum with all the varieties of each
belong to Philosophia Prima; likewise Idem, Simile, &c., and the
opposites thereof. All opposites may be traced in the last analysis
to this foundation--the antithesis of Unum and Multa (p. 1004, a. 1).
We must set forth and discriminate the different varieties--primary,
secondary, tertiary, &c.--of Idem and Simile, and also of their
opposites, Diversum and Dissimile; and we must show how they are
derived from or related to Primum Idem, &c., just as we must do in
the case of Ens and Unum. All this task belongs to First Philosophy
(a. 20-30). Aristotle speaks of [Greek: o( philo/sophos], as meaning
the master of Philosophia Prima (b. 1; B. p. 997, a. 14).

If these investigations do not belong to the First Philosopher, to
which among the other investigators can they belong? Who is to
enquire whether Sokrates, and Sokrates sitting, is the same person?
Whether Unum is opposite to Unum? In how many senses Opposite can be
said? (p. 1004, b. 3). All these are affections _per se_ of Unum
_quatenus_ Unum, and of Ens _quatenus_ Ens, not _quatenus_ numbers,
or lines, or fire; that is, they are propria (_sensu logico_) of Ens
and Unum (not included in the notion or definition, but deducible
therefrom--"notæ consecutione notionis"), just as odd and even,
proportionality, equality, excess and defect, are propria of numbers;
and there are other propria of solids, whether moved or unmoved,
heavy or light. It is these propria of Ens and Unum that Philosophia
Prima undertakes to explain (b. 7-16), and which others fail to
explain, because they take no account of [Greek: ou)si/a] (b. 10), or
of the fundamental Ens or Essentia to which these belong as propria.

These Propria of Ens are the [Greek: oi)kei=a]--the special and
peculiar matter or principles--of Philosophia Prima. That all of them
belong in this special way to the First Philosopher, we may farther
see by the fact that all of them are handled by the Dialectician and
the Sophist, who assume an attitude counterfeiting the Philosopher.
All three travel over the same ground, and deal with Ens, as a matter
common to all (p. 1004, b. 20). But the Sophist differs from the
Philosopher in his purpose, inasmuch as he aims only at giving the
false appearance of wisdom without the reality, while the
Dialectician differs from the Philosopher in his manner of handling
([Greek: tô=| tro/pô| tê=s duna/meôs]--b. 24). The Dialectician
discusses the subject in a tentative way, from many different points
of view, suggested by current opinions; the Philosopher marches by a
straight and assured road from the appropriate principles of his
science to certain conclusions and cognitions.

The same view of the scope and extent of Philosophia Prima may be
made out in another way. Almost all philosophers affirm that Entia
are composed of contraries, and may be traced back to opposite
principles--odd and even, hot and cold, limit and the unlimited,
friendship and enmity, &c. Now these and all other contraries may be
traced back to Unum and Multa: this we may assume (p. 1005, a. 1;
according to Alexander Aph., it had been shown in the treatise De
Bono--Schol. p. 648, a. 38, Br.).

Though it be true, therefore, that neither Ens nor Unum is a true
genus, nor separable, but both of them aggregates of analogical
derivatives, yet since all these derivatives have their root in one
and the same fundamentum, the study of all of them belongs to one and
the same science (p. 1005, a. 6-11). It is not the province of the
geometer to examine what is The Opposite, The Perfect, Ens, Unum,
Idem, Diversum, except in their application to his own problems. The
general enquiry devolves upon the First Philosopher; who will
investigate Ens _quatenus_ Ens, together with the belongings or
appendages ([Greek: ta\ u(pa/rchonta]) of Ens _quatenus_ Ens,
including Prius, Posterius, Genus, Species, Totum, Pars, and such
like (a. 11-18).

It falls to the First Philosopher also to investigate and explain
what mathematicians call their Axioms: the mathematician ought not to
do this himself, but to leave it to the First Philosopher. These
Axioms are, in their highest generality, affirmations respecting Ens
_quatenus_ Ens, all of which belong to the First Philosopher; from
whom the mathematician accepts them, and applies them as far as his
own department requires (p. 1005, a. 20, seq.).

In First Philosophy, the firmest, best known, and most unquestionable
of all principles is this: It is impossible for the same predicate at
the same time and in the same sense to belong and not to belong to
the same subject (p. 1005, b. 20). No one can at the same time
believe that the same thing both is and is not; though Herakleitus
professed to believe this, we must not suppose that he really did
believe it (b. 25). No man can hold two contrary opinions at the same
time (b. 31). This is by nature the first principle of all other
axioms; to which principle all demonstrations are in the last resort
brought back (b. 33: [Greek: phu/sei ga\r a)rchê\ kai\ tô=n a)/llôn
a)xiôma/tôn au(/tê pa/ntôn]).

Aristotle then proceeds to explain and vindicate at length this
[Greek: a)rchê/]--the Principle of Contradiction, which many at that
time denied. This principle is at once the most knowable, and noway
assumed as hypothesis ([Greek: gnôrimôta/tên kai\ a)nupo/theton]--p.
1005, b. 13). You cannot indeed demonstrate it to be true; the very
attempt to demonstrate it would be unphilosophical: demonstration of
every thing, is an impossibility. You cannot march upwards in an
infinite progression of demonstrations; you must arrive ultimately at
some first truth which is not demonstrable; and, if any such first
truth is to be recognized, no one can point out any truth better
entitled to such privilege than the Principle of Contradiction (p.
1006, a. 11). But you can convict an opponent of self-contradiction
([Greek: a)podei=xai e)legktikô=s], a. 12, 15), if he will only
consent to affirm any proposition in significant terms--that is, in
terms which he admits to be significant to himself and which he
intends as such to others; in other words, if he will enter into
dialogue with you, for without significant speech there can be no
dialogue with him at all (a. 21).

When the opponent has shown his willingness to comply with the
conditions of dialogue, by advancing a proposition in terms each
having one definite signification, it is plain, by his own admission,
that the proposition does not both signify and not signify the same.
First, the copula of the proposition (_est_) does not signify what
would be signified if the copula were _non est_; so that here is one
case wherein the affirmative and the negative cannot be both of them
true (p. 1006, a. 30; see Alex. Schol. and Bonitz's note). Next, let
the subject of the proposition be _homo_; a term having only one
single definite signification, or perhaps having two or three (or any
definite number of) distinct significations, each definite. If the
number of distinct significations be indefinite, the term is unfit
for the purpose of dialogue (a. 30-b. 10). The term _homo_ will
signify one thing only; it will have one determinate essence and
definition--say _animal bipes_: that is, if any thing be a man, the
same will be _animal bipes_. But this last cannot be the essence and
definition of _non-homo_ also: _non-homo_, as a different name, must
have different definition; _homo_ and _non-homo_ cannot be like
[Greek: lô/pion] and [Greek: i(ma/tion], two terms having the same
signification, essence and definition; for _homo_ signifies one
subject of constant and defined nature, not simply one among many
predicates applicable by accident to this same constant subject; it
signifies [Greek: mi/an phu/sin] and not [Greek: a)/llên tina\
phu/sin] (Scholia, p. 656, b. 21). Since each name indeed is applied
by convention to what it denominates, the name _non-homo_ may be
applied elsewhere to that which we term _homo_; but this is a mere
difference of naming; what bears the name _homo_, and what bears the
name _non-homo_, must always be different, if _homo_ is defined to
signify one determinate nature (b. 22). The one single nature and
essence defined as belonging to _homo_, cannot be the same as that
belonging to _non-homo_. If any thing be _homo_, the same cannot be
_non-homo_: if any thing be _non-homo_, the same cannot be _homo_ (b.
25-34). Whoever says that _homo_ and _non-homo_ have the same
meaning, must say _à fortiori_ that _homo_, _fortis_, _musicus_,
_simus_, _pulcher_, &c., have the same meaning; for not one of these
terms is so directly and emphatically opposite to _homo_, as
_non-homo_ is. He must therefore admit that the meaning, not merely
of all these words but also, of a host besides is the same; in other
words, that not merely Opposites are one, but all other things
besides, under different names ([Greek: o(/ti e(\n pa/nta e)/stai
kai\ ou) mo/non ta\ a)ntikei/mena]--p. 1007, a. 6).

This argument is directed against those who maintain that affirmative
and negative are both true at once, but who still desire to keep up
dialogue (Alex. Schol. p. 658, a. 26, Br.: [Greek: tô=| tê/n te
a)nti/phasin sunalêtheu/ein le/gonti, kai\ sô/zein boulome/nô| to\
diale/gesthai]). No man who maintains this opinion, can keep his
consistency in dialogue, if he will only give direct answers to the
questions put to him, without annexing provisoes and gratuitous
additions to his answers. If you ask him, Whether it is true that
Sokrates is _homo_? he ought to answer plainly Yes, or No. He ought
not to answer: "Yes, but Sokrates is also _non-homo_," meaning that
Sokrates is also the subject of many other accidental
predicates--fair, flat-nosed, brave, accomplished, &c. He ought to
answer simply to the question, whether the one essence or definition
signified by the word man, belongs to Sokrates or not; he ought not
to introduce the mention of these accidental predicates, to which
the question did not refer. These accidental predicates are infinite
in number; he cannot enumerate them all, and therefore he ought not
to introduce the mention of any of them. Sokrates is _homo_, by the
essence and definition of the word; he is _non-homo_, ten thousand
times over, by accidental predicates; that is, he is fair, brave,
musical, flat-nosed, &c., all of which are varieties of the general
word _non-homo_ (p. 1007, a. 7-19).

Those who contend that both members of the Antiphasis are at once
true disallow Essentia altogether, and the distinction between it and
Accidens (p. 1007, a. 21). When we say that the word _homo_ signifies
a certain Essentia, we mean that its Essentia is nothing different
from this, and that the being _homo_ cannot be the same as the being
_non-homo_, or the not being _homo_. Those against whom we are
reasoning discard Essentia as distinguished from Accidens, and
consider all predicates as Accidentia. _Albus_ belongs to _homo_ as
an accident; but the essence of _albus_ does not coincide with that
of _homo_, and cannot be predicated of _homo_ (a. 32). Upon the
theory of these opponents, there would be no Prima Essentia to which
all accidents are attached; but this theory is untenable. Accidents
cannot be attached one to another in an infinite ascending series (b.
1). You cannot proceed more than two steps upward: first one
accident, then a second; the two being joined by belonging to one and
the same subject. No accident can be the accident of another
accident. [Greek: To\ leuko/n] may have the accident [Greek:
mousiko/n], or [Greek: to\ mousiko/n] may have the accident [Greek:
leuko/n]; each of these may be called indifferently the accident of
the other; but the truth is, that [Greek: leuko/s] and [Greek:
mousiko/s] are both of them accidents belonging to the common
Essentia--_homo_. But, when we affirm _homo est musicus_, we
implicate the accident with the Essentia to which it belongs; that
Essentia is signified by the subject _homo_. There must thus be one
word which has signification as Essentia; and, when such is the case,
we have already shown that both members of the Antiphasis cannot be
predicated at once (b. 5-18).

(Alexander, in Scholia, p. 658, b. 40-p. 659, b. 14, Br., remarks on
this argument of Aristotle: Those who held the opinion here
controverted by Aristotle--[Greek: tê\n a)nti/phasin
sunalêtheu/ein]--had in their minds accidental propositions, in regard
to which they were right, except that both members of the Antiphasis
cannot be true at the same time. _Sokrates est musicus_--_Sokrates non
est musicus_: these two propositions are both true, in the sense that
one or other of them is true only potentially, and that both cannot be
actually true at the same time. One of them is true, and the other
false, at the present moment; but that which is now false has been
true in the past, and may become true in the future. Aristotle does
not controvert this theory so far as regards accidental propositions;
but he maintains that it is untenable about essential propositions,
and that the theorists overlooked this distinction.)

Moreover, if you say that both members of the Antiphasis are alike
true respecting every predicate of a given subject, you must admit
that all things are one (p. 1007, b. 20). The same thing will be at
once a wall, a trireme, a man. Respecting every subject, you may
always either affirm or deny any given predicate; but, according to
this theory, whenever it is true to affirm, it is always equally true
to deny. If you can say truly, _Homo non est triremis_, you may say
with equal truth, according to the theory before us, _Homo est
triremis_. And, of course, _Homo non est triremis_ may be said truly;
since (still according to this theory) the much more special
negative, _Homo non est homo_, may be said truly (b. 32).

Again, if this theory be admitted, the doctrine that every predicate
may be either affirmed or denied of any given subject, will no longer
hold true. For, if it be true to say of Sokrates both _Est homo_ and
_Est non-homo_: it must also be true to say of him both _Non est
homo_ and _Non est non-homo_. If both affirmative and negative may be
alike affirmed, both may be alike denied (p. 1008, a. 2-7). If both
members of the Antiphasis are alike true, both must be alike false
(Alex. Schol. p. 663, a. 14-34).

Again, the theory that both members of the Antiphasis are alike true,
is intended by its authors to apply universally or not universally.
Every thing is both white and not white, Ens and Non-Ens; or this is
true with some propositions, but not with regard to others. If the
theorists take the latter ground and allow some exceptions, so far at
least as those exceptions reach, firm truth is left ([Greek: au(=tai
a)\n ei)=en o(mologou/menai]--p. 1008, a. 11). But, if they take the
former ground and allow no exceptions, they may still perhaps say:
Wherever you can affirm with truth, we can also deny with truth; but,
wherever we can deny with truth, we cannot in every case affirm with
truth (a. 15). Meeting them upon this last ground, we remark that at
any rate some negative propositions are here admitted to be knowable,
and we obtain thus much of settled opinion; besides, wherever the
negative is knowable, the corresponding affirmative must be still
more knowable (a. 18). If they take the former ground and say that,
wherever the negative is true, the affirmative is true also, they
must either mean that each of them is true separately, or that
neither of them is true separately but that both are true when
enunciated together in a couple (a. 19). If they mean the latter,
they do not talk either of these things or of any thing else: there
is neither speech nor speaker, nothing but non-entity; and how can
non-entity either speak or walk (a. 22)? Every thing would be
confounded in one. If they mean the former--that affirmative and
negative are each alike true taken separately, we reply that, since
this must be true as much respecting one subject as respecting
another, so there can be no distinction or difference between one
subject and another; all must be alike and the same; if there be any
difference of any kind, this must constitute a special and
exceptional matter, standing apart from the theory now under
discussion. Upon this view of the theory in question, then, as well
as upon the preceding, we are landed in the same result: all things
would be confounded into one (a. 27). All men would speak truly and
all men alike (including the theorist himself, by his own admission)
would speak falsely. Indeed in discussing with this theorist we have
nothing to talk about; for he says nothing. He does not say, It is
thus; he does not say, It is not thus; he says, It is both thus and
not thus: then, again, he negatives both, saying, It is neither thus
nor not thus; so that there is nothing definite in what he says (a.
32).

Again, let us ask, Does he who believes things to be so, believe
falsely, and he who believes things not to be so and so, believe
falsely also, while he who believes both at once, believes truly? If
this last person believes truly, what is meant by the common saying
that such and such is the constitution of nature? If you even say
that the last person does not indeed believe truly, but believes more
truly than he who believes the affirmative alone, or he who believes
the negative alone, we still have something definite in the
constitution of nature, something which is really true, and not true
and false at the same time. But, if there be no more truly or less
truly--if all persons alike and equally speak truly and speak
falsely--speech is useless to such persons; what they say, they at
the same time unsay. If the state of their minds really corresponds
to this description--if they believe nothing, but at once think so
and so and do not think so and so--how do such persons differ from
plants (b. 3-12; see Alexander's Scholion, p. 665, b. 9-17 Br., about
the explanation of [Greek: ma=llon], and the distinction between
[Greek: le/gein] and [Greek: u(polamba/nein], p. 665, b. 31, seq.)?

It is certain, however, that these theorists are not like plants, and
do not act as such in matters of ordinary life. They look for water,
when thirsty; they keep clear of falling into a well or over a
precipice. In regard to what is desirable or undesirable, at least,
they do not really act upon their own theory--That both members of
the Antiphasis are equally true and equally false. They act upon the
contrary theory--That one of the members is true, and the other
false. But, if these theorists, admitting that they act thus, say
that they do not act thus with any profession of knowing the truth,
but simply on the faith of appearance and greater probability, we
reply that this ought to impose upon them a stronger sense of duty in
regard to getting at the truth. The state of Opinion stands to that
of Knowledge in the same relation as that of sickness to health (p.
1008, b. 12-31).

Finally, to follow up this last argument, even if we grant to these
theorists that both members of the Antiphasis are true, still there
are degrees of truth: the More and the Less pervades the constitution
of nature (p. 1008, b. 32). We shall not surely affirm that two and
three are equally even; nor shall we say, when any one affirms four
to be five, that he commits an equal error with one who affirms four
to be a thousand. Clearly one of these persons is more near to the
truth, the other is less near to the truth. But, if there be such a
thing as _being nearer to the truth_, there must surely be some truth
to which you have come nearer; and, even if this be denied, yet at
least what we have already obtained (the [Greek: e)ggu/teron tê=s
a)lêthei/as]) is something firmer and of a more truth-like character.
We shall thus have got rid of that unqualified theory which forbids
all definite conceptions of the intellect ([Greek: ka)\n ei) mê/
e)stin, a)ll' ê)/dê ge/ ti e)sti\ bebaio/teron kai\ a)lêthinô/teron,
kai\ tou= lo/gou a)pêllagme/noi a)\n ei)/êmen tou= a)kra/tou kai\
kôlu/onto/s ti tê=| dianoi/a| o(ri/sai]--p. 1009, a. 2).

Having thus completed his refutation of the "unqualified theory,"
which declares both members of the Antiphasis to be alike true,
Aristotle passes to the examination of the Protagorean doctrine "Homo
Mensura:" he affirms that it proceeds from the same mode of thinking,
and that the two must stand or fall together. For, if all things
which appear true are true, all things must be at once true and
false; since the opposition of men's opinions is a notorious fact,
each man thinking his own opinions true and his opponent's opinions
false (p. 1009, a. 16).

Aristotle here distinguishes between two classes of reasoners, both
of whom he combats, but who require to be dealt with in a very
different manner: (1) Those who are sincerely convinced of what they
affirm; (2) Those who have no sincere conviction, but merely take up
the thesis as a matter for ingenious argument ([Greek: lo/gou
cha/rin]), and will not relinquish it until they are compelled by a
strong case made out against them. The first require persuasion, for
their ignorance may be easily cured, and the difficulties whereby
they are puzzled may be removed; the second require to be constrained
by a forcible Elenchus or refutation, which may correct their misuse
of dialectic and language (p. 1009, a. 22).

Aristotle begins with the first class. The difficulties which perplex
them proceed from sensible things ([Greek: e)k tô=n ai)sthêtô=n]--p.
1009, a. 23). They perceive contrary things generated by the same;
and this leads them to believe that contraries are both alike real,
and that the two members of the Antiphasis are alike true. For, since
Non-Ens cannot be generated, both the two contraries must have
pre-existed together as Entia, prior to the generation in the thing
as it then stood (a. 25). This is the opinion of Anaxagoras, who
affirms that every thing is mixed in every thing; and of Demokritus,
who affirms that Plenum and Inane--in other words. Ens and
Non-Ens--exist alike and together in every part (a. 28). To these
reasoners we reply, that in a certain sense they are right, in a
certain sense wrong. The term Ens is used in two senses: the same
thing may therefore be at once Ens and Non-Ens, but not in the same
sense; moreover, from Non-Ens in one sense something may be generated,
but not from Non-Ens in the other. The same thing may be at once two
opposites _in power_, but not _in act_ ([Greek: duna/mei me\n ga\r
e)nde/chetai a(/ma tau)to\ ei)=nai ta\ e)nanti/a, e)ntelechei/a| d'
ou)/]--a. 35). We must farther remind these reasoners that the basis
on which they proceed is not universally admissible; for there are
various Entia of completely distinct and different essence, in which
there is neither movement nor generation nor destruction of any sort
(a. 38).

The doctrine held by Protagoras--That what appears true is truth,
comes from the same source as the other doctrine--That both members
of the Antiphasis are true. Both doctrines proceed from the sensible
world ([Greek: o(moi/ôs de\ kai\ ê( peri\ ta\ phaino/mena a)lê/theia
e)ni/ois e)k tô=n ai)sthêtô=n e)lê/luthen]--p. 1009, b. 2; [Greek:
o(moi/ôs] refers back to a. 23--[Greek: au(/tê ê( do/xa], the other
doctrine). Demokritus, Protagoras, and others observe that sensible
phenomena are differently appreciated by different men, by other
animals, and even by the same animal or man at different times. They
do not think that truth upon these points of difference can be
determined by a majority of voices. Demokritus says that either there
is nothing true, or that we cannot know what it is (b. 10). These
reasoners identified intelligence with sensible perception, and
considered that this latter implied a change in the subject (b. 13):
they conceived that what appeared to sense was necessarily true.
Empedokles, Demokritus, Parmenides, Anaxagoras, Homer, &c., all lay
down the doctrine, that the intelligence of men is varied with and
determined by their sensible perceptions. They thought that men of
wrong intelligence were nevertheless intelligent men, though their
intelligence did not carry them to the same conclusions (b. 30); that
if, both in one case and in the other, there were acts of
intelligence, there must be realities corresponding to both,
justifying the affirmative as well as the negative (b. 33).

That sincere and diligent enquirers should fall into these errors is
very discouraging; but we must remark that their errors originated
from this--that, while investigating the truth respecting Entia, they
supposed that Entia were only the Percepta or Percipibilia (p. 1010,
a. 2). Now in these Entia Perceptionis there is a great deal of the
Indefinite and of mere Potential Entity (a. 3). Hence the theories of
these reasoners were plausible, though not true. They saw that all
the Entia Perceptionis were in perpetual movement, and they thought
it impossible to predicate any thing with truth respecting what was
at all times and in every way changing (a. 9). Kratylus and the
Herakleitizers pushed this to an extreme. Even against their
reasoning, we have something to say in reply. We grant that they have
some ground for imagining that what undergoes change does not exist
at the moment when it changes (a. 16). Yet even here there is room
for dispute; for that which is in the act of casting off, still
retains something of that which is being cast off; and of that which
is being generated, something must already be in existence. As a
general doctrine, if something is in course of being destroyed,
something must be in existence; and, if something is in course of
being generated, there must exist something out of which it proceeds
and by which it is being generated; nor can this go back _ad
infinitum_ (a. 22). Dropping this argument, however, let us advance
another. Change as to Quantity is not the same as change as to
Quality or Form. Let us grant that, as to Quantity, there is change
continuous and perpetual--growth or decay--no such thing as
stationary condition. But all our knowledge relates to Quality or
Form, in which there is no continuous change (a. 24: [Greek: kata\
me\n ou)=n to\ poso/n, e)/stô mê\ me/non; a)lla\ kata\ to\ ei)=dos
a(/panta gignô/skomen.]--Compare Alex. Schol., p. 671, b. 5-22; p.
670, a. 36: Bonitz has good remarks in his note, pp. 202-204**.).

Again, we have a farther reproach to make to these reasoners. Their
argument is based only on the Percepta or Percipienda; yet, even as
to these it is true only as to the minority and untrue as to the
majority. It is true merely as far as the sublunary Percepta; but as
to the superlunary or celestial it is the reverse of truth. Our earth
and its neighbourhood is indeed in continual generation and
destruction; but this is an insignificant part of the whole. In
affirming any thing respecting the whole, we ought to follow the
majority rather than the minority (p. 1010, a. 28-31**).

Lastly, we must repeat against these reasoners the argument urged
just now. We must explain to them, that there exists, apart from and
besides all generation, destruction, change, motion, &c., a certain
Immovable Nature ([Greek: a)ki/nêto/s tis phu/sis]--a. 34). Indeed
their own doctrine--That all things both are and are not--would seem
to imply an universal stationary condition rather than universal
change (a. 38). There can be no change; for there is no prospective
terminus which can be reached by change. Every thing is assumed as
already existing.

We have now to remark upon the special doctrine of
Protagoras--[Greek: pa=n to\ phaino/menon a)lêthe/s]. If we grant that
perception is always true upon matters strictly belonging to it, still
phantasy is not identical with perception and we cannot say that what
appears to the phantasy is always true ([Greek: to\
phaino/menon]--which implies a reference to [Greek: phantasi/a]--p.
1010, b. 2), Besides, it is strange that thinkers should puzzle
themselves about the questions: Whether the magnitude and colour of
objects is that which appears to a spectator near or to a spectator
far off? and to a spectator healthy or jaundiced? Whether the weight
of an object is as it appears to a weak or to a strong man? Whether
objects are truly what they appear to men awake or to men asleep?
Their own actions show that they do not think there is any doubt; for
if, being in Libya, they happen to dream that they are in Athens, none
of them ever think of going to the Odeium (b. 5-11). Moreover,
respecting the future, as Plato remarks, the anticipations of the
ignorant man are not so trustworthy as those of the physician, whether
a patient will recover or not (b. 14). Then, again, in respect of
present sensations, the perception of sight is not equally trustworthy
with the perception of smell about a question of odour (b. 17); and
the perception of smell will never report at the same time and about
the same thing, that it is at once fragrant and not fragrant; nor,
indeed, at different times about the affection itself, but only about
the subject to which the affection belonged (b. 20). The same wine
which tasted sweet last month, may now taste not sweet; but the sweet
taste itself is the same now and last month, and the reports of the
sense are never contradictory on this point. The sweet taste which is
to come in the future will be of necessity like the sweet taste in
the past. Now such necessity is abrogated by all those reasonings
which affirm at once the two members of the Antiphasis. These
reasonings disallow all essence of every thing, and all necessity;
for whatever is necessary, cannot be at once both thus and not thus
(b. 21-30).

On the whole, if nothing exist except Percepta, nothing can exist
without animated beings; since without these last there can be no
perception. It is indeed true, perhaps, that under such a supposition
there exist neither Percepta nor acts of Perception (which are
affections of the Percipient); but that the Substrata which cause
Perception should not exist even without Perception--is an
impossibility (p. 1010, b. 33: [Greek: to\ de\ ta\ u(pokei/mena mê\
ei)=nai, a(\ poiei= tê\n ai)/sthêsin, kai\ a)/neu ai)sthê/seôs,
a)du/naton]). Perception is not perception of itself; there exists
besides, apart from perception, something else which must necessarily
be prior to perception. For the Movens is by nature prior to the
Motum; and this is not the less true, though each of these two is
enunciated in relation to the other (b. 35).

A difficulty is often started, and enquiry made, Who is to be the
judge of health and sickness? Whom are we to recognize as the person
to judge rightly in each particular case? Persons might as well raise
difficulty and make enquiry, Whether we are now awake or asleep? It
is plain by men's actual conduct that they have no real doubt upon
the point in any particular case; and both these enquiries arise from
the same fundamental mistake--that men require to have every thing
demonstrated, and will recognize nothing without demonstration.
(Alex. says in Scholia, p. 675, b. 3: [Greek: e)/sti ga\r pro\s a(\
e)k phu/seôs be/ltion e)/chomen ê)\ ô(/ste dei=sthai tê=s peri\
au)tô=n a)podei/xeôs; e)/sti de\ tau=ta ai(/ te ai)sthê/seis, kai\
ta\ a)xiô/mata kai\ ai( phusikai/ te kai\ koinai\ e)/nnoiai.]) Those
who sincerely and seriously feel this difficulty, may be expected to
acquiesce in the explanation here given (p. 1011, a. 2-14). But those
who put forward the difficulty merely for the sake of argument, must
be informed that they require an impossibility. They require to have
a refutative case made out against them (which can only be done by
reducing them to a [Greek: sullogismo\s a)ntipha/seôs]); yet they
themselves begin by refusing to acknowledge this refutation as
sufficient, for they maintain the thesis--That both members of the
Antiphasis are alike and equally true (a. 16; compare Alex. Schol.,
p. 675, b. 20-28).

Those who maintain this last-mentioned thesis say, in other words,
That every thing which appears true, is true. But this thesis of
theirs cannot be defended except by the admission that every thing is
relative, and that nothing is absolute. Accordingly they must take
care to announce their thesis, not in absolute terms as it now
stands, but in terms strictly relative: Every thing which appears
true, appears true to some individual--at a certain moment of
time--under certain circumstances and conditions (p. 1011, a. 24).
For, if they affirm, in absolute phrase, that all things are alike
false and true, on the ground that what appears true is true, urging
that the same things do not appear true either to different persons,
or to the same person at different times--nay, sometimes even to the
same person at the same time, as may be seen by handling a pebble
between two crossed fingers ([Greek: e)n tê=| e)palla/xei tô=n
daktu/lôn]--a. 33), so that it appears two to the touch, but only
one to the sight;--we shall reply, that there is no such
contradiction of judgment, if they confine themselves to the same
person, the same time, and one and the same sense. In these cases,
there is only one affirmation which appears to be true, and
therefore, according to their theory, that affirmation is true.
They are not, therefore, justified in concluding that every thing
is alike true and false (b. 1).

They can only escape this refutation by avoiding to say, This is
true, and by saying, This is true to such an individual, at such a
time, &c.; that is, by making every affirmation relative to some
person's opinion or perception. Hence the inference is, that nothing
either ever has occurred or ever will occur, without the antecedent
opinion of some person ([Greek: mêtheno\s prodoxa/santos]--p. 1011,
b. 6): if any thing ever has so occurred, it cannot be true that all
things are relative to opinion. Moreover, if the Relatum be one, it
must be relative to some one, some definite, Correlate; and, even if
the same Relatum be both half and equal, it will not be equal in
reference to a double Correlate, but half in reference to a double,
and equal in reference to an equal (b. 9). Moreover, if _homo_ and
_conceptum_ have both of them no more than a relative existence--that
is, if both of them exist only in correlation with a
_concipiens_--then the _concipiens_ cannot be _homo_; it will be the
_conceptum_ that is _homo_. And, if every individual thing have
existence only in relation to a _concipiens_, this _concipiens_ must
form the Correlate to an infinite number of Relata (b. 12). (All this
is very briefly and obscurely stated in Aristotle. The commentary of
Alexander is copious and valuable: one might suppose that he had
before him a more ample text; for it is difficult to find in the
present text all that his commentary states**.)

Let thus much be said to establish the opinion, That the two members
of the Antiphasis (the Affirmative and the Negative) are not both
true at the same time. We have shown whence it arises that some
persons suppose both to be true; and what are the consequences in
which those who hold this opinion entangle themselves. Accordingly,
since both sides of the Antiphasis cannot be truly predicated of the
same subject, it is impossible that opposite attributes can belong at
the same time to the same subject (p. 1011, b. 17: [Greek: ou)de\
ta)nanti/a a(/ma u(pa/rchein e)nde/chetai tô=| au)tô=|]). For one of
these opposites includes in itself privation, and privation of a
certain real essence; now privation is the negation of a certain
definite genus. And, since affirmation and negation cannot be truly
applied at the same time, it follows that opposite attributes cannot
belong at the same time to the same subject. At least it is only
possible thus far: one may belong to it absolutely, the other
_secundum quid_; or both of them _secundum quid_ only ([Greek: tô=n
me\n ga\r e)nanti/ôn tha/teron ste/rêsi/s e)stin ou)ch ê(=tton,
ou)si/as de\ ste/rêsis a)po/phasi/s e)stin a)po/ tinos ô(risme/nou
ge/nous]--b. 20).

But, also, there can be nothing intermediate between the two members
of the Antiphasis; we must of necessity either affirm or deny any one
thing of any other (p. 1011, b. 24). This will appear clearly, when
we have first defined what is Truth and Falsehood. To say that Ens is
not, or that Non-Ens is, is false: To say that Ens is, or that
Non-Ens is not, is true. Accordingly, he who predicates _est_--or he
who predicates _non est_--will speak truly or speak falsely, according
as he applies his predicate to Ens or to Non-Ens. But he cannot,
either in application to Ens or to Non-Ens, predicate _est aut non
est_ (b. 29). Such a predication would be neither true nor false, but
improper and unmeaning. (I follow at b. 27 the text of the Berlin
edition: [Greek: ô(/ste kai\ o( le/gôn ei)=nai ê)\ mê\ a)lêtheu/sei
ê)\ pseu/setai]--which seems to me here better than that of Bonitz,
who puts [Greek: ô(/ste kai\ o( le/gôn tou=to ei)=nai ê)\ mê\
a)lêtheu/sei ê)\ pseu/setai]--following Alexander's explanation,
Schol., p. 680, a. 33, which I cannot think to be correct, though
Bonitz praises it much. Aristotle defines Truth and Falsehood: When
you say _Ens est_, or _Non-Ens non est_, you speak truth; when you
say _Ens non est_, or _Non-Ens est_, you speak falsehood.
Accordingly, when you employ the predicate _est_, or when you employ
the predicate _non est_, you will speak truly or falsehood, according
as the subject with which you join it is Ens or is Non-Ens. But
neither with respect to the subject Ens nor with respect to the
subject Non-Ens, can you employ the disjunctive predicate--_est aut
non est_.**)

Again, a medium between the two horns of the Antiphasis must be
either a medium between opposites, like grey between white and black,
or like the neither between man and horse. If it be the latter, it
will never change; for all change is either from a negative to its
affirmative (_non-bonum_ to _bonum_) or _vice versâ_: now that which
is both _non-homo_ and _non-equus_ must change, if it change at all,
into that which is both _homo_ and _equus_; but this is impossible.
We see change always going on; but it is always change either into
one of the two extremes or into the medium between them. But can we
assume that there is such a medium (so that the case supposed will
belong to the analogy of grey, halfway between white and black)? No,
we cannot assume it; for, if we granted it, we should be forced to
admit that there was change into white not proceeding from that which
is not white: now nothing of the kind is ever perceived. There cannot
therefore be any admissible medium halfway between the two members of
the Antiphasis--something which is neither white nor not-white,
neither black nor not-black (p. 1011, b. 35: [Greek: ei) d' e)/sti
metaxu/]--if such medium be admitted--[Greek: kai\ ou(/tôs ei)/ê a)/n
tis ei)s leuko\n ou)k e)k mê\ leukou= ge/nesis; nu=n d' ou)ch
o(ra=tai]).

Furthermore, whatever our intelligence understands or reasons upon,
it deals with as matter affirmed or denied. The very definition of
truth and falsehood recognizes them as belonging only to affirmation
or negation: when we affirm or deny in a certain way we speak truth;
when in another way, we speak falsely. Nothing is concerned but
affirmation and denial (_i.e._, there is no mental operation midway
between the two--p. 1012, a. 2-5). If there be any such medium or
midway process, it is not confined to this or that particular
Antiphasis, but belongs alike to all, and must lie apart from all the
different Antiphases--at least if it is to be talked of as a reality,
and not as a mere possible combination of words; so that the speaker
will neither speak truth, nor not speak truth; which is absurd (a.
7). It must also lie apart both from Ens and from Non-Ens; so that we
should be compelled to admit a certain mode of change of Essence,
which yet shall neither be generation nor destruction; which is
impossible. **(According to Aristotle's definition, all change of
[Greek: ou)si/a] must be either Generation, _i.e._, passage from
[Greek: to\ mê\ o)/n] to [Greek: to\ o)/n], or Destruction, _i.e._,
passage from [Greek: to\ o)/n] to [Greek: to\ mê\ o)/n].--See Alex.
Schol. p. 681, b. 30-40**.)

Again, there are certain genera in which negation carries with it the
affirmation of an opposite; such as odd and even, in numbers. In such
genera, if we are to admit any medium apart from and between the two
members of the Antiphasis, we should be forced to admit some number
which is neither odd nor even (p. 1012, a. 11). This is impossible:
the definition excludes it. (Alexander gives this as the definition
of number: [Greek: pa=s ga\r a)rithmo\s ê)\ a)/rtio/s e)stin ê)\
peritto/s, kai\ _a)rithmo/s e)stin o(\s ê)\ a)/rtio/s e)stin ê)\
peritto/s_]--Schol. p. 682, a. 16.)

Again, if the Antiphasis could be divided, and a half or intermediate
position found, as this theory contends, the division of it must be
admissible farther and farther, _ad infinitum_. After bisecting the
Antiphasis, you can proceed to bisect each of the sections; and so
on. Each section will afford an intermediate term which may be denied
with reference to each of the two members of the original Antiphasis.
Two new Antiphases will thus be formed, each of which may be bisected
in the same manner; and so bisection, with the formation of
successive new Antiphases, may proceed without end (p. 1012, a. 13).

Again, suppose a questioner to ask you, Is this subject white? You
answer, No. Now you have denied nothing else than the being-white:
this is the [Greek: a)po/phasis], or negative member of the
Antiphasis. But you have neither denied nor affirmed the intermediate
stage between the affirmative and the negative; nor is there any
answer possible by which you could do so. Therefore there is no real
intermediate stage between them ([Greek: e)/ti o(/tan e)rome/nou ei)
leuko/n e)stin ei)/pê| o(/ti ou)/, ou)the\n a)/llo a)pope/phêken ê)\
to\ ei)=nai; a)po/phasis de\ to\ mê\ ei)=nai]--p. 1012, a. 15; see
Alex. Schol. p. 682, b. 15-38, and Bonitz's note. Bonitz suggests,
though timidly, [Greek: a)pope/phêken] instead of the common reading
[Greek: a)pope/phuken], which none of the commentators explain, and
which seems unintelligible. I think Bonitz is right, though [Greek:
a)pope/phêken] is an unknown tense from [Greek: a)po/phêmi]: it is
quite as regular as [Greek: a)pophê/sô] or [Greek: a)pe/phêsa]**.).

The doctrines which we have been just controverting (Aristotle says)
arise, like other paradoxes, either from the embarrassment in which
men find themselves when they cannot solve a sophistical difficulty;
or from their fancying that an explanation may be demanded of every
thing. In replying to them, you must take your start from the
definition, which assigns to each word one fixed and constant
signification. The doctrine of Herakleitus--That all things are and
all things are not--makes all propositions true; that of
Anaxagoras--That every thing is intermingled with every thing--makes
all propositions false: such mixture is neither good, nor not good;
neither of the members of the Antiphasis is true (a. 17-28). Our
preceding reasonings have refuted both these doctrines, and have
shown that neither of the two one-sided extremes can be universally
true: neither the doctrine--Every proposition is true; nor
that--Every proposition is false; still less that which comprehends
them both--Every proposition is both true and false. Among these
three doctrines, the second might seem the most plausible, yet it
is inadmissible, like the other two (b. 4).

In debating with all these reasoners, you must require them (as we
have already laid down), not to admit either existence or
non-existence but, to admit a constant signification for each word.
You must begin by defining truth and falsehood; each of them belongs
only to affirmation in a certain way. Where the affirmation is true
the denial is false; all propositions cannot be false; one member of
each Antiphasis must be true, and the other member must be false.
Each of these doctrines labours under the often-exposed defect--that
it destroys itself (p. 1012, b. 14, [Greek: to\
thrullou/menon]--allusion to the Theætetus, according to Alexander).
For whoever declares all propositions to be true, declares the
contradictory of this declaration to be true as well as the rest, and
therefore his own declaration not to be true. Whoever declares all
propositions to be false, declares his own declaration to be false as
well as all other propositions (b. 17). And, even if we suppose each
of these persons to make a special exception in regard to the
particular propositions here respectively indicated, still this will
not serve. The man who declares all propositions to be false, will be
compelled to admit an infinite number of true propositions; because
the proposition declaring the true proposition to be true, must
itself be true; a second proposition declaring this last to be true,
will itself be true; and so on to a third, a fourth, &c., in endless
scale of ascent. The like may be said about the man who declares all
propositions to be true: he too will be obliged to admit an infinite
number of false propositions; for that which declares a true
proposition to be false, must itself be false; and so on through a
second, a third, &c., in endless scale of ascent as in the former
case (b. 22).

It follows from what has been just proved, that those who affirm
every thing to be at rest, and those who affirm every thing to be in
motion, are both alike wrong. For, if every thing were at rest, the
same propositions would be always true and always false. But this is
plainly contrary to evidence; for the very reasoner who affirms it
was once non-existent, and will again be non-existent. On the other
hand, if every thing were in motion, no proposition would be true,
and all would be false: but we have proved above that this is not so.
Nor is it true that all things are alternately in motion or at rest;
for there must be something ever-moving and other things
ever-moved--and this prime movent must be itself immovable (p. 1012,
b. 22-30).

. . . . . .

Book E.

The First Philosophy investigates the causes and principles of Entia
_quatenus_ Entia (p. 1025, b. 3). It is distinguished from other
sciences, by applying to all Entia, and in so far as they are Entia;
for each of the other sciences applies itself to some separate branch
of Entia, and investigates the causes and principles of that branch
exclusively. Each assumes either from data of perception, or avowedly
by way of hypothesis, the portion or genus of Entia to which it
applies; not investigating the entity thereof, but pre-supposing this
process to have been already performed by Ontology: each then
investigates the properties belonging _per se_ to that genus (b. 13).
It is plain that by such an induction not one of these sciences can
demonstrate either the essence of its own separate genus, nor whether
that genus has any real existence. Both these questions--both [Greek:
ei) e)/stin] and [Greek: ti/ e)stin]--belong to Ontology (b. 18).
(The belief derived from perception and induction never amounts to
demonstration, as has been shown in the Analytica; you may always
contest the universality of the conclusion--Alex. p. 734, b. 16, Br.)

Apart from Ontology, each of these separate sciences is either
theoretical, or practical, or constructive (p. 1025, b. 21). Two of
the separate sciences are theoretical--Physics and Mathematics; and,
as Ontology (or Theology) is also theoretical, there are three
varieties of theoretical science (p. 1026, a. 18).

Physical Science applies to subjects having in themselves the
principle of mobility or change, and investigates, principally and
for the most part, the Essence or Form thereof; yet not exclusively
the Form, for the Form must always be joined with Matter. The subject
of Physics includes Matter in its definition, like hollow-nosed, not
like hollow (p. 1025, b. 33). All the animal and vegetable world is
comprised therein; and even some soul, as far as soul is inseparable
from Matter ([Greek: peri\ psuchê=s **e)ni/as theôrê=sai tou=
phusikou=, o(/sê mê\ a)/neu tê=s u(/lês e)sti/n]--p. 1026, a. 5).

Mathematics is another branch of theoretical science; applying to
subjects immovable and in part inseparable from Matter; that is,
separable from Matter only in logical conception (p. 1026, a. 7-15).

Theology, or First Philosophy, or Ontology, is conversant with
subjects self-existent, immovable, and separable from Matter (p.
1026, a. 16).

Now all causes are necessarily eternal; but these more than any
other, because they are the causes active among the visible divine
bodies; for, clearly, if the Divinity has any place, it must be found
among subjects of that nature; and the most venerable science must
deal with the most venerable subjects (p. 1026, a. 19). The
theoretical sciences are more worthy than the rest ([Greek:
ai(retô/terai]), and First Philosophy is the most worthy among the
theoretical sciences (a. 22). A man may indeed doubt whether First
Philosophy is distinguished from the other theoretical sciences by
being more universal, and by comprehending them all as branches; or
whether it has a separate department of its own, but more venerable
than the others; as we see that Mathematics, as a whole, comprehends
Geometry and Astronomy (a. 27). If there exist no other distinct
Essence beyond the compounds of Nature ([Greek: para\ ta\s phu/sei
sunestêkui/as]--a. 28), Physics would be the first of all sciences.
But if there be a distinct immovable Essence, that is first;
accordingly the science which deals with it is first, and, as being
first, is for that reason universal ([Greek: kai\ katho/lou ou(/tôs
o(/ti prô/tê]--a. 30). It is the province of this First Philosophy to
theorize respecting Ens _quâ_ Ens--what it is and what are its
properties _quâ_ Ens (a. 32). (Alexander says the First Philosophy is
more universal than the rest, but does not comprehend the rest:
[Greek: prô/tê pa/ntôn kai\ katho/lou ô(s pro\s ta\s a)/llas, ou)
perie/chousa e)kei/nas, a)ll' ô(s prô/tê]--Schol. p. 736, a. 27.)

Now Ens has many different meanings:--

1. Ens [Greek: kata\ sumbebêko/s].

2. Ens [Greek: ô(s a)lêthe/s]--Non-Ens [Greek: ô(s pseu=dos].

3. Ens [Greek: kata\ ta\ schê/mata tê=s katêgori/as] (decuple).

4. Ens [Greek: duna/mei kai\ e)nergei/a|].

1. Respecting the first, there can be no philosophical speculation
(p. 1026, b. 3). No science, either theoretical, or practical, or
constructive, investigates Accidents. He who constructs a house, does
not construct all the accidents or concomitants of the house; for
these are endless and indeterminate. It may be agreeable to one man,
hurtful to a second, profitable to a third, and something different
in relation to every different Ens; but the constructive art called
house-building is not constructive of any one among these
concomitants (b. 7-10). Nor does the geometer investigate the
analogous concomitants belonging to his figures; it is no part of his
province to determine whether a triangle is different from a triangle
having two right angles (b. 12). This is easy to understand: the
Concomitant is little more than a name--as it were, a name and
nothing beyond (b. 13). Plato came near the truth when he declared
that Sophistic was busied about Non-Ens; for the debates of the
Sophists turn principally upon Accidents or Concomitants, such as,
Whether musical and literary be the same or different? Whether
Koriskus or literary Koriskus, be the same or different? Whether
everything which now is, but has not always been, has become; as in
the case of a man who being musical has become literary or being
literary has become musical? and such like debates (see Alexander,
Schol. p. 736, b. 40). For the Concomitant or Accident appears
something next door to Non-Ens ([Greek: e)ggu/s ti tou= mê\ o)/ntos],
p. 1026, b. 21), as we may see by these debates. Of other Entia there
is generation or destruction, but of Accidents there is none (b. 23).

Nevertheless, we shall state, as far as the case admits, what is the
nature of the Accident, and through what cause it is ([Greek: ti/s ê(
phu/sis au)tou=, kai\ dia/ tin' ai)ti/an e)sti/n;]--p. 1026, b. 25):
we shall perhaps at the same time explain why there can be no science
respecting it. Among Entia, some are always and necessarily the same,
others are usually but not always the same. These which come to pass
in neither of these two ways, are called Accidents or Concomitants.
Of the first two, the Constant and the Usual, there is always some
definite cause; of the third, or Accidents, there is none: the cause
of these is an Accident (p. 1027, a. 8). In fact, Matter is the cause
of Accidents, admitting as it does of being modified in a way
different from the usual and ordinary way (a. 13). It is plain that
there can be neither science nor teaching of Accidents: the teacher
can teach only what is constant or usual, and nothing beyond (a. 20).

Now of these Accidents, there is a certain principle or cause which
it is indispensable to admit--Chance ([Greek: ê( tou= o(po/ter'
e)/tuchen]--p. 1027, b. 12). There must be principles and causes,
generable and destructible, yet which never are either generated or
destroyed; if this were not so, all events would occur by necessity
(p. 1026, b. 29-31). (Thus the builder, considered as cause of the
house which he builds, has been generated, _i.e._, he has acquired
the art of building and the proper accessories; and he will be
destroyed, _i.e._, he will lose his art, and its conditions of being
exercised. But, considered as the cause of the accidents belonging to
the house, of its being annoying or inconvenient to A or B, he has
not been generated nor will he be destroyed; _i.e._, he has neither
acquired, nor will he lose, any skill or conditions tending to the
production of this effect. As the contact of two substances is not
generated, but appears of itself along with the substances when they
are generated; as the limits of periods of time appear without
generation along with the periods of time themselves; so the builder,
when he acquires the power of building the house, stands possessed
thereby, without any additional time or special generation, of the
power to produce the concomitant accidents of the house. The house is
thus produced by necessity; its concomitant accidents not by
necessity--Alex. Schol. p. 738, a. 19-33.)

But whether this [Greek: to\ o(po/ter' e)/tuchen] is to be considered
as referable to Matter, End, or Movent, is a point important to be
determined (p. 1027, b. 15). Aristotle shows elsewhere that it is
referable to the last of the three--[Greek: to\ poiêtiko/n]
(Asklepius, p. 738, b. 41).

Having now said enough upon Ens _per Accidens_, we proceed to touch
upon the second variety of Ens--Ens as the True, Non-Ens as the
False.

This variety of Ens depends upon conjunction and disjunction, and
forms an aggregate of two portions separately exhibited and brought
together in the Antiphasis. Such conjunction and disjunction is not
in things themselves; but in the act of intelligence which thinks the
two things together and not successively: in regard to simple matters
and Essence, not even any special conjoining act of intelligence is
required; such things must be conceived together, or not conceived at
all (p. 1027, b. 27). The mental act of apprehension, in these cases,
is one and indivisible: you either have it entire at once, or not at
all.

The cause of this variety of Ens is to be found in a certain
affection of the intelligence; that of the preceding variety of Ens
is an undefined or indeterminate cause (b. 34). Both these two
varieties of Ens are peculiar, standing apart from what is most
properly and _par excellence_ Ens, _i.e._, from the Ens according to
the ten Categories, on which we shall now say something.

. . . . . .

Book Z.

We have already stated that Ens is a [Greek: pollachô=s
lego/menon]--distinguished according to the ten figures or genera
called Categories. The first is [Greek: ti/ e)stin], or [Greek:
ou)si/a] (_sensu dignissimo_)--Essentia, Substantia (p. 1028, a. 15).
The remaining Categories are all appendages of Essentia, presupposing
it, and inseparable from it; whereas Essentia is separable from all
of them, and stands first in reason, in cognition, and in time. All
the other Categories are called Entia only because they are
quantities, qualities, affections, &c., of this Essentia Prima. A man
may even doubt whether they are Entia or Non-Entia, since none of
them is either _per se_ or separable. We ought hardly to say that a
quality or an affection, enunciated abstractedly, is Ens at all--such
as _currere_, _sedere_, _sanitas_: we ought more properly to say that
_currens equus_, _sedens homo_, _sanus miles_, are Entia, enunciating
along with the quality the definite Essence or Individual Substance
to which it belongs (a. 24). The quality then becomes Ens, because
the subject to which it belongs is an individual Ens (a. 27).
Essentia Prima is first in reason or rational explanation ([Greek:
lo/gô|], a. 34), because in the rational explanation of each of the
rest that of Essentia is implicated. It is first also in cognition,
because we believe ourselves to know any thing fully, when we are
able to answer _Quid est_? and say that it is _homo_ or _ignis_; not
simply when we are able to answer _Quale_ or _Quantum est_? So that
in answering the great and often-considered question, _Quid est Ens_?
we shall first understand it as meaning Essentia (_hoc sensu
dignissimo_), and shall try to solve it so (b. 3, [Greek: peri\ tou=
_ou(/tôs_ o)/ntos]).

Essentia (understood in this sense) appears to belong in the most
manifest manner to bodies: we predicate it of animals, plants, the
parts thereof, the natural bodies such as fire, water, and such like,
as well as the parts and aggregates thereof, such as the heaven and
its parts, the stars, moon, and sun (p. 1028, b. 7-13). But are these
the only Essences, or are there others besides? Or again, is it an
error to call _these_ Essences, and are all Essences really something
different from these? This is a point to be examined. Some think that
the limits of bodies (surface, line, point, monad) are Essences even
more than the body and the solid: others admit no Essences at all
beyond or apart from Percipienda; others again recognize other
Essences distinct from and more eternal than the Percipienda; for
example, Plato, who ranks Ideas or Forms, and the Mathematica, as two
distinct Essences, while he places the Percipienda only third in the
scale of Essence. Speusippus even enumerates a still greater number
of Essences, beginning with the One, and proceeding to Numbers,
Magnitudes, Soul, &c., with a distinct [Greek: a)rchê/] or principle
for each (b. 21). Some others hold that Forms and Numbers have the
same nature, and that there are other things coming near to these,
such as lines and surfaces, in a descending scale to the Heaven and
the Percipienda (b. 24). We must thus investigate which of these
doctrines are true or false, whether there are any Essences beyond
the Percipienda; and, if so, how they exist: whether there is any
separable essence apart from Percipienda, and, if so, how and why; or
whether there is nothing of the kind. But first we must give a vague
outline what Essence is generally ([Greek: u(potupôsame/nois], b.
31).

There are four principal varieties of meaning in this Essentia,
[Greek: kuri/ôs] or _sensu dignissimo_: (1) [Greek: to\ ti/ ê)=n
ei)=nai], (2) [Greek: to\ katho/lou], (3) [Greek: to\ ge/nos], (4)
[Greek: to\ u(pokei/menon].

We shall first speak about the fourth--Substratum--which is the
subject of all predicates, but never itself the predicate of any
subject. That which appears most of all to be Essentia is, [Greek:
to\ u(pokei/menon prô=ton]. This name applies, in one point of view,
to Matter; in another, to Form; in a third, to the total result of
the two implicated together (p. 1029, a. 1): _e.g._, the brass, the
figure, and the complete statue of figured brass. If, therefore, the
Form be _prius_, and more Ens, as compared with the Matter, it will
be also _prius_ and more Ens as compared with the complete result. We
get thus far in the adumbration of Essentia--that it is the subject
of all predicates, but never itself a predicate.

But this is not sufficient to define it: there still remains
obscurity. It would seem that Matter is Essentia; and that, if it be
not so, nothing else is discernible to be so; for, if every thing
else be subtracted, nothing (save Matter) remains. All things else
are either affections, or agencies, or powers, of bodies; and, while
length, breadth, depth, &c., are quantities belonging to Essence,
Quantity is not Essence, but something belonging to Essence as First
Subject. Take away length, breadth, depth, and there will remain only
that something which these three circumscribe; in other words,
Matter--that which, in itself and in its own nature, is neither
Quantity, nor Quality, but of which, Quantity, Quality, and the other
Categories, are predicated. All these Categories are predicated of
Essence, and Essence of Matter; so that Matter is the last remaining
_per se_ (p. 1029, a. 12-24). Take away Matter, and there remain
neither affirmative nor negative predicates; for these negative
predicates are just as much concomitants or accidents as the others
(a. 25).

Upon this reasoning, it seems that Matter is the true Essence. Yet,
on the other hand, this will be seen to be impossible. For the
principal characteristic of Essence is to be separable and Hoc
Aliquid. So that either Form, or the Compound of Form and Matter
together, must be the true Essence. But this last, the Compound, may
be dismissed as evidently unsuitable for the enquiry, not less than
Matter separately; for it is manifestly posterior to either of the
two components (p. 1029, a. 30). We must therefore investigate the
Form, though it is full of difficulty (a. 33).

We shall begin the investigation from some of the Percipienda, which
are acknowledged as Essence; for it is useful to go across from this
starting-point to what is more cognizable ([Greek: pro\ e)/rgou ga\r
to\ metabai/nein ei)s to\ gnôrimô/teron]--p. 1029, b. 3. These words
ought properly to come immediately after [Greek: zêtête/on
prô=ton]--p. 1028, a. 35, and the intervening words now standing in
the text, [Greek: e)pei\ d' e)n a)rchê=|--peri\ au)tou=], ought to be
transferred to a more proper place some lines lower down, immediately
before the words, [Greek: kai\ prô=ton ei)/pômen]--p. 1029, b. 12.
Bonitz has made this very just correction in his Observatt. pp.
129-130, referred to in his Notes on the Metaphysica.). Every man
learns in this way--by proceeding from what is less cognizable by
nature to what is more cognizable by nature. And the business ([Greek:
e)/rgon]) of learning consists in making what is most cognizable to
nature, most cognizable to ourselves also; just as, in practical
matters, proceeding from what is good for each, to make what is good
by nature good also for each man's self. For it will often happen
that things first and most cognizable to each man's self, are only
faintly cognizable, and have little or nothing of Ens (b. 9). Yet
still, we must try to become cognizant of things fully knowable, by
beginning with things poorly knowable, but knowable to us (b. 12).

Taking up these Percipienda, for the purpose of searching for
Essentia in them, we shall first advert to [Greek: ti/ ê)=n ei)=nai],
which we discriminated as one of the characteristics of Essentia,
saying something about the rational explanation or definition of it
(p. 1029, a. 12). The [Greek: t.ê.e.] of each subject is what is
affirmed of it _per se_ ([Greek: e)/sti to\ t.ê.e. e(ka/stô| o(\
le/getai kath' au(to/]--a. 13). Your essence is not to be musical;
you are not musical by yourself: your essence is, what you are _by
yourself_. Nor does it even include all that you are by yourself.
Surface is not included in the essence of white; for the essence of
surface is not the same thing as the essence of white. Moreover white
surface, the compound of both, is not the essence of white; because
white itself is included in the definition of white--which cannot be
tolerated. The definition, which explains [Greek: t.ê.e.], must not
include the very word of which you intend to declare the [Greek:
t.ê.e.] If you intend to declare the [Greek: t.ê.e.] of white surface
by the words smooth surface, this does not declare it all: you only
declare that white is identical in meaning with smooth (b. 22).

Now, since there are compounds in every one of the Categories, we
must enquire whether there is a [Greek: t.ê.e.] belonging to each of
these. Is there, for example, a [Greek: t.ê.e.] for white man? Let
the meaning of these two words be included in the single word
garment. Is there a [Greek: t.ê.e.] for garment? What is it to be a
garment? You cannot answer; for neither is this an enunciation _per
se_ (p. 1029, b. 29). Are we to say, indeed, that there are two
distinct sorts of enunciation _per se_: one including an addition
([Greek: e)k prosthe/seôs]), the other, not? You may define by
intimating something to which the matter defined belongs; _e.g._, in
defining white you may give the definition of white man. Or you may
define by intimating something which is not essential but accessory
to the matter defined; _e.g._, garment signifying white man, you may
define garment as white. Whereas the truth is, that, though a white
man is white, yet to be white is accessory and not essential to him
(p. 1030, a. 1).

But can we in any way affirm that there is any [Greek: t.ê.e.] to
garment (taken in the above sense)? Or ought we to say that there is
none (p. 1030, a. 2; Bonitz. Obss. p. 120)? For the [Greek: t.ê.e.]
is of the nature of [Greek: to/de ti] ([Greek: o(/per ga\r to/de ti
e)/sti to\ t.ê.e.]--a. 3), or Hoc Aliquid, _i.e._, a particular
concrete; but, when one thing is affirmed of another, as when we say
white man, this is not of the nature of [Greek: to/de ti], if [Greek:
to/de ti] belongs to Essences alone (a. 5). Thus it appears that
[Greek: to/de ti] belongs to all those matters of which the rational
explanation can be given by Definition. For to give the equivalent of
a name in many other words is not always to give a definition: if
this were so, a paraphrase of any length, even the Iliad, might be
called a definition. There can be no definition except of a primary
something; which is affirmed, without being affirmed as something
about another (a. 10). There will be no [Greek: t.ê.e.], therefore,
except for species of a genus; for in these alone what is affirmed is
not an affection or an accessory or by way of participation.
Respecting every thing besides, there will be no [Greek: t.ê.e.] or
definition, but there may be a rational explanation ([Greek: lo/gos])
of what the name signifies, or a more precise explanation substituted
in place of a simpler (a. 16).

Yet have we not gone too far in restricting the applicability of
[Greek: t.ê.e.] and Definition? and ought we not rather to say, that
both the one and the other are used in many different senses (p.
1030, a. 18)? For the _Quid est_ ([Greek: to\ ti/ e)stin]) signifies
in one way Essence and Hoc Aliquid, and in different ways all the
other Categories each respectively. To all of them _Est_ belongs,
though not in like manner, but primarily to one and consequentially
to the rest; so also _Quid est_ belongs simply and directly to
Essence, but in a certain way to the others (a. 21). Respecting
Quale, Quantum, and the rest, we may enquire _Quid Est_? so that
Quale also comes under the _Quid est_, though not absolutely or
directly ([Greek: ou)ch a(plô=s], a. 25), but analogously to Non-Ens;
for some assert in words that _Est_ belongs to Non-Ens also though
not absolutely, viz., Non Ens _est_ Non-Ens--(a. 26).

Now we ought to be careful how we express ourselves about any
particular matter, but we ought not to be less careful to determine
how the matter itself really stands (p. 1030, a. 27: [Greek: dei=
me\n ou)=n skopei=n kai\ to\ pô=s dei= le/gein peri\ e(/kaston, ou)
mê\n ma=llo/n ge ê)\ to\ pô=s e)/chei.] This contrast of [Greek: pô=s
dei= le/gein] with [Greek: pô=s e)/chei] appears to refer to what had
been said two lines before: [Greek: _logikô=s_ phasi/ tines ei)=nai
to\ mê\ o)/n]--verbal propositions distinguished from real.). The
phraseology used just before is clear, and we must therefore
recognize that [Greek: t.ê.e.], as well as [Greek: ti/ e)sti],
belongs absolutely and primarily to Essentia, but in a secondary way
to the other Categories; that is not absolutely, but [Greek: poiô=|
t.ê.e., po/sô| t.ê.e.], &c. (a. 31). For we must either declare the
Categories to be simply _æquivoca_, or we must recognize this
addition and subtraction of the separate title of each, like the
non-cognizable cognizable ([Greek: ô(/sper kai\ to\ mê\ e)pistêto\n
e)pistêto/n]--a. 33. I do not understand these words, nor does the
Scholiast or Bonitz explain them satisfactorily.). But the truth is,
that they are neither _æquivoca_ nor _univoca_, but in an
intermediate grade of relation--not [Greek: kath' e(/n], but [Greek:
pro\s e(/n] (b. 3.). People may express this in what phrases they
like; but the truth is, that there is both [Greek: t.ê.e.] and
Definition, directly and primarily, of Essence; and of the other
Categories also, but not directly and primarily. Of white man, you
may give a rational explanation and a definition; but it will apply
in a different manner to white and to the essence of man (b. 12).

There is a farther difficulty to be noticed. How are you to define
any matter not simple but essentially compound, where two or more
elements coalesce into an indivisible whole, like hollow-nosedness
out of nose and hollowness. Here we have hollow-nosedness and
hollowness belonging to the nose _per se_, not as an affection or
accessory; not as white belongs to Kallias or man, but as male
belongs to animal, or equal to quantity, _i.e._, _per se_ (p. 1030,
b. 20). The subject is implicated with the predicate in one name, and
you cannot enunciate the one apart from the other. Such predicates
belong to their subject _per se_, but in a different sense (see
Bonitz's note). You cannot properly define them, in the sense given
above (b. 27). If definitions of such are to be admitted, it must be
in a different sense: Definition and [Greek: t.ê.e.] being recognized
both of them as [Greek: pollachô=s lego/mena]. Definition therefore
is the mode of explanation which declares the [Greek: t.ê.e.], and
belongs to Essences, either exclusively, or at least primarily,
directly, and chiefly (p. 1031, a. 7-14).

We have now to enquire--Whether each particular thing, and its
[Greek: t.ê.e.], are the same, or different (p. 1031, a. 15). This
will assist us in the investigation of Essence; for apparently each
thing is not different from its own Essence, and the [Greek: t.ê.e.]
is said to be the Essence of each thing.

In regard to subjects enunciated _per accidens_, the above two would
seem to be distinct. White man is different from the being a white
man. If these two were the same, the being a man would be the same as
the being a white man; for those who hold this opinion affirm that
man, and white man, are the same; and, if this be so, of course the
being a man must also be the same as the being a white man. Yet this
last inference is not necessary; for _same_ is used in a different
sense, when you say, Man and white man are the same, and when you
say, The being a man and the being a white man are the same. But
perhaps you may urge that the two predicates may become the same _per
accidens_ (_i.e._, by being truly predicated of the same subject);
and that, because you say truly, Sokrates is white--Sokrates is
musical, therefore you may also say truly, The being white is the
same as the being musical. But this will be denied ([Greek: dokei= d'
ou)/]--p. 1031, a. 28).

In regard to subjects enunciated _per se_, the case is otherwise:
here each thing is the same with its [Greek: t.ê.e.] Suppose, _e.g._,
there exist any Essentiæ (such as Plato and others make the Ideas)
prior to all others; in that case, if the [Greek: au)toagatho/n] were
distinct from [Greek: to\ a)gathô=| ei)=nai], and the [Greek:
au)tozô=|on] distinct from [Greek: to\ zô/|ô| ei)=nai], there must be
other Essences and Ideas anterior to the Platonic Ideas. If we
believe [Greek: t.ê.e.] to be Essentia, it must be an Essentia
anterior and superior in dignity to these Ideas of Plato. Moreover,
if the Essentiæ or Ideas, and the [Greek: t.ê.e.], be disjoined
([Greek: a)polelume/nai]--p. 1031, b. 3), the first will be
uncognizable, and the last will be non-existent ([Greek: ta\ d' ou)k
e)/stai]--b. 4). For to have cognition of a thing, is, to know its
[Greek: t.ê.e.] This will be alike true of all [Greek: t.ê.e.]; all
of them are alike existent or alike non-existent (b. 9). If [Greek:
to\ o)/nti ei)=nai] be not identical with [Greek: to\ o)/n], neither
is [Greek: to\ a)gathô=| ei)=nai] identical with [Greek: to\
a)gatho/n], &c. But that of which [Greek: to\ a)gathô=| ei)=nai] is
not truly predicable, is not [Greek: a)gatho/n] (b. 11).

Hence we see that of necessity [Greek: to\ a)gatho/n] is one and the
same with [Greek: to\ a)gathô=| ei)=nai]; likewise [Greek: to\
kalo/n], with [Greek: to\ kalô=| ei)=nai]; and so in all cases where
the term enunciates a subject primarily and _per se_, not a predicate
of some other and distinct subject (p. 1031, b. 13: [Greek: o(/sa mê\
kat' a)/llo le/gêtai, a)lla\ kath' au(ta\ kai\ prô=ta]). This last is
the characteristic and sufficient mark, even if the Platonic Ideas be
not admitted; and even more evidently so, if they be admitted (b.
14). It is at the same time clear that, if the Ideas be what Plato
declares them to be, the individual perceivable subjects here cannot
be Essences; for the Ideas are necessarily Essences, but not as
predicable of a subject. If they were Essences, in this last sense,
they would be Essences _per participationem_; which is inconsistent
with what is said about them by Plato ([Greek: e)/sontai ga\r kata\
me/thexin]--b. 18).

These reasonings show that each separate thing, enunciated _per se_
and not _per accidens_, is the same with its [Greek: t.ê.e.]; that to
know each thing, is, to know its [Greek: t.ê.e.]; that, if you
proceed to expose or lay them out, both are one and the same ([Greek:
ô(/ste kata\ tê\n e)/kthesin a)na/gkê e(/n ti ei)=nai a)/mphô]--p.
1031, b. 21; with Bonitz's explanation of [Greek: e)/kthesis] in his
Note).

But that which is enunciated _per accidens_ (_e.g._, _album_,
_musicum_) cannot be truly affirmed to be one and the same with its
[Greek: t.ê.e.], because it has a double signification: it signifies
both the accident and the subject to which such accident belongs; so
that in a certain aspect it is identical with its [Greek: t.ê.e.],
and in another aspect it is not identical therewith (p. 1031, b. 26).
The being a man, and the being a white man, are not the same; but the
subject for affection is the same in both (b. 28: [Greek: ou)
tau)to\, pa/thei de\ tau)to/]--obscure). The absurdity of supposing,
that the [Greek: t.ê.e.] of a thing is different from the thing
itself, would appear plainly, if we gave a distinct name to the
[Greek: t.ê.e.] For there must be another [Greek: t.ê.e.] above this,
being the [Greek: t.ê.e.] of the first [Greek: t.ê.e.]; and it would
be necessary to provide a new name for the second [Greek: t.ê.e.];
and so forward, in an ascending march _ad infinitum_. What hinders us
from admitting some things at once, as identical with their [Greek:
t.ê.e.], if the [Greek: t.ê.e.] be Essentia? (b. 31). We see from the
preceding reasoning that not only the thing itself is the same with
its [Greek: t.ê.e.], but that the rational explanation ([Greek:
lo/gos]) of both is the same; for One, and the being One, are one and
the same not _per accidens_, but _per se_ (p. 1032, a. 2). If they
were different, you would have to ascend to a higher [Greek: t.ê.e.]
of the being One; and above this, to a higher still, without end (a.
4).

It is therefore clear that, in matters enunciated _per se_ and
primarily, each individual thing is one and the same with its [Greek:
t.ê.e.] The refutations brought by the Sophists against this
doctrine, and the puzzles which they start, _e.g._, Whether Sokrates
and the being Sokrates are the same,--may be cleared up by the
explanations just offered (p. 1032, a. 8). It makes no difference
what particular questions the objector asks: one is as easy to solve
as another (a. 10).

Of things generated, some come by Nature, some by Art, some
Spontaneously. All generated things are generated out of something,
by something, and into or according to something (p. 1032, a. 12).
The word _something_ applies to each and all the Categories. Natural
generation belongs to all the things whose generation comes from
Nature ([Greek: e)k phu/seôs]); having [Greek: to\ e)x ou(=]--what we
call Matter, [Greek: to\ u(ph' ou(=]--one of the things existing by
nature ([Greek: tô=n phu/sei ti o)/ntôn]--a. 17), and [Greek: to\
ti/], such as a man, a plant, or the like, which we call Essences in
the fullest sense ([Greek: ma/lista ou)si/as]). All things generated
either by Nature or Art have Matter: it is possible that each of them
may be, or may not be; and this is what we call Matter in each (a.
20). As an universal truth ([Greek: katho/lou]), Nature includes (1)
That _out of which_, or Matter; (2) That _according to which_
([Greek: kath' o(/]), every thing which is generated having a
definite nature or Form, such as plant or animal; That _by which_, or
nature characterized according to the Form, being the same Form as
the thing generated but in another individual; for a man begets a man
(a. 24).

The other generations are called Constructions ([Greek: poiê/seis]),
which are either from Art, or from Power, or from Intelligence. It is
with these as with natural generations: some of them occur both by
spontaneity and by chance ([Greek: kai\ a)po\ tau)toma/tou kai\ a)po\
tu/chês]--p. 1032, a. 29; the principle of these last is apparently
[Greek: _du/namis_], the second of the three _principia_ announced
just before (?)); both in the one and in the other, some products
arise without seed as well as with seed, which we shall presently
advert to.

The generations from Art are those of which the Form is in the mind.
By Form I mean the [Greek: t.ê.e.] of each thing and its First
Essence ([Greek: tê\n prô/tên ou)si/an], p. 1032, b. 1). For, in a
certain way, the Form even of contraries is the same; since the
essence of privation is the opposite essence: for example, health is
the essence of disease; for disease is declared or described as
absence of health, and health is the rational notion existing in the
mind and in science. Now a healthy subject is generated by such an
antecedent train of thought as follows ([Greek: gi/gnetai dê\ to\
u(gie\s noê/santos ou(/tôs]--b. 6):--Since health is so and so, there
is necessity, if the subject is to attain health, that such and such
things should occur, _e.g._, an even temperature of the body, for
which latter purpose heat must be produced; and so on farther, until
the thought rests upon something which is in the physician's power to
construct. The motion proceeding from this last thought is called
Construction (b. 10), tending as it does towards health. So that, in
a certain point of view, health may be said to be generated out of
health, and a house out of a house; for the medical art is the form
of health and the building art the form of the house: I mean the
[Greek: t.ê.e.], or the Essence without Matter, thereof (b. 14). Of
the generations and motions here enumerated, one is called Rational
Apprehension, viz., that one which takes its departure from the
Principle and the Form; the other, Construction, viz., that which
takes its departure from the conclusion of the process of rational
apprehension ([Greek: a)po\ tou= teleutai/ou tê=s noê/seôs]--b. 17).
The like may be said about each of the intermediate steps: I mean, if
the patient is to be restored to health, he must be brought to an
even temperature. But the being brought to an even temperature, what
is it? It is so and so; it will be a consequence of his being warmed.
And this last again--what is it? So and so; which already exists
potentially, since it depends upon the physician to produce it, the
means being at his command ([Greek: tou=to d' ê)/dê e)p' au)tô=|]--b.
21).

We see thus that the Constructive Agency ([Greek: to\ poiou=n]) and
the point from which the motion towards producing health takes its
origin, is, when the process is one of Art, the Form present in the
mind; and, when the process is one of Spontaneity, it proceeds from
that which would be the first proceeding of the artist, if Art had
been concerned. In the medical art, _e.g._, the artist begins by
imparting warmth. He does this by rubbing. But this warmth might
perhaps arise in the body without any such rubbing or interference by
the artist. The warmth is the prime agent, in the case of spontaneous
production. The warmth is either a part of health, or a condition to
the existence of health, as bricks are to that of a house (p. 1032,
b. 30).

Nothing can be generated, if nothing pre-existed--as has been already
said before. Some part of what is generated must exist before: Matter
pre-exists, as in-dwelling and not generated ([Greek: ê( ga\r u(/lê
me/ros; e)nupa/rchei ga\r kai\ gi/gnetai au(/tê]--p. 1033, a. 1. I do
not understand these last words: it ought surely to be--[Greek:
e)nupa/rchei ga\r kai\ _ou)_ gi/gnetai au(/tê]. Bonitz's explanation
suits these last words better than it suits the words in the actual
text.).

But something of the Form or rational explanation ([Greek: tô=n e)n
tô=| lo/gô|]) must also pre-exist. In regard to a brazen circle, if
we are asked, _Quid est_? we answer in two ways: We say of the
Matter--It is brass; We say of the Form--It is such and such a
figure. And this is the genus in which it is first placed (p. 1033,
a. 4).

The brazen circle has Matter in its rational explanation. But that
which is generated, is called not by the name of the Matter out of
which it is generated, but by a derivative name formed therefrom; not
[Greek: e)kei=no], but [Greek: e)kei/ninon]. A statue is called not
[Greek: li/thos], but [Greek: li/thinos]. But, when a man is made
healthy, he is not said to be the Matter out of which the health is
generated; because that which we call the Matter is generated out of
Privation along with the subject. Thus, both the man becomes healthy,
and the patient becomes healthy; but the generation is more properly
said to come out of Privation: we say, _Sanus ex ægroto generatur_,
rather than, _Sanus ex homine generatur_ (p. 1033, a. 12). In cases
where the Privation is unmarked and unnamed, as, in the case of
brass, privation of the spherical, or any other, figure, and, in the
case of a house, the privation of bricks or wood, the work is said to
be generated out of them like a healthy man out of a sick man (a.
14). Nevertheless the work is not called by the same name as the
material out of which it is made, but by a paronym thereof; not
[Greek: xu/lon] but [Greek: xu/linon] (a. 18). In strict propriety,
indeed, we can hardly say that the statue is made out of brass, nor
the house out of wood; for the _materia ex quâ_ ought to be something
which undergoes change, not something which remains unchanged (a.
21).

It was remarked that in Generation there are three things or aspects
to be distinguished--

1. [Greek: To\ u(ph' ou(=, o(/then ê( a)rchê\ tê=s gene/seôs].

2. [Greek: To\ e)x ou(=]--rather [Greek: u(/lê] than [Greek:
ste/rêsis].

3. [Greek: Ti/ gi/gnetai].

Having already touched upon the two first, I now proceed to the
third. What is it that is generated? Neither the Matter, nor the
Form, but the embodiment or combination of the two. An artisan does
not construct either the brass or the sphere, but the brazen sphere.
If he be said to construct the sphere, it is only by accident
([Greek: kata\ sumbebêko/s]), since the sphere in this particular
case happens to be of brass. Out of the entire subject-matter, he
constructs a distinct individual Something (p. 1033, a. 31). To make
the brass round, is not to make the round, or to make the sphere, but
to make a something different: that is the Form (of sphericity)
embodied in another thing (a. 32). For, if the artisan made the round
or the sphere, he must make them out of something different,
pre-existing as a subject: _e.g._, he makes a brazen sphere, and in
this sense--that he makes out of that Matter, which is brass, this
different something, which is a sphere. If he made the sphere
itself--the Form of sphere--he must make it out of some pre-existent
subject; and you would thus carry back _ad infinitum_ the different
acts of generation and different pre-existent subjects (b. 4).

It is, therefore, clear that [Greek: to\ ei)=dos], or by whatever
name the shape of the percipiend is to be called, is not generated,
nor is generation thereof possible; nor is there any [Greek: t.ê.e.]
thereof; that is, of the Form abstractedly: for it is this very
[Greek: t.ê.e.] which is generated or becomes embodied in something
else, either by nature, or by art, or by spontaneous power (p. 1033,
b. 8). The artisan makes a brazen sphere to exist, for he makes it
out of brass (Matter), and the sphere (Form): he makes or embodies
the Form into this Matter, and that is a brazen sphere (b. 11). If
there be any generation of the sphere _per se_ ([Greek: tou=
sphaira=| ei)=nai]), it must be Something out of Something; for the
Generatum must always be resolvable into a certain Matter and a
certain Form. Let the brazen sphere be a figure in which all points
of the circumference are equidistant from the centre; here are three
things to be considered: (1) That in which what is constructed
resides; (2) That which does so reside; (3) The entire Something
generated or constructed--the brazen sphere. We see thus plainly that
what is called the Form or Essence itself is not generated, but the
combination called _according to the Form_ is generated; moreover
that in every Generatum there is Matter, so that the Generatum is in
each case this or that (b. 19).

Can it be true, then, that there exists any sphere or house beyond
those which we see or touch (_i.e._, any Form or Idea of a sphere,
such as Plato advocates)? If there existed any such, it could never
have become or been generated into Hoc Aliquid. It signifies only
_tale_. It is neither This nor That nor any thing defined: but it (or
rather the Constructive Agency) makes or generates _ex hoc tale_; and
when this last has been generated, it is Tale Hoc (p. 1033, b. 22),
and the entire compound is Kallias, or Sokrates, or _this_ brazen
sphere, while man, animal, &c., are analogous to brazen sphere
generally. Even if there exist Platonic Forms by themselves, they
could be of no use towards generation or the production of Essences.
Frequently it is obvious that the Generans is like the Generatum,
only a different individual. There is no occasion to assume the
Platonic Form as an Exemplar; for the generating individual is quite
sufficient of itself to be the cause of the Form in a new mass of
Matter. The entire result is the given Form in these particular bones
and flesh--called Kallias or Sokrates: each is different so far as
Matter, but the same in the Form; for the Form is indivisible (p.
1034, a. 7).

But how does it happen that there are some things which are generated
sometimes by art, sometimes spontaneously (_e.g._, health), while in
other things (_e.g._, a house) spontaneous production never takes
place? The reason is, that, in the first class of cases, the Matter
which governs the work of generation by the artist, and in which
itself a part of the finished product resides, is of a nature to be
moved or modified by itself, while, in the second, this is not the
fact; and to be moved, besides, in a certain manner and direction;
for there are many things which are movable by themselves, but not in
such manner and direction as the case which we are supposing
requires. For example, stones are incapable of being moved in certain
directions except by some other force, but they are capable of being
moved by themselves in another direction; the like with fire. It is
upon this that the distinction turns between some results which
cannot be realized without an artist, and others which may perhaps be
so realized (a. 17).

It is plain from what has been said that, in a certain sense,
everything is generated from something of the same name, as natural
objects are (_e.g._, a man); or from something in part bearing the
same name (as a house out of the ideal form of a house), or from
something which possesses that which in part bears the same name; for
the first cause of the generation is itself part of the thing
generated. The heat in the motion generates heat in the body; and
this is either health, or a part of health, or the antecedent of one
or other of these; hence it is said to produce or generate health,
because it produces that of which health is concomitant and
consequent (p. 1034, a. 30; see Bonitz's correction in his Note).
Essence is in these cases the beginning or principle of all
generations, just as in Demonstration it is the beginning or
principle of all syllogisms (a. 33). In the combinations and growths
of Nature, the case is similar. The seed constructs, as Art
constructs its products; for the seed has in it potentially the Form,
and that from which comes the seed is, in a certain manner, of the
same name with the product (b. 1). For we must not expect to find
_all_ generations analogous to that of man from man--woman also is
generated from man, moreover, mule is not generated from mule--though
this is the usual case, when there is no natural bodily defect (b.
3). Spontaneous generation occurs in the department of Nature, as in
that of Art, wherever the Matter can be moved by itself in the same
manner as the seed moves it: wherever the Matter cannot be so moved
by itself, there can be no generation except the natural, from
similar predecessors (b. 7, [Greek: e)x au)tô=n]--compare Bonitz's
note: "non ex ipsis, sed [Greek: e)x au)tô=n tô=n poiou/ntôn]").

This doctrine--That the Form is not generated, does not belong to
Essence alone, but also to all the other Categories alike--Quality,
Quantity, and the rest (p. 1034, b. 9). It is not the Form Quality
_per se_ which is generated, but _tale lignum_, _talis homo_: nor the
Form Quantity _per se_, but _tantum lignum_ or _animal_ (b. 15). But,
in regard to Essence, there is thus much peculiar and distinctive as
compared with the other Categories: in the generation of Essence,
there must pre-exist as generator another _actual_ and _complete_
Essence; in the generation of Quality or Quantity, you need nothing
pre-existing beyond a _potential_ Quality or a _potential_ Quantity
(b. 16).

A difficult question arises in this way: Every definition is a
rational explanation consisting of parts; and, as the parts of the
explanation are to the whole explanation, so are the parts of the
thing explained to the whole thing explained. Now is it necessary or
not, that the rational explanation of the parts shall be embodied in
the rational explanation of the whole (p. 1034, b. 22)? In some cases
it appears to be so; in others, not. The rational explanation of a
circle does not include that of its segments; but the rational
explanation of a syllable does include that of its component letters.
Moreover, if the parts are prior to the whole, and if the acute angle
be a part of the right angle, and the finger a part of the man, the
acute angle must be prior to the right angle, and the finger to the
man. Yet the contrary seems to be the truth: the right angle seems
prior, also the man; for the rational explanation of acute angle is
given from right angle, that of finger from man: in respect to
existing without the other, right angle and man seem _priora_. In
fact the word _part_ is equivocal, and it is only one of its meanings
to call it--that which quantitatively measures another (b. 33). But
let us dismiss this consideration, and let us enquire of what it is
that Essence consists, as parts (b. 34). If these are (1) Matter,
(2) Form, (3) The Compound of the two, and if each of these three be
Essence, Matter must be considered, in a certain way, as a part of
something, yet in a certain way as not so; in this latter point of
view, nothing being a part except those elements out of which the
rational explanation of the Form is framed (p. 1035, a. 2). Thus,
flesh is not a part of flatness, being the matter upon which flatness
is generated or superinduced, but flesh is a part of flat-nosedness;
the brass is a part of the entire statue, but not a part of the
statue when enunciated as Form, or of the ideal statue. You may
discriminate and reason separately upon the statue considered as Form
(apart from the complete statue); but you cannot so discriminate the
material part _per se_, or the statue considered as Matter only (a.
7). Hence the rational explanation of the circle does not contain
that of the segments of the circle; but the rational explanation of
the syllable does contain that of the component letters. The letters
are parts of the Form, and not simply the Matter upon which the Form
is superinduced; but the segments are parts in the sense of being the
Matter upon which the Form of the circle is superinduced (a. 12):
they are, however, nearer to the Form than the brass, when the Form
of a circle or roundness is generated in brass (a. 13). In a certain
way, indeed, it cannot be said that _all_ the letters are contained
in the rational explanation of the syllables; _e.g._, the letters
inscribed in wax are not so contained, nor the sounds of those
letters vibrating in the air; both these are a part of the syllable,
in the sense of being the perceivable matter thereof (a. 17: [Greek:
ô(s u(/lê ai)sthêtê/]). If a man be destroyed by being reduced to
bones, ligaments, and flesh, you cannot for that reason say, that the
man is composed of these as of parts of his Essence, but as parts of
his Matter: they are parts of the entire man, but not of the Form,
nor of what is contained in the rational explanation; accordingly
they do not figure in the discussions which turn upon rational
explanation, but only when the discussions turn upon the entire or
concrete subject (a. 23). Hence, in some cases, things are destroyed
into the same _principia_ out of which they are formed; in other
cases, not. To the first class, belong all things which are taken in
conjunction with Matter, such as the flat-nosed or, the brazen
circle; to the second class, those which are taken disjoined from
Matter, with Form only. Objects of the first class, (_i.e._, the
concretes) have thus both _principia_ and parts subordinate; but
neither the one nor the other belong to the Form alone (a. 31). The
plaster-statue passes when destroyed into plaster, the brazen circle
into brass, Kallias into flesh and bones; and even the circle, when
understood in a certain sense, into its segments, for the term circle
is used equivocally, sometimes to designate the Form of a circle,
sometimes to designate this or that particular circle--particular
circles having no name peculiar to themselves (b. 3).

That which has been already said is the truth; yet let us try to
recapitulate it in a still clearer manner (p. 1035, b. 4). The parts
of the rational explanation or notion, into which that notion is
divided, are prior to the notion, at least in some instances. But the
notion of a right angle is prior to that of an acute angle or is one
of the elements into which the notion of an acute angle is divided;
for you cannot define an acute angle without introducing the right
angle into your definition, nor can you define the semicircle without
introducing the circle, nor the finger without introducing the
man--the finger being such and such a part of the man. The parts into
which man is divided as Matter, are posterior to man; those into
which man is divided as parts of his Form or Formal Essence, are
prior to man--at least some of them are so (b. 14). Now, since the
soul of animals (which is the Essence of the animated being--b. 15)
is the Essence and the Form and the [Greek: t.ê.e.] of a suitably
arranged body; and, since no good definition of any one part can be
given, which does not include the function of that part, and this
cannot be given without the mechanism of sense (b. 18), it follows
that the parts of this soul, or some of them at least, are prior to
the entire animal, alike in the general and in each particular case.
But the body and its parts are posterior to the soul or Form, and
into these, as parts, the entire man (not the Essence or Form) is
divided. These parts are, in a certain sense, prior to the entire
man, and, in a certain sense, not; for they cannot even exist at all
separately (b. 23): the finger is not a finger unless it can perform
its functions, _i.e._, unless it be animated by a central soul; it is
not a finger in every possible state of the body to which it belongs;
after death, it is merely a finger by equivocation of language. There
are, however, some parts, such, as the brain or heart, to which the
Form or Essence is specially attached which are neither prior nor
posterior but _simul_ to the entire animal (b. 25).

Man, horse, and such like, which are predicated universally of
particular things, are not Essentia; they are compounds of a given
Form and a given Matter (but of that first Matter) which goes to
compose Universals. It is out of the last Matter, which comes lowest
in the series, and is already partially invested with Form, that
Sokrates and other particular beings are constituted (p. 1035, b.
30).

Thus, there are parts of the Form or [Greek: t.ê.e.], parts of the
Matter, and parts of the Compound including both. But it is only the
parts of the Form that are included as parts in the rational
explanation or notion; and this notion belongs to the Universal; for
circle and the being a circle, soul and the being a soul--are one and
the same (p. 1036, a. 2). Of the total compound (this particular
circle), no notion, no definition, can be given: whether it be a
particular circle perceivable by sense, in wood or brass, or merely
conceivable, such as the mathematical figures. Such particular
circles are known only along with actual perception or conception (a.
6. [Greek: Noei=n] here means the equivalent of [Greek: a)phairei=n =
chôri/zein tê=| dianoi/a|]--"die Thätigkeit des Abstrahirens, durch
welche das Mathematische gewonnen wird"--Schwegler ad loc. Comm., p.
101, Pt. II.): when we dismiss them as actualities from our view or
imagination, we cannot say clearly whether they continue to exist or
not; but we always talk of them and know them by the rational
explanation or definition of the universal circle (a. 7: [Greek:
a)peltho/ntas d' e)k tê=s e)ntelechei/as ou) dê=lon po/tero/n pote/
ei)sin ê)\ ou)k ei)si/n, a)ll' a)ei\ le/gontai kai\ gnôri/zontai tô=|
katho/lou lo/gô|.] I apprehend that Aristotle is here speaking of the
[Greek: ku/klos noêto/s] only, not of the [Greek: ku/klos
ai)sthêto/s] or [Greek: chalkou=s ku/klos]. He had before told us
that, when the [Greek: chalkou=s ku/klos] passes out of [Greek:
e)ntele/cheia] or [Greek: phthei/retai], it passes into [Greek:
chalko/s]. He can hardly therefore mean to say that, when the [Greek:
chalkou=s ku/klos] passes out of [Greek: e)ntele/cheia], we do not
clearly know whether it exists or not. But respecting the [Greek:
ku/klos noêto/s] or mathematical circle, he might well say that we
did not clearly know whether it existed at all under the
circumstances supposed: if it cease to exist, we cannot say [Greek:
ei)s o(\ phthei/retai]). Matter is unknowable _per se_ ([Greek: kath'
au(tê/n]--a. 9, _i.e._, if altogether without Form). One variety of
Matter is perceivable by sense, as brass, wood, and all moveable
matter; another variety is conceivable, viz., that which exists in
the perceivable variety, but not _quâ_ perceivable--the mathematical
figures ([Greek: noêtê\ de\ ê( e)n toi=s ai)sthêtoi=s u(pa/rchousa
mê\ ê(=| ai)sthêta/, oi(=on ta\ mathêmatika/]--a. 12; _i.e._, making
abstraction of the acts of sense, or of what is seen and felt by
sense, viz., colour by the eye, resistance by the touch; and leaving
behind simply the extension or possibility of motion, which is a
geometrical line).

We have now laid down the true doctrine respecting Whole and Part,
Prius and Posterius. And, if any one asks whether the right angle,
the circle, the animal, is prior or not to the parts into which it is
divided and out of which it is formed, we cannot answer absolutely
either Yes or No. We must add some distinguishing words, specifying
what we assert to be prior, and to what it is prior (p. 1036, a. 19).
If by the soul you mean the Form or Essence of the living animal, by
the circle, the Form of the circle, by the right angle, the Form or
Essence thereof,--then this Form is posterior in regard to the
notional parts of which it is constituted, but prior in regard to the
particular circle or right angle. But, if by soul you meant the
entire concrete animal, by right angle or circle, these two figures
realized in brass or wood, then we must reply that any one of these
is prior as regards the material parts of which it is constituted (a.
25).

Another reasonable doubt arises here ([Greek: a)porei=tai d'
ei)ko/tôs]--p. 1036, a. 26) as to which parts belong to the Form
alone, which to the entire Concrete. Unless this be made clear, we
can define nothing; for that which we define is the Universal and the
Form, and, unless we know what parts belong to the Matter and what do
not, the definition of the thing can never be made plain (a. 30).
Now, wherever the Form is seen to be superinduced upon matters
diverse in their own Form, the case presents no difficulty: every one
sees circles in brass, stone, wood, &c., and is well aware that
neither the brass, nor the stone, belongs to the Form or Essence of
the circle, since he easily conceives a circle without either. But,
if a man had never seen any circles except brazen circles, he would
have more difficulty in detaching mentally the circle from the brass,
and would be more likely to look upon brass as belonging to the Form
of circle; although, in point of fact, he would have no more logical
ground for supposing so than in the case just before supposed; for
the brass might still belong only to the Matter of circle (b. 2).
This is the case with the Form of man. It is always seen implicated
with flesh, bones, and such like parts. Are these parts of the Form
of man? Or are they not rather parts of the Matter, though we are
unable to conceive the Form apart from them, because we never see it
in conjunction with any other Matter? This is at least a possibility,
and we cannot see clearly in what cases it must be admitted. Some
theorists are so impressed by it as to push the case farther, and
apply the same reasoning to the circle and triangle. These theorists
contend that it is improper to define a circle and a triangle by
figure, lines, continuity, &c., which (they affirm) are only parts of
the Matter of circle and triangle; as flesh and bones are parts of
the Matter of man. They refer all of them to numbers as the Form, and
they affirm that the definition of the dyad is also the definition of
a line (b. 12). Among the partisans of Ideas, some call the dyad
[Greek: au)togrammê/] others call it the Form of a line; saying that
in some cases the Form and that of which it is the Form are the same,
as the dyad and the Form of the dyad, but that this is not true about
line. (These two opinions seem to be substantially the same, and only
to differ in the phrase. [Greek: Au)togrammê/] means the same as
[Greek: to\ ei)=dos tê=s grammê=s]: it seems to have been a peculiar
phrase adopted by some Platonists, but not by all. Others preferred
to say [Greek: to\ ei)=dos tê=s grammê=s].) These reasonings have
already misled the Pythagoreans, and are likely to mislead others
also: they would conduct us to the recognition of one and the same
Form in many cases where the Form is manifestly different: they lead
us even to assume one single Form universally, reducing every thing
besides to be no Form, but merely Matter to that one single real
Form. By such reasoning, we should be forced to consider all things
as One (b. 20), which would be obviously absurd.

We see from hence that there are real difficulties respecting the
theory of Definition, and how such difficulties arise. It is because
some persons are forward overmuch in trying to analyse every thing
and in abstracting altogether from Matter; for some things include
Matter along with the Form, or determined in a certain way, _i.e._,
this along with that, or these things in this condition (p, 1036, b.
22). The comparison which the younger Sokrates was accustomed to make
about the animal is a mistaken one (b. 24): it implies that man may
be without his material parts, as the circle may exist without brass.
But this analogy will not hold; animal is something perceivable by
sense and cannot be defined without motion; of course, therefore, not
without bodily members organized in a certain way (b. 30). The hand
is not a part of man, when it is in any supposable condition, but
only when it can perform its functions, that is, when it is animated;
when not animated, it is not a part (b. 32). Clearly the soul is the
first Essence or Form, the body is Matter, and man or animal is the
compound of both as an Universal; while Sokrates, Koriskus &c., are
as particulars to this Universal, whether you choose to take Sokrates
as soul without body, or as soul with body (p. 1037, a. 5-10: these
words are very obscure).

Respecting Mathematical Entia, why are not the notions of the
**parts parts of the notion of the whole? _e.g._, why is not the
notion of a semi-circle part of the notion of a circle? Perhaps it
will be replied that this circle and semi-circle are not perceivable
by sense: but this after all makes no difference; for some things
even not perceivable by sense involve Matter along with them, and
indeed Matter is involved in every thing which is not [Greek: t.ê.e.]
and Form [Greek: au)to\ kath' au(to/]. The semi-circles are not
included as parts of the notion of the universal circle; but they are
parts of each particular circle: for there is one Matter perceivable
and another cogitable (p. 1036, a. 34.--Bonitz remarks that these
words from p. 1036, a. 22 to p. 1037, a. 5, are out of their proper
place). Whether there be any other Matter, besides the Matter of
these Mathematical Entia, and whether we are to seek a distinct Form
and Essence for them--such as numbers, must be reserved for future
enquiry. This has been one of our reasons for the preceding chapters
about perceivable Essences; for these last properly belong to the
province of Second Philosophy--of the physical theorist ([Greek: tê=s
phusikê=s kai\ deute/ras philosophi/as e)/rgon]--p. 1037, a. 15). The
physical philosopher studies not merely the Matter, but the Form or
notional Essence even more (a. 17).

We are now in a position to clear up what was touched upon in the
Analytica (Anal. Poster. II. p. 92, a. 27; also, De Interp. v. p. 17,
a. 13), but not completed, respecting Definition. How is it that the
definition is One? We define man _animal bipes_: How is it that this
is One and not Many? Man and white are two, when the latter does not
belong to the former: when it does so belong to and affects the
former, the two are One--white man (p. 1037, b. 16): that is, they
are One [Greek: kata\ pa/thos]. But the parts included in the
definition are not One [Greek: kata\ pa/thos], nor are they one
[Greek: kata\ me/thexin]; for the Genus cannot be said to partake of
the Differentiæ. If it did, it would at one and the same time partake
of Opposita, for the Differentiæ are Opposita to each other. And,
even if we say that the Genus does partake of the Differentiæ, the
same difficulty recurs, when the Differentiæ are numerous. The Genus
must partake alike and equally of all of them; but how is it that all
of them are One, and not Many? It cannot be meant that all of them
belong essentially to the thing; for, if that were so, all would be
included in the definition, which they are not. We want to know why
or how those Differentiæ which are included in the definition
coalesce into One, without the rest: for we call the _definiend_
[Greek: e(/n ti kai\ to/de ti] (b. 27).

In answering this question, we take, as a specimen, a definition
which arises out of the logical subdivision of a Genus (p. 1037, b.
28). Definition is given by assigning the Genus and Difference: the
Genus is the Matter, the Difference is the Form or Essence; the two
coalesce into one as Form and Matter. In the definition of
man--_animal bipes_--_animal_ is the Matter and _bipes_ the Form; so
that the two coalescing form an essential One. It does not signify
through how many stages the logical subdivision is carried, provided
it be well done; that is, provided each stage be a special and
appropriate division of all that has preceded. If this condition be
complied with, the last differentia will include all the preceding,
and will itself be the Form of which the genus serves as Matter. You
divide the genus animal first into [Greek: zô=|on u(po/poun--zô=|on
a)pou=n]; you next divide [Greek: zô=|on u(po/poun] into [Greek:
zô=|on u(po/poun di/poun--zô=|on u(po/poun polu/poun]; or perhaps
into [Greek: zô=|on u(po/poun schizo/pun--zô=|on u(po/poun
a)/schiston]. It is essential that the next subdivision applied to
[Greek: zô=|on u(po/poun] should be founded upon some subordinate
differentia specially applying to the feet (p. 1038, a. 14: [Greek:
au(=tai ga\r diaphorai\ podo/s; ê( ga\r schizopodi/a podo/tês tis]).
If it does not specially apply to the feet, but takes in some new
attribute (_e. g._, [Greek: pterôto/n, a)/pteron]), the division will
be unphilosophical. The last differentia [Greek: zô=|on di/poun]
includes the preceding differentia [Greek: u(po/poun]: to say [Greek:
zô=|on u(po/poun di/poun] would be tautology. Where each differentia
is a differentia of the preceding differentiæ, the last differentia
includes them all and is itself the Form and Essence, along with the
genus as Matter (a. 25). The definition is the rational explanation
arising out of these differences, and by specifying the last it
virtually includes all the preceding (a. 29: [Greek: o( o(rismo\s
lo/gos e)sti\n o( e)k tô=n diaphorô=n, kai\ tou/tôn tê=s teleutai/as
kata/ ge to\ o)rtho/n]).

In the constituents of the Essence, there is no distinctive order of
parts; no subordination of _prius_ and _posterius_; all are equally
essential and coordinate ([Greek: ta/xis d' ou)k e)/stin e)n tê=|
ou)si/a|]--p. 1038, a. 33).

As we are treating now about Essence, it will be convenient to go
back to the point from which we departed, when we enumerated the four
varieties recognized by different philosophers. These were (1) The
Subject--Substratum--Matter, which is a subject of predicates in two
different ways: either as already an Hoc Aliquid and affected by
various accidents, or as not yet an Hoc Aliquid, but simply Matter
implicated with Entelechy (p. 1038, b. 6); (2) Form--Essence--the
[Greek: t.ê.e.]; (3) The Compound or Product of the preceding two;
(4) The Universal ([Greek: to\ katho/lou]). Of these four, we have
already examined the first three; we now proceed to the fourth.

Some philosophers consider the Universal to be primarily and
eminently Cause and Principle (p. 1038, b. 7). But it seems
impossible that any thing which is affirmed universally can be
Essence. For that is the First Essence of each thing which belongs to
nothing but itself; but the Universal is by its nature common to many
things. Of which among these things is it the Essence? Either of all
or of no one. Not of all certainly; and, if it be the Essence of any
one, the rest of them will be identical with that one; for, where the
Essence is one, the things themselves are one (b. 15). Besides, the
Essence is that which is not predicated of any subject: but the
Universal is always predicated of a subject.

Perhaps, however, we shall be told, that the Universal is not
identical with [Greek: t.ê.e.], but is Essence which is immanent in
or belongs to [Greek: t.ê.e.], as animal in man and horse. But this
cannot be admitted. For, whether we suppose animal to be definable or
not, if it be essence of any thing, it must be the essence of
something to which it belongs peculiarly, as _homo_ is the essence of
man peculiarly; but, if animal is to be reckoned as the essence of
man, it will be the essence of something to which it does not
peculiarly belong; and this contradicts the definition of Essence (p.
1038, b. 15-23. This passage is very obscure, even after Bonitz and
Schwegler's explanatory notes. I incline to Schwegler, and to his
remark, Comm. II. p. 115, that the text of b. 23 ought to be written
[Greek: e)n ô(=| _mê\_ ô(s i)/dion u(pa/rchei].).

Again, it is impossible that Essence, if composed of any elements,
can be composed of what is not Essence, as of Quality; for this would
make Quality _prius_ as regards Essence; which it cannot be, either
in reason ([Greek: lo/gô|]), or in time, or in generation. If this
were so, the affections would be separable from Essences (p. 1038, b.
28). Essence, if composed of any thing, must be composed of Essence.

Once more, if the individual man or horse are Essences, nothing which
is in the definition of these can be Essence; nor apart from that of
which it is Essence; nor in any thing else. There cannot be any man,
apart from individual men (p. 1038, b. 34).

Hence we see clearly that none of the universal predicates are
Essence: none of them signify Hoc Aliquid, but Tale. To suppose
otherwise, would open the door to many inadmissible consequences,
especially to the argument of the 'Third Man' (p. 1039, a. 2).

Another argument to the same purpose:--It is impossible that Essence
can be composed of different Essences immanent in one Entelechy. Two
in the same Entelechy can never be One in Entelechy. If indeed they
be two _in potentiâ_, they may coalesce into one Entelechy, like one
double out of two potential halves. But Entelechy establishes a
separate and complete existence (p. 1039, a. 7); so that, if Essence
is One, it cannot be made up of distinct Essences immanent or
inherent. Demokritus, who recognized only the atoms as Essences, was
right in saying, that two of them could not be One, nor one of them
Two. The like is true about number, if number be, as some contend, a
synthesis of monads. For either the dyad is not One; or else the
monads included therein are not monads [Greek: e)ntelechei/a|] (a.
14).

Here however we stumble upon a difficulty. For, if no Essence can be
put together out of Universals, nor any compound Essence out of other
Essences existing as Entelechies, all Essence must necessarily be
simple and uncompounded, so that no definition can be given of it.
But this is opposed to every one's opinion, and to what has been said
long ago, that Essence alone could be defined; or at least Essence
most of all. It now appears that there can be no definition of
Essence, nor by consequence of any thing else. Perhaps, however this
may be only true in a certain sense: in one way, definition is
possible; in another way, not. We shall endeavour to clear up the
point presently (p. 1039, a. 22.--Schwegler says in his note upon
this passage: "Die von Aristoteles häufig berührte, doch nie zur
abschliessenden Lösung gebrachte, Grundaporie des aristotelischen
Systems"--Comm. II. p. 117).

Those who maintain that Ideas are self-existent are involved in
farther contradictions by admitting at the same time that the Species
is composed out of Genus and Differentia. For, suppose that these
Ideas are self-existent and that [Greek: au)tozô=|on] exists both in
man and horse: [Greek: au)tozô=|on] is, in these two, either the same
or different numerically. It is, of course, the same in definition or
notion ([Greek: lo/gô|]); of that there can be no doubt. If it be
numerically same ([Greek: ô(/sper su= sautô=|]) in man and in horse,
how can this same exist at once in separate beings, unless we suppose
the absurdity that it exists apart from itself (p. 1039, b. 1)?
Again, are we to imagine that this generic Ens, [Greek: au)tozô=|on],
partakes at the same time of contrary differentiæ--the dipod,
polypod, apod? If it does not, how can dipodic or polypodic animals
really exist? Nor is the difficulty at all lessened, if, instead of
saying that the generic Ens partakes of differentiæ, you say that it
is _mixed_ with them, or _compounded_ of them, or _in contact_ with
them. There is nothing but a tissue of absurdities ([Greek: pa/nta
a)/toma]--b. 6).

But take the contrary supposition and suppose that the [Greek:
au)tozô=|on] is numerically different in man, horse, &c. On this
admission, there will be an infinite number of distinct beings of
whom the [Greek: au)tozô=|on] is the Essence; man, for example, since
animal is not accidental, but essential, as a constituent of man (p.
1039, b. 8). [Greek: Au)tozô=|on] will thus be Many ("ein
Vielerlei"--Schwegler); for it will be the Essence of each particular
animal, of whom it will be predicated essentially and not accidentally
([Greek: ou) ga\r ka/t' a)/llo le/getai]--_i.e._, this is not a case
where the predicate is something distinct from the subject). Moreover
all the constituents of man will be alike Ideas (_e.g._, not merely
[Greek: zô=|on], but [Greek: di/poun]): now the same cannot be Idea of
one thing and Essence of another; accordingly, [Greek: au)tozô=|on]
will be each one of the essential constituents of particular animals
([Greek: di/poun, polu/poun], b. 14).

Again, whence comes [Greek: au)tozô=|on] itself, and how do the
particular animals arise out of it? How can the [Greek: zô=|on] which
is Essence, exist apart from and alongside of [Greek: au)to\ to\
zô=|on]? (p. 1039, b. 15.)

These arguments show how impossible it is that there can exist any
such Ideas as some philosophers affirm (p. 1039, b. 18).

We have already said that there are two varieties of Essence: (1) The
Form alone, (2) The Form embodied in Matter. The Form or Essence in
the first meaning, is neither generable nor destructible; in the
second meaning it is both. [Greek: To\ oi)ki/a| ei)=nai] is neither
generable nor destructible; [Greek: to\ tê=|de tê=| oi)ki/a| ei)=nai]
is both the one and the other (p. 1039, b. 25). Of these last,
therefore, the perceivable or concrete Essences, there can be no
definition nor demonstration, because they are implicated with
Matter, which is noway necessary, or unchangeable, but may exist or
not exist, change or not change. Demonstration belongs only to what
is necessary; Definition only to Science, which cannot be to-day
Science and to-morrow Ignorance. Neither Science, nor Demonstration,
nor Definition, applies to such things as may be otherwise: these
latter belong to Opinion ([Greek: tou= e)ndechome/nou a)/llôs
e)/chein]--p. 1040, a. 1). You cannot have Science or Demonstration
or Definition about particular or perceivable things, because they
are destroyed and pass out of perception, so that you do not know
what continues to be true about them; even though you preserve the
definition in your memory, you cannot tell how far it continues
applicable to them (a. 7). Any definition given is liable to be
overthrown.

Upon the same principle, there cannot be any definition of the
Platonic Ideas; each of which is announced as a particular, distinct,
separable, Ens (p. 1040, a. 8). The definition must be composed of
words--of the words of a language generally understood--and of words
which, being used by many persons, are applicable to other
particulars besides the definiend (you define Alexander as white,
thin, a philosopher, a native of Aphrodisias, &c., all of which are
characteristics applicable to many other persons besides). The
definer may say that each characteristic taken separately will apply
to many things, but that the aggregate of all together will apply to
none except the definiend. We reply however, that [Greek: zô=|on
di/poun] must have at least two subjects to which it applies--[Greek:
to\ zô=|on] and [Greek: to\ di/poun]. Of course this is all the more
evident about eternal Entia like the Platonic Ideas, which are prior
to the compound and parts thereof ([Greek: zô=|on] and [Greek:
di/poun] are each prior and both of them parts of [Greek:
au)toa/nthrôpos]), and separable, just as [Greek: au)toa/nthrôpos] is
separable (a. 14-20); for either neither of them is separable, or
both are so. If neither of them is separable, then the Genus is
nothing apart from the Species, and the Platonic assumption of
self-existent Ideas falls to the ground; if both are separable, then
the Differentia is self-existent as well as the Genus (a. 21): there
exist some Ideas prior to other Ideas. Moreover, the Genus and
Differentia, the component elements of the Species, are logically
prior to the Species: suppress the Species, and you do not suppress
its component elements; suppress these, and you _do_ suppress the
Species (a. 21). We reply farther that, if the more compound Ideas
arise out of the less compound, the component elements (like [Greek:
zô=|on di/poun]) must needs be predicable of many distinct subjects.
If this be not so always, how are we to distinguish the cases in
which it is true from those in which it is not? You must assume the
existence of some Idea which can only be predicated of some one
subject, and no others. But this seems impossible. Every Idea is
participable (a. 27).

These philosophers do not reflect that definition is impossible of
eternal Essences (which the Platonic Ideas are), especially in cases
where the objects are essentially unique, as Sun, or Moon, or Earth
(p. 1040, a. 29). When they try to define Sun, they are forced to use
phrases which are applicable to many in common; but Sun, (and each
Idea) is particular and individual, like Kleon or Sokrates. Why does
none of them produce a definition of an Idea? If any one tried, he
would soon see the pertinence of the above remarks (b. 3).
(Alexander, Bonitz, and Schwegler, all observe incidentally that the
reasoning of what immediately precedes is weak and sophistical.
Bonitz, p. 352, gives a good summary of the chapter, concluding: "Hoc
capite non id ipsum demonstrat, res singulas non esse substantias,
sed rerum singularum non esse definitionem neque scientiam; nimirum
quum substantiæ vel unice vel potissimum esse definitionem
demonstratum sit, c. 4, hoc si comprobat, illud simul est
comprobatum.")

It is farther evident that many apparent Essences are not strictly
and truly Essences; for example, the parts of animals; since not one
of them is separated from the whole ([Greek: ou)the\n ga\r
kechôrisme/non au)tô=n e)sti/n]--p. 1040, b. 6; Alexander says _ad
loc._: [Greek: ou)si/as e)kei=na/ phamen o(/sa kath' au(ta\ o)/nta
du/natai to\ oi)kei=on e)/rgon a)potelei=n; ou)si/a ga\r ou)de\n
a)/llo e)sti\n ê)\ to\ a)ph' ou(= to\ e(ka/stou e)/rgon
e)kplêrou=tai; ou)si/a ga\r kai\ ei)=dos Sôkra/tous ê( tou=
Sôkra/tous psuchê/, a)ph' ê(=s au)tô=| to\ tou= a)nthrô/pou ê(=|
a)/nthrôpos e)/rgon e)kplêrou=n]). When any one of them is separated,
it exists only in the character of Matter--earth, fire, air; none of
them, in this separate condition, being an unity, but only like a
heap of grains of gold or tin before they are melted and combined
into one. We might suppose, indeed, that the parts of the body, and
the parts of the soul, of animated beings, come near to Essence, both
one and the other, alike potentially and actually (b. 12), because
they have principles of motion in their turnings ([Greek: kampai=s]),
so that in some cases they continue separately alive after division.
Still the functions of the part alone must be really regarded as
nothing more than potential, wherever the oneness and continuity of
the whole is the work of Nature (b. 15), and not a mere case of
contact or forcible conjunction.

Nevertheless the being One, or Unity (p. 1040, b. 16), is not itself
the Essence of things. Unum is predicated in the same manner as Ens;
the two may always be predicated together: the Essence of Unum is
One; and things of which the Essence is Unum Numero, are themselves
numerically one. Neither Unum nor Ens is the Essence of things any
more than the being an Element, or the being a Principle, can be the
Essence thereof: we have farther to enquire what the Principle is, in
order to bring the problem into a more cognizable shape (b. 20). Unum
and Ens are more near to Essence than either Element, Principle, or
Cause; nevertheless neither Unum nor Ens is Essence; for nothing
which is common to many things is Essence. Essence belongs only to
itself and to that which has itself. Farther, Unum cannot be in many
places at once; but that which is common is in many places at once.
It is thus plain that nothing Universal exists apart or separate from
particulars (b. 27).

The advocates of the (Platonic) Ideas are right in affirming them to
be separate, if they be Essences; but they are wrong in calling that
which is predicable of many things (the Universal) an Idea (p. 1040,
b. 29). When asked, What are these indestructible Essences of which
you speak, as apart from the visible individual objects?--they had no
intelligible answer to give. Accordingly they were forced to make
these Essences the same specifically with the destructible
(individual) objects; for _these_ we do know (b. 33). They simply
prefixed the word [Greek: au)to/] to the names of sensible
objects--[Greek: au)toa/nthrôpos, au)toi+/ppos]. But these Ideas
might still exist, even though we knew not what they were; just as
eternal Essences like the stars would still exist, even though we
had never seen them (p. 1041, a. 2).

Let us again examine what we call Essence, and what sort of thing it
is; and let us take another point of departure, which may perhaps
help us to understand what that Essence is which is apart and
separate from perceivable Essences (p. 1041, a. 9). We know that
Essence is a certain variety of Principle or Cause; and from this
premiss we will reason (a. 10). Now the enquiry into Cause, or the
Why, always comes in this shape: Why does one thing belong to
another? The enquiry, Why a thing is itself? is idle. The fact--the
[Greek: o(/ti]--must be assumed to be clear and known in the first
instance. You know that the moon is eclipsed, as matter of fact; you
proceed to enquire into the cause thereof (a. 11-24). Why does it
thunder? or, to enunciate the same question more fully, Why is there
noise in the clouds? The _quæsitum_ is always one thing predicated of
another (a. 26). Why are these materials, bricks and stones, a house?
Here the answer sought is, the Cause; and that is the [Greek:
t.ê.e.], speaking in logical or analytical phraseology ([Greek:
_logikô=s_]--_i.e._, that which belongs to the [Greek: _lo/gos_ tê=s
ou)si/as]). In some cases, this _quæsitum_ is a Final Cause, as in
the case of a bed or a house; in others, an Efficient or Movent
Cause; for that also is a variety of Cause, generally sought for in
regard to things generated or destroyed; but the other (viz., [Greek:
to\ t.ê.e.], "ipsa rei forma ac notio, aut concepta in animo
artificis, aut inclusa [Greek: duna/mei] in ipsâ naturâ ac semine
rei"--Bonitz, Comm. p. 359) is sought for in regard to [Greek:
ei)=nai].

The true nature of the _quæsitum_ is often unperceived, when the
problem is announced without stating distinctly the subject and
predicate in their mutual relations ([Greek: e)n toi=s mê\
katallê/lôs legome/nois], p. 1041, a. 33). For example, [Greek:
a)/nthrôpos dia\ ti/ e)stin?] is ambiguous by imperfect enunciation.
As it stands, it might be supposed to be intended as [Greek:
a)/nthrôpos dia\ ti/ e)stin a)/nthrôpos?] which would be a question
idle or null. To make it clear, you ought to distinguish the two
members to which the real _quæsitum_ refers (b. 2), and say [Greek:
dia\ ti/ ta/de ê)\ to/de e)sti\n a)/nthrôpos?] your real enquiry is
about the [Greek: u(/lê] or Matter, why it exists in this or that
manner. Why are these materials a house? Because the Essence of a
house belongs to them (b. 6). Some [Greek: t.ê.e.], some sort of
[Greek: ei)=nai], must belong to the Matter (b. 4). Why is this
Matter a man? or why is the body disposed in this particular way a
man? Here we enquire as to the Cause which acts upon a certain
Matter; and that is the Form whereby the thing is; which again is the
Essence (b. 8).

Hence it is plain that a distinction must be taken between the Simple
and the Compound. The enquiry above described, and the teaching above
described, cannot apply to the Simple, which must be investigated in
another way (p. 1041, b. 9). Compounds are of two sorts--aggregates
like a _heap_ (mechanical), and aggregates like a _syllable_ (organic
or formal). In these last there are not merely the constituent
elements, but something else besides (b. 16). The syllable _ba_ is
something more than the letters _b_ and _a_; flesh is something more
than fire and earth, its constituent elements. Now this _something
more_ cannot be itself a constituent element; for, if that were so,
flesh would be composed of three constituent elements instead of two,
and we should still have to search for the _something beyond_, and
this ulterior process might be repeated _ad infinitum_ (b. 22). Nor
can the _something beyond_ be itself a compound of several elements,
for we should still have to find the independent something which
binds these into a compound. It is plain that this _something beyond_
must be in its nature quite distinct from an element, and must be the
cause why one compound is flesh, another compound a syllable, and so
about all the remaining compounds. Now this is the Essence of each
compound--the First Cause of existence to each (b. 25). The Element
([Greek: stoichei=on]) is that into which the compound is separated,
as included Matter ([Greek: e)nupa/rchon ô(s u(/lên]): _b_ and _a_,
in the syllable _ba_ (b. 32). There are some things which are not the
Essences of objects (white, for example, is not of the Essence of
man, but an attribute); but, in all cases where compounds have come
together according to Nature and by natural process, that Nature also
which is not Element but Principle is the Essence (b. 28: [Greek:
e)pei\ d' e)/nia ou)k ou)si/ai tô=n pragma/tôn, a)ll' o(/sai ou)si/ai
kata\ phu/sin kai\ phu/sei sunestê/kasi, phanei/ê a)\n kai\ au(/tê ê(
phu/sis ou)si/a, ê(/ e)stin ou) stoichei=on a)ll' a)rchê/.] Schwegler
in his note, p. 135, proposes to correct this passage by striking out
[Greek: kai/] before the words [Greek: au(tê\ ê( phu/sis ou)si/a].
But, if this were done, it would make the passage mean that [Greek:
u(/lê] or [Greek: stoichei=on] is not [Greek: ou)si/a], and that the
other [Greek: phu/sis] which is not [Greek: stoichei=on], is to be
regarded exclusively as [Greek: ou)si/a]. Now this is certainly not
the doctrine of Aristotle, who expressly declares [Greek: u(/lê] to
be [Greek: ou)si/a]; see H, p. 1042, a. 32. Retaining the [Greek:
kai/], the passage will then mean that not merely [Greek: u(/lê], but
_also_ [Greek: phu/sis] which is not [Greek: u(/lê], is [Greek:
ou)si/a]).

. . . . . .

Book [Greek: Ê].

In this Book, Aristotle begins by recapitulating the doctrines and
discussions of the preceding. His purpose had been declared to be the
investigation of the Causes, Principles, and Elements of Essences.
Now Essences are diverse: some universally admitted, as the natural
elements and simple bodies, also plants, animals, and the parts of
each, lastly, the heaven and the parts thereof; others not
universally admitted, but advocated by some philosophers, as the
Ideas and Mathematical Entia; others, again, which we arrive at by
dialectical discussion, as [Greek: to\ t.ê.e.], the Substratum
(Logical Entia--[Greek: e)k tô=n lo/gôn], p. 1042, a. 12), the Genus
more Essence than the Species, the Universal more Essence than
Particulars. The (Platonic) Ideas make a near approach to the Genus
and the Universal; they are vindicated as Essences upon similar
grounds. Next, since [Greek: to\ t.ê.e.] is Essence, and since the
Definition is the rational explanation of [Greek: t.ê.e.], we found
it necessary to discuss Definition; and, since the Definition is a
sentence having parts, we were called upon to examine these parts,
and to explain what parts belonged both to Essence and to Definition.
We decided farther, after discussion, that the Universal and the
Genus were not Essence; the Platonic Ideas and the Mathematical Entia
we postponed for the moment, and we confined ourselves to the
perceivable Essences, recognized by all (a. 25).

Now all these perceivable Essentiæ include Matter. The
Substratum--Matter in one way--is Essence; while, in another way, the
Form and the [Greek: lo/gos] is Essence; and finally the Compound of
the two is Essence. Matter is Hoc Aliquid, not [Greek: e)nergei/a|]
but only [Greek: duna/mei]. Form is an Hoc Aliquid separable by reason
([Greek: tô=| lo/gô| chôristo/n], p. 1042, a. 29). The Compound of
the two, the complete Hoc Aliquid, is capable of existing separably,
in an absolute sense (which is true also of some Forms), and is
liable alone to generation and destruction (a. 30).

It is clear that Matter also, not less than Form, is Essence; for in
all changes from opposite to opposite, there is a certain substratum
to such changes. Thus, in changes of Place, there is a substratum
which is now here, presently there; in changes of Quantity, what is
now of such and such a size, is presently greater or less; in changes
of Quality, what is now healthy is presently sick; in changes of
Essence, what is now in course of generation is presently in course
of destruction, or what is now the substratum of some given Form (and
is thus Hoc Aliquid) is presently the substratum of Privation, and
thus no longer Hoc Aliquid. Among these four varieties of change
([Greek: kat' ou)si/an, kata\ poso/n, kata\ poio/n, kata\ to/pon])
the three last are consequent upon the first, but the first is not
consequent upon all the three last; for we cannot maintain that,
because a thing has Matter capable of local movement, it must
therefore have generable and destructible Matter (p. 1042, b. 6).

Having discussed the Essence of perceivable things so far forth as
_potential_, we now proceed to the same Essence so far forth as
_actual_ ([Greek: ê( duna/mei ou)si/a--ê( ô(s e)ne/rgeia ou)si/a tô=n
ai)sthêtô=n]--p. 1042, b. 10). What is this last? Demokritus
recognizes a primordial body one and the same as to Matter, but
having three differences--in figure, in position, in arrangement. But
it is plain that this enumeration is not sufficient and that there
are many other differences, to each of which corresponds a special
acceptation of [Greek: e)/sti] ([Greek: to\ e)/sti tosautachô=s
le/getai]--b. 26). Some differences depend upon the mode of putting
together constituent materials ([Greek: sunthe/sei tê=s u(/lês]--b.
16), as mixture, tying, gluing, pegging, &c.; some upon position, as
threshold, coping, &c.; some upon time; some upon place; some upon
affections of perceivable things, such as hardness, softness,
dryness, moisture, density, rarity, &c.; some upon combinations of
the foregoing; some again simply upon excess or defect in quantity.
To one or other of these, [Greek: e)/stin] has reference in each
particular case. We say--This _is_ a threshold, because it lies in a
particular manner: _Is_ (or _To be_--[Greek: to\ ei)=nai]) signifies
in this case that particular manner of lying. To be ice, is to have
become solidified in this particular manner (b. 28). We must
therefore look for the summa genera of the differences; in some cases
[Greek: to\ ei)=nai] will be defined by all these differences: thus
more or less dense, more or less rare, belong to the genus excess and
defect; differences of figure, smoothness, roughness, &c., belong to
the genus straight and curve; in other cases, to be, or not to be,
will depend upon mixture, as the genus (p. 1043, a. 1).

If then the Essence is the cause why each thing is what it is, we
must seek in these differences the cause why each thing is what it is
(p. 1043, a. 3). None of these differences indeed is itself
Essence,--not even when it is embodied or combined with Matter; but
it is in each the analogue of Essence, and must be employed in
defining, just as in real and true Essence we define by predicating
of Matter the Actuality or Formality ([Greek: ô(s e)n tai=s ou)si/ais
to\ tê=s u(/lês katêgorou/menon au)tê\ ê( e)ne/rgeia]--a. 6). Thus,
if we define a threshold, we say--a piece of wood or stone lying in
this particular way; if we define ice, we say--water frozen or
solidified in this particular way, &c. The Form or Actuality of one
Matter is different from that of another; so also is the rational
explanation or Definition; in some cases it is composition, in others
mixture, &c., and so forth. If any one defines a house by saying that
it is stone or brick, he indicates only the potential house, for these
are the Matter (a. 15); if he defines it--a vessel protecting bodies
or property, he then assigns the Actuality ([Greek: e)ne/rgeian]); if
he includes both of the above in his definition, he then gives the
third Essence completed out of the two together ([Greek: tê\n tri/tên
kai\ tê\n e)k tou/tôn ou)si/an]--a. 18). To define from the
differences, is to define from the side of the Actuality or Form; to
define from the included elements ([Greek: e)k tô=n e)nuparcho/ntôn])
is to define from the side of the Matter (a. 20).

We see herefrom what perceivable Essence is, and how it is: partly,
of the nature of Matter; partly, of Form and Actuality or Energy:
again, the third or Concrete, out of both combined (p. 1043, a. 28).
Sometimes, it is not clear whether the name signifies this third
Concrete, or the Form and Energy. Thus, when you say a house, do you
mean a protective receptacle built of bricks? or do you mean simply a
protective receptacle--the Form simply, without specifying the
Matter? When you say a line, do you mean a dyad in length--Form in
Matter? or simply a dyad--Form alone? When you talk of an animal, do
you mean soul in body? or simply soul, which is the Essence and
Actuality of a certain body? The word animal may be applied to both,
not indeed univocally, as implying generic resemblance, but
(quasi-univocally, or semi-univocally) by analogical relationship to
a common term ([Greek: ou)ch ô(s e(ni\ lo/gô| lego/menon, a)ll' ô(s
pro\s e(\n]--a. 36). This distinction however, though important in
some respects, is unimportant so far as regards the investigation
about perceivable Essence; for the [Greek: t.ê.e.] belongs to the
Form and the Actuality (a. 38). Soul, and the being soul, are
identical; but man, and the being man, are not identical; unless the
soul be called man. Thus this identity exists in some cases, but not
in others (b. 4). A syllable is not composed merely of letters and
synthesis, nor is a house simply of bricks and synthesis; for the
synthesis or the mixture does not proceed out of the elements which
are put together or mixed (b. 8). The like is true in other cases;
_e.g._, if the threshold is a threshold by position, the position
does not proceed out of the threshold, but rather the threshold out
of the position. Nor again is man simply animal and biped. If these
two are the Matter, there must be something apart from and beyond
them, something not itself an element nor proceeding out of an
element--the Essence; which is indicated by abstracting from the
Matter (b. 13). This, as being the Cause of Existence and of Essence
([Greek: ai)/tion tou= ei)=nai kai\ tê=s ou)si/as]--b. 14) is what is
meant when Essence is spoken of.

This Essence or Form must be eternal; or at least, if destructible,
it has never been destroyed; if generable, it has never been
generated. For we have shown already that no one either constructs or
generates Form: the Hoc Aliquid is constructed; the product of Form
and Matter is generated (p. 1043, b. 18). As yet it has not been made
clear whether the Essences of destructible things are separable or
not: in some cases at least, they certainly are not--in those cases,
namely, where there can exist nothing beyond the particular things,
as a house or an implement (b. 21). Perhaps, indeed, these are not
truly Essences--neither these particular things nor any other things
which have come together not by natural process; for we might
indicate Nature alone as the Essence in destructible things ([Greek:
tê\n ga\r phu/sin mo/nên a)/n tis thei/ê tê\n e)n toi=s phthartoi=s
ou)si/an])--b. 23. Aristotle seems to say in what precedes, that
there is no [Greek: ge/nesis] or [Greek: phthora/] of [Greek:
ou)si/a]; see Z. p. 1033, b. 17. But how is this to be reconciled
with K. p. 1060, b. 18: [Greek: ou)si/as me\n ga\r pa/sês
ge/nesi/s e)stin, stigmê=s d' ou)k e)/stin]? See Schwegler's Comm.
explaining [Greek: gigno/menon] and [Greek: phtheiro/menon], Pt. II.
pp. 82, 83).

Hence we see that the difficulty started by Antisthenes and others
equally unschooled ([Greek: a)pai/deutoi]) is not without pertinence.
They say that, as a definition is a sentence of many words,
predicating something of something, so you cannot define _Quid est_:
you can only define and inform persons _Quale Quid est_: you can only
tell people what the definiend is like, not what it is in itself: you
can tell them that silver is like tin, but you cannot tell what
silver is. Upon this theory, definition may be given of Compound
Essence, whether perceivable or cogitable; but not of the _primordia_
of which the compound consists. The definition must predicate a
something, which is of the nature of Form, of another something,
which is of the nature of Matter (p. 1043, b. 31).

If Essences are (as the Platonists say) in a certain sense Numbers,
they are so in _this_ sense; not (as these philosophers affirm) in
the character of assemblages of Monads. For the definition is a sort
of number, divisible into indivisible units; and the number is so
likewise. If you add any thing to, or deduct any thing from, a number
(let the thing added or deducted be never so small), it will be no
longer the same number; in like manner, neither the definition nor
the [Greek: t.ê.e.], will be the same, if any thing be added or
subtracted (p. 1044, a. 1). Each number must have something which
makes its component units coalesce into one number, though the
Platonic philosophers cannot tell what that something is; either the
units are a mere (uncemented) heap, or else you must say what is that
something which makes them _one_ out of many (a. 5). The definition
also is one; yet these philosophers cannot explain what makes it one.
The units of the number and that of the definition, is to be
explained in the same way, and that of the Essence also; not as a
monad or a point, but in each case like an Entelechy and a peculiar
nature ([Greek: ou)ch, ô(s le/gousi/ tines, oi(=on mona/s tis ou)=sa
ê)\ stigmê/, a)ll' e)ntele/cheia kai\ phu/sis tis e(ka/stê]--a. 9). A
given number admits of no degrees, more or less: neither does a given
Essence, unless it be taken embodied in Matter (a. 10).

Respecting the Material Essence ([Greek: peri\ de\ tê=s u(likê=s
ou)si/as]--p. 1044, a. 15), we must not forget that, if there be one
and the same First Matter common as a principle to all Generata or
Fientia, there is nevertheless a certain Matter special or peculiar
(proximate) to each ([Greek: o(/môs e)/sti tis oi)kei/a
e(ka/stou]--a. 18; [Greek: oi)kei/a kai\ prosechê/s]--Alexander).
Thus the Materia Prima of phlegm is, sweet or fat things; that of bile
is, bitter things and such like. Perhaps these two come both from the
same Matter; and there are several different Matters of the same
product, in cases where one Matter proceeds from another. Thus phlegm
proceeds from fat and sweet, if fat proceeds from sweet; and even
from bile, if bile be analysed into its First Matter from whence
phlegm may proceed by a different road (a. 23). One thing may proceed
from another in two different ways: either D may proceed from C,
because C is its immediate Matter, already preformed up to a certain
point, and thus on the way to a perfectly formed state; or D may
proceed from C, after the destruction of C and the resolution of C
into its Materia Prima ([Greek: dichô=s ga\r to/d' e)k tou=de, ê)\
o(/ti pro\ o(dou= e)/stai ê)\ o(/ti a)naluthe/ntos ei)s tê\n
a)rchê/n]--a. 24). From one and the same Matter different products
may proceed, if the moving cause be different: from the same wood
there may proceed a box or a bed. What product shall emerge does not,
however, depend only upon the Moving Cause, but often upon the Matter
also; thus a saw cannot be made out of wool or wood. If the same
product can proceed out of different Matter, this is evidently
because the Art or Moving Cause is the same: if this last be
different, and the Matter different also, the product will of course
be different (p. 1044, a. 32).

When a man asks us, What is the Cause? we ought to reply, since the
word has many senses, by specifying all the causes which can have a
bearing on the case (p. 1044, a. 34). Thus, What is the Cause of man,
as Matter? Perhaps the katamenia. What, as Movent? Perhaps the seed.
What, as Form? The [Greek: t.ê.e.] What, as [Greek: ou(= e(/neka]?
The End. These two last are perhaps both the same (a. 36). Moreover
we ought to make answer by specifying the proximate causes (not the
remote and ultimate). Thus, What is the Matter of man? We must answer
by specifying the proximate matter; not fire and earth, the ultimate
and elemental (b. 2).

This is the only right way of proceeding in regard to Essences
natural and generable; since the Causes are many, and are what we
seek to know. But the case is different in regard to Essences
natural, yet eternal. Some of these last perhaps have no Matter at
all; or at least a different Matter, having no attribute except local
movability (b. 8. Alexander says in explanation: [Greek: le/gei de\
tê\n xu/mpasan tô=n o)ktô\ sphairô=n e(na/da--u(/lên ou) gennêtê\n
kai\ phthartê\n a)lla\ mo/non kata\ to/pon kinêtê/n]--p. 527, 20-25,
Bon.).

Again, in regard to circumstances which occur by Nature, but not in
the way of Essence, there is no Matter at all: the subject itself is
the Essence. Thus in regard to an eclipse: What is its Cause? What is
its Matter? There is no Matter, except the moon which is affected in
a certain way. What is the Cause, as Movent--here light-destroying?
The earth. Perhaps there is no [Greek: ou(= e(/neka] in the case. But
the Cause in the way of Form is the rational explanation or
definition; and this must include a specification of the Movent
Cause, otherwise it will be obscure. Thus, the eclipse is, privation
of light; and, when you add--by the earth intervening, you then
specify the Movent, and make your definition satisfactory (b. 15).

In defining sleep we ought to say what part of the system is first
affected thereby; but this is not clear. Shall we indicate only the
animal (as substratum)? But this is not enough. We shall be asked,
What part of the animal? Which part first? The heart, or what other
part? Next, by what Cause? Lastly, how is the heart affected, apart
from the rest of the system? To say--Sleep is a certain sort of
immobility, will not be a sufficient definition. We must specify from
what primary affection such immobility arises (p. 1044, b. 20).

Since some things exist, and do not exist, without generation or
destruction (as Forms, and Points, if there be such things as
Points), it is impossible that all Contraries can be generated out of
each other, if every generation be both _aliquid_ and _ex aliquo_.
_Albus homo ex nigro homine_ must be generated in a different way
from _album ex nigro_. Now Matter is only to be found in those cases
where there is generation and change into each other; in other cases,
where no change takes place, there is no Matter. There is a
difficulty in understanding how the Matter of each substance stands
in regard to the contrary modifications of that substance (p. 1044,
b. 29). If the body is potentially healthy, and if disease is the
contrary of health, are we to say that both these states are
potential? Is water potentially both wine and vinegar? Or are we to
say rather that the body is the Matter of health, and that water is
the Matter of wine, in the way of acquisition by nature and by taking
on the Form to which it tends; and that the body is the Matter of
sickness, and wine the Matter of vinegar in the way of privation and
of destruction contrary to nature (b. 34)? However, there is here
some difficulty: Since vinegar is generated out of wine, why is not
wine the Matter of vinegar, and potentially vinegar? Why is not the
living man potentially a corpse? Is it not rather the truth, however,
that these are accidental or contra-natural destructions ([Greek:
kata\ sumbebêko\s ai( phthorai/]--b. 36, _i.e._, not in the regular
appetency and aspirations, according to which the destruction of one
Form gives place to a better); and that through such destruction the
same Matter which belonged to the living man becomes afterwards the
Matter of the corpse; likewise the Matter of wine becomes, through
the like destruction, Matter of vinegar--by a generation like that of
night out of day? Changes of this sort must take place by complete
resolution into the original Materia Prima ([Greek: ei)s tê\n u(/lên
dei= e)panelthei=n]--a. 3); thus, if a living animal comes out of a
dead one, the latter is first resolved into its elements, and then
out of them comes the living animal. So vinegar is first resolved
into water, then out of the water comes wine (a. 5).

We shall now revert to the difficulty recently noticed, about
Definitions and Numbers. What is the cause that each number and each
definition is One? In all cases where there are several parts not put
together as a mere heap, but where there is a Whole besides the
parts, there must be some cause of this kind. With some bodies,
contact is such cause; with others, viscosity ([Greek:
glischro/tês]--p. 1045, a. 12), or some other affection. But the
definition is one complex phrase, not by conjunction like the Iliad,
but One by being the definition of one subject (a. 14). Now what is
it which makes the subject man, One? Why is he One and not Many, say
animal and a biped--more especially if there exist, as the Platonists
say, a Self-animal and a Self-biped? Why are not these two [Greek:
au)ta/] the man ([Greek: dia\ ti/ ga\r ou)k e)kei=na au)ta\ o(
a)/nthrôpo/s e)sti?]--a. 17), so that individuals are men by
participation not of one Self-man, but of the two--Self-animal,
Self-biped? On this theory altogether, it would seem that a man
cannot be One, but must be Many--animal and biped. It is plain that
in this way of investigation the problem is insoluble.

But if, as _we_ say (p. 1045, a. 23), there be on one side Matter, on
the other side Form--on one side that which is in Potency, on the
other side that which is in Act (a. 24)--the problem ceases to be
difficult. The difficulty is the same as it would be if the
definition of _himation_ were, round brass: the word _himation_ would
be the sign of that definition, and the problem would be, What is the
Cause why round and brass are One? But the difficulty vanishes, when
we reply that one is Matter, the other Form. And, in cases where
generation intervenes, what is the Cause why the potential Ens is
actual Ens, except the Efficient ([Greek: para\ to\ poiê=san]--a.
31)? There is no other Cause why the sphere in potency is a sphere in
actuality: such was the [Greek: t.ê.e.] of each ([Greek: tou=t' ê)=n
to\ t.ê.e. e(kate/rô|]--a. 33). Of Matter there are two varieties,
the Cogitable and the Perceivable; and, in the Definition, a part is
always Matter, a part is Form or Energy; as when we define the
circle--a plane figure. (Aristotle argues:--On the Platonic theory
that Ideas or Forms are Entia, separate from particulars,
self-existent, and independent of each other, no cause can be assigned
for the coalescence of any two or more of them into one; _e.g._ animal
and biped, into man. But upon my theory, Form and Matter, Power and
Act, are in their own nature relative to each other. It is their own
inherent nature to coalesce into one, or for Power to pass into Act.
This is the cause of their unity: no other cause can be found or is
necessary. See Alexander, p. 531.)

In those cases where there is no Matter, either cogitable or
perceivable, as in the Categories, Hoc Aliquid, Quale, Quantum, &c.,
each of them is, in itself and at once, both Ens and Unum (p. 1045,
b. 2). Hence neither Ens nor Unum is included in the Definitions, and
the [Greek: t.ê.e.] is, in itself and at once, both Ens and Unum. No
other cause can be assigned why each of these is Ens and Unum; each
of them is so, at once and immediately; yet not as if they were all
included in Ens or Unum as common genera; nor as if they were apart
and separable from particulars (b. 7).

Philosophers, who do not adopt this opinion, resort to various
phrases, all unsatisfactory, to explain the coalescence or unity of
the elements included in the Definition. Some call it [Greek:
me/thexis], but they give no cause of the [Greek: me/thexis]; others
[Greek: sunousi/a], or [Greek: su/ndesmos], or [Greek:
su/nthesis]--of soul with body, as definition of life. But we might
just as well use these phrases on other occasions, and say that to
be well was a synthesis of the soul with health; that the brazen
triangle was a [Greek: su/ndesmos] of brass with triangle; that
white was a synthesis of superficies with whiteness (p. 1045, b. 15).
These phrases carry no explanation; and these philosophers get into
the difficulty by taking a wrong point of departure. They first lay
down Power as different from Entelechy, and then look for an
explanation which makes them one ([Greek: ai)/tion d' o(/ti duna/meôs
kai\ e)ntelechei/as zêtou=si lo/gon e(nopoio\n kai\ diaphora/n]--p.
1045, b. 16, Schwegler observes that the two last words are loosely
put, and that the clear words to express what Aristotle means would
be: [Greek: zêtou=si lo/gon e(nopoio\n u(potithe/ntes
diaphora/n]--Comm. II. p. 154.). But the truth is that Power and
Entelechy are not essentially two, but only different aspects of one
and the same. The Last Matter and the Form are the same; but the
first is in potency, the second in perfect actuality ("Stoff und
Form, Potenzielles und Actuelles, sind eins und dasselbe auf
verschiedenen Entwicklungsstufen"--Schwegler II. p. 151). To enquire
in any particular case what is the cause of this One, is the same as
to enquire generally the cause of Unity. Each thing is a certain One;
the Potential and the Actual are One, in a certain way (b. 20). So
that no other Cause can be found except the Movent or Efficient--that
which moved the matter out of Potency into Actuality. As to those
things which have no Matter, each of them is One immediately and _per
se_ (b. 23).

. . . . . .

Book [Greek: Th].

In discriminating the meanings of Ens, we noticed one [Greek: kata\
du/namin kai\ e)ne/rgeian] (apart from Ens according to the
Categories). We shall now proceed to discuss these two terms [Greek:
du/namis] and [Greek: e(ntele/cheia = e)ne/rgeia] (p. 1045, b. 35).

It is elsewhere mentioned ([Greek: D]. p. 1019) that [Greek:
du/namis] has many senses, of which some (like the geometrical, &c.)
are equivocal or metaphorical, so that we shall pass them over here
(p. 1046, a. 6). But there is one first and proper sense of [Greek:
du/namis], from which many others diverge in different directions of
relationship or analogy (a. 10). That first and proper sense is--a
principle of change _in alio vel quatenus aliud_, or a principle of
change _ab alio vel quatenus aliud_ ([Greek: a)rchê\ metabolê=s e)n
a)/llô| ê)\ ê(=| a)/llo--a)rchê\ metabolê=s u(p' a)/llou ê)\ ê(=|
a)/llo]--a. 11, 14. The same definition is given in terms somewhat
different at p. 1048, a. 28: [Greek: tou=to le/gomen dunato\n o(\
pe/phuke kinei=n a)/llo ê)\ kinei=sthai u(p' a)/llou, ê)\ a(plô=s ê)\
tro/pon tina/.] This Aristotle calls [Greek: ê( kata\ ki/nêsin
du/namis]--expressed by Bonitz, Comm., p. 379: "agendi patiendive
nisum quendam."). The notion of [Greek: du/namis] however extends
more widely than this first sense of [Greek: du/namis kata\
ki/nêsin]. It includes other cases, as where we say that Hermes is
[Greek: duna/mei] in the wood, and that the half foot is [Greek:
duna/mei] in the whole foot (p. 1048, a. 33; Bonitz distinguishes
this last sense as Möglichkeit, from the first sense as Vermögen, p.
379).

We begin by speaking about the first and proper sense--[Greek:
du/namis ê( kata\ ki/nêsin]. One variety thereof is, when a thing has
power of being passively affected so and so--when there resides in
the thing a principle of passive change ([Greek: a)rchê\ metabolê=s
pathêtikê=s]--p. 1046, a. 13) by something else or by itself
_quatenus_ something else. (These last words are added because a sick
man has the [Greek: du/namis] of being cured either by a physician,
or by himself if he be a physician; but then in this last case he is
to be looked upon in two different characters, as physician and as
patient: he cures himself as physician, he is cured as patient.)
Another variety of [Greek: du/namis kata\ ki/nêsin] is, when a thing
has power of resisting change for the worse or destruction by any
exterior principle of change (a. 14); as hardness in iron. Sometimes
this [Greek: du/namis] is restricted to the cases in which a person
can do the thing in question well: no man is said to have the power
of speaking or singing unless he can perform these functions pretty
well (a. 18).

In all these varieties, the general notion of [Greek: du/namis kata\
ki/nêsin] is included (p. 1046, a. 16). The active and passive
[Greek: du/namis] are, in one sense, one and the same; in another
sense, distinct and different. For one of them resides in the
patient, the other in the agent (a. 27): sometimes the two come by
nature together in the same thing; yet the patient does not suffer
from itself as patient, but from itself as agent. Impotence ([Greek:
a)dunami/a]) is the privation contrary to this [Greek:
**du/namis]. Privation has many different meanings (a. 32).

Among these principles of change, some reside in the inanimate
substances, others in the animated; not only in the soul generally,
but also in the rational branch of the soul (p. 1046, a. 38).
Accordingly some [Greek: duna/meis] are Rational, others Irrational.
All arts and constructive sciences are [Greek: duna/meis] (or [Greek:
a)rchai\ metablêtikai\ e)n a)/llô| ê)\ ê(=| a)/llo]--b. 3). In the
rational capacities, the same capacity covers both contraries; in the
irrational, each bears upon one of the two contraries exclusively;
thus, fire will only heat but not chill, while the medical art will
produce either sickness or health. The reason is, that Science is
based upon rational explanations or definitions; and the same
rational explanation declares both the thing itself and the privation
thereof; though not indeed in the same manner: it declares, in a
certain way, both together, and, in a certain way, chiefly the
positive side (b. 10). Accordingly these sciences are sciences of
both the contraries at once: namely, _per se_, of one side of the
Antiphasis; not _per se_, of the other side; since the rational
explanation also declares, directly and _per se_, only one side,
while it declares the other side in a certain way indirectly,
mediately, _per accidens_--_i.e._, by negation and exclusion ([Greek:
a)popha/sei kai\ a)pophora=|].--b. 14). For the Contrary is the
highest grade of privation; and this is the exclusion of one side of
the alternative ([Greek: ê( ga\r ste/rêsis ê( prô/tê to\ e)nanti/on,
au(/tê d' a)pophora\ thate/rou]--p. 1046 b. 15; Bonitz says that
[Greek: to\ e)nanti/on] is the subject of this proposition, and
[Greek: ê( ste/rêsis] the predicate). Both of two contraries cannot
reside, indeed, in the same subject; but Science is a [Greek:
du/namis] through rational explanation or reason in the soul which
has within it a principle of motion; accordingly the soul can bring
to pass either of the two contraries, through reference to the same
rational notion or explanation which comprises both (b. 22).

The Megaric philosophers recognize no [Greek: du/namis] apart from
[Greek: e)ne/rgeia]; affirming that no one has any power, except at
the moment when he is actually exercising it. These philosophers are
wrong (for various reasons indicated: p. 1046, b. 30--p. 1047, a.
20). Power and Act are distinct. A particular event is possible to
happen, yet it does not happen; or possible not to happen, yet it
does happen (p, 1047, a. 22). That is possible, to which, if the act
supervene whereto such possibility relates, nothing impossible will
ensue (a. 25). The name [Greek: e)ne/rgeia], appended to that of
[Greek: e)ntele/cheia] ([Greek: ê( pro\s tê\n e)ntele/cheian
suntitheme/nê]--a. 30), has come to be applied to other things
chiefly from reference to motions; for motion is _par excellence_
[Greek: e)ne/rgeia]. Hence Non-Entia are never said to be moved,
though other predicates may be applied to them: we may call them
[Greek: dianoêta/] and [Greek: e)pithumêta/], but never [Greek:
kinou/mena]; for, if we did, we should be guilty of contradiction,
saying that things which are not [Greek: e)nergei/a|] are [Greek:
e)nergei/a|]. Among the Non-Entia there are some which are Entia
[Greek: duna/mei]: we call them Non-Entia, because they are not
[Greek: e)ntelechei/a|] (b. 2).

If the definition above given of [Greek: to\ dunato/n] be admitted,
we see plainly that no one can say truly: This is possible, yet it
will never happen (p. 1047, b. 3, seq.).

Among all the various [Greek: duna/meis], some are congenital, such
as the perceptive powers ([Greek: ai)sthê/seôn]--p. 1047, b. 31);
others are acquired by practice, such as playing the flute; others by
learning, like the arts: these two last varieties we cannot possess
without having previously exercised ourselves in them actively (b.
34), but the others, which are more of a passive character, we may
possess without such condition. This distinction coincides with that
which was drawn previously between the rational and the irrational
[Greek: duna/meis] or capacities: the rational capacities belonging
only to a soul, and to the rational branch thereof. Now every [Greek:
dunato/n] has its own specialities and conditions: it is itself a
given something, and it is surrounded with concomitants of special
time, place, neighbourhood, &c. (p. 1048, a. 1). The irrational
capacities must necessarily pass into reality, whenever the active
and the passive conditions come together, because there is but one
reality to arise; but the rational capacities not necessarily,
because they tend to either one of two contrary realities, both of
which cannot be produced. Which of the two contraries shall be
brought to reality, will depend upon another authority--the appetency
or deliberate resolution of the soul: to whichsoever of the two, each
possible, such sovereign appetency tends, that one will be brought to
pass, when agent and patient come together and both are in suitable
condition (a. 11); and under those circumstances, it will
_necessarily_ ([Greek: a)na/gkê]--a. 14) be brought to pass. We need
not formally enunciate the clause--"if nothing extrinsic occurs to
prevent it": for this is already implied in the definition of [Greek:
du/namis] which is never affirmed as absolute and unconditional, but
always under certain given conditions (a. 18: [Greek: e)/sti d' ou)
pa/ntôs, a)ll' e)cho/ntôn pô=s]). Accordingly the agent will not be
able to bring about both sides of the alternative at once, even
though appetite or deliberate resolution may prompt him to do it (a.
21).

Having thus gone through the variety of [Greek: du/namis] called
[Greek: ê( kata\ ki/nêsin], we shall now give some explanations of
[Greek: e)ne/rgeia]; in the course of which we shall be able to
illustrate by contrast, the other variety of [Greek: du/namis], which
was indicated above (p. 1048, a. 30). [Greek: E)ne/rgeia] is used
when the thing exists, not [Greek: duna/mei]: meaning by [Greek:
duna/mei] such as Hermes in the wood or the half-yard in the whole
yard. We shall explain our meaning, by giving an induction of
particulars; for definition cannot be given of every thing. We must
group into one view the analogies following ([Greek: ou) dei= panto\s
o(/ron zêtei=n, a)lla\ kai\ to\ a)na/logon sunora=n]--a. 37): As the
person now actually building is to the professional builder not so
engaged; as the animal awake is to the animal asleep; as the animal
seeing is to the animal possessed of good eyes but having them
closed; as that which is severed from matter is to matter ([Greek:
to\ a)pokekrime/non]--b. 3); as the work completed is to the material
yet unworked;--so is [Greek: e)ne/rgeia] to [Greek: du/namis]. The
antithesis is not similar in all these pairs of instances, but there
is a relationship or analogy pervading all ([Greek: ô(s tou=to e)n
tou/tô| ê)\ pro\s tou=to, to/d' e)n tô=|de ê)\ pro\s to/de]--b. 8).
In some of the pairs, the antithesis is the same as that of [Greek:
ki/nêsis pro\s du/namin]; in others, it is the same as that of
[Greek: ou)si/a pro/s tina u(/lên] (b. 9). In one member of each
pair, we have [Greek: ê( e)ne/rgeia a)phôrisme/nê]; in the other
[Greek: to\ dunato/n] (b. 5--[Greek: e)ne/rgeia] here is _reality
severed and determinate_, as contrasted with [Greek: du/namis]
_potentiality huddled together and indeterminate_.--See Schwegler's
note: "Potenzialität und Aktualität sind reine
Verhältnissbegriffe"--p. 172, seq.). But in all the above-named
examples, that which is now [Greek: duna/mei] may come actually to
be [Greek: e)nergei/a|]: the person now sleeping may awake; the
person whose eyes are now closed may open them and see; the Hermes
now in the wood may be brought out of the wood and exist as a real
statue. It is otherwise with The Infinite, Vacuum, &c. These exist
[Greek: duna/mei] only, and can never come to exist [Greek:
e)nergei/a|], or independently. The Infinite can exist [Greek:
e)nergei/a|] only for our cognition. The fact that the bisection
thereof is never exhausted--that we may go on dividing as long as
we choose--gives to the potential Infinite a certain actuality,
though it cannot be truly separated (b. 16).

We must farther explain in what cases it is proper to say that a
thing is [Greek: duna/mei], and in what cases it is not proper. You
cannot properly say that earth is potentially a man: you may perhaps
say that the semen is potentially a man; yet even _this_ not
certainly, since other conditions besides semen are required (p.
1049, a. 2). The physician cannot cure every patient, yet neither is
the cure altogether a matter of chance ([Greek: a)po\ tu/chês]--a.
4): there is a certain measure of cure possible, and that is called
[Greek: to\ u(giai=non duna/mei]. The definition thereof, taken from
the side of the agent, would be--that which will come to pass if he
wills it, without any impediment from without; from the side of the
patient--when no impediment occurs from within him (a. 8). In like
manner, a house exists [Greek: duna/mei], when all the matter for it
is brought together, without need either of addition or subtraction
or change, and when there is no internal impediment; and so with
other products of art, where the principle of generation is extrinsic
to themselves. In natural products, where the principle of generation
is intrinsic, we treat them as potentially existing, when this
principle is in a condition to realize itself through itself,
assuming no external impediments to interfere. Thus we do not call
the semen potentially a man, because, before it becomes such, it must
undergo change in something else, and therefore stands in need of
some other principle; we call it so only when it is in such
conditions that its own principle suffices. Earth is not said to be a
statue [Greek: duna/mei], until it has first been changed into brass
(a. 17). We call the product not by the name of the Matter itself,
but by an adjective appellation derived from the next adjacent
Matter; thus we call a box, not wood, but wooden: wood is then a box
[Greek: duna/mei]. But we say this only of the proximate or immediate
Matter, not of the remote or primary Matter. We must go back through
successive stages to the first or most remote Matter; thus wood is
not earth, but earthy: earth therefore is potentially wood. The earth
may be aeriform; the air may be fiery; the fire has no analogous
adjective whereby it can be called, and is thus the first or last
Matter. But it is not said to be potentially any thing except the
[Greek: su/ntheton] combined with Form immediately above it. Matter
may be either proximate or remote: Potentiality is affirmed only of
the proximate Matter.

Since all the different meanings of Prius have been enumerated and
distinguished, it is plain that in all those meanings Actuality is
_prius_ as compared with Potentiality: whether the [Greek: du/namis]
be [Greek: a)rchê\ metablêtikê\ ( = kinêtikê\) e)n a)/llô| ê(=|
a)/llo], like Art; or [Greek: a)rchê\ kinêtikê\ ê)\ statikê\ e)n
au)tô=| ê(=| au)to/], like Nature (p. 1049, b. 5-10). Actuality is
_prius_ both [Greek: lo/gô|] and [Greek: ou)si/a|]: it is also
_prius_ [Greek: chro/nô|] in a certain sense, though not in a certain
other sense.

It is _prius_ [Greek: lo/gô|], because the Actual is included in the
definition of the Potential; that is, it must be presupposed and
foreknown, before you can understand what the Potential is (p. 1049,
b. 17). You explain [Greek: oi)kodomiko/s] or [Greek: o(ratiko/s] by
saying that he is [Greek: duna/menos oi)kodomei=n ê)\ o(ra=n]: you
explain [Greek: o(rato/n] by saying that it is [Greek: dunato\n
o(ra=sthai]: [Greek: to\ dunato/n], in its first and absolute
meaning, is [Greek: dunato/n] because it may come into Actuality (b.
13).

It is _prius_ [Greek: chronô=|] in the sense that the Potential
always presupposes an Actual identical _specie_, though not identical
_numero_, with that Actual to which the Potential tends. Take a man
now existing and now seeing, or corn now ripe in the field: these
doubtless, before they came into their present condition, must have
pre-existed in Potentiality; that is, there must have pre-existed a
certain matter--seed or a something capable of vision--which at one
time was not yet in a state of Actuality (p. 1049, b. 23). But prior
to this matter there must have existed other Actualities, by which
this matter was generated: the Actual is always generated out of its
Potential by a prior Actual, _e.g._, a man by a man, a musical man by
a musical man; there being always some prior movent, which must be
itself already in Actuality (b. 27). We have already declared that
every thing generated is something generated out of something, and by
something which is identical in species with the thing generated (b.
29). Hence it seems that there can be no builder who has built
nothing, no harper who has never harped; for the man who is learning
to harp learns by harping (b. 32); which gave occasion to the
sophistical puzzle--That one, who does not possess the knowledge,
will nevertheless do that to which the knowledge relates. The learner
does not possess the knowledge; yet still he must have possessed some
fragments of the knowledge: just as, in every thing which is in
course of generation, some fraction must have been already generated;
in every thing which is moved, some fraction has been already moved
(b. 36).

Lastly, Actuality is _prius_ as compared with Potentiality (not
merely [Greek: lo/gô|, kai\ chro/nô| e)/stin ô(/s], but also) [Greek:
ou)si/a|] (p. 1050, a. 4). In the first place, that which is latest
in generation is first in Form and in Essence; a man compared with a
child, man as compared with semen. Man already possesses the Form,
semen does not. Next, every thing generated marches or gradually
progresses towards its principle and towards its end. The principle
is the [Greek: ou(= e(/neka], and the generation is for the sake of
the end. Now the end or consummation is Actuality, and for the sake
of this the Potentiality is taken on ([Greek: lamba/netai]--a. 10).
Animals do not see in order that they may have sight; they have sight
in order that they may see: they do not theorize in order that they
may possess theoretical aptitude, but the converse; except indeed
those who are practising as learners. Moreover, Matter is said to
exist potentially, because it may come into Form; but, when it exists
actually, it is then in Form (a. 16). (Alexander says: [Greek: ô(/ste
ka)\n tou/tô| prote/ra (ê( e)ne/rgeia) ô(s _e)pheto\n_ kai\ ta/sson
kai\ ei)s ko/smon a)/gon duna/meôs]--p. 559, 10, Bon.) The case is
the same where the end is nothing beyond a particular mode of motion
(_e.g._, dancing): the dancing-master has attained his end when he
exhibits his pupil actually dancing. In natural productions this is
no less true than in artificial: Nature has attained her end, when
the product comes into [Greek: e)ne/rgeia]; that is, when it is
actually at work, from whence the name [Greek: e)ne/rgeia] is derived
([Greek: to\ ga\r e)/rgon te/los, ê( de\ e)ne/rgeia to\ e)/rgon--kai\
suntei/nei pro\s tê\n e)ntele/cheian]--a. 23).

In some cases (as we have often remarked) the ultimatum is use,
without any ulterior product distinct from the use, _e.g._, the act
of seeing is the ultimatum of the visual power (p. 1050, a. 24); in
other cases there is something ulterior and distinct as a house from
the building power. In the former of these cases, Actuality is the
end of [Greek: du/namis]; in the latter it is more the end than
[Greek: du/namis]. ([Greek: O(/môs ou)the\n ê(=tton e)/ntha me\n
te/los e)/ntha de\ ma=llon te/los tê=s duna/meô/s e)stin; ê( ga\r
oi)kodo/mêsis e)n tô=| oi)kodomoume/nô|, kai\ a(/ma gi/gnetai kai\
e)/sti tê=| oi)ki/a|]--a. 29. This passage is obscure: see the
comments of Alexander, with the notes of Schwegler and Bonitz, who
accuse Alexander of misunderstanding it; though it appears to me that
neither of them is quite clear. I understand Aristotle to reason as
follows:--[Greek: O(/rasis] is the [Greek: te/los], the [Greek:
e)ne/rgeia], the consummation of the visual power called [Greek:
o)/psis]; but [Greek: oi)kodo/mêsis], is not the [Greek: te/los], the
[Greek: e)ne/rgeia], the consummation of the building power called
[Greek: oi)kodomikê/]. This last has its [Greek: te/los], [Greek:
e)ne/rgeia], consummation, in the ulterior product [Greek: oi)ki/a].
Nevertheless [Greek: oi)kodo/mêsis], residing as it does [Greek: e)n
tô=| oi)kodomoume/nô|], and coming into existence simultaneously with
the house, is more the end, more akin to the end or consummation than
the building power called [Greek: oi)kodomikê/].)

In cases where there is an ulterior product beyond and apart from the
exercise of the power, the Actuality (consummation) resides in that
product (p. 1050, a. 31). In cases where is no such ulterior product,
the Actuality resides in the same subject wherein the power resides.
Thus sight resides in him who sees, and life in the soul. Hence also
happiness resides in the soul; for happiness is a certain kind of
life (b. 1).

It is thus plain that Actuality is the Essence and the Form, and that
it is _prius_ [Greek: tê=| ou)si/a|] compared with Potentiality. And,
as has been already remarked, one Actuality always precedes another,
in time, up to the eternal Prime Movent (p. 1050, b. 5). Moreover,
[Greek: e)ne/rgeia] is _prius_ to [Greek: du/namis] in respect to
speciality and dignity ([Greek: kuriôte/rôs]--b. 6). For eternal
things are _priora_ in essence to destructible things, and nothing is
eternal [Greek: duna/mei], as the reason of the case will show us (b.
8).

All Potentiality applies at once to both sides of the Antiphasis--to
the affirmative as well as to the negative. That which is not
possible, will never occur to any thing; but every thing which is
possible may never come to Actuality ([Greek: to\ dunato\n de\ pa=n
e)nde/chetai mê\ e)nergei=n]--p. 1050, b. 10). That which is possible
to be, is also possible not to be. Now that which is possible not to
be, may perhaps not be ([Greek: e)nde/chetai mê\ ei)=nai]--b. 13);
but that which may not be, is destructible, either absolutely (that
is, in respect to Essence), or in respect to such portions of its
nature as may not be, that is, in respect to locality or quantity or
quality. Accordingly, of those things which are absolutely, or in
respect to Essence, indestructible, nothing exists [Greek: duna/mei]
absolutely or in respect to Essence, though it may exist [Greek:
duna/mei] in certain respects, as in respect to quality or locality);
all of them exist [Greek: e)nergei/a|] (b. 18). Nor does any thing
exist [Greek: duna/mei], which exists by necessity; yet the things
which exist by necessity are first of all (_i.e._, _priora_ in regard
to every thing else); for, if they did not exist, nothing would have
existed. Moreover, if there be any Eternal Motion, or any Eternal
Motum, it cannot be Motum [Greek: duna/mei] except in respect to
whence and whither; in that special respect, it may have Matter or
Potentiality (b. 21).

Accordingly, the Sun, the Stars, and the whole Heaven, are always at
work, and there is no danger of their ever standing still, which some
physical philosophers fear ([Greek: a)ei\ e)nergei= o( ê(/lios]--p.
1050, b. 22); nor are they fatigued in doing this. Motion with them
is not a potentiality of both members of the Antiphasis, either to be
moved or not to be moved. If the fact were so--if their Essence were
Matter and Power, and not Act--the perpetual continuity of (one side
of the alternative) motion would be toilsome to them; but it is not
toilsome, since Actuality is their very Essence (b. 28). Likewise
mutable things (which are destructible), such as earth and fire,
imitate these indestructible entities, being ever at work; for these
elements possess motion by themselves and in themselves, each
changing into another (b. 30; compare De Gen. et Corr. p. 337, a. 2).
But the other [Greek: duna/meis] are all potentialities of both sides
of the Antiphasis, or of both alternatives. The rational [Greek:
duna/meis] can cause motion in such and such way, or not in such and
such way; the irrational [Greek: duna/meis] may be present or absent,
and thus embrace both sides of the alternative (b. 33).

Hence we draw another argument for not admitting the Platonic
doctrine of Ideas, affirmed by the dialecticians ([Greek: oi( e)n
toi=s lo/gois]--p. 1050, b. 35). If there existed such Ideas, they
would be only [Greek: duna/neis**duna/meis] in respect to the [Greek:
e)ne/rgeia] existing in their particular embodiments. Thus an
individual cognizing man would be much more cognizant than [Greek:
au)toepistê/mê]; a particular substance in motion would be much more
in motion than [Greek: ki/nêsis] or [Greek: au)toki/nêsis] itself.
For [Greek: au)toepistê/mê] or [Greek: au)toki/nêsis] are only
[Greek: duna/meis] to the [Greek: e)pistê=mo/n ti] or the [Greek:
kinou/meno/n ti], which belong to [Greek: e)ne/rgeia] (b. 36). (We
may remark that in the Platonic Parmenides, p. 134, C., an argument
the very opposite to this is urged. It is there contended that
Cognitio _per se_ (the Idea) must be far more complete and accurate
than any cognition which _we_ possess.)

It is thus plain that [Greek: e)ne/rgeia] is _prius_ to [Greek:
du/namis], and to every principle of change (p. 1051, a. 2). It is
also better and more honourable than [Greek: du/namis] even in the
direction of good. We have already observed that [Greek: du/namis]
always includes both of two contraries, in the way of alternative:
one of these must be the good, the other the bad. Now the actuality
of good is better than the potentiality of good; the actuality of
health is better than the potentiality of health, which latter must
also include the potentiality of sickness, while the actuality of
health excludes the actuality of sickness. On the other hand, the
actuality of evil is worse than the potentiality of evil; for the
potentiality is neither of the two contraries or both of them at once
(a. 17). Hence we see that evil is nothing apart from particular
things; since it is posterior in its nature even to Potentiality:
there is therefore neither evil, nor error, nor destruction, in any
of the principia or eternal Essences (a. 19). (The note of Bonitz
here is just:--"Quem in hac argumentatione significavi
errorem--judicium morale de bono et malo immisceri falso iis rebus,
a quibus illud est alienum--ei non dissimilem Arist. in proximâ
argumentatione, si recte ejus sententiam intelligo, videtur
admisisse, quum quidem malum non esse [Greek: para\ ta\ pra/gmata],
seorsim ac per se existens, demonstrare conatur." Aristotle here as
elsewhere confounds the idea of Good, Perfection, Completeness, &c.,
with that of essential Priority. But what he says here--[Greek: ou)k
e)/sti to\ kako\n para\ ta\ pra/gmata]--can hardly be reconciled with
what he says in the Physica (pp. 189, 191, 192) about [Greek:
ste/rêsis], which he includes among the three [Greek: a)rchai/], and
which he declares to be [Greek: kakopoio/s]--p. 192, a. 15.)

Lastly, we discover geometrical truths by drawing visible diagrams,
and thus translating the Potentialities into Actuality. If these
diagrams were ready drawn for us by nature, there would be no
difficulty in seeing these truths; but, as the case stands, the
truths only inhere in the figures potentially (p. 1051, a. 23:
[Greek: ei) d' ê)=n diê|rêne/na, phanera\ a)\n ê)=n; nu=n d'
e)nupa/rchei duna/mei]). If the triangle had a line ready drawn
parallel to its side, we should have seen at once that its three
angles were equal to two right angles. Potential truths are thus
discovered by being translated into Actuality. The reason of this is,
that the Actuality is itself an act of cogitation, so that the
Potentiality springs from Actuality ([Greek: ai)/tion d' o(/ti
no/êsis ê( e)ne/rgeia; ô(/st' e)x e)nergei/as ê( du/namis]--a. 30. It
is not therefore true--what the Platonists say--that the mathematical
bodies and their properties are [Greek: ou)si/ai kai\ e)nergei=ai]:
they are only [Greek: duna/meis], and they are brought into being by
our cogitation or abstraction). It is true that each individual
diagram drawn is posterior to the power of drawing it (a. 32).

Having gone through the discussion of Ens according to the first of
the ten Categories, and of Ens Potential and Actual, we have now to
say something about Ens as True or False in the strictest sense of
the words ([Greek: to\ de\ kuriô/tata o)\n a)lêthe\s ê)\
pseu=dos]--p. 1051, b. 1). These words mean, in reference to things,
either that they are conjoined or that they are disjoined. To speak
truth is to affirm that things which are disjoined or conjoined in
fact, are disjoined or conjoined; to speak falsely, the reverse. The
appeal is to the fact: it is not because we truly call you white,
that you are white; it is because you really are white, that we who
call you white speak truth (b. 9). If there are some things which
are always conjoined, others always disjoined, others again
sometimes conjoined sometimes disjoined, propositions in reference
to the first two classes affirming conjunction or disjunction, will
be always true or always false, while in reference to the third
class propositions may be either true or false, according to the
case (b. 10).

But what shall we say in regard to things Uncompounded? In respect to
them, what is truth or falsehood--to be or not to be? ([Greek: ta\
a)su/ntheta]--p. 1051, b. 18). If we affirm white of the wood, or
incommensurability of the diagonal, such conjunction of predicate and
subject may be true or false; but how, if there be no predicate
distinct from the subject? Where there is no distinction between
predicate and subject, where the subject stands alone,--in these
cases, there is no truth or falsehood in the sense explained above:
no other truth except that the mind apprehends and names the subject,
or fails to do so. You either know the subject, or you do not know
it: there is no alternative but that of knowledge or ignorance; to be
deceived is impossible about the question _Quid est_ ([Greek: to\
me\n thigei=n kai\ pha/nai a)lêthe/s, ou) ga\r tau)to\ kata/phasis
kai\ pha/sis, to\ d' a)gnoei=n mê\ thigga/nein; a)patêthê=nai ga\r
peri\ to\ ti/ e)stin ou)k e)/stin a)ll' ê)\ kata\ sumbebêko/s]--b.
25. The last words are thus explained by Bonitz: "nisi forte per
abusum quendam vocabuli ipsam ignorantiam dixeris errorem"--p. 411.).
All these uncompounded subjects exist actually, not potentially: if
the latter had been true, they would have been generated and
destroyed; but Ens Ipsum ([Greek: to\ o)\n au)to/]--b. 29) is neither
generated nor destroyed; for, if it had been, it must have been
generated out of something. Respecting all those things which exist
in Essence and Actuality, you cannot be deceived: you may apprehend
them in cogitation, or fail to apprehend them. The essential question
respecting them is, whether they exist in such or such manner or not;
as it is respecting the One and the Uncompounded--whether, being an
existent, it exists thus and thus or not (b. 35). Truth consists in
apprehending or cogitating them (p. 1052, a. 1): the contrary thereof
is non-apprehension of them or ignorance ([Greek: a)/gnoia]), yet not
analogous to blindness; for that would be equivalent to having no
apprehensive intelligence ([Greek: ô(s a)\n ei) to\ noêtiko\n o(/lôs
mê\ e)/choi tis]--a. 3; one is not absolutely without [Greek:
noêtiko/n], but one's [Greek: no/êsis] does not suffice for
apprehending these particular objects).

Respecting objects immoveable and unchangeable, and apprehended as
such, it is plain that there can be no mistake as to the When
([Greek: kata\ to/ pote/]--p. 1052, a. 5; _i.e._, a proposition which
is true of them at one time cannot be false at another time). No man
will suppose a triangle to have its three angles equal to two right
angles at one time, but not at another. Even in these unchangeables,
indeed, a man may mistake as to the What: he may suppose that there
is no even number which is a prime number, or he may suppose that
there are some even numbers which are prime, others which are not so;
but, respecting any particular number, he will never suppose it to be
sometimes prime, sometimes not prime (a. 10).

(In respect to the meaning of [Greek: ta\ a)su/ntheta]--p. 1051, b.
17--Bonitz and Schwegler differ. Bonitz says, Comm. p. 409:
"Compositæ quas dicit non sunt intelligendæ eæ quæ ex pluribus
elementis coaluerunt, sed eæ potius, in quibus cum substantia
conjungitur accidens aliquod, veluti homo albus, homo sedens,
diagonalis irrationalis, et similia." Schwegler says, p. 187: "Unter
den [Greek: mê\ sunthetai\ ou)si/ai] versteht Arist. näher diejenigen
Substanzen, die nicht ein [Greek: su/ntheton] oder [Greek: su/nolon]
sondern [Greek: a)/neu u(/lês (ou) duna/mei)] und schlechthin [Greek:
e)nergei/a|], also reine Formen sind, und als solche kein Werden und
Vergehen haben." Of these two different explanations, I think that
the explanation given by Bonitz is the more correct, or at least the
more probable.)

. . . . . .

Book [Greek: L].

We have to speculate respecting Essence; for that which we are in
search of is the principles and causes of Essences (p. 1069, a. 18).
If we look upon the universe as one whole, Essence is the first part
thereof: if we look upon it as a series of distinct units ([Greek:
ei) tô=| e)phexê=s], a. 20), even in that view [Greek: ou)si/a]
stands first, [Greek: poio/n] next, [Greek: poso/n] third; indeed
these last are not Entia at all, strictly speaking (a. 21)--I mean,
for example, qualities and movements, and negative attributes such as
not-white and not-straight; though we do talk of these last too as
Entia, when we say _Est non-album_. Moreover Essence alone, and none
of the other Categories, is separable. The old philosophers ([Greek:
oi( a)rchai=oi]) are in the main concurrent with us on this point,
that Essence is _prius_ to all others; for they investigated the
principles, the elements, and the causes of Essence. The philosophers
of the present day (Plato, &c.) declare Universals, rather than
Particulars, to be Essences; for the genera are universal, which
these philosophers, from devoting themselves to dialectical
discussions, affirm to be more properly considered as Principles and
Essences (a. 28); but the old philosophers considered particular
things to be Essences, as fire and earth, for example, not the common
body or Body in general ([Greek: ou) to\ koino\n sô=ma]--a. 30).

Now there are three Essences. The Perceivable includes two varieties:
one, the Perishable, acknowledged by all, _e.g._, animals and plants;
the other Eternal, of which we must determine the elements, be they
many or one. There is also the Immoveable, which some consider to be
separable ([Greek: a)/llê de\ a)ki/nêtos kai\ tau/tên tine\s ei)=nai
phasi chôristê/n]--p. 1069, a. 33; [Greek: ou)si/a noêtê\ kai\
a)ki/nêtos]--Schwegler's note): either recognizing two varieties
thereof, distinct from each other--the Forms and Mathematical Entia;
or not recognizing Forms as separable Entia, but only the
Mathematical Entia (a. 36). Now the first, or Perceivable Essences,
belong to physical science, since they are moveable or endued with
motion; the Immoveable Essences, whether there be two varieties of
them or only one, belong to a science distinct from physical. The
Perceivable and the Immoveable Essences have no common principles
(b. 2).

The Perceivable Essence is subject to change ([Greek: metablêtê/]).
Since change takes place either out of Opposites or out of
Intermediates, and not out of every variety of Opposites, but only
out of Contraries ([Greek: e)k tê=s oi)kei/as a)popha/seôs, e)k tê=s
oi)kei/as sterê/seôs]--Alexander, pp. 644, 645, Bon.; the voice,
_e.g._, is not white, yet change does not take place from voice to
white, these being disparates, or of different genera: [Greek: ta\
ge/nei diaphe/ronta ou)k e)/chei o(do\n ei)s a)/llêla]--I. iv. p.
1055, a. 6), there must of necessity be a certain Substratum which
changes into the contrary condition; for contraries do not change
into each other. The substratum remains, but the contraries do not
remain: there is therefore a third something besides the contraries;
and that is Matter (p. 1069, b. 9). Since then the varieties of
change are four: (1) [Greek: ge/nesis] and [Greek: phthora/ (kata\
to\ ti/)], (2) [Greek: au)/xêsis kai\ phthi/sis (kata\ to\ poso/n)],
(3) [Greek: a)lloi/ôsis (kata\ to\ pa/thos] or [Greek: kata\ to\
poio/n]), (4) [Greek: phora/ (kata\ to/pon] or [Greek: kata\ to\
pou=]), each of these changes will take place into its respective
contrary: the Matter will necessarily change, having the potentiality
of both contraries (b. 14). Ens being two-fold, all change takes
place out of Ens Potentiâ into Ens Actu, _e.g._, out of potential
white into actual white; and the like holds for Increase and
Decrease. Thus not only may there be generation from Non-Ens
accidentally but all generation takes place also out of Ens; that is,
out of Ens Potentiâ, not Ens Actu (b. 20). This Ens Potentiâ is what
Anaxagoras really means by his Unum, which is a better phrase than
[Greek: o(mou= pa/nta]; what Empedokles and Anaxagoras mean by their
[Greek: mi=gma]; what Demokritus means when he says [Greek: o(mou=
pa/nta]. They mean that all things existed at once potentially,
though not actually; and we see that these philosophers got partial
hold of the idea of Matter ([Greek: ô(/ste tê=s u(/lês a)\n ei)=en
ê(mme/noi]--b. 24). All things subject to change possess Matter, but
each of them a different Matter; even the eternal things which are
not generated but moved in place, possess Matter--not generated, but
_from whence whither_ (_i.e._, the Matter of local movement pure and
simple--direction: [Greek: kai\ tô=n a)i+di/ôn o(/sa mê\ gennêta\
kinêta\ de\ phora=|, a)ll' ou) gennêtê/n (u(/lên), a)lla\ po/then
poi=]--b. 26).

Since there are three varieties of Non-Ens (p. 1069, b. 27; Alexander
and Bonitz explain this [Greek: trichô=s] differently), it may seem
difficult to determine, out of which among the three Generation takes
place. But the answer is, that the Potential Ens is not potential of
every thing alike and at haphazard, but potential in each case from
something towards something ([Greek: ei) dê\ ti/ e)sti duna/mei,
a)ll' o(/môs ou) tou= tucho/ntos, a)ll' e(/teron e)x e(te/rou]--b.
29). Nor is it enough to tell us that all things are huddled together
([Greek: o(mou= pa/nta chrê/mata]--b. 30); for they differ in respect
to Matter or Potentiality. If this were not so, how is it that they
are of infinite diversity, and not all One? The Noûs (_i.e._,
according to the theory of Anaxagoras) is One; so that, if the Matter
were One also, it would become in actuality that which it was at
first in potentiality, and the result would be all One and the Same
(b. 32).

The Causes are thus three and the Principles are three: the pair of
Contraries, one of them Form ([Greek: lo/gos kai\ ei)=dos]), the
other Privation, and the third Matter (p. 1069, b. 35). But we must
keep in mind that neither Materia Prima nor Forma Prima is generated.
For in all Change, there is something (the Matter) which undergoes
change; something by which the change is effected (the Prime Movent,
[Greek: u(ph' ou(= me/n, tou= prô/tou kinou=ntos]--p. 1070, a. 1);
and something into which the change takes place (the Form). The brass
becomes round; but, if both the brass becomes and the round becomes,
you will be condemned to an infinite regression: you must stop
somewhere ([Greek: a)na/gkê dê\ stê=nai]--a. 4). Moreover, every
Essentia is generated out of another Essentia of the same name and
form ([Greek: e)k sunônu/mou]--a. 5). All generated things proceed
either from Nature, Art, Fortune, or Spontaneity. It is Nature, where
the principle or beginning is in the subject itself; it is Art, where
the principle or beginning is in something apart from the subject;
Fortune is the privation of Art; Spontaneity is the privation of
Nature ([Greek: ai( de\ loipai\ ai)/tiai sterê/seis tou/tôn]--a. 9).
Essentiæ are threefold: (1) Matter, which appears to be Hoc Aliquid
but is not so, for detached members or fragments, simply touching
each other without coalescing, are matter and substratum (_i.e._,
prepared for something ulterior); (2) Nature, which is really Hoc
Aliquid--a certain definite condition, into which generation takes
place ([Greek: ê( de\ phu/sis kai\ to/de ti, ei)s ê(/n, kai\ e(/xis
tis]--a. 12); (3) The Concrete of the two preceding--the individual
object called Sokrates or Kallias. In some cases there is no Hoc
Aliquid except in this Concrete or Compound; thus in artificial
objects or productions, such as a house or health, there is no Form
except the Art itself: the ideal house, pre-existing in the mind of
the builder, is generated and destroyed in a different sense from the
real house. It is in the case of natural objects, if in any case,
that there exists a Hoc Aliquid independent of the concrete
individual (a. 17).

Hence Plato was not wrong in saying that Forms were coextensive with
natural objects ([Greek: o(po/sa phu/sei]--p. 1070, a. 18), if there
are Forms distinct from these objects: such as fire, flesh, head,
which are all properly Matter. The Last Matter (or that which has
come most under the influence of Form) belongs to that which is in
the fullest sense Essentia (or the individual concrete named Sokrates
or Kallias--a. 20). The Moving Causes pre-exist, as real individual
beings or objects: the Formal Causes come into existence
simultaneously with the individual real compound. When the patient
becomes well, then health comes at the same time into existence: when
the brazen sphere comes, the sphericity of it comes at the same time
(a. 24). Whether any thing of the Form continues after the
dissolution of the individual compound, is a problem to be
investigated (a. 25). In some cases nothing hinders but what it may
continue; for example, the soul may be of such a nature: I do not
mean every soul--for every soul perhaps cannot continue--but the
[Greek: Nou=s] or rational soul (a. 27). Still it is plain that this
affords no support to the theory of self-existent separate Ideas; for
every individual man is begotten by another individual man. In like
manner also with respect to the arts; for the medical art affords the
Form or rational explanation of health (a. 30; _i.e._, health is
generated, not by the Idea of Health, but by the medical art, or by
the artist in whom that art is embodied).

Causes and principles, in one point of view, are different: different
subjects; but in another point of view, they are the same for all;
that is, if we speak generally and according to analogy (if we
confine ourselves to the most general terms, Form, Privation, Matter,
&c.). In respect to Essentia, Relatio, and the remainder of the
Categories, a difficulty arises to say whether the causes, elements,
and principles of all the Categories are the same. It would be
strange if they were all the same; because then Essentiæ, as well as
Relata, would proceed out of the same causes and elements. For, what
can these latter be? They cannot be extra-categorical; since there
exists no general class apart from or besides Essentia and the other
Categories (p. 1070, b. 1). Nor can any one Category be the element
of the others: for the element is _prius_ to that of which it is the
element. Nor again can Essentia be the element of Relata; nor is any
one of the nine Categories the element of Essentia. Again, how is it
possible that the elements of all the Categories can be the same? No
element can be the same as that compound of which it is an element:
neither B nor A can be the same as B A. If, therefore, there were
such elements, they must be extra-categorical; which is impossible.
Nor can the element in question (the supposed one and the same) be
any cogitable, such as Ens or Unum; for every individual Concrete is
both Ens and Unum and the element cannot be identical with the
compound put together out of it. Neither Essentia nor Relatio could
be said to exist, if Ens were the element out of which they are
composed; but these Categories exist necessarily: therefore there is
no one and the same element common to all the Categories (b. 9).

Yet we ought perhaps rather to repeat, what was observed before, that
in one sense, the elements of all are the same; in another sense,
different. Take for example the perceivable bodies. We find here hot
as the Form, cold as the Privation; as Matter, there is that which
is, primarily and _per se_, both hot and cold potentially: the hot
and the cold are both Essentiæ; likewise other things of which these
are the principles, _e.g._, flesh and bone, which of necessity are
different from the principles out of which they proceed (b. 15).
Flesh and bone have these elements and principles; other things have
other elements and principles. The same specific principles cannot be
assigned to all, but only principles analogous to these in each case,
as saying, in general terms, that there are three principles--Form,
Privation, Matter. Each of these is different in every different
genus; thus in colour, the principles are white, black, surface,
light, darkness, air, and out of these are generated day and night
(b. 21).

The three preceding causes are all intrinsic or immanent ([Greek:
e)nupa/rchonta]). But there are other causes also extrinsic, such as
the Movent. So that Principle and Element are not exactly identical;
for Principle as well as Cause includes all the four: [Greek: to\
kinou=n ê)\ i(sta/n] is a Principle, and is itself an Essentia (p.
1070, b. 25). Thus the analogous Elements are three, while the
Principles or Causes are four; but the four are specifically
different in each different case. Thus, health is Form; sickness is
Privation; body is Matter; the medical art is Movent. House is Form;
disorder of a certain sort is Privation; bricks are Matter; the
building art is Movent. We thus make out four Causes; yet, in a
certain sense, there will be only three (b. 32). For, in natural
products, a man is the Movent Cause of a man; in artificial products
([Greek: e)n toi=s a)po\ dianoi/as]) the Movent is Form or Privation.
In a certain sense, the medical art is health, and the building art
is the Form of a house, and a man begets a man. And farther, over and
above these special movent causes, there is the Primum Movens of all
(b. 35).

We distinguish what is separable from what is not separable. Now
Essentiæ, and they only, are separable; accordingly they are the
causes of every thing else, since without Essentiæ there cannot be
either affections or movements (p. 1071, a. 2). Such causes would be
soul and body, or reason, appetite, and body. Again, in another
sense, the principles of all things are generically the same, though
specifically different; such are Potentia and Actus. In some cases,
the same thing exists now potentially, at another time actually; thus
wine, though actually wine, is potentially vinegar; flesh is actually
flesh, potentially a man, Potentia and Actus will merge in the
above-mentioned causes--Form, Privation, Matter, Movent (a. 7). For
the Form (if it be separable), the Concrete (of Form and Matter), and
Privation (like darkness or sickness)--all these exist actually;
while Matter exists potentially, capable either of Form or Privation.
Things differ potentially and actually sometimes through difference
in the Matter, sometime through difference in the Form. Thus, the
cause of a man is, in the way of Matter, the elements fire and earth;
in the way of Form his own Form, and the same Form in another
individual--his father and besides these, the Sun with its oblique
motion; which last neither Matter, nor Form, nor Privation, nor the
like Form in another individual, but a Movent Cause ([Greek: a)lla\
kinou=nta]--a. 17).

We must remember, besides, that some things may be described in
general terms, others cannot be so described. The first principles of
all things are, speaking in general terms, Hoc Primum Actu and Aliud
Primum Potentiâ. These universals do not really exist (p. 1071, a.
19), for the principium of all individuals is some other individual.
Man indeed is the principium of the Universal Man but no Universal
Man exists (a. 21). Peleus is the principium of Achilles; your
father, of you; this B, of that B A; B, the universal, of B A the
universal. Next (after the Movent) come the Forms of Essences; but
the different genera thereof (as has been already stated), colours,
sounds, essences, quantities, &c., have different causes and
elements, though the same when described in general terms and by
analogy; also different individuals in the same species have
different causes and elements, not indeed different in species, but
different individually; that is, your Matter, your Movent, your Form,
are different from mine, though in general terms and definition they
are the same ([Greek: tô=| katho/lou de\ lo/gô| tau)ta/]--a. 29).

When therefore, we enquire, What are the principles or elements of
Essences, of Relata, of Qualities &c., and whether they are the same
or different? it is plain that, generically speaking (allowing for
difference of meaning--[Greek: pollachô=s], p. 1071, a. 31), they are
the same in each; but, speaking distributively and with reference to
particulars, they are different, and not the same. In the following
sense ([Greek: ô(di/]--a. 34), they are the same, namely, in the way
of Analogy ([Greek: tô=| a)na/logon]). They are always Matter, Form,
Privation, the Movent; hence the causes of Essences are causes of all
other things, since, when Essences disappear, all the rest disappears
along with them: besides all these, there is the Primum Movens
Actuale, common to all ([Greek: e)/ti to\ prô=ton e)ntelechei/a|]--a.
36). In the following sense, again, they are different--when we cease
to speak of genera, and pass from equivocal terms to particulars:
wherever there are different opposites (as white and black, health
and sickness) and wherever there are different Matters ([Greek: kai\
e)/ti ai( u(=lai]--p. 1071, b. 1; [Greek: u(=lai] in the plural,
rare).

We have thus declared, respecting the principles of Perceivable
Essences, what and how many they are; in what respect the same, and
in what respect they are different. Essences are threefold; two
Physical and one Immoveable. We shall proceed to speak of this last.
There exists, of necessity, some Eternal, Immoveable Essence. For
Essences are the first of all existent things; and, if they all be
perishable, every thing is perishable. But it is impossible that
Motion can ever have been generated or can ever be destroyed; for it
always existed: it is eternal. There is the like impossibility about
Time: for, if Time did not exist, there could be nothing _prius_ and
nothing _posterius_ (p. 1071, b. 8). Both Motion and Time are thus
eternal; both are also continuous; for either the two are identical,
or Time is an affection ([Greek: pa/thos]) of Motion. Now no mode of
Motion is continuous except local motion; and that in a circle (for
rectilinear motion cannot be continuous and eternal). There must be a
Movent or Producent Principle ([Greek: kinêtiko\n ê)\ poiêtiko/n]--b.
12); but, if the Movent existed potentially and not actually, there
could not be motion continuous and eternal; for that which has mere
power may never come into act. There will be no use therefore in such
eternal Essences as Plato assumes in his Ideas, unless there be along
with them some principle of potential change ([Greek: ei) mê/ tis
duname/nê e)ne/stai a)rchê\ metaba/llein]--b. 15). Nor indeed will
even that be sufficient (_i.e._, any principle of _merely potential_
change), nor any other Essence (such as Numbers--Schwegler) besides
or along with the Platonic Ideas; for, if this _principium_ shall not
come into Actuality ([Greek: ei) mê\ e)nergê/sei]--b. 17), the motion
which we postulate, continuous and eternal, will not result from it.
Nor will it even be sufficient that the Movent Principle should be
supposed to be in actuality or operation ([Greek: ou)d' ei)
e)nergê/sei], p. 1071, b. 18), if its Essence be Potentiality: the
motion resulting therefrom cannot be eternal; for that which exists
potentially may perhaps not exist at all. The Movent Principles
therefore must be something of which the Essence is Actuality (b.
19), and which shall be without Matter, for they must be eternal,
otherwise nothing else can be eternal. They must therefore be
essential Actualities (b. 22).

Here however, a difficulty suggests itself. It seems that every thing
which is in actuality must also be in potentiality, but that every
thing which is in potentiality does not in every case come into
actuality: so that Potentiality seems the _prius_ of the two ([Greek:
dokei= ga\r to\ me\n e)nergou=n pa=n du/nasthai, to\ de\ duna/menon
ou) pa=n e)nergei=n]--p. 1071, b. 24; Bonitz compares p. 1060, a. 1:
[Greek: a)rchê\ ga\r to\ sunanairou=n]). But, if this were true, no
Entia could exist; for it may be that they exist potentially, but not
yet exist actually (b. 26). There is the like impossibility, if we
adopt the theory of those theologians (Orpheus, Hesiod, &c.) who take
their departure from Night, or of those physical philosophers who
begin with a chaotic huddle of all things. In both cases such
original condition is one of mere potentiality; and how can it ever
be put in motion, if there is to be no cause in actuality ([Greek:
ei) mêthe\n e)/stai e)nergei/a| ai)/tion]--b. 29)? Matter will never
cause motion in itself, but must wait for the carpenter's art; nor
will the earth, but must wait for seed.

It is for this reason that some philosophers, like Plato and
Leukippus, represent Actuality as eternal; for they say that motion
has always existed. But they do not say what variety of motion, nor
why that variety, to the exclusion of others. For nothing is moved at
haphazard; there must always be some reason why it is moved in one
way rather than another: for example, by nature in one way; by other
causes, such as violence or Noûs, in some other way (p. 1071, b. 36).
But it is not competent to Plato to assume what he sometimes does
assume as principium (p. 1072, a. 2--allusion to Plato Phædrus 245,
E), viz., a Self-Movent; for Plato affirms (in Timæus 34, B) that the
soul is _posterius_, and coæval with the Kosmos. The doctrine just
mentioned--That the Potential is prior to the Actual--is true in one
sense, but not true in another; we have already explained _how_
([Greek: ei)/rêtai de\ pô=s]--a. 4. Schwegler thinks, note p. 254,
that this [Greek: ei)/rêtai] refers to what has been said in Book
[Greek: Th], p. 1049, b. 3, seq.; and this seems probable, though
Bonitz in his note contests it, and refers to his own theory, set
forth in his Prooemium pp. 24, 25, that Book [Greek: L] is a separate
treatise of Aristotle, completely distinct from all the rest of the
Metaphysica. This theory of Bonitz may be in the main true; but it is
still possible that Book [Greek: Th] may have been written
previously, and that Aristotle may here refer to it, as Schwegler
suppose**.).

That Actuality is prior to Potentiality, is conformable to the
doctrine of Anaxagoras, Noûs in his doctrine existing in Actuality;
also to that of Empedokles, who introduces Friendship and Enmity; and
again, to that of Leukippus, who affirms Motion to be eternal. So
that Chaos or Night (_i.e._, mere Potentiality) did not prevail for
an infinite anterior time, but the same things came round in
perpetual vicissitude or rotation; which consists with the doctrine
that Actuality is prior to Potentiality. If the same condition comes
round periodically, we must necessarily assume something Actual,
which perpetually actualizes in the same manner ([Greek: dei= ti
a)ei\ me/nein ô(sau/tôs e)nergou=n]--p. 1072, a. 10). Again, if
generation and destruction are to take place, we must assume
something else Actual, which actualizes in a manner perpetually
changing ([Greek: a)/llo dei= ei)=nai a)ei\ e)nergou=n a)/llôs kai\
a)/llôs]--a. 12). This last must actualize sometimes _per se_,
sometimes in a different way; that is, according to some other
influence, or according to the First (or Uniform) Actual. But it will
necessarily actualize according to the First Actual; which will thus
be a cause both to itself, and to the variable Actual. Now the First
Actual is the best; for it is the cause of perpetual sameness, while
the other is cause of variety; both together are the cause of
unceasing variety. But this is how the motions really stand. Why
then, should we look out for other principles (a. 18)?

Now, since the preceding views are consistent with the facts and may
be true ([Greek: e)pei\ d' ou(/tô t' e)nde/chetai]--p. 1072, a.
18)--and, if they be not true, we shall be compelled to admit that
every thing proceeds either from Night, or from confused Chaos or
Non-Ens--we may consider the problem as solved. There exists something
always in unceasing circular motion: this is evident not merely from
reason, but from fact. The First Heaven (Aplanês or Fixed Star sphere)
will therefore be eternal. There must therefore exist something which
causes this unceasing motion, or some Prime Movent. But, since Movens
Immobile, Movens Motum, Motum non Movens, form a series of three
terms, and since the two last of these certainly exist, we may infer
that the first exists also; and that the Prime Movent, which causes
the motion of the Aplanês, is immoveable (a. **20-25.--This
passage perplexes all the commentators--Schwegler, Bonitz, Alexander,
&c. It can hardly be construed without more or less change of the
text. I do not see to what real things Aristotle can allude under the
description of Mota which are not Moventia. There is much to be said
for Pierron and Zévort's translation, p. 220: "Comme il n'y a que
trois sortes d'êtres--ce qui est mu, ce qui meut, et le moyen terme
entre ce qui est mu et ce qui meut: c'est un être (_i.e._, this
middle term is an être) qui meut sans être mu."--Bonitz disapproves
this interpretation of the word [Greek: me/son], and it is certainly
singular to say that between _Movens_ and _Motum_, the term _Movens
sed non Motum_ forms a medium: _Motum sed non Movens_ would form just
as good a medium**.). This Prime Movent, which causes motion
without being itself moved, must be eternal, must be Essentia, and
must be an Actuality.

Now both the Appetibile ([Greek: to\ o)rekto/n]) and the Cogitabile
([Greek: to\ noêto/n]) cause motion in this way, _i.e._, without
being moved themselves; moreover the Primum Appetibile and the Primum
Cogitabile are coincident or identical (p. 1072, a. 27). For that
which appears beautiful, is the object of desire; but that which is
beautiful, is the first object of will (a. 28). Cogitation is the
principium of the two (the primary fact or fundamental element): we
will so and so, because we think it good; it is not true that we
think it good because we will it ([Greek: o)rego/metha de\ dio/ti
dokei=, ma=llon ê)\ dokei= dio/ti o)rego/metha]--a. 29). Now the
Cogitant Mind ([Greek: nou=s]) is moved by the Cogitabile, and, in
the series of fundamental Contraries, the members of one side of the
series are Cogitabilia _per se_ (while those of the other side are
only Cogitabilia _per aliud_--[Greek: noêtê\ d' ê( e(te/ra
sustoichi/a kath' au(tê/n]--a. 31; see Alex., p. 668, 16, Bon.).
These Cogitabilia _per se_ are first as to Essentia (_i.e._, compared
with the Cogitabilia _per aliud_, they are logically _priora_): and
again, among Essentiæ, that variety which is simple and actual comes
first (_i.e._, it is logically _prius_, as compared with the compound
and the potential). Now Unum is not identical with Simplex: Unum
signifies that which is a measure of something else, while Simplex
denotes a peculiar attribute of the subject in itself (a. 34). But
the Pulchrum and the Eligibile _per se_ belongs to the same side of
the series of Contraries, as the Cogitabilia _per se_: and the Primum
Pulchrum or Eligibile is the Best or akin thereunto, in its own
particular ascending scale (b. 1).

That [Greek: to\ ou(= e(/neka] is among the Immoveables, may be seen
by our Treatise De Bono, where we give a string of generic and
specific distributions ([Greek: ê( diai/resis dêloi=]--p. 1072, b. 2;
see the interpretation of Alexander, adopted both by Schwegler and by
Bonitz). For [Greek: to\ ou(= e(/neka] is used in a double sense: in
one of the two senses it ranks among the Immoveables: in another it
does not ([Greek: e)/sti ga\r ditto\n to\ ou(= e(/neka], b.
3--[Greek: ditto/n] is Schwegler's correction, adopted by Bonitz). It
causes motion, in the manner of a beloved object; and that which it
causes to move, causes motion in the other things ([Greek: kinei= de\
ô(s e)rô/menon; to\ de\ kinou/menon ta)/lla kinei=]--b. 3; [Greek:
to\ de\ kinou/menon] is the conjecture of Schwegler and Bonitz).

Now, if any thing be moved, there is a possibility that it may be in
a condition different from that in which it actually is. If the first
actuality of the Moveable be translation or motion in space, there is
a possibility that it may be otherwise than it is as to place, even
though it cannot be otherwise than it is as to Essentia (p. 1072, b.
7).

But, as to the Prime Movent, which is itself immoveable, and which
exists in actuality, it is impossible that _that_ can be other than
what it is, in any respect whatever (p. 1072, b. 8). For the first of
all changes is local motion, or rotation in a circle, and this is
exactly what the Prime Movent imparts (but does not itself possess).
It exists by necessity, and by that species of necessity which
implies the perfect and beautiful: and in this character it is the
originating principle. For there are three varieties of necessity:
(1) That of violence, in contradiction to the natural impulse;
(2) That without which good or perfection cannot be had; (3) That
which is what it is absolutely, without possibility of being otherwise.
From a principle of this nature (_i.e._, necessary in the two last
senses) depend the Heaven and all Nature (b. 14).

The mode of existence ([Greek: diagôgê/]) of this Prime Movent is for
ever that which _we_ enjoy in our best moments, but which we cannot
obtain permanently; for its actuality itself is also pleasure (p.
1072, b. 16). As actuality is pleasure, so the various actualities of
waking, perceiving, cogitating, are to us the pleasantest part of our
life; while hopes and remembrances are pleasing by derivation from
them (but these states we men cannot enjoy permanently and without
intermittence). Cogitation _per se_ (_i.e._, cogitation in its most
perfect condition) embraces that which is best _per se_; and most of
all when it is most perfect. The Noûs thus cogitates itself through
participation of the Cogitabile: for it becomes itself cogitable by
touching the Cogitabile and cogitating: so that Cogitans and
Cogitabile become identical. For Noûs in general (the human Noûs
also) is in potentiality the recipient of the Cogitabile, and of
Essentia or Forms; and it comes into actuality by possessing these
Forms. So that what the Prime Movent possesses is more divine than
the divine element which Noûs in general involves; and the actuality
of theorizing is the pleasantest and best of all conditions ([Greek:
noêto\s ga\r gi/gnetai thigga/nôn kai\ noô=n, ô(/ste tau)to\n nou=s
kai\ noêto/n. to\ ga\r dektiko\n tou= noêtou= kai\ tê=s ou)si/as
nou=s. e)nergei= de\ e)/chôn; ô(/st' e)kei=no ma=llon tou/tou o(\
dokei= o( nou=s thei=on e)/chein, kai\ ê( theôri/a to\ ê(/diston kai\
a)/riston]--b. 24. This is a very difficult passage, in which one
cannot be sure of interpreting rightly. None of the commentators are
perfectly satisfactory. The pronoun [Greek: e)kei=no] seems to refer
to [Greek: ê( no/êsis ê( kath' au(tê/n]--three lines back. The
contrast seems to be between the Prime Movent, and Noûs in general,
including the human Noûs. [Greek: To\ dektiko/n] cannot refer to the
Prime Movent, which has no potentiality, but must refer to the human
Noûs, which is not at first, nor always, in a state of actuality.
[Greek: Ma=llon] seems equivalent to [Greek: theio/teron]. The human
Noûs has [Greek: thei=o/n ti], by reason of its potentiality to
theorize.).

Thus it is wonderful, if God has perpetually an existence like that
of our best moments; and still more wonderful, if he has a better.
Yet such is the fact. Life belongs to him: for the actuality of Noûs
is life, and God is actuality. His life, eternal and best, is
actuality _per se_ (or _par excellence_). We declare God to be an
Animal Optimum Æternum, so that duration eternal and continuous
([Greek: ai)ô\n sunechê/s]) belongs to him: for _that_ is God
([Greek: tou=to ga\r o( theo/s]--p. 1072, b. 30).

The Pythagoreans and Speusippus are mistaken in affirming that
Optimum and Pulcherrimum is not to be found in the originating
principle ([Greek: e)n a)rchê=|]); on the ground that the principles
of plants and animals are indeed causes, but that the beautiful and
perfect appears first in the results of those principles. For the
seed first proceeds out of antecedent perfect animals: the first is
not seed, but the perfect animal. Thus we must say that the man is
prior to the seed: I do not mean the man who sprang from the seed,
but the other man from whom the seed proceeded (p. 1073, a. 2).

From the preceding reasonings, it is evident that there exists an
Essence eternal, immoveable, and separated from all the perceivable
Essences. We have shown (in Physica; see Schwegler's note) that this
Essence can have no magnitude; that it is without parts and
indivisible (p, 1073, a. 6). For it causes in other subjects motion
for an infinite time; and nothing finite can have infinite power. For
this reason the Prime Movent cannot have finite magnitude; but every
magnitude is either finite or infinite, and there is no such thing as
infinite magnitude; therefore the Prime Movent can have no magnitude
at all. We have also shown that it is unchangeable in quality, and
without any affections ([Greek: a)pathe\s kai\ a)nalloi/ôton]). For
all other varieties of change are posterior as compared with
locomotive change or motion in space, which is the first of all. As
the Prime Movent is exempt from this first, much more is it exempt
from the others (a. 13).

We must now consider whether we ought to recognize one such Movent or
Essence only, or several of the same Essences? and, if several, how
many? Respecting the number thereof we must remember that our
predecessors have laid down no clear or decisive doctrines ([Greek:
a)popha/seis], p. 1073, a. 16). The Platonic theory of Ideas includes
no peculiar research on this subject (a. 18). The Platonists call
these Ideas Numbers: about which they talk sometimes as if there were
an infinite multitude of them, sometimes as if they were fixed as
reaching to the dekad and not higher--but they furnish no
demonstrative reason why they should stop at the dekad. We shall
proceed to discuss the point consistently with our preceding
definitions and with the nature of the subjects (a. 23). The
Principium, the First of all Entia, is immoveable both _per se_ and
_per accidens_: it causes motion in another subject, to which it
imparts the first or locomotive change, one and eternal (a. 25). The
Motum must necessarily be moved by something; the Prime Movent must
be immoveable _per se_; eternal motion must be caused by an eternal
Movent; and one motion by one Movent (a. 30). But we see that, over
and above the simple rotation of the All (or First Heaven), which
rotation we affirm to be caused by the Primum Movens Immobile, there
are also other eternal rotations of the Planets; for the circular
Celestial Body, as we have shown in the Physica, is eternal and never
at rest (a. 32). We must therefore necessarily assume that each of
these rotations of the Planets is caused by a Movent Immoveable _per
se_--by an eternal Essence (a. 35). For the Stars and Planets are in
their nature eternal Essences: that which moves them must be itself
eternal, and prior to that which it causes to be moved; likewise that
which, is prior to Essence must itself be Essence, and cannot be any
thing else (a. 37). It is plain, therefore, that there must
necessarily exist a number of Essences, each eternal by nature,
immoveable _per se_, and without magnitude, as Movents to the
Heavenly Bodies and equal in number thereto (a. 38). These Essences
are arranged in an order of first, second, &c., corresponding to the
order of the planetary rotations (b. 2), But what the number of these
rotations is, we must learn from Astronomy--that one among the
mathematical sciences which is most akin ([Greek: oi)keiota/tês]) to
the First Philosophy; for Astronomy theorizes about Essence
perceivable but eternal, while Arithmetic and Geometry do not treat
of any Essence at all ([Greek: peri\ ou)demia=s ou)si/as]--b. 7).
That the rotations are more in number than the rotating bodies, is
known to all who have any tincture of Astronomy; for each of the
Planets is carried round in more than one rotation (b. 10). But what
the exact number of these rotations is, we shall proceed to state
upon the authority of some mathematicians, for the sake of
instruction, that the reader may have some definite number present to
his mind: for the rest, he must both investigate for himself and put
questions to other investigators; and, if he learns from the
scientific men any thing dissenting from what we here lay down, he
must love both dissentients but follow that one who reasons most
accurately ([Greek: philei=n me\n a)mphote/rous, pei/thesthai de\
toi=s a)kribeste/rois]--b. 16).

Aristotle then proceeds to unfold the number and arrangement of the
planetary spheres and the corrective or counter-rolling ([Greek:
a)nelittou/sas]) spheres implicated with them (p. 1073, b. 17--p.
1074, a. 14). He afterwards proceeds: Let the number of spheres thus
be forty-seven; so that it will be reasonable to assume the
Immoveable Movent Essences and Principles to be forty-seven also, as
well as the perceivable spheres ([Greek: ai)sthêta/s]--p. 1074, a.
16): we say _reasonable_ ([Greek: eu)/logon]), for we shall leave to
stronger heads to declare it necessary. But, since there cannot be
any rotation except such as contributes to the rotation of one of the
Planets, and since we must assume that each Nature and each Essence
is exempt from extraneous affection and possessed _per se_ of the
Best as an end, so there will be no other Nature besides the
forty-seven above enumerated, and this number will be the _necessary_
total of the Essences (a. 21). For, if there were any others, they
would cause motion by serving as an end for some rotation to aspire
to ([Greek: kinoi=en a)\n ô(s te/los ou)=sai phora=s]--a. 23); but it
is impossible that there can be any other rotation besides those that
have been enumerated.

We may fairly infer this from the bodies which are carried in
rotation ([Greek: e)k tô=n pherome/nôn]--p. 1074, a. 24). For, if
every carrier exists naturally for the sake of the thing carried, and
if every current or rotation is a current of something carried, there
can exist no current either for the sake of itself or for the sake of
some other current. Every current must exist for the sake of the
Planets, and with a view to their rotation. For, if one current
existed for the sake of another, this last must exist for the sake of
a third, and so on; but you cannot go on in this way _ad infinitum_;
and therefore the end of every current must be, one or other of the
Divine Bodies which are carried round in the heavens (a. 31).

That there is only one Heaven, we may plainly see. For, if there were
many heavens, as there are many men, the principium of each would be
one _in specie_, though the principia would be many _in numero_ (p.
1074, a. 33). But all things that are many in number, have Matter,
and are many, by reason of their Matter; for to all these many, there
is one and the same Form ([Greek: lo/gos])--definition or rational
explanation: _e.g._, one for all men, among whom Sokrates is one (a.
35). But the First Essence has no Matter; for it is an Actual
([Greek: to\ de\ ti/ ê)=n ei)=nai ou)k e)/chei u(/lên to\ prô=ton;
e)ntele/cheia **ga/r]--a. 36). The Primum Movens Immobile is
therefore One, both in definition and in number; accordingly, the
Motum--that which is moved both eternally and continuously--is One
also. There exists therefore only one Heaven (p. 1074, a. 38).

Now it has been handed down in a mythical way, from the old and most
ancient teachers (p. 1074, b. 1) to their successors, that these
(Eternal Essences) are gods, and that the divine element comprehends
all nature ([Greek: o(/ti theoi/ te/ ei)sin ou(=toi kai\ perie/chei
to\ thei=on tê\n o(/lên phu/sin]--b. 3). The other accompaniments of
the received creed have been superadded with a view to persuading the
multitude and to useful purposes for the laws and the common interest
(b. 4); wherefore the gods have been depicted as like to men and to
some other animals, combined with other similar accompaniments. If a
man, abstracting from these stories, accepts only the first and
fundamental truth--That they conceived the First Essences as gods, he
will consider it as a divine doctrine ([Greek: thei/ôs a)\n
ei)rê=sthai nomi/seien]--b. 9), preserved and handed down as
fragments of truth from the most ancient times. For probably all art
and philosophy and truth have been many times discovered, lost, and
rediscovered. To this point alone, and thus far, the opinion of our
fathers and of the first men is evident to us (b. 14).

There are however various difficulties connected with the Noûs; for
it would seem to be more divine than the visible celestial objects,
and yet we do not understand what its condition can be to be such (p.
1074, b. 17). For, if it cogitates nothing but is in the condition of
slumber and inaction, what ground can there be for respecting it
([Greek: ti/ a)\n ei)/ê to\ semno/n]--b. 18)? And, if it cogitates
something actually, yet if this process depends upon something
foreign and independent (_i.e._, upon the Cogitatum), the Noûs cannot
be the best Essence; since it is then essentially not Cogitation in
act, but only the potentiality of Cogitation; while its title to
respect arises from actual Cogitation. Again, whether we assume its
Essence to be Cogitation actual or Cogitation potential, _what_ does
it cogitate? It must cogitate either itself, or something different
from itself; and, if the latter, either always the same Cogitatum, or
sometimes one, sometimes another. But is there no difference whether
its Cogitatum is honourable or vulgar? Are there not some things
which it is absurd to cogitate? Evidently the Noûs must cogitate what
is most divine and most honourable, without any change; for, if it
did change, it must change for the worse, and that very change would
at once ([Greek: ê)/dê]) be a certain motion; whereas the Noûs is
essentially immoveable (b. 27). First of all, if the Essence of the
Noûs be, not Cogitation actual but Cogitation potential, we may
reasonably conceive that the perpetuity of Cogitation would be
fatiguing to it (b. 29); next, we see plainly that there must exist
something else more honourable than the Noûs; namely, the Cogitatum;
for to cogitate, and the act of cogitation, will belong even to one
who cogitates the vilest object. If cogitation of vile objects be
detestable ([Greek: pheukto/n], b. 32)--for not to see some things is
better than to see them--Cogitation cannot be the best of all things
(_i.e._, Cogitation absolutely, whatever be the Cogitatum).

Since the Noûs is itself the best of all things, it must employ its
cogitation upon itself and nothing else. Its cogitation will thus be
Cogitation of Cogitation ([Greek: au(to\n a)/ra noei=, ei)/per e)sti\
to\ kra/tiston, kai\ e)/stin ê( no/êsis noê/seôs no/êsis]--p. 1074,
b. 35). Yet, if we look to the human mind, Cognition, Perception,
Opinion, Mental Discourse, &c., appear always as having direct
reference to something else, and as referring each to itself only in
an indirect and secondary way ([Greek: a)ei\ a)/llou--au(tê=s d' e)n
pare/rgô|]--b. 36); and farther, if to cogitate is one thing and to
be cogitated another thing, in which of the two points of view will
the _bene_ of the Noûs consist? To be Cogitation, and to be a
Cogitatum, are not logically the same ([Greek: ou)de\ ga\r tau)to\
to\ ei)=nai noê/sei kai\ nooume/nô|]--b. 38).

But may we not meet these difficulties by replying that there are
some things in which Cognition is identical with the Cognitum? that
is, in those Cognita which are altogether exempt from Matter? In
Constructive cognitions without Matter, the Form and the [Greek:
t.ê.e.] is both Cognitum and Cognitio; in Theoretical cognitions
without Matter, the Notion and the Cogitation is itself the Cognitum
([Greek: o( lo/gos to\ pra=gma kai\ ê( no/êsis]). Since it appears,
therefore, that, wherever there is no Matter, Cogitatum and Noûs are
not different, the same will be true of the divine Noûs: its
Cogitatio and its Cogitatum will be identical (p. 1075, a. 5).

One farther difficulty remains, if we suppose the Cogitatum to be a
Compound ([Greek: su/ntheton]); for, on that supposition, the
Cogitans would change in running through the different parts of the
whole. But the reply seems to be, that every thing which has not
Matter is indivisible and not compound (p. 1075, a. 7). As the human
Noûs, being that which deals with compounds, comports itself for a
certain time--for it does not attain its _bene_ in cogitating this or
that part of the compound, but in apprehending a certain total or
completion which is something different from any of the parts--so
does the divine Noûs, engaged in cogitation of itself, comport itself
in perpetuity (a. 10).

Another point to be considered is--in what manner the nature of the
Universe ([Greek: ê( tou= o(/lou phu/sis]--p. 1075, a. 11) includes
Bonum and Optimum. Is Bonum included as something separate and as an
adjunct by itself transcendent? Or is it immanent, pervading the
whole arrangement of the constituent parts? Or does it exist in both
ways at once, as in the case of a disciplined army; for, in this
latter, Bonum belongs both to the array and to the general, and
indeed more to the latter, since the array is directed by the
general, not the general by the array. All things in the universe are
marshalled in a certain orderly way--the aquatic creatures, the
aërial, and the plants; but all things are not marshalled alike. The
universe is not such that there is no relation between one thing and
another: there is such a relation; for every thing is marshalled with
a view to one end, though in different degrees. As, in a family, the
freemen have least discretion left to them to act at haphazard, but
all or most of their proceedings are regulated, while slaves and oxen
are not required to do much towards the common good, but are left for
the most part to act at hazard,--in this way the principium of each
is arranged by nature (a. 23). For example, every thing must
necessarily come to the termination of one individual existence to
make room for another: there are also some other facts and conditions
common to all things in the universe ([Greek: le/gô d' oi(=on ei)/s
ge to\ diakrithê=nai a)na/gkê a(pa=sin e)lthei=n]--a. 23; see the
explanation of [Greek: diakrithê=nai], given by Bonitz, Comm. p.
519--not very certain).

In concluding this exposition, we must not lose sight of the
absurdities and impossibilities which attach to all other, nor what
is advanced by the most ingenious philosophers before us, nor which
of their theories carries with it the fewest difficulties (p. 1075,
a. 27).

That all things proceed from Contraries, all these philosophers agree
in affirming. But it is not true that all things are generated, nor
that they are generated from contraries; for the celestial substance
is not generated at all, nor has it any contrary. Moreover, in those
cases where there really are contraries, these philosophers do not
teach us how generation can take place out of them; for contraries
themselves have no effect upon each other. Now our doctrine solves
this difficulty reasonably, by introducing a _tertium quid_ (p. 1075,
a. 31)--Matter. Some of these philosophers erroneously consider
Matter to be itself one of the contraries: they consider the Unequal
as matter or substratum to the Equal; or the Many as matter or
substratum to the One; (Evil, as opposed to Good). We resolve this in
the same way: our Matter is one, is contrary itself to nothing, but
may be potentially either of two contraries. Farthermore, if we admit
the doctrine that Evil itself is Matter or one of the elements, the
inference will follow that every thing whatever, except the Unum
itself, partakes of Evil (a. 6).

Some philosophers do not admit either Good or Evil to be principles
at all; but they are manifestly wrong; for in all things Good is most
of all the principle (p. 1075, a. 37). Others again are so far right
that they recognize Good as a principle: but they do not tell us
_how_ it is a principle--whether as End, or as Movent, or as Form.

Empedokles lays down a strange doctrine: he makes Friendship to be
the Good (p. 1075, b. 2). But, in his theory, Friendship is principle
partly as Movent, for its function is to bring together ([Greek:
suna/gei ga\r]--b. 3); partly as Matter, for it is itself a portion
of the mixture ([Greek: mo/rion tou= mi/gmatos]--b. 4). Now, even
granting the possibility that the same thing may be _per accidens_
([Greek: kata\ sumbebêko/s]--b. 5, _i.e._, by special coincidence in
any one particular case) principle as Movent, and also principle as
Matter, nevertheless the two are not the same logically and by
definition. Under which of the two, therefore, are we to reckon
Friendship? It is moreover another strange feature in the theory of
Empedokles, that he makes Enmity to be indestructible; for this very
Enmity is with him the nature and principle of Evil (b. 8).

Anaxagoras declares Good to be the principle as Movent; for, in his
theory, Noûs causes motion; but it causes motion with a view to some
end, which is of course different from itself; so that the real
principle is different from Noûs: unless indeed he adopted one of our
tenets; for we too say that, in a certain sense, the medical art is
health (p. 1075, b. 10; Z. vii. p. 1032, b. 10). It is moreover
absurd, that Anaxagoras does not recognize any contrary to Good and
to the Noûs (b. 11). (Bonitz remarks, Comm. p. 522:--Aristotle means
that Anaxagoras was wrong, because he failed "ad eam devenire
rationem, ut intellectum sui ipsius intelligentiam ideoque sui ipsius
[Greek: te/los] esse statueret"; farther, he remarks, on the line b.
10--[Greek: a)/topon de\ kai\ to\ e)nanti/on mê\ poiê=sai tô=|
a)gathô=| kai\ tô=| nô=|]: "Quid enim? nonne pariter et eodem jure
[Greek: nou=s a)migê/s], quem posuit Anaxagoras, ab omni
contrarietate et oppositione immunis sit, ac primus motor apud
Aristotelem?"--Aristotle would have replied to this: "I recognize
principles of Evil under the names of [Greek: u(/lê] and [Greek:
ste/rêsis]; the last of the two being directly opposed to Form
(Regularity or Good), the first of the two being indifferent and
equally ready as a recipient both for evil and for good. My Prime
Movent acts like an [Greek: e)rô/menon] in causing motion in the
Celestial Substance: the motion of this last is pure Good, without
any mixture of Evil. But, when this motion is transmitted to the
sublunary elements, it becomes corrupted by [Greek: u(/lê] and
[Greek: ste/rêsis], so that Evil becomes mingled with the Good.
Anaxagoras recognizes no counteracting principles, analogous to
[Greek: u(/lê] and [Greek: ste/rêsis], so that Evil, on his theory,
remains unexplained.")

Those philosophers who lay down Contraries as their principles, do
not make proper use of these Contraries, unless their language be
improved or modified (p. 1075, b. 12). Nor do they tell us why some
things are destructible, other things indestructible; for they trace
all things to the same principles. Some make all things to proceed
from Non-Ens; others, to escape that necessity, make all things One
(and thus recognize no real change or generation at all--the Eleates,
b. 16). Again, not one of them tells us why generation must always
be, or what is the cause of generation. Once more, those who
recognize two contrary principles must necessarily recognize a third
superior to both (b. 18); and the Platonists with their Ideas are
under the like necessity. For they must assign some reason why
particular things partake of these Ideas.

Other philosophers, moreover, must consistently with their theories
recognize something contrary to Wisdom and to the most venerable
Cognition. But we are under no such necessity; for there is nothing
contrary to the First ([Greek: tô=| prô/tô|]). All contraries involve
Matter, and are in potentiality the same: one of the two contraries
is ignorance in regard to the other; but the First has no contrary
(p. 1075, b. 24).

Again, if there be no Entia beyond the Perceptibilia, there can be no
beginning, no arrangement in order, no generation, no celestial
bodies or proceedings (_i.e._, all these will remain unexplained).
There will always be a beginning behind the beginning, _ad
infinitum_; as there is in the theories of all the theologians and
physical philosophers (p. 1075, b. 27). And, even if we recognize,
beyond the Perceptibilia, Ideas or Numbers, these are causes of
nothing; or, if causes of any thing, they are certainly not causes of
motion. How, moreover, can Magnitude, and a Continuum arise out of
that which has no Magnitude? Number cannot, either as Movent or as
Form, produce a Continuum (b. 30).

Again, (Contraries cannot be principles, because) no Contrary can be
essentially Constructive and essentially Movent (p. 1075, b. 31); for
Contraries involve Matter and Potentiality, and may possibly,
therefore, not exist. And, if there be Potentiality, it will come
prior to Actuality: upon that supposition therefore (_i.e._, of
Contraries as the fundamental principles) Entia could not be eternal.
But Entia are eternal; therefore these theories must be in part
amended: we have shown how (b. 34).

Farther, none of these theories explains how it is that numbers
coalesce into One; or soul and body into One; or Form and Matter into
one Concrete. Nor can they explain this, unless they adopt our
doctrine, that the Movent brings about this coalition (p. 1075, b.
37).

Those philosophers (like Speusippus) who recognize many different
grades and species of Entia (first the Mathematical Number, &c.),
with separate principles for each, make the Essence of the Universe
to be incoherent ([Greek: e)peisodiô/dê]--p. 1076, a. 1) and set up
many distinct principles; for none of these Essences contributes to
or bears upon the remainder, whether it exists or does not exist. Now
Entia are not willing to be badly governed ([Greek: ta\ de\ o)/nta
ou) bou/letai politeu/esthai kakô=s. "ou)k a)gatho\n polukoirani/ê;
ei(=s koi/ranos."]--p. 1076, a. 4).




IV.

DE COELO.


Book I.

CH. 1.--The science of Nature has for its principal object--Bodies,
Magnitudes, and the various affections and movements of Bodies and
Magnitudes; also the beginnings or principles of this sort of
Essence. The Continuous is that which is divisible into parts
perpetually divisible: and Body is that which is divisible in every
direction. Of magnitudes, some (lines) are divisible only in one
direction; others (planes) only in two directions; others again
(bodies) in three directions. This is the maximum: there is no other
magnitude beyond; for three are all, and to say "in three directions"
is the same as to say "in all directions." As the Pythagoreans say,
The Universe and All Things are determined by Three: in End, Middle,
and Beginning, lies the number of the Universe, or the Triad. We have
received these as laws from nature, and we accordingly employ this
number (Three) for solemnities in honour of the Gods. Moreover, we
apply our predicates on the same principle; for we call Two, and The
Two--Both, but we do not call them all. Three is the first number to
which we apply the predicate All. Herein (as was observed before) we
follow the lead of Nature herself. Since therefore these three
phrases--All Things, The Universe, The Perfect or Complete--do not
specifically differ from each other, but are distinguished only in
respect of the matter or occasions on which they are applied. Body is
the only kind of magnitude which can be declared Perfect or Complete,
that is, All; for it is the only magnitude determined or defined by
the Three. Being divisible in three directions, it is divisible every
way; other magnitudes are divisible either only in one way or only in
two. Magnitudes are both divisible and continuous according to the
number by which they are designated--continuous in one direction, in
two, in three, or all. All divisible magnitudes are also continuous:
whether all continuous magnitudes are divisible, is not yet clear.
But what _is_ clear is--that there is no upward transition to a
higher genus beyond Body, as there is from line to surface, and from
surface to Body. If there were, Body would not be perfect or complete
as a magnitude; for the transition would be made at the point of
deficiency; but the perfect or complete can have no deficiency: it
stretches every way. Such is each body included as a part in the
universe: it has dimensions in every direction. Yet each is
distinguished from its neighbour by contact, and each therefore in a
certain sense is many. But the Universe ([Greek: to\ pa=n]) including
all these parts is of necessity perfect and complete; extending not
merely in one way, and in another way not, but [Greek: pa/ntê|], as
the word literally means (ss. 1-4).

CH. 2.--Respecting the nature of the Universe, we shall enquire
presently whether in the aggregate it be infinite or of finite
magnitude. But first let us speak about its different constituent
species, proceeding on the following basis. I affirm that all natural
bodies and magnitudes are _per se_ locally moveable; and that Nature
is to them a beginning or principle of motion. Now all Local Motion
(known by the name of [Greek: phora/]) is either Rectilinear or
Circular, or compounded of the two; for these two are the only simple
motions, by reason that the only two simple magnitudes are the
rectilinear and the circular. The circular is motion round the
Centre; the rectilinear is motion either downwards towards the centre
or upwards from the centre. These three are the only simple modes of
motion or currents: as I said in the last chapter that body was made
complete in the number three, so also the motion of body is made
complete in the number three. Now, as there are some bodies (such as
fire, earth, and their cognates) which are simple (_i.e._ which have
in themselves a natural beginning or principle of motion), and others
which are compounds of these, so also there must be simple motions
belonging to the former and compound motions belonging to the latter;
such compound motions being determined by the preponderant element
therein. Since, therefore, circular motion is a simple mode of
motion, and since simple modes of motion belong only to simple
bodies, there must of necessity be a particular variety of simple
body, whose especial nature it is to be carried round in circular
motion. By violence, indeed, one body might be moved in a mode
belonging to another; but not by nature. Moreover, since motion
against nature is opposite to motion conformable to nature, and since
each mode has one single opposite, simple circular motion, if it be
not conformable to the nature of this body, must be against its
nature. If then the body rotating in a circle be fire or any of the
other elements, its natural mode of motion must be opposite to
circular motion. But each thing has only one opposite; and up and
down are each other's opposites. If then the body which rotates in a
circle rotates thus against nature, it must have some other mode of
motion conformable to nature. But this is impossible: for, if the
motion conformable to its nature be motion upwards, the body must be
fire or air; if motion downwards, the body must be earth or water
(and there is no other simple mode of motion that it can have).
Moreover, its rotatory motion must be a first motion; for the perfect
is prior in nature to the imperfect. Now the circle is perfect; but
no straight line is perfect: neither an infinite straight line, for
in order to be perfect, it must have an end and a boundary; nor any
finite straight line, for each has something without it and may be
prolonged at pleasure. So that, if motion first by nature belong to a
body first by nature, if circular motion (as being perfect) be prior
to rectilinear motion, and if rectilinear motion belong to a first or
a simple body, as we see both in fire and in earth,--we may be sure
_à fortiori_ that circular motion belongs to a simple body, and that
there is, besides the four elements here, prior to them and more
divine than them, a different body cf special nature and essence.
Indeed, since circular motion is against the nature of these four
elements, there must be some other different body to whose nature it
is conformable. There must thus be some simple and primary body,
whose nature it is to be carried round in a circle, as earth is
carried downwards and fire upwards. On the assumption that the
revolving bodies revolved against their own nature, it would be
wonderful and even unreasonable that this one single mode of motion,
being thus contrary to nature, should be continuous and eternal; for
in all other things we see that what is contrary to nature dies away
most speedily. Now, if the revolving body were fire, as some affirm,
the revolving motion would be just as much contrary to its nature as
motion downwards; for the natural motion of fire is upwards or away
from the centre. Reasoning from all these premisses, we may safely
conclude that, distinct from all these bodies which are here around
us, there exists a body whose nature is more honourable in proportion
to its greater distance from us here (ss. 1-13).

CH. 3.--We plainly cannot affirm that every body is either heavy or
light: meaning by heavy, that which is carried by its nature
downwards or towards the centre; by light, that which is carried by
its nature upwards or away from the centre. Heaviest (or earth) is
that which underlies all other downward moving bodies, lightest
(fire) is that which floats above all upward moving bodies. Air and
water are both light and heavy, relatively, but relatively to
different terms of comparison; thus, water is heavy as compared to
air and fire, light as compared to earth. But that body whose nature
it is to revolve in a circle, cannot possibly have either heaviness
or levity; for it cannot move in a right line, either upwards or
downwards, nor either by nature or against nature. Not by nature,
for, in that case, it must be identical with some one of the four
elements; not against nature, because, if it moved upwards against
nature, this would prove that motion downwards was conformable to its
nature, and it would thus be identical with earth: we have already
seen that, if a body moves upwards against nature, it must move
downwards according to nature, and _vice versâ_. Now the same natural
motion which belongs to any body as a whole, belongs also to its
minute fragments (to the whole earth and to any of its constituent
clods). Accordingly the revolving body in its local movement of
revolution cannot possibly be dragged in any other direction, either
upward or downward,--neither the whole nor any portion thereof. It is
alike reasonable to conceive it as ungenerable, indestructible,
incapable both of increase and of qualitative change ([Greek:
a)nauxe\s kai\ a)nalloi/ôton]). It cannot be generated, because
every thing generated comes out of a substratum and an opposite, into
which it relapses on being destroyed. Now the revolving body has no
opposite; for we have already seen that opposite bodies have their
currents of motion opposite, and there is no current of motion
opposite to that of circular rotation. Nature has rightly excepted
this ungenerable and indestructible substance from the action of
contraries, in which generation and destruction occur. It is also
incapable of increase or diminution, because these processes take
place through the accession of new cognate materials; and in this
case there are none such. It is farther incapable of qualitative
change, because this always implies the being affected favourably or
unfavourably ([Greek: pa/thos]); and this last never takes place, in
plants or in animals, without some increase or diminution in quantity
(ss. 1-5).

This Celestial Substance is thus eternal, ungenerable,
indestructible, noway increased nor diminished, neither growing old
nor capable of disturbing affections nor changeable in quality.
Herein the evidence of reason and that of phenomena concur. For all
men, Hellenes and Barbarians, have some belief respecting the Gods,
and all who believe Gods to exist assign to the divine nature the
uppermost place in the Kosmos; an immortal place going naturally
along with immortal persons. Our perceptions confirm this
sufficiently, at least when we speak with reference to human belief.
For not the smallest change has ever been observed in the celestial
substance, throughout all past time. Under these impressions, the
ancients gave to it the name which it now bears; for the same
opinions suggest themselves to us not once, nor twice, but an
infinite number of times**. Hence the ancients, regarding the First
Body as something distinct from Fire, Earth, Air, or Water, called
the uppermost place Æther, from its being always running ([Greek:
a)po\ tou= thei=n a)ei/]), the adverbial designation being derived
from eternal duration. Anaxagoras employs this name improperly: he
calls Fire by the name of Æther (s. 6).

It is plain, from all we have said, that the simple bodies cannot be
more in number than those just indicated; for a simple body must of
necessity have a simple mode of motion, and there are only three
simple modes of motion--one circular and two rectilinear, one of
these being from the centre, the other towards the centre (s. 7).

CH. 4.--That Circular Rotation has no motion opposed to it, may be
shown by several different arguments. If there were any, it would
certainly be rectilinear motion; for convex and concave, though each
respectively opposed to the other, are, when both put together,
opposed as a couple to rectilinear motion. But each variety of
rectilinear motion has another variety of rectilinear motion opposed
to it; and each thing has but one opposite. Moreover the oppositions
between one motion (or one current--[Greek: phora/]) and another are
founded upon oppositions of place, which are three in number: (1)
Above and Below; (2) Before and Behind; (3) Right and Left. Now the
motion in circular rotation **from A to B is not opposite to that
from B to A: the opposition of motion is along the straight line
which joins the two; for an infinite number of different circles may
be drawn, not interfering with each other but all passing through the
same two points A and B. In the same circle, the opposition between
the current from A to B and that from B to A, is along the line of
diameter--not along the line of circumference. If one circular
current were really opposed to any other circular current, one or
other of the two would have existed to no purpose; for both have the
same object. That is to say: what is carried round in a circle, let
it begin from any point whatever, must necessarily come round equally
to all the opposite places, above, below, before, behind, right,
left. If the two (presumed) opposite circular currents were equal,
they would neutralize each other, and there would be no motion at all
of either of them. If one of the two were the more powerful, it would
extinguish the other; so that to suppose the existence of both is to
suppose that one or both exists in vain (_i.e._, can never be
realized). We say that a sandal exists in vain ([Greek: ma/tên]),
when it cannot be fastened on. But God and nature do nothing in vain
(ss. 1-8).

CH. 5.--Most of the ancient philosophers admitted an infinite body;
but this may be shown to be impossible. The question is very
important; for the consequences which follow from admitting the
Infinite as principium, affect our speculations concerning the whole
of Nature (s. 1).

Every body is of necessity either simple or compound. The infinite
body therefore, if it exists, must of necessity be either one or the
other. But there can be no infinite compound composed of simple
bodies finite in magnitude and in number: so that, if an infinite
body exist, it must be simple. We shall first enquire whether the
First Body, whose nature it is to move in a circle, can be infinite
in magnitude. Now, if it were infinite, the radii thrown out from the
centre would be infinite, and the distance between them would also be
infinite; that is, no finite peripheral line can be found touching
all the extremities of the radii without: if any such line be
assumed, you may always assume a greater. We call Number infinite,
because the greatest number cannot be given; and the like may be said
about this distance. Now, as an infinite distance cannot be passed
over, no circular motion passing over it is possible, so as to come
round to the point of departure. But we see plainly that the First
Body or the Heaven does come round in a circle; and it has been shown
by reasoning _à priori_ that there _is_ a variety of body whose
nature it is to move in a circle. Such a body therefore as the First
(revolving) Body cannot be infinite (ss. 2, 3).

Four other arguments are added, proving the same conclusion (s. 4,
seq.). One of them is: That an infinite square, circle, or sphere, is
an impossibility; each of these figures being defined or determined.
As there can be no infinite circle, so neither can an infinite body
be moved round in a circle (s. 7).

CH. 6.--As the First Body cannot be infinite, so neither can those
bodies be infinite whose nature it is to move to the centre and from
the centre--neither the centripetal nor the centrifugal body. For
these two currents are opposite in nature; opposite currents being
characterized by the opposite places to which they tend. But of two
opposites, if the one be fixed and determinate, the other must be
fixed and determinate also. Now the centre is determined; for the
centripetal body, let it fall from what height it will, can never
fall lower than the centre; and, since the centre is determined, the
upper region or extremity must also be determined. The places at each
extreme being thus determined, the intermediate space must be
determined also; otherwise there would exist motion undetermined or
infinite, which has been shown in a former treatise to be impossible
(Physica, VIII. viii.); and therefore that body which either is
therein, or may possibly be therein, must be determined. But it is a
fact that the centripetal body and the centrifugal body can be
therein; for centripetality and centrifugality are of the nature of
each respectively (ss. 1, 2).

Hence we see that there can be no infinite body. There are other
reasons also. As the centripetal body is heavy, if it be infinite,
its gravity must also be infinite; and, if gravity cannot be
infinite, neither can any heavy body be infinite. The like about any
light body, such as the centrifugal (s. 3).

He then shows (by a long process of reasoning, not easy to follow)
first, that there cannot be an infinite body with finite gravity;
next, that there can be no infinite gravity. Accordingly there can be
no infinite body at all, having gravity. At the end, he considers
that this is established, (1) by the partial arguments ([Greek: dia\
tô=n kata\ me/ros]) immediately preceding; (2) by the general
reasonings in his other treatises respecting first principles, in
which he explained the Infinite--in what sense it existed and did not
exist; (3) by an argument about the Infinite, upon which he touches
in the next chapter (ss. 4-13).

CH. 7.--Every body is of necessity either infinite or finite. If
infinite, it is as a whole either of like constituents or of unlike.
If the latter, either of a finite number of species, or of an
infinite number. The last is impossible, if our fundamental
assumptions are allowed to stand. For since the simple modes of
motion are limited in number, the simple bodies must be alike
limited; each simple mode of notion belonging to its own special
simple body, and each natural body having always its own natural
motion. But, if the Infinite be composed of a finite number of
species, each of these constituent parts must be infinite; that is,
water and fire must be infinite. Yet this too, is impossible; for we
have seen that there cannot be either infinite levity or infinite
gravity (the attributes of fire and water). Moreover, if these bodies
be infinite, the places which they occupy, and the motions which they
make, must also be infinite; but this also we have shown to be
inadmissible, if our fundamental assumptions are admitted. The
centripetal body cannot be carried to an infinite distance downward,
nor the centrifugal body to an infinite distance upward. That which
cannot come to pass, cannot be in course of coming to pass; thus, if
a thing cannot come to be white, or a cubit long, or domiciled in
Egypt, it cannot be in course of becoming white, or a cubit long, &c.
It cannot be in course of being carried to a terminus which cannot be
reached. It might be argued that fire, though discontinuous and
dispersed, might still be infinite, in the sum total of its different
masses. But body is that which is extended in every direction: how
can there be many bodies unlike to each other, yet each of them
infinite? Each of them, if infinite at all, ought to be infinite in
every direction (ss. 1-5).

We thus see that the Infinite cannot consist of unlike constituents.
But neither can it consist of constituents all similar. For, first,
there are only three simple motions, and one of the three it must
have; but we have shown that it cannot have either centripetal or
centrifugal motion (_i.e._, that it cannot have either infinite
gravity or infinite levity); nor can it again have circular motion,
for the Infinite cannot be carried in a circle: this would amount to
saying that the Heaven is infinite, which we have shown to be
impossible. The Infinite indeed cannot be moved in any way at all;
for, if moved, it must be moved either according to nature, or
contrary to nature (violently), and, if its present motion be
violent, it must have some other mode of motion which is natural to
it. But, if it have any such, this assumes that there exists some
other place belonging to it, into which it may be conveyed--an
obvious impossibility (ss. 6, 7).

Farthermore, the Infinite cannot act in any way upon the Finite, nor
be acted upon thereby (ss. 8-10). Nor can the Infinite be acted upon
in any way by the Infinite (ss. 11-12).

If then every perceptible body possesses powers, as agent or patient
or both, there can be no perceptible body which is infinite. But all
bodies which are in any place are perceptible; therefore no body
which is in any place can be infinite. There is no infinite body,
indeed there can be no body at all, outside of the Heaven; for that
which is outside of the Heaven is in a place. Even if perceivable
only up to a certain point ([Greek: me/chri tino/s]), even if merely
intelligible, it would still be in a place, and would therefore come
under the foregoing argument--that there is no body outside of the
Heaven (ss. 13, 14).

The foregoing reasoning may be summed up, in more general language
([Greek: logikô/teron]), as follows:--The Infinite assumed as
homogeneous cannot be moved in a circle, since the Infinite has no
centre; nor in a straight line, since this would imply a second
infinite place into which it must be moved according to nature, and a
third infinite place into which it must be moved against nature, and
since in either case the force which causes it to be moved must be
infinite. But we have already argued, in treating of Motion (Phys.
VIII. x.) that nothing finite can have infinite power, nothing
infinite can have finite power; and, if that which is moved according
to nature can also be moved contrary to nature, there must of
necessity be two Infinites--Movens and Motum. Yet what can that be
which causes the Infinite to move? If it cause itself to move, it
must be animated ([Greek: e)/mpsuchon]): but how can an infinite
animated being ([Greek: zô=|on]) exist? And, if there be anything
else which causes it to move, there must exist two Infinites, each
distinguished from the other in form and power (ss. 15-17).

Again, even if we admit the doctrine of Leukippus and
Demokritus--That the whole is not continuous, but discontinuous,
atoms divided by intervening spaces--still the Infinite is
inadmissible. For the nature and essence of these atoms is all the
same, though they are different from each other in figure and
arrangement; accordingly the motion of all must be the same: if one
is heavy or centripetal, all must be so alike; if one is light or
centrifugal, all must be so alike. But either of these motions would
imply the existence of centre and periphery; which does not consist
with an infinite whole. In the Infinite, there is neither centre nor
periphery; no terminus prefixed either for upward or downward motion;
no _own place_ either for centripetal or centrifugal matter.
Therefore in an infinite universe, there can be no motion at all
(ss. 18, 19).

CH. 8.--There cannot be more than one Kosmos. All things both rest
and are moved, either by violence, or according to nature. In that
place to which it is carried by nature, it also rests by nature: in
that place to which it is carried by violence, it rests by violence.
If the current which we see towards the centre is by violence, the
opposite current must be natural; if earth is carried by violence
from thence hitherward, its natural current must be from hence
thitherward; and, if being here it rests without violence, its
current towards here must be a natural one. For there is one only
which is natural. Now, if there be many Kosmi, they must be alike in
their nature, and must be composed of the same bodies, having the
same nature and powers--fire, earth, and the two intermediate
elements: for, if the bodies here are not the same as those in other
Kosmi--if the same names are given in an equivocal sense and do not
connote the same specific attributes--the name Kosmos must be
equivocal also, and there cannot be many true or real Kosmi, in the
same sense. To the parts or elements of each Kosmos, therefore, the
centripetal and **centrifugal currents are natural; for the simple
currents are limited in number, and each element is so named as
to connote one of them specially; and, if the currents are
the same, the elements must also be the same everywhere. If there
were another Kosmos, the earth in that would tend towards the centre
of our Kosmos, and the fire in that would tend towards the periphery
of our Kosmos. But this is impossible; since in that case the earth
in that Kosmos would run away from the centre of its own Kosmos, and
the fire therein would run away from its own periphery. Either we
must not admit the same nature in the simple elements of the numerous
Kosmi; or, if we do admit it, we must recognize only one centre and
one periphery. This difficulty prevents our recognizing more than one
Kosmos (ss. 1-6).

It is unphilosophical to affirm that the nature of these simple
elements becomes changed according as they are more or less distant
from their own places. The difference is at best one of degree, not
one of kind. That they _are_ moved, we see plainly; there must
therefore be some one current of motion natural to them. Accordingly
every portion of the same element (or of elements the same in kind)
must tend towards the same numerical place--towards this actual
centre ([Greek: pro\s to/de ti me/son]), or that actual periphery;
and, if the tendency be towards one centre _specie_, but towards many
centres _numero_, because particulars differ _numero_ alone, and not
_specie_, still the attribute will be alike in all, and will not be
present in some portions, absent in others: I mean that, if the
portions of this Kosmos are relative to each other, those in another
Kosmos are in the like condition, and what is taken from this Kosmos
will not be different from what is taken from the corresponding
elements of any other Kosmos. Unless these assumptions can be
overthrown, it is indisputably certain that there can be only one
centre and one periphery; by consequence therefore, only one Kosmos
and not more (ss. 7-10).

There are other reasons to show that there is a given terminus for
the natural current both of fire and of earth. A thing moved,
speaking generally, changes from something definite into something
else definite; but there are different species of such change: the
change called getting-well is from sickness to health; that called
growth is from the little to great; that called local movement is
from a terminus to another terminus, and local movements are
specifically different from each other, according as the terminus _a
quo_ and the terminus _ad quem_ is defined in each. The terminus is
always a known and definite point: it is not accidental, nor
dependent upon the arbitrium of the mover. Fire and earth therefore
do not move on to infinity, but to definite points in opposite
directions; and the local antithesis is between above and below:
these are the two termini of the respective currents. Earth is
carried with greater velocity, the nearer it approaches to the
centre; fire is carried with greater velocity, the nearer it
approaches to the periphery. This shows that its current does not
stretch to infinity; for its velocity would then increase infinitely.
Earth is not carried downward by the force of any thing else, nor
fire upwards: not by any violence, nor by squeezing out ([Greek:
e)kthli/psei]), as some say. If this were so, a larger quantity of
earth would move downward, and a larger quantity of fire upward, more
slowly than a smaller. But the reverse is what occurs: the larger
quantity of earth moves downward more rapidly than the smaller; if
its motion had been caused by violence or by squeezing out, such
motion would have slackened as it became more widely distant from the
moving force (ss. 11-14).

We may deduce the same conclusion from the reasonings of the First
Philosophy, also from the fact of circular motion which of necessity
is constant both here and everywhere. Further, it is clear that there
can be only one Kosmos; for, as there are three bodily elements, so
there are three special places of such elements: one the undermost,
at the centre; another the uppermost, at the periphery, revolving in
a circular orbit; the third, in the intermediate place between the
two, being the light or floating element ([Greek: to\ e)pipo/lazon]);
for, if not there, it must be outside of the Kosmos, which is
impossible (ss. 15, 16).

CH. 9.--We must however now examine some reasons, which have been
alleged to prove the contrary; and which seem to show, not only that
there are many Kosmi, but even that there _must_ be many, and that
the hypothesis of one single Kosmos is inadmissible. It is urged that
in all aggregates, natural as well as artificial, the Form by itself
is one thing, and the Form implicated with Matter is another. When we
declare the definition of a sphere or a circle, we do not include
therein gold or brass, for this makes no part of the essence: if we
mention these metals, it is when we cannot conceive or grasp anything
beyond the particular case; for example, if we have one particular
circle before us. Nevertheless, even here the circle in the abstract
is one thing, and this particular circle is another: the first is the
Form by itself, the last is the Form along with Matter, one among
particular objects. Now, since the Heaven is perceivable by sense, it
must be one among particular objects; for every thing perceivable is
implicated with Matter. As such, it is _this_ Heaven: to be _this_
Heaven (Form along with Matter) is one thing; to be the Heaven simply
and absolutely (Form without Matter) is another. Now, wherever there
is Form, there either are or may be many distinct particulars;
whether we admit (with Plato) that the Forms exist separately, or
not. In all things where the Essence is implicated with Matter, we
see that the particular manifestations are many and of indefinite
number. Upon this reasoning therefore, there are or at least may be
many Heavens: the supposition that there can be no more than one, is
inadmissible (ss. 1-2).

But we must see how far this reasoning will hold. That the Form
without Matter differs from the Form with Matter, is perfectly true.
But this does not show that there must be many Kosmi; nor can there
be many, if this one Kosmos exhausts all the matter that exists. If
the matter of man were flesh and bone, and if a single man were
formed, including all flesh and all bone indissolubly united; there
could not possibly exist any other man; and the like is true about
other objects; for, where the essence is implicated with an
underlying matter, no object can come into existence unless some
matter be furnished. The Kosmos, or Heaven, is a particular object,
composed partly out of appropriate matter: but if it absorbs all the
appropriate matter, no second Kosmos can come to pass. We shall now
show that it does include all the appropriate matter (ss. 3-5).

The word Heaven has three different senses. 1. It means the essence
of the extreme periphery of the universe, or the natural body which
is there situated: we call this highest and farthest place Heaven,
where we suppose all the divine agency to be situated ([Greek: e)n
ô(=| to\ thei=on pa=n i(dru=sthai/ phamen]). 2. It means the body
continuous ([Greek: to\ suneche\s sô=ma]) with the extreme periphery
of the universe, wherein are contained Sun, Moon, and some of the
Stars (Planets); for these we affirm to be in the Heaven. 3. In a
third sense, it means the body circumscribed ([Greek:
periecho/menon]) by this extreme periphery: for we usually call the
Whole and the Universe, Heaven.--These being the three senses of
Heaven, the Whole circumscribed by the extreme periphery must by
necessity consist of all the natural and perceivable body existing,
since there neither is nor can be any such outside of the Heaven.
For, if there were any such outside of the Heaven, it must be either
one of the elements or a compound thereof--either by nature or
contrary to nature. For we have shown that each of the three
elements--the circular, the centrifugal, and the centripetal--has its
own special place by nature; and that, even if the place in which it
now is were not its natural place, that place would be the natural
place of another one among the three; for, if a place be contrary to
nature in reference to one, it must be conformable to nature in
reference to another. Neither of these three elements therefore can
be outside of the Heaven, nor, of course, any of their compounds. And
there exists no other body besides these; nor can **there exist
any other (ss. 6, 7).

We see therefore plainly that there neither is nor can be any mass of
body ([Greek: sô=matos o)/gkon]) outside of the Heaven; and that the
Heaven comprehends all matter--all body natural and perceptible. So
that there neither are, nor ever have been, nor ever can be, many
Heavens: this one is unique as well as perfect. Nor is there either
place, or vacuum, or time, outside of the Heaven. There is no place
or vacuum; because, if there were, body might be placed therein;
which we have shown to be impossible. There is no time; because time
is the number of motion, and there can be no motion without some
natural body; but there cannot exist any extra-celestial body.
Neither, therefore, are the things outside of the Heaven in place,
nor is there time to affect them with old age, nor do they undergo
change of any kind. They are without any change of quality and
without susceptibility of suffering; they remain, throughout the
entire Æon, in possession of the best and most self-sufficing life.
The word Æon is a divine expression proposed ([Greek: thei/ôs
e)/phthegktai]) by the ancient philosophers: they call the Æon of
each creature that end which circumscribes the natural duration of
the creature's life. Pursuant to this same explanation, the end of
the whole Heaven--the end comprising all time and the infinity of all
things--is Æon, so denominated [Greek: a)po\ tou= **a)ei\
ei)=nai], immortal and divine. From this is suspended existence and
life for all other things; for some closely and strictly, for others
faintly and feebly. For it is a doctrine often repeated to us in
ordinary philosophical discourse ([Greek: e)n toi=s e)gkukli/ois
philosophê/masi]) respecting divine matters--that the Divine, every
thing primary and supreme, is by necessity unchangeable; and this
confirms what has been just affirmed. For there exists nothing more
powerful than itself which can cause it to be moved (if there were,
_that_ would be more divine); nor has it any mean attribute; nor is
it deficient in any of the perfections belonging to its nature. Its
unceasing motion too is easily explained. For all things cease to be
moved, when they come into their own place; but with the circular or
revolving body the place in which it begins and in which it ends is
the same (ss. 8-10).

CH. 10.--We shall next discuss whether the Kosmos be generable or
ungenerable, and perishable or imperishable; noticing what others
have said on the subject before. All of them consider the Kosmos to
be generated: but some think it (although generated) to be eternal;
others look upon it as perishable, like other natural compounds;
others again--Empedokles and Herakleitus--declare it to be generated
and destroyed in perpetual alternation. Now to affirm that it is
generated and yet that it is eternal, is an impossibility: we cannot
reasonably affirm any thing, except what we see to happen with all
things or with most things; and, in the case before us, what happens
is the very reverse of the foregoing affirmation, for all things
generated are seen to be destroyed. Again that which has no beginning
of being as it is now--that which cannot possibly have been otherwise
previously throughout the whole Æon--can never by any possibility
change; for, if it could ever change, there must exist some cause,
which, if it had existed before, would have compelled what is assumed
to be incapable of being otherwise, to be otherwise. To those who say
that the Kosmos has come together from materials previously existing
in another condition, we may reply**: If these materials were always
in this prior condition and incapable of any other, the Kosmos would
never have been generated at all; and, if it _has_ been generated, we
may be sure that the antecedent materials must have been capable of
coming into another condition, and were not under a necessity to
remain always in the same condition; so that aggregations once
existing were dissolved, and disgregations brought into combination,
many times over before the present Kosmos; at least they possibly may
have been so: and this is enough to prove that the Kosmos is not
indestructible (ss. 1-3).

Among those who maintain the Kosmos to have been generated yet to be
indestructible, there are some who defend themselves in the following
manner. They tell us that the generation of which they speak is not
meant to be affirmed as a real past fact, but is a mere explanatory
or illustrative fiction, like the generation of a geometrical figure,
introduced to facilitate the understanding by pupils. But such an
analogy cannot be admitted. For in geometry the conclusions are just
the same, if we suppose all the figures existing simultaneously; but
it is not so with the demonstrations which they tender about the
generation of the Cosmos, where the antecedent condition and the
consequent condition are the reverse of each other. Out of disorder
(they tell us) things came into order: these two conditions cannot be
simultaneous; generation must be a real fact, and distinction of time
comparing the one condition with the other; whereas in geometrical
figures no distinction of time is required (ss. 4-6).

To assume alternate generation and dissolution, over and over again,
is in fact to represent the Kosmos as eternal, but as changing its
form; as if you should suppose the same person to pass from boyhood
to manhood and then back again from manhood to boyhood--calling that
by the name of generation and destruction. For, if the elements come
together, the aggregation resulting will not be accidental and
variable but always the same, especially upon the assumptions of
these philosophers. So that, if the whole Kosmos, remaining
continuous, is sometimes arranged in one way, sometimes in another,
it is these arrangements which are generated and destroyed, not the
Kosmos itself (ss. 7, 8).

Total generation, and total destruction without any renovation, of
Kosmos might be possible, if there were an infinity of Kosmi, but
cannot be possible with only one; for anterior to the moment of
generation there existed the antecedent condition, which, never
having been generated, could not be destroyed (s. 9).

There are some who think (with Plato in Timæus) that the
non-generable may yet be destroyed, and that the generated may be
indestructible. We have combated this opinion on physical grounds,
respecting the Heaven specially. We shall now treat the subject upon
universal reasonings (_i.e._, belonging to Logic or
Metaphysics--[Greek: pro\s ou(\s phusikô=s me\n peri\ tou= ou)ra/nou
mo/non ei)/rêtai; katho/lou de\ peri\ a(/pantos skepsame/nois,
e)/stai kai\ peri\ tou/tou dê=lon]--s. 10).

CH. 11.--In this reasoning, the first step is to point out that
Generable and Non-Generable, Destructible or Indestructible, are
words used in many different senses, which must be discriminated
([Greek: pollachô=s lego/mena]). If a man uses these words in an
affirmative proposition without such discrimination, his affirmation
is indeterminate; you cannot tell in which of their many different
senses he intends to affirm. Non-Generable means: (1) That which now
is, having previously not been, even though without either generation
or change, as, to touch or to be moved; for, according to some
persons, touching or being moved are not cases of generation; you
cannot become touching, or become moved; you are moved, or you are
not moved; you touch, or you do not touch ([Greek: ou) ga\r ei)=nai
gi/nesthai/ phasin a(pto/menon, ou)de\ kinou/menon.] He means, I
presume, that to touch, and to be moved, are instantaneous acts,
though how they can be said to occur [Greek: a)/neu metabolê=s], I
do not see.). It means: (2) That which, though capable of coming to
pass or of having come to pass ([Greek: e)ndecho/menon gi/nesthai
ê)\ gene/sthai]), nevertheless is not; for this too is
non-generable, since it might have come to be. Again, it means:
(3) That which cannot by possibility sometimes exist, sometimes not
exist. Impossible has two meanings: (1) That of which you cannot
truly say that it might be generated ([Greek: o(/ti ge/noit' a)/n]);
(2) That which cannot be generated easily, or quickly, or well
([Greek: kalô=s]). So also the Generable ([Greek: to\ gennêto/n])
means: (1) That which, not existing previously, afterwards exists
at one time and not at another, whether generated or not (he seems
here to point to [Greek: to\ a(/ptesthai] or [Greek: to\
kinei=sthai]); (2) The possible, whether it be the strictly possible,
or the easily possible; (3) That of which there is generation out of
the nonexistent into existence, whether it now does actually exist,
or may exist hereafter. The Destructible and Indestructible ([Greek:
phtharto\n kai\ a)/phtharton]) have similar differences of meaning
(ss. 1-6).

If we say that a man can raise a weight of 100 pounds, or march 100
stadia, we speak always with reference to a certain extreme, meaning
to imply that he can also raise a weight of 50, 40, 30 pounds, and
that he can also walk 50, 40, 30 stadia. If we say that he cannot
raise a weight of 100 pounds, we mean to imply, _à fortiori_, that he
cannot raise a weight of 110 pounds. In regard to sight and hearing,
the case is opposite; he who can see a small object, can certainly
see a large one; he who can hear a faint sound, can certainly hear a
loud one. But he who can see a large object, is not necessarily able
to see a small one; he who can hear a loud sound, is not necessarily
able to hear a faint one. In sight and hearing, superior power is
indicated by the less including the greater; in motion, by the
greater including the less (ss. 7-8).

CH. 12.--If there are some things capable both of existence and of
nonexistence, we must define on which falls the major portion of
time; for, if we cannot in either case define the time, and can only
say that it is greater than any assumed length of time and never less
than any assumed length,--the same thing will be capable both of
existence and of non-existence for an infinite time; which is an
impossibility. We must take our departure from this principle:
Impossibility is one thing, Falsehood another. Both the impossible
and the false are, however, either conditional (as when it is said to
be impossible that the triangle should have its three angles equal to
two right angles, if such and such things are granted, and that the
diameter should be commensurate with the periphery, if such and such
positions were true), or absolute. But there are matters absolutely
false, which are not absolutely impossible. When you are standing, I
affirm that you are sitting: this is absolutely false, but not
absolutely impossible. On the other hand, if I affirm that you are at
the same time sitting and standing, or that the diameter is
commensurable with the periphery, the proposition is not merely
absolutely false, but absolutely impossible. An assumption simply
false is not the same thing as an assumption absolutely impossible:
from an impossible assumption there follow other impossibilities. The
power of sitting or standing means that you can do either one at any
given time--one at one time, the other at another; but not that you
can do both at the same time. But, if any thing has throughout an
infinite time the power of doing more things than one, it must have
the power of doing more things than one at the same time; for this
infinite time comprehends its whole existence. Accordingly, if any
thing existing for an infinite time is nevertheless destructible,
this means that it has the possibility not to exist. This being a
possibility, let us imagine it realized: then the thing in question
will both exist actually for an infinite time and yet not exist;
which is a consequence not only false, but impossible, and thus
proves the premiss assumed to be impossible (_i.e._, that a thing
existing for an infinite time is nevertheless destructible). We thus
see that what exists always is absolutely indestructible (ss. 1-3).
It is also ungenerable; for, if generable, there will be a
possibility that at some time or other it did not exist. That is
generable, which may possibly have not existed at some anterior time,
finite or infinite: so that, if [Greek: to\ a)ei\ o)/n] cannot
possibly not exist, it cannot be generable. Now that which is always
possible to exist, has, for its correlate negative ([Greek:
a)po/phasis]), that which is not always possible to exist; and that
which is always possible not to exist, has, for its contrary, that
which is not always possible not to exist. These two negatives must
of necessity be true of the same subject: there must be something of
which we may truly say--It has no possibility always to exist--It has
no possibility always not to exist. This therefore is something
intermediate between that which always exists, and that which always
exists not, viz., That which may exist and may not exist ([Greek:
kai\ ei)=nai me/son tou= a)ei\ o)/ntos kai\ tou= a)ei\ mê\ o)/ntos,
to\ duna/menon ei)=nai kai\ mê\ ei)=nai]); for both the negative
predicates will find application, if it do not exist always. The
possible to exist, and the possible not to exist, must therefore be
the same thing--a mean between the two above-mentioned extremes (ss.
4, 5).

After a long metaphysical deduction, occupying from sections 6 to 17,
Aristotle proceeds as follows.

We may also discern in the following manner that nothing which has
been once generated, can continue indestructible; nothing which is
ungenerable and which always existed heretofore, can ever be
destroyed. For it is impossible that any thing which arises
spontaneously ([Greek: a)po\ tou= au)toma/tou]) can be either
indestructible or ungenerable. The Spontaneous, and the Casual
([Greek: to\ a)po\ tê=s tu/chês]), are in antithesis to the always
or the most frequently Ens or Fiens ([Greek: para\ to\ a)ei\ kai\ to\
ô(s e)pi\ to\ polu\ ê)\ o)\n ê)\ gino/menon]--s. 18); but that
which has existed for an infinite or a very long tine, must belong to
this last category. Accordingly, such things must by nature sometimes
exist, sometimes not exist. In them, both sides of the contradiction
are alike true, owing to the matter of which they are composed: they
exist, and they do not exist. But you cannot say with truth now that
the thing exists last year; nor could you say last year that it
exists now. Having once been non-existent, it cannot be eternal for
future time; for it will still possess in future time the possibility
of non-existence, yet not the power of non-existing at the moment
when it does exist, nor with reference to last year and to past time;
there being no power bearing upon past time, but only on present and
future time. (Sections 21 and 22 are hardly intelligible to me.)

On physical grounds also it appears impossible that what is eternal
in the past should be destroyed afterwards, or that what did not
exist at some former time should afterwards be eternal. Those things
which are destructible, are all of them generable and changeable
([Greek: gennêta\ kai\ a)lloiôta\ pa/nta]). Those things which
exist by nature, are changed by their opposites and by their
component materials, and are destroyed by the same agencies (s. 23).

. . . . . .

Book II.

CH. 1.--The Heaven has not been generated nor can it be destroyed, as
some (Plato) affirm: it is one and eternal, having neither beginning
nor end of the whole Æon, holding and comprehending in itself
infinite time. This we may believe not merely from the foregoing
reasonings, but also from the opinion of opponents who suppose the
Cosmos to be generated. For, since their opinion has been shown to be
inadmissible, and our doctrine is at least admissible, even thus much
will have great force to determine our faith in the immortality and
eternity of the Heaven. Hence we shall do well to assist in
persuading ourselves that the ancient doctrines, and especially those
of our own country, are true--That there is among the substances
endowed with motion one immortal and divine, whose motion is such
that it has itself no limit but is rather itself the limit of all
other motions, limit being the attribute of the circumscribing
substance. The circular motion of the Heaven, being itself perfect,
circumscribes and comprehends all the imperfect motions which are
subject to limit and cessation. It has itself neither beginning nor
end, but is unceasing throughout infinite time: in regard to other
motions, it is the initiatory cause to some, while it is the
recipient of the cessation of others (ss. 1, 2).

The ancients assigned Heaven to the Gods, as the only place which was
immortal, and our reasonings show that it is not merely
indestructible and ungenerable, but also unsusceptible of all mortal
defect or discomfort. Moreover it feels no fatigue, because it is not
constrained by any extraneous force to revolve contrary to its own
nature: if it were so, that would be tiresome, and all the more since
the motion is eternal; it would be inconsistent with any supremely
good condition. The ancients therefore were mistaken in saying that
the Heaven required to be supported by a person named Atlas: the
authors of this fable proceeded upon the same supposition as recent
philosophers; regarding the celestial body as heavy and earthy, they
placed under it, in mythical guise, an animated necessity ([Greek:
a)na/gkên e)/mpsuchon]), or constraint arising from vital force. But
they are wrong; and so is Empedokles, when he says that the Heaven is
kept permanently in its place by extreme velocity of rotation, which
counteracts its natural inclination downwards ([Greek: oi)kei/as
r(opê=s]). Nor can we reasonably suppose that it is kept eternally
in its place (_i.e._, contrary to its own nature) by the compulsion
of a soul or vital force ([Greek: u(po\ psuchê=s a)nagkazou/sês]):
it is impossible that the life of a soul thus acting can be painless
or happy. The motion which it causes, being accompanied with violence
and being also perpetual (as it is the nature of the First Body to
cause motion continuously throughout the Kosmos), must be a tiresome
duty, unrelieved by any reasonable relaxation; since this soul enjoys
no repose, such as the letting down of the body during sleep affords
to the soul of mortal animals, but is subjected to a fate like
Ixion's--ceaseless and unyielding revolution. Now our reasonings, if
admissible, respecting the First or Circular Motion ([Greek:
prô/tês phora=s]) afford not merely more harmonious conceptions
respecting its eternity, but also the only way of speaking in
language which will be allowed as consistent with the vague
impressions respecting the Deity ([Greek: tê=| mantei/a| tê=| peri\
to\n theo/n]). Enough, however, of this talk for the present
(ss. 3-6).

CH. 2.--Since the Pythagoreans and others recognize a Right and Left
in the Heaven, let us enquire whether such [Greek: a)rchai/] can
properly be ascribed to the body of the Universe; for, if these can
be ascribed, much more may the other [Greek: a)rchai/] prior to them
be ascribed to it. Of [Greek: a)rchai/ kinê/seôs] (_termini a
quibus_), there are three couples: (1) Upwards and Downwards;
(2) Forward and Backward; (3) Right and Left. All the three exist in
animals; but the first alone is found in plants. All the three are in
all perfect bodies, and in all animated bodies which have in
themselves a beginning of motion; but not in inanimate bodies, which
have not in themselves a beginning. Each of these three [Greek:
a)rchai/] or [Greek: diasta/seis] is true and appropriate as an
attribute; but among the three, Upwards and Downwards comes first in
the order of nature, Right and Left, last. The Pythagoreans are to be
blamed for dwelling on Right and Left, and not noticing the other two
pairs which are prior in the order of nature and more appropriate,
and for supposing that Right and Left are to be found in every thing.
Upward is the principle of length; Right, of breadth; Forward, of
depth. Again, from upward movement comes growth; movement from the
right is local movement; movement from before is movement of sense
([Greek: ê( kata\ tê\n ai)/sthêsin]), or the line in which
sensible impressions are propagated ([Greek: e)ph' ô(=|
ai)sthê/seis]). Up is the source from whence motion originates
([Greek: to\ o(/then ê( ki/nêsis]--s. 6); Right, the point from
which the direction of the motion starts; Forward, the point towards
which it goes ([Greek: to\ e)ph' o(/]). In inanimate bodies (which
are either not moved at all, or only moved in one manner and
direction, as fire only upwards, earth only downwards), we speak of
above and below, right and left, only with reference to ourselves,
and not as attributes really belonging to these objects; for by
inverting the objects these attributes will be inverted also, right
will become left, and left will become right. But in animated
objects, which have in themselves an [Greek: a)rchê\ kinê/seôs], a
real right and left, a real upward and downward, are to be
recognized: of course therefore in the Heaven, which is an animated
object of this character ([Greek: e)/mpsuchos]). For we must not make
any difficulty in consequence of the spherical figure of the
universe, or suppose that such a figure excludes real right and left,
the parts being all alike and all in perpetual motion. We must
conceive the case as like that of a person having a real right and
left, distinct in attributes, but who has been enclosed in a hollow
sphere: he will still have the real distinct right and left, yet to a
spectator outside he will appear not to have it. In like manner, we
must speak of the Heaven as having a beginning of motion; for, though
its motion never did begin, yet there must be some point from which
it would have taken its departure, if it ever had begun, and from
which it would recommence, if it ever came to a standstill. I call
the length of the Heaven, the distance between the poles--one of the
poles above, the other below. Now the pole which is above us, is the
lower pole; that which is invisible to us, is the upper pole. For
that is called right, in each object, from whence local movement
takes its departure, or where local movement begins. But the
revolution of the Heaven begins on the side where the stars rise;
this, therefore, is the true right, and the side on which they set,
is left. If, therefore, it begins from the right, and revolves round
to the right ([Greek: e)pi\ ta\ de/xia periphe/retai]), the invisible
pole must be the upper pole; for, if the visible pole were the upper,
the movement of the Heaven would be to the left, which we deny to be
the fact. The invisible pole is therefore the upper, and those who
live near it are in the upper hemisphere, and to the right ([Greek:
pro\s toi=s dexi/ois]); we on the contrary are in the lower
hemisphere, and to the left. The Pythagoreans are in error when they
say that we are in the upper hemisphere, and to the right, and that
inhabitants of the southern hemisphere are in the lower hemisphere
and to the left. But, speaking with reference to the second
revolution ([Greek: tê=s deute/ras periphora=s]) or that of the
planets, which is in the contrary direction to the first revolution
or that of the First Heaven, it is we who are in the upper hemisphere
and on the right side; it is the inhabitants of the southern
hemisphere, who are in the lower hemisphere and on the left side:
that is, it is we who are on the side of the beginning of motion,
they who are on the side of the end (ss. 1-10).

CH. 3.--I have previously laid it down, that circular movement is not
opposite to circular. But, if this be the case, what is the reason
that there are many different revolutions in the Heaven? This is what
I shall now enquire, fully aware of the great distance from which the
enquiry must be conducted ([Greek: po/r)r(ôthen])--not so much a
distance in place, as owing to the small number of accompanying facts
which can be observed by the senses respecting them.

The cause must be looked for in this direction. Every thing which
performs a work, exists for the sake of that work. Now the work of
Deity is immortality, or eternal life; so that the divine substance
must of necessity be in eternal motion. The Heaven is a divine body
and has for that reason the encyclical body, whose nature it is to be
moved for ever in a circle. But why is not the whole body of the
Heaven thus constituted (_i.e._, encyclical)? Because it is necessary
that some portion of its body should remain stationary in the centre;
and no portion of the encyclical body can possibly remain stationary,
either in the centre or elsewhere. For, if it could, its natural
motion (_i.e._, the motion of that supposed portion) would be towards
the centre; whereas its natural motion is circular; and it cannot
move towards the centre contrary to its nature, because on that
supposition its motion would not be eternal: no motion contrary to
nature can be eternal. Moreover that which is contrary to nature is
posterior to that which is natural; it is a deviation therefrom
arising in the course of generation (s. 1).

Hence it is necessary that earth should exist, the nature of which it
is to rest in the centre (_i.e._, the divine encyclical body will not
suffice alone, without adjuncts of different nature). I assume this
for the present; more will be said about it anon.

But, if earth exists, fire must exist also; for of two contraries, if
the one exist by nature, the other must exist by nature also. For the
matter of contraries is the same, and Form (positive and affirmable)
is prior by nature to Privation (for example, hot is prior to cold);
now rest and gravity denote the privation of motion and lightness (s.
2--_i.e._, fire is prior in nature to earth, as having the positive
essences motion and levity, while earth has for its essence the
privation thereof).

Again, if fire and earth exist, the two other elements intermediate
between them must also exist; for each of the four elements has its
peculiar mode of contrariety with reference to each. At least let
this be assumed now: I shall show it at length presently.

Now, these points being established, we see that generation must
necessarily come to pass, because no one of the four elements can be
eternal: they act upon each other, and suffer from each other, with
contrary effects; they are destructive of each other. Besides, each
of them has a mode of motion natural and appropriate to it, but this
mode of motion is not eternal (because it is either to the centre or
to the circumference and therefore has a natural terminus). It is not
reasonable to suppose that any Mobile can be eternal, whose natural
mode of motion cannot be eternal (s. 3).

Thus the four elements are not eternal, but require to be renewed by
generation; therefore generation must come to pass. But, if
generation be necessary, more than one revolution of the celestial
body is indispensably required: two at least, if not more. For, if
there were no other revolution except that of the First Heaven, that
is consistent only with a perfectly uniform condition of the four
elements in relation to each other (s. 4).

When the question is asked, therefore, Why there are (not one only
but) several encyclical bodies? I answer: Because generation _must_
come to pass. There must be generation, if there be fire; there must
be fire and the other elements, if there be earth; there must be
earth, because something must remain stationary eternally in the
centre, if there is to be eternal revolution (s. 5).

CH. 4.--The Heaven is by necessity spherical: this figure is at once
both most akin to its essence and first in its own nature. I shall
begin with some observations respecting figures generally--plane and
solid, as to which among them is the first. Every plane figure is
either rectilinear or curvilinear; the former is comprehended by many
lines, the latter only by one. Now, since in every department one is
prior to many and simple to compound, the first of all plane figures
must be the circle. Moreover, since that is perfect which can receive
nothing additional from without, and since addition can be made to
every straight line, but none whatever to the line circumscribing a
circle, it is plain that this latter is perfect; and therefore the
circle is the first of all plane figures, and the sphere of all solid
figures (ss. 1, 2). This doctrine appears most reasonable when we set
out the different figures, each with a number belonging to it in
numerical order. The circle corresponds to One, the triangle to Two,
since its three angles are equal to two right angles; whereas, if we
assign number One to the triangle and place that first, we can find
no number fit for the circle: the circle will be no longer recognized
as a figure (s. 4).

Now, since the first figure belongs to the first body, which is that
in the extreme or farthest circumference, this body which revolves
constantly in a circle, will be spherical in figure. That which is
continuous with it even to the centre, will also be spherical; and
all the interior parts are in contact and continuity with it: the
parts below the sphere of the planets touch the sphere above them. So
that the whole revolving current, interior and exterior, will be
spherical; for all things touch and are continuous with the spheres
(s. 5).

There is another reason too why the universe is spherical in figure,
since it has been shown to revolve in a circle. I have proved before
that there exists nothing on the outside of the universe; neither
place nor vacuum. If the figure of the Kosmos, revolving as it does
in a circle, were any thing else but spherical--if it were either
rectilinear or elliptical--it could not possibly cover exactly the
same space during all its revolutions: there must therefore be place
and vacuum without it; which has been shown to be impossible (s. 6).

Farthermore, the rotation of the Heaven is the measure of motions,
because it is the only one continuous and uniform and eternal. Now in
every department the measure is the least, and the least motion is
the quickest; accordingly the rotation of the Heaven will be the
quickest of all motions (s. 7). But among all curved lines from the
same back to the same, the circumference of the circle is the
shortest, and motion will be quickest over the shortest distance.
Accordingly, since the Heaven revolves in a circle and with the
quickest of all motions, its figure must be spherical (s. 8).

We may also draw the same conclusion from the bodies fixed in the
central parts of the Kosmos. The Earth in the centre is surrounded by
water; the water, by air; the air, by fire. The uppermost bodies
surround the fire, following the like proportion or analogy; being
not continuous therewith, but in contact therewith. Now the surface
of water is spherical; and that which is either continuous with the
spherical or surrounds the spherical, must itself be spherical also
(s. 9). That the surface of the water is truly spherical, we may
infer from the fact, that it is the nature of water always to flow
together into the lowest cavities, that is, into the parts nearest to
the centre (s. 10).

From all the foregoing reasonings, we see plainly that the Kosmos is
spherical, and moreover turned with such a degree of exact sphericity
([Greek: kata\ a)kri/beian e)/ntornos ou(/tôs]), that no piece of
human workmanship nor any thing ever seen by us on earth can be
compared to it. For none of the component materials here on earth is
so fit for receiving perfect level and accuracy as the nature of the
First or Peripheral Body; it being clear that, in the same proportion
as water is more exactly spherical, the elements surrounding the
water become more and more spherical in proportion as they are more
and more distant from the centre (s. 11).

CH. 5.--Circular revolution may take place in two directions; from
the point A on one side towards B, or on the other side towards C.
That these two are not contrary to each other, I have already shown.
But, since in eternal substances nothing can possibly take place by
chance or spontaneity, and since both the Heaven and its circular
revolution are eternal, we may enquire what is the reason why this
revolution takes place in one direction and not in the other. This
circumstance either depends upon some first principle, or is itself a
first principle (s. 1). Perhaps some may consider it a mark either of
great silliness, or great presumption, to declare any positive
opinion at all upon some matters, or upon all matters whatever,
leaving out nothing. But we must not censure indiscriminately all who
do this: we must consider what is the motive which prompts each
person to declare himself, and with what amount of confidence he
affirms, whether allowing for human fallibility or setting himself
above it. Whenever a man can find out exact and necessary grounds for
the conclusions which he propounds, we ought to be grateful to him:
here we must deliver what appears to be the truth. Nature (we know)
always does what is best among all the practicable courses. Now the
upper place is more divine than the lower, and accordingly among
rectilinear currents, that which is directed upwards is the more
honourable. In the same manner, the current forwards is more
honourable than backwards; and the current towards the right more
honourable than that towards the left--as was before laid down. The
problem above started indicates to us that there is here a real Prius
and Posterius--a better and a worse; for, when we recognize this, the
difficulty is solved. The solution is that this is the best
practicable arrangement, viz., that the Kosmos is moved in a motion,
simple, never-ending, and in the most honourable direction ([Greek:
e)pi\ to\ timiô/teron], s. 2).

CH. 6.--I have now to show that this motion of the First Heaven is
uniform and not irregular ([Greek: o(malê\s kai\ ou)k a)nô/malos]):
I speak only of the First Heaven and of the First Rotation; for in
the substances lower than this many rotations or currents have
coalesced into one. If the motion of the First Heaven be irregular,
there will clearly be acceleration and remission of its motion, and
an extreme point or maximum ([Greek: a)kmê/]) thereof. Now the
maximum of motion must take place either at the terminus _ad quem_,
as in things moved according to nature; or at the terminus _a quo_,
as in things moved contrary to nature; or during the interval
between, as in things thrown ([Greek: e)n toi=s r(iptoume/nois]). But
in circular motion, there is neither terminus _a quo_, nor terminus
_ad quem_, nor middle between the two--neither beginning, nor end,
nor mean; for it is eternal in duration, compact as to length or
space moved over, and unbroken ([Greek: tô=| mê/kei sunêgme/nê
kai\ a)/klastos]). It thus cannot have any maximum or acceleration or
remission; and of course, therefore, it cannot be irregular (s. 1).

Besides, since every thing that is moved is moved by some thing, the
irregularity, if there be such, must arise either from the Movens, or
the Motum, or both: the power of the Movens, or the quality of the
Motum, or both, must undergo change. But nothing of the sort can
happen with the Motum, being in this case the Heaven; for it has been
shown to be a First, simple, ungenerable, indestructible, and in
every way unchangeable. Much more then is it reasonable to believe
that the Movens is such; for that which is qualified to move the
First, must be itself a First ([Greek: to\ ga\r prô=ton tou=
prô/tou kinêtiko/n]); that which is qualified to move the simple,
must be itself simple, &c. If then the Motum, which is a body,
undergoes no change, neither will the Movens, being as it is
incorporeal (s. 2). Accordingly the current, or motion ([Greek:
phora/]), cannot possibly be irregular. For, if it comes to pass
irregularly, its irregularity either pervades the whole, the velocity
becoming alternately more or less, or certain parts only. But, in
regard to the parts separately, there is certainly no irregularity:
if there had been, the relative distances of the stars one from the
other would have varied in the course of infinite time; now no such
variation in their distances has ever been observed. Neither in
regard to the whole is there any irregularity. For irregularity
implies relaxation, and relaxation arises in every subject from
impotence. Now impotence is contrary to nature: in animals, all
impotences (such as old age or decay) are contrary to nature; for all
animals, perhaps, are compounds put together out of elements each of
which has a different place of its own and not one of which is in its
own place. In the First Bodies, on the other hand, which are simple,
unmixed, in their own places, and without any contrary, there can be
no impotence, and therefore neither relaxation nor intensification,
which always go together ([Greek: ei) ga\r e)pi/tasis, kai\
a)/nesis], s. 3). Besides, we cannot with any reason suppose that the
Movens is impotent for an infinite time, and then again potent for an
infinite time; nothing contrary to nature lasts for an infinite time,
and impotence is contrary to nature; nor can it be for an equal time
contrary to nature and agreeable to nature--impotent and potent. If
the motion relaxes, it cannot go on relaxing for an infinite time,
nor go on being intensified, nor the one and the other alternately.
For in that case the motion would be infinite and indeterminate;
which is impossible, since every motion must be from one term to
another term and also determinate (s. 4: [Greek: a)/peiros ga\r a)\n
ei)/ê kai\ a)o/ristos ê( ki/nêsis. a(/pasan de/ phamen e)/k tinos
ei)/s ti ei)=nai, kai\ ô(risme/nên]--_i.e._, all motion must be
determined both in distance and direction).

Again, the supposition may be made that there is a minimum of time
required for the revolution of the Heaven, in less than which the
revolution could not be completed; just as there is a minimum of time
indispensable for a man to walk or play the harp. Admitting this
supposition, there cannot be perpetual increase in the intensity or
velocity of the motion (the increase has an impassable limit), and
therefore there cannot be perpetual relaxation; for both are on the
same footing (s. 5).

It might be urged, indeed, that intensification and relaxation go on
alternately; each proceeding to a certain length, and then giving
place to the other. But this is altogether irrational--nothing better
than a gratuitous fiction. Besides, if there were this alternation,
we may reasonably assume that it could not remain concealed from us;
for contrasting conditions coming in immediate sequence to each other
are more easily discerned by sense. What has been said, then, is
sufficient to prove--That the Heaven or Cosmos is one and only one;
that it is ungenerable and eternal; that its motion is uniform (s.
6).

CH. 7.--Next in order, I have to speak of what are called the Stars
([Greek: tô=n kaloume/nôn a)/strôn]). Of what are they composed?
What is their figure? What are their motions?

It is consistent with the foregoing reasonings, as well as in itself
the most rational doctrine, to conceive each of the stars as composed
of portions of that body in which its current of motion takes place;
that is, of that body, whose nature it is to move in a circle. For
those who affirm the stars to be fire say this because they believe
the upper body to be fire, assuming it as reasonable that each thing
should be composed of the elements in which it is; and I assume the
same also (s. 1). The heat and light of the stars arises from their
friction with the air in their current of motion. If it is the nature
of motion to inflame pieces of wood, and stones, and iron, it is
still more reasonable that what is nearest to fire (that is, air)
should be so inflamed. We see that darts projected are so inflamed,
that their leaden appendages are melted; and, these being thus
inflamed, the air around them must be modified in the same manner.
Now objects like these darts are thus violently heated, because they
are carried along in the medium of the air, which through the shock
given by their motion becomes fire. But each of the upper bodies or
stars is carried round (not in the air, but) in its appropriate
sphere, so that they themselves are not inflamed; while the air which
is under the sphere of the encyclical body becomes of necessity
heated by the rotation of that sphere; and most of all at the point
where the Sun has happened to be fastened in ([Greek: kai\ tau/tê|
ma/lista, ê(=| o( ê(/lios tetu/chêken e)ndedeme/nos]).

Let it then be understood, that the stars are neither composed of
fire, nor are they carried round in the medium of the fire (s. 2).

CH. 8.--It is seen as a fact, that both the stars, and the entire
Heaven, change their place ([Greek: methista/mena]). Now, in this
change, we must assume either that both continue at rest, or that
both are in motion, or that one is at rest, and the other is in
motion. Now it is impossible that both can be at rest, at least if we
assume the earth to be at rest; for the facts which we see would not
have taken place, upon that supposition (s. 1). Either therefore both
are in motion, or one is in motion and the other at rest. Now, if
both are in motion, it is against reason that the stars and the
circles in which they are fastened should have equal velocities of
motion. Each one of them must, be equal in velocity to the circle or
sphere in which it is carried, since all come back round along with
their circles to the same position; so that in one and the same time,
the star has gone round its circle, and the circle has completed its
revolution. It is not reasonable to suppose that the velocities of
the stars and the magnitudes of the circles should be in the same
proportion. Comparing one circle with another, indeed, it is not only
not absurd, but even necessary, that the velocities should be in
proportion to the magnitudes; but it is not reasonable that each of
the stars in these circles should be of such velocity. For, if it be
necessary that what is carried round in the larger circle should have
the greater velocity, the consequence would be that, if the stars in
one circle were transferred to another, their motions would become
accelerated or retarded; which is equivalent to saying that they have
no motion of their own at all, but are carried round by the
revolution of the circles (s. 2). If, on the contrary, it be not
necessary, but a spontaneous coincidence ([Greek: ei)/te a)po\
tau)toma/tou sune/pesen]) that what is carried round in the greater
circle has the greater velocity, neither upon this supposition is it
reasonable that in all the circles without exception the
circumference should be greater, and the motion of the star fastened
in the greater circle quicker, in the same proportion. That this
should happen with one or two of them, might be reasonably expected;
but that it should happen with all alike, savours of fiction.
Moreover chance has no place in matters according to nature; nor is
that which occurs everywhere and belongs to all, ever the produce of
chance (s. 3).

So much for the hypothesis, that both stars and circles are in
motion. Let us now assume that one is at rest, and the other in
motion; and first, let the circles be at rest, and the stars in
motion. This again will lead to absurdities; for we shall still be
unable to explain how it happens that the outermost stars are moved
most quickly, and that their velocities are proportioned to the
magnitudes of the circles.

Since then we cannot assume either that both are moved, or that the
star alone is moved, we must adopt the third supposition, that the
circles are moved, and that the stars, being themselves at rest, are
fastened in the circles and carried round along with them. This is
the only hypothesis which entails no unreasonable consequences. For
it is reasonable that, of circles fastened round the same centre, the
greater velocity should belong to the greatest. For, as in all the
varieties of body the heavier fragment is carried with greater
velocity than the lighter in its appropriate motion, so it happens
with the encyclical body. When two straight lines are drawn from the
centre, the segment of the greater circle intercepted between them
will be greater than the segment of the smaller; and it is consistent
with reason that the greater circle should be carried round in equal
time. This is one reason why the Kosmos is not split into separate
parts; another reason is, because the universe has been shown to be
continuous (s. 4, 5).

Now we all agree that the stars are of spherical figure: and
spherical bodies have two motions of their own--rolling and rotatory
([Greek: ku/lisis kai\ di/nêsis]). If they were moved of themselves,
they would be moved in one or other of these two ways; but we see
that they are so in neither. They do not rotate; for, if they did,
they would remain always in the same place, which contradicts
universal observation and belief. Besides, it is reasonable to
suppose that all the stars move in the same manner, but the Sun is
the only one that is seen so to move, when he rises or sets; and he
too, not by any movement of his own, but through the distance of our
vision, which when stretched to a great distance, rotates from
weakness (s. 6). This is perhaps the reason why the stars fastened
(in the outer sphere) twinkle, while the planets do not twinkle; for
the planets are near to us, so that our vision reaches them while yet
strong; whereas in regard to the unmoved stars it is made to quiver
in consequence of the great distance from being stretched out too
far, and its quivering causes the appearance of motion in the star.
For there is no difference between moving the vision and moving the
object seen ([Greek: ou)the\n ga\r diaphe/rei kinei=n tê\n o)/psin
ê)\ to\ o(rô/menon]--s. 6).

Again, neither do the stars roll nor revolve forward. For that which
rolls forward must necessarily turn round; but the same side of the
moon--what is called the face of the moon--is always clearly visible
to us (s. 7).

Since it is reasonable to believe, therefore, that, if the stars were
moved in themselves, they would be moved in their own special variety
of motion (_i.e._, rolling or rotatory), and since it has been shown
that they are not moved in either of these two ways, we see plainly
that they cannot be moved in themselves (but are carried round in the
revolution of the Aplanês).

Besides, if they were moved in **themselves, it is unreasonable that
Nature should have assigned to them no organ suitable for motion,
since Nature does nothing by haphazard; and that she should have been
considerate in providing for animals, while she overlooked objects so
honourable as the stars. The truth rather is, that she has withheld
from them, as it were by express purpose, all aids, through which it
was possible for them to advance forward in themselves, and has
placed them at the greatest possible distance from objects furnished
with organs for motion (s. 8).

Hence it would seem to be the reasonable doctrine--That the entire
Heaven is spherical, and that each of the stars (fastened in it) is
also spherical. For the sphere is the most convenient of all figures
for motion in the same place, so that the Heaven being spherical
would be moved most rapidly and would best maintain its own place.
But for forward motion the sphere is of all figures the most
inconvenient; for it least resembles self-moving bodies; it has no
outlying appendage or projecting end, as rectilinear figures have,
and stands farthest removed from the figures of marching bodies.

Since therefore it is the function of ([Greek: dei=]) the Heaven to
be moved by a motion in the same place ([Greek: kinei=sthai tê\n e)n
au(tô=| ki/nêsin]), and that of the stars not to make any advance
by themselves ([Greek: ta\ a)/lla d' a)/stra mê\ proi+e/nai di'
au(tô=n]), it is with good reason that both of them are spherical.
For thus will the Heaven best be moved, and the stars will best be at
rest.

CH. 9.--From what I have said, it is plain that those who affirm that
the revolving celestial bodies emit in their revolutions sounds
harmonious to each other, speak cleverly and ingeniously, but not
consistently with the truth. There must necessarily be sound (they
say) from the revolution of such vast bodies. Since bodies near to us
make sound in motion, the sun, moon, and stars, being so much larger
and moving with so much greater velocity, must make an immense sound;
and, since their distances and velocities are assumed to be in
harmonic proportion, the sounds emitted in their revolution must also
be in harmony. To the question put to them--Why do we not hear this
immense sound? they reply, that we have been hearing it constantly
from the moment of our birth; that we have no experience of an
opposite state, or state of silence, with which to contrast it, and
that sound and silence are discriminated only by relation to each
other ([Greek: ô(/ste mê\ dia/dêlon ei)=nai pro\s tê\n e)nanti/an
sigê/n; pro\s a)/llêla ga\r phônê=s kai\ sigê=s ei)=nai tê\n
dia/gnôsin]); that men thus cease to be affected by it, just as
blacksmiths from constant habit cease to be affected by the noise of
their own work (s. 1).

The reasoning of these philosophers (the Pythagoreans), as I have
just said, is graceful and poetical, yet nevertheless inadmissible.
For they ought to explain, upon their hypothesis, not merely why we
hear nothing, but why we experience no uncomfortable impressions
apart from hearing. For prodigious sounds pierce through and destroy
the continuity even of inanimate bodies; thus thunder splits up
stones and other bodies of the greatest strength. The impression
produced here by the sound of the celestial bodies must be violent
beyond all endurance. But there is good reason why we neither hear
nor suffer any thing from them; viz., that they make no sound. The
cause thereof is one which attests the truth of my doctrine laid down
above--That the stars are not moved of themselves, but carried round
by and in the circle to which they are fastened. Bodies thus carried
round, make no sound or shock: it is only bodies carried round of
themselves that make sound and shock. Bodies which are fastened in,
or form parts of, a revolving body, cannot possibly sound, any more
than the parts of a ship moving, nor indeed could the whole ship
sound, if carried along in a running river. Yet the Pythagoreans
might urge just the same reasons to prove that bodies so large as the
mast, the stern, and the entire ship, could not be moved without
noise. Whatever is carried round, indeed, in a medium not itself
carried round, really makes sound; but it cannot do so, if the medium
itself be carried round continuously. We must therefore in this case
maintain that, if the vast bodies of the stars were carried round in
a medium either of air or of fire (whose motion is rectilinear), as
all men say that they are, they must necessarily make a prodigious
sound, which would reach here to us and would wear us out ([Greek:
diaknai/ein]). Since nothing of this nature occurs, we may be sure
that the stars are not carried round in a current of their own,
either animated or violent. It is as if Nature had foreseen the
consequence, that, unless the celestial motions were carried on in
the manner in which they are carried on, nothing of what now takes
place near us ([Greek: tô=n peri\ to\n deu=ro to/pon]), could have
been as it is now. I have thus shown that the stars are spherical,
and that they are not moved by a motion of their own (ss. 2-5).

CH. 10.--Respecting the arrangement of the stars--how each of them is
placed, some anterior others posterior, and what are their distances
from each other--the books on astronomy must be consulted and will
explain. It consists with the principles there laid down, that the
motions of the stars (planets) should be proportional to their
distances, some quicker, others slower. For, since the farthest
circle of the Heaven has a revolution both simple and of extreme
velocity, while the revolutions of the other stars (planets) are many
in number and slower, each of them being carried round in its own
circle in the direction contrary to that of the first or farthest
circle of the Heaven, the reasonable consequence is, that that planet
which is nearest to the first and simple revolving circle takes the
longest time to complete its own (counter-revolving) circle, while
that which is most distant from the same circle takes the shortest
time, and the remaining planets take more or less time in proportion
as they are nearer or farther. For the planet nearest to the first
revolving circle has its own counterrevolution most completely
conquered or overpowered thereby; the planet farthest from the same,
has its own counterrevolution least conquered thereby; and the
intermediate planets more or less in inverse proportion to their
distances from the same, as mathematicians demonstrate.

CH. 11.--We may most reasonably assume the figure of the stars to be
spherical. For, since we have shown that it is not their nature to
have any motion of their own, and since Nature does nothing either
irrational or in vain, it is plain that she has assigned to the
immovables that figure which is least fit for motion; which figure is
the sphere, as having no organ for motion. Besides, what is true of
one is true of all ([Greek: e)/ti d' o(moi/ôs me\n a(/panta kai\
e(/n]): now the Moon may be shown to be spherical, first, by the
visible manifestations which she affords in her waxings and wanings,
next, from astronomical observations of the eclipses of the Sun.
Since therefore one among the stars is shown to be spherical, we may
presume that the rest will be so likewise.

CH. 12.--I proceed to two other difficulties, which are well
calculated to perplex every one. We must try to state what looks most
like truth, considering such forwardness not to be of the nature of
audacity, but rather to deserve respect, when any one, stimulated by
the thirst for philosophy, contents himself with small helps and
faint approximations to truth, having to deal with the gravest
difficulties.

1. Why is it, that the circles farthest from the outermost circle (or
Aplanês) are not always moved by a greater number of motions than
those nearer to it? Why are some of the intermediate circles (neither
farthest nor nearest) moved by a greater number of motions than any
of the others? For it would seem reasonable, when the First Body is
moved by one single rotatory current, that the one nearest to it
should be moved by two, the next nearest by three, and so on in
regular sequence to those which are more distant. But we find that
the reverse occurs in fact: Sun and Moon have fewer movements than
some of the planets, which are nevertheless farther from the centre,
and nearer to the First Body. In regard to some of the planets, we
know this by visual evidence; for we have seen the Moon when at
half-moon passing under Mars, who was occulted by the dark part of her
body, and emerged on the bright side of it. The like is attested
respecting the other planets, by the Egyptians and Babylonians, the
most ancient of all observers.

2. Why is it, that in the First Revolution (in the revolution of the
First Heaven or First Body) there is included so vast a multitude of
stars as to seem innumerable; while in each of the others there is
one alone and apart, never two or more fastened in the same current?

Here are two grave difficulties, which it is well to investigate and
try to understand, though our means of information are very scanty,
and though we stand at so great a distance from the facts. Still, as
far as we can make out from such data, these difficulties would not
seem to involve any philosophical impossibility or incongruity. Now
we are in the habit of considering these celestial bodies as bodies
only; and as monads which have indeed regular arrangement, but are
totally destitute of soul or vital principle. (When Aristotle here
says _we_, he must mean the philosophers whose point of view he is
discussing: for the general public certainly did not regard the Sun,
Moon, and stars as [Greek: a)/psucha pa/mpan], but, on the contrary,
considered this as blameable heresy, and looked upon them as
Gods**.) We ought, however, to conceive them as partaking of life
and action ([Greek: dei= d' ô(s metecho/ntôn u(polamba/nein
pra/xeôs kai\ zôê=s]); and in this point of view the actual state
of the case will appear nowise unreasonable (s. 2). For we should
naturally expect that to that which is in the best possible
condition, such well-being will belong without any agency at all; to
that which is next best, through agency single and slight; to such as
are farther removed in excellence of condition, through action more
multiplied and diversified. Just so in regard to the human body: the
best constituted body maintains its good condition without any
training at all; there are others which will do the same at the cost
of nothing more than a little walking; there are inferior bodies
which require, for the same result, wrestling, running, and other
motions; while there are even others which cannot by any amount of
labour attain a good condition, but are obliged to be satisfied with
something short of it (s. 3). Moreover it is difficult to succeed in
many things, or to succeed often: you may throw one or two sixes with
the dice, but you cannot throw ten thousand; and, farther, when the
conditions of the problem become complicated--when one thing is to be
done for the sake of another, that other for a third result, and that
third for a fourth, &c.--success, which may be tolerably easy when
the steps are only few, the more they are multiplied, becomes harder
and harder.

Hence we must consider the agency of the stars as analogous to that
of plants and animals. For here the agency of man is most
multifarious, since he is capable of attaining many varieties of
good, and accordingly busies himself about many things and about one
thing for the sake of others. The agency of other animals on the
other hand is more restricted; that of plants yet more so, being of
slight force and only of one special character (s. 4). But that which
exists in the best possible condition stands in no need of acting or
agency; for it already possesses that for the sake of which action is
undertaken. Now action always includes two elements--that for the
sake of which and what is for the sake thereof--the end and the
means: there is either some one end, which the agent may attain, as
in the case of man; or there are many different matters all of which
may be used as means towards the best possible condition. Thus one
agent possesses and partakes of the best possible condition; another
comes near to it with little trouble; a third, with much trouble; a
fourth does not even aspire to the end, but is competent only to
arrive near to the last of the means. For example, let health be the
end: one man is always in health; a second becomes so, by being
starved down; a third by that, combined with running exercise; a
fourth is obliged to take some additional exercise, in order to
qualify himself for running, so that his motions are multiplied; a
fifth is incapable of arriving at health, but arrives only at the
running and the being thinned down, one of which in this case serves
as end. For it would be best for all, if they could attain the
supreme end--health; but, if that be impossible, then the next best
thing is to get as near to the best as possible (ss. 5-7).

For this reason the Earth is not moved at all, and the matters near
the Earth are moved with few motions; since they do not arrive at the
extreme best, but only as near as their ability permits to obtain or
hit the supremely divine principle; while the First Heaven, on the
contrary, obtains or hits it at once, through one single motion; and
the bodies intermediate between the First Heaven and those which are
last (or nearest to the Earth), obtain it or arrive at it also, but
only through a greater number of motions.

There is the other difficulty also to be considered--that vast
multitude of stars are put all together in the one single First
Current or Revolution, but each of the other stars (planets) has its
own motions singly and apart. The principal reason of this we may
fairly suppose to be that it follows as a natural consequence from
the vast superiority of the first, in each variety of life and in
each beginning, over all posterior to the first. Here the First
Current or Revolution, being one and by itself, moves many of the
divine bodies, while the others (secondary or countercurrents),
numerous as they are, move each only one; for each one of these
wandering bodies or planets is carried by many different currents.
Thus Nature establishes equalization and a sort of symmetry, by
assigning, in the one case, many bodies to one current, and in the
other, many currents to one body (ss. 8-10). Beside this principal
reason, there is also another. The other currents have each one body
only, because motion is given to many bodies by all of them prior to
the last which bears the one star. For the last sphere is carried
round fastened into many spheres, and each sphere is a body (ss. 11,
12. I do not clearly understand the lines that follow:--[Greek:
e)kei/nês a)\n ou)=n koino\n ei)/ê to\ e)/rgon; au(/tê me\n ga\r
e(ka/stê| ê( i)/dios phu/sei phora/; au(/tê de\ oi(=on
proskei=tai. panto\s de\ peperasme/nou sô/matos pro\s peperasme/non
ê( du/nami/s e)stin.]).[1]

[Footnote 1: [See Prantl's note on this difficult passage in his
German translation of the De Coelo, p. 309 (Leipzig, 1857).]]

CH. 13.--Having thus explained, respecting the Stars and Planets
which are carried round in circular motion, what is their essence,
figure, current, and order of position, we now proceed to speak of
the Earth: What is its position? Whether is it at rest or in motion?
What is its figure?

Philosophers differ respecting the position of the Earth. Most of
those who conceive the entire Kosmos as finite, declare the Earth to
be in its centre. But the Italian philosophers, called Pythagoreans,
are of an opposite opinion; affirming that Fire is in the centre, and
that the Earth, being one of the stars revolving round the centre,
makes night and day. They assume moreover another Earth opposite to
this ([Greek: e)nanti/an a)/llên tau/tê|])--which other they call
_Antichthon_. Herein they do not adjust their theories and look out
for causes adapted to the phenomena; but, on the contrary, they
distort the phenomena so as to suit their own doctrines and
reasonings, and try to constitute themselves auxiliary governors of
the Kosmos ([Greek: peirô/menoi sugkosmei=n]--s. 1). And, if we are
to look for assurance not to the phenomena but to our own reasonings,
many others might agree with them, that it is not proper ([Greek:
mê\ dei=n]) to assign to the Earth the central place. They think
that the most honourable place belongs to the most honourable body,
and that Fire is more honourable than Earth; that the two extremes,
centre and circumference, are more honourable than the parts
intermediate between them. Upon these grounds they consider that Fire
and not Earth is at the centre of the Universal Sphere; and they have
another reason, peculiar to themselves, for this conclusion: they
hold that the centre is the most important place in the universe, and
that it ought as such to be the most carefully guarded; wherefore
they call it the watch of Zeus ([Greek: Dio\s phulakê/n]), and
regard it as occupied by Fire (s. 2).

This assumes that what is absolutely (_i.e._, without subjoining any
qualifying adjunct), described as _the centre_, is at once centre of
the magnitude, centre of the object, and centre of nature. But we
ought rather to follow the analogy of animals, where the same point
is not the centre of the animal and the centre of the body: the case
is the same in the entire Kosmos. Hence the Pythagoreans need not
feel any anxiety about the Universe ([Greek: ou)the\n au)tou\s dei=
thorubei=sthai peri\ to\ pa=n]), nor introduce a guard at the centre.
They ought rather to enquire where and of what character the middle
point is; for that middle point is the true beginning and the
honourable. The middle of the place occupied is rather like an end
than like a beginning; for that which is limited is the middle, that
which limits is the boundary: now that which comprehends and is
boundary, is more honourable than that which is bounded; the former
is the Essence of the entire compound, the latter is only its Matter
(s. 3).

As about the place of the Earth, so also about its motion or rest,
philosophers differ. The Pythagoreans and those who do not even place
it at the centre, consider it to revolve in a circle, and they
consider the Antichthon to revolve in like manner. Some even think it
possible that there may be many other bodies carried round the centre
in like manner, though invisible to us, by reason of the obstructing
body of the Earth. Hence (they say) the eclipses of the moon are more
frequent than those of the Sun; since not only the Earth, but also
each of these unseen bodies, causes the Moon to be eclipsed. For, the
Earth not being a point, we on the circumference thereof, even
assuming it to occupy the centre, are distant from the centre by the
entire hemisphere of the Earth; yet we do not find out that we are
not in the centre, and astronomical appearances present themselves to
us just as if we were so. Thus it happens (according to these
philosophers), the Earth not being in the centre at all: the
appearances presented to us are just the same as if we were at the
centre.

Again, there are some who (like Plato in Timæus) affirm that the
Earth, though situated in the centre, is packed and revolves round
the axis stretched across the universe (s. 4).

About the figure of the Earth, there is no less difference of
opinion. Some say that it is spherical; others, that it is flat and
in shape like a tambourine ([Greek: tumpanoeidê/s]). These last
adduce as proof, that the Sun, at rising and setting, exhibits a
rectilinear section or eclipse of his disk and not a circular one,
when partially concealed by the Earth, and becoming invisible under
the horizon or visible above the horizon. They do not take proper
account of the vast distance of the Sun and the magnitude of his
circumference. The segment of a long circle appears from a distance
like a straight line. These philosophers further add, that the flat
tambourine-like shape must be inferred of necessity from the fact
that the Earth remains stationary (s. 5).

Upon this disputed question, a feeling of perplexity comes
unavoidably upon every one. It would argue a very irrational mind not
to wonder how a small piece of the Earth, if suspended in the air, is
carried downward and will not stop of itself, and the larger piece is
carried downward more quickly than the smaller; while nevertheless
the entire Earth, if suspended in like manner, would not be so
carried. In spite of its great weight, it remains stationary (s. 6).
But the solutions of this problem which some suggest are more strange
and full of perplexity, and it is surprising that they have not been
so considered. The Kolophonian Xenophanes affirmed that the lower
depths of the Earth were rooted downwards to infinity, in order to
escape the troublesome obligation of looking for a reason why it
remained stationary. Others say, that the Earth rests upon water,
floating thereupon like wood: this is an ancient doctrine promulgated
by Thales; as if there were not as much perplexity about the water
which supports the Earth, as there is about the Earth itself. For it
is not the nature of water to remain suspended, but always to rest
upon something (s. 7). Moreover, air is lighter than water, and water
lighter than earth; how then can these men think that the substance
naturally lighter can lie below the substance naturally heavier?
Besides, if it were the nature of the whole Earth to remain resting
on water, it must be the nature of each part of the Earth to do the
same; but this does not happen: each part of the earth is carried
down to the bottom, and the greater part more quickly than the less
(s. 8).

All these philosophers carry their researches to a certain point, but
not to the bottom of the problem. It is indeed a habit with all of us
to conduct our enquiries not with reference to the problem itself,
but with reference to our special opponents. If we have no opponent
but are conducting our investigations alone, we pursue them as far as
that point where we can make no farther objections to ourselves.
Whoever therefore intends to investigate completely must take care to
make objections to himself upon all the points of objection which
really belong to the subject; and this he can only do after having
thoroughly surveyed all the differences of opinion and doctrine (s.
9).

The reason why the Earth remains at rest, Anaximenes, Anaxagoras, and
Demokritus, declare to be its breadth or flatness ([Greek: to\
pla/tos]): it does not (they say) divide the air beneath, but covers
over the air like a lid ([Greek: ou) ga\r te/mnein, a)ll'
e)pipômati/zein to\n a)e/ra to\n ka/tôthen]); as we see that flat
and spreading bodies usually do, being difficult to be moved and
making strong resistance even against the winds. The Earth does the
same, through its flatness, against the air beneath, which remains at
rest there (in the opinion of these philosophers) because it finds no
sufficient place into which to travel, like water in a _klepsydra_:
they also produce many evidences to show that air thus imprisoned,
while remaining stationary, can support a heavy weight (s. 10).

Now, in the first place, these men affirm that, unless the shape of
the Earth were flat, it would not remain at rest. Yet on their own
showing it is not alone the flat shape of the earth which causes it
to remain at rest, but rather its magnitude. For the air beneath
remains _in situ_ by reason of its vast mass, finding no means of
escape through the narrow passage: and the mass of the air is thus
vast, because it is imprisoned inside by the great magnitude of the
Earth; which effect will be produced in the same manner, even though
the Earth be spherical, provided it be of its present magnitude.
Moreover, philosophers who hold this opinion about the motion of the
Earth, think only of its motion as a whole, and take no account of
its parts. For they ought to define at the first step whether bodies
have or have not one special mode of motion by nature; and, if none
by nature, then whether they have any mode of motion violent or
contra-natural. I have already determined this point as well as my
powers admitted, and shall therefore assume the results as settled.
If there be no special motion natural to bodies, neither will there
be any which is contra-natural or violent; and, if there be none
either natural or violent, no body will be moved at all. I have
already shown that this is a necessary consequence; and, farther,
that (upon that supposition) there can be no body even at rest; for
rest, like motion, is either natural or contra-natural; and, if there
be any special mode of motion which is natural, neither
contra-natural motion, nor contra-natural rest, can stand alone
(ss. 11-13).

Let us then assume (reasoning on the hypothesis of these
philosophers) that the Earth now remains in its present place
contrary to nature, and that it was carried into aggregation at the
centre by the revolution of the Kosmos (also contrary to
nature--[Greek: kai\ sunê=lthen e)pi\ to\ me/son pherome/nê dia\ tê\n
di/nêsin]--s. 14). For all those who recognize a generation of the
Kosmos assign this revolution as the cause which determined the
aggregation of the Earth at the centre, upon the analogy of particles
carried round in liquids or in air, where the larger and heavier
particles are always carried to the centre of the revolution. They
profess thus to know the cause which determined the Earth to _come
to_ the centre; but what they seek to find out is the cause which
determines it to remain there, and upon that they differ: some
saying, as has been stated just now, that its breadth and magnitude
is the cause; others, with Empedokles, ascribing the fact to the
revolution of the Heaven, the extreme velocity of which checks the
fall of the Earth downward, just as water in a cup may be whirled
rapidly round without falling to the ground. But suppose absence of
these two causes: in which direction will the Earth be naturally
carried? Not to the centre; for (upon the doctrine which we are now
criticising) its motion to the centre, and its remaining at the
centre, are both of them contra-natural; but some special mode of
motion, natural to the Earth, there must necessarily be. Is this
upward, or downward, or in what other direction? If there be no
greater tendency downward than upward, and if the air above does not
hinder the Earth from tending upward, neither will the air beneath
hinder it from tending downwards: the same causes produce the same
effects, operating on the same matter (ss. 14, 15).

A farther argument becomes applicable, when we are reasoning against
Empedokles. When the four elements were first separated out of their
confused huddle by the influence of Contention, what was the cause
for the Earth to remain still and _in situ_? Empedokles cannot claim
to introduce then the agency of the cosmical revolution. Moreover, it
is strange that he should not have reflected that in the first
instance the particles and fragments of the Earth were carried to the
centre. But what is the cause now that every thing having weight is
carried towards the Earth? It cannot be the revolution of the Heaven
which brings these things nearer to us (s. 16).

Again, Fire is carried upward. What is the cause of this? The
revolution of the Heaven cannot cause it. But, if it be the nature of
fire to be carried in one certain direction, it must be equally the
nature of Earth to be carried in one certain direction. Light and
heavy, also, are not discriminated by the heavenly revolution. There
are matters originally heavy, and matters originally light: the
former are carried to the centre, the latter to the circumference,
each by its own special motion. Even prior to the heavenly revolution
there existed things intrinsically light and intrinsically heavy;
which are discriminated by certain attributes--a certain natural mode
of motion and a certain place. In infinite space, there can be no
upward and downward; and it is by this (local distinction) that light
and heavy are discriminated (ss. 17, 18).

While most philosophers insist upon the causes just noticed why the
Earth remains stationary where it is, there are others, like
Anaximander, among the ancients, who say that it remains so because
of its likeness or equality ([Greek: dia\ tê\n o(moio/tera]--equal
tendency in all directions). That which is situated in the centre
(they say) and which has like relation to the extreme parts (_i.e._,
like to _all_ the extreme parts) ought not to be carried any more
upward or downward or sideways; and it cannot be moved in opposite
directions at once; so that it remains stationary by necessity (s.
19).

This doctrine is ingenious, but not true. For the property affirmed
is noway peculiar to the Earth: the affirmation is, that every thing
which is placed at the centre must of necessity remain there; so that
Fire also would remain there at rest, as well as Earth. But this
necessity must be denied. For it is shown by observation that the
Earth not only remains at the centre, but is carried to the centre;
since each part of it is carried thither, and, whithersoever the
parts are carried, the whole is carried necessarily to the same
point. The peculiar property of the earth therefore is, not (as this
hypothesis declares) to have like relation to all the extreme
parts--for that is common to all the elements--but to be carried
towards the centre (ss. 20, 21).

Moreover, it is absurd to investigate why the Earth remains at the
centre, and not to investigate equally why Fire remains at the
extremity. For, if you explain this last by saying that Fire has its
natural place at the extremity, the Earth must have its natural place
somewhere else. If the centre be not the natural place of the Earth,
and if the Earth remains there through like tendency in all
directions, like the hair in equal tension or the man both hungry and
thirsty between food and drink, you must equally assign the reason
why Fire remains at the extremity. It is singular too that you should
try to explain only the _remaining at rest_ ([Greek: monê=s]) of the
Earth, and not also seek to explain the natural current ([Greek:
phora/])--why Earth is carried downward, and Fire upward, when there
is no opposing force (s. 22).

Nor can it be admitted that the doctrine is true. Thus much indeed is
true by accident--that every thing which has no greater obligation to
be moved in this direction than in that, must necessarily remain at
the centre. But this is true only so long as it remains a compact
whole; for, according to the theory which we are discussing, it will
not remain stationary, but will be moved: not indeed as a whole, but
dispersed into parts (s. 23: [Greek: a)lla\ mê\n ou)de\ a)lêthe/s
e)sti to\ lego/menon. kata\ sumbebêko\s me/ntoi tou=to/ ge
a)lêthe/s, ô(s a)nagkai=on me/nein e)pi\ tou= me/sou pa=n, ô(=|
mêthe\n ma=llon deu=ro ê( deu=ro kinei=sthai prosê/kei. a)lla\
dia/ ge tou=ton to\n lo/gon ou) menei= a)lla\ kinêthê/setai; ou)
me/ntoi o(/lon, a)lla\ diespasme/non.]--I understand [Greek: kata\
sumbebêko/s] to mean, subject to the condition of its remaining a
compact whole). For the same reasoning would apply to Fire as well as
to Earth: it would prove that Fire, if placed at the centre, will
remain there just as much as Earth, because Fire will have like
relation to each point of the extreme periphery. Yet nevertheless it
will (not remain at the centre, but will) be carried away, if not
impeded, as we observe that it is carried in fact, to the periphery;
only not all to one and the same point of the periphery, but
corresponding portions of the Fire to corresponding portions of the
periphery: I mean, that the fourth part (_e.g._) of the Fire will be
carried to the fourth part of the periphery; for a point is no real
part of bodies ([Greek: ou)the\n ga\r stigmê\ tô=n sôma/tôn
e)sti/n]). This is the only necessary consequence flowing from the
principle of likeness of relation. As, if supposed to be put all
together at the centre, it would contract from a larger area into a
smaller, so, when carried away from the centre to the different parts
of the periphery, it would become rarer and would expand from a
smaller area into a larger. In like manner the Earth also would be
moved away from the centre, if you reason upon this principle of
likeness of relation, and if the centre were not the place belonging
to it by nature (s. 24).

CH. 14.--Having thus reported the suppositions of others respecting
the figure, place, rest and motion, of the Earth, I shall now deliver
my own opinion, first, whether it is in motion or at rest; for some
philosophers, as I have said, regard it as one of the stars (and
therefore not in the centre, but moving round the centre--the
Pythagorean theory); others (as Plato), though they place it in the
centre, consider it to be packed and moved round the middle of the
axis of the Kosmos ([Greek: oi( de\ e)pi\ tou= me/sou the/ntes,
ei)lei=sthai kai\ kinei=sthai/ phasi peri\ to\n me/son po/lon]).

That neither of these hypotheses is possible, we shall perceive if we
take as our point of departure--That, if the Earth be carried round,
whether in the centre or apart from the centre, such motion must
necessarily be violent or contra-natural. Such motion does not belong
naturally to the Earth itself; for, if such were the fact, it would
belong equally to each portion of the Earth, whereas we see that all
these portions are carried in a straight line to the centre. Being
thus violent or contra-natural, it cannot possibly be eternal. But
the order of the Kosmos is eternal. Besides, all the bodies which are
carried round in a circular revolution (all except the First or
Outermost Sphere--the Aplanês) appear to observation as lagging
behind and as being moved in more than one current. The like ought to
happen with the Earth, if moved round, whether on the centre or apart
from the centre: it ought to be moved in two currents; and, as a
consequence thereof, there ought to be side-motions and back-turnings
of the stars fastened in their sphere. But we see by observation that
this does not happen; and that the same stars always rise and set at
the same places of the Earth (s. 1).

Farthermore, the natural current both of the entire Earth and of each
of its parts is towards the middle of the universe: this is the
reason why it is at the centre, even though it happens to be actually
there at present ([Greek: dia\ tou=to ga\r, ka)\n ei) tugcha/nei
keime/nê nu=n e)pi\ tou= ke/ntrou]--he means that though actually
there, it remains there not through any force of inertia or other
cause, but because it has a natural current towards the centre). You
might start a doubt, indeed, since the centre of the Universe
coincides with the centre of the Earth, to which of the two it is
that the current of heavy bodies naturally tends: whether they tend
thereto because it is the centre of the Universe, or because it is
the centre of the Earth. We must however necessarily suppose the
former; since Fire and light bodies, whose current is the contrary of
the current of heavy bodies, are carried to the extreme periphery of
the Universe, or of that place which comprehends and surrounds the
centre of the Universe (ss. 2, 3). But it happens ([Greek:
sumbe/bêke]: it is an accompanying fact) that the same point is
centre of the Universe and centre of the Earth; accordingly heavy
bodies are carried by accident ([Greek: kata\ sumbebêko/s]--by
virtue of this accompanying fact) to the centre of the Earth; and the
proof that they are carried to this same point is, that their lines
of direction are not parallel but according to similar angles (s. 4).
That the Earth therefore is at the centre, and that it is at rest, we
may see by the foregoing reasons, as well as by the fact, that stones
thrown upwards to ever so great a height, are carried back in the
same line of direction to the same point (s. 5).

We may see farther the cause why the Earth remains at rest. For, if
its natural current be from all directions towards the centre, as
observation shows, and that of Fire from the centre to the
periphery,--no portion of it can possibly be carried away from the
centre, except by violence. For to one body belongs one current of
motion, and to a simple body a simple current--not the two opposite
currents; and the current _from_ the centre is opposite to the
current _to_ the centre. If, therefore, it be impossible for any
portion of the Earth to be carried in a direction away from the
centre, it is yet more impossible for the whole Earth to be so; for
the natural current of each part is the same as that of the whole.
Accordingly, since the Earth cannot be moved except by a superior
force or violence, it must necessarily remain stationary at the
centre (s. 6). The same conclusion is confirmed by what we learn from
geometers respecting astronomy; for all the phenomena of the
Heavens--the changes in figure, order, and arrangement of the
stars--take place as if the Earth were in the centre (s. 7).

The figure of the Earth is necessarily spherical. For each of its
parts has gravity, until it reaches the centre; and the lesser part,
pushed forward by the greater, cannot escape laterally, but must
become more and more squeezed together, one part giving place to the
other, until the centre itself is reached. We must conceive what is
here affirmed as occurring in a manner like what some of the ancient
physical philosophers tell us, except that _they_ ascribe the
downward current to an extraneous force; whereas we think it better
to state the truth, and to say that it occurs because _by nature_ all
heavy bodies are carried towards the centre. Since, therefore, the
preliminary Chaos or hotchpotch existed in power (or with its
inherent powers existing though not exercised), the elements (those
which had gravity), were carried from all sides equally towards the
centre ([Greek: e)n duna/mei ou)=n o)/ntos tou= mi/gmatos, ta\
diakrino/mena e)phe/reto o(moi/ôs pa/ntothen pro\s to\ me/son]--this
is an allusion to the doctrine of Anaxagoras); indeed, whether
brought together at the centre equally from all the periphery or in
any other manner, the result will be the same. If we suppose
particles to be brought together at the centre equally from all
sides, it is plain that the mass so formed will be regular and
spherical; and, even if not equally from all sides, this will make no
difference in the reasoning; for, since all portions of the mass have
weight or tend to the centre, the larger portions will necessarily
push the lesser before them as far as the centre (ss. 8, 9).

A difficulty here presents itself, which may be solved upon the same
principles. The Earth being spherical, and at the centre, suppose
that a vast additional weight were applied to either of its
hemispheres. In that case, the centre of the Universe, and the centre
of the Earth, would cease to coincide: either, therefore, the Earth
will not remain at the centre; or, if it would still remain at rest,
while not occupying the centre, it is in its nature to be moved even
now (s. 10: [Greek: ô(/ste ê)\ ou) menei= e)pi\ tou= me/sou, ê)\
ei)/per ê)remê/sei ge kai\ mê\ to\ me/son e)/chousa ê)=|,
pe/phuke kinei=sthai kai\ nu=n])--_i.e._, if the Earth _can_ be at
rest when not at the centre, we must infer that the centre is not its
natural place, and therefore that its nature will be to be moved from
the centre towards that natural place wherever situated).

Such is a statement of the difficulty; but we shall see that it may
be cleared up with a little attention. We must distinguish what we
mean when we affirm that every particle having weight is carried
towards the centre. We clearly do not mean that it will be so carried
until the particles farthest from the centre shall touch the centre.
We mean that the greater mass must press with preponderating force
([Greek: dei= kratei=n to\ plei=on e(/ôs a)\n la/bê| tô=| au(tou=
me/sô| to\ me/son]) until its centre grasps the centre of the
universe; up to this point its gravity will last; and this is equally
true about any clod of earth as about the whole earth: large or small
size makes no difference. Whether the whole Earth were carried in a
mass from any given position, or whether it were carried in separate
particles, in either case it would be carried onward until it
embraced the centre equally on all sides; the smaller parts being
equalized to the greater in gravitating tendency because they are
pushed forward by the greater ([Greek: a)nisazome/nôn tô=n
e)latto/nôn u(po\ tô=n meizo/nôn tê=| proô/sei]--s. 11). If,
therefore, the Earth was ever generated, it must have been generated
in this manner, and must thus acquire a spherical figure; and, even
if it be ungenerable and stationary from everlasting, we must
conceive its figure to be that which it would have acquired, if it
had been generable and generated from the first ([Greek: ei)/te
a)ge/nnêtos a)ei\ me/nousa, to\n au)to\n tro/pon e)/chein, o(/nper
ka)\n ei) gignome/nê to\ prô=ton e)ge/neto]). That it must be
spherical, we see not only from this reasoning, but also because all
heavy bodies are carried towards it, not in parallel lines but, in
equal angles. This is what naturally happens with what is either
actually spherical, or by nature spherical. Now we ought to call
every thing such as it by nature wishes to become and to be: we ought
not to call it such as it is by force and contrary to nature (s. 12).

The same conclusion is established by the sensible facts within our
observation. If the Earth had been of any other than spherical
figure, the eclipses of the Moon would not have projected on the Sun
the outlines which we now see. The moon in her configurations
throughout the month takes on every variety of outline--rectilinear,
double convex, and hollow. But in her eclipses the distinguishing
line is always convex. Now this must necessarily be occasioned by the
circumference of the Earth being spherical, since the eclipses of the
Moon arise from the interposition of the Earth (s. 13).

Farthermore, we see from the visible phenomena of the stars not only
that the Earth is spherical, but also that its magnitude is not
great. For, when we change our position a little as observers, either
to the north or to the south, we find the celestial horizon to be
manifestly different. The stars at the zenith are greatly changed,
and the same stars do not appear: some stars are visible in Egypt and
Cyprus, but become invisible when we proceed farther north; and those
which are constantly visible in the northern regions, are found to be
not constantly visible, but to set, when the observer is in Egypt or
Cyprus. The bulk of the Earth must therefore be small, when a small
change of position is made so soon manifest to us (s. 14). Hence
those who hold that the regions near the pillars of Herakles join on
with India and that the ocean eastward and westward is one and the
same, must not be supposed to talk extravagantly ([Greek: mê\ li/an
u(polamba/nein a)/pista dokei=n]): they infer this from the presence
of elephants alike at both extremities. Geometers who try to
calculate the magnitude of the Earth, affirm that its circumference
is 400,000 stadia.

It follows necessarily from all these reasonings, that the body of
the Earth is not only of spherical form, but also not large compared
with the magnitude of the other Stars (ss. 15, 16).

[The remaining two books of the treatise known by the title 'De
Coelo,' while connected with the foregoing, are still more closely
connected with the two Books composing the treatise entitled 'De
Generatione et Corruptione.' The discussion carried on throughout the
two treatises is in truth one; but, if anywhere broken, it is at the
end of Book II. De Coelo, as above. From this point Aristotle
proceeds to consider (in four Books) the particular phenomena
presented by natural bodies--phenomena of Generation and Destruction
(in the widest sense of these words)--dependent on the opposition of
the upward and downward motions; bodies, thus light or heavy, being
thence seen to be ultimately reducible to four elements variously
combined. Treating of the Kosmos in its larger aspects, the first two
Books of De Coelo, here abstracted, are obviously those that alone
correspond strictly to the name of the treatise.]




V.

EPIKURUS


Our information from Epikurean writers respecting the doctrines of
their sect is much less copious than that which we possess from Stoic
writers in regard to Stoic opinions. We have no Epikurean writer on
philosophy except Lucretius; whereas respecting the Stoical creed
under the Roman Empire, the important writings of Seneca, Epictetus,
and Marcus Antoninus, afford most valuable evidence.

The standard of Virtue and Vice is referred by Epikurus to Pleasure
and Pain. Pain is the only evil, Pleasure is the only good. Virtue is
no end in itself, to be sought; vice is no end in itself, to be
avoided. The motive for cultivating virtue and banishing vice arises
from the consequences of each, as the means of multiplying pleasures
and averting or lessening pains. But to the attainment of this
purpose, the complete supremacy of Reason is indispensable; in order
that we may take a right comparative measure of the varieties of
pleasure and pain, and pursue the course that promises the least
amount of suffering.

This theory (taken in its most general sense, and apart from
differences in the estimation of particular pleasures and pains), had
been proclaimed long before the time of Epikurus. It is one of the
various theories of Plato; for in his dialogue called Protagoras
(though in other dialogues he reasons differently) we find it
explicitly set forth and elaborately vindicated by his principal
spokesman, Sokrates, against the Sophist Protagoras. It was also held
by Aristippus (companion of Sokrates along with Plato) and by his
followers after him, called the Kyrenaics. Lastly, it was maintained
by Eudoxus, one of the most estimable philosophers contemporary with
Aristotle. Epikurus was thus in no way the originator of the theory;
but he had his own way of conceiving it, his own body of doctrine
physical, cosmological, and theological, with which it was
implicated, and his own comparative valuation of pleasures and pains.

Bodily feeling, in the Epikurean psychology, is prior in order of
time to the mental element; the former is primordial, while the
latter is derived from it by repeated processes of memory and
association. But, though such is the order of sequence and
generation, yet when we compare the two as constituents of happiness
to the formed man, the mental element much outweighs the bodily, both
as pain and as pleasure. Bodily pain or pleasure exists only in the
present; when not felt, it is nothing. But mental feelings involve
memory and hope, embrace the past as well as the future, endure for a
long time, and may be recalled or put out of sight, to a great
degree, at our discretion.

This last point is one of the most remarkable features of the
Epikurean mental discipline. Epikurus deprecated the general habit of
mankind in always hankering after some new satisfaction to come;
always discontented with the present, and oblivious of past comforts
as if they had never been. These past comforts ought to be treasured
up by memory and reflection, so that they might become as it were
matter for rumination, and might serve, in trying moments, even to
counterbalance extreme physical suffering. The health of Epikurus
himself was very bad during the closing years of his life. There
remains a fragment of his last letter, to an intimate friend and
companion, Idomeneus:--"I write this to you on the last day of my
life, which, in spite of the severest internal bodily pains, is still
a happy day, because I set against them in the balance all the mental
pleasure felt in the recollection of my past conversations with you.
Take care of the children left by Metrodorus, in a manner worthy of
your demeanour from boyhood towards me and towards philosophy."
Bodily pain might thus be alleviated, when it occurred; it might be
greatly lessened in occurrence, by prudent and moderate habits;
lastly, even at the worst, if violent, it never lasted long; if not
violent, it might be patiently borne, and was at any rate terminated,
or terminable at pleasure, by death.

In the view of Epikurus, the chief miseries of life arose, not from
bodily pains, but partly from delusions of hope and exaggerated
aspirations for wealth, honours, power, &c., in all which the objects
appeared most seductive from a distance, inciting man to lawless
violence and treachery, while in the reality they were always
disappointments and generally something worse; partly, and still
more, from the delusions of fear. Of this last sort, were the two
greatest torments of human existence--fear of Death and of eternal
suffering after death, as announced by prophets and poets, and fear
of the Gods. Epikurus, who did not believe in the continued existence
of the soul separate from the body, declared that there could never
be any rational ground for fearing death, since it was simply a
permanent extinction of consciousness. Death was nothing to us (he
said): when death comes, _we_ are no more, either to suffer or to
enjoy. Yet it was the groundless fear of this nothing that poisoned
all the tranquillity of life, and held men imprisoned even when
existence was a torment. Whoever had surmounted that fear was armed
at once against cruel tyranny and against all the gravest
misfortunes. Next, the fear of the gods was not less delusive, and
hardly less tormenting, than the fear of death. It was a capital
error (Epikurus declared) to suppose that the gods employed
themselves as agents in working or superintending the march of the
Kosmos; or in conferring favour on some men, and administering
chastisement to others. The vulgar religious tales, which represented
them in this character, were untrue and insulting as regards the gods
themselves, and pregnant with perversion and misery as regards the
hopes and fears of mankind. Epikurus believed sincerely in the gods;
reverenced them as beings at once perfectly happy, immortal, and
unchangeable; and took delight in the public religious festivals and
ceremonies. But it was inconsistent with these attributes, and
repulsive to his feelings of reverence, to conceive them as agents.
The idea of agency is derived from human experience: we, as agents,
act with a view to supply some want, to fulfil some obligation, to
acquire some pleasure, to accomplish some object desired but not yet
attained--in short, to fill up one or other of the many gaps in our
imperfect happiness: the gods already _have_ all that agents strive
to get, and more than agents ever do get; their condition is one not
of agency, but of tranquil, self-sustaining, fruition. Accordingly,
Epikurus thought (as Aristotle[1] had thought before him) that the
perfect, eternal, and imperturbable well-being and felicity of the
gods excluded the supposition of their being agents. He looked upon
them as types of that unmolested safety and unalloyed satisfaction
which was what he understood by pleasure or happiness, as objects of
reverential envy, whose sympathy he was likely to obtain by
assimilating his own temper and condition to theirs as far as human
circumstances allowed.

[Footnote 1: Aristot. De Coelo, II. xii. p. 292, a. 22-b. 7: [Greek:
e)/oike ga\r tô=| me\n a)/rista e)/chonti u(pa/rchein to\ eu)= a)/neu
pra/xeôs, tô=| d' e)ggu/tata dia\ o)li/gês kai\ mia=s, toi=s de\
por)r(ôta/tô dia\ pleio/nôn,--tô=| d' ô(s a)/rista e)/chonti ou)the\n
dei= pra/xeôs; e)/sti ga\r au)to\ to\ ou(= e(/neka, ê( de\ pra=xis
a)ei/ e)stin e)n dusi/n, o(/tan kai\ ou(= e(/neka ê)=| kai\ to\
tou/tou e(/neka.] &c. Ibid. iii. p. 286, a. 9: [Greek: theou= d'
e)ne/rgeia a)thanasi/a; tou=to d' e)sti\ zôê\ a)i+/dos], &c.

In the Ethica, Aristotle assigns theorizing contemplation to the
gods, as the only process worthy of their exalted dignity and supreme
felicity.]

These theological views were placed by Epikurus in the foreground of
his ethical philosophy, as the only means of dispelling **those fears
of the gods that the current fables instilled into every one, and
that did so much to destroy human comfort and security. He proclaimed
that beings in immortal felicity neither suffered vexation in
themselves nor caused vexation to others; neither showed anger nor
favour to particular persons. The doctrine that they were the working
managers in the affairs of the Kosmos, celestial and terrestrial,
human and extra-human, he not only repudiated as incompatible with
their attributes, but declared to be impious, considering the
disorder, sufferings, and violence, everywhere visible. He disallowed
all prophecy, divination, and oracular inspiration, by which the
public around him believed that the gods were perpetually
communicating special revelations to individuals, and for which
Sokrates had felt so peculiarly thankful.

It is remarkable that Stoics and Epikureans, in spite of their marked
opposition in dogma or theory, agreed so far in practical results,
that both declared these two modes of uneasiness (fear of the gods
and fear of death) to be the great torments of human existence, and
both strove to remove or counterbalance them.

So far the teaching of Epikurus appears confined to the separate
happiness of each individual, as dependent upon his own prudence,
sobriety, and correct views of Nature. But this is not the whole of
the Epikurean Ethics. The system also considered each man as in
companionship with others: the precepts were shaped accordingly,
first as to Justice, next as to Friendship. In both, these, the
foundation whereon Epikurus built was Reciprocity--not pure sacrifice
to others, but partnership with others, beneficial to all. He kept
the ideas of self and of others inseparably knit together in one
complex association: he did not expel or degrade either, in order to
give exclusive ascendancy to the other. The dictate of Natural
Justice was, that no man should hurt another: each was bound to
abstain from doing harm to others; each, on this condition, was
entitled to count on security and relief from the fear that others
would do harm to him. Such double aspect, or reciprocity, was
essential to social companionship: those that could not, or would
not, accept this covenant, were unfit for society. If a man does not
behave justly towards others, he cannot expect that they will behave
justly towards him; to live a life of injustice, and expect that
others will not find it out, is idle. The unjust man cannot enjoy a
moment of security. Epikurus laid it down explicitly, that just and
righteous dealing was the indispensable condition to every one's
comfort, and was the best means of attaining it.

The reciprocity of Justice was valid towards all the world; the
reciprocity of Friendship went much farther: it involved indefinite
and active beneficence, but could reach only to a select few.
Epikurus insisted emphatically on the value of friendship, as a means
of happiness to both the persons so united. He declared that a good
friend was another self, and that friends ought to be prepared, in
case of need, to die for each other. Yet he declined to recommend an
established community of goods among the members of his fraternity,
as prevailed in the Pythagorean brotherhood: for such an institution
(he said) implied mistrust. He recommended efforts to please and to
serve, and a forwardness to give, for the purpose of gaining and
benefiting a friend, and he even declared that there was more
pleasure in conferring favours than in receiving them; but he was no
less strenuous in inculcating an intelligent gratitude on the
receiver. No one except a wise man (he said) knew how to return a
favour properly.[2]

[Footnote 2: Seneca, Epist. p. 81.]

These exhortations to active friendship were not unfruitful. We know,
even by the admission of witnesses adverse to the Epikurean
doctrines, that the harmony among the members of the sect, with
common veneration for the founder, was more marked and more enduring
than that exhibited by any of the other philosophical sects. Epikurus
himself was a man of amiable personal qualities: his testament, still
remaining, shows an affectionate regard both for his surviving
friends, and for the permanent attachment of each to the others as
well as of all to the school. Diogenes Laertius tells us--nearly 200
years after Christ, and 450 years after the death of Epikurus--that
the Epikurean sect still continued its numbers and dignity, having
outlasted its contemporaries and rivals. The harmony among the
Epikureans may be explained, not merely from the temper of the
master, but partly from the doctrines and plan of life that he
recommended. Ambition and love of power were discouraged; rivalry
among the members for success, either political or rhetorical, was at
any rate a rare exception; all were taught to confine themselves to
that privacy of life and love of philosophical communion which alike
required and nourished the mutual sympathies of the brotherhood. In
regard to politics, Epikurus advised quiet submission to established
authority, without active meddling beyond what necessity required.

Virtue and happiness, in the theory of Epikurus, were inseparable. A
man could not be happy until he had surmounted the fear of death and
the fear of gods instilled by the current fables, which disturbed all
tranquillity of mind; until he had banished those factitious desires
that pushed him into contention for wealth, power, or celebrity; nor
unless he behaved with justice to all, and with active devoted
friendship towards a few. Such a mental condition, which he thought
it was in every man's power to acquire by appropriate teaching and
companionship, constituted virtue; and was the sure as well as the
only precursor of genuine happiness. A mind thus undisturbed and
purified was sufficient to itself. The mere satisfaction of the wants
of life, and the conversation of friends, became then felt pleasures:
if more could be had without preponderant mischief, so much the
better; but Nature, disburthened of her corruptions and prejudices,
required no more to be happy. This at least was as much as the
conditions of humanity admitted: a tranquil, undisturbed, innocuous,
non-competitive fruition, which approached most nearly to the perfect
happiness of the Gods.

When we read the explanations given by Epikurus and Lucretius of what
the Epikurean theory really was, and compare them with the numerous
attacks upon it made by opponents, we cannot but remark that the
title and formula of the theory was ill-chosen, and really a
misnomer. What Epikurus meant by Pleasure was not what most people
meant by it, but something very different--a tranquil and comfortable
state of mind and body; much the same as what Demokritus had
expressed before him by the phrase [Greek: eu)thumi/a]. This last
phrase would have expressed what Epikurus aimed at, neither more nor
less. It would at least have preserved his theory from much misplaced
sarcasm and aggressive rhetoric.

The Physics of Epikurus was borrowed in the main from the atomic
theory of Demokritus, but modified by him in a manner subservient and
contributory to his ethical scheme. To that scheme it was essential
that those celestial, atmospheric, or terrestrial phenomena which the
public around him ascribed to agency and purposes of the gods, should
be understood as being produced by physical causes. An eclipse, an
earthquake, a storm, a shipwreck, unusual rain or drought, a good or
a bad harvest--and not merely these, but many other occurrences far
smaller and more unimportant, as we may see by the eighteenth chapter
of the 'Characters' of Theophrastus--were then regarded as
visitations of the gods, requiring to be interpreted by recognized
prophets, and to be appeased by ceremonial expiations. When once a
man became convinced that all these phenomena proceeded from physical
agencies, a host of terrors and anxieties would disappear from the
mind; and this Epikurus asserted to be the beneficent effect and real
recommendation of physical philosophy. He took little or no thought
for scientific curiosity as a motive _per se_, which both Demokritus
and Aristotle put so much in the foreground.

He composed a treatise called 'Kanonicon' (now lost), which seems to
have been a sort of Logic of Physics--a summary of the principles of
evidence. In his system, Psychology was to a great extent a
branch--though a peculiar and distinct branch--of Physics, since the
soul was regarded as a subtle but energetic material compound (air,
vapour, heat, and another nameless ingredient), with its best parts
concentrated in the chest, yet pervading and sustaining the whole
body--still, however, depending for its support on the body, and
incapable of separate or disembodied continuance.

Epikurus recognized, as the primordial basis of the universe, Atoms,
Vacuum, and Motion. The atoms were material solid _minima_, each too
small to be apprehended separately by sense; they had figure,
magnitude, and gravity, but no other qualities. They were infinite in
number, and ever moving in an infinite vacuum. Their motions brought
them into various coalitions and compounds, resulting in the
perceptible bodies of nature; each of which in its combined state
acquired new, specific, different qualities. In regard to the
primordial movements of the atoms, out of which these endowed
compounds grew, Epikurus differed from Demokritus who supposed the
atoms originally to move with an indefinite variety of directions and
velocities, rotatory as well as rectilineal; whereas Epikurus
maintained that the only original movement common to all atoms was
one and the same--in the direction of gravity straight down, and all
with equal velocity in the infinite void. But it occurred to him
that, upon this hypothesis only, there could never occur any
collisions or combinations of the atoms--nothing but continued and
unchangeable parallel lines. Accordingly he modified it by saying
that the line of descent was not strictly rectilinear, but that each
atom deflected a little from the straight line, each in its own
direction and degree; so that it became possible to assume
collisions, resiliences, adhesions, combinations, among them, as it
had been possible under the variety of original movements ascribed to
them by Demokritus. The opponents of Epikurus derided this auxiliary
hypothesis, affirming that he invented the individual deflection of
each atom without assigning any cause, and only because he was
perplexed by the mystery of man's freewill. But Epikurus was not more
open to attack on this ground than other physical philosophers. Most
of them (except perhaps the most consistent of the Stoic fatalists)
believed that some among the phenomena of the universe occurred in
regular and predictable sequence, while others were essentially
irregular and unpredictable: each philosopher devised his hypothesis,
and recognized some fundamental principle, to explain the latter
class of phenomena as well as the former; thus, Plato admitted an
invincible erratic necessity, Aristotle introduced Chance and
Spontaneity, Demokritus multiplied indefinitely the varieties of
atomic movements. The hypothetical deflection alleged by Epikurus was
his way, not more unwarranted than the others, of providing a
fundamental principle for the unpredictable phenomena of the
universe. Among these are the volitional manifestations of men and
animals; but there are many others besides, and there is no ground
for believing that what is called the mystery of Free-Will (_i. e._,
the question whether volition is governed by motives, acting upon a
given state of the mind and body) was at all peculiarly present to
his mind. Whatever theory may be adopted on this point, it is certain
that the movements of an individual man or animal are not exclusively
determined by the general law of gravitation, or by another cause
extrinsic to himself; but to a great degree by his own separate
volition, which is often imperfectly knowable beforehand and
therefore not predictable. For these and many other phenomena,
Epikurus provided a fundamental principle in his supplementary
hypothesis of atomic deflection; and indeed not for these only, but
also for the questions of opponents, how there could ever be any
coalition between the atoms, if all followed only one single law of
movement--rectilineal descent with equal velocity. Epikurus rejected
the inexorable and all-comprehensive fatalism contained in the
theories of some Stoics, though seemingly not construed in its full
application even by them. He admitted a limited range of empire to
Chance, or phenomena essentially irregular. But he maintained that
the will, far from being among the phenomena essentially irregular,
is under the influence of motives; for no man can insist more
strenuously than he does (see the letter to Menoekeus) on the
complete power of philosophy--if the student could be made to feel
its necessity and desire the attainment of it, so as to meditate and
engrain within himself sound views about the gods, death, and human
life generally--to mould our volitions and character in a manner
conformable to the exigencies of virtue and happiness.

All true belief, according to Epikurus, rested ultimately upon the
impressions of sense, upon our internal feelings, and upon our
correct apprehension of the meaning of terms. He did not suppose the
significance of language to come by convention, but to be an
inspiration of Nature, different among different people. The facts of
sense were in themselves beyond all question. But truth, though
founded upon these evidences, included various inferences, more than
sense could directly testify. Even the two capital points of the
Epikurean physical philosophy--Atoms and Void--were inferences from
sense, and not capable of direct attestation. It was in these
inferences, and in the superstructure built upon sense, that error
was so frequently imposed upon us. We ought to test all affirmations
or dogmas by the evidence of sensible phenomena; looking therein, if
possible, for some positive grounds in support of them, but at any
rate assuring ourselves that there were no grounds in contradiction
of them, or, if there were such, rejecting the dogmas at once. Out of
the particular impressions of sense, when often repeated, remembered,
and compared, there grew certain general notions or anticipations
([Greek: prolê/pseis]), which were applied to interpret or illustrate
any new case when it arose. These general notions were not inborn or
intuitive, but gradually formed (as Aristotle and the Stoics also
conceived them) out of frequent remembrances and association.

Besides those conclusions which could be fully proved by the
evidentiary data just enumerated, Epikurus recognized admissible
hypotheses, which awaited farther evidence confirmative or refutative
([Greek: to\ pro/smenon]), and also other matters occult or as yet
unexplained ([Greek: ta\ a)/dêla]). Along with the intermediate or
half-explained class, he reckoned those in which plurality of causes
was to be invoked. A given effect might result from any one out of
two, three, or more different causes, and there was often no
counter-evidence of sense to exclude either of them in any particular
case. This plural explanation ([Greek: to\ pleonachô=s]) was not so
complete or satisfactory as the singular ([Greek: to\ monachô=s]);
but it was often the best that we could obtain, and was quite
sufficient, by showing a possible physical agency, to rescue the mind
from those terrors of ignorance, which drove men to imagine
visitations of the gods.

Epikurus agreed with Demokritus in believing that external objects
produced their impressions on our senses by projecting thin images,
outlines of their own shapes. He thought that the air was peopled
with such images, which passed through it and still more through the
infinite vacuum beyond it with prodigious velocity. Many of them
became commingled, dissipated, recombined, during the transit, so
that, when they reached us, the impressions produced were not
conformable to any real object; hence the phenomena of dreams,
madness, and the various delusions of waking men.

In setting forth the criterion of truth, Epikurus insisted chiefly
upon the fundamental groundwork--particular facts of sense, as the
data for proving or disproving general affirmations; and he had the
merit of calling attention to refutative data as well as to
probative. But, respecting the process of passing from these
particulars to true generalities and avoiding the untrue, we can make
out no clear idea from his writings that remain: his great work on
Physical Philosophy is lost. It is certain that he disregarded the
logical part of the process--the systematic study of propositions,
and their relations of consistency with one another--which had made
so prodigious a stride during his early years under Aristotle and
Theophrastus. We can, indeed, detect in his remaining sentences one
or two of those terms which Aristotle had stamped as technical in
Logic; but he discouraged as useless all the verbal teaching and
discussion of his day--all grammar, rhetoric, and dialectic, beyond
the lowest minimum. He disapproved of the poets as promulgators of
mischievous fables and prejudices, the rhetoricians as furnishing
weapons for the misleading career of political ambition, the
dialecticians as wasting their time in useless puzzles. None of them
were serviceable in promoting either the tranquillity of the mind, or
the happiness of life, or the acquisition of truth. He himself
composed a great number of treatises and epistles, on subjects of
ethics and philosophy; but he is said to have written in haste,
without taking time or trouble to correct his compositions. By the
Alexandrine critic, Aristophanes of Byzantium, his style was censured
as unpolished; yet it is declared to have been simple, unaffected,
and easily understood. This last predicate is hardly applicable to
the three epistles which alone remain from his pen; but those
epistles are intended as brief abstracts of doctrine, on topics which
he had already treated at length in formal works; and it is not easy
to combine clearness with brevity.




VI.

THE STOICS--A FRAGMENT.


The Stoics were one of the four sects of philosophy recognized and
conspicuous at Athens during the three centuries preceding the
Christian era and during the century or more following. Among these
four sects, the most marked antithesis of ethical dogma was between
the Stoics and the Epikureans.

The Stoics agreed with the Peripatetics (anterior to Epikurus, not
specially against _him_) that the first principle of nature is (not
pleasure or relief from pain, but) Self-preservation or Self-love; in
other words, the natural appetite or tendency of all creatures is, to
preserve their existing condition with its inherent capacities, and
to keep clear of destruction or disablement. This appetite (they
said) manifests itself in little children before any pleasure or pain
is felt, and is moreover a fundamental postulate, pre-supposed in all
desires of particular pleasures, as well as in all aversions to
particular pains. We begin by loving our own vitality; and we come,
by association, to love what promotes or strengthens our vitality; we
hate destruction or disablement, and come (by secondary association)
to hate whatever produces that effect.

This doctrine associated, and brought under one view, what was common
to man not merely with the animal, but also with the vegetable world;
a plant was declared to have an impulse or tendency to maintain
itself, without feeling pain or pleasure. Aristotle (in the tenth
Book of the Ethica) says that he will not determine whether we love
life for the sake of pleasure, or pleasure for the sake of life; for
he affirms the two to be essentially yoked together and inseparable:
pleasure is the consummation of our vital manifestations. The
Peripatetics, after him, put pleasure down to a lower level, as
derivative and accidental. The Stoics went farther in the same
direction--possibly from antithesis against the growing school of
Epikurus.

The primary _officium_ (in a larger sense than our word duty) of man
is (they said) to keep himself in the State of Nature; the second or
derivative _officium_ is to keep to such things as are according to
nature, and to avert those that are contrary to nature; our gradually
increasing experience enables as to discriminate the two. The youth
learns, as he grows up, to value bodily accomplishments, mental
cognitions and judgments, good conduct towards those around him,--as
powerful aids towards keeping up that state of nature. When his
experience is so far enlarged as to make him aware of the order and
harmony of nature and human society, and to impress upon him the
comprehension of this great _idéal_, his emotions as well as his
reason becomes absorbed by it. He recognizes this as the only true
Bonum or Honestum, to which all other desirable things are referable;
as the only thing desirable for itself and in its own nature. He
drops or dismisses all these _prima naturæ_ that he had begun by
desiring. He no longer considers any of them as worthy of being
desired in itself, or for its own sake.

While, therefore, (according to Peripatetics as well as Stoics) the
love of self and of preserving one's own vitality and activity is the
primary element, intuitive and connate, to which all rational
preference (_officium_) was at first referred, they thought it not
the less true that in process of time, by experience, association,
and reflection, there grows up in the mind a grand acquired sentiment
or notion, a new and later light, which extinguishes and puts out of
sight the early beginning. It was important to distinguish the feeble
and obscure elements from the powerful and brilliant after-growth;
which indeed was fully realized only in chosen minds, and in them
hardly before old age. This idea, when once formed in the mind, was
The Good--the only thing worthy of desire for its own sake. The
Stoics called it the only good, being sufficient in itself for
happiness; other things being not good, nor necessary to happiness,
but simply preferable or advantageous when they could be had: the
Peripatetics recognized it as the first and greatest good, but said
also that it was not sufficient in itself; there were two other
inferior varieties of good, of which something must be had as
complementary (what the Stoics called _præposita_ or _sumenda_).[1]
Thus the Stoics said about the origin of the Idea of Bonum or
Honestum, much the same as what Aristotle says about ethical Virtue.
It is not implanted in us by nature; but we have at birth certain
initial tendencies and capacities, which, if aided by association and
training, enable us (and that not in all cases) to acquire it.

[Footnote 1: Aristotle and the Peripatetics held that there were
_tria genera bonorum_: (1) Those of the mind (_mens sana_); (2) Those
of the body; and (3) External advantages. The Stoics altered this
theory by saying that only the first of the three was _bonum_; the
others were merely _præposita_ or _sumenda_. The opponents of the
Stoics contended that this was an alteration in words rather than in
substance.

The earlier Stoics laid it down that there were no graduating marks
below the level of wisdom: all shortcomings were on a par. Good was a
point, Evil was a point; there were gradations in the _præposita_ or
_sumenda_ (none of which were good), and in the _rejecta_ or
_rejicienda_ (none of which were evil), but there was no more or less
good.]

A distinction was made by Epictetus and other Stoics between things
in our power and things not in our power. In our power are our
opinions and notions about objects, and all our affections, desires,
and aversions: not in our power are our bodies, wealth, honour, rank,
authority, &c., and their opposites; though, in regard to these last,
it is in our power to _think_ of them as unimportant. With this
distinction we may connect the arguments between the Stoics and their
opponents as to what is now called the Freedom of the Will. But we
must first begin by distinguishing the two questions. By things in
our power, the Stoics meant things that we could do or acquire if we
willed: by things not in our power, they meant things that we could
not do or acquire if we willed. In both cases, the volition was
assumed as a fact: the question what determined it, or whether it was
non-determined, _i. e._, self-determining, was not raised in the
antithesis. But it was raised in other discussions between the Stoic
theorist Chrysippus, and various opponents. These opponents denied
that volition was determined by motives, and cited the cases of equal
conflicting motives (what is known as the Ass of Buridan) as proving
that the soul includes in itself, and exerts, a special supervenient
power of deciding action in one way or the other--a power not
determined by any causal antecedent, but self-originating, and
belonging to the class of agency that Aristotle recognizes under the
denomination of automatic, spontaneous (or essentially irregular and
unpredictable). Chrysippus replied by denying not only the reality of
this supervenient force said to be inherent in the soul, but also the
reality of all that Aristotle called automatic or spontaneous agency
generally. Chrysippus said that every movement was determined by
antecedent motives; that in cases of equal conflict the exact
equality did not long continue, because some new but slight motive
slipped in unperceived and turned the scale on one side or the
other.[2] Here, we see, the question now known as the Freedom of the
Will is discussed, and Chrysippus declares against freedom, affirming
that volition is always determined by motives.

[Footnote 2: See Plutarch, De Stoicorum Repugnantiis, xxiii. p.
1045.]

But we also see that, while declaring this opinion, Chrysippus does
not employ the terms Necessity or Freedom of the Will; neither did
his opponents, so far as we can see: they had a different and less
misleading phrase. By freedom, Chrysippus and the Stoics meant the
freedom of doing what a man willed, if he willed it. A man is free as
to the thing that is in his power, when he wills it: he is not free
as to what is not in his power, under the same supposition. The
Stoics laid great stress on this distinction. They pointed out how
much it is really in a man's power to transform or discipline his own
mind--in the way of controlling or suppressing some emotions,
generating or encouraging others, forming new intellectual
associations, &c.; how much a man could do in these ways, if he
willed it, and if he went through the lessons, habits of conduct, and
**meditations, suitable to produce such an effect. The Stoics
strove to create in a man's mind the volitions appropriate for
such mental discipline, by depicting the beneficial consequences
resulting from it, and the misfortune and shame inevitable, if the
mind were not so disciplined. Their purpose was to strengthen the
governing reason of his mind, and to enthrone it as a fixed habit and
character, which would control by counter suggestions the impulse
arising at each special moment--particularly all disturbing terrors
or allurements. This, in their view, is a free mind; not one wherein
volition is independent of all motive, but one wherein the
susceptibility to different motives is tempered by an ascendant
reason, so as to give predominance to the better motive against the
worse. One of the strongest motives that they endeavoured to enforce,
was the prudence and dignity of bringing our volitions into harmony
with the schemes of Providence; which (they said) were always
arranged with a view to the happiness of the Kosmos on the whole. The
bad man, whose volitions conflict with these schemes, is always
baulked of his expectations, and brought at last against his will to
see things carried by an over-ruling force, with aggravated pain and
humiliation to himself: while the good man, who resigns himself to
them from the first, always escapes with less pain, and often without
any at all. As a portion of their view concerning Providence it may
here be mentioned that the earlier Stoics, Zeno and Chrysippus,
entertained high reverence for the divination, prophecy, and omens
that were generally current in the ancient world. They considered
that these were the methods whereby the gods were graciously pleased
to make known beforehand revelations of their foreordained purposes.
Herein lay one among the marked points of contrast between Stoics and
Epikureans.

We have thus seen that in regard to the doctrine called in modern
times the Freedom of the Will (_i.e._, that volitions are
self-originating and unpredictable), the Stoic theorists not only
denied it, but framed all their Ethics upon the assumption of the
contrary. This same assumption of the contrary, indeed, was made also
by Sokrates, Plato, Aristotle, and Epikurus; in short, by all the
ethical teachers of antiquity. All of them believed that volitions
depended on causes; that, under the ordinary conditions of men's
minds, the causes that volitions generally depended upon are often
misleading and sometimes ruinous; but that, by proper stimulation
from without and meditation within, the rational causes of volition
might be made to overrule the impulsive. Plato, Aristotle, Epikurus,
not less than the Stoics, wished to create new fixed habits and a new
type of character. They differed, indeed, on the question what the
proper type of character was; but each of them aimed at the same
general end--a new type of character, regulating the grades of
susceptibility to different motives. And the purpose of all and each
of these moralists precludes the theory of free-will, _i.e._, the
theory that our volitions are self-originating and unpredictable.

While the Epikureans declined, as much as possible, interference in
public affairs, the Stoic philosophers urged men to the duties of
active citizenship.[3] Chrysippus even said that the life of
philosophical contemplation (such as Aristotle preferred and
accounted godlike) was to be placed on the same level with the life
of pleasure; though Plutarch observes that neither Chrysippus nor
Zeno ever meddled personally with any public duty: both of them
passed their lives in lecturing and writing. The truth is that both
of them were foreigners residing at Athens, and at a time when Athens
was dependent on foreign princes. Accordingly, neither Zeno nor
Chrysippus had any sphere of political action open to them: they
were, in this respect, like Epictetus afterwards, but in a position
quite different from Seneca, the preceptor of Nero, who might hope to
influence the great imperial power of Rome, and from Marcus
Antoninus, who held that imperial power in his own hands.

[Footnote 3: Tacitus says of the Stoics (Ann. xiv. 57): 'Stoicorum
secta, quæ turbidos et negotiorum appetentes facit.']

Marcus Antoninus--not only a powerful emperor, but also the most
gentle and amiable man of his day--talks of active beneficence both
as a duty and a satisfaction. But in the creed of the Stoics
generally, active beneficence did not occupy a prominent place. They
adopted the four Cardinal Virtues--Wisdom, or the Knowledge of Good
and Evil, Justice, Fortitude, Temperance--as part of their plan of
the virtuous life, the life according to Nature. Justice, as the
social virtue, was placed above all the rest. But the Stoics were not
strenuous in requiring more than Justice, for the benefit of others
beside the agent. They even reckoned compassion for the sufferings of
others as a weakness, analogous to envy for the good fortune of
others.

The Stoic recognised the gods (or Universal Nature, equivalent
expressions in his creed) as managing the affairs of the world, with
a view to producing as much happiness as was attainable on the whole.
Towards this end the gods did not want any positive assistance from
him; but it was his duty and his strongest interest, to resign
himself to their plans, and to abstain from all conduct tending to
frustrate them. Such refractory tendencies were perpetually suggested
to him by the unreasonable appetites, emotions, fears, antipathies,
&c., of daily life; all claiming satisfaction at the expense of
future mischief to himself and others. To countervail these
misleading forces by means of a fixed rational character built up
through meditation and philosophical teaching, was the grand purpose
of the Stoic ethical creed. The emotional or appetitive self was to
be starved or curbed, and retained only as an appendage to the
rational self; an idea proclaimed before in general terms by Plato,
but carried out into a system by the Stoics, though to a great extent
also by the Epikureans.

The Stoic was taught to reflect how much that appears to be
desirable, terror-striking, provocative, &c., is not really so, but
is made to appear so by false and curable associations. And, while he
thus discouraged those self-regarding emotions that placed him in
hostility with others, he learnt to respect the self of another man
as well as his own. Epictetus advises to deal mildly with a man that
hurts us either by word or deed; and advises it upon the following
very remarkable ground:--"Recollect that in what he says or does, he
follows his own sense of propriety, not yours. He must do what
appears to him right, not what appears to you: if he judges wrongly,
it is he that is hurt, for he is the person deceived. Always repeat
to yourself, in such a case: The man has acted on his own opinion."

The reason here given by Epictetus is an instance, memorable in
ethical theory, of respect for individual dissenting conviction, even
in an extreme case; and it must be taken in conjunction with his
other doctrine, that damage thus done to us unjustly is really little
or no damage, except so far as we ourselves give pungency to it by
our irrational susceptibilities and associations. We see that the
Stoic submerges, as much as he can, the pre-eminence of his own
individual self, and contemplates himself from the point of view of
another, as only one among many. But he does not erect the happiness
of others into a direct object of his own positive pursuit, beyond
the reciprocities of family, citizenship, and common humanity. The
Stoic theorists agreed with Epikurus in inculcating the reciprocities
of Justice between all fellow-citizens; and they even went farther
than he did, by extending the sphere of such duties beyond the limits
of city, so as to comprehend all mankind. But as to the reciprocities
of individual Friendship, Epikurus went beyond the Stoics in the
amount of self-sacrifice and devotion that he enjoined for the
benefit of a friend.




INDEX.


A.

Abduction (_Apagoge_), 202.

Abstract, and Concrete, appellatives not used by Aristotle, 64.

Abstraction, belongs to the Noëtic function, 486, 487, 492.

_Absurdum_, _Reductio ad_, _see_ _Reductio_.

Accentuation, Fallacy of 385; rare, 408.

_Accidens_, Ens _per_ &c., _see_ Accident, Ens.

_Accidentis Fallacia_, 386; not understood among Aristotle's
scientific contemporaries, 390; how to solve, 410.

Accident, Ens by, 60, 424, 561, 593; modern definition of 62; an
individual, allowed by Aristotle, 63; no science of, 98; one of the
Predicables, 276; thesis of, easiest to defend, hardest to upset,
284, 353; thirty-seven dialectical _Loci_ bearing on, 285 seq.; why
no science of, 425, 593, 594; one, cannot be accident of another,
586; opposed to the constant and the usual, 594; Chance, principle or
cause of, 594; _see_ Concomitants.

Action (_Agere_), Category, 65, 73.

Actuality, as opposed to Potentiality, 128, 456, 615 seq.

_Adoxa_, opposed to _Endoxa_, 269.

Æon, of the Heaven, 636.

Æther, derivation of the name, 632.

Affirmation, conjunction of predicate with subject, 111; constituents
of, 118; [Greek: e)k metathe/seôs] (Theophrastus), 122, 169.

Akroamatic books, opposed to Exoteric, 50.

Alcuin, followed Aristotle on Universals, 563.

Alexander of Macedon, taught by Aristotle from boyhood, 5; came to
the throne, and went on his first Persian expedition, 6; his action
towards Athens, 8; correspondent, protector, patron, of Aristotle at
Athens, 7, 8; later change in his character and alienation from
Aristotle, 9; his order for the recall of exiles throughout Greece,
10; his death, 7, 12.

Alexandrine, _literati_, their knowledge of Aristotle, 34, 38, 40,
42.

_Aliquid_, _Ad_, _see_ Relation; _Hoc_, or the definite individual,
_see_ Essence.

Alkmæon, his view of the soul, 449.

Ammonius, put Relation above all the Categories, 84; his opinion on
last paragraph of De Interpretatione, 134.

Amphiboly, Fallacy of, 385; how to solve, 407.

Amyntas, king of Macedon, 2.

Analytica, referred to in Topica, 56; presuppose contents of
Categoriæ and De Interpretatione, 56; terminology of, differs from
that of De Interpretatione, 141; purpose of, 141.

Analytica Priora, different sections of Book I., 157, 163; relation
of the two books of, 171.

Analytica Posteriora, applies Syllogism to Demonstration, 142, 207;
relation of, to the Metaphysica, 422.

Anaxagoras, doctrine of, inconsistent with Maxim of Contradiction,
429, 592; disregarded data of experience, 436; his view of the soul,
449; Maxim of Excluded Middle defended by Aristotle specially
against, 581; made intelligence dependent on sense, 588; doctrine of,
makes all propositions false, 592; must yet admit an infinite number
of true propositions, 592; meant by his Unum--Ens Potentiâ, and thus
got partial hold of the idea of Matter, 620; in his doctrine of the
Noûs, makes Actuality prior to Potentiality, 623; declares Good to be
the principle as Movent, 628; called fire Æther, 632; his reason for
the stationariness of the Earth, 649.

Anaximander, his reason for stationariness of the Earth, 650.

Anaximenes, his reason for stationariness of the Earth, 649.

Andronikus of Rhodes, source of our Aristotle, 35; sorted and
corrected the Aristotelian MSS. at Rome, 37, 39; Peripatetic
Scholarch, 39; difficulties of his task--the result appreciated, 43;
placed theological treatises first, 55; put Relation above all the
Categories, 84.

Animâ, Treatise de, referred to in the De Interpretatione, 109.

Anonymus, his catalogue of Aristotle's works, compared with that of
Diogenes and with the extant works, 29 seq.

Antipater, friend and correspondent of Aristotle, 7, 8; victor in the
Lamian war, occupied Athens, 12; letter to, from Aristotle at
Chalkis, 16; letter of, in praise of Aristotle, 16; executor under
Aristotle's Will, 17.

_Antiphasis_, pair of contradictory opposites, 111; rule of, as
regards truth and falsity, 112, 113; made up of one affirmation and
one negation corresponding, 113; does not hold for events particular
and future, because of irregularity in the Kosmos, 113 seq.;
quaternions exhibiting each two related cases of, 118 seq., 170;
forms of, in Modals, 127; involves determination of quantity, 135;
not understood before Aristotle, 136; the two members of, can neither
be both true nor both false, argued at length by Aristotle in
Metaph**. [Greek: G]., ii. 586-92.

Antisthenes, declared contradiction impossible, 136, 137; allowed
definition only of compounds, 611.

Antonius, Marcus, authority for Stoical creed, 654; on active
beneficence, 662.

_Apagoge_ (Abduction), 202.

Apellikon, of Teos, a Peripatetic, bought Aristotle's MSS., &c., from
heirs of Neleus, 36; exposed them at Athens and had copies taken, 36;
wrote a biography of Aristotle, 37; library of, composite, 43.

_Aplanês_, exterior sphere of the Kosmos, 114, 623.

[Greek: A)po/phansis], Enunciation, name for Proposition in De
Interpretatione, 141.

Appetite, the direct producing cause of movement in animals, 492.

Archytas, made _Habere_ fifth Category, 80.

Arguments, how to find, for different theses, 157.

Arimnestus, brother of Aristotle, 19.

Aristippus, anticipated Epikurus, 654.

Aristomenes, friend of Aristotle, 17.

Aristophanes, of Byzantium, arranged dialogues of Plato, 34; on the
style of Epikurus, 658.

'_Aristoteles Pseudepigraphus_,' work by V. Rose, 32.

Aristotle, birth and parentage, 1, 2; opportunities for physiological
study, 2; an orphan in youth, became ward of Proxenus, 8; discrepant
accounts as to his early life, 3; medical practice, 3; under Plato at
Athens, 4; went to Atarneus, on Plato's death, 4; married Pythias, 5;
driven out to Mitylene, 5; invited by Philip of Macedon to become
tutor to Alexander, 5; life in Macedon, 5; re-founded Stageira, 6;
taught in the Nymphæum of Mieza, 6; returned to Athens, and set up
his school in the Lykeium, 7; lecturing and writing, 7, 25;
correspondence, 7; relation to Athenian polities, 8; protected and
patronized at Athens by Alexander and Antipater, 8; in spite of
estrangement between him and Alexander, regarded always as unfriendly
to Athenian liberty, 9, 10; his relation to Nikanor, bearer of
Alexander's rescript to the Greek cities, 11; indicted for impiety in
his doctrines and his commemoration of the eunuch Hermeias, 12, 13;
retired to Chalkis, 14; died there, before he could return to Athens,
15; wrote a defence against the charge of impiety, 15; his judgment
on Athens and Athenians, 16; his person, habits, manners, &c., 16;
his second wife, son, and daughter, 17; last testament, 17-19; his
character as therein exhibited, 19; reproaches against, 20; his
opposition to Plato misrepresented by **Platonists, 20, 21; a student
and teacher of rhetoric, 22; attacked Isokrates, 24; assailed by
three sets of enemies, 26; difficulty in determining the Canon of his
works as compared with Plato's, 27; extant works ascribed to, 27;
ancient authorities for his works, 28; catalogue and extent of his
works, according to Diogenes, 29; according to Anonymus, 29; the
catalogues compared with each other, and with list of his extant
works, 29, 30; ancient encomiums on his style, 30; his principal
works unknown to Cicero and others, 31, 40; dialogues and other works
of, lost to us, 31; works in the catalogue are declared by V. Rose
not to belong to, 32; different opinion of E. Heitz, 32; allowance to
be made for diversity of style, subject, &c., in the works of, 33;
works in the catalogue to be held as really composed by, 34; extant
works of, whence derived, 35; fate of his library and MSS. on his
death, till brought to Rome and cared for by Andronikus, 35 seq.;
through Andronikus, became known as we know him, 40; not thus known
to the Alexandrine librarians, 42; so-called Exoteric works of, 44;
his own use of the phrase "exoteric discourses," 46 seq.; had not two
doctrines--the Exoteric and Esoteric, 52; the order of his extant
works uncertain, 54; his merit in noting equivocation of terms, 57;
not free from fascination by particular numbers, 74; first made
logical analysis of Ens, 97; first to treat Logic scientifically,
130; what he did for theory of Proposition, 136, 139; claimed the
theory of Syllogism as his own work, 140, 153, 259, 420; his
expository manner, novel and peculiar, 141; specialized the meaning
of Syllogism, 143; first to ask if a proposition could be converted,
144; first used letters as symbols in exposition, 148; proceeded
upon, but modified, Platonic antithesis of Science and Opinion, 207,
264; specially claimed to be original in his theory of Dialectic,
262, 418; attended to current opinion, drew up list of proverbs, 272,
440; started in his philosophy from the common habit of speech, 434,
440; continued the work of Sokrates, 439, 441; devised a First
Philosophy conformable to the habits of common speech, starting from
the definite individual or _Hoc Aliquid_, 445; psychology of, must be
compared with that of his predecessors, 446; rejected all previous
theories on Soul, 452; advance made in the Ontology of, 561; his view
of pleasure, 660; ethical purpose of, 662.

Arithmetic, _præcognita_ required in, 212; abstracted from material
conditions, 234; simpler, and therefore more accurate, than geometry,
234.

Art, Generation from, 598, 620.

Asklepiads, traditional training of, 2.

Association of Ideas, principles of, 477; Aristotle's account of,
perplexed by his sharp distinction of Memory and Reminiscence, 478.

Astronomy, the mathematical science most akin to First Philosophy,
626.

Atarneus, Aristotle there, 4.

Attalid kings of Pergamus, Aristotle's library at Skepsis buried, to
be kept hidden from, 36.

Axioms, assumed in Demonstration, 212, 215, 220; a part of
Demonstration, 219; not always formally enunciated, 221; those common
to all sciences, scrutinized by Dialectic, 221, 575; and by First
Philosophy, 221, 425, 575, 584; the common, not alone sufficient for
Demonstration in the special sciences, 236; use of the word before,
and by, Aristotle, 566, 575, 584.

B.

Bees, partake in Noûs, 483, 576.

Belief, at variance with Knowledge, 182; founded on evidence either
syllogistic or inductive, 187.

Berlin edition of Aristotle, 27, 30.

Bernays, his view of "exoteric discourses," 49, 52.

Body, animate and inanimate, 456; Matter with Aristotle may be, but
is not necessarily, 456; thorough-going implication of Soul with, in
animated subject, 458 seq.; has three and only three dimensions, 630;
no infinite, 633.

Boëthius, translated Aristotle's Categoriæ and defended its position,
563.

Boêthus the Sidonian, student of Aristotle, 38; his recommendation as
to order of studying the works, 55.

Bonitz, his view of the canon of the Metaphysica, 583.

Brain, specially connected with the olfactory organ, 470; function of
the, 480.

Brandis, refers catalogue of Diogenes to Alexandrine _literati_, 34,
40; his view of the canon of the Metaphysica, 583.

Bryson, his quadrature of the circle, 381.

C.

Canon, Aristotelian, _see_ Aristotle.

Categoriæ, the treatise, not mentioned in Analytica or Topica, 56;
subject of, how related to that of De Interpretatione, 57, 59, 108,
109; deals with Ens in a sense that blends Logic and Ontology, 62,
108; difference of Aristotle's procedure in, compared with Physica
and Metaphysica, 65, 103; probably an early composition, 80; remained
known, when other works of Aristotle were unknown or neglected, 563.

Categories, Ten, assumed in Analytica and Topica, 56; led up to by a
distinction of Entia (Enunciata), 59; blending together Logic and
Ontology, 62; Ens according to the, 61, 425, 594 seq. (Metaph. Z.,
[Greek: Ê].); enumerated, 65; all embodied in First or Complete Ens,
66, 595; each a Summum Genus, and some wider still, 66; not all
mutually exclusive, 66, 73, 81, 89; may be exemplified, not defined,
66; how arrived at, 66, 76 seq.; joined by later logicians with the
Predicables, 73; stress laid by Aristotle upon the first four, 74;
why Ten in number--might have been more, 74 seq.; obtained by logical,
not metaphysical, analysis, 76; heads of information or answers
respecting an individual, 77; inference **as to true character
of, from case of _Habere_ and _Jacere_, 79; all, even **the first,
involve Relativity, 80 seq.; Mr. J. S. Mill on, 90 n.; capital
distinction between the first and all the rest, 91 seq., 563, 594;
Trendelenburg's view of their origin, 99, likely and plausible, 99;
compared with Categories of the Stoics, 100, 563, of Plotinus, 102,
563, of Galen, 103.

Cause, Knowledge of, distinguished from knowledge of Fact, 223;
knowledge of, the perfection of cognition, 224, 235; one of the four
heads of Investigation, 238; nature of the question as to, 239, 608;
substantially the same enquiry with _Cur_, _Quid_, and the Middle
Term, 240, 246; four varieties of, 245, 611, 621; relation among the
varieties of, 246; how far reciprocal with the _causatum_, 247, 254;
has an effect only one? 254; the General Notion viewed by Aristotle
as a, 422.

Chance, source of irregularity in the Kosmos, 114, 206; affects the
rule of Antiphasis, 115; Aristotle's doctrine of, challenged, 116;
objective correlate to the Problematical Proposition, 133, 205;
principle or cause of Accidents, 594; Generations and Constructions
proceeding from, 598, 620.

Change, four varieties of, 609.

Chrysippus, on the determination of will by motives, 661; his
reverence for divination, &c., 662; a foreigner at Athens, without a
sphere of political action, 662.

Cicero, his encomium on Aristotle's style, 30, 41; how far he knew
Aristotle's works, 30, 31, 33, 40, 50; his use of the word
"exoteric," 44, 51.

Claudian, referred to, 13.

Coelo, Treatise de, connected with what
other works, 54, 653.

Colour, object of vision, action of, 466; varieties of, proceeding
all from white and black, 467.

Common Sense, or Opinion, opposed to Science in Plato and Aristotle,
207; Sir W. Hamilton on, 565; legitimate meaning of, 567;
authoritative character of, in one place allowed by Aristotle, 569;
Aristotle's conception of, as devoid of scientific authority, 573,
574.

Compound, The ([Greek: to\ su/nolon]), of Form and Matter, or the
Individual, 445, 456, 599 seq.

Concealment, how to be practised by dialectical questioner, 356.

Conclusion, of Syllogism, indicates Figure, 152, 164, 167; when more
than one, 171; true, from false premisses, 172 use to demonstrate
premisses, 173; reversed to refute premisses, 174; kinds of, in
Demonstration, compared, 231.

Concomitants, non-essential, no demonstration of, 219; no definition
of, 220; near to Non-Entia, 561; little more than a name, 593; _see_
Accident.

Concrete, and Abstract, appellatives not used by Aristotle, 65; the,
as compound of Form and Matter, 456 seq.; _see_ Compound.

Conjunction, Fallacy of, 385; how to solve, 408.

_Consequentis Fallacia_, 388; not understood before Aristotle, 390;
how to solve, 412.

Construction, kind of Generation, 598.

Contradiction, Maxim or Axiom of, depends upon knowledge of quantity
and quality of propositions, 137, 441; not self-evident, 144; among
the _præcognita_ of Demonstration, 212, 427; not formally enunciated
in any special science, 221; discussion of, belongs to First
Philosophy, 422, 425, why, 426, 579; enunciated, as highest and
firmest of all principles, 425, 585; controverted by Aristotle's
predecessors, Herakleitus, Anaxagoras, &c., 427, 429, 441;
Aristotle's indirect proof of, 427 seq., 585 seq.; applied in the
Sokratic Elenchus, 441; remarks on Aristotle's defence of, 442; can
be supported only by an induction of particular instances, 443;
enunciated both as a logical and as an ontological formula, 579;
defended by Aristotle specially against Herakleitus, 579.

Contradictory Opposites, pair of, make Antiphasis, 111; distinguished
from Contrary Opposites, 111, 124, 134; rule of, as to truth and
falsity, 112; related pairs of, set forth in quaternions, 118 seq.,
170; distinction of from Contrary, fundamental in Logic, 137; _see_
_Antiphasis_.

_Contrariorum_, _Petitio_, in Dialectic, 372.

Contrary Opposites (terms), 104; Opposites (propositions),
distinguished from Contradictory, 111, 124, 134; rule of as to truth
and falsity, 112.

Conversion (1) of Propositions, import of, 144; rules for, with
Aristotle's defective proof thereof, 144 seq.; can be proved only by
Induction, 146, 147; (2) of Syllogism, 174.

Copula, _Est_ as, 127, 591.

Courage, definition of, 525.

D.

Debate, four species of, 377.

Definition, among the _præcognita_ assumed in Demonstration, 212,
214, 220, 221; propositions declaring, attained only in First figure,
224; of Essence that depends on extraneous cause, 240-44; of Essence
without such middle Term, 245; three varieties of, 245; how to frame
a, 249; as sought through logical Division, 250; to exclude
equivocation, 251; one of the Predicates, according to Aristotle,
276; thesis of, easiest to attack, hardest to defend, 285, 353;
dialectical Loci bearing on, 329 seq.; how open to attack or defence,
330; defects in the setting out of, 330; faults in the substance of,
332-48; the genuine and perfect, 333; general rule for dialectically
testing, 349; is primarily of Essences, of the other Categories not
directly, 597; none, of particular Concretes, 602, 606; is of the
Universal or Form, 603; whence the unity of the, 604, 612; none, of
eternal Essences, 607; analogy of, to Number, 611.

Delboeuf, Prof., on indemonstrable truths, 229 n.

Demades, with Phokion at the head of the Athenian administration
under Alexander, 12.

Demochares, nephew of Demosthenes, accuser of Aristotle, 14.

Demokritus, disregarded experience, 436; his view of the soul, 449;
made intelligence dependent on sense, which is ever varying, 588;
recognized one primordial body with three differences--figure,
position, arrangement, 609; got partial hold of the idea of Ens
Potentiâ or Matter, 620; atomic doctrine of, 634; his reason for the
stationariness of the Earth, 649; how followed by Epikurus, 656-58.

Demonstrative Science, _see_ Demonstration.

Demonstration, ultimately reducible to two first modes of First
figure, 155; circular, 173, 215; subject of Analyt. Post. 207; how
opposed to Dialectic, 209, 573; is teaching from _præcognita_
assumed, 211, 214; undemonstrable principles of, 215; two doctrines
of, opposed by Aristotle, 215, 228; necessary premisses of, 216;
conclusion of, must be necessary, 218; none, of nonessential
concomitants, 219; the parts of, 219; premisses of, must be essential
and appropriate, 220; requires admission of universal predicates,
221; premisses for, obtained only from Induction, 226, 258, 260, 576;
implies some truths primary or ultimate, 227, 230; the unit in, 231;
of the Universal better than of the Particular, 231; Affirmative
better than Negative, 233; Direct better than Indirect, 234; is of
the necessary or customary, not of the fortuitous, 235, 606; none,
through sensible perception, 235; in default of direct observation,
230; relation of, to Definition, 240; _principia_ of, not innate,
256; _principia_ of, how developed upon sensible perception, 256,
575.

Demophilus, joined in indicting Aristotle for impiety, 12.

Demosthenes, reproached for conversing with the bearer of Alexander's
rescript to the Greek cities, 11; suicide of, 12.

Desire, _see_ Appetite.

Dexippus, vindicated Aristotle's Categories,103, 563.

Dialectic, how related to Science or Philosophy, 47, 210, 272, 273;
form of putting questions in, 125, 275; theses in, variously liable
to attack and defence, 156, 285, 352; as conceived by Plato, 208,
263; by Aristotle placed with Rhetoric in the region of Opinion, 208,
266, 573; opposed to Demonstrative Science and Necessary Truth, 209,
573; concerned about the Common Axioms of all Science, 221, 272, 574,
584; Aristotle claims to be specially original in his theory of, 262,
418; as conceived and practised by Sokrates, 263, 436; opposed by
Aristotle to Didactic, 264, 377; province of, 266, 573; essentially
contentious, 266, 378, 397; uses of, 271, 574; propositions, how
classified in, 276; procedure of, in contrast with that of
Philosophy, 353, 584; conditions and aims of the practice of, 354,
361, 378; to be practised as a partnership for common intellectual
profit, 355, 367; part of the questioner in, 355 seq.; part of the
respondent in, 361 seq.; respondent at fault in, 366; questioner at
fault in, 367; four kinds of false argument in, 370; outfit for
practice of, 372; one of four species of debate, 377; when and why
called eristic or sophistic by Aristotle, 379; Aristotle's
distinction of Sophistic from, contested, 382, 393 seq.

Dialogues of Aristotle lost, 30, 32, 49.

Diaphanous, action of the, in vision, 466.

_Dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter_,_Fallacia a_, 386; how to
solve, 412.

Didactic, confounded by Plato with Dialectic, 264; distinguished from
Dialectic by Aristotle, 264, 377; species of Debate, 377; scope and
conditions. Of, 377; _see_ also Demonstration.

Differences, study of, an organon of debate, 280.

Differentia, not _in_, but _predicated of_, a Subject, 68; ranked
with Genus in Aristotle's list of Predicables, 276; discriminated
from Genus, 313; definition of Species through Genus and, 333, 601;
is Form in the definition, 604; logically prior to the Species, 607.

Diogenes of Apollonia, his view of the soul, 449.

Diogenes Laertius, his catalogue of Aristotle's works, 28, compared
with that of Anonymus, 29; ignorant of the principal works of
Aristotle known to us, 31; catalogue of, probably of Alexandrine
origin, 34, 41.

Dionysius, younger of Syracuse, visited by Plato, 4; corresponded
with Plato, 7.

Dionysodorus, the Sophist, 383.

Dioteles, friend of Aristotle, 17.

[Greek: Dio/ti, To/], the _Why_, knowledge of, 223, one of the four
heads of Investigation, 238; in search for a middle term, 239;
relation of, to the question _Quid_, 239; _see_ Cause.

Disjunction, Fallacy of, 385; how to solve, 408.

Division Logical, weakness of, 163, 242; use of, to obtain a
definition, 250.

E.

Ear, structure of the, 468.

Earth, opinions as to positions of, 648; opinions as to its state of
motion or rest, figure, &c., 649 seq.; at rest in the centre of the
Kosmos, 652; necessarily spherical, 652. 653; size of, 653.

Eclipse, lunar, illustration of Causation from, 254, 611.

Education of the citizen, 543.

Efficient Cause, 245.


Elenchus, of Sokrates, 263, 437; in general, 376; the Sophistical,
376, 404 directions for solving the Sophistical, 404.

Emotions, not systematically treated by Aristotle as part of
Psychology, but in Ethics and Rhetoric, 492.


Empedokles, his disregard of experience, 436; his view of the soul,
449; criticized by Aristotle, 451; made intelligence dependent on
sense, 588; got partial hold of the idea of Ens Potentiâ or Matter,
620; his principle of Friendship, 623, 628; held the Kosmos to be
generated and destroyed alternately, 637; held the Heaven to be kept
in its place by extreme velocity of rotation, 639, 650.

End, _see_ Final Cause.

_Endoxa_, premisses of Dialectic, 269; not equivalent to the
Probable, 270; collections to be made of, 275, as an _organon_ of
debate, 278.

Energy, _see_ Entelechy.

Ens, four kinds of, viewed with reference to Proposition, and as
introductory to the Categories, 59; _quatenus_ Ens, subject of First
Philosophy, 59, 422, 583; a homonymous, equivocal, or multivocal
word, 60, 424, 594; not a _Summum Genus_, but a _Summum Analogon_,
60, 584; four main aspects of, in Ontology, 60, 424; (1) _Per
Accidens_, 593; (2) in the sense of Truth, 108, 594, 618; (3)
Potential and Actual, 614-18 (Metaph. [Greek: Th]); (4) according to
the Categories, 594 seq. (Metaph. Z, [Greek: Ê]; relation among the
various aspects of, 61, 424; aspects (1) and (2) lightly treated in
Metaphysica, belonging more to Logic, 61; in aspect (4) Logic and
Ontology blended, 62; in the fullest sense, 66, 67, 96; first
analyzed in its logical aspect by Aristotle, 97; as conceived in
earliest Greek thought, 97, 436; Plato's doctrine of, 552 seq.;
Aristotle's doctrine of, 561.

_Enstasis_ (Objection), 202.

Entelechy, Soul the first, of a natural organized body, 458; _see_
Actuality.

Enthymeme, The, 202.

Enunciative speech, 109; _see_ Proposition.

Epictetus, authority for Stoical creed, 654; his distinction of
things in, and not in, our power, 661; his respect for dissenting
conviction, 663.

Epikurus, doctrine of, imperfectly reported, 654; his standard of
Virtue and Vice, 654; ethical theory of, anticipated, 654;
subordinated bodily pain and pleasure to mental, 654; fragment of his
last letter, 654; his views on Death and the Gods, 655, 657; founded
Justice and Friendship upon Reciprocity, 655; specially inculcated
Friendship, 656; duration and character of his sect, 656; his theory
misnamed, and hence misunderstood, 656; modified atomic theory of
Demokritus with an ethical purpose, 657; his writings, 657, 658;
provided by atomic deflection (not for Freedom of Will but) for the
unpredictable phenomena of nature, 658; his view of the nature of
Truth, 658; disregarded logical theory, 658.

Equivocation, of terms, 57; detection of, an organon of debate, 279;
Fallacy of, 385; how to solve Fallacy of, 407; perhaps most frequent
of all fallacies, 414.

Eric, of Auxerre, followed Aristotle on Universals, 563.

Eristic, given as one of the four Species of Debate, 377; really a
variety or aspect of Dialectic, 377, 379.

Error, liabilities to, in (the form of) Syllogism, 176; in the matter
of premisses, 181; particular, within knowledge of the universal,
183; three modes of, 184, modes of, in regard to propositions as
Immediate or Mediate, 225.

Esoteric doctrine, as opposed to Exoteric, 52.

Essence (Substance), degrees of, 63, 561; first and fundamental
Category, 65, 67; First, or Hoc Aliquid, subject, never predicate,
67, 18, 561; Second, _predicated of_, not _in_, First, 68; Third, 68;
has itself no contrary, but receives alternately contrary accidents,
69, 83; relativity of, as a subject for predicates, 83, 91 seq.;
First, shades through Second into quality, 91; priority of, as
subject over predicate, logical, not real, 93; treated in Metaphys.
Z, 595 seq.

Essence (Quiddity), propositions declaring, attained only in First
figure of Syllogism, 224; one of the four _quæsita_ in Science, 238;
nature of the question as to, 239; how related to the question _Cur_,
240; in all cases undemonstrable, but declared through syllogism,
where it has an extraneous cause, 244; variously given in the
Definition, 245; a variety of Cause (Formal) 245, 611; treated in
Metaphys. Z, 595 seq.

Essential predication, how distinguished by Aristotle from
Non-Essential, 65.

_Est_, double meaning of, 126.

Ethics, Aristotle's treatise on, analyzed, 495 seq.; uncertainty and
obscurity of the subject, 497; Ethical science the supreme good of
the individual citizen, 500; fundamental defect in Aristotle's
theory, 514, 519; first principles how acquired in, 578.

Eubulides, wrote in reproach of Aristotle, 20.

'Eudêmus,' Dialogue of Aristotle's, 52.

Eudêmus, disciple of Aristotle, knew logical works of his now lost,
56; wrote on logic, 56; followed Aristotle in treating Modals, 144;
his proof of the convertibility of Universal Negative, 146; on the
negative function of Dialectic, 284.

Eudoxus, anticipated ethical theory of Epikurus, 654.

Eumêlus, asserted that Aristotle took poison, 15.

Eurymedon, the Hierophant, indicted Aristotle for impiety, 12.

Euthydemus, the Sophist, 383.

Example, the Syllogism from, 191; Induction an exaltation of, 197;
results in Experience, 198.

Excluded Middle, Maxim of, not self-evident, 144; among the
_præcognita_ of Demonstration, 212; supplement or correlative of
Maxim of Contradiction, 426; enunciated both as a logical, and as an
ontological, formula, 579; vindicated by Aristotle specially against
Anaxagoras, 581, 590 seq.

Existence, one of the four heads of Investigation, 238.

Exoteric, the works so called, how understood by Cicero, 44; how by
the critics, 45; "discourse," meaning of in Aristotle himself, 46
seq.; opposed to Akroamatic, 50; doctrine, as opposed to Esoteric,
52.

[Greek: E)xôterikoi\ lo/goi], allusions to, in Aristotle, 46 seq.

Experience, inference from Example results in, 198; place of, in Mr.
J. S. Mill's theory of Ratiocination, 199; basis of science, 199; is
of particular facts, 576.

_Expetenda_, dialectical _Loci_ bearing on, 296 seq.

Eye, structure of the, 466.

F.

Fact, knowledge of, distinguished from knowledge of Cause, 223, 235;
one of the four heads of Investigation, 238; nature of question as
to, 239; assumed in question as to Cause, 239, 608.

Fallacies, subject of Sophistici Elenchi, 377; incidental to the
human **intellect, often hard to detect, not mere traps, 383, 395,
404; operated through language, 384; classified, 385; (1)
_Dictionis_ or _In Dictione_, 385; (2) _Extra Dictionem_ 385 seq.;
may all be brought to _Ignoratio Elenchi_, 390; current among
Aristotle's contemporaries, 391; _In Dictione_, how to solve, 409
seq. _Extra Dictionem_, how to solve, 410 seq.

Falsehood, Non-Ens in the sense of, 60; &c.; _see_ Truth and Ens.

Favorinus, 35.

_Figura Dictionis_, Fallacy of, 385; how to solve, 408.

Figure of Syllogism, 148; First, 148; alternative ways of
enunciating, 148; Modes of, 149; valid modes of First, 149; invalid
modes of First, how set forth by Aristotle, 150; Second and its
modes, 151; Third and its modes, 152; superiority of First, 152, 153,
224; indicated by the Conclusion, 153, 164, 167; all Demonstration
ultimately reducible to two first modes of First, 154; Reduction of
Second and Third, 168; in Second and Third, conclusion possible from
contradictory premisses, 175; knowledge of Cause, also propositions
declaring Essence and Definition, attained in the first, 224.

Final Cause, 246, 611.

Forchhammer, his view of "exoteric discourse," 49.

Form, joint-factor with Matter, a variety of Cause, 245, 611; in the
intellectual generation of the Individual, 445, 598 seq.; and Matter,
distinction of, a capital feature in Aristotle's First Philosophy,
454, 594 seq. (from Metaph. Book Z onwards); relation of, to Matter,
455; as the Actual, 455, 616; the Soul is, 457, 460; the Celestial
Body, the region of, 480.

_Fugienda_, dialectical _Loci_ bearing on, 296 seq.

G.

Galen, his list of Categories, 103.

Gellius, A., his distinction of Exoteric and Akroamatic books, 50.

Generable, the senses of, 637.

Generation, the doctrine of, 598 seq., 620.

Generatione et Corruptione, Treatise de, connected with what other
works, 54, 653 n.

Genus, is Second Essence, 63; or more strictly Third Essence, 67; in
a Demonstration, 219; division of a, 250; one of the Predicables,
276, 284; dialectical _Loci_ bearing on, 302 seq.; not often made
subject of debate, but important for Definition, 302; distinguished
from Differentia, 312; perfect definition through, and Differentiæ,
333; easier to attack than to defend, 352; is Matter in a definition,
604; logically prior to the Species, 607.

Geometry, use of diagrams in, 167, 618; _præcognita_ required in,
212.

Gorgias, style of, 22.

Gryllion, sculptor named in Aristotle's will, 19.

Gymnastics, as part of education, 544.

H.

_Habere_, Category, 66, 73; sometimes dropt by Aristotle, 74, 80;
entitled with the others to a place, 78; refers primarily to a Man,
79; is also understood more widely by Aristotle, 79, 103; exclusively
so by some Aristotelians, 80; ranked fifth by Archytas, 80.

_Habitus_ and _Privatio_, case of _Opposita_, 104, 105.

Hamilton, Sir W., on Modals in Logic, 130, 200; wavers in his use of
the term Common Sense, 565; points on which he misrepresents
Aristotle, 565, 566; real question between, and the Inductive School,
567; the passages upon the strength of which he numbers Aristotle
among the champions of authoritative Common Sense, examined
_seriatim_, 568 seq.

Happiness, Aristotle's definition of, examined, 501 seq.; happiness
of the individual and of society distinct, 517.

Hearing, operated through a medium, 167.

Heart, organ of Sensation generally, 464, 472, 474, specially of
Touch, 472.

Heaven (Kosmos), always in action, 617; uppermost place in, assigned
to the Gods, 632; revolving in a circle, cannot be infinite, 633; no
body outside of, 634, 636; there cannot be more than one, 634;
different senses of, 636; ungenerated and indestructible, 637-39;
directions in the, 640; whence the number of revolutions in, 641;
necessarily spherical, 611, 645; motion of, uniform, 642.

Heavy, distinguished from Light, 631.

Heitz, Emil, takes ground against V. Rose on the catalogue of
Diogenes, 32; refers it to Alexandrine _literati_, 34, 40.

Herakleitus, philosophy of, inconsistent with the Maxim of
Contradiction, 427, 429, 592; disregarded data of experience, 436,
444; position of, inexpugnable by general argument, 443; his view of
the soul, 449; his view of the world of sense and particulars, 551;
not a dialectician, 551; Maxim of Contradiction defended by Aristotle
specially against, 579; the doctrine of, makes all propositions true,
592; must yet admit an infinite number of false propositions, 592;
held the Kosmos to be generated and destroyed alternately, 636.

Hermeias, despot of Atarneus and Assos, friend of Aristotle, 4;
commemorated after death by Aristotle in a hymn and epigram, 5, 12,
13.

Hermippus, drew up catalogue of pupils of Isokrates, 21; probable
author of the catalogue in Diogenes, 34, 35.

Herpyllis, second wife of Aristotle, 17, 18.

Hipparchus, friend of Aristotle, 17.

Hippokrates, his quadrature of the circle, 381.

Hobbes, his definition of Accident, 62.

Homer, made intelligence dependent on sense, 588.

_Homo Mensura_, doctrine of Protagoras, held by Aristotle to be at
variance with Maxim of Contradiction, 430 seq., 580, 587 seq.

Homonymous things, 57.

Homonymy (Equivocation), Fallacy of, 385; how to solve, 407.

Hypereides, executed, 12.

Hypothesis, Syllogisms from, 160, 168; as a principle of
Demonstration, 215, 221.

I.

Iamblichus, defended Aristotle's Categories, 563.

Ideas, Platonic Theory of, not required for Demonstration, 221; as
set forth by Plato himself, 553; psychological ground for, 554;
objections urged against, in Sophistes and Parmenides, 556 seq.;
objections urged by Aristotle against, 558; allusions to in books of
the Metaphysica, 595, 598, 600, 603, 606, 607, 612, 617, 619, 620.

_Idem_, three senses of, 277, 350; a topic in First Philosophy, 584.

Identity, Maxim of, among the _præcognita_ of Demonstration, 212.

Idomeneus, letter to, from Epikurus, 654.

_Ignoratio Elenchi_, Fallacy of, 387; all fallacies may be brought
to, 390; how to solve, 412.

Immortality, not of the individual, 462, 489, 490.

Immoveable, essence, subject of Ontology, also of Mathematics, 423,
593, 619; Prime Movent, 624.

_Impossibile_, _Reductio ad_, _see_ _Reductio_.

Impossible, The, senses of, 638; differs from the False, 638.

Induction, sole proof of the rules for converting propositions, 146,
147; everything believed through Syllogism or upon, 187, 194, 226;
the Syllogism from or out of, 187 seq.; the opposite of genuine
Syllogism, 190; plainer and clearer to us, than Syllogism, 191;
Aristotle's attempt to reduce, to syllogistic form, 192, 193; wanting
in the first requisite of Syllogism--necessity of sequence, 193, 197;
presupposed in Syllogism, 194; the antithesis of, to Syllogism,
obscured by Aristotle's treatment, 198, 199; as part of the whole
process of Scientific Inference, 199, 201; true character of,
apprehended by Aristotle, but not followed out, 199, 200; Logic of,
neglected by the expositors after Aristotle till modern times, 200;
requisites to a Logic of, 201; supplies the premisses of
Demonstration, starting from particulars of sense, 226, 258, 259,
562, 576; repeated and uncontradicted, gives maximum of certainty,
260; process of, culminates in the infallible Noûs, 259-61; procedure
by way of, in Dialectic, 358; most suitable to a young beginner in
Dialectic, 374.

Inductive School, exact question between the, and Sir W. Hamilton,
567.

Infinite, the, exists only potentially, not actually except in a
certain way for our cognition, 615; no body is, 632 seq.

Intellect, _see_ Noûs.

_Intellectus Agens_, relation of, to the _Patiens_, 488, 489; eternal
and immortal, but not in the individual, 488, 489.

_Intellectus Patiens_, relation to the _Agens_, 488, 489; belongs to
and perishes with the individual, 488, 489.

Interpretatione, Treatise de, not named, but its contents
presupposed, in Analytica and Topica, 56; subject of, how related to
subject of Categoriæ, 57, 59, 108, 109; last section of, out of
connection, 134; contains first positive theory of Proposition, 136;
summary of, 139.

Interrogation in Dialectic and in Science, 222.

Irregularity, principle of, in the Kosmos, _see_ Chance.

Isokrates, corresponded with Nikokles, 7, 23; his rhetorical school,
21; his style of composition and teaching, 22; attacked by Aristotle,
24; defended by Kephisodorus, 24.

J.

_Jacere_, Category, 66, 73; sometimes dropt by Aristotle, 74, 80;
entitled with the others to a place, 78; refers primarily to a Man,
79.

Justice, definition of, 531; view of the Pythagoreans respecting,
533.

K.

Kallimachus of Alexandria, drew up tables of authors and their works,
34.

Kallisthenes, recommended by Aristotle to Alexander, 9.

Kallistratus, his skolion on Harmodius and Aristogeiton, 13.

Kassander, pupil of Aristotle, 9.

Kephisodorus, defended Isokrates against Aristotle, 24, 272 n.

Knowledge, of the Universal with error in particulars, 182; three
modes of, 184; two grades of--Absolute, Qualified, 212; of Fact, of
Cause, 223; proper, is of the Universal, 235; versus Opinion, 236,
573.

Kosmos, principles of regularity and irregularity in, 114; _see_
Heaven.

Kratylus refrained from predication, and pointed only with the
finger, 429 n., 580, 590.

L.

La Mennais, on Common Sense, 567.

Lamian War, 12.

Language, significant by convention only, 109; as subservient to the
growth of intellect, 484, 576.

Leukippus, affirmed motion to be eternal, 623; atomic doctrine of,
634.

Life, defined, 453; _see_ Soul.

Light, distinguished from Heavy, 631.

Light, takes no time to travel, 466.

_Loci_, in Dialectic, nature of, 283; distribution of, according to
the four Predicables, 284; bearing on Accident, 285 seq.; bearing on
_Expetenda_ and _Fugienda_ as cases of Accident, 296 seq.; bearing on
Genus, 302 seq.; bearing on Proprium, 313 seq.; bearing on
Definition, 329 seq.; belonging to Sophistic, 382, 403.

Locomotion, Animal, produced by Noûs and Appetite, 493.

Logic, importance of Aristotle's distinction of the Equivocal in, 57;
deals with Ens in what senses, 61; blended with Ontology in the
Categories, 62; connection of, with Psychology, 110; deals with
speech as Enunciative, 111; first presented scientifically by
Aristotle, 130; properly includes discussion of Modals, 130 seq.;
distinction of Contradictory and Contrary fundamental in, 136; use of
examples in, 167; Aristotle's one-sided treatment of, in
subordinating Induction, 200; as combining Induction and Deduction,
201; Mr. J. S. Mill's system of, in relation to Aristotle's, 201;
Aristotle's claim to originality in respect of, 420; line between,
and Ontology, not clearly marked by Aristotle, 422; Sokrates first
broke ground for, 426; subjective point of view chiefly taken by
Aristotle in, 578.

Lucian, uses word "esoteric," 52.

Lucretius, only extant Epikurean writer, 654.

M.

Madvig, his view of "exoteric discourse," 49.

Mathematics, theoretical science, subject of, 423, 593.

Matter, a variety of Cause, 246, 611; joint-factor with Form in the
intellectual generation of the Individual, 445, 598 seq.; and Form,
distinction, of, a capital feature in Aristotle's First Philosophy,
454, 595 seq. (from Metaph. Book Z onwards); relation of, to Form,
455, 456; as the Potential, 455, 615 seq.; various grades of, 456.

Mechanics, place of, in Aristotle's philosophy, 54.

Megarics, allowed no power not in actual exercise, 614.

Memory, Tract on, and Reminiscence, 475; nature of, as distinguished
from Phantasy, 475; distinguished from Reminiscence, 476; phenomena
of, 477.

Menedêmus, disallowed negative propositions, 136.

Meno, Platonic, question as to possibility of learning in, 212.

Menoekeus, letter to, from Epikurus, 654.

Mentor, Persian general, drove Aristotle from Mitylene, 5.

Metaphysics, in modern sense, covers Aristotle's Physica and
Metaphysica, 422.

Metaphysica, name not used by Aristotle, 54, 59; relation of the, to
the Physica, 54, 422; characteristic distinction of the, 422.

Meteorologica, connected with what other works, 54.

Metrodorus, third husband of Aristotle's daughter, 20.

Middle term in Syllogism, literal signification of, 148; how to find
a, 157 seq.; the _Why_ of the conclusion in Demonstration, 219; power
of swiftly divining a, 237; fourfold question as to, in Science, 239;
as Cause, 246.

Mieza, school of Aristotle there, 6.

Mill, Mr. J. S., on the Ten Categories, 90 n.; his system of Logic,
in relation to Aristotle's, 198-201; on indemonstrable truths, 229 n.

Milton, his description of Realism, 552.

Mitylene, Aristotle spent some time there, 4.

Modal Propositions, form of Antiphasis in, 127; excluded by Hamilton
and others from Logic, 130; place of, in Formal Logic vindicated,
131; Aristotle's treatment of, not satisfactory, 133, 138; doctrine
of, related to Aristotle's Ontology and Physics, 133;
disadvantageously mixed up with the Assertory, 138, 143, 154; in
Syllogism, 204.

Modes of Figure, 149; _see_ Figure.

Moon, spherical, 646; motions of, 647.

Motion, Zeno's argument against, paradoxical, 365; the kinds of
local, 593.

_Motus_, under _Opposita_, 104.

Movent, The Immovable Prime, 624 seq.

Music, necessary part of education, 545.

Myrmex, slave or pupil of Aristotle, 19.

N.

Nature, sum of the constant tendencies and sequences within the
Kosmos, 114, 117; objective correlate to the Necessary Proposition in
Logic, 133; Generation from, 598.

Naturalia Parva, complementary to the De Animâ, 54.

Necessary, The, as a mode affecting Antiphasis, 126 seq.; relation
of, to the Possible, 127, 205; a formal mode of Proposition, 131; why
it may be given up as a Mode, 206.

Necessity, in what sense Aristotle denies that all events happen by,
116.

Negation, disjunction of subject and predicate, 111; through what
collocations of the negative particle obtained strictly, 118 seq.,
169; real and apparent, 122; _see_ Contradictory, _Antiphasis_.

Neleus, inherited library of Theophrastus, and carried it away to
Skêpsis, 36; heirs of, buried his library for safety, 36.

Nikanor, son of Proxenus, ward and friend of Aristotle, bore
Alexander's rescript to the Greek cities, 11; executor, and chief
beneficiary, under Aristotle's will, 17-20; married Aristotle's
daughter, 20.

Nikokles, correspondent of Isokrates, 7.

Nikomachus, father of Aristotle, medical author and physician to
Amyntas, 2; son of Aristotle, 17, 18.

Nominalism, main position of, clearly enunciated by Aristotle, 481
n.; scholastic formula of, 555.

_Non Causa pro Causâ_, 388; how to solve, 413.

_Non-Ens_, in the sense of Falsehood, 60, 108; Accident borders on,
98, 593.

_Non per Hoc_, the argument so called, 179; Fallacy of, 388.

Notion, the general, as a cause and creative force, 422.

_Notiora, nobis_ v. _naturâ_, 197, 215, 239, 332.

Noun, function of the, 109, 110, 130; the indefinite, 118, 124.

Noûs, the unit of Demonstration or Science, 231; the _principium_ of
Science or scientific Cognition, 236, 259; unerring, more so even
than Science, 259, 491, 577; stands with Aristotle as terminus and
correlate to the process of Induction, 260, 578; (Noëtic soul)
distinct from, but implying, the lower mental functions, 461, 479;
independent of special bodily organs, 479, 481, 487; how related to
the Celestial Body, 481, 487; the form or correlate of all
cogitables--Form of Forms, 482, 486; limited in its function, as
joined with sentient and nutritive souls, 482, 484; differently
partaken of by man and animals, 483; growth of, 484; not clearly
separated by Aristotle from Phantasy, with which it is in its
exercise bound up, 485; distinguished from Sense, 486; of the Soul,
an unlimited cogitative potentiality, like a tablet not yet written
on, 487, 491; function of, in apprehending the Abstract, 488, 490;
has a formal aspect (_Intellectus Agens_) and a material (_Patiens_),
489; in what sense immortal, 489; in what sense the _principia_ of
Science belong to, 491; analysis, selection, and concentration of
attention, the real characteristics of, 492; Theoretical, Practical,
493; cogitation and _cogitatum_ are identical in, 627.

Number, analogy of Definition to, 611.

Nutritive soul, functions of, 461; origin of, 480.

O.

Objection (_Enstasis_), 202; response to false, in Dialectic, 366.

Ontology, starts from classification of Entia, 59, 61; Science of Ens
_quatenus_ Ens, how named by Aristotle, 59; opposed as the universal
science to particular sciences, not to Phenomenology, 59; blended
with Logic in the Categories, 62; logical aspect of, as set forth by
Aristotle, 127; of Aristotle's predecessors, 97, 108, 551 seq.; has
Dialectic as a tentative companion, 273; not clearly distinguished
from Logic and Physics by Aristotle, 422; highest of Theoretical
Sciences, subject of, 423, 593; treats of Ens in two senses
specially, 424, 425; also critically examines highest generalities of
Demonstration, 425, 579; Aristotle's advance in, upon Plato, 445,
561; an objective science, 579.

Opinion, opposed to Science, in Plato, 207; in Aristotle, 207, 236,
573; wanting to animals, 475.

_Opposita_, four modes of, 104; included under, rather than
including, _Relativa_, 104; should be called _Opposite-Relativa_,
105.

Opposition, Contradictory and Contrary, 111; squares of, Scholastic
and Aristotelian, 137 n.

Oppositis, Treatise de, by Aristotle, lost, 134.

Organon, The, meaning of, as applied to Aristotle's logical
treatises, 55; what it includes, 56; not so specified by Aristotle,
56; Aristotle's point of view throughout, 578.

_Organa_, or Helps to command of syllogisms in dialectical debate,
278; use of the, 282; relation of the, to the _Loci_, 283.

[Greek: O(/ros], Term, applied both to subject and to Predicate in
Analytica, 141.

[Greek: O(/ti, To/], _see_ Fact.

[Greek: Ou)si/a], 67, _see_ Essence.

P.

Paradeigmatic inference, 198; _see_ Example.

_Paradoxa_, a variety of _Adoxa_, 269.

Paralogisms, Scientific, 267, 380; _see_ Fallacies.

Parmenides, eliminated Non-Ens, 136; uses equivocal names as
univocal, 414; his doctrine of Absolute Ens, 436, 551; not a
dialectician, 551; made intelligence vary with sense, 588.

Paronymous things, 57.

Part, relation of, to Whole, with a view to Definition, 601.

Particular, The, _notius nobis_ compared with the Universal, 196;
inferiority of, to the Universal, 231.

Passion, _Pati_, Category, 65, 73.

Peirastic, given as one of the four species of debate, 377; really a
variety or aspect of Dialectic, 377, 379.

'Peplus,' work of Aristotle's, 32.

Perception, sensible, _see_ Sensation.

Pergamus, kings of, their library, 36.

Peripatetics, origin of the title, 7.

Phæstis, mother of Aristotle, 2; directions for a bust to, in
Aristotle's will, 19.

Phanias, disciple of Aristotle, knew logical works of his now lost,
56; wrote on Logic, 56.

Phantasy, nature of, 475; distinguished from Memory, 475;
indispensable to, and passes by insensible degrees into, Cogitation,
479, 484, 485.

Philip of Macedon, chose Aristotle as tutor to Alexander, 5;
destroyed Stageira, 6.

Philosopher, The, distinguished from the Dialectician, 354, 584; also
from the Sophist, 584.

Philosophy, First, usual name for Science of Ens _quatenus_ Ens, 59,
422, 584; _see_ Ontology.

Phokion, at the head of the Athenian administration under Alexander,
12; ineffectually opposed anti-Macedonian sentiment after Alexander's
death, 12.

Physica, relation of the, to the Metaphysica, 54, 422.

Physics, theoretical science, subject of, 423, 593, 630.

Pindar, subject of his Odes, 13.

Place, in Dialectic, 283; none outside of the Heaven, 636.

Planets, number of the spheres of, 626; do not twinkle, why, 645;
_see_ Stars.

Plato, much absent from Athens, between 367-60 B.C., 4; died, 347
B.C., 4; corresponded with Dionysius, 7; Aristotle charged with
ingratitude to, 20; attacked with Aristotle by Kephisodorus, 24;
ancients nearly unanimous as to the list of his works, 27, 42; his
exposure of equivocal phraseology, 58; fascinated by particular
numbers, 74; on Relativity, 84; his theory of Proposition and
Negation, 135, 427; called for, but did not supply, definitions, 141;
his use of the word Syllogism, 143; relied upon logical Division for
science, 162; opposed Science (Dialectic) to Opinion (Rhetoric), 208,
263; explained learning from Reminiscence, 212; his view of Noûs as
infallible, 260; character of his dialogues, 264; recognized
Didactic, but as absorbed into Dialectic, 264; his use of the word
Sophist, 376; his psychology (in the Timæus), 446-9, 451, 461; first
affirmed Realism, 552; his Ontology and theory of Ideas, 553 seq.,
_see_ Ideas; held Sophistic to be busied about Non-Ens, 593; his
scale of Essences, 595, 620; his assumption of a self-movent as
_principium_, 623; held that the non-generable may be destroyed, 637,
639; on the position of the Earth, 649; in his Protagoras anticipated
Epikurus, 654; admitted an invincible erratic necessity in Nature,
657; ethical purpose of, 662.

'Plato and the other Companions of Sokrates,' subject of the work, 1;
referred to, on subject of the Platonic Canon, 27.

Platonists, their view of Essences as Numbers, 611; _see_ Ideas.

Plotinus, censured Categories of the Stoics, 100, 563; his list of
Categories, 102, 563.

_Plurium Interrogationum ut Unius_, _Fallacia_, 389; how to solve,
413.

Plutarch does not appear to have known the chief Aristotelian works,
31; authority for story of the fate of Aristotle's library, 35.

Poetic, place of, in Aristotle's philosophy, 54; modes of speech
entering into, 111, 130.

[Greek: Poio/n], _see_ Quality.

Political Science, the Supreme Science, 449.

Politics, place of in Aristotle's philosophy, 54; Aristotle's
Treatise on, 539; founded on the Republic of Plato, 539; his
conception of a republic, 539.

Porphyry, disposed works of Plotinus in Enneads, 44; his Eisagoge,
73, 101, 552; rejected last paragraph of De Interpretatione, 134; his
statement of the question as to Universals, 552, 564; defended
Aristotle's Categories against Plotinus, 563.

[Greek: Poso/n], _see_ Quantity.

Possible, The, as a Mode affecting Antiphasis, 127; relation of, to
the Necessary, 127, 205; three meanings of, given by Aristotle, 128;
effective sense of, 129, 133, 205, 617, 638; truly a Formal Mode of
Proposition, 131; gradations in, 205.

Poste, Mr., upon Aristotle's proof that Demonstration implies
indemonstrable truths, 229; on the Theory of Fallacies, 383.

_Posterius_, different senses of, 105; as between parts and whole,
601-603.

Post-prædicamenta, 79, 80, 104.

Postulate, as a principle of Demonstration, 220.

Potentiality (Power) as opposed to Actuality, 128, 456, 615 seq.;
varieties of, 613.

Prædicament, _see_ Categories.

Predicables, four in Aristotle, five in later logicians, 276;
quadruple classification of, how exhaustive, 276; come each under one
or other of the Categories, 277.

Predicate, in a proposition, 109; to be One, 120; called Term in
Analytica, 141.

Predication, essential and non-essential, Aristotle's mode of
distinguishing, 63, 64.

Premisses of Syllogism, 148; how to disengage for Reduction, 164;
involving qualification, 166; false, yielding true conclusion, 172;
contradictory, yielding a conclusion in Second and Third figures, 175;
necessary character of, in Demonstration, 215; in Dialectic, 227.

Principles of Science, furnished only by Experience, 162, 257;
knowable in themselves, but not therefore innate, 178, 256; what,
common to all, 212, 215; maintained by Aristotle to be
indemonstrable, 215, 228; general and special, 236, 578; development
of, 256; known by Noûs upon Induction from particulars, 259, 562,
577; discussed by First Philosopher, and by Dialectician, 575.

_Principii Petitio_, Fallacy of, 156, 176; in Dialectic, 367, 371; in
Sophistic, 388; how to solve, 412.

_Prius_, different senses of, in Post-præedicamenta, 105; in
Metaphysica [Greek: D], 106; Aristotle often confounds the meanings
of, 106; as between parts and whole, 601-603.

_Privatio_ and _Habitus_, case of _Opposita_, 104, 105.

[Greek: Proai/resis], definition of, 526.

Probabilities, Syllogism from, 202.

Probable, The, true meaning of, in Aristotle, 269.

Problematical proposition, The, a truly formal mode, 131.

Problems, for scientific investigation, 238; identical, 253; in
Dialectic, 273.

Prokles, second husband of Aristotle's daughter, 20.

Proof ([Greek: tekmê/rion]) distinguished from Sign, 203.

Propositions, subject of De Interpretatione, 57, 109; Terms treated
by Aristotle with reference to, 59; Ens divided with reference to,
59; defined, 109; distinguished in signification from Terms, 109,
110, also from other modes of significant speech, 111, 130; Simple,
Complex, 111; Affirmative, Negative, 111, 122; Contradictory (pair
of, making Antiphasis), Contrary, 111, 124, 134; Universal, Singular,
111; about matters particular and future, 113; in quaternions
illustrative of real Antiphasis, 118 seq.; subject of, and predicate
of, to be each One, 125; function of copula in, 126; Simple
Assertory, Modal (Possible or Problematical and Necessary), 127 seq.;
subjective and objective aspects of, 131; Aristotle's theory of,
compared with views of Plato and others, 135; summarized, 139; how
named in Analytica, 141; named either as declaring, or as generating,
truth, 141; formally classified according to Quantity in Analytica,
142; Universal, double account of, 142; Conversion of, taken singly,
144; rules for Conversion of Universal Negative, Affirmative, &c.,
144 seq.; comparison of, as subjects of attack and defence, 156;
Indivisible or Immediate, and Mediate--modes of error with regard to,
224 seq.; as subject-matter of Dialectic, 273; classified for
purposes of Dialectic, 276.

Proprium, one of the Predicables, 276; thesis of, hardest, after
Definition, to defend, 285, 353; dialectical _Loci_ bearing on, 313
seq.; ten different modes of, 321.

[Greek: Pro/s ti], _see_ Relation.

Protagoras, his doctrine, "Homo Mensura" impugned by Aristotle as
adverse to the Maxim of Contradiction, 430 seq., 587 seq.; true force
of his doctrine, 431; misapprehended by Aristotle and Plato, 432.

[Greek: Pro/tasis], name for Proposition in Analytica, 141.

Proxenus, of Atarneus, guardian of Aristotle at Stageira, 3;
mentioned in Aristotle's will, 19.

Pseudographeme or Scientific Paralogism, 267; or pseudographic
syllogism, 380.

Psychology, relation of, to Logic, 110; summary of Aristotle's, 493.

Pythagoras, disregarded experience, 436; _see_ Pythagoreans.

Pythagoreans had a two-fold doctrine--exoteric and esoteric, 52;
fascinated by particular numbers, 74; their view of the soul, 449;
went astray in defining from numbers, 603; ascribed perfection and
beauty to results, not to their originating principles, 625; said the
Universe and all things are determined by Three, 630; recognized
Right and Left in the Heaven, 610; erred in calling ours the upper
hemisphere and to the right, 640; affirmed harmony of the spheres,
646; placed Fire, not Earth, at the centre of the Kosmos, 648; made
the Earth and Antichthon revolve each in a circle, 648.

Pythias, wife of Aristotle, 5, 17, 20; daughter of Aristotle, 17-19.

Q.

_Quæsita_, in science, four heads of, 238; order of, 239; the four,
compared, 240.

Quality (_Quale_)**, third Category, treated fourth, 65, 72;
varieties of, 72; admits in some cases, contrariety and graduation,
72; foundation of Similarity and Dissimilarity, 73; illustrated from
_Relata_, 73; First Essence shades through Second into, 91; to
Aristotle a mere predicate, highest of substances to Plato, 503; is
hardly Ens at all, 593.

Quantity (_Quantum_), second. Category, 65; Continual, Discrete, 70;
has no contrary, 70; a mere appendage to Essence, 595, 596.

Quiddity, _see_ Essence.

R.

Realism, first affirmed by Plato, 552, 555; problems of, as set out
by Porphyry, and discussed before and after, 552; scholastic formula
of, 555; objections, urged against, by Plato himself in Sophistes and
Parmenides, 550 seq.; peculiarity in Plato's doctrine of, 557;
impugned by Aristotle, 558 seq.; character of Aristotle's objections
to, 500; counter-theory to, set up by Aristotle, 500, 501; standard
against, raised by Aristotle in his First **Category, 502;
of Plotinus, 563; of J. Scotus Erigena, 564; of Remigius, 564.

Reciprocation, among Terms of Syllogism, 185.

Reduction, in Syllogism, 153; object and process of, 164 seq.

_Reductio ad Impossibile_ or _Absurdum_, used in proving modes of
Second figure, 152; nature of, 155, 160, 168; a case of Reversal of
Conclusion for refutation, 175; abuse of, guarded against by the
argument _Non per Hoc_, 179.

Regularity, principle of, in the Kosmos, _see_ Nature.

_Relata_, defined, 70.

Relation, fourth Category, treated third, 65, 70; admits, in some
cases, contrariety and graduation, 71; too narrowly conceived by
Aristotle, 80; covers all predicates, 82; covers even Essence as
Subject, 83; an Universal comprehending and pervading all the
Categories, rather than a Category itself, 84; understood at the
widest by some of the ancients, 84; comprehensiveness of, conceded by
Aristotle himself, 84, 88.

_Relative-Opposita_, should rather stand _Opposite-Relativa_, 104,
105.

Relativity, or Relation, _see_ Relation; of knowledge, universal (in
the sense of Protagoras), impugned by Aristotle, 430 seq., 589 seq.;
allowed by Aristotle to pervade all mind, 493.

Remigius of Auxerre, went as far as Plato in Realism, 564.

Reminiscence, Plato's doctrine of, 212, 554; Aristotle's Tract on
Memory and, 475; nature of, as distinguished from Memory, 470;
phenomena of, 476.

Resemblances, study of, an organon of debate, 280.

Respiration, organ and function of, 408.

Reversal of Conclusion, 174.

Rhabanus Maurus, followed Aristotle on Universals, 503.

Rhetoric, place of, in Aristotle's philosophy, 54; modes of speech
dealt with in, 111, 131; opposed by Plato to Dialectic, 208, 203;
opposed with Dialectic to Science by Aristotle, 208, 265, 266;
developed before Aristotle, 419.

Rose, Valentine, his view of the catalogue of Diogenes, 32.

S.

Sagacity, in divining Middle Term, 237.

Sameness, three senses of, 277, 349.

Scholarchs, Peripatetic, their limited knowledge of Aristotle before
Andronikus, 30, 38.

Science, _see_ Knowledge.

Sciences, some prior and more accurate than others, 210, 234, 578;
classified as Theoretical, Practical, Constructive, 423, 593;
Theoretical subdivided, 423, 593.

Seneca, authority for Stoical creed, 654; a Stoic engaged in active
politics, 662.

Sensation, knowledge begins from the natural process of, 256, 483,
492; consciousness of, explained, 473.

Senses, the five, 465 seq.; cannot be more than five, 472.

Sentient soul, involves functions of the Nutritive with sensible
perception besides, 461; distinguishes animals from plants, 462;
receives the form of the _perceptum_ without the matter, as wax an
impression from the signet; 462; communicated by male in generation,
and is complete from birth, 463: differs from the Noëtic, in
communing with particulars and being dependent on stimulus from
without, 463 seq., 486; grades of, 463; has a faculty of
discrimination and comparison, 464, 483; heart, the organ of, 464;
cannot perceive two distinct sensations at once, 473; at the lowest,
subject to pleasure and pain, appetite and aversion, 473; Phantasy
belongs to the, 475; Memory belongs to the, 475.

Sepulveda, his use of "exoteric," 45.

Signs, Syllogism from, 202; distinguished from Proof ([Greek:
tekmê/rion]), 203; in Physiognomy, 204.

Simplikius, defended Aristotle's Categories, 563.

_Simul_, meaning of, 105; as between parts and whole, 602.

Skêpsis, Aristotle's books and manuscripts long kept buried there,
36.

Smell, operated through a medium, 467; stands below sight and
hearing, 468; action of, 469; organ of, 470.

Sokrates, reference to his fate by Aristotle, 16; his exposure of
equivocal phraseology, 58; called for, but did not supply,
definitions, 141; his conception and practice of Dialectic, to the
neglect of Didactic, 263; Elenchus of, 263, 437, 441; did nothing but
question, 418; Greek philosophy before, 426; first broke ground for
Logic, 426; his part in the development of Greek Philosophy, 436
seq.; peculiarities of, according to Aristotle, 437; first inquired
into the meaning of universal terms, 551, 552.

Sokrates, the younger, false analogy of, in defining animal, 604.

Solecism, sophistic charge of, 385; how to repel, 413.

Sophist, the, as understood by Aristotle, 376, 377, 381; as
understood by Plato, 376; five ends ascribed to, 384; not really
distinguished by Aristotle from the Dialectician, 382, 393 seq.

Sophistes of Plato, theory of Proposition in, 135.

Sophistic, busied about accidents, 98, 593; as understood by
Aristotle, 376, 382; given as one of four species of debate, 377;
Aristotle's conception of, both as to purpose and subject matter,
disallowed, 382, 393 seq.; _Loci_ bearing on, 408; debate,
difficulties in, 416; borders on Dialectic, 417.

Sophistici Elenchi, last book of Topica, 56, 262; subject of, 376;
last chapter of, 417 seq.

Sorites, what was afterwards so called, 156.

Soul, according to Plato, 446, 449, 451, 461; Alkmæon, 449;
Herakleitus, 449; Diogenes of Apollonia, 449; Anaxagoras, 449;
Empedokles, 449; Pythagoreans, 450; Xenokrates, criticized by
Aristotle, 450; theory of Empedokles criticized, 451; theory of, as
pervading the whole Kosmos, 451; all the foregoing theories of,
rejected by Aristotle, 452; requisites of a good theory of, 452;
Aristotle's point of view with regard to, 453; the problem of, stated
to cover all forms of Life, 453; resolved by metaphysical distinction
of Form and Matter, 454-7; defined accordingly, 458; not a separate
entity in itself, 458; not really, but only logically, separable from
body, 458; thoroughgoing implication of, with Matter, 459, 478; is
Form, Movent, and Final Cause, of the body as Matter, 460, 480; makes
with body the Living or Animated Body, 460, 480; varieties of, in an
ascending scale, 460, 481; the lowest or Nutritive, 461; the Sentient
(also nutritive), 462-74, _see_ Sentient; higher functions of,
conditioned by lower, 474; Phantastic department of, 474; the Noëtic
or Cogitant, 478, _see_ Noûs, Noëtic; all varieties of, proceed from
the region of Form or the Celestial Body, 480; Noûs of the, 487; not
immortal, even the Noëtic, in the individual, 489; is, in a certain
way, all existent things, 493; two parts of, the rational and the
irrational, 521.

Sound, cause of, 467.

Species, is Second Essence, 63, 68; one of the Predicables in
Porphyry's, not in Aristotle's, list, 276; logically posterior to
Genus and to Differentiæ, 607.

Speech, significant by convention only, 109, 111; Enunciative, and
other modes of, 111.

Speusippus, succeeded Plato in the Academy, 7, 21; books of, at his
death, bought by Aristotle, 35; held it impossible to define anything
without knowing everything, 249; his enumeration of Essences, 595,
629; ascribed beauty and perfection to results, not to their
originating principles, 625.

Spinoza, his definition of Substance contrasted with Aristotle's, 93.

Spontaneity, source of irregularity in the Kosmos, 115, 205; affects
the rule of Antiphasis, 115; objective correlate to the Problematical
Proposition, 133, 205; Generations and Constructions from, 598, 620.

Stageira, birthplace of Aristotle, 2; destroyed by Philip, restored
by Aristotle, 6.

Stars, in their nature eternal Essences, 626; whence the heat and
light of, 644; themselves at rest, are carried round in their
circles, 644; spherical in figure, 645, 646; (not planets) twinkle,
why, 645; rates of motion of (planets), as determined by their
position, 646; irregular sequence of (planets), in respect of
complexity of motions, 646; partakers of life and action, 647; why so
many, in the one single First Current, 648.

Stilpon, merely disputed on Proposition, 136.

Stoics, Categories of the, 100, 563; their doctrine copiously
reported, 654; points in which they agreed with the Epikureans, 655,
663; fatalism of, 657; held Self-preservation to be the first
principle of Nature, 660; inculcated as primary _officium_, to keep
in the State of Nature, 660; their idea of the Good, 660; their
distinction of things in our power, and not in our power, 661; held
the will to be always determined by motives, 661; their view of a
free mind, 661; allowed an interposing Providence, 661; ethical
purpose of,662; urged to active life, 662; subordinated beneficence,
put justice highest, 662, 663; their respect for individual
conviction, 663.

Strabo, authority for story of the fate of
Aristotle's library, 35, 38.

Subject, to be _predicated of_ a, distinguished from to be _in_ a,
59, 62, 64; which is never employed as predicate, 63, 68, 157; which
may also be predicate, 63, 157; called Term in Analytica, 141.

Substance, _see_ Essence.

Substratum, 67, 595; _see_ Essence.

Sun, ever at work, 617; whence the heat and light of, 644; why seen
to move at rising and setting, 644; motions of, 646.

Sylla, carried library of Apellikon to Rome, 37.

Syllogism, principle of, indicated in Categoriæ, 65; theory of,
claimed by Aristotle as his own work, 140, 153; defined, 143, 426;
Perfect and Imperfect, 143; meaning of, in Plato, specialized in
Aristotle, 143; conditions of valid, 148, 155; Premisses, Terms,
Figures, &c., of, 148 seq.; Reduction of, 153; mediaeval abuse of,
153; Direct or Ostensive, and Indirect, 155; has two (even number of)
propositions, and three (odd number of) terms, 156; how to construct
a, 157; method of, superior to logical Division, 162; from an
Hypothesis, 168; plurality of conclusions from, 171; inversion of,
173; conversion of, 174; liabilities to error in the use of, 176;
cases of Reciprocation among terms of, 185; antithesis among terms
of, 185 seq.; canons of, common to Demonstration, Dialectic,
Rhetoric, 186, 210, 265; the, from Induction, 187; prior and more
effective as to cognition, than Induction, 191; the, from Example,
191; relation of, to Induction, 192 seq.; varieties of Abduction,
Objection, Enthymeme, &c., 202 seq.; Modal, 204; theory of,
applicable both to Demonstration and Dialectic, 207, 265; the
Demonstrative or Scientific, 215, 219, 265; of [Greek: o(/ti], and of
[Greek: dio/ti], 223; the unit in, 231; scope and matter of the
Dialectical, 265, 267; the Eristic, 268, 380; the Elenchus, or
Refutative, 376; the Pseudographic, 380; inquiry into Axioms of,
falls to First Philosophy, 426.

Synonymous things, 57.

T.

Taste, operates through contact, 469; a variety of Touch, 471; organ
of, 471.

Tautology, sophistic charge of, 385; how to repel, 413.

Temperance, definition of, 531.

[Greek: Tekmê/rion] (Proof), distinguished from Sign, 203.

Terms, as such, subject of Categoriæ, 57; things denoted by,
distinguished as Homonymous (Equivocal), Synonymous (Univocal),
Paronymous--importance of the distinction, 57; viewed by Aristotle,
as constituents of a Proposition, 59; distinguished from Proposition
in signification, 109, 110; the word, used instead of Noun and Verb
in Analytica, 141; Major, Middle, and Minor, in Syllogism, 148; in
Syllogism, are often masked, 165; reciprocation of, in Syllogism,
185; equivocation of, to be attended to in Dialectic, 278.

Thales, character of his philosophy, 435; supposed the Earth to float
at rest on water, 649.

Themison, correspondent of Aristotle, 7.

Themistius, speaks of an "army of assailants" of Aristotle, 26; on
the order of the _Quæsita_ in science, 238.

Theodoras, developed Rhetoric, 419.

Theology, alternative name for First Philosophy or Ontology, 59, 423.

Theophrastus, left in charge of Aristotle's school and library, 15,
35; directions to, in Aristotle's will, 17, 18; bought as well as
composed books, 35; disposition of his library, 35, 42; wrote on
Logic, 56; distinguished Affirmation [Greek: e)k metathe/seôs], 122,
169; followed Aristotle in treating of Modals, 144; assumed
convertibility of Universal Negative, 146.

Theses, how to find arguments for, 157; art of impugning and
defending, 180; in Dialectic, how open to be impugned, 284; chiefly
Universal Affirmative, 281; comparison of, as subjects of attack and
defence, 285, 352, 300.

Thrasyllus, canon of, 27, 41; tetralogies of, 44.

Thrasymachus, developed Rhetoric, 419.

Thomas Aquinas, his use of "exoteric," 45.

[Greek: Ti/ ê)=n ei)=nai, To/], _see_ Essence (Quiddity).

Timæus, Platonic, summary of the psychological doctrine in the,
446-9.

Timarchus, friend of Aristotle, 17.

Time, none, outside of the Heaven, 277.

Tisias, first writer on Rhetoric, 419.

Topica, referred to in Analytica, 56; presupposes contents of
Categoriæ and De Interpretatione, 56; part of one scheme with
Analytica, 142; design of, specially claimed by Aristotle as
original, 262; subject of, 262, 265; First Book of, preliminary to
the _Loci_, 283; distribution of, 284.

Torstrick, his view of "exoteric discourse," 49.

Touch, most wisely diffused sense, 464; operated through contact,
468; _i.e._, apparently, 472; most developed in man, 471; an
aggregate of several senses, 471; organ of, 471.

Trans-Olfacient, action of the, in Smell, 467.

Trans-Sonant, action of the, in Hearing, 467.

Trendelenburg, brings the Categories into relation with parts of
speech, 99.

Truth, Ens in the sense of, 60, &c., _see_ Ens; a mental conjunction
or disjunction of terms in conformity with fact, 60, 111, 591, 594,
618; embodied in the Proposition or Enunciative Speech, 109, 130.

Tyrannion studied Aristotle's MSS. At Rome, 37-39, 43.

U.

Universal, The, knowledge of, with error as to particulars, 183;
knowledge of, better than of the Particular, 231; not perceivable by
sense, 235; but cf. 258; reveals the Cause, 235; generated by a
process of Induction from particulars, 260; controversy about, began
with Sokrates and Plato, 551; questions as to, set out by Porphyry,
552; Plato's statements as to, collected, 553 seq.; scholastic
formulae of the different theories of, 555; Aristotle's objection to
Plato's Realistic theory of, 558 seq.; Aristotle's counter-theory as
to, 560; is to Aristotle a predicate in or along with the Particular,
561, 605; later history of the question of, till launched in the
schools of the Middle Age, 562-4; given as one of the varieties of
Essence, 595; arguments against its being Essence, 605.

_Universalia Prima_, as premisses in Demonstrative Science, 216.

Universe, extends every way, 630.

Univocal terms, 57.

V.

Vacuum, exists potentially only, 615; none, outside of the Heaven,
636.

Verb, function of the, 109, 110, 130; the indefinite, 118, 124.

Virtue, Aristotle's definition of, examined, 521 seq.; intellectual
and ethical, 521; is a medium between two extremes. 524.

Vision, most perfect sense, 465; colours, the object of, 465;
effected through media having diaphanous agency, 466.

Voice, The, 468.

Voluntary and Involuntary actions, 525.

W.

Waitz, prints Sophistici Elenchi as last Book of Topica, 56.

When, _Quando_, Category, 65, 73.

Where, _Ubi_, Category, 65, 73.

Words, subjective and objective aspects of, 109.

Works of Aristotle, dates of, uncertain, 54; in what order to be
studied, 55; cross-references in the logical, 56.

Wyttenbach, started doubts as to Platonic Canon, 27.

X.

Xenokrates, fellow-pupil of Aristotle, accompanied him to Atarneus,
4; head of the Academy, 7; attached to Athenian democracy, 10;
character of, 25; his view of the soul, 450.

Xenophanes, improved on by Parmenides, 551; his reason for the
stationariness of the Earth, 649.

Z.

Zeller, his view of "exoteric discourse," 49.

Zeno, the Eleatic, argument of, against Motion, paradoxical, 365;
uses equivocal names as univocal, 414; defended the Parmenidean
theory dialectically, 551.

Zeno, the Stoic, a foreigner at Athens, without a sphere of political
action, 662.

Zoological Treatises, place of the, among the other works of
Aristotle, 54.




LONDON:

PRINTED BY WILLIAM CLOWES AND SONS,

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*************************************
Transcriber's Note

There are several references in this text to Grote's previous book on
Plato, 'Plato and the Other companions of Sokrates'. The 4-volume
version of this book is available in Project Gutenberg:
Vol. 1 - http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/40435
Vol. 2 - http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/40436
Vol. 3 - http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/40437
Vol. 4 - http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/40438.

Unfortunately references in this text are to the 3-volume edition, so
page numbers differ and in almost all cases chapter numbers are 2 less
than in the 4-volume version--as the advertisement says "In the present
Edition, with a view to the distribution into four volumes, there is a
slight transposition of the author's arrangement. His concluding
chapters (XXXVIII., XXXIX.), entitled "Other Companions of Sokrates,"
and "Xenophon," are placed in the First Volume, as chapters III. and IV."

The text is based on versions made available by the Internet Archive.

For the Greek transcriptions the following conventions have been used:
) is for smooth breathing; ( for hard; + for diaeresis; / for acute
accent; \ for grave; = for circumflex; | for iota subscript.
ch is used for chi, ph for phi, ps for psi, th for theta;
ê for eta and ô for omega; u is used for upsilon in all cases.

Corrections to the text, indicated in text with **:

Location             Text of scan of 2nd edition   Correction
Preface, after fn. 4 dialetical                    dialectical
Ch. 1 fn 5           ad.                           ad
Ch. 1 fn 10          mge/an                        me/gan
Ch. 1 fn 46          a)lla)                        a)lla\
Ch. 1 fn 61          Quintillian                   Quintilian
Ch. 2 fn 15          Art                           Ar.
Ch. 2 before fn. 22  Theopharstus                  Theophrastus
Ch. 2 fn 40          a)utô=n                       au)tôn
Ch. 2 fn 40          dia lektikô=s                 dialektikô=s
Ch. 2 fn 40          tô=n.                         tô=n
Ch. 2 fn 41          la\r                          ga\r
Ch. 3 after fn 49    e(te/rô/n                     e(te/rôn
Ch. 3 fn 54          e)pistê\mê                    e)pistê/mê
Ch. 3 fn 101         tê=n                          tê\n
Ch. 3 before fn 111  Subiect                       Subject
Ch. 3 fn 112         ou                            où
Ch. 3 fn 112         déja                          déjà
Ch. 3 fn 112         Voila dont                    Voilà donc
Ch. 3 fn 121         ad.                           ad
Ch. 3 fn 131         le/nos                        ge/nos
Ch. 3 fn 131         Stoic                         Stoics
Ch. 3 fn 132         deu/te/ron                    deu/teron
Ch. 3 fn 132         .                             ,
Ch. 3 fn 142         a)ntikei/me/na                a)ntikei/mena
Ch. 3 fn 142         o(\then                       o(/then
Ch. 3 after fn 146   if                            of
Ch. 4 fn 9           Scholian                      Scholion
Ch. 4 after fn 25    justis                        justus
Ch. 4 fn 28          .                             ,
Ch. 4 before fn 38   Nons-Ens                      Non-Ens
Ch. 4 fn 48          lxii-lxviii.                  lxii.-lxviii.
Ch. 4 fn 52          no superscript
Ch. 5 fn 37          ad.                           ad
Ch. 5 fn 60          completély                    completely
Ch. 5 fn 63-65       ;                             :
Ch. 5 before fn 81   faciliate                     facilitate
Ch. 6 before fn 4    the the                       the
Ch. 6 fn 14, 24      no superscript
Ch. 6 after fn 39    suscessively 	           successively
Ch. 6 fn 42          ad.                           ad
Ch. 6 fn 55          xxxiii. 	                   xxiii.
Ch. 6 fn 55          Sir.                          Sir
Ch. 6 fn 58                                        .
Ch. 6 fn 59 	     Lokik 	                   Logik
Ch. 6 fn 60          e)pogôlê=s                    e)pagôgê=s
Ch. 6 fn 60          e)/st                         e)/sti
Ch. 6 fn 61          .                             ,
Ch. 6 fn 65          Sir.                          Sir
Ch. 6 fn 67 (twice)  ,                             .
Ch. 6 fn 67          :                             ;
Ch. 6 fn 71          seq                           seq.
Ch. 6 fn 74          Induction                     "Induction
Ch. 7 fn 13          maximum                       maxim
Ch. 7 fn 19          tro\pon                       tro/pon
Ch. 7 fn 35          .                             ,
Ch. 7 fn 39          .                             ,
Ch. 7 before fn 71   dialetical                    dialectical
Ch. 7 fn 75          .                             ,
ch. 7 fn 80          .                             ,
Ch. 8 fn 2           Schl.                         Schol.
Ch. 8 fn 2           attibute                      attribute
Ch. 8 fn 12          jusqu' à                      jusqu'à
Ch. 8 fn 18          ou)de                         ou)de\
Ch. 8 fn 34          a                             a.
Ch. 8 fn 49          lanthanousi                   lantha/nousi
Ch. 8 fn 52          .                             ,
Ch. 8 fn 56          .                             ,
Ch. 8 fn 62          de                            de\
Ch. 8 fn 70          primilibri                    primi libri
Ch. 9 fn 27          plei/on'                      plei/on
Ch. 9 fn 39          vii..                         viii.
Ch. 9 before fn 44   analgous                      analogous
Ch. 9 fn 71          to                            to\
Ch. 9 before fn 113  usuage                        usage
Ch. 9 before fn 158  is respecting                 is) respecting
Ch. 9 before fn 161  more more                     more
Ch. 9 fn 210         la\r                          ga\r
Ch. 9 fn 211         la\r                          ga\r
Ch. 9 fn 211         dto\                          to\
Ch. 9 fn 229         ei)rêmenon                    ei)rême/non
Ch. 9 before fn 283  impunging                     impugning
Ch. 9 before fn 298  defininition                  definition
Ch. 9 fn 367         poi=oume/nois                 poioume/nois
Ch. 9 fn 367         diê\rthrôtai/                 diê/rthrôtai/
Ch. 9 fn 408         sugkrisin                     su/gkrisin
Ch. 9 before fn 436  revelant                      relevant
Ch. 9 before fn 444  you you                       you
Ch. 9 fn 464         gar                           ga\r
Ch. 9 fn 464         proteinomenôn                 proteinome/nôn
Ch. 10 before fn 9   predominence                  predominance
Ch. 10 fn 85         Topic,                        Topica,
Ch. 10 fn 98         xxii.                         xvii.
Ch. 10 fn 98         Firman                        Firmin
Ch. 10 fn 112        b. 17;                        b. 17);
Ch. 10 fn 112        a. 10,.                       a. 10).
Ch. 10 before fn 129 philosphers                   philosophers
Ch. 10 before fn 138 tell                          tells
Ch. 11 after fn 9    confides                      confines
Ch. 11 after fn 28   that                          that,
Ch. 12 after fn 5    sperical                      spherical
Ch. 12 after fn 27   most most                     most
Ch. 12 fn 36         ad.                           ad
Ch. 12 fn 69         .                             ,
Ch. 12 before fn 75  accept                        except
Ch. 12 fn 129        and                           ad
Ch. 12 fn 139        tên                           tê\n
Ch. 12 after fn 144  thoraic                       thoracic
Ch. 12 fn 156        88                            18
Ch. 13               endæmonise                    eudæmonise
Ch. 13               perforance                    performance
Ch. 13 (5 times)     ii.                           iii.
Ch. 14               commonweath                   commonwealth
Ch. 14               indulgencies                  indulgences
App. I               preceptions                   perceptions
App. I fn 8          370-395                       320-395
App. II fn 6         ê|                            ê(=|
App. III             ).                            .).
App. III             .)                            ).
App. III             ).                            .)
App. III             .                             .)
App. III             According                     (According
App. III             ).                            .)
App. III             ).                            .).
App. III             tni/as                        e)ni/as
App. III             parts                         parts parts
App. III             du/na/mis                     du/namis
App. III             duna/neis                     duna/meis
App. III             .)                            .).
App. III             2-025                         20-25
App. III             ).                            .).
App. III             ga\r                          ga/r
App. IV              [stop omitted]                .
App. IV              from from                     from
App. Iv              contrifugal                   centrifugal
App. IV              their                         there
App. IV              a)ei=                         a)ei\
App. IV              ;                             :
App. IV              them-themselves               themselves
App. IV              ).                            .)
App. V               the fears of those gods       those fears of
                                                   the gods
App. VI              medita-tations                meditations
Index                Metaph                        Metaph.
Index                Platonist                     Platonists
Index                as as                         as
Index                the the                       the
Index                inteltellect                  intellect
Index                )                             ),
Index                Categorie                     Category