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TWO CHANCELLORS:

Prince Gortchakof and Prince Bismarck.

by

JULIAN KLACZKO.

Translated from the Revue des Deux Mondes by
Frank P. Ward.







[Illustration]

New York:
Published by Hurd and Houghton.
Cambridge: The Riverside Press.
1876.

Copyright,
by Frank P. Ward.
1876.

Riverside, Cambridge:
Stereotyped and Printed by
H. O. Houghton and Company.




TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.


In the year 1866 Carlyle said: "The only man appointed by God to be His
viceregent here on earth in these days, and knowing he was so appointed
and bent with his whole soul on doing, and able to do God's work," is M.
de Bismarck. If this be true, then M. de Bismarck has found a most
valuable ally and colleague in the present Premier of Russia. It is of
these two men, Prince Bismarck, and Prince Gortchakof, the Chancellor of
Germany, and the Chancellor of all the Russias, that this book treats.
The author is M. Julian Klaczko, a Polish refugee, a man of cosmopolitan
habits, an accomplished and able writer, thoroughly acquainted with the
contemporaneous history of Europe, prejudiced against Prussia, an ardent
friend of Austria, and devoted to a conservative and monarchical form of
government. He was always the friend of Poland. In 1863 he defended
Denmark in a series of able papers, which came out in the "Revue des
deux Mondes," under the title of "Studies of Contemporaneous Diplomacy."
After the battle of Sadowa, he appeared as the friend of Austria in a
work entitled, "The Preliminaries of Sadowa." Count de Beust summoned
him to Vienna, and attached him to the Foreign Office. Klaczko was then
elected Deputy in the Polish province of Galicia. After 1870 he resigned
his posts and returned to France.

In the "Two Chancellors" he has given a condensed but graphic review of
the diplomatic history of Europe from 1855 to 1871, and a sketch of the
lives of Prince Bismarck and Prince Gortchakof, the two most eminent men
of the day. He also seeks to prove that the "disaster" of Sadowa,
followed by the still greater one of Sedan, was brought about by the
blind devotion of Prince Gortchakof to Prince Bismarck, aided largely,
it is true, by the "inconceivable vacillations and hallucinations of
Napoleon III., the Dreamer of Ham." In a word, he seeks to establish
that the prodigious events of the last ten years are due to a conspiracy
between Russia and Prussia. This is a one-sided, partial view, but is
presented with such power as will almost persuade the reader that such
may have been the case. According to Klaczko's theories, Prussia has
grasped the substance and Russia the shadow, and the old chancellor of
the great empire of the North has been the dupe of his pupil of Berlin.

The great changes which will undoubtedly soon take place in the East,
make M. Klaczko's views as to the past and present relations between
Germany and Russia of marked interest, and the student of
contemporaneous history will find in the "Two Chancellors,"
notwithstanding the peculiar views and strong prejudices of the writer,
one of the most instructive as well as interesting works that have
appeared for many years. It has been issued in book form in Paris, and
widely circulated in Russia, where it has caused a profound sensation.

In the translation I have endeavored to reproduce as justly as possible
the words of M. Klaczko, whose style, though strong and forcible, is at
times somewhat involved. With these few words in regard to the
importance of the subject and the character of the author, I leave to
the judgment of the reader the account of the momentous events which may
be truly said to have changed the political face of Europe.




CONTENTS.


                                                            PAGE
    I.

    THE MISSIONS OF PRINCE GORTCHAKOF AND THE DÉBUTS
    OF M. DE BISMARCK                                          1


    II.

    A NATIONAL MINISTER AND A FAULT-FINDING DIPLOMAT
    AT ST. PETERSBURG                                         75


    III.

    UNITED ACTION                                            122


    IV.

    THE ECLIPSE OF EUROPE                                    188


    V.

    ORIENT AND OCCIDENT                                      227


    VI.

    TEN YEARS OF ASSOCIATION                                 287


    APPENDIX                                                 311




TWO CHANCELLORS.




I.

THE MISSIONS OF PRINCE GORTCHAKOF AND THE DÉBUTS OF M. DE BISMARCK.


The good old Plutarch, in commencing his long and charming series of
Parallels with the account of the lives of Theseus and Romulus,
experiences some difficulty in justifying such an association of the two
heroes; he can find in them only very vague traits of resemblance, and
these by no means striking. "To strength they both joined great powers
of mind, both carried off women by violence, and the one as well as the
other was not exempted from domestic miseries; indeed, toward the end of
their lives they both aroused the hatred of their fellow-citizens."[1]
Without doubt a writer of our day, wishing to give a comparative study
of the two most prominent figures of contemporaneous politics, the
chancellors of Russia and Germany, would only mislead in giving
prominence to such points of resemblance. The association in this case
is justifiable, for it suggests itself to every contemplative mind, to
whoever has meditated on the events of the last fifteen or twenty years.
The modern Plutarch who would undertake to write the lives of these two
illustrious men, could, as it seems to us, easily resist the temptation
of searching too deeply for, or forcing analogies in a subject where
similarities abound and are so striking. Perhaps he would rather have to
guard against necessary and tiresome repetitions in presence of a
commonalty of ideas and of a harmony of action such as history has
rarely known in two ministers guiding two different empires.

It is not, the reader may be well assured, a work of this sort which the
author has undertaken in the following pages. We have only given the
mere sketch of a picture which, to be even in a slight degree full and
satisfactory, would have required much larger proportions, and above all
a much more skillful hand. Without pretending to present here new and
unpublished materials, or indeed to reunite all those which are already
known, we have simply chosen a few, and tried to assort and arrange them
so as to afford a better perspective. We have been obliged to renounce
the wish to give to the different parts an equality of design and depth
of coloring, and we have not even bound ourselves to follow a very
regular and methodical course in this narration. Before a subject so
vast and presenting so many shades and shadows, we have thought that it
was permissible, that it was indeed occasionally useful, to vary the
points of observation and to present it in different aspects.


I.

Like the Odoïefski, the Obolenski, the Dolgorouki, and many aristocratic
families on the banks of the Moscova and the Neva, the Gortchakof also
pride themselves on their descent from the Rourik; to speak more
plainly, they claim to trace their origin from one of the sons of
Michael, Grand Duke of Tchernigof, put to death towards the middle of
the thirteenth century by the Mongolians of Batou Khan, since proclaimed
martyr of the faith, exalted, indeed, among the saints of the Orthodox
Church. One meets, nevertheless, with but few illustrious bearers of the
name of Gortchakof in the gloomy and exciting annals of old Russia. In
the epoch which preceded the accession of the Romanof, there lived a
certain Peter Ivanovitch Gortchakof, the unfortunate commander of
Smolenski, who surrendered this celebrated place to the Poles after two
years of energetic and desperate resistance. He was taken to Warsaw, and
there, in 1611, with the Czar Vassili, the two princes Schouyski,
Sèhine, and a number of powerful _boiars_, he was forced to take part in
the famous "_cortége_ of captives" which the grand constable Zolkiweski
presented one day--_honorificentissime_, says the chronicle of the
times--to the king and the senate of the most serene republic. It was
only in the second half of the last century, under the reign of
Catherine II., that a Prince Ivan Gortchakof succeeded (thanks
especially to his marriage with a sister of the opulent and courageous
Souvorof) in again raising the glory of his old house, which has never
since ceased to distinguish itself in the different branches of state
service, principally in the career of arms. The France of to-day has
preserved the memory of two Princes Gortchakof, two old soldiers of
Borodino who distinguished themselves during the war of the Orient. The
one commanded the left wing of the Russian troops at the battles of
Alma and Inkermann; the other, Prince Michael, was the generalissimo of
the armies of the czar in the Crimea, and rendered his name imperishable
by the heroic defense of Sebastopol. Afterwards he governed the Kingdom
of Poland as lieutenant of the emperor, and became therefore (strange
example of the vicissitudes of history!) the supreme representative of a
harsh, foreign government in this same city of Warsaw, where one of his
ancestors had formerly figured in a memorable procession of the
vanquished. However, if this circumstance ever occurred to Prince
Michael, he drew therefrom none but suggestions worthy of his character;
he governed the conquered country with moderation and benevolence, and
left behind him the fame of a man as just in civil administration as he
was intrepid in war.

The cousin of Prince Michael and present chancellor of the empire,
Alexander Mikhaïlovitch Gortchakof, was born in 1798, and was educated
in that lyceum of Zarkoe-Zeloe which has its distinct place in the
pedagogic history of Russia. Founded by Catherine II. as a model
educational establishment for the aristocratic youth of the empire, the
lyceum shone with great _éclat_ under the reign of Alexander I.,
although the Rollin and the Pestalozzi would certainly have had more
than one reservation to make with respect to a college which only
moulded its scholars for the world, and thought the vigorous classical
studies a burden too heavy to carry into the ethereal spheres of
pleasures and elegance. Almost all the professors of the establishment
were foreigners, men marked with the stamp of the eighteenth century,
acute minds, slightly frivolous, and above all disciples of Voltaire.
The most eminent among them, the professor of French literature, he who
initiated the future chancellor into the language of Voltaire, of which
he so well knew the subtleties, was a Genevese, who, under the
inoffensive name of M. de Boudry, concealed another of a terrible
significance. M. de Boudry was the brother of Marat, that "_sinistre
conventionnel_."[2] The Empress Catherine, in order "to end a scandal,"
had forced this patronymic change on M. Marat, without, however,
succeeding in making him change his opinions, which always remained
"Jacobin." He died in final impenitence, cherishing an openly avowed
admiration for _the friend of the people_, unjustly calumniated. From
this education of very doubtful value, the young Gortchakof succeeded in
extracting a strong and useful substance. He left Zarkoe-Zeloe with
various and solid acquirements; a surprising matter, he was even a good
Latinist, and this last fact has remained a cause of amazement to his
fellow-scholars as well as to the generations who followed. It is
certain, however, that the chancellor could quote Horace with about the
same appropriateness as Louis XVIII. of sainted memory. One of his best
known dispatches ingeniously borrows from Suetonius an eloquent passage
on the distinction to be established between liberty and anarchy.

Next to his classical attainments, that part of his youth which the
chancellor loves especially to recall is that he was the fellow-scholar,
and that he remained the friend, of the great national poet, Pouchkine,
a fact more to his honor inasmuch as this friendship has brought with
it embarrassments at certain times. When, by the order of the Emperor
Alexander I., in consequence of an offensive ode, which one is not now
known, the young singer of "Rouslan" and "Loudmila" was confined in an
obscure village in the far interior of Russia, only two of his former
comrades at the lyceum had the courage to go to see and offer him their
condolence, and one of these intrepid youths was Prince Gortchakof. One
finds in the work of Pouchkine some verses written in a lively and
playful style, and which only derive their interest from the name of
Alexander Mikhaïlovitch, to whom they are addressed. In one of these
juvenile pieces, Pouchkine wishes his friend "to have Cupid as an
inseparable companion as far as the banks of the Styx, and to go to
sleep on the bosom of Helen in the very boat of Charon." Thoughtless
wishes, which human malignity would surely not have failed to carry out
in the end, if very fortunately the chancellor had not been able to
preserve his old days from every deceitful seduction, and to avoid even
the appearance of an arctic Ruy Gomez. The inspiration of the poet was
happier another time, when, speaking of their different vocations, he
predicts for Alexander Mikhaïlovitch a splendid destiny, and calls him
"the beloved child of fortune."

Fortune was nevertheless slow to recognize its child, and to give him
the lot which he merited. Having early entered the department of foreign
affairs, being attached to the _suite_ of M. de Nesselrode at the time
of the Congresses of Laybach and Verona, Prince Gortchakof had already
long passed that period which Dante calls the _mezzo del cammin di
vita_; and even when very near his fiftieth year, was still only a
minister plenipotentiary at a little court in Germany. A fortunate event
at last came to commend him to the kindness of his master, and to render
him distinguished in those diplomatic circles, in those regions "free
from tears, but filled with sighs," which in the language of diplomacy
are called the secondary posts.

In a moment of paternal weakness, the Emperor Nicholas had one day
consented to the union of his daughter, the Grand Duchess Marie, with
the Duke of Leuchtenberg, "the son of a Beauharnais, a Catholic officer
in the service of the King of Bavaria," as was whispered with sadness in
the intimate circles of the winter palace. Nicholas was not the man to
retract his given word, but not the less did he feel the sting of what
his surrounding court did not cease to call a _mésalliance_; and the
bitterness increased when none of the foreign members of the imperial
family came to take part in the brilliant festivities which preceded or
followed the nuptial ceremony. Ill-luck would have it that soon
afterwards a first cousin of the new imperial son-in-law and daughter of
the ex-King Jerome married a Russian grown rich in trade, a prince in
the valley of the Arno but scarcely a gentleman on the banks of the
Neva,--a disagreeable accident, and which, according to the amazed
courtiers, made the autocrat of all the Russias _the relation of one of
his subjects_! It became necessary to efface all these unpleasant
impressions, and to take, by a brilliant alliance, an incontestable
revenge for so many vexations. It was hoped for a moment to be able to
marry the Grand Duchess Alexandra to an arch-duke of Austria, but it was
necessary to fall back on a prince of Darmstadt; for the Grand Duchess
Olga, the most beautiful and the most beloved of the emperor's
daughters, had been chosen by the only prince royal then unengaged, the
presumptive heir to the throne of Würtemberg, of the old and illustrious
house of Suabia.

The plan was not easily executed. The good Suabian people had little
liking for it. A Russian marriage made it tremble for its constitutional
liberties; and what was a graver matter, the old King William of
Würtemberg, a good, liberal sovereign, but obstinate in all things,
showed himself rather reluctant, and at his own pleasure retarded the
negotiation. Other objections came from other sides still; but the
Russian minister plenipotentiary at Stuttgart, the old fellow-scholar of
Pouchkine, knew how to overcome them all with consummate skill. By aid
of art and address, he was able to establish the Grand Duchess Olga in
the royal family of Würtemberg. The joy of the Emperor Nicholas was
great and unreserved, and the winter palace sang the panegyrics of the
wonderful diplomat. After such a success, Prince Gortchakof could well
demand to be promoted in his career, having approached nearer by several
strides towards that embassy of Vienna which was considered as the
supreme goal of ambition. He did nothing of this sort, however, and
showed an admirable patience,--the patience of the patriarch Jacob with
Laban, son of Nahor. To the four years which he had already passed at
Stuttgart, Alexander Mikhaïlovitch declared himself ready to add another
term more prolonged if it were necessary. He promised the empress-mother
to remain indefinitely by the side of the Grand Duchess Olga, to aid her
as a guide and counselor in a foreign country and in the midst of
surroundings entirely new to her. Barren as the soil might be, he did
not despair of growing there under this ray of beauty and of grace,
which came directly from the great boreal sun; and in truth he kept this
post at Stuttgart for eight more long years. _Tenues grandia conamur!_

However, any point of observation is good for one who understands how to
adjust his glass and question the stars. The resident minister at
Stuttgart had extensive information and found means of informing his
government of many things quite outside the limits of the horizon of the
little kingdom of Würtemberg. Soon the year 1848 came with its terrible
catastrophes, with its great revolutionary earthquakes which added to
the experience of the most experienced, which lightened with a sudden
glimmer the ignorant depths of human nature, and, in the words of
Milton, lightened the darkness. Such a lesson of history was not without
profit, one can well believe, to the former scholar of Zarkoe-Zeloe. The
_salons_ and the cabinets for a long time had had no secrets from him;
he now knew those of the forum and of the cross-roads. The vicinity of
Frankfort, seat of the famous parliament, permitted him to study closely
and fully the German agitation of this memorable epoch; he understood
beforehand the phases, by turns _naïve_, burlesque, and odious, and was
able to predict in good time the unfailing miscarriage of a revolution,
the subdued billows of which foamed for a day even in the streets of
Stuttgart, ordinarily so peaceful.

It was in the month of April, 1849. Preceding by twenty years the great
work of 1870, the parliament of Frankfort had just formed a German
Empire to the exclusion of Austria, and offered the crown to the King of
Prussia, Frederick William IV. The King of Prussia hesitated, and ended
by declining; the other German princes were still less willing to assent
to a decree which implied their abdication; but this was by no means the
plan of the German demagogy. It suddenly fell enthusiastically in love
with this constitution, which on the very eve before it had denounced as
reactionary, fatal to the liberties of the people, and designed to
impose by force the Prussian vassalage decreed at Frankfort on different
sovereigns of Germany. In Würtemberg, the chamber of deputies voted a
pressing, imperious address in order to draw from the king the
recognition of the Emperor Frederick William IV. The monarch replied by
a refusal. The riot thundered on the public square, and the members of
the court were forced to seek refuge at Ludwigsburg, fleeing from an
enraged capital. "I will not submit to the House of Hohenzollern," the
old King William of Würtemberg had said to the deputation of the
chamber. "I owe it to my people and to myself. It is not for myself that
I speak thus; I have but very few years to live. My duty to my country,
my House, my family, forces this course of action on me." Alexander
Mikhaïlovitch, touched by these agitating scenes, by this pathetic
protestation of the father-in-law of Olga, "for the House, for the
family of Würtemberg," assuredly had then but little expectation that
one day, as Chancellor of the Russian Empire, he would become the most
useful auxiliary, the firmest aid of an aggressive, audacious policy,
destined to realize in every particular the plan of the rioters of
Stuttgart, and to make Queen Olga the vassal of Hohenzollern.

This was, however, nothing but the noisy prologue of a drama yet far
distant, and the year 1850 could indeed rejoice at seeing disappear in
Germany the very last traces of an agitation which had done nothing but
astonish Europe, instead of illuminating and warning it. Towards the end
of this year, 1850, the German Confederacy was established anew under
the terms of the ancient treaty of Vienna. The _Bundestag_ again
commenced its peaceable deliberations, and Prince Gortchakof was quite
naturally appointed to represent the Russian Government at the Diet of
Frankfort. Alexander Mikhaïlovitch henceforth had his marked place in a
great centre of political affairs, where the personal merit of the
minister borrowed a peculiar _éclat_ from the extraordinary fortune
which the latest events had created for his august master. Russian
influence, at all times very considerable with the ruling houses of
Germany, had grown prodigiously, having reached its zenith, one will
remember, after the disorders of February. Alone remaining sheltered
from the revolutionary tempest which had swept over almost all the
States of the Continent, the empire of the czars appeared to be at that
time the firmest stronghold of the principles of order and conservatism.
"Humiliate yourselves, nations, God is with us!" said the Emperor
Nicholas in a celebrated proclamation; and without being too much
offended at language which made God in a manner the accessory to a great
human boast, monarchical Europe had only acclamations for a prince who,
after all, worked with a remarkable disinterestedness for the
reëstablishment of the legitimate authorities, and for the maintenance
of the equilibrium of the world.

In fact, it is just to acknowledge that in these troubled years of
1848-50, the autocrat of the North used his influence, as also his
sword, only to strengthen the tottering thrones and to enforce respect
for the treaties. He effectively protected Denmark, towards which from
this epoch the rapacious hand of Germany was stretched, and he was the
most ardent in calling a meeting of the Powers, which ended by snatching
from the Germans the coveted prey. He interposed directly in Hungary,
and with his military forces helped put down a formidable insurrection
there, which had shaken to its foundations the ancient empire of
Hapsburg, undermined at the same time by intestine troubles and an
aggressive war which the kingdom of Piedmont had twice stirred up
against it. Little favoring by his principles and interests this united
Germany, "of which the first thought was a thought of unjust extension,
the first cry a cry of war,"[3] he later used all his power in bringing
about the reëstablishment pure and simple, of the German Confederation
on the same basis as prior to 1848. The bonds of relationship and of
friendship which united him to the court of Berlin were never strong
enough to make him abandon for a single instant the cause of the
sovereignty of princes, and of the independence of the States; and in
spite of the sincere affection which he bore "his brother-in-law, the
poet," he neither spared the King of Prussia, Frederick William IV., the
evacuation of the Duchies, nor the hard conditions of Olmütz. Defender
of European right on the Eider and the Main, of monarchical right on the
Theiss and Danube, peacemaker for Germany, and, so to say, wholesale
dealer in justice for Europe, Nicholas had at this moment a true
greatness, an immense _prestige_, well merited on the whole, and which
allowed no reflection on the agents charged with representing away from
home a policy of which no one dared contest the immovable firmness and
the perfect justice.

The Emperor Nicholas, in accrediting Prince Gortchakof to the German
Confederation, in an autograph letter dated 11th November, 1850,
recognized in the reunion of the Diet of Frankfort "a pledge for the
maintenance of the general peace," and thus characterized by an able and
judicious act, the honorable and salutary mission of this Diet in
ordering matters created by the treaties of 1815. However legitimate the
grievances of the liberal Germans were against the internal policy of
the _Bund_[4] and its tendencies, little favorable to the development
of the constitutional _régime_, yet one cannot deny that, according to
the European point of view, and with regard to the equilibrium and the
general peace of the world, this was a marvelous conception, well fitted
to preserve the independence of the States and to hinder any deep
perturbation in the bosom of the Christian family. The chimerical and
mercantile minds of the times, the leading men of Manchester and the
rich publicists, with at least "one idea a day," imagined that this was
the moment to declare "war to war," to force a universal disarmament, to
abolish military slavery; and to this effect they convoked noisy
congresses of peace in different parts of the world. They had, indeed,
in a day of _naïveté_, convoked one at Frankfort, without suspecting
that by their side, and in this very _Bundestag_ of such modest
appearance, had sat for a long time a true and permanent congress of
peace,--a congress which would do as much good as possible, and which,
moreover, would have the advantage of not being ridiculous.

Placed in the very centre of Europe, separating by its large and
immovable body the great military powers which form the border, so to
speak, of our old continent,--a power neutral by necessity and almost by
law over those great plains, where in former times the destinies of
empires were decided,--the German Confederation formed an _ensemble_ of
States sufficiently coherent and compact to repulse any shock from
abroad, yet not strong enough to become aggressive itself and to menace
the security of its neighbors. Many years later, and when chancellor of
the empire, Prince Gortchakof, in a celebrated circular, rendered homage
to this beneficial combination of the _Bund_, "a combination purely and
exclusively defensive," which permitted the localization of a war,
become inevitable, "instead of generalizing it and of giving to the
struggle a character and proportions beyond all human calculation, and
which in any case would pile up ruins and cause torrents of blood to
flow."[5]

In truth, if in this long half century which intervened between the
Congress of Vienna and the ill-omened battle of Sadowa, the frontiers of
the States have changed so little in spite of so many and so great
changes in their political complexion; if the revolution of July, the
campaign of Belgium, and even the wars of the Crimea and Italy have been
carried on without noticeably disturbing the balance of the nations, or
injuring them in their independence, we are specially indebted to this
_Bundestag_ so unappreciated, which by its very existence, by its
position, and the wheelwork of its completed mechanism, prevented any
conflict from becoming a general conflagration. It is doubtful whether
the cause of humanity and civilization, or the very cause which the
chancellor of Russia more specially represents with such facility and
_éclat_, have gained in any considerable degree in seeing this old
"combination" replaced in our time by another, more simple, it is true,
but, perhaps, also much less calculated to restore confidence.

While acquitting himself zealously of the duties of his office in
connection with the Germanic Confederation, Alexander Mikhaïlovitch
continued to occupy the post of minister plenipotentiary at Stuttgart.
He held it to be a matter of honor to fulfill to the end his
confidential and intimate mission by the side of the Grand Duchess Olga.
He divided his time between the free city on the Main, the seat of the
_Bund_, and the little capital on the banks of the Neckar, where a warm
and kind interest always greeted him. At Frankfort he took especial
pleasure in the society of his Prussian colleague, a young lieutenant in
the _Landwehr_,[6] an entire novice in the diplomatic career, although
marked out for such a prodigious destiny. There had been settled here
for many years a great Russian celebrity, a poet, who was at the same
time an influential courtier, and who could not be overlooked by a
diplomat with a love for intellectual enjoyments, and who had been a
school-fellow of Pouchkine. The good and mild Vassili Joukofski had
certainly none of the genius of Pouchkine, nor his independent and
ardent character. More properly a facile versifier and an ingenious
translator than a creative and original mind, with a nature rather
effeminate and contemplative, the formerly renowned author of "Ondine"
had early made his peace with the official society which the despotic
will of Nicholas had created, and had always sunned himself in the rays
of imperial favor.

During his long and pleasant career as poet at the court, he had not
been without dignities and honors. He, however, had a mission much more
important and honorable; he was charged with directing the education of
the heir-presumptive, Alexander, the present emperor, and of his brother
the Grand Duke Constantine. Joukofski devoted himself to this task with
intelligence and ardor, and retained the affection of his two august
pupils to the end of his life. A proof of this fact is the
correspondence which ensued and which he still maintained with them
while at Frankfort. These letters were published quite recently. After
having finished the education of the grand dukes, he made a voyage of
pleasure in Germany. At Düsseldorf he found a companion for life, much
younger than himself, but sharing all his tastes, even his charming
weaknesses. He finally selected a home on the banks of the Main, at
Frankfort.

Thus, as it happens to more than one of his compatriots, Joukofski,
living entirely in a foreign country, and being indeed manifestly
unwilling to return to his native land, considered the Occident
miserably sunken and corrupted, and hoped only in "holy Russia" for the
renovation and safety of a world overrun and possessed by the demon of
revolution. The events of February only served to confirm him in these
gloomy visions and to plunge him more and more into an uneasy mysticism,
at times even irritating, but more often inoffensive and not devoid of a
certain unhealthy charm. The campaign of Hungary caused a momentary
diversion in his sad thoughts, and filled him with joy. It was not so
much the glory with which the Russian army covered itself which pleased
his mind; it was not even the triumph attained by the Russian sword, the
sword of St. Michael, over "the impure beast:" his prayers, his hopes
went far beyond. He hoped--thus he wrote to his imperial pupil that the
great czar would profit by the power which God had given him and would
"solve a problem on which the crusades had stranded;" that is to say,
that he should drive the infidel from Byzantium, and liberate the holy
land. Mme. Joukofski, although born a Protestant, felt in unison with
her melancholy husband. Her soul had need of a "principle of authority,"
which failed her in the reformed confession, and which she sought one
day in the Orthodox Church, to the great joy of the poet, without,
however, being able to find there perfect rest.

Sometimes in the _salon_ of the Joukofski the conversations were
strangely varied and _bizarre_, on literature, politics, the glorious
destinies of holy Russia, the inanity of modern civilization, the
necessity of "a new eruption of Christianity," and on many matters
invisible and "ineffable." Occasionally there fell into the midst of
this _salon_, like a fantastic apparition, like a ghost from the world
of spirits, a genius original and powerful in a very different way, but
also tormented and troubled differently from the good court poet and
former preceptor of the grand dukes. After having unveiled the hideous
sores of Russian society with a vigorous, implacable hand, after having
presented to his nation, in "Les Ames Mortes" and in "L'Inspecteur," a
picture whose vices were appalling with truth and life, Nicholas Gogol
suddenly gave up in despair civilization, progress, and liberty, and
betaking himself to adore that which he had burned, valued nothing but
barbarian Muscovy, saw no salvation but in despotism, thought himself in
a state of "unpardonable" sin, and went in search of divine pity which
always fled from him. Shortly afterwards he went from St. Petersburg to
Rome, then to Jerusalem, then to Paris, everywhere seeking appeasement
for his lacerated soul. Then he came from time to time to Joukofski, and
passed whole weeks in his house, exhorting his friends to prayer, to
repentance, and to contemplation of the divine mysteries. There were
discussions without end, without a truce, on the "heathens of the
Occident," on "a crusade," which was drawing near, on the redemption of
sinful humanity by a race not yet defiled, and which had kept its faith.
At several revivals the physicians were forced to interfere to put an
end to a connection not without peril. One day Gogol was found, having
died of inanition, prostrate before the holy images, in the adoration of
which he had lost all thought of himself.... May we be pardoned for this
short digression. It makes us acquainted with the state of the minds of
a certain Russian society towards the end of the reign of Nicholas, and
adds a curious stroke to the picture of the origins of the war in the
Orient. One delights, however, to think of Alexander Mikhaïlovitch in
this _salon_ of the Joukofski, on an evening for instance, during such
an intellectual conflict with the poor Gogol. The diplomat, equally
cultivated and skeptical, was certainly made to recognize the bright and
brilliant flashes which furrowed those driving clouds in a great,
disordered mind; and he was made to unravel more than one strong and
thrilling thought from the midst of those strange ramblings concerning
an imminent crusade and the near deliverance of Zion.

Who would have thought it? It was these mystics, these men laboring
under hallucinations, who had the true presentiment and saw the signs of
the times! While Joukofski composed his "Commentary on Holy Russia," and
Gogol mortified himself before the _icônes_, the Emperor Nicholas
revolved in his mind the great thought of a crusade, and prepared in the
most profound secrecy the mission of Prince Menchikof. The fact that the
monarch who had done so much for preserving the peace and equilibrium of
Europe had suddenly decided to throw such a fire-brand of war in the
midst of the continent scarcely consolidated, while on the other hand
the autocrat had awaited precisely this epoch of relative calm and of
the reëstablishment of general order to announce his designs, in place
of executing them boldly some years before during the revolutionary
tempest which paralyzed almost all the Powers, his armies being already
in the very heart of Hungary and commanding the banks of the
Danube,--these facts will be for the impartial historian an evident
proof of the good faith with which the czar undertook his fatal
campaign, of the mystical blindness which guided his spirit at this
time, and of the profound conviction which he had of the justice of his
cause. Did Prince Gortchakof partake in the same measure of the
illusions of his master? We doubt whether he did. We believe that, like
the Kisselef, the Meyendorf, the Brunnow, and all the distinguished
diplomats of Russia, without excepting the chancellor of the empire, the
old Count Nesselrode, he was conscious of the great error toward which a
proud prince, who allowed no objections and understood being "his own
minister of foreign affairs," was tending. That naturally did not
prevent the Russian representative to the German Confederation from
fulfilling his duty with all the zeal which circumstances so critical
made necessary, and from placing the various resources of his mind at
the service of his country in the sphere of action which was reserved
for him.

Events did not make it of much importance. In the _Bundestag_ were
concentrated not only all the efforts of the secondary States of the
confederation, but there also were formed or conceived the projects,
the preparations, and even the desires of the two principal German
powers, the assistance of which Russia on the one side and France and
England on the other, were equally concerned in obtaining. Prince
Gortchakof could not complain of the turn affairs took in Germany.
Frederick William IV. was faithful against every temptation. The czar
could count in any case on "his brother-in-law, the poet;" and Alexander
Mikhaïlovitch found an equally firm support in his colleague of Prussia,
the young officer of the _Landwehr_. The cabinet of Berlin consented
from time to time to join in the representations which the allies sent
to St. Petersburg, to sign in concert with them the same note, or one
analogous or concordant. But it did not take long to see that it only
did this to retard their movements, and to deter them from any energetic
resolution. At decisive moments it stopped short, hesitated, and
pretended to preserve "_la main libre_" (_free Hand_). The other members
of the _Bund_ were much more sympathetic and more frankly won over to
the Russian policy. They did not think the demands of the czar against
Turkey at all exorbitant, and troubled themselves very little about the
preservation of the "sick man." They likewise desired to preserve "_la
main libre_," closed their ranks in the famous conferences of Bamberg,
and were at times all ready to draw their swords. In truth, Alexander
Mikhaïlovitch showed in the sequel, in the fatal year 1866, very little
gratitude, very little distributive justice, for these poor secondary
States, so devoted, so serviceable, so immovably attached at the time of
the Oriental crisis.

While at London and at Paris vehement comments were made in the
celebrated dispatches of Sir Hamilton Seymour, and the ambitious
projects of Russia were denounced there, at Hanover, at Dresden, at
Munich, at Stuttgart, at Cassel, nothing but censure was heard against
the proceedings of the allies and their "usurpations." At Berlin they
groaned all the more at seeing Christian monarchies undertake so
ardently the defense of the Crescent. A single Germanic power, however,
at that time the largest it is true, maintained a different attitude; a
single one thought the cause of the allies just, seemed, indeed, at
moments to be inclined to make common cause with them; and that power
was Austria,--Austria, but lately succored by the Russian arms; saved by
the strong and generous hand of the czar on the very brink of the abyss;
"saved" by him from sudden dissolution. The astonishment, the
stupefaction, the exasperation of the Emperor Nicholas knew no bounds.
The entire Russian nation shared his sentiments,--Alexander
Mikhaïlovitch like every patriotic Muscovite. "The immense ingratitude
of Austria" became even then the unanimous cry,--the _siboleth_ of every
political faith in the vast empire of the North; and so it has remained
even to our days.

It is necessary to lay stress upon this sentiment born in Russia in
consequence of the Oriental conflict, and to discuss the real causes for
it; for this sentiment has produced incalculable effects. It has
contributed largely to the recent catastrophes; it has dictated more
than one extreme resolution to the cabinet of St. Petersburg; it has
made it abandon its venerable traditions,--its principles, consecrated
by the experience of generations and seemingly immovable, having become,
in a certain sense, the _arcana imperii_ of the descendants of Peter the
Great. To sum up, it has governed the general policy of the successor of
Nesselrode during the last twenty years.

Assuredly Russia had the right to count on the recognition of Austria
after the signal and incontestable service which it had rendered her in
1849. The armies which the czar then sent to the succor of the tottering
empire of Hapsburg contributed powerfully to suppress a fatal, menacing
insurrection there; and if it is true that in order to obtain this
succor it was sufficient to recall to the Czar Nicholas a word given
long before in a moment of confidential intimacy, the action does not
become the less meritorious, and does so much the more honor to the
heart of the autocrat.[7] It would be difficult to deny that this
intervention in Hungary had not a generous and chivalric character which
astonished the contemporaries and the clever. The clever ones, the
statesmen, who, at this troubled epoch of Europe, had still preserved
enough liberal spirit to cast their eyes toward the Danube,--Lord
Palmerston among others,--remained for a long time incredulous, and
endeavored to divine the reward paid for the aid that was lent. Should
not the czar retain Galicia as a recompense for his assistance? Would he
not procure some positive assurance from the side of the Principalities?
was asked in the offices of Downing Street. Nothing of the sort
happened, however. The Russians left Austria without a reward, as they
had entered it without an _arrière-pensée_, and the troops of Paskévitch
evacuated the country of the Carpathians unladen with booty. A young and
ardent orator in the Prussian chambers, with the name (as yet but little
known) de Bismarck,--the same who fifteen years later was to project
striking a _coup au coeur_ and arming the legions of Klapka,--admired at
this moment the brilliant action of the czar, and only expressed the
patriotic regret that this magnanimous _rôle_ had not fallen to his own
country, to Prussia. It was for Prussia to bring assistance to its elder
brother in Germany, to "its former comrade in arms."[8] But it is
allowable to suppose that, even with a king as loyal and poetic as
Frederick William IV., affairs would have been conducted much less
handsomely than with the barbarian of the North, and that similar aid
from Prussia would have cost the empire of Hapsburg a part of Silesia or
a part of its influence on the Main.

Shall we say, then, that in intervening in Hungary the Emperor of Russia
acted from pure chivalry and platonic friendship, that he had no thought
of personal interest and the good of his empire? Certainly not; and the
czar had too much loyalty not to avow it frankly. He intervened in
Hungary, not only as the friend of the Hapsburg, not only as the
defender of the cause of order against cosmopolitan revolution; the most
powerful motive in deciding him was the presence in the Hungarian army
of Polish generals and officers, who intended to carry the war into the
countries subjected to Russian rule. In his manifest of the 8th May,
1849, Nicholas expressed himself as follows: "The insurrection sustained
by the influence of _our traitors from Poland_, of the year 1831, has
given to the Hungarian revolt an extension more and more _menacing_....
His majesty, the Emperor of Austria, has invited us to assist against
_the common enemy_.... We have ordered our army under way to quell the
revolt, and to destroy the audacious anarchists, _who equally menace the
tranquillity of our provinces_." The language was clear and frank, as
was fitting for a sovereign preserving the consciousness of his dignity.
This sovereign intended to render himself a service as well as his ally.
He was going to stifle in his neighbors' territory an incendiary fire
which threatened to harm his own domains; and in the act of intervening,
let it be well understood, he at the same time acted in
self-preservation.

Well! it seems according to all justice that the gratitude should
correspond to the service rendered, and that the law of preservation,
the supreme law of nature, should have equal force for the party under
obligations as for the benefactor. There is no policy in the world, were
it even taken from Holy Writ which could advise voluntary servitude;
there is no doctrine, however sublime one wishes to imagine it, which,
among the duties of the confession, recommends suicide. Now, it was
nothing less than absolute subjection, the ruin of its personality as a
great European State, which the Russians demanded of Austria in
demanding its assent to their pretensions against the Orient. By
geography, by the spirit of races, by religion, the Russian enterprises
would strike a mortal blow at the empire of the Hapsburg, if this empire
allowed them to triumph. A Danubian power, Austria should take care that
the Lower Danube remained neutral, and that it should not fall into the
hands of a powerful neighbor, who would then become master of this great
river. A Sclavic power in its Oriental provinces, it ought to guard
against being placed in immediate contact with an empire pan-Sclavic by
tradition and by fatality, and it could not wish it to be planted in the
Principalities, in Bosnia and Herzegovania. A Catholic power, it was
forbidden to recognize the influence and the protectorate which the
orthodox czar claimed over the Christians of the Grecian rite, of whom
it counted several millions among its subjects. "My conduct in the
question of the Orient! Why it is written on a map?" said Count Buol, to
his brother-in-law, M. de Meyendorf, the Russian ambassador. He added
that it was also written in history. "I have made no innovation. I have
only inherited the political legacy of M. de Metternich."

In fact, in a previous crisis, at the time of the Hellenic insurrection
and the war of 1828, the grand chancellor of the court and of the empire
had defended this principle of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire with
a firmness which nothing could disturb. During eight years he had
defended it, braving the storm alone, not allowing himself to be
discouraged either by the unpopularity then attaching to the Turkish
cause or by the desertion of France. Why should the Russians hope that
Austria would now desert this principle so vital for her, that she would
desert it at the very moment when it commenced to triumph over the
indifference of the Occident, and counted France and England among its
most earnest champions?

Placed between a sentiment of gratitude very lively and real, as we have
said, and a great political necessity, the government of Vienna has
certainly done for gratitude all that it owed. It lavished warnings,
prayers, good offices, offers of mediation on the Emperor Nicholas.
Austria pardoned Russia more than one want of respect, more than one
action of ill humor; it pardoned her the more than airy tone in which it
had been disposed of in the effusions with Sir Hamilton Seymour,--the
manner in which a certain autograph letter of the Emperor Francis
Joseph had been received at St. Petersburg,--the haughty, almost
insulting attitude of Count Orlof during his mission at Vienna. It did
not cease till the end to calm the irritation of the allies, to modify
and alter their programme, to assert the conciliating disposition of the
czar, to hope against all hope. It pleaded only for the return _in statu
quo_, repudiating any idea of humiliating or weakening Russia; it
demanded nothing from her but the freedom of the Danube, the
renunciation of the protectorate, and refused to follow the allies in
their demands concerning the Black Sea. Unfortunately, as it happens too
often to him who wishes to be equitable and just towards all parties,
the Austrian government, by this conduct, ended by alienating France and
England and exasperating the Russians. In the summer of 1854, at the
very moment when Prince Gortchakof exchanged his post at Frankfort for
that at Vienna, an eminent publicist, who was then, so to speak, the
mouth-piece of the Occident, and of its generous spirits, almost
despaired of Austria, and cried with bitterness that over there, in the
_Burg_, "the Russian alliance was something as sacred as a religion, as
fixed as propriety, and as popular as a fashion!" In the spring of the
following year, the cabinets of Paris and of London resisted, as too
favorable to Russia, a new plan of arrangement presented by Count Buol,
and the French government on this occasion reproached Austria, in the
"Moniteur Officiel," with offering an expedient rather than a solution.

The solution! The Emperor Francis Joseph certainly had it in his hands,
and it perhaps depended only on him to render it as decisive and as
radical as the most mortal enemies of Russia could wish. Why not
confess it? To see the bitter fruit _gathered_ by Austria in consequence
of its honorable efforts during the Oriental crisis, and to see the
implacable hatred and the cruel disasters which fell to its lot because
of its attitude then, one surprises one's self sometimes in regretting
that the cabinet of Vienna had so many scruples at this memorable epoch.
One almost reproaches it for not having given proof of that independence
of heart which seems, alas! the forced, indispensable condition for the
independence of states. If Austria had wished to be a little less
grateful and a little less politic during this war of the Orient, she
would have resolutely joined herself to France and England, she would
have taken part in the struggle, and instead of letting the allies rove
for years around the borders of Russia, in the Black Sea and Baltic, she
would have opened for them the fields of Poland, and have entered there
with them. In place of "tickling the soul of the Colossus or of filing
off a nail,"--as Russian publicists said later, and not without
justice,--they should then have given him a _coup au coeur_,--one of
those blows that the great recluse of Varzin knows how to plan and give.
The cabinet of the Tuileries would not have refused to do this. In his
dispatch of the 26th March, 1855, M. Drouyn de Lhuys laid down very
skillfully the question of Poland; neither would the cabinet of St.
James have raised serious objections. As to the probable success of such
an enterprise, it suffices to remember that Russia was at the end of its
resources, and that Prussia had not yet re-formed its military
organization, was not yet in possession of its "instrument," and lastly
that in place of William the Conqueror, Frederick the Romantic occupied
the throne of the Hohenzollern. The mind is confounded before the
contemplation of the consequences which such a decision on the part of
the Emperor Francis Joseph might have caused. The face of the world
would have been changed; Austria would certainly not have seen Sadowa[9]
in 1866; Europe would not have seen the dismemberment of Denmark, nor
the destruction of the _Bund_, nor the conquest of Alsace and Lorraine.

It was in the summer of 1854, as we have said above, that Prince
Gortchakof was sent to Vienna. He replaced there, first provisionally,
and in the following spring, definitely, Baron de Meyendorf, whose
situation had become unpleasant in consequence of his ties of very near
relationship with the Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs. Alexander
Mikhaïlovitch at last held that post at Vienna to which he had so long a
time aspired, the post which, with that of London, was considered, under
the reign of Nicholas, as the highest in Russian diplomacy, like the
_bâton_ of a marshal in his career. But now how full this honor was of
bitterness, and what patriotic pangs accompanied a distinction formerly
ardently wished for, to-day accepted through devotion to his sovereign
and his country! On this ground, formerly so pleasant and smiling, the
envoy of the czar could everywhere see nothing but briers and thorns.
In this capital, renowned for its boisterous gayety and too frequent
frivolity, he received nothing but disastrous and distracting news. And
this "Austrian ingratitude," which he had only had glimpses of and
combated from afar during his mission at Frankfort, he could now look in
the face--and smile at it! There is a grief greater than the _ricordare
tempi felici nella miseria_; it is to see a dream of happiness turn into
a reality of misery, and one can easily understand what a treasure of
gall this sojourn at Vienna must have heaped up in the wounded heart of
the Russian patriot.[10]

It is superfluous to lay stress upon the activity which the new envoy of
the czar displayed in this unhappy mission; to mention the infinite
variety of means which he placed at the service of his cause,
especially during the conferences of Vienna, which were opened after
the death of Nicholas and the accession of the Emperor Alexander II.
That was a moving sight and one which was truly not wanting in grandeur,
that of the two Gortchakof, one behind the ramparts of Sebastopol, the
other before the council board of Vienna, both defending their country
with an equal tenacity, only yielding each inch of ground after a
desperate combat, forced into their last intrenchments, but honored even
to the end by loyal and chivalrous adversaries. To-day an epoch "of iron
and of blood" has accustomed us to the summary proceedings--we had
almost said executions--of Nikolsburg, of Ferrières, of Versailles, and
of Frankfort, and a martial law used by the diplomats in helmets has
replaced that which a former Europe, full of prejudices, loved to call
the right of nations. To-day it is difficult to resist a sentiment of
astonishment, almost of incredulity, in re-reading the protocols of
these conferences of Vienna, where everything breathes decorum,
politeness, urbanity, and mutual respect. One thinks himself carried
back to an idyllic age, one far from us, to a world of ancient
gentlemen. M. Drouyn de Lhuys, Minister of Foreign Affairs in France,
Lord John Russell, until lately President of the Privy Council of
England, did not think it beneath their dignity to go in person to
Vienna to discuss there with Prince Gortchakof the possible conditions
of a peace. Russia had lost several great battles, the allied fleets had
blockaded all its seas and even menaced its capital. That did not
prevent the French and English plenipotentiaries from treating it with
all deference, with all the respect which the diplomacy of this good
old time could employ. They displayed a veritable art in the invention
of euphemisms; they gave themselves pains to find the mildest mediums,
the most acceptable terms for the representative of a vanquished power.
Indeed, that excellent Lord John Russell forced kindness so far as to
recall, and that in the face of M. Drouyn de Lhuys, that England had
made Louis XIV. submit to conditions much harder and more
humiliating.[11] That was, perhaps, the only instance of want of tact
which one can find in the conferences of Vienna, and yet what was it but
a courteousness from an ally to an ally? As for Austria, it exhausted
itself in finding means to spare the susceptibilities of Russia, and
ended by presenting a plan of arrangement which was judged inacceptable
by the cabinets of London and Paris, and drew on it the reproach of the
"Moniteur Officiel," of which we have already spoken.

Negotiations were broken off, and nothing could be done but to await the
issue of the supreme combat under the walls of Sebastopol. The Russian
plenipotentiary awaited it at his post in Vienna in the twofold anguish
of a patriot and a relation. The bulwark of the Crimea fell, and Russia
found itself in the most critical situation. It was exhausted,--indeed
much more exhausted than Europe then thought,--and the prolongation of
the war would have infallibly transported the hostilities to the plains
of Poland. At this moment Austria intervened anew. It agreed to the
demands made by the allies at the conference of Vienna,--even that
clause concerning the neutralization of the Black Sea, which it had
hitherto resisted as too wounding to Russia. It was not possible to
refuse this satisfaction to the allies after the capture of Sebastopol.
In reality, these were the easiest conditions which have ever been
imposed on a power at the close of a war so long, so bloody, and of such
incontestable victories. Austria did more; it sent these conditions
under form of an ultimatum, declaring that it would make common cause
with the allies if they were not accepted; and Russia accepted them. To
look at it plainly, this was a service rendered to a young sovereign,
who, having inherited a disastrous war, thus found the means to spare at
the same time the memory of his predecessor and the pride of his people.
He could say now that he had only made peace because of a new adversary,
who had arisen at the side of the old ones, and whom his father did not
count on. In fact, it was said in Russia,--it was believed, indeed, so
much was it in their interest to believe it. The Russian people were
quickly reconciled with the conquerors of Alma and of Malakof. A single
power remained in their eyes responsible for their disasters,--the power
which during the whole war had rested on its arms. Even at this hour
every Russian heart boils with indignation at the thought of Austria, of
its immense ingratitude and its great treason.

Alexander Mikhaïlovitch shared these bitternesses, these popular
rancors, and became the most energetic and openly avowed representative
of them. In this respect he allowed his sentiments to burst forth with a
frankness which approached very nearly to ostentation. A remark uttered
by him during the session of the Congress at Paris, is still cited at
Vienna: "Austria is not a state, it is only a government." These words
preceded him to St. Petersburg and made his fortune there. The popular
voice designated him as the future avenger, as the man destined to
prepare for his nation a brilliant revenge; and the acute diplomat did
not trouble himself to controvert such an opinion. Already, however, at
this Congress of Paris certain tendencies, certain desires were
revealed, which gave hope, which even opened horizons entirely new. The
name of Italy was pronounced there. Roumania itself found there an
unexpected support. At this strange Congress, which definitely regulated
the conditions of a peace that France, England, and Austria had imposed
on Russia, Austria appeared gloomy and morose, England irritated and
nervous. France and Russia alone exchanged between one another the most
exquisite politeness and surprising cordialities. The sword of Napoleon
III. became the lance of Achilles, healing where it had just wounded,
wounding where it had healed. "There was balm of Gilead in it," and
support in the sovereign of the Tuileries. The day after the Congress,
in the month of April, 1856, the old Count Nesselrode asked to be
retired on account of his age, and Prince Alexander Gortchakof became
Minister of Foreign Affairs.


II.

During the four years which he had passed at Frankfort as representative
of his government to the German Confederation, Prince Gortchakof, as we
have already seen, had made the acquaintance of, and maintained the
most intimate relations with a colleague, whose rare qualities of mind,
as probably also those of the heart, he appreciated as no one else did.
The two friends were separated in the summer of 1854, when the Russian
plenipotentiary went to fulfill his painful mission at Vienna. But they
did not delay in meeting anew, and found as before that perfect
congeniality of ideas and of sentiments, which, established since their
first meeting in Frankfort, has never been interrupted, and has lasted
for twenty-five years: _grande mortalis ævi spatium_. This friend of
Prince Gortchakof on the smiling banks of the Main, was no other than M.
de Bismarck, the future chancellor of Germany.

Otto-Edward-Leopold de Bismarck-Schoenhausen, born the 1st of April,
1815, at Schoenhausen, hereditary estate of his family in the old Mark
of Brandenburg, could not flatter himself with having, like his friend
Alexander Mikhaïlovitch, blood of the Saints in his veins. His
biographers even observe with visible satisfaction, that at least two of
his ancestors were excommunicated by the Church and died in final
impenitence. What is more serious is that the most authorized historians
of the Mark of Brandenburg, M. de Riedel among others, call into
question the noble origin of the family. They show that the first of the
line, of whom authentic documents of the fourteenth century speak, Rulo
Bismarck, was a member and on several occasions even provost of "the
guild of master tailors in cloth" at Stendal, a small market town of the
old Mark. The fact does not seem doubtful. But could not the citizens of
Stendal, just as well as those of certain cities in Tuscany, have
forced every country noble, who wished to inhabit the city, to subscribe
himself in one of those guilds? This is the opinion of the tories in
this curious genealogical dispute. To hear them, the good citizens of
Stendal must have been on a par, in the fourteenth century, with the
great citizens of Florence and of Pisa, and Rulo Bismarck must have been
master tailor in cloth about as much as Dante, his contemporary, was an
apothecary. The whigs, on the contrary, the biographers in
national-liberal colors, take their part gayly, and one of them
ingeniously concludes, that in any case the ancestor Rulo ought "to
contemplate with satisfaction and pride from the high heavens the
splendid imperial mantle which his descendant has made for King William
out of the cloth of Europe."

In times relatively more modern, the House of Bismarck presents, like
many a noble country family of Brandenburg, an unbroken succession of
modest and faithful servants of the state, some soldiers, some employed
in civil duties. The eighteenth century offers us two rather more
curious specimens, the grandfather and great uncle of the chancellor.
One was surnamed the _poet_, the other the _adventurer_. The _poet_,
this painful avowal must be made, composed his verses in the French
language. We have notably by him an "_Eloge ou Monument érigé
à la Mémoire de Christine de Bismarck, née de Schoenfeld, par
Charles-Alexandre de Bismarck_," Berlin, 1774. It was to his dead wife
that the retired captain of cavalry thought necessary to elevate this
mausoleum of words and of _Welche_ rhymes, full of the insipid
sentimentality of the time. The _adventurer_ (Ludolf-August) is more
deserving of his name. He killed his servant in a fit of anger or
drunkenness, was pardoned, took service in Russia, became involved in
political intrigues in Courland, and was forced to go to Siberia in
exile. Pardoned again, he entered into Russian diplomacy, filled several
missions, and died commanding general at Poltava. Let us say in passing,
that this Ludolf was not the only one of his family to serve under the
Russian flag, and thus the name of Bismarck has long been well known at
St. Petersburg.

The whig biographers lay much stress on the fact, that the mother of the
young Otto, "an intelligent, ambitious, and rather cold woman," was a
_bourgeoise_, a Miss Menken, of a family of _savans_ well known at
Leipsic. They love to prove in this manner that the restorer of the
empire was connected by his mother with the _bourgeoisie_, that studious
and cultivated _bourgeoisie_ which is the great strength of
Germany,--while claiming his right to the nobility and the army by his
father, retired captain of cavalry, and by his grandfather the _poet_.
Those profound Germans have a weakness, it is known, for all symbolism.
They dignify very often with this name that which is nothing but a _jeu
d'esprit_, in reality a play of words, and it is thus that they attach a
certain signification to the futile circumstance that the young Otto was
confirmed[12] at Berlin at the hands of Schleiermacher, the celebrated
Doctor of Divinity, whose learning was much more respectable than his
life; "in a manner and for a fleeting moment, it is true, but solemnly,
the young man called to a life of action _par excellence_, was brought
in contact with our learned theology and our romantic philosophy." Nor
has it been forgotten to exalt the name of the "gray cloister" (_Grauer
Kloster_), which the lyceum at Berlin bore, where the future destroyer
of convents studied, or to note the French origin of one of his
principal professors, Doctor Bonnet, descendant of a Huguenot family
which sought refuge in Brandenburg in consequence of the revocation of
the Edict of Nantes.

After having finished his studies at the lyceum of the gray cloister,
Otto de Bismarck went to the University of Goettingen, to the celebrated
_Georgia Augusta_, in order to study. In reality, he did nothing but
lead the life of the sons of the muse, who have the good or bad fortune
to be at the same time sons of family, _cavalieri_; he cultivated
nothing but hunting, riding, swimming, gymnastic exercises, and fencing.
He had more than twenty duels, and fully justified the glorious name of
_Bursche_, which clung to him for a long time afterwards, even when he
was ambassador and minister. One easily understands that the Institutes
and Pandects cannot be very thoroughly studied in the midst of so many
corporal exercises, and even the attempt to change the noisy _Georgia
Augusta_ for the most quiet and sedate University of Berlin, was a
remedy heroic rather than efficacious. Has M. de Bismarck ever regularly
passed this "state examination" (_Staatsexamen_) which in Prussia is the
indispensable condition for an appointment to any public function? A
grave question, which was discussed for a long time in Germany, and out
of which a weapon has shaped itself for twenty years against the man,
the deputy, the ambassador, the president of the council. A fact worthy
of notice, and one which well characterizes the formal and regulative
mind of the nation: M. de Bismarck had already defied all Europe, and
dismembered the Danish monarchy, when in the opposition journals of
Germany, there appeared from time to time, like belated rockets,
malignant allusions to this problematical state examination! Since the
epoch of Sadowa only have these malicious jibes entirely ceased: Sadowa
caused many other irregularities to pass unnoticed, and assuredly much
graver ones.

It is perhaps proper to inquire here what benefits M. de Bismarck reaped
from his academic life, and to estimate, if but briefly, the cultivation
and the peculiarities of his mind. It seems certain that M. de Bismarck
is not a man of science and study, and that his liberal education shows
more than one gap. A pleasing contrast, the two chancellors, Russian and
German, of whom one knew but a single lyceum and that one of very
doubtful merit, while the other attended the most renowned college
(_gymnasium_) and _alma mater_ of learned Germany. Certainly the pupil
of Zarkoe-Zeloe, as regards classical knowledge and true _humaniora_, is
far in advance of the lucky foster child of _Georgia Augusta_.
Nevertheless it is well to observe that M. de Bismarck fills and more
than fills a certain programme laid down one day by the _spirituel_ and
regretted Saint-Marc Giradin for the well educated men of the world. "I
do not require, said he, that they know Latin; I only ask that they have
forgotten it." From his academic youth, there has always remained to
the chancellor of Germany a fund of culture of which he well knows the
use on occasion, and he understands in a sufficient degree, his Bible,
his Shakspere, his Goethe, and his Schiller, those four elements of all
education, even the most common one, in German countries,--precious and
enviable quadrivium of the children of Arminius! Prince Gortchakof has
the refinements as well as the weaknesses of the man of letters; he
takes care of his "_mot_," he corrects his phrase, he looks at and
admires himself in his compositions; it is known that he was one day
surnamed the _Narcissus of the inkstand_. By his tastes, by his
exquisite sensibility, by his artistic instinct, he has a marked
superiority over his former colleague of Frankfort. But the latter
regains all this advantage as soon as one considers the original and
personal stamp which he knows how to give to his thoughts and to his
speech, as soon as one seeks the individuality, the breathing creator,
the _mens agitans molem_, that something mysterious and powerful which
antique sculpture rendered so ingeniously by placing a flame on the
forehead of certain of its statues.

The chancellor of Germany is not a lettered man in the strict and
somewhat vulgar acceptation of the world. He is, to speak correctly,
neither an orator nor a writer. He does not understand developing a
theme well, graduating its arguments, arranging its transitions. He does
not construct his period and does not trouble himself about it. He has
difficulty in expressing himself, both on the tribune and also with the
pen. His style is harsh, occasionally very incorrect, as unacademical as
possible. It is intricate, embarrassed, even trivial at moments. Every
part guarded, and all reserve made, there is something of Cromwell in
his manner of expressing himself. But in an entirely different manner
than in Cromwell one is forced to admire in him those flashes of
thought, those strong and unforeseen images, those penetrating words
which strike, which impress themselves, and which are not forgotten.
When quite lately in the midst of an argument, disconnected and
embarrassed, concerning his conflict with Rome, he suddenly cried out:
"Be sure of one thing, gentlemen, _we will not go to Canossa_!"[13] one
should remember that he knew how to comprise there, in a sort of
menacing _cæterum censeo_,[14] a whole world of memories and of
passions. In a very different spirit, also in a time already far
distant, it is true, speaking one day--about twenty years have since
flown--of the principles of revolution and contra-revolution, he said
that a parliamentary debate could never decide between these two
principles: "The decision will only come from God, from the God of
battles, _when he lets fall from his hand the iron dice of destiny_!"
One thinks that he hears De Maistre in this last part of the phrase, and
like M. de Maistre the chancellor of Germany has had his passage decried
by the _hangsman_; we wish to speak of this invocation to _iron_ and to
_blood_, which must be replaced in its frame and put in its true
light,--to settle its date,--to appreciate all the relief by the side
of the incontestable brutality. The invocation was made when those
national-liberals, to-day of such great servility towards him and with
the _obedience of a corpse_, wished to prevent him from reforming the
army, at the same time demanding him to complete the unity of Germany.
The man who felt the distant thunder of Sadowa and Sedan rumble in his
soul, launched at this moment to the orators the _défi_ which he has
only too well justified since, saying that it was not by speeches that
Germany could be united: "to consummate this unity, iron and blood are
necessary!" This orator does not breathe at ease in the uniform which
never leaves him, and he advances only by fits and starts. He collects
laboriously the clouds of his rhetoric, but the spark ends by flashing
and by illuminating the whole situation. To make himself understood he
employs the greatest or most familiar images, without choice, just as
they come; he borrows a quotation from Shakspere and from Goethe just as
well as from the Wasps of M. Alphonse Karr, or from a couplet of the
vaudeville. One of his most happy, most memorable inspirations, he
suddenly drew one day from the libretto of the "Freischütz."

The reader will kindly permit us to recall this last episode, even at
the risk of delaying somewhat in some preliminary explanations of which
a German auditory, full of souvenirs of its "Freischütz," would have no
need. In this opera of Weber, Max, the good and unfortunate hunter,
borrows a cartridge from Robin, the evil spirit, and immediately kills
an eagle, one of whose feathers he proudly sticks in his cap. He then
asks for some more cartridges, but Robin tells him that they are
"enchanted balls," and that in order to obtain them he must surrender
himself to the infernal spirits, and deliver his soul to them. Max draws
back, and then Robin, sneering, tells him that he hesitates in vain,
that the bargain is made, and that he has already committed himself by
the ball he made use of: "Do you think, then, that this eagle was a free
gift?" Well! when in 1849 the young orator of the Mark of Brandenburg
had to implore the Prussian chamber not to accept for the King of
Prussia the imperial crown which the parliament of Frankfort offered
him, he ended by crying out: "It is radicalism which offers this gift to
the king. Sooner or later this radicalism will stand upright before the
king, will demand of him its recompense, and pointing to the emblem of
the eagle on that new imperial flag, it will say: _Did you think, then,
that this eagle was a free gift?_" A striking image and equally deep and
ingenious! Yes, one cannot use with impunity the "enchanted balls" of
revolution, and one does not make a bargain with the popular demon,
without leaving it some of his soul. Sooner or later there will stand
upright before you the bad genius whose aid you have accepted, Robin of
the woods and the streets. He will come to receive your salute, and tell
you that he did not intend to have worked for the King of Prussia. This
magnificent oratorical burst of the young deputy of the Mark, the
chancellor of Germany might have considered with benefit in more than
one decisive circumstance, for instance on the day when he overthrew the
secular throne, also the day when he gave the signal for the _combat of
civilization_.

The writer does not differ much from the orator, and, in speaking of the
writer, we think above all of those intimate and familiar letters which
have been published in the well known book of George Hesekiel, and which
have had a merited success in Germany. There is always the same
obscurity, the same embarrassment of elocution, the same disorder, from
time to time passages of lively and original expressions, of astonishing
figures, of a bitter, harsh _humor_, which grinds and bites you with
cruel pleasure. These letters are for the great part addressed to his
sister, to "dear Malvina" (married to an Arnim), and we will borrow from
them more than once during the course of this study. One notices in them
certain descriptions of nature, of the brightness of the moon, of the
North Sea, of the view of the Danube from the heights of Buda-Pesth,
which are not wanting in coloring effect, and make up a picture. There
is something of Heinrich Heine in these private _Reisebilder_, and it
has been remarked of them, that there is perhaps something of Hamlet
(and what a Hamlet!) in the following passage, the only melancholy one
which we have met with in the midst of so many sanguine and robust
sallies. "At the mercy of God! Everything is in reality but a question
of time, peoples and individuals, wisdom and folly, peace and war. To
the living, everything upon earth is but hypocrisy and jugglery, and
this _mask of flesh having once fallen off_, the wise man and the fool
resemble each other greatly, and it would be hard to distinguish between
the Prussian and the Austrian, _their skeletons being very carefully
prepared_." These lines fell from the same hand, however, which, since
then, and assuredly by a very specific patriotism, has furnished so many
thousand subjects to the preparers of skeletons!

One sees by these letters that M. de Bismarck handled at an early hour
and with predilection this irony, in which he is without a master; a
cold, crafty irony, and which too often approaches sneering. He used it
later in his speeches, in his conversations with ministers and
ambassadors, and even in diplomatic negotiations, in the most important,
most decisive moments of history. At such moments this irony sometimes
affects a great frankness, sometimes a great politeness, but a frankness
to make you fall on your knees before the first lie, however brazen, a
politeness to make you implore an incivility without forms as a
veritable charity. One day, on the very eve of the war of 1866, Count
Karolyi, ambassador of Austria, and acting in the name of his
government, summoned M. de Bismarck to declare categorically if he
expected to break the treaty of peace, the treaty of Gastein.[15] "No,"
was the reply, "I have not that expectation; _but, if I had, would I
answer you differently_?" There is an example of that frankness which
disconcerts, which confounds, and seems to cry in your ear with that
devil from the "Inferno":

    "Tu non pensavi ch'io loico fossi!"

As to the murderous politeness, which sometimes clothes the sarcasm of
M. de Bismarck, let us recall here the _mot_ which he launched later at
the negotiators of Versailles, coming to treat with him concerning the
surrender of famished Paris, and to offer him two hundred millions in
contributions. "Oh," said he, "_Paris is too great a personage_ that we
should treat it in such a shabby manner; let us do it the honor of a
milliard." That is truly an original turn which the rival of Heine
thought to give to the _maxima reverentia_ which one owes to misfortune!
When one is destined in a ripe age to exercise his _humor_ with such
ease at the cost of princes and of peoples, how is it possible when
young not to jest pleasantly about that poor fellow of a peasant in
Pomerania who drank too much water? In one of his letters to his dear
Malvina, the young country gentleman describes with a hilarious spirit
an inundation which swept over his domain which is divided by a little
branch of the narrow river Hampel. This inundation severed him from all
his neighbors, carried off so and so many casks of _eau-de-vie_,
"introduced an anarchical interregnum from Schievelbein to Damm," and he
ends by this stroke: "_I am proud to be able to say_, that in my little
branch of the Hampel a wagoner was drowned with his horse and his whole
load of tar!" How proud in a different degree was this gentleman one day
when, Europe having become his domain, he saw disappearing in the midst
of the billows, billows of blood this time, a whole army and its chief,
a whole empire and its emperor,--_currus Galliæ et auriga ejus!_ That
did not prevent, at another time, the young country gentleman from
jumping bravely into the water to rescue his groom and gaining the medal
for saving life. During many years this medal was the only one to
decorate the broad chest of the Prussian minister at Frankfort. Asked
one day by a colleague to the _Bund_ about a decoration to which the
diplomatic corps is but little accustomed, he replied in the tone which
he alone possesses, that he sometimes happened to rescue a man,--in his
leisure moments, be it understood. Probably, if he had been further
pressed, he was capable of adding that he only did it for exercise.

Thus, to resume, from the epoch of his apprenticeship at the gray
cloister and _Georgia Augusta_, Otto de Bismarck carried a literary
burden, which, without being either too heavy or too full, has
nevertheless enabled him to make his tour of the political world with
ease and honor. And also since this epoch his mind disclosed the
precious qualities which still distinguish it; a vivid and powerful
imagination, a rare happiness in his choice of expressions occasionally
grandiose, occasionally vulgar, but always striking; and lastly, a
_humor_ which has no equal, and which, to speak with Jean Paul, is a
true _sirocco_ to the soul. With all this no grace, no charm, no
distinction or delicacy,--not a generous accent, no sweet and
sympathetic cord, a complete absence of that milk of human kindness of
which the poet speaks, an absolute want of that charity which, according
to the great Christian moralist, is like the heavenly perfume of the
soul. As to the art or rather handicraft, as to the work which consists
in arranging his phrases, in connecting and disposing them so as to
introduce harmony and clearness in the different parts of speech, in
effacing its asperities and inequalities, in one word as to the _style_,
M. de Bismarck never learned it or always disdained it. If we dared to
apply to this style one of those trivial but expressive images of which
he himself offers us more than one example, we would willingly compare
it to a certain strange drink, hardly credible, and which, according to
his biographers, the German chancellor has always liked: it consists of
a mixture of champagne and _porter_! The language is in imitation of the
drink: one finds in it the _piquant_, the sparkling, the exhilarating of
the _Aÿ_ together with the heaviness, the blackness, and above all the
bitterness of the _stout_.

It is a curious fact, that the man who one day was to impose on all the
States of Germany the severe bureaucratic and military laws of Prussia,
"to place Germany in the saddle," to use one of his _mots_, to press it
into the straight jacket of obligatory service,--even to indirectly
train all Europe to new exercises, and to make it leave the plow for the
sword, liberal occupations for the autumn and summer manoeuvres,--this
man, for his part, has never been able to bind himself down to academic
duties, neither to the regular work of the bureau, nor to the severe
discipline of the soldier. He himself has acknowledged having heard but
_two_ hours of lecture during his whole stay at _Georgia Augusta_. The
university course being ended, he tried several times the administrative
or judiciary career; he tried it at Aix-la-Chapelle, at Potsdam, at
Greifswalde, then again at Potsdam, and had to give it up every time,
disgusted by the monotonous labor of the bureau, or by quarrels with his
superiors. On this subject is told the _piquant_ reply of the young
_referendarius_ to a principal who had made him wait an hour in an
antechamber: "I came to request a short leave of absence; but during
this long hour I have had time to reflect, and I demand my dismission."
Thrice he made a trial of the military service, without arriving at a
higher grade than that of lieutenant in the _Landwehr_, a rank which he
appreciated, however, and of which he loved to don the uniform on solemn
occasions, even at the very time when he was already minister at
Frankfort. The reader knows that the day of Sadowa brought him the
insignia of a general. Those ten or twelve years which had passed for M.
de Bismarck since his disputed state examination to his entrance into
the Prussian chamber, the German biographers call by the fine name
"years of storm and trouble," which recalls one of the most brilliant
epochs of their literature.[16] In truth they were stormy, filled with
miscarriages of more than one kind, with travels, financial
embarrassments, perhaps also with an unrequited love. At least that is
the meaning one is inclined to give to the following passage from a
letter addressed to his sister Malvina: "I struggle in vain, I shall end
by marrying ----; the world wishes it thus, and nothing seems more
natural, and then we will both be killed on the spot. She left me
coldly, it is true, but they all do that. It would not be so bad,
however, if one could throw off his feelings with his shirts, no matter
how rarely one changes the latter."

He seems to have had a very sincere affection for this sister; he
overwhelms her with the most tender names. Thus he calls her his little
dear, his Malvina, his _Maldewinchen_, his good little Arnim; he even
calls her once (pardon him, O divinities of Walhalla) simply _and in
French_, "_ma soeur_." In all the letters of this epoch, dated for the
most part from the estates of Kniephof or Schoenhausen (it was not until
later that M. de Bismarck acquired the famous Varzin[17]), by the side
of an always biting and harsh _humor_, one can perceive a certain
disenchantment; by the side of the cares of fortune appear from time to
time projects for the future, very modest, truly, and which seldom aim
at politics. In 1846 he attached a certain importance at being made
surveyor of dikes in the district (_Deichhauptmann_). "The position is
not remunerative, but it offers some interest in regard to Schoenhausen
and other estates, for we would depend on it in a great measure if we
were again without water as in the past year.... Bernard (a friend)
insists on my going to Prussia (to Berlin). I would like to know what he
expects there. He affirms that by my disposition and my inclinations, I
am made for the service of the state, and that sooner or later I will
end by entering it." Suddenly, and on the very eve of the reunion of the
first Prussian parliament, one is surprised by the plan of a voyage to
the Indias,--probably to make his fortune and establish himself
there,--and one thinks involuntarily of Cromwell wishing to embark for
America on the eve of the long parliament. Do not think, however, that
the days passed sadly and morosely at Kniephof and at Schoenhausen: one
lives there, one overlives the life of _Juncker_ (country squire) and
the officers of the neighboring garrison are good and stout fellows, in
whose company one hunts and dances, "one empties great bowls half filled
with champagne, half with porter;" the guests are awakened in the
morning by pistols fired off close to their pillows; on entering the
_salon_ the female cousins are frightened with four foxes, and honor is
paid to the name given by the whole country to the proprietor of the
domain, the name of "mad Bismarck" (_der tolle Bismarck_). They are
madcaps, and blusterers, prompt to draw their swords, to fight with
pistol or steel, and they do not even avoid a pugilistic scene. One day
in a smoking room at Berlin, the former pupil of _Georgia Augusta_ broke
his beer mug on the skull of a stranger disrespectful in his language
towards a member of the royal family; not, however, without having first
addressed a charitable warning to the insolent speaker, nor without
having afterwards, very sedately, very politely, asked of the waiter the
cost of the damage.[18] This happened in 1850; M. de Bismarck had
already been deputy several years, and was on the point of becoming
minister plenipotentiary to the Germanic Confederation.

_Der tolle Bismarck_; it was not only at Kniephof and at Schoenhausen
that the future chancellor of Germany was thus called. The Berlinese
themselves had no other name for him for a long time, during all the
parliamentary period of the young deputy of the Mark, since his maiden
speech and his first appearance on the tribune,--when having provoked
an indescribable tumult by a violent attack against the liberals he
drew from his pocket a newspaper, and quietly commenced reading, while
waiting for the storm to calm,--up to his last speech on December 3,
1850, which completed the exasperation of the chamber, but was worth a
diplomatic post to the orator. Success advances a little like the
aristocratic law of the Chinese: it is necessary to supply glory from
the rear and to throw lustre on the obscure antecedents of the favorite
of fortune. This was, however, more to mistake the time and to misplace
the historical perspective, than to wish to assign to M. de Bismarck in
those years (1847-50) any important _rôle_ which he did not fill until
fifteen years later. The truth is that this _rôle_ was not in this first
period either of such eminence, or, above all, sufficiently respected to
be tempted to arrange itself in an abstract, inductive method. An active
and restless member of the group of _Juncker_ in 1847, and of the great
_party of the cross_ which was formed after the revolution of February,
the country gentleman of Schoenhausen was far from having in the bosom
of this party the authority of a Gerlach and a Stahl, or the great
position of a similar feudal lord of Silesia or Pomerania. In spite of
his audacity, his impetuosity, and his _sang-froid_; in spite of his
exceedingly happy sallies with an eloquence unequal and embarrassed in a
very different manner from to-day, M. de Bismarck was at this epoch
nothing but the Hotspur, and the _enfant terrible_ of the sacred phalanx
which defended the throne, the altar, and the conservative principles.
He was in a measure the General Temple of the ill-tempered
light-horsemen, a General Temple joined with the Marquis of Piré. At
any rate he only passed for a successful Thadden-Triglaff, that brave M.
Thadden-Triglaff who declared that he desired the liberty of the press,
on condition, however, "that there was a power by the side of each
journal to hang up the pamphleteers." The speeches of M. de Bismarck,
friend and neighbor of this ingenious legislator of the press, were
often not more reasonable. Did he not say one day, word for word, "that
all the great cities ought to be destroyed and razed to the ground, as
the eternal homes of revolution?"

The Athenians of the Spree[19] laughed at these jests, repeated those
words full of _humor_, and above all admired a certain argument _ad
hominem_ by means of a mug of beer. Occasionally also they criticised
with malice the advances made to the innocent, to the democrats, and
diverted themselves especially over the famous little branch of olive
which the country squire of Schoenhausen showed one day to his colleague
of the chamber, the very radical Doctor d'Ester. This branch, he told
him, he had cut in a recent excursion to Vaucluse, from the tomb of
Laura and Petrarch. He put it carefully in his cigar case and thought of
presenting it one day to the red gentlemen "as a sign of
reconciliation." It was in the strange destiny of this extraordinary man
not to be thought in earnest until the day when he became terrible. _Der
tolle Bismarck_, the Germans said in 1850; at Frankfort the good Count
Rechberg called him scoffingly a _Bursche_, and he was considered a
personage worthy of laughter in the eyes of the French minister, a man
of mind, however, even in 1864. The year after the legendary coast of
Biarritz, he pursued with his projects the Emperor Napoleon III., who,
resting on the arm of the author of "Colomba," whispered from time to
time into the ear of the academician senator those words: "He is crazy!"
Five years later the dreamer of Ham gave up his sword to the crazy man
of the Mark.

"I belong,"--such was the defiant declaration of M. de Bismarck in one
of his first speeches in the chamber,--"I belong to an opinion which
glories in the reproaches of obscurantism, and of tendencies of the
Middle Age; I belong to that great multitude which is compared with
disdain to the most intelligent party of the nation." He wanted a
_Christian State_. "Without a religious basis," said he, "a state is
nothing but a fortuitous aggregation of interests, a sort of bastion in
a war of all against all; without this religious basis, all legislation,
instead of regenerating itself at the living sources of eternal truth,
is only tossed about by human ideas as vague as changeable." It is for
this reason that he pronounced against the emancipation of the Jews, and
repulsed, above all, with horror the institution of civil marriage, a
degrading institution, and one which "made the church the train-bearer
(_Schleppentraeger_) of a subaltern bureaucracy."[20] He was as
_intransigeant_ for the throne as for the altar: he set at defiance the
principle of the sovereignty of the people; universal suffrage (which he
himself was to introduce one day into the whole German empire!) seemed
to him a social danger and an outrage to good sense. He denied the
rights of the nation; the crown alone had rights: the old Prussian
spirit knew but that,--"and this old Prussian spirit is a Bucephalus who
willingly allows his legitimate master to mount him, but who will throw
to the ground every Sunday rider (_Sonntagsreiter_)!"

A resolute adversary of modern ideas, of constitutional theories, and of
all that then formed the programme of the liberal party in Prussia, the
deputy of the Mark combated with the same energy the two great national
passions of this party: the "deliverance" of Schleswig-Holstein and the
unity of Germany. He deplored that "the royal Prussian troops had gone
to defend the revolution in Schleswig against the legitimate sovereign
of that country, the King of Denmark;" he asserted that they were making
a groundless quarrel with this king, that they sought a quarrel with him
"for no cause" (_um des Kaisers Bart_), and he did not hesitate to
declare before an angry chamber, that the war provoked in the Duchies of
the Elbe was "an undertaking eminently iniquitous, frivolous,
disastrous, and revolutionary."[21] As to the unity of Germany, the
young orator of the ultras repulsed it in the name of Right, of the
sovereignty and of the independence of princes, as well as in the name
of patriotism, be it understood. He was Prussian, a _specific_ Prussian,
a hardened Prussian (_stockpreusse_), and cared very little to unite
the good and firm substance "with the dissolved elements (_das
zerfahrene Wesen_) of the South." He called on the army: Does this army
wish to exchange the old national colors, black and white, for this
German tricolor, which was only known to it as the emblem of revolution?
Does it wish to exchange its old Dessauer march for the song of a
Professor Arndt on the _German fatherland_?

We have already spoken of his speech against the imperial crown offered
by the parliament of Frankfort, of the ingenious allusion borrowed from
the libretto of the "Freischütz." While refusing the imperial crown,
Frederick William IV. did not the less endeavor, during the years 1849
and 1850, to rescue some waifs from this wreck of unitarian ideas; he
tried to group around himself, and with the aid of the liberals, a
notable part of the Germanic body, to create a sort of northern
confederation: "restricted union" became for a moment the _mot d'ordre_
of a programme which General Radowitz was charged to place on the stage
of the parliament of Erfurt. M. de Bismarck condemned without pity or
weakness all these vain attempts; with the great theorician of his
party, the celebrated Professor Stahl, he pleaded for the return to the
_statu quo_ prior to 1848. Like him he demanded "that the overturned
column of right be replaced in Germany," that the _Bund_ be restored on
legal bases, according to the terms of the treaty of Vienna, and that no
cessation should be made in placing Prussian politics on its guard
against any "course of Phæton" in a region of clouds and thunder.

The thunderbolt did not in truth delay in striking, and the "course of
Phæton" was brusquely arrested by the hand of that great Austrian
minister, who himself only traversed, like a luminous meteor, the most
elevated regions of power to disappear suddenly and to leave behind him
eternal regrets. Prince Felix de Schwarzenberg recalls in some respects
those statesmen of whom England lately offered the astounding example,
those Peterboroughs, those Bentincks, and those like them, who knew how
to interrupt, almost suddenly, a life given up to pleasures and to the
frivolous follies of the world, to reveal themselves in a trice like
veritable political geniuses, and to die before their time, after having
exhausted the intoxication of easy good fortune and of glory, arduous in
a very different degree. It is known with what a firm and steady hand
the prince seized the helm of affairs in Austria, and in how short a
time he succeeded in lifting up a monarchy placed on the brink of an
abyss. Was his conduct in every particular irreproachable; was it even
provident to the end? That is not the question for us. Let us limit
ourselves in saying that rarely has a minister met with more good luck
in his short career, found so much assurance in success, and spoken in a
loftier or prouder tone in vexatious necessities. This time Prince
Schwarzenberg spoke with all the authority which right gave him. Perhaps
he spoke even too harshly, and Prussia seemed for a moment ready to pick
up the glove. Frederick William IV. demanded of the chambers a credit of
fourteen million thalers for the armament, and made a warlike speech.
Europe became attentive, the national assembly of France was on the
point of ordering a new levy of troops, and, fatidical prelude of a
tragedy which was not to be played till fifteen years later, in 1850 as
in 1866, Louis Napoleon thought that he ought to encourage the cabinet
of Berlin, encourage it with aid, and in direct opposition to the
general sentiment of the country! While the national assembly in France
pronounced itself very plainly for neutrality and the minister of
foreign affairs was even inclined in favor of Austria, the president of
the republic sent an intimate friend to Berlin, M. de Persigny, with the
mission to engage the King of Prussia as much as possible in the war.
War appeared inevitable. The troops were already disposed in two parts;
there had already been encounters between the advanced guards. All of a
sudden, and before a menacing ultimatum from Vienna, strengthened by a
friendly notice from St. Petersburg, M. de Manteuffel, president of the
Prussian council, proposed to that of Austria to hold an interview at
Oderberg, on the frontier of the two States. Some hours after having
sent this proposition, he announced by telegraph (a proceeding then very
rare), that, on positive orders from the king, he should go as far as
Olmütz, without waiting for the reply. He went there, and signed (29
November, 1850) the preliminaries of peace, the famous "punctuations" by
which Prussia yielded to the demands of Austria on every point.

It is not astonishing that such a profound humiliation,--preceded by a
measure of distress up to that time unheard of in the annals of
diplomacy, and immediately followed by an Austrian dispatch which very
uselessly did nothing but irritate the wound,[22]--filled liberal
Prussia with grief and indignation. It was in vain that M. de Manteuffel
endeavored to justify his conduct before the national mind. He affirmed
that he would rather be placed "in front of conical balls than pointed
speeches" (_lieber Spitzkugeln als spitze Reden_); the chamber of Berlin
expressed with passion the griefs of the country, and M. de Vincke
closed one of the most vehement philippics with these words: "Down with
the ministry!" A single orator dared to undertake the defense of the
ministry, and to make in the same moment the apotheosis of Austria.
Already in the preceding year M. de Bismarck had desired for his country
the _rôle_ of the Emperor Nicholas in Hungary. Since then he had never
neglected an occasion to resent in behalf of the empire of the Hapsburg
the insults which German liberalism had heaped on him, and he remained
true to this policy even in the most extraordinary circumstances, and in
the midst of the indescribable clamors of the assembly. He maintained
that there could be no possible or legitimate federation in Germany
without Austria. One of the greatest griefs of the Teutons against
Austria has been in all times its not forming a state purely German, its
containing in its bosom different populations and of an "inferior" race.
This was the principal argument of the parliament of Frankfort in favor
of the constitution of a Germany without the empire of the Hapsburg, and
M. de Bismarck did not fail to reproduce it in 1866, in a memorable
circular. In 1850 the deputy of the Mark did not share this opinion; he
was convinced that "Austria was a German power in the full force of the
term, although it also had the good fortune to exercise its dominion
over foreign nationalities," and he boldly concluded that "_Prussia
should subordinate itself to Austria_ to the end that they might combat
in concert the menacing democracy." Truly, in recalling that session of
the Prussian chamber on the 3d December, 1850, one can, in the words of
Montesquieu, observe the spectacle of the astounding vicissitudes of
history; but the irony of fate commences to take its truly fantastic
proportions, when one remembers that it was precisely this speech of the
3d December, 1850, which decided the vocation of M. de Bismarck and
opened to him the career of foreign affairs. Forced to consent to the
restoration of the _Bund_, and resigned to the preponderance of the
empire of the Hapsburg, the Prussian government thought in truth that it
could give no better pledges of its disposition than in choosing for its
plenipotentiary to the Germanic Confederation the ardent orator whose
devotion to the cause of the Hapsburg was even able to resist the proof
of the humiliation of Olmütz. And it was as the most decided partisan of
Austria that the future conqueror of Sadowa made his entrance into the
arena of diplomacy!

The chamber was prorogued in consequence of this stormy discussion. The
rupture with the national party was consummated, and M. de Manteuffel,
whose cold and bureaucratic mind sympathized in reality but very
slightly with the ultras, thought it nevertheless useful to strengthen
the government by making them some advances. Several prominent posts in
the civil service were conferred on members of the extreme right: M. de
Kleist-Retzow, among others, held the presidency of the Rhenish
provinces. One could hardly dream of utilizing in the same manner the
talents of the former _referendarius_ of Potsdam and Greifswalde, who
had shown so little disposition and taste for the administrative career:
on account of the considerations already mentioned, it was first thought
of sending him to Frankfort as first secretary of the legation, but with
the assurance of being made real representative at the end of some time.
This choice produced some surprise. It was an entirely new proceeding
(they have become accustomed to it there and in other places since) to
reward a deputy with a diplomatic mission for his attitude or his vote
in the chamber. It was asked if the eccentric and impetuous cavalier of
the Mark would be the right man in the right place in the midst of such
delicate circumstances. The timid and overscrupulous M. de Manteuffel
was not without apprehension on this head, and the very ardor with which
M. de Bismarck accepted the position only augmented the uneasiness of
the president of the council. King Frederick William IV., who personally
had a very high regard for the ardent "Percy" of the _party of the
cross_, had nevertheless some doubts. "Your majesty can try me," said
the aspirant for diplomacy; "if matters go wrong, your majesty will be
at perfect liberty to recall me at the end of six months or even
before."

It was only, however, at the end of eight years that he was recalled by
the successor of Frederick William IV. And still, after the first days
of his mission (June, 1851) he expressed himself thus in a confidential
letter concerning the men and the affairs he was charged to deal with:
"Our relations here consist in distrust and mutual _espionage_. If we
only had something to spy out or to hide! But these are merely silly
trifles, for which these people torment their minds. These diplomats who
retail with an air of importance their _bric-à-brac_, seem to me much
more ridiculous than a deputy of the second chamber draping himself in
the feeling of his dignity. If exterior events do not unexpectedly
arise, I know from to-day exactly what we shall have done in two, three,
or five years, and what we can dispatch in twenty-four hours, if we wish
to be sincere and reasonable for one day. I never doubted that all these
gentlemen did their cooking in water; but a soup so watery and insipid
that it is impossible to find in it a trace of fat does not cease to
astonish me.... I have made very rapid progress in the art of saying
nothing with many words; I write several sheets of reports, plain and
round, like the leading articles, and if, after having read them,
Manteuffel understands a jot, he is cleverer than I am. No one, not even
the most malicious of democrats can have any idea what nonsense and
charlatanisms diplomacy hides."

Some years later, during the complications of the Orient, he wrote to
his sister Malvina: "I am at a session of the _Bund_; a very highly
honored colleague is reading a very stupid speech on the anarchical
situation in Upper Lippe, and I think that I cannot better improve this
opportunity than in pouring out before you my fraternal sentiments.
These knights of the _round table_ who surround me in this ground floor
of the Taxis palace are very honorable men, but not at all amusing. The
table, twenty feet in diameter, is covered with a green cloth. Think of
X---- and of Z---- in Berlin; they are entirely of the calibre of these
gentlemen of the _Bundestag_. I have the habit of approaching all things
with a feeling of innocence which gapes. My disposition of mind is that
of a careless lassitude after I have succeeded in bringing little by
little the _Bund_ to the desolating consciousness of its profound
nothingness. Do you remember the _Lied_ of Heine: _O Bund, o chien tu
n'es pas sain_, etc.? Well! that _Lied_ will soon, and by a unanimous
vote, be raised to the rank of national hymn of Germany."

The lassitude, the disgust as well as the contempt for the _Bund_
increased from year to year. In 1858 he thought of leaving the career
forever. He had enough of "this _régime_ of truffles, of dispatches and
of grand crosses." He spoke of withdrawing "under the guns of
Schoenhausen," or still better of "growing young by ten years, and once
more taking the offensive position of 1848 and 1849." He wished to
fight, without being hindered by relations and official courtesies, to
throw off the uniform, and to "go into politics in swimming drawers (_in
politischen Schwimmhosen_)."

What is there astonishing in it? Of all imaginable political men, M. de
Bismarck was certainly the least fitted to have a regard and liking for
a deliberative body essentially moderated and moderating, where
everything was discussed in private, in elaborated speeches, thought
over at length and still more freely discussed, and where the gashes and
thrusts actually amounted to nothing. A great congress of peace could
scarcely have any attraction for the ardent Percys whom the smallest
conference of Bangor[23] caused, enraged, to jump out of their skins;
and the _Bundestag_, as we have said, was a permanent congress of peace
called to maintain the _statu quo_ and to remove every cause for
conflict. The little incidents, the little manoeuvres and the little
struggles for influence were not wanting, it is true, in this company,
more than in any other; they served to maintain the good humor of the
ordinary diplomats, and were generally considered as useful stimulants
for the good management of affairs and good digestion of dinners. But
they must have seemed paltry in the eyes of a man of action and of
combat; they must have irritated, at times even exasperated him! To
observe the affairs of the world from this post on the Main, which
allowed them to be grasped in their _ensemble_; to profit by abundant
information, to compose therefrom brilliant dispatches, fit to instruct
and above all to amuse an august master; to utter occasionally a very
_spirituel_, very malicious _mot_, and to rejoice at it; to make others
enjoy it, even to carry it perfectly warm to Stuttgart, and to confide
its further expedition to a gracious Grand Duchess,--that was an
occupation which might content Prince Gortchakof, even charm the leisure
hours of a man educated in the school of Count Nesselrode and grown old
in the career. But how was it possible to make such an existence
agreeable to a cavalier of the Mark, improvised into a minister
plenipotentiary, or to shut up in such a narrow circle, though a
pleasant one, a "_fiancé_ of Bellona," still foaming from battles
delivered without cessation for four years on a resounding stage! In
order to find a fitting compensation in the new circle in which he was
placed, he needed at least some great European combination, some great
negotiation capable of exercising his faculties, and of making them
known,--and they talked to him of _bric-à-brac_, of Upper Lippe! A
negotiation as insignificant as that with the poor Augustenburg, brought
to a happy end in 1852, could certainly not be counted among the
triumphs worthy of a Bismarck,[24] and this was nevertheless the single
and pitiful "bubble of fat" which he was able to discover in the soup
cooked during several years at Frankfort!

It is true that the question of the Orient did not delay in breaking
out, and that at first it even seemed to open vast perspectives. Prussia
was well disposed towards Russia. The secondary States of Germany showed
themselves still more ardent, and sometimes even went so far as to have
the appearance of being willing to draw their swords; so much the worse
for Austria if she persisted in making common cause with the allies;
that might bring about important territorial modifications, and all to
the advantage of the House of Hohenzollern! And the representative of
Prussia to the Germanic Confederation ("his excellency the lieutenant,"
as he was then called on account of the Landwehr uniform which he liked
to wear) gave a warm and firm support in this crisis to his colleague of
Russia, who had become his most intimate friend. He was not, however,
long in seeing that the Germanic Confederation would not desert its
neutrality; that the secondary States, in spite of all the agitations in
the conferences of Bamberg, would not take an active part either in one
sense or in the other, and that the war would be localized in the Black
Sea and the Baltic. He conceived a profound disdain for the _Bund_, was
"conscious of its unfathomable nothingness," and hummed over the green
cloth of the Taxis palace the _Lied_ of Heine on the Diet of Frankfort.
In addition, he experienced on this occasion a grief, which he never
forgot, which he recalled many years afterwards in a confidential
dispatch which has become celebrated. During the Oriental complications,
he wrote in 1859 to M. de Schleinitz, "Austria overcame us at Frankfort
in spite of all the commonalty of ideas and desires which we then had
with the secondary States. These States, after each oscillation, always
indicate with the activity of the magnetized needle, the same point of
attraction." Nothing more natural, however; it was not from the empire
of the Hapsburg that Hanover and Saxony had to dread certain annexation,
as events have since proved only too clearly. But the man who can one
day desire the destruction of great cities, as the hot-beds of
revolutionary spirit, did not hesitate to condemn in his soul and
conscience the small States as the inextinguishable hearths of the
"Austrian spirit."

Austria, in truth, was not slow in taking in the thoughts and the
resentments of the cavalier of the Mark the place which the revolution
had lately held there, and the ardent champion of Hapsburg in the
chambers of Berlin became little by little their most bitter, most
implacable enemy in the _Bundestag_. Moreover, all the great men of
Prussia, commencing with the great elector and Frederick II., and
without excepting William I., have always had, as regards Austria, "two
souls in their breasts" like Faust, or, like Rebecca, "two children
conflicting with one another in her bosom;" in a word, two principles,
one of which imbued them with an almost religious respect for the
antique and illustrious imperial house, while the other urged them to
conquest and spoliation at the cost of this very house. In the month of
May, 1849, the honest and poetical King Frederick William IV. declared
to a deputation of ministers from the Germanic States,[25] "that he
should consider that day as the most happy one of his life when he
should hold the wash basin (_Waschbecken_) at the coronation of a
Hapsburg as Emperor of Germany;" that did not prevent him later from
smiling from time to time at the work of the parliament of Frankfort,
and from working for the "restricted union" under the auspices of
General de Radowitz. And even M. de Bismarck was certainly very sincere
as deputy of the Prussian parliament in his "Austrian religion," when in
the name of conservative principles he undertook the energetic defense
of the Hapsburg against the attacks of German liberalism; but he was now
the representative of his government in the Taxis palace, encountered
Austria on its way to a struggle for influence with the secondary
States, to a struggle of interests concerning the affairs of the Orient,
and he began to engage in an order of ideas, at the end of which he was
to take up the policy of "heart blow." It was thus that on the occasion
of the war in the Orient and in the very city of Frankfort there arose
in the hearts of the two future chancellors of Russia and of Germany
that hatred of Austria which was to have such fatal consequences, for,
that the reader may not be deceived, it was the connivance of these two
political men,--the fatal ideology of the Emperor Napoleon III. aiding
them largely, it is just to add,--which rendered possible the
catastrophes of which our days have been the witnesses: the calamity of
Sadowa, and the destruction of the _Bund_, and the dismemberment of
Denmark as well as of France! With Prince Gortchakof, this sentiment of
hostility burst forth suddenly in consequence of an erroneous
appreciation of events, but which his whole nation shared with him. With
M. de Bismarck, the hatred of Austria had not an origin so spontaneous;
it had not, for instance, as an origin, the grievances of Olmütz, which
the deputy of the Mark had on the contrary been able to easily overcome;
it was slow in forming, it developed, consolidated itself in consequence
of a long and daily struggle in the heart of the _Bund_, in consequence
of an experience acquired at the end of several years of vain attempts,
and from the definite conviction that Hapsburg would never of its free
will, abandon the secondary States, and he defended them against every
effort at absorption. Resuming the instruction which his sojourn of
eight years at Frankfort had given him, the representative of Prussia to
the Germanic Confederation wrote in 1859, in his often quoted dispatch
to M. de Schleinitz, those remarkable words: "I see in our federal
relations a fault which sooner or later we must cure _ferro et igne_."
_Ferro et igne!_ that is the first version of the received text "iron
and blood," which one day the president of the council laid down in an
official manner in a speech to the chamber.

At the same time that the ancient "Austrian religion" underwent with its
former ardent confessor a transformation so radical, a no less curious
change was wrought in his mind in regard to several other articles of
the _credo_ of his party. Removed from the _mêlée_ and participating no
longer in the parliamentary struggles, he began to observe more coldly
certain questions important in those times, and to temper more than one
antipathy of past days. Since 1852, on returning from a trip to Berlin,
he writes: "There is something demoralizing in the air of the chamber;
the best men of the world become vain there and cling to the Tribune as
a woman to her toilet.... I find parliamentary intrigues hollow and
unworthy of any notice. While one lives in their midst, one has
illusions concerning them, and attaches to them I do not know how much
importance.... Every time that I arrive there from Frankfort, I
experience the feelings of a temperate man who falls among drunken
people." Many things in old times disgraceful and abhorred, take now a
less repulsive aspect to the eyes of the statesmen maturing great
projects for the future. "The chamber and the press can become the most
powerful instruments of our external policy," wrote in 1856 the former
despiser of parliamentarism and friend of M. Thadden-Triglaff, and it is
thus that one finds in the correspondence of these times the vague idea
of a national representation of the _Zollverein_, even a pronounced
desire for universal suffrage itself, provided that these means could
become the _instrumenta regni_. The example of the second empire
exercised then an influence which the historian should carefully bear in
mind. This system of absolutism tinged with popular passions, "spotted
with red," to employ a characteristic expression of M. de Bismarck,
seduced the imagination of more than one aspirant for _coups d'état_ and
_coups d'éclat_, and the former colleague of the Doctor d'Ester must
have opened his cigar case more than once and contemplated there the
little sprig of olive plucked from the tomb of Petrarch and Laura.

Yet the goal seemed distant, and how veiled was the future, still
indistinctly seen! It was not under King Frederick William IV., whose
mind became more and more clouded, that he was permitted to think of
action; even the accession of the regent, the present King William,
seemed at first to make no change in the exterior situation. The new
ministers of the regent, the ministers of the _new era_, as was said
then, were honest doctrinarians who spoke of the development of conceded
liberties and of the strengthening of the representative _régime_. The
good and _naïf_, they even allowed William I. to proclaim solemnly one
day that "Prussia need only make _moral conquests_ in Germany!"
Evidently the _new era_ was not yet the era of M. de Bismarck. During
the years which passed after the war of the Orient until his embassy in
Russia, one sees the representative of Prussia to the Germanic
Confederation in constant motion, on continual journeys across Germany,
France, Denmark, Sweden, Courland, and Upper Italy, seeking subjects for
distraction, or perhaps also subjects for observation, and each time
returning to Frankfort only to raise a difficulty, break some
_bric-à-brac_, and to press to the utmost the nervous and bilious Count
Rechberg, Austrian representative and president of the _Bundestag_. His
frequent excursions to Paris caused him to have a presentiment of the
events which were preparing in Italy; he only became more aggressive,
and there was a time when his recall was considered at Frankfort as
indispensable for the maintenance of peace. It was at this moment that
he thought of definitely abandoning this career, of throwing off the
uniform, and of going into politics in his "swimming drawers." He
consented, however, to do it in "a bear-skin and with caviar," as he
expressed himself in one of his letters; in other words called to
exchange his post at Frankfort for that at St. Petersburg. One hoped
thus to remove him from the burning ground, to "put him on ice" (another
expression of M. de Bismarck); as for himself, he perhaps attached other
hopes to this removal, and in any case found consolation in seeing his
former colleague of Frankfort become principal minister of a great
empire, and with whom he was always on such good terms. The 1st of
April, 1859, "the anniversary of his birth," M. de Bismarck arrived in
the capital of Russia.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] Plutarch, Theseus, _initio._

[2] _Aus der Petersburger Gesellschaft_, vol. ii. p. 156.

[3] Expressions from the Russian circular of the 6th July, 1848,
addressed by Count Nesselrode to his agents in Germany.

[4] The Germanic Confederation was formed in 1816. Frankfort was chosen
as its seat, whither delegates were sent from all the States of Germany
retaining sovereign rights. These delegates formed the assembly called
the Diet.

The assembly was composed of seventeen envoys, presided over by the
representative of Austria. There were however thirty-one States
exclusive of the free cities, represented in the last period of the
Diet's existence. The Diet was so constituted that each of the following
States or combination of States had one representative: Austria;
Prussia; Bavaria; Kingdom of Saxony; Hanover; Würtemberg; Grand Duchy of
Baden; Electorate of Hesse; Grand Ducal Hesse; Denmark, for the Duchies
of Holstein and Lauenburg; The Netherlands, for Limburg and Luxemburg;
The Duchies of Saxe-Meiningen, Saxe-Coburg-Gotha and Saxe-Altenburg;
Brunswick and Nassau; The two Mecklenburgs (Schwerin and Strelitz);
Oldenburg, Anhalt and two Schwarzburgs (Rudolstadt and Sonderhausen);
Lichtenstein, Reuss, Schaumburg Lippe, Lippe Detmold, Waldeck and Hesse
Homburg; The free cities, Lubeck, Frankfort, Bremen and Hamburg.

The votes were equal. Sittings were secret.

On important occasions the assembly was resolved into what was called
the _plenum_, in which a greater number of votes were assigned to the
chief States, and the total number of voices was then increased to
seventy. In these cases a majority of three fourths was necessary for
any question to be carried.

The leading idea with the founders of the Diet was the preservation of
internal tranquillity, the next, the formation of a league which should
inspire other nations with respect.

Ambassadors were accredited to the Diet.--TRANSLATOR.

[5] Russian circular of the 27th May, 1859, concerning the war in Italy.

[6] This young lieutenant was M. de Bismarck. The _Landwehr_ is divided
into two levies. The soldier belongs to the first levy seven years, to
the second levy for a like period.--TRANSLATOR.

[7] A writer in a position to be well informed, a former under secretary
of state in the ministry of Prince Schwarzenberg, thus narrates the
origin of Russian intervention in Hungary, tracing it back to 1833, to
the celebrated interview of Munchengraetz between the Emperor Francis I.
of Austria and the Czar Nicholas. In one of the confidential
conversations, Francis spoke with sadness and apprehensions of the
sickly and nervous state of his son and prospective successor, and
begged the czar to maintain towards that son the friendship which he had
always had for the father. "Nicholas fell on his knees, and raising his
right hand to heaven, swore to give to the successor of Francis all aid
and succor he should ever need. The old Emperor of Austria was
profoundly touched, and placed his hands on the head of the kneeling
czar as a token of benediction." This strange scene had no witness, but
each of the two sovereigns narrated it some months later to a superior
officer who then commanded the division of the army stationed at
Munchengraetz. This superior officer was no other than the Prince of
Windischgraetz, who, later, in 1848, nominated and made generalissimo of
the Austrian army at the critical moment of the Hungarian insurrection,
took upon himself to recall to Nicholas, in a letter, the pledge
formerly given at Munchengraetz. The czar replied by placing his whole
army at the disposition of his imperial and apostolic majesty.--Cf.
Hefter, _Geschichte Oesterreichs_, Prague, 1869, vol. i. pp. 68-69.

[8] Session of the Prussian chamber of the 6th September, 1849. This
speech is not reproduced in the official collection of the _speeches_ of
M. de Bismarck published at Berlin.

[9] The battle of Sadowa, or as it is more commonly called in Germany, the
battle of Königsgrätz, was fought on the 3d of July, 1866, and decided the
result of the conflict between Prussia and Austria.--TRANSLATOR.

[10] We take the liberty of citing on this subject a piquante _scène
d'antichambre_ which has its instructive side. There was then at Vienna,
in the ministry of foreign affairs, a very original figure, an usher,
the memory of whom is not effaced at the Ballplatz. He bore the uncouth
name of Kadernoschka; placed in the large waiting room before the
cabinet of the minister, it was his duty to introduce the different
visitors to the chief. This M. Kadernoschka was an usher of great style:
he had been trained by the old Prince Metternich himself and loved to
recall that he had "exercised his functions" from the time of the famous
congress of 1815! One day, after a long interview with Prince
Gortchakof, Count Buol sees this good Kadernoschka entering with a more
than usually solemn air. He had a communication to make to his
Excellency "in the interest of the service!" And Count Buol learns that
the Russian envoy, after having left his Excellency, had appeared
entirely overcome and suffocating with anger,--that he had asked for a
glass of water; that for half an hour he had walked up and down in the
waiting room, gesticulating with violence, talking to himself, and
crying from time to time in French: "Oh! some day they shall pay me well
for that, they shall pay me for that!"

[11] Protocol of the conference of the 17th April, 1855.

[12] A religious ceremony which, in the Protestant Church, corresponds
in a certain degree to the first communion in the Catholic Church.

[13] Referring to Henry IV., Emperor of Germany from 1056 to 1106, who
humbled himself before Pope Gregory VII. at Canossa in 1077.--TRANSLATOR.

[14] Referring to the closing words of Cato's speeches: _Cæterum censeo
Carthaginem esse delendam_.--TRANSLATOR.

[15] Treaty of Gastein, 14th August, 1865, between Austria and Prussia
on the one side and Denmark on the other.--TRANSLATOR.

[16] _Sturm and Drang-Periode_, first period of Goethe and Schiller.

[17] Varzin, the Tusculum of the German chancellor, is situated in
Pomerania, to the right of the Stettin-Danzig road, and about ten miles
from Schlawe. The comfortable dwelling-house is almost surrounded by a
magnificent park of beech and oak trees. Varzin has been in M. de
Bismarck's possession since 1867.--TRANSLATOR.

[18] In the popular edition of the book of M. Hesekiel, this scene is
_illustrated_ by a vignette.

[19] Berlin is situated on the river Spree.--TRANSLATOR.

[20] Session of the chamber of the 15th November, 1849. One knows that
the chancellor of Germany has lately enacted a law which institutes
civil marriage in Prussia. However, none of the speeches which have been
cited is found in the official collection of the _speeches_ of M. de
Bismarck published at Berlin.

[21] Session of the chamber of the 21st April, 1849. See also the
interpellation of M. Temme in the session of the 17th April, 1863.

[22] A circular of Prince Schwarzenberg, made public by a calculated
indiscretion, after having related the incident of the telegraph, and
the desperate course of M. de Manteuffel as regards the Austrian
minister, added: "His majesty the Emperor thinks it his duty to comply
with the desire of the King of Prussia, _so modestly expressed_."

[23] Shakspere, _Henry IV._ part I. act iii. scene I.

[24] It does not, however, fail to be interesting, and to even have a
very piquant side. Still full of the conviction that they had made on
Denmark a war "eminently iniquitous, frivolous, and revolutionary," the
Prussian plenipotentiary to the _Bund_ labored, in 1852, very actively
in dissipating for the future a possible cause of perturbation, and
negotiated an Esau bargain with the Duke Christian-August Augustenburg,
the former upholder of _Schleswig-Holsteinism_, and eventual pretender
to the Duchies. Thanks to the intervention of M. de Bismarck, the old
duke signed for the sum of one million and a half rixdalers given by the
government of Copenhagen, a solemn act, by which he bound "_himself and
his family_, on his princely word and honor, to undertake nothing which
could disturb the tranquillity of the Danish monarchy." That did not
prevent the son of Christian from impudently insisting on his pretended
rights in 1863, nor even M. de Bismarck from supporting them for a
certain time, up to the moment when the famous syndics of the crown cast
the doubt in the soul of the first minister at Berlin and proved to him
that the Duchies, belonging by right to no one, belonged to King William
by the fact of conquest.

[25] The minister of Nassau, Baron Max de Gagern was at the head of this
deputation.




II.

A NATIONAL MINISTER AND A FAULT-FINDING DIPLOMAT AT ST. PETERSBURG.


I.

In the prodigious development which advanced the empire of the czars
after the impulse which the genius of Peter the Great had given it, one
can certainly signalize more than one Russian minister of foreign
affairs whose name has a right to be commemorated by history. For
instance, the mind of Count Panine was not an ordinary one, who
conceived and caused to be accepted by different states the idea of
_armed neutrality_ at sea, and this at an epoch when Russia scarcely
began to be reckoned among the maritime powers of the second or third
class. If in this bold conception, as well as in the still more
interesting attempts of Panine to limit the absolute power of the czars
by aristocratic institutions, the remote influence of an Italian origin
could be seen (the Panine descended from the Pagnini of Lucca), one
cannot, however, overlook the perfectly indigenous, largely,
autochthonal character of another famous minister of the same century,
that of the Chancellor Bestoujef, whose figure Rulhière has drawn so
very originally. Bestoujef, who spoke perfectly, feigned stammering, and
had the courage to simulate this defect for seventeen years. In his
conversations with foreign ambassadors he stammered in such a manner as
not to be understood. He also complained of being deaf, of not
understanding all the _finesses_ of the French language, and had the
same thing repeated a thousand times. He was in the habit of writing
diplomatic notes with his own hand in a manner perfectly illegible. They
were sent back to him and sometimes he could decipher their meaning.
Having fallen into disgrace, Bestoujef immediately recovered his speech,
hearing, and all the senses.

Very different is the type which was presented during all of the first
half of this century by the immediate predecessor of Prince Gortchakof,
the chancellor of the emperors Alexander I. and Nicholas. Connected with
Germany by origin and the interests of his family, never even having
learned to speak the language of the country whose relations with other
powers he watched over, Count Charles Robert de Nesselrode did not the
less complete a long and laborious career to the satisfaction of his two
august masters, and figured with honor in congresses and conferences at
the side of Talleyrand and Metternich. Without having recourse to the
too Asiatic subterfuges of a Bestoujef, Count Nesselrode knew and
practiced all the allowable tricks of the profession, and few men
equaled him in the art of preserving an air of dignity and ease in the
midst of the most embarrassing situations. He knew how to change his
conduct without too great a change of language, and among other things
managed in a very delicate manner the transition between the policy of
the czar Alexander I. (unfavorable to the Greeks) and the frankly
philhellenic sympathies of his successor. During the last Oriental
crisis he placed all the resources of a shrewd and subtle mind at the
service of a cause in which he saw nothing but grave dangers, and of
which he ignored the national and religious side completely. Differing
from Bestoujef, and much more European in this sense than in many
others, M. de Nesselrode lost in his disgrace or rather in his retreat,
the greater part of his faculties and his virtues, and above all caused
an immense deception by his posthumous memoirs, composed in the decline
of life and of a hopeless insignificance. But perhaps this was nothing
but a last trait of cleverness and diplomatic malice in order to deceive
on this point profane curiosity, and to leave behind him a work as empty
and uninstructive as possible of a life so well filled.

Not one, however, of the Russian statesmen who have just been named was
a great minister in the Occidental acceptation of the word. No one of
them (in order to make comparisons in absolute monarchies only) had the
position of a Duke de Choiseul in France during the last century, the
authority of a Prince Clement de Metternich in Austria in the present
century, or even the notoriety and popularity which Prince Gortchakof
actually enjoys in Russia itself. Bestoujef, Panine, Nesselrode were,
one may say, much better known abroad than in their own country, and
their contemporaries were far from attributing to them the merit which
posterity later saw in them, thanks to the posthumous revelations of the
archives. No one of them was raised to power by a current of opinion,
nor sustained in his position by public favor; not one of them
pretended to show an individuality, to impress a personal direction on
the affairs, which he conducted. This is because since Peter the Great
to the present government, the _éclat_ of the imperial name in Russia
cast into the shade every other name, and instead of being a favorite or
a great captain, every state servant was only the subaltern executor of
a single and absolute will. The external policy, above all, was then
considered as the exclusive domain of the sovereign, and the very fixity
of the system rendered in some degree secondary and unimportant the
question of the persons charged with fulfilling it. In fact, from the
time of Peter the Great, the Russian government has always had in its
relations with Europe certain traditions approved by experience, and
certain sacred principles, from which it never deviated even in a small
degree. The minister of foreign affairs at St. Petersburg, whatever his
name might be, always had to labor to augment Russian _prestige_ among
the Christian populations of the Orient, to guard the maintenance of the
equilibrium of power between Austria and Prussia, and to extend the
influence of his government among the secondary States of Germany. To
these rules, so to speak, elementary and invariable, of the external
Russian policy, there was added from the year 1815 an international
principle of preservation, a superior idea of solidarity between the
governments for the defense of established order, the feeling of the
duties and of the common interests created in the representatives of the
monarchical authority in opposition to subversive passions sprung from
the revolution, and it was this _ensemble_ of the views and convictions
of the two emperors Alexander I. and Nicholas which Count Nesselrode
had, during almost half a century, to enforce, in all the acts and
documents emanating from the chancellor's office at St. Petersburg.

It has been the destiny of the successor of Count Nesselrode to break
little by little with all this _ensemble_ of traditions and principles,
and to inaugurate for the empire of the czars, in its external
relations, an entirely new policy. One may dispute the merit of this
policy, and dispute it the more widely as it is still far from having
borne all its fruit. What is indisputable and astonishes at first sight,
is that Prince Gortchakof has been able to attach his name to a change
of system which is marked in the diplomatic annals of his country, and
to create for himself, as minister of foreign affairs in Russia, a
situation entirely personal, an important position, such as none of his
predecessors ever had. Alexander Mikhaïlovitch is not only the faithful
servant of his august master, he is the veritable chief of his
department, the directing minister; he accepts boldly his part of the
responsibility, and above all his share of the _éclat_ in the different
transactions of Europe. An equally new phenomenon in Russia, this
minister not only retains the favor of his sovereign, but also that of
the nation. He manages the public opinion of his country, he watches
over it, sometimes he even flatters it, and it repays him. It has had
some moments of infatuation for Alexander Mikhaïlovitch, even some
moments of enthusiasm,--after the affairs of Poland; more than that, it
has in a measure brought forward and created him. This elevation of the
plenipotentiary of Vienna to the high position left vacant by Count
Nesselrode in the month of April, 1856, was not without its results.

In 1815, on his triumphal return from the congress of Vienna, Alexander
could select as he wished from the celebrated men who then formed the
_état-major_ of Russian diplomacy, the least known and the most humble
of this illustrious body. Passing over Capo d'Istria, Pozzo di Borgo,
Ribeaupierre, Razoumovsky, Stakelberg, d'Anstett, it was lawful for him
to confide the direction of the external policy to a German gentleman of
Westphalian origin, born at Lisbon, and Russian only by naturalization.
In 1856, after the congress of Paris, the choice of Prince Gortchakof
for the same position was, we will not say imposed, but certainly
indicated to the Emperor Alexander II. by the voice of the people, or,
if one likes it better, by that voice of the _salons_ which did not
delay at this moment in taking more and more a popular tone. And since
his _début_ at the Hotel of the Place du Palais the former pupil of
Zarkoe-Zeloe distinguished himself by liberal ways and advances made in
a public spirit, which must have occasionally astonished his
predecessor, still living and in possession of the honored title of
chancellor. For the first time, a Russian minister had _mots_, not only
for the _salons_, but also for the lecture halls and the bureaux of
journalists, words which went straight to the heart of the great lady
and country gentleman, the humble student and proud officer of the
_gardes_. His aphorism on Austria[26] went the rounds of all the
Russias. Another aphorism, taken from a circular, soon transported the
nation: the celebrated phrase, "Russia does not sulk, but meditates,"
seemed to be dictated by the very soul of the people, and drew from it a
cry of enthusiasm. It was then that one remembered the awakening of the
Russian spirit after a long period of compression; the journals, the
thoughtful periodicals, inaugurated their joyful _ébats_, the authors,
the literary men, began to have an importance hitherto unknown;
Alexander Mikhaïlovitch, who always displayed a liking and sympathy for
Russian literature, the former fellow scholar of Pouchkine, passed for a
patriotic statesman in the eyes of Pogodine, Axakof, Katkof, etc. One
perceived that he had a great hatred for Austria, a pronounced desire
for the French alliance, and the nation, which also shared equally and
even in an exaggerated manner, these two sentiments, saluted in him the
national minister _par excellence_. A strange comparison, well made to
demonstrate the inanity of words and the instability of things on earth,
is the manner in which the most decided partisan of the empire of the
Hapsburg, M. de Bismarck, the future conqueror of Sadowa, entered into
the _cænaculum_ of diplomats; and at the same time it was the implacable
enemy of the Germans and the warm friend of the French whom, in 1856,
the Russians exalted above all in the person of their vice-chancellor,
the statesman who, later, by a policy of omission and commission, was to
favor as no one else did, the dismemberment of France and the
constitution of a Germany greater, more powerful, and more formidable
than the history of past centuries has ever known! It is true that by
the "Germans" the Russia of 1856 meant principally the Austrians,[27]
and that in the France of that day it admired above all a certain
absolutism in the democratic instincts which showed itself touched with
the misfortunes of Italy, which professed to sympathize with Roumania,
Servia, Montenegro, and which had not yet pronounced the fatal name of
Poland.

"Calm yourself," the emperor of the French said to M. de Cavour, in the
month of April, 1856, after the closing of the congress of Paris,--"Calm
yourself; I have a presentiment that the present peace will not last
long."[28] Prince Gortchakof had without doubt the same presentiment,
and perhaps others more positive in this respect. The thought of "making
war for an idea," the thought of freeing Italy, had long been fixed in
the mind of Napoleon III.; at the moment of signing the treaty of Paris
"with an eagle's feather," he let his hidden and dreaming glance fall on
the classic plains of Lombardy. Now, for the enterprise which France
meditated against Austria, and in which it could scarcely count on an
angry neutrality of England, it was thought useful to secure in good
season the friendship of Russia and Prussia. Prussia had emerged from
the Oriental crisis very much weakened with its policy "of the free
hand;" England, Austria, and Turkey had even had little desire to admit
it to the honors of the congress. The president of the council at
Berlin, M. de Manteuffel, was obliged to wait long in the antechamber,
while the plenipotentiaries of Europe were in full deliberation, and it
was only at the instance of the emperor of the French that the Prussian
envoy was at last admitted. Napoleon III. insisted absolutely, in 1856,
on allowing _that_ Prussia to retake its position in Europe which
fourteen years later was to dethrone him! As for Russia, we have already
spoken of the politenesses and cordialities of which Count Orlof was the
recipient from France during all the time of the congress. Since then,
in the successive arrangements of the various difficulties which the
execution of some of the clauses of the treaty of Paris caused to arise
(Belgrade, Isle of Sérpents, navigation of the Danube, etc.), one saw
the arguments or interpretations of the Russian plenipotentiary
sustained almost constantly by the plenipotentiary of France. In the
different and numerous conferences and commissions which followed in
these years, 1856-1859, for regulating the pending questions, the
distribution of the votes was almost invariably thus: England and
Austria on one side, on the other France, Russia, and Prussia.[29]

Although Prince Gortchakof acknowledged with good grace all these
attentions of the cabinet of the Tuileries, he was not sufficiently
complaisant to follow it in a campaign of remonstrances against the
government of Naples, a campaign undertaken in concert with the cabinet
of Saint James, in consequence of the famous letters addressed to Lord
Aberdeen by M. Gladstone on the _régime_ of King Ferdinand II. A similar
intermeddling in the internal affairs of an independent state did not
seem very correct in the eyes of the successor of Count Nesselrode; but
he was the more forward in seconding the Emperor Napoleon III. in his
generous designs every time that there was a question of ameliorating
the lot of the Christian populations in the Ottoman empire, of
augmenting their autonomy, and, as was said then, of _reforming the
Turk_. "To reform the Turk," maliciously thought M. Thouvenel,
ambassador of France at Constantinople, "it is necessary to begin by
first impaling him;" one commenced, however, by applying to him the
question of _hatt-houmayoum_, by interrogating him concerning his
intentions in favor of the rajahs of Bosnia, Bulgaria, and Herzegovina,
and by thus annoying in a certain degree the cabinets of Vienna and
London. Much greater was naturally the solicitude for the vassal States
of the good padishah, for Moldavia, Wallachia, Servia, and Montenegro;
these States already had a demi-independence, they made it possible to
render it entire.

The little Prince of Montenegro, former _protégé_ and servitor of the
Emperor Nicholas, had come to visit the sovereign of France after the
peace of Paris, and since his return had quarreled with the sultan, in
consequence of which the _Algésiras_ and _L'Impétueuse_ appeared before
Ragusa. French vessels in the waters of the Orient to menace Turkey, to
the great mortification of England and Austria, to the great rejoicings
of Russia, all this scarcely two years after the war in the Crimea! The
sight was surely not wanting in originality, and prepared the world for
a series of surprises. At about the same time, Servia expelled Prince
Alexander Kara Géorgevitch, and recalled to the throne the old Miloch
Obrenovitch. The Porte protested, England and Austria joined in this
protest; but, thanks to the combined efforts of Russia and France, they
ended by acknowledging the right of the national Servian assembly, whose
principal grievance against the dethroned prince was his having shown
too much sympathy for the allies in the war of 1853! The question of the
Danubian Principalities presented an aspect serious, and also _piquant_.
France and Russia had begged at the congress of Paris for the complete
union of Moldavia and Wallachia; the other Powers were opposed to it,
and, weary of war, they had agreed to accept a combination which
completely assimilated the administration in the two countries, while
maintaining their separation. It was, as later in Italy, the project of
confederation opposed to that of unity; but then there was also given on
the banks of the Danube the first example of that national strategy,
which was soon to show itself on a larger scale in Tuscany and Emelia.
The twofold election of Prince Couza was in truth the first trial of
that popular diplomacy, which later, in Italian affairs, took pleasure
in so often confounding the combinations of high plenipotentiaries and
high contracting parties, and proclaimed in the face of the world a deed
accomplished by the suffrage of the nation. The popular votes annulling
the arrangements of diplomacy, and the understanding of France and
Russia to respect these votes, these are the two salient traits of the
policy in the years 1856-1859, a policy which the liberal opinion of
Europe received with favor without being too much astonished at such a
concordance of views between the cabinets of the Tuileries and St.
Petersburg on this very ground of the Orient, still warm with the
bullets of the war; on this ground, from which Russia should have been,
in the opinion of the allies of 1853, completely shut out, and where she
now regained influence and a footing, modestly it is true, and under the
protecting shadow of France.

At last the Italian complications came, and the government of the czar
increased the testimonials of his good relations with the cabinet of the
Tuileries. "Our relations with France are _cordial_," replied Prince
Gortchakof to Lord Napier, charged by his government with sounding the
disposition of Russia in such grave matters. England then made earnest
efforts to prevent the war in Italy from breaking out. Lord Cowley, sent
with a certain flourish on a mission to Vienna, exerted himself to
discover the possible bases of an accommodation, and the cabinet of St.
James already flattered itself with the hope of having quelled the
tempest, when Prince Gortchakof suddenly proposed a _congress_, and
pronounced that fatal word which then, as so often since, was only the
signal for a rupture. A congress! A treaty of peace before any
hostility, the glory of the triumph without the peril of victory,--that
was the eternal _hystéron-protéron_ of the Napoleonic ideology, that was
the chimera pursued by the dreamer of Ham in the question of the Papacy,
in the question of Poland, and of Denmark; and up to the catastrophe of
1870, after the declaration of war, it is curious to see Prince
Gortchakof first suggest a remedy which imperial France was yet to
recommend so often for all the chronic evils of Europe.[30] The chief of
the English government, the old Earl of Derby, complained bitterly of
the horrible trick which the proposition emanating from St. Petersburg
had played him, and there has never been any doubt in England but that
it was brought about by a telegram sent from Paris. Not less serviceable
for France did the Russian vice-chancellor show himself in his circular
of the 27th May, 1859, when he endeavored to calm the warlike ardor of
the secondary States of Germany, and it was in this celebrated dispatch
that he made the judicious demonstration as well as the merited praise
of the "combination purely and exclusively defensive" of the _Bund_, a
salutary combination which permitted the localization of a war become
inevitable, "in place of generalizing it and giving to the struggle a
character and proportions which escape all human foresight."

Napoleon III. descended to the plains of Lombardy; Austria was
vanquished at Magenta and Solferino, and Russia could enjoy its first
revenge on the ungrateful Hapsburg, who had "betrayed" it before
Sebastopol. The year after, in consequence of the annexation of Savoy,
Lord Russell made the solemn declaration to the parliament that his
country "should not separate itself from the rest of the nations of
Europe; that it should always be ready to act with the different states,
if it did not wish to dread to-day such an annexation, and to-morrow to
hear another spoken of." That was the funeral oration of the
Anglo-French alliance: four years after the war of the Crimea, France
had lost one and then the other of its two great allies in the crisis of
the Orient, and Russia did not care to complain. It did not protest
against the annexation of Savoy; it even declared that it only saw in it
a "regular transaction;" but it profited by the moment to make its
reëntry into European politics, and bring back on the tapis the question
... of the Ottoman empire! The 4th May, 1860, Prince Gortchakof
convoked in his cabinet the ambassadors of the great Powers in order to
examine with them the "dolorous and precarious" position of the
Christians in Bosnia, Herzegovina and Bulgaria, and soon a circular of
the vice-chancellor (20th May) insisted on the reunion of a conference
in order to alter the stipulations established by the treaty of Paris.
"The time of illusions is passed," Alexander Mikhaïlovitch wrote in this
circular; "all hesitation every adjournment will bring grave
inconvenience," and he even seized upon the recent liberation of Italy
as an argument for the future independence of the populations who
awakened all his solicitude: "the events accomplished in the east of
Europe have resounded in all the Orient _like an encouragement and like
a hope_!" Thus, scarcely four years after the treaty of Paris, Russia
began anew to speak to the world of the "sick man," and to do it, it did
not shelter itself, as in the conferences and commissions of 1856-1859,
under the protection and language of France; it went all alone, and took
the initiative in the debate!

This was not enough: in that year alone, 1860, the cabinet of St.
Petersburg regained almost all the ground lost since the war of the
Crimea; that was a year of peculiar fortune for Russia, for it was a
year of universal distrust of France. The acquisition of Savoy, the
strange and profoundly immoral spectacle which the negotiations of this
treaty of Zurich offered, torn up even before being signed, the
Piedmontese annexations in Italy, the expedition of Garibaldi to Sicily,
the "new right" of which the official journals in France spoke, and the
famous pamphlet on the "Pope and Congress," had caused the alarm and
awakened in the highest degree the uneasiness of Europe. Lord Palmerston
declared "that he would only be willing to give his hand to a former
ally in holding the other on the buckler of defense," and he armed his
_volunteers_. Switzerland was violently agitated; the _National-Verein_
swore to die for the defense of the Rhine, and even those honest and
peaceful Belgians affirmed in an address to the king that "if their
independence was menaced, they would submit to the most severe trials."
Above these popular frights the cabals of the sovereigns were agitated;
the German princes united at Baden, and the emperor of the French
thought it opportune to surprise them in a measure in the midst of their
deliberations by making that "rapid voyage" from which the "Moniteur"
promised "very happy results." "Nothing was wanting but the spontaneity
of a proceeding so significant," added the official journal, "to put an
end to this unanimous concert of malicious rumors and false estimations.
In truth, the emperor, in explaining frankly to the sovereigns united at
Baden how his policy never conflicted with right and justice, carried to
minds equally distinguished and equally exempt from prejudices, the
conviction which does not fail to be inspired by a true sentiment
expressed with loyalty." It appeared, however, that the conviction had
not worked completely on the prejudices, for, at the close of the
reunion of Baden, there was another at Toeplitz, between the Emperor of
Austria and the Prince Regent of Prussia, where they agreed on a third
which was to be held at Warsaw with the Emperor of Russia,--and the
czar accepted the _rendezvous_.

"It is not a coalition, it is a reconciliation which I am going to make
at Warsaw," declared the Emperor Alexander II. to the French ambassador,
the Duke of Montebello, whose government was naturally much agitated by
the turn affairs were taking. In truth, conciliating expressions were
not wanting in the dispatch by which Prince Gortchakof "invited the
French government to let him know in what measure it thought that it
would be able to second the efforts which Russia was making to prevent
_the crisis with which Europe was menaced_;" but, however polite these
forms were, they did not hide a necessity for explanation. The cabinet
of the Tuileries replied by a memorandum in which it gave, above all,
"the categoric engagement not to give any support to Piedmont in case
that Austria should be attacked in Venetia." The cabinets of Vienna and
Berlin made their remarks on several points of the French memorandum,
and addressed them ... to the Russian vice-chancellor, who transmitted
them to Paris, with the request for new explanations more explicit and
more reassuring. Sum total, no positive result came from this meeting of
the three sovereigns of the North, who had for a moment caused very
grave apprehensions in France. This was because the Emperor Alexander
had gone to Warsaw only in a particular interest; he did not wish to
make a coalition nor a reconciliation there; he simply wished to show
his influence: to give a demonstration of his power. He was flattered at
seeing these sovereigns, these German princes, coming to the former
capital of Poland to deliberate there on the general situation, and to
receive the word of command: that recalled the good days of the Emperor
Nicholas. On the other side, Russia was very much pleased at making
France feel the whole price of its friendship, at making it understand
that its services had now a much greater value, perhaps even their
tariff. The clever productions which emanated successively in these
years 1856-1860 from the chancellor's office at St. Petersburg,
indicated in a very plastic manner the continually ascending advance of
Russia since the peace of Paris. In the first of these celebrated
circulars, it declared "that it did not sulk, but meditated;" in the
second, on the occasion of the Italian complications, it already emerged
"from the reserve which it had imposed on itself since the war of the
Crimea." After the annexation of Savoy "its conscience warned it of
being any longer silent on the unhappy state of the Christians in the
Orient, etc." At last, in the month of October, 1860, it was the
mouth-piece of the general interests of Europe, the intermediary which
demanded explanations from the cabinets of the Tuileries. A modest
_protégé_ of France, and full of "reserves" until the war in Italy, it
ascends in 1859 to the rank of a "precious friend," to become after the
interview of Warsaw the important and almost indispensable ally,--an
ally very resolute in not accepting a secondary _rôle_, in guarding its
position of marked influence, in taking for itself a large part in the
great combinations of the future.

Assuredly the desultory, undecisive, and eternally contradictory policy
of the Emperor Napoleon III. played into the hands of Russia. But it is
just to acknowledge that Prince Gortchakof allowed no chance of fortune
to escape, and that without creating the events, he understood admirably
how to profit by them. The superiority of the statesman always reveals
itself by the measure which he preserves in his "cordiality" and even in
his vengeance, by the foreseeing mind which he does not cease to
preserve even in the midst of the allurements of success. It is not
doubtful for instance that the warnings of Russia after the battle of
Solferino, the fears which it then suddenly expressed of not being able
longer to restrain Germany in its ardor to go to the rescue of Austria,
contributed greatly to the hasty peace of Villafranca, and, however
fatal this event was as regards the interests of France and even of
Austria, one cannot deny that Russia accomplished its purpose perfectly.
In fact, the complete execution of the programme "of the Alps to the
Adriatic" would have probably given an entirely different turn to the
Italian affairs, would certainly have rendered possible in the future a
sincere reconciliation between France and Austria, while the half drawn
solution by the peace of Villafranca, leaving all the questions in
suspense, could only embitter the relations of the two belligerents, and
render the friendship of Russia more precious to France. On the other
side, this campaign of Lombardy, while giving satisfaction to the
Muscovite hatred sprung from the war of the Orient, was still far from
destroying one of the fundamental elements of the traditional policy of
the czars as regards Germany. In spite of the loss of Milan, Austria
preserved its position intact in the centre of Europe, was a balance for
Prussia, and the interview of Warsaw proved that the Russian influence
among the Germanic States had certainly not decreased.

Not less circumspect and skillful did the Russian vice-chancellor show
himself in not compromising too far in his connivances with the Emperor
Napoleon III. during these years 1856-1860, certain general principles
of preservation which had made the greatness and strength of the reign
of Nicholas. Without doubt, in Servia, in the Danubian Principalities,
Alexander Mikhaïlovitch was not of a vigorous orthodoxy, and allowed
popular votes to annul there the arrangements stipulated by the
treaties; but in comparison with those countries of the Orient Russia
has always allowed itself many political licenses. In the affairs of the
Occident, on the contrary, Prince Gortchakof took care to remain as far
as possible in the traditions and not to overturn too much in the "new
right." He let the journals and periodicals of Moscow and St. Petersburg
plume themselves at their ease on what Russia boldly contributed to the
deliverance of the peoples and to the triumph of nationalities; for
himself, in the documents dated at his office, he refrained carefully
from all these neologisms and persevered in the terminology consecrated
by the old diplomatic language. In these documents he had not spoken at
all of the national aspirations nor of the popular votes, when Milan and
Savoy changed masters; in the eyes of the Russian vice-chancellor, all
these were simply facts of war, "regular transactions." Still less did
he care to make the revolutionary propaganda abroad and to associate
himself in the commerce of exportation which, according to a malicious
remark of those days, Napoleon III. had undertaken with liberal ideas.
He declined categorically all participation in the remonstrances
addressed to the King of Naples, and declared in his circular of the 22d
September, 1856, "that to wish to obtain from a sovereign concessions as
to the internal government of his states in a comminatory manner or by
menacing demonstrations, was to substitute one's self violently on one's
own authority, to govern in his place, and to proclaim without disguise
the right of the strong over the weak." Lastly, in his famous note to
Prince Gagarine of the 10th October, 1860, he took up the Sardinian
government roundly for its conduct in Emilia, Tuscany, the Duchies of
Parma and Modena, and strongly opposed the deposal of these princes and
the annexations of those provinces, which six years later he was to
tolerate, even favor in Germany. "It is no longer," he said in the
dispatch to Prince Gagarine, "a question of Italian interests, but of
general interests, common to all governments, it is a question which is
directly connected with those eternal laws without which, neither order,
peace, nor security can exist in Europe." Finally, he sneered at those
Jenners of politics who recommend the vaccination of anarchy to remove
from it its pernicious character, and who pretend to remove the arms
from the demagogy in appropriating to themselves its baggage; "the
necessity in which the Sardinian government pretends to be situated in
combating anarchy does not justify it, since _it only moves with the
revolution to recover by it its heritage_." In a word, the Russian
vice-chancellor profited with prodigious dexterity by the good
disposition of France and still more by its errors, without ever
sacrificing the will, the decorum, and the principles of his own
government to it. He made use of the Emperor Napoleon III. without using
him too much, and above all without ever subjecting himself to an order
of ideas in which Russia could find any deception. For the good of
Russia, for the happiness of Europe, it would have been desirable for
Prince Gortchakof to have observed later, in his intimacy with Prussia,
a little of that care and that intelligent egotism which he gave proof
of in such a superior manner in his intimacy with France. "To love,
there must be two," said the great theologian of the Middle Ages on the
subject that those centuries of faith called divine love, the relations
of the human soul with its heavenly Creator. The precept is assuredly
much more to be recommended in the much less mystical relations between
the powers of the earth, and the Russian vice-chancellor did not forget
it during that first period of his ministry, during those years of
"cordiality" with the cabinet of the Tuileries. It was only during the
second period that the heart of Alexander Mikhaïlovitch began to control
the right of the state, and that the love for M. de Bismarck proved to
be stronger than the world, stronger even than Russia and its interests.


II.

While Prince Gortchakof thus reaped the fruits of his "French" policy,
among which that of vengeance on Austria was surely not the least sweet
or pleasant, his former colleague of Frankfort, having become
representative of Prussia at the court of Russia, was consumed at his
side by the languishing fever of a man of action trammeled by foolish
probity. He had arrived at St. Petersburg in the spring of the year
1859, three months after the famous birthday reception given to M. de
Hübner by the Emperor Napoleon III.; the Italian complications were
about to break out, and the Russian vice-chancellor lent himself to all
those diplomatic tricks which, according to the desire of the cabinet of
the Tuileries, would drive the Emperor Francis Joseph to a declaration
of war. The new plenipotentiary of Prussia at the court of St.
Petersburg had not a moment of doubt concerning the bearing which his
government should observe in circumstances so propitious. It was from
this time (12th May, 1859) that his confidential dispatch to M. de
Schleinitz dates, in which he recommends the rupture with the _Bund_,
the radical proceeding by sword and fire, _ferro et igne_. In the
preceding year, during a journey to Paris, he had occasion to have an
interview with the Emperor of the French, and to recognize his good will
toward Prussia, and the unqualified wishes which were expressed in the
Tuileries for the greatness and the prosperity of the country of
Frederick II. and of Blücher. In the month of November of that same year
1858, Napoleon III. had charged the Marquis Pepoli, then _en route_ for
Berlin, to represent to the Hohenzollern all the advantages which he
would find in a rupture with Austria: "In Germany," the Emperor of the
French had said, "Austria represents the past, Prussia represents the
future; in linking itself to Austria, Prussia condemns itself to
immobility; it cannot be thus contented; it is called to a higher
fortune; it should accomplish in Germany the great destinies which await
it, and which Germany awaits from it."[31] Thus thought the future
prisoner of Wilhelmshoehe on the eve of Magenta and Solferino, and "his
excellency the lieutenant" certainly found no objections in such a
magnificent programme. But those good ministers of the _new era_ at
Berlin unfortunately had not the slightest notion of the "new right,"
and up to the prince regent himself, they did not cease to speak of
conquests purely _moral_. They even asked one another at Potsdam if they
should not assist Austria, and whether they did not have federal
obligations towards the Emperor Francis Joseph! The Samson of the Mark
strove in vain against the ties which the "Philistines of the Spree"
imposed on him, and the war in Italy became his Dalila: in fact, it was
from this epoch that the renowned boldness of the present chancellor of
Germany dates.

It is interesting to study, in the confidential letters to Malvina, the
state of mind of M. de Bismarck during these years 1859-1860. At the
commencement of hostilities, and evidently despairing of seeing his
government adopt the line of conduct which he had not ceased to
recommend, he left his post, went to Moscow to visit the Kremlin, passed
an agreeable day in a villa, so much more agreeable "when one has the
feeling of being sheltered from the telegraph." The news of a great
battle fought in Lombardy (Magenta) caused him, nevertheless, to return
to St. Petersburg. "Perhaps there will be something for the diplomats to
do." At St. Petersburg, he learns of the strange desire at Berlin of
interceding for Austria, of mobilizing the federal armies, and from it
he conceived the greatest apprehensions for his country. He became ill.
A very grave case of hepatitis endangered his life seriously. "They
covered my body with innumerable cupping glasses large as saucers, with
mustard poultices and quantities of blisters, and I was already half way
to a better world when I began to convince my doctors that my nerves
were disordered by eight years of griefs and excitement without
intermission (the eight years of Frankfort!), and that by continuing to
weaken me, they would lead me into typhoid fever or imbecility. My good
constitution ended by conquering, thanks, above all, to several dozen
bottles of good wine."

His good disposition did not the less remain dull and morose, and two
months later he avowed that he would not have been sorry to have ended
his life then. Austria was vanquished, it is true; she had lost two
great battles and one of the richest provinces; but Prussia had not
drawn any material, palpable advantage from this disaster of the
Hapsburg, and the cavalier of the Mark was not the man to cherish, like
his friend Alexander Mikhaïlovitch, a purely Platonic hatred. He
consoled himself, however, by the thought that the peace of Villafranca
was only a truce: "to wish in the present state of affairs to seriously
reconcile Austria with France, is to labor at the squaring of the
circle." "I shall endeavor," he wrote at the approach of autumn, 1859,
"to cower in my bear-skin, and to bury myself in the snow; in the thaw
of next May, I will see what remains of me and our affairs; if too
little I shall definitely settle with politics." The following month of
May brought grave events; the annexation of Savoy became the signal for
the greatest distrust in Europe, of which we have spoken above: but the
cabinet of Berlin persisted in its ancient course, and the prince regent
had, in July, an interview with the Emperor Francis Joseph at Toeplitz.
"I learn," wrote the representative of Prussia at the court of St.
Petersburg with undisguised spite, "that we have been shaved at
Toeplitz, splendidly shaved; we have let ourselves be taken in by the
Viennese good nature. And all that for nothing, not even the smallest
plate of lentils." At last, in the month of October, after Castelfidardo
and the conquest of the kingdom of Naples, the cabinet of Berlin
addressed an energetic note to M. de Cavour, on the bearing of the House
of Savoy on the Italian peninsula. The note established that "it is
solely in the legal manner of reforms, and in respecting the existing
rights, that a regular government is allowed to realize the legitimate
wishes of nations," and closes by the following passage: "Called to
express ourselves on the acts and principles of the Sardinian
government, we can only deplore them profoundly, and we believe that we
are fulfilling a rigorous duty by expressing in the most explicit and
formal manner our disapprobation, both of those principles and of the
application which has been thought could be made of them." One can
imagine what bad humor such _naïvetés_ would cause to the future
destroyer of the _Bund_, to the future spoliator of Denmark, of Hanover,
and so many other states. He again thought of leaving the career; he
resolved in any case to "cling to the situation of an observer," as
regards the monstrous policy which was pursued at Berlin. He is
perfectly astonished at the scandal which is caused on the banks of the
Spree by the publication of the posthumous journal of M. de Varnhagen, a
journal full of piquant revelations concerning the court of Prussia.
"Why be so indignant. Is it not taken from life? Varnhagen is vain and
_méchant_, but who is not? Does it not all depend on the manner in which
nature has ripened our lives? According to what we have suffered from
the bites of worms, from dampness, or from the sun, behold us sweet,
sour, or rotten."

That did not hinder him, however, from carefully cultivating, during
these years 1859-1860, his relations with the political world of St.
Petersburg from taking root there, and from attaching by a thousand ties
the fortune of his country to this friendship of Russia, of which he
understood all the value. The position of the representatives of Prussia
has always been exceptional at St. Petersburg; thanks to the near
relationship of the two courts, they enjoyed in the winter palace a
confidence and intimacy which the envoys of other states scarcely ever
obtained there. M. de Bismarck was able to add to these favorable
conditions the influence of his personal merit, and the good reputation
which he had acquired, in a Russian point of view, during his long
sojourn at Frankfort. His former journeys in Courland had made him
known and liked by the German nobility of the Baltic Provinces, by the
Keyserlingk, the Uxküll, the Nolde, the Bruvern, etc., always so
influential at court, in the chancellor's office, and in Russian
diplomacy. "The first prophets of the future greatness of M. de
Bismarck," says an author very _au fait_ in the society of St.
Petersburg, "the first who predicted the providential mission which was
reserved for him in Germany, were perhaps those barons of Courland and
Livonia with whom the present chancellor of Germany had so often passed
the hunting season, shared their amusements, their banquets, and their
political conversations."[32] The representative of Prussia at the court
of St. Petersburg took care, however, not to give himself up too much to
this liking for the Courlanders and Livonians; he was careful to place
in his affections, or at least in his demonstrations, the greatest part
in Russian Russia, autochthonal Muscovy (_nastaïastchaïa_). This
enthusiasm for the customs and genius of the "Scythians," this love for
the "bear-skin and caviare," was it very sincere? We may perhaps doubt
it; it is allowable to suppose that the man who, in the name of his
Germanic superiority, has so often and boldly expressed his disdain for
the _Welches_ and Latins, feels at bottom a still greater contempt for
that Sclavic race which every good German makes rhyme with slave
(_slave-esclave_).[33] However that may be, never did foreign
ambassador on the banks of the Neva have so much devotion as the
cavalier of the Mark for the polar stars, or pushed as far as he did the
passion of local color. He pushed it so far as to introduce into his
house several little bears which (as formerly the foxes at Kniephof)
came, at the dinner hour, bounding into the dining hall, agreeably
deranging the _convives_, licking the hand of their master, and "biting
the calves of the servants' legs."[34] A worthy Nimrod, he never missed
an expedition against the black king of the boreal forests; he did not
fail to don on these occasions the Muscovite hunting costume, and the
team of horses _à la Russe_ has remained dear to him up to the present,
and even in the streets of Berlin. He also affected to interest himself
greatly in the literary movement of the country; he had a Russian
professor in his house, and he learned enough of it to be able to give
his orders to those people in their native idiom, even to delightfully
surprise one day the Emperor Alexander with some phrases pronounced in
the language of Pouchkine.

The Russians could not help giving a most cordial reception to a
diplomat who showed himself so taken with their usages and customs, with
their pleasures and their "peculiarities," and who, moreover, had the
advantage of succeeding to that good M. de Werther, whose reputation,
neither there nor anywhere else, was exactly that of a too hilarious
character. On the contrary, they had never known on the banks of the
Neva a Prussian as gay as this excellent M. de Bismarck, as good a
fellow, as good a liver, having a loud laugh, coarse jests, and a witty
speech. He indulged in all sorts of pleasantries at the expense of the
"Philistines of the Spree," the "old fogies of Potsdam," which gave him
no small success: a minister plenipotentiary slandering his own
government, a grumbling, fault-finding diplomat in the very political
sphere which he had the mission to represent and to second, that was an
originality which could be appreciated by a world always on the watch
for the _piquant_ and pleasing. He knew how to please the empress-mother
Helen, whose influence at court was considerable, and whose warm support
never failed him in consequence, in the most grave moments of his career
as minister. The emperor had conceived a great affection for him,
invited him regularly to his bear hunts, and did him the honor of
admitting him in his _cortége_ during his journeys to Warsaw and Breslau
to meet the Prince Regent of Prussia. As for Prince Gortchakof, he
enjoyed more than ever the society of his former colleague of Frankfort,
and the _salons_ often repeated a malicious _mot, a méchant_ insinuation
of which Austria generally had to bear the brunt, and the paternity of
which they indifferently attributed first to one then to the other of
these two friends, grown inseparable, and whom spiteful intrigues
nevertheless wished to separate! At the end of 1859, M. de Bismarck
wrote in a confidential letter: "Austria and its dear confederates are
intriguing at Berlin to have me recalled from here: I am, however, very
amiable. God's will be done!"

At Berlin, in the mean time, they began little by little to glide down a
declivity, which would have caused Prussian politics to descend rapidly
from the cloudy regions of the _new era_ upon that ground of realities
and of action to which the tried friend of Alexander Mikhaïlovitch had
so long invited them, and, curiously enough, it was precisely the
mobilization of the Prussian army in 1859, the mobilization so condemned
by M. de Bismarck, which was the immediate cause of this sudden revival
fraught with incalculable consequences. It is fashionable now in France
to represent the Prussian government as having meditated for half a
century a war of revenge and conquest, slowly brightening their arms,
and training a succession of generations for the decisive hour of
combat. There is nothing more false, however. Neither the government of
Frederick William III., nor that of Frederick William IV. ever cherished
warlike projects, and even the humiliation of Olmütz was not an
incentive to the minister of war at Berlin. The two predecessors of
William I. only sacrificed to the military spirit just that which was
necessary to insure them a stand among the great Powers, to hold
reviews, and to be able to speak of their faithful troops, and of their
always valiant swords; at bottom, they were not far from thinking like
the Grand Duke Constantine, the brother of the Emperor Nicholas, who one
day said naïvely: "I detest war, it spoils the armies!" The swords of
Blücher and Scharnhorst were sheathed since 1815; even the adoption of
the needle gun in 1847 was only an accident, rather a scientific
experiment; in 1848 and 1849, the Prussian troops did not shine with
marvelous _éclat_ in the war of the Duchies, and were even miserably
held in check by the undisciplined bands of the insurrection of Posen
and Baden. The brother of the king, who had commanded the troops in
Baden, was grievously moved at the sight which his soldiers then
presented, and, having become regent of the kingdom (October, 1858), he
immediately turned his attention to military reform. Nevertheless it was
only the mobilization attempted during the Italian complications (in the
summer of 1859) which opened their eyes to all the grave inconveniences
and incoherencies of the organization till then in force. Two superior
men, MM. de Moltke and de Roon, joined with the prince regent in
remodeling the system from the very bottom. They displayed in it an
intelligence, an energy, and a rapidity without equal in history; they
knew how to profit by all the discoveries of science, and above all did
not let the great lesson escape them which a formidable civil war in
North America soon taught, a war so rich in experiments and inventions
of every kind. In spite of the obstacles which were thrown in their way
without cessation from all sides, these two men, at the end of six
years, produced an armed force, entirely new, powerful, invincible; and
"the instrument," still rough and rudimentary in 1860, proved its ill
omened "perfection" on the calamitous day of Sadowa! Not less erroneous
is the opinion, very generally spread, however, that the Prussian people
had demanded of its government victories and aggrandizement; to refute
these perfectly gratuitous suppositions, it suffices to remember that
the different parliaments of Berlin did not cease to oppose military
reform, and that they had on their side the almost unanimous voice of
the people. The ideas of German greatness, of German power, of the
German mission, haunt the imagination of professors and authors much
more than that of the people; they were academic themes, choice morsels
of rhetoric and opposition, still they are much more in vogue south of
the Main than north of this river,--and precisely there appears the
astounding art of M. de Bismarck in having known how, to speak with
Münchausen, "to condense mists into stones of size for a gigantic
edifice," and to make of a dream of _savans_ a popular passion. The
force of will, the force of character, and in one word the genius, can
still, even in a century of democratic leveling and uniform mediocrity
play a _rôle_, of which our poor philosophy of history scarcely had a
suspicion, which drowns so skillfully all responsibility and initiative
in the blind fatality of the "masses," and, as a Teutonic proverb says,
cannot distinguish the trees on account of looking at the forest. Take
from the most recent history of Prussia three or four men who answer to
the names of William I., Moltke, Roon, and Bismarck, and the old
Barbarossa would very probably up to the present time have continued his
secular sleep in the cave of the Kyffhäuser.

Nature delights as well in analogies as in contrasts, and it is thus
that the antecedents of this prince regent, who to-day bears the name of
William I., Emperor of Germany, does not fail to present some similarity
with the past of the extraordinary man, who, at the destined hour, was
to forge for him, _ferro et igne_, the imperial crown of Barbarossa. In
order to be enlightened concerning these antecedents, it is necessary
to turn to the posthumous "Journal" of M. Varnhagen von Ense,--the
liberal, crabbed Dangeau, compromising in the highest degree, amiable as
a whole, of the court of Berlin,--the same "Journal" whose defense we
have seen M. de Bismarck undertake in a confidential letter, against the
clamors which this publication had awakened in the capital of Prussia.
There is no doubt that Prince William made an energetic opposition to
the liberal desires which had signaled the _débuts_ of the reign of his
brother, King Frederick William IV. He had begun to work out at this
epoch _memoirs for consulting_ which established his right of _veto_ in
every amendment of the fundamental laws of the state. The rumor of a
formal protest in his name and in that of his descendants against every
project of constitution, found credit for a moment even in the heart of
the ministry; and under no conditions would he give his consent to the
feudal "charter" granted by his brother the 3d of February, 1847, except
on the express reservation that the States should not decide on the
budget, and should never occupy themselves with foreign affairs. And the
unpopularity of the heir presumptive was great before the revolution of
1848; during the fatal month of March of that year, it was against him
especially that the fury of the inhabitants of Berlin was let loose, who
attributed to him (and wrongly) the order given to the troops to fire on
the people. He was then forced to leave the country on a "mission" to
London, and the multitude did not forego the satisfaction of inscribing
on the palace of the fugitive the words of _national property_. Returned
from England after the appeasement of the revolutionary effervescence,
he placed himself, in 1849, at the head of the troops to stifle in Baden
a ridiculous insurrection, and feigned "important military operations,"
which kept him in the south of Germany, so as not to be present at the
solemn session of the 6th February, 1850, when King Frederick William
IV. took his oath to the definite statute.

Afterwards, however, especially towards the last years of the
disenchanted and morose reign of his brother, the Prince of Prussia
commenced to relax in his "reactionary" vigor, and especially made a
sufficiently marked opposition to the "pietist" influences at the court
of Potsdam. Affections and family considerations contributed also in
creating for the prince a peculiar situation. The esteem and tenderness
with which Frederick William IV. surrounded his wife did not always
console her for the sterility with which she was afflicted, and the
sight of a sister-in-law a happy mother of children destined for the
throne, probably to be called some day to occupy the throne, produced
coolness and irritation which the wife of the heir presumptive sharply
resented. The Princess Augusta was not of a disposition to bear certain
thrusts. Sprung from that House of Weimar which was always distinguished
by its taste for arts and pleasure, she early had her own acquaintances,
friendships, and a bearing sufficiently different from the ordinary way
of the court to resemble occasionally a divergence sought after with
intention. The wishes of the Princess Augusta did not fail to finally
exercise their influence on her husband, and the project, long nursed
by the august couple, realized at last in 1857, of uniting their eldest
son with the daughter of Queen Victoria, was regarded as the first
concession made to popular opinion. In fact, courtiers were not wanting
at Potsdam, the terrible M. de Varnhagen tells us, who asked in their
soul and conscience if it were quite worthy of the House of Hohenzollern
to ally itself by blood with a dynasty which was only half sovereign,
and held in dependence by a house of commons! How the times and customs
have changed at this court of Potsdam which last year saw the heiress
presumptive of the throne of Prussia and Germany, this same daughter of
Queen Victoria, send affectionate telegrams to Doctor Strauss when
dying, and render to the author of the "Life of Jesus" an homage _in
extremis_ which transported with enthusiasm all the valiant cavaliers of
the _combat of civilization_!

Habituated in a manner, and for several years already, to consider the
brother of the king as reconciled to modern ideas and favorable to the
cause of progress, the nation was much less astonished than charmed to
hear him, on his accepting the regency, use liberal and constitutional
language. A "new era" was to commence for Prussia; that word was almost
officially adopted to designate the change of system, and in a memorable
address, delivered on the 8th November, 1858, to the cabinet which he
had formed, the prince regent sketched the programme of a reparative
policy. He besought his councilors to bring about ameliorations in that
which was arbitrary or contrary to the wants of the epoch. While
defending himself against a dangerous _laisser aller_ towards liberal
ideas, and expressing the will "to courageously hinder that which has
not been promised," he did not the less proclaim the duty of keeping
with loyalty the contracted engagements, and of not hindering useful
reforms. The address ended with the phrase become celebrated, and since
then so frequently cited, "that Prussia should make '_moral conquests in
Germany_.'"

The harmony between the regent and the nation was not, however, of long
duration; the relations were not slow in cooling and proceeding towards
a complete rupture, thanks especially to the projected reform of the
army. The prince had this reform at heart: the wants of 1859 had only
convinced him of the absolute urgency of a measure with which his mind
had been occupied for many years; but the deputies of the nation refused
to follow him in this road, and opposed him tenaciously and firmly. They
did not understand the obstinacy which the prince displayed in a project
which answered neither to the wants nor to the aspirations of the
country, and they laughed at those who pretended that once in possession
of his new "instrument," the Hohenzollern, would _do great things_! They
had resisted judiciously, says a German author, the temptation of the
parliament of Frankfort in 1849, and the provocation of Olmütz in 1850;
they had let pass the opportunities which the wars of 1854 and 1859
presented. The love of peace was absolute, there was a complete absence
of ambition, they were perfectly resigned to the political situation
which they occupied, and on the other side no one wished to admit that
a kingdom so peaceable could be menaced by neighbors. In such a state of
affairs, every aggrandizement of the army drawing after it an increase
of military and financial charges, already heavy enough for the
citizens, only seemed to the country an inconceivable caprice of its
rulers.[35] The chambers refused the demanded credit; the government
went its way and continued its expenditures. The military question thus
became a question of budget, and soon transformed itself into an
irremediable constitutional conflict. Towards the end of 1861, no other
remedy could be seen for the situation but a _coup d'état_.

Not less profound and irresistible was soon the change in the ideas of
the court of Potsdam, as regarded the external policy. In proportion as
the "instrument" perfected itself (and it perfected itself rapidly), one
began to ask one's self about the most practical and fruitful employment
for it. One did not yet distinctly know what one wished, but one wished
it with strength, with the strength which one drew from the battalions
increasing without cessation. Assuredly one always saw nothing but moral
conquests in Germany, but one thought that a moral in action, aided
somewhat by needle guns, would give excellent results. The atmosphere
was charged with electricity and with the principles of nationality, and
it was not only the professors and orators of the _National Verein_ who
recommended a "united Germany with a Prussian point (_mit preussischer
Spitze_)." When, in the month of October, 1860, the envoy of Prussia,
Count Brassier de Saint-Simon, read to Count Cavour the famous note of
M. de Schleinitz against the Italian annexations, the president of the
Sardinian council listened in silence to the harangue, then expressed
his great regret at having displeased the government of Berlin on this
point, but declared that he consoled himself with the thought that
"Prussia would one day, thanks to Piedmont, profit by the example which
he had given it." In France, the journals of the democratic authority,
the devoted organs of the "new right," did not cease to praise the
"Piedmontese mission" of the House of Hohenzollern, and we have recalled
above the encouragements which Napoleon III. sent to Berlin after 1858.
The visit made by King William I.[36] to the Emperor of the French at
Compiègne in the month of October, 1861, was in this respect a symptom
more significant, since none of the sovereigns of the North had till
then given this mark of courtesy to the choice of universal suffrage.
Strange rumors began to spread concerning the alliance of the three
courts of the Tuileries, of St. Petersburg, and of Berlin, and they
continued up to the month of March, 1863. Publications of mysterious
origin, but which denoted a very specious knowledge of political
affairs, spoke of the "_great combination of states_ summing up in three
races,--the Roman, Germanic, and Sclavic,--to which corresponded three
centres of gravity, France, Prussia, and Russia, and of the definite
establishment of the peace of the world by means of a _triple alliance
of universal monarchies_, in which their full expression (_Abschluss_)
would not only find the three principal races of the European system,
but also the three great Christian churches!"[37] Lord Palmerston
declared at this very epoch in parliament, with his Britannic
_désinvolture_, "that the situation seemed pregnant with at least half a
dozen respectable wars;" and in spite of the obscurity which still
covers the transactions of the years 1861-1862, it is not doubtful that
Napoleon III. had then occasionally brought up in his scheming mind a
combination embracing at once the Orient and the Occident, a combination
as vague as gigantic, and of which Prince Gortchakof prepared to profit
with his tried dexterity. Whatever these shadowy projects were, the
Hohenzollern had only to be satisfied with his sojourn at Compiègne,
which he was to recall with a certain tenderness two years later in his
polite reply to the invitation of the Congress. In October, 1861,
Napoleon III., at Compiègne, probably made use of no other language than
that which he had used in 1858 at Berlin by the mediation of the Marquis
Pepoli, the fatidical language, "on the great destinies which awaited
Prussia in Germany, and which Germany expected from it."

It was thus that the difficulties from within and the facilities from
without, the parliamentary conflicts in the interior and the political
constellations in the exterior united, towards the end of 1861, in
equally urging the King of Prussia to energetic resolutions. A man of
vigor was wanted for the vigorous actions which were projected, and the
glances naturally fell on that grumbling diplomat at St. Petersburg,
who, for so many years already, had not ceased to criticise the
ministers of the _new era_, and to blame their conduct from without as
well as from within. In spite of the promise which he had given "to
confine himself to his situation as an observer," M. de Bismarck had not
failed from time to time to give a thrust during those years 1860 and
1861, and to repeat without cessation the precept of Strafford, the
precept of thorough (_à outrance!_). We see him during these years
making very frequent journeys to Germany, seeking opportunities of
meeting the head of the state, of conversing with him on his ideas and
presenting him various memoirs. In October, 1861, on the very eve of the
journey to Compiègne, he submitted to him a little project, from which
he expected some success, and of which it is not so difficult in fact to
imagine the tenor, when, above all, one takes care to study a
confidential letter written by him a few days before (18th September,
1861), and directed entirely against a political programme which the
conservative party in Prussia had published. In this curious letter he
rises with violence against the _Bund_, "the hot-bed of particularism,"
demands "a (_straffer_) firmer concentration of the armed forces of
Germany, and a more natural configuration of the frontiers of the
States;" but, above all, he puts his party on guard against _the
dangerous fiction of a solidarity which would exist between all the
conservative interests_. To triumph over this "dangerous fiction"
strongly rooted in certain minds, there was in truth the great
difficulty for the future minister of William I., his _omne tulit
punctum_, for it is not so easy in this order of things to well
distinguish between reality and fiction; it is perhaps even perilous to
discuss them, and a Retz would certainly have said of the conservative
interests what he so finely remarked of the right of peoples and of that
of kings, "that they never agree so well together as in silence." M. de
Bismarck was once more obliged to combat this "fiction" at Berlin as at
St. Petersburg, and if the mind as open as subtle of his friend
Alexander Mikhaïlovitch allowed itself most often to be convinced
without too much assistance, it was not the same with the Hohenzollern,
who, afterwards, on many an occasion, and in decisive moments, was to
feel the scruples, the shudders, and what Falstaff calls the "tertian
fevers of conscience."

On the return of William I. from Compiègne, the nomination of the
cavalier of the Mark to the direction of affairs was already a
well-arranged and fixed matter. M. de Bismarck soon afterwards came to
assist at the coronation of the king at Koenigsberg, and he only
returned to St. Petersburg to take leave definitely. At the beginning of
the month of May, 1862, he was again at Berlin; at the great military
parade which was held in the capital on the occasion of the unveiling of
the statue of Count de Brandenburg (17th May), the political men, the
deputies, and the high functionaries of state looked upon him already as
the future "Polignac" of Prussia. The fears and the hopes which such a
provision excited were not, however, so soon to be realized, and the
world was somewhat perplexed in suddenly learning that M. de Bismarck
was to be appointed to the post in Paris. Did he still hesitate to take
charge of the burden of power, and did he in any case prefer to await
the result of the new elections which were to be held in Prussia? It is
more probable that before inaugurating his government of combat he
wished to add some new conversations to those which were held at
Compiègne, to take once again the measure of the man on whom a then
universal belief made the destinies of Europe depend, and to prepare in
general the minds in France for the new policy which he was to
inaugurate.

He only remained at Paris two months, during the two delightful months
of May and June, but this short stay sufficed for him both to complete
his studies and to throw light on his religion. He had more than one
conversation with the sovereign of France, whose profound ideas every
one exalted at this time, commented _ad infinitum_ on the smallest
words, admired even his silence, and whom he, however, the future
conqueror of Sedan, did not hesitate in his confidential effusions to
define even then as "a great unrecognized incapacity." He saw also the
influential men in the government, and in society, and strove to rally
them to his ideas and his projects. He did not conceal that his
sovereign would not delay to appeal to him, and he exposed without a
_détour_ the line of conduct which he would adopt on such an occurrence.
What history will perhaps most admire in the present chancellor of
Germany, will be the supreme art with which he sometimes handled the
truth: this man of genius has understood how to give to frankness
itself all the political virtues of knavishness. Very artful and very
cunning as to the means, he has nevertheless always been, as regards the
goal which he pursued, of a _désinvolture_, of an indiscretion without
equal, and it was thus that he had at Paris in 1862 those astonishing
and confidential conferences which only amused and which should have
made them reflect.[38]

France,--said M. de Bismarck then and since, in 1862 as in 1864 and
1865, every time that he conversed with any of the political men from
the banks of the Seine,--France would be wrong in taking umbrage at the
increase in Prussian influence, and, the case occurring, at its
territorial aggrandizement at the cost of the small States. Of what
utility, of what help are then those small States, without a will,
without strength, without an army? However far the designs and wants of
Prussia could reach, they would necessarily stop at the Main; the line
of the Main is its natural frontier; beyond that river, Austria will
guard it, even its preponderance will increase, and there will thus
always be in Germany two powers balancing one another. Good order will
gain, and certainly France will lose nothing there, it will even draw
immense advantages for its politics, for its movement in the world. In
fact Prussia has an unfortunate, impossible configuration; _it wants a
stomach_ on the side of Cassel and Nassau, _it has a dislocated
shoulder_ on the side of Hanover, it is in the air, and this painful
situation necessarily condemns it to follow entirely the policy of
Vienna and St. Petersburg, to turn without rest in the orbit of the holy
alliance. Better outlined, planted more solidly, having its members
complete, it would be itself again, would have freedom of movements, the
_freedom of alliances_, and what alliance more desirable for it than
that with the French Empire? More than one question pending to-day, and
almost unsolvable could have been settled then with perfect security:
that of Venice, that of the Orient,--who knows? perhaps even that of
Poland! Finally, if the possible aggrandizements of Prussia seem to be
excessive, and to break the balance of strength what would prevent
France from growing, from increasing itself in turn? Why should it not
take Belgium, and _destroy there a nest of demagogy_? The cabinet of
Berlin would not oppose it; _suum cuique_, that is the antique and
venerable device of the Prussian monarchy.

All that said with liveliness, with spirit, with intelligence,
accompanied by many an ingenious malicious remark, happy _mots_ on men
and things, on that chamber of lords at Berlin, for instance, composed
of respectable _old fogies_, and the chamber of deputies, equally
composed of old fogies, but not respectable, and on an august personage,
the most respectable, but the greatest old fogy of all. M. de Bismarck
had at Paris during these two months almost the same success which had
accompanied his three years' sojourn on the banks of the Neva. The
important men, however, were careful not to overdo it; they readily
recognized in him all the qualities of a man of intellect, but they
could not make up their minds to consider him a _serious man_.

In the last days of the month of June, the new representative of Prussia
at the court of the Tuileries undertook a pleasure trip in the south of
France. He visited in turn Chambord, Bordeaux, Avignon, Luchon,
Toulouse, and made an excursion in the Pyrenees. "The chateau of
Chambord," he wrote in a letter dated the 27th July, 1862, "answers, by
its isolation, to the destinies of its possessor. In the great
porticoes, in the splendid halls, in which formerly the kings with their
mistresses held their court and their hunts, the playthings of the child
of the Duke of Bordeaux now form the only furniture. The _concierge_,
who served as my guide, took me for a legitimist, and _crushed_ a tear
in showing me a little cannon of his prince. I paid him a franc more
than the tariff for this tear, although I feel but little desire to
subsidize Carlism." At Bordeaux he rejoiced in having been able to
"study _in the original_, and in the cellar of those great masters
called Lafitte, Mouton, Pichon, Larose, Margaux, Branne, Armillac,
etc.," who are generally known in Germany only through bad translations.
He is delighted with his tour in the Pyrenees, but above all the Baths
of Biarritz and St. Sébastian made him happy. He "devotes himself there
entirely to the sun and to the salt water," he forgets politics, and
knows neither journals nor dispatches. It was at this moment (the end of
September, 1862) that he received from his sovereign the pressing call
to go to Berlin. The elections had given a deplorable result, the
immense majority of the new chamber belonged to the _progressionists_.
They had not been able to decide at Berlin on the choice of the
president of the future ministry,--"a cover for the government pot," as
M. de Bismarck said; he was to fill those functions in the interim by
taking the portfolio of foreign affairs. Burned by the sun of the South
and fortified by the waters of the Gulf, "tanned and salted," the former
aspirant for the inspectorship of dikes in a district of the Mark,
started for his country to fill there the first position in the state.
He only, so to speak, crossed Paris this time, but he remained there
long enough to leave a characteristic _mot_, which summed up his entire
programme. "Liberalism," said the designated chief of the Prussian
government, in taking leave in the bureaux of the Quai d'Orsay,
"liberalism is only nonsense which it is easy to bring to reason; but
revolution is a force, which it is necessary to know how to use."

FOOTNOTES:

[26] "Austria is not a state, it is only a government."

[27] As well as the Germans born or naturalized in Russia who encumbered
the different branches of the state service, and occupied in general a
very large and important position in the administration of the empire.
On his accession to the ministry, Alexander Mikhaïlovitch loudly
signified his intention of "purging" his department of all these
"intruders." Routine, however, and above all Sclavic idleness (which
willingly leaves to foreigners and to "intruders" all work demanding
perseverance and application) were not slow in triumphing over the
principle of nationality; the palingenesis of the minister, announced
with so much fuss, ended in a very insignificant change in the
_personnel_ of the lower order, and the chancellor found among these
Germans his two most devoted and capable aids: M. de Westmann, deceased
last May at Wiesbaden, and M. de Hamburger, quite recently made
secretary of state.

[28] Letter of M. de Cavour to M. Castelli-Bianchi, _Storia
documentata_, vol. viii. p. 622.

[29] See, for this and all that follows concerning the relations of
France and Russia in the years 1856-63, _Two Negotiations of
Contemporaneous Diplomacy; the Alliances since the Congress of Paris_,
in the _Revue des deux Mondes_, of the 15th September, 1864.

[30] It is true that, in a circular of the 27th May, 1859, the Russian
vice-chancellor took care to give a commentary to his proposition, and
to prove that the congress which he had planned looked to nothing
chimerical. "This congress," said he, "_did not place any power in
presence of the unknown_: its programme had been traced in advance. The
fundamental idea which had presided at this combination, _prejudiced no
essential interest_. _On one side, the state of territorial possession
was maintained_, and on the other there could come from the congress _a
result which had nothing excessive or unusual in the international
relations_." It would be well to re-read this remarkable circular, and
to weigh every word of it. One will find in it the most curious and
substantial criticism, made, so to speak, by anticipation, of the
different projects of the congress, those which later the Emperor
Napoleon III. was to present to Europe, especially the eccentric project
which surprised the world in the imperial speech of the 5th November,
1863.

[31] Massari, _Il Conte Cavour_, p. 268.

[32] _Aus der Petersburger Gesellschaft_, vol. ii. p. 90.

[33] In 1862, at the moment of definitely leaving his post at St.
Petersburg, M. de Bismarck received the visit of a colleague, a foreign
diplomat. They were speaking of Russia, and the future chancellor of
Germany said, among other things, "I am in the habit, when leaving a
country where I have lived long, to consecrate to it one of my watch
charms, on which I have engraved the final impression which it has left
me; do you wish to know the impression which I carry from St.
Petersburg?" And he showed to the puzzled diplomat a little charm on
which these words were engraved: "_Russia is nothingness!_"

[34] M. de Bismarck has since presented these quadrupeds to the
zoölogical garden of the former free city of Frankfort.

[35] Constantin Roessler, _Graf Bismarck und die deutsche Nation_,
Berlin, 1871.

[36] Frederick William IV. having died the 2d January, 1861, the prince
regent took from that day the name William I.

[37] See the remarkable pamphlet entitled _Europa's Cabinete und
Allianzen_, Leipzig, 1862. It is the work of a Russian diplomat,
celebrated in political literature, the same whose book on the
_Pentarchie_ had such a loud echo under the monarchy of July.

[38] See in the _Revue des deux Mondes_ of the 1st October, 1868, _Les
Préliminaires de Sadowa_.




III.

UNITED ACTION.


I.

However great one wishes to make the share of genius in the work of M.
de Bismarck, one cannot deny that a great part also comes from the
unforeseen, from an extraordinary combination of circumstances, in one
word, from that goddess Fortune whom the _minnesinger_ of the Middle
Ages did not cease to praise in song, whom Dante himself did not fail to
extol in the immortal verses, "The course always luminous like a star in
heaven, and the decree always hidden like a serpent in the grass."
Without doubt, one can admire the extreme audacity with which the
present chancellor of Germany has so often let fall from his hand the
_iron dice of destiny_; one can even, to speak with the witty Abbé
Galiani, suspect more than one cogged one in such a persistent "_pair
royal of six_." It is not less true that in his long career as player,
the president of the council at Berlin has occasionally met, in the most
decisive moments, such marvelous luck as no human wisdom could foresee,
that no political subtlety could prepare, and in which the hardy
_punter_ only had the merit, very considerable it is true, of not
letting the vein exhaust itself or of using up the series. One of these
magnificent strokes of luck, one of these perfectly prodigious events
fell to the lot of William I. on his accession to power, in the month
of January, 1863. This event laid the first foundations of his future
greatness, it became the mainspring of his action in Europe, the
Archimedean point from whence afterwards he raised up a world of daring
projects, and it is necessary to bear it well in mind.

The ideal which M. de Bismarck had before him in taking into his hands
the reins of state, was the aggrandizement, "the rounding off" of the
monarchy of Frederick II. He had made the premature avowal of it at the
time of his mission to Paris; he also declared it very frankly in the
first sitting of the commission of the chamber at Berlin, scarcely a
week after having been made minister (29th September, 1862). He
certainly did not foresee in what measure he should realize this ideal,
to what limits he could extend in Germany conquests which should cease
to be "moral;" but he clearly foresaw that in this attempt he would find
a resolute adversary in Austria, and he made up his mind to it.[39] The
only question which engrossed him was the attitude which the other great
Powers of Europe would maintain in view of certain events. Among them,
he did not count England; with his rare political sagacity, he had early
appreciated to what state of domestication and mildness that excellent
school of Manchester had reduced the leopard formerly so fierce, and his
conviction that proud Albion would not think of evil, and would even
allow itself to be disgraced a little, was soon to be fully justified in
the piteous campaign of Denmark. "England is far from entering into my
calculations," he said in 1862, in a familiar conversation, "and do you
know when I ceased to count her? From the day when she renounced of her
free will the Ionian Islands; a Power which ceases to take and begins to
surrender is a used-up Power." France and Russia remained, and it was
not forbidden to think that, skillfully managed, these two states would
favor to a certain degree the Prussian designs, or at least would not
oppose them too strongly. On the banks of the Neva old grudges existed,
sprung from the war of the Orient, imperfectly gratified by the war of
Lombardy; the old relations between the Gottorp and the Hohenzollern,
always cordial, had become more intimate than ever, thanks to the recent
efforts of M. de Bismarck during his sojourn at St. Petersburg; finally,
there was his friend Alexander Mikhaïlovitch, former colleague of
Frankfort, so prepossessed in favor of the new minister of King William
I., so well united with him in the hatred against Austria, and also so
well warned against the "dangerous fiction" of a solidarity which should
exist between all the conservative interests. On the banks of the Seine,
in the Tuileries, still so much dreaded, there reigned a sovereign who,
by dint of studying the general good of humanity, lost more and more the
consideration of the French state, and whose vague vacillating regard it
was not very difficult to dazzle, especially when one mirrored before
him the "new right" and the affranchisement of Venice. Moreover, since
the congress of Paris, there was established between the two cabinets
of the Tuileries and St. Petersburg a "cordiality" which increased from
day to day, and in which Prussia began to have a very large share: was
there not ground to hope for the latter, in the enterprise which it
meditated, a generous coöperation or at least a cordial neutrality of
the two Powers so friendly to one another, and so unsympathetic towards
the House of Hapsburg?

And yet such an enterprise was so profoundly contrary to the well
understood interests and to the firmly rooted traditions of Russia as
well as of France, the substitution in the centre of Europe of a great
military and conquering monarchy in the place of a pacific
confederation, and one "purely defensive," presented such manifest
inconveniences, even such evident dangers for the security and
equilibrium of the world, that the president of the council at Berlin
could scarcely entertain as regards this matter too flattering hopes.
The bitter resentments at the winter palace, and the sweet dreams at the
palace of the Tuileries, could not long prevail against the reality of
geography and the brutality of facts. Unless at Paris and St. Petersburg
there was a complete want of statesmen with a little political
discernment in their minds, a little national history in their souls,
one might wager that the two governments, Russian and French, would not
remain indifferent spectators to such a formidable overturning in the
balance of the Continent. From well-wishing, their neutrality would not
delay in becoming by degrees watchful and alarmed, would even change to
declared hostility, as the Prussian successes became marked, and it was
this cordiality between the two empires, apparently so favorable to
Prussia, which would then form another peril, facilitating prompt and
decisive action against the Hohenzollern. Such being the situation of
Europe at the beginning of the year 1863, what the new minister of
William I. could wish for in his boldest combinations, invoke in his
most golden dreams, was some unforeseen incident, some extraordinary
event which should embroil in an irremediable manner the two emperors
Alexander II. and Napoleon III., which should revive at St. Petersburg
all the ancient rancor towards Vienna, which should permit Prussia to
attach Russia to itself by ties stronger, more indissoluble, while
preserving its necessary good relations with the cabinet of the
Tuileries. A chimera! the boldest constructor of hypotheses would have
certainly cried, before such demands; a problem of algebra and political
alchemy unworthy of occupying a mind however frivolous! Well! chance,
that providence of the fortunate of earth, did not delay to cause an
event which realized to the profit of M. de Bismarck all the conditions
of the indicated problem, which filled all the points of such a
fantastic programme. "If Italy did not exist, it would be necessary to
invent it," the president of the council at Berlin said later in 1865;
in the month of January, 1863, he certainly did not think otherwise
concerning the Polish questions.

History offers few examples of a fall so rapid, so humiliating, from the
sublime to the odious and to the perverse, than was presented on the
banks of the Vistula by that lamentable drama which, after two years of
bitter revolutions, reached its final catastrophe in this month of
January, 1863, as if to celebrate the joyful accession of M. de Bismarck
to power. Certainly there was something very poetic and very exalted in
those first manifestations from Warsaw, when a people so long, so
cruelly tried, knelt one day before the castle of the lieutenant of the
king in mute complaint, holding only the image of Christ, and demanding
only "its God and its country!" The lieutenant of the king, who was no
other than the old hero of Sebastopol, Prince Michael Gortchakof, had a
horror of a conflict so unequal, so strange; he appealed to St.
Petersburg, and,--miracle of divine pity,--from that place, whence for
thirty years only orders of blood and punishment had gone forth, there
came this time a word of clemency and reparation. A generous spirit then
animated the governing and intelligent classes in Russia, they were
under the influence of ideas of reform and emancipation, they desired
the esteem of Europe, the friendship of France, and they had the very
sincere desire to be reconciled with Poland. The Emperor Alexander II.
sent his brother to Warsaw; a patriot of rare vigor of mind and of
character took in hand the civil government; the instruction, the
justice, the administration received a national impress; a modest but
certain autonomy was assured for the country. The precepts of the most
common wisdom, the instinct of preservation, the terrible lessons of the
past, should have all counseled the Poles to profit by this good
disposition of their sovereign, to put to proof the granted
institutions, to accept with _empressement_ the hand stretched out to
them. In fact everything counseled them thus, but they bent to the
anathema which the Holy Scriptures had long before pronounced against
every kingdom which allows itself to be guided by women and children.
The women and the youth of the schools resolved to continue to multiply
the manifestations which had succeeded so well, and which, in ceasing to
be spontaneous, became theatrical and sacrilegious. The European
demagogy hastened to transport to a ground so overturned its emblems,
its words of disorder, its secret societies, and its _instrumenta
regni_; from afar, from the midst of the Palais Royal came
recommendations "to leave the Catholic mummeries and to make
barricades." The great conservative party showed itself cowardly there
as elsewhere, as everywhere, as always; and, in wishing to save its
popularity, it lost a whole population. One made a void around the
brother of the emperor, around the patriotic minister, and this void was
not slow in being filled by horror, by terror and crime. The government
struggled in vain against a shadowy organization which enveloped it on
all sides; it took contradictory and violent measures. The demagogy
gained its cause; it succeeded in throwing into a powerless, foolish
revolt an unhappy people which for a century seemed to have imposed on
itself the task of astonishing the world by periodical resurrections,
and of disheartening it at the same time by suicides, alas, not less
periodical!

This criminal folly of a nation could only be equaled by the
heedlessness not less culpable with which Europe encouraged and fanned
it. Europe, which had not dared to touch the Polish question during the
war of the Crimea, thought it opportune to sympathize, to trifle with it
in this moment, the most ill-timed and the most desperate! Lord John
Russell was the first to enter the lists. In 1861 he wrote the famous
despatch to Sir J. Hudson, and persuaded himself and England that by it
he had delivered Italy. The year afterwards, in the celebrated dispatch
of Gotha, he conceived for Denmark a most original constitution in four
parts, with four parliaments, and thus gave the signal for the
dismemberment of the Scandinavian monarchy. This time he believed that
he ought to recommend parliamentary institutions for Poland; and to the
observation of the Russian ambassador that it would be difficult for the
czar to favor on this point his Polish subjects over his own national
ones, he naïvely asked why he would not extend the same benefit to all
the Russias?[40] Count Rechberg, the fatal minister who then directed
the external affairs at Vienna, experienced on his part the desire of
showing himself compassionate; he accorded himself the malicious and
very costly pleasure of paying the cabinet of St. Petersburg, in Polish
coin, for the sympathies which this latter had shown for the Italian
cause. As if Austria had not already suffered enough from the imaginary
grievances of the Muscovites as regards the pretended "treason" during
the war of the Crimea, it desired to give it very legitimate grievances
by a very real "connivance"[41] in Gallicia; Gallicia became, in fact,
the refuge, the depot of arms, and the place of revictualing for the
insurgents of the kingdom.

It is just to acknowledge that the French government had long hesitated
before starting on a way so perilous. From the first period of the
Polish agitation, a note published in the "Moniteur" of the 23d April,
1861, had put the press and public opinion on guard against "the
supposition that the government of the emperor encouraged hopes which it
could not satisfy."

"The generous ideas of the czar," continued the note of the "Moniteur,"
"are a certain gauge of his desire of realizing the ameliorations of
which the state of Poland admits, and we should wish that it be not
hindered by irritating manifestations." The French government persevered
in this sensible and perfectly amicable attitude towards the czar during
the years 1861 and 1862, in spite of the interest which the Parisian
press did not cease to take in the "dramatic" events of Warsaw, in spite
of several animated debates which were held in the English parliament,
and which were rather addressed to France than to Russia. The Britannic
statesmen in fact had not thought it useless during those two years 1861
and 1862 to slightly embarrass the cabinet of the Tuileries in its very
pronounced liking for the Russian alliance by the frequent and
sympathetic evocation of the name of Poland. Lord Palmerston
especially, in a very _witty_ speech on the 4th April 1862, exalted the
Poles, praised their "indomitable, inextinguishable, inexhaustible"
patriotism, while not neglecting to recall to them the cruel deceptions
which a French emperor had already caused them "at another epoch."
Napoleon III. always resisted the unguarded emotions at home, as well as
the selfish excitements from abroad. Even on the 5th February, after the
breaking out of the fatal revolt, M. Billault, the minister-orator in
the midst of the legislative body, harshly qualified the Polish
insurrection as the work of "revolutionary passions," and insisted with
force on the danger of "useless words and vain protestations;" but the
noisy language of the English ministers, the enigmatical attitude of
Austria, and lastly the military convention which M. de Bismarck
concluded with Russia (8th February, 1863), and which he made public,
ended by involving him. After having done so much for seven years to
gain the Russian "cordiality," after having sacrificed to it almost all
the fruits of the war of the Orient, Napoleon III. overturned brusquely
a scaffolding so laboriously constructed, and prepared to organize
against the government of the czar a _great European remonstrance_ of
which the first and terrible effect was naturally to increase in Poland
the torrent of blood and tears. The general cry at Warsaw was then that
the insurrection must last to justify the intervention of Europe,[42]
that it was necessary to let as much Polish blood flow as sympathetic
ink flowed from the chancellors' offices. One knows the deplorable
issue of this great diplomatic campaign, which lasted nine months, and
only served to demonstrate the profound disagreement between the Powers
of the East. The foreign intermeddling wounded the pride of Russia, and
impelled it to undertake against the Polish nationality a work of
general, methodical, implacable extermination, and one from which it has
never since desisted. However frivolous the diplomatic tourney of the
Occidental Powers in favor of Poland was, the Russians did not the less
think that they had been menaced with a moment of extreme peril, and
that they had only escaped, thanks to the firmness of their "national"
minister, to his patriotic courage, to his acute, dignified, and
vigorous dispatches. Certainly the minister is, humanly speaking, very
excusable for not having protested against a belief so flattering: he
let it go, he let it be said that he had repulsed a new invasion and had
"overcome Europe:" _scripsit et salvavit!_ He was made chancellor, he
received enthusiastic ovations from his compatriots, he became the idol
of the nation by the side of M. Katkof and the sanguinary Mouravief.
During a whole year he did not attend a single banquet in the most
obscure corner of Russia without these three names "saviors and blessed"
being celebrated by speeches, fêted in toasts, congratulated by
telegrams, and, whatever repugnance the descendant of the Rourik and the
foster child of the classical humanities must have felt in his spiritual
tribunal at being thus constantly coupled with a fierce journalist and
with a frightful executioner, he made the sacrifice to his love for his
country and for popularity. In his well meaning ardor to receive the
homage which came to him from all sides, he even so far forgot himself
one day as to thank with a stereotyped smile the German nobility of the
Baltic provinces for a diploma as honorary citizen which had been sent
him, and the national party reproached him with a certain bitterness for
the "culpable delight" to which he gave way on this occasion. Alexander
Mikhaïlovitch had all the honors of the sad campaign of 1863; the
profits of it went to another, to the former colleague of Frankfort, to
the president of the council at Berlin, who was to find in it a solid
and assured basis for all the great strategy in the future. We will show
how the balance sheet of the situation, which created, towards the end
of 1863, the _great European remonstrance_ in the affairs of Poland,
presented itself to the interests and the hopes of Prussia: the happy
quiet of England was duly established; France and Russia were from this
time forward embroiled, and in an irreparable manner; the resentment
against Austria had grown stronger than ever at St. Petersburg, and also
the Prussian minister had more than ever the right of counting on the
grateful friendship, on the devotion to any extent, of Prince
Gortchakof; lastly, it was not so difficult to foresee that after his
signal check of Warsaw the Cæsar of the new right would hasten to cast
his glances on Venice, to wish to "do something for Italy," and would
therefore favor more benevolently "a young power of the North" in its
enterprises against the Hapsburg, to whom the Napoleonic ideology had
long since assigned "a great destiny in Germany."

It would, however, do too much honor to human genius to credit M. de
Bismarck with a clear and precise view at first sight of all the
favorable, even prodigious consequences, which the fatal insurrection in
Poland was to bring him. Many circumstances seemed rather to indicate
that, especially in the beginning, the Prussian minister only groped and
sought his way in unfrequented paths. A curious matter, and which
perhaps might give cause for reflection even to-day, M. de Bismarck, who
had certainly studied Russia well, who had lived there for several
years, and had just left it, seems to have very seriously doubted the
strength of this empire in 1863, and doubted it so far that he did not
even think it capable of conquering in that miserable affray with the
unhappy Polish youth! He expressed his fears on this point before the
plenipotentiaries of England and Austria,[43] and went so far one day as
to become very confidential on this subject to the vice-president of the
Prussian chamber, M. Behrend. "This question," said the minister of
William I., towards the middle of the month of February, "can be solved
in two ways: it is either necessary to stifle the insurrection promptly
in concert with Russia, and to come before the Eastern Powers with an
accomplished fact, or one can let the situation develop and aggravate
itself; wait till the Russians are driven from the kingdom, or reduced
to invoke aid, and then _proceed boldly and occupy the kingdom for
Prussia_; at the end of three years all of it will be Germanized.... But
that is a ball-room plan which you propose to me, cried out the
stupefied vice-president (the conversation took place at a court ball).
No, was the answer: I am speaking seriously of serious things. The
Russians are tired of the kingdom, the Emperor Alexander himself told me
at St. Petersburg."[44] This thought of recovering the line of the
Vistula, lost since Jena, haunted more than once the mind of M. de
Bismarck during the year 1863: let it be well understood, he did not
wish to obtain the "rectification of the frontier" except with the
consent of the Emperor Alexander II., but he did not neglect the means
which could force to a slight extent such a solution. One of the most
intimate confidants of the minister, and now the representative of
Germany to the court of King Victor Emmanuel, M. de Keudell, proprietor
of vast domains in the kingdom of Poland, profited by his relations with
the prominent men of the unhappy country to advise them on several
occasions to look to Berlin for help, to demand there, for instance, a
_temporary_ Prussian occupation which would render them not liable to
Russian duty! In looking carefully into the history of this fatal
insurrection, one will perhaps find there other Prussian agents, much
more obscure, but also much more compromising than M. de Keudell. Did
the president of the council at Berlin seriously hope to obtain so much
from the "lassitude" of the Emperor Alexander and the friendship of the
Prince Gortchakof?

Whatever these hopes or _arrière-pensées_ were, M. de Bismarck used a
restless ardor in making evident from the time of his _début_ his
absolute solidarity with the Russian vice-chancellor as opposed to the
East. He offered him a military convention in the most spontaneous, even
impetuous manner; he undertook his defense on every occasion, and did
not cease to aid him faithfully, ardently, in passages of diplomatic
arms with the cabinets of England, France, and Austria, experiencing
with pleasure the first fire of the notes of M. Drouyn de Lhuys,
supporting with joy the universal clamors of the press, responding with
haughtiness to the interpellations of his parliament. The great men of
the progressionist party understood nothing, on this occasion as on so
many others, of the policy of their "Polignac;" they thought it
inopportune, perilous, and demanded where the German interest was in all
that? To which the Polignac replied one day in the chamber with this
veiled and yet very significant image, that, "Placed before the
chess-board of diplomacy, _the profane spectator_ believes the game
ended at every new piece that he sees advanced, and can even fall into
the illusion that the player is changing his objective point."

Certainly M. de Bismarck did not change his objective point at all, and
always had in mind the aggrandizement of Prussia; but it is evident that
up to the autumn of that year, 1863, he had no well-fixed plan; he
"moved his pieces" in different directions, and awaited the inspiration
of chance to know from what side he should strike "the blow,"--from the
Main, from the Vistula, or from the Elbe? He had aimed at Cassel for a
moment, and had thrown himself with some bluster into the constitutional
conflict of this country with the elector; he had even given on this
occasion the pleasing spectacle of a minister intervening in a
neighboring state to force the prince there to the most strict
observation of parliamentary rule, while himself governing without
regard for the constitution, and by means of taxes levied contrary to
the vote of the chamber. Without speaking of the adventurous projects
which were cherished at Berlin touching a possible rectification of
frontier from the side of the Vistula, on the banks of the Elbe there
was the old, everlasting question of the Duchies, a question hushed up
since the treaty of London, but reawakened anew in 1859 in consequence
of the events in Italy, and become even more dangerous since a famous
dispatch, mortal for Denmark, which Lord John Russell, in a moment of
inconceivable thoughtlessness, had issued from Gotha, the 24th
September, 1862,--precisely the day of M. de Bismarck's accession to the
ministry! The secondary States, the Diet of Frankfort, and M. de
Rechberg himself, had become very ardent, and vied with each other in
German patriotism in this cause of Schleswig-Holstein, a cause which at
bottom they thought to be chimerical, and by which they only wished to
embarrass Prussia, to convince it of "national lukewarmness." The
temptation became great to take at their word the secondary States, the
Diet of Frankfort, even Austria, to unite them against Denmark in a war
which would give Prussia the magnificent port of Kiel, and would permit
it, moreover, to try the "instrument" which King William I. "had been
perfecting" for four years, ... provided that the war could be
_localized_, and that the European Powers would not put themselves in
the way as in 1848! The president of the council at Berlin did not
entirely despair of succeeding by patient and wise manoeuvres. He
counted on the friendship of Prince Gortchakof, on different political
constellations, finally on the strange confusion, and, to speak with
Montaigne, on "the great hubbub of brains" which certain principles of
the new right and of nationality had introduced into each chancellor's
office of the Continent. He said to himself occasionally, that in this
grave enterprise he would certainly have for a determined adversary only
that good Lord Russell, who, after his fatal dispatch of Gotha, had
again altered his mind, had even constituted himself the advocate, the
protector, and the _mentor_ of the unfortunate government of Copenhagen:
such a partner did not greatly frighten the bold cavalier of the Mark.

At first, however, and as long as the negotiations on Poland lasted, the
cavalier of the Mark thought that he ought to use prudence and simulate
to the cabinet of Saint James extreme indifference on the subject of
this "vexatious" affair of the Duchies. Nothing is more instructive than
to follow in the state papers, as well as in the documents communicated
to the _Rigsraad_, the intimate and almost daily effusions by which M.
de Bismarck had been able to persuade, up to the last hour, not only
Lord Russell and his envoy Sir A. Buchanan, but also M. de Quade, the
Danish minister at the court of Berlin, that this question of
Schleswig-Holstein was a _hobby_ of the secondary States and of Austria,
that Prussia was far from sharing those Teutonic effervescences and
concupiscences, and that it would do all that lay in its power to calm,
to allay them. The 14th October, 1863, two weeks after the Diet of
Frankfort had decreed the federal execution in Holstein, M. de Bismarck
stipulated in a conversation with the envoy of Great Britain, Sir A.
Buchanan, to _prevent this execution_, if Denmark accepted the English
mediation.[45] Denmark accepted it, and Lord Russell could at last
breathe. Moreover, on the 6th November, 1863, M. Quade wrote from Berlin
to his government: "The first minister of Prussia, be it on account of
his personal views, or on account of the attitude taken by England, has
put the affair in a position that _exceeds greatly all that one could
have hoped_. I am not certain whether the question is regarded at Vienna
with the same clearness and the same warmth (warmth for the interests of
Denmark!) as it is here." Thus Sir A. Buchanan and M. Quade still judged
the situation on the 6th November. But they were not slow in being
brusquely awakened from their illusions by a despairing dispatch from
the principal secretary of state, dated the 9th November, and couched in
these terms: "If the information which reaches me is exact, M. de
Bismarck no longer offers any objection (_n'oppose plus aucune
objection_) to the federal execution in Holstein; the government of her
majesty can only leave to Germany the responsibility of exposing Europe
to a general war." The information was unfortunately only too correct,
and the vexations of the good Johnny commenced.

Two important facts had taken place in the interval of three weeks which
had passed since the conversation of the 14th October; in this interval,
the cabinet of Saint James had abandoned to the Russian government the
affairs of Poland, and the Emperor Napoleon III. had launched into the
world a fantastic project of a congress _for the arrangement of all the
pending questions_! Charmed in the highest degree with the aid which M.
de Bismarck lent him in this month of October in the Danish
difficulties, the principal secretary of state had at last decided to
make him the sacrifice so often demanded, of the Polish question, even
to recall by telegraph a courier, bearer of a very comminatory note
addressed to the government at St. Petersburg, and to replace this
missive by a most humble dispatch, which renounced all ulterior
controversy on this subject (20th October).[46] On his part, the
Emperor of the French, kept informed of these intrigues, profoundly
vexed at this abandonment by England, and not being able to resolve to
accept his check, nor, above all, to make the avowal of it without
ceremony before the legislative body, had thought (5th November) of that
call for a general congress which only increased the uneasiness of
Europe, and especially inspired the chief of the foreign office with
unspeakable fears. Not content with replying to the invitation of the
cabinet of the Tuileries by a most bitter and offensive note, Lord John
Russell bestirred himself to preserve the foreign courts from the
contagion of the French idea; he almost entirely lost from view the
dangers of Denmark, and only cared to combat the project of Napoleon
III., a project assuredly without vitality, and which, in order to die
its natural death, had no need of such a display of British forces. The
president of the Prussian council thought that the moment had come to
begin his game. The last shadow of an Eastern understanding disappeared;
only the alliance of Russia and Prussia remained intact, unshaken, in
the midst of the general disorder of the cabinets. No European concerted
action for the protection of Denmark was to be feared. M. de Bismarck
could now "no longer have any objection" to the federal execution in
Holstein; and soon an unhoped-for event, one of those magnificent
strokes of fortune, such as the minister of William I. has so often met
with in his marvelous career, proved that he was decidedly in luck. The
sudden death of King Frederick VII. (15th November, 1863) has something
so tragical, so fatal to the destinies of Denmark, that it makes one
think of one of the most disconsolate sayings that antiquity has
bequeathed to us, that mournful cry of the historian: "_Non esse curæ
deis securitatem nostram, esse ultionem._"

This death gave in truth an entirely new turn to the Teutonic demands
towards the unfortunate Scandinavian monarchy. Germany did not content
itself with a federal execution in Holstein; it pretended not to
recognize the sovereignty of the new king, Christian IX., in the
Duchies, and wished to enthrone there that intriguing and treacherous
family of Augustenburg from whom M. de Bismarck himself had lately
obtained the retraxit for one million and a half _rixdalers_ paid by the
government of Copenhagen. And it was only from this moment that the
plans of the minister of William I. seemed to be finally settled;
decidedly it was from the side of the Elbe that Prussia was to begin to
"round itself" and complete its unity! The resolution once made, M. de
Bismarck carried it out with ardor, with audacity, with incomparable
acuteness. This trial stroke was a master stroke; and the great
Machiavelli would certainly have found a "divine" pleasure in
contemplating the address, or, as he would have said, the _virtu_ with
which the cavalier of the Mark knew how, in the space of some weeks, to
engross the attention of this poor Lord Russell; to encircle the Emperor
Napoleon; to involve Austria in a distant expedition equally unjust and
foolish; to make use of and at the same time oust the _Bund_; to strike
the secondary States with terror and throw off their _protégé_; lastly,
to take into his own hands the holy cause of the German country, and,
according to the word of the Apostle, make himself all things to all
men!

The spectacle which Europe presented at the beginning of the year 1864,
was certainly one of the strangest and most painful that history has
known. Two great Powers, jealous of one another, and even destined to
soon fight in mortal combat for the spoils torn from their victim,--two
great Powers, at once incited and cried down by a whole league of
princes and peoples of Germany, attacked a feeble state, but
nevertheless an old and glorious monarchy, and one whose existence was
proclaimed by all the cabinets to be necessary to the balance of
nations; they attacked it under the most futile pretext, in the name of
a cause which the very chief of the coalition had formerly qualified as
"eminently iniquitous, frivolous, disastrous, and revolutionary." It
was, moreover, to punish King Christian IX. for his disobedience to the
_Bund_ that Prussia and Austria had charged themselves with this work of
"justice;" and this work they inaugurated with a formal declaration of
their own disobedience to the same _Bund_; they acted "as proxies for
Germany," and entire Germany protested against the usurpation of the
mandate! All these monstrous things Europe saw and let pass, this same
Europe which, in 1848 at the time of the first German aggression against
the Scandinavian monarchy, had not failed in its duty, and had fulfilled
it nobly in spite of the great revolutionary tempest which might have
served it as an excuse. The Powers were then unanimous in defending the
weak against the oppressor; the Emperor Nicholas was in accord on this
point with the Republic of General Cavaignac, and it was only the
diplomats improvised by the "surprise" of February who had not shown at
this time a sufficient knowledge of the conditions necessary for the
equilibrium of the world. It has been reserved for the most tried
statesmen, for chancellors grown old in the tradition and respect for
treaties, for the representatives of regular and strong monarchies, to
allow the consummation of a revolutionary work which the Bastide and
Petetin would have thought their duty not to admit![47] Without doubt it
is, above all, England who will bear before posterity the shame of the
ruin of Denmark, for she it was who had taken in hand the cause of the
Scandinavian kingdom, who had counseled, guided, reprimanded up to the
last day, and who had solemnly declared _that in the moment of danger it
(Denmark) should not fight alone_; it would, however, be unjust to
pretend to completely exonerate the rest of the European Powers. More
than one thoughtful and honest mind assigned at that time to this
dismemberment of a monarchy in the nineteenth century all the import
that another dismemberment had had in the preceding century, and foresaw
from it with anxiety great overturnings and formidable catastrophes in
the future. The _naïfs_, or, to speak with M. de Bismarck, the
_profane_, could alone believe the game finished after this first stroke
dealt to the right of nations, after this first exploit also of the
marvelous "instrument" which the Prussian government had employed so
many years and so much time to "perfect."

The cannon of Missunde was for the cavalier of the Mark what the cannon
of Toulon had formerly been for a certain officer of Corsica, and this
short campaign of the Duchies revealed many things to the future
conqueror of Europe. He learned there that legitimate rights, sacred
treaties, stipulated minutes, the sworn faith and many other
old-fashioned things reputed inassailable were much more feeble and
decaying than the poor fortresses erected by the Danes in the preceding
ages, and, if Moltke and Roon made in this war a perfectly satisfactory
trial of their needle gun, he could for his part prove the precious,
unalterable qualities of his own instrument. It must be plainly said
that during the whole of this expedition against Denmark, Prince
Gortchakof did not cease to favor the Prussian minister by all means, to
tender him with ardor, and very often privately, a helping hand at each
new difficulty. His aid was absolute and the more efficacious since it
took the appearance of a busy neutrality in search of a pacific
arrangement. It was thus that he aided the president of the council at
Berlin in forcing into the stubborn head of Lord Russell the equally
specious and pleasing reasoning, that the occupation of Holstein by the
federal troops would become a title of validity in the hands of the new
King of Denmark. "M. de Bismarck told me," Sir A. Buchanan wrote on the
28th November, "that a federal execution would prevent any revolutionary
movement in Holstein, and would be at the same time to a certain degree
an _indirect recognition_ of King Christian IX. as Duke of Holstein on
the part of the Diet of Frankfort. His excellency affirmed that the
alarming state of Germany forced him to proceed at once to the
execution; but he could not or would not explain to me how such an
execution could be a recognition of the sovereignty of King Christian,
and could avoid the appearance of an occupation." Three days afterwards,
the 1st December, Lord Napier wrote on his part from St. Petersburg:
"The language of Prince Gortchakof makes me believe that he is
persuaded that M. de Bismarck has _moderate views_ in this question. The
vice-chancellor is disposed to consider a federal execution, if it is
well conducted, as a _preservative measure_. In his opinion, the federal
troops, acting according to judicious instructions, will assure order
and maintain the necessary distinction between the legislative and the
dynastic question." "_I despoil, then I recognize!_" said M. de Bismarck
by a logic belonging to him alone,[48] but which Prince Gortchakof
shared at this moment, and which the two friends soon tried to apply
also to Schleswig, after the chief of the foreign office had resigned
himself to it in Holstein. "This morning the Russian vice-chancellor
suggested to me," again wrote Lord Napier from St. Petersburg under date
of the 11th January, "that one should bind Denmark to _admit_ the
occupation of Schleswig by the forces of Austria and Prussia under title
of a _guarantee_ given to these two Powers as regards the German
population of the Duchy." Thus the state papers and the documents
communicated to the _Rigsraad_ continue to instruct and edify us; one
does not find there a single insinuation or "suggestion" sent from the
banks of the Spree against Denmark which was not at once reverberated on
the banks of the Neva. And yet Denmark has always been the friend and
the _protégé_ of the empire of the czars! More than any other Power in
the world, Russia was interested in preserving the liberty of the
Baltic, in not letting the port of Kiel fall into the hands of Germany;
more than any other Power, also, it was interested in remembering that
Courland and Livonia talked German much more purely and harmoniously
than Schleswig! Lastly, it was certainly the cause of the revolution
against that of legitimate sovereignty which was engaged in this debate
on the Eider; the old Nesselrode had declared so in a celebrated
circular, and what would the Emperor Nicholas have said of such
complacency for revolution on the part of a Russian chancellor?
Alexander Mikhaïlovitch will yet cause the astonishment of history by
the immensity of his gratitude towards M. de Bismarck.


II.

Thus was inaugurated, concerning Poland and Denmark, that common action
of the two ministers of Russia and Prussia, which was to continue for so
many years, and have such a considerable, such a disastrous influence on
the affairs of the Continent. With this year 1863 the second period of
the ministry of Prince Gortchakof commences, his second _term_, which
was assuredly much less open to discussion. To the French "cordiality,"
properly dosed and taken in fact as a tonic, which had prevailed till
then, the Prussian friendship, undeniably too passionate and too
absorbing, succeeded. In fact, in this second period, Alexander
Mikhaïlovitch no longer preserved that calm and reserved mind, and that
intelligent egotism which made his fortune at the time of his intimacy
with the Emperor Napoleon III.; he embraced all the opinions, every
cause of his formidable friend at Berlin, unfortunately without
possessing his astonishing flexibility of mind, his marvelous art of
turning and twisting. Nothing, for instance, equals the address with
which M. de Bismarck can, if necessary, forget a disagreeable past, and,
above all, be unable to remember his wrong-doings toward others; in
fact, he has a charming euphemism, he calls them _misunderstandings_.
More than once, from the height of the tribune, he has adorned with this
name his long and outrageous conflict against parliament which he
sustained up to the war of 1866 against Austria (a little
misunderstanding which cost 40,000 men their lives!). And how can one
help admiring the affection, the enthusiasm, which he has inspired in
that excellent Lord Russell, certainly the statesman whom he ridiculed
and ill-treated the most in 1863, during the Danish contention? As for
his Polish quarrels with the Eastern Powers in the same year (1863), he
was the more ready to forget them as those very Powers felt that a great
act of folly had been committed. He dictated to King William a most
polite reply, full of tender souvenirs of Compiègne, in answer to the
letter of Napoleon III. concerning the congress, and toward the end of
the year he was already in touching accord with the cabinet of the
Tuileries concerning the treaty of London, a treaty which guaranteed the
entireness of the Danish monarchy, and which a circular of M. Drouyn de
Lhuys now qualified as an _impotent work_! As regards Austria, he soon
granted it full indulgence for its Polish error in the spring, and even
forgave the very reprehensible enterprise which it attempted in the
month of August at Frankfort, on _the day of the princes_. In the month
of November he had already made it his companion and accomplice in the
wars of the Duchies. Prince Gortchakof appeared in a very different
light; he was never willing to pardon France and Austria for their
intermeddling in the affairs of Poland, and remained immovable to every
attempt at reconciliation. He knew no intimacy except with the cabinet
of Berlin, and his former colleague of Frankfort became his only
confidant and ally. The famous aphorism of 1856 then underwent an
important modification; beginning with 1863, the Russian chancellor
began to sulk while continuing to _meditate_, and the Achaeans have paid
dearly for this spite of Achilles. The "sulks" of Alexander
Mikhaïlovitch have been almost as fatal for Europe as the dreams of
Napoleon III.

This Napoleonic policy regarding the affairs of Germany, at once
reasonable and chimerical, ingenious and ingenuous, which he sincerely
thought would work good, and which only accumulated disasters and ruin,
seemed like a dream, a real _summer night's dream_. One day they had a
sublime vision at the Tuileries: Italy was completed in its unity,
Austria reëxalted, Prussia rendered more homogeneous, Germany more
satisfied, Europe regenerated, and France consolidated and glorious. All
this only depended on a single hypothesis, but a hypothesis which did
not exist, on a battle fought and won by the brave _Kaiserliks_ always
inured against this Prussian _Landwehr_ which for half a century had not
smelt powder, and it was on this frail skiff, on this "nut-shell," as
the Puck of Midsummer Night's Dream had said, that the fortune of Cæsar
and that of France was embarked! In fact, at this moment, all the world
believed in the incomparable military superiority of Austria over its
bold rival in Germany; no one admitted the possibility of a Prussian
victory, still less a victory as decisive, as startling as that at
Sadowa. "That was," M. Rouher said later, in a memorable session of the
legislative body,--"that was an event which Austria, which France, which
the military man, which the simple citizen had all considered as
unlikely; for there was an universal presumption that Austria would be
victorious and that Prussia would pay, and pay dearly, the price of its
imprudence." This presumption, very real and universal at that time,
remained the sole excuse of Napoleon III. before history, for that
lamentable phantasmagoria which was announced to the world by the speech
of Auxerre in the month of May, 1866, but whose origin goes back as far
as the convention of September and the first journey of M. de Bismarck
to France after his campaign in Denmark in the autumn of 1864.[49]

"I have at least one superiority over my conqueror," the Emperor of
Austria, Francis I., said to M. de Talleyrand, the negotiator of the
peace of Presburg, with a dignity not without keenness; "I can reënter
my capital after such a disaster, while it would be difficult for your
master, in spite of all his genius, to do the same thing in a similar
situation." This curious _mot_ displayed in a striking manner the
profound, incurable vice of all Cæsarism. No more than the conqueror of
Austerlitz, could Napoleon III. accept a check; he was obliged _to do
great things_, condemned to success and prestige. Soon after the
misadventures and the miscalculations in the affairs of Poland, of
Denmark, and of the congress, he was forced to look out for a revenge,
he cast his glances from north to south, "struck an attitude" by means
of the convention of September, which seemed to be the preface of a new
and great work. He was isolated in Europe, incensed against England,
very much embarrassed in regard to Russia, more than cool with Austria,
and it was with a certain inward trepidation that one saw M. de Bismarck
hasten to France (October, 1864) at the first news of the convention
concluded with the cabinet of Turin. Evidently "something was to be done
for Italy;" without rancor, as without prejudices, the president of the
Prussian council came to renew the conversations broken off two years
before at the time of his short mission to Paris.

He added nothing to the truth; he only affirmed that his alliance with
the Hapsburg in the war against Denmark had been a simple incident, and
he allowed to be clearly seen his desire to keep for Prussia the
countries recently conquered on the Elbe in the name of the Germanic
Confederation. For the rest, he only varied the ancient theme on the
inevitable imminent duel between Berlin and Vienna, on the advantages
which Italy might gather from it, on the advantage that would accrue to
France, having Prussia, with a better defined and firmer outline, as its
natural, unfailing ally in all the questions of _civilization_ and
_progress_. Such expressions, coming from a minister who had shown his
character in the campaign of the Duchies, now met an auditory much more
attentive than that of 1862. Without yet taking him for a perfectly
_serious_ man, they began to recognize in him the qualities of a useful
man, of a man of the future, whom Italy should cultivate with care, whom
France, for its part, should watch carefully, encourage, and manage. The
leaders of the imperial democracy, Prince Napoleon first of all, showed
themselves especially taken with the prospectives which were opened to
them. A distinguished member of this group, a diplomat reputed to be
acute above all, and whose name even allied him to the Italian cause,
was sought out in his retreat and placed at the head of the mission at
Berlin, elevated now to an embassy. Another member of the "party of
action," equally unattached for some time, a former ambassador at Rome,
was not long in being recalled into the councils of the empire: by the
side of M. Rouher, he was destined to form there a useful counterpoise
to the slightly "antiquated" ideas of M. Drouyn de Lhuys. Finally, on
the other side of the Alps, at Turin, a general, well known for his
"Prussomania," had taken in hand the direction of political affairs on
the 23d September. Each of these personages,--M. Benedetti, M. de La
Valette, General La Marmora,--will have his _rôle_ and his day in the
great drama of 1866.

At this time, however, in the autumn of 1864, no plan was fixed or even
discussed: one had only come as yet to simple confidences, to vague and
fleeting conversations, to that which, in diplomatic language, one had
not even dared to call an exchange of ideas; but the impression which
the Prussian minister obtained from this rapid journey to France was
sufficiently encouraging for him soon to launch that circular of the
24th December, 1864, which became the point of departure for his action
against Austria. It was in this circular, in fact, that M. de Bismarck
broached for the first time the question of the countries of the Elbe,
which he well knew to be a question of war. Six months before, in the
peremptory declaration made the 28th May, 1864, in the midst of the
conference of London, Austria and Prussia had demanded the "reunion of
the Duchies of Schleswig and of Holstein in a single state under the
sovereignty of the hereditary Prince of Augustenburg," and the cabinet
of Berlin took care to add then that this prince had, "in the eyes of
Germany, _the greatest right_ to the succession; that his recognition by
the _Bund_ was consequently assured, and that, moreover, he would
reunite the _indubitable suffrages_ of the great majority of the
population of this country." Quite different were the sentiments of the
Prussian minister towards the end of the same year, some time after his
return from Paris. In a circular dispatch addressed to the German
courts, the president of the council of Berlin declared now (24th
December, 1864) that grave doubts assailed his mind touching the titles
of the Duke of Augustenburg, that several serious competitors, such as
the Princes of Oldenburg and Hesse, had arisen in the interval;[50]
that in the midst of such multiplied and such confused claims he was
perplexed; that his conscience was not sufficiently enlightened on this
point of right; that he felt the need of meditating and of "consulting
the legists!"

The world knows the magnificent decree which the "legists"--the syndics
of the crown--did not delay in pronouncing, as well as the conclusions
which the scrupulous minister conscientiously drew from them. There were
judges at Berlin, and they proved it in overruling all parties, in
declaring them all badly grounded in their pretensions: Hesse,
Oldenburg, Brandenburg, Sonderburg, Augustenburg, none of them had the
right of succession to Schleswig-Holstein. The King of Denmark alone had
the titles! But as the King of Denmark had been forced by the war to
abandon the provinces of the Elbe to the sovereigns of Prussia and
Austria, M. de Bismarck concluded therefrom that the two monarchs could
dispose of their "property" as they wished, without any intervention of
the _Bund_, and he demanded of the Emperor Francis Joseph the cession of
his part of the conquest for ready cash. The Prussian minister made
this impudent demand in an arrogant dispatch, full of menaces, dated the
11th July, 1865, from Carlsbad, from the very place where the old King
William had come to enjoy the Austrian hospitality during the season.
The alarm was great for some weeks. M. de Bismarck made no mystery of
the negotiations which he entered upon with Italy; he said to M. de
Gramont "that far from dreading the war, he desired it by all means;"
some days after, he even declared to M. de Pfordten, president of the
council of Bavaria, "that Austria could not sustain a campaign, that it
would suffice to strike a single blow, to fight a single and great
battle from the side of Silesia to obtain satisfaction of the Hapsburg."
In reality, he only wished to sound the ground and to make a careful
examination. At this moment he was not yet sufficiently sure of the
disposition of the Emperor Napoleon to dare to risk the great cast; he
also wanted time to persuade the pious Hohenzollern to pronounce the
"God wills it!" of a fratricidal war. He had to content himself with
that convention of Gastein (14th August, 1865) which was only a
provisional arrangement, yet the first breach made in the rights of the
_Bund_, and like an indirect consecration of the conclusions which he
had pretended, to draw from the decree pronounced by the famous syndics
of the crown.

The very day on which he signed this equivocal transaction at Gastein,
M. de Bismarck wrote his wife a short note as follows: "For several days
I have not found a moment of leisure to write you. Count Blome is again
here, and we are doing our best to preserve peace and stop up the
crevices of the building. Day before yesterday I devoted an entire day
to hunting. I think that I wrote you that I returned disgusted from my
first expedition; this time I at least killed a roe, but I saw nothing
else during the three hours that I devoted without cessation to
experiments on all sorts of insects, and the noisy activity of the
cascade below me drew from my heart the cry: '_Little brook, leave there
thy murmur._'[51] After all, it was a very good shot made across the
precipice. The animal, killed instantly, fell with its four feet in the
air from a height of several church steeples into the torrent at my
feet." After all, he no more missed the shot than when he slew, in order
that he might no longer be the cherished candidate of the _Bund_, the
poor Augustenburg, and made the little Duchy of Lauenberg fall into the
Prussian game-bag! This fact of the chase and of diplomacy even had an
extraordinary reëcho in Germany, in France, and even as far as Lord
Russell, who experienced the shock. The principal secretary of state
insisted on the honor of associating himself with M. Drouyn de Lhuys in
a very eloquent protest against the arrangements made at Gastein, and
the iron-clad squadron of England, which had not appeared in the Baltic
since the war of Denmark, came this time at least to pay a courteous
visit to the French fleet at Cherbourg. There, however, the
demonstration of the two Powers of the East limited itself; M. de
Bismarck could enjoy in peace his triumph and the title of count which
the fortunate campaign of 1865 brought him.

Is it admissible to depart from the gravity of history to describe still
another incident of Gastein, a little _genre_ picture of manners which
was much talked of at this epoch, and even became the object of
confidential explanations between the president of the Prussian council
and a devoted friend, all extremely devout? And why not, since the
letter of M. de Bismarck to M. André (de Roman) concerning Mlle. Pauline
Lucca is one of the most curious pages of his familiar correspondence,
if it throws light in a very picturesque manner on that vast and bald
forehead on which the hand of King William had just placed the coronet
of a count. Well, in the midst of those political negotiations and the
deer hunts, M. de Bismarck found time at Gastein to be photographed in a
romantic attitude with Mlle. Lucca, first _cantatrice_ of the royal
opera at Berlin. The photographs caused a certain scandal on the banks
of the Spree; the leaders of _the party of the cross_ were especially
moved at the thermal license which the former Levite of the tabernacle,
the fervent disciple of MM. Stahl and de Gerlach, took. M. André (de
Roman) was perfectly willing to accept the _rôle_ of Nathan in the
Bible, and, in a sermon written in entire confidence, he did not limit
himself to talking of the Bethsabea of the opera; he also spoke some
well-chosen words touching the reparation by arms which the first
minister of Prussia had but lately wished to impose on the good Doctor
Virchow, the very learned and very peaceful discoverer of _trichina_. M.
André found that that was not the conduct of a true Christian; he did
not conceal that his old friends sighed at not seeing their Eliakim
assist at divine service, and even began to be rather uneasy at the
state of his soul. It was to such a sermon that M. de Bismarck replied
by the confidential letter which follows, and which a lucky indiscretion
has since given to the public, a letter assuredly very characteristic,
and which makes one think once more of Cromwell, whose memory has been
so often called forth in the course of this study:--

     "DEAR ANDRÉ,[52]--Although my time is very much restricted, I
     cannot, however, refuse to reply to a summons addressed to me
     by an upright heart, and in the name of Christ. I am
     profoundly pained at scandalizing Christians who have faith,
     but I have the certainty that it is an inevitable
     circumstance in my position. I will not yet speak of the
     parties who are necessarily opposed to me in politics, and
     who not the less count in their midst a great number of
     Christians, who have far preceded me in the way of salvation,
     and with whom, nevertheless, I am obliged to be in conflict
     on account of matters which, in my estimation as well as
     theirs, are terrestrial; I appeal only to what you yourself
     said: 'That nothing that is omitted or committed in the
     elevated regions remains hidden.' Where is the man who, in a
     similar situation, would not cause scandal, rightly or
     wrongly? I will grant you much more still, for your
     expression 'does not remain hidden' is not exact. Would to
     God that apart from the sin the world knows I had not upon my
     soul others which remain unknown, and for which I can only
     hope for pardon in my faith in the blood of Christ! As a
     statesman, I even think that I use far too much
     consideration; according to my idea I am rather cowardly, and
     that perhaps because it is not so easy in the questions
     which come before me to arrive always at that clearness at
     the bottom of which confidence in God exists. He who
     reproaches me with being a political man without conscience,
     wrongs me; he should first commence by himself testing his
     conscience on the field of battle. As regards the matter of
     Virchow, I have long since passed the age in which, on
     similar questions, one seeks counsel from flesh and blood. If
     I expose my life for a cause, I do it not only in this faith
     which I have fortified by a long and painful combat, but also
     by fervent and humble prayer before God; this faith, the word
     of man cannot shake, not even the word of a friend in the
     Lord, and of a servant of the church. It is not true that I
     have never attended a church. For just seven months, I have
     been either absent from Berlin or ill; who then can have made
     the observation on my negligence? I willingly agree that it
     has often happened, much less for want of time than for
     considerations of health, especially in the winter; I am
     always ready to give more detailed explanations to all those
     who consider it their vocation to be my judges in this
     matter: as for you, you will believe me without other details
     of medicine. As to the Lucca photograph, you would probably
     judge less severely, if you knew to what chance it owes its
     origin. Besides, Mlle. Lucca, although a _cantatrice_, is a
     lady whom the world has never, any more than it has me,
     reproached with illicit relations. Nevertheless, I would have
     certainly taken care to keep away from the glass pointed at
     us, if I had in a tranquil moment reflected on the scandal
     which so many faithful friends would find in this jest. You
     see by the details into which I enter that I consider your
     letter as well meant, and that I do not dream in any way of
     placing myself above the judgment of those who share with me
     the same faith; but I expect from your friendship and from
     your Christian knowledge which you commend to others, in
     future circumstances, more indulgence and charity in their
     judgments: all of us have need of them. I am of the great
     number of sinners to whom the glory of God is wanting; I do
     not hope the less with them that in His mercy, He will not
     withdraw from me the staff of the humble faith by the aid of
     which I seek to find my way in the midst of the doubts and
     dangers of my position; this confidence, however, should not
     render me deaf to the reproaches of friends, nor impatient at
     proud and harsh judgments."

Let us lock up the hair shirt with the discipline; let us only think of
the diplomat in tunic and helmet, of the "iron count" (_der eiserne
Graf_), as his people soon called him, and let us look at the
disposition of France towards him at the moment when, after having left
the rugged valley of Gastein, he prepared to visit the delightful region
of Biarritz, to salute, interrogate, divine, and ... cast down the
sphinx!

In the councils of the empire the debates had become from day to day
sharper between the ancients and the moderns, between those zealous for
the new right and the partisans of a more circumspect and traditional
policy, in proportion as the Austro-Prussian conflict had grown more
bitter and aggravated. The ardent ones would have willingly concluded an
offensive and defensive alliance with Prussia. They showed the
irresistible movement which was drawing Germany towards unity, and the
advantages which France would reap by favoring this evolution in place
of opposing it, by attaching to itself by the ties of an eternal
recognition the Piedmont of Germany, as it had already done with that of
the peninsula. Passionate friends of Italy, and still more violent
adversaries of Austria, this bulwark of the reaction, of legitimacy and
of temporal power, they cherished in the kingdom of Frederick the Great
the incontestable representative of civilization, and trembled at seeing
it going toward certain defeat in an unequal contest with the
_Kaiserliks_. To hear them, the united action of France, Italy, and
Prussia was not too much to preserve the cause of progress and to place
Europe on new and immovable bases. Why, however, should not Belgium be
the legitimate recompense of the French efforts in favor of Germany, as
Savoy had been in consequence of the constitution of the kingdom of
Italy, and how decline a combination in which each of the three nations
representing _par excellence_ modern ideas on the Continent was called
to complete its respective unity?

Very different was in this respect the sentiment of the "ancients," the
statesmen of the old school, of a whole political group of which M.
Drouyn de Lhuys was in the cabinet the most authorized and clearsighted,
if not the firmest. First casting aside all desire for Belgium, as a
certain cause of a formidable conflict with England, they asserted the
absolute impossibility of finding for France a compensation, however
small it might be, in proportion to the injury which the unification of
Germany would cause it. Without misunderstanding the Germanic
aspirations for a federal reform, for a more homogeneous and united
constitution, they asked what obligation France was under to hasten such
a work, and if in any case it were not more desirable that such a
transformation should be accomplished by the enlightened and pacific
classes, by the federal diet, even by Austria,--always respecting
acquired rights and particular sovereignties,--rather than by a power
peculiarly military, bureaucratic, and centralistic? Was not that also
the almost general wish of the other side of the Rhine, of the dynasties
as well as of the chambers, of the princes as well as of the peoples,
and had not the pretension of Prussia, among others, of confiscating for
its own profit the conquest of Denmark aroused the consciences of all of
them? Only the press of France and Italy which persisted in speaking of
"the Piedmontese mission" of the Hohenzollern; on the banks of the Main
and Elbe, every one rejected this pretended mission, and even the
_National-Verein_, brought into contempt some time before while
demanding "a united Germany with a Prussian point," did not the less
repudiate M. de Bismarck, and declared him unworthy of taking in hand so
holy a cause. As to the danger of seeing Prussia succumb in the
conflict, and thus render the Hapsburg all powerful in Germany, there
was a very simple means of preventing such an eventuality, that was to
refuse the government of Berlin any aid in the enterprise which it
meditated. However bold in truth M. de Bismarck was, it was not doubtful
that he would never dare to defy Austria and its allies of the _Bund_ in
the face of a formal veto of France, which at the same time would take
from him all hope of aid from Italy.[53] The plan to follow in such
events seemed then as clearly indicated as singularly easy. Without
mixing directly in German affairs, without wounding at all the Teutonic
susceptibilities, one could oppose an insuperable barrier to Prussian
ambition; one had only to maintain the _statu quo_. Such a policy would
inevitably have the warm support of England, and would encourage the
resistance of Austria and the secondary States. Without doubt, the
Venetian question would be thus warded off; but, besides that, the peace
of Europe and the greatness of France were well worth "the pearl of the
Adriatic;" it was not forbidden to have great hopes for the city of
lagoons from the progress of time, and from the good relations preserved
and augmented between France and Austria.

Generally silent in the midst of these contradictory debates, loving,
moreover, to plan beneath the passions and agitations of his surrounding
counselors in the serenity of a calm and meditative intelligence, the
Emperor Napoleon III. slowly ripened a project which seemed to him to
sufficiently take into consideration the different arguments of the two
sides, and which, moreover, well answered the recommendation made by him
at about the same time to his minister of foreign affairs, _inertia
sapientia_! Italy naturally was of more real interest to him than to M.
Drouyn de Lhuys; that was a passion, perhaps indeed a youthful contract,
and it was even so with the Empress Eugenie, who had become ardent for
the affranchisement of Venice since the entry of M. de La Valette to the
ministry, also since the day when M. the Cavalier Nigra had turned some
couplets full of graceful allusions to a gondola which she had had made
for the lake of Fontainbleau. Not less inveterate, but much more fatal,
was Louis Napoleon's liking for the country of Blücher and Scharnhorst;
the "great destinies" of the monarchy of Brandenburg in Germany formed
one of the articles of his cosmopolitan faith. "_The geographical
position of Prussia is badly defined!_" as he cried out the following
year, at a solemn moment, and in a document too much forgotten.[54] He
certainly did not intend to destroy the empire of Hapsburg, and allow
the Hohenzollern to rule from the Sound to the Adriatic, as such a
course would have readily recognized the _intransigeans_ and the
know-nothings of the principle of nationality. A strong appreciator of
logic in the affairs of states, and in that (in that alone, perhaps!)
truly French spirit, the former prisoner of Ham would have willingly
constructed an essentially Protestant Prussia opposed to a traditionally
Catholic Austria in the centre of Germany, leaving for the secondary
States an intermediary and fluctuating situation in a religious as well
as in a political point of view. An augmented and rounded Prussia on
the Elbe and the Baltic, and thus rendered "stronger and more
homogeneous in the North," seemed to him a useful combination, almost
indispensable, counterbalancing Russia, and it was perfectly just that
in exchange for new and vast Protestant territories, which it would
acquire, the monarchy of Frederick II. should lose Silesia, a Catholic
country and former patrimony of Hapsburg, that it should also renounce
the Catholic provinces of the Rhine, situated too far outside of its
natural orbit. "One would thus maintain for Austria its great position
in Germany," above all its position as a great Catholic state, and the
return of Silesia would be for the Emperor Francis Joseph an ample
compensation for the Venetian province which he would cede to King
Victor Emmanuel. For the secondary States of the Confederation, one
would mediatize for their profit several of the little unimportant
princes; one would add to them, perhaps, as a new member of the _Bund_,
a new State composed entirely of Rhenish provinces taken from Prussia;
one would assure for them, in any case, "a closer union, a more powerful
organization, a more important _rôle_," which the great leaders of the
party of Würzburg, the advocates of the _triad_, MM. de Beust, de
Pfordten, and de Dalwigk, did not cease to demand. A curious fact, in
these vast projects which embraced the world and which tended to
determine and to satisfy the "legitimate wants" of Italy, Prussia,
Austria, the Germanic Confederation, the only obscure question, and
never decided in the mind of the French sovereign, was that of the
compensations which, in the presence of this universal alteration, he
could claim for his own country. He did not dare to touch the problem
of Belgium; it would be, he declared very honestly, "an act of
brigandage."[55] Neither did he deceive himself on the impossibility of
annexing important Germanic territories; generally he stopped at the
idea of a simple rectification of frontiers on the side of the Saar and
the Palatinate, and of the neutralization of the German line of
fortresses on the Rhine. Even reduced to these modest proportions, the
end did not seem to him to be less worthy of being ardently pursued, in
view of the very great and moral satisfaction France would find in the
achievement of its work in Italy, and in the rational ordering of
affairs in Germany.

Moreover, that which, in the situation in which he was engaged,
especially flattered his instincts, generous at bottom and vaguely
humanitarian, was that he hoped to reap considerable advantages for his
own country, for the entire universe, without any necessity of drawing
the sword, without spilling a drop of blood, "by moral force only," by
the ascendancy of the name of France. He was resolved to "remain in a
watchful neutrality," not to leave it except in the extreme case of the
too complete victories of one of the belligerents menacing "the
overthrow of the equilibrium and the modification of the map of Europe
for the benefit of a single Power." He proclaimed it very loudly, on all
occasions, and gloried in such "disinterested" policy,--a very strange
policy, however, and which, according to the very judicious _mot_ of
Prince Napoleon, declared itself in advance _hostile to the conqueror_.
"You have changed the address of your letter," said with fine raillery
the conqueror of Austerlitz to the Prussian envoy who brought him the
congratulations of his sovereign; the nephew of Napoleon I. acted in
such a manner that he could not change the address, alienating in
advance the still unknown conqueror. It is true that he believed he knew
him, that, with all the world, he saw him in the Emperor of Austria, and
that he counted on making with him preventive arrangements. Moreover,
even should the army of William I. show itself much superior to the
general opinion one had of it,--and, more perspicacious in that than his
followers, he fully admitted such an eventuality,--still he only saw in
this case a long and fatiguing conflict which would exhaust the two
parties and would allow him more easily to intervene as judge of the
combat and as protector of the right. He thus hoped, in any case, at his
time and at his convenience, to be able to pronounce a word of peace, of
equity, and of equilibrium, and he was convinced that "this word would
be heard." It was important for the moment that Prussia should begin the
combat, and to decide it in its favor it would be necessary for it to
procure the alliance of Italy. It was also necessary to carefully avoid
with the court of Berlin an untimely debate on the combinations and
compensations to come; the least insistence on this delicate point might
wound the patriotic feelings of William I., cool his warlike ardor,
destroy in the embryo a world of great things, _novus rerum ordo_! It
was better to ask nothing, to promise nothing, to compromise nothing.
Moreover, what use in demanding notes of a bankrupt, taking sureties
from one whose fate seemed so little assured, and whom, according to all
probabilities, one would soon have to protect, to defend against too
hard conditions which its Austrian conqueror would wish to impose on it?

So complicated and specious as was the strategy planned by the Emperor
of the French, there is no doubt that M. de Bismarck penetrated it from
the beginning, that he divined it, foresaw it in some way, even before
it was completely fixed in the mind of its author, and we have on this
subject a most striking proof. In the month of August, 1865, at the time
when the first conferences were held between the two governments of
Prussia and Italy against Austria, which were soon to interrupt the
brusque conclusion of the armistice of Gastein, M. Nigra wrote to
General La Marmora, being evidently inspired by the observations of his
Prussian colleague at Paris, Count Goltz: "The cabinet of Berlin would
not wish that, war once declared and begun, France should come, like the
Neptune of Virgil, to dictate peace, lay down conditions, or convoke a
congress at Paris."[56] Thus all is foreseen in those few lines written
long before Biarritz, all up to that congress which a Napoleon III.
would naturally not fail to extol one day or another, and which he in
fact was to advance in the month of May, 1866. "The difficulty consists,
then," continues M. Nigra in his dispatch, "in obtaining from France a
promise of absolute neutrality. Will, or can, the Emperor Napoleon make
this promise? _Will he give it in writing as Prussia wishes it?_" This
promise of _absolute_ neutrality M. de Bismarck certainly did not obtain
at Biarritz (October, 1865), still less was there a question of any
engagement _in writing_; but he learned there from august lips that
Italy was right in wishing to "complete its unity," that it should not
fail to profit by the first favorable occasion,--that France, for its
part, was resolved to respect Germany, not to contradict on the other
side of the Rhine the "national aspirations." Unless the map of Europe
was to be modified to its detriment, France would preserve the
neutrality, and this neutrality would not be other than "favorable" to a
combination in which the interests of Italy were engaged. It is
allowable to recall a reminiscence which is like a fragment of the
conversations of Biarritz in this curious declaration, made six months
afterwards by the president of the council of Prussia to General
Govone,[57] "that apart from the profit which he might find in it, and
with no _regard for principles_, the Emperor of the French would sooner
approve the great war for the German nationality than the war for the
Duchies of the Elbe!"

What, during his sojourn at Biarritz, could hardly have escaped a
sagacious observer like M. de Bismarck, was the hold which his profound
attachment for the country of Cavour and Manin had on the mind of Louis
Napoleon; there was the key to the position, the real word of the
Sphinx, and that certainty acquired, compensated in the eyes of the
Prussian minister for many still disquieting doubts, made him pass over
many a reticence of the august, taciturn man.[58] For certain reasons,
he could even congratulate himself on the reserve which he preserved
towards him, on the care which he took to avoid a discussion in detail;
that released him on his part from any precise engagement, from any
premature offer; it allowed him to confine himself to generalities, to
make fantastic journeys over spaces and centuries,--and he neglected
nothing. He spoke of Belgium and a part of Switzerland as the necessary
and legitimate complement of French unity,--of the common action of
France and Germany for the cause of progress and humanity,--of a future
accord between Paris, Berlin, and Florence, even London and Washington,
to conduct the destinies of Europe, to regulate those of the entire
world, to lead, for instance, Russia to its real vocation in Asia and
Austria to its civilizing mission on the Danube. How many times was seen
on this henceforward historical coast of the Gulf of Biscay, the Emperor
Napoleon slowly walking and leaning on the arm of Prosper Mérimée, while
the president of the Prussian council followed him at a respectful
distance, haranguing, gesticulating, and generally receiving for reply
only a dull and slightly incredulous look, and how the thought remains
to-day sadly fixed on this strange group of the romantic Cæsar, the
romancing Cesarean and the terrible realist who, very obsequious at
this moment towards his imperial host, four years later was to harshly
assign him the prison of Wilhelmshoehe! From time to time Napoleon III.
caused the author of "Colomba" to understand by a furtive pressure of
the arm how amusing he found this diplomat with the futile imagination,
this representative of a more than problematical Power, who so cleverly
dismembered Europe and distributed the kingdoms. "He is crazy!" he even
whispered one day in the ear of his companion; but, before recriminating
a remark so cruelly expiated since, one can well recall the following
passage of a dispatch which General Govone wrote the year after: "In
speaking to me of Count Bismarck, M. Benedetti told me that he was, so
to speak, a _maniacal_ diplomat,"[59] and M. Benedetti took care to add
that he had long known his man, that he had "followed" him for nearly
fifteen years!

Is it not necessary in fact to be a little _maniacal_, to have that
"little grain of folly" which Molière attributes to all great men, and
which Boerhaave believes he finds in every great genius,[60] to launch
the monarchy of Brandenburg into an adventure so eminently perilous as
that of 1866? The minister of William I. remarked correctly, however, at
Paris, that he would perhaps meet a second Olmütz, and his biographers
quote a characteristic speech of his, "that death on the scaffold is
under certain circumstances neither the most dishonorable nor the worst
of deaths." In a diplomatic point of view, his only assurance was the
profound love of Napoleon III. for the Italian cause, and after as
before Biarritz the "Neptune of Virgil" arose, always menacing, free to
pronounce his _quos ego_: the war once declared and begun, France could
always dictate peace, lay down the conditions or convoke a congress. The
whole point, then, was not to allow the benevolent neutrality of
Napoleon III. the time to work those infallible changes; all that was
necessary was to act quickly and well, to strike a blow at the beginning
which should dictate peace to Vienna and respect to Paris; victory was
only possible at this price! But, however, there has always been luck
and misfortune in the affairs of this world,--"the all powerful God is
capricious," according to the singular expression of M. de Bismarck at
one of the most solemn moments,[61]--how far could one count on an army
formed only a few years before, and which, as well as its chiefs, had
never gone through a great campaign? An extraordinary circumstance in
truth, and one which will never cease to be an astonishing fact in
history, of the two eminent men who took upon themselves more especially
the terrible responsibility of commencing the combat, neither of them
had had a superior command, or had made his name illustrious on a
historical field of battle! Before 1864, the only campaign in which
General Moltke had ever assisted was that of Syria between the Turks and
the Egyptians; in 1864 he had borne arms against his own country in that
invasion of Denmark which was certainly not calculated to produce
Turennes and Bonapartes. General de Roon had formed a part in 1832 of a
"corps of observation" which watched the French besieging Antwerp, and
had only distinguished himself since by books of military geography.
"After all that we have heard said of these officers," General Govone
wrote from Berlin on the 2d April, 1866, "the army is not enthusiastic
for the war against Austria; there is rather in its ranks sympathy for
the Austrian army. I know well that the war, once declared, the army
will be electrified, and will do its duty bravely; but it is neither a
spur nor a support for the policy which Count de Bismarck wishes to make
prevail."[62]

As to public opinion in Germany, as to the national sentiment of the
blond children of Arminius, far from finding there a "spur and support,"
the Prussian minister only met with repugnance and imprecations. All the
Napoleonic ideology was necessary to see in the conflict which was
preparing "the great war for German nationality," all the blindness of
the authoritative and democratic press in France was necessary to
assimilate the enterprise of M. de Bismarck on the other side of the
Rhine to the work of Cavour in the peninsula. The German nationality was
neither oppressed nor threatened from any quarter; none of the States of
the _Bund_ groaned under a foreign dominion; the ruling houses in
Hanover, Saxony, Würtemberg, Bavaria, etc., were indigenous, antique and
glorious, popular and liberal dynasties; the larger part of these
countries enjoyed a constitutional and parliamentary system unknown at
Berlin; the cities of Frankfort, Hamburg, Lubeck, Bremen were even
republics! To-day, when success has obscured the conscience and even the
memory of contemporary generations, and when a sad philosophy of history
is always on the point of justifying the present by falsifying the past,
one is prepared to recognize the "providential," irresistible movement
which drew Germany towards Prussian unity, and to almost call with M. de
Bismarck the campaign of 1866 "a simple misunderstanding." The truth is
that this campaign was a civil war, a fratricidal combat, and it was not
only the Prussian people which repudiated the thought and even cursed
its author on the eve of Sadowa. On the eve of Sadowa, the principal
cities of the kingdom, Cologne, Magdeburg, Stittin, Minden, etc., sent
addresses to the sovereign in favor of peace and against "a baleful
policy of the cabinet," the great corporation of merchants of
Koenigsberg, the city of Kant, even decided to no longer celebrate the
king's birthday. On his arrival at Berlin, General Govone wrote: "Not
only the upper classes, but even the middle classes are against or
unfavorable to the war. This aversion shows itself in the popular
journals; there is no hatred of Austria. More than that, although the
chamber has neither great prestige nor great popularity, the debates
still create adversaries for Count de Bismarck." Two months later, and
at the approach of hostilities, he wrote: "Unfortunately the public mind
in Prussia does not awaken in a perceptible manner, even face to face
with a situation so decisive, so vital for the country."[63]

It is true that none of these obstacles were of a nature to disturb the
president of the council at Berlin in his resolutions, nor to retard the
course which was traced out. On the contrary there were quite other
difficulties and falterings against which he stumbled in the court
itself, with the old fogies of Potsdam, especially with his sovereign,
and in many a circumstance the "iron count" could well say, like a
certain cardinal, "that the cabinet of the king and his _petit-coucher_
embarrassed him more than all Europe." In spite of the faith of William
I. in his "mission from above," in spite of the equally strong
resolution to preserve at any price his good port of Kiel, he did not
the less look upon an open conflict with the Emperor of Austria, an act
of hostility declared against this German sovereign who bore the
venerated name of Hapsburg, as the last of extremities, and he did not
wish to have recourse to it until after having exhausted all the means
of an amiable settlement. For the extreme case, and in opposition to
Napoleon III., he also greatly preferred the little war for the Duchies
to "the great war for German nationality;" but what he disliked above
all things, was the idea of a compact with Italy, a veritable compact,
offensive and defensive, in place of a "generic" treaty with a vague
declaration of _alliance and friendship_, and only destined, as one had
persuaded him from the first, to make Austria reflect and bring it to an
adjustment. He, the loyal Hohenzollern, to make war on a Hapsburg on
joint and equal terms with a _Welche_,--he, the Lord's anointed, the old
combatant of the holy alliance, to become the brother in arms of a
Victor Emmanuel, that representative of revolution, that usurper who had
overthrown so many legitimate princes, besieged and dethroned his own
nephew, and made Garibaldi in a red shirt sit near him, in the coach of
the king!

The faltering and compunctions on this point were very sincere.
Notwithstanding what has been said, nothing less than the marvelous art
of M. de Bismarck was necessary to triumph in the end over these
"syncopes" of the mission, to operate on these tumors of the conscience.
"There is my doctor!" said the old monarch of Prussia one day to a
Russian princess who congratulated him on his good health, pointing to
his first minister.[64] The difficulty of _gaining over the king_, of
triumphing over his _superstitions_, over the _old ideas_, over his
_legitimist scruples_,--these words were continually on the lips of M.
de Bismarck in the confidential interviews of the spring of 1866, which
the valuable reports of General Govone have so fortunately preserved for
posterity. Assuredly, in studying those reports, as well as the other
dispatches which M. le Marquis La Marmora wished very much to deliver to
the public, one can enjoy the spectacle of a comedy in five different
acts, all doing little honor to human nature; one can ask who bears away
the palm in duplicity of language, and in _æs triplex_ of the forehead,
the grandsons of Machiavelli or the heirs of the Teutonic order; one can
admire there how, to use an ingenuous expression of the Italian
negotiator, the Southern _viper_ attempts to _bite the charlatan_ of the
North, and the charlatan puts his foot on the viper.[65] What, however,
is the most curious and the most instructive in these documents is the
quantity of matters which the president of the Prussian council
succeeded in this short space of some months in teaching his august
master, a still greater quantity than he had made him forget. Without
doubt, one of the most remarkable of these forgetfulnesses is a certain
_word of honor_ given in _June_, 1866, by a very august personage to the
Emperor Francis Joseph, _that there was no treaty signed with
Italy_,[66] when that treaty, a treaty of offensive and defensive
alliance in good and due form, already counted at this moment two months
of existence, which had been signed at Berlin the 8th April by the
respective plenipotentiaries, ratified by the King of Italy at Florence
on the 14th, and then ratified on the 20th by the King of Prussia at
Berlin.

By the side of official Italy, the minister of William I. had taken care
to equally attach discontented Italy, which murmured in the shallows of
the young monarchy, and General La Marmora complains on several
occasions, in his interesting book, "of the intimate and cordial
relations which the minister of Prussia at Florence, Count d'Usedom,
entertained with some members of the party of action," and whose
untoward advice it followed only too often. On his part, the consul of
Prussia at Bucharest held in hand (February, 1866) the thread of a
conspiracy which was to bring about the fall of the Prince Couza, and
make a considerable difference in the action of the government at
Berlin. "Liberalism is childishness which it is easy to bring to reason;
but revolution is a force of which it is necessary to know how to avail
one's self," the cavalier of the Mark one day said at Paris, and he did
not delay to prove the two truths of his aphorism. It is known that his
relations with Mazzini were kept up a long time even after Sadowa,[67]
and the engagements contracted in 1866 towards Prussia by the Magyar
chiefs have since influenced, influence still at the present time, and
much more than is generally thought, the external policy of the empire
of the Hapsburg. It was also in the conventicles of the men of the
European revolution where the fantastic plan of campaign was worked out,
which M. d'Usedom wished to force on General La Marmora in his famous
dispatch of the 17th June;[68] in it he recommended making war
thoroughly, to overturn the quadrilateral, to march along the Adriatic,
to penetrate into Hungary, which would at once rise at the name of
Garibaldi: "we will thus strike Austria, not at the extremities, but at
the heart!" As to the endeavor to form, under the orders of the refugee
General Klapka, a legion composed of deserters from the Austrian army,
the president of the Prussian council greatly wished to affirm before
the chambers of Berlin, in his celebrated speech of the 16th January,
1874, that he had _rejected with energy all those projects at the
beginning of the war_. "It was not until after the battle of Sadowa, at
the moment when the Emperor Napoleon III., by a telegraphic dispatch,
had caused the possibility of his intervention to be seen,--it was not
till then, and as an act of legitimate defense, that I did not order but
only tolerated the formation of this Hungarian legion." Unfortunately,
the dates are not quite in accord with the declarations of the present
chancellor of Germany. The battle of Sadowa was fought the 3d July; but
on the 12th June, M. de Bismarck let the Italian government know that it
had definitely accepted the aid of the Sclavic and Hungarian
defections,[69] and it is established by evidence that, long before
Sadowa, even before any beginning of war, the Prussian government had
had recourse to a means which, according to the chancellor's own
expressions, "would excite to revolt and treason the Magyar and
Dalmatian regiments of the Austrian army." Let us not forget, however,
that, while treating with Mazzini and M. Klapka, the minister of William
I. was not sparing in denouncing to Europe the Jacobin spirit of the
House of Hapsburg: "The king, our august master," said a Prussian
dispatch of the 26th January, 1866, "is grievously affected at seeing in
the Duchies of the Elbe, and under the ægis of the Austrian eagle,
revolutionary tendencies, hostile to all thrones. If at Vienna they
believe that they can tranquilly assist in this transformation of a race
distinguished up to the present time by its conservative sentiments into
a hot-bed of revolutionary agitations, we cannot do it for our part, and
we are decided not to do it."

It was in the midst of such dark intrigues, and of negotiations more or
less regular, of preparations for war and a continual exchange of notes,
of parliamentary conflicts and of almost continual daily combats with
the "old fogies" of the court, that the first six months of the year
1866 passed for the president of the council at Berlin, and rarely has a
statesman lived through a more troubled or disturbed period. The waves
of events first cast him ashore, then threw him back again, and seemed
to remove him farther than ever from his goal. The revolution in
Roumania, and the election of Prince Hohenzollern by the people of
Bucharest, was, for instance, a great stroke of fortune, for this
incident brusquely shut a door through which, in the opinion of more
than one politician at that time, the Venetian question might have
resulted in peace,[70] and it was through efforts of the French, who
had contributed to the installation of the young Prussian prince on the
banks of the Danube! However, immediately after, M. de Bismarck was
again aroused from his security by vague rumors of conferences between
Austria and France, touching the city of Saint Mark. He, at least,
profited by them to persuade the king to sign the secret treaty of the
8th April with the government of Florence; but soon the offer of
disarming, made by the cabinet of Vienna, the debates in the midst of
the legislative body, and the manifestations of public opinion in
France, more and more favorable to the cause of peace, produced a
despairing lull, and again gave courage to the numerous partisans of
Austria at the court of William I. The Emperor Napoleon III. then
rendered to the Prussian minister the signal service of again putting in
motion the great political machine which began to slacken. He made the
speech of Auxerre (6th May), and defied, with scorn, the treaties of
1815. That did not, however, prevent him from immediately baffling all
the plans of M. de Bismarck, by the sudden proposition of a congress,
and, at this new occurrence, which seemed to compromise everything, the
president of the council at Berlin spoke _for the first time_ of
compensations for France. "I am much less German than Prussian," he said
to General Govone; "I would not have any difficulty in ceding to France
the whole country comprised between the Rhine and Mosel, but the king
would have very grave scruples."[71] Let it be well understood, he would
in return demand of the French government an active coöperation in the
war. But what did not enter at all into the views of Napoleon III. was,
that the state of opinion in France did not even permit it to be thought
of. In the interim, he learned that new negotiations had just been
entered on between Austria and France concerning Venice, and that on the
other side the king was making, without his knowledge, propositions to
the Emperor Francis Joseph for an amicable arrangement: William I.
always preferred the little question of the Duchies to the great war for
the German nationality! One can surmise what must have been at this
moment the state of mind of the minister who, for so many months,
complained before the Count de Barral, Italian plenipotentiary at
Berlin, of being betrayed by his agents at London, at Florence, and at
Paris. Moreover, he considered his life in danger since an attack made
on his person the 7th May; he was not without uneasiness about his
sojourn at Paris during the congress in which he was going to take part,
and which he dreaded for so many other reasons. "He does not go out
unaccompanied," wrote the Count de Barral, the 1st June, "and agents of
French police will come as far as the frontier to follow him during the
whole journey."[72]

The journey did not take place, as is known; Prussia, in the words of M.
d'Usedom, was "rescued from the congress," and Prince Gortchakof
contributed largely to this work of salvation. Always a ready friend, he
was the first to think that the projected conference had no "practical
aim" with the reservations which Austria wished to bring to it,[73] and
thus gave the signal for the general overthrow. From that time M. de
Bismarck set himself to "work on the mind of his royal master," and he
ended by freeing him from all _scruples_. "His majesty," Count de Barral
telegraphed even on the 23d May from Berlin, "was very much _moved_ at
the situation, of which he spoke with great tears in his eyes." Two
weeks later, the 8th June, the king wept no longer, but "he still had in
his voice something sad, indicating clearly the decision of a resigned
man, who believed that he could not act differently. His majesty told me
that he had full confidence in the justice of his cause. I have a clear
conscience," he added, with a moved air, and placing his hand on his
heart; "for a long time I have been accused of wishing war for ambitious
views, but now the whole world knows who is the aggressor."[74]

"I will return _via_ Vienna or Munich, or I will charge with the last
squadron, which will never return," M. de Bismarck said to a foreign
ambassador, at the moment of leaving Berlin for the head-quarters, the
30th June, 1866. Two days later he was already at Jitschin, on the field
still smoking from a great battle which had just been fought there. "I
have just arrived," he wrote to his wife from Jitschin; "the ground is
still heaped up with corpses, horses, and arms. Our victories are much
greater than we thought.... Send me some French romances to read, but
not more than one at a time. May God keep you!" This was written the 2d
July, 1866; the next day the battle of Sadowa was fought; the next day
Germany was at the feet of this singular lover of _French romances_; and
the Emperor Napoleon III. was sadly awakened from his own romance, from
his long humanitarian dream. Like the Titania of the "Midsummer Night's
Dream," imperial France saw all at once that, in a state of
inconceivable hallucination, she had caressed a monster.

And while so many events were taking place on the world's stage, great,
marvelous, and terrible events, Russia continued to sulk and meditate;
it meditated in the perpetual adoration of Prussia. One seeks in vain
for a trace of its action in the events which, nevertheless, concerned
in so high a degree its interests, its family alliances, its secular
traditions. "Since I have been in Russia," wrote M. Benedetti to his
chief in the spring of the year 1866, "let me mention that I have always
remarked, not without surprise, the indifference with which the cabinet
of St. Petersburg seems to me, from the beginning, to watch the
pretensions of Prussia and the eventuality of a conflict between the two
great Germanic Powers; and what I have not been less struck with is the
_constant security_ in which I have found M. de Bismarck as to the
attitude and the intentions of the Empire of the North." Russia was
silent in 1865 during the crisis of Gastein; in the month of May, 1866,
it only accepted the invitation to the congress to make them despair
and to discourage the other Powers from it; it was absent from the
deliberations of Nikolsburg and of Prague; it left to France the care of
making efforts for the South of Germany, for Saxony; it even left it the
honor of stipulating a clause in favor of unhappy Denmark, the country
of the future empress! One moment, it is true, M. d'Oubril, the Russian
ambassador at Berlin, a diplomat of the old school, had shown himself
very much alarmed at the victories and conquests of the Hohenzollern; he
was ordered in all haste to St. Petersburg, and "returned from there in
a few weeks entirely reassured, and affecting a satisfaction which was
not disturbed a single instant either by the reverses of the German
princes allied with the House of Russia, or by the developments which
Prussia made in its military power."[75] Prince Gortchakof did not
sacrifice to the old idols of the right of nations and of the balance of
power; he did not share certain prejudices touching the "solidarity
which should exist among all the conservative interests;" and he had too
lofty a soul to be jealous of a good neighbor. Moreover, had he not too
"vanquished Europe," three years previously, in the memorable campaign
of Poland? Some august personages, some princesses and grand duchesses,
had said in vain, with the women of the Bible, that Saul killed his
thousands, but David tens of thousands; they had in vain showed their
despoiled relations and their confiscated patrimonies; Alexander
Mikhaïlovitch did not envy the young laurels of his former colleague of
Frankfort, become Chancellor of the Confederation of the North. He
rejoiced in seeing Austria severely punished and France well mortified;
for the rest, he thought that nothing was changed, and that there was
only one more great chancellor in this century.

FOOTNOTES:

[39] See the celebrated circular dispatch of M. de Bismarck of the 24th
January, 1863, in which he gives an account of the curious interviews
which he had with the ambassador of Austria, Count Karolyi, in the last
months of the year 1862, soon after his accession to power.

[40] "Why, then, should not representative institutions be accorded at
the same time to the kingdom of Poland and to the empire of
Russia?"--Dispatch of Lord John Russell to Lord Napier, 10th April,
1863.

[41] "This _connivance_ of Austria was not the least remarkable event in
the history of this insurrection."--Confidential dispatch of M. de
Tengoborski to M. d'Oubril, 4th February, 1863.

[42] "The Polish insurrection, on which its duration impressed a
national character," the Emperor Napoleon III. said in his speech of the
5th November, 1863.

[43] "On former occasions, M. de Bismarck always spoke to me of the
probability that the Russian army would be too weak to suppress the
insurrection."--Dispatch of Sir A. Buchanan, 21st February, 1863. He
uses the same language to the Austrian minister, Count Kavolyi. On his
part, the director of the diplomatic chancellor's office of the Grand
Duke Constantine wrote on the 4th of February, at the first news of the
envoy of the Prussian generals for the conclusion of a military
convention: "While recognizing the courtesy of the mission of these
gentlemen, we cannot give an exact account of what has influenced it.
There is no _pericolo_ (_sic!_) _in mora_, and we have no need of it for
the coöperation of foreign troops.... The Prussian government paints the
Devil much blacker than he really is."--Confidential dispatch of M. de
Tengoborski to M. d'Oubril, Russian minister at Berlin.

[44] The German papers at this time published this interview after the
narration of M. Behrend, who did not deny it. See, among others, the
_Cologne Gazette_ of the 22d February, 1863.

[45] Dispatch of M. Buchanan of the 17th October, 1863. Inclosure.
Minute of conversation between M. de Bismarck and Sir A. Buchanan.

[46] Seeking an issue, however dishonorable to the campaign so foolishly
undertaken, the chief of the foreign office had decided towards the end
of September (after the speech of Blairgowrie) to declare the Emperor
Alexander _deprived of his rights over Poland_, "for not having
fulfilled the conditions in virtue of which Russia obtained this kingdom
in 1815." France was to make an analogous declaration, but M. Drouyn de
Lhuys, become prudent, and with reason would not send his note until
after that of England had reached Prince Gortchakof. Lord Russell then
wrote his dispatch; it was read at the council, approved by Lord
Palmerston, and a copy of it was given to the minister of foreign
affairs of France. Lord Napier had already been advised to inform Prince
Gortchakof of an "important communication" which he would soon have the
honor to transmit to him, and the Duke of Montebello was also instructed
by the French government to support his colleague of Great Britain in
his solemn declaration; already the debated document had left for its
destination, and was on its way to St. Petersburg, ... when suddenly, and
to the unspeakable astonishment of the persons initiated, a telegram
brusquely stopped in Germany the bearer of the note; another telegram
informed Lord Napier that no further attention should be given to the
"important communication." For during the interval Count Bernstorff had
read at the foreign office a Prussian dispatch in which M. de Bismarck
advised the principal secretary of state to take care how he
proceeded,--for, if the czar were declared deprived of his rights over
Poland for his violation of the treaty of Vienna, the German governments
could also declare on their part the King of Denmark deprived of his
sovereignty over the Duchies of the Elbe for not having fulfilled all
the engagements of the treaty of London. Lord John Russell recalled the
courier and tore up the note.--_Vide_ in the _Revue des deux Mondes_ of
the 1st January, 1865, "Two Negotiations of Contemporaneous Diplomacy;
M. de Bismarck and the Northern Alliance."

[47] "In 1848 Denmark had demanded the protection of France; M. Bastide,
then minister of foreign affairs under the republic, took its part
warmly, and there was even an idea of sending 10,000 men to assist the
Danes in the defense of their country."--Dispatch of Lord Cowley of the
13th February, 1864. See also the curious dispatches of M. Petetin, then
envoy of the republic at Hanover.

[48] The official journals of Berlin have renewed this reasoning in
their recent discussions on the laws of guarantee accorded to the Holy
See. The Pope, they argue, cannot be treated as a sovereign, as
reprisals cannot be exercised against him by seizing his states.

[49] See the _Revue des deux Mondes_ of the 1st October, 1868, _Les
Préliminaires de Sadowa_, as well as the instructive work of General La
Marmora, _Un pó più di luce_, Firenze, 1873.

[50] It is not useless to mention, _en passant_, the circumstances in
the midst of which these new candidatures were produced. Summoned by the
conference of London to present his pretensions, M. de Bismarck (28th
May, 1864) could not do otherwise than to follow Austria, and to
pronounce himself for the Duke of Augustenburg. The 2d June, at the
reunion succeeding the conference (the telegraph had had time to work),
the Russian plenipotentiary declared unexpectedly that the emperor, his
august master, "desiring to facilitate as far as he could the
arrangements to be concluded," had ceded his eventual rights, as chief
of the House Holstein-Gottorp, to his relative, ... the Grand Duke of
Oldenburg! The 18th June, another relative of the Emperor Alexander II.,
Prince Frederick William of Hesse, also asserted his rights to the
succession at the conference of London. This is an example of the
numerous and discreet services which Prince Gortchakof knew how to
render to his friend of Berlin in the sad campaign of the Duchies.

[51] Verse of a German song.

[52] We have taken care to preserve in the translation the character of
edifying obscurity which distinguishes the original.

[53] "What can one say now, if France had shown itself opposed to these
proceedings (the treaty of Italy with Prussia), we could not run the
risk of finding ourselves face to face with an Austro-Franco alliance.
Prussia was as solicitous as we, perhaps even more, with the attitude
which France would take in case of a war of Prussia and Italy against
Austria."--La Marmora, _Un pó più di luce_, p. 80. Three days before the
signing of the secret treaty with Italy, M. de Bismarck said to General
Govone: "_All this, let it be well understood, if France wishes it, for,
if she shows ill will, then nothing can be done._"--Dispatch of General
Govone to General de la Marmora of the 5th April, 1866. _Ibid._ p. 139.

[54] Letter of the emperor to M. Drouyn de Lhuys of the 11th June, 1866.
It is from this letter, solemnly presented to the legislative body, that
the quotations which follow are taken.

[55] He used this expression more than once, and in a very convincing
tone, in the council of ministers before 1866. It was not till later,
after Sadowa and the affair at Luxemburg, that he at times seemed to
yield to the "party of action" in his views concerning Belgium, without,
however, ever giving his full acquiescence.

[56] Dispatch of M. Nigra of the 8th August, 1865. La Marmora, p. 45.

[57] Dispatch of General Govone of the 17th March, 1866. La Marmora, p.
90.

[58] It was on his return from Biarritz that M. de Bismarck said to the
Chevalier Nigra, these significant words: "If Italy did not exist, it
would have to be invented." La Marmora, p. 59.

[59] Dispatch of General Govone, of the 6th April, 1866. La Marmora, p.
139.

[60] _Est aliquid delirii in omni magno ingenio._--BOERHAAVE.

[61] At the moment when hostilities commenced; dispatch of M. de Barral
of the 15th June, 1866. La Marmora, p. 332.

[62] Dispatch of General Govone of the 2d April, 1866. La Marmora, p.
131.

[63] Dispatches of General Govone of the 2d April and 22d May 1866. La
Marmora, pp. 131 and 245.

[64] George Hesekiel, iii. p. 271.

[65] _E la vipera avrà morsicato il ciarlatano._ Dispatch of General
Govone of the 15th March, 1866. La Marmora, p. 88.

[66] It was the Queen Augusta who affirmed it in a letter to the Emperor
of Austria, saying that on this matter she had received the word of
honor of her royal spouse. See the curious dispatch of M. Nigra of the
12th June, 1866, as well as the telegram of General La Marmora of the
same day. La Marmora, pp. 305 and 310.

[67] After the death of the great Italian agitator, the journals of
Florence published his letters to M. de Bismarck during the years
1868-1869. In case of a war between France and Germany, Mazzini suggests
the plan of overthrowing Victor Emmanuel, if this latter allied himself
with the Emperor Napoleon III.

[68] It is necessary to observe that the strategical part of the note of
d'Usedom was an _almost literal_ copy of an article of Mazzini published
in the _Dovere_ of Genoa, the 26th May, 1866.

[69] See the notes of M. d'Usedom of the 12th and 17th June, as well as
the dispatch of Count de Barral of the 15th June. La Marmora, pp. 316,
331, 345-348.

[70] In a dispatch of the 1st March, 1866, M. Nigra informs General La
Marmora that, conformably with his authorization, he endeavored to
broach the question of the exchange of the Danubian Principalities for
Venetia. He showed the advantages which this solution would have for
France and England, who would thus see the two programmes of the wars of
the Crimea and Italy peacefully accomplished. The minister adds that the
Emperor Napoleon III. was _struck with this idea_. La Marmora, p. 119.

[71] Dispatch of General Govone of the 3d June, 1866. La Marmora, p.
275.

[72] Telegrams of Count de Barral of the 7th April and the 1st June,
1866. La Marmora, pp. 141 and 266.

[73] Telegram of M. de Launay, from St. Petersburg, of the 1st June,
1866. La Marmora, p. 266. One can see in the same work with what
_empressement_ M. de Bismarck used this opinion of the Russian
chancellor, and transmitted it by telegraph to the different cabinets.

[74] Telegrams of M. de Barral. La Marmora, pp. 248 and 294.

[75] Benedetti, _Ma Mission en Prusse_, pp. 99 and 254.




IV.

THE ECLIPSE OF EUROPE.


I.

In the little _salon_ of the house Jessé, situated on the Rue de
Provence at Versailles, in the first of the sad month of November, 1870,
sat by the side of the fire two illustrious speakers, whose movements
Europe in suspense watched with the most intense anxiety. Leaning his
elbow on a writing table, on which "two bottles with candles in their
necks did service as lights,"[76] M. de Bismarck had asked M. Thiers for
permission to smoke a cigar, while he rested from the negotiations
pursued during the whole day concerning the armistice and the peace, and
entered into a conversation full of _abandon_ and gossip on the events
of the war. Among other things he related that the Emperor Napoleon
III., having retired to a little garden after the capitulation of Sedan,
grew pale at seeing him arrive armed with two pistols in his belt: "He
thought me capable of an action in bad taste." One would scarcely be
deceived in supposing that the man who since the attack of Blind had
not ceased to show a very nervous solicitude for his person,[77]
attributed here in this circumstance, and surely very ungenerously, to
the unhappy monarch sentiments which were far from his mind. However
that may be, the Prussian minister took pleasure during whole hours in
the reminiscences and stories in which he showed all his brilliancy of
mind; and on his part M. Thiers, scarcely returned from that journey of
forty days, during which he had twice crossed Europe and negotiated with
so many sovereigns and ministers, was not behind hand with _piquant_
anecdotes and ingenious ideas. He thought, however, that it was
necessary to recall, after some time, the serious matters which brought
him to the head-quarters; but M. de Bismarck,--this "savage full of
genius," as the French statesman soon called him in his effusions at the
bishop's palace at Orleans,--seemed to wish to prolong as much as
possible a delightful chat, and, taking the hand of M. Thiers, he cried
out, "Allow me, I beg of you; allow me, it is so pleasant to be a little
while with civilization!" The _civilization_, allowed at last to plead
his cause anew, did not the less find the old "iron count" in the
affable and fluent talker of a few moments before: the arts had
decidedly in no respect softened the political manners of the _savage_.
Then M. Thiers remembered the favorable disposition which he had found
in Russia, and he thought it useful to make the most of it in a moment
so critical. During his sojourn at St. Petersburg, he had addressed to
the delegation of Tours a telegraphic dispatch singularly hopeful. "He
had every cause," he said, "to be very much satisfied with his reception
by the emperor, the imperial family, Prince Gortchakof, and the other
dignitaries as well as with that of Russian society in general. The
emperor and his chancellor had expressed themselves warmly against the
exorbitant conditions of peace laid down by Prussia; they had declared
that Russia would never give its consent to conditions which were not
equitable; that, in consequence, the consent of the other Powers would
likewise be wanting; the exactions of Prussia would only be from the
effect of force, and would not rest on any sanction."[78] Without
entering into such developments, M. Thiers spoke this time in general
terms of the marks of solicitude which "his friend Prince Gortchakof"
had given him, and ended by stating that Russia had become alarmed and
irritated. At these words, M. de Bismarck got up and rang: "Bring the
portfolio that contains the papers of Russia." The portfolio having been
brought, "Read," said he; "here are thirty letters from St. Petersburg."
M. Thiers did not fail to profit by the permission: he read, he
understood, and he was disabused.

Yet, it would not have been difficult for the illustrious historian of
the Consulate and the Empire to have spared himself this cruel
deception, to have avoided, also, more than one false step in his rapid
course across Europe, if he had only wished to consult competent men or
even paid them the least attention. M. de Beust, for instance, was
perfectly able to enlighten him on the real relations between Russia and
Prussia; but it was especially M. Benedetti who could have told him the
precise and already old date of the understanding agreed upon by the two
courts of Berlin and St. Petersburg in view of a war with France, as
well as the very extraordinary circumstances which had accompanied this
understanding. Let us briefly recall here those circumstances,
endeavoring to free them as much as possible from certain obscurities
with which the interested parties continue to surround them, and let us
return once more to the day after Sadowa, to the public or secret
transactions which followed this dreadful day. The greater part of the
political combinations which were to be so fatal to France in the war of
1870, were contrived and consolidated during that equally gloomy and
turbulent period, during the two months of July and August of the year
1866.

"None of the questions which touch us can be solved without the consent
of France," the Emperor Napoleon III. had declared the 11th June, 1866,
in a solemn document produced before the legislative body; and among
those questions any "modification of the map of Europe to the exclusive
profit of a great Power" was naturally placed in the first rank. But,
using that equally immense as unhoped-for victory of the 3d July, 1866,
Prussia intended changing the map to its exclusive profit. In place of
"maintaining for Austria its great position in Germany," as the imperial
letter of the 11th June had demanded, Prussia demanded that the empire
of the Hapsburg should be totally excluded from the Germanic
Confederation; in place of according to the secondary States "a more
important _rôle_, a more powerful organization," it aspired to the
complete hegemony over all Germany, and furthermore wished to complete
large annexations in the countries occupied by its troops. In fomenting
this war which was to end in such unforeseen results, the imperial
policy had above all pursued two ends,--the affranchisement of Venice,
and the equitable settlement of affairs in Germany. Venice was ceded,
ceded even before the commencement of hostilities, and in accepting this
cession, in announcing in the "Moniteur" this "important event" after
the great disaster of General Benedeck, the Emperor Napoleon, in the
judgment of his minister of foreign affairs, was the more bound not to
allow Austria and its allies to be overwhelmed as it concerned the vital
interests of France itself. The minister demanded, in consequence, his
august master to convoke the legislative body, to send to the frontier
of the East an army of observation of 80,000 men whom Marshal Randon
would bring together very quickly, and to declare to Prussia that they
would occupy the left bank of the Rhine, if it was not moderate in its
demands towards the vanquished, and if it realized territorial
acquisitions of a nature to destroy the equilibrium of Europe.

Assuredly, after the terrible experiences of the year 1870, these very
legitimate doubts as to the efficaciousness of the measures proposed by
M. Drouyn de Lhuys in the month of July, 1866, can be raised; it is
nevertheless well to remember that the prestige of France was still
great and almost intact; that in a week Austria could bring back from
Italy 120,000 or 130,000 soldiers still fresh from the victory of
Custozza, and that the troops of General Moltke already began to
experience the natural consequences of the whole war, although
fortunate. "Prussia is victorious," wrote the ambassador of France at
the court of Vienna, "but it is exhausted. From the Rhine to Berlin
there are not 15,000 men to be met with. You can be master of the
situation by means of a simple military demonstration, and you can do it
in all security, for Prussia is incapable at this moment of accepting a
war with France. Let the emperor make a simple military demonstration,
and he will be astonished at the facility with which he will become,
without striking a blow, arbiter and master of the situation." In the
confidential letters addressed by M. de Bismarck to his wife during this
campaign, there are some traces of anxiety which at this moment assailed
his mind, especially of his efforts to talk sense to the overexcited,
"to the good people who do not see farther than their noses, _and swim
at their ease on the foaming wave of the phrase_." Six days after
Sadowa, on the way to Vienna, he wrote from Hohenmauth: "Do you still
remember, my heart, that we passed by here nineteen years ago, in going
from Prague to Vienna? No mirror then showed us the future, neither did
it in 1852, when I crossed this iron line with the good Lynar!... As for
us, all is well, and we will have a peace which is worth something, if
we do not exaggerate our demands and do not think that we have conquered
the world. Unfortunately we are as quick to get drunk as to despair, and
I have the unthankful task of pouring water in the foaming wine, and to
show that _we are not alone in Europe_ and that we have three
neighbors." Lastly, in his celebrated speech of the 16th January, 1874,
in the Reichstag, the chancellor of Germany, in speaking of those
decisive days, made the important avowal, that, "if France had then had
only a few available troops, a small body of French troops would have
sufficed to make quite a respectable army by joining the numerous corps
of South Germany, which on their part could furnish excellent materials
whose organization alone was defective. Such an army _would have first
placed us in the prime necessity of covering Berlin, and of abandoning
all our successes in Austria_." Let us add to that that Germany was
still effervescent against the "fratricidal" policy of Prussia, that the
proceedings and the exactions of Generals Vogel de Falkenstein and
Manteuffel had exasperated the minds of all on the banks of the Main:
there was a single instant, very fleeting also, it is true, when the
appearance of the French on the Rhine would not have wounded the
Teutonic susceptibilities, would have even been saluted with joy!
"Sire," said to the Emperor Napoleon III. one of the most eminent
ministers of the Germanic Confederation,--"sire, a simple military
demonstration on your part can save Europe, and Germany will also
preserve an eternal recollection of it. If you let this moment pass, _in
four years from now_ you will be forced to make war against Prussia, and
then you will have all Germany against you."

But the fright caused by the prodigious victories of Prussia was too
great in the Tuileries to allow the preservation of the _sang froid_
which the circumstances so imperiously demanded. The needle gun was also
a revelation which, by turns, exalted or depreciated beyond measure by
authorities reputed competent, contributed not a little to increase the
perplexities springing up on all sides; lastly, doubts arose even as to
the possibility of getting together the 80,000 men of whom the minister
of war spoke. The fatal expedition to Mexico had swallowed up almost all
the arms, and almost all the troops of France! They were forced to make
the strange avowal that they had desired with ardor, favored, provoked
the greatest European complications without even asking if, at the
critical and foreseen moment of the rupture of the equilibrium of the
world, they would be in a condition to make even a simple military
demonstration. The _party of action_ in the councils of the empire would
then have had a good chance to praise Prussia as the powerful agent of
civilization and progress, to rise against the tendencies, always
Austrian, of the bureaux of the Quai d'Orsay, and to recommend more than
ever an alliance with M. de Bismarck: it was necessary to give him
_carte blanche_ in Germany, and to complete French unity in acquiring
Belgium. M. Drouyn de Lhuys did not take the trouble to demonstrate the
inanity, the temerity of such suggestions, and he asked, not without
bitterness, how France, which they declared incapable of placing on foot
even a corps of observation on the Rhine, would be strong enough to
attack Antwerp, provoke England, and end by probably arraying against
itself all the Powers of Europe, among whom Prussia would not be the
last? He was not behind hand in recriminations; he showed the officious
and culpable zeal which had been used in order to incite war, the
consequences of which he, for his part, had never ceased to dread, as
they had taken care to place no limit to the _license_ allowed to one of
the parties, the most redoubtable, the most skillful, and from which it
was most essential to take sureties in advance. On the side from which
it was never threatened, it had neglected no precaution; in case of the
victory of Austria, Venetia would have nevertheless been acquired by
Italy. "In my opinion," ingenuously added the minister, "in a French
point of view it is a bad result; but the emperor insisted on it, above
all, and I have procured it for him." It was certainly the least that
could be asked, he thought, that they should allow him to obtain, on the
other hand, compensations, _French this time_, which alone could justify
before the nation the kindnesses shown to Prussia.

The debates were long and very violent for several days, and different
influences worked in the most opposite directions. The party of the
_Palais Royal_ was not the only one, however, to preach the abandonment
of the conqueror of Sadowa; in a certain measure it found its adherents
among statesmen the most moderate in their opinions, and ordinarily the
most calm in their judgments. M. Rouher was one of the first to oppose
any armed demonstration on the Eastern frontier, and soon we even hear
him speak of a _necessary and fruitful_ alliance between France and
Prussia! "Austria," thought another important member of the privy
council, "only inspires to-day that interest, so near to indifference,
which one feels for the strong become weak through their fault, not
having foreseen or prepared themselves. _Up to the present time, all is
for the best!_"[79] While M. Magne thus pronounced the _væ victis_ on
the empire of the Hapsburg,--without thinking that four years later,
alas! Europe would use almost the same expressions in regard to France
itself,--an august woman, a sister of the King of Würtemberg, and a near
relative of the imperial family of France, used different language. "You
cherish strange illusions," said she; "your prestige has diminished more
in these last two weeks than during the whole duration of your reign.
You allow the weak to be destroyed, you let the insolence and brutality
of your nearest neighbor grow beyond measure; you accept a gift, and you
do not even know how to address a kind word to him who gives it. I
regret that you do not believe me disinterested in the question, and
that you do not see the fatal danger of _a_ powerful Germany and _a_
powerful Italy. The _dynasty_ is menaced, and it will suffer the
consequences. Do not believe that the misfortune which overwhelms me in
the disaster of my country makes me unjust or distrustful. Venice ceded,
it would be necessary to succor Austria, to march to the Rhine, impose
your conditions! To let Austria be slaughtered is more than a crime, it
is an error!" Error or crime, the decision on this point had been
already reached, before this warm appeal from the Queen of Holland
reached the Tuileries.[80] Napoleon III. was very ill at this epoch,
struggling against the first advances of a cruel disease which never
forsook him,--in consequence less than ever inclined to vigorous
resolutions; and, on the 10th July, after a grand council of ministers
held at Paris in presence of the emperor, the Prince de Metternich was
obliged to telegraph to Vienna that France would only interfere in the
conflict through its diplomats.

Yet there was something more efficacious, more loyal in any case, in
trying only a vain isolated mediation, full of perilous reticence and
selfish calculations: that was simply to agree on a harmony of action
among the Powers on a question certainly eminently "European," and which
interested the equilibrium of the world in so high a degree. A word from
France in the sense indicated "would certainly have been listened to,"
to borrow an expression from the imperial letter of the 11th June, for
it was Prince Gortchakof himself who spoke at this moment of the
necessity of a general congress.[81] Threatened with the first and
violent commotion caused by the sudden undermining of Austria at the
sight of so many relations and cousins of his august master menaced with
spoliation and ruin, the Russian chancellor had in truth given this true
description of the situation. So devoted as he was to his former
colleague of Frankfort, so fascinated by his genius, Alexander
Mikhaïlovitch had not yet sufficiently cast aside the old Adam, the
_attaché_ of the suite of Count Nesselrode at the reunions of Laybach
and Verona, to admit in a trice that such a considerable transformation
of the public right could be effected without the knowledge of Europe
and without its consent. Why did the cabinet of the Tuileries not
appreciate the solution offered by the Russian chancellor? Why did it
not try to provoke a concerted action of the Powers in view of an
overturning so menacing for the balance of the states? Why did it not
see that in treating separately with M. de Bismarck it only made the
game for the conqueror? In spite of all his triumphs, even in spite of
all his audacity, the Prussian minister would have been slightly
embarrassed in asking before the areopagus of the Powers for the almost
complete abolition of the treaties of 1815, the dethronement of the old
House of the Guelphs, or the expulsion of the empire of the Hapsburg
from the bosom of Germany; and one will see in the sequel the cleverness
which he used in escaping from such a necessity and in making France an
accomplice in the eclipse of Europe. Strange fatality of the Napoleonic
ideology! The dreamer of Ham had passed all his reign in proposing
congresses, in invoking them at the most inopportune moments, under the
least propitious circumstances, and he neglected to apply this panacea,
so celebrated and recommended, on the only occasion where it was
demanded by good sense and good right, in the only crisis in which it
could become useful and salutary! The not less surprising good luck of
the minister of William I., who was "saved from the congress," according
to the _mot_ of Count d'Usedom, and saved on two occasions in the space
of some weeks: in the month of June, thanks to the kindness of Prince
Gortchakof, and in the month of July, thanks to the infatuation of
France! They were not ignorant at the Tuileries of the desire manifested
in a moment of happy inspiration by Alexander Mikhaïlovitch; but the
treaties of 1815 had been so eloquently "cursed" in the speech of
Auxerre, they had announced with so much noise the "important event" of
Venice and had illuminated Paris! As always, they clung to the
_prestige_, to the glory of appearing as the "Neptune of Virgil," in the
eyes of the profane, and they hoped more than ever to obtain some good
God-send by again obliging the "Piedmont of Germany." Consequently M.
Benedetti received the order to present himself at the head-quarters in
Moravia, to offer to M. de Bismarck French mediation, and to "sound"
him on the advantages that in justice he could scarcely fail to accord
to the ardent mediator.


II.

There is nothing more curious than the language used by the minister of
Prussia to the ambassador of France at those first conversations in
Moravia! M. de Bismarck began by renewing the fantasies of Biarritz, and
it was the very opposite of a Tilsit who appeared to form plans at the
head-quarters at Brünn: the son of Frederick William III., conquered at
Jena, seemed to wish to offer to the nephew of Napoleon I. to share the
world with him, to share it to the detriment of Russia and England! "He
endeavored to prove to me," wrote M. Benedetti on the 15th July, "that
the reverses of Austria allowed France and Prussia to modify their
territorial situation, and to solve at the present time the greater part
of the difficulties which will continue to menace the peace of Europe. I
reminded him that treaties existed, and that the war which he desired to
prevent would be the first result of such a policy. M. de Bismarck
answered me, that I misunderstood, that France and Prussia, united and
resolved to remodel their respective frontiers by binding one another by
solemn engagements, were henceforward in a position to regulate together
these questions, without fear of meeting an armed resistance _either on
the part of England or on the part of Russia_." In other words,--and
these words were likewise employed in the report of M. Benedetti,--the
Prussian minister believed that "he could free himself from the
obligation to submit to the control of Europe," thanks to a separate
agreement with France. As to the means to bring about this precious
agreement, it was perfectly simple: France had only to seek its fortune
along the Meuse and the Escaut. "I do not tell your excellency anything
new," wrote M. Benedetti to his chief, some days after, from Nikolsburg,
in announcing to him that M. de Bismarck was of the opinion "that we
should seek compensation in Belgium, and that he offered to act in
concert with us." He did not, however, utterly repel the idea of giving
France its share on the Rhine, not, for instance, in the Prussian
territories, where it would be difficult to persuade King William to
renounce any portion of his possession; "but something could perhaps be
found in the Palatinate," that is, in Bavaria. He was always "much more
Prussian than German," and reasonable terms could be made with the
Walhalla.

The French government fell into the trap which was thus set, and it then
aided Prussia in _freeing itself from all control of Europe_, in working
at these preliminaries of Nikolsburg, signed the 26th July, and which
sealed the exclusion of Austria from Germany, and constituted a
confederation of the North, under the hegemony of the Hohenzollern. This
grave attack on public right and the equilibrium of the world once
conceded, and the war virtually ended, one began to talk of
compensations. In a letter addressed to M. de Goltz, and dated from Vichy
the 3d August, M. Drouyn de Lhuys declared that the emperor, his august
master, "had not wished to complicate the difficulties of a work of
_European interest_ in treating _prematurely_ with Prussia" on
territorial questions; but the moment seemed finally come to consider
these questions, all the more as they were preparing to obtain large
annexations north of the Main. "The king," M. de Bismarck had written to
M. de Goltz the 10th July,--"the king cares less for the constitution of
a political northern confederation, and _above all desires annexations_;
he would rather abdicate than return without an important territorial
acquisition."[82] In fact, besides the Duchies of the Elbe, the
abandonment of which had been stipulated at Nikolsburg, Prussia still
wished to absorb the free cities, Cassel, Hanover, even Saxony, and at
the Tuileries they hoped to measure the French demands according to the
number of souls and of square leagues that William the Conqueror should
demand for himself. "The great war for German nationality," which the
popular Cæsar had recommended at Biarritz, turned in a measure into "this
human cattle market," so blamed at the congress of Vienna, at the
"execrated" treaties of 1815,--and how is it possible not to acknowledge
that France played a _rôle_ there unworthy of itself? It was for it to
deny at once the new and the old right, the principle of national will as
well as that of the legitimacy of princes; it wished, moreover, to
realize an illicit gain and a paltry sum on the occasion of a great
universal calamity, and, to speak with the English humorist, to profit by
the eruption of Vesuvius to boil an egg! M. de Bismarck uttered at this
moment a cruel _mot_, but which was not entirely unmerited. "France,"
said he to a former minister of the Germanic Confederation,--"France
_follows a Trinkgeld policy_ (_la France fait une politique de
pour-boire_)."

A letter written by M. Rouher on the 6th August, 1866, and since found
among the papers of the Tuileries,[83] makes us see the strange
illusions which the French government then cherished, and the ambassador
of Prussia at Paris did his best to sustain. "M. de Goltz finds our
pretension legitimate in principle," wrote the minister of state; "he
considers that satisfaction ought to be given to the only wish of our
country to constitute between France and Prussia _a necessary and
fruitful alliance_." The embarrassment is solely to determine the sum of
the demands that should be put forward. "The empress would demand much
or nothing, in order not to compromise our final pretensions." As for M.
Rouher, he thinks that "public opinion would have _food_ and
_direction_, if to-morrow we could say officially, Prussia consents that
we retake the frontiers of 1814, and thus efface the consequences of
Waterloo." Let it be well understood, the minister of state does not
admit "that this rectification would serve as a receipt for the future!"
"Without doubt, new facts must develop in order that new pretensions
arise, but these facts will certainly be developed. Germany is only in
the first of those numerous oscillations which it will undergo before
finding its new position. Let us be more ready, in the future, to better
profit by events; opportunities will not be wanting. The States south of
the Main, especially, will be, in a few years from now, an apple of
discord or a matter for a compromise. M. de Goltz does not dissimulate
at present the covetousness as regards this group of confederates."
Thus, at the very moment that they boasted of "saving" the States of the
South, of establishing on the other side of the Rhine a new political
combination which the minister of state was soon to adorn with the
famous name of _three fragments_, and to declare, marvelously reassuring
for France, they already waited for an opportunity to abandon this
combination, and to traffic for it "at a reasonable price!"

How naïve to think that after Sadowa and Nikolsburg, the ruin of Austria
consummated, Germany completely subjected, all intervention of Europe
checked, and the military weakness of France proclaimed to all the
winds,[84] that one would find Prussia accessible to those arrangements
which it had not wished to make before its immense victories, at the
moment of its greatest perplexities, and in the midst of the anguish of
a crisis which all the world agreed in proclaiming perilous in the
extreme! Even on the 8th June, on the eve of the war, M. Benedetti thus
summed up the state of public opinion in Prussia in regard to France:
"The apprehensions which we inspire everywhere in Germany still exist,
and they will awaken unanimously and violently at the least sign which
would allow our intention of enlarging our boundaries towards the East
to be guessed. The king, like the most humble of his subjects, would not
bear at this moment the suggestion of the probability of a sacrifice on
the Rhine. The crown prince, so profoundly convinced of the dangers of
the policy of which he is the witness, declared, not long ago, to one of
my colleagues, with extreme vivacity, that he preferred war to cession,
if it was only the little county of Glatz."[85] And it was the same
diplomat who had so appreciated the situation before the campaign of
Bohemia, it was this same ambassador who now took upon himself to
present to M. de Bismarck the demands of the cabinet of the Tuileries,
who even submitted to him on the 5th August a project for a secret
treaty, implying the abandonment to France of all the left bank of the
Rhine, without excepting the great fortress of Mayence! "In view of the
important acquisitions which the peace assures to the Prussian
government," said M. Benedetti, "I was of the opinion that a territorial
remodeling would hereafter be necessary for our security; I have
instigated nothing, I have still less guaranteed the success; I have
only allowed myself to hope for it, provided that our language were firm
and our attitude resolute." Was firmness wanting, or was too much of it
shown? In any case, M. de Bismarck asserts that he replied in a tone
which certainly showed no irresolution. "Very well," he replied to the
pressing entreaties of the ambassador, "then we will have war. But let
his majesty well observe, that such a war could become in certain
eventualities _a_ war with a revolution, and that in presence of
revolutionary dangers, the German dynasties would prove to be much more
firmly established than that of Napoleon."[86]

That was not, however, the last remark of the Prussian minister.
Perfectly decided not to admit the discussion on the subject of the
Rhine, he took care, nevertheless, not to completely discourage the
French ambassador, and to continue a game with him which later, in his
circular of the 29th July, 1870, he called by the name, unknown until
then in the diplomatic dictionary, of _dilatory negotiations_. He spoke
of his liking for Napoleon III., of his great ambition to solve in
concert with him the important problems of the future. "Prussia needs an
alliance with a great Power;" that was his inmost conviction; he did not
cease to preach it to the king his august master,--and what alliance
more desirable, in a point of view of progress and of civilization, than
that with the French empire? He thus returned to his recent effusions of
Brünn and Nikolsburg; he insinuated "that _other arrangements_ could be
made which would satisfy the respective interests of the two
countries,"[87] and he strengthened M. Benedetti in his design to return
to Paris and to expose the situation.

At Paris the conflict of Powers was carried on with vigor between the
minister of foreign affairs and the ambassador of Prussia, M. de Goltz,
ably seconded by the _party of action_, to which the arrival of M.
Benedetti (11th August) brought considerable support. M. Drouyn de Lhuys
was not at all surprised at the _Prussian ingratitude_, as M. Benedetti
had expressed it in one of his last dispatches,[88] but, by a logic
which escapes us, he did not the less rejoice at seeing the French
demands at last stated, "They can be taken up again in good time." He
had no doubt of the use that they would soon make on the banks of the
Spree of the project of the treaty of the 5th August! He hoped, besides,
that the final refusal given at Berlin would cause the ardent promoters
of dangerous intrigues to reflect that it would prevent certain
engagements for the future which he apprehended above all. M. de Goltz
suddenly told him that he had come to an agreement with the emperor
concerning the annexations to be effected by William I. in Northern
Germany, and a letter addressed the 12th August by the chief of state to
the Marquis de La Valette cut short all controversy with Prussia. "It
results from my conversation with Benedetti," wrote Napoleon III. to the
minister of the interior, "that we will have all Germany against us for
a small profit; it is important not to let public opinion be mistaken on
this point." The misfortune was only that the imperial government
allowed itself at this moment to be misled on a very dangerous point,
and that Belgium became for it, from that time, the object of a
negotiation as deceptive as fatal, and from which later, at the
beginning of the war of 1870, it in vain endeavored to elude the
crushing responsibility.

That M. de Bismarck was, from the beginning, the great tempter of the
imperial government, and the tempter repulsed even for a long time, in
these shadowy projects concerning the country of the Meuse and the
Escaut, is a truth which to-day cannot be doubted, the authentic
documents published lately suffice to convince the most incredulous
mind. It was not only in his conversations with General Govone that the
president of the Prussian council indicated on several occasions, and
very clearly, Belgium and certain parts of Switzerland as the most
proper territories to "indemnify France:" long before the spring of the
year 1866, even long before the interview of Biarritz, M. de Bismarck
had tried to _sell the bear-skin_, as Napoleon III. said to him one day.
General La Marmora, who understood it a long time, adds that "the bear
was neither in the Alps nor in the Carpathians; he was very well (_stava
benone_) and he neither wished to die nor to be caged up."[89] Such
suggestions were, without doubt, of a nature to startle the _party of
action_ in the councils of the empire, they were, however, eagerly
received by it; but scornfully checked, up to that point, by M. Drouyn
de Lhuys, treated as "projects of brigandage" by the chief of the state,
they had to await that hour of _patriotic anguish_ which marked the
arrival of Benedetti, to be at last taken into serious consideration.

Certainly the ambassador of France at the court of Berlin had, in this
year 1866, a very difficult and painful situation, we had almost said a
pathetic one. He had worked with ardor, with passion, to bring about
this _connubio_ of Italy and Prussia, which seemed to him to be an
immense good fortune for the imperial policy, a brilliant victory gained
over the old order of things to the profit of the "new right" and
Napoleonic ideas. In the fear, very well founded besides, of seeing this
work miscarry and Prussia draw back, if one spoke to it of eventual
compensations and preventive engagements, he had not ceased to dissuade
his government from any attempt of this kind, and to lay stress upon the
fierce, intractable, and suspicious patriotism of the House of
Hohenzollern, even to the point of being sometimes suspected at the
Hotel of the Quai d'Orsay of somewhat exaggerating the colors, and of
making a certain devil blacker and more German than he really was. The
work had at last succeeded; succeeded beyond all expectations; succeeded
in inspiring fear, in suddenly convincing M. Benedetti "that a
territorial remodeling was henceforth necessary to the security of
France." This remodeling he had flattered himself for a moment with
having obtained on the Rhine: "He had not guaranteed the success, but he
had allowed himself to _hope_ for it." Refused with firmness, if not
with pride, "and having taken the measure of Prussian ingratitude," he
was nevertheless soon given to hope what the minister of William I. had
insinuated to him, "that other proper arrangements could be made to
satisfy the respective interests of the two countries," and he had
grasped at the expedient which was thus pictured before his eyes, with
so much the more feverish energy as he saw in it a new triumph for the
modern right and the principles dear to his party. Anxious to repair the
consequences of a policy to which for his part he had contributed more
than any other to make it successful; recognizing, however, the
difficulties, if not the impossibility, for the court of Berlin to cede
any portion of the German soil, and always convinced of the sincere
desire of M. de Bismarck "to indemnify France,"[90] at this decisive
hour he made himself, at the side of Napoleon III., the interpreter of
the ideas which he had gathered from the head-quarters at Brünn, and
pleaded with warmth for this necessary and fruitful alliance with
Prussia, which, extolled for a long time by the Palais Royal, had
recently deluded even the well balanced mind of M. Rouher.

Let it be well understood, there was no question of immediate action, of
which, indeed, the military situation of the country allowed no thought;
the question was simply of an agreement and a solidarity to be
established for future eventualities, for the time more or less distant,
but inevitable, when Prussia should think of crowning its work, of
freeing the Main, of extending its rule from the Baltic to the
Alps,--this question was of _boldly taking stand on the ground of
nationalities_! "If France boldly takes its stand on the ground of
nationalities," said a curious note found among the papers of the
Tuileries, and which incontestably sums up the ideas of the party of
action at this epoch,[91] "it is necessary to establish now that there
exists no Belgian nationality, and to fix this essential point with
Prussia. As the cabinet of Berlin seemed to be, on the other hand,
disposed to enter with France into arrangements which would suit France,
there would be time to negotiate a secret act which should bind the two
parties. Without pretending that this act was a perfectly sure
guarantee, it would have the double advantage of compromising Prussia,
and would be for it a gage of the sincerity of the policy or of the
intentions of the Emperor.... To be certain of finding at Berlin a
confidence which is necessary for the maintenance of an intimate
understanding, we must try to dissipate the apprehensions which have
always been entertained, which have been reawakened, and even
overexcited by our last communications. This result cannot be obtained
by words; an act is necessary, and one which will regulate the ulterior
lot of Belgium in concert with Prussia, in proving at Berlin that the
emperor seeks elsewhere than on the Rhine the extension necessary for
France since the events of which Germany was the theatre. We must at
least have a relative certainty that the Prussian government will not
oppose our aggrandizement in the North."


III.

It was with the mission of negotiating a _secret act_, binding the two
parties in the sense indicated by the note which we have just given,
that M. Benedetti left Paris towards the end of the month of August. The
act was to provide for an offensive and defensive alliance between the
two states, and, in exchange for the recognition of the changes already
accomplished or still to be accomplished in Germany, to assure to
Napoleon III. the diplomatic aid of Prussia for the acquisition of
Luxemburg, and its _armed_ aid at the moment when France should judge it
opportune to annex Belgium. Immediately on his arrival at his post the
French ambassador went resolutely to work: he carried on the negotiation
_without the knowledge of his immediate chief_, and only referred to the
emperor and the minister of state.[92] He begged the president of the
council of Prussia to regard the propositions of the 5th August, those
relative to the left bank of the Rhine, as null and void, as a joke of
M. Drouyn de Lhuys during the sickness of his august master, and
submitted to him a new project in five articles concerning Belgium. It
matters little that the ambassador of France had with him the minute of
it which he had written in the cabinet of the Prussian minister, at his
request, and, "in some measure at his dictation;" it is certain that
Benedetti acted according to the instructions from Paris,[93] and that
M. de Bismarck on his part did not decline such overtures. He had even
made observations on some of the terms employed in the draft, and
insisted on introducing several changes in the text. The project thus
amended was sent to Paris, and returned anew to Berlin with
rectifications made by the emperor and M. Rouher. On the banks of the
Seine, in the councils of the small number initiated in the secret,
they were full of expectation and cheerfulness; they debated the
question of the successor of M. Drouyn de Lhuys, and the opinions were
divided between M. La Valette and M. Benedetti; they exchanged ideas
which were soon expressed in a sadly celebrated document, and they
rejoiced at seeing "the treaties of 1815 destroyed, the coalition of the
three Powers of the North broken, and Prussia made sufficiently
independent and sufficiently compact to ignore its former
traditions."[94] All of a sudden a discouraging dispatch from the
ambassador of France at the court of Berlin (29th August) troubled their
minds, and they had again some apprehensions on the subject of the
"necessary and fruitful alliance" which they flattered themselves with
having established.

The conferences had continued up to the last days of the month of
August, and M. de Bismarck had lent himself with good grace to the
_dilatory negotiations_. In the mean time, the peace of Prague, the
definite peace with Austria, was signed (26th August); the States of the
South had adhered one after the other to the stipulations of Nikolsburg,
and solemnly recognized the confederation of the North, as well as the
territorial acquisitions of Prussia. The secret act concerning Belgium
was in the hands of the minister of William I., and only needed to be
fairly copied and signed, but at this moment M. Benedetti suddenly met
with strange inconceivable distrusts which did not fail to wound him
deeply. M. de Bismarck hesitated, spoke to him of his fears "that the
Emperor Napoleon would wish to make use of such a negotiation to create
suspicion between Prussia and England." The stupefaction of the French
ambassador was extreme. "What degree of confidence can we on our side
accord to those open to such suspicions?" he asked in his dispatch of
the 29th August.[95] The proceeding seemed to him unjustifiable, and, in
order not to be tempted to qualify it, he judged it opportune "to go for
a fortnight to Carlsbad where he would hold himself ready to return to
Berlin on receipt of the first telegram which M. de Bismarck should
address to him." Slightly moved at this circumstance, the court of the
Tuileries was not the less obstinate in believing in the _secret act_
which was preparing at Berlin; it dismissed M. Drouyn de Lhuys, and long
before the arrival of his successor from Constantinople, M. de Moustier,
they hastened to publish that famous circular of the 16th September,
which bore the signature of the minister of the interior, M. de La
Valette, and was one more pledge given to the conqueror of Sadowa. The
manifest praised the theory of combinations and affirmed that "Prussia,
enlarged, free henceforth from any solidarity, would assure the
independence of Germany;" as to the most secret hopes, scarcely an
allusion was made to them: "France can only desire territorial
aggrandizements which do not alter its powerful cohesion." Nothing
happened, however, and M. Benedetti waited in vain under the elms and
the beautiful firs of Carlsbad: M. de Bismarck gave no sign of life. He
had gone to Varzin, from whence he did not return until the month of
December. The _dilatory negotiations_ had borne all their fruit in the
month of August, and the French government would have been too happy if
all those shadowy intrigues had remained for it only a simple deception:
they became its chastisement.

M. de Benedetti had, however, pretended to know his man, to have
_followed_ him for fifteen years! He had followed him in any case during
the negotiations of the spring which brought about the treaty between
Prussia and Italy; he had then contemplated the magnificent tilt between
the _viper_ and the _charlatan_, and himself very judiciously judged a
situation in which the plenipotentiaries of the two countries had
surpassed one another in miracles of the true Punic faith. "M. de
Bismarck and General Govone distrusted and still distrust one another,"
M. Benedetti wrote in his dispatch of the 27th of March, 1866. "It is
feared at Florence that, finding itself in possession of _an act which
places Italy in a certain degree at its discretion_, Prussia will make
known the stipulations of it at Vienna and will persuade the Austrian
cabinet, by intimidation, to peacefully make the coveted concessions. At
Berlin, they fear that Italy, if they promised to negotiate on these
bases, will directly inform Austria before concluding any treaty, and
will thus try to obtain from it the abandonment of Venice." After a
similar experience _in anima vili_, how could M. Benedetti have left on
the table of the president of the council of Berlin his compromising
autograph on the subject of Belgium, _an act which in a certain degree
placed France at the mercy of Prussia_? How could he be astonished at
seeing his interlocutor "open to certain suspicion," and did he not on
the contrary make the same calculations for his own account and profit?
It was, however, very foolish to suppose that M. de Bismarck had the
will to do unto others that which he declared he did not wish others to
do unto him! And the ambassador of France would have scarcely been wrong
in crediting this charitable thought to his interlocutor, however
unevangelical, for the amusing or rather the sad part of the
affair,--the true humor of all this imbroglio, as the Bardolph of
Shakspere would say,--is that the cavalier of the Mark had already
executed precisely the manoeuvre, indifferently chivalric surely, of
which he pretended to suspect Napoleon III., and that the thing was done
at the moment when he demanded if they had nothing in their hands and
pockets. They had left in his hands two very secret and dangerous
documents, the two plans of the treaties on the Rhine and Belgium,[96]
and he took care not to avail himself of them immediately at the expense
of the interested parties, whom he had every interest to attach to
himself.

The preliminaries of Nikolsburg, the reader will remember, had
stipulated that the States of the South should remain outside of the new
confederation directed by Prussia, and that they should form among
themselves a restricted union. That was the great success obtained by
the French mediation, the salutary combination of the _three fragments_,
much more favorable to the interests of France, according to its
opinion, than that of the former _Bund_, the ill-omened creation of
1815. It is true that among the persons initiated in the secret of
Benedetti's mission, "this group of confederates" was only regarded as
"a matter of business for a reasonable profit;" in waiting, however,
they "saved" the South, and M. Drouyn de Lhuys honestly exerted himself,
in this month of August, 1866, to aid the unhappy plenipotentiaries of
Bavaria, of Würtemberg, of Hesse, etc., who had gone to seek a definite
peace at Berlin. M. de Bismarck had first frightened them by his fiscal
and territorial demands; they had invoked and obtained the support of
the emperor, and in the Tuileries they flattered themselves with having
in truth persuaded the minister of William I. to more equitable
sentiments. Still, on the 24th August, M. Drouyn de Lhuys wrote to his
agent in Bavaria: "I am happy to think that our last step has not been
without influence on the result of a negotiation which is ending in a
more satisfactory manner than the cabinet of Munich had at first thought
possible;" and it was not only M. Benedetti who took to himself in this
matter the credit of playing the fine _rôle_ of moderator.[97] The truth
is, that if M. de Bismarck ended by becoming more moderate and even
amicable towards the Southern States, he had very different motives than
the desire of being agreeable to the cabinet of the Tuileries. He had
simply shown to "the group of confederates" the project of the treaty of
the 5th August; he had made them see that the French government, at the
same time when it seemed to protect, sought to extend itself together
with Prussia at their expense, and demanded portions of the Palatinate
and of Hesse. In place of demanding from them the sacrifices which they
feared, the minister of William I. offered to defend them against the
"hereditary enemy." There was no hesitation: the States of the South
surrendered, and Prussia concluded with them (from the 17th to the 23d
August) _secret_ treaties of offensive and defensive alliance. The
contracting parties guaranteed reciprocally the integrity of their
respective territories, and the States of the South engaged to place, in
case of war, all their military forces at the disposal of the King of
Prussia. The "matter of business," on which M. Rouher had counted, was
henceforward out of the market; the line of the Main found itself free
before it had been traced on the official map of Europe, and from the
month of August, 1866, M. de Bismarck could count on the armed
coöperation of all Germany.[98]

The military conventions with the States of the South were kept
rigorously secret for a long time, and it was not till the spring of the
following year that M. de Bismarck found it convenient to give them a
crafty publicity in reply to the speech of the minister of state on the
_three fragments_. Up to that time M. Benedetti had been ignorant of
them, like other mortals, but he had shown himself more clear-sighted as
regards another very grave event, contemporary with these conventions
concluded with the South, and he recognized from the beginning the
ominous bearing of the mission of General Manteuffel to St. Petersburg
in the month of August, 1866. It must not be forgotten that at the
bottom of the "new policy" which during this month they were flattering
themselves with having inaugurated at the Tuileries by a cordial
understanding with the court of Berlin, a Russian problem was agitating.
Would the monarchy of Brandenburg, "rendered sufficiently independent
and sufficiently compact to loosen itself from its traditions, free
henceforward from all solidarity," decide to break its secular and
hitherto unrelaxed ties with the empire of the czars? That was the true
and vital question of the future. "Prussia must have an alliance with a
great Power," the minister of William I. did not cease to reiterate at
this epoch; but, as Austria was destroyed, and England had long since
condemned itself to widowhood, only France and Russia remained, between
whom the lucky conqueror of Sadowa had then the position of the Don Juan
of Mozart, between Doña Anna and Doña Elvira. Surprised in the darkness,
imposed upon in a moment of deplorable misunderstanding, the proud and
passionate Doña Anna occasionally cast glances of defiance and
_venganza_, oftener, alas! looks still ardent from the last embrace, and
betraying the secret flame, which even said very plainly, that she
would go still farther, provided there was reparation, provided that a
marriage followed, if it was only a clandestine marriage. Russia was
Doña Elvira, the former, the _legitimate_ ally a little vexed at recent
neglect, even very gravely injured in family interests, but always
loving, always fascinated, and only waiting for a kind word to forget
all and to throw herself into the arms of the fickle one. We only speak
briefly of Zerline, of Italy, a cunning and lively soubrette, intruding
herself everywhere, in love, she also, the poor little thing, with the
irresistible seducer, and often treated very cavalierly, happy,
nevertheless, to be pinched privately, and to say that she also was
"protected by a great lord."

Such being the situation in this decisive month, the ambassador of
France to the court of Berlin experienced a violent shock in learning
one day of the sudden departure for St. Petersburg of General
Manteuffel, the general-diplomat, more diplomat than general, the
confidant, _par excellence_, of King William, and always the man for
private missions. "I have asked M. de Bismarck," M. Benedetti hastened
to write to Paris, "what I should think of this mission, confided to a
general commanding troops in the campaign. After having pretended that
he thought he had informed me of it, M. de Bismarck assured me that he
had told M. de Goltz, in order that he might instruct you." Strictly
speaking, one finds it natural that the king wished to plead before his
imperial nephew the extenuating circumstances of a painful situation,
which forced him to take the goods and the crowns of several very near
relations of the House of Romanoff; but the French ambassador was above
all struck by the circumstance that the journey of M. de Manteuffel had
been decided the day after he had delivered his project of the treaty.
"I asked the president of the council," he continues in the same
dispatch, "if this general officer had been informed of our overture; he
answered that he had had no occasion to make him a party to it, but that
he could not guarantee to me that the king had not told him the
substance. I should add, as I have told you by telegraph, that I gave a
copy of our project to M. de Bismarck on Sunday morning, and that
General Manteuffel, who had scarcely removed his head-quarters to
Frankfort, was called to Berlin in the following night." Towards the end
of the month of August, when M. de Bismarck for the first time showed
his hesitation in signing the secret act concerning Belgium, M.
Benedetti wrote, in a letter to M. Rouher, concerning the mission that
M. de Manteuffel continued to fill at St. Petersburg. "They have
elsewhere obtained assurances which dispense with our aid," said he; "if
they decline our alliance, it is because they are already provided, or
on the eve of being."[99]

General Manteuffel remained several weeks at St. Petersburg; he stayed
there long enough to dissipate a certain sadness caused by the recent
misfortunes of the Houses of Hanover, Cassel, Nassau, etc., all allied
by blood to the imperial family of Russia, also long enough to
communicate such projects and show autographs by which they had
treacherously endeavored to turn the Hohenzollern from his loyal,
unalterable affection for his relative of the North. Thanks to all these
proceedings, and all these attentions, the good harmony between the two
courts became greater than ever; they easily explained the past, and
arranged for the future, and the ambassador of France at the court of
Berlin was not deceived in designating, from this moment, the "bear,"
whose skin the general-diplomat had gone to sell on the banks of the
Neva. To speak in the words of the Marquis La Marmora, it was a bear of
the Balkans, which had not been well for a long time, and which the
Emperor Nicholas had declared _sick_ twenty years before. One will see
in the sequel that Alexander Mikhaïlovitch did not the less miss the
deer at the general hunt in 1870, that he scarcely succeeded in getting
for himself a handful of hair well fitted to adorn his helmet; that
takes nothing from the merit of the perspicacity which the unfortunate
negotiator of the _secret_ act concerning Belgium had given proof of on
this occasion. M. Benedetti early foresaw the desolating truth, which,
for M. Thiers, was not visible until very late, at the bottom of this
_Russian box_ which M. de Bismarck allowed him one evening, at
Versailles, to rummage with a liberality which was certainly not free
from malice.

In endeavoring, after the great disaster of the campaign of Bohemia, to
obtain from Prussia compensations first on the Rhine, then on the Meuse,
the Emperor Napoleon III., in those months of July and August, 1866, had
only facilitated for M. de Bismarck the two great political
combinations which were since, in 1870, of such prodigious use: the
armed coöperation of the Southern States, and the moral aid of Russia in
case of a war with France. The chief fault, however, of the Napoleonic
policy the day after Sadowa, was to have so well served Prussia in its
desire to escape from all control on the part of Europe, and to have
given its sanction from the very first to such an immense derangement of
the equilibrium of the world, without the cause being brought before the
areopagus of nations. This forgetfulness of the duties towards the great
Christian family of states was only too quickly and too cruelly avenged,
alas! and Prince Gortchakof, in 1870, only followed a recent and
lamentable example in allowing France and Germany to decide their
quarrel in the lists, in hindering all common action of the Powers, all
European concert. "I see no Europe!" cried M. de Beust, in 1870, in a
celebrated dispatch, and no one thought of disputing this dolorous
affirmation. A few only observed with sadness that the eclipse had
already lasted several years, that it dated from the preliminaries of
Nikolsburg and from the treaty of Prague.

FOOTNOTES:

[76] This detail, as well as those which follow, are taken from the
narration made by M. Thiers himself, some days later, to the diocese of
Orleans, and gathered together by M. A. Boucher in his interesting
_Story of the Invasion_ (Orleans, 1871), pp. 318-325.

[77] "He (M. de Bismarck) only goes out accompanied, and agents of
French police will come as far as the frontier to follow him during the
whole journey," announced M. de Barral from Berlin, the 1st June, 1866,
three days after the assault by Blind. M. Jules Favre (_History of the
Government of the National Defense_, vol. i. p. 163-164) speaks of the
uneasiness manifested by the minister of William I. at the interview at
the castle of _Haute-Maison_, at Montry: "We are very badly off here;
your _Franc-tireurs_ can take aim at me through the windows." One can
also recall the language of the German chancellor in the Prussian
chambers concerning the assault by Kulmann.

[78] According to the analysis of Lord Lyons, to whom M. de Chaudordy
communicated this telegram.--Dispatch of Lord Lyons, of the 6th October,
1870. It is curious to compare with this singular telegram of M. Thiers
the opinion expressed by Prince Gortchakof before the English
ambassador, "that the conditions indicated in the circular of M. de
Bismarck of the 16th September could only be modified by military
events, and that nothing authorized such a conjecture."--Dispatch of Sir
A. Buchanan of the 17th October. Now the conditions indicated in the
Prussian circular of the 16th September were already _Alsace and Metz_.

[79] Confidential note of M. Magne for the emperor.--_Papers and
Correspondence of the Imperial Family_, vol. i. p. 240.

[80] The letter addressed to the minister of France at the Hague and
placed under the eyes of the emperor, was re-found at the Tuileries
after the 4th September.--_Papers and Correspondence of the Imperial
Family_, vol. i. p. 14.

[81] This, however, was only a short desire on the part of Prince
Gortchakof, a design without consequence, and of which we find the only
authentic trace in an obscure phrase of a dispatch of the French
ambassador at Berlin. Vide Benedetti, _My Mission in Prussia_, p. 226.

[82] Dispatch in cipher intercepted by the Austrians and published in
connection with the war of 1866 by the Austrian staff.

[83] _Papers and Correspondence of the Imperial Family_, vol. ii. pp.
225, 228. The editors pretend that this letter was addressed to M. de
Moustier, which is entirely erroneous, M. de Moustier being then at
Constantinople. We are inclined to believe that the receiver was M.
Conti, who had accompanied the emperor to Vichy. It will be remembered
that Napoleon III., very unwell and suffering during this whole epoch,
had gone the 27th July to Vichy, where M. Drouyn de Lhuys went to see
him for a short time; the chief of the state could not, however, prolong
his sojourn in the watering-place, and returned to Paris on the 8th
August.

[84] "For some time it has been too often said that France _is not
ready_."--Confidential note of M. Magne of the 20th July (_Papers and
Correspondence of the Imperial Family_, vol. i. p. 241). M. de Goltz had
early discovered this secret, and had not ceased to recommend to M. de
Bismarck a firm attitude as regarded France.

[85] _My Mission in Prussia_, pp. 171-172. M. Drouyn de Lhuys, who had
already obtained from Austria the cession, in any case, of Venetia,
insisted at this moment more strongly than ever that they should also
take pledges in advance from Prussia, "the most formidable, the most
active of the parties." M. Benedetti did not cease to oppose such a
proceeding, fearing that Prussia would renounce in this case all idea of
war against Austria, and this dispatch of the 8th July was in reality
only a new plea in favor of the _laisser-aller_ without conditions which
should be granted to M. de Bismarck.

[86] Benedetti, _My Mission in Prussia_, pp. 177 and 178. _Moniteur
prussien_ (_Reichsanzeiger_) of the 21st October, 1871.

[87] _My Mission in Prussia_, p. 181. This assertion of M. Benedetti is
fully confirmed by the note found among the papers of the Tuileries, of
which we will speak farther on.

[88] "Prussia will disregard what justice and foresight demand, and will
give us at the same time the measure of its ingratitude, if it refuses
us the guarantees which the extension of its frontiers obliges us to
claim."--Dispatch of M. Benedetti, the 5th August, 1866, found at the
castle of Cerçay among the papers of M. Rouher, and published in the
_Moniteur prussien_ of the 21st October, 1871. Towards the same epoch,
they spoke also of the ingratitude of Italy. "The unjustifiable
ingratitude of Italy irritates the calmest minds," wrote M. Magne in his
confidential note by order of the emperor, dated the 20th July. The
cabinet of Florence in truth created in France at this moment unheard of
embarrassments by susceptibilities and demands which, to say the least,
were very ill-timed. After having been beaten on land and sea, at
Custozza and at Lissa, and having received as a recompense the
magnificent gift of Venetia, the Italians made pretensions to Tyrol!
There was even an instant when the emperor thought "of renouncing the
fatal gift made him, and of declaring, by an official act, that he gave
back to Austria its parole." See the curious note of M. Rouher written
by order of the emperor, _Papers and Correspondence of the Imperial
Family_, vol. ii. pp. 229 and 23.

[89] La Marmora, _Un pó più di luce_, p. 117. Report of General Govone,
3d June, 1866. _Ibid._ p. 275.

[90] "All the efforts which he (M. de Bismarck) has without cessation
made to bring about an agreement with us prove sufficiently that, in his
opinion, it was essential to indemnify France."--_My Mission in
Prussia_, p. 192. Thus thought the ex-ambassador of France, even in
1871!

[91] _Papers and Correspondence of the Imperial Family_, vol. i. pp. 16,
17. The editors thought that they recognized in this note the
handwriting of M. Conti, chief of the emperor's cabinet.

[92] "On my departure from Paris, towards the middle of August," says M.
Benedetti, in his book, _My Mission in Prussia_, p. 194, "M. Drouyn de
Lhuys had offered his resignation, and I supposed that his successor
would be M. Moustier, who was then ambassador at Constantinople. At this
moment there was no minister of foreign affairs. In this state of
things, I thought it _proper_ to address to the minister of state, M.
Rouher, the letter in which I announced my interview with M. de
Bismarck, and which accompanied the plan of treaty relative to Belgium."
M. Drouyn de Lhuys had not tendered his resignation towards the middle
of August; right or wrong, he believed at this epoch that he was "doing
an act of honesty and disinterestedness in remaining," and his portfolio
was not taken from him till 1st September, 1866. Up to that date M.
Drouyn de Lhuys had not ceased to direct the department; the ambassador
himself quotes in his book several dispatches exchanged with him, on
grave questions, dated 21st and 25th August (pp. 204, 223), and M.
Benedetti has singular ideas on the hierarchical duties, believing that
it is _proper_ for an agent to evade the control of his immediate chief
in view of his near retirement. The conclusion of the passage quoted in
the book of M. Benedetti is not less curious: "M. Rouher," says he, "has
not laid before the ministry, having never taken the direction of it,
the correspondence which I, during several days, exchanged with him. If
I gave it here, I should not know how to refer the reader, that he might
verify the text of it, to the depot of the archives, as I am authorized
to do with all the documents which I put before his eyes." What of that?
Once decided to make revelations, M. Benedetti could have well produced
this correspondence with M. Rouher on such a disputed subject, while
conscientiously warning the reader that he could not find the originals
at the depot of the archives. (It is known that the originals were
seized by the Prussians, with a great number of other important
documents, in the castle of M. Rouher, at Cerçay.) While throwing "a
little more light" on all the unnatural obscurities, let us also observe
that it is wrongfully, but with a design easy to divine, that the
celebrated circular of M. de Bismarck, of the 29th July, 1870 (at the
beginning of the war), had assigned to this plan of the secret treaty
concerning Belgium a much later date, the year 1867, the epoch after the
arrangement of the affair of Luxemburg. This allegation does not
withstand a first examination and a simple comparison of the parts
delivered to the public. The shadowy negotiation on the subject of
Belgium was held in the second half of the month of August, 1866, as M.
Benedetti says.

[93] The _Moniteur prussien_ of the 21st October, 1871, gives (from the
documents seized at Cerçay) extracts from the instructions sent from
Paris the 16th August to M. Benedetti concerning the secret treaty. A
passage from these instructions contains "the designation of the persons
to whom this negotiation was to be confined."

[94] Quoted from the circular of M. de La Valette of the 16th September,
1862.

[95] These details, as well as those which follow, are taken from the
papers seized at Cerçay and published in the _Moniteur prussien_ of the
21st October, 1871.

[96] The two plans of the treaties have since been published by the
Prussian journals of the 29th July and 8th August, 1870. The Prussian
government is now in possession of two French autographs of the plan
concerning Belgium; the one which M. Benedetti left with M. de Bismarck
in the month of August, 1866, the other likewise from the hand of M.
Benedetti, with marginal notes by Napoleon III. and M. Rouher; this
latter document was seized at Cerçay. For the description and other
details, see the _Moniteur prussien_ of the 21st October, 1871, and the
article from the _North German Gazette_ on the subject of the affair La
Marmora.

[97] Private letter from M. Benedetti to the Duke of Gramont, dated 22d
August, 1866. _My Mission in Prussia_, p. 192.

[98] Albert Sorel, _Diplomatic History of the Franco-German War_, vol.
i. pp. 29, 30.

[99] Papers seized at Cerçay, _Moniteur prussien_ of the 21st October,
1871.




V.

ORIENT AND OCCIDENT.


I.

"They have provided themselves elsewhere," the French ambassador at the
court of William I. sadly wrote, in the last days of the month of
August, 1866, on seeing Prussia so brusquely break off the _dilatory
negotiations_ concerning Belgium; and it is just to add that he has
never since ceased to clearly appreciate the situation, and to keep his
country constantly on its guard as regards the confidential harmony and
absolute agreement between the two courts of Berlin and St. Petersburg
after the mission of General Manteuffel. If he nevertheless endeavored
for some time to obtain a compensation for his country,--a very modest
one, it is true, and consonant with the new fortune of France,--if,
during the first months of the year 1867, he particularly flattered
himself with obtaining from the kindness of M. de Bismarck the
permission to buy Luxemburg from the King of Holland, if he even once
went so far, during a hasty journey to Paris, as to affirm, in a
confidential conversation, that he already had the fortress of Alzette
"in his pocket," it was not that he thought it possible to return to the
beautiful dream of the head-quarters of Brünn, and to effect that
"necessary and fruitful alliance with Prussia" with which at a certain
moment some sanguine minds on the banks of the Seine had been deluded.
He was only persuaded that the conqueror of Sadowa would not envy France
this paltry atonement of Luxemburg, that he would even find it worth
while to "indemnify" the Emperor Napoleon III. so cheaply, so that, in
the words of the poet, "the lion would only gape before such a little
morsel." The lion roared, however, shook his mane with fury, and
signified harshly that it had done forever with any _politique de
pour-boire_. But even this only confirmed M. Benedetti in the opinion
that they had provided themselves elsewhere, and that henceforward they
were on the verge of great trouble. He thought rightly that M. de
Bismarck must be very sure of the support, in any case, of his former
colleague of Frankfort, to refuse to France even this moderate prize
(_aubaine_), and to give it on this occasion "the measure of its
ingratitude."

At the same time with the affair of Luxemburg, the events in Crete
showed in their turn to the cabinets of Vienna and the Tuileries how far
Prince Gortchakof was already pledged to M. de Bismarck, and how
resolved to sacrifice to his friendship with Prussia the most brilliant
prospects. Whoever reads attentively the curious exchange of notes which
the troubles of Crete had caused, will see that, during the entire epoch
from the month of November, 1866, to the month of March, 1867, the two
governments of Austria and France had sought to sound the designs of the
court of St. Petersburg, and to make very significant advances to it.
The insurrection of the Candiots, one will remember, in the autumn of
1866, surprised and moved Europe, scarcely recovered from the violent
shock of Sadowa. Immoderately exaggerated by the journalists, who were
more or less interested, after having excited lively sympathy in Russia,
the insurrection ended by seriously occupying the attention of the
chancellors, and seemed for a moment destined to bring before the
cabinets the whole question of the Orient in its appalling _ensemble_.
Certain cabinets did not even seem greatly dismayed at the contingency:
instead of conforming with the constant traditions of diplomacy in the
Ottoman affairs, instead of quelling the disturbance and lessening as
much as possible its proportions and bearings, M. de Moustier thought
that he ought "to find means to pacify the Orient," and busied himself
"in convoking a sort of _consultation of doctors_ to learn the opinion
of each one concerning the remedy to be applied to the evil."[100] Still
more astonishing was the language used by the government of Vienna, by
the Power which up to that time and always had contented itself with
sustaining Turkey _per fas et nefas_, without demanding anything from
it, no more for the immediate subjects of the sultan than for the
tributary provinces. Resolutely breaking with these habits of the past,
M. de Beust, who had at this time just undertaken the direction of
affairs in Austria, wrote on the 10th November, 1866, to his ambassador
at Paris that, while desiring to preserve the throne of the sultan,
"Austria could not refuse its sympathies and its support in a certain
degree to the Christian peoples of Turkey who have at times just
demands to make, and who are connected with some of the peoples of the
Austrian empire by close ties of blood and religion." Questioned some
days later (28th November) by the envoy of Russia at the court of
Vienna, the Austrian minister did not hesitate to reply that he was
disposed to favor amongst the Christians of the Orient "the development
of their autonomy and the establishment of a limited self-government by
a bond of vassalage." Lastly, in a remarkable dispatch addressed to
Prince Metternich and dated the 1st January, 1867, M. de Beust proposed
"a revision of the treaty of Paris of the 30th March, 1856, and
subsequent acts," announcing in advance his desire to make over, in the
arrangement to intervene, the greater part to Russia. He had no trouble
in showing that "the remedies through which they had sought, in the
course of the last few years, to maintain the _statu quo_ in the Orient,
had shown themselves insufficient to subdue the difficulties which grew
with each day." "The physiognomy of the Orient taken as a whole,"
continued the dispatch, "shows itself to-day under an essentially
different aspect from that which it had in 1856, and the stipulations of
that epoch, exceeded as they are on more than one important point by
after events, no longer answer to the necessities of the actual
situation." In a word, M. de Beust looked to nothing less than to a
joint intervention of the European Powers in the affairs of Turkey,
without concealing that in such a situation, "there would be an
opportunity to take into consideration, in a fitting degree, the natural
_rôle_ which the commonalty of religious institutions would secure for
Russia in the Orient," and clearly showing the necessity of relieving
the empire of the czars of the onerous conditions which were imposed
upon it in the Black Sea, "in order to secure for himself by a
conciliating attitude the sincere coöperation of this Power in the
questions of the Levant."

It was truly a bold plan; it did not even fail to violently shock the
French feelings. Was it not in truth to erase with a single stroke a
past of ten years, to lose all the fruit of the Crimean war? They had
some repugnance in avowing to themselves that the treaty of 1856 had not
existed for a long time, alas! since the day when the French government
had broken by its gratuitous kindness towards Russia this cluster of the
three great Occidental Powers which alone could assure its efficacious
execution. Since then the act had gradually become void, had been
violated in the majority of the stipulations; and the conference of
Paris, charged nominally with watching over the observance of the
treaty, was always restricted, as the Austrian dispatch observed, "in
giving its sanction to facts accomplished outside of its sphere of
action, and which were not in harmony with the agreements placed under
its protection." However, on the day after Sadowa, Prince Gortchakof did
not fail to seize the first opportunity to begin to prepare the epitaph
of the treaty of Paris. "Our august master," said the Russian chancellor
in a document dated the 20th August, 1866, and marked by fine
irony,--"our august master does not intend to insist on the general
engagements of the treaties _which have no value except by reason of
the accord existing between the great Powers in order to make them
respected_, and which to-day have received, by _the want of this joint
will_, too frequent and too severe blows not to be rendered _invalid_."
It was exactly this _collective will_ which M. de Beust expected to
revive and strengthen in projecting the revision of the act of 1856.
According to his opinion, the treaty of Paris had not attained its
purpose, which was to insure the entireness and the vitality of the
Ottoman empire. On one side the Occidental Powers have imposed on Russia
on the banks of the Euxine a restriction of its rights of sovereignty
which a great empire could not definitely accept, and from which sooner
or later it would seek to free itself. On the other side, and as regards
the Christian population of the Levant, they contented themselves with
promulgating a firman promising reforms, and leaving Turkey to itself,
instead of reserving for Europe the right to watch over the Ottoman
government with a gentle but continued vigilance, so that it should
fulfill its duties toward the rajahs, and by a wise and honest
administration become independent and strong. The treaty of Paris had
only, thought the Austrian minister, given to Russia what the Crimean
war ought to have refused it above all,--the monopoly of influence over
the rajahs; this monopoly it continued to exercise as in the past, in a
hidden manner, it is true, but so much the more dangerously as it
recognized no competition. M. de Beust wished to reëstablish the
competition, or rather he wished to establish a general agreement "to
make the Christian populations of the sultan _the debtors of all
Europe_, in giving them, by the care of all the guaranteeing courts,
autonomous institutions according to the diversity of religions and
races,"[101] and he hesitated the less to make to this vast conception
the sacrifice of the article of the treaty of Paris touching the
neutralization of the Black Sea which Austria had combated from the
beginning, and to which it had only given its adherence at the last
moment to humor the Occidental Powers and put an end to the Crimean war,
the events of which had since demonstrated its complete inefficacy. It
was under the influence of the disaster of Sinopa that France and
England had hoped to restrain the naval forces of the czar in the
Euxine. They had thus thought to shelter Constantinople from a blow from
the Russian hand; but on this point, as on so many others, the
physiognomy of the Orient had essentially changed. Russia no longer
meditated a _coup de main_: it advanced more slowly, but much more
surely, towards its goal. The pacification of the Caucasus[102] the
irremediable weakness of the Porte and the daily increasing discontent
of the rajahs, as impatient of the Turkish yoke as they were devoted to
their sole protector, the czar, were worth to it all the vessels of the
Black Sea. "However, have they really freed Constantinople from all
danger on that side?" asked the Austrian minister. "Supposing that
Russia decides to construct vessels in the Sea of Asoph, will war be
declared to hinder it?" And the cabinet of Vienna concluded by these
characteristic words: "The question of _amour-propre_ should not be
decisive in view of the immense interests which are at stake to-day." In
fact, they could not insist too much on this truth: the clause on the
subject of the Euxine had been for a long time only a "question of
_amour-propre_" between the Occidental Powers and Russia; nor could one
deny that M. de Beust saw far and justly in his dispatch of the 1st
January, 1867. On the day after Sadowa, he sought to reconstitute
Europe, to regain it, if we are allowed to express ourselves thus, and
he knew how to fix the price of it.

In a different direction, France exerted itself on its part to accede to
the views of the cabinet of St. Petersburg in concentrating its efforts
principally on the question of the hour, on this Candian insurrection,
of which public opinion in Russia had so ardently espoused the cause. M.
de Moustier proposed to Prince Gortchakof "an understanding on the
eventualities which might arise in the Orient," and, after having
already spoken of a "consultation of doctors," in a dispatch addressed
to the ambassador of France at Constantinople (7th December, 1866) he
even pronounced the words "heroic remedies." By this always medical
euphemism, one understood, at Paris, the annexation of the isle of Crete
to Greece, "the only possible issue," Prince Gortchakof had affirmed,
the 16th November, 1866, "if the Powers will leave expedients and
palliatives, which up to the present time have only increased for the
future the present difficulties." The marriage of the young King of the
Greeks, George I., with the Grand Duchess Olga Constantinovna, was then
a decided matter, and at the Tuileries one demanded nothing better than
to make the isle of Crete the "dowry" of the Russian princess. In fact
they would not have felt any inconvenience, it seems, in increasing this
dowry with Epirus and Thessaly: that was going very far, much farther
even than could be desired by Russia, which had no interest in "allowing
such an extension of Greece that it might become a powerful state."[103]
It was the reconciliation between France and Russia that gave birth to
the plan of a common proceeding to demand of the Turkish government the
realization of the internal reforms, and the cession of Crete, disguised
under the proposition of a plebiscite, a proceeding which was
effectively realized in the month of March, 1867, and to which Austria,
Prussia, and Italy rallied. Without doubt there was still a great deal
of vagueness, and above all of desultoriness in the situation which
began to take a form at this moment, and it was to be regretted that
France and Austria had not previously agreed to be of one mind on the
nature of the offers which they intended to make to Russia; but the
offers were very real and very great, we cannot deny that; and it only
depended on the successor of Count Nesselrode to arrange, to adjust, and
to turn them to the profit and the glory of his august master. England
could not oppose serious obstacles to the joint will of France, Russia,
and Austria, in the affairs of the Levant; it was already resigned, and
certainly the fruit which Prince Gortchakof saw ripening in the spring
of 1867, although not having all the attraction of forbidden fruit, was
nevertheless good and savory, very different from that which, four years
later, he was to pick up in the ashes of Sedan.

It is true that the governments of France and Austria did not mean to
make a gratuitous gift; it was understood that, in exchange for these
very large concessions in the Orient, they should obtain the support of
the cabinet of St. Petersburg in the menacing complications of the
Occident, and many circumstances seemed to plead in favor of such a
combination. After all, and exclusive of the vengeance taken on "the
ungrateful" empire of the Hapsburg, Russia could not greatly rejoice at
the work of M. de Bismarck. Without mentioning several relations of the
imperial family whom the Hohenzollern dethroned and despoiled with
firmness tempered with a few tears, there was in general in the
proceedings and principles inaugurated on the Elbe and the Main a strong
revolutionary taint which could hardly please a court which did not
cease to protect the shadow of Nicholas. The gravest, however, was that
the victory of Sadowa had just brusquely disturbed and even threatened
to ruin entirely the secular system of the Russian policy in regard to
the affairs of Germany.

In fact, since Peter the Great, especially since Catherine II., Russia
had always labored to obtain a preponderant influence among the
different German courts: its czars have more than once acted with a high
hand and used high words in the Teutonic troubles. "The Romanof enjoys
with us a birthright acknowledged by his brothers, our sovereigns of the
_Bund_," a celebrated publicist of the other side of the Rhine exclaimed
with bitterness one day, and the attitude of the secondary States during
the Crimean war truly did not weaken the justice of this expression. But
it was this work of several reigns, and of a thought hitherto immutable,
that Russia saw placed in question by the foreseen results of the
campaign of Bohemia. The North of Germany was already escaping its
influence, and the "_naïf_" ones alone could deceive themselves on the
fortune reserved for the South in a very near future. "From the month of
September, 1866, the cabinet of Berlin had, in a circular which was
designedly made public, claimed for the confederation of the North and
the States of the South alone, to the exclusion of all the other Powers,
without excepting Austria, the right to bind their relations as closely
as they wished, thus giving to Article IV. of the treaty of Prague, an
interpretation of which it did not admit. In the speeches which he had
delivered at the opening of the Prussian chambers and of the Northern
parliament, the king himself, while addressing them _to Germany, to the
brotherly peoples, to the country which the Alps and the Baltic bound_,
had given utterance to allusions which made, according to the expression
of the official journals, the hearts of all patriots tremble."[104] On
his part, M. de Bismarck had cried out in the midst of the same
parliament, using these gambling terms which are so common in his
language and so characteristic of his temperament: "Our stake has become
greater in consequence of our victories; we have now more to lose, but
the game is still far from being completely won!" By means of a combined
and resolute action of Europe; the absorption of all Germany by Prussia
was only a question of time and of management; Russia, even less than
France, would find its reward in it. France only saw uniting in a more
compact and menacing body a confederation of kingdoms and principalities
which already before had been either hostile, or at least opposed to it.
Russia, on the contrary, lost an entire league of states, whose fidelity
and devotion had never wavered, who formed for it a sort of continuous
_enceinte_ on the side of an occasionally unsympathetic Occident; in
their place was to arise a formidable Power, restless and invading from
the very start, called sooner or later by the necessity of history, by
the fatality of race, to represent and to oppose the Germanic to the
Sclavic idea. At every other epoch of the empire of the czars, in the
good old time of Count Nesselrode, for instance,--when, in place of a
policy of spite and propaganda on the banks of the Neva, they maintained
a policy of conservation and equilibrium,--the conduct of a Russian
chancellor in such an occurrence would not have been doubtful: a
coalition of Russia, of France, and of Austria would have been formed on
the day after Sadowa for the safety of Europe, and it is not saying too
much to affirm that, in the spring of the year 1867, Alexander
Mikhaïlovitch held in his hands the destinies of the world.

Thus compelled to make his choice, Prince Gortchakof was unwilling to
decline the French and Austrian advances in the question of the Orient;
on the contrary, he hastened to echo them loudly, and sometimes even
rose on this occasion to a lyricism not often heard in the chancellors'
offices. He was charmed with the new minister of Austria, and filled all
the country with a rather forced enthusiasm. "M. de Beust," he wrote to
his ambassador in London, "inaugurates a new era in the policy of
Austria, an era of large and elevated views; he is the first statesman
of this country and of our epoch who courageously endeavors to leave the
ground of petty rivalries." As regards France, he endeavored especially
to indicate plainly that the initiative came from it, and "while begging
the Emperor Napoleon III. to recall the interviews which the Emperor
Alexander had had with him at Stuttgart" (in 1860), he seemed to wish to
assign to the present conferences an extraordinary character of gravity
and generality. "His imperial majesty," continued the Russian
chancellor, in his dispatch of the 16th November, 1866, to M. de
Budberg, "has received with satisfaction the overtures which M. le
Marquis de Moustier has made us in view of an understanding between the
French cabinet and ours on the eventualities which might arise in the
Orient. The general principles which the French minister of foreign
affairs has propounded, the assurances which he has given us, have in
the eyes of our august master a very especial value, since they emanate
from the direct thought of the Emperor Napoleon, and since it was by the
express order of his majesty that M. le Marquis de Moustier has
broached these questions." The animation and spirits of Alexander
Mikhaïlovitch increase daily: he even ended by talking Latin and by
confounding the poor Turkish envoy with a classical quotation. "Here,"
he wrote in the month of February, 1867, "is what I have said to
Comnenos-Bey: the isle of Crete is lost to you; after six months of such
a bitter struggle, reconciliation is no longer possible. Even admitting
that you succeeded in reestablishing there for some time the authority
of the sultan, it would only be on a heap of ruins and a mountain of
corpses. Tacitus long ago told us of the danger there is in this reign
of silence which succeeds devastation: _Solitudinem faciunt, pacem
appellant_."

Unfortunately it did not take long to see that while holding out hopes
to France and Austria for the success of their Oriental movement, and
even endeavoring to compromise them in this direction as much as
possible,[105] the Russian chancellor was extremely careful to maintain
his intimate accord with his former colleague of Frankfort, and not to
oppose him in his ideas in the affairs of the Occident. Very ardent for
the cause of the plebiscite in Crete, he showed on the contrary an
absolute indifference on the subject of an analogous cause on the Eider,
otherwise legitimate, however, guaranteed by solemn treaties,[106] and
which interested to such a high degree the noble and unfortunate country
of the future empress. He preserved a not less significant silence as
regarded the publication made in the month of March, 1867, by M. de
Bismarck, of the conventions with the Southern States, conventions which
bound to Prussia the military forces of Germany, and abolished, in fact,
"the international independent situation" which the preliminaries of
Nikolsburg had stipulated for Bavaria and Würtemberg.[107] Alexander
Mikhaïlovitch held Würtemberg as cheaply as Denmark, the throne of Queen
Olga, as the cradle of the Princess Dagmar. In the mean time the affair
of Luxemburg arose, and the French government could measure the degree
of benevolence with which it had succeeded in inspiring the cabinet of
St. Petersburg by its "heroic remedies" as regards Turkey. The Russian
chancellor was surely right and very sincere in his desire for peace,
but he had not for the position of France the regards which England
itself thought just to show it; he seemed, above all, engaged in not
giving umbrage to his illustrious friend of Berlin. While also
glorifying M. de Beust for his "courageous endeavor to have done with
petty rivalries," the Russian government did not fail to encourage at
the same time, in the most dangerous and provoking manner, the violent
Sclavic opposition in the empire of the Hapsburg by means of that famous
_congress_ of Moscow, of which we shall speak later. Other deceptions
still, less known to the public, but not less sharp, probably added to
all these disappointments, for Austria as well as France did not delay
in making their retreat from this shifting ground of the Orient and
joining in with England in thenceforward firmly maintaining the rights
of the sultan. The "consultation of doctors" had a final end, and the
legendary _sick man_ was none the worse for it; but all was then decided
for the terrible eventualities of the future.

"There exists an understanding between St. Petersburg and Berlin," M.
Benedetti again avowed in the year after (5th January, 1868), while
speaking of the so often mentioned mission of General Manteuffel as the
point of departure of this agreement which did not cease to harass him.
"Was it not, in fact, from this moment," he asked, "that the two courts
indicate more plainly their policy, Russia in the Orient and in the
Sclavic Provinces of Austria, Prussia in Germany, without even a cloud
arising between them? Firmly united on all questions, they have, each
for itself, pursued their designs with a confidence which proves that
they have stipulated mutual guarantees." And the ambassador adds that
this conviction begins to impress itself on many minds, especially on
Lord Loftus, his English colleague, for a long time very incredulous on
this matter. "His manner of seeing is sensibly modified, and he is not
less persuaded than other members of the diplomatic corps that final
arrangements had been made between the two governments of King William
and the Emperor Alexander. I have, for my part, found the permanent
demonstration of it, if I may so express myself, in the firmly fixed
resolution, which has never changed, of the cabinet of Berlin, to
inaugurate German unity for its own especial benefit, without allowing
itself to be moved for an instant by the possibility of a conflict with
France. I have also seen the proof of it in the care with which M. de
Bismarck avoids explaining himself on the question of the Orient. When
one asks him, he replies that he never reads the correspondence of the
ministers of the king at Constantinople; and your excellency will not
have forgotten with what complaisance he has always lent himself to the
views of Prince Gortchakof." M. Benedetti also notices "the new impulse
given since last summer to the Pan-Sclavic propaganda;" he shows very
clearly the vast designs and far-reaching hopes of the cabinet of St.
Petersburg, in its connivance with Prussia, and gives a higher and
juster idea in general of the Russian policy at this epoch than certain
ill-advised panegyrists of our day, who, to prove that Prince Gortchakof
has filled his _rôle_ as completely as possible, and with all desirable
success, can devise nothing better than to lessen and depreciate this
part.


II.

It is the characteristic of all conventional praise to exaggerate not
only the tone, but even to deceive itself sometimes in the amount; there
is perfume and ashes in incense, said the ancients, and there is
something equivocal also in the usual manner of congratulating the
Russian chancellor on his "triumph" in the question of the Euxine. To
pretend that Prince Gortchakof did not favor the audacious designs of
Prussia in order to free Russia from its bonds in the Black Sea, that he
delivered Europe in advance to Prince Bismarck in the sole hope of some
day repudiating to his advantage the act of 1856, is in truth to pay as
little honor to his genius as to his patriotism. Certainly the eminent
statesman whose "prophetic glance" the grandchildren of Washington[108]
celebrated at St. Petersburg in the year of Sadowa, supplicating the
eternal God, "who had made the sun stand still for Joshua," also to
suspend the course of life for Alexander Mikhaïlovitch, "so that the
eyes of the world might long remain fixed on him,"[109] the consummate
diplomat who, in the spring of 1867, slighted the important advances
made by the cabinets of Vienna and the Tuileries,--certainly this
minister did not fail at this moment to put aside with a disdainful
smile, the petty hypothesis, that in the approaching and foreseen
overturning of Europe, there would be assigned to Russia as its sole
victory and conquest, the abolition of any wounding article of a treaty
which events had long before rendered "invalid." It was not for such a
"plate of lentils," to use the language of M. de Bismarck, that Prince
Gortchakof intended to cede to the Hohenzollern the fixed _birthright_
of the Romanof; he did not think of abandoning the Occident for such a
ridiculous price: he looked higher, and expected to have the lion's
share in the quarry to come. Fortune has deceived his hopes, defeated
his calculations, and forced him to bend to many unforeseen necessities;
but, if it is puerile to allow him to have made virtues of all these
vexatious necessities, and to form for him a sort of aureole of
lightnings and thunderbolts of the war of 1870, history, in its
impartiality, must not the less take into consideration the intentions
of Prince Gortchakof, which were as great as the events themselves, and,
without denying his defeat, nevertheless accord him the full benefit _in
magnis voluisse_.

They cherished, in fact, great, gigantic projects on the banks of the
Moscova and the Neva, in all this agitated and feverish epoch which
separated Sedan from Sadowa; they deluded themselves with enchanting
dreams; they divided the world between Sclavians and Germans, and the
"national" minister responded to the ardent wishes of the entire nation
in making the Prussian alliance the pivot of its policy, in seeing in it
the absolute condition and the sure pledge of a future of glory and
prosperity for Russia. We must look back on the universal mental
agitation in consequence of the equally prodigious and unforeseen
victory of Prussia in 1866, on the innumerable fantastic plans which
were then suddenly formed for the reconstruction of empires and races;
it is necessary to recall this endless flight of Minervas all armed,
whom the blow of the German Vulcan's hammer caused to spring forth from
so many cracked heads who thought themselves Olympian,--the general
_remoulding_ which our poor philosophy of history, at once so cutting
and so malleable, undergoes in the twinkling of an eye,--to appreciate
justly the current of strange and impetuous ideas which then seized the
people of Peter the Great and of Catherine II. "An irresistible power
forces the people to reunite in great masses, making the secondary
States disappear, and this tendency is perhaps inspired by a sort of
providential prevision of the destinies of the world." This, on the day
after Sadowa, was the expression of an official document of
incontestable authority, a diplomatic manifest which announced _urbi et
orbi_ the profoundest thoughts of the imperial government of
France.[110] How can one be astonished, then, that the children of
Rourik followed the same reasoning, and asked themselves with candor if
the battle of Koenigsgraetz did not entirely deliver Central Europe to
the Hohenzollern and Oriental Europe to the Romanof? After some moments
of hesitation and surprise, Muscovite patriotism resolved therefore, to
take no umbrage at the ambition of King William I., but it immediately
proclaimed that Russia also had a mission to fulfill, an "idea" to
realize, and that the sun of national unities and grand combinations
shone for all the world.

There was in the old capital of the czars a celebrated journal whose
power has since greatly declined, and which, although now an ordinary
paper only, but still important, then exercised a preponderant, tyrannic
influence, from the Dwina to the Ural: it was occasionally called, and
without malice, "the first power in the state after the emperor." From
the time of the fatal insurrections of Poland, the "Gazette of Moscow"
was in truth the monitor of the popular passions of Holy Russia, the
office from whence the word of command for public opinion went forth
into the vast empire of the North, and it often issued formal
instructions for the directing ministers at St. Petersburg. Even at this
time the all-powerful organ of M. Katkof made itself the mouth-piece of
the nation, and imperiously traced the programme of the policy of the
future. Only a short time after the conclusion of the peace of Prague,
the journal of Moscow laid down "as an incontestable truth, that the
march of events has produced interests which invite the two Powers of
Russia and Prussia to ally themselves still more actively than in the
past;" it affirmed, moreover, that overtures on this point had been made
by M. de Bismarck, "overtures the more acceptable as Prussia has no
interests in the Orient; on this question, the cabinet of Berlin could
take, in concert with Russia, such an attitude as suited it." The theme
was again taken up and developed under many a form and in many an
article, until a leader of the 17th February, 1867, impressed on it the
great consecration of a speculative and humanitarian principle.

"The new era is at last sketched," one reads there, "and for us Russians
it has a peculiar bearing. This era is truly ours; it calls to life a
new world kept until now in the shadow and expectation of its destinies,
the Græco-Sclavic world. After centuries passed in resignation and
servitude, this world at last reaches the moment of renovation; what has
so long been forgotten and down-trodden, comes back to the light and
prepares for action. The present generations will see great changes,
great facts, and great formations. Already on the peninsula of the
Balkan, and under the worm-eaten couch of Ottoman tyranny, three groups
of lively and strong nationalities are being formed, the Hellenic,
Sclavic, and Roumanian groups. Closely bound among themselves by the
commonalty of their faith and their historical destinies, these three
groups are equally connected with Russia by all the ties of religion and
national life. These three groups of nations once reconstructed, Russia
will reveal itself in an entirely different light. It will no longer be
alone in the world; in place of a sombre, Asiatic power, as it now seems
to be, it will become a moral force indispensable to Europe, a
Græco-Sclavic civilization completing the Latin-German civilization,
which without it would remain imperfect and inert in its sterile
exclusiveness." Soon after descending from these rather abstract heights
to the more practical ground of ways and means, the fiery apostle of the
_new era_ exclaimed on the 7th April: "If France sustains by arms and by
its political influence the _renaissance_ of the Latin races, if Prussia
acts in the same manner _vis-à-vis_ to Germany, why, then, should not
Russia, the only independent Sclavic Power, sustain the Sclavic races,
and should it not prevent foreign Powers from placing obstacles in the
way of their political development? Russia should employ all its powers
to introduce in its neighbors of the South a transformation similar to
that which took place in Central and Occidental Europe; _vis-à-vis_ the
Sclavians it should take, without the least hesitation, the rôle which
France has taken in regard to the Latin races and Prussia _vis-à-vis_
the German world. The task is a noble one, for _it is exempt from
egotism_: it is beneficial, for it will achieve the triumph of the
principle of nationalities, and will give a solid basis to the modern
equilibrium of Europe; it is worthy of Russia and of its greatness; it
is immense, and we have the firm conviction that Russia will fulfill
it."

It was under the stimulant of such theories, hopes, and passions, that,
in the spring of the year 1867, the strange _ethnological exposition of
Moscow_[111] was instituted, which soon became the pretext for a great
demonstration from without, sufficiently inoffensive in appearance to
remove all diplomatic embarrassment, well calculated, however, to
produce its effect on _naïf_ and inflammable minds, to fascinate
unfortunate, disinherited people, richer in imagination than in culture.
Certainly, true science would draw very little profit from this
projected reunion in the _manége_ of Moscow of all the Sclavic "types"
with their costumes, their arms, their domestic utensils, and their
flora; but the undertaking was considered not the less worthy of the
most august protection. The emperor and the empress offered considerable
sums to defray the costs of the work, the Grand Duke Vladimir accepted
the honorary presidency of it, the high dignitaries of the court and the
church charged themselves with its direction. Warm appeals were
addressed to the Sclavians of Austria and Turkey, to their different
historical, geographical, or other learned societies, to add by
numerous contributions to the magnificence of the exposition, and a
cloud of emissaries collected in the countries of the Danube and of the
Balkan in search of adhesion, samples, and "types." Committees were
formed in different parts of the empire, in order to worthily prepare
the reception of the "Sclavic guests," who did not fail to swarm to the
"national jubilee," and soon a _congress_ was spoken of, in which should
be discussed the wants and the interests of so many "brother peoples,"
the hopes and the griefs of the great common country, of the _ideal_
country. It was the moment, it is necessary to recall it, when the
Cretan insurrection, always persistent, stirred up by Greece, and
exaggerated by the journals too little or too well informed, kept the
Christian populations of Turkey in alarm and on their guard; the moment,
also, when the Czechen of Bohemia; urging on in consequence almost all
the Sclavians of Austria, protested against the Cisleithan constitution,
and refused to sit in the representative chambers of the empire. The
_Kremlin_ thus became the _mons sacer_ of the _intransigeans_ of the two
banks of the Leitha, the _congress of Moscow_ had all the appearance of
an _opposition parliament_ opposed to the Reichsrath of Vienna, and the
language held by the authorized organs of the cabinet of St. Petersburg
was not calculated to calm the susceptibilities of the interested
governments, nor to dissuade vexatious manifestations. Speaking of the
pious _pilgrims_ of Turkey and Austria who were preparing to visit
Moscow, "that holy Mecca of the Sclavians," the "Correspondance Russe,"
the ministerial journal _par excellence_,[112] thus expressed itself in
the month of April, 1867: "One cannot reasonably demand of us that we
abjure our past. We will let, then, our guests believe that they have
come to a sister nation _from whom they have everything to expect_ and
nothing to fear; _we will listen to their grievances_, and the recital
of their evils can only tighten the ties which unite us with them. If
now they intend to establish a comparison between their political state
and ours, _we will not be foolish enough_ to prove to them that they are
in the most favorable conditions of Sclavic development. These
conditions, we believe, on the contrary, to be bad; we have said so a
hundred times, and we can well say so again."

Without doubt the Russian intrigues in the countries of the Danube and
the Balkan were not of very recent invention; they even dated back very
far in the past, from the reign of the great Catherine. Underhandedly
and secretly, the Pan-Sclavic propaganda had been encouraged or
protected for nearly a century; but it was for the first time, in this
summer of 1867, that the government of St. Petersburg thus loftily
assumed the responsibility of such a propaganda, and unfurled in its
states the flags of Saints Cyrille and Methode. In an empire where all
is watched, regulated, and commanded from the throne, where nothing is
done spontaneously, where all is arranged and _devised_, "foreign
Sclavians," subjects of two neighboring and "friendly" Powers, were
admitted, encouraged to come to expose their grievances, to bring
complaints against their respective governments, to demand assistance
and deliverance in the name of a new right of nations, of a principle
lately discovered of great combinations and national unities. _They were
not foolish enough_ to dismiss these foreign "deputies," to counsel
reason and resignation to them; on the contrary they spoke to them of a
"better and approaching condition," they took them through all the
cities of the empire amidst enthusiastic manifestations directed by the
colonels and archimandrites, they overwhelmed them with testimonies of
sympathy, ovations and demonstrations, in which the army, the
magistrates, and all the higher official world took part. Generals,
admirals, and ministers presided at banquets where the disaster of
Sadowa was celebrated as a providential and happy event by the subjects
of the Emperor Francis Joseph, where appeals were addressed to the czar
"to revenge the secular outrages of the White Mountain and of Kossovo,
and to plant the Russian banner on the Dardanelles, and on the basilica
of St. Sophia." The shock given by such demonstrations to a whole race,
to a whole religious world, was profound and prolonged, and certainly
the contemporaneous annals have rarely known a period as _incorrect_ in
point of view of international right and of the usages of the
chancellors' offices as that which had for its starting point the
congress of Moscow and for its end the conference of Paris on the
subject of Greece. It was a strange one in truth, this epoch, with such
presidents of the council as Ratazzi, Bratiano, Koumondouros, with
generalissimos like Garibaldi, Pétropoulaki, and "Philip the
Bulgarian;" with these expeditions of Mentana, of Sistow, of the
_Arcadion_ and _Enosis_; with these agitations, to mention all, German,
Italian, Czech, Croatian, Roumanian, Servian, Bulgarian, Grecian, and
Pan-Sclavic. Without entering farther into the tiresome history of these
complex and not yet explained events, it suffices, in order to
appreciate the general character of them and to comprehend their close
ties, to re-read with all the attention which it merits the report,
already mentioned, of the ambassador of France to the court of Berlin,
dated the 5th January, 1868. "M. de Bismarck must have," wrote M.
Benedetti, "a disturbed Italy, in permanent disagreement with France, to
constrain us to maintain forces more or less considerable in the States
of the Holy See, to be able, if necessary, to excite, by the aid of the
revolutionary party, a violent rupture between the government of the
emperor and that of King Victor Emmanuel, to neutralize, in a word, our
liberty on the Rhine.... And I would not be surprised if M. de Bismarck
were the instigator of the new impulse given since last summer to the
Pan-Sclavic propaganda; he finds in it the immediate advantage of
disturbing Austria by Russia. Russia will assuredly show itself less
enterprising, and Prussia on its part will not encourage it (Russia) to
renew the question of the Orient, for the simple reason that it itself
(Prussia) would gain no advantage in it, if it did not think it
indispensable to pay with this price for the liberty which it claims in
Germany. The uncertainty of the situation only tightens every day the
ties which unite Prussia with Russia and solidifies the ambitions of the
one in Germany with those of the other in the Orient."

A _permanent committee for the interests of Sclavic unity_ was formed on
the day after the congress of Moscow, under the auspices of a grand
duke, and his action was not slow in making itself felt among the
Ruthenes, the Czechen, the Croatians of Austria; but it was especially
in the tributary or subject provinces of the Ottoman Porte that the
agitation became as chronic as it was perilous. The unfortunate Turk was
assailed on all sides: one day it was the Vladika of Montenegro who
demanded of him in a menacing tone some port of the Adriatic, another
day the Prince of Servia demanded the evacuation of some fortress,
enforcing his request with extraordinary armaments. Numerous convoys of
arms arrived from Russia in the Danubian Provinces under the false
designation of material for the construction of railroads,[113] while
the Greek ships of war did not cease to wish to rekindle with all their
strength in the isle of Crete an insurrection about to be extinguished
and which, in truth, never was of very great extent. It was the epoch of
"committees of aid" and "liberating bands" now overrunning the States of
the Pope with the cry "_Roma o Morte!_" now making incursions in
Thessaly to revenge "the outraged manes of Phocion and Philopoemon," or
again freeing five times in the space of a year the Danube from the side
of Roumania only to awaken in the Balkans "the lion with the golden
mane!" "To-day it is our duty, brothers, to prove to European diplomacy
that descendants of the terrible Krum still exist; the lion with the
golden mane and the trumpet of war call you." Thus read in the month of
August, 1868, a proclamation dated from the "Balkans," and signed
"_Provisional Government_."[114] "It is a fact," wrote on the 6th
February, 1868, in a curious report addressed to Count de Beust by the
agent of Austria in the Principalities, Baron d'Eder,--"it is a fact
that at Bucharest, as in the different cities on the banks of the
Danube, there exist Bulgarian committees; their object is to provoke
troubles in Bulgaria, to aid them, to give them more extended
proportions than those of the past year. Only quite lately they were
persuaded here that on the return of pleasant weather serious
complications would break out in Occidental Europe which would permit
Russia to declare war against Turkey, and, foreseeing these events, they
have made preparations to influence with energy the Bulgarian rising.
Although the government of the Principalities is in the hands of a party
(radical) traditionally hostile to Russia, it has nevertheless for some
time inclined towards this Power, and expects from it the realization of
its efforts and its hopes. The journals of the opposition (conservative)
combat these Russophile tendencies of the government; they reproach it
with acting in concert with Prussia and with preparing difficulties for
Austria in case of a conflict between France and Prussia. The journals
of the government reply by saying that the national party is from
principle the adversary of no Power, and that there is no reason for
combating Russia from the moment that this Power defends the cause of
right and of oppressed nationalities."

Assuredly it would be unjust to throw on the Russian government the
responsibility of all the disorderly agitations of this epoch in the
Sclavic-Græco-Roumanian world, but it is not the less true that it did
nothing to stop or even disown them. In looking over the parliamentary
documents of this time,--the different blue, red, green, and yellow
books of the years 1867-1869,--one is struck at meeting at every step
repeated and energetic representations, addressed by the cabinets of
London, of the Tuileries, and of Vienna to Servia, Roumania, and to
Greece concerning their military preparations, the clandestine shipments
of arms and marauding bands, while the cabinets of St. Petersburg and
Berlin carefully abstained from any proceeding of this sort. By a
piquant change of things here below, which must have astonished the
Nesselrode and the Kamptz in their heavenly abode, the Occidental Powers
now, England and France, to whom also Austria joined itself, denounced
to the world the revolutionary practices of the European demagogic
party, while Prussia kept silent, and Russia refused to deny the fact or
to plead extenuating circumstances for it. The excuses for the
government of Athens Prince Gortchakof kindly found in the Hellenic
constitution: "This constitution," said he, "gives to all Greeks full
liberty to leave their own country and to take part in any conflict such
as existed in Crete;"[115] and that was truly an original spectacle,
that of a minister of an autocracy displaying before an old whig like
Lord Clarendon the inexorable conditions of a parliamentary and legal
_régime_. The Porte, it will be remembered, wished to know nothing of a
legality which destroyed it; it ended by losing patience, by addressing
an _ultimatum_ to the government of Athens, and a conference assembled
at Paris "to seek for means to smooth over the difference between Turkey
and Greece." Some good people apprehended an embarrassed attitude on the
part of the Russian chancellor before such areopagus, they even believed
him capable of trammeling the labors of this reunion: this was to ignore
the resources of a mind as crafty as cultivated, and which profited by
the occasion to venture his famous _mot_ on Saturn. "I remember," he
wrote to Baron Brunnow, at London, 13th January, 1869, "that there are
some persons who accuse Russia of wishing to render the conference
abortive. One is not ignorant that the conference emanates from the mind
of the emperor. The fable of Saturn has no application in the wanderings
of the policy of the imperial cabinet." Alexander Mikhaïlovitch was not
at the end of his boldness; he became bitter, almost aggressive; he
spoke of the "excitement from without," of a "process of progress," of
the "distrust which was attached to every step of Russia," and went so
far as to denounce a great conspiracy contrived by the Occidental Powers
against the peace of the Levant. "It is impossible for us not to
remark," he said, in a dispatch to Baron de Brunnow, of the 17th
December, 1868, "that this discordant note is not the only one which has
come to _disturb the echoes of the Orient_. It is thus that we have
first seen Servia become the end in view of an agitation which,
originated with the press, ended by gaining over diplomacy; Prince
Michael Obrenovitch was suspected, and nothing less than his tragic end
was necessary to disarm the hostilities directed against him. Soon
after, accusations were directed against the government of the united
Principalities: the Bulgarian bands became a motive for incrimination,
it was reproached with having tolerated them, it was accused with having
encouraged them. This complication was scarcely removed, before a new
crisis arose in the relations of Turkey with Greece, a crisis still more
grave and more dangerous to the general peace." Decidedly, in absence of
the "fable of Saturn," that of the wolf and the lamb had its application
in the wanderings of the policy of the imperial cabinet of St.
Petersburg.

The conference of Paris succeeded, nevertheless, in its efforts; the
Græco-Turkish difference was smoothed over, and with the spring of the
year 1869 the cold wind of the propaganda whistled less strongly in the
valleys of the Danube and the gorges of the Balkan. There was a sort of
lull; but the combustible matters still remained heaped up, ready to
catch fire from the first spark. The radicals of Roumania were not the
only ones to foresee an offensive action of Russia in the Orient as soon
as serious complications should break out in Occidental Europe; that was
an almost universal conviction, and one which the children of Rourik
shared the very first. The end of the year 1869 was signaled by an
incident which did not fail to gravely impress all serious minds. They
celebrated at St. Petersburg the centennial of the institution of the
Order of St. George, the great military order of Russia, and of which
the first class is only conferred on him who gains a brilliant victory.
The Emperor Alexander II. sent this distinction to King William I., to
the conqueror of Sadowa and the former champion of 1814. "Accept it," he
telegraphed him, "as a new proof of the friendship which unites us, a
friendship founded on the souvenir of that great epoch when our united
armies fought for a sacred cause which was common to us." And the King
of Prussia soon replied by telegraph: "Profoundly touched, and _with
tears in my eyes_, I thank you for the honor which you have done me, and
which I did not expect; but what pleases me still more are the
expressions by which you have announced it to me. I see, in truth, in
these expressions a new proof of your friendship and your remembrance of
the great epoch when our united armies fought for the same sacred
cause."[116]

At the commencement of the same year, and while the conference of Paris
was still sitting, there died at Nice a faithful servant of the
sultan's, one of the last great statesmen of Turkey. Before descending
into the tomb, Fuad-Pacha traced with a faltering hand a memorial for
his august master, which he said was his political testament. The
document was to remain secret, and, in fact, only came to light quite
recently.[117] "When this writing is placed before the eyes of your
majesty," one reads in it, "I will no longer be in this world. You can
therefore listen to me without distrust, and you should imbue yourself
with this great and grievous truth, that _the Empire of the Osmanlis is
in danger_." And after having reviewed the different states of the
Continent, and marked out the conflict more or less near, but
inevitable, between France and Prussia, Fuad-Pacha concluded by these
words: "An intestine dissension in Europe, and _a Bismarck in Russia_,
and the face of the world will be changed."


III.

God alone could contemplate his finished work, and say "that it was
good;" our poor humanity rarely tastes such a pure enjoyment, and the
_party of action_ in the councils of the second empire scarcely
experienced it in consequence of the events of 1866, which it had so
powerfully contributed to create. The ambassador of France at the court
of Berlin was among the number of the disabused; the achievement of
Italian unity only consoled him, very imperfectly in truth, for the
profound blow which the calamity of Sadowa had given his own country.
His disenchantment was great; but there is nothing like a great and
grievous deception to sharpen and refine a mind naturally sagacious; and
if Pascal has spoken of a second ignorance, that which comes after
knowledge, there is also for certain diplomats a second knowledge, and
like a second sight after a passing blindness. One cannot praise too
highly the eminent qualities of observation and of judgment which M.
Benedetti showed during the last four years of his embassy at Berlin,
and, for this epoch of 1867 to 1870, history will fully confirm the
testimony which he once thought proper to testify of himself, while
protesting before his chief,[118] that during his mission in Prussia he
had been "an active, correct, and far-seeing agent."

From 1867, in fact, the ambassador worked with patriotic zeal to
enlighten his government on the state of affairs in Europe, and to
advise it to make a strong resolution, either to resign itself frankly
to the inevitable, or to prepare in good time for a conflict very
imminent and full of great perils. He represented Prussia as working
without cessation to unite all Germany, at the risk of provoking a
conflict with France, inclining only too often to consider such a
conflict as the surest and most direct means of arriving at its ends. In
such a case, he guarded against giving them the least hope from the
_particularists_ of the South. "At the beginning of a national war," he
said, "the most obstinate among them will only be extinguished by the
masses who will regard the struggle, whatever may be the circumstances
in the midst of which it will break out, as a war of aggression of
France against their country; and if the fortune of arms were favorable
to them, their demands would know no limits." He also noticed "the most
active propaganda" which M. de Bismarck maintained in the countries the
other side of the Main: "With the exception of some journals in the pay
of the governments (of Munich and Stuttgart), or belonging to the
ultra-radical party, the press seconds him in all the Southern States."
He also sent word to Paris that the minister of William I. continued
his negotiations with the revolutionary party in Italy; that he received
agents of Garibaldi, unknown to the regular government of King Victor
Emmanuel, the personal friend of the Emperor Napoleon III., who, at the
time of the complications of Mentana, had only sounded Prussia in order
to know "in what measure it could lend it its aid."[119] He was also the
first to give warning concerning the shadowy practices with Prim and the
Spanish candidature of the Hohenzollern. Lastly, one has already seen
that he had recognized from the beginning the alarming character and
true bearing of the mission of General Manteuffel to Russia.

"However difficult it may be for a great country like France to trace in
advance its line of conduct in the actual state of things," said M.
Benedetti to his government at the beginning of the year 1868, "and
however great may be the part which it expects to take in unforeseen
contingencies, the union of Germany under a military government strongly
organized, and which in certain respects has of parliamentary _régime_
only external forms, constitutes, however, a fact which touches too
closely our national security to allow us to dispense with preparations,
and to solve, without longer delay, the following question: Would such
an event endanger the independence or the position of France in Europe,
and would not this danger be conjured up only by war? If the government
of the emperor thinks that France has nothing to fear from such a
radical alteration in the relations of the states situated in the centre
of the Continent, it will be desirable, in my opinion, in the interest
of the maintenance of peace and public prosperity, to shape entirely and
without reserve our attitude according to this conviction. If the
contrary opinion is entertained, let us prepare for war without
cessation, and let us be well assured in advance of what aid Austria can
be to us; let us shape our conduct so as to solve one after the other
the questions of the Orient and that of Italy; all our united forces
will not be too great to render us victorious on the Rhine."

Especially in his manner of judging of the accord established between
the two courts of Berlin and St. Petersburg, M. Benedetti showed a
justness and superiority of judgment truly remarkable. He had the merit
of foreseeing the understanding from the first moment, and of positively
believing in it until the last. In the month of September, 1869, the
Emperor of the French had thought of appointing as ambassador to the
czar one of his most intimate friends, one of his most devoted
coöperators of the 2d December, a general renowned for his bravery and
intelligence, a grand equerry. It was sufficient to indicate that they
wished to enter into relations as intimate and direct as possible, and
in spite of the exchange of telegrams at the festival of St. George,
they were already, at the beginning of the year 1870, full of hope; they
believed that _the affair was progressing of itself_.[120] The French
general, an able man, however, was very quickly taken to the bear hunts,
to journeys on sledges, and shown many other marks of august kindness,
which he had the modesty to credit to the policy of his master, in place
of attributing them with much more reason to his very real and in truth
very fascinating personal charms. The conviction of the grand equerry
was shared by those surrounding him, especially by his aides-de-camp,
who did not delay to praise in their confidential letters addressed to
Paris, "the great results obtained" by their chief, and to speak of "his
growing favor with the Emperor of all the Russias," in terms very strong
and much more military than diplomatic.[121] Without being imposed upon
by all these recitals, full of cheerfulness, M. Benedetti did not the
less persist in his well founded conviction; even on the 30th June,
1870, on the very eve of the war, he expressed it in a lucid dispatch,
from which we will have more than one instructive passage to quote.
Speaking of the recent interview (1st-4th June) of the Emperor Alexander
and the King of Prussia at Ems, the ambassador supposes that M. de
Bismarck had shown himself then, as generally, on one side favorable to
the policy of the cabinet of St. Petersburg in the Orient, and that on
the other he endeavored to excite the susceptibility of the czar in the
questions which agitate the national sentiment in Russia as regards
Austria, Galicia, etc. "While the minister will have undertaken to
reassure the emperor on the first of these two points and to alarm him
on the other, the king will have displayed that good grace of which he
has always known how to make such a marvelous use to capture the
sympathies of his august nephew, and I do not doubt, for my part, that
they have left impressions in conformity with his desire. But whatever
may have been the means which they employed, their object must have been
to strengthen the emperor in the sentiments which they have been able to
inspire in him, and they have attained it more or less."

M. Benedetti was, however, far from admitting an official arrangement
drawn up in due form between the two courts, and above all far from
believing that the minister of Prussia had in all sincerity and candor
made the cession and abandonment of the Oriental heritage to the hands
of his former colleague of Frankfort, and it is precisely in such
estimates that the uncommon perspicacity of the French diplomat shows
itself. M. de Bismarck could for the necessities of the moment, simulate
indifference regarding the affairs of the Levant, affirm that he "never
read the correspondence of Constantinople," and even consider the
pretensions of Russia "to introduce a certain unity in the intellectual
development of the Sclavians, legitimate;"[122] but the extreme care
which he used at the same time to maintain the most intimate relations
with the Hungarians, his allies of 1866, should have already enlightened
the zealots of Moscow concerning the inanity of their dream of a
division of the world between the sons of Teut and those of Rourik. "The
Hungarians regard us, us Prussians, as their mediate protectors against
Vienna in the future," wrote, in a confidential dispatch, Baron de
Werther in the month of June, 1867, on his return from the coronation of
Buda, to reassure the cabinet of Berlin on the recent enthusiasm of the
Magyars reconciled with their "king;" it is not only against Vienna, it
is still much more against Moscow and St. Petersburg, against any
Sclavic preponderance on the banks of the Danube, that the children of
Arpad will in the future have aid from the Hohenzollern. "Prussia has no
rightful interests in the Orient," M. de Bismarck was pleased to say in
the years 1867-1870, and the organ of M. de Katkof did not cease to
repeat this remark so often commented on; but from the day when Prussia
identified itself with Germany, or rather incorporated itself in it, it
remained charged, under pain of forfeiture, with the Germanic interests
and influences in the countries of the Danube and of the Balkan, and the
interest then became greater, much greater, than that of France and
England.

All this was very well understood by the ambassador of France to the
court of Berlin, and from time to time keenly exposed in the dispatches
which he addressed to his government during the last years of his
mission in Prussia. Writing, in his report of the 5th January, 1868, of
the complaisance with which the chancellor of the confederation of the
North always lent himself to the views of Prince Gortchakof, M.
Benedetti added, however: "He (M. de Bismarck) persuades himself without
doubt that other Powers have an interest of the first order in
preserving the Ottoman empire from the covetousness of Russia, and he
abandons the care of it to them; he knows, moreover, that _nothing can
be definitely accomplished there without the aid or the adhesion of
Germany, if Germany is united and strong_; he believes, then, that he
can, for the present, and without peril, himself sharpen the ambition of
the cabinet of St. Petersburg, provided that he obtains in return for
this condescension a kind withdrawal from everything which he undertakes
in Germany."

"In the Orient," wrote the ambassador some time after (4th February,
1868), "M. de Bismarck is careful to preserve a position which does not
bind him in any way, and permits him, according to the necessities of
his own designs, to give the hand to Russia, or to ally himself with
Occidental Powers; but he can only preserve this position by abstaining
from any proceeding which would compromise him with the friends or the
adversaries of Turkey." This reasoning was not long in being fully
justified by the attitude of Prussia, during the conference of Paris, on
the subject of Greece (January, 1869). The cabinet of Berlin did not
share in the ardor of Alexander Mikhaïlovitch; it did not defend, as he
did, persecuted innocence in the person of "the young Roumania," and of
the Servian _Omladina_, and above all was careful to denounce the great
conspiracy of England, France, and Austria against the peace of the
Levant. In reality the minister of Prussia did not wish the death of the
just Osmanli, still less the collapse of Hungary, the advance guard of
the Germanic "mission" in the East;[123] and his sympathies for a
"certain ideal unity" of the Sclavians grew cold in proportion as the
hour of the real unity of Germany approached. "Any conflict in the
Orient will put it under the influence of Russia," wrote the French
diplomat the 27th January, 1870, "and he will seek to excite it; he
tried it last year at the beginning of the Græco-Turkish trouble.
_Russia is a card in his game_ for the eventualities which may arise on
the Rhine, _and he is particularly careful not to change the rôles_, not
to become himself a card in the game of the cabinet of St. Petersburg."

Some months after, on the very eve of the war with France (30th June,
1870), M. Benedetti, while thinking that the ties between Russia and
Prussia could only have been drawn closer in the recent interview of
Ems, concluded by the following observations: "It must not be supposed,
however, that M. de Bismarck thinks it opportune to connect his policy
closely with that of the Russian cabinet. In my opinion, he has not
contracted and is not disposed to make any engagement which might, while
compromising Prussia in the complications of which Turkey will become
the scene, draw France and England closer together, and create
difficulties for him or weaken him on the Rhine. The kind feelings of
the chancellor of the confederation of the North for Russia will never
be of a nature to limit his liberty of action; _he promises in fact
more than he means to do_, or, in other words, he seeks the alliance
with the cabinet of St. Petersburg to gain for himself the benefit of it
in case of a conflict in the Occident, but with the well-fixed
resolution never to engage the resources or the forces of Germany in the
Orient. I have also always been persuaded that no official arrangement
has been concluded between the two courts, and we can certainly believe
that they did not consider that at Ems."

Everything, in fact, leads us to believe that neither a treaty was
signed there, nor conditions discussed; the commonalty of views and the
harmony of hearts dispensed with a fatiguing discussion of details.
Moreover, it would have been very difficult, in all the useless cases,
to make stipulations _en règle_ for the eventualities, the time of whose
appearance is not known, of which it is impossible to calculate the
distant consequences, or even the immediate effects. They contented
themselves with the conviction that they had no opposite interests;
that, on the contrary, they were congenial and sympathetic, and that it
was understood that at the propitious moment each one would be for
himself and God for all. It must also be acknowledged that the Russians,
in their views concerning the Orient, are not exempt from certain
_mirages_. Europe credits them with much more method than they have in
reality: the sentiment is profound and tenacious, but the plans are as
wavering as they are different and vague. One might say that this great
people suffer in this regard rather from a fascination and almost a
fatality which prevents them from pursuing a systematic conquest; it
advances on the phantom which possesses it only to make it recoil. It
is a matter worthy of notice that Russia is never so far removed from
the goal as when it undertakes to force the _dénoûment_. In 1829, a few
halting places only separated its armies from Constantinople, and they
turned back. It lost, in 1854, all the fruit of its campaign in Hungary,
and of its ascendency in consequence of the catastrophe of February,
while its prospects were never as brilliant as on the day when the
treaty of Paris expected to close the Black Sea to it. It lost
Sebastopol, but it gained the Caucasus and a whole world on the banks of
the Amour and the Syr-Daria. The temptation became then very natural in
presence of the formidable conflict which since 1867 was preparing in
the centre of Europe, rather to await events than to wish to regulate
them and to prescribe their course. In a war between the two strongest
Powers of the Continent, which promised to be as long as desperate, and
which in the end might well equally exhaust the two adversaries and draw
several other states into the lists, Russia--thus they surely thought on
the banks of the Neva--would always find the opportunity and the means
of saying its word and securing its booty. Such a line of conduct seemed
entirely marked out for a chancellor to whom so much good fortune had
already come while "meditating;" it recommended itself to a policy which
only measured the infinity of its aspirations by the uncertainty of
possible events. The infinity of desires accommodates itself in case one
can do nothing better with the indefinite in the designs, and nothing at
times gives such a false impression of depth as emptiness.

It was cruelly ironic of the founder of German unity to choose in each
of his successive enterprises an accomplice who was to become his victim
in the following undertaking; but he showed, also, his great superiority
in having had each time a very clear aim, a well-defined object marked
out, and, so to speak, tangible, while his partners allowed themselves
to be drawn in, one after the other, in the perilous game, under the
impulse of abstract principles, vague desires, and cloudy combinations.
At the time of the invasion of the Duchies and his first attempt against
the equilibrium of Europe, M. de Bismarck was certainly not at a loss to
show his aim: the prey was in reach of his hands, and the roadstead of
Kiel spread itself in all its splendor before whoever had eyes to see;
but M. de Rechberg is still seeking for it to-day, and to make the
motives of his coöperation in this work of iniquity acceptable. "He
tried to master the demagogic passions, to gain the ascendency over the
revolution,"--these are the pompous and sonorous phrases taken from the
"doctrine" with which later the former Austrian minister was to seek to
cover up before the Austro-Hungarian delegations his fatal and pitiful
policy of 1863. At Biarritz, the president of the Prussian council
demanded in very clear terms the line of the Main for his country, while
the dreamer of Ham recommended "the great war for the German
nationality," and let his undecided glance fall first on the right bank
of the Rhine and Mayence, then on the limits of 1814, and only fixed it
on the winged lion of St. Mark. From 1867 to 1870, the chancellor of the
Northern Confederation resolutely made preparations for the unification
of Germany and the conquest of Alsace and Lorraine, leaving to his
former colleague of Frankfort perfect leisure "to awaken the echoes of
the Orient," and to demand of them the key to the approaching destinies
of Russia. In each of these fatidical circumstances, the same great
_realist_ is always leading the ideologists to different degrees and to
different titles: it is always the same Fortinbras of Shakspere,--the
_fort en bras_ of Germany,--proclaiming his dominion where the
doctrinary, melancholy, or word-making Hamlets have only lost their way
in chimerical and puerile machinations, and, before a "murder which
cries out to heaven," find no other words than,--the time is out of
joint!

"Russia cannot feel any alarm at the power of Prussia,"[124] said Prince
Gortchakof, in reply to the representations which were made him from the
beginning of the Hohenzollern affair on "the danger which would result
to Russia from the aggrandizement of Prussia, and from the extension of
its influence in Europe." As to the Spanish candidature of the Prussian
prince, the chancellor recalled that "when Prince Charles of
Hohenzollern became (in 1866) sovereign of Roumania, with the support of
France and in spite of Russia, this latter had limited itself to
remonstrances, and had then accepted the fact, he did not see why to-day
Prussia could be more responsible for the election of another member of
the royal family to the throne of Spain." Thus spoke the minister of the
czar at the very beginning of the conflict, the 8th July, 1870, before
the renunciation of Prince Anthony, before any exhibition of anger on
the part of the cabinet of the Tuileries, and at the moment when Europe
still thought well of the legitimate susceptibilities of France.
However, when the hour of blindness and giddiness came, and when the
government of Napoleon III. lost all the profit of a great diplomatic
success by its provoking language before the legislative body, by its
demands of Ems, and its fatal declaration of war (15th July), illusions
could no longer be cherished concerning the true sentiments of the
cabinet of St. Petersburg. "With all due deference to General Fleury,"
wrote with humor M. de Beust to Prince de Metternich, the 20th July,
"Russia perseveres in its alliance with Prussia so far, that in certain
eventualities the intervention of the Muscovite arms must be looked upon
not as probable, but as _certain_." Soon after the declarations of war
of the 15th July, the Russian government had addressed to Vienna the
very clear and categorical notice that it would not allow Austria to
make common cause with France. General Fleury was even soon to think
himself lucky with having at least made sure that this invalidating
clause touching the empire of the Hapsburg was not explicitly mentioned
in the declaration of neutrality which the Emperor Alexander II.
published the 23d July.[125]

"Russia has done us much harm," said the Duke de Gramont, in regard to
this interdicting command to Austria.[126] It weighed equally on the
court of Copenhagen and forced it to neutrality, in spite of all the
enthusiasm of the unfortunate Scandinavian people for an alliance with
which was connected a French plan of a landing in the North, an
enterprise of the greatest strategical interest, General Trochu said,
who was to have taken part in it. "Russia," thought with an official
journal of the country, the ambassador of the United States at St.
Petersburg, "has contributed more to the neutrality than any other
nation; by its menaces it has forced Austria not to move, and it has
succeeded, by the influence of the emperor and the hereditary prince, in
hindering Denmark from taking part with France."[127] England, it is
just to add, powerfully seconded in all this the Russian chancellor. It
was more prejudiced than ever against France, thanks to the recent and
terrible revelations of M. de Bismarck concerning the _dilatory
negotiations_ in August, 1866, on the subject of Belgium. It was evident
that for the pleasure of Prince Gortchakof the conflagration came much
too soon. The military preparations of Russia were not made; even the
perfectly "moral" action on the Sclavic world had undergone a rest since
the conference on the subject of Greece. M. de Bismarck had not exactly
consulted the convenience of his colleague on the Neva. As M. Benedetti
had predicted, he had taken care not to invert the _rôles_ and thought
only of his own convenience and opportunities; but Alexander
Mikhaïlovitch did not the less apply himself to play his _rôle_
according to his strength. A sagacious observer, the ambassador of the
United States, already mentioned, wrote about this time from St.
Petersburg to his government: "The general opinion here seems to be
that, if Russia were ready, it would declare war and try to gain certain
advantages from it.... The government is making great efforts to prepare
for future events. The cartridge factories work night and day. An order
for a hundred Gattling cannon has just been sent to America." They
armed, they deterred or intimidated the probable allies of France,
thinking thus to equalize for the moment the chances between the two
belligerents,[128] and they still hoped to find more than one favorable
opportunity in the midst of the numerous events of a war which Napoleon
III. himself proclaimed must be "long and difficult."

The terrible disasters of France in the beginning of the campaign
suddenly arrested the imaginations in their flight and dissipated the
sublime vision of a "new Græco-Sclavic world," which since 1867 had
haunted the minds of those on the banks of the Moscova and the Neva.
With the marvelous political and _realistic_ aptitude which
distinguishes it, the Russian nation soon understood that for the moment
any crusade in the Orient was impossible, that the destiny of the world
was being decided at the foot of the Vosges, and that it must attend to
the most urgent and reasonable claims. A curious phenomenon, the
peninsula of the Balkan was never as relatively quiet, as little
tormented by the "great idea" as during these years 1870-1871, during
this "intestine dissension in Europe" which Fuad-Pacha when dying had so
feared for the empire of the Osmanlis. Towards the end of the month of
August, still before the catastrophe of Sedan, public opinion in Russia
cared only for the displeasing article of the treaty of Paris on the
subject of the Euxine. "Russia," said an influential journal of St.
Petersburg,[129] "has not hindered the forced unification of Germany,
and, in its turn, _it does not dream of the forced unification of the
Sclavians_; but it has the right to demand that its position on the
Black Sea and the banks of the Danube be ameliorated. We hope that its
legitimate demands will be taken into consideration in the European
congress which will probably follow the present war." A European
congress! that was in truth the only logical issue, however unreassuring
in such grave events, disturbers of the equilibrium of the world; and it
must render this justice to the greater part of the Russias, that they
have the true appreciation of the situation, and aspire to a _rôle_ as
legitimate as honorable. They wish to attain a satisfaction of
_amour-propre_; but they did not wish to sacrifice France and the
general interests of the Continent to it; the little question was in
their eyes only the corollary of the great. At Constantinople one did
not augur otherwise from the line of conduct which the cabinet of St.
Petersburg undoubtedly pursued, although dreading it. On the 2d
September, Mr. Joy Morris, minister of the United States to the Porte,
wrote to his government that the general conviction on the Bosphorus was
that Russia would profit by the crisis to bring about the revision of
the treaty of 1856. "It would be strange if it did not succeed in it,"
added the "Yankee" diplomat, "seeking, as it will, to obtain honorable
conditions of peace for France, and exercising a dominating influence on
the regulations of the terms of peace." Unfortunately, and for the first
time in his long and popular reign at the chancellor's palace, the
"national minister" divorced himself on this occasion from the sentiment
of the nation, and in place of acting as "a good European," according to
the favorite expression of M. de Talleyrand, he sought above all to show
himself the good friend of his former colleague of Frankfort. He took
care to renounce the question of the Black Sea,--he owed his country
this little consolation after such great mistakes,--but he resolved to
separate two causes which public opinion in Russia demanded to have
united; and it demanded it with an idea much more politic than generous,
in an instinct much more sensible for the vital interests of the future
than for the satisfaction more or less lively of the present moment. He
thought that he could not better serve the Russian cause on the Euxine,
than in injuring as much as possible the cause of Europe in Alsace and
Lorraine, and he endeavored above all to let France and Prussia fight
out their quarrel in single combat. Immediately after the first French
disasters, he seized with _empressement_ the ingeniously perfidious idea
of the _league of neutrals_, originally an Italian idea, naturalized in
England by Earl Granville, and soon became in the hands of the Russian
chancellor, as was very acutely remarked, the most efficacious means to
"organize impotence in Europe." M. de Beust had vainly essayed, _while
adopting the principle_ of the English proposition (19th August) to
change the character of it, to make it the point of departure of a
concerted intervention; he demanded "efforts not separated, but common
in view of a mediation," in place of a ridiculous conception which only
"leagued" the states to prevent any collective proceeding. "The
combination which the minister of Austria then suggested," wrote on this
subject a judicious historian, "was repeated again and again by him
during the whole duration of the war. If it had been adopted, it would
have changed the course of things. One can say that it is for this
reason that Europe did not adopt it."[130]

It is for this reason that Prince Gortchakof especially opposed it from
the first day to the last. There was a moment when England itself felt
some qualms of conscience and showed a wish for mediation. That was at
the beginning of the month of October, after a circular of M. de
Bismarck had announced to Europe the conditions of peace of Germany,
which were Alsace and Lorraine. "The ambassador of Prussia communicated
this circular to the Russian government, and Prince Gortchakof abstained
from making his impressions known. Sir A. Buchanan said to him then,
that at London they were disposed to be governed in a certain measure by
what was done at St. Petersburg. The chancellor replied simply that
Prussia, not having asked of him his opinion, he had not given it.[131]
Earl Granville had the, for him, extraordinary courage to return again
to the charge, and Sir A. Buchanan read to the Russian chancellor a
memorandum timidly asking "if it would not be possible for England and
Russia to arrive at an agreement concerning the conditions under which
peace could be concluded, and then to make, with the other neutral
Powers, an appeal to the humanity of the King of Prussia, also
recommending moderation to the French government." Prince Gortchakof
gave to those overtures a dry and disdainful reception. Prussia, said
he, has indicated its conditions of peace; a victory alone can modify
them, and this victory is not probable. Confidential conversations
between England and Russia will be then without object; common
representations would always have a more or less menacing character.
Isolated action of each of the neutral Powers before the King of Prussia
is preferable.[132] Isolated action! Alexander Mikhaïlovitch was not
moved, and for Russia this action was summed up in several personal
letters addressed by the august nephew to his royal uncle, very
charming letters, which recommended peace, justice, humanity, and
moderation, and to which the conqueror of Sedan always replied
affectionately, with a moved heart and with tears in his eyes, pleading
his duties to his allies, his armies, his people, and his
frontiers.[133] It was this "policy of euphemism," as the historian has
so well called it, which they did not cease to practice, during the
entire war, on the banks of the Neva, towards General Fleury as well as
towards M. Thiers and M. de Gabriac, and the last word as well as the
first thought of "action" of Prince Gortchakof was to leave France alone
with its conqueror, alone till exhaustion, _usque ad finem_. It is known
in what terms this end was announced at St. Petersburg. "It is with
inexpressible feeling and returning thanks to God," the Emperor of
Germany telegraphed from Versailles to the Emperor of Russia, on the
26th February, 1871, "that I announce to you that the preliminaries of
peace have just been signed. Prussia will never forget that it owes to
you that the war has not taken extreme dimensions. May God bless you for
it. Your grateful friend for life."

"Long and disastrous" was this war, alas! as the unhappy Cæsar had well
predicted, long enough at least to let Europe measure all the depth of
its abasement, and "to give it all the time to blush at nothing,"
according to the strong expression of the poet. Still more humiliating,
perhaps, than this abasement, is the thought of the perfect similarity
of the two terrible catastrophes which succeeded one another in the
interval of scarcely four years; in producing its second tragedy so soon
after the first, destiny was sufficiently disdainful to our generation
not to even change the procedure or bestow any care on the imagination.
The work of 1870 was only the exact copy of that of 1866. You will take
the Orient, M. de Bismarck said at St. Petersburg, through General
Manteuffel, as on the shore of Biarritz he had told the Emperor Napoleon
III. to take Belgium, always making the same gift of the property which
did not belong to him, the same gracious gift of the fruit defended by
the dragon. The dreamers of Moscow believed in a _new era_, in a new
"Græco-Sclavic-Roumanian world," as Napoleon III. had thought of a
Europe remodeled after the principle of nationalities. "Russia will not
feel any alarm at the power of Prussia," Prince Gortchakof declared at
the beginning of the Hohenzollern affair, exactly as the zealots of the
_new right_ had affirmed of France on the eve of the campaign of
Bohemia. In both of the terrible years they had counted on the events
and opportunities of a war, slow and of divers fortunes; they had even
made it a study to derisively equalize the chances of the belligerents,
and the surprise and the fright were not less great at St. Petersburg
after Reichshoffen and Sedan than it had been at Paris after Nahod and
Sadowa. The military preparations were wanting in Russia in 1870, as in
France in 1866, and after the one as after the other of the calamities
which desolated and overturned the world, they had only egotistical and
petty thoughts; they prevented designedly any collective intervention,
they aided Prussia in _freeing itself from all European control_; in a
word they sacrificed the policy of justice, preservation, and
equilibrium to a calculation as false as sordid, and which the great
humorist of Varzin had one day called the _politique de pour-boire_.

The Russian chancellor, it is just to acknowledge, was happier after
Sedan than Napoleon III. had been after Sadowa: he had his Luxemburg, he
could proclaim the abrogation of Article II. of the treaty of Paris,
"the abrogation of a theoretical principle without immediate
application," as he himself said in an official document.[134] One knows
the judgment which at that time the cabinets gave on this "conquest"
purely nominal in reality, and extremely small in any case in proportion
to all those which Alexander Mikhaïlovitch had allowed to his former
colleague of Frankfort. He succeeded, but not by legitimate means, by
that action of _éclat_ and equity which one had hoped for in Russia,
dreaded at Constantinople; he did not provoke the revision of the treaty
of 1856, in "seeking to obtain honorable conditions of peace for France
and in exercising a dominating influence on the regulation of the terms
of peace."[135] He chose precisely "the psychological moment" of the
defeats of France, of the disorder of Europe and of the gloomy shock to
public right, to give it in his turn a humiliating blow, a _telum
imbelle_, but not _sine ictu_. He freed himself and his own chief from
an engagement contracted with the Powers, as he had freed his friend of
Berlin from any control of Europe. "The procedure of Russia," said Earl
Granville, in his remarkable dispatch of the 10th November to Sir A.
Buchanan, "breaks all the treaties: the object of a treaty is to bind
the contracting parties one to the other; according to the Russian
doctrine, each party submits all to his own authority, and holds himself
bound only to himself."

At the beginning of the year 1868, an eminent man whom the disasters of
his country were soon to restore to the political life which the second
empire closed to him, rose even here[136] with passionate eloquence
against "the growing mistrust of this elementary right which honor and
good public sense have called the faith of treaties." "We see," said he,
"creating itself every day under our eyes, a fruitful jurisprudence
whose rapid development does not astonish those who know what force
false principles borrow from and lend in turn to the passions which they
favor. Only a few years ago they imposed on this unilateral resilition
of reciprocal treaties some conditions which made the usage of them more
legitimate, or at least more rare and less perilous. They still wished
greatly to admit that, in case one state should want to repudiate a
treaty signed by representatives regularly accredited, it should be
necessary that in its interior one of those great overturnings of
institutions, persons, and things should be effected which is called a
revolution. A revolution was a sheriff's summons by which a nation made
known to whom it should concern its intention to put itself into
bankruptcy and to no longer pay its debts. This was, it seems to me, a
sufficiently great facility, but the last form of new right does not
find it sufficient to its taste. The formality of a revolution is
embarrassing and costly to carry out. A change of ministry, or, better
still, a vote of parliament causes less inconvenience. Nothing more will
be necessary henceforward in order that a convention in which God,
honor, and conscience have been taken to witness the past year be
trampled under foot the following year."

Well! we have lived through enough, since the time when an honest
conscience uttered this cry of alarm, to see foreign jurisprudence arise
without even the formality of a revolution, of a change of ministry or a
vote of parliament, to hear it proclaimed by the minister of a regular
absolute monarchy, by a Russian chancellor. It is true that the Italians
also then hastened to profit by the misfortunes of France, to break in
their turn a solemn engagement made with it in a public document, that
in 1870 they had even anticipated Prince Gortchakof in a proceeding well
known to them; but it was not from a government born yesterday that the
successor of Count Nesselrode should have borrowed the procedures. There
was a day when Alexander Mikhaïlovitch reproached this very government
with _moving with the revolution to reap the heritage of it_.[137]
Since then he has also moved with the revolution,--with one of the most
audacious, most violent revolutions which has ever overturned thrones
and kingdoms; he has reaped no heritage from it, it is true (it is only
too often so in life, as one knows), he only accepted from it a gracious
legacy, a legitimate donation, a modest gift in fact, and out of
proportion to services rendered, but which was not the less sullied with
undue influences, and which injured the right of the third parties, the
right of nations.

How otherwise great and glorious might have been the "conquests" of
Alexander Mikhaïlovitch, if, inspiring himself, in the month of October,
1870, with the legitimate ambition of the Russian people, the "national
minister" had brought about a concerted action of Europe in order to
produce peace between France and Germany, and to regulate the troubled
affairs of the Continent! "We have always been of the opinion," wrote M.
de Beust, on the 10th September, to St. Petersburg, "that it is for
Russia to take the initiative." Its great influence abroad, its security
in the interior, its good relations with the conqueror, assigned to it
in truth such an initiative, and certainly neither Austria, Italy, nor
England would have hesitated to range themselves under its banner. There
was no necessity for a menacing intervention, nor even for that armed
neutrality which M. Disraeli recommended:[138] the wish firmly expressed
by all the Powers of the Continent would have fully sufficed. They could
have thus limited the losses of France, given to Germany a less
formidable organization, more in harmony with the aspirations and
liberal occupations of our century,--the great vassals of the new
emperor would not have failed to lend their aid to it,--a general
disarmament would have given to a generation cruelly tried, and which
now cannot even rest in its sterility, a reparative and a fruitful work.
And who would dare to doubt that after such services Russia would not
have obtained of Europe the grateful abrogation of that onerous article
of the treaty of 1856? France would certainly not have thought of
opposing it; Austria would not have maintained a clause which it had
combated from the beginning, and which, four years before, it had
solemnly declared to be "only a question of _amour-propre_," whose
gravest interests demanded the sacrifice; as to England, it is well
known that in course of time it accommodates itself to everything. How
much such a benefit procured for humanity by a monarchical government,
absolute indeed, would have given force to the cause of order and
preservation, of rejuvenation of monarchical principles! with what
prestige it would have surrounded the Russian people; what imperishable
splendor it would have attached to the name of Alexander II! The call of
destiny was very manifest; the _rôle_ as plain as easy: the successor of
Count Nesselrode shrunk from it. It was only a sin of omission, if you
will, but of that sort which the sublime lover of justice Alighieri did
not pardon when they were committed against his ideal of _justitia et
pax_. On such a sin he inflicted the name of _il gran rifiuto_.

FOOTNOTES:

[100] Dispatch of Count de Mülinen to Baron de Beust, 30th December,
1866.

[101] Dispatch of M. de Beust to Baron de Prokesch at Constantinople,
January 22, 1867.

[102] "What alarms me the most, is the considerable change which the
pacification of the provinces of the Caucasus has given to the situation
of Russia. I have no doubt that in future possibilities the most serious
attacks of the Russians will be directed against our provinces of Asia
Minor." Thus Fuad-Pacha expresses himself at the beginning of 1869 in
his political testament addressed to the sultan.

[103] Remarks of the Emperor Nicholas to Sir Hamilton Seymour. For the
rumors concerning Thessaly and Epirus, see especially the dispatch of
Fuad-Pacha to the ambassadors at Paris and London, 27th February, 1867.

[104] Benedetti, _My Mission in Prussia_, p. 249.

[105] "I wish very much that you would send your carriage before my
door, but on the condition that you get in at my house," one of the
predecessors of M. de Moustier said wittily to M. de Budberg, at the
Hotel of the Quay d'Orsay, some years before, but in the same way in
which Russia encouraged the advances of the cabinet of the Tuileries, at
the same time that it carefully avoided any positive engagement with it.

[106] The preliminaries of Nikolsburg as well as the treaty of Prague
had stipulated the retrocession to Denmark of the northern districts of
Schleswig after a popular vote. One knows that Prussia up to the present
has evaded the execution of this engagement.

[107] M. de Beust wrote concerning these military conventions with a
resigned _finesse_: "An alliance established between two states, one of
which is weak, the other strong; an alliance which has no particular
text, but which should be permanently maintained for all the
eventualities of war, is not of a nature to create a belief in an
_international, independent existence_ of the weak state."--Dispatch to
Count Wimpffen, at Berlin, 28th March, 1867.

[108] See Appendix.

[109] Speech of the assistant secretary of state, Mr. Fox, at the
banquet given by the English Club of St. Petersburg to the mission
extraordinary from the United States in 1866.

[110] Circular of M. de La Valette, 16th September, 1866.

[111] See the _Revue des deux Mondes_ of the 1st September, 1867: "The
Congress of Moscow and the Pan-Sclavic Propaganda."

[112] It emanated directly from the ministry of the interior, was
written in French, and destined to "enlighten" foreign opinion on the
facts and deeds of the Russian government.

[113] See, on this subject, the English, French, and Austrian
parliamentary documents of the year 1868, and especially the reports of
the agents of Austria at Iassy and Bucharest.

[114] Appendix to the dispatch of the Consul de Knappitsch to Baron de
Prokesch at Constantinople, Ibraïla, 14th August, 1868.

[115] Dispatch of Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Clarendon, 19th
December, 1868.

[116] Official journal of the Russian empire, 12th December, 1869.

[117] One can read this remarkable document, which bears the date of the
3d January, 1869, in the interesting pamphlet of M. J. Lewis Farley,
_The Decline of Turkey_, London, 1875, pp. 27-36.

[118] Private letter to the Count Daru, 27th January, 1870.

[119] See, on this subject, the curious dispatch of the 10th November,
1867. The correspondence of Mazzini with M. de Bismarck during the years
1868 and 1869, suggesting the plan of overthrowing Victor Emmanuel if
this latter became the ally of the Emperor Napoleon III., has been
brought to light only very recently, after the death of the celebrated
Italian agitator.

[120] Confidential letter of M. de Verdière, St. Petersburg, 3d
February, 1870. _Papers and Correspondence of the Imperial Family_, vol.
i. p. 129.

[121] "The Emperor of Russia has taken the general in great favor; he
takes him continually on bear hunts, and makes him travel with him on a
f... in his one-seated sleigh. That is the height of favor, and I think
that politics are in a good condition."--Confidential letter of M. de
Verdière, 25th January, 1870. _Papers and Correspondence_, vol. i. p.
127.

[122] Expressions of the _North German Gazette_ (principal organ of M.
de Bismarck) of the 20th July, 1867, on the occasion of the congress of
Moscow.

[123] _Drang nach Osten._

[124] Dispatch of Sir A. Buchanan, St. Petersburg, 9th July, 1870. For
the details of these years, 1870-71, we can only refer the reader to the
very instructive work of M. A. Sorel, _Diplomatic History of the
Franco-German War_, Paris, Plon, 1875, 2 vols. We have only two
reservations to make in regard to a book written with as much sincerity
of investigation as loftiness of mind. The author shows a pronounced
weakness for "the diplomacy of Tours," and limits in much too great a
degree the original views of Prince Gortchakof in his connivance with
Prussia since 1867.

[125] Dispatches of Sir A. Buchanan of the 20th and 23d July. Valfrey,
_History of the Diplomacy of the Government of National Defense_, vol.
i. p. 18.

[126] _France and Prussia_, p. 348.

[127] Dispatch of Mr. Schuyler to Mr. Fish, St. Petersburg, 26th August.
General Trochu, _Pour la vérité_, p. 90.

[128] Prince Gortchakof was far from having at the beginning absolute
confidence in the victory of Prussia; he told M. Thiers more than one
_piquant_ detail on this subject. Deposition of M. Thiers before the
commission of inquiry, p. 12. In an interview, towards the end of July,
with a political personage whom he knew to be in relation with Napoleon
III., he even let these words fall: "Tell the Emperor of the French to
be moderate." Valfrey, vol. i. 79.

[129] The _Golos_, quoted in the dispatch of Mr. Schuyler, 27th August.

[130] A. Sorel, _Diplomatic History_, vol. i. p. 254. Let us quote the
passage from another dispatch of M. de Beust, dated the 29th September,
and destined for London: "Let us not fear to say it: what to-day serves
powerfully to prolong the conflict to the extreme horrors of a war of
extermination, is, on one side illusions and false hopes, on the other
indifference and contempt for Europe, spectator of the combat."

[131] A. Sorel, _Diplomatic History_, vol. i. p. 402.

[132] Report of Sir A. Buchanan of the 17th October.

[133] It was only the simple recommendation of an armistice, with no
other design of influencing what might be the conditions of peace, that
Prince Gortchakof declined to make common cause. M. d'Oubril, his
minister at Berlin, found himself at the last moment without
instructions on this subject. "It is singular enough," wrote Lord
Loftus, on the 26th October, "that Russia, after having in many
circumstances, proved its desire for peace, thus stands aside and
prefers isolated to common action."

[134] Dispatch of Prince Gortchakof to Baron Brunnow at London, November
20, 1870.

[135] Dispatch of Mr. Joy Morris of the 2d September, quoted above.

[136] See the _Revue des deux Mondes_ of the 1st February, 1868 ("The
Diplomacy and the Principles of the French Revolution," by M. le Prince
Albert de Broglie).

[137] Note to Prince Gagarine at Turin, 10th October, 1860.

[138] Speech on the 1st August, in the House of Commons.




VI.

TEN YEARS OF ASSOCIATION.


On the 9th January, 1873, Napoleon III. passed sadly away from the land
of exile at Chiselhurst, and a short time after, the 27th March, William
I. entered on the sixty-sixth year of a life in which assuredly the most
extraordinary favors of fortune have not been wanting. Germany
celebrated the _fête_ of its new emperor with transports of joy, the
more noisy and sincere since the monarch had waited for this anniversary
to ratify a last convention with the government of Versailles, a
convention which assured the anticipated payment of the fifth milliard
of the French ransom, and the very early return of the troops of
occupation from the other side of the Vosges. The great accounts with
_the hereditary enemy_ thus definitely settled, the conqueror of Sedan
thought, on his part, of acquitting himself of a little debt of the
heart: he resolved to carry to the Emperor Alexander II. the expression
of his lively gratitude for the loyal aid which he had lent him during a
memorable period of trials and combats. Long foreseen, from time to time
announced and put off, the journey to St. Petersburg was at length
undertaken at the beginning of pleasant weather, and M. de Bismarck took
care to state precisely on this occasion the date as well as the
character of the close association of interests established between
Russia and Prussia, and which became so fatal to the Occident. "The
commonalty of views,"--thus the official organ of the German chancellor
expressed itself,[139]--"which brought about the alliance of Prussia and
Russia in 1863, at the time of the Polish insurrection, was the point of
departure for this present policy of the two states, which, on the
occasion of the great events of the last years, has affirmed its power.
Since the attitude of Russia in the question of Schleswig-Holstein, up
to the important proofs of sympathy given to Germany by the Emperor
Alexander during the last war, all has concurred to render this alliance
still more firm."

By a sort of historical fiction which confounds the reason not a little,
but which a sovereign will imposes on acts and even public monuments in
Russia, the campaign of 1870 did not cease to be exalted in the official
spheres of the empire of the czars as the continuation of the work of
1814, as the final episode of "that great epoch when the united armies
of Russia and Prussia fought for a sacred cause which was common to them
both."[140] At the Kremlin, in the splendid hall consecrated by the
Emperor Nicholas to the military glories of the country, and which is
the _arc de l'Etoile_ of Holy Russia, the foreign tourist is astonished
to see glittering now in letters of gold on the marble the names of
Moltke, of Roon, and other captains of Germany who shone in the last war
against France.[141] And the conqueror of Sedan might imagine that he
was still in the midst of his subjects in traversing in 1873 the vast
Muscovite plains: from the frontier to the Gulf of Finland the journey
was an uninterrupted succession of triumphs and ovations. At each depot
where the imperial train stopped a guard of honor was in waiting, and
played the German national song; the czar came to meet his august guest
to Gatchina, and the 27th April the two sovereigns entered the capital
of Peter the Great. The skies were gloomy and cold, and the sun refused
to lighten "the city of wet streets and dry hearts," as one of its poets
has called it; but human industry did all that was possible to supply
the place of nature, and make amends for the irreparable outrage of the
climate. "All the green-houses of the capital, without excepting those
of the imperial gardens," says an eye-witness,[142] "were literally
devastated to improvise around the gates and windows a spring which,
retarded in our North, only arrived with summer," and the rich carpets
suspended from the ledges or stretched along the edifices gave to the
boreal city the joyous aspect of the city of lagoons. "The perspective
of Izmaïlovsky, the perspective of Voznessensky, the Grande-Morskaïa,
formed a sort of continuous alley of draperies of the Russian, German,
and Prussian colors. On a great number of balconies, one saw in the
midst of the verdure and the flowers the busts of the two monarchs
crowned with laurel. The façade of the great stable Préobrajensky was
ornamented with a number of standards surrounding a colossal cross of
that military order of Saint George of which his majesty the Emperor
William is the oldest knight and the only grand ribbon." The crowd
pressed close to the passage of the guests from Berlin; the unreserved
Prince de Bismarck and the taciturn Count de Moltke especially attracted
the eyes of the spectators.

For twelve days there was an endless succession of reviews, parades,
tatoos, illuminations, balls, _raouts_, banquets, concerts, and gala
representations. Among the latter, the chroniclers mention the two
splendid ballets of the "Roi Candaule" and "Don Quixotte." The people
had also their part in the rejoicings, especially on the evening of the
29th April, at the gigantic festival of the Place du Palais. The two
sovereigns were present at the immense balcony concert above the piazza
of the castle. "On their arrival, five electric suns all at once lighted
the square with such intensity that one could distinguish the features
of all the spectators, and the orchestra struck up the national Prussian
hymn. The total number of musicians was 1,550, in addition to 600
trumpets and 350 drums. After the hymn the "March of King Frederick
William III." was played; then came a whole series of military marches,
the "March of Steinmetz," the "Watch on the Rhine," the "March of the
Garde of 1808," to the music of which the Russian regiments returned to
St. Petersburg after the campaign of Eylau, and the "March of Paris,"
which the allied armies heard in olden times at the time of their
triumphal entry into the capital of France. The military prayer, "God is
great in Zion," also produced an immense effect." One can hardly explain
how, in the midst of music entirely consecrated to the gods Mars and
Vulcan, the sweet romance of Weber, entitled "The Praise of Tears,"
could be introduced, unless it was a discreet homage rendered to the
well known sensibility of the old Hohenzollern, and of which many
speeches, letters, or telegrams bear in history authentic traces. This
easily impressionable character of the sovereign of Germany was visible
as far as was necessary at St. Petersburg; it showed itself especially
at the moment when the two monarchs made their adieux in the imperial
_salons_ of the depot of Gatchina. In order not to succumb to his
emotion, William I. had to leave the _salon_ brusquely; his head bent
forward, his features contracted, he went out with hasty steps and
reached the car _without turning round_.

However, if during this sojourn of the Prussian guests on the banks of
the Neva all the honors were for the uncle of the czar, the curiosity of
the public, panting and almost feverish, willingly turned, one may be
sure, to the extraordinary minister whose uniform of the white
curassiers set off his imposing stature--to this chancellor of Germany
who, in the short space of a lustrum, had founded an empire on the ruins
of two others. One had not had time to forget at St. Petersburg the
grumbling diplomat, who from 1859 to 1862 astonished and amused the
Russian society by his slanders against his own court, by his
pleasantries on the "old fogies of Potsdam" and the "Philistines of the
Spree," and who occasionally repeated the famous _mot_ of M.
Prudhomme--the _mot_: "_If I were the government!_"--he who was to laugh
at it the first. He was the government at this time, he was even the
master of Europe; and his star had dimmed the star of a Hapsburg, of a
Napoleon! The subject gave rise to more than one touching
reconciliation, to many a _piquant_ reminiscence, and there was room
also for futile remarks for the _plerisque vana mirantibus_ of which the
immortal historian speaks in presence of any prodigious change of
fortune. In presence of the man of the five milliards, the great ladies
at the winter palace remembered a certain ambassadress ten years before,
who one day boldly declared that she could not pay forty silver roubles
for early asparagus, who another day avowed in all candor that she owed
her new diamond ear-rings only to the exchange of a valuable snuff-box,
an old gift of the Prince of Darmstadt.[143] The ambassadress was the
wife of Prince de Bismarck, then baron, prince to-day, a good prince
too, and having lost nothing of his former affability. He was easy,
playful, earnest, as at the time of his mission in Russia; he inquired
for friends, acquaintances, small or great people whom he had known
formerly, and seemed to renew relations and conversations as if
interrupted only yesterday. The statesman disappeared entirely, to show
only the courtier and the man of the world, and it was only in his
relations with Prince Gortchakof, a sagacious observer tells us, that
he laid aside the foreign minister, and only appeared as the companion,
almost as the compatriot. He showed him the deference of an affectionate
friend towards his elder,--of a disciple towards the master, said the
flatterers, without thinking of evil, without thinking, above all, on
the _discipulus supra magistrum_ of whom Alexander Mikhaïlovitch, a good
Latinist himself, perhaps thought.

They often appeared thus in public, at numerous _fêtes_ and receptions,
side by side, the one towering above the crowd with his strongly-marked
head, the other also easily recognizable by his fine, _spirituel_, and
rather sharp features. According to that ingenious court etiquette of
which the good Homer has given the first precept, in making Diomede and
Glaucus exchange their brilliant armor, the Russian minister wore the
insignia of the black Eagle of Prussia, and the Prussian minister the
insignia of St. Andrew of Russia,--and this exchange of ribbons
involuntarily recalled the commonalty of ties which had for so long
united these illustrious diplomats. Such a cordial, unalterable
understanding between two statesmen directing two different empires, was
assuredly a rare phenomenon, well calculated to excite attention, and
which, during the pompous solemnities of St. Petersburg, did not cease,
in fact, to occupy reflective minds. They sought in vain in the past for
the example of a harmony of action as constant and glowing: certain
political friendships celebrated in history, those among others of
Choiseul and Kaunitz, of Dubois and Stanhope, or yet of Mazarin and
Cromwell, were only evoked an instant to be immediately recognized as
deceptive souvenirs, apparent analogies only. No one, however,
disregarded the considerable, decisive influence which the accord
between the two chancellors has had on the recent destinies of Europe;
nor did any one doubt the prodigious benefit which M. de Bismarck has
been able to draw from this juncture in his bold enterprises: the
opinions began to differ only when there was a question of settling the
accounts of Russia, of fixing well the profits brought to the empire of
the czars by this association of ten years, the most turbulent ten years
which the Continent has known since the day of Waterloo.

According to the ideas of some, there was only advantage and gain for
the people of Rourik, in the situation created by the immense events of
Sadowa and Sedan. They showed the humiliating treaty of 1856 torn up,
Austria punished for its "treason" at the time of the Crimean war,
France sunken and weakened, England a resigned spectator of the progress
of General Kaufman at Bokhara, and Russia recovering its ancient
prestige, tasting in all quiet the vengeance, that pleasure of the gods
and of the great favorites of the gods like Alexander Mikhaïlovitch. Is
there not in truth, was said, a marvelous fortune, an imposing unity in
the career of this minister who, at the conference of Vienna, had sworn
to take revenge for the abasement of his country, and who has so well
kept his word? Is there not a grand Nemesis in the successive
chastisement of these proud "allies" who, in 1853, had undertaken the
defense of the crescent against the cross of St. Andrew, who, ten years
later, had dared to raise the question of Poland? At the present time
Austria and France are rivals in flattering, obsequious conduct before
the so decried "barbarian of the North," England solicits of him a
_modus vivendi_ in central Asia; and this enviable and glorious position
Russia has obtained without conflict, without sacrifices, only by
_meditating_, developing its interior prosperity, and letting its
neighbor act alone, its secular, tried friend, whose devotion has never
been doubted. It is only just that Prussia should reap the fruits of its
valor and its fidelity, and the well known sentiments of the Emperor
William towards the czar, the family ties which have so long united the
two courts; lastly, the destinies, so distinct and yet so connected, of
the two states, are certain gages of a future, permanent, and immovable
understanding. How many times has Prussia solemnly declared that it has
no interest in the Oriental question. The day when the question of the
succession of the Osmanli arises, the Hohenzollern will prove his
gratitude to the Romanof. The little jealousies and the little rivalries
have had their day, like the little states and the little artifices of
influence and of the balance of power: the future is for a rational
policy based on the nature of things, the reality of geography, the
homogeneity of races; and this policy assigns to Russia and Germany
their respective _rôles_ and corollaries. In point of view of general
principles, we can only rejoice that the sceptre of the Occident has
escaped a turbulent, volcanic nation now making Jacobin, now
ultramontane propaganda, but always revolutionary, to pass into the
hands of a well-ordered, hierarchical, and disciplined state, as it is.
Lastly, Sadowa and Sedan were Protestant victories over the first two
Catholic Powers, and the contest in which M. de Bismarck engaged against
the Roman Curia is only the logical consequence of this great fact of
history; but without even sharing certain ideas, widely spread however,
of a possible fusion of the Protestant and Orthodox beliefs, it is not
for the church of Photius, in any case, to take umbrage at the mortal
blow given to the Vatican.

To such justifications, in which neither convincing arguments nor sharp
touches were wanting, those dissenting opposed objections inspired by a
patriotism equally sincere, but much less hopeful. Also admiring the
facility and promptitude with which Russia has arisen from its great
disaster of the Crimea, they pretended only that this great result had
been obtained long before the advent of M. de Bismarck, long before any
association with him, and that from the year 1860 the empire of the
Rourik had retaken the great position which it deserved in Europe, when
the sovereigns of Austria, Prussia, and so many of the princes of
Germany had come to salute the czar at Warsaw, to recognize his moral
supremity, and that Napoleon III. on his part sought his friendship and
accepted his arbitration. The great ability with which Prince Gortchakof
used the "French cordiality" for the good of Russia, without giving up
any essential interests, and without compromising the conservative and
traditional principles of his government, always remained one of his
greatest claims to the gratitude of his country, and it would have been
desirable had he preserved the same moderation, the same reserve, later
in this intimacy with Prussia, which on the occasion of the Polish
insurrection had replaced the former understanding with the Tuileries.
The successor of Nesselrode exaggerated, without doubt, the bearing and
the danger of the famous _remonstrances_ on the subject of Poland, as
well as the nature of the services, very selfish as a whole, which his
friend of Berlin then rendered him; in any case, that was certainly not
a reason to pout at Europe after the affair had turned out to the
striking advantage of the Russian government, to pout at it during long
years, to wish no other ally than Prussia, and to persist, in respect to
this last Power, in the constant policy of let-go, let-do, and let-take.

This was in general the profound misfortune of the fifteen or twenty
last years,--thought these enlightened patriots,--that rancor and bad
humor had played such a great _rôle_ in the grave affairs of the world:
sad sentiments surely, and from which the present chancellor of Germany
has alone been able to preserve himself! It was through anger at the
conduct of the cabinet of St. Petersburg in the Italian question, that
Austria took under its protection the insurgents of Poland; it was
through bad humor towards England in the question of the congress that
Napoleon III. abandoned the cause of Denmark, and Alexander
Mikhaïlovitch yielded to such motives more than to any others; he was
the first to practice this "policy of spite" with his imaginary
grievances against Austria in the war of the Orient, as he was also not
the last to cherish a certain "_policy de pour-boire_" with his _league
of the neutrals_ which hindered any concerted action of the Powers.
What happy opportunities for the preservation of Europe, for the glory
of his nation and the splendor of his august master, has not the Russian
chancellor let pass through love for Prussia: in the spring of 1867,
when France and Austria offered him such large concessions in the
Orient; in the autumn of 1870, when England and Austria solicited him to
take the initiative in the work of peace! What illusions also in that
belief, that Prince Gortchakof has sacrificed nothing during those ten
years of association with his formidable colleague! Was the port of
Kiel, the key of the Baltic, delivered into the hands of the Germans,
nothing? Was that nothing, the dismemberment of the Danish monarchy, the
country of the future empress? Was the vassalage of Queen Olga nothing?
The overturning and spoliation of so many reigning families allied by
blood to the House of Romanof, the loss of the independence of these
secondary States always so devoted and so faithful to Russia? Lastly,
was this profound overturning of the ancient European equilibrium, and
the unmeasured, gigantic aggrandizement of a neighboring Power, nothing?

"Greatness is a relative thing, and a country can be diminished, while
remaining the same, when new forces accumulate around it."[144] These
words, which Napoleon III. heard on the day after Sadowa, Russia could
well apply to itself, since the day of Sedan, for assuredly no one would
wish to pretend that the abolition of Article III. of the treaty of
Paris is the equivalent of the forces accumulated by Prussia in the
centre of Europe. As to the _hopes_ in the Orient, they are very
contingent, like every speculation of heritage: the _sick man_ has
already so many times deceived the expectations of his doctors, one can
no longer count the mortal crises which should have carried him off, and
perhaps it is not Russia that should complain of this prolongation of
the agony. It is still a question in truth if Russia is now in a
position to take care of the succession, if it is sufficiently supplied
with implements for such a vast establishment; if, in a word, it has all
its military and financial strength, as well as all the administrative
_personnel_ indispensable to advantageously occupy the domains as
various as extended. It cannot take possession of European provinces
like the countries along the Amour and Syr-Daria; it runs the risk of
finding more than one ungovernable Poland among those peoples of the
Danube and the Balkan; and the unity of the law, the uniformity of the
_svod_, will not be so easy to establish in the countries where, side by
side, the most incongruous institutions have flourished from the
_régime_ of the cimeter to that of the parliament. Will not the
transformation of Turkey transform, however, in turn the Muscovite
people, and will not history on this occasion be careful to repeat the
great and pathetic lessons of _Græcia capta_? Will Russia still be
Russia the day when it rules the Oriental peninsula, and can an empire
bathed by the blue waves of the Bosphorus preserve its capital on the
icy banks of Finland? Grave and obscure problems before which it is
allowable to stop, to conceive apprehensions and doubts. What is not
doubtful, on the contrary, is that at the destined hour Prussia will
make its conditions and will stipulate its compensations. It will not be
a debt of gratitude which it will think of paying then, it will be a new
bargain which it will make. Will it demand as the price of its consent,
Holland, Jutland, or the German territories of Austria? the frontier of
the Vistula, or the provinces of the Baltic?

But who knows if this prolonged drama of Turkish decadence is not yet
destined to receive a _dénoûment_ little or not at all foreseen, yet
very original and nothing less than illogical. The publicists and the
patriots of Berlin do not speak to-day of the mission of Austria in the
countries of the Danube and the Bosphorus, which they say is called by
Providence to strengthen in these countries German interests, to bring
there "German culture." Since the great day of Sedan, especially,
exhortations and summons are not wanting to this Power "to seek its
centre of gravity elsewhere than at Vienna," in short, to justify its
secular name of _Ostreich_, and to become an empire of the East, in the
true meaning of the word. A monarchy constantly menaced with the early
loss of its Germanic possessions on the Leitha may at length be brought
to try the experiment, when, above all, care is taken to present to it
this experiment as a necessity and as a virtue; a state which has never
been strongly centralized, and which has always oscillated between
dualism and a federal system more or less definite, will even have a
great chance to appear to Europe as the most proper outline of this
medley of races, of religions, of institutions, which stretches from the
Iron Gates to the Golden Horn. An _empire of the East_ of Germanic
traditions and influences on the Bosphorus, more to the South a kingdom
of Greece enlarged by Thessaly and Epirus, lastly, in the North a
Germany completed in its unity by the Cisleithan provinces,--that will
be something to fully content the world, not excepting England. We must
acknowledge, one solution of the formidable Ottoman question is like
another, and every hypothesis, every fantasy, has the right to appear,
when one touches this fantastic world of the Orient, and that world not
less mysterious and terrible which the great recluse of Varzin carries
in his head.

What, in any case, is not within the domain of hypothesis and fantasy,
what unfortunately is only a too evident and palpable reality, is, that
in place of this "combination purely and exclusively defensive," as
Prince Gortchakof one day so justly called the old _Bund_,--in place of
a league of peaceful states, all devoted friends of Russia, and forming
for it a continual succession of ramparts,--the empire of Alexander II.
now sees before it, firmly settled all along its frontier, a formidable
Power, the strongest Power of the Continent, ambitious, avaricious,
enterprising, and having henceforward the undoubted mission of defending
against it what they have agreed to call the _interests of the
Occident_. This Power can always excite the Polish question, if it
wishes to, according to its wants, and quite differently than the
cabinets of Paris and London would do it: has not the argument for such
a "_coup au coeur_" been very warmly sustained in 1871, by certain
Hungarian statesmen in the confidence of the Prussian minister? The
conduct of the government of Berlin at the time of the last insurrection
of Warsaw did not injure it in the future: the passionate speeches of M.
de Bismarck in 1849 against the revolt of the Magyars did not prevent
him from arming, many years later, the legions of General Klapka. We
cannot at least deny the Prussian plans in 1863 on the left bank of the
Vistula, "the natural frontier;" now, do not the friends of Berlin
occasionally insinuate that this would be the most efficacious means to
end the spirit of Polonism? They do not speak of the provinces of the
Baltic, as before Sadowa they repudiated all thoughts of ever wishing to
free the Main; but the Teutonic effervescence from Courland and Livonia
goes on increasing, and to what grievous sacrifices will the
Hohenzollern not resign himself when he thinks that he hears a voice
from above, the voice of "German brothers?"

Certainly it would have made the prince regent tremble in 1858, if any
one had spoken to him then of a war against a Hapsburg, and of a
companion in arms named Garibaldi; he ended, however, by accepting the
hard necessity, and he gave the signal for a fratricidal combat, with
grief in his soul and tears in his eyes. Is it not puerile, however, to
measure the destinies of nations by the life, more or less long, of this
or that sovereign? An emperor can reign in Germany who has neither
affection for, nor the remembrance of Alexander II.; he can raise up "a
Pharaoh who knows not Joseph," to speak with Holy Writ, and then there
is something stronger in the world than czar and emperor: the necessity
of history, the fatality of race. A formidable race that of these
conquerors of Sadowa and Sedan, whose invading and conquering minds have
from the beginning survived all transformations and accommodated
themselves to all disguises! Humble, and at the same time presumptuous,
temperate and prolific, expansive and tenacious, practicing with
persistence their old proverb, _ubi bene, ibi patria_, and nevertheless
always preserving a rough attachment for the _mother country_, the
Germans infiltrate every country, penetrate all regions, disdain no
corner of the habitable world. They have their friends and relations on
all the thrones and in all the offices of the world; they people the
industrial centres of Europe and the solitudes of the far West; they
decide the presidential elections in the United States; they furnish the
largest contingent of the high administrative _personnel_ in the empire
of the czars, and the remembrance is still recent of that statistic of
the Russian army, which, in 100 superior officers, counts eighty of
German origin.[145] So Germany appeared before the great strokes of
fortune of 1866 and of 1870, before the era of _iron and blood_, before
M. de Bismarck had awakened in it the secret of its strength, had said
to it the magic word, _tu regere imperio populos_! Is it necessary to
recall now the hatred which the Germans have always borne against the
Sclavic name, the extermination which they lately vowed on the Elbe
and the Oder; and does not the mind recoil in terror before a new
conflict of the two races, to-day more probable than ever? It is
allowable to treat all these apprehensions as boyish dreams, hollow
thoughts of _literati_ and professors; but the eminent men, the serious
men, the _augures_ and _aruspices_ of politics, have they in our day
treated otherwise many a formidable problem? Have they not used the same
language on the question of Schleswig-Holstein and the German
pretensions to Alsace, in regard to the unity of Italy and the plans of
the _National Verein_? That would be a curious chapter of
contemporaneous history to write, that of the _Diplomats and
Professors_, and which could well show that of these two respectable
bodies the most pedantic and the most ideological is not exactly the one
which a vain people thinks.

Is there not,--the same persons continue, more careful of the interests
of the present and the future than of the unseasonable reminiscences of
the past,--is there not ideological force, for instance, in the manner
of assimilating the two epochs of 1814 and 1870, and of saluting in
Field Marshal Moltke the continuator of the work of Koutouzof? At the
time of the memorable war of which the burning of Moscow had given the
heroic signal, it was all Europe that arose against an insolent master
and bore deliverance to states trodden and ground down by a universal
dominion. Was it the same in the last conflagration? and can one not
rather say that it was France, on the contrary, that fought at this
moment for the equilibrium of the world and the independence of
kingdoms, trying to repair by a tardy and badly conceived effort a
series of culpable errors, but from which it was not the only one to
suffer? Different in their motives, the two epochs scarcely resemble
each other more as to ways and means. It was "a war by means of
revolutions" that the Prussian minister had early announced to M.
Benedetti, and he has kept his word; he had regards, attenuations,
_comprehensions_ for the _commune_ difficult to justify; now he openly
protects the Republican _régime_ in France against any attempt at
restoration, thus sacrificing the monarchical principle and the highest
considerations of European order to a purely selfish and vindictive
calculation. That is not the spirit which animated the allies of 1814;
the magnanimous Alexander I. especially understood differently the
duties of sovereigns and the solidarity of conservative interests. And
what a severe judgment would the Emperor Nicholas have given on every
_ensemble_ of the policy of Berlin, on that regeneration of Germany
which has not ceased to be the revolution from above, from the federal
execution in Holstein up to the arrest of the syndics of the crown; from
the destruction of the _Bund_ up to the overturning of the dynasty of
the Guelphs; from the formation of the Hungarian legions and the close
relations with Mazzini to the _Kulturkampf_ against the Catholic Church!

That we may not be deceived in fact, we can still say it is the
revolution alone which finds its profit in the war made to-day in
Germany on Catholicism, and very great, very _naïve_ is the illusion of
those who flatter themselves with seeing Protestant or Orthodox ideas,
the religious spirit in general, benefited by the losses of Papacy. It
suffices to cast a glance on the great battalions of the _Kulturkampf_
to recognize their God; they bear on their banners very clearly the sign
under whose name they expect to conquer. Are these sincere Protestants,
these _evangelical men_ for whom the Gospel is a truth, who first rush
to the assault or who only follow it with their wishes and their
prayers? Assuredly not; all those who from the Reformation have not kept
the name in vain, but the strong doctrine, openly repudiate this
dissension, while sighing in their souls. They have the just feeling
that in our epoch, so overturned, so profoundly disturbed by the genius
of negation, religious interests are conjointly responsible between them
just as well as conservative interests. Those eager for the combat, the
zealots "filled with the divine spirit," are precisely those who admit
neither divinity nor spirit, who have no other positive religion than
positivism; and it is not in them surely that Luther resuscitated would
wish to recognize his children. The great adversary of Rome in the
sixteenth century held on to the revelation, he held on to his Bible, to
his dogma of pardon: are not all these things very "old-fashioned," and
very laughable in the eyes of the disciples of Strauss and Darwin? The
apostle of Wittemberg believed in justification through faith; the
apostles of Berlin believe in justification through success.

It is a grave matter,--at length conclude these men, alarmed in their
patriotism and in their conservative sentiments,--an extremely perilous
matter for a great state to abandon, in its relations with the Powers,
certain established maxims, certain rules of conduct tried by long
experience, become in a manner the _arcana imperii_, and Napoleon III.
has just paid dearly for such a rupture with the ancient traditions in
the exterior policy of France. Russia had also, in regard to Europe,
sacred traditions, which have made the greatness and the strength of the
preceding reigns; under these reigns, they were jealous in defending the
liberty of the Baltic, they watched over the maintenance of the
equilibrium of strength between Austria and Prussia, they appreciated
the friendship and the devotion of the secondary States of Germany, and
they caused the monarchical principle to be everywhere respected as
opposed to revolution. Then Russia never had to repent at having turned
aside from the ways hollowed out by the triumphal car of Peter the
Great, of Catherine II., of Alexander I., and of Nicholas!

Thus spoke the independent minds on the banks of the Neva while the
official world there displayed all the northern magnificence in honor of
William the Conqueror: however, they only lent a reasoning and touching
language to a vague, but intense and profound sentiment which agitated
the very soul of Russia. With that habit of obedience and discipline
that one can often accuse of a servile instinct, but which with this
people is also sometimes a great and admirable patriotic instinct, the
children of Rourik were careful not to cross the government in the
brilliant reception which it gave the Prussian; they limited themselves
to remaining impassible witnesses of a spectacle which did not appeal to
their inmost feelings. The press showed itself abstemious of
descriptions, more sparing still in reflections during these days of
_fêtes_ and festivals; the officials of Berlin only praised them with
having maintained a _decorous_ tone. Such was also the tone of Russian
society taken as a whole; the beautiful _perspectives_ of the imperial
residence appealed to the moral as well as to the physical man; flowers
from hot-houses on the first floor, ice under foot! The guests were not
the last to see the contrast: with the exquisite perfumes of exotic
plants, they breathed from time to time the sharp air of the country,
the rough North wind, and it was not M. de Bismarck himself who did not
seem to feel the circumambient atmosphere. One found in him more
vivacity and enjoyment than of dash and warmth; his words preserved a
measuredness which was not usual with him, and seemed to designedly
avoid all _éclat_ and all light. A curious matter, during this sojourn
of two weeks in the capital of Russia, the former grumbling diplomat did
not let any of his sallies and jokes escape, of which he is generally so
prodigal,--none of those amazing indiscretions which are at once the
amusement and the horror of the _salons_ and the chancellors' offices.
They only gleaned a single sensational expression fallen from those lips
which have so often pronounced the decree of destiny, the expression
"that he could not even admit the thought of being hostile to Russia."
The declaration seemed explicit and reassuring, and like a discreet
reply to an apprehension which did not dare to show itself openly. The
incredulous or fretful souls could not, however, desist from observing
that only ten years before such an assurance given to the empire of the
czars by a minister of Prussia, would have seemed very superfluous,
would have even provoked smiles.

Here ends the task which was imposed on us in undertaking this study.
The meeting of the two chancellors in the capital of Peter the Great, in
the spring of 1873, was like the epilogue of a common action which has
lasted ten years, and which has contributed so much to change the face
of the world. Since this epoch, Europe has known no tempest, although
occasionally menacing and threatening clouds have not ceased to traverse
its still obscured horizon. There were even glimmerings and indications
that the old and fatal agreement between the cabinets of Berlin and St.
Petersburg was no longer as absolute as in the past, that it admitted
certain intermissions, or at least certain differences of opinions and
appreciations. It is thus that the government of the czar refused to
follow the chancellor of Germany in his Spanish campaign, in his
feverish adhesion to the presidency of Marshal Serrano, and it did not
seem doubtful that the personal intervention of Alexander II., strongly
supported by England in the past year, turned from France an iniquitous
aggression and a terrible calamity. Since that epoch, also, the adhesion
of Austria to the official policy of the two Northern states has
come--we cannot emphasize it too much--either to complete or to
complicate an association in which it becomes difficult to discover any
common interests, and which, up to this day at least, has only found
harmony in silence. The future alone can unveil the importance and the
virtue of this extolled alliance of three empires, as badly known as it
is badly conceived, perhaps; but one will scarcely be deceived in
supposing that to-day, in this double and troubled household, it is M.
de Bismarck who can think himself the happiest of the three.

FOOTNOTES:

[139] _Provincial Correspondence_ of the 1st May, 1873.

[140] Telegram from the czar to King William I. of the 9th December,
1869. Quite recently, at the last banquet of St. George, the Emperor
Alexander II. said: "I am happy to be able to state that the close
alliance between our three empires and our three armies, founded by our
august predecessors for the defense of the same cause, exists intact at
the present moment." Official journal of the Russian empire of the 12th
December, 1875.

[141] Count Tarnowski, "A Visit to Moscow," _Revue de Cracovie_,
November, 1785.

[142] _Ausder Petersburger Gesellschaft._ The other descriptions are
taken from the _Journal de St. Petersburg_, and _L'Invalide Russe_ of
that time.

[143] _Aus der Petersburger Gesellschaft_, vol. ii. p. 89.

[144] Confidential note of M. Magne, 20th July, 1866. _Papers and
Correspondence of the Imperial Family_, vol. i. p. 241.

[145] The _Golos_, several years ago, advanced these curious statistics,
the effect of which was profound at the time. The name of Kozlof had a
moment of celebrity in Russia: hearing it pronounced at the end of a
long list of purely Teutonic names, at the presentation of the officers
of a grand army corps, the czarovich cried out, "At last! thank God."
Fr. J. Celestin, _Russland seit Aufheburg der Leibeigenschaft_, Laibach,
1875, p. 334.




APPENDIX.


     LETTER FROM M. BENEDETTI TO THE EDITOR OF THE "REVUE DES DEUX
     MONDES." REPLY OF M. KLACZKO.

                              PARIS, _24th September_, 1875.

     TO THE EDITOR,--You published in the last number of the
     "Revue des deux Mondes," an article by M. Klaczko, which
     forces me to ask you for an opportunity for a short
     explanation. I surely would not wish to contest with any one
     the right of estimating the events of which this author has
     undertaken the anecdotal history, and of judging, as best one
     can, of the part which I took in them; I call, on the
     contrary, with all my heart, in my own interest as well as in
     that of the government which I have had the honor to serve,
     for the examination and the discussion; for it, as for me, I
     can only be satisfied with the light which already flashes
     from it, and with the errors which have been dissipated; but
     the discussion is serious and useful only if it is loyal, and
     it is loyal only when recounting fixed and undeniable facts.

     Now, here is what I read in the article of M. Klaczko:
     "Certainly the ambassador of France at the court of Berlin
     had, in this year 1866 a very difficult and painful position,
     we had almost said a pathetic one. He had worked with
     _ardor_, with _passion_, to bring about this _connubio_ of
     Italy and Prussia, which seemed to him to be an immense good
     fortune for the imperial policy, a brilliant victory gained
     over the old order of things to the profit of the 'new right'
     and Napoleonic ideas. In the fear, very well founded besides,
     of seeing this work miscarry and Prussia draw back, if one
     spoke to it of eventual compensations and preventive
     engagements, he had not _ceased to dissuade_ his government
     from any attempt of this kind." Pp. 210, 211. Already, at p.
     206, in a note, M. Klaczko had said: "M. Drouyn de Lhuys, who
     had already obtained from Austria the cession, in any case,
     of Venetia, insisted at this moment more strongly than ever,
     that they should also take pledges in advance from Prussia,
     'the most formidable, the most active of the parties.' M.
     Benedetti _did not cease to oppose_ such a proceeding,
     fearing that Prussia would renounce in this case all idea of
     war against Austria."

     Now, these allegations have no meaning, or they signify that
     I was the real inspirer, if not the negotiator, without the
     knowledge of my government, of the treaty of alliance
     concluded in 1866 between Prussia and Italy; that I,
     moreover, turned, by incessant efforts, M. Drouyn de Lhuys
     from his intention of demanding of the Berlin government,
     before the war against Austria, the pledges eventually
     necessary for the security of France.

     M. Klaczko neither corroborates these assertions by any known
     fact, nor by the extract from an official document; he gives
     no proof of them in any degree or in any way.

     As to what concerns the Prusso-Italian treaty, he was
     informed, however, since he continually quotes the
     publication which I made in 1871, under the title, "My
     Mission in Prussia," that I repudiated any participation in
     this act; he knew that I had claimed to have shown it, and it
     is not sufficient to contradict me; in such a case it is
     necessary to prove the contrary, to establish that, far from
     having remained ignorant, as I maintained, of the accord
     between Prussia and Italy, I had been the principal
     instigator of it.

     It is of importance to me that the readers of the "Revue des
     deux Mondes" be enlightened; they have seen the article of M.
     Klaczko, it is just to place under their eyes some words only
     from the dispatches which I published.... I wrote on the 14th
     March, 1866: "The early arrival of an Italian officer,
     General Govone, is announced, who comes to Berlin charged
     with an important mission; this news ... has caused
     considerable emotion. If it is confirmed, one will not fail
     to believe that Prussia and Italy are negotiating a treaty of
     alliance."

     The third day after, I added: "General Govone arrived day
     before yesterday at Berlin. According to Count Bismarck and
     the Italian minister, he is charged with a military mission,
     and his journey will have simply for its object the study of
     the perfection arrived at in the instruments of war."

     Two days later, I was in a position to inform my government
     exactly, and I said: "I wrote you, announcing the arrival of
     General Govone, that, according to M. de Bismarck and the
     Italian minister, this envoy of the cabinet of Florence was
     simply charged with studying the military condition of
     Prussia. Forgetting, without doubt, what he had told me on
     this point, M. de Bismarck informed me yesterday that General
     Govone was authorized to conclude arrangements with the
     Prussian government. The communications which he has made to
     the president of the council substantiate this." In closing
     this dispatch, I added: "The legation of Italy observes
     toward me absolute reserve. I do not know whether to regret
     it. The confidences of M. de Bismarck, which I cannot,
     however, decline, already place me in a sufficiently delicate
     position."

     At last, on the 27th March, when the plenipotentiaries had
     already held several conferences, I wrote to M. Drouyn de
     Lhuys: "(M. de Bismarck) has spoken to me of his conferences
     with General Govone and the Italian minister, ... and I am so
     much the better in a position to inform you that M. de
     Barral, Italian minister, _has_ AT LAST _decided on his part
     not to hide from me entirely his proceedings and the
     intentions of his government_."

     One of two things, either M. Klaczko admits that my
     correspondence was sincere, or he supposes that it was drawn
     up with the design of dissimulating my conduct and the part
     which I clandestinely took in the negotiation. In the first
     case, no one will conceive how he can pretend that I labored
     _with ardor and with passion to bring about this connubio of
     Italy and Prussia_. In the second hypothesis matters are
     changed, and I shall expect that M. Klaczko will be explained
     as far as he goes by the expression of my opinion.

     For the moment, I will invoke the only testimony that no one
     can suspect, that of the Italian plenipotentiary. The
     correspondence of General Govone was published after his
     death and subsequently to "My Mission in Prussia," through
     the efforts of General La Marmora, who has omitted nothing.
     In this correspondence, where all is told in detail, my name
     is quoted twice, the first time in a telegram of the 28th
     March, twelve days after the arrival of the Italian
     plenipotentiary at Berlin, and here is what he says as
     regards me: "I think that I ought to announce to you that the
     president (M. de Bismarck) keeps M. Benedetti exactly
     advised."

     In the letter in which my name appears for the second and
     last time, dated the 6th April, on the very eve of the
     signing of the treaty (the dates are valuable, and it is well
     to retain them), General Govone mentions a visit which he
     paid me, the first since his arrival at Berlin; and what did
     I say to him concerning these negotiations? I quote
     literally: "Yesterday, after my visit to M. de Bismarck, I
     saw M. Benedetti; he thought that it was preferable for us to
     sign no treaty, but only to have a project all discussed and
     ready to sign when the mobilization of Prussia should be
     achieved."

     Do these two extracts, Mr. Editor, authorize the belief that
     I was the confidant and the counselor of the Italian envoy?
     Do they not confirm, on the contrary, from point to point the
     sincerity of my correspondence? In what has M. Klaczko
     sought, where has he seen that I labored for the accord
     between Italy and Prussia? Should he not have told us before
     making such a grave assertion? Does he think to reproach me
     for having endeavored to keep myself informed as to what was
     passing, and for having instructed my government exactly?

     As to the assertion of M. Klaczko, twice repeated in his
     article, that I did not cease, before the war, to dissuade M.
     Drouyn de Lhuys from speaking at Berlin of eventual
     compensations and preventive engagements, from fear of seeing
     Prussia give up the combat with Austria, I will reply by the
     following extract from a letter which M. Drouyn de Lhuys
     himself addressed to me on the 31st March, during the
     negotiation opened between the two cabinets of Berlin and
     Florence: "I have read with pleasure," said he to me, "the
     private letters which you have written to me during the
     present month. I beg leave to express to you all my thanks
     for them. If I have received them without replying
     immediately, it was because I had nothing to modify _in the
     instructions_ which I have given you on different occasions.
     We are still of the same opinions. While recognizing the
     gravity of the new crisis in which we participate, we see, in
     the contention which presents itself to-day, no sufficient
     motive for us to depart from our attitude of neutrality. We
     have explained ourselves frankly to the court of Prussia.
     When we have been asked by the cabinet of Vienna, we have
     firmly declared to it, that we wish to remain neutral,
     although it has observed to us that our neutrality was more
     favorable to Prussia than to Austria. _We await, then, the
     armed conflict_, if it must break out, in the attitude in
     which we really are. The king himself has acknowledged that
     the present circumstances do not offer the bases of accord
     that his majesty desires. The course of events, the nature
     and the bearing of the interests which are involved, and the
     dimensions which the war will take, as well as the questions
     which it will give rise to, will _then_ determine the
     elements of the understanding which can exist between Prussia
     and us."

     In this same letter, the whole of which can be read on page
     77 of "My Mission in Prussia," M. Drouyn de Lhuys wished
     moreover to indicate to me the consideration which obliged us
     to observe a reserved attitude in view of the efforts made by
     Prussia, and by Italy, to act in concert, and he added at the
     close: "That is the whole truth concerning our opinions. I
     approve, however, completely of your attitude and your
     language, and I trust that you will continue to keep me
     equally well informed of all the details of this crisis."

     Would M. Drouyn de Lhuys have acknowledged the receipt of my
     correspondence in these terms, if it was intended to deter
     him from any plan of contracting eventual engagements with
     Prussia, if there had existed between the minister and the
     ambassador the disagreement the whole responsibility of which
     M. Klaczko wishes to throw on me? I dwell no longer on this
     subject, leaving to the penetration of your readers the task
     of seeing things more clearly; I only wish you to remark
     that, if M. Klaczko, as I suppose, has seen that letter
     before writing his article, it becomes impossible to explain
     the errors of it.

     I regret to say, however, that I should have to criticise
     almost all his work, if I wished to correct the defective
     parts of it; but I do not intend to abuse my right of reply,
     and I will go no farther. I will rectify, however, another
     error on account of its particular importance. Replying to a
     telegraphic question of M. Drouyn de Lhuys, I wrote him on
     the 8th June, 1866, that no one in Prussia, from the king to
     the most humble of his subjects, with the exception of M. de
     Bismarck, would consent, in my opinion, to abandon to us any
     part of the German territory on the Rhine. After having
     quoted an extract from my dispatch, M. Klaczko adds: "And
     this is the same diplomat who had so well appreciated the
     situation before the campaign of Bohemia, it is the same
     ambassador _who now undertakes_ to present to M. de Bismarck
     the demands of the cabinet of the Tuileries, who went so far
     as to submit to him, on the 5th August, a plan of a secret
     treaty implying the abandonment to France of the whole left
     bank of the Rhine, without excepting the great fortress of
     Mayence!"

     M. Klaczko mistakes. I did not take upon myself to make this
     communication, and his allegation, deprived, moreover, of all
     proof, astonishes me the more as he could have seen in "My
     Mission in Prussia," that affairs were not conducted in that
     manner; that, on the contrary, while pointing out the serious
     and new difficulties which seemed to oppose this project, I
     demanded time to previously go to Paris to confer with the
     government, and that I was _ordered_ to proceed. Did I do
     well or badly in obeying? That is another question; but M.
     Klaczko should all the more abstain from presenting this
     incident in such a manner as to emphasize the consequences of
     it, which have been grave and gloomy, as he is careful to
     remember.

     If it is thus that M. Klaczko understands the duties of the
     historian, I can only express my surprise at it. He,
     doubtless, did not perceive that party spirit and personal
     sympathies have suggestions which loyalty disavows. I regret
     it for a publicist who had accustomed the readers of the
     "Revue des deux Mondes" to better prepared and more
     impartially written studies. As far as I am concerned, you
     will understand, Mr. Editor, that I could not sanction by my
     silence assertions so destitute of foundation, and that M.
     Klaczko has forced me to protest in spite of my very sincere
     desire to avoid any polemics, and to maintain a reserve from
     which it is painful for me to depart. This letter, however,
     has no other object, and while asking you to insert it in the
     next number of the "Revue," I beg you to accept the assurance
     of my highest regard.

                                                  BENEDETTI.

       *       *       *       *       *

M. Benedetti's letter was communicated to M. Julian Klaczko, who
returned it to us with the following observations:--

     M. le Comte Benedetti confounds two very different
     negotiations which have been spoken of in our work, as well
     as the two very distinct estimations of which they have been
     the object on our part. It was only in the affair concerning
     the treaty on Belgium, in the month of August, 1866, that the
     conduct of M. Benedetti toward his minister seemed incorrect
     to us; we have not passed the same judgment on his attitude
     in the months of March and April of the same year, as regards
     the secret treaty negotiated between M. de Bismarck and
     General Govone; still less have we reproached him with having
     been the inspirer of this treaty _without the knowledge of
     his government_. We have only affirmed that his dispatches at
     that time were of a nature to deter the French government
     from any attempt at a prior engagement with Prussia in view
     of the eventualities of the war.

     M. Benedetti in truth did not cease to represent the court of
     Berlin as inaccessible to any overture of this sort. Even on
     the 8th June, 1866, on the eve of the war, he wrote: "The
     apprehensions which France inspires everywhere in Germany
     still exist, and they will reawaken unanimously and violently
     at the slightest indication which could reveal our intention
     to extend ourselves toward the East.... The king, like the
     most humble of his subjects, would not listen at this moment
     to the possibility of a sacrifice (on the Rhine). The crown
     prince, profoundly sensible of the dangers of the policy of
     which he is the witness, declared, not long ago, to one of my
     colleagues, with extreme vivacity, that he preferred war to
     the cession of the little county of Glatz." ("My Mission in
     Prussia," pp. 171-172). In his other reports, as well as
     throughout his whole book, M. Benedetti always returns to
     this circumstance, that he never "encouraged hopes" on this
     side, and that he "sufficiently indicated that one would not
     obtain in any case, with the consent of Prussia, territorial
     concessions on the frontier of the East." ("My Mission," p.
     176).

     That was, however, not the sentiment of the Italian
     negotiators at the court of Berlin. M. de Barral, in a
     telegram addressed the 6th May to General La Marmora, thus
     expressed himself: "They are busily occupied with
     negotiations, we are assured, which are taking place between
     France and Austria to indemnify Italy, and which will have
     gone as far as the line of the Rhine to France. To the
     observation which I made on the danger of such an offer by a
     German Power, Bismarck replied to me by shrugging his
     shoulders, indicating very clearly that, should the case
     occur, he would not recoil from this means of
     aggrandizement!" On his side, General Govone, in his very
     minute report of the 7th May, relates the same incident in a
     fuller and much more explicit manner. "M. de Bismarck wishes
     to know the intentions and desires of the emperor; he has
     spoken of them to M. de Barral; he told him to try to learn
     something about them through M. Nigra; he has even given them
     cause to believe that he will be disposed to abandon to him
     the banks of the Rhine, having been informed by his agents
     that the emperor was negotiating with Austria, and that
     Austria would cede to him, so he believes, Venetia, and would
     even invite him to take possession of the left bank of the
     Rhine." M. de Barral, to whom he spoke, cried out: "But
     Austria should not thus compromise itself with Germany while
     sacrificing countries which belong to the confederation!" M.
     de Bismarck made a gesture which seemed to say: "I too would
     cede them." Lastly, in his report of the 3d June, five days
     before the dispatch of M. Benedetti concerning "the king and
     the most humble of his subjects," General Govone quotes the
     following reply of M. de Bismarck to his demand whether one
     could not find "some geographical line" to indemnify France?
     "There will be the Mosel (said M. de Bismarck). I am, he
     added, much less German than Prussian, and I would have no
     difficulty in conceding to France the cession of all the
     country between the Mosel and the Rhine: the Palatinate,
     Oldenburg, a part of the Prussian territory, etc. But the
     king will have great scruples, and can only decide in a
     supreme moment when it is a question of losing or winning
     all. At any rate, to bring the mind of the king to any
     arrangement with France, it will be necessary to know the
     minimum (_il limite minimo_) of the pretensions of this
     Power." (La Marmora, "Un pó più di luce," p. 211, 221, 275).

     Thus the Italian negotiators differed notably from M.
     Benedetti in their opinion on this very grave point; in all
     the confidential and evidently sincere relations which they
     had with their own government, they considered a territorial
     and previous arrangement between France and Prussia as a very
     difficult thing, without doubt, but not impossible. We have
     not discussed in our work the question whether it was General
     Govone or M. Benedetti who had judged the situation best; we
     have not even mentioned this divergence of opinions: we have
     only asked how M. Benedetti could have believed that after
     Sadowa and Nikolsburg he would find Prussia accessible to
     arrangements which it had not wished to accept before its
     immense victories and in the midst of an extremely perilous
     crisis? How could he have undertaken on this 5th August[146]
     to demand of M. de Bismarck for France all the left bank of
     the Rhine without excepting the great fortress of Mayence,
     when on the 8th June he was persuaded that one could not
     obtain from Prussia even a territory of the value of the
     county of Glatz? We have given the only possible explanation
     of this contradiction, the only one, we dare affirm, which
     has presented itself to the minds of all those who have
     studied these events. Before the campaign of Bohemia, we
     said, M. Benedetti did not think it possible to obtain
     territorial concessions from Prussia, and had shown all the
     more plainly the difficulties of such a demand which he
     feared to see Prussia refuse and thus render its _connubio_
     with Italy abortive, if they insisted prematurely, too firmly
     on the point of compensations. He desired rather to count on
     the military events to procure advantages for his country,
     on "the necessities to which the war might reduce the
     Prussian government" ("My Mission," p. 172), for he did not
     expect any more than the most ordinary of mortals the
     startling blow of Sadowa. After Sadowa he was dismayed at the
     success of the Hohenzollern; patriotic anguish for France
     succeeded in his heart to the generous sympathies for Italy,
     and, as he himself says, "in view of the important
     acquisitions of Prussia he was of the opinion that a
     territorial remodeling was henceforward necessary for the
     security of France." ("My Mission," p. 177). This remodeling
     he had _at first_ hoped to find on the Rhine, "provided that
     the language of his government was firm and its attitude
     resolute" (p. 178); he had then sought it on the Meuse and
     the Escaut, and had allowed himself to be drawn into that
     secret negotiation on Belgium which was to be so fatal to
     France.

     It was probably not the _patriotic anguish_ attributed by us
     to M. Benedetti on the day after Sadowa, that could have
     wounded his feelings. Could it be the Italian sympathies with
     which we have credited him that awakened his
     susceptibilities? But the pronounced liking for the country
     and the cause of M. de Cavour has been the principal and
     marked characteristic of the political life of the former
     ambassador of France to the court of Berlin; in sight, and
     with the knowledge, of every one, M. Benedetti has always
     been reckoned among the most distinguished members of a party
     which had great influence in the councils of the second
     empire, a party which considered Italian unity as the most
     glorious work of the reign, the most useful for France, and,
     in its eyes, the _connubio_ of Italy and Prussia seemed an
     immense good fortune for the imperial policy, a brilliant
     victory gained over the old order of things, to the profit of
     the "new right" and Napoleonic ideas! The diplomatic career
     of M. Benedetti, even presents in this respect a character
     of unity and indivisibility which will arouse the eternal
     admiration of all Italian patriots. In 1860 he had negotiated
     and brought to a successful end the treaty on Savoy and Nice,
     in exchange for which the imperial government tore up the
     treaty of Zurich, and sanctioned implicitly the annexations
     of Tuscany and Emilia. In 1861 he was made minister
     plenipotentiary of France to Turin, as if to console Italy
     for the recent death of M. de Cavour, to reëstablish in any
     case beyond the Alps the friendly relations which the
     invasion of the kingdom of Naples had for a moment strongly
     compromised. In the summer of the following year (August,
     1862), the harmony between France and Italy was again
     troubled in consequence of Aspromonte, and of the circular of
     General Durando, of the 10th September, which demanded the
     evacuation of Rome. M. Thouvenel was then obliged to leave
     the Hotel of the Quai d'Orsay, giving place to M. Drouyn de
     Lhuys; and M. Benedetti, as well as his colleague of Rome, M.
     de La Valette, hastened to give his resignation, in order to
     mark with _éclat_ his disapprobation as regarded a system
     become less favorable to the aspirations of Italy. He did not
     reënter the career until two years later, the 7th October,
     1864, after the convention of the 15th September had given
     satisfaction to the wishes of the cabinet of Turin concerning
     Rome, also after M. de Bismarck had passed by Paris and had
     placed there the first beacons of the great combination
     against Austria. The post at Berlin was then raised to an
     embassy, and M. Benedetti became the holder of it. His former
     colleague of Rome, M. de La Valette, did not delay to sit in
     the councils of the empire, and at the same moment General La
     Marmora, well known for his _Prussomania_, undertook the
     direction of affairs at Turin. And from the beginning of the
     year 1865, M. de Bismarck engaged in his first campaign
     against Austria concerning the Duchies, and made his first
     proceedings at Florence to combine an understanding with
     Italy. The _connubio_ was not definitely consummated until
     April, 1866, under the eyes of M. Benedetti.

     No one that we know (and we less than any one) has reproached
     M. Benedetti with having favored this _connubio without the
     knowledge of his government_; but M. Benedetti will doubtless
     not pretend that this understanding between Italy and Prussia
     did not have all his sympathies. General Govone had no
     confidences for him at Berlin, perhaps; it was M. Benedetti,
     on the contrary, who made the Italian negotiator precious
     confidences,--that one among others, "that M. de Bismarck was
     a sort of _maniac_, whom he (Benedetti) knew and had
     _followed_ for nearly fifteen years."[147] He had advised
     him, also, "not to sign any treaty, but only to have a
     project thoroughly discussed and ready to sign when the
     mobilization of Prussia should be achieved." Would M.
     Benedetti seek to persuade that by this advice he had wished
     to hinder the _connubio_? No, assuredly, by such advice M.
     Benedetti told General Govone to act only in earnest. It was
     good counsel that he gave him. Now one does not give good
     counsel for an affair which one wishes to see go under.
     Moreover, it was not the Italians that it was necessary to
     render favorable to the _connubio_; they inclined to it
     naturally: the important part was to gain over the court of
     Berlin, to triumph over its scruples, to reassure it, above
     all, as to the intentions of France. "I think that I should
     announce to you," the Italian negotiator telegraphed on the
     28th March to General La Marmora, "that the president (M. de
     Bismarck) keeps M. Benedetti exactly informed."[148] M. de
     Bismarck would certainly not have thought of keeping M.
     Benedetti so exactly informed, if he had credited him with an
     aversion or even a lukewarmness for the Italian marriage.
     Then, as since, in France as well as abroad, in the eyes of
     the publicists as well as in the eyes of his own chiefs (as
     we are going to prove immediately), the former ambassador of
     France to the court of Berlin has always passed for the agent
     of the imperial government who wished most ardently for the
     success of the Italo-Prussian combination, and the book, "My
     Mission in Prussia," has not succeeded at all in shaking a
     conviction which we do not fear to call general.

     We would never have thought of intruding in such an important
     debate our obscure person and our humble writings; but, since
     M. Benedetti has kindly wished to recognize in the works
     previously published by us in the "Revue des deux Mondes,"
     "studies better prepared and more impartially written," we
     feel less hesitation in quoting one of those pages which we
     consecrated even here seven years ago to that pathetic
     episode of contemporaneous history. Speaking in our
     "Preliminaries of Sadowa," of the treaty negotiated between
     M. de Bismarck and General Govone in the spring of 1866, we
     expressed ourselves as follows: "There was only one strong
     mind like M. de Bismarck to enter into a compact with this
     secretary of the dreaded kingdom who assisted his colleague
     the Count de Barral; in the depths M. Benedetti appeared from
     time to time. In this respect, we involuntarily stretch our
     hand toward that volume of Machiavelli; we are seized with a
     desire to re-read a chapter from the "Legazioni." How happy
     he would have been, the great Florentine, to contemplate his
     three compatriots fighting with a _barbarian_! At Paris, one
     only saw (in this treaty) the single, prodigious fact of a
     pact concluded between a monarch by the grace of God, and a
     king of the national will, and one went into ecstacies over
     the skill of M. Benedetti. There was only one diplomat of the
     new school who could perform such a miracle!" Lastly, at the
     beginning of the same study, in relating the circumstances
     which in 1864 had brought on the political stage those
     formerly disgraced by the affair Durando, we said: "Without
     doubt it cost M. Drouyn de Lhuys something to accept as a
     colleague M. de La Valette, who made no secret of his desire
     to take his department from him; it cost him still more,
     probably, to allow such an open adversary as M. Benedetti to
     be imposed on him as principal agent. Two years later, after
     Sadowa, and on the day when he gave up his portfolio, the
     same minister was yet to countersign another decree which
     raised M. Benedetti to the dignity of the grand cross. Who
     knows, however, whether, in the mind of M. Drouyn de Lhuys,
     this second signature was not destined to avenge somewhat the
     first? In truth, perhaps that was a peculiar trait of mind, a
     Parthian trait, to distinguish so highly an agent for having
     only too well served a policy the responsibility of which he
     not the less repudiated."[149]

     Did the former chiefs of the ex-ambassador of France to the
     court of Berlin judge otherwise of it? M. Benedetti himself
     furnishes us on this point with valuable testimony, which we
     will take care not to neglect. He says ("My Mission," p. 148)
     that in January, 1870, M. Daru, then minister of foreign
     affairs, had made, in a letter, allusion to the events of
     1866, in terms which could not but strongly affect the
     ambassador: "The territorial state of Prussia," M. Daru had
     written him, "results from events which _perhaps_ it has not
     depended on you to bring about." Thus, even four years after
     Sadowa, they did not cease to attribute to M. Benedetti, to
     the bureaux of the Quai d'Orsay, a notable part in these
     gloomy events. The ambassador found it opportune to enlighten
     his new chief on "the _rôle_ which he played in this
     circumstance," by a private letter dated the 27th January,
     1870. "I am not ignorant," we read there, "of all that has
     been said on this point; but, by a feeling which you will
     appreciate, I do not doubt, I have never thought of declining
     the share of responsibility which has been cast on me, and,
     for this purpose, to set at right the errors too easily
     gathered by a badly informed public." He affirmed, therefore,
     that he was then "an active, correct, foreseeing informer,"
     and he appeals to his correspondence deposited in the
     archives of foreign affairs. "I should add that I never, _and
     in none of the missions which I have fulfilled_, have
     undertaken other correspondences than those whose marks exist
     in the department, or in the hands of your predecessors, and
     that I never had, _in all the epochs of my career_, other
     orders to execute than those that have been given me directly
     through them." ("My Mission," pp. 148-149). Yet that is not
     sufficient for M. Benedetti, and in publishing this letter he
     accompanies it (p. 150) with a triumphant commentary: "I have
     affirmed a fixed and indubitable fact in mentioning, in my
     letter (to M. Daru), that I did not have the honor, _on any
     occasion_ (these words are underlined by M. Benedetti
     himself), to sustain a direct and confidential correspondence
     with the emperor. He has deigned to grant me his confidence,
     and occasionally to testify to me his satisfaction; he has
     never ceased to transmit to me his orders by the mediation of
     his minister of foreign affairs, with whom I have exclusively
     corresponded. No one will suppose, I think, that I would
     affirm this in such absolute terms as I have in writing to M.
     Daru, my immediate chief, if I had not been fully
     authorized."

     Unfortunately some pages beyond (p. 194), M. Benedetti is
     forced to acknowledge that, in his negotiation concerning the
     secret treaty on Belgium, he exchanged a correspondence which
     did not pass through the department for foreign affairs, and
     which the directing minister of this department did not know
     of. "I thought it fitting," we read there, "to address to the
     minister of state, M. Rouher, the letter in which I announced
     my interview with M. de Bismarck, and which accompanied the
     plan of the treaty relating to Belgium. M. Rouher did not lay
     before the ministry, not having then undertaken the direction
     of it, the correspondence which during several days I
     exchanged with him." It is true that, in order to palliate
     this very grave irregularity, M. Benedetti pretends that M.
     Drouyn de Lhuys had offered his resignation toward the middle
     of August: "At this moment there was no minister of foreign
     affairs;" but we have proved to him that M. Drouyn de Lhuys
     did not lose his portfolio until the 1st September, 1866. Up
     to that date, M. Drouyn de Lhuys had not ceased to direct the
     department, with the desire of remaining there, and of
     preventing the complete abandonment of the traditional French
     policy. The ambassador himself quotes in his book several
     dispatches exchanged with him on grave questions, up to the
     date of the 21st and 25th August (pages 204 and 223); but M.
     Benedetti thought _proper_ to be silent to his immediate
     chief concerning the negotiation on the subject of the treaty
     on Belgium, and only to inform the minister of state. This
     negotiation not only had its beginning, but also its end (it
     was broken off by M. de Bismarck the 29th August), _during
     the ministry of M. Drouyn de Lhuys, and without his
     knowledge_. This was then _one occasion_ when M. Benedetti
     did not exclusively correspond with the minister of foreign
     affairs! There was then _one epoch in the career_ of M.
     Benedetti when he received orders which did not pass through
     the Quai d'Orsay! And how suppose of the honorable M. Daru
     that what had happened in the month of August, 1866, could
     have also taken place in the months of March and April of the
     same year?

     M. Benedetti completely ignores in his protest this incident
     of the treaty concerning Belgium; it is, however, the
     culminating point, in fact the only grave point of the
     debate, and the only one concerning which we allowed
     ourselves to reproach him with having acted _without the
     knowledge_, not of his government, but _of his minister_.
     Would M. Benedetti perhaps find that this is an anecdotal
     incident, incompatible with the dignity of history? He had in
     fact first tried, in his letter published in the "Moniteur,"
     the 29th July, 1870, to give to this deplorable event an
     entirely anecdotal turn, to assign to the compromising
     document a, so to say, spontaneous generation; he would have
     wished to give only an exact account of the ideas of M. de
     Bismarck, and "consented to transcribe them in a manner under
     his dictation." He could not long persist in such trifling;
     he had to avow in his book that he had entered on a veritable
     negotiation, and M. de Bismarck has since then taken
     malicious pleasure in casting light on the different phases
     of this negotiation, by different extracts taken from the
     papers of Cerçay and published in the "Moniteur prussien," in
     reply to the book of M. Benedetti. "During my long career,"
     says M. Benedetti, in the preface of his book (p. 4), "I have
     been charged only on three different occasions with opening
     negotiations having a fixed object, and leaving me with an
     initiative part proportionate to the responsibility." He
     enumerates these three negotiations and proves that he
     conducted them all to a good end, but he takes good care not
     to include in the number his negotiations on Belgium, in
     which he was given an initiative part, and in which we will
     also give him his proportional part of the responsibility.

     We will also leave him the tone of his polemics; it is like
     his diplomacy, _sui generis_, and we can say with M. de
     Bismarck: "M. Benedetti is too clever for us."

                                             JULIAN KLACZKO.

       *       *       *       *       *

THE MISSION EXTRAORDINARY OF MR. FOX.

On Monday, the 16th April (according to the Russian calendar, the 4th),
1866, an attempt was made on the life of Alexander II., Emperor of
Russia. The would-be assassin was a Russian named Dmitry Karakozoff, a
member of the order of the Nihilists. The rescuer of the Czar was a
newly-emancipated serf, Ossip Ivanovitch Komissaroff by name. The facts
of the attempted assassination are as follows: In the morning of that
day Komissaroff started for the chapel built by Peter the Great on an
island in the Neva. The bridge between the main bank and the island had,
however, been removed, and he therefore turned toward the palace quay.
On approaching the Summer Garden he joined the crowd of people waiting
to see the Emperor pass. While trying to secure a favorable position,
Komissaroff was attracted by a stranger who was attempting to force his
way to the front, and who kept his right hand constantly in his coat
pocket.

When the Emperor appeared, the man beside Komissaroff drew a pistol and
aimed it at his Majesty. He stood so near that the shot would
undoubtedly have proved fatal, had not Komissaroff struck up his arm
and caused the weapon to be discharged in the air. Karakozoff was
seized, and after trial, was executed on the 15th September. Komissaroff
was made a nobleman, and had gifts and orders showered on him by the
score. Mr. Clay, our minister to Russia, delivered a congratulatory
address to the Emperor at a special audience, and the Emperor returned
his thanks to the President and the people of the United States.

In the mean time, Congress, remembering that Russia had given our nation
its warmest sympathies and aid in our hour of peril, introduced a joint
resolution, relative to the attempted assassination of the Emperor of
Russia. The resolution was approved by President Johnson, and it was
then resolved to send a special envoy in a national vessel to carry to
the Emperor of Russia the congratulations at his providential escape.
For this delicate mission the Hon. Gustavus Vasa Fox, the Assistant
Secretary of the Navy, was chosen. At his own request it was determined
to send him in a monitor, a class of vessel which had never crossed the
Atlantic, but in whose seaworthiness Mr. Fox trusted implicitly. For
this purpose the _Miantonomoh_, a two-turret monitor, to be accompanied
by two wooden men-of-war, was selected. On June 5, 1866, Mr. Fox left
St. John, N. B., for Queenstown, arriving there on June 16th. Mr. Fox
then left the _Miantonomoh_, and made short trips through England,
Ireland, and France. He rejoined the squadron at Copenhagen on Saturday,
July 21st, and after having been hospitably entertained by the king,
left on August 1st for Cronstadt. He arrived there on August 5th, and on
the following day he went to St. Petersburg and paid his respects to Mr.
Clay, the United States Minister there. On the 8th the mission was
received at Peterhof by the Emperor, assisted by Prince Gortchakof. Mr.
Fox addressed the Emperor, who replied to him through Prince
Gortchakof. On August 9th his Majesty visited the ships at Cronstadt.

For more than a month a series of dinners and balls were given in honor
of the mission, and Mr. Fox's progress throughout the country was a
perfect ovation. He was made honorary citizen of all the large cities;
he received delegations of peasants, and was honored with rich presents
from the Emperor. The tact and eminent social qualities which he
displayed, made this altogether unique mission successful, and greatly
strengthened the warm ties which exist between the two countries. It
will be seen that M. Klaczko erroneously calls Mr. Fox "assistant
secretary of state."

FOOTNOTES:

[146] We have said: "How could he undertake to present to M. de Bismarck
the _demands of the cabinet of the Tuileries_?" and M. Benedetti sees in
the word undertake the insinuation of an initiative. We have, however,
very explicitly said, _The demands of the cabinet of the Tuileries_, and
we immediately added M. Benedetti's own expressions: "_I have provoked
nothing_, still less have I guaranteed the success; I have only allowed
myself to _hope_ for it." None of our readers could mistake the meaning
of our words, nor, above all, see therein the insinuation which M.
Benedetti gratuitously credits us with.

[147] "_Del Conte Bismarck dice (M. de Benedetti) che è un diplomatico
per così dire_ MANIACO; _che da quindici anni che to conosce e lo_
SEGUE."--Report of General Govone, 6th April, 1866. La Marmora, p. 139.

[148] La Marmora, p. 110.

[149] See the _Revue_ of the 15th September, and the 1st October, 1868.




       *       *       *       *       *




Transcriber's note:

Obvious spelling and punctuation errors have been corrected.

Both clear-sighted and clearsighted, re-formed and reformed, Lauenberg
and Lauenburg, and Leipsic and Leipzig, were used equally in this text
and were retained. Herzegovania and Herzegovina were also retained.

Changes were made to the original as follows:

    "Wurtemberg" to "Würtemberg."

    "Hôtel" to more frequent "Hotel."

    "Moskova" to more frequent "Moscova."

    "Over-excited" to more frequent unhyphenated uses, "overexcited."

    P. 122, Chapter III, Section heading "I." which is implied but not
    present in the original was added.

    P. 181, "hotbed" to more frequent "hot-bed."

    P. 243, single occurrence of "Slavic" changed to much more frequent
    "Sclavic"(22).

    P. 258, "Obrénovitch" standardized to "Obrenovitch."