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THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS


[Illustration: WILHELM II]


THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

by

WILHELM II
Emperor of Germany 1888-1918

English Translation by Thomas R. Ybarra







Harper & Brothers Publishers
New York and London
1922




THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

Copyright, 1922
By McClure Newspaper Syndicate

Copyright, 1922
By Harper & Brothers
Printed in the U. S. A.

_First Edition_
K-W




CONTENTS


  CHAP.                                                 PAGE

  I.    BISMARCK                                           1

  II.   CAPRIVI                                           51

  III.  HOHENLOHE                                         59

  IV.   BÜLOW                                             95

  V.    BETHMANN                                         124

  VI.   MY CO-WORKERS IN THE ADMINISTRATION              171

  VII.  SCIENCE AND ART                                  196

  VIII. MY RELATIONS WITH THE CHURCH                     208

  IX.   ARMY AND NAVY                                    223

  X.    THE OUTBREAK OF WAR                              246

  XI.   THE POPE AND PEACE                               263

  XII.  END OF THE WAR AND MY ABDICATION                 272

  XIII. THE ENEMY TRIBUNAL AND THE NEUTRAL TRIBUNAL      292

  XIV.  THE QUESTION OF GUILT                            303

  XV.   THE REVOLUTION AND GERMANY'S FUTURE              337




THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS




CHAPTER I

Bismarck


Prince Bismarck's greatness as a statesman and his imperishable
services to Prussia and Germany are historical facts of such tremendous
significance that there is doubtless no man in existence, whatever his
party affiliations, who would dare to place them in question. For this
very reason alone it is stupid to accuse me of not having recognized
the greatness of Prince Bismarck. The opposite is the truth. I revered
and idolized him. Nor could it be otherwise. It should be borne in
mind with what generation I grew up--the generation of the devotees of
Bismarck. He was the creator of the German Empire, the paladin of my
grandfather, and all of us considered him the greatest statesman of his
day and were proud that he was a German. Bismarck was the idol in my
temple, whom I worshiped.

But monarchs also are human beings of flesh and blood, hence they, too,
are exposed to the influences emanating from the conduct of others;
therefore, looking at the matter from a human point of view, one will
understand how Prince Bismarck, by his fight against me, himself
destroyed, with heavy blows, the idol of which I have spoken. But my
reverence for Bismarck, the great statesman, remained unaltered.

While I was still Prince of Prussia I often thought to myself: "I hope
that the great Chancellor will live for many years yet, since I should
be safe if I could govern with him." But my reverence for the great
statesman was not such as to make me take upon my own shoulders, when
I became Emperor, political plans or actions of the Prince which I
considered mistakes. Even the Congress of Berlin in 1878 was, to my
way of thinking, a mistake, likewise the "Kulturkampf." Moreover, the
constitution of the Empire was drawn up so as to fit in with Bismarck's
extraordinary preponderance as a statesman; the big cuirassier boots
did not fit every man.

Then came the labor-protective legislation. I most deeply deplored the
dispute which grew out of this, but, at that time, it was necessary for
me _to take the road to compromise, which has generally been my road
both on domestic and foreign politics_. For this reason I could not
wage the open warfare against the Social Democrats which the Prince
desired. Nevertheless, this quarrel about political measures cannot
lessen my admiration for the greatness of Bismarck as a statesman; he
remains the creator of the German Empire, and surely no _one_ man need
have done more for his country than that.

Owing to the fact that the great matter of unifying the Empire was
always before my eyes, I did not allow myself to be influenced by the
agitations which were the commonplaces of those days. In like manner,
the fact that Bismarck was called the majordomo of the Hohenzollerns
could not shake my trust in the Prince, although he, perhaps, had
thoughts of a political tradition for his family. As evidence of this,
he felt unhappy, for instance, that his son Bill felt no interest in
politics and wished to pass on his power to Herbert.


HIS GRANDFATHER'S SUCCESSOR

The tragic element for me, in the Bismarck case, lay in the fact that I
became the successor of my grandfather--in other words, that I skipped
one generation, to a certain extent. And that is a serious thing. In
such a case one is forced to deal constantly with old deserving men,
who live more in the past than in the present, and cannot grow into the
future. When the grandson succeeds his grandfather and finds a revered
but old statesman of the stature of Bismarck, it is not a piece of good
luck for him, as one might suppose, and I, in fact, supposed. Bismarck
himself points that out in the third volume of his memoirs (p. 40),
when he speaks, in the chapter about Bötticher, of the oldish caution
of the Chancellor, and of the young Emperor.

And when Ballin had the Prince cast a glance over the new harbor of
Hamburg, Bismarck himself felt that a new era had begun which he no
longer thoroughly understood. On that occasion the Prince remarked, in
astonishment, "Another world, a new world!"

This point of view also showed itself on the occasion of the visit of
Admiral von Tirpitz at Friedrichsruh, at the time when he wished to win
the old Imperial Chancellor over to favoring the first Navy bill.

As for me personally, I have the satisfaction of recalling that
Bismarck intrusted to me in 1886 the very delicate Brest mission, and
said of me: "Some day that man will be his own Chancellor." This shows
that Bismarck must have had some belief in me.

I feel no grudge against him for the third volume of his reminiscences.
I released this volume after I had sought and obtained my rights. To
withhold the volume any longer would have been pointless, since the
main contents had become known already through indiscretions; were this
not true, there might have been varying opinions as to the advisability
in the choice of the time for publication. Bismarck would turn over
in his grave if he could know at what time the third volume appeared,
and what consequences it had. I should be honestly grieved if the
third volume had damaged the memory of the great Chancellor, because
Bismarck is one of the heroic figures whom the German people need for
their regeneration. My gratitude and reverence for the great Chancellor
cannot be impaired or extinguished by the third volume nor by anything
else whatever.

In the first half of the 'eighties I had been summoned to the Foreign
Office at the behest of Prince Bismarck; it was then presided over by
Count Herbert Bismarck. Upon reporting myself to the Prince he gave me
a short sketch of the personages employed at the Foreign Office, and
when he named Herr von Holstein, who was then one of the most prominent
collaborators of the Prince, it seemed to me that a slight warning
against this man ran through the Prince's words.

I got a room all to myself, and all the documents concerning the
preliminary history, origin, and conclusion of the alliance with
Austria (Andrassy) were laid before me in order that I might study
them. I went often to the home of the Prince and to that of Count
Herbert.


THE MAN WITH THE HYENA'S EYES

When I had thus become more intimate in the Bismarck circle I heard
more open talk about Herr von Holstein. I heard that he was very
clever, a good worker, inordinately proud, an odd sort of man, who
never showed himself anywhere and had no social relations, full of
distrust, much influenced by whims, and, besides all this, a good
hater, and, therefore, dangerous. Prince Bismarck called him "The Man
with the Hyena's Eyes," and told me that it would be well for me to
keep away from him. It was quite apparent that the bitter attitude
which the Prince showed later toward Holstein, his former collaborator,
was forming even at that time.

The Foreign Office was conducted with the strictest discipline by Count
Herbert, whose rudeness toward his employees particularly struck me.
The gentlemen there simply flew when they were summoned or dismissed
by the Count, so much so that a joking saying arose at the time that
"their coat tails stood straight out behind them." The foreign policy
was conducted and dictated by Prince Bismarck alone, after consultation
with Count Herbert, who passed on the commands of the Chancellor and
had them transformed into instructions. Hence _the Foreign Office was
nothing but an office of the great Chancellor_, where work was done
according to his directions. Able men, with independent ideas, were not
schooled and trained there.

This was in contrast to the General Staff under Moltke. There new
officers were carefully developed and trained to independent thinking
and action, in accordance with approved principles, and by dint of
preserving old traditions and taking into account all that modern times
had taught. At the Foreign Office there were only executive instruments
of a will, who were not informed as to the important interrelationship
of the questions turned over to them for treatment, and could not,
therefore, collaborate independently. The Prince loomed up like a huge
block of granite in a meadow; were he to be dragged away, what would be
found beneath would be mostly worms and dead roots.

I won the confidence of the Prince, who consulted me about many
things. For instance, when the Prince brought about the first German
colonial acquisitions (Gross and Klein Popo, Togo, etc.), I informed
him, at his wish, concerning the state of mind created in the public
and the navy by this move, and described to him the enthusiasm with
which the German people had hailed the new road. The Prince remarked
that the matter hardly deserved this.

Later on I spoke often with the Prince about the colonial question
and always found in him the intention to utilize the colonies as
commercial objects, or objects for swapping purposes, other than to
make them useful to the fatherland or utilize them as sources of raw
materials. As was my duty, I called the Prince's attention to the fact
that merchants and capitalists were beginning energetically to develop
the colonies and that, therefore--as I had learned from Hanseatic
circles--they counted upon protection from a navy. For this reason, I
pointed out that steps must be taken for _getting a fleet constructed_
in time, in order that German assets in foreign lands should not be
without protection; that, since the Prince had unfurled the German flag
in foreign parts, and the people stood behind it, there must also be a
navy behind it.


BISMARCK'S CONTINENTAL PREPOSSESSIONS

But the Prince turned a deaf ear to my statements and made use of
his pet motto: "If the English should land on our soil I should have
them arrested." His idea was that the colonies would be defended by
us at home. The Prince attached no importance to the fact that the
very assumption that the English could land without opposition in
Germany--since Heligoland was English--was unbearable for Germany, and
that we, in order to make a landing impossible from the start, needed a
sufficiently strong navy, and, likewise, Heligoland.

The political interest of the Prince was, in fact, concentrated
essentially upon continental Europe; England lay somewhat to one
side among the cares that burdened him daily, all the more so since
Salisbury stood well with him and had, in the name of England, hailed
with satisfaction the Double (_i. e._, Triple) Alliance, at the time
of its formation. The Prince worked primarily with Russia, Austria,
Italy, and Rumania, whose relations toward Germany and one another he
constantly watched over. As to the prudence and skill with which he
acted, Emperor William the Great once made a pointed remark to von
Albedyll, his chief of Cabinet.

The General found His Majesty much excited after a talk with Bismarck,
to such an extent that he feared for the health of the old Emperor. He
remarked, therefore, that His Majesty should avoid similar worry in
future; that, if Bismarck was unwilling to do as His Majesty wished,
His Majesty should dismiss him. Whereupon the Emperor replied that,
despite his admiration and gratitude toward the great Chancellor,
he had already thought of dismissing him, since the self-conscious
attitude of the Prince became at times too oppressive. But both he and
the country needed Bismarck too badly. Bismarck was the one man who
could juggle five balls of which at least two were always in the air.
That trick, added the Emperor, was beyond his own powers.

Prince Bismarck did not realize that, through the acquisition of
colonies for Germany, he would be obliged to look beyond Europe and
be automatically forced to act, politically, on a large scale--with
England especially. England, to be sure, was one of the five balls in
his diplomatic-statesmanly game, but she was merely one of the five,
and he did not grant her the special importance which was her due.

For this reason it was that the Foreign Office likewise was involved
entirely in the continental interplay of politics, had not the
requisite interest in colonies, navy, or England, and possessed no
experience in world politics. The English psychology and mentality, as
shown in the pursuit--constant, though concealed by all sorts of little
cloaks--of world hegemony, was to the German Foreign Office a book
sealed with seven seals.


SOURCE OF RUSSIAN ENMITY

Once Prince Bismarck remarked to me that his main object was to not
let Russia and England come to an understanding. I took the liberty of
observing that the opportunity to postpone such an understanding for
a long time lay ready to hand in 1877-78, when the Russians might have
been allowed to occupy Constantinople--had this been done, the English
fleet would have sailed in without further ado to defend Constantinople
and the Russo-English conflict would have been on. Instead, I
continued, the Treaty of San Stefano was forced upon the Russians and
they were compelled to turn about at the very gates of the city which
they had reached and saw before them, after frightful battles and
hardships.

This, I went on, had created an inextinguishable hatred in the Russian
army against us (as had been reported by Prussian officers who had
accompanied the Russian army on the Turkish campaign, especially Count
Pfeil); moreover, the above-mentioned treaty had been cast aside and
the Berlin Treaty substituted for it, which had burdened us even more
with the hostility of the Russians, who looked upon us as the enemy of
their "just interests in the East." Thus the conflict between Russia
and England, which the Prince desired, had been relegated far into the
future.

Prince Bismarck did not agree with this judgment of "his" Congress,
concerning the results of which he, as the "honest broker," was so
proud; he remarked earnestly that he had wished to prevent a general
conflagration and had been compelled to offer his services as a
mediator. When I, later on, told a gentleman at the Foreign Office
about this conversation, he replied that he had been present when
the Prince, after signing the Berlin Treaty, came into the Foreign
Office and received the congratulations of the officials assembled
there. After he had listened to them the Prince stood up and replied:
"Now I am driving Europe four-in-hand!" In the opinion of the said
gentleman the Prince was mistaken in this, since, even at that time,
there was the threat of a Russo-French friendship in place of the
Russo-Prussian--in other words, two horses were already to be counted
out of the four-in-hand. As Russia saw it, Disraeli's statecraft had
turned Bismarck's work as "honest broker" into the negotiation of an
Anglo-Austrian victory over Russia.

Despite considerable differences in our opinions, Prince Bismarck
remained friendly and kindly disposed to me, and, despite the great
difference in our ages, a pleasant relationship grew up between
us, since I, in common with all those of my generation, was an
ardent admirer of the Prince and had won his trust by my zeal and
frankness--nor have I ever betrayed that trust.

During the time of my assignment at the Foreign Office, Privy Councilor
Raschdau, among others, discoursed with me on commercial policy,
colonies, etc. In these matters, even at that early date, my attention
was called to our dependence upon England, due to the fact that we had
no navy and that Heligoland was in English hands. To be sure, there
was a project to extend our colonial possessions under the pressure of
necessity, but all this could happen only with England's permission.
This was a serious matter, and certainly an unworthy position for
Germany.


INTERCOURT POLITICS

My assignment at the Foreign Office brought a very unpleasant happening
in its wake. My parents were not very friendly toward Prince Bismarck
and looked with disfavor upon the fact that their son had entered into
the Prince's circle. There was fear of my becoming influenced against
my parents, of superconservatism, of all sorts of perils, which all
sorts of tale bearers from England and "liberal circles," who rallied
around my father, imputed against me. I never bothered my head with all
this nonsense, but my position in the house of my parents was rendered
much more difficult for me and, at times, painful. Through my work
under Prince Bismarck and the confidence reposed in me--often subjected
to the severest tests--I have had to suffer much in silence for the
sake of the Chancellor; he, however, apparently took this quite as a
matter of course.

I was on good terms with Count Herbert Bismarck. He could be a very
gay companion and knew how to assemble interesting men around his
table, partly from the Foreign Office, partly from other circles.
However, true friendship never ripened between us two. This was shown
particularly when the Count asked to go at the same time that his
father retired. My request that he stay by me and help me to maintain
tradition in our political policy elicited the sharp reply that he had
become accustomed to report to his father and serve him, wherefore it
was out of the question to demand that he come, with his dispatch case
under his arm, to report to anybody else than his father.

When Tsar Nicholas II, he who has been murdered, came of age, I was
assigned at the instigation of Prince Bismarck to confer upon the
heir-apparent at St. Petersburg the Order of the Black Eagle. Both the
Emperor and Prince Bismarck instructed me concerning the relationship
of the two countries and the two reigning dynasties with each other,
as well as concerning customs, personages, etc. The Emperor remarked
in conclusion that he would give his grandson the same piece of advice
that was given him, on the occasion of his first visit as a young man
to Russia, by Count Adlerberg, _viz._, "In general, there as well as
elsewhere, people prefer praise to criticism." Prince Bismarck closed
his remarks with these words: "In the East, all those who wear their
shirts outside their trousers are decent people, but as soon as they
tuck their shirts inside their trousers and hang a medal around their
necks, they become pig-dogs."

From St. Petersburg I repeatedly reported to my grandfather and to
Prince Bismarck. Naturally, I described, to the best of my knowledge,
the impressions which I got. I noticed especially that the old
Russo-Prussian relations and sentiments had cooled to a marked extent
and were no longer such as the Emperor and Prince Bismarck in their
talks with me had assumed. After my return, both my grandfather
and the Prince praised me for my plain, clear report, which was all
the pleasanter for me since I was oppressed by the feeling that,
in a number of things, I had been forced to disillusion these high
personages.


TO OFFER DARDANELLES TO RUSSIA

In 1886, at the end of August and beginning of September, after the
last meeting at Gastein of Emperor William the Great and Prince
Bismarck with Emperor Franz Josef, where I also was present at the
command of my grandfather, I was commissioned to report personally to
Tsar Alexander II concerning the decisions made there and to take up
with him the questions relating to the Mediterranean and Turkey. Prince
Bismarck gave me his instructions, sanctioned by Emperor William; they
dealt most especially with Russia's desire to reach Constantinople,
to which the Prince meant to raise no obstacles. On the contrary, I
received direct instructions to offer Russia Constantinople and the
Dardanelles (in other words, San Stefano and the Berlin Treaty had been
dropped!). There was a plan to persuade Turkey in a friendly way that
an understanding with Russia was desirable for her also.

The Tsar received me cordially at Brest-Litovsk and I was present there
at reviews of troops and fortress and defensive maneuvers, which, even
then, unquestionably bore an anti-German look.

To sum up my conversations with the Tsar, the following remark by him
is of importance: "If I wish to have Constantinople, I shall take
it whenever I feel like it, without need of permission or approval
from Prince Bismarck." After this rude refusal of the Bismarck offer
of Constantinople, I looked upon my mission as a failure and made my
report to the Prince accordingly.

When the Prince decided to make his offer to the Tsar, he must have
altered his political conceptions which had led to San Stefano and
the Congress of Berlin; or else, on account of the development of the
general political situation in Europe, he considered that the moment
had come for shuffling the political cards in another way or, as my
grandfather had put it, to "juggle" differently. Only a man of the
world importance and diplomatic ability of Prince Bismarck could embark
on such a course. Whether the Prince had planned his big political
game with Russia in such a way that he might, first, by means of the
Congress of Berlin, prevent a general war and cajole England, and then,
after having thus hindered Russia's Eastern aspirations, cater to these
aspirations later, by a stroke of genius, in an even more striking
manner, it is impossible for me to say--Prince Bismarck never told
anyone about his great political projects.

If the above is true, Bismarck, trusting absolutely to his
statesmanlike skill, must have reckoned upon bringing Germany all the
more into Russian favor because Russian aspirations were brought to
fulfillment by Germany alone--and that at a moment when the general
European political situation was less strained than in 1877-78.
In this case, nobody except Prince Bismarck could have played the
tremendous game to a successful end. And therein lies the weakness in
the superiority of great men. Had he also informed England of his offer
to the Tsar? England must have been opposed to it, as in 1878.

In any event, the Prince now adopted the policy which I had already
noted when I realized the disillusion of the Russians at having stood
before the gates of Constantinople without being allowed to enter.


PROPHECY OF RUSSIAN DOWNFALL

At Brest-Litovsk, in the course of the constant military preparations
of all kinds, I could easily see that the conduct of the Russian
officers toward me was essentially cooler and haughtier than on the
occasion of my first visit to St. Petersburg. Only the small group of
old generals, especially those at the Russian court, who dated from the
days of Alexander II, and who knew and esteemed Emperor William the
Great, still showed their reverence for him and their friendly feeling
toward Germany. In the course of a talk with one of them concerning
the relations between the two courts, armies, and countries, which I
had found undergoing a change in comparison with former times, the
old General said: "C'est ce vilain congrès de Berlin. Une grave faute
du Chancelier. Il a détruit l'ancienne amitié entre nous, planté la
méfiance dans les coeurs de la Cour et du Gouvernement, et fourni le
sentiment d'un grave tort fait à l'armée russe après sa campagne
sanglante de 1877, pour lequel elle veut sa revanche. Et nous voilà
ensemble avec cette maudite République Française, pleins de haine
contre vous et rempli d'idées subversives, qui en cas de guerre avec
vous, nous coûteront notre dynastie."[1]

A prophetic foreshadowing of the downfall of the reigning Russian
dynasty!

From Brest I went to Strassburg, where my grandfather was attending the
Imperial maneuvers. In spite of the failure of my mission I found calm
judgments of the political situation. My grandfather was pleased at
the cordial greetings from the Tsar, which, in so far as the personal
relationship of the two rulers was concerned, showed no change of
heart. Also, to my surprise, I received a letter from Prince Bismarck
wherein he expressed gratitude and appreciation to me for my actions
and my report. This meant all the more since my statements could not
have been agreeable to my grandfather and the Chancellor. The Congress
of Berlin had, especially in Russian military circles, done away with
the remnants of the brotherhood in arms still fostered among us and had
engendered a hatred against everything Prussian and German, stirred
up by association with French officers, which was increased by the
French until it developed into the desire of vengeance by means of
arms. That was the soil in which, later, the World War ambitions of our
foes found nourishment. "Revanche pour Sedan," combined with "Revanche
pour San Stefano." The words of the old General at Brest have remained
unforgettably engraved upon my memory; they induced me to bring about
my many meetings with Alexander III and Nicholas II, at which my
grandfather's wish, impressed upon me on his deathbed, that I watch
over our relations with Russia, has always been my guiding motive.


RELIEF AT CHANCELLOR'S DISMISSAL

In 1890, at the Narva maneuvers, I was obliged to describe minutely
to the Tsar the retirement of Prince Bismarck. The Tsar listened very
attentively. When I had finished, the usually very cool and reserved
sovereign, who seldom spoke about politics, spontaneously seized my
hand, thanked me for this token of my confidence, regretted that I
had been brought into such a situation and added, in exactly these
words: "Je comprends parfaitement ta ligne d'action; le Prince avec
toute sa grandeur n'était après tout rien d'autre que ton employé ou
fonctionnaire. Le moment où il réfusait d'agir selon tes ordres, il
fallait le renvoyer. Moi pour ma part je me suis toujours méfié de lui,
et je ne lui ai jamais cru un mot de ce qu'il faisait savoir ou me
disait lui-même, car j'étais sûr et savais qu'il me blaguait tout le
temps. Pour les rapports entre nous deux, mon cher Guillaume [this was
the first time that the Tsar so addressed me], la chute du Prince aura
les meilleures conséquences, la méfiance disparaîtra. J'ai confiance en
toi. Tu peux te fier à moi."[2]

I immediately wrote down this important talk at the time it occurred.
I am objective enough to ask myself to what extent the courtesy of
one ruler to another and possibly, in addition, the satisfaction at
the elimination of a statesman of Bismarck's importance, can have
influenced the Tsar, consciously or unconsciously, in making the
above-mentioned statement. Prince Bismarck's belief in the Tsar's trust
in him was, subjectively, undoubtedly genuine; and, moreover, there can
be no doubt as to the esteem in which Alexander III held Bismarck's
ability as a statesman.

In any event, the Tsar remained true to his word up to the day of his
death. This, to be sure, did little to change Russia's general policy,
but Germany, at least, was safe from an attack from that quarter. The
straightforward character of Alexander III guaranteed this--it became
otherwise under his weak son.

Whatever one's attitude may be toward Bismarck's Russian policy, one
thing must be acknowledged: the Prince, despite the Congress of Berlin
and the rapprochement of France to Russia, was able to avoid serious
friction. That is equivalent to saying that, reckoning from the time of
the Berlin Congress, he played a superior diplomatic and statesmanlike
game for twelve years (1878-90).


GERMANY AS PEACEMAKER

One must also lay stress upon the fact that it was a German statesman
who, in 1878, prevented a general war, even at the cost of weakening
the relations of Germany to Russia, in the justified belief that he
would succeed, being a statesman of genius who knew exactly what he was
aiming at, in strengthening these relations once more, or, at least,
in avoiding conflicts after he had overcome the crisis threatening all
Europe.

He succeeded in doing that for twelve years and his successors at the
helm of the ship of state succeeded in doing likewise for twenty-four
more years.

When I was a Prince I purposely held aloof from party politics,
concentrating my entire attention upon my duties in the different army
branches to which I was assigned. This afforded me satisfaction and
filled up my whole life. For this reason I avoided, while I was Prince
of Prussia, all attempts to drag me into party activities. Often enough
endeavors were made, under the cloak of harmless functions, teas and
the like, to ensnare me into political circles or for electioneering
purposes. But I always held aloof.

The outcome of the treacherous malady which killed Emperor Frederick
III was frankly told me in advance by German physicians called
into consultation as experts by the English physician, Sir Morell
Mackenzie. My deep grief and sorrow were all the greater because it
was almost impossible for me to speak alone with my beloved father.
He was guarded like a prisoner by the English physicians and, though
reporters from all countries could look upon the poor sick man from
the physicians' room, every kind of obstacle was placed in my path to
keep me from my father's side and even to prevent me from keeping in
constant touch with him by writing; my letters were often intercepted
and not delivered. Moreover, from among the group of watchers, an
infamous, organized campaign of slander was conducted in the newspapers
against me. Two journalists were especially active in this: one Herr
Schnidrowitz and M. Jacques St. Cère, of the _Figaro_--a German
Jew--who slandered him who was later Emperor in the most poisonous way
in France, until the "Petit Sucrier" trial put an end to his activities.

I gave the dying Emperor his last joy on earth when I had the Second
Infantry Brigade march past him, led by me in person. These were the
first and last troops seen by Frederick III as Emperor. He delighted
his son by writing on this occasion, on a little card, that he was
grateful for having had the pleasure of seeing these troops and proud
to call them his own. This event was a ray of light during the gloomy
ninety-nine days, which brought upon me also, as Crown Prince, much
grief, humiliation, and suspicion. In fulfillment of my duty during
this crisis, I kept a watchful eye upon all happenings in military,
official, and social circles, and was inwardly outraged at the signs of
slackness which I noted everywhere, most especially at the hostility
against my mother, which was becoming more and more noticeable.
Moreover, I was naturally deeply hurt at the constant campaign of
slander directed against me which depicted me as living in discord with
my father.


HE BECOMES EMPEROR

After Emperor Frederick III had closed his eyes forever, the heavy
burden of governing the Empire fell upon my youthful shoulders. First
of all I was confronted with the necessity of making changes in the
government personnel in various quarters. The military entourage of the
two emperors, as well as the body of officialdom, had grown too old.
The so-called "maison militaire" (military household of Emperor William
the Great) had been retained in its entirety by Emperor Frederick III,
without being required to discharge military duties. In addition, there
was the entourage of Emperor Frederick III. I proceeded to dismiss,
in the friendliest way, all those gentlemen who wished to go into
retirement; some of them received positions in the army, a few of the
younger remained in my service for the transition period.

During the ninety-nine days, while I was still Crown Prince, I had
silently concerned myself with those personages to whom I proposed
later to give appointments, since the physicians had left me no
doubt that my father had only a short time to live. I ignored court
or external considerations; nothing but previous achievements and
character moved me to my choice. I did away with the term "maison
militaire" and transformed it into "Main Headquarters of His
Majesty." In choosing my entourage I took the advice of only one man
in whom I reposed special confidence, my former chief and brigade
commander, General--afterward Adjutant General--von Versen, a man
of straightforward, knightly, rather harsh character, an officer of
the old Prussian school, a typical chip of the old block. During his
military service in line and guard regiments he had noted with an
observing eye the court influences and tendencies which had often
worked to the disadvantage of the officer corps in the old "maison
militaire." In this direction the circle of ladies of high position,
jokingly known among the officers as "trente et quarante" on account
of their age, also played a certain part. I wished to eliminate such
influences.

I appointed General von Wittich my First Adjutant General and General
von Hahnke, commander of the Second Infantry Guard Division, chief of
my Military Cabinet. The latter was a friend of Emperor Frederick III
and, while I was still serving with the First Infantry Guard Regiment,
he was my brigade commander. These two were men of military experience
and iron principles, who shared absolutely the sentiments of their
master, and remained bound to me to the end of their lives by the most
exemplary fidelity.

As the head of my court I appointed a man known to me from his youth,
the former Court Marshal of my father, Count August Eulenburg, who
remained at the head of the Ministry of the Royal House until his
death in June, 1921, at the age of eighty-two years. He was a man
of fine tact, uncommon ability, clear insight in court as well
as political matters, sincere character, and golden fidelity to
his King and his King's family. His manifold abilities would have
enabled him, to the same degree that they had made him known as Court
Marshal throughout Europe, to act with equal success as ambassador
or as Imperial Chancellor. Working with unswerving zeal, endowed
with winning politeness, he stood by me with helpful counsel in many
matters--dynastic, family, court, public life. He had to do with many
men, in all social strata and all walks of life, by all of whom he was
revered and esteemed, and he was treated by me likewise with friendship
and gratitude.


VICTORIA'S HAND IS FELT

After consultation with Prince Bismarck, Herr von Lucanus from the
Ministry of Public Worship and Instruction, was appointed chief of the
Civil Cabinet. Prince Bismarck observed jokingly that he was pleased
with this choice, since Herr von Lucanus was known to him as an able
and enthusiastic huntsman, which was always a good recommendation for
a civilian official; he added that a good huntsman was a regular good
fellow. Herr von Lucanus took over his post from His Excellency von
Wilmowski. He discharged his duties admirably and, being well endowed
in all pertaining to art, technical matters, science, and politics, he
was to me a counselor, untiring collaborator, and friend. He combined
with a healthy knowledge of men a strong dash of refined humor, which
is so often lacking in men of the Germanic race.

With Prince Bismarck I had stood on very good and trustful terms ever
since my assignment at the Foreign Office. Then, as well as before, I
revered the powerful Chancellor with all the ardor of my youth and was
proud to have served under him and to have the opportunity now to work
with him as my Chancellor.

The Prince, who was present during the last hours of the old Emperor
and had listened with me to the latter's political testament to his
grandson--_i. e._, his wish as to the special care to be lavished upon
relations with Russia--brought about my summer trip to St. Petersburg
as my first political act before the eyes of the world, in order to
emphasize our relationship to Russia in accordance with the last wish
of my dying grandfather. He also had "travel arrangements" drawn up
for me.

An obstacle was placed in the way of carrying out this plan by a
letter from Queen Victoria of England, who, upon hearing of the
projected visit to St. Petersburg, expressed to her eldest grandson,
in a good-humored but authoritative tone, her disapproval of the
contemplated journey. She said that a year of mourning must first
elapse, after which my first visit was due to her, since she was my
grandmother, and to England, it being the native country of my mother,
before other lands should be considered. When I placed this letter
before the Prince, he gave way to a violent fit of anger. He spoke
about "family dictation in England," of interference from that quarter
which must cease; the tone of the letter showed, he said, how the Crown
Prince and Emperor Frederick had been ordered about and influenced
by his mother-in-law, wife, etc. Thereupon the Prince wished to draw
up the text of a reply to the Queen. I remarked that I would prepare
the appropriate answer, steering the proper middle course between the
grandson and the Emperor, and that I would show it to the Prince before
dispatching it.

The answer paid heed in its outward form to the close relationship
between a grandson and his grandmother, who had carried him in her
arms when he was a baby and, in view of her age alone, commanded great
respect--but, in its essentials, it laid stress upon the position and
duty of the German Emperor, compelled to carry out unconditionally a
command of his dying father affecting Germany's most vital interests.
It stated that the grandson was obliged to respect this command of
his grandfather in the interest of the country, the representation of
which interests had now devolved upon him by the will of God, and that
his royal grandmother must leave to him the question of deciding in
what manner this was to be done. I added that, otherwise, I was her
loving grandson, who would always be grateful for any advice from his
grandmother, who had derived so much experience from her long reign;
but that I was, nevertheless, in matters affecting Germany, compelled
to retain my freedom of action; the visit to St. Petersburg, I said,
was politically necessary, and the command of my Imperial grandfather
was consonant with the close family relations between me and the
Russian Imperial house; therefore it would be carried out.

The Prince approved of the letter. The answer, which arrived after a
while, was surprising. The Queen agreed that her grandson was in the
right; he must act in accordance with the interests of his country; she
would be glad to see him, even if it were later on, at her own home.
From that day onward my relations with the Queen, who was feared even
by her own children, were of the best imaginable; from that day onward
she never treated her grandson except as a sovereign of equal rank with
herself!

On my first journeys I was accompanied by Count Herbert, as the
representative of the Foreign Office. He drew up the speeches and
conducted the political conferences, in so far as they were of an
official nature, in accordance with the instructions of his father.


CONFLICT ON TURKISH POLICY

Upon my return from Constantinople in 1889 I described to the Prince
at his request my impressions of Greece, where my sister Sophie was
married to the heir-apparent, Crown Prince Constantine, and also my
Constantinople impressions. In doing this, it struck me that Prince
Bismarck spoke quite disdainfully of Turkey, of the men in high
position there, and of conditions in that land. I thought I might
inspire him in part with essentially more favorable opinions, but my
efforts were of little avail. Upon asking the Prince the reason why
he held such an unfavorable opinion, he answered that Count Herbert
had reported very disapprovingly on Turkey. Prince Bismarck and Count
Herbert were never favorably inclined toward Turkey and they never
agreed with me in my Turkish policy--the old policy of Frederick the
Great.

During the last period of his tenure of office as Chancellor, Bismarck
declared that the maintenance of friendly relations with Russia, whose
Tsar reposed special trust in him, was the most important reason for
his remaining at his post. In this connection it was that he gave me
the first hints concerning the secret reinsurance treaty with Russia.
Up to then I had heard nothing about it, either from the Prince or
the Foreign Office, although it happened that I had concerned myself
especially with Russian matters.

When I assumed the reins of government owing to the early death of my
father, the generation of the grandson, as I have already remarked,
followed upon the generation of the grandfather, which meant that
the entire generation of Emperor Frederick was overleaped. This
generation, through its dealings with Crown Prince Frederick William,
was imbued with many liberal ideas and projects of reform which were
to be carried out under the direction of the Emperor Frederick. Upon
his death, this entire generation, especially the politicians, found
itself deceived in its hopes of exerting influence, and felt itself,
to a certain extent, in the position of an orphan. Those belonging
to it, despite the fact that they did not know my inner thoughts and
aims, adopted a distrustful and reserved attitude toward me, instead of
transferring their interest from the father to the son, for the purpose
of furthering the welfare of the fatherland.

There was one exception to this--a representative of the National
Liberals, Herr von Benda--a man still in the full bloom of youth. While
I was still Prince I had made his acquaintance at the great hare hunts
got up by Councilor Dietze at Barby. There Herr von Benda had won my
affection and confidence when I, surrounded by older men, had listened
to discussions on political, agricultural, and national-economic
questions. In the course of these, Herr von Benda held my attention
by means of his independent, interesting judgment. I accepted with
pleasure an invitation to Benda's country seat, Rudow, near Berlin, and
from this arose the custom of a regular yearly visit.

The hours spent in the family circle at Rudow stand out pleasantly in
my memory. His talented daughters used to regale us with music. The
political conversations there proved Herr von Benda to be a man of
great foresight, which, free from partisan considerations, gave him
an open mind as to the general needs of the state to an extent seldom
found among members of political parties. He gave me many a helpful
piece of advice for the future, drawn from the depths of his faithful,
genuinely Prussian heart, by which he was attached firmly to the family
of his sovereign; yet he was able to feel broad tolerance for other
parties.


HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD PARTIES

The later periods of my reign proved that I was not hostile to any
party, with the exception of the Ultra-Socialists; also, that I was
not anti-Liberal. My most important Finance Minister was the Liberal,
Miquel; my Minister of Commerce was the Liberal, Möller; the leader
of the Liberals, Herr von Bennigsen, was Chief President of Hanover.
I stood very close, especially in the second half of my reign, to
an elderly Liberal deputy, whose acquaintance I made through Herr
von Miquel. This man was Herr Seydel (Celchen), owner of an estate
in eastern Germany--a man with two clever eyes, which gazed forth
from a clean-shaven face. He worked with Miquel in railway and canal
questions, and was a thoroughly able, simple, practical man--a Liberal
with a streak of conservatism.

Naturally, I had numerous dealings and points of contact with the
Conservative party, since the gentlemen of the country nobility often
met me at court hunts and other hunts, or else came to court and served
in court positions. Through them I could become thoroughly informed on
all agrarian questions and learn where the farmer's shoe pinched him.

The Free Thinkers, under the "unswerving" leader, entered into no
relations with me; they limited themselves to opposition.

In my conversations with Benda and Bennigsen we often spoke of the
future of Liberalism, and, on one occasion, Benda made this interesting
observation: "It is not necessary and also not advisable to have the
Prussian heir-apparent dabble in Liberalism--we have no use for that
sort of thing. He must be essentially conservative, though he must,
at the same time, combine this with breadth, and avoid narrowness and
prejudice against other parties."

Bennigsen agreed with me when I spoke to him of the necessity of
having the National Liberals revise their program, which--originally
bearing the motto: "Maintenance of the German Empire and Freedom of
the Press"--had long since rallied the members around the Liberal
banner--in order that, by such revision, the proselytizing power of
the old brand of Prussian Liberalism should not be lost among the
people. Both the Prussian Liberals and the Conservatives, I continued,
made the mistake of remembering too well the old period of conflict of
1861-66; and, at elections and other political fights, they were prone
to fall back into the habits of those days. That period, I said, had
already passed into history and come to an end so far as our generation
was concerned; the present had begun for us with the year 1870 and the
new Empire; our generation had drawn a line under the year 1866; we
must build anew upon the foundations of the Empire; political parties
must shape their course also in this direction and not take over from
the past stuff that was outworn and, moreover, calculated to create
discord. Unfortunately, all this has not come to pass. Bennigsen made
a very telling point when he said: "Woe to the North German Liberals
if they come under the leadership of the South German Democrats, for
that will mean the end of real, genuine Liberalism! Then we shall get
the masked democracy arising from below, for which we have no use
hereabout."

The Conservative party, honorable and faithful to its King,
unfortunately has not always produced leaders of superior endowments
who were at the same time skillful, tactically trained politicians. The
agrarian wing was at times too strongly marked and was a burden to the
party. Moreover, memories of the period of conflict were still too
lively. I counseled union with the Liberals, but found little support.
I often pointed out that the National Liberals in the Empire were true
to the Empire and to the Emperor, for which reason they should be
thoroughly welcome to the Conservatives as allies; that I could not and
did not wish to govern without them in the Empire, and was absolutely
unwilling to govern against them; that North German conservatism was
misunderstood in some parts of the Empire because of differences in
historical development; and that, therefore, the National Liberals were
the natural allies. It was owing to these views of mine, for instance,
that I removed Court Preacher Stöcker, a man of brilliant achievement
as a social missionary, from his post, since he made a demagogical
provocative speech in South Germany, aimed against the Liberals there.

The Center party was welded together by the "Kulturkampf" and was
strongly anti-Protestant and hostile to the Empire. Notwithstanding
this, I had dealings with many important men of the party and managed
to interest them in practical collaboration for the good of all. In
this Schorlemer (the father) was especially helpful to me. He never
made a secret of his Prussian loyalty to his King. His son, the
well-known Minister of Agriculture, even joined the Conservative party.
In many matters the Center co-operated; at one period it possessed in
its old leader, Windthorst, the keenest politician in the legislature.
Nevertheless, in spite of all this, one could not help being aware of
the underlying Centerist conviction that the interests of the Roman
Church must always be maintained and never relegated to a secondary
place.


THE BREAK WITH BISMARCK

When I was Prince William I was placed for a long time under the Chief
President of the Province of Brandenburg, von Achenbach, in order that
I might learn about home administration, get experience in economic
questions, and, moreover, take an active part in the work. Spurred
on by the captivating discourses of Achenbach, I derived from this
period of my life a special interest in the economic side of the inner
development of the country, whereas the purely judicial side of the
administration interested me to a lesser degree. Improvements, canal
construction, highway building, forestry, improvement in all kinds of
transportation facilities, betterment of dwellings, introduction of
machines into agriculture and their co-operative development--all of
these were matters with which I busied myself later on; this being
especially true of hydraulic work and the development of the network
of railways, particularly in the badly neglected territory of Eastern
Germany.

I discussed all these matters with the Ministers of State after I
had ascended the throne. In order to spur them on, I allowed them
free rein in their various domains. But it turned out that this was
hardly possible so long as Prince Bismarck remained in office, since
he reserved for himself the main deciding voice in everything, thereby
impairing the independence of those working with him. I soon saw that
the Ministers, being entirely under Bismarck's thumb, could not come
out in favor of "innovations" or ideas of the "young master" of which
Bismarck disapproved.

The Ministry, in short, was nothing but a tool in the hands of
Bismarck, acting solely in accordance with his wishes. This state
of things was, in itself, natural enough, since a Premier of such
overwhelming importance, who had won for Prussia and Germany such great
political victories, naturally dominated his Ministers completely and
led them despotically. Nevertheless, I found myself in a difficult
position; the typical answer with which my suggestions were met was:
"Prince Bismarck does not want that done; we cannot get him to consent
to that; Emperor William I would not have asked such a thing; that is
not in accordance with tradition, etc." I understood more and more
that, in reality, I had no Ministry of State at my disposal; that the
gentlemen composing it, from long force of habit, considered themselves
officials of Prince Bismarck.

Here is an example to show the attitude of the Cabinet toward me in
those Bismarck days: The question came up of renewing the Socialist
law, a political measure devised by Prince Bismarck for fighting
socialism. A certain paragraph therein was to be toned down, in order
to save the law. Bismarck opposed the change. There were sharp
differences of opinion. I summoned a Crown Council. Bismarck spoke
in the antechamber with my adjutant; he declared that His Majesty
completely forgot that he was an officer and wore a sword belt; that
he must fall back upon the army and lead it against the Socialists,
in case the Socialists should resort to revolutionary measures; that
the Emperor should leave him a free hand, which would restore quiet
once for all. At the Crown Council Bismarck stuck to his opinion. The
individual Ministers, when asked to express their views, were lukewarm.
A vote was taken--the entire Ministry voted against me.

This vote showed me once more the absolute domination exerted by the
Chancellor over his Ministers. Deeply dissatisfied, I talked over the
matter with His Excellency Lucanus, who was as much struck as I was by
the situation. Lucanus looked up some of the gentlemen and took them to
task for their attitude, whereupon they made it clear that they were
"not in a position" to oppose the Prince and declared that it was quite
impossible for anybody to expect them to vote against the wishes of the
Prince.


HANDLING A COAL STRIKE

The great Westphalian coal workers' strike in the spring of 1889 took
the civil administration by surprise, causing great confusion and
bewilderment, especially among members of the Westphalian provincial
administration. From all sides came calls for troops; every mine owner
wanted, if possible, to have sentries posted outside his room. The
commanders of the troops which were summoned immediately made reports
on the situation as they had found it.

Among these was one of my former barrack comrades, belonging to the
Hussar Guard Regiment, von Michaelis by name, who was famous as a wit.
He rode, alone and unarmed, among the striking crowds of workers,
who--the early spring being remarkably warm--were camped upon the
hillsides, and soon managed, by his confidence-inspiring, jovial ways,
to set up a harmless intercourse with the strikers. By questioning them
he obtained much valuable information about the grievances--real and
imaginary--of the workers, as well as about their plans, hopes, and
wishes for the future. He soon won for himself general appreciation
and affection among the workers and handled them so well that complete
quiet reigned in his territory. When I, on account of nervous and
worried telegrams from the big industrial leaders and officials
received at the office of the Imperial Chancellor, inquired of
Michaelis how the situation stood, the following telegraphed answer
came from him: "Everything quiet excepting the Government officials."

A mass of material was collected, during the spring and summer, from
the announcements and reports received which showed clearly that
all was not well in industrial circles; that many a wish of the
workers was justified and, to say the least, entitled to sympathetic
investigation on the part both of the employers and of the officials.
The realization of this, which was confirmed in me when I questioned
my former private teacher, Privy Councilor Dr. Hinzpeter--a man
particularly well informed on social phenomena, especially those in his
own province--caused the resolve to ripen in me to summon the State
Council, include employers and employees in its deliberations, and
bring about, under my personal direction, a thorough investigation of
the labor question. I decided that in so doing guiding principles and
material were to be acquired which would serve the Chancellor and the
Prussian Government as a basis for working out appropriate projects for
new laws.

Inspired by such thought I went to His Excellency von Bötticher, who
at once prophesied opposition on the part of the Chancellor to such
action, and advised strongly against it. I stuck to my ideas, adducing
in support of them the maxim of Frederick the Great: "Je veux être un
Roi des gueux" ("I wish to be King of the rabble"). I said that it was
my duty to take care of those Germans who were used up by industry, to
protect their strength and better their chances of existence.


FURTHER CONFLICT WITH CHANCELLOR

The predicted opposition from Prince Bismarck was not long in coming.
There was much trouble and fighting before I put through what I wanted,
owing to the fact that some of the big industrial interests ranged
themselves on the side of the Chancellor. The State Council met,
presided over by me. At the opening session the Chancellor unexpectedly
appeared. He made a speech in which he ironically criticized and
disapproved the whole undertaking set in motion by me, and refused his
co-operation. Thereupon he walked out of the room.

After his departure the strange scene had its effect on the assemblage.
The fury and ruthlessness which the great Chancellor brought to the
support of his own policy and against mine, based upon his absolute
belief in the correctness of his own judgment, made a tremendous
impression upon me and all those present. Nevertheless, it stood to
reason that I was deeply hurt by what had occurred. The assemblage
proceeded to take up its work again and turned out a wealth of material
for the extension of that social legislation called into being by
Emperor William the Great, which is the pride of Germany, evincing, as
it does, a protective attitude toward the laboring classes such as is
not to be found in any other land on earth.

Thereupon I decided to summon a general social congress. Prince
Bismarck opposed this also. Switzerland was contemplating something
similar, and had thought of convening a congress at Berne. Roth,
the Swiss ambassador, hearing of my scheme, advised canceling the
invitations to Berne and accepting an invitation to Berlin. What he
wished occurred. Thanks to the generosity of Herr Roth, it was possible
to convene the congress at Berlin. The material collected as a result
of it was worked out and applied in the form of laws--only in Germany,
however.

Later on I talked with Bismarck concerning his project of fighting
the socialists, in case they resorted to revolutionary acts, with
cannon and bayonets. I sought to convince him that it was out of
the question for me, almost immediately after William the Great had
closed his eyes after a blessed reign, to stain the first years of my
Government with the blood of my own people. Bismarck was unmoved; he
declared that he would assume responsibility for his actions; that all
I need do was to leave the thing to him. I answered that I could not
square such a course with my conscience and my responsibility before
God, particularly as I knew perfectly well that conditions among the
laboring classes were bad and must be bettered at all costs.

The conflict between the views of the Emperor and the Chancellor
relative to the social question--_i. e._, the furtherance of the
welfare of the laboring classes of the population, with participation
therein by the state--was the real cause of the break between us,
and caused a hostility toward me, lasting for years, on the part of
Bismarck and a large part of the German nation that was devoted to him,
especially of the official class.

This conflict between the Chancellor and me arose because of his belief
that the social problem could be solved by severe measures and, if
the worst came to the worst, by means of soldiers; not by following
principles of general love for mankind or humanitarian nonsense which,
he believed, he would have to adopt in conformity to my views.


BISMARCK'S LABOR VIEWS

Bismarck was not a foe to the laboring classes--on that I wish to lay
stress, in view of what I have previously said. On the contrary! He
was far too great a statesman to mistake the importance of the labor
question to the state. But he considered the whole matter from the
standpoint of pure expediency for the state. The state, he believed,
should care for the laborer, as much and in whatever manner it deemed
proper; he would not admit of any co-operation of the workers in this.
Agitation and rebellion, he believed, should be severely suppressed; by
force of arms, if necessary. Government protection on the one hand, the
mailed fist on the other--that was Bismarck's social policy.

I, however, wished to win over the soul of the German workingman,
and I fought zealously to attain this goal. I was filled with the
consciousness of a plain duty and responsibility toward my entire
people--also, therefore, toward the laboring classes. What was theirs
by right and justice should become theirs, I thought; moreover, I
believed that this should be brought about, wherever the will or power
of the employers ceased, by the lord of the land and his Government, in
so far as justice or necessity demanded. As soon as I had recognized
the necessity for reforms, to some of which the industrial elements
would not consent, I took up the cudgels for the laboring classes,
impelled by a sense of justice.

I had studied history sufficiently to guard myself against the delusion
of believing in the possibility of making an entire people happy. I
realized clearly that it was impossible for one human being to make
a nation happy. The truth is that the only nation which is happy is
the one that is contented, or at least is willing to be contented; a
willingness which implies a certain degree of realization of what is
possible--a sense of the practical, in short. Unfortunately, there is
often a lack of this.

I was well aware that, in the unbounded demands of the Socialist
leaders, unjustified greed would be constantly developed anew. But,
for the very reason that I wished to be able to combat unjustified
aspirations with a clear conscience and in a convincing way, it
behooved me not to deny recognition and aid to justified aspirations.


GERMAN SOCIAL PROBLEMS

The policy that kept in view the welfare of the workers unquestionably
imposed a heavy burden upon all the industrial elements of Germany in
the matter of competition in the world market, through the well-known
laws for the protection of workingmen. This was especially true in
relation to an industrial system like the Belgian, which could,
without hindrance, squeeze the last drop out of the human reserves of
Belgium and pay low wages, without feeling any pangs of conscience or
compassion for the sinking morale of the exhausted, unprotected people.
By means of my social legislation I made such conditions impossible in
Germany, and I caused it to be introduced also in Belgium, during the
war, by General von Bissing, in order to promote the welfare of the
Belgian workers. First of all, however, this legislation is--to use a
sporting term--a handicap upon German industry in the battle of world
competition: it alienated many big leaders of industry, which, from
their point of view, was quite natural. But the lord of the land must
always bear in mind the welfare of the whole nation; therefore, I went
my way unswervingly.

Those workers, on the other hand, who blindly followed the Socialist
leaders, gave me no word of thanks for the protection created for them
nor for the work I had done. Between them and me lies the motto of the
Hohenzollerns, "Suum cuique." That means, "To each his own"--not, as
the Social Democrats would have it, "To everyone the same!"

I also harbored the idea of preventing to some extent competitive
warfare, at least in the industrial world of the European continent,
by bringing about a sort of quota-fixing in foreign lands, thereby
facilitating production and making possible a healthier mode of life
among the working classes.

There is great significance in the impression which foreign workers
get in studying Germany's social legislation. A few years before the
war people in England, under the pressure of labor troubles, awoke
to the conviction that better care must be taken of the workers.
As a result of this, commissions visited Germany, some of them
composed of workingmen. Guided by representative Germans, among them
Socialists, they visited the industrial regions, factories, benevolent
institutions, sanatoria of insurance companies, etc., and were
astonished at all the things they saw. At the farewell dinner given
them the English leader of the workingmen's deputation turned to Bebel
and made this concluding remark:

"After all we have seen of what is done in Germany for the workers, I
ask you: Are you people still Socialists?" And the Englishmen remarked
to a German that they would be quite satisfied if they could succeed,
after long fights in Parliament, in putting through one tenth of what
had already been accomplished years before in Germany toward bettering
the condition of the laboring classes.

I had observed with interest these visits of the English deputations
and marveled at their ignorance of German conditions. But I marveled
even more at a question asked by the English Government, through the
channel of the English Embassy, on the same subject, which betrayed an
absolutely amazing lack of knowledge of the progress made in Germany
in the province of social reform. I questioned the English ambassador,
remarking that England, having been represented in 1890 at the Berlin
Social Congress, must certainly have been informed, at least through
the Embassy, of the Reichstag debates, which had dealt in a detailed
way with the various social measures. The ambassador replied that the
same thing had also occurred to him and caused him to have the earlier
records of the Embassy investigated, whereupon it had transpired that
the Embassy had sent the fullest reports on the subject to London
and that thorough reports had been forwarded home concerning every
important stage in the progress of social reform; but, "because they
came from Germany, nobody ever read them; they were simply pigeon-holed
and remained there ever since; it is a downright shame; Germany does
not interest people at home."

Thus the Briton, with a shrug of his shoulders. Neither the British
King nor Parliament had enough conscience or time or desire to work for
the betterment of the working class. The "policy of encirclement" for
the annihilation of Germany, especially of its industry, and, thereby,
of its working population, was, in their eyes, far more important and
rewarding. On the 9th of November (1918) the German Radical Socialist
leaders, with their like-minded followers, joined forces with this
British policy of annihilation.


"WELFARE WORK" AT THE COURT

In a small way, in places where I had influence, as, for instance, in
the administration of my court and in the Imperial Automobile Club,
I laid stress upon the social point of view. For instance, I caused
a fund to be established, out of the tips paid for visiting palaces,
which was destined solely to the benefit of the domestic staff, and
which, in the course of time, reached a magnificent total. From this
fund the domestics and their families received money for trips to
bathing resorts, cost of taking cures, burial expenses, dowries for
their children, confirmation expenses, and similar payments.

When I, at the request of the newly founded Imperial Automobile Club,
took it under my protection, I accepted an invitation to a luncheon in
the beautiful rooms of the clubhouse, built by Ihne. In addition to
magnates like the Duke of Ratibor, the Duke of Ujest, etc., I found
there a number of gentlemen from Berlin's high financial circles, some
of whom behaved rather wildly. When the conversation turned to the
subject of drivers, I suggested establishing a fund which, in case of
accident, illness, or death befalling these men, should provide means
of livelihood for those whom they left behind. The suggestion met with
unanimous approval, and the fund has had most excellent results. Later
on I brought about the establishment of something similar for the
skippers and pilots attached to the Imperial Yacht Club at Kiel.

Special pleasure was afforded me by the Kaiser Wilhelm Children's
Home, founded by me at Ahlbeck, at which, in peace times, between May
and the end of September in each year, a large number of children
from the most poverty-stricken working people's districts in Berlin
were accommodated in successive detachments, each lot staying four
weeks. This home is still under the tried direction of the admirable
superintendent, Miss Kirschner, daughter of the former Chief
Burgomaster of Berlin, and it has achieved most brilliant results,
both in the physical and the psychical domain. Weakened, pale, needy
children were transformed there into fresh, blooming, happy little
beings, concerning whose welfare I often joyfully convinced myself by
personal visits.

For the very reason that I have spoken of my quarrel with Bismarck
as a result of labor questions, I wish to add to what I have already
said about his basic position in the matter--an example showing how
brilliantly the Prince behaved in something that concerned the workers.
In this, to be sure, he was impelled by nationalistic motives, but he
also realized at once that it was necessary to protect a large element
against unemployment, which caused him to intervene with the full
weight of his authority.

Sometime around 1886, while I was still Prince Wilhelm, I had learned
that the great Vulcan shipping concern at Stettin was confronted,
owing to lack of orders, with bankruptcy, and its entire force of
workmen, numbering many thousands, with starvation, which would mean a
catastrophe for the city of Stettin. Only by an order for the building
of a big ship could the Vulcan shipyards be saved.

Spurred on some time before by Admiral von Stosch, who wished to free
us once and for all from the English shipbuilders, the Vulcan people
had set to work courageously to build the first German armored ship,
christened by my mother in 1874 on her birthday, on which occasion I
was present. Ever since that time the warships built at the Vulcan
yards had always satisfied naval experts--the concern, however, seldom
built warships.


THE CHANCELLOR IN ACTION

The German merchant marine, on the other hand, had not dared to follow
the path courageously blazed by Admiral von Stosch. And now the brave
German shipyard company was faced with ruin, since the North German
Lloyd had refused its offer to build a passenger steamer, alleging
that the English, because of their years of shipbuilding traditions,
could build it better. It was a serious emergency. I hastened to Prince
Bismarck and laid before him the matter as I have described it above.

The Chancellor was furious; his eyes flashed, his fist came crashing
down on the table.

"What! Do you mean to say that these shopkeepers would rather have
their boats built in England than in Germany? Why, that is unheard of!
And is a good German shipyard to fail for such a reason? The devil take
this gang of traders!"

He rang the bell and a servant entered.

"Have Privy Councilor X come here immediately from the Foreign Office!"

In a few minutes--during which the Prince stamped up and down the
room--the man summoned appeared.

"Telegram to Hamburg, to our envoy--the Lloyd in Bremen is to have its
new ship built by the Vulcan Company in Stettin!"

The Privy Councilor vanished in hot haste, "with his coat tails
sticking straight out behind him." The Prince turned to me and said:
"I am greatly obliged to you. You have done the fatherland, and also
myself, an important service. Henceforth ships will be built only in
our yards--I'll take care to make this clear to the Hanseatic crowd.
You may telegraph to the Vulcan people that the Chancellor will
guarantee that the ship will be built in the Vulcan yards. May this be
the first of a whole lot of such ships! As for the workers whom you
have thus saved from unemployment, I hope that they will express their
thanks to you!"

I passed on the news to Privy Councilor Schlutow at Stettin and great
was the joy caused thereby. This was the first step upon the road
destined to lead to the construction of the magnificent German express
steamers.

When I went, after I had ascended the throne in 1888, to Stettin,
in order to place honorary insignia on the flags of my Pomeranian
Grenadiers, I also visited the Vulcan shipyards, at the invitation of
the directors. After my reception by the directors outside the yards,
the great doors were flung open and I walked inside. But, instead of
work and pounding hammers, I found deep silence. The entire body of
workmen was standing in a half circle, with bared heads; in the middle
stood the oldest workman of all, a man with a snow-white beard, bearing
a laurel wreath in his hand.

I was deeply moved. Schlutow whispered to me: "A little pleasure for
you, which the workmen themselves have thought up." The old workman
stepped forward and, in pithy, plain words, expressed to me the
gratitude of the workmen to me for having saved them, and, above all,
their wives and children, from hardship and hunger, by my appeal to
Bismarck about the building of the ship. As a token of their gratitude,
he asked my permission to hand over the laurel wreath. Most deeply
moved, I took the wreath and expressed my pleasure at receiving my
first laurels, without the shedding of a drop of blood, from the hands
of honest German workmen.

That was in the year 1888! In those days, the German laboring classes
knew how to appreciate the blessing of labor.

  [1] "It is that confounded Congress of Berlin. A serious mistake on
      the part of the Chancellor. He has destroyed the old friendship
      between us, sown distrust in the hearts of the Court and the
      Government, and engendered the idea of a great injustice done
      the Russian army after its bloody 1877 campaign, for which it
      wishes revenge. And here we are by the side of that damned French
      Republic, full of hate for you and of subversive ideas, which, in
      case of a war against you, will cost us our dynasty."

  [2] "I understand perfectly your line of action; the Prince, with all
      his greatness, was, after all, merely your employee or official.
      As soon as he refused to follow your orders, it was necessary
      to dismiss him. As for me, I always distrusted him, and I never
      believed a word of what he had told me or said to me himself,
      for I was sure and knew that he was hoaxing me all the time. As
      to the relations between us two, my dear William, the downfall
      of the Prince will have the best of results; distrust will
      disappear. I have confidence in you. You can trust me."




CHAPTER II

Caprivi


When I began my reign, General von Caprivi was Chief of the Admiralty.
He was the last general to hold this post. I at once took energetically
in hand the development and reform--in fact, one may say the foundation
anew--of the Imperial German Navy, based on my preliminary studies in
England and at home. That was not to the liking of the General, who was
able, but rather self-willed, and not entirely devoid of pride.

Unquestionably he had rendered valuable services in mobilization,
improvement of the officer corps, and the improvement and development
of the torpedo-boat organization. On the other hand, the building of
ships and the replacement of worn-out material were in a deplorable
state, to the detriment of the fleet and to the dissatisfaction of
the shipbuilding industry, which was growing and looking about for
employment.

Being an old Prussian general, Caprivi's way of thinking was that of
his day--that of his comrades of 1864, 1865, 1870, 1871--in his eyes,
the army had always done everything and would continue to do so in
the future; therefore, no great demands for money to be devoted to the
navy should be imposed upon the country, since, should this be done,
there was danger that the sums destined to the army might be decreased
and its development thereby hampered. This idea, from which he was
not to be dissuaded, is false. The amounts granted did not flow into
a reservoir from which they might be directed, by the mere turning of
a valve, now into army, now into navy, channels. Whenever Caprivi was
unwilling to demand anything for naval construction, in order, by so
doing, to turn more money toward the army, things did not happen as he
foresaw. By his action the army received not one penny more, but merely
whatever the Minister of War asked for and received in accordance with
his budget.

There was need of creating a Secretaryship of State for the Navy which,
entirely independent of the Ministry of War, should have as its duty
to demand and obtain for the navy as much as was required for the
protection of our commerce and colonies. And that is what came to pass
later on.

Caprivi soon came to me with the request that I relieve him from
his post. He stated that he was not satisfied with it in itself;
that, moreover, I had all sorts of plans for the future affecting
the navy which he considered impossible of realization, in the first
place, because there existed no means of replacement for the officer
corps--at that time the yearly influx of cadets was between sixty and
eighty--and a large navy without a large officer corps was unthinkable.
In addition to this, he informed me, he had soon seen in the course of
the inspection tours of His Majesty that the Emperor knew more about
naval matters than he, the General, which placed him in an impossible
situation in relation to his subordinates.

In view of these circumstances, I parted with him, placing him in
command of an army corps. Following the motto, "The navy for the
seamen!" I chose, for the first time, an admiral as its chief, a step
which was received in maritime circles with great joy. The man chosen
was Admiral Count Monts.


BISMARCK'S SUCCESSOR

When I was soon afterward confronted with the rather unexpected
retirement of Prince Bismarck, I found the choice of his successor
a difficult one. Whoever it might be was sure to have a hard task,
without any prospect of appreciation for what he might achieve; he
would be looked upon as the usurper of a post to which he was not
entitled, and which he was not qualified to fill. Criticism, criticism,
nothing but criticism--that was sure to be the daily bread upon which
the new Chancellor must reckon; and he was also certain of becoming
the target for the hostility of all those who favored Prince Bismarck
as well as with that of the many who previously could not do enough in
opposition to him. There was bound to be a strong current of enmity
toward the new Chancellor, in which the old Prince himself would not
be the least serious factor.

After taking all this into consideration, it was decided to choose a
man belonging to Prince Bismarck's generation, who had held a leading
position in the wars and had already filled a Government position under
him. Hence Caprivi was chosen. His age was a guarantee that he would be
a careful and calm adviser for the "orphaned" young Emperor.

Very soon the question arose of the extension of the reinsurance treaty
with Russia. Caprivi declared that, out of consideration for Austria,
he was unable to renew it, since the threat against Austria contained
therein, when it became known in Vienna--as it almost unavoidably
would--was such as to lead to very disagreeable consequences. For
this reason the treaty lapsed. To my way of thinking, it had already
lost its main value from the fact that the Russians no longer stood
whole-heartedly behind it. I was confirmed in this view by a memorial
written by Count Berchem, Under Secretary of State, who had worked with
Prince Bismarck.

The Agrarian Conservatives opposed Caprivi as a man without landed
property and a violent fight raged around the commercial treaties.
These difficulties were greatly enhanced because Prince Bismarck,
ignoring his former maxims, took part in the fight against his
successor with all his characteristic energy. Thus arose the
opposition of the Conservatives against the Government and the
Crown, and the Prince in person sowed the seed from which later
grew the "misunderstood Bismarck" and that "Reichsverdrossenheit"
(unfriendliness to the Empire) so often taken up in the newspapers. The
"misunderstood Bismarck" created permanent opposition throughout my
reign against my suggestions and aims by means of quotations, speeches,
and writings, as well as by passive resistance and thoughtless
criticism. Everything that was done was painted in black colors,
made ridiculous, and criticized from top to bottom, by a press that
placed itself quite willingly at the disposal of the Prince and often
out-Bismarcked Bismarck in its behavior.

This phenomenon became most apparent at the time of the acquisition of
Heligoland. This island, lying close in front of the great waterways
leading to the principal Hanseatic commercial ports, was, in the
hands of the British, a constant menace to Hamburg and Bremen and
rendered impossible any project for building up a navy. Owing to this,
I had firmly resolved to win back this formerly German island to its
fatherland.


THE DEAL FOR HELIGOLAND

The way to cause England to give up the red rock of Heligoland was
found in the colonial domain. Lord Salisbury proved inclined to
exchange the "barren rock" for Zanzibar and Witu in East Africa.
From commercial sources and the reports of the commanders of German
cruisers and gunboats which were stationed there and cruised along
the coast of the recently acquired German East African colonies, I
knew that, as soon as Togo, Dar-es-Salaam, etc., rose to prosperity,
the importance of Zanzibar on the coast of Africa as the principal
port of transshipment would be a thing of the past, since, as soon as
the above-mentioned harbors were made deep enough and provided with
sufficient cargo-loading equipment for trading steamers, there would no
longer be any need of ferrying goods coming from the interior in dhows
to Zanzibar, in order to have them again loaded on vessels there, since
they could be loaded direct at the new harbors along the coast.

Therefore, I was convinced that we had, first, an acceptable asset
for swapping purposes, and, secondly, a good opportunity to avoid
colonial friction with England and come to a friendly understanding
with her. Caprivi agreed, the negotiations were concluded, and one
evening, shortly before dinner, I was able to tell the Empress and a
few intimates the exceedingly joyful tidings that Heligoland had become
German.

A first and very important extension of the Empire had been
achieved--without bloodshed--the first condition for the upbuilding of
the fleet was fulfilled, something which the natives of the Hanseatic
towns and the rest of the North Germans had wished for centuries had
come to pass. In silence, an important event had occurred.

Had Heligoland been acquired in the Chancellorship of Prince Bismarck,
it would probably have been valued very highly. Having happened under
Caprivi, it loosed a lot of criticism. It was merely Caprivi, the
usurper, who had had the audacity to sit in the Prince's chair, and
the "irresponsible," "ungrateful," "impulsive" young master who had
done such a thing! Had Bismarck only wished, he could have had the old
rock any day, but he never would have been so unskillful as to give up
to the English for it the very promising African possessions, and he
never would have allowed himself to be thus worsted. That was the sort
of thing heard almost everywhere. The newspapers of the Prince joined
loudly in this sort of criticism, to the great grief of the people of
the Hanseatic cities.

Curious indeed were the criticisms occasioned by the swapping of
Zanzibar and Witu, which appeared in the Bismarckian press, although
previously, when I worked under him, these newspapers had always
explained that he had not much belief in the value of colonies in
themselves and looked upon them merely as objects to be exchanged,
possibly, for something else, in deals with the British. His successor
acted according to these ideas in the Heligoland question, and was
most violently criticized and attacked. Not until the World War was
on did I see articles in the German press which unreservedly admitted
the acquisition of Heligoland to be an act of far-sighted politics
and added reflections as to what would doubtless have happened if
Heligoland had not become German.

The German nation has every reason to be thankful to Count Caprivi
for this achievement, since thereby the building of its navy and its
victory at the Skagerrak were made possible. As for the German navy, it
long ago acknowledged this.

The school law of Count Zedlitz aroused violent new conflicts. When
they led to Zedlitz's retirement, the cry arose among his adherents:
"If the Count goes, so must the Chancellor."

Caprivi left his post, in a calm, dignified manner. He tried honestly,
within the measure of his powers and abilities, to continue the
traditions of Prince Bismarck. In this he found little support among
the political parties, and, for this reason, all the more criticism and
hostility in the public and among those who, had they acted for the
right and the interests of the state, should have stood by him. Without
one word of apology, Caprivi, in noble silence, lived all the rest of
his life in almost solitary retirement.




CHAPTER III

Hohenlohe


Again I was confronted with the difficult task of choosing a
Chancellor. His position and activities were to be under somewhat about
the same auspices and subject to the same conditions as in the case
of his predecessor. But now there was more of a desire that he should
be a statesman, an older man, of course, qualified to inspire Prince
Bismarck with more confidence than a mere general could do.

It was assumed that a statesman would know better how to walk in the
footsteps of the Prince, politically speaking; and provide Bismarck
with less opportunity for criticism and attacks. These latter had
tended to create gradually among all Government officials, who dated
mostly from the period of Bismarck, an unmistakable nervousness and
dissatisfaction, by which the work of the entire governmental system
was impaired to an extent by no means inconsiderable. Moreover, it
lent to the opposition in the Reichstag a constantly renewed strength
drawn from elements previously faithful to the Government, and made
itself felt in a detrimental manner. Especially in the Foreign Office,
the spirit of Holstein, the supposed representative of the "old,
tried Bismarckian traditions," began to assert itself, so that the
unwillingness to collaborate with the Emperor became particularly
strong and the belief grew up that it was necessary to carry on,
independently, the policy of Bismarck.

After mature deliberation, I decided to intrust the post of Chancellor
to Prince Hohenlohe, who was then Governor of Alsace-Lorraine. At the
outbreak of the War of 1870 he had succeeded, as Bavarian Minister, in
getting Bavaria to enter the war on the side of Prussia. Ever since he
had been highly esteemed by Prince Bismarck on account of his fidelity
to the Empire. It was natural to expect that Bismarck's opposition
would cool off when confronted with such a successor. Thus, the choice
of Hohenlohe as Chancellor was strongly influenced by consideration for
Prince Bismarck and for the public opinion inspired by him.

Prince Hohenlohe was the typical old-style grand seigneur. He was
thoroughly urbane by nature and in his dealings with others: a man of
refined mind, with a slight touch of playful irony sometimes glinting
through, keen on account of his years, a level-headed observer and
judge of men. Despite the great difference in age between him and me he
got along very well with me, which was shown on the surface by the fact
that he was treated both by the Empress and by myself as our uncle, and
addressed as such, which brought about a certain atmosphere of intimate
confidence in our intercourse. In his talks with me, especially in
giving his opinion as to appointments of officials, he offered very
characteristic descriptions of the gentlemen being discussed, often
combined with philosophical observations which proved that he had
reflected deeply on life and humanity, and which were evidence of a
maturity and wisdom grounded on experience.

Something happened during the first period of Hohenlohe's régime as
Chancellor which throws an interesting light upon the relations between
France and Russia. Having, at the time of the fraternization between
Russia and France, received reliable information from the General
Staff as well as from our Embassy at Paris to the effect that France
contemplated withdrawing a portion of her troops from Algeria, in
order to shift them to southern France either against Italy or against
Alsace, I apprised Tsar Nicholas II of this news, adding the remark
that I should be obliged to adopt counter-measures unless the Tsar
could dissuade his ally from so provocative a step.


SOME DIPLOMATIC FENCING

At that time the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs was Prince
Lobanoff, formerly ambassador at Vienna, well known for his pro-French
proclivities. During the summer of 1895 he had visited France and been
very cordially entertained. During the autumn, just as I was staying
for the hunting at Hubertusstock on the Schorfheide near Eberswalde,
Prince Lobanoff, on his return journey from Paris, requested to be
received in audience, at the behest of the Tsar. Upon being received
by me he described the calm and sensible frame of mind which he
had found in Paris and sought to quiet me, too, with regard to the
above-mentioned troop movements, which, according to him, were mere
empty rumor and chatter without any real basis. He added that he was
bringing to me the most quieting assurances, that there was no reason
for my feeling the slightest alarm. I thanked him heartily for his
report, remarking that the word "alarm" was not to be found in the
dictionary of a German officer; and I added that, if France and Russia
wished to make war, I could not prevent it.

Whereupon the Prince, piously casting up his eyes toward heaven, made
the sign of the cross and said: "Oh, la guerre! quelle idée; qui y
pense?--cela ne doit pas être" ("Oh, war! what an idea; who thinks
of such a thing? it must not be"). To that I replied that I, in any
event, was not thinking about it, but that an observer--and he need not
be very keen eyed--must assuredly consider the constant celebrations
and speeches, as well as the official and unofficial visits exchanged
between Paris and St. Petersburg, as significant symptoms which
could not be ignored, and which were calculated to arouse great
dissatisfaction in Germany; that, should it come to war, against my own
will and that of my people, I felt that, trusting in God and in my army
and people, it would be possible for Germany to get the better of both
opponents.

To this I added still another statement, reported to me from Paris,
which had been made by a Russian officer who was in France as a member
of an officers' deputation. Having been asked by a French comrade
whether the Russians believed that they could beat the Germans, the
gallant Slav replied: "Non, mon ami, nous serons battus à plate
couture, mais qu'est-ce que ça fait? Nous aurons la République" ("No,
my friend, we shall be thoroughly beaten, but what does that matter? We
shall get a republic").

At first the Prince eyed me, speechless, then, shrugging his shoulders,
he remarked: "Oh, la guerre, il ne faut pas même y penser" ("Oh,
war, one must not even think about it"). The officer had merely
expressed the general opinion of the Russian intelligentsia and social
circles. As far back as my first visit to St. Petersburg, in the early
'eighties, a grand duchess said to me at dinner, quite calmly: "Here we
sit all the time on a volcano. We expect the revolution any day! The
Slavs are not faithful, they are not at all monarchical, all of them
are republicans at heart; they disguise their sentiments, and they lie,
every one of them, all the time."

Three important events, related to foreign politics, came within the
period of Prince Hohenlohe's incumbency of the Chancellorship: the
opening, in 1895, of the Emperor William Canal (North Sea-Baltic
Canal), begun under Emperor William the Great, to which squadrons
or individual ships representing countries all over the world were
invited; the annexation, in 1897, of Tsing-tao; and, third, the
much-discussed Kruger dispatch.


THE SEIZURE OF TSING-TAO

Prince Hohenlohe played an especially important rôle in the annexation
of Tsing-tao. He, too, was of the opinion that Germany needed some
coaling stations for her ships, and that the demands of commercial
elements that the opportunity for opening up China to international
trade be not allowed to pass were justified. It was resolved that,
under unimpaired Chinese sovereignty and after payment of the likin
(octroi, or internal revenue tax), a trading port, with a marine
coaling station as protection, was to be founded, wherein it was
contemplated to allow China to co-operate to the utmost possible extent.

The station was to serve the ends of commerce, before all else, the
military measures being limited solely to the protection of the trading
center as it developed; they did not constitute an end in themselves or
a basis for further military enterprises.

Already several places had been considered, but these had proved,
upon more careful investigation, to be unfitted, mostly because they
had either bad connections or none at all with the interior regions,
were not promising from a commercial-political standpoint, or were
encumbered by privileges already granted to other foreign countries.
Finally it was agreed--because of the reports of Admiral Tirpitz,
who was, at that time, chief of the East Asiatic cruiser squadron,
and because of the opinion of the geographical expert, Freiherr von
Richthofen, who, having been questioned on the subject, had drawn
a most promising picture of the possibilities of development in
Shantung--to found a settlement on the bay of Kiao-Chau.

The Chancellor proceeded to collect data on the political questions
which arose as a result of this and which must be taken into
consideration. It was particularly necessary not to interfere with
Russia's designs, nor to disturb her. Further information was obtained,
some of it from our East Asiatic division; from this source favorable
reports came in as to anchorages and the ice-free nature of the bay
of Kiao-Chau, and as to the prospects, if a port were to be founded
there. From conversations among the officers of the Russian China
division, which had come to our ears in our intercourse with them, it
was learned that the Russian Admiral, in accordance with orders from
his Government, had anchored one winter in the bay, but had found it
so desolate and so atrociously lonesome--there were no tea houses
with Japanese geisha girls, which the Russians deemed absolutely
indispensable to winter quarters--that the Russian squadron would never
go back there any more.

It was also reported that the Russian Admiral had advised his
Government most earnestly against prosecuting any further its intention
of founding a settlement on this bay, since there was absolutely no
advantage to be derived from it. Hence, the Russians had no intention
of gaining a foothold there.

This last piece of news arrived at about the same time as the answer
from the Russian Foreign Minister, Count Muravieff, sent through the
German ambassador, relative to the sounding of Russian opinion, which
had been made pursuant to instructions from the Chancellor. Muravieff
set forth that Russia, to be sure, had no direct claims, based on
treaty with China, to the bay, but that she, nevertheless, laid claim
to it on the basis of the "droit du premier mouillage" ("right of first
anchorage"), since the Russian ships had anchored there before those
of any other fleet. This answer, it will be seen, ran counter to the
report of our East Asiatic division relative to the statements made by
the Russian Admiral.

When I, with Hollmann, met the Chancellor, in order to discuss the
Russian claim to Kiao-Chau, the Prince listened to the reading of
it with his little ironical smile, and remarked that he had been
unable to find any jurist at the Foreign Office who could tell him
anything about this wonderful claim. Was the navy in a position to
do so? Admiral Hollmann declared that he, in all his experience on
foreign service, had never heard of it; that it was nonsense and an
invention of Muravieff, whose only motive was unwillingness to have
some other nation settle on the shores of the bay. I advised that
Privy Councilor of the Admiralty Perels, one of the most famous living
experts on international maritime law and an acknowledged authority in
this domain, be asked to deliver an opinion, in order to clarify the
question. This was done. The opinion tore Muravieff's contention to
pieces, corroborated that of Hollmann, and completely did away with the
legend about the "right of first anchorage."

Months elapsed; my August, 1897, visit to Peterhof was imminent. In
agreement with the Prince, my uncle, I decided to discuss the entire
matter in person and frankly with the Tsar, and, if possible, put an
end to Muravieff's notes and evasions. The talk took place at Peterhof.
The Tsar stated that he had no interest in the territory south of the
Tientsin-Peking line, which meant that there was no reason why he
should place obstacles in our path in Shantung: that his interest was
concentrated upon the territory on the Yalu, around Port Arthur, etc.,
now that the English had made difficulties for him at Mokpo; that he
would, in fact, be pleased if Germany should locate herself in future
on the other side of the Gulf of Chih-li as Russia's welcome neighbor.

Afterward I had a talk with Muravieff. He employed all his arts,
wriggled back and forth in his statements, and finally brought up his
famous "right of first anchorage." That was all I wanted. I now passed
to the offensive myself, striking out at him squarely with the opinion
delivered by Perels. When I had told him, finally, as the Tsar desired,
the result of the conversations between us two sovereigns, the diplomat
was even more embarrassed, lost his assumed calm, and capitulated.

Thus was the soil prepared, politically speaking. In the autumn
came the news from Bishop Anzer of the murder of the two German
Catholic missionaries in Shantung. The entire German Catholic world,
particularly the "colonials" in the Centerist party, demanded energetic
measures. The Chancellor proposed to me immediate intervention. While I
was engaged in the winter hunting at Lotalingen, I consulted with him,
in one of the little towers of the castle there, as to what steps were
to be taken. The Prince proposed to intrust Prince Henry of Prussia,
who was present, with the command of the squadron that was to be sent
out to reinforce the East Asiatic Division. I informed my brother
of this in the presence of the Chancellor, whereat the Prince and
the other gentlemen present were highly pleased. The Chancellor sent
the news to the Foreign Office and to the new Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs, Herr von Bülow, who was away on a journey.

Kiao-Chau was occupied in November, 1897. In December of that year
Prince Henry sailed, on board the _Deutschland_, with his squadron to
Eastern Asia, where he later took over the command of the entire East
Asiatic Division. On the 6th of March, 1898, the agreement with China
concerning Kiao-Chau was signed. At the same time, Mr. Chamberlain
in London brought up before the Japanese ambassador, Baron Kato, the
idea of the conclusion of an Anglo-Japanese alliance, in order to bar
Russia's advance in the East.


QUEST FOR COALING STATIONS

One will naturally inquire why, in the discussion of our audacious
move, there is no mention of England, since she was certainly deeply
interested therein. Preliminaries, however, had already been gone
into with England. In order to meet the necessity for German coaling
stations, I had intended to found, lease, or buy some in agreement
with England, so far as might be possible. In view of the fact that
my uncle, the Chancellor, was, as a member of the Hohenlohe family,
related to Queen Victoria, known to her personally for years and
highly esteemed by her, I hoped that this might tend to facilitate the
negotiations which were entered into with the English Government for
the above-noted purpose. My hope was disappointed. The negotiations
dragged along without any prospect of successful termination.

I took occasion, therefore, at the behest of the Chancellor, to discuss
the matter with the English ambassador at Berlin. I complained of
the treatment received from the English Government, which everywhere
opposed German wishes, even such as were justified. The ambassador
agreed frankly with this, and expressed his astonishment at England's
failure to meet Germany halfway, and at English shortsightedness,
since, when a young, rising nation like Germany, whose development,
after all, was not to be prevented, turned directly to England in
order to acquire territory with her consent, instead of going straight
ahead or allying itself with other nations, it was certainly more than
England could reasonably ask.

Moreover, he added that, since England already owned almost all the
world, she could certainly find a place where she might permit Germany
to establish a station; that he was unable to understand the gentlemen
in Downing Street; that in case Germany should not succeed in obtaining
England's approval, she would probably occupy, on her own account, such
places as were suited to her ends, since, after all, there was no law
against it.

I laid stress upon the fact that this agreed entirely with my own
view and, in conclusion, I summed up my standpoint once more for
the ambassador: I told him that Germany was the only country in the
world which, despite its colonial possessions and its rapidly growing
commerce, possessed no coaling stations; that we were quite willing to
acquire these with England's consent; that, should she refuse to show a
realization of our situation and fail to meet us halfway, we should be
compelled to turn to some other great power, in order, with its help,
to found settlements.

This talk, likewise, was fruitless. Finally, the negotiations with
England were broken off, without result, in a rather impolite manner.
Thereupon the Chancellor and I decided to appeal to Russia.

The occupation of Kiao-Chau aroused surprise and anger in the English
Government. Having refused us her support, England had definitely
reckoned on the belief that nobody would help Germany in attaining her
goal. Now things had turned out differently, and there was no lack of
recriminations from London. When the English ambassador took up this
tone he was referred to the conversation with me, and it was made clear
to him that it was solely the fault of his Government that it had come
to no understanding with Germany.

England's attitude of aloofness surprised us at that time. An
occurrence which, then, was unknown to me, may serve to throw light on
the matter.


FINDS SEED OF WORLD WAR[3]

In a book (_The Problem of Japan_) which appeared anonymously at The
Hague in 1918 and was said to have been written by an "Ex-Diplomat from
the Far East," an excerpt was published from a work of the American,
Professor Usher of Washington University at St. Louis. Usher, like his
former colleague, Prof. John Bassett Moore of Columbia University,
New York, has often been called into consultation as an adviser on
foreign relations by the State Department at Washington, since he had a
knowledge possessed by few other Americans on international questions
affecting the United States. Professor Usher, in his book published in
1913, made known, for the first time, the existence and contents of
an "agreement" or "secret treaty" between _England_, _America_, and
_France_, dating from the spring of 1897. In this it was agreed that,
in case Germany or Austria, or both of them, should begin a war for the
sake of "Pan-Germanism," the United States should at once declare in
favor of England and France and go to the support of these powers with
all its resources. Professor Usher cites at length all the reasons,
including those of a colonial character, which inevitably imposed upon
the United States the necessity of taking part, on the side of England
and France, in a war against Germany, which Professor Usher, in 1913,
prophesied as _imminent_!!

The unknown author of _The Problem of Japan_ went to the trouble of
publishing in tabulated form the agreements between England, France,
and America in 1897, in order thereby to show, in a way easily
understood, the extent of the reciprocal obligations. This chapter
is extraordinarily worth reading; it gives a good glimpse into the
preliminary history and _preparation of the World War_ on the part of
the _Entente_, which even at that time was uniting _against Germany_,
although not yet appearing under the name of Entente Cordiale. The
ex-diplomat remarks in this connection:

    Here is a treaty that Professor Usher alleges to have been entered
    into as long ago as 1897, in which every phase of activity and
    participation in future events by England, France, and the United
    States is provided for, including the conquest of the Spanish
    dependencies, control over Mexico and Central America, the opening
    of China, and the annexation of coaling stations. And all these
    measures Professor Usher wishes us to believe were taken to defend
    the world against Pan-Germanism.

    It is unnecessary to remind Professor Usher, or anybody else, for
    that matter, that Pan-Germanism, if we go so far as to assume that
    such a thing actually exists, had certainly never been heard of
    in 1897, at which time Germany had not yet adopted her program
    for naval construction on a large scale, the same having been
    bruited for the first time in 1898. If, therefore, it is true that
    England, France, and the United States harbored the mutual designs
    imputed to them by Professor Usher, and entered into an alliance to
    accomplish them, it will scarcely do to attribute the conception
    of the idea and the stimulus to its consummation to so feeble a
    pretext as the rise of a Pan-Germanism.[4]

Thus the ex-diplomat.

This is truly amazing. A definite treaty of partition directed against
Spain, Germany, etc., arranged even to minute details, was planned
between Gauls and Anglo-Saxons, in a time of the profoundest peace,
and concluded without the slightest twinge of conscience, in order to
annihilate Germany and Austria and eliminate their competition from
the world market! _Seventeen years_ before the beginning of the World
War _this_ treaty was made by the united Anglo-Saxons and its goal was
systematically envisaged throughout this entire period! Now one can
understand the ease with which King Edward VII could pursue his policy
of encirclement; for years the principal actors had been united and
in readiness. When he christened the compact "Entente Cordiale," its
appearance was for the world, especially for Germany, an unpleasant
novelty, but in the countries on the other side it was merely the
official acknowledgment of facts long known there.

In view of this agreement, one can understand also the opposition
of England in 1897 to an agreement with Germany regarding coaling
stations, and the anger aroused because Germany managed, in agreement
with Russia, to gain a firm foothold in China, concerning the
exploitation of which land _without_ German participation a tripartite
treaty had already been made.

Usher talked out of school and conclusively proved _at whose door
lies the guilt for the World War_. The treaty directed against
Germany--sometimes called the "gentleman's agreement"--of the spring
of 1897, is the basis, the point of departure, for this war, which was
systematically developed by the Entente countries for seventeen years.
When they had succeeded in winning over Russia and Japan likewise for
their purposes, they struck the blow, after Serbia had staged the
Sarajevo murder and had thus touched the match to the carefully filled
powder barrel.

Professor Usher's statements are likewise a complete refutation of
all those who were impelled, during the war, to find the reason for
the entry of the United States in certain military acts on the part
of Germany, as, for instance, the _Lusitania_ case, the expansion of
U-boat warfare, etc. None of that is right. The recently published,
excellent book of John Kenneth Turner, _Shall It Be Again?_ points out,
on the basis of convincing proofs, that Wilson's alleged reasons for
going to war and war aims were not the real ones. America--or rather
President Wilson--was resolved probably from the start, certainly
from 1915, to range herself against Germany and to fight. She did the
latter, alleging the U-boat warfare as a pretext, in reality under the
influence of powerful financial groups, and yielding to the pressure
and prayers of her partner, France, whose resources in man power were
becoming more and more exhausted. America did not wish to leave a
weakened France along with England, whose annexation designs on Calais,
Dunkirk, etc., were well known to her.

It was a fateful thing for Germany--let this be stated here, in a
general way--that our Foreign Office was unable to meet the broad
policy of encirclement of England and the cunning of Russia and France
with an equal degree of diplomatic skill. This was partly because it
had not really been trained under Prince Bismarck; and therefore
when, after the retirement of the Prince and Count Herbert, the
all-dominating will and spirit were lacking, it was not up to the task
of conducting foreign affairs on its own independent initiative.

Moreover, it is difficult in Germany to train up good diplomats, since
our people lack the taste and endowment for diplomacy which have shone
forth brilliantly only from a few German minds, like Frederick the
Great and Bismarck. Unfavorable also to the Foreign Office were the
very frequent changes of Secretaries of State. Imperial Chancellors,
following the example of Bismarck, maintained their influence upon the
Foreign Office and suggested the Secretaries of State who should direct
its affairs. I acquiesced in the proposals of the Imperial Chancellors
as to these posts, since I admitted their right to choose themselves
their leading collaborators in the domain of foreign affairs. That
these frequent changes were not calculated to work toward the
continuity of political policy was a disadvantage that had to be taken
into account.

The Foreign Office was largely influenced by the axiom: "No
disagreeable quarrels with other powers"--"surtout pas d'histoires"
("above all, no yarns"), as the French general said to a company of
soldiers which, he had heard, wished to mutiny. One of the Secretaries
of State told me once when, in placing some matter before me, I had
called his attention to the apparently serious situation in connection
with some foreign question, that this simply must be righted, that the
Foreign Office based its acts primarily upon the maxim: "Let us have
quiet."

Given this attitude, one can also understand the answer which the
German representative gave to a German merchant in a South American
republic who had asked him for help and intercession with the
authorities, since his shop had been plundered and his property
stolen: "Oh, don't bother me with these things! We have established
such pleasant relations with this republic; any action undertaken in
your behalf would only serve to upset them." I need scarcely add that
whenever such a conception of duty came to my attention I removed the
official concerned from his post.

The Foreign Office enjoyed general unpopularity both among the people
and in the army. I worked continuously, during the tenure of office
of various Chancellors, for thorough reform, but in vain. Every new
Chancellor, especially if he himself did not come from the ranks of the
foreign service, needed the Foreign Office in order to work himself
into foreign affairs, and this took time. But once he had worked
himself in he was under obligation to the officials, and was reluctant
to make extensive changes, burdened as he was by other matters and
lacking detailed knowledge regarding the Foreign Office personnel,
particularly as he still believed that he needed the advice of those
who were "orientated."


DEVELOPMENT OF TSING-TAO

But let us return to Tsing-tao. Here everything was done to promote
commerce and industry, and done jointly with the Chinese; the flag
of the Chinese Empire, moreover, was hoisted over the Custom House at
Tsing-tao. The development there was such that the port, during the
years immediately preceding the war, ranked sixth among all Chinese
trading centers in the commercial register of the great Chinese
merchants and of the merchants' guild coming just after Tientsin.
Tsing-tao was a prospering German commercial colony, where many Chinese
worked side by side with Germans; it was, so to speak, a great sample
warehouse of German abilities and German achievements, to which the
Chinese, who formerly had not known Germany, her capabilities of
achievement, or her products, could repair for selection and emulation;
it was a contrast to the naval stations of Russia and England, which
were purely military, directed solely toward domination and conquest.

The rapid rise of Tsing-tao as a trading center aroused the envy of the
Japanese and English, but this did not prevent swarms of the latter
from journeying, with their families, to the splendid beach, enjoying
its cool air and the beautiful Strand Hotel, and devoting themselves
to playing polo and lawn tennis after they had escaped from the heat
of Hongkong, Canton, and Shanghai. Envy prompted England in 1914 to
demand that Japan should take Tsing-tao, although it was _de facto_
Chinese. Japan did this joyfully, promising to return it to China, but
it was not returned until the beginning of 1922, after much pressure,
although Japan had agreed with America that she was not to be allowed
to make any territorial changes in China without previous consultation
with Washington.

Thus a great German cultural work in foreign lands, which stood as a
model of the method and manner which a cultured nation should employ
in extending the advantages of its culture to another nation, was
annihilated by English commercial envy. Some day, when Hongkong has
gone the same way, England will repent of her act and bitterly reproach
herself for having abandoned her old maxim, in accordance with which
she has acted for so many years: "White men together against colored
men." When once Japan has made a reality out of her watchword, "Asia
for the Asiatics," and brought China and India under her sway, England
will cast her eyes about in search of Germany and the German fleet.

As to the "yellow peril," I had the following interview with the Tsar
later, after the Russo-Japanese War, at a meeting between us.

The Tsar was, at that time, visibly impressed by the growing power
of Japan and its constant menace to Russia and Europe, and requested
my opinion concerning this. I answered that if the Russians counted
themselves among the cultured nations of Europe they must be ready
to rally to the defense of these nations against the "yellow peril"
and to fight for and by the side of Europe for their own and Europe's
existence and culture; but that if the Russians, on the other hand,
considered themselves Asiatics they would unite with the "yellow
peril," and, joining forces with it, would assail Europe. The Tsar,
said I, must bear this in mind in providing for the defense of his land
and organizing his army.

When the Tsar asked me what course I thought the Russians would take, I
replied: "The second."

The Tsar was outraged and wished to know at once on what I based
this opinion. I answered that my opinion was based on Russia's
construction of railways and on the arraying of the Russian army along
the Prussian-Austrian frontier. Thereupon the Tsar protested that he
and his house were Europeans, that his country and his Russians would
certainly cleave to Europe, that he would look upon it as a matter of
honor to protect Europe from the "yellow men." To this I replied that
if this was the Tsar's attitude he must make his military preparations
conform to it without delay. The Tsar said nothing.

At all events, I sought to utilize Tsar Nicholas II's worry at the
growing power of Japan to the advantage of Germany and general European
culture. Russia, despite siding with Japan, was the first nation to
collapse among all those participating in the war.


REPROACHES FOR JAPAN

The able statesmen of Japan, of whom there are quite a number, must be
in some doubt as to whether they ranged their country on the right side
in the war. Yes, they will perhaps ask themselves whether it would not
have been more advantageous for Japan to have prevented the World War.
This would have been within her powers, had she ranged herself firmly
and unequivocally on the side of the Central Powers, from which in
former times she had learned so willingly and so much.

Had Japan adopted soon enough such an orientation in her foreign
policy, and, like Germany, fought by peaceful means for her share in
world trade and activity, I should have put the "yellow peril" away in
a corner and joyfully welcomed into the circle of peacefully inclined
nations the progressive Japanese nation, the "Prussians of the East."
Nobody regrets more than I that the "yellow peril" had not already lost
its meaning when the crisis of 1914 arose. The experience derived from
the World War may yet bring this about.

Germany's joint action with France and Russia at Shimonoseki was based
upon Germany's situation in Europe. Wedged in between on-marching
Russia, threatening Prussia's frontier, and France, fortifying her
borders anew with forts and groups of fortresses, confronted with a
friendship between these two nations resembling an alliance, Berlin
looked with anxiety into the future. The warlike preparations of the
two powers were far ahead of ours, their navies far more modern and
powerful than the German navy, which consisted of a few old ships
almost without fighting value. Therefore it seemed to us wise to
acquiesce in the suggestion of this strong group, in order that it
might not--should we decline--turn immediately to England and cause
the entry of the latter into the combination. This would have meant
the formation, at that time, of the combination of 1914, which would
have been a serious matter for Germany. Japan, on the other hand,
was about to go over anyhow to England, in her sympathies. Moreover,
Germany's making common cause with the Franco-Russian group offered
the possibility of achieving gradually a more trusting and less
strained relationship in Europe and of living side by side with our two
neighbors there in more friendliness, as a result of the common policy,
adopted in the Far East. The policy adopted by us at this juncture was
also consistently based on the maintenance of world peace.

In the entire Kiao-Chau question, Prince Hohenlohe, despite his age,
evinced a capacity for sticking steadily to his purpose and a degree of
resolution which must be reckoned as greatly to his credit.

Unfortunately in the matter of the Kruger dispatch his prudence and
his vision, so clear on other occasions, abandoned him: only by so
assuming is his obstinate insistence on the sending of this dispatch
to be understood. The influence of such an energetic and eloquent
personage as Herr von Marschall, former State Attorney, may have been
so powerful, the siren song of Herr von Holstein so convincing, that
the Prince yielded to them. In any event, he did his country an ill
turn in this matter, and damaged me seriously both in England and at
home.


THE KRUGER TELEGRAM[5]

Since the so-called Kruger dispatch made a big stir and had serious
political consequences, I shall tell the story of it in detail.

The Jameson raid caused great and increasing excitement in Germany.
The German nation was outraged at this attempt to overpower a little
nation, which was Dutch--and, hence, Lower Saxon-German in origin--and
to which we were sympathetic because of racial relationship. I was much
worried at this violent excitement, which also seized upon the higher
classes of society, foreseeing possible complications with England. I
believed that there was no way to prevent England from conquering the
Boer countries, should she so desire, although I also was convinced
that such a conquest would be unjust. But I was unable to overcome the
reigning excitement, and was even harshly judged by my intimates on
account of the attitude I adopted.

One day when I had gone to my uncle, the Imperial Chancellor, for a
conference, at which the Secretary of State for the Navy, Admiral
Hollmann, was present, Freiherr Marschall, one of the Secretaries of
State, suddenly appeared in high excitement, with a sheet of paper in
his hand. He declared that the excitement among the people--in the
Reichstag, even--had grown to such proportions that it was absolutely
necessary to give it outward expression, and that this could best be
done by a telegram to Kruger, a rough draft of which he had in his hand.

I objected to this, being supported by Admiral Hollmann. At first the
Imperial Chancellor remained passive in the debate. In view of the fact
that I knew how ignorant Freiherr Marschall and the Foreign Office were
of English national psychology, I sought to make clear to Freiherr
Marschall the consequences which such a step would have among the
English; in this, likewise, Admiral Hollmann seconded me. But Marschall
was not to be dissuaded.

Then, finally, the Imperial Chancellor took a hand. He remarked that
I, as a constitutional ruler, must not stand out against the national
consciousness and against my constitutional advisers; otherwise, there
was danger that the excited attitude of the German people, deeply
outraged in its sense of justice and also in its sympathy for the
Dutch, might cause it to break down the barriers and turn against me
personally. Already, he said, statements were flying about among the
people; it was being said that the Emperor was, after all, half an
Englishman, with secret English sympathies; that he was entirely under
the influence of his grandmother, Queen Victoria; that the dictation
emanating from England must cease once for all; that the Emperor must
be freed from English tutelage, etc.


SAYS HE SIGNED AGAINST HIS WILL

In view of all this, he continued, it was his duty as Imperial
Chancellor, notwithstanding he admitted the justification of my
objections, to insist that I sign the telegram in the general political
interest, and, above all else, in the interest of my relationship to my
people. He and also Herr von Marschall, he went on, in their capacity
of my constitutional advisers, would assume full responsibility for the
telegram and its consequences.

Sir Valentine Chirol, at that time correspondent of the _Times_,
wrote, in the _Times_ of September 11th, that Herr von Marschall,
directly after the sending of the dispatch, had stated to him that the
dispatch did not give the personal opinion of the Emperor, but was a
governmental act, for which the Chancellor and he himself assumed full
responsibility.

Admiral Hollmann, when the Imperial Chancellor appealed to him for
corroboration of this point of view and was asked by him to uphold it
to me, declined to do so with the remark that the Anglo-Saxon world
would unquestionably attribute the telegram to the Kaiser, since
nobody would believe that such a provocative thing could come from His
Majesty's elderly advisers, and all would consider it an "impulsive"
act of the "youthful" Emperor.

Then I again tried to dissuade the gentlemen from their project. But
the Imperial Chancellor and Marschall insisted that I sign, reiterating
that they would be responsible for consequences. It seemed to me that I
ought not to refuse after their presentation of the case. I signed.

Not long before his death Admiral Hollmann recalled the occurrence to
me in full detail, as it is described here.

After the Kruger dispatch was made public the storm broke in England,
as I had prophesied. I received from all circles of English society,
especially from aristocratic ladies unknown to me, a veritable flood of
letters containing every possible kind of reproach, some of the writers
not hesitating even at slandering me personally and insulting me.
Attacks and calumnies began to appear in the press, so that soon the
legend of the origin of the dispatch was as firmly established as the
amen at church. If Marschall had also announced in the Reichstag what
he stated to Chirol, I personally would not have been drawn into the
matter to such an extent.

In February, 1900, while the Boer War was in progress and while I was
with the fleet at Heligoland attending the maneuvers of ships of the
line, after having been present at the swearing in of recruits at
Wilhelmshafen I received news by telegraph from the Wilhelmstrasse,
_via_ Heligoland, that Russia and France had proposed to Germany to
make a joint attack on England, now that she was involved elsewhere,
and cripple her sea traffic. I objected and ordered that the proposal
be declined.

Since I assumed that Paris and St. Petersburg would present the matter
at London in such a way as to make it appear that Berlin had made
the above proposal to both of them, I immediately telegraphed from
Heligoland to Queen Victoria and to the Prince of Wales (Edward) the
fact of the Russo-French proposal, and its refusal by me. The Queen
answered expressing her hearty thanks, the Prince of Wales with an
expression of astonishment.

Later, Her Majesty let me know secretly that, shortly before the
receipt of my telegram from Heligoland concerning the proposal from
Paris and St. Petersburg, the false version of the matter foreseen
by me had indeed been told, and that she was glad to have been able,
thanks to my dispatch, to expose the intrigue to her Government and
quiet it as to the loyal attitude of Germany; she added that she would
not forget the service I had done England in troublous times.


DEAL WITH CECIL RHODES

When Cecil Rhodes came to me, in order to bring about the construction
of the Cape-to-Cairo Railway and Telegraph line through the interior
regions of German East Africa, his wishes were approved by me, in
agreement with the Foreign Office and the Imperial Chancellor; with
the proviso that a branch railway should be built _via_ Tabora, and
that German material should be used in the construction work on German
territory. Both conditions were acquiesced in by Rhodes most willingly.
He was grateful at the fulfillment of his pet ambition by Germany, only
a short time after King Leopold of Belgium had refused his request.

Rhodes was full of admiration for Berlin and the tremendous German
industrial plants, which he visited daily. He said that he regretted
not having been in Berlin before, in order to have learned about the
power and efficiency of Germany, and to have got into touch with the
German Government and prominent Germans in commercial circles. He said
he had wished, even before the Jameson raid, to visit Berlin, but had
been prevented in London at that time from so doing; that, had he been
able to inform us before of his plan to get permission to build the
Cape-to-Cairo line through the Boer countries, as well as through our
colonies, the German Government would probably have been able to help
him by bringing persuasion to bear upon Kruger, who was unwilling to
grant this permission; that "the stupid Jameson Raid" would never have
been made, in that case, and the Kruger dispatch never written--as to
that dispatch, he had never borne me a grudge on account of it.

He added that as we, in Germany, could not be correctly informed as
to aim and actual purposes, the said raid must have looked to us like
"an act of piracy," which naturally and quite rightly had excited the
Germans; that all he had wanted was to have such stretches of land as
were needed for his rail lines--such, in fact, as Germany had just
granted to him in the interior of her colonies--a demand which was not
unjust and would certainly have met with German support. I was not to
worry, he added, about the dispatch and not bother myself any more
about the uproar in the English press. Rhodes did not know about the
origin of the Kruger dispatch and wanted to console me, imagining that
I was its originator.

Rhodes went on to advise me to build the Bagdad Railway and open up
Mesopotamia, after having had irrigation simultaneously introduced
there. He said that this was Germany's task, just as his was the
Cape-to-Cairo line. In view of the fact that the building of this line
through our territory was also made dependent upon the cession to us of
the Samoan Islands, Rhodes worked actively in London toward having them
turned over to us.

In home politics, Prince Hohenlohe, as Chancellor, showed a mildness
which was not generally favorable. Owing to his long acquaintanceship
with Herr von Hertling, he was able to establish friendly relations
with the Vatican. His mildness and indulgence were also exercised
toward Alsace-Lorraine, in which, as an expert of long standing,
he showed particular interest. But he got little thanks for this,
since the French element, indirectly benefited thereby, behaved with
ever-increasing arrogance.


PEN SKETCH OF HOHENLOHE

Prince Hohenlohe loved to employ mediation, compromise, and
conciliation--toward the Socialists likewise--and he employed them on
some occasions when energetic measures would have been more fitting. He
hailed with much joy my Far East trip to Constantinople and Jerusalem.
He was pleased at the strengthening of our relations with Turkey and
considered the plan for the Bagdad Railway arising from them as a great
cultural work worthy of Germany.

He also gave his most enthusiastic approval to my visit to England in
1899, made by me with my wife and two sons at the desire of my royal
grandmother, who, growing steadily weaker on account of her years,
wished to see her oldest grandson once more. He hoped that this journey
might serve to efface somewhat the consequences of the Kruger dispatch
sent by him, and also to clarify some important questions by means of
conferences between me and English statesmen.

In order to avoid any unpleasantness from the English press, which,
angered by the Boer War and the partly unjustified attacks of certain
German newspapers, had been answering in like tone, the Queen had
commissioned the author of _The Life of the Prince Consort_, Sir
Theodore Martin, to inform the English press of Her Majesty's desire
that a friendly reception be accorded to her Imperial grandson. And
that is what indeed came to pass. The visit ran its course harmoniously
and caused satisfaction on all sides. I held important conferences with
various leading men.

Not once in the entire visit was the Kruger dispatch mentioned.
On the other hand, my royal grandmother did not conceal from her
grandson how unwelcome the whole Boer War was to her; she made no
secret of her disapproval and aversion for Mr. Chamberlain and all
that he represented, and thanked me again for my prompt and sharp
refusal of the Russo-French proposal to interfere and for my immediate
announcement of this proposal. One could easily see how much the Queen
loved her splendid army and how deeply she had been grieved by the
heavy reverses suffered by it at the outset of the war, which had
caused by no means negligible losses. Referring to these, the aged
Field Marshal Duke of Cambridge coined the fine phrase: "The British
nobleman and officer have shown that they can die bravely as gentlemen."

On my departure, the Queen bade me farewell with cordial and grateful
greetings to her "much-cherished cousin," the Imperial Chancellor,
whose ability and experience, she hoped, would continue to maintain
good relations between our two countries.

My report entirely satisfied Prince Hohenlohe as to the success of
my journey; at the same time, however, I was the object of the most
violent attacks from a certain section of the press and from many
excited "friends of the Boers." The German lacks the very thing with
which the English people has been inoculated, and to which it has
been trained by long political self-discipline: when a fight is on,
even though it be merely upon the field of diplomacy, the Englishman
unquestioningly follows the flag, in accordance with the proverb: "You
can't change the jockey while running."

In the autumn of 1900 Prince Hohenlohe retired from the Chancellorship,
since the work had become too arduous for a man of his advanced age.
Moreover, the constant quarrels and disputes of the political parties
with one another were disagreeable to him, and it went against the
grain with him to make speeches before them in the Reichstag. Equally
disagreeable to him was the press, part of which had taken the bit
between its teeth and imagined that it could conserve the Bismarckian
tradition by quoting sayings by Bismarck, and had greatly jeopardized
relations with England, especially during the Boer War.


CHANCELLOR'S RETIREMENT

The hope, aroused by the choice of Prince Hohenlohe as Chancellor and
his assumption of the office, that Prince Bismarck would place less
obstacles in his path, had been only partly fulfilled. The atmosphere
had been much relieved and Prince Bismarck brought to a much milder
frame of mind by my reconciliation with him, which had received
outward expression in his solemn entry into Berlin and his staying
at the old Hohenzollern palace, but his adherents and those rallying
around him for the sake of opposition were not to be dissuaded from
their activities. Moreover, the political representatives of the
people succeeded, while I was on my way to Friedrichsruh to celebrate
Bismarck's eightieth birthday, in refusing to pay homage to the old
Imperial Chancellor, a thing which naturally deeply hurt the sensitive
Prince Hohenlohe and filled him with indignation.

He, like myself, was deeply moved by the death of his great
predecessor, and we, together with the German people, sincerely mourned
Prince Bismarck as one of the greatest of the sons of Prussia and
Germany, in spite of the fact that he had not always made our task
easy. I insisted upon hurrying back from my trip to Norway in order
to pay honor to him who, as a faithful servant of his old master, had
helped the German nation to unity, and under whom I, when I was Prince,
had had the proud privilege of working.

It is said that one of the reasons why Prince Hohenlohe retired from
his post was the advice of his son Alexander, who was much at his
father's house; he was known in society as "the Crown Prince," and was
essentially different from his lovable father.

Prince Hohenlohe could look back upon a series of successes during
his term as Chancellor: the overcoming of the disputes concerning
the "Citizens' Book of Laws," the reform of the military punishment
procedure, the Naval law, the appointment of Waldersee to the command
in China at the time of the Boxer War, Tsing-tao, and the Yangtse
Treaty.

He bade me farewell on the 15th of October, 1900. Both of us were
greatly moved, for not only was the Chancellor and faithful co-worker
parting from his Emperor, but also the uncle from his nephew,
who looked up with grateful esteem to the old man. At the age of
seventy-five years--an age when others have long since retired to rest
and contemplation--he had not hesitated to obey the summons of the
Emperor to subject himself to even more exacting labors and devote his
time and strength to the German fatherland. When about to leave my
room, he grasped my hand once again with the request that I might grant
him, during the years of life still remaining to him (which he meant
to spend in Berlin), the same plain, faithful friendship which he had
so long noted and admired between me and Admiral von Hollmann. I shall
always preserve him faithfully in my memory.

  [3] "Once the magnitude of Pan-Germanism dawned on the English and
      French diplomats, once they became aware of the lengths to
      which Germany was willing to go, they realized the necessity of
      strengthening their position, and therefore made overtures to the
      United States, which resulted, probably before the summer of the
      year 1897, in an understanding between the three countries. There
      seems to be no doubt whatever that no papers of any sort were
      signed, that no pledges were given which circumstances would not
      justify any one of the contracting parties in denying or possibly
      repudiating. Nevertheless, an understanding was reached that in
      case of a war begun by Germany or Austria for the purpose of
      executing Pan-Germanism, the United States would promptly declare
      in favor of England and France and would do her utmost to assist
      them."--ROLAND G. USHER, _Pan-Germanism_, chap. x, p. 139.

  [4] _The Problem of Japan_, by an Ex-Counselor of Legation in the Far
      East, chap. viii, p. 136, note. Published by C. L. Langenhuysen,
      Amsterdam and Rotterdam. 1918.

  [5] Tremendous excitement was caused in England when the incident of
      the Kruger message became known. On January 3, 1896, the German
      Emperor telegraphed as follows to the President of the South
      African Republic:

      "I congratulate you most sincerely on having succeeded, with
      your people, without calling on the help of foreign powers,
      by opposing your own force to an armed band which broke into
      your country to disturb the peace, in restoring quiet and in
      maintaining the independence of your country against external
      attack."

      On January 6th, in conversation with Sir Frank Lascelles,
      Baron von Marschall protested against the view of the English
      press that it was an act of hostility against England and
      an encroachment on English rights for the German Emperor to
      congratulate the head of a friendly state on his victory over an
      armed band that had invaded his land in defiance of international
      law, and had been declared to be outside the pale of the law by
      the English Government itself. But it was not recorded that he
      disavowed the Kaiser's responsibility for it.




CHAPTER IV

Bülow


On the day after Prince Hohenlohe's farewell, the man summoned by me
as his successor--Count Bülow, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,
arrived. His choice for the post was eminently fitting, because he was
thoroughly cognizant of our foreign policy and, especially, of our
relations with England--which policy was becoming constantly livelier
and more complicated--and because he had already proved himself a
skillful orator and ready debater in the Reichstag. The fact that
the second of these qualities was lacking in his predecessor had
often been painfully noticeable. When Prince Hohenlohe's intention to
retire became known in the Imperial Council, the Bavarian ambassador
at Berlin, Count Lerchenfeld, very pointedly remarked to me that for
Heaven's sake I was not to choose another South German, since South
Germans were not fitted for the leading post at Berlin; North Germans
were naturally better able to fill it and, therefore, it would be
better for the Empire to select a North German.

I had been acquainted personally with Bülow for a long time, ever
since the period of his ambassadorship at Rome and his work as
Secretary of State. Then I had often visited him at his home and had
held many a conference with him in his garden. He came into closer
relationship with me when he accompanied me on my journey to the Far
East, where, in co-operation with the ambassador, Freiherr Marschall,
he assisted me in getting into personal touch with the leading men of
the Turkish Government. Hence, the relations of the new Chancellor with
me were already begun and, to a certain extent, established, since we
had for years discussed all political problems and spheres. Moreover,
he stood much nearer to me in age than his predecessors, most of whom
could have been my grandfather. He was the first "young Chancellor" of
Germany. And this made our common task easier for both of us.

When I was in Berlin, scarcely a day went by without my taking a
long morning walk with the Chancellor in the garden of the Imperial
Chancellor's palace, during which outstanding business was cleared up
and problems of actuality discussed. I often had a meal with him and
always found at his table, where I was most hospitably received by the
Count, his amiable wife and a group of the most interesting men, in
choosing whom the Count was a master. He was likewise unsurpassed in
skillfully conducting conversation and in the witty handling of the
various topics that arose. To me it was always a pleasure to be in the
company of the Chancellor and enjoy his bubbling wit, to exchange
views at his table with many professors, savants, and artists, as
well as Government officials of all sorts, in informal, unofficial
intercourse and stimulating exchange of ideas.

The Count was an excellent narrator of anecdotes, drawn both from books
and his own personal experience, which he told in several languages. He
liked to tell stories of the days when he was a diplomat, especially
about his stay at St. Petersburg.


BÜLOW A DISCIPLE OF BISMARCK

The Count's father was an intimate friend of Prince Bismarck and
had been one of his closest co-workers. Young Bülow also had begun
his career under the great Chancellor; he had been brought up on
Bismarckian ideas and traditions and strongly influenced by them, but,
nevertheless, had not adhered to them to such an extent as to lose his
independence.

In the course of one of the first talks which I had with Bülow as
Imperial Chancellor he informed himself concerning my ideas of how best
to handle the English and have dealings with them. I told him that I
considered absolute frankness the most important thing in dealing with
England and Englishmen; that the Englishman, in presenting his point of
view and working for his interests, was inconsiderate to the point of
brutality, for which reason he thoroughly understood anybody who acted
similarly toward him; that there must be no playing the diplomatic
game, or "finessing," with an Englishman, because it made him distrust
those with whom he was dealing and suspect that they were not honest
and wished secretly to cheat him; that such devious methods could be
successful only in dealing with Latin and Slavic nations; that, once
the Englishman had become suspicious, there was nothing more to be done
with him, despite the most honeyed words and most obliging concessions;
that the only advice, therefore, which I could give the Chancellor was
that he confine himself entirely to straightforwardness in his English
policy. I said this with particular emphasis, since "finessing" was
especially dear to the diplomatic character of Count Bülow and had
become second nature to him.

I also took occasion, during this talk, to warn the Chancellor against
Holstein. In spite of my warning--which was merely a repetition of
that given me before by Bismarck--Bülow worked a great deal, or was
obliged to work, with Holstein. This remarkable man had been able
gradually, especially since the time that the Foreign Office had been,
so to speak, orphaned by Bismarck's retirement, to create for himself a
position that became steadily more influential and to maintain it under
three Chancellors with such skill that he was considered indispensable.

Holstein was unquestionably possessed of great shrewdness, seconded by
a phenomenal memory and a certain talent for political combinations,
which, to be sure, often became a hobby in his case. His position
was also based largely on the fact that he was looked upon in many
quarters, especially among the older officials, as the "bearer of
the Bismarckian traditions," the man who upheld these in the teeth
of "the young master." His importance rested, above all, on his wide
personal knowledge in the entire domain of the foreign service. Since
he wielded, on account of this, an authoritative influence on all
proposals relative to the appointment of officials and hence, also, on
the careers of the younger officials, it may be easily understood why
he, little by little, had obtained for himself a dominating position at
the Foreign Office. But he sought more and more to obtain, at the same
time, a decisive influence upon the conduct of foreign policy; he had,
in fact, become the guiding spirit both of the Foreign Office and of
German foreign policy.


HOLSTEIN'S SECRET POWER

The serious thing about this was that he exerted his far-reaching
influence entirely from under cover and avoided all official
responsibility as an adviser. He preferred to remain in the dark and
exert his influence from there. He refused every responsible post--many
stood open to him--every honorary title, every promotion. He lived
in complete seclusion. For a long time I tried in vain to become
personally acquainted with him, for which purpose I used to invite him
to meals, but Holstein declined every time. Only once, in the course
of many years, did he consent to dine with me at the Foreign Office,
and it was characteristic of him that, whereas on this occasion all
the other gentlemen present wore full evening dress, he appeared in a
frock coat and excused himself on the plea that he had no dress coat.

The secrecy with which he surrounded himself in his work, so as not
to be held responsible for it, became apparent also at times in the
character of the memorials drawn up by him; they were unquestionably
ingenious and attractive, but often as involved and ambiguous as the
oracle of Delphi; there were occasions when, after a decision had been
made based on the contents of one of these documents, Herr von Holstein
would prove to a nicety that he meant exactly the opposite of what had
been thought.

I considered it a serious matter that an irresponsible counselor should
bring to bear such powerful influence, especially as he did so from
under cover and, hence, in doing it, eluded the officials who were in
duty bound to exert influence, and who were the responsible parties.
Often, especially in the von Richthofen era, it happened that I would
advise a foreign ambassador to discuss some political question, which
he had taken up with me, with the Secretary of State, and he would
reply: "J'en parlerai avec mon ami Holstein" ("I shall speak about
it with my friend Holstein"). The fact alone that an official of the
Foreign Office dealt with foreign ambassadors, going over the head of
his superior, did not seem right to me; but that he should be dubbed
by these foreigners "friend" seemed to me to go beyond what I deemed
advisable.

Matters had, in fact, developed gradually to such a stage that Holstein
conducted a good part of our foreign affairs. To be sure, he still
listened to the Chancellor in connection with them, but what the
Emperor thought or said about foreign affairs was rather unimportant.
If things turned out successfully, the Foreign Office reaped the
reward; if things went wrong, then it was the fault of the "impulsive
young master."

In spite of all this, Bülow, too, apparently thought Herr von Holstein
indispensable at first; he worked together with him for a long time,
until at last he, too, found unbearable the pressure which this strange
man exerted on everybody. To Herr von Tschirschky, during his tenure
of office as Secretary of State, belongs the merit of finally bringing
the unendurable situation to a head. On being questioned by me, he
declared that he considered it impossible that Herr von Holstein remain
at his post any longer, since he was embroiling the whole Foreign
Office, seeking to eliminate him, the Secretary of State, entirely, and
creating all kinds of obstacles, likewise, for the Chancellor.


DISMISSAL--AND AN ENEMY

Thereupon I ordered Herr von Tschirschky to prepare the way for the
dismissal of Herr von Holstein, which afterward took place, with the
approval of the Chancellor, after the latter had recovered from the
serious break-down in health which he had suffered meanwhile. Herr von
Holstein himself showed what manner of man he was by going at once
after his dismissal to Herr Harden and placing himself at the latter's
disposal for the campaign against the Emperor.

The year 1901 gave Count Bülow plentiful opportunities to show and
assert himself in dealings with England. Count Bülow still believed
strongly in the Bismarckian theory of having "two irons in the
fire"--_i. e._, in making friendly agreements with another country
while always remaining on good terms with Russia--in which he received
support from the many pretended adherents of Bismarck.

From the midst of the Jubilee celebration of the two hundredth
coronation anniversary, I was called to the deathbed of my grandmother,
Queen Victoria, by a dispatch announcing to me the serious condition
of the Queen. I hurriedly made the journey with my uncle, the Duke
of Connaught, who was at Berlin as the Queen's representative at the
festivities--he was the favorite son of the Queen and my particular
friend, and a son-in-law of Prince Frederick Charles--and I was
cordially received in London by the then Prince of Wales and the royal
family. As my carriage drove out at a trot from the railway station
a plainly dressed man stepped forward from the closely packed crowd
standing there in absolute silence, to the side of the carriage, bared
his head, and said: "Thank you, Kaiser." The Prince of Wales, later
Edward VII, added: "That is what they all think, and they will never
forget this coming of yours."

Nevertheless, they did forget it, and quickly.

After the Queen had quietly breathed her last in my arms, the curtain
fell for me upon many memories of childhood. Her death signified the
close of an epoch in English history and in Germany's relations with
England. I now got into touch, as far as possible, with prominent
personages, and noted everywhere a thoroughly sympathetic, friendly
spirit, which made no secret of the wish for good relations with
Germany.

At the farewell banquet impromptu speeches were made by King Edward
VII and myself, which were cordial in tone and content, and did not
fail to make an impression on their hearers. After the meal the English
ambassador at Berlin clasped my hand and said that my speech had
touched all his fellow countrymen's hearts, because what I said was
sincere and simple, as was fitting for Englishmen; that the speech
must at once be made public, since it would have an effect throughout
the country, which was grateful for my coming; and that this would be
useful to the relations between the two countries. I answered that it
was a matter for the British Government and the King to decide, that
personally I had no objections to having the speech made public.

Nevertheless, it was not made public, and the British people never
learned of my words, which were the sincere expression of my sentiments
and thoughts. In another talk later on with me at Berlin the same
ambassador deeply regretted this, but was unable to say what the reason
was for this omission.

In concluding my remarks on my stay in England I cannot pass over the
fact that a portion of the German press was unfortunately lacking both
in tactful appreciation of the grief of the English royal family and
people, as well as of the obligations which my family relationship and
political considerations imposed upon me.

After my return home from England I was able to report to the
Chancellor on the good impressions I had received, and particularly
that opinion in England was apparently in favor of an understanding and
of closer relations.

Bülow expressed himself as satisfied with the results of the journey,
after we had talked at length about it at Homburg, and consulted as
to how the situation created by the journey should be put to use. I
suggested that we should unquestionably come to a good agreement, if an
alliance--which I preferred--could not be brought about. In any event,
a firm agreement would suffice, I said, and would suit the English; in
the long run an alliance might always develop from it.

The opportunity for such an alliance came with unexpected promptness.
While I was at Homburg von der Höhe in the spring of 1901, Count
Metternich, who was with me as representative of the Foreign Office,
brought me a notification from Berlin that _Mr. Chamberlain_ had
inquired there as to whether Germany was ready for an _alliance with
England_. I immediately asked: "Against whom?"--since, if England so
suddenly offered to make an alliance in the midst of peace, it was
plain that she needed the German army, which made it worth while to
find out against whom the army was needed and for what reason German
troops were to fight, at England's behest, by her side. Thereupon the
answer came from London that they were needed against Russia, since
Russia was a menace both to India and to Constantinople.

The first thing I did was to call London's attention to the old
traditional brotherhood-in-arms between the German and Russian armies,
and the close family ties between the reigning dynasties of the two
countries; in addition, I pointed out the dangers of a war on two
fronts, in case France came in on the side of Russia, and also the
fact that we had acted jointly with France and Russia in the Far East
(Shimonoseki, 1895) and that there was no reason to unloose a conflict
with Russia at this time, when we were in the midst of peace; that the
superiority in number of the Russian army on a peace footing was very
great and the eastern frontiers of Prussia seriously threatened by the
grouping of the Russian forces; that England would not be in a position
to protect our eastern province from a Russian attack, since her fleet
could accomplish little in the Baltic and would be unable to sail into
the Black Sea; that, in case of our making common cause against Russia,
Germany would be the only one who would be in great danger, quite
independently of the possibility of the entry of France into the fight.

Chamberlain then informed us that a firm alliance should be made, by
which England would naturally bind herself to come to our aid.


BRITISH ALLIANCE FAILS

I had also pointed out that the validity of an alliance could only
be assured when the English Parliament had placed its approval upon
it, since the Ministry might be driven from office by the will of the
nation as expressed in Parliament, whereby signature of the Ministry
might be rendered null and void and the alliance invalidated, and that
we could look upon the Chamberlain suggestion, for the time being,
merely as a purely personal project of his own.

To this Chamberlain replied that he would get backing from Parliament
in due time and would find the way of winning the Unionists over to
his idea; that all needed now was the signature of Berlin. Matters
did not progress as far as that, because Parliament was not to be won
over to Chamberlain's plan; therefore the "plan" came to nothing. Soon
afterward England concluded her alliance with Japan (Hayashi). The
Russo-Japanese War broke out, in which Japan--owing to the fact that
it fitted in with her schemes--played the rôle of pawn for England's
interests, which rôle had originally been reserved for Germany. By
this war Russia was thrown from the east back to the west, where she
might concern herself again with the Balkans, Constantinople, and
India--which was to Japan's advantage--leaving to Japan a free hand in
Korea and China.

In 1905 came my journey to Tangier, undertaken much against my will.
It came about as follows: Toward the end of March I intended, as in
the previous year, to take a Mediterranean trip for the sake of my
health, for which I proposed to avail myself of some ship running empty
from Cuxhaven to Naples. The _Hamburg_ was destined by Ballin for this
purpose. At his request that I take along some other guests, since the
steamer was quite empty, I invited a number of gentlemen, among them
Privy Councilor Althoc, Admiral Mensing, Count Pückler, Ambassador von
Varnbuhler, Professor Schiemann, Admiral Hollmann, etc.

Soon after the proposed trip became known Bülow informed me that
there was a strong desire at Lisbon to have me stop there and pay the
Portuguese court a visit. To this I agreed. As the date of departure
approached, Bülow expressed the additional wish that I also stop at
Tangier and, by visiting that Moroccan port, strengthen the position of
the Sultan of Morocco in relation to the French.

This I declined, since it seemed to me that the Morocco question was
too full of explosive matter and I feared that such a visit would
work out disadvantageously rather than beneficially. Bülow returned
to the attack, without, however, persuading me of the necessity or
advisability of the visit.


AGAIN KAISER "GIVES IN"

During the journey I had several talks with Freiherr von Schoen, who
accompanied me as representative of the Foreign Office, as to the
advisability of the visit. We agreed that it would be better to drop
it. I telegraphed this decision to the Chancellor from Lisbon. Bülow
replied emphatically that I must take into consideration the view of
the German people and of the Reichstag, which had become interested in
the project, and that it was necessary that I stop at Tangier.

I gave in, with a heavy heart, for I feared that this visit, in view
of the situation at Paris, might be construed as a provocation and
cause an inclination in London to support France in case of war. Since
I suspected that Delcassé wished to make Morocco a pretext for war, I
feared that he might make use of the Tangier visit for this purpose.

The visit took place, after much difficulty had been experienced in the
open roadstead of Tangier, and it met with a certain amount of friendly
participation by Italian and Southern French anarchists, rogues, and
adventurers. A lot of Spaniards stood upon a small square, amid waving
banners and loud cries; these, according to a police official who
accompanied us, were an assembly of Spanish anarchists.

The first I learned about the consequences of my Tangier visit was
when I got to Gibraltar and was formally and frigidly received by the
English, in marked contrast to my cordial reception the year before.
What I had foreseen was justified by the facts. Embitterment and anger
reigned in Paris, and Delcassé tried to rouse the nation to war; the
only reason that he did not succeed was that both the Minister of War
and the Minister of the Navy declared France not yet ready.

The fact that my fears were justified was also corroborated later by
the conversation between Delcassé and the editor of _Le Gaulois_,
in which the Minister informed an astonished world that, in case of
war, England would have sided with France. Thus, even as far back as
that, I ran the risk, through the Tangier visit forced upon me, of
getting blamed for the unchaining of a world war. To think and act
constitutionally is often a hard task for a ruler upon whom in every
case responsibility is finally saddled.

In October, 1905, the Paris _Matin_ reported that Delcassé had declared
in the Council of Ministers that England had offered, in case of war,
to land 100,000 men in Holstein and seize the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal.
This English offer was repeated once more later on, with the suggestion
that it be affirmed in writing. And the well-known Jaurès, who was
murdered in accordance with the political ideas of Isvolsky upon the
outbreak of war in 1914, knew beforehand about the statements by
Delcassé published in the _Matin_.

The downfall of Delcassé and the accession of Rouvier to his post are
to be ascribed partly to the influence of the Prince of Monaco. During
the regatta week at Kiel the Prince had assured himself, by talks with
me, the Imperial Chancellor, and Government officials, of the sincerity
of our desire to compromise with France for the purpose of enabling us
to live at peace with each other. He stood well with the ambassador,
Prince Radolin, and worked actively toward a rapprochement between the
two countries.

The Prince of Monaco himself was of the opinion that Delcassé was a
menace to the maintenance of peace and hoped that he would soon fall
and be replaced by Rouvier, who was a prudent politician thoroughly
inclined to coming to an understanding with Germany. The Prince said
that he was on good terms with Rouvier personally and would willingly
place himself at the disposal of the German ambassador as a go-between.


NEGOTIATIONS FRUITLESS

Then came Delcassé's fall, and Rouvier became Minister. At once I
caused the initiation of the measures wherein I could count upon the
support of the Prince of Monaco. The Chancellor was instructed to
prepare a rapprochement with France. And I particularly told Prince
Radolin, who personally received his instructions in Berlin, to make
good use of the Rouvier régime for the purpose of eliminating all
possibilities of conflict between the two countries. I added that the
reports of the Prince of Monaco, with whom he was well acquainted,
would be useful to him in relations with Rouvier. Prince Radolin
proceeded with zeal and pleasure to the accomplishment of this
worth-while task.

At first the negotiations went well, so much so that I began to hope
that the important goal would be attained and the evil impression
caused by the Tangier visit effaced by an understanding. In the
meantime, the negotiations concerning Morocco were continued; they were
concluded, after endless trouble, by the summoning of the Algeciras
Conference, based upon the circular note of Prince Bülow, which
pointed out that the Most-Favored-Nation Clause No. 17 of the Madrid
Convention should remain in force and that the reforms in Morocco,
for which France alone was working, should be carried out, in so far
as necessary, only in agreement with the signatory powers of the
Madrid Conference. These events, which riveted general attention upon
themselves, relegated the special negotiations with Rouvier to the
background.

With regard to domestic policy, I had agreed with the Chancellor that
his main task was to be the restoration of order in the relations
between the parties in the Reichstag, which had got into a bad way
under Hohenlohe, and, above all, to rally the Conservatives, who had
been won over to the opposition by the Post-Bismarckians, once more to
the support of the Government. The Chancellor accomplished this task
with great patience and tenacity. He finally formed the famous "bloc,"
which arose from the great electoral defeat of the Socialists.

The Conservative party had many members who had direct relations with
the court, and also with me personally, so that it was easier for this
party than for any other to become informed as to my plans in political
and other matters and to discuss my ideas with me before they took
shape in projects for laws. I have not the impression that this was
done to the extent that was possible; I might perhaps have come into
agreement with the gentlemen, through informal conversations, in the
question of the building of the Central Canal--opposed, as is well
known, by the Conservatives--as well as in the less important matters
of the construction of the Cathedral and the Berlin Opera House, in
which I was deeply interested for the sake of the Church and of art.

I am saying nothing new if I remark that it was by no means easy to
deal with the gentlemen of the Conservative party. Through their
traditional services to the state they had acquired great experience
and independence of judgment, and had thus formed firm political
convictions, to which they held faithfully and in a genuinely
conservative manner. From their ranks great statesmen, eminent
Ministers, a brilliant officer corps, a model body of officials, had
largely been produced. Therefore, the consciousness of their own merit
was not without justification; in addition, their loyalty to their King
was unshakable. The King and the country both owed them gratitude.


FINDS FAULT WITH CONSERVATIVES

Their weakness lay in the fact that they were at times too
conservative--that is, they recognized too late the demands of the
time and began by opposing progress, although it might be progress
advantageous to themselves. One may understand this in view of their
past, but the fact remains that it worked to the detriment of their
relations with me, especially during my reign, when the development
of the Empire, particularly of industry and commerce, pushed rapidly
forward; and I desired--and was obliged--to place no obstacles in the
way of that development, but to promote it. When I said that it was not
always easy, for the reasons adduced, to deal with the Conservatives,
I am well aware that the same thing is maintained about me. Perhaps
this is because I stood close to the Conservatives on account of my
traditions, but was not a Conservative for party reasons. I was and
am, indeed, in favor of progressive conservatism, which preserves what
is vital, rejects what is outworn, and accepts that portion of the new
which is useful.

Let me add that in discussions I was able to endure the truth, even
when it was uncomfortable and bitter, better than people are aware,
provided it was told to me tactfully.

So that, when it is maintained that I and the Conservatives did not
get along in dealings with each other, the same reason was at the root
of the difficulty on both sides. It would have been better to arrive
oftener at an understanding with me in private conversations, for which
I was always ready. And in the canal question, on which we could not
agree, who was better qualified than the Conservative to understand and
appreciate the fact that I have never subscribed to the pretty couplet,
"Unser König absolut, wenn er unseren Willen tut" ("Absolute our King
may be, if he does what we decree")? For, had I acted according to
that principle--a very comfortable one for me--the Conservatives,
in view of their belief in a strong King who really governs, would
logically have been forced to oppose me. Surely the Conservatives must
have respected me for having matched their honorable axiom of manly
pride before the thrones of Kings with mine of kingly pride before the
Conservative party's throne, just as I did with regard to all other
parties.

In any event, the occasional differences with the Conservative party
and with individual Conservatives cannot make me forget the services
rendered by men of this very party to the House of Hohenzollern, the
Prussian state, and the German Empire.

Bülow finally did the great trick of bringing Conservatives and
Liberals together in Germany, thus getting a big majority for the
parties siding with the Government. In doing so, the great abilities
of the Chancellor, his skill, statecraft, and shrewd knowledge of men,
shone forth most brilliantly. The great service rendered by him in
achieving this success won him thorough appreciation and gratitude from
his country and from myself; and, in addition, an increase of my trust
in him. The boundless delight of the people of Berlin in the defeat of
the Social Democrats at the polls led to the nocturnal demonstration,
which I shall never forget, in front of my palace, in the course of
which my automobile had to force a way for itself, little by little,
amid a cheering crowd of many thousands surrounding it. The Lustgarten
was packed with great multitudes of people, at whose tumultuous request
the Empress and I had to appear on the balcony in order to receive
their homage.

The Chancellor was present at the visit of King Edward VII to Kiel.
Among the many guests was the former Chief Court Marshal of the
Empress, Frederick, Count Seckendorff, long acquainted with Edward
VII through his many visits to England, who reposed great trust in
the Count. This gentleman, at the behest of Bülow, with whom he was
friendly, arranged an interview between the King and the Chancellor.

It took place on board the royal English yacht after a breakfast to
which I and the Chancellor were invited. Both gentlemen sat for a long
time alone over their cigars. Afterward Bülow reported to me what had
transpired at the interview. In discussing the possible conclusion of
an alliance between Germany and England, the King, he told me, had
stated that such a thing was not at all necessary in the case of our
two countries, since there was no real cause for enmity or strife
between them. This refusal to make an alliance was a plain sign of the
English "policy of encirclement," which soon made itself felt clearly
and disagreeably at the Algeciras Conference. The pro-French and
anti-German attitude of England, which there came out into the open,
was due to special orders from King Edward VII, who had sent Sir D.
Mackenzie Wallace to Algeciras as his "supervising representative,"
equipped with personal instructions.

From hints given by the latter to his friends it turned out that it
was the King's wish to oppose Germany strongly and support France
at every opportunity. When it was pointed out to him that it might
be possible, after all, to take up later with Germany this or that
question and perhaps come to an understanding, he replied that,
first of all came the Anglo-Russian agreement; that, once that was
assured, an "arrangement" might be made with Germany also. The English
"arrangement" consisted in the encirclement of Germany.


HIS FRIENDSHIP WITH BÜLOW

The relations between me and the Chancellor remained trustful and
friendly throughout this period. He was present repeatedly at the Kiel
regatta. Here, he found occasion, among other matters, to confer with
the Prince of Monaco and a number of influential Frenchmen, who were
guests aboard the Prince's yacht, among whom doubtless the most eminent
was M. Jules Roche, the leading expert on European budgets, and a great
admirer of Goethe. He always carried a copy of _Faust_ in his pocket.

In April, 1906, came the unfortunate collapse in the Reichstag of the
overworked Chancellor. As soon as I received the news, I hurried there
and was glad that Privy Councilor Renvers could give me encouraging
news about Bülow's condition. While the Prince was recuperating
during the summer at Norderney, I went from Heligoland, which I had
been inspecting, on a torpedo boat to the island and surprised the
Chancellor and his wife at their villa. I spent the day in chatting
with the Chancellor, who had already recovered his health to an
encouraging degree and was browned by the sea air and sunlight.

In the late autumn of 1907 the Empress and I paid a visit to Windsor,
at the invitation of King Edward VII. We were most cordially received
by the English royal family and the visit went off harmoniously. After
this visit I went for a rest to the castle of Highcliffe, belonging
to General Stewart Worthley, situated on the south coast of England,
opposite The Needles.

Before my departure for England, the Chancellor, who was much pleased
at the English invitation, had long talks with me as to the best way
for getting on a better footing with England, and had suggested to
me a number of his desires and projects, to serve me as guides in my
conversations with Englishmen. During my visit I had frequent occasion
to discuss the subjects agreed upon and conduct conversations as
desired by the Chancellor. Cipher telegrams containing my reports on
these conversations went regularly to Berlin and I repeatedly received
from the Chancellor approving telegrams. I used to show these after
the evening meal to my intimates who accompanied me on my visit; these
men, among them the Chief Court Marshal Count Eulenburg and Prince Max
Egon Fürstenberg, read them and rejoiced with me at the harmonious
understanding between me and the Chancellor.

After my return from England I made a general report to the Chancellor,
whereupon he expressed to me his thanks for my having personally
troubled myself so much and worked so hard toward improving the
relations between the two countries.


DEFENDS FAMOUS INTERVIEW[6]

A year later came the incident about the so-called "interview,"
published in the _Daily Telegraph_. Its object was the improvement of
German-English relations. I had sent the draft submitted to me to the
Chancellor for examination through the representative of the Foreign
Office, Herr von Jenisch. I had called attention, by means of notes, to
certain portions which, to my way of thinking, did not belong therein
and should be eliminated. Through a series of mistakes on the part of
the Foreign Office, when the matter was taken up at my request, this
was not done.

A storm broke loose in the press. The Chancellor spoke in the
Reichstag, but did not defend the Kaiser, who was the object of attack,
to the extent that I expected, declaring, on the other hand, that he
wished to prevent in future the tendency toward "personal politics"
which had become apparent in the last few years. The Conservative party
took upon itself to address an open letter to the King through the
newspapers, the contents of which are known.

During these proceedings, I was staying first at Eckartsau, with Franz
Ferdinand, heir to the Austrian throne, and later with Kaiser Franz
Joseph at Vienna, both of whom disapproved of the Chancellor's conduct.
From Vienna I went to Donaueschingen to visit Prince Fürstenberg, to
whom the press saw fit to address the demand that he should, being
an honest, upright man, tell the Emperor the truth for once. When we
talked over the whole matter, the Prince advised me to get together,
at the Foreign Office, the dispatches from Highcliffe in 1907, and the
answers to them, and have these laid before the Reichstag.

During this whole affair I underwent great mental anguish, which was
heightened by the sudden death before my eyes of the intimate friend
of my youth, Count Hülsen-Haeseler, chief of the Military Cabinet.
The faithful, self-sacrificing friendship and care of the Prince and
his family were most welcome to me in these bitter days. And letters
and demonstrations from the Empire, part of which sided with me and
severely censured the Chancellor, were a consolation to me during that
period.

After my return, the Chancellor appeared, lectured me on my political
sins, and asked that I sign the document that is already known, which
was afterward communicated to the press. I signed it in silence and in
silence I endured the attacks of the press against myself and the Crown.

The Chancellor struck a serious blow, by his conduct, at the firm
confidence and sincere friendship which had bound me before to him.
Undoubtedly Prince Bülow thought that, handling the matter as he did
both in the Reichstag and with me personally, he could best serve me
and the cause, especially as public excitement was running very high
at that time. In this I could not agree with him, all the more so
since his actions toward me in the _Daily Telegraph_ affair stood out
in too sharp contrast to the complaisance and recognition which Bülow
had previously manifested toward me. I had become so accustomed to the
amiability of the Prince that I found the treatment now accorded me
incomprehensible.


A BREAK WITH BÜLOW

The relationship between Emperor and Chancellor, excellent and amicable
up to that time, was, at all events, disturbed. I gave up personal
relations with the Chancellor and confined myself to official dealings.
After consultation with the Minister of the Royal Household and the
chief of the Cabinet, I resolved to follow Prince Fürstenberg's advice
as to getting together the Highcliffe dispatches, and charged the
Foreign Office with this task. It failed of accomplishment because the
dispatches in question were not to be found.

Toward the end of the winter the Chancellor requested an audience
with me. I walked up and down with him in the picture gallery of the
palace, between the pictures of my ancestors, of the battles of the
Seven Years' War, of the proclamation of the Empire at Versailles,
and was amazed when the Chancellor harked back to the events of the
autumn of 1908 and undertook to explain his attitude. Thereupon I took
occasion to talk with him about the entire past. The frank talk and
the explanations of the Prince satisfied me. The result was that he
remained in office.

The Chancellor requested that I dine with him that evening, as I had so
often done before, in order to show the outer world that all was again
well. I did so. A pleasant evening, enlivened by the visibly delighted
Princess with charming amiability, and by the Prince with his usual
lively, witty talk, closed that memorable day. Alluding to the Prince's
audience with me, a wag wrote later in a newspaper, parodying a famous
line: "The tear flows, Germania has me again."

By this reconciliation I also wished to show that I was in the
habit of sacrificing my own sensitiveness to the good of the cause.
Despite Prince Bülow's attitude toward me in the Reichstag, which
was calculated to pain me, I naturally never forgot his eminent gifts
as a statesman and his distinguished services to the fatherland. He
succeeded, by his skill, in avoiding a world war at several moments of
crisis, during the period indeed, when I, together with Tirpitz, was
building our protecting fleet. That was a great achievement.

A serious epilogue to the above-mentioned audience was provided by the
Conservatives. The Civil Cabinet informed the party leaders of the
Chancellor's audience and what happened there, with the request that
the party might now take back its "Open Letter." This request--which
was made solely in the interest of the Crown, not of myself
personally--was declined by the party. Not until 1916, when the war
was under way, did we get into touch again, through a delegate of the
party, at Great General Headquarters.

Just as the Conservatives did not do enough out of respect for the
Crown to satisfy me, so also the Liberals of the Left, the Democrats
and the Socialists, distinguished themselves by an outburst of fury,
which became, in their partisan press, a veritable orgy, in which
loud demands were made for the limitation of autocratic, despotic
inclinations, etc. This agitation lasted the whole winter, without
hindrance or objection from high Government circles. Only after the
Chancellor's audience did it stop.

Later, a coolness gradually arose between the Chancellor and
the political parties. The Conservatives drew away from the
Liberals--rifts appeared in the bloc. Centrists and Socialists--but,
above all, the Chancellor himself--brought about its downfall, as Count
Hertling repeatedly explained to me later--for the last time at Spa. He
was proud to have worked energetically toward causing Bülow's downfall.

When matters had reached an impossible pass, the Chancellor drew
the proper conclusions and recommended to me the choice of Herr
von Bethmann as the fifth Chancellor of the Empire. After careful
consultations, I decided to acquiesce in the wish of Prince Bülow, to
accept his request for retirement, and to summon the man recommended by
him as his successor.

  [6] One of the most startling incidents of the Kaiser's reign was
      the interview with him printed in the London _Daily Telegraph_
      of Oct. 28, 1908. In it he said that "Englishmen, in giving rein
      to suspicions unworthy of a great nation," were "mad as March
      hares"; and that "the prevailing sentiment among large sections
      of the middle and lower classes of my own people is not friendly
      to England. I am, therefore, so to speak, in a minority in my
      own land, but it is a minority of the best elements, just as it
      is in England with respect to Germany." German opinion was, he
      admitted, "bitterly hostile" to England during the Boer War, and,
      that the German people, if he had permitted Boer delegates in
      Berlin, "would have crowned them with flowers." He asserted that
      he had formulated a plan of campaign in South Africa which Lord
      Roberts adopted in substance.

      The Kaiser was quoted in this interview as declaring Germany
      needed a large fleet chiefly on account of the Far Eastern
      situation.

      The interview was republished in official German organs, and
      caused as great a stir in Germany as in England. There were many
      debates on it in the Reichstag and one or two "investigations."




CHAPTER V

Bethmann


I had been well acquainted since my youth with Herr von Bethmann
Hollweg. When I was in active service for the first time in 1877, as
Lieutenant in the Sixth Company of the First Infantry Guard Regiment,
it was quartered once at Hohenfinow, the home of old Herr von Bethmann,
father of the Chancellor. I was attracted by the pleasant family circle
there, which was presided over by Frau von Bethmann, a most worthy
lady, born of Swiss nationality, amiable and refined.

Often, as Prince and later as Emperor, I went to Hohenfinow to visit
the old gentleman, and I was received on every occasion by the young
head of the rural district administration; at that time neither of us
imagined that he would become Imperial Chancellor under me.

From these visits an intimate relationship sprang up little by little,
which served to increase steadily my esteem for the diligence, ability,
and noble character of Bethmann, which were much to my liking. These
qualities clung to him throughout his career.

As Chief President and as Imperial Secretary of State for the Interior
Bethmann gave a good account of himself, and, while occupying the
last-named post, made his appearance successfully before the Reichstag.

Co-operation with the Chancellor was easy for me. With Bethmann I kept
up my custom of daily visits whenever possible, and of discussing fully
with him, while walking in the garden of the Chancellor's palace, on
politics, events of the day, special bills, and occurrences and of
hearing reports from him. It was also a pleasure for me to visit the
Chancellor's home, since Bethmann's spouse was the very model of a
genuine German wife, one whose simple distinction earned the esteem
of every visitor, while her winning kindness of heart spread around
her an atmosphere of cordiality. During the Bethmann régime the custom
of holding small evening receptions, instituted by Prince Bülow and
most enjoyable to me, was continued, and this enabled me to keep on
associating informally with men of all circles and walks of life.

In the journeys which the Chancellor had to make in order to introduce
himself, he won esteem everywhere by his distinguished calm and sincere
methods of expression. Such foreign countries as were not hostile to us
considered him a factor making for political stability and peace, to
the maintenance and strengthening of which he devoted his most zealous
efforts. This was entirely to my liking.

In foreign politics he busied himself from the start with the position
of England in relation to Germany and with the "policy of encirclement"
of King Edward VII, which had made itself felt more and more since
Reval, and was a source of worry to Bethmann. This was likewise true
of the growing desire for revenge and enmity of France, and the
unreliability of Russia. During his régime as Chancellor it became
clear that Italy was no longer to be reckoned with militarily; the work
of Barrère in that country made "extra tours" chronic.

Upon assuming office, Herr von Bethmann found the situation with regard
to France cleared up to such an extent that the German-French Morocco
Agreement had been signed on February 9, 1909. By recognizing thereby
the political predominance of France in Morocco Prince Bülow had put
the finishing touch to the German political retreat from Morocco. The
standpoint which had determined the trip to Tangier and, in addition,
the Algeciras Conference, was thereby definitely abandoned. The great
satisfaction of the French Government over this victory was expressed
in a manner unwelcome to us by the conferring of the cross of the
Legion of Honor upon Prince Radolin and Herr von Schoen.


RECEIVES BRITISH ROYALTY

On the same day King Edward VII, with Queen Alexandra, made his first
official visit to the German Emperor and his wife at their capital
city of Berlin--eight years after his accession to the throne! Berlin
received the exalted gentleman with rejoicing (!!) and showed no signs
of dissatisfaction at his unfriendly policy.

The King did not look well; he was tired and aged, and suffered,
moreover, from a severe attack of catarrh. Nevertheless, he accepted
the invitation of the municipal authorities of Berlin to informal tea
at the City Hall. From his description, which was corroborated by
Berlin gentlemen, the function must have been satisfactory to both
parties.

I informed my uncle of the signing of the German-French Morocco
Agreement and the news seemed to please him. When I added, "I hope this
agreement will be a stepping stone to a better understanding between
the two countries," the King nodded his head approvingly and said, "May
that be so!" If the King had co-operated toward this, my project would
probably not have failed. Nevertheless, the visit of Their English
Majesties engendered a more friendly atmosphere for the time being,
which greeted Herr von Bethmann upon his assuming office.

During his term of office Herr von Bethmann had plenty of foreign
matters to handle, connected with the well-known events of 1909-14.
Concerning this period a mass of material has been published in
different quarters, for instance, in the book, _Causes of the World
War_, by Secretary of State von Jagow. In the _Belgian Documents_ the
attitude of the German Government in the various complications is
described from a neutral standpoint. I had based this attitude on the
following:

    Caution on the one hand, on the other, support of our
    Austro-Hungarian allies whenever there is a plain threat against
    their position as a world power, combined with counsels of
    moderation in action. Efforts in the rôle of "honest broker"
    everywhere, activity as a go-between wherever peace seems
    endangered. Firm assertion of our own interests.

In view of the "encirclement" ambitions of our opponents, we were in
duty bound, for the sake of self-preservation, to work steadily at
the same time toward building up our army and navy for purposes of
defense, because of the central location of Germany and her open,
unprotected frontiers. This period of history is also well described in
Stegemann's book, and Helfferich and Friedjung also depict the prewar
days interestingly.


"EDWARD THE ENCIRCLER"

The death of the "encircler," Edward VII--of whom it was said once, in
a report of the Belgian Embassy at Berlin, that "the peace of Europe
was never in such danger as when the King of England concerned himself
with maintaining it"--called me to London, where I shared with my close
relations, the members of the English royal family, the mourning into
which the passing of the King had thrown the dynasty and the nation.
The entire royal family received me at the railway station as a token
of their gratitude for the deference to family ties shown by my coming.

King George drove with me to Westminster Hall, where the gorgeously
decorated coffin reposed upon a towering catafalque, guarded by
household troops, troops of the line, and detachments from the
Indian and Colonial contingents, all in the traditional attitude of
mourning--heads bowed, hands crossed over the butts and hilts of their
reversed arms. The old, gray hall, covered by its great Gothic wooden
ceiling, towered imposingly over the catafalque, lighted merely by a
few rays of the sun filtering through narrow windows. One ray flooded
the magnificent coffin of the King, surmounted by the English crown,
and made marvelous play with the colors of the precious stones adorning
it.

Past the catafalque countless throngs of men, women, and children of
all classes and strata in the nation passed in silence, many with hands
folded to bid a reverent farewell to him who had been so popular as a
ruler. A most impressive picture, in its marvelous mediæval setting.

I went up to the catafalque, with King George, placed a cross upon it,
and spoke a silent prayer, after which my right hand and that of my
royal cousin found each other, quite unconsciously on our part, and met
in a firm clasp. This made a deep impression on those who witnessed it,
to such an extent that, in the evening, one of my relations said to me:
"Your handshake with our King is all over London: the people are deeply
impressed by it, and take it as a good omen for the future."

"That is the sincerest wish of my heart," I replied.

As I rode through London behind the coffin of my uncle I was a witness
of the tremendous and impressive demonstration of grief on the part
of the vast multitude--estimated at several millions--on streets,
balconies, and roofs, every one of whom was clad in black, every man
of whom stood with bared head, among all of whom reigned perfect order
and absolute stillness. Upon this somber, solemn background the files
of British soldiers stood out all the more gorgeously. In splendid
array marched the battalions of the English Guards: Grenadiers, Scots
Guards, Coldstreams, Irish Guards--in their perfectly-fitting coats,
white leather facings, and heavy bearskin headgear; all picked troops
of superb appearance and admirable martial bearing, a joy to any man
with the heart of a soldier. And all the troops lining the path of the
funeral cortège stood in the attitude of mourning already described.

During my stay I resided, at the special desire of King George, in
Buckingham Palace. The widow of the dead King, Queen Alexandra,
received me with moving and charming kindness, and talked much with me
about bygone days; my recollections stretched back to my childhood,
since I, while still a little boy, had been present at the wedding of
my dead uncle.


THE PICHON CONVERSATION

The King gave a banquet to the many princely guests and their suites,
as well as for the representatives of foreign nations, at which M.
Pichon was also present. He was introduced to me and, in conversation
with him, I told him of the wishes which the Imperial Chancellor had
communicated to me regarding our interests in Morocco and some other
political matters, which M. Pichon readily agreed to carry out. All
other combinations connected in various quarters with this talk, belong
in the domain of fancy.

Although the period between 1909 and 1914 demanded extraordinary
attention to foreign events, interior development was, nevertheless,
promoted zealously, and efforts made to meet the demands of commerce,
transportation, agriculture, and industry, which were growing rapidly.
Unfortunately endeavors in this direction were made much more difficult
by the discord among political parties.

The Chancellor wished to accomplish everything possible of
accomplishment. But his inclination to get to the bottom of problems
and his desire to deal only with what was, from his meticulous critical
standpoint, thoroughly matured, tended, in the course of time, to
hamper progress. It was difficult to bring him to make decisions
before he was thoroughly convinced of their being absolutely free from
objection. This made working with him tiresome and aroused in those not
close to him the impression of vacillation, whereas, in reality, it was
merely overconscientiousness carried too far.

In addition, the Chancellor eventually developed a strong and growing
inclination toward domination; in discussions this tended to make
him obstinate and caused him to lay down the law to those thinking
otherwise as dogmatically as a school teacher. This brought him many
enemies and often made things hard for me. A boyhood friend of the
Chancellor, to whom I spoke once about this, replied, with a smile,
that it had been so with him even in school; there Herr von Bethmann
had constantly taught and school-mastered his fellow students, of whom
my informant was one, so that finally his classmates had nicknamed
him "the governess." He added that this trait was a misfortune for
Bethmann, but that it had so grown into his very being that he would
never be able to get rid of it.

An example of this is Bethmann's relationship to Herr von Kiderlen,
whom he desired to have as Secretary of State, despite my emphatic
objections. Herr von Kiderlen was an able worker and a man of strong
character, who always sought to assert his independence. He had been
about one year in office when Herr von Bethmann came to me one day,
complained of Kiderlen's obstinacy and insubordination, and asked me
to appeal to his conscience. I declined, with the observation that the
Chancellor had chosen Kiderlen against my wishes and must now manage to
get along with him; that the maintenance of discipline at the Foreign
Office was a duty devolving upon the Chancellor, in which I had no
desire to interfere.


FINDS FAULT WITH BETHMANN

Meanwhile, Bethmann's inadequacy to the post of Chancellor became
evident. Deep down in his heart he was a pacifist and was obsessed
with the aberration of coming to an understanding with England. I can
perfectly well understand that a man of pacifist inclinations should
act thus in the hope of avoiding a war thereby. His object was entirely
in accord with my policy. The ways and means whereby Bethmann sought
to achieve it were, in my opinion, unsuitable. Nevertheless, I backed
his endeavors. But I certainly did not believe that real success would
result. It became ever more apparent, while he was Chancellor, that
he was remote from political realities. Yet he always knew everything
better than anybody else. Owing to this overestimation of his own
powers he stuck unswervingly to his ideas, even when things all turned
out differently from what he had expected.

His reports were always admirably prepared, brilliant in form, and,
hence, impressive and attractive. And in this there was an element of
danger. In his opinion there was always but one solution, the one which
he proposed! The apparent solidity and thoroughness of his reports and
suggestions, the illuminating treatment of the matters reported upon
from every angle, the references to experts, to foreign and native
statesmen and diplomats, etc., easily led to the impression that solely
the Bethmann solution was worthy of consideration. In spite of these
thorough preparations, he made mistake after mistake.

Thus he had an actual share in our misfortune. When I returned from my
Norwegian trip in 1914 he did not place his resignation in my hands,
to be sure, but he admitted that his political calculations had gone
wrong. Nevertheless, I left him in office, even after his Reichstag
speech and the English declaration of war of August 4, 1914, because I
considered it most serious to change the highest official in the Empire
at the most critical moment in German history. The unanimous attitude
of the nation in the face of the challenge from the Entente might have
been impaired by such action.

Moreover, both the Chancellor and the chief of the Civil Cabinet
maintained that they had the working classes behind them. I was loath
to deprive the working classes, which behaved in an exemplary manner in
1914, of the statesman whom, I had been told, they trusted.

The theory, constantly repeated to me in 1914 by the chief of the
Civil Cabinet and the representative of the Foreign Office, that
only Bethmann had the support of the working classes, was finally
supplemented further by reports to me that the Chancellor enjoyed the
confidence in foreign countries which was necessary to the conclusion
of peace. Thus it came about that Bethmann always stayed in office,
until, finally, the Crown Prince made the well-known investigation
among the party leaders which showed that the above-mentioned theory
was mistaken. This mistake was made all the clearer to me when I read,
at the time of Bethmann's dismissal--to which other factors also
contributed--the most unfavorable opinions of him, especially in the
Social Democratic and Democratic press.

I do not wish to blame Bethmann with these frank remarks, nor to
exonerate others; but, when such important matters are discussed,
personal considerations must be ignored. I never doubted the nobility
of Bethmann's sentiments.

May I be allowed to say a few words here concerning the reform in the
Prussian franchise, since the handling of this by Herr von Bethmann
is characteristic of his policy of vacillation. During the winter of
1914-15, when, following the brilliant summer campaign, the hard,
severe winter trench-fighting had brought military movements to a
standstill, the extraordinary achievements of all the troops and the
spirit which I had found among officers and men, both at the front and
in the hospitals, made such a profound impression on me that I resolved
to provide, for the tried, magnificent "Nation in Arms," something in
the political domain, when it returned home, which should prove that I
recognized what it had done and wished to give the nation joy.

I often touched upon this theme in conversations and suggested reforms
in the Prussian franchise; the man, said I, who returned home, after a
struggle like this, with the Iron Cross--perhaps of both classes--must
no longer be "classified" at the polls.

At this juncture a memorial was submitted to me by Herr von Loebell
which proposed a reform in the Prussian franchise on similar grounds.
The concise, clear, and convincing treatment of the subject pleased me
so much that I had a number of gentlemen read the memorial, which took
up, in its original form, only general points of view, without going
into detail, and I was pleased to see that it found approval with all
whom I questioned concerning it.

I had my thanks expressed to Herr von Loebell through the chief of the
Cabinet, von Valentini, and caused Loebell to work out the matter in
detail and make suggestions. This was done in the spring of 1915. The
memorial was very thorough and dealt with a number of possibilities
for the franchise, without advising any one system. It was approved
by me, and sent by the chief of the Cabinet to the Chancellor, with
the command that it be discussed, in the course of the year, by the
Ministers, and that their vote on it--possibly, also, some suggestions
from them--be laid before me. The franchise law, of course, was not to
be proposed until after the conclusion of peace.


EARLY GERMAN VICTORIES

Immediately after that I went to Pless. The battle of Gorlice-Tarnow,
with its smashing victory over the enemy, brought on the
Galician-Polish campaign, leading to the reconquest of Lemberg,
Przemysl and the capture of Warsaw, Ivangorod, Modlin, Brest-Litovsk,
etc., and completely engaged my attention.

The _Lusitania_ case, too, cast its shadow over events, and Italy
severed her alliance with us. So it is not to be wondered at if the
franchise memorial was pushed into the background.

The next winter, and the summer of 1916, likewise, with their fighting
on all fronts, the terrible battle of the Somme, and the brilliant
Rumanian autumn and winter campaign, took me to all sorts of places on
the western and eastern fronts, even as far as Nisch--where the first
memorable meeting with the Bulgarian Tsar took place--and to Orsova,
so that I had no opportunity to take up the matter of franchise reform
with the care that its importance demanded.

In the spring of 1917 I asked the Chancellor to draw up an announcement
of the reform, to be made to the nation at Easter, since I assumed that
the Ministers had long since discussed it. The Chancellor drew up the
text of the proclamation at Hamburg, in agreement with the chief of the
Cabinet and myself; he proposed that the method of voting be left open
for the time being, since he was not yet quite sure about this. The
Easter proclamation appeared; it was based, like previous treatments of
the matter, on the idea that the reform was not to be introduced until
after the conclusion of peace, because most of the voters were away
facing the enemy.

Party and press did what they could to postpone the accomplishment of
my purpose by recriminations and strife, by bringing up the question
of the Prussian Reichstag franchise, and by the demand for the
introduction of the franchise bill while the war was still in progress.
Thus the question embarked upon its well-known and not very pleasant
course, which dragged itself out on account of the interminable
negotiations in the Landtag. It was not until after the retirement of
Herr von Bethmann that I learned through Loebell that the memorial
of 1915 had never been submitted to the Ministers, but had lain
untouched for a year and a half in a desk drawer; that the Chancellor,
influenced by the desires expressed in the country, had dropped the
various systems proposed and concentrated upon the general (Reichstag)
franchise, of the eventual introduction of which he was, doubtless,
inwardly convinced.

In any event, the original basic idea was thoroughly bungled by
Bethmann's dilatoriness and the strife among the parties. What I wanted
was to present a gift of honor, of my own free will, on its triumphal
return home, to my victorious army, to my "Nation in Arms," my brave
Prussians, with whom I had stood before the enemy.


CHANCELLOR'S DIPLOMATIC POWER

One of the results of Bethmann's marked inclination toward control
was that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs was, under him, a
mere helper, so much so that the Foreign Office was almost affiliated
with the office of the Chancellor, a state of affairs that made itself
felt most especially in the use made of the press department. Bethmann
likewise asserted his independence decidedly in his relations with me.
Basing himself upon the fact that, constitutionally, the Chancellor
alone is responsible for foreign policy, he ruled as he pleased. The
Foreign Office was allowed to tell me only what the Chancellor wished,
so that it happened sometimes that I was not informed concerning
important occurrences.

The fact that this was possible is to be laid at the door of the
Constitution of the Empire. And this is the right place for saying a
word concerning the relations between the Emperor and the Chancellor.
In what follows I do not refer to my relationship to Herr von Bethmann,
but, quite impersonally, to the difficulties in the relationship of the
German Emperor to the Imperial Chancellors, which are caused by the
Imperial Constitution.

I wish to call attention to the following points:

1. According to the Constitution of the Empire, the Chancellor is the
director and representative of the foreign policy of the Empire, for
which he assumes full responsibility; he has this policy carried out by
the Foreign Office, which is subordinated to him, after he has reported
on it to the Emperor.

2. The Emperor has influence on foreign policy only in so far as the
Chancellor grants it to him.

3. The Emperor can bring his influence to bear through discussions,
information, suggestion, proposals, reports, and impressions received
by him on his travels, which then take rank as a supplement to the
political reports of the ambassadors or ministers to the countries
which he has personally visited.

4. The Chancellor _may_ act pursuant to such action by the Emperor, and
may make it the basis of his decisions, whenever he is in agreement
with the Emperor's point of view. Otherwise he is supposed to maintain
_his own_ point of view and carry it out (Kruger dispatch).

5. According to the Constitution, the Emperor has no means of
compelling the Chancellor or the Foreign Office to accept his views.
He cannot cause the Chancellor to adopt a policy for which the latter
feels that he cannot assume responsibility. Should the Emperor stick to
his view, the Chancellor can offer his resignation or demand that he be
relieved of his post.

6. On the other hand, the Emperor has no constitutional means of
hindering the Chancellor or the Foreign Office from carrying out a
policy which he thinks doubtful or mistaken. All he can do, if the
Chancellor insists, is to make a change in the Chancellorship.

7. Every change of Chancellors, however, is a serious matter, deeply
affecting the life of the nation, and hence, at a time of political
complications and high tension, an extremely serious step, an ultima
ratio (last resort) which is all the more daring in that the number of
men qualified to fill this abnormally difficult post is very small.

The position of the Imperial Chancellor, which was based on the
towering personality of Prince Bismarck, had assumed a serious
preponderance through the constantly growing number of posts under
the Empire, over all of which the Chancellor was placed as chief and
responsible head.


DISCLAIMS RESPONSIBILITY

If this is borne in mind, it is absolutely impossible that anybody
should still hold the Emperor alone responsible for everything, as was
done formerly, especially toward the end of the war and after the war,
by critical know-it-alls and carping revolutionists, both at home and
in the Entente countries. That, quite apart from everything personal,
is a proof of complete ignorance of the earlier Constitution of the
German Empire.

The visit of the Tsar to Potsdam in November, 1910, went off to the
satisfaction of all concerned, and was utilized by the Chancellor and
Herr von Kiderlen to get into touch with the newly appointed Foreign
Minister, Sazonoff, whom the Tsar had brought with him. Apparently,
the Russian ruler enjoyed himself among us, and he took an active
part in the hunt arranged in his honor, at which he proved himself an
enthusiastic huntsman. The result of the conferences between the two
statesmen seemed to promise well for the future; both, after they had
felt each other out, harbored the hope of favorable relations between
the two countries.

During my spring visit to Corfu, the Melissori troubles began, which
riveted Greek attention upon themselves. Corfu was well informed of
the constant smuggling of arms from Italy by way of Valona into
Albania, and there was a feeling in Greek circles that machinations
from across the Adriatic, as well as from Montenegro, were not without
responsibility for what was happening. It was also felt that the new
Turkish Government had not been wise in its handling of the Albanians,
who were very sensitive and suspicious; the former Sultan Abdul-Hamid
had realized this very well and understood admirably how to get along
with the Albanians and to keep them quiet. Nevertheless, there was no
fear that more serious complications would ensue.

At the beginning of 1911 I received a most cordial invitation from King
George of England to be present at the unveiling of the statue of Queen
Victoria, the grandmother of both of us. Therefore I went in the middle
of May to London with the Empress and our daughter. The reception on
the part of the English royal family and the people of London was
cordial.

The unveiling festivities were well arranged and very magnificent.
The big, round space in front of Buckingham Palace was surrounded by
grandstands, which were filled to overflowing by invited guests. In
front of them were files of soldiers of all arms and all regiments of
the British army, in full parade uniform, the cavalry and artillery
being on foot. All the banners of the troops were arrayed at the foot
of the statue.

The royal family, with their guests and their suites, was grouped
around the statue. King George made a dedication speech which had a
good effect, in which he made mention also of the German Imperial
couple.

Then, amid salutes and greetings, the statue was unveiled; the Queen,
in marble, seated upon a throne, became visible, surmounted by a golden
figure of victory. It was an impressive moment. Afterward the troops
marched past, the Guards in the van, then the Highlanders--who, with
their gayly colored, becoming costume, gave an especially picturesque
touch to the military spectacle--then the rest of the soldiers. The
march past was carried out on the circular space, with all the troops
constantly wheeling: the outer wings had to step out, the inner to hold
back--a most difficult task for troops. The evolution was carried out
brilliantly; not one man made a mistake. The Duke of Connaught, who had
made all the military arrangements, deservedly won unanimous applause.


FESTIVITIES IN ENGLAND

The remainder of our stay in England was devoted to excursions; we also
enjoyed the hospitality of noble English families, at whose homes there
was an opportunity to hold intercourse with many members of English
nobility.

Special enjoyment in the domain of art was provided by the King to his
guests by a theatrical performance at Drury Lane Theater. A well-known
English play, "Money," was performed, by a company especially
assembled for the occasion, consisting of the leading actors and
actresses of London. As a surprise, a curtain fell between the acts,
painted especially for the occasion by a lady, which depicted King
George and me, life size, on horseback, riding toward each other and
saluting militarily. The picture was executed with much dash and was
enthusiastically acclaimed by the audience.

The performance of the actors and actresses in "Money" was veritably
masterly, since all concerned played their rôles, even the smallest, to
perfection. In fact, it was a classic performance.

Another day I attended, at the Olympia track, the sports of the British
army and navy, which included admirable individual feats on foot and
horseback, as well as evolutions by bodies of troops in close formation.

In describing the unveiling of the statue, as well as the funeral of
King Edward VII, I have concerned myself purposely with the externals
and pomp that are characteristic of such occasions in England. They
show that, in a land under parliamentary rule, a so-called democratic
land, more importance is attached to well-nigh mediæval magnificence
than in the young German Empire.

The French actions in Morocco, which were no longer such as could
be reconciled with the Algeciras Agreement, had once more engaged
the attention of the diplomats. For this reason the Chancellor had
requested me to find out, as soon as opportunity should arise, what
King George thought about the situation.

I asked him if he thought that the French methods were still in
accordance with the Algeciras Agreement. The King remarked that the
agreement, to tell the truth, no longer was in force, and that the best
thing to do would be to forget it; that the French, fundamentally, were
doing nothing different in Morocco from what the English had previously
done in Egypt; that, therefore, England would place no obstacles in the
path of the French, but would let them alone; that the thing to do was
to recognize the "fait accompli" of the occupation of Morocco and make
arrangements, for commercial protection, with France.

To the very end the visit went off well, and the inhabitants of London,
of all social strata, expressed their good will every time the guests
of their King showed themselves.

Thus the German Imperial couple was enabled to return home with the
best of impressions. When I informed the Chancellor of these, he
expressed great satisfaction. From the remarks of King George he drew
the inference that England considered the Algeciras Agreement no longer
valid and would not place any obstacles in the way of the French
occupation of Morocco.

From this the policy followed by him and the Foreign Office arose which
led to the Agadir case, the last and equally unsuccessful attempt to
maintain our influence in Morocco. The situation became more serious
during the Kiel regatta week. The Foreign Office informed me of its
intention to send the _Panther_ to Agadir. I gave expression to strong
misgivings as to this step, but had to drop them in view of the urgent
representations of the Foreign Office.

In the first half of 1912 came the sending of Sir Ernest Cassel with
a verbal note in which England offered to remain neutral in case of
an "unprovoked" attack upon Germany, provided Germany agreed to limit
her naval construction program and to drop her new Naval bill, the
latter being darkly hinted at. Owing to our favorable answer to this
Lord Haldane was intrusted with the negotiations and sent to Berlin.
The negotiations finally fell through, owing to the constantly more
uncompromising attitude of England (Sir E. Grey), who finally disavowed
Lord Haldane and withdrew his own verbal note, because Grey was afraid
to offend the French by a German-English agreement and jeopardize the
Anglo-French-Russian understanding.

Here are the details of the case:

On the morning of January 29, 1912, Herr Ballin had himself announced
to me at the palace in Berlin and asked for an audience. I assumed that
it was a case of a belated birthday greeting, therefore I was not a
little astonished when Ballin, after a short speech of congratulation,
said that he had come as an emissary of Sir Ernest Cassel, who had just
arrived in Berlin on a special mission and wished to be received.

I asked whether it was a political matter, and why, if so, the meeting
had not been arranged through the English ambassador. Ballin's answer
was to the effect that, from hints dropped by Cassel, he knew the
matter to be of great importance, and the explanation for Cassel's
acting without the intervention of the ambassador was because the
earnest desire had been expressed in London that the official
diplomatic representatives, both the English and the German, should not
be apprised of the affair.

I declared that I was ready to receive Cassel at once, but added that,
should his mission have to do with political questions, I should
immediately summon the Chancellor, since I was a constitutional monarch
and not in a position to deal with the representative of a foreign
power alone without the Chancellor.

Ballin fetched Cassel, who handed me a document which, he stated,
had been prepared with the "approval and knowledge of the English
Government." I read the short note through and was not a little
surprised to see that I was holding in my hand a formal offer
of neutrality in case Germany became involved in future warlike
complications, conditioned upon certain limitations in the carrying out
of our program of naval construction, which were to be the subject of
mutual conferences and agreements. Walking with Ballin into the next
room, I handed over the document for him to read. After he had done so
both of us exclaimed in the same breath: "A verbal note!"

It was plainly apparent that this "verbal note" was aimed at the
forthcoming addition to our Naval law and designed in some way to delay
or frustrate it. No matter how the matter was interpreted, I found
myself confronted with a peculiar situation, which also amazed Ballin.
It reminded me of the situation at Cronberg-Friedrichshof in 1905,
when I was obliged to decline the demand, made to me personally by the
English Under Secretary, Hardinge, that we should forego our naval
construction.


SURPRISE AT BRITISH NOTE

Now, an intimate business friend of Edward VII appears, without
previous announcement through official diplomatic channels, before the
German Emperor with a "verbal note" inspired by the English Government,
with explicit instructions to evade all the diplomatic officials of
both countries. He hands over an offer from the English Government to
maintain neutrality in future warlike complications provided certain
agreements regarding limitation of naval construction are made. And
this is done by England, the mother of "Constitutionalism"! When I
pointed this out to Ballin, he exclaimed: "Holy Constitutionalism! What
has become of you? That is 'personal politics' with a vengeance!"

I agreed with Ballin to send at once for Herr von Bethmann, in order
that he might learn what was transpiring and decide what to do in this
peculiar situation.

Bethmann was called up on the telephone and soon appeared. At first the
situation aroused in him likewise a certain degree of astonishment; it
was interesting to watch the play of expression on his face as he was
told about the matter. The Chancellor suggested that Grand Admiral von
Tirpitz also be summoned, for the proper dispatching of the business,
and recommended that an answer be drawn up in English, in the same
manner and form as the note delivered by Cassel, and that it be handed
to Sir Ernest, who wished to return home that night. (English was
chosen because there was fear of obscurity and misunderstanding if the
note were translated in London.) The Chancellor asked me to draw up the
note, since I knew English best. After some objection I had to make up
my mind to be myself the writer of the answer.

And now the following scene took place:

I sat at the writing table in the adjutant's room; the other gentlemen
stood around me. I would read a sentence from the note aloud and sketch
out an answer, which was, in turn, read aloud. Then criticisms were
made from right and left: one thought the sentence too complaisant,
another too abrupt; it was thereupon remodeled, recast, improved, and
polished. The Chancellor particularly subjected my grammar and style
to much torture, owing to his habit of probing things philosophically,
to his methods of profound thoroughness, which caused him to be most
particular with every word, in order that it, having been studied from
every angle, should later on afford nobody cause for criticism.

After hours of work the note was finally finished and, having been
passed a couple of times from hand to hand and then read aloud by me
half a dozen times more, it was signed.

When our group broke up, the Chancellor asked Sir Ernest who was to be
expected from England to conduct the negotiations. Cassel replied that
it would certainly be a Minister, which one he did not know--perhaps
Mr. Winston Churchill, Minister of the Navy, since the question was
a naval one. Then the Chancellor arranged further with him that the
unofficial method should be retained and that Ballin should undertake
to transmit all the news regarding the matter which should emanate from
England.

Sir Ernest expressed his lively gratitude for his cordial reception
and his satisfaction at the tenor of our reply. Later Ballin informed
me from his hotel that Cassel had expressed himself as completely
satisfied over the successful outcome of his mission, and that he would
report to his Government the good impression made upon him.

When I thereupon conferred on the matter with Admiral von Tirpitz we
both agreed that the Naval bill was in danger and, therefore, that we
must be very careful.


DIPLOMATIC PREPAREDNESS

In perfect secrecy the material was collected which Admiral von Tirpitz
was to present at the negotiations; it consisted of a short historical
sketch of the development of the fleet and of the increasingly
difficult tasks devolving upon it; the Naval law and its aims, nature,
enactment, and extension; finally, the contemplated Naval bill, its
meaning and the method of putting it through.

The Chancellor asked that the main negotiations should be conducted
at the palace in my presence. In addition, I agreed with Admiral von
Tirpitz that he should speak English, as far as possible, and that I,
in case of difficult technical expressions, would interpret.

Until England made known the name of the negotiator, our time was spent
in suppositions, and Ballin informed us of combinations in connection
with which a number of names, even that of Grey, came up.

At last the news arrived, through Ballin, that Haldane--the Minister of
War, previously a lawyer--had been intrusted with the conduct of the
negotiations and would soon arrive. General amazement! Just imagine,
"mutatis mutandis," that Germany had sent her Minister of War (at that
time von Heeringen) to London, instead of Admiral von Tirpitz, for the
discussion of a naval matter!

When this point was discussed with Bethmann and Tirpitz a number of
suppositions were advanced; the Chancellor said that Haldane was
known in England as a student of Goethe and as a man versed in German
philosophy and knowing the German language, so that his choice was
a piece of politeness toward us. Tirpitz observed that Haldane had
formerly spent some time in Berlin and worked with General von Einem at
the War Ministry, and hence knew the state of affairs in Germany. I
suggested that all that was very well, but that the choice of Haldane
showed that England looked upon the question as purely political, since
he knew only superficially about naval affairs; that the whole thing
was probably directed against Germany's naval policy in general and the
new Naval bill in particular; that it would be well, therefore, not to
forget this, in order that the whole thing might not develop into a
foreign assault upon our right of self-determination as to the strength
of our defensive measures.

Haldane arrived and was received as an Imperial guest. Ballin, who
accompanied him, solved the riddle of Haldane's choice on the basis of
information received by him from England.

He said that when Cassel had got back to London, reported on his
reception, and handed over the German reply, the impression made was
so favorable that no further doubt was entertained there as to the
satisfactory course of the negotiations and their conclusion in the
form of an agreement; that, thereupon a keen dispute had arisen among
the Ministers, especially between Churchill and Grey, as to who should
go to Berlin and affix his name to this great historical document, in
case the object should be achieved of making Germany completely give up
the further development of her fleet; that Churchill thought himself
the right man for the job, since he was at the head of the navy. But
Grey and Asquith would not let their colleague reap the glory, and, for
this reason, Grey stood for a while in the foreground--another proof
that it was politics rather than the number of ships which was to play
the leading rôle.


SELECTION OF CHURCHILL

After a while, however, it was decided that it was more fitting
to Grey's personal and official importance to appear only at the
termination of the negotiations, to affix his name to the agreement,
and--as it was put in the information transmitted from England to
Ballin--"to get his dinner from the Emperor and to come in for his part
of the festivities and fireworks"--which, in good German, means to
enjoy the "Bengal light illumination."

As it had been decided that Churchill was not to get this in any event,
it was necessary to choose somebody for the negotiations who was close
to Asquith and Grey and who, possessing their complete confidence, was
willing to conduct the negotiations as far as the beginning of the
"fireworks"; one who, moreover, was already known at Berlin and not
a stranger in Germany. Churchill, to be sure, qualified in this, for
he had been present a few times at the Imperial maneuvers in Silesia
and Württemberg as a guest of the Emperor. Ballin guaranteed the
reliability of his London source of information.

Before the negotiations began I once more pointed out to Secretary of
State von Tirpitz that Haldane, in spite of being just then Minister
of War, probably had prepared himself for his task, and had surely
received careful instructions from the English Admiralty, in which
the spirit of Fisher was paramount. In his _Handbook for English Naval
Officers_, Fisher had stated, among other precepts well worthy of being
remembered, one which is characteristic of the Admiral, his department
and its spirit, which runs, word for word, as follows: "If you tell a
lie, stick to it."

Moreover, I said to Tirpitz, we must not forget what an amazing
adaptability the Anglo-Saxons had, which fitted them for occupying
positions which had no relation to their previous life and training.
Furthermore, the interest in England in the navy was generally so
intense that almost every educated man was an expert up to a certain
point on naval questions.

In the course of the negotiations Haldane proved himself admirably
well informed and a skillful, tenacious debater, and his brilliant
qualities as a lawyer came to the fore. The conversation lasted several
hours, and brought about a general clarifying, as well as a preliminary
agreement as to postponement of time limits of ship construction, etc.
The details concerning it are deposited in documents at the Imperial
Naval Office. Tirpitz was splendid.

After some more conferences--at which, likewise, Ballin was
present--Haldane returned to England. Ballin informed me that Haldane
had expressed himself to him as entirely satisfied with the outcome of
his mission, and had stated that in about a week or two the first draft
of the agreement could be sent to us.

Time passed--the date set for the introduction of the Naval bill
approached. Tirpitz suggested, in case the agreement were concluded
previously, that the Naval bill be altered accordingly; otherwise, that
it be introduced without alteration.


SUSPECTS ENGLISH PURPOSES

At last we received, not the draft of the agreement, but a document
asking all sorts of questions and expressing a desire for all sorts of
data, a reply to which required many consultations and much reflection.
Little by little the suspicion grew in me that the English were not in
earnest with regard to the agreement, since question followed question
and details were sought which had nothing directly to do with the
agreement. England withdrew more and more from her promises, and no
draft of the agreement came to hand.

In Berlin a big agitation set in against the Naval bill, Tirpitz and
myself on the part of the Foreign Office, and from other quarters,
both qualified and unqualified. The Chancellor also, who hoped to
achieve the agreement and affix his name to a document which would
free Germany from "encirclement" and bring her into a regular and
better relationship with England, came out in favor of dropping the
Naval bill. But that would simply have meant allowing a foreign
power enormous influence in matters of German national defense and
jeopardizing thereby the national right of self-determination and
our readiness for battle in case of a war being forced upon us. Had
we allowed this it would have amounted to our consenting to permit
England, Germany's principal foe, to grant us whatever she wished,
after consulting her own interests, without receiving ourselves the
guaranty of any equivalent concession.

In this confused state of affairs differences of opinion and violent
disputes arose, which, especially in those circles which really knew
little about the navy, were conducted with much violence and not
always in a practical manner. Admiral von Tirpitz, all through that
winter, which was so hard a one for him and me, fought his fight like
a genuine, patriotic officer, realizing the situation and seeing
through his opponents with clear vision and supporting me with complete
conviction to the limit of his ability. All the Government officials
agreed that no foreign country could be allowed any voice in helping
decide what we had or had not to do toward insuring our protection.

The hope of bringing about the agreement grew ever fainter; England
continually showed lessening interest and kept eliminating important
parts of her original verbal note. And so it came about that Admiral
von Tirpitz and I realized that the whole proposal was merely a
"maneuver."

The fight over the German Naval bill grew steadily hotter. I happened
at this time to meet at Cuxhaven Doctor von Burchard, President of the
Hamburg Senate, whom I respected greatly, as he was the very model of
an aristocratic citizen of a Hanseatic city, and who had often been
consulted by me in political matters. I described to him the entire
course of the affair and the disputes in Berlin as to the introduction
or nonintroduction of the bill, and asked him then to tell me, with his
usual complete frankness, what he thought the right thing to do in the
interest of the national welfare, since I greatly desired to hear an
objective opinion, uninfluenced by the rival camps of Berlin.

Doctor Burchard replied in his clear, keen, pointed, convincing
manner that it was my duty toward the people and the fatherland to
stick to the bill; that whosoever spoke against its introduction was
committing a sin against them; that whatever we thought necessary
to our defense must be unconditionally brought into being; that,
above all else, we must never permit a foreign country to have the
presumption to interfere with us; that the English offer was a feint
to make us drop the Naval bill; that this must, in no circumstances,
be allowed; that the German nation would not understand why its
right of self-determination had been sacrificed; that the bill must
unquestionably be introduced; that he would work in its favor in the
Federal Council (as indeed he did in a brilliant, compelling speech)
and also otherwise press its acceptance in Berlin; that the English
would naturally resort to abuse, but that this made no difference,
since they had been doing so for a long time; that they certainly
would not get into a war for such a cause; that Admiral von Tirpitz
was merely doing his duty and fulfilling his obligations, and that
I should support him in every way; that the Chancellor must give up
opposing the measure, otherwise he would run the risk of finally
forfeiting public esteem on account of being "pro-English."

Thus spoke the representative of the great commercial city, which was
threatened before all others in case of war with England. The genuine
Hanseatic spirit inspired his words.

Strangely enough, this opinion of Doctor Burchard concerning the
English offer has recently been corroborated to me in Holland by a
Dutchman who heard from Englishmen at that time the English point of
view. I and Tirpitz guessed right--the offer of neutrality, in case
naval expansion was curbed, was a political maneuver.


COUNTERCHARGES OF CHEATING

Soon news also came from Ballin that the matter was not going well in
England: that, according to information received, a dispute had arisen
about the agreement; that there was dissatisfaction with Haldane, who,
it was said, had let himself be cheated by Tirpitz! This was plain
evidence of the indignation felt because Tirpitz had not walked into
the trap and simply let the bill drop, and that Haldane had been unable
to serve up the bill to the English Cabinet on a platter at tea time.
It is useless to say that there was any "cheating" on Germany's part,
but the reproach leveled at Haldane justifies the suspicion that his
instructions were that _he_ should seek to "cheat" the Germans. Since
his fellow countrymen thought that the reverse was true, one can but
thank Admiral von Tirpitz most sincerely for having correctly asserted
the German standpoint to the benefit of our fatherland.

Toward the end of March the fight about the bill took on such violence
that finally the Chancellor, on the 22d, asked me for his dismissal
as I stepped out of the vault in the Charlottenburg Park. After long
consultation and after I had told him Doctor Burchard's view, the
Chancellor withdrew his request.

When, some time afterward, I paid a visit to Herr von Bethmann in his
garden, I found him quite overcome and holding in his hand a message
from London. It contained the entire disavowal of the verbal note
delivered by Cassel, the withdrawal of the offer of neutrality, as well
as of every other offer, and at the end the advice that I dismiss Herr
von Bethmann from the Imperial Chancellorship, since he enjoyed to a
marked degree the confidence of the British Government! Tears of anger
shone in the eyes of the Chancellor, thus badly deceived in his hopes;
the praise accorded to him by a foreign government with which Germany
and he had just had such painful experiences hurt him deeply. For the
second time he offered me his resignation; I did not accept it, but
sought to console him. I then ordered that the ambassador in London be
asked how he could have accepted and forwarded such a message under any
conditions.

Now the Chancellor was in favor of the bill, but it was honorably
proposed with the limitation which it had been decided to impose upon
it in case of the conclusion of the agreement. In England, on the other
hand, the full naval construction program was carried out.

This "Haldane episode" is characteristic of England's policy. This
whole maneuver, conceived on a large scale, was engineered for the
sole purpose of hampering the development of the German fleet, while,
simultaneously, in America, which had an almost negligible merchant
fleet; in France, whose navy was superior in numbers to the German; in
Italy, in Russia, which also had ships built abroad--vast construction
programs were carried out without eliciting one word of protest from
England. And Germany, wedged in between France and Russia, certainly
had to be at least prepared to defend herself on the water against
those nations.


DEFENDS NAVAL PROGRAM

For this our naval construction program was absolutely necessary; it
was never aimed against the English fleet, four or five times as strong
as ours, and assuring England's superiority and security, to equal the
strength of which no sensible man in Germany ever dreamed. We needed
our fleet for coast defense and the protection of our commerce; for
this purpose the lesser means of defense, like U-boats, torpedo boats,
and mines, were not sufficient. In addition the coast batteries on the
Baltic were so antiquated and miserably equipped that they would have
been razed within forty-eight hours by the massed fire of the heavy
guns of modern battleships. Thus, our Baltic coast was practically
defenseless. To protect it the fleet was necessary.

The Skagerrak (Jutland) battle has proved what the fleet meant and
what it was worth. That battle would have meant annihilation for
England if the Reichstag had not refused up to 1900 all proposals for
strengthening the navy. Those twelve lost years were destined never to
be retrieved.

Before we take our leave of Haldane I wish to touch upon another
episode in his activities. In 1906 he came, with the permission of
the German Government, to Berlin, to inform himself concerning the
Prussian defense conditions, recruiting, General Staff, etc. He busied
himself at the Ministry of War, where the Minister, General von Einem,
personally gave him information. After about two or three weeks' work
there he returned, well satisfied, to England.

When, after the outbreak of the World War, the "pro-German" Haldane,
the friend of Goethe, was boycotted and treated with such hostility
that he could no longer show himself in public, he had a defense
written of his term of office as Minister of War by the well-known
littérateur and journalist, Mr. Begbie, entitled _Vindication of Great
Britain_. Therein his services toward forming a regular General Staff
and preparing the British army for the World War are placed in a
bright light and emphasis is laid on the skill with which he utilized
the permission obtained from the Prussian War Ministry in order to
learn in Germany about military matters and to reorganize the British
army and General Staff, to the minutest detail and on the German model,
for the coming war against the erstwhile German hosts.

Here we see the sly, adroit lawyer, who, sheltered under the
hospitality of a foreign country, studies its military arrangements in
order to forge weapons against it out of the material and knowledge
thus acquired. Quite characteristically the book is dedicated to King
Edward VII, whose intimate, emissary, and tool Haldane was. In those
days Berlin saw in Haldane's mission a "rapprochement" with England,
toward which Germans were always bending their efforts; in reality,
however, it was a "reconnoitering expedition" under the very roof of
the German cousin. England showed her gratitude by the World War, which
Haldane helped to prepare; in this case Haldane "cheated" the Germans!

That is the history of the Haldane mission. Later it was summarily
maintained by all sorts of ignorant dabblers in politics, belonging to
the press and the general public, that the promising "rapprochement"
with England through Haldane had been wrecked by the obstinacy of the
Emperor and Admiral von Tirpitz and by their clinging to the Naval
bill against the wishes of all "sensible counselors!"


KINGSHIP OF ALBANIA

At that time [in 1912] the question of the establishment of an
independent Albanian state and the choice by the Powers of a head for
it, was brought to my attention also. A number of candidates lusting
for a crown had already presented themselves before the tribunal of the
Powers, without getting themselves accepted; a number of candidates,
considered by the Powers, were declined by the Albanians. I looked
upon the matter in itself with indifference, and was of the opinion
that--as in the case of every "creation of a nation"--the greatest
possible attention should be paid to historical development, also to
geographical peculiarities and the customs of the inhabitants.

In this peculiar land there has never been any united nation under
one ruler and one dynasty. In valleys, encircled and cut off by high
mountain ranges, the Albanian tribes live separated to a considerable
degree from one another. Their political system is not unlike the clan
system of the Scotch. Christians and Mohammedans are represented in
equal numbers.

The custom of "vendetta" is an ancient one, sanctified by tradition,
which is no less true of robbery and cattle stealing. Agriculture is
still in a backward stage of development, farming is in its infancy,
the implements used therein date from before the flood.

The head man of the clan dispenses justice in the open, under the
village tree, as it used to be done once upon a time among the ancient
Germans. Every man is armed and most are excellent shots. Whenever the
head man of the clan turns up while on a horseback tour through his
territory in some hamlet, the inhabitants expect a blessing from him
in the form of jingling coins, which sometimes are scattered about by
him from the saddle. This, of course, is particularly customary at the
outset of a new Government's term, and great is the dissatisfaction
when it does not happen.

Up to the time of the Balkan War many Albanians entered the Turkish
service, where they rose to high importance, being greatly prized on
account of their diligence and keen intelligence, as well as their
tenacious energy. They supplied the Turkish administration with a large
number of officials, also with a certain percentage in the diplomatic
corps and the army. The young Albanian nobles were proud to serve in
a splendid company of palace guards of the Sultan, which scarcely had
an equal for size, martial appearance, and manly beauty. These were
partly relatives of the Sultan, since the latter used to have noble
Albanian women of the principal clans in his harem in order that
he--protected by blood brotherhood--might be safe from the "vendettas"
of the clans, and, also, that he might find out everything that might
serve to influence the feelings of the Albanian chieftains. The desires
of the Albanians which reached him by this road--for instance, as to
supplies of arms and ammunition, school houses, building of highways,
etc.--were thereupon granted in an inconspicuous manner. Thus the
Sultan was enabled to keep the usually turbulent Albanians quiet and
loyal by means of "family ties."

With this knowledge of the state of affairs as a foundation, I sought
to bring my influence to bear toward having a Mohammedan Prince chosen,
if possible--perhaps an Egyptian Prince--not forgetting that he should
have a well-lined purse, which is an absolute necessity in Albania. My
advice was not heeded by the "Areopagus of the Powers," whose members
were not bothering themselves with the interests of the Albanians,
but seeking, first of all, for pretexts and opportunities for fishing
in the troubled Albanian waters in such a way as to benefit their own
countries.


OPPOSED CHOICE OF GERMAN

Therefore, I was not at all pleased when the choice fell upon Prince
William of Wied. I esteemed him as a distinguished, knightly man of
lofty sentiments, but considered him unfitted for the post. The Prince
knew altogether too little about Balkan affairs to be able to undertake
this thorny task with hope of success. It was particularly unpleasant
to me that a German Prince should make a fool of himself there, since
it was apparent from the start that the Entente would place all sorts
of obstacles in his path. Upon being questioned by the Prince, I told
my cousin all my doubts, laying stress upon the difficulties awaiting
him, and advised him urgently to decline. I could not command him,
since the Prince of Wied, as head of the family, had the final word in
the matter.

After the Prince's acceptance of the candidacy offered him by the
Powers, I received him in the presence of the Chancellor. A certain
irresolution in the bearing of the Prince, who contemplated his new
task with anything but enthusiasm, strengthened the resolve in me and
the Chancellor to try hard once more to dissuade the young candidate
from ascending the recently invented Albanian "throne." But in vain.
The ambitious, mystically excited wife of the Prince saw in Albania the
fulfillment of her wishes. And "ce que femme veut, Dieu le veut" ("what
woman wishes, God wishes").

Carmen Sylva [the Queen of Rumania] also worked toward having him
accept; she went so far, in fact, as to publish an article in the
newspapers beginning "Fairyland Wants Its Prince."

So even the best meant warnings were useless. I had also strongly
advised the Prince not to go to Albania before the settlement of the
financial question, since the reasons which had led me to suggest the
selection of a rich ruler now came to the fore. The Prince was not very
wealthy and the Powers had to supply him with a "donation," concerning
the amount of which, and the method of paying it by installments, an
unpleasant quarrel arose. At last a part payment was made.

Danger lurked for the Prince and his eventual Government in the person
of Essad Pasha, an unreliable, intriguing, greedy soldier of fortune,
who himself had designs on the Albanian throne and held sway over a
certain number of armed adherents. From the start he was an opponent
of the new Prince and he plotted secretly with Italy, which was not
favorably inclined toward the Prince of Wied. Now, it would have been
quite natural and a matter of course if the new ruler had taken with
him in his suite men from Germany whom he knew and who were faithful to
him. But he did not. An Englishman and an Italian were attached to his
person as "secretaries" and they had nothing better to do than to work
against his interests, to give him bad advice and to intrigue against
him.


REQUIREMENTS OF A RULER

During the time that the Prince of Wied was making his preparations
the excellently written pamphlet of an Austrian General Staff officer,
dealing with his travels in Albania, appeared. The officer described,
in a lively and clear style, the geographical and climatic drawbacks,
the population and customs, the general poverty and backwardness of the
land.

He pointed out that a future ruler of the land must in no circumstances
reside on the coast, but must show himself to the inhabitants
and travel about in the country. Owing to the primitive means of
transportation, he went on, the lord of the land must sit all day on
horseback and ride through his domain, having at his saddle bow the
famous "bag of sequins" mentioned in all Oriental tales and legends, in
order to sway public opinion in his favor in the places visited by the
expected shower of gold. The ruler must be sure, the author continued,
to bind some of the clans of the region closely to himself, so as to
have at his beck and call an armed force for asserting his will and
overcoming any opponents wishing to rebel, since this was the only way
to maintain his power, in view of the utter lack of "troops" or an
"army" in the European sense of the word.

This meant that the ruler of Albania must lead at first a nomadic,
horseback life, and, in addition, provide himself with a wandering
camp, with tents and other accessories and the necessary horses. Plenty
of men adapted to this sort of life might have been found in his
squadron of the Third Guard Uhlan Regiment, since many of his Uhlans,
who were very fond of the Prince, had declared that they were ready to
accompany him as volunteers. Surely, they would have served him better
and been more useful to him than what he did in preparing to take over
the overlordship of Albania, without knowledge of the country.

I advised my cousin urgently to study this pamphlet and to follow
its recommendations, especially with regard to his residence, which
should be fixed at some point as far as possible from the warships of
the Powers, in order that he might not be forced to act under their
pressure and arouse suspicion among the Albanians that their ruler
needed these ships for protection against his subjects. Did the Prince
ever read the pamphlet? In any event, the course adopted by him
subsequently was contrary to its advice and the advice given him by me.

The Prince and his wife journeyed to Albania, and things turned out
as I had foreseen. According to reports describing the arrival of the
sovereign couple, the Princess, although she was a German, addressed
the assembled Albanians from her balcony in French, since they
understood no German! The "court" remained at Durazzo under the guns of
the foreign ships. The Prince did not travel on horseback through the
land, nor did he scatter gold sequins about--not even from his balcony
on the day of his arrival--nor did he push Essad out of the way. So the
adventure ended as one might imagine.

I have gone into some detail in describing my opinion and attitude
toward the question of the choice of the ruler of Albania because,
from every possible quarter, false rumors have been circulated for the
purpose of imputing to me motives which were utterly foreign to me. In
this matter, also, I gave honest advice when questioned, based on sound
knowledge of mankind.

The year 1912 also witnessed the meeting with the Tsar at
Baltisch-Port, whither I repaired on board my yacht at the invitation
of Nicholas II. Our two yachts anchored side by side, so that visiting
from ship to ship was easy. The Tsar, his children, and his entire
entourage vied with one another in evidences of good will and
hospitality. The Russian and German escorting squadrons were inspected,
turn and turn about, by the Tsar and myself together, and we took our
meals either at the Tsar's table or mine.

We spent one morning on land near Baltisch-Port. The Eighty-fifth
"Viborg" Infantry Regiment, whose commander I was, had been drawn up in
a field and was inspected first in parade formation, then in company
and battalion exercises, which were carried out in as satisfactory a
manner as was the parade with which the evolutions were brought to a
close.

The regiment, composed of four battalions, made an excellent
impression. It was in field equipment--brown-gray blouses and caps--and
the latter, worn jauntily cocked over one ear by all, gave to the
sun-browned, martial faces of the strong young soldiers a bold air
which brought joy to the heart of every soldier who gazed upon them.

In the course of the brilliant and uncommonly amiable reception which
I met with on this occasion I received no hint of the Balkan alliance,
concluded a short time before.

It was my last visit in Russia before the outbreak of the war.




CHAPTER VI

My Co-workers in the Administration


It behooves me to remark that I found particular pleasure in working
with His Excellency von Stephan and in dealing with him. He was a man
of the old school, who fitted in so well with me that he always grasped
my ideas and suggestions and afterward carried them out with energy
and power, owing to his firm belief in them. A man of iron energy and
unflagging capacity for work and joyousness; endowed, moreover, with
refreshing humor, quick to perceive new possibilities, never at a
loss for expedients, well versed in political and technical matters,
he seemed to have been born especially for creative co-operation.
I trusted him implicitly, and my trust in him was never betrayed.
I learned much from my association with this stimulating, shrewd
counselor.

The Post-Office Department reached an unimagined degree of excellence
and aroused the admiration of the whole world. The great invention of
the telephone was utilized to the limit, was applied extensively to the
public service, and was developed so as to facilitate it. Likewise in
the domain of building Stephan brought about a decided improvement,
which received my approval and support.

All great state building projects depended on the vote of the
investigating "Academy of Building," which, at that time, was a
slow-moving, cumbrous, and backward body. I had already had experiences
of my own with it. The "White Drawing Room," originally merely
provisional, had been put up without much attention to style--it had
been intended at first for an Indian masquerade, a "Lalla Rookh"
festival, in honor of the Grand Duchess Charlotte, daughter of
Frederick William III, and her husband, later Tsar Nicholas I. An
investigation instituted at my order showed the material to be spurious
and inferior; the structure was in the worst possible state of decay
and in danger of collapse; a new one was needed.

With the co-operation and collaboration of the Empress Frederick,
projects and plans were made, and, finally, a big model was provided
by Building Councilor Ihne--the "modern Schlüter," as the Empress
Frederick used to call him--which won unanimous approval. Only the
Building Academy opposed wearisome objections, stating that the "White
Drawing Room" ought to be preserved "in its old historical beauty," and
required no alterations. When the new structure was completed, however,
it also met with the approval of the gentlemen who had been formerly so
critical.

Herr von Stephan also was at loggerheads with the Academy of Building.
He wanted to alter many post offices, or build entirely new ones,
especially in the big cities, but, in view of the fearful slowness
and devotion to red tape of the aforesaid official body, he used to
receive no answers at all, or else refusals, when he brought these
matters to its attention. The rule of thumb was supreme there. Herr
von Stephan was of the opinion that, in its buildings as well as in
other directions, the youthful German Empire must give an impression of
power, and that the Imperial post offices must be built accordingly;
he believed that they should harmonize with the general style of the
towns where they were located, or, at least, conform to the style of
the oldest and most important buildings there. Nor could I do otherwise
than agree with such a view.


ACADEMY'S SHACKLES BROKEN

At last there came a rupture with the aforementioned Academy. His
Excellency von Stephan lost patience and informed me that he had freed
his office, and the buildings erected by it, from the supervision of
the Academy; that he had even formed a committee from among his own
architects and officials for supervising purposes; and that all he
asked of me was to subject the more important plans for buildings to a
final inspection. I did so willingly.

Stephan was an enthusiastic huntsman, so that I had additional
opportunities, while on the court hunts, to enjoy association with this
refreshing, unchanging, faithful official and counselor.

Among the Ministers whom I particularly esteemed His Excellency Miquel
took first place. He it was who, as my Finance Minister, put through
for Prussia the great reform which placed the land on a sound basis and
helped it toward prosperity. Intercourse with this astute political
expert gave me great pleasure, and a wealth of teaching and stimulus.

The degree to which Miquel was versed in all possible matters was
astounding. In conversation he was brisk, humorous, and keen in
elucidating and arguing on a subject, in addition to which a strong
historical bent ran, like a red thread, through his quotations. In
history and ancient languages he was marvelously well equipped, so
that, in his reports, he was able often to hark back to the times
of the Romans and quote from his store of knowledge--not out of
Büchmann[7]--pieces of Latin in support of his arguments. Even when
he was instructing he was never tiresome on account of his brilliant
dialectics, but used to hold his hearers spellbound to the very end.

It was His Excellency Miquel likewise who incited me to favor the
great canal projects and supported me when the Prussian Conservatives
opposed the Central [Rhine-Weser-Elbe] Canal, and caused the failure
of the plan to build it. He lent strength to the King and made the
latter decide not to let up in this fight until victory was won. He
knew, as I did, what blessings the canals in Holland and the splendid
canal network of France had brought to those lands and what a relief
they were to the ever more hard-pressed railways. In the World War we
might have had a splendid east-to-west artery of transportation for
ammunition, wounded, siege material, supplies, and the like, which
would have made it possible, by thus relieving the railways, for the
latter to transport troops on an even greater scale--moreover, this
would have lessened the shortage of coal. In time of peace also, for
which the canal was destined, it would have been most beneficial.

Minister von Miquel was a most ardent enthusiast for the Imperial
German idea and the German Empire of the Hohenzollerns: I lent an
attentive ear to his spirited handling of this theme. He was a man who,
clinging to the old tradition, thought in a great German, Imperial way;
he was fully adequate to the requirements and demands of the new era,
rightly appreciating when these were of value.

From the start I concerned myself with the completion of the railway
system. From the reports relating to national defense and the
complaints of the General Staff, as well as from personal observation,
I knew of the absolutely incredible neglect suffered by East Prussia in
the matter of railways. The state of affairs was absolutely dangerous,
in view of the steady, though gradual, reinforcing of the Russian
troops facing our frontier, and the development of the Russian railway
system.

During the last years of his reign Emperor William the Great had
commanded Field Marshal Moltke to report on the situation, since the
Russian armies, under the influence of France, were being posted
ever more conspicuously on the eastern frontier of Prussia, arousing
apprehension as to the possibility of irruptions of great masses of
Russian cavalry into Prussia, Posen, and Silesia. Quartermaster-General
Count Waldersee and I were present at the reading of this report. From
it came the resolve to shift Prussian troops eastward and to push
toward completion the neglected railway system.

The measures ordained by Emperor William I and begun by him required
time, particularly as the new railway bridges over the Vistula and
Nogat had to be built by the military authorities in the teeth
of strong official opposition (Maybach). Since the railways were
considered a "national pocketbook," there was a desire to build only
"paying" lines, which caused prejudice against outlays for military
lines designed for the defense of the fatherland, since it diminished
the fine surplus funds by which such great store was laid.

Not until my reign were the plans of Emperor William I brought to
realization. Anyone taking up a railway map of 1888 will be amazed
at the lack of railway connection in the east, particularly in East
Prussia, especially if he compares it with a 1914 map showing the
development in the intervening years. If we had had the old network,
we should have lost our eastern territory in 1914.

Unquestionably, Minister von Maybach rendered valuable services in the
promotion and development of the railway system. He had to take into
account the wishes and demands of the rapidly developing industrial
sections of Western Germany, in doing which he naturally considered
military desires also, as far as he could. But during his régime
Eastern Germany was very badly treated with regard to railway lines,
bridges, and rolling stock. Had there been mobilization at that time,
it would have been necessary to transfer hundreds of locomotives to the
east in order to maintain schedules capable of meeting even part of
the requirements of the General Staff. The only means of communication
with the east were the two antiquated trestle bridges at Dirschau and
Marienburg. The General Staff became insistent, which brought quarrels
between it and Maybach.

Not until Minister Thielen came into office was there a change,
occasioned by his self-sacrificing work, for which thanks are due him.
Realizing correctly what the military requirements were, he pushed
forward the completion of the eastern railways. Thielen was an able,
diligent, thoroughly reliable official of the old Prussian type,
faithful to me and enjoying my high esteem. In common with Miquel, he
stood faithfully by the side of his sovereign in the fight for the
Central Canal. Characteristic of him were the words which he said in
my presence, before a big assembly of people, at the opening of the
Elbe-Trave Canal: "The Central Canal must and will be built." Relations
between him and me remained harmonious until his retirement.

Despite the railway construction work in the western part of Germany,
there were in that region likewise serious gaps in the network of
railways, from the point of view of mobilization and deployment of
troops, which had long since needed remedying. The Rhine, as far up
as Mainz, was crossed by one railway bridge only; the Main could be
crossed only at Frankfort. For a long time the General Staff had been
demanding the remedying of these conditions. Fortunately, general
traffic moved in the same direction--for instance, if a traveler coming
from the west wished to reach one of the watering places in the Taunus
Mountains, or some place on the railway along the right bank of the
Rhine, he had to go as far as Frankfort, and then return in the same
direction whence he had come, although at Mainz he had almost been
opposite Wiesbaden.

Minister Budde was the man chosen for the accomplishment of this work.
As chief of the railway department of the General Staff he had long
since attracted my attention by his extraordinary capacity for work,
his energy, and his promptness in making decisions. He had often
reported to me on the gaps in our railway system, which would hamper
quick deployment of troops on two fronts, and always pointed out the
preparations being made by Russia and France, which we were in duty
bound to meet with preparations of equal scope, in the interests of the
national defense.

The first consideration, of course, in railway construction had been
the improvement and facilitation of industry and commerce, but it had
not been able to meet the immeasurably increased demands of these,
since the great network of canals, designed to relieve the railways,
was not in existence. The war on two fronts, which threatened us more
and more--and for which our railways were, technically speaking, not
yet ready, partly from financial-technical reasons--made necessary that
more careful attention should be paid to military requirements. Russia
was building, with French billions, an enormous network of railways
against us, while in France the railways destined to facilitate the
deployment of forces against Germany were being indefatigably extended
by the completion of three-track lines--something as yet totally
unknown in Germany.

Minister Budde set to work without delay. The second great railway
bridge over the Rhine at Mainz was constructed, likewise the bridge
over the Main at Costheim, and the necessary switches and loops for
establishing communication with the line along the right bank of the
Rhine, and with Wiesbaden; also the triangle at Biebrich-Mosbach was
completed. Budde's talents found brilliant scope in the organization
and training of the railway employees, whose numbers had grown
until they formed a large army, and in his far-sighted care for his
subordinates.

I respected this vigorous, active man with all my heart, and deeply
regretted that a treacherous ailment put an end to his career in the
very midst of his work.

In His Excellency von Breitenbach I acquired a new and valuable aid
and co-worker in my plans regarding the railways. In the course of
years he developed into a personage of high eminence. Distinguished and
obliging, of comprehensive attainments, keen political insight, great
capacity for work and untiring industry, he stood in close relationship
to me.

His co-operation with the General Staff in military matters was due
to his thorough belief in the necessity of strengthening our means
of defense against possible hostile attacks. Plans were made for the
construction of three new Rhine bridges, at Rüdesheim, Neuwied, and
the Loreley, which were not completed until during the war--they
were named, respectively, after the Crown Prince, Hindenburg, and
Ludendorff. In the east, great extensions of railway stations, bridges,
and new railway lines were built, some of them while the war was in
progress.

Other important works carried out by Breitenbach in the west were the
great railway bridge at Cologne, to replace the old trestle bridge; a
new bridge, by the Beyen Tower, for freight traffic; and new railways
in the Eiffel Mountains. Moreover, at my special suggestion, a through
line was built from Giessen to Wiesbaden, which included reconstruction
of the stations at Homburg and Wiesbaden and the building of a loop
around Frankfort and Höchst. In addition, trains were provided with
through cars from Flushing to the Taunus.

To show that it is impossible to please everybody, I wish to observe
in passing that we were violently attacked by the hotel proprietors of
Frankfort, who were naturally not at all pleased at this elimination of
Frankfort and of the necessity, existing previously, for passengers to
change trains there, since they lost thereby many customers formerly
obliged to spend a night in some Frankfort hotel. This element brought
particularly strong opposition to bear against the loop line around
Höchst.

The battle concerning the Central Canal was decided at last in favor of
my plans. Under Breitenbach, construction on it was pushed forward by
sections with great energy. Those portions of this canal which it had
been possible to place in operation have fully met expectations.

During this period, also, the extraordinarily difficult extension and
deepening of the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal, almost equivalent to building
an entirely new waterway, was brought to completion, likewise the
great Emden sea lock. These were remarkable achievements in the domain
of bridge and lock construction, which aroused the admiration of the
world; in the matter of locks, for instance, those built at this time
far surpassed the locks of the Panama Canal in size. The difficult
tasks were brilliantly and thoroughly completed by the officials in
charge; in so far as the construction work was in the hands of the
Empire, it was carried out mostly with the supervising co-operation of
the Prussian Ministry of Transportation.

I often went to Breitenbach's home, where I had an opportunity, thanks
to him, of having interesting talks on commercial-political and
economic subjects with a highly intelligent circle, of meeting a lot of
eminent men and discussing important questions. The plans and sketches
of all the larger railway stations, locks, and bridges were submitted
to me before the work of building or rebuilding them was begun, and
reports concerning them were made to me.

I have intentionally gone into detail in this matter in order to
show the following: First, how a monarch can and must influence the
development of his realm by personal participation; second, how, if
he makes his selections quite independently of party reasons, he can
place able men at the head of the various departments; third, how, by
the honest co-operation of these men with the sovereign, whose complete
confidence they enjoy, brilliant results can be achieved. Everything
that we did together was aboveboard and honest; nothing mattered but
the welfare and development of the fatherland, its strengthening and
equipment for competition in the world market.

As was natural, I had close and lasting relations in the regular course
of events with the Ministry of Public Worship and Instruction. Herr
von Gossler and Herr von Trott may surely be considered the most
important and prominent occupants of this post. In this Ministry a
co-worker almost without equal arose in the person of Ministry Director
Althoff, a man of genius.

I had been made acquainted with the dark side of the high-school
system of education by my own school experiences. The predominantly
philological character of the training led, in the whole educational
system as well, to a certain one-sidedness.

When I was at the Cassel High School in 1874-77 I had observed that,
although there was great enthusiasm for 1870-71 and the new Empire
among the boys, there was, nevertheless, a distinct lack of the right
conception of the German idea, of the feeling "civis Germanus sum"
("I am a German citizen")--which I impressed later upon my people at
the laying of the foundation-stone of the Saalburg. To create such
sentiments and awaken them in the rising generation and to lay the
foundations for them firmly in the young hearts was a task somewhat
beyond the powers of the teaching staff, in view of the fossilized,
antiquated philological curriculum.

There was great neglect in the department of German history, which
is exactly the study through which young hearts may be made to
glow, through which the love of one's native country, its future
and greatness, may be aroused. But little was taught of more recent
history, covering the years since 1815. Young philologists were
produced, but no German citizens qualified for practical co-operation
toward building up the flourishing young Empire.

In other words, no _youths who were consciously Germans_ were being
turned out. In a small reading club composed of my classmates I often
tried to inculcate the idea of the Greater Germany, in order to
eliminate parochial and similar conceptions which hampered the German
idea. Admiral Werner's _Book of the German Fleet_ was one of the few
works by means of which the living feeling for the German Empire could
be fanned into flame.

Another thing that struck me, in addition to the one-sidedness of the
education in the schools, was the tendency, among youths planning their
careers in those days, to turn their attention to becoming Government
officials, and always consider the profession of lawyer or judge the
most worthy goal.

This was doubtless due to the fact that the conditions obtaining in the
Prussia of olden days still had their effect in the youthful German
Empire. As long as the state consisted, so to speak, of government and
administration, this tendency among German youths in the shaping of
their lives was understandable and justified; since we were living in
a country of officials, the right road for a young man to select was
the service of the state. British youths of that time, self-reliant and
made robust by sports, were already talking, to be sure, of colonial
conquests, of expeditions to explore new regions of the earth, of
extending British commerce; and they were trying, in the guise of
pioneers of their country, to make Great Britain still stronger and
greater, by practical, free action, not as paid hirelings of the state.
But England had long been a world empire when we were still a land of
officials; therefore, the youth of Britain could seek more remote and
important goals than the German.

Now that Germany had entered into world economics and world politics,
however, as a by no means negligible factor, the aspirations of
German youth should have undergone a more prompt transformation. For
this reason it was that I, during the later years of my reign, used
to compare, with a heavy heart, the proud young Britons, who had
learned much less Latin and Greek than was required among us, with the
children of Germany, pale from overstudy. To be sure, there were even
then enterprising men in Germany--brilliant names can be cited among
them--but the conception of serving the fatherland, not by traveling
along a definite, officially certified road, but by independent
competition, had not yet become sufficiently generalized. Therefore I
held up the English as an example, for it seems to me better to take
the good where one finds it, without prejudice, than to go through the
world wearing blinkers.

With these considerations as a basis I won for my German youths the
_School Reform_ against desperate opposition from the philologists,
inside and outside the Ministry and school circles. Unfortunately, the
reform did not take the shape which I hoped, and did not lead to the
results which I had expected.

The Germanic idea in all its splendor was first revealed and preached
to the astonished German people by Chamberlain in his _Foundations
of the Nineteenth Century_. But, as is proved by the collapse of the
German people, this was in vain. To be sure, there was much singing of
"Deutschland über alles," but Germans, obeying the commands of their
enemies, allowed the Emperor to fall and the Empire to be broken to
pieces; and, placing themselves under the orders of Russian criminals
vastly inferior to them in culture, they stabbed their own army in the
back while it was still fighting valiantly.

Had Germans of all classes and conditions been educated to feel joy and
pride in their fatherland, such a degradation of a great nation would
have been unimaginable.

This degradation--which, it must be admitted, occurred under
remarkable, extremely difficult circumstances--is all the more
difficult to understand in view of the fact that the youth of Germany,
although it was impaired in health by overstudy, and not so toughened
by sports as the English, achieved brilliant feats in the World War,
such as were nowhere equaled before.

The years 1914-18 showed what might have been made out of the German
people had it only developed its admirable qualities in the right
direction. The 4th of August, 1914, the heroes of Langemark, countless
splendid figures from all classes, rise up from the chaos of the long
war to show what the German can do when he throws away Philistinism and
devotes himself, with the enthusiasm which so seldom reveals itself
completely in him, to a great cause. May the German people never forget
these incarnations of its better self; may it emulate them with its
full strength by inculcating in itself the true German spirit!

In the post of Minister of Justice I found His Excellency Friedberg,
the intimate, faithful friend of my father, whom I had known ever since
my youth, when he was a welcome guest in the home of my parents. This
simple, affable man enjoyed with me the same consideration which had
been shown him by my parents.

In later years I had frequent and welcome dealings with His Excellency
Beseler, who also enabled me to hear informal discussion at his house
of many an interesting legal problem by prominent lawyers, and to come
into touch with legal luminaries. I felt no particular inclination
toward the lawyers in themselves--since pedantry, remoteness from
actualities and doctrinaire leanings often assert themselves in the
domain of the law altogether too much for my taste--but the compilation
of the _Citizens' Law Book_ interested me greatly. I was present at
sessions dealing with it, and was proud that this fundamental German
work should have been brought to completion in my reign.

When I met the Lord Chief Justice of England, while I was on a visit to
that country, at the home of Lord Haldane, I asked that great jurist
what he thought of the administration and interpretation of the law
in Germany. His answer ran thus: "You pronounce judgment too much
according to the letter of the law; we according to the spirit and
content of the law."

I have often pointed out how unfortunate it was that we have not been
able to introduce, in police cases--connected with traffic, streets,
etc.--the prompt procedure of the English "police court." For, in
England, punishment in such cases is meted out on the very next day,
whereas in Germany months often elapse, what with gathering of evidence
and examination of witnesses, until, finally, some insignificant
sentence is pronounced long after the case has been forgotten. I should
also have liked to introduce into Germany the heavy penalties for
libels published in the press which are customary in England.

I have often pointed out how unfortunate it was Prince, with Minister
of Finance Scholz, and had taken part in sessions wherein that famous
man, His Excellency Meinecke, figured. Meinecke was Under Secretary of
State in the Finance Ministry and had, therefore, much to do with other
Ministers, since finances were an important thing everywhere. He had
achieved a certain degree of fame because he--as he thought--was always
able smilingly to find the best way out of tight places.

Scholz was faithful to his duty and able, but he did not succeed in
making the dry substance of taxes and the like particularly interesting
and pleasant to me, nor was there any change in this state of affairs
until the versatile Miquel took charge of the Finance Ministry. When
Miquel reported to me concerning the Prussian financial reform, he
suggested three plans: one modest, one medium, one ambitious. To the
delight of the Minister I decided, without hesitation, for the third.
Both the monarch and the Minister were filled with satisfaction when
the reform was carried out.

The Minister of the Interior, Herr von Puttkamer, had been forced to
retire during the ninety-nine days, to the great sorrow of him who was
then Crown Prince. He was an able, tried old Prussian official; one
of those Pomeranians of the old school, filled with loyalty to the
King--a nobleman through and through. Rumor had it that the Empress
Frederick had driven him from office by a plot, but this is not true.
The Empress, with her inclination to English Liberalism, doubtless did
not like the old-time Prussian Conservative, yet she was not at all to
blame for his going. Prince Bismarck pushed him aside, perhaps out of
consideration for the Empress Frederick.

I was deeply interested in forestry and its improvement along practical
lines, especially as new gold reserves could be created for the state
by reforestation.

Next to Herr von Podbielski, the ablest Minister of Agriculture and
Forests was Freiherr von Schorlemer. Just as Herr von Podbielski
bent his efforts toward creating great stretches of forests in the
east, in order to keep off the east wind by a compact forest zone and
thus improve our climate, and, at the same time, provide a natural
protection against Russian attacks, so Herr von Schorlemer opened up
the eastern forest reservations by extensive construction of roads, and
by thus facilitating the transportation of wood helped Germany greatly
in making headway in competition against wood from Russia.

Both Ministers sought, in co-operation with me, to improve our splendid
Prussian forestry personnel and better living conditions among them,
and to help toward promotions in their ranks--all of which these
officials, zealous in their work and faithful to their King, fully
deserved.

The influx of large sums into the state's pocketbook depended indeed
on the honesty, industry, and reliability of these men. I expected
much toward the restoration of the fatherland from the statesmanlike
shrewdness and ability of Herr von Schorlemer, who was always quite
conscious of the goal at which he was aiming.[8]

I learned much about forestry from Head Foresters Freiherr von
Hövel (Joachimsthal, Schorfheide) and Freiherr Speck von Sternburg
(Szittkohnen, Rominten) on my many hunting expeditions with these
excellent huntsmen and administrators.

Let me say a word here regarding a Russian curiosity in the domain of
preserving wild game. The Tsar, who had heard a great deal about the
fine antlers of the stags at Rominten, wished to have some of the same
sort at Spala, in Poland. Freiherr von Sternburg was sent to the Spala
hunting lodge one summer in order to give advice regarding this project.

He was received very cordially by a general, who had charge of the
hunting there and lived at the lodge. Sternburg noticed that all the
apartments, even those not inhabited, were always kept heated. When he
spoke of the enormous waste of wood occasioned by this, the general
shrugged his shoulders and remarked that one never could tell, the Tsar
might put in an appearance some day, after all. A gamekeeper, who was a
German, was assigned to Sternburg, since the general did not know his
way about on the reservation and was quite ignorant of game feeding.

In the course of his tours about the place Sternburg observed a number
of places where meadows could be turned into pastures or good feeding
places could be installed. He drew attention to the need of such
arrangements, having noticed that the deer had already begun to shed
their horns to a considerable extent, thereby causing much damage to
the trees.

But the gamekeeper shook his head sadly and remarked that he had
already reported all that, but in vain, since the hay for the deer
had to be brought by rail from the Black Sea and the shipments
sometimes either did not arrive at all or were greatly delayed and
arrived spoiled. But nothing would be done to alter this, continued
the gamekeeper, since too many people made a good thing out of this
transporting of the hay, which was paid for at huge prices.

He also told how--after he had called attention to the many splinters
of wood found in the intestines of the deer, in order to prove
that they were insufficiently fed and that feeding places must be
provided--a committee of animal doctors had been brought from St.
Petersburg to investigate the matter. The said committee lived and ate
for weeks in Spala at the Tsar's expense, shot many deer, examined
them, and held sessions; and the upshot of all this was a report that
the animals had wood in their stomachs, which proved that they could
live on wood, for which reason feeding places would be superfluous and
the hay from the Black Sea would suffice to supplement the wood. And
there the matter remained, in spite of Sternburg's visit!

When I heard this yarn, I involuntarily thought of an anecdote which
Prince Bülow especially delighted to tell in connection with his
sojourn at St. Petersburg. While there, he had attended the salon of
Madame Durnovo, where society used often to gather. One day a prominent
general was complaining to the hostess that he had been trapped in a
money matter, which had brought him much unpleasantness from "above."
Apparently he wished, by his mournful description, to arouse sympathy
for his bad luck, but Madame Durnovo retorted, in her rough way: "Mon
cher Général, quand on fait des sâletés, il faut qu'elles réussissent!"
("My dear General, when you play dirty tricks it is necessary that they
be successful!")

As Secretary of State in the Imperial Postal Department likewise, Herr
von Podbielski, after I had chosen him and declined a number of other
candidates, did excellent work, treading worthily in the footsteps of
Stephan. Very practical; endowed with the business sense and a great
knowledge of business; well versed and clever in financial matters; of
innate administrative talent, and, at the same time, quick to fight;
caustically witty; a good speaker and debater--he worked with zeal and
skill, often as a pioneer, particularly in matters of world postal
service, wireless telegraphy, etc. This former colonel in the Ziethen
Hussars made a name for himself in the service of his fatherland which
will never be forgotten.

An amusing contrast to his career is that of a Russian Hussar officer
under Nicholas I. This Tsar, being full of anger against the Holy
Synod, had driven away the man at the head of it. Shortly afterward
he inspected the Hussar Body Guard Regiment, commanded by Colonel
Count Protassoff. The immense satisfaction of the Tsar at the splendid
appearance and maneuvering of the fine regiment found expression
in the words, amazing alike to the commander and his men: "Thou
hast maneuvered thy regiment magnificently, and, as a token of my
satisfaction, I name thee Procurator of the Holy Synod, which thou must
put into good shape for me!"

Mention must be made here of another excellent and worthy man, Minister
Möller. He came from Bielefeld, like Hinzpeter, and was bound to my
old teacher by lasting ties of friendship. In the legislature he was
one of the leaders of the National Liberals, by whom he was highly
esteemed, as he was in the Reichstag, on account of his upright,
distinguished Westphalian characteristics and his great experience in
the commercial-political domain.

When Imperial Chancellor Bülow suggested Möller to me as Minister I
remarked that he was a party man and member of the Reichstag. The
Chancellor said that the National Liberals would be pleased at Möller's
appointment. I observed that the state Ministry of the Prussian King
could not and must not be a party Ministry, but must stand above
the parties in entire independence of them; that I esteemed Möller
personally very much, but, should he become Minister, every member
of the legislature would have the ambition to become one likewise;
that, through Möller's appointment, the ambitions of the other parties
to obtain ministerial chairs would also be aroused and nobody could
foresee the consequences; that, moreover, Möller would be greatly
missed in the Reichstag, from which I did not wish to take him on
account of his influence with all parties.

Despite these objections and my advice against it, Bülow stuck to his
idea. Möller became Minister, and, as such, stood very well with me.
But what I had prophesied occurred comparatively soon: Minister Möller
was obliged to retire by circumstances partially connected with the
inner workings of his party.

  [7] A German philologist who compiled a well-known book of quotations.

  [8] His recent death, which snatched him away in the midst of
      beneficial labors, is a serious loss to the fatherland.




CHAPTER VII

Science and Art


The broad and many-sided field whose care devolved upon the Ministry
of Public Worship and Instruction--embracing art, science, research,
medical matters, etc.--always aroused my lively interest and enlisted
my efforts in its behalf.

Special pleasure was afforded me by the development of the Technical
High School. The increasing importance of technical matters drew ever
larger numbers of the ablest youths to institutions of learning of this
description, and the achievements of the teachers there and of the
young engineers who were graduated constantly brought new laurels to
the German name.

Among the teachers at Charlottenburg one of the most prominent and best
known all over the world was Professor Doctor Slaby. Until his death
he had constant dealings with me and kept me informed concerning the
newest inventions by means of captivating discourses. These were given
not only in his laboratory, but also in the quiet hunting lodge in the
forests of Brandenburg, where I, together with the Empress, surrounded
by a few intimates, used to listen eagerly to Slaby's words. Slaby was
also dear to me as an individual and caused me much mental enjoyment by
his simple, clear views on every possible sort of thing in this world,
which he could always express in the most stimulating and enthralling
manner. Slaby meant much to me, and I felt grateful affection for him
up to the time of his death.

Influenced by the achievements of the technical high schools and of
such men as Slaby, Intze, and so on, I resolved to grant the high
schools the same privilege of representation in the Prussian upper
house as was enjoyed by the universities. But the universities
protested vehemently against this to the Minister of Public Worship
and Instruction, and there ensued a violent fight against the
classical-scientific arrogance of the savants, until I finally enforced
my will by a decree. Slaby received the news from me by telegraph in
his laboratory while he was delivering a lecture, and gave it to the
students, who burst into wild cheers. The technical high schools have
shown themselves worthy of the honor conferred upon them.

In view of the constantly more violent fight for the markets of the
world and its outlets, it became necessary, in order to utilize the
wisdom of the leaders of German science in this direction, to provide
them with more freedom, quiet, possibility for working, and materials.
Many savants of importance were hampered in research work by their
activities as teachers, so that the only time they had left over for
research was their vacation. This state of affairs resulted in overwork
and overburdening, which had to be stopped.


CHEMICAL RESEARCH

Attention was turned first to improvements in the domain of chemistry.
Minister von Trott and Director of the Ministry Althoff, having grasped
the state of affairs with clear understanding, made possible for me the
establishment of the Kaiser Wilhelm Society and drew up the statutes
governing it. In the short time of its existence it has achieved
brilliant results and given me an opportunity, at its general meetings,
to become acquainted with eminent men in all branches of knowledge with
whom I thereafter entered into regular intercourse. I also visited
their laboratories, where I could follow the progress of their labors.
New laboratories were founded, others subsidized from the contributions
of the senate and members of the organization.

I was proud of this creation of mine, since it proved a boon to the
fatherland. The inventions due to the research of its members benefited
the entire nation. It was a peace-time achievement with a great and
most promising future, which, under the guidance of Herr von Trott, was
in most excellent hands; unfortunately, the war robbed me of this joy,
along with all others. Nowadays I must do without the intercourse with
my men of learning of my association, and that is a cruel blow to me.
May it continue to live and labor for the benefit of research and the
good of the fatherland!

I had to face a severe fight in getting Professor Harnack summoned to
Berlin. The theologians of the Right and the Orthodox element protested
vehemently. After I had again obtained full information from Hinzpeter
and he had closed his opinion with the words that it would be most
regrettable for Berlin and Prussia if I backed down, I insisted upon
the summoning of Harnack, and summoned he was.

Nowadays it is impossible to understand the opposition to him. What a
man Harnack is! What an authoritative position he has won for himself
in the world of the mind! What benefit, what knowledge, intercourse
with this fiery intellect has brought to me! What wonders he has
achieved, as head of the Royal Library and dean of the senate of
the Kaiser Wilhelm Society, where he, the theologian, delivered the
most learned and most substantial talks on exact sciences, research,
inventions, and chemistry. I shall always look back with pleasure on
the personality of Harnack and on his labors.

Professor Erich Schmidt of the University of Berlin was also a friend
of mine and was often at my home; I owe many an enjoyable evening to
the learned discourses of this savant.

Professor Schiemann enjoyed my particular confidence. An upright man,
a native of the Baltic Provinces, a champion of the Germanic idea
against Slavic arrogance, a clear-sighted politician and brilliant
historian and writer, Schiemann was constantly asked by me for advice
on political and historical questions. To him I owe much good counsel,
especially regarding the East. He was often at my home and often
accompanied me on journeys--as, for instance, to Tangier--and he
heard from me in our talks much important confidential matter not yet
known to others on political questions. His unshakable capacity for
keeping his mouth shut justified my trust in him. It was a source of
satisfaction to me to appoint this tried man curator of the University
of Dorpat, after the liberation of the Baltic Provinces.


KAISER'S RUSSIAN FORESIGHT

How well he and I agreed in our political views regarding Russia is
illustrated by the following incident: After the Peace of Portsmouth,
between Russia and Japan, brought about by me in conjunction with
President Roosevelt in 1905, there was much official (Foreign Office)
and unofficial puzzling of heads at Berlin as to what political line
Russia would take. In general it was thought that Russia, angered at
her defeat, would lean toward the West--and hence toward Germany--in
order to find there new connections and strength to help her in
striking a blow for revenge against Japan and reconquest of her lost
territory and prestige.

My opinion was quite different--but I could not make the official world
share it. I emphasized the following points: That the Russians were
Asiatics and Slavs; being the first, they would be inclined to favor
Japan, in spite of their defeat; being the second, they would like to
ally themselves with those who had proved themselves strong. Hence I
thought that, after a while, Russia, despite the Björkö Agreement,
would join Japan, not Germany, and turn later against Germany.
On account of these "fantastic" ideas, I was actually ridiculed,
officially and unofficially.

I summoned Schiemann and questioned him on this subject, without
revealing to him what I thought about it. I was much pleased when his
answer agreed absolutely with the views held by me. For a long time
Schiemann and I stood almost alone when this weighty matter of foreign
politics came up in discussions.

The event justified us. The so-called "Russian experts" of Berlin, as
well as the official world, were mistaken.

During the very first years of my reign there was occasion for much
important building work.

First, there was the question of erecting a worthy monument over the
tomb of my grandparents. Since the old mausoleum at Charlottenburg
was inadequate, it was necessary to erect an addition. Unfortunately,
the funds left by Emperor William the Great for such "extra
construction"--the so-called Extra Construction Fund--had been used
up during the ninety-nine days on something else. Hence I was obliged
to burden the Crown revenues with unforeseen building expenses. The
mausoleum of my parents at Marly was erected by the Empress Frederick,
according to her own sketches and designs, and for this, too, I had to
provide the funds.

A thorough examination of the royal palaces--including those in the
provinces--had revealed, particularly at the palace in Berlin, such
deplorable conditions in sanitation, comfort, and so on, that there
could be no more delay in remedying them. In the course of my thirty
years' reign I restored these palaces to good condition--working in
accordance with carefully prepared budgets, examined, corrected, and
supervised by myself with the help of architects (such as Ihne), and
of artists, with due regard for the traditions of my ancestors--all of
which gave me much trouble and tried my patience, but also provided me
with a great deal of enjoyment.


ARCHITECTURAL INTERESTS

In restoring the Berlin palace, the Empress Frederick, with her sure,
keen eye for the proper style and her sound judgment, helped materially
in offsetting the harm and neglect dating from bygone days. My mother's
expression of her view ought surely to be of general interest: "Any
style is good so long as it is pure." Ihne used to call the eclecticism
of the 'nineties "à peu près style" (the "almost style"). The
restoration of the Picture Gallery, the last work of Herr Ihne--who
died, unfortunately, all too soon--was not completed until during the
first half of the war. The palace of my forefathers, erected at much
pains and a source of pride to me, was later bombarded, stormed,
sacked, and devastated by revolutionary hordes.

These artistic building enterprises, as well as the already-mentioned
restoration of the White Drawing Room, belong among the duties of
representation devolving upon every Government, be it absolute,
constitutional, or democratic in form. They afford a criterion of the
national culture and are a means of encouraging artists and, through
them, the development of art.

During my vacations I busied myself with archæology and was active in
excavation work. Here I kept in view one basic idea: to discover the
roots from which ancient Greek art developed and to erect or find a
bridge in the endeavor to establish the cultural influence of the East
on the West. It appeared to me that Assyriology was important, since
from it might be expected an elucidation and vitalizing of the Old
Testament, and, hence, of the Holy Scriptures. Therefore, I accepted
with pleasure the offer of the presidency of the German Orient Society
and devoted myself to the study of its work, which I promoted to the
best of my ability, never missing one of its public lectures on the
results of its explorations. I had much to do with those at the head of
it, and caused detailed reports to be made to me of the excavations at
Nineveh, Assur, and Babylon, in Egypt and in Syria, for the protection
and facilitation of which I often personally brought influence to bear
on the Turkish Government.

Professor Delitzsch, a member of the society gave his well-known and
much-attacked lecture on "Babel and Bible," which, unfortunately, fell
upon the ears of a public as yet too ignorant and unprepared, and led
to all sorts of misinterpretations, some of them in church circles.

I strove hard to clear up the matter. Since I realized that the
importance of Assyriology, then enlisting the efforts of many prominent
men, including clergymen of both religions, was not yet understood
and appreciated by the general public, I had my trusted friend and
brilliant theater director, Count Hülsen-Haeseler, produce the play
"Assurbanipal," after long preparation, under the auspices of the
German Orient Society. Assyriologists of all countries were invited
to the dress rehearsal; in the boxes, all mixed up together, were
professors, Protestant and Catholic clergymen, Jews and Christians.
Many expressed to me their thanks for having shown, by this
performance, how far research work had already progressed and for
having, at the same time, revealed more clearly to the general public
the importance of Assyriology.

My sojourn at Corfu likewise afforded me the pleasure of serving
archæology and of busying myself personally with excavation. The
accidental discovery of a relief head of a Gorgon near the town of
Corfu led me to take charge of the work myself. I called to my aid the
experienced excavator and expert in Greek antiques, Professor Dörpfeld,
who took over the direction of the excavation work. This savant, who
was as enthusiastic as I for the ancient Hellenic world, became in the
course of time a faithful friend of mine and an invaluable source of
instruction in questions relating to architecture, styles, and so on
among the ancient Greeks and Achæans.


"ILIAD" AS A GUIDE BOOK

It was a joy to hear Dörpfeld read and elucidate the old Homeric
poems, and establish, by means of a map and following the hints and
descriptions of the poet, the location of the old Achæan settlements
destroyed later by the Doric migration. It appeared that the names
of the old places had often been transferred by the dispossessed
inhabitants to the new places. This made the identification of the
location more difficult. Nevertheless, Dörpfeld had rediscovered the
location of a whole series of them, with the help of his Homer, which
he carried in his hand like a Baedeker, hitting upon it by following
the minute geographical descriptions given by Homer.

This interested me so much that I took a trip by water, with the
Empress, in the company of Dörpfeld, in order to put the matter to the
test. We went to Leukas (Ithaca) and visited, one after another, the
places made famous by the "Odyssey," while Dörpfeld read from his Homer
the descriptive text referring to each. I was amazed and had to admit
that the region and the description tallied exactly.

The excavations begun by me in Corfu under Dörpfeld's direction
had valuable archæological results, since they produced evidence
of an extremely remote epoch of the earliest Doric art. The relief
of the Gorgon has given rise already to many theories--probable
and improbable--combined, unfortunately, with a lot of superfluous
acrimonious discussion. From all this, it seems to me, one of the piers
for the bridge sought by me between Asia and Europe is assuming shape.

I sent reports regularly to the Archæological Society, and I also
brought the well-known Professor Caro from Athens to work with me. I
was busy with preparations for lectures to be delivered before the
society during the winter of 1914-15, and with searching discussions
on many disputed questions, which I hoped to bring toward a solution
"sine ira et studio." It was a pleasure to me to be visited almost
regularly, at Corfu, by English and American archæologists, former
pupils of Dörpfeld, who helped zealously in throwing light on the
difficult problems which often came up. Since they were at work in Asia
Minor, I was deeply interested in hearing what importance they attached
to the Asiatic influence on early Greek art--as a result of their
discoveries--and how readily they recognized a connection with the
East in the finds made at Corfu. In 1914, Professor Duhn of Heidelberg
visited the excavations at Corfu and, after thorough investigation,
gave his support to the views held by Dörpfeld and me. I shall tell in
a separate piece of writing about the result of my Corfu excavations.

That was the sort of thing which, in the spring of 1914, occupied the
thoughts of the German Emperor, who, lusting for robbery and conquest,
is accused of having bloodthirstily brought on the World War. While I
was exploring and discussing Gorgons, Doric columns, and Homer, they
were already mobilizing against us in the Caucasus and Russia. And the
Tsar, at the beginning of the year, when asked about his travel plans,
had replied: "Je resterai chez moi cette année, car nous aurons la
guerre!" ("I shall stay at home this year, for we are going to have
war!")




CHAPTER VIII

My Relations with the Church


Much has been written and said about my relations with the Church.
Even when I was still a prince and a student at Bonn, I realized
the harmful influence of the "Kulturkampf" in its last phase. The
religious rift did so much toward antagonism that once, for example, I
was directly boycotted, while on a hunting expedition, by members of
leading noble Rhenish-Westphalian families of the Rhineland belonging
to the Ultra-Montane party. Even as far back as that I resolved, in
the interests of the national welfare, to work toward creating a modus
vivendi such as would make it possible for people professing the two
creeds to live peacefully with each other. The "Kulturkampf," as such,
had come to an end before the beginning of my reign.

I strove patiently and earnestly to be on good terms with the Bishops,
and I was on very friendly terms with several, especially Cardinal
Kopp, Archbishop Simar, Doctor Schulte, Prince-Bishop Bertram, Bishop
Thiel, and, last but not least, Archbishop Faulhaber and Cardinal von
Hartmann. All of these were men far above the average and an ornament
to the episcopate, who gave proof during the war of their patriotic
devotion to Emperor and Empire. This shows that I had succeeded in
clearing away the mists of the "Kulturkampf" and enabling my Catholic
subjects, like others, to rejoice in the Empire, in accordance with the
motto, "suum cuique" ("to each his own").

I was bound particularly closely all my life to Cardinal Kopp,
Prince-Bishop of Breslau. He always served me loyally, so that my
relationship to him was most trusting. Of much value to me was his
mediation in dealings with the Vatican, where he stood in high honor,
although he championed absolutely the German point of view.


FRIENDSHIP FOR POPE LEO XIII

Probably little is known by the general public of the friendly,
trusting relationship that existed between me and Pope Leo XIII.
A prelate who was close to him told me later that I had won the
confidence of the Pope on my first visit by the absolute frankness
which I showed toward him and with which I told him things which others
intentionally kept from his ears.

Receptions by the Pope were conducted with tremendous pomp. Swiss
and Noble Guards, in brilliant uniforms, servants, chamberlains, and
ecclesiastical dignitaries, were present in large numbers--a miniature
representation of the might of the Roman Catholic Church.

After I had traversed the courts, halls, and drawing-rooms, in which
all these men had arrayed themselves, I seated myself opposite the
Pope himself, in his little, one-windowed study. The distinguished
gentleman, with the fine, noble-featured old face, whose eyes gazed
piercingly at his visitor, made a deep impression upon me. We discussed
many timely subjects. I was greatly pleased that the Pope spoke
appreciatively and gratefully of the position occupied in Germany by
the Catholic religion and its adherents, adding the assurance that he,
for his part, would contribute toward having the German Catholics yield
to no other Germans in love for their fatherland and in loyalty.

Pope Leo XIII gave evidences of friendliness toward me whenever he
could. For instance, on the occasion of one of my visits to Rome,
he accorded my suite and servants the honor of a special audience;
he sent Prince-Bishop Kopp as Papal Delegate on the occasion of the
consecration by me of the portal which I had had added to the cathedral
at Metz, and was so kind as to inform me of the naming of Archbishop
Fischer of Cologne as Cardinal, which was done to celebrate that day.

On the occasion of the Papal Jubilee in 1903 to celebrate the
twenty-fifth anniversary of his accession to the Papacy, I sent a
special mission to convey my congratulations to the Pope, at the head
of which was Freiherr von Loë, for many years intimately acquainted
with him.

Not long after that--and only a few months before his death--I paid
my third and last visit to the Pope. Though he was very weak, this
ninety-three-year-old man came up to me, holding both his hands
outstretched. Concerning this visit, which was characterized by great
cordiality on both sides, I immediately jotted down some notes, which
recently came into my possession again.

The Pope said, among other things, that he could not but give his
full approval to the principles according to which I governed; that
he had followed with interest my methods of governing and recognized
with pleasure that I had built up my rule on a foundation of firm
Christianity; that such lofty religious principles underlay it that it
behooved him to ask the blessing of Heaven upon myself, my dynasty, and
the German Empire, and to grant me his apostolic benediction.


"SWORD OF CATHOLIC CHURCH"

It was of interest to me that the Pope said to me on this occasion that
Germany must become the sword of the Catholic Church. I remarked that
the old Roman Empire of the German nation no longer existed and that
conditions had changed. But he stuck to his words.

Then the Pope went on to say that he must thank me once more for my
unflagging attention to the welfare of my Catholic subjects; that he
had heard about this from so many sources that he was glad to tell me
personally how grateful both he and the German Catholics were for this
attention to their interests; that he could assure me that my Catholic
subjects would stand by me, in good and bad times, with absolute
fidelity. "Ils resteront absolument et infailliblement fidèles" ("They
will remain absolutely and infallibly faithful").

I rejoiced greatly at these words of appreciation from such an exalted
source. I answered that I considered it the duty of a Christian
sovereign to care for his subjects to the best of his ability,
irrespective of creed; that I could assure him that, during my reign,
everybody could profess his religion without interference and fulfill
his duties toward his ecclesiastical overlord; that this was a
fundamental principle of my life, from which I could not be swerved.

Because I showed my Catholic fellow countrymen from the very beginning
that I wished to allow them complete freedom in the exercise of their
religion, a quieter spirit was engendered in the land and the aftermath
of the "Kulturkampf" disappeared more and more. But I did not conceal
from myself the fact that, despite all politeness and friendliness, the
prelates, with the sole exception of Cardinal Kopp, still continued to
look upon me as the Emperor, and I was compelled to take into account
that, in the Catholic south and west, this idea would never quite
vanish. Grateful acknowledgment has repeatedly been made to me of the
fact that the Catholics were as well off, during my reign, as they
could possibly desire; but the constantly more uncompromising attitude
of the Church on mixed marriages, and that of the Centrist party in
politics, were certainly a sign that the antiheretical tendency still
lived beneath the peaceful surface.

This made all the more intense my desire for the firm union of the
_Protestant Churches_--first, in Prussia, then in Germany, finally, in
all Europe. My endeavors, in conjunction with the Chief Ecclesiastical
Councilor, the General Superintendent, and so on, to find means
of effecting this union, were most earnest. I hailed the Eisenach
Conference with joy and followed its proceedings with interest. I
assembled all the General Superintendents for the consecration of the
Church at Jerusalem and also was able to greet invited deputations
from Sweden, Norway, and so forth; and I did likewise on the occasion
of the consecration of the Berlin cathedral, where, among many other
deputations, the Church of England was represented by the Bishop of
Ripon (W. Boyd-Carpenter), the pastor of Queen Victoria of England,
equally prominent as a writer and preacher.

Whenever possible, I worked toward compromise, closer relations and
union, yet nothing definite resulted. Though church union in Prussia
has been a success, Lutherans and Reformists kept apart in other
sections of the fatherland. Many local rulers kept sharp watch over
their rights in relation to religions and, owing to this, were hostile
to a closer union of the different creeds within their territory.
Therefore, despite my endeavors, the German Protestant Church was not
able to unite and make common cause against the elements hostile to
it. Only through the emergency brought on by the revolution was this
made possible. On Ascension Day, 1922, to my great joy, the "German
Evangelical Church Union" was solemnly formed at the Schloss Church at
Wittenberg.


DOCTOR DRYANDER'S INFLUENCE

During the first years of my military service at Potsdam I had felt
deeply the inadequacy of the sermons, which often dealt only with
dry dogmatic matter and paid too little attention to the person of
Christ. In Bonn I became acquainted with Doctor Dryander, who made an
impression on me lasting throughout my life. His sermons were free from
dogma, the person of Christ was their pivotal point, and "practical
Christianity" was brought into the foreground.

Later I brought him to Berlin and soon had him appointed to a post at
the Cathedral and in my palace. Dryander was by my side for years,
until long after the 9th of November, standing close to me spiritually,
and bringing to me spiritual consolation. We often talked on religious
matters and thrashed out thoroughly the tasks and the future of the
Protestant Church. The views of Dryander--mild, yet powerful, clear,
and of truly evangelical strength--made of him a pillar and an ornament
of his Church, and a faithful co-worker with the Emperor, to whom he
was closely bound, in the interests of the Church and its development.

Since the 9th of November, Doctor Dryander also has been exposed to
persecutions, but he has stood his ground courageously; the hopes,
beliefs, and trust of his King are with him and the Evangelical Church!
The Church must again raise up the broken nation inwardly according to
the gospel of "Ein'feste Burg ist unser Gott."

I cannot allow to pass without remark the influence exerted by the
work--translated at my instigation--of the English missionary Bernard
Lucas, entitled _Conversations with Christ_; as well as the sermons
on Jesus by Pastor Schneller (Jerusalem), and the collections of
sermons called _The Old God Still Lives_ and _From Deep Trouble_, by
Consistorial Councilor Conrad. These brought us much inspiration and
comfort by their vital ability to absorb and hold readers and hearers.

The fact that I could deal with religious and church questions with
complete objectivity "sine ira et studio" is due to my excellent
teacher, Professor Doctor Hinzpeter, a Westphalian Calvinist. He caused
his pupil to grow up and live with the Bible, eliminating, at the same
time, all dogmatic and polemical questions; owing to this, polemics
in religion have remained alien to me, and expressions like that
autocratic one, "orthodox," are repulsive to me. As to my own religious
convictions, I set forth what they were years ago, in a letter to my
friend, Admiral Hollmann, made public at the time, part of which is
reproduced at the end of this chapter.

I was enabled to bring joy to the hearts of my Catholic subjects when
I presented the plot of ground known as the "Dormition," acquired by
me from the Sultan in 1898 as a result of my sojourn in Jerusalem, to
the German Catholics there. The worthy, faithful Father Peter Schmitz,
representative of the Catholic Society in Jerusalem, expressed to me
the heartfelt thanks of the German Catholics on the spot in eloquent
words at the ceremony of taking possession.


THE CHURCH IN JERUSALEM

When I conferred with him as to future building operations and as
to the selection of persons to occupy the place, the old expert on
Jerusalem advised me to select none of the order of monks there, since
all were more or less mixed up in the intrigues and quarrels concerning
the "loci sacri" (sacred spots). After my return a delegation of the
German Knights of Malta, under Count Praschma, appeared before me to
express their gratitude. The design for the church, made by a very
talented Cologne architect and skillfully adapted to the local style,
was submitted to me. After the completion of the church I decided that
the Benedictine monks of Beuron should take over the "Dormition"; they
did so in 1906, also taking over the monastery built next the new St.
Mary's Church.

I was on friendly terms for many years with the Benedictine monks of
the Beuron Congregation, with whose Archabbot, Wolter, I had become
acquainted at Sigmaringen. In mediæval times the order always stood
well with the German Emperors, of whom scarcely one failed to visit,
in connection with his journeys to Rome, the magnificently situated
Monte Cassino. When the Benedictine monks asked permission to establish
a settlement on the Rhine I had the splendid Romanesque abbey of Maria
Laach--unused at the time--turned over to them. The order, which counts
among its members excellent artists, including Father Desiderius, has
brought new glory to the abbey, which had fallen into neglect and
decay, by magnificent interior decorations. Often have I visited Maria
Laach and rejoiced in the progress of its restoration, as well as in
conversations with the intelligent abbots and in the hearty, simple
reception on the part of the faithful brethren.

When I visited the monastery of Monte Cassino I became acquainted, in
the person of Archabbot Monsignor Krug, with a man of extraordinary
mental gifts and comprehensive culture, who had traveled a great
deal about the world. He could express himself with equal fluency
in Italian, English, and French, and his mother tongue, German. In
his address to King Victor Emmanuel of Italy and me, he pointed out
that nearly all the German Emperors, as well as the Lombard Kings
before them, had paid visits to Monte Cassino. He presented me with
a magnificent collection of copies of documents of the time of the
Emperor Frederick II, taken from the library of the order, and I
reciprocated by presenting him with the works of Frederick the Great.

Agriculture flourishes in the environs of the monasteries maintained by
the Benedictine Order, being carried on by the lay brothers with all
the latest improvements, to the benefit of the backward peasantry of
the region; and in the country and town communities of the order church
singing and organ playing are zealously cultivated by the monks, who
have attained a high degree of artistic skill. The art of the goldsmith
also flourishes among the monks, likewise art embroidery among the
Benedictine nuns.

I caused to be reproduced in its full size the Labarum (standard) of
the Emperor Constantine the Great, designed in accordance with the
researches made by Monsignor Wilpert: one copy I presented to the Pope,
another to my Palace Chapel at Berlin. The latter was stolen from the
chapel by the mob during the days of the revolution. The metal work
was done entirely by monks, the embroidery by nuns of the order, both
excellently. One of the places inhabited by nuns of this order is the
convent of Saint Hildegard, above Rüdesheim, which I visited in 1917.

My letter to Admiral Hollmann was due to the excitement aroused by a
lecture entitled "Babel and Bible," delivered by Professor Delitzsch
before the German Orient Society, of which Admiral Hollmann was one of
the Board of Managers.


SCHOLARSHIP AND RELIGION

The first part of the letter, which deals primarily with Professor
Delitzsch's statements, has been omitted from the reproduction of the
letter printed below:

                                                      _Feb. 15, 1903._

    MY DEAR HOLLMANN:

    I should now like to return once again to my own standpoint
    regarding the doctrine or view of revelation, as I have often
    set it forth to you, my dear Hollmann, and other gentlemen.
    I distinguish between two different kinds of revelation: a
    progressive, to a certain extent historical revelation, and a
    purely religious one, paving the way to the future coming of the
    Messiah.

    Of the first, this is to be said: There is not the smallest doubt
    in my mind that God constantly reveals Himself through the human
    race created by Him. He has "breathed His breath into mankind," or,
    in other words, given it a piece of Himself, a soul. He follows the
    development of the human race with a Father's love and interest;
    for the purpose of leading it forward and benefiting it, he
    "reveals" Himself in some great savant or priest or king, whether
    among the heathens, Jews, or Christians.

    Hammurabi was one of these, likewise Moses, Abraham, Homer,
    Charlemagne, Luther, Shakespeare, Goethe, Kant, Emperor William
    the Great. These men were selected by Him and made worthy of His
    grace; of achieving for their people, both in the spiritual and the
    physical domain, splendid and imperishable things, in accordance
    with His will. How often did my grandfather clearly emphasize that
    he was but an instrument in the hand of the Lord.

    The works of great minds are gifts of God to the peoples of the
    earth, in order that they may improve themselves on these models
    and grope forward, by means of them, through the confusion of that
    which is still unexplored here below. God has certainly revealed
    Himself in different ways to different peoples, according to their
    standing and degree of culture, and He is still doing it now.
    For, just as we are overcome most by the greatness and majesty of
    the splendor of Creation when we contemplate it, and are amazed
    at the greatness of God as revealed therein, so also may we, in
    contemplating whatever is great or splendid in the works of a man
    or a people, recognize therein with gratitude the splendor of the
    revelation of God. He works directly upon us and among us! The
    second kind of revelation, the more religious kind, is that which
    leads to the coming of the Lord. It is introduced from Abraham
    onward, slowly but with foresight, all-wise and all-knowing; for
    without it mankind would have been doomed.

    And now begins the most astounding influence, the revelation of
    God. The tribe of Abraham, and the people descended from it,
    consider the holiest thing of all, unescapable in its logical
    consequences, the belief in one God. This belief they must have and
    cultivate. Scattered by the captivity in Egypt, the separate parts
    are welded together by Moses for the second time, and still they
    try to maintain their "monotheism." The direct intervention of God
    is what brings regeneration to this people.

KAISER'S THEOLOGY

    And thus it goes through the centuries, until the Messiah announced
    and foreshadowed by the Prophets and Psalmists shall at last
    appear. The greatest revelation of God in the world! For He Himself
    appeared in the body of His Son; Christ is God, God in human
    form. He saved us. He inspires us, we are led to follow Him, we
    feel His fire burning within us, His pity strengthening us, His
    dissatisfaction destroying us, but also His intercession saving us.
    Sure of victory, building solely upon His word, we go through work,
    scorn, grief, misery, and death, for in Him we have the revealed
    word of God, and God never lies.

    That is my view of this question. The Word, especially for us of
    the Evangelical faith, has become everything on account of Luther;
    and Delitzsch, as a good theologian, should not forget that our
    great Luther taught us to sing and believe: "Das Wort sie sollen
    lassen stehn" ("The Word they must allow to stand").

    It is self-evident that the Old Testament contains a large number
    of parts which are of purely human-historical character and not
    "God's revealed Word." These are purely historical descriptions
    of events of all sorts, which occur in the life of the people of
    Israel in the domain of politics, religion, morals, and spiritual
    life.

    For instance, the giving out of the Law on Mount Sinai can be
    looked upon only symbolically as having been inspired by God,
    since Moses had to turn to a revival of laws perhaps known of old
    (possibly drawn from the Code of Hammurabi), in order to bring
    coherence and solidarity to the framework of his people, which was
    loose and little capable of resistance. Here the historian may
    perhaps find a connection, either in sense or words, with the laws
    of Hammurabi, the friend of Abraham, which may be logically right;
    but this can never affect the fact that God had inspired Moses to
    act thus, and, to that extent, had revealed Himself to the people
    of Israel.

    Therefore, my view is that our good professor should rather avoid
    introducing and treating of religion as such in his lectures
    before our association, but that he may continue, unhindered, to
    describe whatever brings the religion, customs, and so on of the
    Babylonians, and so on, into relation with the Old Testament.

    As far as I am concerned, I am led by the above to the following
    conclusion:

    (a) I believe in one only God.

    (b) We men need, in order to teach Him, a _Form_, especially for
    our children.

    (c) This _Form_ has been, up to now, the Old Testament, as we now
    know it. This _Form_ will be essentially changed by research,
    inscriptions, and excavations; but that will cause no harm, nor
    will the fact that, thereby, much of the halo of the Chosen People
    will disappear, cause any harm. The kernel and content remain
    always the same: God and His influence.

    Religion was never a result of science, but something flowing from
    the heart and being of man, through his relations with God.

    With heartiest thanks and many greetings, I remain always

                         Your sincere friend,
                                 (Signed) WILHELM I. R.




CHAPTER IX

Army and Navy


My close relations with the army are a matter of common knowledge. In
this direction I conformed to the tradition of my family. Prussia's
kings did not chase cosmopolitan mirages, but realized that the welfare
of their land could only be assured by means of a real power protecting
industry and commerce. If, in a number of utterances, I admonished my
people to "keep their powder dry" and "their swords sharp," the warning
was addressed alike to foe and friend. I wished our foes to pause and
think a long time before they dared to engage with us. I wished to
cultivate a manly spirit in the German people; I wished to make sure
that, when the hour struck for us to defend the fruits of our industry
against an enemy's lust of conquest, it should find a strong race.

In view of this I attached high value to the educational duty of the
army. General compulsory military service has a social influence upon
men in the mass equaled by nothing else. It brings together rich and
poor, sons of the soil and of the city; it brings acquaintanceship and
mutual understanding among young people whose roads, otherwise, would
lead them far apart; the feeling that they are serving one idea unites
them.

And think what we made out of our young men! Pale town boys were
transformed into erect, healthy, sport-hardened men; limbs grown stiff
through labor were made adroit and pliable.

I stepped direct from brigade commander to king--to repeat the
well-known words of King Frederick William III. Up to then I had
climbed the steps of an officer's career. I still think with pleasure
of my pride when, on the 2d of May, 1869, during the spring parade,
I first stood in the ranks before my grandfather. Relations with the
individual man have always seemed valuable to me, and, therefore, I
particularly treasured the assignments, during my military service,
where I could cultivate such relations. My activities as commander of a
company, a squadron, and a battery, likewise as head of a regiment, are
unforgettable to me.

I felt at home among my soldiers. In them I placed unlimited trust.
The painful experiences of the autumn of 1918 have not diminished this
trust. I do not forget that a part of the German people, after four
years of unprecedented achievements and privations, had become too ill
to withstand being corrupted by foes within and without. Moreover, the
best of the Germans lay under the green sod; the others were thrown
into such consternation by the events of the revolution which had been
held to be impossible that they could not spur themselves to act.

Compulsory military service was the best school for the physical and
moral toughening of our people. It created for us free men who knew
their own value. From these an excellent corps of noncommissioned
officers was formed; from the latter, in turn, we drew our Government
officials, the like of whom, in ability, incorruptibility and fidelity
to duty no other nation on earth can show.


BELIEVES OFFICERS STILL LOYAL

And it is from these very elements that I receive nowadays signs of
loyalty, every one of which does me good. My old Second Company of the
First Infantry Guard Regiment has shared, through good and evil days,
the vicissitudes of its old captain. I saw them for the last time in
1913, in close formation--still one hundred twenty-five strong--under
that excellent sergeant, Hartmann, on the occasion of the celebration
of the twenty-fifth anniversary of my accession to the throne.

In view of its proud duty as an educator and leader of the nation in
arms, the officer corps occupied a particularly important position in
the German Empire. The method of replacement, which, by adoption of
the officers' vote, had been lodged in the hands of the various bodies
of officers themselves, guaranteed the needed homogeneity. Harmful
outcroppings of the idea of caste were merely sporadic; wherever they
made themselves felt they were instantly rooted out.

I entered much and willingly into relations with the various officer
corps and felt like a comrade among them. The materialistic spirit of
our age, to be sure, had not passed over the officer corps without
leaving traces; but, on the whole, it must be admitted that nowhere
else were self-discipline, fidelity to duty, and simplicity cultivated
to such an extent as among the officers.

A process of weeding out such as existed in no other profession
allowed only the ablest and best to reach positions of influence. The
commanding generals were men of a high degree of attainment and ability
and--what is even more important--men of character. It is a difficult
matter to single out individuals from among them.

Though the man in the ranks at the front was always particularly
close to my heart, I must, nevertheless, give special prominence to
the General Staff as a school for the officer corps. I have already
remarked that Field Marshal Count Moltke had known how by careful
training to build up men who were not only up to requirements,
technically speaking, but also qualified for action demanding
willingness to assume responsibility, independence of judgment, and
far-sightedness. "To be more than you seem" is written in the preface
to the _Pocket Manual for the General Staff Officer_.

Field Marshal Count Moltke laid the foundations for this training; and
his successors--Count Waldersee, that great genius, Count Schlieffen,
and General von Moltke--built upon them. The result was the General
Staff, which accomplished unprecedented feats in the World War, and
aroused admiration throughout the world.

I soon realized that the greatest possible improvement of our highly
developed technical department was absolutely necessary and would save
precious blood. Wherever possible, I worked toward the perfection of
our armament and sought to place machinery in the service of our army.

Among new creations, the very first place is taken by the heavy
artillery of the army in the field. In bringing this into being I
was obliged to overcome much opposition--particularly, strange to
relate, in the ranks of the artillery itself. It is a source of
great satisfaction to me that I put this matter through. It laid the
foundation for the carrying out of operations on a large scale, and it
was long before our foes could catch up with us in this direction.


BETTER MILITARY EQUIPMENT

Mention must also be made of the machine gun, which developed from
modest beginnings to being the backbone of the infantry's fighting
powers; the replacement of the rifle by the machine gun multiplied the
firing power of the infantry while, at the same time, diminishing its
losses.

Nor can I pass over without mention the introduction of the movable
field kitchen, which I had seen for the first time at some maneuvers
of the Russian army. It was of the greatest value in maintaining the
fighting efficiency of the army, since the possibility of getting
sufficient nourishment kept our troops fresh and healthy.

All human work remains unfinished. Nevertheless, it may be said,
without exaggeration, that the German army which marched to battle in
1914 was an instrument of warfare without an equal.

Whereas, at my accession to the throne, I had found the army in a
condition which merely required development upon the foundations
already laid, the navy, on the other hand, was in the first stage of
development. After the failure of all the attempts of Admiral Hollmann
to move the recalcitrant Reichstag to adopt a slowly progressing,
systematic strengthening of German sea power--largely due to the cheap
catchwords of Deputy Richter and the lack of understanding of the
Liberals of the Left, who were fooled by them--the Admiral requested
me to retire him. Deeply moved, I acceded to his request; this plain,
loyal man, the son of a genuine Berlin bourgeois family, had become
dear to me through his upright character, his devotion to duty, and his
attachment to me. My friendship with him, based upon this estimate,
lasted for many years up to the moment of the Admiral's sudden death;
it often caused me to visit this faithful man, endowed with fine Berlin
wit, at his home, and there to associate with him as head of the German
Orient Society, as well as to see him, in a small circle of intimates,
at my own home, or to take him with me as a treasured traveling
companion. He was one of the most faithful of my faithful friends,
always remaining the same in his disinterestedness, never asking
anything for himself. Happy the city which can produce such citizens! I
preserve a grateful memory of this tried and trusted friend.

Admiral Tirpitz succeeded Hollmann. In his very first reports,
which laid the foundation of the first Naval law, he showed himself
thoroughly in accord with me in the belief that the sanction of the
Reichstag for the building of warships was not to be gained by the old
form of procedure. As I have already pointed out, the opposition was
not to be convinced; the tone of the debates conducted by Richter was
unworthy of the importance of the subject; for instance, the gunboat
obtained in the Reichstag by the Poles, under Herr von Koscielsky, was
jokingly dubbed _Koscielska_. Ridicule was the weapon used, though the
future of the fatherland was in question.

It was necessary that the representative of the navy should have a
solid phalanx behind him, both among the Ministers of State and in the
Reichstag, and that it should, from absolute conviction, energetically
support him and the cause. Therefore, there was need of communicating
to the Reichstag members, still rather ignorant in naval matters,
the details of the great work; moreover, a great movement must be
engineered among the people, among the "general public," indifferent
as yet, to arouse its interest and enthusiasm for the navy, in order
that pressure from the people itself might be brought to bear upon the
Reichstag members. To this end, an energetic propaganda was needed,
through a well-organized and well-directed press, as well as through
eminent men of science at the universities and technical high schools.


FIGHT IN THE REICHSTAG

There was need of a complete change in the whole method of handling
the matter in the Reichstag. There must be no more bickerings about
individual ships and docks. In making up the military budget, no
arguments arose over the strength of the army, unless it was a
matter of new formations. The makeup of the navy, like that of the
army, must be settled by law once for all, its right of existence
recognized and protected. The units composing it must no longer be a
matter for debate. Moreover, not only the officer corps but that of
noncommissioned officers must be strengthened and trained, in order to
be ready for service on the new ships. At the beginning of my reign,
sixty to eighty cadets, at the most, were enrolled every year; in the
last few years before the war several hundred asked admission. Twelve
precious years, never to be retrieved, were lost by the failure of the
Reichstag; it is even harder to create a navy overnight than an army.

The goal to be striven for was implied in the law, which expressed the
"idea of risk"; the aim was to cause even the strongest hostile fleet
to think seriously before it came to blows with the German fleet, in
view of the heavy losses that were to be feared in a battle, which put
the foe in danger of becoming too weak for other tasks. The "idea of
risk" was brilliantly vindicated in the Skager-Rak (Jutland) battle;
the enemy, in spite of his immense superiority, dared not risk a second
battle. Trafalgar was already dim; its laurels must not be completely
lost.

The total number of units (ships) on hand--it was principally a matter
of ships of the line--was taken as a basis for the Naval law, although
these, with the exception of the four ships of the _Brandenburg_ class,
were little better than old iron.

The Naval law was looked upon by many laymen, in view of the numbers
involved, as a naval increase. In reality, however, this was a false
view, since the so-called existing fleet was absolutely no longer
a fleet. It was slowly dying of old age--as Hollmann said when he
retired; included in it were almost the oldest ships still in service
in all Europe.

Now that the Naval law was gradually coming into force, lively building
operations set in, launchings were reported in the press, and there
was joy among those under the dominion of the "rage du nombre" at the
growing number of ships. But when it was made clear to them that as
soon as the new ships were ready the old ones must be eliminated, so
that, as a matter of fact, the total number of ships of fighting value
would, at first, not be increased, they were greatly disillusioned. Had
the necessary ships been built in time during the wasted twelve years
the Naval law would have found a quite different, usable basis already
in existence. But as matters now stood it was really a question of the
complete rebuilding of the entire German fleet.

The large number of ships, to which those which had to be eliminated
were added, was a fallacy. Therefore the English made a mistake when
they merely took account of the number of ships--since that fitted in
well with the propaganda against Germany--but paid no attention to age
or type, arriving thus at a total that was far too high, and, by such
misleading methods, artificially nourishing the so-called apprehension
at the growth of the German navy.

Admiral Tirpitz now went ahead with the program approved by me. With
iron energy and merciless sacrifice of his health and strength he
soon was able to inject efficiency and power into the handling of the
naval question. At my command he went, after the drafting of the Naval
law, to Friedrichsruh, the residence of Prince Bismarck, in order to
convince the latter of the necessity for having a German navy.

The press worked zealously toward the introduction of the Naval law,
and political economists, experts on commerce and politics and so
forth, placed their pens at the service of the great national cause,
the necessity for a navy having been by now widely realized.

In the meantime the English, too, helped--though quite
unconsciously--toward bettering the Naval law's chance of being
passed. The Boer War had broken out, and had aroused among the German
people much sympathy for the little country and much indignation on
account of England's violent assault upon it. Thereupon the news came
of the utterly unjustified capture of two German steamers on the East
African coast by English warships. Indignation was general.

The news of the stopping of the second steamer happened to be received
by the Secretary of State, von Bülow, at the very moment when Tirpitz
and I were with him. As soon as Bülow had read the dispatch aloud, I
quoted the old English proverb, "It's an ill wind that blows nobody
good," and Tirpitz exclaimed, "Now we have the wind we need for
bringing our ship into port. The Naval law will go through. Your
Majesty must present a medal to the captain of the English ship in
gratitude for having put it through."

The Imperial Chancellor ordered up champagne and the three of us drank
joyously to the new law, its acceptance, and the future German fleet,
not forgetting to express our thanks to the English navy, which had
proved so helpful to us.

Many years later, on my return from Lowther Castle, where I had been
hunting with Lord Lonsdale, I was invited to dine with Lord Rosebery,
the great Liberal statesman and former Minister of Foreign Affairs,
also known through his researches in the history of Napoleon, at his
beautiful country estate of Dalmeny Castle, situated close to the sea,
not far from the great Forth bridge. Among the guests was General Sir
Ian Hamilton, a Scotchman, well known on account of his part in the
Boer War, with whom I had become acquainted when he was a guest at the
Imperial German maneuvers, the Lord Provost of Edinburgh, and a captain
of the English navy, who was commander of the naval station there.

The last sat next Admiral Freiherr von Senden, directly across the
table from me, and attracted my attention by the obvious embarrassment
which he manifested in his talk with the Admiral, which he conducted in
a low voice. After dinner Admiral von Senden introduced the captain to
me, whereat the Englishman's embarrassment caused him to behave even
more awkwardly than before, and aroused my attention because of the
worried look of his eyes and his pale face.

After the conversation, which turned on various maritime topics, had
come to an end, I asked Freiherr von Senden what the matter was with
the man; the Admiral laughed and replied that he had elicited from his
neighbor, during the meal, that he had been the commander of the ship
which had captured the two German steamers in the Boer War, and that
he had been afraid that I might find this out. Senden had thereupon
told him that he was entirely mistaken about this; that had His Majesty
learned who he was he could rest assured that he would have been very
well treated and thanked into the bargain.

"Thanked? What for?" queried the Englishman.

"For having made the passage of the Naval law so much easier for the
Emperor!"

One of the prime considerations in the passage of the Naval law--as
also for all later additions, and, in general, for the whole question
of warship construction--was the question whether the German
shipbuilding industry would be in a position to keep pace with the
naval program; whether, in fact, it would be able to carry it out
at all. Here, too, Admiral von Tirpitz worked with tireless energy.
Encouraged and fired with enthusiasm by him, the German shipbuilding
yards went at the great problem, filled with German audacity, and
solved it with positively brilliant results, greatly distancing their
foreign competitors. The admirable technical endowment of the German
engineers, as well as the better education of the German working
classes, contributed in full measure toward this achievement.


FEVERISH HASTE FOR NAVY

Consultations, conferences, reports to me, service trips to all
shipbuilding yards, were the daily bread of the indefatigable Tirpitz.
But the tremendous trouble and work were richly rewarded. The people
woke up, began to have a thought for the value of the colonies (raw
materials provided by ourselves without foreign middlemen!) and for
commercial relations, and to feel interest in commerce, navigation,
shipping, etc.

And, at last, the derisive opposition stopped cracking its jokes.
Tirpitz, always ready for battle, wielded a sharp blade in fighting,
never joked and allowed nobody to joke with him, so that his opponents
no longer felt like laughing. Things went particularly badly with
Deputy Richter when Tirpitz brilliantly snubbed and silenced him
by quoting a patriotic saying, dating from the 'forties, of old
Harkort--whose district Richter represented--concerning the need for a
German fleet. Now it was the turn of the other side of the Reichstag to
laugh.

And so the great day dawned. The law was passed, after much fighting
and talking, by a great majority. The strength of the German navy was
assured; naval construction was to be accomplished.

By means of construction and keeping an increased number of ships in
service a fleet soon sprang into being. In order to maneuver, lead,
and train its personnel a new book of regulations and signal code were
needed--at the beginning of my reign these had been worked out merely
for one division--four ships--since at that time a larger number of
units never navigated together in the German navy--_i. e._, a larger
number were not kept in service. And even these were out of service
in the autumn, so that, in winter, there was (with the exception of
cruisers in foreign waters) absolutely no German navy. All the care
expended during the summer season on training of crews, officers,
noncommissioned officers, engine-room crews, and stokers, as well as
on rigging and upkeep of ships, was as good as wasted when the ships
were retired from service in the autumn; and when spring came and they
were put back into commission things had to be started at the beginning
again. The result was that any degree of continuity in training and
of coherence among the crews with relation to each other and their
ships--of "ship spirit," in short--could not be maintained. This
was maintained only on board the ships stationed in foreign waters.
Therefore, after the necessary heating equipment, etc., had been put
in, I ordered that ships be kept in service also through the winter,
which was a veritable boon to the development of the fleet.

In order to obtain the necessary number of units needed by the new
regulations, Admiral von Tirpitz, in view of the shortage of ships of
the line, had already formed into divisions all the sorts of vessels
available, including gunboats and dispatch boats, and carried out
evolutions with them, so that when the replacement of line ships began
to take place the foundations for the new regulations had already been
laid. The latter were then constantly developed with the greatest
energy by all the officials concerned and kept pace with the growth of
the fleet.

Hard work was done on the development of that important weapon, the
torpedo boat. At that time we were filled with joyful pride that a
German torpedo-boat division was the first united torpedo squadron ever
to cross the North Sea. It sailed, under the command of my brother,
Prince Henry, to take part in the celebration of Queen Victoria's
Golden Jubilee (1887).


COLONEL GOETHAL'S VISIT

The development of Heligoland and its fortifications as a point of
support for small cruisers and torpedo boats--also, later on, for
U-boats--was also taken in hand, after the necessary protective work
for preserving the island had been constructed by the state--in
connection with which work the Empire and Prussia fought like cat and
dog.

On account of the growth of the fleet it became necessary to widen
the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal. After a hard struggle we caused the new
locks to be built of the largest possible size, capable of meeting
the development of dreadnaughts for a long time to come. There the
far-sighted policy of the Admiral was brilliantly vindicated.

This found unexpected corroboration by a foreigner. Colonel Goethals,
the builder of the Panama Canal, requested through the United States
Government permission to inspect the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal and its
new locks. Permission was most willingly granted. After a meal with
me, at which Admiral von Tirpitz was present, the Admiral questioned
the American engineer (who was enthusiastic over our construction
work) concerning the measurements of the Panama locks, whereupon it
transpired that the measurements of the locks of the Panama Canal were
much smaller than those of the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal. To my astonished
question as to how that could be possible, Goethals replied that the
Navy Department, upon inquiry by him, had given those measurements for
ships of the line. Admiral von Tirpitz then remarked that this size
would be far from adequate for the future, and that the newer type of
dreadnaughts and superdreadnaughts would not be able to go through
the locks, consequently the canal would soon be useless for American
and other big battleships. The Colonel agreed, and remarked that
this was already true of the newest ships under construction, and he
congratulated His Excellency upon having had the courage to demand and
put through the big locks of the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal, which he had
looked upon with admiration and envy.

In like manner the very backward and antiquated Imperial docks [the
old tinker's shops, as Tirpitz called them] were rebuilt and developed
into model modern plants and the arrangements for the workers were
developed so as to further the welfare of the latter along the most
approved lines. Only those who, like myself, have followed and seen
with their own eyes from the very beginning the origin and development
of all these factors necessary to the building up--nay, the creation
anew--of the fleet can form anything like a proper idea of the enormous
achievement of Admiral von Tirpitz and his entire corps of assistants.

The office of the Imperial Naval Department was also a new creation;
the old "Oberkommando" was eliminated when it was divided into the two
main branches of Admiralty Staff and Imperial Naval Department. Both of
these (as in the army) were directly under the supreme war commander
in chief--this meant that there was no longer any official between the
Emperor and his navy.


COMING OF THE DREADNAUGHT

When Admiral Fisher evolved an entirely new type of ship for England
in the shape of the "dreadnaught"--thereby surprising the world as
if he had launched a sudden assault upon it--and thought that he had
thus given England, once for all, an unapproachable naval superiority
which the rest of the powers could never meet, there was naturally
great excitement in all naval circles. The idea, to be sure, did
not originate with Fisher, but came--in the form of an appeal to
shipbuilders of the whole world--from the famous Italian engineer
Cuniberti, who had made public a sketch in Fred Jane's _Illustrated
Naval Atlas_.

At the first conference regarding the introduction of the "dreadnaught"
type of big fighting ship by England I at once agreed with Admiral
von Tirpitz that it had robbed all pre-dreadnaughts of their value
and consigned them to the scrap heap, especially the German ships,
which it had been necessary to keep considerably smaller, on account
of the measurements of our old locks, than the ships of other navies,
particularly the English.

Thereupon Admiral von Tirpitz remarked that this would also apply to
the English fleet itself as soon as the other nations had followed
Fisher's example; that England had robbed her enormous pre-dreadnaught
force, upon which her great superiority lasted, of its fighting value,
which would necessitate her building an entirely new fleet of big
fighting ships, in competition with the entire world, which would do
likewise; that this would be exceedingly costly; that England, in
order to maintain her notorious "two-Power standard," would have to
exert herself to such an extent that she would look with more disfavor
than ever on new warships built by other nations, toward whom she was
unfriendly, and begin to make objections; then this would be especially
true if we started building, but would be in vain, since, with the
existing types of ships in our fleet, we could not expect to fight
against big battleships, but were forced, "nolens volens," to follow
England along this road.

The war fully confirmed Admiral Tirpitz's opinion. Every one of our
ships not in the big fighting-ship class had to be retired from service.

When the first German big fighting ship was placed in service there
was a loud outcry in the land of the British. The conviction gradually
dawned that Fisher and his shipbuilders had counted absolutely on
the belief that Germany would not be able to build any big fighting
ships. Therefore the disappointment was all the greater. Why such an
assumption was made is beyond comprehension, since, even at that time,
German shipbuilders had already built the great ocean greyhounds, far
surpassing our warships of the line in tonnage, which had occasioned
painfully noticeable competition to the English steamship lines. Our
big fighting ships, despite their small number, showed themselves,
at the Skager-Rak (Jutland) battle, not only equal to their English
opponents, but superior to them both in seaworthiness and in standing
up under gunfire.


IMPATIENT FOR U-BOATS

The building of U-boats, unfortunately, could not be pushed forward
before the war to an extent commensurate with my desires. On the one
hand, it was necessary not to overburden the naval budget during the
carrying out of the Naval law; moreover, most important of all, it was
necessary to collect further data from experiments.

Tirpitz believed that the types with which other nations were
experimenting were too small and fit only for coast defense; that
Germany must build "seagoing" submarines capable of navigating in the
open sea; that this necessitated a larger type--which, however, must
first be systematically developed. This took a long time and required
careful experiments with models.

The result was that, at first, in 1914, there were only a small number
of seaworthy submarines in readiness. Even then more pressure might
have been brought to bear upon England with the available submarines
had not the Chancellor been so concerned lest England be provoked
thereby.

The number and efficiency of the submarines rose rapidly in the course
of the war; in considering numbers, however, one must always remember
that in wartime, U-boats are to be reckoned as follows: One third
of the total in active service, one third on the outward or return
journey, one third undergoing repairs. The achievements of the U-boats
aroused the admiration of the entire world and won the ardent gratitude
of the fatherland.

Admiral von Tirpitz's tremendous success in creating the commercial
colony of Tsing-tao must never be forgotten. Here he gave proof once
more of his brilliant talent for administration and organization in
all directions. Those talents of his created, out of a place that was
previously almost unknown and entirely without importance, a commercial
center which, within a few years, showed a turnover of between fifty
and sixty millions.

The dealings with Reichstag members, the press, and big industrial and
world-commercial elements gradually increased the Admiral's interest in
political matters, particularly in foreign affairs, which were always
bound up with the utilization of ships. The clear world-vision acquired
by him as a traveled sailor, well acquainted with foreign parts,
qualified Tirpitz to make quick decisions, which his fiery temperament
wished to see translated promptly into action.

The opposition and slowness of officialdom irritated him greatly.
A certain tendency to distrust, perhaps strengthened by many an
experience, often misled him to harbor suspicion--sometimes justified,
sometimes not--against individuals. This caused a strong tinge of
reserve in Tirpitz's character and "hampered the joyful workings of the
heart" in others. He was also capable of bringing to bear new views on
a matter with great decision, when, after renewed reflection or study
of new facts, he had altered his previous view. This made working with
him not always exactly agreeable or easy. The tremendous results of his
achievements, of which he was justly proud, gave him a consciousness of
the power of his personality, which sometimes made itself apparent even
to his friends.

During the war Tirpitz's tendency to mix in politics got the upper
hand with him so much that it eventually led to differences of
opinion which finally caused his retirement, since von Bethmann, the
Imperial Chancellor, demanded the dismissal of the Admiral-in-chief
with the observation that the Imperial Secretaries of State were his
subordinates and that the political policy must be conducted by himself
alone.

It was with a heavy heart that I acquiesced in the departure of this
energetic, strong-willed man, who had carried out my plans with genius
and who was indefatigable as a co-worker. Tirpitz may always rest
assured of my Imperial gratitude. If only this source of strength might
stand soon again by the side of the unfortunate German fatherland in
its misery and distress! Tirpitz can do and dares to do what many
others do not dare. The saying of the poet most certainly applies to
Admiral von Tirpitz: "The greatest blessing to the children of earth
is, after all, personality!"

The criticisms which the Admiral felt constrained to make of me, in his
book--which is well worth reading--cannot change, in the slightest, my
opinion of him.




CHAPTER X

The Outbreak of War


After the arrival of the news of the assassination of my friend, the
Archduke Franz Ferdinand, I gave up going to Kiel for the regatta week
and went back home, since I intended to go to Vienna for his funeral.
But I was asked from there to give up this plan. Later I heard that one
of the reasons for this was consideration for my personal safety; to
this I naturally would have paid no attention.

Greatly worried on account of the turn which matters might now take, I
decided to give up my intended journey to Norway and remain at home.
The Imperial Chancellor and the Foreign Office held a view contrary to
mine and wished me to undertake the journey, as they considered that it
would have a quieting effect on all Europe. For a long time I argued
against going away from my country at a time when the future was so
unsettled, but Imperial Chancellor von Bethmann told me, in short and
concise terms, that if I were now to give up my travel plans, which
were already widely known, this would make the situation appear more
serious than it had been up to that moment and possibly lead to the
outbreak of war, for which I might be held responsible; that the whole
world was merely waiting to be put out of suspense by the news that I,
in spite of the situation, had quietly gone on my trip.

Thereupon I consulted the Chief of the General Staff, and, when he
also proved to be calm and unworried regarding the state of affairs
and himself asked for a summer leave of absence to go to Carlsbad, I
decided, though with a heavy heart, upon my departure.

The much-discussed so-called Potsdam Crown Council of July 5th in
reality never took place. It is an invention of malevolent persons.
Naturally, before my departure, I received, as was my custom, some
of the Ministers individually, in order to hear from them reports
concerning their departments. Neither was there any council of
Ministers and there was no talk about war preparations at a single one
of the conferences.

My fleet was cruising in the Norwegian fjords, as usual, while I was
on my summer vacation trip. During my stay at Balholm I received only
meager news from the Foreign Office and was obliged to rely principally
on the Norwegian newspapers, from which I got the impression that the
situation was growing worse. I telegraphed repeatedly to the Chancellor
and the Foreign Office that I considered it advisable to return home,
but was asked each time not to interrupt my journey.

When I learned that the English fleet had not dispersed after the
review at Spithead, but had remained concentrated, I telegraphed again
to Berlin that I considered my return necessary. My opinion was not
shared there.

But when, after that, I learned from the Norwegian newspapers--not
from Berlin--about the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia, and, immediately
thereafter, about the Serbian note to Austria, I started without
further ado upon my return journey and commanded the fleet to repair
to Wilhelmshaven. Upon my departure I learned from a Norwegian source
that it was said that a part of the English fleet had left secretly
for Norway in order to capture me (though peace still reigned!). It
is significant that Sir Edward Goschen, the English ambassador, was
informed on July 26th at the Foreign Office that my return journey,
undertaken on my own initiative, was to be regretted, since agitating
rumors might be caused by it.


SAYS WAR WAS NOT FORESEEN

Upon my arrival at Potsdam I found the Chancellor and the Foreign
Office in conflict with the Chief of the General Staff, since General
von Moltke was of the opinion that war was sure to break out, whereas
the other two stuck firmly to their view that things would not get to
such a bad pass, that there would be some way of avoiding war, provided
I did not order mobilization. This dispute kept up steadily. Not until
General von Moltke announced that the Russians had set fire to their
frontier posts, torn up the frontier railway tracks, and posted red
mobilization notices did a light break upon the diplomats in the
Wilhelmstrasse and bring about both their own collapse and that of
their powers of resistance. They had not _wished_ to _believe_ in the
war.

This shows plainly how little we had expected--much less prepared
for--war in July, 1914. When, in the spring of 1914, Tsar Nicholas II
was questioned by his Court Marshal as to his spring and summer plans,
he replied: "Je resterai chez moi cette année parceque nous aurons
la guerre" ("I shall stay at home this year because we shall have
war"). (This fact, it is said, was reported to Imperial Chancellor von
Bethmann; I heard nothing about it then and learned about it for the
first time in November, 1918.) This was the same Tsar who gave me, on
two separate occasions--at Björkö and Baltisch-Port--entirely without
being pressed by me and in a way that surprised me, his word of honor
as a sovereign, to which he added weight by a clasp of the hand and
an embrace, that he would never draw his sword against the German
Emperor--least of all as an ally of England--in case a war should break
out in Europe, owing to his gratitude to the German Emperor for his
attitude in the Russo-Japanese War, in which England alone had involved
Russia, adding that he hated England, since she had done him and Russia
a great wrong by inciting Japan against them.

At the very time that the Tsar was announcing his summer war program I
was busy at Corfu excavating antiquities; then I went to Wiesbaden,
and, finally, to Norway. A monarch who wishes war and prepares it
in such a way that he can suddenly fall upon his neighbors--a task
requiring long secret mobilization preparations and concentration of
troops--does not spend months outside his own country and does not
allow his Chief of the General Staff to go to Carlsbad on leave of
absence. My enemies, in the meantime, planned their preparations for an
attack.

Our entire diplomatic machine failed. The menace of war was not seen
because the Foreign Office was so hypnotized with its idea of "surtout
pas d'histoires" ("above all, no stories"), its belief in peace at any
cost, that it had completely eliminated war as a possible instrument of
Entente statesmanship from its calculations, and, therefore, did not
rightly estimate the importance of the signs of war.

Herein also is proof of Germany's peaceful inclinations. The
above-mentioned standpoint of the Foreign Office brought it to a
certain extent into conflict with the General Staff and the Admiralty
Staff, who uttered warnings, as was their duty, and wished to make
preparations for defense. This conflict in views showed its effect
for a long time; the army could not forget that, by the fault of the
Foreign Office, it had been taken by surprise, and the diplomats were
piqued because, in spite of their stratagems, war had ensued, after all.

Innumerable are the pieces of evidence that as early as the spring
and summer of 1914, when nobody in Germany believed as yet in the
Entente's attack, war had been prepared for in Russia, France,
Belgium, and England.

I included the most important proofs of this, in so far as they are
known to me, in the _Comparative Historical Tables_ compiled by me.
On account of their great number, I shall cite only a few here. If in
so doing I do not mention all names, this is done for reasons easily
understood. Let me remark furthermore that this whole mass of material
became known to me only little by little, partly during the war, mostly
after the war.

    1. As far back as April, 1914, the accumulation of gold reserves
    in the English banks began. On the other hand, Germany, as late as
    July, was still exporting gold and grain; to the Entente countries,
    among others.

    2. In April, 1914, the German Naval Attaché in Tokyo, Captain von
    Knorr, reported that he was greatly struck by the certainty with
    which everyone there foresaw a war of the Triple Alliance against
    Germany in the near future ... that there was a something in the
    air as if, so to speak, people were expressing their condolences
    over a death sentence not yet pronounced.

    3. At the end of March, 1914, General Sherbatsheff, director of
    the St. Petersburg War Academy, made an address to his officers,
    wherein, among other things, he said: That war with the powers
    forming the Triple Alliance had become unavoidable on account
    of Austria's anti-Russian Balkan policy; that there existed the
    strongest sort of probability that it would break out as early as
    that same summer; that, for Russia, it was a point of honor to
    assume the offensive immediately.

    4. In the report of the Belgian ambassador at Berlin regarding a
    Japanese military mission which had arrived from St. Petersburg in
    April, 1914, it was stated, among other things: At the regimental
    messes the Japanese officers had heard quite open talk of an
    imminent war against Austria-Hungary and Germany; it was stated,
    however, that the army was ready to take the field, and that the
    moment was as auspicious for the Russians as for their allies, the
    French.

    5. According to the memoirs of the then French ambassador at St.
    Petersburg, M. Paléologue, published in 1921, in the _Revue des
    Deux Mondes_, the Grand Duchesses Anastasia and Militza told him
    on July 22, 1914, at Tsarskoe Selo, that their father, the King of
    Montenegro, had informed them, in a cipher telegram, that "we shall
    have war before the end of the month [that is, before the 13th of
    August, Russian style]; ... nothing will be left of Austria....
    You will take back Alsace-Lorraine.... Our armies will meet in
    Berlin.... Germany will be annihilated."

    6. The former Serbian Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, Bogitshevich,
    tells in his book, _Causes of the War_, published in 1919, of the
    following statement which Cambon, the then French ambassador at
    Berlin, made to him on the 26th or 27th of July, 1914: "If Germany
    wishes matters to come to a war, she will have England also against
    her. The English fleet will take Hamburg. We shall thoroughly beat
    the Germans." Bogitshevich states that this talk made him sure
    that the war had been decided upon at the time of the meeting of
    Poincaré with the Russian Tsar at St. Petersburg, if not sooner.


RUSSIAN CROWN COUNCIL

    7. Another Russian of high rank, a member of the Duma and a good
    friend of Sazonoff, told me later about the secret Crown Council
    held, with the Tsar presiding, in February, 1914; moreover, I
    obtained corroboration, from other Russian sources mentioned in
    my _Historical Tables_, of the following: At this Crown Council
    Sazonoff made an address wherein he suggested to the Tsar to
    seize Constantinople, which, since the Triple Alliance would not
    acquiesce in it, would cause a war against Germany and Austria. He
    added that Italy would break away from these two, in the natural
    course of events; that France was to be trusted absolutely and
    England probably.

    The Tsar had agreed, it was said, and given orders to take the
    necessary preliminary steps. The Russian Finance Minister, Count
    Kokovzeff, wrote to the Tsar advising against this course--I
    was informed of this by Count Mirbach after the peace of
    Brest-Litovsk--recommending a firm union with Germany and warning
    against war, which, he said, would be unfavorable to Russia and
    lead to revolution and the fall of the dynasty. The Tsar did not
    follow this advice, but pushed on toward war.

    The same gentleman told me this: _Two_ days after the outbreak
    of war he had been invited by Sazonoff to breakfast. The latter
    came up to him, beaming with joy, and, rubbing his hands together,
    asked: "Come now, my dear Baron, you must admit that I have chosen
    the moment for war excellently, haven't I?" When the Baron, rather
    worried, asked him what stand England would take, the Minister
    smote his pocket, and, with a sly wink, whispered: "I have
    something in my pocket which, within the next few weeks, will bring
    joy to all Russia and astound the entire world; I have received the
    English promise that England will go with Russia against Germany!"

    8. Russian prisoners belonging to the _Siberian_ Corps, who were
    taken in East Prussia, said that they had been transported by rail
    in the summer of 1913, to the vicinity of Moscow, since maneuvers
    were to be held there by the Tsar. The maneuvers did not take
    place, but the troops were not taken back. They were stationed for
    the winter in the vicinity of Moscow. In the summer of 1914 they
    were brought forward to the vicinity of Vilna, since big maneuvers
    were to be held there by the Tsar; at and near Vilna they were
    deployed and then, suddenly, the sharp cartridges (war ammunition)
    were distributed and they were informed that there was a war
    against Germany; they were unable to say why and wherefore.

    9. In a report, made public in the press, during the winter of
    1914-15; by an American, concerning his trip through the Caucasus
    in the spring of 1914, the following was stated: When he arrived
    in the Caucasus, at the beginning of _May_, 1914, he met, while
    on his way to Tiflis, long columns of troops of all arms, in war
    equipment. He had feared that a revolt had broken out in the
    Caucasus. When he made inquiries of the authorities at Tiflis,
    while having his passport inspected, he received the quieting
    news that the Caucasus was quite peaceful, that he might travel
    wheresoever he wished, that what he had seen had to do only with
    practice marching and maneuvers.

    At the close of his trip at the end of May, 1914, he wished to
    embark at a Caucasian port, but all the vessels there were so
    filled with troops that only after much trouble could he manage to
    get a cabin for himself and his wife. The Russian officers told him
    that they were to land at Odessa and march from there to take part
    in some great maneuvers.


THE COSSACK'S TESTIMONY

    10. Prince Tundutoff, Hetman of the Calmuck Cossacks living
    between Tsaritsin and Astrakhan, who was, before and during the
    war, personal aid of the Grand Duke Nicholas Nicholaievitch, came
    to General Headquarters at Bosmont in 1918, seeking to establish
    connection with Germany, since the Cossacks were not Slavs at all
    and thoroughly hostile to the Bolsheviki.

    He stated that he had been sent by Nicholas Nicholaievitch, before
    the outbreak of war, to the General Staff, in order to keep the
    Grand Duke posted on happenings there and that he had been a
    witness of the notorious telephone talks between the Tsar and the
    Chief of the General Staff, General Januskevitch; that the Tsar,
    deeply impressed by the earnest telegram of the German Emperor,
    had resolved to forbid mobilization and had ordered Januskevitch
    by telephone not to carry out mobilization, _i. e._, to break
    it off; that the latter had not obeyed the unmistakable order,
    but had inquired by telephone of Sazonoff, Minister of Foreign
    Affairs--with whom, for weeks, he had kept in touch, intrigued and
    incited to war--what he was to do now; that Sazonoff had answered
    that the Tsar's order was nonsense, that all the General need do
    was to carry out mobilization, that he [Sazonoff] would bring the
    Tsar around again next day and talk him out of heeding the stupid
    telegram from the German Emperor; that, thereupon, Januskevitch had
    informed the Tsar that mobilization was already under way and could
    no longer be broken off.

    Prince Tundutoff added: "This was a lie, for I myself saw the
    mobilization order lying beside Januskevitch on his writing table,
    which shows that it had not as yet been given out at all."

    The psychologically interesting point about the above is that Tsar
    Nicholas, who helped prepare the World War and had already ordered
    mobilization, wished to recede at the last moment. My earnest,
    warning telegram, it seems, made him realize clearly for the first
    time the colossal responsibility which he was bringing upon himself
    by his warlike preparations. Therefore, he wished to stop the war
    machine, the murderer of entire peoples, which he had just set in
    motion. This would have been possible and peace might have been
    preserved if Sazonoff had not frustrated his wish.

    When I asked whether the Grand Duke, who was known as a
    German-hater, had incited much to war, the Cossack chief replied
    that the Grand Duke had certainly worked zealously for war, but
    that incitement on his part would have been superfluous, since
    there was already a strong sentiment against Germany all through
    the Russian officer corps; that this spirit was transmitted,
    principally, from the French army to the Russian officers; that
    there had been a desire, in fact, to go to war in 1908-09 (Bosnian
    Question), but France was not then ready; that, in 1914, Russia,
    likewise, was not quite ready; that Januskevitch and Sukhomlinoff
    had really planned the war for 1917, but Sazonoff and Isvolsky, as
    well as the French, could not be restrained any longer; that the
    former two were afraid of revolution in Russia and of the influence
    of the German Emperor on the Tsar, which might dissuade the Tsar
    from the idea of waging war; and that the French, who were sure,
    for the time being, of England's help, were afraid that England
    might come to an understanding later on with Germany at the expense
    of France.

    When I asked whether the Tsar had been aware of the warlike spirit
    in Russia and had tolerated it, the Cossack Prince answered that it
    was worthy of note that the Tsar had forbidden once for all, as a
    matter of precaution, the inviting of German diplomats or military
    attachés to luncheons or evening meals given by Russian officers at
    which he himself was to be present.


STORES OF ENGLISH COATS

    11. When our troops advanced in 1914 they found, in northern France
    and along the Belgian frontier, great stores of English soldiers'
    greatcoats. According to statements by the inhabitants, these were
    placed there during the _last years of peace_. Most of the English
    infantrymen who were made prisoners by us in the summer of 1914
    had no greatcoats; when asked why, they answered, quite naïvely:
    "We are to find our greatcoats in the stores at Maubeuge, Le
    Quesnoy, etc., in the north of France and in Belgium."

    It was the same regarding maps. In Maubeuge great quantities of
    English military maps of northern France and Belgium were found
    by our men; copies of these have been shown to me. The names of
    places were printed in French and English, and all sorts of words
    were translated in the margin for the convenience of soldiers;
    for instance: moulin=mill, pont=bridge, maison=house, ville=town,
    bois=wood, etc. These maps date from 1911 and were engraved at
    Southampton.

    The stores were established by England, with the permission of the
    French and Belgian Governments, _before_ the war, in the midst of
    peace. What a tempest of horror would have broken out in Belgium,
    the "neutral country," and what a rumpus England and France would
    have kicked up, if we had wished to establish stores of German
    soldiers' greatcoats and maps in Spa, Liège, and Namur!

    Among the statesmen who, besides Poincaré, particularly helped
    unleash the World War, the Sazonoff-Isvolsky group probably should
    take first rank. Isvolsky, it is said, when at Paris, proudly
    placed his hand upon his breast and declared: "I made the war. Je
    suis le père de cette guerre" ("I am the father of this war").

    Delcassé also has a large share in the guilt for the World War, and
    Grey an even larger share, since he was the spiritual leader of
    the "encirclement policy," which he faithfully pushed forward and
    brought to completion, as the "legacy" of his dead sovereign.

I have been informed that an important rôle was played in the
preparation of the World War directed against the monarchical Central
Powers by the policy of the international "Great Orient Lodge";
a policy extending over many years and always envisaging the goal
at which it aimed. But the German Great Lodges, I was furthermore
told--with two exceptions wherein non-German financial interests
are paramount and which maintain secret connection with the "Great
Orient" in Paris--had no relationship to the "Great Orient." They
were entirely loyal and faithful, according to the assurance given me
by the distinguished German Freemason who explained to me this whole
interrelationship, which had, until then, been unknown to me. He said
that in 1917 an international meeting of the lodges of the "Great
Orient" was held, after which there was a subsequent conference in
Switzerland; at this the following program was adopted: Dismemberment
of Austria-Hungary, democratization of Germany, elimination of the
House of Hapsburg, abdication of the German Emperor, restitution of
Alsace-Lorraine to France, union of Galicia with Poland, elimination of
the Pope and the Catholic Church, elimination of every state Church in
Europe.

I am not now in a position to investigate the very damaging information
which has been transmitted to me, in the best of faith, concerning the
organization and activities of the Great Orient Lodges. Secret and
public political organizations have played important parts in the life
of peoples and states, ever since history has existed. Some of them
have been beneficial: most of them have been destructive, if they had
to have secret passwords which shunned the light of day. The most
dangerous of these organizations hide under the cloak of some ideal
object or other--such as active love of their neighbors, readiness
to help the weak, and poor, and so forth--in order that, with such
pretexts as a blind, they may work for their real secret ends. It
is certainly advisable to study the activities of the Great Orient
Lodges, since one cannot adopt a final attitude toward this worldwide
organization until it has been thoroughly investigated.

I shall not take up the war operations in this work. I shall leave this
task all the more readily to my officers and to the historians, since
I, writing as I am without a single document, would be able to describe
events only in very broad outline.

When I look back upon the four arduous war years, with their hopes and
fears, their brilliant victories and losses in precious blood, what is
uppermost in my mind is the feeling of ardent gratitude and undying
admiration for the unequaled achievements of the German Nation in arms.


PROUD OF GERMAN ARMY

Just as no sacrifice in endurance and privation was too great for those
staying at home, so also the army, in defending itself during the
war criminally forced upon us, did not merely overcome the crushing
superiority of twenty-eight hostile nations, but likewise, on land and
water and in the air, won victories whose glory may have paled a bit
in the mists of the present day, but, for that very reason, will shine
forth all the more brightly in the light of history. Nor is that all.
Wherever there was distress among our allies, German intervention,
often with weak forces, always restored the situation and often won
noteworthy successes. Germans fought on all the battlefields of the
far-flung World War.

Surely the heroic bravery of the German nation deserved a better fate
than to fall a victim to the dagger that treacherously stabbed it from
behind; it seems to be the German destiny that Germans shall always be
defeated by Germans. Recently I read the unfortunately not entirely
unjustified words: "In Germany every Siegfried has his Hödur behind
him."

Finally, let me say a word concerning the German "atrocities" and give
two instances thereof!

After our advance into northern France I immediately ordered that art
treasures be protected. Art historians and professors were assigned to
each army, who traveled about inspecting, photographing, and describing
churches, châteaux, and castles. Among them Professor Clemen, Curator
of the Rhine Province, especially distinguished himself and reported to
me, when I was at the front, on the protection of art treasures.

All the collections in towns, museums, and castles were catalogued and
numbered; whenever they seemed to be imperiled by the fighting they
were taken away and assembled, at Valenciennes and Maubeuge, in two
splendid museums. There they were carefully preserved and the name of
the owner marked on each article.

The old windows of the cathedral of St. Quentin were removed by German
soldiers, at the risk of their lives, under English shell-fire. The
story of the destruction of the church by the English was told by a
German Catholic priest, who published it with photographs, and it was
sent, by my orders, to the Pope.

At the château of Pinon, which belongs to the Princess of Poix, who had
been a guest of mine and the Empress, the headquarters of the general
commanding the Third Army Corps was located. I visited the château and
lived there. Previously the English had been quartered there and had
ravaged the place terribly. The commanding general, von Lochow, and his
staff had a great deal of trouble getting it into some sort of shape
again after the devastation wrought by the English.

Accompanied by the general, I visited the private apartments of the
Princess, which, up to then, our soldiers had been forbidden to enter.
I found that her entire wardrobe had been thrown out of the clothes
presses by the English soldiers and, together with her hats, was lying
about on the floor. I had every garment carefully cleaned, hung in the
presses, and locked up. The writing desk had also been broken into and
the Princess's correspondence was scattered about. At my command, all
the letters were gathered together, sealed in a package, placed in the
writing desk, and locked up.

Afterward, all the silverware was found buried in the garden.
According to the villagers this had been ordered as early as the
_beginning of July_, so the Princess had known about the war long
before its outbreak! I at once ordered that the silver be inventoried,
deposited in the bank at Aix-la-Chapelle, and returned to the Princess
after the war. Through neutral channels I caused news to be transmitted
to the Princess in Switzerland, by my Court Marshal, Freiherr von
Reischach, concerning Pinon, her silverware, and my care for her
property. No answer was received. Instead, the Princess had published
in the French press a letter to the effect that General von Kluck had
stolen all her silver.

On account of my care and the self-sacrificing work of German art
experts and soldiers--partly at the risk of their lives--art treasures
worth billions were preserved for their French owners and for French
towns. This was done by the Huns, the boches!




CHAPTER XI

The Pope and Peace


In the summer of 1917 I received at Krueznach a visit from the Papal
Nuncio, Pacelli, who was accompanied by a chaplain. Pacelli is a
distinguished, likable man, of high intelligence and excellent manners,
the perfect pattern of an eminent prelate of the Catholic Church. He
knows German well enough to understand it easily when he hears it, but
not sufficiently to speak it with fluency.

Our conversation was conducted in French, but the Nuncio now and then
employed German expressions of speech. The chaplain spoke German
fluently and took part--even when not asked--in the conversation,
whenever he feared that the Nuncio was becoming too much influenced by
what I said.

Very soon the conversation turned on the possibility of peace mediation
and the bringing about of peace, in which connection all sorts of
projects and possibilities were touched upon, discussed, and dismissed.

Finally, I suggested that the Pope should make an effort, seeing that
my peace offer of December 12, 1916, had been rejected in such an
unprecedented manner. The Nuncio remarked that he thought such a step
would be attended with great difficulties; that the Pope had already
been rebuffed when he had made certain advances in this direction;
that, aside from this, the Pope was absolutely in despair on account of
the slaughter and wondered ceaselessly how he might help toward freeing
the world and European culture from the scourge of war. Any suggestion
as to this, he added, would be most valuable to the Vatican.

I stated that the Pope, as the highest in rank among all the priests of
the Roman Catholic Christians and Church, should, first of all, seek
to issue instructions to his priests in all countries to banish hate,
once for all, from their minds, since hate was the greatest obstacle in
the path of the peace idea; that it was, unfortunately, true that the
clergy in the Entente countries were, to a positively frightful extent,
the standard-bearers and instigators of hate and fighting.

I called attention to the numerous reports from soldiers at the
beginning of the war concerning abbés and parish priests captured with
arms in their hands; to the machinations of Cardinal Mercier and the
Belgian clergy, members of which often worked as spies; to the sermon
of the Protestant Bishop of London, who, from the pulpit, glorified the
"Baralong" murderers; and to other similar cases. I added that it would
be, therefore, a great achievement if the Pope should succeed in having
the Roman Catholic clergy in all the countries at war condemn hatred
and recommend peace, as was already being done by the German clergy, be
it from the pulpit or by means of pastoral letters.


URGES PAPAL INTERCESSION

Pacelli found this idea excellent and worthy of attention, but he
remarked that it would be difficult to enlist the efforts of the
various prelates in its support. I replied that, in view of the severe
discipline of the hierarchy of the Roman Catholic Church, I could not
imagine that, if the Pope should solemnly call upon the prelates of the
Church to preach reconciliation and consideration for the foe, those
of any country whatsoever should refuse obedience; that the prelates,
on account of their eminent rank, were above all parties, and, since
reconciliation and love of our neighbor were fundamental principles
of the Christian religion, they were absolutely in duty bound to work
toward making people observe these principles.

Pacelli agreed to this and promised to give the idea his earnest
attention and report upon it to the Vatican. In the further course
of the conversation, the Nuncio asked what form--beyond the purely
ecclesiastical step suggested by me--the bringing about of peace
possibilities through the intervention of the Pope might take. I
pointed out that Italy and Austria were two Roman Catholic states, upon
which the Pope could bring influence to bear easily and effectively;
that one of these lands was his native country and place of residence,
in which he was greatly revered by the people and exerted direct
influence upon his fellow countrymen; that Austria was ruled by a
sovereign who actually bore the title "apostolic"; who, with all his
family, had direct relations with the Vatican and was among the most
faithful adherents of the Catholic Church; that I was, therefore, of
the opinion that it would not be difficult for the Pope to try at least
to make a beginning with these two countries and cause them to talk
peace.

I added that the diplomatic skill and wide vision of the Vatican were
known the world over; that, if once a beginning were made in this
way--and it had a good chance of success--the other Powers could
scarcely refuse an invitation from the Vatican later on to an exchange
of views, which should be, at first, not binding upon them.

The Nuncio remarked that it would be difficult for the Vatican to make
the Italian Government agree to such a thing, since it had no direct
relation with the said Government and no influence upon its members;
that the Italian Government would never look with favor upon an
invitation, even to mere conferences.

Here the chaplain interposed that such a step by the Pope was
absolutely out of the question, since it would entail consequences
which might be actually dangerous to the Vatican; the Government
would at once mobilize the "piazza" ("man in the street") against the
Vatican, and the Vatican certainly could not expose itself to that.
When I refused to attach importance to this objection, the chaplain
grew more and more excited. He said that I did not know the Romans;
that, when they were incited they were simply terrible; that just as
soon as the "piazza" got into action things would get disagreeable;
that, if it did, there was even a possibility of an attack on the
Vatican, which might actually imperil the life of the Pope himself.


SCOUTS DANGER FROM "PIAZZA"

I replied that I, too, was well acquainted with the Vatican; that no
rabble or "piazza" could storm it; that, in addition, the Pope had a
strong party of adherents in society circles and among the people,
which would at once be ready to defend him. The Nuncio agreed with me,
but the chaplain continued unabashed to expatiate upon the terrors of
the "piazza" and paint the risks run by the Pope in the blackest of
colors.

I then remarked that anyone wishing to capture the Vatican must first
get a battery of heavy mortars and howitzers, as well as pioneers and
storm troops, and institute a regular siege; that all this was scarcely
possible for the "piazza"; that, therefore, it was highly improbable
that the latter would undertake anything. Moreover, I mentioned having
heard that measures had already been taken in the Vatican to guard
against such an emergency. At this the priest was silent.

The Nuncio then remarked that it was difficult for the Pope to do
anything really practical toward peace without giving offense and
arousing opposition in lay Italy, which would place him in danger;
that it must be borne in mind that he was, unfortunately, not free;
that had the Pope a country, or at least a district of his own where he
could govern autonomously and do as he pleased, the situation would be
quite different; that, as matters stood, he was too dependent upon lay
Rome and not able to act according to his own free will.

I remarked that the aim of bringing peace to the world was so holy and
great that it was impossible for the Pope to be frightened away, by
purely worldly considerations, from accomplishing such a task, which
seemed created especially for him; that, should he succeed in it, the
grateful world would assuredly bring influence to bear upon the Italian
Government in support of his wishes and of his independence.

This made an impression on the Nuncio; he remarked that I was right,
after all; that the Pope must do something in the matter.

Then I called the attention of the Nuncio to the following point: He
must have noticed, I said, how the Socialists of all countries were
zealously working in favor of peace efforts. I told him that we had
always allowed the German Socialists to travel to foreign parts in
order to discuss the question of making peace at conferences, because I
believed them to be acquainted with the desires and views of the lower
classes; that we placed no obstacles in the path of anybody desiring
to work honestly and without veiled purpose in the interests of peace;
that the same desires for peace also existed among the Entente nations
and among their Socialists, but that the latter were prevented by
refusal of passports from attending congresses in neutral lands; that
the desire for peace was gaining strength in the world, nations were
acquiring it more and more, and if nobody in any Government should
be found willing to work for peace--I, unfortunately, had failed in
my attempt--the peoples would finally take the matter into their own
hands. I added that this would not occur without serious shocks and
revolutions, as history proved, through which the Roman Church and the
Pope would not come unscathed.


WINS PROMISE OF ACTION

What must a Catholic soldier think, I asked, when he reads always of
efforts by Socialists only, never of an effort by the Pope, to free him
from the horrors of war? If the Pope did nothing, I continued, there
was danger of peace being forced upon the world by the Socialists,
which would mean the end of the power of the Pope and the Roman Church,
even among Catholics!

This argument struck home to the Nuncio. He stated that he would at
once report it to the Vatican and give it his support; that the Pope
would have to act.

Greatly worried, the chaplain again interposed, remarking that the Pope
would endanger himself by such a course; that the "piazza" would attack
him.

To this I replied that I was a Protestant, and, hence, a heretic in
the chaplain's eyes, notwithstanding which I was obliged to point
out that the Pope was designated the "Viceroy of Christ upon earth"
by the Catholic Church and world; that I had, in studying the Holy
Scriptures, occupied myself earnestly and carefully with the person of
the Saviour and sought to immerse myself profoundly therein; that the
Lord had never feared the "piazza," although no fortresslike building,
with guards and weapons, was at His disposal; that the Lord had always
walked into the midst of the "piazza," spoken to it, and finally gone
to His death on the Cross for the sake of this hostile "piazza."

Was I now to believe, I asked, that His "Viceroy upon earth" was afraid
of the possibility of becoming a martyr, like his Lord, in order to
bring peace to the bleeding world, all on account of the ragged Roman
"piazza"? I, the Protestant, thought far too highly of a Roman priest,
particularly of the Pope, to believe such a thing. Nothing could be
more glorious for him, I went on, than to devote himself unreservedly,
body and soul, to the great cause of peace, even despite the remote
danger of thus becoming a martyr!

With shining eyes, the Nuncio grasped my hand and said, deeply moved:
"Vous avez parfaitement raison! C'est le devoir du Pape; il faut qu'il
agisse; c'est par lui que le monde doit être régagné à la paix. Je
transmettrai vos paroles à Sa Sainteté" ("You are absolutely right!
It is the duty of the Pope; he must act; it is through him that the
world must be won back to peace. I shall transmit your words to His
Holiness").

The chaplain turned away, shaking his head, and murmured to himself:
"Ah, la piazza, la piazza!"




CHAPTER XII

End of the War and My Abdication


A few days after August 8, 1918, I summoned a Crown Council, in order
to get a clear conception of the situation and to draw therefrom the
necessary conclusions upon which to base the policy to be followed
by Count Hertling. The Chief Military Command approved the idea
that the Imperial Chancellor should keep in sight the possibility
of getting into closer touch with the enemy, but laid stress on the
necessity of first occupying the Siegfried line and there thoroughly
beating off the foe, and on the fact that negotiations must not begin
before this occurred. Thereupon I directed that the Chancellor get
into communication with a neutral power--the Netherlands--in order
to ascertain whether it was ready to undertake such a step toward
mediation.

What rendered the contemplated action through Dutch channels very
difficult was that Austria could not be brought to a definite
agreement, but continually postponed the declaration which had been
requested of her. Even a verbal agreement given to me by the Emperor
Charles was afterward broken by him under Burian's influence.

The Dutch government had already been informed by me and had signified
its readiness to act. Meanwhile, Austria, without notifying us, made
her first separate peace offer, which set the ball rolling. The Emperor
Charles had indeed got into touch secretly with the Entente and had
long since resolved to abandon us. He acted according to the plan which
he had explained thus to his entourage: "When I go to the Germans, I
agree to everything they say, and when I return home, I do whatever I
please."

Thus it happened that my government and I were constantly deceived by
actions in Vienna, without being able to do anything against it, since
from there we constantly received the hint: "If you make things hard
for us, we shall leave you in the lurch; in other words, our army will
no longer fight by your side." In view of our situation, such action on
Austria's part had to be avoided in any way possible, both on military
and political grounds.

The defection of Hungary and Austria brought a crisis upon us. Had
Emperor Charles kept control of his nerves for three weeks longer, many
things would have turned out differently. But Andrassy--as he himself
admitted--had been negotiating for a long time in Switzerland, behind
our backs, with the Entente. Thus Emperor Charles believed that he
would assure himself of good treatment at the hands of the Entente.

After our failure of August 8th, General Ludendorff had declared
that he could no longer guarantee a military victory. Therefore,
the preparation of peace negotiations was necessary. Since diplomacy
had not succeeded in initiating any promising negotiations and the
military situation had become even worse in the meantime, on account of
revolutionary agitation, Ludendorff, on the 29th of September, demanded
that preparations be made for an armistice instead of for peace
negotiations.


MOVEMENT FOR ABDICATION

At this critical time a strong movement began at home in favor of
setting up a new government for the now necessary termination of the
war. I could not ignore this movement, since the old government, during
the seven weeks from August 8th to the end of September, had not
managed to initiate peace negotiations offering any hope of success.

Meanwhile, General von Gallwitz and General von Mudra, summoned from
the front, appeared before me. They gave a picture of the inner
situation of the army, laying due emphasis upon the great number of
shirkers behind the front, the frequency of insubordination, the
displaying of the red flag upon trains filled with soldiers returning
from furloughs at home and other similar phenomena.

The two generals considered that the principal cause of the bad
conditions was to be sought in the unfavorable influence exerted upon
the soldiers by the spirit predominating behind the front and in the
general desire for ending the fighting and getting peace, which was
spreading from the homeland along the lines of communication behind the
front and was already becoming noticeable even among some of the troops
at the front itself. The generals advanced the opinion that, owing
to these reasons, the army must immediately be withdrawn behind the
Antwerp-Meuse line.

On that same day I commanded Field Marshal von Hindenburg by telephone
to effect as soon as possible the retreat to the Antwerp-Meuse line.
The falling back of the tired, but nowhere decisively beaten, army to
this position merely signified occupying an essentially shorter line,
possessing far greater natural advantages. It was not yet completed,
to be sure, but the fact was to be borne in mind that we had engaged
in battle on the Somme while occupying positions composed largely of
shell craters. What we had to do was to regain operative freedom,
which, to my way of thinking, was by no means impossible; in the course
of the war, had we not often retreated in order to put ourselves in a
situation that was more advantageous from the military point of view?

The army, to be sure, was no longer the old army. The new 1918 troops
particularly were badly tainted with revolutionary propaganda and often
took advantage of the darkness at night to sneak away from the firing
and vanish to the rear.

But the majority of my divisions fought flawlessly to the very end
and preserved their discipline and military spirit. To the very end
they were always a match for the foe in morale; despite superiority in
numbers, cannon, munitions, tanks, and airplanes, the foe invariably
succumbed when he ran up against serious resistance. Therefore, the
associations of our ex-fighters at the front are right in bearing upon
their banners the motto: "Unbeaten on land and sea!"


SAYS ARMY WAS STILL STRONG

The achievements of the German fighters at the front and of the German
Nation in arms, during four and a half years of war, are beyond
all praise. One does not know what to admire most: the enthusiasm
with which the magnificent youth of 1914, without waiting for our
artillery fire to take effect, joyfully charged on the enemy, or the
self-sacrificing fidelity to duty and tenacity with which our men in
field gray, sparingly fed and seldom relieved, year in, year out,
digging by night, living in dugouts and earthholes by day, or crouching
in shell holes, defied the hail of steel from the enemy artillery,
flyers, and tanks. And this army, which one might have expected was to
be rated as utterly fought to a finish, was able, after nearly four
years of war, to carry out successful offensive operations such as our
foes could nowhere boast of, despite their colossal superiority.

In spite of all this, it was not right to believe the German army
capable of accomplishing the superhuman; it was necessary for us to
fall back, in order to get breath.

The Field Marshal balked at the order to retreat; the army, he thought,
should stay where it was, for political reasons (peace negotiations and
so on); he also pointed out, among other things, that it was necessary,
first, to arrange for the withdrawal to the rear of war materials, etc.

I now resolved to go to the front, acquiescing in the desire expressed
to me by the army that I might be with my hard-fighting troops and
convince myself personally of their spirit and condition.

I could carry out this resolve all the sooner in view of the fact that,
ever since the new Government had been set up, no further claims were
made upon my time either by it or by the Imperial Chancellor, which
made my staying at home seem useless.

The notes to Wilson were discussed and written by Solf, the War
Cabinet, and the Reichstag, after sessions lasting hours, without my
being informed thereof; until, finally, on the occasion of the last
note to Wilson, I caused Solf to be given to understand very plainly,
through my chief of Cabinet, that I demanded to know about the note
_before_ it was sent.

Solf appeared and showed the note; he was proud of his antithesis
between _laying down_ of arms ("Waffenstreckung"), which was demanded
by Wilson, and _armistice_ ("Waffenstillstand"), which was proposed.
When I spoke about the rumors of abdication and demanded that the
Foreign Office adopt an attitude, through the press, against what was
unworthy in the newspaper polemics, Solf replied that already everybody
on every street corner was talking about abdication and that, even in
the best circles, people were discussing it quite unreservedly.

When I expressed my indignation at this, Solf sought to console me by
observing that, should His Majesty go, he also would, since he could
serve no longer under such conditions. I went, or--to put it much
more correctly--I was overthrown by my own Government, and--Herr Solf
remained.

When the Imperial Chancellor, Prince Max, heard of my resolve to
go to the front, he did all he could to prevent it. He asked why I
wished to go and received the answer that I considered it my duty, as
Supreme Commander, to return to the front, since I had been separated
for almost a month from the hard-fighting army. When the Chancellor
objected that I was indispensable at home, I retorted that we were at
war, that the Emperor belonged to his soldiers. Finally, I declared,
once for all, that I would go; that in case Wilson's armistice note
arrived, it would have to be discussed, anyhow, at the General
Headquarters of the army, for which purpose the Chancellor and other
members of the Government would be obliged to go to Spa for the
conferences.


"JOYFULLY RECEIVED" BY ARMY

I went to the army in Flanders, after having once more given the
General Staff at Spa definite orders to fall back as quickly as
possible to the Antwerp-Meuse line, in order that the troops might
finally be taken out of the fighting and given a rest. Despite
objections that this would demand time, that the position was not yet
ready, that the war material must first be taken back, and so forth, I
stood by the order. The retreat was begun.

In Flanders I saw delegations from the different divisions, spoke with
the soldiers, distributed decorations, and was everywhere joyfully
received by officers and men. Particularly ardent enthusiasm reigned
among the soldiers of a royal Saxon recruit depot, who greeted me
with wild cheers at the railway station when I was returning to my
train. While I was giving out decorations to members of the Reserve
Guard Division, an enemy bombing squadron, followed by heavy fire from
anti-aircraft guns and machine guns, flew directly over us and dropped
bombs near the special train.

The commanders of the army were unanimous in declaring that the spirit
of the troops at the front was good and reliable; that, further to the
rear, among the supply columns, it was not so good; that the worst of
all were the soldiers back from leave, who, it was plain to be seen,
had been worked upon and infected at home, whence they had brought
back a poor spirit. The young recruits at the depots, it was stated,
furthermore, were good.

At Spa, whither I now went, news came constantly from home about the
ever more violent agitation and hostile attitude against the Emperor
and the growing slackness and helplessness of the Government, which,
without initiative or strength, was letting itself be pushed around
at will. It was alluded to contemptuously in the newspapers as the
"debating society" and Prince Max was called by leading newspapers the
"Revolution Chancellor." As I learned afterward, he lay in bed for ten
days, suffering from grippe and incapable of really directing affairs.
His Excellency von Payer and Solf, with the so-called War Cabinet,
which was in permanent session, governed the German Empire.

At such a critical time, to my way of thinking, the imperiled ship
of state should not be steered by representatives of the Imperial
Chancellor, since they certainly cannot have the authority possessed by
the responsible head of the Government. What was particularly needed at
this juncture was authority; yet, so far as I know, no wide powers to
act had been conferred upon the Vice Chancellor.

The right solution--_i. e._, the one that those concerned were in duty
bound to adopt--would have been to remove Prince Max actually from
the post of Chancellor and summon in his place some man of strong
personality. Since we had the parliamentary form of government it
devolved upon the political parties to bring about the change in the
Chancellorship and present me with a successor to Prince Max. This did
not take place.

Now the efforts of the Government and the Imperial Chancellor to induce
me to abdicate began. Drews, the Minister of the Interior, came to me
at the behest of the Chancellor, in order to supply me with information
concerning the spirit in the country. He described the well-known
happenings in press, high finance, and public, and laid emphasis on the
fact that the Imperial Chancellor himself adopted no attitude toward
the question of my abdication, but, nevertheless, had sent him to me.
Drews, in short, was to suggest to me that I myself should decide to
abdicate, in order that it might not appear that the Government had
exerted pressure upon me.

I spoke to the Minister about the fateful consequences of my abdication
and asked how he, as a Prussian official, could reconcile such a
supposition with his oath as an official to his King. The Minister grew
embarrassed and excused himself by reference to the command of the
Imperial Chancellor, who had been unable to find any other man for the
task. I was informed later that Drews was one of the first officials
who spoke of the abdication of his master and King.

I refused to abdicate and declared that I would gather troops together
and return with them in order to help the Government to maintain order
in the land.

After that, Drews was received, in my presence, by Field Marshal
von Hindenburg and General Gröner, whom he informed of the mission
intrusted to him by the Imperial Chancellor and by both of whom he was
very sharply rebuked in the name of the army. Gröner's characterization
of Prince Max, in particular, was expressed in such plain terms that I
had to appease and comfort the Minister.

The Field Marshal also called Drews's attention to the fact that, in
the event of my abdication, the army would not go on fighting, but
would disperse, and that the majority of the officers, in particular,
would probably resign and thus leave the army without leaders.

Soon after that I learned from one of my sons that the Imperial
Chancellor had tried to ascertain whether he was prepared to undertake
the mission which subsequently was undertaken by Drews. My son
indignantly declined to suggest abdication to his father.

In the meantime I had sent the chief of Cabinet, von Delbrück, to
Berlin, in order to lay before the Chancellor a general address, also
intended for publication, which should take the place of my address
to the Ministry (not published by the Chancellor), deal more broadly
with the matters taken up therein, and make clear my attitude toward
the Government and toward the new direction taken by public opinion.
At first the Chancellor failed to publish this. Not until several days
later did he find himself forced to permit publication, owing to a
letter written to him, as I learned afterward, by the Empress.

Thereupon Herr von Delbrück informed me that the address had made a
good impression in Berlin and in the press, relieved the situation,
and tended to quiet the people, so that the idea of abdication had
begun to disappear and even the Socialists of the Right had decided to
postpone action concerning it.


SOCIALIST ACTIVITY

During the next few days there were constant reports that the
Socialists in Berlin were planning trouble and that the Chancellor
was growing steadily more nervous. The report given by Drews to the
Government, after his return from Spa, had not failed to cause an
impression; the gentlemen wished to get rid of me, to be sure, but for
the time being they were afraid of the consequences.

Their point of view was as obscure as their conduct. They acted as
if they did not want a republic, yet failed completely to realize
that their course was bound to lead straight to a republic. Many, in
fact, explained the actions of the Government by maintaining that the
creation of a republic was the very end that its members had in view;
plenty of people drew the conclusion, from the puzzling conduct of the
Chancellor toward me, that he was working to eliminate me in order to
become himself President of the German Republic, after being, in the
interim, the administrator of the Empire.

To believe this is undoubtedly to do the Prince an injustice; such a
train of thought is impossible in a man belonging to an old German
princely family.

General Gröner, who had gone to Berlin to study the situation, reported
on his return that he had received very bad impressions regarding the
Government and the sentiment prevailing in the country; that things
were approaching revolution; that the Government was merely tearing
down without setting up anything positive; that the people wanted peace
at last, at any cost, no matter what kind of peace; that the authority
of the Government was equal to zero, the agitation against the Emperor
in full swing, my abdication hardly to be avoided longer.

He added that the troops at home were unreliable and disagreeable
surprises might come in case of a revolt; that the courier chests of
the Russian Bolshevist ambassador, seized by the criminal police,
had disclosed some very damaging evidence that the Russian Embassy,
in conjunction with the Spartacus group, had long since thoroughly
prepared, without being disturbed, a Bolshevist revolution on the
Russian model. (This had gone on with the knowledge of the Foreign
Office--which had received constant warning, but had either laughed at
them all or dismissed them with the remark that the Bolsheviki must
not be angered--likewise under the very eyes of the police, which was
continually at loggerheads with the Foreign Office.) The men back from
leave, he went on, infected by propaganda, had already carried the
poison to the army, which was already partly affected and would, as
soon as it had been made free by an armistice, refuse to fight against
the rebels upon its return home.

Therefore, he declared, it was necessary to accept, immediately
and unconditionally, any sort of armistice, no matter how hard
its conditions might be; the army was no longer to be trusted and
revolution was imminent behind the front.


PRINCE MAX INSISTENT

On the morning of the 9th of November,[9] the Imperial Chancellor,
Prince Max of Baden, caused me to be informed again--as he had already
done on the 7th--that the Social Democrats, and also the Social
Democratic Secretaries of State, demanded my abdication; that the rest
of the members of the Government, who had stood out so far against it,
were now in favor of it, and that the same was true of the majority
parties in the Reichstag. For these reasons, he continued, he requested
me to abdicate immediately, since, otherwise, extensive street fighting
attended by bloodshed would take place in Berlin; it had already
started on a small scale.

I immediately summoned Field Marshal von Hindenburg and the
Quartermaster General, General Gröner. General Gröner again announced
that the army could fight no longer and wished rest above all else,
and that, therefore, any sort of armistice must be unconditionally
accepted; that the armistice must be concluded as soon as possible,
since the army had supplies for only six to eight days more and was
cut off from all further supplies by the rebels, who had occupied all
the supply storehouses and Rhine bridges; that, for some unexplained
reason, the armistice commission sent to France--consisting
of Erzberger, Ambassador Count Oberndorff, and General von
Winterfeldt--which had crossed the French lines two evenings before,
had sent no report as to the nature of the conditions.

The Crown Prince also appeared, with his Chief of Staff, Count
Schulenburg, and took part in the conference. During our conversation
several telephone inquiries came from the Imperial Chancellor, which,
pointing out that the Social Democrats had left the Government and
that delay was dangerous, became most insistent. The Minister of War
reported uncertainty among part of the troops in Berlin--4th Jägers,
Second Company of Alexander Regiment, Second Battery, Jüterbog, gone
over to the rebels--no street fighting.

I wished to spare my people civil war. If my abdication was indeed the
only way to prevent bloodshed, I was willing to _renounce the Imperial
throne, but not to abdicate as King of Prussia_; I would remain, as
such, with my troops, since the military leaders had declared that the
officers would leave in crowds if I abdicated entirely, and the army
would then pour back, without leaders, into the fatherland, damage it,
and place it in peril.

A reply had been sent to the Imperial Chancellor to the effect that my
decision must first be carefully weighed and formulated, after which
it would be transmitted to the Chancellor. When, a little later, this
was done, there came the surprising answer that my decision had arrived
late! The Imperial Chancellor, on his own initiative, had summarily
announced my abdication--which had not occurred yet at all!--as well as
renunciation of the throne by the Crown Prince, who had not even been
questioned. He had turned over the Government to the Social Democrats
and summoned Herr Ebert as Imperial Chancellor. All this had been
spread simultaneously by wireless, so the entire army could read it.


DENIES HE FORSOOK FOLLOWERS

Thus the decision as to my going or staying, as to my renunciation of
the Imperial Crown and retention of the Royal Crown of Prussia, was
summarily snatched from me. The army was shaken to the core by the
erroneous belief that its King had abandoned it at the most critical
moment of all.

If the conduct of the Imperial Chancellor, Prince Max of Baden, is
considered as a whole, it appears as follows: first, solemn declaration
that he will place himself, together with the new Government, before
the Emperor's throne, to protect it; then, suppression of the address,
which might have impressed public opinion favorably, elimination of
the Emperor from all co-operation in the Government, sacrifice of the
respect due the Emperor by suppression of the censorship, failure to
come to the support of the monarchy in the matter of abdication; then,
attempts to persuade the Emperor to abdicate voluntarily; and, finally,
announcement of my abdication by wireless, in which the Chancellor went
over my head.

This sequence of events shows the course--a perilous one to the
nation--adopted by Scheidemann, who held the Chancellor in the hollow
of his hand. Scheidemann left the Ministers, his colleagues, in the
dark as to his real purposes, drove the Prince from one step to
another, and finally summoned Ebert, declaring that the leaders no
longer had the masses under control. Thus he caused the Prince to
sacrifice the Emperor, the princes, and the Empire, and made him the
destroyer of the Empire. After that, Scheidemann overthrew the weak
princely "statesman."

Following the arrival of the wireless message, the situation was
difficult. To be sure, troops were being transported to Spa for
the purpose of going on undisturbed with the work at Great General
Headquarters, but the Field Marshal now thought it no longer possible
to reckon absolutely on their reliability in case rebellious forces
should advance from Aix-la-Chapelle and Cologne and confront our troops
with the dilemma of whether or not to fight against their own comrades.
In view of this, he advised me to leave the army and go to some neutral
country, for the purpose of avoiding such a "civil war."

I went through a fearful internal struggle. On the one hand, I, as a
soldier, was outraged at the idea of abandoning my still faithful,
brave troops. On the other hand, there was the declaration of our foes
that they were unwilling to conclude with me any peace endurable to
Germany, as well as the statement of my own Government that only by my
departure for foreign parts was civil war to be prevented.

In this struggle I set aside all that was personal. I consciously
sacrificed myself and my throne in the belief that, by so doing, I was
best serving the interests of my beloved fatherland. The sacrifice was
in vain. My departure brought us neither better armistice conditions
nor better peace terms; nor did it prevent civil war--on the contrary,
it hastened and intensified, in the most pernicious manner, the
disintegration in the army and the nation.


PROUD OF THE ARMY

For thirty years the army was my pride. For it I lived, upon it I
labored. And now, after four and a half brilliant years of war with
unprecedented victories, it was forced to collapse by the stab in the
back from the dagger of the revolutionists, at the very moment when
peace was within reach!

And the fact that it was in my proud navy, my creation, that there was
first open rebellion, cut me most deeply to the heart.

There has been much talk about my having abandoned the army and gone to
neutral foreign parts.

Some say the Emperor should have gone to some regiment at the front,
hurled himself with it upon the enemy, and sought death in one last
attack. That, however, would not only have rendered impossible the
armistice, ardently desired by the nation, concerning which the
commission sent from Berlin to General Foch was already negotiating,
but would also have meant the useless sacrifice of the lives of many
soldiers--of some of the very best and most faithful, in fact.

Others say the Emperor should have returned home at the head of the
army. But a peaceful return was no longer possible; the rebels had
already seized the Rhine bridges and other important points in the
rear of the army. I could, to be sure, have forced my way back at the
head of loyal troops taken from the fighting front; but, by so doing,
I should have put the finishing touch to Germany's collapse, since,
in addition to the struggle with the enemy, who would certainly have
pressed forward in pursuit, civil war would also have ensued.

Still others say the Emperor should have killed himself. That was made
impossible by my firm Christian beliefs. And would not people have
exclaimed:

"How cowardly! Now he shirks all responsibility by committing suicide!"
This alternative was also eliminated because I had to consider how to
be of help and use to my people and my country in the evil time that
was to be foreseen.

I knew also that I was particularly called upon to champion the cause
of my people in the clearing up of the question of war guilt--which
was disclosing itself more and more as the pivotal point in our
future destiny--since I better than anyone else could bear witness to
Germany's desire for peace and to our clean conscience.

After unspeakably arduous soul struggles, and following the most urgent
advice of my counselors of the highest rank who were present at the
moment, I decided to leave the country, since, in view of the reports
made to me, I must needs believe that, by so doing, I should most
faithfully serve Germany, make possible better armistice and peace
terms for her, and spare her further loss of human lives, distress, and
misery.

  [9] Concerning the course of events up to the fateful 9th of November
      and this day itself there are authentic statements by an
      eyewitness in the book (well worth reading) of Major Niemann, who
      was sent by the Chief Army Command to me, entitled _War and
      Revolution (Krieg und Revolution)_, Berlin, 1922.




CHAPTER XIII

The Enemy Tribunal and the Neutral Tribunal


When the Entente's demand that I and the German army leaders should
be surrendered for trial before Entente tribunals became known, I
immediately asked myself whether I could be of use to my fatherland by
giving myself up before the German people and the German Government had
expressed themselves regarding this demand. It was clear to me that, in
the opinion of the Entente, such a surrender would so seriously shake
the prestige of Germany, as a state and people, for all time, that we
could never again take our place, with equal rights, equal dignity,
and equal title to alliances, in the first rank of nations, where we
belonged.

I recognized it as my duty not to sacrifice the honor and dignity of
Germany. The question resolved itself into deciding whether there was
any way to give myself up which might benefit the German nation and not
subject it to the above-mentioned disadvantages. Were there such a way
I should have been ready without hesitation to add another sacrifice to
those already made.

The question of my giving myself up has also been debated--as I
know--in well-meaning and earnest German circles. Wherever this was
due to psychological depression or failure to realize the impression
which self-chastisement, self-debasement, and fruitless martyrdom in
the face of the Entente must arouse, all that was needed was to recall
the materially political origin of the Entente's demand, cursorily
mentioned above, in order to arrive at a clean-cut decision--in other
words, at an emphatic refusal.

It was otherwise with the considerations based upon the assumption that
I might, by taking upon myself, before the eyes of the whole world, the
responsibility for all important decisions and acts of my Government
connected with the war, contribute toward making the fate of the German
nation easier. Here was not an act of unpolitical sentimentality, but,
on the contrary, a deed which, in my eyes, had much to commend it.
The thought that, according to the Constitution of the Empire then in
force, not I, but the Chancellor alone as was well known--bore the
responsibility, would naturally not have bothered me with regard to
this.

Had there been even the slightest prospect of bettering Germany's
situation by taking such a step, there would have been no possible
doubt for me personally as to what I should do. Already I had shown my
personal willingness to sacrifice myself when I left the country and
gave up the throne of my fathers, because I had been erroneously and
deceivingly assured that I could, by so doing, make possible better
peace terms for my people and prevent civil war. I should likewise have
made this further attempt to help my people, despite the fact that, in
the meantime, one of the considerations in favor of it which have been
urged upon me--_viz._, the prevention of civil war--had already turned
out to be false.


RECALLS PLIGHT OF VERCINGETORIX

There was, however, no possibility of helping the German people by such
an act. Surrender of my person would have had no result beyond our
obedience to the demand from the Entente that I be given up. For no
tribunal in the world can pronounce a just sentence before the state
archives of _all_ the nations participating in the war are thrown open,
as has been done, and is still being done, by Germany.

Who, after the unprecedented judgment of Versailles, could still summon
up optimism enough to believe that the Entente nations would place
their secret documents at the disposal of such a tribunal? Therefore,
after careful reflection on my part, I gave the decisive importance
that was their due to the above-mentioned weighty considerations of
personal and national dignity and honor, and rejected the idea of
giving myself up. It was not for me to play the rôle of Vercingetorix,
who, as is well known, relying upon the magnanimity of his foes,
surrendered himself to them in order to obtain a better fate for his
people. In view of the conduct of our enemies during the war and in the
peace negotiations, it was surely not to be assumed that the Entente
would show any greater magnanimity than did Cæsar when he threw the
noble Gaul into chains, subsequently had him executed, and, in spite of
what Vercingetorix had done, enslaved his people just the same.

I wish to remark in a general way that it has always proved wrong to
follow the suggestions of the enemy or to heed them to any extent. The
well-meant suggestions regarding my giving myself up, emanating from
Germans, also grew from the soil of the enemy demands, though perhaps
partly unknown to those making them. For that very reason it was
necessary to refuse to heed them.

Thus the only solution remaining is an international, nonpartisan
court, which, instead of trying individuals, shall examine and
pronounce judgment upon all the happenings leading to the World War,
in all the countries taking part therein, after all the national
archives, not merely those of Germany, have been opened up. Germany can
well agree to this mode of procedure. Whosoever opposes it pronounces
judgment upon himself!

My standpoint on the subject here discussed is expressed in the letter
reproduced below, which I addressed, under date of April 5, 1921, to
Field Marshal von Hindenburg, and which the latter has made public in
the meantime. To make matters clearer, the letter which preceded it,
from the Marshal, is also given.[10]


HINDENBURG'S LETTER

                                            HANOVER, _March 30, 1921_.

    YOUR IMPERIAL AND ROYAL MAJESTY:

    I beg to thank Your Majesty most respectfully for his gracious
    interest in the illness of my wife. She is not yet out of danger.

    I have little that is pleasant to report from our country. The
    troubles in Central Germany are more serious than they are
    represented to be by the Prussian Government. I hope that they will
    soon be suppressed.

    The effects of the Versailles peace decree lie ever more crushingly
    upon the German people, and the object of this peace--the policy of
    annihilation of our enemies--comes more plainly to the fore every
    day. For the purpose of justifying this policy of force the fairy
    tale of German war guilt must be adhered to.

    The spokesman of the enemy alliance, Mr. Lloyd George, is little
    disturbed by the fact that, on December 20th of last year, he
    declared that no statesman wished war in the summer of 1914, that
    all the nations had slipped or stumbled into it. In his speech at
    the London conference on March 3d he calmly remarked that Germany's
    responsibility for the war was fundamental, that it was the basis
    on which the Peace of Versailles was erected, and that, if the
    admission of this guilt should be refused or given up, the treaty
    would become untenable.

    Now as before, the question of war guilt is the cardinal point
    in the future of the German nation. The admission of our alleged
    "guilt" regarding the war, forced from the German representatives
    at Versailles against their judgment, is wreaking frightful
    vengeance; equally so the untrue acknowledgment of Germany's
    "complicity" which Minister Simons gave at the London conference.

    I agree with Your Majesty to the uttermost depths of my soul--in my
    long term of military service I have had the good fortune and honor
    to enter into close personal relations with Your Majesty. I know
    that all the efforts of Your Majesty throughout your reign were
    bent toward maintaining peace. I can realize how immeasurably hard
    it is for Your Majesty to be eliminated from positive co-operation
    for the fatherland.

    The _Comparative Historical Tables_ compiled by Your Majesty, a
    printed copy of which Your Majesty sent me recently, are a good
    contribution to the history of the origin of the war and are
    calculated to remove many an incorrect conception. I have regretted
    that Your Majesty did not make the tables public, but limited
    them instead to a small circle. Now that the tables, owing to
    indiscretions, have been published in the foreign press, partly in
    the form of incomplete excerpts, it seems to me advisable to have
    them published in full in the German press.

    To my great joy I have heard that there has been an improvement
    recently in the health of Her Majesty. May God help further!

    With the deepest respect, unlimited fidelity and gratitude, I am
    Your Imperial and Royal Majesty's most humble servant,

                              (Signed) VON HINDENBURG,
                                            Field Marshal.


THE KAISER'S LETTER

                                         HOUSE DOORN, _April 5, 1921_.

    MY DEAR FIELD MARSHAL:

    Accept my warmest thanks for your letter of March 30th, ult. You
    are right. The hardest thing of all for me is to be obliged to
    live in foreign parts, to follow, with burning anguish in my soul,
    the awful fate of our dear fatherland, to which I have devoted the
    labors of my entire life, and to be barred from co-operation.

    You stood beside me during the dark, fatal days of November, 1918.
    As you know, I forced myself to the difficult, terrible decision to
    leave the country only upon the urgent declaration of yourself and
    the rest of my counselors who had been summoned that only by my so
    doing would it be possible to obtain more favorable armistice terms
    for our people and spare it a bloody civil war.

    The sacrifice was in vain. Now, as well as before, the enemy wishes
    to make the German people expiate the alleged guilt of "Imperial
    Germany."


SILENT UNDER ATTACKS

    In my endeavor to subordinate all personal considerations to the
    welfare of Germany, I keep myself completely in the background. I
    am silent in the face of all the lies and slanders which are spread
    abroad concerning me. I consider it beneath my dignity to defend
    myself against attacks and abuse.

    In accordance with this policy of restraint I have also kept the
    _Historical Tables_ mentioned by you strictly objective and made
    them accessible only to a narrow circle of acquaintances. I am
    utterly at a loss to understand how they have now become public
    through some sort of indiscretion or theft (?). The purpose
    inspiring me when I prepared the historical tables was this:
    To bring together strictly historical material by a systematic
    enumeration of sober facts, such as might enable the reader to form
    his own judgment of the historical happenings preceding the war. I
    found my most convincing sources, be it remarked, in the literature
    which has sprung up after the war, particularly in the works of
    natives of the enemy countries. Therefore I am glad that you find
    my modest contribution to history useful.

    As to your suggestion to make the tables, which have been completed
    in the meantime, accessible to the German press, I thank you, and
    will follow it.[11]

    Truth will hew a way for itself--mightily, irresistibly, like an
    avalanche. Whoever does not close his ears to it against his better
    judgment must admit that, during my twenty-six-year reign previous
    to the war, Germany's foreign policy was directed solely to the
    maintenance of peace. Its one and only aim was to protect our
    sacred native soil, threatened from the west and the east, and the
    peaceful development of our commerce and political economy.

    Had we ever had warlike intentions we should have struck the blow
    in 1900, when England's hands were tied by the Boer War, Russia's
    by the Japanese War, at which time almost certain victory beckoned
    us. In any event, we assuredly would not have singled out the year
    1914, when we were confronted by a compact, overwhelmingly superior
    foe. Also, every impartial man must acknowledge to himself that
    Germany could expect nothing from the war, whereas our enemies
    hoped to obtain from it the complete realization of the aims which
    they had based, long since, upon our annihilation.

    The fact that my zealous efforts and those of my Government
    were concentrated, during the critical July and August days of
    1914, upon maintaining world peace is being proved more and
    more conclusively by the most recent literary and documentary
    publications in Germany, and, most especially, in the enemy
    countries. The most effective proof thereof is Sazonoff's
    statement: "The German Emperor's love of peace is a guarantee to
    us that we ourselves can decide upon the moment of war." What
    further proof of our innocence is needed? The above means that the
    intention existed to make an attack upon one who was absolutely
    unsuspecting.


CALLS ACCUSATION FUTILE

    God is my witness that I, in order to avoid war, went to the
    uttermost limit compatible with responsibility for the security and
    inviolability of my dear fatherland.

    It is futile to accuse Germany of war guilt. To-day there is no
    longer any doubt that not Germany, but the alliance of her foes,
    prepared the war according to a definite plan, and intentionally
    caused it.

    For the purpose of concealing this, the allied enemies extorted
    the false "admission of guilt" from Germany in the shameful
    Peace Treaty and demanded that I _be produced before a hostile
    tribunal_. You, my dear Field Marshal, know me too well not to be
    aware that no sacrifice for my beloved fatherland is too great for
    me. Nevertheless, a _tribunal in which the enemy alliance would
    be at once plaintiff and judge would be not an organ of justice,
    but an instrument of political arbitrariness, and would serve
    only, through the sentence which would inevitably be passed upon
    me, to justify subsequently the unprecedented peace conditions
    imposed upon us_. Therefore, the enemy's demand naturally had to be
    rejected by me.

    But, in addition, the idea of _my being produced before a neutral
    tribunal_, no matter how constituted, cannot be entertained by me.
    _I do not recognize the validity of any sentence pronounced by any
    mortal judge whatsoever, be he never so exalted in rank, upon the
    measures taken by me most conscientiously as Emperor and King--in
    other words, as the constitutional, not responsible, representative
    of the German nation_--since, were I to do so, I should thereby be
    sacrificing the honor and dignity of the German nation represented
    by me.

    _Legal proceedings having to do with guilt and punishment_,
    instituted solely _against the head_ of one of the nations which
    took part in the war, _deprive that one nation of every vestige
    of equality of rights with the other nations_, and thereby of
    its prestige in the community of nations. Moreover, this would
    cause, as a consequence, _the impression desired by the enemy that
    the entire "question of guilt" concerns only this one head of a
    nation and the one nation represented by him_. It must be taken
    into consideration, moreover, that _a nonpartisan judgment of the
    "question of guilt" is impossible_, if the _legal proceedings
    are not made to include the heads and leading statesmen of the
    enemy powers_, and if their conduct is not subjected to the same
    investigation, since it goes without saying that the conduct of
    the aforesaid one nation at the outbreak of the war can be judged
    correctly only if there is simultaneous consideration of the
    actions of its opponents.

    _A real clearing up of the "question of guilt,"_ in which surely
    Germany would have no less interest than her foes, could be
    accomplished only if _an international, nonpartisan tribunal,
    instead of trying individuals as criminals, should establish all
    the events which led to the World War_, as well as all other
    offenses against international law, in order thereafter to measure
    correctly the guilt of individuals implicated in every one of the
    nations participating in the war.

    Such an honest suggestion was officially made in Germany after
    the end of the war, but, so far as I know, it was partly refused,
    partly found unworthy of any answer at all. Furthermore, Germany,
    immediately after the war, unreservedly threw open her archives,
    whereas the enemy alliance has taken good care so far not to follow
    such an example. The secret documents from the Russian archives,
    now being made public in America, are but the beginning.

    This method of procedure on the part of the enemy alliance in
    itself, combined with overwhelming damaging evidence coming to
    hand, shows where the "war guilt" is really to be sought! This
    makes it all the more a solemn duty for Germany to collect, sift,
    and make public, by every possible means, every bit of material
    bearing on the "question of guilt," in order, by so doing, to
    unmask the real originators of the war.

    Unfortunately, the condition of Her Majesty has become worse. My
    heart is filled with the most grievous worry.

    God with us!

                         Your grateful
                                     (Signed) WILHELM.

  [10] This letter and the letter from the Field Marshal which preceded
       it are reprinted herewith. The parts which are most important in
       relation to the matter in question are underscored in the text.

  [11] This has meanwhile been done. The _Comparative Historical Tables
       from 1878 to the Outbreak of the War in 1914_ were published in
       December, 1921, by K. F. Koehler, Leipsic.




CHAPTER XIV

The Question of Guilt


History can show nothing to compare with the World War of 1914-18. It
also can show nothing like the perplexity which has arisen as to the
causes leading up to the World War.

This is all the more astounding in that the Great War befell a highly
cultivated, enlightened, politically trained race of men, and the
causes leading up to it were plainly to be seen.

The apparent complicity in the crisis of July, 1914, should deceive
nobody. The telegrams exchanged at that time between the Cabinets of
the great powers and their rulers, the activities of the statesmen
and leading private individuals in verbal negotiations with important
personages of the Entente, were certainly of the greatest importance
on account of the decisive significance assumed by almost every word
when it came from responsible lips, by every line that was written or
telegraphed. The essential basis of the causes of the war, however, is
not altered by such things; it is firmly established, and people must
never hesitate from freeing it, calmly and with an eye to realities,
from the bewildering outcroppings from the events accompanying the
outbreak of war.

The general situation of the German Empire in the period before the
war had become continually more brilliant, and for that very reason
continually more difficult from the point of view of foreign politics.
Unprecedented progress in industry, commerce, and world traffic had
made Germany prosperous. The curve of our development tended steadily
upward.

The concomitant of this peaceful penetration of a considerable part of
the world's markets, to which German diligence and our achievements
justly entitled us, was bound to be disagreeable to older nations of
the world, particularly to England. This is quite a natural phenomenon,
having nothing remarkable about it. Nobody is pleased when a competitor
suddenly appears and obliges one to look on while the old customers
desert to him. For this reason I cannot reproach the British Empire
because of English ill humor at Germany's progress in the world's
markets.

Had England been able, by introducing better commercial methods, to
overcome or restrict German competition, she would have been quite
within her rights in doing so and no objections could have been made.
It simply would have been a case of the better man winning. In the life
of nations nobody can find it objectionable if two nations contend
against each other peacefully by the same methods--_i. e._, peaceful
methods--yet with all their energy, daring, and organizing ability,
each striving to benefit itself.

On the other hand, it is quite another matter if one of these nations
sees its assets on the world's balance sheet threatened by the
industry, achievements, and super business methods of the other,
and hence, not being able to apply ability like that of its young
competitor, resorts to force--_i. e._, to methods that are not those of
peace, but of war--in order to call a halt upon the other nation in its
peaceful campaign of competition, or to annihilate it.


NAVY MERELY PROTECTIVE

Our situation became more serious since we were obliged to build a
navy for the protection of our welfare, which, in the last analysis,
was not based on the nineteen billions yearly to which German exports
and imports amounted. The supposition that we built this navy for the
purpose of attacking and destroying the far stronger English fleet is
absurd, since it would have been impossible for us to win a victory on
the water, because of the discrepancy between the two navies. Moreover,
we were striding forward in the world market in accordance with our
desires and had no cause for complaint. Why, then, should we wish to
jeopardize the results of our peaceful labors?

In France the idea of revenge had been sedulously cultivated ever since
1870-71; it was fostered, with every possible variation, in literary,
political, and military writings, in the officer corps, in schools,
associations, political circles.

I can well understand this spirit. Looked at from the healthy national
standpoint, it is, after all, more honorable for a nation to desire
revenge for a blow received than to endure it without complaint.

But Alsace-Lorraine had been German soil for many centuries; it was
stolen by France and taken back by us in 1871 as our property. Hence, a
war of revenge which had as its aim the conquest of thoroughly German
territory was unjust and immoral. For us to have yielded on this point
would have been a slap in the face to our sentiments of nationality and
justice. Since Germany could never voluntarily return Alsace-Lorraine
to France, the French dream could be realized only by means of a
victorious war which should push forward the French boundary posts to
the left bank of the Rhine.

Germany, on the contrary, had no reason for staking what she had won
in 1870-71, so the course for her to pursue was to maintain peace with
France, all the more so because of the fact that the combination of
the powers against the German-Austrian Dual Alliance was continually
becoming more apparent.

As to Russia, the mighty empire of the Tsars was clamoring for an
outlet on the sea to the southward. This was a natural ambition and
not to be harshly judged. In addition, there was the Russian-Austrian
conflict of influence, especially in Serbia, which also concerned
Germany in so far as Germany and Austria-Hungary were allies.

The Russia of the Tsars, moreover, was in a state of continual internal
ferment and every Tsaristic Government had to keep the possibility for
a foreign conflict ever in readiness, in order always to be able to
deflect attention from inner troubles to foreign difficulties; to have
a safety valve as an outlet for the passions that might lead to trouble
at home.

Another point was that Russia's enormous demand for loans was met
almost exclusively by France; more than twenty billions of French
gold francs found their way to Russia, and France had a voice, to
some extent, in determining how they should be expended. As a result,
it became entirely a matter of expenditure on strategic measures and
preparations for war. The golden chain of the French billions not only
bound Russia to France financially, but made Russia serve the French
idea of revenge.


PURPOSE OF "ENCIRCLEMENT"

Thus England, France, and Russia had, though for different reasons,
an aim in common--_viz._, to overthrow Germany. England wished to do
so for commercial-political reasons, France on account of her policy
of revenge, Russia because she was a satellite of France and also
for reasons of internal politics and because she wished to reach the
southern sea. These three great nations, therefore, were bound to act
together. The union of these ambitions in a common course of action,
duly planned, is what we call the "policy of encirclement."

Added to all this there was also the Gentlemen's Agreement which has
only recently come to light and has already been thoroughly discussed
in the "Hohenlohe" chapter; concerning this agreement I knew absolutely
nothing during my reign, and the German Foreign Office was only
superficially and unreliably informed.

When I learned of it, I immediately sought information about it from
Herr von Bethmann. He wrote me a rather puzzling letter to the effect
that there was surely something about it among the documents of the
Foreign Office; that the German ambassador at that time in Washington,
von Holleben, had made some confidential report on it, to be sure, but
had not given his source of information, wherefore the Foreign Office
had not attached any importance to the matter and had not reported
further on it to me. Hence the said agreement had actually no influence
upon Germany's policy, but it constitutes supplementary proof that the
Anglo-Saxon world as far back as 1897 had combined against us, and
thereby explains a number of obstacles encountered by Germany in her
foreign policy. It also explains America's attitude in the war.

We were quite well acquainted, on the other hand, with the Entente
Cordiale, its foundations and purposes, and it decisively influenced
the course of our policy.

In view of the grouping of England, France, and Russia--three very
strong powers--only one political course lay open to Germany, the
threat of deciding Germany's future by force of arms must be avoided
until we had secured for ourselves such an economic, military, naval,
and national-political position in the world as to make it seem
advisable to our opponents to refrain from risking a decision by arms
and to yield us the share in the apportionment and management of the
world to which our ability entitled us. We neither desired nor were we
entitled to jeopardize our hard-won welfare.

_The aims of the Entente could be attained only through a war, those of
Germany only without a war._ It is necessary to hold fast to this basic
idea; it is of more decisive value than all accessory matters. Hence I
shall not go into detail here, nor take up Belgian or other reports,
nor the telegrams sent just before the outbreak of war. The thorough
treatment of these details lies in the domain of research.

In Germany our situation was correctly understood, and we acted
accordingly.


SOUGHT ENGLAND'S FRIENDSHIP

Taking up once more our relations with England, we did everything in
our power to bring about a rapprochement; we consented to the demand
for limitation of naval construction, as I have shown in my report
of Haldane's visit to Berlin. I went so far as to try to utilize my
family connections. But in vain. The actions of King Edward VII
are explained by the simple fact that he was an Englishman and was
trying to bring to realization the plans of his Government. Maybe the
political ambitions of the King, who did not begin to reign until well
along in years, contributed to this.

We certainly did all that was possible to meet England halfway, but
it was useless, because the German export figures showed an increase;
naturally we could not limit our world commerce in order to satisfy
England. That would have been asking too much.

As regards our policy toward England, we have been much blamed for
having refused the offer of an alliance made us by Chamberlain, the
English Colonial Minister, toward the close of the 'nineties. This
matter, however, was far different in character, on closer inspection,
from what it was represented as being.

First, Chamberlain brought a letter with him from the English Premier,
Salisbury, to Bülow, in which the English Prime Minister declared that
Chamberlain was dealing on his own account only, that the English
Cabinet was not behind him. This, to be sure, might have meant the
adoption of a course that was diplomatically permissible, giving the
English Cabinet, which was responsible to Parliament, a free hand; but
it turned out later, be it remarked, that the Liberal group in England
was at that time hostile to a German-English alliance.

Nevertheless, in view of the fact that there was a possibility that the
course adopted was a mere diplomatic formality--that Chamberlain might
have been sent on ahead and complete freedom of action retained for the
English Cabinet, which is a favorite method in London--Prince Bülow,
with my consent, went thoroughly into the matter with Chamberlain.

It transpired then that the English-German alliance was aimed
unquestionably against Russia. Chamberlain spoke directly about a
war to be waged later by England and Germany against Russia. Prince
Bülow, in full agreement with me, declined politely but emphatically
thus to disturb the peace of Europe. In so doing he was but following
the example of the great Chancellor, for Prince Bismarck coined the
phrase--I myself have heard it repeatedly in the Bismarck family
circle: "Germany must never become England's dagger on the European
continent."

So we did nothing further at that time than to go straight ahead with
our policy--_viz._, we refused all agreements which might lead to a war
which was not based directly on the defense of our native soil. The
refusal of the Chamberlain offer is a proof of the German love of peace.

As to France, we sought to bring about an endurable state of affairs.
This was difficult, for, in French eyes, we were the archenemy and
it was impossible for us to acquiesce in the demands inspired by the
policy of revenge. We settled the Morocco quarrel peacefully; no man of
standing in Germany entertained the idea of war on account of Morocco.
For the sake of peace we allowed France at that time to encroach
upon the essentially legitimate interests of Germany in Morocco,
strengthened as the French were by the agreement concluded secretly
with England as to mutual compensation in Egypt and Morocco.

In the Algeciras Conference the outline of the Great War was already
visible. It is assuredly not pleasant to be forced to retreat
politically, as we did in the Morocco matter, but Germany's policy
subordinated everything to the great cause of preserving the peace of
the world.

We tried to attain this end by courtesy, which was partially resented.
I recall the journey of my mother, the Empress Frederick, to Paris. We
expected a tolerably good reception, since she was an English Princess
and went, as an artist, to be the guest of French art. Twice I visited
the Empress Eugénie--once from Aldershot at her castle of Fernborough,
the other time aboard her yacht, in Norwegian waters, near Bergen. This
was a piece of politeness that seemed to me perfectly natural, seeing
that I happened to be very near her. When the French General Bonnal was
in Berlin with several officers, these gentlemen dined with the Second
Infantry Regiment. I was present and toasted the French army--something
that was still out of the ordinary, but was done with the best
intentions. I brought French female and male artists to Germany. All
this sort of thing, of course, was a trifle in the great game of
politics, but it at least showed our good will.

With regard to Russia, I went to the utmost trouble. My letters,
published in the meantime, were naturally never sent without the
knowledge of the Imperial Chancellors, but always in agreement with
them and largely at their desire. Russia would doubtless never have
got into a war with Germany under Alexander III, for he was reliable.
Tsar Nicholas was weak and vacillating; whoever had last been with him
was right; and, naturally, it was impossible for me always to be that
individual.

I made every effort with this Tsar, also, to restore the traditional
friendship between Germany and Russia. I was moved to do so not only
by political reasons, but by the promise which I had made to my
grandfather on his deathbed.

I most urgently advised Tsar Nicholas, repeatedly, to introduce liberal
reforms within his country, to summon the so-called Great Duma, which
existed and functioned even as far back as the reign of Ivan the
Terrible. In doing so it was not my intention to interfere in Russian
internal affairs; what I wanted was to eliminate, in the interests of
Germany, the ferment going on in Russia, which had often enough been
deflected before to foreign conflicts, as I have already described.
I wished to help toward eliminating at least this one phase of the
internal situation in Russia, which threatened to cause war, and I was
all the more willing to make the effort since I might thereby serve
both the Tsar and Russia.

The Tsar paid no heed to my advice, but created a new Duma instead,
which was quite inadequate for coping with the situation. Had he
summoned the old Duma he might have dealt and talked personally with
all the representatives of his huge realm and won their confidence.

When the Tsar resolved upon war against Japan, I told him that I would
assure him security in the rear and cause him no annoyances. Germany
kept this promise.


GRAND DUKE'S VISIT

When the course taken by the war did not fulfill the Tsar's
expectations, and the Russian and Japanese armies finally lay before
each other for weeks without serious fighting, the young brother of the
Tsar, Grand Duke Michael, arrived at Berlin for a visit. We could not
quite make out what he wanted. Prince Bülow, who was then Chancellor,
requested me to ask the Grand Duke sometime how matters really stood
with Russia; he said that he, the Prince, had received bad news and
thought it was high time for Russia to bring the war to an end.

I undertook this mission. The Grand Duke was visibly relieved when I
spoke to him frankly; he declared that things looked bad for Russia. I
told him that it seemed to me that the Tsar ought to make peace soon,
since what the Grand Duke had told me about the unreliability of troops
and officers appeared to me quite as serious as the renewed internal
agitation.

Grand Duke Michael was grateful for my having given him an opportunity
to talk. He said that the Tsar was vacillating, as always, but he must
make peace and would make it if I advised him to do so. He asked me to
write a few lines to the Tsar to that effect, for him to deliver.

I drafted a letter in English to Tsar Nicholas, went to Bülow, told him
what the Grand Duke had told me, and showed him the draft of my letter.
The Prince thanked me and found the letter suitable. The Grand Duke
informed the Russian ambassador in Berlin, Count Osten-Sacken, and,
after he had repeatedly expressed his thanks, went direct to the Tsar,
who then had peace negotiations begun.

Count Osten-Sacken told me, when next we met, that I had done Russia
a great service. I was glad this was recognized, and felt justified
in hoping, on account of this, that my conduct would contribute
toward bringing about friendly relations with Russia. In acting as I
did I also worked toward preventing the possible spread of a Russian
revolution, during the Russo-Japanese War, across the frontiers of
Germany. Germany earned no thanks thereby; however, our conduct during
the Russo-Japanese War is another proof of our love of peace.

The same purpose underlay my suggestion which led to the Björkö
agreement (July, 1905). It contemplated an alliance between Germany
and Russia, which both the Allies as well as other nations should be
at liberty to join. Ratification of this agreement failed through the
opposition of the Russian Government (Isvolsky).

It remains to say a few words about America. Aside from the Gentlemen's
Agreement already mentioned, which assured America's standing beside
England and France in a World War, America did not belong to the
Entente Cordiale created by King Edward VII at the behest of his
Government, and, most important of all, America, in so far as it is
possible at present to judge events, did not contribute toward bringing
on the World War. Perhaps the unfriendly answer given by President
Wilson to the German Government at the beginning of the war may have
had some connection with the Gentlemen's Agreement.


AMERICAN FACTORS IN DEFEAT

But there can be no doubt that America's entry into the war, and the
enormous supplies of ammunition, and especially of war materials, which
preceded her entry, seriously hurt the chance of the Central Powers to
bring the war to a successful termination by force of arms.

It is necessary, however, to avoid all emotional criticism of America
also, since, in the great game of politics, real factors only can be
considered. America was at liberty (despite the Gentlemen's Agreement)
to remain neutral or to enter the war on the other side. One cannot
reproach a nation for a decision as to war or peace made in accordance
with its sovereign rights so long as the decision is not in violation
of definite agreements. Such is not the case here.

Nevertheless, it must be noted that John Kenneth Turner, in his already
mentioned book, _Shall It Be Again?_ shows, on the basis of extensive
proofs, that all Wilson's reasons for America's entry into the war
were fictitious, that it was far more a case of acting solely in the
interest of Wall Street high finance.

The great profit derived by America from the World War consists in
the fact that the United States was able to attract to itself nearly
fifty per cent of all the gold in the world, so that now the dollar,
instead of the English pound, determines the world's exchange rate. But
here also no reproach is at all justified, since any other nation in
a position to do so would have rejoiced in attracting to itself this
increase of gold and of prestige in the world's money market. It was
certainly regrettable for us that America did not do this stroke of
business on the side of the Central Powers.

But just as Germany objects with perfect justification to having had
her peaceful labors combated by the Entente, not with peaceful, but
with warlike means, so also she can and must enter constant protest--as
she is already trying to do by means of published material--against
America's violation of the right at the close of the World War.

Personally I do not believe that the American people would have
consented to this; American women particularly would not have
participated in the denial of President Wilson's Fourteen Points, if
they could have been enlightened at that time as to the facts. America,
more than other countries, had been misled by English propaganda,
and therefore allowed President Wilson, who had been provided with
unprecedented powers, to act on his own initiative at Paris--in other
words, to be beaten down on his Fourteen Points. Just as Mr. Wilson
omitted mention, later on, of the English blockade, against which he
had protested previously, so also he acted with regard to his Fourteen
Points.

The German Government had accepted Wilson's Fourteen Points, although
they were severe enough. The Allies likewise had accepted the Fourteen
Points, with the exception of those on reparations and the freedom of
the seas. Wilson had guaranteed the Fourteen Points.


FOURTEEN POINTS ABANDONED

I fail to find the most important of them in the Versailles instrument,
but only those expressing the Entente's policy of violence, and
even part of these in a greatly falsified form. Relying on Wilson's
guaranty, Germany evacuated the enemy territory occupied by her and
surrendered her weapons--in other words, made herself defenseless. In
this blind confidence and the abandonment of the Fourteen Points on the
one side, and in the outbreak of the German revolution on the other,
lies the key to our present condition.

According to Turner, the Fourteen Points, as far back as the drawing up
of the armistice terms, were, to Wilson, no more than a means of making
Germany lay down her arms; as soon as this end was achieved he dropped
them.

Already a very large part of the American people has arrayed itself
against Mr. Wilson and is unwilling to be discredited along with him. I
am not dreaming of spontaneous American help for Germany; all I count
upon is the sober acknowledgment by the American people that it has to
make good the gigantic wrong done Germany by its former President. For
the atmosphere of a victory does not last forever, and later on, not
only in Germany, but elsewhere, people will remember the unreliability
of the American President and look upon it as American unreliability.

That is not a good thing, however, for the American people. To have
the policy of a nation branded with the stigma of unreliability is not
advantageous. When judgment is passed hereafter on American policy,
people will forget that Mr. Wilson, unversed in the ways of the world,
was trapped by Lloyd George and Clemenceau.

I have met--particularly at the Kiel regattas--many American men and
women whose political judgment and caution would make it impossible for
them to approve such a flagrant breach of faith as was committed by
Mr. Wilson, because of its effect on America's political prestige. It
is upon such considerations of national egotism, not upon any sort of
sentimental considerations, that I base my hope that Germany's burden
will be lightened from across the ocean.

Besides the injustice in the abandonment of the Fourteen Points, it
must also be remembered that Mr. Wilson was the first to demand of the
German reigning dynasty that it withdraw, in doing which he hinted
that, were such action taken, the German people would be granted a
better peace. Before the Government of Prince Max joined in the demand
for my abdication of the throne, which it based on the same grounds as
Mr. Wilson--that Germany would thereby get better terms--(prevention of
civil war was used as a second means of bringing pressure on me)--it
was in duty bound to get some sort of a binding guaranty from Mr.
Wilson. In any event, the statements made, which became continually
more urgent and pressing, contributed toward making me resolve to quit
the country, since I was constrained to believe that I could render my
country a great service by so doing.


ACCEPTED "SIGHT UNSEEN"

I subordinated my own interests and those of my dynasty, which
certainly were not unimportant, and forced myself, after the severest
inward struggles, to acquiesce in the wish of the German authorities.
Later it transpired that the German Government had obtained no real
guaranties. But, in the tumultuous sequence of events during those
days, it was necessary for me to consider the unequivocal and definite
announcement of the Imperial Chancellor as authoritative. For this
reason I did not investigate it.

Why the Entente demanded, through Mr. Wilson, that I should abdicate
is now obvious. It felt perfectly sure that, following my being
dispossessed of the throne, military and political instability would
necessarily ensue in Germany and enable it to force upon Germany not
easier but harder terms. At that time the revolution had not yet
appeared as an aid to the Entente.

For me to have remained on the throne would have seemed to the Entente
more advantageous to Germany than my abdication. I myself agree with
this view of the Entente, now that it has turned out that the Max of
Baden Government had no substantial foundation for its declaration that
my abdication would bring better terms to my fatherland.

I go even further and declare that the Entente would never have dared
to offer such terms to an intact German Empire. It would not have dared
to offer them to an imperial realm upon which the parliamentary system
had not yet been forced, with the help of German Utopians, at the very
moment of its final fight for existence; to a realm whose monarchical
Government had not been deprived of the power to command its army and
navy.

In view of all this, heavy guilt also lies on the shoulders of the
American ex-President as a result of his having demanded my abdication
under the pretense that it would bring Germany better terms. Here also
we certainly have a point of support for the powerful lever which is
destined to drag the Treaty of Versailles from where it lies behind
lock and key. In Germany, however, Mr. Wilson should never be confused
with the American people.

In setting forth my political principles in what follows I am actuated
solely by a desire to contribute toward proving Germany's innocence of
having brought on the World War.

From the outset of my reign German policy was based upon compromise
of the differences which it found existing between nations. In its
entirety, therefore, my policy was eminently peaceful. This policy
of peaceful compromise became apparent in internal politics, at the
very beginning of my reign, in the legislation desired by me for the
protection of the workers. The development of social legislation,
which placed Germany at the head of civilized nations in the domain of
governmental protection, was based on a like foundation.

The fundamental idea of a policy of compromise went so far within
Germany that the strength of the army would have remained far less than
universal compulsory military service and the size of the population
made possible. Here, as well as in the matter of naval construction,
the curtailments demanded by the Reichstag were put up with by the
Crown and the Government. Already at that time the question of
Germany's capabilities of defense was left to the decision of the
people's representatives. A nation that wished and prepared war would
have adopted quite different tactics.


INADEQUATE PREPAREDNESS

The more apparent the Entente's "policy of encirclement" and attack
became, the more the means of protecting our welfare should have been
strengthened for defensive reasons. This idea of natural and justified
self-protection, by means of defensive measures against a possible
hostile attack was carried out in a wretchedly inadequate manner.

Germany's desire for peace, in fact, was unable to develop this
protection by land and sea in a manner compatible with her financial
and national strength and with the risk which our welfare was bound
to run in case of a war. Therefore, we are now suffering not from the
consequences of the tendency toward aggression falsely imputed to us,
but actually from the consequences of a well-nigh incredible love of
peace and of blind confidence.

The entirely different political principles of the Entente have already
been described by me, also our continuous efforts to get upon friendly
terms with the individual Entente nations.

I do not wish to ignore completely the less important work done by
Germany, also included within the framework of politics on a large
scale, which was always inspired by the same purpose: to effect
compromise of existing points of conflict. The Kiel regatta brought us
guests from all the leading nations. We sought compromise with the same
zeal on the neutral territory of sport as in the domain of science by
means of exchange professors, and foreign officers were most willingly
allowed to inspect our army system. This latter might be adjudged a
mistake, now that we can look back, but, in any event, all these points
are certain proofs of our honest desire to live at peace with all.

Moreover, Germany did not take advantage of a single one of the
opportunities that arose for waging war with a sure prospect of success.

I have already pointed out the benevolent neutrality of Germany toward
Russia at the time of the Russo-Japanese War.

At the time when England was deeply involved in the Boer War we might
have fought against England or against France, which, at that time,
would have been obliged to forego help from England. But we did not do
so. Also, while the Russo-Japanese War was in progress, we might have
fought not only against Russia, but also against France. But we did not
do so.

In addition to the Morocco crisis already touched upon, in connection
with which we set aside the idea of going to war, we also gave evidence
of our desire for peace by overcoming the Bosnian crisis by diplomatic
means.

When one considers these plainly visible political events as a whole
and adduces the declarations of Entente statesmen such as Poincaré,
Clemenceau, Isvolsky, Tardieu, and others, one is bound to ask one's
self, in amazement, how a peace treaty, founded upon Germany's guilt
in having brought on the World War, could have been drafted and put
through. This miscarriage of justice will not stand before the bar of
world history.


BLAMES FRANCE FOR 1870

A Frenchman, Louis Guetant, delegate from Lyon to the Society for the
Rights of Man, recently made this statement:

"If we once look upon events without prejudice, with complete
independence and frankness, without bothering about which camp chance
placed us in at birth, the following is forced upon our attention first
of all: The War of 1914 is a consequence of the War of 1870. For, ever
since that earlier date, the idea of revenge, more or less veiled, has
never left us.

"The War of 1870, however, was prepared and declared by the French
Government. The French Empire, indeed, needed it very badly in order to
contend against interior troubles and its steadily growing unpopularity
with the public. Even Gambetta, the wild tribune of the opposition,
exclaimed: 'If the Empire brings us the left bank of the Rhine, I shall
become reconciled with it!' Thus, it was a war of conquest; nobody
bothered about what the conquered populations might have to say about
it. 'We shall bend their will to ours!' Thus it is written in the law
of the victor!

"And now, suddenly, the opportunity for doing this was to escape
France. In view of the political difficulties and dangers of war caused
by his candidacy, Prince Leopold declared himself ready to withdraw.
That is bad! Without a pretext there can be no war!

"It was the same with France as with the milkmaid and the broken
pitcher in the fable, only instead of, 'Farewell, calf, cow, pig,
hens,' it was, 'Farewell, bloody profits, glory, victory, left bank
of the Rhine, even Belgium!'--for the latter, too, lay on that left
bank of the Rhine which France coveted. No, that would have been too
hard, the disillusionment would have been too great, the opportunity
must be created anew. The entire chauvinistic press, the entire clan
of boasters, set to work and soon found a way. Gramont, Minister of
Foreign Affairs, sent Ambassador Benedetti to visit Emperor William,
who was taking the cure at Ems, and demand from him a written
promise that, in case Prince Leopold should change his mind about
his withdrawal, he, William, as head of the family, would take issue
against this.

"The withdrawal of Prince Leopold was announced to France in a valid
manner and officially accepted by the Spanish Government. There could
be no doubt as to its genuineness. Nevertheless the Paris newspapers,
almost without exception, clamored for war. Whoever, like Robert
Michell in the _Constitutionel_, expressed his pleasure at the
prospects for peace and declared himself satisfied, was insulted on
the street. Gambetta shouted at him: 'You are satisfied! What a base
expression!' Copies of his newspapers were stolen from the news stands,
thrown into the river, hurled in his face! Emilie de Girandin wrote to
him: 'The opportunity is unique, unhoped-for; if the Empire misses it
the Empire is lost!' Then it was that preparation for the War of 1914
was begun."

Voices like this also, which are not unique either in France or
England, must always be adduced as proof that the guilt is not ours.


"MISTAKEN, BUT NOT GUILTY"

Our political and diplomatic operations in the course of decades were
not, it must be admitted, faultlessly conceived or executed. But where
we made mistakes they were caused invariably by the too great desire to
maintain world peace. Such _mistakes do not constitute guilt_.

As I mentioned elsewhere, I even consider the Congress of Berlin a
mistake, for it made our relations with Russia worse. The congress was
a victory for Disraeli, an Anglo-Austrian victory over Russia, which
turned Russian anger upon Germany. Yet--think of all that has been done
since then to make up with Russia! I have partly enumerated these acts.
And Bismarck's sole intention in bringing about the Congress of Berlin
was, as I have pointed out, the prevention of a great general war.

Chancellor von Bethmann Hollweg also, who had strict orders from me to
maintain peace if it was at all possible, made mistakes in 1914; as a
statesman he was not at all adequate to the world crisis. But the blame
for the war cannot be put upon us simply because our opponents profited
by our mistakes. Bethmann Hollweg wished to avoid the war, like all
of us--sufficient proof of this is to be found in the one fact alone
that he persisted, until the 4th of August, in his political inertia,
negotiating with England in the erroneous belief that he could keep
England out of the Entente.

While on this subject I wish also to call attention to the delusion
under which Prince Lichnowsky, the German ambassador in London, was
laboring. Soon after he had become ambassador, King George came to the
Embassy to dinner. The King's example was followed automatically by the
best society people in London.

The Prince and Princess were singled out for marked attentions and
exceedingly well treated socially. From this the German ambassador
drew the conclusion that our relations with England had improved,
until, shortly before the war, Sir Edward Grey coolly informed him
that he must draw no political conclusions from social favors and good
treatment accorded to him personally.

Nothing could give a better insight into the difference between the
English and German mentality than this. The German assumed social
friendliness to be the expression of political friendliness, since
the German is accustomed to express aversion and approval by means of
social forms as well as otherwise. He is very outspoken about what he
has on his mind.


CHARGES ENGLISH INSINCERITY

The Englishman, however, makes a distinction; in fact, he is rather
pleased if the man to whom he is speaking confuses form with substance,
or, in other words, if he takes the form to be the expression of actual
sentiments and political views. Judged from the English standpoint,
the above-mentioned words of Sir Edward Grey were a perfectly frank
statement.

The much-discussed nonrenewal of the reinsurance treaty with Russia,
already touched upon by me, is not to be considered so decisive as
to have influenced the question of whether there was to be war or
peace. The reinsurance treaty, in my opinion, would not have prevented
the Russia of Nicholas II from taking the road to the Entente; under
Alexander III it would have been superfluous.

Prince Bismarck's view that the Russian ambassador, Prince Shuvaloff,
would have renewed the reinsurance treaty with him but not with his
successor, is naturally the honest, subjective way of looking at the
matter--judged in the light of fact, however, it does not hold water,
in view of what the two parties concerned had to consider at that
time. For instance, the Under Secretary of State of the Prince, Count
Berchem, stated officially in a report to the Prince that the treaty
could not be renewed, which meant that it could not be renewed through
Shuvaloff, either.

I thought that not the old treaty, but only a new and different kind
of treaty, was possible, in the drawing up of which Austria must
participate, as in the old Three-Emperor-Relationship.

But, as I said, treaties with Nicholas II would not have seemed
absolutely durable to me, particularly after the sentiment of the very
influential Russian general public had also turned against Germany.

Our acts were founded upon the clear perception that Germany could
reach the important position in the world and obtain the influence in
world affairs necessary to her solely by maintaining world peace. This
attitude was strengthened, moreover, by personal considerations.

Never have I had warlike ambitions. In my youth my father had given me
terrible descriptions of the battlefields of 1870 and 1871, and I felt
no inclination to bring such misery, on a colossally larger scale, upon
the German people and the whole of civilized mankind. Old Field Marshal
Moltke, whom I respected greatly, had left behind him the prophetic
warning: Woe to him who hurls the firebrand of war upon Europe! And I
considered as a political legacy from the great Chancellor the fact
that Prince Bismarck had said that Germany must never wage a preventive
war; that German resistance would be neutralized if she did.

Thus the trend of the German policy of maintaining the peace was
determined by political insight, personal inclination, the legacies
of two great men, Bismarck and Moltke, and the desire of the German
people to devote itself to peaceful labors and not to plunge into
adventures.

Whatever has been said in malevolent circles about the existence of a
German party favoring war is a conscious or unconscious untruth. In
every land there are elements which, in serious situations, either from
honest conviction or less lofty motives, favor the appeal to the sword,
but never have such elements influenced the course of German policy.

The accusations, especially those which have been made against the
General Staff to the effect that it worked for war, are pretty
untenable. The Prussian General Staff served its King and fatherland
by hard, faithful work, and maintained Germany's ability to defend
herself by labors extending over many years of peace, as was its duty,
but it exerted absolutely no political influence whatsoever. Interest
in politics, as is well known, was never particularly strong in the
Prussian-German army. Looking backward, one might almost say, in fact,
that it would have been better for us if those in leading military
circles had concerned themselves a bit more with foreign policy.

Therefore, how the Peace of Versailles, in view of this perfectly
clear state of affairs, could have been founded upon Germany's guilt
in having caused the World War, would seem an insoluble riddle
if it were not possible to trace the tremendous effect of a new
war weapon--_viz._, the political propaganda of England against
Germany--planned on a large scale and applied with audacity and
unscrupulousness. I cannot bring myself to dismiss this propaganda by
branding it with catchwords such as "a piece of rascality," etc., since
it constitutes an achievement which, in spite of its repugnant nature,
cannot be ignored; it did us more harm than the arms in the hands of
our opponents.

To us Germans, such an instrument of insincerity, distortion, and
hypocrisy is not pleasing; it is something that is incompatible with
the German character; we try to convince our opponents with the weapon
of truth as well as with other weapons. But war is a cruel thing
and what matters in it is to win; after all, to fire heavy guns at
civilized beings is not a pleasant matter, nor to bombard beautiful old
towns, yet this had to be done by both sides in the war.

Moreover, we could not have developed a propaganda on a large scale
like that of our enemies during the war for the very reason that they
had no foes in their rear, whereas we were surrounded. In addition,
most Germans have not the gift to fit a scheme of propaganda to the
different nationalities of the nations upon which it is supposed to
work. But, just as the English were more than our match with that
terrible weapon of theirs, the tank, against which we could bring
nothing of equal efficiency, so also were they superior to us with
their very effective weapon of propaganda.

And this weapon still continues its work and we are compelled still to
defend ourselves against it over and over again. For there can be no
doubt that the unjust Peace of Versailles could not have been founded
upon Germany's war guilt unless propaganda had previously accomplished
its task and, partly with the support of German pacifists, instilled
into the brains of 100,000,000 human beings the belief in Germany's
guilt, so that the unjust Peace of Versailles seemed to many justified.


HOPES FOR VERSAILLES REACTION

Meanwhile, things have changed, the barriers between nations have
fallen, and gradually they are awakening to the realization of how
their confidence was imposed upon. The reaction will be crushing to
the makers of the Versailles Peace, but helpful to Germany. It goes
without saying that, among the statesmen, politicians, and publicists
of the Entente who really know, not a single one is really convinced of
Germany's guilt in having caused the World War. Every one of them knows
the real interrelation of events, and assuredly there never was a case
where so many augurs smiled at each other over a secret held in common
as the case of the responsibility for the World War. In fact, one may
even speak of a chorus of such individuals, since twenty-eight nations
took part in the war against Germany. But, in the long run, not even
the shrewdest augurs will suffice to make world history. Truth will
make its way forward and thus Germany will come into her rights.

The various stipulations of the Versailles Treaty are in themselves
null and void, since they can be observed neither by the Entente nor
by Germany. It has been possible for months to note what difficulties
are arising in the path not only of Germany, but of the victors, as a
result of such an extravagant instrument.

In many ways the treaty has been punctured by the Entente itself, and
for this the reason is easily found. In the present highly developed
state of the world, which rests upon free, systematic exchange of
material and intellectual property, regulated solely by production
itself, it is quite out of the question for three men--no matter how
eminent they may be--to sit themselves down anywhere and dictate
paragraphed laws to the world. Yet that is what the Versailles Treaty
does, not only for Germany, but also, indirectly, for the Entente and
America, since all economic questions can be solved by mutual, not
one-sided, action.

The life of nations is regulated always--and most particularly in our
day--not by paragraphs, but simply and solely by the needs of nations.
It is possible, to be sure, to do violence to those national needs
temporarily by the imposition of arbitrary decisions, but, in such
cases, both parties concerned must suffer.

The world is in such a stage just now. Conditions like those at present
cannot last; not guns, nor tanks, nor squadrons of airplanes, can
perpetuate them. Therefore, their removal has already begun; for, if
the peace of Versailles were really such a judicious, unimpeachable
instrument, bringing blessings upon the world, there would not be
constant need of new conferences, discussions, and meetings having
to do with this "marvelous" document. The constant necessity for new
interpretations is due, indeed, to the fact that the needs of highly
cultivated and civilized nations were not taken into account when the
peace was concluded.

One must not be pharisaical, however; up to a certain point the
extravagance of the terms imposed by the victor after a life-and-death
struggle is a natural consequence of the relief felt at having escaped
alive from deadly danger.

Nevertheless, I know that Germany, if we had emerged victorious from
the war, would have imposed quite different terms--_i. e._, terms that
would have been just and endurable. The peace treaties of Brest-Litovsk
and Bucharest--which indeed are not at all comparable with the Treaty
of Versailles--cannot be adduced against us. They were concluded in
the very midst of the war and had to include conditions which would
guarantee our safety until the end of the war. Had it come to a general
peace, the treaty made by us in the East would have had a far different
aspect; had we won the war, it would have been revised by ourselves. At
the time it was made it was necessary to give preference to military
requirements.

But enlightenment regarding the unjust Treaty of Versailles is on the
way and the necessities of life among present-day nations will speak
in imperious tones to victors and vanquished.

After years of the heaviest trial will come the liberation from a yoke
imposed unjustly upon a great, strong, honest nation. Then every one of
us will be glad and proud again that he is a German.




CHAPTER XV

The Revolution and Germany's Future


I do not care what my foes say about me. I do not recognize them as
my judges. When I see how the same people who exaggeratedly spread
incense before me in other days are now vilifying me, the most that I
can feel is pity. The bitter things that I hear about myself from home
disappoint me. God is my witness that I have always wished what was
best for my country and my people, and I believed that every German
had recognized and appreciated this. I have always tried to keep my
political acts, everything that I did as a ruler and a man, in harmony
with God's commandments. Much turned out differently from what I
desired, but my conscience is clean. _The welfare of my people and my
Empire was the goal of my actions._

I bear my personal fate with resignation, for the Lord knows what He
does and what He wishes. He knows why He subjects me to this test. I
shall bear everything with patience and await whatsoever God still
holds in store for me.

The only thing that grieves me is the fate of my country and my
people. I am pained at the hard period of trial which my children of
the German land are undergoing, which I--obliged to live in foreign
parts--cannot suffer with them. _That is the sword thrust which pierces
through my soul_; that is what is bitter to me. Here in solitude I
still feel and think solely for the German people, still wonder how I
can better matters and help with enlightenment and counsel.

Nor can bitter criticism ever lessen my love for my land and people. I
remain faithful to the Germans, no matter how each individual German
may now stand with regard to me. To those who stand by me in misfortune
as they stood in prosperity, I am grateful--they comfort me and relieve
my gnawing homesickness for my beloved German home. And I can respect
those who, impelled by honest convictions, array themselves against me;
as for the rest, let them look to justifying themselves to God, their
consciences, and history.

They will not succeed in separating me from the Germans. Always I
can look upon country and people solely as one whole. They remain to
me what they were when I said on the occasion of the opening of the
Reichstag on the 1st of August, 1914, in the Imperial Palace: "I know
no more of parties; I know only Germans."

The revolution broke the Empress's heart. She aged visibly from
November, 1918, onward, and could not resist her bodily ills with the
strength of before. Thus her decline soon began. The hardest of all
for her to bear was her homesickness for the soil of Germany, for
the German people. Notwithstanding this, she still tried to bring me
consolation.

The revolution destroyed things of enormous value. It was brought about
at the very moment when the German nation's fight for existence was to
have been ended, and every effort should have been concentrated upon
reconstruction. It was a crime against the nation.


WIND AND WHIRLWIND

I am well aware that many who rally around the Social Democratic banner
did not wish revolution; some of the individual Social Democratic
leaders likewise did not wish it at that time, and more than one among
them was ready to co-operate with me. Yet these Social Democrats
were incapable of preventing the revolution, and therein lies their
share of guilt for what is now going on, all the more so since the
Socialist leaders stood closer to the revolutionary masses than the
representatives of the monarchical Government and, therefore, could
exert more influence upon them.

But the leaders, even in the days before the war, had brought the idea
of revolution to the masses and fostered it, and the Social Democracy
had been, from time immemorial, openly hostile to the earlier,
monarchical form of government, and had worked systematically toward
eliminating it. It sowed the wind and reaped the whirlwind.

The time and nature of the revolution were not to the liking of a
number of the leaders, but it was exactly these men who, at the
decisive moment, abandoned leadership to the most unbridled elements
and failed to bring their influence to bear toward maintaining the
Government.

It was the duty of the Government of Prince Max to protect the old form
of government. It failed to fulfill its holy duty because it had become
dependent on the Socialist leaders, the very men who had lost their
influence on the masses to the radical elements.

Therefore, the greatest share of the guilt falls upon the leaders, and
for that reason history will not brand the German working classes, but
their leaders, with the curse of the revolution, in so far as these
leaders participated in making the revolution or failed to prevent it
and it will also brand the Government of Prince Max of Baden with that
curse.

The German workers fought brilliantly in battle under my leadership,
and at home, as well, labored ceaselessly to provide munitions and war
material. That is something which must not be forgotten. It was only
later that some of them began to break away, but the responsibility for
this lies at the door of the agitators and revolutionists, not at that
of the decent, patriotic section of the working classes.

The conscienceless agitators are the men really responsible for
Germany's total collapse. That will be recognized some day by the
working classes themselves.

The present is a hard time for Germany. Of the future of this healthy,
strong nation I do not despair. A nation which can achieve such an
unprecedented rise as that of Germany between 1871 and 1914, a nation
which can maintain itself successfully for over four years in a
defensive war against twenty-eight nations, cannot be driven from the
earth. Economically, the world cannot do without us.

But in order that we may regain the position in the world which is
Germany's due, we must not await or count upon help from outside. Such
help will not come, in any event; were it to come, it would but mean
at best our being mere Helots. Also, the help which the German Social
Democratic party hoped for from abroad has not materialized, after all.
The international part of the socialistic program has proved itself a
frightful mistake.

The workers of the Entente lands took the field against the German
people in order to destroy it; nowhere was there a trace of
international solidarity among the masses.


ANOTHER GERMAN MISTAKE

This mistake, too, is one of the reasons why the war turned out so
badly for Germany. The English and French working classes were rightly
directed--_i. e._, nationalistically--by their leaders; the German
working classes were wrongly directed--_i. e._, internationally.

The German people must rely upon no other people, but solely upon
themselves. When self-conscious, national sentiment returns to all the
Strata of our people our upward march will begin. All classes of the
population must be united in national sentiment, no matter if their
ways lie apart in other departments of the nation's life. Therein lies
the strength of England, of France--even of the Poles.

If this comes to pass, the feeling of solidarity with all fellow
members of the nation, the consciousness of the dignity of our noble
land, the pride in being German, and the genuinely German conception of
ethics, which was one of the secret sources of strength that have made
Germany so great, will come back to us.

In the community of cultured nations Germany will again play, as she
did before the war, the rôle of the nation with the greatest capacity
for labor, and will once more march victoriously in the van in peaceful
competition, offering not only to herself, but to all the nations of
the earth, whatever is best in the domain of technical achievement, of
science, of art.

I believe in the revocation of the unjust Peace of Versailles by the
judgment of the sensible elements of foreign lands and by Germany
herself. I believe in the German people and in the continuation of its
peaceful mission in the world, which has been interrupted by a terrible
war, for which Germany, since she did not will it, does not bear the
guilt.




INDEX


  A

  Abdication of Kaiser and Crown Prince, 280-288, 320, 321, 322.

  Abdul-Hamid, Sultan, and the Albanians, 142, 164, 165.

  Achenbach, von, 34.

  Adlerberg, Count, 13.

  Admiralty, English, 154;
    Staff, German, 240, 250.

  Agadir affair, 145.

  Agrarian Conservatives, 54.

  Agreement, Anglo-Russian, 116;
    German-French, Morocco, 126, 127.

  Airplanes, 276, 334.

  Aix-la-Chapelle, 262, 278.

  Albania, 142, 163-169.

  Albedyll, von, 8.

  Aldershot, 312.

  Alexander II, of Russia, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19, 28.

  Alexander III, of Russia, 313, 329.

  Alexandra, Queen, of England, 127, 130.

  Algeciras Conference, 111, 115, 126, 144, 145, 312.

  Alliance, Triple, 8, 251, 253;
    Double, 8, 306;
    Anglo-Japanese, 69;
    Balkan, 170;
    German-English, 310, 311.

  Alsace-Lorraine, 60, 61, 89, 252, 258, 306.

  Althoc, Privy Councilor, 107.

  Althoff, von, 183, 198.

  America. _See_ United States.

  America, Central, 73.

  Anastasia, Grand Duchess, 252.

  Andrassy, 5, 273.

  Annihilation, policy of, 296.

  Antwerp-Meuse line, 275, 279.

  Archives, 294, 295, 301.

  "Areopagus of the Powers," 165.

  Armistice, 274, 278, 284, 285, 286, 289, 290, 298, 319.

  Armored ship, first German, 48.

  Army, German, 52, 62, 77, 105, 223-228, 259, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278,
          281, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 320, 322, 331;
    Russian, 10, 105, 227, 254;
    British, 91, 142, 162.

  "Asia for the Asiatics," 79.

  Asquith, Herbert Henry, 152, 153.

  "Assurbanipal," 204.

  Assyriology, 203-207.

  Astrakhan, 254.

  Austria, alliance with, 5;
    worked with, 8;
    threat against, 54;
    war begun by Germany on, 71 n.;
    if Germany or, should begin war, 72;
    ultimatum to Serbia, 248;
    Serbia's answer to, 248;
    anti-Russian Balkan policy, 251;
    "nothing will be left of Austria," 252;
    dismemberment of Austria-Hungary, 258;
    elimination of the House of Hapsburg, 258;
    and the Pope, 265, 266;
    Emperor Charles's vacillation, 272;
    peace offer of, 273;
    deceives Germany, 273;
    Russo-Austrian conflict of influence in Serbia, 307;
    Germany's ally, 307.

  Automobile Club, Imperial 45, 46.


  B

  "Babel and the Bible," 204, 218.

  Baden, 285, 287, 321, 340.

  Bagdad Railway, 89, 90.

  Balholm, 247.

  Balkans, 106, 165, 199, 200.

  Ballin, Albert, 3, 107, 146, 147, 148, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 158.

  Baltic, 105.

  Baltisch-Port, 169-170, 249.

  "Baralong" murderers, 264.

  Barrère, Camille, 126.

  Battlefields of 1870-71, 330.

  Bavaria, 60.

  _Belgian Documents_, 127.

  Belgium, 42, 43, 309, 326.

  Bender, Herr von, 29-30, 31.

  Benedetti, Ambassador, 326.

  Benedictine monks, 216.

  Bennigsen, Rudolf von, 30, 31, 32.

  Berchem, Count, 54, 329.

  Bergen, 312.

  Berlin Treaty, 10, 11, 14;
    Congress, 2, 15, 17, 20, 327.

  Berlin, University of, 199;
    Palace Chapel at, 218.

  Bertram, Prince-Bishop, 208.

  Beseler, Max, 187.

  Bethmann Hollweg, von, Chancellor, 124-134;
    "the governess," 132;
    enjoys confidence of foreign countries, 134;
    dismissed, 134;
    his diplomatic power, 138, 246;
    mistakes in 1914, 328;
    wished to avoid war, 328;
    tried to keep England out of the Entente, 328.

  Beuron Congregation, 216.

  Biebrich-Mosbach, 179.

  Bismarck, Bill, 3.

  Bismarck, Count Herbert, 2, 5, 6, 12, 27, 28, 76.

  Bismarck, Prince, Chancellor, 1-53;
    greatness as a statesman, 1;
    services to Prussia and Germany, 1;
    creator of the German Empire, 1;
    Memoirs, 3, 4;
    fight against the Kaiser, 2;
    appreciation by the Prince of Prussia (later the Kaiser), 2;
    majordomo of the Hohenzollerns, 3;
    and the harbor of Hamburg, 4;
    the third volume of his reminiscences, 4;
    continental preparations, 7;
    his Congress, 10;
    "honest broker," 10, 11;
    "Now I am driving Europe four-in-hand," 11;
    retirement of, 18, 53;
    and the Socialists, 40;
    his labor views, 41;
    and the Vulcan shipyards, 48;
    succeeded by Caprivi, 54;
    fight his successor, 55;
    "misunderstood Bismarck," 55, 76;
    reconciliation with Kaiser, 92;
    eightieth birthday, 93;
    "Germany must never become England's dagger on the European
          continent," 311;
    and the Congress of Berlin, 327.

  Bismarckian theory, 102.

  Björkö agreement, 201, 249, 315.

  Bissing, General von, 43.

  Black Sea, 105, 191, 192.

  Blockade, English, 318.

  Boches, 262.

  Bolsheviki, 181, 254, 284.

  Bonn, 214.

  Bonnal, General, 312.

  _Book of the German Fleet_, 184.

  Bosmont, 254.

  Bosnia, 324, 326.

  Bötticher, His Excellency von, 3, 38.

  Boyd-Carpenter, W., Bishop of Ripon, 213.

  Brandenburg, 196.

  _Brandenburg_, 231.

  Breitenbach, Paul von, 180, 181, 182.

  Brest-Litovsk, 14, 16, 136, 253, 335;
    Treaty of, 335.

  Brest mission, 4.

  Bucharest, Treaty of, 335.

  Buckingham Palace, 142.

  Budde, Hermann, 178, 179.

  Bülow, Prince von, 68;
    Chancellor, 95-123, 192, 194, 195, 233, 310, 311, 314, 315.

  Burchard, Doctor von, 156, 157-158, 159.

  Burian, Stefan, 272.


  C

  Cabinet, German War, 23, 277, 280;
    Civil, 25, 35, 134, 136;
    English, 310, 311.

  Cæsar, 295.

  Calmuck Cossacks, 254.

  Cambon, Jules, 252.

  Cambridge, Duke of, 91.

  Canal, Central, 112, 174, 177, 178, 181;
    Elbe-Trave, 178;
    Kaiser Wilhelm, 163, 181, 238-239;
    Panama, 181, 238.

  Canton, 78.

  Cape-to-Cairo Railway and Telegraph line deal, 87-88, 89.

  Caprivi, General Leo von, 51;
    Chancellor, 54-58;
    opposition of Bismarck, 57.

  Carlsbad, 247, 250.

  Caro, Professor, 206.

  Cassel, Sir Ernest, 146, 147, 150, 152, 159.

  Cassino, Monte, 217.

  Caucasus, 207, 254.

  _Causes of the World War_, 127, 252.

  Centrists, 33, 68.

  Central Powers, 81, 257, 316, 317.

  Chamberlain, Joseph, 68, 91, 104, 186, 310, 311.

  Charles, Emperor, agreement with Kaiser, 272;
    secret dealings with the Entente, 273;
    "When I go to the Germans, I agree to everything they say, and when
          I return home, I do whatever I please," 273.

  Charlotte, Grand Duchess, 172.

  Charlottenburg, 196, 201.

  Chih-li, Gulf of, 67.

  China, 64, 106.

  Chinese Empire, 78.

  Chirol, Sir Valentine, 85, 86.

  Church, of England, 213;
    St. Mary's (Jerusalem), 216.

  Churchill, Winston, 150, 152, 153.

  "Citizens' Book of Laws," 93, 187.

  "Civis Germanus sum," 183.

  Clemenceau, Georges, 319, 325.

  Clemen, Professor Paul, 260.

  Coaling stations, 64, 69-70, 73, 74.

  Cologne, 180, 288.

  Colonial acquisitions, 7, 9.

  Colonies, German, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 55, 56, 57.

  Commerce, world, 310.

  _Comparative Historical Tables from 1878 to the Outbreak of the War
          in 1914_, 251, 253, 297, 298, 299 n.

  Conference, London, 296, 297.

  Conflict, Russo-English, 10.

  Conflict of Influence, Russian-Austrian, 306.

  Congress of Berlin, 2, 327.

  Connaught, Duke of, 102.

  Conrad, Consistorial Councilor, 215.

  Conservatives, 31, 32, 33, 54, 111, 112, 114, 119, 122, 174.

  Constantine, Crown Prince (of Greece), 28.

  Constantine the Great, 218.

  Constantinople, 10, 14, 15, 16, 28, 90, 105, 106, 253.

  Constitution, German, 2, 139-141, 293.

  _Constitutionel_, 326.

  _Conversations with Christ_, 215.

  Costheim, 179.

  Court, international, 295.

  Cronberg-Friedrichshof situation, 148.

  Crown Council, German, 247, 272;
    Russian, 252, 253.

  Crown Prince, German, 286, 287.

  Cuniberti, 240.

  Cuxhaven, 107, 156.


  D

  _Daily Telegraph_, London, 118, 120;
    "interview," 118.

  Dardanelles, offer of, to Russia, 14.

  Dar-es-Salaam, 56.

  "Debating society," 280.

  Delbrück, Klemens von, 282.

  Delcassé, Théophile, 108, 257.

  Delitzsch, Professor Friedrich, 204, 218.

  "Deutschland über alles," 186.

  Dirschau, 177.

  Disraeli, Benjamin, 11, 327.

  Documents, secret, 294.

  Dollar, American, 317.

  Donaueschingen, 119.

  "Dormition," 216.

  Dorpat, University of, 200.

  Dörpfeld, Professor Wilhelm, 204, 205.

  Downing Street, 70.

  Dreadnaughts, 238, 239, 240, 241.

  Drews, Bill, Minister of Interior, 281.

  Dryander, Doctor Ernest, 214.

  Duhn, Professor, 206.

  Duma, Great, 313, 314;
    new, 314.

  Durnovo, Madame, 192, 193.


  E

  Ebert, Imperial Chancellor, 287, 288.

  Eckartsau, 119.

  Edward VII, of England, 74, 103, 162;
    at Kiel, 115;
    invites Kaiser to Windsor, 117;
    "policy of encirclement," 45, 115, 126, 128, 257;
    visits Berlin, 126;
    death of and funeral, 128-130, 144;
    actions of explained, 310;
    political ambitions of, 310;
    and the Entente Cordiale, 316.

  Egypt, 312.

  Eiffel Mountains, 180.

  Einem, General von, 151, 161.

  Eisenach Conference, 213.

  Emden, 181.

  Empire, French, 325, 327.

  Empress, German, 61, 196, 297, 302, 338.

  Ems, 326, 329.

  England, 9, 10, 15, 16, 26, 44;
    conditions of English workmen, 44-45;
    and Germany as to coaling stations, 69;
    anger at Germany's occupation of Kiao-Chau, 70-71;
    and France, 71 n., 72, 73, 75;
    and United States, 71 n., 72-74, 75;
    naval stations, 78;
    and Japan, 78, 82;
    Kaiser foresees complications with, 83;
    Kruger telegram, 83-86;
    Russia and France's proposal to Germany to attack, 87, 91;
    Kaiser loyal to, 87;
    the Kaiser's opinion of Englishmen, 98;
    death of Queen Victoria, 103;
    Kaiser's reception in England, 102-104;
    Chamberlain suggests alliance between Germany and England against
          Russia, 104-106;
    validity of alliance, 106;
    plan fails, 106;
    alliance with Japan, 106;
    pro-French and anti-German attitude of, at Algeciras Convention,
          115-116;
    Kaiser visits Windsor, 117;
    Edward VII visits Berlin, 126;
    death of Edward VII, 128-130;
    funeral, 129-130;
    unveiling of statue to Queen Victoria, 142-143;
    Kaiser at, 142-143;
    festivities, 143-144;
    comparison of pomp between democratic England and mediæval Germany,
          144;
    in Egypt, 145;
    offer to remain neutral in "unprovoked" attack on Germany, 146;
    "verbal note" to the Kaiser, 147;
    negotiations, 153-155;
    repudiation, 159;
    Kaiser denounces Haldane, 162;
    evolution of the dreadnaught, 240;
    fleet, 241, 247, 252;
    "two-Power standard," 241;
    Tsar's hatred for, 249;
    promise of, to side with Russia against Germany, 253;
    Germany's progress disagreeable to, 304;
    aim to overthrow Germany, 307;
    grouping of Russia, France, and, 309;
    Germany tries to bring about a rapprochement with, 309;
    Germany consents to limitation of naval construction, 309;
    political ambitions of King Edward, 310;
    German could not satisfy, 310;
    secret agreement with France as to Morocco and Egypt, 312;
    propaganda in America, 318;
    blockade, 318;
    Bethmann tries to keep England out of the Entente, 328;
    political propaganda, 331-333;
    working classes, 341;
    strength of England, 342.

  Enmity, source of Russian, 9.

  Entente, 72, 73, 74, 134, 141, 165, 250, 251, 264, 269, 273, 292, 293,
          294, 295, 303, 307, 309, 316, 317, 318, 321, 323, 325, 333,
          334, 341.

  Erzberger, Ambassador, 286.

  Essad Pasha, 167, 169.

  Eugénie, Empress, 312.

  Eulenburg, Count Augustus, 24, 117.


  F

  "Fairyland Wants Its Prince," 166.

  Fatherland, 286, 289, 292, 297, 298, 300, 321, 331.

  Faulhaber, Archbishop, 208.

  Federal Council, 157.

  Fernborough, Castle of, 312.

  _Figaro_, 21.

  Fischer, Cardinal, 210.

  Fisher, Admiral, 154, 240.

  Flanders, 278, 279.

  Fleet, English, 10, 105, 241, 247, 248, 305.

  Foch, General, 290.

  Foreign Office, German, 5, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 25, 27, 29, 48, 59, 66,
          68, 75, 76, 77, 84, 98, 99, 100, 101, 104, 108, 118, 119, 121,
          132, 134, 138, 139, 145, 146, 155, 246, 247, 248, 250, 277,
          284, 308.

  _Foundations of the Nineteenth Century_, 186.

  Fourteen Points, 318, 319, 320.

  France, and Russia, 61;
    and Germany, 71 n.;
    and United States, 71 n., 72, 73, 75;
    and England, 71 n., 72-74;
    at Shimonoseki, 81;
    fortifications, 81;
    Russo-French proposal to Germany against England, 87, 91;
    anger at Kaiser's visit to Tangier, 108;
    not yet ready for war, 109;
    England's offer of 100,000 men to seize Kaiser Wilhelm Canal, 109;
    downfall of Delcassé, 109;
    accession of Rouvier, 109;
    growing desire for revenge and enmity toward Germany, 126, 305;
    German-French Morocco agreement, 126;
    confers cross of Legion of Honor on Radolin and von Schoen, 126;
    railways, 179;
    armistice commission in, 286, 290;
    Kaiser understands spirit, 306;
    Alsace-Lorraine, 306;
    enormous loans to Russia, 307;
    aim to overthrow Germany, 307;
    grouping of England, Russia, and, 309;
    Germany arch enemy of, 311;
    secret agreement with England as to Morocco and Egypt, 312;
    War of 1870, 325;
    working classes, 341;
    strength of France, 342.

  Franchise, Prussian, 135-138.

  Frankfort, 181.

  Franz Ferdinand, Archduke, 119, 246.

  Franz Josef, Emperor, 14, 119.

  Frederick II, Emperor, 217.

  Frederick Charles, Prince, 102.

  Frederick, Crown Prince, 134, 180.

  Frederick, Empress, 172, 189, 202, 312.

  Frederick the Great, 28, 39, 76, 217.

  Frederick, William III, 21, 22, 24, 26, 29, 172, 224.

  Free Thinkers, 31.

  Friedberg, His Excellency Heinrich, 187.

  Friedjung, Heinrich, 128.

  Friedrichsruh, Admiral von Tirpitz at, 4;
          Kaiser at, 93.

  Friendship, Russo-French to replace Russo-Prussian, 11.

  Fürstenberg, Prince Max Egon, 117, 119.


  G

  Gambetta, Léon, 325, 327.

  Galician-Polish campaign, 136.

  Gallwitz, General von, 274.

  General Headquarters, German, 122, 254, 278, 288.

  General Staff, German, 6, 61, 161, 177, 178, 180, 226, 227, 247, 248,
          250, 331;
    English, 161, 162, 175;
    Austrian, 167;
    Russian, 255.

  "Gentlemen's agreement," 74, 308, 316.

  George, David Lloyd, 296, 320.

  George V, of England, 130, 142, 143, 144, 296, 328.

  "German Evangelical Church Union," 214.

  Germany, Bismarck creator of German Empire, 1;
    constitution of, 2, 139-141;
    alliance with Austria, 5;
    animosity of Russian military circles against, 17;
    as peace maker, 20;
    maintenance of, 31;
    conditions of laboring classes in, 36-50;
    first armored ship, 48;
    merchant marine, 48;
    shipbuilding industry, 51, 235;
    corps, naval officer, 51, 52, 53, 112, 230;
    reinsurance treaty with Russia, 54;
    and Kiao-Chau, 64-68, 74;
    coaling stations, 64, 69-70;
    and United States, 71 n., 72-74;
    difficulty of training up good diplomats in, 76;
    English commercial envy of, 79;
    Russia and France's proposal to attack England, 87;
    Cecil Rhodes's admiration for Berlin and tremendous German
          industrial plants, 88;
    difference between Germans and English, 92;
    reform of military punishment procedure, 93;
    Naval law, 93, 146, 147;
    appointment of Waldersee, 93;
    Boxer war, 93;
    Tsing-tao, 94;
    Yangtse Treaty, 94;
    relations with England become more complicated, 95;
    France, Russia, and, in the Far East, 105;
    validity of an alliance, 106;
    failure of plan, 106;
    disturbed relations among the parties in the Reichstag, 111;
    popular demonstration at defeat of Social Democrats, 114;
    Edward VII at Kiel, 115;
    Kaiser's _Daily Telegraph_ interview, 118;
    press demands Fürstenberg to "tell the Emperor the truth for once,"
          119;
    Conservatives' "Open Letter," 122;
    retirement of Bülow, 123;
    Bethmann Hollweg appointed Chancellor, 124;
    growing desire for revenge and enmity of France, 126;
    German-French Morocco Agreement, 126;
    Austro-Hungarian allies, 128;
    "Nation in Arms," 135, 259;
    Chancellor's powers, 139-141;
    German French agreement, 146;
    "A verbal note!" 147, 148;
    astonishment at, 149;
    discussion and reply, 149-150;
    negotiations, 153-155;
    verbal note disavowed by England, 159;
    Haldane "cheated" the Germans, 162;
    blamed on Kaiser and von Tirpitz, 162;
    the Central Canal, 174;
    railways, 175-182;
    schools, 183-185;
    forests, 189;
    science and art, 196-207;
    must become sword of the Catholic Church, 211;
    revolution, 213, 218, 224;
    Protestant Union, 214-215;
    officer corps, 225, 226;
    noncommissioned officer corps, 225, 230;
    development of Heligoland, 238;
    first big fighting ship, 241;
    U-boats, 242-243;
    democratization of, 258;
    Germans on all battlefields, 260;
    "Germans always defeated by Germans," 260;
    "In Germany every Siegfried has his Hödur behind him," 260;
    atrocities, 260;
    protection of churches, châteaux, castles, and art treasures, 260;
    failure of August 8, 1918, 272, 273;
    movement for setting up of new government, 274;
    inner situation of army, 274, 279;
    revolutionary agitation in, 274, 275;
    general desire for ending fighting, 275;
    achievements of fighters and nation in arms, 276;
    army of 1918 cannot compare with army of 1914, 275, 276;
    approaching revolution, 284;
    people want peace at any cost, 284;
    authority of Government zero, 284;
    agitation against Emperor in full swing, 284;
    abdication of Emperor not to be avoided any longer, 284;
    evidence of Russian Bolshevist influence in, 284;
    relations between Foreign Office and police, 284;
    army no longer to be trusted, 285;
    revolution imminent behind front, 285;
    Kaiser's abdication demanded, 285;
    revolt among troop begins, 286;
    Kaiser willing to renounce Imperial throne, but not to abdicate as
          King of Prussia, 286;
    abdication of Kaiser and Crown Prince summarily announced, 287;
    conduct of Prince Max, 287-288;
    sacrifice of Emperor, princes, and Empire, 288;
    Kaiser advised to go to neutral country, 288;
    foes unwilling to conclude peace with Kaiser, 289;
    the question of war guilt, 291, 302;
    desire for peace and clean conscience, 291;
    Kaiser decides to leave country for country's good, 291, 294;
    Entente demands surrender of Kaiser for trial, 292, 300;
    state archives thrown open, 294;
    demands for Kaiser's surrender rejected, 294;
    policy of annihilation of enemies, 296;
    general situation before the war, 304;
    unprecedented progress in industry, commerce, and world traffic, 304;
    navy merely protective, 305;
    exports and imports, 305;
    Alsace-Lorraine, German soil for centuries, 306;
    stolen by France, 306;
    retaken in 1871, 306;
    and Serbia, 307;
    aim of England, France, and Russia to overthrow, 307;
    obstacles encountered in foreign policy, 308;
    only one political course, 309;
    seeks England's friendship, 309;
    consents to limitation of naval construction, 309;
    blamed for refusing alliance with England, 310;
    "Germany must never become England's dagger on the European
          continent" (Bismarck), 311;
    archenemy of France, 311;
    traditional friendship between Russia and, 313;
    protests against America's violation of right, 317;
    and President Wilson's Fourteen Points, 318;
    evacuated German territory and surrendered arms on Wilson's
          guaranty, 318;
    revolution as an aid to Entente, 321;
    financial and national strength, 323;
    War of 1870, 325;
    political and diplomatic operations, 325;
    English propaganda against, 331-333;
    wind and whirlwind, 339;
    agitators responsible for collapse, 340;
    English and French working classes _versus_ German working classes,
          341;
    German people must rely on themselves, 341;
    upward march will begin again, 342;
    will again march in the van, 342.

  "Germany will be annihilated," 252.

  Girandin, Emilie de, 327.

  Goethals, Colonel, 238-239.

  Gorlice-Tarnow, battle of, 136.

  Goschen, Sir Edward, 248.

  Gossler, Gustav von, 183.

  Gramont, Herzog Agénor, 326.

  Greatcoats, English soldiers', 256.

  Greater Germany, 184.

  "Great Orient Lodge," 258.

  Greece, 28, 141, 142.

  Grey, Sir Edward, 146, 151, 152, 153, 257, 328, 329.

  Gröner, General Wilhelm, 281, 283, 285.

  Guetant, Louis, 325.


  H

  Hague, The, 71.

  Hahnke, General Wilhelm von, 23.

  "Haldane Episode," 160.

  Haldane, Lord, 146, 151, 152, 153, 154, 158, 161, 162, 188.

  Hamburg, 3, 49, 137, 252.

  Hamilton, Sir Ian, 234.

  _Handbook for English Naval Officers_, 154.

  Hanseatic ports, 55, 56, 57, 156.

  Harden, Maximilian, 102.

  Hardinge, Sir Charles, 149.

  Harkort, Friedrich, 236.

  Harnack, Professor Adolf von, 199.

  Hartmann, Cardinal Felix von, 208.

  Hayashi, Tadasu, 106.

  Headquarters, Great General, 122, 254, 278, 288.

  Heavy artillery, 227.

  Heeringen, Josias von, 151.

  Helfferich, Karl, 128.

  Heligoland, 8, 11, 55;
    a menace to Hamburg and Bremen, 55;
    deal for, 55;
    acquired by Germany, 56;
    Kaiser at, 86, 117;
    development of, 238;
    Colonel Goethals enthusiastic over, 238.

  Helots, 341.

  Henry of Prussia, Prince, 68, 237.

  Hertling, Count von, 89, 123, 272.

  Highcliffe dispatches, 117, 119, 121.

  Hildegard, Convent of Saint, 218.

  Hindenburg, Field Marshal Paul von, 181, 275, 277, 281, 282, 285, 288,
          295-302.

  Hinzpeter, Professor George Ernst, 38, 194, 199, 215, 228.

  Höchst, 181.

  Hohenfinow, 124.

  Hohenlohe, Alexander ("the Crown Prince"), 93.

  Hohenlohe, Prince, Chancellor, 60-94;
    governor of Alsace-Lorraine, 60;
    Bismarck's opposition, 60, 82, 92;
    attitude toward Socialists, 90, 91;
    retires, 92, 111.

  Hohenzollern, House of, 3, 43, 114, 175, 177.

  Holland. _See_ Netherlands.

  Holleben, Ambassador von, 308.

  Holstein, Fritz von, 5, 6, 60, 82, 98-102.

  Hollmann, Admiral, 66, 67, 84, 94, 215, 218.

  Hövel, Freiherr Baldwin von, 190.

  Homburg, 104, 180.

  Hongkong, 78, 79.

  Hubertusstock, 61.

  Hülsen-Haeseler, Count George von, 119, 204.

  Hungary, defection of, 273.

  Huns, 262.


  I

  "Idea of risk," 230, 231.

  _Illustrated Naval Atlas_, 240.

  India, 105, 106.

  Intze, 197.

  Italy, 8, 61;
    severs alliance with Germany, 136;
    smuggling of arms from, to Albania, 141;
    plots against William of Wied, 167;
    would break away from Germany and Austria, 253;
    and the Pope, 265, 266-268.

  Isvolsky, 256, 257, 316, 325.

  Ivan the Terrible, 313.

  Ivangorod, 136.


  J

  Jagow, Gottlieb von, Secretary of State, 127.

  Jameson raid, 83, 88.

  Januskevitch, General Nikolai, 255.

  Japan, 74;
    England and, 78;
    watchwords, 79;
    growing power of, 79;
    menace to Russia and Europe, 79;
    reproached by Kaiser, 81;
    "Prussians of the East," 81;
    sympathies with England, 82;
    alliance with England, 106;
    war with Russia, 106;
    pawn of England, 106;
    free hand in Korea and China, 106;
    Portsmouth Treaty, 200.

  Jaurès, Jean, 109.

  Jenisch, Martin von, 118.

  Jerusalem, 90;
    Church at, 213, 216.

  Joachimsthal, 190.

  Jubilee, papal, 210;
    Queen Victoria's golden, 238.

  Jutland, 58, 161, 231, 242.


  K

  Kaiser, Bismarck's fight against, 2;
    his regard for Bismarck while Prince of Prussia, 2;
    his grandfather's successor, 3;
    in the Foreign Office, 5, 12;
    at St. Petersburg, 13, 16, 25, 63;
    prophecy of Russian downfall, 16;
    conduct of Russian officers toward, 16;
    relief at Bismarck's dismissal, 18;
    and his father, 21;
    he becomes Emperor, 22;
    and Queen Victoria, 26-27;
    conflict with Bismarck on Turkish policy, 28;
    impressions of Greece, 28;
    Constantinople impressions, 28;
    Turkish policy, 28;
    attitude of father's friends toward, 29;
    his attitude toward parties, 30-34;
    conflict with Bismarck, 34;
    attitude of Bismarck cabinet toward, 35;
    handles a coal strike, 36;
    and the laboring classes, 36, 322;
    his welfare fund, 45-46;
    and the Vulcan shipyard, 47, 50;
    presented with a laurel wreath by workingmen, 50;
    "orphaned" young Emperor, 54;
    newspaper criticism of, 55, 57;
    and Heligoland, 55-58;
    and Prince Lobanoff, 61-63;
    finds seed of World War, 71;
    Tsar asks opinion as to growing power of Japan, 79-80;
    reproaches for Japan, 80;
    at Shimonoseki, 81;
    sees complications with England, 83;
    Kruger telegram, 83-86;
    at Heligoland, 86;
    loyalty to England, 87;
    Cecil Rhodes consults about Cape-to-Cairo Railway and Telegraph
          line, 88;
    visits England in 1899, 90;
    reconciliation with Bismarck, 92;
    at Friedrichsruh, 93;
    his opinion of Englishmen, 97-98;
    warns Bülow against Holstein, 98;
    his reception in England at Queen Victoria's death, 102-104;
    at Tangier, 107;
    at the Portuguese Court, 107;
    declines to visit Morocco, 107;
    decides to do so, 108;
    reception at Tangier, 108;
    at Gibraltar, 108;
    visit to Tangier, 108;
    the construction of the cathedral and Berlin Opera House, 112;
    disagreement with conservatives, 112-114;
    at Windsor, 117;
    Highcliffe dispatches, 117, 119, 121;
    "Englishmen are as mad as March hares," 118 n.;
    _Daily Telegraph_ "interview," 118-119;
    visits Eckartsau and Donaueschingen, 119;
    "tell the Emperor the truth for once," 119;
    his mental anguish, 119;
    lectured by Chancellor Bülow, 120;
    "The tear flows, Germania has me again," 121;
    his attitude, 128;
    fury of all parties against, 122;
    appoints Bethmann-Hollweg chancellor, 124;
    goes to London to funeral of Edward VII, 128-130;
    his reception, 129;
    finds fault with Bethmann, 132;
    at Pless, 136;
    at Nisch, 137;
    at Orsova, 137;
    meets Bulgarian Tsar, 137;
    his franchise plan, 135-138;
    at Corfu, 141, 204;
    goes to London at the unveiling of statue of Queen Victoria, 142;
    surprise at "verbal note" from England, 148;
    writes the answer, 149;
    and the naval bill, 156-159;
    defends naval program, 160;
    and Albania, 163, 165-169;
    meets Tsar at Baltisch-Port, 169-170, 249;
    and von Stephan, 171;
    the "White Drawing Room," 172;
    and the Academy of Building, 172-173;
    and the Central (Rhine-Weser-Elbe) Canal, 174;
    and the railways, 175-182;
    and the schools, 183-186;
    and forestry, 189;
    interest in science and art, 196;
    Russian foresight, 200-201;
    Assyriology and the Achæans, 203-207;
    at Corfu, 204, 205, 206, 249;
    relations with the Catholic Church, 208-213;
    boycotted by Rhenish-Westphalian families, 208;
    friendship for Pope Leo XIII, 209;
    consecration of portal of Cathedral at Metz, 210;
    welfare of Catholic subjects, 211-212;
    Union of Protestant churches, 213;
    Doctor Dryander's influence over, 214;
    presents "Dormition" to German Catholics at Jerusalem, 216;
    and the Benedictine monks, 216, 217, 218;
    letter to Hollmann, 219-222;
    his theology, 220;
    relations with army and navy, 223-245;
    at Vienna, 246;
    his journey to Norway, 247-248;
    Tsar's treachery toward, 249;
    evidence war had been prepared for in France, England, and Russia in
          spring of 1914, 251-257;
    his _Comparative Historical Tables_, 251, 253, 297, 298;
    abdication of, 258, 280-288;
    orders churches, châteaux, castles, and art treasures protected, 260;
    receives papal nuncio, 263;
    suggests Pope make peace offer, 263;
    deceived by Vienna, 272, 273;
    goes to the front, 277;
    note to Wilson, 277;
    rumors of abdication, 277-278;
    Wilson's armistice note, 278;
    orders retreat to Antwerp-Meuse line, 279;
    retreat begun, 279;
    joyfully received by army, 279;
    in danger from aircraft bombs, 279;
    hostile attitude of people against, 280, 282;
    Minister of Interior Drews suggests abdication, 281;
    "fateful consequences of my abdication," 281;
    refuses to abdicate, 281;
    sends Delbrück to Berlin, 282;
    son declines to suggest abdication, 282;
    address to the Ministry, 282;
    abdication no longer to be avoided, 285;
    abdication demanded, 285;
    calls conference, 286;
    wishes to prevent bloodshed, 286;
    willing to renounce Imperial throne, but not to abdicate as King of
          Prussia, 286;
    decision too late, 287;
    abdication summarily announced, 287;
    as to the abandonment of the army by, 287;
    advised to go to neutral country, 288;
    sacrifice in vain, 289;
    sorrows at disaffection in army and navy, 289;
    opinions of German people as to what he should have done, 290;
    decides to leave country for country's good, 291, 294;
    Entente demands his surrender for trial, 292, 300;
    undecided, 292;
    surrender debated in German circles, 293;
    decides not to give himself up, 294;
    letter from Hindenburg, 296-297;
    the Kaiser's answer, 297-302;
    silent in the face of lies and slanders, 298;
    does not recognize the validity of sentence pronounced by any mortal
          judge, 300;
    toasts the French army, 312;
    tries to influence Nicholas II, 313;
    Tsar's obstinacy, 314;
    receives the Grand Duke Michael, 314;
    suggests alliance between Russia and Germany, 316;
    opinion of American women, 318, 319;
    accuses Wilson of wronging Germany, 319;
    counts on American people making good wrong done by Wilson, 319;
    sees dark future for America, 319;
    Wilson first to demand abdication, 320;
    political principles, 322;
    policy eminently peaceful, 322;
    constant striving for peace, 322-331;
    legacies of Bismarck and Moltke, 330;
    impervious to criticism, 337;
    disappointed in German people, 337;
    conscience is clean, 337;
    has confidence in the Lord, 337;
    his sympathy and love for German people, 338;
    is homesick, 338.

  Kaiser Wilhelm Children's Home, 46.

  Kato, Baron Takaaki, 68.

  Kiao-Chau, 64-84, 82.

  Kiderlen, Alfred von, 132, 141.

  Kiel, 109, 116, 145, 246, 319, 324.

  Kirschner, Miss, 46.

  Kluck, General Alexander von, 262.

  Knights of Malta, German, 216.

  Koehler, K. F., 299.

  Kokovzeff, Count Vladimir, 253.

  Kopp, Cardinal George, 208, 210, 212.

  Korea, 106.

  _Krieg und Revolution_, 285 n.

  Krueznach, 269.

  Krug, Archabbot, 217.

  Kruger dispatch, 64, 82-86, 88, 89, 90, 91, 140.

  "Kulturkampf," 2, 33, 208, 209, 212.


  L

  Labor-protective legislation, 2.

  _La Gaulois_, 109.

  Landtag, 138.

  Langemark, 187.

  Lascelles, Sir Frank, 83 n.

  Law, international, 301.

  Legislation, labor-protective, 2.

  Lemberg, 136.

  Leo XIII, Pope, 209;
    receptions of, 209;
    friendship between Kaiser and, 209-210, 218;
    Kaiser asks to make peace effort, 261-271.

  Leopold, King of Belgium, 88.

  Leopold, Prince, 326.

  Le Quesnoy, 257.

  Lerchenfeld, Count Hugo, 96.

  Liberals, German, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 114, 122, 194, 228;
    English, 310.

  Lichnowsky, Prince Karl Max, 328.

  Liège, 257.

  _Life of the Prince Consort, The_, 90.

  Lobanoff, Prince Alexei Borissowitsch, 61.

  Lochow, Ewald von, 261.

  Loë, Freiherr Walter von, 210.

  Loebell, Friedrich Wilhelm von, 135, 136.

  London, recriminations from, 71;
    Kaiser visits, 102, 117, 128, 142;
    message to Bethmann from, 159;
    Bishop of, 264;
    favorite method, 311.

  Lonsdale, Earl Hugh Cecil Lowther, 233.

  Lotalingen, 68.

  Lucanus, Herman von, 24-25, 36.

  Lucas, Bernard, 215.

  Ludendorff, General Erich von, bridge named after, 180;
    cannot guarantee military victory, 273;
    demands preparations for armistice, 274.

  _Lusitania_, 75, 136.


  M

  Machine gun, 227, 279.

  Mackenzie, Sir Morell, 21.

  Madrid Convention, 111.

  Mainz, 178, 179.

  "Maison militaire," 22, 23.

  Man with the Hyena's eyes, The, 5.

  Maria Laach, abbey of, 217.

  Marienburg, 177.

  Market, world, 304, 305;
    money, 317.

  Marschall, Adolf von, 82, 83 n., 84, 96.

  Martin, Sir Theodore, 90.

  _Matin_, Paris, 109.

  Maubeuge, 257, 260.

  Max, Prince, Imperial Chancellor, 277, 278, 280, 281, 282, 285, 286,
          287, 288, 320, 321, 340.

  Maybach, Albert von, 176, 177.

  Meinecke, His Excellency, 188.

  Melissori troubles, 141.

  Memoirs, Bismarck's, 3, 4.

  Mensing, Admiral, 107.

  Mentality, English and German, 328-329.

  Merchant Marine, German, 48.

  Mercier, Cardinal, 264.

  Mesopotamia, 89.

  Metternich, Count Paul, 104.

  Mexico, 73.

  Michael, Grand Duke, 314.

  Michaelis, von, 37.

  Michell, Robert, 326.

  Militza, Grand Duchess, 252.

  Miquel, His Excellency Johanna, 30, 174, 189.

  Mirbach, Count William, 253.

  "Misunderstood Bismarck," 55.

  Modlin, 136.

  Mokpo, 67.

  Möller, Theodore von, 30, 194.

  Moltke, Count von, 6, 176, 226.

  Moltke, General von, 226, 248, 330.

  Monaco, Prince of, 109, 116.

  Montenegro, 142;
    king of, 252.

  Moore, John Bassett, Prof., 71.

  Morocco, Sultan of, 107;
    question, 107;
    negotiations concerning concluded, 111;
    Agreement, German-French, 126, 127;
    French actions in, 144-145;
    King George's views on, 145.

  Moscow, 253, 312, 313, 324.

  Most-Favored-Nation Clause No. 17, 111.

  Mountains, Taunus, 178, 181.

  Mudra, General Bruno von, 274.

  Muravieff, Count Michael, 66, 67.


  N

  Namur, 257.

  Narva, 18.

  National Liberals, 29, 31, 33, 194.

  Naval bill, German, 146, 147, 150, 151, 152, 155, 156, 157, 159, 160,
          163, 229, 231, 232, 233, 235, 236, 242.

  "Nation in Arms," 135, 276.

  Navy, Germany, 7, 8, 9, 11, 51-53, 55, 58, 81, 122, 156, 161,
          224-245, 289, 305, 320;
    English, 10, 105, 241, 247, 248, 305.

  Needles, The, 117.

  Netherlands, The, and mediation, 272-273.

  Nicholaievitch, Grand Duke Nicholas, 254, 255.

  Nicholas I, of Russia, 172, 193.

  Nicholas II, of Russia, 13, 19, 20, 61-62, 67, 79-80;
    visit to Potsdam, 141;
    meets the Kaiser at Baltisch-Port, 169-170, 191, 201, 249;
    "I shall stay at home this year, for we are going to have war," 207,
          249;
    summer plans, 249;
    hatred for England, 249;
    his perfidy toward Kaiser, 249;
    meets Poincaré, 252;
    Sazonoff suggests seizing Constantinople, 253;
    vacillation of, 312, 314, 315;
    Kaiser tries to influence, 313;
    drafts a letter to, 315;
    treaties with not endurable, 330.

  Niemann, Major, 285 n.

  Nisch, 137.


  O

  "Oberkommando," 239.

  Oberndorff, Count Alfred von, 286.

  Officer Corps, German, naval, 51, 52, 53, 112, 230;
    noncommissioned, 225, 230;
    army, 225, 226;
    French, 306;
    Russian, 206.

  Order of the Black Eagle, 13.

  Osten-Sacken, Count Nicholai, 315.

  "Our armies will meet in Berlin," 252.


  P

  Pacelli, Eugenio, Papal Nuncio, 263.

  Palace, Imperial, 338.

  Paléologue, M., 252.

  _Pan-Germanism_, 71 n.

  Pan-Germanism, 71 n., 72, 73.

  Parliament, British, 45, 106, 310.

  Payer, His Excellency Friedrich von, 280.

  Peace, offers, by Germany, 274;
    by the Pope, 263;
    by Austria, 273;
    negotiations, 295, 300.

  Perels, Privy Councilor Ferdinand, 66, 67.

  Peterhof, 67.

  "Petit Sucrier" trial, 21.

  Pfeil, Count Richard, 10.

  Philistinism, 187.

  "Piazza," 266, 267, 269, 270, 271.

  Pichon, Stephane, 130.

  Pinon, Château of, 261, 262.

  _Pocket Manual for the General Staff_, 226.

  Podbielski, Victor von, 189, 190, 193.

  Poincaré, President, 252, 257, 325.

  Poix, Princess of, 261, 262.

  Poland, stags in, 191;
    union of Galicia with, 258.

  Poles, strength of, 342.

  "Policy of encirclement," 45, 115, 126, 128, 155, 257, 307, 308, 323.

  Politics, intercourt, 12.

  Pomeranian Grenadiers, 49.

  Pope. _See_ Leo XIII.

  Popo, Gross and Klein, 7.

  Port Arthur, 67.

  Portsmouth, Peace of, 200.

  Posen, 176.

  Post-Bismarckians, 111.

  Potsdam, 248.

  Pound, English, 317.

  Powers, great, 303, 306, 309.

  Praschma, Count Frederick, 216.

  _Problem of Japan, The_, 71, 72, 73 n.

  Prussia, and Bavaria, 60;
    Prussian-Austrian frontier, 80;
    eastern frontier threatened by Russian forces, 105;
    conditions in olden days, 184;
    financial reform, 189;
    forestry, 190;
    Ministry of Prussian king, 194;
    Upper House, 197;
    Protestant churches, 213;
    kings, 223;
    East, 175, 176, 253.

  Przemysl, 136.

  Psychology, English national, 84.

  Pückler, Count Maximilian, 107.

  Puttkamer, Robert Victor von, 189.


  R

  Radolin, Prince Hugo, 109, 126.

  Raschdau, Privy Councilor, 11.

  Ratibor, Duke of, 46, 92.

  Reichstag, 45, 59, 84, 86, 95, 108, 111, 116, 118, 119, 120, 121, 125,
          134, 137, 161, 194, 228, 229, 230, 236, 243, 277, 285, 322,
          338.

  "Reichsverdrossenheit," 55.

  Reinsurance treaty, 54, 329.

  Reischach, Hugo, Freiherr, von, 262.

  Relations, Russo-Prussian, 14, 26.

  Renvers, Privy Councilor Rudolf, 116.

  Reparations, 318.

  Republic, French, 17 n.;
    German, 283.

  Reval, 126.

  "Revolution Chancellor," 280.

  Revolution, German, 213, 218, 224, 280, 284, 285, 286, 288, 289, 318,
          321, 338, 339;
    Russian, 253, 254, 284, 315.

  _Revue des Deux Mondes_, 252.

  Rhine, 178, 179, 217, 286, 290, 325, 326.

  Rhodes, Cecil, 87-89.

  Richter, Deputy Eugen, 228, 229, 236.

  Richthofen, Ferdinand, Freiherr von, 65, 100.

  Ripon, Bishop (Boyd-Carpenter, W.), 213.

  Roche, M. Jules, 116.

  Roman Catholic Church, interests, 34;
    Kaiser's relations with, 208-212;
    might of, 209;
    Germany must become sword of the, 211;
    elimination of the Pope and, 258;
    Kaiser's views of the power of, 263-270.

  Rominten, 190, 191.

  Roosevelt, President Theodore, 200.

  Rosebery, Lord Archibald Philip Primrose, 233.

  Roth, Arnold (Swiss ambassador), 39.

  Rouvier, Maurice, 109, 111.

  Rumania, Bismarck and, 8;
    campaign, 137;
    Queen of, indorses William of Wied for Albanian throne, 166.

  Russia, 8, 9, 10, 11, 14, 15, 20, 25, 28;
    reinsurance treaty with Germany, 54, 329;
    and France, 61;
    and Kiao-Chau, 65, 74;
    naval stations, 78;
    Tsar and Kaiser, 80;
    at Shimonoseki, 81;
    Russo-French proposal to Germany against England, 87, 91;
    Bülow and, 102;
    Chamberlain suggests alliance between England and Germany against,
          105, 310, 311;
    a menace to India and Constantinople, 105;
    France, Germany, and, in the Far East (Shimonoseki, 1895), 105;
    army, 105;
    Russo-Japanese War, 106, 200;
    Tsar Nicholas visits Potsdam, 141;
    railways, 179;
    Holy Synod, 193, 194;
    Portsmouth Treaty, 200;
    Björkö agreement, 201, 249;
    mobilization, 207, 247, 255;
    field kitchen, 227;
    Tsar's treachery toward Germany, 249;
    he meets Poincaré, 252;
    Sazonoff suggests seizing Constantinople, 253;
    Italy would break away from Austria and Germany, 253;
    France to be trusted absolutely, England probably, 253;
    evidence Russian Embassy prepared Bolshevist revolution in Germany,
          284;
    archives, 301;
    clamor for an outlet on the sea to southward, 306;
    in continual internal ferment, 307;
    possibility of foreign conflict, 307;
    enormous demand for loans, 307;
    French gold in, 307;
    and the French idea of revenge, 307;
    aim to overthrow Germany, 307;
    grouping of England, France, and, 309;
    traditional friendship between Germany and, 313;
    weakness of Nicholas II, 312;
    Grand Duke Michael visits Berlin, 314;
    unreliability of troops in Russo-Japanese War, 315;
    alliance between Germany and, 315;
    Anglo-Austrian victory over, 327.

  Russo-Prussian relations, 13.


  S

  Saalburg, 183.

  St. Cère, Jacques, 21.

  St. Petersburg, 13, 16, 25;
    Bülow at, 97, 192;
    Japanese military mission at, 252;
    Poincaré meets Tsar at, 252.

  Saint-Quentin, Cathedral of, 261.

  Samoan Islands, 89.

  San Stefano, Treaty of, 10, 14, 15;
    revanche pour, 18.

  Salisbury, Lord, 8, 55, 310.

  Sarajevo murders, 75.

  Sazonoff, 141, 252, 253, 255, 256, 257, 299.

  Scheidemann, Philip, 288.

  Schiemann, Professor Theodor, 107, 199-200, 201.

  Schlieffen, Count Alfred, 226.

  Schlutow, Privy Councilor Albert, 49, 50.

  Schnidrowitz, Herr, 21.

  Schmidt, Professor Erich, 199.

  Schmitz, Father Peter, 216.

  Schneller, Pastor Ludwig, 215.

  Schoen, Wilhelm, Freiherr von, 107, 126.

  Scholz, Finance Minister Adolf, 188.

  School reform, 186.

  Schorfheide, 190.

  Schorlemer, Burghard, Freiherr von, 33, 190.

  Schulenburg, Count Friedrich von, 286.

  Schulte, Doctor Joseph, 208.

  Science, German, 196-199.

  Seas, freedom of, 318.

  "Secret treaty" between England, America, and France, 72.

  "Sedan, Revanche pour," 18.

  Senden, Admiral Gustav von, 234.

  Serbia, 75;
    Austrian ultimatum to, 248;
    note to Austria, 248;
    Russian-Austrian conflict of influence in, 306.

  Seven Years' War, 121.

  Seydel, Herr (Celchen), 30.

  _Shall It Be Again?_ 75, 317.

  Shanghai, 78.

  Shantung, 65, 67, 68.

  Sherbatsheff, General, 251.

  Shimonoseki, 81, 105.

  Shuvaloff, Prince, 329.

  Siegfried line, 272.

  Sigmaringen, 216.

  Silesia, 176.

  Simar, Archbishop Hubert, 208.

  Simons, Walter, 297.

  Skagaraak (Jutland), 58, 161, 231, 242.

  Slaby, Professor Adolf, 196-197.

  Social Congress, Berlin, 39, 44.

  Social Democrats, 2, 21, 43, 122, 285, 286, 287, 339, 341.

  Socialist law, 35.

  Social problems, 40-50.

  Socialists, 35-36, 40-41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 90, 111, 114, 122, 268, 269,
          283.

  Society for the Rights of Man, 325.

  Society, Kaiser Wilhelm, 198, 199;
    German Orient, 203, 204, 218, 228.

  Solf, Wilhelm, 277, 278, 280.

  Somme, battle of, 137, 276.

  Source of Russian Enmity, 9.

  South African Republic, 83 n.

  Spa, 278, 279, 283, 288.

  Spain, 73, 326.

  Spala, 191, 192.

  Spartacus group, 284.

  Spithead, 248.

  Stephan, His Excellency Heinrich von, 171, 172, 173, 193.

  Sternburg, Speck von, Joseph, 190, 191.

  Stettin, 47, 49.

  Stöcker, Adolf, Court Preacher, 33.

  Stosch, Admiral Albrecht von, 47, 48.

  Strassburg, 17.

  Sukhomlinoff, Vladimir, 256.

  Surrender for trial, Kaiser's, 292-295.

  "Suum cuique" (Hohenzollern motto), 43.

  Switzerland, 39, 258, 262, 273.

  Sylva, Carmen, 166.

  Szittkohnen, 190.


  T

  Tangier, Kaiser at, 107;
    result of visit, 108-110, 200.

  Tanks, 276, 331, 334.

  Tardieu, 325.

  Theology, Kaiser's, 220.

  Thiel, Bishop, 208.

  Thielen, 177.

  Three-Emperor-Relationship, 330.

  Tientsin, 78.

  Tientsin-Peking line, 67.

  _Times_, London, 85.

  Tirpitz, Admiral von, at Friedrichsruh, 4, 65;
    and fleet, 122;
    called into consultation, 149, 150, 151, 153;
    takes part in negotiations, 153-155;
    and the naval bill, 156-159;
    succeeds Hollmann, 229;
    and naval program, 232, 233, 235, 236, 237;
    and the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal, 238, 239;
    and the dreadnaught, 240, 241;
    and the U-boat, 242;
    and Tsing-tao, 243;
    his temperament, 244;
    Bethmann demands his dismissal, 244.

  Togo, 7, 56.

  Torpedo boat, 237.

  Trafalgar, 231.

  Treaties, Berlin, 10, 11, 14;
    Yangtse, 94;
    Shimonoseki, 105;
    Portsmouth, 200;
    Versailles, 294, 296, 318, 322, 331, 333, 334, 335, 342;
    Bucharest, 335;
    Brest-Litovsk, 335.

  "Trente et quarante," 23.

  Tribunal, enemy, and the neutral tribunal, 292.

  Trott, von, 183, 198.

  Tsaritsin, 254.

  Tsarskoe Selo, 252.

  Tschirschky, Herr von, 103.

  Tsing-tao, 64;
    development of, 77, 94, 243.

  Tundutoff, Prince, 254.

  Turkey, questions relating to the Mediterranean and, 14;
    Bismarck and, 28;
    Kaiser's policy, 28;
    German relations with strengthened, 90;
    his dealings with, 96;
    and Albanians, 142, 164;
    Kaiser's influence on, 203.

  Turner, John Kenneth, 75, 317, 318.


  U

  U-boat warfare, 75.

  Ujest, Duke of, 46.

  Ultra-Montane party, 208.

  Ultra-Socialists, 30, 45.

  "Unbeaten on land and sea," 276.

  Understanding, Russian-English, 9;
    Anglo-French, 146.

  United States, and England and France, 71 n., 72-74, 75;
    Russian archives made public in, 301;
    attitude in the war, 308;
    "gentlemen's agreement" assures standing beside England and France
          in World War, 316;
    did not belong to Entente Cordiale, 316;
    did not contribute toward bringing on World War, 316;
    Germany's unfriendly answer to President Wilson, 316;
    effect of entering the war, 316;
    her right to choose, 316;
    President Wilson's reasons fictitious, 317;
    Wall Street's influence, 316;
    great financial profit, 317;
    Germany protests against America's violation of the right, 317;
    denial of Wilson's Fourteen Points, 318;
    misled by English propaganda, 318;
    Wilson's unprecedented powers, 318;
    American women, 318, 319;
    Germany evacuated enemy territory and surrendered her weapons on
          Wilson's guaranty, 318;
    Kaiser accuses Wilson of wronging Germany, 319;
    counts on American people righting the wrong, 319;
    unreliability of Americans, 320;
    national egotism, 320;
    Wilson not the American people, 322.

  "Unser König absolut, wenn er unseren Willen tut," 113.

  Usher, Roland G., 71, 72.


  V

  Valenciennes, 260.

  Valentini, Rudolf von, 136.

  Varnbuhler, Ambassador Axel von, 107.

  Vatican, The, 89, 209, 264, 265, 266, 267, 269.

  Vendetta, 163, 164.

  "Verbal note," 147-156, 159.

  Vercingetorix, 294, 295.

  Versailles, 294, 296, 318, 322, 331, 333, 334, 335, 342.

  Versen, General Maximilian von, 23.

  "Viceroy of Christ upon earth," 270.

  Victor Emmanuel, King, 216.

  Victoria, Queen, of England, 24, 26, 35, 69, 85, 87, 90, 91, 102, 213,
          238.

  Vienna, 273.

  _Vindication of Great Britain_, 161.

  Vulcan Shipyard, 47-50.


  W

  "Waffenstreckung," difference between, and "Waffenstillstand," 277.

  Waldersee, Count von, 93, 226.

  Wales, Prince of (Edward), 87, 102.

  Wallace, Sir D. Mackenzie, 115.

  Wall Street, 317.

  _War and Revolution_, 285 n.

  War Academy, St. Petersburg, 251.

  War guilt, the question of, 291, 296, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 322,
          325, 327, 331, 333, 342.

  War, Russo-Turkish, 10;
    World, 18, 57, 72, 74, 81, 161, 162, 186, 207, 227, 255, 257, 260,
          295, 299, 301, 303, 312, 316, 317, 322, 325, 327, 331, 333;
    of 1870, 60;
    Russo-Japanese, 79, 106, 200, 201, 249, 299;
    Boer, 83, 86, 90, 91, 92, 118 n., 223, 234, 299, 324;
    Boxer, 93;
    Seven Years', 121;
    English declaration of, 134;
    Balkan, 164;
    causes of the World, 304;
    of 1914 a consequence of the War of 1870, 325;
    civil, in Germany, 286, 288-289, 294, 298, 320.

  Warsaw, 136.

  "Welfare work" at the German Court, 45.

  Werner, Admiral Reinhold, 184.

  Westphalian coal strike, 36-37.

  "White Drawing Room," 172.

  "White men together against colored men," 79.

  Wied, Prince William of, and the Albanian throne, 165-169;
    selects an English and an Italian secretary, 167.

  Wiesbaden, 178, 179, 180, 181.

  Wilhelmshafen, 87, 248.

  Wilhelmstrasse, 249.

  William I, 176, 326.

  William the Great, 8, 14, 16, 22, 25, 39, 40, 63, 176, 201.

  Wilmowski, His Excellency von, 25.

  Wilpert, Monsignor, 218.

  Wilson, President, against Germany in 1915, 75;
    notes to by Germany, 277;
    armistice note of, 278;
    unfriendly answer of, 316;
    unprecedented powers, 318;
    his Fourteen Points, 318;
    and the English blockade, 318;
    double dealing, 319;
    unreliability of, 319;
    gigantic wrong done Germany, 319;
    trapped by Lloyd George and Clemenceau, 319;
    flagrant breach of faith, 320;
    first to demand withdrawal of reigning dynasty, 320;
    Kaiser convinced reasons were good, 320;
    President's heavy guilt, 321.

  Windthorst, Ludwig, 33.

  Winterfeldt, General Henry von, 286.

  Wittenberg, Schloss Church at, 214.

  Wittich, General Adolf von, 23.

  Witu, 55.

  Wolter, Archabbot, 216.

  Women, American, 318, 319.

  World, Anglo-Saxon, 308.

  Worthley, General Stewart, 117.

  Württemberg, 153.


  Y

  Yacht Club, Imperial, 46.

  Yangtse Treaty, 94.

  "Yellow peril," 79, 80, 81.

  "You will take back Alsace-Lorraine," 252.


  Z

  Zanzibar, 55, 56.

  Zedlitz, Count, 58.




       *       *       *       *       *




Transcriber's note:

Apparent punctuation errors were corrected and inconsistencies
were made consistent.

Footnotes have been moved to ends of chapters; index entries may refer
to footnotes' original page numbers.

Alternate spellings "Skagerrak," "Skager-Rak," and "Skagaraak" retained
as in the original text.

Alternate spellings "Wilhelmshafen" and "Wilhelmshaven" retained as in
the original text.

Alternate spellings "Wilhelm" and "William" retained as in the original
text.

Page 17: "vout" changed to "veut" (elle veut sa revanche)

Page 18: "ou" changed to "où," as in the original German version (Le
moment où il réfusait)

Page 18: "at" changed to "et," as in the original German version (et je
ne lui ai jamais)

Page 18: "sur" changed to "sûr," as in the original German version (car
j'étais sûr)

Page 19: "confidance" changed to "confiance," as in the original German
version (J'ai confiance en toi.)

Page 19: "even" changed to "event" (In any event, the Tsar)

Page 21: "compaign" changed to "campaign" (organized campaign of
slander)

Page 23: "chip of the old block" retained instead of more common "chip
off the old block;" non-literal translation from the German "Schrot und
Korn"

Page 30: "Moeller" changed to "Möller" (was the Liberal, Möller)

Page 33: "Stocker" changed to "Stöcker" (Court Preacher Stöcker)

Page 39: "Neverthless" changed to "Nevertheless" (Nevertheless, it
stood to reason)

Page 70: "Kaio-Chau" changed to "Kiao-Chau" (The occupation of
Kiao-Chau aroused surprise)

Page 94: "Yangste" changed to "Yangtse" (and the Yangtse Treaty)

Page 103: "through out" changed to "throughout" (effect throughout the
country)

Page 117: "Eulenberg" changed to "Eulenburg" (Count Eulenburg and
Prince)

Page 129: "medieval" changed to "mediæval" (marvelous mediæval setting)

Page 144: "medieval" changed to "mediæval" (well-nigh mediæval
magnificence)

Page 172: "Inne" changed to "Ihne" (provided by Building Councilor Ihne)

Page 188: "ofter" changed to "often" (I have often pointed out)

Page 188: apparent printer's error retained: second instance of "I
have often pointed out how unfortunate it was" incorrectly overwrites
another line. Original German version of the overwritten sentence reads
"Beim Finanzminister v. Scholz hatte ich als Prinz einige Zeit
hospitiert und an Sitzungen teilgenommen, bei denen die berühmte
Erzellenz Meinecke eine Rolle spielte."

Page 201: "Bjökö" changed to "Björkö" (despite the Björkö Agreement)

Page 202: "a" changed to "à," as in the original German version (à peu
près style)

Page 204: "Hülsen-Haesler" changed to "Hülsen-Haeseler" (theater
director, Count Hülsen-Haeseler)

Page 210: "Loe" changed to "Loë" (von Loë, for many years)

Page 219: "Hollman" changed to "Hollmann," as in the original German
version (to you, my dear Hollmann)

Page 224: "unforgetable" changed to "unforgettable" (are unforgettable
to me)

Page 225: "non-commissioned" changed to "noncommissioned" to match all
other instances (corps of noncommissioned officers)

Page 253: "9." changed to "8." since original text skips "8." (8.
Russian prisoners belonging)

Page 254: "10." changed to "9." since original text skips "8." (10. In a
report)

Page 254: "11." changed to "10." since original text skips "8." (11.
Prince Tundutoff)

Page 256: "(12)" changed to "11." since original text skips "8." and to
make number formatting consistent (11. When our troops advanced)

Page 268: "wordly" changed to "worldly" (by purely worldly
considerations)

Page 274: "unfavorble" changed to "unfavorable" (the unfavorable
influence exerted)

Page 277: "were" changed to "where" (should stay where it was)

Page 288: "Aix-le-Chapelle" changed to "Aix-la-Chapelle" (advance from
Aix-la-Chapelle)

Page 299: "German's" changed to "Germany's" (Germany's foreign policy)

Page 315: "vascillating" changed to "vacillating" to match other
instances (the Tsar was vacillating)

Page 345: "Bjökö" changed to "Björkö" (Björkö agreement, 201, 249, 315.)

Page 345: index entry for "Boyd-Carpenter, W., Bishop of Ripon" moved
from end of "B" section to correct alphabetic position

Page 346: "Dahn" changed to "Duhn" (Duhn, Professor, 206.); index entry
for "Duhn, Professor" moved to correct alphabetic position

Page 346: "Deldrück" changed to "Delbrück" (Delbrück, Klemens von, 282.)

Page 347: "Donaneschingen" changed to "Donaueschingen" (Donaueschingen,
119.)

Page 347: "Eckartsan" changed to "Eckartsau" (Eckartsau, 119.)

Page 347: "Einen" changed to "Einem" (Einem, General von, 151, 161.)

Page 348: "Eugenie" changed to "Eugénie" (Eugénie, Empress, 312.)

Page 353: "Weid" changed to "Wied" (plots against William of Wied, 167;)

Page 355: "Eckartsan" changed to "Eckartsau" (visits Eckartsau and
Donaueschingen, 119;)

Page 355: "Acheans" changed to "Achæans" (Assyriology and the Achæans,
203-207;)

Page 355: "Drysander's" changed to "Dryander's" (Doctor Dryander's
influence over, 214;)

Page 357: "Lengemark" changed to "Langemark" (Langemark, 187.); index
entry for "Langemark" moved to correct alphabetic position

Page 358: "Marienbad" changed to "Marienburg" (Marienburg, 177.)

Page 360: "Reichach" changed to "Reischach" (Reischach, Hugo, Freiherr,
von, 262.)

Page 361: "Rotte" changed to "Roth" (Roth, Arnold (Swiss ambassador),
39.)

Page 361: "Weid" changed to "Wied" (Queen of, indorses William of Wied
for Albanian throne, 166.)

Page 361: "Bjökö" changed to "Björkö" (Björkö agreement, 201, 249;)

Page 362: "Freidrich" changed to "Friedrich" (Schulenburg, Count
Friedrich von, 286.)

Page 364: "Valentine" changed to "Valentini" (Valentini, Rudolf von,
136.)

Page 365: "Weid" changed to "Wied" (Wied, Prince William of); index
entry for "Weid, Prince William of" moved to correct alphabetic position

Page 365: "Wilmonski" changed to "Wilmowski" (Wilmowski, His Excellency
von, 25.)