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THE LAST BOER WAR


"I am told that these men (the Boers) are told to keep on agitating in
this way, for a change of Government in England may give them again the
old order of things. Nothing can show greater ignorance of English
politics than such an idea. I tell you there is no Government--Whig or
Tory, Liberal, Conservative, or Radical--who would dare, under any
circumstances, to give back this country (the Transvaal). They would
not dare, because the English people would not allow them."--(_Extract
from Speech of Sir Garnet Wolseley, delivered at a Public Banquet in
Pretoria, on the 17th December 1879._)


"There was a still stronger reason than that for not receding (from the
Transvaal); it was impossible to say what calamities such a step as
receding might not cause.... For such a risk he could not make himself
responsible.... Difficulties with the Zulu and the frontier tribes
would again arise, and looking as they must to South Africa as a whole,
the Government, after a careful consideration of the question, came to
the conclusion that we could not relinquish the Transvaal."--(_Extract
from Speech of Lord Kimberley in the House of Lords, 24th May 1880.
H.P.D., vol. cclii., p. 208._)


"Our judgment is that the Queen cannot be advised to relinquish the
Transvaal."--(_Extract from Reply of Mr. Gladstone to Boer Memorial,
8th June 1880._)




THE LAST BOER WAR


BY

H. RIDER HAGGARD


_THIRTY-FIFTH THOUSAND_


LONDON
KEGAN PAUL, TRENCH, TRÜBNER & CO. LTD.
PATERNOSTER HOUSE, CHARING CROSS ROAD

1900




WORKS BY H. RIDER HAGGARD.


    CETYWAYO AND HIS WHITE NEIGHBOURS.
    DAWN.
    KING SOLOMON'S MINES.
    THE WITCH'S HEAD.
    SHE.
    ALLAN QUATERMAIN.
    JESS.
    COLONEL QUARITCH, V.C.
    MAIWA'S REVENGE.
    MR. MEESON'S WILL.
    ALLAN'S WIFE.
    CLEOPATRA.
    BEATRICE.
    ERIC BRIGHTEYES.
    NADA THE LILY.
    MONTEZUMA'S DAUGHTER.
    THE PEOPLE OF THE MIST.
    JOAN HASTE.
    HEART OF THE WORLD.
    DOCTOR THERNE.
    SWALLOW.
    A FARMER'S YEAR.

    _IN COLLABORATION WITH ANDREW LANG._

    THE WORLD'S DESIRE.


    _The rights of translation and of reproduction are reserved._




AUTHOR'S NOTE.


It has been suggested that at this juncture some students of South
African history might be glad to read an account of the Boer Rebellion
of 1881, its causes and results. Accordingly, in the following pages
are reprinted portions of a book which I wrote so long ago as 1882. It
may be objected that such matter must be stale, but I venture to urge,
on the contrary, that to this very fact it owes whatever value it may
possess. This history was written at the time by one who took an active
part in the sad and stirring events which it records, immediately after
the issue of those events had driven him home to England. Of the
original handful of individuals who were concerned in the annexation of
the Transvaal by Sir Theophilus Shepstone in 1877, of whom I was one,
not many now survive. When they have gone, any further accurate report
made from an intimate personal knowledge of the incidents attendant on
that act will be an impossibility; indeed it is already impossible,
since after the lapse of twenty years men can scarcely trust to their
memories for the details of intricate political occurrences, even
should they be prompted to attempt their record. It is for this reason,
when the melancholy results which its pages foretell have overtaken us,
that I venture to lay them again before the public, so that any who are
interested in the matter may read and find in the tale of 1881 the true
causes of the war of 1899.

I have written "which its pages foretell." Here are one or two passages
taken from them almost at hazard that may be thought to justify the
words:

"It seems to me, however, to be a question worthy of the consideration
of those who at present direct the destinies of the Empire, whether it
would not be wise, as they have gone so far, to go a little farther,
and favour a scheme for the total abandonment of South Africa,
retaining only Table Bay. If they do not, it is now quite within the
bounds of possibility that they may one day have _to face a fresh
Transvaal rebellion, only on a ten times larger scale_, and might
find it difficult to retain even Table Bay."

And again: "The curtain, so far as this country is concerned, is down
for the moment on the South African stage; when it rises again, there
is but too much reason to fear that it will reveal a state of confusion
which, unless it is more wisely and consistently dealt with in the
future than it has been in the past, may develop into chaos."

One more quotation. In speaking of the various problems of South
Africa, I find that I said that "unless they are treated with more
honest intelligence, and on a more settled plan than it has hitherto
been thought necessary to apply to them, the British taxpayer will find
that he has by no means heard the last of that country and its wars."

Perhaps in a year from the present date the British taxpayer will be in
a position to admit the value of this prophecy.

Nearly two decades have gone by since these words were written. Put
very briefly, what has happened in that time? In 1884, at the request
of the Transvaal Government, the Ministry, of which the late Lord Derby
was a member, consented to modify the Convention of 1881, and to
substitute in its place what is known as the London Convention. This
new agreement amended the terms of the former document in certain
particulars. Notably all mention of the suzerainty of the Queen was
omitted, from which circumstance the Boers and their impassioned
advocates have argued that it was abrogated. There is nothing to show
that this contention is correct. Mere silence does not destroy so
important a stipulation, and it appears to be doubtful whether even a
Lord Derby would have been prepared to nullify the imperial rights of
his sovereign and his country in this negative and novel fashion. It is
more probable to suppose that had such action been decided on, effect
would have been given to it in direct and unmistakable language. But
even if it could be proved that this view of the case is wrong, the
general issue would scarcely be affected.

That issue, as I understand it, is as follows: The Convention of 1881
guaranteed to all inhabitants of the Transvaal equal rights--"Complete
self-government subject to the suzerainty of her Majesty, her heirs and
successors, will be accorded to the _inhabitants of the Transvaal
territory_"--Mr. Kruger explaining verbally at a meeting of the
conference, that the only difference would be that in the case of young
persons who became resident in the Transvaal, there might be some
slight delay in granting full burgher privileges, limited, it would
appear, to one year's residence.[1] After that time, then, according to
the terms of this solemn agreement, which in these particulars were not
modified or even touched, by the supplementary and amending paper of
1884, any one who wished to claim the advantages of Transvaal
citizenship might do so.

          [1] In 1881, when the Convention was being discussed,
          President Kruger was asked by our representative what
          treatment would be given to British subjects in the
          Transvaal. He said, "All strangers have now, and will always
          have, equal rights and privileges to the Burghers of the
          Transvaal."--_Quotation from Speech of_ MR. J. CHAMBERLAIN,
          _June 26, 1899_.

Some years later an event occurred fated profoundly to influence the
destinies of South Africa, namely, the discovery of the Witwatersrand
gold deposits, perhaps the richest and the most permanent in the whole
world. Instantly adventurers, most of them of Anglo-Saxon origin,
flocked in thousands to the place where countless wealth lay buried in
the earth, and on the plains over which I have seen the wild game
wandering, sprang up the city of Johannesburg with its motley and
cosmopolitan population, its speculators, company promoters, traders,
miners, and labouring men.

To the Transvaal, at any rate in the beginning, the arrival of these
wealth-engendering hordes was what the fall of copious rain is to the
sun-parched veld. By this time the country was once more almost
bankrupt, but now, as though by the waving of a magician's wand, money
began to flow into its coffers. One of the characteristics of the Boer
is his hatred of taxation; one of his notions of terrestrial bliss is
to live in a land where the necessary expenses of administration are
paid by somebody else, an advantage, I understand, that among all the
civilised nations of the earth is enjoyed alone by the inhabitants of
the Principality of Monaco. It is not usual, either in the instance of
communities or individuals, that such ideals should be absolutely
attained. Yet to the fortunate possessors of the South African Republic
this happened. For quite a long period they lived at ease in their
dorps and on their farms, while the dwellers at Johannesburg, delving
like gnomes in the reefs of the Rand, provided them with magnificent
and never-failing supplies of cash. Then questions began to arise, as
they will do in this imperfect sphere. The Uitlanders, as the strangers
were called, remembering the terms of the Conventions, drawn under a
very different condition of affairs but still binding, hinted at a wish
for burgher rights.

The Boers, who if they liked their money objected to the money-makers,
instantly took alarm. If the vote were given to the Uitlanders it was
obvious that very soon they would outnumber the original electors. Then
in a natural, but to them terrifying, sequence would come a
redistribution of the burdens of taxation, the abolition of monopolies,
the punishment of corruption, the just treatment of the native races,
the absolute purity of the courts, and all the other things and
institutions, in their eyes abominable, which mark the advent of
Anglo-Saxon rule. Behind these also loomed another danger, that of the
ultimate reappearance of the English flag. So legislation was resorted
to, and bit by bit the Uitlanders were stripped of the rights inherent
to their position as "inhabitants of the Transvaal territory," till at
last none were left to them at all. Indeed Press laws were passed and
other enactments controlling the privilege of free speech and public
meetings. Of course had the British Government put down its foot firmly
and at once at the first symptom of a desire on the part of the Boers
to whittle away such advantages as the Conventions secured to our
fellow-subjects, the present sad situation need never have arisen. But
British Governments are seldom fond of doing things at the right time,
more especially if the issue is not sufficiently distinct to be
appreciated by the masses of the electorate. Therefore matters were
allowed to drift, and they drifted into that outrageous fiasco, the
Jameson Raid of 1895.

Into the history of that event I do not propose to enter; it is
sufficiently well known. Suffice it to say in this brief summary, that
it was the result of a compact under which Dr. Jameson was to come to
Johannesburg with a large armed force of Rhodesian police, with the
view of assisting the Uitlanders to obtain by arms what was denied to
their petitions.

The agreement is undoubted and admitted, but all the rest is chaos.
Failure in a hundred shapes dogged the steps of these ineffective
conspirators. Dr. Jameson, with 500 men instead of 1200, took the bit
between his teeth and started at the wrong time. The Uitlanders did not
sally forth to meet him, the wires were not cut, the railway line was
not destroyed, the Boers were warned, and assembled in great numbers.
Dr. Jameson, who apparently lost his way on the veld, was entrapped
into a bad position, where, after a space of somewhat feeble combat, he
and his whole force surrendered, their lives being guaranteed to them.
The despatch-box of the raiders, with the ciphers and sundry
incriminating documents, was allowed to fall into the hands of the
enemy, and, on their own ammunition-waggons, the personnel of the Raid
performed the journey to that city of Pretoria, which when reinforced
by the Uitlanders they were to have entered in triumph. Thence they
were in due course despatched to London for trial. The members of the
Reform Committee were also seized and tried at Pretoria, several of
them being condemned to death, a sentence which was not executed; the
whole story, coming to its end to an accompaniment of the clash not of
swords, but of gold; the fines inflicted upon the conspirators by the
Transvaal Government amounting to a total of many tens of thousands of
pounds.

Such, except for mutual recriminations which still continue, was the
end of Johannesburg's armed attempt to throw off the yoke of the Boer,
and of the efforts of the ruling powers of Rhodesia to assist them in
the task. Of course the upshot was that the poor Uitlanders fell into a
still deeper pit of oppression and despair. Lord Rosmead, then Sir
Hercules Robinson, never a proconsul remarkable for an iron will, it is
true visited the Transvaal in a great flurry, and assured, or caused
Sir Sidney Shippard and the British agent, a gentleman of the somewhat
alien-sounding name of Sir Jacobus de Wet, in substance to assure the
Uitlanders that if only they would disarm probably their wrongs must
shortly be righted by a beneficent Boer president, assisted to the task
by a Raad full of forgiveness and charity. Moreover, Sir Jacobus de Wet
told them explicitly that the lives of Jameson and his men depended
upon their laying down such weapons as they possessed, although of
course those lives were already guaranteed by the terms of the
surrender.

But this raid had wider issues of an imperial nature. Thus it provoked
the famous telegram from the Emperor William II., which at one time
threatened to bring about a war between Great Britain and Germany.
Also, so far as these South African troubles were concerned, it put our
country hopelessly in the wrong in the eyes of the civilised world,
whom it proved difficult to persuade, although in fact this was the
case, that such strange and tortuous developments of political and
martial activity were purely local in their origin. Again it armed the
Boer with a sword of wondrous power. If Providence had sent all the
German legions to his aid it could scarcely have served him better. Now
indeed he was able to point to his land violated by the foot of the
invader, and to talk of raids as though such a wicked word had never
defiled the innocence of his ears; as though in truth he had never
heard of the plains of Stellaland, and of a certain expedition sent by
the British Government under the command of Sir Charles Warren to
preserve those territories to the peaceful enjoyment of their owners;
nor of that stretch of country which once belonged to the Zulus, but is
now called the New Republic; nor of the trek into Rhodesia that was
"damped"; nor of the extension of authority over Swaziland in defiance
of the provisions of the Convention, and of other kindred matters.

Also it enabled him to claim "moral and intellectual damages" to a
considerable amount, although, so far as the public is aware, these
have never been satisfied, and indeed caused Pharaoh to harden his
heart, and while demanding from the new Israelites of Johannesburg an
even heavier tale of bricks in the shape of direct and indirect
taxation, to deprive them one by one of their last straws of freedom.

Thus things fell back into their former courses, the old abuses
flourished like bay trees, the lucky holders of dynamite and other
monopolies grew fabulously rich, and--so powerful is the love of
gold--_auri sacra fames_--so much more do men value it than
freedom and pure government--the population of Johannesburg still
increased.

More than two years have gone by since Sir Alfred Milner was sent as
High Commissioner to South Africa, during all which time, backed by her
Majesty's present Government, he has been doing his best to secure
redress for the Uitlanders, and to arrange various differences that
have arisen between the Empire and the Transvaal Republic. At length
these efforts resulted in the meeting between himself and President
Kruger, known as the Bloemfontein Conference, which took place about
four months ago. At that Conference Sir Alfred Milner advanced the
request, modest enough seeing that they are entitled to nothing less
than equal rights with the other "inhabitants of the Transvaal," that
those Uitlanders who wished to adopt the country as their home should
be entitled to the franchise after five years' residence. This was
refused by President Kruger as endangering the independence of the
State, and the Conference broke up. It was from this time forward that
war came to be looked upon as probable. In reply to various despatches
and representations of the Imperial Government, the President and
Volksraad made certain offers of a franchise which, if they were ever
seriously meant, were hampered with provisos, such as rendered them
impossible for this country to accept. Thus the five years' offer of
August 19 was coupled with the conditions that in the future there
should be no interference in the internal affairs of the Republic, that
her Majesty's Government would not further insist on the assertion of
the suzerainty, and that the principle of arbitration in the event of
future differences arising should be admitted.

Had the Government agreed to these terms it would have meant, of
course, that the last shadow of the Queen's authority would have
vanished from the Transvaal, and as they had bound themselves not to
interfere in future, that they might be forced to look on while the
franchise which was granted one year was repealed or rendered nugatory
the next. Also, it must be remembered that this question of the
franchise does not cover all the grounds of difference between the two
parties; indeed, it seems that a great deal too much importance has
been given to the matter. Even if a certain number of Uitlanders
elected to become citizens of a Boer state, it is difficult to see,
however advantageous that circumstance might prove to themselves, in
what way it would directly assist the Imperial power on such a
question, let us say, as the treatment of our Indian subjects settled
in the Transvaal. To begin with, the new-born burghers might be
indifferent to the needs and wishes of the country they had renounced.
They might even consider that their oath of allegiance bound them to
oppose those wishes. At the least, even if they had the power to help
us, which could not be the case for many years, surely it would be
neither wise nor dignified for the power to which they once belonged to
trust solely to their good offices.

In the newspapers and elsewhere Johannesburg and its Uitlanders are
spoken of continually as though they made up the sum of the situation.
It is the common cry of Liberal Forwards and of those gentlemen who
might perhaps be called Radical Backwards, that this war is to be waged
for the Uitlander and the millionaire. Of course this is not in the
least true. The Uitlander, with his woes, is only the blister that has
brought the sore of Transvaal misrule and Dutch ambitions in South
Africa to so proud a head, that at last the South African Republic has
come to describe itself as "a Sovereign independent State." That he and
his "Magnates," as Rand millionaires are called, will profit enormously
from a successful war waged by the Imperial Power is admitted; but
because the effect of such a struggle will be ultimately to put a
number of annual millions into certain pockets, it does not follow that
the war is fought for that purpose. Indeed the veriest "jingo" could
scarcely show himself self-sacrificing and altruistic. This is no local
but an Imperial question to be decided in the interests of the Empire.

To return to the course of the negotiations. Offers, withdrawals,
stipulations, palliative clauses, proposals for further conferences
followed each other in bewildering variety, till at length, worn out,
Mr. Chamberlain, on September 22, intimated to the Government of the
South African Republic, through Sir Alfred Milner, that it was "useless
to further pursue a discussion on the lines hitherto followed, and her
Majesty's Government are now compelled to consider the situation
afresh, and to formulate their own proposals for a final settlement of
the issues which have been created in South Africa by the policy
constantly followed for many years by the Government of the South
African Republic. They will communicate to you the result of their
deliberations in a later despatch."

It is rumoured that this later despatch has been delivered at Pretoria,
but has as yet received no reply. Three days later, however, namely, on
September 25, that industrious body, the Liberal Forwards, was honoured
with a telegram from the State Secretary of the Transvaal, which runs
as follows:--

    "Liberal Forwards, London. Many thanks for your telegram. We stick
    to the Convention, and rely upon England doing the same, as
    Convention does not allow interference in internal affairs."

When, however, it is remembered that the Convention did allow equal
rights to all the "inhabitants of the Transvaal," it will be admitted
that this cable is about the strangest of the remarkable series of
State documents which of late have emanated from Pretoria. Very aptly
it crystallises the spirit of Boer diplomacy--a bold disregard of
inconvenient facts.

Meanwhile in South Africa various events of importance have happened.
The Orange Free State has openly thrown in its lot with the Transvaal.
The Uitlanders have fled by thousands from Johannesburg. The Boers have
massed their commandos at various points on the Natal and other British
borders, presumably for offensive purposes, since at present they can
expect no invasion of their territory. The first of these occurrences
reveals the hidden purpose of the Dutch party in South Africa, as at
night a sudden flash of lightning reveals the face of the veld. We have
never threatened the Orange Free State; it has no grievance, no cause
of quarrel, yet suddenly it appears in arms against us. Why? Because
its citizens believe that the time has come to translate into action
the old dream of the Boers, which so long as five-and-twenty years ago
was familiar to the late President Burgers when he spoke of the coming
Dutch Republic, with its eight millions of inhabitants ruling supreme
in the vast territories between the Zambezi and the Cape. Now the great
conspiracy that it has proved so hard to persuade the British public,
or a blind section of it, to credit stands unveiled, and it has for
object nothing less than the expulsion of the English power from
Southern Africa--a vain thing fondly imagined, but still a thing with
which we must reckon, and it is to be feared by the last stern
expedient of arms, since here soft words and diplomacy are of no avail.

Difficult as it is to make the fact understood among a proportion of
the home electorate and publicists, it cannot be stated too often or
too clearly that this war, which is to come, is a war that was forced
upon us by the Boers in their blind ignorance and conceit. The mass of
them believe, because they defeated our troops in various small affairs
in 1881, that they are a match for the British Empire. Their leaders
are better instructed. They trust not so much, perhaps, to the rifles
of their compatriots as to the prowess of certain party captains in
England, and to the enthusiasm of their advocates among the English
Press and public. They remember that the activity of these forces
eighteen years ago was followed by a miserable surrender on the part of
the English Government, and not understanding how greatly opinion has
changed in this country, they hope that history may repeat itself, and
that England, wearying of an unpopular struggle, will soon cede to them
all they ask. They are mistaken, but such is their faith. They hope
also, perchance with better reason, that other complications may force
us to stay our hand. If no more telegrams can be extracted from the
German Emperor, still there is a German regiment fighting on their side
who will take with them the sympathies of the Fatherland, and they know
that the hearts of the great Powers of Europe will go out towards any
people who try to strike a blow at the root of the ever-growing tree of
the might of the British Empire. Buoyed up by bubbles such as these
they have determined to tempt the stern arbitrament of battle.[2]

          [2] See the very remarkable letter of the Boer "P.S." to the
          _Times_ of October 14th, printed as Appendix III. to this
          book, p. 241.

Can it still be avoided? It would seem that except by our surrender,
which is out of the question, for that means the loss not only of South
Africa, but of our prestige throughout the world, this is not in any
way possible. Already acts of war have taken place, such as the seizure
of the gold from the mines, and the commandeering of goods belonging to
British subjects, and perhaps days before these lines can appear in
print the guns will have begun their reasoning.[3]

          [3] Since the above was written, in the swift march of
          events, the Transvaal has despatched its "ultimatum," perhaps
          the most egregious document ever addressed to a great Power
          by a petty State. In effect it is a declaration of war, and
          hostilities have now commenced with the destruction by the
          Boers of an armoured train at Kraaipan, and the capture or
          slaying of its escort.

          H. R. H.

          _9th October _ 1899.

After the rebellion of 1881 a Boer jury, to whom the case was committed
by the tender mercies of Mr. Gladstone's Government, with the murdered
man's bullet-riddled skull lying before them upon the table of the
Court, acquitted the brutal slaughterers of Captain Elliot, not because
they had not done the deed with every circumstance of horrible
treachery and premeditation, but because to find them guilty was
against their brethren's wish. In much the same way, with all the facts
staring them in the face, there are men in England, some of them of
high position and character, who urge the righteousness of the Boer
cause, and with tongue and pen paint our national iniquity in hues
black as ink and red as blood. They write of the "Objects of the War,"
which they do not hesitate to describe as self-seeking and infamous, so
far of course as the English people are concerned, for according to the
same authorities, the Boer objects are uniformly pure and noble. Would
it not be better if they looked back a little and tried to discover the
causes of the war? I think that if they could have witnessed a certain
scene upon the market-square at Newcastle, at which it was my
misfortune to be present, on that night of the year 1881 when the news
of the base betrayal of the loyalists by England became known, they
would win a better understanding of the question. In the spectacle of
that maddened crowd of three or four thousand ruined and deserted men,
English, Boer, and Kaffir, raving, weeping, and blaspheming in the
despair of their shame and bitterness, they might have found
enlightenment. Even now a study of the following forgotten letter
written by Mr. White, the chairman of the Committee of Loyal
Inhabitants, to Mr. Gladstone, might give to some a food for thought:--

"If, sir, you had seen, as I have seen, promising young citizens of
Pretoria dying of wounds received for their country, and if you had had
the painful duty, as I have had, of bringing to their friends at home
the last mementoes of the departed; if you had seen the privations and
discomforts which delicate women and children bore without murmuring
for upwards of three months; if you had seen strong men crying like
children at the cruel and undeserved desertion of England; if you had
seen the long strings of half-desperate loyalists, shaking the dust off
their feet as they left the country, as I saw on my way to Newcastle;
and if you yourself had invested your all on the strength of the word
of England, and now saw yourself in a fair way of being beggared by the
acts of the country in whom you trusted, you would, sir, I think, be
'pronounced,' and England would ring with eloquent entreaties and
threats which would compel a hearing.... We claim, sir, at least as
much justice as the Boers. We are faithful subjects of England, and
have suffered and are suffering for our fidelity. Surely we, the
friends of our country, who stood by her in the time of trial, have as
much right to consideration as rebels who fought against her. We rely
on her word. We rely on the frequently repeated pledges and promises of
her ministers in which we have trusted. We rely on her sense of moral
right not to do us the grievous wrong which this miserable peace
contemplates. We rely on her fidelity to obligations, and on her
ancient reputation for honour and honesty. We rely on the material
consequences which will follow on a breach of faith to us. England
cannot afford to desert us after having solemnly pledged herself to
us."

"England cannot afford to desert us!" but England, or her rulers, could
and did afford itself this luxury. In vain did such men as the late
Lord Beaconsfield, the late Lord Cairns, and Lord Salisbury protest and
point out dangers. In vain did agonised loyalists flourish their own
words and promises in the face of her Majesty's Government; the spirit
of party, or the promptings of a newly acquired conscience proved too
strong. Her Majesty's loyal subjects were sneered at, insulted, and
abandoned, and the Boer, who had butchered them, was bid to go on and
prosper.

Now, nearly twenty years afterwards, England is called upon to pay the
bill of what is in effect, whatever may have been its motives, one of
the most infamous acts that stains the pages of her history. From the
moment that the Convention of 1881 was signed it became as certain as
anything human can be, that one of two things would happen--either that
the Imperial Power must in practice be driven out of South Africa, or
that a time would come when it must be forced to assert its dominion
even at the price of war.

Now that miserable hour is with us, and we are called upon to suppress
by arms a small, but sullen and obstinate people, whom we have taught
to believe themselves our equals, if not our superiors. Unless they
will yield at the last moment, which seems impossible seeing that the
war is of their own choosing, the new settlement of South Africa must
be celebrated by a mighty sacrifice of their blood and our blood. Not
to dwell upon other griefs and dangers, when, I ask, will the smoke and
the smell of it depart from the eyes and nostrils of the dwellers in
that unhappy land? As they troop back merrily to their mines and
workshops the money-spinners of Johannesburg may forget a past of
which, in many instances at least, their chief impression will be that
it was unpleasant and unprofitable. But after the Rand is worked out,
when the stamps cease to fall heavily by day and night, when the great
heaps of tailings no longer increase from month to month, when the
broker's voice is quiet in the Exchange, and the promoter inhabits some
new city, still the Boer women in the farmhouses will tell their
children how the "damned English soldiers" shot their grandfathers and
took the land. In South Africa new Irelands will arise, and from the
dragon's teeth that we are forced to sow the harvest of hate will
spring, and spring again. Thus must we eat of the bitter bread which we
have baked, and thus the ill fowl that we reared have come home to
roost, bringing their broods with them.

Again and again we have blundered in our treatment of the Dutch. For
instance, with kinder and fairer management they would never have
trekked from the Cape sixty years ago. Also, had the promises which
were made to them at the annexation in 1877 been kept, and had not Sir
Theophilus Shepstone, who grew up amongst them and to whom they were
attached, been removed in favour of a military martinet, there would
have been no rebellion, let the Cape wire-pullers working under a cloak
of loyalty to the Crown strive as they might. But the rebellion came
and the defeats, and after these that surrender whereof this country is
called upon to pluck the fruit to-day, which, by the Boers, is
attributed to those defeats with the fear of their prowess and to
nothing else.

And now, in due season, the war comes; an inevitable war which cannot
be escaped, and must be fought out to the end. There is only room for
one paramount power in Southern Africa!

How all these things happened is told briefly, but I trust clearly, in
the following pages. My excuse for reprinting them must be the desire
which, it is said, exists among some readers to become better
acquainted with the facts that engendered the present fateful crisis.

    H. RIDER HAGGARD.

_9th October _1899.




CONTENTS.


                                                                PAGES

AUTHOR'S NOTE                                                       v


CHAPTER I.

ITS INHABITANTS, LAWS, AND CUSTOMS.

Invasion by Mosilikatze--Arrival of the emigrant Boers--Establishment
of the South African Republic--The Sand River Convention--Growth of
the territory of the republic--The native tribes surrounding it--
Capabilities of the country--Its climate--Its inhabitants--The Boers
--Their peculiarities and mode of life--Their abhorrence of settled
government and payment of taxes--The Dutch patriotic party--Form of
government previous to the annexation--Courts of law--The commando
system--Revenue arrangements--Native races in the Transvaal      1-22


CHAPTER II.

EVENTS PRECEDING THE ANNEXATION.

Mr. Burgers elected president--His character and aspirations--His
pension from the English Government--His visit to England--The
railway loan--Relations of the republic with native tribes--The
pass laws--Its quarrel with Cetywayo--Confiscation of native
territory in the Keate Award--Treaty with the Swazi king--The
Secocoeni war--Capture of Johannes' stronghold by the Swazi
allies--Attack on Secocoeni's mountain--Defeat and dispersion of
the Boers--Elation of the natives--Von Schlickmann's volunteers--
Cruelties perpetrated--Abel Erasmus--Treatment of natives by Boers
--Public meeting at Potchefstroom in 1868--The slavery question--
Some evidence on the subject--Pecuniary position of the Transvaal
prior to the annexation--Internal troubles--Divisions amongst the
Boers--Hopeless condition of the country                        23-49


CHAPTER III.

THE ANNEXATION.

Anxiety of Lord Carnarvon--Despatch of Sir T. Shepstone as Special
Commissioner to the Transvaal--Sir T. Shepstone, his great
experience and ability--His progress to Pretoria, and reception
there--Feelings excited by the arrival of the mission--The
annexation _not_ a foregone conclusion--Charge brought against
Sir T. Shepstone of having called up the Zulu army to sweep the
Transvaal--Its complete falsehood--Cetywayo's message to Sir T.
Shepstone--Evidence on the matter summed up--General desire of
the natives for English rule--Habitual disregard of their
interests--Assembly of the Volksraad--Rejection of Lord
Carnarvon's Confederation Bill and of President Burgers' new
constitution--President Burgers' speeches to the Raad--His
posthumous statement--Communication to the Raad of Sir T.
Shepstone's intention to annex the country--Despatch of Commission
to inquire into the alleged peace with Secocoeni--Its fraudulent
character discovered--Progress of affairs in the Transvaal--Paul
Kruger and his party--Restlessness of natives--Arrangements for
the annexation--The annexation proclamation                     50-86


CHAPTER IV.

THE TRANSVAAL UNDER BRITISH RULE.

Reception of the annexation--Major Clarke and the Volunteers--Effect
of the annexation on credit and commerce--Hoisting of the Union
Jack--Ratification of the annexation by Parliament--Messrs. Kruger
and Jorissen's mission to England--Agitation against the annexation
in the Cape Colony--Sir T. Shepstone's tour--Causes of the growth
of discontent among the Boers--Return of Messrs. Jorissen and Kruger
--The Government dispenses with their services--Despatch of a second
deputation to England--Outbreak of war with Secocoeni--Major Clarke,
R.A.--The Gunn of Gunn plot--Mission of Captain Paterson and Mr.
Sergeaunt to Matabeleland--Its melancholy termination--The Isandhlwana
disaster--Departure of Sir T. Shepstone for England--Another Boer
meeting--The Pretoria Horse--Advance of the Boers on Pretoria--
Arrival of Sir B. Frere at Pretoria and dispersion of the Boers--
Arrival of Sir Garnet Wolseley--His proclamation--The Secocoeni
expedition--Proceedings of the Boers--Mr. Pretorius--Mr. Gladstone's
Mid-Lothian speeches, their effect--Sir G. Wolseley's speech at
Pretoria, its good results--Influx of Englishmen and cessation of
agitation--Financial position of the country after three years of
British rule--Letter of the Boer leaders to Mr. Courtney        87-119


CHAPTER V.

THE BOER REBELLION.

Accession of Mr. Gladstone to power--His letters to the Boer
leader and the loyals--His refusal to rescind the annexation--The
Boers encouraged by prominent members of the Radical party--The
Bezeidenhout incident--Despatch of troops to Potchefstroom--Mass
meeting of the 8th December 1880--Appointment of the Triumvirate
and declaration of the republic--Despatch of Boer proclamation to
Sir O. Lanyon--His reply--Outbreak of hostilities at Potchefstroom
--Defence of the court-house by Major Clarke--The massacre of the
detachment of the 94th under Colonel Anstruther--Dr. Ward--The Boer
rejoicings--The Transvaal placed under martial law--Abandonment of
their homes by the people of Pretoria--Sir Owen Lanyon's admirable
defence organisation--Second proclamation issued by the Boers--Its
complete falsehood--Life at Pretoria during the siege--Murders of
natives by the Boers--Loyal conduct of the native chiefs--Difficulty
of preventing them from attacking the Boers--Occupation of Lang's
Nek by the Boers--Sir George Colley's departure to Newcastle--The
condition of that town--The attack on Lang's Nek--Its desperate
nature--Effect of victory on the Boers--The battle at the Ingogo--
Our defeat--Sufferings of the wounded--Major Essex--Advance of the
Boers into Natal--Constant alarms--Expected attack on Newcastle--
Its unorganised and indefensible condition--Arrival of the
reinforcements and retreat of the Boers to the Nek--Despatch
of General Wood to bring up more reinforcements--Majuba Hill--Our
disaster, and death of Sir George Colley--Cause of our defeat--A
Boer version of the disaster--Sir George Colley's tactics     120-155


CHAPTER VI.

THE RETROCESSION OF THE TRANSVAAL.

The Queen's Speech--President Brand and Lord Kimberley--Sir Henry
de Villiers--Sir George Colley's plan--Paul Kruger's offer--Sir
George Colley's remonstrance--Complimentary telegrams--Effect of
Majuba on the Boers and English Government--Collapse of the
Government--Reasons of the surrender--Professional sentimentalists
--The Transvaal Independence Committee--Conclusion of the armistice
--The preliminary peace--Reception of the news in Natal--Newcastle
after the declaration of peace--Exodus of the loyal inhabitants of
the Transvaal--The value of property in Pretoria--The Transvaal
officials dismissed--The Royal Commission--Mode of trial of persons
accused of atrocities--Decision of the Commission and its results
--The severance of territory question--Arguments _pro_ and _con_--
Opinion of Sir E. Wood--Humility of the Commissioners and its cause
--Their decision on the Keate Award question--The Montsioa difficulty
--The compensation and financial clauses of the report of the
Commission--The duties of the British Resident--Sir E. Wood's
dissent from the report of the Commission--Signing of the
Convention--Burial of the Union Jack--The native side of the
question--Interview between the Commissioners and the native
chiefs--Their opinion of the surrender--Objections of the Boer
Volksraad to the Convention--Mr. Gladstone temporises--The
ratification--Its insolent tone--Mr. Hudson, the British Resident
--The Boer festival--The results of the Convention--The larger
issue of the matter--Its effect on the Transvaal--Its moral
aspects--Its effect on the native mind                        156-202


CHAPTER VII.

Extract from Introduction to new edition of 1888                  203


APPENDIX.

  I. The Potchefstroom Atrocities, &c.                            231

 II. Pledges given by Mr. Gladstone's Government as to the
Retention of the Transvaal                                        239

III. A Boer on Boer Designs                                       241




_THE TRANSVAAL._




CHAPTER I.

ITS INHABITANTS, LAWS, AND CUSTOMS.


The Transvaal is a country without a history. Its very existence was
hardly known of until about fifty years ago. Of its past we know
nothing. The generations who peopled its great plains have passed
utterly out of the memory and even the tradition of man, leaving no
monument to mark that they have existed, not even a tomb.

During the reign of Chaka, 1813-1828, whose history has been sketched
in a previous chapter, one of his most famous generals, Mosilikatze,
surnamed the Lion, seceded from him with a large number of his
soldiers, and striking up in a north-westerly direction, settled in or
about what is now the Morico district of the Transvaal. The country
through which Mosilikatze passed was at that time thickly populated
with natives of the Basuto or Macatee race, whom the Zulus look upon
with great contempt. Mosilikatze expressed the feelings of his tribe in
a practical manner, by massacring every living soul of them that came
within his reach. That the numbers slaughtered were very great, the
numerous ruins of Basuto kraals all over the country testify.

It was Chaka's intention to follow up Mosilikatze and destroy him, but
he was himself assassinated before he could do so. Dingaan, his
successor, however, carried out his brother's design, and despatched a
large force to punish him. This army, after marching over 300 miles,
burst upon Mosilikatze, drove him back with slaughter, and returned
home triumphant. The invasion is important, because the Zulus claim the
greater part of the Transvaal territory by virtue of it.

About the time that Mosilikatze was conquered, 1835-1840, the
discontented Boers were leaving the Cape Colony exasperated at the
emancipation of the slaves by the Imperial authorities. First they made
their way to Natal, but being followed thither by the English flag they
travelled further inland over the Vaal River and founded the town of
Mooi River Dorp or Potchefstroom. Here they were joined by other
malcontents from the Orange Sovereignty, which, though afterwards
abandoned, was at that time a British possession. Acting upon

    "The good old rule, the simple plan,
    Of let him take who has the power,
    And let him keep who can,"

the Boers now proceeded to possess themselves of as much territory as
they wanted. Nor was this a difficult task. The country was, as I have
said, peopled by Macatees, who are a poor-spirited race as compared to
the Zulus, and had had what little courage they possessed crushed out
of them by the rough handling they had received at the hands of
Mosilikatze and Dingaan. The Boers, they argued, could not treat them
worse than the Zulus had done. Occasionally a chief, bolder than the
rest, would hold out, and then such an example was made of him and his
people that few cared to follow in his footsteps.

As soon as the Boers were fairly settled in their new home, they began
to think about setting up a Government. First they tried a system of
Commandants, with a Commandant-general, but this does not seem to have
answered. Next, those of their number who lived in Lydenburg district
(where the gold-fields now are) set up a Republic, with a President and
Volksraad, or popular assembly. This example was followed by the other
white inhabitants of the country, who formed another Republic and
elected another President, with Pretoria for their capital. The two
republics were subsequently incorporated.

In 1852 the Imperial authorities, having regard to the expense of
maintaining an effective government over an unwilling people in an
undeveloped and half-conquered country, concluded a convention with the
emigrant Boers "beyond the Vaal River." The following were the
principal stipulations of this convention, drawn up between Major Hogg
and Mr. Owen, Her Majesty's Assistant-Commissioners for the settling
and adjusting of the affairs of the eastern and north-eastern
boundaries of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope on the one part, and
a deputation representative of the emigrant farmers north of the Vaal
River on the other. It was guaranteed "in the fullest manner on the
part of the British Government to the emigrant farmers beyond the Vaal
River the right to manage their own affairs, and to govern themselves
according to their own laws, without any interference on the part of
the British Government, and that no encroachment shall be made by the
said Government on the territory beyond to the north of the Vaal River,
with the further assurance that the warmest wish of the British
Government is to promote peace, free trade, and friendly intercourse
with the emigrant farmers now inhabiting, or who hereafter may inhabit
that country, it being understood that this system of non-interference
is binding on both parties."

Next were disclaimed, on behalf of the British Government, "all
alliances whatever and with whomsoever of the coloured nations to the
north of the Vaal River."

It was also agreed "that no slavery is or shall be permitted or
practised in the country to the north of the Vaal River by the emigrant
farmers."

It was further agreed "that no objection shall be made by any British
authority against the emigrant Boers purchasing their supplies of
ammunition in any of the British colonies and possessions of South
Africa; it being mutually understood that all trade in ammunition with
the native tribes is prohibited both by the British Government and the
emigrant farmers on both sides of the Vaal River."

These were the terms of this famous convention, which is as slipshod in
its diction as it is vague in its meaning. What, for instance, is meant
by the territory to the north of the Vaal River? According to the
letter of the agreement, Messrs. Hogg and Owen ceded all the territory
between the Vaal and Egypt. This historical document was the Charta of
the new-born South African Republic. Under its provisions, the Boers,
now safe from interference on the part of the British, established
their own Government and promulgated their "Grond Wet," or
Constitution.

The history of the Republic between 1852 and 1876 is not very
interesting, and is besides too wearisome to enter into here. It
consists of an oft-told tale of civil broils, attacks on native tribes,
and encroachment on native territories. Until shortly before the
Annexation, every burgher was, on coming of age, entitled to receive
from the Government 6000 acres of land. As these rights were in the
early days of the Republic frequently sold to speculators for such
trifles as a bottle of brandy or half a dozen of beer, and as the
seller still required his 6000 acres: for a Boer considers it beneath
his dignity to settle on less, it is obvious that it required a very
large country to satisfy all demands. To meet these demands, the
territories of the Republic had to be stretched like an elastic band,
and they were stretched accordingly,--at the expense of the natives.
The stretching process was an ingenious one, and is very well described
in a minute written by Mr. Osborn, the late magistrate at Newcastle,
dated 22d September 1876, in these words:--

"The Boers, as they have done in other cases and are still doing,
encroached by degrees on native territory, commencing by obtaining
permission to graze stock upon portions of it at certain seasons of the
year, followed by individual graziers obtaining from native headmen a
sort of right or license to squat upon certain defined portions,
ostensibly in order to keep other Boer squatters away from the same
land. These licenses, temporarily intended as friendly or neighbourly
acts by unauthorised headmen, after a few seasons of occupation by the
Boer, are construed by him as title, and his permanent occupation
ensues. Damage for trespass is levied by him from the very man from
whom he obtained the right to squat, to which the natives submit out of
fear of the matter reaching the ears of the paramount chief, who would
in all probability severely punish them for opening the door to
encroachment by the Boer. After a while, however, the matter comes to a
crisis in consequence of the incessant disputes between the Boers and
the natives; one or other of the disputants lays the case before the
paramount chief, who, when hearing both parties, is literally
frightened with violence and threats by the Boer into granting him the
land. Upon this the usual plan followed by the Boer is at once to
collect a few neighbouring Boers, including a field cornet, or even an
acting provisional field cornet, appointed by the field cornet or
provisional cornet, the latter to represent the Government, although
without instructions authorising him to act in the matter. A few cattle
are collected among themselves, which the party takes to the chief, and
his signature is obtained to a written document alienating to the
Republican Boers a large slice of all his territory. The contents of
this document are, as far as I can make out, never clearly or
intelligibly explained to the chief, who signs and accepts of the
cattle under the impression that it is all in settlement of hire for
the grazing licenses granted by his headmen. This, I have no hesitation
in saying, is the usual method by which the Boers obtain what they call
cessions to them of territories by native chiefs. In Secocoeni's case
they allege that his father Sequati cedes to them the whole of his
territory (hundreds of square miles) for a hundred head of cattle."

So rapidly did this process go on that the little Republic to the
"North of the Vaal River" had at the time of the Annexation grown into
a country of the size of France. Its boundaries had only been clearly
defined where they abutted on neighbouring White Communities, or on the
territories of great native powers, on which the Government had not
dared to infringe to any marked degree, such as those of Lo Bengula's
people in the north. But wheresoever on the State's borders there had
been no white Power to limit its advances, or where the native tribes
had found themselves too isolated or too weak to resist aggressions,
there the Republic had by degrees encroached, and extended the shadow,
if not the substance, of its authority.

The Transvaal has a boundary line of over 1600 miles in circumference,
and of this a large portion is disputed by different native tribes.
Speaking generally, the territory lies between the 22° and 28° of South
Latitude and the 25° and 32° of East Longitude, or between the Orange
Free State, Natal and Griqualand West on the south, and the Limpopo
River on the north; and between the Lebombo mountains on the east, and
the Kalihari desert on the west. On the north of its territory live
three great tribes--the Makalaka, the Matabele, (descendants of the
Zulus who deserted Chaka under Mosilikatze), and the Matyana. These
tribes are all warlike. On the west, following the line down to the
Diamond Field territory, are the Sicheli, the Bangoaketsi, the
Baralong, and the Koranna tribes. Passing round by Griqualand West, the
Free State, and Natal, we reach Zululand on the south-east corner; then
come the Lebombo mountains on the east, separating the Transvaal from
Amatonga land, and from the so-called Portuguese possessions, which are
entirely in the hands of native tribes, most of them subject to the
great Zulu chief, Umzeila, who has his stronghold in the north-east.

It will be observed that the country is almost surrounded by native
tribes. Besides these there are about one million native inhabitants
living within its borders. In one district alone, Zoutpansberg, it is
computed that there are 364,250 natives, as compared to about 750
whites.

If a beautiful and fertile country were alone necessary to make a state
and its inhabitants happy and prosperous, happiness and prosperity
would rain upon the Transvaal and the Dutch Boers. The capabilities of
this favoured land are vast and various. Within its borders are to be
found highlands and lowlands, vast stretches of rolling veldt like
gigantic sheep downs, hundreds of miles of swelling bushland, huge
tracts of mountainous country, and even little glades spotted with
timber that remind one of an English park. There is every possible
variety of soil and scenery. Some districts will grow all tropical
produce, whilst others are well suited for breeding sheep, cattle, and
horses. Most of the districts will produce wheat and all other cereals
in greater perfection and abundance than any of the other South African
colonies. Two crops of cereals may be obtained from the soil every
year, and both the vine and tobacco are cultivated with great success.
Coffee, sugar-cane, and cotton have been grown with profit in the
northern parts of the State. Also the undeveloped mineral wealth of the
country is very great. Its known minerals are gold, copper, lead,
cobalt, iron, coal, tin, and plumbago: copper and iron having long been
worked by the natives. Altogether there is little doubt that the
Transvaal is the richest of all the South African states, and had it
remained under English rule it would, with the aid of English
enterprise and capital, have become a very wealthy and prosperous
country. However there is little chance of that now. Perhaps the
greatest charm of the Transvaal lies in its climate, which is among the
best in the world, and in all the southern districts very healthy.
During the winter months--that is, from April to October--little or no
rain falls, and the climate is cold and bracing. In summer it is rather
warm, but not overpoweringly hot, the thermometer at Pretoria averaging
from 65° to 73° and in the winter from 59° to 65°. The population of
the Transvaal is estimated at about 40,000 whites, mostly of Dutch
origin, consisting of about thirty vast families; and one million
natives. There are several towns, the largest of which are Pretoria and
Potchefstroom.

Such is the country that we annexed in 1877, and were drummed out of in
1881. Now let us turn to its inhabitants. It has been the fashion to
talk of the Transvaal as though nobody but Boers lived in it. In
reality the inhabitants were divided into three classes: 1. Natives; 2.
Boers; 3. English. I say were divided, because the English class can
now hardly be said to exist, the country having been made too hot to
hold it since the war. The natives stand in the proportion of nearly
twenty to one to the whites. The Boers were in their turn much more
numerous than the English, but the latter owned nearly all the trading
establishments in the country, and also a very large amount of
property.

The Transvaal Boers have been very much praised up by members of the
Government in England, and others who are anxious to advance their
interests, as against English interests. Mr. Gladstone, indeed, can
hardly find words strong enough to express his admiration of their
leaders, those "able men," since they inflicted a national humiliation
on us; and doubtless they are a people with many good points. That they
are not devoid of sagacity can be seen by the way they have dealt with
the English Government.

The Boers are certainly a peculiar people, though they can hardly be
said to be "zealous of good works." They are very religious, but their
religion takes its colour from the darkest portions of the Old
Testament; lessons of mercy and gentleness are not at all to their
liking, and they seldom care to read the Gospels. What they delight in
are the stories of wholesale butchery by the Israelites of old; and in
their own position they find a reproduction of that of the first
settlers in the Holy Land. Like them they think they are entrusted by
the Almighty with the task of exterminating the heathen native tribes
around them, and are always ready with a scriptural precedent for
slaughter and robbery. The name of the Divinity is continually on their
lips, sometimes in connection with very doubtful statements. They are
divided into three sects, none of which care much for the other two.
These are the Doppers, who number about half the population, the
Orthodox Reform, and the Liberal Reform, which is the least numerous.
Of these three sects the Doppers are by far the most uncompromising and
difficult to deal with. They much resemble the Puritans of Charles the
First's time, of the extreme Hew-Agag-in-pieces stamp.

It is difficult to agree with those who call the Boers cowards, an
accusation which the whole of their history belies. A Boer does not
like fighting if he can avoid it, because he sets a high value on his
own life; but if he is cornered, he will fight as well as anybody else.
The Boers fought well enough in the late war, though that, it is true,
is no great criterion of courage, since they were throughout flushed
with victory, and, owing to the poor shooting of the British troops, in
but little personal danger. One very unpleasant characteristic they
have, and that is an absence of regard for the truth, especially where
land is concerned. Indeed the national characteristic is crystallised
into a proverb, "I am no slave to my word." It has several times
happened to me to see one set of highly respectable witnesses in a land
case go into the box and swear distinctly that they saw a beacon placed
on a certain spot, whilst an equal number on the other side will swear
that they saw it placed a mile away. Filled as they are with a land
hunger, to which that of the Irish peasant is a weak and colourless
sentiment, there is little that they will not do to gratify their
taste. It is the subject of constant litigation amongst them, and it is
by no means uncommon for a Boer to spend several thousand pounds in
lawsuits over a piece of land not worth as many hundreds.

Personally Boers are fine men, but as a rule ugly. Their women-folk are
good-looking in early life, but get very stout as they grow older.
They, in common with most of their sex, understand how to use their
tongues; indeed, it is said that it was the women who caused the rising
against the English Government. None of the refinements of civilisation
enter into the life of an ordinary Transvaal Boer. He lives in a way
that would shock an English labourer at twenty-five shillings the week,
although he is very probably worth fifteen or twenty thousand pounds.
His home is but too frequently squalid and filthy to an extraordinary
degree. He himself has no education, and does not care that his
children should receive any. He lives by himself in the middle of a
great plot of land, his nearest neighbour being perhaps ten or twelve
miles away, caring but little for the news of the outside world and
nothing for its opinions, doing very little work, but growing daily
richer through the increase of his flocks and herds. His expenses are
almost nothing, and as he gets older wealth increases upon him. The
events in his life consist of an occasional trip on "commando" against
some native tribe, attending a few political meetings, and the journeys
he makes with his family to the nearest town, some four times a year,
in order to be present at "Nachtmaal" or communion. Foreigners,
especially Englishmen, he detests, but he is kindly and hospitable to
his own people. Living isolated as he does, the lord of a little
kingdom, he naturally comes to have a great idea of himself, and a
corresponding contempt for all the rest of mankind. Laws and taxes are
things distasteful to him, and he looks upon it as an impertinence that
any court should venture to call him to account for his doings. He is
rich and prosperous, and the cares of poverty, and all the other
troubles that fall to the lot of civilised men, do not affect him. He
has no romance in him, nor any of the higher feelings and aspirations
that are found in almost every other race; in short, unlike the Zulu he
despises, there is little of the gentleman in his composition, though
he is at times capable of acts of kindness and even generosity. His
happiness is to live alone in the great wilderness, with his children,
his men-servants, and his maid-servants, his flocks and his herds, the
monarch of all he surveys. If civilisation presses him too closely, his
remedy is a simple one. He sells his farm, packs up his goods and cash
in his waggon, and starts for regions more congenially wild. Such are
some of the leading characteristics of that remarkable product of South
Africa, the Transvaal Boer, who resembles no other white man in the
world.

Perhaps, however, the most striking of all his oddities is his
abhorrence of all government, more especially if that government be
carried out according to English principles. The Boers have always been
more or less in rebellion; they rebelled against the rule of the
Company when the Cape belonged to Holland, they rebelled against the
English Government in the Cape, they were always in a state of
semi-rebellion against their own Government in the Transvaal, and now
they have for the second time, with the most complete success, rebelled
against the English Government. The fact of the matter is that the bulk
of their number hate all Governments, because Governments enforce law
and order, and they hate the English Government worst of all because it
enforces law and order most of all. It is not liberty they long for,
but license. The "sturdy independence" of the Boer resolves itself into
a determination not to have his affairs interfered with by any superior
power whatsoever, and not to pay taxes if he can possibly avoid it. But
he has also a specific cause of complaint against the English
Government, which would alone cause him to do his utmost to get rid of
it, and that is its mode of dealing with natives, which is radically
opposite to his own. This is the secret of Boer patriotism. To
understand it, it must be remembered that the Englishman and the Boer
look at natives from a very different point of view. The Englishman,
though he may not be very fond of him, at any rate regards the Kafir as
a fellow human being with feelings like his own. The average Boer does
not. He looks upon the "black creature" as having been delivered into
his hand by the "Lord" for his own purposes, that is, to shoot and
enslave. He must not be blamed too harshly for this, for, besides being
naturally of a somewhat hard disposition, hatred of the native is
hereditary, and is partly induced by the history of many a bloody
struggle. Also the native hates the Boer fully as much as the Boer
hates the native, though with better reason. Now native labour is a
necessity to the Boer, because he will not as a rule do hard manual
labour himself, and there must be some one to plant and garner the
crops and herd the cattle. On the other hand, the natives are not
anxious to serve the Boers, which means little or no pay and plenty of
thick stick, and sometimes worse. The result of this state of affairs
is that the Boer often has to rely on forced labour to a very great
extent. But this is a thing that an English Government will not
tolerate, and the consequence is that under its rule he cannot get the
labour that is necessary to him.

Then there is the tax question. If he lives under the English flag the
money has to be paid regularly, but under his own Government he pays or
not as he likes. It was this habit of his of refusing payment of taxes
that brought the Republic into difficulties in 1877, and that will ere
long bring it into trouble again. He cannot understand that cash is
necessary to carry on a Government, and looks upon a tax as though it
were so much money stolen from him. These things are the real springs
of the "sturdy independence" and the patriotism of the ordinary
Transvaal farmer. Doubtless there are some who are really patriotic;
for instance, one of their leaders, Paul Kruger. But with the majority,
patriotism is only another word for unbounded license and forced
labour.

These remarks must not be taken to apply to the Cape Boers, who are a
superior class of men, since they, living under a settled and civilised
Government, have been steadily improving, whilst their cousins, living
every man for his own hand, have been deteriorating. The old
Voortrekkers, the fathers and grandfathers of the Transvaal Boer of
to-day, were, without doubt, a very fine set of men, and occasionally
you may in the Transvaal meet individuals of the same stamp whom it is
a pleasure to know. But these are generally men of a certain age, with
some experience of the world; the younger men are very objectionable in
their manners.

The real Dutch Patriotic party is not to be found in the Transvaal, but
in the Cape Colony. Their object, which, as affairs now are, is well
within the bounds of possibility, is by fair means or foul to swamp the
English element in South Africa, and to establish a great Dutch
Republic. It was this party, which consists of clever and well educated
men, who raised the outcry against the Transvaal Annexation, because it
meant an enormous extension of English influence, and who had the wit,
by means of their emissaries and newspapers, to work upon the feeling
of the ignorant Transvaal farmers until they persuaded them to rebel;
and finally, to avail themselves of the yearnings of English radicalism
for the disruption of the Empire and the minimisation of British
authority, to get the Annexation cancelled. All through this business
the Boers have more or less danced in obedience to strings pulled at
Cape Town, and it is now said that one of the chief wire-pullers, Mr.
Hofmeyer, is to be asked to become President of the Republic. These men
are the real patriots of South Africa, and very clever ones too--not
the Transvaal Boers, who vapour about their blood and their country and
the accursed Englishman to order, and are in reality influenced by very
small motives, such as the desire to avoid payment of taxes, or to hunt
away a neighbouring Englishman, whose civilisation and refinement are
as offensive as his farm is desirable. Such are the Dutch inhabitants
of the Transvaal. I will now give a short sketch of their institutions
as they were before the Annexation, and to which the community has
reverted since its recision, with, I believe, but few alterations.

The form of government is republican, and to all intents and purposes
manhood suffrage prevails, supreme power resting in the people. The
executive power of the State centres in a President elected by the
people to hold office for a term of five years, every voter having a
voice in his election. He is assisted in the execution of his duties by
an Executive Council, consisting of the State Secretary and such other
three members as are selected for that purpose by the legislative body,
the Volksraad. The State Secretary holds office for four years, and is
elected by the Volksraad. The members of the Executive have all seats
in the Volksraad, but have no votes. The Volksraad is the legislative
body of the State, and consists of forty-two members. The country is
divided into twelve electoral districts, each of which has the right to
return three members; the Gold Fields have also the right of electing
two members, and the four principal towns one member each. There is no
power in the State competent to either prorogue or dissolve the
Volksraad except that body itself, so that an appeal to the country on
a given subject or policy is impossible without its concurrence.
Members are elected for four years, but half retire by rotation every
two years, the vacancies being filled by re-elections. Members must
have been voters for three years, and be not less than thirty years of
age, must belong to a Protestant Church, be resident in the country,
and owners of immovable property therein. A father and son cannot sit
in the same Raad, neither can seats be occupied by coloured persons,
bastards, or officials.

For each electoral district there is a magistrate or Landdrost, whose
duties are similar to those of a Civil Commissioner. These districts
are again subdivided into wards presided over by field cornets, who
exercise judicial powers in minor matters, and in times of war have
considerable authority. The Roman Dutch law is the common law of the
country, as it is of the colonies of the Cape of Good Hope and Natal,
and of the Orange Free State.

Prior to the Annexation justice was administered in a very primitive
fashion. First, there was the Landdrosts' Court, from which an appeal
lay to a court consisting of the Landdrost and six councillors elected
by the public. This was a court of first instance as well as a court of
appeal. Then there was a Supreme Court, consisting of three Landdrosts
from three different districts, and a jury of twelve selected from the
burghers of the State. There was no appeal from this court, but cases
have sometimes been brought under the consideration of the Volksraad as
the supreme power. It is easy to imagine what the administration of
justice was like when the presidents of all the law courts in the
country were elected by the mob, not on account of their knowledge of
the law, but because they were popular. Suitors before the old
Transvaal courts found the law surprisingly uncertain. A High Court of
Justice was, however, established after the Annexation, and has been
continued by the Volksraad, but an agitation is being got up against
it, and it will possibly be abolished in favour of the old system.

In such a community as that of the Transvaal Boers the question of
public defence was evidently of the first importance. This is provided
for under what is known as the Commando system. The President, with the
concurrence of the Executive Council, has the right of declaring war,
and of calling up a commando, in which the burghers are placed under
the field cornets and commandants. These last are chosen by the field
cornets for each district, and a Commandant-general is chosen by the
whole laager or force, but the President is the Commander-in-Chief of
the army. All the inhabitants of the State between sixteen and sixty,
with a few exceptions, are liable for service. Young men under
eighteen, and men over fifty, are only called out under circumstances
of emergency. Members of the Volksraad, officials, clergymen, and
school-teachers are exempt from personal service, unless martial law is
proclaimed, but must contribute an amount not exceeding £15 towards the
expense of the war. All legal proceedings in civil cases are suspended
against persons on commando, no summonses can be made out, and as soon
as martial law is proclaimed no legal execution can be prosecuted, the
pounds are closed, and transfer dues payments are suspended until after
thirty days from the recall of the proclamation of martial law. Owners
of land residing beyond the borders of the Republic are also liable, in
addition to the ordinary war tax, to place a fit and proper substitute
at the disposal of the Government, or otherwise to pay a fine of £15.
The first levy of the burghers is, of men from eighteen to thirty-four
years of age; the second, thirty-four to fifty; and the third, from
sixteen to eighteen, and from fifty to sixty years. Every man is bound
to provide himself with clothing, a gun, and ammunition, and there must
be enough waggons and oxen found between them to suffice for their
joint use. Of the booty taken, one quarter goes to Government, and the
rest to the burghers. The most disagreeable part of the commandeering
system is, however, yet to come; personal service is not all that the
resident in the Transvaal Republic has to endure. The right is vested
in field cornets to commandeer articles as well as individuals, and to
call upon inhabitants to furnish requisites for the commando. As may be
imagined, it goes very hard on these occasions with the property of any
individual whom the field cornet may not happen to like.

Each ward is expected to turn out its contingent ready and equipped for
war, and this can only be done by seizing goods right and left. One
unfortunate will have to find a waggon, another to deliver over his
favourite span of trek oxen, another his riding-horse or some slaughter
cattle, and so on. Even when the officer making the levy is desirous of
doing his duty as fairly as he can, it is obvious that very great
hardships must be inflicted under such a system. Requisitions are made
more with regard to what is wanted than with a view to an equitable
distribution of demands; and like the Jews in the time of the Crusades,
he who has got most must pay most, or take the consequences, which may
be unpleasant. Articles which are not perishable, such as waggons, are
supposed to be returned, but if they come back at all they are
generally worthless.

In case of war, the native tribes living within the borders of the
State are also expected to furnish contingents, and it is on them that
most of the hard work of the campaign generally falls. They are put in
the front of the battle, and have to do the hand-to-hand fighting,
which, however, if of the Zulu race, they do not object to.

The revenue of the State is so arranged that the burden of it should
fall as much as possible on the trading community, and as little as
possible on the farmer. It is chiefly derived from licenses on trades,
professions, and callings, 30s. per annum quit-rent on farms, transfer
dues and stamps, auction dues, court fees, and contributions from such
native tribes as can be made to pay them. Since we have given up the
country, the Volksraad has put a very heavy tax on all imported goods,
hoping thereby to beguile the Boers into paying taxes without knowing
it, and at the same time strike a blow at the trading community, which
is English in its proclivities. The result has been to paralyse what
little trade there was left in the country, and to cause great
dissatisfaction amongst the farmers, who cannot understand why, now
that the English are gone, they should have to pay twice as much for
their sugar and coffee as they have been accustomed to do.

I will conclude this chapter with a few words about the natives who
swarm in and around the Transvaal. They can be roughly divided into two
great races, the Amazulu and their offshoots, and the Macatee or Basuto
tribes. All those of Zulu blood, including the Swazis, Mapock's Kafirs,
the Matabele, the Knob-noses, and others are very warlike in
disposition, and men of fine physique. The Basutos (who must not be
confounded with the Cape Basutos), however, differ from these tribes in
every respect, including their language, which is called Sisutu, the
only mutual feeling between the two races being their common
detestation of the Boers. They do not love war; in fact, they are timid
and cowardly by nature, and only fight when they are obliged to. Unlike
the Zulus, they are much addicted to the arts of peace, show
considerable capacities for civilisation, and are even willing to
become Christians. There would have been a far better field for the
Missionary in the Transvaal than in Zululand and Natal. Indeed, the
most successful mission station I have seen in Africa is near
Middleburg, under the control of Mr. Merensky. In person the Basutos
are thin and weakly when compared to the stalwart Zulu, and it is their
consciousness of inferiority both to the white men and their black
brethren that, together with their natural timidity, makes them submit
as easily as they do to the yoke of the Boer.




CHAPTER II.

EVENTS PRECEDING THE ANNEXATION.


In or about the year 1872, the burghers of the Republic elected Mr.
Burgers their President. This remarkable man was a native of the Cape
Colony, and passed the first sixteen or seventeen years of his life, he
once informed me, on a farm herding sheep. He afterwards became a
clergyman noted for the eloquence of his preaching, but his ideas
proving too broad for his congregation, he resigned his cure, and in an
evil moment for himself took to politics.

President Burgers was a man of striking presence and striking talents,
especially as regards his oratory, which was really of a very high
class, and would have commanded attention in our own House of Commons.
He possessed, however, a mind of that peculiarly volatile order that is
sometimes met with in conjunction with great talents, and which seems
to be entirely without ballast. His intellect was of a balloon-like
nature, and as incapable of being steered. He was always soaring in the
clouds, and, as is natural to one in that elevated position, taking a
very different and more sanguine view of affairs to that which men of a
more lowly, and perhaps a more practical, turn of mind would do.

But notwithstanding his fly-away ideas, President Burgers was
undoubtedly a true patriot, labouring night and day for the welfare of
the State of which he had undertaken the guidance; but his patriotism
was too exalted for his surroundings. He wished to elevate to the rank
of a nation a people who had not got the desire to be elevated; with
this view he contracted railway loans, made wars, minted gold, &c., and
then suddenly discovered that the country refused to support him. In
short, he was made of very different clay to that of the people he had
to do with. He dreamt of a great Dutch Republic "with eight millions of
inhabitants," doing a vast trade with the interior through the Delagoa
Bay Railway. They, on the other hand, cared nothing about republics or
railways, but fixed their affections on forced labour and getting rid
of the necessity of paying taxes--and so between them the Republic came
to grief. But it must be borne in mind that President Burgers was
throughout actuated by good motives; he did his best by a stubborn and
a stiff-necked people; and if he failed, as fail he did, it was more
their fault than his. As regards the pension he received from the
English Government, which has so often been brought up against him, it
was after all no more than his due after five years of arduous work. If
the Republic had continued to exist, it is to be presumed that they
would have made some provision for their old President, more especially
as he seems to have exhausted his private means in paying the debts of
the country. Whatever may be said of some of the other officials of the
Republic, its President was, I believe, an honest man.

In 1875, Mr. Burgers proceeded to Europe, having, he says in a
posthumous document recently published been empowered by the Volksraad
"to carry out my plans for the development of the country, by opening
up a direct communication for it, free from the trammels of British
ports and influence." According to this document, during his absence
two powerful parties, viz., "the faction of unprincipled
fortune-hunters, rascals, and runaways on the one hand, and the faction
of the extreme orthodox party in a certain branch of the Dutch Reform
Church on the other, began to co-operate against the Government of the
Republic and me personally.... Ill as I was, and contrary to the advice
of my medical men, I proceeded to Europe, in the beginning of 1875, to
carry out my project, and no sooner was my back turned on the Transvaal
than the conspiring elements began to act. The new coat of arms and
flag adopted in the Raad by an almost unanimous vote were abolished;
the laws for a free and secular education were tampered with; and my
resistance to a reckless inspection and disposal of Government lands,
still occupied by natives, was openly defied. The Raad, filled up to a
large extent with men of ill repute, who, under the cloak of progress
and favour to the Government view, obtained their seats, was too weak
to cope with the skill of the conspirators, and granted leave to the
acting President to carry out measures diametrically opposed to my
policy. _Native lands_ were inspected and given out to a few
speculators, who held large numbers of claims to lands which were
destined for citizens, and so a war was prepared for me, on my return
from Europe, which I could not avert." This extract is interesting, as
showing the state of feeling existing between the President and his
officers previous to the outbreak of the Secocoeni war. It also shows
how entirely he was out of sympathy with the citizens, seeing that, as
soon as his back was turned, they, with Mr. Joubert and Paul Kruger at
their head, at once undid all the little good he had done.

When Mr. Burgers got to England, he found that city capitalists would
have nothing whatever to say to his railway scheme. In Holland,
however, he succeeded in getting £90,000 of the £300,000 he wished to
borrow at a high rate of interest, and by passing a bond on five
hundred Government farms. This money was immediately invested in
railway plant, which, when it arrived at Delagoa Bay, had to be
mortgaged to pay the freight on it, and that was the end of the Delagoa
Bay railway scheme, except that the £90,000 is, I believe, still owing
to the confiding shareholders in Holland.

On his return to the Transvaal the President was well received, and for
a month or so all went smoothly. But the relations of the Republic with
the surrounding native tribes had by this time become so bad that an
explosion was imminent somewhere. In the year 1874 the Volksraad raised
the price of passes under the iniquitous pass law, by which every
native travelling through the territory was made to pay from £1 to £5.
In case of non-payment the native was made subject to a fine of from £1
to £10, and to a beating of from "ten to twenty-five lashes." He was
also to go into service for three months, and have a certificate
thereof, for which he must pay five shillings; the avowed object of the
law being to obtain a supply of Kafir labour. This was done in spite of
the earnest protest of the President, who gave the Raad distinctly to
understand that by accepting this law they would, in point of fact,
annul treaties concluded with the chiefs on the south-western borders.
It is not clear, however, if this amended pass law ever came into
force. It is to be hoped it did not, for even under the old law natives
were shamefully treated by Boers, who would pretend that they were
authorised by Government to collect the tax; the result being that the
unfortunate Kafir was frequently obliged to pay twice over. Natives had
such a horror of the pass laws of the country, that when travelling to
the Diamond Fields to work they would frequently go round some hundreds
of miles rather than pass through the Transvaal.

That the Volksraad should have thought it necessary to enact such a law
in order that the farmers should obtain a supply of Kafir labour in a
territory that had nearly a million of native inhabitants, who, unlike
the Zulus, are willing to work if only they meet with decent treatment,
is in itself an instructive commentary on the feelings existing between
Boer master and Kafir servant.

But besides the general quarrel with the Kafir race in its entirety,
which the Boers always have on hand, they had just then several
individual differences, in each of which there lurked the possibilities
of disturbance.

To begin with, their relations with Cetywayo were by no means amicable.
During Mr. Burgers' absence the Boer Government, then under the
leadership of P. J. Joubert, sent Cetywayo a very stern message--a
message that gives the reader the idea that Mr. Joubert was ready to
enforce it with ten thousand men. After making various statements and
demands with reference to the Amaswazi tribe, the disputed boundary
line, &c. it ends thus:--

"Although the Government of the South African Republic has never
wished, and does not now desire, that serious disaffection and
animosities should exist between you and them, yet it is not the less
of the greatest consequence and importance for you earnestly to weigh
these matters and risks, and to satisfy them; the more so, if you on
your side also wish that peace and friendship shall be maintained
between you and us."

The Secretary for Native Affairs for Natal comments on this message in
these words: "The tone of this message to Cetywayo is not very
friendly, it has the look of an ultimatum, and if the Government of the
Transvaal were in circumstances different to what it is, the message
would suggest an intention to coerce if the demands it conveys are not
at once complied with; but I am inclined to the opinion that no such
intention exists, and that the transmission of a copy of the message to
the Natal Government is intended as a notification that the Transvaal
Government has proclaimed the territory hitherto in dispute between it
and the Zulus to be Republican territory, and that the Republic intends
to occupy it."

In the territories marked out by a decision known as the Keate Award,
in which Lieutenant-Governor Keate of Natal, at the request of both
parties, laid down the boundary line between the Boers and certain
native tribes, the Boer Government carried it with a yet higher hand,
insomuch as the natives of those districts, being comparatively
unwarlike, were less likely to resist.

On the 18th August 1875, Acting President Joubert issued a proclamation
by which a line was laid down far to the southward of that marked out
by Mr. Keate, and consequently included more territory within the
elastic boundaries of the Republic. A Government notice of the same
date invites all claiming lands now declared to belong to the Republic
to send in their claims to be settled by a land commission.

On the 6th March 1876, another chief in the same neighbourhood
(Montsoia) writes to the Lieutenant-Governor of Griqualand West in
these terms:--

    "MY FRIEND,--I wish to acquaint you with the doings of some people
    connected with the Boers. A man-servant of mine has been severely
    injured in the head by one of the Boers' servants, which has proved
    fatal. Another of my people has been cruelly treated by a Boer
    tying a rein about his neck, and then mounting his horse and
    dragging him about the place. My brother Molema, who is the bearer
    of this, will give you full particulars."

Molema explains the assaults thus: "The assaulted man is not dead; his
skull was fractured. The assault was committed by a Boer named Wessels
Badenhorst, who shamefully ill-treated the man, beat him till he
fainted, and, on his revival, fastened a rim round his neck, and made
him run to the homestead by the side of his (Badenhorst's) horse
cantering. At the homestead he tied him to the waggon-wheel, and
flogged him again till Mrs. Badenhorst stopped her husband."

Though it will be seen that the Boers were on good terms neither with
the Zulus nor the Keate Award natives, they still had one Kafir ally,
namely, Umbandeni, the Amaswazi king. This alliance was concluded under
circumstances so peculiar that they are worthy of a brief
recapitulation. It appears that in the winter of the year 1875, Mr.
Rudolph, the Landdrost of Utrecht, went to Swaziland, and, imitating
the example of the Natal Government with Cetywayo, crowned Umbandeni
king, on behalf of the Boer Government. He further made a treaty of
alliance with him, and promised him a commando to help him in case of
his being attacked by the Zulus. Now comes the curious part of the
story. On the 18th May 1876, a message came from this same Umbandeni to
Sir H. Bulwer, of which the following is an extract:--"We are sent by
our king to thank the Government of Natal for the information sent to
him last winter by that Government, and conveyed by Mr. Rudolph, of the
intended attack on his people by the Zulus. We are further instructed
by the king to thank the Natal Government for the influence it used to
stop the intended raid, and for instructing a Boer commando to go to
his country to render him assistance in case of need; and further for
appointing Mr. Rudolph at the head of the commando to place him
(Umbandeni) as king over the Amaswazi, and to make a treaty with him
and his people on behalf of the Natal Government.... The Transvaal
Government has asked Umbandeni to acknowledge himself a subject of the
Republic, but he has distinctly refused to do so." In a minute written
on this subject, the Secretary for Native Affairs for Natal says, "No
explanation or assurance from me was sufficient to convince them
(Umbandeni's messengers) that they had on that occasion made themselves
subjects of the South African Republic; they declared it was not their
wish or intention to do so, and that they would refuse to acknowledge a
position into which they had been unwittingly betrayed." I must
conclude this episode by quoting the last paragraph of Sir H. Bulwer's
covering despatch, because it concerns larger issues than the supposed
treaty: "It will not be necessary that I should at present add any
remarks to those contained in the minute of the Secretary for Native
Affairs, but I would observe that the situation arising out of the
relations of the Government of the South African Republic with the
neighbouring native States is so complicated, and presents so many
elements of confusion and of danger to the peace of this portion of
South Africa, that I trust some way may be found to an early settlement
of questions that ought not, in my opinion, to be left alone, as so
many have been left, to take the chance of the future."

And now I come to the last and most imminent native difficulty that at
the time faced the Republic. On the borders of Lydenburg district there
lived a powerful chief named Secocoeni. Between this chief and the
Transvaal Government difficulties arose in the beginning of 1876 on the
usual subject--land. The Boers declared that they had bought the land
from the Swazis, who had conquered portions of the country, and that
the Swazis offered to make it "clean from brambles," _i.e._, kill
everybody living on it; but that they (the Boers) said that they were
to let them be, that they might be their servants. The Basutos, on the
other hand, said that no such sale ever took place, and, even if it did
take place, it was invalid, because the Swazis were not in occupation
of the land, and therefore could not sell it. It was a Christian Kafir
called Johannes, a brother of Secocoeni, who was the immediate cause
of the war. This Johannes used to live at a place called Botsobelo, the
mission-station of Mr. Merensky, but moved to a stronghold on the
Spekboom river, in the disputed territory. The Boers sent to him to
come back, but he refused, and warned the Boers off his land.
Secocoeni was then appealed to, but declared that the land belonged
to his tribe, and would be occupied by Johannes. He also told the Boers
"that he did not wish to fight, but that he was quite ready to do so if
they preferred it." Thereupon the Transvaal Government declared war,
although it does not appear that the natives committed any outrage or
acts of hostility before the declaration. As regards the Boers' right
to Secocoeni's country, Sir H. Barkly sums up the question thus, in a
despatch addressed to President Burgers, dated 28th Nov. 1876:--"On the
whole, it seems perfectly clear, and I feel bound to repeat it, that
Sikukuni was neither _de jure_ or _de facto_ a subject of the
Republic when your Honour declared war against him in June last." As
soon as war had been declared, the clumsy commando system was set
working, and about 2500 white men collected; the Swazis also were
applied to to send a contingent, which they did, being only too glad of
the opportunity of slaughter.

At first all went well, and the President, who accompanied the commando
in person, succeeded in reducing a mountain stronghold, which, in his
high-flown way, he called a "glorious victory" over a "Kafir
Gibraltar."

On the 14th July another engagement took place, when the Boers and
Swazis attacked Johannes' stronghold. The place was taken with
circumstances of great barbarity by the Swazis, for when the signal was
given to advance the Boers did not move. Nearly all the women were
killed, and the brains of the children were dashed out against the
stones; in one instance, before the captive mother's face. Johannes was
badly wounded, and died two days afterwards. When he was dying, he said
to his brother, "I am going to die. I am thankful I do not die by the
hands of these cowardly Boers, but by the hand of a black and
courageous nation like myself...." He then took leave of his people,
told his brother to read the Bible, and expired. The Swazis were so
infuriated at the cowardice displayed by the Boers on this occasion
that they returned home in great dudgeon.

On the 2d of August Secocoeni's mountain, which is a very strong
fortification, was attacked in two columns, or rather an attempt was
made to attack it, for when it came to the pinch only about forty men,
mostly English and Germans, would advance. Thereupon the whole commando
retreated with great haste, the greater part of it going straight home.
In vain the President entreated them to shoot him rather than desert
him; they had had enough of Secocoeni and his stronghold, and home
they went. The President then retreated with what few men he had left
to Steelport, where he built a fort, and from thence returned to
Pretoria. The news of the collapse of the commando was received
throughout the Transvaal, and indeed the whole of South Africa, with
the greatest dismay. For the first time in the history of that country
the white man had been completely worsted by a native tribe, and that
tribe wretched Basutos, people whom the Zulus call their "dogs." It was
glad tidings to every native from the Zambesi to the Cape, who learnt
thereby that the white man was not so invincible as he used to be.
Meanwhile the inhabitants of Lydenburg were filled with alarm, and
again and again petitioned the Governors of the Cape and Natal for
assistance. Their fears were, however, to a great extent groundless,
for, with the exception of occasional cattle-lifting, Secocoeni did
not follow up his victory.

On the 4th September the President opened the special sitting of the
Volksraad, and presented to that body a scheme for the establishment of
a border force to take the place of the commando system, announcing
that he had appointed a certain Captain Von Schlickmann to command it.
He also requested the Raad to make some provision for the expenses of
the expedition, which they had omitted to do in their former sitting.

Captain Von Schlickmann determined to carry on the war upon a different
system. He got together a band of very rough characters on the Diamond
Fields, and occupied the fort built by the President, from whence he
would sally out from time to time and destroy kraals. He seems, if
we may believe the reports in the blue-books and the stories of
eye-witnesses, to have carried on his proceedings in a somewhat savage
way. The following is an extract from a private letter written by one
of his volunteers:--

"About daylight we came across four Kafirs. Saw them first, and charged
in front of them to cut off their retreat. Saw they were women, and
called out not to fire. In spite of that, one of the poor things got
her head blown off (a d----d shame).... Afterwards two women and a baby
were brought to the camp prisoners. The same night they were taken out
by our Kafirs and murdered in cool blood by order of ----. Mr. ---- and
myself strongly protested against it, but without avail. I never heard
such a cowardly piece of business in my life. No good will come of it,
you may depend.... ---- says he would cut all the women and children's
throats he catches. Told him distinctly he was a d----d coward."

Schlickmann was, however, a mild-mannered man when compared to a
certain Abel Erasmus, afterwards denounced at a public dinner by Sir
Garnet Wolseley as a fiend "in human form." This gentleman, in the
month of October, attacked a friendly kraal of Kafirs. The incident is
described thus in a correspondent's letter:--

"The people of the kraals, taken quite by surprise, fled when they saw
their foes, and most of them took shelter in the neighbouring bush. Two
or three men were distinctly seen in their flight from the kraal, and
one of them is known to have been wounded. According to my informant
the remainder were women and children, who were pursued into the bush,
and there, all shivering and shrieking, were put to death by the Boers'
Kafirs, some being shot, but the majority stabbed with assegais. After
the massacre he counted thirteen women and three children, but he says
he did not see the body of a single man. Another Kafir said, pointing
to a place in the road where the stones were thickly strewn, 'the
bodies of the women and children lay like these stones.' The Boer
before mentioned, who has been stationed outside, has told one of his
own friends, whom he thought would not mention it, that the shrieks
were fearful to hear."

Several accounts of, or allusion to, this atrocity can be found in the
blue-books, and I may add that it, in common with others of the same
stamp, was the talk of the country at the time.

I do not relate these horrors out of any wish to rake up old stories to
the prejudice of the Boers, but because I am describing the state of
the country before the Annexation, in which they form an interesting
and important item. Also, it is as well that people in England should
know into what hands they have delivered over the native tribes who
trusted in their protection. What happened in 1876 is probably
happening again now, and will certainly happen again and again. The
character of the Transvaal Boer and his sentiments towards the native
races have not modified during the last five years, but, on the
contrary, a large amount of energy, which has been accumulating during
the period of British protection, will now be expended on their devoted
heads.

As regards the truth of these atrocities, the majority of them are
beyond the possibility of doubt; indeed, to the best of my knowledge,
no serious attempt has ever been made to refute such of them as have
come into public notice, except in a general way, for party purposes.
As, however, they may be doubted, I will quote the following extract
from a despatch written by Sir H. Barkly to Lord Carnarvon, dated 18th
December 1876:--

"As Von Schlickmann has since fallen fighting bravely, it is not
without reluctance that I join in affixing this dark stain on his
memory, but truth compels me to add the following extract from a letter
which I have since received from one whose name (which I communicate to
your Lordship privately) forbids disbelief: 'There is no longer the
_slightest doubt_ as to the murder of the two women and the child
at Steelport by the direct order of Schlickmann, and in the attack on
the kraal near which these women were captured (or some attack about
that period) he ordered his men to cut the throats of all the wounded!
This is no mere report; it is positively true.'" He concludes by
expressing a hope that the course of events will enable Her Majesty's
Government to take such steps "as will terminate this wanton and
useless bloodshed, and prevent the recurrence of the _scenes of
injustice, cruelty, and rapine which abundant evidence is every day
forthcoming to prove have rarely ceased to disgrace the Republics
beyond the Vaal ever since they first sprang into existence_."[4]

          [4] The italics are my own.--AUTHOR.

These are strong words, but none too strong for the facts of the case.
Injustice, cruelty, and rapine have always been the watchwords of the
Transvaal Boers. The stories of wholesale slaughter in the earlier days
of the Republic are very numerous. One of the best known of those
shocking occurrences took place in the Zoutpansberg war in 1865. On
this occasion a large number of Kafirs took refuge in caves, where the
Boers smoked them to death. Some years afterwards Dr. Wangeman, whose
account is, I believe, thoroughly reliable, describes the scene of
their operations in these words:--

"The roof of the first cave was black with smoke; the remains of the
logs which were burnt lay at the entrance. The floor was strewn with
hundreds of skulls and skeletons. In confused heaps lay karosses,
kerries, assegais, pots, spoons, snuff-boxes, and the bones of men,
giving one the impression that this was the grave of a whole people.
Some estimate the number of those who perished here from twenty to
thirty thousand. This is, I believe, too high. In the one chamber there
were from two hundred to three hundred skeletons; the other chambers I
did not visit."

In 1868 a public meeting was held at Potchefstroom to consider the war
then going on with the Zoutpansberg natives. According to the report of
the proceedings, the Rev. Mr. Ludorf said that "on a particular
occasion a number of native children, who were too young to be removed,
had been collected in a heap, covered with long grass, and burned
alive. Other atrocities had also been committed, but these were too
horrible to relate." When called upon to produce his authority for this
statement, Mr. Ludorf named his authority "in a solemn declaration to
the State Attorney." At this same meeting Mr. J. G. Steyn, who had been
Landdrost of Potchefstroom, said, "there now was innocent blood on our
hands which had not yet been avenged, and the curse of God rested on
the land in consequence." Mr. Rosalt remarked that "it was a singular
circumstance that in the different colonial Kafir wars, as also in the
Basuto wars, one did not hear of destitute children being found by the
commandoes, and asked how it was that every petty commando that took
the field in this Republic invariably found numbers of destitute
children. He gave it as his opinion that the present system of
apprenticeship was an essential cause of our frequent hostilities with
the natives." Mr. Jan Talyard said, "Children were forcibly taken from
their parents, and were then called destitute and apprenticed." Mr.
Daniel Van Nooren was heard to say, "If they had to clear the country,
and could not have the children they found, he would shoot them." Mr.
Field-Cornet Furstenburg stated "that when he was at Zoutpansberg with
his burghers, the chief Katse-Kats was told to come down from the
mountains; that he sent one of his subordinates as a proof of amity;
that whilst a delay of five days was guaranteed by Commandant Paul
Kruger, who was then in command, orders were given at the same time to
attack the natives at break of day, which was accordingly done, but
which resulted in total failure." Truly, this must have been an
interesting meeting.

Before leaving these unsavoury subjects, I must touch on the question
of slavery. It has been again and again denied, on behalf of the
Transvaal Boers, that slavery existed in the Republic. Now, this is,
strictly speaking, true; slavery did not exist, but apprenticeship
did--the rose was called by another name, that is all. The poor
destitute children who were picked up by kind-hearted Boers, after the
extermination of their parents, were apprenticed to farmers till they
came of age. It is a remarkable fact that these children never attained
their majority. You might meet oldish men in the Transvaal who were
not, according to their masters' reckoning, twenty-one years of age.
The assertion that slavery did not exist in the Transvaal is only made
to hoodwink the English public. I have known men who have owned slaves,
and who have seen whole waggon-loads of "black ivory," as they were
called, sold for about £15 a-piece. I have at this moment a tenant,
Carolus by name, on some land I own in Natal, now a well-to-do man, who
was for many years--about twenty, if I remember right--a Boer slave.
During those years, he told me, he worked from morning till night, and
the only reward he received was two calves. He finally escaped into
Natal.

If other evidence is needed it is not difficult to find, so I will
quote a little. On the 22d August 1876 we find Khama, king of the
Bamangwato, one of the most worthy chiefs in South Africa, sending a
message to "Victoria, the great Queen of the English people," in these
words:--

"I write to you, Sir Henry, in order that your Queen may preserve for
me my country, it being in her hands. The Boers are coming into it, and
I do not like them. Their actions are cruel among us black people. We
are like money, they sell us and our children. I ask Her Majesty to
pity me, and to hear that which I write quickly. I wish to hear upon
what conditions Her Majesty will receive me, and my country and my
people, under her protection. I am weary with fighting. I do not like
war, and I ask Her Majesty to give me peace. I am very much distressed
that my people are being destroyed by war, and I wish them to obtain
peace. I ask Her Majesty to defend me, as she defends all her people.
There are three things which distress me very much--war, selling
people, and drink. All these things I shall find in the Boers, and it
is these things which destroy people to make an end of them in the
country. _The custom of the Boers has always been to cause people to
be sold, and to-day they are still selling people._ Last year I saw
them pass with two waggons full of people whom they had bought at the
river at Tanane" (Lake Ngate).

The Special Correspondent of the _Cape Argus_, a highly respectable
journal, writes thus on the 28th November 1876:--"The Boer from whom
this information was gleaned has furnished besides some facts which may
not be uninteresting, as a commentary on the repeated denials by Mr.
Burgers of the existence of slavery. During the last week slaves have
been offered for sale on his farm. The captives have been taken from
Secocoeni's country by Mapoch's people, and are being exchanged at the
rate of a child for a heifer. He also assures us that the whole of the
High-veld is being replenished with Kafir children, whom the Boers have
been lately purchasing from the Swazis at the rate of a horse for a
child. I should like to see this man and his father as witnesses before
an Imperial Commission. He let fall one or two incidents of the past
which were brought to mind by the occurrences of the present. In 1864,
he says, 'The Swazis accompanied the Boers against Males. The Boers did
nothing but stand by and witness the fearful massacre. The men and
women were also murdered. One poor woman sat clutching her baby of
eight days old. The Swazis stabbed her through the body, and when she
found that she could not live, she wrung the baby's neck with her own
hands to save it from future misery. On the return of that commando the
children who became too weary to continue the journey were killed on
the road. The survivors were sold as slaves to the farmers.'"

The same gentleman writes in the issue of the 12th December as
follows:--"The whole world may know it, for it is true, and
investigation will only bring out the horrible details, that through
the whole course of this Republic's existence it has acted in
contravention of the Sand River Treaty; and slavery has occurred not
only here and there in isolated cases, but as an unbroken practice, and
has been one of the peculiar institutions of the country, mixed up with
all its social and political life. It has been at the root of most of
its wars. It has been carried on regularly even in times of peace. It
has been characterised by all those circumstances which have so often
roused the British nation to an indignant protest, and to repeated
efforts to banish the slave trade from the world. The Boers have not
only fallen on unsuspecting kraals simply for the purpose of obtaining
the women and children and cattle, but they have carried on a traffic
through natives who have kidnapped the children of their weaker
neighbours, and sold them to the white man. Again, the Boers have sold
and exchanged their victims among themselves. Waggon-loads of slaves
have been conveyed from one end of the country to the other for sale,
and that with the cognisance of, and for the direct advantage of, the
highest officials of the land. The writer has himself seen in a town,
situated in the south of the Republic, the children who had been
brought down from a remote northern district. One fine morning, in
walking through the streets, he was struck with the number of little
black strangers standing about certain houses, and wondered where they
could have come from. He learnt a few hours later that they were part
of loads which were disposed of on the outskirts of the town the day
before. The circumstances connected with some of these kidnapping
excursions are appalling, and the barbarities practised by cruel
masters upon some of these defenceless creatures during the course of
their servitude are scarcely less horrible than those reported from
Turkey. It is no disgrace in this country for an official to ride a
fine horse which was got for two Kafir children, to procure whom the
father and mother were shot. No reproach is inherited by the mistress
who, day after day, tied up her female servant in an agonising posture,
and had her beaten until there was no sound part in her body, securing
her in the stocks during the intervals of torture. That man did not
lose caste who tied up another woman and had her thrashed until she
brought forth at the whipping-post. These are merely examples of
thousands of cases which could be proved were an Imperial Commission to
sit, and could the wretched victims of a prolonged oppression recover
sufficiently from the dread of their old tyrants to give a truthful
report."

To come to some evidence more recently adduced. On the 9th May 1881, an
affidavit was sworn to by the Rev. John Thorne, curate of St. John the
Evangelist, Lydenburg, Transvaal, and presented to the Royal Commission
appointed to settle Transvaal affairs, in which he states:--"That I was
appointed to the charge of a congregation in Potchefstroom, about
thirteen years ago, when the Republic was under the presidency of Mr.
Pretorius.[5] I remember noticing one morning as I walked through the
streets, a number of young natives, whom I knew to be strangers. I
inquired where they came from. I was told that they had just been
brought from Zoutpansberg. This was the locality from which slaves were
chiefly brought at that time, and were traded for under the name of
'Black Ivory.' One of these natives belonged to Mr. Munich, the State
Attorney. It was a matter of common remark at that time that the
President of the Republic was himself one of the greatest dealers in
slaves." In the fourth paragraph of the same affidavit Mr. Thorne says,
"That the Rev. Doctor Nachtigal, of the Berlin Missionary Society, was
the interpreter for Shatane's people in the private office of Mr. Roth,
and, at the close of the interview, told me what had occurred. On my
expressing surprise, he went on to relate that he had information on
native matters which would surprise me more. He then produced the copy
of a register, kept in the Landdrost's office, of men, women, and
children, to the number of four hundred and eighty (480), who had been
disposed of by one Boer to another for a consideration. In one case an
ox was given in exchange, in another goats, in a third a blanket, and
so forth. Many of these natives he (Mr. Nachtigal) knew personally. The
copy was certified as true and correct by an official of the Republic,
and I would mention his name now, only that I am persuaded that it
would cost the man his life if his act became known to the Boers."

          [5] One of the famous Triumvirate.

On the 16th May 1881, a native, named Frederick Molepo, was examined by
the Royal Commission. The following are extracts from his
examination:--

"(_Sir E. Wood._) Are you a Christian?--Yes.

"(_Sir H. de Villiers._) How long were you a slave?--Half a year.

"How do you know that you were a slave? Might you not have been an
apprentice?--No, I was not apprenticed.

"How do you know?--They got me from my parents, and ill-treated me.

"(_Sir E. Wood._) How many times did you get the stick?--Every day.

"(_Sir H. de Villiers._) What did the Boers do with you when they
caught you?--They sold me.

"How much did they sell you for?--One cow and a big pot."

On the 28th May 1881, amongst the other documents handed in for the
consideration of the Royal Commission, is the statement of a headman,
whose name it has been considered advisable to omit in the blue-book
for fear the Boers should take vengeance on him. He says, "I say, that
if the English government dies I shall die too; I would rather die than
be under the Boer Government. I am the man who helped to make bricks
for the church you see now standing in the square here (Pretoria), as a
slave without payment. As a representative of my people I am still
obedient to the English Government, and willing to obey all commands
from them, even to die for their cause in this country, rather than
submit to the Boers.

"I was under Shambok, my chief, who fought the Boers formerly, but he
left us, and we were _put up to auction_ and sold among the Boers. I
want to state this myself to the Royal Commission in Newcastle. I was
bought by Fritz Botha and sold by Frederick Botha, who was then veld
cornet (justice of the peace) of the Boers."[6]

          [6] I have taken the liberty to quote all these extracts
          exactly as they stand in the original, instead of weaving
          their substance into my narrative, in order that I may not be
          accused, as so often happens to authors who write upon this
          subject, of having presented a garbled version of the truth.
          The original of every extract is to be found in blue-books
          presented to Parliament. I have thought it best to confine
          myself to these, and avoid repeating stories of cruelties and
          slavery, however well authenticated, that have come to my
          knowledge privately such stories being always more or less
          open to suspicion.

It would be easy to find more reports of the slave-trading practices of
the Boers, but as the above are fair samples it will not be necessary
to do so. My readers will be able from them to form some opinion as to
whether or not slavery or apprenticeship existed in the Transvaal. If
they come to the conclusion that it did, it must be borne in mind that
what existed in the past will certainly exist again in the future.
Natives are not now any fonder of working for Boers than they were a
few years back, and Boers must get labour somehow. If, on the other
hand, it did not exist, then the Boers are a grossly slandered people,
and all writers on the subject, from Livingstone down, have combined to
take away their character.

Leaving native questions for the present, we must now return to the
general affairs of the country. When President Burgers opened the
special sitting of the Volksraad, on the 4th September, he appealed, it
will be remembered, to that body for pecuniary aid to liquidate the
expenses of the war. This appeal was responded to by the passing of a
war tax, under which every owner of a farm was to pay £10, the owner of
half a farm £5, and so on. The tax was not a very just one, since it
fell with equal weight on the rich man who held twenty farms and the
poor man who held but one. Its justice or injustice was, however, to a
great extent immaterial, since the free and independent burghers,
including some of the members of the Volksraad who had imposed it,
promptly refused to pay it, or indeed, whilst they were about it, any
other tax. As the Treasury was already empty, and creditors were
pressing, this refusal was most ill-timed, and things began to look
very black indeed. Meanwhile, in addition to the ordinary expenditure,
and the interest payable on debts, money had to be found to pay Von
Schlickmann's volunteers. As there was no cash in the country, this was
done by issuing Government promissory notes, known as "goodfors," or
vulgarly as "good for nothings," and by promising them all booty, and
to each man a farm of two thousand acres, lying east and north-east of
the Loolu mountains--in other words, in Secocoeni's territory, which
did not belong to the Government to give away. The officials were the
next to suffer, and for six months before the Annexation these
unfortunate individuals lived as best they could, for they certainly
got no salary, except in the case of a postmaster, who was told to help
himself to his pay in stamps. The Government issued large numbers of
bills, but the banks refused to discount them, and in some cases the
neighbouring colonies had to advance money to the Transvaal post-cart
contractors who were carrying the mails, as a matter of charity. The
Government even mortgaged the great salt-pan near Pretoria for the
paltry sum of £400, whilst the leading officials of the Government were
driven to pledging their own private credit in order to obtain the
smallest article necessary to its continuance. In fact, to such a pass
did things come that when the country was annexed a single threepenny
bit (which had doubtless been overlooked) was found in the Treasury
chest, together with acknowledgments of debts to the extent of nearly
£300,000.

Nor was the refusal to pay taxes, which they were powerless to enforce,
the only difficulty with which the Government had to contend. Want of
money is as bad and painful a thing to a State as to an individual, but
there are perhaps worse things than want of money, one of which is to
be deserted by your own friends and household. This was the position of
the Government of the Republic; no sooner was it involved in
overwhelming difficulties than its own subjects commenced to bait it,
more especially the English portion of its subjects. They complained to
the English authorities about the commandeering of members of their
family or goods; they petitioned the British Government to interfere,
and generally made themselves as unpleasant as possible to the local
authorities. Such a course of action was perhaps natural, but it can
hardly be said to be either quite logical or just. The Transvaal
Government had never asked them to come and live in the country, and if
they did so, it was presumably at their own risk. On the other hand, it
must be remembered that many of the agitators had accumulated property,
to leave which would mean ruin; and they saw that, unless something was
done, its value would be destroyed.

Under the pressure of all these troubles the Boers themselves split up
into factions, as they are always ready to do. The Dopper party
declared that they had had enough progress, and proposed the extremely
conservative Paul Kruger as President, Burgers' time having nearly
expired. Paul Kruger accepted the candidature, although he had
previously promised his support to Burgers, and distrust of each other
was added to the other difficulties of the Executive, the Transvaal
becoming a house very much divided against itself. Natives, Doppers,
Progressionists, Officials, English, were all pulling different ways,
and each striving for his own advantage. Anything more hopeless than
the position of the country on the 1st January 1877 it is impossible to
conceive. Enemies surrounded it; on every border there was the prospect
of a serious war. In the exchequer there was nothing but piles of
overdue bills. The President was helpless, and mistrustful of his
officers, and the officers were caballing against the President. All
the ordinary functions of Government had ceased, and trade was
paralysed. Now and then wild proposals were made to relieve the State
of its burdens, some of which partook of the nature of repudiation, but
these were the exception; the majority of the inhabitants, who would
neither fight nor pay taxes, sat still and awaited the catastrophe,
utterly careless of all consequences.




CHAPTER III.

THE ANNEXATION.


The state of affairs described in the previous chapter was one that
filled the Secretary of State for the Colonies with alarm. During his
tenure of office Lord Carnarvon evidently had the permanent welfare of
South Africa much at heart, and he saw with apprehension that the
troubles that were brewing in the Transvaal were of a nature likely to
involve the Cape and Natal in a native war. Though there is a broad
line of demarcation between Dutch and English, it is not so broad but
that a victorious nation like the Zulus might cross it, and beginning
by fighting the Boer, might end by fighting the white man irrespective
of race. When the reader reflects how terrible would be the
consequences of a combination of native tribes against the Whites, and
how easily such a combination might at that time have been brought
about in the first flush of native successes, he will understand the
anxiety with which all thinking men watched the course of events in the
Transvaal in 1876.

At last they took such a serious turn that the Home Government saw that
some action must be taken if the catastrophe was to be averted, and
determined to despatch Sir Theophilus Shepstone as Special Commissioner
to the Transvaal, with powers, should it be necessary, to annex the
country to Her Majesty's dominions, "in order to secure the peace and
safety of Our said colonies and of Our subjects elsewhere."

The terms of his Commission were unusually large, leaving a great deal
to his discretionary power. In choosing that officer for the execution
of a most difficult and delicate mission, the Government, doubtless,
made a very wise selection. Sir Theophilus Shepstone is a man of
remarkable tact and ability, combined with great openness and
simplicity of mind, and one whose name will always have a leading place
in South African history. During a long official lifetime he has had to
do with most of the native races in South Africa, and certainly knows
them and their ways better than any living man; whilst he is by them
all regarded with a peculiar and affectionate reverence. He is _par
excellence_ their great white chief and "father," and a word from
him, even now that he has retired from active life, still carries more
weight than the formal remonstrances of any governor in South Africa.

With the Boers he is almost equally well acquainted, having known many
of them personally for years. He possesses, moreover, the rare power of
winning the regard and affection, as well as the respect, of those
about him in such a marked degree that those who have served him once
would go far to serve him again. Sir T. Shepstone, however, has enemies
like other people, and is commonly reported among them to be a disciple
of Machiavelli, and to have his mind steeped in all the darker wiles of
Kafir policy. The Annexation of the Transvaal is by them attributed to
a successful and vigorous use of those arts that distinguished the
diplomacy of two centuries ago. Falsehood and bribery are supposed to
have been the great levers used to effect the change, together with
threats of extinction at the hands of a savage and unfriendly nation.

That the Annexation was a triumph of mind over matter is quite true,
but whether or no that triumph was unworthily obtained, I will leave
those who read this short chronicle of the events connected with it to
judge. I saw it somewhat darkly remarked in a newspaper the other day
that the history of the Annexation had evidently yet to be written; and
I fear that the remark represents the feeling of most people about that
event, implying as it did that it was carried out by means certainly
mysteriously and presumably doubtful. I am afraid that those who think
thus will be disappointed in what I have to say about the matter, since
I know that the means employed to bring the Boers--

    "Fracti bello, fatisque repulsi"--

under Her Majesty's authority were throughout as fair and honest as the
Annexation itself was, in my opinion, right and necessary.

To return to Sir T. Shepstone. He undoubtedly had faults as a ruler,
one of the most prominent of which was that his natural mildness of
character would never allow him to act with severity even when severity
was necessary. The very criminals condemned to death ran a good chance
of reprieve when he had to sign their death-warrants. He has also that
worst of faults (so-called), in one fitted by nature to become
great--want of ambition, a failing that in such a man marks him the
possessor of an even and a philosophic mind. It was no seeking of his
own that raised him out of obscurity, and when his work was done to
comparative obscurity he elected to return, though whether a man of his
ability and experience in South African affairs should, at the present
crisis, be allowed to remain there, is another question.

On the 20th December 1876, Sir T. Shepstone wrote to President Burgers,
informing him of his approaching visit to the Transvaal, to secure, if
possible, the adjustment of existing troubles, and the adoption of such
measures as might be best calculated to prevent their recurrence in the
future.

On his road to Pretoria, Sir Theophilus received a hearty welcome from
the Boer as well as the English inhabitants of the country. One of
these addresses to him says: "Be assured, high honourable Sir, that we
burghers, now assembled together, entertain the most friendly feeling
towards your Government, and that we shall agree with anything you may
do in conjunction with our Government for the progress of our State,
the strengthening against our native enemies, and for the general
welfare of all the inhabitants of the whole of South Africa. Welcome in
Heidelberg, and welcome in the Transvaal."

At Pretoria the reception of the Special Commissioner was positively
enthusiastic; the whole town came out to meet him, and the horses
having been taken out of the carriage, he was dragged in triumph
through the streets. In his reply to the address presented to him, Sir
Theophilus shadowed forth the objects of his mission in these words:
"Recent events in this country have shown to all thinking men the
absolute necessity for closer union and more oneness of purpose among
the Christian Governments of the southern portion of this continent:
the best interests of the native races, no less than the peace and
prosperity of the white, imperatively demand it, and I rely upon you
and upon your Government to co-operate with me in endeavouring to
achieve the great and glorious end of inscribing on a general South
African banner the appropriate motto--"Eendragt maakt magt" (Unity
makes strength)."

A few days after his arrival a commission was appointed, consisting of
Messrs. Henderson and Osborn, on behalf of the Special Commissioner,
and Messrs. Kruger and Jorissen, on behalf of the Transvaal Government,
to discuss the state of the country. This commission came to nothing,
and was on both sides nothing more than a bit of by-play.

The arrival of the mission was necessarily regarded with mixed feelings
by the inhabitants of the Transvaal. By one party it was eagerly
greeted, viz., the English section of the population, who devoutly
hoped that it had come to annex the country. With the exception of the
Hollander element, the officials also were glad of its arrival, and
secretly hoped that the country would be taken over, when there would
be more chance of their getting their arrear pay. The better educated
Boers also were for the most part satisfied that there was no hope for
the country unless England helped it in some way, though they did not
like having to accept the help. But the more bigoted and narrow-minded
among them were undoubtedly opposed to English interference, and under
their leader, Paul Kruger, who was at the time running for the
President's chair, did their best to be rid of it. They found ready
allies in the Hollander clientelle, with which Mr. Burgers had
surrounded himself, headed by the famous Dr. Jorissen, who was, like
most of the rulers of this singular State, an ex-clergyman, but now an
Attorney-general, not learned in the law. These men were for the most
part entirely unfit for the positions they held, and feared that in the
event of the country changing hands they might be ejected from them;
and also, they did all Englishmen the favour to regard them with that
peculiarly virulent and general hatred which is a part of the secret
creed of many foreigners, more especially of such as are under our
protection. As may easily be imagined, what between all these different
parties and the presence of the Special Commissioner, there were
certainly plenty of intrigues going on in Pretoria during the first few
months of 1877, and the political excitement was very great. Nobody
knew how far Sir T. Shepstone was prepared to go, and everybody was
afraid of putting out his hand further than he could pull it back, and
trying to make himself comfortable on two stools at once. Members of
the Volksraad and other prominent individuals in the country who had
during the day been denouncing the Commissioner in no measured terms,
and even proposing that he and his staff should be shot as a warning to
the English Government, might be seen arriving at his house under cover
of the shades of evening, to have a little talk with him, and express
the earnest hope that it was his intention to annex the country as soon
as possible. It is necessary to assist at a peaceable annexation to
learn the depth of meanness human nature is capable of.

In Pretoria, at any rate, the ladies were of great service to the cause
of the mission, since they were nearly all in favour of a change of
government, and, that being the case, they naturally soon brought their
husbands, brothers, and lovers to look at things from the same point of
view. It was a wise man who said that in any matter where it is
necessary to obtain the goodwill of a population you should win over
the women; that done, you need not trouble yourself about the men.

Though the country was thus overflowing with political intrigues,
nothing of the kind went on in the Commissioner's camp. It was not he
who made the plots to catch the Transvaalers; on the contrary, they
made the plots to catch him. For several months all that he did was to
sit still and let the rival passions work their way, fighting what the
Zulus afterwards called the "fight of sit down." When anybody came to
see him he was very glad to meet them, pointed out the desperate
condition of the country, and asked them if they could suggest a
remedy. And that was about all he did do, beyond informing himself very
carefully as to all that was going on in the country, and the movements
of the natives within and outside its borders. There was no money spent
in bribery, as has been stated, though it is impossible to imagine a
state of affairs in which it would have been more easy to bribe, or in
which it could have been done with greater effect; unless indeed the
promise that some pension should be paid to President Burgers can be
called a bribe, which it was certainly never intended to be, but simply
a guarantee that after having spent all his private means on behalf of
the State he should not be left destitute. The statement that the
Annexation was effected under a threat that if the Government did not
give its consent Sir T. Shepstone would let loose the Zulus on the
country is also a wicked and malicious invention, but with this I shall
deal more at length further on.

It must not, however, be understood that the Annexation was a foregone
conclusion, or that Sir T. Shepstone came up to the Transvaal with the
fixed intention of annexing the country without reference to its
position, merely with a view of extending British influence, or, as has
been absurdly stated, in order to benefit Natal. He had no fixed
purpose, whether it were necessary or no, of exercising the full powers
given to him by his commission; on the contrary, he was all along most
anxious to find some internal resources within the State by means of
which Annexation could be averted, and of this fact his various letters
and despatches give full proof. Thus, in his letter to President
Burgers, of the 9th April 1877, in which he announces his intention of
annexing the country, he says: "I have more than once assured your
Honour that if I could think of any plan by which the independence of
the State could be maintained by its own internal resources I would
most certainly not conceal that plan from you." It is also incidentally
remarkably confirmed by a passage in Mr. Burgers' posthumous defence,
in which he says: "Hence I met Shepstone alone in my house, and opened
up the subject of his mission. With a candour that astonished me, he
avowed that his purpose was to annex the country, as he had sufficient
grounds for it, unless I could so alter as to satisfy his Government.
My plan of a new constitution, modelled after that of America, of a
standing police force of two hundred mounted men, was then proposed. He
promised to give me time to call the Volksraad together, and to
_abandon his design_ if the Volksraad would adopt these measures,
and the country be willing to submit to them, and to carry them out."
Further on he says: "In justice to Shepstone I must say that I would
not consider an officer of my Government to have acted faithfully if he
had not done what Shepstone did."

It has also been frequently alleged in England, and always seems to be
taken as the groundwork of argument in the matter of the Annexation,
that the Special Commissioner represented that the majority of the
inhabitants wished for the Annexation, and that it was sanctioned on
that ground. This statement shows the great ignorance that exists in
this country of South African affairs, an ignorance which in this case
has been carefully fostered by Mr. Gladstone's Government for party
purposes, they having found it necessary to assume, in order to make
their position in the matter tenable, that Sir T. Shepstone and other
officers had been guilty of misrepresentation. Unfortunately, the
Government and its supporters have been more intent upon making out
their case than upon ascertaining the truth of their statements. If
they had taken the trouble to refer to Sir T. Shepstone's despatches,
they would have found that the ground on which the Transvaal was
annexed was, not because the majority of the inhabitants wished for it
but because the State was drifting into anarchy, was bankrupt, and was
about to be destroyed by native tribes. They would further have found
that Sir T. Shepstone never represented that the majority of the Boers
were in favour of Annexation. What he did say was that most thinking
men in the country saw no other way out of the difficulty; but what
proportion of the Boers can be called "thinking men?" He also said, in
the fifteenth paragraph of his despatch to Lord Carnarvon of 6th March
1877, that petitions signed by 2500 people, representing every class of
the community, out of a total adult male population of 8000, had been
presented to the Government of the Republic, setting forth its
difficulties and dangers, and praying it "to treat with me for their
amelioration or removal." He also stated, and with perfect truth, that
many more would have signed had it not been for the terrorism that was
exercised, and that all the towns and villages in the country desired
the change, which was a patent fact.

This is the foundation on which the charge of misrepresentation is
built--a charge which has been manipulated so skilfully, and with such
a charming disregard for the truth, that the British public has been
duped into believing it. When it is examined into, it vanishes into
thin air.

But a darker charge has been brought against the Special Commissioner--a
charge affecting his honour as a gentleman and his character as a
Christian; and, strange to say, has gained a considerable credence,
especially amongst a certain party in England. I allude to the
statement that he called up the Zulu army with the intention of
sweeping the Transvaal if the Annexation was objected to. I may state,
from my own personal knowledge, that the report is a complete
falsehood, and that no such threat was ever made, either by Sir T.
Shepstone or by anybody connected with him, and I will briefly prove
what I say.

When the mission first arrived at Pretoria, a message came from
Cetywayo to the effect that he had heard that the Boers had fired at
"Sompseu" (Sir T. Shepstone), and announcing his intention of attacking
the Transvaal if "his father" was touched. About the middle of March
alarming rumours began to spread as to the intended action of Cetywayo
with reference to the Transvaal; but as Sir T. Shepstone did not think
that the king would be likely to make any hostile movement whilst he
was in the country, he took no steps in the matter. Neither did the
Transvaal Government ask his advice and assistance. Indeed, a
remarkable trait in the Boers is their supreme self-conceit, which
makes them believe that they are capable of subduing all the natives in
Africa, and of thrashing the whole British army if necessary.
Unfortunately, the recent course of events has tended to confirm them
in their opinion as regards their white enemies. To return: towards the
second week in April, or the week before the proclamation of Annexation
was issued, things began to look very serious; indeed, rumours that
could hardly be discredited reached the Special Commissioner that the
whole Zulu army was collected in a chain of Impis or battalions, with
the intention of bursting into the Transvaal and sweeping the country.
Knowing how terrible would be the catastrophe if this were to happen,
Sir T. Shepstone was much alarmed about the matter, and at a meeting
with the Executive Council of the Transvaal Government he pointed out
to them the great danger in which the country was placed. This was done
in the presence of several officers of his staff, and it was on this
friendly exposition of the state of affairs that the charge that he had
threatened the country with invasion by the Zulus was based. On the
11th April, or the day before the Annexation, a message was despatched
to Cetywayo, telling him of the reports that had reached Pretoria, and
stating that if they were true he must forthwith give up all such
intentions, as the Transvaal would at once be placed under the
sovereignty of Her Majesty, and that if he had assembled any armies for
purposes of aggression they must be disbanded at once. Sir T.
Shepstone's message reached Zululand not a day too soon. Had the
Annexation of the Transvaal been delayed by a few weeks even--and this
is a point which I earnestly beg Englishmen to remember in connection
with that act--Cetywayo's armies would have entered the Transvaal,
carrying death before them, and leaving a wilderness behind them.

Cetywayo's answer to the Special Commissioner's message will
sufficiently show, to use Sir Theophilus' own words in his despatch on
the subject, "the pinnacle of peril which the Republic and South Africa
generally had reached at the moment when the Annexation took place." He
says, "I thank my Father Sompseu (Sir T. Shepstone) for his message. I
am glad that he has sent it, because the Dutch have tired me out, and I
intended to fight them once and once only, and to drive them over the
Vaal. Kabana (name of messenger), you see my Impis (armies) are
gathered. It was to fight the Dutch I called them together; now I will
send them back to their homes. Is it well that two men ('amadoda-amabili')
should be made 'iziula' (fools)? In the reign of my father Umpanda the
Boers were constantly moving their boundary further into my country.
Since his death the same thing has been done. I had therefore
determined to end it once for all!" The message then goes on to other
matters, and ends with a request to be allowed to fight the Amaswazi,
because "they fight together and kill one another. This," says Cetywayo
naively, "is wrong, and I want to chastise them for it."

This quotation will suffice to convince all reasonable men, putting
aside all other matters, from what imminent danger the Transvaal was
delivered by the much-abused Annexation.

Some months after that event, however, it occurred to the ingenious
mind of some malicious individual in Natal that, properly used, much
political capital might be made out of this Zulu incident, and the
story that Cetywayo's army had been called up by Sir Theophilus himself
to overawe, and, if necessary, subdue the Transvaal, was accordingly
invented and industriously circulated. Although Sir T. Shepstone at
once caused it to be authoritatively contradicted, such an astonishing
slander naturally took firm root, and on the 12th April 1879 we have
Mr. M. W. Pretorius, one of the Boer leaders, publicly stating at a
meeting of the farmers that "previous to the Annexation Sir T.
Shepstone had threatened the Transvaal with an attack from the Zulus as
an argument for advancing the Annexation." Under such an imputation the
Government could no longer keep silence, and accordingly Sir Owen
Lanyon, who was then Administrator of the Transvaal, caused the matter
to be officially investigated, with these results, which are summed up
by him in a letter to Mr. Pretorius, dated 1st May 1879:--

1. The records of the Republican Executive Council contained no
allusion to any such statement.

2. Two members of that Council filed statements in which they
unreservedly denied that Sir T. Shepstone used the words or threats
imputed to him.

3. Two officers of Sir T. Shepstone's staff, who were always present
with him at interviews with the Executive Council, filed statements to
the same effect.

"I have no doubt," adds Sir Owen Lanyon, "that the report has been
originated and circulated by some evil-disposed person."

In addition to this evidence we have a letter written to the Colonial
Office by Sir T. Shepstone, dated London, August 12, 1879, in which he
points out that Mr. Pretorius was not even present at any of the
interviews with the Executive Council on which occasion he accuses him
of having made use of the threats. He further shows that the use of
such a threat on his part would have, been the depth of folly, and
"knowingly to court the instant and ignominious failure of my mission,"
because the Boers were so persuaded of their own prowess that they
could not be convinced that they stood in any danger from native
sources, and also because "such play with such keen-edged tools as the
excited passions of savages are, and especially such savages as I knew
the Zulus to be, is not what an experience of forty-two years in
managing them inclined me to." And yet, in the face of all this
accumulated evidence, this report continues to be believed, that is, by
those who wished to believe it.

Such are the accusations that have been brought against the manner of
the Annexation and the officer who carried it out, and never were
accusations more groundless. Indeed, both for party purposes, and from
personal animus, every means, fair or foul, has been used to discredit
it and all connected with it. To take a single instance, one author
(Miss Colenso, p. 134, "History of the Zulu War") actually goes the
length of putting a portion of a speech made by President Burgers into
the mouth of Sir T. Shepstone, and then abusing him for his incredible
profanity. Surely this exceeds the limits of fair criticism.

Before I go on to the actual history of the Annexation there is one
point I wish to submit to my reader. In England the change of
Government has always been talked of as though it only affected the
forty thousand white inhabitants of the country, whilst everybody seems
to forget that this same land had about a million human beings living
on it, its original owners, and only, unfortunately for themselves,
possessing a black skin, and therefore entitled to little
consideration,--even at the hands of the most philanthropic Government
in the world. It never seems to have occurred to those who have raised
so much outcry on behalf of the forty thousand Boers, to inquire what
was thought of the matter by the million natives. If they were to be
allowed a voice in their own disposal, the country was certainly
annexed by the wish of a very large majority of the inhabitants. It is
true that Secocoeni, instigated thereto by the Boers, afterwards
continued the war against us, but, with the exception of this one
chief, the advent of our rule was hailed with joy by every native in
the Transvaal, and even he was glad of it at the time. During our
period of rule in the Transvaal the natives have had, as they foresaw,
more peace than at any time since the white man set foot in the land.
They have paid their taxes gladly, and there has been no fighting among
themselves; but since we have given up the country we hear a very
different tale. It is this million of men, women, and children who,
notwithstanding their black skins, live and feel, and have intelligence
as much as ourselves, who are the principal, because the most numerous
sufferers from Mr. Gladstone's conjuring tricks, that can turn a
Sovereign into a Suzerain as airily as the professor of magic brings a
litter of guinea-pigs out of a top hat. It is our falsehood and
treachery to them whom we took over "for ever," as we told them, and
whom we have now handed back to their natural enemies to be paid off
for their loyalty to the Englishman, that is the blackest stain in all
this black business, and that has destroyed our prestige, and caused us
to be looked on amongst them, for they do not hide their opinion, as
"cowards and liars."

But very little attention, however, seems to have been paid to native
views or claims at any time in the Transvaal; indeed they have all
along been treated as serfs of the soil, to be sold with it, if
necessary, to a new master. It is true that the Government, acting
under pressure from the Aborigines Protection Society, made, on the
occasion of the Surrender, a feeble effort to secure the independence
of some of the native tribes; but when the Boer leaders told them
shortly that they would have nothing of the sort, and that, if they
were not careful, they would reoccupy Laing's Nek, the proposal was at
once dropped, with many assurances that no offence was intended. The
worst of the matter is that this treatment of our native subjects and
allies will assuredly recoil on the heads of future innocent
Governments.

Shortly after the appointment of the Joint-Commission alluded to at the
beginning of this chapter, President Burgers, who was now in possession
of the Special Commissioner's intentions, should he be unable to carry
out reforms sufficiently drastic to satisfy the English Government,
thought it best to call together the Volksraad. In the meantime, it had
been announced that the "rebel" Secocoeni had sued for peace and
signed a treaty declaring himself a subject of the Republic. I shall
have to enter into the question of this treaty a little further on, so
I will at present only say that it was the first business laid before
the Raad, and, after some discussion, ratified. Next in order to the
Secocoeni peace came the question of Confederation, as laid down in
Lord Carnarvon's Permissive Bill. This proposal was laid before them in
an earnest and eloquent speech by their President, who entreated them
to consider the dangerous position of the Republic, and to face their
difficulties like men. The question was referred to a committee, and an
adverse report being brought up, was rejected without further
consideration. It is just possible that intimidation had something to
do with the summary treatment of so important a matter, seeing that
whilst it was being argued a large mob of Boers, looking very
formidable with their sea-cow hide whips, watched every move of their
representatives through the windows of the Volksraad Hall. It was Mr.
Chamberlain's caucus system in practical and visible operation.

A few days after the rejection of the Confederation Bill, President
Burgers, who had frequently alluded to the desperate condition of the
Republic, and stated that either some radical reform must be effected
or the country must come under the British flag, laid before the Raad a
brand new constitution of a very remarkable nature, asserting that they
must either accept it or lose their independence.

The first part of this strange document dealt with the people and their
rights, which remained much as they were before, with the exception
that the secrecy of all letters entrusted to the post was to be
inviolable. The recognition of this right is an amusing incident in the
history of a free Republic. Under following articles the Volksraad was
entrusted with the charge of the native inhabitants of the State, the
provision for the administration of justice, the conduct of education,
the regulation of money-bills, &c. It is in the fourth chapter,
however, that we come to the real gist of the Bill, which was the
endowment of the State President with the authority of a dictator. Mr.
Burgers thought to save the State by making himself an absolute
monarch. He was to be elected for a period of seven instead of five
years, and to be eligible for re-election. In him was vested the power
of making all appointments without reference to the Legislature. All
laws were to be drawn up by him, and he was to have the right of veto
on Volksraad resolutions, which body he could summon and dissolve at
will. Finally, his Executive Council was to consist of heads of
departments appointed by himself, and of one member of the Volksraad.
The Volksraad treated this Bill in much the same way as they had dealt
with the Permissive Confederation Bill, gave it a casual consideration,
and threw it out.

The President, meanwhile, was doing his best to convince the Raad of
the danger of the country; that the treasury was empty, whilst duns
were pressing, that enemies were threatening on every side, and,
finally, that Her Majesty's Special Commissioner was encamped within a
thousand yards of them, watching their deliberations with some
interest. He showed them that it was impossible at once to scorn reform
and reject friendly offers, that it was doubtful if anything could save
them, but that if they took no steps they were certainly lost as a
nation. The "Fathers of the land," however, declined to dance to the
President's piping. Then he took a bolder line. He told them that a
guilty nation never can evade the judgment that follows its steps. He
asked them "conscientiously to advise the people not obstinately to
refuse a union with a powerful Government. He could not advise them to
refuse such a union.... He did not believe that a new constitution
would save them; for as little as the old constitution had brought them
to ruin, so little would a new constitution bring salvation.... If the
citizens of England had behaved towards the Crown as the burghers of
this State had behaved to their Government, England would never have
stood so long as she had." He pointed out to them their hopeless
financial position. "To-day," he said, "a bill for £1100 was laid
before me for signature; but I would sooner have cut off my right hand
than sign that paper--(cheers)--for I have not the slightest ground
to expect that, when that bill becomes due, there will be a penny to
pay it with." And finally, he exhorted them thus: "Let them make the
best of the situation, and get the best terms they possibly could;
let them agree to join their hands to those of their brethren in the
south, and then from the Cape to the Zambesi there would be one great
people. Yes, there was something grand in that, grander even than
their idea of a Republic, something which ministered to their national
feeling--(cheers)--and would this be so miserable? Yes, this would be
miserable for those who would not be under the law, for the rebel and
the revolutionist, but welfare and prosperity for the men of law and
order."

These powerful words form a strong indictment against the Republic, and
from them there can be little doubt that President Burgers was
thoroughly convinced of the necessity and wisdom of the Annexation. It
is interesting to compare them, and many other utterances of his made
at this period, with the opinions he expresses in the posthumous
document recently published, in which he speaks somewhat jubilantly of
the lessons taught us on Laing's Nek and Majuba by such "an inherently
weak people as the Boers," and points to them as striking instances of
retribution. In this document he attributes the Annexation to the
desire to advance English supremacy in South Africa, and to lay hold of
the way to Central South Africa. It is, however, noticeable that he
does not in any way indicate how it could have been averted, and the
State continue to exist; and he seems all along to feel that his case
is a weak one, for in explaining, or attempting to explain, why he had
never defended himself from the charges brought against him in
connection with the Annexation, he says: "Had I not endured in silence,
had I not borne patiently all the accusations, but out of selfishness
or fear told the plain truth of the case, the Transvaal would never
have had the consideration it has now received from Great Britain.
However unjust the Annexation was, my self-justification would have
_exposed the Boers to such an extent_, and the state of the country in
such a way, that it would have deprived them both of the sympathy of
the world and the consideration of the English politicians." In other
words, "If I had told the truth about things as I should have been
obliged to do to justify myself, there would have been no more outcry
about the Annexation, because the whole world, even the English
Radicals, would have recognised how necessary it was, and what a
fearful state the country was in."

But to let that pass, it is evident that President Burgers did not take
the same view of the Annexation in 1877 as he did in 1881, and indeed
his speeches to the Volksraad would read rather oddly printed in
parallel columns with his posthumous statement. The reader would be
forced to one of two conclusions, either on one of the two occasions he
is saying what he does not mean, or he must have changed his mind. As I
believe him to have been an honest man, I incline to the latter
supposition; nor do I consider it so very hard to account for, taking
into consideration his natural Dutch proclivities. In 1877 Burgers is
the despairing head of a State driving rapidly to ruin, if not to
actual extinction, when the strong hand of the English Government is
held out to him. What wonder that he accepts it gladly on behalf of his
country, which is by its help brought into a state of greater
prosperity than it has ever before known? In 1881 the wheel has gone
round, and great events have come about whilst he lies dying. The
enemies of the Boers have been destroyed, the powers of the Zulus and
Secocoeni are no more; the country has prospered under a healthy
rule, and its finances have been restored. More,--glad tidings have
come from Mid-Lothian to the "rebel and the revolutionist," whose hopes
were flagging, and eloquent words have been spoken by the new English
Dictator that have aroused a great rebellion. And, to crown all,
English troops have suffered one massacre and three defeats, and
England sues for peace from the South African peasant, heedless of
honour or her broken word, so that the prayer be granted. With such
events before him, that dying man may well have found cause to change
his opinion. Doubtless the Annexation was wrong, since England disowns
her acts; and may not that dream about the great South African Republic
come true after all? Has not the pre-eminence of the Englishman
received a blow from which it can never recover, and is not his
control over Boers and natives irredeemably weakened? And must
he,--Burgers,--go down to posterity as a Dutchman who tried to forward
the interests of the English party? No, doubtless the Annexation was
wrong; but it has done good, for it has brought about the downfall of
the English: and we will end the argument in the very words of his last
public utterance, with which he ends his statement: "South Africa
gained more from this, and has made a larger step forward in the march
of freedom, than most people can conceive."

Who shall say that he is wrong? the words of dying men are sometimes
prophetic! South Africa has made a great advance towards the "freedom"
of a Dutch Republic.

This has been a digression, but I hope not an uninteresting one. To
return--on the 1st March, Sir T. Shepstone met the Executive Council,
and told them that in his opinion there was now but one remedy to be
adopted, and that was that the Transvaal should be united with the
English colonies of South Africa under one head, namely the Queen,
saying at the same time that the only thing now left to the Republic
was to make the best arrangements it could for the future benefit of
its inhabitants, and to submit to that which he saw to be, and every
thinking man saw to be, inevitable. So soon as this information was
officially communicated to the Raad, for a good proportion of its
members were already acquainted with it unofficially, it flew from a
state of listless indifference into vigorous and hasty action. The
President was censured, and a committee was appointed to consider and
report upon the situation, which reported in favour of the adoption of
Burgers' new constitution. Accordingly, the greatest part of this
measure, which had been contemptuously rejected a few days before, was
adopted almost without question, and Mr. Paul Kruger was appointed
Vice-President. On the following day, a very drastic treason law was
passed, borrowed from the statute-book of the Orange Free State, which
made all public expression of opinion, if adverse to the Government, or
in any way supporting the Annexation party, high treason. This done,
the Assembly prorogued itself until--October 1881.

During and after the sitting of the Raad, rumours arose that the chief
Secocoeni's signature to the treaty of peace, ratified by that body,
had been obtained by misrepresentation. As ratified, this treaty
consisted of three articles, according to which Secocoeni consented,
first, to become a subject of the Republic, and obey the laws of the
country; secondly, to agree to a certain restricted boundary line; and,
thirdly, to pay 2000 head of cattle; which, considering he had captured
quite 5000 head, was not exorbitant.

Towards the end of February a written message was received from
Secocoeni by Sir T. Shepstone, dated after the signing of the
supposed treaty. The original, which was written in Sisutu, was a great
curiosity. The following is a correct translation:--

    "_February 16, 1877._

    "FOR MYN HEER SHEPSTONE,--I beg you, Chief, come help me, the Boers
    are killing me, and I don't know the reasons why they should be
    angry with me; Chief, I beg you come with Myn Heer Merensky.--I am
    SIKUKUNI."

This message was accompanied by a letter from Mr. Merensky, a
well-known and successful missionary, who had been for many years
resident in Secocoeni's country, in which he stated that he heard on
very good authority that Secocoeni had distinctly refused to agree to
that article of the treaty by which he became a subject of the State.
He adds that he cannot remain "silent while such tricks are played."

Upon this information, Sir T. Shepstone wrote to President Burgers,
stating that "if the officer in whom you have placed confidence has
withheld any portion of the truth from you, especially so serious a
portion of it, he is guilty of a wrong towards you personally, as well
as towards the Government, because he has caused you to assume an
untenable position," and suggesting that a joint-commission should be
despatched to Secocoeni, to thoroughly sift the question in the
interest of all concerned. This suggestion was after some delay agreed
to, and a commission was appointed, consisting of Mr. Van Gorkom, a
Hollander, and Mr. Holtshausen, a member of the Executive Council, on
behalf of the Transvaal Government, and Mr. Osborn, R.M., and Captain
Clarke, R.A.,[7] on behalf of the Commissioner, whom I accompanied as
Secretary.

          [7] Now Sir Marshall Clarke, Special Commissioner for
          Basutoland.

At Middleburg the native Gideon who acted as interpreter between
Commandant Ferreira, C.M.G. (the officer who negotiated the treaty on
behalf of the Boer Government), and Secocoeni was examined, and also
two natives, Petros and Jeremiah, who were with him, but did not
actually interpret. All these men persisted that Secocoeni had
positively refused to become a subject of the Republic, and only
consented to sign the treaty on the representations of Commandant
Ferreira that it would only be binding as regards to the two articles
about the cattle and the boundary line.

The Commission then proceeded to Secocoeni's town, accompanied by a
fresh set of interpreters, and had a long interview with Secocoeni.
The chiefs Prime Minister or "mouth," Makurupiji, speaking in his
presence and on his behalf, and making use of the pronoun "I" before
all the assembled headmen of the tribe, gave an account of the
interview between Commandant Ferreira in the presence of that
gentleman, who accompanied the Commission, and Secocoeni, in almost
the same words as had been used by the interpreters at Middleburg. He
distinctly denied having consented to become a subject of the Republic
or to stand under the law, and added that he feared he "had touched the
feather to" (signed) things that he did not know of in the treaty.
Commandant Ferreira then put some questions, but entirely failed to
shake the evidence; on the contrary, he admitted by his questions that
Secocoeni had not consented to become a subject of the Republic.
Secocoeni had evidently signed the piece of paper under the
impression that he was acknowledging his liability to pay 2000 head of
cattle, and fixing a certain portion of his boundary line, and on the
distinct understanding that he was not to become a subject of the
State.

Now it was the Secocoeni war that had brought the English Mission
into the country, and if it could be shown that the Secocoeni war had
come to a successful termination, it would go far towards helping the
Mission out again. To this end, it was necessary that the chief should
declare himself a subject of the State, and thereby, by implication,
acknowledge himself to have been a rebel, and admit his defeat. All
that was required was a signature, and that once obtained the treaty
was published and submitted to the Raad for confirmation, without a
whisper being heard of the conditions under which this ignorant Basuto
was induced to sign. Had no Commission visited Secocoeni, this treaty
would afterwards have been produced against him in its entirety.
Altogether, the history of the Secocoeni Peace Treaty does not
reassure one as to the genuineness of the treaties which the Boers are
continually producing, purporting to have been signed by native chiefs,
and, as a general rule, presenting the State with great tracts of
country in exchange for a horse or a few oxen. However fond the natives
may be of their Boer neighbours, such liberality can scarcely be
genuine. On the other hand, it is so easy to induce a savage to sign a
paper, or even, if he is reticent, to make a cross for him, and once
made, as we all know, _litera scripta manet_, and becomes title to
the lands.

During the Secocoeni investigation, affairs in the Transvaal were
steadily drifting towards anarchy. The air was filled with rumours; now
it was reported that an outbreak was imminent amongst the English
population at the Gold Fields, who had never forgotten Von
Schlickmann's kind suggestion that they should be "subdued;" now it was
said that Cetywayo had crossed the border, and might shortly be
expected at Pretoria; now that a large body of Boers were on their road
to shoot the Special Commissioner, his twenty-five policemen, and
Englishmen generally, and so on.

Meanwhile, Paul Kruger and his party were not letting the grass grow
under their feet, but worked public feeling with great vigour, with the
double object of getting Paul made President and ridding themselves of
the English. Articles in his support were printed in the well-known
Dutch paper _Die Patriot_, published in the Cape Colony, which are
so typical of the Boers and of the only literature that has the
slightest influence over them, that I will quote a few extracts from
one of them.

After drawing a very vivid picture of the wretched condition of the
country as compared to what it was when the Kafirs had "a proper
respect" for the Boers, before Burgers came into power, the article
proceeds to give the cause of this state of affairs. "God's word," it
says, "gives us the solution. Look at Israel, while the people have a
godly king, everything is prosperous, but under a godless prince the
land retrogrades, and the whole of the people must suffer. Read
Leviticus, chapter xxvi., with attention, &c. In the day of the
Voortrekkers (pioneers), a handful of men chased a thousand Kafirs and
made them run; so also in the Free State war (Deut. xxxii. 30; Jos.
xxiii. 10; Lev. xxvi. 8). But mark, now, when Burgers became President,
he knows no Sabbath, he rides through the land in and out of town on
Sunday, he knows not the church and God's service (Lev. xxvi. 2, 3), to
the scandal of pious people. And he formerly was a priest too. And what
is the consequence? No harvest (Lev. xxvi. 16), an army of 6000 men
runs because one man falls (Lev. xxvi 17, &c.). What is now the
remedy?" The remedy proves to be Paul Kruger, "because there is no
other candidate. Because our Lord clearly points him out to be the man,
for why is there no other candidate? Who arranged it this way?" Then
follows a rather odd argument in favour of Paul's election. "Because he
himself (Paul Kruger) acknowledges in his own reply that he is
_incompetent_, but that all his ability is from our Lord. Because
he is a warrior. Because he is a Boer." Then Paul Kruger, the warrior
and the Boer, is compared to Joan of Arc, "a simple Boer girl who came
from behind the sheep." The burghers of the Transvaal are exhorted to
acknowledge the hand of the Lord, and elect Paul Kruger, or to look for
still heavier punishment. (Lev. xxvi. 18 _et seq._) Next the _Patriot_
proceeds to give a bit of advice to "our candidate, Paul Kruger." He is
to deliver the land from the Kafirs. "The Lord has given you the heart
of a warrior, arise and drive them," a bit of advice quite suited to
his well-known character. But this chosen vessel was not to get all the
loaves and fishes; on the contrary, as soon as he had fulfilled his
mission of "driving" the Kafirs, he was to hand over his office to a
"good" President. The article ends thus: "If the Lord wills to use you
now to deliver this land from its enemies, and a day of peace and
prosperity arises again, and you see that you are not exactly the
statesman to further govern the Republic, then it will be your greatest
honour to say, 'Citizens, I have delivered you from the enemy, I am no
statesman, but now you have peace and time to choose and elect a _good_
President.'"

An article such as the above, is instructive reading, as showing the
low calibre of the minds that are influenced by it. Yet such writings
and sermons have more power among the Boers than any other arguments,
appealing as they do to the fanaticism and vanity of their nature,
which causes them to believe that the Divinity is continually
interfering on their behalf at the cost of other people. It will be
noticed that the references given are all to the Old Testament, and
nearly all refer to acts of blood.

These doctrines were not, however, at all acceptable to Burgers' party,
or the more enlightened members of the community, and so bitter did the
struggle of rival opinions become that there is very little doubt that
had the country not been annexed, civil war would have been added to
its other calamities. Meanwhile the natives were from day to day
becoming more restless, and messengers were constantly arriving at the
Special Commissioner's camp, begging that their tribe might be put
under the Queen, and stating that they would fight rather than submit
any longer to the Boers.

At length on the 9th April, Sir T. Shepstone informed the Government of
the Republic that he was about to declare the Transvaal British
territory. He told them that he had considered and reconsidered his
determination, but that he could see no possible means within the State
by which it could free itself from the burdens that were sinking it to
destruction, adding that if he could have found such means he would
certainly not have hidden them from the Government. This intimation was
received in silence, though all the later proceedings with reference to
the Annexation were in reality carried out in concert with the
authorities of the Republic. Thus on the 13th March the Government
submitted a paper of ten questions to Sir T. Shepstone as regards the
future condition of the Transvaal under English rule, whether the debts
of the State would be guaranteed, &c. To these questions replies were
given which were on the whole satisfactory to the Government. As these
replies formed the basis of the proclamation guarantees, it is not
necessary to enter into them.

It was further arranged by the Republican Government that a formal
protest should be entered against the Annexation, which was accordingly
prepared and privately shown to the Special Commissioner. The
Annexation proclamation was also shown to President Burgers, and a
paragraph eliminated at his suggestion. In fact, the Special
Commissioner and the President, together with most of his Executive,
were quite at one as regards the necessity of the proclamation being
issued, their joint endeavours being directed to the prevention of any
disturbance, and to secure a good reception for the change.

At length, after three months of inquiry and negotiation, the
proclamation of annexation was on the 12th of April 1877 read by Mr.
Osborn, accompanied by some other gentlemen of Sir T. Shepstone's
staff. It was an anxious moment for all concerned. To use the words of
the Special Commissioner in his despatch home on the subject, "Every
effort had been made during the previous fortnight by, it is said,
educated Hollanders, and who had but lately arrived in the country, to
rouse the fanaticism of the Boers, and to induce them to offer 'bloody'
resistance to what it was known I intended to do. The Boers were
appealed to in the most inflammatory language by printed manifestoes
and memorials; ... it was urged that I had but a small escort, which
could easily be overpowered." In a country so full of desperadoes and
fanatical haters of anything English, it was more than possible that,
though such an act would have been condemned by the general sense of
the country, a number of men could easily be found who would think they
were doing a righteous act in greeting the "annexationists" with an
ovation of bullets. I do not mean that the anxiety was personal,
because I do not think the members of that small party set any higher
value on their lives than other people, but it was absolutely necessary
for the success of the act itself, and for the safety of the country,
that not a single shot should be fired. Had that happened it is
probable that the whole country would have been involved in confusion
and bloodshed, the Zulus would have broken in, and the Kafirs would
have risen; in fact, to use Cetywayo's words, "the land would have
burned with fire."

It will therefore be easily understood what an anxious hour that was
both for the Special Commissioner sitting up at Government House, and
for his staff down on the Market Square, and how thankful they were
when the proclamation was received with hearty cheers by the crowd. Mr.
Burgers' protest, which was read immediately afterwards, was received
in respectful silence.

And thus the Transvaal Territory passed for a while into the great
family of the English Colonies. I believe that the greatest political
opponent of the act will bear tribute to the very remarkable ability
with which it was carried out. When the variety and number of the
various interests that had to be conciliated, the obstinate nature of
the individuals who had to be convinced, as well as the innate hatred
of the English name and ways which had to be overcome to carry out this
act successfully, are taken into consideration, together with a
thousand other matters, the neglect of any one of which would have
sufficed to make failure certain, it will be seen what tact and skill
and knowledge of human nature was required to execute so difficult a
task. It must be remembered that no force was used, and that there
never was any threat of force. The few troops that were to enter the
Transvaal were four weeks' march from Pretoria at the time. There was
nothing whatsoever to prevent the Boers putting a summary stop to the
proceedings of the Commissioner if they had thought fit.

That Sir Theophilus played a bold and hazardous game nobody will deny,
but, like most players who combine boldness with coolness of head and
justice of cause, he won; and, without shedding a single drop of blood,
or even confiscating an acre of land, and at no cost, annexed a great
country, and averted a very serious war. That same country four years
later cost us a million of money, the loss of nearly a thousand men
killed and wounded, and the ruin of many more confiding thousands, to
surrender. It is true, however, that nobody can accuse the retrocession
of having been conducted with judgment or ability--very much the
contrary.

There can be no more ample justification of the issue of the Annexation
proclamation than the proclamation itself.

First, it touches on the Sand River Convention of 1852, by which
independence was granted to the State, and shows that the "evident
objects and inciting motives" in granting such guarantee were to
promote peace, free-trade, and friendly intercourse, in the hope and
belief that the Republic "would become a flourishing and
self-sustaining State, a source of strength and security to
neighbouring European communities, and a point from which Christianity
and civilisation might rapidly spread toward Central Africa." It goes
on to show how these hopes have been disappointed, and how that
increasing weakness in the State itself on the one side, and more than
corresponding growth of real strength and confidence among the native
tribes on the other, have produced their natural and inevitable
consequence ... that after more or less of irritating conflict with
aboriginal tribes to the north, there commenced about the year 1867
gradual abandonment to the natives in that direction of territory
settled by burghers of the Transvaal "in well-built towns and villages
and on granted farms."

It goes on to show that "this decay of power and ebb of authority in
the north is being followed by similar processes in the south under yet
more dangerous circumstances. People of this State residing in that
direction have been compelled within the last three months, at the
bidding of native chiefs, and at a moment's notice, to leave their
farms and homes, their standing crops ... all to be taken possession of
by natives, but that the Government is more powerless than ever to
vindicate its assumed rights or to resist the declension that is
threatening its existence." It then recites how all the other colonies
and communities of South Africa have lost confidence in the State, how
it is in a condition of hopeless bankruptcy, and its commerce
annihilated, whilst the inhabitants are divided into factions, and the
Government has fallen into "helpless paralysis." How also the prospect
of the election of a new President, instead of being looked forward to
with hope, would in the opinion of all parties be the signal for civil
war, anarchy, and bloodshed. How that this state of things affords the
very strongest temptation to the great neighbouring native powers to
attack the country, a temptation that they were only too ready and
anxious to yield to, and that the State was in far too feeble a
condition to repel such attacks, from which it had hitherto only been
saved by the repeated representations of the Government of Natal. The
next paragraphs I will quote as they stand, for they sum up the reasons
for the Annexation.

"That the Secocoeni war, which would have produced but little effect
on a healthy constitution, has not only proved suddenly fatal to the
resources and reputation of the Republic, but has shown itself to be a
culminating point in the history of South Africa, in that a Makatee or
Basuto tribe, unwarlike and of no account in Zulu estimation,
successfully withstood the strength of the State, and disclosed for the
first time to the native powers outside the Republic, from the Zambesi
to the Cape, the great change that had taken place in the relative
strength of the white and black races, that this disclosure at once
shook the prestige of the white man in South Africa, and placed every
European community in peril, that this common danger has caused
universal anxiety, has given to all concerned the right to investigate
its cause, and to protect themselves from its consequences, and has
imposed the duty upon those who have the power to shield enfeebled
civilisation from the encroachments of barbarism and inhumanity." It
proceeds to point out that the Transvaal will be the first to suffer
from the results of its own policy, and that it is for every reason
perfectly impossible for Her Majesty's Government to stand by and see a
friendly white State ravaged, knowing that its own possessions will be
the next to suffer. That Her Majesty's Government, being persuaded that
the only means to prevent such a catastrophe would be by the annexation
of the country, and, knowing that this was the wish of a large
proportion of the inhabitants of the Transvaal, the step must be taken.
Next follows the formal annexation.

Together with the proclamation, an address was issued by Sir T.
Shepstone to the burghers of the State, laying the facts before them in
a friendly manner, more suited to their mode of thought than it was
possible to do in a formal proclamation. This document, the issue of
which was one of those touches that insured the success of the
Annexation, was a powerful summing up in colloquial language of the
arguments used in the proclamation, strengthened by quotations from the
speeches of the President. It ends with these words: "It remains only
for me to beg of you to consider and weigh what I have said calmly and
without undue prejudice. Let not mere feeling or sentiment prevail over
your judgment. Accept what Her Majesty's Government intends shall be,
and what you will soon find from experience, is a blessing not only to
you and your children, but to the whole of South Africa through you,
and believe that I speak these words to you as a friend from my heart."

Two other proclamations were also issued, one notifying the assumption
of the office of Administrator of the Government by Sir T. Shepstone,
and the other repealing the war-tax, which was doubtless an unequal and
oppressive impost.

I have in the preceding pages stated all the principal grounds of the
Annexation and briefly sketched the history of that event. In the next
chapter I propose to follow the fortunes of the Transvaal, under
British Rule.




CHAPTER IV.

THE TRANSVAAL UNDER BRITISH RULE.


The news of the Annexation was received all over the country with a
sigh of relief, and in many parts of it with great rejoicings. At the
Gold Fields, for instance, special thanksgiving services were held, and
"God save the Queen" was sung in church. Nowhere was there the
slightest disturbance, but, on the contrary, addresses of
congratulation and thanks literally poured in by every mail, many of
them signed by Boers who have since been conspicuous for their bitter
opposition to English rule. At first, there was some doubt as to what
would be the course taken under the circumstances by the volunteers
enlisted by the late Republic. Major Clarke, R.A., was sent to convey
the news, and to take command of them, unaccompanied save by his Kafir
servant. On arrival at the principal fort, he at once ordered the
Republican flag to be hauled down and the Union Jack run up, and his
orders were promptly obeyed. A few days afterwards some members of the
force thought better of it, and having made up their minds to kill him,
came to the tent where he was sitting to carry out their purpose. On
learning their kind intentions, Major Clarke fixed his eye-glass in his
eye, and after steadily glaring at them through it for some time, said,
"You are all drunk, go back to your tents." The volunteers, quite
overcome by his coolness and the fixity of his gaze, at once slipped
off, and there was no further trouble. About three weeks after the
Annexation, the I-13th Regiment arrived at Pretoria, having been very
well received all along the road by the Boers, who came from miles
round to hear the band play. Its entry into Pretoria was quite a sight;
the whole population turned out to meet it; indeed the feeling of
rejoicing and relief was so profound that when the band began to play
"God save the Queen" some of the women burst into tears.

Meanwhile the effect of the Annexation on the country was perfectly
magical. Credit and commerce were at once restored; the railway bonds
that were down to nothing in Holland rose with one bound to par, and
the value of landed property nearly doubled. Indeed it would have been
possible for any one, knowing what was going to happen, to have
realised large sums of money by buying land in the beginning of 1877,
and selling it shortly after the Annexation.

On the 24th May, being Her Majesty's birthday, all the native chiefs
who were anywhere within reach were summoned to attend the first formal
hoisting of the English flag. The day was a general festival, and the
ceremony was attended by a large number of Boers and natives in
addition to all the English. At mid-day, amidst the cheers of the
crowd, the salute of artillery, and the strains of "God save the
Queen," the Union Jack was run up a lofty flagstaff, and the Transvaal
was formally announced to be British soil. The flag was hoisted by
Colonel Brooke, R.E., and the present writer. Speaking for myself, I
may say that it was one of the proudest moments of my life. Could I
have foreseen that I should live to see that same flag, then hoisted
with so much joyous ceremony, within a few years shamefully and
dishonourably hauled down and buried,[8] I think it would have been the
most miserable.

          [8] The English flag was during the signing of the Convention
          at Pretoria formally buried by a large crowd of Englishmen
          and loyal natives.

The Annexation was as well received in England as it was in the
Transvaal. Lord Carnarvon wrote to Sir T. Shepstone to convey "the
Queen's entire approval of your conduct since you received Her
Majesty's commission, with a renewal of my own thanks on behalf of the
Government for the admirable prudence and discretion with which you
have discharged a great and unwonted responsibility." It was also
accepted by Parliament with very few dissentient voices, since it was
not till afterwards, when the subject became useful as an
electioneering howl, that the Liberal party, headed by our "powerful
popular minister," discovered the deep iniquity that had been
perpetrated in South Africa. So satisfied were the Transvaal Boers with
the change that Messrs. Kruger, Jorissen, and Bok, who formed the
deputation to proceed to England and present President Burgers' formal
protest against the Annexation, found great difficulty in raising
one-half of the necessary expenses--something under one thousand
pounds--towards the cost of the undertaking. The thirst for
independence cannot have been very great when all the wealthy burghers
in the Transvaal put together would not subscribe a thousand pounds
towards retaining it. Indeed, at this time the members of the
deputation themselves seem to have looked upon their undertaking as
being both doubtful and undesirable, since they informed Sir T.
Shepstone that they were going to Europe to discharge an obligation
which had been imposed upon them, and if the mission failed, they would
have done their duty. Mr. Kruger said that if they did fail, he would
be found to be as faithful a subject under the new form of government
as he had been under the old; and Dr. Jorissen admitted with equal
frankness that "the change was inevitable, and expressed his belief
that the cancellation of it would be calamitous."

Whilst the Annexation was thus well received in the country immediately
interested, a lively agitation was commenced in the Western Province of
the Cape Colony, a thousand miles away, with a view of inducing the
Home Government to repudiate Sir T. Shepstone's act. The reason of this
movement was that the Cape Dutch party, caring little or nothing for
the real interests of the Transvaal, did care a great deal about their
scheme to turn all the white communities of South Africa into a great
Dutch Republic, to which they thought the Annexation would be a
deathblow. As I have said elsewhere, it must be borne in mind that the
strings of the anti-annexation agitation have all along been pulled in
the Western Province, whilst the Transvaal Boers have played the parts
of puppets. The instruments used by the leaders of the movement in the
Cape were, for the most part, the discontented and unprincipled
Hollander element, a newspaper of an extremely abusive nature called
the _Volkstem_, and another in Natal known as the _Natal Witness_,
lately edited by the notorious Aylward, which has an almost equally
unenviable reputation.

On the arrival of Messrs. Jorissen and Kruger in England, they were
received with great civility by Lord Carnarvon, who was, however,
careful to explain to them that the Annexation was irrevocable. In this
decision they cheerfully acquiesced, assuring his lordship of their
determination to do all they could to induce the Boers to accept the
new state of things, and expressing their desire to be allowed to serve
under the new Government.

Whilst these gentlemen were thus satisfactorily arranging matters with
Lord Carnarvon, Sir. T. Shepstone was making a tour round the country
which resembled a triumphal progress more than anything else. He was
everywhere greeted with enthusiasm by all classes of the community,
Boers, English, and natives, and numerous addresses were presented to
him couched in the warmest language, not only by Englishmen, but also
by Boers.

It is very difficult to reconcile the enthusiasm of a great number of
the inhabitants of the Transvaal for English rule, and the quiet
acquiescence of the remainder, at this time, with the decidedly
antagonistic attitude assumed later on. It appears to me, however, that
there are several reasons that go far towards accounting for it. The
Transvaal, when we annexed it, was in the position of a man with a
knife at his throat, who is suddenly rescued by some one stronger than
he, on certain conditions which at the time he gladly accepts, but
afterwards, when the danger is passed, wishes to repudiate. In the same
way the inhabitants of the South African Republic were in the time of
need very thankful for our aid, but after a while, when the
recollection of their difficulties had grown faint, when their debts
had been paid and their enemies defeated, they began to think that they
would like to get rid of us again, and start fresh on their own account
with a clean sheet. What fostered agitation more than anything else,
however, was the perfect impunity with which it was allowed to be
carried on. Had only a little firmness and decision been shown in the
first instance there would have been no further trouble. We might have
been obliged to confiscate half-a-dozen farms, and perhaps imprison as
many free burghers for a few months, and there it would have ended.
Neither Boers or natives understand our namby-pamby way of playing at
government; they put it down to fear. What they want, and what they
expect, is to be governed with a just but a firm hand. Thus when the
Boers found that they could agitate with impunity, they naturally
enough continued to agitate. Anybody who knows them will understand
that it was very pleasant to them to find themselves in possession of
that delightful thing, a grievance, and, instead of stopping quietly at
home on their farms, to feel obliged to proceed, full of importance and
long words, to a distant meeting, there to spout and listen to the
spouting of others. It is so much easier to talk politics than to sow
mealies. Some attribute the discontent among the Boers to the
postponement of the carrying out of the Annexation proclamation
promises with reference to the free institutions to be granted to the
country, but in my opinion it had little or nothing to do with it. The
Boers never understood the question of responsible government, and
never wanted that institution; what they did want was to be free of all
English control, and this they said twenty times in the most outspoken
language. I think there is little doubt the causes I have indicated are
the real sources of the agitation, though there must be added to them
their detestation of our mode of dealing with natives, and of being
forced to pay taxes regularly, and also the ceaseless agitation of the
Cape wire-pullers, through their agents the Hollanders, and their
organs in the press.

On the return of Messrs. Kruger and Jorissen to the Transvaal, the
latter gentleman resumed his duties as Attorney-General, on which
occasion, if I remember aright, I myself had the honour of
administering to him the oath of allegiance to Her Majesty, that he
afterwards kept so well. The former reported the proceedings of the
deputation to a Boer meeting, when he took a very different tone to
that in which he addressed Lord Carnarvon, announcing that if there
existed a majority of the people in favour of independence, he still
was Vice-President of the country.

Both these gentlemen remained for some time in the pay of the British
Government, Mr. Jorissen as Attorney-General, and Mr. Kruger as member
of the Executive Council. The Government, however, at length found it
desirable to dispense with their services, though on different grounds.
Mr. Jorissen had, like several other members of the Republican
Government, been a clergyman, and was quite unfit to hold the post of
Attorney-General in an important colony like the Transvaal, where legal
questions were constantly arising requiring all the attention of a
trained mind; and after he had on several occasions been publicly
admonished from the bench, the Government retired him on liberal terms.
Needless to say, his opposition to English rule then became very
bitter. Mr. Kruger's appointment expired by law in November 1877, and
the Government did not think it advisable to re-employ him. The terms
of his letter of dismissal can be found on page 135 of Blue-book (c.
144), and involving as they do a serious charge of misrepresentation in
money matters, are not very creditable to him. After this event he also
pursued the cause of independence with increased vigour.

During the last months of 1877 and the first part of 1878 agitation
against British rule went on unchecked, and at last grew to alarming
proportions, so much so that Sir T. Shepstone, on his return from the
Zulu border in March 1878, where he had been for some months discussing
the vexed and dangerous question of the boundary line with the Zulus,
found it necessary to issue a stringent proclamation warning the
agitators that their proceedings and meetings were illegal, and would
be punished according to law. This document, which was at the time
vulgarly known as the "Hold-your-jaw" proclamation, not being followed
by action, produced but little effect.

On the 4th April 1878 another Boer meeting was convened, at which it
was decided to send a second deputation to England, to consist this
time of Messrs. Kruger and Joubert, with Mr. Bok as secretary. This
deputation proved as abortive as the first, Sir. M. Hicks Beach
assuring it, in a letter dated 6th August 1878, that it is "impossible,
for many reasons, ... that the Queen's sovereignty should now be
withdrawn."

Whilst the Government was thus hampered by internal disaffection, it
had also many other difficulties on its hands. First, there was the
Zulu boundary question, which was constantly developing new dangers to
the country. Indeed, it was impossible to say what might happen in that
direction from one week to another. Nor were its relations with
Secocoeni satisfactory. It will be remembered that just before the
Annexation this chief had expressed his earnest wish to become a
British subject, and even paid over part of the fine demanded from him
by the Boer Government to the Civil Commissioner, Major Clarke. In
March 1878, however, his conduct towards the Government underwent a
sudden change, and he practically declared war. It afterwards appeared,
from Secocoeni's own statement, that he was instigated to this step
by a Boer, Abel Erasmus by name--the same man who was concerned in the
atrocities in the first Secocoeni war--who constantly encouraged him
to continue the struggle. I do not propose to minutely follow the
course of this long war, which, commencing in the beginning of 1878,
did not come to an end till after the Zulu war: when Sir Garnet
Wolseley attacked Secocoeni's stronghold with a large force of
troops, volunteers, and Swazi allies, and took it with great slaughter.
The losses on our side were not very heavy, so far as white men were
concerned, but the Swazis are reported to have lost 400 killed and 500
wounded.

The struggle was, during the long period preceding the final attack,
carried on with great courage and ability by Major Clarke, R.A.,
C.M.G., whose force, at the best of times, only consisted of 200
volunteers and 100 Zulus. With this small body of men he contrived,
however, to keep Secocoeni in check, and to take some important
strongholds. It was marked also by some striking acts of individual
bravery, of which one, performed by Major Clarke himself, whose
reputation for cool courage and presence of mind in danger is
unsurpassed in South Africa, is worthy of notice; and which, had public
attention been more concentrated on the Secocoeni war, would
doubtless have won him the Victoria Cross. On one occasion, on visiting
one of the outlying forts, he found that a party of hostile natives,
who were coming down to the fort on the previous day with a flag of
truce, had been accidentally fired on, and had at once retreated. As
his system in native warfare was always to try and inspire his enemy
with perfect faith in the honour of Englishmen, and their contempt of
all tricks and treachery even towards a foe, he was very angry at this
occurrence, and at once, unarmed and unattended save by his native
servant, rode up into the mountains to the kraal from which the white
flag party had come on the previous day, and apologised to the chief
for what had happened. When I consider how very anxious Secocoeni's
natives were to kill or capture Clarke, whom they held in great dread,
and how terrible the end of so great a captain would in all probability
have been had he been taken alive by these masters of refined torture,
I confess that I think this act of gentlemanly courage is one of the
most astonishing things I ever heard of. When he rode up those hills he
must have known that he was probably going to meet his death at the
hands of justly incensed savages. When Secocoeni heard of what Major
Clarke had done he was so pleased that he shortly afterwards released a
volunteer whom he had taken prisoner, and who would otherwise, in all
probability, have been tortured to death. I must add that Major Clarke
himself never reported or alluded to this incident, but an account of
it can be found in a despatch written by Sir O. Lanyon to the Secretary
of State, dated 2d February 1880.

Concurrently with, though entirely distinct from, the political
agitation that was being carried on among the Boers having for object
the restoration of independence, a private agitation was set on foot by
a few disaffected persons against Sir T. Shepstone, with the view of
obtaining his removal from office in favour of a certain Colonel
Weatherley. The details of this impudent plot are so interesting, and
the plot itself so typical of the state of affairs with which Sir T.
Shepstone had to deal, that I will give a short account of it.

After the Annexation had taken place, there were naturally enough a
good many individuals who found themselves disappointed in the results
so far as they personally were concerned; I mean that they did not get
so much out of it as they expected. Among these was a gentleman called
Colonel Weatherley, who had come to the Transvaal as manager of a
gold-mining company, but getting tired of that had taken a prominent
part in the Annexation, and who, being subsequently disappointed about
an appointment, became a bitter enemy of the Administrator. I may say
at once that Colonel Weatherley seems to me to have been throughout the
dupe of the other conspirators.

The next personage was a good-looking desperado, who called himself
Captain Gunn of Gunn, and who was locally somewhat irreverently known
as the very Gunn of very Gunn. This gentleman, whose former career had
been of a most remarkable order, was, on the annexation of the country,
found in the public prison charged with having committed various
offences, but on Colonel Weatherley's interesting himself strongly on
his behalf, he was eventually released without trial. On his release,
he requested the Administrator to publish a Government notice declaring
him innocent of the charges brought against him. This Sir T. Shepstone
declined to do, and so, to use his own words, in a despatch to the High
Commissioner on the subject, Captain Gunn of Gunn at once became "what
in this country is called a patriot."

The third person concerned was a lawyer, who had got into trouble on
the Diamond Fields, and who felt himself injured because the rules of
the High Court did not allow him to practise as an advocate. The
quartette was made up by Mr. Celliers, the editor of the patriotic
organ, the _Volkstem_, who, since he had lost the Government printing
contract, found that no language could be too strong to apply to the
_personnel_ of the Government, more especially its head. Of course,
there was a lady in it; what plot would be complete without? She was
Mrs. Weatherley, now, I believe, Mrs. Gunn of Gunn. These gentlemen
began operations by drawing up a long petition to Sir Bartle Frere as
High Commissioner, setting forth a string of supposed grievances, and
winding up with a request that the Administrator might be "promoted to
some other sphere of political usefulness." This memorial was forwarded
by the "committee," as they called themselves, to various parts of the
country for signature, but without the slightest success, the fact of
the matter being that it was not the Annexor but the Annexation that
the Boers objected to.

At this stage in the proceedings Colonel Weatherley went to try and
forward the good cause with Sir Bartle Frere at the Cape. His letters
to Mrs. Weatherley from thence, afterwards put into Court in the
celebrated divorce case, contained many interesting accounts of his
attempts in that direction. I do not think, however, that he was
cognisant of what was being concocted by his allies in Pretoria, but
being a very vain, weak man, was easily deceived by them. With all his
faults he was a gentleman. As soon as he was gone a second petition was
drawn up by the "committee," showing "the advisability of immediately
suspending our present Administrator, and temporarily appointing and
recommending for Her Majesty's royal and favourable consideration an
English gentleman of high integrity and honour, in whom the country at
large has respect and confidence."

The English gentleman of high integrity and honour of course proves to
be Colonel Weatherley, whose appointment is, further on, "respectfully
but earnestly requested," since he had "thoroughly gained the
affections, confidence, and respect of Boers, English, and other
Europeans in this country." But whilst it is comparatively easy to
write petitions, there is sometimes a difficulty in getting people to
sign them, as proved to be the case with reference to the documents
under consideration. When the "committee" and the employés in the
office of the _Volkstem_ had affixed their valuable signatures it
was found to be impossible to induce anybody else to follow their
example. Now, a petition with some half dozen signatures attached would
not, it was obvious, carry much weight with the Imperial Government,
and no more could be obtained.

But really great minds rise superior to such difficulties, and so did
the "committee," or some of them, or one of them. If they could not get
genuine signatures to their petitions, they could at any rate
manufacture them. This great idea once hit out, so vigorously was it
prosecuted that they, or some of them, or one of them, produced in a
very little while no less than 3883 signatures, of which sixteen were
proved to be genuine, five were doubtful, and all the rest fictitious.
But the gentleman, whoever he was, who was the working partner in the
scheme--and I may state, by way of parenthesis, that when Gunn of Gunn
was subsequently arrested, petitions in process of signature were found
under the mattress of his bed--calculated without his host. He either
did not know, or had forgotten, that on receipt of such documents by a
superior officer, they are at once sent to the officer accused to
report upon. This course was followed in the present case, and the
petitions were discovered to be gross impostures. The ingenuity
exercised by their author or authors was really very remarkable, for it
must be remembered that not one of the signatures was forged; they were
all invented, and had, of course, to be written in a great variety of
hands. The plan generally pursued was to put down the names of people
living in the country, with slight variations. Thus "De _V_illiers"
became "De _W_illiers," and "Van Z_y_l" "Van Z_u_l." I remember that my
own name appeared on one of the petitions with some slight alteration.
Some of the names were evidently meant to be facetious. Thus there was
a "Jan Verneuker," which means "John the Cheat."

Of the persons directly or indirectly concerned in this rascally plot,
the unfortunate Colonel Weatherley subsequently apologised to Sir T.
Shepstone for his share in the agitation, and shortly afterwards died
fighting bravely on Kambula. Captain Gunn of Gunn and Mrs. Weatherley,
after having given rise to the most remarkable divorce case I ever
heard--it took fourteen days to try--were, on the death of Colonel
Weatherley, united in the bonds of holy matrimony, and are, I believe,
still in Pretoria. The lawyer vanished I know not where, whilst Mr.
Celliers still continues to edit that admirably conducted journal the
_Volkstem_; nor, if I may judge from the report of a speech made
by him recently at a Boer festival, which, by the way, was graced by
the presence of our representative, Mr. Hudson, the British Resident,
has his right hand forgotten its cunning, or rather his tongue lost the
use of those peculiar and _recherché_ epithets that used to adorn
the columns of the _Volkstem_. I see that he, on this occasion,
denounced the English element as being "poisonous and dangerous" to a
State, and stated, amidst loud cheers, that "he despised" it. Mr.
Cellier's lines have fallen in pleasant places; in any other country he
would long ago have fallen a victim to the stern laws of libel. I
recommend him to the notice of enterprising Irish newspapers. Such is
the freshness and vigour of his style that I am confident he would make
the fortune of any Hibernian journal.

Some little time after the Gunn of Gunn frauds a very sad incident
happened in connection with the government of the Transvaal. Shortly
after the Annexation, the Home Government sent out Mr. Sergeaunt,
C.M.G., one of the Crown Agents for the Colonies, to report on the
financial Condition of the country. He was accompanied, in an
unofficial capacity, amongst other gentlemen, by Captain Patterson and
his son, Mr. J. Sergeaunt; and when he returned to England, these two
gentlemen remained behind to go on a shooting expedition. About this
time Sir Bartle Frere was anxious to send a friendly mission to Lo
Bengula, king of the Matabele, a branch of the Zulu tribe, living up
towards the Zambesi. This chief had been making himself unpleasant by
causing traders to be robbed, and it was thought desirable to establish
friendly relations with him, so it was suggested to Captain Patterson
and Mr. Sergeaunt that they should combine business with pleasure, and
go on a mission to Lo Bengula, an offer which they accepted, and
shortly afterwards started for Matabeleland with an interpreter and a
few servants. They reached their destination in safety; and having
concluded their business with the king, started on a visit to the
Zambesi Falls on foot, leaving the interpreter with the waggon. The
falls were about twelve days' walk from the king's kraal, and they were
accompanied thither by young Mr. Thomas, the son of the local
missionary, two Kafir servants, and twenty native bearers supplied by
Lo Bengula. The next thing that was heard of them was that they had all
died through drinking poisoned water, full details of the manner of
their deaths being sent down by Lo Bengula.

In the first shock and confusion of such news it was not very closely
examined, at any rate by the friends of the dead men, but, on
reflection, there were several things about it that appeared strange.
For instance, it was well known that Captain Patterson had a habit, for
which, indeed, we had often laughed at him, of, however thirsty he
might be, always having his water boiled when he was travelling, in
order to destroy impurities, and it seemed odd that he should on this
one occasion have neglected the precaution. Also, it was curious that
the majority of Lo Bengula's bearers appeared to have escaped, whereas
all the others were, without exception, killed; nor even in that
district is it usual to find water so bad that it will kill with the
rapidity it had been supposed to do in this case, unless indeed it had
been designedly poisoned. These doubts of the poisoning-by-bad-water-story
resolved themselves into certainty when the waggon returned in charge
of the interpreter, when, by putting two and two together, we were able
to piece out the real history of the diabolical murder of our poor
friends with considerable accuracy, a story which shows what
blood-thirsty wickedness a savage is capable of when he fancies his
interests are threatened.

It appeared that, when Captain Patterson first interviewed Lo Bengula,
he was not at all well received by him. I must, by way of explanation,
state that there exists a pretender to his throne, Kruman by name, who,
as far as I can make out, is the real heir to the kingdom. This man
had, for some cause or other, fled the country, and for a time acted as
gardener to Sir T. Shepstone in Natal. At the date of Messrs. Patterson
and Sergeaunt's mission to Matabeleland he was living, I believe, in
the Transvaal. Captain Patterson, on finding himself so ill received by
the king, and not being sufficiently acquainted with the character of
savage chiefs, most unfortunately, either by accident or design,
dropped some hint in the course of conversation about this Kruman. From
that moment Lo Bengula's conduct towards the mission entirely changed,
and, dropping his former tone, he became profusely civil; and from that
moment, too, he doubtless determined to kill them, probably fearing
that they might forward some scheme to oust him and place Kruman, on
whose claim a large portion of his people looked favourably, on the
throne.

When their business was done, and Captain Patterson told the king that
they were anxious, before returning, to visit the Zambesi Falls, he
readily fell in with their wish, but, in the first instance, refused
permission to young Thomas, the son of the missionary, to accompany
them, only allowing him to do so on the urgent representations of
Captain Patterson. The reason of this was, no doubt, that he had kindly
feelings towards the lad, and did not wish to include him in the
slaughter.

Captain Patterson was a man of extremely methodical habits, and,
amongst other things, was in the habit of making notes of all that he
did. His note-book had been taken off his body, and sent down to
Pretoria with the other things. In it we found entries of his
preparations for the trip, including the number and names of the
bearers provided by Lo Bengula. We also found the chronicle of the
first three days' journey, and that of the morning of the fourth day,
but there the record stopped. The last entry was probably made a few
minutes before he was killed; and it is to be observed that there was
no entry of the party having been for several days without water, as
stated by the messengers, and then finding the poisoned water.

This evidence by itself would not have amounted to much, but now
comes the curious part of the story, showing the truth of the old
adage, "Murder will out." It appears that when the waggon was coming
down to Pretoria in charge of the interpreter, it was outspanned
one day outside the borders of Lo Bengula's country, when some
Kafirs--Bechuanas, I think--came up, asked for some tobacco, and fell
into conversation with the driver, remarking that he had come up with a
full waggon, and now he went down with an empty one. The driver replied
by lamenting the death by poisoned water of his masters, whereupon one
of the Kafirs told him the following story:--He said that a brother of
his was out hunting, a little while back, in the desert for ostriches,
with a party of other Kafirs, when hearing shots fired some way off,
they made for the spot, thinking that white men were out shooting, and
that they would be able to beg meat. On reaching the spot, which was by
a pool of water, they saw the bodies of three white men lying on the
ground, and also those of a Hottentot and a Kafir, surrounded by an
armed party of Kafirs. They at once asked the Kafirs what they had been
doing killing the white men, and were told to be still, for it was by
"order of the king." They then learned the whole story. It appeared
that the white men had made a mid-day halt by the water, when one of
the bearers, who had gone to the edge of the pool, suddenly shouted to
them to come and look at a great snake in the water. Captain Patterson
ran up, and, as he leaned over the edge, was instantly killed by a blow
with an axe; the others were then shot and assegaied. The Kafir further
described the clothes that his brother had seen on the bodies, and also
some articles that had been given to his party by the murderers, that
left little doubt as to the veracity of his story. And so ended the
mission to Matabeleland.

No public notice was taken of the matter, for the obvious reason that
it was impossible to get at Lo Bengula to punish him; nor would it have
been easy to come by legal evidence to disprove the ingenious story of
the poisoned water, since anybody trying to reach the spot of the
massacre would probably fall a victim to some similar accident before
he got back again. It is devoutly to be hoped that the punishment he
deserves will sooner or later overtake the author of this devilish and
wholesale murder.

The beginning of 1879 was signalised by the commencement of operations
in Zululand and by the news of the terrible disaster at Isandhlwana,
which fell on Pretoria like a thunderclap. It was not, however, any
surprise to those who were acquainted with Zulu tactics and with the
plan of attack adopted by the English commanders. In fact, I know that
one solemn warning of what would certainly happen to him if he
persisted in his plan of advance was addressed to Lord Chelmsford,
through the officer in command at Pretoria, by a gentleman whose
position and long experience of the Zulus and their mode of attack
should have carried some weight. If it ever reached him, he took, to
the best of my recollection, no notice of it whatever.

But though some such disaster was daily expected by a few, the majority
both of soldiers and civilians never dreamed of anything of the sort,
the general idea being that the conquest of Cetywayo was a very easy
undertaking; and the shock produced by the news of Isandhlwana was
proportionately great, especially as it reached Pretoria in a much
exaggerated form. I shall never forget the appearance of the town that
morning; business was entirely suspended, and the streets were filled
with knots of men talking, with scared faces, as well they might: for
there was scarcely anybody but had lost a friend, and many thought that
their sons or brothers were among the dead on that bloody field. Among
others, Sir T. Shepstone lost one son, and thought for some time that
he had lost three.

Shortly after this event Sir Theophilus went to England to confer with
the Secretary of State on various matters connected with the Transvaal,
carrying with him the affection and respect of all who knew him, not
excepting the majority of the malcontent Boers. He was succeeded by
Colonel, now Sir Owen Lanyon, who was appointed to administer the
Government during the absence of Sir T. Shepstone.

By the Boers, however, the news of our disaster was received with great
and unconcealed rejoicing, or at least by the irreconcilable portion of
that people. England's necessity was their opportunity, and one of
which they certainly meant to avail themselves. Accordingly, notices
were sent out summoning the burghers of the Transvaal to attend a mass
meeting on the 18th March, at a place about thirty miles from Pretoria.
Emissaries were also sent to native chiefs, to excite them to follow
Cetywayo's example, and massacre all the English within reach, of whom
a man called Solomon Prinsloo was one of the most active The natives,
however, notwithstanding the threats used towards them, one and all
declined the invitation.

It must not be supposed that all the Boers who attended these meetings
did so of their own free will; on the contrary, a very large number
came under compulsion, since they found that the English authorities
were powerless to give them protection. The recalcitrants were
threatened with all sorts of pains and penalties if they did not
attend, a favourite menace being that they should be made "biltong" of
when the country was given back (_i.e._, be cut into strips and hung
in the sun to dry). Few, luckily for themselves, were brave enough
to tempt fortune by refusing to come, but those who did have had to
leave the country since the war. Whatever were the means employed, the
result was an armed meeting of about 3000 Boers, who evidently meant
mischief.

Just about this time a corps had been raised in Pretoria, composed, for
the most part, of gentlemen, and known as the Pretoria Horse, for the
purpose of proceeding to the Zulu border, where cavalry, especially
cavalry acquainted with the country, was earnestly needed. In the
emergency of the times officials were allowed to join this corps, a
permission of which I availed myself, and was elected one of the
lieutenants.[9] The corps was not, after all, allowed to go to Zululand
on account of the threatening aspect adopted by the Boers, against whom
it was retained for service. In my capacity as an officer of the corps
I was sent out with a small body of picked men, all good riders and
light weights, to keep up a constant communication between the Boer
camp and the Administrator, and found the work both interesting and
exciting. My headquarters were at an inn about twenty-five miles from
Pretoria, to which our agents in the meeting used to come every evening
and report how matters were proceeding, whereupon, if the road was
clear, I despatched a letter to headquarters; or, if I feared that the
messengers would be caught _en route_ by Boer patrols and searched, I
substituted different coloured ribbons according to what I wished to
convey. There was a relief hidden in the trees or rocks every six
miles, all day and most of the night, whose business it was to take the
despatch or ribbon and gallop on with it to the next station, in which
way we used to get the despatches into town in about an hour and a
quarter.

          [9] It is customary in South African volunteer forces to
          allow the members to elect their own officers, provided the
          men elected are such as the Government approves. This is
          done, so that the corps may not afterwards be able to declare
          that they have no confidence in their officers in action, or
          to grumble at their treatment by them.

On one or two occasions the Boers came to the inn and threatened to
shoot us, but as our orders were to do nothing unless our lives were
actually in danger, we took no notice. The officer who came out to
relieve me had not, however, been there more than a day or two before
he and all his troopers were hunted back into Pretoria by a large mob
of armed Boers whom they only escaped by very hard riding.

Meanwhile the Boers were by degrees drawing nearer and nearer to the
town, till at last they pitched their laagers within six miles, and
practically besieged it. All business was stopped, the houses were
loopholed and fortified, and advantageous positions were occupied by
the military and the various volunteer corps. The building, normally in
the occupation of the Government mules, fell to the lot of the Pretoria
Horse, and, though it was undoubtedly a post of honour, I honestly
declare that I have no wish to sleep for another month in a mule stable
that has not been cleaned out for several years. However, by sinking a
well, and erecting bastions and a staging for sharpshooters, we
converted it into an excellent fortress, though it would not have been
of much use against artillery. Our patrols used to be out all night,
since we chiefly feared a night attack, and generally every preparation
was made to resist the onset that was hourly expected, and I believe
that it was that state of preparedness that alone prevented it.

Whilst this meeting was going on, and when matters had come to a point
that seemed to render war inevitable, Sir Bartle Frere arrived at
Pretoria and had several interviews with the Boer leaders, at which
they persisted in demanding their independence, and nothing short of
it. After a great deal of talk the meeting finally broke up without any
actual appeal to arms, though it had, during its continuance, assumed
many of the rights of government, such as stopping post-carts and
individuals, and sending armed patrols about the country. The principal
reason of its break-up was that the Zulu war was now drawing to a
close, and the leaders saw that there would soon be plenty of troops
available to suppress any attempt at revolt, but they also saw to what
lengths they could go with impunity. They had for a period of nearly
two months been allowed to throw the whole country into confusion, to
openly violate the laws, and to intimidate and threaten Her Majesty's
loyal subjects with war and death. The lesson was not lost on them; but
they postponed action till a more favourable opportunity offered.

Sir Bartle Frere before his departure took an opportunity at a public
dinner given him at Potchefstroom of assuring the loyal inhabitants of
the country that the Transvaal would never be given back.

Meanwhile a new Pharaoh had arisen in Egypt, in the shape of Sir Garnet
Wolseley, and on the 29th June 1879 we find him communicating the fact
to Sir 0. Lanyon in very plain language, telling him that he
disapproved of his course of action with regard to Secocoeni, and
that "in future you will please take orders only from me."

As soon as Sir Garnet had completed his arrangements for the
pacification of Zululand, he proceeded to Pretoria, and having caused
himself to be sworn in as Governor, set vigorously to work. I must say
that in his dealings with the Transvaal he showed great judgment and a
keen appreciation of what the country needed, namely, strong
government; the fact of the matter being, I suppose, that being very
popular with the Home authorities he felt that he could more or less
command their support in what he did, a satisfaction not given to most
governors, who never know but that they may be thrown overboard in
emergency to lighten the ship.

One of his first acts was to issue a proclamation, stating that,
"Whereas it appears that, notwithstanding repeated assurances of
contrary effect given by Her Majesty's representatives in this
territory, uncertainty or misapprehension exists amongst some of Her
Majesty's subjects as to the intention of Her Majesty's Government
regarding the maintenance of British rule and sovereignty over the
territory of the Transvaal: and whereas it is expedient that all
grounds for such uncertainty or misapprehension should be removed once
and for all beyond doubt or question: now therefore I do hereby
proclaim and make known, in the name and on behalf of Her Majesty
the Queen, that it is the will and determination of Her Majesty's
Government that this Transvaal territory shall be, _and shall
continue to be for ever_, an integral portion of Her Majesty's
dominions in South Africa."

Alas! Sir G. Wolseley's estimate of the value of a solemn pledge thus
made in the name of Her Majesty, whose word has hitherto been held to
be sacred, differed greatly to that of Mr. Gladstone and his
Government.

Sir Garnet Wolseley's operations against Secocoeni proved eminently
successful, and were the best arranged bit of native warfare that I
have yet heard of in South Africa. One blow was struck, and only one,
but that was crushing. Of course the secret of his success lay in the
fact that he had an abundance of force; but it was not ensured by that
alone, good management being very requisite in an affair of the sort,
especially where native allies have to be dealt with. The cost of the
expedition, not counting other Secocoeni war expenditure, amounted to
over £300,000, all of which is now lost to this country.

Another step in the right direction undertaken by Sir Garnet was the
establishment of an Executive Council and also of a Legislative
Council, for the establishment of which Letters Patent were sent from
Downing Street in November 1880.

Meanwhile the Boers, paying no attention to the latter proclamation,
for they guessed that it, like other proclamations in the Transvaal,
would be a mere _brutum fulmen_, had assembled for another mass
meeting, at which they went forward a step, and declared a Government
which was to treat with the English authorities. They had now learnt
that they could do what they liked with perfect impunity, provided they
did not take the extreme course of massacring the English. They had yet
to learn that they might even do that. At the termination of this
meeting, a vote of thanks was passed to "Mr. Leonard Courtney of
London, and other members of the British Parliament." It was wise of
the Boer leaders to cultivate Mr. Courtney of London. As a result of
this meeting, Pretorius, one of the principal leaders, and Bok, the
secretary, were arrested on a charge of treason, and underwent a
preliminary examination; but as the Secretary of State, Sir M. Hicks
Beach, looked rather timidly on the proceeding, and the local
authorities were doubtful of securing a verdict, the prosecution was
abandoned, and necessarily did more harm than good, being looked upon
as another proof of the impotence of the Government.

Shortly afterwards, Sir G. Wolseley changed his tactics, and, instead
of attempting to imprison Pretorius, offered him a seat on the
Executive Council, with a salary attached. This was a much more
sensible way of dealing with him, and he at once rose to the bait,
stating his willingness to join the Government after a while, but that
he could not publicly do so at the moment lest he should lose his
influence with those who were to be brought round through him. It does
not, however, appear that Mr. Pretorius ever did actually join the
Executive, probably because he found public opinion too strong to allow
him to do so.

In December 1879 a new light broke upon the Boers, for in the previous
month Mr. Gladstone had been delivering his noted attack on the policy
of the Conservative Government. Those Mid-Lothian speeches did harm, it
is said, in many parts of the world; but I venture to think that they
have proved more mischievous in South Africa than anywhere else; at any
rate, they have borne fruit sooner. It is not to be supposed that Mr.
Gladstone really cared anything about the Transvaal or its independence
when he was denouncing the hideous outrage that had been perpetrated by
the Conservative Government in annexing it. On the contrary, as he
acquiesced in the Annexation at the time (when Lord Kimberley stated
that it was evidently unavoidable), and declined to rescind it when he
came into power, it is to be supposed that he really approved of it, or
at the least looked on it as a necessary evil. However this may be, any
stick will do to beat a dog with, and the Transvaal was a convenient
point on which to attack the Government. He probably neither knew nor
cared what effect his reckless words might have on ignorant Boers
thousands of miles away; and yet, humanly speaking, many a man would
have been alive and strong to-day whose bones now whiten the African
Veldt had those words never been spoken. Then, for the first time, the
Boers learnt that, if they played their cards properly and put on
sufficient pressure, they would, in the event of the Liberal party
coming to office, have little difficulty in coercing it as they wished.

There was a fair chance at the time of the utterance of the Mid-Lothian
speeches that the agitation would, by degrees, die away; Sir G.
Wolseley had succeeded in winning over Pretorius, and the Boers in
general were sick of mass meetings. Indeed, a memorial was addressed to
Sir. G. Wolseley by a number of Boers in the Potchefstroom district,
protesting against the maintenance of the movement against Her
Majesty's rule, which, considering the great amount of intimidation
exercised by the malcontents, may be looked upon as a favourable sign.

But when it slowly came to be understood among the Boers that a great
English Minister had openly espoused their cause, and that he would
perhaps soon be all-powerful, the moral gain to them was incalculable.
They could now go to the doubting ones and say,--we must be right about
the matter, because, putting our own feelings out of the question, the
great Gladstone says we are. We find the committee of the Boer
malcontents, at their meeting in March 1880, reading a letter to Mr.
Gladstone, "in which he was thanked for the great sympathy shown in
their fate," and a hope expressed that, if he succeeded in getting
power, he would not forget them. In fact, a charming unanimity
prevailed between our great Minister and the Boer rebels, for their
interests were the same, the overthrow of the Conservative Government.
If, however, every leader of the Opposition were to intrigue or
countenance intrigues with those who are seeking to undermine the
authority of Her Majesty, whether they be Boers or Irishmen, in order
to help himself to power, the country might suffer in the long run.

But whatever feelings may have prompted Her Majesty's Opposition, the
Home Government, and their agent, Sir Garnet Wolseley, blew no
uncertain blast, if we may judge from their words and actions. Thus we
find Sir Garnet speaking as follows at a banquet given in his honour at
Pretoria:--

"I am told that these men (the Boers) are told to keep on agitating in
this way, for a change of Government in England may give them again the
old order of things. Nothing can show greater ignorance of English
politics than such an idea; I tell you that there is no Government,
Whig or Tory, Liberal, Conservative, or Radical, _who would dare
under any circumstances to give back this country_. They would not
dare, because the English people would not allow them. To give back the
country, what would it mean? To give it back to external danger, to the
danger of attack by hostile tribes on its frontier, and who, if the
English Government were removed for one day, would make themselves felt
the next. Not an official of Government paid for months; it would mean
national bankruptcy. No taxes being paid, the same thing recurring
again which had existed before would mean danger without, anarchy and
civil war within, every possible misery; the strangulation of trade,
and the destruction of property."

It is very amusing to read this passage by the light of after events.
On other occasions Sir Garnet Wolseley will probably not be quite so
confident as to the future when it is to be controlled by a Radical
Government.

This explicit and straightforward statement of Sir Garnet's produced a
great effect on the loyal inhabitants of the Transvaal, which was
heightened by the publication of the following telegram from the
Secretary of State:--"You may fully confirm explicit statements made
from time to time as to inability of Her Majesty's Government to
entertain _any proposal_ for withdrawal of the Queen's sovereignty."

On the faith of these declarations many Englishmen migrated to the
Transvaal and settled there, whilst those who were in the country now
invested all their means, being confident that they would not lose
their property through its being returned to the Boers. The excitement
produced by Mr. Gladstone's speeches began to quiet down and be
forgotten for the time, arrear taxes were paid up by the malcontents,
and generally the aspect of affairs was such, in Sir Garnet Wolseley's
opinion, as justified him in writing, in April 1880, to the Secretary
of State expressing his belief that the agitation was dying out.[10]
Indeed, so sanguine was he on that point that he is reported to have
advised the withdrawal of the cavalry regiment stationed in the
territory, a piece of economy that was one of the immediate causes of
the revolt.

          [10] In Blue-Book No. (C. 2866) of September 1881, which is
          descriptive of various events connected with the Boer rising,
          is published, as an appendix, a despatch from Sir Garnet
          Wolseley, dated October 1879. This despatch declares the
          writer's opinion that the Boer discontent a on the increase.
          Its publication thus--_apropos des bottes_--nearly two
          years after it was written, is rather an amusing incident. It
          certainly gives one the idea that Sir Garnet Wolseley,
          fearing that his reputation for infallibility might be
          attacked by scoffers for not having foreseen the Boer
          rebellion, and perhaps uneasily conscious of other despatches
          very different in tenor and subsequent in date: and, mindful
          of the withdrawal of the cavalry regiment by his advice, had
          caused it to be tacked on to the Blue-Book as a documentary
          "I told you so," and a proof that, whoever else was blinded,
          he foresaw. It contains, however, the following remarkably
          true passage:--"Even were it not impossible, for many other
          reasons, to contemplate a withdrawal of our authority from
          the Transvaal, the position of insecurity in which we should
          leave this loyal and important section of the community (the
          English inhabitants), by exposing them to the certain
          retaliation of the Boers, would constitute, in my opinion, an
          insuperable obstacle to retrocession. Subjected to the same
          danger, moreover, would be those of the Boers, whose superior
          intelligence and courageous character has rendered them loyal
          to our Government"

          As the Government took the trouble to republish the despatch,
          it is a pity that they did not think fit to pay more
          attention to its contents.

The reader will remember the financial condition of the country at the
time of the Annexation, which was one of utter bankruptcy. After three
years of British rule, however, we find, notwithstanding the constant
agitation that had been kept up, that the total revenue receipts for
the first quarter of 1879 and 1880 amounted to £22,773 and £47,982
respectively. That is to say, that, during the last year of British
rule, the revenue of the country more than doubled itself, and amounted
to about £160,000 a year, taking the quarterly returns at the low
average of £40,000. It must, however, be remembered that this sum would
have been very largely increased in subsequent years, most probably
doubled. At any rate the revenue would have been amply sufficient to
make the province one of the most prosperous in South Africa, and to
have enabled it to shortly repay all debts due to the British
Government, and further to provide for its own defence. Trade also,
which, in April 1877, was completely paralysed, had increased
enormously. So early as the middle of 1879, the Committee of the
Transvaal Chamber of Commerce pointed out, in a resolution adopted by
them, that the trade of the country had in two years risen from almost
nothing to the considerable sum of two millions sterling per annum, and
that it was entirely in the hands of those favourable to British rule.
They also pointed out that more than half the land-tax was paid by
Englishmen, or other Europeans adverse to Boer Government. Land, too,
had risen greatly in value, of which I can give the following instance.
About a year after the Annexation I, together with a friend, bought a
little property on the outskirts of Pretoria, which, with a cottage we
put up on it, cost some £300. Just before the rebellion we fortunately
determined to sell it, and had no difficulty in getting £650 for it. I
do not believe that it would now fetch a fifty-pound note.

I cannot conclude this chapter better than by drawing attention to a
charming specimen of the correspondence between the Boer leaders and
their friend Mr. Courtney. The letter in question, which is dated 26th
June, purports to be written by Messrs. Kruger and Joubert, but it is
obvious that it owes its origin to some member or members of the Dutch
party at the Cape, from whence, indeed, it is written. This is rendered
evident both by its general style, and also by the use of such terms as
"Satrap," and by references to Napoleon III. and Cayenne, about whom
Messrs. Kruger and Joubert know no more than they do of Peru and the
Incas.

After alluding to former letters, the writers blow a blast of triumph
over the downfall of the Conservative Government, and then make a
savage attack on the reputation of Sir Bartle Frere. The "stubborn
Satrap" is throughout described as a liar, and every bad motive imputed
to him. Really, the fact that Mr. Courtney should encourage such
epistles as this is enough to give colour to the boast made by some of
the leading Boers, after the war, that they had been encouraged to
rebel by a member of the British Government.

At the end of this letter, and on the same page of the Blue-Book, is
printed the telegram recalling Sir Bartle Frere, dated 1st August 1880.
It really reads as though the second document was consequent on the
first. One thing is very clear, the feelings of Her Majesty's new
Government towards Sir Bartle Frere differed only in the method of
their expression from those set forth by the Boer leaders in their
letter to Mr. Courtney, whilst their object, namely, to be rid of him,
was undoubtedly identical with that of the Dutch party in South Africa.




CHAPTER V.

THE BOER REBELLION.


When the Liberal ministry became an accomplished fact instead of a
happy possibility, Mr. Gladstone did not find it convenient to adopt
the line of policy with reference to the Transvaal that might have been
expected from his utterances whilst leader of the Opposition. On the
contrary, he declared in Parliament that the Annexation could not be
cancelled, and on the 8th June 1880 we find him, in answer to a Boer
petition, written with the object of inducing him to act up to the
spirit of his words and rescind the Annexation, writing thus:--"Looking
to all the circumstances, both of the Transvaal and the rest of South
Africa, and to the necessity of preventing a renewal of disorders which
might lead to disastrous consequences, not only to the Transvaal, but
to the whole of South Africa, our judgment is, that the _Queen cannot
be advised to relinquish her sovereignty over the Transvaal_; but,
consistently with the maintenance of that sovereignty, we desire that
the white inhabitants of the Transvaal should, without prejudice to the
rest of the population, enjoy the fullest liberty to manage their local
affairs. We believe that this liberty may be most easily and promptly
conceded to the Transvaal as a member of a South African
confederation."

Unless words have lost their signification, this passage certainly
means that the Transvaal must remain a British colony, but that England
will be prepared to grant it responsible government, more especially if
it will consent to a confederation scheme. Mr. Gladstone, however, in a
communication dated 1st June 1881, and addressed to the unfortunate
Transvaal loyals, for whom he expresses "respect and sympathy,"
interprets his meaning thus: "It is stated, as I observe, that a
promise was given by me that the Transvaal never should be given back.
There is no mention of the terms or date of this promise. If the
reference be to my letter, of 8th June 1880, to Messrs. Kruger and
Joubert, I do not think the language of that letter justifies the
description given. Nor am I sure in what manner or to what degree the
fullest liberty to manage their local affairs, which I then said Her
Majesty's Government desired to confer on the white population of the
Transvaal, differs from the settlement now about being made in its
bearing on the interests of those whom your Committee represents."

Such twisting of the meaning of words would, in a private person, be
called dishonest. It will also occur to most people that Mr. Gladstone
might have spared the deeply wronged and loyal subjects of Her Majesty
whom he was addressing the taunt he levels at them in the second
paragraph I have quoted. If asked, he would no doubt say that he had
not the slightest intention of laughing at them; but when he
deliberately tells them that it makes no difference to their interests
whether they remain Her Majesty's subjects under a responsible
Government, or become the servants of men who were but lately in arms
against them and Her Majesty's authority, he is either mocking them, or
offering an insult to their understandings.

By way of comment on his remarks, I may add that he had, in a letter
replying to a petition from these same loyal inhabitants, addressed to
him in May 1880, informed them that he had already told the Boer
representatives that the Annexation could not be rescinded. Although
Mr. Gladstone is undoubtedly the greatest living master of the art of
getting two distinct and opposite sets of meanings out of one set of
words, it would try even his ingenuity to make out, to the satisfaction
of an impartial mind, that he never gave any pledge about the retention
of the Transvaal.

Indeed, it is from other considerations clear that he had no intention
of giving up the country to the Boers, whose cause he appears to have
taken up solely for electioneering purposes. Had he meant to do so, he
would have carried out his intention on succeeding to office, and,
indeed, as things have turned out, it is deeply to be regretted that he
did not; for, bad as such a step would have been, it would at any rate
have had a better appearance than our ultimate surrender after three
defeats. It would also have then been possible to secure the repayment
of some of the money owing to this country, and to provide for the
proper treatment of the natives, and the compensation of the loyal
inhabitants who could no longer live there: since it must naturally
have been easier to make terms with the Boers before they had defeated
our troops.

On the other hand, we should have missed the grandest and most
soul-stirring display of radical theories, practically applied, that
has as yet lightened the darkness of this country. But although Mr.
Gladstone gave his official decision against returning the country,
there seems to be little doubt that communications on the subject were
kept up with the Boer leaders through some prominent members of the
Radical party, who, it was said, went so far as to urge the Boers to
take up arms against us. When Mr. White came to this country on behalf
of the loyalists, after the surrender, he stated that this was so at a
public meeting, and said further that he had in his possession proofs
of his statements. He even went so far as to name the gentleman he
accused, and to challenge him to deny it I have not been able to gather
that Mr. White's statements were contradicted.

However this may be, after a pause, agitation in the Transvaal suddenly
recommenced with redoubled vigour. It began through a man named
Bezeidenhout, who refused to pay his taxes. Thereupon a waggon was
seized in execution under the authority of the court and put up to
auction, but its sale was prevented by a crowd of rebel Boers, who
kicked the auctioneer off the waggon and dragged the vehicle away. This
was on the 11th November 1880. When this intelligence reached Pretoria,
Sir Owen Lanyon sent down a few companies of the 21st Regiment, under
the command of Major Thornhill, to support the Landdrost in arresting
the rioters, and appointed Captain Raaf, C.M.G., to act as special
messenger to the Landdrost's Court at Potchefstroom, with authority to
enrol special constables to assist him to carry out the arrests. On
arrival at Potchefstroom Captain Raaf found that, without an armed
force, it was quite impossible to effect any arrest. On the 26th
November Sir Owen Lanyon, realising the gravity of the situation,
telegraphed to Sir George Colley, asking that the 58th Regiment should
be sent back to the Transvaal. Sir George replied that he could ill
spare it on account of "daily expected outbreak of Pondos and possible
appeal for help from Cape Colony," and that the Government must be
supported by the loyal inhabitants.

It will be seen that the Boers had, with some astuteness, chosen a very
favourable time to commence operations. The hands of the Cape
Government were full with the Basuto war, so no help could be expected
from it; Sir G. Wolseley had sent away the only cavalry regiment that
remained in the country, and lastly, Sir Owen Lanyon had quite recently
allowed a body of 300 trained volunteers, mostly, if not altogether,
drawn from among the loyalists, to be raised for service in the Basuto
war, a serious drain upon the resources of a country so sparsely
populated as the Transvaal.

Meanwhile a mass meeting had been convened by the Boers for the 8th
January to consider Mr. Gladstone's letter, but the Bezeidenhout
incident had the effect of putting forward the date of assembly by a
month, and it was announced that it would be held on the 8th December.
Subsequently the date was shifted to the 15th, and then back again to
the 8th. Every effort was made, by threats of future vengeance, to
secure the presence of as many burghers as possible; attempts were also
made to persuade the native chiefs to send representatives, and to
promise to join in an attack on the English. These entirely failed. The
meeting was held at a place called Paarde Kraal, and resulted in the
sudden declaration of the Republic and the appointment of the famous
triumvirate Kruger, Joubert, and Pretorius. It then moved into
Heidelberg, a little town about sixty miles from Pretoria, and on the
16th December the Republic was formally proclaimed in a long
proclamation, containing a summary of the events of the few preceding
years, and declaring the arrangements the malcontents were willing to
make with the English authorities. The terms offered in this document
are almost identical with those finally accepted by Her Majesty's
Government, with the exception that in the proclamation of the 16th
December the Boer leaders declare their willingness to enter into
confederation, and to guide their native policy by general rules
adopted in concurrence "with the Colonies and States of South Africa."
This was a more liberal offer than that which we ultimately agreed to,
but then the circumstances had changed.

This proclamation was forwarded to Sir Owen Lanyon with a covering
letter, in which the following words occur:--"We declare in the most
solemn manner that we have no desire to spill blood, and that from our
side we do not wish war. It lies in your hands to force us to appeal to
arms in self-defence.... We expect your answer within twice twenty-four
hours."

I beg to direct particular attention to these paragraphs, as they have
a considerable interest in view of what followed.

The letter and proclamation reached Government House, Pretoria, at
10.30 on the evening of Friday the 17th December. Sir Owen Lanyon's
proclamation, written in reply, was handed to the messenger at noon on
Sunday, 19th December, or within about thirty-six hours of his arrival,
and could hardly have reached the rebel camp, sixty miles off, before
dawn the next day, the 20th December, on which day, at about one
o'clock, a detachment of the 94th was ambushed and destroyed on the
road between Middleburg and Pretoria, about eighty miles off, by a
force despatched from Heidelberg for that purpose some days before. On
the 16th December, or the _same day_ on which the Triumvirate had
despatched the proclamation to Pretoria containing their terms, and
expressing in the most solemn manner that they had no desire to shed
blood, a large Boer force was attacking Potchefstroom.

So much then for the sincerity of the professions of their desire to
avoid bloodshed.

The proclamation sent by Sir O. Lanyon in reply recited in its preamble
the various acts of which the rebels had been guilty, including that of
having "wickedly sought to incite the said loyal native inhabitants
throughout the province to take up arms against Her Majesty's
Government," announced that matters had now been put into the hands of
the officer commanding Her Majesty's troops, and promised pardon to all
who would disperse to their homes.

It was at Potchefstroom, which town had all along been the nursery of
the rebellion, that actual hostilities first broke out. Potchefstroom
as a town is much more Boer in its sympathies than Pretoria, which is,
or rather was, almost purely English. Sir Owen Lanyon had, as stated
before, sent a small body of soldiers thither to support the civil
authorities, and had also appointed Major Clarke, C.M.G., an officer of
noted coolness and ability, to act as Special Commissioner for the
district.

Major Clarke's first step was to try, in conjunction with Captain Raaf,
to raise a corps of volunteers, in which he totally failed. Those of
the townsfolk who were not Boers at heart had too many business
relations with the surrounding farmers, and perhaps too little faith in
the stability of English rule after Mr. Gladstone's utterances, to
allow them to indulge in patriotism. At the time of the outbreak,
between seventy and eighty thousand sterling was owing to firms in
Potchefstroom by neighbouring Boers, a sum amply sufficient to account
for their lukewarmness in the English cause. Subsequent events have
shown that the Potchefstroom shopkeepers were wise in their generation.

On the 15th December a large number of Boers came into the town and
took possession of the printing-office in order to print the
proclamation already alluded to. Major Clarke made two attempts to
enter the office and see the leaders, but without success.

On the 16th a Boer patrol fired on some of the mounted infantry, and
the fire was returned. These were the first shots fired during the war,
and they were fired by Boers. Orders were thereupon signalled to Clarke
by Lieutenant-Colonel Winsloe, 21st Regiment, now commanding at the
fort which he afterwards defended so gallantly, that he was to commence
firing. Clarke was in the Landdrost's office on the Market Square with
a force of about twenty soldiers under Captain Falls and twenty
civilians under Captain Raaf, C.M.G., a position but ill-suited for
defensive purposes, from whence fire was accordingly opened, the Boers
taking up positions in the surrounding houses commanding the office.
Shortly after the commencement of the fighting, Captain Falls was shot
dead whilst talking to Major Clarke, the latter having a narrow escape,
a bullet grazing his head just above the ear. The fighting continued
during the 17th and till the morning of the 18th, when the Boers
succeeded in firing the roof, which was of thatch, by throwing
fire-balls on to it. Major Clarke then addressed the men, telling them
that, though personally he did not care about his own life, he did not
see that they could serve any useful purpose by being burned alive, so
he should surrender, which he did, with a loss of about six killed and
wounded. The camp meanwhile had repulsed with loss the attack made on
it, and was never again directly attacked.

Whilst these events were in progress at Potchefstroom, a much more
awful tragedy was in preparation on the road between Middleburg and
Pretoria.

On the 23d November, Colonel Bellairs, at the request of Sir Owen
Lanyon, directed a concentration on Pretoria of most of the few
soldiers that there were in the territory, in view of the disturbed
condition of the country. In accordance with these orders, Colonel
Anstruther marched from Lydenburg, a town about 180 miles from
Pretoria, on the 5th December, with the headquarters and two companies
of the 94th Regiment, being a total of 264 men, three women, and two
children, and the disproportionately large train of thirty-four
ox-waggons, or an ox-waggon capable of carrying five thousand pounds'
weight to every eight persons. And here I may remark that it is this
enormous amount of baggage, without which it appears to be impossible
to move the smallest body of men, that renders infantry regiments
almost useless for service in South Africa except for garrisoning
purposes. Both Zulus and Boers can get over the ground at thrice the
pace possible to the unfortunate soldier, and both races despise them
accordingly. The Zulus call our infantry "pack oxen." In this
particular instance, Colonel Anstruther's defeat, or rather,
annihilation, is to a very great extent referable to his enormous
baggage train; since, in the first place, had he not lost valuable days
in collecting more waggons, he would have been safe in Pretoria before
danger arose. It must also be acknowledged that his arrangements on the
line of march were somewhat reckless, though it can hardly be said that
he was ignorant of his danger. Thus we find that Colonel Bellairs wrote
to Colonel Anstruther, warning him of the probability of an attack, and
impressing on him the necessity of keeping a good look-out, the letter
being received and acknowledged by the latter on the 17th December.

To this warning was added a still more impressive one that came to my
knowledge privately. A gentleman well known to me received, on the
morning after the troops had passed through the town of Middleburg on
their way to Pretoria, a visit from an old Boer with whom he was on
friendly terms, who had purposely come to tell him that a large patrol
was out to ambush the troops on the Pretoria road. My informant having
convinced himself of the truth of the statement, at once rode after the
soldiers, and catching them up some distance from Middleburg, told
Colonel Anstruther what he had heard, imploring him, he said, with all
the energy he could command, to take better precautions against
surprise. The Colonel, however, laughed at his fears, and told him that
if the Boers came "he would frighten them away with the big drum."

At one o'clock on Sunday, the 20th December, the column was marching
along about a mile and a half from a place known as Bronker's Splint,
and thirty-eight miles from Pretoria, when suddenly a large number of
mounted Boers were seen in loose formation on the left side of the
road. The band was playing at the time, and the column was extended
over more than half a mile, the rearguard being about a hundred yards
behind the last waggon. The band stopped playing on seeing the Boers,
and the troops halted, when a man was seen advancing with a white flag,
whom Colonel Anstruther went out to meet, accompanied by Conductor
Egerton, a civilian. They met about one hundred and fifty yards from
the column, and the man gave Colonel Anstruther a letter, which
announced the establishment of the South African Republic, stated that
until they heard Lanyon's reply to their proclamation they did not know
if they were at war or not; that, consequently, they could not allow
any movements of troops, which would be taken as a declaration of war.
This letter was signed by Joubert, one of the Triumvirate. Colonel
Anstruther replied that he was ordered to Pretoria, and to Pretoria he
must go.

Whilst this conference was going on, the Boers, of whom there were
quite five hundred, had gradually closed round the column, and took up
positions behind rocks and trees which afforded them excellent cover,
whilst the troops were on a bare plain, and before Colonel Anstruther
reached his men a murderous fire was poured in upon them from all
sides. The fire was hotly returned by the soldiers. Most of the
officers were struck down by the first volley, having, no doubt, been
picked out by the marksmen. The firing lasted about fifteen minutes,
and at the end of that time seven out of the nine officers were down
killed and wounded; an eighth (Captain Elliot), one of the two who
escaped, untouched, being reserved for an even more awful fate. The
majority of the men were also down, and had the hail of lead continued
much longer it is clear that nobody would have been left. Colonel
Anstruther, who was lying badly wounded in five places, seeing what a
hopeless state affairs were in, ordered the bugler to sound the cease
firing, and surrendered. One of the three officers who were not much
hurt was, most providentially, Dr. Ward, who had but a slight wound in
the thigh; all the others, except Captain Elliot and one lieutenant,
were either killed or died from the effects of their wounds. There were
altogether 56 killed and 101 wounded, including a woman, Mrs. Fox.
Twenty more afterwards died of their wounds. The Boer loss appears to
have been very small.

After the fight Conductor Egerton, with a sergeant, was allowed to walk
into Pretoria to obtain medical assistance, the Boers refusing to give
him a horse, or even to allow him to use his own. The Boer leader also
left Dr. Ward eighteen men and a few stores for the wounded, with which
he made shift as best he could. Nobody can read this gentleman's report
without being much impressed with the way in which, though wounded
himself, he got through his terrible task of, without assistance,
attending to the wants of 101 sufferers. Beginning the task at 2
P.M., it took him till six the next morning before he had seen
the last man. It is to be hoped that his services have met with some
recognition. Dr. Ward remained near the scene of the massacre with his
wounded men till the declaration of peace, when he brought them down to
Maritzburg, having experienced great difficulty in obtaining food for
them during so many weeks.

This is a short account of what I must, with reluctance, call a most
cruel and carefully planned massacre. I may mention that a Zulu driver,
who was with the rearguard, and escaped into Natal, stated that the
Boers shot all the wounded men who formed that body. His statement was
to a certain extent borne out by the evidence of one of the survivors,
who stated that all the bodies found in that part of the field (nearly
three-quarters of a mile away from the head of the column), had a
bullet hole through the head or breast in addition to their other
wounds.

The Administrator of the Transvaal in council thus comments on the
occurrence in an official minute:--"The surrounding and gradual hemming
in under a flag of truce of a force, and the selection of spots from
which to direct their fire, as in the case of the unprovoked attack by
the rebels upon Colonel Anstruther's force, is a proceeding of which
very few like incidents can be mentioned in the annals of civilised
warfare."

The Boer leaders, however, were highly elated at their success, and
celebrated it in a proclamation of which the following is an
extract:--"Inexpressible is the gratitude of the burghers for this
blessing conferred on them. Thankful to the brave General F. Joubert
and his men who have upheld the honour of the Republic on the
battlefield. Bowed down in the dust before Almighty God, who had thus
stood by them, and, with a loss of over a hundred of the enemy, only
allowed two of ours to be killed."

In view of the circumstances of the treacherous hemming in and
destruction of this small body of unprepared men, most people would
think this language rather high-flown, not to say blasphemous.

On the news of this disaster reaching Pretoria, Sir Owen Lanyon issued
a proclamation placing the country under martial law. As the town was
large, straggling, and incapable of defence, all the inhabitants,
amounting to over four thousand souls, were ordered up to camp, where
the best arrangements possible were made for their convenience. In
these quarters they remained for three months, driven from their
comfortable homes, and cheerfully enduring all the hardships, want, and
discomforts consequent on their position, whilst they waited in
patience for the appearance of that relieving column that never came.
People in England hardly understand what these men and women went
through because they chose to remain loyal. Let them suppose that all
the inhabitants of an ordinary English town, with the exception of the
class known as poor people, which can hardly be said to exist in a
colony, were at an hour's notice ordered--all, the aged and the sick,
delicate women, and tiny children--to leave their homes to the mercy of
the enemy, and crowd up in a little space under shelter of a fort, with
nothing but canvas tents or sheds to cover them from the fierce summer
suns and rains, and the coarsest rations to feed them; whilst the
husbands and brothers were daily engaged with a cunning and dangerous
enemy, and sometimes brought home wounded or dead. They will then have
some idea of what was gone through by the loyal people of Pretoria, in
their weak confidence in the good faith of the English Government.

The arrangements made for the defence of the town were so ably and
energetically carried out by Sir Owen Lanyon, assisted by the military
officers, that no attack upon it was ever attempted. It seems to me
that the organisation that could provide for the penning up of four
thousand people for months, and carry it out without the occurrence of
a single unpleasantness or expression of discontent, must have had
something remarkable about it. Of course, it would have been impossible
without the most loyal co-operation on the part of those concerned.
Indeed everybody in the town lent a helping hand; judges served out
rations, members of the Executive inspected nuisances, and so forth.
There was only one instance of "striking;" and then, of all people in
the world, it was the five civil doctors who, thinking it a favourable
opportunity to fleece the Government, combined to demand five guineas
a-day each for their services. I am glad to say that they did not
succeed in their attempt at extortion.

On the 23d December, the Boer leaders issued a second proclamation in
reply to that of Sir O. Lanyon of the 18th, which is characterised by
an utter absence of regard for the truth, being, in fact, nothing but a
tissue of impudent falsehoods. It accuses Sir O. Lanyon of having
bombarded women and children, of arming natives against the Boers, and
of firing on the Boers without declaring war. Not one of these
accusations has any foundation in fact, as the Boers well knew; but
they also knew that Sir Owen, being shut up in Pretoria, was not in a
position to rebut their charges, which they hoped might, to some
extent, be believed, and create sympathy for them in other parts of the
world. This was the reason of the issue of the proclamation, which well
portrays the character of its framers.

Life at Pretoria was varied by occasional sorties against the Boer
laagers, situated at different points in the neighbourhood, generally
about six or eight miles from the town. These expeditions were carried
out with considerable success, though with some loss, the heaviest
incurred being when the Boers, having treacherously hoisted the white
flag, opened a heavy fire on the Pretoria forces, as soon as they,
beguiled into confidence, emerged from their cover. In the course of
the war, one in every four of the Pretoria mounted volunteers was
killed or wounded.

But perhaps the most serious of all the difficulties the Government had
to meet was that of keeping the natives in check. As has before been
stated, they were devotedly attached to our rule, and, during the three
years of its continuance, had undergone what was to them a strange
experience, they had neither been murdered, beaten, or enslaved.
Naturally they were in no hurry to return to the old order of things,
in which murder, flogging, and slavery were events of everyday
occurrence. Nor did the behaviour of the Boers on the outbreak of the
war tend to reconcile them to any such idea. Thus we find that the
farmers had pressed a number of natives from Waterberg into one of
their laagers (Zwart Koppies); two of them tried to run away, a Boer
saw them and shot them both. Again, on the 7th January, a native
reported to the authorities at Pretoria that he and some others were
returning from the Diamond Fields driving some sheep. A Boer came and
asked them to sell the sheep. They refused, whereupon he went away, but
returning with some other Dutchmen fired on the Kafirs, killing one.

On the 2d January information reached Pretoria that on the 26th
December some Boers fired on some natives who were resting outside
Potchefstroom and killed three; the rest fled, whereupon the Boers took
the cattle they had with them.

On the 11th January some men, who had been sent from Pretoria with
despatches for Standerton, were taken prisoners. Whilst prisoners they
saw ten men returning from the Fields stopped by the Boers and ordered
to come to the laager. They refused and ran away, were fired on, five
being killed and one getting his arm broken.

These are a few instances of the treatment meted out to the unfortunate
natives, taken at haphazard from the official reports. There are plenty
more of the same nature if anybody cares to read them.

As soon as the news of the rising reached them, every chief of any
importance sent in to offer aid to Government, and many of them,
especially Montsioa, our old ally in the Keate Award district, took the
loyals of the neighbourhood under their protection. Several took charge
of Government property and cattle during the disturbances, and one had
four or five thousand pounds in gold, the product of a recently
collected tax, given him to take care of by the Commissioner of his
district, who was afraid that the money would be seized by the Boers.
In every instance the property entrusted to their charge was returned
intact. The loyalty of all the native chiefs under very trying
circumstances (for the Boers were constantly attempting to cajole or
frighten them into joining them) is a remarkable proof of the great
affection of the Kafirs, more especially those of the Basuto tribes,
who love peace better than war, for the Queen's rule. The Government of
Pretoria need only have spoken one word to set an enormous number of
armed men in motion against the Boers, with the most serious results to
the latter. Any other Government in the world would, in its extremity,
have spoken that word, but, fortunately for the Boers, it is against
English principles to set black against white under any circumstances.

Besides the main garrison at Pretoria there were forts defended by
soldiery and loyals at the following places:--Potchefstroom,
Rustenburg, Lydenburg, Marabastad, and Wakkerstroom, none of which were
taken by the Boers.[11]

          [11] Colonel Winsloe, however, being short of provisions, was
          beguiled by the fraudulent representations and acts of the
          Boer commander into surrendering the fort at Potchefstroom
          daring the armistice.

One of the first acts of the Triumvirate was to despatch a large force
from Heidelberg with orders to advance into Natal Territory, and seize
the pass over the Drakensberg known as Lang's Nek, so as to dispute the
advance of any relieving column. This movement was promptly executed,
and strong Boer troops patrolled Natal country almost up to Newcastle.

The news of the outbreak, followed as it was by that of the Bronker's
Spruit massacre, and Captain Elliot's murder, created a great
excitement in Natal. All available soldiers were at once despatched up
country, together with a naval brigade, who, on arrival at Newcastle,
brought up the strength of the Imperial troops of all arms to about a
thousand men. On the 10th January Sir George Colley left Maritzburg to
join the force at Newcastle, but at this time nobody dreamt that he
meant to attack the Nek with such an insignificant column. It was known
that the loyals and troops who were shut up in the various towns in the
Transvaal had sufficient provisions to last for some months, and that
there was therefore nothing to necessitate a forlorn hope. Indeed the
possibility of Sir George Colley attempting to enter the Transvaal was
not even speculated upon until just before his advance, it being
generally considered as out of the question.

The best illustration I can give of the feeling that existed about the
matter is to quote my own case. I had been so unfortunate as to land in
Natal with my wife and servants just as the Transvaal troubles began,
my intention being to proceed to a place I had near Newcastle. For some
weeks I remained in Maritzburg, but finding that the troops were to
concentrate on Newcastle, and being besides heartily wearied of the
great expense and discomfort of hotel life in that town, I determined
to go on up country, looking on it as being as safe as any place in the
colony. Of course the possibility of Sir George attacking the Nek
before the arrival of the reinforcements did not enter into my
calculations, as I thought it a venture that no sensible man would
undertake. On the day of my start, however, there was a rumour about
the town that the General was going to attack the Boer position. Though
I did not believe it, I thought it as well to go and ask the Colonial
Secretary, Colonel Mitchell, privately, if there was any truth in it,
adding that if there was, as I had a pretty intimate knowledge of the
Boers and their shooting powers, and what the inevitable result of such
a move would be, I should certainly prefer, as I had ladies with me, to
remain where I was. Colonel Mitchell told me frankly that he knew no
more about Sir George's plans than I did; but he added I might be sure
that so able and prudent a soldier would not do anything rash. His
remark concurred with my own opinion; so I started, and on arrival at
Newcastle a week later was met by the intelligence that Sir George had
advanced that morning to attack the Nek. To return was almost
impossible, since both horses and travellers were pretty nearly knocked
up. Also, anybody who has travelled with his family in summer-time over
the awful track of alternate slough and boulders between Maritzburg and
Newcastle, known in the colony as a road, will understand that at the
time the adventurous voyagers would far rather risk being shot than
face a return journey.

The only thing to do under the circumstances was to await the course of
events, which were now about to develop themselves with startling
rapidity. The little town of Newcastle was at this time an odd sight,
and remained so all through the war. The hotels were crowded to
overflowing with refugees, and on every spare patch of land were
erected tents, mud huts, canvas houses, and every kind of covering that
could be utilised under the pressure of necessity, to house the many
homeless families who had succeeded in effecting their escape from the
Transvaal, many of whom were reduced to great straits.

On the morning of the 28th January, anybody listening attentively in
the neighbourhood of Newcastle could hear the distant boom of heavy
guns. We were not kept long in suspense, for in the afternoon news
arrived that Sir George had attacked the Nek, and failed with heavy
loss. The excitement in the town was intense, for, in addition to other
considerations, the 58th Regiment, which had suffered most, had been
quartered there for some time, and both the officers and men were
personally known to the inhabitants.

The story of the fight is well known, and needs little repetition, and
a very sad story it is. The Boers, who at that time were some 2000
strong, were posted and entrenched on steep hills, against which Sir
George Colley hurled a few hundred soldiers. It was a forlorn hope, but
so gallant was the charge, especially that of the mounted squadron led
by Major Bronlow, that at one time it nearly succeeded. But nothing
could stand under the withering fire from the Boer schanses, and as
regards the foot soldiers, they never had a chance. Colonel Deane tried
to take them up the hill with a rush, with the result that by the time
they reached the top, some of the men were actually sick from
exhaustion, and none could hold a rifle steady. There on the bare
hill-top they crouched and lay, whilst the pitiless fire from redoubt
and rock lashed them like hail, till at last human nature could bear it
no longer, and what was left of them retired slowly down the slope. But
for many that gallant charge was their last earthly action. As they
charged they fell, and where they fell they were afterwards buried. The
casualties, killed and wounded, amounted to 195, which, considering the
small number of troops engaged in the actual attack, is enormously
heavy, and shows more plainly than words can tell the desperate nature
of the undertaking. Amongst the killed were Colonel Deane, Major Poole,
Major Hingeston, and Lieutenant Elwes. Major Essex was the only staff
officer engaged who escaped, the same officer who was one of the
fortunate four who lived through Isandhlwana. On this occasion his
usual good fortune attended him, for though his horse was killed and
his helmet knocked off, he was not touched. The Boer loss was very
trivial.

Sir George Colley, in his admirably lucid despatch about this
occurrence addressed to the Secretary of State for War, does not enter
much into the question as to the motives that prompted him to attack,
simply stating that his object was to relieve the besieged towns. He
does not appear to have taken into consideration, what was obvious to
anybody who knew the country and the Boers, that even if he had
succeeded in forcing the Nek, in itself almost an impossibility, he
could never have operated with any success in the Transvaal with so
small a column, without cavalry, and with an enormous train of waggons.
He would have been harassed day and night by the Boer skirmishers, his
supplies cut off, and his advance made practically impossible. Also the
Nek would have been re-occupied behind him, since he could not have
detached sufficient men to hold it, and in all probability Newcastle,
his base of supplies, would have fallen into the hands of the enemy.

The moral effect of our defeat on the Boers was very great. Up to this
time there had been many secret doubts amongst a large section of them
as to what the upshot of an encounter with the troops might be; and
with this party, in the same way that defeat, or even the anxiety of
waiting to be attacked, would have turned the scale one way, victory
turned it the other. It gave them unbounded confidence in their own
superiority, and infused a spirit of cohesion and mutual reliance into
their ranks which had before been wanting. Waverers wavered no longer,
but gave a loyal adherence to the good cause, and, what was still more
acceptable, large numbers of volunteers,--whatever President Brand may
say to the contrary,--poured in from the Orange Free State.

What Sir George Colley's motive was in making so rash a move is, of
course, quite inexplicable to the outside observer. It was said at the
time in Natal that he was a man with a theory: namely, that small
bodies of men properly handled were as useful and as likely to obtain
the object in view as a large force. Whether or no this was so, I am
not prepared to say; but it is undoubtedly the case that very clever
men have sometimes very odd theories, and it may be that he was a
striking instance in point.

For some days after the battle at Lang's Nek affairs were quiet, and it
was hoped that they would remain so till the arrival of the
reinforcements, which were on their way out. The hope proved a vain one
On the 7th February it was reported that the escort proceeding from
Newcastle to the General's camp with the post, a distance of about
eighteen miles, had been fired on and forced to return.

On the 8th, about mid-day, we were all startled by the sound of
fighting, proceeding apparently from a hill known as Scheins Hoogte,
about ten miles from Newcastle. It was not known that the General
contemplated any move, and everybody was entirely at a loss to know
what was going on, the general idea being, however, that the camp near
Lang's Nek had been abandoned, and that Sir George was retiring on
Newcastle.

The firing grew hotter and hotter, till at last it was perfectly
continuous, the cannon evidently being discharged as quickly as they
could be loaded, whilst their dull booming was accompanied by the
unceasing crash and roll of the musketry. Towards three o'clock the
firing slackened, and we thought it was all over, one way or the other,
but about five o'clock it broke out again with increased vigour. At
dusk it finally ceased. About this time some Kafirs came to my house
and told us that an English force was hemmed in on a hill this side of
the Ingogo River, that they were fighting bravely, but that "their arms
were tired," adding that they thought they would be all killed at
night.

Needless to say we spent that night with heavy hearts, expecting every
minute to hear the firing begin again, and ignorant of what fate had
befallen our poor soldiers on the hill. Morning put an end to our
suspense, and we then learnt that we had suffered what, under the
circumstances, amounted to a crushing defeat It appears that Sir George
had moved out with a force of five companies of the 60th Regiment, two
guns, and a few mounted men, to, in his own words, "patrol the road,
and meet and escort some waggons expected from Newcastle." As soon as
he passed the Ingogo he was surrounded by a body of Boers sent after
him from Lang's Nek, on a small triangular plateau, and sharply
assailed on all sides. With a break of about two hours, from three to
five, the assault was kept up till nightfall, with very bad results so
far as we were concerned, seeing that out of a body of about 500 men,
over 150 were killed and wounded. The reinforcements sent for from the
camp apparently did not come into action. For some unexplained reason
the Boers did not follow up their attack that night, perhaps because
they did not think it possible that our troops could effect their
escape back to the camp, and considered that the next morning would be
soon enough to return and finish the business. The General, however,
determined to get back, and scratch teams of such mules, riding-horses,
and oxen as had lived through the day being harnessed to the guns, the
dispirited and exhausted survivors of the force managed to ford the
Ingogo, now swollen by rain which had fallen in the afternoon, poor
Lieutenant Wilkinson, the adjutant of the 60th, losing his life in the
operation, and to struggle through the dense darkness back to camp.

On the hill-top they had lately held the dead lay thick. There, too,
exposed to the driving rain and bitter wind, lay the wounded, many of
whom would be dead before the rising of the morrow's sun. It must
indeed have been a sight never to be forgotten by those who saw it. The
night--I remember well--was cold and rainy, the great expanses of hill
and plain being sometimes lit by the broken gleams of an uncertain
moon, and sometimes plunged into intensest darkness by the passing of a
heavy cloud. Now and again flashes of lightning threw every crag and
outline into vivid relief, and the deep muttering of distant thunder
made the wild gloom more solemn. Then a gust of icy wind would come
tearing down the valleys to be followed by a pelting thunder
shower--and thus the night wore away.

When one reflects what discomfort, and even danger, an ordinary healthy
person would suffer if left after a hard day's work to lie all night in
the rain and wind on the top of a stony mountain, without food, or even
water to assuage his thirst, it becomes to some degree possible to
realise what the sufferings of our wounded after the battle of Ingogo
must have been. Those who survived were next day taken to the hospital
at Newcastle.

What Sir George Colley's real object was in exposing himself to the
attack has never transpired. It can hardly have been to clear the road,
as he says in his despatch, because the road was not held by the enemy,
but only visited occasionally by their patrols. The result of the
battle was to make the Boers, whose losses were trifling, more
confident than ever, and to greatly depress our soldiers. Sir George
had now lost between three and four hundred men out of his column of
little over a thousand, which was thereby entirely crippled. Of his
staff officers Major Essex now alone survived, his usual good fortune
having carried him safe through the battle of Ingogo. What makes his
repeated escapes the more remarkable is that he was generally to be
found in the heaviest firing. A man so fortunate as Major Essex ought
to be rewarded for his good fortune if for no other reason, though, if
reports are true, there would be no need to fall back on that to find
grounds on which to advance a soldier who has always borne himself so
well.

Another result of the Ingogo battle was that the Boers, knowing that we
had no force to cut them off, and always secure of a retreat into the
Free State, passed round Newcastle in Free State Territory, and
descended from fifteen hundred to two thousand strong into Natal for
the purpose of destroying the reinforcements which were now on their
way up under General Wood. This was on the 11th of February, and from
that date till the 18th the upper districts of Natal were in the hands
of the enemy, who cut the telegraph wires, looted waggons, stole herds
of cattle and horses, and otherwise amused themselves at the expense of
Her Majesty's subjects in Natal.

It was a very anxious time for those who knew what Boers are capable
of, and had women and children to protect, and who were never sure if
their houses would be left standing over their heads from one day to
another.

Every night we were obliged to place out Kafirs as scouts to give us
timely warning of the approach of marauding parties, and to sleep with
loaded rifles close to our hands, and sometimes, when things looked
very black, in our clothes, with horses ready saddled in the stable.
Nor were our fears groundless, for one day a patrol of some five
hundred Boers encamped on the next place, which by the way belonged to
a Dutchman, and stole all the stock on it, the property of an
Englishman. They also intercepted a train of waggons, destroyed the
contents, and burnt them. Numerous were the false alarms it was our
evil fortune to experience. For instance, one night I was sitting in
the drawing-room reading, about eleven o'clock, with a door leading on
to the verandah slightly ajar, for the night was warm, when suddenly I
heard myself called by name in a muffled voice, and asked if the place
was in the possession of the Boers. Looking towards the door I saw a
full-cocked revolver coming round the corner, and on opening it in some
alarm, I could indistinctly discern a line of armed figures in a
crouching attitude stretching along the verandah into the garden
beyond. It turned out to be a patrol of the mounted police, who had
received information that a large number of Boers had seized the place
and had come to ascertain the truth of the report. As we gathered from
them that the Boers were certainly near, we did not pass a very
comfortable night.

Meanwhile we were daily expecting to hear that the troops had been
attacked along the line of march, and knowing the nature of the country
and the many opportunities it affords for ambuscading and destroying
one of our straggling columns encumbered with innumerable waggons, we
had the worst fears for the result. At length a report reached us to
the effect that the reinforcements were expected on the morrow, and
that they were not going to cross the Ingagaan at the ordinary drift,
which was much commanded by hills, but at a lower drift on our own
place, about three miles from Newcastle, which is only slightly
commanded. We also heard that it was the intention of the Boers to
attack them at this point and to fall back on my house and the hills
behind. Accordingly, we thought it about time to retreat, and securing
a few valuables, such as plate, we made our way into the town, leaving
the house and its contents to take their chance. At Newcastle an attack
was daily expected, if for no other reason, to obtain possession of the
stores collected there.

The defences of the place were, however, in a wretched condition, no
proper outlook was kept, and there was an utter want of effective
organisation. The military element at the camp had enough to do to look
after itself, and did not concern itself with the safety of the town;
and the mounted police--a colonial force paid by the colony--had been
withdrawn from the little forts round Newcastle, as the General wanted
them for other purposes, and a message sent that the town must defend
its own forts. There were, it is true, a large number of able-bodied
men in the place who were willing to fight, but they had no
organisation. The very laager was not finished until the danger was
past.

Then there was a large party who were for surrendering the town to the
Boers, because if they fought it might afterwards injure their trade.
With this section of the population the feeling of patriotism was
strong, no doubt, but that of pocket was stronger. I am convinced that
the Boers would have found the capture of Newcastle an easy task, and I
confess that what I then saw did not inspire me with great hopes of the
safety of the colony when it gets responsible government, and has to
depend for protection on burgher forces. Colonial volunteer forces are,
I think, as good troops as any in the world; but an unorganised
colonial mob, pulled this way and that by different sentiments and
interests, is as useless as any other mob, with the difference that it
is more impatient of control.

For some unknown reason the Boer leaders providentially changed their
minds about attacking the reinforcements, and their men were withdrawn
to the Nek as swiftly and silently as they had been advanced, and on
the 17th February the reinforcements marched into Newcastle, to the
very great relief of the inhabitants, who had been equally anxious for
their own safety and that of the troops. Personally, I was never in my
life more pleased to see Her Majesty's uniform; and we were equally
rejoiced on returning home to find that nothing had been injured. After
this we had quiet for a while.

On the 21st February, we heard that two fresh regiments had been sent
up to the camp at Lang's Nek, and that General Wood had been ordered
down country by Sir George Colley to bring up more reinforcements. This
item of news caused much surprise, as nobody could understand why, now
that the road was clear, and that there was little chance of its being
again blocked, a General should be sent down to do work which could, to
all appearance, have been equally well done by the officers in command
of the reinforcing regiments, with the assistance of their transport
riders. It was, however, understood that an agreement had been entered
into between the two Generals that no offensive operations should be
undertaken till Wood returned.

With the exception of occasional scares, there was no further
excitement till Sunday the 27th February, when, whilst sitting on the
verandah after lunch, I thought I heard the sound of distant artillery.
Others present differed with me, thinking the sound was caused by
thunder, but as I adhered to my opinion, we determined to ride into
town and see. On arrival there we found the place full of rumours, from
which we gathered that some fresh disaster had occurred; and that
messages were pouring down the wires from Mount Prospect camp. We then
went on to camp, thinking that we should learn more there, but they
knew nothing about it, several officers asking us what new "shave" we
had got hold of. A considerable number of troops had been marched from
Newcastle that morning to go to Mount Prospect, but when it was
realised that something had occurred, they were stopped, and marched
back again. Bit by bit we managed to gather the truth. At first we
heard that our men had made a most gallant resistance on the hill,
mowing down the advancing enemy by hundreds, till at last, their
ammunition failing, they fought with their bayonets, using stones and
meat tins as missiles. I wish that our subsequent information had been
to the same effect.

It appears that on the evening of the 26th, Sir George Colley, after
mess, suddenly gave orders for a force of a little over six hundred
men, consisting of detachments from no less than three different
regiments, the 58th, 60th, 92d, and the Naval Brigade, to be got ready
for an expedition, without revealing his plans to anybody until late in
the afternoon; and then without more ado, marched them up to the top of
Majuba--a great square-topped mountain to the right of, and commanding
the Boer position at Lang's Nek. The troops reached the top about three
in the morning, after a somewhat exhausting climb, and were stationed
at different points of the plateau in a scientific way. Whilst the
darkness lasted, they could, by the glittering of the watch-fires,
trace from this point of vantage the position of the Boer laagers that
lay 2000 yards beneath them, whilst the dawn of day revealed every
detail of the defensive works, and showed the country lying at their
feet like a map.

On arrival at the top, it was represented to the General that a rough
entrenchment should be thrown up, but he would not allow it to be done
on account of the men being wearied with their marching up. This was a
fatal mistake. Behind an entrenchment, however slight, one would think
that 600 English soldiers might have defied the whole Boer army, and
much more the 200 or 300 men by whom they were hunted down at Majuba.
It appears that about 10.15 A.M., Colonel Stewart and Major Fraser
again went to General Colley "to arrange to start the sailors on an
entrenchment." ... "Finding the ground so exposed, the General did not
give orders to entrench."

As soon as the Boers found out that the hill was in the occupation of
the English, their first idea was to leave the Nek, and they began to
inspan with that object, but discovering that there were no guns
commanding them, they changed their mind, and set to work to storm the
hill instead. As far as I have been able to gather, the number of Boers
who took the mountain was about 300, or possibly 400; I do not think
there were more than that. The Boers themselves declare solemnly that
they were only 100 strong, but this I do not believe. They slowly
advanced up the hill till about 11.30, when the real attack began, the
Dutchmen coming on more rapidly and confidently, and shooting with
ever-increasing accuracy, as they found our fire quite ineffective.

About a quarter to one, our men retreated to the last ridge, and
General Colley was shot through the head. After this, the retreat
became a rout, and the soldiers rushed pell-mell down the precipitous
sides of the hill, the Boers knocking them over by the score as they
went, till they were out of range. A few were also, I heard, killed by
the shells from the guns that were advanced from the camp to cover the
retreat, but as this does not appear in the reports, perhaps it is not
true. Our loss was about 200 killed and wounded, including Sir George
Colley, Drs. Landon and Cornish, and Commander Romilly, who was shot
with an explosive bullet, and died after some days' suffering. When the
wounded Commander was being carried to a more sheltered spot, it was
with great difficulty that the Boers were prevented from massacring him
as he lay, they being under the impression that he was Sir Garnet
Wolseley. As was the case at Ingogo, the wounded were left on the
battlefield all night in very inclement weather, to which some of them
succumbed. It is worthy of note that after the fight was over they were
treated with considerable kindness by the Boers.

Not being a soldier, of course, I cannot venture to give any military
reasons as to how it was that what was after all a considerable force
was so easily driven from a position of great natural strength; but I
think I may, without presumption, state my opinion as to the real
cause, which was the villainous shooting of the British soldier. Though
the troops did not, as was said at the time, run short of ammunition,
it is clear that they fired away a great many rounds at men who, in
storming the hill, must necessarily have exposed themselves more or
less, of whom they managed to hit--certainly not more than six or
seven--which was the outside of the Boer casualties. From this it is
clear that they can neither judge distance nor hit a moving object, nor
did they probably know that when shooting down hill it is necessary to
aim low. Such shooting as the English soldier is capable of may be very
well when he has an army to aim at, but it is useless in guerilla
warfare against a foe skilled in the use of the rifle and the art of
taking shelter.

A couple of months after the storming of Majuba, I, together with a
friend, had a conversation with a Boer, a volunteer from the Free State
in the late war, and one of the detachment that stormed Majuba, who
gave us a circumstantial account of the attack with the greatest
willingness. He said that when it was discovered that the English had
possession of the mountain, they thought that the game was up, but
after a while bolder counsels prevailed, and volunteers were called for
to storm the hill. Only seventy men could be found to perform the duty,
of whom he was one. They started up the mountain in fear and trembling,
but soon found that every shot passed over their heads, and went on
with greater boldness. Only three men, he declared, were hit on the
Boer side; one was killed, one was hit in the arm, and he himself was
the third, getting his face grazed by a bullet, of which he showed us
the scar. He stated that the first to reach the top ridge was a boy of
twelve, and that as soon as the troops saw them they fled, when, he
said, he paid them out for having nearly killed him, knocking them over
one after another "like bucks" as they ran down the hill, adding that
it was "alter lecker" (very nice). He asked us how many men we had lost
during the war, and when we told him about seven hundred killed and
wounded, laughed in our faces, saying he knew that our dead amounted to
several thousands. On our assuring him that this was not the case, he
replied, "Well, don't let's talk of it any more, because we are good
friends now, and if we go on you will lie, and I shall lie, and then we
shall get angry. The war is over now, and I don't want to quarrel with
the English; if one of them takes off his hat to me I always
acknowledge it." He did not mean any harm in talking thus; it is what
Englishmen have to put up with now in South Africa; the Boers have
beaten us, and act accordingly.

This man also told us that the majority of the rifles they picked up
were sighted for 400 yards, whereas the latter part of the fighting had
been carried on within 200.

Sir George Colley's death was much lamented in the colony, where he was
deservedly popular; indeed, anybody who had the honour of knowing that
kind-hearted English gentleman, could not do otherwise than deeply
regret his untimely end. What his motive was in occupying Majuba in the
way he did has never, so far as I am aware, transpired. The move, in
itself, would have been an excellent one, had it been made in force, or
accompanied by a direct attack on the Nek, but, as undertaken, seems to
have been objectless. There were, of course, many rumours as to the
motives that prompted his action, of which the most probable seems to
be that, being aware of what the Home Government intended to do with
reference to the Transvaal, he determined to strike a blow to try and
establish British supremacy first, knowing how mischievous any apparent
surrender would be. Whatever his faults may have been as a General, he
was a brave man, and had the honour of his country much at heart.

It was also said by soldiers who saw him the night the troops marched
up Majuba, that the General was "not himself," and it was hinted that
continual anxiety and the chagrin of failure had told upon his mind. As
against this, however, must be set the fact that his telegrams to the
Secretary of State for War, the last of which he must have despatched
only about half an hour before he was shot, are cool and collected, and
written in the same unconcerned tone--as though he were a critical
spectator of an interesting scene--that characterises all his
communications, more especially his despatches. They at any rate give
no evidence of shaken nerve or unduly excited brain, nor can I see that
any action of his with reference to the occupation of Majuba is out of
keeping with the details of his generalship upon other occasions. He
was always confident to rashness, and possessed by the idea that every
man in the ranks was full of as high a spirit, and as brave as he was
himself. Indeed, most people will think, that so far from its being a
rasher action, the occupation of Majuba, bad generalship as it seems,
was a wiser move than either the attack on the Nek or the Ingogo
fiasco.

But at the best, all his movements are difficult to be understood by a
civilian, though they may, for ought we know, have been part of an
elaborate plan, perfected in accordance with the rules of military
science, of which, it is said, he was a great student.




CHAPTER VI.

THE RETROCESSION OF THE TRANSVAAL.


When Parliament met in January 1881, the Government announced, through
the mediumship of the Queen's Speech, that it was their intention to
vindicate Her Majesty's authority in the Transvaal. I have already
briefly described the somewhat unfortunate attempts to gain this end by
force of arms; and I now propose to follow the course of the diplomatic
negotiations entered into by the ministry with the same object.

As soon as the hostilities in the Transvaal took a positive form,
causing great dismay among the Home authorities, whose paths, as we all
know, are the paths of peace--at any price; and whilst, in the first
confusion of calamity, they knew not where to turn, President Brand
stepped upon the scene in the character of "Our Mutual Friend," and, by
the Government at any rate, was rapturously welcomed.

This gentleman has for many years been at the head of the Government of
the Orange Free State, whose fortunes he had directed with considerable
ability. He is a man of natural talent and kind-hearted disposition,
and has the advancement of the Boer cause in South Africa much at
heart. The rising in the Transvaal was an event that gave him a great
and threefold opportunity: first, of interfering with the genuinely
benevolent object of checking bloodshed; secondly, of advancing the
Dutch cause throughout South Africa under the cloak of amiable
neutrality, and striking a dangerous blow at British supremacy over the
Dutch and British prestige with the natives; and, thirdly, of putting
the English Government under a lasting obligation to him. Of this
opportunity he has availed himself to the utmost in each particular.

So soon as things began to look serious, Mr. Brand put himself into
active telegraphic communication with the various British authorities
with the view of preventing bloodshed by inducing the English
Government to accede to the Boer demands. He was also earnest in his
declarations that the Free State was not supporting the Transvaal;
which, considering that it was practically the insurgent base of
supplies, where they had retired their women, children, and cattle, and
that it furnished them with a large number of volunteers, was perhaps
straining the truth.

About this time also we find Lord Kimberley telegraphing to Mr. Brand
that "if _only_ the Transvaal Boers will desist from armed opposition
to the Queen's authority," he thinks some arrangement might be made.
This is the first indication made public of what was passing in the
minds of Her Majesty's Government, on whom its Radical supporters were
now beginning to put the screw, to induce or threaten them into
submitting to the Boer demands.

Again, on the 11th January, the President telegraphed to Lord Kimberley
through the Orange Free State Consul in London, suggesting that Sir H.
de Villiers, the Chief Justice at the Cape, should be appointed a
Commissioner to go to the Transvaal to settle matters. Oddly enough,
about the same time the same proposition emanated from the Dutch party
in the Cape Colony, headed by Mr. Hofmeyer, a coincidence that inclines
one to the opinion that these friends of the Boers had some further
reason for thus urging Sir Henry de Villiers' appointment as
Commissioner beyond his apparent fitness for the post, of which his
high reputation as a lawyer and in his private capacity was a
sufficient guarantee.

The explanation is not hard to find, the fact being that, rightly or
wrongly, Sir Henry de Villiers, who is himself of Dutch descent, is
noted throughout South Africa for his sympathies with the Boer cause,
and both President Brand and the Dutch party in the Cape shrewdly
suspected that, if the settling of differences were left to his
discretion, the Boers and their interests would receive very gentle
handling. The course of action adopted by him, when he became a member
of the Royal Commission, went far to support this view, for it will be
noticed in the Report of the Commissioners that in every single point
he appears to have taken the Boer side of the contention. Indeed so
blind was he to their faults, that he would not even admit that the
horrible Potchefstroom murders and atrocities, which are condemned both
by Sir H. Robinson and Sir Evelyn Wood in language as strong as the
formal terms of a report will allow, were acts contrary to the rules of
civilised warfare. If those acts had been perpetrated by Englishmen on
Boers, or even on natives, I venture to think Sir Henry de Villiers
would have looked at them in a very different light.

In the same telegram in which President Brand recommends the
appointment of Sir Henry de Villiers, he states that the allegations
made by the Triumvirate in the proclamation in which they accused Sir
Owen Lanyon of committing various atrocities, deserve to be
investigated, as they maintain that the collision was commenced by the
authorities. Nobody knew better than Mr. Brand that any English
official would be quite incapable of the conduct ascribed to Sir Owen
Lanyon, whilst, even if the collision had been commenced by the
authorities, which as it happened it was not, they would under the
circumstances have been amply justified in so commencing it. This
remark by President Brand in his telegram was merely an attempt to
throw an air of probability over a series of slanderous falsehoods.

Messages of this nature continued to pour along the wires from day to
day, but the tone of those from the Colonial Office grew gradually
humbler. Thus we find Lord Kimberley telegraphing on the 8th February,
that if the Boers would desist from armed opposition all reasonable
guarantees would be given as to their treatment after submission, and
that a scheme would be framed for the "permanent friendly settlement of
difficulties." It will be seen that the Government had already begun to
water the meaning of their declaration that they would vindicate Her
Majesty's authority. No doubt Mr. Chamberlain, Mr. Courtney, and their
followers had given another turn to the Radical screw.

It is, however, clear that at this time no idea of the real aims of the
Government had entered into the mind of Sir George Colley, since on the
7th February he telegraphed home a plan which he proposed to adopt on
entering the Transvaal, which included a suggestion that he should
grant a complete amnesty only to those Boers who would sign a
declaration of loyalty.

In answer to this he was ordered to do nothing of the sort, but to
promise protection to everybody and refer everything home.

Then came the battle of Ingogo, which checked for the time the flow of
telegrams, or rather varied their nature, for those despatched during
the next few days deal with the question of reinforcements. On the 13th
February, however, negotiations were reopened by Paul Kruger, one of
the Triumvirate, who offered, if all the troops were ordered to
withdraw from the Transvaal, to give them a free passage through the
Nek, to disperse the Boers, and to consent to the appointment of a
Commission.

The offer was jumped at by Lord Kimberley, who, without making
reference to the question of withdrawing the soldiers, offered, if only
the Boers would disperse, to appoint a Commission with extensive powers
to develop the "permanent friendly settlement" scheme. The telegram
ends thus: "Add, that if this proposal is accepted, you now are
authorised to agree to suspension of hostilities on our part." This
message was sent to General Wood, because the Boers had stopped the
communications with Colley. On the 19th, Sir George Colley replies in
these words, which show his astonishment at the policy adopted by the
Home Government, and which, in the opinion of most people, redound to
his credit--

"Latter part of your telegram to Wood not understood. There can be no
hostilities if no resistance is made, but am I to leave Lang's Nek in
Natal territory in Boer occupation, and our garrisons isolated and
short of provisions, or occupy former and relieve latter?" Lord
Kimberley hastens to reply that the garrisons must be left free to
provision themselves, "but we do not mean that you should march to the
relief of garrisons or occupy Lang's Nek if an arrangement proceeds."

It will be seen that the definition of what vindication of Her
Majesty's authority consisted grew broader and broader; it now included
the right of the Boers to continue to occupy their positions in the
colony of Natal.

Meanwhile the daily fire of complimentary messages was being kept up
between President Brand and Lord Kimberley, who alternately gave
"sincere thanks to Lord Kimberley" and "fully appreciated the friendly
spirit" of President Brand, till on the 21st February the latter
telegraphs through Colley: "Hope of amicable settlement by negotiation,
but this will be greatly facilitated if somebody on spot and friendly
disposed to both could by personal communication with both endeavour to
smooth difficulties. Offers his services to Her Majesty's Government,
and Kruger and Pretorius and Joubert are willing." Needless to say his
services were accepted.

Presently, however, on 27th February, Sir George Colley made his last
move, and took possession of Majuba. His defeat and death had the
effect of causing another temporary check in the peace negotiations,
whilst Sir Frederick Roberts with ample reinforcements was despatched
to Natal. It had the further effect of increasing the haughtiness of
the Boer leaders, and infusing a corresponding spirit of pliability or
generosity into the negotiations of Her Majesty's Government.

Thus on 2d March, the Boers, through President Brand and Sir Evelyn
Wood, inform the Secretary of State for the Colonies that they are
willing to negotiate, but decline to submit on cease opposition. Sir
Evelyn Wood, who evidently did not at all like the line of policy
adopted by the Government, telegraphed that he thought the best thing
to do would be for him to engage the Boers, and disperse them _vi et
armis_, without any guarantees, "considering the disasters we have
sustained," and that he should, "if absolutely necessary," be empowered
to promise life and property to the leaders, but that they should be
banished from the country. In answer to this telegram, Lord Kimberley
informs him that Her Majesty's Government will amnesty _everybody_
except those who have committed acts contrary to the rules of civilised
warfare, and that they will agree to anything, and appoint a Commission
to carry out the details, and "be ready for friendly communications
with _any persons_ appointed by the Boers."

Thus was Her Majesty's authority finally re-established in the
Transvaal.

It was not a very grand climax, nor the kind of arrangement to which
Englishmen are accustomed, but perhaps, considering the circumstances,
and the well-known predilections of those who made the settlement, it
was as much as could be expected.

The action of the Government must not be considered as though they were
unfettered in their judgment; it can never be supposed that they acted
as they did because they thought such action right or even wise, for
that would be to set them down as men of a very low order of
intelligence, which they certainly are not.

It is clear that no set of sensible men, who had after much
consideration given their decision that under all the circumstances the
Transvaal must remain British territory, and who, on a revolt
subsequently breaking out in that territory, had declared that Her
Majesty's rule must be upheld, would have, putting aside all other
circumstances, deliberately stultified themselves by almost
unconditionally, and of their own free will, abandoning the country,
and all Her Majesty's subjects living in it. That would be to pay a
poor tribute to their understanding, since it is clear that if reasons
existed for retaining the Transvaal before the war, as they were
satisfied there did, those reasons would exist with still greater force
after a war had been undertaken and three crushing defeats sustained,
which if left unavenged must, as they knew, have a most disastrous
effect on our prestige throughout the South African continent.

I prefer to believe that the Government was coerced into acting as it
did by Radical pressure, both from outside and from its immediate
supporters in the House, and that it had to choose between making an
unconditional surrender in the Transvaal and losing the support of a
very powerful party. Under these circumstances it, being Liberal in
politics, naturally followed its instincts, and chose surrender.

If such a policy was bad in itself, and necessarily mischievous in its
consequences, so much the worse for those who suffered by it; it was
clear that the Government could not be expected to lose votes in order
to forward the true interests of countries so far off as the South
African Colonies, which had had the misfortune to be made a party
question of, and must take the consequences.

There is no doubt that the interest brought to bear on the Government
was very considerable, for not only had they to deal with their own
supporters, and with the shadowy caucus that was ready to let the lash
of its displeasure descend even on the august person of Mr. Gladstone,
should he show signs of letting slip so rich an opportunity for the
vindication of the holiest principles of advanced Radicalism, but also
with the hydra-headed crowd of visionaries and professional
sentimentalists who swarm in this country, and who are always ready to
take up any cause, from that of Jumbo or of a murderer to that of
oppressed peoples, such as the Bulgarians or the Transvaal Boers.

These gentlemen, burning with zeal, and filled with that confidence
which proverbially results from the hasty assimilation of imperfect and
erroneous information, found in the Transvaal question a great
opportunity of making a noise; and--as in a disturbed farmyard the bray
of the domestic donkey, ringing loud and clear among the utterances of
more intelligent animals, overwhelms and extinguishes them--so, and
with like effect, amongst the confused sound of various English
opinions about the Boer rising, rose the trumpet-note of the Transvaal
Independence Committee and its supporters.

As we have seen, they did not sound in vain.

On the 6th of March an armistice with the Boers had been entered into
by Sir Evelyn Wood, which was several times prolonged up to the 21st
March, when Sir Evelyn Wood concluded a preliminary peace with the Boer
leaders, which, under certain conditions, guaranteed the restoration of
the country within six months, and left all other points to be decided
by a Royal Commission.

The news of this peace was at first received in the colony in the
silence of astonishment. Personally, I remember, I would not believe
that it was true. It seemed to us, who had been witnesses of what had
passed, and knew what it all meant, something so utterly incredible
that we thought there must be a mistake.

If there had been any one redeeming circumstance about it, if the
English arms had gained a single decisive victory, it might have been
so, but it was hard for Englishmen, just at first, to understand that
not only had the Transvaal been to all appearance wrested from them by
force of arms, but that they were henceforth to be subject, as they
well knew would be the case, to the coarse insults of victorious Boers,
and the sarcasms of keener-witted Kafirs.

People in England seem to fancy that when men go to the colonies they
lose all sense of pride in their country, and think of nothing but
their own advantage. I do not think that this is the case, indeed, I
believe that, individual for individual, there exists a greater sense
of loyalty, and a deeper pride in their nationality, and in the proud
name of England, among colonists, than among Englishmen proper.
Certainly the humiliation of the Transvaal surrender was more keenly
felt in South Africa than it was at home; but, perhaps, the
impossibility of imposing upon people in that country with the farrago
of nonsense about blood-guiltiness and national morality, which was
made such adroit use of at home, may have made the difference.

I know that personally I would not have believed it possible that I
could feel any public event so keenly as I did this; indeed, I quickly
made up my mind that if the peace was confirmed, the neighbourhood of
the Transvaal would be no fit or comfortable residence for an
Englishman, and that I would, at any cost, leave the country,--which I
accordingly did.

Newcastle was a curious sight the night after the peace was declared.
Every hotel and bar was crowded with refugees, who were trying to
relieve their feelings by cursing the name of Gladstone with a vigour,
originality, and earnestness that I have never heard equalled; and
declaring in ironical terms how proud they were to be citizens of
England--a country that always kept its word. Then they set to work
with many demonstrations of contempt to burn the effigy of the Bight
Honourable Gentleman at the head of Her Majesty's Government, an
example, by the way, that was followed throughout South Africa.

Even Sir Evelyn Wood, who is very popular in the colony, was hissed as
he walked through the town, and great surprise was expressed that a
soldier who came out expressly to fight the Boers should consent to
become the medium of communication in such a dirty business. And,
indeed, there was some excuse for all this bitterness, for the news
meant ruin to very many.

But if people in Natal and at the Cape received the news with
astonishment, how shall I describe its effect upon the unfortunate
loyal inhabitants in the Transvaal, on whom it burst like a
thunderbolt?

They did not say much, however, and indeed there was nothing to be
said. They simply began to pack up such things as they could carry with
them, and to leave the country, which they well knew would henceforth
be utterly untenable for Englishmen or English sympathisers. In a few
weeks they come pouring down through Newcastle by hundreds; it was the
most melancholy exodus that can be imagined. There were people of all
classes, officials, gentlefolk, work-people, and loyal Boers, but they
had a connecting link; they had all been loyal, and they were all
ruined.

Most of these people had gone to the Transvaal since it became a
British colony, and invested all they had in it, and now their capital
was lost and their labour rendered abortive; indeed, many of them whom
one had known as well to do in the Transvaal, came down to Natal hardly
knowing how they would feed their families next week.

It must be understood that so soon as the Queen's sovereignty was
withdrawn the value of landed and house property in the Transvaal went
down to nothing, and has remained there ever since. Thus a fair-sized
house in Pretoria brought in a rental varying from ten to twenty pounds
a month during British occupation, but after the declaration of peace,
owners of houses were glad to get people to live in them to keep them
from falling into ruin. Those who owned land or had invested money in
businesses suffered in the same way; their property remains neither
profitable or saleable, and they themselves are precluded by their
nationality from living on it, the art of "Boycotting" not being
peculiar to Ireland.

Nor were they the only sufferers. The officials, many of whom had taken
to the Government service as a permanent profession, in which they
expected to pass their lives, were suddenly dismissed, mostly with a
small gratuity, which would about suffice to pay their debts, and told
to find their living as best they could. It was indeed a case of _vae
victis_,--woe to the conquered loyalists.[12]

          [12] The following extract is clipped from a recent issue
          of the _Transvaal Advertiser_. It describes the present
          condition of Pretoria:--

          "The streets grown over with rank vegetation; the
          water-furrows uncleaned and unattended, emitting offensive
          and unhealthy stenches; the houses showing evident signs of
          dilapidation and decay; the side paths, in many places,
          dangerous to pedestrians--in fact, everything the eye can
          rest upon indicates the downfall which has overtaken this
          once prosperous city. The visitor can, if he be so minded,
          betake himself to the outskirts and suburbs, where he will
          perceive the same sad evidences of neglect, public grounds
          unattended, roads uncared for, mills and other public works
          crumbling into ruin. These palpable signs of decay most
          strongly impress him. A blight seems to have come over this
          lately fair and prosperous town. Rapidly it is becoming a
          'deserted village,' a 'city of the dead.'"

The Commission appointed by Her Majesty's Government consisted of Sir
Hercules Robinson, Sir Henry de Villiers, and Sir Evelyn Wood,
President Brand being also present in his capacity of friend of both
parties, and to their discretion were left the settlement of all
outstanding questions. Amongst these, were the mode of trial of those
persons who had been guilty of acts contrary to the rules of civilised
warfare, the question of severance of territory from the Transvaal on
the eastern boundary, the settlement of the boundary in the Keate-Award
districts, the compensation for losses sustained during the war, the
functions of the British Resident, and other matters. Their place of
meeting was at Newcastle in Natal, and from thence they proceeded to
Pretoria.

The first question of importance that came before the Commission was
the mode of trial to be adopted in the cases of those persons accused
of acts contrary to the usages of civilised warfare, such as murder.
The Attorney-General for the Transvaal strongly advised that a special
tribunal should be constituted to try these cases, principally because
"after a civil war in which all the inhabitants of a country, with very
few exceptions, have taken part, a jury of fair and impartial men,
truly unbiassed, will be very difficult to get together." It is
satisfactory to know that the Commissioners gave this somewhat obvious
fact "their grave consideration," which, according to their Report,
resulted in their determining to let the cases go before the ordinary
court, and be tried by a jury, because in referring them to a specially
constituted court which would have done equal justice without fear or
favour, "the British Government would have made for itself, among the
Dutch population of South Africa, a name for vindictive oppression,
which no generosity in other affairs could efface."

There is more in this determination of the Commissioners, or rather of
the majority of them--for Sir E. Wood, to his credit be it said,
refused to agree in their decision--than meets the eye, the fact of the
matter being that it was privately well known to them, that though the
Boer leaders might be willing to allow a few of the murderers to
undergo the form of a trial, neither they nor the Boers themselves
meant to permit the farce to go any further. Had the men been tried by
a special tribunal they would in all probability have been condemned to
death, and then would have come the awkward question of carrying out
the sentence on individuals whose deeds were looked on, if not with
general approval, at any rate without aversion by the great mass of
their countrymen. In short, it would probably have become necessary
either to reprieve them or to fight the Boers again, since it was very
certain that they would not have allowed them to be hung. Therefore the
majority of the Commissioners, finding themselves face to face with a
dead wall, determined to slip round it instead of boldly climbing it,
by referring the cases to the Transvaal High Court, cheerfully
confident of what the result must be.

After all, the matter was, much cry about little wool, for of all the
crimes committed by the Boers--a list of some of which will be found in
the Appendix to this book--in only three cases were a proportion of the
perpetrators produced and put through the form of trial. Those three
were--the dastardly murder of Captain Elliot, who was shot by his Boer
escort whilst crossing the Vaal river on parole; the murder of a man
named Malcolm, who was kicked to death in his own house by Boers, who
afterwards put a bullet through his head to make the job "look better;"
and the murder of a doctor named Barber, who was shot by his escort on
the border of the Free State. A few of the men concerned in the first
two of these crimes were tried in Pretoria; and it was currently
reported at that time, that in order to make their acquittal certain
our Attorney-General received instructions not to exercise his right of
challenging jurors on behalf of the Crown. Whether or not this is true
I am not prepared to say, but I believe it is a fact that he did not
exercise that right, though the counsel for the prisoners availed
themselves of it freely, with the result that in Elliot's case, the
jury was composed of eight Boers and one German, nine being the full
South African jury. The necessary result followed; in both cases the
prisoners were acquitted in the teeth of the evidence. Barber's
murderers were tried in the Free State, and were, as might be expected,
acquitted.

Thus it will be seen that of all the perpetrators of murder and other
crimes during the course of the war not one was brought to justice.

The offence for which their victims died was, in nearly every case,
that they had served, were serving, or were loyal to Her Majesty the
Queen. In no single case has England exacted retribution for the murder
of her servants and citizens; but nobody can read through the long list
of these dastardly slaughters without feeling that they will not go
unavenged. The innocent blood that has been shed on behalf of this
country, and the tears of children and widows, now appeal to a higher
tribunal than that of Mr. Gladstone's Government, and assuredly they
will not appeal in vain.

The next point of importance dealt with by the Commission was the
question whether or no any territory should be severed from the
Transvaal, and kept under English rule for the benefit of the native
inhabitants. Lord Kimberley, acting under pressure put upon him by
members of the Aborigines Protection Society, instructed the Commission
to consider the advisability of severing the districts of Lydenburg and
Zoutpansberg, and also a strip of territory bordering on Zululand and
Swaziland, from the Transvaal, so as to place the inhabitants of the
first two districts out of danger of maltreatment by the Boers, and to
interpose a buffer between Zulus, and Swazis, and Boer aggression, and
_vice versâ_.

The Boer leaders had, it must be remembered, acquiesced in the
principle of such a separation in the preliminary peace signed by Sir
Evelyn Wood and themselves. The majority of the Commission, however
(Sir Evelyn Wood dissenting), finally decided against the retention of
either of these districts, a decision which, I think, was a wise one,
though I arrive at that conclusion on very different grounds to those
adopted by the majority of the Commission.

Personally, I cannot see that it is the duty of England to play
policeman to the whole world. To have retained these native districts
would have been to make ourselves responsible for their good
government, and to have guaranteed them against Boer encroachment,
which I do not think that we were called upon to do. It is surely not
incumbent upon us, having given up the Transvaal to the Boers, to
undertake the management of the most troublesome part of it, the Zulu
border. Besides, bad as the abandonment of the Transvaal is, I think
that if it was to be done at all, it was best to do it thoroughly,
since to have kept some natives under our protection, and to have
handed over the rest to the tender mercies of the Boers, would only be
to render our injustice more obvious, whilst weakening the power of the
natives themselves to combine in self-defence, since those under our
protection would naturally have little sympathy with their more
unfortunate brethren--their interests and circumstances being
different.

The Commission do not seem to have considered the question from these
points of view; but putting them on one side, there are many other
considerations connected with it which are ably summed up in their
Report. Amongst these is the danger of disturbances commenced between
Zulus or Swazis and Boers spreading into Natal, and the probability of
the fomenting of disturbances amongst the Zulus by Boers. The great
argument for the retention of some territory, if only as a symbol that
the English had not been driven out of the country, is, however, set
forth in the forty-sixth paragraph of the Report, which runs as
follows:--"The moral considerations that determine the actions of
civilised governments are not easily understood by barbarians, in whose
eyes successful force is alone the sign of superiority, and it appeared
possible that the surrender by the British Crown of one of its
possessions to those who had been in arms against it, might be looked
upon by the natives in no other way than as a token of the defeat and
decay of the British power, and that thus a serious shock might be
given to British authority in South Africa, and the capacity of Great
Britain to govern and direct the vast native population within and
without her South African dominions--a capacity resting largely on the
renown of her name--might be dangerously impaired."

These words, coming from so unexpected a source, do not, though couched
in such mild language, hide the startling importance of the question
discussed. On the contrary, they accurately and with double weight
convey the sense and gist of the most damning argument against the
policy of the retrocession of the Transvaal in its entirety; and
proceeding from their own carefully chosen Commissioners, can hardly
have been pleasant reading to Lord Kimberley and his colleagues.

The majority of the Commission then proceeds to set forth the arguments
advanced by the Boers against the retention of any territory, which
appear to have been chiefly of a sentimental character, since we are
informed that "the people, it seemed certain, would not have valued the
restoration of a mutilated country. Sentiment in a great measure had
led them to insurrection, and the force of such it was impossible to
disregard." Sir Evelyn Wood, in his dissent, states that he cannot even
agree with the premises of his colleagues' argument, since he is
convinced that it was not sentiment that had led to the outbreak, but a
"general and rooted aversion to taxation." If he had added, and a
hatred not only of English rule, but of all rule, he would have stated
the complete cause of the Transvaal rebellion. In the next paragraph of
the Report, however, we find the real cause of the pliability of the
Commission in the matter, which is the same that influenced them in
their decision about the mode of trial of the murderers and other
questions--they feared that the people would appeal to arms if they
decided against their wishes.

Discreditable and disgraceful as it may seem, nobody can read this
Report without plainly seeing that the Commissioners were, in treating
with the Boers on these points, in the position of ambassadors from a
beaten people getting the best terms they could. Of course, they well
knew that this was not the case but whatever the Boer leaders may have
said, the Boers themselves did not know this, or even pretend to look
at the matter in any other light. When we asked for the country back,
said they, we did not get it; after we had three times defeated the
English we did get it; the logical conclusion from the facts being that
we got it because we defeated the English. This was their tone, and it
is not therefore surprising that whenever the Commission threatened to
decide anything against them, they, with a smile, let it know that if
it did, they would be under the painful necessity of re-occupying
Lang's Nek. It was never necessary to repeat the threat, since the
majority of the Commission would thereupon speedily find a way to meet
the views of the Boer representatives.

Sir Evelyn Wood, in his dissent, thus correctly sums up the
matter:--"To contend that the Royal Commission ought not to decide
contrary to the wishes of the Boers, because such decision might not be
accepted, is to deny to the Commission the very power of decision that
it was agreed should be left in its hands." Exactly so. But it is
evident that the Commission knew its place, and so far from attempting
to exercise any "power of decision," it was quite content with such
concessions as it could obtain by means of bargaining. Thus, as an
additional reason against the retention of any territory, it is urged
that if this territory was retained "the majority of your Commissioners
... would have found themselves in no favourable position for obtaining
the concurrence of the Boer leaders as to other matters." In fact, Her
Majesty's Commission, appointed, or supposed to be appointed, to do Her
Majesty's will and pleasure, shook in its shoes before men who had
lately been rebels in arms against her authority, and humbly submitted
itself to their dicta.

The majority of the Commission went on to express their opinion, that
by giving way about the retention of territory they would be able to
obtain better terms for the natives generally, and larger powers for
the British Resident. But, as Sir Evelyn Wood points out in his Report,
they did nothing of the sort, the terms of the agreement about the
Resident and other native matters being all consequent on and included
in the first agreement of peace. Besides, they seem to have overlooked
the fact that such concessions as they did obtain are only on paper,
and practically worthless, whilst all _bonâ fide_ advantages remained
with the Boers.

The decision of the Commissioners in the question of the Keate Award,
which next came under their consideration, appears to have been a
judicious one, being founded on the very careful Report of Colonel
Moysey, R.E., who had been for many months collecting information on
the spot. The Keate Award Territory is a region lying to the south-west
of the Transvaal, and was, like many other districts in that country,
originally in the possession of natives of the Baralong and Batlapin
tribes. Individual Boers having, however, _more suo_ taken possession
of tracts of land in the district, difficulties speedily arose between
their Government and the native chiefs, and in 1871 Mr. Keate,
Lieutenant-Governor of Natal, was by mutual consent called in to
arbitrate on the matter. His decision was entirely in favour of the
natives, and was accordingly promptly and characteristically repudiated
by the Boer Volksraad. From that time till the rebellion the question
remained unsettled, and was indeed a very thorny one to deal with. The
Commission, acting on the principle _in medio tutissimus ibis_, drew a
line through the midst of the disputed territory, or, in other words,
set aside Mr. Keate's award, and interpreted the dispute in favour of
the Boers.

This decision was accepted by all parties at the time, but it has not
resulted in the maintenance of peace. The principal chief, Montsioa, is
an old ally and staunch friend of the English, a fact which the Boers
are not able to forget or forgive, and they appear to have stirred up
rival chiefs to attack him, and to have allowed volunteers from the
Transvaal to assist them. Montsioa has also enlisted some white
volunteers, and several fights have taken place, in which the loss of
life has been considerable. Whether or no the Transvaal Government is
directly concerned it is impossible to say, but from the fact that
cannon are said to have been used against Montsioa it would appear that
it is, since private individuals do not, as a rule, own Armstrong
guns.[13]

          [13] I beg to refer any reader interested in this matter to
          the letter of "Transvaal" to the _Standard_, which I have
          republished in the Appendix to this book.

Amongst the questions remaining for the consideration of the
Commissioners was that of what compensation should be given for losses
during the war. Of course, the great bulk of the losses sustained were
of an indirect nature, resulting from the necessary and enormous
depreciation in the value of land and other property, consequent on the
retrocession. Into this matter the Home Government declined to enter,
thereby saving its pocket at the price of its honour, since it was upon
English guarantees that the country would remain a British possession
that the majority of the unfortunate loyals invested their money in it.
It was, however, agreed by the Commission (Sir H. de Villiers
dissenting) that the Boers should be liable for compensation in cases
where loss had been sustained through commandeering seizure,
confiscation, destruction, or damage of property. The sums awarded
under these heads have already amounted to about £110,000, which sum
has been defrayed by the Imperial Government, the Boer authorities
stating that they were not in a position to pay it.

In connection with this matter I will pass to the financial clauses of
the Report. When the country was annexed, the public debt amounted to
£301,727. Under British rule this debt was liquidated to the extent of
£150,000, but the total was brought up by a Parliamentary grant, a loan
from the Standard Bank, and sundries to £390,404, which represented the
public debt of the Transvaal on the 31st December 1880. This was
further increased by moneys advanced by the Standard Bank and English
Exchequer during the war, and till the 8th August 1881, during which
time the country yielded no revenue, to £457,393. To this must be added
an estimated sum of £200,000 for compensation charges, pension
allowances, &c., and a further sum of £383,000, the cost of the
successful expedition against Secocoeni, that of the unsuccessful one
being left out of account, bringing up the total public debt to over a
million, of which about £800,000 is owing to this country.

This sum, with the characteristic liberality that distinguished them in
their dealings with the Boers, but which was not so marked where loyals
were concerned, the Commissioners (Sir Evelyn Wood dissenting) reduced
by a stroke of the pen to £265,000, thus entirely remitting an
approximate sum of £500,000, or £600,000. To the sum of £265,000 still
owing must be added say another £150,000 for sums lately advanced to
pay the compensation claims, bringing up the actual amount now owing to
England to something under half a million, of which I say with
confidence she will never see a single £10,000. As this contingency was
not contemplated, or if contemplated, not alluded to by the Royal
Commission, provision was made for a Sinking Fund, by means of which
the debt, which is a second charge on the revenues of the States, is to
be extinguished in twenty-five years.

It is a strange instance of the proverbial irony of fate, that whilst
the representatives of the Imperial Government were thus showering
gifts of hundreds of thousands of pounds upon men who had spurned the
benefits of Her Majesty's rule, made war upon her forces, and murdered
her subjects, no such consideration was extended to those who had
remained loyal to her throne. Their claims for compensation were passed
by unheeded; and looking from the windows of the room in which they sat
in Newcastle, the members of the Commission might have seen them
flocking down from a country that could no longer be their home; those
that were rich among them made poor, and those that were poor reduced
to destitution.

The only other point which it will be necessary for me to touch on in
connection with this Report is the duties of the British Resident and
his relations to the natives. He was to be invested as representative
of the Suzerain with functions for securing the execution of the terms
of peace as regards--(1) the control of the foreign relations of the
State; (2) the control of the frontier affairs of the State; and (3)
the protection of the interests of the natives in the State.

As regards the first of these points, it was arranged that the
interests of subjects of the Transvaal should be left in the hands of
Her Majesty's representatives abroad. Since Boers are, of all people in
the world, the most stay-at-home, our ambassadors and consuls are not
likely to be troubled much on their account. With reference to the
second point, the Commission made stipulations that would be admirable
if there were any probability of their being acted up to. The Resident
is to report any encroachment on native territory by Boers to the High
Commissioner, and when the Resident and the Boer Government differ, the
decision of the Suzerain is to be final. This is a charming way of
settling difficulties, but the Commission forgets to specify how the
Suzerain's decision is to be enforced. After what has happened, it can
hardly have relied on awe of the name of England to bring about the
desired obedience!

But besides thus using his beneficent authority to prevent subjects of
the Transvaal from trespassing on their neighbour's land, the Resident
is to exercise a general supervision over the interests of all the
natives in the country. Considering that they number about a million,
and are scattered over a territory larger than France, one would think
that this duty alone would have taken up the time of any ordinary man;
and, indeed, Sir Evelyn Wood was in favour of the appointment of
sub-residents to assist him. The majority of the Commission refused,
however, to listen to any such suggestion--believing, they said, "that
the least possible interference with the independent Government of the
State would be the wisest." Quite so, but I suppose it never occurred
to them to ask the natives what their views of the matter were! The
Resident was also to be a member of a Native Location Commission, which
was at some future time to provide land for the natives to live on.

In perusing this Report it is easy to follow with more or less accuracy
the individual bent of its framers. Sir Hercules Robinson figures
throughout as a man who has got a disagreeable business to carry out,
in obedience to instructions that admit of no trifling with, and who
has set himself to do the best he can for his country, and those who
suffer through his country's policy, whilst obeying those instructions.
He has evidently choked down his feelings and opinions as an
individual, and turned himself into an official machine, merely
registering in detail the will of Lord Kimberley. With Sir Henry de
Villiers the case is very different. One feels throughout that the task
is to him a congenial one, and that the Boer cause has in him an
excellent friend. Indeed, had he been an advocate of their cause
instead of a member of the Commission, he could not have espoused their
side on every occasion with greater zeal. According to him they were
always in the right, and in them he could find no guile. Mr. Hofmeyer
and President Brand exercised a wise discretion from their own point of
view when they urged his appointment as Special Commissioner. I now
come to Sir Evelyn Wood, who was in the position of an independent
Englishman, neither prejudiced in favour of the Boers, or the reverse,
and on whom, as a military man, Lord Kimberley would find it difficult
to put the official screw. The results of his happy position are
obvious in the paper attached to the end of the Report, and signed by
him, in which he totally and entirely differs from the majority of the
Commission on every point of any importance. Most people will think
that this very outspoken and forcible dissent deducts somewhat from the
value of the Report, and throws a shadow of doubt on the wisdom of its
provisions.

The formal document of agreement between Her Majesty's Government and
the Boer leaders, commonly known as the Convention, was signed by both
parties at Pretoria on the afternoon of the 3d August 1881, in the same
room in which, nearly four years before, the Annexation Proclamation
was signed by Sir T. Shepstone.

Whilst this business was being transacted in Government House, a
curious ceremony was going on just outside, and within sight of the
windows. This was the ceremonious burial of the Union Jack, which was
followed to the grave by a crowd of about 2000 loyalists and native
chiefs. On the outside of the coffin was written the word "Resurgam,"
and an eloquent oration was delivered over the grave. Such
demonstrations are, no doubt, foolish enough, but they are not entirely
without political significance.

But a more unpleasant duty awaited the Commissioners than that of
attaching their signatures to a document,--consisting of the necessity
of conveying Her Majesty's decision as to the retrocession to about a
hundred native chiefs, until now Her Majesty's subjects, who had been
gathered together to hear it. It must be borne in mind that the natives
had not been consulted as to the disposal of the country, although they
outnumber the white people in the proportion of twenty to one, and
that, beyond some worthless paper stipulations, nothing had been done
for their interests.

Personally, I must plead guilty to what I know is by many, especially
by those who are attached to the Boer cause, considered as folly, if
not worse, namely, a sufficient interest in the natives, and sympathy
with their sufferings, to bring me to the conclusion that in acting
thus we have inflicted a cruel injustice upon them. It seems to me,
that as they were the original owners of the soil, they were entitled
to some consideration in the question of its disposal, and consequently
and incidentally, of their own. I am aware that it is generally
considered that the white man has a right to the black man's
possessions and land, and that it is his high and holy mission to
exterminate the wretched native and take his place. But with this
conclusion I venture to differ. So far as my own experience of natives
has gone, I have found that in all the essential qualities of mind and
body they very much resemble white men, with the exception that they
are, as a race, quicker-witted, more honest, and braver than the
ordinary run of white men. Of them might be aptly quoted the speech
Shakespeare puts into Shylock's mouth: "Hath not a Jew eyes? hath not a
Jew hands, organs, dimensions, senses, affections, passions?" In the
same way I ask, Has a native no feelings or affections? does he not
suffer when his parents are shot, or his children stolen, or when he is
driven a wanderer from his home? Does he not know fear, feel pain,
affection, hate, and gratitude? Most certainly he does; and this being
so, I cannot believe that the Almighty, who made both white and black,
gave to the one race the right or mission of exterminating or even of
robbing or maltreating the other, and calling the process the advance
of civilisation. It seems to me, that on only one condition, if at all,
have we the right to take the black men's land; and that is, that we
provide them with an equal and a just Government, and allow no
maltreatment of them, either as individuals or tribes, but, on the
contrary, do our best to elevate them, and wean them from savage
customs. Otherwise, the practice is surely undefensible.

I am aware, however, that with the exception of a small class, these
are sentiments which are not shared by the great majority of the
public, either at home or abroad. Indeed, it can be plainly seen how
little sympathy they command, from the fact that but scanty
remonstrance was raised at the treatment meted out to our native
subjects in the Transvaal, when they were, to the number of nearly a
million, handed over from the peace, justice, and security that on the
whole characterise our rule, to a state of things and possibilities of
wrong and suffering which I will not try to describe.

To the chiefs thus assembled Sir Hercules Robinson, as President of the
Royal Commission, read a statement, and then retired, refusing to allow
them to speak in answer. The statement informed the natives that "Her
Majesty's Government, with that sense of justice which befits a great
and powerful nation," had returned the country to the Boers, "whose
representatives, Messrs. Kruger, Pretorius, and Joubert, I now," said
Sir Hercules, "have much pleasure in introducing to you." If reports
are true, the native chiefs had, many of them personally, and all of
them by reputation, already the advantage of a very intimate
acquaintance with all three of these gentlemen, so that an introduction
was somewhat superfluous.

Sir Hercules then went on to explain to them that locations would be
allotted to them at some future time; that a British Resident would be
appointed, whose especial charge they would be, but that they must bear
in mind that he was not ruler of the country, but the Government,
"subject to Her Majesty's suzerain rights." Natives were, no doubt,
expected to know by intuition what suzerain rights are. The statement
then goes on to give them good advice as to the advantages of indulging
in manual labour when asked to do so by the Boers, and generally to
show them how bright and happy is the future that lies before them.
Lest they should be too elated by such good tidings, they are, however,
reminded that it will be necessary to retain the law relating to
passes, which is, in the hands of a people like the Boers, about as
unjust a regulation as a dominant race can invent for the oppression of
a subject people, and had, in the old days of the Republic, been
productive of much hardship. The statement winds up by assuring them
that their "interests will never be forgotten or neglected by Her
Majesty's Government." Having read the document the Commission hastily
withdrew, and after their withdrawal the chiefs were "allowed" to state
their opinions to the Secretary for Native Affairs.

In availing themselves of this permission, it is noticeable that no
allusion was made to all the advantages they were to reap under the
Convention, nor did they seem to attach much importance to the
appointment of the British Resident. On the contrary, all their
attention was given to the great fact that the country had been ceded
to the Boers, and that they were no longer the Queen's subjects. We are
told, in Mr. Shepstone's Report, that they "got very excited," and
"asked whether it was thought that they had no feelings or hearts, that
they were thus treated as a stick or piece of tobacco, which could be
passed from hand to hand without question." Umgombarie, a Zoutpansberg
chief, said: "I am Umgombarie. I have fought with the Boers, and have
many wounds, and they know that what I say is true.... I will never
consent to place myself under their rule. I belong to the English
Government. I am not a man who eats with both sides of his jaw at once;
I only use one side. I am English, I have said." Silamba said: "I
belong to the English. I will never return under the Boers. You see me,
a man of my rank and position; is it right that such as I should be
seized and laid on the ground and flogged, as has been done to me and
other chiefs?"

Sinkanhla said: "We hear and yet do not hear, we cannot understand. We
are troubling you, Chief, by talking in this way; we hear the chiefs
say that the Queen took the country because the people of the country
wished it, and again that the majority of the owners of the country did
not wish their rule, and that therefore the country was given back. We
should like to have the man pointed out from among us black people who
objects to the rule of the Queen. We are the real owners of the
country; we were here when the Boers came, and without asking leave,
settled down and treated us in every way badly. The English Government
then came and took the country; we have now had four years of rest and
peaceful and just rule. We have been called here to-day, and are told
that the country, our country, has been given to the Boers by the
Queen. This is a thing which surprises us. Did the country, then,
belong to the Boers? Did it not belong to our fathers and forefathers
before us, long before the Boers came here? We have heard that the
Boers' country is at the Cape. If the Queen wishes to give them their
land, why does she not give them back the Cape?"

I have quoted this speech at length, because, although made by a
despised native, it sets forth their case more powerfully and in
happier language than I can do.

Umyethile said: "We have no heart for talking. I have returned to the
country from Sechelis, where I had to fly from Boer oppression. Our
hearts are black and heavy with grief to-day at the news told us, we
are in agony, our intestines are twisting and writhing inside of us,
just as you see a snake do when it is struck on the head.... We do not
know what has become of us, but we feel dead; it may be that the Lord
may change the nature of the Boers, and that we will not be treated
like dogs and beasts of burden as formerly, but we have no hope of such
a change, and we leave you with heavy hearts and great apprehension as
to the future." In his Report, Mr. Shepstone (the Secretary for Native
Affairs) says: "One chief, Jan Sibilo, who has been, he informed me,
personally threatened with death by the Boers after the English leave,
could not restrain his feelings, but cried like a child."

I have nothing to add to these extracts, which are taken from many such
statements. They are the very words of the persons most concerned, and
will speak for themselves.

The Convention was signed on the 3d August 1881, and was to be formally
ratified by a Volksraad or Parliament of the Burghers within three
months of that date, in default of which it was to fall to the ground
and become null and void.

Anybody who has followed the course of affairs with reference to the
retrocession of the Transvaal, or who has even taken the trouble to
read through this brief history, will probably come to the conclusion
that, under all the circumstances, the Boers had got more than they
could reasonably expect. Not so, however, the Boers themselves. On the
28th September the newly-elected Volksraad referred the Convention to a
General Committee to report on, and on the 30th September the Report
was presented. On the 3d October a telegram was despatched through the
British Resident to "His Excellency W. E. Gladstone," in which the
Volksraad states that the Convention is not acceptable--

(1.) Because it is in conflict with the Sand River Treaty of 1852.

(2.) Because it violates the peace agreement entered into with Sir
Evelyn Wood, in confidence of which the Boers laid down their arms.

The Volksraad consequently declared that modifications were desirable,
and that certain articles _must_ be altered.

To begin with, they declare that the "conduct of foreign relations does
not appertain to the Suzerain, only supervision," and that the articles
bearing on these points must consequently be modified. They next attack
the native question, stating that "the Suzerain has not the right to
interfere with our Legislature," and state that they cannot agree to
Article 3, which gives the Suzerain a right of veto on Legislation
connected with the natives; to Article 13, by virtue of which natives
are to be allowed to acquire land; and to the last part of Article 26,
by which it is provided that whites of alien race living in the
Transvaal shall not be taxed in excess of the taxes imposed on
Transvaal citizens.

They further declare that it is _infra dignitatem_ for the President of
the Transvaal to be a member of a Commission. This refers to the Native
Location Commission, on which he is, in the terms of the Convention, to
sit, together with the British Resident, and a third person jointly
appointed.

They next declare that the amount of the debt for which the Commission
has made them liable should be modified. Considering that England had
already made them a present of from £600,000 to £800,000, this is a
most barefaced demand. Finally, they state that "Articles 15, 16, 26,
and 27 are superfluous, and only calculated to wound our sense of
honour" (_sic_).

Article 15 enacts that no slavery or apprenticeship shall be tolerated.

Article 16 provides for religious toleration.

Article 26 provides for the free movement, trading, and residence of
all persons, other than natives, conforming themselves to the laws of
the Transvaal.

Article 27 gives to all the right of free access to the Courts of
Justice.

Putting the "sense of honour" of the Transvaal Volksraad out of the
question, past experience has but too plainly proved that these
Articles are by no means superfluous.

In reply to this message, Sir Hercules Robinson telegraphs to the
British Resident on the 21st October in the following words:--

"Having forwarded Volksraad Resolution of 15th to Earl of Kimberley, I
am desired to instruct you in reply to repeat to the Triumvirate that
Her Majesty's Government cannot entertain any proposals for a
modification of the Convention _until after it has been ratified_,
and the necessity for further concession proved by experience."

I wish to draw particular attention to the last part of this message,
which is extremely typical of the line of policy adopted throughout in
the Transvaal business. The English Government dared not make any
further concession to the Boers, because they felt that they had
already strained the temper of the country almost to breaking in the
matter. On the other hand, they were afraid that if they did not do
something, the Boers would tear up the Convention, and they would find
themselves face to face with the old difficulty. Under these
circumstances, they have fallen back upon their temporising and
un-English policy, which leaves them a back-door to escape through,
whatever turn things take. Should the Boers now suddenly turn round and
declare, which is extremely probable, that they repudiate their debt to
us, or that they are sick of the presence of a British Resident, the
Government will be able to announce that "the necessity for further
concession" has now been "proved by experience," and thus escape the
difficulty. In short, this telegram has deprived the Convention of
whatever finality it may have possessed, and made it, as a document, as
worthless as it is as a practical settlement. That this is the view
taken of it by the Boers themselves, is proved by the text of the
Ratification which followed on the receipt of this telegram.

The tone of this document throughout is, in my opinion, considering
from whom it came, and against whom it is directed, very insolent. And
it amply confirms what I have previously said, that the Boers looked
upon themselves as a victorious people making terms with those they
have conquered. The Ratification leads off thus: "The Volksraad is not
satisfied with this Convention, and considers that the members of the
Triumvirate performed a fervent act of love for the Fatherland when
they upon their own responsibility signed such an unsatisfactory state
document." This is damning with faint praise indeed. It then goes on to
recite the various points of objection, stating that the answers from
the English Government proved that they were well founded. "The English
Government," it says, "acknowledges indirectly by this answer (the
telegram of 21st October, quoted above) that the difficulties raised by
the Volksraad are neither fictitious nor unfounded, inasmuch _as it
desires from us the concession_ that we, the Volksraad, shall submit
it to a practical test." It will be observed that England is here
represented as begging the favour of a trial of her conditions from the
Volksraad of the Transvaal Boers. The Ratification is in these words:
"Therefore is it that the Raad here unanimously resolves not to go into
further discussion of the Convention, _and maintaining all objections
to the Convention_ as made before the Royal Commission or stated in
the Raad, and for the purpose of showing to everybody that the love
of peace and unity inspires it, _for the time and provisionally_
submitting the articles of the Convention to a practical test, _hereby
complying with the request of the English Government_ contained in
the telegram of the 13th October 1881, proceeds to ratify the
Convention."

It would have been interesting to have seen how such a Ratification as
this, which is no Ratification but an insult, would have been accepted
by Lord Beaconsfield. I think that within twenty-four hours of its
arrival in Downing Street, the Boer Volksraad would have received a
startling answer. But Lord Beaconsfield is dead, and by his successor
it was received with all due thankfulness and humility. His words,
however, on this subject still remain to us, and even his great rival
might have done well to listen to them. It was in the course of what
was, I believe, the last speech he made in the House of Lords, that
speaking about the Transvaal rising, he warned the Government that it
was a very dangerous thing to make peace with rebellious subjects in
arms against the authority of the Queen. The warning passed unheeded,
and the peace was made in the way I have described.

As regards the Convention itself, it will be obvious to the reader that
the Boers have not any intention of acting up to its provisions, mild
as they are, if they can possibly avoid them, whilst, on the other
hand, there is no force at hand to punish their disregard or breach. It
is all very well to create a Resident with extensive powers; but how is
he to enforce his decisions? What is he to do if his awards are laughed
at and made a mockery of, as they are and will be? The position of Mr.
Hudson at Pretoria is even worse than that of Mr. Osborn in Zululand.
For instance, the Convention specifies in the first article that the
Transvaal is to be known as the Transvaal State. The Boer Government
have, however, thought fit to adopt the name of "South African
Republic" in all public documents. Mr. Hudson was accordingly directed
to remonstrate, which he did in a feeble way; his remonstrance was
politely acknowledged, but the country is still officially called the
South African Republic, the Convention and Mr. Hudson's remonstrance
notwithstanding. Mr. Hudson, however, appears to be better suited to
the position than would have been the case had an Englishman, pure and
simple, been appointed, since it is evident that things that would have
struck the latter as insults to the Queen he represented, and his
country generally, are not so understood by him. In fact, he admirably
represents his official superiors in his capacity of swallowing
rebuffs, and when smitten on one cheek delightedly offering the other.

Thus we find him attending a Boer meeting of thanksgiving for the
success that had waited on their arms and the recognition of their
independence, where most people will consider he was out of place. To
this meeting, thus graced by his presence, an address was presented by
a branch of the Africander Bond, a powerful institution, having for its
object the total uprootal of English rule and English customs in South
Africa, to which he must have listened with pleasure. In it he, in
common with other members of the meeting, is informed that "you took up
the sword and struck the Briton with such force" that "the Britons
through fear revived that sense of justice to which they could not be
brought by petitions," and that the "day will soon come that we shall
enter with you on one arena for the entire independence of South
Africa," _i.e._, independence from English rule.

On the following day the Government gave a dinner, to which all those
who had done good service during the late hostilities were invited, the
British Resident being apparently the only Englishman asked. Amongst
the other celebrities present I notice the name of Buskes. This man,
who is an educated Hollander, was the moving spirit of the
Potchefstroom atrocities; indeed, so dark is his reputation that the
Royal Commission refused to transact business with him, or to admit him
to their presence. Mr. Hudson was not so particular. And now comes the
most extraordinary part of the episode. At the dinner it was necessary
that the health of Her Majesty as Suzerain should be proposed, and with
studied insolence this was done last of all the leading political
toasts, and immediately after that of the Triumvirate. Notwithstanding
this fact, and that the toast was couched by Mr. Joubert, who stated
that "he would not attempt to explain what a Suzerain was," in what
appear to be semi-ironical terms, we find that Mr. Hudson "begged to
tender his thanks to the Honourable Mr. Joubert for the kind way in
which he proposed the toast."

It may please Mr. Hudson to see the name of the Queen thus
metaphorically dragged in triumph at the chariot wheels of the
Triumvirate, but it is satisfactory to know that the spectacle is not
appreciated in England: since, on a question in the House of Lords, by
the Earl of Carnarvon, who characterised it as a deliberate insult,
Lord Kimberley replied that the British Resident had been instructed
that in future he was not to attend public demonstrations unless he had
previously informed himself that the name of Her Majesty would be
treated with proper respect. Let us hope that this official reprimand
will have its effect, and that Mr. Hudson will learn therefrom that
there is such a thing as _trop de zéle_--even in a good cause.

The Convention is now a thing of the past, the appropriate rewards have
been lavishly distributed to its framers, and President Brand has at
last prevailed upon the Volksraad of the Orange Free State to allow him
to become a Knight Grand Cross of Saint Michael and Saint George,--the
same prize looked forward to by our most distinguished public servants
at the close of the devotion of their life to the service of their
country. But its results are yet to come--though it would be difficult
to forecast the details of their development. One thing, however, is
clear: the signing of that document signalised an entirely new
departure in South African affairs, and brought us within a measurable
distance of the abandonment, for the present at any rate, of the
supremacy of English rule in South Africa.

This is the larger issue of the matter, and it is already bearing
fruit. Emboldened by their success in the Transvaal, the Dutch party at
the Cape are demanding, and the demand is to be granted, that the Dutch
tongue be admitted _pari passu_ with English, as the official
language in the Law Courts and the House of Assembly. When a country
thus consents to use a foreign tongue equally with its own, it is a
sure sign that those who speak it are rising to power. But "the Party"
looks higher than this, and openly aims at throwing off English rule
altogether, and declaring South Africa a great Dutch republic. The
course of events is favourable to their aspiration. Responsible
Government is to be granted to Natal, which country, not being strong
enough to stand alone in the face of the many dangers that surround
her, will be driven into the arms of the Dutch party to save herself
from destruction. It will be useless for her to look for help from
England, and any feelings of repugnance she may feel to Boer rule will
soon be choked by necessity, and a mutual interest. It is, however,
possible that some unforeseen event, such as the advent to power of a
strong Conservative Ministry, may check the tide that now sets so
strongly in favour of Dutch supremacy.

It seems to me, however, to be a question worthy of the consideration
of those who at present direct the destinies of the Empire, whether it
would not be wise, as they have gone so far, to go a little further and
favour a scheme for the total abandonment of South Africa, retaining
only Table Bay. If they do not, it is now quite within the bounds of
sober possibility that they may one day have to face a fresh Transvaal
rebellion, only on a ten times larger scale, and might find it
difficult to retain even Table Bay. If, on the other hand, they do, I
believe that all the White States in South Africa would confederate of
their own free-will, under the pressure of the necessity for common
action, and the Dutch element being preponderant, at once set to work
to exterminate the natives on general principles, in much the same way,
and from much the same motives that a cook exterminates black beetles,
because she thinks them ugly, and to clear the kitchen.

I need hardly say that such a policy is not one that commands my
sympathy, but Her Majesty's Government having put their hand to the
plough, it is worth their while to consider it. It would at any rate be
in perfect accordance with their declared sentiments, and command an
enthusiastic support from their followers.

As regards the smaller and more immediate issue of the retrocession,
namely, its effect on the Transvaal itself, it cannot be other than
evil. The act is, I believe, quite without precedent in our history,
and it is difficult to see, looking at it from those high grounds of
national morality assumed by the Government, what greater arguments can
be advanced in its favour, than could be found to support the
abandonment of,--let us say,--Ireland. Indeed a certain parallel
undoubtedly exists between the circumstances of the two countries.
Ireland was, like the Transvaal, annexed, though a long time ago, and
has continually agitated for its freedom. The Irish hate us, so did the
Boers. In Ireland, Englishmen are being shot, and England is running
the awful risk of blood-guiltiness, as it did in the Transvaal. In
Ireland, smouldering revolution is being fanned into flame by Mr.
Gladstone's speeches and acts, as it was in the Transvaal. In Ireland,
as in the Transvaal, there exists a strong loyal class that receives
insults instead of support from the Government, and whose property, as
was the case there, is taken from them without compensation, to be
flung as a sop to stop the mouths of the Queen's enemies. And so I
might go on, finding many such similarities of circumstances, but my
parallel, like most parallels, must break down at last Thus--it
mattered little to England whether or no she let the Transvaal go, but
to let Ireland go would be more than even Mr. Gladstone dare attempt.

Somehow, if you follow these things far enough, you always come to
vulgar first principles. The difference between the case of the
Transvaal and that of Ireland is a difference not of justice of cause,
for both causes are equally unjust or just according as they are
viewed, but of mere common expediency. Judging from the elevated
standpoint of the national morality theory, however, which, as we know,
soars above such truisms as the foolish statement that force is a
remedy, or that if you wish to retain your prestige you must not allow
defeats to pass unavenged, I cannot see why, if it was righteous to
abandon the Transvaal, it would not be equally righteous to abandon
Ireland!

As for the Transvaal, that country is not to be congratulated on its
success, for it has destroyed all its hopes of permanent peace, has
ruined its trade and credit, and has driven away the most useful and
productive class in the community. The Boers, elated by their success
in arms, will be little likely to settle down to peaceable occupations,
and still less likely to pay their taxes, which, indeed, I hear they
are already refusing to do. They have learnt how easily even a powerful
Government can be upset, and the lesson is not likely to be forgotten,
for want of repetition to their own weak one.

Already the Transvaal Government hardly knows which way to turn for
funds, and as, perhaps fortunately for itself, quite unable to borrow,
through want of credit.

As regards the native question, I agree with Mr. H. Shepstone, who, in
his Report on this subject, says that he does not believe that the
natives will inaugurate any action against the Boers, so long as the
latter do not try to collect taxes, or otherwise interfere with them.
But if the Boer Government is to continue to exist, it will be bound to
raise taxes from the natives, since it cannot collect much from its
white subjects. The first general attempt of the sort will be the
signal for active resistance on the part of the natives, whom, if they
act without concert, the Boers will be able to crush in detail, though
with considerable loss. If, on the other hand, they should have
happened, during the last few years, to have learnt the advantages of
combination, as is quite possible, perhaps they will crash the Boers.

The only thing that is at present certain about the matter is that
there will be bloodshed, and that before long. For instance, the
Montsioa difficulty in the Keate Award has in it the possibilities of a
serious war, and there are plenty such difficulties ready to spring
into life within and without the Transvaal.

In all human probability it will take but a small lapse of time for the
Transvaal to find itself in the identical position from which we
relieved it by the Annexation.

What course events will then take it is impossible to say. It may be
found desirable to re-annex the country, though, in my opinion, that
would be, after all that has passed, an unfortunate step; its
inhabitants may be cut up piecemeal by a combined movement of native
tribes, as they would have been, had they not been rescued by the
English Government in 1877, or it is possible that the Orange Free
State may consent to take the Transvaal under its wing: who can say?
There is only one thing that our recently abandoned possession can
count on for certain, and that is trouble, both from its white
subjects, and the natives, who hate the Boers with a bitter and a
well-earned hatred.

The whole question can, so far as its moral aspect is concerned, be
summed up in a few words.

Whether or no the Annexation was a necessity at the moment of its
execution--which I certainly maintain it was--it received the
unreserved sanction of the Home authorities, and the relations of
Sovereign and subject, with all the many and mutual obligations
involved in that connection, were established between the Queen of
England and every individual of the motley population of the Transvaal.
Nor was this change an empty form, for, to the largest proportion of
that population, this transfer of allegiance brought with it a
priceless and a vital boon. To them it meant freedom and justice--for
where, on any portion of this globe over which the British ensign
floats, does the law even wink at cruelty or wrong?

A few years passed away, and a small number of the Queen's subjects in
the Transvaal rose in rebellion against her authority, and inflicted
some reverses on her arms. Thereupon, in spite of the reiterated
pledges given to the contrary--partly under stress of defeat, and
partly in obedience to the pressure of "advanced views"--the country
was abandoned, and the vast majority who had remained faithful to the
Crown, was handed to the cruel despotism of the minority who had
rebelled against it.

Such an act of treachery to those to whom we were bound with double
chains--by the strong ties of a common citizenship, and by those claims
to England's protection from violence and wrong which have hitherto
been wont to command it, even where there was no duty to fulfil, and no
authority to vindicate--stands, I believe, without parallel on our
records, and marks a new departure in our history.

I cannot end these pages without expressing my admiration of the
extremely able way in which the Boers managed their revolt, when once
they felt that, having undertaken the thing, it was a question of life
and death with them. It shows that they have good stuff in them
somewhere, which, under the firm but just rule of Her Majesty, might
have been much developed, and it makes it the more sad that they should
have been led to throw off that rule, and have been allowed to do so by
an English Government.

In conclusion, there is one point that I must touch on, and that is the
effect of the retrocession on the native mind, which I can only
describe as most disastrous. The danger alluded to in the Report of the
Royal Commission has been most amply realised, and the prevailing
belief in the steadfastness of our policy, and the inviolability of our
plighted word, which has hitherto been the great secret of our hold on
the Kafirs, has been rudely shaken. The motives that influenced, or are
said to have influenced, the Government in their act, are naturally
quite unintelligible to savages, however clever, who do believe that
force is a remedy, and who have seen the inhabitants of a country ruled
by England defeat English soldiers and take possession of it, whilst
those who remained loyal to England were driven out of it. It will not
be wonderful if some of them, say the natives of Natal, deduce
therefrom conclusions unfavourable to loyalty, and evince a desire to
try the same experiment.

It is, however, unprofitable to speculate on the future, which must be
left to unfold itself.

The curtain is, so far as this country is concerned, down for the
moment on the South African stage; when it rises again, there is but
too much reason to fear that it will reveal a state of confusion,
which, unless it is more wisely and consistently dealt with in the
future than it has been in the past, may develop into chaos.




CHAPTER VII.


The following pages, extracted from an introduction to a new edition to
"Cetywayo and His White Neighbours," written in 1888, are reprinted
here, because they contain matter of interest concerning the more
recent history of the Transvaal Boers.


    _Extract from Introduction to New Edition of 1888._

The recent history of the Transvaal, now once more a republic, will
fortunately admit of brief treatment. It is, so far as England is
concerned, very much a history of concession. For an account of the
first Convention I must refer my readers to the remarks which I have
made in the chapter of this book headed "The Retrocession of the
Transvaal." It will there be seen that the Transvaal Volksraad only
ratified the first convention, which was wrung from us (Sir Evelyn
Wood, to his honour be it said, dissenting) after our defeats at Lang's
Nek, Ingogo, and Majuba, as a favour to the British Government, which
in its turn virtually promised to reconsider the convention, if only
the Volksraad would be so good as to ratify it. This convention was
ratified in October 1881. In June 1883 the Transvaal Government[14]
telegraphs briefly to Lord Derby through the High Commissioner that the
Volksraad has "resolved that time has come to reconsider convention."
Lord Derby quickly telegraphs back that "Her Majesty's Government
consent to inquire into the working of convention." Human nature is
frail, and it is impossible to help wishing that Lord Palmerston or
Disraeli had been appointed by the Fates to answer that telegram. But
we have fallen upon different days, and new men have arisen who appear
to be suited to them; and so the convention was reconsidered, and on
the 27th of February 1884 a new one was signed, which is known as the
convention of London. It begins by defining boundaries to which the
"Government of the South African Republic will strictly adhere, ... and
will do its utmost to prevent any of its inhabitants from making any
encroachments upon the said boundaries." The existence of the New
Republic in Zululand is a striking and practical comment on this
article. Article ii. also provides for the security of the amended
southwest boundary. The proclamation of 16th September 1884 (afterwards
disallowed by the English Government), by which the South African
Republic practically annexed the territories of Montsioa and Moshette,
already for the most part in the possession of its freebooters, very
clearly illustrates its anxiety to be bound by this provision. Art xii.
provides for the independence of the Swazis; and by way of illustrating
the fidelity with which it has been observed, we shall presently have
occasion to remark upon the determined attempts that have continually
been made by Boer freebooters to obtain possession of Swaziland--and so
on.

          [14] [C. 3659], 1883.

In order to make these severe restrictions palatable to the burghers of
a free and haughty Republic, Lord Derby recommends Her Majesty's
Government to remit a trifling sum of £127,000 of their debt due to the
Imperial Treasury, which was accordingly done. On the whole, the
Transvaal had no reason to be dissatisfied with this new treaty, though
really the whole affair is scarcely worth discussing. Convention No. 2
is almost as much a farce and a dead letter as was Convention No. 1. It
is, however, impossible to avoid being impressed with the really
remarkable tone, not merely of equality, but of superiority, adopted by
the South African Republic and its officials towards this country. To
take an instance. The Republic had found it convenient to wage a war of
extermination upon some Kafir chiefs. Two of these, Mampoer and Njabel,
fell into its hands. Her Majesty's Government was, rightly or wrongly,
so impressed with the injustice of the sentence of death passed upon
these unfortunates, that, acting through Mr. Hudson, the British
Resident at Pretoria, it strained every nerve to save them. This was
the upshot of it. In a tone of studied sarcasm, His Honour the State
President "observes with great satisfaction the great interest in these
cases which has been manifested by your Honour and Her Majesty's
Government." He then goes on to say that, notwithstanding this
interest, Mampoer will be duly and effectually hung, giving the exact
time and place of the event, and Njabel imprisoned for life, with hard
labour. Finally, he once more conveys "the hearty thanks of the
Government and the members of the Executive Council for the interest
manifested in these cases,"[15] and remains, &c.

          [15] [C. 3841], 1884, p 148.

The independence of Swaziland was guaranteed by the convention of 1884.
Yet the Blue-books are full of accounts of various attempts made by
Boers to obtain a footing in Swaziland. Thus in November 1885
Umbandine, the king of Swaziland, sends messengers to the Governor of
Natal through Sir T. Shepstone, in which he states that in the winter
Piet Joubert, accompanied by two other Boers and an interpreter, came
to his kraal and asked him to sign a paper "to say that he and all the
Swazis agreed to go over and recognise the authority of the Boer
Government, and have nothing more to do with the English."[16] Umbandine
refused, saying that he looked to and recognised the English
Government. Thereon the Boers, growing angry, answered, "Those fathers
of yours, the English, act very slowly; and if you look to them for
help, and refuse to sign this paper, we shall have scattered you and
your people, and taken possession of the land before they arrive. Why
do you refuse to sign the paper? You know we defeated the English at
Majuba." Umbandine's message then goes on to say that he recognises the
English Government only, and does not wish to have dealings with the
Boers. Also, in the following month, we find him making a direct
application to the Colonial Office through Mr. David Forbes,[17] praying
that his country may be taken under the protection of Her Majesty's
Government.

          [16] [C. 4645], 1886, p. 64.

          [17] Ibid. p. 70.

More than one such attempt to secure informal rights of occupation in
Swaziland appears to have been made by the Transvaal Boers. Mr. T.
Shepstone, C.M.G., is at present acting as Resident to Umbandine,
though he has not, it would seem, any regular commission from the Home
Government authorising him to do so, probably because it does not
consider that its rights in Swaziland are such as to justify such an
assumption of formal authority over the Swazis. However this may be,
Umbandine could not have found a better man to protect his interests.
Of course, when acts like that of Piet Joubert are reported to the
Government of the South African Republic and made the subject of a
remonstrance by this country, all knowledge of them is repudiated, as
it was repudiated in the case of the invasion of Zululand.

It is part of the policy of the Transvaal only to become an accessory
after the fact. Its subjects go forth and stir up trouble among the
natives, and then probably the Boer Government intervenes "in the
interests of humanity," and takes, or tries to take, the country. This
process is always going on, and, unless the British Government puts a
stop to it, always will go on. We shall probably soon hear that it is
developing itself in the direction of Matabeleland. A country the size
of France, which could without difficulty accommodate a population of
from eight to ten millions of industrious folk, is not large enough for
the wants of a Boer people, numbering something under fifty thousand
souls. Every young Boer must have his six or more thousand acres of
land on which to lord it. It is his birthright, and if it is not
forthcoming he goes and takes it by force from the nearest native
tribe. Hence these continual complaints. Of course, there are two ways
of looking at the matter. There is a party that does not hesitate to
say that the true policy of this country is to let the Boers work their
will upon the natives, and then, as they in turn fly from civilisation
towards the far interior, to follow on their path and occupy the lands
that they have swept. This plan is supported by arguments about the
superiority of the white races and their obvious destiny of rule. It
is, I confess, one that I look upon as little short of wicked. I could
never discern a superiority so great in ourselves as to authorise us,
by right divine as it were, to destroy the coloured man and take his
lands. It is difficult to see why a Zulu, for instance, has not as much
right to live in his own way as a Boer or an Englishman. Of course,
there is another extreme. Nothing is more ridiculous than the length to
which the black brother theory is sometimes driven by enthusiasts. A
savage is one thing, and a civilised man is another; and though
civilised men may and do become savages, I personally doubt if the
converse is even possible. But whether the civilised man, with his gin,
his greed, and his dynamite, is really so very superior to the savage
is another question, and one which would bear argument, although this
is not the place to argue it. My point is, that his superiority is not
at any rate so absolutely overwhelming as to justify him in the
wholesale destruction of the savage and the occupation of his lands, or
even in allowing others to do the work for him if he can prevent it.
The principle might conceivably be pushed to inconvenient and indecent
lengths. Savagery is only a question of degree. When all true savages
have been wiped out, the most civilised and self-righteous among the
nations may begin to give the term to those whom they consider to be on
a lower scale than themselves, and apply the argument also. Thus there
are "cultured" people in another land who do not hesitate to say that
the humble writers of these islands are rank and rude barbarians not to
be endured. Supposing that, being the stronger, they also _applied
the argument_, it would be inconvenient for some of us, and perhaps
the world would not gain so very much after all. But this is a
digression, only excusable, if excusable at all, in one who has endured
a three weeks' course of unmitigated Blue-book. To return.

The process of absorption attempted in Swaziland, and brought to a
successful issue in Zululand, also went forward merrily in
Bechuanaland, till recently, under the rule of Mankorane, chief of the
Batlapins, and Montsioa, chief of the Baralongs. These two chiefs have
always been devoted friends and adherents of the English Government,
and consequently are not regarded with favour by the Boers. Shortly
after the retrocession of the Transvaal, a rival to Mankorane rose up
in the person of a certain Massou, and a rival to Montsioa named
Moshette. Both Massou and Moshette were supported by Boer fillibusters,
and what happened to Usibepu in Zululand happened to these unfortunate
chiefs in Bechuanaland. They were defeated after a gallant struggle,
and two Republics called Stellaland and Goschen were carved out of
their territories and occupied by the fillibusters. Fortunately for
them, however, they had a friend in the person of the Rev. John
Mackenzie, to whose valuable work, "Austral Africa," I beg to refer the
reader for a fuller account of these events. Mr. Mackenzie, who had for
many years lived as a missionary among the Bechuanas, had also mastered
the fact that it is very difficult to do anything for South Africa in
this country unless you can make it a question of votes, or, in other
words, unless you can bring pressure to bear upon the Government.
Accordingly he commenced an agitation on behalf of Mankorane and
Montsioa, in which he was supported by various religious bodies, and
also by the late Mr. Forster and the Aborigines Protection Society. As
a result of this agitation he was appointed Deputy to the High
Commissioner for Bechuanaland, whither he proceeded early in 1884 to
establish a British protectorate. He was gladly welcomed by the
unfortunate chiefs, who were now almost at their last gasp, and who
both of them ceded their rights of government to the Queen. Hostilities
did not, however, cease, for on the 31st July 1884 the fillibusters
again attacked Montsioa, routed him, and cruelly murdered Mr. Bethell,
his English adviser. Meanwhile Mr. Mackenzie's success was viewed with
very mixed feelings at the Cape. To the English party it was most
acceptable, but the Dutch,[18] and more numerous party, looked on it
with alarm and disgust. They did not at all wish to see the Imperial
power established in Bechuanaland; so pressure was put upon Sir
Hercules Robinson, and through him on Mr. Mackenzie, to such an extent
indeed as to necessitate the resignation of the latter. Thereon the
High Commissioner despatched a Cape politician, Mr. Cecil Rhodes, and
his own private secretary, Captain Bower, R.N., to Bechuanaland. These
gentlemen at once set to work to undo most of what Mr. Mackenzie had
done, and, generally speaking, did not advance either British or native
interests in Bechuanaland. At this point, taking advantage of the
general confusion, the Government of the South African Republic issued
a proclamation placing both Montsioa and Moshette under its protection,
as usual "in the interests of humanity."

          [18] By the Dutch party I mean the anti-Imperial and
          retrogressive party. It must be remembered that many of the
          now educated and progressive Boers do not belong to this.

But the agitation in England had, fortunately for what remained of the
Bechuana people, not been allowed to drop. Her Majesty's Government
disallowed the Boer proclamation, under Article iv. of the convention
of London, and despatched an armed force to Bechuanaland, commanded by
Sir Charles Warren. This good act, I believe I am right in saying, we
owe entirely to the firmness of Sir Charles Dilke and Mr. Chamberlain,
who insisted upon its being done. Meanwhile Messrs. Upington and
Sprigg, members of the Cape Government, hastened to Bechuanaland to
effect a settlement before the arrival of Sir Charles Warren's force.
This settlement, though it might have been agreeable to the
fillibusters and the anti-Imperialists generally, was disallowed by Her
Majesty's Government as unsatisfactory, and Sir Charles Warren was
ordered to occupy Bechuanaland. This he accordingly did, taking Mr.
Mackenzie with him, very much against the will of the anti-English
party, and, be it added, of Sir Hercules Robinson. Indeed, if we may
accept Mr. Mackenzie's version of these occurrences, which seems to be
a fair one, and adequately supported by documentary evidence, the
conduct of Sir Hercules Robinson towards Mr. Mackenzie would really
admit of explanation. As soon as the freebooters saw that the Imperial
Government was really in earnest, of course there was no more trouble.
They went away, and Sir Charles Warren took possession of Bechuanaland
without striking a single blow. He remained in the country for nearly a
year arranging for its permanent pacification and government, and as a
result of his occupation, on the 30th September 1885, all the territory
south of the Molopo River was declared to be British territory, and
made into a quasi crown colony, the entire extent of land, including
the districts ruled over by Khama, Sechele, and Gasitsive, being about
160,000 square miles in area. I believe that the new colony of British
Bechuanaland is proving a very considerable success. Every provision
has been made for native wants, and its settlement goes on apace. There
is no reason why, with its remarkable natural advantages, it should not
one day become a great country, with a prosperous white, and a loyal
and contented native population. When this comes about it is to be
hoped that it will remember that it owes its existence to the energy
and firmness of Mr. Mackenzie, Sir Charles Dilke, Mr. Chamberlain, and
Sir Charles Warren.

It is probably by now dawning upon the mind of the British public that
when we gave up the Transvaal we not only did a cowardly thing and
sowed a plentiful crop of future troubles, we also abandoned one of the
richest, if not the richest, country in the world. The great
gold-fields which exist all over the surface of the land are being
opened up and pouring out their treasures so fast that it is said that
the Transvaal Government, hitherto remarkable for its impecuniosity,
does not know what to do with its superfluous cash. To what extent this
will continue it is impossible to say, but I for one shall not be
surprised if the output should prove to be absolutely unprecedented.
And with gold in vast quantities, with iron in mountains, and coal-beds
to be measured by the scores of square miles, with lead and copper and
cobalt, a fertile soil, water, and one of the most lovely climates in
the world, what more is required to make a country rich and great? Only
one thing, an Anglo-Saxon Government, and that we have taken away from
the Transvaal. Whether the English flag has vanished for ever from its
borders is, however, still an open question. The discovery of gold in
such quantities is destined to exercise a very remarkable influence
upon the future of the Transvaal. Where gold is to be found, there the
hardy, enterprising, English-speaking diggers flock together, and
before them and their energy the Boer retreats, as the native retreats
and vanishes before the rifle of the Boer. Already there are many
thousands of diggers in the Transvaal; if the discoveries of gold go
on and prove as remunerative as they promise to be, in a few more years
their number will be vastly increased. Supposing that another five
years sees sixty or seventy thousand English diggers at work in the
Transvaal, is it to be believed that these men will in that event allow
themselves to be ruled by eight or nine thousand hostile-hearted Boers?
Is it to be believed, too, that the Boers will stop to try and rule
them? From such knowledge as I have of their character I should say
certainly not. They will _trek_, anywhere out of the way of the
Englishman and his English ways, and those who do not _trek_ will
be absorbed.[19] Should this happen, it is, of course, possible, and
even probable, that for some time the diggers, fearing the vacillations
of Imperial policy, would prefer to remain independent with a
Republican form of Government. But the Englishman is a law-abiding and
patriotic creature, and as society settled itself in the new community,
it would almost certainly desire to be united to the Empire and
acknowledge the sovereignty of the Queen. So far as a judgment can be
formed, if only the gold holds out the Transvaal will as certainly fall
into the lap of the Empire as a green apple will one day drop from the
tree--that is, if it is not gathered.

          [19] The occupation of Rhodesia has now made it impossible
          for the Boers to trek out of reach of the English and their
          flag.--H. R. H.

Now it is quite possible that the Germans, or some other power, may try
to gather the Transvaal apple. The Boers are not blind to the march of
events, and they dislike us and our rule. Perhaps they might think it
worth their while to seek German protection, and unless we are prepared
to say "no" very firmly indeed--and who knows, in the present condition
of Home politics, what we are prepared to do from one day to
another?--Germany would in such a case almost certainly think it worth
her while to give it. Very likely the protection, when granted, would
in some ways resemble that which the Boer himself, his breast aglow
with love of peace and the "interests of humanity," is so anxious to
extend to the misguided native possessor of desirable and well-watered
lands. Very likely, in the end, the Boer would be sorry that he did not
accept the ills he knew of. But that is neither here nor there. So far
as we are concerned, the mischief would be done. In short, should the
position arise, everything will depend upon our capacity of saying
"no," and the tone in which we say it. It will not do to rely upon our
London convention, by which the Transvaal is forbidden to conclude
treaties with outside powers without the consent of this Government.
The convention has been broken before now, and will be broken again, if
the Boers find it convenient to break it, and know that they can do so
with impunity. Meanwhile we must rest on our oars and watch events. One
thing, however, might and should be done. Some person having weight and
real authority--if he were quite new to South Africa so much the
better--should be appointed as our Consul to watch over the welfare of
Englishmen and our Imperial interests at Pretoria, and properly paid
for doing so. It is difficult to find a suitable man unless he is
adequately salaried and supported.

But quite recently this country has awakened to the knowledge that
Delagoa Bay is important to its South African interests, though how
important it perhaps does not altogether realise. For years and years
the colony of Natal has been employed in the intermittent construction
of a railway with a very narrow gauge, which is now open as far as
Ladysmith, or to within a hundred miles of the Transvaal border. Natal
is very poor, and in common with the rest of South Africa, and indeed
of the world, has lately been passing through a period of great
commercial depression. The Home Government has refused to help it to
construct its railways (if it had done so, how many hundreds of
thousand pounds would have been saved to the British taxpayer during
the Zulu and Boer wars!), and has equally refused to allow it to borrow
sufficient money to get them constructed, with the result that a large
amount of the interior trade has already been deflected into other
channels. And now a fresh and very real danger, not only to Natal, but
to all Imperial interests in South Africa, has sprung into sudden
prominence, that is, in this country, for in Africa it has been
foreseen for many years. Above Zululand is situated Amatongaland, which
reaches to the southern shore of one of the finest harbours in the
world, Delagoa Bay. This great bight, in which half a dozen navies
could ride at anchor, the only really good haven on the coasts of South
Africa, is fifty-five miles in width and twenty in depth, that is, from
east to west It is separated from the Transvaal, of which it is the
natural port, by about ninety miles of wild and sparsely inhabited
country.

The ownership of this splendid port was for many years in dispute
between this country and the Portuguese, with whose dominions of
Mozambique it is connected by a strip of coast, and who have a small
fort upon it. This dispute was finally referred by Lord Granville in
1872 to the decision of Marshal MacMahon, and on this occasion, as on
every other in which this country has been weak enough to go to
arbitration, that decision was given against us. Into the merits of the
case it is not necessary to enter, further than to say, as has already
been recently pointed out by a very able and well-informed correspondent
of the _Morning Post_, that it is by no means clear by what right the
matter was referred to arbitration at all. The Amatongas are in
possession of the southern shore of the bay, including, I believe, the
Inyack Peninsula and Inyack Island, and they are an independent people.
The Swazis also abut on it, and they are independent. What warrant had
we to refer their rights to the arbitration of Marshal MacMahon? The
evidence of the exercise of any Portuguese sovereignty over these
countries is so shadowy that it may be said never to have existed;
certainly it does not exist now. This is a point, but it is nothing
more. We must take things as we find them, and we find that the
Portuguese have been formally declared and admitted by us to be the
owners of Delagoa Bay.

Now, so long as we held the Transvaal it did not so much matter who had
the sovereignty of the Bay, since a railway constructed from there
could only run to British territory. But we gave up the Transvaal,
which is now virtually a hostile state, and the contingency which has
been so long foreseen in South Africa, and so blindly overlooked at
home, has come to pass--the railway is in course of rapid completion.
What does this mean to us? At the best, it means that we lose the
greater part of the trade of South-eastern Africa; at the worst, that
we lose it all. In other words, it means, putting aside the question of
our Imperial needs and status in Africa, a great many millions a year
in hard cash out of the national pocket. Let us suppose that the worst
happens, and that the Germans get a footing either in the Transvaal or
Delagoa Bay. Obviously they will stop our trade in favour of their own.
Or let us suppose that the Transvaal takes advantage of one of our
spasms of Imperial paralysis, such as afflicted us during the
_régime_ of Lord Derby, and defies the provision in the convention
which forbids them to put a heavier tax upon our goods than upon those
of any other nation. In either event our case would be a bad one, for
our road from the eastern coast to the vast interior is blocked. But it
is of little use crying over spilt milk, or anticipating evils which it
is our duty to try to avert, and which in all probability still could
be averted by a sound and consistent policy.

To begin with, both Swaziland and Amatongaland can be annexed to the
Empire. It is true that the independence of the first of these
countries is guaranteed by Article xii. of the convention of London of
1884. Here is the exact wording:--"The independence of the Swazis
within the boundary-line of Swaziland, as indicated in the first
article of this convention, will be fully recognised." But England has
for years exercised a kind of protective right over Swaziland--a right,
as I have already shown, fully acknowledged and frequently appealed to
by the Swazis themselves. And for the rest, what is the obvious meaning
of this provision? It means that the independence of Swaziland is
guaranteed against Boer encroachments; its object was to protect the
Swazis from extermination at the hands of the Boers. Further, the Boers
have again and again broken this article of the convention in their
repeated attempts to get a foothold in Swaziland. It has now become
necessary to our interests that the Swazis should come under our rule,
as indeed they are most anxious to do, and a way should be found by
which this end can be accomplished.

Then as to Amatongaland, or Maputaland, as it is sometimes called, only
a month or two ago an embassy from the Queen of that country waited on
the Colonial Office, praying for British protection. It is not known
what answer they received; let us trust that it was a favourable
one.[20] The protection that should be accorded to the Amatongas, both
in their interests and our own, is annexation to the British Empire
upon such terms as might be satisfactory to them. The management of
their country might be left to them, subject to the advice of a
Resident, and the enforcement of the ordinary laws respecting life and
property common to civilised states. Drink and white men might be
strictly excluded from it, unless the Amatongas should wish to welcome
the latter. But the country, with its valuable but undefined rights
over Delagoa Bay, should belong to England, for whoever owns Swaziland
and Amatongaland will in course of time be almost certain to own the
Bay also. It must further be remembered that circumstances have already
given us certain rights over the Amatongas. They regarded Cetywayo as
their suzerain, and it was, I believe, at his instance that Zambila was
appointed regent during the minority of her son. As we have annexed
what remains of Zululand, Cetywayo's suzerainty has consequently passed
to us.

          [20] I understand that the treaty which we have concluded
          with Amatongaland (where, by the way, it is said a new
          harbour has been discovered) binds the authorities of that
          country not to cede territory to any other Power. But there
          is nothing in such a treaty to prevent, say Portugal or the
          Boers, from taking possession of the land by force of arms.
          Were the country annexed to the Crown, or a British
          Protectorate established, they would not dare to do this.

          _Note._--This has since been done.--H. R. H.

Meanwhile, can nothing be done by direct treaty with the Portuguese? A
little while ago the Bay could no doubt have been acquired for a very
moderate consideration, but those golden opportunities have been
allowed to slip from hands busy weaving the web of party politics. Now
it is a different affair. Delagoa Bay is of no direct value to Portugal
except for the honour and glory of the thing. Portugal has never done
anything with it, any more than she has with her other African
possessions, and never will do anything with it. But it has become very
valuable, indeed, so far as its South African interests are concerned,
almost vital, to this country, and of that fact Portugal is perfectly
well aware. Consequently, if we want the Bay we must pay for it, if not
in cash, at the offer of which the Portuguese national pride might be
revolted, then in some other equivalent. Surely a power like England
could find a way of obliging one like Portugal in return for this small
concession. Or an exchange of territory might be effected. Perhaps
Portugal might be inclined to accept of some of our possessions on the
West Coast or an island or two in the West Indies. It is hard to
suppose that there is no way out of the trouble; but if indeed there is
none, why, then, one must be found, or we must be content to lose a
great part of our African trade.

The reader who has followed me through this brief and imperfect summary
of recent events in South Africa will see how varied are its interests,
how enormous its areas, and how vast its wealth. In that great country
England is still the paramount power. Her prestige has, indeed, been
greatly shaken, and she is sadly fallen from her estate of eight or
nine years gone. But she is still paramount; and if she has to face the
animosity of a section of the Boers, she can, notwithstanding her many
crimes against them, set against it the love and respect of every
native in the land, with the exception, perhaps, of a few self-seekers
and intriguers. The history of the next twenty years, and perhaps of
the next ten, will decide whether this country is to remain paramount
or whether South Africa is to become a great Dutch, English-hating
Republic. There are some who call themselves Englishmen, and who
possessed by that strange itch which prompts them to desire any evil
that can humble their country in the face of her enemies, or can bring
about the advantage of the rebel to the injury of the loyal subject, to
whom this last event would be most welcome, and who have not hesitated
to say that it would be welcome. To such there is nothing to be said.
Let them follow their false lights and earn the wonder of true-hearted
men and the maledictions of posterity.

But, addressing those of other and older doctrines, I would ask what
such an event would mean? It would mean nothing less than a great
national calamity; it would mean the utter ruin of the native tribes;
and, to come to a reason which has a wider popularity, for as I think
Mr. S. Little says in his work on South Africa, "the argument to the
pocket is the best argument to the man," it would mean the loss of a
vast trade, which, if properly protected, will be growing while we are
sleeping. And this calamity can yet be averted; the mistakes and
cowardice of the past can still be remedied, at any rate to a great
extent; the door is yet open. We have many difficulties to face, among
the chief of which are the Transvaal, the question of Delagoa Bay, and
last, but not least, the question of the Dutch party at the Cape, which
may be numerically the strongest party. When, in our mania for
representative institutions, we thrust responsible government upon the
Cape, we placed ourselves practically at the mercy of any chance
anti-English majority. It is possible that in the future we may find
some such majority urging upon an English Ministry the desirability of
the separation of the Cape Colony from the Empire, and may find also
that the prayer meets with favourable attention from those to whom
there is but one thing sacred, the rights of a majority, and especially
of an agitating majority.

But let not the country be deceived by any such representations. The
natives too have a right to a voice in the disposal of their fortunes
and their lands. They are the majority in the proportion of three to
one, and let any doubter go and ask of them, anywhere from the Zambesi
to Cape Agulhas, whether they would rather be ruled by the Queen or by
a Boer Republic, and hear the answer. When it was a question of
surrendering the Transvaal we heard a great deal of the rights of some
thirty thousand Boers, and very little, or rather nothing, of the
rights of the million natives who lived in the country with them, and
to whom that country originally belonged. And yet, if the reader will
turn to that part of this book which deals with the question, he will
find that they had an opinion, and a strong one. No settlement of South
African questions that does not receive adequate consideration from a
native point of view can be a just settlement, or one which the Home
Government should sanction. Moreover, the Cape is not by any means
entirely anti-English at heart, as was shown clearly enough by the
number and enthusiasm of the loyalist meetings when its Ministry was
attempting to undo Mr. Mackenzie's work in Bechuanaland in the
interests of the Patriot-party.

Still, it is possible that movements may arise under the fostering care
of the Africander Bond and its sympathisers, having for object the
separation of the colony from the Empire, or other ends fatal to
Imperial interests; and in this case the Home Government should be
prepared to disallow and put a final stop to them. We cannot afford to
lose our alternative route to India and to throw these great
territories into the hands of enemies, from which they would very
probably pass into those of commercial rivals. In such an event all
that would be required is a show of firmness. If once it was known that
an English Ministry really meant what it said, and that its promises
made in the Queen's name were not liable to be given the lie by a
succeeding set of politicians elected on another platform, there would
be an end to disloyalty and agitation in South Africa. As it is,
loyalists, remembering the experiences of the last few years, are
faint-hearted, never knowing if they will meet with support at home,
while agitators and enemies wax exceeding bold.

Our system of party government, whatever may be its merits, if any, as
applied to Home politics, is a great enemy to the welfare and progress
of our Colonies, the affairs of which are, especially of late years,
frequently used as stalking-horses to cover an attack upon the other
side. Could not the two great parties agree to rule Colonial affairs,
and especially South African affairs, out of the party game? Could not
the policy of the Colonial Office be guided by a Commission composed of
members of different political opinions, and responsible not to party,
but to Parliament and the country, instead of by a succession of
Ministers as variable and as transitory as shadows? Lord Rosebery and
Mr. Chamberlain, for instance, are Radicals; but, putting aside party
tactics and exigencies, are their views upon Colonial matters so widely
different from those of, let us say, Sir Michael Hicks Beach and Lord
Carnarvon that it would be impossible for these four gentlemen to act
together on such a Commission? Surely they are not; and perhaps a day
may come when the common-sense of the country will lead it to adopt
some such system which would give to the Colonies a fixed and
intelligent control aiming at the furtherance of the joint interests of
the Empire and its dependencies. If it ever does, that day will be a
happy one for all concerned.

Meanwhile, there is, so far as South Africa is concerned, a step that
might be taken to the great benefit of that country, and also of our
Imperial aims, and that is the appointment of a High Commissioner who
would have charge of all Imperial as distinguished from the various
Colonial interests. This appointment has already been advocated with
ability by Mr. Mackenzie in the last chapter of his book, "Austral
Africa," and it is undoubtedly one that should receive the
consideration of the Government. Such an officer would not supersede
the Governors of the various colonies or the administrators of the
native territories, although, so far as Imperial interests were
concerned, they would be primarily responsible to him. At present there
is no central authority except the Colonial Office, and Downing Street
is a long way off and somewhat overworked. Each Governor must
necessarily look at South African affairs from his own standpoint and
through local glasses. What is wanted is a man of the first ability,
whose name would command respect abroad and support at home; and
several such men could be found, who would study South African politics
as a whole as an engineer studies a map, and who would set himself to
conciliate and reconcile all interests for the common welfare and the
welfare of the mother-country. Such a man, or rather a succession of
such men, might, if properly supported, succeed in bringing about a
very different state of affairs from that which has been briefly
reviewed and considered in these pages. They might, little by little,
build up a South African Confederation, strong in itself and loyal to
England, that shall in time become a great empire. For my part,
notwithstanding the difficulties and dangers which we have brought upon
ourselves, and upon the various South African territories and their
inhabitants, I believe that such an empire is destined to arise, and
that it will not take the form of a Dutch Republic.




APPENDIX.




I.

THE POTCHEFSTROOM ATROCITIES, &c.


There were more murders and acts of cruelty committed during the war at
Potchefstroom, where the behaviour of the Boers was throughout both
deceitful and savage, than at any other place.

When the fighting commenced a number of ladies and children, the wives
and children of English residents, took refuge in the fort. Shortly
after it had been invested they applied to be allowed to return to
their homes in the town till the war was over. The request was refused
by the Boer commander, who said that as they had gone there, they might
stop and "perish" there. One poor lady, the wife of a gentleman well
known in the Transvaal, was badly wounded by having the point of a
stake, which had been cut in two by a bullet, driven into her side. She
was at the time in a state of pregnancy, and died some days afterwards
in great agony. Her little sister was shot through the throat, and
several other women and children suffered from bullet wounds, and fever
arising from their being obliged to live for months exposed to rain and
heat, with insufficient food.

The moving spirit of all the Potchefstroom atrocities was a cruel
wretch of the name of Buskes, a well-educated man, who, as an advocate
of the High Court, had taken the oath of allegiance to the Queen.

One deponent swears that he saw this Buskes wearing Captain Fall's
diamond ring, which he had taken from Sergeant Ritchie, to whom it was
handed to be sent to England, and also that he had possessed himself of
the carriages and other goods belonging to prisoners taken by the
Boers.[21] Another deponent (whose name is omitted in the Blue Book for
precautionary reasons) swears, "That on the next night the patrol again
came to my house accompanied by one Buskes, who was secretary of the
Boer Committee, and again asked where my wife and daughter were. I
replied, in bed; and Buskes then said, 'I must see for myself.' I
refused to allow him, and he forced me, with a loaded gun held to my
breast, to open the curtains of the bed, when he pulled the bedclothes
half off my wife, and altogether off my daughter. I then told him if I
had a gun I would shoot him. He placed a loaded gun at my breast, when
my wife sprang out of bed and got between us."

          [21] Buskes was afterwards forced to deliver up the ring.

I remember hearing at the time that this Buskes (who is a good
musician) took one of his victims, who was on the way to execution,
into the chapel and played the "Dead March in Saul," or some such
piece, over him on the organ.

After the capture of the Court House a good many Englishmen fell into
the hands of the Boers. Most of these were sentenced to hard labour and
deprivation of "civil rights." The sentence was enforced by making them
work in the trenches under a heavy fire from the fort. One poor fellow,
F. W. Finlay by name, got his head blown off by a shell from his own
friends in the fort, and several loyal Kafirs suffered the same fate.
After these events the remaining prisoners refused to return to the
trenches till they had been "tamed" by being thrashed with the butt end
of guns, and by threats of receiving twenty-five lashes each.

But their fate, bad as it was, was not so awful as that suffered by Dr.
Woite and J. Van der Linden.

Dr. Woite had attended the Boer meeting which was held before the
outbreak, and written a letter from thence to Major Clarke, in which he
had described the talk of the Boers as silly bluster. He was not a paid
spy. This letter was, unfortunately for him, found in Major Clarke's
pocket-book, and because of it he was put through a form of trial,
taken out and shot dead, all on the same day. He left a wife and large
family, who afterwards found their way to Natal in a destitute
condition.

The case of Van der Linden is somewhat similar. He was one of Raaf's
Volunteers, and as such had taken the oath of allegiance to the Queen.
In the execution of his duty he made a report to his commanding officer
about the Boer meeting, and which afterwards fell into the hands of the
Boers. On this he was put through the form of trial, and, though in the
service of the Queen, was found guilty of treason and condemned to
death. One of his judges, a little less stony-hearted than the rest,
pointed out that "when the prisoner committed the crime martial law had
not yet been proclaimed, nor the State," but it availed him nothing. He
was taken out and shot.

A Kafir named Carolus was also put through the form of trial and shot,
for no crime at all that I can discover.

Ten unarmed Kafir drivers, who had been sent away from the fort, were
shot down in cold blood by a party of Boers. Several witnesses depose
to having seen their remains lying together close by Potchefstroom.

Various other Kafirs were shot. None of the perpetrators of these
crimes were brought to justice. The Royal Commission comments on these
acts as follows:--

"In regard to the deaths of Woite, Van der Linden, and Carolus, the
Boer leaders do not deny the fact that those men had been executed, but
sought to justify it. The majority of your Commissioners felt bound to
record their opinion that the taking of the lives of these men was an
act contrary to the rules of civilised warfare. Sir H. de Villiers was
of opinion that the executions in these cases, having been ordered by
properly constituted court martial of the Boers' forces after due
trial, did not fall under the cognisance of your Commissioners.

"Upon the case of William Finlay the majority of your Commissioners
felt bound to record the opinion that the sacrifice of Finlay's life,
through forced labour under fire in the trenches, was an act contrary
to the rules of civilised warfare. _Sir H. de Villiers did not feel
justified by the facts of the case in joining in this expression of
opinion_ (sic). As to the case of the Kafir Andries, your Commissioners
decided that, although the shooting of this man appeared to them, from
the information laid before them, to be not in accordance with the
rules of civilised warfare, under all the circumstances of the case, it
was not desirable to insist upon a prosecution."

"The majority of your Commissioners, although feeling it a duty to
record emphatically their disapproval of the acts that resulted in the
deaths of Woite, Van der Linden, Finlay, and Carolus, yet found it
impossible to bring to justice the persons guilty of these acts."

It will be observed that Sir H. de Villiers does not express any
disapproval, emphatic or otherwise, of these wicked murders.

But Potchefstroom did not enjoy a monopoly of murder.

In December 1880, Captain Elliot, who was a survivor from the Bronker
Spruit massacre, and Captain Lambart, who had been taken prisoner by
the Boers whilst bringing remounts from the Free State, were released
from Heidelberg on parole on condition that they left the country. An
escort of two men brought them to a drift of the Vaal river, where they
refused to cross, because they could not get their cart through, the
river being in flood. The escort then returned to Heidelberg and
reported that the officers would not cross. A civil note was then sent
back to Captain Elliot and Lambart, signed by P. J. Joubert, telling
them "to pass the Vaal river immediately by the road that will be shown
to you." What secret orders, if any, were sent with this letter has
never transpired; but I decline to believe that, either in this or in
Barber's case, the Boer escort took upon themselves the responsibility
of murdering their prisoners, without authority of some kind for the
deed.

The men despatched from Heidelberg with the letter found Lambart and
Elliot wandering about and trying to find the way to Standerton, They
presented the letter, and took them towards a drift in the Vaal.
Shortly before they got there the prisoners noticed that their escort
had been reinforced. It would be interesting to know, if these extra
men were not sent to assist in the murder, how and why they turned up
as they did and joined themselves to the escort. The prisoners were
taken to an old and disused drift of the Vaal river and told to cross.
It was now dark, and the river was much swollen with rain; in fact,
impassable for the cart and horses. Captains Elliot and Lambart begged
to be allowed to outspan till the next morning, but were told that they
must cross, which they accordingly attempted to do. A few yards from
the bank the cart stuck on a rock, and whilst in this position the Boer
escort poured a volley into it. Poor Elliot was instantly killed, one
bullet fracturing his skull, another passing through the back, a third
shattering the right thigh, and a fourth breaking the left wrist. The
cart was also riddled, but strange to say, Captain Lambart was
untouched, and succeeded in swimming to the further bank, the Boers
firing at him whenever the flashes of lightning revealed his
whereabouts. After sticking some time in the mud of the bank he managed
to effect his escape, and next day reached the house of an Englishman
called Groom, living in the Free State, and from thence made his way to
Natal.

Two of the murderers were put through a form of trial, after the
conclusion of peace, and acquitted.

The case of the murder of Dr. Barber is of a somewhat similar character
to that of Elliot, except that there is in this case a curious piece of
indirect evidence that seems to connect the murder directly with Piet
Joubert, one of the Triumvirate.

In the month of February 1881, two Englishmen came to the Boer laager
at Lang's Nek to offer their services as doctors. Their names were Dr.
Barber, who was well known to the Boers, and his assistant, Mr. Walter
Dyas, and they came, not from Natal, but the Orange Free State. On
arrival at the Boer camp they were at first well received, but after a
little while seized, searched, and tied up all night to a disselboom
(pole of a waggon). Next morning they were told to mount their horses,
and started from the camp escorted by two men who were to take them
over the Free State line.

When they reached the Free State line the Boers told them to get off
their horses, which they were ordered to bring back to the camp. They
did so, bade good-day to their escort, and started to walk on towards
their destination. When they had gone about forty yards Dyas heard the
report of a rifle, and Barber called out, "My God, I am shot!" and fell
dead.

Dyas went down on his hands and knees and saw one of the escort
deliberately aim at him. He then jumped up, and ran dodging from right
to left, trying to avoid the bullet. Presently the man fired, and he
felt himself struck through the thigh. He fell with his face to the
men, and saw his would-be assassin put a fresh cartridge into his rifle
and aim at him. Turning his face to the ground he awaited his death,
but the bullet whizzed past his head. He then saw the men take the
horses and go away, thinking they had finished him. After waiting a
while he managed to get up and struggled to a house not far off; where
he was kindly treated and remained till he recovered.

Some time after this occurrence a Hottentot, named Allan Smith, made a
statement at Newcastle, from, which it appears that he had been taken
prisoner by the Boers and made to work for them. One night he saw
Barber and Dyas tied to the disselboom, and overheard the following,
which I will give in his own words:--

"I went to a fire where some Boers were sitting; among them was a
low-sized man, moderately stout, with a dark brown full beard,
apparently about thirty-five years of age I do not know his name.
_He was telling his comrades that he had brought an order from Piet
Joubert_ to Viljoen, to take the two prisoners to the Free State
line _and shoot them there_. He said, in the course of conversation,
'Piet Joubert het gevraacht waarom was de mensche neet dood geschiet
toen hulle bijde eerste laager gekom het' ('Piet Joubert asked why were
the men not shot when they came to the first laager.') They then saw me
at the fire, and one of them said, 'You must not talk before that
fellow; he understands what you say, and will tell everybody.

"Next morning Viljoen told me to go away, and gave me a pass into the
Free State. He said (in Dutch), 'You must not drive for any Englishman
again. If we catch you doing so we will shoot you, and if you do not go
away quick, and we catch you hanging about when we bring the two men to
the line, we will shoot you too.'"

Dyas, who escaped, made an affidavit with reference to this statement
in which he says, "I have read the foregoing affidavit of Allan Smith,
and I say that the person described in the third paragraph thereof as
bringing orders from Piet Joubert to Viljoen, corresponds with one of
the Boers who took Dr. Barber and myself to the Free State, and to the
best of my belief he is the man who shot Dr. Barber."

The actual murderers were put on their trial in the Free State, and, of
course, acquitted. In his examination at the trial, Allan Smith says,
"It was a young man who said that Joubert had given orders that Barber
had to be shot.... It was not at night, but in the morning early, when
the young man spoke about Piet Joubert's order."

Most people will gather, from what I have quoted, that there exists a
certain connection between the dastardly murder of Dr. Barber (and the
attempted murder of Mr. Dyas) and Piet Joubert, one of that "able"
Triumvirate of which Mr. Gladstone speaks so highly.

I shall only allude to one more murder, though more are reported to
have occurred, amongst them that of Mr. Malcolm, who was kicked to
death by Boers,--and that is Mr. Green's.

Mr. Green was an English gold-digger, and was travelling along the main
road to his home at Spitzcop. The road passed close by the military
camp at Lydenburg, into which he was called. On coming out he went to a
Boer patrol with a flag of truce, and whilst talking to them was shot
dead. The Rev. J. Thorne, the English clergyman at Lydenburg, describes
this murder in an affidavit in the following words:--

"That I was the clergyman who got together a party of Englishmen and
brought down the body of Mr. Green who was murdered by the Boers and
buried it. I have ascertained the circumstances of the murder, which
were as follows:--Mr. Green was on his way to the gold-fields. As he
was passing the fort, he was called in by the officers, and sent out
again with a message to the Boer commandant. Immediately on leaving the
camp, he went to the Boer guard opposite with a flag of truce in his
hand; while parleying with the Boers, who proposed to make a prisoner
of him, he was shot through the head."

No prosecution was instituted in this case. Mr. Green left a wife and
children in a destitute condition.




II.

PLEDGES GIVEN BY MR GLADSTONE'S GOVERNMENT AS TO THE RETENTION OF
THE TRANSVAAL AS A BRITISH COLONY.


The following extracts from the speeches, despatches, and telegrams of
members of the present Government, with reference to the proposed
retrocession of the Transvaal, are not without interest:--

During the month of May 1880, Lord Kimberley despatched a telegram to
Sir Bartle Frere, in which the following words occur: "_Under no
circumstances can the Queen's authority in the Transvaal be
relinquished._"

In a despatch dated 20th May, and addressed to Sir Bartle Frere, Lord
Kimberley says, "That the sovereignty of the Queen in the Transvaal
could not be relinquished."

In a speech in the House of Lords on the 24th May 1880, Lord Kimberley
said:--

"There was a still stronger reason than that for not receding; it was
impossible to say what calamities such a step as receding might not
cause. We had, at the cost of much blood and treasure, restored peace,
and the effect of our now reversing our policy would be to leave the
province in a state of anarchy, and possibly to cause an internecine
war. For such a risk, he could not make himself responsible. The number
of the natives in the Transvaal was estimated at about 800,000, and
that of the whites less than 50,000. Difficulties with the Zulus and
frontier tribes would again arise, and, looking as they must to South
Africa as a whole, the Government, after a careful consideration of the
question, came to the conclusion _that we could not relinquish the
Transvaal_. Nothing could be more unfortunate than uncertainty in
respect to such a matter."

On the 8th June 1880, Mr. Gladstone, in reply to a Boer memorial, wrote
as follows:--

"It is undoubtedly a matter for much regret that it should, since the
Annexation, have appeared that so large a number of the population of
Dutch origin in the Transvaal are opposed to the annexation of that
territory, but it is impossible now, to consider that question as if it
were presented for the first time. We have to do with a state of things
which has existed for a considerable period, during which _obligations
have been contracted, especially, though not exclusively, towards the
native population, which cannot be set aside_. Looking to all the
circumstances, both of the Transvaal and the rest of South Africa, and
to the necessity of preventing a renewal of disorders, which might lead
to disastrous consequences, not only to the Transvaal but to the whole
of South Africa, _our judgment it that the Queen cannot be advised to
relinquish the Transvaal_."

Her Majesty's Speech, delivered in Parliament on the 6th January 1881,
contains the following words: "A rising in the Transvaal has recently
imposed upon me the duty of _vindicating my authority_."

These extracts are rather curious reading in face of the policy adopted
by the Government, after our troops had been defeated.




III.

A BOER ON BOER DESIGNS.


I reprint here a letter published in _The Times_ of 14th October
1899, together with a prefatory note added by the editor of that
journal. This epistle seems to me worthy of the study of thinking men.
Much of it, most of it indeed, is mere brutal vapouring, false in its
facts, false in its deductions; remarkable only for the livid hues of
hate with which it is coloured. Yet in this vile concoction, the work
evidently of a half-educated member of the Cape Dutch party, or perhaps
of an Afrikander Irishman of the stamp of the late notorious Fenian
Aylward, appear statements built upon a basis of truth which we should
do well to lay to heart. I allude principally to the question of our
food supply and to the possible behaviour of the electorate in the
event of a great war under pressure of want and high prices. (See
paragraph 3 of the letter of "P. S.") In a very different work, "A
Farmer's Year," pages 179 and 380, I have attempted to treat of this
great matter which elsewhere has been dealt with also by others more
able and perhaps better qualified. Until it is reasonably certain that
under any circumstances which we can conceive the price of food stuffs
will not be raised to a prohibitive point, it can never be said that
the future of Great Britain is assured beyond all probable doubt. When
will this problem receive the attention it deserves at the hands of our
Governments and of those over whom they rule?


We have received the following letter, appropriately headed "Boer
Ignorance." The writer bears a well-known Dutch name, and gives as his
late address the name of a well-known town in a Dutch district of Cape
Colony:--

    _To the Editor of the "Times."_

    SIR,--In your paper you have often commented on what you are
    pleased to call the ignorance of my countrymen, the Boers. We are
    not so ignorant as the British statesmen and newspaper writers, nor
    are we such fools as you British are. We know our policy, and we do
    not change it. We have no opposition party to fear nor to truckle
    to. Your boasted Conservative majority has been the obedient tool
    of the Radical minority, and the Radical minority has been the
    blind tool of our farseeing and intelligent, President. We have
    desired delay, and we have had it, and we are now practically
    masters of Africa from the Zambezi to the Cape. All the Afrikanders
    in Cape Colony have been working for years for this end, for they
    and we know the facts.

     1. The actual value of gold in the Transvaal is at least 200,000
    millions of pounds, and this fact is as well known to the Emperors
    of Germany and Russia as it is to us. You estimate the value of the
    gold at only 700 millions of pounds, or, at least, that is what you
    pretend to estimate it at. But Germany, Russia, and France do not
    desire you to get possession of this vast mass of gold, and so,
    after encouraging you to believe that they will not interfere in
    South Africa they will certainly do so, and very easily find a
    _casus belli_, and they will assist us directly and indirectly
    to drive you out of Africa.

     2. We know that you dare not take any precautions in advance to
    prevent the onslaught of the Great Powers, as the Opposition, the
    great peace party, will raise the question of expense, and this
    will win over your lazy, dirty, drunken working classes, who will
    never again permit themselves to be taxed to support your Empire,
    or even to preserve your existence as a nation.

     3. We know from all the military authorities of the European and
    American continents that you exist as an independent Power merely
    on sufferance, and that at any moment the great Emperor William can
    arrange with France or Russia to wipe you off the face of the
    earth. They can at any time starve you into surrender. You must
    yield in all things to the United States also, or your supply of
    corn will be so reduced by the Americans that your working classes
    would be compelled to pay high prices for their food, and rather
    than do that they would have civil war, and invite any foreign
    Power to assist them by invasion, for there is no patriotism in the
    working classes of England, Wales, or Ireland.

     4. We know that your country has been more prosperous than any
    other country during the last fifty years (you have had no civil
    war like the Americans and French to tone up your nerves and
    strengthen your manliness), and consequently your able-bodied men
    will not enlist in your so-called voluntary army. Therefore you
    have to hire the dregs of your population to do your fighting, and
    they are deficient in physique, in moral and mental ability, and in
    all the qualities that make good fighting men.

     5. Your military officers we know to be merely pedantic scholars or
    frivolous society men, without any capacity for practical warfare
    with white men.  The Afridis were more than a match for you, and
    your victory over the Sudanese was achieved because those poor
    people had not a rifle amongst them.

     6. We know that your men, being the dregs of your people, are
    naturally feeble, and that they are also saturated with the most
    horrible sexual diseases, as all your Government returns plainly
    show, and that they cannot endure the hardships of war.

     7. We know that the entire British race is rapidly decaying, your
    birth-rate is rapidly falling, your children are born weak,
    diseased, and deformed, and that the major part of your population
    consists of females, cripples, epileptics, consumptives, cancerous
    people, invalids, and lunatics of all kinds whom you carefully
    nourish and preserve.

     8. We know that nine-tenths of your statesmen and higher officials,
    military and naval, are suffering from kidney diseases, which
    weaken their courage and will-power and makes them shirk all
    responsibility as far as possible.

     9. We know that your Navy is big, but we know that it is not
    powerful, and that it is honeycombed with disloyalty--as witness
    the theft of the signal-books, the assaults on officers, the
    desertions, and the wilful injury of the boilers and machinery,
    which all the vigilance of the officers is powerless to prevent.

    10. We know that the Conservative Government is a mere sham, and
    that it largely reduced the strength of the British artillery in
    1888-89. And we know that it does nor dare now to call out the
    Militia for training, nor to mobilise the Fleet, nor to give
    sufficient grants to the Line and Volunteers for ammunition to
    enable them to become good marksmen and efficient soldiers. We
    know that British soldiers and sailors are immensely inferior as
    marksmen, not only to Germans, French, and Americans, but also to
    Japanese, Afridis, Chilians, Peruvians, Belgians, and Russians.

    11. We know that no British Government dares to propose any form of
    compulsory military or naval training, for the British people would
    rather be invaded, conquered, and governed by Germans, Russians, or
    Frenchmen than be compelled to serve their own Government.

    12. We Boers know that we will not be governed by a set of British
    curs, but that we will drive you out of Africa altogether, and the
    other manly nations which have compulsory military service--the
    armed manhood of Europe--will very quickly divide all your other
    possessions between them.

    Talk no more of the ignorance of the Boers or Cape Dutch; a few
    days more will prove your ignorance of the British position, and in
    a short space of time you and your Queen will be imploring the good
    offices of the great German Emperor to deliver you from your
    disasters, for your humiliations are not yet complete.

    For thirty years the Cape Dutch have been waiting their chance, and
    now their day has come; they will throw off their mask and your
    yoke at the same instant, and 300,000 Dutch heroes will trample you
    under foot.

    We can afford to tell you the truth now, and in this letter you
    have got it.--Yours, &c.,

    P. S.

    _October 12._


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