MORAL THEOLOGY

A Complete Course Based on St. Thomas Aquinas and the Best Modern
Authorities

BY
JOHN A. MCHUGH, O.P.
AND
CHARLES J. CALLAN, O.P.

REVISED AND ENLARGED BY
EDWARD P. FARRELL, O.P.

NEW YORK CITY
JOSEPH F. WAGNER, INC.
LONDON: B. HERDER

Nihil Obstat
ELWOOD FERRER SMITH, O.P., S.T.M.
BENJAMIN URBAN FAY, O.P., S.T.LR.

Imprimi Potest
VERY REV. WILLIAM D. MARRIN, O.P., P.G., S.T.M.
Provincial

Nihil Obstat
JOHN A. GOODWINE, J.C.D.
Censor Librorum

Imprimatur
+ FRANCIS CARDINAL SPELLMAN
Archbishop of New York

New York, May 24, 1958

The nihil obstat and imprimatur are official declarations that a book
or pamphlet is free of doctrinal or moral error. No implication is
contained therein that those who have granted the nihil obstat and
imprimatur agree with the contents, opinions or statements expressed.

[Transcriber’s note: References to the Code of Canon Law in this work
are to the 1917 version of the Code, later superseded by the 1983
version.]

All Rights Reserved by Joseph F. Wagner, Inc., New York
PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA




PREFACE

The purpose of the present work is to give a complete and comprehensive
treatise on Catholic Moral Theology, that is, on that branch of sacred
learning which treats of the regulation of human conduct in the light
of reason and revealed truth. This new work strives to deal with the
subject as a systematic and orderly whole, and is based throughout on
the principles, teaching and method of St. Thomas Aquinas, while
supplementing that great Doctor of the Church from the best modern
authorities. Needless to say, there are many questions and problems
connected with modern life that did not exist when the great classic
works on Moral Theology were written, and to these naturally special
attention has been given in the treatment that follows.

Nowadays, since the appearance of the New Code and of many special
works on Canon Law, it would be a mistake to encumber the pages of a
work like the present one with canonical questions of interest only to
the specialist, and which are ably and abundantly treated in fine
commentaries on the Code that are already available. Likewise, it would
be an error to treat here matter pertinent only to Dogmatic Theology or
History. All digressions, therefore, into alien fields have been
avoided in this work, with the result that a greater number of useful
moral questions have been herein considered.

But not only is it necessary to avoid irrelevant subjects, but it is
also needful not to sacrifice essentials for accidentals in any work of
this kind. It is the fault of too many textbooks on Moral Theology to
stress controversies, cite authors, and quote opinions, at the expense
of the principles and reasons that govern and explain the teaching
given. This work eschews that method, and is at pains everywhere, first
of all, to lay the foundations on which the superstructure is to be
built, namely, the definitions and rules that are presupposed to moral
judgments and conclusions. Obviously, this is a more logical way of
proceeding, and it consequently enables the student much more easily to
understand and retain the matter studied, since he can thus reason
questions out for himself. Moreover, such a method makes for brevity
and renders it possible, as said above, to treat more subjects than
could otherwise be treated; it makes it possible to condense the matter
of many pages of larger and less accessible works into brief and terse
paragraphs. But from this it should not be gathered that the work which
follows aims to present Moral Theology in a dryly scientific fashion.
On the contrary, it has been our endeavor to treat the matter in a way
that is at once clear, solid, comprehensive and interesting. Since the
general and the abstract do not make the same strong impression as the
particular and the concrete, laws and axioms are copiously illustrated
throughout with pertinent and practical examples that often amount to
brief _casus conscientiae_, thus combining the theory and the practice
of Moral Theology.

It would be a mistake to think that, while Moral Theology is a
technical and scientific treatise on human conduct, it deals
exclusively or primarily with vice and sin, and that it is intended
only to enable the priest rightly to administer the Sacrament of
Penance, distinguishing between the various classes of sins and their
consequences. Of course, it does all this, but it should do much more;
for it has also a much higher purpose, which is to enable man, not only
to know what is forbidden and how he may escape from moral disease and
death, but also to understand what are his duties and how he may live
the life of grace and virtue. The subject is indeed more positive than
negative, and it should be discussed accordingly. Thus, far from being
useful merely to confessors as a guide by which they may detect and
distinguish mortal and venial sins and the higher and lower degrees of
culpability, Moral Theology in its broader aspect should be of the
greatest service likewise to the individual in forming his own habits
and character, and in particular to those who have the guidance of
others, whether in or out of the confessional, such as pastors,
preachers, teachers, and the like. Consequently, the present work has
been written with a view to the homiletic and pastoral functions of the
priest, as well as those that pertain strictly to the administration of
the Sacraments.

Heretofore works on Moral Theology in English have been altogether too
few or too fragmentary, whereas they have been abundant in the
vernaculars of Continental Europe--German, French, Spanish, Italian,
etc. This does not mean that the present work is intended to replace
the Latin text-books used in our seminaries, but rather that it should
enable students and priests to get a more thorough and ready knowledge
of an all-important subject, and to adapt it more easily to the varying
needs of the ministry.

The section of this work on Law has been carefully read by two eminent
civil lawyers.

THE AUTHORS. May 10, 1929.




REVISOR’S NOTE

This is a revision, not a rewriting. Various deletions and additions
have been made with the intent of bringing the work up to date within
the scope of the original plan and methods of the authors. In this way
it has been possible to preserve the features that have made this
manual a standard guide for the past thirty years.

EDWARD P. FARRELL, O.P., S.T.LR., S.T.D. Washington, D.C., June 8, 1958




CONTENTS

[Volume I of print edition, through section 1625]

PREFACE

INTRODUCTION

Definition of Moral Theology (1-3).--The Objects of Moral Theology
(4-5).--The Sources of Moral Theology (6-12).--The Methods of Moral
Theology (13-14).--The History of Moral Theology (15-16).--The Division
of Moral Theology (17-18).

PART I. GENERAL MORAL THEOLOGY

Question I

THE LAST END OF MAN AND THE MEANS TO THAT END

Art. 1. THE LAST END OF MAN

The Existence of the Last End (19).--The Nature of the Last End
(20).--The Attainment of the Last End (21).

Art. 2. ACTS AS HUMAN

Introduction (22).--Definition (23).--Knowledge Requisite for a Human
Act (24-33).--Consent Requisite for a Human Act (34-39).--Obstacles to
Consent (40-55).--Two Kinds of Voluntary Acts (56-62).

Art. 3. ACTS AS MORAL

Introduction (63).---Definition (64-69).--The Sources of Morality
(70-75).--Good Acts (76-78).--Bad Acts (79-81).--Indifferent Acts
(82-86).--Perfect and Essential Goodness (87-88).--Morality of the
External Act (89-93).--Morality of the Act Indirectly Willed
(94-95).--Morality of the Consequences of an Act (96).--Imputability
(97-105).

Art. 4. ACTS AS MERITORIOUS

Introduction (106).--Definition (107).--Divisions of Merit (108-115).

Art. 5. THE PASSIONS

Introduction (116).--Definition (117).--Division (118-120).--Moral
Value of the Passions (121-131).

Question II

GOOD AND BAD HABITS

INTRODUCTION (132)

Art. 1. HABITS IN GENERAL

Definition (133).--Division (134-136).--Strengthening and Weakening of
Habits (137-139).--Habits and Morality (140-141).

Art. 2. GOOD HABITS, OR VIRTUES

Definition (142).--Division (143-152).--Properties of the Virtues
(153-158).--Complements of the Virtues (159-166).

Art. 3. BAD HABITS, OR VICES

Definition (167).--Divisions (168).--Mortal Sin (169-179).--Venial Sin
(180-184).--Imperfections (185).--Change in the Gravity of Moral
Defects (186-196).--The Distinctions of Sins (197-219).--Comparison of
Sins (220-229).--The Subjects of Sins (230-245).--The Causes of Sin
(246-267).--The Motives of Sin (268-271).--The Results of Sin (272-283).

Question III

LAW

INTRODUCTION

Art. 1. LAW IN GENERAL

Definition (285).--Division (286-287).--Collision of Laws
(288-292).--The Basis of All Laws (293-294).

Art. 2. THE NATURAL LAW

Meaning (295-296).--Division (297-304).--Properties (305-327).

Art. 3. THE POSITIVE DIVINE LAW

Meaning (328-330).--Division (331).--The Mosaic Law (332-345).--The Law
of the New Testament (346-369).

Art. 4. HUMAN LAW

Definition (370).--Division (371).--Qualities (372-374).--Obligation of
Human Laws (375-384).--Interpretation of Law (385-386).--Those Subject
to Law (387-388).--Change of Law (389-390).--The Law of Custom
(391-400).--Dispensation (401-410).--Epieikeia (411-417).

Art. 5. ECCLESIASTICAL LAW

Introduction (418-419).--General Law of the Church (420-422).--
Lawgivers in the Church (423-424).--Subject-Matter of Church Law
(425-426).--Those Bound by General Laws (427-434).--Those Bound by
Particular Laws (435-446).--Promulgation (447-449).--Irritant Laws
(450-458).--Laws Based on Presumption (459-461).--Fulfillment of Law
(462-482).--Interpretation (433-486).--Cessation of Obligation
(487-499).--Cessation of Law (500-505).--Custom (506-513).--Laws in a
Wide Sense (514-541).

Art. 6. CIVIL LAW

Meaning (542).--Origin (543-545).--Subject-Matter (546-549).--Those
Subject to Civil Law (550).--The Obligation of Civil Law (551-556).--
Special Kinds of Laws (557-572).--Other Questions (573).

Question IV

CONSCIENCE

INTRODUCTION (574)

Art. 1. THE LAW OF CONSCIENCE

Definition (575).--Division (576-579).--Obligation of Conscience
(580-587).--Results of Conscience (588-592).

Art. 2. A GOOD CONSCIENCE

Introduction (593).--Definitions (594).--Divisions (595-596).--The Lax
Conscience (597-606).--The Scrupulous Conscience (607-613).--
Scrupulosity (614-635).--Practical Conclusions (636-639).

Art. 3. A CERTAIN CONSCIENCE

Introduction (640).--Necessity of Certitude (641-642).--Kinds of
Certitude (643-653).--An Uncertain Conscience (654-655).--Doubt and
Suspicion (656-661).--Opinion (662-671).--The Moral Systems
(672-675).--Tutiorism (676-679).--Laxism (680-681).--The Other Systems
(682).-Probabiliorism (683-687).--Equiprobabilism (688-700).--
Probabilism (701-730).--Compensationism (731-738).--Practical
Conclusions (739-742).

PART II. SPECIAL MORAL THEOLOGY

INTRODUCTION (743)

Question I. THE DUTIES OF ALL CLASSES OF MEN

THE INFUSED VIRTUES (744-745)

Art. 1. THE VIRTUE OF FAITH

Introduction (746-749).--The Meaning of Faith (750-753).--The Object of
Faith (754-781).--The Acts of Faith (782-796).--The Habit of Faith
(797-807).--The Gifts of Understanding and Knowledge (808-811).

Art. 2. THE SINS AGAINST FAITH

Introduction (812).--The Sin of Unbelief (813-825).--Heresy
(826-834).--Apostasy (835-839).--The Sin of Doubt (840-846).--Credulity
and Rationalism (847).--Dangers to Faith (848).--Dangerous Reading
(849-866).--Dangerous Schools (867-874).--Dangerous Marriages
(875-881).--Dangerous Communication (882-888).--The Sin of Blasphemy
(887-903).--Sins of Ignorance, Blindness, Dullness (904-912).

Art. 3. THE COMMANDMENTS OF FAITH

Introduction (913).--The Commandment of Knowledge of Faith (914-924).--
The Commandment of Internal Acts of Faith (925-937).--The Negative
Commandment of External Profession of Faith (938-943).--Dangers of
Profession of Unbelief (944).--Forbidden Societies (945-955).--
Communication in Worship (956-975).-Cooperation in Religious Activities
(976-986).--The Affirmative Commandment of External Profession of Faith
(987-1008).

Art. 4. THE VIRTUE OF HOPE

Definition (1009-1017).--The Object of Hope (1018-1026).--The
Excellence of Hope (1027-1035).--The Subject of Hope (1030-1040).--The
Gift of Fear of the Lord (1041-1058).--The Sins against Hope
(1059-1091).--The Commandments of Hope and of Fear (1092-1104).

Art. 5. THE VIRTUE OF CHARITY

Definition (1105-1114).--The Excellence of Charity (1115-1120).--
Production of Charity (1121-1132).--The Object of Charity
(1133-1157).--The Order of Charity (1158-1182).--The Acts of Charity
(1183-1192).

Art. 6. THE EFFECTS OF CHARITY

Internal Effects of Charity (1193).--Joy (1194).--Peace (1195-1197).--
Reconciliation (1198-1204).--Mercy (1205-1209).--External Effects of
Charity (1210).--Beneficence (1211-1215).--Almsgiving (1216-1257).--
Fraternal Correction (1258-1294).

Art. 7. THE SINS AGAINST LOVE AND JOY

Introduction (1295).--Hate (1296).--Hatred of God (1297-1303).--Hatred
of Creatures (1304-1311).--Gravity of the Sin of Hatred (1312-1316).
--Species of the Sin of Hatred (1317-1319).--The Sin of Sloth
(1320-1325).--Laziness (1326).--Lukewarmness (1327).--The Sin of Envy
(1328-1331).--Emulation (1332).--Jealousy (1333).--Fear (1334).--
Indignation (1335-1336).--Gravity of the Sin of Envy (1337-1344).--
Means of Overcoming Envy (1345-1346).

Art. 8. THE SINS AGAINST PEACE

Introduction (1347).--Discord (1348-1354).--Contention (1355-1362).--
Acts of Sin against Peace (1363).--Schism (1364-1375).--War
(1376-1427).--Fighting (1428-1434).--Duelling (1435-1439).--Sedition
(1440-1443).

Art. 9. THE SINS AGAINST BENEFICENCE

Introduction (1444).--Scandal (1445-1446).--Definition of Scandal
(1447).--Causes of Scandal (1448-1458).--Results of Scandal
(1459-1464).--Sinfulness of Scandal (1465-1474).--Persons Scandalized
(1475-1476).--Duty of Avoiding Scandal (1477-1487).--Duty of Repairing
Scandal (1488-1492).--Denial of Sacraments in Case of Scandal
(1493-1494).--Seduction (1495-1505).--Cooperation in Sin (1506-1508).--
Kinds of Cooperation (1508-1512).--Sinfulness of Cooperation
(1513-1514).--Lawfulness of Material Cooperation (1515-1525).--
Lawfulness of Immediate Cooperation (1526-1527).--Special Cases of
Cooperation (1528).-Cooperation in Reading Matter (1529-1530).--In
Dances and Plays (1531-1532).--In Selling (1533-1536).--In Providing
Food and Drink (1537-1539).--In Renting (1540-1541).--In Service
(1542-1544).--Duties of the Confessor as Regards Cooperation
(1545-1546).

Art 10. THE COMMANDMENTS OF CHARITY

Introduction (1547-1552).--The Commandment of Love of God
(1553-1560).--The Commandment of Love of Self (1561-1578).--The
Commandment of Love of Neighbor (1579-1584).--Fulfillment of the
Commandments of Charity (1585-1608).

Art 11. THE GIFT OF WISDOM

Introduction (1609).--The Nature of the Gift of Wisdom (1610-1614).--
The Persons who Possess Wisdom (1615-1618).--The Beatitude and the
Fruits that Correspond to Wisdom (1619-1620).--The Sins Opposed to
Wisdom (1621-1625).

[Volume II of print edition, section 1626 to end]

Question II. THE DUTIES OF ALL CLASSES OF MEN (The Moral Virtues)

Art. 1. THE VIRTUE OF PRUDENCE

Definition (1627).--Objects (1628, 1629).--Certainty of Prudence
(1630).--Excellence (1631, 1632).--Acts (1633).--Qualities (1634).--
Parts (1635, 1636).--Integral Parts (1637, 1638).--Subjective Parts
(1639-1645).--Potential Parts (1646, 1647).--Persons Who Possess
Prudence (1648-1656).--Growth and Decay of Prudence (1657).--The
Beatitude and the Fruits that Correspond to Counsel (1662).--The Sins
Against Prudence (1663).--Imprudence (1664-1666).--Haste (1667).--
Thoughtlessness.--Inconstancy (1669).--Causes of These Sins (1670).--
Negligence (1671-1673).--False Prudence (1674).--The Prudence of the
Flesh (1675, 1676).--Astuteness, Trickery, Fraud (1677-1680).--
Solicitude (1681-1685).--Avarice, a Cause of Sins Against Prudence
(1686).--The Commandments of Prudence (1687).

Art. 2. THE VIRTUE OF JUSTICE

Introduction (1688).--The Nature of Justice (1689-1700).--Division
(1701-1708).--The Object of Justice (1709-1713).--Comparison of Justice
and Other Virtues (1714-1718).--Injustice (1719-1726).--Judgment
(1727-1744).

Art. 3. THE SUBJECTIVE PARTS OF JUSTICE: DISTRIBUTIVE AND COMMUTATIVE
JUSTICE

Subjective Parts of a Virtue (1745).--Distributive and Commutative
Justice Compared (1746, 1747).--The Objects of Commutative Justice
(1748-1750).--Restitution (1751-1761).-The Roots of Restitution
(1762-1777).--Restitution for Cooperation in Injustice (1778-1785).--
The Circumstances of Restitution (1786-1796).--Causes Excusing from
Restitution (1797-1801).--Some Special Cases of Restitution (1802,
1803).

Art. 4. THE VICES OPPOSED TO COMMUTATIVE AND DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE

The Vice against Distributive Justice (1804-1814).-The Vices against
Commutative Justice (1815).--Homicide (1816-1851).-Suicide
(1852-1861).--Accidental Homicide (1862-1865).--Bodily Injury
(1866-1871).--Titles to Property (1872-1876).--Contracts
(1877-1889).--Theft and Robbery (1890-1919).--Lawful Occupation
(1920-1926).--Occult Compensation (1927-1938).-Judicial Injustice
(1939).--In Judges (1940-1963).--In Accusers (1964-1974).--In
Defendants (1975-1983).--In Witnesses (1984-1994).--In Lawyers
(1995-2008).--Unjust Words (2009).--Contumely (2010-2027).--Defamation
(2028-2075).-Cooperation in Defamation (2076-2084).--Restitution for
Defamation (2085-2102).--Whispering (2103-2105).--Derision
(2106-2110).--Cursing (2111-2119).--Murmuring (2120).--Fraud in
Contracts (2121, 2122).--In Sales (2123-2133).--Trading (2134,
2135).--Usury (2136).--Other Frauds (2137, 2138).

Art. 5. THE QUASI-INTEGRAL AND POTENTIAL PARTS OF JUSTICE; THE VIRTUE
OF RELIGION AND THE OPPOSITE VICES

The Quasi-Integral Parts of Justice (2139, 2140).--The Potential Parts
of Justice (2141-2144).--The Virtue of Religion (2145-2148).--The
Internal Acts of Religion (2149).--Devotion (2150-2152).--Prayer
(2153-2169).--Distractions (2170-2174).--The External Acts of Religion
(2175).--Adoration (2176, 2177).--Sacrifice (2178-2182).--Offerings
(2183, 2184).--Contributions (2185-2190).--Vows (2191-2225).--Cessation
of Vows (2226-2243).--Other External Acts of Religion (2244).--Oaths
(2245-2262).--Adjuration (2263-2268).--Divine Praises (2269-2272).--The
Sins against Religion (2273).--Superstition (2274-2276).--Idolatry
(2277-2281).--Divination (2282-2289).--Vain Observance (2290-2298).--
Irreligiousness (2299).--Temptation of God (2300-2307).--Sacrilege
(2308-2316).--Simony (2317-2334).--Sinfulness of Simony (2335-2343).

Art. 6. THE REMAINING POTENTIAL PARTS OF JUSTICE; THE GIFT OF PIETY;
THE COMMANDMENTS

Piety (2344-2350).--Reverence (2351-2354).--Obedience (2355-2372).--
Gratitude (2373-2380).--Vengeance (2381-2384).--Truthfulness
(2385-2388).--Lying (2389-2397).--Mental Reservation (2398-2402).--
Simulation (2403, 2404).--Hypocrisy (2405).--Braggadocio and Irony
(2406).--Breach of Promise (2407).--Violation of Secret (2408-2420).--
Affability (2421-2423).--Liberality (2424-2429).--Equity (2430-2432).--
The Gift of Piety (2433).--The Commandments of Justice (2434-2436).

Art. 7. THE VIRTUE OF FORTITUDE

Nature (2437-2441).--Martyrdom (2442-2445).--The Opposite Vices
(2446).--The Parts of Fortitude (2447).--Greatness of Soul (2448,
2449).--Presumption, Ambition and Vanity (2450).--Pusillanimity
(2451).--Greatness of Deed, Meanness and Vulgarity (2452).--Patience
(2453, 2454).--Stolidity and Impatience (2455).--Steadfastness,
Effeminacy and Pertinacity (2456).--The Complements of Fortitude
(2457).--The Commandments of Fortitude (2458-2460).

Art. 8. THE VIRTUE OF TEMPERANCE

Nature (2461-2463).--The Opposite Vices (2464).--The Parts of
Temperance (2465).--Abstemiousness (2466, 2467).--Fasting and
Abstinence (2468, 2469).--The Sins Opposed to Abstemiousness
(2470).--Gluttony (2471-2473).--Sobriety (2474, 2475).--The Sins
against Sobriety (2476).--Drunkenness (2477-2485).--Purity (2486,
2487).--Virginity (2488-2491).--Impurity (2492-2496).--Temptations to
Impurity (2497-2503).--Non-Consummated Sins of Impurity (2504).--Impure
Thoughts (2505, 2506).--Impure Rejoicing (2507).--Impure Desire (2508,
2509).--Lewdness (2510-2514).--Sinfulness of Lewdness (2515-2518).--
Moral Species of Lewdness (2519).--The Consummated Sins of Impurity
(2520-2522).--Fornication (2523-2528).--Defloration and Rape
(2529).--Adultery (2530).--Incest (2531, 2532).--Carnal Sacrilege
(2533).--Sins against Nature (2534).--Pollution (2535-2538).--The
Sinfulness of Pollution (2539-2541).--Penalties (2542).--The Potential
Parts of Temperance (2543).--Continence (2544).--Meekness (2545).--
Anger (2546-2549).--Sinful Indulgence (2550).--Clemency (2551,
2552).--Humility (2553-2556).--Pride (2557-2560).--Abjectness
(2561).--Studiousness (2562).--Curiosity and Negligence (2563,
2564).--Modesty (2565).--Decorum (2566).--Modest Relaxation (2567,
2568).--Modesty in Style and Dress (2569, 2570).--Complements of
Temperance (2571).--Commandments of Temperance (2572).

Question III

THE DUTIES OF PARTICULAR CLASSES OF MEN

INTRODUCTION (2573)

Art. 1. THE DUTIES OF MEMBERS OF THE CHURCH

General Duties of the Faithful (2574).--First Precept of the Church:
Sanctification of the Lord’s Day (2575).--Hearing Mass (2576-2578).--
Servile Works (2579-2582).--Gravity of the First Precept (2583).--
Excuses (2584, 2585).--Second Precept: Abstinence (2586, 2587).--
Fasting (2588, 2589).--Third Precept: Yearly Confession (2590,
2591).--Fourth Precept: Easter Duty (2592, 2593).--Fifth and Sixth
Precepts (2594).--Laws on the Index and Cremation (2595).--The Special
Duties of Clerics (2596).--Vocation (2597, 2598).--Positive Duties of
Clerics (2599).--The Divine Office (2600, 2601).--Celibacy (2602).--
Negative Duties of Clerics (2603).--Trading (2604).--Stocks and Bonds
(2605).--Duties of Clerical Superiors (2606).--Duties of Pastors
(2607).--Charity to the Poor (2608-2610).--Special Duties of Religious
(2611).--The Vows (2612).

Art. 2. DUTIES OF MEMBERS OF DOMESTIC AND CIVIL SOCIETY

Husband and Wife (2613).--The conjugal Debt (2614-2617).--Morality in
Marriage (2618, 2619).--Contraception and Onanism (2620).--
Birth-Control (2621, 2622).--Cooperation with Contraception (2623).--
Recapitulation (2624).--Regulae pro Confessariis (2625).--The Duty of
Conjugal Companionship and Assistance (2626).--The Obligation of
Marrying (2627).--The Duties of Engaged Persons (2628, 2629).--The
Duties of Parents (2630, 2631).--Sex Education (2632).--The Duties of
Children (2633).--The Duties of Other Relatives (2634).--The Duties of
Superiors (2635).--The Duties of Subjects (2636).--Taxes (2637-2642).--
Voting (2643-2645).--The Duties of Employers (2646, 2647).--The Duties
of Employees (2648).--Labor Disputes (2649).--Employment (2650).--The
Duties of Certain Professions (2651).

Question IV

THE DUTIES OF MEN IN THE USE OF THE SACRAMENTS

INTRODUCTION (2652, 2653)

Art. 1. THE SACRAMENTS IN GENERAL: THE SACRAMENTALS

Nature of a Sacrament (2654).--Matter and Form (2655-2660).--Necessity
of the Sacraments (2661-2663).--The Minister of the Sacraments
(2664).--Requisites for Valid Ministration (2665-2668).--For Lawful
Ministration (2669, 2670).--The Recipient of the Sacraments; Requisites
for Valid Reception (2671-2674).--Requirements for Lawful Reception
(2675).--Obligations of the Minister in Reference to the Recipient
(2676-2682).--Obligations of the Recipient in Reference to the Minister
(2683).--The Sacramentals (2684).

Art. 2. BAPTISM; CONFIRMATION; THE EUCHARIST; THE SACRIFICE OF THE MASS

Introduction (2685).--The Sacrament of Baptism (2686).--Solemn and
Private Baptism (2687).--Duties of Pastors (2685).--Duties of Parents
and Guardians (2689).--Duties of Sponsors (2690, 2691).--Duties of
Adult Recipients (2692).--Duties of the Minister (2693).--The Sacrament
of Confirmation (2694).--The Minister (2695).--The Recipient (2696).--
The Sponsors (2697).--The Pastor (2698).--The Sacrament of the
Eucharist (2699).--Matter and Form of the Eucharist (2700).--The
Minister of Consecration (2701, 2702).--The Minister of Communion
(2703).--The Communicant (2704).--Worthy Communion (2705).--Frequent
Communion (2706).--Duties of Parents, Pastors, Confessors (2707).--The
Custody and Worship of the Eucharist (2708).--The Sacrifice of the
Mass; the Celebrant (2709).--The Obligation of Saying Mass (2710).--
Dispositions for Celebration of Mass (2711).--The Circumstances of Mass
(2712).--Interruption of Mass (2713).--Application of Mass (2714,
2715).--Stipends (2716).

Art. 3. REPENTANCE; PENANCE; EXTREME UNCTION

Introduction (2717).--The Virtue of Repentance (2718-2726).--The
Sacrament of Penance (2727, 2728).--Contrition (2729-2735).--Resolution
of Amendment (2736).--Confession (2737-2744).--Satisfaction
(2745-2749).--The Minister (2750).--Jurisdiction (2751, 2752).--
Reserved Cases (2753, 2754).--Absolution without Jurisdiction (2755).--
Duties of the Confessor before Confession (2756).--Duties of the
Confessor as Judge (2757-2761).--Duties of the Confessor as Physician
(2762).--Duties of the Confessor as Teacher and Guide (2763).--Duties
of the Confessor after Confession (2764).--Reparation of Defects (2765,
2766).--The Seal of Confession (2767, 2768).--Abuses of Confession
(2769-2773).--The Sacrament of Extreme Unction (2774).--Duties of the
Recipient and the Minister of Extreme Unction (2775).

Art. 4. HOLY ORDERS; MATRIMONY

Introduction (2776).--The Sacrament of Orders (2777).--Distinctions of
Orders (2778).--The Hierarchy (2779).--The Matter and Form of Orders
(2780).--The Minister of Ordination (2781, 2782).--The Recipient of
Orders (2783-2785).--Registration of Ordinations (2786).--The Sacrament
of Matrimony (2787, 2788).--The Elements of Matrimony as a Contract
(2789-2793).--The Elements of the Sacrament (2794).--Duties in
Reference to Marriage (2795).--Engagement (2796-2798).--Duties to
Parents and to Children (2799, 2800).--Pre-Nuptial Investigations
(2801).--Examination of the Parties by the Pastor (2802, 2803).--
Matrimonial Impediments (2804, 2805).--Impedient Impediments
(2806-2809).--Diriment Impediments (2810-2819).--Dispensations and
Banns (2820).--After the Examination (2821).--Instruction of the Couple
(2822-2824).--Religious Preparation for Marriage (2825).--The
Celebration of Marriage (2826-2829).--Validation (2830).--Divorce and
Separation (2831).

APPENDICES [placed at end of Volume I in print edition]

I. SUMMARY OF COMMON LAW ON PROHIBITION OF BOOKS

II. THE “ECUMENICAL MOVEMENT”

INDEX TO VOLUMES I AND II




MORAL THEOLOGY

A Complete Course




INTRODUCTION

1. Definition.--Moral Theology is defined: (a) etymologically, as the
study of God, considered as the beginning and the end of man’s moral
life, i.e., of those acts that proceed from reason and will; (b)
scientifically, as that part of Sacred Theology which treats of God as
our Last End, and of the means by which we may tend to Him.

2. Hence, Moral Theology differs from various related sciences or
habits. Thus: (a) it differs from Ethics, which is the science of human
conduct as directed by reason to man’s natural end, for Moral Theology
uses faith as well as reason, and is concerned with man’s supernatural
end; (b) it differs from faith, since it includes not only principles
revealed by God, but also conclusions derived from them; (c) it differs
from synderesis, or the habit that perceives the natural principles of
morality that are self-evident to the mind, for Moral Theology deals
also with supernatural truths and with truths that are not
self-evident; (d) it differs from conscience, which draws conclusions
for individual cases, since Moral Theology is concerned with general
conclusions.

3. Relation of Moral Theology to Dogmatic Theology.--(a) They do not
differ as two distinct sciences, for the main object, in the light of
which all else is studied, is the same in both--viz., God. (b) They do
differ as two quasi-integral parts or branches of the same science,
Dogma being concerned more with the speculative, and Moral with the
practical aspects of theology. Dogmatic Theology is the more important
of the two, as treating more directly on divine things and as being the
basis of Moral Theology.

In Dogma, God Himself is considered in His own nature and creatures as
they proceed from Him as from an exemplary and efficient cause, or
Creator. Moral Theology continues the pursuit of knowledge of God,
concentrating upon Him as He is the Final Cause of things. Creatures
emanate from God by way of creation, and this is part of the
subject-matter of Dogma; but creatures return to Him, each in its own
proper way by virtue of its nature created by God and directed by His
Providence and Government, and this return of creatures to God
constitutes the general subject-matter of Moral Theology. As Divine
Providence and Government are continuations of His Creation, Moral
Theology continues to study and to unfold the implications of Dogma’s
consideration of God as Creator. God is known to have created as an
Intelligent Being ordering His handiwork to Himself as end. His special
masterpiece, man, special because he is made to the Image of God,
returns to God in a special way proper to him as an Image, i.e., by way
of acts of his intellect and will guided and moved by Divine Providence
and Predestination. It is of this special way of returning to God by
man, His image, that Moral Theology treats. Thus it adds to and
perfects Dogmatic Theology, enriching our knowledge of God by way of
making explicit the implications of Divine Creation and Providence to
His image, man.

4. The Objects of Moral Theology.--(a) The central theme or object of
Moral Theology, which is considered for its own sake and to which all
else is secondary (_objectum formale quod_), is God as the supernatural
End or Destiny of man.

(b) The secondary object (_objectum materiale_) is the means by which
one is advanced towards one’s Last End (such as human acts, virtue,
grace, the Sacraments), or the obstacles which hinder one from
attaining that End (such as vice, temptation, etc.).

(c) The medium through which the above objects are known (_objectum
formale quo_) is the light of natural reason illuminated by faith
studying the sources of divine revelation and deducing conclusions from
doctrines revealed by God.

5. Hence Moral Theology includes: (a) the revealed doctrines concerning
man’s destiny and duty that are contained in the written and oral Word
of God and as interpreted by their custodian, the Catholic Church; (b)
the conclusions that are contained in revelation; (c) the duties of man
to human laws that are based on the divine natural or positive law; (d)
the opinions of theologians on matters that are disputed, as in the
controversy about the systems of conscience.

6. The Sources of Moral Theology, therefore, are: (a) Holy scripture;
(b) tradition; (c) the decisions of Popes, Councils, and Congregations,
Laws, etc.; (d) the authority of Doctors and theologians; (e) natural
reason.

7. Holy scripture.--“All scripture, inspired by God, is profitable to
teach, to reprove, to correct, to instruct in justice” (II Tim., iii.
16). (a) Thus, the deeds narrated in scripture contain lessons for our
instruction; but not all of them, even though they be concerned with
holy men, are offered for our imitation. (b) The laws of the Old
Testament known as ceremonial (such as the rite of circumcision), and
those called judicial (such as the prohibition against the taking of
interest), are no longer obligatory; but the moral precepts, such as
those found in the Decalogue, always remain in force. (c) The
ordinances of the New Testament are of three kinds: the Gospel
counsels, which are not laws, but invitations to a higher practice of
virtue than is necessary for salvation (e.g., the advice of our Lord
that one sell all and give to the poor); the laws of the New Testament,
which are the commands that it imposes for all times (such as the
precepts that one believe the Gospel message, receive Baptism, hear the
Church, etc.); temporary regulations, which are those dispositions that
were made only for passing circumstances (such as the prohibition
issued by the Apostles against the eating of animals that had been
suffocated).

8. Tradition.--Tradition contains those doctrines concerning faith and
morals, not found in scripture, that were given orally by Christ or
inspired by the Holy Spirit, and that have been handed down from one
generation to another in the Catholic Church.

Tradition becomes known to us: (a) through the teaching of the Church
expressed by her solemn or ordinary magisterium; (b) through the
writings of the Fathers of the Church; (c) through the practice of the
Church expressed in her universal customs and laws; (d) through the
worship of the Church expressed in her universal forms of prayer and
liturgical observance.

9. Decisions.--In addition to divine tradition just spoken of, Moral
Theology uses: (a) Apostolic tradition, which comes down from the
Apostles, but whose subject-matter is not a teaching revealed to them,
but an ordinance which they themselves made as rulers of the Church
(e.g., the law that Sunday be sanctified as the Lord’s day); (b)
ecclesiastical tradition, which contains regulations made by the
authorities in the Church and handed down to succeeding times (e.g.,
the introduction of certain days of feast or fast).

10. Authority of Doctors and Theologians.--(a) St. Thomas Aquinas has
been recognized by the Church as her highest theological authority, and
the Code of Canon Law (Canons 589, Sec. 1, and 1366, Sec. 2) orders
that in all seminaries and religious houses of study the courses of
theology shall be made according to his method, teaching and principles.

(b) When the theologians agree with unanimity that a certain doctrine
pertaining to faith or morals is divinely revealed, it would be next
to heresy to hold the opposite; if they agree only that it is certain,
it would be rash to contradict them, unless new and serious objections
unknown to them can be offered; if they are divided between schools
and systems (even though great claims for opinions are made by their
partisans), it is lawful for competent theologians to use their
own judgment and decide for the side that seems to have the better
arguments in its favor.

11. Reason.--The uses of natural reason in Moral Theology are: (a) it
demonstrates certain preambles to the teachings of Moral Theology, such
as the existence of God, His omniscience and veracity; (b) it
corroborates from philosophy many of the revealed teachings, viz., that
man’s end is not in things finite, that he has duties to God, to
society, to himself, etc.; (e) it affords analogies in the natural
order by which we may illustrate the end and duties of man in the
supernatural order; (d) it supplies the means by which the teachings on
morals may be developed into the conclusions that are contained in
them, by which those teachings may be defended against the fallacious
objections of adversaries, and by which the whole may be arranged
scientifically into a body of doctrine.

12. Moral Theology is served not only by the various branches of
philosophy (such as Ethics, Theodicy, Psychology, Logic), but also by
many of the natural sciences. Thus: (a) Medicine and Physiology are
useful for understanding the morality and imputability of acts; (b)
Sociology and Economics may throw light on problems concerning justice;
(c) Jurisprudence is, of course, closely related to questions
concerning duties that arise from human laws; (d) History confirms the
teachings of Christian morality by the lessons of experience.

13. The Method to Be Followed in Moral Theology.-(a) The positive
method is a simple statement of moral principles and doctrines, with
little attention to argument, except such as is found in the positive
sources (e.g., scripture, tradition, the decisions of the Church).

(b) The Scholastic method is a scientific statement of moral teaching
through accurate definition of terms, systematic coordination of parts,
strict argumentation and defense, attention to controversies, and
recourse to philosophy and other natural knowledge.

(c) The casuistic method, or case-system, is the application of moral
principles to the solution of concrete problems of lawfulness or
unlawfulness.

14. The Scholastic method is the one best suited for the study of Moral
Theology, because it is more scientific, and fits one better to
understand, retain, and apply what one learns. But it is not exclusive
of the other methods, since it perfects the positive method, and is the
groundwork for the case method. Each method has a special suitability
for certain ends. Thus: (a) the positive method is well adapted to
preaching, and hence was much in favor with the Fathers of the Church,
as can be seen from their moral homilies and treatises; (b) the
Scholastic method is the best for study, teaching, apologetic, and was
followed by the great classical works of theology in the Middle Ages
and later; (c) the case method is very helpful to the seminarian and
the priest in the exercise of the ministry of the confessional.

15. The History of Moral Theology.--There are three periods in the
history of Moral Theology: the Patristic, the Medieval, and the Modern.

(a) The Patristic Period (1st to 12th century).--The moral writings of
the-Fathers are popular, exhortatory, and occasional; and it is not
till the Middle Ages that we meet with works of systematic Moral
Theology. The following are among the most notable moral works of the
Fathers: the _Paedagoga_ of Clement of Alexandria (d. about 217), which
explains what the everyday life of the Christian should be; the
_Catecheses_ of St. Cyril of Jerusalem (d. 386); the _De Officiis
Ministrorum_ of St. Ambrose (d. 397), a Christian counterpart of
Cicero’s work _De Officiis_; the _De Civitate Dei_ of St. Augustine (d.
430), which contrasts love of God and love of self; the _Expositio in
Job seu Moralium libri XXV_ of St. Gregory the Great (d. 604), which
consists of moral instructions based on the Book of Job.

Celebrated among the ascetical and mystical writings are: the _Ladder
of Paradise_ of St. John Climacus (6th century), the Conferences of
Cassian (about 416), the _Libri V de Consideratione_ of St. Bernard (d.
1153). St. Gregory the Great’s _De Cura Pastorali_ is a systematic work
of pastoral theology, and is regarded as a classic.

(b) The Medieval Period (12th to 16th century).--The method of the
moralists of this period differs from that of the Fathers in that the
former is systematic and philosophical, and more proximately adapted to
the use of confessors. The masterpiece of scientific Moral Theology is
of course found in the _Summa Theologica_ of St. Thomas Aquinas (d.
1274). Works of casuistry were composed by St. Raymond of Pennafort
(about 1235), by John of Freiburg (d. 1314), by John of Asti (about
1317), by Angelus of Chiavasso (about 1476), by Sylvester Prierias (d.
1523). The _Summa Theologica_ of St. Antoninus of Florence (d. 1459)
has been called an inexhaustible storehouse for manuals of casuistry.

Among the ascetical writers are: St. Bonaventure, the Seraphic Doctor
(d. 1274), John Gerson (d. 1429), John Tauler (d. 1361), Bl. Henry Suso
(d. 1366), and Denis the Carthusian (d. 1471).

(c) The Modern Period (16th century to the present).--Characteristic of
this period are the commentaries written on St. Thomas, the
controversies over the systems of conscience, the appearance of
numerous manuals and special treatises, and the attention given to
changed conditions of society and ecclesiastical discipline. Noteworthy
among modern works are: the Commentary on St. Thomas by Cajetan (d.
1534); the writings of Bartholomew de Medina (d. 1581), called the
father of moderate Probabilism; the _De Paenitentia_ of Lugo (d. 1660),
a handbook that combines speculative and casuistical theology; the
_Roman Catechism_, which was issued by the authority of the Council of
Trent in 1566; the _Theologia Moralis_ of St. Alphonsus Liguori (d.
1787), a work whose authority is universally recognized; the celebrated
treatise on the virtues by Lessius (d. 1623); the classic work of
Suarez (d. 1617), _De Religione_; the _Summa Casuum Conscientiae_ of
Toletus (d. 1596); the commentaries of Francis de Victoria (d. 1546),
which are writings of extraordinary merit. More recent works are so
numerous that it is impossible to mention them here.

18. Among the many modern works on Moral Theology which have been
published abroad, not a few are in the vernacular--in German, French,
Italian, Spanish, etc. While they are not intended to replace the Latin
text-books used in seminaries, these are nevertheless a very great help
to a fuller knowledge of the matter treated and to a more ready use of
it in the work of the ministry.

So far there has been a dearth of works on Moral Theology in English;
and it is this want that has occasioned the present work, which aims at
presenting Moral Theology, not only in its essentials, but even more in
detail and with greater fullness than is done by most of the text-books
commonly in use. And yet, while pursuing this larger and more
comprehensive plan, the authors of this new work have tried to be as
brief and compact as possible. It has been their endeavor especially to
avoid digressions into other fields and to sum up pertinent matter in
as clear and simple a manner as the subjects treated will permit.

17. The Division and Order of Parts in Moral Theology.--The arrangement
of his matter made by St. Thomas Aquinas in the _Summa Theologica_ is
admittedly unsurpassed and unsurpassable in the qualities that good
distribution should have, viz., clearness, connection between parts,
completeness. Hence, we cannot do better than follow the order he has
used in his treatment of moral subjects. His general division is as
follows:

(1) The Last End of Man.--From the Last End acts derive their morality,
those being good that advance man towards its attainment, and those
evil that turn him away from its possession. The Last End is
considered; (a) as to its existence; (b) as to its nature (i.e., the
constituents of supreme beatitude).

(2) The General Means Tending to the Last End.--God is approached, not
by the steps of the body, but by the operations of the soul, and thus
it is human acts that lead one to one’s Last End. These acts are
considered: (a) as they are in themselves or absolutely, and according
to the twofold division of acts proper to man (human acts) and acts
common to man and beast (passions); (b) as to the internal principles
from which they proceed, i.e., habits, whether good (virtues) or bad
(vices); (c) as to the external principles by which they are
influenced. The external principle of evil is the demon, who tempts man
to sin. The external principle of good is God, who instructs us by His
law and the voice of conscience, and assists us by His grace.

(3) The Special Means Tending to the Last End.--These are our own good
works; hence, here are considered the virtues incumbent on all classes
of men, i.e., the theological and moral virtues.

18. Some of the topics just mentioned (e.g., divine grace) are
discussed fully in works on Dogmatic Theology, and hence may be omitted
here. Again, since the Last End of man is considered at great length in
dogmatic works on Eschatology, little need be said about it here.
Hence, it will be convenient to divide this work into two parts as
follows: General Moral Theology, in which are treated the more remote
principles on duty, such as the Last End, human acts, good and bad
habits, laws and conscience, grace; (b) Special Moral Theology, in
which are treated the more immediate rules concerning duty, i.e., man’s
obligations as regards the virtues and the Commandments.




PART I

GENERAL MORAL THEOLOGY




Question I

THE LAST END OF MAN AND THE MEANS TO THAT END




Art. 1: THE LAST END OF MAN

(_Summa Theologica_, I-II, qq. 1-5; _Contra Gentes_, IV, cc. 1-63.)

19. Existence of the Last End.--Every deliberate act proceeds from the
will, and, since the will pursues good as its goal, it follows that
every deliberate act is done for some good or end. But, if this end is
an imperfect good, it is desired not for itself but as leading up to a
perfect good, that is, to one which will leave nothing beyond it to be
desired; in other words, the intermediate end is willed on account of a
last end. Hence, all that a man wills, he wills directly or indirectly
on account of a last end. All men desire their own happiness and
perfection; but not all understand in what beatitude consists, since
some aim ultimately at finite goods.

20. Nature of the Last End.--As man’s Last End is that object which
will make him perfectly happy, it cannot consist: (a) in external
goods, such as wealth, honors, fame, glory and power, since one might
have all these and yet be very unhappy; (b) in goods of the body, such
as health, beauty, pleasure and strength, since all these things are
passing, and moreover satisfy only a part, and that the lower part, of
man; (c) in goods of the soul, such as wisdom or virtue, since man’s
intellect is never content with particular truth, nor his will with
particular good, the former always reaching out for the highest truth,
the latter for the highest good. Hence, the Last End of man is the
Infinite Good, or God “who satisfieth thy desire” (Psalm cii. 5).

21. Attainment of the Last End.--God being supersensible, the act by
which He is attained cannot be any operation of the senses, but must be
an act of the higher powers. Man possesses his Last End through the
vision of God, from which result beatific love and every good that is
compatible with the glorified state. For “we see now through a glass in
a dark manner, but then face to face” (I Cor., xiii. 12); and there
shall be “glory and honor and peace to everyone that worketh good”
(Rom, ii. 10).




Art. 2: ACTS AS HUMAN

(_Summa Theologica_, I-II, qq. 6-17.)

22. Human acts are a means to man’s Last End, inasmuch as they are
meritorious--i.e., labors that deserve a recompense (I Cor., iii. 8),
struggles that deserve a crown (II Tim., ii. 5). But works are not
meritorious unless they are one’s own (human) and good (moral); and,
since the reward is supernatural, they must also be the fruit of grace.
Hence, we shall speak of acts in the following order: (a) acts as human
and free (Art. 2); (b) acts as morally good (Art. 3); (c) acts as
supernaturally meritorious (Art. 4).

23. Definition.--Those acts are called human of which a man is the
master, and he is master of his actions in virtue of his reason and his
will, which faculties make him superior to non-human agents that act
without reason and freedom. Hence, the following kinds of acts done by
a human being are not called human: (a) those that are not under the
control of the mind, because one is permanently or temporarily without
the use of reason or without knowledge (e.g., the acts done by the
insane; by those who are unconscious or delirious, under the influence
of hypnotism or drugs, distracted or carried away by vehement fear,
anger, etc.; by infants and uninstructed persons); (b) those that are
not under the control of the will, even though they are known (e.g.,
automatic acts, such as the acts of the vegetative powers, growth,
circulation of the blood; pathological acts, such as convulsions; acts
done under external violence).

24. Knowledge Requisite for a Human Act.--An act is human, or
voluntary, when it is deliberately desired; and, since nothing can be
deliberately desired unless it is known, an act done without knowledge
is not human or voluntary. Thus, a delirious patient does not will the
language he uses, for his mind is confused and he does not understand
what he is saying.

25. The condition of a person without knowledge is ignorance, which is
defined as the absence of knowledge in one who is capable of knowing.
Ignorance is of various kinds. From the viewpoint of that which is not
known (i.e., of the object of the ignorance), there is ignorance of the
substance of an act and ignorance of the quality of an act. For
example, Titus driving rapidly in the dark runs over and kills a pet
animal of his neighbor, but knows nothing of this happening (ignorance
of the substance of the act); Balbus, a child, fires a pistol at his
playmate, not knowing that this causes death (ignorance of the physical
quality of an act), and that it is the sin of murder (ignorance of the
moral quality of an act).

26. With reference to the will of the person who is ignorant, three
kinds of ignorance may be distinguished.

(a) Ignorance is concomitant (simultaneous with the act of the will),
when it is not voluntary, and yet is not therefore the reason of the
act that follows it, since that act would have been done, even had
there been knowledge. This may be illustrated by the example of a
hunter who intended to kill an enemy, and killed him only accidentally
while shooting at an animal.

(b) Ignorance is consequent (after the act of the will), when it is
voluntary, which may happen in different ways: first, when ignorance is
affected, as when a person expressly desires to remain ignorant about
his duties, so that he may have an excuse for his sins, or that he may
not be disturbed in his evil life; secondly, when he neglects to
acquire the knowledge he ought to possess, as when a hunter kills a
man, thinking him an animal, because he took no pains to be sure before
firing.

(c) Ignorance is antecedent (before the act of the will), when it is
not voluntary, and is the cause of the act that follows since the act
would not have been done, if there had been knowledge. For example, a
hunter who has used reasonable diligence to avoid accidents, kills a
man whom he mistook for a deer.

27. With reference to the responsibility of the person who is ignorant,
there are two kinds of ignorance. (a) Ignorance is invincible when it
cannot be removed, even by the use of all the care that ordinarily
prudent and conscientious persons would use in the circumstances. Thus,
a person who has no suspicions of his ignorance, or who has tried in
vain to acquire instruction about his duties, is invincibly ignorant.
(b) Ignorance is vincible when it can be removed by the exercise of
ordinary care. There are various degrees of this species of ignorance:
first, it is merely vincible, when some diligence has been exercised,
but not enough; secondly, it is crass or supine, when hardly any
diligence has been used; thirdly, it is affected, when a person
deliberately aims to continue in ignorance.

28. Influence of the Various Kinds of Ignorance on the Voluntariness of
Acts.--(a) Ignorance of an act, whether as to its substance or quality,
makes an act involuntary, when the ignorance itself is involuntary, as
will be explained in paragraph 29. Hence, if we refer to ignorance that
is not blameworthy and to the guilt of violating the law of God, we may
say: “Ignorance excuses.”

(b) Ignorance does not make an act involuntary before human law, unless
the law itself presumes the ignorance or the ignorance is proved, as
will be explained in the Question on Law (see 489 sqq.). For, when law
is sufficiently promulgated or a fact pertains to one’s own self, the
presumption is that ignorance does not exist, or that it is culpable.
Hence, the general rule of law common to all forms of jurisprudence:
“Ignorance does not excuse” (cfr. Canon 16 of the Code of Canon Law).

29. Effects of Concomitant, Consequent, and Antecedent Ignorance.--(a)
Concomitant ignorance does not make an act involuntary, because it does
not cause anything that is contrary to the will; but it does make the
act that is performed non-voluntary, since what is unknown cannot be
actually desired.

(b) Consequent ignorance cannot make an act entirely involuntary, since
such ignorance is itself voluntary; but it does in a certain respect
make an act involuntary, i.e., inasmuch as the act would not have been
done save for the ignorance. (c) Antecedent ignorance makes an act
entirely involuntary.

30. Effects of Invincible and Vincible Ignorance.--(a) Invincible
ignorance, even of what pertains to the natural law, makes an act
involuntary, since nothing is willed except what is understood. Hence,
no matter how wrong an act is in itself, the agent is not guilty of
formal sin (see 249), if he is invincibly ignorant of the malice
involved.

(b) Vincible ignorance does not make an act involuntary, since the
ignorance itself is voluntary; hence, it does not excuse from sin. It
does not even make an act less voluntary and less sinful, if the
ignorance is affected in order that one may have an excuse; for such a
state of mind shows that the person would act the same way, even though
he had knowledge.

31. Vincible ignorance makes an act less voluntary and less sinful: (a)
when the ignorance is not affected, for the voluntariness is measured
by the knowledge, and knowledge here is lacking; (b) when the
ignorance, though affected, was fostered only through fear that
knowledge might compel a stricter way of life; for such a state of mind
seems to show that one would not act the same way if one had knowledge.

32. Like to ignorance are the following: (a) error, which is a judgment
not in agreement with the facts (e.g., Balbus, a young child, thinks
stealing is lawful, because older persons are represented as stealing
in the moving pictures); (b) forgetfulness, which is ignorance of what
was once known (e.g., Titus made a study of his duties as a Catholic
when he was young, but at present what he does not know about those
duties is not inconsiderable); (c) inadvertence, which is a lack of
attention to what is being done (e.g., Caius, who is absent-minded,
sometimes gets his hair cut and goes away without paying, or takes
money that does not belong to him).

33. The principles and conclusions given above with regard to ignorance
will apply also to error, forgetfulness and inadvertence; for in all
these cases the lack of actual knowledge at the moment an act is done,
is either willed or not willed, and accordingly the act itself is
either voluntary or not voluntary. In the examples mentioned above,
Balbus does not will the guilt of theft, since he does not know it; but
his elders do will that guilt, because they should know it. Titus is
responsible for neglecting his duties, if he has forgotten them through
his own neglect of them or other fault; otherwise, he is not
responsible. Caius’ inattention is involuntary, if due to mental
concentration or distraction, and if it is not desired by him; it is
voluntary, if he is aware of it and cultivates it, or if he does not
try to be more attentive to his duties.

34. Consent Requisite for a Human Act.--To be human, an act must
proceed not only from knowledge, but also from inclination; that is, it
must be voluntary. Three things are necessary in order that an act be
voluntary: (a) it must be agreeable to an internal principle, i.e., in
most moral matters to the will. Hence, an act that is done against
one’s will on account of external violence is not voluntary; (b) it
must be caused by the will. Hence, a shower of rain is said to be
agreeable to the gardener, but not voluntary since his will is not its
cause; (c) it must be performed with a conscious purpose. Hence,
natural acts (such as sleeping) and spontaneous acts (such as stroking
one’s beard absent-mindedly) are not voluntary acts.

35. Kinds of Voluntary Acts.-(a) A voluntary act is free or necessary,
according as one can or cannot abstain from it. The vision of God in
heaven is voluntary to the blessed, since they look at Him knowingly
and gladly; but it is not free, since they cannot avert their gaze from
that which makes them blessed. The love of God on earth is voluntary,
since chosen; but it is also free, since man is able to turn away from
God.

(b) An act is perfectly or imperfectly voluntary, according as the
deliberation and consent that precede it are full or only partial.

(c) An act is said to be simply--that is, absolutely--voluntary, when
it is wished under circumstances that exist here and now, although in
itself, apart from those circumstances, it is not wished. It is said to
be voluntary under a certain aspect, when it is desired for itself, but
not under existing conditions. Thus, if an arm needs to be amputated to
save life, the amputation is absolutely voluntary, while the
preservation of the arm is voluntary only in a certain respect. Hence,
an act is voluntary simply or absolutely when one chooses it, all
things considered; it remains involuntary under a certain respect,
inasmuch as the choice is made with reluctance.

(d) An act is voluntary in itself or directly, when it is desired in
itself for its own sake (i.e., as an end), or for the sake of something
else (i.e., as a means). It is voluntary in its cause or indirectly,
when it is not desired in itself, either as a means or an end, but is
foreseen as the result of something else that is intended. Examples:
Titus quarrels with his neighbors, at times because he likes to
quarrel, and at other times because he wishes to make them fear him;
hence, his quarrels are directly voluntary. Caius is a peaceful man who
dislikes quarreling; but he likes to drink too much occasionally,
although he knows that he always quarrels when he is under the
influence of liquor. Thus, his quarrels are indirectly voluntary.

36. An act is voluntary in its cause in two ways: (a) approvingly
(physically and morally voluntary in cause), when one is able and
obliged not to perform the act that is its cause (e.g., the quarrels of
Caius mentioned above are approved implicitly by him, since he could
and should prevent the intoxication which is their cause); (b)
permissively (physically voluntary in cause), when one is not able or
not obliged to omit the act that is its cause (see 94 sqq.). Examples:
Balbus, in order to make a living, has to associate with persons of
quarrelsome character, and as a result often hears shocking disputes.
Titus, a military commander, orders an enemy fortification to be
bombarded, although he knows that this will involve the destruction of
other property and the unavoidable killing of some non-combatants or
neutrals. Caius writes a book whose purpose and natural result is
edification, but he foresees that evil-minded persons will
misunderstand it and take scandal.

37. Omissions, as well as acts, may be voluntary. (a) Thus, they are
directly voluntary, when they are willed as an end or as a means to
an end. Example: Titus fails to reprove the disorders of those in
his charge because he likes disorder, or because it illustrates his
theory that everyone should go through an evolution from roughness to
refinement. (b) They are indirectly voluntary, when their cause is
willed with approval or permitted with disapproval. Example: Balbus
does not like to miss Mass, but he fails to rise from bed when he hears
the church bell ringing, and as a result does not get to church. If
his failure to get up was due to laziness, the omission of Mass was
approved by Balbus; if it was due to illness, the omission was only
permitted.

38. The effect that follows upon an omission may also be voluntary. (a)
Thus, it is directly voluntary, if the omission is chosen as a means to
the effect. Example: Caius hears Titus say that he is going to make a
certain business deal, and he knows that Titus will suffer a great loss
thereby; but he wishes Titus to lose his money, and therefore says
nothing about the danger. (b) It is indirectly voluntary, if one
foresees the effect, and approves or permits it. Examples: Balbus sees
Titus attacked by a hoodlum and realizes that, unless assisted, Titus
will be badly beaten up; but he is such an admirer of pugilism that, in
spite of his sorrow for Titus, he decides not to stop the fight. Caius
sees his friend Sempronius drowning, and fails to go to his assistance,
because to his regret he is not an expert swimmer.

39. The effect of an omission is indirectly voluntary and approved by
the will when one is able and bound to do what one omits. Example:
Balbus receives some confidential documents with the understanding that
he will guard them sacredly; but fearing to lose the good graces of
Titus, who is curious and loquacious, he omits to put the papers away
as promised, with the result that Titus finds them and reads them.

40. Obstacles to Consent.--The obstacles to consent are all those
factors that take away or lessen the voluntariness of an act. (a) Thus,
the actual obstacles that affect the intellect are reduced to
ignorance, spoken of above; those that affect the will are passion and
fear, and that which affects the external powers is coercion. (b) The
habitual obstacles are habits and abnormal mental states.

41. Fear is a disturbance of mind caused by the thought that a future
danger is impending. It is an obstacle to consent in various ways: (a)
it lessens or takes away freedom of judgment, inasmuch as it hinders or
suspends the reasoning processes; (b) it lessens the voluntariness of
choice, inasmuch as it makes one decide for what is not of itself
agreeable.

42. An act done under fear that impeded the use of judgment is: (a)
involuntary, if the fear was so great that one was temporarily out of
one’s mind. Example: Titus is so panic-stricken at the thought that a
wild animal is pursuing him that he fires a revolver in every
direction; (b) less voluntary, if the fear prevents one from thinking
with calmness and deliberation. Example: Caius is being questioned by a
stern examiner who demands an immediate reply. Fearing to hesitate,
Caius gives what he knows is a “bluffing” answer.

43. The acts of one who is under fear are of various kinds.

(a) Acts are done with fear, when the fear is concomitant--i.e., when
it is not willed and does not cause the act, but is merely its occasion
or would rather prevent it. Examples: Julius is ordered under pain of
death to drink a glass of wine, a thing he was intending to do and
which he would have done even without any threats. Balbus walks along a
lonely road, because he must get home, but he trembles at the thought
of robbers. Caius, a highwayman, at the point of the revolver, forces
Balbus to hand over his purse, but he fears that the police may arrive
before he has secured the money. Titus, a business man, makes a trip by
air, because he must reach another city without delay, but he has some
apprehensions about his safety. All these men act, not because of, but
apart from or in spite of their fears.

(b) Acts are done through fear, when fear causes an act that would not
otherwise be performed. The fear may be antecedent (i.e., unwilled) or
consequent (i.e., willed). Examples: Balbus, in the case mentioned
above, surrendered his purse because of involuntary fear which was
caused by the revolver of the robber. Claudius makes an act of sorrow
for sin because of voluntary fear which he produces by thinking of the
punishment of hell.

44. The effects of fear, which do not take away the use of reason, on
the voluntariness of acts are as follows.

(a) Acts done with fear are not made really involuntary on account of
the fear that accompanies them, for they are done for their own sake,
not out of fear or as a consequence of fear. They may be called
relatively involuntary in the sense that, by reason of fear, they are
comparatively unpleasant, unless one enjoys the thrill of danger.
Examples: Balbus, Caius and Titus, in the cases mentioned above, acted
with perfect willingness. Whether they enjoyed their experiences or
not, depends on their attitudes towards adventure and excitement.

(b) Acts done through fear are voluntary simply and absolutely, for the
act done under the impulse of fear is what the agent considers here and
now as most desirable. Examples: Balbus’ surrender of his purse and
Claudius’ act of contrition are just what these two men wish to do as
best suited to the circumstances.

(c) Acts done through fear are involuntary in a certain respect, if the
agent can retain his inclination towards the opposite of the act and
still avoid what he fears; otherwise, they are in no way involuntary.
Examples: Balbus retains his liking for the money taken from him by
force, and hence the surrender of it to the highwayman, although
voluntary, if all things are considered, is not voluntary, if only the
money itself is considered. Claudius, on the contrary, retains no
liking for his sins, for he knows that, if he does, he will defeat the
purpose of his act of sorrow, which is to escape the pains of hell;
hence, his contrition, although the result of fear, is in no respect
involuntary.

45. Passion is a movement of the sensitive appetite towards its object
through love, desire, hope, or its repose therein through delight. It
tends towards good, as fear tends away from evil (see 117 sqq.).
Passion is an obstacle to consent in the following ways: (a) it takes
away voluntariness (i.e., the quality of proceeding from an internal
principle with knowledge of the end of the act), whenever it is so
intense as to prevent knowledge; (b) it diminishes liberty (i.e., the
quality of being perfectly voluntary, or indifferent as between many
acts), even when it does not prevent knowledge.

46. Spiritual appetites fortify the reason, but the opposite is true of
sensible appetites; for these latter draw all the attention to things
that are lower and away from those that are higher, and impede the
exercise of imagination and other senses that serve the reason. In
extreme and rare cases passion may be so intense as to distract from or
prevent altogether the exercise of reason, or to produce insanity.
Thus, we sometimes hear of persons losing their minds through affection
for money, or of performing irrational deeds under the excitement of
joy.

47. With reference to the will, passion is twofold. (a) It is
antecedent, when it precedes the act of the will and causes it. In this
case the passion arises not from the will, but from some other cause
(e.g., the bodily state, as when a sick man longs for food that is
forbidden). (b) Passion is consequent when it follows the act of the
will and results from it. This may happen either without the will
choosing the passion (as when the very vehemence with which the will
desires some object causes a corresponding sensitive emotion to
awaken), or because the will has deliberately aroused the emotion in
order to be able the better to act through its cooperation.

48. Antecedent passion makes an act more voluntary, since it makes the
will tend with greater inclination to its object; but it likewise makes
an act less free, since it impedes deliberation and disturbs the power
of choice. Example: A man who takes extreme delight in sports, plays
voluntarily, but is less free than if he were not so immoderately
inclined that way.

49. Consequent passion which results naturally from an intense act of
the will does not increase the voluntariness of the act, since it is
not its cause; but it does show that the act of the will is intense,
for it is only that which is willed vehemently that overflows from the
will and affects the emotions.

50. Consequent passion which results from the deliberate choice of the
will increases the voluntariness of the act that follows, since the act
is performed with greater intensity on account of the passion that has
been deliberately excited.

51. What has been said about the passions that tend to sensible good
can be applied also to the passions that are concerned with sensible
evils, such as hatred, sadness, aversion, boldness, anger. If they are
antecedent, they increase the voluntariness of an act, but diminish its
freedom; and, if they cause a passing frenzy or insanity, they take
away all responsibility. If they are consequent, they either increase
the willingness of the act, or indicate that it is willed with great
intensity.

52. Violence, or coercion, is the use of force by an external agent to
compel one to do what one does not want to do. Its effects on
voluntariness are: (a) it cannot affect the internal act of the will,
else we should have the contradiction that the act of the will was both
voluntary, as proceeding from the will, and involuntary, as proceeding
from external coercion; (b) it can affect external acts, such as
walking, and so make them involuntary. If a boy is driven to school,
the violence makes his going involuntary, but it does not make his will
not to go to school involuntary.

53. Habits.--Characteristic of habits is a constant inclination,
resulting from repeated acts, to perform similar acts (see 133 for
definition of habit). Its effect[s] on the voluntariness of acts are:

(a) if the habit is in a sense involuntary, i.e., caused by free acts
but retracted by a sincere act of contrition, it diminishes or even
takes away voluntariness. If the actual advertence to the act is
imperfect, the voluntariety is diminished; if advertence is totally
absent, all voluntariety is taken away. Thus a drunkard who retracts
his habit and makes an act of true contrition may again fall into sin
because of the acquired dispositions to drink. Then the sins are less
voluntary or at times, owing to total lack of advertence, may be
regarded solely as material sins.

(b) if the habit is voluntary, i.e., acquired by free acts and not
retracted, it increases the voluntariness in respect to the inclination
to act. Should all advertence and deliberation be taken away, a rare
occurrence, it diminishes the liberty of the act and consequently its
morality as good or bad. Voluntariety, however, is not taken away
entirely, since the habit itself was freely willed and hence acts
flowing from it are voluntary in cause (see 35.). If sufficient
advertence remains, the habit diminishes the freedom of the act owing
to the impeding of reason; but this diminution of liberty is in accord
with the will of the individual who freely contracted and conserves the
habit to have facility in acting. Accordingly, absolutely speaking, a
voluntary habit increases the voluntariety of acts caused by that habit
and consequently increases their goodness or evil. Thus St. Thomas
asserts that one who sins from habit sins from certain malice, i.e.,
not from ignorance or passion, but from the will’s own choice.

54. Natural propensities are inclinations that arise from bodily
constitution or physical condition (e.g., a strong native attraction to
temperance or to intemperance not acquired by frequent acts). Natural
propensities have the same kind of influence on the willingness of an
act as involuntary habits (see 53.).

55. Pathological states are diseases of the brain or nerves that react
upon the intellect and the will, such as various kinds of neuroses and
psychoses, hysteria and epilepsy. The influence of pathological states
on the voluntariness of acts seems similar in kind to that ascribed to
antecedent passion (see 48.). Caution must be observed in applying
these principles to particular kinds of mental diseases.[1]

[1] In doubt whether an act associated with a pathological state is
free or not, the rule of moralists is lenient. When the act is sinful,
it is not imputed as gravely sinful, for man is innocent until proven
guilty. If the act is good, it is presumed voluntary and free and,
consequently, meritorious. See Prummer, D.M., O.P., _Manuale Theologiae
Moralis_ (Barcelona: Herder, 1946), I. n.93.

56. Two Kinds of Voluntary Acts.--Having discussed human or voluntary
acts in general, we shall now indicate in particular the acts that are
of this kind. There are two classes of voluntary acts: (a) those
elicited by the will; (b) those commanded by the will.

57. Acts Elicited by the Will.--The first class of acts under the
control of the will are those that are performed by the will
itself--i.e., that are begun and completed in that power of the soul.

58. There are three acts of the will that are directed to the end the
will has in view, viz., wish, intention and fruition. Wish is the love
or inclination of the will towards the end without any reference to the
means by which it is to be obtained: this is the first act of the will.
Intention is the direction of the will to the gaining of the end
through certain means. Fruition is the enjoyment of the end after it
has been gained: this is the last act of the will.

59. There are three acts of the will that are directed to the means and
that follow after intention, viz., consent, election, and use. Consent
follows upon the counsel of the intellect, and is an act of the will
agreeing to several means as suitable for the intended end. Election
follows after a practical judgment of the intellect about the means
consented to, and is an act of the will which chooses one of the means
in preference to the others, as being most suitable for gaining the
intended end. Use is the act by which the will directs and moves the
other powers to employ the particular means that has been chosen.

60. Acts Commanded by the Will.--The second class of acts that are
under the control of the will are those that proceed, not from the will
itself, but from the other powers under the direction of the will.

61. Acts commanded by the will are of various kinds: (a) intellectual
acts, such as judgment, reasoning, etc., performed under the direction
of the will, (b) sensible acts such as sight, hearing, imagination, the
passions of love, hate, etc.; (c) external corporal acts, such as
walking, writing, etc. None of the foregoing acts need be commanded by
the will, as they may be indeliberate (see 23).

62. The following kinds of acts are not subject to the control of the
will: (a) intellectual acts, such as the assent of the reason to
self-evident truths, as regards the specification of the act; (b)
sensible acts, such as the passions considered as arising from bodily
dispositions before they are adverted to; (c) acts of the vegetative
life, such as digestion and growth; (d) bodily movements, such as the
circulation of the blood and the beating of the heart.




Art. 3: ACTS AS MORAL

(_Summa Theologica_, I-II, qq. 18-20.)

63. In order that an act be a means by which man may tend to his Last
End, it is not sufficient that it be human (proceeding from knowledge
and will); it must also be morally good.

64. Definition.--Morality is the agreement or disagreement, of a human
act with the norms that regulate human conduct with reference to man’s
Last End. The act which is in agreement with those norms is morally
good; the act which is in disagreement with them is morally bad. An act
that neither agrees nor disagrees with the norms of morality, is called
morally indifferent.

65. The constitutive norm of morality is that which gives an act its
moral quality. (a) Proximately, this is the relation of agreement or
disagreement of the act to the rational nature of man considered in its
entirety and with reference to its true happiness; (b) remotely, this
norm is the relation of the act to God, the Last End of man.

66. Hence, that which makes an act morally good is its agreement with
the nature of man as a rational being destined for heaven, and its
promotion of the glory of God, which is the purpose of all creation.

67. The manifestative norm of morality is that through which the moral
quality of acts is known. (a) Proximately, this is right reason, which
is the superior faculty and guide of the will; (b) remotely, it is the
divine intellect, from which reason receives its light.

68. The preceptive norm of morality is that which points out duty with
respect to good and evil. (a) Proximately, it is conscience; (b)
remotely, it is the law of God.

69. The species of morality are three: (a) an act is morally good when
it is in harmony with the norms of morality mentioned above (e.g.,
prayer, works of charity); (b) an act is morally bad when it is out of
harmony with those norms (e.g., blasphemy, injustice); (c) an act is
morally indifferent when, if considered in the abstract, it neither
agrees nor disagrees with moral norms (e.g., walking, riding, etc.).

70. The Sources of Morality.--The sources from which the morality of an
act is derived are its own tendencies and modes, in so far as they have
a relation of agreement or disagreement to the standards of morals.
These sources are: (a) the object of the act, from which it derives its
essence (e.g., God is the object of charity); (b) the circumstances of
the act, by which it is modified accidentally (e.g., fervor is a
circumstance of the act of charity); (c) the purpose or end of the
agent, which is the chief circumstance (e.g., to please God, as the
purpose of a work of charity).

71. The object of an action is that to which it primarily and naturally
tends as to its term and end, and from which it is named. Thus, an alms
is directed immediately and of its own nature to the relief of the poor
(end of the act); it is only secondarily and from the direction given
it by the agent that it tends to generosity and edification, since the
agent may give stingily, or from a bad motive (end of the agent).

72. The circumstances are all those conditions, different from the
object, that affect the morality of the act. The chief moral
circumstances are: (a) the time (i.e., the duration, the character of
the day, as a holyday, fast-day, etc.); (b) the place (i.e., in public
or in private, in church or elsewhere, etc.); (c) the manner (i.e., the
advertence or inadvertence, the cruelty, etc.); (d) the quantity or
quality of the thing done (e.g., that an alms is large or small, that
the person who is helped is more or less deserving, etc.); (e) the
purpose of the agent (e.g., that an alms is given to honor God); (f)
the quality or condition of the agent (e.g., that the giver of an alms
is poor himself); (g) the means used (e.g., that a benefactor’s own
money is used against himself).

73. With reference to their influence on the moral character of acts,
circumstances are divided as follows: (a) circumstances that change the
kind of morality, by making what was good to be bad, what was
indifferent to be good or bad, what was venial to be mortal, what
belonged to one class of mortal sins to take on another character,
etc.; (b) circumstances that change the degree of morality, by making a
good act more or less good, or by making a bad act more or less bad.

74. The purpose or end of an action is the reason which induces the
agent to act. It is the chief circumstance of an act, and hence is
treated as a separate source of morality.

75. The end or purpose is twofold. (a) It is the total end when it
alone is intended, so that the action is done with no other aim in
mind. Thus, if one helps the poor only to practise charity, the total
motive is charity. (b) The end is partial when it is intended along
with another motive of equal or unequal force. Thus, if a person helps
the poor in order to relieve them and also to benefit temporarily by
his charity, the assistance of others is only a partial motive of his
act; and if he would not give alms except in view of the personal
advantage he expects, charity becomes the secondary motive.

76. Good Acts.-An act is said to be entirely good when all its
elements--its object, circumstances and purpose--are in conformity with
the standards of morality. Thus, an alms given to one in need, in a
considerate manner, and purely out of love for God, is good in every
respect. Furthermore, the fact that the circumstances and purpose of
the act are good increases the goodness derived from the object of the
act.

77. An act is likewise entirely good when at least one of its elements
is good, the others being indifferent, and none evil; for it is the
good alone that is intended (see 85), and this gives the moral color to
the whole act. This happens as follows: (a) when the object is
indifferent and the purpose good, as when one takes a walk for the
purpose of performing a work of mercy; (b) when the object is
indifferent and a circumstance good, as when one eats a meal with
intentional moderation; (c) when the object is good and a circumstance
indifferent, as when one prays with unintentional stammering.

78. An act is partly good when, while its object is good, there is some
evil in the circumstances that does not neutralize or transform the
object. This happens in the following cases: (a) when the object is
good and some minor circumstance, not intended as affecting the
substance of the act, is evil, as when a person prays with
distractions; (b) when the object is good and a partial, but not
predominant motive is slightly evil, as when a person prays in public
in order to give edification and also incidentally to help his
reputation. In both these cases the good--i.e., the worship of God--is
desired for itself as good, and the evil that is simultaneously desired
does not change this good object.

79. Bad Acts.-An act is called entirely evil when all its elements--its
object, circumstances and purpose-are contrary to the moral norms.
Thus, to steal, on a large scale, in order to drive the victim to
desperation is an act that is entirely wrong. The wickedness of the
circumstance and of the motive increases the wickedness of the object
of the act.

80. An act is likewise called entirely bad, when one or more of its
elements are of themselves good or indifferent, but when there is an
element which is evil and which neutralizes or transforms the good.
This happens in various ways:

(a) when the object is evil, and the purpose is good, as when one
steals in order to pay one’s debts. The good end is wished only as
obtainable through a wicked means, and thus ceases to be good;

(b) when the object is good or indifferent, and the total purpose is
evil, as when one talks or prays with no other motive than to annoy
another person. The good is willed, not as good, but only as a means to
evil;

(c) when the object is good or indifferent, and a partial but ulterior
purpose is evil. For example, if a person extinguishes a fire in order
to save a neighbor’s house and thus be enabled to rob him; if a person
takes physical exercises to develop his strength so as to be enabled to
bully a neighbor. The good act and the immediate end in these cases are
intended not for the sake of their goodness, but as instruments to the
accomplishment of the evil ulterior end;

(d) when the object is good or indifferent, and an evil circumstance is
intended, not as a circumstance, but as forming a unit with the object
and as affecting the substance of the act--for example, when a person
intends prayer precisely as distracted, thus converting prayer into a
sin. The good object is willed in such cases, not as good, but as
vitiated by an evil circumstance.

81. Although an act is totally evil when the good in it is absorbed by
the evil, the presence of what is good in itself can diminish, though
it cannot take away, the evil. Thus, to lie in order to help a neighbor
is totally evil; yet, it is not as great an evil as to lie to hurt that
neighbor.

82. Indifferent Acts.--An act is entirely indifferent if all the
elements in it--its object, circumstances and purpose--are neither
harmonious nor discordant with the standards of morality. Such an act
would be walking home rapidly in order to eat a meal, if besides these
factors, which bear no relation to good morals, there was nothing else
in the act that did bear such a relation.

83. As to the actual existence of a human or voluntary act that is
morally indifferent, we conclude: (a) Considered in the abstract and
universally, some human acts are morally indifferent; for if acts be
considered with reference to their objects alone and apart from the
circumstances that accompany them, and as they are classified in the
mind, it is clear that many of them have no determinate relations to
moral norms--e.g., reading, writing, walking, etc. (one can read either
good or bad literature); (b) considered in the concrete, and as they
happen in individual cases, no human acts are morally indifferent,
since the purpose of the agent is either according to right reason or
against it, so that, in spite of the indifferent object, the act
becomes either good or bad by reason of the presence or absence of the
good purpose.

84. Considered even in the concrete and in individual cases, all acts
that are not human, but indeliberate or involuntary (see 23 sqq.), are
morally indifferent--or, more correctly, unmoral, as being outside the
genus of moral acts on account of the absence in them of will, which is
the prerequisite of morality. Thus, absent-minded acts are neither good
nor bad morally.

85. As to the kind of intention required to make an indifferent act
morally good, or which should be had when the act is objectively good,
we conclude: (a) The good intended must not be solely a sensible good
(i.e., the pleasure that the act gives), but also and chiefly a
rational good (i.e., its conformity to moral standards), since man,
unlike the animals, was made, not for sensible, but for rational good.
Hence, to eat deliberately with no other end than that of gratifying
the palate, is to eat without a moral purpose worthy of a human being,
and is a bad act.

(b) The moral good of virtue which is intended in acts must not be
regarded as the supreme good, but should be referred to God, since He
alone is the Last End (see 20). Hence, to eat and drink with moderation
solely because that is reasonable and suitable to human nature, if one
excludes the Last End, is to slight the necessary purpose and is
morally bad. (c) The intention of moral good or virtue in human acts
need not be actual or reflex. Thus, a person who has a previously
formed intention of living reasonably, or who at the time of eating
intends to eat moderately for the sake of health, sufficiently intends
a moral end. Likewise, it is not necessary that the reference of an act
to the Last End be made actually or explicitly. Hence, every person in
the friendship of God, in all his deliberate acts that are not evil,
has a sufficient reference of them to God contained in the fact that he
has chosen God for his Last End, or in that here and now he intends
some motive that becomes a rational being.

86. An actual and explicit intention of the moral goodness of an act,
and an actual and explicit reference of the act to the Last End, though
not necessary, increase the moral value of what is done.

87. Axiom of Pseudo-Dionysius: “That act is good whose causes are
complete; that act is evil in which a single cause is lacking.”

(a) This axiom can be understood as referring to perfect good, and the
meaning then is that an act is not perfectly good in the moral sense
unless all its elements--its object, purpose and circumstances--are
good; just as an oration is not called perfect, unless all its
elements--the speaker, the matter, the style and the delivery--are what
they should be. Hence, a single defect is enough to make an act fall
short of perfection.

(b) The axiom can be understood of essential goodness, and the meaning
then is that an act is not essentially good unless all the causes that
contribute to essential goodness--the object of the act and any
circumstances that may through the intention of the agent take on the
character of object--are good; just as a man is not said to be healthy,
unless his heart, lungs, and all the other chief parts of the body are
sound. Hence, an act is substantially bad, if either its own end (the
object of the act) or the special purpose had in mind by the agent (the
end of the agent) is bad, as explained above in 79-81.

88. The axiom of Dionysius does not mean: (a) that an act cannot be
essentially or substantially good and at the same time accidentally bad
(see 78), for, if even one circumstance not properly attended to could
change an act from good into bad, how few good acts would be done even
by the most saintly persons! Example: Caius who sacrifices himself for
the service of God and his neighbor, now and then feels some slight
vanity over his work. His acts remain substantially good. (b) The axiom
does not mean that an act cannot be substantially bad and yet have good
circumstances that diminish its badness (see 81).

89. Morality of the External Act.--Having considered the morality of
the internal act, we shall now turn to the external act (such as giving
an alms, stealing, and the like), and inquire whether it has a morality
of its own distinct from that of the internal act (see 56 Sqq.).

90. If the external act be considered precisely as it is the object, or
effect, of the internal act of the will, it does not add any essential
morality to the internal act, since, having no freedom of its own, it
is moral only in so far as it proceeds from the will. In this sense,
then, he who gives an alms to the poor, and he who would give it if he
could, are equal in goodness of will; and he who wishes to defraud, and
he who actually defrauds, are equal in malice of will.

91. If the external act be considered precisely as it is the term
towards which the internal act tends, it completes the essential
morality of the internal act by extending and communicating it without.
For, though this external act cannot add a distinct morality of its
own, it does carry the internal morality to its natural conclusion and
diffuses its good or evil. In this sense, he who actually gives an alms
is more deserving than he who really desires to give but is unable; and
he who really defrauds is more reprehensible than he who wishes to
defraud but cannot.

92. If the external act be considered precisely as something added to
the internal act, it can increase the accidental morality of the
internal act by the reaction of the external circumstances on the will.
This can happen in such ways as the following: (a) the performance of
the external act, being pleasurable or difficult, increases or
decreases the intensity of the will to act; (b) the performance of the
external act, since it requires more time than the internal act,
prolongs the latter; (c) the external act by reason of repetition may
also increase the strength of the internal act.

93. Furthermore, it is through the external act that edification or
scandal is given, that penalties or rewards for overt action are
deserved, etc. Examples: Titus bears murderous hatred towards Balbus,
but keeps it concealed. Caius also hates Balbus, and first calumniates
him, thus giving scandal, and then kills him, thus making himself
liable before the law.

94. The Morality of the Act That Is Indirectly Willed.--An act is said
to be willed indirectly, or in its cause, when it is foreseen as the
result of another act which alone is directly intended (see 35 sqq.).
According to the different moral character of the acts, there are four
cases in which the act is willed indirectly:

(a) when both the act directly willed and the resultant act are bad.
Examples: Titus is heartily opposed to quarreling and blasphemy; but he
makes himself drunk to forget his troubles, foreseeing that he will
quarrel and blaspheme while in that state. Balbus has a real dislike
for uncharitable thoughts; but he chooses the company of a notorious
scandalmonger in order to be amused, knowing that thoughts against
charity will be caused by listening to him;

(b) when the act directly willed is bad and the resultant act is good.
Example: Caius is very miserly when sober, but liberal when
intoxicated; to vary the monotony of his life, he decides to become
intoxicated, but grieves at the thought of the money he may give away
to some deserving charity before he returns to his senses. Sempronius
decides on an act of injustice with sorrow over the unbidden thoughts
of remorse or repentance that will follow his act;

(c) when both acts are good. Example: Out of charity Titus makes up his
mind to visit a pious relative who is ill; and he foresees that
thoughts of improving his own conduct--a thing not pleasing to
him--will be occasioned by this visit;

(d) when the act directly willed is good and the resultant act is bad.
Examples: Balbus takes a drug prescribed for his health, although he
foresees it will make him unable to go to church. Caius gives alms to
the poor, intending only an act of charity, but he knows that thoughts
of vainglory will arise.

95. The act indirectly willed sometimes gives, sometimes does not give,
a new morality. (a) Thus, if it is good, it adds no internal goodness,
since the will only permits, without intending the good act. Example:
Caius, who does not intend, but regretfully permits his act of charity
which he foresees, does not desire the act of charity. (b) If it is
bad, the act indirectly willed adds a bad act of the will, if the will
desires evil by permitting what it has no right to permit. Example:
Titus who does not prevent, when he should, what will lead to blasphemy
on his part, implicitly desires the act of blasphemy.

96. The Morality of the Consequences of an Act.--Man’s life receives
its moral character, not only from his internal and external acts which
are done in the present and from those which he knows will result from
them in the future, but also from the influence his acts exercise now
and afterwards upon his fellowman. It is this influence upon others
that we now speak of as the consequences of an act. According to the
case, the consequences sometimes add, sometimes do not add, to the
morality of an act. The good men do lives after them, and also the
evil. There are various kinds of consequences:

(a) foreseen consequences, which, if intended, add to the morality of
an act, since it is clear that one who wishes the many good or evil
results of his act is better or worse in intention than another who has
no such wish. Thus, one who knows that many will be edified or
scandalized by his conduct, and wills the result, is better or worse
than if he had no such will about those consequences;

(b) unforeseen consequences, which, if they follow naturally and
usually from an act, make the act in itself better or Worse according
to their character. Thus, the teaching of Christian doctrine is good as
conveying a knowledge of truth, but it is made better on account of the
spiritual benefit of others that naturally results from it. Similarly,
the teaching of evil is made worse on account of the evil consequences
it usually produces;

(c) unforeseen consequences, which, if they follow only accidentally
and rarely from an act, do not affect its morality, since an act must
be judged by what belongs to its nature, not by what is merely
occasioned by it. Thus, the fact that an alms is used by the recipient
as a means to intemperance does not detract from the goodness of the
almsgiving done for the sake of charity. Likewise, the fact that an
injury is used by the sufferer as an occasion for spiritual profit does
not lessen the wickedness of the injurious act.

97. Imputability.--Just as an act may be an act done by man (i.e.,
higher than the operations of brutes) and yet not be human (i.e., not
performed in the manner that is proper to man as man; e.g., an act of
reasoning or of decision during a dream, see 23 sqq.), so an act may be
moral (i.e., in conformity or disagreement with the standards of right)
and yet not imputable as good or bad to the agent (e.g., a prayer or
imprecation said by an infant, or the drunkenness of one who did not
realize the power of a liquor).

98. Imputability is that property of an act by which it belongs to its
agent, not only in its physical nature as something of himself or as an
effect produced by him or in its human quality of subjection to his
will, but in its moral character of goodness or badness. From contact
with the moral object, the agent takes as his own something of the
brightness or defilement of that object, and so becomes chargeable
himself with goodness or badness.

99. The conditions for the imputability of an act are:

(a) the act must be human--i.e., it must be performed knowingly and
willingly (see 23 sqq.). One is not chargeable with the quality of the
act, if not responsible for its very substance. Example: Titus suffers
such intense pain that he does not know what he is saying, and he
blasphemes. The morality of blasphemy is not unknown to him, but his
present act is not voluntary, and hence is not imputable;

(b) the morality of the act must be known, or be something that should
be known, at least in a general way, to the agent; for no one is
responsible for what he is wholly ignorant of through no fault of his
own. Example: Titus, Caius, Balbus and Sempronius rob the orchard of
their neighbor. Titus in good faith thinks he is doing an act of
virtue, because the owner owes money to his companions. Caius thinks
that some kind of sin is being committed, but he does not know whether
it is theft, or gluttony, or what. Balbus thinks that only a venial sin
of stealing is being perpetrated. Sempronius, the youngest of the
crowd, looks on the whole affair as a part of the day’s sport. All
committed theft, and the act is wrong; but Titus and Sempronius were
not guilty of sin, since they were in good faith. Caius and Balbus
committed sin, the species and degree depending on the knowledge they
had or should have had (see 588 sqq.);

(c) the morality of the act must be willed. If the act is good, the
goodness must be intended, since a person should not get credit for
what he does not wish. Example: Titus does not believe in virtue, and
Caius is opposed to helping the poor; but both give an alms to a
beggar, the former in order to get rid of the beggar, the latter in
order to get rid of some old clothes. Hence, neither wishes or receives
credit for the charity done. If the act is bad, the badness is
sufficiently intended by the performance of what one knows is forbidden
and wrong. The will chooses contact with the evil object, and thus
implicitly with the evil of the object. Example: Balbus protests that
he does not wish to harm anyone, and then proceeds to calumniate his
neighbors. His disavowal of sinful intent does not make him any the
less responsible for his calumny.

100. Imputability may be conceived as making one responsible for the
moral quality of an act in three ways: (a) generically, if one should
get the credit or diseredit of goodness or badness only; (b)
specifically as to kind, if one gets the credit or discredit of a
particular category of goodness or badness; (c) specifically as to
degree, if one gets the credit or discredit of higher or lower grades
of the same virtue or vice, or if one is made guilty of mortal or
venial sin. These points will be discussed in the articles on the
virtues and vices (see 186 sqq.).

101. Goodness is imputable as follows:

(a) As regards internal acts, a person is credited with all the
goodness of the object, end, and circumstances, in so far as it is
known and willed by him. Example: Titus purposes to pray in a
penitential posture, in order to obtain the virtue of humility. Hence,
he has the credit of worship, mortification and humility through his
holy desire. If he thought of the penitential posture, not as a moral
circumstance, or if he regretted it, he would have the act, but not the
credit of mortification;

(b) As regards external acts, a person is credited with the greater
readiness or intensity or duration which, through it, his will gives to
what is good. Example: If Titus prays in the manner above described,
his good will is intensified, and he has the credit of this increase in
the accidental goodness of his act;

(c) As regards acts indirectly willed, one is not credited with their
goodness, if this is merely permitted. Example: Sempronius, who is
sorry that thoughts of a better life will go through his mind as a
consequence of going to church, has not the credit of those good
thoughts;

(d) As regards consequences that were foreseen, or that naturally
result from an act, one is not credited with their goodness, unless it
was wished. Example: Balbus teaches religion to children because he is
paid to do so; Caius does so because it is a good act. The consequence
that these children afterwards live virtuously is not morally
creditable to Balbus, since he thought nothing about it; but it is a
circumstance that increases the goodness of Caius’ act, since he
intended his teaching precisely as it is a good work;

(e) As regards consequences that are not natural results of an act, if
they were not foreseen or intended, they are not credited to the agent.
Example: Titus speaks a simple and ordinary word of good advice to
Sempronius, but the impression is so great that Sempronius undertakes
and accomplishes extraordinary things, which Titus would not have
deemed possible or advisable.

102. Evil is imputable as follows:

(a) As regards the internal act, a person is guilty of all the evil of
the object, end and circumstances, as far as it is known and willed by
him. Example: Balbus wishes he could steal all the possessions of
Caius, and thereby drive the latter to suicide. Balbus has committed
theft and murder in his heart;

(b) As regards the external act, one is guilty of all the circumstances
of greater willingness, etc., which it adds to the internal act.
Example: If Balbus actually steals from Caius and causes his death, his
malice is shown to be very strong and to extend to the evil
consequences of his external acts;

(c) As regards acts indirectly willed, one is guilty of the evil they
entail, if one could and should have prevented it. Example: Balbus is
guilty of the blasphemies he foresees will take place when he has taken
too much drink, for he could and should have kept sober.

(d) As regards the evil consequences of acts, foreseen or natural, one
is responsible for the evil, if one could and should have prevented it.
Examples: Titus knows that a beggar will use profane language if denied
an alms, but Titus cannot spare the money and is not responsible for
what happens. Sempronius blasphemes in the company of many, and is
therefore guilty of the sin of scandal, since he has no right to
blaspheme;

(e) As regards the evil consequences of acts that could not have been
foreseen, they are not imputable. Example: Balbus steals fifty cents
from Caius, and the latter is so heartbroken that he commits suicide.
Balbus is not responsible for the suicide, since such a thing was far
from his thoughts when he stole.

103. It was just said (102, d) that when two results, one good and one
evil, follow an act, the evil is imputable if it could and should have
been prevented. It is not always easy, however, to determine at once
when the evil result should be prevented, and, as cases of double
effect are many, it will be useful to give rules that are more
particularized, and that enable one to decide when it is lawful to do
that from which will follow an act indirectly willed, or a consequence
that is evil.

104. It is lawful to perform an action from which an evil effect is
foreseen when the following conditions are present:

(a) the action willed itself must be good or at least indifferent; for
clearly, if the action is bad, it is also unlawful;

(b) a good effect must also follow from the act, and it must not be
caused by the evil effect; for the end does not justify the means.
Thus, it is not lawful to take what belongs to others in order to give
alms, for the evil effect (stealing) results from the act (taking)
immediately; whereas the good effect (almsgiving) results only
mediately through the theft;

(c) the agent must intend only the good effect, since it is unlawful to
wish evil. Thus, if one foresees that one’s virtuous life will cause
the sin of envy in a neighbor, this evil result of one’s virtue must
not be entertained by one as something pleasing;

(d) the agent must have a reason sufficiently weighty for permitting
the evil result that follows his act. Evil should not even be
permitted, unless there is adequate compensation in the good that is
intended.

105. To judge whether a reason for permitting an evil effect is
proportionately grave, the following rules should be kept in mind:

(a) the greater the evil that results, the greater must be the good
that is intended. Thus, it is not lawful to kill a robber in order to
save a small amount of money: but it is lawful to kill an aggressor, if
this is necessary in order to save one’s life;

(b) the greater the dependence of the evil effect on one’s act, the
greater must be the reason for performing the act. Example: Titus gives
permission to his class to play a game against another class,
foreseeing quarrels and disputes between the teams. Less reason is
required for granting the permission, if Titus knows that higher
authority will grant it, should he refuse it;

(c) the more nearly the evil effect follows upon the act, the greater
must be the reason for the act, Thus, less reason is required to direct
a person who looks like a heavy drinker to the city than to direct him
to a bottle of strong drink;

(d) the more certain it is that the evil effect will follow, the
greater is the reason required for placing its cause. For example, one
who speeds in an automobile on an unfrequented road, does not require
the same excusing cause as one who speeds on a thoroughfare where many
other cars are passing;

(e) the more obligation one has to prevent the evil effect, the graver
is the reason required for placing its cause. Thus, since
parish-priests, lawgivers, superiors and policemen are bound by their
office to prevent moral disorders, a far greater cause is required in
them, than in persons who have no such charge, for doing what will have
an evil consequence.




Art. 4: ACTS AS MERITORIOUS

(_Summa Theologica_, I-II, q. 21.)

106. When the morality of an act is attributable to one as one’s own,
one becomes worthy of praise and reward, if the act is good, but
deserving of censure and punishment, if the act is evil.

107. Definitions.--Merit is the right to a reward arising from works
done for God. Demerit is the debt of punishment incurred on account of
works done against God.

108. Divisions.--According to the difference of the person who confers
the reward, there are two kinds of merit: (a) human merit, or the claim
which a person has to a reward from his neighbor, or from society, for
the benefits he has conferred upon his neighbor or society; (b) divine
merit, or the right a person has to receive a reward from God for the
fidelity wherewith he has exercised stewardship over his acts, of which
God is the Last End, or wherewith he has served society, of which God
is the Supreme Ruler. Only divine merit is here considered.

109. According to the difference of the object of the reward, there are
two kinds of merit: (a) natural merit, which makes one worthy of a
reward that does not exceed the native powers or exigencies of a
created being, such as success, prosperity, or other goods that do not
constitute the Last End of man (see 20). Thus, we read in scripture of
pagans or sinners who were blest with temporal happiness on account of
their natural virtues; (b) supernatural merit, which makes one worthy
of the beatitude surpassing mere created power that God has prepared
for those who serve Him (see 20). It is only this kind of merit that is
being considered here; for, since the Last End of man is a supernatural
reward (viz, the Beatific Vision of God), it follows that the acts by
which he tends to that End must be not only human and moral, but
supernaturally meritorious.

110. There are four kinds of supernatural merit: (a) condign merit in
the stricter sense, that is merit which arises from justice, and which
presupposes no favor on the part of the rewarder. In this sense Christ
merited, since even the grace which made His merits supernatural was
due to Him as the God-Man; (b) condign merit in the less strict sense,
that is merit which arises indeed from justice, but presupposes a favor
on the part of the rewarder. In this way the righteous merit before
God, since their works confer a right to their own reward, while the
grace which enables them to perform their works is a divine favor; (c)
congruous merit in the stricter sense, that is merit which arises not
from justice (since there is no equality between the work and the
reward), but from the fitness of things, because the person who merits
is a friend of God. In this way all who are in the state of grace can
merit spiritual goods for others; (d) congruous merit in the wide
sense, that is merit which arises from the liberality of God, who
answers a good work as if it were a prayer. In this way the good works
done by sinners can be said to merit conversion for them.

111. The second kind of merit mentioned above--i.e., condign merit in
the less strict sense--is that with which we are chiefly concerned
here, since it is the kind of merit that must be found in human acts in
order that they may lead man to a supernatural reward. A fuller
treatment of merit is found in Dogmatic Theology in the Question on
Grace.

112. The conditions requisite for the kind of merit now in question
are: (a) that the work done be human, that is, free, morally good, and
supernatural (i.e., proceeding from sanctifying grace and divine
charity); (b) that the one who merits be in the wayfaring state (i.e.,
that he have not already passed to final reward or punishment), and
that he be in the state of grace; (c) that God has promised a reward
for the work done. From the statements made above, it follows that all
the human and morally good works of those who are in the state of grace
possess condign merit.

113. The objects of condign merit--i.e., the rewards promised by God
for the good works done for Him in this life--are: (a) an increase of
sanctifying grace; (b) the right to eternal life; (c) the attainment of
eternal life, if the one who merits dies in grace; (d) an increase of
glory.

114. The conditions for the merit of strict congruity are the same as
those given above (112), except the promise made by God, which is not
required. Examples of this kind of merit are the sanctity of the
Blessed Virgin, which made her deserve more than others to be the
Mother of God, and the conversion of St. Paul through the merits of St.
Stephen.

115. For the merit of wide congruity it is necessary that the work done
be morally good. Examples of this kind of merit are the sighs of the
ancient Patriarchs, as obtaining the coming of the Messiah. The just
man can merit with the merit of wide congruity the following: (a) his
own conversion after a future fall; (b) his final perseverance; (c)
temporal goods.




Art. 5: THE PASSIONS

(_Summa Theologica_, I-II, qq. 22-48.)

116. Having discussed the acts proper to man, we shall now speak of the
passions, which are common to both man and beast.

117. Definition.--The passions--also called the emotions, affections,
or sentiments--are acts of desire; but, unlike the acts of the will,
they are directed, not to good apprehended by the higher knowing power
of the intellect, but to good apprehended by the lower knowing power of
sense and imagination. They are defined as: acts or movements of the
sensitive appetite which arise from the representation of some good in
the sense faculties, and which produce some transformation in the body,
such as palpitation of the heart, increased circulation of the blood,
paleness, blushing, etc.

118. Division.--There are two classes of passions; (a) the
concupiscible, which have as their object sensible good considered as
delightful, or sensible evil considered as unpleasant, and which are
love and hatred, desire and flight, delight and sadness; (b) the
irascible, which have as their object sensible good or sensible evil
considered as difficult to attain or to avoid, and which are hope and
despair, boldness and fear, anger.

119. The concupiscible passions are defined as follows: (a) love, the
first of the passions and the cause of all the others, tends to
sensible good considered as desirable, abstracting from its presence or
absence; while hatred is the aversion from sensible evil considered
precisely as unsuitable and abstracting from its presence or absence;
(b) desire tends to sensible good that is absent, and flight turns away
from sensible evil apprehended as future; (c) delight is the affection
produced in the sensitive appetite by the presence and possession of
the object desired; (d) sadness is the passion which dejects the soul
on account of the presence of an evil.

120. The irascible passions are explained as follows: (a) hope reaches
out towards a future good whose attainment is difficult, but not
impossible; despair turns away from a good that seems impossible of
attainment; (b) bravery goes out to attack an evil that seems difficult
and imminent, but not unconquerable; fear falls back before a future
difficulty that seems irresistible; (e) anger is the desire of
vengeance for an injury received.

121. Moral Value of the Passions.--The Stoics held that all the
passions are diseases of the soul, and that one is perfect when one
arrives at the condition of being passionless or apathetic. Lucretius,
on the contrary, taught that all the impulses of passion are good. The
truth is that the passions are good or evil according to the way they
are considered. (a) Physically, the passions are good, since they are
the acts of natural powers, or the perfection and complement of
something good in itself. (b) Morally, they are indifferent, if they
are viewed in themselves, as the product of the sensitive appetite. For
this appetite is an irrational power of the soul, similar to that of
the beasts, and acts are not moral unless rational--i.e., an act is
good or evil only from its relation to reason. (c) Morally, the
passions are good or bad, if commanded by reason and will, for thus
they partake of the good or evil that is in the acts from which they
proceed, just as the acts of the external members of the body are moral
in so far as they execute the commands of the will. The passions are
voluntary if commanded by the will, or not forbidden by it. Examples:
Our Lord looked about Him with anger, being grieved at the blindness of
His enemies who watched Him in the synagogue (Mark, iii. 5); He wept
over the destruction of Jerusalem (Luke, xix. 41); He was sad at the
approach of His passion (Mark, xiv. 34).

122. The passions are morally good: (a) if they are directed by the
will to a morally good object; for example, shame is a praiseworthy
passion, because it is fear of what is dishonorable, and pity is also
good, because it is according to right reason, being sorrow for the
misfortune of another; (b) if they are chosen by the reason for a good
purpose; for example, it is good to excite the emotion of joy that one
may pray with greater fervor, or to arouse the feelings of pity, fear,
or hope, in order that one may be more earnestly moved to acts of
mercy, repentance, courage; (c) if the circumstances are moderated
according to right reason; for example, to grieve over the death of a
friend excessively, so that one is unfitted for duty and suffers in
health, is unreasonable; but to grieve even unto tears, as Christ did
at the tomb of Lazarus, is an act of piety. Similarly, the slight anger
of Heli was blamable and the great anger of Moses was laudable, because
the evils in both instances called for severity (I Kings, ii, iii;
Exod., iii).

123. The passions can either diminish or increase the goodness of an
act. (a) They diminish its goodness, if they are antecedent--i.e.,
prior to the judgment of the reason--for they thus obscure the mind and
make the act that follows less voluntary. For example, there is less
goodness in an alms given under an impulse of sentimentality than in
one given after serious consideration of the matter and from a motive
of charity. (b) They increase its goodness if they are
consequent--i.e., subsequent to the judgment and the result of the
vehemence of the will, or of deliberate encouragement by the will (see
47 sqq.)--for, just as the external act increases the goodness of the
internal act, so is it better that man should tend towards good, not
only with the will, but also with the emotions. Examples: The spiritual
gladness of the Psalmist is seen to have been more than ordinarily
great from the fact that it acted upon his feelings, and both heart and
flesh rejoiced (Ps, lxxxii. 3); to sing a hymn in order to encourage
oneself to greater fervor or devotion adds to the goodness of what is
done, through the greater promptness or ease it causes in the act that
follows.

124. The passions are morally evil: (a) when they are commanded by the
will and directed to an object, a purpose, or circumstances that are
evil, Thus, envy is an ignoble passion, since it is unreasonable, being
sorrow at another’s success. Examples; Titus drinks to excess for the
delight of intoxication (bad object); Balbus purposely excites his
imagination, that he may hate more bitterly and act more cruelly (bad
end); Sempronius loves his children so immoderately that he grows
morose and jealous (bad circumstance). (b) The passions are also
morally evil when they should be forbidden and are not forbidden by the
will. Example; Caius is surprised by a sudden burst of anger, which,
though he judges to be unreasonable, he does nothing to check.

125. The passions can remove, diminish or increase the evil of an act.
(a) Thus, antecedent passions take away all evil, if (a thing that is
rare) they prevent entirely the use of reason; they diminish malice if
they obscure the judgment. Examples: Balbus, fearing that he is about
to drown, becomes panic-stricken, seizes Titus and almost drowns him.
Caius, threatened with a black eye if he refuses, calumniates: his
calumny would be worse if he acted coldbloodedly. (b) Consequent
passions increase the evil, for then they manifest a strong intention,
or are the result of direct purpose. Examples: Sempronius attacks the
conduct of an opponent, not with dispassionate argument and from a love
of truth, but with bitter personal feeling and from a desire of
revenge. Titia works herself into a rage that she may be the more ready
for an encounter with a person of whom she is unjustly jealous.

126. Though the passions are physically good and in their nature
morally indifferent, they may have physical reactions or moral
consequences that are harmful or evil. These dangers may be physical,
mental or moral.

(a) Physical Dangers of the Passions.--It is a well-known fact that
there is a close connection between the passions and the nerves, heart,
and bodily organism in general, and that strong or persistent emotion
can work great detriment to the health, producing disease,
unconsciousness, or even death.

(b) Mental Dangers of the Passions.--It is admitted by all that the
passions disturb the judgment, and can even take away the use of
reason. For they act upon the body or the senses, and these in turn
affect the mind in a way similar to what happens in sleep or
intoxication. Thus, love makes one blind to the defects of the object
of one’s love; fear makes one magnify the evil of what is dreaded;
melancholy unbalances the mind, etc.

(c) Moral Dangers of the Passions.--It is likewise a matter of common
experience that the passions are a source of many temptations and sins.
Often they are antecedent (i.e., not premeditated or willed), as when
they arise from bodily states over which one has no control or from
imaginations strongly fixed in the mind, and at the same time tend to
that which is not according to right reason, rebelling against the law
of the mind. Thus, a person whose health is bad is easily dispirited,
and this feeling occasions temptations to despair; one whose memory is
haunted with the image of a lost parent becomes a prey to sadness,
which makes it difficult to perform duties with zest and diligence.

127. A passion may become morally bad on account of the physical or
mental evils connected with it. (a) Thus, a person has duties to his
own well-being, and he indirectly wills (see 35 sqq., 94 sqq.) to
neglect these duties, if he indulges harmful passions. Example:
Sempronia grieves immoderately over the death of her mother, with the
result that her health and mental vigor are impaired. (b) A person also
has duties with respect to the life, health, and happiness of his
neighbor, and he chooses to neglect these duties if he unjustly
provokes emotions in others, foreseeing injurious consequences (see 96
sqq.). Examples: Titus so vexes Balbus by petty annoyances that the
latter loses appetite and sleep, and becomes an invalid. Sempronia so
exasperates her father by long-continued unfilial conduct that the
latter becomes insane. Caius appeals to prejudices in order to have
injustice done to a rival.

128. As to passions that incite to evil or deter from good, we must
observe the following: (a) if the passion is consequent, one is placing
oneself or others in danger of sin, and one’s conduct must be judged
according to the principles given in 258 sqq. (Examples: Titus likes to
brood over his troubles, although this causes temptations to neglect
duty; Sempronia makes remarks to a hot-headed acquaintance which are a
provocation to great uncharitableness); (b) if the passion is
antecedent, it constitutes a temptation which one is bound to resist
(see 252 sqq.). Example: Balbus has a natural dislike for Caius, and
often feels impelled to judge him rashly or treat him unjustly.

129. Antecedent or involuntary passions, as well as other involuntary
acts of imagination, thought and will, tending to evil, are sometimes
called “first motions of the soul,” as distinguished from consequent or
voluntary passions and acts, which are known as “second motions of the
soul.” The first motions are of two kinds: (a) those that precede all
deliberation and consent, actual or virtual (_motus primo-primi_), and
these are free from all sin; (b) those that precede full deliberation
and consent, but follow on partial deliberation (_motus
secundo-primi_). These latter are venial sins.

Most theologians since the Council of Trent maintain that the
inordinate movements of passion which precede the advertence of reason,
such as lust, envy, sloth, etc., are not sins. The Council of Trent
defined that the _fomes peccati_ has never been understood by the
Church to be truly a sin in the baptized, but has been called sin by
St. Paul in the sense that it is from sin and inclines to sin (Council
of Trent, fifth session). On the basis of this text some authors argue
that it is of faith that the inordinate motions called _primo-primi_
are not sins for the baptized. The condemnation of both the fiftieth
proposition of Baius: _The evil desires to which reason does not
consent, and which man endures unwillingly (_invitus_), are prohibited
by precept_; and his fifty-first: _Lust, or the law of the members, and
evil desires of it, which men suffer unwillingly, are true disobedience
of the law_; is interpreted as establishing as certain the
non-sinfulness of such movements in infidels. (See Merklebach, O.P.,
_Summa Theol_. Mor., Vol. I, n. 448).

St. Thomas taught otherwise that such inordinate movements of passion
are venial sins (_Summa. Theol_. I-II, q. 74, a. 3, ad 2um; _de Malo_
q. 7, a. 6. ad 4m; _de Veritate_, q. 25, a. 5). Although they precede
the deliberation of reason, they attain to the order of moral acts,
however imperfectly, insofar as sensuality in man by its nature is made
to be subject to reason. Reason can and ought to control these motions,
but fails to do so owing to the great number of them possible to occur.
Hence they are not involuntary, but indirectly voluntary as sins of
omission (_II Dist_. 24, q. 3, a. 2; _de Veritate_, q. 25, a. 5;
_Quodlib_. IV, q. 11, a. 1). Since these movements are indirectly
voluntary, St. Thomas’ teaching does not conflict with the Council of
Trent which speaks of the _fomes_ as habitual dispositions and not of
its acts which St. Thomas considers. Clearly, too, his teaching does
not fall under the condemnation of the propositions of Baius; with
Baius the motions are involuntary, but for St. Thomas indirectly
voluntary.

St. Thomas distinguishes the motions of sensuality differently from
modern manualists. For him the motions-_primo-primi_ arise from
corporal dispositions which are not under the control of reason and
hence can not be sins. Motions-_secundo-primi_ arise from some
apprehension of the internal senses proper to the passions and can, at
least if taken singly, and ought to be ruled by reason. Thus, they are
moral acts (_de Malo_, q. VII, a. 6, ad 8um; _II Dist_. 24, q. 3, a. 2).

130. Bodily suffering or sickness is sometimes called a passion of the
body, but, unlike the passions of the soul, it is a physical evil.
Morally considered, it is indifferent in itself, but it has contacts
with morality in various ways. (a) Thus, it may receive morality from
the will. Examples: Sufferings endured with resignation are acts of
virtue; sickness or pain inflicted upon others is imputable to the
unjust cause. (b) It may affect the morality of the act of the will.
Examples: Severe toothache or other exquisite pain is an extenuating
circumstance in sins of grumbling, for the suffering draws so much
attention to itself that deliberation on other things is much
diminished; weakness of stomach may be a moral advantage in freeing one
from temptations to over-eating.

131. Though the passions are good in themselves, they are often morally
dangerous. The regulation of the passions through the virtues of
fortitude and temperance will be treated later on, but we shall
indicate here some natural means by which, God helping, their first
motions may be controlled. (a) Thus, if a passion is not strong, it may
be repressed directly by command of the will. Example: The impulse to
anger may sometimes be checked by the command of silence. (b) If a
passion is strong, it may be combated through other activities which
are its opposites or which, through the amount of energy they call for,
will diminish proportionately the force of the passion. Examples: In
time of fear one can fall back on thoughts of confidence; in time of
mourning one can seek joy or alleviation in the society of friends or
in the repose of sleep. Study or other strenuous occupation is an
excellent means to overcome impetuous passion.

(c) If a passion is persistent, it may be diverted to some lawful
object vividly represented and held in the imagination and thoughts.
Examples. Those who are inclined to love immoderately the world or the
things that are in the world should direct their love to divine
goodness. Those who are inclined to be too fearful of men should think
how much more God is to be feared.




Question II

GOOD AND BAD HABITS

132. Having considered human acts and the passions, we now pass to a
consideration of the principles from which acts proceed proximately.
These principles are, first, the faculties, powers or forces of the
soul (such as the intellect, will, sense, appetite, and vegetative
powers); and, secondly, the habits which permanently modify the
faculties. For some faculties may be turned in various directions,
either favorably or unfavorably, as regards their ends, and it is the
stable bent given to a faculty that is called a habit. Thus, the
intellect may be directed towards its end, which is truth, by the habit
of knowledge; or away from that end by the habit of ignorance.
Likewise, the will may be directed towards or away from its end, which
is good, by virtue or vice. The faculties are treated in Psychology,
but the habits, since they turn the faculties towards good or evil,
must be considered in Moral Theology, as well as in philosophy.




Art. 1: HABITS IN GENERAL

(_Summa Theologica_, I-II, qq. 49-54.)

133. Definition.--A habit is a perfect and stable quality by which a
being is well- or ill-affected in itself, or with regard to its
motions. It differs from mere disposition or tendency, which is an
imperfect and transitory quality. Thus, a sallow complexion is a habit;
a blush, a disposition.

134. Division.--Habits are variously divided, as follows:

(a) From the viewpoint of their subject, they are either entitative or
operative, according as they affect directly the nature or the powers
of a being. Thus, in the soul there are the entitative habit of
sanctifying grace and operative habits like science and virtue; while
in the body are entitative habits of health, beauty, etc.

(b) From the viewpoint of their object, habits are good (i.e., virtues)
or evil (i.e., vices);

(c) From the viewpoint of their cause, habits are infused or acquired,
according as they are supernaturally produced by God, or are naturally
obtained by man through repeated acts, or result from nature without
repeated acts. Faith in a baptized infant is an infused habit;
knowledge obtained through study is an acquired habit; the perception
that the first principles of truth are to be granted is natural.

135. Operative acquired habits are defined as qualities not easily
changed, by which a faculty that is able to act in various ways is
disposed to act in one way with ease, readiness and pleasure. Thus, by
training a man acquires a correct carriage, and is able to walk
straight without difficulty.

136. Operative infused habits are enduring qualities that give to a
faculty the power to perform acts that are supernatural. Thus, the
infused virtues of faith, hope and charity give to the intellect and
the will the ability to elicit acts with reference to supernatural
truth and good. Facility and promptitude with respect to these acts
come through the use of the infused power.

137. Strengthening and Weakening of Habits.--Habits are increased: (a)
extensively when they are applied to more objects--thus the habit of
science grows as it is applied to more truths; (b) intensively, when
they are rooted more firmly in their subject and become easier to
exercise. This last comes about when intense acts of a habit are
frequently repeated. Thus, a habit of virtue or vice becomes a second
nature, and it is exercised with ever greater delight and resisted with
ever-increasing difficulty.

138. The infused habits cannot be diminished, but they can be destroyed
(see 745). As to the acquired habits, they are weakened and destroyed
chiefly in two ways: (a) by acts opposed to them, especially if these
acts are earnest and frequent--thus, evil custom is overcome by good
custom, and vice-versa; (b) by long discontinuance or disuse. Thus, a
person who has learned a foreign language will forget it, if he fails
to speak, read or hear it. The knowledge of first principles,
speculative or moral, is not lost, however, through forgetfulness, as
experience shows.

139. Accidentally, a habit may be corrupted through injury of an organ
that is necessary for the exercise of the habit. Thus, right moral
judgment may be lost if certain areas of the brain are affected.

140. Habits and Morality.--The importance of habits in man’s moral life
is very great. (a) Habits are an index to a man’s past career, for the
ease and facility he now possesses through them is the result of many
struggles and efforts and difficulties overcome, or of defeats and
surrenders and neglected opportunities. (b) Habits constitute a man’s
moral character. Morally, a person is the sum of his moral habits and
dispositions grouped around the central interest or idea of his life.
He who would know himself, therefore, cannot do better than to examine
what are his habits, and which is the predominant one among them. (e)
Habits are a prophecy of the future. Habits are not irresistible and do
not destroy freedom, but they produce such ease and readiness for
acting in one particular way that the probabilities are, when habits
are strong, that a person will continue to follow them in the future as
he has done in the past, thus progressing or deteriorating, as the case
may be.

141. Duties as regards Habits.--(a) Bad habits should be avoided and
those that have been formed should be destroyed (see 138). The means to
accomplish these victories are divine help obtained through prayer and
the other instrumentalities of grace, watchfulness through
self-examination, and the cultivation of a spirit of self-denial, as
well as attack made on the habit that is forming or already formed (see
255 sqq.)

(b) Good habits should be acquired, and those already possessed should
be exercised and put to the best advantage. The means to this end, in
addition to those that are supernatural, are especially a realization
of the importance of good habits, a great desire to have them, and
constant and regular effort to practise them (see 137).




Art. 2: GOOD HABITS OR VIRTUES

(_Summa Theologica_, I-II, qq. 55-70.)

142. Definition.--A virtue is a good habit of the free powers of the
soul, that is a principle of good conduct, and never of conduct that is
evil. Hence, the following are not virtues: (a) an occasional
inclination to good, for this is not a fixed habit; (b) good habits of
the body or of the vegetative powers, etc. (such as beauty and health),
for these are not free; (c) knowledge of the right or affection for it
without any reference to practice, for virtue is a principle of right
living; (d) habits that can be applied indifferently to good or bad
conduct, such as human opinion.

143. Division.--The virtues are divided: (a) according to their
different causes, into infused and acquired virtues (cfr. 134 sqq.);(b)
according to their different objects, into intellectual, moral and
theological virtues.

144. The intellectual virtues are those habits that perfect the
intellect with reference to its good--i.e., truth, speculative or
practical.

145. The speculative virtues are three: understanding, knowledge and
wisdom.

(a) Understanding or intelligence is the habit of perceiving truths
that are not in need of proof, as being self-evident. Axiomatic truths
or first principles are the object of this virtue.

(b) Knowledge or science is the habit of perceiving truths that are
learned from other truths by argumentation, and that are ultimate in
some category of being. The object of this virtue embraces the various
sciences (like astronomy) which are conclusions from principles.

(c) Wisdom is the habit of learning through reasoning the truth that is
absolutely ultimate; it is the knowledge of things in their supreme
cause, God. Examples are theology and philosophy in their highest sense.

146. The practical intellectual virtues are two: prudence and art.

(a) Prudence is an intellectual virtue which indicates in individual
cases what is to be done or what is to be omitted, in order that one
may act according to the requirements of good morals.

(b) Art is an intellectual virtue which indicates in individual cases
how one must act in order to produce things that are useful or
beautiful (e.g., music, painting, building, etc.).

147. The intellectual virtues, except prudence, are not perfect
virtues, since, While they make an act good, they do not necessarily
make the agent good. A man may have great knowledge about morality, or
be able to produce excellent works of art, and at the same time be not
virtuous, or have no love for his work.

148. Prudence is an intellectual virtue, since it resides in the
intellect; but it is also classed among the moral virtues, since its
object is the direction of human acts to their right end.

149. The moral virtues are those habits that perfect the will and the
sensitive appetite with reference to their immediate and respective
objects; that is, they are habits concerned with acts as means to the
Last End. They make the act good, and make good also him who performs
it; and they are thus superior as virtues to the intellectual habits.

150. There are four principal moral virtues: (a) in the intellect there
is prudence, which guides all the actions and passions by directing the
other moral virtues to what is good according to reason; (b) in the
will there is justice, which inclines a person to make his actions
accord with what he owes to others; (c) in the irascible appetite is
fortitude, which subjects to reason the passions that might withdraw
from good, such as fear of dangers and labors; (d) in the concupiscible
appetite is temperance, which represses the motions of passions that
would impel one to some sensible good opposed to reason.

These four virtues are also called cardinal virtues, because all the
other moral virtues hinge on them.

151. The theological virtues are those that perfect the intellect and
the will with reference to God, their ultimate, supernatural object.
They are three: (a) faith, which is a virtue infused into the
intellect, giving man supernatural truths that are perceived by a
divine light; (b) hope, which is a virtue infused into the will,
enabling man to tend towards the supernatural destiny disclosed by
faith as towards an end possible of attainment; (c) charity, which is a
virtue infused into the will, uniting man’s affections to the object of
his hope and transforming him into its likeness.

152. Causes of Virtues.--The causes of virtue are three: (a) nature,
which is the cause of the inchoative intellectual and moral virtues,
that is, of the theoretical and practical principles that are naturally
known, and of the inclinations to virtue that arise from an
individual’s bodily constitution; (b) practice, which is the cause of
perfected intellectual and moral virtues, that is, of the good habits
that are formed by repeated acts (e.g., knowledge obtained through
study, temperance fixed in the character through continued effort); (c)
infusion from on high, which is the cause of the virtues that surpass
nature (i.e., of the theological virtues and of the moral virtues that
are concerned with our acts as ordered to the supernatural).

153. Properties of the Virtues.--From the definition of virtue given
above certain properties result.

(a) Since a virtue makes conduct agree with a certain fixed standard,
it does not allow of excess or defect. Hence, virtue follows the golden
mean.

(b) Since the other moral virtues would go to extremes without the
guidance of prudence, and since prudence would not judge aright without
the right dispositions of the other virtues, it follows that the four
moral virtues, at least in their perfect state, must always be
together. And because charity is the fulfillment of the whole law, he
who has charity has also all the other infused virtues.

(c) Since the virtues are directed towards objects of varying degrees
of excellence, and since they are habits, and are capable of increase
and decrease (137 sqq.), it follows that both virtues of different
species, and those of the same species, are or may be unequal.

(d) Since some of the virtues imply conditions that will not exist in
the life to come, it follows that these virtues will be somewhat
changed in the blessed. Thus, temperance, which subdues the rebellion
of the passions, will not be exercised in heaven, where the passions do
not rebel.

154. The golden mean is found differently in different virtues.

(a) In the case of justice, the mean is determined by an external
object that is invariable, since justice gives what is due to others,
neither more nor less; in the case of fortitude and temperance the mean
is determined by prudent judgment and is not invariable, since these
two virtues are concerned with the regulation of the internal passions
according to conditions of individuals and circumstances. Thus, a debt
of ten dollars remains the same whether the debtor is rich or poor,
whether the creditor needs it or not. But a glass of liquor, which
would be just enough for one who was well, might be far too much for
him when he was sick; and a danger which a man might be expected to
encounter, might be too much for a woman or a boy.

(b) The mean of the intellectual and speculative virtues is the
agreement with objective truth, as lying between the extremes of false
affirmation and false negation. The mean of the practical virtue of
prudence, as regulating the moral virtues, is right reason, considered
as directive of the desires and conduct so as to avoid excess and
defect.

(c) The theological virtues have no mean, as far as their object is
concerned, since God, being infinite in truth, power and goodness,
cannot be believed in, hoped in, or loved too much. By reason of their
subject, however, these virtues have a mean, since it is possible for
one to exceed, for example, in hope by presumptuously expecting what
is not due to one’s condition.

155. Without charity one may possess certain other virtues. (a) Thus,
one may have the natural or acquired moral virtues, as is the case with
many pagans, but such virtues are imperfect, since they do not direct
their subject to the Supernatural End of man; (b) one may have the
supernatural or infused virtues of faith and hope, as is the case with
Christians who are not in the state of grace. Even such faith and hope
are imperfect virtues, and are not meritorious.

156. Considered precisely as virtues (cfr. Article on Hope), the three
groups rank as follows: (a) the theological virtues are the most
excellent, since they deal directly with man’s supernatural end; (b) By
reason of their object, universal truth, the intellectual virtues are
superior to the moral virtues, which are concerned with particular
goods; (c) the moral virtues, nevertheless, are more perfect as
virtues, for, so considered in the order of action, in perfecting the
appetites, they are more properly principles of action.

157. The highest of the virtues within each group are the following:

(a) Charity is greater than faith and hope, since it implies union with
its objects, while the other two imply a certain distance from their
object;

(b) Justice is superior to fortitude and temperance, since it deals
with actions by which man is rightly ordered, both as to himself and as
to others, while the others deal with the passions and the right
disposition of man as to himself. The order of the moral virtues is:
prudence, which is the guide of the others; justice, which deals with
man’s actions and orders him rightly, both as to himself and as to
others; fortitude, which governs the passions, even when life and death
are the issues; temperance, which governs the passions in affairs of
less importance;

(c) The chief of the intellectual virtues is wisdom, which considers
the supreme cause of things, and therefore judges the other virtues of
the intellect.

158. In the blessed the virtues will remain, but changed in some
respects. (a) Thus, the rectitude of soul contained in the moral
virtues will endure, but there will be no rebellious passions to
overcome, no dangers to oppose, no debts of justice to be discharged,
as in this life; (b) the intellectual virtues acquired in this life
will remain, but the soul separated from the body will not employ sense
images as in its earthly existence; (c) faith and hope will give place
to vision and realization, but charity will never fall away.

159. The Complements of the Virtues.--The virtues are habits that
supply the soul with an internal guide (prudence), and with
inclinations to follow its direction (moral virtues). But there is also
a higher Guide who speaks to the soul, and it is necessary that the
inclinations of virtue be carried out in a suprahuman mode. Hence, the
virtues are completed by certain adjuncts. These are: (a) the Gifts of
the Holy Ghost, which are habits infused into the soul, making it
sensitive to the guidance of the Holy Spirit and docile under His
direction; (b) the Fruits of the Holy Ghost, which are acts that grow
out of the virtues and have a special spiritual sweetness attached to
them; (c) the Beatitudes, which are activities of special excellence
having a corresponding special reward attached to them, The acts are
produced by the infused virtues and the Gifts, especially by the Gifts.

160. There are seven Gifts of the Holy Ghost, which are divided as
follows:

(a) There are the Intellectual Gifts, which make the soul more
responsive to the light which the Holy Spirit sheds upon truths held by
faith. These Gifts assist the intellect, first, in its apprehension of
the mysteries of faith, that it may be made to grasp more clearly what
it believes (Gift of Understanding); secondly, in its judgments, that
it may be illuminated so as to adhere to the principles of faith and
depart from their opposites, whether there be question of judgments
about divine things (Gift of Wisdom), or created things (Gift of
Knowledge), or human actions (Gift of Counsel);

(b) There are the Appetitive Gifts, which make the soul more ready to
follow divine motions and inspirations. These Gifts aid the irascible
affections by giving them a confidence of victory over every peril and
by assuring safe arrival at the term of life (Gift of Fortitude); they
aid the will in its social relations by leading to a filial love and
devotion toward God (Gift of Piety); they assist the concupiscible
affections by filling them with a reverence of God’s majesty and a
horror of offending Him (Gift of Fear of the Lord).

161. The Gifts of the Holy Ghost are superior to the moral and
intellectual virtues, for these virtues perfect the powers of the soul
that they may be always ready to follow the guidance of reason, while
the Gifts make the powers of the soul docile to the guidance of the
Holy Ghost.

162. The Gifts of the Holy Ghost are inferior to the theological
virtues, for these virtues unite the soul to the Holy Ghost, while the
Gifts only make the soul ready to receive His illuminations and
inspirations.

163. There are twelve Fruits of the Holy Ghost enumerated by St. Paul
(Gal. v, 22-23). (a) Some of these acts grow out of the indwelling
Spirit, and are delightful to the spiritual taste because they perfect
the agent in himself. Charity, joy, and peace indicate that the soul is
rightly disposed as to what is good; patience and longsuffering, that
it is not disturbed by evils. (b) Others of these Fruits give spiritual
delight because they perfect the agent in his relations to his fellows.
Good will and kindness show that one is well-disposed towards others;
meekness and fidelity, that injury does not overcome him, or make him
deceitful. (c) Still other Fruits are delightful because they order a
man’s life rightly as to external actions or internal passions, such as
modesty, continency, chastity.

164. There are eight Beatitudes enumerated by our Lord. (a) Some of
these are acts that surpass the virtues as regards the use of external
goods and the government of the passions. Thus, it is lawful to have
possessions, but the poor in spirit despise them; it is lawful to
exercise the irascible passions according to reason, but the meek under
divine guidance keep themselves in tranquillity; it is lawful to
rejoice according to moderation, but the mourners, when this is better,
refrain from all rejoicing. (b) Other Beatitudes are acts that surpass
the virtues of justice or liberality to one’s neighbor. Thus, those who
hunger and thirst after justice not only discharge their obligations,
but they do so with the greatest willingness; the merciful bestow their
bounty, not only on their friends and relatives, but on those who are
most in need. (c) Still other Beatitudes are concerned with the acts
that most fit one for the contemplation of divine things, namely, that
in oneself one be pure or heart or free from the defilements of
passion, and that one be peaceful with reference to others. (d) The
final Beatitude is the crown of the others; for one is perfectly
attached to poverty of spirit, meekness, etc., when he is prepared for
their sake to suffer persecution.

165. The rewards promised to the Beatitudes are conferred, not only in
the life to come, but also in the present life. But they are not
necessarily temporal or corporal rewards (such as riches, pleasure,
ete.), but spiritual beatitude, which is a foretaste and figure of the
eternal joy to come.

166. All the Beatitudes may be called Fruits of the Holy Ghost, since
they are the outgrowth of the indwelling Spirit and are filled with
spiritual sweetness. But the Beatitudes are really more excellent than
the Fruits, since they are works of more than ordinary excellence;
whereas every work of virtue that gives delight may be called a Fruit
of the Holy Spirit.




Art. 3: BAD HABITS OR VICES (_Summa Theologica_, I-II, qq. 71-89.)

167. Definition.--A vice is a habit inclining to moral evil. A sin is
an act resulting from a vice, or tending to the formation of a vice; or
it is any thought, word, deed or omission against the law of God.

168. Divisions.--There are various divisions of sins. Thus:

(a) according to the kind of delight that is taken in evil, sins are
either spiritual (e.g., vainglory) or carnal (e.g., intemperance);

(b) according to the person who is more directly offended by evil, sins
are either against God (e.g., heresy, despair, blasphemy), or against
one’s neighbor (e.g., theft, calumny), or against oneself (e.g.,
intemperance, suicide);

(c) according to the greater or less gravity of the evil, sins are
either mortal (e.g., blasphemy) or venial (e.g., idle thoughts);

(d) according as the evil is done by acting or not acting, sins are
either of commission (e.g., theft) or of omission (e.g., failure to pay
debts);

(e) according to the progress of a sin, there are three stages: first,
it is a sin of the heart when it exists only in the mind, as when one
entertains a wish for revenge; secondly, it is a sin of the mouth, when
it is manifested in words, as when one uses contumelious language;
thirdly, it is a sin of work when it is carried out in act, as when one
strikes another in the face;

(f) according to the manner in which they deviate from the golden mean,
sins are either of excess (e.g., extravagance) or of defect (e.g.,
miserliness);

(g) according to the manner in which its guilt is contracted, sin is
either original (i.e., the loss of grace inherited from Adam) or actual
(i.e., the stain derived from one’s own wrongdoing; sec 272 sqq.).

169. Mortal Sin.--A sin is mortal or deadly, when by it a person turns
away from God, his Last End, and prefers to Him some created good,
thereby incurring the debt of eternal punishment.

170. The first condition necessary in order that a sin may be judged
mortal is that the matter of the sin be grave, either in itself or in
the opinion of him who commits it; it must include turning away from
God and the substitution of some created good as the Last End.

171. The matter of a sin is known to be grave: (a) when the law of God
or of the Church declares that it is seriously displeasing to God, or
that it will separate one from His favor or rewards; (b) when right
reason shows that it does great injury to the rights of God, of
society, of one’s neighbor, or of oneself.

172. The matter of a sin is grave in two ways. (a) It is grave from the
character of the act and without exception, when the good which is
injured is infinite, or is a finite good of greatest importance and
indivisible, Thus, heresy, despair, and simony against divine law are
always serious, because they offend against an infinite good; while
murder, though it injures only a finite good, is nevertheless always
grave matter because earthly life is of highest importance among finite
goods, and if taken away is taken entirely. (b) The matter of a sin is
grave from the character of the act but with exceptions, when the good
that is injured is of grave importance, but finite and divisible. Thus,
the worship we give to God is finite and admits of more and less; and
hence a sin against worship, though serious from the nature of the
offence, may be slight on account of the smallness of the irreverence.
Similarly, though theft injures a grave right, it is not grave matter
when the amount stolen is small.

173. The second condition required that a sin be mortal is that there
be full advertence to the grave malice of the act, for one cannot be
said to separate oneself from God unless one has made the same amount
of deliberation that is required for any temporal affair of great
moment.

174. Advertence is the act by which the mind gives attention to
something. It is of two kinds: (a) full advertence, when there is
nothing to impede perfect attention, as when a person is wide awake, in
full possession of his faculties, and not distracted; (b) partial
advertence, when there is something that, prevents entire attention, as
when a person is only partly awake; or not entirely conscious, or
distracted with many things.

175. Hence in the following cases, even though there be serious matter,
a sin is not mortal, on account of lack of full advertence. (a) When
without one’s will there is no full advertence to the act itself, as
happens with those who are half-asleep, or who are under the influence
of drugs, or who are mentally confined by anxiety or physical pain,
etc. (see on Human Acts, 24 sqq.). (b) A sin is not mortal when there
is no full advertence to the sinfulness or to the gravity of the act.
Those who through no fault of their own are unaware that an act is
sinful, or that it is a mortal sin (e.g., children, the half-witted, or
the uninstructed), have no full advertence to the malice of the act;
likewise, those who, without being responsible for their inadvertence,
do not think at the moment of the sinfulness or seriousness of what
they do (e.g., those who think out plans for revenge before they have
taken second thought on its immorality).

176. Signs that indicate that there was no full advertence are: (a) if
afterwards one can scarcely recall what happened; (b) if shortly
afterwards one cannot be sure what was one’s state of mind at the time.

177. Though full advertence is required for a mortal sin, it is not
required that this advertence be the most perfect. (a) It is not
necessary that the advertence be preceded by long deliberation, for
advertence can be full even when the consideration is only momentary,
(b) It is not necessary that advertence be continued during the
commission of a sin, for what follows is foreseen if adverted to at the
beginning. (c) It is not necessary that advertence to the malice of the
sin be clear or exact. One who perceives that there is some special
malice in robbing a church, even though he does not understand just
what the malice is, has sufficient advertence to become guilty of
sacrilege. Likewise, one who has doubts as to whether a certain sin is
mortal, or who suspects that it is mortal, has sufficient advertence
for grave guilt if he commits that sin. (d) It is not necessary that
advertence to the malice of the sin be reflex (i.e., that one advert to
the fact that one is conscious of the gravity of the sin); for to will
the malice, it suffices that one be conscious of the malice. (e) It is
not necessary that advertence to the malice of the sin be explicit
(i.e., that one have in mind the precise nature of sin as an offense
against God, which produces a stain on the soul and incurs the debt of
punishment); for to will evil and its gravity, it suffices that one
perceive the evil and its gravity, even though one does not analyze the
meaning or seek out the ultimate reasons.

178. The third condition required that a sin be mortal is that full
consent of the will be given it, for no one separates him self from God
except through his own free choice. (a) Consent is not full, when there
has not been full advertence, or when an act has been done under
violent compulsion; (b) consent is full when there has been full
advertence and no forceful compulsion (see above on Violence, 52).

179. Indications that consent was not full are: (a) if before the sin
the person was of tender conscience and had habitually a horror of
grave sin; (b) if at the time of the sin the person recoiled from the
sinful suggestion--e.g., if he had a hatred for it as soon as it was
fully perceived, or if he was saddened at the temptation, or if he kept
from an external act that could have been easily performed; (c) if
after the sin the person was conscientious, and yet had doubts as to
whether consent was given.

180. Venial Sin.--A sin is venial, or more easily pardonable, when by
it one turns inordinately towards some created good, not so, however,
as to forsake God as one’s Last End or to prefer self-will to the
divine friendship.

181. The first condition required that a sin be called venial is that
its matter be light, either in reality, or in the invincible belief of
him who commits it. The criteria by which we may know what matter is
light are authority and right reason (see above, 171).

182. The matter of a sin is light in two ways. (a) From the character
of the act, the matter is light when the good which is injured is
finite and of minor importance. Thus, truth about trivial things is of
less importance among finite goods, and consequently a small lie about
some unimportant matter, which helps and does not harm the neighbor, is
light matter. (b) From the quantity of the matter, the matter is light
when the good injured is of major importance but divisible. An example
here is a theft that works only small harm (see above, 172).

183. The second condition for a venial sin is that there be some
advertence to the malice of the act. (a) The advertence is not full
when the matter is grave, and the act done without compulsion, for else
the sin would not be venial but mortal. (b) The advertence may be full
or partial when the matter is light.

184. The third condition for a venial sin is that there be some consent
of the will to the malice of the act. (a) The consent is not full when
the matter is grave, for else the sin would be mortal. (b) The consent
may be either full or partial when the matter is light.

185. Imperfections.--The description of venial sin just given indicates
that it is a voluntary transgression of the law of God in matters of
lighter importance, and is thus distinguished from the various classes
of moral imperfections. These latter imperfections are:

(a) natural imperfections, which are the falling short on the part of
good acts of the higher degree of goodness they might have possessed.
Since man is finite by nature, it is inevitable that he be limited in
the good he does; and hence this kind of imperfection is not a
transgression or a sin;

(b) personal imperfections which are voluntary but not transgressions,
are acts or omissions whose motive is reasonable, but which are
contrary to that which is of counsel. Example: to omit hearing a Mass
that is not obligatory, when one is able to assist at it, but has a
good reason for staying away;

(c) personal imperfections which are transgressions but not voluntary,
are acts or omissions done without deliberation, but which are opposed
to some law of less importance. Example: To pray with involuntary
distractions.

186. Change in the Gravity of Moral Defects.-An imperfection becomes a
sin: (a) if the motive for omitting what is of counsel only is sinful
(e.g., to neglect a Mass that is not of obligation out of contempt);
(b) if a slight indeliberate transgression has a cause that was
voluntary (e.g., involuntary distractions caused by previous neglect).

187. Venial sins become mortal when that which in itself is a slight
offense, becomes in the individual agent a grave offense by reason of
some change in the object or of some grave malice in the purpose,
circumstances, or the foreseen results (see above 97 sqq.).

188. A change in the object makes venial sin mortal: (a) when that
which is light matter objectively is apprehended subjectively as grave
matter (e.g., a person tells a small lie or commits a trifling theft,
thinking these to be mortal sins); (b) when that which is light matter
by itself becomes knowingly grave matter through the additions that are
made to it (e.g., a thief steals small amounts frequently with the
intention of having a great amount of ill-gotten money after a time).

189. It should be noted that, while the matter of venial sins may
coalesce so as to form grave matter and constitute a mortal sin, as
just explained, venial sins themselves do not, from mere
multiplication, ever become mortal, since the difference between mortal
and venial sin is not one of quantity, but of kind. Hence, when acts
are slightly sinful but do not coalesce, they multiply venial sins, but
do not form mortal sin. Example: Coming a few minutes late for Mass
every Sunday.

190. The multiplication of venial sins, especially when they are held
as of no importance, disposes for the commission of mortal sin: (a)
directly, by forming a habit that calls for ever greater indulgence
(e.g., petty thefts lead to dishonesty on a large scale); (b)
indirectly, by familiarizing one with wrongdoing and chilling the love
for virtue.

191. The wrong purpose of the agent makes an act that is only venially
sinful (as far as the object is concerned) to become mortally sinful,
when the purpose contains a grave malice in itself, for the act is then
intended only as a means to what is seriously wrong (see above 80).
Example: To tell a small lie in order to break up friendships and sow
hatreds.

192. The circumstances of an act that is only venially sinful in itself
also make the act mortally sinful, when there is grave malice in such
circumstances. Cases of this kind are the following:

(a) The circumstance of the person committing the sin sometimes changes
the malice from light to grave. Example: Unbecoming levity in one in
authority may cause serious disrespect for his office and thus be
gravely sinful;

(b) The circumstance of the manner in which an act is performed may
change it from a venial to a mortal sin, as when the sin is committed
out of contempt, or is so coveted that it would be preferred to a grave
obligation. Examples: One who violates a law of lesser moment, not
because he regards it as bad, but because he wishes to show his
disregard of all law and authority; or one who is so attached to games
of chance that he is prepared to steal a large sum rather than give
them up.

193. The serious harm that is foreseen as a result of venial sin also
changes the malice from slight to serious. Examples: One who jokingly
annoys another, knowing that this will provoke grave dissensions; or
one who tells small lies to persons who are known for their
uncharitable distortions and exaggerations; or one who agrees to take
too much strong drink knowing from experience that this invariably
leads to serious excess.

194. Mortal sins become venial when that which in itself is a grave
offense, becomes light by reason of some change in he object or lack of
full consent in the subject.

195. A change in the object makes a mortal sin venial: (a) when that
which is grave matter objectively, is apprehended through inculpable,
or only venially culpable ignorance as light matter (e.g., when an
uninstructed child thinks that a serious calumny is only a venial sin);
(b) when a sin whose character is serious but whose matter is divisible
is small as to matter (e.g,, to be absent from a small part of the Mass
on Sunday); (e) when a law whose obligation is grave will cause more
than slight inconvenience in a particular case, and thus becomes of
light obligation for that case (e.g., to miss Mass on Sunday because of
a difficulty that was not unsurmountable, but yet considerable).

196. Lack of sufficient advertence or of full consent makes a mortal
sin venial; (a) when without serious fault one does not advert to a
gravely sinful act (e.g., a desire of revenge); (b) when without
serious fault one does not know or does not think about the grave
malice of what one is doing (e.g., to repeat a story, not knowing or
not remembering at the time that it is a serious calumny); (c) when on
account of considerable excitement, fear or other disturbance, one
gives only partial consent to an act that is mortally sinful (e.g.,
when one, on being suddenly insulted, replies with a serious
imprecation).

197. The Distinction of Sins.--There are three kinds of distinction of
sins: (a) sins that differ according to theological species, that is,
according as they turn or do not turn the sinner away from God as his
Last End. There are only two theological species of sin, viz., mortal
and venial; (b) sins that differ according to moral species, that is,
according to their essences, or the various kinds of finite good to
which they turn the sinner. There are many moral species of sins, for
example, infidelity, uncharitableness, etc.; (c) sins that differ
according to number, but agree according to moral species (e.g., two
distinct acts of uncharitable hatred).

198. The criteria for the specific distinction of sins are two:

(a) that which makes sins to differ specifically is the difference of
the objects to which they tend, inasmuch as these created goods are out
of harmony in specifically different ways with the standards of
morality (e.g., pride and gluttony); (b) that by which we recognize the
specific difference of sins is the opposition they have to virtues or
laws that are specifically different. Thus, pride is opposed to
humility, gluttony to temperance--two different virtues.

199. The following rules assist us in recognizing specific distinctions
of sins. (a) Those sins are specifically different which are opposed to
virtues that are specifically distinct. Thus, infidelity and despair
are different in species, because opposed to faith and hope, which are
two distinct species of virtue. (b) Those sins are specifically
different that are opposed to specifically different objects of one and
the same virtue--that is, to functions of the virtue, or to laws
concerning it that have intrinsically different motives. Thus, sins of
murder, theft, and false testimony, though opposed to the same virtue
of justice, are specifically distinct, since they contravene
obligations of that virtue whose purposes are morally distinct. (c)
Those sins are specifically different that are opposed in specifically
different ways to the same object of the same virtue, one opposing that
object by way of excess and the other by way of defect. Thus,
miserliness and extravagance are specifically distinct sins, because
one falls short of, while the other goes beyond, the golden mean that
is found in liberality.

200. Sins are not specifically distinct: (a) when they are opposed to
the same virtue in ways that are physically, but not morally, contrary.
Thus, sins of omission and sins of commission are physically opposites,
but they are not morally so, unless they offend against different moral
objects in the ways explained in the preceding paragraph. Hence, to
steal and to refuse to pay debts, to take and to keep what belongs to
another, are not specifically different sins; whereas to violate two
distinct precepts about the same virtue, one a command and the other a
prohibition, is to commit two species of sin, one by omission, and the
other by commission;

(b) when they are opposed to the same virtue with reference to commands
that differ in their lawgivers, but not in their motives. Thus, God,
the Church, and the State all forbid theft; but he who steals is not
therefore guilty of three sins, for each lawgiver forbids theft from
the same intrinsic motive, viz., because it is an injury.

201. One and the same act contains in itself many sins, when it has
many malices specifically different. Thus, he who kills his parents
violates two commandments relative to the virtue of justice; he who
steals from a church is guilty of theft and of sacrilege.

202. Sins that are multiplied numerically within the same species are
committed in three ways: (a) by purely internal acts, that is, acts
that are completed within the powers of the soul and do not tend to
execution in some external act (e.g., unbelief, envy, pride, delight in
the thought of sin, etc.); (b) by internal acts that are not completed
in the will, but tend to execution in some external act (e.g., the
purpose or desire to injure another, to lie, etc.); (c) by external
acts that are performed or neglected by the bodily faculties under
command of the will (e.g., theft, quarrels, lies, omissions of duty,
etc.).

203. Acts may be numerically one or many in two ways.

(a) Physically, there is one act when the agent moves or puts into
action a power of the soul or body only once (e.g., to steal from a
church). Physically, there are many acts when the agent exercises
different operative faculties, or the same one different times (e.g.,
to put one’s hand many times into a money box in order to steal the
entire contents).

(b) Morally, there is one act when a single physical act does not
contain more than one species of morality, or when several physical
acts are united as parts of one whole by reason of the intention of the
agent, or the nature of the acts themselves. For example, the wish to
steal is morally one act. The intention to steal, the decision to use
certain means to accomplish this intention, the various attempts made,
and finally the carrying out of the plan--all these form morally but
one act, since the acts that follow are only the development of the
original intention. Similarly, several curses hurled at another form
morally one act, if all are uttered under the influence of the same
passion of anger. Finally, acts of spying on another, of entering his
house without permission, and of taking his property unlawfully, are
morally one act, because the first acts are naturally the preparation
for what follows.

204. Morally, there are several acts when a single physical act
contains several species of malice (as when one steals from a church),
or when there are several physical acts not united by any bond of
common purpose or natural subordination (as when one steals on
different occasions because an opportunity suddenly presented itself,
or as when one misses Mass on different Sundays).

205. Objects of acts may also be numerically one or many in two ways.

(a) Physically, an object is one when it has its own proper
individuality different from that of others. Thus, each coin in a
pocket-book is physically one thing, each member of a family is
physically one person. Objects are physically many, when they include
more than one distinct thing or person. Thus, physically a pocket-book
contains many objects, as does also a family.

(b) Morally, objects that are physically many become one, if they are
not such as to require morally distinct acts in their regard, and if
they form according to prudent judgment parts of an integral or
collective whole. Otherwise, these objects are morally many. Example:
Missing Mass for a whole year constitutes, morally speaking, many
objects, since it implies many independent external omissions, or
morally distinct acts. A box of ordinary coins, though it contains many
individual pieces of money, is commonly regarded as one integral
object; and likewise religious, civil, domestic, and financial bodies,
though each is made up of many members, are each, morally speaking, but
one person. The possessions of different proprietors, however, are not
one moral object; neither do the individual, personal rights of the
members of one group constitute a single object.

206. It is clear that two sins specifically different in malice are also
numerically different (e.g., a sin of theft and a sin of calumny). The
rules that follow will pertain only to sins that are of the same
species, but that differ numerically within the species (e.g., two
distinct sins of theft, two distinct sins of calumny).

207. The rules for the numerical distinction of sins within the same
species suppose: (a) that the distinction be not taken from the object,
which gives the specific difference, but from the repetition of acts
with regard to one object, made either actually (by different acts) or
equivalently (by what is equal to different acts); (b) that the
distinction be not taken from a physical but from a moral consideration
of the acts.

208. Three rules of numerical distinction will be given, one for each
of the three following hypotheses: (a) many distinct acts are concerned
with morally distinct objects of the same species; (b) many distinct
acts are concerned with what is morally one object; (c) one act is
concerned with what are physically many, but morally one object.

209. First Rule of Numerical Distinction.--Many sinful acts, each of
which is concerned with an object that is distinct in number (morally
speaking) from the objects of the other acts, make as many numerically
distinct sins as there are acts and objects numerically distinct.
Example: He who fires distinct shots and unjustly kills three persons
is guilty of three murders.

210. Second Rule of Numerical Distinction.--Many sinful acts, all of
which are concerned with an object that is (morally speaking) one and
the same in number, make as many numerically distinct sins as there are
acts numerically distinct according to moral estimation.

211. When the acts concerned with the same object are purely internal,
they are multiplied numerically, according to moral estimation, in the
following cases:

(a) when they are repeated after having been renounced by an act of the
will. Example: He who hates in the morning, repents at noon, and
returns to his hate in the afternoon, commits two sins of hatred;

(b) when they are repeated after having been voluntarily discontinued,
if the interval between the two acts is so considerable that the second
act is not a mere continuation of the first. Example: He who in his
mind reviles an enemy passing by, then turns his attention to his work
and thinks no more about his anger, and later, seeing his enemy again,
reviles him mentally a second time, commits two sins;

(c) when they are repeated after having been involuntarily
discontinued, if a notable period (say, three hours) intervenes between
the two acts. Example: He who thinks thoughts of hatred until he falls
asleep, or until he is distracted from them by something unusual going
on about him, or by the entrance of a visitor, commits a second sin of
hatred, when he returns to the same thoughts, if the interruption was
so long that there is no moral connection between the two acts.

212. When acts tending to the same object are internal, but directed
towards completion in some external act, they are multiplied
numerically, in moral estimation, in the following cases:

(a) when they are repeated after having been renounced. Example: He who
decides to steal, but repents for his sin, and then again decides to
steal, commits two sins;

(b) when they are repeated after voluntary discontinuance, if the
interval is not merely momentary. Example: He who thinks over a plan to
acquire money unjustly, and then deliberately turns his thought away
and gives all his attention to lawful affairs, but later resumes the
dishonest planning, commits a new sin;

(c) when they are repeated after involuntary discontinuance, if the
interval is notable in view of the external act desired, and nothing
external was done that could serve as a link to unify the two acts.
Example: A burglar plans a robbery that could easily be carried out at
once, but he takes no steps to execute his plan, and soon forgets about
it. A month later, passing the house he had intended to rob, he
remembers his plan and carries it out. Two distinct sins were here
committed.

213. Involuntary discontinuance does not, however, separate the acts
into two distinct sins: (a) if the interval was brief in view of the
external act that was desired (e.g., if the burglar above mentioned had
forgotten his plan for a few days only before he renewed it and carried
it out); (b) if something had already been done by reason of the first
act (e.g., if the burglar, after resolving to rob the house, had
procured keys or tools for the purpose, and had kept them with this in
mind, although he allowed months and years to pass without making any
attempt to fulfill his design).

214. When the acts tending to the same object are external, they are
multiplied numerically in moral estimation, and make distinct sins as
follows: (a) if the internal acts from which they proceed are
numerically distinct sins (e.g., if a burglar attempts to rob a house,
but leaves his work unfinished because he becomes conscience-stricken
or is interrupted, and later makes another plan and another attempt,
there are two sins); (b) if the external acts are of such a kind that
no internal intention can make them morally one act, even when one
follows directly upon the other (e.g., missing Mass on Sunday and again
on the following day, a holyday, makes one guilty of two distinct
violations of the law).

215. In the following cases, however, distinct external acts with
reference to the same object do not multiply the number of sins: (a)
when these acts form a part of one moral whole, and are intended as
such by the agent (e.g., one who reads a forbidden book, but divides it
into parts, reading only so many pages a day); (b) when these acts have
to one another the relation of means to a common end, and they are
intended as such by the agent (e.g., various preparations made for
robbery).

216. Third Rule of Numerical Distinction.--One sinful act, internal or
external, that is concerned with objects that are physically many, but
morally one, makes but one sin in number. Example: He who steals a
purse that contains ten bills commits one sin; he who calumniates a
family of ten persons commits one sin; he who steals what is the common
property of three proprietors commits one sin.

217. When the objects are not morally one of themselves, they may
become so through the belief of the one who acts, since distinct
malices are not incurred except as apprehended (see 588-592). Example:
He who tells three different lies against a neighbor (e.g., that he is
a thief, a drunkard and a liar), commits one sin of calumny, if he has
in mind general injury to reputation, but does not think at the time of
the special injuries contained in his calumny. Likewise, he who
calumniates before ten persons commits but one sin of calumny, if,
being in a passion, he thinks only of the harm he wishes to cause and
not of the number of persons who are present.

218. When the objects are morally one, they may become many through the
intention of the one who acts. Example: He who calumniates a family of
three persons by saying they are all dishonest, commits three sins, if
he intends three distinct injuries (e.g., against the business of one,
the religious reputation of another, and the friendship of the third).
So also he who steals part of the money in a purse, and later on,
having another opportunity, decides to steal the rest, commits two sins.

219. When the objects are not morally one in themselves and cannot be
apprehended as such, distinct sins are committed. Example: He who
intends to miss Mass all year, foresees at least in a confused way many
distinct violations of the law; he who purposes to rob various
proprietors foresees at least in a vague way many separate and complete
external acts of robbery.

220. Comparison of Sins.--Sins that differ in species differ also in
gravity, those being more serious that depart further from the norms of
reason and the law of God.

221. Other things being equal, those sins are worse that offend against
a more noble object or a more noble virtue. Hence, sins that are
directly against God (such as infidelity, despair, and hatred of God)
are the most serious of all; while sins against human personality (such
as murder) are more serious than those against human rights (such as
theft).

222. Of those sins that are opposed to the same virtue, that one is
worse which is opposed to the principal inclination of the virtue.
Thus, avarice is more foreign to the virtue of liberality than the
opposite vice of prodigality; timidity is more contrary to bravery than
its opposite rashness.

223. The gravity of a sin is increased in the following ways:

(a) by the circumstances, in so far as they give it a new species of
malice (e.g., theft from a church) or increase its malice within the
species (e.g., money given prodigally and to those who do not deserve
it, or money stolen in a large quantity);

(b) by the greater willingness with which the sin is committed. Hence,
those who sin through ignorance or under the excitement of passion are
less guilty than those who sin in cold blood;

(c) by the condition of the person offended. Thus, a sin is made worse
according as the person offended is nearer to God by reason of his
personal holiness or the sacredness of his state or the dignity of his
office, or is nearer to the offender himself. Hence, an injury is
greater if done to a priest, a public official or one’s own family,
than if done to another who has not the same claim to honor or justice;

(d) by the condition of the person who sins. Those who are better
instructed or otherwise better advantaged, or who are supposed to give
good example to others, sin more grievously by reason of their greater
ingratitude and of the greater scandal they give, whenever they sin
deliberately;

(e) by the evil results that follow from the sin, when these are
willed, even indirectly or implicitly, as when one spreads stories that
are bound to cause enmities, strifes, and a lowering of ideals (see 96).

224. Spiritual and carnal sins, considered precisely as such, and other
things being equal, may be compared from two viewpoints, viz., of
malice and of reputation. (a) From the viewpoint of malice, spiritual
sins are worse, since, while a carnal sinner is carried away by strong
passion and offends directly only his own body, he who commits
spiritual sins acts with greater freedom and offends directly against
God and his neighbor. Hence, the Pharisees, though they despised the
fallen woman, were worse than she, since in the eyes of God their
pride, envy, detraction, hypocrisy, etc., were more hateful crimes.

(b) From the viewpoint of reputation, carnal sins are worse, since they
liken man more to the beast, and are thus more infamous.

225. In actual experience, carnal sins are frequently more grave than
non-carnal sins.

(a) Many carnal sins are not purely carnal, but also contain other
malice, and cause directly more injury to God or the neighbor than a
non-carnal sin of the same category. Example: Adultery combines both
lust and injustice, and is a greater injustice than the non-carnal sin
of theft. Rape combines lust and injury, and is more injurious than the
non-carnal sin of anger resulting in bodily blows. Lascivious
conversation combines impurity and spiritual damage to another, and is
more harmful than the non-carnal sin of detracting that other and
causing him some temporal injury.

(b) Many carnal sins are accompanied by greater malice or greater
scandal, or are followed by greater evils than purely spiritual sins.
Example: Sins of impurity or drunkenness, committed habitually and
deliberately or by adults, are more malicious than sins of pride or
anger committed rarely or without full deliberation, or by children.
Drunkenness or licentious language and suspicious intimacies, committed
by those from whom good example is expected, do more to undermine
religion than sins of impatience or uncharitableness in the same
persons. The results of a man’s pride (such as ambition, arrogance,
luxurious living and deceitfulness) are often less disastrous than the
results of his intemperance (such as detraction, immodesty, fights,
extravagance, disgrace of family, etc.).

226. Sins different in species rank in the order of gravity, as said
above, according to their objects. For, just as diseases are considered
more serious when they affect more important vital organs or functions,
so sins are more grave when they affect more radical principles of
human conduct. The greater the object or end of action that is injured,
therefore, the greater is the harm done and the greater the sin
committed. Hence: (a) sins committed directly against God are worse
than sins committed against creatures, for God is the end of all
creatures; (b) sins committed against persons are greater than sins
committed against things, for persons are the end of things.

227. Of the sins committed against God, the rank according to gravity
is: (a) sins against the personality of God--that is, against the
divine nature--such as hatred of God (the greatest of all sins),
infidelity, despair; (b) sins against the peculiar possessions of
God--that is, His external honor and glory, and those things that
belong to Him in a special way, such as the humanity of Christ
hypostatically united to the Word, the Sacraments, and things
consecrated to God. Such sins are idolatry, superstition, perjury, the
sins of those who had Christ crucified, simony, sacrilege, unworthy
reception of the Eucharist or other Sacrament, violation of vows, etc.

228. Sins committed against creatures, other things being equal, rank
in gravity as follows: (a) Sins against personality are greater than
sins against possessions. Example: The sin of murder, which is against
personality, is worse than the sin of theft, which is against
possessions. (b) Sins against being are greater than sins against
wellbeing. Examples: Murder is worse than mutilation, and scandal that
causes another to lose his soul is worse than scandal that only
diminishes another’s goodness; murder and the irreparable scandal take
away life, mutilation and the lesser scandal only diminish the
perfection of the life that is had. (c) Sins against those who have a
greater claim are greater than sins against those who have a less
claim. Examples: It is a greater sin to neglect one’s own salvation
than that of a neighbor; to murder a member of one’s own family, a
benefactor, or a person distinguished on account of his position or
virtue, is a greater crime than to murder a stranger, an enemy, a
private individual, or one of bad life. (d) Sins against possessions
that are dearer are graver offenses. Examples: It is worse to steal
away the peace of a household than to carry off its material treasures;
it is worse to rob a man of his good name than to defraud him of his
wages.

229. The above rating of sins is based on their natures considered in
the abstract, that is, according to the essential relations they have
to their own proper objects. It is impossible to consider any other
factor when drawing up general rules of comparison; for the
circumstances that enter into concrete cases of sin are innumerable,
and hence have to be left out of consideration. By reason of these
factors other than the object, however, the ranking of sins according
to gravity given above may be changed or reversed.

(a) In the act of a greater sin there may be extenuating circumstances,
or in the act of a lesser sin aggravating circumstances that change
their respective order. Example: Detraction is from its nature worse
than theft; but, if the detraction does only small harm and the theft
great harm, the theft is worse on account of the circumstances.

(b) In the persons who commit the sins there may be circumstances that
change the order of guilt, so that he who commits the greater sin is
less guilty. Examples: By his careless handling of a revolver, Balbus
unintentionally causes lasting injury to a bystander. Caius without
malice aforethought, but enraged by an unexpected insult, strikes a
blow that destroys the sight in one eye of his adversary. Titus, angry
because he has been dismissed from his employment, revenges himself by
defacing a precious work of art. The bodily injuries caused by the
first two men are more harmful than the injury to property done by
Titus; but they sinned, the one from ignorance and the other from
passion, whereas Titus sinned from malice. Hence, while the sins of
Balbus and Caius are objectively or materially greater, that of Titus
is greater subjectively or formally (i.e., as to guilt).

230. The Subjects of Sin.--By the subjects of sin we understand the
powers of the soul in which sin is found. These powers are sometimes
called the material causes of sin, just as the objects to which the
sins tend are called their formal causes.

231. Just as virtuous habits have their seats in the will (e.g.,
justice), in the reason (e.g., prudence), and in the sensitive
appetites (e.g., fortitude and temperance), so also contrary habits of
vice may be found in these same faculties. (a) From the sensitive
appetites proceed impulses caused by sense apprehension or bodily
states, which, when they are inordinate and voluntary, are sinful
(e.g., lust, envy; see 129, on Second Motions). (b) From the reason
proceed false judgments caused by vincible ignorance, wrong direction
deliberately given to the passions, pleasurable dwelling on inordinate
thoughts, etc. (c) From the will proceed consent given to sins of the
other powers, desires to commit sin, joy over sin already committed,
etc.

232. As was said above (89-93), the external acts of the members of the
body have no morality of their own, since they are completely subject
to the will. Consequently, there are only three classes of sins, if
classification is made according to the faculties from which the sins
proceed: (a) sins of sensuality, which were spoken of above when we
treated of the passions (177 sqq.); (b) sins of thought; (c) sins of
desire and reminiscent approval.

233. Pleasurable dwelling on inordinate thoughts occurs when one
deliberately, even though it be only for a moment, turns over in his
mind some sinful object, delighting in it as if it were actually
present, but not desiring that it be actually done. Example; One who
imagines his neighbor’s house burned down, and rejoices at the mental
picture, though for interested reasons he does not wish any
conflagration in the vicinity.

234. The sinful thoughts just described are not to be confused with
thoughts in which the object of the delight is something else than a
sinful picture represented in the mind.

Thoughts of this latter kind are: (a) those in which one takes delight
in an external act of sin being committed, as when one destroys one’s
neighbor’s property with great internal satisfaction; here the thought
forms one sin with the outer act; (b) those in which one delights in
the mental image, not as it represents something morally wrong, but as
it contains some object of lawful delight. There is a distinction
between bad thoughts and thoughts on things that are bad. Examples: A
moralist may think with pleasure about theft, not because he approves
of it, but because it is a subject he has to know. A person may read
detective stories with great interest, not because crime appeals to
him, but because the style of the author is good, the details of the
plot exciting, the manner of the crime mysterious, etc. There is danger
in thoughts of this kind, however, if one indulges in them from mere
curiosity, or immoderately, or if sin itself may take an attraction
through them.

235. The gravity and species of pleasurable dwelling on inordinate
thoughts vary according to the thing thought on (see on Objects, etc.,
70 sqq.). (a) If pleasure is taken only in the object represented, the
sin has the moral character of that object. Example: He who delights at
the thought of theft, is guilty of theft; and if he thinks of a great
theft, he is guilty of mortal sin. (b) If pleasure is also taken in the
circumstances imaged in the mind, the sin takes on the added malice
contained in the circumstances. Example: He who delights over the
thought of the robbery of a church, is guilty of mental theft and
sacrilege.

236. The following are signs that delight taken in a thought about
sinful things is about their sinfulness, and not about some other of
their properties: (a) if one thinks about them without any lawful
necessity (such as that of study), but through mere curiosity, or
without any good reason; (b) if at the same time one loves to think on
them frequently and lingeringly, or shown great satisfaction whenever
they are mentioned. Example: One who thinks about injustices for
pastime and admires them as great exploits, who idolizes criminals as
heroes or martyrs.

237. Sinful joy is an act of the will by which one takes delight in
sins already committed by oneself or by others. We must distinguish
between sinful joy and joy about things that are sinful.

(a) Sinful joy rejoices over the iniquity contained in past acts,
either because it loves that iniquity in itself, or because it loves it
as the cause of some gain. Examples: An unjust and revengeful man
rejoices when he thinks of the oppression he exercised against some
helpless person who had incurred his wrath. A criminal recalls with joy
the perjuries by which his helpers secured his escape from justice.

(b) Joy about things that are sinful or consequent on sin rejoices, not
that what was done was wicked, but over other circumstances that were
good or indifferent. Examples: An employer admires in the conduct of a
dishonest employee, not the injustice committed, but the shrewd manner
in which the fraud was perpetrated. A bystander is very much amused to
witness a fight, not because he likes discord, but because the acts and
remarks of the fighters are comical. A man rejoices when he hears that
a friend has committed suicide and made him his heir, if the joy is
confined to the second part of the news.

238. The moral gravity and species of evil rejoicing has the same
character as the past sins that are its object (see 70 sqq.). For to
rejoice over sin is to approve of it, and therefore to be guilty of it
in will. Example: A prisoner who, to overcome melancholy, thinks over
the times he became intoxicated in the past, is guilty again of those
sins, with their number and circumstances adverted to.

239. What has been said about evil rejoicing applies likewise: (a) to
boasting over sin committed, because this implies complacency in the
sin; (b) to sorrow over sin omitted, because this means that one
approves of sin rather than virtue.

240. To be sorry because one performed good that was not obligatory is
not sinful of itself, but it may become so by reason of the evil motive
of the sorrow, or of the danger of sin. Examples: If a person is sorry
that he performed many unnecessary devotional exercises, because he
injured his health thereby, his sorrow is not sinful. If he grieves
over this because he now dislikes religion, his sorrow is made bad by
his evil motive. If he regrets that he married, this is sinful if it
leads him to neglect the duties of his state and commit injustice.

241. Evil desires are acts of the will by which one deliberately
intends to commit sin in the future. They are of two kinds, viz.,
absolute and conditional: (a) absolute or efficacious desires are those
in which the mind is fully made up to carry out the evil design, come
what may; (b) conditional or inefficacious desires are those in which
the purpose to commit sin hinges upon the fulfillment of some event or
circumstance that is explicitly or implicitly willed.

242. Absolute evil desires have the same moral gravity and species as
that to which they tend (i.e., they take their character from the
object, end and circumstances). Example: He who plans to steal a large
sum from a benefactor in order to be able to live in idleness and
dissipation, sins gravely against justice, and is also guilty of
ingratitude and intemperance, for he has committed all these sins in
his heart.

243. Conditional evil desires, if they are indeliberate and express
rather the propensity of nature than the considered will of him who
makes them, are not formally sinful. Examples: A poor man who
unthinkingly wishes that stealing were lawful; a sufferer who under the
influence of pain wishes that the Almighty had not forbidden suicide.

244. Conditional desires, if made deliberately, are of two kinds. (a)
There are some desires in which the condition willed (e.g., if this
were not a sin, if this were lawful, if this were allowed by God, etc.)
takes away the malice of the act desired, since some laws may be
dispensed or changed. Examples: “Would that God had not pronounced
against taking the property of others!” “I would stay away from church,
if this were not Sunday.” Desires of this kind are not sinful on
account of their object, which is not really wished, but on account of
their end, or their lack of useful purpose, and of the danger that the
conditional may become absolute. (b) There are other desires in which
the condition does not take away the malice of what is desired, either
because the condition is not at all concerned with the malice, or
because it wishes something to become lawful which even God cannot make
lawful. Examples: “I would steal, if this could be done safely.” “I
would blaspheme, if God permitted.” These desires partake of the malice
of the things that are wished.

245. Just as we distinguished above between bad thoughts and thoughts
on things that are bad, so may we distinguish between bad desires and
desires of what is bad. For bad desires that are not mere velleities
are sinful, as we have just seen; whereas the desire of what is
physically evil is good, if the evil is wished, not for its own sake,
but for the sake of some greater good. Example: To desire out of hatred
that a neighbor lose his arm is a bad desire and sinful; but if one
wished this as a means to save the neighbor’s life, while he still
desires something evil, it is not the evil but the benefit that is
intended, and hence the desire itself is not bad.

246. The Causes of Sin.--The causes of sin are partly internal (i.e.,
those which are in man himself) and partly external (i.e., those which
are without).

247. The internal causes of sin are: (a) ignorance in the intellect;
(b) passion in the sensitive appetites; (c) malice in the will.

248. Since ignorance and passion may render an act involuntary (see 40
sqq.), the sins that result from them are of two kinds, viz., material
and formal. (a) Material or objective sins are transgressions of the
law that are involuntary, and consequently not imputable as faults.
Examples: Blasphemies uttered by one who is delirious or hypnotized;
breaking of the fast by one who is inculpably ignorant of the law;
imprecations pronounced by a person out of his mind through fear. (b)
Formal or subjective sins are transgressions of the law that are
voluntary, and hence imputable as faults. They are not only against the
law, as is the case with material sins, but they are also against
conscience.

249. Ignorance, passion and malice cause sin as follows:

(a) Every sin results from practical error (i.e., from a wrong decision
as to what one should do here and now), for the will chooses wrong only
after the intellect has decided on wrong. In this sense, then, it is
said that all who sin are in error (Prov,, xiv. 22), and that every
sinner is in ignorance (Aristotle, _Nich. Ethics_, Bk. III, c.1, 1110b
27). But not every sin results from speculative error (i.e., from a
false notion or judgment about the lawfulness of an act in general).
else we should have to hold that everyone who sins is in error against
the faith;

(b) Speculative ignorance causes formal sin, when the ignorance is
culpable and leads to wrongdoing, as when a person has never taken the
pains to learn what the law of fast requires and in consequence
violates the law, or when an automobilist through carelessness does not
see a person crossing the street and runs him down. Speculative
ignorance causes material sin, when the lack of knowledge is inculpable
and leads one to do what one would not otherwise do, as when a child
shoots a playmate, not knowing that this is a sin, or a soldier shoots
a comrade whom, on account of darkness, he mistook for an enemy spy;

(c) Passion, by clouding the judgment and vehemently inciting the will,
leads one to act against one’s better knowledge and to choose
inordinately the concupiscences of pleasure, or possessions, or glory
(I John, ii. 16). If the passion is voluntary, the resulting sin is
formal; but, if the passion is involuntary and takes away the use of
reason, the sin caused is material;

(d) Malice is found in a sense in every formal sin, inasmuch as every
sin is committed out of choice. But malice in the strict sense, as here
understood, is a choice of sin made, not on account of preceding
ignorance or passion, but on account of some corrupt disposition of the
sinner which makes sin pleasing or acceptable to him, such as a vicious
habit or inclination which he cultivates, or willful despair or
presumption which he entertains.

250. Ignorance and passion do not always make an act involuntary (see
40 sqq.), and hence three kinds of formal sins may be distinguished
according to the three kinds of causes from which they proceed:

(a) sins of weakness, which are those that result from antecedent
concupiscence or other passion that lessens without taking away the
voluntariness of an act. Since the First Person of the Trinity is
especially described by the attribute of almighty power, sins of this
kind are sometimes called sins against the Father;

(b) sins of ignorance, which are those that result from antecedent and
vincible ignorance. Since wisdom is especially attributed to the Second
Person of the Trinity, sins of this kind are called sins against the
Son;

(c) sins of malice, which are those that proceed entirely from a free
will that is undisturbed by ignorance or passion. Since love is
especially ascribed to the Third Person of the Trinity, sins of this
class are sometimes called sins against the Holy Ghost. Example: One
whose heart is so set on wealth that he decides to sacrifice the
friendship of God for new acquisitions; one who sees clearly the
offense to God a sin entails, and deliberately chooses it; one who is
so jealous of a neighbor that he schemes to ruin him; one who sins
habitually without fear or remorse.

251. Other things being equal, sins of malice are graver than sins of
weakness and sins of ignorance, since the former are more voluntary,
more enduring, and more dangerous. But just as sins of ignorance and
sins of weakness may be mortal, as when their object is seriously
wrong, so sins of malice may be venial, as when their object is not
seriously wrong. A fully deliberate lie that works no great harm is
venially sinful, whereas a murder committed by one who was intoxicated
or moved by rage is a mortal sin, if there was sufficient reflection.

252. The external causes of sin are: (a) the devil or other evil
spirits, who by acting on the imagination or other sensitive powers of
the soul attempt to draw mankind to destruction; (b) the world, that
is, the persons and things about us, which by their seductiveness, or
by their principles and examples, tend to draw away from the practice
of virtue.

253. Since free consent is implied in the concept of formal sin, none
of the internal or external causes of sin just mentioned, the choice of
the will alone excepted, can actually effect sin. Hence the distinction
between temptation and sin. The rebellion of the passions, the
suggestions of evil spirits, the seductions of the world, are
temptations; if the will does not yield to them, there is no sin, but
rather virtue and merit.

254. In the presence of temptation fully adverted to, it is not lawful
to remain indifferent (neither consenting nor dissenting), since this
without just cause exposes one to the danger (see 258 sqq.) of being
overcome by sin.

255. Resistance to temptation is made by the act of the will which
commands the other powers not to yield and withholds its own consent to
the sin suggested. This resistance may be:

(a) implicit or explicit, according as the dissent is expressed in what
contains it, or is expressed in itself. Examples: Contempt of a
temptation or displeasure over its presence is implicit resistance,
while the resolve never to yield to it is explicit resistance;

(b) internal or external, according as it remains in the will, or is
also exercised by the other powers. Examples: Displeasure over an
uncharitable thought is internal resistance, while the reading of a
book to divert the mind from the thought is external resistance;

(c) indirect or direct, according as the means employed to drive away a
temptation are flight or attack. Examples: One who is disturbed by
thoughts of hatred, resists them indirectly if he goes to the opera in
order to be calmed by music, while he resists them directly, if he
reads prayerfully I Cor. xiii, in order to become more charitable;

(d) virtual or actual, according as the act of dissent made, and not
retracted, is adverted to or not. Examples: If a man rejects a
temptation of envy as soon as he notices it, and repeats this act of
rejection until the temptation has disappeared, his resistance is
actual; if he rejects the temptation once for all as soon as it
appears, but is not able to think of this purpose at each instant, his
resistance was actual at the beginning, but virtual afterwards.

256. General rules regarding resistance to temptation: (a) it is a
grave sin not to resist temptation, when the sin suggested is grave,
the danger of consent serious, and the negligence considerable;
otherwise the sin is venial; (b) negligence is considerable when the
resistance used is not at all in proportion to the temptation. Example:
If a man were suddenly to advert to the fact that a shrewd plan he had
decided on was gravely unjust, he would be seriously negligent if he
put off recalling the decision till he had dwelt more fully on its
appealing features.

257. The kind of resistance to be opposed to temptation depends on the
character and urgency of the temptation and the disposition of the
person tempted. (a) Generally speaking, the more serious the
temptation, the stronger should be the resistance. Example: One who
knows from experience that temptations to hatred overcome him, if he
uses only internal resistance, should make use of external resistance
also. (b) In those cases in which the violence of the temptation
increases in proportion to the strength of the resistance, it is better
that the resistance be internal, indirect, etc. Examples: Temptations
against faith are often overcome more readily by turning the mind away
from the doubts suggested to other matters. Temptations that last a
long time may be conquered more easily by despising them than by
worrying about them and renewing protest after protest. The same is
true as regards temptations against purity.

258. Danger of sin is the likelihood that it will be committed in
certain circumstances. It is of two kinds, proximate and remote. (a)
Danger of sin is proximate, when there is moral certainty that in given
circumstances sin will be committed, either because the generality of
mankind falls in such cases (absolute danger), or because in them a
particular individual has always fallen (relative danger). Examples:
Associating with depraved persons is a proximate danger of sin for
anyone, since it is a matter of universal experience that evil
associations corrupt good morals. Taking strong drink is a proximate
danger for one who has never imbibed moderately in the past. (b) Danger
of sin is remote, when the likelihood that sin will be committed is not
morally certain, and does not exclude a serious and well-founded
probability or expectation to the contrary. Example: There is remote
danger in an occasional drink, if a person who had several times
relapsed into intemperance, has practised abstemiousness for years.

259. Possibility of sin is the conceivability but unlikelihood that it
will result from a certain set of circumstances. Example: Attention to
business sometimes makes a man avaricious, practices of piety may
degenerate into hypocrisy, etc., but there is no natural connection
between industry and devotion, on the one hand, and greed and
insincerity, on the other hand. Sin follows naturally from its danger,
but only accidentally from its possibility.

260. It is not lawful imprudently to expose oneself to the danger of
sin, since it is manifestly against reason to risk spiritual loss
without cause. The character of the sin of him who does this differs
according to circumstances. (a) He who rashly exposes himself to the
proximate danger of grave sin, or to what he foresees will become
proximate danger, is guilty of grave sin and of the species of sin to
which he exposes himself--and this even though the sin does not
actually follow. For to love what is so closely related to the sin is
to love the sin itself. (b) He who rashly exposes himself to the remote
danger of grave sin or to the proximate danger of venial sin is
venially guilty. For, while such action is unreasonable, it does not
imply affection for grave sin.

261. It is lawful to expose oneself to the danger of sin, if this can
be done according to the laws of prudence, for otherwise absurdities
would follow (e.g., that urgent duties should not be performed, if one
feared they contained the danger of sin). The requirements of prudence
referred to are: (a) that the one who exposes himself to the danger of
sin be sure that his motive is good (viz., that he firmly intends to
avoid the sin to which he may be tempted and to accomplish only the
good he desires); (b) that the action he performs and which involves
the danger is necessary, and bears a correspondence in importance to
the gravity of the sin and the proximity of the risk; (c) that means be
employed (e.g., prayer, pious thoughts, spiritual reading, and the use
of the Sacraments), which will so reduce the danger that one has
confident assurance that the danger will be encountered safely.

262. It is lawful to expose oneself to the possibility of sin, for,
since almost every action may be perverted, one who wished to avoid the
possibility of sin would have to leave this world and become confirmed
in grace.

263. The Occasions of Sin are external circumstances--persons, places
or things--which tempt one to sin. Examples: Persons who invite others
to defraud and show how it can be accomplished, theatres where
irreligious plays are staged, books that aim to depreciate virtue, etc.

264. The occasions of sin are of various kinds. (a) They are proximate
or remote, according as it is morally certain, or only likely that they
will lead to sin. (b) Occasions are necessary or free, according as one
is able or not able to abandon them without difficulty. For example,
one who chooses dishonest persons as his associates is in a free
occasion of sin; one who is imprisoned with criminals is in a necessary
occasion of sin. An occasion of sin is also necessary when the
impossibility of leaving it is not physical, but moral. Examples: A
wife who is bound to a provoking husband; a person who cannot give up
an employment that offers many temptations, without suffering great
temporal or spiritual injury, or without incurring a worse condition.
(c) Occasions are present or absent, according as one has the occasion
with him or must go to seek it. Examples; Intoxicants kept in his home
are a present occasion of sin for a drunkard; atheistic lectures are an
absent occasion of sin for one who has to go out to hear them.

265. It is not lawful to remain in a free occasion of sin,, whether it
be present or absent; for to do so is to expose oneself rashly to the
danger of sin (see 258 sqq.).

266. It is not lawful for one who is in a necessary occasion of sin to
neglect means that are adapted to preserve him from the moral contagion
by which he is surrounded; for to neglect spiritual safeguards and
protections in such a case is to refuse to resist temptation (see 252
sqq.). The means that should be used depend on circumstances, but
prayer and firm resolves to avoid sin should be employed in every case.

267. The gravity of the sin committed by one who freely remains in an
occasion of sin, or who does not use the requisite spiritual helps in a
necessary occasion, depends on various factors: (a) if the sin to which
he is tempted is light, he does not sin gravely; (b) if the sin to
which he is tempted is serious, and the occasion is proximate, he sins
gravely; (c) if the occasion is remote, he sins venially.

268. The Motives of Sin.--The purposes that lead men to sin can be
considered as follows: (a) according to the predominant vices of
individual men, which are for them motives for committing their other
sins (particular motives)--e.g., a man whose chief sin is unbelief
and who is led by it to intolerance, blasphemy, despair, etc.; (b)
according to the natural relationship and sequence between sins
themselves, by which some are usually the motives for others _in all
men (general motives)_.

269. The predominant individual motives for sin are as numerous as
the different characters of those addicted to sin, and hence it is
impossible to classify them. The predominant general motives for sin,
on the contrary, can be assigned according to the principal goods that
most often move or repel with wills of all who commit sin, as follows:
(a) goods of the soul, such as praise and honor, inordinately pursued
(the vice of pride); (b) goods of the body, inordinately desired (the
views of lust and gluttony); (c) goods that are external, unduly loved
(the vice of avarice); (d) one’s own good, not sufficiently wished (the
vice of sloth); (e) the neighbor’s good, not suffiviently desired (the
vices of envy and anger).

270. The seven vices mentioned above are usually calle the capital, or
head vices, since the other sins are directed by them just as the other
parts of the body are directed by the head.

271. Among the seven capital vices there are two that have principality
over the others: (a) in the intention of the sinner the motive force
that impels to sin is always some inordinate desire of his own personal
excellence, and hence pride is the beginning of all sin; (b) in the
execution of the sin the opportunity for satisfying every base desire
is afforded by money, and thus avarice is the root of nourishment of
all evils.

272. The Results of Sin.--There are two kinds of sins from the
viewpoint of origin: (a) original sin, which is inherited from Adam by
all his descendants (except Christ and the Blessed Virgin); (b) actual
sin, which is committed by the personal will of each sinner.

273. The immediate consequences of original sin were that Adam lost for
himself and his posterity the gifts of the state of original innocence.
Thus: (a) the soul in subjection to God was endowed with the beauty
of holiness, to which succeeded the deformity of enmity against Him;
(b) the powers of the soul were in harmony, the lower subject to the
higher, but to this succeeded a state of disunion and rebellion and
what are called the four wounds of nature, the intellect and will
becoming prone to error and sin, and the sensitive appetites tending
inordinately towards delights or away from difficulties; (c) the body
which had been in subjection to the soul and endowed with freedom from
suffering and mortality, became burdensome to the soul and subject to
pain and death.

274. The consequences that are common to all sin, both original and
actual, are: (a) the sinner loses the spiritual beauty to which sin is
opposed, and this loss is called the stain of sin, since the soul
defiles itself by inordinate contact with what it loves; (b) the sinner
incurs the debt of punishment, since sin is an injustice against the
internal law of reason and against the external law of God and man.

275. The stain of sin is not: (a) a mere privation or absence of grace,
for otherwise all sins would be the same; nor (b) a mere passing shadow
over the soul, since the bad state of the will can remain after the act
of sin.

276. The stain of sin differs according to the sin. (a) The stain of
original sin is the privation of original justice (i.e., of the
subjection of reason and will to God), as being a voluntary privation
through the will of the first parent Adam; (b) the stain of mortal sin
is the privation of sanctifying grace, as connoting the act of the
individual will through which it was incurred; (c) the stain of venial
sin is the privation of the fervor of charity resulting from the sin,
inasmuch as it, to some extent, hinders the beauty of interior grace
from appearing in external acts.

277. The stain of grave sin is the disfigurement of death, for (a) it
removes the principle of supernatural existence (i.e., grace); (b) it
takes away the principles of supernatural activity (i.e., the infused
habits), though faith and hope may remain; (c) it deprives the soul of
the rights that belong to the spiritually living (i.e., of merits
already acquired).

278. The stain of venial sin is the disfigurement of disease, for (a)
it disposes one for spiritual death (i.e., for mortal sin); (b) it
lessens spiritual vitality, by setting up habits that make the practice
of the virtues more difficult.

279. The penalty of sin is threefold according to the threefold offense
of sin. (a) Inasmuch as sin is against reason, it is punished by
remorse of conscience; (b) inasmuch as it is against ecclesiastical,
civil or other human law, it is punished by man; (c) inasmuch as it is
against divine law, it is punished by God.

280. The punishment of sin is twofold according to its duration. (a)
Grave sin, since it deprives of spiritual life and turns man away from
his Last End, introduces a radical and, of itself, irreparable
disorder, and thus incurs an eternal punishment; those who die in grave
sin will be sentenced to eternal punishment. (b) Venial sin does not
inflict spiritual death, but is a defect or excess, not as regards the
Last End, but as regards the means to the Last End. Thus, it incurs,
not an eternal, but a temporal punishment.

281. The punishment of sin is twofold according to its quality. (a) Sin
by which man turns away from his Last End is punished by the pain of
loss, the deprivation of eternal happiness which was despised. This
pain may be called infinite, inasmuch as it is the loss of Infinite
Good. (b) Sin, in so far as it is an inordinate turning towards created
things, is punished by the pain of sense, which comes through
creatures. This pain is finite.

282. Sin may be a punishment of sin: (a) if a later sin results from a
former sin (e.g., God may permit those who refuse to serve Him, to
become the servants of their passions); (b) if the commission of sin is
accompanied by internal or external sufferings (e.g., the jealous
indulge their vice at the expense of great mental torment).

283. Not all the afflictions that befall mankind are chastisements. In
the strict sense, only those evils are punishments which are inflicted
by the lawgiver against the will of the offender as a vindication of
justice violated by the personal offense of the latter. Hence we must
distinguish punishment from the following: (a) from satisfaction, which
is compensation willingly endured for one’s own sin, or freely offered
for another’s (e.g., David after his repentance performed penance for
his sins; Christ on the cross offered His satisfaction for the human
race); (b) from medicinal afflictions, which are intended, not as
reparations to injured justice, but as remedies to preserve men against
sin or relapse, or to afford them opportunities for progress (e.g., the
calamities of Job, the condition of the man born blind, the dolors of
the Blessed Virgin, the physical evils Which in this world sometimes
happen to subjects as a punishment on their rulers, etc.); (c) from the
natural defects of fallen human nature, such as hunger, thirst,
disease, etc. These are only indirectly the consequences of original
sin, the direct punishment, from which they follow, being the infirmity
and corruption of nature produced by original sin.


Question III

LAW

284. In the previous Question we considered the internal principles of
human acts--that is, habits, good and bad, from which they proceed. Now
we shall turn to the external principles, good and bad, that move one
to one’s acts. The external principle that moves to evil is the demon,
who tempts us to sin; the external principle that moves to good is God,
who instructs us by His law and helps us by His grace to fulfill it.
Temptation has been discussed already, and grace belongs to Dogmatic
Theology; the next Question to be considered, therefore, is Law.




Art. 1: LAW IN GENERAL

(_Summa Theologica_, I-II, qq. 90-92.)

285. Definition.--Law is an ordinance of the reason for the common good
promulgated by him who has authority in the community.

(a) It is an ordinance, that is, a command or prohibition which has
obligatory and lasting force. Hence, advice is not a law, because not
obligatory; a rule that binds only during the lifetime of the lawgiver
or of those who received it is not strictly a law, because not enduring.

(b) It is an ordinance of the reason, since the rule and standard of
human acts is reason (see 64 sqq.). Hence, the arbitrary will of a
ruler commanding what is against reason would not be law, but rather
iniquity.

(c) It is made for the common good, that is, it must tend to promote,
directly or indirectly, general happiness, which is the end of society.
Hence, the commands of a tyrant which benefit a few at the expense of
public peace and prosperity are not truly laws.

(d) It is made by him who has authority, that is, by the person or
persons who have the lawmaking power according to the form of
government. Hence, the decisions of an advisory body or the decrees of
a usurper are not laws.

(e) It is made by the proper authority in a community, that is, as here
understood, in a self-sufficing community, which has its own means for
attaining its end and is independent in its own order of other
societies. Hence, the regulations made by parents for their family are
not called laws, since the family is not a self-sufficing society.

(f) It is an ordinance that has been promulgated, that is, brought to
the notice of those whom it binds. Hence, a law that has been drawn up
but not published as such, is not obligatory even for those who know of
its existence. A law becomes obligatory, however, as soon as it has
been promulgated, and the presumption then is that the law is known;
but he who is inculpably ignorant is not guilty of formal sin if he
breaks the law.

286. Division.--According as the immediate lawgiver is God or man, laws
are divine or human. Divine laws are threefold: (a) the eternal law is
the ordinance of the divine mind which from eternity has directed the
motions and actions of all creatures for the common good of the
universe; (b) the natural law is the light of man’s reason as an
impression and reflection of the eternal law; (c) the positive divine
law is that which God of His free will has added to the natural law,
viz., the Mosaic law under the Old Testament and the law of the Gospel
under the New Testament.

287. Human laws are ecclesiastical or civil according to the authority
from which they originate.

288. Collision of Laws.--Not infrequently it happens that opposite laws
seem to call for fulfillment at the same time, as, when in case of
unjust attack it seems that one is bound to defend oneself and bound
not to injure the other party. Hence arises a conflict of obligations
and rights. But the difficulty is only apparent; for, since God is a
just and wise lawgiver, He does not intend either that one should be
held to impossibilities, or that a superior obligation should yield to
one that is inferior. Hence, the rule in such cases of apparent
collision of laws is:

(a) if a person can recognize which of the two obligations is superior,
he is bound to follow that one; (b) if he is unable to discover after
careful examination which obligation has the greater claim, and must
decide at once, he may decide for the law whose observance seems to him
safer; or, if he sees no difference as regards safety, he may decide
for either as he wishes. If the decision is wrong, the error is
involuntary, and hence not imputable as sin.

289. When the contending precepts belong to different categories of
law, the higher law must be followed. (a) The natural law has
precedence over the positive law, divine or human. For example, the
natural law of self-preservation allowed David to eat the loaves of
proposition, a thing forbidden by the positive divine law. The same law
of self-preservation allows a starving man to take what does not belong
to him according to human laws, if it is necessary for his life. The
same law of self-preservation excuses one from assisting at Mass, if
one is very ill.

(b) The positive divine law has precedence over human law. Example: The
command of Christ to his Apostles to preach His Name was to be obeyed
rather than the command of the Sanhedrin to the contrary (Acts, v. 19).
(c) The ecclesiastical law has precedence over civil law, for the end
of the Church is higher than that of the State, and the Church’s
judgment about the means to her end should prevail.

290. The precedence of ecclesiastical over civil law does not mean that
the Church has the right to interfere in matters that belong to the
jurisdiction of the State, or that the Church should insist on settling
every dispute by its own action alone.

(a) A law on matters purely civil and political made by the Church in
opposition to a law of the State would not prevail over the latter,
for, as the Church admits, “whatever is to be ranged under the civil
and political order is rightly subject to the civil authority” (Leo
XIII).

(b) A law on matters directly or indirectly spiritual, made by the
Church but not necessary to her end, can be made the subject of
negotiation or even of compromise by the Church in order to avoid a
conflict of laws; in fact, the Church has shown her willingness to make
concessions, where possible, for the common peace and happiness.

291. When contending laws belong to the same category of laws, the more
important, or more urgent, or more necessary law prevails.

(a) The law that defends greater goods (those that are spiritual,
internal, or common) has precedence over the law that defends lesser
goods (the temporal, external, or private). Examples: The natural law
that one must save oneself from persecution and death yields to the
natural law that one must not blaspheme or deny God, and hence one must
prefer to die rather than blaspheme. The law that one may not expose
one’s life to danger yields to the law that the common welfare must be
defended; hence, citizens are obliged to go to war when the nation
calls, pastors and physicians to remain at their posts in time of
pestilence, disaster, etc.

(b) Obligations of justice have precedence over obligations of charity,
for in the former case a stricter right is in question. Example: Titus
is keeping $5.00 in order to pay a debt to Caius, who needs the money
today; Balbus, who is very poor, asks Titus to give the money to him.
Titus should pay Caius.

(c) Negative or prohibitory laws have precedence over affirmative or
preceptive laws (see 371). Example: Titus is asked to write out a
testimonial stating that he knows that Balbus is honest, competent,
etc. Balbus has claims on the help of Titus on account of a promise
made in the past; but Titus knows very well that Balbus is not
competent, honest, etc. The law forbidding lies prevails here over the
law that one keep a promise made.

292. Since rights and duties are correlative--there being a duty that
corresponds to every right, and vice versa--and since both are
regulated by law, the principles given for the apparent collision of
laws can be applied to the apparent collision of rights.

(a) Rights of a higher kind have preference over rights of a lower
kind. Therefore, the rights that arise from birth itself, or from the
fact that one is a human being (e.g., the right to life), are superior
to the rights that are acquired through some condition, such as
inheritance or contract (e.g., the right to property, etc.). Example:
Titus must get his child, who is in danger of death, to a hospital
without delay. Balbus is getting ready for a pleasure ride, but Titus
takes his car since there is no other ready means of getting to the
hospital. Titus acts within his natural rights, if the car is returned
safely and as soon as possible to the owner. According to civil law his
act would be technical larceny, but in view of the necessity courts and
juries would certainly not insist on the letter of the law.

(b) Inalienable rights (i.e., those which one may not renounce, because
they are also duties), such as the right to serve God, the right to
live, etc., are superior to alienable rights (i.e., those which one may
renounce), such as the right to marry, the right to own property, etc.
Example: One may surrender the right to drink intoxicants in order to
serve God or preserve one’s life.

293. The Basis of All Laws.--Prior to every other law and the ground
and principle of all laws is the Eternal Law; for, since this is the
plan of Divine Wisdom directing from eternity all acts and movements to
their particular ends and to the end of the universe, it follows that
all other laws are reflections of the eternal plan and realizations of
the divine decree. The Eternal Law differs from other laws in various
ways:

(a) as to duration. The Eternal Law existed before anything was made,
whereas all other laws begin to exist when they are promulgated;

(b) as to breadth of application. The Eternal Law regulates, not only
contingent things (such as actions) but also necessary things (such as
that man should have a soul, hands and feet); for all things created,
whether they be contingent or necessary, are subject to divine
government. Human laws, as is evident, cannot regulate what is
necessary (e.g., it would be foolish for them to decree that men must
or must not have souls);

(c) as to subjects. The Eternal Law rules, not only rational creatures
(i.e., angels and men), but also irrational creatures, such as matter,
plants, and animals. The former are ruled through commands, which
require that they direct themselves to their End; the latter are ruled
through the inclinations given them by God, which move them to the ends
He desires them to attain. Human laws cannot regulate the acts of
irrational creatures, for these creatures cannot understand a command
as such, and man cannot give them natural inclinations (e.g., it would
be foolish to make a law for cats against the catching of birds).

294. The laws to be considered in the pages that follow are temporal
and moral. Thus: (a) they are laws promulgated at some particular time,
either from the beginning of humanity (as is the case with the Natural
Law) or later (e.g., the Mosaic Law, the Christian Law, etc,); (b) they
are laws regulating, not the necessary (as is the case with
metaphysical or mathematical laws), but the contingent; (c) they are
laws given, not to the irrational creature (as is the case with
physical and biological laws), but to the rational, that it may attain
its end through self-government in accordance with law.




Art. 2: THE NATURAL LAW

(_Summa Theologica_, I-II, qq. 93, 94.)

295. Meaning.--The Natural Law is so called for the following reasons:
(a) it is received by man, not through special promulgation, but along
with his rational nature. Hence, St. Paul says that the Gentiles, who
had not received the laws specially promulgated, were a law unto
themselves, that is, through their rational nature (Rom., ii. 14); (b)
it includes only such precepts as can be known or deduced from the very
nature of man, and thus some pagans fulfilled the Law of Moses
naturally, i.e., as regards its natural precepts (Rom., ii. 14); (c) it
can be known from the natural light of reason without instruction,
being a law written on the heart of man (Rom, ii. 15).

The Natural Law is defined theologically as a participation of the
Eternal Law in man. Three elements constitute its essence in its
integrity: (a) a passive participation of the Eternal Law consisting in
man’s nature and faculties with their inclinations to their proper acts
and ends. This man shares with all creatures. (b) an active
participation in the Eternal Law proper to man. This consists in the
activity of man’s intellect through which he shares in God’s providence
and government in a special way as one who can rule himself and others.
Reason, reflecting upon the natural inclinations and ordering them to
their proper acts and ends, formulates (c) a dictate or command of the
practical reason. This command constitutes the essence of Natural Law.
“Hence the Psalmist after saying (Psalm, IV. 6): _Offer up the
sacrifice of justice_, as though some one asked what the works of
justice are, adds: _Many say, Who showeth us good things_, in answer to
which he says: _The light of thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon
us_. Thus the Psalmist implies that the light of natural reason,
whereby we discern what is good and bad, which is the function of the
Natural Law, is nothing else than an imprint on us of the divine light.
It is therefore evident that the Natural Law is nothing else than the
rational creature’s participation in the eternal law” (_Summa Theol_.
I-II, q. 91, a.2).

296. Relation of the Natural Law to Other Laws.-(a) The Natural Law is
inferior to the Eternal Law; for, while the Eternal Law exists in the
mind of God, underived from any other law and is regulative of all
created things, the Natural Law exists in the mind of man, as a
derivation and image of the Eternal Law and a rule for man’s acts only.
(b) It is superior to Positive Law, for all Positive Law is a deduction
from or a determination of Natural Law.

297. Division.--Since Natural Law is the reflection of the eternal plan
of Divine Wisdom in the reason of man, we cannot distinguish different
species of it according to difference of lawgivers or subjects. The
objects regulated are, however, different; and hence we may distinguish
various precepts of Natural Law.

(a) According to the difference of persons to whom natural duties are
owed, there are natural laws concerning God (e.g., that God must be
honored), natural laws concerning self (e.g., that one must not commit
suicide), and natural laws concerning the neighbor (e.g., that
injustice must not be done).

(b) According to the difference of natural inclinations in man, there
are, first, natural laws common to him with all beings (e.g., the law
of self-preservation, and hence it is a natural duty of man to take
sleep, food, drink, remedies, etc., as necessary for life); secondly,
natural laws common to him with all sentient beings or animals (e.g.,
the law of preservation of the species, and hence it is a natural duty
of man to rear and provide for his children); thirdly, natural laws
proper to man as a rational being (e.g., the laws that he should
cultivate his powers of mind and will, and hence it is a natural duty
of man to further religion and education, and to organize into
societies and to respect the rights of others).

298. According to their necessity for the primary or the secondary end
of a natural inclination, the laws of nature are divided into primary
and secondary. (a) The primary end of a natural inclination is the
conservation of a natural good; and so it is a primary law of nature
that man should take the food, drink, sleep and exercise necessary for
life, and that he should avoid poison or other things that cause death.
(b) The secondary end of a natural inclination is the betterment of a
natural good, or its easier conservation; thus, it is a secondary law
of nature that man should use those kinds of food or drink that promote
his health, that he should be careful about his diet, practise
moderation, etc.

299. Primary and secondary laws of nature are also explained as
follows: (a) a primary law is one that expresses the principal purpose
of a natural inclination (e.g., social good, that is, the begetting and
rearing of children, is the primary law of the married state); (b) the
secondary law is one that expresses a less important purpose of a
natural inclination. For example, individual good (i.e., companionship,
mutual assistance, the practice of virtue and freedom from temptation)
is the secondary purpose to be promoted in the married state.

300. Precepts of the Natural Law may be divided also on account of the
different relations they have to one another or to our knowledge.

(a) According to the priority they have among themselves, the laws of
nature are divided into the first principle and the secondary
principles. The first principle, which is general, which depends on no
other, and which is the root of all the others, is: “Good must be done,
evil omitted.” The secondary principles are particular, and they apply
this general principle to the natural inclinations of man mentioned
above, which reason indicates as ends of action--i.e., as goods to be
sought.

(b) According to the priority they have with respect to our knowledge
of them, the laws of nature are divided, first, into axiomatic
precepts, which are evident and are granted by all (e.g., that good is
to be done, that one should follow reason, that one should not do to
others what one does not wish done to oneself etc.), and, secondly,
into inferred precepts (e.g., that one should not steal from others, as
one does not wish others to steal from oneself).

301. The inferred precepts are also of two kinds, namely, general and
particular. (a) The general precepts are those that are deduced
immediately from the axioms as universal conclusions (e.g., the
commandments of the Decalogue, the principle that one should return
what one borrowed). (b) The particular precepts are those that are
deduced only remotely from the axioms as conclusions about cases in
which many particular conditions and circumstances are involved (e.g.,
many conclusions about contracts, the conclusion that a loan is to be
paid in some particular way, at this particular time, etc.).

302. According to the invariability or permanence of their
subject-matter, the laws of nature are of two kinds, namely, necessary
and contingent. (a) The necessary laws are those whose matter always
bears the same relation of essential conformity to or difformity from
reason. For example, the command, “Thou shalt not take the name of the
Lord in vain,” is necessary, because God remains always worthy of
honor, and there is no conceivable or possible case in which it could
become useful to speak of Him with dishonor. (b) The contingent laws of
nature are those whose matter generally, but not always, bears the same
essential relation to right reason. For example, the command, “Thou
shalt not kill,” is contingent, because, though man generally remains
worthy of having his life respected by others, there are cases when it
might be injurious to the common welfare, and hence to natural law,
that an individual be permitted to live, as when he has committed and
been convicted of a capital crime.

303. According to the manner in which they oblige, the laws of nature
are twofold, namely, absolute and relative. (a) Absolute laws are those
that oblige for every case and condition, because the matter with which
they are concerned is intrinsically good or bad in every instance
(e.g., the laws forbidding marriage between parent and child, the law
against polyandry). (b) Relative laws of nature are those that oblige
except in case of a most grave public necessity, because the matter
with which they are concerned is generally and of its very nature
becoming or unbecoming (e.g., the laws forbidding marriage between
brother and sister, the law forbidding polygamy).

304. According to the manner in which the obligation is contracted,
laws of nature are of two kinds, viz., those whose obligatory force
depends entirely on the nature of things (e.g., the law that God must
be honored), and those whose obligatory force depends upon, an act of
the will of man freely undertaking an obligation, which the nature of
things then demands that he fulfill (e.g., the laws that those who have
made vows, oaths, contracts, etc., should live up to that which they
have freely promised).

305. Properties.--Since the Natural Law is the reflection of God’s
Eternal Law impressed on the rational nature of man, it has the
following properties: (a) it is both declarative and imperative; being
immanent in man, it declares to him his duty; being transcendent in its
origin, it speaks with the voice of authority; (b) it is universal, or
for all, for it declares the necessities of nature, which are the same
in all men; (c) it is unchangeable, that is, it admits of neither
abrogation, nor dispensation, nor emendatory interpretation, for the
essences of things, on which it is based, do not change; (d) it is
recognizable and indelible, that is, it cannot fail to be known and
cannot be forgotten by mankind, for it is promulgated through the light
of reason given to man.

306. The Natural Law is of universal obligation. It is in force in all
places, at all times, and for all persons. (a) Thus, those who have not
the use of reason, such as infants and the insane, are subject to the
Natural Law on account of their human nature which is injured by any
transgression of its inclinations. Their ignorance, of course, excuses
them from formal sin (see 24 sqq., 97 sqq.). Example: It is sinful to
induce or permit children to blaspheme or become intoxicated, not only
because of scandal or of harm done to them, but also because such
things are necessarily repugnant to their dignity as human beings. (b)
those who have the use of reason are subject to the Natural Law, and
their transgressions are imputable as formal sins and incur the debt of
punishment.

307. The Natural Law is unchangeable, not as regards additions, but as
regards subtractions. (a) Additions may be made to the Natural Law,
for, in many points not determined by it, it is well that supplementary
regulations be made to provide for particular situations. These
additions, made by Positive Law, divine and human, are amplifications
rather than changes, for they must not be out of harmony with Natural
Law. (b) Subtractions may not be made from the Natural Law--that is,
there can be no exception when it declares that a certain thing must
always be observed, and there can be no abrogation when it declares
that a certain thing must be observed usually.

308. From the foregoing it follows that no precept of the Natural Law
can be abrogated--that is, repealed and deprived of all force, so that
what was today a precept of nature should no longer be such tomorrow;
for the necessities of nature on which the Natural Law is based do not
change.

309. As to the question whether any precepts of the Natural Law may be
dispensed or not, distinction must be made between two kinds of
dispensation.

(a) A dispensation in the strict sense is granted when a legislator
relaxes for a particular case the obligation of a law, although the
subject-matter of the law still remains. Example: Titus is in the class
of those who are bound by the law of fast, but he is exempted by
competent authority from the obligation of the law.

(b) A dispensation in the wide sense is granted when the subject-matter
of the law is taken away by the legislator himself or by another, so
that it ceases to be comprehended under the law, although the
obligation of the law still remains. Example: Balbus owed money to
Caius, but, as Caius forgave him the debt, he is no longer in the class
of those who are bound by law as debtors to Caius; he is not exempted,
however, from the obligation of the general law that one must pay one’s
debts.

310. There are various opinions as to the possibility of a dispensation
from the Natural Law granted by God, but the following doctrine seems
the most probable.

(a) God Himself cannot dispense in any way from those precepts whose
matter is necessary (see 302), such as axiomatic precepts (viz., those
that prohibit malice and those that command duties to be fulfilled at a
proper time and place). For all the subject-matter of these precepts is
intrinsically either consonant with or dissonant from right reason.
Example: God could not by decree abolish the Ten Commandments, for, as
long as God is God, He must remain worthy of worship, praise and love;
and, as long as man is man, it must be against his rational nature to
murder, steal, lie. etc.

(b) God cannot grant a dispensation in the strict sense from those
precepts of the Natural Law whose matter is contingent, such as the
precepts against the taking of human life, against taking possessions
from others against their will, etc. For, as long as the subject-matter
of these precepts remains what it is supposed to be by the law,
transgression of them is necessarily opposed to reason. Example: God
cannot command the killing of a person who has the right to life, nor
the taking of property that rightly belongs to another.

(c) God can grant a dispensation in the wide sense from contingent
precepts of the Natural Law--that is, He can make a change as regards
the subject-matter, so that it no longer falls under the law. Thus,
since God is the supreme Lord of life and property, He can without
injury to human rights command that a person be put to death or
deprived of his property by another. These acts would not constitute
murder (i.e., unjust homicide) or stealing (i.e., unlawful taking); for
God has a higher claim on life and possessions than the immediate
owners have. Examples: The command to Abraham to kill his son was not a
dispensation from the law against murder any more than the sending of
death to the first-born of Egypt was the commission of murder by God.
The command given the Israelites to carry away with them the goods of
the Egyptians was not a dispensation from the law against theft, any
more than the destruction of the fruits of the Egyptians by plagues was
the commission of theft by God.

311. Is God able to make a decree which sets up a most grave public
necessity opposed to the observance of a law of nature?

(a) If there is question of absolute laws (see 303), this cannot be
done, for God cannot deny Himself by making a disposition contrary to
His Eternal Law. Example: We do not read that God ever sanctioned
polyandry or marriage between parent and child, and it seems that He
could never permit such things as lawful.

(b) If there is question of relative laws (see 303), the decree in
question can be made by God; for the unbecomingness of that which is
forbidden by a relative law passes away in the face of a great need.
Example: Since God desired the propagation of the human race from one
man and one woman, marriage between brothers and sisters was not
against the Natural Law at the beginning. Since God desired the speedy
multiplication of the chosen people after the patriarchal era, polygamy
was not repugnant to nature among the Jews of that period.

312. Is God able to remove a natural obligation in a case of private
necessity, that is, when the fulfillment would be harmful to an
individual?

(a) Natural obligations that do not depend upon any free consent of the
will given to them (see 304) cannot be removed except by a dispensation
widely so-called and when their matter is contingent (as explained in
309-310). Examples: God could not dispense an individual from the duty
of confessing Him in order to escape death, for the subject-matter of
the law here is necessary. God, could dispense an individual from the
obligation of not taking the property of another, for God is the
principal owner of all things, including those possessed by others.

(b) Natural obligations that depend upon the act or deed of human
beings consenting to obligation (see 304) can be removed. For since
human beings cannot know all the circumstances existent, or all the
conditions that will arise, it can happen that a thing agreed to or
promised is only seemingly good, or will change from good to bad, so
that while the promise or agreement made is in itself good and
naturally obligatory, its fulfillment would work harm and evil, or be
useless, or would prevent the accomplishment of a greater good. It is
reasonable, therefore, that God should release from obligation here,
thus changing the subject-matter of the law, so that it is no longer
comprehended under the law (see 309-310). Example: Titus vows or swears
that he will give a certain alms or make a certain pilgrimage; but,
when the time for fulfillment arrives, his circumstances have so
changed that it would not be advisable for him to keep the promise
made. The Church, acting in the name of God, can declare that the
subject-matter of this promise has become harmful and is not longer
suitable, and hence that the obligation has ceased.

313. Human Authority and Modification of the Natural Law.

(a) Additions to the Natural Law may be made, not only by positive laws
of God, but also by human laws of Church or State, through the
introduction of that which Natural Law permits, or the determination or
confirmation of that which Natural Law contains implicitly or
explicitly. Examples: Division of property rights introduced by the law
of nations; conditions for valid contracts determined by particular
codes; the laws against theft and murder confirmed by definite
penalties prescribed for those crimes.

(b) Subtractions from Natural Law cannot be made by any human
authority, for God has not delegated His power of dispensing which He
has as supreme owner of all things. Examples: No human authority could
authorize a father to sacrifice his innocent son, nor permit a servant
to carry away the effects that belong to his employer.

314. Apparent Cases of Dispensation from Natural Law made by Human
Authority. (a) The Church frees from the obligation of vows, contracts
and promissory oaths, from impediments to marriage, from espousals,
etc. In so doing, however, she does not dispense from the Natural Law
that vows, contracts, etc., should be fulfilled, but only declares in
the name of God that the subject-matter of an obligation contracted by
act of man’s will has become unsuitable for vow, contract, etc., and
hence is no longer comprehended under the law.

(b) Societies or private individuals can free from the obligation of
paying or returning to them what they have a right to, as when a
creditor forgives a debt, or an owner permits a thief to keep what he
stole. In so doing, however, they do not dispense from the law of
nature that one should pay one’s debts and not keep ill-gotten goods;
they only change the quality of the things in question so that they
cease to be due another or ill-gotten, and hence no longer fall under
the law. This differs, too, from the dispensation that God can grant;
for He can transfer rights without the consent of the immediate owner
(see 310).

315. Interpretation--that is, explanation of the law which indicates
whether or not it obliges in a particular case--may be applied to the
Natural Law as follows:

(a) Interpretation which explains the intention the lawgiver had in
making the law and the sense he gave to the words of the law (verbal
interpretation), may be made when either a law itself is not entirely
clear, or some person is not clever enough to see its meaning. Example:
The commandment, “Thou shalt not kill,” needs to be interpreted, for it
does not forbid every kind of killing.

(b) Interpretation which explains the intention a lawgiver would have
had, had he foreseen a particular case in which his law would be
harmful, and which therefore sets the will of the lawgiver against the
words of the law (emendatory interpretation, _epieikeia_), may not be
applied to the Natural Law; for God, unlike human legislators, foresees
things not only in general, but also in particular, and hence there is
no room for correction or benign interpretation of natural laws.
Example: Titus, who was a chronic invalid, committed suicide in order
that his family might be freed from distress. He argued that the Fifth
Commandment did not foresee the difficulties of earning a living under
modern conditions, and that his sacrifice would be pleasing to God.
Titus did not reason well, for suicide is forbidden for motives that
apply universally (e.g., that society, and especially one’s family, are
injured by the act of suicide).

316. Verbal interpretation of the Natural Law is made as follows: (a)
by private authority--that is, by those who are competent, on account
of learning and prudence, to understand the meaning of the law, such as
moral theologians; (b) by public authority--that is, by those who are
appointed to rule, with the prerogative of declaring the meaning of the
Natural Law. The Pope, since he must feed the flock of Christ, is
divinely constituted to interpret Natural Law, and does so
authentically and infallibly. Thus, the Church declares that certain
matrimonial impediments are natural, and therefore incapable of being
dispensed.

On the competence of the Church to give authoritative interpretations
of the natural law in the field of morals, Pius XII has spoken clearly
and forcefully: “... it must openly and firmly be held that the power
of the Church has never been limited to the boundaries of strictly
religious matters’ as they are called; but the whole content of the
natural law, its institution, interpretation and application are within
its power insofar as its moral element is concerned. For the
observation of the natural law, by the ordination of God, is the way by
which man must strive to attain his supernatural end. On the road to
this supernatural end. it is the Church that is his leader and guide.
This is the way the Apostles acted, and from the earliest times the
Church held to this way of acting as it does today--and not in the
manner of a private leader and counselor, but from the command and
authority of God” (AAS 46 [1954] 671-672).

317. From the foregoing it follows that the Natural Law is so
unchangeable that it cannot be abrogated or properly dispensed, or
given an emendatory interpretation. But, though the law itself remains,
there are cases in which non-observance of it is excused from guilt.
These cases can be reduced to physical and moral impossibility.

(a) In cases of physical impossibility (i.e., when the powers requisite
for observance are wanting), one is manifestly excused; for law is
reasonable, and it is not reasonable to require impossibilities.
Examples: Infants are not guilty of sin against the Natural Law, when
they do not pray; for they lack the use of reason, which is presupposed
by the notion of prayer. He who is unable to work is not obliged to
earn support for relatives.

(b) In cases of moral impossibility (i.e., when a law cannot be kept
without the infringement of a higher law or the loss of a higher good),
one is also excused; for it is unreasonable to prefer the less to the
more important. Example: Titus lends a revolver to Balbus. Later he
asks that it be returned to him, as he wishes to kill himself. Now,
property is less valuable than life, and hence Balbus is unable in this
case to observe the law which requires that things borrowed must be
returned.

318. Moral impossibility is also defined as the inability to observe
the law without serious injury or loss to oneself or a third party.
Serious injuries are such as deprive some one of great goods, such as
the use of reason, life, knowledge, friendship, health, reputation,
property. Serious losses are such as prevent one from obtaining notable
goods, The following rules indicate when grave inconvenience excuses,
and when it does not excuse, from the guilt arising from the
non-observance of Natural Law:

(a) when the law is negative (i.e., prohibitory), no inconvenience
excuses from sin; for that which is forbidden by the Natural Law is
always morally evil, and hence more to be shunned than even the
greatest physical evil, or death. Example: One is obliged, under grave
or light sin, as the case may be, to forfeit all temporal goods rather
than blaspheme, murder, lie, etc.;

(b) when the law is affirmative (or mandatory), an inconvenience which,
all things considered, is really and relatively grave, excuses from
sin; for that which is commanded by the Natural Law is not always
morally obligatory, but only at the right time and in the right
circumstances (see 371), and hence its omission is not always morally
evil. Examples: Sempronius vowed that he would go on foot to a place of
pilgrimage, but when the day came he had a sprained ankle that would be
badly injured if he walked. Caius received a jewel stolen from Balbus
and promised that he would return it at once to the owner, but he finds
that he cannot do so now without danger, either of the arrest of
himself or of the one who took the jewel. Titus sees a person who has
been seriously injured lying by the roadside, but he is tired, and
neither gives help himself nor summons aid. In the first two cases the
inconvenience is grave, and hence Sempronius may ride to the place of
pilgrimage, and Caius may return the jewel to Balbus later; but the
inconvenience of Titus is slight, and does not excuse him from sin.

319. Just as the Natural Law is unchangeable, because based on the
unchangeable Eternal Law instituting the nature of man, so is it easily
knowable, because it is promulgated by the light of reason. Hence: (a)
invincible ignorance of the entire Natural Law is impossible in any
person who has the use of reason; (b) complete forgetfulness of the
Natural Law by mankind is impossible.

320. Those who have not the use of reason, either habitually (as
children and the insane) or actually (as the intoxicated), may be
invincibly ignorant of the Natural Law--for example, they may be unable
to perceive even the difference between right and wrong. As to those
who have the use of reason, they can be ignorant of the Natural Law
only as follows:

(a) they cannot ever be invincibly ignorant of the most general
precepts (such as “good is to be done,” “evil is to be avoided”), for
since they know the difference between right and wrong, they must also
perceive that which is contained in the concepts of right and wrong,
viz., that the former is something desirable and which ought to be
done, the latter something undesirable which must not be done;

(b) one cannot, as a rule, be invincibly ignorant of those precepts
that are immediately inferred as necessary conclusions from the most
general precepts (such as “that which was borrowed must be returned”),
for the conclusion follows so easily from the manifest principle that
only in exceptional cases could one be excused for not knowing its
truth;

(c) one can, even as a rule, be ignorant of precepts that are inferred
as necessary but very remote conclusions from the most general
precepts, (such as “that which was borrowed must be returned at such a
time or place, or in such a manner or condition”), for this conclusion
is so far removed from its premise, and there are so many factors to be
considered, that considerable knowledge and skill in reasoning are
required for a correct judgment--things in which many people are
lacking.

321. The Commandments of the Decalogue follow directly from the most
general precepts of the Natural Law, and so to them may be applied what
was said in the previous paragraph. Hence: (a) generally speaking, no
person who has the use of reason can be invincibly ignorant of the
Commandments. St. Paul blames the pagans as inexcusable in various sins
committed against the Decalogue; (b) in special cases, a person who has
the use of reason can be invincibly ignorant of one or more
Commandments; for while the Commandments may be easily inferred by most
persons from the common principles of right and wrong, there are
sometimes involuntary impediments that hinder the right employment of
reason. Thus, children and older persons whose mentality is
undeveloped, although they know the difference between right and wrong,
are frequently unable to draw the conclusion that follows from it
(e.g., that one should not tell lies).

322. The Commandments regarding which invincible ignorance may most
easily exist are: (a) those that deal with merely internal acts, for
the malice of violating them is less apparent. Hence, many theologians
admit that even among Christians the wickedness of sinful thoughts and
desires may be inculpably unknown, at least when the wickedness of the
corresponding external acts is also not known; (b) those that deal with
the control of sensuality, for the impulse to inordinate acts is at
times most vehement. Unde theologi sunt qui affirmant malitiam
peccatorum externorum contra sextum invincibiliter ignorari posse, non
solum apud infideles, sed etiam apud Christianos, ita quod ab
adolescentibus facile ad tempus ignorari possit malitia mollitiei.

323. If a Commandment be applied to some particular case in which there
are many circumstances to be considered, or some reason that appears to
change the subject-matter of the law, even adults who have the perfect
use of reason may be invincibly ignorant; for in such instances we are
considering, not an immediate, but a remote conclusion from the general
principles of Natural Law.

(a) If the case is difficult relatively (i.e., in view of the training
or lack of education of the person studying it), there can be
invincible ignorance, at least for a time. Examples: Jepthe, according
to St. Jerome, appears to have been invincibly ignorant that it was not
lawful for him to slay his daughter. Being a soldier and living in a
rude age, he perhaps did not appreciate the sacredness of human life.
Unlettered persons might conceivably think in good faith that it is not
wrong to commit perjury in order to help one in danger, to steal in
order to pay debts, to think evil if there is no intention to fulfill
it, to do what the majority do or what is tolerated, etc.

(b) If the case is difficult absolutely (i.e., in view of the matter
itself, which is complicated and obscure), there can be invincible
ignorance, even for a long time. Thus, it is so difficult to settle
many problems pertaining to justice (i.e., to the application of the
Seventh Commandment) that we find professional theologians who take
opposite sides, or admit that, speculatively speaking, they do not know
where the truth lies.

324. The Natural Law can never be erased from the hearts of men. (a) In
abnormal circumstances only, as when the general power of reasoning has
been weakened or lost, can the Natural Law be forgotten. Thus, to a
degenerate who becomes violently insane murder and other crimes may
appear as good acts. But no community could govern itself by the
standards of madmen and long survive. (b) In normal circumstances
(i.e., as long as the general power of reasoning remains unimpaired),
the Natural Law cannot be forgotten, as far as its general principles
or immediate conclusions are concerned, although it may be overlooked
or lost sight of when it is applied to particular cases, or when remote
conclusions are deduced from it.

325. As long, therefore, as a body of men remain sane, even though they
be uncivilized or addicted to crime, they cannot become oblivious of
the Natural Law. (a) The general principles (“good is to be done,”
“evil is to be avoided”) cannot vanish from the mind, although, in
particular affairs, anger, pleasure, or some other passion may prevent
men from thinking about them. Thus, when the mob spirit takes hold of a
crowd, it becomes intent only on violence or revenge, and gives no
thought to conscience. (b) The secondary precepts, such as those
contained in the Decalogue, cannot be obliterated from the mind,
although in applying them to concrete situations a people may go astray.

There are many examples of laws, both ancient and modern, which
permitted or commanded, for particular cases, things contrary to the
current application of natural precepts. Thus, the Spartans and the
Romans ordered the murder of infants who were weakly and of slaves
whose master had been killed. Some ancient races encouraged robberies
committed beyond the boundaries of the states, and savage tribes have
been found who had the practice of putting to death parents who were
aged or infirm.

326. The causes of wrong applications of the Natural Law are the
following:

(a) Some causes are involuntary. Thus, the correct application may be
difficult, as when more than one moral principle has to be considered
and applied; or, if the case is not difficult, the person who makes the
application may be mentally undeveloped, or his mind may be blinded on
account of his bad education or environment. Examples: The races who
saw no infamy in robbery committed against their neighbors, lived in a
wild age when such acts of violence seemed necessary as measures of
self-protection. The savage killed his aged parents, because to his
untutored mind this seemed an act of mercy.

(b) Some causes are voluntary, such as neglect of the truth, vicious
habits, etc. Examples: St. Paul blames the pagans for their idolatry,
because they had darkened their own minds about God. Pirates and
bandits who came to regard violence as necessary for their own defense
were responsible for their state of mind, inasmuch as they had chosen a
life of crime.

327. Transgression of Natural Law, therefore, is not imputable as
formal sin if it is not voluntary. Hence: (a) lack of knowledge
excuses, when ignorance is involuntary (e.g., those who have not the
use of reason, as infants and the unconscious; children and others
mentally undeveloped who cannot grasp the meaning of some precept;
educated persons who are unable to get a right solution of some knotty
problem of morals, etc.); (b) lack of consent excuses in whole or in
part (as when one acts through fear).




Art. 3: THE POSITIVE DIVINE LAW

(_Summa Theologica_, I-II, qq. 98-108.)

328. Meaning.--The Positive Divine Law is the law added by God to the
Natural Law, in order to direct the actions of man to his supernatural
End, to assist him to a better observance of the Natural Law, and to
perfect that which is wanting in human law.

(a) The Last End of man is not natural, but supernatural (see 20), and
hence it was necessary that, in addition to the precepts which guide
man towards his natural beatitude, there should be added precepts that
will guide him towards his supernatural beatitude: “The Law of the Lord
gives wisdom to little ones” (Ps. xviii. 8).

(b) The light of natural reason was sufficient to instruct man in the
Natural Law, but through sin that light had become obscured, with the
result that evil customs set in, and very many were at a loss how to
apply the Natural Law, or applied it wrongly. Hence, it was most
suitable that the Natural Law should be summed up in brief commandments
and given externally by the authority of God. This was done through the
Decalogue, which is a part of the Positive Divine Law of both the
Mosaic and the Christian dispensations: “The testimony of the Lord is
faithful” (Ps. xviii. 8).

(c) Human laws are the product of fallible human judgment; they can
direct only such acts as are external, and they are unable to forbid or
punish many evil deeds. Hence, it was necessary that there should be
positive divine laws to supply for what is wanting in human law: “The
law of the Lord is unspotted, converting souls” (Ps. xviii. 8).

329. The Positive Divine Law differs from the Natural Law as to
subject-matter, permanence, and manner of promulgation.

(a) The precepts of the Natural Law are necessary, since they follow as
necessary consequences from the nature of man, the precepts of the
Positive Law of God, excluding those that are external promulgations of
the Natural Law, are not necessary, since they follow from the free
decree of God raising man to that which is above his nature.

(b) The precepts of the Natural Law are unchangeable, since the nature
of man always remains the same. Of the precepts of the Positive Law of
God some were changed, because given only for a time (such as the
ceremonial laws of Judaism); others, absolutely speaking, could be
changed, because not necessarily connected with the end God has in view
(e.g., the laws concerning Sacraments).

(c) The precepts of both kinds of law are immediately from God; but the
Natural Law is promulgated only in a general way, through the light of
reason given to man along with his nature, while the Positive Law of
God is proclaimed by special commands (e.g., “thou shalt not steal”).

330. The Positive Divine Law contains two kinds of precepts, viz.,
natural and supernatural commandments. (a) The natural precepts were
given in order to recall to the minds of men the laws knowable through
reason which had become obscured through passion, custom or example.
The Commandments given to Moses on the tablets of stone renewed the
natural precepts which God had written through reason on the hearts of
men. (b) The supernatural precepts were given in order to point out to
men the duties their supernatural destiny imposed. Example: The
precepts of faith, hope, charity.

331. Division.--There are four historical states of man with reference
to his Last End, and to each of these correspond positive divine laws.

(a) The state of Original Innocence is that which existed in Paradise
before the Fall. Man had been raised to the supernatural state, and
hence he was obliged to the supernatural acts of faith, hope, charity,
etc.; he was subject to God, both as to body and soul, and hence he was
obliged to offer some kind of external sacrifice; he was sanctified
immediately by God, and hence was not bound to the use of any
sacraments; but he was still in a state of probation, and was subject
to various special regulations, such as the commands to avoid the fruit
of a certain tree, to labor in Eden, etc.

(b) The state of the Law of Nature is that which existed from the Fall
to the giving of the written law through Moses. It is called the state
of the Law of Nature, not in the sense that there were no supernatural
precepts then in force, but in the sense that there were as yet no
written precepts. In that period man knew the Natural Law, not from
commandments written on tablets of stone, but from the law of reason
inscribed in his heart; he knew the supernatural precepts, not from
scriptures given him by God, but from tradition or special divine
inspiration. In addition to the inner acts of supernatural worship and
faith in the Messiah to come and the outer sacrifices, there were
during this state certain rites of purification, or sacraments, by
which fallen man was purified from sin. A special precept of the
patriarchial times was the prohibition made to Noe against the eating
of flesh with blood in it.

(c) The state of the Mosaic Law is that which existed from the giving
of the law on Sinai until the giving of the New Testament law by Christ.

(d) The state of the Christian Law, or of the New Law, is that which
began with Christ and the Apostles and will continue till the end of
the world.

332. The Mosaic Law.--This was the special law of God to the Jews, the
people chosen by God as the race from which the Saviour of the world
was to come. It has two periods: the period of preparation and the
period of the Law.

(a)The period of preparation for the Law began with the Promise or
Covenant given to Abraham. A law is not given except to a people (see
285), and, as the peoples of the world at that time had returned to the
general corruption that reigned before the Deluge, God chose Abraham to
be the father of a new nation in which true religion should be
preserved until the Redeemer of the world had come. The rite of
circumcision was ordered as a mark of the covenant and a sacrament of
remission.

(b) The period of the Law began with the promulgation of the Decalogue
on Sinai. The descendants of Abraham had grown into a nation and had
been freed from slavery, and they were thus ready to receive a special
law. Their history thereafter shows how God trained them according to
the pattern of the Mosaic Law and prepared them for the providential
mission, which, through the Messiah, should be theirs, of giving to the
world the perfect and universal Law of the Gospel.

333. The Excellence of the Mosaic Law.--(a) The Law was good (Rom, vii.
12): it commanded what was according to reason and forbade what was
opposed to reason; it had God for its Author and prepared man for the
Law of Christ. (b) The Law was imperfect (Heb., vii. 19); it was given
for a time when men were spiritually but children and not ready as yet
for the teaching and morality of the Gospel; it forbade sin and
provided punishments, but the necessary helps for observing it came
only from faith in Christ, the Author of the New Law.

334. The Subjects of the Mosaic Law.--(a) The Jewish people were bound
by the Mosaic Law. God had chosen Abraham by gratuitous election to be
the forefather of the Messiah, and it was by gratuitous election that
He gave the Jews a Law which would lend them a special holiness
befitting the promises made their race. The Jews, therefore, were bound
to more things than other nations, as being the Chosen People; just as
clerics are bound to more things than the laity, as being the ministers
of God.

(b) The Gentiles were not bound by the laws peculiar to the Mosaic
Code, but only by the common precepts, natural and supernatural, that
were in force in the state of the Law of Nature. But it was permitted
to Gentiles to become proselytes, that by observing Mosaic rites they
might more easily and more perfectly work out their salvation.

335. The Duration of the Mosaic Law.--(a) The Law began when experience
had proved that knowledge is not sufficient to make man virtuous, that
is, at a time when, in spite of the Natural Law, the peoples were
turning to polytheism and vice: “The Law was given on account of
transgression” (Gal, iii. 19).

(b) The Law ended when experience had shown that external observance is
not sufficient for holiness, that is, at the time when Judaism was
degenerating into formalism, putting the letter before the spirit of
the Law: “What the Law could not do, God sending His own Son, hath
condemned sin in the flesh, that the justification of the Law might be
fulfilled in us” (Rom., viii. 3, 4).

336. Deuteronomy, vi. 1, describes the Mosaic Law as precepts,
ceremonies and judgments; and the commandments of the Old Testament can
be classified according to this threefold division. (a) The moral
precepts defined the duties to God and man that arise from the dictates
of reason and the Natural Law; (b) the ceremonial prescriptions were
determinations of the religious duties to God contained in the moral
law, and rules concerning the performance of worship based on the
positive ordinance of God; (c) the judgments were determinations of
social duties contained in the moral law; they were the civil or
political code of the theocratic nation which had its force from the
positive ordinance of God.

337. The moral precepts are contained in the Decalogue, which is a sum
of the whole Natural Law, inasmuch as the general principles of the
Natural Law are implicit therein in their immediate conclusions, while
the remote conclusions are virtually found in the Commandments as in
their principles (see 301).

338. The Decalogue expresses man’s duties: (a) towards God, viz.,
loyalty (First Commandment), reverence (Second), service (Third)--all
of which are Laws of the First Table; (b) towards parents (Fourth), and
all fellow-men, viz., that no injustice be done them by sins of deed
(Fifth, Sixth, Seventh), of mouth (Eighth), or of heart (Ninth,
Tenth)--all of which are Laws of the Second Table.

339. The further moral precepts which were added after the giving of
the Decalogue can all be reduced to one or the other of the Ten
Commandments. Examples: The prohibition against fortune-telling belongs
to the First; the prohibition against perjury and false teaching, to
the Second; the commandment to honor the aged, to the Fourth; the
prohibition against detraction, to the Eighth.

340. The ceremonial laws, which prescribed the manner of performing the
divine worship or of acting as befitted the Chosen People, and which
prefigured the worship and people of the New Testament, were numerous,
in order that the Jews might be more easily preserved from pagan rites
and customs. The ceremonies they regulated were of four kinds: (a) the
sacrifices through which God was worshipped and through which the
sacrifice of Christ was prefigured (e.g., the holocausts,
peace-offerings, sin-offerings); (b) the sacred times and places,
things and persons set apart in order to give more dignity to divine
worship and to foreshadow more distinctly the good things to come; (c)
the sacraments by which the people or sacred ministers were consecrated
to the worship of God and were made to prefigure Christ (e.g.,
circumcision and the consecration of Levites); (d) the customs which
regulated the details of life so that both priests and people might act
as became their special calling, and might be types and figures of the
Christian people (e.g., the laws about food, dress, etc.).

341. Unlike the moral laws, which had existed before Moses as the
Natural Law and which continue under the Christian dispensation, the
ceremonial laws were temporary. Thus: (a) before Moses other ceremonies
were observed by the patriarchs (e.g., the sacrifice of Abel, the
altars of Abraham and Jacob, the priesthood of Melchisedech, etc.); (b)
after the coming of Christ, distinctions of food, new moons, sabbaths,
and other Mosaic ceremonies were abrogated, since the figures of future
things had been superseded by rites that commemorated benefits that
were present.

342. We may distinguish four periods in the history of the Mosaic
ceremonial law: (a) from Moses until Christ, it was the divinely
ordained manner of worshipping God, and was obligatory for the Chosen
People; (b) at the death of Christ, when the New Testament began, the
Mosaic ceremonial ceased to be obligatory; (c) until the Gospel had
been sufficiently promulgated (i.e., until the destruction of the City
and the Temple of Jerusalem), the ceremonial law was permitted to
Jewish converts, not as prefiguring Christ, but as a form of divine
worship; (d) after the Gospel had been sufficiently proclaimed, it was
no longer lawful to conform to the Mosaic observances.

343. The judgments or judicial laws of the Old Testament were intended;
(a) to regulate the relations of the people of God to one another and
to strangers according to justice and equity, and thus to prepare them
for the coming of the Messiah; (b) to be, consequently, in some sort a
figure of the social constitution of the Christian people.

344. The judicial laws, like the ceremonial, expired with the New
Testament. But since, unlike the ceremonial laws, they were not
appointed directly as prefigurative of Christianity, their provisions,
if not opposed to Christian law, could be used as part of the civil
code of a Christian State.

345. There were four kinds of judicial precepts:

(a) those concerning rulers. The government was monarchical and
aristocratic, as being administered by Moses and his successors with
the assistance of a body of elders; but it was also democratic,
inasmuch as the princes were chosen from the people and by the people;

(b) those concerning citizens. Excellent laws concerning sales,
contracts, property, and the administration of justice, are laid down
in the Pentateuch;

(c) those concerning foreigners. The relationship of the Jews to other
nations, whether in peace or in war, was regulated by wise and humane
laws;

(d) those concerning families. The rights and duties of husband and
wife, parent and child, master and servant, were carefully and
considerately provided for.

346. The Law of the New Testament.--This is the special law given by
God through Christ to the whole world, and which endures till the end
of time. Its character will be understood most readily from a
comparison of it with the Law of the Old Testament.

(a) In both Testaments grace and the Holy Spirit are given through
faith in Christ (the internal law), and doctrines, commandments and
ceremonies are prescribed (the external law). But, whereas the Old
Testament is principally a law of works, the New Testament is
principally a law of faith (Rom., iii, 27); the former is concerned
mostly with the external conduct, the latter regulates, not only
actions, but also the internal movements of the soul, of which faith is
the first.

(b) In both Testaments men are justified and saved through faith and
works (Heb, xi., 39; Rom., i. 16), and not through the external written
law or the letter. But it is only through Christ, the author of the New
Law, that men are enabled to perform what the law requires: “The law
was given by Moses; grace and truth came by Jesus Christ” (John, i. 17).

347. Comparison of the Two Testaments from Other Viewpoints.--(a) The
aim of both Laws is to secure obedience to God and holiness for man.
But the New Testament, since given to those who were better prepared
and more perfect, unveils more clearly the mysteries of faith, enjoins
more perfect works, and supplements the Commandments with counsels of
perfection (cfr. the Sermon on the Mount).

(b) Both Laws make use of threats, promises and persuasion in order to
move men to obedience. But, as the Old Law was for those who were
spiritually but children, it dwells especially on the punishments to be
meted out to transgressors and the external rewards that will be given
to the obedient (the law of fear); whereas the New Law, being for those
who are spiritually mature, holds out as inducements chiefly the love
of virtue and rewards that are internal and spiritual (the law of love).

(c) The author of both laws is God. But, while the Old Law was
announced through God’s servants as the preparatory dispensation, the
New Law was proclaimed by the Son of God Himself as the final economy
of human salvation: “God, who at sundry times spoke in times past to
the fathers by the prophets, last of all in these days hath spoken to
us by His Son, whom He hath appointed heir of all things” (Heb, ii. 1).

348. Differences in the Precepts of the Two Laws.--(a) There is no
opposition between the commandments of the two Laws; for the ceremonial
and judicial precepts of the Old Law, which contained figure and
prophecy, are fulfilled in the precepts of Christ, while the moral laws
of the Old Testament are confirmed and perfected by the moral laws of
Christ: “I am not come to destroy, but to fulfill” (Matt., v. 17).

(b) There is no substantial difference between the faith and works of
the two Testaments. For, that which is now believed explicitly and
clearly, was believed implicitly and in figure in the Old Testament,
and the greater things that now are commanded were contained germinally
in the precepts of the Old Law.

349. The Old and the New Law Compared as to Difficulty.--(a) If we
consider the difficulty that arises from the fulfillment of external
works, the Old Law was much more difficult. For while the Law of Moses
imposed numerous and complicated ceremonies and observances, the Law of
Christ commands but few and simple rites. Of the Old Law St. Peter says
that it was a yoke, “which neither our fathers nor we have been able to
bear” (Acts, xv. 10)--that is, it was extremely burdensome; but of His
own Law Christ says: “My yoke is sweet, and My burden light” (Matt, xi.
30). Even the additions made by Christ to the Old Law (e.g., the
prohibition against divorce) really facilitate that which the Old Law
itself intended--viz., the perfection of man. Hence, the Old Law is the
law of servitude; the New Law, the law of liberty.

(b) If we consider the difficulty that arises from internal works, or
the dispositions and motives with which precepts are to be fulfilled,
the New Law is more difficult; for it inculcates a loftier piety and
gives more attention to the spirit with which God is to be worshipped.
But, since love is the all-inclusive commandment of Christ, and since
gladness and fervor are easy to the lover, the commandments of Christ
“are not heavy” (I John, v. 3).

350. The External Works Commended by Christ.--(a) Since the New Law is
the law of grace, it commands only those things by which we are brought
to grace, or by means of which we make use of grace already received.
We receive grace only through Christ, and hence there are commandments
regarding the Sacraments; we make right use of grace by faith that
worketh through charity, and hence there are the precepts of the
Decalogue to be kept.

(b) Since the New Law is the law of liberty, it does not determine the
details of the moral law, nor prescribe minutely how we must worship
God and observe justice to others, as was done in the ceremonial and
judicial laws of the Old Testament. Minor dispositions of this kind
have no necessary relation to internal grace, being morally
indifferent. Hence, Christ left many things free, to be determined
later according to conditions, either by the individual (in personal
matters) or by the spiritual or temporal authority (in matters of
public concern). It is contrary to the spirit of the Gospel, however,
that mankind should be oppressed with numerous and burdensome
observances.

351. The Internal Works Commanded by Christ.--In the Sermon on the
Mount were given the commandments of the New Law that summarize the
entire duty of the Christian as to his internal acts: “Everyone that
heareth these My words, and doeth them, shall be likened to a wise man
that built his house upon a rock” (Matt., vii. 24). Thus, there are:
(a) internal acts commanded as regards our own wills and purposes (we
must avoid not only external, but also internal sins and the occasions
of sin; we must not only do good, but we must have a good motive, not
placing our end in human applause or riches); (b) internal acts
commanded as regards our neighbor (we must not judge him rashly,
unjustly, presumptuously; nor must we trust him imprudently); (c)
interior dispositions with which we must perform our duties (we must
avoid inordinate cares, imploring and expecting the divine assistance;
but we must also avoid carelessness, having our minds set on the narrow
way, and eschewing seductions).

352. The Teaching of Christ on the Three Classes of Precepts: Moral,
Ceremonial and Judicial.--(a) As regards the moral precepts (i.e., the
Decalogue or Natural Law), not one jot or tittle was to pass away. But
so little was the soul of these precepts then recognized that Christ
gave a new commandment of love, by which His followers were to be
known; and He reduced the whole law to the two commandments of love of
God and love of our neighbor.

(b) As regards the ceremonial precepts (i.e., the forms of Jewish
worship), these were to be superseded. Christ declared the manner in
which God was to be worshipped, namely, in spirit and in truth. He
instituted the Sacrifice of the New Testament, appointed the ritual of
the Sacraments (e.g., of Baptism and the Eucharist), and taught a form
of prayer which was to be used by His disciples. Other things He left
to be determined by the Church.

(c) As regards the judicial precepts (i.e., the civil laws of the
theocratic nation), these ceased to be necessary with the coming of
Christ, whose Kingdom is spiritual and with whom there is no
distinction of Jew or Gentile, since His law is for all. In fact, with
the destruction of Jerusalem in A.D. 70, foretold by Christ, both the
Temple worship and the separate national life of Israel came to an end.
In correcting the false interpretations which the Pharisees put upon
various judicial precepts of their law (e.g., in showing them that the
law of retaliation and the law that public enemies should be put to
death did not authorize revenge and hatred), Christ indicated the
spirit that should animate all civil laws, namely, love of justice. He
left it to the wisdom of future lawgivers to apply the rule of justice
to the relations between man and man, nation and nation, as
circumstances would require.

353. The precepts by which Christ established the primacy of the Pope
and the hierarchy may be called judicial. But the details of this
constitution He left the Church to determine.

354. The Duration of the Law of Christ.--(a) The Beginning.--The New
Law was given through the revelation made by Christ and the Holy Ghost
to the Apostles; it was ratified at the Last Supper and in the death of
Christ, when the New Testament was proclaimed and the Old Testament
came to an end; it was promulgated, first at Jerusalem on the day of
Pentecost, and later throughout the world by the preaching of the
Apostles.

(b) The End.--The Law of Christ continues till the end of time; for
this generation--that is, this last period of world history under the
Christian dispensation--shall not end until Christ returns to judge
mankind; “Behold, I am with you all days, even unto the consummation of
the world” (Matt., xxviii. 20).

355. The Subjects of the Law of Christ.--(a) The Law of Christ is for
all: “Going, therefore, teach ye all nations. teaching them to observe
all things whatsoever I have commanded you” (Matt., xxviii. 19).

(b) The Law of Christ does not oblige all in the same way. Those
outside Christianity are obliged directly by the commands to believe
and to be baptized. Christians are obliged directly by the laws of
faith and works accepted in Baptism.

356. Ignorance of the Law of Christ.-(a) Outsiders may be in invincible
ignorance of the Law of Christ. For many persons through no fault of
their own, in times past or even today, have not heard the Gospel
message: “How shall they believe Him of whom they have not heard?”
(Rom, x. 14).

(b) Christians may be in invincible ignorance of the Law of Christ.
For, just as want of a preacher causes a pagan to be invincibly
ignorant of the necessity of Baptism, so a lack of instruction in
Christian doctrine might leave a baptized person inculpably ignorant
(e.g., of the duty of receiving the Eucharist).

357. Dispensation from the Law of Christ.--(a) Its Possibility.--It
cannot be denied that Christ could have dispensed from the positive
precepts of His law, either directly or through His Church; for those
precepts depend on His will, and, like every other legislator, He can
relax His law or delegate others to do so.

(b) Its Reality.--Some believe that Christ granted dispensations from
His Law (e.g., that He freed the Blessed Virgin and the Apostles from
the duty of receiving Baptism, that he authorized the Apostles to give
Baptism without mentioning the Trinity), but these opinions seem
unlikely and are not well supported. Some also believe that the power
of loosing granted the Church (Matt., xvi. 19) includes the power of
dispensing from the Law of Christ. The contrary, however, seems more
probable. For the power of loosing is certainly limited to such matters
as the good of the Church and of souls requires, and it is more
advantageous for the Church and its members that the laws given by
Christ Himself should be absolutely unchangeable, in order that the
unity of the Church and its dependence on its Founder may be more
manifest.

On the other hand, the alternate opinion has solid grounds and
arguments, and merits due consideration. Some authors distinguish a
twofold law of Christ; (a) absolute, that which obliges immediately and
of itself independently of any action of man; e.g., the law concerning
the necessity of Baptism or determining bread and wine as the matter of
the Eucharist; (b) hypothetic, which presupposes some human action;
e.g., the law of the indissolubility of matrimony which urges after man
has freely willed to be bound by the laws of matrimony. Similarly, the
binding force of vows presupposes the taking of the vow.

As to the absolute law, no human authority may dispense from it. As
already indicated, the good of the Church, its unity and stability,
seem to demand an unchangeable law. In regard to the hypothetical law,
many of the more modern authors assert that the Holy Pontiff can at
times dispense. The power of loosing implies a power of dispensing in
the Church which has been used in particular cases; e.g., _ratum et non
consummatum_ matrimony. Moreover, the power to dispense seems extremely
useful and almost necessary for the prudent and wise governing of the
Church. For, with a change of circumstances an individual might be
impeded from doing a greater good because of a preceding act of will;
e.g., one might be impeded from embracing the religious life because of
a prior vow to remain in the world to assist in Catholic Action (see
Fanfani, O.P., _Theol. Moral. Manuale_, Vol. I, n. 134).

358. Interpretation of the Law of Christ.-(a) Private interpretation
(_epieikeia_ or equity) is used in extraordinary cases, not foreseen by
the lawgiver, and it declares that a particular case does not fall
under the Law. This kind of interpretation applies only to human laws,
since God foresees things not only universally, but also in particular
(cfr. on Natural Law, 315). (b) Public interpretation of the Law of
Christ is made by the Church, in virtue of the commission: “Teach all
things whatsoever I have commanded” (Matt, xxviii. 20).

359. Public Interpretation of the Law of Christ--(a) The Church is able
to give a declarative interpretation of the Positive Divine Law--that
is, to explain its meaning, to show what cases are comprehended in the
law, what cases are not, when one is obliged, when one is excused, etc.
Example: The Church interprets the doctrine of Christ on the
indissolubility of marriage, explaining when the bond is absolutely
indissoluble, the conditions under which it may sometimes be dissolved,
etc.

(b) The Church is able to give determinative interpretation of the
Positive Divine Law--that is, to settle in what manner a law must be
fulfilled. Examples: Christ gave the command that the Eucharist should
be received, but it was the Church that determined when and how often
one must receive Communion to comply with the wishes of Christ. Christ
instituted only generically the essential rite of some Sacraments,
leaving it to the Church to determine the rite more specifically.

360. The Law of Christ and Impossibility.--(a) Impossibility does not
excuse from a law, in which an act is necessary not because it is
prescribed, but is prescribed because it is a necessary means without
which, even if one be not guilty of negligence, salvation cannot be had
(necessity of means). Example: Infants who die without Baptism are not
held guilty of neglecting the Sacraments, but lack of it deprives them
of the supernatural bliss promised by Christ. Only Baptism confers
regeneration, and only the regenerated are capable of the vision of God.

(b) Impossibility can excuse from a law in which an act is necessary
because it is prescribed, and which therefore makes one guilty of sin,
if one willfully neglects it (necessity of precept). Example: An adult
who dies without the Eucharist cannot be saved if he was guilty of
grave negligence; but he can be saved, if it was not his own fault that
he did not receive Holy Communion. The Eucharist increases supernatural
life, but inculpable lack of it does not exclude from that life.

361. Impossibility--or what is called impossibility--does not always
excuse even from those divine laws which have only the necessity of
precept.

(a) Physical impossibility is the lack of power to perform an act; for
example, it is physically impossible for a blind man to read. This kind
of impossibility, of course, excuses from guilt and punishment.
Example: Titus is dying and thinks of the command that he should
receive Viaticum. But he is unable to receive Communion without
vomiting. Hence, in his case the impossibility excuses from the divine
command.

(b) Moral impossibility is the inability to perform an act without
serious inconvenience; for example, it is morally impossible for one
who has weak eyes to read small print. This kind of impossibility does
not excuse, if a greater evil will result from the non-observance of
the law than the evil of inconvenience that will result from its
observance. Examples: Eleazer would not eat the meats forbidden by the
law of Moses, preferring to die rather than give public scandal (II
Mach., vii. 18). The command of Christ that pastors minister to their
flocks obliges, even if it involves danger of death, when there is a
great public necessity (as in time of pestilence) or an urgent private
necessity (as when an infant is about to die without Baptism).

362. Moral impossibility excuses from divine laws that have only
necessity of precept, if the inconvenience is serious, even when
compared to the evil of violating the law; for God does not wish
commands freely instituted by His will to oblige more rigorously than
the commands of the Natural Law (see 289, 317). Examples: Christ
excused David for eating the loaves of proposition (which was forbidden
by the law of Moses) on account of urgent necessity. A most grave
external inconvenience excuses from the law of integrity of confession
(see Vol. II).

363. What is the nature of the Church’s action in dissolving the bond
of marriages that are not ratified, or not consummated after
ratification (see Vol. II), with reference to Christ’s law of
indissolubility? (a) Some see in this an application of other divine
laws that limit the law of indissolubility, and that were enunciated by
Christ Himself in His teaching on the supremacy of faith over other
bonds, the superiority of virginity to marriage, the power of the
Church in loosing, etc. (b) Others see in this an interpretation,
declarative or expansive, of the law of indissolubility. (c) Still
others regard these dissolutions as a removal of the proper matter of
the obligation contracted through the act of the human will (cfr. the
Natural Law, 312). The power of loosing would apply here as in the case
of vows. Some authors call this removal of matter “annulment of act,”
“remission of debt,” “permission”; while others call it “dispensation”
(see 314). Those who consider the dissolution of _ratum non
consummatum_ matrimony as “dispensation” list the law of
indissolubility as hypothetical positive law (see 357).

364. Counsels.--In addition to its precepts (which are obligatory), the
New Law contains counsels, which are optional, but which are expressly
recommended.

365. A counsel is a moral direction by which one who is willing is
advised to prefer a higher to a lower good, in order thereby to tend
more efficaciously towards perfection and to merit a greater reward.

(a) A counsel is not something commanded. Example: Our Lord’s direction
to the disciples on their first mission that they should not carry
their sustenance with them was required as a duty that they might learn
to trust in Providence. Hence, it was not a counsel.

(b) A counsel is not everything good that is not commanded. Example:
Marriage is not commanded to all, but it is not a counsel, since the
opposite good, viz., celibacy, is better (I Cor., vii. 38).

366. That which is only counselled as to its actual performance, is
commanded as to its acceptance by the will for a case of necessity.
Example: Our Lord’s direction that good be done to personal enemies
does not command that one actually confer favors on them outside of the
case of necessity (this is only counselled), but only that one be so
charitably inclined that one is ready to help even a personal enemy who
is in serious need.

367. The superiority of the counsels may be seen from the attitudes men
take to the goods of this world.

(a) Some are taken up entirely with the things of earth, making
temporal goods the end of life and the standard of action. These do not
keep the Commandments and cannot be saved.

(b) Some use the goods of this world not as ends, but as subordinate to
things that are higher. These keep the Commandments and will be saved;
but their solicitude about temporal concerns lessens the attention they
could give to things of the spirit.

(c) Some renounce entirely the goods of this life, in order to give
themselves as completely as possible to the things of God. These
observe the counsels, and can more readily attain to holiness and
salvation; for, being freed from numerous cares about earthly things,
they can devote themselves more easily and earnestly to things that are
heavenly.

368. The Three Counsels.--There are many counsels given in the Gospels,
but all can be reduced to three, according to the three chief earthly
goods that may be surrendered, and the three kinds of temptation that
come from those goods.

(a) The counsel of poverty requires that one give up entirely external
goods or wealth, from which comes the concupiscence of the eyes: “If
thou wilt be perfect, go sell what thou hast, and give to the poor, and
thou shalt have treasure in heaven” (Matt, Xix. 21).

(b) The counsel of chastity requires that one renounce entirely carnal
goods of pleasure, from which arise the concupiscence of the flesh: “He
that giveth his virgin in marriage, doth well; and he that giveth her
not, doth better” (I Cor., vii. 38).

(c) The counsel of obedience requires that one deny oneself the good of
the soul which is one’s own will, from which comes the pride of life:
“Come follow Me” (Matt, xix. 21).

369. The counsels can be followed in two ways. (a) They are followed
completely, when one accepts them as a rule for one’s whole life, as is
done by those who embrace the state of perfection in the religious
life, taking by vow the three evangelical counsels of poverty, chastity
and obedience. (b) They are followed partially when one practises them
in particular instances. Examples: A wealthy man who gives to the poor
when there is no obligation to do so, practises the counsel of poverty
in that case. A person who renounces his own legitimate wishes in some
matter, practises the counsel of obedience in that case, as when he
confers some favor on one who has offended him, or pardons a debt.
Married persons who practise conjugal abstinence for the sake of
religion, follow a counsel of chastity (I Cor., vii. 5).




Art. 4: HUMAN LAW

(_Summa Theologica_, I-II, qq. 95-97.)

370. Definition.--Since human perversity often needs a check in
regulations that are not expressly contained in the Natural or in the
Divine Law, other laws must be made by society, drawn from those higher
laws as conclusions or added to them as determinations, in order to
meet special circumstances and necessities.

371. Division of Human Laws.-Human laws are variously divided.

(a) According to the difference of legislators, laws are either
ecclesiastical or civil.

b) According to their mode of derivation from the Natural Law, laws
belong either to the law of nations (_jus gentium_) or to civil law. To
the _jus gentium_ belong those laws which are derived from the Natural
Law as conclusions from premises, e.g., the right to private property
without which men cannot live peacefully in society. To civil law
belongs whatever is derived from Natural Law by way of positive
determination by a legislator; e.g., Natural Law dictates that the
evil-doer be punished; but that the punishment take a particular form,
imprisonment, exile, death, is a determination depending upon the will
of the legislator.

The _jus gentium_ is not international law which derives its force and
sanction from the free will of the legislator. The law of nations is
common to all men and derives its force from the conviction of men that
such a law is demanded for the good of mankind. It is not a secondary
precept of the Natural Law which is derived from the primary precepts
necessarily. Rather it is based upon a contingent set of circumstances;
it does not spring from man’s nature absolutely considered, but from
the way in which man acts and reacts in his society.

(c) According to the difference of their objects, laws are either
affirmative (i.e., preceptive) or negative (i.e., prohibitive). An
affirmative law obliges always, but not for every occasion; a negative
law obliges always, and for every occasion. Example: The Third and
Fourth Commandments are always in force, but it is not necessary to
elicit a positive act of compliance at every instant. The other
Commandments, which are negative, are not only in force always, but it
is necessary at every instant to omit what they forbid.

(d) According to the obligation which they impose, laws are either
moral, penal, or moral-penal. Moral laws oblige under pain of sin,
penal laws under pain of punishment, moral-penal laws under pain of
both.

(e) According to their inclusiveness, laws are either personal or
territorial. The former affect the person for whom the law is made, and
oblige him even when he is outside the territory of the lawgiver. The
latter affect the territory, and hence do not oblige a subject when he
is outside the territory affected by the law.

(f) According to their effect, prohibitive laws are either merely
prohibitive or irritant. The former make what is forbidden illegal, the
latter make it also void.

372. Qualities.--The objects or content of human law must be of such a
character: (a) that they do not conflict with the Natural or the Divine
Law; (b) that they be beneficial to the community for which they are
made.

373. Laws fail to be of public benefit in such cases as the following:
(a) if they are made without a broad view of the public good, which has
regard for different classes of people and various interests, and which
provides for the future as well as for the present; (b) if, losing
sight of the fact that the majority are not perfect in virtue, the
lawgivers require so much that the law falls into contempt, and graver
evils result than would have happened otherwise. Hence, it is advisable
that human laws confine their prohibitions to graver misdeeds,
especially those that are harmful to others and to society, and
restrict their commands to such good acts as promote the common weal.
Multiplicity of laws, excessive penalties for minor offenses, cruel and
unusual sanctions, lead to lawlessness.

374. Human laws should not prescribe what is too difficult.

(a) They should not prescribe heroic virtue, unless the common safety
demands it, or a subject has voluntarily obliged himself to it.
Example: Soldiers in war and pastors in time of pestilence must expose
themselves to danger of death; but for ordinary occasions the law
should not oblige one to risk one’s life or other great good.

(b) They should not prescribe agreement with the mind of the legislator
or a virtuous performance of what is prescribed, unless the thing
ordered itself demands this. Examples: The law of annual Confession and
of the Easter Communion requires, not only that these Sacraments be
received, but that they be received worthily, for an unworthy
Confession is no Sacrament, and an unworthy Communion does not satisfy
the command of Christ, of which the Church command is but a
determination. On the other hand, the Lenten fast observed by one who
is not in the state of grace is an act good in itself and satisfies the
law. He who hears Mass on a holyday, not knowing that it is a holyday,
satisfies the obligation, though he had no intention of fulfilling it.

375. Obligation of Human Laws.--All human laws that are just, whether
they be ecclesiastical or civil, made by believers in God or
unbelievers, are obligatory in conscience, (a) From the beginning the
Church has made laws and imposed them as obligatory (Acts, xv. 29; I
Cor., vi. 4; I Cor., xi. 5; I Tim., v. 9-12), and has recognized as
obligatory the laws of the State, without regard to the moral or
religious qualifications of the rulers (I Peter, ii. 13-16; Rom., xiii.
1-7).

(b) Human laws are necessary. The Natural Law does not prescribe
definite penalties, while the Positive Divine Law prescribes only such
as are remote and invisible; and hence, if there were no human laws
holding out the threat of determined and present punishments, the
Divine laws would be contemned. Moreover, since the higher laws are
sometimes unknown, or prescribe no time, place or manner of
accomplishment, or do not command things that would be useful for their
observance, it is necessary that there be laws made by man to secure
the better knowledge and fulfillment of the laws given by God Himself.

376. A human law is unjust in two ways:

(a) if opposed to the rights of God. Examples: The command of Pharaoh
that the Hebrew male children be murdered (Exod., i. 17), the command
of Antiochus that his subjects sacrifice to idols (I Mach., ii. 16-20),
the command of the Sanhedrin that the Apostles should cease to preach
(Acts, v. 29);

(b) if opposed to the rights of man. This happens in three ways: First,
when the purpose of the law is not the common good, as when the
lawgiver seeks only his own profit or glory; secondly, when the maker
of the law has not the requisite authority; thirdly, when the law
itself, although for the common good and made by competent authority,
does not distribute burdens equally or reasonably among the people.
Examples: Achab and Jezabel, in the affair of the vineyard of Naboth,
had in view not the public, but their own private benefit (III Kings,
xvi). The sentence of death pronounced on our Lord by the Sanhedrin was
illegal, because, among other reasons, the body was not assembled
according to law, and hence had no authority to give sentence. The
commands given the Israelites by Pharaoh (Exod., v. 18), and to their
subjects by Oriental despots (I Kings, viii), were unjust, because the
former discriminated against the Israelites, and the latter bore down
too heavily on all the people. The former civil laws that prescribed
the same penalty of hanging for a slight misdemeanor (such as the theft
of a loaf of bread by a boy) as for the capital crimes of piracy or
murder, the Stamp Act of George III, and some modern laws that sentence
to life imprisonment those who have been four times convicted of slight
offenses, are more recent examples of unjust laws.

377. Obedience to unjust laws is not obligatory in the following cases.
(a) If a law is opposed to the rights of God, it is not lawful to do
what that law commands or permits, nor to omit what it forbids.
Examples: If a law permits one to practise polygamy, or commands one to
blaspheme religion, one may not use the permission or obey. If a law
forbids one to give or receive Baptism, it has no force. (b) If a law
is certainly opposed to the rights of man in any of the three ways
mentioned in the previous paragraph (376, b), it does not of itself
oblige in conscience, since it lacks some essential condition of a true
law, and even the consent of the majority or of all does not make it
just. However, it may oblige accidentally, on account of the greater
evils that would follow on disobedience, such as scandal, civil
disturbances, etc. The duty of subjects is to remonstrate against such
a law and to work for its repeal.

378. The obligation of all laws is not the same in kind, or degree. (a)
Moral laws oblige one to do what is commanded or to omit what is
forbidden, as a duty owed in conscience; hence, he who violates a law
of this kind is guilty of moral fault. Penal laws oblige one to follow
what they prescribe, if one would be free from guilt before the law and
not liable in conscience to the penalty prescribed; hence, he who
violates a penal law is guilty of juridical fault, and, if he further
illegally resists the penalty, he becomes guilty also of moral fault.
(b) Moral laws are not all of the same obligatory force, some of them
obliging under grave sin, others under venial sin.

379. The following human laws are recognized as moral laws: (a)
ecclesiastical laws, with few exceptions; (b) civil laws that confirm
the Eternal or Divine Law, or that pertain directly to the common
welfare, such as the laws that determine the duties of public
officials, the rights of inheritance, etc.

380. The following human laws are generally regarded as merely penal:
(a) ecclesiastical laws which expressly state that their observance is
not required under pain of sin (e.g., the statutes of many Religious
Orders); (b) civil laws of minor importance, or which the legislator
imposes as a purely civil duty (e.g., some traffic regulations).

381. Moral laws oblige under grave sin if the two following conditions
are present: (a) if the thing prescribed by the law is of great
importance, because of its nature or circumstances; (b) if the lawgiver
intended to impose a grave obligation.

382. A matter of light moment cannot be made the object of a law that
binds under grave sin, for this would impose an intolerable burden, and
would thus be contrary to the common good. What is unimportant in
itself, however, may become important on account of its purpose or
other circumstance.

383. The intention of the legislator to impose a grave moral obligation
is recognized either: (a) from his own declaration, as when a church
law is commanded under threat of the divine judgment; or (b) from
circumstances that indicate such an intention, such as the gravity of
the subject-matter of the law or the kind of penalty it prescribes, the
general opinion of authorities, or the common practice of the community.

384. By obliging to the observance of what they command and the
avoidance of what they forbid, laws indirectly oblige to what is
necessary for such obedience. (a) Hence, the law obliges one to make
use of the ordinary means for its fulfillment. Examples: He who has not
used ordinary diligence to know the law, sins against the law if he
violates its prescriptions. He who eats meat on a day of abstinence,
because he neglected to provide himself with other food, is guilty of
sin. (b) The law obliges one to use sufficient diligence in removing
impediments to its fulfillment or dangers of its violation. Examples:
The law of hearing Mass on Sunday obliges one not to stay up so late on
Saturday that fulfillment will be impossible. The law of fasting
obliges one to avoid dangerous occasions of its violation.

385. Interpretation.--Though laws are carefully framed as to language,
doubts about their meaning will often arise--in ordinary cases, because
of lack of understanding or changes of conditions, and in extraordinary
cases, because from the circumstances the law seems inapplicable. Hence
the need of explaining the law, which is done in ordinary cases by
interpretation, in extraordinary cases by _epieikeia_ (see 411 sqq.).

386. Interpretation is a genuine explanation of the law, that is, one
that states the meaning of the words of the law according to the
intention the lawgiver had in mind when he chose them. It is of various
kinds.

(a) According to the author from whom it proceeds, interpretation is
authentic, if it comes from the lawgiver himself or from another
authorized by him; it is usual, if it comes from common usage (i.e.,
from the manner in which the law is customarily observed); it is
doctrinal, if it is made by learned men according to the rules of
correct exegesis.

(b) According to the effect, interpretation is declarative, if it
clears up what was obscure in the law; it is supplementary, if it
extends or limits the law, by adding to or subtracting from the cases
included under it.

(c) According to the manner in which it is made, interpretation is
strict or wide, Strict interpretation gives to a word of law that least
inclusive and most proper signification it bears (e.g., it understands
“son” to stand for son by birth). Wide interpretation gives to a word a
more inclusive and less proper signification (e.g., it understands
“son” to stand for son by birth or by adoption).

387. Those Subject to Law.--Only those are morally obliged to observe
human law who are subjects of the lawgiver and who have the use of
reason. (a) Those who are not subjects in any sense are not bound, for
to obligate by law is an act of authority and jurisdiction; (b) those
who have not reached the age of reason, or who are habitually insane,
are not themselves morally bound, since they are incapable of moral
obligation. Of course, they may be restrained as to acts, and their
rights may be determined.

388. The lawgiver himself, even though not subject, is held to observe
the laws he makes. Thus: (a) if the lawmaking power resides in a
legislative assembly, each legislator is subject to the body and hence
to its laws; (b) if the lawmaking power is vested in an individual, he
is not subject to the coactive force of his own laws, since he cannot
punish himself; but he is subject to their directive force, inasmuch as
the higher law of nature requires that the superior show good example
by observing what he requires of others.

389. Change of Law.--The growth of knowledge and experience, or the
change of social circumstances, requires now and then that human laws
be improved or adapted to new conditions. But, since laws derive a
great part of their influence from custom, they should not be changed
unless the break with custom is compensated for by the urgent necessity
of the new law, by its manifest advantage, or by the evident iniquity
or harmfulness of the old law, In brief, the common good should be the
norm by which to decide whether a law should be retained or changed.

390. Constitutional law, as being fundamental and organic, is more
immutable than ordinary law. (a) If given to a society established
according to the positive ordinance of a superior, it cannot be
abrogated or modified by the legislative authority of that society,
since this would be contrary to the will of the founder. Hence, the
Church has no power to change the fundamental constitution given her by
Christ, who prescribed the religious society as established by Him to
be necessary. (b) If a constitutional law is given to a society which
is perfect and necessary from the law of nature, such constitution can
be modified for extraordinary reasons and in the special ways provided
(e.g., by amendments approved by the people).

391. The Law of Custom.--Custom (i.e., a long-continued practice that
has acquired binding force) is able to establish a new law or to do
away with an old law. For the will of the lawgiver is manifested not
only by words, as happens in the written law, but also and more clearly
by repeated and continued acts, as happens in the case of the unwritten
law of custom. In a democracy it is the consent of the people who
follow the custom as law that imposes the obligation; in a monarchy it
is the consent of the ruler who permits the custom.

392. With reference to their legal effects, there are three kinds of
customs: (a) customs according to the law, which are those that confirm
by use an existing law; in this way custom interprets law (see 386);
(b) customs beside the law, which are those that introduce a new
obligation that is not prescribed by any written law; in this way
custom establishes law; (c) customs contrary to law, which are those
that remove the obligation of a previous law; in this way custom
repeals, at least in part, the law to which it is opposed.

393. Custom has not the power to establish or repeal a law, unless it
possesses the requisites of law itself (see 285). Hence arise the
following conditions:

(a) Since the exercise of the legislative power requires freedom,
customs do not possess legal force unless they have been practised
freely. Hence, a custom that has been established by force does not
suffice;

(b) Since laws can be made only for perfect societies, customs have not
the force of law, unless they are practised by a perfect society, or by
a majority of its members who are representative. Hence, a custom
observed by a family or by a minority of the voters in a body that has
its own jurisprudence has not the status of law;

(c) Since laws must proceed from competent authority, customs do not
make or unmake law, unless they have the approval of the ruling power.
In a society where the legislative function rests with the people
(e.g., in the ancient democracy of Athens), the fact that they follow a
custom with the purpose of enacting it into law or of using it against
an existing law is sufficient approval. But if the supreme power is not
with the multitude, their customs do not obtain the force of
legislative acts, unless approved by the constituted authority;

(d) Since law needs to be promulgated, a custom, to have the effect of
law, must be practised by public acts through which it becomes known to
the people as a whole.

394. Customs that have the other requisite conditions begin to be
obligatory or derogatory as soon as the approval of competent authority
is had. (a) If the approval is given expressly, the custom has the
force of law at once; (b) if it is given tacitly, inasmuch as the
lawgiver, knowing the custom and being under no restraint, does not
disapprove, the custom has the force of law as soon as tacit consent is
recognized by the learned and prudent; (c) if it is given by the law
itself, which explicitly accepts reasonable customs, the custom has the
force of law when it has lasted for ten years, or other length of time
prescribed.

395. If the superior disapproves of a custom or maintains diplomatic
silence for fear of greater evils, his consent is withheld, and the
custom cannot be deemed as of legal force.

396. There are other conditions necessary that a custom may acquire the
force of law. (a) Since a law is an ordinance knowingly imposed by the
will of the legislator, a custom does not constitute a law if it is
followed through the erroneous conviction that it is already a law, or
if there is nothing to indicate a will to make it obligatory. Signs of
the intention to raise a custom to the dignity of a law are the
punishment of transgressors of the custom, the observance of the custom
even at the cost of great inconvenience, the opinion of the good that
it should be followed, etc. (b) Since a law cannot prescribe except
what is reasonable and for the common good, a practice opposed to the
Natural or Divine Law, or expressly reprobated by written law as an
abuse, or one that is injurious to the welfare of the community, cannot
become unwritten law through custom.

397. There are special conditions in order that a custom may do away
with an existing law. (a) A written law is not repealed unless the
legislator wills to take away its obligation, and hence desuetude or a
custom contrary to law does not abrogate a law unless it manifests a
purpose not to be obligated by what the law prescribes. This it does if
the whole people regard a certain law as a dead letter, or feel that
circumstances or the common welfare require the opposite of what the
law requires, and have no scruple in acting uniformly according to this
conviction.

(b) A written law is not repealed, if it is immutable, or if a change
would be prejudicial to the common interest; similarly, therefore, a
custom cannot abolish a law, unless this law is one that can be
abrogated by human acts, and that is not essential to the public good.
Hence, customs contrary to the Commandments or to the Law of Christ,
customs that are expressly condemned in Canon Law as corruptions,
customs that encourage lawlessness or afford occasions of sin, can
never do away with a law, no matter how long or by how many they are
practised.

398. Those who start a custom contrary to law are sometimes in good
faith, and hence are not guilty of disobedience. (a) It may be that
they are in ignorance of the law, but have the interpretative will not
to be bound by it; (b) it may be that they know the law, but sincerely
think that, on account of conditions, it has ceased of itself.

399. Even when a custom has been started in bad faith, it may continue
through good faith, and so become not a violation, but an abrogation of
the law. Changed conditions may make the law useless or harmful; or the
very fact that it is no longer observed may make it too difficult to
enforce.

400. Today customs do not so often attain the force of law. Moreover,
so difficult is it to know whether any custom has all the qualities
necessary for establishing, modifying, or abrogating a law that only an
expert is competent to judge in this matter.

401. Dispensation.--Human law has not the immutability of the Divine
Law. Hence, not only may it be changed, but it may also be dispensed.
Dispensation is a relaxation of the positive law made for a particular
case by him who has the competent authority.

(a) It is a relaxation of the law--that is, it takes away the
obligation of the law. Thus, it differs from permission, which is
fulfillment of what is conditionally allowed by the law.

(b) Dispensation is made for a particular case--that is, it is granted
when the provisions of the law, though beneficial to the community as a
whole, are not suitable for a particular person or case. Thus, it
differs, first, from abrogation and derogation, which remove the
obligation of the whole or a part of the law for the entire community;
and, secondly, from privilege, which is granted permanently as a
private law.

(c) Dispensation is given by competent authority--that is, by the
legislator or others who have the lawful power. Thus, it differs from
_epieikeia_ and private interpretation, which are made by those who
have no power to dispense.

(d) Dispensation is a relaxation of the positive law, for since the
Natural Law is immutable (see 305), no dispensation can be given from
its requirements. Thus, dispensation differs from the official
declaration or interpretation of the Natural or Divine Law (see 315).

402. Those who have the power to dispense from a law are the lawgiver
and others duly authorized. (a) The lawgiver himself can dispense as
follows: in his own laws, since he was able to make them; in the laws
of his predecessors, since his authority is equal to theirs; in the
laws of his inferiors, since they are his subordinates. (b) Others can
dispense who have received from the law, from their superior, or from
custom the necessary authority to dispense.

403. Those Who May Be Dispensed from a Law.--(a) Since dispensation is
an act of jurisdiction, only those can be dispensed who are in some way
subject to the dispenser. Since, however, the jurisdiction used in
dispensing does not impose an obligation but grants a favor, it is held
that he who has the power to dispense others may also dispense himself,
if his power is not restricted. (b) Since dispensation is an act of
authority, it may be exercised even in favor of one who is absent, or
ignorant of the dispensation or unwilling to accept it. But, since as a
rule favors should not be forced, the validity of a dispensation
generally depends upon the consent of the one dispensed.

404. The power of dispensing has for its end the common good, and
therefore it must be exercised: (a) faith fully, that is, not for
reasons of private interest or friendship; (b) prudently, that is with
knowledge of the case and with judgment that there are sufficient
reasons for dispensation.

405. In order that the reason for a dispensation be sufficient, it is
not required that it be so grave as to constitute a physical or moral
impossibility of keeping the law, since the obligation of the law
ceases in the face of impossibility (see 317, 487), without the need of
dispensation. Hence, lesser reasons suffice for dispensation.

406. A dispensation must be granted whenever the law itself or justice
requires it. The following cases are usually given: (a) when there
exists a reason that requires, according to law, that a dispensation be
granted; (b) when the common good, or the spiritual good of an
individual, or his protection from some considerable evil, demands the
concession of a dispensation.

407. A dispensation may be either granted or denied, when the case does
not demand it and the superior after careful investigation is not
certain whether the reason is sufficient or insufficient; otherwise, a
greater responsibility would rest on the superior than the law can be
thought to impose--viz., that of attaining certainty where it cannot
easily be had.

408. He who dispenses without a sufficient reason is guilty of the sin
of favoritism, and is responsible for the discontent and quarrels that
result. He is guilty of grave sin thus: (a) if serious scandal or other
inconvenience is caused, even when the dispenser is the lawgiver
himself; (b) if the law obliges under grave sin and the dispensation is
not granted by the lawgiver, but by an inferior who usurps the right to
dispense.

409. The subject of dispensation is guilty of sin: (a) if he asks a
dispensation when he knows for certain that there is no sufficient
reason for it; (b) if, having been denied a dispensation, even though
unjustly, he acts against the law; or if he knowingly makes use of an
invalid or expired dispensation.

410. Sufficient reasons for a dispensation can be reduced to two
classes: (a) private welfare (e.g., the difficulty of the law for the
petitioner, a notable benefit he will receive through the dispensation,
etc.); (b) public welfare (e.g., the benefits that are secured to the
community, or the evils that are avoided through the dispensation).

411. _Epieikeia_.--Since human laws regulate particular and contingent
cases according to what usually happens, and since they must therefore
be expressed in general terms, exceptional cases will occur that fall
under the law, if we consider only the general wording of its text, but
that do not fall under the law, if we consider the purpose of the
lawgiver, who never foresaw the exceptional cases and would have made
different provision for them, had he foreseen them. In such exceptional
cases legalism insists on blind obedience to the law-books, but the
higher justice of _epieikeia_ or equity calls for obedience to the
lawgiver himself as intending the common welfare and fair treatment of
the rights of each person.

412. _Epieikeia_ may be defined, therefore, as a moderation of the
words of the law where in an extraordinary case, on account of their
generality, they do not represent the mind of the lawgiver; which
moderation must be made in the manner in which the lawgiver himself
would have made it, had he thought of the case, or would make it now,
were he consulted. Hence, _epieikeia_ differs from the various causes
that take away the obligation of a law, for it supposes the
non-existence of obligation from the beginning and non-comprehension in
the law.

Thus: (a) it is not revocation, desuetude, restrictive interpretation,
or dispensation; (b) it is not cessation on account of impossibility;
(c) it is not presumed permission or self-dispensation.

413. In its use _epieikeia_ is at once lawful and dangerous.

(a) It is lawful, for it defends the common good, the judgment of
conscience, the rights of individuals from subjection to a written
document, and from oppression by the abuse of power;

(b) it is dangerous, for it rests on the judgment of the individual,
which is prone to decide in his own favor to the detriment of the
common good as well as of self.

414. _Epieikeia_ by its very nature imposes certain limits on its use.

(a) It is based on the fact that a certain case is not comprehended in
a law, because the legislator did not foresee it.

Hence, _epieikeia_ is not applicable to the Divine Law; for the Divine
Lawgiver foresaw all cases that could arise, and so excluded all
exceptions (see 315). This is clear as regards the Ten Commandments and
other precepts of the Natural Law, since they deal with what is
intrinsically good or bad, and are unchangeable (see 307). But it
applies also to the prescriptions of the Positive Law of God, and
apparent cases of _epieikeia_, such as the eating of the loaves of
proposition by David (I Kings, xxi. 6), can be explained by the
cessation of law or divine dispensation. Examples: One may not excuse
certain modern forms of cheating on the plea that they were not thought
of when the Decalogue was given. One may not omit Baptism on the ground
that Christ Himself would have excused from it, had He foreseen the
circumstances.

(b) _Epieikeia_ is based on the principle that the words of a law must
be subordinated to the common good and justice. Hence, it is not
applicable to those laws whose universal observance is demanded by the
common good--that is, to irritant laws. Any hardship suffered by an
individual through the effect of such laws is small in comparison with
the injury that would be done to the common welfare if there were any
cases not comprehended in such laws; for irritant laws are the norms
for judging the validity of contracts and other acts, and public;
security demands that they be uniform and certain. Example: One may not
contract marriage with a diriment impediment, on the plea that the
Church would not wish the impediments to oblige under the serious
inconvenience that exists in one’s case.

415. The dangers of _epieikeia_ also place limitations on its use.

(a) There is the danger that one may be wrong in judging that the
lawgiver did not wish to include a case under his law. If this is not
certain, one should investigate to the best of one’s ability, and have
recourse, if possible, to the legislator or his representative for a
declaration or dispensation. It is never lawful to use _epieikeia_
without reasonable certainty that the legislator would not wish the law
to apply here and now.

(b) There is the danger that one may be in bad faith in deciding that
the common good or justice requires the use of _epieikeia_; the motive
in reality may be self-interest or escape from obligation, Hence, a
person should not use _epieikeia_ except in necessity, when he is
thrown on his own resources and must decide for himself; and, even
then, he must be sure that he acts from sincerity and disinterestedness.

416. Cases in which the use of _epieikeia_ is lawful are the following:

(a) Epieikeia in a wide sense--that is, a benign interpretation made by
a private individual that a particular case is not comprehended in the
intention of the lawgiver, because the latter had not the power to
include it--may be used for all cases in which the opposite
interpretation would set the law up in opposition to the common welfare
or would work injustice to individuals. Example: The law that goods
borrowed must be returned to their owners yields to _epieikeia_, if
there is question of putting weapons into the hands of one who would
use them against the public security or for the commission of murder;

(b) _Epieikeia_ in a strict sense--that is, the judgment that a
particular case is not included in the intention of the lawgiver,
because the latter had not the wish to include it--may be used for all
those cases in which the opposite interpretation would suppose in the
lawgiver a severity that is not likely. “The rigor of the law may be
extreme injustice” (Cicero, _De Officiis_, I, 10). Example: Titus has
the opportunity to make a notable sum of money on a Sunday morning, but
cannot make use of the opportunity without missing Mass that day. Caius
on a fast day feels well, but is tired and will be not a little
inconvenienced if he fasts. Both Titus and Caius may use _epieikeia_,
for the Church does not wish to be unkind, nor, generally speaking, to
have her laws oblige rigorously and for every case.

417. Though all human law is subject to _epieikeia_, the practice of
the civil law does not always allow it. (a) Action on individual
responsibility makes one guilty of technical violation. Example:
Balbus, fearing that his house may be robbed or he himself assaulted,
borrows a revolver and practises shooting. He had not time to get the
necessary permit, but argued that necessity knows no law. But, if he is
arrested, the court may hold him guilty of violating the law. (b)
Action in a court of equity, however, will give relief for cases not
provided for in law. Example: One may obtain an order from the court
restraining a neighbor from injury, when the law itself gives only the
right to recover damages for injury done.




Art. 5: ECCLESIASTICAL LAW

418. The Church, being a perfect and independent society, has the power
to make laws for its members in order to promote the common spiritual
welfare. These laws are not an encroachment on the liberty of the
Gospel, for Christ Himself bestowed on the Church legislative and other
governmental powers suitable to her mission. The charter of the
legislative authority of the Church is contained in the words of
Christ to Peter: “I say to thee that thou art Peter, and upon this rock
I will build My Church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against
it. And I will give to thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven. And
whatsoever thou shalt bind upon earth, shall be bound also in heaven;
and whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth, it shall be loosed also in
heaven” (Matt., xvi. 18, 19; see also Matt., xviii. 17; Luke, x. 16).

419. The character of laws made by the Church is as follows:

(a) their purpose is to guide and assist the individual that he may
more easily and perfectly fulfill the laws of Christ, and to protect
and promote the welfare of the Church as a whole;

(b) their contents generally do not impose what is the height of
perfection, but what is the minimum necessary for salvation (see 374);

(e) their number, unlike that of the laws of the Synagogue, is few.
There are only six precepts of the Church that bind all the faithful;
the other laws of the Church do not all oblige each individual, some
being for prelates, some for priests, some for religious, some for
judges, etc.;

(d) their obligation is not so strict as that of the laws of the Old
Testament, for they are more easily changed or dispensed.

420. General Law of the Church.--The general law of the Church is found
in the five books of the Code of Canon Law, promulgated by Benedict XV
on May 27, 1917. It applies only to the Latin Church, except in those
matters that of their nature affect the Oriental Church as well, and it
has been in force from Pentecost Sunday, May 19, 1918.

421. The effects of the Code on the older legislation are as follows:

(a) it retains in their entirety liturgical laws that are not expressly
corrected; agreements of the Holy See with various nations, even if
they are opposed to the Code; favors, privileges and indults that are
not revoked (Canons 2-4);

(b) disciplinary laws of ecclesiastical origin opposed to the Code are
to be held as revoked, even if they are particular, unless the contrary
is provided. Disciplinary laws of ecclesiastical origin omitted by the
Code are retained in force, if they are particular; they are abrogated,
if they are general and not contained at least implicitly in the
Code; if a general law decreed a penalty, it must be expressly
mentioned in the Code to retain force (Canon 6);

(c) customs, universal or particular, opposed to the Code, when
expressly disapproved by it, must be corrected, even if immemorial;
when they are not expressly disapproved by the Code, they may or may
not be continued, as a rule, according as they are immemorial--or one
century old--or not (Canon 5).

422. The rules laid down for the interpretation of the Code are as
follows: (a) in those parts where the Code agrees with the older
legislation, it is to be interpreted by means of the latter; (b) in
those parts where it certainly disagrees with the older legislation, it
is to be interpreted from its own phraseology (Canon 6).

423. Lawgivers in the Church.--The Pope, as Vicar of Christ and Visible
Head of the Church, has supreme legislative power in the Church (Canon
218): “Thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build My Church ....
And I will give to thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven, etc.”
(Matt., xvi. 18, 19). Thus, the Pope can legislate: (a) for the whole
Church, either alone or with the body of the Episcopate subject to him
in an Ecumenical Council, either directly or through Congregations; (b)
for any part of the Church, either directly or through representatives.
Thus also, by Papal concession, legates may legislate for a place to
which they are sent, _Praelati nullius_ for a territory over which they
are placed, General Chapters for a Religious Order, and the like.

424. The Bishops, “placed by the Holy Ghost to rule the Church of God”
(Acts, xx. 28), have legislative power within their own territory,
dependently on the Pope (Canon 335). (a) They can make laws, each for
his own diocese, either in or out of a synod; (b) when gathered
together in council, provincial or plenary, they can legislate for
ecclesiastical provinces, or for all the faithful of their country.

425. Subject-Matter of Church Law.--The end of the Church being the
glory of God and the salvation of souls, she can legislate concerning
all matters that are sacred or that refer, directly or indirectly, to
the satisfaction of man or the worship of God (see Leo XIII, Const.
_Immortale Dei_, d. 1 Nov. 1885).

(a) The Church can call to mind those things that are already
prescribed by the Divine Law, Natural or Positive; and, although she
cannot dispense in these laws (see 313-814 and exception as to
hypothetical positive law in 357), she can interpret them
authoritatively, and can decide when obligations of the Divine Law,
that depend upon an act of the human will, cease (see 315-316).

(b) The Church can determine those things that were left undetermined
in the Divine Law. Examples: The manner in which the Lord’s Day is to
be sanctified, the times and frequency with which the Divine law of
Communion is to be fulfilled, the way in which the obligation of
fasting is to be complied with, etc.

(c) The Church can make laws in matters that were left free by our Lord
whenever this will promote the better observance of His law (e.g., many
church laws for the clergy and religious, for the conduct of worship,
for administration, etc.).

426. The acts that may be commanded by the Church are of various kinds.

(a) The Church may command acts that are purely external (e.g.,
fasting) and acts that are partly external and partly internal, that
is, those external acts to which, from the nature of things or from
law, a special moral act of the intellect or will must be joined (e.g.,
a true oath, a worthy confession or Communion).

(b) The Church may command acts that are purely internal, that is, acts
of the intellect or will that are not necessarily connected with any
external act (such as meditation, the intention in applying Mass,
ctc.), whenever she is explaining, applying, or determining the Divine
Law, or acting in virtue of the power of Christ. Examples: The Pope may
define a dogma to be accepted internally. A confessor may impose as
penance a pious meditation. The Church prescribes the days when pastors
must intend to offer Mass for their people. A religious superior may
command a spiritual retreat.

(c) It is more probable that, apart from instances such as those just
given, the Church cannot legislate regarding acts that are purely
internal. For unlike the divine Legislator, who sees the internal acts
of the soul and who can pass judgment on them, the Church cannot read
the heart or judge the conscience. Hence, it would appear useless for
the Church to give commandments about acts that elude her knowledge,
all the more so since the Divine Law has given commands and
prohibitions regarding internal acts and no one can escape the judgment
of God.

427. Those Bound by General Laws.--The general laws of the Church
oblige all and only such persons as are at once subjects of the Church
and capable of receiving a law (Canon 12).

(a) By Baptism one becomes a member of the Church, and hence it is
the baptized who are subject to ecclesiastical laws; (b) by her laws,
the Church commands only human and deliberate acts or omissions, and
hence it is only those who can reason that are subject to those laws.
(c) Moreover, unless the law expressly rules otherwise, those who,
although they have attained the use of reason, have not yet completed
their seventh year are not bound by purely ecclesiastical law. Specific
exceptions are stated in the law. Thus: (1) Canons 854, Sec.2, and
940, Sec.1, regarding the reception of the sacraments in danger of
death, Canon 859, Sec.1, stating the precepts of Easter Communion,
and Canon 906, containing the precepts of annual confession, declare
that the law in these matters is binding on persons having the use of
reason, regardless of the actual completion of the seventh year, The
law of fasting in Canon 1254, Sec.2 binds after the completion of the
twenty-first year. (2) Canon 1099 explicitly exempts non-Catholics, in
their own marriages, from the ecclesiastical form of marriage; also
Canon 1070 exempts them from the impediment of disparity of cult. (3)
The habitually insane are considered as infants under seven (Canon 88,
Sec.3). Accordingly, although they are bound by the Divine Law during
lucid moments, they are not usually bound by purely ecclesiastical laws
during this period.

428. By the unbaptized are here understood, not only those who have
never received Baptism (such as infidels, pagans, Mohammedans, Jews,
catechumens), but also those who were baptized invalidly. The divine
law of receiving Baptism and entering the Church applies to these
persons, but, as long as they are unbaptized, they are not subjects of
the Church. Thus: (a) directly they are not obliged by any
ecclesiastical law, and hence it is not sinful in itself to ask them to
do what is forbidden by such laws (e.g., work on a holyday); (b)
indirectly they become subject to ecclesiastical law when they enter
into law-governed relations with the baptized who are subject to church
law. Example: An unbaptized person who marries a Catholic is married
invalidly, unless the law on dispensation has been observed.

429. Baptized non-Catholics include heretics and schismatics. Thus: (a)
objectively, these persons are obliged by ecclesiastical laws, unless
they are excepted by the law itself, and hence it is not lawful
directly to induce them to transgress a Church law (e.g., to eat meat
on Friday); (b) subjectively, they are generally excused from formal
sin in the non-observance of Church laws, and it is not a sin to
co-operate materially in such non-observance (e.g., by giving meat on
Friday to a Protestant in good faith who requests it or wishes it).

430. It is held that the Church is more lenient as regards those
baptized as non-Catholics, that is, those who were born and brought up
in some non-Catholic sect. Thus: (a) laws that have for their object
the sanctification of the individual (such as fasting and abstinence,
Sunday Mass, etc.), are not insisted on for them, since this would hurt
rather than help their spiritual interests; (b) laws that have for
their object the protection of the public welfare (such as the laws
regarding mixed marriage), apply also to baptized non-Catholics.

Other authors do not admit this distinction and hold that these
non-Catholics are bound by the laws of the Church, since Canon 87
expressly states: By Baptism man is constituted a person in the Church
of Christ with all the rights and duties of Christians.

Apostates and excommunicated persons are certainly bound by all
ecclesiastical laws.

431. Oriental Catholics are not bound by pontifical laws (Canon 1)
except in the following cases: (a) when the matter is dogmatic; (b)
when the law implicitly extends to them, since it contains a
declaration of natural or divine law; (c) when the law is explicitly
extended to them. An example of (a) is Canon 218; of (b) Canon 228,2;
of (c) Canons 622, Sec.4 and 1099, Sec.1, 3.

432. It is a general rule that all persons baptized, as just explained,
are subject to ecclesiastical laws, if they are habitually able to
reason; but that they are not subject to those laws, if they are not
habitually able to reason.

First Rule.--Persons habitually able to reason are all those who in
their normal state are able to understand the difference between right
and wrong, that is, the majority of those who have completed seven
years of age. Such persons are subject to ecclesiastical laws, even
when actually they are unable to reason on account of temporary
intoxication, delirium, derangement, unconsciousness, etc. Hence, one
who would offer meat on Friday to a person momentarily unbalanced on
the plea that his condition excused him from the law, would do wrong;
for the state of passing irresponsibility excuses from formal sin (see
249), but not from the law.

Second Rule.--Persons habitually unable to reason are all those who
have not yet learned the difference between right and wrong (e.g.,
infants and idiots), or who have permanently lost all knowledge of
right and wrong (e.g., the hopelessly insane). These persons are not
bound by ecclesiastical laws, at least not by those that are directive.
Hence, in itself it is not wrong to give meat on days of abstinence to
such persons, even when they are Catholics.

433. Exceptions to the first rule just given are as follows:

(a) According to Canon Law, the age of reason comes legally when one
has completed seven years (Canon 12). If a boy or girl is able to
reason before that age, he or she is not obliged by laws that are
purely ecclesiastical, although it is advisable that parents accustom
their children to the hearing of Mass, to abstinence, etc., as soon as
this can be conveniently done. If a child has passed the seventh year
and does not appear able to reason, he is not bound by ecclesiastical
laws.

(b) According to Canon Law, the age of puberty is fixed for males at
the completion of fourteen years of age, for females at the completion
of twelve years of age (Canon 88, Sec.2). These who have not attained
this age are excused from all penal laws, unless a law expressly states
the contrary; for on account of the want of mature judgment they
deserve leniency (Canon 2230).

(c) The age of majority in Canon (as in Civil) Law is reached when one
has completed twenty-one years (Canon 88, Sec.1). Minors in the exercise
of rights are subject to the power of parents or guardians, except
where the contrary is declared by the law, as is the case for the
reception of the Sacraments and the choice of a religious life (Canon
89). They are not obliged by the law of fast (Canon 1254, Sec.2).

434. There are some exceptions to the second rule given in 432. Thus,
those laws of the Church that grant favors or that invalidate acts can
apply even to those who are habitually unable to reason (such as
infants and the perpetually demented); for laws of this kind are not
directive of the acts of subjects.

435. Those Bound by Particular Laws.--The particular laws of the Church
oblige all those who are subject to her general laws, and who become
subject to the laws of a locality by reason of domicile or personal
presence (Canon 13, Sec.2).

436. There are two kinds of domicile. (a) A true domicile or home is
acquired in a place in two ways: immediately, when one takes up one’s
abode there, with the intention of remaining permanently or
indefinitely; finally, after ten years, when one has lived there so
long, even though there was no intention of remaining permanently
(Canon 92, Sec.1). (b) A quasi-domicile or residence is acquired in a
place in two ways: immediately, when one takes up one’s abode there
with the intention of remaining there for at least the greater part of
the year; finally, after the greater part of the year, when one has
lived there so long (Canon 92, Sec.2).

437. With regard to abode, four classes of persons are distinguished in
Canon Law (Canon 91): (a) an inhabitant, who is one that has a domicile
in a place and is present there; (b) a resident, who is one that has
a quasi-domicile in a place and is present there; (c) a stranger, who
is one that is outside the places of his domicile and quasi-domicile;
(d) a _vagus_ or homeless person, who is one that has no domicile or
quasi-domicile anywhere.

438. The rules as regards those who are not strangers are: (a)
inhabitants and residents are subject to the diocesan, provincial, and
other particular laws of their territory (Canon 13, Sec. 2); (b) the
homeless are subject to the local laws of the territory where they are
present (Canon 14, Sec. 2).

439. The rules for strangers with reference to general laws (Canon 14,
Sec. 1, n. 3) are; (a) a stranger is obliged to follow these laws, if
they are observed in the place where he is, even though they are not in
force in the place of his domicile or quasi-domicile; (b) a stranger
is not obliged to observe general laws, if they are not in force where
he is, even though they are in force in the place of his domicile or
quasi-domicile. Thus, the general law of abstinence on Friday does
not oblige one who is travelling in a place where the law has been
suspended, even though he would be obliged by it at home. The traveller
would do better, however, to keep to the practice of his home.

440. The rules for strangers with regard to the particular laws of
their own domicile or quasi-domicile (Canon 14, Sec. 1, n. 1) are;
(a) they are obliged in two cases--first, when those laws are not
territorial but personal and obligatory on them everywhere (as is the
case with the statutes of religious superiors), and secondly, when the
violation of a territorial law would be harmful in its own territory
(as when by fiction of law one must be considered as present on account
of the law of residence); (b) they are not obliged in other cases.
Thus, if one is travelling on a feast-day that is a diocesan holyday
in one’s home diocese, but not in the diocese where one is, one is not
obliged to hear Mass.

441. The following are the rules for strangers with regard to the
particular laws of the place where they are: (a) they are obliged in
two cases--first, when natural law itself requires that a territorial
law be observed by all, and secondly, when the Church includes
strangers among those who are subject to a territorial law; (b) they
are not obliged in other cases. Thus, if a person is travelling on a
feast-day that is observed as a holyday of obligation both in his home
diocese and in the diocese where he is, but not as a general holyday
of the Church, he is not obliged to hear Mass; for the law of his home
diocese does not bind him, since he is out of its territory, and the
law of the diocese where he is does not bind him, since he is not a
subject of that law.

442. The natural law requires that strangers should conform themselves
to local laws in the following cases:

(a) when non-observance would be a cause of scandal, which the natural
law commands one to avoid. In this sense we understand the rule of
St. Ambrose: “When you are at Rome, do as the Romans do.” Hence, if
a stranger would cause real scandal by eating meat on a local day of
abstinence, he would be obliged to abstain from it;

(b) when a local law deals with the solemnities required for validity
of contracts (Canon 14, Sec. 1, n. 2). If strangers were not obliged
by laws of this kind, they could take advantage of the inhabitants, a
thing that is contrary to natural justice. Thus, “the place rules the
act”;

(c) when the local law has for its object the maintenance of public
order (Canon 14, Sec. 1, 11. 2); for the natural law demands that
public safety be guarded. Hence, a stranger who commits a crime is
subject to the penalties of the local law (Canon 1566).

443. Examples of territorial laws that oblige even strangers according
to the precept of the Church are the laws that require all, even
strangers, to follow the Calendar of the Church where they celebrate
Mass, and to say the _collectae imperatae_ prescribed by the bishop of
the local diocese.

444. The rules given for strangers can be applied also to those who are
in places exempt from local jurisdiction (e.g., in the monasteries of
exempt regulars). The exempt are those who by fiction of law are held
to be outside the territory of every diocese, and are subject, not to
the local bishop, but directly to the Pope (Canon 515).

445. There are various cases, however, in which exempt religious are
subject to the territorial laws of the diocese where they are. Thus:
(a) when they accept parishes in a diocese, they are subject to the
Ordinary in those matters that pertain to the parishes; (b) when the
common good or the avoidance of scandal requires it, they should
conform to a diocesan law.

446. Those who have a personal privilege can use it anywhere, for a
personal privilege, like a personal precept, follows the person, not
the territory.

447. Promulgation.--Church laws are promulgated as follows: (a) the
laws of the Holy See are promulgated by publication in the official
periodical, _Acta Apostolicae Sedis_. They become effective three
months from the date of publication, unless from the nature of the case
they oblige at once, or it is otherwise provided in the law itself
(Canon 9); (b) the laws of a bishop are promulgated in the manner he
decides, generally by publication in the official periodical of the
diocese. They become effective as soon as published, unless it is
otherwise provided in the law itself (Canon 335, Sec. 2).

448. When a law has been promulgated and become known, if it begins
to be observed, it is said to be accepted; if it is not observed, it
is said to be not accepted. This acceptance is not essential to law.
Hence: (a) the observance of a law by the people is not necessary for
the obligatory force of the law, for otherwise the lawgiver would be
without real authority; (b) the approval of ecclesiastical laws by the
State is not necessary for their validity, since Church and State are
distinct and independent societies within the proper sphere of each.

449. A law that has been promulgated may fail to obtain force in the
following ways: (a) through contrary custom, already existing and
not excluded by the law, or then arising to abrogate the law (see
391 Sqq.); (b) through appeal entered with the lawgiver. Thus, if a
bishop deems a law of the Pope unsuited to his diocese, he explains the
reasons to the Holy See, and pending the answer it is considered that
the lawgiver does not wish the law to oblige.

450. Irritant Laws. Laws Based on Presumption.--There are two classes
of human laws that deserve particular mention on account of special
difficulties regarding them: (a) irritant laws, which would seem to be
unjust, since they declare null what according to natural law would
be valid; (b) laws based on presumption, which would seem to be of
uncertain force, since presumptions are often contrary to fact.

451. An irritant or inhabilitating law is one that expressly or
equivalently declares that certain defects make an act void or
voidable, or a person incapable. Such laws are just, even when made by
human authority, since it is the common good that makes them necessary,
and the natural law itself requires that the common good be promoted.

452. Irritant laws are of various kinds.

(a) They are morally or juridically irritant, according as that which
is taken from the irritated act is either the natural value it has in
conscience, or the positive value it derives from the law. Hence, an
act may be legally null (i.e., have no value that the law recognizes
or protects) and at the same time morally valid (i.e., of just as much
force in conscience as though no irritant law existed).

(b) Irritant laws are merely irritant or irritant and prohibitive,
according as they make an act invalid but not illicit, or both invalid
and illicit. Thus, a law that requires certain formalities for making
a will invalidates the act of writing an informal will, but does not
make it an offense; but the church law of diriment impediments makes a
marriage contracted with one of these impediments both null and sinful.

(c) Irritant laws are merely irritant or irritant and penal, according
as the legislator does not or does intend them as punishments. For
example, the law of clandestinity is merely irritant; the law regarding
the impediment of crime is probably both irritant and penal.

453. Laws that are merely irritant do not oblige one in conscience to
omit the act, but only to suffer the effect of irritation; but laws
that are both irritant and prohibitive oblige one in conscience to omit
the act. Example: In itself, it is not unlawful to make an informal
will, but it is unlawful to marry with a diriment impediment.

454. As to the time when irritant laws obtain their effect, the
following points are important.

(a) Ecclesiastical voiding laws oblige at once in conscience,
although like other laws of the Church they are not retroactive,
unless the contrary is provided, and they do not oblige in case of a
doubt concerning the law. Example: If espousals are made without the
canonical formalities, there is no duty to live up to them as such,
either in conscience or before the law.

(b) Civil voiding laws are generally only civilly irritant, for as
a rule external means are sufficient for the purpose of those laws;
thus, they produce civil irritation at once, but moral irritation only
after pronouncement by the courts. Hence, after a judicial sentence
the voided act becomes such morally, since the decision is founded on
a presumption of common danger (see below, 459). Examples: One who has
received money through a will which he knows to be informal (i.e.,
legally invalid), may retain possession until the civil authority
declares that he has no rights to the money. But, on the other hand,
one who has been disinherited through a will naturally good, but not
made in due form, has the right to contest, if we except the case of
pious bequests (see Vol. II).

455. Laws that make an act voidable or rescindable do not irritate
before declaration of nullity by a judge. Hence, an act that is
rescindable according to law retains its natural force until the
court has decided against it. Example: Acts that were done under the
influence of grave and unjust fear, or that were induced through
deception, are held as valid until declared null by a judge.

456. As to the effects of ignorance on acts irritated by law, the Code
states that ignorance of irritating (invalidating) and inhabilitating
(disqualifying) laws does not excuse from their observance, unless the
law expressly states otherwise (Canon 16, Sec. 1). Moralists discuss
the influence of ignorance (as well as force or fear) on such acts as
follows: (a) if the law is irritant and not penal, it has its effect,
in spite of ignorance, oversight, etc.; for this the common good
requires. Example: One who marries his cousin in good faith, being
invincibly ignorant that it is against the law, contracts invalidly;
(b) if the law is irritant and penal, the irritation being decreed
solely as a punishment, ignorance, oversight, etc., sufficient to
excuse from fault, excuse also from the penalty of irritation; for
penalty presupposes fault. Before the law, however, ignorance and
error as to law or penalties are not presumed but must be proved.
(Nevertheless, it must be noted that according to some authors no
penalty is necessarily or primarily intended in ecclesiastical
irritating and inhabilitating laws. Though punishment actually results
from the matrimonial impediment of crime, for example, the impediment
as such primarily is a personal disqualification intended to protect
the dignity of the sacrament and good morals. Ignorance, then, does
not excuse from it. Some authors maintain that this is true of all
ecclesiastical disqualifying laws.)

457. Generally speaking, _epieikeia_ may not be used in the
interpretation of irritating and inhabilitating laws. Since they
transcend the individual welfare, they demand uniform observance of
all subject to them. Some authors permit the use of _epieikeia_,
however, in particular cases in which the law itself aims to protect
the individual, whereas its observance would tend rather to harm
the individual or at times even the interests of the community.
Accordingly, it seems probable that an irritant law may cease in case
of impossibility or of a most grave inconvenience that is common.
Example: If in a pagan country Christians were so few that they could
marry only infidels, and if distance or other circumstances made it
impossible to seek a dispensation, the diriment impediment of disparity
of worship would seem to cease for those Christians.

458. Some authors hold that an irritant law may also cease on account
of impossibility, or of a most grave inconvenience that is only
private; but this opinion cannot be deemed certain. An example of
private inconvenience is the case of an invalidly married person who is
near to death and unable to seek the dispensation from the impediment
that has made the marriage null.

459. A law based on presumption is one in which the lawgiver rules for
certain cases according to what experience shows in their regard--viz.,
that such cases are generally dangerous, or indicative of a particular
fact. These laws are not of uncertain force, for the cases in which
they cease to oblige are few and definite.

460. When a law is based on a presumption of common danger and that
danger does not exist in a particular instance, the law nevertheless
obliges (Canon 21); for the end of the law is the common good, and if
it ceased for an individual whenever its presumption of danger was
not true in his case, everyone could persuade himself that the law
did not apply to him, and thus the common good would be defeated.
Examples: The law against the reading of irreligious books is based on
the presumption of common danger of sin, the law against clandestine
marriages on the presumption of common danger of fraud; hence, they
oblige even in the particular instances where these dangers are absent.
Examples of laws based on the presumption of common danger can be found
in Canons 199; 409, Sec. 1; 420; 422; 1022; 1028; 1114; 1116; 1138;
1396; 1398.

461. When a law is based on the presumption of a particular fact that
usually happens in the cases with which the law is concerned, and the
fact in an individual instance did not happen, does the law oblige?

(a) In conscience the law does not oblige of itself, because
presumptions must yield to the truth; but it may oblige accidentally,
if non-observance would cause great public or private harm. Example:
The law presumes that a person born and brought up among Catholics has
been baptized, and is therefore subject to the church laws. But if, in
fact, the person was never baptized, he is not subject to those laws,
as long as he remains unbaptized, unless there be some accidental
necessity of keeping them, such as the danger of scandal.

(b) Before the public authority the law in question does oblige until
the non-existence of the fact presumed by the law has been proved in
the manner required by law. Example: When parties contract marriage
according to the form prescribed by the Church, the presumption is
that the contract was valid, and, as long as that presumption is not
overcome, the Church will not sanction a new marriage by either of the
parties. But if it can be proved in court that threats or violence
produced lack of consent, the obligation not to contract a new marriage
will terminate before the law.

462. Fulfillment of Law.--With reference to the manner of fulfilling
a law there are a number of questions to be considered: (a) as to the
external acts, whether or not one can fulfill the law for another,
whether or not the omission of some slight detail renders compliance
insufficient, whether or not he who cannot fulfill the whole law is
bound to fulfill a part of it, whether or not several obligations can
be satisfied at the same time or by the same act, etc.; (b) as to the
internal acts, whether or not one must have the intention of meeting
the wishes of the lawgiver, whether or not one must be in the state of
grace, etc.

463. Personal fulfillment is not always necessary; for an affirmative
law requires either that some thing be given, or that some personal act
be performed. (a) When the law requires that some thing be given (e.g.,
that taxes be paid), the obligation can be satisfied through another,
since a thing can be transferred from one person to another, who agrees
at least interpretatively; (b) when the law requires that a personal
act be performed (e.g., that Mass be heard on Sunday), the obligation
cannot be satisfied through another, for actions cannot be transferred
from one to another.

464. Minute fulfillment is not always necessary; for sometimes the
minor details of the fulfillment of a law are expressly prescribed,
sometimes they are not.

(a) If these details are required by the law itself or by the nature
of the case, the law is not satisfied if they are neglected. Example:
Friday abstinence ends exactly at midnight, and hence to eat meat even
one minute before midnight is to break that abstinence.

(b) If the law does not prescribe minute details, these are not
required for the fulfillment of the obligation; for laws should not be
unduly burdensome. Example: One who is a few minutes late for Mass does
not miss Mass, if he is present for the essential parts of the Mass.

465. Partial fulfillment is required of him who cannot make complete
fulfillment, only when the part is commanded for its own sake; for that
which is commanded by a law is considered by the lawgiver as either an
indivisible unit, or as a whole composed of parts that have singly an
independent moral value and obligation.

(a) If the thing commanded is morally an indivisible unit (e.g., a
pilgrimage to a shrine), he who is not able to fulfill the whole law is
bound to nothing. Example: One who has made a vow to go on pilgrimage
to a distant sanctuary, is not bound to go part of the way, if he is
unable to make the entire journey.

(b) If the thing commanded has parts that contribute to the end of
the law, he who is able to fulfill only one or more such parts is
obliged according to his ability; if it is certain that he can perform
even a part, he is bound to that; if it is not certain that he can
perform even a part, it would seem that generally he is excused from
all. Examples: A cleric who can say some but not all the Hours of his
Office, is obliged to say what he can. A person who can certainly
abstain, but who cannot fast, is bound during Lent to abstain.

466. Simultaneous fulfillment by one act of several obligations is
lawful, if the obligations differ only materially. They are said to
differ only materially, if the motive of the legislator in giving
different commands about the same thing is the same in each instance;
they differ formally, if the legislator has a different motive in each
instance. The motive is recognized either from the express declaration
of the lawgiver, or from interpretation given through authority or
custom.

(a) When two commands differ only materially, it can be presumed that
the legislator is not unwilling that they be fulfilled by one and the
same act, unless it is clear that he wishes them to be fulfilled by
distinct acts. Example: If one falls sick at Easter time and receives
the Viaticum, it is not necessary for him to receive Communion again in
order to make his Easter duty; for the divine law of Viaticum and the
church law of Easter Communion have the same motive, and hence can be
fulfilled by one and the same Communion.

(b) When two commands differ formally, it can be presumed, unless the
opposite is manifest, that the legislator wishes them to be complied
with by distinct acts. Example: If a confessor imposes a fast as a
penance, this penance cannot be performed on a fast day; for the motive
of the law of fast is general, that of the sacramental penance is
particular.

467. Simultaneous fulfillment by several acts of several obligations
is sometimes possible, sometimes impossible. For the acts prescribed
by different laws are either capable or incapable of being done at the
same time. Thus, it is possible to hear a Mass and to say a penance
of some Hail Marys at the same time. But it does not seem easy for an
ordinary person to give attention to four or more Masses at the same
time.

(a) If the acts do not impede one another and the legislator is not
unwilling, several laws can be fulfilled at the same time. Example: If
two Masses are being said on adjoining altars, one can hear both--the
one to satisfy the Sunday obligation, the other to perform a penance
received.

(b) If the acts impede one another, or if the legislator wishes his
laws to be fulfilled at distinct times, the different obligations
cannot be satisfied simultaneously. Examples: If a distracted person
has received a penance to hear six Masses, he cannot hear them all
at once, on account of the division of attention necessary. If the
confessor told a person to hear Mass “three times,” the latter cannot
satisfy by hearing three Masses at one time.

468. When a law prescribes not only what is to be done, but when it
is to be done, the time must be observed. But the obligation does not
always cease with the expiration of the time.

(a) If the time set by the law is a limit beyond which the obligation
ceases, he who has not complied within that time has no further
obligation. Examples: He who did not fast on Christmas Eve, would
not be obliged to fast on Christmas Day. He who did not hear Mass on
Sunday, would not be obliged to hear Mass on Monday.

(b) If the time set by the law is not a limit to terminate the
obligation, but a date fixed in order to insist on the obligation, he
who has not complied within the prescribed period, is nevertheless
still obliged. Examples: He who has not made the Easter duty by Trinity
Sunday, is obliged to receive Communion after Trinity. He who has not
paid a debt on the day required by law, is bound to pay it after that
day.

469. It depends on the intention of the lawgiver whether the time he
prescribes for fulfillment is a limitation of the obligation or not.
The intention of the lawgiver is known either from the words or purpose
of the law, or from custom.

470. If the law declares that some duty must be performed within a
determined period, allowing freedom for earlier or later performance
within the period, the following points must be considered. (a) A
person is not obliged to comply early, if he intends to comply before
the period has ended. (b) He is obliged to comply early, if he foresees
that later he will not be able to do what is required. Examples: If a
person who has not made his Easter duty has the opportunity to receive
Communion on Easter Sunday, and will not have another such opportunity
till Christmas, he is obliged to receive on Easter Sunday. But, if he
can communicate any Sunday during the Paschal time, he is not bound to
do so on one of the early Sundays. If one can hear an early Mass, but
not another Mass, on a holyday, one must hear the early Mass.

471. Just as one may not delay fulfillment until after the time set
by law, so neither may one anticipate fulfillment before the time
determined, unless the law may be considered to allow this. Examples:
If a person has heard Mass on Saturday, he has no right to make this
count for the following day. A rosary said before confession cannot be
considered as performance of the penance, if in confession one is given
the rosary to say.

472. It is held that a cleric who said the Breviary in the morning,
just before he was ordained subdeacon and undertook the obligation of
the Office, satisfied by that anticipated recitation; likewise, that a
traveller who heard Mass in a place where a holyday of obligation of
the general law was not in force, has satisfied by anticipation, if
later in the morning he reaches as his destination a place where the
holyday is observed. For in both these cases the law intends that the
Office be said, or the Mass be heard within the day.

473. If a person who is now able to do what the law requires, foresees
that he will not be able to do this when the time set by the law
arrives, he is not obliged to anticipate fulfillment, even when he has
the privilege of anticipation. Examples: A cleric who at 2 p.m. is able
to anticipate Matins for tomorrow, and who knows that later, on account
of an operation, he will not be able to say his Office, is not bound to
anticipate; for no one is obliged to use a privilege. A person who is
able to hear Mass on Saturday, and who knows that all of Sunday must be
spent on the train, is not obliged to hear Mass on Saturday, though of
course this is the better thing to do.

474. The internal acts concerned in the fulfillment of a law are: (a)
those in the intellect, such as knowledge; (b) those in the will, such
as consent, motive.

475. Knowledge of what one is doing is sometimes necessary, sometimes
unnecessary for the fulfillment of a law.

(a) If the law is prohibitive, knowledge is not necessary, since
nothing more is required by the law than the omission of what is
forbidden. Example: He who ate no meat on a day of abstinence has
fulfilled the law, even though he was unconscious all day.

(b) If the law is preceptive of a payment to be made, knowledge is not
necessary, since the law requires nothing more than the effect of an
external act. Example: He who pays his taxes while intoxicated fulfills
his obligation, even though he does not know what he is doing.

(c) If the law is preceptive of an act to be performed, knowledge
is required, for it is supposed that the act will be exercised in a
human manner. Example: He who sleeps all during Mass on Sunday does
not fulfill his duty, for the law intends that one assist at Mass in a
human way (i.e., with consciousness of what is being done).

476. Fulfillment of a law is not morally good and meritorious, unless
it is voluntary (see 97 sqq.); but the legal obligation is sometimes
satisfied even by an unwilling fulfillment.

(a) When the law commands a payment to be made, one may will the
contrary of what is commanded and yet fulfill one’s obligation.
Example: He who pays his taxes unwillingly and under compulsion
satisfies the law, which requires not an act, but its effect.

(b) When the law forbids something, it is possible that one does not
will the omission commanded and yet fulfills one’s obligation. Example:
He who intends to eat meat on a day of abstinence which he thinks is
a meat day, but, being unable to find what he wants, omits the meat,
satisfies the law, which requires only that one omit what is forbidden
and have no will to violate the law.

(c) When the law commands that an act be performed, one must perform
the act willingly, since the law being for humans intends that
fulfillment be made in a human manner. Examples: He who is dragged
to church and forcibly detained there during Mass, does not satisfy
the law of sanctifying the Sunday, since force makes his assistance
at Mass involuntary (see 52). A child that goes to church only to
escape punishment satisfies its duty, if, in spite of reluctance, it
really intends to hear Mass, for fear does not necessarily make an act
involuntary (see 41 sqq.).

477. As to the intention required in fulfilling a law, it is to be
noted that one must have, at least implicitly, the intention of doing
what the law prescribes, in the case given in the third section (c) of
the preceding paragraph. Example: He who goes to church on Sunday while
Mass is being said with no other purpose than that of hearing the music
or of waiting for a friend, does not satisfy the Sunday duty, since he
does not at all intend to hear Mass.

478. The following kinds of intention, though to be recommended, are
not necessary for the fulfillment of a law.

(a) It is not necessary, as a rule, that one intend to satisfy one’s
obligation, for human lawgivers have not generally the power or the
intention to command acts that are purely internal (see 374, 426).
Examples: He who hears Mass on a holyday not intending to perform his
duty, as he does not know that it is a holyday, has satisfied the law.
He who says the rosary out of devotion and then remembers that he has
an obligation of saying it because of a promise made or of a penance
received, can regard the rosary said as a fulfillment of his obligation.

(b) It is not necessary that one intend that which the lawgiver had in
mind as the purpose of the law; for “the end of the law is not a part
of the law.” Example: A person who takes only one full meal during
Lent, observes the letter of the law; but he misses its spirit if he
eats or drinks greedily, daintily or copiously, in order to avoid the
mortification intended by the law.

479. If one intends to perform what a law prescribes, but at the
same time expressly intends not to satisfy, by that performance,
the obligation imposed, one’s act is sufficient or insufficient for
fulfillment according to the source from which the obligation arises.

(a) If the obligation arises from the will of the lawgiver, the act
is a sufficient fulfillment, since the human lawgiver, as said in
the previous paragraph, does not concern himself with what is purely
internal. Example: If a person hears Mass on Sunday out of devotion,
intending to hear another Mass in satisfaction of the Sunday duty, he
is not bound to hear a second Mass, as he has already done all that the
law requires.

(b) If the obligation arises from one’s own will, as in the case
of a promise or a vow, the act above described is not sufficient
fulfillment; for, as the obligation arose from the will, so also the
mode of fulfillment is to be determined by the will. Example: One
who has vowed to hear Mass, and who now while hearing Mass expressly
determines that not this but another Mass will be in satisfaction of
his vow, is bound by his vow to hear another Mass.

480. As to virtuous dispositions in fulfilling a law, it is to be
observed that, while a good lawgiver always wishes them, he does not
always require them as a duty of obedience. The virtuous dispositions
referred to are of two kinds: (a) habitual, that is, the permanent
spiritual condition of the soul, such as the state of grace, the
habit of charity, etc.; (b) actual, that is, the good manner in which
the commanded act is done, such as devout attention in hearing Mass,
heartfelt contrition in making confession, freedom from vain-glory in
fasting, etc.

481. Virtuous dispositions are or are not commanded according as that
which is prescribed is or is not a mixed, or a purely external act (see
above, 426).

(a) When a mixed act is commanded by law, the virtuous disposition that
the nature of the case calls for, but nothing further, is strictly
prescribed. Hence, the law of Easter Communion requires that Communion
be received in the state of grace, the law of yearly confession that
the penitent be truly contrite, the law of Sunday Mass that there be
sufficient attention to the Mass; but more perfect dispositions (such
as freedom from venial sin in the communicant, perfect contrition
in the penitent, the state of grace in him who hears Mass) are not
required for the fulfillment of the laws we are considering.

(b) When a purely external thing is commanded, the law does not require
internal dispositions, and hence one who performs what is required is
not obliged to repeat it on account of the imperfect way he obeyed.
Example: He who fasts while he is not in the state of grace is not
obliged to fast again to make good what was lacking in his previous
disposition.

482. Of course, what was said in the preceding paragraph has to do only
with single laws, and with what is strictly needed for the fulfillment
of the law. Hence: (a) he who sins because of the way in which he
fulfills one law, violates another law (e.g., one who is willingly,
though not entirely, distracted at Mass, obeys the church law of
assistance at Mass on Sunday, but he disobeys the divine law that he
worship God devoutly);

(b) he who has less devotion in obeying a law than he might have had,
does not deserve reprehension as a transgressor, but his conduct is
less praiseworthy.

483. Interpretation.--The meaning of interpretation and its various
species were explained above in 315 sqq.

484. As to the force of interpretation of church laws, the following
points must be noted:

(a) Authentic interpretation given in the form of law has the force
of law; if it is merely declarative of words of the law certain in
themselves, it does not need promulgation and is retroactive; if it is
supplementary, it needs promulgation and is not retroactive, since it
is a new law (Canon 17, Sec. 2);

(b) Authentic interpretation given in the form of judicial sentence or
of rescript in a particular matter has not the force of law; and it
obliges only the persons and affects only the things concerned (Canon
17, Sec. 3);

(c) Usual interpretation has the force of law when it is given through
a legitimate custom (see above, 391 sqq.), for “custom is the best
interpreter of law”;

(d) Doctrinal interpretation has not the force of law, since it does
not proceed from the lawgiver. Its value depends on the reasons and the
authority by which it is supported. When all the doctors agree, their
interpretation is morally certain; when they disagree, the various
interpretations have more or less probability.

485. Rules for Doctrinal Interpretation.--(a) The words must be
understood in their proper sense according to text and context, unless
this be impossible; if doubtful, they must be judged according to
parallel places in the Code, the circumstances, reason of the law, and
the mind of the lawgiver (Canon 18).

(b) Things that are burdensome should be understood in their most
restricted sense (Canon 19), things that are favorable in their widest
sense. Thus, the censure pronounced against simony is understood in the
narrow sense of simony against the divine law; a privilege granted to
the clergy is understood in the wide sense as given to all the clergy.

(c) Things that remain obscure should be understood in the sense that
is least burdensome to subjects.

(d) A particular law derogates from a general law; but a general law
does not derogate from a previous particular law, unless derogation
is expressly mentioned in the general law; for the particular law is
considered an exception to the general law (Canon 22).

486. Authentic interpretations of ecclesiastical laws are given by the
legislator, his successor, or one delegated by either (Canon 17, Sec.
1). (a) The Pope is the authentic interpreter of all ecclesiastical
laws. A special commission appointed by the Pope interprets the general
law of the Code. (b) The bishop is the authentic interpreter of
diocesan laws made by himself or by his predecessors.

487. Cessation of Obligation.--The ordinary ways in which a law ceases
to be obligatory for an individual are: (a) on the part of the subject,
that he ceases to be subject to the law (exemption), or is unable to
observe it (excuse); (b) on the part of the lawgiver, that he removes
the obligation for the individual (dispensation).

488. As to exemption from Church laws note: (a) he who ceases to
be subject to the law (e.g., one who has received a privilege of
exemption, or who has departed from the place where the law is in
force), is of course not obliged by the law; (b) neither is he guilty
of any fault if he brought about his freedom only just before the law
became effective and with the sole purpose of being exempt; for the law
does not oblige that one remain subject to it.

489. Excuses from the law are reduced to two, namely, ignorance and
impossibility.

(a) Ignorance excuses from the guilt of non-observance, if it is
inculpable (see 24 sqq.). The question now is whether or not and when
it excuses from legal consequences, such as invalidity, penalty,
reservation of sin, etc.

(b) Impossibility excuses from both obligation and guilt.

490. Ignorance of ecclesiastical law or of a penalty attached to the
law has the following effects determined in the law: (a) No kind of
ignorance excuses from irritating or inhabilitating laws, unless the
contrary is expressly provided for in the law itself (Canon 16, Sec.
1). Thus a person who contracts marriage, while ignorant that he and
the other person are first cousins, is invalidly married.

(b) Affected ignorance of ecclesiastical law or of the penalty alone
does not excuse from any penalties _latae sententiae_ (Canon 2229,
Sec.1).

(c) If the law contains the following words: _praesumpserit, ausus
fuerit, scienter, studiose, temerarie, consulto egerit_, or others
similar to them which require full knowledge and deliberation, any
diminution of imputability on the part of either the intellect or the
will exempts the delinquent from penalties _latae sententiae_ (Canon
2229, Sec.2). (d) If the law does not contain such words, crass or
supine ignorance of the law or even of only the penalty does not exempt
from any penalty _latae sententiae_; ignorance that is not crass or
supine exempts from medicinal penalties, but not from vindicative
penalties _latae sententiae_ (Canon 2229, Sec.3, 1).

491. Other specific determinations of the law include: (a) Inculpable
ignorance of the law itself excludes moral imputability (Canon 2202,
Sec.1); actual inculpable inadvertence or error in regard to the law
has the same effect (Canon 2202, Sec.3). (b) Culpable ignorance, or
culpable inadvertence, or error concerning the law or concerning
the fact diminish imputability more or less in proportion to the
culpability of the ignorance (Canon 2202, Sec.1). (c) If the ignorance,
even inculpable, affects only the fact of the existence of the penalty,
it does not exclude imputability of the delict, but it does diminish it
(Canon 2202, Sec.2).

492. Absolute or physical impossibility (i.e., the want of the power
or of the means of complying with a law), of course, excuses from its
observance; for no one is bound to what is impossible. This applies to
divine law, and hence much more to human law. Example: He who is unable
to leave the house is not obliged to go to Mass.

493. Moral impossibility--that is, the inability to comply with the law
without extraordinary labor, or the imminent danger of losing a notable
good or of incurring a great evil--does not excuse from the observance
of ecclesiastical law when this law receives through circumstances
the added force of the negative law of nature. This happens when the
evil that will result through the observance of the law bears no
proportion to the evil that will result from its violation, the former
being private or temporal or human, the latter public or spiritual or
divine; for the law of nature forbids that the common welfare, or the
salvation of a soul, or the honor of God be sacrificed for the benefit
of an individual, or for the life of the body, or for the welfare of a
creature. Example: The command to abstain from meat on Friday obliges,
if one has been ordered to violate it as a sign of contempt of God or
of religion, even though death is threatened for refusal.

494. Moral impossibility excuses from the observance of a human law in
the following cases:

(a) One is excused when a considerable loss in health, reputation,
spiritual advantage, property, etc., or a grave inconvenience will
result from observing a law which is not a prohibition of nature in
the sense of the previous paragraph; for the legislator cannot impose
obligations that are needlessly heavy, and hence positive law does not
oblige in case of such moral impossibility. Example: Our Lord reproved
the inhuman rigor of the Pharisees, who insisted that their regulations
must be observed, whatever the difficulty or cost.

(b) One is excused when a lower or less urgent law is in conflict
with a law that is higher or more urgent. In such a case the greater
obligation prevails, and the lesser obligation disappears. Examples:
The divine laws that one must preserve one’s life or administer Baptism
to a dying person prevail over the human law of attendance at church.
The less urgent law of fasting yields to the more urgent law of
devoting oneself to duties required by one’s state of life, if there is
a conflict between the two laws.

495. The loss, evil or inconvenience that constitutes moral
impossibility with respect to a law, must bear a proportion to the
law itself; and hence the higher or the more imperative the law, the
greater must be the reason that suffices to excuse from it.

496. Only a learned and prudent man can determine whether moral
impossibility exists with reference to a particular case, and hence it
would be dangerous for those who are not theologians to decide, either
for themselves or for others. The points that have to be considered
in judging are: (a) whether or not the difficulty is of a gravity
proportionate to the importance of the law (e.g., a graver reason is
required to excuse from a law that obliges under mortal sin than to
excuse from a law that binds under light sin); (b) whether or not the
difficulty is grave in relation to the person concerned (e.g., an
obligation that is easy for a healthy person may be very difficult for
one who is infirm).

497. It is never lawful to bring about either physical or moral
impossibility of observing a law, if this be done with the sole or
principal purpose of escaping one’s duty. Example: To go away on
Saturday in order to avoid Mass on Sunday.

498. It is lawful to cause impossibility of observing a law, if there
be some sufficient reason for doing this; for it is lawful to do
something from which two effects, one good and the other bad, result,
if the good effect is the one intended, and there is a sufficient
reason for permitting the evil effect (102 sqq.). Example: It is
sometimes lawful to do some extra work that is very useful, even if the
labor makes one unable to observe a fast.

499. The sufficient reason spoken of in the last paragraph is one that
is proportionate to the urgency and importance of the command and to
the frequency of the non-observance. Examples: A greater reason is
required to take up some work which will make it impossible to keep the
fast, if this be done on the fast day itself, than if it be done the
day before. A far greater reason is required to take up some work that
makes the observance of the fast impossible, if this happens frequently
or habitually, than if it happens only once or twice.

500. Cessation of Law.--A law ceases in two ways.

(a) It ceases from without (i.e., from the act of the legislator),
when he abolishes it, by total or partial revocation (abrogation,
derogation), or by the institution of a new law directly contrary to it
(obrogation). In the new Code of Canon Law there are many instances of
revocation or obrogation of older legislation (see Canons 22, 23), as
in the matter of censures and matrimonial impediments. Examples: In the
diocese of X a minor feast was made a holyday of obligation. This law
was abrogated, if later on it was decreed that neither the prohibition
against servile works nor the precept of hearing Mass was obligatory
for that feast; it was derogated from, if later it was decreed that
servile works were permitted, but Mass was obligatory for that day; it
was obrogated, if a later law included the minor feast in a list of
special days of devotion for which the hearing of Mass was recommended.

(b) A law ceases from within (i.e., of itself), when through change of
conditions the purpose for which it was made no longer exists, or is no
longer served by the law.

501. The purpose for which a law was made ceases to be served by the
law in two cases.

(a) A law no longer serves its purpose, if, from having been a benefit,
it has become a detriment, inasmuch as its observance now would be
wicked, or impossible, or too burdensome. In this case the law ceases,
since it is now contrary to the supreme law that the common welfare be
promoted. Example: A particular law forbade the use of fat or grease
in the preparation of food on days of abstinence. Later, it became
impossible to procure the substitutes previously used.

(b) A law no longer serves its purpose, if, from having been useful, it
has become useless, inasmuch as it is no longer necessary for the end
intended by the lawgiver. In this case the law ceases, for regulations
should not be imposed needlessly. Example: The Council of Jerusalem
made a law that the faithful should abstain from using as food animals
that had been strangled (Acts, xv. 20). The purpose of the law was to
avoid offense to the Jewish converts, who at that time formed a large
part of the Christian community and who had a religious abhorrence for
such food. But shortly afterwards, the Gentile element having become
stronger in the Church, no attention was paid to ceremonial rules of
Judaism.

502. A law ceases to serve its purpose also as follows:

(a) The law becomes harmful or useless with reference to the purpose
of the lawgiver generally and permanently, if the changed conditions
affect the whole community or the great majority, and are lasting. In
this case the law ceases; for, since it is made for the community as
a whole and as a lasting ordinance, it cannot endure, if it becomes
permanently unserviceable to the community. Examples are given in the
previous paragraph.

(b) The law becomes harmful or useless with reference to the lawgiver’s
purpose privately or temporarily, if the harm or uselessness affects
only individuals, or is not lasting. In this case the law continues to
be an instrument of public welfare, or is only momentarily deprived
of its beneficial character. Hence it endures; but for temporary
inconvenience to the public a remedy is had in suspension of the
law, for inconvenience to individuals in dispensation. Example: If
the use of fats or grease were forbidden on days of abstinence, and
if for a time only it were impossible to obtain the substitutes for
the preparation of the food, the law would not cease, but would be
suspended until such time as substitutes could be obtained.

503. The inconvenience caused to individuals from the fact that a law
does not serve its purpose in a case before them, does not always
justify the use of _epieikeia_.

(a) If the observance of the law would be detrimental to the purpose
intended by the lawgiver, _epieikeia_ might be used; for the lawgiver
does not intend that his law should be an obstacle to what he has in
view as its end. Example: Caius needs to read a book placed on the
Index in order to defend the Faith against attacks, but he is unable
to request the general faculty to read forbidden works. Obedience to
the law in this case would defeat the purpose of the law, which is the
protection of faith, and hence Caius may use epieikeia.

(b) If the observance of the law would be unnecessary, but not
detrimental as regards the purpose of the lawgiver, _epieikeia_ may not
be used; else the law would lose its force through the judgments of
individuals in their own favor, and the common welfare would suffer.
Examples: Titus has an opportunity to read a book placed on the Index,
but has not the time to apply for permission. The work was condemned
as dangerous to faith; but Titus is strong in faith, and wishes only
to study the literary qualities of the writer. Sempronius, a parish
priest, is requested to officiate at a marriage immediately, without
proclaiming the banns or seeking a dispensation from proclamation. The
purpose of the law of banns is that impediments may be detected and
invalid marriages avoided, and Sempronius is absolutely certain that
there is no impediment in the case before him. Titus and Sempronius
must observe the law, and the same must be said as regards every actual
case in which there is the possibility of self-deception and peril
to the common good. The theoretical case, in which neither of these
inconveniences would be present, need not be considered.

504. The purpose of the law ceases to exist as follows:

(a) adequately, when all the reasons on account of which it was made
are no longer in existence; in such a case the law itself ceases, for
the lawgiver is not considered as intending to oblige when the reason
for obligation has ceased. Example: If the bishop orders prayers to be
said for rain, the prayers cease to be obligatory when rain has come;

(b) inadequately, when the reason for the law has ceased partially,
but not entirely. In such a case the law does not cease, for it still
remains useful. Example: If the bishop orders prayers for peace and
rain, the prayers are obligatory until both requests have been obtained.

505. A law ceases, therefore, in greater or less degree, according to
circumstances. (a) It ceases entirely or partially, according as it
is revoked or as it becomes useless as to all its provisions, or only
as to one or more of them; (b) it ceases permanently or temporarily,
according as the revocation or cessation is only for a time, or for
good.

506. Custom.--In Canon Law custom can interpret, abrogate or introduce
law, provided: (a) it has the qualities of legitimate custom, and (b)
its existence is proved juridically, or is notorious.

507. According to their extension, customs are of various kinds.
(a) Universal customs are those that prevail in the entire Church;
(b) particular customs are those that are confined to a territorial
portion of the Church (e.g., a province of the Church or of an
Order); (c) special customs are those that are followed in societies
that are smaller, but capable of having their own laws (e.g.,
independent monasteries); (d) most special customs are those observed
by individuals, or by communities not capable of having their own
legislation (e.g., parishes). At the most, customs of this last class
have only the force of privilege (Canon 26).

508. Custom is formed as follows. (a) As to origin, it arises from
the practice of the people, when this practice is followed with the
purpose of making or unmaking a law. Hence, the habitual way of acting
of an individual, even if he be the superior, does not give rise to a
custom. By “people” here is meant a community capable of having its own
law (Canon 26). (b) As to legal force, custom arises solely from the
consent of the Pope or other prelate, when this consent is expressed by
the law or lawgiver, or tacitly admitted by him. Hence, a custom not
approved by the superior has no legal force (Canon 25).

509. A custom can introduce or abrogate any kind of ecclesiastical law
or other custom--penal, prohibitive, irritant--if it is reasonable and
has lasted the prescribed time (Canons 27, 28). Examples: A law that
forbids contrary customs can be abrogated, according to the Code, by
such customs when they are immemorial, or a century old (Canon 27, Sec.
1). The impediment of disparity of worship became diriment through
custom; it was custom that introduced the obligation of the Divine
Office, and that mitigated the early law of fast.

510. A custom expressly disapproved of in law is not reasonable or
legitimate, and cannot derogate from an existing law, nor establish a
new law (Canons 27, 28).

511. The time prescribed by the Code of Canon Law for the acquisition
of legal force by customs that have not the personal consent of the
lawgiver is as follows: (a) forty continuous and complete years are
required to unmake an ordinary law; one hundred years to unmake a law
that forbids future contrary custom (Canon 27, Sec. 1); (b) forty
continuous and complete years are likewise required to make a new law
(Canon 28).

512. The effect of the Code on customs previously existing was
considered above under 421.

513. Like the written law, custom ceases: (a) from within, when its
purpose has ceased entirely; (b) from without, when it is abrogated by
desuetude, or by a contrary law or custom (Canon 30).

514. Laws in a Wide Sense.--In addition to laws strictly so-called,
there are laws in a wide sense, commands or provisions made by
ecclesiastical superiors that have not all the conditions given above
(see 285) for law. Such are: (a) precepts, which differ from law,
because they are given not to the community or permanently, but to
individuals or temporarily; (b) rescripts, which are given with regard
to particular cases and without the solemnity of law; (c) privileges,
which are not obligatory; (d) dispensations, which are relaxations of
law granted to individuals.

515. A precept is a command given to individuals, or for an individual
case, by a competent superior.

(a) It is a command obliging in conscience, and so differs from
counsel, desire, exhortation.

(b) It is given to individuals, and thus differs from law, which has
the character of universality and stability. A precept may be imposed
on a community, but even then it is particular, as being given only for
an individual case or for a certain length of time--for a month or a
year, or during the lifetime of the superior.

(c) It is given by a competent superior. Even here precept differs
from law, since laws can be made only by one who has jurisdictional or
public authority (see above, 285), while precepts may be given also
by those who have only dominative or private authority (as parents,
heads of families, husbands, employers, abbesses). In canonical matters
precepts may be given by religious superiors, parish priests, rectors
of seminaries, and for the court of conscience by the confessor.

516. Precept is similar to law: (a) as to its object, which must be
just, good, and possible of observance; (b) as to its binding force,
since it can be imposed even on those who are unwilling.

517. Precepts are personal (i.e., they affect the person to whom they
are given wherever he may be), unless they are given as territorial
(Canon 24). Hence: (a) a precept given by one who has no territorial
authority (e.g., a religious superior) is personal; (b) a precept
given by the Pope, whose authority includes every territory, is also
personal; (c) a precept given by the bishop is personal, if given to
an individual; it is personal or territorial if given to a community,
according to the nature of the case or the wording of the precept.
Example: The precept not to go to theatres during a journey, imposed by
a bishop under pain of suspension, obliges everywhere, both as to fault
and as to penalty.

518. As to the force of precepts: (a) morally or as to fault, they
oblige, so that the violator is guilty of disobedience and of sin
against any particular virtue the superior willed to impose under
precept; (b) juridically or as to the penalty prescribed, they do
not oblige, unless the precept was given legally--i.e., by a written
document, or in the presence of two witnesses, etc. (Canon 24).
Example: If a precept was given under the penalty of loss of office,
but without the legal formalities, the canonical process and sentence
of deprivation could not be resorted to.

519. A precept expires of itself with the expiration of the authority
that gave it (e.g., at the death or cessation of office of the
superior), unless the precept was given by document or before witnesses
(Canon 24).

520. A rescript is a written reply made by the Holy See or the
Ordinary to a request, statement, or consultation. Replies of this
kind are employed in reference to the concession of benefices and to
dispositions to be made concerning litigation and judicial procedure.
Usually they grant favors, either transitory--e.g., a dispensation--or
permanent--e.g., a privilege (Canons 36-62).

521. A privilege is a special and permanent right granted by a ruler to
an individual or community to act contrary to or beyond the law.

(a) It is a permanent right, and so resembles law, which is also stable
and forbids interference with what it grants.

(b) It is a special right, and so it differs from law, which is general
and imposes obligation. It is sometimes styled “private law.” Moreover,
law requires promulgation, privilege requires only acceptance.

(c) It is granted by the ruler (i.e., by the Pope, bishop, or other
legislator), and thus it differs from permission granted by a simple
superior.

(d) It is granted to a person, that is, to an individual (Titus, Caius,
Balbus, etc.) or to a congregation or community; for, if granted to
all, it would not be special.

(e) A privilege gives the right to act contrary to the general law
(e.g., by exempting from a tax) or beyond the general law (e.g., by
granting the power to dispense). Thus, a privilege differs also from
prerogatives that are set down in the Code itself (e.g., the special
rights and faculties of Cardinals, bishops, regulars, etc.), all of
which are laws and not privileges in the strict sense.

522. The rules for interpretation of privileges are similar to those
for the interpretation of law (see 483 sqq.). They should be neither
extended nor restricted, but should be understood according to the
meaning of the words themselves (Canon 67), yet so that the party
receiving the privilege will seem to have obtained a favor (Canon 68).
If the meaning intended is doubtful, the following rules of the Code
(Canons 50, 68) should be followed: (a) wide interpretation is to be
given to the privileges that are beyond or outside of the law and that
are not prejudicial to others, as well as to privileges that were
given as a reward of merit; (b) strict interpretation is to be given
to privileges that are contrary to law (saving the cases of privileges
granted to pious causes or in favor of a community), to privileges
granted because of an agreement made, and to privileges that are
prejudicial to third parties.

523. A privilege is a favor, and hence does not as such impose the duty
of acceptance or use; but obligations owed to others often make it
necessary to avail oneself of a privilege (Canon 69).

(a) Prerogatives granted in the law cannot be renounced by individuals,
since their preservation is required by the common good. Example: A
cleric has no right to abandon an immunity which the law gives to his
state.

(b) Privileges granted to a community can be renounced by the
community, but not by its individual members. An individual member is
not bound, however, to use the privilege, unless there be accidental
reasons, such as the command of a superior, that require him to do so.

(c) Privileges granted to individuals need not be used by them, unless
there be accidental reasons that call on one to use a privilege.
Example: A priest who has the privilege of a private oratory is not
bound to establish such an oratory; but a priest who has the privilege
of absolving from reserved cases is bound in charity to use it, if a
penitent would otherwise suffer.

524. Dispensation differs from privilege: (a) because the former from
its nature is temporary, the latter permanent; (b) because the former
is always contrary to the law, whereas the latter may be only beyond
the law.

525. The Pope can dispense as follows: (a) in all ecclesiastical laws
he can grant a dispensation strictly so-called (Canon 81); (b) in
divine laws in which the obligation depends on an act of the human will
(such as the laws of oaths, vows, contracts, etc.), he can grant a
dispensation improperly so-called (see above, 313 sqq., 357), In other
divine laws, he can interpret or declare, but he cannot dispense.

526. The Ordinary can dispense as follows: (a) in the general law of
the Church when he has an explicit or implicit faculty from the Pope or
from the law (Canon 81); (b) in diocesan laws and, in particular cases,
also in laws of provincial and plenary councils, when there is just
reason (Canon 82); (c) in papal laws made for a particular territory,
when faculty has been given explicitly or implicitly, or recourse to
the Holy See is difficult (Canon 82); (d) in all ecclesiastical laws
that are dispensable, when there is doubt of fact (Canon 15).

527. The pastor can dispense as follows: (a) from the general law
concerning feasts of obligation and from the laws of fast and
abstinence. The dispensation can be granted either to his own subjects
or to strangers, but only for a just reason, in individual instances
and for particular individuals or families. The bishop may dispense the
whole diocese, but the pastor cannot dispense the whole parish (Canon
1245). (b) When there is danger of death, the pastor can dispense from
matrimonial impediments as provided in Canon 1044.

528. Religious superiors, local superiors included, can dispense in the
laws and statutes of their own institutes, except where this is
forbidden. In clerical and exempt institutes the superiors can also
dispense the subjects and all who live day and night in the religious
house (such as students, guests and servants) from the general laws of
the Church, as follows:

(a) The higher superiors, such as abbots, generals, provincials, have
the same authority in this respect as the bishop has with reference to
his own diocese. Hence, they can dispense in all ecclesiastical laws
in which the Pope dispenses, when there is doubt of fact, or recourse
to the Holy See is difficult (Canons 15, 81); in case of necessity,
they can dispense from the laws of abstinence individuals, or an entire
convent, or an entire province (Canon 1245, Sec. 2); they can dispense
in irregularities as provided in Canon 990, Sec. 1.

(b) The other superiors, local superiors included, can dispense their
subjects from the laws of fast and abstinence in the same manner as
pastors are able to dispense their parishioners (Canon 1245, Sec. 3),
Religious superiors are also able to dispense the private non-reserved
vows of their subjects (Canons 1313, Sec. 2, 1314).

529. Confessors, when delegated, can dispense as follows: (a) with
ordinary faculties, from impediments, irregularities and penalties, as
provided in Canons 1044, 1045, 985, 990, 2290; (b) with privileged
faculties, from simple vows not reserved to the Pope, if no injury is
done to the rights of a third party; and from occult irregularity
produced by delinquency, that from homicide excepted. (In the internal
sacramental forum the confessor can dispense from the impediments
indicated in Canons 1043-1045.)

530. Priests that assist at marriages can dispense from impediments as
provided in Canons 1043-1045.

531. The manner of seeking dispensations is as follows: (a) for the
usual dispensations (e.g., those from fast, abstinence, observance of
feasts, and the vows that may be dispensed by confessors) no particular
procedure is required; (b) for the dispensation that must be sought
from the Holy See, if the matter belongs to the internal forum, the
petition is sent to the Sacred Penitentiary through the Confessor or
Ordinary; if it belongs to the external forum, it is sent to the
competent Congregation through the parish priest or Ordinary.
Dispensation from public marriage impediments must be sent through the
Ordinary.

532. The manner of preparing a petition for dispensation is as follows:
(a) the name of the penitent must not be given in petitions to the
Sacred Penitentiary, but the name and address of the party to whom the
reply is to be sent should be clearly given; (b) the petition should be
sent by letter. It may be written in any language, and should state the
case with its circumstances, the favor that is asked, and the true
reason for asking it.

533. A dispensation is invalidated as follows: (a) through defect of
the petition, if it contains a substantial error, and the dispensation
is given on condition of substantial truth (Canon 40); (b) through
defect of the petitioner, if he is incapable of receiving the favor
asked (Canon 46); (c) through defect of the dispensation, as when the
requisite signature or seal is omitted; (d) through defect of the
dispenser, as when he lacks jurisdiction, or grants without a just and
proportionate reason a dispensation for which he has only delegated
power (Canon 84).

534. If a dispensation is unjustly refused, note the following: (a)
ordinarily, the subject has not the right to hold himself free from the
law; (b) in extraordinary circumstances, when the law ceases, or no
longer obliges (see 487 sqq.), the subject is free.

535. The faculty of dispensing should be interpreted as follows: (a)
widely, when it was granted for cases in general (Canon 200, Sec.1); (b)
strictly, when it is granted for a particular case (Canon 85).

536. A dispensation itself should be interpreted strictly in the
following cases: (a) when the dispensation has an odious side, as when
it is contrary to law and advantageous to private interest or is
detrimental to a third party; (b) when wide interpretation is
dangerous, as favoring injustice, promoting ambition, etc. (Canons 50,
85).

537. A dispensation ceases intrinsically in the following ways: (a) by
the lapse of the period of time for which it was granted; (b) by the
entire and certain cessation of the motive of the dispensation, if the
effect of the dispensation is divisible--that is, if the motive for
dispensation has to be existent each time that the law calls for an act
or omission (Canon 86). Example: If one is dispensed from the fast or
Office on account of ill-health, and later recovers, the dispensation
ceases.

538. A dispensation ceases extrinsically in the following ways: (a) by
the act of the one who dispensed, if he validly recalls the
dispensation, or by his cessation from office, if he limited the
dispensation to his own term of authority (Canons 86, 73); (b) by the
act of the one who was dispensed, if he renounces the dispensation
without detriment to any third party, and with the consent of the
superior (Canons 86, 72).

539. A dispensation does not cease in the following cases through the
cessation of the motive for which it was given:

(a) If the motive ceases only partially or doubtfully, even though the
effect of the dispensation be divisible--that is, requiring the
existence of the motive for the grant each time the dispensation is
used. For, if the dispensation ceased in such cases, its benefit would
frequently be in great part lost on account of the worry and scruple to
which the persons dispensed would be exposed. Example: Balbus has been
dispensed from fast on account of poor health. Later on he improves,
but has not recovered his strength entirely, or at least is not certain
of his recovery. He may continue still to use the dispensation.

(b) A dispensation does not cease if the motive ceases entirely and
certainly, but the effect of the dispensation is indivisible--that is,
removing the entire obligation once for all.

Example: Titus is a widower with several young children. He wishes to
marry in order to have a home for the children, and this wish is the
motive of a dispensation given him from an impediment of affinity to
the marriage he contemplates. But before the marriage takes place, the
children die, The dispensation still holds good.

540. A dispensation does not cease by reason of the grantor in the
following cases:

(a) It does not cease through the grantor’s cessation from authority,
if it was given independently of his term of office. Example:
Sempronius received a dispensation “valid until recall,” but never made
use of it. Although now the grantor has died, the dispensation
continues in force.

(b) It does not cease, if the grantor invalidly recalls the
dispensation, as when he dispenses from delegated power and his
authority ceases with the act of dispensation. Example: Balbus, a
confessor, dispensed Caius from the law of abstinence, but now wishes
to recall the dispensation. The dispensation remains.

541. A dispensation does not cease on account of the person dispensed
in the following cases:

(a) It does not cease when he leaves the territory of the dispenser, if
the dispensation was personal. Example: A person dispensed from the
general law of fast by indult granted to his diocese cannot use that
dispensation outside the diocese; but if he has a personal
dispensation, he is dispensed everywhere.

(b) It does not cease when the grantee fails to use it, or acts
contrary to it, if there is no renunciation on his part. Examples:
Sempronius has been dispensed from the fast of Lent, but he fasts on
some days. This non-use of the dispensation on some days does not renew
the obligation. Balbus has received a dispensation to marry Sempronia,
but he changes his mind and marries Claudia. This act contrary to the
dispensation does not take away its force, and, if Claudia dies, he
will be free to marry Sempronia.




Art. 6: CIVIL LAW

542. Meaning.--Just as the Church has the right and duty to make laws
which will promote the spiritual welfare of her members, so has the
State the power and obligation to legislate for the temporal happiness
of its citizens: “There is no power but from God and those that are,
are ordained of God. He (the ruler) is God’s minister to thee for good”
(Rom., xiii. 1, 4).

543. Origin.--The authority to make civil laws resides in that person
or body to whom according to the constitution of the State the
legislative function belongs. (a) In an absolute monarchy, the
legislative authority is vested in the prince; (b) in a state that has
an appointed or hereditary aristocracy, the legislative power may be
entrusted, at least in part, to a body of nobles; (c) in a limited
monarchy or republic the lawmaking function belongs to the people, who
exercise it either directly or (as is the case in most modern states)
indirectly through elected representatives.

544. The acceptance of civil law by the people is not necessary for its
obligation, for obedience to higher powers is commanded (Rom., xiii,
5), and, if law has no authority, the common welfare is defeated.
Several points must, however, be noted.

(a) The foregoing principle is to be understood of law in itself, for,
if there is question of the form of government or of him who exercises
the powers of sovereignty, acceptance by the people may be said to be
necessary in the sense that the multitude may set up the particular
system of rule which it prefers, and may designate the individuals who
are to wield authority under the constitution adopted.

(b) The principle given above is to be accepted regularly speaking, for
there may be cases in which the acceptance of the people is required by
law itself. Example: Under former civil constitutions, if in a certain
place a lawful custom was in force, a contrary law which did not
expressly abolish the custom did not oblige unless accepted. But this
example is theoretical, for modern civil codes do not recognize the
derogatory force of custom. If the constitution of the state calls for
a referendum or plebiscite (i.e., submission to the electors for
ratification), then the bill passed by the legislature or a measure
proposed by the initiative body lacks force until accepted. This
illustrates acceptance of a proposed law, but the acceptance is
supplemented by some ministerial act.

(c) The principle given above is to be understood of the taking effect
of a law, for the continuance of a law may depend on the acceptance of
the people in the sense that a contrary custom of the people is able to
abrogate law, if the superior consents (see 500 sqq.). Few codes of
modern states give legal force to popular custom; they suppose that, if
a law is not satisfactory to the people, the way is open to its repeal
through exercise of the suffrage. But, morally speaking, there is no
obligation to obey a law that has fallen into desuetude.

545. As to laws made by one who has no lawful authority, we should
note: (a) of themselves, they have no binding force, since law is an
act of authority; (b) from the necessities of the case, they are
obligatory, if, being otherwise just, they are accepted by the great
body of the people; for to resist them then would be prejudicial to
public order.

546. Subject-Matter.--The objects or classes of temporal goods that
fall under the regulation of civil law are many:

(a) external goods, or goods of fortune, which should have the
protection of the State; and the laws regarding them should promote
agriculture, commerce, industry, the arts, etc.;

(b) the goods of the body, which are more important still, and hence
the law should favor the family and the increase of its members, and
should provide for the health and well-being of the citizens by
sanitary regulations and measures of relief for the needy, the
unemployed, the orphans, and the aged;

(c) the goods of the mind, which are necessary for progress and
happiness, and hence the law should provide the means for instruction
in the secular arts and sciences and for the general diffusion of
useful knowledge;

(d) the goods of the will (i.e., virtue and morality), which are most
important both to the individual and the community, and hence the law
must safeguard public decency and sobriety, and restrain and punish the
opposite crimes and vices;

(e) the social goods of the people, which are promoted by wise
legislation concerning the form and administration of government, the
mutual duties and rights of citizens, the protection of the State and
of its members, etc.

547. The relation of civil law to natural law is as follows:

(a) The State has no power to make laws that are opposed to nature,
for, since law is an ordinance according to reason, any human command
that is contrary to nature and therefore to reason is not law, but the
corruption of law. No sin, not even a venial sin, can be made
obligatory by law. Example: The rule of Sparta that sickly infants were
to be put to death was not law but legalized murder.

(b) The State has the power to declare and enforce by suitable
sanctions the conclusions that are derived from the general principles
of the law of nature; for many people might be ignorant of these
conclusions or inclined to disregard them, unless they were promulgated
and confirmed by human law. Example: The natural law requires that
parents provide for their young children, and that children assist
their needy parents; the civil law adopts these natural principles,
compels their observance, and punishes transgressors.

(c) The State has the power to make concrete and to determine the
provisions of the natural law that are abstract or general. Example:
The natural law decrees that some form of government be set up, that
the people contribute to the support of the government, that crimes be
punished, that the general welfare be served, etc.; the civil law
determines the special form of government, the manner in which the
revenues are to be obtained, the specific penalties for each crime, the
public measures that are best suited to the circumstances, etc.

548. The relation of the civil law to divine and ecclesiastical law is
as follows:

(a) In matters purely spiritual the State has no power to legislate,
since its end and authority are confined to things temporal; and hence
the State has no right to interfere with the faith, worship and
government of the Church. But, since morality promotes the prosperity
of the State, and since the end of the individual is spiritual, the
civil law should respect and favor religion.

(b) In matters that are partly spiritual, partly temporal, the State
has the power to legislate on those aspects that are temporal, yet so
as not to infringe on divine or ecclesiastical right. Example: Civil
laws on education have the right to regulate non-religious subjects,
courses, standards, etc.; but they have no right to proscribe religious
training, or to prescribe the teaching of irreligion or immorality,
State laws on marriage may require registration, settle the civil
effects of marriage, etc., but they have no right to interfere with the
unity of marriage or the sanctity of the marriage bond.

549. The State is for the individual, and not the individual for the
State; hence, civil law should not interfere with human liberties,
except where this is necessary for the common peace and safety or the
lawful opportunity of the people as a whole. Hence:

(a) Human liberties that are not inalienable may be limited by the law,
when the public good or the welfare of individuals requires this (see
292). Examples: The State has the right to regulate the acts of those
who are unable to take care of themselves in matters of importance; to
forbid what is detrimental to the common interest (such as hunting and
fishing at certain seasons), to protect the public when it neglects to
protect itself, etc. Uncalled-for interference by government with the
personal and private affairs of individuals--paternalism in
government--is of course to be avoided, for restriction of liberty is
something disagreeable and should not be resorted to without necessity.

(b) Human rights that are fundamental (such as the rights to live, to
marry, to rear a family, to be free, to pursue happiness) should not be
trespassed on by civil law. Thus, the State has no right to forbid
marriage to the poor, but on the contrary it has the duty to remove
conditions that cause poverty. But, when the common welfare demands the
sacrifice, the State has the right to call on citizens to expose even
life and fortune in its defense.

550. Those Subject to Civil Law.--Civil laws oblige all those who are
in any way subject to their authority.

(a) Citizens, when in the country, are bound by all the laws that
pertain to them; when outside the country, they are bound by some laws,
such as those that regulate their personal status and office, but not
by others, in particular such as are of a territorial character.

(b) Aliens are bound by the laws of the country that include them, such
as those that regulate public order and the making of contracts.

551. The Obligation of Civil Law.--Civil law, when it has all the
conditions of valid law, even if the legislator is non-religious or
anti-religious, is obligatory not only before the State, but also
before God (i.e., in conscience). This is; (a) by reason of the natural
law, of which it is a derivation (see above, 313); (b) by reason of
divine positive law, for it is frequently declared in scripture and in
the Church’s teaching and practice that lawful authority represents God
and must be obeyed for conscience’ sake: “Render to Caesar the things
that are Caesar’s” (Matt, xxii 21), “Be subject of necessity, not only
for wrath, but also for conscience’ sake” (Rom, xiii. 5).

552. Are subjects obliged to offer themselves for punishment prescribed
by law?

(a) If the fault committed was merely juridical (i.e., before the law),
the penalty is certainly not obligatory before sentence. Example:
Balbus through sheer accident, and without design or negligence, kills
a man. If involuntary homicide is punished by imprisonment, Balbus is
not bound to give himself up. English common law, it should be noted,
presumes a man innocent until proved guilty, and a man cannot be
convicted of any degree of homicide on his own confession alone. But he
may plead guilty to minor offenses.

(b) If the fault committed was theological (i.e., before God) and the
penalty is primitive (i.e., the loss of some right or privilege), the
penalty is obligatory in conscience. In Canon Law such penalties are
sometimes _ipso facto_, that is, before sentence (e.g., suspension of a
cleric); but the civil law, it seems, imposes penalties only after
judicial declaration. Example: Titus on account of bribery has
forfeited the right to vote; but he has not been declared guilty by
court, and hence may continue to use the right of suffrage.

(c) If the fault was theological and the penalty incurred is active
(e.g., exile, imprisonment, fine), the penalty is not obligatory before
sentence; for it would demand too much of human nature to require that
one deliver oneself up to exile, accept confiscation, etc. The
apprehension and detention of the guilty is imposed by law as a duty on
the police and other officers, not on the guilty.

553. The kind of obligation imposed depends on the will of the
lawgiver: (a) he can oblige under pain of sin, or under pain of nullity
or punishment; (b) he can oblige under pain of grave sin, or under pain
of venial sin.

554. Generally speaking, the legislator is held to oblige under pain of
sin in the following cases: (a) when the law is a just determination of
the natural law (e.g., the laws that determine ownership); (b) when the
law is directly concerned with and necessary to the public good (e.g.,
laws on national defense in time of war, laws that impose necessary
taxation, etc.; see above, 379).

555. The legislator is held not to oblige under sin in the following
cases: (a) when the law is enacted as penal, or is prudently regarded
as such--as is the case with laws that are of minor importance or that
can be enforced without a moral obligation--laws useful rather than
necessary; (b) when the law is merely irritant or inhabilitating, the
subject is not obliged to omit the act invalidated, but only to suffer
the consequence of nullity before the law.

556. In doubt as to the obligation of a law, what is the duty of the
subject? (a) If there is doubt concerning its justice, the subject can
always observe it with a safe conscience. One may obey an unjust law,
until it is judicially declared unjust, if it is not manifestly opposed
to divine or human rights. (b) If there is doubt whether a law obliges
under sin or not, the subject does not sin directly by non-observance
(see 375, 376, 377, 561).

557. Special Kinds of Laws.--Laws that determine ownership are those
that define in distinct and explicit terms the rights of citizens as to
property, in such matters as goods lost or found, prescription,
inheritance, copyright, distribution of property of intestates, rights
of wives, capacity of minors, contracts, etc. It is commonly held that
these laws are obligatory under sin, even before judicial decision: (a)
because they are determinations of the natural law made by the
authority that represents God in matters temporal; (b) because they are
necessary for the peaceful existence of society.

558. Irritant or voiding laws are those that deprive certain acts of
legal value. The common welfare requires that certain acts, even if
valid naturally, may be made invalid by the State (e.g., contracts
entered into by minors, donations made under fear, wills devised
irregularly), and hence there is no doubt that the effect of
invalidation can be imposed under pain of sin.

(a) This holds even before judicial decision, if it is clear that the
lawgiver ought to intend and does intend to deprive an act of its moral
validity from the beginning. Example: If a lawsuit would put one party
(e.g., a minor) under great disadvantage, the law can irritate a
contract in conscience and before judgment is rendered.

(b) An irritant law does not oblige under sin before declaration of
nullity, if it is not clear that the legislator intended this; for it
can be presumed that the State is content with external means as long
as these are sufficient for its ends; and, since invalidation of acts
is odious, it calls for certain expression of his intention by the
lawgiver. But after sentence has been given, that which is civilly null
is also null morally. Hence, if the courts declare a will to be of no
effect, because it was not drawn legally, the decision is binding under
sin.

559. Civil lawgivers in modern times do not, as a rule, concern
themselves with moral or natural obligation as such, but rather
consider only what regulations will best promote the peaceful
intercourse of society. Hence, the question whether a civil irritation
obliges in conscience ipso facto (i.e., before judicial declaration of
a case) has to be decided generally, not from the words, but from the
purpose of the law.

(a) An irritant law should be regarded as obligatory _ipso facto_, when
the general purpose of law (viz., the common good) or the specific
purpose of this law requires that there should be obligation in
conscience even before a court decision. Examples are laws irritating
agreements to do what is illegal, laws whose purpose is to protect
minors or others who would be at a disadvantage in case of litigation,
or to lessen the number of cases before the courts.

(b) An irritant law should be regarded as not obligatory _ipso facto_,
when the end of the law does not clearly demand obligation before
judicial declaration; for, as remarked above, the invalidation of an
act is something odious, and hence not to be taken for granted. Thus,
laws that void an act, contract or instrument on account of lack of
some legal form, do not affect the natural rights or obligations before
sentence.

560. Though the civil lawgiver has the right to annul certain acts, and
thus to extinguish moral rights or obligations that would otherwise
exist, laws seemingly irritant frequently have a different intention.

(a) Laws that make a claim unenforceable in court do not destroy the
natural right of the claimant. Example: The Statute of Limitations in
modern states generally bars the right to pursue a debtor in court
after six years; nevertheless, the moral obligation of the debtor
remains.

(b) Laws that make an act or contract voidable do not nullify, but only
grant to the person concerned the right to attack validity before the
courts. Hence, if the conditions for valid contract required by natural
law are present (knowledge, consent, etc.), moral rights and
obligations are not voided. Example: Under the civil law some contracts
made by minors may be retracted by them. But, as long as such a
contract is not disavowed, the other party has a moral right to insist
on its execution; if it has been ratified after majority, the former
minor has no moral right to seek the benefit of the law by asking for
rescindment.

561. With reference to penalty, four kinds of laws can be distinguished.

(a) Purely preceptive laws are such as oblige under pain of sin, but
not under pain of punishment. There are church laws of this kind (such
as the command to assist at Mass on Sunday), and there are also some
civil laws that do not oblige under penalty (e.g., statutes governing
the age for legal marriage, for, if a couple misrepresented their age,
they might be prosecuted for the misrepresentation, but not for the act
of marriage).

(b) Purely penal laws are such as oblige under pain of juridical fault
and punishment, but not under pain of sin (e.g., a law that punishes
negligence in driving as defined by itself, even though there be no
moral culpability involved).

(c) Mixed laws disjunctively are such as oblige under sin either to
obey the law or to suffer the penalty (e.g., a law that commands one
either to get a license before fishing or hunting, or to pay a fine if
caught doing these things without a license).

(d) Mixed laws conjunctively are such as oblige under pain of both sin
and punishment (e.g., the laws that forbid injustice and command the
punishment of transgressors).

562. There is no question about the existence of laws of the first and
fourth classes just described, but some authorities argue against the
existence of the other two classes, maintaining that a law that does
not oblige in conscience is an impossibility. They argue: (a) the
teaching of scripture and of the Church supposes that all just laws
oblige in conscience; (b) the lawgiver holds the place of God, and
hence one cannot offend against the law of man without offending God;
(c) human law, being only a reaffirmation or determination of the
higher law, obliges in conscience like the law on which it is based;
(d) directions of a superior that do not oblige under sin are counsels
rather than laws.

563. To these and similar arguments the defenders of the existence of
penal laws reply: (a) such laws do not oblige in conscience, under pain
of sin and of offense to God, to do or to omit as the law prescribes,
just as a vow which gives one the option of not playing cards, or else
of giving each time an alms, does not bind one in conscience not to
play cards; (b) but those laws do oblige one in conscience to respect
their juridical value, not to resist their enforcement, and to pay the
penalty of violation, just as the vow mentioned obliges one in
conscience to give an alms each time one plays cards. The Church
recognizes penal laws (see 450), and there is no reason why civil law
may not be penal.

564. Even when the transgression of a purely penal law is not sinful by
reason of the civil law, it will frequently, if not usually, be sinful
by reason of repugnance to the law of God. Thus: (a) the transgression
will be sinful, if there is a wrong intention (such as contempt for the
law) or wrong circumstances (such as culpable neglect or some
inordinate passion); (b) the transgression will be sinful, if one
foresees or should foresee evil consequences, such as scandal (see 96).

565. It is generally admitted that some civil laws are purely penal,
since they impose penalties for fault, negligence, or responsibility
that is only juridical at times. Examples: A law that imposes a fine on
all motorists caught driving over a certain speed limit, even though
they be free of moral guilt; or that makes the owner of a car pay
damages for injuries caused while it was used by his chauffeur.

566. Even these laws oblige under sin to some extent. (a) The
transgressor is morally bound to the penalty prescribed by law, after
sentence has been passed; and such penalties are just, for the common
good requires them. Example: The speed violator is held to pay the
lawful fine when it has been imposed. He may have been guiltless of
sin, but the fine makes him more careful the next time. (b) The
officers of the law are morally bound to apprehend and convict
transgressors.

567. Many civil laws are commonly regarded nowadays as disjunctively
preceptive or penal; and, since the custom of the prudent affords a
good norm of interpretation (see above, 484 sqq., 506 sqq.), this
common view is a safe guide, Example: Even conscientious persons do not
feel that they have committed a sin if now and then they run a car
without a license, or fish in a government reservation without the
permit required by law, when there is no danger or damage to anyone.

568. Whether most modern legislatures intend practically all or the
great majority of their laws that are not declarations of natural law
or provisions essential to public welfare to be purely penal or only
disjunctively preceptive, is a disputed question. For the affirmative
view it is argued:

(a) Moral obligation is not necessary, since the enforcement of the law
is well taken care of by the judiciary and the police;

(b) Moral obligation would be harmful, for the laws that are put on the
statute books every year, along with those already there, are so
numerous that, if all these obliged in conscience, an intolerable
burden would be placed on the people;

(c) Moral obligation is not intended, for legislatures as bodies either
despise or disregard religious motives when framing laws; and so many
jurists today believe that the danger of incurring the penalty
prescribed by the law is the only obligation the lawgiver intends to
impose, or that moral obligation must come from conscience (i.e., be
self-imposed);

(d) Moral obligation is not admitted by custom, the best interpreter of
law, for most citizens today regard civil legislation as not binding
under sin.

569. Opponents of the view just explained answer:

(a) The prevalence of crime and the ineffectiveness of the courts in so
many places prove the need of moral obligation of civil laws; and, even
if the laws are well enforced, this will scarcely continue, if respect
for them is lowered;

(b) Though there is an excess of legislation, it is not generally true
that the individual citizen is burdened in his daily life by a
multitude of laws;

(c) Lawmakers today are not more irreligious than the pagan rulers to
whom the scriptures commanded obedience; and, even though they do not
themselves believe in religion or the obligation of conscience, they do
intend to give their laws every sanction that the common good requires,
and thus implicitly they impose a moral obligation wherever the
contrary is not manifest;

(d) The statement that the majority of the people in modern states
regard the civil legislation as a whole as not obligatory in conscience
may be passed over, as there is no proof for it. Moreover, the
customary interpretation of the citizens does not make penal the laws
which the elected representatives intended as preceptive, without the
consent of the latter (see 394).

570. Signs that a law is merely penal are the following:

(a) The express declaration of the lawgiver that it obliges only under
penalty. Examples: In the Dominican Constitutions it is declared that
they oblige, not under fault, but only under penalty (No. 32). The same
is true of the Franciscan, Redemptorist and most recent religious
Constitutions. Some civil laws, it is said, are formulated thus:
“Either do this, or pay the penalty on conviction.” Other laws define
punishable negligence in such a way that it does not ultimately suppose
sin.

(b) Another sign of a penal law is the implicit declaration of the
lawgiver. If a heavy penalty is prescribed for a transgression regarded
by all as very slight proportionately, the government implicitly
declares that it imposes no other obligation than that of penalty.
Blackstone, in his “Commentary on the Laws of England” (1769),
considers as purely penal all those laws in which the penalty inflicted
is an adequate compensation for the civil inconvenience supposed to
arise from the offense, such as the statutes for preserving game and
those forbidding the exercise of trades without serving an
apprenticeship thereto (Vol. I, Sect. 58).

(c) A third sign is the interpretation of competent authorities.
Example: Practically all Catholic moralists, and the opinion of the
people generally, consider as penal some laws that are merely useful,
but not necessary (e.g., prohibitions against smoking or spitting in
certain public places, laws on permits for fishing, hunting, etc.).

571. Whatever may be said about legislatures in general, it cannot be
argued that in the United States they are indifferent or contemptuous
as regards the moral obligation of law; the public acts and speeches of
Congress and of the State Assemblies show that the elected
representatives of the people respect religion, and do not wish to
deprive themselves of its help in their deliberations and decisions.
Nevertheless, the opinion is very prevalent among lawyers that purely
positive law in the United States is not intended to oblige under sin.

572. In practice, the attitude of the citizen to civil law should be
one of respect and loyalty.

(a) If a law is good, even though the legislator did not impose a moral
obligation, it should be obeyed; for reason and experience show that
disregard for law is a source of scandal and of many public and private
evils.

(b) If a law is not good, every lawful means should be used to have it
repealed as soon as possible. But the principle that a bad law is
always best overcome by being rigidly enforced, is not borne out by
history, and sometimes the public good demands disregard for
unreasonable ordinances. The so-called “Blue Laws” are a case in point.

573. Other questions pertaining to civil law that will be found
elsewhere are: (a) the obligation of customs, taxation and military
duty; (b) the power of the State to inflict capital punishment.


Question IV

CONSCIENCE

574. In order that man many tend to his Last End, it is not sufficient
that the way be pointed out in a general manner (as is done by the
natural and positive laws), but these laws must be applied to each act
in particular by the practical reason or conscience, as it passes
judgment on the right or wrong of an action in the light of all the
circumstances.




Art. 1: THE LAW OF CONSCIENCE

(_Summa Theologica_, I, q. 79, aa. 11-13.)

575. Definition.--Conscience is an act of judgment on the part of the
practical reason deciding by inference from general principles the
moral goodness or malice of a particular act.

(a) It is an act, and as such it differs from moral knowledge and
intellectual virtues, which are not transitory but enduring. Moral
understanding (synderesis), by which everyone naturally perceives the
truth of general and self-evident principles of morality; moral
science, by which the theologian or ethician knows the body of
conclusions drawn from moral principles; prudence, by which the
virtuous man is able to make right applications of moral rules to
individual cases--all these are permanent states and are preparatory to
the act of conscience, in which one makes use of one’s knowledge to
judge of the lawfulness or unlawfulness of an action in the concrete,
as attended by all its circumstances.

(b) Conscience is an act of judgment, and thus it differs from the
other acts employed by prudence--from counsel about the right means or
ways of action, and from command as to their use. Counsel inquires what
is the right thing to do, conscience gives the dictate or decision, the
moral command moves to action.

(c) Conscience is in the reason--that is, it is a subjective guide, and
thus it differs from law, which is objective.

(d) Conscience is in the practical reason. Unlike other judgments,
which are speculative and deal not with action or only with theoretical
aspects of action (e.g., the judgment that God is perfect, that the
active faculties are distinct from the soul, etc.), conscience is
concerned with action from the view-point of its moral exercise.

(e) Conscience is the inference from general principles, and thus it
differs from moral understanding (synderesis). This latter is a habit
by which everyone who is mentally developed is able to perceive without
argument that certain more general propositions of morality must be
true, such as the axioms of the natural law (see above, 319 sqq.);
conscience draws conclusions from those axioms.

(f) Conscience judges concerning the morality of an act. Here lies the
difference between consciousness and conscience; consciousness is a
psychological faculty whose function is to perceive one’s own states
and acts; conscience is a moral judgment concerning the lawfulness or
unlawfulness of those states or acts. Thus, consciousness testifies
that one is considering the performance of a certain act, conscience
judges the morality, and permits or forbids; or consciousness testifies
that a certain thing was done or not done in the past, conscience
declares the morality--condemning, excusing, or approving what took
place.

(g) Conscience judges concerning a particular act--that is, it
considers an act that is to be done here and now (or was done), with
all the attendant circumstances. Conscience, thus, differs from moral
science, which, though it systematizes the body of conclusions drawn
from the natural and positive laws, is not able to make the
applications for the innumerable cases that arise. Even works
containing moral cases, which give solutions for concrete instances, do
not take the place of conscience in such instances, for it is still the
individual who judges about those solutions or about their
applicability to his particular circumstances.

576. Division.-Conscience is variously divided. (a) According as the
act judged is in the future or in the past, conscience is antecedent or
consequent. The antecedent conscience is a monitor which decides that a
future act will be lawful or unlawful; the consequent conscience is a
judge which causes peace or remorse for what has been done in the past.
(b) According to the kind of direction or decision it gives, antecedent
conscience is commanding, forbidding, permitting or counselling; while
consequent conscience is excusing, approving, or condemning (Rom., ii.
15).

577. According as it agrees or disagrees with the external divine or
human law, conscience is true or false. (a) A true conscience judges
that to be good and commanded which is really good and commanded.
Example: According to law, one may use money of which one has the
disposal. A sum of money before Balbus is really at his disposal.
Hence, his conscience is true if it decides that he may use this money.

(b) A false conscience judges the lawful to be unlawful, or vice versa:
“The hour cometh that whosoever killeth you will think that he doth a
service to God” (John, xvi. 2). Example: Balbus would have a false
conscience, if he decided that he had no right to use the money before
him. This would happen if he was mistaken about the general principle,
or about the fact that the money was at his disposal, or if he drew a
wrong inference from the premises.

578. According to its qualities and suitability as a guide of conduct,
conscience may be viewed either with reference to the will or to the
intellect. (a) With reference to the will, conscience is either good
(right) or bad (wrong), according as it does or does not proceed from a
well-meaning intention and a right disposition towards one’s end and
duties. Example: If the Balbus mentioned above decided that the money
was at his disposal because he wished to know the truth and had
investigated to the best of his ability, his conscience would be good.
But, if he decided this without sufficient investigation and only
because he was prejudiced in his own favor, his conscience would be bad.

(b) With reference to the intellect, conscience is either certain or
uncertain, according as the mind assents to its judgment without or
with fear of error. Examples: If Balbus decides that he has the right
to use the money, and is so firmly convinced that his judgment is true
that he has no fears or doubts, his conscience is certain. But, if
there remain solid difficulties or objections against his judgment
which he cannot satisfactorily answer so that he assents to his view
only with the fear that he may be wrong, his conscience is uncertain.

579. A conscience may have some and lack others of the qualities just
mentioned.

(a) The same conscience may be true and bad, or false and good--that
is, the judgment of the intellect may be in agreement with objective
facts, but at the same time it may be directed by a wrong will and
intention, or vice versa. Examples: Caius, through no fault of his own,
is convinced that he is bound to tell a lie to help Sempronius, because
Sempronius once helped him by lying. His conscience is false, but good.
Titus is really not bound to pay a sum of money demanded of him. But
the arguments by which he persuades himself that he is not bound are
not honest, since he has recourse to what he knows are hair-splitting
distinctions, quibbles and sophistical reasonings. His conscience is
true, but bad.

(b) The same conscience may be good and uncertain, or bad and certain.
Examples: If the Caius above-mentioned believes he is bound to lie, but
has some qualms or suspicions that such conduct might not be right
after all, his conscience would be good, seeing that he meant to do
what is right; but it would be uncertain, seeing that he is not sure he
is right. If the Titus above-mentioned had so habituated himself to
insincerity and illogical reasoning that he no longer had any fears
about his own judgments, and gave firm and unhesitating assent to his
decision that he was not bound to pay the money demanded, his
conscience, though bad, would be certain subjectively.

580. Obligation of Conscience.--Man is bound to be guided by
conscience, both negatively and positively--that is, he must neither
disobey when it forbids, nor refuse to obey when it commands.

(a) It obliges by reason of divine command, since it acts as the voice
or witness of God making known and promulgating. to us the moral law.
Hence “all that is not from conscience is sin” (Rom, xiv. 23).

(b) Conscience obliges from the nature of things, for, since the will
is a blind faculty, it must be guided by the judgment, of the
intellect, and must follow the inner light given it about the law.
Apart from revelation, there is no other way of learning what God
wishes one to do here and now.

581. The authority of conscience is not, however, unlimited.

(a) Conscience is not independent of external law and authority. It is
not autonomous morality of the reason or will, nor private inspiration
or interpretation; for its function is not to establish law or pass
judgment on it, but to apply the law as expounded by the Church to a
present case. Hence, conscience must aim to be true--that is, to agree
with and express the objective law.

(b) Conscience is not independent of the righteousness of the will. It
is not a speculative judgment, whose value depends solely on agreement
between the mind and the facts, as is the case with a conclusion of
pure science. It is a practical judgment, which has to guide all man’s
conduct, and thus its value depends on the relation of the means it
selects to the end towards which the means should be directed. Hence,
conscience must be good--that is, a judgment dictated by a will well
disposed towards the true end of life.

(c) Conscience is not independent of the certainty of the intellect. It
is a judgment formed, not by sentiment, emotion, or one’s own wishes,
but by evidence and firm conviction; for its office is to guide man
reliably in the most important of affairs. Hence, conscience must be
certain--that is, a judgment to which the intellect yields its
unhesitating assent.

582. In order, therefore, that conscience may be the proper rule and
moderator of man’s moral life, it must have the following qualities:

(a) It must be good, and practically true--that is, in agreement with
the Last End of man and, as far as the efforts of the individual can
attain to such agreement, with the objective law--for the standard of
moral good is not each one’s wish or opinion, but God as the Last End
and the external natural and positive law as means to that End.

(b) It must be certain--that is, without fear that one is wrong; at
least, it must have that degree of certainty which is possible in moral
matters. For to act with the fear that one is committing sin, is to be
willing to do what may be sin, and is thus consent to sin.

583. Since conscience that has the requisite conditions is our
immediate guide in moral matters, it follows: (a) that a conscience
which is true objectively, good, and certain must be followed, whenever
it commands or forbids; (b) that a conscience which is in invincible
error (see 30), but seems to him who has it to be not only true but
certain, must also be followed when it forbids or commands. Examples:
If a child were told and believed that he was obliged to tell a lie to
prevent an evil, he would be bound to do this. If a person eats what he
wrongly thinks to be forbidden food, he is guilty of the violation he
apprehends.

584. Exception.--If invincible error results from lack of sufficient
intelligence to be capable of sin (see above, 249, 387), then the
failure to follow one’s conscience in such error does not make one
guilty. Example: If a person unable to walk were persuaded that he was
bound nevertheless to walk to church for Mass, his conscience would not
make his omission sinful. Conscience supposes sane judgment, but the
judgment we are now considering is not sane.

585. A conscience that has not the requisite conditions is not a safe
guide, and hence it cannot be followed.

(a) An erroneous conscience may not be followed, if the error is
vincible and there is danger of sin; neither may one act against it if
there be danger of sin. To follow such a conscience would be to do what
is wrong and to act in bad faith (i.e., to have a bad and erroneous
conscience); not to follow it, would be to act against one’s judgment,
wrongly formed though it was, and to do insincerely what is right
(i.e., to have a bad, though true conscience). Example: A person who
has made up his mind that dishonesty is necessary in his business, but
who realizes that his reasons are not convincing, sins against
sincerity if he follows his opinion; he sins against conviction, if he
does not follow his opinion. But his predicament is due to his own
sophistry or bad will, and the escape from it requires only that he be
honest enough with himself to inquire about the matter.

(b) A doubtful conscience may not be followed, if the doubt is such
that one is not reasonably sure that a certain act is lawful. Example:
If a man does not know whether a certain remedy will be helpful or
seriously harmful to another, his conscience is doubtful as to the
lawfulness of administering the remedy, and it may not be followed. If
in spite of this he makes use of the remedy, he is guilty of the harm
he foresaw, even though it does not happen.

586. Exception.--It is lawful to follow a vincibly erroneous
conscience, if there is no danger of sin in this. Example: If a person
has neglected inquiry about holydays of obligation, and through his own
neglect believes that Good Friday is a holyday, he does not sin by
attending the services that day.

587. The signs of a vincibly erroneous conscience are: (a) that in the
past one did not use the same diligence to inform oneself about one’s
religious duties as is employed by conscientious persons; (b) that in
the present one has fears, doubts or suspicions as to one’s own
sincerity of judgment.

588. Results of Conscience.--The results of following an erroneous
conscience are as follows:

(a) He who follows an erroneous conscience, commanding or forbidding or
permitting, is not guilty of sin if his ignorance is invincible.
Example: A child who thinks he is obliged to lie because he has been
told to do this, is excused from sin on account of his ignorance.

(b) He who follows an erroneous conscience, commanding or permitting
evil, is guilty if his ignorance is vincible. Example: A grown person
who has persuaded himself that deception is lawful, obligatory or
advisable, or that truthfulness is forbidden, but who ought to know
better, is not excused by the conscience he has formed (see above, 97
sqq.).

589. The results of disobeying an erroneous conscience are as follows:

(a) He who disobeys an invincibly erroneous conscience, is guilty.
Example: The child who refuses to tell a lie when he thinks he ought to
do so because it has been commanded, is guilty of disobedience.

(b) He who disobeys a vincibly erroneous conscience, is also guilty.
Example: Caius promises to tell a lie to help another party. The doubt
occurs whether or not this is lawful, and he takes no pains to settle
it correctly, but decides offhand that a promise must be kept. When the
time comes, Caius becomes alarmed and does not keep his promise, lest
he get into trouble. He is guilty.

590. If a conscience which was vincibly erroneous in its origin is here
and now invincibly erroneous, the acts that result from following such
a conscience are to be judged as follows:

(a) They are materially evil in themselves and formally evil in their
cause. Example: Titus, who intends to take a position in which he will
have to advise others, foresees that later on he may make mistakes
costly to others, as a result of his present lack of sufficient study.
He secures the position, and tries to make up for former neglect of
study, but on one occasion injures a patron by wrong advice which he
would not have given, had he worked more faithfully as a younger
student. The wrong advice is objectively sinful in itself, as being an
injury; it is subjectively sinful in its cause, as being the result of
negligence which foresaw what might happen.

(b) The acts in question are not formally evil in themselves. Example:
Titus was formally guilty of injury to others at the time he foresaw
what would happen on account of his negligence; he was not formally
guilty at the time he did the injury, because he had tried meanwhile to
repair his negligence and was not conscious of his ignorance.

591. The kinds of sin committed in consequence of an erroneous
conscience are as follows:

(a) Sin committed by following a vincibly erroneous conscience is of
the same gravity and species as the act for which the conscience is
responsible, but the ignorance is an extenuating circumstance. Example:
He who blinds his conscience so that it decides in favor of grave
calumny, is guilty of mortal sin against justice; but he is less guilty
than if he had sinned without any permission from conscience.

(b) Sin committed by disobeying an invincibly erroneous conscience is
of the gravity and species apprehended by the conscience. Example: A
person who tells a small lie, thinking it a mortal sin against charity,
is guilty of the malice he understands to be in his act.

(c) Sin committed by disobeying a vincibly erroneous conscience is of
the species that was perceived. Example: Caius who did not live up to
his promise of telling a lie, after he had decided that to keep his
word was the right thing to do, was guilty of a breach of promise. As
to the gravity of sin against a vincibly erroneous conscience, it is
always the same as that apprehended by the conscience, unless what is
seriously wrong is culpably mistaken for what is only slightly wrong.
Examples: If Caius, just referred to, thought that his desertion of his
friend inflicted a grave injury, he was guilty of grave sin. A person
who persuades himself by vain reasonings that complete intoxication
does not differ in gravity from incipient intoxication, is nevertheless
guilty of the greater malice, if he puts himself in the former state;
for his wrong opinion cannot change the fact, and his culpable
ignorance cannot excuse him.

592. An erroneous conscience may apprehend something not wrong as
wrong, but in an indeterminate manner.

(a) If the species of evil is not determinate before the conscience,
but an indifferent act is thought to be sinful without any definite
species of sin being thought of, he who acts against such a conscience
seems to commit a sin of disobedience. Example: A person who thinks
that smoking is a sin, of what kind he does not know, must have at
least vaguely the opinion that it is forbidden by the divine law; and
hence, if he smokes, he is guilty of disobedience.

(b) If the gravity of the putative sin is not determinate before the
conscience, but an act is thought to be sinful without the degree of
sinfulness being at all known or thought of, he who acts against such a
conscience commits a mortal or a venial sin according to his own
disposition with respect to sin. If he is so attached to the sin he
apprehends that he intends to commit it, whether it be great or small,
he is guilty of mortal sin, at least in so far as he exposes himself to
it. But if he is habitually resolved not to commit grave sin, it can be
presumed that he would not do that which he apprehends as sinful, if he
thought it was a grave offense, Example: If a person erroneously thinks
that it is a sin to read a certain book, and then reads it without
adverting at all to the gravity of the sin he apprehends, his greater
or less guilt will have to be judged by his character. If he is so
conscientious that he would stop reading at once if he feared the book
was seriously harmful, he sins only venially; but if he knows that he
is lax and is yet resolved to read the book at all costs, it seems that
he is guilty of grave sin.




Art. 2: A GOOD CONSCIENCE

(_Summa Theologica_, I-II, q. 19, aa. 5, 6.)

593. As was explained in the previous article, conscience is not a
proper guide unless it is good. In this article we shall speak of the
good conscience and of its opposite the various kinds of bad conscience.

594. Definition.--The distinction of good and bad conscience is applied
both to consequent and antecedent conscience (see 576).

(a) The consequent conscience is good, and one is said to have a good
conscience, if it testifies that past acts were rightly performed, that
past sins were forgiven, that one is in the friendship of God, etc.;
“The end of the commandment is charity from a good conscience” (I Tim.,
i. 5); “War a good warfare, having faith and a good conscience” (ibid.,
19). The consequent conscience is bad if it testifies in a contrary
way: “Let us draw near with a true heart, having our hearts sprinkled
from an evil conscience” (Heb., x. 22).

(b) The antecedent conscience, with which we are now concerned, judges
about the morality of an act to be performed here and now, or in the
future. It is called good, if it is made by one who is in good
faith--that is, one who sincerely loves goodness and who decides
according to the truth as far as he is able to see it. It is called
bad, if it is the judgment of one who is in bad faith--that is, one who
is in error through his own fault, or who arrives at the truth by
reasonings that are not honest or not understood by him. Example:
Speaking of those who, though fearing that idol meats were forbidden,
yet ate of them because they saw others do this, St. Paul says: “There
is not knowledge in everyone. For some until this present, with
conscience of the idol, eat as a thing sacrificed to an idol, and their
conscience being weak is defiled” (I Cor., viii. 7).

595. Divisions.--By training and care a good conscience is developed
and becomes better. (a) A vigilant conscience is one that asserts
itself promptly and strongly under all circumstances. (b) A tender
conscience is one that inclines to a careful observance of all the
Commandments and to a purification of the inner workings of the soul. A
possessor of this kind of conscience is called conscientious. (c) A
timorous conscience moves one through filial fear to shun even the
slightest sins and imperfections, and to use all prudent efforts to
avoid occasions and dangers of sin. The possessor of this kind of
conscience is called God-fearing.

596. A bad conscience that is in vincible error is divided according to
its effects into the scrupulous and the lax conscience. (a) The lax
conscience errs on the side of liberty. It is moved by trivial reasons
to judge the unlawful to be lawful, the gravely sinful to be only
slightly evil, that which is commanded to be only counselled, and so on.

(b) The scrupulous conscience errs on the side of obligation. It is
moved by trivial reasons to judge that there is sin in something
lawful, grave sin in something venially wrong, and obligation in
something that is only counselled; it sees inhability or defect where
these do not exist, and so on.

597. The Lax Conscience.--According to the more or less control it has
over one, the lax conscience may be divided into the incipient and the
habitual. (a) It is incipient when one is becoming familiar with
careless decisions and less responsive to remorse about evil done. In
this state the conscience is said to be sleeping. (b) It is habitual
when through long-continued habit one has become enamored of a worldly,
frivolous conception of life, and is rarely visited by compunction. In
its worst state, when there is little hope of cure, a lax conscience is
said to be seared or cauterized (I Tim., iv. 2).

598. According to the greater or less responsibility of the one in
error, a lax conscience is either malicious or not malicious. (a) It is
malicious when it results from one’s own disregard for religious truth,
as in the case of the pagans who did not care to know God, and were
thus led into perverse conceptions of morality. St. Paul calls such a
conscience a reprobate sense (Rom., i. 28). (b) It is not malicious
when it results from some less blamable reason, as in the case of the
Christians at Corinth who thought that the eating of idol meats was
sinful, but that it was to be practised on account of the example of
others. St. Paul calls this a weak conscience (I Cor., viii. 10).

599. Laxity of conscience is either partial or entire. (a) A conscience
entirely lax takes an easy and indulgent view in all things. It is
careless both in little and great matters, both in directing self and
in directing others. (b) A conscience partially lax is too liberal in
some things, but not in others. Examples: Titus is very exacting with
his girls, and wishes to have them models of virtue; but he is too easy
with himself and his boys. Balbus is very loyal to friends, but has no
sense of justice as regards those who do not agree with him. Sempronius
tries to serve both God and mammon, being very faithful to church
duties, but at the same time dishonest in business matters.

600. A conscience partially lax may even combine scrupulosity and
laxism (see 610), becoming like a mirror that reflects large objects as
small and vice versa; or like a color-blind eye: “Woe to you that call
evil good and good evil, that put darkness for light and light for
darkness” (Is., V. 20). This kind of conscience is called pharisaical.

(a) One may be lax and scrupulous about the same kind of things.
Examples: Caius regards great disobedience in himself as a mote which
he doesn’t need to worry about, but small disobedience in his children
as a beam in the eye which he is seriously bound to extract (Matt, vii.
3-5). Titus is lax about almsgiving to those from whom he can expect
nothing, but scrupulous about almsgiving to those from whom he expects
a return later on.

(b) One may be scrupulous and lax about different things, straining at
gnats and swallowing camels. Example: The Pharisees were scrupulous
about external observances and minor things of the law, such as tithes;
but they were lax about inward justice and the weightier things of the
law, judgment, mercy and faith (Matt, xxiii. 13-31).

601. Causes of a Lax Conscience.--(a) If the laxity is inculpable but
habitual, it is caused generally by lack of Christian training in
childhood and the influence of evil principles and practices that are
widespread. In particular cases a lax decision of conscience may be due
to want of sufficient consideration or to a sudden storm of passion
that obscures the reason, when one has no time for deliberation; and
thus it is inculpable.

(b) If the laxity is culpable, its usual causes are an easy-going view
of God’s law and its obligation (Is, xliii. 24); or a self-love that
sees in one’s vices nothing but virtue or amiable weakness; or a
long-continued indulgence of sin that has destroyed all refinement of
conscience.

602. Special Dangers of a Lax Conscience.--(a) If the laxity is
inculpable, it is an occasion of demoralization to others and a
preparation for formal sin in him who has the conscience;

(b) if the laxity is culpable, it is the cause of formal sin; and if it
is not corrected, it naturally leads to moral blindness, hardness of
heart and impenitence: “There is a way that seemeth to man right, and
the ends thereof lead to death” (Proverbs, xvi. 25).

603. Since a lax conscience is a species of erroneous conscience, the
rules given above as to the kind of sins committed in consequence of an
erroneous conscience, apply also to the lax conscience (see above, 588
Sqq.).

(a) When the laxity is concerned with the existence of sin, the
conscience taking what is sinful for something lawful, he who follows
such a conscience is guilty or not guilty according as his ignorance is
culpable or inculpable (i.e., as he acts from a bad or a good
conscience). Examples: The man who practises dishonesty, because he has
cheated his conscience by sophistry into deciding that dishonesty is
lawful; the child who uses profane language without realization of sin,
because he hears his elders use it. But if the lax conscience takes
what is sinful for a duty, he who disobeys it is guilty of sin.
Example: The person who refuses to tell a lie when he thinks he ought
to lie on account of a promise made.

(b) When the laxity is concerned with the gravity of sin, the
conscience taking what is mortal for venial sin, he who disobeys such a
conscience is guilty of mortal or venial sin, according as his
ignorance is culpable or inculpable (i.e., as he acts from a bad or a
good conscience). Examples: A child who thinks that calumny or missing
Mass is only a venial sin, because he sees grown up persons treat these
things lightly; a person that, to solace his conscience, advises with
lax associates who always approve of what he wishes to do or has done.

604. He who knows, or who has good reason to think, that his conscience
is lax, should guide himself by the following rules: (a) with reference
to the past, if there is a doubt whether or not sin was consented to or
was grave, the presumption is against him, for laxity willingly
contracted makes one responsible for what ensues; (b) with reference to
the future, a person must make use of the means prescribed for one who
is in danger of sin (see above, 258 sqq.), for a lax conscience places
one in danger of sin.

605. Remedies Recommended for a Lax Conscience.--(a) The defect of will
or character should be corrected. Example: The presumptuous should
reflect on the justice of God, and recall that the broad way leads to
perdition. Those in whom the wish is father to the lax judgment should
make war on the passion that leads them astray. Those who have become
lax through bad habits, should set about acquiring good habits, like
that of going to the Sacraments frequently. (b) The error of the
intellect should be corrected. Example: If a person’s religious
training has been neglected, he should do what he can to get correct
information and advice as to his duties. If one has been influenced by
lax ideas or conduct, one should change one’s reading or associations.

606. Is a lax person held responsible, if he does not know that he is
lax? (a) If his conscience is invincibly erroneous, he cannot know that
it is lax, and hence he is not responsible; (b) if his conscience is
vincibly erroneous, he ought to know that he is lax, and hence he is
responsible. Examples: The boy Caius keeps whatever he finds, because
he thinks he has a right to do this. The man Titus does not like
cheating, but he cheats habitually, because he thinks he has as much
right to do so as others. Both the boy and the man are lax, but neither
considers himself lax; the difference is that Titus can and ought to
know that he is lax.

607. The scrupulous Conscience.--This is a species of erroneous
judgment that sees sin where there is no sin, or grave sin where there
is only light sin, and whose reasons are trivial or absurd. (a) It
differs, therefore, from a strict or tender conscience, which, while it
does not exaggerate sin, judges that one should try to avoid even
slight sin and imperfection. This is the golden mean between a lax and
a scrupulous conscience. Persons with this sort of conscience are
sometimes called scrupulous or singular, because they are more exact
than the majority. More accurately they are to be called conscientious
or God-fearing.

(b) The scrupulous conscience differs also from scrupulosity, which is a
state of mind in which one whose judgment is not erroneous, is
nevertheless tormented by fears or doubts about his moral condition.

608. The rules given above (588 sqq.) for the erroneous conscience
apply also to the scrupulous conscience. (a) He who follows a
scrupulous conscience does not sin by this, even though he is vincibly
in error; for there is no danger of sin in doing more than is required.
Example: Caius is too lazy to make inquiries about his religious
duties, but he has the exaggerated notion that grace at meals obliges
under pain of grave sin. He does not sin by following his conscience,
for grace at meals is recommended to all. (b) He who disobeys a
scrupulous conscience commits the sin his conscience apprehends.
Example: If Caius omits grace, he is guilty of grave sin.

609. Special Dangers of a scrupulous Conscience.--(a) As to himself,
the scrupulous person suffers from his conscience; it makes him guilty
of sin where there should be no sin, and by its exaggerated strictness
it often drives him to the other extreme of laxity. (b) As to others,
the scrupulous person is an annoyance and a detriment; he tries to
impose his conscience on them, or at least he makes virtue appear
forbidding.

610. It is possible for a conscience to be scrupulous and lax at the
same time, over-indulgent on some points, over-severe on others (see
600). (a) It may be scrupulous as regards others, and lax as regards
self, or vice versa. Example; Parents sometimes are too lenient with
themselves, but rule their children with extreme severity; in other
cases they are meticulous as to their own conduct, but think they must
allow their children every indulgence.

(b) A conscience may be scrupulous in minor matters and lax in major
matters. Example: The Jewish leaders scrupled to take the money from
Judas or to enter the house of Pilate, but they did not hesitate to
condemn our Lord unjustly.

(c) A conscience may be scrupulous as to externals, lax as to
internals. Example: The Pharisees made much of bodily purifications,
but gave little thought to purity of mind and heart.

611. The Perplexed Conscience.--Like to the scrupulous conscience is
the perplexed conscience, which judges that in a particular instance
one cannot escape sin, whether one acts or does not act. Example: Titus
fears that, if he goes to church, he will sin by endangering his
health, which is feeble; that, if he does not go to church, he will sin
by disobeying the law. This seems to have been the conscience of Herod,
who thought he was confronted with the alternative of perjury or murder
when the head of John the Baptist was asked of him (Matt, xiv. 9).

612. St. Alphonsus gives the following directions to assist one who is
perplexed in conscience:

(a) If without serious inconvenience decision can be delayed, reliable
advice should be obtained (e.g., from the confessor).

(b) If decision cannot be delayed, the alternative that seems the
lesser evil should be chosen. Example: The natural law requires that
Titus should not expose his life to danger unnecessarily. The positive
law of the Church requires that he go to Mass on Sunday. It is a less
evil to omit what is required by the law of the Church than to omit
what is required by the law of God. Hence, Titus should decide that he
is not obliged in his circumstances to go to church.

(c) If decision cannot be delayed and the party cannot decide where the
lesser evil lies, he is free to choose either; for he is not bound to
the impossible.

613. If, in the supposition last mentioned, the perplexed person acts
with the feeling that he is committing sin through necessity, is he
really guilty or not?

(a) If by the feeling of guilt is meant, not a judgment of the mind,
but a scruple or doubt, he is not guilty, as we shall see below when we
speak of scrupulosity.

(b) If by the feeling of guilt is meant a judgment of the mind that he
has to sin and an intention to welcome the opportunity, he is guilty;
but his guilt is considerably diminished by the error and his difficult
circumstances. Example: Titus thinks that he sins whether he obeys or
disobeys an order to take a good dose of whiskey. He decides to take
the dose, and feels rather pleased at the thought that he will become
intoxicated.

(c) If by the feeling of guilt is meant a judgment that one has to sin,
accompanied by sorrow at the necessity, one is not guilty, if one
thinks the matter over to the best of one’s ability before acting;
there is some guilt, if the perplexity arises from previous culpable
negligence and no effort whatever is made to remedy this before acting.
Example: Gaia asks her mother if she may go for a ride. The mother
fears that, if she refuses, Gaia will become desperate; if she permits,
Gaia will meet unsuitable companions. If the mother’s perplexity is due
to the fact that she has never taken any interest in Gaia, she is
responsible if she carelessly makes a wrong decision; but if the
perplexity arises only from the difficult character of Gaia, the mother
is not responsible.

614. Scrupulosity.--Like to the scrupulous conscience is the state of
scrupulosity, which manifests itself in moral matters especially as a
vain fear or anxiety concerning the presence or magnitude of sin in
one’s act. A psychopathic state, scrupulosity is usually listed as a
form of psychasthenia which is characterized by weakness of soul,
inability to cope with problems, and a lack of psychic energy.
Clinically examined, the psychasthenic presents the following
characteristics: (1) physically, he is listless and always tired; (2)
intellectually, his tiredness makes it impossible for him to
concentrate for long periods of time; (c) psychologically, he is an
introvert concerned with himself as the center of his interests and
activities.

The more common manifestations of the psychasthenic’s difficulties
include: self-diffidence, uncertainty, hesitation, obsessions and
scruples. A species of psychasthenia, scrupulosity may be described as
an inordinate preoccupation with the moral and religious order, a
special type of worry directed toward the morality of actions.

(a) scrupulosity must be distinguished, however, from the scrupulous
conscience, inasmuch as scrupulosity is not a judgment, but a fear that
accompanies one’s judgment. Example: A scrupulous person knows very
well that it is not a sin to omit grace, nor a grave sin to pray with
some voluntary distraction; but he worries over these things as if they
were sins, or grave sins.

(b) scrupulosity must be distinguished from the tender conscience,
inasmuch as scrupulosity is an exaggerated and harmful solicitude. A
person of tender conscience is careful even in smaller duties, but in a
quiet and recollected way, whereas the scrupulous person is all
excitement and distraction.

(c) scrupulosity must be distinguished from the anxious or doubtful or
guilty conscience, inasmuch as scrupulosity is a baseless fear or
phobia. Examples: A person who has practised injustice for many years,
has good reason to be perturbed in conscience when he reflects that
restitution or reparation is a prerequisite to pardon; but a mother who
did all she could to train her children well, is scrupulous, if she is
constantly reproaching herself that she should have done better. A
person who makes a contract while fearing that it may be unlawful,
because good authorities hold its unlawfulness, acts with a doubtful
conscience; but if he fears that the contract is unlawful, in spite of
the fact that others regard it as lawful and that his only reason for
doubt is that they may be wrong, he is scrupulous. The Egyptians at the
time of the plagues could reasonably forecast grievous chastisements on
account of their wickedness (Wis., xvii. 10); but a good person who
worries constantly over the possibility of being damned must be
scrupulous.

615. Scruples may be divided in various ways, but the simplest division
seems to be by virtue of object, extension and duration. By reason of
object, scruples may center on only one or, at most, a few moral
activities, e.g., duties of charity, or sins against chastity, or they
may embrace the whole moral life of the individual. By reason of
extension, some scruples are limited to interior actions, others extend
to external manifestations. By reason of duration, scruples may be
classified as intermittent, or temporary, and quasi-permanent which is
characteristic of the constitutionally scrupulous person whose physical
and psychical disposition incline him to scrupulosity.

616. The signs or external manifestations of scrupulosity have been
variously divided, but a simplified division into intellectual, or
cognitive, affective, or volitional, and compulsive suffices for our
present purpose.

(a) Intellectual: habitual abulia, i.e., an inability to decide,
coupled with and interacting with constant doubt.

(b) Affective: closely allied to the intellectual state is the feeling
of insufficiency which extends to actions, to the individual’s own
personality, to his desire for higher goals, to his abilities, etc.
This fosters and strengthens the inability to decide. Inordinate fears,
anxieties and sadness contribute to the genesis and growth of the sense
of inadequacy.

(c) Compulsive: numerous compulsion factors are present in more serious
cases of scrupulosity, e.g., obsessions, phobias, and compulsions
properly so called, which concern external actions or rituals.

Obsessions include irresistible, persistent and irrational ideas
accompanied by feelings of tension and fear. These ideas which plague
the individual are “discordant,” that is, out of harmony with his
habitual attitude, and “impulsive,” tending to reduce themselves
spontaneously to action. The scrupulous person is frightened and
flustered by the thought of doing a thing for which he has a positive
abhorrence and by his inability to get the thought out of his mind.

Phobias refer to habitual, irrational fears of a definite entity
associated with a high degree of anxiety and unwarranted by objective
reality. They are very intense fears, completely out of proportion to
their causes or objects.

Finally, compulsions strictly so called may be defined as irresistible,
unreasonable urges to perform actions to free the individual from an
obsessing idea. Tension and anxiety are associated if the act or
external ritual is not performed.

For the confessor, the recognition of a scrupulous person is not too
difficult. The penitent’s own difficulties present the first and most
obvious sign, e.g., irrational doubts about consent to temptation, as
to the gravity of a sin, etc., and undue concern about circumstances.
Concomitant signs confirming the judgment that a person is scrupulous
include:

(a) Obstinacy of judgment; Although the scrupulous person seeks advice,
frequently from many confessors, he tends to follow his own judgment.
He is inclined to think that the confessor has not understood him, that
he has not given a complete picture of his state of soul, etc.

(b) Inconstancy in acting owing to inability to judge rightly and the
consequent frequent changes of judgment for light reasons.

(c) Irrelevant accusations of multiple circumstances that tend to lose
the sin in the maze of circumstances.

(d) External motions by which the individual tries to do away with the
fear, sin, or other difficulty.

617. Causes of a scrupulous Conscience.--Although the signs of
scrupulosity are easily recognizable, the causes are not clearly
defined, and authors are not entirely agreed in this matter. A listing
of probable causes would include internal causes:

(a) physical--the physical causes are virtually unknown. Most authors
admit a constitutional disposition to scrupulosity, just as there is
one to its quasi-genus, psychasthenia. Reductively this might involve
disorders in the vago-sympathetic nervous system and the
neuro-endocrine system. (b) psychical--the cause is attributed to too
low a psychic tension. The inability to cope with obsessions and the
attacks of phobias serve to exhaust the individual; (c) moral--perhaps
a suspicious and melancholy character, a disposition that is overly
impressionable and changeable, or a self-opinionated nature,
overconfident of its own ability.

618. The external causes of scrupulosity are: (a) the devil, who
excites vain fears in order to diminish devotion, to discourage the use
of prayer and of the Sacraments, to drive to tepidity and despair; (b)
the neighbor, who teaches scrupulosity by his words or example;
association with persons who are scrupulous; the reading of spiritual
books of a rigoristic character; assistance by persons of a timid
character at terrifying sermons on the divine justice; overly
protective and overly rigorous education.

619. Though God cannot be the cause of scrupulosity in the same way as
the evil spirits (who use it for man’s destruction), nor in the same
way as human agencies (which are unable to bring good out of the evil
they cause), He does in exceptional cases directly permit even saintly
persons to be vexed by scrupulosity that they may thereby satisfy for
sin, or exercise themselves in humility and patience, or shake off
spiritual torpor.

Scrupulosity that is supernatural in origin is much rarer than that
which has a natural source, and it can be usually recognized by certain
signs, like the following; (a) when it cannot be accounted for by
natural causes, and is generally short in duration; (b) if it is from
the evil spirits, it leaves the soul shaken or dismayed, if from God,
it is followed by light and peace.

620. Dangers of scrupulosity.--The evil results of indulged
scrupulosity are as follows: (a) temporal evils--the constant fears and
worries of the scrupulous affect the brain and nerves, break down the
bodily vigor, and lead to neurasthenia, hysteria, insanity or
monomania; (b) spiritual evils--time is wasted in useless regrets and
anxieties, prayer becomes a torture, confidence in God decreases, and,
seeing they do not find consolation in virtue, the scrupulous often end
in vice and despair.

621. Rules to be observed by the scrupulous.--(a) They must not yield
to their scruples. As was said above, scrupulosity is not a conscience,
but only the counterfeit appearance of a conscience; not a help to the
soul, but a grave drawback and danger. Hence, the scrupulous must learn
to despise their foolish fears and imaginations. (b) They must follow
blindly the commands of a prudent spiritual director. To attempt to
make decisions for themselves is a harrowing experience for scrupulous
persons, and one fraught with great peril. They must protect
themselves, therefore, by following the decisions made for them by one
who will guide them aright. Gradually, as their condition improves,
however, they must learn to take the initiative and thus prepare
themselves to act as responsible persons capable of forming a correct
judgment.

622. Not to follow their scruples means: (a) that scrupulous persons
should recognize their scruples for what they really are (i.e., for a
spiritual disorder), and that they should firmly resolve to use the
means to get rid of them; (b) that they will prevent scruples from
arising by keeping themselves occupied with external things, or by
interesting themselves with matters that will exclude the worrisome
thoughts; (c) that they will banish scruples at once, as they would a
temptation. The two key aims of the scrupulous individual is to
counteract his introversion by greater social activity and to re-train
his faculty so that he will be in control at all times.

623. Though the scrupulous are obliged not to heed their scruples, they
rarely sin by heeding them, because their condition is such that they
are not responsible. For, as was said above (40 sqq.), fear and other
passions lessen or remove deliberation and the voluntariness of acts.

624. To give absolute obedience to the spiritual director means: (a)
that scrupulous persons should recognize that it is wrong for them to
depend on their own prudence, whereas they are absolutely safe in
following the advice and precepts of the spiritual father who holds the
place of God; (b) that they should avoid changing directors, and should
adhere strictly to the rules prescribed for them.

625. Qualities required for a successful direction of the scrupulous
are:

(a) Knowledge. The spiritual physician must be able to distinguish
scrupulosity from spiritual diseases or conditions that are similar,
lest he prescribe what is not suitable for the case. Example: A person
of tender conscience should continue in that state, a person of
scrupulous conscience needs instruction that he may put aside his
erroneous views; a scrupulous person stands in need of special
guidance. He must also recognize that scrupulosity is a mental illness
that at times requires the expert treatment of a psychiatrist. Knowing
his own limitations and the need of expert therapy, he should not
hesitate to send the penitent to a competent doctor.

(b) Prudence. Some persons pretend scrupulosity in order to get a name
for holiness, or to make a good impression; needless to say, they must
be dealt with cautiously, as they often prove very unscrupulous. With a
person who is really scrupulous, the spiritual director must carefully
obtain all the knowledge necessary to ascertain the true state of soul,
prudently bring the individual to recognize that he is a sick person,
help to restore his confidence in himself, in his confessor, in God,
etc.

(c) Patience. The scrupulous are almost as troublesome to their
directors as they are to themselves; but they are heavily burdened and
are unable to help themselves. The law of charity applies. They have
the same right to charitable treatment as others who are physically
suffering and needy.

(d) Firmness. Disobedience will defeat every effort of a director to
help a scrupulous person. On this point, therefore, there must be no
leniency: the rules laid down must be insisted on, the reasons should
not be given, and no argument or discussion should be allowed. The
director should speak with certainty and authority; he should be brief,
and, if he must repeat, he will do well to use the same words.

(e) Good judgment. After deciding that a person is scrupulous, the
director must discover what is the particular form of scrupulosity in
the case, and must apply remedies that are suitable.

626. Rules Concerning Persons Scrupulous about Past Confessions.--(a)
For the first time the confessor may permit a general confession of the
past life, if the scrupulous penitent has fears about previous
confessions and has not already made such a general confession. Let the
individual relate his whole story at once, with all its details and
complications. This might perhaps take more than one confession to
complete, but the full recital is necessary if the scrupulous person is
to have confidence in his director’s knowledge of his exact state of
soul. (b) After this general confession, no mention of past confession
must be permitted, unless the scrupulous person is ready to swear
without hesitation that he is sure that a sin certainly grave was
committed by him and never rightly confessed.

627. Rules Concerning Persons scrupulous about Present
Confessions.--(a) Before confession, the penitent must be content with
a certain brief space of time appointed by the confessor for making his
examination of conscience and act of contrition. A longer time spent in
these preparations is useful to other penitents, but harmful to the
scrupulous.

(b) During confession only those sins need be mentioned which are seen
from a brief examen to be both certain and grave, and only those
circumstances whose declaration is absolutely necessary. If the
scrupulous penitent begins to speak of doubtful sins or irrelevant
details, the confessor must forbid him to go on; for though confessions
must be complete, whenever possible, doubts and details must not be
permitted in the case of such scrupulous persons (see Vol. II).

(c) After confession, if the confessor judges that there is not
sufficient matter for absolution, he must not yield to the penitent’s
fears, but must assure him that he does not need absolution and that he
may go to the Sacraments Without it.

628. Rules Concerning Persons scrupulous about the Performance of
Duties.--(a) The scrupulous person should be instructed that positive
laws, divine as well as human, do not oblige in case of moral
impossibility (i.e., when their observance is too burdensome); that the
matter about which he has scruples has become too difficult for him,
and hence that he is not obliged to it as others are.

(b) The scrupulous person should be commanded to leave undone what his
vain fear calls on him to do; and, if this does not suffice, he should
be told that he is not bound by the duty which causes him such anxiety.
Example: Titus is scrupulous about the performance of obligatory
prayers, so much so that he is not satisfied until he has repeated them
several times, lest some syllable may have been omitted or hurried
over, or the intention or attention may have been lost sight of at some
part of the prayer, or the devotional posture may not have been
observed throughout. If Titus cannot learn to say these prayers without
making senseless repetitions, he should be told that the obligation has
ceased until such time as he is able to fulfill it without torture to
himself or others.

629. Of course, if harm is done to another by the incomplete
performance of a duty, even a scrupulous person cannot be dispensed
from repetition. Example: If a priest has not pronounced a sacramental
form correctly, the fact that he is scrupulous does not excuse him from
repeating the form correctly.

630. Rules Concerning Persons Scrupulous about the Commission Of
Sin.--(a) The scrupulous person should be told that he is scrupulous,
that his scrupulosity is not a conscience that he is obliged to follow,
but a vain fear which he is obliged to struggle against by observing
the directions given him.

(b) He should be directed not to deliberate long before acting, but to
do what seems right to him at first; not to conclude after acting that
he has committed sin, unless this appears certain and evident. Since
the scrupulous are over-careful, the presumption is in their favor, and
they can act and judge prudently by disregarding their fears and
doubts. If by deciding offhand they sometimes sin or fail to recognize
sin in a past act, this will come from invincible ignorance, and they
will be excused from responsibility.

631. Since a disease is best cured by removing its cause, the
confessor, when he has diagnosed a case of scruples, should prescribe
remedies that are opposed to the source of the trouble.

(a) If scrupulosity seems to come from God, the penitent should be
encouraged to regard it as a means of satisfaction for past negligences
or as an occasion of virtue and progress, to pray incessantly for light
and assistance, and to follow the guidance which God has provided. (b)
If scrupulosity appears to be the result of diabolical obsession, and
exorcism seems to be called for, the sufferer should not be told this.
(c) If scrupulosity comes from associations or reading, the sufferer
should avoid these occasions, and cultivate the companionship of
persons or books that are cheerful and that give a hopeful outlook on
one’s duty and destiny.

632. Remedies for Scruples That Are Mental in Origin.--(a) Those who
suffer from fixed ideas, phobias, and delusions, should not be reproved
harshly and told that their fears are insane, but should be treated
with kindness and firmness. In ministering to these troubled minds, the
best course seems to be kind assurance that they have nothing to fear,
along with insistence that they imitate the example of the generality
of good people, avoid singular practices of piety, discuss their
anxieties only with their director, and give themselves to some
occupation that will distract their attention from their manias.

(b) Those whose minds are over-active and given to doubts and
objections must avoid introspection and the study of moral problems
that are too difficult for them; they must take a proper amount of
suitable recreation, think and plan how they may help others who are in
need, and avoid idleness.

633. Remedies for Scruples Whose Origin is Moral.--(a) If scruples
arise from a stubbornness of character, the penitent must be told that
the confessor is better fitted to judge the case, and that it is the
height of rashness and presumption for a scrupulous person to prefer
his ideas to those of the priest.

(b) If a melancholy or timid nature accounts for the existence of
scruples, confidence and cheerfulness should be inculcated, and the
penitent should be encouraged to meditate frequently on the goodness of
God, and to remember always that God is not a harsh taskmaster, but a
kind Father.

(c) Those who are scrupulous because their character is fickle and
easily moved by every suggestion or imagination, need to cultivate
seriousness, and to hold strongly to their judgments and resolves
deliberately formed. Obedience to their director will be of more
lasting benefit to these and other psychical scrupulants than
psychiatric treatments through hypnotism, mental suggestion, and
psychoanalysis; observance of the rules prescribed is an excellent
cultivation of will-power, and it is sustained and perfected by the
motives and helps which religion alone can supply.

634. Remedies for scrupulosity Whose Cause Is Physical.--(a) The
physician is the proper person to care for bodily ills; hence, a
scrupulous person who is troubled with headaches, dizziness,
sleeplessness, loss of appetite, nervousness, hallucinations, etc.,
should go to a competent and conscientious specialist in the healing
art. Removal of the causes of hurry and worry, moderate but sufficient
diet, fresh air and exercise, and especially congenial occupation and
surroundings are by general consent included among the best natural
cures.

(b) The confessor, if he perceives that illness is the cause of
scruples, should forbid any spiritual practices that cause or aggravate
the malady. Example: scrupulous penitents should not be permitted to
practise mortification by depriving themselves of necessary sleep,
food, exercise or fresh air, or to use devotions or austerities for
which they are physically unfit.

635. Persons who are scrupulous and lax at the same time need to be
directed so as to overcome both spiritual maladies.

(a) If they are more scrupulous than lax, the case is less difficult,
as they incline rather to the safer side, and it will suffice to apply
the remedies indicated above for laxity and scrupulosity, as they are
needed. Example: Titus, on account of scrupulosity, spends too much
time at his prayers, and thus neglects the exercise and recreation
which are necessary for his health. He should be instructed to limit
his devotions, to have a regular time for them each day, and to realize
that he has an obligation to take proper care of his health.

(b) If persons are more lax than scrupulous, the case is difficult, as
they incline more to evil; indeed, if the trouble is Pharisaism, it is
well-nigh incurable, on account of the pride and blindness that oppose
resistance to every effort to cure. These persons need to be treated
with severity, since nothing else will make any impression; they should
be told in plain language how they stand and what is in store for them,
unless they repent. Examples: Caius is extremely careful not to be
guilty of sins of commission, but he thinks nothing of sins of
omission; he would not take a postage stamp without express permission
of the owner, but he neglects from year to year to pay bills, and sees
nothing wrong in this. Titus thinks himself a saint because he worships
the letter of the law, when it is to be applied to others; but he cares
nothing about its spirit, and, though indulgent to self, is a tyrant
with others. Both these men need to be told that, far from being good,
they are very bad; that, far from being secure, they are in great
danger. If insensible to reproofs, they should be reminded of the woes
that await the wilfully blind (Matt., xxiii. 13 sqq.).

636. Practical Conclusions.--An instrument is called good when it
produces with sufficient exactness the effects for which it was
intended; it is bad, if it fails to produce those effects. Thus, a
timepiece, a compass, or a thermometer is good if it indicates
accurately, and bad if it indicates inaccurately. But, as it would be
harmful to guide oneself by an unreliable instrument (e.g., by a watch
with a defective mainspring, or which runs fast or slow), one naturally
corrects the defects and regulates the working of the mechanism. Now,
from what has been said above in this article, we see that conscience
can be a deceptive indicator, and that its accuracy can be improved.
Hence, the need of correcting a bad conscience and of cultivating a
good conscience.

637. Remedies for a bad conscience and means for cultivating a good
conscience are as follows:

(a) The remote causes of a bad conscience are in the will itself. A
person judges wrongly often because he is wrong in himself, wrong in
his intentions and purposes with regard to life as a whole, wrong in
his attitude towards a particular line of duty, wrong in his lack of
sincerity with himself. Hence, the correctives needed are a sincere
love of God and of virtue, courage to wish the truth, and an honest
examination of motives and actions: “The sensual man perceiveth not the
things that are of the Spirit of God, but the spiritual man judgeth all
things” (I Cor., ii. 14, 15).

(b) The immediate causes of a bad conscience are in the intellect. One
judges wrongly because one clings in time of doubt to erroneous ideas
or principles. The remedy, therefore, is to seek diligently for light
through prayer, to study the lives and conduct of those who are models,
to consult with the prudent and the conscientious. The bad conscience
says to God: “Depart from us, we desire not the knowledge of Thy ways”
(Job, xxi. 14); but the good one says: “Teach me Thy justifications.
Thy testimonies are my delight, and Thy justifications my counsel” (Ps.
cxviii. 12, 24).

638. Signs of a Good Conscience.--(a) Extraordinary holiness is not
necessary before one may consider one’s conscience good, for there are
degrees of goodness. If, therefore, a person’s external life is
directed by the duties of his state, and his internal life, as far as
he can judge, is free from serious guilt and guided by love of God and
hatred of sin, he may safely regard his will as good. If sometimes he
sins venially, this is not because he lacks a good conscience, but
because he does not always follow it.

(b) Extraordinary diligence in studying one’s duties is not necessary
before one may regard one’s conscience as good, for otherwise a heavier
burden would be imposed than we can suppose God to intend. A person who
is using all the means for obtaining religious instruction that are
used by others in his position and who are conscientious, may safely
regard himself as free from voluntary error. If sometimes he judges
wrongly, the mistake will be involuntary and not due to a bad
conscience. Of course, one whose conscience is not in vincible error
may sin even mortally, not because his conscience is bad, but because
he does not follow it.

639. The following are means for preserving and maintaining a good
conscience: (a) we should judge our motives frequently with the
severity with which we judge the motives of another (Rom., ii. 1), and
as before God (I Cor., ii. 10); (b) we should measure our actions, not
by the standards of the world, its maxims and examples, but by those of
Christ (I John, ii. 15-17; III John, 11).




Art. 3: A CERTAIN CONSCIENCE

(_Summa Theologica_, I-II, q. 57, a. 5; II-II, q. 47, a. 9.)

640. As was said above, only that conscience is a safe guide which is
not only good--that is, in agreement, as far as one’s efforts can
secure this, with the external law--but also certain. A certain
conscience is one which, without any prudent fear of erring, judges
that a particular act is obligatory or unlawful, and hence here and now
to be done or omitted.

641. Necessity of Certitude.--We must be sure we are right before we
act; otherwise, we expose ourselves to the danger of sinning, and
therefore commit sin (see 582). Hence, it is necessary to act with a
certain conscience, and unlawful to act with an uncertain conscience.
“If the trumpet give an uncertain sound, who shall prepare himself to
the battle?” (I Cor., xiv. 8) may be accommodated to conscience. In
Rom., xiv. 22, 23, the Apostle declares that he who acts with
conviction is blessed, whereas he who acts in uncertainty is condemned.
Examples: Sempronia doubts whether it is sinful to sew on Sunday; she
is not sure, but has grave suspicions that sewing is servile work; if
she goes ahead, she will be guilty of violating the law, as being
willing to take the risk, and therefore the responsibility. Titus
offers another a drink, being uncertain whether it has poison in it or
not; he is guilty of sin, since he has no right to expose himself to
sin and his neighbor to the danger of death.

642. Those persons who act with a doubtful conscience, and later
discover that what they feared might be wrong was not wrong, or not so
bad as they suspected, must bear in mind: (a) that their past conduct
is not to be judged by their newly acquired knowledge, for that conduct
must be judged by the knowledge had at the time. Example: Sempronia
does some work on Sunday, doubting whether she is committing a grave or
a slight sin. Later she discovers that it was really only a venial sin,
and she congratulates herself that she did not sin seriously. Her
judgment is wrong, because she did not know at the time of the work
that it was not a grave sin; (b) that they must guide themselves in
future acts by their newly acquired knowledge.

643. Kinds of Certitude.--Judgments may be certain in a greater or less
degree.

(a) They are metaphysically certain, when error is absolutely
impossible, the opposite of what is held by the mind being a
contradiction in terms which omnipotence itself could not make true.
Example: The judgments that the same, identical act cannot be both good
and bad, that good is to be done and evil to be avoided, that God is to
be honored, are metaphysically certain, since they result immediately
from the very concepts of being, of goodness, and of God.

(b) Judgments are physically certain, when error is impossible
according to the laws of nature, the opposite of what is held by the
mind being unrealizable except through intervention of another cause.
Example: The judgments that he who takes poison will destroy life, that
he who applies fire to a house will destroy property, are physically
certain. because natural agencies, like poison and fire, act infallibly
when applied to suitable matters and under suitable conditions and left
to their course, unless they are overruled by superior power.

(c) Judgments are morally certain, when error is impossible according
to what is customary among mankind, the opposite of what is held by the
mind being so unlikely that it would be imprudent to be moved by it.
Examples: One is morally certain that what a reputedly truthful and
competent person relates to one is true. A person is morally certain
that a conclusion he has drawn about his duty in a particular instance
is correct, if he believes that he has overlooked no means of reaching
the truth. Testimony and inference, since they come from free and
fallible agencies, may lead into error; but, when they appear to have
the requisite qualities indicative of truth, they are for the most part
reliable and in practical life have to be considered as such.

644. As to the certainty that is required in the judgment of
conscience, the following points must be noted:

(a) Metaphysical certainty is not required, since conscience does not
deal with primary propositions, but with deductions about particular
acts. The first moral principles, which are the object of synderesis,
and at least some of the general conclusions, which are the object of
moral science, are metaphysically certain (see above 145, 300), as they
are based on necessary relations; but the particular conclusions, which
are the object of conscience, are concerned with the contingent and the
individual.

(b) Physical certainty is not required for the judgment of conscience,
since conscience is not concerned with the activities of natural
agents, but with the activities of moral agents that act with freedom
and responsibility.

(c) Moral certitude, therefore, is sufficient for the conclusions drawn
by conscience. That a higher kind of certitude is not necessary should
not surprise us, for it would be unreasonable to expect that the same
degree of assent be given to judgments that are concerned with
particular and contingent cases as to those that are concerned with
universal and necessary principles.

645. Moral certitude is of two kinds: (a) certitude in the strict
sense, which excludes not only the fear of error, but every doubt,
prudent and imprudent, great and small, Example: Titus thinks of a way
in which he could easily make money dishonestly; but his conscience
sees that the thing is manifestly wrong and decides without the
slightest fear or doubt that it must not be done; (b) certitude in the
wide sense, which excludes all fear of error and every serious or
prudent doubt, but not one or other slight and imprudent doubt.
Example: Caius was baptized by an excellent priest, but the date was
omitted in the register. The doubt occurs to Caius that perhaps
something essential was also omitted, and that it may be his duty to
seek another Baptism. His doubt is unreasonable.

646. Moral certitude in the wide sense is sufficient for a safe
conscience, even in matters of great importance, since it is frequently
the only kind of certitude one can have, and he who would strive to be
free from every slight and baseless suspicion would be soon involved in
a maze of scruples and perplexities. Example: If the Caius above
referred to were to yield to his doubt and be rebaptized, a similar
doubt about the second Baptism might easily arise in his mind, and he
would be no more contented than before.

647. From the point of view of its object, certitude is twofold. (a)
Speculative certitude refers to a judgment considered as a general law,
abstraction being made from particular circumstances. Example: It is
speculatively certain that farm work on a holyday is a forbidden kind
of work, and that clerics are obliged to say the Divine Office. (b)
Practical certitude refers to a judgment which is an application of a
general law to a particular case, consideration being given to all the
pertinent circumstances. Example: It is practically certain that Titus
may make hay on a holyday, if otherwise he will suffer great loss; and
that a cleric is excused from the Divine Office, if his physician has
warned him that he is physically or mentally unable to perform it.

648. Speculative certainty is not sufficient for conscience, but
practical certitude is required, since conscience refers not to
abstract laws but to concrete cases--not to what is right if only the
object of the act is considered, but to what is right when one
considers the object, the motive, and all the circumstances here and
now present.

649. From the point of view of the arguments on which it is based,
certitude is of two kinds. (a) Demonstrative certitude is the assent
that rests on a conclusion logically drawn from certainly true
premises. Example: Caius argues that he is obliged to go to Mass on
Sunday, because the law is certain, and it is also certain that the law
applies to him. (b) Probable certitude, which is the assent that rests
on a conclusion, whose premises, though not certain, seem to be true,
and against which there is no counter conclusion, or none that cannot
be readily answered (see 703). Example: Caius is pretty sure that he is
seriously ill, because he perceives a number of alarming symptoms; the
possibility that these may be due to imagination is excluded by the
fact that they are new and sudden. Caius, therefore, concludes that he
may hold himself excused from attendance at Mass.

650. Probable certitude is sufficient for conscience, for in moral
matters it is impossible to have at all times reasons that amount to a
demonstration, and hence a person acts prudently in following a
decision that is solidly probable and unopposed by any contrary serious
probability. What is called “probable certitude” here is very different
from probable opinion, about which there will be question below (662
sqq.)

651. From the point of view of the manner in which it is obtained,
certitude is again twofold. (a) Direct certitude is that which is
obtained from principles that are intrinsic to the case by applying to
the matter the law concerning it. Examples: A judge who decides
according to the evidence and proofs given in court that an accused is
guilty, and a son who concludes from the Fourth Commandment that he is
bound to help his parents in necessity, have direct certainty in their
judgments, because they argued from principles that deal with the
question before them. (b) Indirect certitude is that which is obtained
from principles that are extrinsic to the case by applying to the
matter in hand reflex principles (i.e., rules that direct how one
should act in doubt) or the principle of authority (i.e., the argument
drawn from the opinion of those who are acknowledged as competent to
decide). Examples; If a judge is not able to form a certain judgment
from intrinsic reasons concerning an accused, because strong arguments
have been given both for guilt and for innocence, he has recourse to
principles that have reference to his own state of doubt, and which
declare that he must acquit when he is not certain of guilt. If a man
is not able to decide whether the Fourth Commandment obliges him to
keep his grandparents or mother-in-law in his home, when they upset his
family and are able to take care of themselves, he can have recourse to
the external principle of authority by consulting his confessor.

652. Direct certitude is not necessary for the judgment of conscience,
for often, as in the cases just mentioned, it is not possible.
Moreover, indirect certitude suffices to give one who is in doubt such
practical assurance that one’s fears become unimportant and one is able
to act prudently in spite of them.

(a) The principle of authority--that “in doubt we can safely follow the
advice of those who are experts and truthful”--is reliable, as both the
conditions required for authority (viz., knowledge and truthfulness)
and also daily experience show.

(b) Reflex principles likewise, although they do not prove what is
deduced from them, are well founded, and point so clearly the side to
be taken when judgment is suspended between alternatives that they
enable one to act with all the certitude that prudence demands.
Example: The principle that “in doubt decision should be given in favor
of the accused,” is based on the fact that a man’s right to his life
and liberty is so certain that he does not forfeit that right unless it
is proved convincingly that he is guilty.

653. Examples of uncertain and certain consciences are the following:

(a) Uncertain conscience: It is lawful to make a just contract (major
premise certain); but this contract is just (minor premise a matter of
doubt or opinion); therefore, this contract is lawful (conclusion a
matter of doubt or opinion).

(b) Conscience directly certain: It is lawful to make a just contract
(certain); but this contract is just (certain); therefore, I may make
this contract (certain).

(c) Conscience indirectly certain: It is lawful to follow competent
advice or a moral system approved by the Church (certain); but a
competent spiritual adviser or an approved system of Moral Theology
holds that this kind of contract is lawful (certain); therefore, it is
lawful for me to make this contract (certain).

654. An Uncertain Conscience.--Uncertainty of conscience can be
understood in two senses.

(a) Conscience is uncertain in a more strict sense, if the verdict of
the moral judgment on a question of lawfulness or unlawfulness is that
no decision can be given either way, either because there are no
reasons of importance on either side (negative doubt), or because the
opposing reasons balance so perfectly that it is impossible to choose
between them (positive doubt). Examples: Titus, wishing to do some
drawing on Sundays, asks himself whether drawing is servile work. Not
knowing the definition of “servile,” he can only reply to his doubt
that he has no reasons either for affirmation or for negation. Caius
reads moral authors on the same question, and the pros and cons seem to
him so equally strong that he cannot pronounce for either side.

(b) Conscience is uncertain in a less strict sense, if the verdict of
the moral judgment on a question of lawfulness or unlawfulness is that
the mind inclines to one side more than the other, but cannot decide in
its favor (suspicion), or that it decides for one side, while
perceiving that the arguments for the contrary are not to be despised
(opinion). Example: Titus decides to spend a good part of Sunday taking
photographs. Caius argues that this is unlawful; Sempronius, that it is
lawful. Titus thinks the arguments of both are strong, but is better
pleased with those of Sempronius. If he feels he cannot act on either
opinion, his state of mind is what we called suspicion; if he feels
that the opinion of Sempronius has prevailed, his state of mind is one
of opinion.

655. From what was said above concerning the certitude requisite for
conscience (see 641 sqq.), it follows that: (a) when the state of mind
is positive or negative doubt, one is not allowed to act; for a person
who is ignorant of what he should do, or who is fluctuating between
opposites, runs the risk of sin and its consequences, if he acts
blindly; (b) when the state of mind is suspicion, one is not allowed to
act, for conscience must be more than conjecture or inclination; (e)
when the state of mind is opinion, one is or is not allowed to act,
according as the opinion has or has not the qualities required for
certitude that is moral and practical (as explained above in 643 sqq.).

656. Doubt and Suspicion.--The following are the duties of a person
whose state of mind about his obligation is one of doubt or suspicion:

(a) If he has no time to resolve his hesitation but must decide at
once, he should follow the rules given for a perplexed conscience (see
above, 611 sqq.). Example; Sempronius is ordered by his father to go on
an errand; by his mother, to remain at home. He does not know whom he
should obey, but argues that there can be no harm in performing the
errand, since he feels that he is forced anyway. Sempronius’ impromptu
decision proceeds from a sense of moral responsibility; it is good, and
as certain as he is able to make it.

(b) If a person has time to resolve his hesitation, he should not trust
to common sense, but should consult moral theology, if he is competent
to understand and apply it, or should have recourse to his confessor,
if he is not a theologian. The attention given to his problem should be
proportionate to the gravity of the duty in question, its importance
for third parties, etc. (see below, 667 Sqq.). Example: If a layman is
uncertain whether a practice he follows in his business is dishonest,
he should consult a priest; if the priest is uncertain, he should refer
to his theology and study the matter until he is able to give a
well-founded, morally certain judgment.

657. Reflex principles by the aid of which a negative doubt may be
solved, when the question is about the existence or non-existence of
some fact connected with obligation, are the following:

(a) If the fact at issue is one about which presumption may be had from
general or personal experience, the doubt may be settled by the
principle: “In uncertainty decide according to what usually happens.”
Examples: Titus is uncertain whether his boy of seven years has the use
of reason and is bound to go to Mass. As a rule, children attain
discretion at the age of seven; and hence Titus should take his boy to
Mass. Fr. Caius is uncertain whether he has said Terce. His experience
is that such uncertainties on his part have always been baseless in the
past; hence, he may consider that he has said Terce as usual.

(b) If the fact at issue is one about which no presumption is afforded,
either from general or personal experience, recourse may be had to the
principle: “A fact should not be taken for granted, but must be
proved.” Examples: Sempronia doubts whether her practice of saying the
Rosary daily was the result of a vow; but, as there is no proof or
circumstantial evidence of a vow, it may be held that her practice
originated in a resolution. Caius, a stranger, claims that Titus owes
him for an unpaid debt of his father. Titus knows nothing of the
alleged debt, and the only substantiation for its existence is the word
of the stranger. Titus is not obliged to pay.

658. Presumption of a fact is of three kinds according to Weight:

(a) Violent presumption is based on indications so significant or
numerous that it leaves only slight room for evasion. This kind of
presumption suffices, but is not essential in solving doubts. Example:
Caius has no direct proof or disproof that he paid Titus in a certain
business transaction, because all the papers have been lost. But he
remembers distinctly that he drew the money and went personally to the
office of Titus on the day payment was to be made, and that the latter,
up to the time of his death several months later, always acted as if
full settlement had been made.

(b) Strong presumption is based on circumstances or signs so moving
that they permit one to infer a fact as being their natural or usual
accompaniment or result. This kind of presumption suffices in solving
the doubts we are considering. Example: If Caius, spoken of above, has
no individual recollection of any circumstances bearing on the payment
of his debt to Titus, but knows that it was his invariable custom to
pay all his debts promptly, the presumption that he paid this debt is
strong.

(c) Light presumption occurs when the reasons are so slight, that they
hardly ever suffice to permit us to infer a given fact from them.
Example: If we suppose that Caius was dilatory in paying debts, and
that he has no better indication of payment having been made than the
fact that Titus gave him a cigar about the time of their business
transaction, there is little presumption that the debt was paid.

659. Reflex principles that may be used to settle negative doubts about
the quality of an act performed are the following:

(a) If there is an individual presumption, the quality of the act may
be inferred from what usually happens. Example: Sempronius cannot
remember whether a certain good work he undertook was prompted by zeal
or ambition. But, as he usually tried to keep his motives pure, it may
be concluded that the work in question proceeded from a right intention.

(b) If there is no individual presumption, the quality of an act may be
settled from general presumptions or principles. When the act was
according to law, and the doubt concerns its validity or sufficiency,
one may take it that all was rightly done; for it usually happens that
he who complies with the substance, also complies with what is
accessory. Moreover, the welfare of the public and of individuals
require that an act done outwardly according to law should be deemed as
rightly performed unless the contrary can be proved. Hence the rules:
“In doubt decide for the validity of what was done”; “What has been
done is presumed to have been rightly done.” Examples: Caia cannot
remember whether she really consented when she married Titus.
Sempronius cannot remember whether he had sufficient attention in
hearing Mass on Sunday. The presumptions are that Caia married validly
and that Sempronius heard Mass properly, if they acted in good faith.

660. Reflex principles that may be used to settle negative and
invincible doubts concerning law or obligation are the following:

(a) If no serious reasons can be found to prove or disprove the
existence of a law, or its gravity or application to a present case,
use may be made of the principle: “Invincible ignorance of the law
excuses from sin.” Example: Titus on an ember day consults all the
sources of information he has to discover whether it is a fast day; but
all he can learn is that some vigils are fast days, others are not.

(b) If no serious reasons can be found to prove or disprove that a law
bears a certain meaning, recourse may be had to such principles as the
following: “A law obliges only in so far as it is knowable”; “The
interpretation may be made against the legislator who could have spoken
more clearly”; “Things burdensome to the subjects of the law should be
construed narrowly; things favorable, broadly.” Example: Caius, who
supervises workingmen, has no notion regarding the meaning of the word
“workingman” as used in an indult on fasting--viz., whether it applies
to supervisors of work or exclusively to laborers.

(c) If no serious reasons can be found to prove or directly disprove
that a certain law has ceased or been abrogated, the principle to be
followed is: “In doubt decide for that which has the presumption.” In
this case the presumption is for the continuance of the law, since it
was certainly made, and there is no probability for its
non-continuance. Example: Sempronius learns that certain mitigations
have been made in the law of fasting, and wonders whether the same is
true as regards the law of abstinence; but he has no reason to think
that any change has been made on this latter point.

661. In the above cases negative doubt was solved generally in favor of
non-obligation as against obligation. But there are two cases in which
negative doubt must be settled in favor of obligation, according to the
rule: “In doubt follow that which is safer.” The two cases are:

(a) Negative doubt must be settled in favor of obligation, when the
doubt is about a matter of such importance that it does not permit the
taking of risks in its performance, as when there is question of laws
that safeguard the supreme rights of man, or of laws that prescribe the
essentials to be used in the administration of the Sacraments. Example:
Sempronius adopts a newly-born infant abandoned at his door. As there
is nothing to indicate whether the baby has been baptized or not,
Sempronius takes the safer course and has it baptized.

(b) Negative doubt must be settled in favor of obligation when it
persists because no reflex principle is found, or none that seems to be
suitable for the case. Example: Titus wavers between uncertainties
about the existence of a law; he can discover no reasons pro or con,
and he knows no principle or presumption to guide himself by in his
difficulty. He does not know or even think that he may act as if the
law were non-existent, and hence he must inquire further, or else act
as if the law did exist.

662. Opinion.--The duty of one whose state of mind is opinion is as
follows:

(a) If he is able to remove every objection against his judgment or to
make unimportant such objection or objections as remain, his opinion
has become moral certainty (see above, 644 Sqq.), and he may follow it
as a safe guide. Example: Caius promises to marry Sempronia, but his
parents forbid the marriage. Caius opines that he should keep his
promise, but to be sure he consults his pastor. The latter shows him
that the opposition to his marriage is unreasonable, and thus sets at
rest the difficulties of Caius.

(b) If a person is not able to remove one or more important objections
against his judgment, his opinion has not become moral certitude, and
he may not follow it as a safe guide. Example: If Caius’ pastor holds
that the parents are right and Caius wrong in the question of marriage
with Scmpronia, so that Caius, while still thinking he should keep his
promise, has serious fears that it would be a wrong step, the young man
should not follow his own view.

663. Those who act when their state of mind is doubt, suspicion, or
uncertain opinion are: (a) guilty of sin, for they do not act in good
faith (Rom, xiv. 22, 23), and they are imprudent and lovers of danger
(Ecclus., iii. 27); (b) guilty of the species and gravity of sin which
they fear may be in their act; for they interpretatively wish that to
which they expose themselves. Example: If Titus takes an oath, fearing
that his act is perjury, he is guilty of perjury before God, even
though what he says is true.

664. Fears or objections against an opinion are unimportant as follows:
(a) if they have only a slight probability (e.g., Titus opines that he
is not obliged to say the second lessons, because he knows that he
began them, and therefore must have said them; but he fears he may be
obliged to say them, because he cannot remember the details of the
lessons, and hence has probably not said them); (b) if they are
improbable (e.g., Caius fears that he may have omitted Sext, although
he recalls going to choir to chant at the regular times.)

665. Fears against an opinion are important, when they are not merely
possible, but have such an appearance of truth that even a prudent man
would consider them as worthy of support.

(a) Intrinsic signs of this solid probability are the good arguments by
which the fear, or contrary of an opinion, is supported. Example: Titus
after careful examination of conscience decides that he is not obliged
to mention a theft in confession, because it happened just before his
last confession; yet, he fears that he is obliged, because he does not
remember having thought of restitution.

(b) Extrinsic signs of solid probability are the good authorities by
whom the contrary of the opinion is defended. Example: Caius opines
that he is not obliged to confess a calumny, because he is not certain
that it is unconfessed; he fears that he is obliged, because St.
Alphonsus, whose authority is great in Moral Theology, teaches that a
grave sin must be confessed unless it is certain that it has been
confessed already.

666. He who is moved by unimportant fears or difficulties is
scrupulous, but not so he who hesitates in the face of an important
difficulty. Examples: Balbus fears he may be guilty of murder, because
he left a sick person for a moment and the latter unexpectedly died in
his absence (scrupulous conscience). Sempronius fears he may be bound
to restitution, because by his ridicule he made Titus lose his means of
livelihood (disturbed conscience).

667. What is to be done by one who holds an opinion as to what he may
or may not do here and now, but who has a serious fear that his opinion
is wrong?

(a) If the fear persists as serious, when the means to remove it (such
as consideration and consultation) have been duly resorted to, he
should delay, if this is possible, or follow the safer course, if delay
is not possible. Example: Titus must go to confession now, but he
cannot recall whether or not a past theft was ever confessed; he thinks
he is not obliged to mention it now, but is far from feeling certain
about this, because of a serious doubt which he cannot resolve. The
thing for him to do is to resolve to confess the theft as one that was
perhaps unconfessed before.

(b) If the fear is removed or made unimportant, by direct means (such
as theological argument from moral principles) or by indirect means
(such as consultation or the use of reflex principles), the opinion may
be followed. Example: If Titus, mentioned above, learns from his
confessor or deduces from reliable reflex principles that he is not
obliged to confess the theft, he may act with a safe conscience in
following this decision.

668. The authority that may be safely followed by a lay person who
holds an opinion, but fears that the opposite may be true, is that of
anyone whom he knows to be pious, instructed and prudent; for, as it is
impossible for him either to settle the question for himself or to
remain in perpetual uncertainty, he must acquire certainty here as in
other important affairs by consulting those who are expert and
reliable. Hence, if the conscience is merely opinionative, a dependable
adviser should be conferred with to make it certain.

(a) In the case of an accusing or excusing conscience, it is at least
advisable that the doubtful sin be mentioned in confession, and
especially by those who are not strict in their lives and who are
inclined to judge their own acts and motives with leniency.

(b) In case of a forbidding or permitting conscience, it is necessary
that one seek reliable information where it can be had, as from parents
or teachers, and if these cannot give it, from a pastor or confessor or
other priest. Example: Sempronius thinks he has a right to drink a
glass of wine now and then to be sociable; but he fears he has no right
to do so, as the drink occasions excitement or foolish remarks, and
sometimes makes it difficult for him to get to his home safely.

669. The authority that may be safely followed by confessors and other
priests in resolving important doubts against a moral judgment is as
follows:

(a) If the opinion is supported as morally certain by all or nearly all
of the approved text-books on moral teaching, it may be followed; for
surely there would not be such unanimity, if the objections were really
formidable.

(b) If the opinion is supported as morally certain by a goodly number
(say, six or seven) of those who are considered as preeminent in Moral
Theology, and who independently arrived at the same conclusion, it may
be followed; for the judgment of many is better than that of one, and
the certainty of authorities should prevail over the doubt of one who
has not the same authority.

(c) If the opinion has the support as certain of only one theologian,
it may be followed without further investigation, if he has received
special mention from the Church as an authority and a safe guide. Thus,
the Holy See has expressly declared that the doctrine of St. Alphonsus
may be safely followed by confessors, and the approbation given to St.
Thomas Aquinas as Universal Doctor makes his word more convincing than
a contrary argument based on one’s own reasoning. Of course, this does
not mean that these or any other private Doctors are infallible in
their judgments, or that one should not depart from their teaching in a
point where the Church has decided against them, or where there is a
manifest reason for doing so; it simply means that they are so
conspicuous among moralists for the correctness of their teaching that
one who is in doubt may safely follow them unless the contrary is known
to him.

670. But one may be unable to settle one’s difficulty by appeal to
authority, as such, as in the following instances: (a) when the
particular case to be decided is not considered at all in text-books,
or is not considered under the circumstances that exist; (b) when the
authorities speak hesitatingly about the question, and say that the
opinion in question is at most probable, etc.; (c) when the authorities
are about equally divided, as when a few great names are opposed to
many names of inferior rank, or when those who are equal in knowledge
so disagree that half are on one side, half on the other. In counting
authorities, however, it is not always easy to decide who should be
included, as a writer may himself be arguing from the authority of an
individual or of a school, and thus he is not a distinct witness in
favor of what he holds.

671. When a priest or other person sufficiently instructed in theology
is not able to change through recourse to authority an opinionative or
doubtful conscience into a certain conscience, he can still obtain
certitude: (a) directly, by reexamining the question diligently and
with entire impartiality, until he has discovered reasons strong enough
to settle it convincingly one way or the other; (b) indirectly, by
submitting the question to the arbitrament of a reflex principle that
really appears true to him, and permitting it to decide between the
opinion and the objection, or between the contending doubts.

672. The Moral Systems.--There are two general systems regarding reflex
moral principles:

(a) Tutiorism, which teaches that the only principle which can change
uncertainty into certainty is: “When one is undecided between the safer
and the less safe, he must always choose the safer,” because only what
is safer excludes the uncertainty of sinning;

(b) Anti-tutiorism, which teaches that the principle given above is
true in a few exceptional cases on account of special reasons, but
untrue as a rule. The general principle which it substitutes for that
of Tutiorism is: “When one is undecided between the safer and the less
safe, one may choose the less safe if it is morally certain.”

673. Of two moral judgments that are compared, it must be noted:

(a) that one is safer which departs more from the danger of sin by
deciding for the stricter side. Example: In doubt whether a law exists,
whether it obliges in a present case, whether its obligation is grave,
the safer opinion is that which holds for the affirmative;

(b) that moral judgment is more likely which is supported by stronger
arguments. Example: That a law has ceased, or does not apply in a
certain case, or does not oblige under sin, is a more likely opinion if
the arguments in its favor outweigh those against it.

674. Thus, it may happen that an opinion which is safer is less likely.
Example: The opinion that the precept of repentance obliges under pain
of new sin from the moment a sin is committed is safer, but less likely
than the opposite opinion.

675. Danger of sin is twofold. (a) Danger of formal sin (see 249, 258)
is a risk taken which involves, not only that an act may be unlawful,
but that the doing of it may be unlawful. Example: Caius eats meat,
doubting whether the day is one of abstinence and whether he is obliged
to abstain or not. (b) Danger of material sin (see 249, 258) is the
danger that an act may be unlawful, not in the concrete or as to its
performance, but in the abstract as to itself. Example: Titus is unable
to discover whether this is a day of abstinence, but he is of the
opinion that it is not. Hence, he takes meat, arguing that, while this
may be a violation of the law, he himself is not guilty of sin, since
he feels that he has a right to eat meat under the circumstances.

676. Tutiorism.--This system has been condemned by the Church, and with
good reason, for the following motives:

(a) If by that which is safer, Tutiorism intends that which is better,
it contradicts the Gospel, which distinguishes between counsel and
precept (see 364 sqq.), commanding what is good, but only recommending
what is better.

(b) If by that which is safer Tutiorism means that which favors law
against liberty, it imposes an intolerable yoke on the consciences of
men; for, while law obliges only in so far as it is promulgated and
known, Tutiorism would bind one to observe, not only what was not known
to be obligatory, but what was held to be most probably not obligatory.

677. A modified form of Tutiorism taught: “When one is undecided
between the safer and the less safe, one must choose the safer, unless
the less safe is most probable.” This system has not been censured by
the Church, but Catholic theologians with hardly an exception have
rejected it, for the following reasons:

(a) Most probable, as understood by the defenders of this system, is
that which has such likelihood and such appearance of truth as to
remove every probable danger of even material sin. Thus, in reality
this system requires absolute certitude and agrees with the rigorous
tenet of Tutiorism that even a most probable opinion against the law
may not be followed.

(b) Most probable, as commonly understood, is that side of a question
which so far excels the other side that no answer can be given to any
of its arguments, while all the arguments of the other side can be
answered. To require this in moral difficulties is to require the
impossible, for even the greatest theologians have to be content at
times with less.

678. We are obliged always to follow a safe course, that is, not to
expose ourselves to the danger of formal sin (see 249, 258); but
Tutiorism errs when it teaches that we are also obliged always to
follow the safer or safest course, that is, never to expose ourselves
even to the danger of material sin. There are cases, however, when we
are obliged (because some law requires it) to follow a safer course,
that is, not to expose ourselves or others to some great harm. Thus, we
must follow the safer side in the following cases:

(a) when there is question concerning something essential for the
salvation of ourselves or of others, for the law of charity forbids
that any risk be taken in this supremely important matter. Example:
Titus instructs the dying Caius only concerning the existence of God
and of the future life. He should also instruct him about the Trinity
and the Incarnation, which is the safer course, since it is more
probable that an explicit faith in these two mysteries is a condition
of salvation;

(b) when there is question of some great spiritual loss or gain for
ourselves or others, for justice or charity forbids that we take
chances in such affairs. Examples: Sempronia doubts whether she is
excused from the law of abstinence, and whether she will be guilty of
sin if she eats meat. Caius doubts whether attendance at a certain
school will do harm to the religion of his son. Balba doubts whether
she is bound to inquire about the truth of her sect. As long as their
serious doubts remain, these persons should follow the safer course;

(c) when there is question of the validity or invalidity of a
Sacrament, for the virtue of religion requires that the Sacraments be
administered with fidelity, and be not exposed to the peril of nullity.
Example: It is not lawful to consecrate matter that has probably been
substantially adulterated;

(d) when there is question of some temporal good or evil to oneself or
another, and one is certainly obliged to promote the former or prevent
the latter. Examples: Caius suspects that a drink before him is deadly
poison; Titus suspects that an object at which he is preparing to shoot
is a human being. Neither may disregard his suspicion, even if its
contrary is more probable, because the safer side must here be taken.
The Fifth Commandment forbids one needlessly to imperil one’s own or
another’s life.

679. In emergency one may expose a Sacrament to nullity by taking a
course that is less safe for the Sacrament, but safer for the subject,
relying on the axiom that the Sacraments are for men, and not men for
the Sacraments. Example: Titus is called to baptize the dying Caius. No
water can be procured except rose water, whose sufficiency is doubtful.
Titus not only may, but should, use the doubtful matter, since no other
can be had.

680. Laxism.--The extreme opposite of Tutiorism is Laxism, whose
principle is: “When one is undecided between the safer and the less
safe, one may choose the less safe, if it is only slightly or
uncertainly probable,” because whatever seems at all probable may be
prudently followed, and so forms a certain conscience. Example:
According to Laxism, one would be justified in following an opinion,
because it was defended by one theologian, even though he was of little
authority.

681. This system has been condemned by the Church for the following
reasons:

(a) It is contrary to the teaching of the Gospels and of the Fathers,
which requires one to observe the laws of God with understanding and
diligence;

(b) It leads to corruption of morals. The Laxists of the seventeenth
century were called in derision those “who take away the sins of the
world,” and it was against their loose teachings that Pascal inveighed;

(c) Its argument is of no value, for no prudent person would feel that
he should follow what was only slightly above the improbable, or that a
law should be deemed uncertain because an opinion of uncertain
probability could be quoted against it.

682. The true system of reflex principles will lie between the extremes
of Tutiorism and Laxism. As already said, these two doctrines have been
censured by the Church; but there are other systems that are moderate,
and that are permitted by the Church and defended by theologians. These
systems are:

(a) Probabiliorism, whose principle is: “When one is undecided between
the safer and the less safe, one may choose the less safc only when it
is more probable”;

(b) Equiprobabilism, whose doctrine is: “When one is undecided between
the safer and the less safe, one may choose the less safe only when it
affirms the non-existence of the law, and is at least equally probable
with the opposite”;

(c) Probabilism, whose doctrine is: “When one is undecided between the
safer and the less safe, one may choose the less safe whenever it is
certainly and solidly probable”;

(d) Compensationism, whose doctrine is: “When one is undecided between
the safer and the less safe, one may choose the less safe whenever it
is certainly and solidly probable, and there is a proportionate reason
to compensate for the risk taken.”

683. Probabiliorism.--The arguments in favor of Probabiliorism are as
follows:

(a) extrinsic or from authority. This system is more ancient, and, when
the controversy over systems began in the seventeenth century, this was
the one that was most favored by the Church and theologians;

(b) intrinsic and direct. An essential note of certitude is that it
should exclude all doubt, for as long as doubt remains there is only
opinion. But one who is undecided cannot exclude all doubt, unless the
arguments against the doubts not only balance, but outweigh the latter
(i.e., unless one has greater probability on one’s side). Hence, he who
acts against the safer, which is always certain enough, when his own
opinion is not more probable, acts with an uncertain conscience;

(c) intrinsic and indirect. In all other matters a man is not prudent
if he assents to that which is less safe and less probable. Thus, in
things speculative no scholar would think of accepting a theory which
to his knowledge was further removed from the truth; in things
practical no man of common sense would prefer a road that seemed less
likely to lead to his destination. But we should not be less prudent
about the good than we are about the true and the useful. Hence, in
doubt we should always decide in favor of the law, unless the arguments
for liberty are more convincing.

684. The answers given to the above arguments are:

(a) Probabiliorism is not more ancient as a system, since none of the
moral systems were formulated before the sixteenth century; if
Patristic and medieval authorities can be quoted who decided cases
probabilioristically, others who were contemporary can be named who
decided according to milder principles. Moreover, the passages cited
are frequently obscure, and do not necessarily bear a Probabilioristic
sense. That Probabiliorism enjoyed more favor at the beginning of the
controversy is not wonderful, since other systems were more or less
identified with Laxism, and the question at issue had not been studied
thoroughly. Today Probabiliorism has few defenders.

(b) That which is more probable by far, or most probable, does overcome
all doubt, and is even speculatively certain; but he who would require
the more probable in this sense does not differ from the Tutiorists
spoken of above. That which is more probable, but not to a notable
extent, does not exclude all doubt, for the very definition of the more
probable is “that judgment which appears more likely to be true than
another, but which does not exclude all fear that the other may be
true.” Hence, if Probabiliorism calls for the notably more probable, it
does not differ from Tutiorism; if it calls for the moderately more
probable, it wrongly claims that there is no probability on the
opposite side.

(c) The true is that which is in harmony with facts, the useful that
which conduces to the obtaining of an end, the good that which is in
conformity with law. Certainly, a man is not a prudent seeker of truth
if he arbitrarily prefers the less to the more true-seeming, nor a
prudent seeker of the useful if he chooses the less safe way of
obtaining what is a necessary end; but a man can be a prudent seeker of
the good, even though he prefers the less safe and less probable, when
the law itself, the norm of good, does not demand more from him. Hence,
one who makes a judgment according to the anti-Probabiliorist systems
does not feel that he is yielding assent to what is speculatively less
probable; but that he is making a decision that is practically certain;
not that he is choosing a perilous way, but one that is absolutely safe.

685. Arguments against Probabiliorism.--(a) Theoretical Objection.--The
principle of Probabiliorism that it is lawful to act against the safer
side when the less safe side is more probable, cannot be justified
except on the ground that invincible ignorance of obligation exists,
and hence that the law does not oblige. But the same argument can be
used in favor of milder systems; for even if the less safe side is only
probable, it makes one invincibly ignorant that one is obliged. Hence,
the basis of Probabiliorism is fatal to its own claims.

(b) Practical Objection.--A system for the direction of conscience
should be so simple that it can be easily applied in the everyday
affairs of life. Abstract questions may receive attention from
moralists for days and months, but concrete cases have to be decided as
a rule without delay. But Probabiliorism is such a complicated system
that it is unsuited to everyday life. St. Alphonsus declares that he
found by the experience of many years that this system cannot be
profitably used in the guidance of souls, for it imposes an intolerable
burden on both confessors and penitents. And how few are so skilled as
to be able to decide quickly, without scruples, and correctly about the
relative degrees of probability in opposite opinions!

686. Answers of the Probabiliorists.--(a) A probable opinion against
the existence of obligation does not create invincible ignorance, but
only doubt; nor does a more probable opinion against obligation create
invincible ignorance, since it excludes the less probable opinion for
obligation, and makes one assent unwaveringly and in good faith, even
though erroneously, to the judgment that one is not bound.

(b) It is no more difficult to decide what is more probable than to
decide what is equally probable, or truly and solidly probable; nor is
the same skill and attention expected in all persons and cases, but
each person must judge according to the best light he has, and each
case must receive the measure of attention its importance calls for. If
Probabiliorists may become scrupulous, may not Probabilists become lax?

687. The debate between Probabiliorism and its adversaries is not often
heard today, as most modern moralists give their allegiance either to
Equiprobabilism (a modified Probabiliorism) or to Probabilism.

688. Equiprobabilism.--The doctrine of Equiprobabilism is a middle way
between Probabiliorism and Probabilism. Thus: (a) it agrees with
Probabiliorism in holding that it is not lawful to follow the less
safe, if the safer is more probable, or if the safer is equally
probable, and the question is about the cessation of the law; (b) it
agrees with Probabilism in holding that it is lawful to follow the less
safe, if the safer is only equally probable, and the question is about
the existence of the law.

689. The principle that “it is not lawful to follow the less safe, if
the safer is equally probable and the question is about the cessation
of the law,” is defended as follows by Equiprobabilists:

(a) In real doubt we should decide in favor of that side which is
possession. But, when doubt is about the cessation of a law, the law is
in possession; for there is no question that it was made. Therefore, in
such a doubt we should decide for the safer side, that is, that the law
has not ceased.

(b) A certain obligation is not complied with by a doubtful
fulfillment. But doubts about the cessation of the obligation of law
usually arise from a probability that one has already fulfilled the
law. Therefore in such cases we should decide that the law has not been
fulfilled--that is, that its obligation has not ceased.

690. The Probabilists reply that: (a) it is not true that, in
equiprobability about the cessation of law, the law is in possession;
for liberty is naturally prior to law, and hence has possession in
doubt; (b) nor is it true that an obligation that has probably been
complied with or removed is certain.

691. The Equiprobabilists answer: (a) liberty was in possession, until
it was dispossessed by the making of the law; (b) an obligation that
certainly existed must be held as certainly in existence, until the
contrary is proved; whereas a fact, such as dispensation, abrogation,
or fulfillment, is not proved if it is only probable.

692. The principle that “it is lawful to follow the less safe side, if
the safer is only equally probable and the question is about the
existence of the law,” is defended as follows by Equiprobabilists:

(a) In real doubt we should favor the side that is in possession. But
when doubt is about the existence of a law, liberty is in possession;
for liberty is prior to law. Therefore, in such doubt we may decide
that there is no obligation.

(b) An uncertain law does not oblige, if one is invincibly ignorant of
its existence. But, when there are equiprobable reasons against the
existence of a law, one is invincibly ignorant of its existence.
Therefore, in such cases one is not obliged.

693. The principle that “it is not lawful to follow the less safe side
if the safer side is more probable,” is defended as follows by
Equiprobabilists:

(a) In doubt improperly so called--that is, in that condition of mind
in which there is no fluctuation between equal arguments, but only some
indecision between the more and the less probable--we should decide in
favor of the more probable, as being morally certain. Hence, it is not
lawful to follow what is less safe and less probable.

(b) A law sufficiently promulgated obliges. But, when it is more
probable that a law was made or is in force, such law is sufficiently
promulgated to the conscience. Hence, the safer side must be followed,
if it is more probable.

694. Probabilist Criticism of the Foregoing Arguments.

(a) If the excess of the more probable over the less probable is so
great that the latter is only slightly or doubtfully probable, the more
probable is equivalent to certitude; for certitude is assent without
fear of the opposite, and the fear of the opposite in such a case would
be so slight that it may be considered as non-existent. If the excess
is not so great, the less probable remains solidly and certainly
probable, and the more probable is not certitude, but opinion (that is,
assent with fear of the opposite). The Equiprobabilists are speaking of
greater probability in the second sense, and hence they are wrong when
they identify it with certitude (see above, 654).

(b) A law must be so promulgated to the conscience that one knows the
law or could know it with sufficient diligence; it does not suffice
that one can get no further than opinion. It would be unreasonable to
oblige one to observe not only what is the law, but also what seems to
be the law. Now, he who has only more probable opinion that he is bound
by some law, does not know that such obligation exists; he only knows
that it seems to exist.

695. Reply of the Equiprobabilists.-(a) The more probable always
removes the appearance of truth from the less probable. Hence, he who
recognizes an opinion as more probable can assent to it without any
fear of error.

(b) One who holds it as more probable that he is obliged by a certain
law, does not know for certain that he is obliged by reason of that
law; but he does know for certain that he is obliged by reason of a
higher law. Superior to every particular law is the general law that
nothing may be done that will deprive law of its efficacy. But law
loses its efficacy if each one is free to decide that he is not bound
even when the greater weight of probability is to the contrary.

696. General Arguments in Favor of Equiprobabilism.--(a) From
Authority.--St. Alphonsus Liguori, who holds a unique place in the
Church as a moralist, preferred Equiprobabilism to every other moral
system; and his views are followed not only by his own Congregation,
the Redemptorists, but by many others.

(b) From Comparison with Other Systems.--Truth lies midway between
extremes; for truth is lost either by exaggeration or by defect. But
Equiprobabilism is a happy medium between Probabiliorism inclining to
Rigorism, and Probabilism inclining towards Laxism. Hence, the relation
of Equiprobabilism to other systems is in its favor.

(c) From the Character of Its Teaching.--According to principles of
justice universally admitted as true, a judge should pronounce sentence
in favor of the more probable when there is evidence of unequal weight
and in favor of that which is in possession when there is evidence of
equal weight. But these principles ought to be of universal
application. Therefore, Equiprobabilism does right in making these the
guiding principles for the court of conscience.

697. Probabilist Criticism of these Arguments.--(a) St. Alphonsus is
one of the greatest moral theologians of the Church. Whether in his
later years (1762-1787) he taught Equiprobabilism, is a matter of
dispute among those who are familiar with his writings. But there is no
doubt that in his mature age (1749-1762), when he wrote his Moral
Theology, he was a Probabilist.

(b) Probabilism can likewise claim that it stands midway between the
extremes of Rigorism (represented by Probabiliorism and
Equiprobabilism), on the one side, and of Laxism, on the other side.

(c) The principle of possession invoked by Equiprobabilism applies to
matters of justice, because there is a presumption that he who holds
property has a right to it, and also because human laws must favor him
who is in possession, lest property rights be left uncertain and
disputes be multiplied. The principle of possession does not apply,
however, to other matters; if the law obliged one yesterday, how can
that create a presumption that it obliges one today, if one has good
reasons for thinking the obligation has ceased? And as for human
ordinances, while they have jurisdiction over external goods and may
award them in case of doubt to the possessor, they have not, and have
never claimed, the right to make the principle of possession a rule for
solving all difficulties about duty.

The principle of Probabiliorism for which the Equiprobabilists claim
the authority of judicial practice certainly does not apply to criminal
cases, for in these preponderance of evidence against an accused is not
to be followed if there is a reasonable doubt. In civil cases judges
apply the principle of probabiliorism, but it does not follow that
conscience should do the same, for the circumstances are different. The
judge is seeking to decide which of two litigants has the more likely
claim, and hence he is bound to declare for the side that has stronger
evidence. Conscience is seeking to decide whether an obligation is
certain or uncertain, and hence it is not obliged to decide for
obligation when this is more probable, but still not certain.

698. Answer of Equiprobabilists to this Criticism.--(a) Granted that
St. Alphonsus once held Probabilism, he rejected it later emphatically,
and when dying declared that his former defense of Probabilism was the
only thing that gave him anxiety.

(b) Equiprobabilism is further removed from Rigorism than Probabilism
is from Laxism. It hears both sides of the question--that for liberty
and that for law--before it decides. Probabilism is satisfied to hear
one side, that for liberty; or at least it does not compare the two
sides.

(c) The principle of possession is applied more strictly in cases of
justice; for, since justice implies a more exact equality and a more
rigorous right than other virtues (see 154), disputes in matters of
justice demand stronger proofs. But every virtue renders to someone his
due, and hence there is no reason why principles applicable to justice
should not be applicable to other virtues also. The principle of
Probabiliorism, likewise, is just as applicable to the court of
conscience as to the civil court, since in both courts the aim is to
get the truth as nearly as possible.

699. General Arguments Against Equiprobabilism.--(a) Theoretical
Objection.--If we judge Equiprobabilism by its arguments, we find it
unconvincing, for that which is old in it does not agree with that
which is new, and that which is new argues equally well for
Probabilism. Thus, the old arguments for Probabiliorism mean in the
last analysis that the greater probability deprives the opposite side
of all solid probability; logically, then, one should conclude that
equal probability deprives both sides of all solid probability, since
one neutralizes the other. The new arguments are drawn from the
principles that in doubt one should decide in favor of the side in
possession, that a doubtful law does not oblige, etc.--all of which
principles, as we shall see, favor Probabilism.

(b) Practical Objection.--If we judge Equiprobabilism by its
adaptibility for use, we find it wanting. A moral system should be one
that can be easily understood and applied, otherwise it is unworkable
and useless. But Equiprobabilism is so complicated and abstruse that
even the professional theologians who hold it are often at a loss how
to apply it, and are found to give inconsistent decisions. How can it
be expected, then, that anyone else will be able to decide whether the
law or liberty is possession, whether the degree of probability on
one side is greater than or equal to that on the other, whether the
question has to do with the existence of the law or its cessation, etc.?

700. Replies of the Equiprobabilists.--(a) The old (i.e.,
probabilioristic) principles of Equiprobabilism are not contrary to the
new. A more probable opinion not only balances the opposition by its
equal arguments, and thus puts away doubt, but it also wins assent by
the surplus in its favor, and thus certitude is had. When the two
opposites are equally probable, there is a state of true doubt, but
certitude is had by recourse to the principles of possession and
doubtful law. These principles proper to Equiprobabilism do not favor
Probabilism, if one is impartial in one’s use of them, and willing to
use them against as well as for liberty.

(b) Equiprobabilism is not more difficult in its application than
Probabilism. It does not require that one determine minutely and
exactly the greater or equal probability of the arguments for law and
for liberty, or that one devote extraordinary diligence to the solution
of the problem. All it requires is that one consider the matter
seriously, weigh the arguments on both sides impartially, and decide to
the best of one’s ability which side appears to be more probable or to
have the presumption in its favor.

701. Probabilism.--The meaning of Probabilism can be seen from a
comparison with the opposite systems. (a) Unlike Probabiliorism and
Equiprobabilism, Probabilism does not require a greater or equal
probability, but permits one to follow what is less probable; (b)
unlike Laxism, it does not allow one to follow what is only slightly or
uncertainly probable, or to apply the system to all cases of doubt.

702. A judgment is probable when it is supported by arguments that make
it seem true, although there may remain reasons for doubt. Examples are
conclusions based on analogy, on hypothesis, on the opinions of others,
or on the calculus of probabilities.

703. Probability is of various kinds. (a) It is absolute or relative,
according as the supporting reasons are grave, either when considered
alone, or when compared with the objections. Even the Probabiliorists
admit that an opinion that is merely probable may be followed, if it is
solidly probable and there is no argument against it (see 649). (b) We
have solid or slight probability, according as the supporting motives
are or are not such as would move, if not convince, a prudent man--that
is, a man who shows good judgment in most things. (c) We have certain
or uncertain probability, according as a person is sure or not, after
reasonable consideration, that the arguments seem valid and the opinion
likely. (d) Probability is internal or external, according as the
arguments are drawn from the matter at issue itself (i.e., from its
nature, properties, causes, effects, etc.) or from the authority of the
doctors who have defended an opinion.

704. Relative probability according to logicians remains even when a
lesser is compared with a greater probability. (a) If the opposing
arguments are drawn from different sources, the more probable does not
attack the less probable, and hence does not weaken its probability.
Example: An intrinsic argument has more weight than a mere appeal to
authority, but it does not attack the opposite argument, and hence does
not diminish its probability. (b) If the opposing arguments are drawn
from the same source, each one weakens the opposite, since there is
direct opposition. But the more probable does not destroy the less
probable, since, in spite of the greater appearance of truth on the one
side, there still remains room for the possibility that the other side
may be true.

705. A moral judgment is solidly probable when the following conditions
are present:

(a) For the judgment there must be an intrinsic or extrinsic argument
that would be considered weighty by a prudent man. Example: An opinion
that has the support of a universally acknowledged authority is
strongly probable, whereas, if it has only the support of one obscure
writer, it is only slightly probable.

(b) Against the judgment there must be no decisive argument from
authority or reason. Example; The judgment that a certain course of
action is lawful because St. Alphonsus permits it, is ordinarily
solidly probable; it is not probable, however, if the opinion of St.
Alphonsus (e.g., that Catholics may act as sponsors in non-Catholic
baptisms) has been disallowed by the Church, or if the argument he uses
(e.g., that concerning the amount that constitutes grave matter in
theft, which reasons from conditions in his day) is not strong.

(c) The arguments for the judgment must retain their probability, if
they are set over against the arguments for the opposite. Manifestly,
if the arguments are all satisfactorily answered by the opposite side,
the judgment based on them ceases to retain the appearance of truth.
Probabilism does not require, however, that one determine the relative
degrees of probability in opposite opinions.

706. It is not sufficient according to the Probabilists that another be
certain of the probability of an opinion; but the person who follows
the opinion must himself be certain that it is solidly probable.

707. Regarding the kind of authority necessary to make an opinion
solidly probable from external evidence, Probabilism teaches:

(a) that absolute probability (that is, such a weight of authority as
would appear strong even to the most learned) ought to be estimated by
quality rather than quantity--by the learning, prudence, impartiality,
and independent study of the authors, rather than by their numbers. If
five distinguished moralists arrive by separate study at the same
conclusion (i.e., that an opinion is probable), or if one of special
reputation in a matter under question supports the probability of an
opinion, the argument from authority is strong;

(b) that relative probability (that is, such a weight of authority as
suffices for one who is unlearned, such as a child, a halfwit, an
uneducated person) is had sufficiently through the word of only one
person who is looked up to as a guide or instructor, such as a parent,
confessor, or teacher.

708. Probabilism supposes that one regards the opinion one follows as
truly probable, and that one is convinced that it is lawful to follow
such an opinion. Hence, the system does not apply in certain cases.

(a) It does not apply to cases in which there is no probability on
either side--that is, to cases of negative doubt (see 656 sqq.),
whether the doubt be of law or of fact.

(b) Probabilism does not apply to cases in which there is only slight
or uncertain probability for the less safe side. Example: Caius has
heard that a certain novel opinion is defended by a recent author, but
he is uncertain of the author’s standing as a theologian, and he
realizes that the fact that a man has written a book does not make his
ideas solidly probable.

(c) Probabilism does not apply to cases in which there is solid
probability for the less safe side, but one doubts whether one can
lawfully follow it; for it is always sinful to act with a doubtful
conscience (see 641 sqq.). Example: Caius has read in a reliable work
of theology that a person in certain circumstances, which are his own,
is probably excused from Mass. But the word “probably” makes him
uncertain whether he can follow this opinion.

709. For the above-mentioned cases, to which their principle does not
apply, Probabilists refer to the rules for a doubtful conscience (see
656 sqq.). The following special rules are given for cases of negative
doubt:

(a) If the doubt is one of law and insoluble, one is free to act; for
it is a general principle that an act may be considered lawful, as long
as there is no serious reason to the contrary. Example: Sempronius goes
out into the country on Sunday afternoon. An opportunity to fish
presents itself, but Sempronius begins to doubt whether there is or is
not a church law against fishing on Sundays. As no argument for either
side is known to him, he may act on the general principle that what is
not forbidden is lawful.

(b) If the doubt is one of fact and insoluble, and a prohibitory law is
involved, one is free to act; for it is commonly admitted that
legislators do not intend their prohibitions, which are restrictions of
liberty, to be interpreted with the utmost rigor. Example: Titus is
eating a chicken dinner late on Thursday night when his watch stops. As
he has no way of discovering the time, he does not know whether Friday
or the end of the dinner will arrive first. He may continue the meal,
making no undue delays.

(c) If the doubt is one of fact, and a preceptive law is in question,
one must take reasonable precautions to settle the doubt; for the
lawgiver wills that those who are subject to the law should make use of
the ordinary means to learn the facts on which obligation depends (see
above, 384). If the doubt remains insoluble, one may decide in favor of
liberty; for it may reasonably be presumed that the legislator does not
intend to obligate those whose obligation remains uncertain. Example:
Caius doubts whether he has reached the age of sixty, when the
obligation of fasting ends. He should try to discover his real age;
but, if he can find no real proofs either for or against the age of
sixty, he may decide in favor of sixty, if there are some indications
that he is of that age.

710. The solutions given above for cases of negative doubt suppose that
there is no other or higher law that forbids one to take the risk of
deciding in favor of liberty. Hence, in the following instances one
must decide against liberty:

(a) in negative doubts when the validity of acts is at stake. Example:
Titus is uncertain whether the law requires the age of fourteen for a
valid contract of marriage; he is also uncertain whether he is fourteen
years old. The doubt of law and of fact does not excuse Titus from the
law, if he wishes to marry. He must clear up the doubts, and if
necessary he must secure a dispensation.

(b) in negative doubts when reasons of charity or justice forbid one to
take risks. Example: Caius is uncertain whether he paid Sempronius for
work done for him. He is bound to make inquiries about the matter.

711. Probabilism cannot be applied, therefore, when the mental state of
the subject is doubt, weakly founded opinion, or practical uncertainty.
But, even when one holds an opinion as solidly and certainly probable,
one may not follow it as a moral guide, if there is something in the
nature of the object or matter itself which forbids this.

(a) A probability of law favoring liberty may not be followed in those
matters in which some natural, divine or human law requires one to
follow the safer side (see cases enumerated above, 678, 661). Example:
The following opinions are probable; that instruction regarding the
Trinity and the Incarnation is not indispensable for salvation; that
rye-bread is valid matter for the Eucharist. But in practice it would
be unlawful to take the risk of following these opinions, except in
cases of extreme necessity, when nothing else can be done.

(b) A probability of fact favoring liberty may not be followed so long
as there remains nothing more than probability of fact; for, while the
will of the lawgiver may on account of probability of non-obligation
change one’s relation to the law from obligation to non-obligation, it
does not change facts. Examples: On Friday Titus doubts whether a dish
before him is meat or fish; probably it is meat on account of its
appearance, probably it is fish on account of its odor. At night Fr.
Caius is much fatigued, and doubts whether he has said Vespers.
Probably he did not, because he cannot recall what feast will be
celebrated tomorrow; probably he did, because he remembers having said
Compline.

712. For probabilities of fact, to which as such their system does not
apply, Probabilists offer the following solutions:

(a) In certain cases one may take from the doubt of fact its bearing on
obligation, by recourse to the manifest will of the legislator as
declared in the law itself or expressed through dispensation. Examples:
While hearing confessions, Sempronius doubts whether his jurisdiction
has already expired. He cannot recall the date of expiration, but,
thinking the matter over, he sees that probably the date has not
arrived. His difficulty is therefore solved, for the Code (Canon 209)
supplies jurisdiction in cases of probability of fact. Titus and Caia
wish to marry. There is a doubt whether or not they are first cousins,
but it seems that probably they are not so related. Their difficulty is
solved by obtaining a dispensation.

(b) In other cases one may change the probability of fact into a
probability of law by recourse to a probable opinion or argument that
under the existing doubt of fact the legislator does not wish the law
to oblige. Examples: Titus, who has what is probably lawful food before
him, argues with himself that it is not likely that the Church wills to
put him to the expense, trouble, and loss of time required to order
other food. Fr. Titus, who has probably said Vespers, argues that
theologians of authority teach that, when there is a serious reason for
thinking one has performed such an obligation, it may be presumed that
the Church does not require more.

713. If a case of probability of fact on which obligation hinges cannot
be solved by recourse to the expressed or inferred will of the
lawgiver, one has no choice but to follow the safer side, for then,
though it is probable that a certain thing is a fact, it is not
probable that one has a right to act. Example: Sempronius, while
hunting, sees an object moving in the bushes. The probabilities are
that it is not a human being, but it is not probable that Sempronius
has the right to risk homicide by firing at it.

714. Not all Probabilists use the principle of the presumptive will of
the lawgiver for all cases of negative doubt; some employ different
principles for different kinds of doubt, and sometimes arrive at other
decisions than those given in the preceding paragraphs. Thus, they give
such rules as the following:

(a) In negative doubt of law regarding the lawfulness of an act, use
the principle that law or liberty should be followed according as one
or the other is in possession (see 660). Example: He who has only
slight reasons for thinking that a law exists, or that it is of grave
obligation, or that it extends to his case, etc., may decide against
the law. But he who has only slight reasons for thinking that a law has
been abrogated, or that a dispensation has been granted, etc., must
decide for obligation.

(b) In negative doubt of law regarding the validity of a past act, use
the principle _that what was done is to be held as rightly done_.
Example: He who has no reasons, or only trifling ones, for thinking
that a Sacrament was not administered validly or received validly,
should decide for validity.

(c) In negative doubts of fact, use the principles that one should
judge according to what usually happens, or that facts must not be
taken for granted but must be established, or that presumption favors
that which has possession. Examples: If there is no good reason to
think that a conscientious person gave consent to a temptation, one may
decide for the negative, since that would usually be true. If there is
no good reason to think that one has made a vow, one may decide for the
negative, since the burden of proof is with the other side. If, in a
question about fast and abstinence, it is uncertain whether or not a
person has reached twenty-one years, or whether Friday has commenced,
the presumption is for the negative, since liberty has been in
possession; but if it is uncertain whether a person has reached the age
of sixty or whether Friday has ended, the presumption is for the
negative, since the law has been in possession.

715. Having discussed the cases to which Probabilism is not extended,
we pass on to the cases to which it is applied. Probabilism is used in
any and every case where speculative certainty as to what is lawful or
unlawful is not had, but where there is only speculative probability
against an opposite probability.

(a) Probabilism is used not only in probability of law, but also in
probability of fact that can be reduced to probability of law, as was
explained above (see 712).

(b) Probabilism is used in probability of law, whether or not the
question be about the existence or the cessation of the law. There is
probability against existence of law, when one has good reason to think
that a law was not made or not promulgated, or that the time when it
goes into force has not arrived, or that it does not apply to certain
persons or circumstances, etc.; there is probability for cessation of
law, when it is certain that a law did exist, but one has good reason
to think that it ceased or was abrogated, that one is excused or
dispensed from it.

(c) Probabilism is used in probability of law, whether the law in
question be natural, divine or human--that is, in every case of law
where invincible ignorance is possible (see 319 sqq., 356).

716. The claim of Probabilism is that, in all the cases given above, he
who follows an opinion excusing him from obligation, may act with a
practically certain conscience and be free of all moral guilt, if the
opinion is theoretically and seriously probable. The arguments for this
thesis are of two kinds: (a) extrinsic proofs, from the approval given
Probabilism by the Church and the favor it has enjoyed among moralists;
(b) intrinsic proofs, from the nature of law and obligation, and the
superiority of Probabilism in practice.

717. Extrinsic Arguments.--(a) The Church gave explicit approval to
Probabilism by praising the theological works of St. Alphonsus in which
Probabilism is defended; she gave and continues to give implicit
approval by the freedom she has granted to the teachers of this system
from the days of Bartholomew Medina, its first expounder (1527-1581),
down to the present. The Church even makes use of the principles of
Probabilism in interpreting her own laws, as is evidenced by such rules
of law as the following in the Decretals: “Things that are odious
should be understood strictly, things that are favorable widely” (Rule
15); “Where the law is doubtful, follow the minimum” (Rule 30); “Where
the lawgiver could have spoken more clearly, the interpretation should
be against him” (Rule 57); “The kinder interpretation should be given
penal laws” (Rule 89).

(b) In the Patristic and medieval periods Probabilism had not been
scientifically formulated, but many of the Fathers and early Doctors
solved cases probabilistically, and there are not a few passages in the
great theologians before the sixteenth century which enunciate the same
principles as those advocated by Probabilists. When the system was
formulated by Medina in 1577, it met with universal favor among
Catholic moralists, and, though it suffered an eclipse from the middle
of the seventeenth to the middle of the eighteenth century, it has been
growing in influence since the days of St. Alphonsus, and appears today
to have recovered its former preeminence. Among its adherents are some
of the greatest names in the history of theology, and it is not
confined to any particular school or body.

718. Objections of Equiprobabilists.--(a) The praise given to St.
Alphonsus by the Church reflects no glory on Probabilism, since the
Saint rejected Probabilism and professed Equiprobabilism. Further, more
than one Pope, and especially Innocent XI (1676-1689), has expressed a
dislike for Probabilism, while the silence of others does not mean more
than toleration. The legal axioms used by canonists apply to the
external forum, and cannot be used equally in the forum of conscience.
(b) Probabiliorism had the field before Probabilism, having been
formulated and defended before Medina appeared, and it is that more
ancient system that is represented today in a milder form as
Equiprobabilism.

719. Answer of the Probabilists.--(a) St. Alphonsus teaches Probabilism
in his Moral Theology, which is his chief work; if later, in his old
age, he was an Equiprobabilist, it can be shown that the change was not
free, but under compulsion. As to Pope Innocent XI, he is the only Pope
who expressed disapproval of Probabilism, and even he refrained from
any official pronouncement. The fact that hundreds of works written by
Probabilists since the sixteenth century have not been censured or
forbidden by the Church authorities, indicates more than mere
toleration.

(b) Probabiliorism, as a systematized method, preceded Probabilism as a
systematized method only by a brief interval, if at all. Before the
16th century neither of these systems had been formulated, and neither
can make much of the argument of priority in time. As for
Equiprobabilism, it is first seen in the writings of Christopher
Rassler (about 1713) and of Eusebius Amort (1692-1775).

720. Intrinsic Arguments for Probabilism.--(a) Theoretical
Argument.--An uncertain law does not oblige. But a law is uncertain if
there is a solidly probable opinion against its existence, or for its
cessation, even though the other side be equally or more probable.
Therefore, he who follows such an opinion does not violate any
obligation.

(b) Practical Argument.--Probabiliorism and Equiprobabilism impose on
confessors and the faithful impossible burdens, since, as was explained
above (see 683 sqq.), they require that one compare and weigh
probabilities, decide whether or not possession is had by the law or by
liberty, etc.; whereas Probabilism is simple and easily applied,
requiring only that one be convinced that one’s opinion is really
probable, and that one use it in good faith.

721. The proposition that an uncertain law does not oblige (saving
cases of validity, etc., as above, 678), is defended as follows:

(a) If the uncertainty arises from the law itself, because it has not
been clearly worded or sufficiently promulgated, the truth of the
proposition is manifest, for the very nature of law requires that it be
brought to the knowledge of those for whom it is made (see 285).

(b) If the uncertainty arises from the invincible ignorance of one who
is subject to the law, the proposition is true in the sense that no one
is a transgressor in the internal forum who fails against a law
unwittingly (see 327, 489 sqq.). But an act that transgresses no law is
lawful in conscience, for all that is not forbidden is lawful.

722. The adversaries of Probabilism offer the following criticism:

(a) As to the proposition that “an uncertain law does not oblige,” the
use of this principle by Probabilism may be considered as a begging of
the whole question; for what is in dispute is whether, in case a law is
uncertain, there is or is not a higher law that requires one to decide
for obligation. It can be shown, however, that there is such a higher
law; for the legislator cannot be willing that his ordinances be at the
mercy of every uncertainty or loophole which subtle minds can devise,
and God cannot be willing that those who are subject to laws should
expose themselves to sin by deciding against a law because it appears
to them to be of doubtful obligation.

(b) As to the proofs given for that proposition, they proceed from an
incomplete enumeration, for a law can be doubtful on account of
vincible ignorance, as well as for the reasons given. And no one will
maintain that vincible ignorance excuses.

723. The Probabilists reply: (a) The principle that “an uncertain law
does not oblige,” cannot render law nugatory, since there is question
here only of honest doubt, not of pretended or responsible ignorance.
Neither can that principle expose one to the danger of formal sin (see
249), since it is supposed that he who follows it is convinced that it
is true, and that he has the right to regulate his conduct by it. It
does expose to the danger of material sin (see 249), since the law
about which there is uncertainty may be existent; but we are not
obliged to avoid every danger of material sin, else we should be under
the intolerable necessity of fulfilling not only all certain, but all
uncertain duties. Moreover, the danger of material sin is not avoided
by any moral system except Tutiorism, since even equiprobable and more
probable opinions may be false.

(b) The enumeration of cases of doubtful law is sufficient; for, as
just remarked, only those cases are being considered in which one is
judging about one’s duty in good faith.

724. The second proposition used above as the Minor of the argument for
Probabilism--that “a law is uncertain whenever there is a solidly
probable opinion against its existence or for its cessation”--is
defended by the very definition of the term “uncertain.”

A thing is said to be accepted as certain when one yields it firm
assent and has no serious misgivings that it may be false; hence, the
uncertain is that which is not assented to firmly (the doubtful), or
that which does not exclude serious doubts about its truth (matter of
opinion). Now, a law whose existence or obligation seems likely, but
against which there militates a solidly probable argument, is not so
firmly established as to inhibit every prudent doubt. In other words,
such a law is uncertain.

725. Criticism of the Argument in the Preceding Paragraph.--(a) The
supposition on which the argument rests is false. It supposes that the
interpretation of the legal axiom that “a doubtful law does not
oblige,” should be drawn from the philosophical definition of the
terms, whereas it should be drawn from the sense given it by other
rules of law. Now, there are canonical rules which declare that in
doubt one should follow that which has possession, or that which seems
more probable. Hence, the axiom quoted by the Probabilists refers only
to cases of negative doubt; the other two rules refer to cases of doubt
in the wide sense, or to cases of opinion; otherwise, we should have to
admit that these legal maxims are contradictory, one to the other.
Thus, it appears that Probabilism is based on a principle formulated to
solve difficulties of an entirely different kind from those which the
system deals with.

(b) The argumentation itself is fallacious. It takes for granted that
an opinion is certainly and solidly probable, not only when it has no
opposite or when its opposite is less probable, but also when its
opposite is equally or more probable. This cannot be. Solid probability
on the other side of a question must create doubt about an opinion
held, and so make it at best uncertainly probable or probably probable;
while greater likelihood or presumption on the other side must make
one’s own opinion appear imprudent and unworthy of a rational being,
and therefore not solidly probable.

726. The Probabilists answer: (a) The two principles with reference to
doubtful law are understood and proved by Probabilism by an analysis of
the notions of obligation and incertitude (see 285, 654), and hence
they apply to every case that is restricted to the question of probable
lawfulness or unlawfulness.

The rules quoted against Probabilism--there are some that might also be
quoted against Probabiliorism and Equiprobabilism--are opposed to it
only in appearance, since they deal with matters that are outside its
sphere (see 697). Thus, in civil cases when both ownership and
possession are doubtful, the decision must be given for the more
probable side, since the issue is not what is lawful, but what seems to
be true. As to the principle of possession, it is not, as supposed,
unfavorable, but favorable to Probabilism; since liberty, inasmuch as
it is presupposed by obligation (for only those who have freedom can
receive obligation), has priority and must be given the benefit of the
doubt, whenever a strictly probable reason in its favor cannot be
refuted.

(b) Solid probability for the law creates doubt of the truth of the
opinion for liberty, but it does not create doubt of its probability;
for truth is the agreement of one’s judgment with the facts,
probability the appearance of such agreement on account of the
arguments by which the judgment is supported. Hence, greater
probability for law does not make uncertain the probability there is
for liberty. Neither is it a sign of imprudence to accept the less
probable, if one has sincerely and diligently sought the truth; for
even the more probable may not be true, and the great majority of
moralists hold that one is not obliged to follow it.

727. Criticism of the Pragmatic Test Offered by
Probabilists.--Probabilism boasts of the ease with which it can be used
(see 700, 720); but the ease with which it can be misused is greater
still.

(a) Persons not inclined to piety must quickly fall into Laxism, if
they make use of this system, for they will accustom themselves to find
every sort of pretext to escape unwelcome duties by raising doubts and
dignifying them with the name of probable opinions; they will follow,
now one opinion, now its contrary, according as it suits their
interests; they will become stubborn in their own views, and unwilling
to change or accept instruction.

(b) Persons inclined to piety, if guided by Probabilist principles,
will soon lose all interest in what is higher and better, and content
themselves with the minimum; for in every case of uncertainty
Probabilism permits one to choose what is less safe and less probable.

728. General Answer of the Probabilists to the Objections of the
Preceding Paragraph.--(a) The history of Probabilism contradicts these
objections. From its beginning to the present day it has been defended
and followed by men noted for piety, who used kindness towards others,
but were severe with themselves. While the principles of stricter
systems have proved a torture both to confessors and penitents, no
detriment to holiness is observed from the use of Probabilism.

(b) The nature of Probabilism refutes the objections in question. There
is no system so good that it may not be perverted and turned to evil,
and stricter systems have been converted into Tutiorism or Rigorism.
But the logical and usual results of Probabilism are not a lowering of
moral standards. If these evils follow it, they do so only when it is
not rightly understood or not rightly applied.

729. The charges of a tendency to Laxism are thus answered:

(a) Probabilism holds that only learned theologians are judges of
internal probability. Others must not decide for themselves, but must
seek instruction from their spiritual guides who have competent
knowledge. The moralists themselves must not be so wedded to their
opinions that they are not always ready to change when they find they
are wrong or learn that the Church does not admit their view.

(b) Probabilism permits one to use contrary probable opinions in
different instances (e.g., to use for one will or testament the opinion
that informality makes it invalid, and for another will the opinion
that informality does not make it invalid); but it does not permit
contrary opinions to be used in the same case for one’s advantage
(e.g., to use the opinion that an informal will is valid, in order to
secure an inheritance, and at the same time to use the opinion that it
is invalid, in order to escape the payment of legacies).

(c) Probabilism does not sanction the use of a probable opinion, unless
it has been examined without prejudice, and has been honestly judged to
be of certain and solid value (see 708 sqq.). Neither does it approve
of the conduct of those who put themselves voluntarily in a state of
doubt. On the contrary, it considers such conduct as sinful, and as
gravely so, if the matter be serious and if this occur frequently.
Example; Titus is uncertain whether three hours remain before Communion
time, and yet he takes some refreshment, and thus makes it doubtful
whether he has the right to receive Communion. The principle that a
doubtful law does not oblige will enable Titus to receive Communion,
but it does not excuse him from venial sin in putting himself without
cause in a state of doubt and in danger of material sin.

730. The charge of a tendency to minimism in spiritual matters is thus
answered: Probabilism deals only with what is lawful, not with what is
better; it aims to show only what one may do without sin, not what one
ought to do in order to become perfect. Hence, it is used when there is
question of imposing obligations, or of deciding whether a certain
course is lawful; for in these matters one must be kind, lest by
exceeding one’s authority one drive others to sin; but it is not used
when there is question of giving spiritual advice and direction, for
here all should be exhorted to seek after progress in holiness.

731. Compensationism.--Between 1850 and 1880 a number of theologians,
feeling that there were serious difficulties against all the systems up
to then considered, developed a reformed or restricted Probabilism,
which would not be open to the criticisms made against ordinary
Probabilism, and yet would have those good qualities that make it
preferable to the stricter systems. This new doctrine is called
Compensationism, because it permits one to follow a probable opinion
against the law only when there is present a sufficient reason to
compensate for this course of action.

732. The following rules are, therefore, given as restrictions on the
use of Probabilism: (a) the more serious or the more probable the
doubtful law, the greater the reason must be to justify one in acting
against it; (b) the higher and greater the good to be obtained from the
exercise of freedom against a doubtful law, the less the reason that
suffices for exercising freedom.

733. Illustrations of the Use of Compensationism.--(a) Titus, a poor
man, is in uncertainty, through no fault of his own, about two debts.
He thinks it more probable that he owes $10 to Sempronius, and 10 cents
to Caius; but he believes it is really probable that he has paid both
debts. He foresees that, if he offers the money to Sempronius, he will
be subjected to serious quarrels and vexations, or at least that very
bad use will be made of the money; while, if he offers to pay Caius,
the latter may take some slight offense. He decides that there are
proportionate reasons in each case to justify his following the less
probable opinion.

(b) Fr. Titus thinks that a penitent is more probably bound to ask
pardon of one whom he has offended. But he knows that, if he imposes
the obligation, the present good faith of the penitent will be changed
to bad faith, and he will refuse to do what is imposed. Fr. Titus
decides, therefore, that it will be more profitable for the penitent if
the less probable opinion--that there is no obligation--be followed.

734. The two chief arguments for Compensationism, which are also the
two chief objections it makes against ordinary Probabilism, are:

(a) The obligation of a law depends on the knowledge one has about it.
If one knows that the law exists, there is certain obligation; if one
knows that the law does not exist, there is no obligation; if one holds
it as probable that the law exists, there is probable obligation. Now,
since one may not be excused from obligation unless there is a reason
proportionate to the obligation itself (see 495), he who is under
probable or more probable obligation must have a graver reason for
using freedom than he who is under no obligation (against Probabilism),
but he need not have as grave a reason as one who is under a certain
obligation (against Probabiliorism). Hence, one may not act against a
probable law, unless by so doing there is some good secured that
compensates for the danger to which the right of the law is exposed.

(b) It is lawful to perform a good act from which an evil effect will
result, only if one has a proportionally grave cause for permitting the
evil effect (see 102 sqq.). But he who follows the opinion for liberty
against a more probable or equally probable opinion for law, performs
an act from which will probably result the evil of a material
transgression of law. Therefore, one may not use Probabilism unless by
so doing there is some good secured that compensates for the danger of
material sin to which one exposes oneself.

735. Criticisms from the Probabilists.--(a) The dictum that a doubtful
law obliges doubtfully cannot be applied, for in actual life there is
no middle way between decision for the law and decision for liberty,
unless it be indecision. The principle of Compensationism must mean,
then, that we must always decide for a doubtful law (which is
Tutiorism), or remain in suspense (which is no help to the one in
doubt).

(b) The supposition that there must always be some special reason of
good to offset the evil of the danger of material sin is not correct.
For there always exists a compensation proportionate to the danger,
namely, the exercise of liberty, a great gift of God, and the avoidance
of the burden of fulfilling all uncertain obligations.

736. Reply of the Compensationists.--(a) The principle that a doubtful
law obliges doubtfully means only that the reasons in favor of the law
deserve some consideration, and should not be put aside unless one has
some better reason than mere arbitrariness, self-will, or the intention
to take always the easier way. There is no question of either Tutiorism
or hesitation, but only of a prudent and honest facing of the fact that
there are two sides to one’s doubt.

(b) It is not true that the exercise of liberty and the escape from the
burden of uncertain obligations are always a sufficient compensation
for the danger of material sin. For material sin is not only an evil in
itself, as being a violation of law; it is also the source of many and
great evils both to the individual and society, such as wrong habits
acquired, scandal given, etc. Liberty is a great gift, but it should
not become a cloak for malice. Neither is the foregoing of liberty so
great an evil that one should not be willing to suffer it now and then
in order to prevent the greater evils spoken of just above.

737. Other Objections Against the System of Compensation.

(a) From Authority.--Compensationism is of very recent origin, and it
cannot be admitted that the right solution of moral difficulties was
unknown before this new system appeared.

(b) From Reason.--It runs counter to the principle commonly accepted in
the controversies of the systems, namely, that the decisive factor as
to obligation in doubt is knowledge. For it introduces a new factor,
that of sufficient reason or compensation.

(c) From Serviceability.--It is easy to say in the abstract that one
should always have a suitable reason for adopting a probable opinion in
favor of liberty. But, when one attempts to apply this rule to actual
cases, difficulties innumerable arise (searchings of motives, comparison
of probabilities, measuring of consequences, etc.), so that for use
Compensationism is impossible, or impracticable.

738. Reply of Compensationists.--(a) Compensationism is an example of
doctrinal progression from the implicit to the explicit. The principles
on which it is based are found in the teaching and practice of the most
ancient authorities.

(b) Sufficient reason is not a new principle, since it is admitted by
all moralists for the case of double effect (see above, 102 Sqq.); its
application to the solution of doubts of conscience is not an
innovation, since the cases of doubt and of double effect are analogous.

(c) Compensationism is not intended as a system to be applied by those
who have not sufficient theological training, but as a guide for
moralists, directors and confessors. That it is not difficult, is clear
from the fact that it is only an application of the commonly accepted
principle of double effect, and that Probabilists themselves recommend
it and make very general use of it, as if they instinctively recognized
its necessity.

739. Practical Conclusions.--From the foregoing discussions one may
deduce three rules for the guidance of those who are not expert
theologians:

(a) If your state of conscience is certitude (i.e., if you are firmly
convinced which way your duty lies), entertain no fears or scrupulous
doubts, and, having done your part to understand your obligations, you
need not hesitate to follow your conscience.

(b) If your state of conscience is imprudent assent (i.e., the
acceptance of what you recognize as unlikely), or if it is suspended
assent (i.e., a wavering between opposites), do not act blindly, but
seek truth and decision.

(c) If your state of conscience is opinion (i.e., the acceptance of
what you regard as likely though uncertain), consult your confessor or
another competent theologian; if there is no time for this, decide for
any course that seems true and prudent (see on perplexed conscience,
611 sqq.).

740. Regarding the respective merits and the use of the rival systems
of conscience, the following conclusions may be drawn:

(a) If there is question of what is to be counselled, one should be a
“Meliorist,” for the better and more perfect is more advisable than
what is merely good or lawful. All Christians should be directed to
aspire after holiness, but, if one is unwilling to follow a counsel, it
should not be imposed on him as a precept. Naturally, of those in
higher station higher things are required.

(b) As between doubt and certitude regarding obligations, one must be a
“Certitudinist,” that is, one must resolve doubts or slight
probabilities into direct or indirect certitude (as was explained above
in 641 sqq.). If a doubt remains, one must for that case be a
Tutiorist, that is, one must follow the safer side (as explained in
661).

(c) As between the safer and the less safe, one must be a Tutiorist,
when some law requires this, as is the case when validity or supreme
rights are at stake (as explained in 678, 679).

(d) As between the more likely and the less likely, one must be a
Probabiliorist, when this is according to law, as is the case in civil
suits where the preponderance of evidence must be followed (see 697).

(e) One may not follow either Tutiorism (see above, 676) as a general
moral system, nor Laxism (see above, 681).

(f) If a probable opinion for liberty is opposed by no contrary
probable opinion or by none whose arguments cannot be overcome, one is
free to follow that opinion, as explained in 649, 703.

(g) If a probable opinion for liberty is opposed by an opinion that is
less, equally or more probable, one is free to act according to the
principles of Probabiliorism, Equiprobabilism, Probabilism or
Compensationism, according to conviction.

741. As for the use of moral systems by confessors, the two following
rules are generally admitted:

(a) If a penitent has formed his conscience according to one moral
system, the confessor has no right to impose on him the opinion of a
different moral system; for the Church allows liberty.

(b) If a penitent has not formed his conscience according to any moral
system and seeks the answer to a moral doubt, the confessor should
decide, not necessarily for what his own system declares lawful, but
for what appears, all the circumstances being considered, to be most
advantageous spiritually for the penitent. Example: Fr. Titus is a
Probabilist, and he usually advises questioners to follow opinions that
are less probable; while Fr. Caius, who is a Probabiliorist, always
requires that such persons follow the more probable opinions. Both act
unwisely. For persons who are better disposed, it will often be more
profitable to follow what is more probable or favorable to obligation;
for those Whose dispositions are less good, milder opinions may be
recommended, lest the smoking flax of goodness that is in them be
entirely extinguished. Neither is it right to impose as certain an
obligation which the penitent, if he were acquainted with Moral
Theology, would see is controverted.

742. In case of disagreement between confessor and penitent as to
whether absolution may be given, whose opinion should prevail? (a) If
the disagreement is concerned with matters about which the confessor
himself has to judge (e.g., the disposition of the penitent, the
requisite matter for absolution, etc.), the opinion of the confessor
must prevail; for the act of judging is his own, and he must be guided
therefore by his own conviction.

(b) If the disagreement is concerned with matters about which the
confessor is not the judge (such as the controversies of schools and
theologians), the confessor may not refuse absolution to a
well-disposed penitent, just because the latter will not accept the
opinion of his school or system. If it be manifest that the penitent’s
opinion is false or improbable, absolution may be denied him, unless it
seems more prudent to leave him in good faith.




PART II

SPECIAL MORAL THEOLOGY

743. In the First Part of this work, the means to man’s Last End were
spoken of in a general way; the features that are common to all good
acts--that they be human, morally deserving, directed according to law
and conscience--were treated. In the present Part the means to the Last
End will be discussed in particular, and we shall consider in turn the
kinds of duties that are owed by all men and those owed by persons in
special states of life.


Question I

THE DUTIES OF ALL CLASSES OF MEN

744. Good habits, specifically different, are all reducible to seven
most general virtues (see 150, 151), and hence in studying these seven
virtues, we shall at the same time study all the common duties of man.

745. The properties of the seven infused virtues are chiefly four:

(a) In the first place, these virtues may be increased: “This I pray,
that your charity may more and more abound” (Phil, i. 9). The increase
takes place _ex opere operato_ through the Sacraments, or _ex opere
operantis_ through meritorious works--that is, whenever sanctifying
grace, their root, is increased.

(b) A second property of the infused virtues is that they may be lost:
“I have somewhat against thee, because thou hast left thy first
charity” (Apoc., ii. 4); “Some have made shipwreck concerning the
faith” (I Tim., i. 19). The loss is caused by the contrary of the
virtue: faith is lost by disbelief, hope by despair; charity and the
moral virtues are lost by any mortal sin, for they are built on
sanctifying grace, which mortal sin destroys.

(c) A third property of the infused virtues is that they cannot be
diminished directly. If we leave out of consideration their opposites
(which, as just said, remove these virtues entirely), there is nothing
else that can act directly upon them. Mere failure to exercise them
cannot lessen them, since they are caused by divine infusion, not by
human exercise; venial sin cannot lessen them, since it does not lessen
grace on which they depend.

(d) A fourth property of the infused virtues is that they are
diminished indirectly. Failure to practise them or venial sin does
diminish the ease and fervor with which the acts of these virtues are
exercised; and thus indirectly--that is, by preparing the way for acts
that are directly contrary--neglect or venial sin diminishes the habits
themselves.




Art. 2: THE VIRTUE OF FAITH

(_Summa Theologica_, II-II, qq. 1-9.)

746. The order of the theological virtues here followed is that given
by St. Paul in I Cor., xiii. 13--viz., faith, hope, charity. The order
of these virtues is twofold: (a) according to dignity the order is
charity, hope, faith; (b) according to time, the order is that of I
Cor., xiii. The habits of these three virtues are infused at the same
time (i.e., at the moment when grace is conferred), but their acts are
not simultaneous, and one must believe before one can hope or love.

747. Excellence of the Virtue of Faith.--(a) Faith is the beginning of
the supernatural life, the foundation and the root of justification,
without which it is impossible to please God and arrive at fellowship
with Him. (b) It is an anticipation of the end of the supernatural
life, for by faith we believe that which we shall behold in the
beatific vision: “All these died according to faith, not having
received the promises, but beholding them afar off, and saluting them
and confessing that they are pilgrims and strangers on the earth”
(Heb., xi. 13).

748. Utility of Faith for the Individual.--(a) Through faith the
intellect receives a new light, which discloses to it a higher
world--“the wisdom of God in a mystery” (I Cor., ii. 7)--and which
illuminates even this lower world with a heavenly brightness, that man
may know more quickly, more surely, and more perfectly the natural
truths that pertain to God and duty. (b) The will is strengthened to
perform duties valiantly through the motives and examples which faith
offers: the patriarchs of old “by faith conquered kingdoms, wrought
justice, obtained promises, recovered strength from weakness” (Heb.,
xi. 33). In adversity faith is a stay and a consolation: “For what
things soever were written, were written for our learning, that through
patience and the comfort of the scriptures, we might have hope” (Rom.,
xv. 4).

749. Utility of Faith for Society.--(a) Domestic society is defended in
its security and happiness by faith, which teaches the sacramental
character of marriage, which offers the model of the Holy Family to
Christian homes, which never ceases to declare in the name of God the
duties of husbands and wives, parents and children. (b) Without faith
and religion civil society cannot be maintained in strength and
prosperity. It is faith in God more than laws or armies that gives
security to life, reputation, and property, with order and peace at
home and abroad.

750. The Meaning of Faith.--In Holy Scripture and other religious
writings the word _faith_ has various meanings.

(a) Sometimes it stands for a promise, or for the quality of being true
to one’s promises. Examples: St. Paul condemns widows who remarry
against their word, “because they have made void their first faith
(promise)” (I Tim., v. 12). Speaking of the unbelief of the Jews, he
says: “Shall their unbelief make the faith (i.e., fidelity to promise
or faithfulness) of God without effect? God forbid. But God is true”
(Rom, iii. 3, 4).

(b) Sometimes the term _faith_ stands for good reputation, or for
confidence in another. Examples: “He that discloseth the secret of a
friend loseth his faith (credit, reputation), and shall never find a
friend to his mind” (Ecclus., xxvii. 17); “O thou of little faith
(trust, confidence), why didst thou doubt?” (Matt., xiv. 31).

(c) Sometimes _faith_ stands for truths or doctrines offered for one’s
belief, or for the assent of the mind to the judgment of conscience or
to the revelation of God. Examples: “Thou has not denied My faith”
(that is, “the truths revealed by Me,” Apoc. ii. 13); “All that is not
of faith (i.e., from the firm conviction of conscience) is sin” (Rom,
xiv. 23); “Without faith (i.e., assent to the unseen on the word of
God) it is impossible to please God; for he that cometh to God must
believe” (Heb., xi. 6).

751. It is faith only in the last sense that is known as the
theological virtue of faith, and hence with it alone we are here
concerned. St. Paul describes this faith as follows: “Faith is the
substance of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things that appear
not” (Heb., xi. 1). This verse is variously interpreted. (a) According
to St. Chrysostom, the meaning is: Faith is the subsistence or
anticipated existence in the soul of future blessings that are hoped
for, through the firm confidence it gives; it is the conviction of the
reality of the unseen. (b) According to St. Thomas, the meaning is:
Faith is the substance or basis on which is built the hope of
blessedness, or on which rests as on its foundation the whole work of
justification; it is an argument producing certainty of that which is
not seen. The elements of St. Thomas’ interpretation have been
incorporated into the Vatican Council’s definition: “The Catholic
Church professes that this faith which is the beginning of human
salvation is a supernatural virtue by which we, with the aid and
inspiration of the grace of God, believe that the things revealed by
Him are true, not because the intrinsic truth of these things has been
perceived by the natural light of reason, but because of the authority
of God Himself revealing, who can neither deceive nor be deceived”
(Sess. 3, chap. 3, Denz. 1789).

752. Thus, faith is an intellectual habit and act, but it differs from
all other intellectual habits and acts as follows: (a) it differs from
science, vision, understanding, for its object is “the things that
appear not”; (b) it differs from opinion, doubt, suspicion, for it is a
firm “substance,” a certain “evidence”; (c) it differs from human faith
or belief resting on man’s word and promises, for it is the pledge,
beginning and cornerstone of the happiness promised by God Himself.

753. Faith will now be considered according to two aspects: (a)
objectively, as regards the things that are believed by him who has
faith; (b) subjectively, as regards the habit and act of the believer
which put him in contact with these truths of the unseen world.

754. The Object of Faith.--There is a twofold object of faith, viz.,
material and formal.

(a) The material object, or the truth that is believed, includes all
that is contained in the Word of God, whether written or handed down by
tradition. The principal material object is God Himself as the Deity,
or Supreme Truth in Being (_prima veritas in essendo_); the secondary
material object embraces all other revealed truths.

(b) The formal object of faith, or the motive that prompts one to give
assent to the material object, is the authority of God, who is Supreme
Truth in Knowing and Speaking (_prima veritas in cognoscendo et
dicendo_), and hence He can neither be deceived nor deceive.

755. The material object of faith includes all truths revealed by God;
but, since it belongs to the Church to teach those truths, there is a
distinction of truths that are revealed by God but not defined by the
Church, and truths that are revealed by God and defined by the Church
as revealed. Thus: (a) divine faith is belief in revealed truth that
has not been declared by the Church as revealed; (b) divine and
Catholic faith is belief in a revealed truth that has been proposed as
such by the Church, either solemnly or ordinarily. Example: Dogmas
contained in creeds, definitions of Popes or general councils. The
Vatican Council has determined the object of this faith: By divine and
Catholic faith all those things must be believed which are contained in
the written word of God and in tradition, and which are proposed by the
Church, either by a solemn pronouncement or by her ordinary and
universal magisterium, to be believed as divinely revealed (Ibid., Denz.
1792).

756. The formal object of faith extends to all truths that have been
revealed and to no others. Theologians discuss the status of certain
truths connected with revelation concerning which the Church is
guaranteed infallibility on account of her teaching office. Special
difficulties arise in relation to: a) dogmatic facts, that is,
definitions concerning particular facts closely related to dogma (e.g.,
that Anglican orders are invalid; that a particular book contains a
sense contrary to revelation; that this Supreme Pontiff, legitimately
elected, is the successor of St. Peter in the primacy and consequently
infallible); b) theological conclusions, that is, deductions drawn from
revealed truth.

Many theologians teach that both dogmatic facts and theological
conclusions when defined by the Church constitute a special object of
faith distinct from divine and Catholic faith, namely, ecclesiastical
faith. Accordingly, for them, ecclesiastical faith is the internal
assent given to truths connected with revelation and defined by the
Church as true, the motive of assent being the infallibility of the
Church in her teaching office.

Others deny the existence of such faith and insist a) that dogmatic
facts are contained in revealed doctrine implicitly as singulars in
universals and hence are believed before definition by divine faith
implicitly, and after definition by divine and Catholic faith, b) that
theological conclusions before definition are held by theological
assent, afterwards by divine and Catholic faith. Some also have
maintained that before definition such conclusions belong to divine
faith. (For a summary of the various teachings on this problem see
Reginaldo-Maria Schultes, O.P., _Introductio in Historiam Dogmatum_,
pp. 46 ff.; Marin-Sola, O.P., _L’Evolution homogene du Dogme
Catholique_).

757. Private revelations, even when approved by the Church, are not an
object of divine and Catholic faith, for they form no part of the
revelation given to the whole human race that was closed with the death
of the Apostles and committed to the Church. Hence: (a) if they are
negatively approved by the Church, the approval means only that such
revelations contain nothing contrary to faith and morals, and are
useful and edifying; (b) if they are approved positively (as is the
case with the revelations of St. Hildegarde, St. Brigit, and St.
Catherine of Siena), the approval means that they appear to be true
divine revelations and may be prudently accepted as such.

758. The assent to be given to private revelations, therefore, is as
follows:

(a) Such revelations should receive the assent of divine faith, if it
is certain that they are genuine. This applies to those to whom and for
whom they were given, and probably to others also. It rarely happens,
however, that the genuineness of a private revelation can be critically
established, and the Church does not require that such revelations be
accepted by all the faithful. To refuse assent, therefore, to a private
revelation is not generally an offense against divine faith.

(b) Private revelations cannot receive the assent of Catholic faith,
since, even when approved by the Church, they are not proposed as a
part of the Christian revelation committed to her care. To dissent from
them, therefore, is not a sin against Catholic faith, unless in
rejecting them one would also reject defined dogma (e.g., by denying
the possibility of revelation).

(c) Private revelations are not offered for the assent of
ecclesiastical faith, since in approving them the Church does not
propose them as necessarily connected with the exercise of her teaching
office or under guarantee of infallibility. To dissent from them,
therefore, is not a sin against ecclesiastical faith, unless other
errors (e.g., against the authority of the Church in matters connected
with revelation) are also involved.

(d) Private revelations are offered for the assent of human faith,
since the Church proposes them to the faithful, if approved, as matters
of pious opinion, which are according to the rules of prudence truly
probable on account of traditions in their favor, supported by suitable
testimony and documents (Benedict XIV, _De Canonizatione Sanctorum_,
lib. II, cap. 23; III, cap. ult.; Sacred Cong. Rites, May 12, 1877, n.
3419, ad 2). The Church permits, but does not exact belief in these
revelations. One would not be excused, however, who rejected them
through pride or contempt, or without sufficient reason.

759. Similarly, although the Church offers for human faith alone
certain particular facts of history, one who rejects them may easily be
guilty of contempt or temerity. Such particular facts are: (a)
apparitions of heavenly beings in post-Biblical times, such as the
appearance of the Archangel Michael in Monte Gargano about 525 and the
appearance of the Blessed Virgin at Lourdes in 1858, for which the
Church has instituted feasts; (b) deeds related in the legends of the
Saints, such as the victory of St. Catherine of Alexandria over the
pagan philosophers and the carrying of her body to Mt. Sinai by Angels,
which the Church inserts in the Breviary lessons; (c) the authenticity
of relics. In granting certificates of genuineness, the Church
guarantees only that there is sufficient historical evidence or
probability for the belief that particular bones or other objects
belonged to a particular Saint.

760. Many tenets of the Church, indeed, have not the prerogative of
infallibility--for example, decrees of the Popes not given _ex
cathedra_, decisions of Congregations made with Papal approval,
teachings of Bishops to particular members of the Church, doctrines
commonly held by Catholics as theological truths or certain
conclusions. These decrees, decisions, etc., receive not the assent of
Catholic faith, but what is called religious assent, which includes two
things, viz., external and internal assent.

(a) External assent should be given such teachings--that is, the homage
of respectful silence due to public authority. This does not forbid the
submission of difficulties to the teaching authority, or the scientific
examination of objections that seem very strong.

(b) Internal assent should be given such teaching--that is, the
submission of the judgment of the individual to the judgment of the
teacher who has the authority from Christ and assistance from the Holy
Spirit. This internal assent differs, however, from the assent of
faith, inasmuch as it excludes fear of error, but not of the
possibility of error, and it may later on be suspended, called into
doubt, or even revoked. Pope Pius X in his _Motu proprio_, “Praestantia
scripturae Sacrae” (Nov. 18, 1907), indicated the binding force of the
decrees both of the Pontifical Biblical Commission and of all doctrinal
decrees: All are bound in conscience to submit to the decisions of the
Biblical Commission which have been given in the past and which shall
be given in the future, in the same way as to the decrees which
appertain to doctrine, issued by the Sacred Congregations and approved
by the Supreme Pontiff; nor can they escape the stigma both of
disobedience and temerity, nor be free from grave guilt as often as
they impugn their decisions either in word or writing; and this over
and above the scandal which they give and the sins of which they may be
the cause before God by making other statements on these matters which
are very frequently both rash and false. (Reaffirmed by the Biblical
Commission on Feb. 27, 1934.)

761. The objects, therefore, which formally or reductively pertain to
the virtue of faith, are as follows:

(a) Divine faith has for its object all the truths revealed by God as
contained in the Canonical scriptures approved by the Church, and in
the teachings received by the Apostles from Christ or the Holy Spirit
and handed down to the Church as Tradition. Private revelations in
exceptional cases may also be the object of divine faith.

(b) Catholic faith has for its object all the truths formally revealed
in scripture and Tradition that have been defined as such by the
Church. The definitions of the Church are either solemn (e.g., those
given in the Creeds, _ex cathedra_ definitions of the Popes, decisions
of Ecumenical Councils) or ordinary (e.g., those contained in the
universal preaching, practice or belief of the Church, encyclical
letters [see _Humani Generis_, n.20]). Equivalent to definitions are
the condemnations of error opposed to revealed truths.

(c) According to some theologians ecclesiastical faith has for its
object all infallible decisions of the Church about matters not
revealed, but connected with revelation, or necessary for the exercise
of the teaching office of the Church. Such are: (i) definitions, that
is, definitive declarations of theological conclusions or of dogmatic
facts, disciplinary laws made for the entire Church, canonization of
the saints, solemn approbation of religious Orders, express or special
recognition of Doctors of the Church, declaration of the relation of
private revelations to the public revelation; and (ii) censures, that
is, condemnations of teachings, on account of falsity, as heretical,
near to heresy, savoring of heresy, erroneous, rash, etc.; on account
of their expression, as equivocal, ambiguous, presumptuous, captious,
suspected, ill-sounding, offensive to pious ears, etc.; on account of
their tendency, as scandalous, schismatical, seditious, unsafe, etc.
Examples: The definitions concerning the sense of the book
_Augustinus_, the suitability of the terms “consubstantial” and
“transubstantiation,” the agreement of the Vulgate with the original
scriptures, the lawfulness of the insertion of the _Filioque_.

(d) Religious assent has for its object all doctrinal pronouncements of
the Church that are not infallible, but are yet official and
authoritative. Examples are ordinary instructions and condemnations
given by Pontifical Congregations and Commissions. The Syllabus of
Modern Errors issued by Pius IX was most likely not an infallible or
definitive document, although many of the errors it rejects are
contrary to dogma, and hence, even apart from the Syllabus, they are to
be rejected as opposed to Catholic faith. Likewise, many of its tenets
are drawn from encyclical letters. Papal allocutions, radio addresses,
and the doctrinal parts of Apostolic Constitutions, in themselves, are
in this class.

(e) Respect is due to the judgment of the Church even in non-doctrinal
matters and where no obligation is imposed by her, on account of her
position and the careful examination given before decision. Example: It
would be disrespectful to reject without good reason a pious belief
which the Church after mature deliberation has permitted to be held.

762. Though the truths of faiths are many, the duty of believing
imposes no great burden on the believer. Thus: (a) it is not required
that explicit belief be given to all the teachings of faith; (b) it is
not required that one distinguish the particular kind of assent in case
of uncertainty, but it suffices to yield assent according to the mind
and intention of the Church. Example: When a group of propositions is
condemned under various censures, no indication being made of the
censure that applies to particular propositions, it suffices to hold
that all of them are false, and that to each of them applies one or
more of the censures listed.

763. Faith is divided into explicit and implicit, according as the
object believed is unfolded or not to the mind.

(a) Faith is explicit regarding any truth, when assent is given to that
truth as known in itself and expressed in terms proper to itself.
Example: He has explicit faith in the Eucharist who has been instructed
concerning the meaning of the mystery, and who assents to it according
to that distinct knowledge.

(b) Faith is implicit regarding any truth, when that truth is not known
or not accepted in itself, but is accepted in another truth. Example:
He has implicit faith in the Eucharist who has not yet heard of it, but
who accepts all the teachings of the Church, even those he does not
know.

764. Faith is implicit as follows:

(a) Improperly, faith is implicit, if one does not give assent, but is
prepared to give it, if necessary, or wishes to give it. These pious
dispositions are not the act of faith itself, but they are its
beginnings, or preparations leading up to it; they are good, but not
sufficient. Example: A pagan who says he would accept the Christian
creed, if he thought it were true, or who wishes that he could believe
it.

(b) Properly, faith is implicit, if one gives assent to a truth by
accepting another in which it is contained, as a particular is
contained in a universal (e.g., he who explicitly accepts all the
truths of Christianity, implicitly accepts the Eucharist, even when in
good faith he thinks it is not revealed), or as an instrument is
involved in its principal cause (e.g., he who explicitly believes in
the Redemption implicity believes in Baptism, which is the instrument
by which Redemption is applied), or as means are contained in their end
(e.g., he who explicitly believes that eternal life is a reward,
implicitly believes that good works must be performed as a means to
that end), or as the reality is expressed in the figure (e.g., those in
the Old Testament who explicitly believed in the Paschal Lamb,
implicitly believed in the sacrifice of Christ of which the Paschal
Lamb was the figure), or as the assent of the disciple is bound up with
the assent of the teacher (e.g., the child who explicitly accepts as
true the doctrines of faith taught by his pastor, implicitly believes
the sense and implications contained in the latter’s instructions).

765. The points about which explicit faith is required can be reduced
to four heads (see Catechism of the Council of Trent). These heads are:

(a) The things to be believed: “Preach the Gospel to every creature. He
that believeth shall be saved” (Mark, xvi. 15). The Gospel doctrine is
summarized in the Apostles’ Creed;

(b) The things to be done: “Teach them to observe all things whatsoever
I have commanded you” (Matt., xxviii. 20). The Ten Commandments (see
Vol. II) are called the epitome of the whole law;

(c) The ordinances to be observed; “Baptize them in the name of the
Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost” (Matt, xxviii. 19). The
Seven Sacraments are the sacred instruments through which the merits of
the Passion of Christ are applied to the soul;

(d) The petitions to be made to God: “Thus shall you pray: Our Father,
etc.” (Matt., vi. 9). The prayer (see Vol. II) given us by Christ
teaches us both the manner of prayer and the requests that should be
offered.

766. Faith in the revelation given by God is necessary for salvation
(Heb., xi. 6), but in the usual providence of God faith cannot be had or
safeguarded without short formulas of its principal doctrines.

(a) Faith cannot be received without such formulas, because, its
doctrines being many and frequently difficult and the study of all
scripture and Tradition being impossible for most persons, a list of
short and clear propositions of revealed truths (Creed) is needed that
the faith may be proposed and accepted.

(b) Faith cannot be retained without such formulas, because, being
unchanging in itself and yet for all times and places, its doctrines
would be easily corrupted if there were not an official standard
(Symbol) by which both truth and error could be at once recognized (I
Cor., i. 10; II Tim., i. 13).

767. The formulas of Christian teaching as summarized in the Creeds,
since they must be brief and orderly, are divided into short and
connected propositions, which are therefore known as articles. Brevity
being the character of Creeds, not all revealed truths are expressed in
them as articles, but only those that have the following
characteristics:

(a) An article of the Creed deals with one of the two main objects of
belief, namely, the end of man, which is eternal life (Heb., xi. 1), and
the means thereto, which is Jesus Christ (John, xvii. 3). Other things,
which are proposed for faith, not for their own sake, but only on
account of their relation to these two main objects (e.g., the
wandering of the Israelites in the desert, the details of the journeys
of St. Paul, etc.), are not mentioned in the Creeds.

(b) An article of the Creed deals only with those doctrines concerning
eternal life and Christ which are in a special manner unseen or
difficult, for faith is “the evidence of things that appear not” (Heb.,
xi. 1). Other doctrines which have no special difficulty of their own
are considered as implicit in those that express the general mysteries,
and hence they are not mentioned. Thus, the three Persons of the
Trinity are given distinct articles, because the mysteriousness of the
Triune God cannot be reduced to any more general mystery, whereas the
Eucharist is not mentioned, as having no mystery that is not implied in
the articles on the divine omnipotence and the sanctification of man
through Christ.

768. Has there been an increase in the articles of faith?

(a) If by increase is meant the addition through new revelation of main
beliefs not contained in the primitive revelation, there has never been
an increase in the articles of faith; for from the beginning God made
known His own being, which includes the eternal things of God and the
end or happiness of man, and His providence, which includes the
temporal dispensations of God and the means for the salvation of man
(Heb., xi. 6).

(b) If by increase is meant the addition of new revelations that
brought out more clearly and definitely things contained in previous
revelation, there was an increase in the articles of faith from the
beginning of revelations down to the end of the Apostolic age. Thus,
the nature of God and His purpose as regards the redemption of humanity
were brought out ever more distinctly by new revelations in Old
Testament times (Exod., vi. 2), and were given in final and complete
form by the revelation of Christ (Heb., i. 1; Eph., iii. 5; Heb., xii.
27, 28; II Tim., i. 13).

(c) If by increase is meant a clearer and fuller explanation of the
revelation once delivered to the Saints, there has been and always can
be an increase of articles of faith. Thus, in the Council of Nicaea the
Apostles’ Creed was amplified; in the Council of Constantinople the
Creed of Nicaea was added to, and similarly today or tomorrow the Pope
could add new explanations or developments to the Creed, if new
heresies or necessities required that the true sense of revelation
already given should be brought out more clearly or fully.

769. There are three principal Creeds used by the Church:

(a) the Apostles’ Creed, which according to an early tradition was
composed by the Apostles themselves before they separated to preach the
Gospel. It was in use from the first centuries in the Roman Church,
which required that the catechumens learn and recite it before
receiving Baptism. It is divided into twelve articles;

(b) the Nicene Creed, which is used in the Mass and was drawn up at the
Council of Nicaea (325) against the Arian denial of the divinity of
Christ, and was revised by the Council of Constantinople (381) against
the Macedonians, who refused to acknowledge the divinity of the Holy
Ghost;

(c) the Athanasian Creed, which is used in the Office of Prime and is a
resume of the teaching of St. Athanasius on the Trinity and
Incarnation. It was composed in the West some time after the beginning
of the fifth century.

770. Summary of the teaching of the First Article of the Creed: “I
believe in God, the Father Almighty, Creator of heaven and earth.”--(a)
“I believe,” i.e., I give unhesitating assent to God revealing His
mysterious truths; (b) “in God,” i.e., the Supreme Being, one in nature
and three in persons; (c) “the Father,” i.e., our Maker and Provider,
from whom also we receive the spirit of adoption of sons; (d)
“almighty,” i.e., all-powerful, and therefore all-wise and endowed with
every other perfection in the highest degree; (e) “Creator,” i.e., who
freely produced the world out of nothing, without external model or
effort of any sort, and who preserves, rules and moves all creatures;
(f) “of heaven and earth,” i.e., of the world of pure spirits, of
matter, and of man, who is at the confines of matter and spirit--in
other words, of all finite things, visible and invisible.

771. Summary of the Second Article: “And in Jesus Christ, His only Son,
our Lord.”--(a) “Jesus,” a name given by command of God and meaning
“Saviour”; (b) “Christ,” i.e., “the anointed,” because He was King,
Priest, and Prophet; (c) “His only Son,” i.e., born of the Father before
all ages, God of God, Light of Light, true God of true God, begotten
not made, consubstantial with the Father, by whom all things were made;
(d) “our Lord,” for as God He shares all the perfections of the divine
nature, as man He has redeemed us and thus deservedly acquired the
title of Lord over us, while as the God-man He is the Lord of all
created things. It should be noted that there is nothing imperfect or
carnal in the generation of the Son, or in the procession of the Holy
Ghost, for God is a spirit and all-perfect.

772. Summary of the Third Article: “Who was conceived by the Holy
Ghost, born of the Virgin Mary.”--(a) “Who was conceived.” The
Only-begotten Son, the second Person of the Trinity, for us men and for
our salvation, became incarnate and was made man. Thus, the same Divine
Person is in both the divine and human natures, and the union preserves
the properties and the actions of both natures. (b) “By the Holy
Ghost.” At the moment when Mary consented to the announcement of the
angel, the body of Christ was formed in her womb from her flesh, the
rational soul was infused, and the divine and human natures were united
in the Person of the Word. Thus, Mary is truly the Mother of God. This
conception was miraculous, accomplished without the aid of man, through
the sole operation of the three Persons of the Trinity. Being an
external work of God in which love towards us is especially manifested,
the Incarnation is attributed to the Holy Ghost, who in the internal
life of the Deity proceeds as the mutual love of Father and Son. (c)
“Born of the Virgin Mary.” Mary was ever a virgin, before, during, and
after childbirth; immaculate and holy in soul; the spiritual Mother of
whom Christians are born in holiness.

773. Summary of the Fourth Article: “Suffered under Pontius Pilate, was
crucified, dead and buried.”--(a) The effect of that which is contained
in this article is expressed in the words of the Nicene Creed, “for
us.” The passion and death of Christ, willed by Himself, accomplished
our salvation, as satisfaction, sacrifice and redemption; (b) The
manner in which this was brought about is declared in the words above
quoted. In His human nature Christ suffered agony and pain of body; He
was sentenced to death by the Roman governor and nailed to the cross.
His soul and body were separated in death, although the Divinity never
departed from either, and His dead body was laid in the tomb.

774. Summary of the Fifth Article: “He descended into hell; the third
day He rose again from the dead.”--(a) “He descended.” After His death
the soul of Christ went to the abode of the departed, to liberate those
who were there. (b) “Into hell.” The name hell is applied in a wide
sense to all those secret abodes in which are detained the souls of
those who have not obtained the happiness of heaven--viz., the hell of
the damned, in which the impenitent suffer eternal pain of loss and
sense; purgatory, in which the souls of just men are cleansed by
temporary punishments; limbo, where the fathers of the Old Testament
awaited in peaceful repose the coming of Christ. It was this last abode
into which the soul of Christ entered. (c) “The third day”--i.e., on
Sunday morning, the third day after His burial. (d) “He rose again.” As
He had laid down His life by His own power, so He took it up again by
His own power. (e) “From the dead.” Christ not only returned to life,
He also conquered death; He rose to die no more, and thus He is first
in the final resurrection. (f) “According to the scriptures.” These
words are added in the Creed of Constantinople, to call attention to
the fact that the resurrection is the attestation of the truth of our
Lord’s claims and doctrine (I Cor., xv. 14, 17; Matt., xii. 39, 40).

775. Summary of the Sixth Article: “He ascended into heaven, sitteth at
the right hand of God, the Father almighty.”--(a) “He ascended.” By His
own power as God and man Christ ascended into heaven. (b) “Into
heaven.” As God, He never forsook heaven, the Divinity being
omnipresent; but as man, body and soul, He ascended to the abode of
glory forty days after the resurrection. (c) “Sitteth at the right hand
of God the Father Almighty.” Christ is said to stand at the right hand
of God, inasmuch as He is our Mediator with the Father (Acts, vii. 55;
Heb., vii. 25; John, xiv. 2); He is said to sit at the right hand of
the Father to express the permanent possession of royal and supreme
power and glory (Eph., i. 20-22; Heb., i. 13).

776. Summary of the Seventh Article: “From thence He shall come to
judge the living and the dead.”--There is a particular judgment at
death; at the end of the World, of which the time is uncertain, there
will be a general judgment, both of the living and the dead. Christ
will come a second time, and as Judge will pass sentence either of
eternal loss and pain or of eternal happiness.

777. Summary of the Eighth Article: “I believe in the Holy Ghost.”--The
Third Person of the Trinity is equal to the Father and the Son,
proceeds from them both as their mutual love, and is spoken of,
therefore, by appropriation, as the Author of works of grace and
sanctification, in which especially the charity of God is manifested:
“The Holy Ghost, the Lord and Giver of life, who proceedeth from the
Father and the Son, who together with the Father and the Son is adored
and glorified, who spoke by the prophets” (Creed of Constantinople).

778. Summary of the Ninth Article: “I believe the Holy Catholic Church;
the Communion of Saints.”--(a) The Church pertains to the material, not
the formal object of divine faith (see 754), and hence it is not said:
“I believe in the Church.” We believe of the Church that she is the
visible society made up of the faithful scattered throughout the world,
called also the house of God (I Tim., iii. 15), the flock of Christ,
the spouse of Christ (II Cor., xi. 2), the body of Christ (Eph., i. 23;
Col., i. 24); that besides the Church militant on earth, composed of
both the good and the bad, and outside of which are unbelievers and the
excommunicated, there is the Church triumphant in heaven and the Church
suffering in purgatory; that there are four marks by which the true
Church may be recognized--viz., that she is one, holy, Catholic, and
Apostolic; that she is divine in her origin and possesses divinely
given powers. (b) “The Communion of Saints.” The members of the Church
have different offices, but there is among them a community of
spiritual goods, the Sacraments being a bond of union, and each one
profiting according to his condition in the good works done by others,
The Church suffering is assisted by our suffrages, while we in turn are
helped by the intercessions of the Church triumphant.

779. Summary of the Tenth Article: “The forgiveness of sins.”--God
forgives all sins, when they are truly repented of, either through
Baptism (in case of sins before Baptism) or through the due exercise of
the power of the keys given the Church (in case of sins after Baptism).
Venial sins may be forgiven by private repentance.

780. Summary of the Eleventh Article: “The resurrection of the
body.”--The soul is immortal, the body mortal. But at the end of the
world the bodies of all the dead, even though corrupted, shall be
restored and reunited with their principle of life--i.e., the soul to
which they belonged. Substantially, the risen body will be identical
with the mortal body, but it will have certain new qualities
corresponding to its new state.

781. Summary of the Twelfth Article: “Life everlasting.”--Those who die
in the friendship of God will be received into unending happiness, in
which they will be exempted from all evil and enjoy the beatific vision
and other divine gifts.

782. The Acts of Faith.--According to St. Paul, there are two acts of
faith, one internal, the other external: “With the heart we believe
unto justice, but with the mouth confession is made unto salvation”
(Rom., x. 10). (a) The internal act of faith is the firm and constant
judgment of the intellect assenting to divine revelation (II Cor., x.
5), but freely and under the command of the will (Mark, xvi. 16), being
moved thereto by divine grace (Eph., ii. 5). (b) The external act of
faith is the profession before the world by signs, such as words or
deeds, of the internal assent given to divine revelation.

783. The internal act of faith is one, but it has a threefold
relationship: (a) it believes about God, if we consider the intellect
as assenting to the material object; (b) it believes God, if we
consider the intellect as assenting to the formal object; (c) it
believes in God, if we consider the will as moving the intellect to
assent, and tending towards God as the Last End.

784. The truths to which the assent of faith is given are either
supernatural or natural. (a) Supernatural truths or mysteries (e.g.,
the Trinity of Persons in God) are revealed for faith, that man may
know, desire and work for the supernatural destiny to which he has been
raised. (b) Natural truths (e.g., the Oneness of God) are revealed for
faith, so that mankind may obtain more quickly, more generally, and
more certainly the knowledge of divine things which reason can afford.
It is impossible, however, that an act of faith and an act of knowledge
should coexist in the same individual about the same truth, for faith
is of things that appear not.

785. The act of faith is a necessary preliminary to other supernatural
acts, for we do not tend towards the supernatural, unless we first
accept it by belief; hence, faith is necessary. But the act of faith
may also be made after other supernatural acts, like those of hope and
charity; and so it may be meritorious. (a) The act of faith is
necessary, both as a means and as a precept (see 360). The necessity of
means will be treated now, the necessity of precept later, when we
speak of the commandments of faith (see 913 sqq.). (b) The act of faith
before justification is meritorious congruously and in a wide sense;
but after justification it has condign merit (see 110).

786. For all adults the act of faith is necessary for salvation as a
necessity of means (see 360), for the Apostle says: “Without faith it
is impossible to please God” (Heb., xi. 6). The truths which must be
believed under necessity of means are of two kinds. (a) One must
believe with implicit faith all revealed truths which one does not know
and is not bound to know. An act of implicit faith is contained in the
formula: “O my God, I firmly believe all the truths the Catholic Church
teaches, because Thou hast revealed them.” (b) One must believe with
explicit faith all the truths which one is bound to know. An act of
explicit faith in all the truths necessary by necessity of means is
contained in the Apostles’ Creed. Other truths that must be explicitly
believed on account of a necessity of precept will be discussed in 918,
920.

787. What specifically are the truths just referred to that all are
bound to know as a necessary means? (a) Theologians generally agree
that it has always been necessary for adults to know and accept two
basic mysteries--God’s existence, as the supernatural End or happiness
of man, and His providence as exercised in supplying the means
necessary for supernatural salvation (see 768). Without such belief,
supernatural hope and charity, at all times necessary, are impossible.
(b) A majority of theologians hold, and with greater probability it
seems, that since the promulgation of the Gospel it is necessary for
adults to know and accept the two basic mysteries of Chrisitanity--
viz., that in God, who is our beatitude, there are three persons (the
Trinity), and that the way to our beatitude is through Christ our
Redeemer (the Incarnation).

788. Even before the Gospel, it was always necessary as a means that
one believe explicitly in God as our supernatural happiness and as the
provider of the means thereto. Thus, the Apostle, speaking of the
ancient patriarchs, says: “He that cometh to God, must believe that He
is, and is a rewarder to them that seek Him” (Heb., xi. 6). He that
would come to God (i.e., be saved), must believe in God as the Author
of glory and of grace. Hence, one must believe: (a) that God exists,
who is not ashamed to be called our God, and who prepares for us a
better, that is, a heavenly country (Heb., xi. 6); (b) that God is a
remunerator, from whom must be expected the working out of His promises
and the helps to attain the reward, as well as the meting out of
justice. In this faith is included implicitly a faith in Christ, and
thus in the Old Testament a belief, at least implicit, in the Messiah
to come was always necessary: “Man is not justified by the works of the
law, but by the faith of Jesus Christ” (Gal., ii. 16).

789. Since the promulgation of the Gospel (see 342, 354), it is also
necessary as a means that one believe explicitly in the mysteries of
the Trinity and Incarnation. For he who does not accept these, does not
accept the Gospel, whereas Christ says: “Go ye into the whole world,
and preach the Gospel to every creature. He that believeth not shall be
condemned” (Mark, xvi. 15, 16).

(a) Theoretically, this opinion seems more probable than the opposite
opinion; but chiefly on account of the difficulty about negative
infidels, which is discussed in dogmatic treatises on Predestination
and Grace, many theologians either reject it (e.g., those who say that
belief in the two great Christian mysteries is necessary only as a
precept, or that implicit faith suffices), or modify it (e.g., those
who say that belief in these two mysteries is not necessary as a means
for justification, but only for glorification, and those who say that
regularly such faith is a necessary means, but that an exception is
allowed for invincible ignorance, or for the insufficient promulgation
of the Gospel in many regions).

(b) Practically, this opinion is safer, and hence all theologians, even
Probabilists, hold that one must act as if it were true and certain,
whenever it is possible to give instruction on the Trinity and
Incarnation.

790. Knowledge about the mysteries of faith is either substantial (by
which one knows the essentials of a mystery) or scientific (by which
one knows also its circumstances and details, and is able to give a
more profound explanation of it). Scientific knowledge is required, on
account of their office, in those who are bound to teach the faith, but
substantial knowledge suffices for salvation. Hence, for an adult to be
saved, it suffices that he have the following kind of knowledge about
the four great mysteries:

(a) There is a God who has spoken to us, promising freely that He will
take us to Himself as our reward. It is not necessary that one
understand such theological concepts as the essence of deity, the
definition of supernaturality, the formal and material objects of
beatitude, etc.; for many persons are incapable of understanding them.

(b) This God, who will be our reward, is one, but there are three
divine Persons--the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost, really distinct
and equal. It is not necessary that one understand the distinction
between nature and person, nor subtle questions about the processions
and properties.

(c) God provides for us, giving us the helps we need, and also, if we
serve Him, the reward He has promised. It is not necessary that one
understand the theology of providence, grace, and merit.

(d) Jesus Christ, who is God the Son, became man, suffered and died for
us, thus saving us from sin and winning back for us the right to
heaven. It is not necessary that one understand scientifically that in
Christ there are two natures united hypostatically in the one Person of
the Word.

791. Since Baptism is fruitless without due faith in the recipient, it
is not lawful as a rule to baptize those who lack substantial knowledge
of the four mysteries just mentioned. (a) Outside of danger of death,
it is never lawful to baptize a person, adult in mind, who is in
substantial ignorance of any of these four mysteries. Such a person
must first receive instruction. (b) In danger of death, when
instruction cannot be given, an adult in substantial ignorance about
the Trinity and the Incarnation may be baptized conditionally; for it
is probable that explicit knowledge of those two mysteries is not a
necessity of means (see 789; Canon 752, Sec.2).

792. Since absolution is invalid if the person absolved is incapable of
receiving grace, and since acts of faith in the four chief mysteries
are an essential means to justification in adults, absolution given to
one who is in substantial ignorance about one of the four mysteries
above mentioned is certainly or probably invalid, as the case may be.
Absolution certainly invalid is never lawful, but absolution probably
valid may in certain cases be regarded as lawful before administration,
and as valid after administration. Hence, the following cases must be
distinguished:

(a) Outside of danger of death, it is not lawful to absolve one who is
in substantial ignorance about any of those four mysteries. Such a
person should be sent away for further instruction, or given a brief
instruction then and there, if there is time.

(b) In danger of death, when instruction cannot be given, an adult in
substantial ignorance about the Trinity and Incarnation may be absolved
conditionally, for the reason given in the similar case of Baptism.

(c) After the fact, absolution given to one who was in substantial
ignorance of the Trinity and Incarnation, may be regarded as valid,
since the opinion that explicit knowledge of these mysteries is not a
necessary means, is at least probable. Hence, according to the
principles of Probabilism a penitent who made confessions While
ignorant of those two mysteries is not obliged to repeat his
confessions, since he has probably satisfied his obligation.

793. In the following cases (which would be rare, it seems) Baptism or
absolution cannot be administered, even to the dying who are unable to
receive instruction: (a) when it is certain that the dying person is
substantially ignorant about the existence of God, the Author of grace
and glory; (b) when it is certain that the dying person is
substantially ignorant of the Trinity and Incarnation through his own
fault, and is unwilling to hear about them.

794. Practical rules for granting the Sacraments in case of doubt or
urgency to those who seem to be indisposed on account of substantial
ignorance are the following:

(a) In danger of death, when instruction is out of the question, if
there is doubt about his ignorance, the dying person should be given
the benefit of the doubt.

(b) In danger of death, and when instruction is impossible, if there is
doubt about the mental ability of the dying person and his obligation
to have explicit faith, he should receive the benefit of the doubt.

(c) In danger of death or other urgent necessity, when instruction is
needed and possible, it should be given briefly as follows: “Let us say
the act of faith: I believe in one God, the Father, Son and Holy Ghost,
who has promised to take to Himself after this life all those that love
Him, and who punishes the wicked. I hope to have the happiness of being
received into His companionship through the help of Jesus Christ, the
Son of God, who became man and died for my salvation.” This or a
similar instruction should be given by the priest or lay person present
in baptizing an adult who is about to die. When there is not immediate
danger of death, a person who is baptized or absolved after short
instruction on account of emergency, should be admonished of the duty
of receiving fuller instruction later on.

795. Faith is the free exercise of the free assent of the intellect
to the unseen, an acceptance of obligations and tasks hard to human
nature. It is, therefore, an act of homage to the authority of God, and
is meritorious: “By faith the ancient patriarchs obtained the promises”
(Heb., xi. 33). Is the freedom and meritoriousness of this act of
faith lessened if one seeks for other arguments than the authority of
God in giving one’s assent to revelation? (a) The merit of the act of
faith is not lessened, when one seeks human arguments for the assent
of credibility which is prior to the assent of faith; for it is only
the part of prudence that one should first assure oneself of the fact
that a revelation has been made, before one assents on faith to the
doctrines contained in that revelation. Now, the arguments by which
one assures oneself of the fact of a revelation are human arguments,
such as proofs that revelation is possible and suitable, that there are
miracles, prophecies and other signs to guarantee the divine mission of
those who delivered the revelation, etc.

(b) The merit of the act of faith is not lessened if one seeks human
arguments for the preambles of faith, that is, for those divine truths
that can be established by natural reason (such as the existence
of God, His infinite knowledge and truthfulness). The person who
demonstrates these preambles by philosophical proofs, has knowledge,
not belief, about them; but the merit of faith is not lost, if,
while knowing these truths, he remains willing to accept them on the
authority of revelation.

(c) The merit of faith is not lessened, if one seeks human arguments
for the mysteries of faith, that is, for those truths of revelation
that are above human reason (such as the Trinity and the Incarnation),
provided these arguments are sought not for the demonstration, but for
the confirmation or defense of dogma. Nay, a person ought, in so far as
he is able, to use his reason in the service of faith, and to do so is
a sign, not of little, but of great faith. “Be ready always,” says St.
Peter (I Peter, iii. 15), “to satisfy everyone that asketh you a reason
of that hope which is in you.” And St. Anselm says: “It appears to me a
sign of carelessness, if, having been confirmed in the faith, we do not
take pains to understand what we believe.” St. Thomas writes: “When a
man is willing to believe, he loves the truth, meditates upon it, and
takes to heart whatever reasons he can find in support thereof; and
with regard to this, human reason does not exclude the merit of faith,
but is a sign of greater merit.”

(d) The merit of faith is lessened if one seeks human arguments as the
formal object, that is, as the motive on which faith is grounded; for
then one does not wish to believe, or to believe so readily, on the
word of God alone, but feels one must call in other testimony to
support it.

The attempt to understand mysteries or to establish them by natural
reason is opposed to the humble assent of faith: “He that is a
searcher of majesty, shall be overwhelmed by glory” (Prov., xxv. 27);
“Seek not the things that are too high for thee, and search not into
things above thy ability” (Ecclus., iii. 22); “Faith loses its merit,
if it is put to the test of reason” (St. Gregory the Great, Hom. xxvi).

796. Besides the internal act of acceptance of revealed truth, faith
has also external acts. (a) It commands the external acts of the other
virtues, that is, acts directed to the specific ends of those virtues.
Hence, one who fasts exercises an external act of the virtue of
temperance, but it is his faith in the virtue that commands the fast.
(b) Faith elicits the external act of profession of faith as its own
proper external act directed to its own specific end: “I believed, for
which cause I have spoken” (Ps. cxv. 10; II Cor., iv. 13). External
profession of faith, therefore, is not an act proceeding from faith; it
is an act of faith. The necessity of this act will be considered below
in the article about the commandments of faith.

797. The Habit of Faith.--Faith is not only an act that passes, but it
is also a permanent quality or habit conferred by God, one of the “most
great and perfect promises” which man must make use of (II Peter, i. 3
sqq.), a charism that is not for a time but for all this life, just
like hope and charity (I Cor., xiii. 13). God, who does all things
sweetly (Wis., viii. 1), and who has provided for His natural creatures
internal powers by which they incline and move themselves towards the
ends of their activities, has not done less for those whom He moves to
a supernatural destiny; and, in justifying the sinner, He infuses along
with grace the supernatural virtues of faith, hope and charity (Council
of Trent, Sess. VI, Cap. 6).

798. The virtue of faith is thus defined by the Council of the Vatican:
“Faith is a supernatural virtue, by which, with the help of God’s
grace, we believe the truths revealed by Him, not on account of an
intrinsic evidence of the truths themselves, perceived by natural
reason, but on account of the authority of God who revealed them.”

799. Hence, the virtue of faith has the following properties:

(a) It is supernatural, not only because its object and motive are
supernatural, but because it proceeds from a supernatural principle,
i.e., grace (John, vi, 29; Eph., ii. 8).

(b) It is obscure, because the believer assents to that which has no
intrinsic evidence for him. He does not see its truth as the blessed
see God, for “we see now through a glass in a dark manner, but then
face to face” (I Cor., xiii. 12). He does not know its truth as he
knows evident or naturally demonstrated propositions, for faith is
about truths that surpass reason--things “that appear not.” This, of
course, does not mean that faith is not rightly called a new light
added to the mind, and that the motives which call for the acceptance
of faith are not evidently credible.

(c) It is free, because, although one cannot dissent from that which is
evident intrinsically (e.g., that two and two make four), one is able
to dissent from that which is obscure.

(d) It is not a process of reasoning, but a simple act of assent, in
which one accepts at the same time the authority of the Revealer and
the truth of His revelation. “Jesus said to her (Martha): I am the
resurrection and the life .... Believest thou this? She saith to Him:
Yea, Lord, I have believed that Thou art the Christ, etc.” (John, xi.
25-27).

(e) It is firm and unshaken in a far higher degree than the assent of
understanding and science, since it rests on the infallible authority
of God (I Thess., ii. 13).

800. Before justification, faith exists, it seems, only as an act
performed under the influence of actual or transitory grace. After the
infusion of habitual grace, faith is a habit or infused virtue. But
there are two modes of existence characteristic of this one habit, and
hence the distinction of living and dead faith (Gal., v. 6; James, ii.
26).

(a) Living faith is that which is informed or animated by charity. This
latter virtue is called the soul of all the other virtues, inasmuch as
it directs them to their supreme end, divine friendship, and gives
meritorious value to their works. All those have living faith who join
to belief a life in agreement with belief--that is, the state of grace,
love of God and good works.

(b) Dead faith is that which is separated from charity. It is a true
virtue, because it directs the assent of the intellect to its proper
end; but it is an imperfect virtue, because its acts are not directed
to the Last End, and are not meritorious of eternal life. All those who
believe, but who do not live up to their belief in matters of
importance, who neglect serious duties to God or others, have dead
faith. Examples are those who call themselves Catholics, but neglect
attendance at church and the reception of the Sacraments.

801. Those who have, or who had faith, are the following:

(a) the Angels in the state of probation and our first parents in
Paradise, for faith is necessary as a means in every condition short of
the beatific vision (see 785, 158); (b) those in this life who are in
the friendship of God, and also those believers who are not in the
friendship of God, the former having living, and the latter dead faith
(see 800); (c) the souls in purgatory, the ancient patriarchs in limbo.

802. Those who have not faith are the following: (a) those who have
vision of the truths of faith, that is, the Saints in heaven and Christ
while on earth (I Cor., xiii. 10); (b) those who reject obstinately
even one doctrine of faith, for, if individual judgment is put above
the authority of God even in one point, the motive or keystone of
faith, and therefore faith itself, is no longer assented to; (c) the
lost, for, being cut off entirely from grace, these possess no virtue
infused by God. “The devils believe and tremble” (James, ii. 19), but
their belief is not supernatural or free, but natural and unwilling.

803. Of those who have faith, some have greater, and some less faith.
Thus, our Lord reproved St. Peter for his little faith (Matt., xiv.
31), and praised the Woman of Canaan for her great faith (Matt., xv.
28). But since all are obliged to have supreme confidence in God and to
accept all He teaches, how is there room for different degrees of faith?

(a) Faith must be supreme appreciatively, that is, all must put the
formal object of faith, the motive of its assent, above every other
motive of assent, for the First Truth speaking deserves more adherence
than any other authority. In this respect, therefore, and in the
exclusion of every doubt, the faith of all is equal. But faith need not
be supreme intensively, that is, it is not required that the intellect
should feel the assent of faith more than the assent given to natural
truth, or that the will must experience the highest alacrity, devotion
and confidence; for the truths that are nearer to us move us more
vehemently than do higher and invisible truths. Hence, in this respect
the faith of one may be more firm or fervent than the faith of another,
according as one is more childlike, more loving, more intense in his
acceptance of God’s Word than another.

(b) Faith must be universal, that is, we must accept the entire
material object of revelation, and none may pick and choose according
to his likes or fancies, for all of revelation has God for its Author.
In this respect the faith of all is equal, all believers accepting
twelve articles, while those who accept eleven or six or one or none,
are not believers. But faith need not be explicit as to all its
doctrines, and hence, while one believer who is not thoroughly
instructed may know only the twelve articles of the Creed, another
believer who is better instructed may know the hundreds of other truths
that are contained in the articles. In this way the faith of one is
greater extensively.

804. Can faith grow or decline in the same person? (a) If there is
question of acts of faith, the later acts can be more or less firm or
fervent than those that preceded, in the way explained in the previous
paragraph. In this sense we may understand the Apostles to have asked
of our Lord a higher degree of faith, that they might work miracles in
His name (Luke, xvii. 5). (b) If there is question of the habit of
faith, it itself is increased at every increase of sanctifying grace
(see 745). St. Paul writes to the Corinthians (II Cor., x. 15) that he
has hope of their “increasing faith.” Moreover, by repeated acts of
faith the ease and delight with which the habit is exercised increases,
as is the case with acquired habits. But the habit of faith is not
diminished directly as was explained regarding the infused virtues in
general (see 745).

805. The means of growing in faith are: (a) prayer to the Father of
lights: “Lord, increase our faith” (Luke, xvii. 5); (b) reading of the
scriptures, the Lives of the Saints and other similar works, and
attendance at spiritual instructions; (c) frequent acts of faith in the
world we see not and its coming rewards; (d) exercise of faith, by
directing our thoughts, words, and actions according to the teaching of
faith, rather than according to the maxims of the world; for “the just
man liveth by faith” (Heb., x. 38), and “faith without works is dead”
(James, ii. 20).

806. The cause of faith is God. (a) It is God who directly through
revelation, or indirectly through the Church, the evangelists,
preachers, etc., “brings the message before man” (Rom., x. 15); (b) it
is God who “causes the mind of man to assent” to His message. No matter
how persuasive the teacher or how well disposed or learned the hearer
may be, faith will not come unless the light of grace leads the way
(Eph., ii. 8).

807. The effects of faith are fear of God and purification of the
heart. (a) Dead faith causes one to fear the penalties of divine
justice, that is, to have servile fear (James, ii. 19): living faith
causes one to fear sin itself, that is, to have filial fear. (b) Faith,
by elevating man to higher things, purifies his soul from the
defilements of lower things (Acts, xv. 9): if faith is dead, it at
least purifies the intellect from error; if it is living, it also
purifies the will from evil.

808. The Gifts of Understanding and Knowledge.--As was said above (see
159), the Gifts of the Holy Ghost are intended as means for perfecting
the theological virtues. There are two Gifts that serve the virtue of
faith, namely, the Gifts of Understanding and Knowledge.

(a) Faith, being assent, must have a right idea of what is proposed for
acceptance; but, as it is obscure (see 799), and as there are things
apart from faith that may corrupt our notion of it, the Gift of
Understanding is conferred, a simple perception and divine intuition
through which one receives a correct notion of the mysteries of faith.

(b) Faith, being the starting point of all supernatural activities,
must be the norm by which we judge of what we should think and do in
the affairs of life; but, as it is a simple act of assent (see 799) and
as the creatures of the world are a temptation and a snare (Wis., xiv.
11), the Gift of Knowledge is given, through which one receives a
correct judgment about the things of this world. These then take on a
new and fuller significance in the light of the teachings of faith.

809. The Gift of Understanding must not be confused with the Beatific
Vision. (a) A perfect penetration of the mysteries, which enables one
to perceive their essence and causes (e.g., the how and the why of the
Trinity), is given by the Beatific Vision; but such understanding
removes all obscurity, and is therefore insociable with faith. (b) An
imperfect penetration of the teachings of faith, which does not take
away the obscurity and mysteriousness, is given by the Gift of
Understanding, and is therefore sociable with faith. The effects of
this Gift are: it distinguishes the truths of faith from false
doctrines; it conveys a clear view of the credibility of the mystery of
faith against all difficulties and objections; it gives knowledge of
the supernatural import of the secondary truths of faith, that is, of
those revealed happenings and facts that are not themselves
supernatural (Luke, xxiv. 32); it gives understanding of the practical
aspect of a mystery--for example, that the intratrinitarian relations
of the Divine Persons are a model for the regulation of the Christian
life, in knowledge and love of divine things.

810. The Gift of Knowledge, which like the other Gifts is had by all
the just, must not be confused with sacred knowledge or theology, nor
with the extraordinary gifts of infused knowledge and the charism of
knowledge.

(a) The Gift of Knowledge resembles theology in that it reproduces
objectively what reason does when it argues from the visible world to
the invisible Creator; but, while subjectively theology is the result
of study in which one passes successively from premise to conclusion.
Knowledge is the result of a divine light that may be found even in the
illiterate, and it takes in at a glance all that is contained in a
process of argumentation. Through this Gift the wonders of nature, the
events of history, the arguments of philosophy, lead one firmly and
spontaneously to the Last End and the supernatural realities of faith.

(b) Infused knowledge may have for its object things purely natural
(such as truths of philosophy and the ability to speak foreign
languages), while the Gift of Knowledge is concerned only with faith,
judging what is to be believed or done according to faith.

(c) The charism of knowledge (I Cor., xii. 8) is a grace given one for
the benefit of others, by which one is able to communicate to them
successfully the teachings of faith; the Gift of Knowledge, on the
contrary, proceeds from the habit of sanctifying grace, and is intended
for the benefit of its recipient.

811. To each of the Gifts of the Holy Ghost correspond Beatitudes and
Fruits (see 159).

(a) To the Gift of Understanding corresponds the Sixth Beatitude:
“Blessed are the pure of heart, for they shall see God.” For by
Understanding the mind is pure from wrong ideas of truth, and sees that
God is above all that the intellect can comprehend. The two fruits that
proceed from Understanding are faith (i.e., conviction about revealed
truth) and ultimately joy, in union with God through charity. (b) To
the Gift of Knowledge corresponds the Third Beatitude: “Blessed are
they that mourn, for they shall be comforted.” For by Knowledge one
judges rightly about created things, grieves over the wrong use made of
them, and is comforted when they are turned to their proper end.




Art. 2: THE SINS AGAINST FAITH

(_Summa Theologica_, II-II, qq. 10-15.)

812. The sins against faith can all be reduced to four heads: (a) sins
of unbelief (see 813-886), which are opposed to the internal act of
faith; (b) sins of blasphemy (see 887-903), which are opposed to the
external act of faith; (c) sins of ignorance (see 904-911), which are
opposed to the Gift of Knowledge; (d) sins of blindness and dullness
(912), which are opposed to the Gift of Understanding.

813. The Sin of Unbelief.--Unbelief in general is a want of faith. It
is of two kinds, negative and positive.

(a) Negative unbelief is the absence of faith in a person who has never
heard of it at all, or only insufficiently. Thus, the Indians in
America before the coming of Christian missionaries were negative
unbelievers. This kind of unbelief is a punishment, since it results
from original sin; but it is not a sin itself, and those who die in
negative unbelief are lost, not on account of this, but on account of
sins against the natural law (John, xv. 22; Rom., x. 14). With this
kind of unbelief we are not here concerned.

(b) Positive unbelief is the absence of faith in one who has heard it
sufficiently, so that the lack of it is due to his own fault. This kind
of unbelief is, of course, a sin, for it supposes that one is acting
against the light one has received.

814. Positive unbelief is either a refusal or a renouncement of faith.
(a) Ordinary unbelief is a refusal of faith, that is, non-acceptance of
faith by one who has never had faith; (b) apostasy, or desertion, is
the abandonment of faith by one who formerly accepted it. This is not a
distinct kind of unbelief, since, like ordinary unbelief, it has for
its object or term the denial of revealed truth; but it is an
aggravating circumstance of unbelief (II Peter, ii. 21).

815. The sin of unbelief is, committed either directly or indirectly.
(a) It is committed directly, when one rejects what pertains to faith
(its acts, objects or motive); (b) it is committed indirectly, when one
guiltily places oneself or others in the occasion or danger of
unbelief. The dangers against faith will be considered after the sins
of unbelief (see 848-886).

816. Direct sins of unbelief are those opposed to the elements that
belong to the nature of faith and that are contained in its definition
(see 751, 798). (a) Opposed to the act of assent are sins of non-assent
or dissent (see 817-839); (b) opposed to the certitude and firmness of
assent are sins of doubt (840-846); (c) opposed to the right object of
faith are sins of credulity (847); (d) opposed to the motive of faith
is rationalism (847).

817. Sins of non-assent are those by which one omits to make an act of
faith when one should. This kind of sin will be treated when we come to
the commandments of faith as to its internal and external acts (see 925
sqq.)

818. Sins of dissent are sins of commission, and are of two kinds: (a)
privative unbelief, which is the want of faith in one who has heard the
faith sufficiently and should realize the obligation of embracing it,
but who refuses to believe, although he makes no opposition to faith;
(b) contrary unbelief, which is the want of faith in one who has heard
the faith and its motives of credibility sufficiently to know the duty
of embracing it, and who not only refuses to believe, but even accepts
the errors opposed to faith.

819. What is the gravity of sins of dissent, doubt, and rationalism?
(a) From their nature, these sins are always mortal, for they refuse to
God the homage of the intellect and will that is due Him, deprive man
of the beginning of spiritual life, and lead to eternal condemnation
(Mark, xvi. 16). (b) From their circumstances, these and other sins
against faith may be venial (see 180-184). Thus, if a man refuses to
believe or accepts error, not having sufficient knowledge of his
obligation or not fully consenting to the sin, his fault is venial
subjectively or formally.

820. Are sins against faith more serious than all other kinds of sin?
(a) From their nature, sins against faith are worse than sins against
the moral virtues, for the former offend directly against God Himself,
but not so the latter. Hatred of God, however, is a greater sin than
sins of unbelief, as will be shown when we treat of sins against
charity. (b) From their circumstances, sins against faith may be less
serious than sins against the moral virtues. Example: A venial sin
against faith is less serious than a mortal sin against justice.

821. With regard to the effect of sins against faith on good acts it
should be noted: (a) an unbeliever is able to perform works that are
ethically or naturally good (Rom., ii. 14), and the Church has
condemned the opposite teaching of Baius (Denzinger, _Enchiridion_, n.
1025). (b) an unbeliever is not able to perform works that are
supernaturally good and meritorious (see 112).

822. Contrary unbelief (see 818), which not only refuses to believe but
also assents to contrary errors, has three degrees according to the
greater or less number of truths denied or errors admitted in these
three degrees. Some theologians see different species of unbelief,
while other theologians regard them as only accidental modes or
circumstances of the one species of sin.

(a) The most extensive denial of faith is found in infidelity, which
rejects both Christ and His revelation. To this form of unbelief belong
atheism, agnosticism, pantheism, paganism, polytheism, animism, and
denials of Christ and Christianity. The chief religious bodies today
that profess such errors are: Confucianism, Taoism and Shintoism
(founded in China and Japan), which are polytheistic and practise
idolatry and ancestor worship; Brahmanism (founded about 14 centuries
before Christ), which is polytheistic or animistic: Buddhism (founded
6th century B.C. in India), which is polytheistic and practises
idolatry; Zoroastrianism (founded in Persia about the 7th century
B.C.), which is dualistic; Mohammedanism (founded in Arabia in the
6th century A.D.), which makes Mohammed and his religion superior to
Christ and Christianity, and rejects the Trinity and the Incarnation.
(b) A less complete departure from faith is found when Christ and His
revelation are accepted as contained in the figures and prophecies of
the Old Testament, but rejected in their fulfillment and development in
Jesus and the New Testament. This is the error of Judaism, which today
has about 15 million adherents.

(c) A still smaller degree of rejection of faith exists when Christ
is recognized as leader and teacher, but not all of His revelation
is accepted. This kind of error is called heresy, and those bodies
which profess it are known as sects. The chief heresies in times past
were Gnosticism and Manicheism in the first centuries; Arianism and
Macedonianism in the fourth century; Nestorianism, Monophysism and
Pelagianism in the fifth century; Monothelism in the seventh century;
Iconoclasm in the eighth century; Photianism in the ninth century;
Albigensianism in the eleventh century; Waldensianism in the twelfth
century; Wicliffism in the fourteenth century; Hussism in the fifteenth
century; Protestantism in the sixteenth century, and Modernism in the
twentieth century. Today, the erring Christian groups outside the
Church are the Orientals, called Orthodox, and the Protestants.

823. Since error is not consistent, false teachings are found that
accept all the above-mentioned degrees of unbelief, or borrow
impartially from all.

(a) Indifferentism or Latitudinarianism holds that all forms of
religion are equally true, and that it makes no difference whether
one is Buddhist, Jew or Christian. In a modified form, Indifferentism
teaches that any form of Christian belief, provided it suits the
inclinations of the individual concerned, may be followed, and hence it
is left to each one to decide whether he prefers Catholicism or one of
the bodies of the Orthodox Church or of Protestantism. Many who profess
a denominational creed or confession are Indifferentists in belief.

(b) Syncretism holds that there are truths in all separate religions,
but that none of them has all the truth, and hence that one must select
what is good from each, rejecting the evil. Thus, the Judaizers of the
first century borrowed from Judaism, the Gnostics and Manicheans from
paganism, while today Freemasonry, Theosophy, Christian Science and
Spiritism accept, along with the Gospel, ancient pagan, Buddhistic,
Brahmanistic and Mohammedan theories; finally, Mormonism endeavors to
unite characteristics of the Old and the New Testament dispensations.
In a restricted form, religious Syncretism teaches the doctrine of
Pan-Christianism--that is, that truth is scattered among the various
Christian denominations, and that all should confederate as equals on
the basis of more important doctrines to be agreed on by all.

824. What is the order of gravity in unbelief, as between infidelity,
Judaism, heresy?

(a) The gravity of a sin against faith is to be determined primarily
from the subjective resistance made to faith, so that he sins more
against the light to whom greater light was given. The sin of unbelief
in one who has received the Gospel (heresy), is greater than the same
sin in one who has accepted only the Old Testament (Judaism); in one
who has received the revelation of the Old Testament (Judaism) the
sin of unbelief is more serious than the same sin in one who has not
received that revelation (infidelity).

(b) The gravity of unbelief is measured secondarily from the objective
opposition of error to truth, so that he is farther away from faith who
is farther away from Christ and the Gospel. Thus, a Buddhist denies
Christian truths more radically than a Jew, and a Jew more radically
than a Protestant. Hence, of three apostates, one to Protestantism,
another to Judaism and a third to Buddhism, the second sins more
grievously than the first, the third more grievously than the second.

825. If we leave out of consideration the radical truth of divine
revelation (formal object of faith), it is possible that a heretic,
in spite of his acceptance of Christ and the scriptures, should be
farther away objectively from faith than an infidel--that is, that he
should deny more revealed truths (material objects of faith). Thus, the
Manicheans called themselves followers and disciples of Christ, but
their teaching on God contains more errors than does the doctrine of
many pagans.

826. Heresy.--Heresy is defined as “an error manifestly opposed to
faith and assented to obstinately by one who had sincerely embraced the
faith of Christ.”

(a) It is called “error,” that is, positive assent given to error, or
dissent from truth. Hence, those who merely act or speak as if they do
not believe, but who internally do believe, are not heretics, although
in the external forum they may fall under the presumption of heresy.
Similarly, those who have doubts or difficulties in matters of faith,
but who do not allow these to sway their judgment, are not guilty of
heresy, since they give no positive assent to error (see 842 sqq.).
Examples: Titus is internally convinced of the truth of the Church’s
teaching; but he attends Protestant services, says he does not believe
the Trinity, refuses to make a profession of faith required by the
Church, separates himself from obedience to the authorities of the
Church, and calls himself an independent. By his former external acts
he makes himself guilty of disobedience and falls under the suspicion
of heresy, and by his last external act he incurs the guilt of schism;
but, since internally he does not disbelieve, he is not a heretic.
Balbus has doubts before his mind from his reading or conversation, but
he must immediately give his whole attention to a very pressing matter
of business, and so gives neither assent nor dissent to the doubts. He
is not guilty of heresy, since he formed no positive erroneous judgment.

(b) Heresy is “opposed to faith.” By faith here is understood divine
faith, especially divine and Catholic faith (see 755). Hence, an error
opposed to what one held to be a genuine private revelation, or to the
public revelation, especially when dogmatically defined by the Church,
is heretical. On the contrary, an error opposed to ecclesiastical faith
alone, to human faith, or to human science, is not of itself heretical.
Examples: The Saints who received special private revelations from
Christ with proofs of their genuineness would have been guilty of
heresy, had they refused to believe. Sempronius refuses to believe some
Biblical teachings about things not pertaining to faith and morals and
not expressly defined by the Church (e.g., chronological, physical,
geographical, statistical data). If he really believes that what he
denies is contained in the Bible, he is guilty of heresy. Balbus admits
the infallibility and authority of the Church, but he does not believe
that a certain Saint solemnly canonized is in heaven, that a certain
non-infallible decision of a Roman Congregation is true, that certain
second lessons of the Breviary or certain relics are genuine. He is
not a heretic, since, as supposed, he denies no revealed truth; but
in his first unbelief he sins against ecclesiastical faith; in his
second unbelief, if the contrary of the decision has not been clearly
established, he sins against the duty of religious assent; in his
third unbelief, he sins against prudence, if he has no good grounds
for his opinion, or against the respect due the Church, if he is moved
by contempt for its judgment. In a conversation between A, B, C, D
and E, the following opinions are defended. A thinks that any use of
natural knowledge with reference to matters of faith is wrong; B, that
the theologian should employ mathematics and physical science, but
avoid reasoning and philosophy; C, that the method and principles of
Scholasticism are not suited to our ago or to all peoples; D, that the
psychology and cosmology of the Scholastics should be remade entirely;
E, that many hypotheses of Aristotle in physics have been proved false.
The opinion of A contains heresies condemned in the Vatican Council
regarding the preambles of faith and the motives of credibility. The
opinions of B and C are at least contrary to the religious assent due
the authority of the Church (see Denzinger, Enchiridion, nn. 1652,
1680, 1713, Code of Canon Law, Canon 1366, Sec.2, _Humani Generis_, n.
11-14). The opinion of D, as it stands, contains a denial of several
doctrines of faith, such as the immortality of the soul and the
creation of the world, and is thus implicitly heretical. The opinion of
E is true and admitted by all.

(c) By “opposed” to faith is meant any judgment which, according to the
logical rules of opposition between propositions, is irreconcilable
with the truth of a formula of dogma or of a censure of heresy.
Examples: The Council of Trent defined that “all sins committed after
Baptism can be forgiven in the Sacrament of Penance.” It would be
heretical, therefore, to hold that “no sins committed after Baptism can
be pardoned in the Sacrament of Penance” (contrary opposition), or that
“some sins committed after Baptism cannot be absolved” (contradictory
opposition), Similarly, the Council of Trent (Sess. VI, Can. 7)
rejected the proposition that “all Works done before justification are
sinful,” and hence according to Logic the contradictory--viz., that
“some works before justification are not sinful”--is of faith, for two
contradictories cannot both be false; the contrary--viz., that “no
works before justification are sinful”--is not, however, defined, for
two contraries can both be false.

(d) Heresy is “manifestly opposed to faith.” He who denies what is
only probably a matter of faith, is not guilty of heresy. Example: The
Instruction of Eugenius IV on the matter of the Sacraments is held by
some authorities of note not to be a definition, and hence those who
accept opposite theories are not on that account heretical.

(e) Heresy is “assented to obstinately,” This is the distinctive note
of heresy, and hence those who assent to error through ignorance,
whether vincible or invincible, are not heretics, if they are willing
to accept the truth when known. A heretic, therefore, is one who
knowingly refuses to admit a truth proposed by the Church, whether his
motive be pride, desire of contradicting, or any other vice.

(f) Heresy is held “by one who had sincerely embraced the faith of
Christ.” This includes only catechumens and the baptized, for others
who deny the truths of faith are Jews or infidels, not heretics.

827. The sin of heresy (heresy before God), as just defined, differs
from the canonical crime of heresy (heresy before the Church), since
it is more inclusive. (a) These two differ as regards the error in the
intellect, for one is guilty of the sin, but not of the crime, even
without error--that is, if one denies what is really false, thinking
it to be defined doctrine; (b) they differ as regards the obstinacy in
the will, for one is guilty of the sin, but not of the crime, if one
is prepared in mind and purpose to deny a truth not yet defined, if it
is ever defined; (c) they differ as regards the truths rejected, for
one is guilty of the sin, but not of the crime, if one rejects divinely
revealed truths not defined as such by the Church; (d) they differ as
regards the person who denies, for not everyone who merely accepted the
faith of Christ can be guilty of the crime of heresy, but only those
who after Baptism retain the name of Christian (Canon 1325, Sec.2).

828. Various Kinds of Heresy.--(a) Heresy is positive when error is
accepted (e.g., the doctrine of consubstantiation); it is negative when
truth is denied (e.g., the doctrine of transubstantiation).

(b) Heresy is internal, when it is in the mind alone and not externally
professed. It is external, when expressed in an external way (i.e.,
by words, signs, acts or circumstances that clearly indicate present
heresy), if this is done not for a good purpose, such as that of asking
advice, but for the purpose of professing error.

(c) External heresy is occult, when it is made known to no one, or only
to a few; it is public or notorious, when it is made known before a
large number and cannot be concealed. Example: One who calls himself
a Catholic and is known as such, but who in conversation with a few
intimate friends declares himself a Modernist, is an occult heretic.
One who declares in public addresses or articles that he agrees with
Modernism, or who joins openly an heretical sect or has always belonged
to one, is a public heretic.

(d) Occult and public heresy may be either formal or material,
according as one is in good or bad faith. Heresy is formal, if its
malice is known and willed by the one in error; if its malice is not
known by him, it is material.

829. Heresy is not formal unless one pertinaciously rejects the truth,
knowing his error and consenting to it.

(a) One must know that one’s belief is opposed to divine revelation
or to Catholic faith. Hence, those who were born and brought up in
Protestantism, and who in good faith accept the confession of their
denomination, are not formal but material heretics. Even those who
are ignorant of their errors through grave fault and who hold to them
firmly, are guilty, not of formal heresy, but of sinful ignorance (see
904 sqq.)

(b) One must willingly consent to the error. But for formal heresy it
is not required that a person give his assent out of malice, or that
he continue in obstinate rejection for a long time, or that he refuse
to heed admonitions given him. Pertinacity here means true consent
to recognized error, and this can proceed from weakness (e.g., from
anger or other passion); it can be given in an instant, and does not
presuppose an admonition disregarded. Hence, if one sees the truth
of the Catholic Church, but fears that assent will involve many
obligations and out of weakness turns away from the truth, one then and
there pertinaciously consents to error.

830. Examples of material heresy are: (a) Catholics who deny certain
dogmas of faith, because they have not been well instructed, but who
are ready to correct their errors, whenever the Church’s teaching is
brought home to them; (b) non-Catholics who do not accept the Catholic
Church, but who have never had any misgivings about the tenets of their
own denomination, or who in doubts have searched for the truth to the
best of their ability.

831. The sinfulness of heresy is as follows: (a) formal heresy is a
grave sin, as was said above regarding unbelief in general (see 819;
Tit., iii. 10); (b) material heresy is no sin at all, if the ignorance
is invincible; it is a grave or a venial sin, according to the amount
of negligence, if the ignorance is vincible.

832. Circumstances of the sin of heresy are of various kinds. (a)
Circumstances that change the species. Most theologians hold that
the particular article denied, or the particular sect adhered to,
does not constitute a particular species of heresy, and hence that
in confession it suffices for one to accuse oneself generically of
heresy. (b) Circumstances that aggravate the sin. The facts that heresy
is external, that it is manifested to a large number, that it is
joined with apostasy and adhesion to an heretical sect, etc., increase
the accidental malice of this sin. (c) Circumstances that multiply
the number of sins. It seems that when several articles or defined
truths are denied at the same time, so many numerically distinct sins
are committed (see 219). Example: Titus says: “I do not accept the
Resurrection, either of Christ or of the dead.” The act is one, but two
sins are committed.

833. Various penalties and inhabilities are incurred through heresy,
for example, excommunication _latae sententiae_ reserved to the Pope
(Canon 2314), loss of the power of suffrage (Canon 167, Sec.1, n.4),
irregularity (Canon 984, n. 5; 985), inhability for the office of
sponsor (Canons 765, 795), deprivation of ecclesiastical burial (Canon
1240, Sec.1, n. 1). The excommunication which perhaps had been incurred
by those who now wish to join the Church is absolved according to the
form for the reception of converts prescribed by the Congregation of
the Holy Office, July 20, 1859, and found in rituals. Rituals published
after March, 1942, contain the formula of profession of faith and
abjuration approved by the Holy Office.

834. If a confessor should meet with a case of heresy, his procedure
will be as follows: (a) If the heresy was merely internal, no censure
was incurred, and every confessor has power to absolve from the sin,
no matter how serious it was. (b) If the heresy was external, but the
person was in good faith, or even in affected ignorance of the sin, or
inculpably ignorant of the penalty, no censure was incurred; for the
excommunication attaches only to formal heresy, and contumacity (Canon
2242). (c) If the heresy was external and formal, but not notorious
(i.e., the party did not publicly join an heretical sect), ordinarily
the case should be brought before the bishop for absolution in the
external or internal forum. But in urgent cases every confessor has
power to absolve as prescribed in Canon 2254. (d) If the heresy was
public and notorious (i.e., if the party joined officially an heretical
sect), absolution is regularly to be given in both the external and
internal forums. The case should be submitted first to the Ordinary,
unless there is urgency (Cfr. Canon 2254), or the confessor has special
powers from Rome. The Ordinary can absolve in the external forum.
Afterwards, the heretic can be absolved by any confessor in the forum
of conscience (see Canon 2314, Sec.2.)

835. Apostasy.--Apostasy (etymologically, desertion) has various
meanings in theology.

(a) In a special sense, it means the abandonment of the religious or
clerical state; but in its usual sense it means the abandonment of the
Christian religion.

(b) Apostasy from faith in a wide sense includes both partial
abandonment (heresy) and total abandonment; but, in the strict sense,
it means only total abandonment of Christianity.

Example: A Christian who denies one article of the Creed becomes a
heretic and an apostate in a wide sense; if he rejects the entire
Creed, he becomes an infidel and an apostate in the strict sense.

(c) Apostasy which extends to infidelity is also twofold: before God
and before the Church. The first kind is committed by any person
who really had faith, even though unbaptized or not a Catholic; the
second kind is committed only by those who were baptized and were
Catholics. Examples: A catechumen who accepted Christianity and asked
for Baptism, becomes an apostate before God if he abandons his belief
and purpose and goes back to paganism. Similarly, a person brought up
as a Lutheran becomes an apostate before God, if he abandons all belief
in Christianity. But the crime of apostasy of which the Church takes
cognizance is the desertion of Christianity by a baptized Catholic.

(d) A Catholic apostatizes from Christianity, either privatively (by
merely renouncing all belief in Christ), or contrarily (by taking up
some form of unbelief, such as indifferentism or free thought, or by
joining some infidel sect, such as Mohammedanism or Confucianism).

836. What was said above regarding the gravity, divisions, penalties
and absolution of heresy, can be applied also to apostasy.

887. As to the comparative gravity of sins of apostasy, the following
should be noted. (a) Apostasy is not a species of sin distinct from
heresy, since both are essentially the same in malice, being rejections
of the authority of divine revelation; but it is a circumstance that
aggravates the malice of unbelief, since it is more sweeping than
heresy (see 822, 824). (b) Apostasy into one form of infidelity is
not specifically different from apostasy into another, but the form
of infidelity is an aggravating or extenuating circumstance. Example:
Paganism is further from faith than Mohammedanism; atheism further than
paganism.

838. Could one ever have a just reason for abandoning the Catholic
Church or remaining outside its faith? (a) Objectively speaking, there
can never be a just cause for giving up Catholicism or for refusing
to embrace it. For the Catholic Church is the only true Church, and
it is the will of Christ that all should join it. (b) Subjectively
speaking, there may be a just cause for leaving or not entering the
Church, namely, the fact that a person, ignorant in this matter but
in good faith, believes that the Catholic Church is not the true
Church. For one is obliged to follow an erroneous conscience, and,
if the error is invincible, one is excused from sin (see 581-583).
Examples: A Protestant taught to believe that the teachings of the
Church are idolatrous, superstitious and absurd, is not blamed for not
accepting them. A Catholic, poorly instructed in religion and thrown
in with non-Catholic and anti-Catholic associates, might become really
persuaded, and without sinning against faith itself, that it was his
duty to become a Protestant.

839. Apostasy is committed not only by those who leave the Church and
join some contrary religion (e.g., Mormonism), but also by those who,
while professing to be Catholics, assent to the non-Catholic principles
of some society that claims to be philosophical, charitable, economic,
patriotic, etc. Much more are those apostates who join societies that
openly conspire against the Church. Such are: (a) Societies that are
really non-Catholic sects, because they have an infidel or heretical
creed--e.g., Freemasonry (which, according to its own authorities, is
a brotherhood based on Egyptian mysteries and claiming superiority to
Christianity), Theosophy (which is a conglomeration of nonsensical
ideas about the Deity, Christ and Redemption), the Red International,
whose aims are the destruction of property rights, etc; (b) Societies
that are anti-Catholic sects, because their creed is hatred of the
Church--e.g., the Orangemen’s Society, the Grand Orient, the Ku Klux
Klan, Junior Order, etc.

840. The Sin of Doubt.--Faith as explained above must be firm assent,
excluding doubt (see 752, 799), and hence the saying: “He who doubts
is an unbeliever.” The word “doubt,” however, has many meanings, and
in some of those meanings it is not opposed to firm assent, or has not
the voluntariness or acceptance of error that the unbelief of heresy or
infidelity includes. To begin with, doubt is either methodical or real.

(a) Methodical doubt in matters of faith is an inquiry into the motives
of credibility of religion and the reasons that support dogma, made
by one who has not the slightest fear that reason or science can ever
contradict faith, but who consults them for the purpose of clarifying
his knowledge and of strengthening his own faith or that of others.
This kind of doubt is employed by St. Thomas Aquinas, who questions
about each dogma in turn (e.g., “Whether God is good”), and examines
the objections of unbelievers against it; but unlike his namesake, the
doubting Apostle, he does not withhold assent until reason has answered
the objectors, but answers his own questions by an act of faith: “In
spite of all difficulties, God is good, for His Word says: ‘The Lord is
good to them that hope in Him, to the soul that seeketh Him’ (Lament,
iii. 25).”

(b) Real doubt, on the contrary, entertains fears that the teachings
of revelation or of the Church may be untrue, or that the opposite
teachings may be true.

841. Real doubt in matters of faith is always unjustifiable in itself,
for there is never any just reason for doubting God’s word; but it
is not always a sin of heresy or of infidelity. There are two kinds
of real doubt, viz., the involuntary and the voluntary. (a) Doubt is
involuntary, when it is without or contrary to the inclination of the
will, or when it proceeds from lack of knowledge (see 40-55 on the
Impediments to Voluntariness). Example: Indeliberate doubts, and doubts
that persist in spite of one, lack the inclination of the will, while
doubts that proceed from invincible ignorance lack knowledge. (b) Doubt
is voluntary, when it is according to inclination and with sufficient
knowledge.

842. Involuntary doubt in matters of faith is neither heretical nor
sinful, for an act is not sinful, unless it is willed (see 99).

(a) Indeliberate doubts arise in the mind before they are adverted to
and without any responsibility of one’s own for their appearance. From
what was said above on first motions of the soul (see 129), it is clear
that such doubts are not sinful.

(b) Unwelcome doubts persist in the mind after they have been adverted
to, and, since faith is obscure (see 752, 799), it is not possible to
exclude all conscious doubts, or even to prevent them from occurring
often or lasting a considerable time. From what was said above on
temptation (see 253 sqq.), it is clear that, if the person troubled
with unwished doubts makes prompt and sufficient resistance, he not
only does not sin, but gains merit. But, if his resistance is not all
it should be, and there is no danger of consent to the temptation, he
sins venially.

(c) Ignorant doubts occur in persons who have not received sufficient
religious instruction, through no fault of their own, and who therefore
regard the doctrines of faith as matters of opinion, or at least look
upon doubts as not sinful. From what was said above on invincible
ignorance (see 30), it is clear that such persons do not sin by their
doubts.

843. Voluntary doubt is entertained either in ignorance for which
one is responsible, or in full knowledge; in the former case it is
indirectly voluntary, in the latter, directly voluntary.

(a) The doubts of one who is responsible for them because he did not
use the means to instruct himself in the faith, are a sin of willful
ignorance proportionate to the negligence of which he was guilty; but,
if he is willing on better knowledge to put aside his doubts and accept
the teaching of the Church, he is not pertinacious, and hence not
guilty of heresy or infidelity.

(b) The doubts of one who is responsible for them, and not uninstructed
or ignorant in faith, are sometimes positive, sometimes negative.
Neither of these kinds of doubt is equivalent to heresy or infidelity
in every case.

844. Negative doubt is the state of mind in which one remains suspended
between the truth contained in an article of faith and its opposite,
without forming any positive judgment either of assent to or dissent
from the article, or its certainty or uncertainty.

(a) If this suspension of decision results from a wrong motive of
the will, which directs one not to give assent on the plea that the
intellect, while not judging, offers such formidable difficulties that
deception is possible, then it seems that the doubter is guilty of
implicit heresy, or at least puts himself in the immediate danger of
heresy.

(b) If this suspension of judgment results from some other motive of
the will (e.g., from the wish to give attention here and now to other
matters), the guilt of heresy is not incurred, for no positive judgment
is formed. Neither does it seem, apart from the danger of consent
to positive doubt or from the obligation of an affirmative precept
of faith then and there (see 925), that any serious sin in matters
of faith is committed by such a suspension of judgment. Examples:
Titus, being scandalized by the sinful conduct of certain Catholics,
is tempted to doubt the divinity of the Church. He does not yield to
the temptation by deciding that the divinity of the Church is really
doubtful, but the difficulty has so impressed him that he decides to
hold his judgment in abeyance. It seems that there is here an implicit
judgment (i.e., one contained in the motive of the doubt) in favor of
the uncertainty of the divinity of the Church. Balbus has the same
difficulty as Titus, and it prevents him from eliciting an act of
faith on various occasions. But the reason for this is that an urgent
business matter comes up and he turns his attention to it, or that he
does not wish at the time to weary his brain by considering such an
important question as that of faith, or that he thinks he can conquer a
temptation more easily by diverting his thoughts to other subjects (see
257), or that he puts off till a more favorable moment the rejection
of the difficulty. In these cases there is not heretical doubt,
since Balbus forms no positive judgment, even implicitly, but there
may be a sin against faith. Thus, Balbus would sin seriously if his
suspension of assent should place him in immediate danger of positive
doubt; he would sin venially, if that suspension be due to some slight
carelessness.

845. Positive doubt is the state of mind in which one decides, on
account of some difficulty against faith, that the latter is really
doubtful and uncertain, and that assent cannot be given to either
side. With regard to such a state of mind note: (a) If this judgment
is formed by a Catholic, it is heretical; for his faith, as he knows
and admits, is the true faith, revealed and proposed as absolutely
certain. Hence, although he does not deny the faith, he does positively
judge that what is revealed by God and proposed infallibly by the
Church as certain, is not certain, and thus in his intellect there is
pertinacious error.

(b) If this judgment is formed by a non-Catholic, it is likewise
heretical, if the truth doubted belongs to divine or Catholic faith,
for we are now considering the formal heretic who belongs to a
non-Catholic sect against conviction; but it is not heretical, if the
doctrine doubted belongs only to what is wrongly considered in his sect
as divine faith, or to what may be called Protestant faith (i.e., the
official confession of his religion), for he does not profess to accept
his church as an infallible interpreter.

846. The doubts We have been just discussing are the passing doubts
that come to those who are believers, or who consider themselves
believers. There are also doubts that are permanent, and that are held
by those who class themselves, not as believers, but as doubters or
agnostics. Some of these sceptics doubt all religious creeds, holding
that it is works and not beliefs that matter. This doctrine amounts to
infidelity, since it rejects Christian faith entirely. Others profess
Fundamentalism, which accepts a few Christian beliefs and considers the
others as optional, pretending that the true faith cannot be recognized
amid so much diversity of opinions. This doctrine is heretical, since
it accepts some and rejects others of the articles of faith.

847. Credulity and Rationalism.--Opposed in special ways to the
material and formal objects of faith are credulity and errors about the
existence and nature of revelation.

(a) Other sins against faith are opposed to its material object (i.e.,
the articles of belief), inasmuch as they subtract from it by denying
this or that article. Credulity, on the contrary, adds to the material
object of faith by accepting a doctrine as revealed when there is no
prudent reason for so doing, contrary to the teaching of scripture
that “he who is hasty to believe is light of heart” (Ecclus., xix. 4).
This sin is opposed rather to prudence, inasmuch as it causes one to
neglect the consideration of the reasons on which a prudent judgment
rests (see Vol. II), and hence it does not destroy the virtue of faith.
It is, nevertheless, injurious to faith, since it brings Christianity
into contempt, keeps others from embracing the teachings of the Church,
and leads to superstition, the “twin-sister of unbelief.” Examples:
Sempronia, who is not well educated, accepts as matters of faith every
pious legend, every marvellous report of miracle no matter from what
source it comes or how suspicious may be its appearance. Titus holds
many views considered by good authorities as improbable or false, or
as at best only opinions, but he gives them out as doctrines of the
Church that must be accepted, or as infallible or revealed teaching.
The credulity of Sempronia is excusable imprudence on account of her
ignorance, if she has not neglected instruction; but that of Titus is
blameworthy, for he ought to inform himself better before attempting to
instruct others.

(b) Other kinds of unbelief are opposed to the formal object of faith
(i.e., to the authority of revelation as the motive of belief); for
implicitly at least they substitute private judgment for authority. The
various systems of Naturalism, such as Deism, go farther and openly
attack supernatural revelation as the ground of belief. Some of these
systems deny the fact of revelation (e.g., Deism), others its character
(e.g., Modernism, which makes revelation to consist in the internal
experience of the believer), others its necessity (e.g., Rationalism).
These heterodox teachings pertain, some to infidelity (e.g., Deism),
some to heresy (c.g., Modernism). The great majority of Protestants
nowadays cannot be said to have faith, declares Cardinal Newman, since
they deduce from scripture, instead of believing a teacher. What looks
like faith is mere hereditary persuasion.

848. Dangers to Faith.--One becomes guilty of heresy, infidelity,
doubts against faith, etc., indirectly, by placing oneself in the
danger of those sins (see 258 sqq., on the Dangers of Sin). Dangers of
this kind are partly internal, partly external.

(a) Internal dangers to faith are especially the following:
intellectual pride or an excessive spirit of independence, which
makes one unwilling to accept authority; love of pleasure, which sets
one at odds with the precepts of faith; neglect of prayer and piety,
particularly in time of temptation.

(b) External dangers to faith are especially as follows: literature
opposed to religion; schools where unbelief is defended; mixed
marriages; association with unbelievers in religious matters; certain
societies.

849. Dangerous Reading.--There is a threefold prohibition against the
reading of literature dangerous to faith.

(a) The natural law forbids one to read or hear read written matter
of any description which one knows is dangerous to one’s faith, even
though it is not dangerous to others and not forbidden by the law of
the Church. For a similar reason one may not keep such material in
one’s possession. Example: Titus and Balbus read the letters of a
friend on Evolution. Titus finds nothing unsound in the letters, and
is not troubled by reading them; but they fill the mind of Balbus with
doubts and perplexities, as the subject is above him. This reading is
naturally dangerous for Balbus, but not for Titus.

(b) The law of the Church forbids the use of certain kinds of writings
or representations dangerous to faith (Canon 1399), as well as of those
individual writings that have been denounced to the Holy See and placed
on the Index, or forbidden by other ecclestiastical authorities. (See
Appendix I for Summary of Common Law on Prohibition of Books.)

(c) The law of the Church also pronounces ipso facto excommunication
against those who make use of works written by unbelievers in favor of
their errors (Canon 2318).

850. As regards the kind of sin committed by using writings dangerous
to faith, the following points must be noted:

(a) If a writing is dangerous and forbidden under natural law, the sin
committed is of itself grave whenever the danger itself is serious and
proximate; it is venial, when the danger is slight or remote. The sin
committed depends, therefore, not on the time spent in reading or the
number of pages covered, but on the danger (see 260-261, on the Dangers
of Sin). No sin at all is committed, if the danger is slight or remote,
and there is reason for reading the writing in question (e.g., the
defense of truth).

(b) If the writing is forbidden under ecclesiastical law, the sin
committed is of itself grave, even though the danger to an individual
is not serious or proximate, for the law is based on the presumption
of a common and great danger (see 460). The sin is not grave, however,
when the prohibition is generally regarded as not binding under grave
sin, or when the use made of the writing is inconsiderable. No sin at
all is committed, if one has obtained the necessary permission to read
forbidden works, and is not exposed to spiritual danger in using the
permission.

851. There are two cases in which the use of writings forbidden by the
Church is only a venial sin. (a) When a writing, which in itself is
not dangerous or only slightly dangerous, is forbidden, not on account
of its contents, but only on account of its lack of ecclesiastical
approval, it is not ordinarily regarded as forbidden under grave sin
(e.g., Catholic Translations of scripture that have not received the
Imprimatur). (b) When a writing has been condemned on account of its
contents or manner of presentation, one does not sin mortally, if the
use one makes of it is only slight.

852. What constitutes notable use of forbidden matter is not determined
by law, but recent moralists, bearing in mind the character of the law
and what would prove proximately dangerous to faith for the generality
today, offer the following rules: (a) notable matter in reading a book
is three or four pages from the more dangerous parts, from thirty to
sixty pages from the slightly dangerous parts; (b) notable matter in
reading a paper or periodical is habitual use of it, or even one very
bitter article; (c) notable matter in retention of forbidden writings
is a period in excess of the reasonable time (say, a month) for
securing permission or for delivering the writings to those who have a
right to have them.

853. It is more difficult to decide what is notable matter, when a book
has been condemned on account of its general tendency. (a) Under the
natural law, of course, even a page or less is notable matter, if it
places an individual in proximate danger; (b) under the positive law,
perhaps anything in excess of one-tenth of the book would place one in
proximate danger. But, as we are dealing now with the general tendency
of a writing, this may have its effect on the reader before he has read
one-tenth, if the book is large, or the treatment is very seductive.
Hence, “one-tenth” is an approximation, rather than a rule.

854. The kinds of printed matter forbidden by the Code (Canon 1399) are
as follows: (a) the prohibition extends to books, to other published
matter (such as magazines and newspapers), and to illustrations that
attack religion and what are called “holy pictures” (i.e., images of
our Lord and the Saints), if opposed to the mind of the Church; (b)
the prohibition extends to published matter dangerous to faith, and
therefore to the following; to writings or caricatures that attack the
existence of God, miracles or other foundations of natural or revealed
religion, Catholic dogma, worship or discipline, the ecclesiastical
hierarchy as such, or the clerical or religious state; to those that
defend heresy, schism, superstition, condemned errors, subversive
societies, or suicide, duelling, divorce; to non-Catholic publications
of the Bible and to non-Catholic works on religion that are not clearly
free from opposition to Catholic faith; to liturgical works that do
not agree with the authentic texts; to books that publish apocryphal
indulgences and to printed images of holy persons that would be the
occasion of error (e.g., the representation of the Holy Ghost in human
form).

855. The mere presence, however, of condemned matter in a writing does
not cause it to fall under prohibition.

(a) Some works are not forbidden unless the author’s purpose to teach
error or attack the truth is known. Hence, books on religion written
by non-Catholics which contain errors against the Catholic Faith are
not forbidden, unless they deal with religion _ex professo_ (i.e., not
incidentally or cursorily, but clearly for the purpose of teaching).
It is not necessary, however, that religion be the main theme of the
book, Similarly, books that attack religion are forbidden, not when
attacks are casual or by the way, but when they are made purposely;
and the same is true as regards books that insult the clerical state.
The purpose is recognized from the declaration of the author, from the
nature of the work, from the systematic treatment, length or frequency
of argumentation or attack, etc.

(b) Other works are not forbidden, unless they contain not only
agreement with error, but also argument in defense of error. Thus,
books in favor of heresy, schism, suicide, duelling, divorce,
Freemasonry, etc., are forbidden when they champion wrong causes by
disputing in their behalf.

(c) Other works are forbidden, not because they state, but because
they approve of error. Such are books that attack or ridicule the
foundations of religion or the dogmas of faith, those that disparage
worship, those that are subversive of discipline, those that defend
proscribed propositions, those that teach and favor superstition, etc.

856. Books that deal with religion _ex professo_ (i.e., of set
purpose), or _obiter_ (i.e., incidentally), are as follows: (a) Books
that are _ex professo_ religious are manuals of theology, works of
sermons, treatises on the Bible, instructions on religious duties,
works of piety, text-books of church history. Works of a profane
character, such as scientific books, may also teach religion _ex
professo_, but it is not easy as a rule to perceive the intention of
teaching religion in works of this kind. (b) Books that deal with
religion only _obiter_ are works of a profane character, in which
the subject of religion is introduced only briefly (e.g., by way of
illustration).

857. Books dealing _ex professo_ with religion and written by
non-Catholics are: (a) forbidden, if they contain matter contrary to
Catholic faith; (b) not forbidden, if it is clear to one (e.g., from a
competent review) that they contain nothing contrary to Catholic faith.

858. How is one to know in a particular case whether a book falls under
one of the foregoing classes forbidden by the Code? (a) If the Holy
See has made a declaration, the matter is of course clear; (b) if no
declaration has been made, and one is competent to judge for oneself,
one may read as much as is necessary to decide whether the book is one
of those proscribed by the Code; but if a person has not received the
education that would fit him for judging, he should consult some person
more skilled than himself, such as his parish priest or confessor.

859. Is it lawful to read newspapers, magazines, or reference works
(such as encyclopedias), which contain some articles contrary to faith,
and others that are good or indifferent, if these papers or books have
not been condemned? (a) If the reading or consultation, on account of
one’s individual character, will subject one to grave temptations,
then according to natural law it should be avoided. (b) If there is no
serious danger or temptation, but the policy of the works or journals
in question is anti-religious or anti-Catholic, as appears from the
space given to hostile attack, their frequency or bitterness of spirit,
then, according to the law of the Code just mentioned, one should avoid
such reading matter. Examples of this kind of literature are papers
devoted to atheistic or bolshevistic propaganda, anti-Catholic sheets,
etc. (c) If there is no danger to the individual, and the editorial
policy is not hostile, one may use such matter as is good and useful,
while passing over any elaborate or systematic attack on truth or
defense of error.

860. Individual books are forbidden by name to all Catholics by the
Holy See and to their own subjects by Ordinaries and other local or
particular councils (Canon 1395). Books condemned by the Apostolic See
must be considered as forbidden everywhere and in whatsoever language
they may be translated into (Canon 1396).

(a) If a book is forbidden, one may not read even the harmless parts of
it, for there is the danger that, if one part is read, the other parts
will also be read. But, if the part that occasioned the prohibition be
removed, the prohibition ceases as regards the remainder of the book.

(b) If a work is forbidden, one may not read any volume, if all the
volumes deal with the same subject. But, if the volumes treat of
different subjects or of one subject that is divisible (e.g., universal
history), one may read such volumes as do not contain the danger that
occasioned the prohibition.

(c) If all the works of an author are condemned, the prohibition is
understood to apply only to books (i.e., not to smaller works), and
only to books dealing with religion, unless it appears that the other
kinds of writings are also included; but the prohibition is to be
presumed to include works that appear after the condemnation, unless
the contrary is manifest.

861. Some outstanding works that have been condemned are the following:
(a) In English: _Decline and Fall of The Roman Empire_ (Gibbons);
_Myth, Ritual, and Religion_ (Andrew Lang); _History of England_
(Goldsmith); _The Roman Popes_ (Ranke); _The Life and Pontificate
of Leo X_ (Roscoe); _Constitutional History of England_ (Hallam);
_Political Economy_ (Mill); _Happiness in Hell_ (Mivart); _History
of English Literature_ (Taine); _Reign of Charles V_ (Robertson);
_Zoonomia_, or The Laws of Organic Life (Darwin).

(b) In French: _Notre Dame de Paris_ (Hugo); _Life of Jesus_ and
eighteen other works of Renan; all the works of Anatole France; _The
Social Contract_ and four works of Rousseau; nearly all the works
of Voltaire; _The Gospel and the Church, Gospel Studies, The Fourth
Gospel, Apropos of a Little Book, The Religion of Israel_ (Loisy); all
the works of Jean Paul Sartre; _La Deuxieme Sexe_ and _Les Mandarins_
by Simone de Beauvoir.

862. What is meant by “use” of forbidden writings? (a) In the first
place, those “use” a writing who read it--that is, who go over it
with their eyes, understanding the meaning therein contained. Hence,
a person does not violate the church law against forbidden books if
he merely listens to another read; although he might sin against the
natural law, and even against the church law, if he induced the other
to read to him; neither does a person violate the church law, if he
merely glances at the characters, without understanding the sense
expressed. Example: Titus, a professor of theology, has permission to
read forbidden books, and he sometimes reads to his class doctrinal
passages from works on the Index in order to explain and refute errors.
Balbus examines very carefully the pages of a beautifully printed copy
of a forbidden work, but he understands hardly a word of it, since it
is in a foreign language. Neither Titus’ class nor Balbus are guilty of
reading as forbidden by the Church, for strict interpretation is given
to penal laws (see 485).

(b) In the second place, those “use” a forbidden writing who retain
it--that is, who keep it in their home as belonging to themselves or
borrowed from another, or who give it for safekeeping to another,
even though they are not able to read it. Hence, a librarian who has
forbidden books on his shelves does not break the law, since the books
are not his property, nor are they kept in his home. A bookbinder
also who receives forbidden books is considered as excused through
_epieikeia_ for the time the books are in his shop, especially if his
customer has the permission to read those books. Example: Sempronius
bought an expensive work and then discovered that it is on the Index.
Is he obliged to destroy it? No, if he does not wish to destroy it, he
may, if he does not delay beyond a month, either give it to someone who
has permission to keep it, or obtain that permission for himself.

(c) In the third place, those “use” a forbidden writing who communicate
it to others--for example, those who make presents of works that are on
the Index, who lend such books to others, or place them where others
will read them, who read to others passages or write out excerpts for
them. It is lawful, however, for professors in theological and other
classes of sacred science to read from forbidden works to their student
body, if a suitable explanation and refutation exclude all danger.

(d) Lastly, those fall under the law as violators who co-operate in
the production or distribution of forbidden literature--for example,
publishers, owners, authors, translators, booksellers, printers, etc.
(cfr. 976 sqq., on cooperation in Worship).

863. The church law on forbidden literature affects all Catholics not
excepted by law, no matter how learned they may be, what position they
may hold, or how immune from danger they may seem, unless they obtain
permission to read such literature from the Holy See, the Ordinary,
or their regular Superior (Canon 1402). Those excepted by law and
who do not need to seek such permission are certain prelates and
students. (a) Cardinals, Bishops, and other Ordinaries (Canon 1401),
and likewise major superiors in exempt clerical orders (Canon 198,
Sec. 1) are not bound by the church prohibition of books dangerous to
faith; (b) those who are pursuing theological or biblical studies may
use forbidden editions of scripture, provided these are correct and
complete as to the text, and contain no attacks on Catholic teaching in
the introductions and annotations (Canon 1400). This permission extends
not only to seminarians, but also to lay students; not only to those
who are at school, but also to those who are really studying outside
of school, such as professors, writers and those who are preparing
lectures or dissertations.

864. When the necessity of reading a forbidden book is urgent, and
the opportunity of asking permission from the Holy See or Ordinary
is lacking, a person whose duties call for acquaintance with such a
book may consider that the law does not bind in his particular case
(see 411-417 on _epieikeia_). (a) A professor, editor, critic, etc.,
who had not yet received permission might read a forbidden book, if,
being called upon to criticize it, he could not await the permission;
(b) a confessor, pastor, etc., in similar circumstances could read a
forbidden book in order to be able to refute it.

865. Those who have received permission to read books forbidden as
generally dangerous to faith, may also read papers and periodicals
of the same character, and they may use the permission given them
anywhere, since it is a personal indult (see 446). The following
restrictions, however, are understood in the grant of permission:

(a) Permission to read, no matter by whom granted, does not make it
lawful to read what is really a danger to one’s faith, for this (as
explained above in 849-850) is contrary to natural law. Moreover, those
who have received an apostolic indult may not read or retain books
proscribed by their Ordinaries, unless the indult extends even to this.

(b) Permission to retain does not make it lawful to keep forbidden
books in such a way that they will fall into the hands of those
who have no right to read them. On the contrary, there is a grave
obligation arising from the natural law to prevent such a thing from
happening. Hence, those who have permission to keep writings dangerous
to faith should not place them on shelves to which there is general
access, or else they should label them as dangerous and forbidden (see
Canons 1405, Sec.1, and 1403, Sec.2).

866. According to Canon 2318, the following censures are incurred
through the use of forbidden books:

(a) Excommunication specially reserved to the Apostolic See is incurred
_ipso facto_ by those who offer to the public books, even of a
non-religious character, written by apostates, schismatics, or heretics
in systematic defense of heresy or schism. This censure applies, first,
to the chief causes of publicity of the work--i.e., to the author who
offers it for publication, and to the publisher and printer (owner or
manager of the press) who accept it for that purpose--not, however,
to remote cooperators or helpers; secondly, to such chief causes as
understand the character of the book, either from the word of the
author or from the contents. It is not incurred, if the work is not
published (i.e., if it remains in manuscript, or is circulated only
privately), or if it is published in other than book form (e.g., as a
pamphlet, leaflet or article). Ignorance, if not crass or supine (see
27), excuses from this censure (Canon 2229, Sec.3, n. 1).

(b) The same censure is incurred by those who defend the aforementioned
books, either materially (e.g., by saving them from destruction) or
morally (e.g., by defending, praising, or recommending them). Ignorance
excuses here as in the case of publishers.

(c) The same censure is incurred by those who defend books of any
author condemned by name through Apostolic letters. Hence, the censure
does not apply to books condemned by a pontifical congregation nor to
books condemned in a Papal Letter, if their title is not mentioned.
Ignorance excuses here as in the previous case.

(d) The same censure is incurred by those who knowingly keep or read
any of the forbidden books mentioned so far in this paragraph. The
sense to be attached to the words “keep or read” has been given above
(see 862). Even crass and supine ignorance of law or penalty, provided
it be not affected, as well as other causes that lessen imputability
(see 40), excuse from this censure (Canon 2229, Sec.Sec.1, 2).

(e) Excommunication not reserved is incurred _ipso facto_ by authors
and publishers who are responsible for the printing without due
authorization of books of Holy Writ, or of notes or commentaries on the
Bible, even though the text be correct and the explanation orthodox.
This censure is not incurred by those who are not responsible for the
printing done, such as typesetters and readers. Ignorance, if not crass
and supine, excuses here (Canon 2229, Sec.3).

867. Dangerous Schools.--With reference to their danger to faith,
schools are of three kinds:

(a) sectarian schools, in which heresy or infidelity is prescribed
as part of the curriculum, and assistance at non-Catholic rites
is required. Examples are colleges and universities supported by
Protestant denominations, sectarian Sunday schools, Bible classes;

(b) neutral schools (i.e., schools in which all religious teaching
is forbidden and no recognition given to any denomination) whose
spirit and teaching in secular branches is anti-religious or
anti-Catholic. Examples are non-sectarian colleges or universities in
which materialism is incidentally taught, or in which the faculty are
freethinkers or bigots;

(c) neutral schools in which no positive offense is given to religion
or the Church. Examples are public schools in which only the profane
sciences are taught, and care is exercised that neither the text-books
nor the teachers shall be irreligious or interfere with the religious
beliefs of others. Reducible to this category are mixed schools, that
is, those which are open also to non-Catholics (Canon 1374).

868. The danger of the foregoing kinds of schools to the faith of
pupils is as follows:

(a) in the sectarian schools there is danger of heresy or infidelity,
since the pupils are obliged to hear the defense of false doctrine and
to join in the services of a false religion;

(b) in the neutral schools of an anti-religious spirit the danger
is the same, for the pupils must attend courses in which the
interpretations given to history, science, philosophy, letters, etc.,
are unfriendly to the faith;

(c) in the neutral schools whose spirit is not anti-religious, there
is a danger of Indifferentism that arises from the system itself; for
the very fact that religion is slighted tends to impress the students
with the idea that it is unimportant or unrelated to other matters of
life, and this prepares the way for doubt and scepticism. Moreover,
since example teaches more effectively than the printed or spoken word,
the neglect or contempt of religion by professors and fellow-pupils in
mixed schools is a danger to faith.

869. The lawfulness or unlawfulness of attending or patronizing schools
dangerous to faith must be decided according to the principles given
above on the occasions of sin (see 263 sqq.).

(a) If the danger to faith is voluntary, the use of such schools is not
lawful, for those who are able are bound to seek or provide religious
education both in elementary and higher schooling (see Canon 1373).
Example: In the town of X there are good parochial and Catholic high
schools. Sempronius could easily send his children to these schools,
but he thinks that certain select schools offer greater social and
financial advantages, and so he chooses them. His conduct is not lawful.

(b) If the danger to faith is necessary, the use of such schools is
lawful, provided the needed precautions are duly observed. Example: In
the country district of Y there is no school except the public school,
and therefore Balbus sends his children to that school. His conduct is
lawful, but he must see that his children receive religious instruction
outside of school.

870. The danger to faith is necessary when there is no Catholic school,
or none that is sufficient for the needs of individual students, and
their parents are unable to send them elsewhere. In such a case it
is lawful to attend a school that is neutral, but means must be used
to make the proximate danger remote. Such means are the following:
(a) religious instruction must be taken outside of school, as in
special week-day classes, Sunday school, home study, etc.; (b) special
attention must be given to the strengthening of faith on those points
that are attacked or slighted in the neutral school; (c) parents,
guardians, or others responsible must see that the reading and the
associates of their wards in the neutral schools are good, and that
they are faithful to their religious duties.

871. Is attendance at non-Catholic schools sometimes unlawful, even
when there are serious reasons in its favor?

(a) It is unlawful, if the schools are sectarian, and then no
excuse can justify such attendance; for, in addition to scandal and
cooperation in false worship, there is present a proximate danger to
faith that is not made remote. Parents or guardians who knowingly send
their children to schools for education in a non-Catholic religion are
suspected of heresy and incur excommunication _ipso facto_, reserved
to the Ordinary (see Canon 2319). Example: Titus sends his daughter to
a sectarian academy because it is nearer and cheaper than the Catholic
academy. He claims that she is old enough not to lose her religion,
that opposition will make her faith stronger, etc. Titus’ arguments are
fallacious and his conduct gravely sinful.

(b) Attendance at non-Catholic schools is unlawful, if the schools are
neutral in theory, but so dangerous in practice that loss of faith is
practically certain if one attends. Example: Balbus sends his son to an
undenominational university which is regarded as a hotbed of atheism,
and whose students practically to a man lose all religion.

872. Absolution should be denied in some cases to those who send their
children to non-Catholic schools, if they refuse to change.

(a) Absolution should be denied on account of lack of faith in the
parents themselves, if they send their children to non-Catholic schools
on account of their own ideas that are contrary to the teachings of the
Church. Example: Sempronius refuses to send his children to parochial
schools, because he thinks each one should judge about religion for
himself, and not receive it from instructors.

(b) Absolution should be denied on account of the danger caused to the
faith of the children, when the children are sent to sectarian schools,
or when they are sent to neutral schools and sufficient efforts are not
used to counteract the evil influence there felt.

(c) Absolution should be refused on account of scandal or cooperation
in evil, if, while the parents themselves are sound in faith and
prevent all danger of perversion of their children, they send them
to non-Catholic schools without sufficient reason, to the grave
disedification of others, or the great assistance of unchristian
education.

873. Absolution should not be denied in the following cases: (a) when
the parents have a sufficient reason for sending their children to
non-Catholic schools (i.e., a reason approved by the local Ordinary
as sufficient). It belongs only to the Ordinary to decide in what
circumstances and with what precautions attendance at such schools is
allowable (Canon 1374; for application to the United States, see Holy
Office, 24 Nov., 1875; Council of Baltimore, III, n. 199, in regard
to elementary and high schools. As to colleges and universities, see
_S.C.Prop.Fid_., 7 Apr., 1860; _Fontes_, n. 4649, Vol VII, p. 381;
n.4868, Vol. VII, p.405; also S.C.Prop.Fid., 6 Aug., 1867); (b) when
the parents have no sufficient reason, but there is no lack of faith on
their part, no danger of perversion of the children, no grave scandal
or sinful co-operation in evil.

874. The presence of Catholics as teachers in non-Catholic schools
is beneficial, since it lessens to some extent the evil influence of
such schools; but there is also the danger that it may cause scandal
or create the impression that attendance at Catholic schools is not
necessary. Hence, it has been permitted by the Church in certain cases
but only when danger of scandal or wrong impression is absent. (a)
The secular sciences may be taught by laymen in non-Catholic schools
of higher or lower education, if there is no scandal, no unlawful
cooperation, and no immediate danger of perversion. (b) Christian
doctrine may be taught by priests to Catholic students of neutral
schools, either in the school building or elsewhere (as in a church),
and certain priests may be appointed as chaplains for this work (Sacred
Congregation of the Holy Office to Bishops of Switzerland, March 26,
1866).

875. Dangerous Marriages.--The following kinds of marriage are
dangerous to the faith of Catholics: (a) marriage with non-Catholics,
unbaptized or bigoted persons (mixed marriages); (b) marriage with
fallen-away Catholics (that is, with those who have given up the
Catholic religion, although they have not joined another), or with
those who belong to societies forbidden by the Church.

876. The danger to faith in the aforesaid kinds of marriage are serious
and proximate, and hence such unions are forbidden by divine law, as
long as the danger is not removed or made remote through the use of
precautions. The dangers are for the Catholic party and the children.

(a) The Catholic party is in serious danger of losing the faith
(i.e., of joining the religion or sharing the ideas of the other
party), or of doubting the truth of the Church, or of taking refuge in
Indifferentism. For, if domestic life is peaceful, the Catholic may
easily be led in time to regard with favor the other party’s religion
or views; if it is not peaceful, the Catholic through fear or annoyance
may make compromises or sacrifices in matters of faith, or else suffer
temptations that could have been avoided.

(b) The children born are in serious danger of being deprived of the
faith (i.e., of not being brought up as Catholics), or of having their
faith weakened by the example of parents who do not agree in the matter
of religion. If the non-Catholic or fallen-away Catholic interferes
with the religion of the children, their baptism, religious education,
attendance at church, etc., will be forbidden or impeded; if that
party does not interfere, there will be at least the example during
impressionable years of one parent who does not accept the Catholic
faith or who disregards its requirements. Statistics indicate that one
of the chief sources of leakage in the Church today is mixed marriages.

877. Dangerous marriages are also forbidden by the law of the Church.
(a) Lack of baptism in the non-Catholic party causes the diriment
impediment of disparity of worship (Canon 1070); (b) membership of the
non-Catholic party in an heretical or schismatical sect causes the
prohibitive impediment of mixed religion (Canon 1060); (c) unworthiness
of one of the parties, on account of notorious apostasy or affiliation
with forbidden societies (see 945 sqq.), prevents the pastor from
assisting at the marriage without permission from the Ordinary (Canon
1065).

878. No one may enter into any of the dangerous marriages here
considered, unless the requirements of the natural and ecclesiastical
laws be complied with. (a) The natural law requires under pain of grave
sin that the danger of perversion be removed, that no non-Catholic
ceremony take place, and that the Catholic spouse work prudently for
the conversion of the other party. (b) The ecclesiastical law requires
under grave sin that guarantees be given that the requirements of the
natural law shall be fulfilled (Canons 1061, 1071); that there be grave
and urgent reasons for the marriage (ibid.); that dispensations from
the impediments be obtained, or permission, in the case of unworthiness
of one of the parties, to assist at the marriage be granted by the
Ordinary (Canons 1036, 1065).

879. The canonical consequences of dangerous marriages illegally
contracted are as follows: (a) Those who knowingly contract a mixed
marriage without dispensation are _ipso facto_ excluded from legitimate
ecclesiastical acts, (e.g., the office of godparent), and from the
use of sacramentals, until a dispensation has been obtained from the
Ordinary (Canon 2375). Marriage contracted with the impediment of
disparity of worship is invalid, whether the parties are in ignorance
or not (Canon 1070, Sec.16). (b) Catholics who enter into marriage
before a non-Catholic minister acting in a religious capacity or who
contract marriage with the implicit or explicit understanding that
any or all of the children will be educated outside the Church incur
excommunication _latae sententiae_ reserved to the Ordinary (Canon
2319).

880. The prenuptial guarantees required by church law in case of mixed
or other dangerous marriages are as follows: (a) According to the
Code, no dispensation for mixed marriages will be granted unless the
non-Catholic party gives a guarantee that the danger of perversion
for the Catholic party shall be removed, and both parties promise
that all the children shall be baptized and brought up only in the
Catholic faith. There must be moral certainty that the promises will be
kept, and as a rule they should be demanded in writing (Canons 1061,
1071). The permission for marriage with fallen-away Catholics is not
granted until the Ordinary has satisfied himself that the danger to the
Catholic and the children has been removed (Canon 1065, Sec.2). (b) The
pre-Code legislation further required that both parties promise that
there would be no non-Catholic ceremony and that the Catholic promise
to work for the conversion of the other party. Canons 1062-1063 speak
of these obligations, but do not exact promises.

881. Remedies against mixed and other dangerous marriages are the
following: (a) Before engagement Catholics should be instructed and
encouraged to marry those of their own faith. Thus, confessors can
discourage company-keeping with non-Catholics, parents can provide
their children with opportunities for meeting suitable Catholics, and,
above all, pastors should frequently speak and preach to old and young
on the evils of mixed marriages. (b) After engagement to a non-Catholic
has been made, the non-Catholic should be persuaded to accept the
Catholic religion, if he or she can do this with sincerity; otherwise,
the Catholic should be warned of the danger of the marriage, and the
pastor should refuse to seek a dispensation unless there is a really
serious cause (see Canon 1064; II Plenary Council of Baltimore, n. 336;
III Plenary Council of Baltimore, n. 133).

882. Dangerous Communication.--Mixed marriages are mentioned specially
among the communications with non-Catholic that are dangerous to faith,
because marriage is a lifelong and intimate association. But there
are other communications with unbelievers that can easily corrupt
faith, the less dangerous being communication in matters that are not
religious, and the more dangerous being communication in religious
matters. (a) Non-religious or civil communication is association with
non-Catholics in secular affairs, such as business, social life,
education, politics. (b) Religious communication is association with
non-Catholics in sacred services or divine worship.

883. Non-religious communication is sinful as follows: (a) It is sinful
according to natural law, when in a particular case it would be a
proximate danger of perversion freely chosen, or an involuntary danger
against which one does not employ sufficient precaution. Examples:
Titus chooses infidels and freethinkers for his friends and intimates,
understanding their character and bad influence. Balba on account of
her poverty is obliged to work in a place where all her companions are
unbelievers who scoff at religion and try in every way to win her over
to their errors; yet she is not concerned to arm herself more strongly
in faith.

(b) According to ecclesiastical law, civil communication is forbidden
with those who have been excommunicated as persons to be avoided (Canon
2267). Such persons are those who lay violent hands on the Roman
Pontiff (Canon 2343), or who have been excommunicated by individual
name and as persons to be avoided through public decree or sentence of
the Apostolic See (Canon 2258). Exception is made, however, for husband
and wife, children, servants, subjects, and for others in case of
necessity.

884. Religious communication is sinful on account of danger in the
following cases:

(a) If it is a proximate and voluntary occasion of sin against faith.
Examples: Sempronius goes to a non-Catholic church to hear a minister
who attacks the divinity of Christ and other articles of the Creed.
The purpose of Sempronius is to benefit himself as a public speaker,
but he knows that his faith suffers, because he admires the orator.
Balbus chooses to listen over the radio to attacks on religion and
Christianity, which cause serious temptations to him.

(b) If it is a necessary occasion of sin and one does not employ
sufficient precautions against it, religious communication becomes
sinful. Example: Titus, a prisoner, has to listen at times to a jail
chaplain, who teaches that there are errors in the Bible, that man
evolved from the ape, etc. Titus feels himself drawn sympathetically to
these teachings, but makes no effort to strengthen his faith.

885. Communication with unbelievers that is a remote occasion of sin,
is not sinful, for “otherwise one must needs go out of this world” (I
Cor., v. 9). On the contrary, reasons of justice or charity frequently
make it necessary and commendable to have friendly dealings with
those of other or no religious conviction. (a) Reasons of justice.
It is necessary to cooperate with non-Catholic fellow-citizens in
what pertains to the welfare of our common country, state, city, and
neighborhood; to be just and fair in business relations with those
outside the Church, etc. (b) Reasons of charity. Catholics should be
courteous and kind to all (Heb., xii. 14), and be willing to assist,
temporarily and spiritually, those outside the Church. Thus, St. Paul,
without sacrificing principle or doctrine, made himself all things to
all men, in order to gain all (I Cor., ix. 19). Indeed, the mission
of the Church would suffer, if Catholics today kept aloof from all
that goes on about them. The Church must teach, by example as well as
precept, must be a salt, a light, a leaven, an example of the Gospel in
practice; and surely this ministry will be weakened if her children aim
at complete isolation and exclusivism.

886. Societies that are purely civil or profane--e.g., social clubs,
charitable organizations, temperance societies, labor unions, that
are not identified with any church and are neutral in religion--may
be dangerous to faith. (a) There may be danger on account of the
membership, even when the nature of the society is purely indifferent
or good. Example: It would be dangerous to faith to join a convivial
society whose members were mostly aggressive infidels, even though
the purpose of the organization was only recreation. (b) There may be
danger to faith on account of certain methods or principles of the
society. Example: A Boys’ or Girls’ Club whose purpose is to train
young people for good citizenship is dangerous to faith, if it acts
as though the natural virtues were sufficient, or as though moral
education belonged to itself exclusively or principally.

887. The Sin of Blasphemy.--So far we have spoken of the sins of
unbelief that are contrary to the internal act of faith. We now come
to the sins that are contrary to the external act, or profession of
faith. These sins are of two kinds: (a) The less serious sin is that of
ordinary denial of the faith, that is, the assertion that some article
of faith is false, or that some contrary error is true. This sin will
be treated below in 913 sqq. on the commandments of faith. (b) The more
serious sin is blasphemy, that is, the denial to God of something that
is His; or the ascription to God of what does not belong to Him. Of
this sin we shall speak now.

888. Blasphemy etymologically is from the Greek, and signifies damage
done to reputation or character; theologically, it is applied only to
insults or calumnies offered to God, and is threefold according to
the three stages of sin described above (see 168). (a) Blasphemy of
the heart is internal, committed only in thought and will. So “the
wicked man said in his heart: There is no God” (Ps. xviii. 1), and the
demons and lost souls blasphemed God without words (Apoc., xvi. 9).
(b) Blasphemy of the mouth is external, committed in spoken words, or
in their written or printed representations. (c) Blasphemy of deeds is
also external, committed by acts or gestures. The action of Julian the
Apostate in casting his blood towards heaven was intended as a sign of
contempt for Christ.

889. Internal blasphemy does not differ from unbelief or disrespect for
God. We are concerned here, therefore, only with external blasphemy,
which is contrary to the external profession of faith. External
blasphemy is opposed to faith either directly (by denying what is of
faith) or indirectly (by showing disrespect to what is of faith), and
hence it is either heretical or non-heretical.

(a) Heretical blasphemy affirms about God something false, or denies
about Him something true. The false affirmation is made directly, when
some created imperfection is attributed to God, or indirectly, when
some divine perfection is attributed to a creature. Example: It is
heretical blasphemy to affirm that God is a tyrant or the cause of sin,
or that man is able to overcome God. It is also heretical blasphemy to
deny that God is able to perform miracles, that His testimony is true,
etc.

(b) Non-heretical blasphemy affirms or denies something about God
according to truth, but in a mocking or blaming way. This sin is
opposed, therefore, to reverence rather than to faith, and will be
treated later among the sins against the virtue of religion (see Vol.
II). Example: A person in anger at God says scornfully: “God is good!”

890. The nature of heretical blasphemy will better appear, if we
compare it with other kinds of speech disrespectful to God.

(a) It differs from maledictions or curses, (e.g., “May God destroy
you!”), because the one directly offended in blasphemy is God Himself,
while in a curse it is some creature of God.

(b) It differs from non-heretical blasphemy, from perjury and disregard
of vow, from vain use of the name of God, because none of these
necessarily proceeds from a lack of faith, as does heretical blasphemy.
Non-heretical blasphemy proceeds from hatred or contempt of God,
perjury from presumption, disregard of vow from disobedience, vain use
of the Divine Name from irreverence.

(c) Heretical blasphemy differs from temptation of God (e.g., “God
must help me now if He can,” said by one who exposes himself rashly to
danger), for, while temptation of God implies doubt, it is directly an
act of irreverence by which one presumes to put God Himself to proof,
whereas heretical blasphemy is directly an act of denial of truth.

891. Heretical blasphemy calumniates God, either in His own attributes
and perfections, or in those created persons or things that are
specially His by reason of friendship or consecration. Thus, we have:
(a) blasphemy that attacks the Divine Being Himself, as was explained
above; (b) blasphemy that attacks what is especially dear to God, which
consists in remarks or acts derogatory to the Blessed Virgin, the
Saints, the Sacraments, the crucifix, the Bible, etc.

892. Unlike God, creatures are subject to imperfections, moral or
physical, and thus it is not always erroneous or blasphemous to
attribute imperfections to the Saints or sacred things.

(a) If sacred persons or things are spoken ill of precisely on account
of their relation to God, or in such a way that the evil said of
them reverts on God Himself, blasphemy is committed. Example: It is
blasphemous to say that the Mother of God was not a Virgin, that St.
Peter was a reprobate, that St. Anthony and St. Simeon Stylites were
snobbish or eccentric, that the Sacraments are nonsense, that relics
are an imposture, etc.

(b) If sacred persons or things are criticized precisely on account
of their human or finite imperfections, real or alleged, the sin of
irreverence is committed, when the criticism is prompted by malice
or levity. No sin at all is committed, if one is stating facts with
due respect for the character of the persons or things spoken of.
Examples: To call a Doctor of the Church an ignoramus out of anger at a
theological opinion defended by him, would be of itself a serious sin
of disrespect. To speak of a Saint as a dirty tramp or idle visionary,
if the intention is to insult, is also a serious sin of disrespect.
But, if one were to say in joke that St. Peter was a baldhead, St.
Charles Borromeo a big nose, the sin of irreverence would be only
slight. No sin would be committed, if one, describing a religious
painting from the artistic standpoint, called it an abomination.

893. Heretical blasphemy is expressed not only by sentences that
are complete and in the indicative mood, but also by phrases or
interjections, by wishes, commands, or even signs.

(a) Blasphemy is expressed optatively, imperatively, or
interrogatively. Examples: “Away with God!” is equivalent to the
assertion that God is not eternal. “Come down from the cross, if Thou
be the Son of God” (Matt., xxvii. 40), is equivalent to the statement
that Christ is not the Son of God. The question put to the Psalmist,
“Where is thy God?” (Ps. xli. 4.), meant in the mouth of the Psalmist’s
enemies that Jehovah did not exist, or was powerless.

(b) Blasphemy is expressed even by short words, or by a grunt or snort
of contempt. Example: To utter the name of our Lord in a contumelious
way signifies that one regards Him as of no account. The word
“hocus-pocus” is sometimes used in derision of the Mass or other sacred
rites.

(c) Blasphemy is expressed by acts that signify disbelief and dishonor,
for example, to spit or shake one’s fist at heaven, to turn up the nose
or make a wry face at the mention of God, to trample in the dust a
crucifix, etc.

894. Rules for Interpreting Cases of Doubtful Blasphemy.--(a)
Custom or usage is a better guide than etymology or grammar in
discovering whether a blasphemous meaning is contained in certain
common expressions of an ambiguous character. Examples: According to
signification the phrase, “Sacred Name of God,” is harmless and might
be a pious ejaculation, but according to the sense in which it is taken
in French it curses God and is blasphemous. According to signification,
the expression “Ye gods” in English, “Thousand names of God” in French,
“Thousand Sacraments” in German, are blasphemous; but according to
the sense in which they are used by the people they merely express
surprise, and are at most a venial sin of irreverence. The English
language as a whole is singularly free from blasphemous expressions,
just as English classic literature as a whole is singularly free from
obscenity.

(b) The dispositions or feelings of the user are a better index of the
presence or absence of blasphemy than the mere words, if the latter
are capable of various senses. If doubt persists about the sense of an
ambiguous expression that could be blasphemous, it may be held that
no blasphemy was intended. Examples: Titus, a good man, is so annoyed
trying to correct his children that he exclaims: “Why did the Lord
ever send me such pests?” Balbus, who is a hater of religion, answers
him: “Who is to blame if they are pests?” Since Titus is habitually
religious and Balbus habitually irreligious, the question of the former
sounds like irritation, the question of the latter like blasphemy.
Claudius is a very religious-minded man, but he meets with a series
of calamities which so stun him that he exclaims: “I must be only a
step-child of God. Certainly, He cares little for me. Why did He ever
create me?” The sentiment seems to be one of grief and wonder rather
than of insult to God. Balbus is very devoted to his mother, and often
addresses her in hyperbolic language, saying that he adores her, that
she is the goddess at Whose shrine he worships, his supreme beatitude,
etc. Taken literally, these expressions are blasphemous, but as used by
Balbus they are harmless.

895. The Sinfulness of Blasphemy.--(a) From its very nature (i.e., from
the importance of the rights it attacks and the goods it injures),
blasphemy is a mortal sin, since it outrages the Majesty of God, and
destroys the virtues of religion, love of God, and frequently faith
itself. In the Old Testament it was punished with death (Lev., xxiv. 15
sqq.), and Canon 2323 of the Code prescribes that blasphemy be punished
as the Ordinary shall decide. It is also a crime at common law and
generally by statute, as tending to a breach of the peace and being a
public nuisance or destructive of the foundations of civil society;
when printed, it is a libel.

(b) Unbelief is the greatest of sins after hatred of God (see 820). But
blasphemy is the greatest of the sins against faith, since to inner
unbelief it adds external denial and insult.

(c) Blasphemy cannot become a venial sin on account of the smallness
of the matter involved, for even slight slander or scorn becomes great
when its object is God Himself. Example: It is blasphemous to say
that our Lord was not above small or venial imperfections, or to show
contempt for even one of the least of the Saints as such.

(d) Blasphemy cannot become a venial sin on account of unpremeditation,
if at the time it is committed one is aware of its character, just as
murder does not become a venial sin, because one killed another in a
sudden fit of anger. Example: Sempronius has the habit when driving his
refractory mules of shouting at them: “You creatures of the devil!” A
priest on hearing this admonishes Sempronius that the expression is
blasphemous. But Sempronius continues to use it whenever the mules
irritate him, making no effort to improve.

896. There are some cases in which blasphemy is only a venial sin or no
sin on account of the lack of deliberation.

(a) If there is no advertence or only semi-advertence to the act
itself, the blasphemy pronounced, unless it be voluntary in its cause
(see 102, 196), is not a mortal sin. In the former case, there is no
sin at all, for the act is not human (see 33); in the latter case
there cannot be mortal sin, for there is no full reflection on the
deed (see 175). Example: Balbus now and then catches himself humming
blasphemous songs that he heard years ago, but he always stops as soon
as he thinks of what he is saying. Titus, coming out of the ether after
an operation, makes a few blasphemous remarks, but he is so dazed
that he hardly knows who is speaking. Sempronius makes himself drunk,
foreseeing that he will blaspheme while out of his senses. Balbus
commits no sin, Titus may be guilty of venial sin, but Sempronius is
guilty of mortal sin in blaspheming.

(b) If there is no advertence or only semi-advertence to the malice of
the act, the blasphemy pronounced, if it is not voluntary in its cause,
is not a mortal sin; for one is not responsible for more than one
knows or should know (see 99-100, on imputability). Examples: Titus, a
foreigner, has been taught to repeat certain blasphemous phrases, whose
real meaning he does not suspect. Balbus has the habit when angry of
blaspheming at his mules, but he is doing his best to use more suitable
language. Sempronius unawares gets into a tipsy condition in which he
realizes his acts, but is confused about moral distinctions, and hence
uses blasphemous expressions which he would abhor if he were in his
normal state. Caius, a boy, blasphemes, thinking that he is committing
only a venial sin of “cussing.”

897. Different kinds of blasphemy must be noted with reference to the
duty of confession.

[a] There are three distinct species of blasphemy--non-heretical, which
is opposed to the virtue of religion; heretical, which is opposed to
religion and faith; diabolical, which is opposed to religion, faith
and the precept to love God. These species should be distinguished
in confession. Examples: Titus, angered because his Patron Saint did
not obtain a favor for him, ironically turns the Saint’s picture to
the wall, saying: “You have great influence with God!” (non-heretical
blasphemy). Balbus in similar circumstances said: “I have lost all
faith in Saints” (heretical blasphemy). Sempronia, Whose child has just
died, rebels against God and calls Him a cruel monster (diabolical
blasphemy).

(b) Circumstances may aggravate the malice of blasphemy. Blasphemy that
is directly against God Himself is worse than blasphemy against the
Saints; blasphemy against the Blessed Virgin is worse than blasphemy
against other friends of God; blasphemy that ascribes evil to God is
greater than blasphemy that denies Him some perfection; blasphemy
that excuses itself or boasts is worse than blasphemy that is more
concealed; blasphemy that expressly intends to dishonor God is graver
than blasphemy that only implicitly intends this. Some authors require
that aggravating circumstances be mentioned in confession, but others
say this is not necessary (see Vol. II).

898. According to the causes from which they proceed (see 250),
blasphemies are divided into three kinds: (a) blasphemy against the
Father, which is contumely spoken against God out of passion or
weakness, as when one being annoyed uses what he knows to be blasphemy;
(b) blasphemy against the Son, which is contumely against God spoken
out of ignorance. Thus, St. Paul said of himself that he had been a
blasphemer, and a persecutor, and contumelious, but that he obtained
mercy, because he did it ignorantly in unbelief (I Tim., i. 12, 13);
(c) blasphemy against the Holy Ghost, which is contumely against
God spoken out of sheer malice. Such was the sin of the Jews, who
attributed the divine works of Christ to the prince of demons (Matt,
xii. 31).

899. To the Holy Ghost are appropriated the supernatural gifts of
God that prevent or remove sin; and, as these can be reduced to six,
there are also six sins against the Holy Ghost (i.e., six kinds of
contemptuous disregard of spiritual life). The expression of this inner
contempt is a blasphemy.

(a) Man is kept from sin by the hope mingled with fear which the
thought of God, as both merciful and just, excites in him. Hence,
despair and presumption which remove these divine preventives of sin
are blasphemies against the Holy Ghost.

(b) Man is kept from sin, next, by the light God gives him to know the
truth and by the grace He diffuses that all may perform good. Hence,
resistance to the known truth and displeasure at the progress of God’s
kingdom are also sins against the Spirit of truth and holiness.

(c) Man is kept from sin by the shamefulness of sin itself and the
nothingness of the passing satisfaction it affords; for the former
inclines him to be ashamed of sin committed, or to repent, while the
latter tends to make him tire of sin and give it up. Hence, the resolve
not to grieve over sin and obstinate adherence to such a resolve are
also sins against the Holy Ghost.

900. There is no sin which, if repented of, cannot be forgiven in this
life. How then does our Lord say that the blasphemy against the Holy
Spirit shall not be forgiven, neither in this world nor in the world to
come (Matt., xii. 31)?

(a) The sins against the Holy Ghost are unpardonable according to
their nature, just as some diseases are incurable according to their
nature, because not only do they set up an evil condition, but they
also remove or resist those things that could lead to betterment. Thus,
if one despairs, or presumes, or resists truth or good, or determines
not to abandon error or evil, one shuts out the remedy of repentance,
which is necessary for pardon; whereas, if one sins through passion or
ignorance, faith and hope remain and help one to repentance.

(b) The sins against the Holy Ghost are not unpardonable, if we
consider the omnipotence of God. Just as God can cure miraculously
a disease that is humanly incurable, so can He pardon a sin which,
according to its nature, is unpardonable; for He is able to bring hope
and repentance to those who were in despair, for example. Hence, we
repeat, there is no sin which, if repented of, cannot be forgiven in
this life.

901. Does one arrive at the state of malicious sin or blasphemy
suddenly or gradually? (a) Malice in sin (i.e., the willing choice of
evil by one who is not weakened by ignorance or passion) is sometimes
due to a disorder in the will itself which has a strong inclination
towards wrong, as when long-continued habit has made sin attractive. It
is clear that in such cases one does not arrive at blasphemy suddenly,
Example: Titus blasphemes with readiness and without remorse. This
argues that he is an adept and not a beginner, for readiness and strong
attachment are signs of practice. (b) Malice in sin is sometimes due to
the fact that the will has lost certain protections against sin, and
hence chooses sin readily and gladly, as happens when a sin against the
Holy Ghost has been committed. Generally, the contempt of God’s gifts
contained in sins against the Holy Ghost does not come suddenly, but
follows as the climax of a progressive deterioration (Prov., xviii. 3);
but, since man is free and sin very alluring, it is not impossible that
one should suddenly become a blasphemer, especially if one had not been
careful before in other matters. It is next to impossible, however,
that a religious-minded man should all at once become a blasphemer or
malicious sinner.

902. Remedies Against Blasphemy.--(a) Those who blaspheme maliciously
should be admonished of the enormity of their sin, as well as the
absurdity of defying the Almighty (Ps. ii. 1, 4). Prayers and
ejaculations in praise of God are a suitable penance for them. (b)
Those who blaspheme through habit or out of sudden anger or passion
should be told that at least they cause great scandal, and make
themselves ridiculous. A good practice for overcoming habit or sudden
outbursts is that some mortification or almsdeed or litany should be
performed each time blasphemy is uttered.

903. Absolution of Blasphemers.--(a) If blasphemy is not heretical, no
censure or reservation is incurred under the general law, and every
confessor may absolve; (b) if blasphemy is heretical, excommunication
is incurred under the conditions given above in 834, and absolution may
be granted as explained there.

904. Sins of Ignorance, Blindness, Dullness.--After the sins against
faith itself come the sins against the Gifts of the Holy Ghost that
serve faith (see 808): (a) against the Gift of Knowledge is the sin
of ignorance; (b) against the Gift of Understanding are the sins of
blindness of heart and dullness of understanding.

905. Ignorance (as explained in 28 and 249) is a cause of sin--of
material sin, if the ignorance is antecedent, of formal sin, if the
ignorance is consequent. But ignorance is also a sin itself, in the
sense now to be explained.

(a) Ignorance may be considered in itself (i.e., precisely as it is the
absence of knowledge), and in this sense it is not called a sin, since
under this aspect it is not opposed to moral virtue, but to knowledge,
the perfection of the intellect.

(b) Ignorance may be considered in relation to the will (i.e.,
precisely as it is a voluntary defect), and in this sense it is a sin,
since under this aspect it is opposed to the moral virtue of studiosity
(i.e., the part of temperance which moderates the desire of learning
and keeps the golden mean between curiosity and negligence). This
sin of ignorance pertains to neglect, and is twofold; it is called
affected ignorance, if the will is strongly desirous of the lack of
due knowledge, and is called careless ignorance, if the will is remiss
in desiring due knowledge. Affected ignorance is a sin of commission,
careless ignorance a sin of omission.

(c) Ignorance may be considered in relation to obligatory acts (i.e.,
precisely as it makes one voluntarily incapable of fulfilling one’s
duties), and in this sense it partakes of various kinds of sinfulness,
inasmuch as he who is voluntarily ignorant of his duty is responsible
for the mistakes he will make. Thus, he who is sinfully ignorant in
matters of faith, will fail against the precepts of that virtue; he who
does not know what his state of life as judge, lawyer, physician, etc.,
requires, will fail against justice; he who does not know what charity
demands of him, will sin against charity.

906. The malice of the sin of ignorance in matters of faith is as
follows: (a) Vincible ignorance of the truths one is obliged to know,
whether the obligation be of means or of precept (see 360, 786 sqq.),
is a grave sin, for faith in these truths is commanded under pain of
losing salvation (Mark, xvi. 15, 16). (b) The sin committed is but
one sin, regardless of length of time, and is incurred at the time
one omits due diligence in acquiring knowledge, as is the case with
other sins of omission. Hence, he who remains in culpable ignorance of
Christian doctrine for a year commits one sin, but the length of time
is an aggravating circumstance.

907. Culpable ignorance regarding truths of faith, as a distinct sin,
is as follows:

(a) It is not distinct from its cause (i.e., negligence), for
ignorance is not a sin at all, except in so far as it proceeds from
negligence. Hence, one would not be obliged to accuse oneself of the
sins of omission in regard to instruction in Christian doctrine and of
ignorance in Christian doctrine, for these are but one sin.

(b) Culpable ignorance is not distinct from its effect (i.e., from
a sin committed on account of the ignorance), if the truth one is
ignorant of has to be known only on account of some passing duty that
must be performed here and now; for in such a case the knowledge is
required, not for its own sake, but for the sake of the duty. Hence,
ignorance of fact or of a particular law is not distinct as a sin from
the sin that results from it. Examples: Titus knows that he should not
take money that belongs to another; but through his own carelessness he
is ignorant of the fact that the money before him belongs to another,
and takes the money. Balbus knows that the precept of the Church on
fasting is obligatory; but through his own negligence he is unaware
that today is a fast day, and does not fast. Titus and Balbus committed
one sin apiece.

(c) Culpable ignorance is distinct from its effect, if the truth one
is ignorant of has to be known for its own sake; for in such a case
one sins against the virtue of studiosity (see 905) by not knowing
something which one should know habitually, and also against some other
virtue by violating its precepts as a result of one’s sinful ignorance.
Truths one is obliged to know for their own sake are the mysteries of
faith, the Commandments of the Decalogue, the Precepts of the Church,
and the duties of one’s own state. Examples: Sempronius through his own
carelessness does not know the mystery of the Incarnation, and as a
result blasphemes Christ. Titus does not know that stealing is a sin,
and therefore he steals. In both cases two sins are committed, the sin
of ignorance and the sin that resulted from ignorance.

908. Cases in which ignorance in matters of faith is not culpable are
the following: (a) if one has used sufficient diligence to acquire
knowledge, one is not responsible for one’s ignorance; (b) if one
has not used sufficient diligence to acquire knowledge, one is not
responsible for one’s ignorance, if the lack of diligence is not one’s
fault.

909. Sufficient diligence is a broad term and has to be understood with
relation to the mental ability of the person and the importance and
difficulty of the truth in question. What is sufficient diligence in
an illiterate person, or with regard to a matter of minor importance,
would be insufficient in a learned person, or in a matter of greater
importance. However, the following general rules can be given:

(a) To be sufficient, diligence need not be as a rule supreme (i.e.,
it is not necessary that one employ every possible means to acquire
instruction), for even the most conscientious persons feel they have
used sufficient diligence when they have employed the usual means for
obtaining religious instruction;

(b) To be sufficient, diligence should equal that which is employed by
good people in similar circumstances. Thus, the unlearned who consult
the learned or frequent the instructions provided for them, the learned
who devote themselves to study as ordered and who seek assistance in
doubts, are sufficiently diligent.

910. One who has not used sufficient diligence is sometimes
responsible, sometimes not responsible.

(a) A person is not responsible for his ignorance and lack of
sufficient diligence, if he conscientiously desires to have the proper
amount of instruction, and has not even a suspicion that his studies
and knowledge are not sufficient. Example: Titus, having gone through
a very small catechism, thought that he understood Christian doctrine
sufficiently and had done all that was required. But some years later
he discovered, when examined, that he was ignorant of many important
matters, and had entirely misunderstood others.

(b) A person is responsible for his lack of diligence and knowledge, if
at heart he does not care to know, even though no fears or doubts about
his ignorance disturb him. Examples: Balbus always felt religion a
bore. At Sunday school he was daydreaming; now during sermons on Sunday
he falls asleep. The result is that he has many infidel ideas, but
doesn’t know it, and is not much concerned. Caius secured for himself
an office, for which he is unfitted on account of his ignorance.
But he enjoys his position so much, and cares so little about its
responsibilities, that he does not even dream of his incompetence, and
would not try to change things if he did.

911. Similar to negligence about the truths of faith itself is
negligence about truths connected with faith. (a) An unbeliever is
guilty of negligence when against conscience he fails to pray for light
and to inquire or inform himself about the credentials of religion,
revelation, and the Church; (b) a believer is guilty of negligence if
he fails to seek answers to objections against faith, when thrown much
in the company of objectors.

912. Like to sins of ignorance are the two sins opposed to the Gift
of Understanding. (a) Dullness of understanding is a weakness of mind
as regards spiritual things which makes it very difficult for one to
consider or understand them. It is sinful inasmuch as it arises from
over-affection for carnal things, especially the delights of eating
and drinking. (b) Blindness of mind is a complete lack of knowledge of
divine things due to the fact that one refuses to consider them lest
one feel obligated to do good, or to the fact that one is so wedded to
passion that one gives it all one’s attention (Ps. xxv. 4). Blindness
is sometimes a punishment (Is., vi. 10; Wis., ii. 21); it is a sin when
it is voluntary--that is, when carnal delights, especially lust, make
one disgusted or negligent as to the things of faith. Abstinence and
chastity are two means that greatly aid spiritual understanding, as is
seen in the example of Daniel and his companions (Dan. i. 17).




Art. 3: THE COMMANDMENTS OF FAITH

(_Summa Theologica_, II-II, q. 16.)

913. Unlike the commandments of justice, which are summed up in the
Decalogue, the commandments of faith are not given in any one place
of scripture; but they may be reduced to three: (a) one must acquire
knowledge and understanding of one’s faith according to one’s state in
life and duties; (b) one must believe internally the truths of faith;
(c) one must profess externally one’s belief.

914. The Commandment of Knowledge.--The first of the foregoing
commandments includes three things. (a) The doctrines of faith must be
taught and must be listened to--“These words thou shalt tell to thy
children” (Deut., vi. 6), “Teach ye all nations” (Matt, xxviii. 19),
“He that heareth you heareth Me, and he that despiseth you despiseth
Me” (Luke, x. 16). (b) One must apply oneself to understand what one
hears--“Thou shalt meditate on these words, sitting in thy house, and
walking on thy journey, sleeping and rising” (Deut., vi. 7), “Meditate
upon these things, be wholly in these things. Take heed to thyself
and doctrine” (I Tim., iv, 15, 16). (c) One must retain what one has
learned--“Thou shalt bind the words of the law as a sign on thy hand,
and they shall be and shall move between thy eyes. And thou shalt write
them in the entry and on the doors of thy house” (Deut., vi. 8, 9);
“Have in mind in what manner thou hast received and heard” (Apoc., iii.
3).

915. The means of communicating a knowledge of the faith to unbelievers
are as follows:

(a) The remote means is to get a hearing from those who have not the
true faith, and this supposes that one secure their good will through
edifying example and charity towards them: “Be without offense to the
Jews and the Gentiles, and to the church of God; as I also in all
things please all men, not seeking that which is profitable to myself,
but to many that they may be saved” (I Cor., x. 32, 33); “Let us work
good to all men” (Gal., vi. 10).

(b) The proximate means of communicating a knowledge of faith is the
declaration of the faith to non-Catholics who are willing to hear,
through missionaries sent to foreign countries, Catholic literature
given to those who are well-disposed, invitations to Catholic
instructions, public lectures on the faith, the question box at
missions, etc. (see Canons 1350, 1351). cooperation with Catholic
schools and publications, foreign and home missions, etc., makes one a
sharer in the work of the apostles who are bearing the burden of the
day.

916. The means appointed by the Church for communicating the doctrines
of faith to Catholics are as follows:

(a) For the Laity.--From childhood religious and moral training
should have the first place in education, and should not be confined
to elementary schools, but continued in secondary and higher schools
(Canons 1372, 1373). Pastors are obliged to give catechetical
instructions, and parents must see that their children attend them
(Canons 1329-1336).

(b) For the Clergy.--Aspirants to the priesthood must follow the
courses prescribed for preparatory and higher seminaries or houses
of studies (Canons 1352-1371, 587-592), and no one is admitted to
Orders who has not passed canonical examinations (Canons 996, 997,
389, Sec.2). The faculties for hearing confessions and preaching
also presuppose examinations (Canons 1340, 877), and no one is to be
promoted to ecclesiastical offices, such as that of parish priest,
unless he is judged competent in knowledge (Canons 459, 149). The
clergy are encouraged to take university studies and degrees (Canons
1380, 1378).

917. A person applies himself sufficiently to the understanding of
the teaching of faith when he takes care that, both extensively or in
quantity and intensively or in quality, his knowledge is all that is
required of him.

(a) Extensively, the knowledge should be such as to include at least
all those truths that have to be known, because explicit faith in
them is necessary; (b) intensively, the knowledge should be more or
less perfect according to the greater or less intelligence, rank or
responsibility of the person.

918. The truths that have to be known by all capable of the knowledge
are as follows:

(a) All must know, from the necessity of the case (necessity of means),
that they have a supernatural destiny and that Christ is the Way that
leads to it; for one cannot tend to a destination, if one is unaware
of its existence and of the road that will bring one there. Hence, all
must know the four basic truths: God our Last End, the Trinity, the
Incarnation, God the Remunerator (see 787).

(b) All must know, from the will of Christ (necessity of precept),
the other truths to which He wishes them expressly to assent, and the
duties, general or particular, that He wishes them to fulfill (Mark,
xvi. 16); that is, they must know the doctrine contained in the Creed,
the commandments and ordinances of Christ concerning the Sacraments and
prayer, and the special obligations of each one’s particular state or
office.

919. As to the degree of knowledge that one must possess intensively
(i.e., as to its quality and perfection), it is clear that knowledge
ought to be more perfect in those who are more intelligent or whose
duties call for a more excellent learning.

(a) Knowledge of the truths that should be known by all the faithful
ought to be of a more developed kind in those whose minds are more
mature. A scientific and theological understanding of religion is not
required in any lay person; nor should we expect the same knowledge
in a child as in an adult, or in a subnormal person as in one who is
normal mentally. Examples: No religious instruction is necessary for
an idiot (i.e., a grown-up person who has the mind of a two-year-old
child), for such a one cannot reason. A child of seven or an imbecile
(i.e., a grown-up person whose mentality is on a par with that of a
child of seven) may be received to Communion, after such a child or
imbecile has learned in a simple way that the God-Man is received in
the Eucharist and that it is not common food. A child who is between
ten and twelve and a moron (i.e., a grown-up who is not mentally such a
child’s superior) should receive more instruction than an imbecile.

(b) Knowledge of sacred doctrine naturally should be greater in priests
than in the laity; for in religious things priests are the teachers,
the people their pupils (Mal., ii. 7). A mediocre knowledge of theology
in a priest is not sufficient, especially in these days when the laity
are educated, when theological questions are debated on all sides, and
when so many outside the Church as well as in it are looking for help
and light. A profound knowledge of abstruse questions, however, is
not demanded of all priests in an equal degree: more is expected of a
bishop than of his parish priests, more of a parish priest than of one
who has not the care of souls or office of teaching, more of one who
has to speak to or write for the better educated than of one who has to
do these things for those who are less educated, etc. Knowledge should
include not only learning, but also prudence (i.e., good judgment and
practical ability to use learning well), for a priest learns, not for
his own sake alone, but also for the benefit of others.

920. Scientific or complete knowledge is not required of those who are
not theologians, as was said about the four basic truths (see 790). It
suffices for lay persons that they know in a simple way, according to
their age and capacity, the substance of the truths they must believe.
Thus, they should know:

(a) The Creed.--One should know about God, that He is but one and that
there are three divine Persons, Father, Son and Holy Ghost; that God is
the maker of the world, and that He will reward everyone according to
his deeds. One should know about Christ, that He is the Son of God and
God Himself; that He was miraculously born of the Blessed Virgin Mary;
that He suffered and died for our salvation; that He rose from the dead
and by His own power ascended into glory and will come again after the
general resurrection to judge all. One should know about the Church,
that it is the one true Church founded by Christ, in which are found
the communication of spiritual goods and the forgiveness of sins.

(b) The Decalogue.--One should know the general meaning of the
Commandments so as to be able to regulate one’s own conduct by them.
It is not necessary that a child should know all the kinds of crimes
and vices that are forbidden by the Commandments. In fact, it is better
for such not to know much about evil. Nor is it required that a layman
should know how to make correct applications of the Commandments to
complicated situations that require much previous study.

(c) The Virtues.--One should know enough to be able to apply to one’s
own life, for ordinary cases, what a virtuous life demands. It is not
necessary that a child should know the requirements of prudence as well
as an experienced person, or that a layman should be able to settle
doubts of conscience as well as a priest. But each should know enough
to fulfill what is required of one of his age and condition. Both old
and young should know in substance the acts of faith, hope, charity and
contrition; for to these all are bound. The young should know the laws
of the Church that apply to them (e.g., the law of abstinence); the
older people should understand the law of fasting which they are bound
to observe, etc.

(d) The Sacraments.--One should know substantially the doctrine of
the Sacraments that are necessary for all, namely, Baptism, Penance
and the Eucharist. Since all the faithful have the duty of baptizing
in case of necessity, all should know how to administer lay Baptism
properly and fruitfully. When the time comes for receiving a Sacrament,
the recipient should know enough to receive it validly, licitly, and
devoutly, although less knowledge is required in children and in the
dying who cannot be fully instructed (see Canons 752, 854, 1330, 1331,
1020).

(e) Special Duties.--One should know the essentials of one’s
condition or state of life and the right way to perform its ordinary
duties. Children should understand the obligations of pupils and
of subjects; the married, religious and priests should know the
duties of their respective states; citizens, the loyalty owed to the
community; officials, judges, lawyers, physicians, teachers, etc., the
responsibilities to the public which their own professions imply.

(f) The Lord’s Prayer.--The substance of this form of prayer should be
known by all, namely, that God is to be glorified, and that we should
ask of Him with confidence goods of soul and body and deliverance from
evil. Though Christ is the only necessary Mediator (I Tim., ii. 5),
it is most suitable that all should know substantially the Hail Mary,
namely, that we should ask the intercession of her who is the Mother of
God and our Mother (John, xix, 27).

921. Is a person guilty of sin who does not know what to do in some
manner that pertains to his state of life? (a) If he is blamably
ignorant of the nature of a state he has undertaken or of the ordinary
duties that it imposes, he is guilty of sin; for he is, in a sense,
unjust to himself by obligating himself to what he does not understand,
and to others by promising what he cannot fulfill. Examples: A young
person who marries without understanding the meaning of the contract,
or becomes a religious without knowing the meaning of the vows, would
be ignorant of the nature of the state embraced. A priest occupied
in the ministry, who does not know how to administer the Sacraments
validly, how to explain the Gospels correctly, how to judge usual
cases in confession rightly, etc., would be ignorant of the ordinary
duties of his office. A ruler who habitually acts beyond his authority,
a lawyer who regularly gives wrong advice, and a teacher who makes
mistakes in the elements of his specialty, would also be ignorant of
their ordinary duties.

(b) If a person understands the nature of his state and his everyday
duties, but is ignorant of recondite points or extraordinary cases, he
is not guilty; otherwise, no one could undertake with a safe conscience
the office of pastor, physician, judge, etc.; for, even when a person
has devoted a lifetime to a calling, he has to admit that he finds
difficulties or problems that he cannot solve offhand. Example: Father
Titus gave an incorrect solution about a case of restitution, because
he had to express an opinion at once, and there were so many angles and
circumstances that some of them were overlooked.

922. The means appointed by the Church for the retention of knowledge
in matters of faith are:

(a) For the Laity.--The course of Christian doctrine should not be
discontinued with the parochial school or Sunday school, but should
be continued in the higher schools (Canon 1373). Moreover, for adults
catechetical instruction is given on Sundays and feast days (Canon
1332), and the people are exhorted to attend sermons on matters
of faith and morals that are preached at parochial Masses (Canons
1337-1348).

(b) For the Clergy.--The clergy are admonished not to give up study
after ordination (Canon 129), and the law requires that the junior
clergy should take examinations annually during the first three or five
years after ordination to the priesthood (Canons 130, 590), and that
all the clergy should take part in theological conferences several
times a year (Canon 131).

923. What has been learned by heart is more easily retained in the
memory, and hence the common practice of committing the Catechism to
memory is to be recommended. Some believe that it is obligatory to
memorize the Creed and other points mentioned above (see 920); but this
is unlikely, since even the form of the Decalogue and of the Lord’s
Prayer is not identical in different parts of scripture. In the early
centuries the catechumens were obliged to learn the Creed and the
Lord’s Prayer by heart before Baptism, but there is no general law that
requires this at the present time.

(a) According to positive law, one is not obliged to memorize the words
and order of the Creed and other formulas, and it may be considered an
indication that a person has retained sufficiently what was learned,
if he is able to reply correctly to questions put to him (e.g., to
explain the first article of the Creed by stating the direct and simple
signification of its terms, and so on with the rest).

(b) According to natural law, one is obliged to learn by rote ithe
formulas of faith, if this is possible and there is danger of spiritual
detriment when it is not done. There is hardly anyone who cannot by
practice commit to memory the Our Father, the Apostles’ Creed, and
short forms of acts of faith, hope, charity, and contrition; and, if
none of them is thus known, it is practically certain that the grave
duty of prayer will be neglected. Hence, it seems that there is a
serious obligation of memorizing at least the Our Father. Feebleminded
persons are not obliged to memorize, or even to know, the truths of
faith, if they are incapable.

924. Confessors should examine in religion penitents who show signs of
ignorance (e.g., in the manner of making their confession), and should
grant or deny absolution according to the case.

(a) If the ignorance is about the truths that are necessary as a means
of justification (see 790), the penitents should be dealt with as
explained in 792.

(b) If the ignorance is about the truths that are necessary because
commanded and there is urgent need of absolution (e.g., on account of
mortal sin committed), the penitent may be absolved, if he is truly
contrite and promises to repair his negligence by studying his
religion, attending Sunday school, instructions, etc.

(c) If the ignorance is about the truths necessary because commanded,
and there is no urgent necessity of absolution, the penitents may be
sent away without absolution. Thus, children who have no serious sins
to confess and who do not know how to say the act of contrition or
other prayers, or who cannot answer simple questions of the Catechism,
should be sent away with a blessing and told to study these things and
return when they know them better.

925. The Commandment of Internal Acts of Faith.--The second commandment
of faith mentioned above (see 913) is both negative and affirmative.
(a) As negative, it forbids at any time disbelief or doubt concerning
that which God proposes for faith. This aspect has been treated above
in discussing the sins against faith (see 813 sqq., 840 sqq.). (b) As
affirmative, it commands that one at certain times should give assent
to the truths revealed by God. This aspect of the commandment will be
considered now.

926. The existence of the command that one should elicit a positive act
of assent to divine truth is taught in both Testaments. (a) In the Old
Testament, implicit faith in all scripture was required; for lawgivers,
prophets, and inspired writers spoke as delivering a message from God.
Moreover, explicit faith in God and His Providence was commanded (see
788). (b) In the New Testament, implicit faith in all revealed doctrine
is required, whether delivered in writing or as tradition (II Thess.,
ii. 15). Moreover, there is a command of explicit faith in the Gospel:
“This is His commandment that we should believe in the name of His Son,
Jesus Christ, and love one another, as He hath given commandment unto
us” (I John, iii. 23).

927. This commandment obliges adults under grave sin as to all revealed
truths. (a) The primary truths of revelation, truths of faith and
morals to which all are commanded to give assent (i.e., to believe
explicitly), are so important that those who refuse to believe them
merit condemnation (Mark, xvi. 16). (b) The secondary truths of
revelation--i.e., those that were made known by God, not for their own
sake, but on account of their relation to the primary truths (e.g., the
names of the patriarchs, the size of Saul, the complexion of David and
thousands of similar facts)--need not be known by all, for that is
impossible. But all are seriously obliged to believe that everything
contained in the Word of God is true, and to be ready to give assent
even to the truths that are not known. Hence, the minor truths of
revelation must be believed under pain of grave sin--implicitly, if
they are not known, explicitly, when they become known.

928. The obligation of explicit faith in the primary truths or articles
of faith is not grave with reference to every detail contained in those
truths. (a) Some details, on account of their difficulty, oblige to
explicit faith only under venial sin. Such are (in the Creed) the
descent into Limbo, the procession of the Holy Ghost, the mode of the
Communion of Saints. (b) Other details, on account of less importance,
do not oblige to explicit faith under any sin. Such are the facts that
it was Pilate under whom Christ suffered, that it was the third day
when Christ rose from the dead.

929. An affirmative commandment “obliges at all times, but not for all
times” (see 371). Hence, the question: How often or when must one give
internal assent to the teachings of faith, in order to fulfill the law?
Before answering this question, let us distinguish three kinds of laws
that may oblige one to an act of faith: (a) the divine law expressly
prescribing an act of faith; (b) the divine law prescribing an act of
some other virtue, which presupposes an act of faith; (e) human law
prescribing something that at least presupposes or includes an act of
faith.

930. The divine law expressly prescribing an act of faith (about which
we spoke in 925), obliges in the following cases: (a) at the time when
the commandment is first presented to one, and one recognizes its
obligation: “Preach the Gospel to every creature. He that believeth and
is baptized shall be saved; he that believeth not shall be condemned”
(Mark, xvi. 16); (b) it also obliges at other times during life; for
“the just man liveth by faith” (Rom, i. 17). The Church has rejected
the Jansenistic teaching that an act of faith once in a lifetime
suffices (see Denzinger-Banwart, nn. 1101, 1167, 1215).

931. The commandment of internal belief is brought before one for the
first time, either of one’s whole life or for the first time after loss
of faith, as follows:

(a) It is brought before a person for the first time in his life, when
he first hears the truths of faith, or first realizes his duty of
accepting them. Examples: A Catholic child who has just reached the age
of reason and has been told in Sunday school that he must believe the
Creed and other truths he has been taught; an adult Catholic who hears
for the first time of transubstantiation, or of some other dogma just
defined by the Church; a non-Catholic who has just perceived the truth
of the Catholic Church.

(b) The commandment of internal belief is brought before one for the
first time after loss of faith, as soon as the duty of returning to
belief occurs to the mind.

932. Does this commandment require that, as soon as the obligation of
faith dawns on one, one is obliged without an instant’s delay to make a
formal and explicit act of faith?

(a) As regards children, on account of the imperfection of their
understanding, it can easily happen that they do not perceive that the
obligation binds them there and then, or that it binds under sin, and
thus some time may elapse after the use of reason, or after knowledge
of the command of faith, before the omission of the act of belief would
become a sin. Practically every child of Catholic education complies
with the command when, having learned the truths that must be known, he
says devoutly the act of faith, either in his own words or according to
the form given in the Catechism.

(b) As regards adults, while the entrance of converts into the Church
admits of some delay for necessary preparation, the act of faith itself
should not be postponed for an instant, once the necessity of making it
is perceived as certain.

933. As to its frequency or the times when the act of faith should be
renewed, there are various opinions, but in actual life the question
presents no difficulty.

(a) As to theory, the theologians are divided, some holding that the
act of faith should be made at least once a year, others holding for
once a month, still others for all Sundays and holydays. There is no
solid support for any of these opinions, and it seems that the time and
frequency of acts of faith are not determined by divine law.

(b) As to practice, the theologians agree that one who fulfills the
usual religious duties of a Catholic, has also fulfilled the command to
renew the act of faith. Thus, those who attend Mass and receive the
Sacraments, as the law of the Church prescribes, make acts of faith in
doing so, which satisfy the divine law of faith.

934. Those who omit to make an act of faith in time of temptation
against faith, are also guilty of sin, if the omission is through
sinful neglect.

(a) If the act of faith is the only means by which the temptation can
be overcome (a rare contingency, outside the danger of death), one is
of course gravely bound to elicit the act. The sin committed by one who
would neglect the act of faith in such a circumstance is by some
considered as opposed to the negative command, that one do not dissent;
by others as opposed to the affirmative command, that one assent to
faith. Example: Caius is very much tempted to blasphemy, and finds that
the best remedy is an act of faith in the Majesty of God.

(b) If the act of faith would be harmful, as prolonging or intensifying
the temptation (a thing that is not infrequent), it is better to
struggle against the temptation indirectly by turning the attention to
other matters (see 257, 844).

935. Other cases in which one is obliged to make an internal act of
faith are as follows:

(a) By reason of a divine commandment of some virtue other than faith,
it is sometimes necessary to make an act of faith also. Examples: When
a sinner is preparing himself for the state of grace, of which faith is
the prerequisite; when one is tempted against hope, justice, etc., and
needs to call on faith to resist the tempter; when one is near to death
and must make an act of charity in preparing to meet God. In these
cases there are divine precepts of repentance, hope, justice, charity,
and virtually of faith, which is presupposed.

(b) One must at times make an internal act of faith by reason of a
human commandment enjoining some external act or virtue which supposes
faith. Examples: The command to swear on the Bible, or by some mystery
of religion, supposes an act of faith. The commands to receive
Communion at Easter (Canon 859), to make meditation and spiritual
retreats (Canons 125, 126, 595, 1001), to apply the intention of Mass
(Canons 339, Sec. 1, 466, Sec. 1), all include virtually the command
of an act of faith, for the things required (Communion, retreat, Mass)
cannot be rightly performed without such an act.

936. The act of faith is either formal or virtual, according as it is
made in itself, or in the act of another virtue that supposes it.

(a) The act of faith is formal, when one mentally accepts the truths
of revelation on account of divine authority, even though one does
not express the assent in words or according to any set formula. This
kind of act of faith is necessary when one passes from non-belief
or unbelief to belief, for none of the acts prior to faith contains
supernatural assent to revelation. Hence, the commandment of faith
requires in children or in converts from unbelief a formal act.

(b) The act of faith is virtual, when one elicits the act of some other
supernatural virtue without thinking expressly about faith; for faith
is presupposed by all other supernatural virtues, since one cannot
wish what one does not believe. Thus, the acts of hope, charity, and
contrition are virtually acts of faith. It seems that commandments of
other virtues and of the renewal of faith itself do not require that
one make a formal act of faith, although of course this would be the
better thing to do. Thus, to fulfill the Easter precept of yearly
Confession and Communion well, it is not required that one make a
formal act of faith before Confession, since faith is included in the
act of contrition. It is not necessary, then, that the penitent should
say: “I believe in the forgiveness of sins, etc.,” for in his purpose
to receive forgiveness he makes a virtual act of faith in the tenth
article of the Creed and in the Sacrament of Penance, as well as in the
other mysteries of faith.

937. Practically, there is no difficulty for confessors about the
violation of the commandment regarding internal acts of faith.

(a) If penitents are instructed and practical Catholics, they have made
at some time a formal act of faith, even though they do not remember
the time, for the act of faith precedes the acts of other virtues they
are exercising. True, this act of faith may not have been made as soon
as the age of reason was attained or the duty of faith perceived, but
invincible ignorance excuses those who were in good faith about the
matter. Regularity in prayer and other duties is an index that the act
of faith is being renewed in such a way as to comply with the
commandment. Hence, there is no necessity of questioning this class of
penitents about the act of faith.

(b) If penitents are very ignorant Catholics (e.g., young children), it
is clear that they have not made an act of faith as they should, for no
one believes what he does not know. They should, therefore, be
instructed that it is their duty to acquire more knowledge, and to make
an act of faith along with their other prayers. Regarding absolution,
see 924.

(c) If penitents are instructed but not practical, the confession that
they have neglected prayer, Mass, and the Sacraments, means that they
have also neglected the command of making acts of faith. It is not
necessary, therefore, that the confessor interrogate or instruct them
about this command, and he may absolve them, if they are resolved to
amend. It is well, however, to recommend daily acts of faith, hope,
charity and contrition to careless Catholics, especially to those who
cannot attend Mass or receive the Sacraments often.

938. The Commandment of External Profession of Faith.--The third
commandment of faith given above (see 913) is both negative and
affirmative: (a) as negative, it forbids denial of the faith or
profession of error opposed to faith; (b) as affirmative, it commands
that one make open profession of one’s faith.

939. The existence of a prohibition against denial of the faith or
profession of error is taught in scripture and the sinfulness of such
denial is clear from its nature. (a) “He that shall deny Me before men,
I will also deny him before My Father who is in Heaven” (Matt., x. 33).
Denial of Christ is a grievous sin, for it entails denial by Christ.
(b) He who denies the faith is a heretic or infidel, if he means what
he says; he lies, if he does not mean what he says, and his lie is a
grave injury to God, whose truth is called into question, and against
the neighbor, who is scandalized.

940. With reference to its voluntariness, denial of faith is either
direct or indirect. (a) It is direct, when one intends to deny the
faith; (b) it is indirect, when one does not intend to deny the faith,
but wills to use words, acts, etc., which either from their
signification or use, or from the meaning that will or may be given
them by others, will in the circumstances express a denial of the
faith. Examples: A convert from paganism conceals a crucifix in the
idol of a temple and then joins the pagans in their customary bows of
reverence, while intending only adoration to Christ crucified and
detesting the idol. Titus takes off his hat when passing any church, as
a mark of respect for the good they do. Balbus, a convert from
Nestorianism, recites the names of Nestorius and Dioscurus at Mass,
intending only to honor the patron Saints of those two heresiarchs.

941. There are three ways of denying the faith: (a) by words, spoken or
written, as when one says: “I am not a Catholic,” “I do not believe in
miracles”; (b) by acts, as when one dissuades persons of good faith
from entering the Church, or moves them to abandon it, or refuses to
genuflect before the Blessed Sacrament, or studiously excludes
scapulars, pictures and all religious symbols; (c) by omission, as when
one fails to answer calumnies against faith, which one could profitably
answer, or fails to protest when another speaks of oneself as a
non-Catholic.

942. There are various ways in which error opposed to faith is
professed: (a) by words, as when one says that one is a freethinker or
Christian Scientist; (b) by acts, as when one offers incense to an
idol, or receives the Lord’s Supper in a Lutheran church, or cheers an
anti-religious address; (c) by signs, as when one uses the Masonic
grip, wears the robes of a Buddhist bonze, takes a Mohammedan or pagan
name, etc., in order to pass oneself off as a non-Catholic; (d) by
omission, as when one is silent when introduced as a Rationalist, or
makes no protest when Indifferentism is being advocated by one’s
companions.

943. The following are not a denial of faith or profession of error:

(a) Words that deny, not one’s allegiance to religion, but one’s
acceptance of it as qualified by some calumnious designation. Examples:
Titus denies that he is a “Papist,” because he wishes his questioner to
use a term that is not intended to be an insult. Balbus, entering a
pagan region where the name Christian has the meaning of criminal or
enemy on account of crimes committed there by white men in past times,
says to the tribesmen that he is not a Christian, but a follower of
Jesus and a Catholic.

(b) Words that conceal one’s rank or state in the Church, are not
against faith, because one can hold the faith without being in a
certain rank or state in the Church, Thus, St. Peter’s denial that he
was a follower of Jesus, that he had ever known Him, etc., was,
according to some authorities, not a denial of the Divinity of Jesus or
of the truth of His teaching. Example: A Catholic who hides or denies
his character of priest or religious, his membership in a Catholic
family, organization, race, does not thereby necessarily deny his faith.

(c) Deeds that are contrary to practices of religion, but not to the
profession of faith, are not denial of belief; for one may be very much
attached to one’s religion, even ready to fight for it, but not willing
to follow its requirements. Example: Caius is careless about church
duties, misses Mass, eats meat on Fridays, and never goes to the
Sacraments; but he always calls himself a Catholic and wishes to be
considered one.

(d) Signs that have some association with non-Catholic religion, but do
not necessarily represent it (since they are indifferent in themselves
and have other and legitimate uses), do not deny the faith, when not
used as symbols of false religion. Similarly, the omission of signs
that are associated with Catholicity, but which are optional, is not a
denial of the faith. Examples: Titus, when travelling in the Orient,
makes use of the national salutation of the pagan peoples among whom he
lives. Balbus builds a church with architectural features borrowed from
pagan temples. Caius wears a fez or turban in Mohammedan regions where
it is not looked on as a religious headgear. Sempronius practises
circumcision as a hygienic measure. Claudius does not say grace at
meals when dining in public, and does not wear scapulars when bathing
at the seashore.

(e) Omission of profession of faith, when it is not obligatory, is not
a denial of faith; for no one is bound to make known his affairs and
convictions to every acquaintance. Example: Titus works in an office
where most of the clerks are non-Catholics. But no one ever speaks
about religion, and hence it is not known that he is a Catholic.

944. Dangers of Profession of Unbelief.--The principal dangers of
making external profession of false religion, if not of losing faith
itself, are the following: (a) membership in forbidden societies; (b)
communication in sectarian services; (c) cooperation in activities
whose tendency or principles are erroneous.

945. Forbidden Societies.--Societies are forbidden by the Church when
they are intrinsically or extrinsically evil. (a) A society is
intrinsically evil, when it has an evil purpose, or uses evil means to
obtain even an honest end. Thus, societies or parties that conspire
against Church or State, or that seek to undermine Christian doctrines
or morals, have an evil purpose; while those that demand absolute
secrecy or oaths of blind obedience to unknown persons, that favor
cremation, use a sectarian ritual, promote evil literature, etc., are
employing evil means, no matter what may be the end in view. (b) A
society is extrinsically evil, when its end and means are good, but
membership in it is dangerous to faith or morals on account of
circumstances (e.g., on account of the bad type of individuals who make
up the society or control it).

946. The Code (Canon 684) mentions the following kinds of societies as
banned for Catholics:

(a) secret societies, that is, those which demand of members that
certain things which the society considers secrets be told absolutely
to no one outside the society, or certain degrees of the society, not
even to those who may legitimately inquire about them, such as the
bishop or civil superior in the external forum, parents with regard to
their children not emancipated, pastors and confessors in the internal
forum. Those societies are also secret which demand blind and absolute
obedience to unknown leaders;

(b) condemned societies, that is, such as have been censured by the
Church, or simply forbidden. Canon 2335 decrees _ipso facto_
excommunication reserved to the Holy See against all those who join
Masonic or similar associations which plot against the Church or lawful
civil authority. Among the societies forbidden without censure are:
various Biblical societies, societies for the promotion of cremation,
the Knights of Pythias, the Odd Fellows, the Sons of Temperance, the
Independent Order of Good Templars, Theosophical societies, the
Y.M.C.A. Female societies affiliated with these are also condemned,
since they are branches of the main society--for example, the Rebeccas,
the Eastern Star, the Pythian Sisters.

Worthy of detailed consideration is the condemnation of the Communist
Party and the penalties attached to membership in, or defense, or
propagation of the Party. The following questions were asked of the
Holy Office:

1. Whether it is licit to join the Communist Party or to favor it.

Reply: In the negative; for Communism is materialistic and
anti-Christian; and the leaders of the Communists, although they
sometimes verbally profess that they are not attacking religion, in
fact, nevertheless, by doctrine and action show themselves to be
enemies of God and of the true religion and the Church of Christ.

2. Whether it is licit to publish, propagate, or read books,
periodicals, daily papers, or sheets which promote the doctrine or
action of Communists, or to write in them.

Reply: In the negative: for they are forbidden _ipso iure_ (see Canon
1399).

3. Whether the faithful who knowingly and freely do the acts mentioned
in 1 and 2 can be admitted to the sacraments.

Reply: In the negative, according to the ordinary principles governing
the refusal of the sacraments to those who are not properly disposed.

4. Whether the faithful who profess the materialistic and
anti-Christian doctrine of Communists, and especially those who defend
or propagate it, incur _ipso facto_ as apostates from the Catholic
faith the excommunication specially reserved to the Holy See.

Reply: In the affirmative (Decree of the Holy Office, July 1, 1949).

The sanction of excommunication specially reserved to the Holy See was
imposed also upon those who teach boys and girls in associations set up
by the Communists to imbue youth with principles and training which are
materialistic and contrary to Christian morality and faith. The
associations themselves are subject to the sanctions of the decree of
July 1, 1949. Moreover parents or guardians who send their children to
such associations, and the children themselves, as long as they have
part in these associations, cannot be admitted to the reception of the
sacraments (Monitum of the Holy Office, July 28, 1950).

(c) seditious societies, that is, those organizations, even though not
secret, which aim at the overthrow of family and property rights;

(d) suspect societies, that is, those whose principles or methods have
the appearance of being unsound. On January 11, 1951 the Holy Office in
response to the question: “Whether Catholics may join the ‘Rotary
Club’?” issued the following decree: “It is not licit for clerics to
join the Association ‘Rotary Club’ or to be present at its meetings;
the laypeople are to be urged to preserve the prescript of Canon 684.”
The decree seems to have taken many English-speaking people by
surprise, one paper describing it as “a bewildering document.” The
surprise flowed from personal experience of Rotary Clubs as social
clubs dedicated to bonhomie and community improvement. Nevertheless,
the decree was in accord with the general trend of Church policy in
regard to undenominational societies. They are not approved; they are
not condemned as Masonry has been condemned. What is their position?
The response that layfolk are to be exhorted to observe Canon 684 is
indicative of the attitude of the Church in regard to such societies.
The canon instructs them to “beware of secret, condemned, seditious and
suspect societies.” Since Rotary Clubs are seldom considered to be
secret and never as condemned nor as seditious, the implication is that
they are suspect. Such was the interpretation of the decree given in
the _Osservatore Romano_ of Jan. 27, 1951.

In regard to clerics, the effect of the decree was to make illicit what
was formerly simply inexpedient; for the Sacred Consistory had replied
on February 4th, 1929, that it was not expedient for Ordinaries to
permit clerics to join Rotary Clubs, or to take part in their meetings.
Moreover, as the _Osservatore_ article indicates, the prohibition is
limited to meetings of members only and does not extend to meetings at
which non-members may be present, provided the purpose of such meetings
befits priestly activity.

The exhortation to layfolk in regard to “Rotary” simply reaffirms the
Church’s general attitude to all secular associations. As early as
November 5, 1920 the Holy Office, referring specifically to Y.M.C.A.,
warned the Ordinaries that the note of “suspicion” attaches to all
secular societies. Their efforts to promote good works and good moral
standards independent of religious authority tend to foster the spirit
of religious indifferentism and moral naturalism. Both the Spanish
hierarchy (1929) and the Dutch hierarchy (1930) have so judged Rotary.
However, the degree of suspicion to be attached to each Rotary Club is
a question of fact to be determined in specific instances by the proper
local Ordinary. Where evidence of suspicion is available, exhortatious
not to join the clubs must be made; in the lack of such evidence, the
ordinaries may maintain discreet silence.

(e) societies that aim to elude the lawful vigilance of religious
authority.

947. The following organizations fall under the censure against Masonic
societies:

(a) all varieties and degrees of Freemasonry, for all the Masonic sects
are included in the Canon. The fact that American, English and Irish
Masons have many excellent individuals in their ranks, and lack the
irreligious and revolutionary character of the Masonry of Continental
Europe or Latin countries, does not exempt them from the censure.

(b) all organizations similar to Masonry, that is, secret societies
that conspire against lawful authority. Such are societies like the
Carbonari, the Fenians, anarchists and nihilists.

948. The sin committed by membership in forbidden societies is grave,
since the purpose of the law--viz., the safeguarding of faith against
serious danger--is itself grave. Such membership is interpreted also as
a profession of false religion, when one joins oneself to a body which
in its branches or degrees has a false creed of its own. (a) Even
though the branch or degree to which one belongs does not require
assent to such a creed, membership expresses a fellowship with those
who do accept it; (b) similarly, participation in the ritual of the
lodges is a communication in ceremonies expressive of false religion;
for, though their externals may appear good or even Christian, the
internal meaning known to the adepts is anti-Catholic or anti-Christian.

949. Absolution of Those Who Belong to Forbidden Societies.--(a) The
sin cannot be absolved unless there is repentance, and hence absolution
cannot be granted those who without sufficient reason refuse to
withdraw from membership, or who refuse to discontinue participation in
false rites.

(b) The excommunication is not incurred by those who joined forbidden
societies in ignorance of the law or of the penalty, provided the
ignorance was not crass or supine. If the censure was actually
incurred, the mode of absolution will depend on the nature of the case:
if the case is occult (i.e., if it is not known and not likely to
become known that the penitent belonged to a society forbidden under
pain of excommunication), the Ordinary may absolve or grant faculties
to absolve (Canon 2237); if the case is a public one, and it would be
very inconvenient to await faculties from Rome, absolution is given
under the condition of recourse to the proper authority within a month
(Canon 2254). Many Ordinaries have by Indult faculties to absolve
members of secret societies.

950. Nominal membership and temporary attendance at meetings may be
permitted as an exception when there are sufficient reasons.

(a) Nominal membership means that one leaves one’s name on the roster
of the society and continues to pay its assessments, but does not
communicate with the society or attend its meetings. In 1896 the Holy
Office replied to the American Bishops that this kind of membership in
the Odd Fellows, Sons of Temperance and Knights of Pythias might be
permitted under certain conditions, if there was a sufficient reason
(viz., that grave material loss would be incurred by withdrawal). (b)
Temporary attendance at meetings means that for a short time, and not
for longer than absolutely necessary, one is present at gatherings of
the society, but takes no active part in its false cult.

951. The following conditions were laid down for permission of nominal
membership in the Odd Fellows, Sons of Temperance, etc.: (a) that the
penitent joined the society in good faith, before knowing that it was
condemned; (b) that there be no danger of scandal, or that it be
removed by the declaration that membership is only nominal and only for
the purpose of avoiding temporal losses; (c) that there be no danger of
perversion of the party himself or of his family, in case of sickness
or of death, and no danger of a non-Catholic funeral.

952. Procedure of the confessor with a penitent who has incurred
excommunication on account of membership in the Masons or other like
society should be as follows: (a) the faculty to absolve must be
obtained (see 949), (b) the following promises must be exacted from the
penitent--that he will withdraw entirely from the sect and that he will
repair, as well as he can, the scandal he may have caused; (c) the
penitent must be required to renounce the sect, at least in the
presence of the confessor, and to deliver over to him the books,
manuscripts, insignia, and other objects that are distinctive of it
(the confessor should give these objects to the Ordinary as soon as he
prudently can, but, if grave reasons prevent this, he should burn
them); (d) a salutary penance should be given and frequent confession
urged.

953. Procedure of the confessor with a penitent who belongs to the Odd
Fellows or other society forbidden by name, but without censure, should
be as follows: (a) if the penitent is contrite and promises to leave
the society, he can be absolved without special faculties; (b) if the
penitent is contrite but wishes to retain nominal membership, the case
must be referred to the Archbishop of the Province or to the Apostolic
Delegate; (c) if the penitent wishes to retain full membership, he is
not repentant and cannot be absolved.

954. Procedure of the confessor with a penitent who belongs to a
society not condemned by name, but which the confessor himself regards
as evil should be as follows: (a) if the confessor is certain that the
society is one of those condemned implicitly by the Church, because it
exacts inviolable secrecy or blind obedience to its leaders, or has
Masonic characteristics, etc., he should treat it in the same way as
the societies condemned by name; (b) if the confessor is certain that
the society is condemned by natural law for the penitent before him
(e.g., on account of the evil associates and moral dangers it
contains), he should treat it as any other occasion of sin, but it
should be noted that no priest or local Ordinary has authority to
condemn publicly and by name any society not condemned by the Church;
(c) if the confessor is in doubt, he should proceed according to the
rules for an uncertain conscience (see 678, 679, 742), and for the
prudent administration of the Sacraments (see Vol. II).

955. As one of the chief remedies against evil societies is the
formation of Catholic societies, the Code (Canon 684) praises those of
the faithful who enroll as members in associations established or
recommended by the Church. Catholic societies distinct from religious
Orders or Congregations are of two kinds.

(a) Distinctly religious societies are those instituted for the purpose
of promoting a more Christian life among their members, or of fostering
works of piety and charity, or of contributing to the solemnity of
public worship. Such are the Secular Third Orders, Confraternities of
the Blessed Sacrament and of Christian Doctrine, and other pious unions.

(b) Societies that are not distinctly religious, but whose membership
and spirit are Catholic, are of many kinds. Such are the Knights of
Columbus, Ancient Order of Hibernians, Catholic Daughters of America,
Volksverein, Young Men’s Institute, etc.

956. Communication in Worship.--Communication with non-Catholics (as
was said above in 882) is either religious or non-religious. It is
clear that communication in non-religious matters does not contain a
profession of error, but the same cannot be said of communication in
religious services, since these are not only acts of worship, but also
expressions of faith in the creed of a certain religion. We must
distinguish, however, between private and public communication.

(a) Communication is private, when a Catholic and non-Catholic offer
together the Lord’s Prayer or other similar prayer as a private
devotion, not as an act of official worship. Private devotion is not
the expression of a sectarian creed, and, if there is nothing false in
it and no danger of scandal or perversion from communication between
Catholic and non-Catholic in such devotion, this kind of communication
is not unlawful. In the following paragraphs there will be question of
public communication.

(b) Communication is public, when the rites performed are the official
services of the Catholic Church or of some non-Catholic sect (e.g., the
Mass, the Lord’s Supper of the Lutherans, the Evensong of the
Anglicans, the prayer-meeting of other sects). Thus, public
communication takes place either when non-Catholics take part in
Catholic worship, or Catholics take part in non-Catholic worship.

957. Participation of non-Catholics in Catholic services is either by
mere presence, or by reception or performance of Catholic rites.

(a) Mere presence consists in a purely material attendance at a
service, as when non-Catholics assist at Mass and sit, rise and kneel
with the congregation or remain seated throughout. There is no
objection whatever to this kind of participation; on the contrary,
non-Catholics should be invited to Catholic sermons and services, and
made to feel welcome, for in what better way can the divine command of
working for their conversion be complied with? Only excommunicated
persons are excluded from the offices of the Church (Canon 2269, Sec.1).
It is also allowed that Catholic bishops and clergy accompany a
non-Catholic ruler to the church, and assign him and his escort an
honorable place therein.

(b) Reception of Catholic rites is had when non-Catholics, without
performing any liturgical function, receive some spiritual favor
through the rites of the Church, as when a non-Catholic receives a
priest’s blessing.

(c) Performance of Catholic rites exists when a non-Catholic exercises
some office in a liturgical function of the Catholic Church, as when a
Protestant acts as sponsor at a Catholic Baptism.

958. Cases of reception of Catholic rites by non-Catholics permitted by
law are the following:

(a) Reception of Sacramentals.--Since the purpose of these rites and
objects is to implore graces and temporal favors with a view to the
illumination and salvation of the recipient, and since our Lord Himself
blessed and cured even the pagans, the Church permits blessings and
exorcisms to be conferred on non-Catholics (Canons 1149, 1152).
Similarly, blessed candles, palms, ashes and other real sacramentals
may be given to them. Examples: The Church has permitted priests to
visit the homes of Mohammedans to bless and pray over the sick, and
also to bless the houses of schismatics, provided they were summoned
and avoided all communication in prayer.

(b) Reception of Sacraments.-Since it is possible that the salvation of
a dying person may depend on absolution, good moralists, relying on
decisions of Roman Congregations, hold that conditional absolution may
be given to a heretic or schismatic who is dying and unconscious, or
even to one such who is dying and conscious, provided he is in good
faith and contrite, and danger of scandal has been removed.

(c) Reception of Fruits of the Mass.--Since Christ died for all, there
is nothing in the nature of things to prevent the application of Mass
to any persons who are living or in Purgatory; and from Canon 809 it
appears that Mass may be offered for any living person, and also for
any deceased person about whose salvation we may entertain hope. Hence,
neither the divine nor the ecclesiastical law forbids the application
of Mass for heretics, schismatics, or infidels. The Church also permits
Mass to be said privately, all scandal removed, for excommunicated
persons. Under these same conditions, then, Mass may be said for
non-Catholics, both living and dead (Canon 2262, Sec.2, n. 2).

(d) Reception of the Suffrages of the Church.--Since God wishes all to
be saved and public peace to be maintained (I Tim., ii), and since the
Church desires that Ordinaries and pastors should have at heart the
conversion of non-Catholics (Canon 1350), public prayers for the
prosperity of non-Catholic rulers and officials--likewise sermons,
missions and other works for the conversion of unbelievers--are not
only allowed, but recommended and required.

959. Non-Catholics have not the same right as Catholics to receive the
rites of the Church, and hence when they are admitted to them, there
are certain restrictions to be observed.

(a) Restrictions as to Sacred Things.--As admission of non-Catholics to
sacramentals, etc., is a favor, not a right, it should be confined to
cases allowed by the Church. Thus, it is forbidden to grant indulgences
or to give the nuptial blessing to non-Catholics, and only in very
exceptional cases may any ceremonies be permitted at mixed marriages
(Canons 1102, 1109). Non-Catholics may not receive the Pax; may not be
invited to take part in the solemn services of receiving ashes on Ash
Wednesday, palms on Palm Sunday and candles on Candlemas Day; may not
receive ecclesiastical burial (Holy Office, June 8, 1859). Children
sent by their parents to non-Catholic services may not be confirmed
(Holy Office, August 28, 1780); a Catholic priest is not allowed to
supply for a non-Catholic minister, by accompanying the body of a
non-Catholic from the home to the graveyard, even though the body be
not brought to Church, nor the bell tolled (Holy Office, January 26,
1886). It is not permissible to lend a Catholic church to non-Catholics
for their services.

(b) Restrictions as to Persons.--As superstition and irreverence have
to be avoided, the sacramentals may not be administered or given at all
to non-Catholics about whose good faith and purpose there is doubt.

(c) Restrictions as to Mode.--The Church, while she wishes to help and
benefit non-Catholics, must avoid anything that would cause scandal or
have the appearance of equal recognition of believers and unbelievers.
Thus, when Mass is offered for outsiders, the same publicity and pomp
is not permitted as when there is question of Catholics.

960. As regards the performance of Catholic rites by non-Catholics, the
Church disapproves of every kind of such participation, but does not
refuse to tolerate the more remote kind, when there is grave necessity
and no scandal is caused.

(a) By more remote participation we understand such as scarcely differs
from passive assistance (e.g., to act as witness at a marriage), or
such as carries with it no recognition as an official of the Church
(e.g., to act as substitute or temporary organist). Hence, the Church
has permitted this kind of participation in particular cases, when the
authorities decided that there was urgent necessity and no scandal.
Examples: Moralists hold that, when a heretic or schismatic has been
designated as sponsor at Baptism and cannot be refused without grave
offense, he may be allowed to act as witness. The Holy Office has also
declared that heretics should not be used as witnesses at marriage, but
may be tolerated as such by the Ordinary, when there is a grave reason
and no scandal (August 18, 1891); that a non-Catholic organist may be
employed temporarily, if it is impossible to secure one who is a
Catholic, and no scandal is caused (February 23, 1820); that in certain
special circumstances girls belonging to a schismatical sect might be
allowed to sing with the Catholics at church functions, especially at
Exposition and Benediction of the Blessed Sacrament (January 25, 1906).

(b) Proximate participation is the exercise of functions connected with
a sacred rite (e.g., to act as server at Mass), or that imply a
recognition of the religion of the one who participates (e.g., to act
as representative of some sect at a funeral and receive liturgical
honors). The Church has always refused to tolerate this kind of
participation. Examples: Non-Catholics may not act as sponsors at
Baptism or Confirmation under pain of invalidity of sponsorship (Canons
765, 795), nor chant the Office in choir (Holy Office, June 8, 1859),
nor be employed as singers of the liturgical music (Holy Office, May 1,
1889), nor carry torches or lights in church ceremonies (Holy Office,
November 20, 1850). Likewise, non-Catholics may not become members of
Catholic confraternities, nor assist at Catholic services as official
representatives of some sect or sectarian society.

961. Participation of Catholics in non-Catholic services may happen
today in so many ways, and it is so difficult at times to draw the line
between lawful and unlawful communication, that it is well before
considering these cases to state the general rules that apply here.

(a) It is lawful to perform an act from which two effects follow, one
good and the other bad, if the act in itself is good or indifferent, if
there is a sufficiently grave reason for performing it, if the evil
effect is not intended, and if the evil effect be not prior to the good
effect (see 104).

(b) Circumstances vary in different localities and countries, and
communication that would signify unity of belief in a place where
Catholics and non-Catholics are very unequal numerically might be very
harmless in a place where there is no great numerical difference.
Offense to non-Catholics should not be given needlessly.

(c) In doubtful cases the decision whether or not a particular kind of
communication is lawful or unlawful pertains to the Ordinary (Canon
1258).

962. Participation of Catholics in non-Catholic services is either
active or passive. (a) Participation is active when one takes a part or
fulfills some function in an act that is an official expression of the
worship and belief of a sect, even though this takes place outside a
church, or is not open to the general public.

(b) Participation is passive, if one merely assists as a spectator, and
not as a worshipper, at something pertaining to non-Catholic worship.

963. Sacred things in which communication is possible are of three
classes:

(a) the chief acts of divine worship (i.e., Sacrifices, Sacraments,
sacramentals);

(b) the secondary acts of divine worship (such as prayers, processions,
vows, oaths, the Divine Office, hymn singing, scripture reading, etc.).
In the Protestant denominations some one or other of these is, as a
rule, the central or distinctive service, although some have other
proper features of their own, such as the silent meeting of the
Quakers, the seance of the Spiritualists, the march of the Salvation
Army, the charity kiss of the Dunkards;

(c) places (e.g., churches, lodge rooms, cemeteries), times (e.g., days
of feast or fast), and objects (e.g., images, badges, aprons, banners,
robes), pertaining to divine worship.

964. It is unlawful for Catholics in any way to assist actively at or
take part in the worship of non-Catholics (Canon 1258). Such assistance
is intrinsically and gravely evil; for (a) if the worship is
non-Catholic in its form (e.g., Mohammedan ablutions, the Jewish
paschal meal, revivalistic “hitting the trail,” the right hand of
fellowship, etc.), it expresses a belief in the false creed symbolized;
(b) if the worship is Catholic in form, but is under the auspices of a
non-Catholic body (e.g., Baptism as administered by a Protestant
minister, or Mass as celebrated by a schismatical priest), it expresses
either faith in a false religious body or rebellion against the true
Church.

965. It is unlawful for Catholics to simulate active assistance in the
worship of non-Catholics, for, while the non-Catholic rite would be
avoided, something which appeared to be that rite would be done, and
thus profession of faith in it would be given.

(a) Hence, it is not lawful to do an indifferent act which bystanders
from the circumstances will have to conclude is an act of false
worship. Thus, Eleazar would not eat lawful meat which was put before
him in order that he might pretend to eat the meat of sacrifice after
the manner of the heathen (II Mach., vi).

(b) It is not lawful to accept a false certificate of participation in
false worship. Hence, the early Church condemned as apostates the
Libellatics (i.e., those Christians, who, to protect themselves in time
of persecution, obtained by bribery or otherwise a forged or genuine
magistrate’s certificate that they had sacrificed to the heathen gods).

966. It is unlawful for Catholics to assist passively at non-Catholic
worship, unless there are present the conditions requisite for
performing an act that has two results, one good and the other evil
(see 104); for even passive assistance frequently involves sin.

(a) Hence, the assistance itself must be really indifferent, that is,
it must be a merely passive presence without any active participation
in the service. Examples: A person who stands in the rear of a Quaker
meeting house as an onlooker assists passively; but one who sits
quietly among the others present, as if in meditation, assists
actively. A person who sits in a pew during a revival in order to see
what is going on, assists passively; but, if he joins with the
congregation in bowing, groaning, etc., he assists actively.

(b) The evil effect that may result from assistance (such as scandal
and danger of perversion) must not be prior to the good effect;
otherwise, evil would be done for the sake of good. Examples: Titus, a
non-Catholic, goes to Mass as a spectator, with his Catholic friend
Balbus. He then asks Balbus to assist as a spectator at the services of
his denomination, and thus see for himself that the latter is better.
Balbus, in order to be courteous, consents. Here Balbus aims to show
politeness, which is good, but the means he uses--namely, the
impression he gives that he is not convinced of the superiority of his
own religion--is bad.

(c) The evil effect (i.e., remote danger of perversion, unavoidable
scandal) must not be intended or approved, but only permitted. Example:
Caius, a Catholic public official, has to attend funerals and weddings
in Protestant churches as a mark of the public respect for notable
persons. He knows that a few will take scandal at his action, but he
wishes only to do his duty as an official, and not to offend anyone
(see on Scandal).

(d) The cause of assistance must be in proportion to the kind of
assistance. Hence, a greater reason is required for assistance on
several occasions than on one, for assistance at infidel than at
heretical services, for assistance at the primary than at the secondary
act of worship, for assistance by a priest than for assistance by a
layman, etc. Example: Graver reason would be necessary to justify
assistance at a non-Catholic funeral, if there were signs of
anti-Catholicism manifested (e.g., flower designs and regalia of a
hostile sect placed on the coffin), than if the service contained
nothing offensive.

967. Cases of communication in false sacrificial rites are as follows:
(a) Active participation is had in such acts as the slaying and
offering of victims, the burning of incense before idols, the eating of
sacrificial banquets; (b) Passive participation is had when one merely
watches the rite of sacrifice without taking any part therein.

968. Cases of communication in the Sacrifice of the Mass are as
follows: (a) Active participation is had in such acts as taking the
part of deacon in a schismatical Mass, assisting at a schismatical Mass
with the intention of hearing Mass formally (i.e., of offering it with
the priest). If on Sunday, one is where there is only a schismatical
church, one is excused from the obligation of hearing Mass, and may not
hear Mass in that church (Holy Office, December 5, 1608; August 7,
1704). (b) Passive participation is had when one is present merely as a
spectator, kneeling before the Blessed Sacrament, but giving no other
signs of religious devotion. This is permissible under the conditions
mentioned above (see 966), if there is no scandal, or danger of
perversion (Holy Office, April 24, 1894).

969. Cases of participation in the Sacraments or sacramentals, real or
reputed, are as follows: (a) Active participation takes place when one
receives a Sacrament from a non-Catholic minister, or offers one’s
child to receive a Sacrament from such a minister, or contracts
marriage in the presence of such a minister, or acts as sponsor at a
non-Catholic baptism or confirmation or as the religious witness at a
non-Catholic marriage, or answers in public non-Catholic prayers, or
takes ashes blessed by schismatics. (b) Passive participation is had
when one merely looks on at the administration of a Sacrament or
sacramental by a non-Catholic minister, without signs of approval or
union in what is being done.

970. There are certain cases that seem to be active participations in
Sacraments with non-Catholics, and yet are permitted by the Code. In
reality, however, there is no active communication in those cases.

(a) Canons 886 and 905 allow the faithful to receive communion and
absolution according to a Rite different from their own, so that one
who belongs to the Latin Rite may lawfully receive in Communion a Host
consecrated according to the Greek Rite, or go to confession to an
Oriental priest. But in these Canons there is question of different
Rites within the Catholic Church, not of those of non-Catholics.

(b) Canons 742 and 882 allow those who are in danger of death to
receive Baptism and absolution from an heretical or schismatical
minister, and theologians apply the same principle to Extreme Unction
and the Viaticum. But there is no communication in non-Catholic
ceremonies in these cases, for the Sacraments belong to the Catholic
Church, and for the sake of the dying she authorizes non-Catholic
ministers to act as her representatives, provided there is no scandal
or danger of perversion.

971. Cases of participation in non-sacramental rites are as follows:

(a) Oaths and Vows.--Participation is active when one swears in words
or by other signs which, according to local usage, manifest belief in
the creed of some sect; it is not active, when the manner of the oath
does not signify adherence to a false creed; Example: If one is
required to swear, by touching or kissing the non-Catholic Bible, as a
sign of approval of Protestantism or Masonry, one may not consent. But,
if the Government presents a non-Catholic Bible with no thought of
Protestantism, there is no approval of Protestantism in the one who
swears on that Bible, although, if the custom is not general, there
might be scandal if no protest were made. A Catholic may bring his own
Bible with him, or ask for a copy of the Catholic Bible.

(b) Services--Participation is active when one marches in an Anglican
procession, plays the organ or sings at Y.M.C.A. services, joins in the
prayers or responses offered in a Protestant church, etc. (Holy Office,
July 6, 1889). Participation is passive if one looks on during a rare
visit, or listens by radio to the musical program broadcast from
Protestant services, or if one is obliged to attend non-Catholic
services habitually, not as a profession of faith, but as a matter of
civil duty or of domestic discipline, as happens with soldiers or with
inmates of public institutions. Participation is not active if one
adores the Blessed Sacrament carried in a schismatical procession which
one meets by chance and unavoidably. Examples: Titus belongs to the
honorary guard of a state ruler, and has to accompany the latter to
non-Catholic services on certain state occasions. Balbus is tutor in a
non-Catholic family, and is expected to take his charges to their
church and back home on Sundays. Claudia is a maid in a non-Catholic
family, and is ordered to hold one of the children while it is being
baptized by the non-Catholic minister. In all these cases the presence
at the services is purely passive, since the intention of the Catholic
present is not to perform any religious duty, but only some civil or
domestic service (see IV Kings, v. 18). But, on the other hand, the
martyrs during the reigns of Elizabeth and her successors refused to
attend the Anglican services, because this was required by law as a
sign of conformity to the Established Church--that is, an active
presence was prescribed.

972. Cases of participation in religious places, times and objects are
as follows:

(a) Places.--Participation is active when one orders one’s body to be
buried in a sectarian graveyard, when one enters a schismatical or
heretical church privately in order to visit the Blessed Sacrament or
pray, when one offers up Catholic services in a non-Catholic temple, if
these things are looked upon by the public as indications of identity
of belief between Catholics and non-Catholics. Participation is merely
passive, if one visits non-Catholic places of worship out of curiosity
in order to look at the pictures, hear the music or listen to or take
part in a political lecture or debate. In case of necessity, the Church
permits Catholic services to be performed in the same building as that
wherein non-Catholic rites are held, e.g., the Church of the Holy
Sepulchre at Jerusalem which is used by various denominations (Holy
Office, 12 April, 1704).

(b) Times.--Participation is active if one observes new moons,
sabbaths, and days of fast as prescribed in the Old Law.

(c) Objects.--Participation is active if one wears the uniform of a
condemned society, the ring or other emblem of Freemasonry, etc., or
makes use of other insignia whose sole purpose is to indicate
membership in some sect, unless it be evident that these are used for
some other purpose (e.g., in order to act a certain part in a play).

973. Cases of participation through attendance at non-Catholic
religious instructions are as follows:

(a) Active participation in worship is had when one listens to a
preacher, Sunday school teacher, etc., and signifies approval by
joining in “Amens” or other acclamations.

(b) Participation is merely passive, if at church or over the radio,
one listens out of curiosity, or in order to be able to refute errors,
or for the sake of perfecting oneself in diction or eloquence, or of
showing respect to a person whose funeral oration is being delivered,
etc. But, even though there be no active participation, it will usually
be unlawful to listen to these sectarian discourses on account of the
danger of perversion to the listener or of scandal to others. Catholics
who are scientifically trained and staunch in faith may for good
reasons hear sectarian sermons, but the greater number would be
disturbed or unsettled (see the principles given above on dangerous
books and schools, 854-857, 868). Moreover, even those who have a right
to listen to non-Catholic religious talks have to be on their guard
against scandal, for outsiders may regard their attention as approval
of doctrine or participation in cult, and Catholics not sufficiently
instructed may regard their example as an encouragement to imitate
(cfr. 979, 981).

974. Participation in non-Catholic assemblages or occasions whose
character is of a mixed kind (partly religious and partly
non-religious) are permitted by the Church, when due regard is had for
avoidance of scandal, perversion, denial of faith, etc.

(a) Some of these occasions are chiefly religious, but are also looked
on as family or civic solemnities, such as christenings, weddings,
funerals. Hence, it is allowed to assist at the religious part of the
occasion in a passive way for the sake of courtesy, or to exercise some
function which is looked upon as belonging to the non-religious part
of the occasion. Caution must be taken to ensure that the particular
sect involved does not consider the exercise of the particular function
as participating in the religious aspect of the ceremony. Likewise,
on condition that the possibility of scandal, perversion, etc., has
been removed, the following functions may be performed. One may act
as a witness at the christening of a near relative who is not a
Catholic; however, it is forbidden to be a sponsor, even by proxy,
at baptisms performed by a heretical minister (Holy Office, decr.,
May 10, 1770). To be pallbearer or undertaker at a funeral, to be an
usher at a wedding, to be an extra bridesmaid, etc., may be permitted.
(If the function of best man or maid of honor be considered as merely
attendants to the bride or groom, such participation in itself would
not be illicit; but since the danger of scandal might often be present,
such participation is dangerous. It is lawful for a Catholic pastor
to attend the funeral of a non-Catholic friend or relative, provided
he does not wear his sacred garb and takes no part in the ceremonies.
Canon 1258, Sec.2 establishes the general norm regulative of these
cases: a passive or merely material presence may be, for a serious
reason, tolerated as a mark of esteem or social courtesy at funerals,
weddings, and similar functions, provided there is involved no danger
of perversion or scandal; in a doubtful case, the serious reason for
this presence must be approved by the local Ordinary.

(b) Other occasions are chiefly non-religious in character, but are
also partly religious, or have the appearance of being religious. Such
are, for example, the coronation, birthday, wedding, or funeral of a
ruler, school commencements, political conventions, patriotic meetings,
civil marriage before a magistrate who is also a non-Catholic minister.
When these exercises are chiefly non-religious or entirely civil, even
though conducted in non-Catholic churches or by non-Catholic ministers,
the Church grants permission to participate in them to some extent, if
there is sufficient reason.

975. Among the mixed occasions just mentioned are not included such
as have an anti-Catholic or anti-religious spirit, such as funerals
from which all manifestations of religion are excluded on account of
hatred of religion, entertainments held by forbidden societies in which
the members are present in regalia, picnics under the auspices of the
Orangemen, etc.

976. Cooperation in Religious Activities.--A third danger of making
external profession of a false religion is cooperation in activities
whose tendency or principles are erroneous (see 944). Cooperation in a
false religion is of two kinds, immediate and mediate. (a) Cooperation
is immediate, when one takes a part in an act of a false religion
itself (e.g., by worshipping an idol). This kind of cooperation was
discussed above, as participation or communication (see 956-975). (b)
Cooperation is mediate, when one takes part, not in an act of a false
religion, but in some other act which is a preparation for a help to
the act of a false religion. This is the kind of cooperation we are now
considering.

977. Mediate cooperation is of various kinds. (a) It is proximate
or remote, according as the preparation or help afforded to false
religion is near to or far from the religious act. Thus, to make ready
the lights, incense, flowers, etc. in front of an idol is proximate
cooperation; to give money to an idolatrous priest or bonze is remote
cooperation. (b) Mediate cooperation is material or formal, according
as the intention of the cooperator is to share in or help error itself,
or merely to help those who are in error, while disapproving of their
error. Thus, if one prepares a pagan temple for worship or contributes
money towards its maintenance because one’s sympathies are with its
idolatry, one’s cooperation is formal; if one does these things only in
order to make a living or to show friendship to an individual pagan,
one’s cooperation is material. It is clear that formal cooperation is a
grave sin against faith, and hence we shall speak now only of material
cooperation.

978. The principles governing the lawfulness of material cooperation
will be treated at length below in their proper place among the sins
opposed to charity. But since, on account of the mixed conditions of
society today, there are innumerable cases of material cooperation
in religion, it will be useful to state in advance in this place the
principles bearing on material cooperation and their application to
cases on religion and worship. The principles are the same as those
given for an act that has two effects, one good and the other bad.
Hence, material cooperation is not lawful, except when the following
conditions are present:

(a) The action of him who cooperates must be good in itself or at least
indifferent, for of course, if it is evil, it is not lawful. Thus, if
a person were to give to one pagan temple objects he had stolen from
another temple, his action would be intrinsically sinful on account of
the theft. Similarly, if a person were to contribute to a collection
list as “sympathizer” with a school for the propagation of atheism
or as “beneficiary” from the sacrifices to be offered an idol, his
act would be intrinsically sinful as being a promotion of error or
superstition, even though he were not really a sympathizer with atheism
or a believer in idols.

(b) The intention of him who cooperates must be good; for, if he wills
to help a false religion, he is guilty of formal cooperation; if he
wills some other wrong end, he is guilty of some other species of
sin. Thus, if one who does not believe in idolatry contributes to it
on account of sympathy with anti-Christian movements, he is guilty of
enmity to the truth.

(c) There must be a reason for the cooperation proportionate to the
gravity of the sin which will be committed by others, to the proximity
and necessity of the cooperation, and to the obligation which one has
of preventing the sin of others. Examples: To contribute to a sect
which plots the downfall of legitimate authority is never lawful,
for there is no reason of temporal or private good that can be a
compensation for the destruction of the public good. To contribute
to the building of a Mohammedan mosque does not require so serious a
reason as to contribute to the building of a pagan temple, for mosques
are not used for idolatry. A graver reason is needed to justify ringing
the bell or ushering the people to their seats for a service of false
worship than to justify sweeping and dusting the temple the day before
the service, for in the former case the cooperation is closer. A
greater reason is required to build a house of false worship, when
there is no one else to build it, than when there are many others who
will gladly build it if one refuses, for in the former case one’s
cooperation is so necessary that without it the false worship cannot
take place, but not so in the latter case. A much more serious reason
would be required to justify parents conducting their children to a
place of false worship than would be required to justify a public
chauffeur in taking passengers thither; for the parents have a special
duty to guard the religion of their children.

979. The above principles on mediate cooperation are clear enough, but
it is frequently very difficult to apply them on account of the
uncertainty as to whether or not a particular act of cooperation is
indifferent in itself, or whether a particular reason for cooperation
is sufficient. But the following rules will help:

(a) An act is indifferent or good, when it does not tend to evil from
its very nature or the circumstances, but has purposes that are not
bad. It is bad when either intrinsically (i.e., from its nature) or
extrinsically (i.e., from circumstances) it tends necessarily to evil.
Examples: A derisory image of Christ and the manual of an obscene cult
are intrinsically evil, inasmuch as they necessarily convey error or
immorality. To draw up plans for a temple of idolaters in a Christian
country would have the appearance of favoring the propagation of
idolatry; to work on the construction of a temple in a pagan country
where the lending of one’s labor is regarded as a sign of acceptance of
paganism, to help build a meeting house for a sect that plots the
overthrow of government or religion--all these acts are indifferent in
themselves (for one may also draw plans and put up walls for good or
indifferent purposes), but from the circumstances they are evil in the
cases given.

(b) Reasons for cooperation may be ranked as great, greater and
greatest according to the kinds of goods that are at stake, and their
sufficiency or insufficiency may be determined by measuring them with
the gravity of the cooperation that is given. Great reasons are: fear
of serious suffering, or of the wrath of husband or other superior, or
of loss of an opportunity to make a considerable profit. Greater
reasons are: fear of loss of position, or of notable detriment to
reputation or fortune, or of severe imprisonment. Among the greatest
reasons for cooperation in the worship of a false religion are the
following: danger of loss of life or limb, of perpetual imprisonment,
of great dishonor, of loss of all one’s earthly possessions, of
disturbance of the public peace.

980. Cases of cooperation in false religion that occur most frequently
are: (a) contributions made to schools, churches, institutions; (b)
labor given to buildings and objects of worship or instruction; (c)
labor given to acts of worship or instruction.

981. Contributions to false worship are unlawful, even apart from
scandal, danger of perversion, and the bad intention of the cooperator
in the following cases:

(a) When on account of circumstances the contributions are signs of
sympathy with religious errors. Examples: Titus gives many stipends for
Masses to a schismatical priest. Balbus, when asked, contributes
liberally to a fund for the building of a hall under the auspices of
atheists. Caius, without being asked, gives a small donation towards
the erection of a pagan temple. Claudius sends in a subscription to the
treasury of a political organization whose purpose is anti-religious,
and promises to support their ticket.

(b) Contributions, even though they manifest no sympathy with religious
error, are unlawful, when there is no reason for the cooperation, or
only an insufficient reason. Examples: Caius contributes to a pagan
temple for no other reason than that he has not the heart to refuse
anyone. Titus advertises constantly in an antireligious paper in order
to help his business (cfr. 1530).

982. If there is no bad intention on the part of the contributor, and
if the danger of scandal or perversion is excluded, contributions are
permitted under the following conditions, of which both must be present:

(a) The contribution must not be a mark of sympathy with religious
error. This condition will be fulfilled more readily in countries of
mixed religion, where Catholics and non-Catholics have been long
associated together, and where non-Catholic denominations are engaged
in many things other than the preaching of their doctrines, such as
works of benevolence. Example: Balbus contributes at times to the
building or maintenance of Protestant orphan asylums, hospitals, and
schools, in a locality where these institutions are open to all and a
contribution is not regarded as a sign of agreement with sectarian
purposes.

(b) There must be a sufficient reason for making the contribution, such
as the common good or great private necessity. Examples: Claudius
contributes to the building of a non-Catholic church, in order that
Catholics may thus obtain exclusive use of a church till then used by
Catholics and non-Catholics alike. Titus buys tickets for bazaars, lawn
fetes, oyster suppers, dances, picnics and other entertainments held
for the benefit of non-Catholic churches, since, if he does not do
this, he will lose trade and his business will be injured.

983. The building of houses of false worship, the production and sale
of articles used in false worship, are unlawful also in two cases:

(a) when, on account of circumstances, they are a mark of approval of
the false worship. Examples: Christians of Japan were forbidden by the
Church to cooperate in the erection of altars or temples to idols, even
if threatened with death or exile, and the reason of the prohibition
seems to have been in each instance that such work was looked on and
demanded as a profession of faith in paganism. Similarly, the
construction of non-Catholic edifices in a Catholic country, of a pagan
temple in a Christian country, or of an atheistic hall, would be signs
of approbation of error. It is difficult to see how one who sells idols
to those who request them for purposes of idolatry does not show favor
to false worship, although he might be excused if, under threat of
great harm, he delivered them with a protest that he was acting under
compulsion;

(b) when there is no reason, or no sufficient reason, for cooperation
with false worship. Example: Balbus helps to build non-Catholic places
of worship for no other reason than that he is asked to do so, or that
he receives good pay.

984. Building non-Catholic temples or furnishing the appurtenances of
worship, scandal and other evil being avoided, are lawful under two
conditions as above:

(a) the work must not be regarded as a sign of approval of false
worship. Examples: The Church has permitted Christians to assist in the
construction of Mohammedan mosques, when this was done unwillingly by
them and under compulsion. The manufacture of statues of Buddha or of
other idols is not a sign that one approves of idolatry, because these
objects have legitimate uses, such as adornment of palaces or art
galleries. Similarly, the production and distribution of emblems of a
non-Catholic sect or secret society is regarded as being in itself an
indifferent sect, on account of the various uses to which such objects
may be put;

(b) there must be a reason sufficiently grave for doing this kind of
work. Hence, a greater reason is needed to build a pagan temple than a
Mohammedan mosque, and graver reason to build a mosque than an
heretical place of worship; likewise, greater reason is required to
cooperate as architect than as hirer and supervisor of labor, greater
reason to cooperate as supervisor of labor than as stonecutter,
bricklayer, etc.; greater reason is required to justify selling than
making idols; greater reason to justify selling altar cloths and breads
for the Lord’s Supper than for selling pews and stained glass windows.
Examples: Since lights, benches, bells, tables, cloths, etc., are not
necessarily intended for direct use in acts of worship, a sufficient
reason for selling them to non-Catholic churches is the profit that
will be made. But, since vestments and chalices pertain directly to
worship, a more serious reason is required for selling them than
business gains.

985. Making the preparations for non-Catholic services is unlawful
in the two cases given above, that is, when there is approval or
insufficient reason. (a) If the work manifests an approval of the
services, it is unlawful. Such positions as sexton, sacristan, usher,
beadle, church-warden, and trustee, imply recognition of the worship
or membership in the congregation, although the same does not seem to
be true of membership in the civil corporation of a church, nor of
external offices such as janitor, caretaker, and attorney. Examples:
Balba, an Anglican who is sick, wishes her minister to bring her
communion. She asks her nurse, Titia, who is a Catholic, to telephone
the minister to bring communion, and also directs Titia to prepare an
altar and assist the minister on his arrival by lighting the candles,
making responses, etc. Titia may not consent, for such immediate
cooperation would mean approval of and participation in Anglican rites.
Claudius, a Catholic, is hired by the minister of a Protestant church
to take care of the yard and garden about the church and parsonage.
Sometimes the minister asks Claudius to play the chimes in his church
tower which call the people to the services. The gardening work is
indifferent, but the playing of the chimes seems at least an unlawful
cooperation, since it is an invitation to non-Catholic worship.

(b) If there is no sufficient reason for the work, it is unlawful.
Examples: Gaia, a Catholic, acts as scrubwoman and cleaner in a
schismatical church for no other reason than friendship for members
of the altar society. On certain feast days her husband, Caius, a
Catholic, takes pilgrims to the schismatical church in a bus, only
because he makes considerable profit.

986. Making preparations for non-Catholic services, scandal and other
danger being avoided, is lawful when the two conditions given above
are present. (a) Hence, the preparations must contain no indication
of approval of the services. Examples: If Titia, the nurse mentioned
in the previous paragraph, called in an Anglican nurse to receive and
fulfill the orders of Balba, she would show that she did not herself
approve of the rites, and her act would be indifferent in itself.
If she could not avoid telephoning the minister without serious
consequences, it would not be unlawful for her to tell him that Balba
wished him to call. She might even in great necessity prepare the
table herself, but could take no part in the rite. The acts of telling
the minister that a visit from him was desired and of preparing the
table would not be, in the circumstances, approving of the rite that
followed. If Claudius mentioned in the foregoing paragraph wound up
the clock in the church tower, or rang the bell at certain times to
indicate the hour of the day, his acts would be indifferent, since they
have no necessary reference to worship.

(b) There must be a reason sufficiently grave for engaging in the
work that prepares for the services. Examples: If Caia mentioned in
the preceding paragraph were in great poverty and could find no other
employment, this would be a sufficient reason for her cooperation.
Likewise, if her husband drove a bus that carried passengers to
whatever destination they desired, and he could not refuse to let
them off at the church without being dismissed or causing other like
inconveniences, he would have sufficient reason for his cooperation.

987. The Commandment of External Profession of Faith.--The third
commandment of faith (mentioned in 918) has been considered so far in
its negative aspect--that is, as a prohibition against the denial of
truth or the profession of error. It remains to consider it in its
affirmative aspect--that is, as a precept of profession of faith or of
denial of error.

988. The ways of making profession of faith are various: (a) It is made
implicitly, if one performs acts that suppose faith; explicitly, if one
declares in words one’s internal belief. Thus, a Catholic professes his
faith implicitly by observing the precepts of the Church; explicitly,
by reciting before others an act of faith or the Creed.

(b) The declaration of one’s faith in words is made in ordinary ways,
if one affirms it to others, privately or publicly, or if one teaches
it or defends it in debate; it is made solemnly, if it is recited
according to a prescribed form as a ceremony. Thus, a Catholic who
answers to a questioner that he is a Catholic, or who explains the
truths of faith to an inquirer, or who replies to the objections of
an unbeliever, makes an ordinary profession of faith; one who reads
before the bishop or other designated authority a formula prescribed by
the Church, makes solemn profession of faith. The solemn profession of
faith is usually made before the altar, on which candles are lighted;
and he who makes profession of faith kneels before the authority who
receives it. Sometimes witnesses are present and the profession is
signed.

(c) The solemn profession of faith is sometimes an abjuration (i.e.,
a declaration of one’s adherence to the faith of the Church and a
recantation of previous errors); sometimes it is a declaration or
oath that one rejects errors or accepts truths. Thus, converts before
reception into the Church abjure the errors they formerly held;
officials in the Church before assuming authority make a profession of
faith in which they reprobate Modernism and express their belief in the
Creed and the teachings of the Church.

989. The existence of a divine precept of profession of faith is proved
from revelation and intrinsic reasons, as follows:

(a) “If thou confess with thy mouth the Lord Jesus, and believe in
thy heart that God hath raised Him up from the dead, thou shalt be
saved. For with the heart we believe unto justice, but with the mouth
confession is made unto salvation” (Rom., x. 9, 10). This precept
obliges under grave sin, since it is required for salvation.

(b) The first reason for external profession of faith is the honor of
God; for it is a mark of disrespect to God to be ashamed or afraid
to acknowledge oneself as a believer in His Word or a witness to its
truth, on account of what others may think or say or do.

(c) A second reason for the external profession of faith is one’s own
good. It is well known that faith is strengthened by external acts, and
that it grows weak and decays among Catholics who have no priests or
churches or means of practising their faith.

(d) A third reason for profession of faith is the good of others, for
the confession of faith is an encouragement to those who are strong in
faith, an example to those whose faith is weak, and a light to those
who have not the faith.

990. The divine precept of profession of faith, since it is
affirmative, does not call for fulfillment at every moment. It obliges
only at those times when the honor of God, the Revealer of Truth, or
the needs of our neighbor, who is called to the truth, demand that one
declare externally one’s internal belief. (a) The honor of God demands
a confession of faith, when a refusal to give it signifies that one
does not accept the truths revealed by God, that revelation contains
error, etc. (b) The needs of our neighbor demand a confession of faith,
when a refusal to give it will prevent another from embracing the
faith, or will cause him to lose it or give up its practices, etc.

991. The honor of God or the good of the neighbor calls for an external
profession of faith at the following times: (a) when a person is
joining the Church or returning to it, for the Church is a visible
society and membership in it should be visible; (b) when a Catholic is
interrogated about his faith, for here the honor of God and the good of
others require that he be not ashamed of Christ or His Words (Luke, ix.
26), and that he should cause his light to shine before men (Matt., v.
16); (c) when a Catholic is in the company of others who are ridiculing
or calumniating the faith, and a protest is looked for from him on
account of his authority, knowledge, etc.

992. The profession of faith made by one who is joining the Church must
be external, but the same publicity is not necessary for every case.

(a) Secret profession of faith is made when the reception of a convert
is known only to himself and the priest who received him. This is
permitted only in grave necessity, when the spiritual good of the
convert requires it, and no injury is done to the honor of God or the
Welfare of the neighbor. Example: Titus is dying and wishes to be
baptized, but for an important reason he is unwilling to have the fact
of his conversion disclosed. Father Balbus, therefore, baptizes without
witnesses.

(b) Private profession of faith is made when the reception of a convert
is made before the priest and two witnesses, but the fact of the
conversion is not made known to others on account of circumstances.
This is permitted only for a short time and for serious reasons (see
932, 993), as the task of concealing one’s faith for a long time is
most difficult and is dangerous to faith itself. Example: Caius is a
pagan who wishes to become a Catholic, but is kept back on account of
dangers from his fellow-pagans, who will persecute him as an apostate.
He, therefore, asks to be received as a secret Christian, with liberty
to profess no religion externally. This may be permitted for a time,
until Caius can move to some other place, but it cannot be permitted
permanently.

(c) Public profession of faith is made when the reception of a convert
is made before the priest and two witnesses, and the convert thereafter
makes it known that he is a Catholic by attending Mass, receiving
the Sacraments, etc. This kind of profession of faith is ordinarily
required, but there is no law making it necessary for a convert to
publish the news of his conversion.

993. A difficult case occurs when one who wishes to become a convert
is unable to make public profession of Catholicity without suffering
very great detriment, and is unable to make private profession without
continuing in external practices of the non-Catholic religion. An
example of this would be a non-Catholic girl who is threatened with
destitution by her parents if she becomes a Catholic openly, and who
knows that she will be forced to go to church with them if she becomes
a Catholic privately. There are three courses in such a case: (a)
public profession of Catholicism at once could be advised if the party
showed signs of a special divine call and of a heroism equal to the
difficulties the public profession would entail; (b) private profession
of Catholicism could be tolerated for a time, if the party was of such
age and circumstances as to appear able to cope successfully with the
temptations and perplexities that beset this course; (c) delay of
Baptism until things take a better turn would be the most prudent plan,
if the deprivation of spiritual advantages would in the long run prove
a lesser evil than the inconveniences of public or private profession
of Catholicism.

994. Examination about one’s religious status refers either to one’s
faith, or to something not necessarily connected with faith. (a) When
a person is examined about his faith (e.g., whether he is a Catholic,
whether he believes in the doctrine of the Real Presence, or in Papal
Infallibility), profession of faith is obligatory, if its omission
is equivalent to denial. (b) When he is examined about something
not necessarily connected with faith, denial or concealment of the
truth would not be denial of faith, and concealment might be lawful,
if the question were unfair. Evasion would be sinful, if the denial
or concealment contained a lie or caused scandal. Examples: If a
missionary in England or Ireland in the sixteenth century had refused
to admit that he was a priest or religious, or a layman had refused to
confess that he had harbored a priest in his house or had assisted at
Mass, these denials would not necessarily contain a denial of the faith.

995. Examination about one’s faith is made either by a private person
or by public authority.

(a) When a person is questioned about his religious belief by a private
person, he is not bound by reason of the question itself to make a
profession of his faith, for a private person has no authority to
call upon one in the capacity of a solemn and public witness; but he
is bound to make a profession of faith by reason of circumstances, if
the honor of God or the good of his neighbor requires that he declare
his belief. Examples: Titius is known as a very iniquisitive and
meddlesome character, who is continually asking others about their
personal affairs and putting silly questions. Wherefore, those who know
him are accustomed to pay no attention to his questions, or to tell
him to mind his business, or to give him some humorous reply. One day
Titius asked Balbus, whom he knew very well to be a Catholic: “What
is your religion?” Balbus retorted: “What is yours?” and left him.
Caius is studying Christianity with a view to embracing it, and asks
Sempronius’ opinion on miracles. Sempronius, fearing the ridicule of
some others present if he admits belief in miracles, says that he knows
nothing about that subject. Balbus had a right to deny an answer to his
questioner; but Sempronius should have replied for the edification of
Caius and the honor of God.

(b) When a person is questioned about his religious belief by public
authority, his obligation to make a profession of faith is certain, if
the questioner has the right according to law to ask the question, and
if it is made to one individually and out of hatred of the faith; for
to this case apply the words of Christ: “You shall be brought before
governors and kings for My sake, for a testimony to them and to the
Gentiles” (Matt., x. 18).

996. In the following cases, one is not bound to confession of faith on
account of the public authority that puts the question, although one
may be bound on account of the circumstances:

(a) When the question is not put to an individual, but to a whole
community, by a law which requires them in time of persecution
to deliver themselves up as Christians or Catholics, there is no
obligation to comply with this law, since it is unjust, and neither the
honor of God nor the good of others requires one to make the profession
of faith it demands (see 377, 552).

(b) When the question is put to an individual by one in authority but
contrary to the law of the land, there is no obligation to answer.
Thus, if according to civil law the magistrates have no right to
examine about matters of conscience and one of them should nevertheless
do so, the party questioned could treat the question as out of order
and deny any answer.

(c) When the question is made according to law, but does not proceed
from hatred of the faith, one is not obliged positively to profess
one’s faith, unless the omission would seem to those present to be a
denial of faith. Thus, a person might remain silent, or say that he
did not wish to answer, that he did not wish to say what his belief
was, etc., and in the circumstances it would seem that he would not be
denying his faith, but merely for some reason refusing to discuss it
when he thought there was no necessity.

997. The third case mentioned above (see 991), in which one is obliged
to profess one’s faith publicly, is when the faith is. being attacked
in one’s presence. The honor of God and the good of the neighbor then
require one to speak out. (a) Thus, if the doctrines of the faith are
being blasphemed or ridiculed, one should defend them, if one is able.
Otherwise, one should protest or leave the company, if this will be
advantageous to religion. (b) If sacred things are being profaned, one
should resist physically, if one is able to prevent what is going on.

998. Debates on religion between Catholics and non-Catholics are not in
themselves wrong, but as a rule they are useless and inexpedient.

(a) That such debates are not essentially wrong, is clear from the
fact that a suitable defender of the faith is able by argumentation
to show the misconceptions that are entertained about the faith and
the fallacious objections that are made against it. This is honorable
to God and profitable to the neighbor: “Saul confounded the Jews that
dwelt at Damascus, affirming that this is the Christ .... He spoke also
to the Gentiles and disputed with the Greeks” (Acts, ix. 22, 29).

(b) That controversy is generally unprofitable is a matter of
experience. Religious debates often lead to bitterness, and seldom
effect conversions. There is, moreover, an ever-present danger that the
sophistry or eloquence of an adversary may give him the appearance of
victory to the discredit of the faith, for even a foolish person can
raise difficulties which only a wise man can answer.

999. Consequently the rule governing religious disputations is that
they should be avoided, unless ecclesiastical authority deems them
useful at times. (a) If no provocation is offered, or if no good seems
likely to result from a debate, it should be avoided. (b) If one is
attacked and it seems that the honor of God and the good of souls will
be served by a debate, then capable and prudent speakers are permitted
by the Church to defend the faith, provided permission is secured from
the Holy See, or, in case of urgency, from the local Ordinary (Canon
1325, Sec.3). The prescriptions of this Canon were reaffirmed recently
by the Holy Office and applied especially to “ecumenical” conventions
convoked to promote church unity. Catholics, both lay and clerical, may
in no way be present at such meetings without the previous consent of
the Holy See (Holy Office, Monitum, June 5, 1948). See Appendix II.

1000. The divine precept of profession of faith so far considered
obliges on account of the virtue of faith itself, that is, on account
of the external honor or service due to the Word of God. There is
also a divine precept of profession of faith which obliges on account
of other virtues that may require such a profession of faith to be
made (e.g., on account of charity or justice). The omission of the
profession of faith in these cases, however, is not a sin against
faith, but against the other virtues, and should be confessed as such.

(a) Justice requires a profession of faith when, by reason of his
office, a person has the duty of teaching others in the faith, for to
teach the faith is to manifest one’s own belief in it. Hence, bishops
and other pastors are obliged to preach: “Woe is unto me, if I preach
not the Gospel” (I Cor., ix. 16); and their teaching is a manifestation
of faith: “Having the same spirit of faith, as it is written: I
believed, for which cause I have spoken; we also believe, and therefore
we speak also” (II Cor., iv., 13).

(b) Charity requires a profession of faith when a person has not the
office of teacher, but has a suitable opportunity to impart instruction
to one who is in great ignorance about religion. For, as charity
requires one to perform corporal works of mercy for the suffering and
destitute, so it requires one to perform spiritual works of mercy
for the spiritually indigent, such as to instruct the ignorant, to
counsel the doubtful. Thus, a lay person who can prudently do so (the
circumstances of time, place, person, etc., being duly considered),
ought in charity to instruct in faith and morals the neglected children
around him.

1001. One is not bound to give instruction about matters of
faith or morals when this would lead to more harm than good; but
misrepresentation must be avoided.

(a) The purpose of instruction is to fulfill the will of God and
to benefit others; therefore, if these ends are not obtained but
rather defeated by an instruction, it should be omitted. The truth
is always good in itself, but its communication may not be expedient
on account of the recipient, who, being immature, may be harmed by
the wrong impression he will receive, or who, being badly disposed,
may use knowledge as a means to wrongdoing. Strong meat should not be
given to infants (Heb., vi. 11-14); pearls should not be cast before
swine (Matt., vii. 6). Examples: The mysteries of the faith (e.g.,
transubstantiation), should be explained with caution to those who are
not well instructed, lest they be overwhelmed with the brightness and
misunderstand. Difficult matters (such as predestination) or dangerous
subjects (such as sex duties) should not be discussed indiscriminately
with all kinds of persons. It is not right to instruct those who are in
ignorance of their duty, if this is not absolutely necessary and one
foresees that instruction will not prevent them from continuing in evil
ways but will only add to their guilt. It is wrong to put the Bible
into the hands of those who will use it for bad purposes.

(b) Misrepresentation or suppression is a lie, and in matters of
doctrine a denial of faith; hence, it is never lawful. The rule to be
followed, therefore, in teaching the faith is that one communicate the
same doctrine to all, but according to the capacity of his hearers--to
some in outline and to others more fully. This was the method of
Christ, who “with many parables spoke to them the word, according as
they were able to hear” (Mark, iv. 33).

1002. The Church has the duty not only of keeping the faith untarnished
among Catholics, but also of spreading it among non-Catholics,
Protestants, Jews and infidels, as far as circumstances will allow.
For God “Will have all men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge
of the truth” (I Tim., ii. 4). Those, therefore, who assist missionary
work for unbelievers at home or abroad, do a work thrice blest, for
(a) it is a thanksgiving offering to God, testifying our appreciation
of the gift of faith which we have received from Him, (b) it is a work
of charity to ourselves, for by helping others to receive the faith
we strengthen our own faith, and (c) it is an act of supreme mercy to
those who are sitting in darkness and the shadow of death.

1003, In addition to the divine precepts, there are also ecclesiastical
laws prescribing profession of faith.

(a) Ecclesiastical precepts of profession of faith for various
officials are contained in Canon 1406 and in the _Sacrorum Antistitum_
of Pius X (September 1, 1910), and Canon 2403 decrees that those who
contumaciously refuse to make the profession of faith of Canon 1406 may
be deprived of their office. Converts to the faith who are received
without absolute Baptism make an abjuration (Holy Office, July 20,
1859), and persons who have incurred excommunication on account of
apostasy, heresy or schism are absolved in the external forum after
juridical abjuration (Canon 2314).

(b) The purpose of these ecclesiastical laws is to prevent the
acceptance of spiritual or temporal jurisdiction or authority in the
Church, or the commission of teaching or the benefits of membership by
those who are unbelievers. Hence, the purpose is grave, and the laws
themselves are held to bind under grave sin.

(c) The persons bound by these ecclesiastical laws are both
ecclesiastics and laymen, namely, those who are about to be received
into or reconciled with the Church, and those who are about to be
admitted to some dignity, order, office or function (such as candidates
for the ranks of Cardinal, bishop, canon, parish priest, religious
superior, professor, preacher, confessor, doctor, etc).

(d) The form of the profession of faith is the Tridentine or Pian given
in the Bull of Pius IV, _Injunctum Nobis_, of November 13, 1564, with
additions referring to the Vatican Council. The oath against Modernism
prescribed in the _Sacrorum Antistitum_ of Pius X, of September 1,
1910, is also obligatory.

(e) The times when these professions of faith must be made are at
admission into the Church and at the reception or renewal of an office.

1004. The affirmative precepts of profession of faith, divine and
ecclesiastical, oblige only at the proper time and place, and therefore
on other occasions one is not obliged to make profession of faith. (a)
Hence, one may avoid a profession of faith by evading interrogation in
time of persecution--for example, through the payment of money to be
exempted from examination, or through flight. As these acts indicate
that the person is unwilling to deny his faith, but has reasons for
wishing to preserve his life or to avoid the danger of apostasy, they
are not of themselves unlawful, and may be a duty. (b) One may omit a
profession of faith by concealing one’s religion, when prudence calls
for concealment rather than publication.

1005. Flight in time of persecution is lawful or unlawful according
to circumstances, since in itself it is something indifferent, being
simply the act of moving from one place to another.

(a) Flight is unlawful, if one’s circumstances are such that one will
do an injury to justice or charity by departure. Hence, a pastor would
sin against justice if he fled in time of persecution, leaving his
flock who stood in need of his presence: “The good shepherd giveth his
life for his sheep. But the hireling and he that is not the shepherd,
seeth the wolf coming, and leaveth the sheep and flieth” (John, x. 11,
12). Hence also, one who has no care of souls but whose presence is
necessary to a persecuted community should prefer out of charity their
spiritual good to his own bodily safety: “We ought to lay down our
lives for the brethren” (I John, iii. 16).

(b) Flight is necessary, if one’s circumstances are such that one will
do an injury to justice or charity by remaining. Hence, if a pastor’s
life is necessary for his flock, while his absence can be supplied by
others who will take his place, justice to his subjects requires that
he save his life for their sake. Thus, for the good of souls St. Peter
escaped from prison (Acts, xii. 17 sqq.); St. Paul fled from Damascus
(Acts, ix. 24, 25); our Lord Himself hid when the Jews took up stones
to cast at Him (John, viii. 59). Similarly, if a person is very fearful
lest his courage may fail him if he is brought before the persecutors,
charity to self requires that he take flight so as to escape the danger
of apostasy.

(c) Flight is permissible, if there is no duty to remain and no duty to
depart: “When they shall persecute you in this city, flee into another”
(Matt., x. 23). Hence, if one’s presence is useful but not necessary
in time of persecution, it is lawful for one to flee. Some authorities
hold that the desertion of Jesus by the disciples during the Passion
was not sinful flight.

1006. To refuse to flee when flight is permissible, is usually not
advisable, for this is dangerous for most persons. It would be
advisable, however, if a person had strong and prudent confidence of
his victory, had the right intention, and used the means to prepare
himself for the struggle.

1007. Concealment of one’s faith is lawful, if the requisite conditions
are present.

(a) Thus, it is not lawful to conceal one’s faith at times when a
profession of it is called for by divine or ecclesiastical law (see
991, 1003); at other times it is lawful. Example: Titus is travelling
in a country where there are no Catholic churches, and where no one
ever asks him about his religion. He never tells anyone what he is.

(b) It is not lawful to conceal one’s faith from a dishonest motive.
Example: If Titus conceals his religion in order not to be unjustly
discriminated against, his motive is good; but if he wishes to be taken
for a non-Catholic, his motive is evil.

(c) It is not lawful to conceal one’s faith in a sinful way. Example:
If the means of concealment employed by Titus imply deception or denial
of the faith (such as lying about his origin and active participation
in non-Catholic worship), he is guilty of sinful concealment. But, if
the means employed are permissible (such as silence about himself,
omission of grace before and after meals, eating meat on Fridays in
virtue of dispensation, etc.), his method of concealment is not sinful.

1008. Generally speaking, concealment of one’s religion is not
advisable. (a) The reasons for concealment are often imaginary, rather
than real. We see that Catholics who are not ashamed of their religion,
or afraid to have it known that they practise it, are respected for
their sincerity and conscientiousness even in bigoted regions, while on
the contrary those who are apologetic or who do not live up to their
religion are looked down on as cowards or hypocrites. (b) The means
employed for concealment will cause endless doubts and scruples, for it
is often difficult to decide what means are lawful and what unlawful.




Art. 4: THE VIRTUE OF HOPE

(_Summa Theologica_, II-II, qq. 17-22.)

1009. Definition.--The word “hope” is variously used. (a) In a wide and
improper sense, it signifies the expectation of some wished-for evil,
or desire without expectation. Hence, colloquially one hopes for
misfortune to another (hope of a future evil), or that another has
succeeded or is in good health (hope of past or present good), or that
some unlooked-for fortune will turn up (hope without expectation). (b)
In its strict and proper sense, hope signifies the expectation of some
desired good in the future. Thus, one hopes to pass an examination, or
to recover from illness.

1010. Hope, strictly understood, is of various kinds. (a) It is an
emotion or an affection, according as it proceeds from the sensitive or
the rational appetite. The emotion of hope is an inclination of the
irascible appetite to possess some object known through the senses and
apprehended as good and attainable, and is found both in man and in the
brutes. The affection of hope is a spiritual inclination, tending to
good as known through the reason.

(b) Hope is either natural or supernatural, according as it tends
either to goods that are temporal and within the power of man to
acquire, or to goods that are eternal and above the unaided powers of
creatures. It is in this latter sense that hope is now taken.

1011. Supernatural hope is understood, sometimes in a wide sense,
sometimes in a strict sense. (a) In a wide sense, it is used
objectively to designate the object, material or formal, of hope. Thus,
St. Paul is speaking of the material object of hope (i.e., of the
things hoped for), when he says: “Hope that is seen is not hope” (Rom.,
viii. 24), “Looking for the blessed hope” (Tit., ii. 13); while the
Psalmist is speaking of the formal object of hope (i.e., the motive of
hope), when he says: “Thou hast been my hope, a tower of strength
against the face of the enemy” (Ps. lx. 4). (b) In a strict sense, hope
is used subjectively to designate the act or habit of hope. The act of
hope is spoken of in the following texts: “We are saved by hope” (Rom.,
viii. 24); “Rejoicing in hope” (Rom., vii. 12). The habit of hope is
indicated in these verses from Job and St. Paul: “This my hope is laid
up in my bosom” (Job, xix. 27); “There remain faith, hope, charity,
these three” (I Cor., xiii. 13). Hope is now taken in the strict sense,
as a virtue or infused habit, from which proceed supernatural acts.

1012. The virtue of hope is defined: “An infused habit, by which we
confidently expect to obtain, through the help of God, the reward of
everlasting life.”

(a) It is “an infused habit.” These words express the genus to which
hope belongs, and they set it apart from the emotion and the affection
of hope, as well as from any acquired habit of hoping for purely
natural goods. A natural virtue of hope, strengthening the will with
reference to natural happiness, is not necessary in any state of man,
fallen or unfallen, for the will does not stand in need of a superadded
virtue with respect to those things that fall within its proper sphere
of action.

(b) Hope is a habit “by which we expect, etc.” These words express the
specific subjective elements of hope, that is, the powers of the soul
in which it resides and the kinds of acts it performs.

(c) “Through the help of God.” These words express the formal object or
motive of hope.

(d) “The rewards of eternal life.” These words express the material
object of hope, that is, the thing that is hoped for.

1013. There is a general similarity between the virtue of hope and
natural hope as regards their objects and acts.

(a) Natural hope is the result of a love of some good, and so differs
from fear, which is the dread of some evil. Similarly, the virtue of
hope springs from a love of heavenly goods (Rom., viii. 24, 25).

(b) Natural hope has to do with a good that is absent, and it is
therefore desire, not enjoyment. Similarly, the virtue of hope looks
forward to goods not as yet attained: “We hope for that which we see
not, we wait for it with patience” (Rom, viii. 25).

(c) Natural hope, unlike mere desire, seeks a good whose attainment is
not certain or easy, and hence it presupposes courage. Similarly, the
virtue of hope demands strength of soul: “Do ye manfully and let your
heart be strengthened, all ye that hope in the Lord” (Ps. xxx. 25).

(d) Natural hope tends towards an objective, which, while difficult, is
not impossible; hence, it expects with confidence, for, when an object
of desire is impossible, one does not hope for it, but despairs. The
virtue of hope also is confident: “Hold fast the glory and confidence
of hope unto the end” (Heb. iii. 6).

1014. Christian hope is superior to natural hope, because it is a
supernatural virtue.

(a) It is a virtue, since its acts are commanded by God, and through it
the will is directed to its beatitude and the secure means of realizing
its lofty aspirations: “I have inclined my heart to do Thy
justifications for ever, for the reward” (Ps. cxviii. 112); “Trust in
the Lord, and do good” (Ps, xxxvi. 3).

(b) Christian hope is a supernatural virtue, since through it man is
sanctified and saved: “I (Wisdom) am the mother of holy hope” (Ecclus.,
xxiv. 24); God “hath regenerated us into a lively hope” (I Pet., i. 3);
“We are saved by hope” (Rom., viii. 24); “Everyone that hath this hope
in Him sanctifieth himself” (I John, iii. 3).

1015. Though hope seeks its own reward, it is not therefore mercenary
or egotistic. Experience shows that hope produces idealism and
self-sacrifice, while the lack of it leads to engrossment in the things
of time and sense and to selfishness. (a) Thus, the hope of the just
man is not separated from charity, and hence he loves God above all,
and his neighbor as himself: “I have inclined my heart to do Thy
justifications forever, for the reward” (Ps. cxviii. 112). (b) The hope
of the sinner is a preparation for charity, since he must desire
charity as a means to the beatitude he wishes: “He that hopeth in the
Lord shall be healed” (Prov., xxviii. 25).

1016. Just as faith is divided into living and dead faith, so hope is
divided into animated and inanimated hope. (a) Animated hope is that to
which is joined the state of grace and charity, and which is thereby
perfect as a virtue and meritorious. This hope is stronger, because we
hope more confidently from friends. An act of animated hope is more
perfect when commanded by the virtue of charity, less perfect when not
so commanded--that is, he who makes an act of hope out of love of God
performs a better work than he who makes an act of hope out of some
other motive (such as self-encouragement). (b) Inanimated hope is that
to which the state of grace and charity is not joined, and which
therefore is an imperfect virtue and not meritorious.

1017. The following divisions of hope made by the Quietists are not
admissible:

(a) The division of hope into natural hope (which seeks its own good,
and which is permitted to the ordinary faithful) and supernatural hope
(which is entirely disinterested, and which is necessary for the
perfect) contains Rigorism; for since natural hope is of no avail
towards justification or for merit, it would follow that without
disinterested love of God one could not obtain forgiveness, nor could
an act be meritorious.

(b) The division of hope into two supernatural species, the one
disinterested (which desires heavenly goods for the glory of God alone)
and the other interested (which desires heavenly goods for the
advantage of self), is useless; for acts of disinterested love belong
to charity, not to hope (Denz., 1327-1349).

1018. The Object of Hope.--By the object of hope we mean three things:
(a) the good that is hoped for (material object, the end which is
intended); (b) the person for whom that good is hoped (the end for
whom); (c) the ground or foundation of hope (formal object).

1019. The material object of hope is twofold, namely, the primary
object, which is desired for its own sake, and the secondary, which is
desired on account of the primary object.

(a) The primary object of hope is God Himself, the infinite good,
considered as our Last End and Beatitude (Ps. lxxii. 25). Connoted in
this object is the beatific vision, the finite act by means of which
the creature attains to the possession of God. The primary object of
our hope is the imperishable crown (I Cor., ix. 25), glory (Col., i.
27), the glory of the children of God (Rom., v. 2), salvation (I
Thess., v. 8), eternal life (Tit., i. 2), entrance into the holy of
holies (Heli, x. 19, 23), the inheritance incorruptible and undefiled
that cannot fade, reserved in heaven (I Pet., i. 4), the vision of God
(I John, iii. 3). It is this object especially that distinguishes
supernatural from natural hope (I Cor., xv. 19). “From God,” says St.
Thomas (II-II, q. 17, a. 2), “we should expect nothing less than God
Himself.”

(b) The secondary object of hope embraces all those created things that
assist one to attain one’s Last End. We may hope for all those things
for which we may pray, as St. Augustine remarks.

1020. The primary object of hope includes: (a) essential beatitude,
that is, the beatific vision; (b) accessory beatitude, that is, all
resultant joys, such as glory of soul and body, the companionship of
the Saints, security from harm, and the like.

1021. The secondary object of hope includes: (a) spiritual goods, such
as graces; (b) temporal goods, such as health and the means that will
enable us, at least indirectly, to work for the life to come and
acquire merit; (c) deliverance from evils that would hinder spiritual
goods; (d) all that promotes one’s salvation, such as labors for God.

1022. The person for whom eternal life is hoped may be either oneself
or one’s neighbor. (a) Absolutely speaking (i.e., apart from the
supposition of friendship towards a neighbor), a person can hope only
for himself; for the salvation of others is not attained by him, but by
them; and thus, if there is no bond of affection, it cannot arouse in
him that feeling of courageous confidence which belongs to hope. (b)
Accidentally (i.e., on the supposition of friendship or charity towards
others), one can hope for them; for love makes a person regard the good
of others as his own. Thus, St. Paul is hopeful for the perseverance of
the Philippians (Phil., i. 6), and he labors for the Corinthians that
his hope for them may be steadfast (II Cor., i. 7).

1023. The formal object of hope is twofold, namely, the primary object,
which is the principal cause that effects our salvation, and the
secondary object, which is a secondary or instrumental cause of
salvation. (a) The primary motive of hope is God Himself, the Author of
salvation, and hence it is said: “Cursed be the man that trusteth in
man” (Jer, xvii. 5). (b) The secondary motive of hope are creatures by
whom one is assisted in obtaining the means for salvation (such as the
Saints, who aid us by their intercessions). Thus, in the _Salve
Regina_, our Lady is addressed as “our hope.” The merits of Christ and
our own merits, since they are instruments used by God, are motives of
hope.

1024. On what divine attribute is the virtue of hope based?

(a) Essentially, hope is based on God’s character of omnipotent helper;
for the specific and differentiating note of this virtue is its
courageous confidence, and this, in view of the surpassing height one
expects to attain and the feebleness of all created efforts, must rely
on the assistance of One who is equal to the task: “The Lord is my rock
and my strength. God is my strong One, in Him will I trust” (II Kings,
xxii. 2, 3); “You have hoped in the Lord Mighty forever” (Is., xxvi.
4); “The name of the Lord is a strong tower; the just runneth to it and
shall be exalted” (Prov. xviii. 10).

(b) Secondary (i.e., as regards acts that it presupposes, or that are
connected with it), hope is concerned with other divine attributes.
Thus, a person does not hope unless he first believes that God has
promised beatitude and that He is true to His promises, unless he
regards beatitude as something desirable; and so he who hopes has
placed his dependence on the loyalty of God to His given word, and on
the desirability of God as the prize of life’s efforts: “Let us hold
fast the confession of our hope without wavering, for He is faithful
that hath promised” (Heb., x. 23); “Unto the hope of life everlasting,
which God, who lieth not, hath promised before the times of the world”
(Tit., i. 2); “The Lord is my portion, therefore will I wait for Him”
(Lam., iii. 24); “Fear not, I am thy reward, exceeding great” (Gen.,
xv. 1). Just as faith presupposes a beginning of belief and a pious
inclination towards it, so does hope presuppose faith and the love of
God, as He is our beatitude.

1025. Omnipotent divine help as the foundation of hope can be
understood in two senses:

(a) It may be taken for some created help, that is, for some gift of
God possessed by us (such as habitual or actual grace, merits, virtues,
etc). It is not in this sense that divine help is called the motive of
hope; for even a sinner can and should hope, and the just man’s merits,
while they are dispositions for beatitude, are not a principal cause
that will conduct him to it.

(b) This divine help may be taken for uncreated help, that is, for the
act by which God confers His gifts upon us. In this sense only is
divine aid the basis of hope. For if a person is asked why he is
confident of salvation, he will not answer, “Because I am in the state
of grace and do good works,” but “Because I know that God will help me.”

1026. The divine perfections included in the title of helper now given
to God are:

(a) essentially, the almighty power of God; for this is the immediate
and sufficient reason for the confident expectation that one will at
last possess the same object of felicity as God Himself. The higher and
more difficult the goal one sets before oneself, the greater must be
the resources on which one counts for success;

(b) secondarily, these perfections include the infinite kindness of
God; for it is the goodness of God that prompts Him to employ His
omnipotence in assisting creatures to attain their Last End. Man has
hope, therefore, of attaining supreme felicity, because he relies on
supreme power to aid him, while this supreme power aids him, because it
is directed by infinite goodness and mercy. Thus, the Psalmist says: “I
have trusted in Thy mercy” (Ps. xii. 6). Just as faith rests
proximately on the reliability of God and remotely on His perfection of
being, so hope rests proximately on God’s almighty power and radically
on His goodness and perfection.

1027. The Excellence of Hope.--Hope is a theological virtue, and is
therefore superior to the moral virtues.

(a) It is a theological virtue, inasmuch as it tends immediately to God
Himself. As was said above (see 1019, 1023), we hope for God and we
hope in God: “In God is my salvation and my glory. He is the God of my
help, and my hope is in God” (Ps. lxi. 8); “What is my hope? Is it not
the Lord?” (Ps. xxxviii. 8); “In Thee, O Lord, have I hoped” (Ps. xxx.
1). Hence, the Apostle numbers hope along with the other theological
virtues (I Cor., xiii. 13). “By faith the house of God receives its
foundations, by hope it is reared, by charity it is completed” (St.
Augustine, Serm. xxvii., 1).

(b) The two moral virtues that most resemble hope are longsuffering and
magnanimity, for the former is the expectation of good that is distant,
while the latter is the readiness to encounter difficulties in the
quest of high ideals. But these two virtues belong to courage, rather
than to hope; for the goods they seek are finite, and the difficulty
they encounter is external struggle, whereas the good which hope seeks
is infinite, and the difficulty lies in the very greatness of that good.

1028. There are various points of view from which virtues may be
compared one with another.

(a) One virtue is prior to another in duration, when it precedes the
latter in time. Thus, the natural virtues that pagans have before their
conversion are prior in duration to the supernatural virtues that are
received in Baptism.

(b) One virtue is prior to another by nature, or in the order of
generation, when it is the necessary preparation or disposition for
that other, which essentially presupposes it. Thus, the intellectual
virtues are naturally prior to justice, for a man cannot will to give
others their due, unless he first knows that this is his duty.

(c) One virtue is prior to another virtue in excellence as a habit,
when it has an object that is more elevated and comprehensive, and when
it is fitted to be the guide of the other virtue. For the standard of
comparison of habits must be taken from the objects to which they tend,
and from which they derive their specific character (see 134). Thus,
the habit of philosophizing is in itself more noble than the habit of
accumulating wealth, for truth is better than money.

(d) One virtue is prior to another in excellence according to the
general concept of virtue, when it does more to set the will right. For
the standard of comparison then is to be taken from the influence
exercised on one’s acts (as the word “virtue” or “power” intimates),
and the will is the motor power that sets the other faculties in
motion. Thus, for one who has debts to pay, it is better that he give
his time to earning money than to storing his mind with the lore of
scientists; justice has more of a claim on him than knowledge.

1029. Comparison of Hope with Faith.--(a) These virtues are not the
same, for, while faith makes us cling to God as the giver of truth and
assent to what is obscure to us, hope makes up turn to Him as the
author of beatitude and strive for that which is difficult for us.

(b) Faith and hope are normally equal in duration, since as a rule they
are infused at the same time (as in Baptism). Accidentally, however,
faith may precede hope, as when one who preserves his faith loses hope
on account of despair, and later recovers it.

(c) They are unequal as to natural precedence, faith being prior to
hope, since both glory and grace--the objects of hope--must be known
through faith (Heb., xi. 6).

(d) They are unequal in their excellence as habits, faith being
superior to hope, as the intellectual habits are superior to the moral;
for faith is regulative and directive of hope, and has an object more
abstract and universal.

(e) They are unequal in their excellence according to the general
concept of virtue, hope being superior to faith, as the moral virtues
are superior to the intellectual (see 156). For hope includes a
rightness of the will towards God that is not included in the concept
of faith, which is chiefly intellectual, and it is the will that moves
the other powers to action.

1030. Comparison of Hope with Charity.--(a) These virtues are not the
same, for, while faith and hope adhere to God as the principle from
which one derives truth or goodness, charity adheres to God for His own
sake. Hope tends towards God as our good, from whom beatitude and the
means thereto are to be expected; but charity unites us to God so that
we live for God rather than for self.

(b) Hope and charity are normally equal as to duration, but
accidentally hope may precede charity, as when one commits a mortal
sin, but retains his hope of salvation, and later recovers charity.
There is question now only of the habits, because the acts of the
sinner leading up to charity--faith, fear, hope, contrition, etc.--are
for the most part successive, although in a sudden conversion hope may
be virtually included in charity.

(c) They are unequal as to natural precedence, hope being prior to
charity, for, just as fear naturally leads to interested love such as
is contained in hope, so does this interested love prepare one for a
higher love that is disinterested: “The end of the commandment is
charity from a pure heart” (I Tim., i. 5). We speak here of hope
unanimated by charity; for animated or living hope trusts in God as a
friend, and hence presupposes charity.

(d) They are unequal in excellence, for hope proceeds from imperfect
love, which desires God for the sake of the one who loves, while
charity is perfect love and desires God for His sake.

1031. Hope, as said above (see 1015-1017), is good and virtuous even
when separated from charity, or when exercised without the actual
motive of charity. But imperfect or less perfect hope must not be
confused with the following acts, which have only the appearance of
hope: (a) acts that remove the material object of hope, which are such
as look for all beatitude in something different from God (e.g., in
secondary joys of heaven); (b) acts that do injury to the objects of
hope, such as those that subordinate them to lesser goods (e.g., hope
which puts self above God or delight above virtue).

1082. Three types of the latter kind of pseudo-hope may be
distinguished:

(a) Egotistical hope is that which places the end for which beatitude
is hoped (i.e., self, as was said in 1022) above the end which is
beatitude (i.e., God the Last End, as was said in 1019 sqq.), or which
places subjective beatitude (i.e., the act of intuitive vision by which
beatitude is attained) above objective beatitude (i.e., God as the
object in which beatitude consists). Just as the intellect is in error
when it mistakes the conclusion for the premise, so is the will in
disorder when it takes a means for the end. Hence, while there is
nothing inordinate in a man’s hoping for food on account of eating and
in his eating on account of health (since in reality health is the
purpose of eating, and eating the purpose of food), it is extremely
inordinate to hope for God on account of the beatific vision or on
account of self, since God is the End of all, and the beatific vision
is only the condition for attaining to this Last End, and self merely
the subject to whom God and the beatific vision are to be given for its
perfection through them.

(b) Epicurean hope is that which places pleasure above the other
elements that pertain to subjective beatitude. The subjective happiness
of man consists essentially in the act that is highest and distinctly
human--namely, in the act of the intellect seeing God intuitively;
hence, pleasure--even the chief spiritual pleasures-should be esteemed
as something secondary and consequent.

(c) Utilitarian hope is that which places reward above virtue, as if
the latter were merely a means, as when one says: “If there were no
heaven, I would practise no virtue.” There are three kinds of good: (i)
useful good, or that which is desirable only because it serves as a
means to something else (e.g., bitter medicine, which is wished, not
for its own sake, but for the sake of health); (ii) moral good, or that
which is desired for its own sake, as being agreeable to the rational
nature of man (such as virtue); (iii) delightful good, that is, the
repose or satisfaction of the will in possession of that which is
desirable for its own sake. It is a mistake, therefore, to regard
virtue as merely a useful good, something that is disagreeable in
itself and cannot be practised on account of its inherent goodness. It
is also a mistake to consider heaven as something above and apart from
virtue; for eternal life is the perfect flowering and fruitage of the
moral life that has been planted and developed here on earth. The
things of this world are only means to virtue, and virtue reaches its
climax in the beatific vision. The delights of heaven are results of
that vision, not its end.

1033. Hope, therefore, must seek God as the chief good; it must not
prefer the lesser to the greater, and it must not hold virtue as good
only in view of the reward. But, on the other hand, hope seeks God as
its own good, and it need not be joined to disinterested love, in order
to be a true virtue.

(a) Hence, it is not necessary that one hope with the proviso that, in
the impossible hypothesis that God were unwilling to reward virtue, the
reward would not be expected; for it is not necessary to consider
chimerical cases.

(b) It is not necessary that hope be elicited by the act of charity
(i.e., that one always direct one’s desire of salvation to the end that
God may be glorified), for thus the motive of hope would cease to be
active, and the lesser virtue would be absorbed in charity.

(c) It is not necessary that hope be commanded by the act of charity
(i.e., that one hope for salvation as one’s own good, only when a
previous act of charity has bidden that this be done as a mark of love
towards God), for to desire that which God wishes one to desire is in
itself good and laudable, and stands in need of no other act to justify
it.

1034. Discouragement and aridity occur even in the lives of great
Saints, and at such times, when pure love of God seems almost
impossible, hope comes to the rescue by offering encouragement and
spurring on to activity. Hence, the importance of this virtue in the
spiritual life; for (a) hope is an anchor of the soul in times of
tempest, since it offers reasons for patience and good cheer (Heb, vi.
19; Ecclus., iii. 9; Rom., xii. 12, viii 25; I Thess., v. 8); (b) hope
gives wings to the soul in times of weariness, since the motives it
presents are inducements to courage and good works (Is., xl. 31, xxx.
15; Ps. cxviii. 32; Heb., X. xi).

1035. The following means are recommended for growth in hope: (a) to
ask this from God: “Grant us, O Lord, an increase of faith, hope, and
charity” (Missal, 13th Sunday after Pentecost); (b) to meditate on the
rewards of heaven and the motives of hope, and to make corresponding
acts (II Cor., iv. 18; Ecclus., ii. 11-13); (c) to have recourse to God
in all our needs, casting all our care on Him (I Pet., v. 7); (d) to
work courageously for salvation and to preserve purity of conscience
(Ps. xxvi. 14; I John, iii. 21, 22).

1036. The Subject of Hope.--By the subject of hope we mean the power of
the soul to which this virtue belongs and also the persons who are
capable of hope. (a) The faculty of the soul in which hope resides is
the will, for this virtue seeks the good, not the true. (b) The persons
capable of hope are all those who have not yet received their final
reward or punishment.

1037. The virtue of hope does not remain in the blessed. (a) They
cannot hope for the principal object of bliss, since they already enjoy
it: “Hope that is seen is not hope. For what a man seeth, why doth he
hope for?” (Rom., viii. 24). (b) The blessed can desire secondary
objects, such as the continuance of their state, the glorification of
their bodies, the salvation of those who are still on earth, etc.; but
this desire belongs to the virtue of charity, since with the blessed
there is no longer the struggle and expectation of the future that is
contained in the desire of hope. Moreover, the desire of objects other
than God does not constitute the theological virtue of hope, which
tends directly to God.

1038. As to the departed who are not in heaven, we must distinguish
between those in hell and those in purgatory.

(a) Those who are in hell, whether demons or men, cannot hope; for it
is part of their punishment that they know their loss is eternal (Matt.,
xxv. 41; Prov., xi. 7). Dante expresses this truth when he says that on
the gates of hell it is written: “Hope abandon ye that enter here.”
Only in an improper sense can the lost be said to hope, inasmuch as
they desire evils, or things other than heaven. Unbaptized infants
either do not know their loss, or else are not tormented by the thought
that heaven is for them unattainable, realizing that its privation has
resulted from no personal fault of their own.

(b) Those who are in purgatory have hope; for, although they are
certain of their salvation, it still remains true that they must ascend
through difficulties to their reward. Hence, in the Mass the Church
prays for the departed “who sleep the sleep of peace”--that is, who are
secure about their salvation. The Fathers in limbo also had hope before
their introduction into heaven: “All these died according to faith,
not having received the promises, but beholding them afar off and
saluting them, and confessing that they are pilgrims and strangers on
the earth.... They desire a better, that is to say a heavenly country”
( Heb., xi. 13, 16).

1039. As to those who have not yet passed from this mortal life, some
have hope, others have it not.

(a) Those who have no hope are unbelievers and those believers who have
rejected hope. Unbelievers have no theological hope, since faith is
“the substance (i.e., basis) of things to be hoped for” (Heb., xi. 1).
Hence, even though one accepts the Article of the Creed, “I look for
the resurrection of the dead and the life of the world to come,” one’s
hope is not real, if one culpably rejects some other Article; for then
one expects the end without the necessary means (Heb. xi. 6). Believers
who despair of salvation, or who do not look to God for it, have not
the virtue of hope; for, just as faith is lost if its object or motive
is not accepted, so also hope perishes if its object is not expected or
its motive is not relied on.

(b) Those who have hope are all believers not guilty of a sin contrary
to hope. Sinners cannot expect to be saved if they continue in sin, but
they can expect through the grace of God to be freed from sin and to
merit eternal life; indeed, they are bound to believe that God wishes
their salvation and to hope for it.

1040. The certainty of hope does not exclude the uncertainty of fear;
on the contrary, man must both hope and fear, as regards his salvation.

(a) If a person looks to the motives of hope (i.e., God’s power and
mercy), he has the assurance of faith that God can and will help him to
attain salvation; and thus there arises in him a firm and unshaken
hope: “I know whom I have believed, and I am certain that He is able to
keep that which I have committed unto Him, against that day” (II Tim.,
i. 12; cfr. Heb., vi. 18; Ps. xxiv. 2; Ps. xxx. 2.; Rom., xiv. 4)

(b) But, if a person looks to his own frailty and remembers that others
have hoped and yet have been lost, he is not certain that he will
cooperate with God and be saved, and hence he must fear (Eccles., ix. 1
sqq.; I Cor., iv. 4, ix. 27). The Council of Trent declares that no one
can promise himself with absolute certainty that he will persevere
(Sess. VI, Cap. 13). Therefore, it is written: “He that thinketh
himself to stand, let him take heed lest he fall” (I Cor., x. 12);
“With fear and trembling, work out your salvation” (Phil., ii. 12).

1041. The Gift of Fear of the Lord.--The Gift of the Holy Ghost that
perfects the virtue of hope is Fear of the Lord (see 159 sqq.); for (a)
hope is the root from which the Gift of Fear is derived, since hope
joins the affections to God, and fear acts upon the soul that is thus
tending towards its beatitude--we fear to lose what we hope for; (b)
fear assists hope, since it makes us dread, not the loss of beatitude
or of divine help, but the lack of cooperation on our own part with the
assistance given by God.

1042. Not every kind of fear pertains to the Gift called Fear of
the Lord. In the first place, we must distinguish between physical
and moral fear. (a) Fear, physically considered, is the emotion
treated above (see 41 sqq., 120), which manifests itself in aversion,
bashfulness, shame, dismay, alarm, horror, etc. This kind of fear, like
the other passions (see 121), is morally indifferent in itself. (b)
Fear, morally considered, is a dread of imminent evil as leading one to
God or away from Him. In this sense fear is now discussed.

1043. The object of fear is always some evil, for the good does not
repel, but attracts. The motive of fear, however, is something good;
for one dreads evil on account of some good one wishes to obtain or
retain. By reason of the motive, then, fear may be divided into two
moral species, namely, fear of the world and fear of God.

(a) Fear of the world is that which dreads creatures more than God,
because it sets more store by the things of time than by those of
eternity. Thus, St. Peter’s denial of Christ was prompted by fear of
the world. When the object of this fear is loss of the esteem of men,
it is called human respect.

(b) Fear of God is that which dreads the Creator more than creatures,
because it prizes Him above all. Thus, St. Peter’s death for Christ
proceeded from his fear of God.

1044. Fear of the world is always sinful, because it makes one offend,
or be willing to offend, God for the sake of escaping some temporal
evil. It is forbidden by our Lord: “Fear ye not them that kill the body
and are not able to kill the soul, but rather fear Him that can destroy
both body and soul in hell” (Matt, x. 28). Elias (or Eliseus) is
praised because of his freedom from fear of the world: “In his days he
feared not the prince” (Ecclus., xlviii. 13). We should note, however,
the distinction between habitual fear, on the one hand, and actual or
virtual fear, on the other hand.

(a) Habitual worldly fear is a state, not an act--that is, the
condition of those who are in mortal sin, and have therefore preferred
self to God as the supreme end of life. It is a matter of faith that
not all the acts of sinners or unbelievers are bad, for they are able
to seek certain particular or natural goods.

(b) Actual fear of the world is a deliberate choice of sin out of fear
of some temporal evil; virtual fear is a deliberate act proceeding from
such a choice though without advertence to the choice or fear. In both
these kinds of fear there is sin, for actual fear commands evil,
virtual fear executes it. Examples: Sempronius internally resolves to
be guided by his fear of imprisonment rather than by the law of God
against perjury (actual fear). He then proceeds to perjure himself,
adverting to what he says, but not thinking about his previous fear
(virtual fear).

1045. The species of sin to which worldly fear belongs are as follows:

(a) The theological species of this sin depends on the disposition of
the person. He sins mortally, if on account of fear he is ready to
offend God seriously; he sins venially, if on account of fear he is
prepared to commit only a venial sin. Examples: Titus, in order to
escape imprisonment or exile, swears falsely. Balbus, having been
absent from his office without leave, tells a little lie to escape
reproof for this misdemeanor. Titus’ fear is a grave sin, that of
Balbus a venial sin.

(b) The moral species of worldly fear is, as a rule, the same as the
species of the sin to which it leads, so that but one sin is committed
and need be confessed. The reason is that generally the object of fear
is something that deserves to be dreaded, and that the aversion from it
is not wrong except in so far as it is carried to the extreme of using
sin as a means of escape. Example: Caius is wrongly suspected of theft.
To free his reputation he swears falsely about a circumstance that
appears incriminating. His fear of losing his good name is not a sin in
itself, and hence he is guilty of the one sin of perjury.

1046. There are exceptional cases when fear is a distinct sin from the
sin to which it leads.

(a) If the fear of losing some temporal good is so great that one is
prepared to commit any sin to escape the loss, and if later by reason
of this fear one swears falsely, two sins are committed--one against
charity, because a temporal good was preferred to God, and the other
against religion, because God was called on to witness to falsehood.

(b) If the fear is that one will not be able to commit one kind of sin,
and this induces one to commit another kind of sin, evidently two sins
are committed. Example: Balbus wishes to calumniate Caius, but is not
able to do so himself. Fearing that Caius will escape his vengeance, he
steals money and offers it to Sempronius as an inducement to calumniate
Caius. The two sins, calumny and theft, are committed.

1047. Not every fear of man or of temporal evil falls under worldly and
sinful fear. (a) To fear or reverence man in those things in which he
represents the authority of God is a duty: “Render to all men their
dues ... fear to whom fear, honor to whom honor” (Rom., xiii. 7). (b)
To fear temporal evils (such as loss of life, reputation, liberty,
property) in a moderate and reasonable manner, is good. Hence, our Lord
bids us pray for deliverance from evil.

1048. Fear of God is of two specifically distinct kinds, according as
the object one dreads is offense of God or punishments from God. (a)
Servile fear, that of a servant with regard to his master, dreads sin
because of the punishment it entails; (b) filial fear, that of a son
with regard to his father, dreads sin because of the offense to God
that is contained in it.

1049. Servile fear may be considered either as to its substance or as
to its accidents. (a) The substance or essence of servile fear is
derived from its object (see 71), that is, from the evil of penalty
which it entails; (b) the accidents of servile fear are its
circumstances (see 72), such as the state of the person who has the
fear, the manner in which he fears, etc.

1050. Servile fear in itself is good and supernatural.

(a) That servile fear is good, is a dogma of faith defined in the
Council of Trent (Sess. VI, Can. 8; Sess. XXIV, Can. 5). Our Lord
recommends this fear when he says: “I will show you whom ye shall fear.
Fear ye Him who after He hath killed, hath power to cast into hell.
Yea, I say to you, fear Him” (Luke, xii. 5). the object of this fear is
penalty, which is an evil, and consequently something that ought to be
dreaded.

(b) That servile fear is supernatural, follows from the fact that its
acts are supernatural. It comes from the Holy Ghost that man may
prepare himself for grace; it is “the beginning of wisdom” (Ps. cx.
10), because through it the wisdom of faith first becomes effective as
a rule of action, causing man to depart from sin on account of the
justice of God which it makes known to him. Servile fear is thus far
superior to that natural fear of pain and suffering which all have.

1051. Though servile fear is good, useful and praiseworthy, it is not
perfect. (a) It is inferior to filial fear; for, while servile fear
looks upon God as a powerful master who cannot be offended with
impunity, filial fear regards Him as a loving Father whom one does not
wish to offend. Hence, the Old Law, given amid the thunder of Sinai and
with many threats against transgressions, is less perfect than the New
Law, which relies more on love than on fear (Rom., viii. 15; Heb., xii.
18-25; Gal., iv. 22 sqq.). (b) Servile fear, although it is regarded by
some theologians as an infused habit, is not a Gift of the Holy Ghost,
since it may coexist with mortal sin. It seems that it is not even a
virtue, since it turns man away, not from moral, but from physical
evil; but a number of authorities consider it as a secondary act of the
virtue of hope.

1052. Servile fear, as to its circumstances, may be evil. (a) The
circumstance of the state of the person who has servile fear is good,
when the person is a friend of God; it is evil, when that person is an
enemy of God. (b) The circumstance of the manner in which servile fear
is elic[i]ted is good, if punishment is not feared as the greatest evil;
it is bad, if punishment is feared as the greatest evil, for then one
makes self the principal end of life, and would be disposed to sin
without restraint, were there no punishment.

1053. The effect of evil circumstances on servile fear itself is as
follows:

(a) Servile fear is not rendered evil because of the evil state of the
person who fears. Just as a person who is habitually foolish may
actually say or do something wise, so a person who is habitually wicked
may perform virtuous acts. Mortal sin is no more a defect of servile
fear in a sinner than it is a defect of faith or hope in one who has
faith or hope without works; neither faith nor hope nor fear is to be
blamed for the state of mortal sin, but the person who has those gifts
of God is at fault. True, the sinner, by reason of his lack of love of
God, does not put fear of sin above fear of punishment. But from this
it does not follow that he puts fear of punishment above fear of sin,
for he may fear punishment absolutely (i.e., without making any
comparison between the evil of sin and the evil of punishment). The
fear which makes no comparisons is good, or else we must say that only
filial fear avails, which, as said above, is not true.

(b) Servile fear is rendered evil as to the manner in which it is
performed, when one compares sin and punishment, dislikes only the
latter, and avoids sin only to escape punishment. This kind of fear is
slavish, for it makes one do something good unwillingly, like a slave
forced to labor against his wishes, whereas God is pleased only with
service that comes from a willing spirit (I Par., xxviii. 9).

1054. Hence, we must distinguish the following cases of servile fear:

(a) Fear of punishment is purely servile when it makes a person avoid
sin, but does not make him put away his love of God.

(b) Fear of punishment is not purely servile, when it causes a sinner
not only to cease from sin, but to give up his affection for sin; this
fear is distinct from charity, but prepares for it: “The fear of the
Lord driveth out sin” (Ecclus., i. 27).

(c) Still less is the fear of punishment purely servile, when it leads
a just man, who already detests sin as an offense against God, to
detest it as involving punishment from God. This fear exists along with
charity, for the love of God and the right love of self are not
exclusive. But, as charity increases, servile fear must decrease; the
more a person loves God, the less is he concerned about his own good,
the more confidently does he hope in God, and hence the less does he
fear penalty.

1055. There are two degrees of filial fear to be distinguished:

(a) Initial fear is that of beginners in charity. On account of past
sins, they fear punishments from God; on account of their present love
of God, they fear they may be again separated from Him. The second fear
is stronger with them, and it commands that the first fear be aroused
to hold the will more firmly against whatever might separate from love.
Of this fear it is said: “The fear of God is the beginning of His love”
(Ecclus., xxv. 16).

(b) Perfected fear is that of those who are established in charity. The
more the love of God sways the heart, the more is every other love,
that of self included, subjugated to the love of God, and the less is
one troubled by the thoughts of evils that may befall self. Even in
this present life some souls are so strong in the love of God that all
servile fear disappears: “I am sure that neither death nor life ...
shall be able to separate us from the love of God” (Rom., viii. 38,
39); “Perfect charity casteth out fear, because fear hath pain, and he
that feareth is not perfected in charity” (I John, iv. 18).

1056. The perfected fear of God has two acts:

(a) In the present life, where it is possible that one may offend God
and lose His friendship, one dreads the commission of offense and the
loss of friendship. This fear should be always with us: “Keep His fear
and grow old therein” (Ecclus., ii. 6). With the growth of charity
there is a corresponding growth in the fear of separation from God,
because the more ardently God is loved, the more one realizes the
greatness of the loss sustained through sin.

(b) In eternal life, where sin and separation from God are impossible,
the blessed do not fear these evils: “He that shall hear Me, shall rest
without terror, and shall enjoy abundance without fear of evils”
(Prov., i. 33). But in the presence of the Divine Majesty the Angels
and Saints are filled with awe and reverence: “I saw them that had
overcome the beast, singing: Who shall not fear Thee, O Lord, and
magnify Thy name?” (Apoc., xv. 3, 4); “The pillars of heaven tremble
and dread at His beck” (Job, xxvi. 11); “Through whom (Christ) the
Angels praise Thy majesty, the Dominations worship it, the Powers are
in awe” (Preface of the Mass). This holy fear is unending, for the
infinite distance between God and His creatures, His
incomprehensibility to them, will never cease: “The fear of the Lord is
holy, enduring forever and ever” (Ps. xviii. 10).

1057. The filial fear of God is identical with the Gift of fear of the
Lord, spoken of in scripture: “He shall be filled with the spirit of
the fear of the Lord” (Is., xi. 3). The function of the Gifts is to
make the soul docile to the inspirations of the Holy Spirit, and to
supplement or serve the habits of virtue, and both these benefits are
conferred by filial fear.

(a) This fear makes the soul ready to follow impulses prompted by God,
for through it we subject ourselves to God as our Father, revering His
wondrous majesty and fearing to stray from Him. Indeed, this is the
first of the Gifts, for the realization of one’s nothingness before God
is the starting-point of promptitude in receiving His teaching and
guidance.

(b) Filial fear is a principle from which proceed acts of all the moral
virtues, inasmuch as the reverence for God’s surpassing majesty and
respect for His almighty power and justice incline one to lay aside
pride, intemperance, and every vice, and exercise good works that are
pleasing to Him: “The root of wisdom is to fear the Lord, and the
branches thereof are long-lived” (Ecclus., i. 27).

(c) Filial fear is especially and primarily related to the virtue of
hope, for these two complement each other, as do the emotions of hope
and fear. Hope aspires to conquer the heights of heaven, and feels that
God is on its side; fear reminds one of the greatness of God and of the
dangers of over-confidence. Each then is necessary to balance the
other: “The Lord taketh pleasure in them that fear Him, and in them
that hope in His mercy” (Ps. cxlvi. 11).

1058. To the Gift of Fear correspond the first Beatitude and the fruits
of modesty, continency and chastity. (a) Filial fear makes one realize
that all but God is as nothing, and hence that true greatness must be
sought, not in the self-esteem of pride, nor in the external pomp of
riches and honors, but in God alone: “Some trust in chariots, and some
in horses; but we will call upon the name of the Lord our God” (Ps.
xix. 8). This is the disposition of soul to which is promised the First
Beatitude: “Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom
of heaven” (Matt, v. 3). To the first of the Gifts, in the order of
preparation, corresponds the first of the Beatitudes. (b) Filial fear
makes one dread the thought of separation from God, and hence it leads
one to use temporal things with moderation, or to abstain from them
entirely, To it, then, pertain the Fruits of the Spirit, which St. Paul
names “modesty, continency, chastity” (Gal, v. 23).

1059. The Sins Against Hope.--There are two sins contrary to hope: (a)
despair, which is the opposite of hope by defect; (b) presumption,
which is the opposite of hope by excess.

1060. Since hope has many elements of which it is composed, despair--or
the falling short of hope--may happen in various ways. (a) Hope is a
turning of the soul towards beatitude, and so the omission of the act
of hope may be called despair (negative despair). (b) Hope regards
beatitude as its good, and so aversion from divine things may be called
despair (despair improperly so-called). (c) Hope pursues a good that is
difficult of attainment, and so he who is dejected by the difficulty is
said to despair. (d) Hope firmly believes that its goal may be reached,
and hence one who doubts the possibility of success in the quest of
heaven is in despair. (e) Hope has the expectation of one day entering
into eternal life, and hence he is guilty of despair who admits that
salvation will be secured by others, but denies that he himself should
expect it.

1061. Definition of Despair.--Leaving out of consideration negative
despair and despair improperly so-called, the sin we are now
considering may be defined as follows: “Despair is an act of the will
by which one turns away from the beatitude one desires, not under the
aspect in which it appears as good, but because one apprehends it as
impossible, or too difficult, or never to be realized, and under this
aspect as evil.”

(a) Despair is an “act of the will,” and as such it differs from the
intellectual sin of unbelief. The Novatians, who rejected the
forgiveness of sins, and a heretic who denies the future life, are
guilty by these acts of sin against faith, though of course one who
disbelieves must also despair (see 1029, 751).

(b) Despair is a positive “turning away from beatitude.” It differs,
therefore, from the mere omission of the act of hope or from an act of
feeble hope, as well as from the sins against the moral virtues, which
consist primarily in a turning towards some created good.

(c) Despair turns away “from God,” and thus it differs from despondency
about other things.

(d) Despair turns away from God “apprehended as good and desired as the
beatitude of man,” for no one is said to despair of what he considers
evil or undesirable. Hence, despair differs from aversions and fears;
such as hatred of God (which regards Him as evil) or fear of God (which
thinks of Him, not as a rewarder, but as the author of chastisement).

(e) Despair, however, does not reject God, because He is good and
desirable, but because He is apprehended as a “beatitude that is
impossible,” or too difficult for one, or as a good that one will never
attain to. For a person does not turn away from that which he regards
as the object of his happiness, unless he considers that there is some
inconvenience in seeking after it.

1062. Is despondency about things other than God a sin? (a) It is the
sin of pusillanimity, when it makes a person abandon hope of something
which he is capable of attaining and which he should aim at, as when
students, on account of the labor required, give up hope of learning a
certain subject which they have been assigned. This sin will be treated
in the section on Fortitude.

(b) It is no sin, if a person gives up the expectation of something
about which he has no reason to hope, or which he is not obliged to
hope for. Examples: Caius gives up the hope of getting an education,
because he lacks money to pay the expenses. Balbus ceases to pray for
health, because he thinks it is not God’s will to grant that request.
Titus abandons the expectation of a long life, and even at times wishes
for death.

1063. To wish for death may include despair of salvation or other sin.

(a) If this wish means that one has no desire for any kind of existence
(as when one desires extinction), manifestly eternal life is not looked
for, and hence there is despair. It should be noted, however, that such
expressions as, “Would that I had never been born!” “Would that I were
out of existence!” often signify nothing more than weariness of life on
earth, or disgust with conditions.

(b)If the wish is not for annihilation, but only that God send death,
it is not a sin of despair; but if the wish is inordinate, some other
species of sin is committed--for example, if the person wishing to die
is not resigned or submissive to God’s will in the matter, he is guilty
of rebellion against Providence, and his sin is grave, if there is
sufficient reflection and consent.

(c) If the wish is merely for death and is not inordinate, it may be an
act of virtue, as when, out of a longing for heaven, one deliberately
desires to be taken from this world, if this be pleasing to God. Thus,
St. Paul said that he desired “to be dissolved and to be with Christ”
(Philip., i. 23).

1064. Certain acts of fear or sadness must not be mistaken for despair:
(a) acts that are praiseworthy, like servile and filial fear spoken of
above (see 1048 sqq.), grief over sin, etc.; (b) acts that are a trial
from God, such as spiritual desolations in holy persons, scruples about
forgiveness of sins, anxieties about predestination, perseverance, or
the Judgment; (c) acts that are sinful, such as worldly fear, fear of
God that is purely servile, timidity (i.e., an excessive dread of death
or other evils). Those who fear that, on account of their frailty, they
may not acquire a good habit or overcome an evil one, are guilty of
pusillanimity. Those who, on account of sadness, neglect prayer are
guilty of spiritual sloth.

1065. There are two species of despair, namely, the despair of unbelief
and the despair that is found even in those that have faith.

(a) The despair of unbelief arises from a judgment contrary to faith,
as when one holds as general principles that salvation is impossible,
that God is not merciful to sinners, that all sins or certain sins
cannot be forgiven. Thus, St. Paul designates the pagans who do not
accept the Final Resurrection as those “who have no hope” (I Thess.,
iv. 12).

(b) The despair of believers arises from a judgment formed by them
which is not directly opposed to faith, but which is erroneous, and is
induced by some wicked habit or passion. Example: Titus lives a very
disorderly life, and so thinks that he is predestined to hell, or that
he is too weak to repent and persevere. Since his predestination and
perseverance are not matters of faith, he is not guilty of unbelief by
his judgment about them, but the judgment itself is wrong, and one
which he has no right to form or act on.

1066. Signs which indicate that a penitent suffering depression has not
been guilty of despair are: (a) if he retains the faith and has not
abandoned the usual practices of religion and piety; (b) if he retains
the faith, but has given up some of its practices through
discouragement or weakness, but intends to repent. His sin is sloth or
cowardice or attachment to some vice.

1067. Hence, the erroneous judgment that precedes despair is similar to
that which precedes every act of sin, namely, it is always practically
erroneous, though not always speculatively so.

(a) Judgment is speculatively erroneous with regard to duty, when one
decides that in general something is lawful which is unlawful; or vice
versa, as when one thinks that lying is pleasing to God. It is clear
that this kind of error need not precede sin, or else all sinners would
err against the faith.

(b) Judgment is practically erroneous about duty, when a person decides
that here and now he should do something which in fact he should not
do, as when he knows well that lying is displeasing to God, and yet
makes up his mind that, all things considered, he ought to tell a lie.
It is clear that this kind of error precedes every sin, for no one
wills something unless his judgment has first told him that he ought to
will it. The sinner first judges in a particular case that he should
prefer the good of pleasure or of utility to the good of virtue, or he
first neglects to consider the right manner in which he should act:
“They err that work evil” (Prov., xiv. 22).

1068. The Malice of Despair.--(a) Despair is a sin, for Holy Scripture
declares woe to the fainthearted, who trust not God and lose patience
(Ecclus., ii. 15, 16), and it holds up the despair of Cain and Judas
for reprehension. The malice of despair appears in this, that it is
based on a perverse judgment that one ought not to labor for salvation
in confident expectation, despite God’s promise and command to the
contrary. (b) It is a mortal sin according to its nature, for it
destroys the theological virtue of hope, turns man away from God his
Last End, and leads to irreparable loss.

1069. In the following cases despair is not a mortal sin, nor at times
even a venial sin. (a) When there is not sufficient reflection, despair
is not a grave sin. Examples: Those who are ignorant of the sinfulness
of despair, those who on account of great discouragement or fear do not
fully advert to their despair of amendment, do not sin gravely. Despair
is often a result of insanity. (b) When there is not full consent of
the will, despair is not a grave sin. Examples: Those who, on account
of a melancholy disposition, inclination to pessimism, past sins, etc.,
are tempted to give up the hope of salvation, are not guilty of sin,
provided they fight against these suggestions of the mind or
imagination.

1070. The gravity of despair as compared with other sins is as follows:

(a) Despair is a greater sin than offenses against the moral virtues,
for the chief inclination of despair is aversion from God, whereas the
chief inclination of the latter kind of sins is conversion towards
creatures. Thus, a person who drinks excessively does not primarily
intend offense against God, but his own enjoyment or escape from
certain worries.

(b) Despair in itself is less serious than the sins of unbelief and
hatred of God; for, while despair is opposed to God as He is our good,
the other two sins are opposed to God’s own truth and goodness.

(c) Despair is more serious than the sins of unbelief and hatred of God
with reference to the danger it contains for the sinner; for it
paralyzes effort and resists remedies: “Why is my sorrow become
perpetual and my wound desperate, so as to refuse to be healed?” (Jer.,
xv. 18) “If thou lose hope, being weary in the day of distress, thy
strength shall be diminished” (Prov., xxiv. 10). Despair is, therefore,
a sin against the Holy Ghost, a sort of attempt at spiritual suicide.
But (see 900) it is not unpardonable and may be overcome by divine
grace.

1071. It is important to know the causes of despair, for this knowledge
enables us to distinguish it from the mystical state known as “the dark
night of the soul,” and to prescribe suitable remedies. Despair comes
from one’s own fault, whereas mystical purgation from God is a
preparation for a higher state of divine union. The causes of despair
can be reduced to two, luxury and sloth.

(a) The secondary characteristic of a hopeful pursuit of heaven is
courage, the adventurous spirit which foregoes ease and comfort for the
sake of higher things, despising the danger and difficulty. Hence, the
vice of lust, since it makes one love bodily delights and disregard or
underestimate those that are spiritual, is a cause of despair, as well
as of other sins opposed to the spiritual life (Gal., v. 17).

(b) The chief and most distinctive characteristic of hope is its
cheerful confidence of success. Hence, the vice of sloth, since it is
sadness weighing down the soul and making it unwilling to think rightly
or to exert itself, is the principal cause of despair (Prov., xvii. 22).

1072. The apparent despair that is a trial to holy persons can be
distinguished, therefore, from the sin of despair, especially by two
signs: (a) though they are spiritually desolate and find no joy in
religious practices, these persons do not turn to unlawful delights for
consolation, but retain their dislike for lower pleasures; (b) though
overcome with dismay at the thought of their own imperfection and of
God’s holiness, they do not so lose heart as to give over their
exercises of piety (cf. St. John of the Cross, _The Dark Night_, Bk. I,
e. 9 ff.).

1073. Spiritual writers make the following recommendations for cases of
spiritual desolation: (a) the afflicted persons should understand that
the deprivation of former sensible devotion is a sign of God’s love and
has been experienced by the Saints, and should, therefore, possess
their souls in peace, leaving to God the time and manner of His
heavenly visitation; (b) they should not burden themselves with new and
heavier mortifications, lest they be overcome by too great sorrow, but
should go on with their accustomed good works, and realize that, though
bitter to them, these works are now all the more pleasing to God
(Ibid., c. 10).

1074. Some Remedies for the Sin of Despair.--(a) If the cause is lust,
one should learn that spiritual joys are nobler and more enduring than
the joys of the flesh, and should take the means to sacrifice the lower
in favor of the higher.

(b) If the cause of despair is spiritual sloth, one should meditate on
the greatness of God’s power, mercy and love, and should avoid whatever
fosters undue sadness, “lest he be swallowed up with over-much sorrow”
(II Cor., ii. 7). Thus, those who are tormented by the thoughts of past
sins or future temptations must subject their scruples to direction,
and remember the mercy shown to the good thief, to Magdalene, and other
penitents; those who have lost courage because they read spiritual
books of a rigorous or terrifying nature, or have been advised to
attempt that for which they were unsuited, should seek more prudent
instruction and counsel; those who are naturally nervous or melancholy,
should employ such therapeutical or preventive measures as are useful
or necessary. All should follow the direction of St. Peter to labor the
more, that by good works they may make sure their calling and election
(II Pet., i. 10).

1075. Presumption is the name given to certain acts of the intellect.
(a) Sometimes it signifies an arrogant self-esteem, as when an ignorant
person thinks he is able to dispute with a learned scholar. (b)
Sometimes it is a judgment about the affairs of others made rashly or
out of fear: “A troubled conscience always presumeth grievous things”
(Wis., xvii. 10). (c) Sometimes it is a conclusion based on probable
evidence, and which by jurists is called violent, strong, or weak
presumption according to the evidence (see 658).

1076. Presumption is also a name given to various acts of the will. (a)
It is used, in a good sense, to signify an excellent confidence or
hope, which seems rash according to human standards, but is really well
founded, since it rests on the immensity of the divine goodness. Thus,
Judith prayed: “O God of the heavens, Creator of the waters and Lord of
the whole creation, hear me a poor wretch, making supplication to Thee,
and presuming on Thy mercy” (Jud., ix. 17). Thus, too, Abraham hoped
against hope (Rom., iv. 18). (b) Generally, however, the word
“presumption” is applied to acts of the will in a bad sense, and
indicates the purpose to do what exceeds one’s powers.

1077. Here we are concerned only with presumption as it is an act of
the will choosing to do what exceeds one’s power. “Power” may he
understood in three ways, and thus there are three kinds of sins all
bearing the name of presumption.

(a) If a person chooses to overstep his moral power (i.e., his right of
action), he is guilty of the general sin of presumption, which is not a
special category of sin, but a circumstance common to any kind of sin
in which one acts with full knowledge, and without subjection to any
fear or coercion. Hence, in Canon Law it is said in various places: “If
anyone shall presume to transgress” (i.e., if anyone shall
coldbloodedly transgress).

(b) If a person wishes to accomplish by his own efforts something so
great and difficult that it surpasses his physical powers, he is guilty
of the special sin of presumption that is opposed to the moral virtue
of magnanimity or greatness of soul, which attempts great things for
which it is suited. Thus, he is presumptuous who undertakes a
profession, when he has no sufficient knowledge of its duties (cf.
Luke, xiv. 28 sqq.). This may be called the moral sin of presumption.

(c) If one wishes to obtain through divine aid something that surpasses
even the divine power to confer, one is guilty of the special sin of
presumption that is opposed to the theological virtue of hope, which
expects from God only such things as are worthy of God and as God has
promised. Thus, he who looks forward to a free admission into eternal
bliss, without repentance or obedience, does injury both to the
character of God and to the virtue of hope. It is this special sin of
presumption that we are now considering. It may be called the
theological sin of presumption.

1078. Definition of Presumption.--The theological sin of presumption
may be defined as follows: “An act of the will by which one rashly
expects to obtain eternal happiness or the means thereto.” (a) It is an
act of the will, and hence is distinct from intellectual sins, such as
disbelief in the justice of God or the necessity of repentance. (b) It
is an act of pleasing expectation, and so differs generically from
fear, which is an act of dreadful expectation. (c) It is a rash
expectation, and so is specifically opposed to hope, which is
well-founded expectation.

1079. The objects of presumption are material and formal.

(a) The material object is eternal happiness and the means thereto,
such as forgiveness of sin, observance of the Commandments, etc. This
object by extension would include also such extraordinary supernatural
gifts as the hypostatic union, equality in glory with the Mother of
God, etc.; for it would be rash to expect against His will what God has
made unique privileges.

(b) The formal object, or motive, of presumption is divine mercy not
joined with justice, or divine power not regulated by wisdom, as when
one hopes for heaven because one reasons that God is too merciful to be
a just judge of sinners. The motive by extension would include also the
unaided power of human nature relied on as equal to the task of working
out salvation, as when a man feels so confident of his own virtue and
his security against temptation that he thinks he can dispense with
prayer and all appointed means of grace and yet save his soul.
Similarly, a person is presumptuous if he feels that it is absolutely
impossible for him to be lost, because he has received Baptism or other
Sacraments.

1080. Presumption is rash, therefore, for the following reasons: (a)
because it leads one to expect what is impossible according to the
absolute or ordinary power of God (e.g., to share in some divine
attribute, to sit at the right hand of Christ in glory), or (b) because
it makes one expect to obtain supernatural goods in ways other than
those ordained by God (e.g., to obtain forgiveness without repentance,
to obtain glory without merits or grace).

1081. The nature of presumption as compared with temptation of God and
blasphemous hope is as follows: (a) they are alike, inasmuch as all
three wrongly expect something from God; (b) they differ, for
presumption looks towards salvation and one’s own happiness, whereas
temptation of God seeks rashly some sign from God as a proof that He is
wise, good, powerful, etc., or that the person is innocent, holy, etc.,
and blasphemous hope expects that God will help one in working revenge
or committing other sin.

1082. The Malice of Presumption.-(a) It is a sin, because it is an act
of the will agreeable to false intellectual judgments, namely, that God
will pardon the impenitent or grant eternal life to those who have not
labored for it. (b) It is a mortal sin, since it does grave injury to
the divine attributes. We cannot hope too much in God, but we can
expect what a perfect God cannot grant; in this latter respect--that
is, in its contempt of God’s majesty and justice--consists the offense
of presumption. (c) It is a sin against the Holy Ghost, because it
makes one despise the grace of God, repentance, etc., as if they were
not necessary.

1083. The gravity of presumption as compared with other sins, is as
follows:

(a) It is graver than sins against the moral virtues, because it is
directly against God. Thus, theological presumption, being injurious to
the power of God, is a more serious offense than moral presumption,
which is an exaggeration of the power of man.

(b) It is less grave than despair, for, while presumption is a
disregard of God’s vindictive justice, despair is a disregard of His
mercy, and God’s vindictive justice is due to the sins of man, His
mercy to His own goodness.

(c) Presumption is less grave, therefore, than unbelief and hatred of
God, which, as said above, are more wicked than despair (see 1070).

1084. Presumption and Unbelief.--(a) Presumption is joined with
unbelief whenever it proceeds from a speculatively false judgment about
matters of faith. Persons, however, who are in error (e.g., Pelagians,
Lutherans, Calvinists, etc.), may be in good faith, and hence guiltless
of the formal sin of presumption. Examples: Caius expects to win heaven
by his own unaided efforts (Pelagian presumption). Balbus expects to be
equal in glory to the greatest Saints, and to be saved by the merits of
Christ without repentance or observance of the Commandments (Lutheran
presumption). Titus expects to be saved on the strength of wearing
scapulars, practising certain devotions, or giving alms, while he
wholly disregards church duties and important Commandments (Pharisaic
presumption). Sempronius thinks that all members of his sect are
predestined, and hence concerns himself little about the Commandments,
being persuaded that all must end well with the elect (Calvinistic
presumption).

(b) Presumption is committed without unbelief, when it proceeds from a
practical judgment that one should act as if salvation were obtainable
without merits or repentance, or as if natural efforts were alone
sufficient, although speculatively one does not accept such errors (see
1067). The same is true when presumption springs from a failure to
consider the divine justice or the established means of obtaining
salvation.

1085. Presumption and Loss of the Virtue of Hope.--(a) Presumption
properly so-called (i.e., hope of the impossible) takes away the virtue
of hope, for it removes the motive and reasonableness of the virtue;
now, the essence of true hope is a reasonable expectation, just as the
essence of faith is assent to divine authority. Hence, he who expects
future blessedness unreasonably (i.e., through his own efforts alone or
through exaggerated mercy exercised by God), is not hopeful, but
presumptuous.

(b) Presumption improperly so-called (i.e., hope of the uncertain) does
not take away the virtue of hope, since it does not remove the motive
of hope. Thus, one who commits sin, trusting to go to confession and to
make restitution after he has enjoyed the benefits of wrongdoing, is
presumptuous in the sense that he puts himself in a state of sin, for
it is uncertain whether the time to repent will be granted him.
However, he is relying on the mercy of God, which never abandons man
during life, and not on his own efforts, or on pardon given freely. He
is guilty of a want of charity towards self, and of injustice to his
neighbor, rather than of a want of hope.

1086. Presumption properly so-called is a sin rarely committed by
Catholics. For (a) the presumption of unbelief is excluded by their
faith in the justice of God and in the necessity of repentance and good
works; (b) the presumption that is not the offspring of erroneous
doctrines is also unusual, because even those who go on sinning with
the expectation of being saved in the end, generally have the purpose
of repenting at some future date.

1087. Is a sin worse because committed with the hope that later it will
be pardoned? (a) If, at the moment of sin, a person has the intention
to continue in sin, though he hopes for pardon, he is guilty of
presumption, and his sin is made worse. (b) If he has the intention of
sinning, but hopes for pardon, and is resolved to repent later on as a
means to pardon, he is not guilty of presumption. The intention not to
continue in sin diminishes the sin, for it shows that one is not so
strongly attached to evil.

1088. The intention to sin now and repent later varies in malice
according to circumstances.

(a) If the hope of obtaining forgiveness is concomitant as regards the
sin now committed--that is, if one sins with the hope, but not because
of the hope of pardon-one is less guilty. Example: Titus while on a
tour indulges in much drunkenness, because he has the opportunity and
is not known; but he intends to repent on his return home.

(b) If the hope of obtaining forgiveness is antecedent as regards the
sin--that is, if one sins because of the hope of pardon--one is more
guilty. Example: Balbus stays away from Mass most Sundays, because he
reasons with himself that God is kind and it will be easy to obtain
pardon. Caius, when urged to repent, always replies that it will be a
simple matter to turn over a new leaf at the hour of death. Sempronius
goes on multiplying sins from day to day, because he argues that it is
just as easy to be pardoned late as early, just as easy to repent of a
hundred sins as of ten.

1089. In the following cases presumption is not a grave sin: (a) no
mortal sin is committed, if there is not sufficient reflection; for
example, a person who is invincibly ignorant of the seriousness of
presumption, or who on account of immaturity has exaggerated ideas of
his own strength, does not sin gravely if he presumes on God’s mercy or
his own power; (b) no mortal sin is committed, if there is not full
consent of the will. For example, Titus is a self-made man, and hence
is inclined at times to feel that he can work out even his salvation
without any assistance, but he rids his mind of this presumptuous
thought as soon as he takes notice of it.

1090. Are there cases in which presumption and despair are transformed
into venial sin, not on account of the imperfect knowledge or consent
of the subject, but on account of the slightness of the matter
involved? (a) If there is question of presumption and despair properly
so-called, they are never venial on account of the lightness of the
matter, for the matter, man’s eternal destiny, must always be an affair
of the utmost moment. (b) If there is question of presumption and
despair in a wider sense, these sins may be venial on account of
smallness of matter; for they may be understood with reference to
things other than salvation. Examples: Titus despairs of his success in
overcoming a habit of arriving late for his meals or of talking too
much. Balbus imprudently trusts to his own efforts to get up promptly
in the morning, or to fight against some slight distraction in prayer.

1091. The causes of presumption are as follows: (a) the presumption
which depends too much on one’s own powers arises from vainglory, for,
the more one desires glory, the more is one inclined to attempt things
that are above one, especially such as are new and will attract
applause; (b) the presumption that depends rashly on divine assistance
seems to result from pride, for a person who desires and expects pardon
without repentance, or heaven without merits, must have a very
exaggerated opinion of his own importance.

1092. The Commandments of Hope and of Fear.--Since hope is a necessary
preparation for justification, and since man should tend towards the
supernatural beatitude prepared for him by God, we cannot be surprised
that scripture in many places inculcates the duty of hope.

(a) In the first legislation, given in the Decalogue, neither faith nor
hope are enjoined by distinct Commandments, for, unless man already
believed and hoped in God, it would be useless to give him commandments
from God. Hence, in the Decalogue faith and hope are presupposed, faith
being enjoined only in so far as it is taught, as when the law begins
with the words: “I am the Lord thy God” (Exod., xx. 2), and hope being
prescribed only in so far as promises are added to the precepts, as in
the First and Fourth Commandments.

(b) In the later laws there are given distinct commandments about hope,
in order to remind man that he must observe not only the law, but also
that which the law presupposes. Thus, we read: “Hope in Him, all ye
congregation of people” (Ps. lxi. 9); “Charge the rich of this world
not to be high-minded, nor to hope in the uncertainty of riches, but in
the living God” (I Tim., vi. 17).

1093. Since acts of hope are obligatory for all adults in this life,
the Quietists were in error when they defended disinterested love and
absolute holy indifference (Denzinger, 1221 ff., 1327-1349). (a) Hence,
man can at times make acts of pure love of God, in which self is not
thought about, or even acts of renunciation of beatitude on condition
that that were possible and necessary; but the habitual state of pure
love, in which self-interest is entirely lost sight of, cannot be
admitted (Philip., iii. 14; II Tim., iv, 8). (b) Indifference to the
happenings of life, sin excluded, is good; but it is not lawful to be
indifferent about one’s own salvation, or the means thereto.
Indifference about salvation is not holy, but unholy.

1094. Is it lawful to desire to surrender beatitude for the sake of
another’s spiritual good? (a) If there is question of beatitude itself,
this is not lawful. The prayer of Moses that he be stricken from God’s
book (Exod., xxxiii. 31, 32), and of St. Paul that he suffer loss of
Messianic benefits (Rom., ix. 3), were only velleities or hyperbolical
expressions of their great love for their race. (b) If there is
question, not of beatitude itself, but of something that refers to it
(such as the time of receiving it, present certainty about its
possession), one may be willing to sacrifice this good for the benefit
of his neighbor. Thus, St. Martin of Tours was willing to have his
entrance into heaven delayed for the sake of his flock (cfr. Philip.,
i. 22 sqq.), and St. Ignatius Loyola would have preferred to remain
uncertain of salvation and labor for souls, rather than to be certain
of salvation and die at once.

1095. At what times does the commandment of hope oblige? (a) In its
negative, or prohibitory aspect, this commandment obliges for all times
and at all times (see 371). Hence, it is not lawful to despair, even
when things are darkest, nor to presume, even when they are brightest.
(b) In its affirmative, or preceptive aspect, this commandment obliges
for all times, but not at all times. Hence, the law of hope remains
always in force, but one is not obliged at every instant to make acts
of hope.

1096. By reason of the virtue of hope itself (i.e., on account of the
response one should make to the promises of God concerning eternal
life), an act of hope is obligatory on the following occasions:

(a) Such an act is obligatory at the beginning of the moral life, that
is, at the time when one first realizes that one must choose between
God and creatures as the object of one’s happiness. This moment occurs
for all when the age of reason is attained, and to it we may apply in
this connection the words of Christ: “Seek ye first the kingdom of God
and His justice” (Matt, vi. 33). This moment occurs for those who are
in the state of sin as soon as they perceive the necessity of turning
from creatures towards God: “Delay not to be converted to the Lord, and
defer it not from day to day” (Ecclus, v. 8).

(b) During the course of the moral life, one is also bound to renew the
act of hope: “The grace of God our Saviour hath appeared to all men,
instructing us that we should live soberly, and justly, and godly in
this world, looking for the blessed hope” (Titus, ii. 11, 12), “Serving
the Lord, rejoicing in hope” (Rom., xii. 11, 12); “He that plougheth,
should plough in hope” (I Cor., ix. 10). Even those who are more
perfect must have on “the helmet of hope” (I Thess., v. 8), for by hope
all are saved (Rom, viii. 25).

(c) It seems that at the end of life one is especially bound to elicit
an act of hope, as on that moment eternity depends (Heb., iii. vi).
But, if one has received the Last Sacraments or is otherwise well
prepared for death and undisturbed by temptations to despair, there is
no manifest need of making an express act of hope (cfr. 930).

1097. How frequently should acts of hope be made during life? (a) About
the theoretical question, there is the same diversity of opinion as
with regard to the act of faith (see 933). (b) But, practically, there
is agreement among theologians that the commandment is fulfilled by all
those who make an act of hope when this is necessary to preserve the
virtue on account of danger of presumption or despair, and who comply
with the duties of a Christian life, such as attendance at Mass and the
reception of the Sacraments.

1098. How should the act of hope be made? (a) The act is made
explicitly, when one expresses one’s confident expectation, the objects
expected and the basis of the expectation, as when one prays according
to the formulas of the Catechism or prayer books: “O my God, relying on
Thy all-powerful assistance and merciful promises, I firmly hope to
obtain pardon for my sins, obedience to Thy commandments, and life
everlasting.” This form of the act of hope is recommended, since it
expresses the essential elements of the virtue. (b) The act of hope is
made implicitly, when one offers petitions to God as one ought; for the
confidence that accompanies every good prayer makes it an expression of
hope of God and of hope in God. Thus, the words, “Thy Kingdom come,”
utter the soul’s expectation of bliss and its reliance on God. The
implicit act of hope satisfies the commandment, and hence those who
comply with the duty of prayer, comply also with the duty of hope.

1099. By reason of some virtue other than hope (cfr. 935), there also
arises at times an obligation of making an act of hope. (a) If another
virtue will be lost or endangered without the assistance of hope, one
is bound to make an act of hope. Examples: Titus is so discouraged by
the difficulties of his duties that he will not perform them, unless he
stirs up his will by thinking of the reward. Balba, on account of
aridity, finds prayer so hard that she will give it up, unless the
motive of future blessedness is before her mind. (b) If another
commandment presupposes an act of hope, one is bound to the act of
hope, although it may be made virtually or implicitly, as being
contained in another virtue. Example: Sempronius is in the state of
sin, and therefore obliged to repentance. Since repentance presupposes
hope of pardon as a means to salvation, Sempronius must not only grieve
over his sins, but must also have confidence in the divine mercy.

1100. Do those persons sin against hope by omission who wish they could
remain in the enjoyment of the present life forever?

(a) If those persons are so disposed that they would willingly forego
heaven for earth, they are guilty of a neglect of the precept of hope
(I Tim., vi. 17). Hope requires that God be the chief object of our
desires, but these persons give the first place to creatures (see 1019,
1031).

(b) If such persons are not willing to relinquish heaven, and their
wish to remain here forever merely denotes an over-fondness for life or
its goods or an exceeding dread of death, hope is not excluded, but
they are guilty, slightly or seriously according to the case, of
inordinate love of creatures.

(c) If such persons mean by their wish only that they are very much
attached to something of earth and wish to retain it as long as God
will allow, there is no sin committed. Thus, man and wife happily mated
or other friends sometimes express the wish that both might live
forever, meaning only that the thought of any separation is unpleasant.

1101. So far we have spoken of the necessity of precept of the act of
hope. But there is also a necessity of means, as was said above about
faith (see 785, 918), as regards both the act and the habit of hope.

(a) The act of hope is an indispensable condition of salvation for all
adults. The unjustified man cannot prepare himself for pardon unless he
hopes in God’s mercy; he cannot resolve on amendment of life unless he
relies on the necessary divine help. The justified man must earn heaven
by his works and must pray to God in his necessities--things that are
impossible without the firm confidence of hope (Rom., vi. 23).

(b) The habit of hope is an indispensable condition of salvation for
all, infants included. For it is by justification, in which the soul
and its various powers are sanctified (Rom., v. 6), that one is
elevated to the supernatural sphere and made ready for the beatific
vision.

1102. The habit of hope is not lost by every sin against hope.

(a) It is not lost by sins of omission, for it depends on divine
infusion, not on human acts (see 745).

(b) It is not lost by sins of commission that do not remove its formal
object or motive, such as sins against charity and the moral virtues.
For it is possible for one to expect external happiness and at the same
time not love God for His own sake, or not regulate one’s conduct
conformably to the happiness desired, just as it is possible for one to
believe and yet not practise one’s belief (see 1016, 1030).

(c) Hope is lost by sins of commission that remove its foundation or
its formal object. Hence, sins of unbelief (since they remove the
foundation of hope) and sins of desperation and despair (since they
take away the formal object of hope) are destructive of this virtue. It
should be noted, however, that sins which only in a wider sense are
named presumption and despair, do not remove the object, nor
consequently the virtue of hope. Examples: Titus does not believe in a
future life, and hence does not expect it. Claudius believes in a
future life, but he is so weak in virtue that he has given up all
expectation of its rewards for himself. Balbus, on the contrary, is
living on stolen property and intends to continue to do so, but he
hopes that somehow all will turn out well in the end. Sempronius, who
is associated with Balbus, intends to make a deathbed repentance and
restitution. The sins of the first three are ruinous to hope, since by
reason of them there is no expectation of salvation, or only an
expectation that is not based on divine power. The sin of Sempronius is
presumptuous, since it risks a most grave danger imprudently; but it is
not theological presumption, since it expects forgiveness through
divine power and in a way that does not exceed divine power. It is not
contrary to, but beyond theological hope.

1103. Divine Commandments Concerning Fear.--(a) Servile fear was not
commanded in the Decalogue by any distinct precept, for fear of
punishment is supposed in those who received the law; it was, however,
commanded there implicitly, inasmuch as penalties were attached to
transgressions. Later, in order to keep man more strictly to the law
already given, instructions or commandments about the necessity of fear
were given. Thus, Job says: “I feared all my works, knowing that Thou
didst not spare the offender” (Job, ix. 28), and the Psalmist prays:
“Pierce Thou my flesh with Thy fear, for I am afraid of Thy judgments”
(Ps. cxviii. 120); our Lord commands: “Fear Him that can destroy both
soul and body in hell” (Matt, x. 28).

(b) Filial fear, on the contrary (i.e., reverential love of God), since
it is the principle from which proceed the external acts of respect and
homage enjoined in the Decalogue, was inculcated at the time the first
law was given. “What doth the Lord thy God require of thee, but that
thou fear the Lord thy God, and walk in His ways, and love Him, and
serve the Lord thy God?” (Deut., x. 12).

1104. As to the times and frequency of obligation, the principles and
conclusions given above for hope can be applied also to fear.




Art. 5: THE VIRTUE OF CHARITY

(_Summa Theologica_, II-II, qq. 23-27.)

1105. Definition.--The word “charity” (_carum_, what is held dear,
highly esteemed) is used either in a more general, or in a particular
sense.

(a) In its more general sense, it is applied to acts or feelings of
a kindly nature towards others, whether or not God be concerned in
them as the object or motive. Thus, it is applied to kindly judgments
about others, to a benevolent disposition towards their welfare, to
gratuitous relief of the needy or suffering, to the bestowal of gifts
for public benefit, and the like. In scripture the word is sometimes
applied to friendship: “It is better to be invited to herbs with
charity than to a fatted calf with hatred” (Prov., xv. 17).

(b) In its particular sense, charity refers to divine love, that is, to
the love of God for man or the love of man for God. Here we are
considering charity as the virtue by which the creature loves God for
His own sake, and others on account of God.

1106. Love in general is the inclination towards a suitable good, or
what is considered as one’s good. It is the root of all appetites of
the soul, and hence the importance that the object of love be a true
good.

(a) Every attraction is based on the recognition of some suitability in
a certain good that attracts, and so is based on love. Example: Love
may result from desire, as when from a desire of money springs love of
the giver of money; but in the last analysis it will be found that the
desire itself came from a previous love, for a person would not wish
for money, unless he saw in it some advantage which inclined him
towards its possession.

(b) Every repulsion is based on the fact that a certain thing is
opposed to that which is suitable for self, and hence results from
love. Example: Love sometimes is an effect of hate, as when one loves A
because he hates A’s enemies; nevertheless, hate is basically always
the result of some love, for one hates only those things that impede or
destroy what one loves.

(c) Every satisfaction is due to the possession or presence of
something helpful or congenial, and so it presupposes love. Example: A
particular satisfaction may cause love, as when one loves a person
because his company is entertaining; but the satisfaction is due to the
love one has of being entertained.

1107. The effects of love are two; (a) union of affection, for the
lover regards the object of love as another self and desires its
presence; he delights to think of it and wishes what it wishes; (b)
separation from other things, for the lover’s thoughts are on the
object of his love, and he is jealous of anything that might take it
from him.

1108. Several degrees of love may be distinguished:

(a) Natural love is the tendency of things to their ends which results,
not from knowledge, but from nature, and which is found in the
irrational and inanimate as well as in higher forms of being. Thus, we
may say that fire loves to burn, that every being loves its own
existence;

(b) Sense love (_amor_) is the attraction that follows on knowledge
obtained through the senses, and that exists in the brutes as well as
in man. Thus, a dog loves bones, a cat loves fish. Sex-attraction is a
species of sense love;

(c) Rational love (_dilectio_) arises from the reflection of the mind,
and is a choice based on the judgment of the reason concerning the
worth of the beloved object.

1109. Rational love is of two kinds: (a) love of desire (_amor
concupiscentiae_), which is affection for an object which one desires
for oneself or for another, in such a way that good is not wished for
the object, but the goodness of the object is wished for something else
(thus, one loves food or money with the love of desire, because one
does not wish good for them, but from them); (b) love of benevolence
(_amor benevolentiae_), which is had for an object to which one wishes
good (thus, one loves a poor person with the love of benevolence when
one wishes to give him food or money).

1110. The love of benevolence is called friendship when the following
conditions exist: (a) when the love is mutual, for, if one party who
is loved does not reciprocate the other party’s affection, they are
not considered friends; (b) when the love is based on some similarity
which is a bond of union, for friendship supposes that the parties
have common interests and that they delight in each other’s company,
which is impossible without congeniality (see Ecclus., xiii. 19). Thus,
there is friendship of relative for relative, of citizen for citizen,
of soldier for soldier, of scholar for scholar. True, those who belong
to the same state in life are often enemies; but this is due, not to
the similarity of their life, but to some individual dissimilarity, as
when one is successful and the other unsuccessful, one rich and the
other poor. Aristotle remarked that potters never got along together,
and Proverbs, xiii. 10, says that between the proud there are always
quarrels; for each potter saw in the other potter one who took away
profits, and each proud man sees in another proud man an obstacle to
personal glory. Unfriendly feeling may exist, then, among those who
are alike, but friendship is impossible when the parties have nothing
special in common.

1111. Two kinds of friendship must be distinguished. (a) The friendship
of utility or of pleasure is that by which one desires good for one’s
friend, not for the friend’s sake, but for one’s own advantage or
gratification. Hence, friendships of this kind contain some love of
benevolence, but they are prompted by love of desire. On account of
this admixture of selfishness, they fall short of friendship in the
truest sense. Examples: Titus cultivates the friendship of Balbus,
because the latter is wealthy and will patronize his business; Balbus,
on his part, returns the friendship of Titus, because he finds his
prices cheaper (a friendship of convenience or utility). Caius and
Claudius associate together much and help each other gladly, but the
only thing that draws them together is the amusement they get out of
each other’s companionship (a friendship of pleasure).

(b) The friendship of virtue is that by which one desires good for
another, and by which the cause of attraction is the virtue of the
friends. This is true friendship, because it is unselfish and has the
highest motive; it is naturally lasting, since it is built on moral
goodness, the real good of an intelligent being (Ecclus., vi. 14-16).
Example: David and Jonathan became friends because each recognized the
other’s virtue.

1112. Charity is a true friendship between God and His intellectual
creature, for in scripture the just are called the friends of God
(John, xv. 15; James, ii. 23; Ps. cxxxviii. 17), and the conditions of
true friendship are affirmed about their relation to God. (a) There is
a mutual love of benevolence between God and the just: “I love them
that love Me” (Prov., viii. 20); “He that loveth Me shall be loved
of My Father, and I will love him” (John, xiv. 21). (b) There is a
common bond; for, while according to nature God and man are infinitely
distant, according to grace man is an adopted son of God and the heir
to glory in which he will share happiness with God.

1113. Charity is twofold, namely, uncreated and created. (a) Uncreated
charity is God Himself. The entire Trinity is called charity, just as
It is also called truth, wisdom, etc.: “God is charity, and he that
abideth in charity, abideth in God” (I John, iv. 8). The Holy Ghost
especially is called charity, because he proceeds in the Trinity as
love. Hence, in the _Veni Creator_ He is addressed as “Fount of life,
fire, charity, and spiritual anointing.” (b) Created charity is a
supernatural habit added to the will, inclining it to the exercise of
love of God and enabling it to act with promptness and delight: “The
charity of God is poured out in our hearts by the Holy Ghost who is
given to us” (Rom., v. 5). We are concerned here only with created
charity.

1114. Created charity is defined: “A supernatural virtue infused by
God, through which we love with friendship God, the author of our
beatitude, on account of His own goodness, and our neighbor, on account
of God.” Charity is given with sanctifying grace, but differs from it,
inasmuch as grace is a principle of being and makes man himself holy,
whereas charity is a principle of acting and makes acts holy.

1115. The Excellence of Charity.--Human friendship of the lower kind
is not a virtue, while that which is higher is rather the extension
or result of virtue than a virtue in itself. The divine friendship,
however, constitutes the theological virtue of charity.

(a) Thus, charity is a virtue, since through it our acts are regulated
by their supreme standard and our affections united to the divine
goodness.

(b) Charity, although it exercises a sway over the other virtues, is
distinct from them; for it has its own proper object, namely, the
divine goodness, all-perfect in itself: “These three: faith, hope and
charity” (I Cor., xiii. 13).

(c) Charity, although it includes our neighbor as well as God among the
objects of love, is but one virtue, since it has but one end (i.e.,
the goodness of God), and it is based on but one fellowship (i.e., the
beatific vision to be bestowed by God).

1116. Charity is less perfect than the act of the intellect by which
God is seen intuitively in the beatific vision, but it is preeminent
among the virtues of this life. (a) Thus, it is superior to the
normal virtues, for while they regulate actions by the inferior rule
of reason, charity regulates them by the supreme rule, which is God
Himself. (b) It is superior to the other theological virtues, since it
tends to God in Himself, whereas faith and hope tend to God as He is
the principle whence we derive truth and blessedness: “The greatest of
these is charity” (I Cor., xiii. 13).

1117. The other virtues require charity for their perfection.

(a) Without charity the other virtues are either false virtues, or true
but imperfect virtues; for they are then directed, not to the universal
and last End, but at most to some particular and proximate good end.
Nor are they meritorious without charity, for “if I should distribute
all my goods to feed the poor, and if I should deliver my body to be
burned, and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing” (I Cor., xiii.
3).

(b) With charity the other virtues become true and perfect virtues.
Examples: Titus gives alms to the poor in order to win them to
infidelity (false charity). Caius avoids drunkenness, not because he
dislikes it, but because he is a miser and dislikes to spend money
(false temperance). Balbus has no religion, but is very faithful to his
family duties (imperfect justice). Claudius discharges his duties to
his family and neighbors out of love for God (perfect justice).

1118. The influence of charity on the other virtues is expressed by
various titles.

(a) Charity is called the informing principle of the other virtues.
This does not mean that charity is the type on which the other virtues
are modelled, or the internal character that makes them what they are;
otherwise, all the virtues would be absorbed in the one virtue of
charity. It means, then, that the other virtues derive the quality of
perfect virtue from charity, through which they are directed to the
Last End.

(b) Charity is called the foundation and root of virtues (Eph., iii.
17), not in the sense that it is a material part of them, but in the
sense that it supports and nourishes them.

(c) It is also spoken of as the end and the mother of the other
virtues, because it directs the other virtues to the Last End, and
produces their acts by commanding their exercise: “The end of the
commandment is charity” (I Tim., i. 5).

1119. Charity causes the other virtues, negatively by forbidding evil,
affirmatively by commanding good (I Cor., xiii, 4-7).

(a) It forbids that evil be done the neighbor, either in desire or in
deed: “Charity envieth not, dealeth not perversely.”

(b) It forbids evil passions by which one is injured in oneself, such
as pride, ambition, greed, anger: “Charity is not puffed up, is not
ambitious, seeketh not her own, is not provoked to anger.”

(c) It forbids that one harm one’s own soul by thoughts or desires of
wrong: “Charity thinketh no evil, rejoiceth not in iniquity.”

(d) It commands that good be done the neighbor, bears with his defects,
rejoices over his good and bestows benefits upon him: “Charity is
patient, is kind; rejoiceth with the truth, beareth all things.”

(e) It commands that good be done towards God by the practice of the
theological virtues of faith and hope, and by continuance in them:
“Charity believeth all things, hopeth all things, endureth all things.”

1120. Direction is given by charity to the other virtues that makes
them perfect and meritorious.

(a) Actual direction--that is, the intention here and now to believe,
or hope, etc., out of love for God--though more perfect, is not
required for merit in faith, hope and other virtues: otherwise, merit
would become extremely difficult and rare.

(b) Habitual direction--that is, the mere fact that one has the habit
of charity, though it in no way influences an act of faith, or of hope,
etc, now made--does not suffice; otherwise, it would follow that an act
of faith recited by a person in the state of charity, but here and now
unconscious, is meritorious, which would make merit too easy.

(c) Virtual direction--that is, the influence of an intention, once
made and never retracted, of acting out of love for God, which
continues, though it is not adverted to, while one believes, hopes,
etc.--at least is necessary; otherwise, one would make oneself
deserving of the Last End, without ever having desired it, for the
other virtues do not tend to the Last End in itself. In practice,
however, there is no person in the state of grace who does not perform
all his acts that are human and virtuous under the direction of
charity, actual or virtual.

1121. Production of Charity.--The virtue of charity belongs to the
appetitive part of the soul, but supposes a judgment by which its
exercise is regulated. (a) Thus, the power of the soul in which
charity dwells is the will, for its object is good apprehended by the
intellect; but (b) the judgment by which it is regulated is not human
reason, as is the case with the moral virtues, but divine wisdom (Eph.,
iii. 19).

1122. The Origin of Charity.--(a) Charity is not caused by nature,
nor acquired by the powers of nature. Natural love of God, indeed,
is possible without grace; but charity is a supernatural friendship
based on a fellowship in the beatitude of God. (b) It is introduced
or begotten by other virtues, in the sense that they prepare one to
receive it from God (I Tim., i. 5).

1123. The cause of charity, then, is God, who infuses it into the soul:
“The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost,
who is given to us” (Rom., v. 5). The measure according to which God
infuses the gift of charity depends on His will and bounty.

(a) The Angels received charity at their creation, according to their
natural rank, so that those who were higher excelled those who were
lower, both in nature and in grace.

(b) Those who receive charity through infant baptism have it according
“to the measure of the giving of Christ” (Eph., iv. 7; cfr. John, iii.
8; I Cor., xii. 2).

(c) Those who receive charity through repentance, have it, “everyone
according to his proper ability” (Matt., xxv. 15), that is, according
to the disposition with which he has prepared himself. But the
preparation itself depends on the grace of God (Col., i. 12).

1124. Charity may be increased: “I pray that your charity may more and
more abound” (Philip., i. 9). It must, however, be noted that: (a) the
increase is not in the motive of charity, for the goodness of God is
supreme and incapable of increase, nor is it in the objects of charity,
for even the lowest degree of this virtue extends to all those things
that must be loved on account of God; (b) the increase, then, is in the
manner in which charity exists in the soul, in that it becomes more
deeply rooted and takes stronger hold of the will, whose acts of love
become correspondingly more intense and fervent. Just as knowledge
grows as it becomes clearer and more certain, so does charity progress
to higher degrees as it exists more firmly in its subject.

1125. With reference to the increase of charity, acts of love are of
two kinds: (a) the less fervent are those that do not surpass the
degree of charity one already possesses; (b) the more fervent are those
that surpass the degree of charity one has. Example: If one has ten
degrees of habitual charity, an act of five degrees is less fervent, an
act of fifteen degrees is more fervent.

1126. Every act of charity, even the less fervent, contributes to an
increase of the charity one already possesses. This is true whether the
act be elicited by charity (i.e., an act of love of God), or commanded
by charity (i.e., an act of some other virtue performed out of love for
God). Every act of charity merits from God an increase of the habit of
charity (see Council of Trent, Sess. VI, Can. 32). Even a cup of cold
water given in the name of a disciple shall not go without its reward
(Matt., X. 42).

1127. As to the manner and time in which the increase takes place,
there are various opinions, but the following points sum up what seems
more probable:

(a) The increase of the habit of charity merited by a more fervent act
is conferred at once, for God confers His gifts when one is disposed
for their reception. Example: Titus, who has habitually ten degrees of
charity, makes an act of charity whose degree is fifteen; he thereby
merits the increase of the habit, and it is conferred at once.

(b) The increase of the habit of charity merited by less fervent acts
is not conferred until the moment one enters into heaven or purgatory,
for there is no time during life on earth when one has a disposition
equal to the added quantity contained in less fervent acts, since, as
just said, more fervent acts are rewarded at once by the increase that
corresponds to them, while less fervent acts do not dispose one for an
increase then and there. But the increase must be conferred when one
enters into glory; otherwise, one would lose the degree of beatitude
one merited during life. Hence, those who make many--even though less
fervent--acts of charity during life, will receive a very high degree
of reward for them hereafter.

1128. The increase of charity will come to an end in the future life,
when one has attained the degree of perfection to which one was
predestined by God (Philip, iii. 12). But, as long as a person lives
here below, he may continually grow in charity, for each increase makes
him capable of receiving from the infinite power of God a further
participation in the infinite charity, which is the Holy Ghost (II
Cor., vi. 11).

1129. Charity is absolutely perfect, when it loves God in the same
degree in which He is lovable--that is, infinitely; but it is clear
that so great charity is possible only to God. Charity is relatively
perfect, when one loves God as much as one can. This relatively perfect
charity is possible to man (Matt, v. 48; I John, ii. 5, iv. 12, 17);
but it has three degrees:

(a) The perfect charity of heaven, which is not possible in this life,
consists in this, that one is constantly occupied in thinking of God
and loving Him.

(b) The perfect charity of earth, which is special to some of the just,
consists in this, that one gives all one’s time to divine things, as
far as the necessities of mortal existence allow.

(c) The perfect charity of earth that is common to all the just,
consists in this, that habitually one gives one’s whole heart to God,
permitting no thought or desire opposed to the divine love.

1130. Those who are growing in charity are divided into three classes:
(a) the beginners, or those whose chief care is freedom from sin and
resistance to what is contrary to divine love; (b) the proficients, or
those who must still fight against temptation, but whose chief
attention is given to progress along the way of virtue; (c) the
perfect, or those who are progressing in holiness, but whose chief
desire is to reach the end of the journey and be with the object of
their love (Philip., i. 13).

1131. The Decline of Charity.--(a) Actual charity can decline, in the
sense that subsequent acts can be less fervent than those that preceded
(Apoc., ii. 4). (b) Habitual charity cannot grow less in itself. The
only causes that can be supposed for a decline in habitual charity are
omission of the act of charity and commission of venial sin; the
former, however, cannot lessen charity, since this habit, being
infused, does not depend on human acts; the latter, which is a disorder
about the means to the end, does not contradict charity, which is the
right order of man with reference to his Last End itself. Thus, charity
differs from human friendships, which grow cold through neglect or
slights. (c) Habitual charity can be lessened, first, with reference to
the disposition that makes for its preservation and increase (as when
one commits numerous and dangerous venial sins), and secondly, with
reference to itself (as when one rising from sin has less charity than
he had before). But in neither of these cases does the same numerical
habit decrease.

1132. The Loss of Charity.--(a) The charity of the blessed cannot be
lost, because they see God as He is, and are constantly occupied in
loving Him. But the charity of earth, since it proceeds from a less
perfect knowledge and is not always in use, may be surrendered by man’s
free will (see Council of Trent, Sess. VI, Cap. 12, 13, 14, Can. 23).
(b) The habit of charity is lost, not only by any sin against the love
of God, but by any other mortal sin opposed to other virtues (see
Council of Trent, Sess. VI, Cap. 15). Every mortal sin is a turning
away from the Last End, and so is incompatible with charity, which is a
turning to God, the Last End: “He that hath My commandments and keepeth
them, he it is that loveth Me” (John, xiv. 21). Venial sin diminishes
the fervor of charity, but does not remove charity itself.

1133. The Object of Charity.--There is a threefold object of charity:
(a) the formal object, that is, the reason for love, which is the
infinite amiability of God in Himself, as known from the supernatural
illumination of faith; (b) the primary material object, that is, the
chief thing which charity loves, which is God (i.e., the divine
Essence, the divine Persons, the divine attributes): “Thou shalt love
the Lord, Thy God. This is the greatest and the first commandment”
(Matt, xxii. 37, 38); (c) the secondary material object, that is, the
thing loved because of God, which is self and the neighbor: “And the
second is like to this: Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself” (ibid,
39).

1134. The love of creatures is not always an act of the virtue of
charity. (a) Sinful love of creatures, by which one loves them more
than God or inordinately, destroys or deviates from charity. Hence, St.
John says: “Love not the world, nor the things that are in the world”
(I John, ii. 15). (b) Natural love of creatures, by which one loves
them on account of reasons apart from love of God (such as the benefits
one derives from them or the excellences they possess), is not charity,
even though good. Thus, gratitude which sees in another only a
benefactor, friendship which sees in another only a congenial spirit,
and philanthropy which sees in another only a fellow-man, differ from
charity, although they are good in themselves. (c) Supernatural love of
creatures, by which one loves them on account of the divine that is in
them, inasmuch as they are friends of God or made for the glory of
one’s divine Friend, does not differ specifically from love of God, for
in both loves there is the same motive (viz, the amiability of God
Himself).

1135. Since charity is friendship, it does not include among its
objects those things that are loved with the love of desire (see 1109),
that is, those things whose good is desired, but for another.

(a) Hence, charity itself is not an object of charity, for it is loved
not as a friend, but as a good that one wishes for one’s friends. The
same applies to other virtues and to beatitudes.

(b) Irrational creatures are not objects of charity, for a fellowship
with them in friendship, and especially in the beatific vision, is
impossible. We can love them out of charity, however, inasmuch as we
desire their preservation for the sake of those whom we love with
charity (e.g., desiring that they be preserved for the glory of God or
the use of man).

1136. Love of self is of various kinds.

(a) Sinful self-love is that by which a person loves himself according
to his lower and corrupt nature, and not according to his higher or
rational nature, or loves himself egotistically to the hurt of others.
Of those who indulge their passions it is said: “In the last days shall
come dangerous times. Men shall be lovers of themselves” (II Tim., iii.
1, 2); of those who love themselves selfishly it is said: “All seek the
things that are their own, not the things that are Jesus Christ’s”
(Philip., ii. 21); whereas charity seeketh not her own (I Cor., xiii.)
to the exclusion of others, but desires what is for the advantage of
the neighbor (I Cor., x. 33).

(b) Natural self-love is that necessary desire which each one has for
his own good, happiness, existence, etc. (II Cor., v. 4), or any desire
for reasonable self-improvement that is not prompted by a supernatural
love of God. This love is stronger than love for another, for it
implies not merely union, but unity. It is not friendship, but the root
of friendship, for one is said to be friendly towards another when one
holds him as another self.

(c) Supernatural self-love is that love which one has for God, and
consequently for self as a friend of God.

1137. If by “self” we understand the substance and nature of man, as
composed of soul and body, then both good and bad understand aright the
meaning of self and desire its preservation. But if by “self” we mean
principally the inward man and secondarily the outward man (II Cor.,
iv. 16), then only the good understand what self is, and have a true
love for it, whereas the wicked hate their own souls (Ps. x. 6). For
the five marks of true friendship are shown to the inner man by the
good, to the outward man by the sinner: (a) the good are solicitous for
the life of the soul, the wicked for that of the body; (b) the good
desire spiritual treasures for the soul, the wicked carnal delights for
the body; (c) the good labor to provide for the needs of the soul, the
wicked work only for the needs of the body; (d) the good are pleased to
converse with their souls, finding there thoughts of past, present and
future good things to delight them, while the wicked seek to distract
themselves from wholesome thought by pleasure; (e) the good are at
peace with their souls, whereas the wicked are troubled by conscience.

1138. Supernatural love of self, which pertains to charity, extends not
only to the soul, but also to the body; for (a) according to its
nature, the body is good, since it is from God and may be employed for
His service (Rom., vi. 13), and hence it may be loved out of charity
with the love of desire on account of the honor it may give to God and
the service it may render in good works; (b) according to grace, the
body is capable of sharing in secondary beatitude, through
glorification with the soul, and hence it may be loved with charity and
with the love of benevolence, inasmuch as we desire for it a share in
beatitude: “We would not be unclothed, but clothed over, that that
which is mortal may be swallowed up by life” (II Cor., v. 4); (e)
according to the consequences of sin that are in it, the body is a drag
on the soul, or a hindrance to it, and one should not love but rather
desire the removal of its imperfections. Hence, St. Paul desired to be
freed from the body (Rom., vii. 24; Philip,, i. 23), and the Saints
have shown their hatred of the body’s corruption by the mortifications
to which they subjected it (John, xii. 25).

1139. Love of neighbor is of three kinds: (a) sinful love, which is all
love that is excessive, irregulated, or directed to what is evil in
others; (b) natural love, which is all love that is attracted by some
excellence of a human or created kind, such as knowledge or skill; (c)
supernatural love, which is that by which one is drawn towards another
on account of the divine in him, such as his gifts of grace and of
heavenly calling.

1140. Hence, it seems that there is no such thing as a special and
distinct virtue of human friendship. (a) Thus, friendships of utility
or of pleasure are clearly not virtues, since they are not caused by
attraction towards moral good. (b) Virtuous friendships are the
consequences of virtues rather than virtues, for the attraction one has
for one’s friend arises from the attraction for the virtue one sees in
him. Thus, friendship for another because he is not the slave of
passion, is an exercise of the virtue of temperance. (c) Supernatural
friendships are not distinct from the virtue of charity, for the gifts
and graces which evoke them are participations of God’s goodness, which
is the object of charity.

1141. The neighbors whom we are to love according to charity are all
those who can have with us the relation of supernatural friendship,
that is, all rational creatures. (a) Hence, the Angels are objects of
this love, and in the resurrection men will be fellow-citizens with
them (Heb., xii, 22); (b) our fellow-men are objects of this love, for
they also are called to the heavenly companionship (ibid., 23).

1142. Charity for Sinners.--Should we love with charity those who are
sinners and enemies of God? (a) If we consider sinners precisely as
enemies of God, we may not love them, for their sin is an evil, an
offense to God and a hurt to themselves. On the contrary, we should
hate even in those who are nearest to us whatever is opposed to love of
God (Luke, xiv. 26). (b) If we consider sinners precisely as creatures
of God, we may not love them with charity or as friends, if they are
demons or lost souls; for in their case fellowship with us in beatitude
is out of the question. We may, however, love their nature out of
charity towards God, desiring that it be preserved by Him for His
glory. (c) If we consider sinners precisely as creatures of God, we may
love them with charity or as friends, if they are still in the present
life; for we should wish that God may be glorified in them by their
conversion and salvation. The commandment of love of neighbor was not
restricted to loving the just.

1143. If sinners be considered precisely as they are enemies of God, is
it lawful to hate them and wish evil to them? (a) It is lawful to hate
the evil that is in sinners, but not their persons. He who hates their
sin, loves themselves, for their sin is against their own interests. In
this way the Psalmist hated sinners (Ps. cxviii. 113, cxxxviii. 32).
(b) It is lawful to wish that punishment overtake sinners, if one is
actuated, not by a spirit of malevolence, but by love of justice (Ps.
lvii. 11; Wis., i. 13; Ps. x. 8). It is also lawful to wish that the
sinfulness that is in them may be destroyed, that they themselves may
be saved. In this sense we may understand some of the imprecations that
are met in scripture (Ps. ciii. 35). Thus, a judge sentences a
criminal, not because he hates the man before him, but because he
wishes to reform him, or to protect society, or to do an act of justice.

1144. The evils of punishment or of destruction of sin are in a broader
view not evils, but goods. But the following punishments may not be
desired: (a) that anyone living lose his soul and be condemned to hell,
for charity requires that we desire the salvation of sinners; (b) that
a sinner be punished by blindness of heart and go from bad to worse. He
who wishes sin approves of the offense to God; but it does not seem
unlawful to wish that God permit a person to fall into sin, as a means
to a spiritual awakening.

1145. Association with Sinners.--(a) It is never lawful to associate
with sinners in their sins, for thus one becomes a sharer in their
guilt. Hence, St. Paul says: “Go out from among them and be ye
separate” (II Cor., vi. 17). (b) It is not lawful to associate with
sinners even in matters indifferent or good, if one is weak and apt to
be led away by them into sin (see 258 sqq.). (c) It is lawful to
associate with sinners in things not forbidden, if one is not
endangered, and if one aims to convert them to better ways. Thus, our
Lord ate with sinners, because He came to call them to repentance
(Matt., ix. 10-13).

1146. Friendship with Sinners.-(a) If this means that we like and
dislike the same things as the sinners, it is an evil friendship, and
it should be discontinued; (b) if it means that we seek to bring the
sinner to imitate our good likes and dislikes, the friendship pertains
to charity (Jer, xv. 19).

1147. Should one continue to show signs of special regard to a friend
who has taken to ways of sin? (a) As long as there is hope of
betterment, one should not deny the other the benefits of friendship.
If it would be wrong to desert a friend because he was perishing from
starvation, much more would it be wrong to desert him because he was
perishing morally. (b) But if all hope of betterment has gone, one
should give up a companionship which is not profitable to either party,
and may prove harmful.

1148. Charity towards Enemies.--Enemies can be considered in two
senses: precisely as enemies, or precisely as human beings destined for
beatitude. (a) If considered as enemies, they are not to be loved with
charity--that is, it should be displeasing to us that they are enemies
and opposed to us, for it would be contrary to charity to love in a
neighbor that which is evil in him. (b) If considered as human beings,
enemies should be loved with charity--that is, their nature created by
God and capable of receiving grace and glory should be pleasing to us,
for love of God should make us love all that belongs to Him, even that
which is not well disposed towards ourselves.

1149. The precept of love of enemies did not originate with the law of
Christ. (a) It pertains to the natural law, for (i) it follows from the
natural principle: “Do unto others as you would have them do unto you,”
and (ii) it was known by natural reason (e.g., Plato and Cicero knew
it). (b) Love of enemies was commanded in the Old Law, being the second
great commandment of that law (Matt., xxii. 39), and was taught in
various Old Testament books (Lev., xix. 17, 18; Exod., xxiii 4, 5;
Prov., xxi. 21, 22). (c) It was renewed by Christ, who corrected the
false interpretation of Leviticus, xix. 18, given by the scribes and
Pharisees, who taught: “Thou shalt love thy friend and hate thy enemy.”
In the Sermon on the Mount our Lord declares: “I say to you: Love your
enemies: do good to them that hate you: that you may be the children of
your Father who is in heaven” (Matt., v. 44, 45).

1150. The following examples of love of one’s enemies are found in the
Bible: (a) in the Old Testament, Joseph forgave his brethren who had
sold him into Egypt, David spared the life of his persecutor Saul and
wept over the ungrateful Absalom, and Moses prayed for the people who
had rebelled against him; (b) in the New Testament our Lord mourned
over Jerusalem which had rejected Him, and on the Cross prayed for His
enemies.

1151. What kind of love must we entertain for enemies?

(a) A general love of enemies is that which extends to all neighbors
for the love of God, no exception being made as regards enemies. This
kind of love is required. Example: Caius makes an act of love in which
he declares his love for his neighbor, but mentions no names. Titus
makes this act of love: “I love all except Caius.” The act of love made
by Caius is sufficient, that of Titus is insufficient.

(b) A special love of enemies is that which extends to them in
particular, not as included in the human race or the community, but as
individuals, as when one expressly mentions the name of an enemy in his
act of love. This kind of love of enemies is not required at all times.

1152. Is there an obligation of special love of enemies? (a) In cases
of necessity (e.g., when the omission of a special love would bring on
hate), one is bound to special love. (b) Outside of cases of necessity,
one is bound to be willing to love an enemy in particular, if the
necessity should arise. (c) Outside of necessity, one is not bound to
love an enemy in particular, for it is impossible to give such
attention even to all those who are not enemies. But to give an enemy
more love than is required is a sign of perfect charity.

1153. The principles just given as to internal love of enemies apply
also to external love, or to the signs by which internal love is
manifested. For St. John says: “Let us not love in word, nor in tongue,
but in deed, and in truth” (I John, iii. 18).

(a) Hence, it is not lawful to deny to an enemy the common signs of
charity (i.e., such benefits as are bestowed on his community or class
as a whole), for to do so would be to signify a desire for revenge
(Lev., xix. 18). Consequently, he who excludes his enemies from prayers
offered for his neighbor sins against charity.

(b) In cases of necessity, as when an enemy is in great need as to
life, fame, fortune or salvation, one is bound to show special signs of
charity, such as salutation, conversation, assistance, etc. Thus, we
are told: “If thy enemy be hungry, give him to eat; if he be thirsty,
give him to drink” (Prov., xxv. 21).

(c) Outside of cases of necessity, one is bound to be ready to assist
an enemy, should there be need.

(d) Outside of necessity, one is not bound actually to manifest
particular love for an enemy, by speaking to him, trading with him,
visiting him, etc. Hence, David, although he had pardoned Absalom,
would not meet him (II Kings, xiv. 24). To confer special benefits on
an enemy when there is no obligation is a counsel of perfection: “Do
good to those that hate you” (Matt., v. 24). This heaps coals of fire
upon the head of the enemy, curing him by the salutary pain of
repentance, and so overcomes evil by good (Rom., xii. 20, 21).

1154. The common signs of charity are not limited to those that are
shown to all mankind, but include also such as are usually shown by one
Christian to another Christian, by one citizen to a fellow-citizen, by
a relative to a relative, etc. Thus, to make a social call, though it
would be a sign of special regard in the case of one not a relative,
might be only a common sign of charity in the case of a relative.

(a) Hence, it is against charity to deny an enemy signs of charity that
are customarily shown to all men. Example: Titus dislikes Balbus, and
therefore refuses to sell to him, does not return his salutations,
speaks to all others in company, while ignoring Balbus, and will not
even answer if Balbus addresses him.

(b) It is against charity to deny an enemy signs of charity that are
commonly shown to all those to whom one is similarly related. Examples:
Claudia calls on her other children frequently and makes them presents,
but she keeps away from one daughter, even when the latter is sick and
poor and she is calling next door. Sempronius habitually invites to his
house for family festivities all his relatives except his brother.

(c) It is against charity to deny to an enemy some benefit not commonly
shown, but which one has bestowed out of liberality on the group to
which the latter belongs. In such a case a special sign of charity
becomes common. Example: Titus prepares a banquet for a neighboring
institution, and purposely sends no invitation to two members whom he
dislikes.

1155. The rule that common signs of charity must be shown does not
apply, if some higher or more urgent duty requires that they be
omitted: however, internal charity must persist all the while.

(a) Thus, by reason of charity owed to self or to the better interests
of an offender, one should at times omit the common signs of charity.
Examples: Caius avoids Balbus, with whom he has had a quarrel, because
he knows well that Balbus is seeking some pretext to get revenge. Titus
has a surly way of speaking, and his mother, in order to cure him, does
not answer until he has spoken civilly.

(b) By reason of justice, the signs of charity should sometimes be
denied as a punishment. Examples: Claudia punishes her children, when
they are disobedient, by refusing them for a time privileges given the
other children. For the same reason she refuses to call on a daughter
who ran away from home and married a worthless fellow.

(c) By reason of justice, the signs of charity should be refused, when
this is required for the protection of one’s own rights. Example: Titus
goes about defaming Sempronius and his family, but appears very affable
when he meets Sempronius; the latter knows all this, and hence is very
cool with Titus, to show that the injuries are not held as light.

1156. The following are the rules for judging whether (apart from
scandal to others) sin has been committed through refusal of the signs
of charity:

(a) If internally there is hatred (i.e., a contempt for one’s neighbor,
as if he were unworthy of common charity), or malevolence (i.e., a will
to exercise spite), then one is guilty of grave uncharitableness,
unless the smallness of the matter makes it only a venial sin.

(b) If externally the denial of charity is such that in the judgment of
a prudent man it indicates real hatred, and the injured party perceives
this and is scandalized or hurt thereby, the sin of uncharitableness is
committed, even though there be no internal hatred. The gravity depends
on the scandal or offense caused the other party. Example: Claudius and
Balbus, once very friendly, have had a disagreement. Now, when Claudius
sees Balbus coming in his direction, he turns off by a side street, not
to show hatred, but to avoid a meeting. If Balbus does not know this,
or does not care, no sin--or at most only a venial sin--is committed;
but if Balbus is deeply wounded or scandalized by this conduct,
Claudius sins seriously against charity.

1157. Refusal of Greetings.--(a) To refuse to exchange a bow or
salutation (such as “Good morning”) indicates a want of charity, when
such mutual courtesy is expected according to custom; not, however,
when custom does not require it, Example: In Balba’s office the girls
employed usually salute one another on arrival and departure, but Balba
never salutes Titia, and hence is regarded as her enemy. On Caius’
street the neighbors are of a very mixed kind, and it is not customary
to speak to everybody. Hence, the fact that Caius never salutes certain
neighbors, whom he dislikes, does not signify any uncharitableness on
his part.

(b) To refuse to salute another first, where custom expects this, is a
mark of uncharity, unless one has a sufficient excuse. Examples:
Claudius has a grudge against Sempronius, an elderly man who is much
his senior, and says he will never salute him as others do. Titus
refuses to greet Balbus, his acquaintance, when they meet, because in
the past Balbus has treated his greetings with contempt, and shows that
he does not care to notice Titus.

(c) To refuse to return a salutation sincerely given indicates a want
of charity.

1158. The Order of Charity.--Charity not only requires that we love
God, ourselves, and our neighbors, but it also obliges us to love these
objects according to a certain order, some being preferred to others.

(a) God must be loved above all, more than self (Matt, xvi. 24), more
than father and mother (Matt., x. 37; Luke, xiv. 26), for He is the
common good of all, and the source of all good.

(b) Other things being equal, one should love self more than one’s
neighbor, for the love of self is the model for the love of neighbor
(Matt., xxii. 39), and nature itself inclines to this in accordance
with the saying: “Charity begins at home.”

(c) Among neighbors those should be loved more who have more of a claim
on account of their greater nearness to God or to ourselves.

1159. Love can become greater in two ways: (a) objectively, when the
person loved is esteemed as of greater worth, or has more titles to
affection, or has a more enduring right to be loved; (b) subjectively,
when the person loving is more touched and moved in his feelings, even
though the object be not more amiable in itself.

1160. The Character of our Love of God.--(a) It must be supreme
objectively, since He is infinite perfection and has the highest of all
claims on our love. Hence, one should be disposed to suffer any loss
rather than abandon God. (b) It must be supreme subjectively, in our
desire, that is, realizing that God is the highest good, we should at
least wish to give Him the utmost of our fervor and ardor. (c) It need
not be supreme subjectively, in fact; for we are not always masters of
our feelings, and things that are nearer to us affect us more than
those that are more important, but remote from sense. Hence, it is not
against charity that one should be more moved sensibly at the thought
of a dear human friend than at the thought of God, provided the will
places God above all.

1161. Regarding the love of God for the sake of reward, we must note:
(a) If there is question of the eternal reward, one may love and serve
God for the sake of reward, provided one makes the reward the end of
one’s service, but not the end of God; for salvation is really the end
of our faith (I Pet., i. 9), but God is the end of all, and He is to be
preferred to all. This love of God for the sake of reward coexists with
charity, for one may love a friend for his own sake, and at the same
time expect benefits from the friendship, provided the love of
benevolence is uppermost. (b) If there is question of a temporal
reward, one may love and serve God for the sake of the reward, not in
the sense that spiritual things are made a means and temporal things
their end, but in the sense that one hopes one’s service of God will be
so blessed that one will have health, strength and opportunity, so as
to be enabled to continue and progress in that service.

1162. Regarding the love of self (i.e., of the inner man, or our
spiritual nature), we should note: (a) Objectively, one esteems others
who are higher in sanctity than oneself (e.g., the Blessed Virgin), as
more worthy of love. But one may desire for self according to charity
such progress in virtue that one will pass some others who are now
better than oneself; for the virtue of charity is given us that we may
perfect ourselves. (b) Subjectively, one holds self as being nearer
than other persons, and thus loves oneself with a greater intensity.

1163. Is it lawful to sacrifice one’s own spiritual goods for the
benefit of a neighbor?

(a) One may not sacrifice necessary spiritual goods for the benefit,
spiritual or temporal, of any one, not even of the whole world; for in
so doing one inflicts a wound on one’s own soul and prefers the good of
others to one’s own spiritual welfare. Hence, it is not lawful to wish
to be damned in place of another; to commit sin, mortal or venial, to
prevent another from sinning; or to expose oneself to the certain and
proximate danger of sin for the sake of another’s spiritual progress.

(b) One may, however, sacrifice unnecessary or less necessary spiritual
goods for the benefit, spiritual or temporal, of a neighbor; for, by
doing this, one chooses the course which God wishes, and does not
lessen but rather increases one’s own profit. Thus, a priest should
interrupt his devotions to hear the confession of a penitent; a
daughter should give up the idea of becoming a nun as long as her
parents need her; a lay person should stay away from Mass on Sunday, if
an invalid has to be cared for, or a dying person must be baptized; it
is laudable to make the heroic act of charity, by which one transfers
the satisfactory value of one’s good works to the souls in purgatory;
one may expose oneself to a remote danger of sin in order to perform a
great service of charity, as in waiting on a sick person who on account
of irritability is a great temptation to anger; one may wish that one’s
entrance into heaven be delayed, so that one may labor longer for souls
(Philip., i. 23, 24).

1164. The Love of the Body.--(a) One should prefer the spiritual
welfare of one’s neighbor to one’s own bodily welfare, for our neighbor
is called to be a partaker with us in the beatific vision, while the
body will share only in accidental glory. (b) One should prefer one’s
own bodily welfare to that of another, all other things being equal,
for it has more of a claim on one.

1165. There are three kinds of spiritual necessity in which a neighbor
may be placed, and in which one might be called on to sacrifice one’s
bodily welfare for the other’s good (cfr. 1236), Thus, there is: (a)
extreme spiritual need, or that in which a neighbor will perish
eternally unless help is given him, as when an infant is about to die
without baptism; (b) grave spiritual need, or that in which a neighbor
runs grave danger of losing his soul unless help is given, as when a
dying person, who is in mortal sin, asks for a confessor, because he is
scarcely able to make an act of perfect contrition; (c) ordinary
spiritual need, or that in which a neighbor is in remote danger of
damnation, or in proximate danger of sin, but can easily help himself,
as is the case with those who from choice live in occasions of sin.

1166. For a neighbor who is in extreme spiritual need, one should risk
death (I John, iii. 16) or lesser evils, if the following conditions
are present: (a) if there is a good prospect of success in helping the
needy one (e.g., a mother is not obliged to undergo an operation
dangerous to her life, in order to secure the baptism of her child, if
it is uncertain that the baptism can be administered); (b) if there is
no one else who can and will give the needed help; (c) if there is no
reason of public good that stands in the way; thus, if by helping one
in extreme need a person would lose his life, and so deprive of his aid
a large number who are also in extreme need, he should prefer to help
the many rather than the one.

1167. For a neighbor who is in grave spiritual necessity, the same risk
is not required of all. (a) The risk of death itself is required of
pastors of souls (John, x. 11), since they have bound themselves to
this. Hence, a pastor who would refuse to go to a parishioner dying of
pestilence and needing absolution and Extreme Unction, would offend
against justice, while another priest who would go to such a dying
person would practise the perfection of charity; for the dying person
can help himself by an act of contrition, and the strange priest is not
bound by office to care for him. (b) The risk of some great corporal
evil (such as a sickness or impairment of health) should be taken even
by those who are not pastors of the person in need, if there is no one
else to help. Thus, if a pastor were sick, another priest ought to
visit a dying person, even at the risk of catching a severe cold.

1168. For a neighbor who is in ordinary spiritual necessity charity
requires that something be done (Ecclus, xvii. 12). (a) But it does not
require the risk of life or of serious bodily loss, for the person in
danger can easily and better help himself. Thus, it is not necessary
that one should penetrate into the haunts of criminals and endanger
one’s life, in order to drag away one who chooses to go to such places.
(b) It does require that one be willing to undergo a slight bodily
inconvenience or deprivation. Thus, an ordinary headache or the loss of
a meal ought not to stop one from counselling another in order to keep
him away from bad company.

1169. If only corporal good (life, health, liberty, etc.) is compared
with corporal good of the same kind, then, as said above, one should
prefer one’s own good to that of another. Thus, it is not lawful to
offer oneself as substitute for a condemned criminal, or to put one’s
family into bankruptcy to save another family from bankruptcy. But, if
a neighbor’s corporal good is of a more important kind or is connected
with higher goods, then one may sacrifice one’s own good for that of
another.

(a) Thus, one may prefer a greater corporal good of a neighbor to a
lesser corporal good of one’s own. Examples: One may weaken one’s
health to save another’s life. One may give of one’s blood for a
transfusion to assist another who is in danger of death.

(b) One may prefer an equal corporal good of a neighbor to an equal
corporal good of one’s own, if the common good requires this; for the
good of all is preferable to that of an individual. Thus, one may
expose oneself to the peril of death in order to protect a public
person whose life is very important to the nation. Thus, policemen and
firemen, soldiers and sailors, are daily imperilling their own safety
for the safety of the public.

(c) One may prefer an equal corporal good of another, who is only a
private individual, to one’s own equal good, if the intention is to
practise virtue, to assist a person in need, or to give edification. At
least, it is more probable that this is lawful, for the good of virtue
is a higher good than the good of the body, and the Fathers praise holy
men who sold themselves into slavery, or who gave themselves as
hostages to barbarians, for the liberation of captives; and they hold
up for admiration Damon and Pythias, each of whom was ready to die for
the other. Hence, it is not against the charity owed to self to jump
into a river and risk one’s life in order to rescue a drowning person,
for heroic charity is a hotter adornment to self than mere, ordinary
charity. Similarly, if two explorers in a wilderness have only enough
provisions for one to reach civilization, one of them may surrender his
rations to the other, that both may not be lost.

1170. There are two exceptions to the rules just given: (a) A person
should not risk his life for another’s life, if he thereby endangers
his own salvation (e.g., if he is in a state of sin and cannot
reconcile himself to God). But this case is theoretical, for it is
admitted that one who makes the supreme sacrifice of giving his life
with a virtuous intention, has not only charity, but the perfection of
charity (John, xv. 13), which will certainly purify him even from a
multitude of sins. (b) One should not risk one’s life for the life of
another, if a third party has a higher claim on him. Thus, a married
man, who has a dependent wife and children, may not throw away his life
for the sake of a friend.

1171. The order of charity between different neighbors is as follows:
(a) as to good in general (e.g., the attainment of salvation), we
should love all neighbors alike, for we should desire salvation for
all; (b) as to good in particular (e.g., the degree of beatitude), we
should love some more than others. Thus, we should desire a higher
degree of glory for the Blessed Virgin than for the Saints.

1172. The reasons for loving one neighbor more than another can be
reduced to two. (a) One neighbor may be nearer to God than another, and
hence more deserving of love--for example, a saintly acquaintance may
be nearer to God than a sinful relative. (b) One neighbor may be nearer
to ourselves on account of relationship by blood or marriage,
friendship, civil or professional ties, etc. Thus, a cousin is nearer
by nature to his cousin than another person who is not a relative.

1173. The order of charity as between those nearer to God and those
nearer to self is as follows:

(a) Objectively, we should esteem more those who are better, and desire
for them that higher degree of God’s favor which belongs to their
merits. But we may desire for those nearer to ourselves that they will
finally surpass in holiness those now better than they are, and thus
attain to a greater beatitude. Moreover, while we prefer in one respect
(i.e., that of holiness) a saintly person, who is a stranger, we prefer
in many respects (e.g., on account of relationship, friendship,
gratitude) another who is less holy.

(b) Subjectively, the love for those nearer to self is greater, that
is, more intense, more vividly felt. The preferences for those nearer
to self, therefore, far from being wrong or the expression of mere
natural love, are expressions of charity itself. For it is God’s will
that more love should be shown to those who are nearer to us: “If any
man have not care of his own, and especially of those of his house, he
hath denied the faith, and is worse than an infidel” (I Tim., v. 8).
Hence, charity itself inclines one to have more love for one’s own, and
it supernaturalizes filial piety, patriotism, and friendship.

1174. The order to be followed in the manifestation of charity will
correspond with the order of charity itself. (a) To those to whom
greater objective love is due, on account of their holiness, more
respect due to their excellence should be shown. (b) To those to whom
greater return of love is due on account of the benefits they have
shown (as parents, friends, etc.), more assistance should be given
spiritually and temporally. That is, if one had to choose between
helping either a relative or a stranger who was more virtuous, one
would have to decide in favor of the relative. (c) To those to whom
greater subjective love is due, more signs of affection (such as
visits) should be given.

1175. Exceptions to the above are the following cases, in which the
good of the better person should be preferred:

(a) if the common good requires such a preference. Thus, public
interest demands that in conferring positions, making appointments, or
voting for candidates, one should not be guided by family affections or
private friendships, but only by the common welfare; and one should
decide in favor of the better man;

(b) if the person nearer to self has forfeited his claims to
preference. Thus, a son who has treated his father with contempt and is
a wastrel, may be deprived of his share of the family goods in favor of
strangers who are self-sacrificing and who promote some holy cause.

1176. The order of charity between various kinds of natural
relationships is as follows: (a) the relationship that arises from
consanguinity is prior and more stable, since it arises from nature
itself and cannot be removed; (b) the relationship of friendship, since
it arises from one’s own choice, may be more congenial and may be
preferred even to kinship, when there is question of society and
companionship (Prov., xviii. 24).

1177. In practice, other things being equal, one should manifest more
love to a relative in those things that belong to the relationship.

(a) To those who are related by blood, corporal or temporal assistance
is more due. If one has to choose between helping one’s indigent
parents or an indigent friend, one should rather help one’s parents.

(b) To those who are spiritually related (e.g., pastor and parishioner,
director and penitent, god-parent and god-child), more spiritual
assistance in instruction, advice and prayer is due. Thus, a pastor is
supposed to be more solicitous about instructing his congregation than
his relatives who belong to another congregation.

(c) To those who are related by some special tie, political, military,
religious, etc., more is due in things political, military, religious,
etc., than to others. Thus, a soldier owes obedience to his officer,
and not to his father, in matters that pertain to army life; a priest
owes deference to an ecclesiastical superior in clerical matters, not
to his parents.

1178. Kinship, as being an older and more fundamental relationship,
should have precedence in assistance over any other kind of private
relationship in case of conflict and extreme necessity. (a) Thus, as
regards spiritual matters (e.g., calling a priest to give absolution),
if a parent and a spiritual father were both in extreme necessity,
one’s first duty would be to one’s parent. (b) As regards temporal
matters, if one has to choose between assisting one’s needy parents and
remaining in some relationship in which one cannot help them, one
should give up the relationship, if possible. Thus, a Religious is
allowed to return to the world, if his parents require his support.

1179. The order of charity as between kinsfolk gives preference of
course to the nearer relatives-parents, children, wife. Between these
nearer relatives there is also an order of preference, as follows: (a)
objectively (or with reference to the greater or less claim to respect
and honor), the order is: father, mother, wife, children; (b)
subjectively (or with reference to the greater or less intensity of
affection), the order is the reverse, namely: children, wife, parents.

1180. The following should be noted about this order of preference
between the members of one’s family: (a) the basis of preference given
is only kinship, and hence there may be other considerations to change
the order given (e.g., a pious mother is rightly more respected and
honored by her children than a worthless father); (b) there is no
notable excess in the claim of one member of the family over that of
another, and hence those whose affections do not follow the order given
are not guilty of serious sin.

1181. The order in which relatives have a claim on assistance when
several are in equal need is as follows: (a) in cases of ordinary need
the order is, first, the wife, for a man leaves his parents for his
wife (Gen., ii. 24), second, the children, for ordinarily parents must
provide for children, and not children for parents (II Cor., xii. 14),
third, parents; after these come in order, brothers and sisters, other
relatives, friends, fellow-citizens of the same locality or country,
all others; (b) in case of extreme need, however, parents are to be
preferred to all others, even to wife, children or creditors, since one
receives life from parents.

1182. The order of charity is also observed in heaven. (a) Thus, God is
loved above all, not only objectively, but also subjectively, for His
amiability is better understood and is not for a moment neglected. (b)
Self is loved less, objectively, than those who are higher, and more,
objectively, than those who are lower in glory: for the state of the
blessed is fixed, and each of them desires that which God wills. But,
subjectively, each loves self with a more intense love, since charity
itself inclines that one first direct self towards God, and then wish
the same for others. (c) Among neighbors, since love of them will be
entirely divine, the reason of earthly preferences (such as dependence
of one on another) having ceased, those who are more perfect in
holiness will be loved with deeper appreciation and affection than
those who are nearer by kinship or friendship.

1183. The Acts of Charity.--The principal act of the virtue of charity
is love. It is sometimes spoken of as benevolence, but in reality the
love of charity includes more than mere benevolence. (a) Thus,
benevolence wishes well to another according to a right judgment, and
so it pertains to charity, which rejoices in the perfections of God and
wishes beatitude to man; but (b) love is a union of affection with
another, which makes one regard him as another self, and so it pertains
to charity, which, as said above, is a supernatural friendship, One can
be benevolent towards a stranger and for a passing moment, but love is
intimate and lasting, from its nature.

1184. Exercise of the Act of Love.--(a) From benevolence proceed
gladness at the perfections of God (I Pet., i. 8), zeal for His
external glory (I Pet., iv. 11), grief over sin committed against Him
(Ps. lxxii. 3), obedience to His commandments (John, xiv. 15, 21, 23).
(b) From the union of affection proceed a warmth of inclination and a
personal interest in the things of God, so that one rejoices over the
divine perfections, not merely because one knows that this is a duty,
but because one feels the attachment of a friend for all that pertains
to God.

1185. Charity loves God: (a) for His own sake; (b) immediately; (c)
entirely; (d) without measure.

1186. We love God for His own sake, in the sense that there is nothing
distinct from God that causes Him to be loved. (a) Thus, there is no
ulterior end on account of which He is loved, for He is the Last End of
all; (b) there is no perfection different from His nature that makes
Him lovable, since He is perfection itself; (c) there is no source of
His goodness on account of which He is loved, since He is the Primal
Source.

1187. We may love God for the sake of reward (see 1161), on account of
benefits, and for fear of punishment, in the following senses: (a) the
eternal reward is the proximate end of our love of God: “Receiving the
end of your faith, even the salvation of your souls” (I Pet., i. 9);
but the end of salvation itself, and the Last End of love of God, is
God Himself; (b) temporal rewards, benefits received, and the wish to
avoid punishment, are dispositions that lead up to love of God, or to
progress in His love; but they are not the end of the act of love.

1188. Charity loves God immediately, and so differs from natural love
of God. (a) Thus, natural love of God rises from love of neighbor whom
we see to love of God whom we do not see, just as natural knowledge
rises from the creature to the Creator. (b) Charity, on the contrary,
tends to God first, and by reason of Him includes the neighbor in its
love.

1189. Charity loves God entirely. (a) But this does not mean that the
creature’s love is adequate to the amiability of God, for God is
infinite, whereas love in the most perfect creature must be finite. (b)
It means, with reference to the object of love, that charity loves
everything that pertains to God--each of the Divine Persons, all of the
divine perfections. (e) It means, with reference to the person who
loves, that he loves God to the best of his ability, by subordinating
all else to God and preferring His love to other loves. On earth,
charity gives to God the greatest objective love; in heaven, it also
gives Him the greatest subjective love (see 1129): “Thou shalt love the
Lord, thy God, with thy whole heart” (Deut., vi. 5).

1190. Charity loves God without measure, as St. Bernard says (_De
diligendo Deo_, cap. 1). God has fixed a degree of perfection in
charity beyond which a soul will not progress, but no one should set a
limit for himself, for love has to do with God, who is not measured,
but is the measure of all things.

(a) Hence, in the internal act of love, there is no possibility of
excess, since the Object is infinitely amiable and the End of all, and
so the greater the charity, the better it is.

(b) In external acts proceeding from charity, however, there is a
possibility of excess, since these acts are a means to an end, and have
to be measured by charity and reason. Thus, it would be excessive to
give more to strangers than to one’s needy parents, for this act would
not be according to the rule of charity. It would also be excessive to
perform works of charity, when one ought to be attending to household
duties, for reason requires that everything be done at its proper time
and place.

1191. The love of an enemy may be a better act than the love of a
friend, when there are special excellencies in the former love that are
not found in the latter. (a) Thus, if the enemy, all things considered,
is a better person than the friend, and if he is for that reason
objectively preferred, this is as it should be (see 1173). (b) If the
parties are of equal merit, an act of love towards the enemy on account
of supernatural charity is better than an act of love towards the
friend on account of natural affection: “If you love them that love
you, what reward shall you have? do not even the publicans this?”
(Matt, v. 46).

1192. If all other things are equal, the love of the friend is
essentially better, while the love of the enemy is better in some minor
respects. (a) Thus, the love of the friend has a better object, for the
friend who loves us is better than the enemy who hates us; it has also
an object that has a greater claim on charity, as being nearer to self.
Hence, it is essentially a better and more meritorious act. (b) The
love of the enemy is more difficult, and may thus be a more convincing
sign that one really loves God. But the fact that an act is more
difficult does not suffice to make it more meritorious, or else we
should have to say that the love of neighbor is more meritorious than
the love of God.




Art. 6: THE EFFECTS OF CHARITY

(_Summa Theologica_, II-II, qq. 28-33.)

1193. Internal Effects of Charity.--There are three acts of the soul
that result from love, viz., joy, peace, mercy. (a) The joy of charity
is a repose or delight of the soul in the perfections of God and in the
union of self and the neighbor with Him: “The fruit of the Spirit is
charity, joy” (Gal., v. 22). (b) The peace of charity is the harmony of
man with God, self and the neighbor: “There is much peace to those that
love Thy law” (Ps. cxviii. 165). (c) Mercy is an inclination of the
will to relieve the misery of another; it follows from charity, for
love of the brotherhood “weeps with them that weep” (Rom., xii. 10, 15).

1194. Joy.--The precept of charity includes a precept of joy, and hence
the Apostle says: “Rejoice in the Lord always; again, I say, rejoice”
(Philip., iv. 4, 5). This joy of charity has the following properties:
(a) it is about good, not about iniquity, and it is not unrestrained;
it rejoices “in the Lord”; (b) it should not be discontinued or
interrupted by sin, but should rejoice “always.” It may, however, be
mixed with sorrow over sin or the delay of entrance into the presence
of God ( Rom., xii. 15; Ps. cxix. 5), for only in heaven will joy be
filled (John, xv. 11). St. Paul spoke of himself as “sorrowful, yet
always rejoicing” (II Cor., vi. 10).

1195. Peace.--The precept of charity also includes a precept of peace,
and our Lord commands: “Have peace among yourselves” (Mark, ix. 49).
Peace, like joy, has two properties: (a) it should be genuine (i.e., it
should be a contentment and agreement based on right), for there is a
false peace, of which Christ says: “I am not come to bring peace”
(Matt, x. 34), which rests in a good that is only apparent, and which
does not exclude great evil and anxiety (Wis., xiv. 22), (b) peace is
constant, for, as long as charity remains, there are friendly relations
with God and man, and order in the interior of the soul. Perfect
tranquility, it is true, is found only in heaven. On earth,
disturbances may arise in the lower part of the soul, or from without,
but the will continues in the peace of God (II Cor., i. 4).

1196. Reconciliation of a sinner to God is effected through an act of
perfect charity: “He who loves Me, will be loved by My Father and I
will love him” (John, xiv. 21). (a) Thus, sin is washed away, even
before Baptism or absolution, when the sinner makes an act of love of
God joined with a desire, at least implicit, of receiving the Sacrament
of Baptism or Penance. The act of love is not the cause, but the final
disposition introducing justification. (b) The punishment of sin is
forgiven, when one makes an act of love, or performs a good deed out of
love of God; but the degree of remission corresponds to the fervor of
the charity.

1197. Does the precept of peace demand unanimity of judgments?

(a) In matters of greater importance, there should be agreement in
judgments; else, there will not be that harmony of wills, desiring the
same things and disliking the same things, which constitute peace. In
necessary things, therefore, there should be unity of judgments: “I
beseech of you, brethren, by the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, that
you all speak the same thing, and that there be no schisms among you,
but that you be perfect in the same mind and in the same judgment” (I
Cor., i. 10).

(b) In matters of slight importance, difference of opinion does not
remove friendship, for each one thinks that his judgment will better
serve the good that is sought alike by all. We find that even very holy
men have disagreed on matters of opinion--for example, Paul and
Barnabas on the question whether or not Mark should be taken on the
second missionary journey (Acts, xv. 37), Jerome and Augustine on the
status of Mosaic observances after the death of Christ. Disputes may
offend against charity, however, if they become too personal or too
heated, as sometimes happens even to minds occupied with heavenly
things (e.g., theologians, spiritual writers).

1198. Reconciliation with enemies is necessary, in order that peace may
be maintained. It includes: (a) internally, the putting away of
thoughts and feelings contrary to concord; (b) externally, signs of
renewed charity, if there has been an open breach.

1199. The duty of reconciliation does not necessitate the forgiveness
of every kind of wrong suffered from an enemy--that is, it does not
always oblige one freely to remit the consequences of an enemy’s acts.
There are three kinds of wrong: (a) offenses, which are such
contradictions offered to the will of another as do not trespass on any
strict right or occasion any damage. Example: Balbus, who is in great
distress, asks his friend Titus to secure employment for him. Titus
could easily do this favor, but he refuses; (b) injuries, which are
violations of the strict right of another, but without damage. Example:
Claudia addresses Caia in very disrespectful language when no witnesses
are present; (c) damages, which are the taking from another of what is
his, or harm done to him as regards his soul, his life, his fame, or
his fortune. Examples are theft, scandal, assault and slander.

1200. Whether an offender asks pardon or not, one is obliged to forgive
the offense--that is, to put aside all aversion, indignation and
hatred: “Forgive us our trespasses, as we forgive them that trespass
against us” (Matt., vi. 12). But, granting that one desires salvation
for the offender as for others, shows the common signs of charity, and
is not prompted by hatred, the following are not required: (a) that one
so pardon the offense as to take the offender back to the same special
friendship as may have existed before; (b) that one overlook an injury
so as not to require satisfaction (and hence, without acting against
charity, Gaia may insist on an apology from Claudia for the
disrespectful language used by the latter); and (c) that one renounce
restitution or reparation for damage done one. No one is obliged to
give to another what is one’s own, and, if there is no other way of
securing one’s rights, one may have recourse to court. If the result of
prosecution will be punishment of the offender rather than restitution
(as in case of libel or slander), it is not uncharitable to prosecute
the offender, if one’s motive is the fulfillment of justice, the
prevention of the same wrong to others, or the honor of one’s family
(Lev., xix. 17).

1201. There are cases, however, in which charity requires one to
forgive a debt of satisfaction or restitution, namely, when this would
impose too heavy a burden on the offender, compared with the benefit
that would be derived therefrom. (a) Thus, restitution should not be
insisted on, when the offender is repentant and can ill afford to pay
the debt, and the party offended can easily get along without the
payment. (b) Punishment should not be insisted on, if the harm done the
offender or his family will be out of proportion to any good that may
result. (c) Prosecution should not be used, if a wrong can be amicably
adjusted out of court (I Cor., vi. 1).

1202. Who should make the advances towards reconciliation after a
rupture of charitable relations? (a) If only one party was the
offender, he should normally make the first move towards
reconciliation. It is of counsel, but not of precept, that the innocent
party ask for reconciliation, unless the circumstances require that he
should do so, as when the offended party can much more easily make the
advances, or when great scandal will arise, or when the offender will
become hardened in hate and lose his soul, if the party offended does
not make efforts for peace. (b) If both parties were offenders, he who
offended more seriously should make the advances. (c) If both offended
equally, he who was first to disturb the peace should also be first to
work for its restoration. (d) If it does not appear which of the
parties was more to blame in any of the foregoing ways, both are
equally bound.

1203. The manner of seeking reconciliation is as follows: (a)
Reconciliation can be sought either in person, or through an
intermediary who is a friend to both parties. (b) It can be sought
either explicitly (by expressing regret and asking pardon), or
implicitly (by a friendly conversation or favors shown). Generally
speaking, an inferior (e.g., a child) should explicitly request
reconciliation with a superior (e.g., a parent); but it will suffice
for a superior to seek forgiveness from an inferior implicitly.

1204. The time for seeking reconciliation is the earliest possible
moment: “If thou offer thy gift at the altar, and there thou remember
that thy brother hath anything against thee, leave there thy offering
before the altar, and go first to be reconciled to thy brother, and
then coming thou shalt offer thy gift” (Matt, v. 23, 24). (a) Thus,
internal reconciliation (i.e., repentance on the part of the offender
and forgiveness on the part of the one offended) should not be delayed,
and should precede any sacred action, such as offering a gift to God,
if this latter is to be acceptable and meritorious. (b) External
reconciliation (i.e., asking pardon and making satisfaction) and the
manifestation of forgiveness should be attended to as soon as the
circumstances of time and place permit. The resolve to be reconciled
externally is included in internal reconciliation, but prudence
dictates that one wait for the suitable occasion, lest precipitation
make matters worse.

1205. Mercy.--From charity results mercy, for he who loves his neighbor
as a friend in God, must grieve over the latter’s sorrows as if they
were his own. Our Lord commands: “Be ye merciful, as your Heavenly
Father is also merciful” (Luke, vi. 36). But not all compassion is true
mercy or supernatural.

(a) Thus, as regards the object that causes sorrow, true mercy grieves
over the evils that befall another against his will, such as sickness,
failure in an enterprise, or undeserved misfortune. But wilful evil,
such as sin, provokes not mercy, but rather indignation, although one
may compassionate sinners on account of the ills their sins bring on
them (Matt., ix. 36).

(b) As regards the internal cause of sorrow or sympathy, supernatural
mercy arises from the love of charity for the one suffering; natural
mercy, from the fear one has that a similar evil may overtake oneself,
or that oneself may suffer loss on account of another’s misfortune.

(c) As regards the act of mercy, it is to be noted that it proceeds
from the will, regulates the emotions, and is itself regulated by
reason. Thus, mercy differs from the sensible distress a refined person
experiences at the sight of suffering, which, though good in itself,
may never lead to a wish to alleviate sorrow. Thus, also, it differs
from unregulated sympathy, which bestows help or forgiveness
indiscriminately, without thought of the greater evils that may result;
it differs from sentimentality, which does not restrain tears and other
emotional expressions within due bounds. The virtue of mercy has a care
for the interests of justice, but mere pity, like prejudice, blinds the
mind to what is true and right.

1206. The causes of an unmerciful spirit are: (a) lack of charity
towards one who is in misery; (b) pride or too much prosperity, which
makes one feel that others suffer justly, or that one is above their
condition (Prov., xxviii. 4); (c) great misfortunes or fears that have
hardened one’s disposition, or made one self-centered.

1207. Mercy Compared with the Other Moral Virtues.--(a) Mercy, if taken
for the emotion of sympathy as regulated by reason, is inferior to
prudence and justice, which are perfections of the higher powers of the
soul (i.e., of the intellect and will). (b) Mercy, if taken for an act
of the will disliking the misery of another and moving one to remove
that misery, surpasses the other moral virtues; indeed, it may be said
to be something divine, and hence more than a virtue. Certainly, it is
the greatest of the virtues that have to do with the neighbor, for of
its nature it implies freedom from some defect and the relief of that
defect in others, which is not the case with other virtues. Thus, while
prudence directs acts and justice renders to others their due, these do
not of themselves remove ignorance or destitution in a neighbor.

1208. Mercy Compared with Charity.--(a) In itself (i.e., considered
precisely as to its essential notes of freedom from misery and relief
given to the miserable), mercy is the greatest of the virtues. For,
carried to its highest development, freedom from defect means infinite
perfection; while relief of defect in others means that, out of
infinite love for the Supreme Good, relief is poured out by God on His
creatures. Thus, in God mercy is an extension of the love God has
towards His own goodness, for the benefit of creatures, and is greater
than charity: “The mercy of God is above all His works” (Ps. cxliv. 9).

(b) In its subject (i.e., considered precisely as to the perfection it
brings to its possessor), mercy is inferior in creatures to charity.
For it is better to be united by love to the Supreme Good than to
remove evil in a creature: “Above all these things have charity” (Col,
iii. 14). Mercy is the sum of the Christian religion as far as external
works are concerned, but charity is the sum of Christianity as regards
internal acts.

1209. The Obligation of Mercy.-(a) The natural law itself inculcates
mercy, but those not influenced by divine revelation have not highly
esteemed it or practised it. Thus, Plato wished that all the poor might
be sent into exile. Virgil thought that freedom from pity was a sign of
wisdom; Seneca called mercy a vice of the soul; Nietzsche taught that
compassion has no place in the morality of the superman.

(b) The divine law commands mercy, especially in the New Testament.
Assistance of the poor, the widows, the orphans, the sick, the
captives, the slaves and other unfortunates is everywhere insisted on:
“I will show thee what the Lord requireth of thee: verily to do
justice, and to love mercy, and to walk solicitous with thy God”
(Mich., vi. 8).

1210. External Effects of Charity.--Three external effects of charity
will now be considered-beneficence, almsgiving and fraternal
correction. These are not distinct virtues, but only separate acts
pertaining to the virtue of charity and proceeding--like love, joy and
peace--from the same motive of love of God. (a) Thus, beneficence
naturally results from charity, since one of the acts of friendship is
to do good to one’s friend; (b) almsgiving is one of the special ways
in which beneficence is exercised; (c) fraternal correction is a
species of spiritual almsgiving.

1211. Beneficence.--Not every act of helping others is virtuous, nor is
all virtuous assistance called beneficence. (a) Thus, to assist others
in evil is maleficence, nor is it virtuous to help them with an evil
purpose. Examples: To give money to criminals to help them defeat the
law is participation in crime. To give presents to others in order to
receive a return of favor from them is cupidity (Luke, xiv. 12). (b) To
assist others or to give to them out of compassion for misery, is
mercy; to do so out of a sense of obligation, is justice; to do so out
of love of God, is beneficence.

1212. Beneficence is a duty, and like charity should be universal:
“While we have time, let us work good to all men” (Gal., vi. 10); “Do
good to them that hate you” (Matt., v. 44). But this does not mean that
no discrimination is to be used in beneficence, or that impossibilities
are required.

(a) Not every kind of activity in which others are engaged is deserving
of assistance, not every kind of suffering of others may be removed.
Examples: Criminals or enemies of the State are not to be assisted in
their wrongdoing, but one may attempt to bring them to better conduct;
one who has been justly sentenced to prison may not be aided to escape,
but he may be visited and consoled and given religious assistance.

(b) Not all can be helped individually; even the richest and most
generous person can benefit only a small percentage of those who are
deserving. Charity requires, however, that one be so disposed that one
would help all individually, if it were possible, and that one does
help all generally, by praying for both Catholics and non-Catholics.

1213. Since it is impossible to help all individually, beneficence
should be regulated by the order of charity (see 1174 sqq.), and
particular good should be done to those with whom on account of
conditions of time or place one is more closely associated. Hence, the
following general rules are given:

(a) In benefits that pertain to a particular kind of relationship; one
should give the preference, other things being equal, to those with
whom one has that relationship. Examples: To make a banquet for another
is a benefit pertaining to friendship, and hence should be shown to one
who is a friend, rather than to one who is a business associate, but
not an intimate. To support another person is a benefit pertaining to
kinship, and hence should be shown to a parent, rather than to a
stranger.

(b) In benefits given to those with whom one has the same kind of
relationship, one should give the preference, other things being equal,
to those nearer in relationship. Example: In dispensing alms, one
should help one’s own family rather than distant relatives.

1214. If other things are not equal, the foregoing rules must sometimes
be reversed.

(a) When the common good is involved, preference should be given those
who represent it, even though others are nearer to one as regards
private good. Hence, a citizen should help the fortunes of his adopted
country rather than those of his mother country; in a civil war one
should aid rather one’s comrades than one’s kinsmen who are on the
opposite side.

(b) When a supreme good of a private person is at stake, one should
prefer to help him, even if a stranger, rather than another who is a
friend, or relative, but who is not in the same distress. Example: One
should give one’s loaf to a man dying of starvation rather than to
one’s own father, who is hungry but not starving.

(c) When the means with which a benefit is bestowable belong to
another, one must prefer to give back what belongs to the other, even
if this person is a stranger, rather than use it for the good of a
friend or relative. Thus, if a person has stolen money or has borrowed
money from a stranger, he must return it to the owner, rather than make
a present of it to his own wife. An exception would be the case in
which the wife was in dire necessity, whereas the owner was not; but
the duty of restitution would remain for the future.

1215. No general rule can be laid down for all cases in which one party
is nearer to self and the other party more in need, and many such cases
have to be decided according to prudent judgment in view of all the
circumstances. It should be noted that, though wife and children are
nearer to one than parents, the latter have a greater claim on charity
when they are in equally extreme necessity, on account of the supreme
benefit of life received from them. But ordinarily one is bound rather
to provide for one’s children (II Cor., xii. 14).

1216. Almsgiving.--Almsgiving is defined: “Assistance to one who is in
need, given out of compassion and for the love of God.” Hence, this act
pertains to various virtues. (a) It is elicited by the virtue of mercy,
which means that compassion for misery is the immediate principle which
produces almsgiving. (b) It is commanded by the virtue of charity,
which means that love of God is the remote principle or end of an alms,
for, as said above (see 1205), mercy itself is an effect of charity (I
John, iii. 17). (c) Secondarily, it may also be commanded by other
virtues. Thus, if a person gives an alms to satisfy for his sins, he
performs an act of justice; if he gives in order to honor God, he
performs an act of religion; if he gives without undue grief over the
loss of what he gives, he practises liberality.

1217. Qualities Recommended for Almsgiving.--(a) Alms should not be
given ostentatiously (Matt, vi. 2 sqq.), though it is often edifying
that they receive publicity (Matt., v. 16); (b) they should be given
cheerfully (II Cor., ix. 7).

1218. Forms of Almsgiving.--(a) In the strict sense, an alms is a gift
made without any obligation of payment or return; (b) in a wide sense,
almsgiving includes selling on credit as a favor to a poor customer, a
loan granted at a low rate of interest or without interest, help in
securing employment, etc. Thus, if a poor man is sufficiently helped by
the use of an article, there is no need of making him a present of it.

1219. Almsgiving is to be distinguished, also, from mere giving. (a)
Thus, assistance given the poor out of a bad motive (e.g., to lead them
away from their religion, to induce them to crime) is sinful; (b)
assistance given the poor out of a merely natural good motive (e.g.,
pity for their sufferings) is philanthropy, but not charity (I Cor.,
xiii. 3), and may coexist with the state of hatred of God.

1220. Corporal alms, in the form of bodily necessaries given freely in
themselves or in their money equivalent, are of as many kinds as there
are bodily needs. (a) Hence, the common necessities of food, drink,
clothing and shelter should be provided as alms to the starving and to
those who lack sufficient clothing, or who are without a home. (b)
Special necessities, whether internal (such as sickness) or external
(such as persecution or imprisonment), should be relieved or assuaged
by remedies, visits, protection or relief. (c) The necessity of the
body after death is that it be cared for with the honor which the
memory of the deceased deserves, and hence burial of the dead is
numbered among the corporal alms.

1221. Thus, there are seven corporal works of mercy. (a) Those that
pertain to the needs of the body during life are mentioned by our Lord
in Matt., xxv. 35, 36. (b) The burial of the dead is praised in
scripture as a good work, as we see in the cases of Tobias (Tob., i,
ii, xii), and of those who buried our Lord (Matt, xxvi. 12, xxvii. 57
sqq.).

1222. Spiritual alms, consisting of assistance given those who suffer
want in mind or spirit, are either prayers, by which divine aid is
asked for them, or various acts by which human aid is conferred. These
acts are also of two kinds, and constitute seven spiritual works of
mercy.

(a) The defects from which a soul suffers, and which are not moral,
include ignorance in the intellect, doubt in the practical judgment,
and sadness in the affections; and hence the acts of almsgiving for
such cases are instruction, counsel, and comfort.

(b) The defects of soul which are moral are the guilt of sin and its
consequences--that is, the offense given and the burdens that result
for the sinner or others. The corresponding spiritual alms are
admonition against sin, pardon of the offense done to self, patience in
bearing with the difficult ways of others, especially if they err
through infirmity, or willingness in helping them to bear the
consequences of their errors (Rom., xv. 1).

1223. The giving of spiritual alms may suppose superiority or authority
in the giver over the receiver, or a certain procedure to be followed;
hence, in the administration of spiritual benefits, the due order of
time, place and persons has to be remembered. (a) Thus, in the
instruction of the ignorant, it is not every kind of ignorance that is
a defect, but only the ignorance of things one must know; and it is not
every person who is to give the needed instruction. (b) In the
correction of sinners, it is not every kind of reproof that is to be
used, but gentleness and secret admonition should be employed where
possible (Prov., xxvii. 6).

1224. Comparison of Corporal and Spiritual Alms.--(a) Spiritual alms
are better, because their nature is higher and they are of greater
benefit to the recipient, even though he appreciates them less. Thus,
it is better to enjoy peace of mind than to feast sumptuously. (h)
Corporal alms are sometimes more necessary in a particular case, and
hence they should be attended to first. Thus, for one suffering from
hunger food is more necessary than words of comfort (James, ii. 15, 16).

1225. Though corporal alms are not spiritual in the assistance they
give, they are spiritual in their effects. (a) Thus, they bless the
recipient corporally, by relieving his hunger or other need; (b) they
bless the giver spiritually, since God will reward his charity
(Ecclus., xxiv, 13, 14), and the person helped will pray for his
benefactor (ibid., 15).

1226. The Duty of Giving Alms.--(a) The natural law requires that we do
to others as we would be done by, and there is no one who does not wish
that help be rendered him if he falls into need. Moreover, the common
welfare requires that the rich assist the poor, for otherwise there
will be discontent and disorder. Hence, even unbelievers are not exempt
from the obligation of almsgiving. (b) The divine law, in both Old and
New Testaments, commands almsgiving: “Give alms out of thy substance,
and turn not away thy face from any poor person” (Tob., iv. 7); “Depart
from Me, you cursed, into everlasting fire, for I was hungry, and you
gave Me not to eat” (Matt., xxv. 41-42); “Let us love, not in word, nor
in tongue, but in deed and in truth” (I John, iii. 18). Tobias, Dorcas,
Cornelius, and Zacheus are praised for their charitable gifts.

1227. Almsgiving, being an affirmative commandment, does not oblige for
every moment of time, but only when right reason calls for it on
account of the state of the giver or of the receiver.

(a) The state of the giver requires him to give alms only when he has a
superfluity of goods, for no one is bound to deprive himself of what is
necessary for his own use (see 1164, 1169). John the Baptist said to
the people: “He that hath two coats, let him give to him that hath
none; and he that hath meat, let him do in like manner” (Luke, iii.
11). “That which remaineth,” says our Lord, “give as alms” (Luke, xi.
41).

(b) The state of the receiver gives him a claim on charity, when he is
in necessity and unable to help himself. Temporal goods, according to
the will of God, are for the benefit of the whole human race; and,
while the ownership of particular goods belongs to the rightful
possessor, he should not withhold the use of them from those who are in
need, when he has more than he needs for his own use. Neither is it
necessary that one be asked for an alms; one is obliged to give it when
one knows that one’s neighbor is in want, though unable or ashamed to
beg for help.

1228. It is not a precept, therefore, but only a counsel, that one give
alms in other cases. (a) Thus, when one is in equal need oneself and
has no superfluous goods, one may give to another; (b) when one’s
neighbor is not in need, or is able to help himself, one may still give
to him out of charity, if he is deserving (see 1169).

1229. Superfluities are those goods that remain over and above what are
necessary for life, or the maintenance of one’s state of life justly
acquired and socially useful.

(a) Necessaries of life are the goods one must have to provide food,
clothing and home for oneself and one’s family. Among necessaries of
life we may include what one has to set aside for old age, sickness,
increase of family, and the future sustenance of dependents who will
need it (II Cor., xii. 14). But they should not be extended to include
imaginary cases, or all the possible cases of personal need that may
arise in the future; otherwise, one is guilty of that exaggerated
solicitude for the morrow which our Lord forbids (Matt, vi. 34).

(b) Necessaries of state are the goods a person must have to keep up
his position and that of his family according to the standard of living
of his class. This includes provision for the education and advancement
of one’s children, for hospitality, adornment of home, and the care and
improvement of one’s business; but it does not include provision for
excessive pleasures or luxuries, or improbable future opportunities of
bettering one’s condition; otherwise, even the wealthiest person might
say that all his money was tied up and that he had no superfluous goods.

1230. What is necessary for the decency of particular stations in life?
(a) This does not consist in any fixed amount, for, even when
considerable additions to or subtractions from a person’s wealth have
been made, he may retain and support the same social rank. (b) It
consists, therefore, in the amount sufficient for him to maintain,
according to the opinion of prudent men, what is becoming in one of his
class. Thus, one’s position may require that one do much entertaining
or keep up an expensive household, or it may require only that one live
moderately.

1231. The giving in alms of goods for which the giver himself has need
is governed by the following rules:

(a) Necessaries of life should be given away to another, as a matter of
precept, if the common good is bound up with the life of that other,
but not with one’s own life; they may be given away to another, as a
matter of counsel, when the common good does not require it, but the
higher good of virtue invites one to sacrifice one’s life for one’s
neighbor (probable opinion). Examples: One should give away one’s last
loaf to save the life of a leader on whom the salvation of his people
depends. One may make the same sacrifice, if one is single and without
dependents, and another is married and has a dependent family. But one
may not give away what is necessary for the life of one’s family (I
Tim., v. 8).

(b) Necessaries of state, at least in part (see 1251), should be given
away to another, as a matter of precept, if the public good or the life
of a private individual are at stake, or if that which is given in alms
can be easily recovered and will now prevent a very grave calamity;
they may be given away, as a matter of counsel, if the higher good of
virtue invites one to embrace voluntary poverty: “If thou wouldst be
perfect, go sell all that thou hast and give to the poor” (Matt., xix.
21). Examples: One should offer one’s fortunes in support of one’s
government, if in some crisis the nation cannot otherwise be saved. One
may give up riches and become poor in order to follow Christ in the
religious life.

1232. Superfluities of one’s state are the goods from which the precept
of almsgiving requires that assistance ordinarily be given. But the
mere fact that one has a superfluity does not oblige one to give alms.
As in every virtuous act, so also in almsgiving there must be not only
an object according to reason, but also circumstances according to
reason. Hence, one who has a superfluity is bound to give alms only
when the proper conditions of time, place, person, etc., are present.
(a) As regards time, a person is not obliged to devote to almsgiving
the time that is needed for other duties. (b) As to persons, a person
is not obliged to give alms, if there is no needy person known to him.

1233. As to need, we may distinguish three classes of persons:

(a) Those in apparent need are such as pretend poverty, sickness, or
misfortune, in order to get sympathy and financial aid (e.g.,
professional beggars). Alms should not be given persons of this kind,
since they take what would be given to the really poor and needy.
Rather they should be exposed and punished.

(b) Those in real need through choice should not be helped, if they
take to begging because they are too lazy to work, or find it
profitable to live off others; for they have no right to beg, being
able to help themselves, and it would be wrong to encourage them in
idleness and an imposition on others (II Thess., iii. 10). But those
who are voluntarily poor for Christ’s sake, whether they belong to a
religious order or not, are worthy of respect and it is meritorious to
assist them.

(c) Those who are in real need against their will, should be assisted;
for, even though they became destitute through their own fault, they
are in fact unable to help themselves now.

1234. Regarding money obtained under the false pretense of poverty and
the duty of restitution, the following rules may be given: (a) If a
person obtains considerable alms by pretending to be blind, disabled,
in great want, etc., and he is not afflicted or in need, he should give
back the money to the donors or, if this is impossible, to the poor,
since the donors wished to help the poor, not to encourage idlers. (b)
If one obtains only a small amount under a false pretense of poverty,
some moralists say there is no duty of restitution, since the donor may
be presumed to give unconditionally in the case of minute sums;
likewise, if a beggar is really poor but exaggerates his need, it does
not seem that he is bound to restitution, for those who give alms expect
a certain amount of romancing from tramps and other professional
beggars.

1235. What is one’s duty in cases of doubtful need? (a) Minute
inquiries are inexpedient, since the really deserving are often
unwilling to publish their needs; (b) refusal of alms except in cases
where one is certain of the need, is not a good general rule to follow,
since it is a less evil that an unworthy person be helped than that a
worthy one be refused.

1236. There are three degrees of corporal need (cfr. 1165). (a) A
person is said to be in extreme need, when he is in manifest danger of
losing his life, if help is not given him at once. This does not mean,
however, that a person is not in extreme need until he is breathing his
last breath; for at that moment he is beyond the reach of human aid.
(b) A person is in grave need, when he is in probable danger of death,
or is in manifest danger of some very serious misfortune, such as
severe sickness, amputation of some member, long and bitter
imprisonment, insanity, loss of good name, reduction from wealth to
poverty, destruction of home by fire, etc. (c) A person is in common
need, when he suffers the inconvenience of poverty, such as being
obliged to beg, to deprive himself of many things, to wear poor clothes
or to eat ordinary victuals, but is not in danger of any serious loss.

1237. Rules on Giving Alms from the Superfluities of One’s State.--(a)
To those who are in extreme or grave necessity alms must be given in
each individual case, for these cases are rare, and the persons in need
have a personal claim on one’s charity when this is the sole means of
saving them from death or other great evil. Example: Last year Titus
saved a mother from death and her child from disease by giving his
money and services free of charge. This would not exempt him from the
duty of doing a like charity, if a like necessity presents itself now.

(b) To those who are in common necessity alms must be given from time
to time--now to one, now to another, as prudence dictates--but there is
no obligation for an individual case. Even the richest man could not
give to all who are in common need, and their want is not so pressing
that any one of them can be said to have an individual claim.

1238. Gravity of the Obligations to Give Alms.--(a) For cases of
extreme and grave necessity, the obligation of almsgiving is grave.
There is general agreement among theologians on this point, since the
loss suffered by the neighbor is serious and the withholding of help
indicates a lack of charity (I John, iii. 17). Example: The priest and
the levite who passed by the wounded man on the road to Jericho were
guilty, from the nature of their act, of mortal sin.

(b) For cases of common necessity, the obligation of almsgiving, as it
appears, is also grave; for it seldom happens that one is called on to
assist those who are in extreme or grave necessity, whereas almsgiving
is inculcated as an ordinary duty, and the reasons given by our Lord in
Matt., xxv. 41-46, for exclusion from heaven seem to be neglect of alms
in common necessity. But some theologians hold that the obligation is
only light, since the need is light; and, since these authorities are
numerous and of repute, a confessor could not refuse absolution to a
rich man who refused on principle to give anything to those in common
necessity. Such a one should be advised, rather than reproved, on this
point.

1239. From what was said above, the following conclusions may be drawn
about the gravity of the sin of refusing alms: (a) It is certainly a
mortal sin to refuse alms to one in extreme or grave need, and probably
also a grave sin to refuse ever to give alms to those in common need,
(b) It is not a mortal sin to refuse an alms in a particular case, if
one is not sure of the obligation (e.g., if there is doubt about one’s
ability to give the alms or the other’s need), or if it seems that
others will give assistance, or that the need will disappear, or that
one will suffer some serious inconvenience by giving, etc.

1240. Refusal of Alms and Restitution.--(a) The mere refusal of an alms
does not oblige one to make restitution. For restitution is the giving
back to another of what strictly belongs to him, and it cannot be said
that a poor person has a strict right to a gift from another. A
violation of charity may be gravely sinful, and yet not oblige to
restitution. (b) The refusal of an alms, if joined with injustice, does
oblige one to make restitution. Thus, if by threats or force one
prevents a starving man from taking the food that has been denied him,
injustice is committed; for in extreme necessity one has the strict
right to take what is necessary, and reparation should be made if this
is prevented.

1241. Alms given from ill-gotten goods are sometimes lawful, sometimes
unlawful.

(a) If the acquisition of the goods was unjust, because they belong to
another and the present possessor has no right to keep them, it is not
lawful to give them as alms, for they must be returned to the owner. An
exception would have to be made, however, for the case of extreme
necessity, for in such a case the person in danger of death would have
a right prior to that of the owner not in need. Example: It is unlawful
to give stolen money as an alms to the poor, when one is able to
restore it to the rightful owner.

(b) If the acquisition of the goods was unjust, because both giver and
receiver acted against law and forfeited their rights to possession,
the former has no claim to restitution, nor the latter to retention,
and the goods ought to be devoted to alms. Example: If a simoniacal
transaction is forbidden under pain of loss of the price paid and
received, the receiver is obliged to give the money to the poor.

(c) If the acquisition was not unlawful, but the manner through which
it was made was unlawful, the gain is shameful, but still it belongs to
the one who has earned it, and may be devoted to alms. Example: Titus
hired Balbus to work on Sundays. The violation of the Sunday law was a
sin, but the labor given was serviceable to Titus and difficult to
Balbus. Hence, the latter is not bound to give back the money, but may
keep it and use it for a good purpose.

1242. Though shameful gain may be used for almsgiving, it should not be
devoted to sacred purposes, when this will cause scandal or be
irreverent to religion. Thus, the chief priests would not accept the
“blood money” of Judas for the use of the temple (Matt., xxvii. 6),
because the law forbade the offering of gifts that were an abomination
to the Lord (Deut., xxiii. 18; Ecclus., xxxiv. 23).

1243. The Proceeds of Gambling and Almsgiving.--(a) Profits made from
gambling may not be used for alms, when one is bound to restore them to
the loser. Thus, according to natural law he who wins money at cards or
similar games from a minor or other person who has not the right to
dispose of money, or who wins through fraud, must give back the
winnings. Likewise, restitution is due according to some, if the civil
law makes such aleatory contracts null and void; but others deny this.
(b) Profits made from gambling may be devoted to alms, when according
to law one has a right to them, as when one has played for recreation,
with moderation and with fairness to the loser.

1244. Persons who may give alms are all those who have a right to
dispose of goods as gifts. Others who have no such general right (e.g.,
religious, wives, children and servants), may also give alms as
follows: (a) They may give alms from any goods that belong to them, and
of which they have the control. Thus, a wife may give alms from money
which is her own, by inheritance, earnings, etc. (b) They may give alms
from such goods as are placed in their charge and dispensation. Thus,
the procurator of a religious house has the right to give alms with
permission of his superior and according to his Constitution (Canon
537). A religious who is a parish priest may administer and dispense
parish alms (Canon 630, Sec.4). (c) They may give alms with express or
implied permission. Thus, children may give articles of food to the
poor, when their parents consent. (d) They may give alms without
permission in a case of extreme need. Thus, a wife could make use of
her husband’s money without his consent, if this should be necessary to
save a life.

1245. The right of a wife to give alms from her husband’s earnings is
as follows: (a) from the money given her for the support of herself and
the family, the wife may give reasonable alms; (b) from the common
money of the family she may give alms with her husband’s express or
presumed consent. But, if he is miserly and unwilling to give alms, she
may nevertheless use what is reasonable according to the family
resources for almsgiving (e.g., in helping her impoverished parents).

1246. The right of servants to give alms from the goods of their
employer is as follows: (a) the rule is that servants have no right to
give away anything that belongs to their employer without his express
permission, for, if permission could be presumed, the property of
employers would not be safe; (b) an exception to the rule is made for
such things as are to be thrown away (e.g., leavings of the table),
since if they are given in alms the proprietor suffers no loss.

1247. Since charity should be universal, no class of persons, such as
strangers, unbelievers or sinners, may be excluded from the benefit of
almsgiving (Matt, v. 45). However, charity is also well ordered, and
hence there is a preference to be observed, as follows:

(a) Other things being equal, one should favor those who are nearer to
oneself by bonds of kinship, friendship, etc., since their claim on
one’s charity is greater. Charity begins at home.

(b) If other things (such as worthiness, need or public utility) are on
the side of those not related by kinship, friendship, etc., the order
of preference may be reversed. Thus, if a person had to choose between
helping a distant relative for whom he was not specially responsible,
and who was a worthless fellow, or who was not in great need or who was
not of great value to the community, and helping a stranger, who was
most deserving, or in dire distress, or of great value to the
community, the latter should be assisted rather than the former.

(c) In case of two strangers in equal poverty, one should help first
the one who is more worthy or who feels his distress more. Thus, a
person who is poor through misfortune is more deserving than one who
gambled his money away; those who were once wealthy feel the sufferings
of poverty more than those who are inured to a life of privation.

1248. Is it permissible for one appointed to distribute alms to keep
some himself, if he is really poor? (a) If the persons are designated
to whom the alms are to be given, the distributor must give only to
them; (b) if it is left to the discretion of the distributor, he may
keep a reasonable alms for himself.

1249. The amount that should be given in alms has to be measured
according to the income of the giver and the need of the receiver.

(a) As to the income of the giver, he should give in proportion to his
income: “According to thy ability be merciful. If thou have much, give
abundantly; if thou have little, take care even so to bestow willingly
a little” (Tob., iv. 9). A rich man who spends more in the barber shop
on cosmetics, etc., than he gives to the poor, and a poor man who gives
more towards alms than to the feeding of his own family, are not giving
according to their means.

(b) As to the need of the receiver, a person should give his share
towards providing for the case before him. Thus, if there is no one
else who can or will give, and a neighbor is in grave necessity, a
charitable person will bear the whole expense, as was done by the good
Samaritan. But if the necessity is ordinary (as in the case of street
beggars), or there are others who will help, a smaller alms suffices.
Steady employment is a better charity than temporary doles, inasmuch as
it gives permanent assistance.

1250. Hence, in the following cases alms are excessive: (a) When,
outside the instances given in 1231, one gives away all the necessaries
of one’s life or station. The poor widow who gave all her living (Luke,
xxi. 1-4) is praised, but doubtless she was able somehow to obtain
enough to provide for her own life. (b) Alms are excessive when one
gives from one’s superfluities so much that the recipients are spoiled
and encouraged to do nothing for themselves, For the purpose of
almsgiving is not that those who have wealth be impoverished and others
enabled to live in luxury, but that the poor be relieved of suffering
and the rich gain the merit of charity (II Cor., viii. 13).

1251. Regarding the obligation of giving all the goods of one’s station
in life or of one’s superfluities, the following points should be noted:

(a) Some theologians hold that, in a case of extreme necessity, one is
bound to give all the goods necessary to one’s state of life, since a
neighbor’s life is a more important good than one’s own position in
life. Others deny this on the ground that one is not bound, even for
preserving one’s own life, to have recourse to extraordinary means and
so lose the rank and style of living one has. Thus, a self-supporting
workingman would not be obliged to reduce himself to beggary in order
to prolong the life of a dying person. A well-to-do person is not
obliged to sell his office, conveyance, books, and other things needed
for his business or profession, in order to rescue a captive held for
ransom by bandits.

(b) There are theologians who hold that one is bound to give away all
one’s superfluous wealth in alms, even apart from cases of extreme or
grave necessity; but others teach that, while this is of counsel, it is
not obligatory, since the needs of the poor will be sufficiently
relieved if all who have means give something from their superfluities.
Moreover, the retention of some superfluous goods is necessary for the
promotion of industrial and commercial enterprises, and, by increasing
national wealth, this policy indirectly benefits the poor.

1252. Ecclesiastical law, however, requires all clerics who enjoy a
benefice to give all that remains over and above from the returns of
the benefice, after they have provided for their own decent
maintenance, to the poor or to pious causes. This obligation is held as
grave. It will be treated below when we come to the special duties of
the clergy.

1253. Is there any definite amount or percentage, then, which should be
contributed to alms?

(a) For a case of extreme or grave necessity, one should contribute
enough, according to one’s ability, either in conjunction with others
or alone (if others will not help), to give relief. Thus, if a neighbor
is about to die of starvation, a charitable man will give food free of
charge. If a poor man is about to be treated unjustly, a charitable
lawyer will give him advice without charge. But it is not necessary
that one provide extraordinary remedies or helps--for example, that one
pay the expenses of a trip to Europe for a poor person whose health
would be benefitted by the travel.

(b) For cases of common necessity, St. Alphonsus held that one should
give two per cent of what remains from the yearly income after the
necessities of life and station have been taken care of. But other
moralists believe that today the amount cannot be fixed mathematically,
and that only the general direction can be given that one should be
generous according to one’s means, and regulate one’s yearly alms
according to the prevalence of poverty.

1254. Is it better to give a little to many, or much to one person in
need? (a) If the one person is in great need, and others are only in
slight need, it is better to give to the one in great need. Example: If
one has ten dollars to give in alms, it is better to buy an overcoat
for Titus who is shivering from the cold, than to give ten one-dollar
bills to ten men who need new collars and neckties. (b) If the need is
equal, it is better to divide the alms, for thus more distress is
alleviated and the danger of spoiling a recipient with overmuch bounty
is avoided. Example: Caius has $30,000 to give in charity and there are
three deserving institutions of charity known to him, all of which are
in great need--a hospital, an orphan asylum and a school. He ought to
divide his money between the three.

1255. The Time for Giving Alms.-(a) One should give at one time all the
amount of one’s alms for a certain period, if one is able to do this,
and there is a need that calls for it--“He gives twice who gives
quickly” (Prov., iii. 28)--for the poor may perish or may be driven to
acts of desperation or violence, if help is postponed. (b) One may
distribute one’s almsgiving if there is no urgent call for it--that is,
one may make partial contributions at various times, retaining
meanwhile money for almsdeeds in order to invest it for future
charities, or to await greater needs to which it may be applied, etc.

1256. The Manner of Giving Alms.--(a) One gives alms directly when one
ministers relief personally to the needy, giving food to the starving
and medicine to the sick, helping to put out a fire, etc. (b) One gives
alms indirectly when one pays taxes for the support of alms-houses,
public hospitals, orphan asylums, homes for the aged, the insane, etc.;
when one contributes to charitable collections or drives or to
organizations for relief (such as the St. Vincent de Paul Society);
when one assists or promotes movements for the free education of those
who cannot pay, for the betterment of living and working condition of
laborers, for security against loss of employment, pensions for the
aged, etc.

1257. Public charity done by the State is useful and necessary under
the conditions of modern life, but it does not and cannot take the
place of charity done by the Church or by private individuals.

(a) State-administered charity does not reach all, or even the most
deserving, cases of need. Hence, those who pay their taxes for the
support of state charities are not thereby exempted from the obligation
of contributing to cases they may meet, especially of extreme or grave
necessity. The payment of these taxes, however, diminishes need, and so
it also diminishes the amount one is bound to give in alms.

(b) State charity provides for the corporal needs of the recipient, and
it is imposed as compulsory on the giver. Hence, it cannot take the
place of alms given by the Church or by individuals that will care for
both soul and body, and that are given cheerfully and received
gratefully.

1258. Fraternal Correction.--Fraternal correction is defined: “An act
of charity and mercy by which one uses suitable words or other means in
order to convert one’s neighbor from sin to virtue.”

(a) Thus, it is an act of charity, for it is a love of our neighbor and
the desire of his spiritual welfare that prompts this correction.
Hence, the admonition of a sinner for his own good differs from a
correction administered to a wrongdoer for the good of another or of
the public; the former is fraternal correction and is an act of
charity, while the latter is judicial correction and is an act of
justice.

(b) Fraternal correction is an act of mercy, for, just as feeding the
hungry and other corporal alms remove bodily misery, so does admonition
of sinners remove spiritual misery.

(c) Fraternal correction uses suitable words or other means, for while
it proceeds from charity and mercy, it must be regulated by prudence.
It is not an easy matter to correct another successfully, and hence the
need of good judgment as to the means to be employed, whether they
shall be words or equivalent signs (e.g., sad looks, a gesture of
disapproval, a change of subject of a sinful conversation, or refusal
of help), and whether one shall use reproof, instruction, counsel, or
warning.

(d) Fraternal correction aims at turning a neighbor from sin to virtue.
It is the proper remedy for sins of negligence, as judicial correction
is for sins of malice. It is applied, also, chiefly to the cure of sin
that has already been committed; but it should be extended so as to
include the prevention of sin in the future, since there is no less an
obligation of preventing than of removing sin. Hence, those who are in
dangerous occasions receive fraternal correction when a charitable
warning is given.

(e) Fraternal correction is given to a neighbor (i.e., to an
individual), and so it differs from the general censure of vice that is
given by preachers, whose duty it is to correct sins that are
prevalent, provided this be done prudently, in such a way as to effect
good and not harm. Unpopularity or other such handicaps do not excuse a
preacher from the duty of correction.

1259. Fraternal correction is a grave duty, and more important than
that of almsgiving. (a) The natural law requires that a person should
do unto others as he would wish them to do unto himself, and everyone
ought to wish that, if he needs correction, it will be given him. Even
the pagans proclaimed the need of correction. Seneca desired to have a
monitor who, by advice and reproof, would guard him against the dangers
of evil examples and conversations; and Plautus said that a friend who
refuses to chide the faults of his friend is himself worthy of blame.

(b) The divine positive law also commands that one should correct one’s
brother in order to save him from another offense (Ecclus., xix. 13,
14), and to win him back to good (Matt. xviii. 15), that the spiritual
should instruct with mildness those who have committed some
transgression (Gal, vi. 1), that a sinner should not be treated as an
enemy, but admonished as a brother (II Thess., iii. 15).

1260. Does the duty of fraternal correction oblige one to go out and
seek a person who is living a life of sin? (a) If the sinner is under
one’s care, so that one is responsible for him, there is a duty to seek
him as long as there is hope of amendment; for the good shepherd goes
after the lost sheep (Matt., xviii. 12, 13). Hence, parents, pastors and
superiors must try to win back their subjects from the ways of sin. (b)
If the sinner is not under one’s care, there is no duty to seek him
out; for obligations that are owed to our neighbor in general, but not
to any determinate person, do not require that we go out to look for
the persons to be aided, but only that we aid those whom we meet.
Hence, a private person is not obliged to frequent the haunts of vice
and crime in order to reform those who are there; but the community at
large has duties regarding such cases.

1261. Since the precept of fraternal correction is affirmative, it does
not oblige for every time and place; acts of virtue must be so
performed that not only the object and the motive shall be good, but
the circumstances also should be suitable. But the object and motive of
correction (viz., the conversion of a sinner) are primary, and the
circumstances of time, place, etc., secondary considerations. (a)
Hence, correction is good and a duty when it will serve to convert or
improve a sinner, now or later, although it may be imperfect as to some
of the circumstances. (b) Correction is not good, nor a duty, when it
will not serve to convert the sinner, even though other circumstances
would seem to call for it (Ecclus., xxxii. 6). Consequently, a person
ought not to correct when either he or the other person is under the
influence of anger, lest matters be made worse. This, of course, is
said of fraternal, not of judicial correction; for a judge or other
superior must condemn even when the culprit will not be made better, in
order to restrain him from evil and to provide for the common good, the
protection of justice, and the avoidance of scandal.

1262. In the following cases fraternal correction defeats its own
purpose: (a) when the sinner will not be bettered by the correction,
for his continuance in sin will become graver by reason of his
rejection of the admonition; (b) when the sinner will become hardened
and embittered by correction, and as a result commit more numerous or
more serious sins. Thus, if one knows that a blasphemer is only made
worse by scolding or remonstrances, it is a sin to attempt to correct
him as to those ways: “Rebuke not a scorner lest he hate thee” (Prov.,
ix. 8).

1263. The duty of fraternal correction depends, therefore, on the
knowledge or opinion one has about the success it will have. Hence, the
following cases may occur: (a) If one is certain that the correction
will be beneficial, one should give it; if one is certain it will not
be beneficial, one should omit it. (b) If it is likely that the
admonition will be profitable, and certain that it will not be
positively harmful, it should be given, for a physician in order to
help a sick person should give a remedy that is harmless, even though
only probably beneficial, if there is nothing else that can be done.
(c) If it is doubtful whether the admonition will do any good, and also
doubtful whether it will do harm (e.g., when one is dealing with a
stranger, whose character one does not know), one should weigh the good
and the evil and decide accordingly, as will be explained in the next
paragraph.

1264. Cases of doubt concerning the advantage of a fraternal correction
may occur as follows: (a) If the good expected is superior to the evil
that is feared, one should give the correction. Example: If it seems
that a sinner, if admonished, may suffer great confusion or be for a
time estranged, but may also be finally converted, the good result of
conversion is to be preferred to prevention of confusion or
estrangement. If it seems doubtful whether correction will help or hurt
a dying man, the good of his salvation should be preferred to the good
of freedom from a new sin. (b) If the good expected and the evil feared
are about equal, the correction should be omitted, since the negative
precept of not injuring a neighbor outweighs the affirmative precept of
doing him a service.

1265. When is sin committed by omitting fraternal correction? (a) If
the correction is omitted out of charity, the omission is good and
meritorious. Example: Titus omits to correct Sempronius, because he
thinks the reproof would do harm to the latter or to others, or because
he awaits a more favorable occasion. (b) If the correction is omitted
contrary to charity (i.e., because a person hates his neighbor or
disregards his spiritual welfare), the omission is a mortal sin.
Example: Caius neglects to correct Sempronius, because he prefers to
see Sempronius go to ruin rather than lose his friendship or incur his
enmity. (c) If the correction is omitted in spite of charity, the
omission is a venial sin. Example: Balbus, who is not a superior, fails
to correct Sempronius, because through frailty he fears to give
offense, or to be considered over-bold, but he prefers the latter’s
spiritual welfare to his own human fears and interests, and would give
the correction, if he felt that it was absolutely necessary.

1266. The sin committed by delaying fraternal correction is to be
judged according to the rules just given about omission of correction.
But is it lawful to put off correction in the hope that the sinner,
through experience of the evil effects of sin, may become more
tractable? (a) If there is hope of present amendment through
correction, this should not be delayed; otherwise, one is careless
about the honor of God, the edification of others, and the possible
hardening of the sinner or his death in the midst of his sins. (b) If
there is no probability of present amendment through correction, one
can only wait in the hope that the experience of the evils of sin may
bring the prodigal back to God.

1267. It is not often necessary for one who is not a superior to make
fraternal correction, since there are many conditions that must exist
before one is obliged to it. These conditions include the purpose to be
attained, of which we have just spoken, and the proper circumstances,
which are as follows: (a) the fault to be corrected should be a known
and serious sin; (b) the person to give the correction should be one
who has the right and duty to correct; (c) the manner of giving the
correction should be such as will promote the end in view.

1268. One should not attempt to correct a fault, unless one is morally
sure that a fault has been committed, or is about to be committed. For
this reason the scrupulous, who are inclined to suspect or see evil
where there is none, are generally excused from the duty of making
corrections. Reasons why doubt, fear, suspicion or rumor do not
suffice, are: (a) correction is not pleasant to the one corrected, and,
if his guilt is not provable, he will be able to argue with the
corrector, and so quarrels and enmities will result; (b) charity bids
us to give the benefit of the doubt to a neighbor, and, if this is not
done, the one who is being corrected will be able to correct the
corrector on account of uncharitable suspicions.

1269. Is one obliged, therefore, to make inquiries into the conduct of
those whom one suspects of wrongdoing?

(a) If there is question of judicial correction, the public authority
is bound in justice to examine juridically into matters of doubt before
acting.

(b) If there is question of fraternal correction, a parent or other
superior is bound in charity to make paternal inquiries into the
conduct of his subjects; for, as a father does not wait until his
children ask for corporal goods but inquires about their needs, so
neither should he wait until their spiritual distress is brought to his
attention. The superior here should avoid the extremes of suspicion, on
the one hand, which will lead him to act rashly and win for him the
hatred of his subjects, and of over-trustfulness, on the other hand,
which will foster all kinds of secret irregularities. Likewise, he
should not betray a special watchfulness about one individual that will
be harmful to the latter’s reputation.

(c) If there is question of fraternal correction, private individuals
should not inquire into the affairs of others. Those who go about
spying on or shadowing others, even if their purpose is to reform, are
acting against charity to themselves and to the persons they wish to
improve; their own affairs will suffer, since the number who need
reformation is large, and the person who is being investigated will be
annoyed or otherwise injured: “Lie not in wait, nor seek after
wickedness in the house of the just, nor spoil his rest” (Prov., xxiv.
15).

1270. The kinds of faults that call for fraternal correction are as
follows: (a) grave sins should be corrected, for otherwise one allows a
soul to perish that might have been saved (Matt., xviii. 14, 15), (b)
slight sins or transgressions of rules should also be corrected, when
they are the occasion of grave scandal or disorder in a community, and
superiors who are negligent about this commit mortal sin; (c) slight
sins or transgressions should not be corrected in ordinary cases, for
these faults are so numerous that, if one had to correct them, an
intolerable burden would be laid on everyone, Persons who scold and
lecture over every trifling misdeed are regarded as pests and do more
harm than good.

1271. The purpose of fraternal correction is to save one who is in
danger of losing his soul. Hence, it should not be restricted to those
sins that are an offense to the corrector, but it should extend also to
sins that are against God, the neighbor, or the offender himself.

1272. Since fraternal correction is given for the purpose of converting
a sinner from the evil of his ways, it is not called for when one’s
neighbor is not a sinner, strictly speaking, or has already reformed.
Thus, there is no need of this correction in the following cases: (a)
when a person sins through ignorance and is not guilty of formal sin;
(b) when a person who was a sinner in the past has given up his old
ways.

1273. A person who sins from vincible ignorance should not be corrected
unless the two following conditions are present: (a) there must be hope
of amendment, otherwise the admonition would only aggravate the
sinner’s guilt; (b) there must be no greater evil that will result from
the admonition and correction.

1274. A person who sins from invincible ignorance is not guilty of
formal sin, and hence, as said above, he is not a subject for fraternal
correction. But charity often requires that he be instructed especially
by superiors, confessors, etc., with a view to the prevention of
various evils. These evils are of the following kinds: (a) injury to
God, as when a person unacquainted with the language uses expressions
that are blasphemous; (b) injury to self, as when a child not
understanding the power of liquor becomes intoxicated; (c) injury to
the neighbor, as when a person who does not know that it is a fast day
causes scandal by not keeping the fast.

1275. If there is hope that the instruction will have a good result,
one should instruct the invincibly ignorant in order to prevent injury
to God, themselves, or their neighbor; but, if it seems that an
instruction will do only harm or more harm than good, it should be
omitted. The duty of instruction rests especially on superiors, such as
parents, teachers, confessors. These principles are applied to various
cases as follows:

(a) A material sin may have been committed in the past. Titus through
inadvertence ate meat on a day of abstinence, but gave no scandal;
Balbus did the same thing, and this caused considerable scandal. Now,
there might be an obligation of telling Balbus what he did in order to
repair the scandal, but no such obligation would exist in the case of
Titus. Sempronius and Caius both married invalidly, but are in good
faith. If Sempronius is told about his marriage, matters can be easily
rectified; but if Caius is informed that his marriage is null, he will
abandon his putative wife and his family, and there will be serious
discords and scandals. Hence, Sempronius should be told, but not Caius.

(b) Material sin may be about to be committed against the natural or
divine law. Titus is about to destroy what he thinks is an abandoned
and useless picture, but which is in reality a very valuable work of
art belonging to Balbus. Caius is going to the altar to be married;
Claudius knows of a diriment impediment to the marriage, but cannot
make it known without causing a scene and giving great scandal. Titus
should be instructed, but it is a duty to say nothing to Caius.

(c) Material sin may be about to be committed against human law.
Sempronius sees Claudius and others eating meat on a day of abstinence,
which they have forgotten. He also sees Father Balbus, who has
forgotten to put on an alb or a chasuble, going to the altar to say
Mass. There is no obligation to call the attention of Claudius to the
day of abstinence, but for the sake of respect to divine worship the
attention of Father Balbus should be directed to the missing vestments.

1276. Certain past sins do not demand fraternal correction: (a) those
sins that have been repented of, especially if there is no danger of a
relapse (e.g., a wife should not be always reminding her now sober
husband that he was addicted to drink before he met her); (b) those
sins that will in all probability be remedied shortly without one’s
intervention. Hence, it is not necessary to reprove Titus because he
drank too much, if he is not careless about his salvation and will soon
approach the Sacraments, or if his parents or wife are better fitted to
make the correction and will not fail to do so.

1277. To what persons may correction be given? (a) Judicial correction
can be given only to one’s subjects, since it supposes authority; (b)
fraternal correction can be given, not only to inferiors and equals,
but also to superiors. For charity should be shown to all those who are
in need of assistance, and, the higher the office, the greater the
danger. Superiors who are giving scandal or doing harm to others should
be remonstrated with by their equals, or, if need be, by their
subjects. Fraternal correction among the clergy is especially
advantageous.

1278. When fraternal correction is given to a superior: (a) the
superior should take a proper correction with gratitude and humility,
imitating St. Peter when reproved by St. Paul (Gal., ii. 11); (b) the
inferior should give the correction without boldness or harshness, but
respectfully and mildly: “An elderly man rebuke not, but entreat him as
a father” (I Tim., v. 1). It is better that the person giving the
correction be himself of some standing, lest the act seem to proceed
from contempt, and so only embitter the superior who is at fault.
Example: Children should plead with parents who steal, get drunk or
neglect religion, to mend their ways.

1279. What persons may administer correction? (a) Judicial correction
as just said can be given only by a superior; (b) fraternal correction
may be given by any person who is not so unfitted that a correction
from him will necessarily be useless or harmful. It is not required,
however, that one be immaculate, for if immunity from all sin were
necessary in a corrector, who could reprove delinquents (I John, i. 8)?

1280. The fact that a person is known to be a sinner, or not in the
state of grace, or guilty of the same things he reproves, does not
unfit him for giving a fraternal correction; because, in spite of his
own sinfulness, he may retain a right judgment and so be able to
correct wrongdoing. In the following cases, however, correction made by
a sinner is reprehensible, on account of circumstances other than that
of the person: (a) the motive of the correction is sinful, when the
sinner corrects only in order to distract attention from himself, to
conceal bad deeds by good words, to practise revenge, etc.; (b) the
mode of the correction is sinful when the sinner corrects with pride,
as if he himself were above correction: “Wherein thou judgest another
thou condemnest thyself, for thou dost the same things which thou
judgest” (Rom, ii. 1); (c) the consequences of correction made by a
sinner are an evil circumstance, as when scandal results. Thus, if a
person who is guilty of far greater sins corrects his neighbor, this
has a demoralizing effect, when the impression is given that good words
rather than good deeds are important.

1281. One who prefers his neighbor’s conversion to his own deviates
from the right order of charity, since he should love himself more. But
a person may without any transgression against the precept of fraternal
correction seek to correct his neighbor before he has corrected himself.

(a) Thus, from the nature of correction itself or from the provisions
of the commandment, there does not seem to be any obligation of
correcting self before correcting others; for a humble correction made
by a sinner with acknowledgment of his unworthiness to censure others,
or by a sinner who is thought to be good or to have reformed, may be
just as efficacious as a correction made by a truly virtuous man. But
it is of counsel that one correct oneself as a means towards the better
correction of another.

(b) Because of special reasons, a person may be otherwise obliged to
correct himself before he attempts to correct another, as when
self-correction is the only means towards obtaining some necessary end.
Thus, a superior who cannot enforce discipline because he is
unobservant himself, the friend of a dying man who cannot convert the
latter unless he gives evidence of his own conversion, a person who
cannot repair the scandal he has given unless he manifests
repentance--all these should begin by correcting themselves. One should
take the beam out of one’s own eye, if otherwise one cannot remove the
mote from a neighbor’s eye (Matt, vii. 5).

1282. All suitable persons, then, are bound by the duty of fraternal
correction: “He gave to every one of them commandment concerning his
neighbor” (Ecclus., xvii. 12). But the duty rests more heavily on some
than on others. (a) Thus, bishops and other pastors are held out of
justice to fraternal correction, and even at the peril of life. (b)
Other prelates, confessors, parents, husbands, masters, teachers and
guardians, are held to fraternal correction from charity and by reason
of their office; but they are not held to this duty when there is grave
personal danger to themselves. (c) Private persons are held out of
charity, but their obligation is less than in the case of those whose
office requires them to make corrections.

1283. A person is not bound to make a correction for the sole reason
that he is able to make it successfully. For he is excused: (a) if
correction by him is not necessary, as when parents or others better
able than himself will attend to the matter; (b) if his correction will
bring on himself evils which he is not obliged to incur.

1284. An obligation of making a correction even when this will cause an
injury to the corrector, exists in the following cases: (a) If the
correction is necessary to avert extreme spiritual evil (i.e.,
damnation), one should be prepared to make a sacrifice, even of life
itself, to give the correction (see 1165). Example: Titus is dying of a
contagious disease, and will lose his soul, if Balbus does not come to
advise him. (b) If the correction is necessary to avert grave spiritual
evil, a pastor should be willing to risk his life, and another person
should be willing to risk the loss of money, and even some injury to
health. But a subject is not bound to correct his superior, when this
will bring on him persecutions; a scrupulous person is not bound to
correct, for this would cause him worries and suffering.

1285. The manner of making a correction is as follows:

(a) The internal dispositions should include charity towards the one
corrected and humility as regards one’s own fitness. For fraternal
correction is not opposed to the commands of bearing with the
weaknesses of others (Gal, vi. 2), and of not proudly preferring self
to others (Philip., ii. 3). One should correct inferiors paternally,
equals kindly, and superiors respectfully. In every correction there
should be seriousness mingled with mildness.

(b) The external order to be followed is that given by our Lord in
Matt., xviii. 15-18, namely, that, when possible, admonition should be
given privately, and that one should not proceed to accusation before
superiors until other means, such as the calling in of witnesses, have
proved unavailing. The order to be followed in fraternal correction is
not only of the positive divine law, but it is also of the natural law.
For the natural law requires that we do for others what we wish done
for ourselves, and there is no one who does not desire that correction
be given him in such a way that the least possible injury be done to
his feelings and to his good name.

1286. In what cases should secret admonition be used?

(a) For public sins (i.e., real sins known or soon to be known to the
larger part of the community), no secret admonition is required, since
the guilt is already publicly known; a public correction, on the
contrary, is necessary to remedy the scandal: “Them that sin reprove
before all, that the rest also may have fear” (I Tim., v. 20).

(b) For occult sins that are against the common good or the good of a
third person no secret admonition is required, but one should denounce
them immediately; for the spiritual or corporal welfare of the
multitude or of an innocent private individual is a greater good than
the reputation of the guilty person. Exception should be made, however,
for the case in which one is certain that by a secret admonition one
can correct the sinner and prevent the harm that threatens others.
Examples: If Titus knows that there is a plot to rob the house of
Balbus, and that any effort to dissuade the criminals would only bring
him into danger, he ought to warn Balbus or the authorities. If
Claudius knows that in his school a certain student is teaching the
other boys to steal and become drunk, he should make this known, and
hence cannot be absolved if he refuses. But the seal of the
confessional must be observed.

(c) For occult sins that are not against the common good or that of a
third person, one should have recourse to secret admonition before
making the sins known. This will save the sinner from loss of
reputation and from consequent hardness in sin; it will also save
others from a share in his infamy, or from the scandal caused by
publicity.

1287. What is the obligation of reporting an occult sin that is doing
harm in a community, when the person who reports will suffer for
telling what he knows? (a) If harm to the community will result from
silence, one is obliged even at the cost of great inconvenience to
speak (see 1284). Example: Claudius knows that a fellow-student has a
bad influence over his companions, and is leading more and more of them
into stealing, with the result that a large number will be corrupted
and the institution disgraced. But he cannot speak without serious harm
to himself, because he also has been implicated, or because informers
are regarded and treated as traitors. (b) If some private harm will
result from silence, one is not bound at the cost of great
inconvenience to speak. Example: If Claudius knows that only one or two
are being led astray, he is not bound to implicate himself or to incur
the ignominy of being regarded as a spy.

1288. There are exceptional cases in which occult faults, not injurious
to others, are reproved publicly, without previous private admonition.
(a) God as the supreme ruler has the right to publish hidden sins,
although He admonishes men secretly through the voice of conscience or
through external preaching or other means. St. Peter, in making known
the sin of Ananias and Saphira, acted as the instrument of God’s
justice and in virtue of a revelation given him (Acts, v. 3, 4, 9). (b)
Members of a society who are agreed to remind one another publicly of
transgressions of their regulations, do not violate the order of
fraternal correction given by Christ, if there is nothing defamatory in
these reminders. Example: The proclamations made in the chapter of
faults in religious orders.

1289. May a prelate (e.g., in a visitation) oblige his subjects to
carry to him, without a previous secret admonition of the person to be
accused, information about the secret sins of fellow-subjects that are
not harmful to others?

(a) If a sin is entirely secret, and the subjects have not renounced
their right to reputation in the sight of the prelate, the latter has
no right to give orders that he be informed at once, since the rule
given by Christ requires that a fraternal correction be first given. A
subject would be bound, therefore, if such orders were given, to obey
the divine injunction, rather than that of the prelate (Acts, v. 3, 4,
9).

(b) If a sin is entirely secret, but subjects have renounced their
right to receive first a private admonition, a prelate may require that
information be brought to him at once. This is the rule in certain
religious societies; but even in them a sin should not be reported to
the prelate if the sinner has already amended, nor should the higher
superior be informed if the immediate superior can take care of the
matter sufficiently. These religious have a right to their reputation.

(e) If a sin is not entirely secret, because there are some indications
(such as ill-repute or grounds for suspicion), a prelate may require
that information be brought to him immediately.

1290. If, after several private admonitions have been made, there is no
hope of success by this method, what should be done? (a) If it appears
that the other means prescribed by our Lord will be successful, they
should be tried, just as a physician has recourse to new remedies when
old ones have failed. (b) If it appears that any further efforts will
do harm rather than good, the attempt to correct a private sin that
harms only the sinner should be given up.

1291. The order to be followed in fraternal correction, after personal
reproof or remonstrance has failed, is as follows:

(a) One should enlist the services of one or two others to assist in
making the brotherly correction. The conversion of the culprit is more
important than his reputation with these others; whereas their
knowledge of the matter safeguards the corrector from the charge of
being a mischievous talebearer, should things go further, and it should
arouse the culprit to the need of correcting himself, before his case
is brought before the superior for correction.

(b) When other things have failed, recourse should be had to the
superior of the person at fault, if there is hope that this will prove
successful. If the superior is imprudent or given to wrath or is known
to dislike the person to be corrected, or if the latter would only be
enraged by a reproof from this superior, charity would urge one to say
nothing about the matter. Example: Titus makes himself intoxicated from
time to time. Balbus is the only one who knows this, and he tries to
correct Titus. But, as the latter denies the accusation, Balbus asks
Caius and Sempronius, friends of Titus, to be witnesses; and all three
of them make an effort to convert Titus. This correction also has no
effect, and so Balbus and the other two make the matter known to the
parents of Titus, that they may watch their son more carefully and keep
him away from occasions of drink.

1292. What are the duties of a superior to whom a subject has been
reported for fraternal correction? (a) He should try to discover the
truth of the matter. Means to this end are a consideration of the
character and motives of the accuser, the reply which the accused makes
in his own defense, and in case of necessity a confrontation of accuser
and accused, a cross-examination, etc. (I Cor., i. xi; Dan., xiii. 5).
Those who make a practice of gladly carrying tales to superiors are
disturbers of peace, and they should be given to understand that their
accusations are not wanted, and that they should mind their own
business.

(b) If the superior has reason to believe that the accusation in
question is true, he should use moderate remedial measures, while at
the same time preserving the good name of the person to be corrected.
For the information has been brought before him, not as judge, but as
father of the person accused, and hence public punishments or
corrections injurious to reputation must be avoided. Removal from an
office, a change of place and special vigilance may be used, when this
can be done prudently.

1293. Cases in which a subject may be reported to his superior for
fraternal correction without previous admonitions are not impossible;
for the law given by Christ concerning the order to be followed is
affirmative, and hence obliges only under the proper circumstances. (a)
Thus, if previous admonitions would be harmful, whereas an admonition
by the superior will be beneficial, recourse should be had at once to
the superior. (b) If an admonition by the superior will be more
advantageous, the other admonitions may be omitted. Thus, if the
superior is more revered by the person to be corrected and will be
listened to more readily, or if there is danger of delay in making
previous admonitions, it is better that the matter be brought before
the superior at once. What is said of the superior can be applied also
to some other pious and prudent person from whom a correction would be
better received.

1294. The obligation of fraternal correction by private individuals may
be summed up as follows: (a) One is bound to correct when one is
certain about a grave sin which will not be corrected except by
oneself, and when one has good reason to hope that the correction will
be profitable to the sinner and not unreasonably harmful to the
corrector. Those who interfere when these conditions are not present
are meddlesome or imprudent, rather than charitable. (b) One is bound
to report to a superior when one is certain about a grave sin which is
harmful to the community or which cannot be corrected so well by
private admonition, if one believes that it will not be reported except
by oneself, and that one’s report will be for the good of others and
not an undue detriment to oneself. Those who report of their own choice
when these conditions are not existent, are malicious tale-bearers or
rash news-carriers, rather than charitable accusers.




Art. 7: THE SINS AGAINST LOVE AND JOY

(_Summa Theologica_, II-II, qq. 34-36.)

1295. The sins against charity and its subordinate virtues can be
reduced to the following: (a) hatred, which is opposed to love; (b)
sloth and envy, which are contrary to the joy of charity; (c) discord
and schism, which are opposed to the peace of charity; (d) scandal,
which is the opposite of beneficence and fraternal correction.

1296. Hate.--Hate is an aversion of the will to something which the
intellect judges evil, that is, contrary to self. As there are two
kinds of love, so there are also two kinds of hate. (a) Hatred of
dislike (_odium abominationis_) is the opposite of love of desire, for,
as this love inclines to something as suitable and advantageous for
self, so hatred of dislike turns away from something, as being
considered unsuitable and harmful to self. (b) Hatred of enmity (_odium
inimicitiae_) is the opposite of love of benevolence, for, as this love
wishes good to the object of its affection, so hatred of enmity wishes
evil to the object of its dislike.

1297. Hatred of God.-A thing cannot be hated unless it is looked upon
as evil, and hence God cannot be hated except by those who regard Him
as evil to themselves.

(a) Thus, those who see the Divine Essence (i.e., the blessed), cannot
hate God, for His Essence is goodness itself, and, therefore, the
blessed can see in God only reasons for love. (b) Those who see God
obscurely through the things made by Him (i.e., wayfarers on earth),
cannot hate God considered as the author of effects that are in no way
displeasing to the will, such as existence, life, intelligence; but
they can hate God as the author of effects displeasing to their will,
such as law and punishment. Thus, no one can hate God because God has
given him being, for existence of itself is something good and
desirable; but a depraved will can hate God for having forbidden sin,
or for inflicting chastisements, or for permitting some evils to
accompany the blessings of life. That hatred of God is not a mere
possibility, the scriptures in many places attest: “The pride of them
that hate Thee ascendeth forever” (Ps, lxiii. 23), “Now they have seen
and hated both Me and My Father” (John, xv. 24).

1298. It should not be inferred from what has just been said that it is
not God in Himself that is hated, but only His works; nor that it is a
sin against God to dislike evils or even divine punishments.

(a) Thus, God Himself is not the principle or motive cause of the
hatred directed against Him, for in God there is no evil that can
produce dislike; but God is the term or object of the hatred aroused in
the sinner by the divine effects that displease him, as the texts given
above from scripture indicate. For example, a man hates his neighbor on
account of certain defects he perceives or thinks he perceives; the
defects are the principle, but the neighbor is the term of the hatred.

(b) Dislike of the evils that are in the world, or of chastisements
sent by God, is not dislike of God Himself, since God does not ask us
to love evil, but only to endure such evils as cannot be cured. Even
murmurs against Providence are usually manifestations of impatience,
not of hatred of Providence. It is only the sinner that dislikes God
Himself for permitting or inflicting evils, who is guilty of hatred of
God.

1299. Hatred of God of various kinds. (a) As regards the intention, it
is either interpretative or formal. Interpretative hatred is aversion
that is not intended directly or for its own sake, but only indirectly
and by reason of something else whose love is preferred. Formal hatred
is an aversion that is intended directly and expressly in itself. Every
mortal sin is an act of interpretative hatred of God, since mortal sin
consists in placing one’s own pleasure or interest above the friendship
of God; but it is only the special sin which attacks God directly that
constitutes formal hate. Thus, he who murders his enemy does not
directly intend dislike of God, but revenge; whereas the condemned
murderer who blasphemes God, because he is to be executed, directly
dislikes God. (b) As regards the degree of malice it contains, formal
hatred of God is either dislike or enmity. Dislike of God is the sin of
those who do not like some attribute of God; enmity towards God is the
sin of those who wish some evil to God. Thus, one who deliberately
wishes that God would sanction injustice dislikes the divine attribute
of justice, while an unjust man who wishes he might be rid of God and
His judgment is guilty of enmity to God.

1300. Hatred of God as a Special Sin.--(a) Interpretative hatred of God
is not a special sin but a general circumstance of every mortal sin;
but formal hatred is a special sin, and indeed one that is
comparatively rare, and that must be specially mentioned in confession.
This is a sin which is distinct, not only from the sins against the
other theological virtues (e.g., unbelief, despair), but also from the
sins against the other objects of charity (e.g., hatred of the
neighbor).

(b) Formal hatred of God is not a special sin against the Holy Ghost
(see 899); but its malice pervades every such sin, and it is thus a
general sin against the Holy Ghost. For example, presumption is a
dislike of God’s law which requires that one must attain salvation
through the observance of the commandments; rejection of the known
truth is a dislike of God’s revelation.

1301. The Gravity of Hatred of God.-(a) It is a mortal sin from its
nature, and can never be venial on account of the smallness of the
injury, but only on account of lack of deliberation or consent. Dislike
of even one attribute of God is a grave injury, for everything
pertaining to God is perfect and infinitely lovable. (b) Hatred of God
is the worst of all mortal sins; for it is directly opposed to God (the
supreme good) and to charity (the most excellent virtue in a creature),
whereas other mortal sins offend against these goods only indirectly.

1302. The comparison just made between hatred of God and other sins
supposes that the other sins do not include hatred of God, for it is
clear that simple hatred of God existing in the will is less serious
than a composite sin, such as external blasphemy uttered to manifest
internal hatred of God. (a) Thus, hatred of God without unbelief is
worse than unbelief without hatred of God; (b) hatred of God without
hatred of the neighbor is worse than hatred of the neighbor without
hatred of God.

1303. Degrees of Malice in Hatred of God.--(a) A new species of sin is
added to hatred of God, when out of hatred one proceeds to sin against
creatures, or to commit other offenses against God Himself. Example:
Titus hates God, and therefore persecutes those who believe in God, and
also blasphemes God. (b) A new degree of malice is added to hatred of
God when one proceeds from dislike to enmity, or when the circumstances
of person, place, manner, etc., aggravate the malice. Example: Hatred
of God outwardly manifested adds the evil of scandal; not so hatred of
God that is concealed.

1304. Hatred of Creatures.--All dislike of God is sinful, because there
is nothing in God that merits dislike. But in creatures imperfections
are found as well as perfections.

(a) Hence, dislike of the imperfections of our neighbor (i.e., of all
that is the work of the devil or of his own sinfulness), is not against
charity, but according to charity; for it is the same thing to dislike
another’s evil as to wish his good. Thus, God Himself is said to hate
detractors, that is, detraction (Rom., i. 30), and Christ bids His
followers hate their parents who would be an impediment to their
progress in holiness, that is, the sinful opposition of those parents
(Luke, xiv. 26). Only when dislike is carried beyond reason is it
sinful. Thus, a wife who dislikes her husband’s habit of drunkenness so
much that she will not give him a necessary medicine on account of the
alcohol it contains, carries her dislike to extremes.

(b) Dislike of the perfections of nature or of grace in our neighbor
(i.e., of anything that is the work of God in him), is contrary to
charity. Thus, God does not hate the detractor himself, nor should
children ever hate the person of a parent, or the natural relationship
he holds to themselves, no matter how bad the parent may be. As St.
Augustine says: “One should love the sinner, but hate his vices.”

1305. The same principles apply to dislike of self. (a) Thus, one
should dislike one’s own imperfections, for they are the enemies of
one’s soul. So, contrition is defined as a hatred and detestation of
one’s vices, and it is a virtue and an act of charity to self. (b) One
should not dislike the good one has, except in so far as it is
associated with evil. Thus, one should not regret one’s honesty, even
if by reason of it one loses an opportunity to make a large sum of
money; but one may regret having married, if one’s choice has been
unfortunate and has made one’s life miserable.

1306. Should a person dislike in others their opposition to himself?
(a) If their opposition is unjust, he should dislike it, for it is then
a sin in them and an injury to himself, and charity to them and to self
requires that he should dislike what is harmful to all concerned. (b)
If their opposition is just, he should like it, for it is virtuous in
them and beneficial to himself: “Better are the wounds of a friend than
the deceitful kisses of an enemy” (Prov., xxvii. 6).

1307. Direct enmity to self is not possible, for nature inclines each
one so strongly to love of self that it is impossible for anyone to
wish evil to himself as evil: “No one hateth his own flesh” (Ephes., v.
29). But indirectly a person may be at enmity with himself, inasmuch as
he wishes evil under the guise of good; and hence St. Augustine,
commenting on the words, “He that loveth his life shall lose it” (John,
xii, 25), says: “If you love self wrongly, you hate it; if you hate
self rightly, you love it.” This indirect enmity to self happens in two
ways. (a) A person sometimes wishes himself what is not a true, but
only an apparent good, as when he chooses the satisfaction of revenge
rather than that of pardon of injuries. (b) A person sometimes chooses
what is good, not for his true, but for his lower self, as when he
decides to gratify the body at the expense of the soul.

1308. Is it ever lawful to wish evil to self or to others? (a) It is
not lawful to wish anyone evil as evil, for even God in punishing the
lost does not will their punishment as it is evil to them, but as it
contains the good of justice. Hence, it is contrary to charity to wish
that a criminal be put to death, if one’s wish does not go beyond the
sufferings and loss of life the criminal will endure. (b) It is lawful
to wish evil as good, or, in other words, to wish misfortunes that are
blessings in disguise. Thus, one may wish that a neighbor lose his arm,
if this is necessary to save his life.

1309. One may easily be self-deceived in wishing evil to one’s neighbor
under the pretext that it is really good one desires, for the true
intention may be hatred or revenge. Hence, the following conditions
must be present when one wishes evil as good:

(a) On the part of the subject (i.e., of the person who wills the
evil), the intention must be sincerely charitable, proceeding from a
desire that the neighbor be benefitted. Thus, it is lawful to wish that
a gambler may meet with reverses, if what is intended is, not his loss,
but his awakening to the need of a new kind of amusement. St. Paul
rejoiced that he had made the Corinthians sorrowful, because their
sorrow worked repentance in them (II Cor., vii. 7-11). Of course, the
desire of a neighbor’s good does not confer the right to wrong him, for
the end does not justify the means.

(b) On the part of the object (i.e., of the evil which is wished to
another), it must be compensated for by the good which is intended. It
is not lawful to desire the death of another on account of the property
one expects to inherit, for the neighbor’s life is more important than
private gain; but it is lawful to wish, out of interest in the common
welfare, that a criminal be captured and punished, for it is only by
the vindication of law that public tranquillity can be secured (Gal.,
v. 12).

1310. Is it lawful to wish the death of self or of a neighbor for some
private good of the one whose death is wished? (a) If the good is a
spiritual one and more important than the spiritual good contained in
the desire to live, it is lawful to desire death. Thus, it is lawful to
wish to die in order to enter into a better life, or to be freed from
the temptations and sinfulness of life on earth. But it is not lawful
to wish to die in order to spare a few individuals the scandal they
take from one’s life, if that life is needed by others as a source of
edification (Philip., i. 21 sqq.). (b) If the good is a temporal one
but sufficiently important, it does not seem unlawful to desire death.
Thus, we should not blame a person suffering from a painful and
incurable disease, which makes him a burden to himself and to others,
if, with resignation to the divine will, he prays for the release of
death; for “death is better than a bitter life” (Ecclus., xxx, 17). But
lack of perfect health or a feeling of weariness is not a good reason
for wishing to die, especially if one has dependents, or is useful to
others.

1311. Is it ever lawful to wish spiritual evil to anyone? (a) Spiritual
evil of iniquity may never be desired, for the desire of sin, mortal or
venial, is a sin itself (see 242), and it cannot be charitable, for
charity rejoiceth not with iniquity (I Cor., xiii. 6). It is wrong,
therefore, to wish that our neighbor fall into sin, offend God,
diminish or forfeit his grace, or lose his soul. On the contrary, we
are commanded to pray that he be delivered from such evils. (b) The
good that God draws out of spiritual evil may be desired. Some are
permitted to fall into sin, or be tempted, that they may become more
humble, more charitable, more vigilant, more fervent. It seems that the
permission of sin in the case of the elect is one of the benefits of
God’s predestination, inasmuch as God intends it to be an occasion of
greater virtue and stronger perseverance. It is not lawful to wish that
God permit anyone to fall into sin, but it is lawful to wish that, if
God has permitted sin, good will follow after it.

1312. Gravity of the Sin of Hatred of Neighbor.--(a) Hatred, whether of
dislike or of enmity, is from its nature a mortal sin, since it is
directly opposed to the virtue of charity, which is the life of the
soul.

(b) Dislike, if enmity is not joined to it, is rarely in fact a mortal
sin. Aversions and antipathies for others usually are either
indeliberate, or have to do with what are real or fancied defects in
others. Dislike is a mortal sin only when one despises another so much
that one deliberately loathes even that which is of divine provenance
in the other, or dislikes a real imperfection so immoderately as to
inflict serious injury (e.g., by refusing pardon or the common signs of
charity, by giving grave scandal, etc.)

(c) Enmity in fact is often only a venial sin, either because one
wishes only a small harm (e.g., the loss of a small sum of money), or
because one wishes harm, even a great harm (e.g., the commission of
mortal sin), without full deliberation. Enmity is a mortal sin,
however, when one deliberately wishes a grave evil (e.g., mortal sin or
the loss of reputation) to one’s neighbor.

1313. Hatred Compared with Other Sins Against the Neighbor.--(a) Hatred
is a graver sin than other internal sins against the neighbor, such as
envy, anger; for, while each of these latter attacks some particular
kind of good of the neighbor or only to a limited degree, hatred may be
directed against any good and knows no measure. Thus, covetousness is
directed against the external goods or possessions of a neighbor, while
hate may extend to either internal or external goods. Envy is opposed
to the neighbor’s good relatively, in so far as it is considered an
obstacle to one’s own glory, but hate detests another’s good
absolutely. The hater finds his satisfaction, not in any profit derived
for self, but in his aversion for another’s good, and the harm that is
wished his neighbor. This comparison here made should be understood,
other things being equal, so that hatred of another’s life is
contrasted with envy of his life, etc.; for, if the goods are not the
same, hatred may be a lesser sin, as when hatred of a neighbor’s
temporal good is compared with envy of his spiritual good. (b) Hatred
of a neighbor is a more serious sin than external offenses done against
him, for hatred sets the will wrong, and it is in the will that sin
takes root: “He who hates his brother is a murderer” (I John, iii. 15).
The external act, on the contrary (e.g., killing an innocent man), is
not a formal sin when the will is guiltless. (c) Hatred is a less
harmful sin to the neighbor than external offenses; for example,
internal dislike and malevolence will not break any bones, as may
happen from a severe blow.

1314. Why is hatred not numbered among the capital vices? As was said
above (see 269), a capital vice is one from which naturally and usually
other species of sin take their origin. Now, hatred of God or the
neighbor, in the natural and usual course of sin, does not precede, but
rather follows other sins. Hence, hatred is not a capital sin. This
will appear more clearly if we distinguish two kinds of hatred:

(a) Hate of that which is truly evil and opposed to the true good of
man (e.g., hate of vice), is naturally prior to other disinclinations,
since rational nature first inclines one to love its good and hate its
evil (see 1106).

(b) Hate of that which is not evil (as hate of God or of the neighbor),
is naturally subsequent to other sins, for it is only a nature already
corrupt that detests true goodness. This does not mean, however, that
the whole catalogue of lesser sins must have been committed before
hatred is arrived at, nor that in individual cases a sinner has not the
freedom to hate before he has committed less grave sins.

1315. In a certain wide sense, however, it may be said that hatred of
the neighbor goes before all other sins against the neighbor, just as
was remarked above (1299) concerning sins against God.

(a) Hence, interpretative hate--i.e., a feeling against another that
makes one act in effect as if there were hatred--does precede the other
sins. Thus, if Titus, who bore no ill-will to Balbus, becomes enraged
against him and inflicts death, the murder is traced back to anger, but
this anger may be called hate, inasmuch as dislike of the life of
Balbus is included in the desire of revenge.

(b) Formal hate--i.e., dislike of another that is absolute, and not
modified by such considerations as desire of revenge or sorrow over
one’s own inferiority--does not precede, but rather follows the other
sins, as was explained in the previous paragraph. It is only this sin
of formal hate that is a special sin. Titus in the example murdered
Balbus, not because he had an absolute dislike for him, but because the
thirst for revenge made Balbus displeasing to him.

1316. The causes of the sin of hatred are as follows: (a) causes that
dispose one to hate are anger and envy, for to desire evil to another,
for revenge or on account of one’s own glory, prepares the way to
desire evil to him absolutely, which is hatred. Envy, however, disposes
to hate more than anger, since it is more akin to hatred: anger wishes
evil to another as something owed to justice, but both envy and hatred
look upon the neighbor’s good as a thing distasteful. (b) The cause
that induces sinful hatred of the neighbor is envy; for one cannot hate
that which is good unless one regards it as in some way disagreeable,
and it is the vice of envy that makes one regard one’s neighbor’s good
as one’s own evil. Hatred of God also indirectly results from envy,
for, while the creature does not envy God, his envy of his neighbor
breeds hatred of his fellow-man, and this in turn may produce hatred of
God.

1317. Various Species of the Sin of Hatred.--(a) Hatred of God and
hatred of the neighbor are sins specifically distinct, and hence to be
declared specifically in confession. They are opposed to the same
virtue of charity, but, on account of the generical difference of sin
against God and sin against the creature, they must be classed as
different species of sin.

(b) Hatred of the neighbor in itself is but one species of sin, since
all its acts have this one essential character in common, that evil is
wished to a neighbor as evil--that is, one wishes another evil in
general or every kind of evil, but does not specify particular evils,
such as damnation or death.

(c) Hatred of the neighbor on account of its circumstances or results
may be connected with sins of other species. Thus, he who hates his
neighbor because the latter is pious, adds irreligion to his hatred; he
who out of hatred wishes the death of his neighbor, adds the guilt of
murder to hatred; he who out of hatred wishes to destroy his neighbor’s
property, adds the guilt of injustice to his hatred: he who hates his
parents, adds impiety to uncharitableness; he who calls down a curse on
another, adds malediction to hate.

1318. Penitents who accuse themselves of hatred often have in mind a
sin specifically distinct from the sin of hatred, or an act not sinful
at all.

(a) Thus, “hatred of God” is sometimes used to signify a want of
resignation to the divine will.

(b) “Dislike of the neighbor” is sometimes used to signify
uncongeniality on account of difference of character, etc., or positive
disapproval of qualities or acts that deserve dislike or censure. Thus,
a penitent who always feels ill at ease in the company of a neighbor on
account of some natural incompatibility or of some fear which he
himself does not understand, or who dreads meeting an individual whose
manners are boorish or whose conversation is distasteful, may accuse
himself of sinful dislike.

(c) “Wishing evil to the neighbor” is sometimes used to signify one’s
desire that justice take its course or that the order of charity be
observed. Thus, a penitent who wished for the common good that a
criminal be punished, or according to charity that his friend would
defeat others in competition for a prize, may accuse himself that he
wished harm to the criminal or had luck to the competitors against his
friend.

1319. Circumstances of hatred should be mentioned in confession as
follows: (a) when they add a new species--thus, the person hated (e.g.,
one’s father) or the evil wished (e.g., a fall into mortal sin, loss of
reputation, death, etc.) may add a new sin to that of hate; (b) when
they multiply the number of sins within the species of hate, as when
one hates a large number of persons (see 219).

1320. The Sin of Sloth.--Sloth is a sadness or dejection of the will
about the divine good one possesses, and arises from a want of esteem
for one’s Last End and the means thereto.

(a) Sloth is a sadness of the will. Hence, the sin of sloth differs
from the passion of sadness, and also from bodily weariness. The
passions (as said in 121) are not evil in themselves, but become evil
when exercised immoderately, or turned to an evil object. Weakness or
weariness of body is not sinful, but it disposes one for the passion of
sadness, and this in turn may tempt the will to sloth, when duties owed
to God are to be attended to.

(b) Sloth is a sadness about good, and so it differs from sadness about
the smallness of one’s good. Humility demands that one be sensible of
one’s own shortcomings and of the greater merits of those who are
better. But it is not humility but ingratitude and sloth to depreciate
and grieve over the good which one has received from God, such as the
gift of faith, membership in the Church, etc.

(c) Sloth is sadness about the divine good, which is loved by charity.
Thus, the sin of sloth differs from the circumstance of sloth, which is
found in every sin. There is no sin that does not contain a sadness or
disgust about the act of the opposite virtue; the very thought of
moderation is depressing to the glutton, and religion is associated
with gloom by the irreligious. But what is special to the sin of sloth
is, that it grieves about that divine good itself over which charity
rejoices, and which is the end of all the other virtues.

(d) Sloth is a sadness about the divine good as shared by self, that
is, about the end offered oneself and the means thereto, such as
eternal beatitude, the friendship of God, the Sacraments, the
Commandments, good works and other divine gifts which should be
esteemed and received with gladness. Sloth thus differs from hatred of
God, which is a sadness over God’s own goodness; and from envy, which
is a sadness over the good of the neighbor.

(e) Sloth is a sadness over the divine good, which is considered by one
as an evil. The sin of sloth looks upon the joys of heaven or the
practice of virtue with contempt; it directly spurns them as unworthy
of love (cfr. Num., xxi. 4). Hence, sloth differs from laziness or
idleness, for this latter sin dislikes the exercise of virtue, not
because it considers virtue as evil, but because it has a dread of the
labor and exertion which virtue entails, and is overmuch in love with
repose and ease.

1321. Sloth is a sin. (a) It is forbidden by God: “Bow down thy
shoulder and bear wisdom, and be not grieved with her bands” (Ecclus.,
vi. 26). (b) It is an evil sorrow, for it grieves over good. (c) It has
evil effects, since it keeps man from his duty, swallowing him up with
overmuch sorrow (II Cor., ii. 7).

1322. Qualities of the Sin of Sloth.--(a) Sloth is a special sin,
since, as explained above, its individual objects differentiate it from
the general slothfulness that is found in every sin, as well as from
hatred, envy and laziness. But it is a sin, by comparison, rarely
committed. (b) It is a mortal sin, from its nature, since it is a
horror and detestation for the divine good. It is implicitly forbidden
in the Third Commandment, (c) It is a capital sin (i.e., a vice
naturally productive of others), for sadness inclines man to many evils
as means of escape from sorrow or of consolation in sorrow.

1323. In the following cases sloth is not a mortal sin. (a) It is not a
mortal sin if in the object there is not grave matter. When a person is
grieved at the thought that he will be forced to some spiritual good
which is not of precept but of counsel, he does not sin thereby, for
one does not sin by not choosing the counsels. Strictly speaking,
however, this grief is not the sin of sloth, which is a sorrow over the
divine good that one is bound to accept with joy. (b) Sloth is not a
mortal sin, if in the subject there is not sufficient reflection or
full consent. Hence, mere bodily weariness in serving God, is no sin at
all, and a feeling of disgust for spiritual things, not consented to,
is only a struggle of the flesh against the spirit, and at most a
venial sin.

1324. Sins that Spring from Sloth.--(a) To escape his sadness about
divine things, the slothful man avoids or flees the things that sadden
him--his last end (sin of despair) and the means thereto (sins of
cowardice and carelessness). He also attacks the causes of his
grief--the persons who would lead him to God (sin of rancor) or the
spiritual things themselves (sin of malice). (b) To console himself for
the want of joy in spiritual things, he seeks comfort in forbidden
things: his mind is unquiet and curious about that which does not
concern him, his talk is excessive, his bodily movements are restless,
and he must be continually moving from place to place.

1325. The Conquest of Sloth.--(a) Flight is a suitable form of
resistance to temptation, whenever the temptation grows stronger by
thinking over the matter, as is the case with temptations against
purity (I Cor., vi. 18). (b) Attack is a suitable form of resistance,
when the temptation becomes weaker as one thinks over the matter (see
257). This is the case with sloth, for, the more one gives oneself to
the consideration of spiritual things, the more pleasing do they become.

1326. Laziness, as distinct from the capital vice of sloth, is a
generic name given to a number of sins or circumstances of sin, and
hence it will be treated in several places.

(a) Thus, negligence is a want of prompt decision about duties to be
performed. It is opposed to the virtue of diligence or solicitude,
which pertains to prudence. Hence, negligence will be considered among
the sins against prudence.

(b) Sluggishness (_pigritia_) is a tardy performance of duty, and will
be considered among the sins opposed to diligence.

(c) Carelessness (_torpor_) is a perfunctory discharge of duties,
without thought or love. It is one of the consequences of sloth given
above (see 1324), and hence it is a sin against charity.

(d) Indolence is an excessive dislike of labor or exertion, caused by
an inordinate love of recreation or bodily rest. It will be considered
when we treat the sin of softness or delicacy, which is opposed to
fortitude.

(e) Idleness is the actual omission of one’s duty on account of
indolence, and hence it is considered among the sins against the
various precepts. Thus, under the precepts of charity and of justice
will be discussed the omission of labor to which one is bound.

1327. The sin of carelessness about the service of God is also known as
tepidity or lukewarmness. It consists in a want of fervor, and causes
one to live in spiritual languor, wishing on the one hand to live
holily and avoid sin, but fearing on the other hand the effort and
generosity required for the practice of virtue and the struggle against
evil. It is, therefore, most dangerous.

(a) Even if it is only internal, it may be more dangerous to the one
concerned than grave sin itself, since threats and promises that move a
sinner are often unavailing with one who is tepid and moving on to
grave sin. Thus, we read: “I know thy works, that thou art neither
cold, nor hot. I would that thou wert cold or hot. But because thou art
lukewarm, and neither cold, nor hot, I will begin to vomit thee out of
my mouth” (Apoc., iii. 15, 16).

(b) If it is external, this sin is a danger to others who witness the
disrespectful way in which one prays or exercises other duties owed to
God.

1328. The Sin of Envy.--Envy is a sadness at the good of a neighbor,
which one considers as a detriment to one’s own excellence or glory,
and therefore as an evil to self.

(a) Envy is a species of sadness, that is, it is a displeasure of the
will at the presence of what one regards as an evil. In this way envy
differs from the sin of rejoicing at the evils of others, which, as
will be said below (see 1342), is one of the consequences of envy,
although both are of the same species. Thus also, envy differs from
pride and vainglory (which are not aversions but inclinations), and
from covetousness (which is the desire of what belongs to another).

(b) Envy is about some good, especially about those goods from which
men obtain the esteem and honor of others, such as virtue, ability,
rank, success, prosperity. Thus, envy differs from sorrow about evil or
the evil effects of good, such as repentance for one’s sins, regret that
one is not as good as others, displeasure at the bad use that men make
of health or wealth.

(c) Envy is about the good of a neighbor, for only an insane person
would feel chagrin at the superiority of God, and self-envy is a
contradiction in terms. Thus, envy differs from sorrow at the good of
God (hatred of God), and from sorrow at the good of self (sloth). A
person may be said, however, to envy God in the sense that he is
mortified at the external glory of God, if he feels himself an
antagonist of that glory. In this way the devil is said to envy the
attributes of God, because they overcome his efforts to promote
impiety, and man is said to envy the Holy Ghost, when he is
discontented at the progress of holiness in the souls of men.

(d) The envious man considers his neighbor’s good as a detriment to his
own good. This is the distinctive trait of envy which sets it apart
from other forms of repining at another’s good fortune. Thus,
displeasure at the excellence or glory of another without reference to
detriment to self is not envy, but hatred; with reference to the
unworthiness of another, it is not envy, but indignation.

(e) Hence, envy looks on the neighbor’s prosperity as a calamity to
self, as a sort of punishment and the contradiction of one’s own
desires. Here envy stands in contrast with mercy, for, while the
merciful regard the misfortunes of neighbors as the misfortunes of
themselves, the envious regard the prosperity of others as their own
misfortune.

1329. The Objects of Envy.--(a) The material objects are many, but they
are reduced to excellence and glory. Excellence includes every kind of
desirable quality. Glory is the honor, fame and praise that follow on
public knowledge of one’s excellence. As a rule, envy is concerned with
the excellence of glory, but it may also be about internal or objective
excellence. Thus, if two disputants are alone, the less able will
perhaps envy the greater knowledge of the more able; but, if there is
an audience, the more able will perhaps envy the greater applause
received by his less able opponent.

(b) The formal object of envy is one, namely, the detriment to the
excellence or glory of self which the envious person sees in the
excellence or glory of another. Detriment must not be understood
absolutely here, as if the envious person lost something or failed to
obtain something on account of the other person. It must be understood
relatively, in the sense that the envious person feels that the
situation between himself and the other person is no longer the same,
that the latter has gained on him or passed him, and has thus lessened
his excellence.

1330. The Subjects of Envy.--(a) The persons most inclined to envy are
of two quite different types, namely, the ambitious and the
pusillanimous. The ambitious man ardently covets honors, and he is
correspondingly saddened when others surpass him, especially if he
already enjoys repute or is not far removed from the object of his
desires. The pusillanimous man, being petty, holds every small
advancement of others as great and as a blow to his own prestige. He
is, therefore, filled with intense envy, where a different person would
see little or no cause for such a feeling. On the contrary, those who
recognize their own unsuitability for what is above them, and those who
are great of soul, are not so much inclined to envy. There are few,
however, even among the most perfect, who are not tempted to envy in
some form.

(b) The persons who are most likely to be envied are those who in some
way or other are one’s likes or equals, for one does not feel that one
is thrown into the shade by a person who is always far above one, or by
those who are far removed in time, place, age, etc. Thus, a beggar will
envy a fellow-beggar who becomes a millionaire, but not those
acquaintances who were always rich, and still less the fortunate
persons whom he knows only from hearsay. The elder son envied his
brother, not his father (Luke, xv. 28). Many exceptions to this are
only apparent. Thus, persons sometimes are envious of those far above
them, but it is because these have advanced at their expense, as when a
poor person envies those who have the property he once owned. Persons
are sometimes envious of their equals who have not surpassed them, but
it is because these latter have obtained with little or no effort what
they themselves have gained only by hard work. Persons are sometimes
envious of their inferiors, but this is because they make a comparison
from some viewpoint in which there is equality, as when an old man
envies a youth the advantages that were not enjoyed in his own youth,
or the present promotion that surpasses his own.

1331. It was said above (see 1313) that hatred differs from other sins
against charity, inasmuch as it dislikes another’s good unqualifiedly,
whereas these other sins dislike his good with some qualification.
Hence, envy differs from hate, because envy is a qualified displeasure.
It differs from other kinds of displeasure over the prosperity of
others, because the qualification in each case is different.

(a) Thus, emulation is displeased at the thought of a neighbor’s
prosperity, not because it does not like his success, but because it
dislikes the unsuccess of self. Example: Titus is grieved when he
thinks of the virtue of Balbus, because he himself lacks virtue.

(b) Fear dislikes the prosperity or superiority of another, not on
account of the prosperity or superiority in itself, but on account of
the evil results it apprehends from that prosperity. Example: Caius is
displeased at the elevation of Claudius, because he knows the latter is
his enemy and will persecute him. He is also displeased that, in spite
of his own greater learning and soundness, he has not the influence
possessed by Balbus, who misleads many by long-winded sophistry.

(c) Indignation (_nemesis_) is displeased that a neighbor has a certain
good, of which he is unworthy. Example: Sempronius is angry because
Titus, who is dishonest, succeeds in business.

(d) Envy grieves over a neighbor’s prosperity, not because it thinks
this prosperity will actually bring about a lessening of the honor of
self, but because it regards the very fact of that prosperity, in
itself and apart from any consequences, as a change in one’s
relationship to the neighbor, and to that extent an obscuration of the
glory of self. Example: Balbus is grieved at the prosperity of
Claudius, because he knows Claudius will use his resources to defame
him. Caius is grieved at Claudius’ prosperity, because he regards it as
a reflection on his own fame, since he is less prosperous. Balbus
fears, Caius envies.

1332. Is emulation a sin? (a) If emulation is about spiritual things,
it is not sinful, but praiseworthy. St. Paul encourages a holy rivalry
among the Corinthians for the higher gifts of God (I Cor., xii. 31).
St. Jerome writes to Laeta that her daughter should be associated with
other girls as fellow-pupils, that the progress of the latter and the
praises they receive may act as a spur to the daughter not to be
outdone. One who equals or surpasses the virtue or knowledge of another
does not take away or lessen the other’s good, but improves his own
good; and thus emulation is not harmful, but beneficial in spiritual
matters. (b) If emulation is about temporal things, it is also lawful
to be sorry at their absence. But, if the desire is inordinate, then
emulation is sinful. Example: Sempronius is not inferior in ability to
Titus, and hence, while not desiring monopoly or disliking
competition, he is sorry that he has not attained an equal success in
business. Balbus is very deficient in education, in initiative and in
character, while Caius excels in all these qualities; and yet Balbus is
discontented that he does not hold the responsible position of Caius,
or one of equal importance. The emulation of Sempronius is reasonable,
that of Balbus is unreasonable.

1333. Rivalry is called jealousy, when it proceeds from a love so
ardent that it wishes to have exclusive possession of the object loved.
This jealousy is lawful or unlawful, according as the person who loves
has or has not exclusive rights.

(a) Jealousy is unlawful in a mother who is vexed because her child
loves his father as well as herself. The child ought to love both
parents, and it is an evil jealousy that makes the mother grieve when
the child does this.

(b) Jealousy is lawful in a wife who grieves because her husband gives
to others the affection he promised would be hers alone. Scripture
speaks of God Himself as jealous of the fidelity of His creatures, and
declares that He will suffer no rival, but must have sole dominion over
the heart (Josue, xxiv. 19 sqq.); and St. Paul tells the Corinthians
that he is jealous of them, with the jealousy of God, because they have
not been faithful to his preaching, but have been friendly to false
teachers (II Cor., xi).

1334. Is grief at the prosperity of another a sin, when it is caused by
fear of the harm he will do?

(a) If it is clear that the other will use his prosperity to act
against justice or charity or the like, it is not a sin to grieve over
the prosperity. For, since it is right to deprive a neighbor of the
means of sinning when one has the power to do so, it is not wrong to
wish that he lacked those means. Thus, it is not a sin to grieve over
the election of an official who will promote lawbreakers and persecute
the law-abiding: “When just men increase, the people shall rejoice;
when the wicked shall bear rule, the people shall mourn” (Prov., xxix.
2). St. Gregory the Great declares that, as it is not uncharitable to
rejoice at the downfall of an enemy, neither is it envious to be
saddened at his success; since his downfall is a blessing to the
oppressed, while his success means injustice to many.

(b) If it is clear that the other will use his power, wealth, or other
goods to inflict evils that are deserved or not unjust, it is wrong to
be sorry that he has the power, wealth, etc., just as it would be wrong
to deprive him of them. Thus, it is wrong to grieve over the election
of an honest official who will correct abuses and punish lawbreakers.
It is not unlawful, however, for a lawbreaker to be sorry for himself
at the prospect of the penalty he will receive.

(c) If it is uncertain whether the other will use his prosperity to do
injury to oneself or to others, it is lawful to fear and to be on one’s
guard, but it is not lawful to grieve unconditionally at the
prosperity, just as it is not lawful in the circumstances to deprive
the other of his prosperity.

1335. Is grief at the prosperity of another sinful, when it is caused
by his unworthiness of prosperity? (a) If the indignation could be
about spiritual things, of course it would be sinful; but this is not
possible, for it is precisely spiritual goods (such as virtues) that
make one deserving. Indignation, then, is about temporal goods, which
are enjoyed by the bad, as well as the good. (b) If the indignation is
about temporal things owned by the wicked, and one grieves that they
have prosperity, sin is committed. For it is God who distributes to the
undeserving the goods they have; His purpose is just, namely, that
these goods may be for the correction or the punishment of the wicked;
those who grieve over the prosperity of the unworthy overlook the fact
that eternal goods are a reward to man, temporal goods only a trust to
be administered. Hence, the Psalmist says: “Be not emulous of
evil-doers, nor envy them that work iniquity, for they shall shortly
wither away as grass” (Ps. xxxvi. 1).

1336. Two special cases of sorrow over the prosperity of the wicked
must be considered. (a) If one sorrows precisely because the prosperity
is had by an undeserving person, and is not thinking of the divine
cause and purpose in human affairs, it does not seem that one sins;
for, abstracting from Divine Providence, there does appear an
unsuitability in the prosperity enjoyed by the wicked, and hence it is
something to be sorry about. But such sorrow is at least a preparation
for the sin spoken of in the previous paragraph, and so it should be
shunned: “My feet were almost moved, my steps had well-nigh slipped, in
anger at the wicked, seeing the prosperity of sinners” (Ps. lxxii. 2,
3). (b) If one sorrows precisely because the sinner will use his
prosperity in such a way as to become more wicked and to incur
chastisement, the sorrow is not uncharitable, but charitable.

1337. Sorrow at being surpassed by another on account of the relative
loss of glory to self, with the wish that the other had not the good
that makes him superior, is envy, as explained above. This sorrow is a
sin. (a) Thus, it is condemned in scripture: “Let us not be made
desirous of vainglory, envying one another” (Gal, v. 26); “The
patriarchs through envy sold Joseph into Egypt” (Acts, vii. 9),
“Charity envieth not” (I Cor., xiii. 4). (b) It is not reasonable to be
grieved at the prosperity of others, since prosperity is something good
and an object of joy rather than of sorrow.

1338. From its nature envy is a mortal sin. (a) Thus, it is directly
opposed to the principal acts of charity, which are love of the
neighbor, desire of his good, and joy over his prosperity; and charity
is the life of the soul (I John, iii. 14). Secondary acts of charity,
such as kissing the sores of a leper, may be omitted without loss of
love, but envy destroys love itself. (b) Envy is directly contrary to
mercy; for, while mercy grieves at the evil of others, envy grieves at
their good. The envious are not merciful, neither are the merciful
envious.

1339. Envy is a greater sin than the other kinds of sorrow at a
neighbor’s good. (a) Thus, envy grieves over the neighbor’s good (even
if he is worthy), and is greater or less in proportion to that good;
(b) emulation grieves over one’s own deficiency, fear over the
consequences of the other’s good, indignation over the prosperity of
one who is unworthy.

1340. Envy is not a mortal sin in the following cases: (a) if the
object is not grave, as when one is envious about some trifle (such as
good looks); (b) if the subject does not give sufficient reflection or
full consent, as when infants are jealous of one another, or adults
feel the stirrings of envy. Even holy men are not above the first
movements or inclinations towards envy, and very many envious thoughts
are not mortal, because not fully adverted to.

1341. Degrees of Gravity in Sins of Envy.--(a) There are no different
species of envy of the neighbor, for all acts of envy have the one
essential trait that they are sorrow over the excellence of another,
viewed, not absolutely in itself, but relatively as a lessening of
one’s own excellence. We should distinguish, however, the envy which is
a sin against God (viz., envy at another’s spiritual good, or sorrow at
the diffusion of grace) from the envy which is a sin against the
neighbor.

(b) There are different degrees of envy within the species, according
to the greater or less excellence of the good which is envied. Thus, it
is a greater sin to be envious about spiritual things (e.g., another’s
influence for good) than about temporal things (e.g., another’s ability
to get money); it is a greater sin to be envious about the wellbeing of
the body than about dress, style, etc.

1342. Envy is one of the capital vices, that is, it is an evil tree
which from its very nature yields the evil fruits of other sins. The
fruits of envy are progressive in evil.

(a) Thus, in the beginning of envy, one tries to diminish the glory of
the person one envies, either secretly (sin of whispering) or openly
(sin of detraction).

(b) In its progress, envy rejoices at the adversity of the neighbor, if
its attempt to injure succeeds; or it sorrows over his continued
prosperity, if its effort at blackening has failed. Rejoicing at a
neighbor’s adversity is not different specifically from envy; but the
affliction over the neighbor’s prosperity now spoken of is of the same
species as the vice which sought to undermine the neighbor. Thus, if
the envious person resorted in vain to detraction, his grief at the
failure of his efforts is in guilt a sin of detraction.

(c) In its consummation, envy becomes hatred, as was said above on the
causes of hate (see 1316).

1343. Envy is not the first of the seven capital vices. (a) Thus, it is
caused by pride, for one who inordinately desires his own excellence
will easily grieve over what he regards as the lessening of that
excellence by the excellence of another. (b) It is caused by vainglory,
for one who inordinately longs for fame and honors, will easily be
grieved over the fame and honors enjoyed by others.

1344. In what way is envy preeminent among sins? (a) Envy is not the
most enormous vice, for, as said above (see 1301), hatred of God is
from its nature the worst of all sins. But there is one kind of
envy--namely, envy of a brother’s spiritual good--which has a place
among those gravest offenses called “sins against the Holy Ghost” (see
899).

(b) Envy is most like to the sin that brought all woe into the world,
for “by the envy of the devil death entered the world” (Wis., ii. 24).
It was sorrow at the gifts bestowed upon our first parents that moved
the demon to tempt them, and accordingly his envy led to their fall and
to the loss of original justice by the Whole race.

1345. Useful Considerations against Envy.--(a) Envy is useless, since
it does not obtain that on which one’s heart is set, or obtains it only
by the sacrifice of charity, which is something better. (b) Envy is
harmful, since it carries its own torment with it (Gen., iv. 5; Wis.,
vi. 25; Prov., xiv. 30), and brings on many sins against the neighbor.
Through envy the first murder was committed (Gen., iv. 8), and it was
envy that brought about the crucifixion of Christ (Matt, xxvii. 18).

1346. Useful practices against envy are: (a) the uprooting of its
causes, pride and vainglory; (b) the cultivation of an unselfish
charity and of emulation of what is best in others: “So that by all
means, whether by occasion, or by truth, Christ be preached, in this I
rejoice, yea, and will rejoice” (Philip., i. 18); “Let us consider one
another, to provoke unto charity and to good works” (Heb., x. 24).




Art. 8: THE SINS AGAINST PEACE

(_Summa Theologica_, II-II, qq. 37-42.)

1347. The following sins are opposed to the peace of charity: (a)
discord, which is opposed to peace in wills; (b) contention or
quarreling, which is opposed to peace in words; (e) schism, war, fights
and sedition, which are opposed to peace in works.

1348. Discord.--As here understood, discord is a disagreement in the
wills of two or more persons in matters pertaining to the divine good,
or the good of the neighbor, and concerning which charity requires that
they be in agreement.

(a) Discord is a disagreement in wills, that is, in wishes and desires.
Hence, it is not the same as difference of opinion (see 1197), which is
a disagreement in judgments.

(b) It is about matters in which agreement is necessary, that is, in
which the law of God requires that all wish the same things, and have
but one heart and soul. Thus, discord differs from disagreement about
matters of supererogation. Examples: Titus and his wife are at
variance, because Titus is unwilling to give any alms. Balbus and his
wife are at variance, because she wishes him to give away in alms more
than is strictly necessary. In the first husband there is discord, but
not in the second.

(c) Discord is opposed to the divine good, or the good of the neighbor.
Thus, it differs from a disagreement with another who is attacking the
divine good or the good of the neighbor. The standard of concord is the
divine will, and he only of the persons at variance is discordant who
is not in harmony with the divine will.

(d) Discord is confined to those matters in which charity calls for
agreement. If it be some other virtue that demands unanimity (e.g.,
justice), the disagreement is not discord in the special sense now
employed, Thus, he whose will refuses consent to the command of a
superior is disobedient; he whose will refuses to pay the debt due a
creditor is dishonest.

1349. There are two kinds of discord: (a) intentional discord, which is
the act of one who knowingly and purposely contradicts in a matter
about which charity requires that he agree;

(b) unintentional discord, which is a disagreement between persons, who
both intend the divine good or the good of the neighbor, but who are
divided in opinion as to what that good here and now requires.

1350. Sinfulness of Intentional Discord.--(a) From its nature, this
species of discord is a mortal sin, since it directly excludes charity.
Hence, those who are guilty of discord shall not obtain the kingdom of
heaven (Gal, v. 21). (b) From the lack of sufficient reflection or
consent, the first impulses towards discord are not mortal sins.

1351. Sinfulness of Unintentional Discord.--(a) From its nature, this
kind of discord is not opposed to charity, nor is it sinful; for the
concord of charity consists in a union of wills, not in a union of
opinions. Thus, the disagreement between Paul and Barnabas about John
Mark (Acts, xv. 39) was not sinful, although the difference of judgment
indicated their human limitations. (b) From its circumstances, this
kind of discord may be sinful, as when it is caused by culpable
ignorance in matters of faith, or is carried on with obstinacy.

1352. By whom is the sin of discord committed? (a) It is committed
sometimes by one party only, as when one knowingly resists the will of
another who wishes to perform a necessary act of charity. (b) It is
committed at other times by both parties, as when each in defending his
own good infringes knowingly on the charity due the other.

1353. Is it lawful to promote divisions, when one’s purpose and the
result will be good? (a) To promote division that takes away the
concord of charity is never lawful, but a mortal sin: “There are six
things the Lord hates, and a seventh which His soul detests, a sower of
discord among brethren” (Prov., vi. 16, 19). (b) To promote division
that takes away a concord of malice is lawful and praiseworthy. Thus,
St. Paul introduced a dissension between the Pharisees and the
Sadducees, who had been in agreement against him (Acts, xxiii. 6, 7).
But the intention of the Apostle was to win the Pharisees to the
defense of the Resurrection and of himself, not to incite the Sadducees
to a denial of the Resurrection, and so there was no question of his
using evil means for a good end.

1354. The Origin of Discord.--(a) The disagreement with the will of a
neighbor arises from envy. For he who considers the excellence of his
neighbor as a lessening of his own excellence, is inclined to
contradict the wishes of the neighbor, even if he recognizes them as
good. (b) The preference of one’s own will and persistence in it are
due to pride and vainglory. For he who unduly desires his own
excellence or fame does not wish to yield to others or change his
purposes. He feels that, even though he is in the wrong, he must not
take what he regards as a position of inferiority.

1355. Contention.--Contention is discord carried into words or
equivalent signs, (i.e., a dispute or altercation), in which one denies
what the other affirms. It is divided as follows: (a) by reason of the
intention, it is either an investigation of the truth, a defense of the
truth, or an attack on the truth; (b) by reason of the manner in which
it is conducted, it is either suitable or unsuitable to the persons and
the matter in question.

1356. Contention whose aim is the discovery of the truth is lawful as
follows. (a) Such contention is lawful and useful in itself, for it is
a means of acquiring useful knowledge, of seeing both sides of a
question, and of sharpening the mind for the refutation of error.
Hence, a contest in a court of justice, a controversy in a scientific
journal, a public debate on some important matter, and a theological
disputation are according to their nature lawful, and may be necessary.
Even to argue against the truth, for the sake of practice in discussion
or to bring out the truth more clearly and forcibly, is, apart from
danger, scandal, or prohibition, not unuseful.

(b) Debate is unlawful in its manner when a disputant does not argue
according to the rules, appeals to prejudice or ignorance, uses an
insulting tone or unparliamentary language, etc.

1357. The Sin of Contention.--Contention is a sin when its aim is the
concealment or discomfiture of the truth. (a) From its nature this kind
of contention is a mortal sin, for it is the external expression of
internal discord in matters about which charity requires concord and
the same speech. Hence, the Apostle numbers contention among the works
of the flesh that exclude from the kingdom of God (Gal, v. 20). (b)
From the lightness of the matter or the imperfection of the consent,
this kind of contention is very often, if not usually, only a venial
sin, or no sin at all. Examples: A person argues against what he knows
is true, but the matter is trivial (e.g., his weight); or he is
distracted by the heat of dispute or the tactics of the other party.

1358. Mortal sin is not committed by contention, therefore, unless the
truths against which one contends are of a serious kind. Such truths
are: (a) truths of a religious or moral character, such as the
doctrines of faith and the commandments of God; (b) natural truths of a
universal character, the knowledge of which pertains to the perfection
of the intellect, such as first principles; (c) natural truths of a
particular character in which important rights are involved. Example:
An historian who writes against some deservedly revered person of the
past, or a lawyer who attempts to prove against an accused what he
knows is not a fact, are guilty of the sin of contention.

1359. Hence, one may be defending one kind of truth and contending
against another kind of truth at the same time. St. Paul, accordingly,
makes the distinction between announcement of the truth out of charity
and announcement of the truth out of contention (Philip, i, 15 sqq.).
(a) The truth is defended out of charity when one does not use truth as
a means for the defense of error; (b) it is defended out of contention
when one makes use of it as a means for the propagation of error. Thus,
while St. Paul was imprisoned at Rome in 61, certain personal enemies
preached Christ, but at the same time spoke or hinted falsehoods
against St. Paul in order to undermine his authority or add to the
bitterness of his captivity. Similarly, if one defends the truth to
make oneself appear different or better than one is, one speaks from
contention.

1360. Ways in which one is guilty of the mortal sin of contention: (a)
when one contends formally against the truth, that is, when one knows
the truth and intends to overcome it or suppress it; (b) when one
contends virtually against the truth, that is, when one is so bent on
carrying one’s point that one does not care whether it is true or
false. Thus, the Sophists aimed to win, right or wrong.

1361. When the aim of contention is the overthrow of error: (a) in
itself, such contention is good and praiseworthy, and at times
necessary; (b) by reason of circumstances, it may be a venial or a
mortal sin. Examples: A dispute on a matter that is unbecoming, such as
which of the disputants is greater (Luke, xxii. 24); dispute with
greater warmth than the case requires; a dispute that leads to scandal
or other evil consequences, as in religious controversies (I Tim., ii.
14).

1362. The Causes of Sinful Contention.--(a) The cause of that which is
principal in contention--namely, the departure from the truth held by
another and the stand made for error--is envy, pride and vainglory, as
said above (see 1854) concerning discord. (b) The cause of that which
is secondary in contention--namely, the wrangling or bawling manner and
the shouts or screams of the contenders--is anger.

1363. The sins in act against the peace of charity are the following:
(a) schism which is opposed to the peace of the spiritual society, the
Church; (b) war, which is opposed to international peace, and sedition,
which is opposed to national peace; (c) fighting, which is opposed to
peace between individuals.

1364. Schism.--Schism (etymologically, a split, rent) is defined: “A
voluntary separation of oneself from the unity of the Church.”

(a) Schism is a voluntary separation, that is, a separation intended
for its own sake. Every sinner in a sense separates himself from unity,
for sin divides one from God (Is., lix. 2); but it is only the
schismatic who expressly intends separation as such. Other sinners
expressly intend some inordinate gratification. Moreover, schism is not
the same thing as the state of the unbaptized, who have not separated
themselves from unity, or of the excommunicated, whom the Church
herself rejected from her body on account of some sin other than schism.

(b) Schism is a separation from unity, and so it differs from disbelief
in unity (heresy) and dislike of unity (hatred). One may separate
oneself from unity, although one believes in it. One may hate unity,
and yet not separate oneself from it. Further, schism does not
necessarily include affiliation with some schismatical body or the
setting up of such a body.

(c) Schism is a separation of oneself from unity--that is, schism does
not deprive the Church of the note of unity, but separates the
schismatic himself from that unity which is in the Church. The
schismatic may wish to take away the unity of the Church, but he
accomplishes only the loss of union of himself with the Church.

(d) Schism is a separation from unity, that is, from fellowship in the
mystical body of Christ (I Cor., xii). It is a refusal to recognize the
authority of the head of the Church, or to communicate with those
subject to him. Thus, schism differs from disobedience to the head of
the Church or to particular prelates in the Church, for one may disobey
orders and still recognize the authority of him who gives the orders.

(e) Schism is a separation from the unity of the Church, that is, of
the spiritual kingdom of Christ on earth. Hence, rebellion in matters
purely civil against a churchman who has civil authority, is not
schism, but is unjust war or sedition. Schism is possible only in the
Church Militant, for the members of the Church Suffering and the Church
Triumphant cannot fall away from unity.

1365. The Principal Schismatical Movements.--(a) In Apostolic times
there were local factions and dissensions, though not real schisms, at
Corinth (I Cor., i. 10 sqq.) and in Asia Minor (III John, i. 10). (b)
In post-Apostolic times there have been numerous schisms, such as that
of the Novatians at Rome in the third century, that of the Meletians in
Egypt in the fourth century, that of the Donatists in Africa in the
fourth century, that of the Acacians in the East in the fifth century.
The most lamentable of all the schisms, because of the number of those
whom it led away from unity, was the Eastern Schism, begun by Photius
in the ninth century and made permanent under Michael Caerularius in the
eleventh century.

1366. Schism is voluntary in two ways: (a) directly, when one intends
schism itself, wishing to separate oneself from the head or members of
the Church; (b) indirectly, when one intends to do that from which
schism follows. Thus, a person who prefers to act as if he were not a
member of the Church rather than desist from his design of calling or
presiding over an unauthorized Council, is guilty of schism, even
though he does not directly intend separation from the Church. His case
is similar to that of one who does not wish to kill his neighbor, and
yet is determined to do something from which the neighbor’s death will
surely result.

1367. There is a threefold unity of the Church, as follows: (a) unity
in the theological virtues and in the Sacraments. All the faithful have
the same faith, hope, charity, Sacraments, and thus there is a unity of
similarity; (b) unity between head and members. There is but one head
of the Church, Christ in heaven and the Vicar of Christ an earth. Thus,
there is a unity of subordination; (c) unity between the members of the
Church. All the faithful form but one society, and all are parts of one
great whole. Thus, there is a collective unity.

1368. The sin of schism is committed in two ways (Canon 1325, n. 2).
(a) It is committed by separation from the head of the Church on earth
and the keystone of unity, that is, the Pope (Col., ii. 18, 19). The
mere fact that a man is in rebellion against his bishop does not make
him a schismatic, if he continues to acknowledge subjection to the Holy
See. But such rebellion is often the first step towards schism. (b) The
sin of schism is also committed by separation from the members of the
Church. Thus, one who refuses to communicate with Catholics in matters
of faith or worship, choosing to act as an independent in those things,
is a schismatic.

1369. Rejection of a decision or command of the Pope can happen in
three ways:

(a) The reason for rejecting the decision may be the thing commanded,
and not the one who gave the command, as when a person refuses to keep
a fast or make a restitution commanded by the Pope, because he
considers it too difficult. In this case the person is guilty of
disobedience, but not of schism, even though he persists in his
refusal; for he rejects a commandment of the Church, not the head of
the Church.

(b) The reason for rejecting the command may be the one who gave the
command, considered as a private individual. As the Pope in his
personal relations is not above human weakness, he may be swayed by
hatred, prejudice or impulsiveness in issuing commands to or forming
judgments about individual subjects. Hence, if we suppose that it is
reasonably certain that a Pope is unfavorable to an individual, and
that the latter accordingly is unwilling to have a case in which he is
concerned fall under the immediate decision of that Pope, neither
schism nor any other sin is committed; for it is natural that the
person should wish to protect his own interests against unfairness.

(c) The reason for rejecting the Pope’s judgment may be the one who
gave the command considered in his official capacity as Pope. In this
case the person is guilty of schism, since he disobeys, not because the
thing ordered is difficult or because he fears that the individual will
be unjust, but because he does not wish to recognize the authority of
Pope in him who issued the judgment.

1370. Comparison of Heresy and Schism.--(a) These sins are not the
same, since heresy is opposed to faith, schism to charity. A person who
really believes that the Church is one in its head and its body, may
nevertheless out of pride, hatred, ambition, interest,
self-sufficiency, etc., decide not to recognize the authority of the
head, or not to communicate with the body. (b) There is an intimate
union between heresy and schism, since every heretic separates himself
from the unity of faith, while schism is always found to adopt some
heresy as a justification for its separation (I Tim., i. 6). Thus, the
Eastern Schism soon trumped up charges of heresy against the Church,
and history shows that schism almost invariably leads to a denial of
papal primacy.

1371. The Opposition between Schism and Charity.--(a) Charity in itself
is a spiritual bond of unity between the soul and God, for love is
unitive. One who sins against this unity by offending God or his
neighbor, is not thereby a schismatic, since one may hate an
individual, for example, without hating the Church. (b) Charity in its
effect is the communion of all the faithful in one mystical body of
Christ, for charity inspires the desire to love, not only individuals,
but also the spiritual society formed of individuals in the entire
world. One who sins against the unity and peace of the Church is a
schismatic.

1372. The Sinfulness of Schism.--(a) Schism has a special seriousness,
since it is opposed to the union and peace of mankind as a whole in the
universal spiritual society which is the Church. It seems to be the
greatest sin against the neighbor; for other sins are against the
individual or against the multitude in temporal things, while this sin
is against the multitude and in spiritual things. Scripture (cfr. I
Cor., i. 10) and Tradition (e.g., St. Clement of Rome, St. Ignatius of
Antioch, St. Irenaeus, St. Cyprian, St. Augustine) energetically condemn
the sin of schism.

(b) Objectively, it is not as serious as unbelief, since unbelief is
against God, schism against the neighbor; but subjectively, or in its
consequences, it may be greater than unbelief, as when a schismatic
sins with greater contempt than an unbeliever, or is an occasion of
more danger to others.

1373. Schism, like heresy, may be either formal or material (see 828).
(a) Formal schism is that described above, in which one wishes to
separate oneself from the unity of the Church, and is in culpable
revolt. It is a mortal sin. (b) Material schism is that in which one is
in fact separated from the unity of the Church, but is in good faith.
An example is the Great Schism of the West (1378-1417), when there were
rival claimants for the Papacy, and invincible ignorance among the
people as to who was the true head. This kind of schism is not a mortal
sin.

1374. The Spiritual Powers of Schismatics.--(a) The power of Orders is
not lost through schism, for that power is conferred through a
consecration, and the consecrations of the Church are permanent. Hence,
a schismatical priest can perform validly the acts that pertain to the
power of Orders, such as the celebration of Mass and administration of
the Sacraments; but he does not perform those acts lawfully, unless the
Church permits, for the power of Orders should not be used by an
inferior except as permitted by the superior.

(b) The power of jurisdiction may be lost through schism, for that
power depends on a commission received from a superior, which may be
withdrawn by him. Hence, a schismatical priest deprived of jurisdiction
could not absolve, excommunicate, grant indulgences, or perform other
acts that pertain to the power of jurisdiction.

1375. The law of the church on the powers of schismatics is as follows:

(a) All schismatics incur _ipso facto_ excommunication, as well as
various inhabilities and penalties (Canon 2314). It is fitting that
those who separate themselves should be declared outside the communion
of the faithful, and this is what Moses commanded to be done at the
time of the schism of Core: “Depart from the tent of these wicked men
and touch nothing of theirs, lest you be involved in their sin” (Num.,
xvi. 26).

(b) The excommunicated are forbidden the celebration of Mass and the
active use and administration of the Sacraments and sacramentals,
except when the faithful apply to them or when there is danger of
death, as declared in Canon 2261.

(c) The excommunicated are denied the power of jurisdiction except in
certain cases where the Church grants it for the sake of the common
good. Thus, they may give absolution in danger of death (Canon 882), or
in common error (Canon 209), or at request, if they are not _vitandi_
or sentenced (Canon 2261). It is the teaching of learned authorities
that the Roman Church for the good of souls has allowed ecclesiastical
jurisdiction to remain in the schismatic Oriental Churches for the
conferring of the Sacraments.

1376. War.--War is defined as a state of conflict between two or more
sovereign nations carried on by force of arms.

(a) It is a state of conflict, and so differs from passing conflicts,
such as battles, skirmishes, campaigns. The enemy in war is not only
those with whom one is actually fighting, but all those who side with
them, as counsellors, helpers, etc.

(b) War is between sovereign nations, and so differs from civil war,
sedition, riots, duels. Moreover, war is made by nation against nation,
not against particular individuals or groups of individuals within a
nation.

(c) It is carried on by force of arms, and so differs from trade war,
rivalry in preparedness for war, embargo, blockade, breach of
diplomatic relations, etc.

1377. There are two kinds of war, just and unjust. (a) War is just when
undertaken for a right cause (e.g., the independence of the nation);
(b) it is unjust when undertaken for a wrong cause (e.g., the
enslavement of a nation).

1378. Just war is either offensive or defensive. (a) Offensive war is
attack made on an enemy in order to avenge an injury or enforce a right
(e.g., invasion of the enemy’s territory to obtain compensation for
damages inflicted by him); (b) defensive war is resistance to unjust
attack made or menaced by an enemy (e.g., war made on the invader of
one’s country).

1379. Just war is called defensive in two senses. (a) In the strict
sense, it is defensive when the nation whose rights are unjustly
attacked does not initiate hostilities, that is, does not declare or
begin the war. (b) In a less strict sense, it is defensive when the
nation unjustly attacked declares war or strikes the first blow. Thus,
if the innocent nation knew that the enemy was secretly preparing war
against its independence, it would be on the defensive, even though it
declared war.

1380. War is not against the law of God. (a) Under the law of nature
Melchisedech blessed Abraham returning from victory over the four kings
(Gen., xiv. 18-20). (b) Under the written law, God many times ordered
or approved of war, as can be seen from Exodus and following books in
numerous places. (c) Under the New Law, John the Baptist acknowledged
the lawfulness of the soldier’s profession (Luke, iii. 14), a centurion
was praised by Christ (Matt, viii. 10), Acts, x. 2, speaks of the
officer Cornelius as a religious man, and St. Paul lauds warriors of
the Old Testament such as Gedeon, Barac, Samson, etc. (Heb, xi. 32-34).
Our Lord Himself used physical force against evildoers (John, ii. 14
sqq.).

1381. Certain sayings of our Lord--for example, that those who take the
sword shall perish by the sword (Matt, xxvi. 52), and that one should
not resist evil (Matt, v. 39)--are not an endorsement of extreme
pacifism, but are respectively a condemnation of those who without due
authority have recourse to violence, and a counsel of perfection, when
this serves better the honor of God or the good of the neighbor.
Moreover, these words of Christ were addressed, not to states, which
are responsible for the welfare of their members, but to individuals.
The Quakers have done excellent service for the cause of world peace,
but their teaching that all war is contrary to the law of Christ cannot
be admitted. The spirit of the Gospel includes justice as well as love.

1382. War is not against the law of the Church. (a) The Church has
never condemned war as such. She has always labored for the promotion
of peace or for the lessening of the evils of wars that could not be
prevented; but her official declarations and the writings of the
Fathers and Doctors show that she recognized that recourse to arms by
nations is not necessarily sinful. (b) The Church has put her approval
on some wars as necessary and laudable. Thus, the Crusades, to which
the salvation of Christian civilization is due, were promoted by the
Church; military orders for the defense of the Holy Sepulchre were
instituted by her, and she has raised to the honors of the altar
soldiers like Sebastian, Maurice, and Martin of Tours.

1383. War is not against the law of nature. (a) As the law of nature
allows even a private individual to use force to drive off an unjust
aggressor, it cannot be unlawful for a nation to have recourse to
defensive war when its rights are invaded. (b) As the law of nature
allows the individual to seek satisfaction for injury and restitution
for loss, it cannot be unlawful for a nation to make offensive war when
another nation will not make reparation, unless compelled to it by
force. If physical coercion were unlawful, a conscienceless nation
would take advantage of this at the expense of other nations, and thus
a premium would be set on iniquity.

1384. Like every other act, war is not morally good, unless its object,
its purpose and its circumstances are in accord with right. War is not
lawful, therefore, unless the three following conditions exist:

(a) Hostilities must be authorized by the public authority, for the
care of the State against internal and external disturbances has been
committed to the ruler (Rom., xii. 4; Ps. lxxxi. 4), and the individual
or the subject state can have recourse for protection of its rights to
the higher authority.

(b) There must be a just cause for war, that is, some fault on the side
of the other nation; for, if a nation may not use force against its own
subjects without sufficient reason, much less may it do so against
those who are not its subjects.

(c) There must be a right intention, that is, the desire to obtain some
good or to ward off some evil. Even if war is declared by the proper
authority and there is a sufficient reason for it, those who take part
in the war are guilty of sin if they have evil motives, such as the
exercise of cruelty, revenge, pride, or avarice. To delight in war
because one loves excitement or wishes to show one’s skill or get
promotion, is not a right frame of mind.

1385. What public authority has the right to declare war? (a)
Ordinarily, only the sovereign power--that is, the person or body in
whom the chief authority is vested according to the constitution of the
nation--can make war. War is an act of the nation, and hence only the
authority that represents the nation can make war. Subordinate bodies
in a confederation or union of states have the right to make war, if
custom or law allows it.

(b) In extraordinary circumstances, an inferior power can authorize
war, as when war is necessary and it is impossible to await a
declaration from the sovereign power. Thus, if a province were suddenly
invaded, it would be lawful for the head of the province to make war on
the invaders at once. It seems, indeed, that the head of a province
could justly authorize the invasion of a neighboring state, to protect
such province against aggressions, if the central authority would do
nothing; for such a war would be really defensive.

1386. In order that the cause of war be just, it is necessary that the
enemy nation has done or now menaces an injury which cannot be repaired
without war, and which is so serious that the evils of war are less
than that of toleration.

(a) Thus, a serious injury or grave dishonor inflicted by another
nation is the only just cause for the armed conflict which constitutes
war, for war is exercised as a punishment or a compulsion, and these
are unjust if no grave and formal fault is supposed.

(b) Only an injury that cannot be otherwise repaired is a just cause
for war, because a state has no right to use force against another
sovereign state except as a last resort. Hence, if the country at fault
has already made satisfaction or has promised to make satisfaction, war
should not be declared.

(c) Only an injury so grave that it outweighs the risks and losses of
war is a justification for making war, for when two effects, one good
and one evil, follow from an act, there must be a proportionately grave
reason for permitting the evil effect before acting (see 104, 105). It
would be wrong to avenge some small insult or some isolated injury at
the expense of immense treasure and enormous loss of life. Modern
warfare is so devastating that only the gravest reasons known to
society can authorize it. For, according to scientists, a single H-bomb
may cause death and destruction over a wide area, perhaps the space of
a hundred square miles. In view of the havoc which is foreseen to
outweigh the benefits of victory, it could happen that a nation with
justice on its side and the potential to wage war would nevertheless
not be justified in waging war (see 1410). This destructive power of
modern weapons, however, need not imply a sweeping condemnation of all
warfare. Spiritual values, e.g., freedom from tyranny, freedom to
worship God, still hold primacy over material values and can be deemed
so precious as to outweigh the great loss of lives and property
involved in defending them or recovering them through modern warfare.
“A people menaced by, or already victims of unjust aggression, if it
desires to think and to act in a Christian manner, cannot remain in
passive indifference” (Pope Pius XII, Christmas Message of 1948).

1387. In comparing the advantages and disadvantages of war, one should
take into consideration, not only the losses oneself will suffer, but
also the losses that will be suffered by others. (a) Thus, if the enemy
nation will be ruined as the price of one’s obtaining some small right,
charity would urge that one abstain from war. (b) If the world in
general or posterity will suffer greater evils materially or
spiritually than a nation is now suffering from the denial of some
non-essential right, charity at least should rule out a declaration of
war.

1388. Is there a just reason for war, when a fault has been committed
on both sides? (a) If the injuries are about equal and still in being,
there is no reason for war, for neither nation is in a position to
accuse the other of injustice. (b) If the injuries are quite unequal or
one nation has shown a willingness to cease from injury, the less
guilty nation has a right to make war; but it should first clear itself
of injustice, before it proceeds to chastise injustice in the other.

1389. Sufficient causes for making war are: (a) grave injury to the
honor of a nation, such as insult to its ruler or ambassadors (II
Kings, x.); (b) injury to the natural right of the nation to existence,
self-preservation, property, free action within its own sphere; thus, a
people may make war to defend their independence (I Mach., iii. 59), to
recover territory taken from them unjustly, to resist a violation of
neutrality (II Kings, viii. 5), to protect their own citizens and
commerce; (c) injury to the rights of the nation under positive law.
Thus, a nation may make war to uphold important international
agreements, to enforce the observance of treaties, and the like.

1390. Injury done to a third nation or to the subjects of a third
nation may also be a sufficient reason for war. (a) Thus, out of
justice, a nation is obliged to help its allies in a just war; for to
help those with whose interests one’s own interests are involved is
only self-defense. (b) Out of charity, a nation that has the right of
intervention may lawfully go to war to protect a weaker nation against
a stronger and bullying nation, to assist a government unjustly
attacked by its subjects, or to help innocent subjects who are
tyrannized over by their government.

1391. Is it lawful to go to war over religion or morality?

(a) Error in the religion or immorality in the practices of another
people is not a sufficient reason for making war on them. No one can be
forced to believe, says St. Augustine; and it is likewise true that no
one can be forced to love virtue, whereas external conformity without
conviction or love is hypocritical. Moreover, a nation has no authority
to correct the sins of those not subject to it. Hence, it would not be
right to attack a people for the sole reason that it was pagan or
polygamous.

(b) Interference, however, with the religious rights of others or
sinful practices that are injurious to others are a sufficient reason
for war. No war ever had a more legitimate cause than the Crusades,
which were undertaken to defend the Christian religion against the
unspeakable atrocities of infidels. The cause of humanity justifies a
war to put an end to such evils as cannibalism or human sacrifice.

1392. Is it lawful to make war on another nation in order to bring to
it the benefits of modern civilization? (a) If the uncivilized nation
lacks a government and suffers from disorder, it is an act of charity
for a civilized nation to set up a government there which will act for
the benefit of the people of the country. It is also lawful to make war
on those who resist the government thus established. (b) If the
uncivilized nation has its own orderly form of government and is at
peace, no other nation has the right to interfere under pretext of
introducing a higher type of government. Colonial expansion is not a
sufficient reason for war in such circumstances.

1393. The following causes for war are not sufficient:

(a) Motives clearly sinful are such as do not suppose any injury done
by the other nation, but rather some evil passion of pride, greed,
jealousy, suspicion, or selfishness on one’s own side. Hence, it is not
lawful to go to war for the glory of a ruler or of the nation, for the
enlargement of one’s territory, for the advantage that may be gained
over a commercial rival, for the preservation of the balance of power,
or for the prevention of difficulties at home.

(b) Motives apparently just, but really sinful, are injuries done by
another, if one has secretly provoked them in order to have a pretext
for war. It is not right to make war on a people because of attacks
made by their citizens, if these attacks were purposely caused by one’s
own citizens.

(c) Motives of displeasure with another nation are not sufficient as
motives for war, if the other nation has violated no right of justice,
but only acted in a way not consonant with charity or friendship. Thus,
the fact that one nation denies another financial assistance or the
tariff advantages granted to a third nation is not a _casus belli_; for
in matters of benevolence or privilege there is no strict claim or
title, and hence no right to have recourse to arms.

1394. Is war lawful when the justice of the cause is doubtful? (a) The
government may not declare war, unless it is morally certain that right
is on its side. The consequences of war are so dreadful, and the use of
force against another nation is such an extreme measure, that one
should refrain from hostilities as long as one’s moral right is
uncertain.

(b) Volunteers not already enlisted may not offer their services to a
belligerent, unless they are morally certain that his cause is just.
They participate in war from choice, and they should assure themselves
that their choice is correct.

(c) Subjects called to the colors should fight for their country, even
if they are in doubt about the justice of the cause, for the
presumption is on the side of the government. This does not mean,
however, that one should be willing to fight for one’s country, right
or wrong. nor that one would be obliged to fight for a cause manifestly
unjust, or to obey an order flagrantly wrong.

1395. What is the meaning of “moral certitude” in the previous
paragraph? (a) Some moralists believe that a high degree of probability
of the righteousness of his cause suffices in order that a ruler may
take steps towards war. (b) The greater number of moralists, however,
hold that no degree of probability suffices. The justifying reasons
must be clearer than day, and the state which goes to war must not
entertain a single doubt that its cause is right. This opinion we
prefer; for, if a jury may not sentence an accused to death as long as
there is a reasonable doubt of his innocence, neither ought a nation to
pass what is really a death sentence on hundreds or thousands of
citizens as long as there exists a doubt of a compelling reason for
such a course. It should, however, be observed that a ruler who has
only probable evidence that an injury has been done already, may have
certainty that it will be done, if it is not prevented by war.

1396. Is it possible that the cause of war should be just on both
sides? (a) Materially or objectively, the cause of war is just only on
one side, for, if one nation has the right to demand satisfaction or
restitution, manifestly the other nation has no right to refuse or
resist. (b) Formally or subjectively, the cause of war is just only on
one side, if the facts and obligations are known to both disputants,
for the nation that knows the right of the other side and yet opposes
it, does not act in good faith. (c) Formally or subjectively, the cause
of war is just on both sides, if the nation that is objectively in the
wrong is subjectively persuaded that it is in the right. And, even
though a government is in bad faith, its people as a rule will be in
good faith as a result of not understanding the facts or merits of the
controversy.

1397. It is possible that there should be objective justice and
injustice on the same side. (a) Thus, the side which is just as regards
the cause of the war, may be unjust in its conduct of the war on
account of the unlawful means it employs to win, or its continuation of
a hopeless struggle. (b) The side which was just as regards the
original cause of the war, may be unjust as regards a new cause that
appears. Thus, a nation which goes to war to regain a lost territory,
but which continues to fight for the sake of conquest after the
legitimate end has been achieved, contends for a just cause at the
beginning, but for an unjust cause later on. (c) The side whose grounds
are justifiable from the immediate point of view may be in the wrong if
causes are traced farther back.

1398. What are the duties before the beginning of war, according to
natural law?

(a) Examination of the Cause of War.--It is clear that those charged
with the declaration of war are bound to examine diligently and
prayerfully into the dispute, weighing the reasons on both sides, and
asking light from on high. To this end they should seek the counsel,
not of a few, but of many--not merely among those who are experts in
the diplomatic, legal, economic, and military aspects of the question,
but also among those who will look at the matter from its ethical side
and who are guided by fairness and justice. Since it is the people who
have to bear the burdens of war, it seems that many wars in the past
would have been prevented, had the wishes of the people been consulted.

(b) Judgment about the Merits of the Controversy.--It is also clear
that those who have to decide for war or peace should be impartial in
their judgment. Hence, they have to be on their guard against jingoism,
yellow journalism, and war interests, as well as against the pacifist
or the favorer of a foreign country at the expense of his own. They
should not proceed to offensive war, if their cause remains doubtful,
unless the other side provokes war by refusing peaceful settlement;
but, if they are in possession, they have the right to make defensive
war.

(c) Judgment about the Feasibility of War.--Prudence demands that, even
when a nation is convinced that it has a just cause to make war, it
should nevertheless refrain from this, unless it has a well-grounded
expectation that war will improve matters (Luke, xiv. 31, 32).
Statesmen who plunge their people into adventures whose end they cannot
at all foresee, are criminals.

(d) Efforts at Peaceful Solution.--Even if the cause is just and the
war feasible, hostilities should not be resorted to except as a last
means. Hence, pacific means--such as direct negotiation, mediation,
arbitration, judicial settlement, or pressure through trade embargoes,
boycotts, breach of diplomatic intercourse, etc.--should be tried in
the first place.

1399. The Chief Duties before Beginning War, According to International
Law.--(a) Before war is declared, an ultimatum should be issued to the
other nation, offering it final terms and a last opportunity to make
apology or satisfaction. (b) Foreigners who are in one’s territory
should be given an opportunity to settle their affairs and leave the
country within a reasonable time. (c) Ambassadors and other
representatives of the enemy should be provided with passports.

1400. In itself, as said above (see 1380 sqq.), war is not unlawful.
But in the light of the conditions required for a just war and of
circumstances as they are today, can war at the present time be ever
justifiable? (a) If the supreme interests of a nation are at stake
(such as its independence, the policies or interests vital to its
existence, its obligations under covenant or treaty of peace), war can
still be lawful today, for a nation cannot surrender its right to
self-defense, or betray its solemn engagements of cooperative defense.
(b) If less than supreme interests are at stake, war today seems
unjustifiable, for what proportion is there between the minor interests
of a single or several nations and the enormous destruction of modern
war and the dislocation of international security? Efforts of statesmen
to secure a world pact, outlawing or renouncing war as a means of
national policy, indicates progress for this view.

1401. What are the duties during war? (a) One should use every lawful
means, according to one’s position, to secure victory for one’s
country. Fighting to gain only a “stalemate,” in itself, is immoral.
(b) One should avoid such means as are opposed to natural or
international law.

1402. It is not true that all is fair in war, for even a just cause
cannot sanction unjust means. The commandments of God and the laws of
nations retain their force even amid the clash of arms. Examples of
acts of war that are unlawful, as being opposed to the natural law are
the following: (a) acts of irreligion, such as wanton destruction of
churches or monasteries; (b) attempts to seduce enemy soldiers from the
obedience or loyalty owed their commanders; (c) murder, that is, the
direct killing of innocent and unarmed persons, as when one refuses
quarter to soldiers who wish to surrender, fires on an officer bearing
a flag of truce, sinks passenger ships not engaged on errands of war,
massacres the civil population by raids from the air, places a
defenceless population at the mercy of savages or criminals employed as
soldiers; (d) the dishonoring of women, the establishment of brothels
for soldiers; (e) stealing, such as the unauthorized pillage of a town
or countryside; (f) lying, such as breaking treaties, not keeping faith
with the foe, entering into perjured agreements, circulating false
stories of atrocities, forging of documents, etc.

1403. Just war is resistance to unjust aggression, and so the same
means are lawful in warfare as are lawful in private aggression. (a)
Thus, the means used against an aggressor must not be evil in
themselves, as when a person protects himself against a murderer by
making an innocent person a shield. Hence, in war one may not use any
means that is opposed to the law of God, or to human contracts or other
obligations. (b) The means employed must be such as are really
necessary for overpowering the aggressor. Thus, it is not lawful to
kill a burglar when wounding him will suffice for the protection of
one’s property. Likewise, in war it is not lawful to exterminate or
depopulate an enemy, if the end of war can be attained by depriving the
enemy of his weapons.

1404. The principal classes of acts of war from the moral standpoint
are: (a) acts in which violence is done to things connected with
religion; (b) acts of violence against persons; (c) acts of violence
against property; (d) acts used to conceal truth.

1405. Acts of War and Sacred Times.--(a) It is lawful to carry on
warfare, offensively or defensively, on feasts, when this is necessary,
just as it is lawful to do servile work on those days in case of
necessity (I Mach., ii. 41; John, vii. 23). (b) But if a suspension of
hostilities can be arranged for feast days (especially for the greater
ones, such as Christmas and Easter), warfare should be discontinued at
those times.

1406. Acts of War and Sacred Places.--(a) It is lawful to attack a
church building, if it is certainly being used for military purposes.
It is also lawful to attack fortifications, and thus unintentionally to
harm adjacent church buildings. (b) It is not lawful, apart from these
reasons of real military necessity, to injure sacred places or edifices.

1407. Acts of War and Sacred Persons.--(a) It is lawful for clerics to
cooperate in a just war in spiritual ways, as by exhortations, prayers,
and religious ministrations. Moses prayed for the armies of Israel
during battle (Exod., xvii. 8 sqq.), the priests accompanied Josue
around the wall of Jericho (Jos., vi. 4), and St. Bernard and other
holy men preached crusades. (b) It is not lawful, apart from necessity
(as in case of conscription), for clerics to take part in actual
fighting. Warfare is unbecoming in a cleric, because he is enrolled for
a spiritual warfare (II Tim., ii. 4), and because his leader, Christ,
shed His own blood, not that of others (Matt, xxvi. 52). Hence, the
Church forbids clerics to volunteer as soldiers (Canon 141).

1408. The persons to whom violence is done during war are: (a)
Combatants, that is, all those who are engaged in the actual promotion
of the war. Direct combatants are the fighters, such as the officers
and privates of army, navy, and air force; indirect combatants are the
unarmed auxiliaries of the soldiers in military ways, such as makers of
munition, transporters of supplies, and those in the communication
service. (b) Non-combatants are enemy subjects who are neither fighters
nor auxiliaries of the armed forces, such as chaplains and members of
the medical service in the army, persons in civil life and occupation,
old men, women, and children. (c) Neutrals are those who are not
subject to either of the warring contenders, and who take no part in
the hostilities, although they may sympathize with one side.

1409. The Killing or Wounding of Enemy Combatants.--(a) According to
natural law, it is lawful to kill or wound the enemy in battle, or to
starve him by blockade, just as it is lawful in self-defense to kill or
wound an unjust aggressor. (b) According to international law, it was
expressly forbidden to attack in ways that make war more cruel without
hastening the decision.

1410. The Killing or Wounding of Non-Combatants.--(a) The indirect
killing of non-combatants (i.e., killing which is unintentional and
unavoidable) is lawful, according to the rules given for double effect
(see 103, 104). Hence, it is lawful to bombard the fortifications,
arsenals, munition works, and barracks of a town, to sink passenger
liners that are carrying arms or stores to the enemy, to cut off food
supplies from a town or country in order to starve out its troops,
although these measures will entail the deaths of some civilians as
well as of combatants. Humanity requires, however, that an effort be
made to spare the non-combatants, when possible, as by serving warning
of attack, so that they may be removed to safety. When it is a
question, however, of the use of modern weapons (the atom, hydrogen or
cobalt bombs) on military targets in the vicinity of large cities,
where it is foreseen that many thousands of civilians will be killed or
severely wounded, then the principle of double effect seems to rule out
the lawfulness of using such devastating weapons. The immediate evil
effect, the slaughter of the innocents, could hardly be called
incidental and only reluctantly permitted. Concretely, the inevitable
results of the use of such weapons would have to be intended directly,
if not as an end, at least as a means.

(b) The direct killing of non-combatants (i.e., killing which is
intentional) is unlawful and constitutes the sin of murder.
Obliteration bombing, the dropping of H-bombs or atom bombs on a
residential section of a city containing no military objectives, are of
this character; for they are attacks on civilians. It can not be argued
that such an attack would probably break down the morale of the
citizens to such an extent that they would force their rulers to make
peace and so save many thousands of lives. For this argument is based
on the principle that a good end justifies evil means.

Occasionally it is argued that modern “total” warfare demands that all
citizens contribute to the war effort and that consequently everyone is
a combatant. The argument can hardly be sustained, for Catholic
doctrine insists that those whose participation is only remote and
accidental are not to be classified as combatants. In a well-documented
article on “The Morality of Obliteration Bombing,” by John C. Ford,
S.J. (_Theological Studies_, V, 1944, pp. 261-309), the validity of the
distinction between combatants and innocent non-combatants, even in the
condition of modern war, is upheld. Fr. Ford shows that in an
industrial city, as found in the United States, three-fourths of the
population belong to the non-combatant category, and he lists more than
a hundred trades or professions which, according to the natural law,
exclude their members from the category of combatants. Direct attacks
on such a population clearly would constitute unjustifiable killing or
wounding of non-combatants.

1411. The Sentence of Death for Military Crimes.--(a) It is lawful to
sentence to death persons guilty of international crime, such as those
who approach when warned to halt, civilians who fire on the troops,
guerrillas, pirates, spies and deserters. (b) It is not lawful to
sentence to death persons not guilty of international crime. Thus, a
private soldier should not be executed because under orders he killed a
non-combatant; a hostage, not guilty of any capital crime, should not
be put to death, because his fellow-citizens for whom he is held rebel
or break faith.

1412. Imprisonment and Restraint.--(a) Combatants may be made prisoners
of war, non-combatants are subject to the restrictions of military
rules when their territory is occupied, and in very exceptional cases
they may be transported behind their enemy’s lines. (b) Prisoners of
war and inhabitants of occupied territory are to be treated as human
beings, but not better than the soldiers of one’s own army. They may
not be reduced to slavery, held as hostages, tortured or starved to
death, or placed in front trenches as a shield to one’s own forces.

1413. The Destruction or Seizure of Property During War.--(a) The
military property of the enemy nation or of its subjects may be
confiscated or destroyed, just as an individual has the right to
destroy the weapon of an unjust aggressor. Hence, a commander may
demolish fortifications, war factories, airships, warships, weapons and
artillery; he may cut off or seize supplies and provisions of money,
food or drink.

(b) The public, non-military property of the enemy may be occupied by a
successful invader. He may appropriate movable goods (works of art and
some others are excepted by international law), and he may use
immovable goods (public places of worship, museums, etc., are excepted
by law).

(c) As to private property of enemy subjects on land, international law
requires that immovables generally be respected, and movables can be
seized only for some necessary purpose of war. Requisitions and
contributions may be exacted and soldiers may be billeted in the homes
of citizens, but only so much may be levied as is needed for army
maintenance and civil administration, and compensation must be made, or
a receipt be given for future compensation. War is made, not against
private persons, but against the state.

(d) As to private property on sea, the usage has been that the merchant
ships of the enemy may be captured and made a lawful prize.

(e) The property of neutrals on land must not be molested, unless it is
not really neutral, as when it is being used by the enemy. As regards
the ships and shipping of neutrals on the high seas, they are not up to
the present protected by international agreement. Rather the naval
powers are divided between the theories of command of the seas and
freedom of the seas. Thus, Great Britain claims the right to search,
seize and hold the vessels or cargoes of neutrals who carry contraband
or attempt to trade with the enemy in the face of a blockade.

1414. It is an axiom that booty taken in war belongs, not to the
private soldiers, but to their government. Hence, the question arises:
Are private soldiers, who take the goods of citizens without
authorization from their officers, bound to make restitution? (a) If
they take what is necessary for their own sustenance, they act against
military discipline, but not against justice, and are not bound to
restore. (b) If they take other things, they are bound to restore,
since international agreements make this a duty of justice. But, if
neither of the belligerents observed this agreement, the obligation of
restitution cannot be insisted on as grave.

1415. Is it lawful to give over a city to be looted by the soldiery?
(a) In ancient times, this was sometimes permissible, as when
compensation and victory in a just war was otherwise impossible. (b) In
modern times and according to present international law, looting is
strictly forbidden. Violation of agreements by city heads gives no
right to attack the property of the citizens who are not responsible,
and valiant defense of the city by its troops does not forfeit the
rights of the inhabitants to their goods.

1416. Stratagems in War.--(a) It is lawful to use various artifices for
concealing one’s plans from the enemy, such as camouflage, smoke
screens, censored reports of engagements, etc. Thus, Josue by command
of the Lord prepared an ambush for the citizens of Hai (Jos., viii. 2).
(b) It is lawful also to conceal one’s identity by wearing the uniforms
of the enemy in order to obtain information about his plans. The Lord
commanded Moses to send out men to spy on the land of Chanaan (Num.,
xiii. 1). While it is not lawful to tell or signify untruth, it is
lawful to conceal the truth from those who have no right to know it.

1417. Reprisals are acts of retaliation by which one replies to
unlawful aggressions of the enemy by equivalent aggressions against
him. Their morality depends on circumstances. (a) Thus, if the act of
the enemy is opposed only to international law, it is not unlawful to
use the same act against him, for, since he has broken faith, the
treaty obligation no longer binds the other side. For example, if the
enemy, contrary to agreement, uses poison gas in warfare, it is lawful
to use poison gas against him. Reprisals should not be made, however,
without authorization from the proper authority. (b) If the act of the
enemy is opposed to natural law, it is not permissible to retaliate by
the same kind of acts. Two wrongs do not make a right. But one may
retaliate in lawful ways, or else issue a protest and await
compensation at the conclusion of the war. Thus, if the enemy murders
the civil population, this does not justify one in murdering enemy
citizens who are in one’s power.

1418. Duties of the Nation Victorious in War.--(a) The victorious
nation must not prolong the war after victory has been gained, or after
the enemy has sued in good faith for peace or armistice. (b) It must
not exact from the defeated foe more than it has a just right to.

1419. The Rights of the Victor.--(a) If the cause of the victorious
nation was unjust, its victory gives it no claim, for might does not
make right. On the contrary, it may be obliged to make restitution to
the defeated nation for the losses it has suffered. (b) If the cause of
the victor was just, the victorious nation has a claim to three things:
(i) to the satisfaction or restitution for the sake of which the war
was undertaken; (ii) to compensation for damages caused by the enemy
during the war, and (iii) to guarantees against a recurrence of the
former injury. Supervision of peace treaties by an impartial tribunal
has much to recommend it, since victors are prone to disregard charity
and justice when treating with a conquered foe, and to extort from him
forced agreements.

1420. The Obligation of a Victor Whose Cause was Unjust.--(a) If the
victorious nation fought in good faith, and only later perceived the
injustice of its cause, it is bound to restore only those things which
it has not consumed, and which make it better off than it was before
the war. (b) If it fought in bad faith, it should restore all. Victory
does not prove that one was right, but only that one was stronger. It
does not make a bad cause good.

1421. The Obligation of a Victor Who Fought Without Due Authorization,
or with a Wrong Purpose.--(a) Soldiers who inflict damage on the enemy
against the orders of the commanders (e.g., by burning dwellings,
robbing private citizens, murdering, etc.), are obliged to restitution
for those injuries, for such acts are not war, but brigandage. (b)
Soldiers who fight with a wrong motive (e.g., out of hatred), are not
obliged to restitution, since they have not committed injustice; for
similarly a judge, who sentences a convicted criminal, sins if his
motive is hate, but he is not held to restitution.

1422. What Indemnity may be Imposed on the Vanquished?--(a) According
to justice, one may exact compensation for the losses and expenses one
has sustained on account of war, since the enemy is responsible for
these. (b) According to charity, one may be obliged to relinquish part
of what is owed, or to grant easier terms of payment, or to cancel a
debt, as when the enemy is greatly impoverished, or cannot easily pay
at present.

1423. In cases of doubt, as when counter claims are made and neither
party is entirely victorious, or when a vanquished nation denies its
ability to pay what is demanded, recourse may be had to other ways of
settlement. (a) Thus, in the former case a compromise or mutual
condonation of claims, especially if both sides are exhausted by the
war, seems the reasonable solution. (b) In the latter case submission
to an impartial tribunal of arbitration would benefit the victors as
well as the vanquished, since in the long run it is not to the
advantage of the former that the latter be deprived of its goods and
productivity.

1424. Guarantees for the Future.--(a) One may insist on such guarantees
as will insure against a probable renewal of the offense committed by
the conquered nation. Hence, one may require that it destroy or deliver
over fortifications and munition plants, sink warships, reduce its
military force, punish certain individuals, or depose certain rulers.

(b) One may not insist on such guarantees as will make a renewal of war
by the enemy, now or in the future, absolutely impossible. As said
above, a nation has the right to go to war to defend itself against
aggression, but it has no right to work at destroying equality or
competition on the part of other nations. Hence, it is not lawful to
demand that the conquered nation surrender its independence or the
management of its affairs, or that one be allowed to annex all the
territory taken during war, if one’s rights or reasonable security does
not require these conditions. Subjugation or temporary occupation are
lawful, however, if there is no other way of obtaining redress or
securities.

1425. Punishment of Enemy Soldiers for Crimes Committed during
War.--(a) Special crimes committed during war (e.g., massacres of
non-combatants) may be punished, but the punishment should be visited
on those responsible, not on those who merely executed orders. (b) The
crime of the war itself should not be revenged on private soldiers, for
it is unjust to punish subjects for the madness of their officers and
rulers. As to the latter, moral guilt is not easily established. The
Nurenberg trials held commanders and high officers responsible for
crimes against humanity, and not without precedent.

1426. Preparation for Future Wars.--(a) Reasonable preparedness is not
only lawful, but a duty of the state to its own people. A nation should
have such a military establishment or such alliances as will safeguard
its right against probable attack. (b) Unreasonable preparedness is
unlawful since it burdens the people and prepares the way for war.
Examples of unreasonable preparations: maintenance of an army or navy
far in excess of those nations of similar rank; oppressive military
expenses or burdens; maneuvers offensive to other governments or too
dangerous for the troops engaged; ruinous competition in armaments.

1427. Preparation for peace or against war is a duty no less obligatory
than preparation for defensive war. Two chief ways of preparing for
peace: (a) will for peace; (b) work for peace.

(a) The will for peace is promoted when the nations educate their
people to a realization of the brotherhood of man, of the wrongfulness
and folly of a narrow nationalism, of the sinfulness of war which has
not all the conditions of a just war in its favor. Without the will for
peace, conferences and treaties will effect little.

(b) Work for peace is done by all who give their service to practical
plans for the prevention of war and the preservation of lasting world
amity. Among these plans are agreements among nations to substitute
moral right for material force, to abolish conscription and armaments,
to establish international tribunals, associations and world courts, to
make arbitration of disputes among themselves compulsory, to codify
international law. History bears witness to the many and great services
to humanity which the Popes have rendered by acting as arbiters between
nations that were on the point of war. If jealousies prevent agreement
among governments, the peoples of the world should nevertheless
continue to work for peace and by constitutional means make their
wishes prevail among the governments. With the Church we should pray:
“From pestilence, famine and war, deliver us, O Lord.”

1428. Fighting.--Fighting is an angry conflict between two or more
persons carried on by means of physical violence.

(a) Thus, it is an angry conflict, and so differs from contests of
strength or skill made for the sake of sport, amusement, recreation,
health, exercise and training. Hence, wrestling and boxing matches,
football games, fencing and similar athletic contests, in which fair
play and a sportsmanlike spirit prevail, are not fighting as here
understood. Similarly, the tournaments of the medieval knights were
sports or spectacles, rather than fights.

(b) It is a conflict, and so differs from punishment inflicted by
lawful authority, as when a police officer uses his club to prevent a
crime, a parent or teacher chastises insubordinate children, or a sober
man scuffles with an inebriate to take away his flask or with a lunatic
to deprive him of a weapon.

(c) It is a conflict between two or more individuals, and so differs
from war and sedition, which are conflicts between nations or parts of
a multitude.

(d) It is conducted by means of physical violence, that is by the
infliction of bodily injuries or harm. Thus, fighting differs from
quarreling, which is a dispute in words. It makes no difference whether
the attack be made by fists, fingernails or teeth, or by weapons or
missiles, or whether the bodily harm be direct (e.g., a blackened eye)
or indirect (e.g., a hat knocked off the head).

1429. Kinds of Fighting.--(a) As to its origin, fighting is provoked or
unprovoked, according as one who fights is attacking another or
defending himself against attack. (b) As to its manner, it is an
ordinary fight or a duel, according as it takes place without or with
previous arrangement and stipulated conditions. (c) As to its eject,
the civil law distinguishes between assault and battery. Assault is a
show of violence against the person of another, as when one lifts one’s
fist or cane in a threatening manner to put another in fear of bodily
harm. Battery is the actual infliction of personal violence, as when
one strikes, pushes, scratches, bites, or spits on another.

1430. The Sinfulness of Fighting.--(a) Unprovoked fighting is from its
nature a mortal sin. It is classed among the works of the flesh that
exclude from the kingdom of heaven (Gal, v. 20, 21), and it is
essentially opposed to the charity owed to a neighbor. It is frequently
only a venial sin, either because the act is not entirely deliberate,
as when one fights in sudden anger, or because the violence is of a
trifling kind, as when school-children pull one another’s hair or throw
snowballs.

(b) Fighting under provocation is no sin at all, when one intends only
to defend one’s rights and does not go beyond what is necessary for
lawful defence, as when one struggles with a burglar who is trying to
enter one’s house, and pushes him through the door. It is a venial sin,
when the person who is resisting aggression acts with some slight
degree of hate or revengefulness, or inflicts a little more injury than
is really necessary. It is a mortal sin, when the person who was
attacked fights in a spirit of hate and revenge, or deliberately and
needlessly seeks to kill or seriously maim the adversary.

1431. Causes of Fighting.--The remedy of sinful fighting is the removal
of its causes. The sources of fighting are proximate and remote.

(a) The immediate cause is anger. The angry man provokes fights (Prov.,
xv. 18, xxix. 22), for anger, being a desire of revenge, is not content
to injure another secretly, but wishes to punish him--that is, to
injure him in such a Way that he will know he is being punished and
will feel grief on that account. Anger also blinds one to the
foolishness of one’s actions, and so leads one precipitately into
quarrels and fights (Prov., xviii. 6).

(b) The remote cause of fighting is an inordinate desire of temporal
things, such as wealth, power, ease: “Why are there wars and disputes
among you? Is it not because of the desires that war among your
members?” (James, iv. 1). Those who are overmuch concerned with their
own interests, easily take offense at what they consider slights or
insults or opposition, their rage bursts forth, and they proceed at
once to visit revenge on those at whom they are offended. It was greed
and envy that caused the herdsmen of Palestine to fill up the wells dug
by Isaac and to fight with his servants for possession (Gen., xxvi. 14
sqq.).

1432. Hatred and Fighting.--(a) Hatred is not necessarily a cause of
fighting. The hater wishes evil to his neighbor, not as punishment, but
absolutely; his passion is calmer, more lasting, and more insatiable
than that of the angry man. If it suits him, he will bide his time
patiently, pretending friendship, but all the while plotting ruin to
the one he hates. (b) Hatred at times does bring on fighting, for, if
the hater sees that he can safely attack openly, he will use quarreling
and fighting as a means to his purpose.

1433. Occasions that Frequently Bring On Fighting.--(a) Boasting about
self or depreciation of others in the presence of persons who will take
offense occasions fights, for “he that boasteth and puffeth himself up
stirreth up quarrels” (Prov., xxviii. 25). Thus, disputes over the
respective merits of nations or political parties often bring on bloody
encounters. (b) Drunkenness occasions fights, for it so stupefies the
mind that one minimizes one’s danger and exaggerates one’s own
strength, and so is emboldened to attack others (Prov., xxiii. 29, 30).

1434. Evil Consequences of Fighting.--(a) Charity is wounded by
fighting, wherefrom there often result lasting hates, discords,
scandals. (b) Justice is wounded by fighting, as when a person unjustly
maims or kills his neighbor, and is himself imprisoned or executed, to
the disgrace and deprivation of his dependents.

1435. Duelling.--A duel is a prearranged combat between two persons
fought with deadly weapons, for the purpose of settling a private
quarrel.

(a) Thus, it is a combat, and hence the “suicide duel,” in which the
contenders draw lots with the understanding that the loser must kill
himself within a specified time, is not properly a duel.

(b) A duel is prearranged, that is, the time, place, and weapons are
determined in advance. Hence, if two feudists meet accidentally and
proceed at once to shoot, their combat is not strictly a duel. It is
not necessary, however, that a formal letter of challenge and a letter
of acceptance precede the fight.

(c) It is between two persons, that is, a determinate combatant is
matched against a determinate opponent. A true duel, however, might be
carried on between many couples simultaneously, as in the fight between
the twelve soldiers of Abner and the twelve soldiers of Joab (II Kings,
ii. 13-17). The presence of seconds or witnesses is not essential to a
duel.

(d) A duel is fought with deadly weapons, that is, with such arms as
are capable of inflicting severe wounds, so that there is serious
danger of grave wound or mutilation or death. There is no duel,
therefore, if one fights with weapons that cannot do serious harm (such
as fists, light sticks, mud), or if by agreement one uses dangerous
weapons in a way that precludes injury (e.g., by padding the edge of
one’s sword, loading one’s revolver with blanks, firing into the air,
as in sham or mock duels). But academic duels, in which students try to
stab each other in the face with small daggers, are true duels; for,
while the fighters are well protected in vital parts and serious or
fatal wounds rarely happen, it remains true that this manner of
fighting is mortally dangerous. The same remark applies to duels fought
on condition that only one or two rounds of shots shall be fired, or
that fighting shall cease as soon as blood has been drawn.

(e) A duel is fought for the purpose of settling a private quarrel. A
hand-to-hand combat during battle between two soldiers of contending
armies is not a duel in the proper sense of the word, since there is no
private quarrel between them, but only the public quarrel of their
countries.

1436. The Morality of Duelling.--(a) Generally, the duel is mortally
sinful. Like ordinary fighting, it is against charity, and in addition
it includes a will to kill or gravely injure another, to expose one’s
own life or limb to chance, and to usurp the function of the State.
This applies to the challenged as well as to the challenger, for one
can decline the combat to which one is dared.

(b) Exceptionally, a duel would not be sinful, if it took on the
character of a war, or of self-defense against an unjust aggressor.
Thus, in order to shorten a war or to lessen the bloodshed, it might be
lawful to make the whole issue depend on a single combat between the
commanders or between champions chosen from opposing armies, as in the
case of David and Goliath (I Kings, xvii); but in modern times such a
practice has been abandoned. Again, if a person had to choose between
certain death, if he refused a duel, and possible death, if he
consented to a duel, it would seem that he is in the position of one
attacked by an unjust aggressor; but it is not easy to picture such a
case as happening in normal conditions.

1437. The Fallacy of the Arguments for Duelling.--(a) The amusement of
the spectators was the purpose of the gladiatorial duels fought in
ancient Rome. But today there is no one who would not grant that the
butchering of human beings to make a holiday for the populace is
savagery.

(b) The decision of doubtful cases before the courts was the purpose of
the judicial duels fought among the Germans and Lombards in the early
Middle Ages. But manifestly such duels are a temptation of God, since
they rashly call on Him to disclose, through a duel between the
litigants, what the evidence in court did not disclose. The outcome of
the duel shows which party is stronger or more skilful, not which is in
the right.

(c) Training in bravery and the termination of serious differences is
the excuse offered for military and university duels. But to kill,
cripple, or brutalize youth does not make the nation stronger, and the
substitution of violence for law as a means of settling disputes is an
encouragement to crime.

(d) Satisfaction for insults or other injury, or the avoidance of the
reputation of being a coward, is the reason given for so-called affairs
of honor. But is it not a superstition and a relic of barbarism to
think that dishonor is wiped out by a dishonorable fight, or that a
person shows himself brave because he lacks the moral bravery to act
against the wrong opinions of the multitude?

1438. Penalties against Duelling.--(a) Church law deprives of
ecclesiastical burial those who die as the result of a duel, if
unrepentant (Canon 1240); it also declares excommunication reserved
simply to the Holy See and infamy against duellists and their helpers
(Canon 2351). (b) Civil law in English-speaking countries makes
duelling a crime. If death results, it is regarded as murder, and the
seconds are liable to punishment as accessories.

1439. What is the moral duty of restitution on account of injuries
caused in a duel? (a) The challenger and his heirs have no right to
restitution. (b) The challenged, if he accepted willingly, has no right
to restitution, for his free acceptance of the fight implies the
cession of such a right. (c) The challenged, if he accepted under grave
compulsion, has the right to restitution. If he is wounded, the
aggressor should pay the medical expense; if he is killed, the heirs
should be compensated.

1440. Sedition.--Sedition is a discord between different factions of the
same multitude so grave as to extend to physical conflict, and to the
destruction of the unity of the State.

(a) It is a discord, that is, a disagreement of wills, and so it
resembles schism, war and fighting. Difference of opinion in the
political parties of a country is not sedition, since there is a unity
of will and purpose in all of them with reference to the common good
and the peace of the State (cfr. 1197, 1348). In fact, under a
democratic system of government, the existence of some opposite parties
has proved a useful, if not necessary means of stimulating the interest
of citizens, and of expediting the business of legislation.

(b) Sedition is between different factions of the same multitude, that
is, between different sections or groups of the same body politic.
Thus, it differs from war (which is between states), and from fighting
(which is between individuals).

(c) Sedition extends to physical conflict, that is, it tends from its
character to break out into violence and to array the opposite factions
in fight against one another. If not accompanied by actual hostilities,
it is simple sedition. But, if fighting has begun, it is insurrection
or rebellion, when the people seek to overthrow the government; it is
civil war, if one part of the nation seeks to secede from or overcome
the other.

(d) It is prejudicial to the civil unity and peace of the people, that
is, it tends to the violent dismemberment of the State, or at least to
the disturbance of the common good. Thus, sedition is more serious than
riots, tumults, gang-warfare, and like particular disturbances, which
are not directed against the State itself, or against the harmony of
the whole body of the people. Sedition differs also from the peaceful
separation of parts of a state, and from the lawful self-defense of the
people against a tyrannical government.

1441. From the definition given above, it is plain that sedition is a
special distinct species of sin. (a) It differs from spiritual discord,
for unlike schism it is opposed, not to the unity of the Church, but to
the unity of the State. (b) It differs from other kinds of temporal
discord, for unlike war and fighting it is opposed, not to peace
between nations or individuals, but to peace between the members of the
same civil body. War takes away peace with foreigners, sedition takes
away peace with fellow-citizens; fighting attacks a private person or
persons, sedition attacks the public welfare of the country.

1442. Sedition in the strict meaning given it above is always sinful.
(a) Thus, it is a mortal sin from its nature, since it is opposed to
what is manifestly one of the greatest of temporal goods, namely, the
unity of the State. (b) It is opposed to charity, as destroying the
bond of peace; it is opposed to justice, as injuring a unity based on
law and common utility, to which the nation has a strict right. (c)
Sedition is graver in some persons than in others. Thus, the moral
causes of sedition (i.e., those that sow discords or promote
disaffection) are more responsible than those who are led and who carry
out acts of violence. The gravity of the sin in each case depends on
the amount of damage that is due to one’s influence or acts.

1443. Is one who resists a tyrannical government guilty of the sin of
sedition? (a) When resistance is made by legal and pacific means, such
as the rejection of a bad government at the polls, there is no
sedition. (b) When legal and pacific means are impossible and armed
aggression against a tyrant will benefit the common good, a rebel is
not guilty of the sin of sedition. In this case, it is rather the bad
ruler who causes discords and is seditious against the common good,
whereas the people only defend themselves according to the laws. Thus,
the rebellion of the Machabees against their Syrian oppressors was not
seditious. (c) When legal means are impossible but armed aggression
will not benefit the common good, a rebel is guilty of the sin of
sedition.




Art. 9: THE SINS AGAINST BENEFICENCE

(_Summa Theologica_, II-II, q. 43.)

1444. Having discussed in the preceding paragraphs the sins opposed to
the internal acts of charity (love, joy and peace), we come now to
treat of scandal and cooperation which are opposed to the external acts
of charity--beneficence and brotherly correction.

1445. Scandal.--Scandal is derived from a Greek word signifying a snare
or trap prepared for an enemy, or a stone or block laid in the road
that he may stumble or trip over it. In use, it is applied in a wide or
general sense, and in a strict or special sense. (a) In its wide sense,
it refers to any kind of harm, especially of a spiritual or moral
nature, that one brings on others. (b) In its strict sense, it refers
to a fall into sin which one occasions for others by misconduct.

1446. The following are some examples of the word “scandal” as employed
in its wide sense: (a) It is used to signify physical or natural
injuries of various kinds. Thus, the servants of Pharaoh called the
plagues brought on Egypt by Moses a scandal (Exod., x. 7), and the
Psalmist says of the sinner that he laid a scandal (calamity) against
his brother (Ps. xlix. 20). Those who spread defamatory gossip are
called scandal-mongers, and “scandal” often signifies opprobrium or
disgrace, as when Shakespeare speaks of the wrangling of nobles as a
scandal to the crown. (b) The word “scandal” is also used to signify
moral injuries distinct from inducement to sin. Thus, the shock and
offense given to virtuous persons by blasphemous language spoken in
their hearing is described as a scandal, and one who would prevent
another from following some more perfect course or practice to which
there is no obligation (such as entering religion, saying grace at
meals, etc.), is sometimes said to scandalize.

1447. Definition of Scandal.--In the strict sense, scandal is defined
as “any conduct that has at least the appearance of evil and that
offers to a neighbor an occasion of spiritual ruin.”

(a) By conduct is understood external behavior or manner of acting in
the presence of others. Thus, scandal differs from sin, for sin is
committed, not only by external acts done before others, but also by
internal thoughts and desires and external acts that are secret.

(b) Scandal is conduct which is evil at least in appearance, that is,
sinful, or from the circumstances seemingly sinful. Thus, an act is not
scandalous, if it is morally indifferent or a less good, and is
perceivable as being such.

(c) Scandal tends to spiritual ruin, that is, to a fall into sin, great
or small. Here scandal strictly understood differs from scandal in the
wide senses given in the previous paragraph.

(d) Scandal is an occasion of a fall into sin, that is, it sets an
example of sin before the attention, and thus suggests to the will that
the will imitate the sin. Scandal is not, however, the cause of sin,
for a person causes his own sin in yielding consent to the suggestion
offered by scandal.

(e) Scandal is to another. A person may be said to scandalize himself
in the sense that by his looks or acts he puts himself in an occasion
of sin (Matt., v. 29, 30), or inasmuch as he maliciously makes the acts
of a virtuous neighbor an occasion of sin; but scandal is more properly
understood of an occasion of sin prepared for one’s neighbor.

1448. Causes of Scandal.--There are various divisions of scandal
according to the kinds of external acts. (a) There is scandal in words,
as profane language or calumnies spoken in a gathering of people. (b)
There is scandal in acts, as when one is perceptibly drunk or fights in
a city street. Scandal applies also to things, in so far as they are
the result of acts or related to acts, such as disedifying books,
pictures, dress. Thus, one gives scandal by having sinful objects on
display, such as profane mottoes on one’s wall, obscene advertisements
or announcements on one’s billboards. (c) There also may be scandal in
omission, as when one is conspicuously absent from Mass on Sundays.

1449. The following kinds of sinful acts are not scandalous, for they
are unknown to others, and hence cannot suggest sin: (a) internal acts,
such as wicked thoughts, desires, emotions; (b) external acts concealed
from others, such as inaudible profanity, intoxication not noticeable
by others, omission of an obligatory penance about which others have no
knowledge.

1450. There are, likewise, various divisions of scandal according to
the internal purpose of the scandalizer. (a) Scandal is directly
intentional, when the purpose of the scandalizer is to lead others to
the guilt of sin (diabolical scandal). Example: Titus blasphemes
religion before Caius in order that the latter may become irreligious,
and thus be more easily persuaded to follow a life of crime. (b)
Scandal is indirectly intentional when the purpose of the scandalizer
is to perform some action whose nature is such that it will lead others
to the guilt of sin, and he is determined to perform that action,
although not directly willing the neighbor’s guilt that will result.
Example: Titus does not like to see his children drunk, but he likes to
get drunk himself occasionally, knowing all the while that his example
encourages them to drink.

1451. In the following cases there is no intention of scandal: (a) when
one does an act that has no appearance of evil, and one neither
directly nor indirectly wills that it should be an occasion of sin to
anyone. Example: Balbus performs his duties faithfully, although he
knows to his regret that his fidelity occasions envy and hatred in
Claudius; (b) when one does an act that is evil or apparently evil, but
is invincibly ignorant of the scandal it may give. Example: Sempronius
and Titus converse together in a foreign tongue which they confidently
think Caius does not understand. The conversation is disedifying, and
Caius, who does understand, is shocked by what they say.

1452. The act of the scandalizer who intends, directly or indirectly,
the spiritual ruin of his neighbor, is called active scandal, while the
act of the person who takes occasion from the active scandal to incur
spiritual ruin, is called passive scandal. Active and passive scandal
are sometimes together, sometimes apart. (a) Thus, there is both active
and passive scandal, when the scandalizer wills the fall of his
neighbor, and the scandalized does fall. (b) There is active but not
passive scandal, when the scandalizer wills the fall of his neighbor,
but the latter does not fall into the snare. (c) There is passive but
not active scandal, when one makes the good action rightly performed by
another an occasion of sin. Thus, some made the life and passion of our
Lord a pretext for not accepting Him (Matt., xiii. 57; John, vi. 62; I
Cor., i. 23), and are said to have been scandalized at Him.

1453. As to the act that occasions the spiritual ruin of another, it
must be wrong either in reality or in appearance. (a) The scandalous
act is wrong in reality, when it is forbidden as a sin--for example,
offering sacrifice in the temple of an idol, or diverting to personal
use money collected for the poor. (b) The scandalous act is wrong in
appearance, when on account of circumstances it seems to be an act
forbidden as a sin. Thus, to take part in a banquet held in a pagan
temple might seem like participation in sacrificial rites (I Cor.,
viii. 10), to expend secretly the money collected for the poor might
have the appearance of improper use of funds (II Cor., viii. 20, 21).
Hence, St. Paul directs; “From all appearance of evil refrain
yourselves” (I Thess., v. 22).

1454. The acts wrong in reality or in appearance that give scandal are
innumerable, since the whole world is seated in wickedness (I John, v.
19). But today there are a number of acts that should be specially
mentioned, as they occasion sin oftener or for more persons than other
acts. Among these are: (a) occasions of sin against faith, such as
atheistical literature, as discussed in the section on faith; (b)
occasions of sin against morals, such as obscenity in dress, pictures,
plays, writings, and dances. These last-mentioned will be discussed now
in separate paragraphs.

1455. Obscenity.--Obscenity is a quality of words, acts or objects by
which impure thoughts are conveyed, or impure desires or actions
suggested. We may consider it either internally (i.e., in the intention
of the person who uses the words, acts or objects) or externally (i.e.,
in the nature of the things themselves which are used).

(a) Thus, internal obscenity, or the will to use what will corrupt the
minds and morals of others, is of course a mortal sin. If the intention
is to deprave another, the guilt of direct scandal is incurred; if the
intention is only to satisfy one’s own wish to use the sinful words,
acts or objects, the guilt is that of indirect scandal. Thus, a woman
who dresses fashionably in order to excite impure love is guilty of
direct scandal; if she dresses immodestly, not to excite impure love,
but to follow a fashion, she is guilty of indirect scandal.

(b) External obscenity is the tendency of words, acts or objects
themselves to call up impure images in the mind, or to excite impure
desires or actions in those to whom they are presented. The use of such
words, acts, etc., is therefore a mortal sin. For, if the thing said or
done is wrong in itself (such as obscene language), it is a scandalous
sin against purity, if it is wrong on account of those who will be
influenced (such as a talk on sex matters to immature or weak persons),
it is a sin of scandal. Hence, a good or even religious motive (such as
instruction, refutation of error, health, or mysticism) does not excuse
the employment of what is clearly obscene, for the end does not justify
the means.

1456. It is not always easy to determine in particular cases when a
thing is obscene from its very nature, but the following general rules
can be given:

(a) Pictures, statues and other images are obscene, when they represent
scenes of immoral or sexual acts, or lascivious attitudes or postures;
also, when they represent nude or partly nude human figures, ut quando
depinguntur verenda adultorum vel pectora aut partes minus honestae
mulierum.

(b) Female dress or adornment is lascivious, when there is a notable
display of the person through abbreviated skirts, necks, and sleeves;
or a suggestiveness expressed in transparency of material or a
closeness of fit that brings out the lines and curves of the figure; or
in an extremity of fashion whose striking color or design will make the
wearer conspicuous and direct special attention to her physical charms.

(c) Plays on the stage or moving picture screen are obscene by reason
of the lesson taught (as when purity is derided or impurity condoned),
by reason of the thing represented (as when the main theme is impurity,
or when acts of impurity are represented or suggested, or when sexual
passion is emphasized), or by reason of the players (as when they are
noted for immorality, or when their dress is indecent, or their
language objectionable).

(d) Dances are obscene in themselves when the postures, movements, or
contact of the dancers is indecent; they are obscene by reason of the
dancers, when these are indecently attired. Public dance halls,
cabarets, road houses, and night clubs--where there is no supervision
and young girls come unattended to dance until late hours with men
unknown to them, and where there is intoxication and
boisterousness--are the natural haunts of the obscene dance, but it may
be found even in more respectable places.

(e) Books or other writings contain obscenity When they inculcate or
recommend impure acts, or advise how these may be committed; when they
treat sins of impurity or narrate immoral facts or stories in such a
manner as to make vice seem alluring or pardonable to the intended
reader; when an erotic composition by language, allusions, details,
sympathetic treatment, etc., gives prominence to animal passion.

1457. As is stated elsewhere (see 1461 sqq.), scandal is not given
unless the persons affected by one’s conduct are susceptible to evil
influence. Hence, there is no obscenity when on account of
circumstances there is no suggestion of evil in things which under
other conditions would be immoral and seductive.

(a) Images of the nude in the studio of an artist, and anatomical
charts, figures or illustrations in a book intended for the instruction
of medical men, are not classed as obscene, since the persons for whom
they are made are supposed to be so much under the influence of the
esthetic or scientific principles of their professions that no harm
will be taken.

(b) The obscenity of dress is largely dependent on its novelty, for
things that are usual cease to excite special attention. This we can
see from the fact that styles that are conservative today would have
been extreme ten years ago. And so the scanty attire of hot countries,
the dress of the bathing beach, and the moderate decollete tolerated in
private gatherings are not obscene in their own proper times and places.

(c) Plays which contain gross or unseemly expressions or passages are
not therefore obscene, if in the main they uphold decency and morality;
otherwise, we should have to regard as immoral even the classic drama.
Newman says of Shakespeare: “Often as he may offend against modesty, he
is clear of a worse charge, sensuality, and hardly a passage can be
instanced in all that he has written to seduce the imagination or to
excite the passions.” It is a simple matter to omit from plays of this
kind the word or phrase that is offensive to modern ears or to the
innocence of youth.

(d) The fact that some individuals find all dancing a strong stimulus
to impure passion does not prove that every dance is obscene. Some
types of dance, it is true, might be rightly called “the devil’s
march”; other dances, named after various animals, may also be
suggestive. But there are also standard types of dance in which many
experience not temptation, but innocent pastime, and which have also
physical, esthetic and social values.

(e) To books and other writings should be applied what was said about
plays, namely, that they are not to be classed as obscene on account of
isolated passages unsuited for the reading of children or other
susceptible persons, or excitable to prurient or impure minds. Even the
Bible may seem objectionable to a prude, and the indecent will go
through its pages with a fine-tooth comb in the search for indecent
matter; but public opinion will rightly class as a lunatic the person
who would endeavor to have the Bible rated as obscene.

1458. Persons Who Give Scandal on Account of Obscenity.--(a) In case of
obscene pictures or statues, scandal is given by the artists, painters,
sculptors or others who make the images, and by the responsible persons
who place them in museums, galleries, parks or other places to which
there is general admission.

(b) As regards female dress, the guilty parties are proximately the
wearers, but remotely and principally the designers and society leaders
who impose their will in making the fashions dangerous and in causing
one extreme mode to follow quickly upon another.

(e) With respect to obscene plays, the scandal is given by playwrights,
managers, actors and actresses, and those who patronize or applaud
them. The public itself and the civil authorities share in the guilt,
when they supinely tolerate the degradation of the stage and the
corruption of morals.

(d) In the case of obscene dances, the givers of scandal are the
proprietors of resorts where the dances are held, the musicians and
singers (especially when the songs themselves are obscene), and the
dancers, spectators and other patrons.

(e) In the case of salacious publications or writings, authors,
publishers, printers, vendors, and the reading public share
responsibility for the scandal. Government censorship of the press is
not desirable, but government suppression of obscenity has always been
the policy of countries of English origin. The private citizen, then,
is not free of guilt if he takes no interest even when he sees piles of
indecent magazines, pictures, etc., being sold openly on the
newsstands. Canon Law (Canon 1404) forbids booksellers to sell, lend,
or keep books that deal _ex professo_ with obscenity, though there is
no objection to expurgated editions, as in the case of classical works.

1459. Results of Scandal.--The spiritual ruin occasioned by scandal is
sin.

(a) Thus, formal or material sin may be the result of scandal. Example:
Titus blasphemed before a boy who did not understand the meaning of the
word and before a youth who did understand, with the result that both
repeated the same blasphemy. Thus, the scandal given by Titus produced
material sin in the boy and formal sin in the youth.

(b) Mortal sin or venial sin may be the result of scandal, just as a
stone in the road may cause either a fall or a stumble.

(c) Sin of the same species or sin of a different species from that
committed by the scandal-giver may be the result of scandal. Thus, a
calumny spoken against a neighbor may induce a hearer either to repeat
the calumny, or to imitate the act imputed by the calumniator, or to
give up religion.

(d) Sin already committed by the person scandalized or sin which is new
to him, sin he had in mind to commit or sin he had not
contemplated--any one of these results suffice for scandal. Example: It
is scandal to recall to drunkenness by bad example a person who had
reformed, or by bad example to bring back to another’s mind and desire
a sin on which he was once resolved.

1460. Scandal resembles solicitation and complicity, since like them it
exercises an evil influence on others; but it is not identical with
them.

(a) Thus, solicitation influences another to evil by counsel,
persuasion, command, or invitation; scandal may influence to evil
either in these ways or by mere example. Again, solicitation does not
necessarily intend the fall of another into guilt, as does scandal.
Thus, one may solicit another to get drunk who had already determined
to get drunk, or one may persuade another that drunkenness is no sin,
and then solicit him to drunkenness. But, if one who intends the
demoralization and corruption of his neighbor solicits him to
drunkenness, solicitation is joined with scandal.

(b) Complicity or cooperation influences another to evil by helping him
in the commission of sin; scandal influences him to evil by suggesting
that he commit sin. Example: Titus, an elderly man, gets drunk or
praises drunkards in the presence of Balbus, a youth. Influenced by
these acts and words, Balbus tells his acquaintance Claudius that he
intends to get drunk, and Claudius supplies him with the intoxicants.
Titus is guilty of scandal, Claudius of cooperation.

1461. The persons before whom disedifying words, deeds or omissions are
done, are of two classes. (a) Persons apt to be scandalized are those
who are not experienced either in vice (especially that to which the
disedifying example would lead), or in virtue (especially the opposite
virtue); for such persons are readily subject to bad influence. Thus,
young persons Whose character is yet unformed, the ignorant and
well-meaning persons who are weak, are peculiarly disposed to be led
astray by example. (b) Persons not apt to be scandalized are those who
are habitually so bad or so good that anything disedifying done before
them is not calculated to influence their attitude towards evil.

1462. May a person hold himself guiltless of scandal, therefore,
because his wrongdoing was committed before those who are not apt to be
scandalized?

(a) If he is certain that the witnesses will not be weakened morally on
his account, and if he does not intend their fall, he is free of the
guilt of scandal. Thus, if one blasphemes in the presence of a lady
renowned for piety, or of a rough crowd of men whose daily talk is
interspersed with blasphemies, it is practically sure that no scandal
is given.

(b) If a person is not certain that the witnesses will suffer no moral
harm through his example, he cannot hold himself as not guilty of
scandal. For, no matter how good or how bad the witnesses may appear to
him, they may not be as fixed in character as he thinks, and his
misconduct may be the starting point for them of a downward course or
of a more rapid descent into evil. Generally speaking, there is this
uncertainty about the influence of bad example, for the reading of
character is no easy matter, and many sins are internal.

1463. There are two cases especially, when even the very good may
become bad or the very bad become worse through force of evil example:
(a) when the sin committed is from its nature very alluring. Sic
auctores censent vix fieri posse quin in materia luxuriae malum exemplum
peccati motus cieat; (b) the second case is when the authority of the
one who gives scandal is great. For the fact that he sides with or
seems to side with evil, will demoralize the good and encourage the
wicked in wrongdoing.

1464. Passive scandal (see 1452), that is, the spiritual fall
consequent on the example of another, is of two kinds: (a) scandal
given, which is a fall into sin occasioned by conduct really
disedifying, as when a youth becomes drunk because he has seen his
elders intoxicated; (b) scandal taken, which is a fall into sin
occasioned by conduct irreproachable in itself, but wrongly
interpreted, either out of malice (Pharisaic scandal), or out of
ignorance or frailty (scandal of little ones). The Pharisees were
scandalized at our Lord’s dining with sinners, because they themselves
were unmerciful (Matt., ix. 11 sqq.), and the weak brethren at Corinth
were scandalized at the eating of certain meats, because their
consciences were tender (I Cor., xi. 23 sqq.).

1465. Sinfulness of Scandal.--(a) Scandal in the wide sense is not
necessarily a sin. Thus, St. Peter acted out of love for his Master
when he wished to dissuade Him from the Passion, but our Lord, in order
to correct more vigorously the wrong ideas of Peter, called them a
scandal (Matt., xvi. 23).

(b) Passive scandal is always a sin in the one who falls because of the
conduct of another; but it does not always suppose that the conduct
which occasioned the fall was a sin, as is clear from the remarks made
above on Pharisaic scandal and the scandal of little ones.

(c) Active scandal is always a sin in the one whose conduct occasions
the fall of another, since that conduct is either sinful, or has such
an appearance of sin that it should have been omitted. But it does not
always suppose a sin in the person who witnesses the scandal, for he
may proceed without a fall in spite of the obstacle placed in his path.

1466. Is scandal a distinct species of sin, or only a circumstance that
may happen to any kind of sin?

(a) Passive scandal is not a special kind of sin. For the scandalized
person may fall into any and every kind of sin, and the fact that
example occasions his fall does not add any special or new opposition
to the virtue against which he offends. Thus, he who breaks the fast
because he saw others break the fast, is guilty of the same sin of
intemperance as those who gave him scandal. But passive scandal may be
an aggravating or an extenuating circumstance, aggravating if the
scandal was taken, extenuating if the scandal was given.

(b) Active scandal, if it is only indirectly intentional (see 1450) and
is offered by conduct evil in itself, is not a special sin. The reason
is that in such scandal one does not specially intend the spiritual
ruin of a neighbor, but only the satisfaction of one’s own desire.
Thus, he who breaks the fast before others to satisfy his own appetite,
does not directly wish the corruption of those others, and hence his
sin is that of intemperance with the added circumstance of bad example.

(c) Active scandal, if it is only indirectly intentional and is offered
by conduct not evil but evil-appearing, is reductively the special sin
of scandal, For, since all active scandal is sinful, and in this case
there is no other species of sin, the conduct not being really evil in
itself, the sin in question must be reduced to scandal. Thus, one who
is dispensed from the law of abstinence and who eats meat on a day of
abstinence in the presence of others who know he is a Catholic but do
not know he is dispensed, does not sin against temperance, but against
edification. His sin is that of scandal only reductively, since he does
not directly will the fall of others. There is also the circumstance
that the law of abstinence may suffer as a result of the scandal.

(d) Active scandal, if it is directly intentional (see 1450), is
directly also the special sin of scandal. For this kind of scandal
directly intends the spiritual ruin of a neighbor, and so is directly
opposed to a special good of another person and to the special
charitable act of fraternal correction. Hence, a person who breaks the
fast in order to lead his neighbor into a like transgression is guilty
of both intemperance and scandal; he who to make his neighbor sin
appears to break the fast, is guilty of scandal, but not of
intemperance.

1467. Practical Applications of the Preceding Paragraph to
Confession.--(a) Species of Sins.--In case of passive scandal there is
only one species of sin to be confessed, namely, the intemperance
occasioned by bad example; in case of active scandal indirectly
intended and offered by evil conduct, there is only one species of sin,
namely, intemperance, with the circumstance of publicity or bad
example; in case of active scandal indirectly intended and offered by
evil-seeming conduct, there is only one species of sin, namely,
scandal; in case of active scandal directly intended, there is only the
species of scandal, if the conduct of the scandalizer is only
evil-seeming, but there are several species of sin, if his conduct is
really evil, namely, his own intemperance and the scandal he gives.

(b) Number of Sins.--As many sins of scandal are committed as there are
persons present to be scandalized, for scandal is given to those
present as individuals, not as parts of a group (see 219). Hence, one
commits more scandals by being drunk on a public street than by being
drunk with a roomful of companions; and by attacking religion before a
large assembly than by attacking it before a small circle.

(c) Circumstances of Intention and Conduct.--Those who give bad example
should confess especially the end and the means employed, for on these
depends the important distinction between directly intentional and
indirectly intentional scandal and the specific character of the sin
committed, as explained in the preceding paragraph.

(d) Circumstance of Condition of the Persons Involved.--This should be
mentioned in confessing scandal, if it adds a new malice. Thus, the
fact that scandal is given by a superior bound by his office to give
good example, adds to the violation of charity a violation of justice;
the fact that the person whose ruin is intended is consecrated to God,
or married, or a relative, adds to the malice of intentional scandal
against chastity; the fact that a person is scandalized entirely
against his will, makes the sin scandal rather than simple solicitation.

(e) Circumstance of the Result of Scandal.--The results of scandal
should be confessed when they add a new malice to the sin or induce an
obligation of restitution. This subject will be considered in the three
following paragraphs.

1468. Is the scandalizer guilty of the species of sin to which his
conduct is calculated to lead the scandalized? (a) If the scandal is
directly intentional, that is, if the scandalizer intends that some
special sin or sins shall be committed by the one scandalized, the
former is guilty in desire of that which he intends that the latter
shall be guilty of in reality (cfr. 96, 102). Hence, if by calumniating
clerics or religious or church members one intends that one’s listeners
shall be induced to repeat these calumnies, or to do what the
calumniated persons were said to do, or to abandon religion, one is
guilty in desire of the particular sin or sins that one wills.

(b) If the scandal is only indirectly intentional, that is, if the
scandalizer foresees but does not expressly will the fall of the
scandalized (e.g., if he calumniates others to injure the calumniated
and not those who hear the calumny), the matter is more difficult, and
authorities differ in their opinions. Some moralists think that the
scandalizer is guilty of the result he foresees, because he wills it
interpretatively by offering the occasion for it. Others think that he
is not guilty of the result foreseen, because he does not effect it,
either in intention (for he does not desire it) or in reality (for he
is not bound, except by charity, to prevent its accomplishment in
others); he permits, but does not approve, the sin of his neighbor.

1469. A practical application of the previous paragraph to confession
may be made as follows: (a) those who are guilty of direct scandal must
confess not only their own sin, but also the sin to which their conduct
leads their neighbor; (b) those who are guilty of indirect scandal are
not obliged, according to the second opinion given above, to confess
the species of sin to which their conduct incited the beholder, and
hence, if their conduct was only evil-seeming, it suffices for them to
confess that they gave scandal.

1470. Is the scandalizer responsible for the injuries to third parties
resulting from the sins occasioned by his scandal?

(a) According to one opinion, he is bound to make his share of
restitution for injustices occasioned by his own bad example, because
it is admitted that he who counsels injustice is so bound, and example
is more persuasive than words of counsel. Hence, one who steals from
his employer before fellow-employees, and so brings on a custom of
stealing among them, is bound to restore, not only what he took
himself, but also a share of other losses not made good to the employer.

(b) According to the more common opinion, however, the scandalizer in
the present case is not held to restitution, except as regards his own
ill-gotten goods, even if there is question of scandal directly
intended. For, either the scandalizer is not guilty of the injustice
committed by the others, as not desiring it; or, at any rate, he is
only the occasion, not the cause or cooperator in that injustice.

1471. If scandal amounts to incitation or cooperation, the guilt of the
neighbor’s sin and responsibility for injury the neighbor causes are
incurred by the scandalizer.

(a) Thus, bad example may amount to incitation to sin, as when a person
knows that others are directed to imitate him, and yet he gives them
bad example. Even though he does not directly intend their fall into
sin, he does intend his own conduct, while realizing that there is
attached to it the circumstance that it is an invitation to sin; and
hence it would seem that the guilt of this sin is also contracted.

(b) Bad example may amount to cooperation in sin, as when a person by
his bad example shows others the way to commit sin, which they could
not have learned without his example. Hence, if a person opens a safe
to steal, knowing that other dishonest persons are observing in order
to learn the combination and steal, it seems that to some extent he
shares in the guilt and duty of restitution of the thieves who learn
from him. There is no doubt that a defamer is bound to make reparation,
not only before his immediate listeners, but also before others who
have listened to them; for, by defaming before talkative persons, he
virtually authorized them to spread his words.

1472. The Gravity of the Sin of Scandal.--(a) From its nature all
active scandal is a mortal sin. It turns man away from Christ (I Cor.,
viii. 12); it is spiritual murder, destructive of the souls of others,
and so contrary to the mercy and brotherly correction required by
charity (Rom, xiv. 15); it brings on oneself the wrath of God (Matt.,
xviii. 6), and on one’s family, friends and profession obloquy and
disgrace.

(b) From the indeliberation of the act or from the smallness of the
matter, active scandal may be venial, as will be seen in the following
paragraph.

1473. Mortal and Venial Scandal.--(a) Passive scandal is always a sin,
mortal or venial according to the fall occasioned by the conduct
witnessed. But mortal sin may be occasioned by venial sin, as when an
inferior takes the liberty to blaspheme, because his superior used
profane language; and venial sin may be occasioned by mortal sin, as
when the blasphemy of an infidel provokes his neighbor to use profane
language against the blasphemer.

(b) Active scandal indirectly intended is sometimes a venial sin, as
when the scandalous conduct is only a venial sin, or is no sin but has
the appearance of a slight sin; sometimes it is a mortal sin, as when
the scandalous conduct is a mortal sin, or when a person so despises
the spiritual welfare of his neighbor that he chooses to do an
evil-seeming act that will cause the neighbor to fall into serious sin.

(c) Active scandal directly intended is sometimes a venial sin, as when
a person intends by conduct venially sinful to lead a neighbor into
venial sin; sometimes it is a mortal sin, as when one intends to lead
one’s neighbor into mortal sin, or commits a mortal sin in order to
lead one’s neighbor into venial sin.

1474. Increase and decrease in gravity of scandal depends on the
internal dispositions of the scandal-giver and the external influence
he has on the person scandalized. (a) The internal factors on which the
quantity of scandal depends are the amount of deliberation and the
degree of intention. It is more serious to speak a scandalous word with
premeditation than to speak it somewhat thoughtlessly; more scandalous
to speak it when the hearer’s spiritual ruin is directly intended, than
when that ruin is not directly intended. (b) The external factors on
which the quantity of scandal depends are the amount of influence the
bad example has and the character of the evil to which it leads. It is
more serious to corrupt A, who would not otherwise have been corrupted,
than to corrupt B, who would have been corrupted even without one’s bad
example; it is more serious to cause another to commit mortal sin, than
to cause him to commit venial sin.

1475. Persons Scandalized.--Is it possible to scandalize people who are
firmly rooted in virtue?

(a) If the question be understood of scandal in a wide sense, even the
perfect may be scandalized. They may be shocked and horrified at the
evil example they witness; they may be hindered from performing the
external good works they desire to accomplish (I Thess., ii. 18). But
these things do not hinder them internally, or separate them from the
love of God (Rom., viii. 38, 39).

(b) If the question be understood of possibility in an absolute sense,
even the perfect may suffer real scandal, that is, they may be
influenced to sin on account of the example witnessed. Since they are
not confirmed in grace in this life, it is not repugnant that they
commit sin and lose grace.

(c) If the question be understood of possibility in a relative
sense--that is, if we consider what we should expect in view of the
character of perfect men, and what does usually happen--the perfect
cannot be scandalized, since they are so firmly united to God that the
sayings or doings, no matter of whom, cannot cause them to sin (Ps.
cxxiv. 1, 2), although they may at times be disturbed thereby (Ps.
lxxii. 2).

1476. Is it possible that the perfect should give scandal?

(a) If the question be understood of absolute possibility, even the
perfect may give scandal, since they are not immune from defect (I
John, i. 8). (b) If the question be understood of relative possibility,
as explained above, the perfect cannot scandalize, for their sins are
mostly internal acts not entirely deliberate, while the external words
or acts in which they fall short deviate so slightly from right as to
offer no occasion of sinning to another. The perfect man is one who is
on his guard, especially that he become not a stumbling-block to
others, and it is therefore a rare exception when he causes scandal.

1477. Duty of Avoiding Scandal.--At times it is impossible to avoid
giving scandal, unless one surrenders some spiritual or temporal good.
Hence, on this point there are two questions to be considered: (a) When
is one obliged to surrender spiritual goods for the sake of avoiding
scandal? (b) When is one obliged to surrender temporal goods for the
sake of avoiding scandal?

1478. The Surrender of Spiritual Goods in order to Avoid Scandal.--(a)
Spiritual goods that are so necessary that one cannot give them up
without committing sin may not be surrendered; for, according to the
order of charity, one must be more solicitous to keep oneself from sin
than to preserve others, and moreover a good end does not justify
sinful means. Hence, it is not lawful to commit mortal or even venial
sin to avoid giving scandal to another. Examples: One may not tone down
the doctrine of right and wrong in order to keep another from
blasphemy. One may not tell a slight lie to keep another from taking
undeserved offense.

(b) Spiritual goods which can be put aside without sin are not to be
neglected on account of malicious or Pharisaic scandal, as long as
there is a good reason which calls for their use; for the person who
takes malicious scandal from these spiritual things is in difficulty
through his own fault and can rescue himself, and it is not reasonable
that his malice should be permitted to impede the benefit of others.
Thus, our Lord declared that no attention was to be given the scandal
which the Pharisees took from His doctrine (Matt., xv. 14).

(c) Spiritual goods which can be put aside without sin should be
neglected on account of Pharisaic scandal, if there is no great reason
for their use; for one should not give another an occasion of sinning,
even if the other is in bad faith, unless there is necessity. Thus, our
Lord declared that the act of teaching truth to others should be
omitted, if it would only provoke rejection (Matt, vii. 6). Example: A
wife may omit saying grace aloud, if her prayer moves her husband to
mimicry or to attempts to make the prayer a mockery.

(d) Spiritual goods which can be put aside without sin should be
omitted on account of the scandal of little ones, as long as it remains
scandal from weakness or ignorance; for charity requires that one
assist those who are in spiritual need, and persons who are in danger
of scandal through no fault, or through a slight fault of their own,
are in spiritual need. Hence, one should conceal or delay the
performance of good works that are not necessary, if they would
scandalize the weak, or else one should explain to these persons the
righteousness of such works. In any case, one should not do these works
before those who without malice will be scandalized, but should await
such a time as will give them better knowledge, or put them in bad
faith. Examples: If a person knows that personal acts of piety which he
performs seem to some well-meaning persons superstitious and will shake
their faith, he should omit these acts when such persons are present.
If parents are scandalized because a child wishes to leave them in
order to become a priest or a religious, the child should delay for a
while, if there is hope of a change of view on their part.

1479. As was said in the chapter on law (see 288 sqq.), the higher law
has the preference in case of a conflict. Now, natural law itself
requires that one avoid the scandal of the weak. Hence the following
cases:

(a) Negative precepts of the natural law may not be contravened in
order to avoid the scandal of the weak; for such contravention is
necessarily sinful. Hence, one may not lie or commit perjury to prevent
scandal.

(b) Affirmative precepts of the natural law should be contravened in
order to avoid the scandal of the weak, but only when such scandal is a
greater evil than the omission of the thing commanded. Thus, one should
omit a fraternal correction or a punishment, if the one corrected would
be made worse, or the punishment occasion a schism. But one may not
neglect to help a person in extreme need because of scandal.

(c) Precepts of the divine law should be contravened on account of
scandal of the weak, unless contravention of the law is a greater evil
than permission of the scandal. Thus, the preaching of the Gospel is
commanded by divine law, and yet it may be omitted to avoid scandal
(Matt., vii. 6). Item integritas confessionis de jure divino est, et
tamen poenitens deberet peccatum silere, si intelligeret confessarium
cui ex necessitate confiteri deberet grave ex eo scandalum passurum.
But it is not lawful to omit Baptism in order to avoid scandal to those
who will be provoked to anger or blasphemy.

(d) Precepts of ecclesiastical law should be contravened, when
otherwise there will arise a scandal of the weak which is a graver evil
than the contravention of the precepts. Thus, a parish-priest should
say Mass on Sunday, even though not fasting, if this is necessary in
order to avoid great scandal among the people. A wife may omit Mass or
a fast, in order to prevent her ignorant husband from using blasphemies
or imprecations, or to avoid notable dissensions in the home. Puella
quae scit juvenem infirmum ex suo aspectu scandalizari debet sacro
omisso domi manere.

1480. In order that scandal of the weak may be considered a greater
evil than contravention of a grave precept, it is necessary that the
following conditions be verified:

(a) The evil of the scandal must be certain and grave, for an uncertain
or slight scandal is not a greater evil than certain contravention of a
grave precept. Thus, if one only has vague fears that scandal may be
given, or if one has no determined person in mind and thinks only that
someone or other will be harmed, there is no excuse for contravention
of the precept.

(b) The evil of contravening the precept must not impose intolerable
hardships or lead to greater scandals; for one is not required to
attempt the impossible, or to give scandal in order to avoid scandal.
Thus, it would be unreasonable to expect that a student should never
read the classical poets or philosophers of Greece or Rome, lest
scandal be given some person overstrict in this matter; that a wife
absent herself from Mass permanently, lest her ignorant husband be
provoked to rage; that a young lady be deprived of fresh air and
exercise, lest an old relative be disedified. If we have to choose
between occasioning irreligion in one person by attending Mass and
occasioning irreligion in many persons by staying away from Mass, we
should rather permit the scandal of the one. Moralists generally hold
that scandal of the weak does not justify absence from obligatory Mass
oftener than once or twice, and some hold that it does not require
absence from Mass at all.

1481. Good works that are of counsel only (such as evangelical
poverty), and those that are obligatory only under certain conditions
(such as almsdeeds), may be more easily put aside in order to avoid
scandal of the weak. It should be noted, however, that for some persons
these works are of precept, and hence they are to be judged, as regards
those persons, according to the rules given for contravention of
precepts. (a) Thus, the counsels are obligatory for those who have
vowed them (e.g., religious).

(b) Corporal and spiritual works of mercy are obligatory for prelates
and other clerics because of their office.

1482. Spiritual goods, therefore, whether of precept or of counsel, are
not to be surrendered entirely on account of any scandal, whether it be
Pharisaic scandal or scandal of the weak. But, out of charity for
others, these goods should not be made use of (apart from necessity) in
a way that would occasion spiritual ruin to anyone. Hence, if there is
danger of scandal: (a) they should be concealed, as when one goes to
Mass early in the morning or by another way, so as not to occasion
blasphemy in one’s neighbor; (b) they should be delayed, as when one
puts off a fraternal correction until the other person is in a frame of
mind to be corrected with profit; (c) they may be used but should be
explained, as when one is called to give Baptism to a person dying in a
notorious resort and takes witnesses with him, or tells the bystanders
the reason of his visit.

1483. When Should Temporal Goods be Surrendered for the Sake of
Avoiding Scandal.--(a) Temporal goods of which one is not the owner,
but only the custodian or administrator, may not be surrendered at will
on account of scandal; for no one has the right to give away the
property of others. Hence, rulers in Church or State may not
arbitrarily surrender common property; guardians may not give up the
property of their charges.

(b) Temporal goods of which one is owner should be surrendered on
account of the scandal of little ones, unless a greater evil results
from such surrender; for, as said above (see 1165 sqq.), one should be
willing to suffer some detriment in temporal things to avert from one’s
neighbor detriment in spiritual things. Hence, one should abstain from
a certain food, if one’s eating of it will cause spiritual ruin to some
innocent person (I Cor., viii. 13).

(c) Temporal goods are not to be surrendered on account of Pharisaic
scandal; for this would be injurious to the common good, since it would
encourage the wicked to despoil the conscientious, and it would also be
injurious to the wicked themselves, since they would continue in sin by
keeping what was not their own. Hence, one may demand money owed, even
if the debtor is greedy and will use profane language.

1484. The surrender of temporal goods spoken of in the previous
paragraph may be understood in a number of senses.

(a) It can be understood either of the act of giving another what is
held by us and is our own property, or of the act of permitting another
to keep that which is held by him but which belongs to us. Charity may
call for either kind of surrender as a means to the avoidance of
scandal. Example: Rather than have a bitter quarrel or lose a
friendship over a few cents of change, it is better to let the other
man keep what he owes you, or give him what you do not owe, if he is
also in good faith.

(b) The surrender of temporal goods can also be understood either of
the internal willingness to sacrifice temporal things for things
spiritual, when necessity requires, or of the actual external
sacrifice. Charity demands the internal willingness, but it does not
always demand the actual sacrifice; for sometimes such a sacrifice
would be harmful to the common welfare and the welfare of individuals.
Thus, the saying of our Lord that we should not contend with a neighbor
who wishes to take our coat, but should rather let him take our cloak
as well (Matt, v. 40), and the saying of St. Paul that the Corinthians
should prefer to suffer injury and fraud rather than have lawsuits
against fellow-Christians (I Cor., vi. 7), are to be understood of a
willingness to sacrifice temporal things in order to avoid scandal,
when a greater good makes this necessary. But those texts do not mean
that it is obligatory or advisable to make an actual sacrifice at other
times.

(c) The surrender of temporal goods may be understood either of a
giving over to others without protest or remonstrance, or of a yielding
to them only after one has tried to prevent scandal without incurring
temporal loss. Charity does not require, even when there is danger of
scandal of the weak, that one should surrender one’s goods without any
effort to save them. Thus, if an ignorant Catholic is shocked because
his priest asks for money to support the Church, the latter will do him
a service by explaining the right the Church has to be supported and
the duty of the members to contribute.

1485. Temporal goods may be understood here either of things of great
value (e.g., necessaries of life) or of things of minor value (e.g.,
luxuries). (a) Thus, if scandal will place a neighbor in extreme
spiritual need, even things of great value should be surrendered, if
this is necessary to avoid scandal. (b) If scandal will not place him
in extreme need, one is not obliged to surrender any except things of
minor value (see 1165 sqq.). Thus, St. Paul does not ask that his
converts give up all food in order to avoid scandalizing the weak, but
only such food as they can get along without (Rom, xiv. 15; I Cor.,
viii. 13).

1486. Should church goods ever be surrendered in order to avoid scandal
of the weak? (a) On the one hand, goods of the Church have a special
sacredness, because they have been given and set apart for spiritual
purposes and the common good of the Church. Hence, he would be an
unfaithful steward who would devote them to merely temporal ends, such
as the enrichment or exaltation of himself or of his friends, or who
would alienate them without due authority. (b) On the other hand, the
temporal goods of the Church are to serve spiritual ends, and the
spiritual must not be subordinated to the temporal. Hence, one of the
chief causes of scandal in the Church is the appearance of avarice in
churchmen (even as regards goods that are not personal, but common),
especially if they seem to put money before the salvation of the
people. There are times, therefore, when to avoid scandal a prelate or
priest ought to forego something really due the Church.

1487. Cases of Scandal and Renouncement of Church Goods.--(a) If there
is question of Pharisaic scandal alone, one should not renounce the
goods of which one is the custodian, but should resist spoliation as
far as one is able. Thus, St. Thomas of Canterbury would not agree to
the invasion of church rights by Henry II. So also a pastor should not
neglect the collection of dues needed for the maintenance of the
church, because some malcontents will take offense at this; neither
should he yield to the extortionate demands of some hired person who
will be scandalized because more is not paid.

(b) If there is question of the scandal of the weak, concessions should
be made, lest spiritual things be made to suffer for the temporal.
Thus, St. Paul would not accept any support for himself from persons
newly converted to Christianity, lest this prove a hindrance to the
preaching of the Gospel (I Cor., ix. 12). For the sake of the ignorant
or the weak, therefore, the Church does not insist on dues and other
payments, until these persons have had the opportunity of learning
their duty. The faithful, indeed, are bound to contribute to the
pastors who serve them, but the precept is an affirmative one, and
obliges therefore not at all times, but when the conditions of time,
place, person, etc., make this possible. It would be a real scandal of
the weak, if a person were driven from church because he did not
realize his duty of contributing, or if a poor person were taxed beyond
his means, or if an affluent cleric were always asking for money and
never giving to the needy, or if a priest were to talk collections
instead of doctrine, or devoted most of his time to money-making
enterprises. Anything that commercializes religion is also a scandal
both to Catholics and non-Catholics.

1488. Duty of Repairing Scandal.-The paragraphs immediately preceding
have spoken of the duty of avoiding scandal. There is also a duty of
repairing scandal that has been given. (a) Thus, there is a duty of
charity to repair the scandal one has given; for, if all are required
to practise fraternal correction, those especially are bound to this
who are responsible for the sins of others. (b) There is sometimes a
duty of legal justice, as when superiors, who are bound from their
office to give good example, give scandal to their subjects. (c) There
is sometimes a duty of commutative justice, as when the scandalizer has
employed unjust means (such as force, fear or traps) in order to lead
another into scandal.

1489. Ways of Repairing Scandal.--(a) Scandal is repaired publicly or
privately. Reparation is public, when it is made before the community,
and private, when it is made before individuals. (b) Scandal is
repaired explicitly or implicitly. Explicit reparation is made by
retractation of one’s words, by condemnation of one’s acts, by the
destruction of one’s scandalous writings, by efforts to bring back to
virtue those whom one has misled, etc. Implicit reparation is made by
reformation of one’s conduct, the abandonment of that which gave
scandal, the practice of good example, prayer for the person
scandalized, etc.

1490. Particular Kinds of Scandal to be Repaired.--(a) Scandal is
public or private. Public scandal is given before the community at
large, as when one openly apostatizes so that it is the talk of the
whole neighborhood or town, or writes a signed article favoring
atheism, or makes a disedifying speech before a gathering of people.
Scandal is private, when it is given before a few persons, and when it
does not tend to become generally known, as when husband and wife
quarrel before their domestic circle.

(b) Scandal is ordinary or extraordinary. Ordinary scandal is given by
bad example alone; extraordinary scandal adds to bad example injury or
injustice, or the debt of punishment for a crime. Thus, one who becomes
slightly intoxicated at a party gives ordinary scandal; while one who
by trickery schemes to get another into a situation in which he will be
effectually scandalized, or who strikes an inoffensive priest, or who
spreads disedifying printed matter, is guilty of extraordinary scandal.

1491. It rests with the prudent judgment of the confessor or
ecclesiastical authority to decide in particular instances the way in
which scandals are to be repaired. But in general the following rules
may be given:

(a) Public scandal should be repaired publicly, even though it has not
actually seduced those who are aware of it; for otherwise the evil
influence remains. Thus, a drunkard should take the pledge of total
abstinence, or else give an example of sobriety; an apostate should
renounce his errors as openly as he defended them.

(b) Private scandal may be repaired privately, that is, before the few
persons who were scandalized. Thus, the husband and wife who quarrelled
before their children make reparation when they tell the children not
to quarrel, and when they strengthen this advice by good example.

(c) Ordinary scandal may be repaired implicitly, that is, by turning
over a new leaf. Thus, one who has been away from Mass and the
Sacraments for a long time makes reparation when he appears at church,
goes to confession, and receives Communion; one who has been keeping
bad company makes reparation when he separates from his former
associates.

(d) Extraordinary scandal is repaired explicitly, that is, by making
the restitution or satisfaction which justice demands, or by performing
the penalty required by the law. Thus, if through treachery a person
has seduced another from virtue, he must either himself or through
others endeavor to recall the scandalized person to his former virtue;
if a person has been guilty of laying violent hands on a cleric, he
must perform the penance prescribed; if a person has distributed
scandalous literature, he must try to stop its circulation, or to
distribute contrary literature.

1492. When satisfaction requires public apology or retraction, this can
be made in various ways. (a) Thus, one may withdraw through the press
false statements publicly made; (b) one may apologize before a number
of witnesses authorized to make this known; (c) one may retract before
the pastor or confessor, with the understanding that the priest will
later declare that all due satisfaction has been made.

1493. Denial of Sacraments in Cases of Scandal.--Is it lawful to
administer the Sacraments to one who has not made satisfaction for
public scandal?

(a) If the obligation of reparation is not grave, it is lawful to
administer the Sacraments, since the person who gave the scandal is not
subject to grave sin and unworthy of the Sacraments, and his admission
to them will not be a new scandal.

(b) If the obligation of reparation is grave, it is lawful to admit the
party in question to the Sacrament of Penance; for every person rightly
disposed has a right to absolution, and the fact that a person who gave
scandal goes to confession is edifying. But absolution should be given
on condition that reparation for the scandal is seriously promised.

(c) If the obligation of reparation is grave, it is not lawful as a
rule to admit to the other Sacraments, until the reparation has been
actually performed. Thus, if it is notorious in a parish that a certain
individual has been living in a serious occasion of sin or has been
circulating impious doctrines, the occasion of sin should be removed or
the doctrines should be retracted, before the individual is admitted to
Communion, etc.; otherwise, a new scandal would be given the faithful
from the apparent approval given the scandalizer by the minister of the
Sacrament received.

1494. In certain cases, however, the Sacraments other than Penance may
also be given before reparation for grave scandal has been made,
namely, when the circumstances are such that the administration of the
Sacraments will offer no scandal. (a) Thus, a dying person who is
penitent but unable to perform some satisfaction for scandal given is
granted the Sacraments. (b) A person who is well disposed, but who has
not yet made satisfaction for scandal, may sometimes be given Communion
privately. (c) A person who is not well disposed, and who will not make
satisfaction for scandal, is sometimes permitted to contract marriage
before the priest, namely, when there is a grave reason for marriage
and scandal is precluded.

1495. Seduction.--Having discussed scandal, which leads others into sin
by bad example, we shall now consider, first, solicitation or
seduction, which leads others into sin by moral inducement, and,
secondly, cooperation, which assists another to sin (see 1460).

1496. Seduction is some external act (words, writing, signs or gesture)
by which one directly and explicitly seeks to win the consent of
another to sin. There are various modes of solicitation.

(a) There is command to sin, which is an authoritative direction to
commit sin imposed by a superior on his subject. Command is given
expressly, as when a father tells his son to steal; or implicitly, as
when he tells his son that it will please him if the son steals.

(b) There is counsel to sin, which is direct persuasion to do evil made
through argument that sin is lawful, or through instruction on the ways
of committing sin, or through advice, request, promises, threats, etc.,
as when one writes in praise of suicide to a person who is very
discouraged, and recommends it.

(c) There is enticement which is an indirect persuasion to sin made
through flattery, insinuation, calumny, narratives, etc. Thus, Absalom
worked on the people of Israel and beguiled them into rebellion against
his father (II Kings, xv. 1-6). Those who ridicule temperance and so
lead others to drink excessively, entice to drunkenness. A host who
offers little except fine meats on a Friday entices to the violation of
abstinence.

1497. The Malice of Solicitation.--(a) The gravity of this sin
according to its nature is mortal, but it may be venial on account of
imperfect deliberation or smallness of matter (see 1473). Thus, it is a
mortal sin to command one’s son to commit grand larceny or perjury, a
venial sin to command him to commit petty theft or tell a harmless lie.
(b) The circumstances of the sin that aggravate or extenuate are the
greater or less degree of deliberation and malice, the greater or less
evil of the sin to which one induces one’s neighbors, etc. (see 1473,
1474). (c) The species of the sin of solicitation is twofold; there is
the sin of scandal, opposed to charity, inasmuch as a neighbor is led
to sin, and there is also the sin which one persuades a neighbor to
commit (see 1468 sqq.).

1498. Applications to Confession and Satisfaction.--(a) Since the
seducer willed the species of sin to which he induced his neighbor, it
does not suffice that he tell in confession that he induced another to
sin; he must also tell the species of sin (e.g., theft), to which he
induced or attempted to induce another. (b) Since the seducer is guilty
of injustice against the person seduced, if he employed fraud, traps,
violence, etc., it does not suffice in such cases merely to confess
that he seduced; he must also tell that he used unjust means to seduce.
(c) Since the seducer is guilty of spiritual damage, he is bound to
make reparation for scandal given (see 1488 sqq.). (d) Since the
seducer is responsible for temporal damages that are due to his
influence (e.g., when he commands A to steal from or calumniate B), he
is held to restitution for any such damages (see Vol. II on Justice).

1499. In confessing a sin whose nature implies an accomplice (e.g.,
obscene conversation), is it necessary to mention the circumstance that
one seduced the other party? (a) If the seduction includes a special
malice against charity or against justice, it should be mentioned.
Thus, if the party seduced had been innocent and was scandalized, or
was trapped into sin, the fact of seduction should be mentioned. (b) If
the seduction includes no special malice against charity or justice, it
seems there is no obligation to mention it. Thus, if the party
solicited had been living a life of sin and consented to the
solicitation without any detriment to ideals or any unwillingness, no
scandal is given and no injustice committed by the solicitation, as far
as that party is concerned, and there seems to be no reason why the
circumstance of seduction must be confessed.

1500. Seduction is incitement to sin, and so differs from mere
permission of sin in another. It is never lawful to incite to sin, but
it is lawful for a sufficient reason to permit sin in others, as was
said above in reference to Pharisaic scandal (see 1477, 1482, 1483).
But, in applying this principle to concrete cases, it is sometimes
difficult to draw the line between incitement and mere permission. We
shall discuss now the following cases in which this difficulty occurs:
(a) when one requests another to do something which one knows will be a
sin for him; (b) when one advises another to commit a less rather than
a greater evil; (e) when the opportunity for another to commit sin is
not removed, or is prepared.

1501. Is it lawful to ask another to do something, when one knows that
he will not consent without sinning?

(a) If the thing requested is sinful in itself, the request is also
sinful. Hence, it is not lawful to ask a thief to sell the goods he has
stolen, nor is it lawful to request absolution from a priest who lacks
jurisdiction.

(b) If the thing requested is lawful in itself, but there is no
sufficient reason for the request in view of the fact that the other
will sin by granting it, the request is sinful. Hence, it is not lawful
to ask baptism from a person who is in the state of sin, when one can
easily obtain it from another person who is in the state of grace.

(c) If the thing requested is lawful, and there is a sufficient reason
for the request, one does not sin by making the request. Hence, it is
lawful for the sake of the common welfare to require that witnesses
take an oath, even though one knows that one of them will commit
perjury.

1502. Is it lawful to advise another to commit a less evil in
preference to a greater evil?

(a) If the other has not made up his mind to commit either evil, it is
not lawful to advise that he do either. Thus, to counsel another to
steal, and to make his victims the rich rather than the poor, is a
species of seduction.

(b) If the person has made up his mind to commit the greater evil and
the lesser evil is virtually contained in the greater, it is lawful to
advise that he omit the former for the latter. For in thus acting one
prevents the greater evil and does not cause the lesser evil, since it
is virtually contained in the greater evil which the other person had
already decided on. Thus, if Titus is bent on stealing $100, Balbus is
not guilty of seduction, if he persuades Titus to take only $10. We are
supposing, of course, that Titus is so determined to steal that it is
out of the question to deter him from taking at least a small amount.

(c) If the person in question has decided on the greater sin and the
lesser is not virtually contained in the greater, it is not lawful to
recommend that he commit the smaller instead of the greater sin. For,
if one does this, one does not save the other from the internal guilt
of the greater sin intended, while one does add the malice of the
lesser sin which was not intended. Thus, if Titus plans to kill Caius,
it is not lawful to advise that he rob him instead, or that he kill
Claudius instead, for robbery is a specifically distinct sin from
murder, and Claudius is a different person from Caius. But, if Titus
planned to kill Caius in order to rob him, it would not be unlawful to
point out that the robbery could be carried out without murder and to
advise accordingly.

1503. Not all theologians accept the last solution just given. (a) Some
reject it, and hold that, even when the lesser evil is not virtually
contained in the greater, it is lawful to advise the lesser. They argue
that what one does thereby is not to commit the lesser evil, to induce
it or approve it, but only to permit it in order to lessen the harm
that will be done, and they confirm their argument from scripture
(Gen., xix. 8). According to this opinion, then, which has some good
authorities in its favor, it would be lawful to advise robbery in order
to dissuade another from the greater evil of murder. (b) Others modify
the solution given in the previous paragraph, and hold that it is
lawful to propose the lesser evil or mention it, provided one does not
attempt to induce the other person to carry it into effect.

1504. Is it lawful so to prearrange circumstances that an occasion of
sin will seem to offer itself to another?

(a) If the end and the means used are good, this is lawful; for there
is no scandal or seduction, but sin or the danger of sin is permitted
for a proportionately grave reason. Examples: Sempronius knows that
someone is robbing his desk, and it is important that he discover the
thief. He leaves the desk open and watches from concealment to see
whether a suspected person who is coming to the room will steal.
Claudius is quite certain that Titus is stealing his chickens, but he
needs evidence in order to have Titus convicted and deterred from
future stealing. So, he leaves doors open and hides himself with
witnesses that Titus may be caught in the act.

(b) If the end or means is bad, it is not lawful to prepare an
opportunity for sin, because in either case one intends something
sinful. Examples: Sempronius knows that his wife Titia has been
unfaithful and he threatens to leave her. She, wishing to have a
countercharge to make or to secure evidence to discredit his word,
hires various dissolute females to lay traps for him and his friends.
Claudius out of revenge wishes that Caius be sent to jail, and he
therefore employs agents to provoke Caius into something criminal in
word or deed that will justify incarceration. Balbus knows that
Mercurius is a dangerous character, and he frames a scheme by which
Mercurius will be invited to participate in an act of banditry and be
captured. Titia and Claudius sin, because their purpose is wrong;
Balbus sins because he uses wrong means. All three are guilty of
seduction, at least in intention.

1505. Seduction was described above (see 1496) as an inducement to sin
through such manifest means as command, counsel, or enticement. But
there is also a more subtle form of seduction, which does not appeal
directly to the intellect or will, but makes a physical approach by
acting upon the body, senses, or imagination. This is a more cunning,
but none the less guilty form of seduction, examples of which are the
following:

(a) Seduction through bodily states is exemplified in those who
minister secretly to others drinks or drugs or foods that will produce
emotional disturbances or mental confusion and make them more
susceptible to temptation.

(b) Seduction through the senses is exemplified in those who surround
others with pictures, companions, music, examples, etc., that
continually speak of the desirability of vice or the undesirability of
virtue.

(c) Seduction through the imagination is seen in hypnotism or
suggestion when used to produce a vivid and strong impression of
something dangerous to be thought on. A spirit of bigoted uniformity
which demands that all dress, think and act alike even in matters where
there should be liberty, may also be very seductive; for, rather than
commit the unpardonable sin of seeming queer, a person may take to
drunkenness or whatever vice is popular in his crowd or group.

1506. Cooperation in Sin.--Cooperation or participation in sin,
strictly understood, is help afforded another, whom one has not
seduced, to carry out his purpose of sinning.

(a) Hence, cooperation differs from scandal and solicitation, for these
lead into sin one who had not decided on sin, while cooperation
supposes that the other party had already made up his mind to sin. The
scandalizer leads into sin, but does not help in its commission; the
cooperator does not lead into sin but he helps in its commission.

(b) Cooperation, however, may include scandal and solicitation as
regards future sins or as regards third parties. Example: Balbus, who
had decided on his own initiative to steal, finds to his surprise that
his conduct receives aid and comfort from Titus, a person of some
authority. This cooperation will act as an example or incitement to
Balbus to repeat the offense, and will likewise be an occasion of sin
to others.

1507. Cooperation is also different from complicity as follows: (a) The
cooperator acts as assistant or subordinate agent to the one who
commits sin, providing him with moral or physical help, or supplying
him with the means requisite for the act of sin. Thus, he whose
services are commandeered by robbers and who carries away the stolen
goods, or who puts a revolver into the hand of one bent on murder or
obscene books into the hands of one bent on the corruption of youth, is
a cooperator. (b) The accomplice acts as an equiprincipal or coordinate
agent with another in the commission of the same sin, performing his
own proper part or share of the joint act of sin. Thus, he who enlists
as a member of a robber band and acts as their chauffeur or lookout at
the time of “hold-ups,” or who fights a duel, or who carries on an
obscene dialogue, or listens willingly to obscene talk, is an
accomplice. The accomplice is always guilty, but the cooperator may be
guiltless.

1508. Kinds of Cooperation.--Divisions of Cooperation according to
Different Kinds of Acts.--(a) From the viewpoint of the internal act,
cooperation is either formal or material, according as one does or does
not intend the sin whose external commission one is aiding. Examples:
Caius offers a burglar information as to ways of climbing into a
second-story window. Claudius, being covered by a revolver, makes no
resistance or outcry while bandits are rifling his employer’s office.
Caius is an abettor of crime and a formal cooperator on account of his
guilty intent; Claudius aids the commission of burglary, but he is only
a material cooperator, since he does not intend what the criminals
intend.

(b) From the viewpoint of the external act, cooperation is positive or
negative, according as one does something to help the principal agent,
or does nothing to impede him. In the examples given above, Caius was a
positive, Claudius a negative cooperator. Positive cooperation is given
in a moral manner, as when one votes for an unjust law or sentence, or
cheers a sinful remark; or in a physical manner, as when one helps
bandits to bind and gag their victims, or leaves doors and windows
unfastened for the convenience of thieves.

1509. Divisions of Cooperation according to its Degree of
Influence.--(a) From the viewpoint of its activity, cooperation is
either occasional or effective. By occasional cooperation is understood
that which leads another into sin, or allows him to be drawn into sin,
but does not assist him to commit sin (e.g., scandalous example,
failure to give a fraternal correction or admonition). By effective
cooperation is understood assistance given another enabling him to
carry out, or to carry out more easily, an act of sin on which he had
resolved. As is clear from the explanation given above (see 1506),
there is question here only of effective cooperation.

(b) From the viewpoint of its nearness to the act of the principal
agent, cooperation is either immediate or mediate, according as one
shares in the sinful act of the principal agent, or in some act that
preceded or followed it. Thus, he who helps a thief to carry away
stolen goods is an immediate cooperator, while he who supplied the
thief with necessary keys before the theft, and he who offered refuge
to the thief or concealment for the stolen goods after the theft, are
mediate cooperators.

(c) From the viewpoint of the dependence on it of what is done,
cooperation is either indispensable or not indispensable, according as
the principal agent cannot act without it, or can. Example: Balbus
supplies intoxicants to Titus and Sempronius, who are intemperate.
Titus cannot secure intoxicants except from Balbus; Sempronius can
secure them elsewhere. Balbus’ cooperation is indispensable for Titus,
but not for Sempronius.

1510. Cooperation is also divided from the viewpoint of responsibility
or of the consequences incurred through it, into unjust cooperation and
merely unlawful cooperation.

(a) Unjust cooperation is participation in the guilt of an injury done
to a third party which involves the duty of restitution or strict
reparation. Thus, those who act as “fences” or receivers of stolen
goods, cooperate in injustice and are bound to restitution to the
rightful owners.

(b) Unlawful cooperation is participation in a sin that contains no
injustice to a third party, and that entails only the obligations of
repentance and satisfaction, and, if the case requires it, of amends
for scandal, proofs of sincerity, avoidance of dangers and submission
to penalty. Thus, those who cooperate by marrying illegally, or by
providing obscene literature to persons who demand it and insist on
having it, are guilty of sin and also fall under various punishments
prescribed in law. Cooperation, in so far as it is unjust, will be
treated specially under the head of Justice (see Vol. II); here we are
concerned with cooperation in general, and as it is a sin against
charity.

1511. Formal cooperation is either explicit or implicit. (a) It is
explicit, when the end intended by the cooperator (_finis operantis_)
is the sin of the principal agent. Examples: Balbus gives incense money
to an idolater, because he approves of idolatry and wishes to see
idolatrous rites performed. Caius joins an anarchistic society because
he agrees with its aims and wishes to help in their fulfillment.

(b) Formal cooperation is implicit, when the cooperator does not
directly intend to associate himself with the sin of the principal
agent, but the end of the external act (_finis operis_), which for the
sake of some advantage or interest the cooperator docs intend, includes
from its nature or from circumstances the guilt of the sin of the
principal agent. Examples: Balbus detests idolatry, but in order to
show courtesy he helps a pagan to burn incense before an idol, or he
assists in the repairing of a pagan shrine, though his act is looked on
as a sign of worship. Caius joins a freethinking society, not because
he likes its principles, but because he wishes to obtain through
membership certain social or financial advantages which he cannot
obtain in any other way.

1512. Mediate cooperation is also subdivided into proximate and remote.
(a) It is proximate or remote by reason of nearness, according as the
act of sin will follow closely or otherwise on the act of cooperation.
Thus, he who gives a ladder to a burglar cooperates in a remote
preparation; he who holds the ladder while the burglar goes up
cooperates in a proximate preparation. (b) Mediate cooperation is
proximate or remote as to definiteness, according as the preparation
points clearly or only vaguely to the commission of sin. Proximate
cooperation is an action which, from its nature or circumstances, is
regarded as morally connected with the evil action of the principal
agent, while remote cooperation is an action that has no such moral
connection with the sin that is committed. Thus, he who sells a
revolver to a gunman who is preparing for a murder cooperates
proximately, while he who sells the materials for this weapon
cooperates only remotely. Again, if one sells to a burglar a “jimmy,” a
dark lantern, a mask, a revolver, and explosives, the cooperation is
definite, since the circumstances indicate that robbery is
contemplated. But if one sells a burglar a pair of soft-sounding shoes,
the cooperation is indefinite, for the burglar may wish them in order
to give no disturbance in his own home, and not in order to attract no
attention in the homes of others.

1513. The Sinfulness of Cooperation.--The Sinfulness of Formal
Cooperation.--(a) Formal cooperation is always sinful, for it includes
the approval of the sin of another and the willing participation in the
guilt of that sin.

(b) Formal cooperation is from its nature opposed to charity; for
charity disapproves of the sins of others and strives to prevent them,
while formal cooperation, on the contrary, approves and assists the
sins of others.

(c) Formal cooperation is also opposed to the virtue violated by the
sin of the principal agent, in so far as the will of the cooperator
delights in or approves of the circumstance of help given to the sin of
the other (see 1468). Thus, if one opens the door to a caller whom one
suspects to be a burglar and at the same time mentally sympathizes with
the act of burglary, one is guilty in will of the act one approves.

(d) Formal cooperation as to its external act is opposed to the virtue
violated by the cooperator, when the external act has a malice of its
own. Thus, if one swears falsely in order to conceal the presence of a
burglar hidden in the house, one is guilty of perjury; if one disobeys
the laws of the Church by marrying clandestinely, one is guilty of
disobedience; if one scandalizes third parties by cooperating with sin,
one is guilty of scandal; if one shares in fraud, one is guilty of
injustice, etc. Hence, in confession it does not suffice to say that
one has cooperated in sin, but one must also tell the sin committed and
the necessary circumstances.

1514. The Sinfulness of Material Cooperation.--(a) Material
cooperation, in itself, is sinful; for charity commands that one strive
to prevent the sin of another, and much more therefore does it forbid
one to help in the sin of another. (b) Material cooperation, in case of
great necessity, is not sinful; for charity does not oblige under
serious inconvenience to self, and it does not forbid one to cooperate
by an indifferent act to prevent a neighbor from committing a greater
evil than the evil he has in mind. He who cooperates materially through
necessity does not cause sin, but uses his own right, which the bad
will of the other abuses and makes an occasion of sin (see 1447 d).

1515. Lawfulness of Material Cooperation.--The conditions necessary in
order that material cooperation be lawful are the same as for any other
act that has a double result (see 104); for from the cooperation follow
two results, one that is bad (viz., the sin of the other person) and
one that is good (viz., the avoidance of loss or the retention of
good). Two of the conditions required in the principle of double result
need not be considered, however, since their presence is manifestly
assured by the very fact that the cooperation is merely material. (a)
Thus, the condition that the good effect must not be secured through
the evil effect is verified; for, if one intends the sin of the other
party as a means to the good end, cooperation is formal. Hence, if
Balbus helps Claudius to get sinfully drunk, so that Claudius may go to
confession the sooner, the cooperation of Balbus in the drunkenness of
Claudius is formal. (b) The condition that the evil effect is not
intended is also verified; for the very definition of material
cooperation excludes the intention of the sin committed by the other
party.

1516. Hence, we may confine our attention to the two remaining
conditions stated in the principle of double effect, and conclude that
material cooperation is lawful when and if the act of the cooperator is
itself good or indifferent, and he has a reason sufficiently weighty
for permitting the sin of the other party.

1517. The first condition of material cooperation is that the act of
the cooperator must be good or at least indifferent; for, if it is
evil, the cooperation becomes implicitly formal. But, since it is often
difficult to determine in particular instances whether cooperation is
intrinsically evil or merely indifferent, one must examine the nature
and circumstances of the act.

(a) Thus, according to its nature, an act of cooperation is
intrinsically evil, if it has no uses except such as are evil; it is
indifferent, if, according to the intention of those who use it, it is
now good, now evil. Hence, it is intrinsically wrong to assist in the
manufacture or distribution of obscene books or pictures, or of drugs
or instruments used exclusively for immoral purposes, since the only
use to which such things can be put is sinful. It is also intrinsically
wrong to take part even remotely in pagan superstitions, or to give any
immediate assistance to an act which from its nature is opposed to the
Sixth Commandment. But it is not intrinsically wrong to assist in the
manufacture of firearms or poisons, which have many good uses, or to
act as bodyguard to a person who fears harm from others.

(b) According to its circumstances, an act of cooperation is evil, if
by reason of adjuncts it is wrong, as when it signifies approval of
evil, gives scandal to others, endangers the faith or virtue of the
cooperator, or violates a law of the Church. Thus, it is not from the
nature of the act wrong to invite a pedestrian to ride in one’s car;
but it is wrong from the circumstances when the pedestrian asks to be
taken to a spot where he intends to commit robbery. It is not wrong
intrinsically to work at building a temple; but it is wrong from the
circumstances, when this act is regarded by the public as a sign of
adherence to a false religion, or when the act causes scandal (see
983). The laws of the Church on mixed marriage or neutral schools
afford other examples of cooperation lawful in one set of
circumstances, but unlawful in another on account of significance,
scandal, danger, etc.

1518. But the circumstance that the cooperator knows for certain that
the principal agent will use the cooperation for sinful purposes, or
will take scandal to the extent of being strengthened in his evil
designs by reason of the assistance given, does not necessarily make
cooperation evil.

(a) Thus, the cooperator may know from the declaration of the principal
agent just what is to be done, and yet have no will whatever to concur
in the evil. Hence, if a person is forced at the point of a revolver to
help in robbing his own guests, he knows very well what is being done,
but he certainly does not approve of it.

(b) The cooperator may know that scandal will be occasioned by the
cooperation, either to the principal agent or to others, but he may
have sufficient reasons for permitting it (see 1478, 1482). Thus, if
the employee of an undertaking establishment has orders to assist at
the funeral of an anarchist, and will lose his means of livelihood if
he does not comply, he is not obliged to suffer this great detriment to
avoid Pharisaic scandal or even scandal of the weak. But he should, if
possible, declare his want of sympathy with anarchy, if he knows of
some anarchist present who regards his cooperation as a mark of
sympathy for the principles of the deceased.

1519. The second condition for lawful material cooperation is that the
cooperator should have a reason sufficiently weighty for permitting the
evil connected with his cooperation. The standards for judging whether
a reason is sufficiently weighty, are the rules given above on
permission of an evil effect (see 105).

(a) Hence, the graver the sin that will be committed, the graver the
reason required for cooperation. Thus, a greater reason is required for
cooperation in assault than for cooperation in theft.

(b) The nearer the cooperation is to the act of sin, the greater the
reason required for cooperation. Thus, he who sells paper to the
publisher of obscene books cooperates remotely; he who sets the type or
reads the proofs of such books cooperates proximately. A greater reason
is necessary for the latter than for the former cooperation.

(c) The greater the dependence of the evil act on one’s cooperation,
the greater the reason required for cooperation. Thus, a more serious
reason is needed to justify giving intoxicants to a person who abuses
liquors, if he is unable to procure them elsewhere, than if he can
easily get them from others. But the fact that, if you deny intoxicants
or other cooperation, another person will grant what you deny, is not
of itself a sufficient reason for cooperation.

(d) The more certain the evil act, the greater the reason required for
cooperation. Example: Titus gets drunk frequently, Balbus at intervals.
Hence, a greater reason is needed for providing liquor to Titus than to
Balbus.

(e) The more obligation one is under to avoid the act of cooperation or
to prevent the act of sin, the greater the reason must be for
cooperation. Hence, a much greater reason is necessary for lawful
cooperation by those who are bound _ex officio_, from piety or justice,
to prevent a sin (such as parents, spiritual directors, and policemen)
than on the part of those who are not so bound.

1520. Reasons for cooperation correspond in gravity with the importance
of the goods or evils involved (see 1163 sqq.).

(a) Hence, a grave reason for cooperation exists when, if one refuses
it, a great good will be lost or a great evil incurred. A day’s wages
or income is generally a great good; a severe or long-continued pain,
great anger of an employer or other superior, things that bring on
notable annoyance, shame, repugnance, etc., are examples of great evils.

(b) A very grave reason for cooperation is the gain or retention of a
very great good or the avoidance of a very great evil. A notable
percentage of the goods of one’s station in life should be considered
as a very great good. A severe and long-continued illness, unemployment
on the part of the breadearner of a needy family, serious detriment to
one’s honor, reputation or peace of mind, etc., are examples of very
great evils.

(c) Graver reasons for cooperation are those that surpass the very
grave without being supreme, such as the loss of one’s station in life,
incurable disease, loss of an eye or other principal member, severe or
perpetual imprisonment.

(d) Most grave reasons for cooperation are the public safety of Church
or State, loss of all one’s property, death, extreme disgrace, and the
like.

1521. When the sin committed by the principal agent is grave, but
contains no injustice to a third party, the reasons for cooperation
need not be so serious as when the sin is grave and unjust.

(a) Thus, immediate and indispensable cooperation is justified in order
to avoid grave loss to self; for example, one may ask absolution from
an unworthy minister, in order to recover the state of grace more
quickly.

(b) Immediate and not indispensable cooperation, or mediate and
indispensable cooperation, is lawful when it is necessary in order to
avoid a moderate loss. Examples: One may receive Communion from an
unworthy minister in order to make the Easter duty more conveniently.
One may supply intoxicants to a drunkard in order to avoid a brawl, if
there is no time to call in the strong arm of the law to subdue the
drunkard.

(c) Mediate and not indispensable cooperation is justified even by
avoidance of a slight loss. Example: A butcher may sell meat on Friday
to a cook who will serve it to some persons bound by abstinence, if the
cook can easily get the meat from others and the profit will go
elsewhere, unless the butcher sells her the meat.

1522. When the sin committed by the principal agent is a grave
injustice to a private party, the reasons for cooperation need not be
so serious as when the sin is against the public good.

(a) Thus, immediate and indispensable cooperation is permissible, if
without it one cannot avoid a loss to self that is both certain and of
a higher kind, or at least a greater one of the same kind than that
which will be suffered by the injured party; for this latter would be
unreasonable, if he expected one to suffer a greater loss in order to
spare him. Example: Mercurius, a servant, is threatened with instant
death if he does not open a safe of his employer, take from it certain
papers, and deliver them to a burglar.

(b) Immediate and not indispensable cooperation, or mediate and
indispensable cooperation, is allowed if necessary for the avoidance of
an equal loss to self. Examples: The burglar mentioned above can blow
open the safe if Mercurius refuses to open it, but, if he is put to
this trouble, he will steal from Mercurius valuables comparable to the
papers in the safe. Claudius, a servant, opens a backdoor, the only way
through which a burglar can enter secretly, because he is taken by
surprise, and refusal on his part will inevitably cost him the loss of
papers equally as valuable as those the burglar wishes to secure.
Sempronius wishes to rob a house, but he cannot get there without the
assistance of Caius, a chauffeur. Caius understands the purpose of
Sempronius, but, if he refuses to take him to the house, Sempronius
will give out information that will do almost as much harm to Caius as
the robbery would do to the owner of the house.

(c) Mediate and not indispensable cooperation is justified by the
avoidance of a loss to self less than the loss of the injured party,
but in proportion to it, Example: Balbus is usually honest, but today
he is going out to “fleece” a number of unsuspecting victims, and he
gives orders to his servant Titus to get his coat and hat and open the
door, and to his chauffeur Caius to drive him to the gambling place.
Titus and Caius have an inkling of Balbus’ plans, but no proofs. If
they disobey his orders, other servants will do what Balbus asks, the
swindling will not be stopped, but Titus will be demoted, and Caius
thrown out of the position necessary for his livelihood.

1523. When the sin committed by the principal agent is against some
good of a public character, though not against the common safety, still
greater reasons are necessary for cooperation than those given above.
(a) Thus, immediate and indispensable cooperation is allowed to avoid a
greater public evil, or an equal public evil joined with grave loss to
self; for it is lawful to permit a lesser in order to escape a greater
evil. Thus, the law may tolerate certain evils for the sake of public
tranquillity, if the attempt to suppress them would lead to serious
disturbances. One may delay to denounce a practice that is doing harm
to a family, if an immediate complaint would cause an equal harm to the
family and bring on the maker of the complaint a serious evil.

(b) Immediate and not indispensable cooperation, or mediate and
indispensable cooperation, is permitted when it is necessary to avoid
an equal public evil, or a very serious personal evil proportionate
according to prudent judgment to the public harm done. Thus, an actor
who has a harmless part in a somewhat evil play may act it for a time,
if the company can easily obtain substitutes but he cannot easily
obtain other employment and needs his wages. Similarly, the owner of
the only theatre in town may rent it to that company in order to be
able to refuse it to another company that is worse.

(c) Mediate and not indispensable cooperation may be allowed when there
is need of avoiding a grave loss to self which cannot be prevented
except by cooperation. Thus, the ushers in the theatre who have no
present way of supporting dependents except by the wages they are
earning, may help patrons to seats, even when the play that is being
shown is not morally unobjectionable.

1524. When the sin committed by another is directed against the
necessary public welfare (i.e., against the common safety of Church or
State), one may not cooperate, but should resist. In this case: (a)
cooperation is unlawful, for there is no greater public good to justify
it, and much less can it be justified by private good; (b) resistance
should be made, if possible; for the individual should be willing to
suffer loss, spoliation, and death itself to conserve the safety of the
Church or of the State.

1525. In giving reasons sufficient for cooperation with sins injurious
to the sinner alone or to some third party, we considered only the harm
or loss to oneself that would result from a refusal to cooperate. But
the good of others may also suffice for cooperation.

(a) Thus, the good of the sinner may justify one in cooperating, as
when one assists in order to prevent the commission of a greater evil.
It would not be wrong to give whisky to one who wished to make himself
drunk, if otherwise he would take poisoned alcohol.

(b) The good of a third party may justify cooperation, as when one
assists in perpetrating a minor injury against him in order to stop a
major injury. It would not be wrong to bind and gag a man who was being
robbed, if otherwise a burglar would murder him.

(c) The common good will often be a justifying reason. Thus, in
political affairs it is at times necessary in indifferent matters to
compromise with opponents, whose general policies one does not approve,
in order to secure the election of good citizens or the passing of good
laws, when these ends are very important for the general welfare. It is
lawful to administer a Sacrament to one who is unworthy in order to
avoid a public evil, such as disturbance or scandal among the people.

1526. Lawfulness of Immediate Cooperation.--(a) If one cannot cooperate
immediately without performing an act that is intrinsically evil (see
1517), immediate cooperation is, of course, unlawful. Thus, if one
helped a trembling assassin to administer poison or to stab or shoot to
death the victim, one would be an accomplice in murder; if one assisted
a decrepit pagan to burn incense before an idol, one would be an
accomplice in false worship. (b) If one can cooperate immediately
without performing an act intrinsically evil, immediate cooperation is
held lawful by some authorities, but there are others who say that all
immediate cooperation is sinful.

1527. Arguments for the Opposing Opinions on Immediate
Cooperation.--(a) Those who deny the lawfulness of all immediate
cooperation argue that immediate cooperation does not differ from
complicity, and hence that it is always intrinsically wrong. If theft
is the taking away of goods without the knowledge and consent of the
owner, what shall we call the act of a servant who assists a thief by
carrying out the family silver to a waiting automobile? The fact that
the servant does this to save himself from wounds or death cannot
change the moral character of the act, else we shall have to say that
the end may justify the means. And what is said of theft, can be said
likewise of other species of sin.

(b) Those who affirm the lawfulness of immediate cooperation in certain
cases argue that circumstances may take away evil from an act of
assistance given to a sinner, so that the act becomes indifferent or
good. Thus, theft is the taking away of what belongs to another against
the reasonable will of the owner. Now, the owner would be unreasonable
if he were unwilling that one should cooperate in removing his goods,
if one had to do so in order to protect one’s life, at least if one had
not engaged to defend his goods; for one is bound to protect one’s life
in preference to the goods of another. If a starving man may take a
loaf of bread without the owner’s consent, why may not one save one’s
life by assisting a desperate criminal to carry off money? Moreover, it
is commonly admitted that a person in great need may lawfully ask a
Sacrament from a minister who is unworthy and who will sin by
conferring it; that is, one may cooperate immediately with the unworthy
administration of a Sacrament and yet be free of guilt on account of
the circumstances.

1528. Special Cases of Cooperation.--The cases of cooperation, like
those involving scandal, are innumerable, but there are certain cases
which occur today more frequently than others, namely, those of
cooperation with evil publications, dances, and theatres, and those of
the cooperation of merchants, innkeepers, renters, servants, and
workingmen. Cooperation in sins against faith and sins against justice
are treated in their proper places, but it will be useful here to speak
of these other special kinds of cooperation, since they offer many
difficulties and a consideration of them now will illustrate the
general principles on cooperation just given. However, the following
points should be noted:

(a) The application of the definitions and rules about cooperation to
particular cases is one of the most difficult tasks of Moral Theology,
and hence there will be found great diversity of opinion among
theologians on particular points. Space forbids a discussion here of
the opposing opinions, and we shall have to content ourselves, in some
of the illustrations that follow, with solutions that are likely, but
whose opposites are also likely.

(b) The cases that follow are treated according to the principles of
cooperation. But frequently in actual life there will be other factors
to be considered, such as the occasion of sin to oneself or scandal to
others. It should be remembered, then, that when a particular kind of
material cooperation is here said to be lawful, this must be understood
as abstractly speaking; for in an individual instance there may be
circumstances of danger or disedification which would make it
unlawful--a thing that often happens.

1529. Formal Cooperation with Evil Reading Matter.--(a) Cases of formal
cooperation on account of explicit intention to do harm are those of
the managers, editors, ordinary collaborators and authors of
periodicals, newspapers, books, etc., which are opposed _ex professo_
to faith and good morals; for these persons are the brains which direct
and select what is to be written and published, and the matter they are
creating or putting on paper is evil, and has no direct purpose except
evil.

(b) Cases of formal cooperation on account of implicit intention to do
harm are those of the responsible heads of printing or publishing firms
and their printers, who agree to publish such objectionable written
matter; of booksellers, owners of newsstands, etc., who agree to sell
it; for, as we suppose, these persons understand that the matter in
question is intrinsically harmful and gravely forbidden.

1530. Cooperation with evil newspapers and other reading matter is
material and lawful if the matter itself is not entirely evil, that is,
if it has good uses as well as bad, and one has a reason for
cooperation that is just and proportionate to the kind of cooperation.
The following are examples of cooperation that may be merely material
and lawful:

(a) Moral cooperation is given by writers of good matter who assist as
collaborators; by those who offer small notices or advertisements; by
readers who use a book, periodical, newspaper, etc., for the good
matter it contains and skip the rest. For all these persons contribute
in a greater or less degree, according to their influence, reputation,
and ability, to the prestige and success of the journal, magazine or
volume, with which their names are connected or which they patronize.
Reasons sufficient to excuse in these cases, given by some authors, are
the following: for a permanent contributor, a very grave reason, such
as the need of support for his family which he cannot earn in any other
way; for an occasional contributor, a rather grave reason, such as the
opportunity of refuting error or of setting forth true principles (see
Canon 1386, Sec. 2); for the habitual reader, a reason somewhat grave,
such as the advantage of reports useful for his business which cannot
be found elsewhere; for the occasional reader, a slight reason, such as
entertainment to be derived from reading a good story; for the small
advertiser, a slight reason, such as profit in business. Those who by
laudatory descriptions in advertisements or book reviews urge others to
buy and read evil books are guilty of seduction, rather than
cooperation (see 1495).

(b) Financial cooperation is given by those who endow or subsidize a
publication, by shareholders, by large advertisers, by subscribers,
etc. Reasons considered sufficient in these cases are as follows: for
the original providers of capital, only a most grave reason; for the
buyers of much stock or advertising space, only a very grave reason;
for subscribers, a grave reason such as would suffice for habitual
reading.

(c) Material assistance is given by those who produce or distribute a
publication and by those who furnish necessary material. Among the
producers, the proximate cooperators are, first, the managers of the
printing company, and, secondly, the printers, the “readers” and the
correctors; the remote cooperators are the typesetters, arrangers of
ink and paper, binders, and machine operators. For proximate
cooperation it is held that a most grave reason suffices, as when a
printer cannot otherwise support himself and his family; for remote
cooperation a grave reason is needed. Among the distributors, there are
degrees of proximity in cooperation as follows: first, those who put
the reading matter into the hands of others (e.g., by keeping it on the
tables in their waiting rooms or offices); next, those who keep it for
purchasers who may ask for it; finally, those who are employed as
keepers of newsstands, newsboys, etc. We cannot think of any reason
sufficient to excuse the first kind of cooperation, since there is no
lack of good reading matter which doctors, lawyers, barbers, etc,, can
provide for those who are waiting in their rooms; for the second kind
of cooperation, a very grave reason suffices, such as loss of trade by
a poor bookseller, if he would not supply his patrons with popular
books or periodicals of a less elevated kind; for the third kind of
cooperation, a grave reason suffices.

Among the suppliers are those who sell to the printer his ink, type,
machinery, etc. These cooperate only remotely, and it is held that
profit is a sufficient reason for their cooperation. This we admit, if
the cooperation is not indispensable, but we do not think that profit
alone would uniformly justify voluntary cooperation upon which depended
the publication of pernicious matter.

1531. Formal Cooperation with Evil Dances or Plays.--(a) Cases of
formal cooperation on account of explicit intention to do harm are
those of the originators of sinful dances and the writers of indecent
plays. (b) Cases of formal cooperation on account of implicit intention
to do harm are those of the managements that produce bad shows,
organize bad dances, or make the arrangements or issue the invitations
for these affairs.

1532. Material Cooperation with Evil Dances or Plays.--Material
cooperation is lawful, if the cooperation is not itself intrinsically
wrong, and if there is a sufficient reason for permitting it.

(a) Cases of immediate material cooperation are those of players and
dancers who have harmless parts in the performance. A very grave
reason, such as avoidance of penury, is considered as sufficient excuse
here, at least for a time.

(b) Cases of proximate material cooperation are those of musicians or
singers, who do not perform lascivious music; of spectators, who show
no approval of the evil that is done; of those who buy tickets but do
not attend. A more serious reason is required in the musician at the
dance than in the musician at the play, for the former directs the
dance, while the latter only accompanies the play. Likewise, a more
serious reason is required when one attends often, or when one’s
patronage is essential to the success of the occasion, than when one
attends only rarely, or when the play or dance does not depend on one’s
presence or patronage.

(c) Cases of remote material cooperation are those of the owners who
rent their theatres or dance-halls or cabarets, of ushers, guards,
box-office employees, stage hands, etc. It is held that profit is a
sufficient reason to justify the owners in renting their places, if the
theatrical company or dance management can readily find other places in
case they are sent away. The ushers, guards, and the like are excused,
if they cannot easily find other employment; but this does not justify
gazing on immodest spectacles or laughing at or applauding obscene
jokes.

1533. Formal Cooperation by the Manufacture or Sale of Objects Whose
Sole Purpose is Gravely or Venially Sinful.--(a) Cases of explicit
cooperation are those of the inventor of contraceptives or of
instruments that frustrate generation, of the designers of blasphemous
representations or of tablets in honor of false deities, the authors of
somewhat profane or irreverent cards, and the like. (b) Cases of
implicit cooperation are those of persons who, for profit only, make or
sell objects such as those just mentioned, while knowing that the
purpose to which they naturally tend is the commission of sin.

1534. Material cooperation by the manufacture or sale of objects that
are used for gravely or venially sinful purposes, is lawful under the
conditions given in 1515. Hence, in the first place, the cooperation
itself must not be intrinsically sinful, that is, the object made or
sold must have good as well as evil uses. There are two classes of
objects of this kind: (a) there are some objects which may have good
uses, but which in fact are nearly always made to serve bad ends (e.g.,
idols, insignia of forbidden societies, pictures of the nude,
ultra-fashionable dress, certain drugs or poisons, blackjacks, and
pistol silencers); (b) there are other objects which are indifferent in
themselves, although often employed for sinful uses (e.g., dice,
playing cards and chips, rouge, lipsticks, necklaces and other feminine
adornments, imitation jewelry, adulterated articles, and the like).

1535. The rules about proportionate cause for cooperation by the
manufacture or sale of things that are employed in committing sin are
those given above in 1519.

(a) Hence, the greater the sin that will be committed or the more
harmful the consequences that will ensue from the use of an object, the
greater the reason required for making, repairing or selling it. In
some instances only a most grave reason will excuse, such as peril of
instant death for refusal. Thus, one may not sell poison or drugs to a
person who contemplates suicide, murder, or abortion. One may not sell
narcotics to a person who asks for them in good faith and who cannot
obtain them elsewhere, but who will become a drug-fiend if they are
given him. One may not sell morphine, heroin, etc., to a person who is
already a drug-addict and who will abuse the drugs, unless there is a
very grave reason for not refusing, such as danger that refusal will
lead him to set fire to the building. If one has all the playing cards
in some remote hamlet, one should not sell them without grave reason to
a customer who will spend a great part of the time at games to the
neglect of serious duties, nor without a very grave reason to a
customer who is a card sharper and who will swindle many innocent
victims, or to a gambler who will waste the money due to his wife and
family.

(b) The more closely related an object is with sinful uses, the graver
must be the excuse for having part in its manufacture or sale. Thus, an
ordinary reason (e.g., profit) might suffice for selling a lamb to a
pagan or attractive ornaments of dress to a woman, where only a very
grave or most grave reason would suffice for selling incense to a pagan
or ornaments that are frequently used as amulets or charms. Generally
speaking, it is seriously wrong and gravely sinful to make or sell
articles whose ordinary use is gravely sinful.

(c) The more a customer depends on a determinate manufacturer or
merchant to obtain such an object, the more serious must be the reason
for making or selling it. Thus, a grave reason, such as a notable loss,
is sufficient reason for selling a special fancy apparel to a notorious
“vampire” (i.e., a woman who carries on scandalous flirtations in order
to get presents), if the adornments can be obtained from other
dressmakers or modistes or stores; but a much graver reason would be
required, if the apparel could not be purchased except at one place. In
the former case, refusal to sell would not prevent the activities of
this woman; in the latter case, it would at least hinder her to some
extent.

(d) The more certain it is that an object will be employed sinfully,
the greater must be the reason for making, repairing or selling it.
Examples: Sempronius, a curio dealer, is asked by three men for a
statue of Joss along with joss-sticks and papers. The first customer
says he intends to use these articles for religious rites; the second
will not tell what his purpose is; the third wishes to present the
articles to a museum. Sempronius may not sell to the first customer
except for a most grave reason, such as fear of death if he refuses; he
may not sell to the second customer without a very great reason, such
as a very considerable loss to himself; he may sell to the third
customer for an ordinary reason, such as the profit he makes from the
sale. Titus, who sells firearms, knows that some of his customers,
though he has no particular individuals in mind, will use these weapons
unlawfully in poaching or shooting out of season. Since evil is not to
be presumed of any particular individual, Titus has the right to sell to
all for the usual reason of business profit.

1536. Is a merchant bound to inquire the use which a customer will make
of an article that is often employed for sin?

(a) If the positive law requires that the merchant inform himself, he
is bound to make inquiries necessary for obtaining the information.
Thus, if the civil law forbids the sale of weapons without a permit or
of poisons without a prescription, the merchant has to ask for the
customer’s authorization to buy.

(b) If the positive law has no such regulation, we should distinguish
between articles that are frequently used for sin and articles that are
generally used for sin. When an article of the former class is
requested, there is no obligation to make inquiries, for such an
obligation would be unduly burdensome; but, if an article of the latter
class is desired, one should make inquiries, unless one is morally
certain that the intention of the customer is good, or there is a very
grave reason for seeking no information. Thus, one may sell a deck of
cards to a stranger without asking for proofs that he is not a
confidence man in disguise; but one may not sell deadly poison to an
entire stranger merely on the strength of his word that he needs it for
medical or other lawful purposes.

1537. Sinful Cooperation in Providers of Food and Drink.--(a) There is
explicit formal cooperation with sins of gluttony, drunkenness,
violation of fast or abstinence, whenever one gladly supplies the means
for these sins to those who are about to commit them. Thus, if a host
supplies a guest who is overdrinking with all the intoxicants the
latter desires, and secretly wishes that the guest may make himself
drunk, there is explicit cooperation. There is implicit formal
cooperation when he who supplies the food or drink does not directly
intend evil, but when the act of giving the food or drink is from the
circumstances of the case an evil act, as when a person is given a meal
which will not agree with him and will make him sick or aggravate a
malady, or when a person who wishes to violate a fast ostentatiously to
show contempt is furnished with the eatables he asks for. (b) There is
unlawful material cooperation when one does not approve of the sin that
will be committed, but nevertheless without sufficient reason supplies
the food or drink. Thus, there is sinful cooperation when a restaurant
owner gives meat on Friday to one not dispensed, for no other reason
than the profit he himself will make.

1538. Material cooperation in providing food or drink to those who ask
it, but have no right to take it, is lawful when one has the right to
provide the food or drink, and there is a sufficient reason for
cooperation. The sufficiency of the reason depends on circumstances, as
explained in 1519.

(a) Hence, a greater reason is required when the sin that the other
person will commit will be greater. Thus, a grave reason, such as
indignation of a customer, might suffice for cooperation with a venial
violation of temperance or abstinence; but a graver reason, such as a
serious quarrel, is required if the violation will be mortally sinful.
A graver reason is also necessary when the consequences will be more
harmful (e.g., the fights of the drunkard, or the serious illness of
one who has neglected his diet) than when they are less harmful (e.g.,
the foolish talk of the drunkard, or the stupefaction of the glutton).

(b) A greater reason is required when the cooperation is closer. Thus,
in supplying meat the butcher cooperates only remotely, while the cook
who prepares it and the waiter who serves it cooperate proximately.

(c) A greater reason is necessary when one’s cooperation is essential
to the commission of the sin. Thus, in a large town where there are
many restaurants, the fact that a customer would quarrel if denied meat
on a day of abstinence would excuse cooperation, whereas in a small
village which has only one eating place, it seems there should be a
more serious reason, such as blasphemies or boycott or strike against
one’s business which the refusal of meat might evoke.

(d) A greater reason is called for when the sin of the other person is
more certain to follow. Thus, a restaurant-keeper who is patronized by
strangers of all kinds, temperate and intemperate, Catholic and
non-Catholic, may serve wine at meals, where this is allowed, and
provide meat on days of abstinence for all comers; for the diners are
not known to him, and it would not be possible for him to inform
himself whether they are sober in their habits or exempted from the law
of abstinence. But in a boarding house the landlady should not consent
to have strong beverages on the table, when she knows that some of
those present will thereby become intoxicated; neither should she agree
to provide meat on Fridays for a Catholic who is not excused from
abstinence, unless there is a serious reason, such as the loss of this
boarder which she cannot afford on account of her poverty. Moreover,
since dispensation is given from the laws of fast and abstinence but
not from the law of temperance, there is less certainty about the
intent to sin when one asks for meat on Friday than when one asks for a
great quantity of liquor to be brought to one’s table. Drunkenness is
also more certain when a person who asks for drink is already somewhat
under its influence.

1539. The sins with which one cooperates by supplying food or drink to
others who have no right to it are more or less serious according as
they violate the natural law or only positive human law.

(a) Thus, violation of fast and abstinence is opposed to the natural
law when it is intended as a manifestation of hatred of religion. One
may not cooperate with a violation of fast and abstinence which is
manifestly of this character.

(b) Violation of temperance is also opposed to natural law, and doubly
so when it leads to such evils as quarrels, fights, murders,
blasphemies, etc. It is not lawful to cooperate with intemperance,
unless this is necessary in order to prevent the commission of a
greater sin by the other person, or a serious loss to oneself. Thus, it
is not unlawful to supply whisky to a burglar who wishes to get drunk,
if this is the only way one can prevent the robbery of a third party or
serious injury to oneself.

(c) Violation of a fast or abstinence in itself is opposed only to
positive law; and, since fasting is more difficult than abstinence, one
is more easily excused from the observance of the former than from that
of the latter. Hence, if there is a doubt whether a customer has a
right to receive the food or drink he asks for, a restaurant-keeper can
decide more readily in the customer’s favor if there is question of
fast or abstinence than if there is question of intemperance, and more
readily still if there is question of fast than if there is question of
abstinence. Generally speaking, a restaurant-keeper may supply meat on
Friday to all who ask it, provided he has other substantial food
indicated on his bill of fare and shows himself willing to serve that
as well as meat.

1540. Renting of Houses or Rooms and cooperation in Sin.--(a) He who
rents to persons who wish to carry on disorderly, immoral, idolatrous,
unlawful, or other sinful occupations or practices, is guilty of formal
or unlawful material cooperation, if he approves of the conduct of the
renters or has no sufficient reason for renting to them. The same is
true if in a similar way one permits persons bent on evil (e.g.,
pickpockets) to lounge in one’s offices, hotels, etc.

(b) He who gives the use of his house, room, hall, field, etc., to
persons who will employ them for evil, is only a material and not a
guilty cooperator, if there is no prohibition of his act, and he has a
sufficient reason for it.

1541. Examples of reasons sufficient for cooperation in renting are as
follows:

(a) A very grave reason.--In civitatibus in quibus majoris mali vitandi
causa permissum est, licet locare domum meretricibus, dummodo non
sequatur grave nocumentum vicinis honestis vel major ansa peccandi ob
domus situm, et adsit ratio proportionate gravis, utputa quod alii
locatorii non adsint, dominus notabile damnum patiatur si domus non
occupetur, et meretrices facile alium locatarium obtinere possint.
Hodie vero quum constet meretrices plerasque invite vitam turpem
exercere (white slavery) et morbis pessimis morteque praematura affligi,
meretricium vero nocumentum multigenum bono publico (the social evil)
inferre, omnis vir probus abhorrebit a pretio locario ab
administratoribus lupanarium oblato.

(b) A more grave reason.--Meetings whose purpose is contrary to the
common good (e.g., anti-religious gatherings), even though permitted by
civil law, should not be given the use of one’s premises except in a
rare case of the greatest necessity.

1542. Unlawful Cooperation of Servants, Employees, and Workingmen.--(a)
Cooperation is formal if these intend the sin of their employer with
which they cooperate, or if the act of cooperation is itself
intrinsically evil. Thus, a bookkeeper does no wrong in merely keeping
a record of receipts and expenses; but, if he notices many instances of
great frauds and injustices done by his firm and keeps at his post in
order that dishonesty may be covered up and continued, he becomes a
formal cooperator. But a bookkeeper who falsifies or destroys records
in order that his business may be able to issue an incorrect statement
of its financial condition is involved in its guilt, even though his
motive is pity or loyalty. Other examples of formal cooperation are
those of a secretary who takes down dictation which contains
blasphemous or obscene expressions, and of a taxi-driver who tells his
passengers how to get to gambling dens, or who helps a criminal to get
away by driving him through dark streets.

(b) Cooperation is material and unlawful, when the intention and the
act itself are not evil, but when there is no sufficient reason for the
cooperation. Thus, the following proposition was condemned by Innocent
XI in 1679 as scandalous and pernicious: “Famulus qui submissis humeris
scienter adjuvat herum suum ascendere per fenestras ad stuprandam
virginem, et multoties eidem subservit deferendo scalam, aperiendo
januam, aut quid simile cooperando, non peccat mortaliter, si id faciat
metu notabilis detrimenti, puta ne a domino male tractetur, ne torvis
oculis aspiciatur, ne domo expellatur” (Denzinger, n. 1201). Though the
acts of cooperation of the servant here mentioned are not intrinsically
evil, the cooperation is proximate and positive and habitual, and the
wrong done so serious that only a most grave reason, such as fear of
death, could justify the help given by the servant to his master.

1543. Lawful Cooperation of Servants, Workingmen, or Employees.--(a) If
cooperation is remote and is not indispensable to the sin to be
committed, the mere fact that one is employed by the principal cause
will excuse; for the employee is not supposed to question the employer
about the reasons of orders given, and he is not responsible for the
intentions of the employer, but for the performance of what is assigned
to himself. Hence, the following kinds of cooperation are held
permissible for no other reason than that of service: carrying liquor
or food to an employer who wishes to make himself drunk or to break the
fast, buying and carrying to him papers which he should not read,
giving him his hat and coat or getting his car ready as he starts out
to attack an enemy, opening the door to a slanderer whom the mistress
of the house wishes to employ. Also, a public taxi-driver may take his
patrons to clubs or road-houses where they will become intoxicated, if
he is in no way responsible for their intention and shows no approval
of it, and they can go just as well without him.

(b) If cooperation is proximate, the mere fact that one is employed is
not sufficient as an excuse for cooperation; there must be some other
reason that is sufficiently weighty in view of the gravity of the sin
and the other circumstances. Thus, to drive one’s employer to the place
where he is to receive stolen valuables is justifiable, if one is under
threat of great bodily harm if one refuses. Item ob incommodum gravius
evitandum permittitur famulo deferre litteras heri amatorias ad amasiam
cum qua illicitum commercium habet, tempus et locum conveniendi amasiae
nuntiare, excubias agere dum simul adsint. But a servant who is called
on habitually to cooperate in these ways should secure another
position, if possible.

1544. The principles given as to servants should be applied likewise to
other persons who are subordinates, with due allowance made for the
difference of circumstances.

(a) Thus, children, wives, pupils, etc., may be less excusable in
cooperation than servants, since the former may be in a better position
to remonstrate against what is ordered. Hence, if the master of the
house who sometimes goes on a spree orders a servant to bring him his
demijohn, disobedience might be more difficult than if the same order
was given the wife.

(b) Children, wives, pupils, etc., may be more excusable, since unlike
the servants they may be unable to go elsewhere. Those who agree to
work at places known as vicious resorts, or who let their employer
understand that they will not see or hear many things, or who
habitually perform services proximately related to sin (what is called
“dirty work”), are guilty of formal cooperation, at least when they can
secure good employment elsewhere. Children, on the contrary, may be so
dependent on a tyrannical father that they cannot refuse cooperation
without serious consequences to themselves.

1545. Duties of Confessors.--Instruction should be given to penitents
who are guilty of sinful cooperation. (a) The confessor should instruct
ignorant penitents on the sinfulness of their cooperation, when there
is a duty of justice to do this, as when the penitents ask to be
instructed; or when there is a duty of charity, as when the sinfulness
of the cooperation in question is known to many persons, or the
penitents by reason of cooperation are giving great scandal or are in
serious danger. (b) The confessor should not instruct ignorant
penitents on the sinfulness of their cooperation--at least, not for a
time--if they are in good faith and if graver evils would result from
the instruction than from silence.

1546. Obligations to be Imposed on Penitents on Account of Sinful
cooperation.--(a) Some cases of cooperation cause the culprit to fall
under ecclesiastical penalties, for example, those who act as seconds
or spectators at duels (Canon 2351). (b) Some cases entail a duty of
reparation for scandal given, as when one has aided the diffusion of
irreligious or obscene literature or whisperings among the people. (c)
Some kinds of cooperation include dangerous occasions of sin which one
is bound to avoid, as when one works for a man who produces adulterated
wares or gets money under false pretenses.




Art. 10: THE COMMANDMENTS OF CHARITY

(_Summa Theologica_, II-II, q. 44.)

1547. There is no commandment concerning charity in the Decalogue, but
charity is implicitly contained in all the commandments of other
virtues; for charity is the end of every commandment (I Tim., i. 5).
Thus, the commandments of the first table of the Law tend to the love
of God; the commandments of the second table to the love of neighbor.
On account of its supreme importance, however, charity was made the
object of special commandments in both the Old and the New Testament.

(a) In the Old Testament, at the second giving of the tables of the
Law, it is declared: “Now, Israel, what doth the Lord thy God require
of thee, but that thou fear the Lord thy God, and walk in his ways, and
love him, and serve the Lord thy God, with all thy heart and with all
thy soul?” (Deut., x. 12).

(b) In the New Testament, our Lord, being asked which is the great
commandment in the law, replied: “Thou shalt love the Lord, thy God,
with thy whole heart, and with thy whole soul, and with thy whole mind.
This is the greatest and the first commandment. And the second is like
to this: Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself. On these two
commandments dependeth the whole law and the prophets” (Matt, xxii.
37-40).

1548. Charity must come “from a pure heart, and a good conscience and
faith unfeigned” (I Tim., i. 5), and these words may be used to
indicate how all other commandments have charity for their purpose.

(a) “A pure heart” is had by the observance of the negative
commandments of the natural law, which forbid evil, or of the
commandments about the virtues regulative of the passions; and it is a
disposition preparatory for the love of God, since an impure heart will
be taken up with evil or with earthly things, and so turned away from
the goodness of God.

(b) “A good conscience” is had by the observance of the affirmative
commandments of the natural law, or of the commandments regulative of
actions; and it too tends to charity as its goal, for a bad conscience
fills one with dread and horror of the justice of God.

(c) “Faith unfeigned” is had by the observance of the supernatural law,
or of the commandments about worship of the true God; and it leads up
to charity, for a feigned faith, or false worship, separates one from
the truth of God.

1549. Though charity is but one virtue (see 1115), it has two acts: one
about love of God, which is the end, and another about love of
neighbor, which is a means to that end.

(a) If all understood that the end includes the means and the means
supposes the end, there would be no necessity for two distinct
commandments; for there is no love of God without love of neighbor (I
John, iv. 20), and he who loves his neighbor has fulfilled the law
(Rom., xiii. 8).

(b) But since many would not perceive that one of the commandments of
charity contains the other, it was necessary to propose these
commandments separately: “We have this command from God that he who
loves God love also his brother” (I John, iv. 21).

1550. Charity extends to other objects than God and the neighbor,
namely, to self and one’s own body (see 1133 sqq.); it also has other
acts than that of love, such as the acts of joy, peace, beneficence
(see 1193 sqq.), and the suppression of uncharitable hatred, sloth,
envy (see 1295 sqq.), etc. Nevertheless, on the two commandments of
love of God and love of neighbor depend the whole law and the prophets
(Matt., xxii. 40), and other commandments about charity are not
necessary.

(a) Thus, the objects of love are either the end or the means to the
end, and, as the two commandments of charity refer to both of these,
they omit nothing that is to be loved. It was not necessary to make
express command of love of self, for nature inclines to that
sufficiently, and the duty of keeping love of self within bounds is
provided for in the commandments that God be loved above all and the
neighbor as oneself.

(b) The acts of charity distinct from love result from love, and the
acts opposed to charity are virtually forbidden in the commandments of
their opposites. Hence, there was no need of explicit precepts about
the secondary acts of charity or of explicit prohibitions of the sins
against charity. But for the sake of those who might not perceive that
the minor functions of charity are commanded and acts of
uncharitableness forbidden in the two great commandments, special and
explicit laws were given which enjoin peace, joy, etc., and forbid
hatred, envy, etc.

1551. The precepts of the secondary acts of charity are: (a) joy:
“Rejoice in the Lord always” (Phillip., iv. 4); (b) peace: “Follow
peace with all men” (Heb., xii. 14); and (c) beneficence: “While we
have time, let us do good to all” (Gal., vi. 10).

1552. The prohibitions of uncharitableness are as follows: (a) against
hatred: “Thou shalt not hate thy brother in thy heart” (Lev, xix. IT);
(b) against sloth: “Bow down thy shoulder and hear her (wisdom), and be
not grieved with her bands” (Ecclus., vi. 26); (c) against envy: “Let us
not be made desirous of vainglory, provoking one another, envying one
another” (Gal., v. 26), (d) against discord: “Speak the same things and
let there be no schisms among you” (I Cor., i. 10); and (e) against
scandal: “Put not a stumbling-block or a scandal in your brother’s way”
(Rom., xiv. 13).

1553. The Commandment of Love of God.--In the commandment of love of
God two things are expressed: (a) the matter of the commandment is God,
the object of love; (b) the manner of the commandment is that God be
loved as the Last End, to whose love all other love is to be
subordinated.

1554. There is a twofold manner or mode of performing a virtuous act:

(a) The intrinsic mode is that which comes from the nature of the
virtue commanded. Thus, in the Fourth Commandment is included not only
the substance of an act (viz., that honor be shown), but also the mode
of the act (i.e., that such honor and so much honor be shown as is owed
to a parent by his child). The intrinsic mode is always included in a
commandment along with the substance of the act prescribed (cfr. 480
sqq.).

(b) The extrinsic mode is that which belongs to some virtue different
from the one commanded. This mode is not included in a commandment.
Thus, if honor be shown to parents out of love of God, the mode of love
of God is extrinsic to the commandment, for the commandment is
concerned with the virtue of filial piety, and the mode of the act
pertains to charity, which is a virtue distinct from filial piety.

1555. The intrinsic mode of performing an act of virtue is also twofold:

(a) The essential mode is that without which an act is not virtuous.
Thus, he who gives to his indigent parents according to his means and
their needs fulfills the essential mode of the Fourth Commandment, for,
if he gave them less than he could afford and they needed, his act
would not come up to the requirements of the commandment.

(b) The ideal mode of the performance of virtue is that which adds to
the virtue greater goodness and value, and which is intended by a
lawgiver as the end, but not as the object of his command. Thus, he who
gives to his indigent parents not only sufficiently, but also with a
great willingness and cheerfulness, fulfills the Fourth Commandment
with greater perfection than another who supports his parents with less
alacrity.

1556. The mode of the love of God prescribed in the first and great
commandment is that God be loved with the whole heart, etc. But “to
love with the whole heart, etc.,” can be understood in various senses.

(a) Thus, it may be understood to mean a love that is subjectively or
intensively great, as when one loves God with much fervor and
affection. This mode of love is ideal, since the measure of loving God
is to love Him without measure, but it is not essential. The end of the
commandment is that we love God ever more and more, and perform what is
required with ever greater promptitude and gladness; but the
commandment does not fix any certain degree of intensity, although it
would be inordinate to choose to love God less intensely than we love
creatures (see 1160).

(b) “To love with the whole heart” may be understood to mean a love
that is objectively or appreciatively great, as when one esteems and
loves God as the Supreme Good. This mode of love is essential, and
hence without it the commandment is not observed. However much one
loves God, if one does not love Him as the Supreme Good, one does not
love Him aright, and does not practise the virtue of charity that is
commanded.

1557. Love of God from the whole heart, objectively or appreciatively
understood, is either actual or habitual.

(a) Actually, one loves God with one’s whole heart when there is never
any interruption or distraction to one’s love, and one is continually
engaged in an act of loving God above all else. This is the ideal mode
of fulfilling the commandment of love, and it is also the end to which
the commandment is intended to lead. But it is only in heaven, where
God will be all in all (I Cor., xv. 28), that this ideal fulfillment
will take place.

(b) Habitually, one loves God with one’s whole heart when one is in the
state of grace, preferring the love of God to every contrary love,
although it is only at intervals that one is able to make acts of love.
This is the essential mode of fulfilling the command of love here on
earth. The whole heart must be given to God to the exclusion of love
for any mortal sin, for mortal sin separates from God.

1558. The mode of loving God is expressed in various places in
scripture (Deut., vi. 5; Matt., xxii. 37; Mark, xii. 30; Luke, x. 27),
and there are slightly different interpretations given to the words by
which it is conveyed. Thus, some exegetes see in the expressions
“heart,” “soul,” “mind,” “strength,” synonymous significations of the
one thought that God should be loved over all, and they think that
different words are used only in order to give greater clearness and
energy to the thought. But the following seems also a reliable
explanation: (a) God must be loved with one’s whole heart, that is, the
will must not intend any Last End other than God; (b) God must be loved
with one’s whole mind, soul and strength, that is, the powers moved by
the will--intellect, appetites and executive faculties--must be subject
to God, must be regulated according to His will, and must carry out His
commandments.

1559. Love of God with one’s whole heart excludes, then, opposite
loves, but it does not exclude other loves that are not opposite or
other dispositions that are less perfect. (a) Thus, love of God with
one’s whole heart does not exclude love of self or of neighbor. (b)
Love of God with one’s whole heart does not exclude the use of acts in
reference to God that do not reach the height of disinterested love,
such as acts of hope, gratitude, or fear (see 1033, 1054, 1093).

1560. There are various degrees of perfection in the fulfillment of the
commandment of love of God.

(a) The most perfect fulfillment is found in heaven, where there is no
turning from the love of God by grave sin, no impediment to its
exercise by venial sin, and no interruption of its act by other
occupations.

(b) The more perfect fulfillment of this commandment found on earth is
modelled on the love of God exercised by the Saints in heaven, and the
nearer one approaches to the model, the better does one fulfill the
commandment. Thus, he who avoids not only what is against charity
(i.e., mortal sin), but also, as far as possible, what is aside from
charity (i.e., venial sin), loves God more perfectly than one who is
careless about venial sin; and he who shuns, not only things unlawful
that are harmful to charity, but also things lawful that interrupt the
exercise of charity, loves God more, other things being equal, than
another who avoids the unlawful, but whose mind is greatly occupied
with lawful temporal matters.

(c) The ordinarily perfect fulfillment of the commandment is found in
all those who, both in their internal and in their external acts, avoid
all that is contrary to the love of God, although they fall into venial
sin and are mostly occupied with temporal affairs. Thus is charity the
bond of perfection (Col, iii. 14), the tie that binds man to his
highest good; those who keep the commandments for its sake are
followers after perfection, those who embrace counsels for its sake are
in the state of perfection.

1561. The Commandment of Love of Self.--Love of self is understood in
many senses. (a) According to its moral character, love of self is
either sinful or virtuous, and virtuous self-love is either natural or
supernatural (as was explained in 1136). (b) According to its physical
character, love of self is either innate or elicited. Innate love of
self is the tendency of nature to desire what pertains to the
perfection of self, such as existence and its preservation (see 1108).
Elicited love of self is the choice on the part of the reason and will
of an ultimate happiness for self and of the means thereto.

1562. Charity obliges each one capable of precept to an elicited
supernatural love of self. The obligation is grave for the following
reasons: (a) the love of God includes love of self, for we cannot love
God truly unless we also love those things that are His, especially His
rational creatures made to His image and destined for His society; (b)
the love of neighbor supposes love of self, for the commandment of love
(Matt., xxii. 39) offers love of self as the model for love of others.

1563. The goods which the law of charity to self requires one to desire
and seek after, are all those things that are necessary for the
attainment of one’s happiness and due perfection.

(a) Thus, as to supernatural goods, one is bound to obtain for oneself
things necessary for salvation. One is obliged, then, to acquire a
sufficient knowledge of the faith; to enter into a state of life for
which one is suited (e.g., matrimony or religion); to avoid sin and the
occasions of sin; not to delay conversion for a notable length of time;
to put oneself in the state of grace, especially at the hour of death.
But one is not obliged to perform these duties with the motive of
charity in mind, nor to elect for self works of supererogation or
counsels of perfection.

(b) As to intellectual goods, one is bound to seek what is necessary
for a proper fulfillment of the duties of one’s station in life. Thus,
one owes it in charity to oneself to seek the education and training
that are presupposed in one’s profession or occupation, and to bestow
the necessary study and attention. See above, on the intellectual
virtues (144 sqq.) and on the sin of ignorance (904 sqq.).

(c) As to corporal goods, one is obliged to use the ordinary means for
preserving life and health (on the desire of death, see 1063). Hence,
in matters of food, drink, clothing, and recreation, each one is in
duty bound to follow the laws of hygiene.

(d) As to the external goods of person (i.e., honor and reputation),
there is a strict duty of guarding them or of recovering them, as far
as possible.

(e) As to external goods of fortune (i.e., wealth and possessions), one
must aim to acquire as much as is necessary for one’s subsistence and
the fulfillment of duties to others. Hence the duty of labor for those
who do not possess the necessary means. But charity to self does not
demand that one aspire to reach the top of the ladder in the financial
world or to accumulate a very large surplus. One may indeed lawfully
seek to become a millionaire, or to become so wealthy as to be able to
retire with leisure, if one goes about this lawfully; but there is no
obligation to strive after more than is reasonably necessary.

1564. Man owes it to himself to put to good use the talents God has
bestowed upon him for his self-improvement and self-development. It is
a sin, therefore, greater or less according to circumstances, to
neglect the care of the mind or of the mental culture one should
possess.

(a) Thus, reason is the faculty that elevates man above the irrational
world, and knowledge is the perfection and excellence of that faculty.
What life or health is to the body, reason or knowledge is to the mind;
and so, just as it is a sin against the body to neglect life or health,
it is also a sin against the mind to neglect reason or knowledge.
Persons predisposed to insanity who expose themselves to alienation of
mind by the use of drugs or strong spirits or by practices or
occupations that expose them to shocks (such as gambling), and others
who value ignorance, scepticism, and error as if these infirmities were
goods, sin against the mind, at least materially.

(b) Reason and knowledge are also necessary in numberless ways to man’s
bodily, social, cultural, and religious life. Without the elements of a
general education in reading, writing and arithmetic, one is very
seriously handicapped in making a bare living; and without the
education of the high school, college or university, one is frequently
under a disadvantage in seeking to better oneself or improve one’s
position. Besides these utilities for practical affairs, education has
advantages of a loftier kind: it makes its possessor a more capable
citizen, a more pleasant companion and friend, a more influential
exponent of good causes, and a greater credit to the religion he
practises; it gives enjoyment to leisure, comfort to rest, and dignity
to success; the labor of acquiring it is a discipline of the will; the
taste for higher things it imparts is a natural protection against much
that is evil; the mental power and knowledge that are its gifts enable
one to expose error and fallacy and to uphold the truth and the right.
It is of precept, therefore, that one acquire the moral and mental
training which one’s salvation and calling in life make necessary; it
is of counsel--and the counsel is one that should be much urged in our
times--that one who has the opportunity of attaining to a higher
proficiency, to the advantage of self and society, should avail himself
of that opportunity.

1565. Examples of Sins Committed by Neglect of Necessary Education--(a)
Directly, one sins against the duty of cultivation of the mind when
through laziness or malice one slights the means of acquiring necessary
knowledge--as when pupils absent themselves from school, or give no
attention to the teacher or no preparation to their lessons; or when
collegians sacrifice study to athletics and amusements.

(b) Indirectly one sins against the duty of knowledge, when one is
responsible for habits that impede or prevent necessary concentration
of mind, as when one goes about so much socially that the mind is
always in a whirl, or reads so much light literature that everything
serious becomes a bore, or overeats so much that the brain becomes
sluggish, or pays no attention to the wise rule that a sound mind needs
a sound body.

1566. The proper care of the body and of health is not merely a thing
next to godliness; it is a moral duty, and so a part of godliness. God
Himself on Sinai gave to the Chosen People of old a sanitary code, and
the faithful observance by orthodox Jews of those regulations has had
much to do with the superior health and longevity of their race. Moral
Theology, therefore, is not digressing from its proper subject-matter,
if it gives some attention to rules of health. The duties owed to
physical well-being can be reduced to the following: (a) to secure for
the body the things needed for the maintenance and replenishment of its
substance and vigor, such as food, air, sleep and exercise; (b) to ward
off or remove those things that are injurious to or destructive of
health, such as excessive heat or cold, waste matter, poisons, and
disease; (c) to assist these physical means by psychical or spiritual
ones, such as cheerfulness and the will to keep well and fit.

1567. Food and drink are naturally a prime requisite for life, since
they furnish the material from which the body is built and renewed.
They should be used, however, in such a way as to serve their purpose.

(a) Thus, the quantity and quality have to be regulated according to
the needs of the individual and circumstances, and so will vary with
climate, age, health, and occupation. The distinction of clean and
unclean foods does not exist in the New Law (Rom., xiv. 14; Matt., xv.
17-20), but it is clear that the same kinds or amounts of food and
drink do not agree with all constitutions; that overeating,
undereating, and want of variety in diet are not conducive to good
health. Physicians recommend that something raw be eaten every day and
something indigestible at every meal, and that a person watch his
weight, keeping a little overweight up to middle life and a little
underweight after that age.

(b) The manner of eating is of first-rate importance, since the
digestion is harmed if one eats without appetite or with mental
preoccupation on deep subjects, or bolts the food, or makes excessive
use of relishes or condiments.

1568. Fresh air, on which the production of pure blood and the
continuance of vitality depend, is another necessity of life. Hence, we
may well heed the following rules which hygienists lay down on this
point: (a) let in fresh air and sunshine to the places where you live
and work, and exclude dust and smoke; (b) wear light, loose and porous
clothing, so that the skin may have air; (c) get out of doors in the
open air part of the time every day, even though the weather is
uninviting, for sunshine or natural light is also a requisite of good
health; (d) breathe through the nose, and not through the mouth.
Breathing should be deep, slow and regular, and one should take
deep-breathing exercises several times a day; (e) sleep in a
well-ventilated room, or out-of-doors if possible.

1569. Rest and relaxation are needful for body and mind alike, that the
burdens of life may not bear too heavily, and nature may be allowed to
exercise her ministries of renewal and restoration. But here, as in
other things, the guiding rule must be moderation.

(a) Through excess, some harm their health by indulging in too much
repose. A strong, healthy individual who remains in bed from midnight
till noon, or who gives most of the afternoon to a prolonged nap, is
storing up more energy than he or she needs, and will feel the worse
for it. Similarly, persons whose life is one round of vacations or
diversions pay for their aimless existence in various kinds of mental
or nervous disorders, to say nothing of the moral dangers to which they
are exposed (Ecclus., xxxiii. 29).

(b) Through defect, on the other hand, some injure their health by
depriving themselves of the sleep or rest they ought to take. The time
that should be given to repose differs with the individual. The young,
brain-workers and the feeble are in greater need than others; but there
is no one who can dispense with his proper share of rest. It is sinful,
therefore, to reduce needed sleep by late retiring or early rising, or
to work unremittingly to such an extent that the bodily powers and
resistance become unequal to the demands made on them and unfitted for
duties. According to physicians, seven hours out of every twenty-four
should be spent in bed, and the hours before midnight are much more
precious for rest than the early morning hours. Some holidays and
vacations are a necessity in these days of rapid and strenuous life.

1570. Physical exercise is a factor of good health, for it stirs up the
circulation of the blood, assists digestion, and rids the body of
surplus weight. Moreover, it has great value for the mind (to which it
gives diversion and refreshment) and for the soul (since it promotes
temperance and chastity). If taken in the form of sports, physical
exercise is a training in cooperation with others, in loyalty,
discipline, and fairness. But health is impaired by excess as well as
by defect in exercise.

(a) Examples of over-exercise are athletes who carry on endurance tests
to the point of exhaustion, devotees of violent forms of contests or
matches that overtax the heart, etc.

(b) Examples of under-exercise are ablebodied persons who prefer to
lounge about the house all day rather than bestir themselves; also
those who work indoors all day and who from choice ride rather than
walk, no matter how short the distance they have to go, etc. Persons of
sedentary life who can do so, should exercise every day, preferably
out-of-doors, playing at some game like golf, taking a brisk walk of
about five miles, or doing some manual labor, such as gardening or
sawing wood. Regular gymnastics or setting-up exercises, and the habit
of sitting, standing, and walking erect at all times are prescribed by
experts on health as very important.

1571. Under the head of preventive or curative measures that ought to
be attended to for the sake of bodily well-being are the following:

(a) In time of health sickness has to be guarded against. Suitable
clothing and shelter must be used as protection against injurious
effects of heat or cold; cleanliness must be cultivated by such means
as daily baths, frequent ablutions, washing of teeth, tongue and gums;
infections must be avoided; drugs or stimulants hurtful to one’s health
must not be indulged in, and attention must be given to daily, regular
and natural elimination and to the exclusion of poisons from the
system. According to authorities, one should drink at least six glasses
of water a day, but warm water is often preferable to cold or hot.

(b) In time of sickness efforts must be made at restoration of health,
if this is possible. It is of obligation to use the ordinary means to
recover physical fitness, that is, to take remedies and medicines that
are suitable, not on the advice of acquaintances or advertisements, but
on the recommendation of a competent physician in whose knowledge and
skill one has perfect confidence (Ecclus., xxxviii. 1 sqq.). But there
is no obligation to have recourse to extraordinary means of recovery,
such as a trip to a more balmy climate when one’s purse cannot afford
it. Similarly, a very painful and uncertain operation or mutilation is
not obligatory, unless one has dependents, and the danger to life from
the operation is slight. In time of sickness, as well as in health, we
should not omit to implore the divine aid.

1572. The state of mind has very much to do with good or bad health. It
is well known, for instance, that a happy, cheerful attitude helps
digestion and sleep; whereas worry, fear, anger or other emotional
stress will bring on dyspepsia, insomnia, disease, and perhaps
insanity. We should not overlook, therefore, the importance of the
mental factor in our efforts to maintain good health.

(a) Natural means of cultivating an even temper and a buoyant
disposition are: some kind of labor or occupation, avoidance of hurry
and worry in one’s affairs, cultivation of some interesting hobby or
avocation that will vary the monotony of business or work, use of
congenial recreations, whether of a more refined (e.g., conversation
with friends, literature, music, art, the drama, travel to historic or
beautiful scenes, etc.) or of a more material kind (e.g., reading tales
of mystery or adventure, raising pet animals, witnessing baseball
games, races, etc., playing billiards, cards, etc., smoking, attending
banquets, picnics, etc.). A sense of humor and laughter in moderation
are good for the health and not opposed to spirituality.

(b) Religious practices are all-important for cheerfulness of spirit.
Christian Science, indeed, is in error when it holds that faith thinks
or wills sorrow and disease and death out of existence, for evil is a
reality; but virtue and a good conscience rid one of many enemies to
peace, and there exist in the Church many supernatural and miraculous
means that benefit body, mind and spirit.

1573. Persons who give exaggerated attention to their health cannot
justify themselves by the commandment of charity to self; for this
commandment has to be interpreted according to the order of charity as
explained above (see 1164 sqq.). The bodily good has to be cared for,
but with due subordination to higher goods (Matt, vi. 25; Rom., xiv.
16).

(a) Thus, spiritual goods are more important than those of the body,
and it is lawful to practise mortifications by fastings, vigils,
hair-shirts, and the like, which, though afflictive to the flesh, are
refreshing to the spirit, provided all be done according to holy
prudence.

(b) Intellectual goods are better than those of the body, and it is not
sinful to devote oneself to studies, researches and other mental
occupations in preference to manual labor or athletic exercises which
would improve one’s physique, but not one’s mind. It is even lawful for
the sake of mental improvement to suffer some slight detriment to
health.

(c) Public good is greater than private good, and hence it is not only
lawful but laudable to expose health, or even life, for the advancement
of science or the welfare of the community. Many men and women in daily
life do this as part of the day’s work.

1574. Does charity to self oblige one to desire honors, such as
dignities, titles, positions or rank, precedence, testimonials,
eulogies, medals, decorations, monuments, and the like?

(a) Charity to self demands that one strive to acquire the excellence
that is expected of one, and so to be deserving of honor. For we must
let our light shine before men (Matt., v. 16; Rom., xii. 17; II Cor.,
vii. 21).

(b) Charity to self does not require that one actually secure honors.
For one cannot force another to declare one’s praises, since he may be
prejudiced or ignorant, and it is not seemly to sing one’s own
greatness or merit (II Cor., x. 18), except in self-defense (II Cor.,
xii. 11).

(c) Charity to self would require one to seek after an honor, if the
honor were necessary and the manner of seeking it honorable. Thus, it
is a duty to self to seek to obtain a diploma or certificate of good
character or proficiency, if this document is needed to exercise the
profession for which one has trained.

(d) Charity to self would forbid one to seek after an honor, if the
honor would prove harmful, or if it could not be obtained in a
respectable way. Thus, if an honor rightfully belonged to another, or
if it were bestowed in recognition of evil done, or if it would impose
obligations for which one knows oneself to be unsuited, or if it could
not be attained except by dishonesty, charity to self would urge one to
fly from the honor.

(e) Charity to self in other cases would permit one either to seek an
honor (as when a dignity will be useful and will be employed for good,
and is not sought out of vainglory or hypocrisy) or to forego it (as
when it is not necessary and one is moved to shun it, not out of
contempt, but out of some virtuous motive).

1575. Does charity to self require one to desire a good name?

(a) Charity to self does require that one desire to be worthy of a good
name, for one owes it to oneself as well as to others to be blameless
(Phil., ii. 14-16) and to provide good things in the sight of men
(Rom., xii. 17).

(b) Charity to self does require that one desire to have a good name.
Spiritually, a good name is an advantage, for many a one is encouraged
to continue in virtue by the good opinion which others have of him,
while many another is discouraged from attempting or continuing a good
life because he has a bad reputation. Temporally also, a good name is
useful or necessary, for, if others do not trust us or respect us, we
shall find it difficult to secure employment or position, or to
exercise our office fruitfully. Hence, scripture admonishes: “Take care
of a good name, for this shall continue with thee, more than a thousand
treasures precious and great” (Ecclus., xli. 15).

(c) Charity to self does not require that one actually have a good
name, since reputation may be lost through the work of detractors or
through one’s own unintentional imprudence, or through circumstances
over which one has no control.

(d) Charity to self ordinarily requires that one seek to acquire a good
name, if it has not yet been earned, also to preserve it, when gained,
to recover it, when lost; for, as a rule, there is no greater good for
which the good of reputation should be sacrificed. The means to be
employed, however, should not be evil, as when one uses hypocritical
pretense in order to pass as a man of piety, or has recourse to lying
or duelling, to undermining or attacking another in order to recover
one’s reputation. A good name is built up by fidelity to the duties of
one’s calling and the avoidance of what may be offensive or scandalous
to others; it is preserved or rebuilt by good deeds, especially those
one is known or supposed to have lacked, and in case of need by words
of self-defense, vindicating one’s conduct, or refuting aspersions or
false charges.

(e) Charity does not require one to seek after a good name, when this
should or may be sacrificed for the sake of some higher good. St. Paul
faithfully practised what he preached, that no dishonor might be
reflected on the Gospel; and yet his enemies looked on him as a seducer
and a nobody, as a melancholy and avaricious man. But the Apostle
answered his traducers that neither honor nor dishonor, neither evil
report nor good report, would move him from the exercise of his
ministry (II Cor., vi. 4 sqq).

1576. Sacrifice of reputation is not lawful, however, unless there is a
proportionately grave reason and the means are good.

(a) The end must be good and relatively important, not only if compared
with the good of personal reputation, but also if compared with the
public good and the rights of third parties. Examples: It would not be
right to allow oneself to be defamed in order to cover up the tracks of
a rascal who deserved punishment, or to distract attention from an evil
that is being done; for the purpose would then be the defeat of justice
or the success of some sinful plan. In such cases the end would not be
good. Neither would it be right to allow the sacrifice of a good name
for the notoriety and money profits to be gained in stage or book
royalties. The practice of many young men of accepting imputed faults,
of which they are not guilty, in order to be popular, or interesting,
or attractive, is also sinful. Money cannot buy back a lost reputation,
and popularity with the thoughtless is no compensation for disgrace
before the judicious and loss of self-respect. In these cases the end
is not important, if compared with the advantage of a good name. And
even when an end is good and more important than one’s fame, there will
frequently be rights of others involved that forbid a sacrifice of
reputation, as when a passive attitude in the face of calumny would
give scandal or cast discredit on one’s profession, office, work,
religion, family, or friends.

(b) The means must be good. Examples: Even if the ambition to be “a
good fellow” is praiseworthy, drunkenness and profanity are not
suitable ways of winning esteem, and the same applies to pretending
wickedness or accusing oneself of imaginary escapades and vices to
please a circle which admires wildness in youth. The means used in
these cases (drunkenness, profanity, lying) are evil in themselves.
Again, the wish to cultivate humility does not justify one in giving
scandal by consorting with evildoers as intimates, or by conducting
oneself in such a way as to lower the esteem or respect that is
entertained for one’s position. The means used in those cases are at
least evil-seeming and disedifying.

1577. Is self-detraction, that is, the revelation of some real fault or
defect, lawful?

(a) If there is question of faults or defects that are of a public
nature and generally known, a disclosure made in a good spirit and in a
proper manner, and from which beneficial and not harmful results can be
foreseen, is lawful, and sometimes obligatory. Example: Balbus has
calumniated his neighbors, and he now admits the fact, not to boast
about or excuse it, but to make satisfaction; he does not repeat the
details of his defamatory remarks, but merely states that he wishes to
retract what he had no right to say; he has every reason to think that
his present course will undo the harm caused by the defamation. Balbus
does right in thus acknowledging his mistake.

(b) If there is question of faults or defects not generally known, the
reasons for mentioning them should be more serious, unless the sins are
of a trifling nature. Examples: Caius once served a term in jail for
dishonesty, but he is now a decent citizen. His family would be
scandalized and would feel disgraced, if they knew this. But Caius
thinks it would be a suitable reparation to tell them of his former
guilt. Caius is wrong. To speak of his past experience would only add
the sin of scandal to the old one, and there are other ways in which he
can do penance in further expiation of dishonesty. Claudius wishes to
marry Sempronia, but the latter insists that there must be no secrets
between husband and wife, and that he must give her complete and
accurate answers on certain questions about his past career--for
example, whether he has ever been drunk, whether he has ever wished to
be drunk, whether he has ever had questionable relations with other
women, etc. Claudius should not deceive Sempronia, nor leave her in
ignorance of any serious objection to the marriage, even if she forgot
to mention it in her questions; but he owes it to himself not to put
himself in her power by giving her information which she would probably
use against him then or later. Titus has stolen a considerable sum,
and, for the sake of getting advice and direction on how to make
restitution, he consults a prudent friend who will regard his
communication as confidential, just as if he were a confessor. Titus
does not act against his own reputation by telling his case to this
friend.

1578. Confession of Sins against Charity Owed to Self.--(a) It is not
necessary to declare in confession that one has acted against the
charity due to self, if there is question only of sins in which
transgression of that charity was not directly intended; for to say
that one has sinned against God by blasphemy, or against self by
intemperance, or against the neighbor by injustice, is equivalent to
saying that one has hurt one’s own soul by sin. (b) It is necessary to
declare a want of charity to self, if one has expressly intended such a
sin. Thus, if a person who has been admonished to have care for his own
soul is so enraged thereat that he vows to deliver his soul over to
evil, and thereupon proceeds to commit various kinds of sin, he does
not declare his true state of conscience by merely mentioning these
latter sins. A case of this kind, however, is not usual (see 1307).

1579. The Commandment of Love of Neighbor.--Charity to
fellow-creatures, especially to members of the chosen nation, was
commanded in the Old Law. (a) Thus, internal love was made obligatory.
The Lord forbade hatred, revenge, remembrance of injuries (Lev., xix.
17), and commanded love of fellow-citizens (ibid.) and kindness to
foreigners dwelling in the land (Lev., xix. 33). (b) External love was
also obligatory. Alms and help were to be given the needy (Deut., xxii.
1, 2, xv. 11), loans were to be made without interest (Deut., xxiii.
19), kindness was to be shown to widows, orphans, the blind, the
crippled (Exod., xxii. 22, 23; Lev., xix. 14), part of each harvest was
to be left for the poor, and in the third, seventh and fiftieth years
special assistance was to be rendered the needy (Lev., xix. 9, xxv.
2-12; Deut., xiv. 28, 29).

1580. In the New Testament, which is the law of love, the precept of
charity to neighbors is given with greater clearness and perfection.
(a) Thus, internal love must be universal and modelled on the love
which Christ had for humanity. Enemies are to be loved as well as
friends, the bad as well as the good (Matt., v. 43-45), Gentiles as well
as Jews, since there is one Lord of all (Rom., x. 12). The new
commandment, whose observance will mark the faithful follower, is an
imitation of the charity of Christ (John, xiii. 34, 35). (b) External
charity must be practised, even at the cost of self-sacrifice (I John,
iii. 16), for it will be regarded by Christ as done to Himself (Matt.,
xxv. 40), and will be the subject of interrogation and eulogy at the
judgment (Matt., xxv. 34-46).

1581. In giving the commandment of love towards fellow-creatures, our
Lord indicated both the reason for the love and the mode in which the
love should be exercised: “Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself”
(Matt, xxii. 39).

(a) The reason for this love is that a fellow-creature is our neighbor,
or, as it is elsewhere expressed, our brother (I John, iv. 20, 21), our
friend (Lev., xix. 18). He, like ourselves, is made to the image of God
and is destined for the same beatitude.

(b) The mode of this love is that it should be similar, though not
equal, to the love one has for oneself. Hence, the end of loving our
neighbor should be God, that it may be a holy love; the rule to be
followed in loving him should be that we agree with his wishes in good,
but not in evil, that the love may be just; the manner of loving him
should be that one wishes him well, not that one only seeks pleasure or
advantage from him, and so the love will be sincere. For, as love of
self must be holy, just and sincere, the same qualities are required in
love of the neighbor.

1582. The following conditions must, therefore, be met in the love of
neighbor which charity commands:

(a) Love must not be of a covetous or selfish or superficial kind, but
must be sincerely benevolent and beneficent (see 1109). Those who wish
to retain the companionship or association of a neighbor because this
redounds to their own gain, on account of his wealth, influence, etc.,
while harming the neighbor, love themselves rather than the neighbor.
Nor is love of neighbor genuine if it exists only in the emotions, or
if it is manifested only in expressions of good will; for true love
includes benevolence and will be translated into beneficence when the
occasion presents itself (James, ii. 14 sqq.; I John, i. 22). Persons
who are most ready to shed tears at the distress of others, or who are
most profuse in compliments or good wishes, are frequently most
unwilling to assist others, especially if some sacrifice is necessary.

(b) The love of the neighbor must not be a sinful benevolence or
beneficence, but must desire for him and confer on him what are real,
and not merely apparent goods, such as we ought to desire for ourselves
(Matt., vii. 12). Those who secure for others lower and unnecessary
goods at the sacrifice of those that are higher and necessary, putting
wealth, pleasure, or position above virtue and a good conscience, have
not the love of charity, for “what does it profit a man to gain the
whole world, and lose his soul?” (Matt., viii. 36).

(c) The love of the neighbor must not be purely natural, but must wish
for him and confer on him real goods out of a supernatural motive. This
motive is the friendship one has for God, so that the neighbor is loved
because God loves him and desires to communicate to him a share in the
divine life through grace and glory. The motive of charity is absent,
therefore, when one loves only one’s friends, when one is kind to
others out of pity, or generosity, or admiration for their good
qualities, if there is no thought of God in this philanthropy or
humanitarianism.

1583. The commandment of love of neighbor is sufficiently complied with
as to its acts by all those who are leading a good Christian life. (a)
Thus, the internal acts of sincere affection, peace, joy, and mercy are
exercised by prayer for the living and the dead, or a devout recitation
of the Lord’s Prayer. (b) The external acts of spiritual and corporal
mercy are performed by those who are giving according to their means
and the necessities they meet.

1584. The commandment of love of neighbor is sufficiently complied with
as to its motive, even though the supernatural motive is not actually
present before the mind, or other and natural motives are also present.
(a) Thus, the supernatural motive directs our love of neighbor, if it
is present virtually, as will be explained in 1590. (b) Natural motives
of love that are good in themselves (such as ties of relationship or
nationality, common intellectual or other interests, the virtue or
ability of a neighbor) do not detract from the supernaturality of love,
provided their influence is subordinated to the divine friendship and
the desire of beatitude for the neighbor. Even a certain amount of
natural repugnance is not inconsistent with charity; on the contrary,
charity is seen to be great, if for love of God one does good to
implacable enemies, or waits on persons suffering from a loathsome
disease.

1585. Fulfillment of the Commandments of Charity.--We speak now only of
the commandment of love, in which the other commandments of charity are
contained (see 1550 b). The love which is commanded must have the
following qualities: (a) on the side of the subject who loves, it must
be internal and made at the proper times--that is, one must love from
the heart and affection, as well as in works and manifestations, and
must make and renew the act of love as the law requires; (b) on the
side of the object loved, it must be both universal and well-ordered;
one must not only love all to whom charity is due (see 1133 sqq.), but
one must also bestow love according to the rank of precedence in which
charity is due (see 1158 sqq.).

1586. The act of charity can be made in various ways.

(a) It is made in itself, when one elicits or expresses love; it is
made in its manifestations, when one performs an act of virtue distinct
from charity. One who sincerely loves God with his whole heart will
keep the commandments (John, xiv. 21), and hence acts of temperance,
justice, fortitude, etc., may be called acts of love, in the sense that
they are indications of love.

(b) The act of charity may be made internally or externally. Thus,
affection for another as a friend in God, and a sincere desire of his
good, are internal acts of love; while spiritual or temporal alms
bestowed upon him, such as instruction or aid in time of sickness, are
external acts of love.

(c) The act of charity may be made explicitly or implicitly. Charity is
called explicit with reference to a person or object which is loved in
itself, and not as included in another; it is called implicit with
reference to a person or object loved as included in another, as when
means and end involve each other, or a part is contained in the whole.
Thus, he who loves God above all things loves God explicitly and his
neighbor implicitly; he who loves his neighbor as a future co-sharer in
bliss loves his neighbor explicitly and God implicitly (see 1549); he
who includes all mankind in a common act of love, gives explicit love
to the race collectively, and implicit love to individual members of
the race not mentioned (e.g., enemies or strangers).

1587. For the fulfillment of the commandment of charity other acts of
virtue are not enough. There must also be love. (a) Thus, as to charity
towards God, our Lord declares that love of God is the great
commandment on which the others depend, and St. Paul makes salvation
depend on love: “If any man love not our Lord Jesus Christ, let him be
anathema” (I Cor., xvi. 22). (b) As to charity towards the neighbor,
the fulfillment of other commandments in his regard is inferior to the
fulfillment of the commandment of fraternal love, and thus the
commandments of justice to others are distinct from the commandment of
love. Innocent XI condemned the proposition that we are not obliged to
love our neighbor by a formal act of love (Denzinger, _Enchiridion_, n.
1160).

1588. For the fulfillment of the law of charity, external acts of love
are not enough; there must also be internal love or affection.

(a) With regard to charity towards God, there can be no question of
external charity through acts of beneficence, as is clear; but one is
obliged to signify one’s love of God, if silence would cause scandal or
convey an expression of hatred of God. Mere lip-service, however, will
not do, for God must be loved and served from the heart (Matt., xxii.
37; Eph., vi, 6; II Thess. iii., 5; etc.).

(b) With regard to charity towards the neighbor, external charity is
commanded (see 1210 sqq. and 1551). But there must also be internal
charity, for we are bidden to love our neighbor as we love ourselves
(Matt, xxii. 39), as Christ loved us (John, xv. 12), from the heart (I
Pet., i. 22). If a man distributed his goods to feed the poor, not out
of love, but out of vanity or other sinful motives, his act would not
be an exercise of charity. Innocent XI condemned the proposition that
we may satisfy through external acts alone the precept of loving our
neighbor (Denzinger, n. 1161).

1589. Must the internal act of love be explicit? (a) Love of God should
be explicit, for the commandment of charity is that God be loved as the
Last End, and the other commandments are to be observed as means to
that End (see 1120, 1547). The Last End is that which is loved for its
own sake, and hence distinctly, while the means are loved for the sake
of the Last End. (b) Love of the neighbor is required to be explicit as
regards all neighbors in general, when this is necessary for the
preservation of charity towards God, or the fulfillment of obligations
of charity towards man; it should be explicit as regards an individual,
when this is necessary for the proper discharge of external works or
other duties of charity, as when one will not be able to overcome a
temptation to hatred unless one makes an act of charity which expressly
includes the person one is tempted to hate. But one who loves his
neighbor implicitly through an act of supernatural love of God, and
neglects no external duty of charity towards others, is considered to
have sufficiently complied with the law in ordinary circumstances.

1590. The Intention of Performing All Good Works out of Love for
God.--(a) This intention is actual, when one expressly wills God as the
Last End of one’s actions. The commandment of loving God above all
things does not require an actual reference of each good work to His
love (see 1120, 85, 86).

(b) This intention is virtual but explicit, when previously a person
had the actual intention and never retracted it, and now acts under the
influence of that explicit and unretracted intention, though he does
not advert to the Last End as he now acts. Thus, if an act of love of
God above all things is made supernaturally by a Christian or naturally
by a non-Christian, and later on by reason of the acts of love these
persons give alms to the poor and do not think of God as they give the
alms, their works are not actually, but virtually and explicitly done
for His love. The commandment of love of God, as we shall see (1593
sqq.), obliges one at certain times to elicit an act of love of God as
the Last End, loved above all things else (in unbelievers it must be an
act of natural benevolence, and in believers an act of supernatural
charity); and, since such an act includes a consecration of one’s works
to God, the commandment requires likewise at certain times a virtual
and explicit reference of good works to the love of God.

(c) The intention is virtual and implicit, when there is no previous
act of love of God influencing a present act, but this act itself is
good, tending from its character and object to the Last End, and it is
precisely its character and object that cause it to be chosen by the
agent. Thus, if an infidel, who has made no offering of his works to
God, gives an alms out of love of mercy, or honors his parents out of
love of piety, or pays his debts out of love of justice, he has
explicit love for virtue and implicit love for the Author and End of
virtue. The commandment of love of God, being affirmative, does not
oblige one at all times to elicit acts of love of God as the Supreme
Good, and hence, apart from the occasions when that affirmative
commandment calls for exercise, a virtual and implicit intention of
acting for the sake of God suffices to excuse from sin.

1591. Applications of the Preceding Paragraph.--(a) A Christian who
makes acts of love of God at the necessary times fulfills the
commandment of loving God with his whole heart and the precepts of
doing all things for the glory of God (I Cor., x. 31), and in charity
(I Cor., xvi. 14), and in the name of Christ (Col., iii. 17).

(b) An infidel invincibly ignorant of the supernatural law, who makes
acts of natural benevolence with reference to God when he should, does
not sin against the precept of charity, and observes the law of natural
love.

(c) A person who in no way refers a deliberate act to love of God,
natural or supernatural, sins in that act. His sin is venial, if the
evil intended is small (e.g., an alms given purely out of vainglory);
it is mortal, if the evil is grave (e.g., an alms given for the purpose
of seduction into serious sin).

1592. It should not be inferred from what has been said on the
qualities which charity must have, or the influence it must exercise,
that the duty of love of God is only for the perfect, or that it is
with difficulty accomplished. (a) On the contrary, charity is a
universal obligation, for it is the first commandment (Matt., xxii. 38),
and he who does not love is accursed (I Cor., xvi. 22). (b) Neither is
the commandment hard (I John, v. 3), for nature itself inclines one to
love the Supreme Good, and grace helps one to remove the impediments to
a love of friendship that will cling to God above all. The observance
of the commandments indicates that one is guided habitually by love,
while a devout recitation of the Lord’s Prayer is an actual expression
of that love; and hence conscientious persons should not worry lest
they may have been wanting in God’s love.

1593. With reference to the times when the precepts of charity oblige,
we should distinguish three kinds of precepts: (a) the negative
precepts forbid sins against charity (such as hatred, envy, scandal,
etc.), and they oblige at all times; (b) the positive precepts of
external beneficence oblige when occasion requires, as was said above
(see 1210 sqq.); (c) the positive precepts of internal love oblige at
certain special times, as will now be explained.

1594. The precept of love of God obliges directly--that is, by reason
of the virtue of charity itself--at the following times: (a) at the
beginning of the moral life, that is, of the use of reason; (b) during
life; (c) at the close of life, or when one is about to die (Denzinger,
nn. 1101, 1289).

1595. The Obligation of an Act of Love of God at the Beginning of the
Moral Life.--(a) The beginning of the moral life here signifies the
moment when a child arrives at a full use of reason, and is able to
deliberate on things of grave importance, such as the duty of having a
supreme purpose in life and of doing good and avoiding evil. This
moment does not coincide necessarily with any fixed period of the
child’s age (e.g., the seventh year), but depends on the gradual
development of the moral conscience and may be earlier or later
according to intelligence, surroundings, education, etc, (see 932).

(b) The act of love of God here signifies the turning to God as one’s
Last End, but it may be made either formally or virtually, according to
the knowledge had. A formal act of love of God is made, when one has
explicit knowledge, either through faith or through natural reason,
concerning God as the Supreme Good and Last End, and when one loves Him
as such. A virtual act of love of God consists in a resolution to
direct one’s life according to reason, or in a love of the goodness of
virtue; for in such an act there is implied a love of the Author and
End of moral good. The faithful who cannot remember having made this
first act of charity when they came to the use of reason, should not
disturb themselves at this, for the commandment was fulfilled by any
service they freely offered to God.

(c) The reason for requiring an act of love at the beginning of the
moral life is, that in that moment one has the choice placed before one
of good or evil, and that faith, hope and charity, being fundamental
precepts, should precede the other virtues of the law.

1596. Ignorance as Excusing from the Act of Love of God.--(a) Ignorance
of God as the Author of the supernatural order excuses from the precept
of supernatural love or charity, if it is invincible ignorance. Thus, a
pagan who knows nothing of revelation does not sin by omitting an act
of charity towards God.

(b) Ignorance of God as the Author of the order of nature does not
excuse from a natural act of benevolence towards God, if the person in
ignorance, though an infidel, has sufficient use of reason, for
ignorance of God is then inexcusable (Rom., i. 20).

1597. The Obligation of the Act of Love of God throughout Life.--(a)
The existence of an obligation to make frequent acts of love of God
during life is a consequence of the preponderant part played by charity
among the virtues (see 1115 sqq.), for how is one to regulate one’s
life according to the virtues, if one does not frequently renew that
virtue which is the inspiration and direction of all the others? The
Old Testament requires that one have the commandment of love of God
frequently in one’s thoughts (Deut., vi. 5-7), and in the New Testament
it is called the commandment on which all the others depend (Matt.,
xxii. 37-40). The Church has condemned propositions that made
infrequent performance of the act of love--such as once in a lifetime,
once in five years--sufficient (Denzinger, nn. 1155-1157).

(b) The details of this obligation--that is, the frequency with which
and the times at which the act of love of God must be made under pain
of grave sin--is a matter of dispute among authorities. Some think once
in three years sufficient; others, guided perhaps by the analogy of the
precept of yearly Communion, regard once a year as sufficient; others,
with St. Alphonsus, hold for once a month, basing their opinion on the
difficulty of overcoming temptations if acts of love of God are omitted
for more than a month; others, with Scotus, think the act of love of
God should be made once a week, for, since the Sundays are set aside
for the worship of God, the Church seems to have thereby determined
with regard to the act of divine charity that which the law of God had
left undetermined; finally, some teach that an act of love of God must
be made daily, arguing that Christ commanded the Lord’s Prayer to be
said daily, and that its first petitions contain formal acts of love of
God.

1598. None of the opposed opinions just given can be considered as
demonstrated and theoretically certain. But in actual life this offers
no difficulty, and the following are accepted as practical rules that
may be acted on:

(a) Those who live habitually in the state of grace may be regarded as
having fulfilled sufficiently the commandment of love of God, for “if
any man love Me, he will keep My word” (John, xiv. 23).

(b) Those who live habitually in an occasion of sin or in sin itself,
no doubt neglect the commandment of love of God; but it is not
necessary that they accuse themselves of the omission to their
confessor, since it is understood in the mention of the occasion of sin
or bad habit. The confessor, however, ought to admonish careless
penitents about the obligation of love of God, of recitation of the Our
Father, etc. Mortal sin revokes the direction of one’s works towards
God, and, though one is not obliged to renew that direction immediately
after repentance, a delay beyond four or five months according to some
authors would be notable.

1599. Obligation of the Act of Love of God at the Close of Life.--The
duty of making an act of love of God when one is at the point of death
is admitted by all for the following cases: (a) the dying person is
directly obliged to make an act of love of God when this is the only
way in which he can secure justification, as when he is not in the
state of grace and cannot receive the Sacraments; (b) the dying person
is indirectly obliged to make an act of love of God when otherwise he
cannot securely struggle against temptations to despair, doubt, etc.

1600. The duty of making an act of love of God at the time when death
is near is considered as doubtful by some authorities when the
following points are morally certain: (a) when the dying person has
already sufficiently complied with the duty of making an act of love
(e.g., when he made such an act just before he fell into danger of
death), or is now in the state of grace (e.g., when he has received
absolution with attrition just before or after the danger); and also
(b) when the dying person will not expose himself on account of
omission of the act of charity to the violation of any serious
commandment.

1601. In practice, the priest who is attending the dying person should
act as follows:

(a) He should remind the dying person of the obligation, if it appears
certain, and should suggest to him the motives and assist him in
pronouncing the form. In many manuals of the Ritual exhortations and
aspirations suitable for this purpose are given.

(b) The priest should recommend the act of love of God, even though the
obligation does not appear certain, if no harm will result from his
doing so. For this will better prepare the dying person for entrance
into eternity.

(c) He should not speak of the act of love of God, if the obligation is
uncertain and harm would result from his doing so (e.g., if the dying
person is in good faith, and would be much disturbed if told about the
act of love to be made).

1602. Thus far we have spoken of the obligation which the precept of
love of God imposes directly, or by reason of charity itself. There is
also an obligation that is indirect, or by reason of some virtue or
commandment distinct from charity.

(a) Thus, by reason of a virtue distinct from charity, one is bound to
make an act of love of God, if this act is the only means of avoiding
sin against that virtue. Example: Titus suffers severe temptations to
injustice, and finds that only the love of God keeps him from
injustice. In temptation, therefore, he should make an act of love of
God.

(b) By reason of a commandment distinct from that of charity, one is
bound to make an act of love of God, if otherwise one cannot fulfill
rightly the commandment in question. Thus, if a person has to receive
or administer a Sacrament of the living, or solemnly to administer a
Sacrament, when he is not in the state of grace and has not the
opportunity of receiving absolution, he is obliged to make an act of
perfect contrition, which includes an act of love of God.

1603. An implicit love of neighbor is contained in every true act of
love of God (see 1549, 1586). But in some cases love of neighbor must
be explicit (see 1589).

(a) Thus, one is bound to explicit love directly (or by reason of
charity itself), when the law of charity requires this. _Per accidens_,
charity requires an internal act of love, when without this act some
good commanded by charity (e.g., reconciliation with an enemy, alms to
one in distress) will not be done, or some evil forbidden by charity
(e.g., hatred, revenge) will not be overcome. _Per se_, it does not seem
that charity requires explicit acts of love towards the neighbor, but
only those implicit acts contained in the love of God; in practice,
however, conscientious persons frequently make explicit acts of
fraternal charity, as when they pray for the living and the dead, or
say the Our Father with due attention and devotion.

(b) One is bound to explicit love indirectly (or by reason of some
other virtue than charity), when apart from such explicit love that
other virtue cannot be exercised as commanded. Example: Balbus is often
tempted to defraud Caius, and does not resist the temptation
successfully, unless he puts himself into a charitable disposition
towards Caius.

1604. The Necessity of Charity.--(a) The habit of charity is necessary
as a means (see 360, 785) for all persons, infants included, so that
without it no one can be saved. For it is only with this virtue that
one possesses the divine indwelling (I John, iv. 16), and is made a
friend of God. Those who have not the wedding garment of charity are
cast into the outer darkness (Matt., xxii. 13).

(b) The act of charity is also necessary as a means of salvation to all
adults, for it is only by actual charity that they turn towards their
Last End, and without actual charity they are in death (I John, iii.
14). A person who is justified through attrition joined with a
Sacrament receives grace and the habit of charity, and by his voluntary
acceptance he consents to the divine friendship and thus makes an act
of charity.

(c) The act of charity is obligatory under grave precept at the
beginning of the moral life, frequently during life, and at the hour of
death (see 1594 sqq.).

1605. Is it possible that a sin against the love of God be only venial?
(a) The imperfection of the act makes such a sin only venial, as when
without full deliberation one wishes to omit an obligatory act of love.
(b) The slightness of the matter makes such a sin venial, when it is
aside from, but not contrary to, the love of God, as when one makes an
act of love of God with culpable lukewarmness. Venial sin is not,
strictly speaking, opposed to the commandment of love, since it does
not destroy love.

1606. As the order of charity is commanded as a part of the law of
charity, one is obliged not only to love those to whom love is
commanded, but also to give greater love to those to whom greater love
is due.

(a) God must be loved above all creatures, since He is to be loved with
the whole heart (Deut., vi. 5; Matt., x. 37).

(b) Self must be loved more than the neighbor, for love of neighbor is
commanded only as like to that of self (Matt., xxii. 9).

(c) One should love one’s neighbor more than one’s own body, since we
ought to lay down our lives for the brethren (I John, iii. 16). The
claims of self and of the neighbor to love are in the following order:
the spiritual goods of self, the spiritual goods of the neighbor, the
bodily goods of self, the bodily goods of the neighbor, the external
goods of self, the external goods of the neighbor.

(d) Among neighbors, those who are better or more nearly related to
self should be given the preference in love; for we should do good to
all, but especially to those who are of the household of the faith
(Gal, vi. 10), and those persons are specially blamed who have no care
for their own and for those of their own house (I Tim., v. 8). The
claims of neighbors on our help (as was explained in 1176 sqq.) rank in
the following order: wife, children, parents, brothers and sisters,
other relatives, friends, domestics, citizens of the same town, state,
and country, and, finally, all others.

1607. The order of charity is commanded, because it is a mode intrinsic
to the performance of the act of charity (see 1554); it is a
circumstance without which the act of love is not in proportion to the
person to whom it is shown. Thus, love given to God is not in
proportion to His lovableness, if it is exceeded by the love given to a
creature; love given to the members of one’s family is not in
proportion to their claims, if it is less than the love given to
strangers.

(a) Hence, outside cases of a neighbor’s need, the law of charity
requires that one give him the amount of internal love that corresponds
with the external charity due to him. Thus, love for a father should be
in proportion to the external honor one is bound to show one’s parent;
love for a brother in proportion to the external marks of friendship
that are due a brother. He who has no filial love for his parents, or
fraternal love for his brethren, does not fulfill the law of charity.

(b) In cases of a neighbor’s need, the law of charity requires that the
internal love be in proportion to the external charitable assistance
one should give. Thus, if a parent and a stranger are in equal
necessity, more help and more love are due the parent; but if a
stranger is in need, and a parent is not in need, more help and more
corresponding love, as to that particular case, are due the stranger.

1608. It should be noted, however, that there is a twofold love of the
neighbor.

(a) Obligatory love is that which is commanded, and which is due another
as a debt, such as love for God, for a parent, for all neighbors in
general, etc. The amount of love for fellow-creatures that is
obligatory is, of course, not infinite, for no creature is infinitely
lovable; neither is it mathematically fixed, for, as said above, it may
be greater or less according to circumstances; but it is comparative or
relative--that is, it should agree with the higher or lower claim to
external charity that a neighbor has on one.

(b) Optional love, or love of supererogation, is that which is not
commanded, but which may be given lawfully, such as special friendship
outside a case of need for an enemy or stranger. As there is no precept
regarding this kind of love, neither is there any precept regarding the
order of love as between those to whom it is given, and one may invert
the order that is obligatory as regards commanded love. Thus, if a
brother and a cousin are both well-to-do, and one has property to
bequeath to which neither of them has any right, it is not against
charity to leave more to the cousin and less to the brother, or some to
the cousin and none to the brother. This supposes, however, that in the
matter of obligatory love the preference in order of charity has been
shown the brother (as explained in 1158-1182).




Art. 11: THE GIFT OF WISDOM

(_Summa Theologica_, II-II, qq. 45, 46.)

1609. Wisdom is the Gift of the Holy Ghost which corresponds with and
serves the virtue of charity (see 159 sqq., 808 sqq., 1041 sqq.), and
hence it is discussed in this place.

The following points concerning Wisdom will be treated: (a) the Nature
of the Gift of Wisdom; (b) the Persons who Possess the Gift of Wisdom;
(c) the Beatitude of the Peacemakers, which pertains especially to
Wisdom; (d) the Sin of Foolishness, which is opposed to Wisdom.

So far is it from being improper to give some space in Moral Theology
to the Gifts of the Holy Ghost (as if they pertained only to higher
mysticism), that it is even necessary to emphasize them. The Gifts are
essential to salvation, and play a most important part in the daily
spiritual life, whether in correcting or reinforcing the virtues, or in
giving immediate direction from the Holy Spirit. Man, it is true, does
not set them into action, but it is man’s part to value them, to hold
himself in readiness for them, and to hearken to their whispered
enlightenment and counsel. The Gifts of the Holy Ghost are the very
soul of Theology and of the Christian life.

1610. The Nature of the Gift of Wisdom.--Wisdom is defined as “a habit
for judging things in the light of their First Cause, the Supreme Good,
which is infused into the soul along with sanctifying grace.”

(a) Wisdom is a habit, and so it differs from passing acts. Thus, a man
in the state of sin who avoids idolatry, judges in the light of the
highest cause that worship is not to be given to creatures; but he
lacks the indwelling of the Holy Ghost, and therefore does not judge in
virtue of that special instinct or power which originates from the
abiding presence of the Holy Ghost.

(b) Wisdom judges, and this sets it apart from habits that belong to
the will (e.g., the Gifts of Piety, Fortitude, and Fear), as well as
from habits whose chief act is assent (e.g., the virtue of Faith) or
penetration (e.g., the Gift of Understanding).

(c) The standard by which Wisdom judges things is the First Cause of
all, or the Supreme Good, as when our Lord explained that the condition
of the man born blind was due to the purpose of God to be glorified
through that blindness (John, ix. 3). The wise man is he who goes back
to first principles, to the origins of things, to ultimate purposes;
but it is not every wisdom that estimates things according to the
Supreme Good, and there is a false wisdom (see 1623) whose canon of
excellence is the imperfect good opposed to Supreme Good. The Gift of
Wisdom, therefore, is distinct from sinful wisdom, which is wise at
doing evil (Jer., iv. 22); from particular wisdom, which understands
well the theory and practice of some science, art, or profession, and
is able therefore to decide correctly and to arrange successfully such
matters as fall under a special kind of activity, as in medicine or
architecture or strategy (I Cor., iii. 10).

(d) The things that make up the object of Wisdom are, in the first
place, divine things (e.g., the attributes, plans, government,
operations of God); and, in the second place, created things, whether
in the speculative order (e.g., mind and matter, good and evil,
science, religion, history), or in the practical order (i.e., human
actions). Wisdom contemplates the divine as known from faith or the
beatific vision, and then, with the things of God as its rule, it
judges the things of earth and directs the conduct of men: “The
spiritual man judgeth all things” (I Cor, ii, 15). Thus does Wisdom
differ from the Gifts of Knowledge and of Counsel; for Knowledge is
concerned directly with secondary causes and rises from the creature to
the Creator, While Counsel is not a speculative but a practical Gift,
and is a response to direction given by the Holy Spirit for the
guidance of conduct.

(e) The Gift of Wisdom is an infused perfection of the intellect, “a
wisdom descending from on high” (James, iii. 15). Hence, while it
resembles the virtue of Wisdom, which also judges human and divine
things through first causes (see 145), it differs from that virtue,
even with reference to the same objects, on account of its different
way of approach. Theology and philosophy judge correctly because they
employ study and the investigation of reason; but the Gift of Wisdom
has a right judgment because it depends, not on analysis or
argumentation, but on a supernatural knowledge had through faith (or
vision in case of the blessed) and a supernatural experience of God
through charity. Wisdom may express itself, indeed, in the concepts and
language of philosophy or theology, but it is not through scientific
processes that it knows and judges.

(f) The Gift of Wisdom is infused into the soul along with sanctifying
grace; for, like the other Gifts of the Holy Ghost, it is intended to
supplement through the action of the Holy Spirit the control exercised
by grace, which is imperfect on account of the limitations of the
virtues. The Gift of Wisdom, therefore, is an ordinary and normal fact
in the spiritual life, and must not be confused with rare and
extraordinary phenomena--with the “word of wisdom” (I Cor., xii. 8),
which was granted to the Apostles and at times to other preachers of
the faith, nor with the clear contemplation of God bestowed in the
state of innocence, nor with the infused knowledge or light of glory
enjoyed by Christ and some of the Saints while on earth. Thus, while
all who are in the state of grace possess the Gift of Wisdom,
comparatively only a few have received the “word of wisdom”--that is,
the ability to instruct others in the higher mysteries of faith and to
explain to them with ease and in suitable language the meaning of these
mysteries and their relation to supreme causes. Both these graces are
supernatural, but, while the Gift of Wisdom is needed by each
individual for his own sanctification, the word of wisdom is needed
only in certain cases for the sanctification of others.

1611. From the foregoing definition it is seen that Wisdom belongs both
to the will and to the intellect.

(a) In its cause, Wisdom belongs to the will. The cause of right
judgment by means of divine things is either the suitability of the
intellect, which knows well how to judge, or the suitability of the
will, which is inclined towards divine things. Thus, he who is well
versed in moral science will give a correct decision about a case of
chastity as it falls under the inquiry of reason, and he who is chaste
will judge correctly about the same case, even without moral science,
but from the sympathy he has for the virtue. The intellectual virtue of
Wisdom, then, judges aright because the intellect is sound in its
procedures; but the Gift of Wisdom is right in its judgments, because
the will has been united to God through charity, so that there has
resulted in one a suitability for judging about the things of God:
“Give me one who loves, and he will understand what I say” (Augustine,
_Tract. xxvi. in Joan_.).

(b) In its essence, Wisdom belongs to the intellect, for it consists in
judgment, and this is an act that is exercised, not by the affections,
but by the reason. Through love the soul becomes one spirit with God (I
Cor., vi. 17), and the will experiences the sweetness of this union
(Ps. xxxiii. 9); the intellect then judges concerning the divine which
has been the object of its mystical communion. The Gift of Wisdom,
built as it is on faith and charity, differs utterly from private
interpretation of revelation (which is subversive of faith) and from
the Modernistic experience of the divine (which is explained as a
natural intuition had by a special religious sense of a reality that is
divine and yet only subjective and unknowable).

1612. From the definition and explanation of the Gift of Wisdom it also
follows that this Gift is practical as well as speculative.

(a) Primarily, Wisdom is speculative, for one must consider divine
things in themselves before one applies them to other things; and,
moreover, the object of Wisdom is God, who is the first truth in the
order of knowledge or speculation. It is by Wisdom, then, as well as by
the other intellectual Gifts or extraordinary graces, that the act of
supernatural contemplation is exercised; but Wisdom, more perfect than
the other Gifts, ascends at once to things that are heavenly, divine
and eternal, and thinks of God as transcending in perfection every
known or knowable degree of created excellence, and as being most true,
most beautiful, most lovable (Eph., iii. 17-19).

(b) Secondarily, Wisdom is practical, for God whom it contemplates is
the supreme rule of action, as well as the first truth. Thus does the
higher Gift of Wisdom unite in itself what are found separate in lower
virtues--the speculative quality of the virtue of Wisdom and the
practical quality of Prudence (see 1620).

1613. The practical uses of the Gift of Wisdom are indicated in
Coloss., iii. 16-17, iv. 6: “Let the word of Christ dwell in you
abundantly, in all Wisdom, teaching and admonishing one another in
psalms, hymns and spiritual canticles, singing in grace in your hearts
to God. All whatsoever you do in word or in work, do all in the name of
the Lord Jesus Christ.... Walk with Wisdom towards them that are
without, redeeming the time. Let your speech be always with grace,
seasoned with salt.”

(a) The contemplation of divine things is useful for instruction in the
truths of faith and the duties of religion (“teaching and admonishing
one another”); for the mind becomes in a way divine, like the things on
which it dwells, filled with knowledge of God and of Christ and of the
means of holiness.

(b) Wisdom helps one to fulfill the duty of praying to God with
reverence and interior devotion (“singing in your hearts to God”); for
Wisdom makes one perceive and feel the sweetness and attraction of the
things of God.

(c) It directs one in both words and works (“do all in the name of
Christ”); for the intellect which judges things in the light of
eternity and with the fervor of divine charity will not mislead in
matters of salvation.

(d) It enables one to profit by opportunities of edification
(“redeeming the time”); for the example of a life directed by tender
love of God and by kindness and courtesy to all is a recommendation of
virtue and religion in the sight of the world.

1614. Wisdom is a Gift of the Holy Ghost, and is numbered with the
other six communications of the Spirit: “And the Spirit of the Lord
shall rest upon him, the Spirit of Wisdom, etc.” (Is., xi. 2).

(a) Likeness to the Other Gifts.--The Gifts of the Holy Ghost are
energies diffused in the powers of the soul as instruments of the
supernatural governance of the indwelling Spirit, just as the moral
virtues are the instruments of the natural governance of reason. The
infused virtues (e.g., faith or charity), unlike the acquired virtues
(e.g., temperance or fortitude), do not suffice for the government of
the soul; for, while these latter are according to nature, the former
surpass nature, and are received by it imperfectly. Hence the need of
the Gifts, which on earth supplement the infused virtues, strengthening
them against contrary vices, developing secondary acts of the virtues
which the virtues only initiate, and in heaven perfecting the blessed
in good.

(b) Unlikeness to the Other Gifts.--Wisdom, which is enumerated by
Isaias in the first place, is also given the highest rank among the
Gifts by theologians, on account of its greater elevation, more
universal scope, and the directive power it exercises. Fittingly, then,
is Wisdom assigned as the Gift that serves Charity, the queen of the
virtues: Charity loves God above all things; Wisdom dwells with delight
upon the object of this love (Wis., viii. 16), looks upon life with the
eyes of love, and in directing its human actions communicates to them
something of the savor and sweetness of divine charity.

1615. The Persons Who Possess Wisdom.--The Gift of Wisdom, as said
above (see 1610), is given with sanctifying grace, and hence only those
and all those who are in God’s friendship have this supernatural
endowment.

(a) Only those in the state of grace have divine Wisdom, for without
love of God it is impossible to have that right judgment of things that
is consequent on the relish for and connaturality with divine things.
Hence, it is said: “Wisdom will not enter into a malicious soul, nor
dwell in a body subject to sins” (Wis., i. 4).

(b) All those who are in the state of grace have the Gift of Wisdom,
for man is so weak and the supernatural virtues are so far above him
that, even when he has received these virtues, he is unable to make
proper use of them or to preserve them in time of temptation, unless he
has received the supplementary forces that will enable him to obey more
easily and promptly the voice and impulse of the Holy Ghost. Thus,
Charity destines man to beatitude, but, unless he has Wisdom to value
this virtue and privilege, to spurn the false wisdom of the world, to
think on the love of God with delight and to make it the norm of his
judgments and decisions, he will not progress in Charity, nor retain
it, nor arrive at the beatitude to which it destines him.

1616. Though all who are in the state of grace possess all the Gifts of
the Holy Ghost, these Gifts are not had in the same way by all their
possessors. Thus, the following points should be noted with reference
to the Gift of Wisdom:

(a) The Gifts, like the infused virtues, are possessed habitually by
baptized children and insane persons, and actually by adults. Just as
infants have the possession but not the use of certain natural gifts
(such as reason and responsibility), so likewise supernatural life and
powers are granted them through baptismal regeneration, but the
exercise of this life and of these powers is prevented by their
inability to realize what they possess and to make use of it. The lack
of bodily development, which impedes the use of natural reason, also
impedes the use of supernatural Wisdom.

(b) The Gift of Wisdom is had in itself by all who are in the state of
grace; but in its extension, which is the “word of Wisdom,” it is
possessed only by highly gifted souls who have a special mission from
God (see above, 1610 sqq.). With sanctifying grace, each one receives
the supernatural Gift of judging rightly about heavenly things and of
regulating his conduct by them in so far as is necessary for the
attainment of salvation; otherwise, we should have to say that grace is
inferior to nature, and does not provide what is necessary for its end.
But the ability to explain heavenly things so as to draw others to the
truth, and to apply heavenly doctrines to the guidance of others so as
to lead them to good, is one of the gifts freely given, which the
Spirit divides according as He wills (I Cor., xii. 11): “To one by the
Spirit is given the word of Wisdom, to another the word of Knowledge,
etc.” (ibid, 8).

1617. The Gift of Wisdom in itself (i.e., as intended directly for the
benefit of the recipient and not for the benefit of others) is also had
in varying degrees. (a) Thus, different persons do not possess this
Gift in equal measure; for to some is granted the contemplation of
loftier mysteries not granted to others, and suprahuman Wisdom plays a
greater part in the direction of some lives than in that of others. (b)
The same persons do not possess Wisdom in an equal degree at all times.
Thus, in Baptism all the Seven Gifts are received, but in Confirmation
they are in some way perfected, either in themselves by a greater
refinement or sensibility to the action of the Holy Spirit, or as
regards their possession by their subject through a firmer hold of them.

1618. The Exercise of the Gift of Wisdom.--(a) The external magisterium
(i.e., revelation and the teaching Church) conveys the truths of faith
to the mind of the believer. (b) The internal Teacher, the Holy Ghost,
illuminates the soul with Wisdom, so that it ponders on the first
principles of faith and makes the love of them control its judgments,
Words, and actions: “You have the unction from the Holy One and know
all things” (I John, ii. 20), that is, all that is needed for salvation.

1619. The Beatitude and the Fruits that Correspond to Wisdom.--The
Gifts of the Holy Ghost, by supplying for what is imperfect in the
habits of virtue (e.g., by protecting faith against dullness of
perception, hope against presumption, charity against distaste for
divine things), give to these virtues a perfectionment like to that
which they will have in the state of beatitude, and to their exercise a
corresponding enjoyment. Hence, to the Gifts, which are most excellent
habits, correspond those most perfect or most delightful acts of virtue
known as Beatitudes and Fruits (see 159 sqq.).

(a) There appears a special correspondence of the seventh beatitude
(“Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called the sons of
God,” Matt., v. 9) with Wisdom, both as regards their merit, and as
regards their reward. The work of Wisdom is to reduce all things to
unity, to see life and the world as a whole, to look upon creatures as
parts of one great divine plan. Similarly, the work of the peacemakers
is to put an end to dissension and division and to reconcile the
warring powers of the soul, or to introduce harmony between those that
are at enmity: “The Wisdom that is from above is peaceable” (James,
iii. 17). Again, the reward promised the peacemakers is that they shall
be called the sons of God, and of Wisdom it may be said that it makes
one the image of the Son of God, who is Eternal Wisdom.

(b) The Fruits of the Holy Ghost that are assigned to Wisdom are, with
regard to God: charity, or a tender love of God (“The charity of God is
poured out in our hearts,” Rom., v. 5.), joy, or delight at union with
God (“Rejoice in the Lord always,” Phillip., iv. 4), peace, or security
in the enjoyment of God (“There is much peace to them that love Thy
law,” Ps. cxviii. 165). The Fruits that have reference to the love of
neighbor are: goodness, or an internal benevolence characterized by
sweetness (“The fruit of the light is in all goodness,” Eph., v. 9),
and kindness, or a beneficence accompanied by cheerfulness (“The Lord
loves the cheerful giver,” II Cor., ix. 7).

1620. St. James (iii. 17, 18) describes the direction which Wisdom
gives to human actions (see 1612, 1613) and the fruit of peace to which
it conducts them, as follows: “The Wisdom that is from above, first
indeed is chaste, then peaceable; modest, easy to be persuaded;
consenting to the good, full of mercy and good fruits, without judging,
without dissimulation. And the fruit of justice is sown in peace to
them that make peace.”

(a) Thus, first, Wisdom directs one to be free from sin (“chaste”), for
the fear of the Lord is the beginning of Wisdom (Ps. cx. 110).

(b) Next, Wisdom directs one to work for peace within one’s own soul,
by following moderation where one can decide for oneself (“modest”), by
seeking advice where one is in doubt (“easy to be persuaded”).

(c) Further, Wisdom directs one to be peaceful towards others, to be
well disposed towards their good or benefit (“consenting to the good”),
compassionate and helpful in their distress (“full of mercy and good
fruits”), not partial or hypocritical in criticizing their defects
(“without judging, without dissimulation”).

(d) Finally, Wisdom, having sown in peace, reaps the peace of
righteousness. False wisdom leads to wrangling and disorder, true
Wisdom to concord and harmony.

1621. The Sins Opposed to Wisdom.--Just as blindness and dullness-that
is, the want of all or of sufficient perceptiveness in spiritual
things--are opposed to the Gift of Understanding (see 912), so
stupidity and foolishness--that is, the want of all or of sufficient
good judgment about spiritual things--are opposed to the Gift of Wisdom.

1622. Foolishness is defined as “a slowness and darkness of mind that
is due to some moral defect, and that makes it difficult for one to
judge rightly about the Last End of things and the Chief Good.”

(a) Foolishness is slow and darksome, and thus the contrary of Wisdom,
which is alert and discerning.

(b) It is a defect of judgment, and so differs from the sins of
blindness and dullness of heart.

(c) It is an error of judgment about the chief concern of life and the
things of greatest value, and thus it is different from the innocent
simplicity of many good persons, whose judgment is not sound in affairs
of this world.

(d) It is brought on by moral fault, and is therefore not to be
identified with invincible ignorance, which is a physical imperfection
caused by nature, as in the weak-minded and the insane.

1623. Just as true Wisdom seems foolishness to the world, so does true
foolishness seem wisdom to the world (I Cor., iii. 18 sqq.). There is a
counterfeit wisdom, which places its last end in some created good, and
which is therefore foolishness before God. St. James (iii. 15)
describes false wisdom as “earthly, sensual, devilish”; and these words
express very well three chief classes of worldly wisdom. (a) Some of
the worldly-wise aim above all things at amassing and increasing wealth
or other external possessions (earthly wisdom). (b) Others seek chiefly
pleasure, health, comfort, or other bodily goods (animal wisdom). (c)
Others imitating Lucifer, who is king over all the sons of pride (Job,
xli. 25), devote their whole lives solely to the pursuit of inordinate
excellence of some kind--that is, of selfish domination or honors or
glory, etc. (devilish wisdom).

1624. The foolishness we are now considering is sinful, for it is a
voluntary choice of evil, a violation of commandments, and the
ruination of man. In scripture the term “fool” is applied to the
wicked, the impious, the objects of divine anger (Ps. xiii. 1), and
hence it was that our Lord declared severe penalty against those who
call another a fool (Matt., v. 22).

(a) Foolishness is a voluntary choice of evil, for it consists in a
turning away from spiritual things or an entire absorption in the
things of this world, with the result that one becomes unfitted to
judge aright concerning the values of human existence: “The animal man
does not perceive the things of the Spirit of God” (I Cor., ii. 14).
But the fact that his taste is perverted, and that he has no relish for
the spiritual, is due to his own deliberate rejection of good and the
cultivation of evil.

(b) Foolishness is a violation of commandments about the knowledge and
employment of truth (see 914 sqq.): “See how you walk, not as unwise,
but as wise” (Eph., v. 15, 16).

(c) Foolishness leads to perdition, for, being defective in its
judgment, it barters away the future for present satisfaction and sells
its birthright for a mess of pottage: “The prosperity of fools destroys
them” (Prov., i. 32); “Thou fool, this night shall thy soul be required
of thee” (Luke, xii. 20).

1625. The causes of the sin of foolishness, as was said above (see
1623), are the wrong and sinful views taken of life, which make men
judge all things by the standards of gain or pleasure or power, rather
than by the standard of the First Cause, in comparison with whom all
these lower goods are but trivial. But, among all the vices that lead
mankind astray from Wisdom, the preeminence is held by lust, for its
attraction is greater and its hold on the soul more complete. As
chastity especially disposes for heavenly contemplation and Wisdom (see
912) by the refinement and elevation and spirituality it gives the
mind, so does sensuality especially indispose for these goods by the
coarseness and degradation and materialism that follow in its wake.




PART II

SPECIAL MORAL THEOLOGY (Continued)




Question II

THE DUTIES OF ALL CLASSES OF MEN (THE MORAL VIRTUES)

1626. After the theological virtues, which offer to God the services of
faith, hope and charity, and which direct man to his Last End, follow
the cardinal or moral virtues, which perfect the actions and passions
of man, and make of them means for tending to the Last End. Of these
four virtues (prudence, justice, fortitude and temperance), prudence is
ranked first, as being the director of the others.




Art. 1: THE VIRTUE OF PRUDENCE

(_Summa Theologica_, II-II, qq. 47-56.)

1627. Definition.--All the definitions of prudence are in substantial
agreement, and from them we may formulate a detailed definition as
follows: “Prudence is the virtue that consults well about the means to
be used for leading a good life and applies the knowledge acquired
through consultation to particular contingencies as they arise.”

(a) Thus, prudence consults well, for its office is to study ways and
means to right conduct, and to arrive at a sound judgment in spite of
various uncertainties or unknown factors. Of the two practical virtues
of the intellect, namely, art and prudence, the former deals with the
application of right reason to cases in which there are, for the most
part, certain and determinate ways of arriving at the end in view
(e.g., the rules of logic or grammar, the methods of music or
sculpture); while the latter has to do with the application of right
reason to cases in which the ways of obtaining the end in view are not
certain or determinate (i.e., the infinitely varied questions of
lawfulness or unlawfulness that present themselves in concrete and
particular situations).

(b) Prudence studies the means to a good life; and hence we do not
consider a man as generally prudent, if he consults well for this or
that particular good end, but not for the general end of leading a good
life. Nevertheless, prudence falls short of the Gift of Wisdom, for
prudence is concerned with human good, wisdom with divine good.

(c) Prudence applies knowledge to the direction of conduct, for the
purpose of the practical virtues of the intellect is to guide the
activities and productions of man according to the light of right
reason. It should be noted, however, that whereas the application of
knowledge is intrinsic to prudence, it is extrinsic to art; for
prudence includes in its very essence a determination of the will to
goodness, but not so art. Hence, a painter is not the less skilled in
his profession if he voluntarily fails to exercise it or exercises it
badly, but a person skilled in moral science is imprudent if
voluntarily he fails to use his knowledge or uses it amiss. The sin
against art is not to know; the sin against prudence is either not to
know what one should know or not to apply rightly what one does know.

1628. The Objects of the Act of Prudence.--(a) Prudence is concerned,
not with speculative truth (i.e., with those things that are known for
the sake of knowledge), but with practical truth (i.e., with those
things that are known for the sake of use). It aims, not to investigate
and discover what is the nature of virtue, but to guide man so that he
may become virtuous and practise virtue. It should be noted, however,
that the acts of the speculative reason, although they do not belong to
prudence itself, are like other acts subject to the direction of
prudence; for in pursuing speculative studies one should use good
judgment as to the subjects to be considered, the time, place, manner,
etc., of study.

(b) Prudence is not concerned with necessary truths and first
principles of morality, but with their application to contingent and
particular cases, just as a physician is called on to cure, not a
universal or abstract man, but the particular and individual man before
him. But since one cannot well apply that of which one is ignorant, the
prudent man must be acquainted both with the general rules of right
living and with the particular things to which his knowledge is to be
applied. He lacks prudence, therefore, who from vincible ignorance does
not know a general principle (e.g., that too much drink is bad), or a
case to which that principle should be applied (e.g., that the quantity
of drink before one is too much).

1629. It is customary to distinguish a twofold object of a virtue,
namely, the material object (i.e., the kind of activity the virtue
perfects, whether in the field of knowledge, or of action, or of
production) and the formal object (i.e., the special viewpoint of
goodness from which the material object is considered).

(a) The material object of prudence embraces individual human actions
performed under choice and freely (_agibilia_). (b) The formal object
of prudence is the right deliberation, decision, and direction (_recta
ratio_) to be given to human actions, with a view to the observance of
the golden mean.

1630. Necessity of Certitude.--Prudence, being an intellectual virtue,
must have certainty (see on the Certain Conscience, 640 sqq.). But with
regard to particular contingencies (e.g., whether Balbus ought to marry
Caia) there are various kinds of certainty.

(a) There is the certainty of knowledge based on a generalization from
experience of what happens in the majority of cases (e.g., that persons
well mated by reason of birth, age, dispositions, etc., marry
successfully). This kind of certainty belongs to moral science.

(b) There is also a certainty of knowledge based on the indications in
a particular case (e.g., that Balbus and Caia appear to have congenial
dispositions and a mutual affection that will make their marriage a
success). This is the certainty of opinion, and while it may suffice as
a rule for conscience (see the Systems of Conscience, 672 sqq.), events
do not always verify its predictions. Hence it is said: “The thoughts
of mortal men are fearful and our counsels uncertain” (Wis., ix. 14).

(c) There is finally the certainty of practical truth, which consists
in harmony with a good will. This is the certainty that is proper to
prudence, for this virtue is not a matter of reason alone. Hence, even
though a matter properly decided on should not take place or should
fail of the purpose intended (e.g., if the marriage of Balbus and Caia
is prevented or turns out badly), it remains that prudence was not
deceived in its decision, for that decision when made was according to
right reason and a good will (see 578).

1631. Relation of Prudence to the Other Moral Virtues.--(a) Prudence
does not direct the moral virtues to their own proper ends; for the
knowledge of those ends comes from synteresis, or moral understanding
(i.e., the natural perception of the first principles of right and
wrong), while the inclination to those ends is from the moral virtues
themselves. Prudence does not deal with first principles, nor is it an
inclination towards particular ends. Hence, it is the intellectual
virtue of synteresis that directs the moral virtues through the dictate
that right reason must be followed, that moderation must be observed,
that the passions of anger, pleasure, sorrow, etc., must be so
regulated that both extremes of excess and defect will be avoided.

(b) Prudence directs the moral virtues to the ways and means by which
their ends are to be attained; for the regulation of things particular
and variable, such as ways and means, pertains to prudence. Synteresis
is concerned with necessary principles, and the moral virtues give a
uniform and steady inclination to follow the mean of right reason, but
neither the one nor the other can indicate how principles are to be
applied or how inclinations are to be put in practice. Hence, it is the
work of moral science to determine what or how much anger, pleasure,
sorrow, etc., is moderate for the average case; but prudence has to
decide this for a particular case here and now (see on Conscience,
575). Without prudence bravery becomes foolhardiness, temperance
degenerates into fanaticism, and mercy changes to weakness.

1632. Prudence, indeed, directs the acts of all the virtues, ruling the
virtues inferior to it (i.e., art and the moral virtues), and serving
the virtues that are its superiors (i.e., the speculative intellectual
virtues and the theological virtues).

(a) Thus, in exercising the intellectual virtues through study,
contemplation, art, etc., one would go sadly astray if one did not
consult prudence as to the time, manner, and method of performing these
acts. Hence, a housewife who spent too much time in meditation would
neglect her domestic duties.

(b) In exercising the theological virtues, through acts of faith, hope,
and charity, there is also need of prudence, for it is not possible to
continue in these acts without interruption, since there are times when
other acts of virtue have to be attended to, and also times for repose.
Thus, a person who goes about giving alms to the poor at hours when he
is supposed to be at work for which he receives pay, is not prudent in
his charity, since he does not choose the right time to exercise it.

1633. The Exercise of Prudence.--The acts that belong to prudence are
those that one needs in order to direct one’s conduct to that
moderation which is the end of virtue. They are three: deliberation,
decision, direction.

(a) Hence, in the first place, prudence takes counsel on, and
deliberates about, the ways and means; (b) after ways and means have
been discovered, it passes judgment (see 575) on their suitability
(e.g., that restitution should be made at such a time, in such a way,
in such an amount, etc., or that moderation in eating and drinking
requires that this or that amount be taken, that this or that kind of
food be avoided, etc.); (c) finally, but chiefly, prudence gives the
command that what has been decided on be carried out, whether this be
the quest of certain things that are advantageous or the avoidance of
certain things that are dangerous.

1634. Qualities of Prudence.--The qualities that should characterize
prudence are carefulness and confidence.

(a) Carefulness is a watchful attention given to deliberation and
judgment enabling one to act with readiness and decision when the
moment for action has arrived. Its necessity for prudence is clear, for
one does not counsel or judge well unless one has a matter at heart, is
anxious about its success, and devotes to it serious study and
vigilance; nor does one direct well if there is hesitation and delay
instead of promptness in performing what has been decided on. In a
word, one should be quick in execution, but slow in deliberation. Hence
the admonition of St. Peter to be prudent, and to be attentive to
prayer as a preparation for a good life and for the judgment (I Peter,
iv. 7). An example of carefulness is St. Paul, who was solicitous about
all his churches (I Cor., xi. 28), ever inquiring about their
condition, their progress, their needs, etc.

(b) Confidence, as a quality of prudence, is a reliance on judgments
carefully formed which excludes worries and undue hesitations. This is
necessary as a balance to carefulness; for while it is true that
absolute certainty is not to be expected in forming decisions about
courses of action (the future event and also many present things
bearing on it being unknown to us), it is also true that
overcarefulness blinds the judgment and paralyzes decision. In the
character of Hamlet Shakespeare pictures the man who is imprudent
through excess of caution.

1635. The Parts or Kinds of Prudence.--As the divisions of parts
correspond with the divisions of wholes, we should note that there are
three kinds of wholes: a subjective, an integral, and a potestative
whole.

(a) A subjective whole is one that is present as to its entire essence
and all its power in each of the parts. This kind of whole is found in
the genus, each of whose species partakes of the entire nature and
energy included in the generic concept, just as the mode of being and
of acting expressed by the term “animal” is found fully in dogs, cats,
horses, and so on with the other kinds of animals.

(b) An integral whole is one that is not present in all its fullness
either of essence or of power in the single parts. This kind of whole
is found in a finished composite made up of heterogeneous units, such
as a house; for neither walls, nor roof, nor foundation, nor any other
single portion of the building is a complete house or has all the uses
of a house, but if any one of them is lacking the house is not integral
or complete.

(c) A potestative whole is one that is present in all its essence, but
not in all its power in each single part. This kind of whole is
exemplified in an active principle functioning through diverse
faculties, such as the soul which thinks, wills, perceives,
accomplishes by means of mind, will, sense, and bodily organs. The soul
is present in its entirety in each of these, since it is a simple
substance, but in one it exercises one power, in another a different
power, in none of them all its powers.

1636. It is customary to speak also of the integral, subjective and
potestative parts of a moral virtue. (a) Thus, the quasi-integral parts
of a virtue are those functions without which its act is not perfectly
performed; and with which it is more perfect. (b) The subjective parts
are the species into which the virtue is divided. (e) The
quasi-potestative parts are certain subsidiary or annexed virtues which
have to do with the secondary acts of a principal virtue, as not having
the full efficacy of the latter.

1637. Integral Parts of Prudence.--The integral parts of prudence,
considered as a cognitive virtue or as an index of the right means, are
those acts which enable one to have knowledge and to acquire knowledge.
(a) Thus, the acts requisite for the possession of knowledge about ways
and means are the memory of the past and the understanding of the
present situation. (b) The acts requisite for the acquisition of new
knowledge are docility, by which one learns from others, and quickness
of perception, by which one discovers for oneself.

1638. The integral parts of prudence, considered as an operative or a
preceptive virtue--that is, as the counsellor and director of life and
behavior--are the acts without which one cannot make good use of
knowledge as applied to conduct.

(a) Thus, knowledge of general principles must be applied to particular
affairs, and this supposes that one knows how to reason correctly, how
to infer the particular from the general, how to put facts together.
Even those who are not skilled dialecticians have a certain amount of
natural logic, and are able to make good use of data or premises in
drawing conclusions about their obligations, and thus to make a prudent
application of what they know.

(b) Knowledge gained through deliberation has to be effectually made
use of; that is, the reason must impose its judgment carefully formed,
must determine the line of action to be followed, must properly dispose
the means in view of the end. This requires that a person should so
direct his future acts as means to the end he has in view that they
will be good in themselves (foresight or providence) and in their
circumstances (circumspection), and that he will be guarded against
external impediments that might hinder him, steering clear of both
Scylla and Charybdis (caution): “The prudent man considereth his steps”
(Prov., xiv. 15). Examples: Titus wishes to help the poor, and decides
on certain methods of raising the money that are dishonest and
disedifying. Balbus wishes to induce Caius to go to church, and
therefore shows him marks of friendship, not reflecting that these acts
of friendship, on account of the character of Caius, will arouse only
haughtiness or suspicion. Claudius, in order to practise mortification,
resolves on a fast, but also makes up his mind to visit certain friends
who will try to make him break his resolution. Sempronius resolves to
provide well for his family and also for certain deserving charities,
but he fails to insure his property, to invest his money well and to
make a will, with the result that neither his family nor the poor are
provided for as he had intended. Titus lacked foresight, Balbus was not
circumspect, Claudius and Sempronius were incautious.

1639. The Subjective Parts or Species of Prudence.--Prudence in general
is the right direction of human actions to their ends; and hence there
will be as many different kinds of prudence as there are different
kinds of ends of human actions. But the division of ends will be into
the particular good of the individual and the common good of the
multitude, and thus there are the two species of individual or personal
prudence and social prudence.

(a) Individual prudence is the right management of his own acts by the
individual, with a view to his personal uprightness.

(b) Social prudence is the right management of the acts of others or of
self, with a view to the general welfare of a society.

1640. Social prudence in turn is subdivided in accordance with the two
classes of society, the perfect and the imperfect, into political and
domestic prudence. (a) Political prudence is the right administration
of the affairs of a larger multitude, such as the State. (b) Domestic
prudence is the right administration of the affairs of the family.

1641. Political prudence, according to usage, often has or may bear an
unfavorable and evil signification. Hence, as we are considering now
the virtue of prudence, we should remark that political prudence here
is something very different from political methods or practices that
are wise in evil, but not in good, though often called prudent (see
1651, 1674 sqq.). Examples: (a) Evil forms of government, such as
tyranny, oligarchy, or mob rule, cannot be said to have the virtue of
political prudence, no matter how successful they may seem, for they do
not rule in the interests of the people at large, and this interest is
the very beginning and end of true social prudence. (b) Evil practices
in the regulation of government or of political parties--such as
employment of foul means to maintain the interests of the State,
corruption, bribery, intimidation, used for the purpose of winning the
election of a ticket or candidate--cannot be honored with the name of
prudence, but should rather be called Machiavellism and dishonest
politics.

1642. Prudence exercised for the benefit of the nation as a whole
should be found, not only in rulers, but also in private citizens. We
may distinguish, then, the following kinds of prudence:

(a) in those who conduct the affairs of the nation there should be
governmental prudence or statesmanship. Of rulers prudence in the
highest degree is expected; for the chief function of prudence is to
direct actions, and the heads of States must direct not only their own
actions but those of great bodies of men. Scripture speaks of prudence
and justice as the two virtues that are especially needed in a prince
(Jer., xxiii. 5);

(b) in those who direct the defense of the nation against its enemies
there should be military prudence, for bravery has to be guided by
wisdom: “A wise man is strong, and a knowing man, stout and valiant,
because war is managed by due ordering, and there shall be safety where
there are many counsels” (Prov., xxiv. 5, 6);

(c) in subjects there should also be political prudence, for, as they
are rational beings and members of society, they should willingly rule
their acts according to the law and should fulfill their own particular
offices with a view, not only to their own individual good, but to the
good of the whole community.

1643. Utility of Prudence for Society.--Hence, we see that none of the
virtues is selfish or concerned exclusively with the good of
individuals. (a) Thus, prudence, as just said, is political and
domestic as well as individual; (b) justice is legal (i.e., towards
society) as well as commutative (i.e., towards individuals); (c) even
temperance (e.g., avoidance of drunkenness) and courage (e.g., defense
of public safety) pertain to the common good and are commanded in laws
of the State.

1644. Prudence attends chiefly to good morals, but it attends also to
other goods that benefit human life.

(a) Thus, personal prudence directs one, not only to seek after virtue,
but also to seek after lawful conveniences and to shun such things as
are embarrassing or undesirable. Hence, the prudent man acts so as to
avoid offense and to gain the good will of others; he studies the
dispositions of those with whom he lives, so as to live peaceably,
etc.; he protects himself against the attacks and snares of the
unfriendly (cfr. Acts, xxiii. 6; Matt., xxii. 17).

(b) Domestic prudence provides not only for the virtuous lives of the
members of the household, but also for their health and happiness, food
and clothing, and other necessities and lawful pleasures (Luke, xii.
42).

(c) Political prudence is exercised, not only in the regulation of the
conduct of the people through good laws, but also in the promotion of
their welfare, peace, prosperity, and contentment.

(d) Military prudence provides for religion and good morals, by
appointing chaplains, giving opportunity for religious exercises,
insisting on discipline and military virtues, etc.; but it also looks
after the interests of the individual men, the efficiency of all
branches of the service, preparedness of the fighting forces, etc.

1645. Neither should practical prudence or practicality (i.e., the
knowing what to do and how to do it) be identified with merely material
pursuits, since it is a quality that pervades all human activity, from
the lowest to the highest, from the manual to the intellectual, from
the temporal to the spiritual. Just as there are unpractical mechanics
and business men who are not skilled at their work, so also there are
practical students and church people who do their own work well and get
good results.

1646. The Potential Parts of Prudence.--As was explained in 1636, the
potential parts of a virtue are certain annexed virtues, usually
inferior ones, that have to do with the secondary acts of a virtue to
which they are subordinated. The principal act of prudence is
direction, its secondary acts are deliberation and decision (1633).
Hence, we have the following potential parts of prudence:

(a) wise deliberation (_eubulia_), which is a habit of debating with
oneself according to correct methods the means to be employed for
virtuous choice;

(b) wise decision, which is an habitual state of the mind which makes
it ready to draw right conclusions about the means to be chosen for
virtuous conduct.

1647. Wise deliberation and wise decision differ from prudence, which
is wise direction, and they are subject to it just as counsellors are
subject to a commander. But is it possible for these three virtues to
exist apart?

(a) If there is question only of natural dispositions to these virtues,
they may exist apart. Thus, we find that certain persons have an
imagination ready to discover ways and means; that others are not so
inventive, but are remarkable for common sense in choosing the most
suitable means; and that still others are so inclined to some virtue
that they will promptly make use of means that tend to it. The first
class are readily listened to in deliberations, the second in
decisions, while the third are usefully employed in executing matters
that suit their natural bent (e.g., the naturally generous in
dispensing alms).

(b) If there is question of the virtues themselves, they do not exist
apart; for a man is not prudent if he does not deliberate as he should
(e.g., if he searches for evil means to effect his good purpose), or if
he does not decide as he should (e.g., if he concludes to prefer evil
means to the good ones his deliberation had shown him), or if he does
not direct his actions as he should (e.g., if he neglects to carry out
what he had decided on as a necessary duty or performs it in a careless
or improper way). True prudence, then, is wise in deliberation, in
decision, in direction. A good man may be excused if he is not
resourceful, or if he lacks sound judgment in worldly matters, but one
who is imprudent in the matter of a virtuous life is not a good man.

1648. The Persons Who Possess Prudence.--Political prudence, if
understood of the ability to rule well, is not found in all persons,
not even in all the good.

(a) Thus, those who are imprudent in their own affairs are not fitted
to rule, and hence a man who is unjust, or intemperate, or cowardly,
lacks political prudence: “If one knows not how to govern his own
house, how will he be able to take care of the Church of God?” said St.
Paul in discussing the qualifications of prelates (I Tim., iii. 5). He
who does not know how to obey well does not know how to rule well.

(b) Those who have infused prudence on account of the state of grace
are not necessarily fitted to govern, for even children have the grace
of prudence through Baptism and there are many grown-up persons of
saintly lives who are not a success in office and administration. Thus,
Pope Celestine V, though a most holy man, resigned from the Papacy,
because he felt himself unequal to the task of ruling in troublous
times.

(c) Those who have acquired prudence through reason and experience, and
who are therefore just, temperate and strong, are morally well fitted
in natural endowments to rule. He who has learned to obey well is
prepared to learn to rule well.

1649. Political prudence pertains to subjects as well as to rulers,
although not in the same manner.

(a) Thus, rulers in the civil community should have political prudence
in a supreme degree, or statesmanship, so that they may be able to
discharge well the function of sovereignty entrusted to them, whether
as legislators by deliberating wisely and choosing suitable laws, or as
judges by correctly interpreting and applying the law, or as executives
by maintaining the government and enforcing its laws.

(b) The citizens who exercise the power of suffrage should be gifted
with no small degree of political prudence: they should be loyal to the
institutions, laws, and welfare of the country, able to form a good
judgment about men and measures that are the issues in a campaign, and
ready to vote according to conviction rather than prejudice or personal
interest.

(c) The people can also exercise political prudence when obeying the
laws, as when they act from a sense of duty and as rational beings, not
unwillingly or blindly; for thus they rule themselves as freemen and
enlightened beings, deliberating and deciding with themselves how they
may cooperate for the common good and directing their acts according to
law.

1650. The principles just given concerning political prudence will
apply also, due proportion being observed, to domestic prudence.

(a) Hence, it is the duty of those who have authority over a family or
a similar community to cultivate domestic prudence, without which they
cannot discharge rightly the duties of their position of parent,
rector, superior, manager, etc. Confessors and directors of souls need
especially to be prudent; for even though a priest is thoroughly
grounded in the principles of a moral system of conscience and in the
teachings of ascetical theology, he will have to be guided by prudence
in making use of his knowledge, so as to apply it well in the great
variety of cases that will come before him, and to decide what will be
most useful for the spiritual welfare of each individual subject.

(b) It is the duty of those who elect or appoint others to positions of
authority (such as the positions of guardian, teacher, superintendent,
etc.) to be assured beforehand of the fitness of the person chosen as
regards prudence, namely, that he is devoted to the welfare of those
whom he will rule, that he has acquired sufficient knowledge and
experience, and that his habits are temperate, resolute, just.

1651. Relations between Prudence and Other Virtues.--In the preceding
paragraphs the possession of prudence has been joined with the moral
virtues. Hence the question presents itself: Can one who lacks the
moral virtues possess prudence?

(a) Evil prudence, which chooses ways and means well adapted to some
nefarious scheme, and imperfect prudence, which means and judges well
but does not strongly resolve, are of course found in sinners. Evil
prudence is called after the virtue, because it is a counterfeit of the
latter’s goodness, but it is more properly named astuteness or cunning.
Its sinfulness is strongly expressed in Rom., viii. 6, which declares
that the prudence of the flesh is death. Imperfect prudence is also
sinful, for it permits a right judgment to remain ineffectual and is
thus recreant to conscience. Examples of evil prudence are the unjust
steward mentioned in the Gospel (Luke, xvi. 1), who was wise enough to
cheat his master and serve his own interests, and artful swindlers who
know how to lure their victims and then escape without detection.
Instances of imperfect prudence are persons who deliberate well on the
means to overcome assaults of temptation or to escape occasions of sin,
but whose resolutions never last.

(b) Indifferent prudence is resourceful in finding ways to accomplish
purposes that are good, but that are not necessarily referred to moral
aims. Thus, certain men seem to have an uncanny instinct in business or
industry of hitting on the methods that lead to success and of acting
at the right time, and a similar fact is observed in the fields of
science, medicine, art, etc. This kind of ability of knowing and doing
the right thing is variously described as insight, discrimination,
tact, and is variously explained as luck, genius, industry, etc. But,
morally speaking, it is neither virtuous nor sinful, since we find, for
example, that men endowed with business acumen or a practical sense of
the uses of some art or science devote their talents sometimes to good,
sometimes to evil, according to the difference of their characters.

(c) Good prudence is that which in thought and in act functions well
with regard to the means for leading a good life. It is only this
prudence that receives the name of virtue; and, since it is clear from
its concept that it supposes a good life, we must conclude that the
virtue of prudence is not found in sinners. It may happen, therefore,
that a man is most sagacious in managing temporal affairs, or most
skillful in administering the spiritual interests of others, and withal
most imprudent, because he neglects his own salvation.

1652. Sins that Cause One to Forfeit the Virtue of Prudence.--(a)
Infused prudence is lost by any and every act of mortal sin, whether
the sin be against the knowledge had through faith or the knowledge had
through reason. (b) Acquired prudence is lost by repeated acts of
mortal sin opposed to the knowledge had through reason, but not by one
sole act. Thus, a person who through experience and practice has become
prudent in overcoming past vices, loses this prudence if he disregards
the lessons of the past and exposes himself to the old dangers of
mortal sin (see 138).

1653. We may sum up as follows regarding sinners and the possession of
the virtue of prudence:

(a) sinners guilty of venial sin only have infused prudence, and also
the habit of natural prudence, if they have acquired it by their own
efforts;

(b) sinners guilty of mortal sin against supernatural light (e.g.,
those who sin against faith or hope) have not the infused virtue of
prudence, though they may have the acquired virtue;

(c) sinners guilty of habitual mortal sin against natural light (e.g.,
those who are accustomed to sin against temperance or justice) have
neither the infused nor the acquired virtue of prudence. Even one
mortal sin, though it will not take away the inclination of the habit
of prudence, will deprive one of the perfection of the virtue of
prudence, for which it is required that in every act there be a
judgment agreeable to a good will.

1654. The Virtue of Infused Prudence in Those Who Are in the State of
Grace.--(a) Infants in the state of grace through Baptism possess this
virtue in an habitual, but not in an actual manner--that is, on account
of their sanctification they have the power, but on account of their
want of reason they have not the use of the power.

(b) All adults in the state of grace have this virtue both habitually
and actually, as far as the need of salvation requires its exercise.
Grace enables them either to perceive what they should do to live well,
or to seek counsel from the better instructed and to distinguish
between good and bad advice.

(c) Some adults in the state of grace have good judgment in a superior
degree and are able to direct not only themselves but others, and to
deliberate and decide rightly, not only in matters necessary for
salvation, but in all kinds of affairs pertaining to the direction of
human life.

1655. Can the Acquired Virtue of Prudence Exist in Young People?--(a)
If there is question of a formed habit of prudence, the virtue is not
in the young, but in those who are advanced in years. Acquired prudence
is originated by deliberation on particular cases and by habit, and
these are not had without experience and time. Hence, this virtue is to
be looked for in the elderly, both because the passions that disturb
calm deliberation are no longer so impetuous in them, and because their
years have taught them many lessons and given them the opportunity to
acquire fixed ways of acting: “In the ancient is wisdom, and in length
of days prudence” (Job, xii. 12; cfr. III Kings, xii).

(b) If there is question of a formative prudence, this is found in the
young, for they deliberate and decide at times with judgment and
firmness, and, if such acts are frequently repeated, they will
eventually proceed from a settled moral inclination. It is necessary,
therefore, that the moral training of the young begin early, that
instruction, counsel and direction be given them by parents and other
guides, so that the way of virtue may be made more easy. The young are
in duty bound to listen frequently, willingly and reverently to the
admonitions of their elders, and hence the modern tendency of youth to
act as critics of morals is as foolish as it is presumptuous.

1656. Is There Such a Thing as an Instinctive or Native Prudence?--(a)
If we speak of the knowledge of universal principles of right and wrong
which are applied by prudence, those principles that are most general
are known naturally (i.e., even without instruction or inference), but
not so the less general principles that follow from them (see 320
sqq.). Broadly speaking, therefore, one might say that prudence is
natural, for in respect of its first principles it has a natural
evidence; but it is more correct to say that knowledge of first
principles belongs to intuitive reason or understanding, which is also
called synteresis in reference to practical truths (see 145), and which
is a gift of nature.

(b) If we speak of the particular knowledge of virtuous aims that is
presupposed to prudence, one may possess naturally a right judgment
about those aims, inasmuch as the right objectives of human life are
not variable but determinate, and accordingly may be the centers of
attraction to nature, which is drawn to the invariable and determinate,
as is seen in irrational creatures. In fact, certain persons are by
nature disposed to certain virtues (e.g., temperance), and readily form
accurate judgments as to what concerns these virtues. Broadly speaking
again, we may say that prudence is natural in the sense that nature
disposes some persons to judge rightly about moral ends.

(c) If we speak of the particular knowledge concerning ways and means
to fulfill virtuous purposes, there is no natural knowledge of this
kind, for the ways and means to moderation are infinitely varied
according to the differences of affairs, persons, and circumstances.
And since prudence strictly understood is concerned, not with universal
principles or the ends of virtues, but with individual cases and the
particular means to be employed, it follows that in the strict sense
prudence is not natural. But just as we find that some men are better
fitted by nature to judge correctly in speculative matters, so also
some persons are superior to others in the ability to reason about
practical cases and the means conducive to morality.

1657. The Growth and Decay of Prudence.--(a) As repeated acts form a
habit of prudence, so do repeated acts strengthen prudence already
formed, especially when the chief act of prudence (i.e., the command
that things wisely deliberated on be performed) is often brought into
play. Even infused prudence is augmented and perfected by use and
practice: “Strong meat is for the perfect, for them who by custom have
their senses exercised to the discerning of good and evil” (Heb., v.
14).

(b) As prudence consists primarily in a dictate which applies the
reason’s knowledge to the control of will and conduct, this virtue is
corrupted chiefly by passion. We see that those who are swayed by
pleasure or pain lose sight of the true motive of choice and action,
and do not issue to themselves the order which prudence and their
better judgment inspire. Thus, lust deceived even the elders of the
people (Dan., xiii. 56), and bribes blind even the prudent (Exod.,
xxiii. 8). Nature enables a man to judge rightly about the universal
principles of right and wrong; but, when judgment is to be given about
particular lines of action, “as a man is, so he judges,” the licentious
man judging for pleasure, the cowardly man for neglect of duty. Hence,
the moral virtues must be united with prudence, else it perishes.

(c) As prudence presupposes a fund of general moral principles,
forgetfulness is an impediment to this virtue; yet not so that every
loss of memory which deprives one of arts and sciences will also take
away prudence. For, while art and science consist entirely of
knowledge, prudence has also a moral element derived from a right
inclination of the will towards goodness, and its chief office is the
utilization of principles in practice. The virtuous man will continue
to follow prudence, even though he has forgotten its theory or rules,
guiding himself by good habits formed or by the counsel of those wiser
than himself.

1658. The Gift of Counsel.--The Gifts of the Holy Ghost supplement the
theological virtues by ministering to them; but they supplement the
moral virtues, of which prudence is the first, by aiding and perfecting
them. The Gift that corresponds directly to prudence is Counsel, for
both are concerned with the direction of human acts, prudence directing
by the standard of human reason and counsel by the Holy Ghost Himself.

1659. Definition.--Counsel is defined as “an infused habit which makes
the soul prompt to receive and act upon the enlightenment offered by
the Holy Ghost about the means to be chosen with a view to its own
eternal salvation.”

(a) Counsel is different from the virtue of wise deliberation spoken of
in 1646; for, while the virtue enables one to do good in a human manner
and from one’s own motion (e.g., by seeking advice, by making
inquiries, etc.), the Gift enables one to do good in a superhuman
manner and under the motion of the Holy Ghost (i.e., by hearkening to
the advice offered by God).

(b) Counsel is different also from the charism of good counsel, which
makes certain persons remarkable as advisors or directors. Thus,
Mathathias when dying said to his sons: “I know that your brother Simon
is a man of counsel; give ear to him always, and he shall be a father
to you” (I Mach., ii. 65). St. Antoninus of Florence was so successful
in guiding those who came to him with their difficulties that he was
called “Antoninus of the Counsels.” The Gift is intended to benefit its
possessor, and it is therefore had by all the just; but the charism is
for the benefit of others, and is freely bestowed according to the will
of God only on certain individuals who have a special mission of
directing or assisting their neighbors.

1660. Subject-Matter of Counsel.--The subject-matter of the Gift of
Counsel embraces all that pertains to salvation, both the things that
are necessary and are commanded and the things that are not necessary
and are only counselled.

1661. The Gift of Counsel may direct one at times to courses that are
singular and extraordinary. But, since the Apostolic rule is that one
should not believe every spirit but should prove the spirits whether
they are from God (I John, iv. 1; I Thess., v. 21), persons who feel
called to unusual kinds of life should submit their ideas to the
judgment of the Church: “Arise and go into the city, and there it shall
be told thee what thou must do” (Acts, ix. 7).

1662. The Beatitude and Fruits that Correspond to the Gift of
Counsel.--(a) Counsel directs one to all the means that are useful for
the attainment of life eternal, but especially to acts of mercy, for,
as St. Augustine remarks, without mercy shown to others we cannot be
freed from our own evils. Cognate to Counsel, therefore, is the Fifth
Beatitude: “Blessed are the merciful, for they shall obtain mercy”
(Matt., v. 7).

(b) Counsel is practical, and hence its ultimate result will be action
of some kind. The acts which its farseeing view puts especially into
exercise are acts of mercy, and acts of mercy have sweetness and
agreeableness when accompanied by a sympathetic love of the afflicted
and a cheerful and generous service of their needs. There belong to
mercy, then, the two delightful acts or fruits of the Spirit mentioned
in Gal., v, 22, and called goodness (i.e., internal benevolence) and
kindness (i.e., external beneficence).

1663. The Sins Against Prudence.--There are two classes of sins opposed
to prudence. (a) Manifestly opposed to it are those sins that consist
in a want of the acts or conditions requisite for prudence. These may
be called sins of imprudence or sins that offend prudence by way of
non-use. (b) Seemingly allied with prudence are those sins that consist
in a wrong application of the acts or conditions of the virtue. These
may be called sins of pseudo-prudence, or sins that offend against
prudence by way of abuse. We shall speak first of imprudence and then
of pseudo-prudence.

1664. Kinds of Imprudence.--There are three kinds of imprudence. (a)
Negatively considered, imprudence is nothing more than the absence of
prudence, and it is not necessarily a sin. Thus, children and young
people through no fault of their own are negatively imprudent, though
of course their lack of prudence may be traced back to original sin.

(b) Privatively considered, imprudence is the failure to have the
habitual prudence that one is bound and able to possess. This failure
is due to the fact that one has taken no pains to educate oneself
through study, sermons, instructions, etc., so as to be able to act
prudently when the occasion arises. Privative imprudence is therefore
reducible to the sin of negligence, although negligence itself, as
being opposed to carefulness (1634), is also against prudence, as we
shall see.

(c) Contrarily considered, imprudence is the voluntary omission of some
act or condition demanded by prudence (as when one is so taken up with
amusements that one makes no effort to deliberate on an important
matter or deliberates with undue haste), or the voluntary commission of
an act exclusive of an act or condition of prudence (as when one
expressly contemns deliberations or decides to act against the rules of
prudence). This kind of imprudence is a mortal sin when it leads away
from things necessary for salvation; otherwise it is a venial sin.

1665. Sinfulness of Imprudence.--Is imprudence a general sin, that is,
a sin which is included in every kind of sin?

(a) Imprudence is not included in every kind of sin in the sense that
it forms a part of the very nature of every kind of sin; for, just as
prudence has its own special acts (i.e., to direct according to
reason), distinct from those of other virtues, so has imprudence its
own special defects that do not belong to other kinds of sin.

(b) Imprudence is included in every kind of sin in the sense that
everyone who sins acts imprudently in sinning; for, just as one does
not act virtuously unless prudence directs one, so one does not act
sinfully unless there is some defect in the deliberation, or decision,
or direction given by reason.

1666. It should be noted that, while the defects against deliberation,
decision, and direction are so many different kinds of imprudence, they
do not form species of sin distinct from the motivating sin if they are
all directed to one evil purpose. Hence, if a person has deliberated
badly, decided badly, and directed badly in the matter of striking a
priest, he needs to confess but one sin, namely, that of laying
sacrilegious hands on a cleric.

1667. The Sin of Haste.--The sin of haste or precipitancy passes over
or hurries over the processes of deliberation that ought to precede
action; it devotes little or no attention to memory of past
experiences, understanding of present conditions, or conjecture of
future possibilities; it does not give to a question the proper amount
of study or of consultation. It is of two kinds, ordinary and rash.

(a) Ordinary precipitancy results from a strong inclination of the will
or of the passions, as when a person speaks in anger before he has
thought of the serious consequences of his words, or marries without
reflection, or purchases an article the worth of which he does not
know, or agrees to something about which he is in the dark, etc. Both
Holy Writ and popular proverbs strongly condemn this sin.

(b) Rash precipitancy results from contempt of the law, as when one so
despises an ordinance as to violate it without the slightest hesitation
or reflection. This sin pertains to pride as well as to imprudence. In
various censures the word “rashness” or “temerity” is used as here
given, as when excommunication is pronounced against rash violators of
the law.

1668. The Sin of Thoughtlessness.--The sin of thoughtlessness or
inconsideration is a neglect or contempt of the means of arriving at a
wise decision. It is a failure, therefore, to make use of right
understanding, which looks well at the particular case before it and
studies and measures it in the light of first principles.

(a) He is guilty of thoughtlessness, then, who fails to do what he can
to judge rightly about his duty; nor is he excused if he leaves the
whole matter to God, for it is temptation of God to expect that He will
provide when man does not do his own part (Prov., iv. 25).

(b) He is not guilty of thoughtlessness who has not the opportunity of
judging, or who lacks sufficient knowledge, or who is taken unawares;
nor is he guilty of temptation of God, if in such difficulties he
commits all to Providence. Thus, when various nations were gathered
together to fight against Juda, King Josaphat prayed: “As we know not
what to do, we can only turn our eyes to Thee” (II Par., xx. 12). And
Our Lord promised special help to the disciples for cases of need when
they were unable to help themselves (Matt., x. 19).

1669. The Sin of Inconstancy.--The sin of changeableness or inconstancy
is committed when, owing to anger, jealousy or other inordinate
passion, the reason repudiates things that had been rightly decided on
and fails to act on judgments that had been rightly made (Is., xxxvii.
3). From inconstancy result incontinence (i.e., instability in the face
of pleasure) and effeminacy (i.e., instability in the face of sadness).

1670. Causes of the Sins of Haste, Thoughtlessness, and
Inconstancy.--(a) Every inordinate desire brings on these sins by
diverting the mind from a good to an evil object. Experience shows that
the avaricious, the ambitious, the angry, the jealous, etc., do not
listen to reason, but act imprudently: “Where envying and contention
is, there is inconstancy” (James, iii. 16).

(b) Desire of pleasure, especially of venereal pleasure, is most fatal
to prudence by extinguishing the judgment of reason. The intellect is
immaterial and is occupied with abstract truth, whereas sensual
delights are immersed in the material and sensible. Hence, carnal sins
are more injurious to prudence than spiritual sins. The sensual man not
merely does not listen to reason, but he does not even hear it. Venus
steals away the reason, said Aristotle, and this truth is well
exemplified in King Solomon.

1671. The Sin of Negligence.--The sin of negligence is opposed to
carefulness or diligence, and consists in the failure of the reason to
direct properly an act, or some circumstance of an act, to which one is
obliged.

(a) Negligence is a general sin in the sense that it has no special
matter of its own, such as a passion to be moderated (as is the case
with temperance and fortitude) or an action to be regulated (as is the
case with justice). The acts of reason should extend to every kind of
matter, and hence a person may be negligent (and likewise inconstant,
thoughtless, hasty) with reference to any kind of action or passion.

(b) It is properly a special sin, as being the opposite of carefulness,
which is a special act of prudence.

1672. Negligence is distinct from the following sins: (a) from laziness
and lukewarmness, which are defects of the external act, while
negligence is a defect of the internal act (see 1326, 1327); (b) from
sins of omission, which pertain to external acts and are results of
negligence, and are opposed to some other virtue than prudence (e.g.,
negligence in paying debts is against justice); (c) from inconstancy,
which fails to command an act to which one is bound, as though one were
impeded, while negligence fails because there is a want of promptness
in the will. The inconstant man is easily diverted from his course; the
negligent man is slow in getting under way.

1673. The Sinfulness of Negligence.--(a) It is a mortal sin when some
act or circumstance necessary for salvation is omitted on its account
(e.g., when a debtor puts off from day to day the payment of a bill,
and in consequence causes a great injury), or when it proceeds from
contempt or preference of the creature to God. (b) It is a venial sin
when the act or circumstance omitted is not necessary for salvation
(e.g., when a judge causes a slight injustice by reason of his
procrastination), or when it proceeds from a want of fervor.

1674. False Prudence.--So far we have considered the sins of
imprudence; now we shall speak of the sins of false prudence, which
turn to wrong objects the acts that prudence employs for good, or which
use inordinately the care that prudence employs in moderation. Thus,
there are several kinds of imitation-prudence.

(a) Prudence is in love with the good of virtue as the end of life; the
prudence of the flesh is in love with some pleasure or utility, and
makes this good the center of attraction for all its acts.

(b) Prudence deliberates and judges about good and lawful means for its
end; astuteness deliberates and judges how it may make use of evil
means, and it employs trickery and fraud to perform what it decides on.

(c) Prudence is chiefly concerned about the spiritual, but its concern
is not excessive; solicitude for temporal things or for the morrow is
more anxious about the things of this world, or is unduly anxious about
spiritual things.

1675. The prudence whose end is bad is the sin of those Who counsel,
judge, and direct well as to the means for securing temporal goods
which they have made the supreme purpose of their lives. This sin is
given the one general name, “prudence of the flesh,” from Rom., viii.
6, where the aspirations of the flesh are contrasted with the
aspirations of the spirit. But it is also sometimes distinguished
according to the different kinds of created things in which false
prudence puts its desire, or according to the different kinds of
allurements to such created goods.

(a) Thus, those who aim chiefly at internal goods (i.e., bodily
pleasures, health, etc.) are said to have the prudence of the flesh,
while those who long mostly after externals (such as fine clothes,
jewelry, estates, etc.) are said to have the prudence of this world:
“The children of this world are more prudent in their generation than
the children of light” (Luke, xvi. 8).

(b) We may also divide prudence about a wrong end into earthly, animal
and devilish, according to the threefold source of temptation, as was
explained above in 1623.

1676. Sinfulness of the Prudence of the Flesh.--(a) If prudence of the
fiesh be understood in its stricter meaning as designating the
condition of those who make the things of this world the be-all and the
end-all of existence, it is a mortal sin; for it is impossible that one
should have two last ends or serve two masters whose interests are
opposite: “The wisdom of the flesh is an enemy to God, for it is not
subject to the law of God, neither can it be” (Rom., viii. 7).

(b) If prudence of the flesh be taken in a less strict sense as
signifying the behavior of those who make God the supreme end of their
lives, but who in some affair plan shrewdly for a particular end that
does not entirely square with right reason, it is then a venial sin. An
example is a host who is very practical in buying supplies and making
all the arrangements for a banquet at which the guests will conduct
themselves with too much hilarity.

(c) If prudence of the flesh be used in a wide or improper sense as
signifying the care of the body and other temporal things for the sake
of a good end, it is not sinful, but virtuous. Thus, a person who is
careful about his diet in order that he may conserve his health and be
enabled to work more efficiently and fruitfully, is virtuously prudent.
The use of the term “prudence of the flesh,” for these last two cases
is inaccurate and misleading.

1677. Astuteness, Trickery and Fraud.--The prudence whose means are bad
is the sin of those who skillfully plan and carry out wicked ways and
methods of securing some desired end, even though it be a good end.

(a) The planning of wicked means through which some design can be
successfully achieved is the sin of astuteness, and the persons who are
well-fitted for such things are known as schemers and plotters. The
counsel of the Jews against Christ (Matt., xxvi. 3-5) and the bribery
of the sepulchre guards (Matt., xxviii. 12-14) are examples of
astuteness.

(b) The carrying out of astute plans may be done either by violence or
by stealth; but, as evil loves to hide itself and to pose as good lest
its success be endangered, schemers usually resort to trickery and
fraud. Lord Bacon’s essay on “Dissimulation” is a good description of
the method of worldly policy.

1678. Trickery in general is the secret employment of sinful means with
the view to impose on others and thus gain some advantage one has in
mind. Hence, it has a wide application and includes fraud as well as
other uses of unlawful means. But trickery may be distinguished from
fraud as follows:

(a) trickery is the execution of an astute plan by words calculated to
deceive or circumvent another person. Words are the chief means of
communication between men, and hence trickery is more usual than fraud.
Examples of trickery are the artful traps prepared for Our Lord by the
Pharisees when with apparent respect they asked His views about the
condemnation of the adulteress (John, viii. 3 sqq.) and the payment of
tribute (Matt., xxii. 17), their purpose being to obtain evidence that
He spoke against the Law;

(b) fraud is the execution of astute plans by means of dishonest
actions, as when a person cheats by not observing the rules of a game,
or defrauds by selling inferior goods, or imposes on others by passing
himself off as their friend, etc.

1679. Trickery may be used for good as well as evil ends, and thus St.
Paul disowns the practice of persuading men to embrace the Faith by
appealing to their prejudices or by toning down the Gospel: “We
renounce the hidden things of dishonesty, not walking in craftiness,
nor adulterating the word of God; but by manifestation of the truth
commending ourselves to every man’s consciousness in the sight of God”
(II Cor., iv. 2).

1680. The gravity of the sins of astuteness, trickery and fraud depends
on the character of the object, end and circumstances. (a) Thus, on
account of the object the sin is grave when the means chosen are very
bad (e.g., serious calumnies), venial when the means are slightly evil
(e.g., lies about unimportant matters); (b) on account of the end the
sin is mortal when one intends to perpetrate a serious offense (e.g.,
clever ruses to get into a house in order to rob it), venial when the
purpose is not so bad (e.g., cheating at cards in order to win a small
sum); (c) on account of the circumstances the sin is made mortal by
some grave defect or disorder in the act resulting from the condition
of time, place, person, etc. Thus, there might easily be great scandal
if a person of authority were known to lie habitually, as it suited his
interests.

1681. Solicitude.--Another form of spurious prudence is solicitude,
that is, an inordinate carefulness about temporal things or about the
future. Its sinfulness appears from the following considerations.

(a) Our Lord condemns solicitude: “Be not solicitous therefore saying:
‘What shall we eat, or what shall we drink, or wherewith shall we be
clothed?’ ... Be not solicitous for the morrow, for the morrow will
be solicitous for itself. Sufficient for the day is the evil thereof”
(Matt, vi. 31, 34).

(b) Solicitude seeks temporal things without the moderation that reason
requires, does not duly esteem the spiritual, and does not confide in
Divine Providence. Without any human care God bestows upon man the gift
of life itself, provides for the animals and plants, directs the whole
inanimate creation, and it is therefore unreasonable to fret and fume
over the temporal things of one individual as if God were unable or
unwilling to see to them (Matt, vi. 25 sqq.).

1682. Cases of Unlawful Solicitude about Temporalities.--(a) Solicitude
is sinful on account of the things sought if one makes temporal things
the end of life, as when a person follows religion purely as a business
matter, for the sake of the living and worldly advantages this secures.

(b) Solicitude is sinful on account of the immoderate desire of
obtaining some good, when one pursues the temporal with such avidity
that the spiritual is made to suffer, as when a person devotes so much
time and thought to business, politics, society or science that
religion is more and more set aside in his life: “The cares of this
world choked up the word” (Matt., xiii. 22).

(c) Solicitude is sinful on account of the immoderate fear of losing a
temporal good, when one is deterred from religion by the thought that
fidelity to virtue means the sacrifice of the necessaries of life.
Examples of this immoderate solicitude are persons who never attend
church or contribute to religion, lest they lose time or money, or who
practise race-suicide to escape the burden of supporting a family.

1683. Cases of Lawful Solicitude.--(a) When the end is a genuine
temporal good, moderate solicitude is not only lawful but is a duty
dictated by prudence. Thus, a man who labors industriously and who
saves, spending economically for the support of himself and his
dependents and the upkeep of his home and business, is prudent in the
true sense of the word, provided he is not too much absorbed in
money-making or too anxious about financial affairs: “Work must be
attended to, but worry must be banished” (St. Jerome).

(b) When the end is a spiritual one, moderate solicitude is also a
duty. Thus, St. Paul was solicitous for his Churches (II Cor., xi. 28),
Timothy for the Philippians (Phil., ii. 20); those who have charge as
almoners should be solicitous for the goods given for the poor, etc.

1684. Cases of Unlawful Solicitude about the Future.--(a) Solicitude is
unlawful on account of the end that is intended, when one makes
temporal things one’s god, and is therefore perturbed about the future,
as when a person has set his heart upon obtaining some honor by fair
means or foul, and is restless and disturbed in mind lest it escape him.

(b) Solicitude is unlawful on account of immoderate desire, when one
seeks for more than one should, as when a person who has sufficient
means busies himself about too many things and deprives himself of
peace and health in order to be wealthier in the future.

(c) Solicitude is unlawful on account of the unsuitability of the time,
when one anticipates the season for care, as when a farmer worries
during planting season about the harvest, and during harvest time about
the next planting. Those who willingly occupy and disquiet themselves
with forebodings of dire calamities that are uncertain (e.g., the
imminent destruction of the world) or of evils that cannot be prevented
(e.g., their death), are also guilty of sinful solicitude.

1685. Cases of Lawful Solicitude about the Future.--(a) When the end is
a lawul temporal good, moderate solicitude about the future is good,
for providence for the future is a part of prudence (see 1654).
Scripture praises the ant which gathers its food in the summer against
the winter (Prov., vi. 6). Joseph stored up a reserve of grain (Gen.,
xii. 34 sqq.); Our Lord appointed Judas to act as treasurer for Himself
and His followers (John, xii. 6); the Apostles kept for future expenses
offerings made from the sale of fields (Acts, iv. 34, 35). (b) When the
end is spiritual, reasonable solicitude is also good, and this is seen
in the conduct of the early Christians who gathered alms in advance
that they might have the means to bestow assistance during a famine
which had been predicted (Acts, xi. 27 sqq.).

1686. False Prudence and Avarice.--The sins of false prudence are
caused chiefly by avarice. (a) They are sins in which reason plays a
great part, though it is not put to a good use; and hence they do not
naturally spring from carnal vices or cowardice, which obscure reason.
Avarice, on the contrary, reasons much on how it may get and keep; it
is shrewd, cunning, deliberate, foresighted. (b) They are sins that
have recourse to stealth and secrecy, and thus are unlike pride,
vainglory, and anger, which incline to display and openness. But
avarice puts utility above considerations of glory or revenge, and
prefers to be without fame or to bear with slights rather than lose
profits.

1687. Commandments of Prudence.--Prudence is not expressly commanded in
the Decalogue, but there are precepts concerning this virtue in other
parts of Scripture.

(a) Prudence is not enjoined in the Decalogue, because the ten
commandments are concerned with those ends of virtue that are manifest
to all, whereas prudence is about the means to practise virtue.

(b) Prudence is commanded in many places of Scripture: “Get wisdom and
with all thy possession purchase prudence” (Prov., iv. 7); “Walk in the
ways of prudence” (ibid, ix. 6); “Purchase prudence, for it is more
precious than silver” (ibid, xvi. 16); “Be ye prudent as serpents”
(Matt., x, 16); “Speak the things that become sound doctrine, that the
aged men be sober, chaste, prudent” (Tit., ii. 1, 2); “Be prudent and
Watch in prayers” (I Peter, iv. 7).




Art. 2: THE VIRTUE OF JUSTICE

(_Summa Theologica_, II-II, qq. 57-60.)

1688. After prudence follows justice. This virtue regulates human
actions and renders to others their due, and so it has preeminence over
fortitude and temperance, which govern the passions and make man
virtuous as regards his own acts only and not as regards his neighbor.
The logical order, then, is that justice should precede fortitude and
temperance.

1689. Nature of Justice.--In God justice is an attribute in virtue of
which He so treats His creatures that they can have no well-founded
complaint against Him: “His own justice supported Him. He put on
justice as a breastplate” (Is, lix. 16, 17). In man it is goodness
towards God or towards neighbors; and it is called in Scripture by
various names, such as “justice,” “equity,” “truth,” “righteousness.”

(a) In a wide sense, justice signifies the general virtue of holiness,
or the collection of all the virtues, as when Our Lord says: “Blessed
are they that hunger and thirst after justice (i.e., holiness)” (Matt.,
v. 6). Holiness, as a supernatural life communicated to the soul, is
also called justice or justification: “The justice of God by faith of
Jesus Christ, unto all and upon all them that believe in Him” (Rom.,
iii. 22).

(b) In a strict sense, it signifies the special moral virtue that
consists in a firm purpose of the will to give to everyone his due or
right: “Love justice, you that are judges of the earth” (Wis., i. 1);
“If in every deed you speak justice” (Ps. lvii. 2). In its strict sense
the word “justice” is hereafter used.

1690. Definition of Right.--Right signifies originally that which
follows a straight course or does not deviate from the true standard,
as in the expressions “right ahead,” “to be in the right.” But in moral
matters right has the derived meaning of that which is good, proper,
suitable; and in general it is of two kinds, objective and subjective,
the former being the foundation of the latter.

(a) Objective right is that which is prescribed by law, or it is the
law itself as the rule and standard of what ought to be done,
especially in the relations of men towards one another. In this sense
there is a twofold right, natural and positive, according as reason
itself or free will imposes a law (see 286, 296).

(b) Subjective right is that relationship introduced between men by
reason of the laws governing their conduct one to another, which gives
to one an authority to exercise certain capabilities (active right,
right properly so-called), and imposes on another the necessity of
respecting that authority (passive right, duty).

1691. Right properly so called is defined as the moral power of doing
or possessing something.

(a) It is a moral power, that is, a power created by the moral law
giving one a true title and forbidding others to interfere with its
enjoyment and use. It is not a physical power, for might does not make
right; on the contrary, he who has moral power is sometimes hindered
from exercising it by another who has physical power. Nor is it a mere
legal power, or capacity to act validly and within human law, but an
ethical power that enables one to act licitly before God and conscience.

(b) It is a power to do (e.g., to labor) or to have (e.g., to own
land). The former includes also the moral power to forbear action
(e.g., to rest on Sunday), to require that another act (e.g., pay what
he owes me), or that he forbear action (e.g., keep off my property);
while the latter includes also the power to acquire, to use, to
transfer, etc.

1692. Divisions of Right.--(a) By reason of its source, or of the law
from which it springs, a right is either natural (e.g. the right to
life, liberty, pursuit of happiness), positive-divine (e.g., the right
to receive the Sacraments), positive-human (e.g., the right of
parishioners that Mass be said for them by their pastor, the right of
citizens to vote and to be voted for). (b) By reason of its term, or of
the power which it confers, a right is strict (legal) or non-strict
(moral). One has a strict right when something is due one, because it
is one’s own by a proper and exclusive title (e.g., the right to life
and property). One has a non-strict right when something is due one,
only because it is something common that is to be distributed and one
is a deserving member of the community (e.g., the right to receive an
appointment from the government), or because virtue (e.g., the right to
receive gratitude for benefits shown) or the perfection of virtue
(e.g., the right to be treated with liberality or affability or
friendship by others) requires it.

1693. Natural rights are subdivided as follows:

(a) in respect of their object, some rights are absolute, as being
based on nature alone (e.g., the right of a child to support from its
parent arises from natural origin); or they are relative, as being
based on nature in its relation to concrete and contingent facts (e.g.,
the right of an owner to private possession of his land arises from the
nature of land, which was made to serve man, and from the contingent
fact that it cannot serve man as a rule without private ownership);

(b) in respect of their source, some rights are innate, that is, they
are had from birth by the very fact of human nature (e.g., the right of
life in the newborn child); others are acquired, that is, obtained in
course of time through some contingent fact. Thus, titles to goods of
fortune which the owner is the first to possess (original titles) are
obtained by occupation and accession; titles to goods obtained from
others (derivative titles) are obtained through prescription,
inheritance, contract;

(c) in respect to their firmness, some rights are alienable, that is,
they are such as may be renounced or superseded lawfully, since they
are not obligatory (e.g., the right to marry, the right to drink
alcohol); while others are inalienable, that is, not subject to
renunciation or deprivation, as being obligatory (e.g., the right to
repel temptation, the right to serve God).

1694. Signs by which Strict and Non-Strict Rights May Be
Distinguished.--(a) That to which one has a strict right belongs to one
as one’s own, and hence it must be determinate or determinable. The
right of a beggar to receive some assistance from someone is not a
strict right, since it cannot be urged against any particular thing or
any individual person; but the right of a creditor is a strict right,
since it can be urged against the debtor for a definite amount.

(b) That to which one has a strict right is owed in justice, and hence
it may be enforced by legal means, or in case of need by physical
force. The right of a child not to be slighted in the distribution of
presents made by its parents, the right of a person who has had a
falling out with another that the latter shall accept advances for a
reconciliation, and the right of a benefactor that the beneficiaries
show signs of gratitude, are not strict rights, because they cannot be
enforced in courts of justice, but the right of a laborer against his
employer is a strict right, since it can be vindicated by legal means.
It should be noted that a strict right is one that is granted as a
proper, exclusive and enforceable power by any law, whether natural or
positive, and hence the fact that human law will not vindicate a right
(e.g., the right arising from a contract naturally good, but legally
not defensible, the right of a parent to his child’s respect) does not
prove that the right is not strict.

1695. A strict right to have or to own is either _in re_ or _ad rem_.
(a) A right _in re_ (real or complete right) is the right to that which
one already lawfully has as one’s own (e.g., the right that Caius has
to the wages paid him by Balbus). (b) A right _ad rem_ (personal or
inchoate right) is the right to that which one is entitled to obtain as
one’s own (e.g., the right that Caius has to receive the wages promised
him by Balbus).

1696. Legal Enforcement of Strict Rights.--(a) The right _in re_
authorizes recourse to a real action (_actio in rem_), that is, to a
suit against the thing itself, no matter where it be or by whom it be
held, as when one sues to recover one’s property through the ejectment
of a wrongful possessor; for the thing is immediately and juridically
bound to him who has the right, as being his own.

(b) The right _ad rem_ enables one to enforce one’s claim by a personal
action (_actio in personam_), that is, to bring a suit against a
definite person on whom one has a claim by reason of contract, domestic
relationship, fiduciary position, etc., as when one sues for recovery
on account of the non-fulfillment of the conditions of a compact.

1697. The right _in re_ to property is either perfect or imperfect.

(a) A perfect right (right of full dominion) is that which enables one
to exercise all the prerogatives of ownership, that is, to dispose at
will of an object (e.g., to sell, lend, give away, etc.), to use it
(e.g., to occupy a house, to make alterations in it, to tear it down,
etc.), and to exclude others (e.g., to put a fence about one’s property
to exclude the public).

(b) An imperfect right (right of partial dominion) is had when one is
restricted as to the right of the disposition of one’s goods, for
example, when one is forbidden to sell; or when one has the right of
disposition without the right of use, for example, when one is
forbidden on account of the vows of religion to use property one owns
(radical dominion); or when one has the right of use without the right
of disposition, for example, when one is forbidden to make permanent
alterations in a house one occupies as tenant (indirect or useful
dominion); or when one has the other rights of ownership but lacks the
right of exclusion, for example, when one may not exclude a neighbor’s
flock from grazing in one’s pasture (ownership subject to servitude).

1698. The Subject of Justice, or the Faculty of the Soul in Which It
Exists.--(a) Justice is not in the intellect, for we are not called
just because we know a thing rightly, but because we act rightly; (b)
nor is it in the sensitive appetite, since a sense faculty does not
apprehend the relations between rights and duties; (c) hence, justice
is in the rational appetite or will.

1699. The Objects or Subject-Matter of Justice.--(a) The material
object of justice (i.e., all those things with which it deals) is
remotely the external things which are the objects of exchange and
distribution among men, and proximately the actions by which they are
exchanged or distributed.

(b) The formal object of justice (i.e., that which it principally
intends in dealing with its material object) is that the rights of
others, or their inviolable moral power of doing, having or acquiring,
may be respected. Justice thus differs from charity. For charity is
owed also to self, justice only to the neighbor; charity considers the
neighbor as he is one with self and gives him what belongs to self,
while justice considers the neighbor as he is distinct from self and
gives him what belongs to him.

1700. Since justice is shown not to self but to another, it is not so
fully-realized when two persons are in some sense one.

(a) Parent and child are especially one, since the child is from the
parent and a part of the parent, and hence the natural obligations that
spring from their special relationship pertain to the virtue of filial
and paternal piety, which is not strictly justice, but obliges more
strictly on account of the greater rights involved. But obligations
that spring from relationships that are common (e.g., from a contract
between a father and his son) pertain to strict justice; for in these
relationships they treat with one another, not as father and son, but
as man and man. Employer and employee may also be considered as one,
inasmuch as the latter is the agent or instrument of the former, and
the same conclusions may therefore be applied to them.

(b) Husband and wife are less perfectly one than parent and child and
than master and servant, for neither is descended from the other, and
neither is servant to the other. But since they form one conjugal
society and the husband is head of the wife, they owe one another
stricter obligations than if they were strangers to one another,
although those obligations partake less rigorously of the character of
justice.

1701. Division of Justice.--Justice is divided according to the rights
it respects into legal and particular. (a) Legal justice (observance of
law) is that which is owed by the individual, whether he be ruler or
subordinate, to the community of which he forms a part, or to the law
and the common good of the entire body. (b) Particular justice
(fairness) is that which is owed to the private good of an individual.

1702. Is legal justice a distinct and separate virtue, or only a
general condition found in all virtues?

(a) Practically speaking, legal justice is a general virtue, inasmuch
as its desire of promoting the common good will impel a man to observe
all the laws and to practise other virtues than justice, such as
fortitude and temperance. The law commands us to perform the actions of
the courageous man, of the temperate man, of the gentle man, and hence,
as Aristotle says (_Ethics_, lib. V, cap. 2), legal justice is often
regarded as the supreme virtue, the summary of all virtue, more
glorious than the star of eve or dawn.

(b) Essentially, it is a distinct virtue, for it alone moves a man
primarily and directly to respect the rights of the common good as
being that greater whole of which the individual is but a part. It
differs even from patriotism and filial piety (for these are moved by
one’s own debt to the source of one’s life) and from obedience (for
legal justice seeks the welfare of the community even in things that
are not commanded).

1703. Comparison of Legal and Particular Justice.--(a) Particular
justice partakes more of the nature of justice, for there is a greater
distinction or separation between the party who has an obligation and
the party who has a right, when the latter is an individual, than when
the latter is a whole of which the former is a part. A distinctive
characteristic of justice, as said just above, is that it takes account
of the independence or “otherness” of those between whom it exists, so
much so that only in a metaphorical sense can we speak of justice when
only one person and nature is in question (e.g., justice between man
and his soul, body, powers).

(b) Legal justice is a more perfect virtue than particular justice or
filial piety, since it seeks a higher object (that is, the common good
as such) and is more voluntary.

1704. Is the right which the community has to receive from the goods of
its members one of legal or one of particular justice?

(a) The right of eminent domain (i.e., the right which the State has
over the goods of private persons when they are necessary for the
common good) is a right of legal justice, for even without compulsion
the citizen should be willing to contribute what is necessary for the
community of which he is part.

(b) The right of the members of a government to receive compensation
for their services is a right of particular justice, for there is an
implicit contract between the rulers and the State that the former will
serve the interests of the latter and that the later will pay the
expenses of the former, as if both parties were private individuals
(see 1708).

1705. Distributive and Commutative Justice.--On account of the
inequality or equality of the individuals between whom it exists,
particular justice is subdivided into distributive and commutative,
which are distinct species of justice.

(a) That the distinction is well-founded is proved by the fact that
this justice--that is, relations towards particular persons--is either
the relation of whole to part or of part to part. The former relations
are governed by distributive justice, which is defined as the virtue
that inclines the ruler, as the representative of the community, to
portion out the public goods (e.g., money, honors, offices) and burdens
(e.g., taxes), not according to favoritism or personal likes, but
according to merits and abilities; the latter relations are governed by
commutative justice, which is defined as the virtue that inclines the
individual to pay to other individuals what is their due, whether the
rights be personal (e.g., the right to reputation) or real (e.g., the
right to wages or price). Commutative justice receives its name from
the fact that it is oftenest called for in commutations (i.e., in
exchanges, such as buying and selling).

(b) That the distinction of particular justice into distributive and
commutative is specific appears from the fact that the main
characteristics of justice (viz., debt owed another and equality
between payment and debt) are found in each of these kinds of justice
in a way proper to itself. There is a debt in commutative justice when
a thing is owed another because he has an individual right to it and it
is already under his dominion; there is a debt of distributive justice,
when a thing is owed another because he has a community interest in it
and a right that it be entrusted to him in view of his merits or
abilities.

1706. Thus, the equality observed in commutative justice is
arithmetical, or of quantity (e.g., if a horse is worth $100, it is
just to pay $100 for it); the equality observed in distributive justice
is geometrical, or of proportion (e.g., if one who had an average of
90% in a civil service examination receives a position that pays $90,
it is just to give another whose average was 80% a position that pays
$80). An indication of the specific difference between distributive and
commutative justice is that the same individual may be just in private
matters and unjust in public matters. Example: Titus, an office-holder,
pays his personal debts faithfully, but he appoints only his friends,
whether they be worthy or unworthy, to important honors.

1707. Corrective Justice.--Corrective (i.e., vindicative or punitive)
justice is a virtue inclining a public person or a superior, such as a
ruler, magistrate, or judge, to inflict on evil-doers penalties
adequate to their faults. It is not to be confused with just vengeance
or retaliation, which is the virtue that moderates in a private person
the desire for punishment of an offense against self, and which is not
justice strictly speaking, either commutative or distributive, but only
a potential part of justice (as stated below in Article 6).

(a) Thus, corrective justice is elicited by commutative justice, for a
punishment is inflicted by a judge in order that there may be equality
between the satisfaction made by the evil-doer and the debt owed to
another on account of the offense. It aims at redressing an unfairness
by taking away so much from the offender and adding so much to the
party offended, that both will stand in the same position as before. If
the person punished accepts the penalty in the same spirit, he also
practises commutative justice.

(b) Corrective justice may be commanded by legal justice, for the judge
may intend the punishment for the sake of the common good, as well as
of the individual who has been injured.

1708. Different Species of Justice in One Act.--Different species of
justice may be present in one and the same act. (a) The same act may be
elicited by one kind of justice and commanded by another kind of
justice (see 56 sqq.), as in the examples given just above of
vindicative justice. (b) The same act may be elicited by two kinds of
justice, as when a debt is owed both in virtue of commutative and of
distributive justice. Some think an example of this is found in the
payment of government employees, for payment is made by distribution
from common funds (distributive justice), and it is owed for services
contracted for (commutative justice). But it seems more correct to say
that wages for services given the community are due in commutative
justice rather than in distributive justice; for in the former justice
equality is between what is given and what is received, in the latter
between the proportion received by one and the proportion received by
another, and government salaries should be paid on the basis of value
received in service (see 1704, 1755, 1767).

1709. The Object of Justice.--The function of a moral virtue is to
direct according to moderation all those things that are subject to the
free will of man, and can be regulated by reason, namely, the actions
of man and the external things of which he makes use.

(a) The actions of man can be understood either in a wide sense, so as
to include both those internal affections that are accompanied by
notable bodily changes (the passions, such as anger, sadness), and
those actions that do not so strongly act upon the body (operations).
Every virtue has for its object action in the wide sense, for virtue is
defined as a habit that makes the agent good and his action good; but
not every virtue has action in the strict sense for its object, since
the virtues of fortitude and temperance regulate, not the operations,
but the passions.

(b) Operations are of two kinds, namely, internal, by which men do not
communicate with one another (such as thoughts and desires), and
external, by which men communicate with one another. These latter
either have to do with external things (such as land, houses, money,
produce, etc.), and we then have such operations as loan, sale, lease
and other contracts, or no external thing is introduced, and we have
such operations as honor, praise, calumny, etc. All the moral virtues
have to do with the internal operation of choice, for virtue is a good
election of the will; but there is this difference between justice and
the other moral virtues, that fortitude and temperance merely dispose
the intellectual appetite for a good choice by the regulation they give
to the sensitive appetite, while justice has for its proper act to
choose well the means for moderating external operations. As for
external operations themselves, these are the objects of justice, but
not of the other two moral virtues.

1710. The purpose of the other moral virtues is to regulate man in
himself; for the passions that are moderated by fortitude and
temperance (such as fear and desire) affect primarily their subject and
not other persons. The purpose of justice, on the contrary, is to
regulate man in his relations to others; for external operations and
things directly affect others, either helping or injuring them, But
both the passions and external operations have effects and consequent
ends that give them new relationships, and hence we may distinguish
between the primary object to which a virtue tends directly, and the
secondary object to which it tends only indirectly on account of the
effects of the primary object.

(a) The primary object of justice is external operations and external
things; the primary object of fortitude and temperance is the passions,
for justice seeks the good of others, whereas fortitude and temperance
seek the good of the agent.

(b) The secondary object of justice is the passions, whenever its
principal object cannot be easily regulated without regulation of the
passions. Thus, when lust urges to the injustice of adultery or avarice
to the injustice of denial of payment due, justice calls on the virtue
of temperance or liberality, as the case may be, to moderate the
passion opposed to it. Similarly, the secondary object of fortitude and
temperance may be external operations, whenever the effect on the
subject of the principal object (i.e., the passions) has reactions in
reference to other persons. Thus, if fear is moderated by fortitude and
desire by temperance, these virtues have external consequences such as
combat against evil, abstinence from food or drink that belongs to
others; but if anger is immoderate, it may lead to unjust attack, and
if desire is immoderate, it may lead to the injustice of theft of food
or drink.

1711. The Golden Mean of Virtue.--The golden mean of virtue is not the
same in all the moral virtues (see 154).

(a) Thus, fortitude and temperance regulate the passions for the
benefit of their subject, that he may avoid in them the extremes of
excess and defect. Hence, the middle way they follow must be determined
by reason from a consideration of the subject and his circumstances
(the mean of reason), and so will vary with different subjects and with
individual cases. Thus, in the matter of temperance it is an old saying
that what is one man’s meat is another man’s poison. It would be absurd
to say, therefore, that there is only one middle way of temperance, and
that all persons must conform to the same rule as to quality and
quantity of food and the time and manner of eating and drinking. On the
contrary, the rule here must suit the subject, and that will be
moderate which agrees with the health, appetite, duties, manner of
life, etc., of the person.

(b) Justice, on the contrary, regulates external operations for the
benefit, not of the subject, but of other persons whom they affect, in
order that the subject in dealing with others may avoid inequality,
which means excess on one side and defect on the other side. Hence, the
middle way of justice is discovered by reason from a consideration of
external things or acts owed to other persons (the mean of reason and
of the thing), and so it does not vary with the circumstances of the
subject. If the real value of a horse is $100--it makes no difference
whether the seller be a prince or a peasant, whether the buyer be rich
or poor--the just payment will be $100. Excess will be unfair to the
buyer, deficiency to the seller.

1712. Though the mean of justice is determined, not by reference to the
person who acts, but by reference to some external thing, it may be
that this external thing cannot be evaluated without consideration of
the person to whom justice is owed.

(a) In distributive justice this is always the case, for the mean of
the thing in distributions consists in equality between relative
proportions of distributions and relative merits or abilities of
persons to whom distributions are made. Hence, distributive justice
must consider the conditions of the person to whom it is owed as
compared with the conditions of other persons, in order to observe
equality by giving proper shares to all.

(b) In commutative justice, this is sometimes the case, namely, when
the condition of a person who has been offended (e.g., that he is a
ruler) increases the debt of satisfaction that is owed him; for the
mean of the thing in commutative justice is equality between the
payment and the debt.

1713. Is observance of the mean of the thing sufficient to make an act
just, no matter what may be the dispositions of the subject?

(a) If there is question of material justice, the reply is in the
affirmative, for a virtue is said to be exercised materially when its
mean is observed. The mean of fortitude and temperance cannot be
observed without reference to the condition of the subject (e.g., he is
not brave who undertakes a difficult task that is beyond his strength);
but the same is not true of justice (e.g., he is just who pays the last
penny of a debt though the payment was beyond his means and required a
sacrifice).

(b) If there is question of formal justice, the reply is in the
negative, for a virtue is said to be exercised formally (i.e., from a
virtuous habit) when the motive of the subject and the circumstances
are agreeable to reason. Thus, he who performs deeds of valor purely
out of vainglory exercises fortitude materially, not formally; and
likewise he who pays his debts faithfully, merely in order to avoid the
penalties of the law, exercises justice materially but not formally.

1714. Comparison of Justice and the Other Virtues.--The differences
between particular justice and the other moral virtues are, therefore,
the following:

(a) justice is for the good of another, the other virtues for the good
of the agent himself;

(b) justice deals with external actions and things, the others with the
passions;

(c) justice follows a mean of the thing, the others a mean of reason;

(d) justice is had materially without any suitability to the
circumstances of the agent, not so the other virtues.

1715. While justice is inferior to the theological and intellectual
virtues (see 156, 157, 1028), it is superior to most of the moral
virtues that perfect the sensitive or the intellectual appetite. The
superiority of justice to fortitude, temperance, and the annexed
virtues, such as mercy (see 1207), is seen from the following reasons.

(a) Legal justice is greater than those other virtues, for, while they
pursue the private good of their subject, it seeks the public good.
“Great is the splendor of justice,” says St. Ambrose (_De Officiis_,
lib. I, cap. 28), “which is born for others rather than for itself, and
which aids society and the community. It holds high position, that all
may be subject to its judgment, that it may bestow assistance, not
refuse responsibility, take upon itself the dangers of others.”
Moreover, since the law commands us to perform the actions of the
courageous man, of the gentle man and of the temperate man, legal
justice, as Aristotle says (_Ethics_, lib. V, cap. 2), is often
regarded as the supreme virtue, the summary of all the virtues, more
glorious than the star of eve or dawn.

(b) Private justice is also greater than those other virtues, since it
perfects a nobler power of the soul (viz., the will), and seeks the
good, not only of its own possessor, but also of others. Justice too is
impartial or blind as between persons, demanding satisfaction, even
though a debtor be a monarch, and granting redress, even though an
injured party be the humblest or most undeserving of mankind. An
indication that justice is nobler than regulation of the passions is
seen by Aristotle (_Ethics_, lib. V, cap. 4) in the fact that it is
more difficult and rarer: “Many people are capable of exhibiting virtue
at home, but incapable of exhibiting it in relation to their neighbor.
Accordingly, there seems to be good sense in the saying of Bias, that
‘office will reveal a man,’ for one who is in office is at once brought
into relation and association with others. As then the worst of men is
he who exhibits his depravity both in his own life and in relation to
his friends, the best of men is he who exhibits his virtue, not in his
own life only, but in relation to others; for this is a difficult task.”

1716. Two virtues of the sensitive appetite that appear more excellent
than justice are courage and liberality, but in reality justice is
nobler than they.

(a) Thus, courage seems to be better, because it is more essential to
the common good in time of great danger; but in reality justice is more
useful to the community, for at all times, whether in peace or in war,
it is justice that preserves unity and contentment among the people and
promotes courage and devotion to the public welfare.

(b) Liberality seems to be better than justice, because it gives more
than is due, while justice gives only what is due. But, on the other
hand, justice is of more general advantage, since of necessity
liberality must be exceptional and shown only to comparatively few,
while justice must be exercised continually and must be shown to all;
justice is also more necessary, for one must be just in order to be
liberal, and not vice versa, since no one is praised as generous unless
he first pays the debts of justice; finally, although liberality gives
more than is due and may thus be a greater private benefit, justice
without liberality is more serviceable to the common interest than
liberality without justice.

1717. Two virtues of the will which some authorities hold to be more
important than justice are the virtues of religion and mercy.

(a) The virtue of religion has a nobler object, since it regulates the
worship owed to God, while justice regulates the things owed to man;
and its obligation is stricter even than that of legal justice.

(b) The virtue of mercy, which is a rational inclination of the will to
relieve the suffering or misfortune of others, is held to be greater
than justice, because to relieve the distress of the community or of an
individual indicates greater perfection than to pay merely what is due
to another.

1718. Virtues may be compared, not only from the viewpoint of the
objective excellence which they have from their own natures (whereby
they are unequal and rank according to the greatness of their objects),
but also from the viewpoint of the subjective participation of them in
the souls of their possessors.

(a) In a certain sense, all the virtues are equal in their possessor,
since all of them alike are related to charity as their perfection (see
1118), and all of them increase or diminish in like proportions with
the growth or decline of grace, which is their root (see 745).

(b) In a certain sense, too, the rank of the virtues may depart from
the order of the dignity of their objects. For the facility and
promptitude of exercise of an infused virtue does not depend formally
on the infused virtue itself, but on subjective conditions, such as
natural inclination or custom, or on a special gift of God (see 135,
136); and hence it may happen that a saint shows greater excellence and
enjoys greater renown in an inferior than in a superior virtue. Thus,
Abraham was singular in faith, Moses in meekness, Josue in bravery,
David in fervor and devotion (Ecclus., xlv-xlviii), and St. Joseph is
praised as “a just man” (Matt., i. 19).

1719. Injustice.--Just as the word “justice” is taken in a wide sense
for holiness or the collection of all the virtues, and in a strict
sense for a special cardinal virtue, so likewise the word “injustice”
is taken widely as a synonym for any transgression, iniquity, or sin
(“He sendeth rain upon the just and the unjust,” Matt., v. 45), but
strictly for violation of the special virtue of justice (“Hear what the
unjust judge saith,” Luke, xviii. 6). It is of this latter injustice
that we now speak.

1720. Species of Injustice.--Injustice is of two kinds. (a) Legal
injustice is a special vice that moves one to despise the common good
or to act against it intentionally. Thus, if one steals or overeats
merely to gratify a passion for money or for food, there is a certain
condition of legal injustice, inasmuch as one violates a law; but if
one does these things also or solely to injure the common good, there
is a special sin of legal injustice, to be declared in confession. (b)
Particular injustice is a special vice against the private good of
others that moves one to seek for more than is one’s share, or to
desire more of the benefits and less of the burdens than equality
appoints. Examples: To sell above the just price or buy below the just
price (commutative injustice); to show favoritism in the distribution
of public offices or burdens, as when a person in authority showers
public benefits on his unworthy relatives or friends, and overburdens
with taxes those who are not his friends (distributive injustice).

1721. The Theological Species of Legal and Particular Injustice.--(a)
From its nature injustice is a mortal sin, for it is an attack on a
very great good, namely, the peace and security of society; the very
foundations of orderly community life are shaken when injustice is done
either to common or to private rights. Moreover, acts of injustice
(unlike sins of mere passion), if the matter is serious, offend against
charity, the life of the soul; for charity “envieth not, dealeth not
perversely” (I Cor., xiii. 4); while injustice injures the neighbor and
leads to hatred, quarrels, and separations. Hence, the Apostle says of
injustice: “Do not err: neither adulterers, nor thieves, nor covetous,
nor extortioners, shall possess the kingdom of God” (I Cor., vi. 10);
and Our Lord, speaking of justice, says: “If you would enter into life,
keep the commandments” (Matt, xix. 18).

(b) From want of sufficient advertence in the subject (see 173 sqq.),
or from smallness of matter in the object (see 172), a sin of injustice
may be only venial. Thus, if one takes money that belongs to another on
account of vincible ignorance due to slight negligence, or if one takes
only a small amount that does no serious injury, the injustice is
venial.

1722. Rule for Determining the Gravity of Sins of Injustice.--The rule
for judging whether the matter of a sin of injustice is great or small,
is the quantity of injury it inflicts, or the degree of reasonable
unwillingness of the offended person to suffer the injustice; for sins
against the neighbor are culpable precisely on account of and in
proportion to the harm they do to others. Hence, since every injustice
offends either the public or private good, or both, the following acts
of injustice are gravely sinful:

(a) mortal sin is committed when injury is done to a private right in a
matter of such great moment that the person offended is reasonably and
gravely unwilling to sanction the injustice (e.g., cases of calumny,
adultery, incendiarism). But if the injury itself is small and the
party offended is nevertheless gravely unwilling to suffer it, only
venial sin is committed against justice, but there may be a mortal sin
done against charity, as when one steals a worthless trinket, knowing
that the owner is so unreasonably attached to it that the loss will
almost break his heart or will provoke in him violent anger, profanity,
etc.;

(b) mortal sin is also committed when injury is done to a public right
in a matter so important that the community is with good reason gravely
averse to the commission of the injury. This happens when the common
good is directly attacked, as when a citizen rebels against lawful
government, or when the peace and security of the community is
imperilled because of injury done to a private person, as when one
steals a sum that is considerable from a wealthy person, even though
the latter will not seriously feel the loss. Hence, an injury to a
private person that does not seriously harm him may seriously harm the
community, and be gravely sinful on account of the disastrous
consequences to social order that would follow if such an injury were
not gravely forbidden.

1723. Moral Species of Legal and of Particular Injustice.--These are
distinguished according to the main classes of objects or rights that
are injured or offended (see 199). Hence, there are the following four
kinds of injustice:

(a) injuries to spiritual rights or goods, whether natural or
supernatural (e.g., superstition, idolatry, simony);

(b) injuries to internal goods of soul (e.g., lies) or of body (e.g.,
murder, mutilation);

(c) injuries to external goods, whether incorporeal (e.g., calumny) or
corporeal (e.g., theft, fraud).

1724. Accidental Forms of Injustice.--There are also many accidental
forms of injustice, that is, variations that do not of themselves
change the moral species (see 200).

(a) Thus, as to its manner, injustice is done either positively, by
action (e.g., by stealing from an employer), or negatively, by omission
(e.g., by allowing another to steal from one’s employer). In both cases
the same kind of injustice is committed; for example, he who permits
theft is just as much a thief as if he had stolen himself.

(b) As to its consequences for the injured person, injustice is either
merely injurious or injurious and damaging, according as a strict right
is violated without loss (e.g., adultery from which no child is born),
or with loss to the injured party (e.g., adultery from which a child is
born). The character of the sin is the same in both cases, but in the
latter case restitution is due (cfr. 1199, 1200). The loss (_damnum_)
that results from violation of a strict right (_injuria_) may be in
internal goods (such as salvation, life, health, sanity of mind) or in
external goods (such as reputation, money, property).

(c) As to its consequences for the party who does the injury, injustice
is either profitable to him (as in the case of unjust taking) or
unprofitable (as in the case of unjust damage). The moral species is
the same in either case, for the fact that the unjust person gains by
his injustice does not make the injury greater, and the fact that he
does not gain does not make the injury less.

1725. Injury is not suffered by one who knows and wills an act that is
done contrary to his right (Rule 27 of the Decretals), for such a one
cedes his right. Hence, if a man looks out with a smile while
neighborhood boys take apples from his orchard and the latter take this
as permission, no injustice, material or formal, is done. But the legal
maxim needs interpretation, for the following two conditions are
necessary in order that there be a surrender of right:

(a) the party who consents must be able to surrender his right, since,
if he is not able to do so, his cession is invalid. Hence, one who
kills a person asking for death is unjust to God and to the State; one
who commits adultery with a woman whose husband gives permission is
unjust to the marriage state and the lawful children; one who strikes a
cleric who waived his privilege of canon (_privilegium canonis_) is
unjust to the clerical state; one who takes property from a ward with
the latter’s consent, is unjust to the estate, since the ward has no
authority to alienate it. Many of the martyrs, it is true, wished to
lose their lives at the hands of persecutors, but this meant only that
they consented to the will of God, not that they consented to their own
murder by the tyrants, for they had not the right to give the latter
dominion over their lives;

(b) the party who consents must really will to yield his right, and
hence, if there is error, fraud, fear or violence, the cession is of no
effect. Thus, a buyer who through ignorance takes a defective article
or pays an exorbitant price, a workman who through necessity accepts
less than a living wage, or a man who yields his purse to a burglar at
the point of the revolver, does not surrender his rights, since true
consent is wanting. Similarly, when one follows the counsel of Christ
not to resist spoliation (Matt., v. 40) or when a saintly person
rejoices over injury done him (Heb., x. 34), the intention is not to
surrender rights to the unjust, nor to approve their conduct, but to
practise heroic virtue by patience, humility, forgiveness, etc.

1726. Internal Injustice.--Does internal injustice (i.e., the intention
of injuring another) make an external action unjust?

(a) If the intention makes the external act to be a violation of a
strict right, it also makes the external act unjust. Thus, to take a
book from another’s room is of itself an indifferent action, for there
may be, no violation of right (e.g., when the intention is to borrow),
or there may be such violation (e.g., when the intention is to steal).

(b) If the intention does not make the external act a violation of
strict right, even though that act be harmful to the other party, it
does not make the external act unjust. Hence, if the other party has no
strict right against the external act (e.g., Titus sees the house of
Balbus on fire, but he is not hired to take care of Balbus’ property,
and he gives no alarm in order that the house may burn down) or if the
agent has a strict right to perform the external act (e.g., Claudius, a
judge, condemns Sempronius, according to law, but his chief intention
is the harm he will inflict on the latter), the unjust intention does
not make the external act unjust. But in these cases sin, and even
grave sin, is committed against charity.

1727. Judgment.--Judgment, or the right determination of what is just
and due to others, is the proper act of the virtue of justice, and
hence Aristotle (_Ethics_, lib. V, cap. 7) declares that people take
their disputes to a judge as to justice personified. Judgment is either
public or private. (a) Public judgment is passed by a judge who has the
authority to compel disputing parties to abide by his decisions. (b)
Private judgment is passed by individuals without public authority
concerning the morals or conduct of others.

1728. Since judgment is an act of virtue, it is lawful, and we find
that both in the Old and the New Testament men have been appointed with
authority to judge others. Thus, God ordered that judges be chosen in
all the cities of Israel (Deut., xvi. 18); St. Paul declares that the
judge is the minister of God (Rom., xiii. 4), and from Apostolic times
tribunals have been set up in the Church. But certain conditions are
required for moral goodness, both in those who ask for judgment and in
those who pass judgment.

(a) Thus, those who seek judgment must be actuated by proper motives
and must conduct themselves in a virtuous manner. Our Lord in Matt., v,
teaches that it is better to suffer temporal loss rather than to
contend in judgment from a motive of revenge to the prejudice of one’s
spiritual good, and St. Paul condemns the Corinthians because they gave
scandal by reason of their lawsuits before heathen tribunals and had
recourse to frauds and injuries in their litigation (I Cor., vi. 1
sqq.).

(b) Those who pass judgment must have a good intention, must proceed
according to law, and must decide according to prudence. If the first
condition is wanting, judgment is unjust or otherwise sinful, according
as the judge chooses against the right or is merely prompted by some
human motive (such as hatred, anger, vainglory, avarice); if the second
condition is lacking, judgment, if public, is usurped or illegal, if
the third condition is not had, judgment is rash. But it should be
noted that the Church has condemned the teaching of Wicliff that office
and authority are forfeited by sinners (Denzinger, 595, 597).

1729. First Condition of Righteous Judgment.--The first condition of
righteous judgment is that the purpose of the judge be just and
sincere. But is it possible for judgment to be righteous if the judge
is a bad man--that is, if he is in the state of mortal sin?

(a) If the sin of the judge is public, and judgment is given against a
sin of the same character (e.g., if a notorious thief passes sentence
on another thief), serious scandal is given; for justice is discredited
and an occasion offered for criticism of authority and for lawlessness.
But if the sin is not of the same character as the one condemned (e.g.,
if a notorious thief passes sentence on a murderer), the scandal is not
grave in so far as justice is concerned.

(b) If the sin is not public, it is clear that no scandal is given; and
if the judge is moved by the duty of his office and by zeal for justice
to condemn even the same kind of sin of which he himself is guilty, he
commits no sin whatsoever in so doing (cfr. 1280). But he is guilty of
hypocrisy if he uses the opportunity to pretend a personal
righteousness which he does not possess. It is this that Our Lord
reprobated in the Pharisees, who, although guilty of many and grave
crimes, wished to put to death an adulteress in order that they
themselves might thus shine as immaculate. The words, “Let him that is
without sin among you cast the first stone” (John, viii. 7), condemn
hypocrisy in judges, though they do not require that a judge be free
from all sin. But though sinners may act against sin as lawmakers,
prosecutors, judges, jurymen, police, etc., they should be admonished
by their office to reform themselves according to the words of St.
Paul: “In judging another, thou condemnest thyself, for thou dost the
same things which thou judgest” (Rom., ii. 1).

1730. Second Condition.-The second condition of righteous judgment is
legality, if there is question of judgment in court.

(a) Thus, the judge must have public authority, for, just as laws
cannot be made except by public authority, neither can they be
interpreted except by the same authority (Rom., xiv. 4). Hence,
proceedings that are not held in the proper place, at the proper time,
or in the manner prescribed by law are void, and the same is true if a
court has not jurisdiction over the parties or over the subject-matter
in controversy.

(b) The judge must administer justice according to the law and the
usual method observed in courts, since his office is to interpret, not
to make law or custom (_jus dicere, non facere_). His opinions as
precedents may affect the development and growth of law, and hence he
is especially bound to be faithful to general principles that are
binding on him. If a statute in its operation is found to impede the
just disposition of controversies, judges perform a public service by
indicating this to those who have authority to regulate procedure. If
the application of a law would work injustice, no judge can in
conscience pronounce sentence according to that law; but there are many
cases recognized in jurisprudence in which courts of equity afford
relief to rights that cannot be defended or protected in courts of law,
and in cases of this kind the judge should be guided by recognized
principles of natural justice and the rules of his court.

1731. Third Condition.--The third condition of righteous judgment is
that the sentence or decision be prudent or well-founded. Thus, in a
judicial process the facts of a case must be examined and the rules of
evidence be observed in judging the meaning of the facts. Since rash
judgment is a sin committed, not only externally and in public, but
also and especially internally and in private conclusions formed about
the character or deeds of others, and since it is one of the commonest
of sins, it will be well to explain its nature somewhat fully.

(a) It is an internal sin, and so it differs from external acts against
the neighbor; but calumny, detraction, and unjust sentence are its
outward expressions.

(b) Rash judgment is an internal sin of decision in which something is
affirmed or denied mentally about a neighbor, and so it differs from a
mere representation or thought. This distinction is important for
scrupulous persons who think that mere suggestions against others that
flash through their minds are rash judgments. These suggestions are a
very common temptation, and, if repelled, are an occasion of merit;
they become sinful only when entertained with pleasure.

(c) Rash judgment is a decision unfavorable to another in matters of
character or honor. Thus, it differs from favorable decisions (as when
without reason one holds that another is virtuous or has extraordinary
merit), and from unfavorable decisions on matters other than character
or honor (as when one concludes that a neighbor is mentally or
physically deficient, and these defects are not connected with
depravity nor considered as ignominious), and from unfavorable
decisions that relate to sin but are not personal (as when one thinks
that an expression used by an ignorant man is blasphemous, but passes
no judgment on the state of conscience of the man).

(d) Rash judgment is a decision that expresses conviction, and not mere
supposition. Thus, it differs from the prudential attitude by which one
assumes for the sake of security that a stranger is to be distrusted,
since he may be dishonest.

(e) Rash judgment is a certain conviction or judgment, that is, one
which holds its own view as true and certain and does not consider the
opposite of its view as worthy of consideration. Thus, it differs from
doubt (that is, a state in which the mind is suspended between the
unfavorable view and its opposite, and does not incline to one more
than the other), from suspicion (that is, a state in which the mind
inclines to the unfavorable view, but does not assent to it as being
either probable or certain), and from opinion (that is, a state in
which the mind assents to the unfavorable view as being probably true,
but admits that it may be untrue). These various forms of mental
reaction were treated in 654 sqq.

(f) Rash judgment is rash, that is, a belief based on insufficient
authority, or an inference that is really groundless or not well drawn
from premises. Thus, if one judges that one’s neighbor is a thief,
because this was told one by an honest and well-informed person, the
judgment is prudent; but, if one judges this on the word of a person
who is unreliable or who has no knowledge of the facts, the judgment is
imprudent. Again, if one judges that it is certain that one’s neighbor
is a thief, because one has evidence that removes all doubt, the
judgment is prudent; but if the evidence is merely probable, an opinion
based on it is prudent, but a judgment based on it is imprudent. It is
not rash to hold that the majority of mankind are lost, or that the
present generation is not as good as the generation that preceded, if
one has good reasons for such beliefs; but a sweeping and all-inclusive
pessimism in such matters is unwarranted.

1732. The reasons for a judgment may be sufficient for something else,
but insufficient for the judgment actually formed.

(a) Thus, they may be reasons sufficient for judging that one kind or
degree of sin has been committed, but insufficient as regards another
kind or degree of sin. For example, if one breaks the lock of another’s
desk, there is an argument for willful trespass, but this alone does
not prove larceny or the intent to steal.

(b) They may be sufficient for doubt and insufficient for suspicion,
sufficient for suspicion and insufficient for opinion, or sufficient
for opinion and insufficient for judgment.

1733. Rash Judgment.--Opinion, suspicion, and doubt are also rash, if
there is no sufficient reason to warrant them.

(a) Thus, if there are no probable reasons for an unfavorable opinion,
it is rash to form such an opinion. For example, the mere fact that two
men have frequent and whispered conference together does not make it
likely that they are plotting evil.

(b) If there are no sufficient reasons for inclining towards an
unfavorable opinion or for suspending all assent, suspicion and doubt
are rash. For example, the mere fact that a man enters a house when the
owners are absent is no reason to suspect him of dishonest purposes, or
even to have doubts, if he is of good reputation and enters the house
in daylight and in a usual way.

1734. Sinfulness of Rash Judgment.--Rash judgment strictly understood,
then, is a firm assent of the mind, based on insufficient data, and
given to the view that a neighbor is or has been guilty of sin.

(a) From its nature this sin is mortal, for it consists in a contempt
for, and an injury to, what is regarded as one of the chief goods of
man, namely, the favorable opinion of him that is entertained by
others. It is denounced in Scripture as an injury to the law itself
(“He that judgeth his brother judgeth the law,” James, iv. 11), and as
meriting condemnation (“Judge not, and you will not be judged, condemn
not and you will not be condemned,” Luke, vi. 37).

(b) From the imperfection of the act or from the lightness of the
matter rash judgment may be only a venial sin, as when unfounded
suspicions arise in the mind without advertence to their sinfulness, or
when one rashly judges in some small matter (e.g., that another person
stole a pin or a cent).

1735. Rash judgment is not mortally sinful in an individual case unless
the following conditions are present:

(a) there must be perfect deliberation, that is, full advertence to the
judgment itself and to its sinfulness and gravity (see 175). There is
no full advertence to the sinfulness and gravity of the judgment,
however, if one does not perceive at least in a confused manner that
one is deciding in one’s mind without sufficient reason that one’s
neighbor is guilty of serious sin, and is thereby doing the latter a
great injury. But it is not necessary that the rash judgment continue
for a considerable time, for the malice depends on the evil done, not
on the length of time it has lasted;

(b) there must be serious rashness, for the sinfulness of the judgment
rests on its rashness. Hence, if one judges a sin to be certain which
is very probable or almost certain, there is no great imprudence and
therefore no serious sin;

(c) there must be grave injury and contempt, for in these the malice of
rash judgment consists. Hence, if one judges that another is a drunkard
and neither the latter person nor others in the same place regard
drunkenness as very dishonorable, there is no great harm done.
Similarly, if one judges that some indeterminate individual of a
multitude or group is a rascal, or that a stranger whom one sees on the
street late at night is out on an evil errand, or that an unknown party
seen from a distance is on his way to a disreputable meeting, it does
not seem that there is great injury done; for one does not greatly
resent lack of esteem in others to whom one is not known.

1736. Rules on Perfect Advertence to Rashness of Judgment.--(a) There
is perfect advertence when one actually perceives that the reasons for
one’s unfavorable judgment are very insufficient; (b) there is perfect
advertence when one virtually perceives the serious insufficiency of
the reasons, that is, when one could and should perceive it, but is
vincibly blind to it (see 30, 31) on account of some passion wilfully
indulged, such as hatred or envy of the person judged. In these cases
one judges with negligence and precipitancy in a serious matter (see
Imprudence).

1737. Rules on Insufficiency of Reasons for Unfavorable Judgments.--(a)
Those authorities for sin are not sufficiently trustworthy whose
reliability is of inferior worth (e.g., because they are enemies of the
person against whom they speak, or calumniators, or gossipers, or of
bad reputation, etc.), or whose story does not merit the credence they
claim for it (e.g., because the person against whom they speak is known
as upright). If both the authorities for a story and the person against
whom they speak are equal in good qualities, there is sufficient reason
for doubts, but nothing more.

(b) Those arguments for sin are not sufficient which create for what is
concluded only a slight presumption (see 658), that is, which offer
facts that are never, or seldom, or not necessarily causes or effects
or indications of sin. Thus, it is rash to judge that a mature man and
woman conversing together in a dignified manner and in a public and
open place are discussing obscene matters; or that a respectable person
whose face is flushed, or whose hand trembles, or who slips on the
street, has been imbibing too freely; or that a man climbing into a
second story on a frequented highway and in broad daylight is a
burglar. This rule may be expressed in other words by saying that
reasons for drawing unfavorable conclusions are insufficient when in
view of the circumstances and time, place, persons, deed, etc., no
prudent person would consider the conclusions as warranted.

1738. Rules on Gravity of Matter in Rash Judgments.--(a) From the
nature of the thing ascribed to the other person, only judgments that
mortal sin has been committed are grave matter; for only mortal sin is
in itself a grave reproach.

(b) From the circumstances of persons or acts, rash judgment of mortal
sin may be only venial; for it sometimes happens that certain kinds of
serious sins are not considered very ignominious in certain persons or
conditions. Thus, in some places it is considered honorable for
soldiers or students to have wounded adversaries in duels; some persons
of a rough kind are proud of their proficiency in blasphemy or
obscenity; where drunkenness is common, it is not considered as very
disgraceful.

(c) From the circumstances of persons or acts, rash judgments of venial
sin or of what is not sin at all may be mortal; for to those from whom
much is expected slighter defects may be causes of great disgrace.
Thus, it is very dishonoring to the parties concerned to think that a
prelate is an habitual liar, that a nun visits too often, that a public
official is illegitimate or stupid or afflicted with syphilis, and
therefore unworthy of his position.

1739. The Moral Species of the Sin of Rash Judgment.--(a) It is a sin
against justice, because it infringes the strict right of the neighbor
that he be not judged guilty of evil without sufficient reason, and
that he be not held worthy of contempt until he has clearly forfeited
the right to respect. It is true that judgment as here taken is an
internal act, and that it was said above that only external acts form
the subject-matter of justice; but internal acts that are referred
immediately to external acts, as concupiscence tends to lust and anger
to injury, may be classed with these external acts. Hence, internal
judgment naturally leads up to external judgment, and so it pertains to
justice, just as the desire to steal is unjust and the desire to make
restitution is just.

(b) It is a sin against charity, because it does not practise
benevolence (“Charity thinketh no evil,” I Cor., xiii. 5), and is
usually associated with ill-will or envy. He who judges rashly does not
love his neighbor as himself, for he does not observe the rule not to
do to others what he would not have done to himself.

1740. The moral species of rash judgment is not changed according to
the species of sin attributed to another (such as heresy, dishonesty,
impurity), and these circumstances of the rash judgment need not be
mentioned in confession.

1741. The Moral Species of Rash Opinion, Suspicion and Doubt.--Do the
conclusions given above on the theological species of rash judgment
apply also to rash opinion, suspicion, and doubt?

(a) Some theologians answer in the affirmative, and argue that the same
grave injury and contempt of the neighbor is found in these sins as in
rash judgment, and that Scripture makes no distinction between the one
and the other. On the contrary, they say, murmurings, detractions, and
hatreds are caused oftener by doubts, suspicions, and opinions, since
firm and certain judgments are not so often formed; and moreover there
is no one who would not prefer to be judged certainly guilty of
fornication than to be doubted or suspected of more heinous crimes,
such as incest or sodomy.

(b) Other theologians answer in the negative, and argue that suspicion
and doubt do not inflict a severe harm, since they stop short of firm
decision of the mind and so are incomplete injuries which diminish
rather than take away the esteem due to another. But the defenders of
the affirmative reply that, while opinion, suspicion and doubt are
incomplete as regards assent, they are not incomplete as regards
deliberation and consent, and so can be mortally sinful, as is seen in
the case of doubts against faith (see 840 sqq.).

(c) Still other theologians hold that rash opinions, suspicions and
doubts are from their nature mortal sins on account of the arguments
for the first opinion, but that in actual experience they are usually
venial on account of the imperfection of the act (since on account of
human frailty doubts, suspicions, or evil opinions of others can easily
arise before they are noticed), or the lightness of the matter (for
there is rarely one of these mental states without some reason that
seems to be at least approximately a justification). But it seems
likely that rash judgments themselves are seldom mortal sins, since the
conditions for mortal sin are not often realized in them.

1742. The Chief Reasons for Rash Conclusions about the Character of
Others.--(a) A first reason is that the person who draws the conclusion
is bad himself. Evil-doers are very prone to suspect others of evil,
for sin seems so delightful to them that they think others must find
the same pleasure in it: “The fool when he walketh in the way, since he
himself is a fool, esteemeth all men fools” (Eccles., x. 3).

(b) A second reason is that the wish is often father to the thought.
Thus, if one hates or envies another or is angered against him, even
trifles light as air will suffice to make one judge him guilty of sin.
Just as love blinds an infatuated lover to the sins or crimes of the
object of his affection, so does prejudice give a distorted vision that
can see nothing but evil in the object of its dislike.

(c) A third reason for rash views unfavorable to others is long
experience in dealing with human nature. Thus, old men sometimes become
not merely cautious, which is reasonable, but unduly suspicious.
Similarly, those who have encountered many trials or disappointments in
life often become cynical and misanthropic, and to them the actions of
all their fellowmen appear either evil or at least spoiled by an evil
purpose.

1743. Rash Doubts.--Doubt about the probity of others is sinful, when
there are no sufficient reason for it; for example, it would be
unreasonable to suspend judgment about a man of excellent reputation
because a well-known calumniator had spoken against him. But a doubt
may be reasonable, as when a person has had a good reputation for
honesty but a reliable witness declares that he is dishonest. In such a
case should one decide for the innocence or for the guilt of the party
called into doubt, or should one suspend judgment on the matter?

(a) It is not lawful to interpret reasonable doubts in a sense
unfavorable to another person, for this would amount to rash judgment,
since the reasons are sufficient for doubt but not for decision. Hence,
it would be wrong to believe that a person of good repute was a thief,
because another person of good repute said so.

(b) It is lawful to suspend judgment in case of reasonable doubts, if
there is no obligation of deciding one way or the other, for in so
doing one does no injury either to one’s own intelligence (since the
doubt is reasonable) or to the honor of another person (since, as
supposed, there is no obligation of judging positively in his favor).
Just as there is no duty of making acts of love of our neighbor on
every occasion, neither is there a duty of deciding doubts to his
advantage on every occasion, or of having any opinion about him
whatever. Some authors do not admit this, but the common teaching is
against them.

(c) It is not lawful to suspend judgment, but the reasonable doubt must
be resolved in a favorable sense, if there is an obligation or a wish
to decide one way or the other; otherwise one would decide in an
unfavorable sense and be guilty of rash judgment. This is what is meant
by the well-known maxim that doubts about the character of a neighbor
should be settled in favor of the neighbor. Hence, if one were in
serious danger of forming a rash judgment and could not otherwise
overcome the temptation, a suspension of judgment should give place to
favorable judgment. It is true that one may be frequently in error by
thus judging well of mankind, since man is inclined to evil from his
youth (Gen., viii. 21) and the number of fools is infinite (Eccles., i.
15). But it is a less evil to fall into the speculative error of taking
a bad man for good than by adopting another course to fall into the
practical error of becoming bad oneself by violating a law of prudence,
justice and charity; and it is less harmful that many sinners should
receive more credit than they deserve, than that one just man should be
deprived of the good opinion that belongs to him. Pseudo-Ambrose (Apol.
ii, David, c. 2, n. 5) says that those who judge others rashly often
become worse by this act than the persons they judge; and St. Thomas
remarks that favorable opinions of others harm no one, whereas
unfavorable opinions are a wrong to innocent persons.

1744. The interpretation of doubts in a favorable sense does not mean
that one may not take into consideration the possibility of danger or
deception and use remedies or precautions. This course is not rash
judgment, for even when one judges that another person is good, one
knows that the judgment is possibly wrong, and therefore cannot be
entirely relied on for external guidance.

(a) It is lawful, therefore, to act as if one did have a bad opinion of
another when there is a possibility of harm that must be guarded
against. Thus, a father may forbid his children to keep company with
other children, for these latter may be corrupt; an employer may keep
his money under lock and key, because servants may be dishonest; a
traveller may carry weapons, because the inhabitants among whom he
travels may be treacherous. Even though appearances are favorable, one
may be on one’s guard, for appearances are often deceptive.

(b) It is not lawful, however, to protect oneself or others in such a
needlessly conspicuous or offensive manner as to sadden or defame the
other party against whom one takes the precautions. Thus, it would be
unjust and uncharitable to go about ostentatiously locking safes and
drawers whenever a certain person appeared, for this would be
equivalent to saying that he was a thief.




Art. 3: THE SUBJECTIVE PARTS OF JUSTICE: COMMUTATIVE AND DISTRIBUTIVE
JUSTICE

(_Summa Theologica_, II-II, qq. 61, 62.)

1745. The Three Species of Justice.--The subjective parts of a virtue
are those that partake of its essence and that are the subordinate
species into which it may be distinguished, as prudence is divided into
individual, domestic and political (see 1639). There are three species
of justice, and their division is taken from the threefold relation
that exists in a whole.

(a) Thus, legal justice directs the parts to respect the rights of the
whole, and it is exercised by all those who promote the common good of
a society by fulfilling well the duties which pertain to their position
and rank in the society.

(b) Distributive justice regulates the whole in reference to the parts,
and it is exercised by all those who seek for such a distribution of
the common things of a society as accords with the inequalities of
merit and ability of the members. Hence, distributive justice is found
not only in the heads of a state, or family, or other body, but also in
the subordinates who are content with the fair distributions made by
the heads.

(c) Commutative justice orders the relations between the parts, and it
is exercised by all who practise fair dealing with their equals, that
is, by states with states, families with families, societies with like
societies, individuals with individuals; or with those who act as their
equals, as when a society acting as a moral person makes a contract
with one of its members as another moral person.

1746. Resemblance between Distributive and Commutative Justice.--The
general likeness between distributive and commutative justice may be
summed up as follows:

(a) they have the same remote matter, since both alike are concerned
with external things, persons or works. Thus, things such as goods of
fortune may be distributed by the community to its members, or may be
exchanged by individuals between them; labors to be performed may be
assigned by the community or may be agreed on by private persons
through contract;

(b) they have the same general form, since both alike seek to impress
equality on the matter with which they deal, by rendering in these
things to every one his due, and by making man’s actions towards his
neighbor to follow the mean of reason and of the thing (see 1711).

1747. The Special Differences between Distributive and Commutative
Justice.--(a) They differ in their proximate matter, that is, in the
operations by which use is made of external things, persons or works;
for while distributive justice acts through distribution (or division),
appointment, or assignment among many, commutative justice acts through
exchange, or transfer from one to another between two persons.

(b) They differ in their special form; for distributive justice seeks
equality and the golden mean, according to proportion, while
commutative justice seeks the same according to quantity (see 1712).
Distributive justice does not treat parties as equals, but gives to
each one according to his personal worth--to the more deserving the
superior positions and high salaries, to the less deserving the
inferior positions and lower salaries. Commutative justice, on the
other hand, treats the parties as equal, and decrees that debts must be
paid and injuries repaired, even though payment or reparation must be
made by a good man to a bad man, and that the recompense must equal the
difference created between the parties by the debt or the injury.

1748. Commutations of Commutative Justice.--There are various kinds of
commutations or exchanges used by commutative justice, but they do not
create new species of justice, since they are only accidental modes of
the act of giving the equivalent of what one receives. They are
classified as follows:

(a) involuntary commutations, which are those in which reparation is
made for the use against the will of another of the things, persons, or
works that pertain to him. Thus, the property of another is used
unlawfully by secret theft and by open robbery; the person of another
is injured by murder and wounds; the honor of another by secret calumny
and detraction, by open false testimony and contumely; the rights of
another to persons are used unlawfully by adultery with his wife, by
seduction of his servant, and the like;

(b) voluntary commutations, which are those in which compensation is
made for a benefit that one derived with the owner’s consent from
something that was his, or in which one gives or returns to another
what is his. They include the various forms of contracts, or agreements
between two parties in which the consent of both to the same proposal
is externally manifested and obligation is produced to abide by the
terms of agreement.

1749. Forms of Contract.--The chief forms of contract are the following:

(a) gratuitous contracts, which are those that confer advantage on only
one of the contractants, or those in which no payment or compensation
for his acts or goods is made to one party by the other party. They
include unilateral contracts, which produce obligation on one side only
(e.g., a promise, gift, testament), and bilateral contracts, which
produce obligation on both sides. The bilateral contracts are also
known as bailments, or understandings whereby a thing or business is
transferred from one person to another in trust, on condition that a
return will be made to the owner, They include the following contracts:
loans, in which return must be made of the identical things borrowed
(_commodatum_), or of a thing similar in kind (_mutuum_); deposit, in
which a thing must be returned after safekeeping (_depositum_); an
agency, in which one conducts the business of another with the
obligation of making returns, either from express contract (_mandatum_)
or from imputed agreement (_negotiorum gestio_). In _commodatum_ and
_mutuum_ the advantage is had by the bailee, in the other three by the
bailor;

(b) onerous contracts of certain event, which are those that confer an
advantage on both parties, and in which the thing agreed on is certain
and definite. They include contracts in which one party transfers
ownership to the other (e.g., buying and selling, barter, loan at
interest, contracts for annuities, stocks and bonds) or useful dominion
(e.g., lease of property, contractor’s agreement, hire of labor), and
contracts in which both parties transfer rights to a moral person of
which they are the members (partnership);

(c) onerous contracts of uncertain event, which are those that confer
advantage on both parties, but in which the thing agreed on is
contingent and uncertain. Examples are insurance, wager, gaming
contracts, lottery, and stock market speculation;

(d) subsidiary contracts, which are those that are made in order to
give security to principal contracts to which they are annexed or for
whose sake they are made. Such are guaranty and surety, pledge and
pawn, and mortgage.

1750. The Equality Sought by Commutative Justice.--The equality in
quantity sought by commutative justice means that in involuntary
transactions the offender must suffer a punishment equal to the injury
he offered or must pay a recompense equal to the damage he caused, and
that in voluntary transactions one must give the equal of what one
receives. But this can be understood in two ways.

(a) Thus, equality may be taken for identity in species, in the sense
that the same kind of thing must be taken or returned (e.g., a life for
a life, an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth). This kind of equality
will do in some instances, as in cases of exchange of goods, but as a
rule it would not be fair to both parties. Thus, if a subject strikes a
ruler, he is not sufficiently punished if he receives the same kind of
blow, for the injury to the ruler is greater on account of his office;
when a man steals a cow or a sheep, he is not sufficiently punished if
he restores what he took, for he would suffer no loss and the community
whose peace he had offended would go without satisfaction (Exod., xxii.
1); if one gives one’s cow for another’s cow, or if a shoemaker trades
his products for the clothes made by a tailor, the exchange may be
unfair, since the thing given on one side may be better than that given
on the other side.

(b) Equality may be understood as identity in value, in the sense that
the thing taken or returned has the same quantity of goodness or
excellence as the thing received, no matter how they differ in species.
This kind of equality must be observed as a rule both in involuntary
and voluntary transactions. Thus, for injury done to merchandise
payment is made in money, or vice versa. If equality in value is not
possible, because the good for which one owes is on a higher plane than
the good which one is able to give, it seems that justice requires one
to approximate equality as far as possible, and hence mayhem or
defamation should be compensated for by the goods of fortune (see 1802
and 2090).

1751. Restitution.--Justice not only commands that one pay or give back
what is due in voluntary transactions, but also that one repair injury
which one has caused in involuntary transactions. But the four acts of
payment, restoration, satisfaction, and restitution must not be
confused.

(a) Thus, payment is the lawful bestowal by one person on another
person of something of value in return for some other thing of value.
It is clear that payment differs from satisfaction and restitution,
since it supposes no act of injustice done.

(b) Restoration is the return to another of his property of which one
had just possession, as when a borrower gives back to the lender, or a
depositee to the depositor. This also differs from satisfaction and
restitution, since it is a voluntary transaction (see 1792, 1796).

1752. Differences between Satisfaction and Restitution.--(a) They
differ as to their principle or cause, since satisfaction is due for
injury to honor, restitution for injury to goods by unjust detention or
unjust damage. Hence, a person who has dishonored another (e.g., by
disrespect) is bound to satisfaction; a person who has injured another
(e.g., by destroying his goods) is bound to restitution; a person who
has both injured and dishonored another (e.g., by adding insults to
robbery) is bound to restitution and satisfaction.

(b) Satisfaction and restitution differ as to their term or object,
since satisfaction is chiefly concerned with the person to whom amends
must be made (as by apology), while restitution is chiefly concerned
with the thing which must be given back in itself or in its equivalent.

1753. When Restitution Is Due.--Restitution is the act by which one
places another in renewed possession or ownership or chance of
ownership of that which is owed to him because it is his by reason of a
strict right _in re_ or _ad rem_; in other words, it restores the
equality that existed before an injury was done to the goods of another.

(a) Thus, restitution is not due for violation of virtues other than
justice, because these virtues are not concerned with strict
obligations and rights. Repentance and satisfaction are due for all
sins, but they are not the same thing as restitution. Hence, one is not
bound to restitution if one refused to help with alms a person in
extreme need, or if, not being obliged to it by office, one neglected
to extinguish a fire or to prevent a robbery. These are sins against
charity, not against justice.

(b) Restitution is not due for violations of virtues that pertain to
justice but do not confer strict rights, and hence it is only a
violation of commutative justice that entails the obligation of
restitution. Thus, if one has been surly or ungrateful, no legal right
has been violated and no restitution is due.

1754. Does Distributive Injustice Oblige to Restitution?--(a) If only
distributive injustice is committed (e. g., if a parent gives his
children all necessaries but shows special favor to those that are less
deserving), there is no duty of restitution, for there is no strict
claim to special favors. (b) If commutative injustice accompanies the
distributive injustice (e.g., if a ruler acts against his agreement to
give the best position to the person who passes the best examination),
there is a duty of restitution, for there is a strict claim to rights
under contract.

1755. Distributive Justice and the Violation of Strict
Rights.--Injustice in distribution is frequently accompanied by
injustice in transaction on account of some strict right violated, and
hence by reason of the latter injustice there will be a duty of
restitution (see 1708, 1808).

(a) Thus, distributive injustice is accompanied by violation of a
strict right of society when an unfair distribution is contrary to
agreement made with the community (e.g., when one is appointed or paid
especially to make fair distributions, or the law or contract expressly
imposes this obligation), or when it causes harm to the community which
one is bound _ex officio_ to prevent (e.g., when one appoints as public
physician or surgeon a person who is entirely unfitted for the post).

(b) Distributive injustice is accompanied by violation of a strict
right of an individual when it is against contract (e.g., when a person
undertakes to select the best statue or portrait presented in a
contest, but chooses one that is inferior), or when it inflicts loss on
a private person (e.g., when a tax assessor requires more than is due
from some persons, or an examiner admits to a school which receives
only a limited number an unworthy candidate and thus excludes a worthy
one, or a board rejects a worthy candidate as unworthy).

1756. Commutative Justice and Unfair Awards of Prizes.--Unfair awards
of prizes in competitions are not violations of commutative justice
unless the following conditions are present:

(a) the promise of award must be given as a contract binding in
justice, for if the promisor intends only to bind himself in fidelity,
the promisee obtains no strict right. Hence, an unfair distribution is
not against commutative justice if a competition has not the character
of a real contest or of an onerous compact to reward the person who
surpasses his rivals, but is rather an opportunity to compete for the
free bounty of the promisor (e.g., if the organizer of an entertainment
offers a prize for the prettiest baby), or an encouragement to useful
industry (e.g., a first prize for the best garden in a neighborhood).
On the contrary, if the promise is part of an onerous contract, the
promisor is bound in justice and the promisee obtains a strict right.
This is the case when the competition has the character of a real
contest, in which the contestants must undergo special labor,
preparation, expense or trouble, etc., in order that the award be given
to the most meritorious;

(b) the thing promised as subject of award must be the prize, and not
merely a claim or right to be considered for the prize. Hence, if an
examination is held in order that a number of worthy persons may be
listed for future vacancies in offices or dignities, the person who
passes as most worthy has no strict right to be given an office or
dignity, but only to be considered for it.

1757. Has a person who passes as most worthy in an examination held in
order to fill a vacant post a strict right to receive the post?

(a) According to the common opinion he has a strict right, because
there is at least an implicit contract to the effect that the position
will be given to the most worthy, since the examination is competitive.

(b) According to some authorities he has no strict right, because
public positions are not to be regarded as rewards of merit, and the
examination is not part of a contract but is only a means used by a
superior to assist him in acting according to distributive justice.
Nevertheless, even in this opinion an unjust award is a sin, and at
times a grave sin, against distributive justice, and may accidentally
be joined with commutative injustice (see 1755).

(c) Under the civil service method, or merit system, of appointment,
the appointing official is bound by law to observe the rules of the
civil service commission. The usual procedure is for the commission to
submit the names of the three persons highest on the examination list.
Position on the list is determined by competitive examination plus
preferential points for veterans, experience in jobs, etc. (On the
whole the preferential system does not seem to involve any injustice to
those who do not receive the preference.) One of the three must be
chosen for the first vacancy; for the second vacancy the remaining two,
together with the next highest eligible, are proposed. Grave injustice
against distributive justice would be done in not proceeding according
to the legal method, and some degree of injustice might be done to an
eligible who is illegally removed from a list, passed over, etc. Of the
three highest eligibles no one has a strict right to the vacant post,
but solely the right to be seriously considered.

1758. What should be said of a superior who would promote undeserving
persons to ecclesiastical benefices?

(a) As regards guilt, it is a mortal sin to confer a benefice on one
who is unworthy, or even (when there is question of a benefice to which
the care of souls is attached) on one who is less worthy (see Canon
459, Sec. 1).

(b) As regards restitution, there is an obligation of reparation to the
community, when it is made to suffer loss, and of compensation to an
individual who is passed over in spite of his strict right (see three
preceding paragraphs).

1759. The Obligation of Restitution.--(a) The obligation is both of
natural and divine law. Reason itself dictates that everyone should
receive his due, and revelation expressly commands restitution, as when
it declares that he who has injured his neighbor’s field or vineyard
must restore according to the damage done (Exod., xxii. 5).

(b) The obligation is both of means and of precept, for without
restitution the offender does not obtain pardon from God (Ezech.,
xxxiii. 13 sqq,; Tob., ii. 20 sqq.). Hence, one who has seriously
injured his neighbor cannot be saved unless he actually makes
restitution, if he is able, or intends to make restitution when
possible, if here and now he is not able to do so. A debtor who makes
no effort to make restitution (e.g., one who refuses to deny himself
luxuries, to curtail his expenses, to leave restitution money in his
will), cannot be said to have a sincere intention of fulfilling his
duty. But it is not true that a person who dies in venial sin on
account of restitution neglected must remain in Purgatory till all the
restitution is made; for this would make the punishment depend on the
negligence of the heirs or on accident.

(c) The obligation is grave if the damage (absolute or relative) and
the fault were both grave, for restitution is an obligation of strict
justice (see 1753); the obligation is light if both the damage and the
fault were light, for the injury then is light.

1760. Duties of Confessors about the Obligation of Restitution.--(a) As
to confession, the penitent is obliged to mention the number of sins
committed against the duty of restitution, if there have been many acts
of intention not to pay (see 202 sqq.); but as a rule those who have
for a long time continued in sinful neglect of the duty of restitution
have committed only one sin thereby, or else they do not apprehend
their duty of mentioning the distinct internal acts, and hence
confessors are advised not to question overmuch about this.

(b) As to absolution, the penitent lacks true contrition if he is under
a serious obligation to make restitution and is wilfully opposed to the
performance of this duty at all or at the proper time. Such a one may
not be absolved. But the confessor should not admonish a penitent of
the duty of restitution, if the penitent is in good faith and the
admonition would only do harm. If the obligation of restitution is only
light, absolution may not be refused, and prudence will often advise
that no admonition about the obligation be given.

1761. There are a number of situations possible when damage done is
grave and culpability slight.

(a) Thus, the damage may be entirely involuntary, as when the offender
could not foresee it and did not wish it (e.g., Sempronius commits a
venial sin by speaking harshly to Claudius, whom he likes, but the
latter is so depressed at this that he commits suicide). In this case
there is clearly no obligation of restitution.

(b) The damage may be voluntary only interpretatively, as when the
offender could not foresee it, but would have willed it had he foreseen
it (e.g., Sempronius is glad when he learns that Claudius committed
suicide, but would be much surprised if he knew that a harsh word of
his caused it). In this case according to some there is a grave duty of
restitution, because internal guilt and external damage are present;
but others, with greater probability, deny the duty of restitution, for
the damage was not caused by the internal sin of hate, which is not
effective of itself, nor by the external harsh word, which was an
occasion rather than a cause (see 1447, 1763).

(c) The damage may be voluntary directly, as when the offender wills it
in itself (e.g., Titus steals a considerable sum from Balbus, but he is
invincibly ignorant and thinks that the wealth of Balbus makes the sin
only venial), or the damage done is voluntary indirectly (e.g., Caius
is guilty of slight carelessness in guarding his cattle, and they get
into a neighbor’s garden and cause great damage to crops; Caius foresaw
some damage, but he could not have foreseen the actual grave damage
that was done). About these cases there are various opinions, which
will be given in 1765.

1762. The Roots of Restitution.--The roots or sources of restitution
are usually reduced to two, according to the following two general
kinds of injury inflicted on others:

(a) unjust damage, which is the loss inflicted, on the goods of
another, without advantage to the offender, as in murder or
incendiarism;

(b) unjust possession, which is the loss inflicted on another by the
possession of his goods without his consent or against his will, to the
advantage of the offender, as when a murderer steals from his victim,
or an incendiary gets the insurance from the house he destroyed.

1763. Unjust damage that obliges to restitution is only an act (or
omission) that is both injurious (being a guilty violation of another’s
strict right) and productive of loss. Hence the following conditions:

(a) the act must be objectively unjust, a contravention of a strict
right _in re_ or _ad rem_ (see 1695 sqq.), for example, stealing or
keeping back the wages due an employee. But it is objectively unjust to
deprive another of a non-strict right (e.g., the right of a beggar to
an alms) by unjust means, such as force, fraud, calumny, etc. If a
neighbor is not hindered from his strict right and unfair means are not
employed, there is no objective injustice (e.g., when a merchant
improves his place of business and thus draws away customers from a
rival merchant);

(b) the act must be efficaciously unjust or the true cause of the loss
which another suffers, for one is not responsible for what does not
proceed from one’s act. An act is not efficaciously unjust, therefore,
if it is only the occasion of damage (e.g., Titus steals and Balbus
imitates him; Claudius steals, and on account of circumstantial
evidence not arranged by Claudius, Sempronius is arrested and sentenced
to prison), or if it is only a _conditio sine qua non_ (e.g., Caius
gives whisky to Julius, who needs its stimulation to nerve himself for
a crime), or if it is only an accidental cause (e.g., Titus steals a
small sum of money from a miser, and the latter, to the great surprise
of Titus, becomes insane);

(c) the act must be subjectively unjust, that is, culpable and
imputable; for one is not bound to satisfy for acts that are inculpable
or not imputable (see 97 sqq.). There must be either theological
culpability, that is, the intention to harm another, which is sinful
before God (e.g., he who purposely sets fire to his neighbor’s barn),
or juridical culpability, that is, carelessness which causes injury to
the legal right of another (e.g., he who lights a fire near his
neighbor’s buildings and by his absent-mindedness permits the buildings
to catch fire).

1764. Some Causes That Remove or Diminish Theological Culpability.--(a)
Mental derangement or passion (e.g., great fear or anger) may make an
injurious act unintentional and so take away natural liability for
restitution (see 40 sqq.), but the civil law does not always admit the
excuse, and after sentence the offender is bound to pay.

(b) According to some authorities, error about the extent of the harm
that is being done, if invincible, excuses from restitution for damage
that was not apprehended, as when a thief throws a gem into the ocean,
thinking that it is only an imitation gem. But the offender would be
held for the entire loss, if sentenced.

(e) Error about the person injured, even though invincible, probably
does not excuse from restitution, if the intention was to harm a class
(e.g., Sempronius intends to kill Balbus, because the latter is a
policeman, but by accident he kills another policeman) or an individual
(e.g., Caius intends to kill Titus and by mistake kills Claudius, the
twin-brother of Titus).

(d) Error about the thing injured, even though invincible, probably
does not excuse from restitution, if the intention was to do damage
(e.g., Julius puts poison in a plate in order to kill his neighbor’s
dog, but the cat takes the poison and is killed).

1765. Restitution for Damages That Are Only Venially Sinful but
Seriously Harmful.--(a) When one injurious act is committed (as when
through slight carelessness one sets fire to one’s neighbor’s chicken
coop), some deny, but others affirm, the duty of restitution, while
still others distinguish according to the full or only partial
advertence to the sinfulness of what is done. Of those who hold for
restitution, some think that all the damage should be repaired, since
all was caused; but others think that it suffices to repair part, since
the culpability was limited.

(b) If several injurious acts, which taken singly are slight but taken
together are serious, were done to the same person (e.g., a waiter
breaking dishes at various times while working for the same
proprietor), restitution is due as soon as the sinner realizes the
amount of harm he has caused; but it is disputed whether the obligation
is grave or light. If the injuries were done to different persons
(e.g., a boy breaking windows in many houses in the neighborhood),
there is more probably only a light obligation.

1766. Restitution on Account of Law for Damages That Are Only
Juridically Culpable.--(a) Before sentence of court there is no
obligation of restitution, for it would be too heavy a burden to impose
this in view of the absentmindedness of so many persons and the
numerous distractions one encounters.

(b) After sentence of court there is an obligation of restitution, for
the law which gives the court a right to impose it is reasonable, since
juridical fault is often accompanied by theological fault, and moreover
men will thus be led to a greater prudence in the care of their own
goods and in respect for those of others.

1767. Restitution on Account of Contract for Damages That Are Only
Juridically Culpable.--(a) Express contract obliges to restitution even
for light fault (i.e., the omission of precautions taken by the more
prudent), or most light fault (i.e., the omission of precautions taken
by the most prudent only), or, if so stipulated, for no fault at all.

(b) Implied contract perhaps also obliges to restitution for juridical
fault, for it seems that equity requires one to make good the losses
caused by the absence of a care which the contract took for granted.
Thus, if the advantage is with the bailor alone (e.g., gratuitous
deposit), ordinary care is expected and the bailee is not held in
danger to prefer the bailor’s goods to his own; if the advantage is
with both parties (e.g., onerous deposit or loan), it seems that more
than ordinary care is demanded and that usually the obligor may give
preference to his own goods.

1768. Restitution for Careless Discharge of Fiduciary Duties, as in the
Case of Physicians, Lawyers, Spiritual Advisers.--(a) If there was
theological fault, restitution is due, unless the injured party took
the risk upon himself. (b) If there was only juridical fault, it seems
there is no natural duty of restitution, since no injustice was done;
but a court may oblige to damages.

1769. Two Cases in Which Culpability Seems Doubtful.--(a) When one has
inculpably done or omitted something from which damage to another can
be foreseen, and one has now become aware of the danger (as when Balbus
lights a fire on his own property and sees that a change of the wind
makes this fire dangerous for his neighbor’s barn), one must prevent
the damage, if this can be done without equal or greater damage to
oneself; otherwise one must make restitution.

(b) When one has culpably done or omitted something from which damage
to another was foreseen, but has tried, though in vain, to prevent the
damage after the cause was placed, restitution is due if the cause was
physical (e.g., Claudius gave poison to Titus, and then moved by
remorse gave an antidote, but Titus died), since the party who set the
cause in operation is responsible; but if the cause was moral (e.g.,
Balbus ordered a gunman to beat up Caius, but withdrew the order, and
the gunman on his own responsibility then assaulted Caius), restitution
is not due when the revocation ends one’s influence upon the damage
that ensues.

1770. Three Kinds of Unlawful Possessors.--The second root of
restitution mentioned above (1762) is unjust possession, which includes
the acceptance or the retention of another person’s goods against the
latter’s will. There are three kinds of unlawful possessors:

(a) the possessor in good faith, who is one that has been invincibly
ignorant of the unlawfulness of his possession, but now learns his
error (e.g., a buyer who discovers that the horse he purchased did not
belong to the seller but was stolen property);

(b) the possessor in doubtful faith, who is one that has serious
reasons for fearing his possession is unlawful (e.g., the buyer of a
horse learns that the seller is known to have sold some stolen
property, or that the price he charged for the horse was remarkably
small);

(c) the possessor in bad faith, who is one that knows his possession is
unjust (e.g., a buyer who purchases a horse which he knew had been
stolen by the seller).

1771. Obligations of the Possessor in Good Faith in Reference to the
Property Itself.--(a) If the property is still in his keeping, he is
generally obliged to return it to the owner, for a thing calls for its
owner. An exception would be the case in which the possessor can not
return the property to the owner without a greater loss to his own
property.

(b) If the property has perished, the possessor is generally obliged or
not to restitution according as he has been enriched or not by the
property; for one person should not be enriched at the expense of
another, but property perishes to its owner.

(c) If the property is in possession of a third party to whom the
possessor transferred it, he is generally obliged or not to restitution
to the third party, on the latter’s dispossession, according as he has
been enriched or not by the third party’s goods; for if he received
nothing for the goods, he is clearly bound to nothing, but if he
received payment, he must indemnify the buyer who is evicted for lack
of title.

1772. Obligations of the Possessor in Good Faith in Reference to the
Fruits of the Property.--(a) He must restore the fruits of the thing
itself that are in existence, for the thing fructifies to its owner.
Hence, he should restore to the owner the natural fruits (e.g., the
fruit on the owner’s trees) and the civil fruits (e.g., the money
received from hire of the owner’s horse).

(b) He must restore the fruits of the thing itself which are not in
existence, but from which he has been enriched (e.g., the net profit
from last year’s crops which the possessor has in the bank).

(c) He is not obliged to restore the fruits of his own labor or
industrial fruits (e.g., the extraordinary interest derived from the
owner’s money through the good judgment and energy of the possessor),
nor the fruits that he consumed without enrichment (e.g., the
vegetables he gave away or wasted).

1773. Rights of the Possessor in Good Faith in Deducting Expenses.--(a)
He may deduct for all expenses that have benefited the owner, that is,
for all the money he spent in necessary or useful ways in preserving or
caring for the property. (b) He may not deduct for expenses that have
not benefited the owner, or which the owner would not have reasonably
authorized, such as special beautification of the property. But he may
take away such adornments added by him as can be removed without injury
to the property.

1774. Obligations of the Possessor in Bad Faith in Reference to the
Property Itself.--(a) If the property is still in his keeping, he must
return it to the owner, for a thing calls for its owner. But if the
actual possessor had the property from the thief and could not restore
it to the owner without serious loss to himself, it is held by some
that he could return it to the thief in order to recover his money.

(b) If the property has perished or restitution of it has become
impossible, he must compensate the owner, even though he has not been
enriched, unless the goods would have perished equally with the owner;
for he is then the efficacious cause of the loss. The same principle
may be applied to damages through deterioration. The civil law often
holds the thief responsible, no matter how the goods perished in his
hands.

(c) If the property is in possession of a third party who bought it in
bad faith from the possessor in bad faith, the seller is not bound to
restitution to his purchaser on the purchaser’s eviction, unless there
was agreement to that effect; for he who buys, knowing that there is no
good title, buys at his own risk.

1775. Obligation of the Possessor in Bad Faith in Reference to the
Fruits of the Property.--(a) He must restore the natural and civil
fruits, even though the owner would not have obtained them from the
thing, but he may keep the industrial fruits.

(b) He must make restitution for the profits lost and the losses
suffered by the owner through the unjust deprivation of his property,
for these are damages of which the possessor was the unjust and
efficacious cause.

1776. Obligations of the Possessor in Doubtful Faith Who Began
Possession in Good Faith (Supervening Doubt).--(a) If he does not
culpably neglect attempts to settle his doubt, he becomes a possessor
in good faith. If the doubt is settled against him, he must restore
(1771); if the doubt continues, he may retain possession and prescribe
(i.e., acquire ownership through long exercise of ownership rights),
for presumption favors the possessor, but he must he willing to
restore, should another appear as the rightful owner.

(b) If he culpably neglects attempts to settle the doubt, he becomes a
possessor in bad faith. If the doubt is settled against him, he must
restore (1800), at least for the time during which his culpability was
grave; if the doubt continues and its settlement is impossible through
his fault, it seems that he should share ratably with another claimant
according to the strength of the respective claims; if the doubt
continues and there is no other claimant, it seems that he may act on
the principle that presumption favors the possessor.

1777. Obligations of the Possessor in Doubtful Faith Who Began in Bad
Faith (Antecedent Doubt).--(a) If the property came to the possessor in
doubtful faith without legal title (e.g., by violence), he has the
obligations of one in bad faith, for presumption favors the former
possessor.

(b) If the property came to him by legal title (e.g., by gift or sale),
but from a former possessor of doubtful or suspected faith (e.g., one
who seemed to have the property through theft), he must attempt to
settle the doubt. Should the doubt nevertheless continue, some think he
should divide it with another probable claimant, but others believe he
may retain all.

(e) If the property came to him by legal title and from a former
possessor in good faith, he must attempt to settle the doubt; but if
the doubt remains in spite of his inquiries, he may retain the property
in good faith, as long as matters continue in the same state.

1778. Cooperators and Restitution.--Restitution is owed for cooperation
in injustice when the cooperator becomes at least partially an unjust
and efficacious cause of damage to another. It should be noted that
this cooperation may be of a limited kind, as when it extends only to
the mode of the damage, or when it is not indispensable to the
commission of the injury.

(a) Thus, he who cooperates only as to the mode of injury is probably
liable only for that damage which he added to the substantial damage.
Thus, if Balbus intended to steal $10, and Claudius persuaded him to
steal $20, it seems that the influence of Claudius extended only to the
amount of $10.

(b) He who cooperates, but whose assistance is not necessary, is bound
to restitution as a cooperator, since he is an unjust and efficacious
cause of damage. Thus, if Caius steals for Sempronius, knowing that,
should he refuse, Mercurius would carry out the orders of Sempronius,
the readiness to steal on the part of Mercurius does not excuse Caius
or make his act any less harmful.

1779. Positive cooperators in injury are bound to restitution when
their act is the unjust and efficacious cause of the damage. The
principal cases of positive cooperation are the following:

(a) a mandator is a superior who explicitly or implicitly commands an
inferior subject to commit an act of injustice, as when a father bids
his son to steal. The mandator bids another to act in his name, and
therefore he is the principal and not the accessory or secondary cause
of injury. He must indemnify both the victim and the agent for losses
he caused them; but he is not liable if he effectively recalled his
mandate before the damage was done;

(b) an advisor is one who through instruction or persuasion induces
another person to commit an injury which is not done in the name of or
for the benefit of the advisor himself. He must make restitution both
to the person whose injury he recommended and to the person to whom he
gave the advice for the damages he brought upon them. Those who give
wrong advice in good faith, or who recall their advice before the
damage is done, are generally excused from responsibility. Bad example
does not seem to be equivalent to bad advice, and he who recommends a
lesser evil only because he wishes to prevent a greater one is not an
efficacious cause of the lesser evil (see 1502, 1503);

(c) an implicit advisor (_palpo_) is one who by flattery, excuse,
blame, ridicule or other such indirect means leads another to commit
injustice against a third party. The implicit advisor is bound to
restitution for damages caused or reparation denied through his fault;

(d) a protector or encourager (_receptans_) is one who knowingly and
willingly bestows upon a malefactor, as such, security or comfort, in
order that the latter may do injury with greater confidence or omit
restitution for evil already done. He is bound to restitution for the
unjust damage or retention of property caused by him;

(e) a consenter is one who gives his vote, decision, or approval to
injustice, or denies it to justice. He must recall his consent to
iniquity before evil results from it, and he must make restitution for
damages that depend on his conduct;

(f) a partaker in injustice is one who gives assistance in the
commission of injustice, positively and physically, by sharing in the
injury or in some previous or subsequent act naturally connected with
it. If he is a cooperator in unjust damage, he must indemnify the
injured party; if he is a cooperator in unjust retention of property,
he must give back to the owner the stolen goods received by him (1774).

1780. Negative cooperators are those who by their silence or inaction
permit an injury to be done or to go unrepaired. They are bound to
restitution for the damages caused by them; but it seems that _per se_
at least they are not bound to restitution for bribes taken by them or
fines lost through their fault. Their responsibility for damages
supposes the usual conditions, namely: (a) they must be the efficacious
causes of damage, and hence if their silence or inaction is
involuntary, or if outcry or resistance would be useless they are not
responsible; (b) they must be unjust causes, that is, there must be an
obligation to act owed by reason of strict right, contract, or implied
contract. Examples are confessors who culpably neglect to give
penitents needed spiritual advice, parents who permit damage to be done
by their children who have not the use of reason, voters who absent
themselves and thus cause damage they were bound by contract to
prevent, owners of animals who sinfully permit their beasts to ravage
the fields of another person, doorkeepers who allow thieves to enter a
house under their charge, collectors who permit bills to go unpaid. But
if the obligation is owed by reason of some other virtue than
commutative justice (e.g., one is bound only in charity to turn in a
fire alarm when one notices a fire, if one is not the custodian of the
house), one sins, and at times gravely, by inaction; but there is no
duty of restitution.

1781. The Circumstances of Restitution.--By the circumstances of
restitution are understood the persons by whom and to whom compensation
is to be made, the things to be restored, the manner, time and place of
restitution.

1782. The persons bound to make restitution are all those who singly or
cooperatively commit injustice. But when several commit injustice
together, the following kinds of causes of the injustice must be
distinguished:

(a) the causes are equal when there is no subordination among the
cooperators; they are unequal when one is a principal upon whom the
others depend as secondary causes or instruments (e.g., when one hires
thieves to steal for one);

(b) the causes are considered as total causes of the injury when they
are principal causes, or equal but indispensable cooperators, or
conspirators; and perhaps also if they are sufficient causes (e.g.,
Caius and Sempronius each fire at a neighbor’s cow and each inflicts a
mortal wound), or if the thing damaged is either not divided (such as a
vineyard) or indivisible (such as a painting). In other causes
cooperators are considered as partial causes of the injury.

1783. Cooperators in damage are bound to restitution either _in
solidum_ or _pro rata_.

(a) Thus, they are bound _in solidum_ (i.e., jointly and severally) for
all the loss when they are total causes of the damage, But the
principal cause is bound absolutely, the secondary or equal cause only
conditionally, that is, the principal must pay all the restitution
himself, the others must pay all only when the principal or other
associates fail to do their duty.

(b) They are bound _pro rata_ (i.e., each one according to his share)
when they are only partial causes of the damage. The obligation of
restitution _in solidum_ should not be imposed, if it is uncertain, or
if the cooperator is in good faith and the admonition would only
produce harm.

1784. The order of restitution among cooperators in injury is according
to the priority of the obligation of one to that of another, in the
sense that one is obliged to pay all and the other is obliged only in
the former’s default. This order of priority in obligation is in force
when many cooperators are bound _in solidum_ and when they cooperated
in different ways (e.g., one as possessor, another as advisor, another
as performer, etc.). The order generally given by moralists is as
follows:

(a) the possessor is bound first of all, since he has the goods of
another and the goods call for their owner;

(b) the cooperators are bound next in the following order: the
originator (such as a perpetrator acting in his own name, or a
mandator); the perpetrator acting in the name of another; the others
who aided the commission of the act (such as advisors, flatterers,
etc.); those who did not prevent or resist injustice.

1785. The obligations of cooperators when restitution in full is made
by one of their number, or when condonation of debt is made to one of
their number, are as follows: (a) if restitution was due _pro rata_,
the other cooperators must indemnify their associate who paid all, or
must pay their shares to the injured party who gave condonation only to
one of their group;

(b) if restitution was due _in solidum_, payment by or condonation to a
principal cause frees the secondary causes; but payment by or
condonation to a secondary cause does not exempt a principal cause, and
the latter is still held either to the secondary cause or to the
injured party, as the case may be; payment by or condonation to an
equal cause does not exempt the other equal causes.

1786. The person to whom restitution must be made is the person whose
strict right has been violated, or, in his absence, it is society. But
the following cases should be distinguished:

(a) when the injured person is known for certain and his right is
certain, restitution should be made to the injured person or his
representatives or successors, or, if this is not possible, to
charitable or pious causes;

(b) when the injured person is entirely unknown, if the one who is the
cause of the loss is in good faith, his obligations are those of a
possessor in good faith; but if he is in bad faith, the common opinion
is that he is bound, at least from customary law, to make restitution
by giving to the poor or to religion;

(c) when the injured person is partly unknown, the person who is the
cause of the loss should make restitution to the best of his ability.
If the doubt extends to only a few persons (say four or five), any one
of whom may be the injured person, restitution should be divided in the
best way possible among these persons; if the doubt extends to many,
but the injured persons were only a few, it seems that restitution may
be made by giving to charity or religion either in the place of the
injury or elsewhere; if the doubt extends to many, and the injured
persons were many inhabitants of the locality, restitution must be made
if possible to the injured parties themselves, otherwise to some public
cause of the local community.

1787. Order of Preference Among Creditors.--The natural order of
preference is to be shown to creditors when the debtor is unable to pay
them all.

(a) Those who have a right _in re_ (e.g., those whose property is held
by the debtor) have precedence over those who have only a right _ad
rem_ (e.g., those who are creditors from contract).

(b) Creditors from onerous contract or delinquency, it is generally
admitted, have priority over creditors from gratuitous contract.

(c) Creditors from delinquency and creditors from onerous contract,
according to what seems to be the common opinion, are equal in rights
and should be settled with _pro rata_.

(d) Debts that are certain have priority over debts that are uncertain,
according to some; others deny this, but admit that the uncertain debts
need be paid only in proportion to their probability.

(e) Creditors who are certain are by some preferred to creditors who
are uncertain; but others think that payment to the poor, in place of
the unknown creditor, is the latter’s presumed will, and that it has an
equal standing with debts owed to known creditors.

(f) Poor creditors have no just claim to preference over rich
creditors; but charity dictates that, when the poor creditor is in
distress, he should be given the preference.

(g) Earlier creditors have a preference over later creditors in a real
claim, but it is disputed whether this holds also in a personal claim.

(h) The creditor who asks for a settlement sooner has a preference, if
the petition is made juridically, and perhaps also if it is made
privately.

1788. The order of preference among creditors according to civil law is
generally as follows: (a) proprietary creditors (i.e., those whose
property is held by the debtor); (b) privileged creditors (i.e., those
whose debts have a special urgency, such as judicial expenses, doctors’
bills, wages for hired help, living costs, etc.); (c) hypothecatory
creditors (i.e., those who have claims against the property of the
debtor, in the form of liens, mortgages, etc.); (d) common creditors
(i.e., all those who are paid after the previous creditors have been
satisfied). American law contains provisions in regard to dispositions
of property made during the four months before bankruptcy is tiled, so
as to protect the creditors of a person who is insolvent. The property
of a bankrupt is placed in the hands of an assignee and allowance is
made for the debtor’s needs and perfected liens (i.e., charges legally
made upon property for debt). The property is then subject to levy by
the creditors as follows: maintenance expenses, legal fees, costs of
administration, wages of workmen, taxes, debts having priority under
Federal or State law.

1789. The “Thing” to Be Restored.--(a) In case of unjust possession,
the identical object must be restored, if it has an individual value;
otherwise it may be restored in its equivalent. (b) In case of
contract, the identical object must be restored, if that is the
agreement (e.g., in loan of a chattel, or deposit), otherwise it may be
restored in its equivalent (e.g., in loan of money).

1790. The “Amount” of Restitution in Certain Cases.--(a) When an Object
Had Various Values During the Time of Its Possession in Bad Faith.--If
the change was from an internal cause and was for the better (e.g., the
calf stolen by a thief has become a cow), the return must be made in
the improved state; if the change was from an internal cause, and was
for the worse but would have happened in any case (e.g., the cow taken
by the thief has become old), return must be made in the actual state;
if the change was from an internal cause and for the worse, which would
not have happened had the object remained with the owner (e.g., a cow
taken by a thief has become lame on account of the thief’s
carelessness), return must be made also for the deterioration. If the
change was from an external cause (e.g., the wine taken by a thief has
risen and declined in value several times), it seems that practically
nothing more can be imposed by way of restitution than the value the
object had when taken.

(b) When Unjust Damage has been Done.--If the damage was caused
positively, the injured person must be indemnified entirely, if the
damage was caused negatively, the injured party should be indemnified
more or less according to the reasonable expectation he had of the gain
of which he was deprived.

1791. The “Manner” of Making Restitution.--The general rule is that it
should be made in such a way that the injury will be repaired and the
injured person indemnified for his loss. Generally speaking, there is
freedom of choice as to various forms in the modes of restitution.
Thus, it may be made publicly or secretly, directly or through an
intermediary, positively (by payment) or negatively (by cancellation of
a debt). It may even be made without the knowledge and intention of the
parties. (a) Thus, the injured party may be compensated, even though he
is unaware that he was cheated or that he is being paid back; (b) the
offender may restore, even though he does not know he is doing so
(e.g., if he pays while intoxicated), and probably even though he has
no express intention of doing so (e.g., if he makes a present of $10,
and then remembers that he owed damages to the amount of $10).

1792. Second Restitution.--Natural law must be applied to certain cases
in which restitution sent through an intermediary perishes on the way
through no fault of the debtor. (a) If the debt is owed on account of
possession in good faith, the debtor is not bound to a second
restitution. (b) If the debt is owed on account of contract, the goods
perish to the owner. Thus, if the contract was one of loan, the loss
must be borne by the lender; if it was one of sale, by the seller. (e)
If the debt is owed on account of delinquency, there is an obligation
to a second restitution, unless the injured party assumed the risk of
transmission. It is held as probable that the choice of the confessor
as intermediary for restitution has the consent of the injured party,
and hence that, if the restitution perishes on the way through chance
or the fault of a third party, there is no duty of second restitution.

1793. The “Time” When Restitution Must Be Made.--(a) Internal
restitution, or the purpose of restoring, must be made at once, that
is, as soon as one adverts to the necessity of this resolve. (b)
External restitution, or the fulfillment of the resolution, must be
made at the first suitable opportunity.

1794. Unjust Refusal to Make Restitution or Pay Bills.--(a) Those who
unjustly refuse to make restitution or to pay their bills at the proper
time are guilty of mortal or venial sin according to the damage their
refusal causes to the creditor. (b) They are not worthy of absolution
if there is serious bad faith on their part, as when they have many
times broken their promises, or when they refuse to pay even the part
or installment which is within their power. (c) They are bound to
additional damages for the losses caused by the unjustifiable delay.

1795. The “Place” Where Restitution Must Be Made.--(a) He who is a
debtor on account of injury must make restitution at the place where
the thing would be were it not for the injury. (b) He who is a debtor
on account of possession in good faith should notify the owner where
the property is, but he is not obliged to bring it to the owner. (c) He
who is a debtor on account of contract must abide by the agreement, or
by the statutes that regulate the contract. Thus, in this country the
place of delivery in sales is according to law the seller’s place of
business or his residence.

1796. Burden of Expense or Loss When Restitution Is Sent to the Place
of the Creditor.--(a) If the obligation of restitution arises from
injury, the debtor is generally bound to pay the transportation and to
stand the loss when the goods perish in transit. (b) If the obligation
arises from contract, the expenses and losses must be borne according
to the agreement.

If nothing was stipulated, it seems equitable that the expenses of
transportation be borne by the party who benefits or who requested the
contract. According to the Sales Act in the United States, the seller
is the loser when goods perish in transit, if a place of delivery had
been agreed on; but the buyer is the loser when in pursuance of the
contract the goods had been delivered to a carrier for transmission to
the buyer (see 1888 d).

1797. The Causes That Excuse Temporarily from Restitution.--These
causes can be reduced to two, namely, physical and moral impossibility.
(a) Physical impossibility exists when the debtor has not the means to
pay and cannot secure them; and it excuses as long as it continues. One
who is bankrupt is excused from restitution during the continuance of
his insolvency; if he later becomes able to pay, it seems to some that
the civil declaration of bankruptcy according to the law of the country
releases him from further payment, unless his bankruptcy was fraudulent
or due to culpable neglect. (b) Moral impossibility exists when the
debtor has the means, but cannot pay immediately without incurring a
loss of a higher order (e.g., if he pays the small sum of money, he
will lose his own excellent reputation), or without suffering a greater
loss in his own goods of the same order (e.g., if he pays the money, he
will be reduced to starvation), or without surely bringing on a far
greater evil than delay of restitution to the creditor or a third party
(e.g., if a stolen weapon is returned to its owner, he will commit
suicide or murder).

1798. The Causes That Excuse Permanently from Restitution.--These
causes can also be reduced to two general ones, namely, the cessation
of the object and the termination of the obligation through the act of
the creditor, or of the debtor, or of authority.

(a) Thus, the cessation of the object releases from the duty of
restitution whenever the object perishes to its owner, as when it is
lost by a possessor in good faith who has not been enriched by it, or
even by a possessor in bad faith, if it would have been lost equally by
the owner (see 1771, 1774).

(b) The termination of obligation through the act of the creditor
occurs when the creditor freely and lawfully excused the debtor from
payment. In some cases condonation may ordinarily be presumed, either
on account of the affection of the creditor for the debtor (e.g., in
case of debts owed by children to their parents) or on account of the
familiar relationship between the parties and the smallness of the debt
(e.g., in case of appropriation by servants or employees of some
unimportant articles not kept under lock and key), or on account of the
indigence of the debtor and the smallness of the damage (e.g., in case
of trifling harm to goods of a wealthy person, if there was no great
malice and the debtor is very poor).

(c) The termination of obligation is also effected by equivalent
payment, which in certain cases is made by payment of the creditor’s
creditor, or the cancellation of an equal debt owed the debtor by the
creditor, and perhaps also by a gift made the creditor by the debtor
and equal in value to the debt. Occult compensation by the creditor is
the secret taking by him of what he is entitled to when the debtor will
not give it of his own accord. This is lawful when the debt is certain,
other means of recovery impossible, and the compensation not injurious;
but it covers restitution, and hence the creditor cannot accept another
payment from the debtor.

(d) The termination of obligation is also effected by the act of
competent authority. Thus, judicial declaration frees from the duty of
restitution a person who has lawfully and in good faith received
certain goods as damages or award; prescription (see 1875) gives a
clear title to property held by adverse possession over a certain
number of years, and it frees from the duty of payment, at least in
certain cases (though not in the United States); papal composition for
good reasons exempts from their obligation those who owe restitution to
pious causes or to church property injured by them.

1799. Condonation of the domestic thefts of wives and children of the
family cannot be presumed in all cases (see 1903).

(a) Thus, if the things stolen are articles of food and drink (or
tobacco), and were consumed by the members of the family, there is no
duty of restitution, since the father or husband is then unwilling, not
so much that these things should be taken, as that they should be taken
furtively.

(b) If the things taken do not fall under the class of eatables and are
still in the possession of the thief, they should be restored. Hence,
if a son steals money from his father in order to have the means for
debauchery, he must give back that money.

(c) If the things taken were not eatables, but were of great value and
have been consumed or alienated, it will depend on circumstances
whether restitution is obligatory or not. Thus, if the father thinks
much of the son who took the money and the family does not miss it
much, condonation may perhaps be taken for granted; but if the son is
not on good terms with his father, or if the theft is very harmful to
the family, restitution may be due.

1800. Excuse from Restitution on Account of Doubtfulness of
Obligation.--(a) One who doubts positively and in good faith whether or
not he did damage to another is excused from restitution if the doubt
is about the fact of the damage (e.g., whether his competitor lost
business) or about his own culpability (e.g., whether he circulated a
calumny about his competitor); he is probably held to restitution _pro
rata_ of the doubt, if the doubt is about the responsibility of his
culpable act for the damage that followed (e.g., whether his calumny or
the poorness of the competitor’s wares caused the falling off in
business); he is probably held to only his share, if the doubt is
whether his culpable act was responsible for the whole or only a part
of the damage (e.g., whether his calumny caused all the damage, in view
of the fact that others were also spreading calumnies).

(b) One who doubts positively and in good faith whether the restitution
owed by him has been paid (e.g., whether his fellows in calumny have
paid their portions of restitution, whether he has paid a bill for
goods or services received) is held to full payment by some, to part
(_pro rata_) payment by others, to nothing by others. Some moralists
think the presumption favors the creditor, others that it favors the
debtor, others that it favors neither and that a compromise is the
right solution.

1801. Doubt does not excuse restitution in the following cases: (a)
when it is merely negative and the presumption is against the doubter
(e.g., when a person knows that he purchased and received goods, but
does not know whether or not he paid for them, and has no reason to
think he did pay); (b) when it is in bad faith, that is, knowingly or
intentionally produced (e.g., when two men simultaneously fire at a
neighbor’s cow, knowing that it will thus become impossible to
determine the author of the damage).

1802. Special Cases.--There are some special cases of restitution for
negative injury in thwarting another’s prospects, or for positive
injury to goods of fortune, of body, of soul, or of spirit.

(a) For Frustration of Another’s Good.--Restitution is due for keeping
another from a good to which he has a strict right (e.g., an office to
which he has been chosen, property for which he has paid), or for using
force, fraud, bribes, or other unjust means to keep another from a good
to which he has a non-strict right (e.g., a position for which he has
made application, a gift which another contemplates bestowing on him).
The amount of restitution should be calculated according to the
previous probability of success on the part of the injured party and
the permanent results of the injury.

(b) For Injury Done to Goods of Fortune.--Private injuries are spoken
of elsewhere (see 1762 sqq.), and now we consider only injuries that
are in some way public. Commutative injustice entailing restitution to
the community is committed by damage to public property, breach of
contract made with the community, unjust means employed to prevent the
government from obtaining its dues, unjust cooperation in any of the
aforementioned acts; commutative injustice entailing reparation to
individuals is committed when the transgression of a law places an
undue burden on a fellow-citizen (e.g., when one unjustly escapes
military or jury service and causes a substitute to be called who would
not have been called otherwise, or when one unjustly evades one’s taxes
and thereby certainly causes the taxes of others to be raised). If a
tax law is just, it obliges in conscience, but whether as penal or
preceptive, whether in virtue of legal or commutative justice, is a
much debated question; and hence the question of sin and of restitution
due is not easily settled. Impossibility or a general and admitted
custom excuse from restitution (see 2637 sqq.).

(c) For Injury Done to Goods of Body or Personal Goods.--According to
one view no restitution is due for merely personal injuries, since the
damage cannot be repaired by a good of the same kind as that which was
taken away (e.g., the murderer cannot give back life to his victim);
but according to another view restitution is due for these injuries,
since justice requires that every kind of damage be repaired as far as
possible (see 1751 and 2090).

1803. Restitution for Various Kinds of Damage Done to Persons.--(a) For
Bodily Injury by Unjust Homicide or Mutilation.--The offender (or his
heirs) is obliged to restitution to the victim (or his heirs or
dependents) for spiritual loss (such as death without the Sacraments),
probably for personal loss (such as pain, facial disfigurement), and
for real losses due to the injury (such as hospital expenses, loss of
support by the widow and orphans). The spiritual loss is compensated by
spiritual goods, such as suffrages for the departed, the personal loss
by compensation suited to the circumstances (e.g., money employment),
the real loss by payment of medical expenses, loss of time, support
lost by dependents, etc. The offender is not liable for damages of
which he is not the unjust cause (e.g., the alms that will be lost by
poor persons on account of homicide, since they have no strict right to
the alms), or the efficacious cause (e.g., the pay that will be lost by
creditors on account of homicide, for as a rule the slayer cannot
foresee this), nor for damages which the injured person clearly
condones.

(b) For Bodily Injuries by Fornication or Adultery.--In case of
fornication the offender owes restitution to the person seduced and
also at times to the latter’s parents, and both sinners are bound to
support their illegitimate child. The form of the compensation will
depend much on circumstances, but in general it should be either
marriage with the person seduced or some kind of pecuniary
compensation. It should be noted that a promise to marry, even though
it is canonically valid, gives no action to enforce marriage, but even
an invalid engagement gives rise to action for unjust material damages,
such as loss of chance to marry or loss of money spent in view of the
marriage (see Canon 1017). In case of adultery the guilty party or
parties are bound to make restitution to the injured husband if an
illegitimate child is being reared at his expense, and also to the
legitimate children for injuries to their strict rights, as in the
diminished inheritance received from their parents on account of the
illegitimate child. A child is not obliged to accept the word of his
mother that he is illegitimate, but if he is certain about his
illegitimacy, he may not take that to which he is not entitled. In
restitution for fornication or adultery, care must be taken to preserve
the good names of all the parties concerned.

(c) For Injuries of Soul.--In case of unjust and efficacious damage to
physical goods (e.g., when one by fraud or force administers to another
drugs or intoxicants that take away the use of reason or self-control,
when a professor neglects his office of teaching or teaches error),
restitution is certainly due for any material damages that result, and
probably for the personal injury alone. In case of damage to spiritual
goods, by inducement to commit sin or by dissuasion from good,
restitution is due when the influence exerted was unjust (e.g., by
fraud, force, threats), not when it was merely uncharitable (e.g., by
advice, persuasion, request, example). Restitution for spiritual damage
may be made negatively, that is, by removal of the unjust influence;
but if a person who was seduced has in consequence become a hardened
sinner, it seems that restitution should be made positively, that is,
by counsels, requests, prayers to God, and other prudent means
calculated to recall the injured party to a life of virtue.




Art. 4: THE VICES OPPOSED TO COMMUTATIVE AND DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE

(_Summa Theologica_, II-II, qq. 63-78.)

1804. The Vice Opposed to Distributive Justice.--Favoritism (i.e.,
acceptance of persons, partiality) is defined as “a species of
injustice which moves one to distribute the common goods or burdens of
society, not according to merit or fitness, but according to some other
and impertinent standard.”

(a) The common goods include offices, honors, functions, while the
common burdens include taxes, contributions, and penalties.

(b) The common goods of which we now speak are those that belong to
society and that must be portioned out to its members justly. Hence,
there is no question of goods that belong to private persons, which the
owners are not obliged to give to others unless it be in virtue of
charity or liberality. A rich man is not guilty of acceptance of
persons, if he bestows his largesses on those who are less in need or
less deserving, but more acceptable to himself; and God is not unjust
when he gives unequal graces to those who are equally sinners (Matt.,
xx. 14, 15).

(c) The right standard of just distribution is merit or fitness, as
when an applicant is appointed to the post of teacher or superior on
account of good character and knowledge. Any other standard which
leaves merit and fitness out of consideration is unjust, as when a
public official selects for offices or honors, not those who have
worked the hardest or who give the most promise, but those who have
more money or who are related to himself.

1805. The Sinfulness of Favoritism from Revelation.--In Holy Scripture
favoritism is reproved (“How long will you judge unjustly and accept
the persons of the wicked?” Psalm lxxi. 2), and impartiality is praised
(“Thou art a true speaker and teachest the way of God in truth, neither
carest Thou for any man, for Thou dost not regard the person of man,”
Matt., xxii. 16; “Masters, know that the Lord both of servants and you
is in heaven, and there is no respect of persons with Him,” Eph., vi.
9). Distributive justice is commanded in many passages of Holy Writ
(“Consider not the person of the poor, nor honor the countenance of the
mighty; but judge thy neighbor according to justice,” Levit. xix. 15;
“There shall be no difference of persons, you shall hear the little as
well as the great, neither shall you respect any man’s person,” Deut.,
i. 17; “Thou shalt not accept persons nor gifts,” Deut., xvi. 19; cfr.
James, ii. 1 sqq.).

1806. The Sinfulness of Favoritism from Reason.--Favoritism
transgresses a divine command and substitutes personal will for right
in the treatment of subjects by superiors. Hence, it is morally evil,
for disobedience is sinful in the high as well as in the low, and
violation of rights is unjust whether the rights be of the community or
of the individual.

1807. The Gravity of the Sin of Favoritism.--(a) From its nature,
favoritism is a mortal sin; for it is a form of injustice (see 1746),
and indeed it is no less damaging than commutative injustice (e.g.,
theft) and is often accompanied by the latter. (b) From its matter and
from the lack of deliberation or consent it may be venial. Thus, if
favoritism is shown in a trifling matter (e.g., in conferring a post
that is unremunerative and unimportant) or in a small degree (e.g., in
preferring an applicant who is only slightly less worthy), there is
only venial injustice.

1808. Distributive injustice is also frequently accompanied by
commutative injustice.

(a) Thus, a first class of common goods that are distributed are those
intended primarily for the common good, and only indirectly and
secondarily for the good of individuals, such as public offices,
dignities, and benefices. He who distributes these offices unfairly, by
appointing unworthy persons, or by appointing the less worthy when he
is under contract to appoint the more worthy, violates commutative
justice and is held to restitution to the community; but the worthy or
more worthy persons slighted had no strict right, and hence no
restitution is due them, unless there was a compact with them or unjust
means were used to exclude them (see 1755).

(b) A second class of common goods are those that are intended
primarily for the benefit of individuals, such as a fund created for
the relief of the destitute or afflicted or pensions set aside for
those who have deserved well of society. He who distributes these goods
unfairly is guilty of commutative injustice against private persons,
since the goods were destined for them, and they had a right _ad rem_
to the goods, and hence to these persons restitution is owed.

1809. Favoritism in Spiritual Matters.--(a) Partiality in granting
favors is sinful, and gravely so when the matter is serious. Examples
are the grant to the unworthy of the power of Orders or of
jurisdiction, the concession of permissions and dispensations to one’s
friends that are denied to others. (b) Partiality in imposing burdens
is also sinful, as when a prelate issues an onerous command, and grants
exemption to his friends. But if the thing commanded is obligatory
already by reason of law, it should be observed in spite of the
favoritism of the prelate.

1810. Who is to be considered as more worthy for appointments in
spiritual matters?

(a) The more worthy person is the one who will better serve the common
good in the office. Hence, the more pious or the more learned man is
not necessarily the more worthy, for another may have greater industry,
influence, executive ability, initiative, prudence, experience, etc.,
and so be better suited to fill the position. But no person should be
considered as worthy of spiritual offices unless his moral character is
good, and excellence in temporal things does not compensate for
negligence in spiritual matters.

(b) The more worthy person is the one who is more available when the
appointment has to be made. Hence, the one who is better gifted for the
office is not necessarily the more worthy, for another may be better
known and it may be impossible to make investigations and comparisons
at the moment.

1811. Opinion of the Applicant or Appointee about His Own Fitness.--(a)
The applicant need not think that he is worthy or the most worthy;
indeed, according to St. Thomas, it would be presumptuous for him to
think so highly of himself, and he would thus become unworthy. It
suffices, then, that the applicant have in mind only to try for the
office, leaving the decision about fitness to the examiner or appointer.

(b) The acceptor who feels that he is unworthy or less worthy is not
guilty of injustice; for he is not the judge of his own abilities and
may rely on the judgment of those who appoint him. Moreover, he can
trust to divine grace and his own efforts to make up for any deficiency
or inferiority of which he is conscious. But it seems that, if the
appointee were absolutely certain that his appointment was unjust, he
would be bound to surrender his office, if this were possible.

1812. Favoritism in Secular Matters.--Do the conclusions in reference
to ecclesiastical offices apply also to secular offices?

(a) In both cases distributive justice is violated by favoritism, for
the standard followed is not merit or fitness, and thus the more worthy
persons are injured. The opinion that civil society has dominion of
public offices and therefore the right to distribute them at will,
without regard to the merits or fitness of persons selected, is not
probable; for civil rulers, like spiritual rulers, should consider
themselves as ministers and dispensers only (I Cor., iv. 1), and even
if they had dominion over offices, they would be bound to use that
power for the benefit of the public for whom they rule.

(b) In both cases also commutative justice is violated in some
instances, the offense being either against society or against
individuals (see 1755, 1808). Thus, an official who appoints a
subordinate knowing that he will oppress and rob, is responsible and
bound to restitution to the victims as being a cooperator in injustice.

1813. Favoritism in Marks of Esteem or Honor Shown to Others.--(a)
There is no favoritism if honor and esteem are shown to those who
deserve it on account of their virtue or position. Hence, it is not
unjust but just to show special marks of veneration to holy persons,
and even to those who are not holy, but whose authority or age deserves
respect (such as rulers and prelates, parents and aged men).

(b) There is favoritism if honor and esteem are shown to those who have
no genuine claim to it on account of goodness or rank. Thus, wealthy
men are worthy of special respect on account of goodness when they
employ their riches in useful ways, or on account of preeminence in the
community in rank, ability, influence, etc., and he who shows special
courtesy or attention to the wealthy for reasons such as these is not a
respector of persons. But if mere wealth is worshipped, sinful
favoritism is shown, as when a villainous rich man is honored and a
worthy poor man is despised, or well-dressed persons are conducted
honorably to comfortable seats in church and good persons whose attire
is poor are treated with contempt (James, ii).

1814. Favoritism in Judges (Umpires, Arbitrators) and the Like.--(a) In
the course of a trial there may be favoritism in matters left to the
judge’s discretion. This does not happen, however, when the
discretionary power is intended for the judge’s own benefit (e.g., when
on a free day he decides to hear one side rather than the other), but
when it is meant for the benefit of the litigants (e.g., when he grants
to one side a longer time for preparation of its case than to the other
side and for no reason pertinent to the matter at issue).

(b) In the sentence pronounced there is favoritism, if the decision is
not based on the merits of the litigants, but on extraneous
considerations, such as the fact that one of the parties is a friend or
relative of the judge or arbitrator, or belongs to the same political
party or business, etc.: “It is not good to accept the person of the
wicked, to decline from the truth of judgment” (Prov., xviii. 5). If
the arguments are about evenly balanced on both sides, it would be
favoritism to decide in favor of one against the other. Alexander VII
condemned the proposition that a judge may take money in such a case of
doubt to decide for one party (Denzinger, n. 1126).

1815. The Vices against Commutative Justice.--These vices can be
classified under two general heads: (a) the vices committed in
involuntary commutations (see 1748), which include deeds against the
person (such as homicide, mutilation, imprisonment) and against
property (such as theft and rapine), and unjust words, whether spoken
during judicial process (by judges, advocates, witnesses, etc.), or
outside of judicial process (such as contumely, detraction, etc); (b)
vices committed in voluntary commutations (see 1748), which include
fraud and usury.

1816. Homicide.--Life destroyed is either that of an irrational being
(i.e., of a plant or beast) or of a rational being. In the latter case
we have homicide, which is defined as follows: “an act or omission of a
human being that is the efficacious cause (see 1763) of the death of a
human being.” A parent who denies his child the food, remedies or
climate which it needs and which he can afford commits homicide by
omission; a physician who practises abortion commits homicide by act.
The following distinctions of homicide have a bearing on its
substantial morality (i.e., its lawfulness or unlawfulness):

(a) in reference to the intention, homicide is either voluntary or
involuntary, and voluntary homicide is intended either as a punishment
or as a defense;

(b) in reference to the slayer, homicide is either the act of a public
or of a private person, of a cleric or of a layman;

(c) in reference to the person slain, homicide is either the killing of
one who is guilty or of one who is innocent, either the killing of a
neighbor or of self (suicide);

(d) in reference to the manner, homicide is either direct or indirect,
according as the action from which death results is from its nature
(_finis operis_) productive of death or of some other effect. Thus, it
is directly homicidal to practise embryotomy (i.e., the destruction of
the vital organs of a fetus) or abortion (i.e., the ejection of a fetus
at a stage of development when it is unable to live outside the
mother), but it is not directly homicidal to give a pregnant woman
remedies necessary for her life, although harmful to the fetus; for the
object or purpose of the former is to kill, of the latter to cure.

1817. Other distinctions of homicide have a bearing on its added or
accidental malice.

(a) A new species of sin is added to that of injustice when other
virtues are offended against. Thus, the virtue of piety is violated
when the victim is a person to whom the slayer owed special respect and
devotedness, as in parricide, regicide, fratricide, uxoricide; the
virtue of religion is offended when murder is committed in a church.

(b) An aggravating circumstance is added by the greater deliberation
with which the homicide is planned, or the greater treachery or cruelty
with which it is executed (e.g., assassination, death by starvation).
Some circumstances, however, may be morally indifferent, such as the
fact that the victim is killed by one kind of poison rather than
another.

1818. The Killing of Animals (or Vegetation).--(a) In itself, the
killing of animals is not sinful; for animals are made for the use of
man. Hence, it is lawful to kill, not only harmful animals, such as
those that prey on human beings or breed pestilence or destroy
property, etc., but also other animals, when their death is necessary
for some good purpose, such as the provision of food, clothing or
medicine for man.

(b) In its circumstances, the killing of animals may be sinful, and
even gravely sinful, as when one kills the animals of one’s neighbor
(Exod, xxii. 10, 11), or hunts against the law, or injures society by
prodigal destruction of animal or plant life, or kills animals in cruel
ways. The skinning of animals alive, in order to secure finer-looking
furs to satisfy the vanity of women, is an inhuman barbarism of the
worst type that should be reprobated by everybody.

1819. When Homicide Is Lawful.--Killing of human beings is lawful in
two cases. (a) It is lawful when the common safety requires that the
State inflict death for a crime (capital punishment); for just as it is
lawful to amputate a gangrenous member which threatens to destroy the
body, so is it lawful to remove from human society by death an
individual who menaces the safety of the community. (b) It is lawful
when the safety of an individual demands that he kill an unjust
aggressor (self-defense); for a man owes his first duty to his own life
in such a case, and the aggressor in making a deadly attack voluntarily
assumes the risk of being killed. It is more correct, however, to say
here that it is lawful to defend one’s life with resultant death to the
offender (as will be explained below, in 1826, 1828, 1834).

1820. Arguments for the Lawfulness of Capital Punishment.--(a)
Scripture.--In the Old Testament the death sentence was prescribed for
certain more serious crimes, such as murder (“whosoever shall shed
man’s blood, his blood shall be shed,” Gen., ix. 6); in the New
Testament Our Lord recognizes that the power of a judge to sentence to
death comes from above (John, xix. 10), and St. Paul declares that
princes do not wield the sword without reason, but act as ministers of
God when they punish evil-doers (Rom., xiii. 4).

(b) Tradition.--The Church has always taught the lawfulness of capital
punishment and rejected contrary errors, as in the case of the
Waldensians condemned by Innocent III.

(c) Reason.--The State has both the duty and the right to promote the
common good and to defend it against its enemies, whether by war
against external foes or by coercive measures against internal
disturbers of the peace. Now, the experience of all the centuries and
of all countries has shown that, generally speaking, the lives of
law-abiding persons and the general peace are not sufficiently
protected unless the supreme penalty be appointed for certain crimes.

1821. Though lawful, capital punishment is not always necessary; for it
is a means to an end, and it may be omitted, therefore, when the end
can be obtained by the use of other and less severe means.

(a) Thus, a general suspension of the capital punishment is lawful in a
community whose members are peaceful and not inclined to violence or
other crimes subversive of law and order. Whether such ideal conditions
exist today may be doubted, and indeed some countries that abolished
the death penalty have found that this proved an incentive to crime and
they were forced to restore the former laws.

(b) A particular exemption from capital punishment is lawful, when
there are good reasons recognized by law for commutation or clemency.
This has been the practice of governments throughout history, and is
justified when it furthers the common welfare, or at least shows mercy
to a deserving individual without harm to society. But a judge has to
condemn when the law and the facts call for condemnation, and the
authority in whom the pardoning power is vested has to use his power
prudently, lest he encourage lawlessness.

1822. It is not morally lawful to put criminals to death unless the
following conditions are present:

(a) the crime must be external and of such a character that the public
welfare requires the supreme punishment, either on account of the
enormity of the act (e.g., murder), or on account of its danger (e.g.,
sleeping at one’s post in time of war). Further, the crime must be
certain and sufficiently established, for, since the punishment should
fit the offense and the law presumes innocence until guilt is proved,
no one should be sentenced to death except for a serious and certain
crime. The Fifth Amendment to the American Constitution declares that
no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law;

(b) the sentence of death and its execution should be performed by
those who have public authority for these acts and in the manner
required by law. For capital punishment is a means of self-defense used
by society, and its use pertains there fore to the representatives of
society. Moreover, if private individuals exercised this function,
accused persons would not receive the consideration of their rights or
the opportunity of defense due them, and the public peace would be
overthrown by murders of revenge committed in the name of justice.

(c) the penalty should be carried out in a humane and Christian manner,
as is manifest. The convicted man should be allowed time and
opportunity to make his peace with God and, if possible, to say
farewell to relatives. Slow and agonizing forms of killing are of
course entirely wrong, no matter how wicked the criminal who is being
executed. The American law and other laws do not permit a pregnant
woman to be executed until she has delivered her child.

1823. Unlawful Killing of Offenders.--The killing of offenders is,
therefore, unlawful in the following cases:

(a) when the offense is not serious or fully deliberate (e.g.,
involuntary manslaughter), or when it has not been sufficiently
established (e.g., if it is not certain that the supposed victim of
murder is dead or that he died from a homicidal act). In civilized
countries today the law inflicts capital punishment only for the most
serious crimes, and the State has to prove its case beyond reasonable
doubt before the punishment can be decreed. But in the past death was
often the penalty for horse- or sheep-stealing, or even smaller
offenses, and in times of excitement men have sometimes been sentenced
to death without a fair trial;

(b) when the sentence of death is not pronounced or executed legally.
Those who lynch the perpetrators of heinous crimes are often in good
faith, especially if the processes of the law are too slow or
uncertain, but since they act without authority, their deed is really
murder. The same is true of a husband who kills his wife taken in
adultery, of the relative of a seduced girl who kills the seducer, of
an officer of the law who unnecessarily or without authorization kills
a man sentenced to death when the latter is trying to escape. The State
has the right, though, to declare a notorious malefactor outlawed, and
thus to give to private citizens the right to take him dead or alive,
or to kill him on sight; but it is clear that the exercise of this
right is a dangerous remedy and one to be used sparingly;

(c) when the mode of killing or the circumstances are repugnant to
Christian feeling. Today capital punishment is generally inflicted in a
humane manner, but history records many cruel forms of execution, as
when men were hanged, drawn and quartered, or burned at the stake, or
put to death amid the jeers and curses of the populace.

1824. Is Tyrannicide Lawful?--(a) If the ruler is a tyrant in act (that
is, one who has a lawful title to rule but who abuses his authority),
it is not lawful to kill him on account of his misdeeds or crimes,
since the subject has not the authority to act in the name of the
nation (Rom., xiii. 1 sqq.; I Peter, ii. 18). In case of self-defense,
however, as when the tyrant unjustly makes a personal attempt on the
life of a citizen, the latter has the right to kill. The Council of
Constance condemned the doctrine of Wycliff that every subject has the
right to assassinate a tyrannical prince, a doctrine that would make
the position of every ruler unsafe, since there are always persons who
think they are victims of persecution. The nation, however, has the
right to depose or even to execute a wicked ruler, for government is
given to rulers for the benefit, not for the destruction, of the common
good.

(b) If the ruler is a tyrant in title (that is, a usurper), it is not
lawful to kill him, when he has already obtained peaceful possession;
for here again it cannot be said that the killer would have the
authorization of the nation. If, however, the tyrant has not obtained
possession but is struggling for it, his status will not be that of
ruler but of public enemy, and it will be lawful to kill him as an act
of war, provided the conditions of a just war are present (see 1384).

1825. Judges and Executioners in Canon Law.--According to the law of
the Church (Canon 984, nn. 6, 7), those who pass the death sentence as
judges and the executioners and their immediate and voluntary helpers
become irregular (i.e., incapable of lawfully receiving Orders or of
exercising their powers). The reasons for this ancient discipline are
chiefly two:

(a) clerics are the ministers of Christ, and therefore they should be
like their High Priest, whose sacrifice they offer at the altar. Now
Christ “when He was reviled, did not revile, when He suffered, He
threatened not, but delivered Himself to him that judged Him unjustly”
(I Peter, ii. 23). Hence, it is unbecoming that clerics should condemn
to death or kill their fellow-men, even criminals;

(b) clerics are the ministers of the New Testament, and therefore they
should conform themselves to its spirit of mildness. The divine law
itself declares that a bishop should not have private quarrels or
inflict blows (I Tim., iii. 3), but the church law goes further and
declares that a cleric should not even act as public judge or
executioner in capital cases. The Old Testament inflicted corporal
punishments and death, and hence we read that its priests and levites
put sinners to death with their own hands (Exod., xxxii. 28; Num., xxv.
7, 8; I Kings, xv. 33; III Kings, xviii. 40; I Mach., ii. 24), but the
law of Christ contains no sentences of death or of bodily chastisement.

1826. The Right of Self-Defense.--The second case of lawful homicide
mentioned above (1819) is the killing of an unjust aggressor, not
intended by the slayer, but consequent on his defense of his life
against the aggressor. This right of self-defense is granted by natural
law itself, and has been denied by but few moralists.

(a) Thus, nature inclines man to prefer his own life to that of
another, other things being equal, and therefore it authorizes him to
defend his life even at the cost of an aggressor’s life. Even the brute
animals are armed by nature to defend themselves against attack.

(b) The natural law also permits one to perform an act from which two
effects will follow, one good and the other bad, provided the good
effect alone is intended and there is a sufficient reason for
permitting the evil effect (see 104). In the present case the killing
of the aggressor is an evil, while the protection of the innocent party
is a good; but it is only the protection that is intended, and the
killing is not an extreme measure in view of the greatness of the good
that is at stake.

1827. The right of self-defense is also sanctioned by human laws. (a)
Thus, church law recognizes this right in the words of Innocent III:
“All laws permit one to repel force by force, but the defense must not
be immoderate, nor exercised from desire of revenge.” According to the
Code (Canon 985, n. 4) irregularity arises from voluntary homicide, but
this does not include the case of lawful self-defense, although a
provisional dispensation must be asked for. A cleric has the right of
self-defense, as well as a layman. (b) Civil law also has always
admitted the right of a person assailed by another to defend himself,
even by killing the assailant, if there is no other alternative.

1828. Conditions for the Exercise of This Right.--(a) The assault must
be a true aggression (i.e., an act of violence threatening the life of
the person assaulted) and unjust (i.e., an attack made without public
authority); (b) the resistance must be true self-defense (i.e., an act
used to ward off attack or to make the assailant powerless) and
moderate (i.e., the person attacked must not use more force than
necessary and he must not intend to kill the assailant).

1829. The person who is killed must be a true aggressor, for otherwise
the slayer is himself the aggressor and guilty of unjustifiable
homicide. Killing is therefore unjust in the following cases:

(a) when the opponent is not using true violence, as when he merely
prays and hopes that you may die or be killed;

(b) when he is not using actual violence, as when he is disarmed or
helpless, or when he has only threatened to kill you in the future, or
to bring you to the gallows by his testimony or vote.

1830. Must one wait, then, until the aggressor has actually attacked,
before using self-defense? (a) One need not wait until physical
aggression has started (e.g., until the adversary has fired a shot or
struck a blow); otherwise self-defense would very often be futile. (b)
One should wait until moral aggression has been shown before proceeding
to defense; that is, the other party must perform some external act
which according to the judgment of a prudent person at the time and
place is one with the act of physical aggression, as when an angry man
reaches for a gun or knife, or a desperado advances in a threatening
manner.

1831. The aggression must also be unjust or contrary to the right of
the person attacked. (a) Thus, if the aggression is just, it is not
lawful to kill the aggressor. Hence, it is not lawful to kill an
officer of the law who is making an arrest, or guarding a prisoner, or
leading him to execution. (b) If the aggression is not just,
self-defense is lawful. It makes no difference whether the aggression
is formally unjust (e.g., when the aggressor attacks you because he
wishes to wreak revenge, or because he fears you), or only materially
unjust (e.g., when you are a stranger to the aggressor, but he is
drunk, or a dope fiend, or a maniac). Similarly, a son may defend
himself against his parent, a subject against his superior, a layman
against a cleric, an adulterer against the injured husband, a
calumniator against the person calumniated; for authority or personal
injury suffered does not give these persons the right to inflict by
private authority the punishment of death.

1832. Self-defense must be merely a protection of self against future
evil and not a punishment of the aggressor for past attacks, for
capital punishment belongs to society, not to private persons. Hence,
if an aggressor has taken to flight, or has been disarmed, or knocked
senseless, or has begged for mercy, it is not permissible to kill him.

1833. Self-defense must be moderate, for injury or the death of a human
being is a thing that should be avoided when possible. (a) Thus, the
person attacked must not reply with force at all, if this is possible.
He should escape, or call a policeman, or throw the weapon out of the
window, etc., if these means will suffice. Some authors excuse from
flight those who would suffer disgrace if they ran away from danger,
such as those who are pugilists or professional fighting men. (b) The
person attacked should use only such force as is necessary, if force
must be employed. Thus, if the aggressor can be made helpless by the
use of gas, permanent bodily harm should not be done him; if he can be
subdued with the fists, knife or pistol wounds should not be resorted
to; if wounds will suffice to hold him at bay (e.g., by blackjacking),
killing should not be resorted to. In the heat of a fight, however, the
person assailed sometimes unintentionally goes beyond what moderation
requires.

1834. The intention of the person who uses force to repel an unjust
aggressor must be good. (a) Thus, as his end he must intend only the
preservation of his own life and look upon the death of his neighbor as
a misfortune. (b) As the means to this end he must intend only to stop
the attack that is being made, not to bring on the death of the
aggrcssor. Those who are commissioned by public authority to put a
human being to death (e.g., the public executioner or soldiers in time
of war) may intend these homicides, since they are means to the common
good; but the death of one private person is not a means to the good of
another private person, and hence it should not be directly aimed at.

1835. The mind of the person who defends himself against the unjust
aggressor must also be free from sinful dispositions, such as hatred
and revenge; otherwise he sins against charity. Our Lord reprobated the
teaching of the Scribes that it is lawful to return injury for injury
in a revengeful spirit, and declared that one should prefer to receive
a second blow rather than return a blow for the sake of revenge (Matt.,
v. 38 sqq.; cfr. also Rom., xii. 19).

1836. When Self-Defense Is Obligatory.--Self-defense is sometimes an
obligation. (a) Thus, it is an obligation, if the only factors
considered are the life of the guilty aggressor and the life of the
innocent person who is assailed; for the life of the innocent should
not be sacrificed for the guilty, and charity indicates that the first
duty of the person attacked is to himself. (b) It is an obligation, if,
on account of circumstances, the person attacked owes it to others to
preserve his life--for example, if he is the father of a dependent
family, or a public official whose life is very necessary for the
welfare of the community, or whose office it is to resist those who
menace public security. This is true from the viewpoint of society
also, for the world needs the good men it has, while there are too many
wicked men already.

1837. Sometimes self-defense is not obligatory. (a) Thus, it is merely
optional, when no duty to others commands self-defense and a divine
counsel invites one to omit it (see 1169). Hence, if the assailant is
certainly in mortal sin, while the person assailed is certainly in the
state of grace, it would be very commendable to die rather than kill
the assailant, in order to grant him time for repentance. But a case of
this kind is rather theoretical than practical, for how could one be
sure that the assailant would profit by the opportunity allowed him of
doing penance? At any rate, the sacrifice is optional, for the
aggressor is either formally unjust, and hence not in extreme spiritual
need, or only materially unjust, and it will be uncertain whether he is
in spiritual need or whether, if he is in such need, the respite will
be used by him (see 1165 sqq.). (b) Self-defense is unlawful according
to some, if the life of the assailant is necessary for the common good,
and the life of the person assailed is not necessary. But this would be
a very rare case.

1838. Defense of Neighbor’s Life.--The principles on defense of one’s
own life against an unjust aggressor, even at cost of the latter’s
life, may be applied to the life of an innocent third party.

(a) Thus, it is necessary to defend the innocent person, even if the
aggressor has to be killed, when one is bound to give this protection
by natural duty (e.g., because the innocent person is one’s child or
father and the aggressor is not a relative), or by contract (e.g.,
because one is a hired bodyguard or policeman).

(b) It is lawful to defend the innocent person, even if the aggressor
has to be killed, and even though there is no duty of nature or
contract to give this protection (Exod., ii, 12). But it is disputed
whether it is also necessary to do this. The affirmative opinion calls
attention to the extreme bodily need of the innocent party, the
negative to the extreme spiritual need of the aggressor. It is not
necessary to risk one’s life in order to protect the life of the
innocent party, unless the public safety is in peril, or one has
undertaken this obligation (see 1169).

1839. A private individual may defend life at the cost of the life of
an unjust aggressor, because he is obliged or permitted to protect the
life that has more of a claim on him. He may also defend certain other
most important goods that belong to him or to his neighbor, even if
need be at the cost of the unjust aggressor’s life, because the common
good is more valuable than the life of the aggressor, and the defense
of those goods is bound up with the common good. Thus, if it were not
permissible to defend valuable property even to the extent of killing a
burglar, criminals would be encouraged, peaceful citizens would be at a
disadvantage, and the public security would greatly suffer. Among the
goods now spoken of are goods of fortune and goods of body. It is not
always obligatory, however, to exercise the right of extreme
self-defense (e.g., in case of violation, provided no consent is given
the deed).

1840. Defense of Goods of Fortune Against an Unjust Aggressor.--(a) If
the attack is equivalent to an attack on life (e.g., the aggressor
wishes to take the last loaf from a starving man or the plank from a
drowning man), or if it seems to be an attack on life (e.g., the
burglar enters a room as if he meant to kill), the killing of the
unjust aggressor is not unlawful, as is clear from the previous
paragraphs.

(b) If the attack is made on goods of fortune only, but they are of
great value and actually possessed, the question is disputed. According
to some, killing in this case is unlawful, because life is more
valuable than property; but the common opinion is that killing is
lawful, both because Scripture excuses the person who kills the
nocturnal robber (Exod., xxii. 2), and because the public safety is at
stake and therefore justifies extreme measures.

(c) If the attack is made only on goods of fortune, and they are not
yet possessed (e.g., a legacy one hopes to obtain) or have only a small
value (e.g., one gold piece), killing is unlawful; for there is no
proportion between external goods that are only hoped for or that are
of minor importance and the life of a human being. Pope Innocent XI
condemned the teaching that one may use homicidal defense to protect a
coin or the prospect of receiving an office.

1841. Defense of Bodily Purity Against an Unjust Aggressor.--(a) If the
attack is equivalent to an attack on life, or seems to be an attack on
life, self-defense even by killing is lawful, and hence it may be
permissible to kill one who is attempting rape.

(b) If the attack is on bodily purity only, but _per actum consummatum
luxuriae_, the question is controverted. One opinion is that killing may
not be resorted to, for the aggressor cannot take away purity of soul,
and the purity of body that he violates is less good than life. The
opposite opinion holds that killing may be employed in self-defense,
since bodily purity has a higher value than even notable goods of
fortune, especially as violation is usually accompanied by spiritual
damage or disgrace of family, etc.; and the public interest demands
that such outrages be sternly suppressed on account of the strong
inclination of many persons to commit them.

(c) If the attack is on bodily purity only, and _per actum
non-consummatum luxuriae_ (e.g., _per osculum vel amplexum_), killing is
not justified, but other means of defense, such as blows or wounds, may
be used.

1842. Defense of Bodily Integrity Against an Unjust Aggressor.--(a) If
the attack is equivalent to an attack on life (e.g., if the aggressor
intends to mutilate or wound, but there is danger that he will kill),
defense even with resultant killing is lawful.

(b) If the attack is not equivalent to an attack on life, but is very
notable (as when a principal member will be lost or the person horribly
disfigured), some authorities claim that defense which would cause the
aggressor’s death is unlawful, because death is too heavy a price to
pay for wounds. But against this it may be argued that the loss of
limbs or organs is more serious than the loss of money, and, in some
respects, is more damaging than violation. The civil law gives a person
the right to protect himself in body and limbs, even by killing the
assailant when absolutely necessary.

(c) If the attack menaces only a minor detriment (e.g., a black eye or
bloody nose), certainly killing is unjustified. But the person attacked
may hit harder and oftener than the assailant, if he is able, so that
the latter may beware of him another time.

1843. Defense of Honor or Reputation.--When honor or reputation is
unjustly attacked, the more perfect course is to bear the injury
patiently and to pardon the offense, according to the teaching of
Christ. But it is not sinful to defend honor and reputation, just as it
is not sinful to defend life, limbs and property. How far may one go in
defense of honor or reputation against an unjust aggressor?

(a) If the aggression is merely in words (as when the offender calls
the other party a liar, or says that he is illegitimate), it is not
lawful to use violence, at least such as would cause death; for there
are other and less drastic means of defense that suffice (e.g., to
answer the allegations, or even to retort the same epithets against the
aggressor), and, unless the violence of even justifiable resentment
were restrained, the world would be filled with disorder and homicidal
violence. Innocent XI and Alexander VII condemned the doctrine that one
may kill in order to prevent the spread of calumny.

(b) If the aggression is in deeds (as when the offender slaps the other
person or throws mud or rotten eggs at him), it is not lawful to kill;
for here also defense can be made in other ways (e.g., by bringing the
aggressor before the court for punishment, or, if this cannot be done,
by returning slap for slap, etc.). Innocent XI rejected the proposition
that it is lawful to kill the aggressor who gave one a blow and then
fled. It is only when the aggressor is continuing his attack, and
imperilling the innocent party in life or limb, that the latter may
repel the extreme force by extreme force.

1844. Killing of the Innocent.--So far we have spoken of the killing of
malefactors and unjust aggressors, which under certain conditions is
not sinful. The next subject is the killing of the innocent, that is,
of those who are neither malefactors nor unjust aggressors worthy of
death.

(a) The killing of the innocent by human authority, if it is done
directly and intentionally, is always sinful, whether the cause be a
private individual or society. But since God is the Master of life and
death, He could command the death of an innocent person, as was done
when he bade Abraham to sacrifice his son (Gen., xxii. 12).

(b) The killing of the innocent, if it is indirect and unintentional,
is not sinful when there is a serious reason for performing an act from
which the killing results; for it is lawful to perform an act from
which two effects follow, if the good is intended but the evil only
permitted, and there is a sufficient justifying reason (see 103 sqq.).

1845. Unlawful killing of the innocent is a most heinous crime.

(a) It is an injury to the rights of God over human life, and is
forbidden in the Fifth Commandment of the Decalogue: “Thou shalt not
kill” (Exod., xx. 13). To judges the special command was given: “The
innocent and just person thou shalt not put to death” (Exod., xxiii.
7). The man-slayer destroys the image of God, a crime so detestable
that in Scripture God declares that He will revenge the blood of man,
even though shed by a beast (Gen., ix. 5; Exod., xxi. 28).

(b) It is a most grave sin against the individual, for it deprives him
of his chief natural good and the means of securing and enjoying many
great spiritual goods. If the person killed desired or asked for death,
no injustice is done to him, since he waived his right, but
uncharitableness is committed, since the neighbor’s life should be
loved, and the uncharitableness is greater according as the person is
more worthy of love. Scripture numbers murder among the sins that cry
to heaven for vengeance (Gen., iv. 10, ix. 5).

(c) It is an outrage against society, for such killing unduly deprives
the community of one of its members, causes scandal and disturbs the
peace. Hence, the law has always inflicted the severest punishment on
slayers of the innocent.

1846. Since the end does not justify the means, the following ends do
not justify the direct and intentional killing of innocent persons:

(a) the public good does not excuse, for example, if an enemy were to
threaten destruction against a city unless it put to death an innocent
person who dwelt in its borders. The criminal on account of his
lawlessness is an obstacle to the common good, but the law-abiding
citizen promotes the common good and it would be harmful to the public
peace if he could be put to death without any fault of his own. The
State is for the citizen, not the citizen for the State. But if the
common safety depended on the sacrifice of one man’s life, charity and
patriotism would require this man to make the sacrifice spontaneously
(see 1169); that is, he should deliver himself to the enemy, and were
he to refuse, it seems the community would have the right to deliver
him. Similarly, it is not lawful to kill hostages, even though the
enemy has broken faith, or killed one’s subjects;

(b) the private good of other individuals does not excuse; for example,
it is not lawful to kill a maniac lest he do harm to those around him,
at least unless the conditions of unjust aggression are fulfilled.
Similarly, it is not lawful to kill a woman with child, in order to
baptize the child;

(c) the private good of the individual himself does not excuse; for
example, it is not lawful to shoot or poison those who are mortally
wounded or suffering from an incurable disease, or who are old and
helpless, in order to spare them suffering. But one may give a person
at the point of death a medicine that may hasten the end, if there is
good hope that it will cure him and other remedies are futile, for the
purpose is not to kill but to cure (see 2485). It is lawful also for
embalmers to puncture the heart or sever an artery of a person who
seems to be dead, if there are certain signs of his death, for the
purpose is not to kill this person, but to free his friends from fear
that he is buried alive.

1847. Indirect or Unintentional Killing of the Innocent.--Indirect and
unintentional killing of the innocent is lawful (1872) only when there
is a reason of sufficient gravity (i.e., one of a value proportionate
to the life of the innocent person).

(a) The public safety is such a sufficient reason. Thus, in time of war
it is lawful to attack a city, even though the death of many
non-combatants will result, or to charge the enemy, even though
innocent persons have been placed by the latter as a shield to his
front ranks.

(b) Private safety from death is not a sufficient reason, if it does
not compensate for the loss, or if it is secured unlawfully (see 104).
Thus, if Balbus cannot escape from an unjust aggressor without running
down and killing an unbaptized infant or a man whose life is very
necessary for the community, the temporal life of Balbus does not
compensate for eternal life lost by the infant in the first instance,
and the mere private good of Balbus does not compensate for the public
good sacrificed in the second instance. Again, if Caius cannot escape
from drowning without pushing a shipwrecked companion from the only
plank which is insufficient for both, or if Sempronius who has been
sentenced to death for crime cannot escape execution unless he kills
his guard, the means of securing safety are unlawful.

(c) Private safety from death is a sufficient reason, if it compensates
for the loss and is secured lawfully. Hence, if the life of the
innocent person is only of equal importance, self-defense against an
unjust aggressor by means of flight that will involve the innocent
person’s death does not make one guilty of homicide (e.g., Titus is
speeding in his car in order to escape a pursuer bent on murder and he
cannot avoid hitting and killing a cripple who crosses the road). If
self-defense is conducted by means of attack, one may use violence
against the aggressor (e.g., one may shoot at him, although an innocent
person whom he is using as a shield will be killed), but not against
the innocent person (e.g., one may not shoot at the innocent person in
order to deprive the aggressor of his shield, nor may one hold the
innocent person before one in order that he receive the assailant’s
bullet).

1848. Destruction of the Unborn.--(a) Direct and intentional
destruction of this kind is unlawful and is known as feticide, when the
fetus is killed within the womb, or abortion, when a non-viable fetus
is expelled from the womb. It is not abortion to hasten the birth of a
viable fetus (i.e., one which is about six or seven months old and can
live outside the womb), since the child can be kept alive, but grave
reasons are required to make it licit, since it presents a risk to the
child’s life. But to deliver or expel a non-viable fetus is abortion.
Every direct abortion is regarded by the Catholic Church as murder and
is penalized with the censure of excommuuication (Canon 2550, Sec. 1).
It might be argued that the direct killing of what is surely a human
being is murder, but when does the fetus become a human being? The
ancient theory of Aristotle, followed by St. Thomas and most medieval
authors, maintains that the embryo did not become human until some
time after conception, an opinion that still has great probability
physically. Others maintain that animation is simultaneous with
conception. Since we do not know the exact moment of animation, the
moment of conception must be accepted in practice as the beginning of
human life. Probabilism is ruled out in this instance, for there is no
doubt about the law and its application: we must not directly kill what
is probably a human being. Accordingly, abortion is considered to be
murder. Hence, even in the case of a girl who has been raped--although
it is a probable opinion that measures may be taken to remove the semen
from-her body--it would be gravely sinful to give any treatment which
would abort an impregnated ovum.

(b) Indirect and unintentional killing, or rather permission of death,
is not unlawful in such a case, when there is a proportionately grave
reason, such as the life of the mother. Thus, it is permissible to
give the mother a remedy necessary to cure a mortal disease (e.g.,
medicinal drugs, baths, injections, or operations on the uterus), even
though this will bring on abortion or the death of the fetus; for the
mother is not obliged to prefer the temporal life of the child to
her own life. But the baptism of the child must be attended to, for
its salvation depends on the Sacrament, and the eternal life of the
child is to be preferred to the temporal life of the mother, if the
conditions of 1166 are verified.

(c) Contemporary moral opinion considers that in tubal pregnancies
(ectopic gestation) the tube itself is in a pathological condition long
before rupture of the tube, as experts in obstetrics teach, and hence
can be excised as a diseased organ of the human body. As such, the
excision of such a tube would be in itself a morally indifferent act
and, granting verification of the other conditions for the principle
of double effect, could be licitly performed. (For a history of the
moral question, medical testimony and full argumentation see Chapter X
of _Medical Ethics_ by Charles J. McFadden, O.S.A.) Some theologians,
however, believe that the tube cannot be removed unless it can be
proved in each case that a pathological condition, placing the woman
in danger of death, exists. The first view is accepted as sufficiently
safe to be followed in practice. (See Francis J. Connell, C.SS.R.,
_Morals in Politics and Professions_, p. 118.)

1849. It is unlawful positively to kill the mother in order that the
unborn child may be saved or baptized. When a caesarean section offers
the sole chance of saving the mother’s life, it is permitted. It is
seriously doubtful whether a mother is morally obliged to undergo the
operation in situations where a threat to her life exists. In this
case, if baptism in the uterus is possible without increasing the
danger to the mother’s life, it should be attempted. When a caesarean
section does not offer any chance of saving the mother’s life, but will
directly contribute to her death, the operation should not be
performed. One must await the death of the mother and then observe the
norm of Canon 746; “Immediately after the death of a pregnant woman, a
caesarean section should be done in order that the fetus may be
baptized.” The procedure to be followed is outlined in medical-ethics
books. (See McFadden op. cit., pp. 244 ff.)

1850. Direction in Cases of Doubt, Ignorance, or Error.--(a) In case of
doubt, if there are positive and solid reasons for believing that an
operation performed to save a woman’s life will not be destructive of
the life of a fetus, the operation seems lawful; for in doubt, the
woman, as the certain possessor of life, has the presumption.

(b) In case of ignorance or error (e.g., when a penitent asks whether a
certain operation is permissible, or a surgeon in good faith performs
an operation that is not lawful), either a truthful answer should be
given to questions, or silence should be observed when an admonition
would only be harmful (e.g., if to require the Caesarean operation from
a dying mother would have no other result than to make her die in bad
faith instead of good faith).

1851. Canonical Penalties for Homicide and Abortion.--(a) Homicide, if
voluntary, produces irregularity (Canon 985, n. 4) and subjects the
guilty party to exclusion from legitimate ecclesiastical acts or to
degradation from the ecclesiastical state (Canon 2354). Moreover, a
church is violated by the crime of homicide (Canon 1172). (b) Abortion
of a human fetus, when the effect is produced, brings irregularity on
those who procure it and also on the cooperators (Canon 985, n. 4).
Moreover, those who procure abortion effectively, the mother not
excepted, incur excommunication _latae sententiae_ reserved to the
Ordinary, and, if clerics, they are to be deposed (Canon 2350).

1852. Suicide.--Suicide, or the killing of oneself, is, like homicide
in general, of various kinds.

(a) Thus, in reference to the intention, it is voluntary or
involuntary, according as it proceeds from knowledge and choice, or as
it is committed without realization of what is done or without the
intention to produce death. Examples of involuntary suicide are a
person who is temporarily insane on account of impending calamity and
drowns himself, and a person who, attempting to frighten another by
pretending to hang himself, actually strangles to death. It would be a
mistake to say that no person who commits suicide is free, but no doubt
a large percentage of those who kill themselves are not responsible for
their act.

(b) In reference to the mode, suicide is direct, if that which is done
tends from its nature to the death of the person who does it (e.g.,
firing a pistol into one’s brain); it is indirect, if that which is
done tends from its nature to another end (e.g., to struggle with a
criminal who is firing a revolver). Direct suicide is committed in many
ways, all of which can be reduced to positive (e.g., the eating or
drinking of deadly poison) and negative (e.g., the refusal to eat or
drink anything).

1853. The difference between direct and indirect suicide is also
explained as follows: (a) direct suicide is an act or omission that has
but one effect, namely, death (e.g., taking deadly poison); (b)
indirect suicide is an act or omission that has two effects, one of
which is the peril of death. This peril of death is certain, if death
always follows (e.g., jumping from the roof of a skyscraper);
proximate, if death usually follows (e.g., jumping from a third- or
fourth-story window); remote, if death now and then follows (e.g.,
jumping from a second-story window).

1854. Sinfulness of Suicide.--Voluntary and direct suicide is always a
most grave sin, if committed without due authority (i.e., the command
of God).

(a) It is a grave injury against the rights of God, for it usurps His
authority, refuses Him the service He desires, spurns the gift He has
bestowed, dishonors the image of God (Gen., ix. 6), and destroys the
property of God: “Thou, O Lord, hast the power of life and death”
(Wis., xvi. 13).

(b) It is an offense against society, for the community has a right to
be benefited by the lives of its members, and to receive a return for
the protection and assistance it affords them. Moreover, death by
suicide is usually felt as a great sorrow and disgrace by the relatives
of the departed, and it has a demoralizing effect on many persons of
suggestible minds. The fact that the death of this or that man is not
felt as a loss by a family or the State, but rather as a relief, is no
argument; for if suicide were left to human decision, how many fatal
mistakes would be made (see 460)! Persons valuable to society would
rashly kill themselves, fearing in a mood of depression that they were
worthless; others who could contribute nothing in material ways would
destroy themselves and deprive their fellow-men of an example of
fortitude, or at least of the opportunity of showing charity and mercy
to the needy.

(c) Direct and voluntary suicide is a sin against the deepest natural
inclination, for self-preservation is called the first law of nature
(see 298), and also against that love of self which charity requires
(see 1136 sqq.). Since charity to self is more obligatory than charity
to the neighbor, suicide is a more serious sin than other forms of
homicide. Nor is it excused by the desire of some good for self. The
suicide does not better himself by his act, for, since he has not
fulfilled his trust in this life, what can he expect in the next life?
He escapes the lesser evils of physical miseries or moral temptations,
but he incurs the greater evils of physical death and of moral
cowardice and defeat, to say nothing of his punishment in the hereafter.

1855. Cooperation in Suicide.--Cooperation in suicide has the guilt of
unlawful homicide. (a) Thus, those who incite, advise, command, or
assist another to commit suicide are guilty of moral murder. (b) Those
who carry out together a suicide pact are guilty both of suicide and of
moral murder.

1856. Permission or Authorization to Commit Suicide.--(a) Divine
authority could command or permit suicide, since God has the power over
life and death. But whether God has ever done this is uncertain. Some
argue for the affirmative from the death of Sampson, who pulled down
the house upon himself saying: “Let me die with the Philistines”
(Judges, xvi. 30), and of Razias who killed himself to escape ill-usage
(II Mach., xiv. 37 sqq.), and from the acts of certain female martyrs
who from love of God or from the desire to preserve chastity rushed to
their deaths. But others think that invincible ignorance may explain
these cases. The act of Sampson may also be understood as indirect
suicide lawfully committed for the public good of his country.

(b) Human authority, according to some authors, could authorize a
condemned malefactor really guilty of a capital crime to execute
himself; for, they argue, there is little difference between opening
one’s mouth to swallow poison administered by an executioner and taking
it with one’s own hands, as was done by Socrates. Others deny that God
has given the State the authority to order suicide, and they declare
that it is both unnecessary and inhuman to force a condemned man to be
his own executioner. Still others believe that the State could command
self-execution, at least in necessity, but that such a punishment is so
strange, cruel and unnatural that it should be avoided; for, if it is
shocking to ask a father to execute his child, much more shocking would
it be to ask a man to kill himself. The argument is inconclusive which
says that because it is lawful to perform an act preparatory for death,
but which is indifferent and would never cause death (such as opening
the mouth for poison), it is also lawful to perform the act which
inflicts death (such as taking the poison).

1857. Indirect Suicide.--Indirect suicide is committed when one is the
cause of an act or omission, indifferent in itself, but from which one
foresees as a result that one’s life will be lost or notably shortened,
This kind of “suicide” is lawful when and if the conditions for a case
of double effect are present--in other words, if there is a
proportionately grave reason for permitting the evil effect (see 103
sqq.). The following reasons are considered sufficient:

(a) the public good, for the welfare of society is a greater good than
the life of an individual. Eleazar is praised because he exposed
himself to death in order to deliver his people (I Mach., vi. 43 sqq.).
It is not sinful, then, but rather obligatory for a soldier to advance
against the enemy or to blow up an enemy fortification, though it be
certain that his own death will result; nor is it wrong for a pastor to
go about ministering to his flock during a pestilence, though it be
certain that he will fall a victim to the plague. Explorers and
experimenters may also risk their lives for the advancement of science;

(b) the good of another suffices for indirect suicide, when he is in
extreme spiritual need. Indeed, there may be an obligation of charity
to risk one’s life for the salvation of a soul (see 1166). Hence, it is
lawful to go as a missionary to a country whose climate is so trying
that strangers die there after a few years;

(c) the higher good of self (i.e., the good of virtue) justifies
indirect suicide, when there is an urgent reason for exercising a
virtue in spite of the peril of death. Thus, for the sake of charity a
shipwrecked passenger may yield his place in the life-boat to his
parent, wife, friend, or neighbor; for the sake of faith, one may
refuse to flee in time of persecution (see 1006), or may refuse and
should refuse to take food or drink offered as a mark of idolatry; for
the sake of chastity a virgin, at the peril of her life, may jump from
a high window or resist the assailant, although it does not seem that
this is obligatory if no internal consent will be given to the rape;
for the sake of justice, a criminal in the death house who has an
opportunity to escape from prison, may decide to remain and be
executed, or a malefactor condemned to die by starvation may refuse to
take food secretly brought him; for the sake of mortification, one may
practise moderate austerities, as by fastings, watchings, scourgings,
hair-shirts, etc., which sometimes shorten life, though generally they
lengthen it;

(d) the preferable temporal good of self suffices, that is, one may
risk the danger of death to escape another danger that is more likely
to happen or more terrible. Thus, a man in a burning building may leap
from a high window, even though death from the fall is almost certain,
for death by burning is more terrible; a prisoner who is about to be
tortured to death may make a break for liberty if he sees a chance of
escape, for death is more certain if he remains. On the same principle,
one may engage in hazardous but useful occupations, such as working on
high buildings, or as a diver or miner, for it is better to live a
shorter time with employment and the necessities of life, and to be of
service to the public, than to live a longer time without these
advantages. But a worker should not undertake dangerous tasks for which
he is unfitted or unprepared, and the employer is bound to safeguard
the lives of the workers.

1858. The same reasons are not sufficient in all cases. (a) Thus, the
greater the risk of death, the more serious the reason required. Hence,
to save the money one has it might be lawful to jump from a
second-story window, but not from a higher window when the fall would
most likely kill one. (b) The more immediate the danger of death, the
more serious the reason required. Thus, to save money one might
lawfully enter a quarantined house, but the risk would not be permitted
if the house were tottering in an earthquake. (c) The more notable the
shortening of life, the greater the reason needed to permit it. Thus,
if the practice of a certain mortification or labor reduces the
expectancy of life for a few years, a lesser reason suffices than if it
reduces the expectancy for ten or more years.

1859. Indirect suicide is unlawful and has the guilt of self-murder
when the reason for risking death is frivolous or insufficient or
sinful.

(a) Examples of insufficient reasons are found in the cases of persons
who engage in occupations or actions that are very dangerous to life or
limb but of little public or private value, as when for the sake of
performing a feat a man walks a tight-rope, pricks himself with pins
and needles, or puts his head into a lion’s mouth. But if the performer
is very skillful and has no other means of livelihood, it seems that he
may exercise his art for the sake of entertainment.

(b) Examples of sinful reasons for risking death are found in persons
who abbreviate their lives by over-eating, drunkenness, habitual
indulgence in strong spirits, or immoderate passion of any kind; and
also in those who refuse to make use of the ordinary means for the
preservation of health (see 1566 sqq.) or of the ordinary remedies
against disease (see 1571). It is not necessary that one be anxious to
live long (see 1063), but it is obligatory to use the normal means for
the preservation of life, and those who notably neglect these means are
guilty of indirect suicide.

1860. Is it suicidal to refuse a surgical operation pronounced
necessary for life?

(a) If the operation is likely to be successful and there is no good
reason for refusing it, it seems that one may not refuse it without the
guilt of indirect suicide, although one might be excused on account of
good faith.

(b) If the success of the operation is doubtful, or if there is a good
reason for refusing, one who refuses is not guilty of suicide. Among
the good reasons are spiritual ones (e.g., modesty, the fear of falling
into blasphemy or despair under the pain are given by some writers)
and temporal ones (e.g., the poverty that would be brought upon the
patient’s family or the hardship that would result for the patient
himself).

1861. Canonical Penalties for Suicide.--(a) Those who attempt suicide
are irregular _ex delicto_ (Canon 985, n. 5). (b) If they die, they are
not given ecclesiastical burial unless they gave signs of repentance
before death (Canon 1240, n, 3), and, if they recover, they are subject
to various penalties (Canon 2350, Sec. 2). (c) If it is doubtful
whether a person committed suicide, or was responsible, the doubt is
decided in his favor, provided no scandal is likely.

1862. Accidental Homicide.--Accidental homicide is that which happens
without any direct purpose to kill. But the following cases should be
distinguished:

(a) when the homicide is not voluntary, either in itself or in its
cause (see 35, 94), that is, when the slayer had no intention to kill
and could not foresee that death would result from his act or omission;

(b) when the homicide is voluntary only in its cause, inasmuch as the
person who kills is guilty of negligence in a lawful thing, or of
something unlawful, and death results from the negligence or from that
which is unlawful, although there was no direct wish to kill.

1863. The Case of One From Whose Lawful Act or Omission Homicide
Accidentally Results.--(a) If this person was not guilty of negligence,
he is not responsible for the resultant homicide, since it was not
voluntary, either directly or indirectly. Thus, if a man who was said
to be dead, but who knows nothing about the report, calls at his home
and his wife drops dead on seeing him, he is not responsible for her
death.

(b) If the person in question was negligent, he is guilty of homicide
in a greater or less degree according to the seriousness of his
neglect. Thus, a sane man who flourishes a loaded revolver in a crowded
room is responsible if the revolver goes off and kills someone present;
but a nurse who leaves a sick room for just a moment with the result
that her patient falls out of bed and is killed, is only slightly
responsible at the most, if there was little reason to expect what
happened.

1864. The Case of One From Whose Unlawful Act or Omission Homicide
Accidentally Results.--(a) If this person was not negligent and his
conduct was not dangerous to the lives of others, he is not guilty of
homicide; for the death that ensued was not voluntary, either directly
or indirectly. Thus, if a thief is driving away carefully with a stolen
automobile and a reckless pedestrian gets in front of the car and is
killed, the driver is guilty of theft, but not of homicide.

(b) If the person in question was not negligent but his conduct was
nevertheless dangerous to the lives of others, he is guilty of
homicide; for the death that followed was voluntary indirectly, since
he could have foreseen the homicide and should have avoided the
conduct. Thus, if a person strikes lightly a pregnant woman and she
suffers an abortion, or if one who is not a surgeon tries to mutilate
an innocent person and kills him, he is responsible for the death,
since the acts committed remained dangerous to life, no matter how
careful the offender may have been to avoid killing.

1865. Moral and Legal Guilt.--The law may hold one responsible for
homicide, even though there is no theological guilt (see 1766 sqq.).
(a) Thus, one may be held responsible for the consequence of acts only
juridically negligent, as when an automobilist while driving at a speed
unreasonable in law, but not in fact, kills a pedestrian. (b) One may
be held responsible for acts committed by those subject to one’s care
or control, as when a man keeps a dog loose not knowing that it is
vicious and it kills a neighbor’s child, or when he illegally lends his
car to a minor, thinking the latter is a good driver, and the minor
carelessly runs down a person in the road.

1866. Bodily Injuries.-Injustice is done not only by destroying the
life of a human being, but also by harming him in his rights to bodily
integrity or well-being. The chief bodily injuries are the following:

(a) mutilation, which deprives a person of limbs or members, without
inflicting death;

(b) wounding, which by an act of violence (such as a stab or blow)
breaks the continuity of the body, or impairs its strength or beauty;

(c) enfeeblement, which impairs or destroys the health, strength, or
comfort of the body in unlawful ways (e.g., by deprivation of necessary
food, sleep, fresh air, by communication of infection, by beating,
hazing, etc.);

(d) restraint, which hinders the lawful exercise of the bodily powers
(e.g., by holding a person against his will, by chaining him to a post,
by locking him in a room).

1867. Mutilation. In general, any kind of act which injures or impairs
bodily integrity is called mutilation. In the strict sense, mutilation
is any cutting off, or some equivalent action, through which an organic
function or a distinct use of a member is suppressed or directly
diminished. Accordingly, three distinct types of mutilation are
possible: (a) when a part of the body with a distinct function is
excised; (b) when a distinct organic function is totally suppressed,
without excision of the organ; (c) when the function is directly
lessened or partially suppressed.

1868. Morality. (a) Liceity. The basic principle governing the morality
of mutilation is: Man is not the master of his own life, but only the
custodian. Accordingly, neither is he master of his own body. Thus,
Pope Pius XII, speaking of the “Surgeon’s Noble Vocation” (_The
Catholic Mind_, Aug. 1948, pp. 490 ff.), declared: “God alone is Lord
of the life and integrity of man, Lord of his members, his organs, his
potencies, particularly of those which make him an associate in the
work of creation. Neither parents, nor spouse, nor the individual in
question may dispose of them at will.”

As steward, man has duties toward his body, its health and welfare,
according to the norms of reason and the divine law, so that it may be
a means of his attaining life with God. Acting in accord with these
norms and the end of life, it may become necessary and licit for man to
mutilate his body in order to safeguard health or to save his life. The
principle expressing the morality of mutilation, known as the principle
of totality (Pius XII, _Nous vous saluons_, AAS 45-674), may be
formulated: Man may licitly mutilate his body only insofar as this is
expedient for the good of the whole. In fact, such mutilation is often
obligatory, since one must use ordinary means to protect his life and
health, and since the part is for the whole. Thus, one would be bound
to undergo an operation for appendicitis in order to save one’s life.

Although an organ be not diseased, it may under certain circumstances
be removed. Thus, a surgeon operating for hernia may remove a healthy
appendix, should the danger of adhesions be foreseen that would require
a later operation. Nor is it necessary that there be a “present”
danger. The words of Pope Pius XII, that mutilations are permissible
when required “to avoid ... serious and lasting damage” (AAS 44-782),
are suggestive of the liceity of prophylactic operations. (See
medical-ethics texts for special cases, such as lobotomy, thalamotomy,
experimentation, etc.)

The problem of mutilation involved in organic transplantation for the
benefit of a neighbor is highly controverted at the present time, Pope
Pius XII discussed the legality of corneal transplants from the dead to
the living (_The Pope Speaks_, Autumn, 1956, pp. 198 ff.), but he did
not touch the matter of transplants from living bodies. In this
controversial matter, the following principles seem to be clear:

1) Mutilation for the good of the neighbor cannot be justified by the
principle of totality, for the subordination implied in the principle
is characteristic of a physical, not a moral, not even the Mystical,
body.

2) Minor mutilations, such as skin grafts or blood transfusions, are
certainly permissible. The speculative basis is still a matter of
dispute.

3) It is solidly probable extrinsically that organic transplantations
may be permitted, possibly out of charity and for a proportionate
reason. Some contend, however, that the act of mutilation involved is
intrinsically evil and can not be justified by the extrinsic motive of
charity.

Mutilation is lawful by public authority in punishment of a criminal;
for if the state has the right to inflict death for serious crime, much
more has it the right to indict the lesser punishment of mutilation.
The expediency, however, of exercising the right must be judged in
terms not only of punishment, but also of prevention of crime.
Mutilation has no necessary connection (apart from special
circumstances) with deterring criminals from further crime.

(b) In other cases mutilation is unlawful; for just as man is not the
master of his life, neither is he the master of his limbs, and he
commits a wrong against God, society, and the individual if he destroys
parts of his body when neither public good nor private safety demands
that this can be done. Thus, mutilation of a criminal performed by
private authority is unlawful. Hence, a husband may not mutilate a man
who has broken up his home.

Mutilation of an innocent person that it not necessary for his bodily
safety is unlawful. Even spiritual good is not a sufficient reason; for
example, one may not castrate oneself in order to escape temptation,
for this operation does not take away passion, and, moreover, there are
spiritual means which suffice against temptation. When Our Lord says
that one should cut off a hand or foot that causes scandal (Matt.,
xviii. 8), He is speaking metaphorically of the avoidance of the
occasions of sin. Much less is temporal good a sufficient reason for
mutilation. Hence, a youth may not have his teeth pulled in order to
escape military service; a pauper may not have his arm amputated in
order to get larger alms; a boy may not be castrated in order to give
him a better singing voice; a woman may not have the hysterectomy or
other similar operations performed merely to prevent conception; a man
may not have the operation of vasectomy performed on him in order to
prevent generation.

1869. Morality of Sterilization. Mutilations which frustrate the power
of procreation in men and women are called sterilization. Two kinds are
distinguished; indirect, to remove diseased organs; direct, to prevent
conception.

(a) Indirect sterilization (also called by many therapeutic) is lawful
when it is necessary to save life or health. The ethical principle
involved is the indirect voluntary or the principle of double effect.
Hence, vasectomy may be used to prevent idiocy or death, or to remove
or allay physiological abnormalities that bring on certain sexual
perversities or disturbances, if it is likely that these evils are
imminent or present and that the operation will be beneficial.

(b) Direct sterilization by public authority includes both punitive and
eugenical sterilization. The latter was condemned by Pope Pius XI in
_Casti Connubii_. In context the Holy Father was dealing with the false
claims made in the name of eugenics that the State might legitimately
sterilize those who by reason of hereditary defect might be considered
likely to generate defective offspring. This position is vehemently
rejected: “Public magistrates have no direct power over the bodies of
their subjects. Therefore where no crime has taken place and there is
no cause present for grave punishment, they can never directly harm or
tamper with the integrity of the body, either for the reasons of
eugenics or for any other reason. St. Thomas teaches this when,
inquiring whether human judges for the sake of preventing future evils
can inflict punishment, he admits that the power indeed exists as
regards certain other forms of punishment, but justly and properly
denies it as regards the maiming of the body.”

In the same context, punitive sterilization, whether as punishment for
crime or as deterrent, was also declared to be unlawful. However,
fasciole 14 of the AAS for 1930 emended the text and seems to have
withdrawn the formal condemnation of punitive sterilization. a subject
of theological discussion at the time. The matter had not been closed
and the emendation had the force of reopening the question.

Theological opinion is still divided as to the liceity of punitive
sterilization. Some still maintain that since the state can inflict the
superior penalty of death for serious crime, _a fortiori_ also the
lesser punishment of sterilization. Others deny the liceity, for
sterilization does not achieve the essential purposes of punishment; it
is not corrective, preventive, retributive, or emendatory. Accordingly
punitive sterilization is unreasonable and inconvenient. This latter
view prevails among most modern moral theologians. Confirmation for the
view is sought in the response of the Holy Office (AAS 32-73) that
direct sterilization is prohibited by the law of nature. Since punitive
sterilization has as its immediate effect, whether as an end or as a
means, sterility of the generative potency, it may well fall under the
category of direct and hence also under condemnation of the Holy Office.

1870. Other Bodily Punishments.--Other bodily harms (wounds, blows,
restraint) may not be inflicted except under the following conditions:

(a) there must be sufficient authority. The State, being a perfect
society, has greater coercive power, and may inflict penalties that are
of a permanent character, such as death or mutilation or wounds (e.g.,
by branding); and it may impose restraint, not only from unlawful, but
also from lawful acts. The family, being an imperfect society, has a
limited coercive power, and hence the father, or those who hold his
place (e.g., teachers), may administer corporal chastisements that are
not of an irreparable kind to his children (such as beatings,
whippings). Other persons may punish or restrain only in case of urgent
necessity (e.g., one may hold a stranger who is about to commit murder;
one may chastize a neighboring boy who cannot be kept from depredations
on one’s property in any other way). It is not wrong, however, to
inflict moderate bodily hurts, if the other person is not unwilling and
there is a reasonable purpose, such as exercise, training in the art of
boxing or wrestling, recreation, or mortification;

(b) there must be a sufficient reason for the harm done. The good of
the public is a sufficient reason; for example, when a criminal is
incorrigible and it is dangerous for him to be at large, it is not
unreasonable to give him a life sentence. The good of the individual is
also sufficient; for example, when a surgeon has to wound in order to
cure, when a father has to use the rod in order to improve the child or
to uphold discipline (Prov., xiii. 24, xxiii. 13);

(c) there must be moderation in the harm or pain inflicted. Thus, while
children should not be spoiled, nor prisoners pampered, the other
extreme of maltreatment or torture must be avoided. It is cruel to box
children soundly on the ears, or to push them roughly about, or to tie
them up in the dark, as they may suffer permanent injury from such
methods. Likewise, it is barbarous to send convicts to a place or
prison so horrible that they lose their minds or fall victims to
lingering disease, or to inflict excruciating punishments by rack,
thumb-screw, prolonged scourgings, etc.

1871. Injury to Health.--Harm unjustly done to the health of others is
sinful, and, if the harm is great, the sin is mortal. Examples: (a)
Harm to health is done negatively by omission of duty, as when a
medical man or physical director does not use sufficient care and a
patient thereby suffers detriment to health, or an employer does not
see that his factory or place of business is sanitary, or that the work
is not too exhausting with the result that employees lose their vigor.
(b) Harm to health is done positively by acts or objects that tend to
deprive another of the means to physical well-being (e.g., annoyances,
noises that prevent sleep, adulterated food, maintenance of a nuisance
which creates suffocating smells or harmful vapors, etc.), or that
bring to another the infection of disease (e.g., when a well person is
made to live or room with one who has tuberculosis).

1872. Theft and Robbery.--Having considered the injuries to person
committed by homicide, mutilation, imprisonment, etc., we shall now
take up the injuries to property committed by theft and robbery.
Private ownership of property is allowed by natural and divine law, and
it is necessary when, as at present, human affairs cannot be well
managed under another system. It has its limits, however, since it is
subordinate to the public good, and charity requires that those who
have the goods of this world share them with those who are in need (see
1210 sqq.). The chief titles to private ownership are the following:

(a) original titles, which are those by which one takes possession and
dominion of goods that have never had or have not now an owner, and
these are reduced to two, namely, occupation (i.e., the taking
possession of a material thing) and accession (i.e., the union of a
material thing with one’s property);

(b) derivative titles, which are those by which one obtains dominion,
through transfer of right, of the goods that belong to another. These
titles are produced by the law itself (as in prescription), or by the
law and the free will of man (as in inheritance from testament or from
intestate), or by the free will of man (as in contracts).

1873. The Chief Kinds or Ways of Occupation.--(a) Animals.--Domestic
animals (e.g., dogs, cats) may not be occupied, even though they have
strayed from their owner; tamed animals (e.g., bees, pigeons,
songbirds) may be occupied only when they have recovered their liberty;
wild animals (e.g., birds, foxes, fishes, hares, etc., at large) may
not be occupied, unless they are kept in a small enclosure from which
they cannot escape.

(b) Land and Plants. These may be occupied only when they have no
present owner.

(c) Treasure-trove.--This is a deposit of precious movables hidden away
so long ago that it is impossible to discover the owner. According to
natural law it may be occupied by the finder, but the civil law
sometimes decides that the find must be divided with the owner of the
place or with the government.

(d) Lost Property.--This embraces those movables which an owner has
recently parted with, through accident or forgetfulness, without any
intention of giving up his ownership of them, and which are now easily
findable, although their owner is not known. The finder is obliged to
make reasonable efforts to find the owner. If he neglects to make these
efforts, proportionate to the worth of the found article, and is
convinced that he might have found the owner, he is considered by some
theologians to be a possessor in bad faith and bound to reserve the
article for the owner or turn it over to the poor or to pious causes.
Having made the effort unsuccessfully, according to natural law, he may
use the article as his own. The prescriptions of civil law as to the
time interval before he may begin to use the article must be observed.

(e) Abandoned Goods.--According to natural law one may occupy goods
voluntarily relinquished by the owner (e.g., an old automobile left by
the roadside), but the civil law sometimes awards certain classes of
goods (e.g., immovables) to the State.

(f) Vacant Goods.--According to natural law the goods of one who died
without heirs may be occupied; but under the civil law they usually
devolve to the State, whether they be movables or immovables.

1874. Principles on Accession.--(a) According to natural law, if the
two things united are separable, then each owner should be given his
own property; but if the things are inseparable and one is more
valuable, the owner of the more valuable part keeps all, but
compensates the owner of the less valuable part; if the things are
inseparable and of equal value, there is joint ownership.

(b) According to positive law, these natural principles are applied to
various cases of accession, whether it be natural (as through growth of
plants or deposit of land by rivers) or artificial (as through change
made in a material by labor, or addition of one substance to another).
These details are treated in books on law.

1875. Prescription.--Prescription laws (see 1798) are valid in
conscience, since they are determinations about property rights made in
the interest of the common welfare. But the following conditions are
required for acquisition of property through prescription:

(a) the object of prescription must be a thing prescriptible according
to natural and positive law. Thus, natural rights and public property
may not be prescribed against;

(b) the subject of prescription must be a person capable of possessing,
and he must be honestly convinced that he has a right to what he
possesses;

(c) the claim of the subject to the object must rest on possession, on
apparent title to the property, and on the lapse of the legal time
during which possession has been held or ownership has remained
undisputed.

1876. Wills.--A will is a declaration made in legal form (i.e., with
the solemnities required by law) of the disposal to be made of one’s
property after one’s death. Defects in a will or legacy sometimes
operate to take away the moral obligations of observing it.

(a) Thus, if the defect is one of natural law (e.g., a will made under
duress), there is no moral right or obligation produced by reason of
the gift.

(b) If the defect is of positive law only and makes the will
rescindable (e.g., a will not subscribed, as by law required, in
presence of the testator), the gift is good in conscience until adverse
decision of court.

(c) If the defect is of positive law only and makes the will _ipso
facto_ invalid (e.g., a legatee acts as witness to a will), the gift is
good in conscience, if there is question of pious causes, since
property donated to God may not be alienated by human laws. But the
Church desires civil formalities to be observed in the making of wills
(Canon 1513).

(d) If the defect is positive and _ipso facto_ invalidating, and there
is question of profane causes, the will is not good in conscience, even
before declaration of court.

1877. Contracts.--A contract may be deined as a mutual agreement
concerning the transfer of a right.

1. A contract is a mutual agreement, i.e., there must be consent of at
least two parties to the same object. An offer made but not accepted is
not a contract, for only one party consents.

2. The contractants transfer a right which produces in most instances
under justice a corresponding obligation of doing or omitting
something. Promises, pledges, pacts, etc., while they impose
obligations based on truthfulness, loyalty, etc., are not contracts.
See 1888 (a).

3. The obligation in justice may be on both sides (bilateral) or only
on one side (unilateral), but consent must be on both sides.

The elements of a contract are made up of essentials and accidentals.
(a) The essentials include the subject-matter, the parties contractant,
their agreement, and the external form that manifests the agreement.
(b) The accidentals include bonds, oaths, conditions and modes.

1878. The subject-matter of a contract--that is, the thing or action or
forbearance with which the agreement is concerned--must have the
following qualities:

(a) it must be something possible, for one may not undertake what one
cannot perform. Thus, one cannot bind oneself by an accessory contract
(such as suretyship), if the principal contract itself is _ipso facto_
invalid. But if the impossibility is only moral (i.e., great
difficulty), one who knowingly undertakes the arduous is bound to
fulfill his promise; if it is only partial, one is held to the part
that is possible; if it is culpable, one is bound to repair damage
caused the other party through non-fulfillment;

(b) it must be something disposable, for one may not transfer that over
which one has no right of control or transfer. Thus, one may not
contract to sell public property that is _extra commercium_, or
property of which one has only the possession, or goods over which
others have a claim (e.g., a debtor may not bestow gifts to the
detriment of creditors’ rights), or goods not transferable for pay
(e.g., payment for a favorable decision by a judge, or property owed to
a third party) or for money (e.g., academic degrees, public offices,
Sacraments, indulgences);

(c) it must be something existent and determinable, for no one wishes
to contract for a right that is valueless and illusory. Thus, one may
not sell shares of a stock company that has no assets, or an indefinite
house or lot or chattel;

(d) it must be something good and lawful, for one may not bind oneself
to iniquity. If it is sinful (e.g., a contract to sell a house in order
to spite a third party), the agreement is _per se_ valid. But if the
substance is evil (e.g., a contract for fornication made with a
prostitute), the agreement is null before the performance of the
promised sin; but it seems to many that after performance of the sin
the promisor is obliged to pay the money promised, unless the law makes
the contract void (see 1886 c). If the law merely denies protection to
a sinful engagement, or forbids it under penalty, it would seem that
after performance of the sin one may follow, as far as strict justice
is concerned, the rule that right is with the possessor. In the United
States immoral and illegal contracts and those that are opposed to
public policy are generally regarded as null, but in some cases the law
declares immoral conditions _de futuro_ non-existent and considers the
agreement to which they are added as valid (e.g., wills and gifts
_inter vivos_ in some codes).

1879. Sinful Contracts.--There is no form of contract that may not be
made sinful as to its substance on account of the wicked offer or
consideration (e.g., sale may deal with immoral objects, labor may be
given to criminal projects), but there are certain forms of contract
that are particularly open to abuse and hence are frequently associated
with evil circumstances or results. Some contracts are often illicit
according to natural law.

(a) Thus, a gift is sinful, on the part of the donor, when it is made
by an employer for the purpose of seducing a servant, and on the part
of the servant, when it is accepted for the purpose of encouraging the
unlawful attentions of the employer; but if the gift is unconditional,
there is no obligation in justice to return it.

(b) Borrowing is sinful, when the lender is in greater need, or when
one becomes unduly obligated to the lender; lending is sinful when the
lender cannot afford to part with the thing loaned, or when the
borrower is encouraged in thriftlessness, or when he will make evil use
of the thing borrowed, etc.

(c) Wagers are frequently sinful, since many of them are incitements to
sin (e.g., a bet that another is afraid to get drunk), or results of
sinful motives (e.g., bets made in order to deceive, or to satisfy
avarice, or to live without work), or causes of great evils (e.g.,
destitution of families, frauds, scandal, and corruption).

(d) Gaming is sinful when the form of the sport is objectionable (e.g.,
the ancient gladiatorial fights in which the combatants killed each
other), or when the motives or circumstances are wrong (e.g., to play
as a professional gambler so as to avoid work, to play cards all day
Sunday, to play for higher stakes than one can afford, to spend time in
“gambling hells”).

(e) Lottery is sinful when the object is bad (e.g., the raffle of an
important office with the risk that incompetent persons may be chosen),
or when the circumstances are bad (e.g., if persons are led into
superstition or idleness and prodigality).

(f) Speculation is sinful in many instances, since it often brings on a
gambling fever that makes the speculator useless to himself and his
dependents, and causes poverty and crime.

(g) Pawning of property is often unjustifiable, since it makes persons
deprive themselves of necessary property in order to indulge in some
useless or extravagant whim with borrowed money.

1880. Illegal Contracts.--For reasons of public policy the positive law
puts its disapproval on many of the above-mentioned contracts, at least
in certain instances.

(a) Thus, sometimes the law makes a contract unenforceable in court,
though the natural obligation is not affected. Hence, if a wager is
only denied a hearing before a judge, the winner may keep his gains,
and the loser should pay.

(b) If the law merely declares that a contract is illegal, the effect
seems to be that the contract retains its natural validity unless the
party who has suffered by it wishes to disavow it. As to the sinfulness
of such a contract, that depends on whether or not the law is penal or
preceptive in intent. Thus, many regard laws that make betting illegal
as preceptive under venial sin, while others regard them as punitive
only. Other examples of illegal contracts are: gifts made to a judge in
connection with a trial; lottery, in Great Britain and the United
States; certain games of chance, in some States; and in Canon Law, as
regards the clergy, alcatory games for money, speculation and trading
(Canons 138, 142).

(c) If the law makes a contract voidable, the effect is that the
contract possesses its natural force until adverse decision is given by
court. Hence, if a wager is voidable in law, the winner may keep his
gains until obliged by a judge to give them up, but the loser is not
bound to pay, unless he confirms the wager.

(d) If the law makes the contract ipso facto void, the agreement loses
its natural force (see 558-560). In most of our States, wagering
contracts are illegal and void whether by statute or by judicial
decision. In many of these States the statute permits the recovery of
the money from the winner or the stakeholder. Gifts offered as bribes
are invalid, and those who give or take such gifts are guilty of
serious sin and of a criminal offense. In some of our States, certain
gaming contracts are also null.

1881. Qualities Necessary in the Parties Contractant.--The parties
contractant must have the following qualities:

(a) from natural law it is necessary that they have the use of reason
sufficient to understand what they are doing. Incompetent are babies
and the insane, and also those who are totally drunk or otherwise
temporarily deranged. Less competent are the half-witted and those who
need a guardian in important matters;

(b) from positive law it is necessary that they be not legally
excluded. In Canon Law administrators of church property and solemnly
professed religious are unable to make certain contracts (Canons 1527,
536). In civil law there are restrictions on the contractual powers of
minors, wives, aliens, guardians and corporations. Persons not yet
conceived are not capable in civil law of receiving a donation, and
there are many prohibitions against the tender or acceptance of gifts
by those who can reasonably be suspected of exercising undue influence
or of being subject to undue influence.

1882. Legal Privileges of Minors.--The law grants certain benefits to
minors and the like; for example, in some cases they are not bound by a
non-executed agreement, while the other party is bound, or in an
executed contract they may recover property without restoring or
offering to restore the consideration, if they have nothing with which
to replace it.

(a) Minors and other persons who are legally incompetent to contract,
may avail themselves of the benefits of the law with a good conscience,
if they are in good faith; for it is just that the law should protect
those who are unable to protect themselves, and those who make
contracts with such persons should know that they (the competent
parties) act at their own risk.

(b) Minors and other persons legally incompetent may not avail
themselves of the benefit of the law if they have acted in bad faith
(e.g., if a minor by deceit induced the other party to sell to him).

1883. Qualities Necessary for Valid Consent.--The agreement or consent
of the contracting parties must have the following qualities:

(a) it must be internal, that is, one must accept in will and not
merely in words the proposal or consideration offered by the other
party. If one consents only to the form of the contract, the contract
is null, and the same is probably true if one does not accept
internally the obligations of the contract; if one consents to the
obligations, but does not intend to fulfill them, the contract is
valid, but unlawful. One who contracts invalidly sins, and is bound in
the external forum to keep the contract seriously made, and in the
internal forum to repair the damage to the other party by giving true
consent or making restitution. One who contracts unlawfully also sins,
and is bound to the engagement;

(b) it must be external, that is, one must manifest in some sensible
way one’s agreement to the proposition contained in an offered
contract. Silence gives consent only when the contract is favorable to
the party who is silent, or when that party should and easily could
manifest his lack of consent, if the proposal did not please him. In
the case of contracts between parties who are not in each other’s
presence, the intimation to the offerer of the offeree’s acceptance
is not necessary for validity, if the contract is gratuitous; but
the contrary seems to be true, at least _per se_, if the contract is
onerous. We shall speak later (1885) on the legal formalities required
in contracts;

(c) it must be mutual, that is, there must be a meeting of minds in the
same sense, or agreement of both parties to the same thing. Mutuality
requires that consent be contemporaneous, that is, that the acceptance
of one be given while the offer of the other still holds good. But
it does not require that the parties be in each other’s presence, or
that they contract through direct personal communication, or (at least
according to natural law) that the knowledge of the accomplishment
of mutual agreement be known to the offerer. The law in the United
States generally is that an offer may be withdrawn immediately or after
a reasonable time, unless it was made on time for a consideration;
and that a contract between the absent begins only on receipt by the
offerer of the acceptance of the offeree, if the former stipulated for
this, or if the offerer uses one means of communication as his agency
and the offeree another. In other cases it begins the moment that
acceptance is entrusted to the agent of the offerer;

(d) it must be free, that is, it must have the advertence and
voluntariness necessary for a human act. If the contract is of grave
import, there should be the same kind of deliberation as is necessary
for commission of a mortal sin (see 173 sqq.); if it is of lesser
import, the deliberation should correspond with the seriousness of
the case. But some authors think there should be perfect deliberation
in every contract, since the contractants are assuming obligations of
justice.

1884. Defects that Invalidate Consent.--The defects that vitiate
consent by taking away knowledge or choice render contracts either void
or voidable (see 40-55). These impediments are the following:

(a) error, which is a judgment of fact or of law in reference to the
contract, not in harmony with the truth, but not maliciously caused
by other persons. If error is substantial (that is, about the nature
of the contract or the nature of the subject-matter of the contract),
the agreement is naturally void; if error is only accidental (that is,
about features of the contract, subject-matter or co-contractant, that
are only incidentally intended), an onerous agreement is naturally
valid, but positive law in the interest of freedom will often grant the
privilege of rescindment (see Canon 1684, n. 2). But if error cannot be
proved, courts will stand for the validity of a contract;

(b) fraud, which is error or mistake about a contract caused in one
of the parties by the dishonest representations of the other party or
of a third person (e.g., when an insurance agent deceives about the
benefits, or a policy-taker deceives about his age or health). Fraud
exists, then, when there is intention, at least indirect, to mislead,
and statements, acts or omissions calculated to mislead; but the usual
boasts of vendors and advertisers about the wonderful excellence of
their wares are not fraudulent, since the public understands that such
talk must be taken _cum grano salis_. The effects of fraud on the value
of contracts are the same as those produced by error; but it should be
noted that the person guilty of the fraud is bound to make good the
losses of the injured party, even though the contract be valid and not
rescindable, or though the guilty person be not a party to the contract;

(c) fear, which is a disturbance of mind caused by the belief that some
danger is impending on oneself or others (see 41 sqq.). It makes a
contract invalid in natural law, when it takes away all consent (e.g.,
when it overpowers the reason, or makes one dissent internally from
what is agreed to externally), and probably also when it takes away
perfect freedom in a gratuitous contract, or makes one enter into a
contract for immunity from an unjust vexation; it renders an act or
engagement invalid according to positive law in many special cases
(e.g., the Canons declare null elections, resignations, marriages,
vows, etc., which are made under the influence of fear). Contracts are
considered naturally voidable if one of the parties unjustly extorts
the consent of the other by grave fear, or if a third party intimidates
a person into bestowing something through gratuitous contract; and the
positive law generally treats agreements entered into under grave fear
as rescindible (see Canon 103, n. 2). Fear unjustly caused, even though
it does not make a contract void or voidable, is at times a reason for
the duty of restitution, as when a third party by his unjust threats
forces an innocent person to make expensive contracts as a measure of
protection, and probably also when a third party directly constrains
one to make an onerous contract with a person who knows nothing about
the coercion. Fear, no matter how great, does not in any way weaken
a contract, if there is consent and the fear is induced by a natural
cause (e.g., a storm), or by a human cause acting justly (e.g., an
injured man threatening a lawsuit);

(d) violence or coercion, which is like to fear, the latter being moral
force and the former physical force (see 52). According to natural
law, violence invalidates a contract, unless we suppose that it is
only concomitant, as when Sempronius uses coercion to make Balbus sign
a contract which Balbus is really willing to sign. Positive law does
not recognize, or will set aside, agreements made under overpowering
constraint (see Canon 103, n. 1).

1885. Form of Contract.--The form of a contract is the external manner
in which, according to the positive law, the internal consent of the
parties must be expressed and manifested.

(a) Thus, Canon Law in certain contracts (e.g., engagement of marriage,
marriage, alienation of church property) requires specified solemnities
under pain of nullity of act.

(b) Civil law in the United States designates various formalities to
be used in transfers of property (e.g., that a deed for real estate be
written, signed, sealed and attested; that a gift be made by delivery
or equivalent act; that certain contracts be in writing; that no
contract be of worth unless it be for a consideration, or else be on
paper with seal attached). The law has the right to annul informal
contracts _ipso facto_, but whether this is the intention in modern
codes is a matter of dispute. The practical rule to be followed,
then, is that the possessor is to be favored, unless there has been a
court decision against his claim. It should be noted, too, that some
legal conditions, such as valuable consideration in simple contracts,
are required for enforceability, not for validity, and hence a good
contract wanting some such condition, though indefensible before the
courts, is obligatory in conscience.

1886. The Accidentals of a Contract.--(a) Bond is the agreement by the
obligor of a contract to pay a certain forfeit to the obligee, if the
former does not perform his contract or does not perform it before a
certain date. This agreement obliges in conscience, if the promise was
seriously made, if the penalty is not excessive, and if the breach of
agreement is culpable.

(b) Oaths added to contracts have moral effects on the contracts
themselves and also on acts contrary to them. As regards the contract,
an oath adds the obligation of religion to that of justice, if the
contract is valid and irrescindable; and the common opinion is that
it strengthens a contract extrinsically, that is, it induces an
obligation of religion to keep the promise, if the oath is invalid or
rescindable by positive law only and in favor of a private privilege;
but an oath in no way strengthens a contract that is naturally invalid
or rescindable positively on account of the public good. As regards
acts that are contrary to an invalid or rescindable contract that was
confirmed by a valid oath, they are sinful, as being irreligious, but
not invalid nor unjust (see 2260).

(c) Conditions are accidents or circumstances so added to a contract
that the consent or dissent is made dependent upon their existence
or fulfillment. An immoral condition, if unfulfilled, takes from the
contract all obligation, exception being made for separable parts that
are not affected by the immoral clause; but if it has been fulfilled,
it seems that there is a moral obligation to pay the consideration
promised (see 1878 d).

(d) Modes are accidents or circumstances so added to a contract as
to qualify the rights or duties of the contractants, or the purpose,
matter or time of the contract, but not so as to make the consent
dependent on the fulfillment of the thing designated. Thus, if Titus
leaves money to Balbus, chiefly because Balbus is his nephew, and
secondarily because he imposes on Balbus the obligation of using the
money for his education, Balbus in accepting the money accepts also
the obligation, but the gift does not lapse if the obligation is not
complied with. If a donor adds an immoral mode to his gift (e.g.,
that the donee use in immoral ways the money left him), this purpose
is regarded as non-existent and the gift stands in spite of it. If an
agent violates a mode (e.g., he pays $1001 when he was directed to
pay $1000) but not a condition (e.g., that he purchase land and not a
house), the contract stands.

1887. The Moral Obligation of Entering into a Contract.--(a) There is
a duty of justice when one is under public or private engagement to
make a contract. Examples are a merchant who opens a store for public
patronage, or an auctioneer who holds a sale before invited patrons, or
an owner who makes with another person a contract to sell, or a man and
woman who make solemn espousals.

(b) There is a duty of charity when a neighbor is in such need that he
deserves to be helped, for example, by a loan or by assistance to make
a loan: “From him that would borrow of thee turn not away” (Matt., v.
42); “A good man is surety for his neighbor” (Ecclus., xxix. 18).

1888. Every valid contract obliges to faithful performance as a duty
of conscience, even though it be unenforceable and without civil
obligation. We shall discuss the properties of this obligation.

(a) Quality of the Obligation.--Onerous contracts oblige in virtue of
commutative justice and under pain of restitution; gratuitous contracts
oblige according to some from justice, according to others from
fidelity, according to others from fidelity or justice as the obligor
intends (see 1692, 1753). In practice one may follow the rule that a
liberal promise or wager or other gratuitous contract obliges only
from fidelity with no duty of restitution, unless it be certain that
the promisor intended to bind himself in justice. One is responsible,
however, for damages resultant on breach of promise. The obligation
seems to be one of legal justice only when the thing promised is
something on which a pecuniary value cannot be set and consists in
compliance with law (e.g., in suretyship or bail for keeping the peace
or appearing in court).

(b) Quantity of Obligation.--In onerous contracts the degree of
obligation depends on the importance of the subject matter, and hence
it is a mortal sin to violate a contract in which a grave right is
concerned; in gratuitous contracts the degree of obligation depends
entirely, according to some, on the will of the person who liberally
binds himself, but others hold that it depends on the importance of the
subject-matter.

(c) Subjects of Obligation.--The parties to the contracts and those
who take their place (e.g., heirs, executors) or who are responsible
for the contract (e.g., those who commanded the agreement) are morally
bound to fulfill the agreement, while others are bound not to interfere
with the fulfillment.

(d) Objects of Obligation.--Directly, there is the duty of observing
what is contained explicitly or implicitly in the agreement, and
indirectly of making good any losses caused by breach of contract. A
rescindable contract obliges until it is lawfully disaffirmed by the
party who has the right to break it; a quasi-contract imposes on the
party who has benefited by the services or expenses of another a moral
obligation of making compensation. If a contract transfers ownership
(e.g., contract of sale passing title to buyer, _mutuum_), the
transferee must bear the risks and expenses of the thing transferred;
but if it does not transfer ownership (e.g., contract to sell,
_commodatum_) or has not yet done so (e.g., contract of sale in which
title will pass later, on delivery or payment), the transferer has the
risk and expense (see 1796).

1889. Cessation of Obligation.--The obligation of a contract ceases in
various ways: (a) by action of the contractants, as when a promisee
renounces his right, or each of the parties to a promise has made a
gratuitous promise in favor of the other and one refuses to keep his
word; (b) by action of law, for example, by prescription, by annulment;
(c) by impossibility, as when a thing freely promised has become
unlawful or useless, or when the donee of a gift _mortis causae_ dies
before the donor.

1890. Theft.--Theft is the secret taking of what belongs to another,
with the intention of appropriating it to oneself, against the
reasonable wishes of the owner.

(a) It is a taking, that is, a carrying away of goods. But theft also
includes the receiving or keeping of property, since the harm done is
the same as when the goods are carried away. Hence, he who does not
restore borrowed or deposited or found objects, or who does not pay
back a loan, when he could and should, is a thief.

(b) It is a secret taking, that is, the property is taken away without
the knowledge of the owner or lawful possessor, even though he be
present. In this respect theft differs from robbery.

(c) It is the taking of property. This includes not only corporeal
things (e.g., books, money, jewelry, clothing), but also incorporeal
things (e.g., patents, trademarks, copyrights), and even persons if
they are looked on as possessions. Hence, plagiarism or infringement
of copyright or man-stealing or kidnapping (i.e., the carrying off of
another’s slave or child) are forms of theft.

(d) It is the taking of property that belongs to another, that is, of
goods of which another person is the owner, or lawful possessor as
usufructuary, guardian, depositary, etc. Hence, one can steal from
oneself by taking one’s goods by stealth from the bailee with the
design of charging him for their value or of depriving him of their use
to which he has a right.

(e) It is the taking away of goods with the intention of appropriating
them to one’s own possession, use or enjoyment to the exclusion of the
rightful owner. Hence, strictly speaking, it is not theft to carry away
property with the intention of borrowing it for a time or of destroying
it; but these are acts of unlawful possession or of unlawful damage. It
is obligatory to take an object from another, if this is necessary to
prevent the commission of a crime (e.g., to take away and hide the gun
with which another intends to kill).

(f) It is against the wishes of the owner. This refers to the substance
(that is, the conversion of the property to one’s use), not to the
mode (that is, secrecy with which it is done). Hence, if the owner is
unwilling that the property be taken, he who takes it is guilty of
theft; if the owner is not unwilling that it be taken, but is unwilling
that it be taken without his knowledge, he who takes it in this way
sins at least venially, but is not guilty of theft in the strict sense.

(g) It is against the reasonable wishes of the owner or possessor; for
no injury is done if he does or should consent to the loss. The owner
does consent if the person who takes the goods is acting according to a
general and recognized custom (e.g., when a servant takes things left
over from her employer’s table, which it is certain the latter does
not wish to keep); the owner should consent, if justice forbids that
he prevent the taking (e.g., when a starving man is taking food from
one who has plenty), or if domestic duty commands that he should give
the thing taken (e.g., when a wife takes from her husband’s pockets
the needed money he denies his family, for a wife and family have
the right to receive from the head of the house support according to
their station and means). But the owner is not bound to consent to the
loss of his goods from the mere fact that he misuses them to his own
spiritual disadvantage, or owes them in charity to the taker. Hence, it
is theft to take a flask from the pocket of one who drinks too much, or
to steal a book from one who is harmed by reading it, or to filch money
from a rich man because one is poor and he will not give an alms.

1891. Unauthorized Use of Another’s Funds.--What is the guilt of one
who uses for his own purposes the money of another entrusted to him for
other purposes?

(a) There is no theft, for it is supposed that the purpose of the user
is to make only a temporary loan of the money.

(b) There is an act of injustice, if the permission of the owner cannot
be presumed; for the rights of an owner are violated when one converts
his property to uses displeasing to him. Thus, if the prospect is that
the owner may never get his money back or that he will lose profits by
the use made of it, the guilt of unjust damage is incurred, at least in
intention (e.g., a depositary uses a deposit to buy stocks on margin,
or a company official makes an unauthorized loan instead of investing
the amount for the company’s benefit).

(c) There is no sin, if the permission of the owner can be reasonably
presumed; for to him who willingly consents no injury is done. Thus,
if one who is managing the funds of another has the chance to make a
large amount of money today by using those funds for himself but cannot
get in touch with the owner, the latter’s consent can be presumed, if
he will suffer no present loss and it is absolutely certain that his
funds will be returned tomorrow. But on account of the risk that is
ordinarily present, this case would be rare.

1892. Comparison of Theft and Robbery.--(a) They differ in species,
for theft contains injustice to an owner in his property, but robbery,
which is an unjust and violent taking of what belongs to another,
contains injustice both to property and to person. The unwillingness of
the owner in the case of theft is due to his ignorance of his loss; in
the case of robbery it is due to intimidation or force. (b) They differ
in gravity, robbery being according to its nature the more serious kind
of stealing; for the robber does a twofold injury, and the owner’s
unwillingness to be robbed is greater.

1893. Kinds of Theft and Robbery.--(a) There are many varieties of
theft, the differences arising from the circumstances in which the
stealing is done. Thus, he who steals from the Church is guilty of
sacrilegious theft; he who uses the public goods for his private ends
commits peculation; he who takes from his parents practises domestic
thievery.

(b) There are also many ways in which robbery or rapine is committed.
The following persons are guilty of robbery: pirates, bandits,
highwaymen, burglars, usurers, profiteers, venal judges, unmerciful
creditors who deprive debtors of necessaries, debtors who escape
payment by fraudulent bankruptcy, profiteers, laborers who extort
unjust wages, those who force subordinates to contribute graft, and
blackmailers. Two forms of robbery are described in Scripture as
sins that cry to heaven for justice, namely, defrauding laborers of
their wages (James, v. 4) and oppression of the poor, which happens
especially when one denies their rights to those who are unable to
defend them. The following persons are also classed as thieves:
pickpockets, spongers, smugglers, forgers, counterfeiters, embezzlers,
and those who misappropriate funds entrusted to them.

In the civil law theft is also known as larceny, and is defined as the
unlawful severance of personal property from the possession of its
owner. The following kinds of larceny are distinguished:

(a) in respect to the manner of perpetration, a theft is larceny when
the property is taken from the possession of the owner by one who had
no possession, whether the latter be a stranger or a custodian; it is
embezzlement when committed by one upon whom the owner had conferred
temporary possession on account of a fiduciary relationship between
them; it is false pretence when committed by one who procures permanent
possession or ownership through fraudulent representations;

(b) In respect to the matter or quantity stolen, theft is called petit
larceny when it falls below a certain sum fixed by the law, grand
larceny when it exceeds that sum.

1894. The Sinfulness of Theft.--(a) From its nature theft--and, much
more, robbery--is a grave sin; for it is opposed to the virtues
of charity and justice, it is expressly forbidden in the Seventh
Commandment (“Thou shalt not steal,” Exod., xx. 15), and it excludes
from eternal life (“Neither thieves nor extortioners shall possess the
kingdom of God,” I Cor., vi. 10). The thief attacks the sacred right of
the individual to his property, and imperils the peace and stability
of society itself. Theft is a grave sin, even when it is committed
by little and little, as happens when a merchant gives underweight
habitually: “A deceitful balance is an abomination to the Lord” (Prov.,
xi. 1). The proposition that restitution for a large sum taken in parts
at different times is not a grave duty was condemned by Innocent XI
(Denzinger, 1188). Canonical penalties for theft include exclusion from
acts and offices, censures, and deposition (Canon 2354).

(b) From the imperfection of the act theft may be only a venial sin,
for example, when the thief is a kleptomaniac and steals without
advertence, or when he is invincibly ignorant that the thing taken is
not his own or is of great value, or from the smallness of the matter
involved (e.g., when the thing taken has little value, or the owner is
opposed rather to the stealthy manner of taking than to the taking, or
is only slightly unwilling to lose the goods).

1895. Theft of a small amount may be a mortal sin (see 187). This may
happen: (a) on account of the internal or subjective circumstances, as
when the thief intends to steal as much as he can or a large amount
here and now, or when he intends to steal a small amount here and
new but to keep this up every day until he has stolen a considerable
amount, or when a child steals a small sum from its parents and falsely
thinks that the theft is gravely sinful in itself; (b) on account of
external or objective circumstances, as when the amount taken today is
small but constitutes, with amounts previously taken, a large sum, or
when the thief foresees serious consequences from his act (e.g., that
the person from whom the goods are taken will fall under suspicion
and be discharged or arrested). It should be noted, however, that
the consequences of the theft do not necessarily make the sin grave
precisely as it is a sin of theft (e.g., in the case just given the
theft was a venial sin, but the unjust damage was a mortal sin), or
even precisely as it is a sin of injustice (e.g., if one steals a
picture of small value, foreseeing that the owner will be afflicted
beyond measure at the loss, the sin against justice is small, but the
sin against charity is mortal).

1896. The determination of the amount that constitutes grave matter
in theft or robbery (or in unjust damage) is a very difficult task,
because the factors upon which the injury depends are to some extent
doubtful and vary in particular cases. Hence, there is a great
diversity of opinion among moralists on this subject, and it will
frequently be uncertain in an individual case whether a theft is
mortally or only venially sinful in itself. But on account of the
spiritual and temporal interests that are concerned it is necessary
to give at least general rules for direction that will enable one to
distinguish between grave and venial theft, and to know when the duty
of restitution is serious, when light.

1897. Moralists are in agreement on the following points:

(a) the standard for measuring gravity of matter is not an invariable
one, but will differ according to circumstances of times and places.
Thus, money has much less purchasing power today than it had before the
Civil War, and the same amount will not go so far nor last so long in
the United States as in some countries of Europe. Hence, other things
being equal, it is less harmful to steal the sum of $10 in 1958 than it
was to steal the same sum in 1858, less harmful to steal that amount
from an American than to steal its equivalent from a European;

(b) the standard for a particular country and period is to be
interpreted morally, not mathematically; for it depends on the opinions
or estimates of the prudent, which after all are only approximations
and subject to revisions. Hence, it would be absurd to draw such a hard
and fast distinction between grave and venial theft--for example, to
decide from the amounts alone that he who stole $50 is certainly guilty
of mortal sin and fit for hell, while he who stole $49.99 is guilty of
venial sin only and not fit for hell. The figures given by moralists
for grave matter are averages, and hence they cannot be expected to
suit each individual locality or moment or injured person. But, being
based on actual conditions, they are serviceable. If a sum stolen is
much above or below them, they indicate truly the theological species
of the sin; if it is only a little above or below them, they afford a
basis for probability, or at least show that there is room for doubt.

1898. Moralists are also at one in measuring the injury of theft by the
following considerations:

(a) it should be estimated by the property loss, that is, that theft
should be deemed a grave sin which in view of all the circumstances and
the common opinion indicts a notable loss on the owner in his property
rights. This is a matter of common sense, for every one can see that it
is a very different thing to steal a cent and to steal $100.

(b) it should be estimated by the personal injury, that is, by the
unwillingness of the proprietor to suffer the loss. This is also clear,
since the unwillingness of the proprietor is one of the ingredients
of theft, as was explained above in the definition, and everyone will
readily grant that an amount which would be notable if stolen from a
stranger, would not be notable if stolen from an indulgent parent.

1899. There are two opinions about the estimation of the property loss.

(a) Thus, an older opinion held that the standard should be an absolute
one, that is, that the loss should be determined independently of the
wealth or poverty of the person injured, since the financial situation
of this person is a purely extrinsic circumstance of the theft. The
rich man has just as much right to his $10 as the poor man has to his
$10, and it is therefore just as injurious to deprive the former of the
sum as it is to deprive the latter. What is a mortal theft in one case
is a mortal theft in every case.

(b) A later opinion, which seems to be the common one today,
distinguishes two standards: an absolute one, which fixes one highest
amount that is always grave matter on account of its magnitude, however
wealthy the loser may be, and a relative one, which proposes a scale
of lower amounts that are grave matter on account of the economic
condition of the persons stolen from. It is argued that a relative
standard should be set up, since the injury of theft is certainly felt
more by those who have less means to fall back on; and that an absolute
standard is also necessary, since without it the property of the rich
would not be sufficiently safeguarded and the peace and order of
society would be endangered.

1900. Opinions on the Amounts that Are Grave Matter.--(a) The older
opinion, according to which there is only one invariable standard
for all classes and conditions, regards as grave matter the amount
necessary to support for a day, according to his state and obligations,
a man whose financial condition is midway between wealth and poverty;
for the loss of a day’s support is usually looked on as a serious
loss, and a standard for all should be taken from the average. This
daily support amount may be reckoned from the amount of daily wages
or income. In the United States in 1955 the average daily wage was
between $14 and $15, but, if only skilled laborers or those who are in
moderately prosperous circumstances are considered, the average would
be considerable higher. Perhaps it would range between $25 and $30. Or
if we strike a medium between the highest and the lowest figures given
by the advocates of two standards, we should arrive at approximately
$30 or $35.

(b) The common opinion today fixes the absolute amount, which is grave
matter even when theft is from the wealthiest person or society as the
equivalent of a week’s wages for the head of a family living in fairly
good circumstances but dependent upon his work for its support. As
to the actual amount, authors differ. Thus, Father Francis Connell,
C.SS.R., wrote in 1945 in _American Ecclesiastical Review_ (p. 69):
“To lay down a general norm in view of actual conditions and value of
money, it would seem that the actual sum for grave theft would be about
$40.” In 1946, writing in the _Homiletic and Pastoral Review_ (p. 694),
Father Joseph Donovan, C.M., stated: “It is hard to see how less than
$100 could be absolutely grave with the chances of a higher amount
being probably so.”[*] This sum was criticized as being excessive and
did not meet with ready acceptance by all moral theologians. On page
127 of the third printing of his _Outlines of Moral Theology_ (1955),
Father Francis J. Connell, C.SS.R., suggested $75 as a reasonable
absolute sum considering the value of money at the time, and, as a
practical norm, the sum has been acceptable to most confessors and
authors. Relatively grave matter corresponds with the amount needed to
support a worker and his family for a day or, according to some, the
amount required for the support of the worker alone. Relatively grave
matter would range from about $5 from a poor person on relief, through
$20-$35 from skilled laborers and persons in comfortable circumstances,
to $75 from the wealthy. The latter sum constitutes the absolute
standard. For a general norm to establish relatively grave matter,
then, an acceptable procedure is to take the daily earning power or
expenses of those who do not belong to the wealthiest classes, but who
just barely make a living by reason of their work or charity.

[*] This is not to suggest that the authors cited hold to the “week’s
pay norm” as the standard. Father Connell, for example, defines the
absolute as “a sum which is so large that society would suffer much if
it could be stolen without grave sin even from the richest or from a
wealthy corporation” (op. cit., pp. 127-128). The interest in citing
the authors is to show the precise sums suggested by them at various
times regardless of the norm used in arriving at the particular amount
suggested.

1901. What is grave matter in theft of sacred objects? (a) If these
objects have a value that may be measured by money (e.g., the gold or
jewels that enter into a reliquary), grave matter is estimated by the
material value, just as in profane objects. (b) If these objects have
no monetary value (e.g., sacred relics), grave matter is judged from
the dignity or rarity of the object. Thus, it would be a serious sin to
steal even the smallest splinter from the True Cross.

1902. It was said above (1898) that the gravity of theft is estimated,
not only by the property loss, but also by the personal loss, that is,
the reluctance, unwillingness or sorrow of the owner at the deprivation
of his goods. This does not mean that a greater unwillingness on the
part of the owner increases the gravity of the theft, if the owner’s
unwillingness is excessive or unreasonable (e.g., it is not a mortal
sin of theft to steal a dollar from a miser, if the miser on account
of his love of money feels the loss as keenly as another person in his
place would feel the loss of $40). But a less unwillingness of the
owner diminishes the injury, and hence increases the amount necessary
for grave matter. There are three reasons especially that diminish the
unwillingess of the owner at the loss of his property.

(a) Thus, by reason of the persons who steal, the owner is less
unwilling when these persons have a greater claim on his affection
(e.g., his children or wife), or when custom permits them to some
extent a greater freedom than is granted to others (e.g., servants,
employees).

(b) By reason of the things stolen, the owner is less unwilling when
these are things of less value, like crops, that are produced mostly by
nature and are left exposed, such as fruits growing by the wayside,
branches and pieces of fallen timber lying on uncultivated land.

(c) By reason of the manner of the theft, the owner is usually less
unwilling when goods are taken gradually and on several occasions, or
piecemeal, than when they are taken all at once.

1903. The Common Opinion on Domestic Thefts and Grave Matter.--(a) In
theft from one’s parents about double the usual quantity is required.
But in an individual case the parents may be just as unwilling, and
with good reason, to be despoiled by members of the family as by
outsiders, and in such a case the rule would not apply. Hence, in
considering thefts by children one must bear in mind the ability of the
family to suffer the loss, the number of the children, the uses to
which the stolen goods are put, the liberality or thrift of the
parents, the affection or dislike which the parents have for the child
who steals, etc. Thus, if poor parents are denying themselves in every
way in order to rear and educate a large family, thefts from them are a
serious matter.

(b) In theft from one’s husband even a greater amount is required. But
there are exceptions, as when the husband is especially unwilling to
have his property stolen by his wife, for example, when the money she
takes is devoted, not to the benefit of the family or other useful
purposes, but to vanity or sin, or to the great detriment of the
husband or family (see 1799).

1904. Theft from One’s Wife or Minor Child.--(a) According to the
law in the United States, a wife cannot steal from her husband nor
the husband from the wife, but this principle has reference to the
common property of which husband and wife are joint tenants (Robinson,
_Elementary Law_, Sec. 563). Both husband and wife may have also their
own separate property, and in that case either of them is guilty of
injustice if he or she damages or takes without leave the goods of the
other.

(b) According to American law, the father has the right to the earnings
of his minor children who live with him and receive their maintenance
from him; but the law gives the father no right over the separate real
or personal estate of these children. Hence, a parent would be guilty
of theft if he unlawfully took or used the individual property of his
child.

1905. The Common Opinion on Thefts Committed by Employees.--(a) If
the things stolen are small articles which the employer customarily
supplies for his help (e.g., food and drink for domestic servants,
pencils and paper for his clerks), the theft is not serious as a rule.
But there are exceptions, as when the employee gives or sells to others
these articles, or when he uses or wastes them to such a degree that
the employer suffers a considerable loss. And one should also consider
such circumstances as the great or small value of the services given by
the employee, his good or bad standing with the employer, etc.

(b) If the thing stolen is not meant for consumption (e.g., furnishings
of the home or office, merchandise of the store, tools or machinery
of the factory) or is of a very precious kind (e.g., rare wines or
expensive brands of tobacco), grave matter is of the same amount as
when an outside person does the stealing. In fact, the guilt of the
employee is more serious on account of his abuse of confidence or
violation of contract. The property of employers would be subject to
constant risk, if employees were permitted greater liberties than
outsiders.

1906. Theft of Things about Whose Loss the Owner Is Less
Concerned.--(a) Vegetation that Belongs to the Public and Is Left
Unprotected.--If these things are of minor importance (e.g., wild
fruits or berries, broken twigs, branches, etc., in public lands),
it seems that it is not theft to take them, at least when one is
poor and a member of the community; for laws against such acts are
generally regarded as penal. But one sins, and may even sin gravely,
when extensive damage is done to public property (e.g., by cutting down
trees, carrying away flowers and plants, injuring shrubs, etc.).

(b) Vegetation that Belongs to Private Parties and Is Left
Unprotected.--If only a small quantity is taken (e.g., an apple or a
bunch of grapes hanging over a public highway taken by a passerby), it
seems no theft is done, unless the owner or law expressly forbids. But
it seems to be a venial sin to take more (e.g., as much as a hungry
person can eat), and a mortal sin to take a quantity whose market value
is equal to grave matter.

1907. Travelling Without Paying Fare.--Is it theft to ride in public
conveyances without paying the fare?

(a) If one rides without payment or ticket, it seems that theft is
committed, unless the company is willing to give a free ride. It may be
said that the company suffers no loss on account of one passenger who
has not paid for his transportation, since the same number of cars and
the same expenses would be required even without that passenger. But
since the owners are unwilling to furnish their service gratis, he who
takes it without pay is guilty of theft.

(b) If one rides without payment, but uses the ticket of another, there
is no injustice if the rules of the company permit this (e.g., A buys
a round-trip ticket, but gives the return ticket to B), but there is
fraud if the rules of the company and the agreement of the purchaser
make the ticket non-transferable (e.g., B uses the half-rate ticket
which A had received as a personal privilege from the railroad company).

1908. Small Thefts Which Amount to a Large Sum.--Small amounts stolen
may accumulate into a large amount. This happens in the following
ways: (a) the thief takes small sums on different occasions from the
same person or from different persons, and continues at this until he
has stolen a considerable amount; (b) the thief conspires with other
thieves to steal on the same occasion from one person or several
persons, and, though the sum he steals is small, the sum taken by the
whole group is considerable. Similarly, petty damages or vexations
may accumulate into a mortal injustice. Thus, if Claudius, aiming to
break down the health, sanity, success, reputation, business, etc., of
Balbus, plans and carries out a systematic campaign of small injuries
daily repeated for years, Claudius is guilty at least in purpose of
serious damage.

1909. Small thefts that grow into a large theft are mortally sinful in
the following cases:

(a) they are mortally sinful by reason of the previous intention when
one steals a little now and a little again, but has it in mind from
the outset to steal a total sum that will be grave matter, or when one
conspires with others to steal a notable sum although one’s own share
will not be a notable amount. In these cases the purpose is to commit
a grave injustice, either against an individual (if all is taken from
one person) or against society (if portions are taken from various
persons), and hence one is internally guilty of grave sin, even though
one has not yet performed it externally. Examples are merchants who use
false weights and measures, or who adulterate their commodities with
small portions of water, etc., and thus make large profits by minute
cheating;

(b) they are mortally sinful by reason of the subsequent intention when
one had no purpose to steal a large amount, but adverts to the fact
that a small theft here and now committed will constitute grave matter
if added to previous petty thefts, or that the amount of stolen goods
now possessed is large, and nevertheless resolves to go ahead with the
theft or to retain the stolen goods. This does not mean that a number
of venial sins coalesce into a mortal sin (see 189), but only that the
object of a sin which is slight in itself becomes serious on account
of the circumstance that it is morally connected with previous sins.
The last act in a connected series must not be taken singly, but in
connection with the acts that precede, as is seen in the violation of a
fast or in omission of parts of an hour. In the cases now considered,
therefore, grave injustice is actually and purposely done, and mortal
sin is committed, even though there was no thought of this in advance.

1910. The case of young men who are educated free of charge in the
expectation that they will go on to the priesthood and who do not
persevere.--(a) If they act in bad faith (i.e., if they enter the
college or seminary merely to get their education, or to avoid work,
or if they remain after they have abandoned thought of the clerical
state), they are guilty of theft and bound to restitution.

(b) If they are not in bad faith (i.e., if they wish to try out their
vocation, or if they begin with the intention to persevere), they are
not guilty of injustice. This is true, even though they are rejected on
account of idleness or other faults, provided there was no intention to
defraud.

1911. In the following cases small thefts which added to others make
a large sum seem not to be the cause of grave loss, and hence not
mortally sinful:

(a) the small theft of one person following on the small thefts of
others, when there is no bond of example, advice, conspiracy, etc.,
to unite the various thefts; for none of the thieves can be held
responsible for the part of the loss caused by the others. Example:
Titus, knowing that Balbus has been cheated by various persons to the
amount of $9 and that $10 will be a serious loss to Balbus, proceeds to
steal $1 from Balbus:

(b) the small thefts of several persons who steal together, and who
influence one another only by example; for example is an occasion,
not a true cause of the imitator’s act (see 1447, 1763). Example:
Sempronius and Claudius go into a store together and find that there
is no one around. Sempronius thereupon steals a number of articles and
leaves. Claudius notices this and steals other things, which will make
the total loss serious.

1912. Moral Connection between Repeated Acts of Theft.--The moral
connection between repeated acts of theft by one person is necessary,
as was said, in order that these acts unite into one grave sin. This
moral connection does not exist, however, if the series is broken by
interruption or revocation.

(a) Thus, the connection is broken by interruption when there is a
long interval between small thefts, because thefts that are small and
infrequent do not inflict severe loss on individuals or society. This
supposes, of course, that there is no intention to practise small
thievery habitually in order to become enriched by it, but that one
steals now and then as opportunity or necessity occurs, or (according
to some) that one intends to steal only small amounts and at long
intervals.

(b) The connection is also broken by restitution or revocation. It is
clear that, if the thief has given back his former thefts, they should
not be computed with later thefts; and it seems also--though some do
not admit this--that, if he has sincerely resolved to give back things
taken before (e.g., things which are useless for him), there is no
moral connection between the past thefts and a theft he is committing
now.

1913. Interval of Time between Acts of Theft.--The interval of time
that breaks the connection between small thefts cannot be determined
with mathematical exactness, but the following rule seems to be
accurate enough: thefts combine to form a great theft only when
considerable property is taken by degrees, but within such a brief
period of time as to be of notable advantage to the thief and of
notable disadvantage to the loser. Some moralists think that six
months is a long space, sufficient to prevent union between thefts,
but that two months is too short a space to prevent the union; others,
on the contrary, believe that the amounts stolen should be taken into
consideration; and hence that the following intervals between thefts
separate them into distinct venial sins without coalescence:

(a) a period of one year between thefts, each of which almost amounts
to grave matter, when the property is kept (e.g., when a dressmaker who
has kept not a little of her patron’s material of a twelvemonth ago
does the same thing again this year);

(b) a period of two months, when the matters are almost grave, but the
property is not kept (e.g., when a thief who beat a restaurant out of
the price of a very elaborate meal at the beginning of January does the
same thing at the beginning of March). But it is hard to see how one
could have the habit of stealing in this way and not have the intention
of stealing a large amount, for a person who steals what is almost
grave matter every two months or so must realize that he will shortly
be enriched to a considerable extent by his dishonesty. Moreover,
the interval of two months might be needed by the thief for avoiding
suspicion;

(c) a period of one month, when the thing stolen falls far short of
grave matter (e.g., a meal of simple fare plainly cooked and served);

(d) a period of about two weeks, when the matters are very small (e.g.,
when a thief takes a few secret sips from a wine bottle on each of his
fortnightly visits to a certain house, or carries away some trifling
object as a souvenir). These thefts would not surpass five or ten cents
a month;

(e) some authors think that one week or perhaps even one day will
prevent coalescence between extremely small thefts; and surely there
are some paltry objects (e.g., a pin or needle, a match, a small lump
of coal, a piece of string) which would not total a large value even
after many years have passed.

1914. Species and Number of Petty Thefts that Coalesce into Grave
Matter.--(a) If the thefts proceed from a previously formed purpose of
stealing by installments a large sum, each of them is a mortal sin,
but they do not form numerically distinct sins, unless there was a
revocation of the intent (see 214, 215).

(b) If the thefts did not proceed from a previously formed plan, those
that preceded the culminating theft (i.e., the one whose addition makes
the quantity grave) are so many separate venial sins of theft. The
culminating theft is a mortal sin, if the thief adverts to the fact
that he has now stolen a notable sum; otherwise it is a venial sin. The
act, after the gravity of the matter has been noticed, is the initial
mortal sin, if it means consent to the grave injustice done (e.g.,
retention of the ill-gotten goods, intention not to make restitution);
it is an additional mortal sin, if it means a renewal of consent to the
grave injustice previously done (e.g., the theft of a new small amount
with the purpose of keeping it as well as the rest).

1915. Sum Required for Grave Matter in Petty Thefts that Coalesce.--(a)
According to one opinion, it is always larger than the sum required for
grave matter in a theft of the same amount on a single occasion; for
the owner does not feel the loss so much when his goods are stolen in
small amounts and at different times. Thus, a man is less unwilling to
have $100 stolen from him through pilferings of cents and dollars over
a period of a year or two than to have it all stolen from him on one
day.

(b) According to another opinion, grave matter for petty thefts is not
larger than grave matter for large thefts of the same amount, if the
petty thief had the intention all along to accumulate a notable sum.
But some who are of this opinion make an exception for the case when
the petty thief steals not from one but from several owners, for in
this way the loss is distributed and less harm done. Grave matter in
this case, they say, is the same as absolutely grave matter.

1916. There are various opinions on the amounts required for grave
matter in the case of petty thefts that coalesce. (a) If all the thefts
are against the same person, the usual opinion fixes grave matter at
one and one-half times or twice the amount fixed for large thefts.
Some authors limit this to cases wherein the thief had not the purpose
from the beginning to steal a great amount (see 1915), and some state
that the amount for large thefts which is considered is the relative,
not the absolute sum. (b) If the thefts are against different persons,
some think that grave matter is the same as the absolute matter of one
large theft, while others make it one and one-half times or twice that
amount. Here again some moralists limit these increases in the sum for
grave matter to cases wherein there was no purpose from the beginning
to steal a notable amount.

1917. Theft from Joint Owners.--Is it a grave sin to steal a
considerable amount of property that belongs to joint owners? (a)
If the amount taken is absolutely grave, the sin is serious for the
reasons given in 1898 sqq.; (b) if the amount taken is relatively grave
(e.g., because a community is very poor, or because the owners are only
two or three and the individual loss is heavy), the sin is serious;
(c) if the amount taken is not relatively grave, as happens when an
organization is not poor and has many members or when the loss will
be so distributed among the joint owners as to be little felt by them
individually, the sin is not serious.

1918. Restitution in Cases of Theft.--(a) Restitution is owed for the
property stolen. He who stole a serious amount but gave back part,
retaining only what is light matter, is bound under venial sin to
restore the rest. Confessors should urge restitution even of small
amounts, when possible, in order to deter men from theft, and it may
sometimes be useful to require children to seek a condonation from
their parents for a similar reason. (b) Restitution is owed also for
damage caused by the theft (see 1895). Thus, if one steals the tool of
a poor farmer, which is of little value in itself but which brings on
him a serious loss, one is responsible for the loss as well as for the
tool.

1919. Cases of Doubt.--(a) Doubts of Law.--The rules given by moralists
on grave matter in thefts are not to be regarded as certain and
authentic, since they are only the opinions of theologians, and have
no obligatory sanction from the Church. They are reasonable and well
founded, indeed, but in spite of them there will occur cases wherein
it is doubtful whether a theft is mortal or venial (see 1896). It is
no disgrace to be ignorant in such difficult cases, for St. Augustine
himself admitted that he did not always know where to draw the line.
Hence, confessors should not feel obliged to decide with finality in
every instance whether the sin committed was in itself grave or light;
on the contrary, it will sometimes be necessary to avoid a definite
answer, while calling attention to the sinfulness of all theft and the
duty of restitution. But the obligation of restitution should not be
imposed as certain, where the doctors disagree.

(b) Doubts of Fact.--The application of the rules for grave matter
will also be at times very difficult on account of uncertainties
about circumstances of time, person, etc. In such cases one must have
recourse to the systems for decision in the presence of a doubtful
conscience. If a thief does not know from whom he stole, it may be
doubtful whether the matter is relatively grave or only light; but the
presumption then will be that the loser was a person of average means.
Again, when there is a strong likelihood that an owner was not greatly
unwilling, one must insist that the thefts cease for the future, but
one cannot always impose restitution. If a petty thief does not know
how much he stole, or whether all the thefts were from the same person,
or whether the intervals between the thefts were great or small, or
whether he had the intention from the outset to take a large sum, the
confessor will have to form an opinion by questioning the penitent on
the time of his last confession, the amounts he generally took, the
general frequency of the thefts, etc.

1920. Conversion of Others’ Property.--The conversion of property owned
by others or held by them may be permitted, or at least tolerated, when
the owner or possessor would be unreasonable if he objected as in the
following cases:

(a) in extreme necessity, for according to natural law each one has the
right to preserve his life by using the temporal things of the earth
(see 1571). In danger of death things necessary for escaping the danger
become common property, and no injury is done by the person in danger
if he uses the goods of another person to save his own life;

(b) in certain cases when occult compensation is the only way in which
one can defend or secure one’s right to property, for it is not wrong
to take what is one’s due, if this is done without harm to the rights
of others.

1921. Conditions for Lawful Occupation of the Goods of Others in
Extreme Need.--(a) The occupation must be necessary for securing one’s
own or another’s natural right to some supreme good, such as life
or what is almost the equivalent of life (e.g., freedom from cruel
restraint, escape from fearful disease). A supreme good is at stake,
then, when one is in extreme, quasi-extreme, or most grave need (see
1236), that is, exposed to the certain or very probable peril of losing
life, limbs, liberty, sight, chastity, etc.; occupation is necessary
when there is no other way (e.g., by begging) to avert the danger.

(b) The occupation must be made without detriment to the rights of
others. Hence, one may not occupy more than is really necessary to
escape the danger; one may not occupy at all if the owner is situated
in an equal danger (e.g., one may not take the plank from a man in
danger of drowning in order to save oneself); one may not retain the
thing taken, if the danger has passed (e.g., one who commandeered his
neighbor’s car in order to escape from a thug must return the car). The
neglect to ask permission, however, does not exceed a venial sin and
does not impose the duty of restitution, if there is a real reason for
occupation. One may not take the goods without permission, if this can
be obtained without too much difficulty; nor forcibly, if possession
can be had peaceably.

1922. Restitution for Occupied Goods.--Is the occupier bound to
restitution for occupied goods that were consumed (e.g., food and
drink), if he afterwards becomes able to pay for them?

(a) If the occupier had no prospect at the time of ever being able
to pay for what he took, he is not bound to restitution--not because
of possession, since the thing has perished, nor because of the
taking, since there was no onerous contract, nor because of injury,
since he acted within his rights. The owner cannot complain at this,
since charity obliges him to give of his own free will to one who is
in supreme need and not to expect that the alms be paid back, while
justice forbids that he impede the appropriation of what is needed
by the person in distress. It seems, however, that a case of this
character would rarely happen, and, if it did happen, the more decent
thing would be to pay for what was used. Some moralists think that more
probably there would be an obligation of justice to do this, since
occupation is lawful only in so far as it is necessary.

(b) If the occupier had the prospect at the time of being able to
pay for what he took, he is bound to restitution; for one should not
occupy more than is necessary, and, if a loan suffices to tide one over
a difficulty, it is not right to expect a gift. Hence, men who raid
bakery shops in times of food shortage, are bound to make restitution
to the bakers when able.

1923. Occupation in the Case of Merely Grave Necessity.--Is it lawful
to occupy in merely grave or ordinary necessity?

(a) This is not lawful, for otherwise the doors would be opened to
thefts without number, and both the security of property and the peace
of the public would be at an end. Innocent XI condemned the proposition
that it is permissible to steal in great need (Denzinger, n. 1186). (b)
Such occupation is less sinful than to occupy without necessity, and
indeed the theft may be only venial if one is in grave need and has
vainly sought work or charity to relieve the difficulty, as when a poor
man who is not able to give his children all the food they need steals
provisions now and then.

1924. Occupation of a Large Sum by One in Dire Need.--(a) One opinion
holds that even for the sake of avoiding death this is not permissible,
for one has no right to extraordinary means for the protection of one’s
life.

(b) A second opinion maintains that this occupation is lawful, under
the conditions given in 1921; for life is more precious than even a
large sum of money, and in such extreme need property right yields to
the right to life.

(c) A third opinion distinguishes between the case in which extreme
necessity is proximate or urgent (e.g., an unarmed Watchman is
threatened with instant death if he does not hand over at once the
money he has in charge) and the case in which it is only remote (e.g.,
the doctor tells a poor man that he will die shortly from tuberculosis
unless he goes to a more healthy altitude, but the patient is too poor
to follow these instructions). In the former case the person in need
may take what is necessary (on account of the reasons for the second
opinion and also because the civil laws allow this), but he is not
bound to do so (on account of the reasons for the first opinion); in
the latter case, more probably he has no right to occupation, for this
would be prejudicial to the public welfare and is moreover strictly
forbidden by civil laws (see 1571, 1253).

1925. Duty of the Owner towards One in Dire Need.--(a) In charity
the owner is bound to come to the aid of the needy person; but, if
he neglects this duty, he does not offend justice and is not held to
restitution (see 1240, 1753). (b) In justice the owner is bound not
to prevent the needy person from taking or using what he is entitled
to; but should the owner do this and the necessity cease, there is no
duty of restitution, for the right of the needy person ends with the
necessity.

1926. Lawfulness of Receiving Support from a Thief.--Is it lawful for
the wife and family to receive support from the head of the family,
when he is a thief?

(a) It is lawful when the persons stolen from are not thus deprived of
their goods or of the prospect of restitution. This happens when the
actual support does not come from the stolen property, and the thief is
able to make restitution from other property that belongs to him, or
the wife and children earn as much for the family by their work as they
receive in support. In this case the family may take from the thief
even things that are not necessary for their support.

(b) It is lawful when the persons stolen from are deprived of
restitution, but the obligation of restitution has ceased on account
of grave necessity (see 1797). This happens when the support does not
actually come from the stolen property, but the thief is unable to make
restitution from his own property without depriving his own family who
are in grave need. In this case the family may take from the thief only
such things as are necessary for them according to their station in
life.

(c) It is lawful when the persons stolen from are deprived of their
goods, but the right to occupy these goods has arisen on account of the
extreme necessity of the family (see 1920 sqq.). This happens when the
support comes from the stolen property itself. But the family may use
only what is really necessary for the relief of their dire distress.

1927. Compensation.-Compensation is of two kinds, strict or legal and
wide or extra-legal.

(a) In a strict sense, compensation is counterclaim, or the comparison
of the debts of two persons to one another with a view to the
cancellation of one or of both debts. This method of extinction of
debt is allowed by law in order to reduce the amount and expenses of
litigation. It is known as recoupment or offset when a defendant brings
a cross-action against a plaintiff for non-fulfillment by the latter
of some part of the contract in controversy, and as set-off when the
defendant introduces the debt owed to him over against the debts sued
for by the plaintiff. Counterclaim is just when no injury is done to
one party (e.g., it would be unjust to keep the horse of Titus which
you had borrowed, simply because Titus owed you a debt equal to the
value of the horse, for the horse might be worth more to Titus); it is
legal when recognized by the law (cfr. 1797, 1798).

(b) In a wide sense, compensation is the summary recovery by a creditor
of the thing or the debt owed him by the debtor. The recovery is
summary in the sense that the creditor does not go to law, or proceed
according to law, but takes from the debtor either openly (open
compensation) or secretly (occult compensation) what is owed.

1928. Lawfulness of Occult Compensation.--(a) Ordinarily, or _per
se_, it is not lawful; for it contains such evils as disregard of due
process of law, scandal, infamy, public disturbance, the menace that
the common good will be harmed by frequent abuse, the danger that the
debtor will suffer loss through a second payment of the same debt,
etc. Innocent XI condemned the proposition that domestic servants may
practise occult compensation when they decide that their services are
worth more than the salary they are receiving (Denzinger, n. 1187).
(b) Exceptionally, or _per accidens_, it is lawful; for under certain
conditions it offends neither public nor private welfare and it is
necessary for the vindication of a right. Just as the natural law gives
authority to occupy the goods of another in case of extreme need, so
does it justify occult compensation in the special cases just mentioned.

1929. Unlawful Occult Compensation and Restitution.--Does unlawful
occult compensation oblige one to restitution?

(a) If the compensation is not only unlawful but also injurious
(e.g., a servant takes what is not due her under the pretext of
compensation), it is not rightly called compensation, but is really
theft, and restitution is due. (b) If the compensation is unlawful but
not injurious (e.g., a servant takes what is really due her, but she
could have obtained it by asking for it), there is no theft or duty of
restitution, since the property of another was not stolen.

1930. Conditions Required by Commutative Justice for Occult
Compensation.--(a) Before the Compensation.--There must be a strict
right to the thing taken; for, if there is no such right, one takes
what belongs to another against his will, or commits theft. Hence, if
an employer has freely promised to make a gift to his servant and then
fails to keep the promise, the servant has no right to take what was
promised, since it is owed from liberality or fidelity or gratitude,
but not from commutative justice. The same applies to a non-necessary
heir who has been left nothing in a will, since he had no strict right.
It is also unjust to take secret compensation for a debt that has not
yet fallen due.

(b) During the Compensation.--No wrong must be done to the debtor
(e.g., by taking more than is due, by taking an article which the
debtor needs for earning his living) or to third parties (e.g.,
by taking goods deposited by them with the debtor). If possible,
compensation should be made from goods of the same nature and kind as
those that were taken or damaged, for the debtor should not be forced
to part with things he wishes to retain and which are not necessary for
the creditor’s satisfaction.

(c) After the Compensation.--One must avoid injury to the debtor (e.g.,
the keeping of a payment which is now not owed by him and which one can
refuse or return to him) and to third parties (e.g., the casting of
suspicion on a servant in order to divert attention from one’s act of
occult compensation).

1931. Must the strictness of the right be morally certain, or, in other
words, must reasonable doubt of fact and of law be excluded?

(a) As to doubt of fact, it must be excluded; for in such doubt the
presumption is with the possessor, or at least it is certainly wrong
to perform an act that will probably be injurious to another person
(see 713). Moreover, everyone can see that the public good would suffer
greatly, if occult compensation were permissible when the existence of
a debt is uncertain. Hence, if it is only probable that one sold goods
to another person or that another person has not yet paid for services
received by him, occult compensation must be avoided.

(b) As to pure doubt of law, the question is controverted. Some think
that it also must be excluded, since the possessor should not be
deprived of possession unless it is certain that there is a right
to do this. Others think that occult compensation may be used in
spite of a mere doubt of law, if the doubt concerns only the mode
of making the compensation, or if the probability in favor of the
creditor is so strong that a judge could conscientiously decide for
him against the possessor. Examples of doubts of law here are three
cases that are in dispute among authors, namely, whether one may take
money as compensation for defamation that will not be repaired by
restoration of fame (see 1802, 1803), whether one may deny reparation
for defamation when one has been defamed by the other party and has
not received restitution, whether one has rights to a legacy of which
one is deprived on account of a mere informality in the document. In
these cases the right is held by some authorities to be probable,
but the decision in a particular instance should be made only on the
advice of a learned and conscientious person, since the matter is very
complicated and there is great danger of self-deception.

1932. Some Cases in Which There Is a Strict Right to Compensation.--(a)
Employees (i.e., servants, workingmen, artisans, officials, etc.) have
a strict right when they are injured by the employer’s non-observance
of the contract (e.g., the stipulated salary is not paid; unjust
subtractions are made from the salary, as by fines for the inadvertent
and infrequent breaking of tools, etc., about which there was no
agreement in the contract; labors not contracted for are exacted), or
when an unjust contract is imposed on them (e.g., they are induced by
force or threats to accept less than a living wage; advantage is taken
of their grave necessity to wring from them agreement to such a wage).

(b) Merchants have a strict right when a debt which they cannot collect
is certainly owed them, or when they sold below the minimum just price,
because forced to this unjustly, or because they made a mistake in
charging. They may compensate themselves by diminishing weights or
measurements.

(c) One has a right to compensation who has been condemned under a
sentence manifestly unjust, because the law is certainly unjust or
because the judge clearly gave a wrong decision in a matter of fact
(e.g., he erroneously presumed that a debt had been contracted, or that
it had not been paid).

1933. Some Cases in Which There Is No Right to Compensation.--(a)
Employees have no right to compensation for subtractions from their
salary, if they culpably injure the property of their employer, or
if they agreed to such subtractions; nor for the smallness of their
wage, if they freely accepted it (e.g., if they regarded it as a favor
to be employed, and the employer did not really need them), or if it
is made up for by presents, board or lodging, opportunity for good
tips, etc.; nor for unusual labors, if they hired themselves out for
general service (unless they are asked to perform work of an entirely
unforeseen kind, such as a very perilous mission), or if they undertook
these labors freely without the knowledge or wish (express or tacit) of
the employer.

(b) Merchants have no right to compensation for goods sold by them
below the minimum just price, if they freely agreed to sell at that
price.

1934. Children and Employees and Compensation.--Some special questions
arise for consideration in case of parents who employ their own
children, and of employers who are forced to underpay on account of the
dishonesty of their help.

(a) Children who work for their parents and who are entitled to a
salary, by agreement or from the law, have the same rights as other
employees, but injustice against them would be less frequent. In
this country the father has a right to the services and wages of his
unemancipated child, but the child becomes independent of the father
when it reaches the age of majority or when the father relinquishes his
right.

(b) Employees who are underpaid because the employer is cheated by his
help have the right to occult compensation, if they are forced to take
less than a living wage (1932); otherwise this is not permissible,
unless it be certain that the employer is not unwilling that the honest
employees receive more than their pay. In practice, on account of the
great peril of injustice, it is advisable that such workers seek better
pay through their organizations or else look for employment elsewhere.

1935. Conditions Required by Legal Justice for Occult
Compensation.--(a) Occult compensation must not be used if payment can
easily be obtained through suit at law or agreement; for the order of
law and the public welfare require that one should not have recourse
to the extraordinary means of occult compensation if ordinary means
will suffice and not cause notable difficulties. But as a rule it seems
this obliges only under venial sin, since ordinarily the departure from
normal procedure in this matter is not seriously detrimental to public
morals or order; and it does not impose a duty of restitution, since he
who takes only what belongs to him does not offend against commutative
justice. Indeed, if it is certain that other means will be futile
(e.g., because one has not sufficient evidence to win or because the
decision would he biased) or harmful (e.g., because great dissensions
will be aroused, or heavy expenses incurred in litigation), occult
compensation is not even venially unlawful.

(b) Occult compensation, according to law, should not be used by a
bailee, for he has a lien for his services and proper expenditures in
caring for the object bailed, but not for any other debt the bailor may
owe him (Bolles, _Handy Law Book_). This is obligatory at least for the
external forum.

1936. Some Conditions Required by Charity for Occult Compensation (see
1165, 1236, 1483).--(a) Charity towards the Debtor.--The creditor
should see, when possible, that the debtor suffers no loss by occasion
of the compensation. Hence, in order to spare the debtor the evils of a
bad conscience in reference to the debt or of a second payment of the
debt, the creditor should, if possible, inform the debtor that the debt
is cancelled or that payment is not expected.

(b) Charity towards Third Parties.-The creditor should, if possible,
prevent any trouble or loss to others that might be occasioned by the
compensation, such as suspicion of theft that might fall on servants.

1937. The Lawfulness of Open Compensation.--(a) If one’s property is
being stolen or carried away, it is lawful to protect or recover it by
force; for this is only just defense.

(b) If one’s property has already been carried away but is still in
being and in a safe place, legal justice requires that one seek redress
from the courts. But it does not seem a serious fault if one recovers
goods by using moderate force, since the property is one’s own and the
public manner of seizing it enables the law to take cognizance of the
case. American law recognizes with certain restrictions the rights of
recaption and of entry whereby a person takes possession without legal
process of goods unlawfully taken or withheld from him (Robinson,
_Elementary Law_, Sec.239, 240).

(c) If a debt owed to one is denied by the debtor, it is not lawful
to take payment from him by force, since this is against the law and
productive of scandal and disturbance, and moreover one is not the
owner of the goods which one thus takes by force.

1938. Notanda pro Confessariis.--(a) Ante factum, rarissime consulenda
est occulta compensatio, tum quia ut plurimum illicita est (1928)
utpote periculo injustitiae, scandali, perturbationis plena, tum quia
lex civilis non solet eam ut remedium agnoscere sed potius ut furtum
habet. Publice de occulta compensatione non expedit loqui, et praestat
ut qui privatim de ea interrogentur, etiam datis conditionibus ad
liceitatem necessariis, per modum tolerationis tantum annuant.

(b) Post factum, facilius in favorem utentis compensatione judicari
potest, in ordine ad restitutionem, sed prudenter, et quasi evasive
loquendum, ne praxis ita agendi ut per se et generaliter licita
approbari videatur.

1939. Judicial Injustice.--We pass now from injustices committed by
deed to those committed by words, and shall consider first unjust
words spoken in courts of law and next unjust words spoken in private
or outside of legal processes. Judicial injustice will be treated
under the following heads: (a) injustice in judges; (b) injustice in
plaintiffs or accusers; (c) injustice in defendants; (d) injustice in
witnesses; (e) injustice in lawyers.

1940. The Office of Judge.--Judgment is the proper act of justice
(1727) and therefore when exercised under due conditions it is not
only lawful, but virtuous. The exercise of public judgment belongs to
the judge, who is a person vested with authority to decide litigated
questions in civil or criminal cases.

(a) Thus, in the strict sense, a judge is the official who has public
authority to preside over tribunals of justice, in which major matters
are tried and a formal procedure is followed, and whose function it is
to direct the course of the proceedings and to settle questions of fact
or of law that arise.

(b) In the wide sense, a judge is any person who has lawful authority
to pass an obligatory sentence in criminal or civil matters. The
name may be applied, then, to those who preside over a tribunal in
which minor or urgent questions are considered and treated summarily
(justices of the peace, police magistrates, etc.); to those who do
not preside over a tribunal, but who are attorneys at law appointed
as officers of a court to pass on some issue of a pending proceeding
or suit (referees); to those who act as assistants of the presiding
judge, by determining the truth of alleged facts in civil cases,
or the innocence or guilt of an accused in criminal cases (trial
jurymen); to those who are chosen, by the parties to the dispute or by
a court, as substitutes for the ordinary courts provided by law, to
hear and settle, without legal formalities, the matter in controversy
(arbitrators).

1941. Classes of Courts.--There are various classes of courts and
therefore various kinds of judges.

(a) Thus, according to their relative dignity and jurisdiction there
are higher and lower courts, courts of the first, second and last
instance.

(b) According to the cases they try, courts are either civil (in which
redress of private injuries is sought) or criminal (in which the
community prosecutes public wrongs).

(c) According to the law which they use courts are ecclesiastical or
secular.

(d) According to the form of procedure used and the remedies applied,
courts in the United States are divided into courts of common law,
courts of equity, probate, admiralty, and military courts.

1942. Jurisdiction.--Authority is necessary in a judge, for judgment
is a binding decision that may be executed by force, and this supposes
that he who pronounces the judgment is the superior of the person on
whom the judgment is passed, Hence, he who acts as judge when he lacks
jurisdiction acts invalidly (unless jurisdiction is supplied, as in
common error for an ecclesiastical judge, in Canon 209), and offends
against the rights of another judge and of the person on whom he passes
sentence. Examples would be secular judges acting in ecclesiastical
cases or ecclesiastical judges acting in temporal cases.

1943. The Qualifications of a Judge.--(a) Mentally, he must be endowed
with knowledge of the law and with prudence, so as to be competent
to pronounce correctly on the questions that are brought to him for
decision; for, as being the authorized interpreter and custodian of the
law, he is bound by quasi-contract with the community and with those
who appear before him to be competent for these offices. If a judge
realizes that he is incompetent in these ways, he must either resign
his office, or make up for his deficiency by study or consultation with
those who are more learned than himself. A juryman, being a layman to
the law, is not expected to have the mental equipment of a lawyer; but
it is his duty to give his attention to the statements, arguments and
testimony and to the instructions of the judge.

(b) Morally, the judge must be a lover of justice, whether commutative,
distributive or legal; for the proper office of the judge is to apply
the law to particular cases and to declare officially the mutual
rights and obligations of litigants who are before him. He must not
be a respecter of persons, one who is moved for or against a man on
account of rank, position or wealth, nor one who is swayed by fear or
favor, by popular outcry or personal ambition. Not only legal but also
commutative justice obliges him to perform his duties conscientiously;
for in taking his office he enters into a quasi-contract with the
community to execute his functions faithfully and well, and similarly
by trying a case he engages that those before him will receive
evenhanded justice. A juror should be a conscientious person who is
openminded and free from prejudice for or against those on whom he has
to vote.

1944. Conduct of a Judge.--A judge must be above suspicion, since
respect for the courts is the very life of the State. But there is good
reason to suspect a judge who judges in his own case, or in a case in
which he will be naturally inclined to favor one side. Hence the duty
of abstaining from certain things.

(a) Thus, he should avoid business, social and political activities
that will give ground for belief that he uses his office for the
promotion of private interests.

(b) He should not act in a case in which his own advantage or the
advantage of his friends might appear to conflict with the duty of
strict impartiality, as when he has personal litigation in the court,
or when a near relative of his is party in a controversy, or when one
of the contestants is his personal or political friend or enemy, etc.
Canon 1613 of the Code forbids a church judge to act in the case of a
person related by blood or marriage in the direct line or in the first
and second degrees of the collateral line, or of a person for whom he
is guardian or administrator, or in cases in which he had previously
acted as advocate or proxy, or from which he stands to profit or lose.

(c) He should refrain from conduct that would tend to arouse doubts of
his impartial attitude, such as incivility to counsel or witnesses,
unexplained rulings that have the appearance of arbitrariness, private
interviews or dealings with one of the parties before him in ways
calculated to influence his action.

1945. Accepting Gifts from Litigants or Others.--May a judge take money
or other goods from those whose interests are submitted to him, such as
litigants or lawyers in his court or their friends?

(a) If the goods are extorted by threats or pressure or unjust
vexation, the judge is guilty of robbery, since he forcibly takes that
to which he has no right.

(b) If the goods are given as payment for the judge’s services during
the trial, the judge sins against commutative justice in receiving
payment for services already due, since his salary comes from the
community and obliges him to administer justice without charge to
those who seek it. Neither is it lawful to take money as compensation
for trying one case before another, or for hastening a case, or for
giving unusual diligence to a complicated case, or for deciding for
one side when the evidence is equal on both sides. But the law could
permit a judge to collect his expenses from both parties if the trial
necessitated a personal outlay of money (e.g., for travel or hire of
assistants) and there was no public fund to defray these costs.

(c) If the goods are offered as bribes, in order that the judge may be
influenced to act against justice, it is clear that grave injustice is
done both to the community and to the party who is injured.

(d) If the goods are given as free gifts, with no condition attached,
some think they may be lawfully accepted, if there is little
probability that they will influence the judge (e.g., because they
are small or given after the trial has ended). But others hold, and
it seems more correctly, that both natural and positive law forbids
this. Natural law forbids because of the danger (“Presents and gifts
blind the eyes of judges, and make them dumb in the mouth, so that they
cannot correct,” Ecclus., xx. 31), and because of the mistrust and
scandal that will result. It is incorrect to suppose that small gifts
and gifts offered after sentence would not have influence, for the
contending parties would soon come to vie with one another in making
gifts, while judges would begin to think about the gratuities that
might be looked for at the conclusion of a trial. Canon Law forbids all
ecclesiastical judges and all who assist in court to accept any gifts
whatever that are offered in connection with the trial (Canon 1624),
and the civil law provides severe penalties for bribes offered as gifts.

(e) If goods are given as a mere alms or from civility or hospitality
(e.g., food and drink such as is usually offered to a guest or
visitor), it does not seem unlawful in itself to accept them, but,
since there is a danger of suspicion and scandal, even this should be
avoided.

1946. Obligation of a Judge to Restore Goods Received in the
Above-Mentioned Ways.--(a) If retention of the goods is contrary to
the reasonable wishes of the person who gave them, restitution is
necessary. Hence, the judge must give back money that was extorted and
the payments made by private parties for the exercise of his official
duties.

(b) If retention of the goods is contrary to law, restitution is also
necessary. Hence, if a judge has taken a bribe, he must give it back,
because the agreement is null, and he cannot lawfully keep his part of
the compact by acting contrary to justice. The same is true when the
law voids the contract whereby he received the goods, or when a court
decree obliges him to return a free gift bestowed upon him.

(c) If retention of the goods is not contrary to the will of the giver
nor to the law, restitution is not necessary. Hence, if a judge has
received a pure gift and no corruption was intended or practised,
he sinned in taking it, but the donation was valid and there is no
obligation to return it. And even though he has taken a bribe, and in
consideration of it has acted against justice, it seems there is no
natural obligation to make restitution to the party who gave the bribe,
since the latter has received a consideration for his payment, but the
judge is held to indemnify the injured party.

1947. Duties of a Judge in the Course of a Trial.--(a) The purpose of
the investigation is to discover the truth in the matter before the
court, and consequently it is the duty of a judge to give a case the
study and attention it deserves.

(b) The method of procedure is intended to secure a fair hearing for
both parties and so to expedite business that the litigants will not
be harmed by needless delays. The judge should therefore observe the
necessary and customary forms of law, while avoiding waste of time
and unnecessary interruptions. “It is not the custom of the Romans,”
said Festus to the Jews who asked him to condemn Paul, “to condemn any
man, before that he who is accused have his accusers present, and have
liberty to make his answer, to clear himself of the things laid to his
charge” (Acts, xxv. 15).

1948. Duties of a Judge at the Conclusion of a Trial.--(a) The sentence
must be just, that is, it must be based on the law and the evidence.
Even though a judge does not personally approve of a law, thinking it
unwise or unnecessary or over-severe, he should nevertheless enforce
it; for he is appointed, not to change or reform, but to apply the law,
yet so, however, that the spirit is not sacrificed.

(b) Sentence must not be relaxed as a rule, for otherwise the rights of
the State or of the party winning the case will be harmed. But there
are times when the public good or some other sufficient reason calls
for relaxation, and in such cases judges have the power to refrain from
passing sentence or to suspend or respite a sentence already announced.
The defeated party should be allowed the opportunity which the law
grants him for seeking a reversal of the judgment.

1949. Sentence Passed under a Law Manifestly Unjust.--(a) If the law is
manifestly opposed to divine or natural law and sentence under it would
command the commission of an act intrinsically evil (e.g., cohabitation
of those who are not really married, “mercy killing” of the physically
or mentally incapacitated, eugenic sterilization of defectives or
criminals), the judge should resign rather than give such a sentence.

(b) If the law is manifestly opposed to divine or natural law and
sentence under it would inflict a grievous penalty (e.g., death or
long imprisonment) on the transgressor of the law, sentence would be
unlawful. But if only a light penalty would be inflicted (e.g., a small
fine or short confinement), it seems that sentence might be tolerated;
for the person condemned might be considered to yield his rights in
such a case for the sake of the public good, which suffers from the
loss of conscientious officials. The act of the judge in giving the
sentence would be only material cooperation, which is lawful for grave
reasons (see 1515 sqq.).

(c) If the law is manifestly opposed to ecclesiastical law, sentence
may be given lawfully, if scandal is avoided and the Church yields her
right in the case, as is sometimes done in favor of Catholic judges,
lest they be deprived of their positions.

1950. May a Catholic Judge Grant a Decree of Divorce?---Apart from
scandal or a positive ecclesiastical prohibition:

(a) The judge may grant a divorce to a couple not married validly
although they have had a marriage ceremony recognized by civil law.
This would occur in the case of Catholics married before a civil
magistrate or non-Catholic minister. Also, when the Church has
pronounced a marriage invalid, civil divorce may be granted for the
sake of civil effects.

(b) Divorce may be granted if the judge knows that one of the parties
will invoke the Pauline privilege.

(c) If the judge is morally certain that neither party will attempt
remarriage and that the divorce is being sought merely for the sake of
civil effects, he may grant the divorce. In the case of Catholics the
consent of Church authorities would be required for this procedure.

(d) If the marriage is valid and it is known that the parties will
attempt a new marriage, some consider that a decree of divorce is
intrinsically evil, since it but applies a law that attempts, contrary
to divine right, to dissolve the marriage bond. Others (and this is
the more common view today) distinguish and think that the decree of
divorce does not concern the religious obligation of the petitioners,
but is simply an official declaration that the state regards the
civil effects of the marriage as no longer existing. Under certain
circumstances, (e. g., loss of office for refusal to accept a divorce
case, loss of prestige, antagonism, etc.), such a decree, in itself
morally indifferent, may be permitted.

(e) If there is question of partial divorce (i.e., separation from
bed and board) of Catholic spouses, a decree is lawful, the Church
consenting, for a reason recognized by ecclesiastical authority, such
as adultery.

1951. When Evidence Is Contrary to Personal Knowledge of Judge.--(a)
In a civil case, the judge should follow the public evidence rather
than his private knowledge; for he acts as a public, not as a private,
person. Moreover, the State has the power to transfer property from one
to another, when the common good requires this, and the common good
requires that civil decisions be based on public evidence rather than
on private information. Some moralists deny this conclusion on the
ground that it is intrinsically wrong to force a person to pay who does
not owe, even though the evidence is against him.

(b) In a criminal case, the judge should follow the evidence rather
than his own knowledge, if the evidence calls for acquittal of the
accused; for it is better for the public welfare that a guilty man
escape than that the judicial order be neglected and a rule admitted
that might convict the innocent as well as the guilty.

(c) In a criminal case in which the evidence points to guilt while the
judge’s private knowledge assures him of the innocence of the accused,
the judge must not condemn, if there is any legal way to avoid it. But
if the evidence stands and the judge has to pronounce sentence, it is
not easy to determine the course that should be followed. According to
St. Thomas, the judge should condemn, since he is a public official and
must therefore be guided by the allegations and proofs offered during
the trial, especially since public order and respect for law depend on
the good reputation of the courts. If judges could disregard at will
the evidence offered on account of private knowledge they claimed to
have, the confidence of the public in the integrity of courts would
be shaken, men would take the law into their own hands, and peace and
order on which the happiness of the community depend would be at an
end. Moreover, the judge is not guilty in sentencing in this case,
since he does not intend evil and acts according to the principle of
double effect (see 103 sqq.). According to a second opinion attributed
to St. Bonaventure, the judge should acquit, since it is intrinsically
wrong to condemn to death a person about whose innocence one is
certain. According to a third opinion, which St. Alphonsus considers
as probable, the judge should condemn in minor criminal cases in which
only pecuniary penalties are imposed (for the State has the right to
exercise eminent domain in order to safeguard an important public good
like that of respect for the law and the courts); but he should acquit
in major cases in which personal punishments are inflicted, for society
has no right to deprive an innocent person of life or liberty.

1952. When the Judge Is the Unjust Cause of Damaging Evidence.--In some
cases the judge may be the unjust cause of the evidence that convicts
an innocent man, as when the judge has committed a crime and thrown
suspicion on the accused (Dan, xiii), or when the judge has moved
others to testify falsely against a man he knows to be innocent.

(a) One opinion holds that the judge would be obliged to condemn, on
account of the reasons just given for the opinion of St. Thomas, if the
judge were unable to overcome the evidence. But those who hold this add
that this is purely speculative, for in a concrete case there would
be many ways by which the judge could extricate both himself and the
accused from the difficulty.

(b) Another opinion says that in no case could the judge of the present
hypothesis condemn. Those who favor this opinion declare that St.
Thomas is to be understood only of the case in which the judge is not
the cause of the unjust accusation; for one who has culpably placed
a cause of damage is bound to remove that cause before it acts, if
this is possible, and in the present instance it is possible for the
judge, if all other things have failed, to free the innocent person by
testifying for him, or even by acknowledging his own guilt.

1953. Practical Conclusions about the Three Controverted Opinions Given
Above in 1951.--(a) In a case tried according to Canon Law, it seems
that the opinion of St. Thomas should be followed, since Canon 1869, n.
2, declares that the ecclesiastical judge must not give sentence unless
he is certain about the matter of the sentence, and that his certainty
must be derived from the acts and proofs of the trial.

(b) In a case tried according to civil law, it seems that the whole
controversy is today very often of little practical importance; for
court decisions are now frequently left to jurymen, and these men
must either have no private certainty before they are admitted to
their office (as is the case in the United States), or they have the
obligation of using private knowledge in casting their vote and of
communicating it to fellow-jurors during the deliberations (as is
the case in some other countries). Hence, the moral question whether
it is lawful to decide according to private knowledge against the
public evidence largely disappears. But when a case of the kind now
considered does occur, the position of the civil law also agrees, it
seems, with that of St. Thomas: “Neither the judge nor the jury can
consider a private fact of which they have a merely personal knowledge,
however important may be its bearing on the issue, unless it has been
brought to their attention by evidence properly produced in open
court” (Robinson, Elementary Law, Sec. 334). But the lightest penalty
allowed by the law should be imposed in such a case. If a judge were
privately certain that a jury verdict was unjust, he could offer his
own testimony or appeal to the pardoning power.

1954. The principle that a judge must be guided only by his public
knowledge applies also to other officials who are required to follow
the results of a public investigation, but not to those who are
required to act according to their best knowledge, whether public or
private.

(a) Thus, public knowledge must be the guide of those who are ministers
of a court and on whom it falls to execute its decrees; for they are
the instruments and subjects of the president of the court. If they
have private information of a material and relevant kind, they should
disclose it as witnesses.

(b) Private knowledge that is opposed to and more reliable than public
knowledge must be the guide of those who are supposed to act according
to the most trustworthy knowledge they have. Hence, a superior who has
the power to make appointments to office should disregard the votes of
his advisors, if he can prove that they are wrong in their opinions
about a nominee for office. He may confirm or annul their choice
according to his honest conscience.

1955. When Guilt Is Doubtful in Criminal Cases.--In a criminal case or
a case in which punishment is inflicted, if the guilt of the accused is
doubtful, the sentence should be for acquittal; for no one should be
condemned unless his guilt is morally certain (see 1728 sqq.).

(a) Thus, according to Canon Law, an ecclesiastical judge who is not
certain that sentence for the plaintiff will be just, must declare that
the latter has not established his case and must dismiss the defendant,
though exception is made for cases that have the favor of law (such
as marriage, liberty, testaments, Canon 1869, n. 4). Canon Law places
the burden of proof on him who makes an assertion, and it rules that
the defendant is to be acquitted if the plaintiff or accuser fails to
prove, even though the person on trial says nothing (Canon 1748).

(b) According to the civil law the rules on evidence also favor the
accused in cases of doubt. He must not be held guilty unless the State
has proved affirmatively and beyond reasonable doubt every material
allegation in the indictment. In capital cases the evidence of guilt
must be equivalent in weight and conclusiveness to the direct testimony
of two competent and reliable witnesses. A reasonable doubt in the
mind of a juryman is one for which he can give himself an adequate and
satisfactory reason (Robinson, Elementary Law, Sec. 608).

1956. Doubt in Civil Cases.--In civil cases, if it is uncertain after
the investigation for whom the decision should be given, the following
rules seem to be just:

(a) if the parties are unequal in claim, the decision should be for the
one whose claim is more weighty; for the judge is appointed by society
to investigate the truth of a controversy and to decide according to
the merits of the case. Thus, decision should be for the party Whose
arguments are of at least equal strength--but who has legitimate
possession (for “possession is nine points in law”), or whose case
enjoys the favor of the law (e.g., in Canon Law, the cases of widows,
wards, minors), or for the party whose case is stronger and more
probable. Innocent XI condemned the proposition that a judge may decide
for the side whose arguments are less probable (Denzinger, n. 1152);

(b) if the parties are equal in their claims, some think that property
in dispute should be equally divided between the contestants, others
that the parties should be persuaded to compromise, or, if this is
impossible, that the decision may be given for either one of them. But
if positive law regulates the manner of proceeding in such a case, its
provisions should be followed. Thus, in Canon Law, if a judge is in
doubt as to which one of two competitors has possession, he may grant
it to both of them indivisibly, or he may command them to deposit it
with a sequester, pending the settlement of the dispute (Canon 1697).

1957. What should be decided when the defendant has possession with
probable title and the plaintiff has more probable title?--(a) If the
possession is not certain, or not certainly legitimate, decision should
be for the plaintiff, for uncertain possession does not create any
presumption of right and hence the more probable case prevails.

(b) If the possession is certainly legitimate, the common opinion is
that decision should be for the defendant; for certain possession is
not overcome by more probable, but only by certain arguments for the
plaintiff. Some authors, however, believe that the judge should decide
for the plaintiff, since possession prevails only when the arguments
are of equal strength on both sides; or at least that he could decide
for him, since it is probable that the plaintiff by presenting a more
convincing case has sufficiently established his right to eject the
defendant.

1958. The Standard by Which a Judge Should Weigh the Evidence.--(a)
When the proving force of an argument is settled by the law itself,
the legal rule should be followed. Thus, in Canon Law certain kinds
of proofs are expressly declared to be demonstrative (e.g., a public
instrument not contested, Canon 1816), while other proofs are held
to be insufficient or only of partial value (e.g., certain kinds of
testimony, Canon 1756). Likewise in civil law public documents are
prima facie evidence, oral interpretation of a written document which
contradicts its language is not admitted, etc.

(b) When the proving force of an argument is left to the discretion of
the judge, he must follow his conscience, that is, he must sincerely
and impartially decide to the best of his ability the value of the
argument, whether it is decisive, or likely, or Weak. Thus, in judging
circumstantial evidence a juryman must use his own common sense and
intelligence in determining whether the premises are doubtful or the
inference illogical; in estimating testimony a judge must bear in mind
the quality of the witnesses and the character of their testimony.

1959. The Moral Obligation of a Judicial Sentence that Is Certainly
Just.--(a) It is binding in conscience; for it is merely the
application of law to a particular case, and law obliges (see 377). (b)
It obliges in virtue of legal justice when the case is only penal, and
hence he who is fined by court is held as a duty of obedience to pay
the fine; it obliges in virtue of commutative justice when the case is
about a strict right, and hence if the court requires an heir to pay a
legacy, the latter must make restitution for neglect of this duty (see
1728).

1960. The Moral Obligation of a Judicial Sentence that Is Certainly
Unjust.--(a) If the sentence is unjust because it is the application
of an unjust law, it produces no obligation in those cases in which
the judge cannot lawfully apply the law (see 1949); for an unjust law
does not oblige in conscience _per se_, but only _per accidens_ (see
377, 461). (b) If the sentence is unjust because it is not based on the
law or the evidence, or because the trial was not conducted fairly, it
produces no obligation _per se_, but there may be an obligation _per
accidens_, as when scandal or great public disturbance will otherwise
result. Hence, one who through plain injustice is deprived of an
inheritance has the right to occult compensation (see 1928), while the
other party is bound to restitution of the inheritance (unless he is in
good faith or has prescribed) and also to damages, if he went to law in
bad faith.

1961. The Moral Obligation of a Judicial Sentence in Case of
Doubt.--(a) If the doubt is about fact or law, not about the right
of the judge to give sentence (see 1955 sqq.), the sentence may be
safely followed; for it is the office of the judge to settle doubtful
matters, and to promote the common welfare by ending litigation. Thus,
in doubtful criminal cases the judge sometimes acquits a guilty man,
and in doubtful civil cases he sometimes awards property to one who
has no right to it; but these sentences are not unjust, since they are
based on rules which long experience has shown to be necessary for the
public welfare. (b) If the doubt is about the justice of the sentence,
there is an obligation of conscience to observe the judgment, since
the presumption favors the judge. Were this not so, the authority of
tribunals of justice would be at an end, for almost everyone who loses
a case thinks that he has been treated unjustly. But one may enter an
appeal, where this is allowed by law.

1962. When a Judge Is Bound to Restitution.--A judge is bound to
restitution when he causes unjust damage to the community or to
litigants (see 1762 sqq.), and hence he must either recall his unjust
act, or repair to the best of his ability the harm done. But the
conditions for unjust damage must be verified (see 1763).

(a) Thus, the judge’s act must be objectively unjust, that is, in
violation of a strict right under commutative justice. This happens
when he conducts the trial unjustly (e.g., when he neglects the
essential procedure, tries without an accuser, and the like) or when
he passes unjust sentence (e.g., condemns without proof of fact or
crime, or in spite of evidence for innocence, votes for acquittal when
there is no reasonable doubt of guilt, imposes penalties that are
insufficient or excessively severe, or awards property to one who to
his knowledge has no right to it).

(b) The judge’s act must be efficaciously unjust, that is, it must be
the real cause of the loss sustained by the other person. Hence, there
is no duty of restitution if loss does not result (e.g., if the party
who is in the right wins in spite of unfairness on the part of the
judge), or if loss cannot be traced to the judge’s action (e.g., when
a judge is not entirely impartial in his charge to the jury, but his
words do not influence them, as they would have given an unfair verdict
anyway).

(c) The judge’s act must be subjectively unjust, that is, the judge
must be seriously responsible for the damage on account of his
culpable ignorance, negligence, or malice. Even though he has made
mistakes through excusable inadvertence or error, he becomes seriously
responsible for damage, if, foreseeing it, he does not do what is in
his power to avert it (see 1769).

1963. When a Judge Is Not Bound to Restitution. A judge is not bound to
restitution, however, for violations of virtues other than commutative
justice.

(a) Thus, charity is offended, but not justice, if the judge has
personal hatred against a person before him, but does not permit this
to influence his conduct or decisions.

(b) Legal, but not commutative, justice is offended, if the judge is
negligent about exemplary damages, provided the common good does not
suffer; for there does not seem to be any strict right to the fine
before sentence has been given. This is disputed, however, by some
moralists, who hold that the judge is under contract with the community
in this matter, and hence that he offends commutative justice, if he is
habitually and to notable amounts indulgent about fines.

1964. Kinds of Accusation.--From injustice committed by judges we pass
now to that committed by accusers. It should be noted that there are
two kinds of accusation: (a) extrajudicial accusation is that which is
brought before a superior in order that he may correct or restrain,
without recourse to judicial process, a subject who is delinquent. This
is evangelical or canonical correction, which was discussed in 1293,
1289; (b) judicial accusation, with which we are now concerned, is that
which is brought before a judge, in order that redress may be obtained
through judicial process against an accused person.

1965. Judicial accusation is also made in two ways. (a) The accuser
sometimes does not act as one of the two antagonistic parties, and does
not assume the burden of proving his accusation. He makes an official
complaint or denunciation, and then drops out of the case, leaving it
to the magistrate or other officer to examine whether a process should
be instituted and the informer summoned as a witness. (b) The accuser
is sometimes one of the two antagonistic parties during the process,
and he then assumes the burden of proving his accusation. In Canon Law
there are two kinds of processual accusers, the actor in civil cases
and the accuser (an official known as the _promotor justitiae_) in
criminal cases. In American law, the accuser in cases of private wrong
is known as the plaintiff; in cases of public wrong he is the District
Attorney or public prosecutor.

1966. The Duty of Judicial Accusation or Denunciation.--(a) If a wrong
has been committed which is directly prejudicial to the common welfare
(e.g., treason, counterfeiting, banditry), there is an obligation to
make accusation, for each member of society is held to come to its
assistance when its peace and order are endangered, and this is done by
cooperating with the tribunals of justice. Duty to one’s family also
requires that one prosecute, when this is necessary in order to protect
its members against some great evil.

(b) If a wrong has been committed which is not immediately prejudicial
to the common welfare, there is not _per se_ an obligation of
accusation; for the purpose of accusation is to obtain punishment or
the correction of a wrong--an end that should not be waived when the
common good is at stake, but which may be waived when private interests
are concerned. But _per accidens_, or by reason of circumstances, there
is often an obligation of denouncing or accusing private wrongs.

1967. Cases in Which There Is a Duty of Making Complaint about Private
Wrongs.--(a) Such complaint is obligatory in virtue of commutative
justice, when by reason of his office, oath, or function a person
is under contract to accuse violators of the law; and hence serious
negligence in such a person entails the duty of restitution for any
damage caused through his fault. Examples here would be a watchman who
fails to report thefts, a man serving on the grand jury who does not
vote for an indictment when he should, a prosecutor who is careless.
The obligation is grave when the danger or injury to the common good is
serious.

(b) This complaint is obligatory in virtue of legal justice, when there
is a positive precept of the law which requires that accusation be
made. The civil law rarely obliges to this as a duty of conscience,
but there are a number of cases in Canon Law in which it is a duty of
conscience to denounce (e.g., when there has been a _sollicitatio ad
turpia_).

(c) This complaint is obligatory in virtue of charity, when without
serious inconvenience one can thereby save a neighbor from a grave
evil, such as unjust sentence of death or infamy: “Deliver them that
are led to death” (Prov., xxiv. 11); “Rescue the poor, and deliver the
needy out of the hand of the sinner” (Psalm lxxxi. 4).

1968. Is a Malefactor Bound to Accuse Himself?--(a) As a rule, he is
not bound to confess guilt, either explicitly or implicitly, for this
is too much opposed to natural inclination, and hence is not demanded
by law (see 552). This seems to be true even though an accused has
unjustly declared himself innocent, and has not been questioned further
or has been acquitted; for legal justice obliges the accused to give a
true answer only when he is being questioned (see 1978). In Canon Law
those who would sustain damage from their own testimony are not bound
to take the witness stand, and hence persons who reasonably fear that
their evidence will subject themselves or their relatives to infamy,
vexation or other disadvantage cannot be forced to testify (Canon 1755,
n. 2). In civil law one may not be convicted on one’s own testimony
alone, unless the confession was voluntary, that is, made neither under
fear, nor with the hope of favor, nor as the result of any species of
coercion (Robinson, _Elementary Law_, Sec.608).

(b) In exceptional cases, one would be bound to accuse oneself, namely,
if there were a grave and urgent necessity of the community which
outweighed the loss that would follow from self-accusation (see 1576,
1577). Self-accusation is also a duty when one is the gravely culpable
cause of the punishment of an innocent person, if there is no other
lawful way of freeing him, and the self-accusation will not bring
on one a much more serious evil than that which the innocent person
suffers.

1969. Ethical Conditions for Lawful Accusation or Denunciation.--(a)
There must be no injury to the common welfare. Hence, if the order and
peace of society would be disturbed by the accusation of a crime which
was private and from which no further damage could be anticipated, it
would be better to leave this occult crime unpunished rather than bring
on greater evils to the public.

(b) There must be no injury to private welfare. Hence, if the accuser
does not believe that his accusation is just, or if he knows that
there is no suitable evidence for his charges, or if he is excluded
by law from making an accusation (e.g., when his knowledge has been
derived from the confessional or in other confidential ways), it would
be unjust to accuse; if the offender offers to make full satisfaction
for a private wrong and has already amended, or was not accustomed
to commit such wrongs, or if the loss he will suffer from the
accusation will be far in excess of the wrong he has done, it would be
uncharitable to make formal accusation (see 1200, 1201).

1970. Persons Who May Not Act as Accusers.--Generally speaking, the
following persons are naturally incapable of acting as accusers: (a)
those who are guilty of greater misdeeds or who are infamous, since
it is unbecoming for them to accuse; (b) those who are enemies of the
other party, since they are swayed by spite or revengefulness; (c)
those who are near relatives of the other party, since it is unnatural
for them to attack their own flesh and blood.

1971. In Whose Favor May One Denounce a Private Wrong?--(a) One may
denounce it in one’s own favor, for one is not obliged to sacrifice
one’s right to redress, and hence accusation is permissible (see 1199).
Those who are considered as one person with the injured party may
accuse for him, such as parents, husband, wife, children.

(b) One may denounce a private wrong in favor of an innocent third
party, as when an innocent person is being harassed by oppression, even
though one can defend him only with notable inconvenience to oneself
(see 1967).

(c) One may denounce a private wrong in favor of the guilty party
himself, as when he is guilty of offenses that are harmful only to
himself (e.g., drunkenness, impurities), if he has a bad reputation
already or his delinquencies are manifest.

1972. Accusation and Fraternal Correction.--Whether obligatory or
permissible accusation should be preceded by a fraternal correction is
controverted among moralists. But perhaps the two opposite views may be
reconciled as follows:

(a) _per se_, that is, in view of the purpose of accusation
(punishment, vindication of justice, example), there is no duty of
previous fraternal admonition, since the purpose of the admonition is
the amendment of the wrongdoer (see above, 1289, 1293);

(b) _per accidens_, that is, in view of the circumstance that there
may be hope of correcting the wrongdoer and of averting evil, and that
punishment may not be very necessary to the public welfare, previous
fraternal correction for secret delinquencies may sometimes be a duty
of charity.

1973. Unjust Accusation.--Injustice in accusation is committed in
the following ways: (a) injury is done the accused when a crime is
falsely imputed to him through malice (calumny), or through a too
great readiness to believe rumors (rashness); (b) injury is done the
community if one whose duty it is to conduct a prosecution makes only a
sham attack or colludes with the defense (prevarication), or if without
good reason he abandons the prosecution (tergiversation).

1974. Cessation of Duty of Accusation.--The duty of accusation ceases:
(a) when accusation is found to be unjust, for example, when the
prosecutor discovers the accused is really innocent, etc. (see 1969);
(b) when accusation is found to be useless, for example, when one
discovers that the authorities are already aware of the fact about
which one intended to give information, or when one perceives that the
charge cannot be substantiated.

1975. The Defendant.--The party who is required to make answer to the
charges of the plaintiff or prosecutor is known as the defendant or the
accused. We shall now speak of the ways in which he may be guilty of
injustice, and shall consider the following cases: (a) the defendant in
civil cases; (b) the accused in criminal cases who is innocent; (c) the
accused in criminal cases who is guilty.

1976. The Duties of the Defendant in Civil Cases.--(a) Before
Sentence.--If the cause of the plaintiff is clearly just, the defendant
as a matter of justice should recognize the claim and withdraw from the
case. But a defendant may take exception to arguments offered by the
plaintiff which, though actually valid, are not juridically made.

(b) After Sentence.--If the cause of the plaintiff is clearly just
but loses in court, the defendant is obliged in conscience to pay the
claim, even though the plaintiff does not appeal the case; he is also
obliged in conscience to indemnify the plaintiff for the expenses of
litigation, if the latter lost the case on account of unjust means
employed by the defendant.

1977. The Duties of One Who Has Been Arrested on a Criminal
Charge.--(a) If the accused person is innocent, he may take to flight
or even offer positive resistance, provided he does no injury to those
who attack him, and public scandal or disorder does not result from
the resistance. This is according to natural law, which permits one
to use self-defense against unjust aggression; but since the positive
law requires the accused to submit to arrest that is not manifestly
unlawful and empowers the officers to employ force against those who
resist, it seems that generally the accused should permit himself to be
taken under protest, if he cannot escape.

(b) If the accused person is guilty, he may take to flight, since he
has not yet been sentenced as guilty nor officially deprived of his
liberty; but he may not offer resistance to those who are sent to
apprehend him, since their aggression against him is not unjust. The
accused person, if not yet convicted, may even use indifferent means to
escape from prison, such as sawing his way out or eluding the vigilance
of the guards; but he may not employ sinful means, such as bribery of
officials.

1978. Duty of the Accused to Plead Guilty, if Questioned by the
Judge.--(a) If the accused is innocent, he may not plead guilty,
as is clear. If to escape most grave evils he did plead guilty, he
would be guilty of lying (if under oath, of perjury), but not of
self-defamation; for, as the owner of his reputation, he has the right
to sacrifice it in order to escape greater evils. Neither would he be
guilty of suicide, according to some, if the death penalty were the
consequence of the confession; for his purpose would be to avoid what
he dreaded more than death.

(b) If the accused is guilty, he must reply truthfully, if the judge
has the right to ask the question; for if the judge has the right
to question, the accused has the obligation to answer, even though
unpleasant things will befall him in consequence.

(c) If the accused is guilty, but the judge has no right to ask about
his guilt (that is, if the judge does not question juridically or
according to law, or if he questions from a false presumption of
guilt), or if the accusation cannot be proved juridically, the accused
is not obliged to answer. He may keep silence or evade the truth, but
it is not lawful to lie.

1979. Legal Right of a Judge to Question a Prisoner about His
Guilt.--(a) According to older legislation a judge had this right, and
could enforce it by torture, when the common good was involved and
the guilt of the prisoner was likely on account of infamy or manifest
indications of crime or half-proof of guilt. In itself, this practice
was not opposed to natural law and had some good results; but it was
open also to many abuses. Some moralists teach that a judge cannot
impose a grave obligation of confessing guilt in capital or similar
cases, if the accused has otherwise a hope of escape and no great evil
is likely to befall the common interests by reason of an acquittal.
They argue that human law cannot oblige so rigorously as a rule.

(b) According to modern civil legislation the right of exacting a
confession is denied to a judge. Thus, according to American law no
person may be compelled “in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself” (Constitution, Article V). In American law the plea of not
guilty is not a lie, even though the accused knows that he is guilty,
for, as everyone understands, the plea means either that one is
innocent or that one is using the privilege of not confessing. Neither
is it considered a lie to say that an unprovable charge is a calumny,
for an accusation that cannot be proved juridically is juridically a
calumny.

(c) The general law of the Church rules for ecclesiastical processes
that, when the judge questions the parties-litigant, they are obliged
to answer and to confess the truth, unless the question is not
legitimate (e.g., questions about irrelevant or privileged matters,
or questions made in a captious or leading manner), or the answer
would incriminate the parties themselves (Canon 1743). Neither is
an ecclesiastical judge permitted to put an accused in a criminal
case under oath to tell the truth (Canon 1744). An instruction of
the Holy Office of 1866 required that the guilty party in a case of
solicitation should confess, but the instruction was directive rather
than preceptive. Particular law (e.g., the statutes of a Religious
Institute) might perhaps prescribe confession by an accused, but most
Constitutions of Religious Institutes bind only under penalty, and,
as for the rest, an ecclesiastical superior could at most advise, but
could not impose, confession by an accused.

1980. Rights and Duties of Accused in Conducting His Own Defense.--(a)
In Reference to Judge or Attorneys.--The accused, if questioned, may
not conceal the truth by lies, ambiguities, or half-truths, since these
are evil means, nor may he use evasion if he is lawfully interrogated.
But if the question put to him is unlawful, he may evade an answer. It
is commonly held that lies told in giving testimony or evidence are
not necessarily mortal sins, as there may be no perjury committed or
grave harm done another by reason of them (e.g., when an innocent man
“doctors” a paper and thereby without harming anyone escapes from an
unjust sentence).

(b) In Reference to the Opponent or His Witnesses.--The accused has the
right to disclose secret but real crimes of the accusers, when this is
an exercise of his legal right of taking exception to the witnesses
as incompetent, or of his natural right of clearing himself of the
charge against him. It makes no difference whether the evidence of the
accusers is true or false, whether given according to the order of law
or not. But he must not go beyond the limits of moderate self-defense
(see 1826). Innocent XI condemned the proposition that it is probable
that calumny may be used without mortal sin as a defense of one’s
justice or honor (Denzinger, n. 1194).

1981. If the accused objects secret crimes of the opposition, he must
beware of injustice or uncharitableness. (a) Thus, it is unjust to
disclose crimes that cannot be proved, or that are irrelevant (e.g.,
it may be irrelevant to prove that the person who testifies that the
accused committed murder is himself a fornicator, but it would be
relevant to show that this witness is a liar, or dishonest, or an enemy
of the accused), or that need not be revealed (e.g., if the witness’s
testimony can be overcome by showing that the witness is weak-minded or
under obligations to the opposition, it is not necessary to defame him).

(b) It is uncharitable to disclose a crime, if the witness will suffer
far more from this defamation than the accused would suffer from the
testimony. If, however, the witnesses are giving false evidence of
their own accord, they take the risk of revelations by the defense.

1982. Rights and Duties of an Accused Who Has Been Found Guilty.--(a)
Appeals.--It is lawful to appeal from a sentence that is unjust
(whether because of the innocence of the accused, or of the illegality
of the process), because appeal is a means of self-defense granted
to the innocent. It is not lawful to appeal from a sentence that
is certainly just, merely in order to cause delay or to defeat an
adversary; but one may make an appeal when there are just reasons
(e.g., in criminal cases the hope of getting an easier sentence or of
prolonging life, in civil cases the discovery of new proofs, or of
probable arguments against the sentence given). But one who has pledged
his word not to appeal from the decision of an arbitrator should abide
by his promise, and there is no appeal from the final decision of the
highest court, which in the Church is the Roman Pontiff (Canon 1880),
and in the State the Supreme Court.

(b) Escape from Prison.--If the sentence was unjust, it is lawful to
escape, unless the means employed are intrinsically evil (e.g., killing
of guards), or the results will be more harmful than continuance in
prison (e.g., the overthrow of public order, the too great risk of
the attempt to escape). If the sentence was just, there are various
opinions on the lawfulness of flight. Some think it is never lawful,
because a just sentence is a precept of authority and should be obeyed;
others think that flight is lawful in grave cases (e.g., when the
prisoner has been sentenced to death or to life imprisonment, or when
the conditions of prison life are unbearable, because human law cannot
impose as a normal regulation what is too difficult for human nature);
still others think that flight is always lawful, because the court
sentence is that the prisoner be forcibly confined, not that he remain
in prison voluntarily. But one is not necessarily bound to escape (see
1857).

(c) Resistance to Sentence.--If the sentence is unjust, resistance
is not unlawful _per se_, because one has the right of self-defense
against unjust aggression (Ezech. xxii. 27). Hence, if one were
condemned to execute oneself (e.g., by taking poison), the common
opinion is that the sentence would be unjust (see 1856), and therefore
not obligatory. If the sentence is just, even though it be a capital
sentence, resistance is not lawful, for the judge who duly pronounces
sentence on a guilty man has the right to obedience (Rom., xiii. 1-5).

1983. Jail-Breaking and Restitution.--If one does not sin by
jail-breaking, is one bound to restitution for the damages connected
with the escape?

(a) If the damages are not caused by, but only follow accidentally on
the flight (e.g., escape of other prisoners, dismissal of guards),
there is no obligation to make restitution for them; for the flight
would not be the efficacious or the unjust cause of such damages.

(b) If the damages result from the flight as from their efficacious and
unjust cause, there is an obligation of restitution (see 1763), as when
a prisoner, in order to escape, does needless damage, or damage out of
all proportion to the evil from which he seeks to escape. But ordinary
property damage, such as a hole cut in a wall, does not seem unjust, if
there is no other way to get out.

1984. Reliability of Witnesses and Testimony.--A witness in court is
a person who declares during a judicial proceeding that he knows some
statement, deed or omission in reference to the matters at issue.
The testimony of witnesses has proving force only in so far as these
persons appear to have knowledge of the matters on which they testify
and appear to be truthful. Hence, certain kinds of witnesses and
certain kinds of testimony are unreliable.

(a) Thus, a witness is unreliable either through his own fault
(e.g., if he is regarded in his community as below the standard in
truthfulness, or has the reputation of being a calumniator) or without
his own fault (e.g., if his powers of observation or his memory are
subnormal, or he is devoted or hostile to or dependent on one of the
contending parties). It is a duty, indeed, to presume good of a person
in whom the opposite does not appear, if he is the only one whose
interests are concerned; but when there is danger to a third party, one
must be on one’s guard (see 1744). Hence, St. John admonishes not to
believe every spirit (I John, iv. 1).

(b) Testimony is unreliable because of the number of the witnesses
(e.g., one witness is often legally insufficient to prove, especially
in graver matters), or the quality of their evidence (e.g., because in
substantial points a witness contradicts himself or is contradicted
by his co-witnesses, or because there are signs of collusion or
conspiracy), or the counter-evidence of the opposition.

1985. Obligation of Freely Appearing as a Witness.--(a) There is an
obligation of commutative justice to offer testimony, if one is under
contract to do this, as when one is hired as a detective or agent to
gather evidence against lawbreakers.

(b) There is an obligation of legal justice to testify, even at the
cost of serious inconvenience, if the testimony is necessary for
averting a serious evil that threatens the common welfare. A person who
knows of a plot against the peace of the State should bring this to the
notice of the authorities, even at the risk of his life. But a person
who knows that a crime has been committed, is not bound to give witness
about it, if the escape of its author will not be a serious detriment
to public or private welfare (e.g., if one knows that an apparent case
of suicide was really a homicide committed by accident).

(c) There is an obligation of charity to testify (but not at the cost
of serious inconvenience), if the testimony is necessary for averting a
serious evil that threatens a private person. A person who can prove
that the evidence which is about to hang an innocent man is false
should testify for the accused, unless the testimony will bring an
equal evil upon himself.

1986. Obligation of Appearing under Lawful Citation to Give
Testimony.--(a) He who avoids citation (e.g., by flight into another
jurisdiction, by concealment of his person when the subpoena is being
served), more probably does not violate legal justice by this act,
since a precept that has not been received cannot be violated. (b) He
who disregards citation offends legal justice, since the summons to
appear has a claim on his obedience. But it does not seem that he
violates commutative justice, unless the party for whom he could
testify has a strict right to the testimony.

1987. Obligation of Witness to Answer Truthfully.--A witness who is
questioned legitimately (i.e., by one who has the authority to question
him) and juridically (i.e., according to the form and order prescribed
in law) is obliged _per se_ to answer according to the truth as he
knows it, for one is bound to obey a superior when he gives a lawful
command. But there are exceptions to this rule _per accidens_, that
is, when a higher law exempts one from the necessity of divulging a
certain matter, or when the question asked refers only to what one
knows juridically. In all these cases the witness may answer that he
does not know, for he has no knowledge that he may, or should, or must
use.

(a) Thus, the natural law permits reticence when a revelation would
work notable damage to the witness or those closely related to him, for
the command of a superior does not oblige under such great
inconvenience. This supposes, of course, that the revelation is not
required in order to prevent a great harm to the commonwealth or a far
greater harm to a private person than that which threatens the witness.
A person who knows that he will be assassinated if he testifies against
a powerful criminal is not ordinarily bound to make the sacrifice.
Canon and civil law excuse witnesses from making disclosures that would
expose them to prosecution or penalties (see Canon 1755, Sec. 2, n. 2).

(b) The natural law commands reticence when a revelation would be
injurious to divine, public or private rights.

1988. Matters Regarding Which a Witness Should Not Testify.--There are
certain cases in which natural law forbids a witness to make known a
fact about which he is questioned.

(a) A witness may never testify to matters known to him only from
Sacramental Confession, for to break the seal of confession is an
injury to the rights of God. In an ecclesiastical process a priest may
not testify from Sacramental knowledge, even though he has the
penitent’s permission (Canon 1757, Sec. 3, n. 2).

(b) A witness may not testify as a rule to matters that are known to
him only in a confidential way, such as the communications between
lawyer and client, physician and patient; for the public interest as
well as the interest of individuals requires that generally there
be security against defamation for those who give their confidence
to others, especially if they are in great need of professional
assistance. Privileged communications are recognized both in Canon
Law (Canon 1755, Sec. 2) and in civil law. But knowledge obtained as
a secret may be used when this is necessary in order to avert a great
evil that threatens the public welfare or the welfare of an innocent
person, whether this person be the giver of the secret, or a third
party, or oneself; for to oblige to secrecy in these cases would be to
throw protection around crime. Thus, a lawyer may make disclosures of
confidential knowledge, if this is necessary in order to defend himself
against the false accusations of a client, or to prevent a crime which
the client intends to commit.

(c) A witness may not testify to matters about which he has unjust
knowledge (e.g., by wire-tapping, by unjust coercion, by intoxicating
another person, by reading private papers without permission), for,
as the knowledge was unjustly acquired, it cannot be justly used (see
2420).

1989. There are also certain cases in which a question refers only to
what the witness knows juridically, or in which he is called upon to
answer according to the mind of the questioner.

(a) If the witness is asked to state what he knows about a case, he is
not obliged to mention what he merely thinks or what he is uncertain
about; and if he is asked what he has heard, he is not obliged to state
what was told him by persons of poor authority.

(b) If he is asked whether the accused was to his knowledge guilty of
a crime, he is not obliged to mention an act of the accused that was
unlawful but done in good faith. But in a civil case, in which inquiry
is made about juridical faults, the witness should testify even to the
existence of delinquencies in which there was no element of theological
fault.

(c) If he is the only one who has knowledge of a delinquency and it
will be certainly useless for him to testify about the matter without
corroboratory evidence, it seems that he may keep silence about what he
knows. But if the testimony of one witness is sufficient according to
law, then the witness should speak of the facts known to him.

1990. Sinfulness of False Testimony.--When we speak of false testimony,
we mean testimony which the witness knows to be false.

(a) By reason of his false oath, the witness is guilty of perjury,
which is a grave sin against the virtue of religion.

(b) By reason of the injury done by the testimony, the witness is
guilty of injustice, which from its nature is a grave sin. In the
Decalogue (Exod., xx. 16) false testimony is forbidden among the sins
against justice: “Thou shalt not bear false testimony against thy
neighbor.” Legal justice is offended, since false testimony is an act
of disobedience to lawful authority, and usually commutative justice is
also violated, since by false testimony one of the litigants as a rule
suffers loss.

(c) By reason of the deliberate falsehood, the witness is guilty of
lying, which, however, is not always a grave sin.

1991. It may happen then, though rarely, that false testimony is only
a venial sin, for example, when the witness is not under oath and he
gives false testimony in a matter of small importance, or without full
deliberation on what he is saying, or when he forges or corrupts a
document to supply for another that has been lost and from which his
certain right could be proved.

1992. Obligation of Witness to Make Restitution.--The obligations of
restitution by a witness on account of failure to perform his duties
properly are as follows:

(a) if the witness has not sinned against commutative justice, there
is no obligation of restitution (see 1753). Hence, if he has evaded
testimony to which he was bound in legal justice or charity alone, he
is guilty of sin, but he is not held to restitution. Similarly, if he
has given false testimony and thereby deprived the State of a fine
under a penal law, or saved a guilty party from punishment, he has
sinned against legal justice, but is not obliged to make good the fine
or pay damages;

(b) if the witness has sinned against commutative justice, materially
but not formally, he is not the gravely guilty cause of damage, and
hence is not obliged from justice (but there may be an obligation
from charity) to make restitution (see 1764). But if he perceives
that his testimony was materially or venially unjust and will cause
serious damage, he is obliged to recall his testimony, or in some other
suitable way prevent the damage, if this is possible (see 1769);

(c) if the witness has sinned against commutative justice formally, he
is the efficacious and culpable cause of the damage that results, and
hence is bound to restitution, unless there is an excusing cause (see
1797 sqq.). Thus, if false testimony, or testimony about matters which
the witness had no right to disclose, has led to the death sentence
for an innocent man, the witness who gave that testimony must retract,
even at the risk of his own life; for in equal danger the rights of the
innocent have the preference. Again, if Titus by false testimony has
saved Balbus from paying damages for injury done to public property,
Titus must make restitution for the loss caused, if Balbus will not
make reparation.

1993. Is a witness guilty against commutative justice when he
unlawfully conceals facts and damage results thereby to another person?
(a) If by concealment is meant the destruction of evidence (e.g., the
burning of a will or letter or forging), the witness or other person
responsible is guilty of a positive act of commutative injustice and
is bound to restitution. (b) If by concealment is meant silence about
material facts that the witness is lawfully called on to disclose,
distinction has to be made between the witness who is not obliged from
contract to give evidence and the witness who is so bound. The former
witness is a negative cooperator and sins against legal justice and
charity; the latter witness is a negative cooperator and sins against
commutative justice (see 1780).

1994. Payment of Witnesses.--Is a witness permitted to accept pay for
giving true and lawful testimony?

(a) For the testimony itself a witness may not accept pay, for he is
bound to tell the truth freely, just as the judge is bound to dispense
justice freely.

(b) For the expenses he incurs and the time he loses by reason of his
assistance in court, he may accept pay; since, as St. Paul says, he
who does a service for another is not required to meet the expenses of
the service (I Cor., ix. 7). Both Canon and civil law make allowances
for suitable compensation to be granted to witnesses (see Canons 1787,
1788). But if a witness receives compensation in excess of what is
allowed by law, the court and the adverse party have a right to be
informed of this.

1995. Lawyers.--Lawyer is the general term used to designate all those
who are versed in the law and who give assistance to others in legal
ways during lawsuits or apart from them.

(a) Thus, apart from lawsuits a lawyer may act as legal adviser, giving
instruction, information or direction on rights and duties under the
law.

(b) During a lawsuit he advises about the case (jurisconsult) or
carries on for clients the prosecution or defense in a court of
justice. The lawyers who attend to only the more mechanical parts of a
suit are sometimes called attorneys, in distinction from counsellors
or counsel, who argue and plead in the courtroom, but generally
“attorney-at-law” and “lawyer” are synonymous terms. The counsellors
are known in England as barristers when they conduct cases in superior
courts; they are called solicitors in chancery, and advocates in Roman
law. Canon Law distinguishes between the advocate who defends, and
the procurator who represents, a litigant; the former argues for his
client by invoking the law in his favor; the latter acts merely as the
representative of his client and is restricted by his commission.

1996. The Qualifications of Lawyers.--(a) The mental and moral
requisites are competency in the knowledge of their profession and
devotion to justice, morality, the constitution, and law (see 1943). A
lawyer should be zealous for the dignity and reputation of the bar and
loyal to associates, but not afraid to take action against practices
that are detrimental to his honorable profession.

(b) The legal requisites for practising as a lawyer vary with the place
or government. In Canon Law, it is necessary that an advocate be a
doctor or expert in ecclesiastical jurisprudence, that he be twenty-one
years of age, duly approved, etc. (see Canons 1657 sqq.).

1997. The Duties of a Lawyer in Introducing Cases.--(a) He may not stir
up litigation, as a means of bringing himself occupation and gain. The
Catechism of the Council of Trent, Translated into English with Notes
(Joseph F. Wagner, Inc., New York City, 1923), p. 475, denounces this
practice as among the chief violations of the Tenth Commandment. Among
lawyers it is regarded as unprofessional, and at common law it is an
indictable offense.

(b) A lawyer may not take or assist an unjust cause--one, namely, that
is in opposition to moral or positive law, as when a party comes to
him with the request that he conduct a spite case whose purpose is to
harass or oppress an innocent person. He who defends injustice is a
cooperator, and is therefore guilty (see 1779). But if a case has a
good foundation in law, the lawyer is not bound to inquire into the
subjective dispositions or the conscience of the client in the matter,
and he may take the case even though he does not know that the client
is in good faith.

(c) A lawyer should not refuse a just cause, merely because the person
he is asked to assist is indigent or not in favor. Commutative justice
does not oblige him to offer his services to one in need of them; but
there is a duty of legal justice to give his best efforts if he is
appointed as counsel for a poor person, and also at times a duty of
charity to do this if he is asked for legal help by one who is in need.

1998. The precept about works of mercy, being affirmative, does not
oblige for every instance, but only when the due circumstances of time,
place, opportunity, etc., are present. Hence, a lawyer is not obliged
by charity to devote himself to every deserving case that is presented
to him (see 1227). (a) Thus, as to place, charity does not require that
one go about looking for the needy, but that one help those who are
at hand. (b) As to time, charity does not require that one take care
of future needs, but that one help those who are in present distress.
(c) As to persons, charity does not require that help be given to all
alike, for some have a greater claim on one’s charity than others (I
Tim., v. 8). (d) As to need, charity does not command that help be
given those who can easily help themselves, or who can obtain it from
third parties who are better fitted to bestow it.

1999. Charity does not oblige to works of almsgiving, if the
inconvenience to the donor is out of proportion to the distress
from which the donee is rescued (see 1158). The inconveniences that
correspond with the various degrees of distress are thus explained by
theologians:

(a) if distress is extreme (e.g., a prisoner is about to be sentenced
to death unjustly), a proportionate inconvenience is, according to
some, a grave loss, or, according to others, the loss of at least a
part of the necessaries of one’s state (see 1231, 1251);

(b) if distress is very grave or grave (e.g., an accused man will be
sentenced unjustly to a long and harsh imprisonment), the loss of goods
without which one’s state of life cannot be maintained so becomingly
is, according to one opinion, not excessive; but, according to another
view, any notable loss or inconvenience is excessive;

(c) if distress is ordinary (e.g., an accused will be unjustly
sentenced to a small fine), the loss of goods that are purely
superfluous is, according to some, a proportionate inconvenience, but
others think that only such assistance need be given as will cause no
inconvenience whatever, such as advice or other service given during
spare times.

2000. When Is a Cause to Be Regarded as Unjust?--(a) In civil cases
the suit or defense is unjust when it clearly has no moral right. A
lawyer who recommends litigation in a case of this kind is unjust to
the adverse party, if that party loses; he is unjust to his client,
if the client loses and is thus put to unnecessary expense. Generally
speaking, a Catholic lawyer ought not to accept a divorce case. The
lawyer’s position is different from that of a judge. Occasionally a
judge cannot refuse a case without serious inconvenience to himself
(see 1949, 1997); the lawyer, however, is free to accept or refuse
these cases. The general prohibition is founded on the fact that in
this country most divorce cases are means to an invalid remarriage.
Some theologians argue that since it is the remarriage, not the
divorce, that is intrinsically evil, a lawyer might accept a divorce
case for a very grave reason, e.g., to relieve desperate financial
conditions. In practice, however, owing to the danger of scandal,
the exception would be rare. Exceptions which are possible include
cases where divorce is sought for a marriage that is invalid _coram
ecclesiam_, e.g., civil marriage of Catholics, or simply for the
settlement of civil effects Where no danger of remarriage is involved.
In all cases involving Catholics, the lawyer should bear in mind the
necessity imposed upon Catholics by the Third Council of Baltimore to
consult ecclesiastical authorities before seeking civil separation from
bed [and board.]

(b) In criminal cases the prosecution is unjust if the accused is
clearly innocent. But the defense is not unjust, even though the
accused is known to be guilty, for both natural and positive law give
the accused a right of defense, and hence he may choose or may be given
an advocate, in spite of his guilt.

2001. Duty of a Lawyer When the Justice of a Cause Is Doubtful.--(a) In
a civil cause, the lawyer may act, whether for the plaintiff or for the
defendant. He may even take a case whose justice seems less probable,
for the purpose of the trial is to settle the doubt, and not
infrequently the cause that seemed doubtful or less probable at the
outset is vindicated by the examination. Some moralists distinguish for
cases in which the doubt is one of fact between the defendant and the
plaintiff: if the former’s case is less or equally probable, they say,
one may take it, but not so if this is true of the latter’s case.

(b) In a criminal case, when life, reputation or other grave issue is
involved, the common opinion is that a lawyer may not prosecute if the
case of the people is doubtful or less probable, but he may defend, as
was just said, even though he is certain that the accused is guilty.
The office of the prosecutor is not necessarily to secure a conviction,
but to see that justice is upheld, while the office of the defender is
to take care that an accused person is deprived of no right or
protection that he should have under the law.

2002. If a lawyer through ignorance takes an unjust case, thinking it
just, he is excused or not excused according to the character of his
ignorance (see 28, 249). (a) Thus, antecedent ignorance excuses from
sin and restitution; (b) concomitant ignorance excuses from
restitution, but not from sin; (e) consequent ignorance excuses from
neither sin nor restitution, if it is crass or affected, but it
diminishes responsibility, if it is only slightly sinful.

2003. Duty of a Lawyer Who Discovers that a Case Is Really Unjust.--(a)
A lawyer who took a case in the belief that it was just, but discovers
that it is really unjust, owes it to himself to abandon the case, for
he cannot honorably cooperate with iniquity. The same principle
applies, if a client insists upon unjust courses in the support of his
case, even though the cause itself be just.

(b) The lawyer owes it to his client in the hypothesis we are
considering to preserve the latter’s confidence inviolate (see 1988).
He should endeavor to persuade the client to abandon the case; but
since the client’s case is unjust, he may not recommend a compromise,
except perhaps in reference to expenses.

2004. Lawyer’s Duties towards Client.--Since every contract depends on
the mutual consent of the contractants, and since the purpose of the
person who retains a lawyer is to receive honest advice and assistance
and to give in return a fair compensation, it follows that the lawyer’s
duty to a client is to give what is thus expected and not to exact more
than this deserves.

(a) Before the case the lawyer should be perfectly candid with the
client as to the advisability of litigation or of the employment of
himself as counsel in the case. If there is a reason why he would be a
less desirable advocate in the case, he should speak of this, so that
his consultant may have freedom of choice. He should also study the
question presented to him, and give his honest opinion on the strength
of the case. If a fair and amicable adjustment outside of court can be
made, the lawyer should recommend that this be done, and if it is not
clear which party is right, he should advise a compromise.

(b) During the case the lawyer should be faithful to the interests of
his client and diligent in the affairs for which he is engaged. Loyalty
demands that the advocate give his undivided devotion to his client
(e.g., he may not give assistance to the adverse party, he may not
receive gifts or compensations from that party; see Code, Canons 1666,
2407), and that he respect the client’s confidences (e.g., he may not
use to the client’s disadvantage the information given him). Diligence
requires that the lawyer use his best ability and efforts to the end
that the client, no matter how poor or unpopular or persecuted, may
receive all the remedies or defenses that the law grants him, and that
his case may be terminated with all possible speed.

(c) After the case he should be honest in his charges and true to the
confidence that was reposed in him. The compensation for the lawyer’s
services should be just, that is, a fair return for what he gave. The
amount of the fee should be fixed, therefore, by such standards as the
law or custom, or by the value of that which the lawyer devotes to the
case (e.g., his time and labor, his loss of other employment or
prospects, the risk he takes in undertaking the case), or of that which
the client receives (e.g., the amount which he gains, the benefit he
receives). The wealth of a client does not justify an excessive charge,
but the poverty of the client makes it a duty of charity at times to
lessen the charges or to make no charges at all (see 1236-1239). It is
clear that a lawyer should not compensate himself from the client’s
business contrary to the latter’s just wishes.

2005. Lawyer’s Duties towards Other Parties.--The duties of the lawyer
to his client do not exempt him from certain duties to other persons
who have a part in the trial; for he is responsible to his own
conscience and cannot act on the principle that he must win at any
cost, or that the client takes all the blame for anything dishonorable
that is done.

(a) Thus, respect is due to the judge and politeness to the opposite
party, his lawyers and witnesses. Abusive language and improper
personalities, therefore, should not be resorted to, and customary
courtesies should be shown.

(b) Truth and fair dealing are due to those to whom or against whom the
pleading is directed. It is contrary to truthfulness to cite statutes
or decisions that are no longer in force, to misquote laws, testimony
or the language of opponents, to assert as a fact what has not been
proved, to introduce false witnesses or documents, to coach clients or
witnesses in untrue stories, to resort to quibbles or sophistry, etc.;
it is unfair to attempt to gain special favor from a judge or a jury,
to make improper statements or remarks with a view to influencing the
jury or the bystanders or the public; to conceal the arguments upon
which one relies until the opposition has no opportunity to reply; in a
word, to practise any of the tricks of pettifoggery.

2006. Concealment of Truth in Presenting a Case.--Is concealment of the
truth in the presentation or defense of a case sinful?

(a) If concealment is not unjust or mendacious, it is lawful. Indeed, a
lawyer should conceal such facts as would be harmful to his own case
(e.g., incidents that are really of no moment, but that would create
prejudice against his client), or as he has learned in confidence. This
is not unjust, since the opposite party has no right to the knowledge,
and it is not deception, since it does not cause but merely permits
others to draw erroneous conclusions. Neither is an advocate bound in
justice to point out to the opposition matters favorable to their case,
of which they are ignorant or which they do not notice.

(b) If concealment is unjust or mendacious, it is unlawful. Thus, if a
lawyer discovers that serious fraud has been practised or that the
court or the opposition has been harmfully imposed upon, he is unjust
if he takes advantage of this through silence. Similarly, a prosecutor
is unjust if he suppresses facts or testimony or papers that would
establish the innocence of an accused person.

2007. The Sinfulness of Introducing False or Corrupted Documents.--(a)
Truthfulness is sinned against by this practice, whether the document
be entirely fictitious or a copy substituted for an original that has
been lost, or an authentic instrument has been changed or interpolated
(see 1980 a, 1991).

(b) This practice is also against legal justice, since the law requires
that no misrepresentations be made about the evidence produced. Indeed,
this is a very serious matter, for, if it were ever permissible to
tamper with documentary evidence, a way would be opened to frauds
innumerable to the great detriment of the public.

(c) Commutative justice is offended by this form of dishonesty, if the
cause defended is not certainly just; for the opposite party, since
justice is perhaps on his side, has the right that he be not defeated
by untruthful means. But if the cause defended is certainly just, there
is not _per se_ any violation of commutative justice, since the adverse
party is not deprived of anything that is his, but is rather prevented
from doing injustice; _per accidens_, though, there might be
commutative injustice (e.g., if the use of a forged exhibit was known
to be risky and did actually lose the case for a client).

(d) Charity to self is violated by this deception, since a lawyer
should not value his client’s interests above his own conscience,
reputation and prospects.

2008. When a Lawyer Is Bound to Restitution.--(a) Unjust damage obliges
to restitution (see 1763), and hence a lawyer must indemnify his client
or the opposite party for the losses either one suffers through his
unjust conduct. The client has a right to restitution if he was put to
unnecessary expense because his lawyer did not tell him the case was
hopeless or too risky, or if he lost a case because the lawyer was very
incompetent or negligent or helped the opposite party, or if he was
injured in his reputation or prospects by the violation of his
confidences. The opposite party is entitled to restitution if he lost a
right or was condemned because the lawyer unjustly took the case
against him, or if he suffered other injuries because the lawyer
employed foul means to his disadvantage. If a lawyer acts as the
mandatary of his client in the use of injustice, the duty of
restitution rests primarily on the client and secondarily on the lawyer
(see 1783); if the lawyer alone is guilty, he is responsible for all
the damage done. There is no duty of restitution if only legal justice
is violated (e.g., if some deception is practised in order to win for
the side that is in the right), or if charity is wronged (e.g., if one
refuses to take the case of a person who is in need).

(b) Unjust possession also obliges to restitution (see 1770), and hence
a lawyer who appropriates goods of his client against the latter’s
right, or who charges exorbitant rates for his services, or who drags
out a case for lucre’s sake, or who has not refunded when he withdrew
from a case, should restore his ill-gotten goods. If the amount of a
fee is settled by law, an attorney who takes more than the legal sum
does not necessarily incur the duty of restitution. All will depend on
the character of the law, whether it is penal or preceptive, and if
preceptive, whether it obliges in virtue of legal or of commutative
justice.

2009. Unjust Words.--We shall now take up the injustice that is done
through words spoken outside of a judicial process, or the classes of
verbal injustice that are not peculiar to courts, but are committed on
all sorts of occasions, public and private. The principal sins here are
distinguished according to the different injuries intended by the
sinful speaker, and are as follows:

(a) sinful words that signify or effect in another person the evil of
guilt, thereby depriving him of benefits that are connected with
virtue. Some evil speakers deprive their neighbor of tributes that are
paid to virtue by others, such as honor (injury by contumely), fame
(injury by defamation), friendship (injury by whispering); while other
evil speakers deprive a person of the tribute of virtue paid by his own
conscience, namely, self-respect and peace of mind (injury by
derision);

(b) sinful words that signify or effect against another person the evil
of punishment. The words are known under the general name of cursing.

2010. Contumely.--Contumely is unjust dishonor shown to a person in his
presence.

(a) It is unjust, and hence those are not guilty of contumely who speak
words that are not honorable to persons deserving of reproof (e.g., in
Luke, xxiv. 25, Our Lord calls the two disciples “foolish and slow of
heart”; in Gal., iii. 1, St. Paul addresses the Galatians as
“senseless”). Similarly, it is not contumelious to call another person
by a name that sounds somewhat disrespectful, if this is done in banter
or pleasantry and will be taken in good part by the other and do no
harm. Thus, to send a comic valentine or good-naturedly to ridicule
some of the spectators at a farce is not contumelious as a rule, since
most persons are not galled by these gibes, nor are the jokes taken
seriously as a rule by the public. But care must be exercised both in
serious and playful rebukes to keep within moderation. St. Augustine
declares that even in corrections one should use reproachful terms
sparingly and only in case of great necessity.

(b) Contumely is dishonor, and so it is distinguished from injurious
words that offend some other right (e.g., detraction offends
reputation). Honor is an external manifestation of the respect felt for
another’s excellence or superiority in some natural or supernatural
perfection given by God, such as virtue, authority, nobility, rank,
wealth, etc. Contumely, therefore, is either negative, as when one
ostentatiously refuses to show another the honor due him (e.g., the
salute or title or deference which custom allows him), or positive, as
when one manifests signs of disrespect (e.g., names derogatory to
virtue or intelligence, or which mean that the person addressed is vile
and contemptible).

(c) Contumely is shown to another in his presence, that is, it is an
affront directed to his person immediately (e.g., the mockery of
Eliseus by the little boys near Bethel, in IV Kings, ii, 23), or
mediately (e.g., the dishonor of David’s ambassadors by the Ammonites,
in II Kings, x), or at least to his knowledge (e.g., the enemies of St.
Paul in Phil., i. 17, who spoke of him insultingly in the expectation
that their words would be carried to him).

2011. Are all persons deserving of honor? (a) If honor be taken in its
strictest sense for reverence shown to a person who is one’s superior
in some good quality, or for veneration for the proper excellence of
mankind (viz., virtue), then honor cannot be shown except to those who
are more exalted than oneself or to those who are virtuous. (b) If
honor be taken in its wider and more usual sense for respect for a good
quality, natural, moral or supernatural, in which a neighbor is more
worthy at least than some others, then honor can be shown to every
rational creature (except the damned, who are irretrievably wicked and
outside the pale of friendship); for there is no one, however bad or
lowly, in whom there is not something that deserves respect. St. Paul
exhorts Christians to be beforehand in honoring one another (Rom., xii.
10), and he urges that each esteem the other as better than himself
(Philip., ii. 3).

2012. Various Forms of Contumely.--(a) By reason of the signs used or
the external form it takes, contumely is either in words (e.g., the
names “thief,” “lunatic,” “bastard”) or in deeds that are equivalent to
word (e.g., offensive cartoons or caricatures, insulting valentines or
postcards, “poisoned pen” letters, lampoons, scurrilous or opprobrious
gestures or acts, sardonic grins, mimicry).

(b) By reason of the thing signified or the contemptible quality that
it ascribes to another contumely is also distinguished into reproach,
which accuses another of sin (e.g., of drunkenness), revilement
(_convicium_), which ascribes to another either a fault or its
consequences (e.g., drunkenness or imprisonment, or diseases of
alcoholism), taunting (_improperium_), which twits another with
misfortunes or inferiority (e.g., his lowly origin or poverty or the
favors one formerly showed him).

2013. Manner of Confessing Contumely in the Sacrament of Penance.--(a)
Circumstances that are of an essential kind, that is, those that change
the species or add a new species, must be mentioned (e.g., the fact
that contumely was blasphemous or calumnious or scandalous or directed
against a cleric or parents). (b) Circumstances that are merely
accidental, such as those given in the previous paragraph, need not be
mentioned, for they are merely various ways of committing the same sin
of contumely.

2014. The Sinfulness of Contumely.--(a) From its nature contumely is a
grave sin of injustice, for it robs one of honor, which is more prized
than any other external possession, since it is a testimony to virtue
and to the esteem of fellowmen honestly earned. Hence, men will often
sacrifice health or wealth or life itself to save honor. He who calls
his brother a fool is deserving of hell (Matt., v. 22), and the
contumelious are classed with those who are delivered over to a
reprobate sense (Rom., i. 30). But, as sins of the tongue are imputable
only in so far as they express the mind of the speaker, contumelious
words are gravely sinful only when they proceed from a direct purpose
to inflict serious disgrace (e.g., Titus applies to Balbus an epithet
that is not regarded as very abusive, but his purpose is to manifest
his supreme contempt), or from an indirect intention to effect this
(e.g., Claudius jokingly addresses Sempronius by a very disgraceful
title, not meaning any great harm, but knowing that Sempronius will
feel this deeply or that in the eyes of the bystanders he will be
greatly dishonored).

(b) From the imperfection of the act or the smallness of the matter,
contumely is made a venial sin. Thus, if one who is suddenly carried
away by anger or who is not thinking of what he says calls another
person a very vile name, there is not sufficient advertence for a grave
offense; and if one who is acting with full deliberation addresses
another in language that is only slightly disrespectful, there is not
sufficient harm done to constitute a mortal sin.

2015. The gravity of the matter in contumely depends, not only on the
character of the signs of disrespect, but also on the persons concerned.

(a) Thus, the less the respect which the offender owes the offended
party, the less the offense. Hence, for a subordinate to call his
superior a liar or an ass is a more grievous fault than for a superior
to give the name to his subordinate.

(b) The less authoritative the word of the person who utters contumely,
or the less evil animus that attaches to his speech, the less the
dishonor and the sin. Thus, fishwomen were once notorious for
vituperation, but little attention or weight was given to their words.
A person of that character, then, might commit only a venial sin by a
very abusive word, whereas a person of more respectable character would
sin mortally by using the same expression. Similarly, when parents or
teachers berate their subjects as fools, blockheads, dunces, etc.,
there is generally no bad spirit behind these exclamations, and hence
the use of such expressions is not very sinful, even when correction is
not being made.

2016. Is the gravity of contumely lessened by the fact that the
offended person feels the injury less?

(a) If the contumely is felt less because the dishonor itself is less,
the gravity of the sin is of course lessened, for example, if the
person offended is less deserving, or the person who offends is not
taken seriously (see 2015).

(b) If the contumely is felt less only because the person dishonored is
very meek and patient, the gravity is not lessened, but is rather
increased (see 1725). If the person offended does not feel the injury
at all (e.g., because he is very thick-skinned or is very fortunate),
less damage is done, but the wrong remains, otherwise, theft from the
rich could be excused on the plea that they will not miss what is
stolen.

2017. The Causes of Contumely.--(a) Pride is sometimes a cause,
inasmuch as those who consider themselves better than others are quick
to express the contempt they feel for others, if they hope that this
will add to their own glory (Prov., xi. 2). But a proud person will
just as often disdain to revile those whom he despises.

(b) Foolishness (see 1621) is sometimes a cause of contumely, for the
foolish man speaks without thinking as he should or without caring what
damage his words may cause (Prov., xx. 3). Hence, those who speak
abusively to others merely in order to raise a laugh among the
bystanders, little caring about the disrespect they show, cannot excuse
themselves on the plea that it was all a joke.

(c) Anger is the usual cause of contumely, for the angry man seeks to
show his revenge in some open and manifest way, and there is no easier
or more ready means to this end than bitter, scornful or jeering words.
Hence the danger of contumelious reprimands given by superiors. The
subject will be enraged by the hard names applied to him, and the
superior in his wrath will easily go to extremes, even of mortal sin,
on account of the language he uses (e.g., exaggerated invective) or on
account of circumstances (e.g., the scandal given).

2018. The Duty of Bearing with Contumely.--(a) As to the internal
disposition, one should be ready and willing to suffer insults without
making any answer to them, if this is necessary. For the precept of
patience requires that one be prepared in mind to tolerate injuries and
to give place to wrath, should the circumstances at any time call for
such restraint. In this sense Our Lord spoke when He commanded that one
turn the other cheek to the striker (Matt, v. 39), and He practised His
teaching by making no reply to the insolence of those who were
implacable or who only sought material for accusations.

(b) As to external conduct, one should repel contumely when there are
good and sufficient reasons for this course, and hence Our Lord
protested against the unlawful blow given Him in the court room, and
which the judge should have reprimanded (John, xviii. 23). He also
refuted those who decried Him as a blasphemer, or glutton, or demoniac,
or political disturber. But if no good end will be served by
self-defense, or if greater evils will follow from it, no answer should
be made. One should be more desirous to possess the right to honor and
fame--viz., virtue and a worthy life--than to possess honor and fame
themselves, for goodness is always a blessing, but prosperity is not
unfrequently a real misfortune. Indeed, Our Lord says that to be
persecuted, reviled and calumniated places one in the same class as the
good men of the past (Matt., v. 11).

2019. The Chief Reasons for Resistance to Contumely or Detraction.--(a)
The good of the offender, in order that his boldness be subdued and
that he be deterred from such injuries in the future, is a sufficient
reason. Hence the words of Proverbs (xxvi. 5) that one should answer a
fool, lest he think himself wise.

(b) The good of others is another reason, in order that they be not
demoralized by the vilification of one whom they have looked up to as
an example and guide, especially if silence will appear to be a sign of
weakness or carelessness or guilt. Hence, St. Gregory says that
preachers should answer detractors, lest the Word of God be without
fruit.

(c) The good of self is a third reason for replying to contumely, for
to enjoy the respect and esteem of others helps many a good person to
act worthily of the opinion in which he is held, and it restrains many
a sinner from descending to worse things than those of which he is
guilty. Hence, Eccl., xli. 15, admonishes that one take care of a good
name, and Prov., xxii. 1, places a good name above wealth.

2020. The Duty of One Who Answers Contumely or Detraction.--(a) The
spirit of the answer should be that of charity, not that of revenge or
of unquiet or exaggerated anxiety about personal honor or fame;
otherwise one becomes like to the offender (Prov., xxii, 2). A person
would sin even by silence in the face of contumely, if the spirit
behind his non-resistance was malicious (e.g., if he intended to enrage
the other party the more by disregarding the attack).

(b) The manner of the answer should be moderate, and the reply should
not go beyond the bounds of reasonable self-defense (see 1833). It is
lawful to deny the charge, or by retort to turn the tables on the
assailant, or to sue him for slander or libel; but it is not lawful to
challenge him to a duel or to utter calumnies (see 1843).

2021. The Duty of Making Restitution for Contumely.--(a) If contumely
is not contrary to commutative justice, there is no duty of
restitution. Hence, dishonor that is purely negative, such as the
refusal to uncover on meeting a clergyman, does not oblige one to make
restitution, for the omission is contrary to the virtue of observance
or reverence but not to commutative justice. The case would be
different, however, if negative dishonor were so marked or noticeable
as to be equivalent to positive disrespect, as when at the entrance of
a distinguished personage all in the room arise except one man who
remains seated and gives a bitter look at the newcomer.

(b) If contumely is contrary to commutative justice, restitution is
due. All agree that commutative justice is violated when contumely
becomes vilification, or when an insult is committed in the presence of
onlookers with the purpose of making the offended person seem
contemptible in their eyes. But there are two opinions about the case
when contumely is merely revilement, or an insult offered when there
are no others present and the purpose is to make the offended person
appear vile in his own eyes.

2022. Opinions on the Duty of Restitution for Revilement.--(a) One
opinion holds that injury is done, not damage, and hence that
satisfaction is owed rather than restitution. Further, it is held that
satisfaction is penal and so not obligatory (except out of charity)
before judicial sentence.

(b) Another opinion says that damage is done as well as injury, since
men regard an insult, even though offered in private, as an unjust
deprivation of a great good. Satisfaction of a very humiliating kind,
such as the begging of pardon on bended knees, as being penal, can
await an order from authority, but the ordinary forms of reparation,
such as expression of regret or request for forgiveness, should be made
without any such order (Matt., v. 24).

2023. What Kind of Reparation Should Be Made for Contumely?--(a) In
general, the rule is that contumely should be repaired by a bestowal of
the same kind of goods as those of which the offended party was
deprived; and hence dishonor is repaired by honor, disrespect by
respect. The injured party should be aware that reparation is being
made, or at least that honor is being shown him. If by reason of
contumely one is responsible for other damages that followed (e.g., if
one foresaw that one’s affront would lead to money losses, enmities,
quarrels, bloodshed, etc.), one is duty bound to make good these losses
also.

(b) In particular, the honor that should be offered in atonement is
generally an apology, for this is both satisfaction for the wrong done
and a token of esteem. At times, according to some, more is required,
for if the insult was very gross, a mere request for pardon is perhaps
not sufficient; on the other hand, less may suffice, as when the
indignity was slight. Many authors hold that a respectful apology is
sufficient reparation for any contumely. Among the lesser forms of
restitution for dishonor are signs of friendship, courteous greetings,
a pleasant chat, an invitation to call at one’s home, a dinner or
toast, a eulogistic speech, etc.

2024. The Manner of Making Apologies.--(a) They should be made with at
least as much formality as accompanied the insult. Hence, if the injury
was public, the acknowledgment of error should also be public. (b) They
may be made either personally or by intermediary. If the guilty person
cannot very well appear before the offended person, he may send his
regrets by letter or through a representative.

2025. Since the gravity of contumely depends on the relations between
the parties and other circumstances, an apology is not always necessary.

(a) Thus, if the offender is an inferior or an equal, an apology should
be made for a serious insult, at least when the offended person insists
on it. Thus, a cheerful salutation by a child does not atone for a vile
name applied to his father. If an inferior dishonors a superior through
ignorance, he makes amends by acknowledging his ignorance and showing
respect, as was done by St. Paul (Acts, xxiii. 5).

(b) If the offender is a superior, an apology is never necessary, lest
by abasing himself he lose the prestige which his office should have.
Hence, if a father has used harsh language to his child, it would not
be seemly for him to ask the child’s pardon, but he should show some
mark of kindness to heal the wound.

2026. Cessation of Obligation of Restitution.--The obligation of
restitution for contumely ceases in certain cases (see 1797, 1798). (a)
Thus, impossibility excuses, as when one cannot make reparation without
renewing an old feud that has been buried and forgotten. (b)
Forgiveness by the offended person excuses. The offended party forgives
the debt expressly when he says or shows that he does not care to have
an apology; he forgives implicitly, when he retaliates by an equally
injurious action, defends himself by retorting equal contumely on his
adversary, or obtains equivalent satisfaction from a court of justice.

2027. A confessor should not impose the duty of an apology in certain
cases.

(a) Thus, if this command would be harmful, it should be omitted, as
when a penitent is in good faith and would be put in bad faith by the
admonition. (b) If this command is not necessary, it should be omitted,
as when the duty of an apology has ceased for one reason or another. In
the case of children who speak or act disrespectfully to their elders,
it may at times be taken for granted that the elders, especially the
parents, do not expect an apology for trifling cases of disrespect.
But, on the other hand, it may often be advisable to require such
children to apologize for their rudeness, in order to cure them of it.

2028. Defamation.--Defamation (backbiting) is the unjust blackening of
the reputation of another person by secret words.

(a) It is unjust, that is, it has no reasonable motive to justify it.
Defamation differs from just revelation of secret faults.

(b) It is a blackening or besmirching, that is, a taking away or
lessening of fame. Defamation casts a shadow over or totally obscures
the brilliance of a good reputation.

(c) It is against reputation, that is, against the favorable opinion
and report of the public on the virtue and character or other good
qualities of a person, Thus, it is defamation to say that an individual
is a drunkard, or that a professional man is incompetent, if these
persons are not known to have such defects. If a person has no
reputation here and now, except a bad one (e.g., a criminal who has
just been convicted and sentenced to prison, a loafer who is often seen
intoxicated on the streets, a woman who is often heard peddling
scandals), it is not defamation to speak about the true and public
faults of this person; nor is it sinful to speak thus if there is some
suitable reason (e.g., to discuss a murder trial that is being reported
in the papers, or to tell a humorous incident that will do no harm).
But those who uselessly or harmfully discuss the known weaknesses of
their neighbors are sinners called gossipers or fault-finders.

(d) It is against the reputation of a person, that is, of an individual
possessed of right. The party offended by defamation can be a natural
person (i.e., a rational being, whether infant or adult, high or low,
rich or poor) or an artificial person (i.e., a society, group or
collection of individuals endowed with reason); he can be either a
living or a deceased person, for death does not destroy the soul nor
take away the right to reputation.

(e) It is against the reputation of another, that is, defamation as now
used is a sin of injustice, and one cannot be strictly unjust to
oneself; but “self-defamation” may be used in a wider sense to
designate a sin opposed to charity (see 1575 sqq.).

(f) It is accomplished by means of words, that is, by oral
communication or its equivalent. One can defame, therefore, by word of
mouth, by deaf and dumb language, by writing, by a gesture, by silence,
or by a look.

(g) It is done by words or signs that are secret, that is, by words or
signs expressed before others but in the absence of the person who is
defamed, or at least when he is thought to be absent (backbiting). The
defamer is like the thief who wishes to do harm but does not wish the
victim to know the author of the harm.

2029. The Differences between Defamation and Contumely.--(a) They
differ in their purposes, for the defamer intends to hurt another in
his reputation before the public, while the contumelious man intends to
hurt another in his honor, either in his own eyes or in those of
others. (b) They differ in their manner of procedure, for defamation is
behind the back, contumely before the face, of the party who is
injured. The defamer has some respect for his enemy, for he fears to
face him and resorts to undermining, but the contumelious sinner
despises his enemy and shows it by insulting him to his face.

2030. Various Forms of Injury to Good Name.--(a) By reason of the
intention, the injury is either defamatory (as when derogatory things
are said about another behind his back) or contumelious (as when
derogatory things are insultingly said to him in his presence). Hence,
there can be injury to reputation that is not contumelious (e.g., the
secret spreading of a rumor that Balbus is a drunkard); there can be
contumely that is not injurious to fame (e.g., the addressing of Balbus
as a drunkard when no else is by, or when those present know already
that he is a drunkard), and contumely that is injurious to reputation
(e.g., when one calls Balbus a drunkard before others who thought he
was a sober man).

(b) By reason of the purpose, defamation is willed either explicitly or
implicitly. In the former case the defamer expressly intends the
blackening of his neighbor’s reputation; in the latter case he intends
something unnecessary, such as mere indulgence of levity or
talkativeness, though the blackening of his neighbor is foreseen.
Explicit defamation is regularly a mortal offense, implicit defamation
a venial one; but the degrees of sinfulness may be changed, if the
former sin causes slight, or the latter sin serious damage.

(c) By reason of the injury done defamation is either detraction or
calumny. Detraction blackens a reputation by revealing faults or
defects that are real; calumny (slander) injures reputation by stories
that are untrue. A common form of calumny is a mixture of truth and
falsehood (e.g., when a historian ascribes to a villain, in addition to
real crimes, faults of which the latter was innocent), or of
half-truths that convey the impression of what is untrue (e.g., when a
historian narrates that a certain character killed a man and does not
give the background or causes of the killing, such as provocation,
challenge, mistake; or when a biographer tells of the crimes of his
subject and glosses over the virtues, or makes no mention of his
amendment).

(d) By reason of the means used defamation is either direct or
indirect. Direct defamation is more open and positive; indirect
defamation is rather concealed or negative. There is also the
distinction of slander (which is oral) and libel (which is written or
printed). Libel is more grievous, since it has a permanence that is not
found in spoken words.

2031. Examples of Indirect Defamation.--(a) Faint praise is a subtle
mode of defamation, as when one says of an absent person that he has
not committed murder yet, or that like everyone he has some good
points, for to the listeners this indicates that the speaker does no
hold a high opinion of the person discussed.

(b) Silence is also at times a hidden form of defamation, as when Titus
says to Balbus that the absent Caius is good and Balbus out of malice
answers: “Let’s talk about something else; we must be charitable”, or
when Sempronius falsely declares in company that the absent Claudius is
to the knowledge of Julius a depraved character and Julius, who is
present, makes no protest against the misrepresentation.

(c) Depreciation is defamatory, as when one says that a person who is
being discussed is not as pious or reliable as is commonly believed, or
that there is great room for improvement, or that he is much better now
than in times past, or that there is another side to the picture, or
that he is good, but....

(d) Denial of good qualities is defamatory, when it lessens the esteem
in which a person is held. The good qualities here referred to are
those that render a person distinguished or commendable among his
fellows: chiefly these are moral qualities (viz., virtuous habits,
dispositions and acts); secondarily, natural and internal qualities
(such as learning, quickness of mind, experience, strength and health
of body, and in women, beauty); finally, natural and external goods
(such as wealth, famous ancestry, able assistants in business, or the
excellent merchandise supplied, etc.).

2032. Examples of Direct Defamation.--The following are examples of
direct defamation:

(a) sinister interpretation, as when one states that words or acts of a
neighbor that were good or at least open to a good interpretation, were
dictated by greed, ambition, pride, etc.;

(b) unjust revelation (detraction), as when one reveals secret faults
or crimes;

(c) exaggeration, as when one magnifies a venial into a mortal sin, an
exceptional or indeliberate fault into an habitual or deliberate sin;
or when one distorts a sin of one species into a sin of another and far
more heinous species, or accuses a whole class or body of men because
one of their number has fallen. Those who add their own little detail
or circumstance to a defamatory tale as they pass it along are
proverbial examples of exaggeration: “_Fama crescit eundo_”;

(d) false accusation (calumny) is the worst kind of defamation.
Innocent XI condemned the proposition that one may probably use calumny
without serious sin as a defense of one’s own justice and honor (see
Denzinger, n. 1194).

2033. Direct defamation is committed either by plain words or by
insinuation. (a) Examples of defamation by innuendo are those ambiguous
expressions or half-veiled accusations that arouse suspicion and often
do more injury than plain accusations. Thus, to say with a laugh or in
an ironical tone that a certain person is human, or broadminded, or
prudent may be equal to volumes of abuse, since the words can have a
bad meaning as well as a good one. Similarly, such expressions as,
“What I know about him is not to be told,” “I know what no one would
believe,” etc., may be taken for slurs on character.

(b) Examples of defamation by plain speech are all those innumerable
statements which, either in general terms (e.g., that another person is
a scoundrel, a villain, a reprobate) or in specific ones (e.g., that
another person is a blasphemer, a thief, a liar), tend to blacken the
good name of a neighbor.

2034. Good Repute or Fame.--Good repute or fame is of various kinds.
(a) Thus, by reason of its object, good reputation is either negative
or positive. A negatively good reputation consists in the absence of
any unfavorable opinion or belief about a person, while a positively
good reputation is the common judgment in favor of a person’s worth.
(b) By reason of its relation to the real character of a person, it is
either true or false. Thus, if a man is regarded by the community as
honest, his reputation is true when he is really honest, but it is
false when he is in fact dishonest. (c) By reason of its degree, it is
either ordinary or extraordinary. Ordinary good repute is that which
every person needs, and it consists in the public belief that an
individual is trustworthy and competent in the affairs and duties that
pertain to his state or occupation. Extraordinary fame is that which is
not necessary, such as the celebrity which a person enjoys for unusual
ability as a statesman, orator, financial expert, mathematician, or for
virtue that is far above the average.

2035. The Right to Good Reputation.--(a) Those who are absolutely
unknown (i.e., both as to their identity and their character) have no
right to reputation, since reputation attaches to one who can be named
or described, and hence it is not defamation (though it might be rash
judgment) to say that a stranger who passed on the street and was lost
in the darkness must have been a criminal.

(b) Those who are known by sight or name, but who have not as yet shown
what they are, have a right to a negatively good reputation, for a man
should not be considered evil until his conduct has given ground for
unfavorable judgment (see 1727 sqq.). It is not defamation to say about
an unknown family that has moved into a locality that we do not know
what kind of people they are, but it is defamation to say that they are
likely undesirable.

(c) Those who are known in a place and who have already acquired a good
name there have a right to a positively good reputation; for, if the
reputation is true, it is a good which they have honestly acquired; if
it is false, it is a good of which they are in possession, and
possession itself is entitled to respect.

2036. Sinfulness of Detraction.--The civil law does not generally
punish slander if the slanderer can prove that his statements are true,
but this does not make veracious defamation morally lawful. God detests
and punishes crimes (e.g., fornication) of which human law sometimes
takes no account. The harmfulness of veracious defamation is both
public and private.

(a) Defamation Does Public Harm.--The peace and order of the community
would be seriously disturbed, if it were lawful to attack reputations
simply because one was persuaded that they were unfounded: the person
detracted would be hampered in his official business and social
relations, innocent persons would be blackened as well as the guilty,
and the friends and relatives would suffer with the person detracted.

(b) Defamation Does Private Harm.--The peace and security of the
individual would be uselessly assailed. Reputation is profitable both
in spiritual and temporal ways, and it is therefore a ruthless act to
rob a person of it, when he has done nothing in public to forfeit it
and its possession by him is harmful to no one.

2037. Right to True and False Reputation. There is, nevertheless, a
difference between the right to a true and the right to a false
reputation.

(a) Thus, the right to a true reputation is an absolute and universal
right, one which does not cease in any case, for truth and justice
demand that one should not represent as evil a person who is really
good. This right applies to an extraordinary, as well as to an ordinary
reputation.

(b) The right to a false reputation is a relative and limited right,
one which ceases when the common good on which it rests no longer
supports it (e.g., when it cannot be maintained without injustice).
Moreover, there is no right to an extraordinary reputation, if it is
based on false premises, for the common good does not require such a
right, and hence it is not detraction to show that the renown of an
individual for superior skill or success is built up on advertising
alone or merely on uninformed rumor.

2038. Sinfulness of Gossip or Criticism about Real and Known
Defects.--(a) It is not unjust, _per se_, since it does not take away
fame, that being non-existent. (b) It is sinful, if there is no
sufficient reason for it, but not mortally sinful _per se_, since grave
harm is not done to the reputation of one whose reputation is already
bad. The sin committed is usually that of idle talk or of
uncharitableness, by reason of the disedification offered the
listeners, or the malice that prompts the speaker, or the sadness that
is caused to the person gossiped about. Gossip is dangerous, since it
prepares the way for detraction, as detraction prepares the way for
calumny.

2039. Moral Species of Defamation.--(a) Moralists agree that wrongful
defamation is a sin against justice and charity. It violates justice,
since it infringes a right which is not less strict than that of
proprietorship over goods of fortune; it violates charity, since it is
opposed to friendship and love of neighbor. They also agree that other
species of sin can be added to defamation (e.g., infidelity, as when
one denies that Christ was sinless, or blasphemy, as when one defames a
Saint).

(b) Moralists disagree on the question whether certain forms of
defamation are distinct sub-species or only degrees of one lowest
species. Some hold that detraction and calumny are distinct species,
because calumny adds mendacity to defamation; others say that
detractions about specifically different sins are distinct kinds of
detraction (e.g., that it is one species of sin to say that a neighbor
is a drunkard, and another species to say that he is a thief, and the
reason is that the reputation for temperance is a different thing from
the reputation for honesty, etc.); still others hold that defamation of
parents and other immediate relations is a special form of defamation,
as being contrary to piety. There are, on the contrary, theologians who
reject all these distinctions and hold that the difference between
defamations is only one of more or less, since all of them have the
characteristic note of attack on reputation, which is one right. Hence,
just as the stealing of a cow and the stealing of a cat are only
greater and lesser forms of the sin of theft, so likewise calumny and
detraction, etc., are only major and minor degrees of the sin of
defamation (see 2012, 2013, 2115).

2040. Species of Sins of Defamation.--Since the species of sins must be
particularized in confessions, the question of the distinction between
defamations has practical importance. The common opinion on the line of
action to be observed seems to be as follows:

(a) the penitent is obliged as a rule in serious matters to tell
whether his defamation was simple detraction or calumny. The reason for
this, according to some, is the specific difference between these two
sins; according to others, the reason is that otherwise the confessor
cannot know whether the sin was mortal or venial, or what restitution
is to be imposed. As to detraction of parents or superiors, it seems
that the quality of the person detracted should be mentioned, if there
was any incitement to disrespect or disobedience;

(b) the penitent is not obliged to mention the sins or defects he
ascribed to the person he defamed. Nor should the confessor inquire
about this unless it is necessary in order to know what was the gravity
of the sin or what kind of reparation should be enjoined (cfr. 2013).
Moreover, questions about what was said might easily lead to a
disclosure of the name of the person defamed, and thus the confessional
would be turned into a place of defamation.

2041. The Numerical Multiplication of Defamations.--(a) They are
multiplied when there are many sinful acts about distinct objects; for
example, when Balbus calumniates Caius today as a thief and Claudius
tomorrow as another thief, there are two calumnies (see 209).

(b) Defamations are multiplied when there are many sinful acts about
the same object; for example, when Balbus calumniates Caius today as a
thief and repeats the same calumny tomorrow, there are two calumnies.
But if Balbus begins his story today and does not finish it till
tomorrow, there is one calumny (see 214, 215).

(c) Defamations are multiplied when there is one sinful act about many
distinct objects; for example, when Balbus calumniates by saying that
the two worst thieves he knows are Caius and Claudius, there are two
sins. But if Caius and Claudius are regarded as a unit (e.g., if they
are the firm of Caius and Claudius), there is one sin. A like calumny
would be that Caius came from a dishonest family (see 216-219). If
Balbus calumniates Caius before ten persons, he does not commit ten
defamations, it seems, but ten scandals, since the ten form a body in
the matter of fame, but are individuals in the matter of example. If
Balbus calumniates by saying that Caius has broken all of the ten
commandments, there may be ten calumnies or but one calumny, according
to the intention and the effect (see 217, 218).

2042. The Theological Species of Defamation.--(a) From its nature
defamation is a mortal sin, and hence the Apostle declares (Rom, i. 29,
30) that detractors are hateful to God. In the first place, it inflicts
an atrocious injury on the public welfare, sowing everywhere hatreds,
dissensions and disorders--so much so that detractors are rightly
called an abomination to mankind (Prov., xxiv. 9).

(b) From the smallness of the matter or the imperfection of the act
defamation may be only a venial sin. Criticism of others is a vice so
widespread that almost all mankind (even pious persons) would be
involved in continual mortal sins, were it not for the fact that sins
of speech are frequently the result of ignorance, thoughtlessness, or
sudden passion (James, iii. 2 sqq.), and that the things said are
frequently of no great harm to the person criticized.

2043. The gravity of the harm done by defamation is well expressed by
St. Bernard when he says that defamation at one blow inflicts a mortal
Wound on the person defamed, on the defamer himself, and on the
listener.

(a) Thus, the person defamed is robbed and often irreparably of a good
name, one of the most esteemed of possessions; he is deprived of many
spiritual and temporal opportunities, and is frequently dragged down to
social and moral ruin, and even to suicide. Scripture says that the
tongue of the detractor has the sharpness of a razor, and it compares
him to an arrow dipped in poison, and to a biting serpent.

(b) The defamer destroys his own good name, at least in the sight of
God, for he defiles his own soul with guilt; he disgraces himself
before others, since it is well known that defamation is the vice of
those who feel themselves inferior or guilty. And, worst of all, his
sin is seldom repented of or repaired by satisfaction, since the
defamer is generally too proud, hateful, jealous or revengeful to
acknowledge his error, or is so blind that the thought of the harm he
has done and of the grave obligation of satisfaction never crosses his
mind.

(c) The listener is scandalized and contaminated by what he hears, his
ideals are shattered, his respect for virtue or religion is destroyed,
and he is encouraged to continue the work of the defamer.

2044. Comparison of Defamation with Other Injuries against the
Neighbor.--(a) Defamation is less sinful than injuries to internal
goods, and hence homicide and adultery, which are opposed to the good
of the body and of life itself, are graver sins than defamation.

(b) Defamation is less sinful than injury to higher external goods
perpetrated in a contemptuous manner, for defamation being secret does
not add insult to injury. Hence, just as robbery is more offensive than
theft, so is contumely more sinful than defamation.

(c) Defamation is more sinful than injury to lower external goods, such
as lands and money, for fame along with honor approaches spiritual
things on account of their relation to virtue, whereas wealth is of the
order of corporeal things. Hence, the Scriptures teach that a good name
is more important than great riches (Prov., xxii. 1), more enduring
than thousands of vast and precious treasures (Ecclus., xli, 15).

2045. It should be noted that the foregoing comparison is based on the
nature of the sins compared, for by reason of circumstances the order
given may be reversed; for example, a slight indignity is less serious
than an outrageous calumny, the theft of thousands of dollars is far
more sinful than the circulation of a ludicrous story that is harmful,
but only in a slight degree, to the reputation of a neighbor (cfr. 220
sqq.).

2046. Rule for Determining the Seriousness of Defamation.--The rule for
determining whether the matter of defamation is serious or not is the
amount of harm done by the defamation, and hence not one but several
factors have to be considered.

(a) Thus, the defect ascribed to the neighbor has to be considered, for
some kinds of defects (e.g., littleness of body or prodigality) are
less disgraceful than others (e.g., dwarfishness of mind or soul or
niggardliness), and it is more harmful to reveal one mortal sin than to
reveal a hundred venial sins.

(b) The person defamed is to be considered, for imputed defects that
are not harmful to one person may be harmful to another (e.g., the
charge of being a toper might be considered praise among persons of gay
or rough habits, but it would be regarded as disgraceful among serious
and refined persons).

(c) The person who defames is also to be considered, for little
attention is paid to the talk of some, but much weight is given to the
slightest words of others. Indeed, some persons’ condemnation is
equivalent to praise.

(d) Finally, the persons before whom the defamation is spoken are to be
considered, for everyone knows that it is much more harmful and
dangerous to speak ill of others before certain ones than before others
(cfr. 1461, 1462).

2047. The Harm Done by Reason of the Defects Revealed.--(a) If the
defects are natural imperfections of soul or body that do not connote
moral stain or turpitude, and if no great detriment is caused by
revelation (e.g., to say that another person is deaf, hunchbacked, a
beggar, or dense), disclosure is not in itself serious, or even sinful;
for little or no harm is done, and the defects are of such a character
that they can be readily discovered by observation. But if the defects
are very ignominious or harmful, defamation is a grave sin (e.g., to
say that a very distinguished person is illegitimate, or of a mixed
race, or that his immediate relative was a criminal).

(b) If the defects are related to moral stain, but do not imply it,
revelation of them is not a grave sin, provided no great loss is caused
by it (e.g., to say that a person is scrupulous about himself, or has
certain peccadillos or human imperfections). If a shortcoming is
usually understood as a propensity rather than as a fault (e.g., quick
temper, high-strung disposition, pride, closeness with money), there is
little if any harm done by speaking of it. But if the defects mentioned
are such as imply or insinuate actual moral lapses (e.g., to say that a
person has a venereal disease and the cause is unknown, or that he has
delirium tremens or morphinism, or is of a very passionate nature), the
revelation is defamatory and more or less sinful.

(c) If the defects are moral, he who reveals them is guilty of sinful
defamation. But the harm done by the imputation of moral guilt is
greater in some cases and less in others. Some sins are more
disgraceful from their degradation (e.g., carnal sins, see 224), and
from this point of view it is worse to accuse a neighbor of gluttony or
sexual irregularity than of pride. Some sins (e.g., solicitation,
sodomy) are especially heinous in the eyes of the law and produce legal
infamy, because they are more harmful to the public or more subject to
public contempt (see Canons 2320, 2328, 2343, 2351, 2356, 2357). There
are also some defamations that are less harmful to reputation, but more
damaging to material prosperity (e.g., it is usually more hurtful to
the prospects of a person in business to be charged with incompetency,
dishonesty, or carelessness than to be charged with religious
indifference or impurity). Finally, there are gradations in the malice
of the same kinds of sin (see 197), as in the angry thought, the angry
word, the angry deed, in tipsiness and drunkenness, in occasional and
habitual lying, etc.

2048. Is it sinful to narrate the secret faults of another, if at the
same time one tells of his repentance and amendment?

(a) If the infamy remains in spite of the remarks about a change of
life for the better (as is generally the case), the narrator is guilty
of sinful detraction. Thus, it is very harmful to one in an exalted
position if it is given out that he was at one time bibacious, but
succeeded in thoroughly curing his appetite. The same principle applies
to those who praise in one matter and detract in another (e.g., by
stating that a person is very learned, but also very dishonest).

(b) If the infamy does not remain, because the atonement is so
extraordinary as to make the hearers think little or nothing about the
fault, the narrator is not guilty of sinful detraction. Thus, it is not
detraction to narrate that a saint was so grieved over a lie he told
that he did lifelong penance for it, or that a person who was once
lukewarm--a thing that is quite common--has in later years become
fervent in an uncommon degree. But the stigma that attaches to uncommon
sins or carnal sins is hardly overcome by the mention of repentance,
unless the person spoken of is already long dead or is one from whom
very little is expected.

2049. The Harm Done by Reason of the Person Defamed.--(a) Serious
faults are sometimes attributed to certain persons without serious sin,
because, on account of the life led by these persons or the notoriety
they have already achieved, they suffer no serious detriment when
defects like to those already known are charged against them. Thus, if
it is well known that a person keeps company with a fast set or
consorts with a tough gang, he suffers little if one reveals that he
uses profanity, gambles, drinks to excess, etc.; and if it is known
that a person has these vices, he is not harmed much by mention of a
particular instance or by the additional report that he has been
arrested for cheating and disorderly conduct. But the case is different
if defects unlike those already known are charged (e.g., if one says of
a person known as a liar that he is also a thief), unless the person
spoken of has so black a name as an all-around cheat that no new crime
charged to his account can give a deeper dye to his reputation.

(b) Light faults or acts that are not sinful in themselves are
sometimes matter of grave defamation when spoken of certain persons,
namely, when so much is expected from these persons that even minor
defects are serious blots on their fame. Thus, to say that a layman is
a confirmed liar or loves the opposite sex might be only a venial sin
or no sin at all, but the same statements about a grave cleric would be
seriously defamatory.

2050. Defamation supposes that the party who is injured is in
possession of a good name. But it is possible that the same individual
who enjoys a good name in one place or time, has a bad name in another
place or time. Hence, a number of special cases on defamation present
themselves for consideration.

(a) Thus, there is the case in which a person who has a good name here
is juridically infamous elsewhere; that is, he has lost his good name
elsewhere through a final and valid sentence, conviction, or confession
made in a public trial (see Canon 2197).

(b) There is the case in which a person who has a good name here is
actually infamous elsewhere, that is, his crime is known to so many
persons there that it is morally impossible to keep it secret or excuse
it.

(c) There is the case in which a person who has a good name now was in
bad repute formerly; that is, his bad name of the past has been
forgotten or has been obliterated by many years of good living.

2051. Meaning of the Expression “Infamous in a Certain Place.”--(a) The
place referred to is either a closed community (e.g., a monastery, a
college, a family) or an open community (e.g., a village, a
neighborhood, a parish, a town, a city); (b) the notoriety referred to
is either universal (i.e. known to all the community), or general
(i.e., known to the greater part of the community), or sufficient
(i.e., known to so many and such talkative persons that the whole
community will shortly be made to share in it). A crime known only to
one or two, or to a small circle of Christian-living persons, is not
notorious.

2052. Number of Persons Who Are Required for Sufficient Notoriety.--(a)
Some authors assign certain definite figures for this purpose--for
example, in a closed community of thirty or a hundred members a fact is
notorious if known to seven or fifteen; in a neighborhood of forty
persons, if it is known to eight individuals from different families;
in a village whose population is one thousand, if it is known to twenty
here and there; in a town of five thousand people, if it is known to
forty here and there.

(b) Other authors hold that no invariable rule can be given, but that
in each case the matter has to be determined by a prudent judgment
based on the character of the crime, the quality of the guilty person
and of the persons present at the time, the publicity of the place,
etc. Thus, if the crime was committed in some central spot from which
news was quickly disseminated, a smaller number of spectators would
make a deed notorious in the surrounding territory.

2053. Publicity of Commission or Report.-Actual infamy or disrepute is
produced either by the publicity of the crime or by the publicity of
the report.

(a) Thus, a crime has publicity in its commission when it was done in a
public place (e.g., on the street, in a public room) or in a private
place but before a considerable number of persons, or when its
indications were publicly given (e.g., by a confession, by maintenance
of a suspected woman in one’s home), or when it was submitted to public
notice or judgment (e.g., the acts of one in public office, the words
of one who delivers a public address, the deeds of one who boasts about
them).

(b) A crime has publicity in its report, when it is widely known,
whether due to the talk of the people, or to presumptions or suspicions.

2054. Revelation about a Person Who Is Juridically in Disrepute
Elsewhere.--(a) This exposure is not contrary to commutative justice,
according to the common opinion, for the condemnation deprives the
criminal of his right to fame (as regards the matter in which he is
found guilty) in all places, and it is often to the interest of the
public to know who has been convicted of crime elsewhere. Exception
should be made for the case in which a trial is conducted secretly in
order to spare the reputation of the condemned, as when a corporation
expels one of its members after a hearing and an unfavorable vote (see
2057).

(b) This revelation is contrary to charity when it deprives a person
without reason of the good fame which he possesses and which he would
not otherwise have lost; for we should love our neighbor as ourselves.
Example: Balbus served a term in jail in the town of A, on account of
drunkenness. He then moved to the distant town of B and by his good
conduct built up an excellent reputation. Claudius from A arrives and
maliciously spreads around the news that Balbus had been once in jail
for drunkenness. Claudius sins gravely against charity.

2055. Revelation about a Person Who Is Actually in Disrepute
Elsewhere.--If the person in question will in all likelihood soon lose
the reputation he has here, the following cases must be considered:

(a) if the disrepute is based on the publicity of a misdeed, the
revelation is not opposed to commutative justice; for he who sins
publicly thereby resigns his right to reputation as regards all those
persons and places to which knowledge of his delinquency is likely to
arrive. The revelation is against charity, however, if there is no
sufficient reason for it; but since the news would be soon brought
hither from other sources, no great harm is done and no serious sin
committed by the revelation;

(b) if the disrepute is based on public rumor and the rumor is unjust,
revelation, according to some, is opposed to commutative justice, since
it is nothing but a continuation and extension of the original injury.
Others hold that, unless one knows the rumor to be false, revelation is
not unjust in this case, since, as is supposed, the revealer was not
the author of the rumor, and those to whom he spoke would have learned
it shortly even without him. Of course, if the person about whom the
revelation is made suffers some considerable damage by reason of the
early loss of his good name, the person who makes the revelation
unnecessarily is guilty of serious sin. And rumor should never be
represented as an established fact.

2056. If the revelation is made about one who is actually in disrepute
elsewhere, but who is in little danger on that account of losing the
good name which he has here, opinions differ regarding the extent of
the guilt.

(a) Some hold that revelation in this case is a grave sin against
charity, since in a serious matter it saddens a neighbor, and thus
violates the rule of love to do unto others as we would have them do
unto us; and others add that it is also a grave sin against justice, if
the party spoken against is solicitous about his fame, since it
deprives him without reason of a great good to which he is entitled on
account of undisturbed possession.

(b) Others hold that this revelation is not a grave sin, either against
justice (since the right of the community to know about crimes that
were committed elsewhere prevails over the right of the individual) or
against charity (since charity does not oblige under grave
inconvenience).

(c) Others again distinguish between different cases, Thus, some say
that, if the crime in question is one that is very detrimental to the
public (e.g., murder, treason, white slave traffic, scandalous
impurity), the opinion under (b) is true; whereas, if it is one that is
not of that character (e.g., drunkenness in a private person), the
opinions under (a) are true. Some also distinguish in the case of
non-pernicious delinquencies between those that are notorious elsewhere
by reason of the public way in which sin was committed and those that
are notorious only on account of rumor; in the former case, they say,
the manifestation is not unjust, for, although public good does not
call for it, the guilty person himself has forfeited his right by the
public manner in which he sinned; but in the latter case it may easily
be unjust (see previous paragraph). The mere fact, however, that a
fault which contains no threat to the public welfare was committed in a
public manner does not seem to be a sufficient reason for manifestation
(e.g., when it will injure a man in earning a living or in supporting
his family), and we believe that one who speaks of such a fault without
necessity sins against charity, if not against justice, and that the
sin is often mortal.

2057. Notoriety in a Closed Community.--Notoriety in a closed community
is not absolute publicity, and hence the conclusions just given on
absolute publicity do not apply to closed communities.

(a) Thus, if a fault is actually notorious in a closed community, the
members may speak about it to one another, if there is any sufficient
reason for this. Hence, if the majority of the members of a religious
house know about a fault that has been committed there, it may be
divulged to one who is in ignorance about it for his instruction or
warning. Similarly, servants in a house may tell other domestics about
faults which are commonly known in the house.

(b) If a fault is notorious in a closed community but not outside, the
members as a rule may not speak or write about it to outsiders without
injustice, for generally speaking there is no reason arising from
necessity or utility for such a revelation. Moreover, the community
itself suffers in repute from such disclosures, since outsiders will be
impressed with the thought that the community has wicked members or is
lax, and that there is a lack of unity among them. To carry stories
from one monastery or house to another (even of the same Order) is a
form of detraction to outsiders, according to St. Alphonsus.

2058. Revelation about a Person Formerly in Disrepute.--When the
revelation concerns one who was in disrepute formerly, but who has a
good name now, either because his crime has been forgotten or because
he has lived it down, a distinction must be made between juridical and
actual notoriety.

(a) If the former disrepute was juridical notoriety, the revelation of
it is not unjust, since condemnation pronounced in a court of law gives
the right to others to make the sentence known in any place or at any
time; but more probably it is mortally uncharitable, if made without
necessity, since it harms the other person or his family in the
reputation which he has honestly recovered, thus depriving him of a
good most useful to him and hurtful to no one else.

(b) If the former disrepute was actual notoriety only, the revelation
is uncharitable, according to all, since it does not observe the golden
rule of doing to others as we would be done by. Many hold that it is
also unjust, since an obliterated crime is the same as an occult crime,
which cannot be divulged without injustice (see 2067). Moreover, the
person who has built up for himself a new reputation has a right to it,
and by the revelation of the old reputation this right is infringed,
inasmuch as his present good name is also lost or made useless. It
should be noted that the common good sometimes makes exceptions, and
thus it is not forbidden to historians to make revelations about
happenings that throw a new and unfavorable light on the youth or
earlier years of persons no longer living (see 2072 Sqq.).

2059. Case in Which the Name of the Person Defamed Is Not Given.--(a)
If there is nothing to indicate the individual and no reflection is
cast on a body to which he belongs, _per se_ no sin is committed.
Hence, if one says, “A certain person whom we shall call Balbus stole a
sheep,” there is no defamation in the narrative, even though a real
happening is described. Similarly, if one says that in the city where
he is speaking there are many criminals, or that even among his
numerous auditors there are doubtless some who are living in mortal
sin, there is no defamation.

(b) If there is something to indicate the individual meant, or if
reflection is cast on a body to which the individual belongs, sin is
committed by the remarks. Hence, if the narrative about Balbus and the
stolen sheep went on to describe incidents so that the hearers could
easily perceive that Balbus was a person known to them, this person
would be injured in his fame. Again, if one states that in a certain
city which one names 90% of the married people are addicted to
drunkenness, or that the party who was guilty of some scandalous act
was a member of a Religious Institute, harm is brought directly upon
individuals or damage is done to societies. It is true that an
organization is not really discredited by the misdeeds of one of its
members, but in popular opinion very often the disgrace of one is the
disgrace of all.

2060. Defamation of Deceased and Legal Persons.--(a) Defamation of the
dead, whether they be long or only recently dead, is sinful _per se_,
since the departed are capable of a glorious or inglorious memory, and
it is reasonable that one should wish one’s good name to be respected
after one’s death, both for one’s own sake and for the sake of others.
Hence the saying, “_De mortuis nil nisi bonum_.” But _per accidens_ it
is not sinful to make revelations about the dead when this is necessary
for historical truth (see 2072 sqq.). Defamation of the dead in itself
is less sinful than defamation of the living, since the dead have less
need of a good reputation; but circumstances may be such that one who
defames a dead person does serious harm and commits a mortal sin.

(b) Defamation of legal persons is also sinful _per se_, since these
bodies possess along with other rights of natural persons the right to
a good name. Public esteem is very necessary for them, and they are
protected in their enjoyment of it by the laws. Thus, it is injurious
to state that a certain Religious Order or monastery or diocese is
relaxed, or that a certain business corporation is not well managed.
But _per accidens_ it is not sinful to make revelations about
organizations, when there is a sufficient reason for the revelation
(see 2067). For example, if a political party is preying on the
citizens, or if a mercantile house is practising frauds, the common
good would require one to make these facts known. Neither is it sinful
to mention faults or defects that are notorious, for example, that a
certain government is warlike, that a certain people is backward, that
a certain group is devoted to erroneous principles or practices (Tit.,
i. 12).

2061. The Harm Done by Reason of the Person of the Defamer.--(a) The
person of the defamer increases the harm when his authority is greater.
A person who is supposed to be better informed (e.g., one who reports
that he was an eyewitness of the event he narrates), or who enjoys a
better reputation for truth (e.g., one who is in an official position,
or who is thought to be honest and disinterested), does more harm by
defamation than another whose authority is weak.

(b) The person of the defamer decreases the harm when his authority is
less. Hence, those who give out unfavorable reports about others with
reservations (such as “perhaps,” “it is not impossible,” “it seems so,
but I would not swear to it,” etc.), and also those whose weight as
authorities is light (such as talkative, lightminded, envious, gossipy,
or untruthful persons), do less harm than persons who are held in
higher repute. The confessor should not let these defamers off easily,
however, since many of them act on the principle that if enough mud is
thrown, no matter how foolish the charges, some of the mud will stick.

2062. One of the commonest forms of defamation is the narration of some
crime or defect at second hand, as when the defamer introduces his
remarks as follows: “They say,” or, “It is reported,” or, “I hear,” etc.

(a) The mode of defamation here lessens the sin when it weakens the
effect of the story upon the hearers. Hence, if one says that the talk
of the town is that Claudius is a heavy drinker, and the listeners
gather from this only that there is a vague rumor which cannot be
traced to any source or be confirmed by any fact and which is therefore
unreliable, the harm is less.

(b) The mode of defamation here does not lessen the sin when it does
not weaken the impression of the story; on the contrary, it increases
the sin when it adds strength to the story. Hence, if one says that
Claudius is said to be an excessive drinker, and if from the phrasing
the listeners will understand that the report originated with very good
authorities, or that it is based on general knowledge of the public,
the harm is greater. Justice is violated if the narrative itself
inclines the hearers to sinister thoughts or suspicions, for then the
narrator causes the harm; charity alone may be violated if it is only
the character of the listeners (e.g., their suspicious or frivolous
minds or their own guilt) that engenders in them evil opinion, for then
the narrator only occasions the harm (cfr. 1447, 1464).

2063. The Harm Done by Reason of the Listeners.--(a) The quality of the
listeners makes a difference, since it may cause the person defamed to
suffer more or less readily in their eyes (e.g., if they are
suspicious, or prejudiced, or credulous, or guilty themselves, they
will more easily believe evil about others) or in the eyes of others
(e.g., if the listeners are newsmongers or enemies of the person
defamed, the spread of the defamatory story is more certain). The loss
itself may be greater or less on account of the character or position
of the listener (e.g., loss of reputation with a friend or a virtuous
person is felt more, loss of reputation with customers or employers is
more damaging, etc.).

(b) The quantity of the listeners also makes a difference, since it is
more harmful, other things being equal, to be defamed before several
than before one. Hence, the fact that many persons are present when the
defamation is uttered is an aggravating circumstance of the sin.
Whether it multiplies the sin numerically, so that one commits as many
sins of defamation as there are persons who hear and are impressed, is
a disputed point. Those who hold for multiplication argue that the
defamed person has a distinct right to his reputation with each person
present; those who deny multiplication contend that the right to
reputation is a single object, since reputation is the opinion of
others, whether they be many or few. This latter view seems to be more
common, and its practical bearing is that a penitent need not mention
the number of persons before whom he defamed his neighbor (see 217).

2064. Is the malice of defamation aggravated by the fact that the
listeners are peculiar and think the defect mentioned is far more
serious than it really is?

(a) If only the harm to reputation is considered, it does not seem that
the over-strict notions of the listeners increase the sinfulness of
defamation; for the harm to reputation is to be measured by the common
opinion, not by the singular ideas of certain persons. Example:
Sempronius tells that Balbus wastes a little time in telling humorous
incidents and reading detective stories. The small group of auditors
think that this is one of the blackest of crimes.

(b) If other harms are taken into account, the peculiar ideas of the
listener may add to the sinfulness of defamation. Thus, if a young
person of delicate conscience will be scandalized at hearing that Caius
plays cards, or if older listeners will be led by this remark to take
their trade away from Caius, the sins of scandal and of unjust damage
are added to defamation. Defamation often destroys in the listener all
faith in humanity, or all belief in religion.

2065. Detraction to One Discreet Person.--Is detraction a mortal sin,
if the revelation of a serious sin is made without sufficient reason
but to only one prudent and discreet person, who will neither divulge
the information, nor be influenced by it to the harm of the party
spoken against?

(a) If the purpose of the speaker is to inflict serious injury on his
neighbor, mortal sin is committed, since the gravity of the sin is
measured by the malevolence of the will.

(b) If the purpose of the speaker is not to inflict serious injury, but
only to indulge his love of talk, levity of mind, etc., the gravity of
the sin depends on the actual harm that is done; for one wills
indirectly the harm connected with one’s acts, even when one does not
desire it directly (see 102). Hence, if the harm is in fact serious,
mortal sin is incurred by the detractor, unless he is excused from it
by the imperfection of his deliberation or consent. How much harm,
then, is done in this case? Most moralists, it seems, think grave harm
is done, since the loss of good name with one prudent man is generally
more distasteful than its loss with many light-minded persons. Some
moralists, however, dissent from this view, and hold that the harm done
is small. They argue that the loss of good name with one prudent person
(exception being made for the cases when he is the one person whose
esteem is prized above that of all others, or when the crime revealed
is an enormous or very degrading one) is not a great blow to
reputation, since reputation consists in the opinion of many persons,
and since a prudent man will be inclined to help rather than harm one
who has been defamed in his presence. The advocates of the first
opinion appeal also to the analogy of contumely and rash judgment, for
these two sins are grave, even when the loss of honor or good opinion
is in respect to one person only. But their adversaries deny the
assumed parity: for, while contumely includes the purpose to injure and
rash judgment includes the imputation to another of a defect of which
he is not guilty or not known to be guilty, the detraction now
considered is innocent both of design to injure and of calumny. Both
opinions are probable, but the former seems to be more common and more
likely.

2066. Belittling a Person to Himself.--It is not impossible to belittle
a person to himself, for example, to make him believe that lie is
illegitimate, that he is regarded with contempt by others, that his
ability is mediocre or his character defective, etc. Is this
defamation, or is it sinful?

(a) To lower a person in his own estimation is not defamation in the
strict sense of the word, since defamation is properly an injury to the
reputation that one has with one’s neighbors or with the public, not to
the opinion one has of oneself. This sin belongs rather to derision
(see 2106).

(b) To lower a person in his own eyes is sinful or not sinful according
to the purpose intended or the means employed. Thus, if a parent,
wishing to correct the pride or presumption of his son, gives the
latter a true picture of his failings or limitations, the act is one of
virtuous correction. But if an envious person, wishing to produce a
sense of inferiority in another, deprives the latter of rightful peace
of mind and of reasonable confidence in self, charity and justice are
violated and there is a duty of restitution.

2067. Disclosing Matters Detrimental to Third Party.--In what cases is
it lawful to disclose to others matters that will be detrimental to the
reputation of a third party?

(a) If the communication is false, it is never lawful, no matter how
important the reason; for the end does not justify the means. It is
sinful, therefore, to resort to calumny as a defense of one’s own
reputation or dignity (see 2035, 2036).

(b) If the communication is truthful and the matter is already well
known to the persons addressed, there is no defamation, unless the
communication makes these persons strongly convinced, whereas they had
been rather uncertain before, or reveals to them some important detail
about which they had been in ignorance.

(c) If the communication is truthful, but the defects are secret and
unknown to the parties addressed, there is defamation, unless the
person whose defects are revealed has lost his right to good name on
account of the right of another person which has precedence and cannot
otherwise be upheld (cfr. 2035). In this latter case there is no
obligation to maintain silence, neither from justice (since the lesser
right must yield to the greater right) nor from charity (since this
virtue does not oblige at the cost of great inconvenience). Thus, Our
Lord made known to the Apostles that the Pharisees were hypocrites
(Luke, xii, 1; Matt., xvi. 6), and St. Paul told Timothy that Alexander
and Hymeneus had neither faith nor a good conscience (I Tim., i. 20).

2068. Rights that Have Precedence over a False Reputation.--(a) The
public good is to be preferred to a false reputation, for the public
welfare is the ground for the right to such reputation, the subject
himself being unworthy of the good name he bears (see 2037). It is
right, therefore, to denounce criminals or conspirators to the proper
authorities, or to testify against them. Employers have the duty to
discuss together the failings or imperfections of their employees that
interfere with the business; subjects should manifest abuses about
which they are asked in a canonical visitation; students in a college
should give information about companions who are depraving the morals
of the student body or exercising an evil influence on the other
residents, etc.

(b) The private good of innocent parties may be preferred to the fame
of one who enjoys a false reputation. One may reveal secret defects for
one’s own defense; for example, a person whose life, honor or property
is being unjustly attacked may reveal sins of the guilty in order to
deter them or weaken their authority; a person who has been injured by
his superior or another party may speak of this to a friend for the
sake of obtaining consolation, or to a confessor, a lawyer or other
adviser for the sake of obtaining counsel or assistance. One may also
reveal secret defects for the protection of others; for example, one
should put unsuspecting persons on their guard against seducers,
impostors, quacks; one should reveal impediments that stand in the way
of a marriage, or should warn a young woman that the man to whom she is
engaged is a criminal or diseased; one should make known the true
author of a crime for which an innocent person is about to suffer; one
should tell the truth to inquirers about the incompetency of servants
or other persons whom one has employed.

(c) The higher good of the person whose faults are revealed may also be
preferred to the lower good of his false reputation; for it is to his
interest that his higher good be promoted, even at the expense of an
inferior good. It is lawful to tell parents about the misdeeds of their
children (e.g., that a daughter is involved in a scandalous liaison),
in order that the latter may be corrected; or to speak to the friends
of wayward persons about the misconduct of the latter in order that
prayers may be said for their conversion.

2069. Unlawful Attack on Another’s False Reputation.--If the false
reputation of another is not the unjust cause of a loss that is feared,
it is not right to deprive him of his good name. Examples: (a) It is
not lawful to accuse a person who is about to be promoted to some
office or dignity of which he is worthy, if the motive of the
accusation is to secure the honor for oneself or one’s friend;
otherwise ambitious persons would be encouraged to practise spying,
manufacturing of evidence, etc., and the public peace would be greatly
disturbed. (b) It is not lawful to accuse a person who is giving one no
offense, if the motive of the accusation is to distract attention from
oneself or to make oneself shine by the comparison.

2070. Conditions that Justify Revelation of Another’s Defects.--In
revealing defects on account of some necessary good, one must observe
the conditions for an act of double result (see 103).

(a) Thus, the action itself must not be evil, and hence one may not
break the seal of secrecy to which one is bound (as will be said in the
next Article in discussing violations of secrets), nor make use of
knowledge unjustly acquired, nor reveal more or to more persons than
the case demands, nor reveal anything, if a warning to the offender
will suffice (see 1286).

(b) The good result must be intended, and the evil result of detriment
to fame must be only permitted. Those who assign pious motives (pity,
zeal, sincerity) for talk against a neighbor, but who are really
actuated by hatred, revenge, ambition to defeat a rival, or other like
passion, sin on account of their wrong intention. A hypocritical form
of defamation is practised by some persons exteriorly devout, who under
the pretext of asking prayers for their neighbor’s conversion spread
stories about those whom they dislike.

(c) The reason for permitting the evil must be sufficiently weighty.
Hence, the good result intended must be one that is likely to follow on
the revelation, and it must be of some importance; for it would be
cruel to throw away a neighbor’s good name on the mere possibility that
a considerable good would be secured, or on the certainty that only a
slight benefit would be obtained. It does seem, however, that the good
which is hoped for must be of an equal dignity with the good of fame,
since the innocent and the guilty party are not on the same footing,
and furthermore all admit, for example, that the fame of an employee
who is stealing from his employer is not to be preferred to the goods
of the employer. In doubt about the seriousness of the evil following
on revelation, the innocent party is to be favored.

2071. Revelations about Public Officials or Candidates for Public
Office.--(a) These are lawful when the public good calls for them
(e.g., when a man has used corrupt practices in order to be elected, or
when he is incompetent, or when he has been guilty of malfeasance in
office), and the conditions of the previous paragraph are observed.

(b) These revelations are unlawful when the public good suffers from
them (e.g., when the safety or dignity of society itself would be
injured by attacks on the head of government), or when the due
conditions are not observed (e.g., when one resorts to personalities
about a deserving public official, or practises muckraking because of
mere prejudice or partisanship). The law permits fair comment on public
persons or works, but it also grants an action for criticism that
contains unfair aspersions of personal character or unjust accusations
about public conduct.

2072. Revelations about Historical Personages.--(a) These revelations
are not lawful unless there is a proportionate reason that justifies
them. For historians there are sufficient reasons to narrate
impartially the crimes as well as the virtues of those who appear in
their pages. These reasons are: the nature of history as a record of
facts and causes (“the first law of history is that it dare not tell
any untruth, that it fear not to tell any truth,” Leo XIII); the rights
of the persons who are treated in the annals (e.g., it is often
impossible to understand the deeds of one character in history or to do
him justice unless the secret crime of another character is revealed);
the rights of the readers (e.g., the reader has the right to know that
the persecutors of religion have been wicked in their personal lives).
The historian, therefore, may search for material bearing on the lives
and deeds of historical personages of the past, he may collect similar
material relating to current events, he may narrate defects or
delinquencies of the past that were unknown or forgotten. But matters
of a purely private character that have no bearing on public events do
not belong, according to some moralists, to the legitimate province of
the historian; for otherwise there would be an end to the rights of the
dead over their fame. Moreover, there is the risk of calumny and of
violation of elementary justice, since the historian is a
self-appointed judge and the person condemned is not able to defend
himself.

(b) These historical revelations are not lawful unless the conditions
mentioned in 2070 are observed. Thus, a historian should not write down
details that were told him in confidence by a person long since dead;
he should not be swayed either by unreasonable likes or unreasonable
dislikes in the expression of his views; he should not publish what
will cause harm rather than good, such as circumstances in the lives of
persons recently deceased which, if revealed, will be detrimental to
living persons.

2073. It is not always easy to determine whether more harm is likely to
result if the persons whose glory is dimmed are high in public esteem
on account of the prestige of their office or their great exploits.
Much will depend on circumstances and on the author’s manner of
treatment.

(a) Thus, _per se_, or from the nature of things, it does not cause
greater harm to narrate truth about the imperfections of great men, for
only error or prejudice or evil has reason to fear the truth. The
inspired Scriptures themselves deal candidly with the public failings
of personages who were high in religious or civil position, for
example, the hesitation of Moses, the infidelity of Aaron, the fall of
King David, the disobedience of the prophet Jonas, the denials of
Peter, the doubts of Thomas, the treason of Judas. These histories are
not harmful, but, on the contrary, contain most useful lessons of
instruction, warning and direction.

(b) _Per accidens_, or on account of special conditions, it may be more
harmful to write of the failings of the great (cfr. 1001). Thus, the
class of persons for whom one is writing may be immature (e.g., a
textbook of history for children would give scandal if it spoke openly
of sexual crimes), the conditions of the time may be unfavorable (e.g.,
a new historical production might lead to injury to some class of
persons at a time of great prejudice against them), the total effect of
a book may be bad (e.g., chronicles of scandals, historical biographies
or novels or plays written in a seductive manner). The class of modern
writers known as “debunkers,” whose aim it is to destroy all
hero-worship, offend against truth and ideals by the prominence they
give to evil, while the so-called psychological historians are
frequently purely subjective as well as immoral.

2074. Revelations about Persons Who Figure in the News of the Day.--(a)
If the matters revealed are of a public nature, the lawfulness or
unlawfulness of the revelation will depend on the reasons for it and
the manner in which it is given. In discussing political affairs, a
newspaper has the right to call attention to mistakes and faults of
public men, since the freedom of the press in this respect is a
protection to liberty and to progress, and those who enter public life
implicitly consent to criticism of their conduct; in reporting the
news, a newspaper has the right to speak of murders, robberies and
other public crimes that have been committed, since the common good
requires that the authors of public offenses be known as such. But if
this kind of news is disserviceable in any instance to the order,
peace or dignity of the community, or if the news is obtained in
unjust or dishonorable ways, or if the motive is merely to gratify
curiosity, to indulge prejudice, or to make money, the newspaper
management is morally guilty, even though it may be legally within its
right. Yellow journalism and “tabloidism” are reprehensible because
they are injurious to the minds and morals of their readers on account
of the undue prominence given to crime, even of the most disgusting
sort, and the appeal made to sense and emotion rather than to thought.

(b) It the matters revealed are of a private nature, the morality of
the revelation has to be judged by the principles given in 2067 sqq. It
would be wrong to make a practice of spying into the private life and
affairs even of public persons merely to add interest to one’s columns;
but if there is some really important advantage to the public or to a
private person that will be served, and if the other conditions are
observed (see 2070), one may publish even private defects that are real
and certain.

2075. Injustice in Professional Critics.--(a) Injustice is done by
professional critics (such as book reviewers, dramatic and art critics,
and the like) to the persons who rely upon their opinion, if there is a
compact with them to give a competent and unbiased judgment and the
compact is not lived up to by the critic with resultant damage to the
client (see 1793). If there is no compact, the critic is nevertheless
guilty of deception and uncharitableness, if he performs his office
carelessly (e.g., by eulogizing a worthless book or play or picture).

(b) Injustice is done the person criticized, if his work is undervalued
purposely (e.g., because the critic is jealous, or in an ill humor or
is hired by others to dispraise), or if uncalled-for personalities are
indulged in at the expense of the person’s fame. A carping critic may
by the stroke of the pen spoil the work of years, and hence ignorance
does not excuse those censors who practise wholesale and unfair
denunciations (see 905).

2076. Cooperation in Defamation.--Not only the defamer sins, but also
those who cooperate with him. Among the cooperators with defamation are
those who give orders for defamation, those who show how it can be
done, those who protect defamers, and those who participate in
defamation by directing the conversation to a certain subject or by
joining in the criticisms. The most ordinary form of participation in
defamation is that of the listener, for no one defames successfully
unless he has a sympathetic listener. Those who listen to detraction in
such a way as to consent to what is said share in the guilt of the
detraction. This happens as follows:

(a) the listener consents directly to defamation when he spurs the
speaker on (e.g., by saying, “Tell us about So-and-So,” by insincerely
praising an absent person in order to excite dispraise, by nodding
approvingly, cheering, or smiling, by showing great marks of favor to
those who bring him news against others or of disfavor to those who
refuse to do this), or when he rejoices internally at the defamation he
hears, because he hates the victim:

(b) the listener consents indirectly to defamation when he does not
spur the speaker on nor approve of what is said, but omits to stop the
defamation or to protest against it, when he could and should do one or
the other of these things.

2077. Sinfulness of Direct Consent to Defamation.--The listener who
consents directly shares in the guilt of the defamer according to the
words of St. Paul: “They who do such things (detractors, etc.) are
worthy of death, and not only they that do them, but they also that
consent to them that do them” (Rom., i. 32), Indeed, St. Bernard says
that it is not easy to say which is more deserving of condemnation, to
defame or to listen to defamation. But we may distinguish as follows:

(a) he who spurs the defamer on is more guilty than the defamer. This
listener sins against the detractor whom he scandalizes by inducing to
sin, against the detracted whom he deprives of his good name. Thus, he
is both uncharitable to the detractor and unjust to the detracted, and
is the moving cause of all the harm that is done (cfr. 2065);

(b) he who hears the defamer willingly may be more guilty internally
than the defamer, since his hatred of his neighbor and his love of
injustice may be more intense; but externally his sin is less, since,
as is supposed, he is not bound to resist the defamation and he does
not give any cooperation to the external injustice. He sins against
justice affectively (i.e., in wish), but not effectively (i.e., in word
or deed).

2078. Persons Who Listen from Curiosity.--What of those listeners who
hear defamation willingly, not because they approve of the harm or evil
that is being done, but because they are unusually curious or the
speaker is unusually interesting?

(a) If these listeners could and should stop the defamation, they
consent to it indirectly by their silence and thus are guilty (cfr.
2079).

(b) If these listeners are not able or are not bound to stop the
defamation, some would nevertheless hold them guilty of grave sin,
since they wish to hear something only because the knowledge will give
them pleasure, knowing all the while that this knowledge cannot be had
except at the expense of the good opinion they have of a neighbor. But
the general view is that in this case there is no grave sin; for the
listener does not approve of the moral evil (he is interested only in
the graceful or eloquent or witty manner of the speaker, or the
strangeness of the things related, or he is only concerned to hear the
latest news, cfr. 234), and what he hears does not cause the lowering
of his neighbor in his own opinion. But here it is supposed that the
listener in no way encourages the defamation and that he is not bound
to stop it. Curiosity about things that do not concern one is, however,
a venial sin.

2079. Sinfulness of Indirect Consent to Defamation.--The listener who
consents indirectly to defamation by not impeding it as he should is
also guilty of sin, and in Scripture his conduct is strongly forbidden:
“Have nothing to do with detractors” (Prov., xxiv. 21); “Hedge in thy
ears with thorns, hear not a wicked tongue” (Ecclus., xxviii. 28).

(a) It is commonly admitted that the listener in question sins doubly
against charity, and grievously if the defamation is seriously harmful;
for he sins against the detractor by refusing to give a brotherly
correction (see 1258 sqq.), and he sins also against the one detracted
by refusing to raise his voice in behalf of the absent who cannot
defend himself.

(b) It is also commonly admitted that, if the listener is the superior
of the defamer or of the person defamed, he sins more gravely, since he
is specially bound to correct his subject who is detracting in his
presence, or to defend his absent subject who is being defamed. If the
listener is a private person not responsible for the defamed person’s
reputation, he does not sin against justice by his indirect consent to
the defamation. Indeed, the inferiors or equals of the defamer rarely
sin gravely by their neglecting to oppose his defamatory remarks.

2080. Guilt of Superior Who Consents to Defamation.--Is the superior
who indirectly consents to defamation of a non-subject by a subject
guilty thereby of injustice?

(a) As regards the spiritual injury (i.e., the guilt of sin incurred by
the defamer), the superior is guilty of injustice towards his subject,
if by reason of his office or contract he is bound to correct faults
and neglects to do so. Thus, a bishop or pastor is supported by his
people, and there is at least an implied agreement that he will direct
them in spiritual matters and reprove their faults. Hence, it seems
that a spiritual superior of this kind is unjust, if he fails to
correct a subordinate who carries defamatory tales to his ears.

(b) As regards the temporary injury (i.e., the detriment to fame
incurred by the person maligned), all depends on whether the superior
is bound by reason of his office or contract to prevent injury to
non-subjects by those who are his subjects. If the superior exercises
his authority in the temporal order and has an agreement with those not
subject to him to protect them against defamation by his subjects, he
is bound in justice to abide by his agreement. But the common opinion
is that a superior in the spiritual order is not responsible _ex
officio_ for the fame or other temporal welfare of those not subject to
him.

2081. Is the superior who indirectly consents to defamation of a
subject guilty thereby of injustice?

(a) If the superior has authority in the temporal order, he is unjust
by his inaction, in so far as law, custom or agreement hold him to
prevent the defamation of his subject. Thus, a guardian entrusted with
the care of his ward’s reputation is unjust if he makes no effort to
prevent defamation of the latter.

(b) If the superior is in the spiritual order, some believe that he is
unjust by inaction, since fame is closely connected with spiritual
goods, being necessary for moral influence over others and useful for
personal perseverance in virtue. But others--and it seems more
commonly--deny this, and state that the relation between fame and
spiritual goods is only accidental.

2082. Circumstances Which Lessen Guilt of Indirect Consent.--Indirect
consent to defamation is often only a venial sin. (a) Thus, by reason
of the lightness of the matter, as when only trivial defects are
mentioned by the defamer; (b) by reason of insufficient reflection, as
when the listener is distracted in mind and does not clearly advert to
the sinfulness of the words he hears; (c) by reason of insufficient
consent, as when the failure to stop or protest against the defamation
is due to slight laziness, to bashfulness, or to fear of the speaker,
at least when the defamation is not extremely harmful to fame or other
good, or gravely slanderous.

2083. Inaction in the Face of Defamation.--Inaction in the face of
defamation of a third party is sometimes no sin at all.

(a) Thus, there is no sin when one is unable to act (e.g., when a
slanderous speech is being delivered by a person in authority who will
not suffer any interruption to be made), or is unable to act with any
success (e.g., when the attempt to correct would provoke worse
defamation, when the listener is too unskilled to refute or
remonstrate). Scrupulous persons should not attempt to correct, since
they are not suited for this. Their attempts to defend an absent person
would generally make them ridiculous, and would often be unjust to the
person whom they suspected of defamation.

(b) There is no sin when one is not obliged to act (e.g., when
interference will expose one to very serious evils, when the defamation
is not grave or is not taken very seriously, when the listener is
uncertain whether the speaker is really guilty of defamation or whether
he himself is bound to intervene). It is sometimes unwise to interrupt
a defamatory story, for many such story seems to promise dire
disclosures at its beginning, but when heard to the end is seen to be
an affair of no importance or to contain little that is new or
startling or credible.

2084. Ways of Opposing Defamation Made in One’s Presence.--(a) Positive
resistance is made by a command to the defamer to be silent, or by
refutation of his words if they are false, or by a rebuke if his words
are true. This mode of correction is generally required if the listener
is the superior of the defamer, and is sometimes suitable if he is the
latter’s equal.

(b) Negative resistance is made by leaving the company, by having no
share in the conversation, by changing the subject, by showing
displeasure or at least gravity in one’s looks or acts: “The north wind
driveth away rain, as doth a sad countenance a backbiting tongue”
(Prov., xxv. 23). This mode of resistance is usually the proper one for
an inferior, and as a rule is found more satisfactory even between
equals (see 1267).

2085. Restitution for Defamation.--Restitution for injuries committed
is necessary (see 1759), and hence it is required of the defamer. In
the language of Scripture (Prov., xiii. 13), he that speaks ill of his
neighbor obliges himself for the future. The two injuries to be
repaired are: (a) the unjust taking, that is, the fame of which he has
deprived his neighbor; (b) the unjust damage, that is, the detriment to
fame or the losses that resulted from the defamation (such as failure
to obtain or keep a position, decline of business, etc., which were
foreseen at least in a confused manner). It is clear there is no duty
of restitution, if in spite of talk against a neighbor he suffered no
loss (e.g., if the listeners gave no heed or credence to the talk).

2086. Gravity of Obligation of Restitution.--The obligation of
restitution for defamation is grave or light according to the degree of
injury done, and the grave obligation binds even at the expense of
serious inconvenience, the light obligation at the cost of small
inconvenience. But the following points should be noted:

(a) the injury is not necessarily grave if the defect imputed to
another is grave, for many circumstances have to be considered (e.g.,
blasphemy is a serious charge, but it would not be very harmful to a
man publicly known as very impious, see 2053 sqq.);

(b) the injury is not necessarily slight if the defect imputed is
slight, for circumstances may make the injury considerable (e.g., it is
not very defamatory to say that a woman is very talkative, or unable to
speak or spell correctly, but this would be very damaging if it lost
the woman a very lucrative position as secretary).

2087. Conditions Which Entail Duty of Restitution.--Restitution is not
obligatory unless one is the unjust and efficacious author of the
damage (see 1763). Hence, disclosures unfavorable to the reputation of
others entail the duty of restitution only when the following
conditions are present:

(a) the detriment to fame or other loss must be unjust objectively, and
hence those who have a just reason for exposing the vices of others are
not held to restitution;

(b) the detriment must be unjust subjectively, and hence one who in
good faith speaks of a neighbors sin, thinking that it is true and
public, whereas it is false or secret, is not bound to restitution, if
he discovers his error after the results of the defamation have been
removed (see, however, 2102). But if he discovers his mistake while the
neighbor is still under a cloud because of the report, he becomes from
that moment responsible and subjectively unjust, if he does not take
steps as far as he conveniently can to correct the error (see 1769);

(c) the detriment must be due to oue’s act as to its efficacious
cause, and hence one is not bound to restitution if a listener
understands one to disparage when in fact one has not disparaged.

2088. Cooperators and Restitution.--Those who cooperate in injustice
are also held to restitution (see 1778 sqq.), and hence the following
are bound to indemnify a defamed person:

(a) positive cooperators are held to restitution, such as those who
command, counsel, or encourage defamation. The same is true of those
who share in a defamatory conversation or who merely listen, but by
their questions, or show of interest or approval, induce the defamer to
continue, or to speak with more assurance;

(b) negative cooperators are also held to restitution, if they were
bound in justice to resist or impede defamation. This will apply
chiefly to a superior who does not prevent, as he should, the
defamation of his subject or community, whether by a subject or a
non-subject (see 2080 sqq.).

2089. Circumstances of Restitution.--We shall now speak of the
circumstances of restitution for defamation: (a) the persons bound to
restitution besides the defamer, namely, his heirs, the listeners,
etc.; (b) the persons to whom restitution is to be made; (c) the manner
of making restitution; (d) the time for making restitution (see 1781
sqq.).

2090. Restitution for Defamation to Be Made by an Heir of the
Defamer.--(a) For the injury to fame, it seems that the heir is not
bound, since the duty of restitution of fame is a personal one, that
is, an obligation to perform an act of retraction or apology, not an
obligation to pay compensation (see 463). But some hold that defamation
may be satisfied for by pecuniary compensation (1750, 1802), and that,
if the injured party should insist on this kind of compensation for the
infamy suffered, the heirs would be obliged to pay it.

(b) For the damages resulting from injury to fame the heir is bound,
since restitution for losses is a real one and rests upon the property
or estate of the deceased. But those who are in good faith are
sometimes to be left undisturbed, lest they become guilty of formal sin.

2091. The Persons to Whom Restitution for Defamation Is to Be
Made.--(a) To the person defamed restitution of fame is owed, and this
is true even when the person is already dead. Just as one who dishonors
the dead by desecrating their tombs or their remains owes it to their
memory to make reparation, so one who defames the dead owes it to their
reputation to make restitution. In fact, the heirs may be bound in
conscience to insist upon this restitution, and it seems they cannot
condone it, since it is not their own fame that has been hurt.

(b) To the listeners restitution is not owed, since no injustice was
done them, but reparation for scandal given them may be obligatory.
And, since justice to the person defamed requires retraction or other
reparation, the defamer must recall his words before the persons to
whom he addressed them. Hence, if defamation appeared in a journal, the
honorable reparation should also appear in the same journal and with
the same prominence given it as was given the offensive remarks.

2092. Responsibility of Defamer for Spread of Defamation.--Is the
defamer bound to recall his words to the wider audience that learned
them from his first listeners?

(a) If the defamer is not responsible for the spread of his talk beyond
the circle which he addressed (e.g., if he imposed strict silence upon
his listeners or had good reason to think that they would keep his
remarks to themselves, and his words nevertheless leaked out), the
common opinion is that he is not held to reparation before the
subsequent listeners.

(b) If the defamer is responsible for the spread of his talk (e.g., if
he gave his listeners permission to quote or repeat, or if he knew well
that they would carry his words far and wide), he is bound to
reparation before the later listeners, in so far as this is possible,
especially if he was guilty of calumny. Whether he or his listeners
have the first duty of restitution will depend on the relationship in
their cooperation (see 1784). If he can do nothing better, he should
admonish his listeners to retract before their listeners.

2093. The First Way of Making Restitution for Defamation.--(a) If the
defamation was by calumny, the defamer (and also the propagator) must
take back his words, admitting that what he said was untrue. If
necessary, he should also make affidavit to this effect, or even admit
that he lied. The reason is that the innocent party has a greater right
to his fame than the guilty party. But the defamer is not obliged to
confess his own malice, when this is not necessary, and it may suffice
to say merely that his former statement was not correct.

(b) If the defamation was by detraction, the defamer cannot truthfully
say that his words were false, and he must counteract directly or
indirectly the effect of his defamation by something favorable to the
person he has injured. If the listeners will not be confirmed in their
belief by his explanation, the defamer should explain to them that his
statements were unjust, that he had no right to make them, that he
wishes them to regard as unsaid all that he said, etc. (direct
revocation). If this cure would be worse than the sickness by
strengthening the belief of the listeners that the defamation was true,
the defamer should be silent about his former statements. But he should
so honor or praise the person defamed that others will be led to
believe, not that restitution is being made, but that the former good
opinion they had of the person defamed was correct (indirect
revocation). Thus, if the defamer knows that the injured person has
reformed, he may call attention to and emphasize the virtues he now
has; if the defamed person has still the same failing, he may be
excused, when possible, or praised for the good qualities he does
possess, or he may be spoken of in general terms of esteem; if the
listeners have been led to dishonor the person who was detracted, the
defamer may show special signs of esteem or confidence to the latter,
etc.

2094. Other Methods of Making Restitution.--If the listeners will not
be impressed by any of the methods of satisfaction just indicated, what
should be done?

(a) If, in the case of calumny, the listeners are unwilling to accept
the formal statement that the defamation was untrue, the defamer is
obliged to nothing more. For the slanderer has done all that is
possible to change the erroneous view of the listeners, and the bad
opinion they have of their neighbor must now be attributed, not to the
defamer, but to their own wickedness or stubbornness.

(b) If the listeners cannot be properly impressed by the direct or
indirect revocation of detraction, the defamer, being unable to make
honorable compensation by restoration of fame, should make a profitable
compensation by the bestowal of a benefit that will in some way be
commensurate with the good of reputation and be acceptable to the other
party. Thus, if the person defamed is satisfied with money or something
measurable in terms of money, he should be given damages; if this kind
of compensation is of little use or is not esteemed (few persons of
honor would take money alone as pay for a lost reputation), he should
be given some other good which in his own judgment and that of a
prudent man is more nearly an equivalent for the good of which he has
been deprived. An apology is not sufficient, since the begging of
pardon does not restore what was taken; neither is it generally
advisable, because the admission to another that one has been secretly
defaming him and is now sorry for this may lead to quarrels and hatreds
rather than to forgiveness and peace.

2095. Legal Reparation for Defamation.--One who has been sentenced by a
lawful judgment of court to reparation and penalty for defamation is
obliged to obedience, but if the satisfaction decided on by a jury is
excessive or meager, it can be set aside by the court. In Canon Law
(Canon 2355) one who has been convicted of defamation may be sentenced:
(a) to satisfaction; (b) to damages; (c) to suitable penalties, even to
suspension or removal from office or benefice.

2096. The Time When Restitution for Defamation Is to Be Made.--(a) It
should be made as soon as possible, for the longer it is delayed the
greater the injury that is suffered, since defamation becomes harder to
correct as it progresses, or at least has a longer life when it is not
corrected early. But prudence will sometimes dictate that one await a
psychological or favorable moment for a retractation. (b) Restitution
should be promised before absolution is given, and, if there is a
well-founded doubt about the sincerity of a promise, the confessor may
delay absolution until restitution has been made.

2097. Cessation of Duty of Restitution.--The duty of restitution
ceases, at least temporarily, in certain cases (see 1797 sqq.), and
hence one who has been guilty of injustice through defamation is
sometimes excused from reparation. (a) Thus, one is excused temporarily
on account of impossibility; (b) one is excused permanently on account
of the cessation of the other party’s good name or the termination of
one’s own obligation.

2098. Excuse from Restitution on Account of Impossibility.--(a)
Physical impossibility excuses, for example, when one does not know who
the persons were before whom one detracted, or cannot recall who the
person was whom one defamed. But in this case the defamer should at
least make satisfaction by praying for the person whom he defamed, or
by having Masses offered for him.

(b) Moral impossibility excuses from restitution, as when the defamer
will suffer a far greater loss than he inflicted on the person defamed
(e.g., if the defamer cannot retract without losing his life, or a
reputation which is far more valuable than that of the obscure person
who was defamed). But if the defamer has subjected the injured party to
the peril of death, or if he has calumniated an innocent man, he must
make satisfaction even at the peril of his own life or at the cost of
his own fame; for the right of the innocent prevails over that of the
guilty defamer.

2099. Excuse from Restitution on Account of Cessation of Other Party’s
Good Name.--The defamer may also be excused from restitution on account
of cessation of the other party’s good name through another cause, as
when the secret defect first made known by the defamer becomes public
from another source.

(a) The detractor is excused from the duty of restoring reputation,
since the person he defamed has now independently of the first
defamation lost his right to reputation (see 2053 sqq.).

(b) The detractor is not excused, however, from payment for damages
which the defamed person suffered from the first defamation or for
expenses which it caused him. Some moralists hold him obligated also
for some compensation for the infamy suffered before the crime became
public through others.

2100. Excuse from Restitution on Account of the Termination of
Obligation.--(a) The act of the defamed person ends the obligation,
when, without injury to others, he expressly or tacitly condones the
offense; for he has dominion over his own fame, as he has over his own
money or lands. Thus, it may often be presumed that parents overlook
the restitution owed them by their children for criticisms made by the
latter.

(b) The act of the defamed person also ends the obligation, according
to the common opinion, when he has inflicted an equal injury by defaming
his defamer and is unwilling to make satisfaction for the injury; for
though it is unlawful to repay evil with evil, and though one damage
does not cure another damage, he who will not pay a creditor cannot
insist that the creditor pay him an equal debt. Thus, if Titus has
burned the barn of Claudius and Claudius then burns the barn of Titus,
and neither will pay damages, the debts neutralize each other, if the
losses are equal. The same principle applies in defamatory
recriminations.

2101. Right of Defamed Person to Condone Injury.--The person defamed
has the right to condone the injury, if it is only personal to himself,
but he has not always the right to condone the injury when the
defamation causes harm to others.

(a) Thus, the defamed person would sin against justice and his act
would be invalid, if he forgave the debt of restitution despite the
fact that his own fame was necessary for the fame of others (e.g., when
a monk loses his good name, the monastery is also disgraced), or was
necessary for the fulfillment of duties owed by him in justice to
others (e.g., when a prelate, priest or public official loses his good
name, the good influence he should exercise over his subjects is
ended). This conclusion is probable.

(b) The defamed person would sin against charity, but his act would be
valid, if he forgave the debt of restitution despite the fact that his
fame was necessary for the fulfillment of charitable duties owed to
others, or that his silence in the face of defamation would cause great
scandal (e.g., when a preacher loses his reputation, his words do not
move, and thus he is unable fruitfully to accomplish works of charity
by instructing the ignorant, etc.).

2102. Excuse from Restitution When Reputation Has Been Recovered.--The
obligation of restitution for defamation also ceases when reputation
has been recovered without any act on the part of the defamer; for it
is clear that one is not bound to give back that which is already had.
But restitution may be due, nevertheless, for damages incurred, and
some think that compensation (e.g., apology, honor, praise) should be
made for the injury of infamy that existed before the good name was
regained.

The usual ways in which reputation is recovered without the act of the
defamer are: (a) by overthrow of the defamation, as when the facts
against it become manifest, or when witnesses prove its falsity, or
when a tribunal declares it a criminal libel; (b) by oblivion, as when
a misdeed of years ago has faded entirely out of the public memory. If
the defamer is uncertain whether his past defamations have been
forgotten, he has to act with great prudence; for, if he makes
inquiries the memory of the defamations may be awakened, while if he
says nothing, the defamations, because never corrected or retracted,
may break out anew. He should consider the circumstances, therefore,
and treat the defamed person as he would wish himself to be treated in
a like case.

2103. Whispering or Tale-Bearing.--Whispering (_susurratio_), also
called mischief-making and tale-bearing, is a speech unfavorable to
another person secretly made with the purpose of breaking up a virtuous
friendship.

(a) It is unfavorable speech, that is, the whisperer says something to
his listener that will turn the latter against the person spoken about.
The thing attributed to the absent person may be either something evil
or something that is only seemingly evil, but in either case it will be
something displeasing to the listener. Whispering, therefore, does not
necessarily include defamation.

(b) It is secret, that is, the whisperer speaks privately, and usually
in the way of confidence to the person whose mind he wishes to impress.
Often, however, he goes now to one of the friends, now to another,
speaking in different senses to each, to make his work doubly
effective. This kind of whisperer is known as double-tongued: “The
whisperer and the double-tongued is accursed” (Ecclus., xxviii. 15).

(c) It is aimed at the breaking up of a friendship, that is, the
whisperer intends to destroy the feeling of respect and affection which
his listener has for the absent person, or even to instill into the
listener’s mind a feeling of disrespect and dislike for the absent
person. Whispering, therefore, is incomplete when it ends a friendship,
and complete when it makes enemies of those who had been friends and
sows discords and quarrels: “A passionate man kindleth strife, and a
sinful man will trouble his friends, and bring in debate in the midst
of them that are at peace” (Ecclus., xxviii. 11); “When the tale-bearer
is taken away, contentions shall cease” (Prov., xxvi. 20). Whispering,
then, differs from simple defamation, whose purpose is to steal away
fame, for the mischief-maker intends to steal away friendship.

(d) It is directed against a virtuous friendship, for there is no sin
but rather an act of charity in the effort to end a sinful or harmful
friendship, as when a parent tries to keep his daughter away from a
wicked man with whom she is infatuated, or his son away from a
disorderly set whose companionship appeals to the youth (see 1353).

2104. The Sinfulness of Whispering.--(a) Theological
Species.--Whispering is from its nature a mortal sin, since it is
hateful to God (the soul of the Lord detesteth “him that soweth discord
among brethren,” Prov., vi. 19), and deprives man of the boon of a
virtuous friendship, the greatest of external goods. “A faithful friend
is a strong defence, and he that hath found him hath found a treasure.
Nothing can be compared to a faithful friend, and no weight of gold and
silver is able to countervail the goodness of his fidelity. A faithful
friend is the medicine of life and immortality” (Ecclus., vi. 14-16).
Whispering is a greater sin than contumely or defamation, since honor
is less esteemed than friendship, and reputation is only a means to
friendship.

(b) Moral Species.--Generally, whispering is a sin against justice on
account of the unjust means (e.g., force, fraud, lies, detractions) to
which it resorts; but from its nature it is only a sin against charity,
for the injured party has no strict right to friendship, which is a
free relationship that may be terminated at will by either of the
parties.

2105. Circumstances Which Affect the Species of Whispering.--Is the
species of whispering changed by circumstances?

(a) The theological species is changed when the sinful act is imperfect
in malice (e.g., when the whisperer had not reflected well on the evil
that would be caused by him), or when the harm done is slight (e.g.,
when no enmity was caused and the friendship broken up was not strong
or important to the friends). It is not a small matter, however, to
destroy friendships that are very necessary, such as the friendship
between husband and wife, between parent and child.

(b) The moral species is not subdivided, for, though there are
different kinds of friendships (see 1111), whispering is not directed
against the special features, but against the general character common
to all of them, namely, unity of soul and mutual affection. Hence, the
whisperer is not obliged to mention in confession whether the
friendship he broke up was based on utility, or pleasure, or virtue. It
is clear, however, that a new species may be added to whispering. Thus,
he who separates husband and wife, intending to secure the wife for
himself, is guilty also of adultery; he who separates a business man
and his patrons, intending to attract the trade to himself, is guilty
also of theft; he who separates ruler and subjects by his whispering,
is also guilty of sedition, etc.

2106. Derision.--Derision is a jest that reproaches another with some
defect or evil in order to put him to confusion.

(a) It is a jest, that is, it is spoken in fun and consists in making
the defects of another person the object of laughter or amusement.
Thus, it differs in manner from contumely, detraction and whispering,
which are spoken seriously.

(b) Its purpose is the confusion of the person ridiculed, that is, it
intends to take from him the good opinion that he is entitled to have
of himself and the peace of conscience that he enjoys. Thus, it differs
in object and purpose from the other injurious words hitherto
considered (see 2009). The intention to put another person out of
countenance by ridicule is either formal or material, according as the
purpose before the mind is to disconcert that person, or only to have
one’s joke, though one sees that this will mean shame and suffering for
the victim of the joke.

2107. Distinction between Derision and Jesting.--Moderate jesting at
another’s expense is not derision, nor sinful, if it is justified by a
reasonable motive. (a) Thus, a serious motive for jesting at another is
fraternal correction. To ridicule a person who is making a fool of
himself is often the best way to correct him, for many persons are less
moved at being called wicked than at being called absurd. Similarly, a
satirical rebuke sometimes serves to abash a person who has an exalted
opinion of himself. In such cases a truth spoken in jest is an act of
charity to a sinner. (b) A playful motive for jesting at another is
recreation. The good-natured exchange of banter about trivial defects
between persons who enjoy this give and take is a reasonable form of
amusement in itself; indeed, it pertains to the virtue known as
_eutrapelia_. But some persons who enjoy a jest at the expense of
another are extremely sensitive to ridicule and fly into a rage if fun
is poked at themselves, or even if they suspect that someone is
laughing at them.

2108. Even jesting whose purpose is good may be sinful on account of
the offensive or immoderate way in which it is conducted (see 2010).
There are three general forms of jest, but they do not constitute
distinct species of sin when jest is unlawful, since the difference
between them is accidental as far as morality is concerned.

(a) Thus, jest of the mouth is one that is made by words or laughter.

(b) A jest of the face is made by the expression of the countenance
(e.g., by wrinkling up the nose, sticking out the tongue).

(c) A jest of act, or practical joke, is some trick played on another,
horseplay, and the like.

2109. The Sinfulness of Derision.--(a) When the derider makes light of
a grave evil, he commits a mortal sin, for he shows grave contempt
towards the person derided, treating the latter as if he were entirely
worthless--one whose misfortunes were matters for joke. Indeed,
derision is a more serious injury than contumely, for the contumelious
person treats the evil of his neighbor as something serious, whereas
the derider makes sport of it and is thus more insulting. In Scripture
grave punishment is threatened to deriders: “God shall scorn the
scorners” (Prov., iii. 34). But if an evil grave in itself is commonly
looked upon as light on account of the inferior condition of the person
who has the defect (viz., because he is an infant or an idiot), there
is no grave sin of contempt.

(b) When the derider makes light of an evil that is really light, there
is no contempt shown, but there may be serious embarrassment caused to
the person derided. For the peace of a good conscience is a great
blessing (“Our glory is this, the testimony of our conscience,” II
Cor., i. 12; “A secure mind is like a continual feast,” Prov., xv. 15),
and that which disturbs it can be a serious distress and harm. If the
butt of the joke does not take the matter much to heart, the sin is
venial. But should he suffer great mental pain or disturbance on
account of the ridicule, the quality of the sin is disputed. Some think
that mortal sin is committed, if the derider foresees the serious evil
that will ensue; but others hold that the sin is venial, since it is
the over-sensitiveness of the person derided that accounts for his
great discomfiture of mind.

2110. The gravity of the sin of derision is increased by the object
against whom it is directed; for the greater the reverence due a
person, the greater the injury shown by making a mockery of him.

(a) Thus, the worst form of derision is that which is directed against
God, and it is not distinct from blasphemy. Hence, Isaias (IV Kings,
xix. 6) calls the deriders of the God of Israel blasphemers, and St.
Luke (xxii. 64, 65) says that the soldiers who gave Our Lord a mock
coronation spoke in blasphemy.

(b) Next in gravity is derision of parents, and Scripture declares the
special horror of this sin: “The eye that mocketh at his father, let
the ravens of the brooks pick it out and the young eagles eat it”
(Prov., xxx, 17).

(c) Finally, there is a special enormity in derision of saintly
persons, for virtue deserves honor, and those who dishonor it deter
men, as far as in them lies, from cultivating or esteeming it.

2111. Cursing.--Cursing in general is the speaking of evil for some
person or thing, that is, in order that the evil spoken may befall him
or it. Thus, it differs from contumely and derision, which are the
speaking of evil to another, and from defamation and whispering, which
are the speaking of evil against another. Cursing is also different
from prediction of evil, and some passages in the Imprecatory Psalms,
though couched in terms of malediction, are prophecies of the future,
rather than curses. An example is Psalm cviii, which foretells the fate
of the traitor Judas. Cursing is expressed in two ways:

(a) imperatively, when one pronounces with authority that punishment is
to be inflicted or evil visited upon some person or object. In this way
God decrees eternal or temporal penalties against sinners, judges
sentence criminals, and the Church anathematize the contumacious;

(b) optatively, when one who has not the power or authority to command
punishment, expresses the wish that misfortune or evil of some kind may
overtake a person or thing. Examples are: “Bad luck to you,” “May you
break your leg,” “The devil take you,” “God damn you.” A curse made in
the form of a prayer is called an imprecation.

2112. When Cursing Is Not Sinful.--Cursing a person is not sinful when
the evil which is ordered or wished is not intended as to the evil that
is in it, but as to some good; for so the intention is directed to
good, not to evil.

(a) Thus, evil may be ordered on account of the good of justice that is
in it, as when a judge decrees capital punishment, which in its
physical being is an evil, but morally is the vindication of justice
and therefore a good. Some of the curses made by holy men in the Bible
are of this character: they proclaim the just sentence of God, as when
Elias called down fire from heaven upon his persecutors (IV Kings, i),
and Eliseus cursed the boys that mocked him (IV Kings, ii. 24); or they
express the submission of the human will to the just decree of God:
“And the Levites shall pronounce with a loud voice, ‘Cursed be he that
abideth not in the words of this law,’ and all the people shall say,
‘Amen’” (Deut., xxvii. 14, 26).

(b) Evil may be desired, if the intention takes in only the good of
public or of private utility that is contained in it, as when one hopes
a jury will find a dangerous criminal guilty, if one has in view, not
the sufferings or death of the criminal, but the safety of the
community. It is right, therefore, to wish confusion and defeat to the
enemies of religion, of the Church, or of one’s country; it is lawful
to pray God to visit a sinner with sickness that he may thereby be
reformed or prevented from harming others. But in wishing evils one
must remember that it is not always lawful to do what one wishes may
happen in some lawful manner, nor is it lawful to wish a greater evil
as a means of escape from a lesser evil (see 1308 sqq.).

2113. Sinfulness of Cursing.--Cursing a person is sinful when the evil
ordered or wished is intended precisely as it is the hurt or loss of
this person.

(a) From its nature this sin is mortal, since it shuts out the curser
from heaven (“Neither cursers nor extortioners shall possess the
kingdom of God,” I Cor., vi. 10), and it is essentially opposed to
charity, being the natural expression of hatred (see 1296). But, other
things being equal, optative cursing is less serious than defamation,
for it is less harm to another to wish him evil (e.g., that he be
defamed) than to inflict that evil on him.

(b) From the imperfection of the act or the lightness of the matter,
cursing becomes at times a venial sin. The act is imperfectly
deliberate when one curses in a sudden fit of temper; it is imperfectly
intentional, when one curses in fun or from habit and does not really
wish that the evils pronounced should be fulfilled. The curses, “Go to
hell,” “God damn you,” are usually not meant or understood to express a
wish that the person addressed be consigned to eternal punishment.
Hence, they are generally in themselves venial sins only. But it should
be remembered that venial curses of this kind may become mortal by
reason of scandal (e.g., when parents habitually address such curses to
their children, or other superiors to their subordinates), or by reason
of irreverence (e.g., when children curse their parents). The matter of
a curse is light when the evil spoken is harmful only in a small degree
(e.g., to wish that a person may lose a small sum of money).

2114. Rules for Deciding as to Gravity of the Sin.--Persons who have
expressed a grave curse against a neighbor are sometimes in doubt
whether there was enough ill-will in the curse to make it a mortal sin.
For such doubts theologians give the following rules:

(a) if the reason for doubting is that after the curse one cooled off
and hoped that no evil would happen to one’s neighbor, mortal sin was
committed during the curse, but the bad disposition quickly passed away;

(b) if the reason for doubting is that one is not sure about the state
of mind one was in during the curse, a good index of that state of mind
will be the feeling one has towards the person who was cursed. Thus, if
one is well disposed towards that person, the presumption is that the
curse was not meant except as an expression of anger; but if one is
hostile to that person, the presumption is rather that the evil in the
curse was really intended. If one is indifferent as regards the person
whom one cursed, the presumption will follow what one is accustomed to
desire in one’s curses, whether that be to give forceful expression to
displeasure or to manifest a malevolent hatred.

2115. Circumstances Which Change the Moral Species of Cursing.--There
are certain circumstances of person and objects which change the moral
species of cursing, and which must therefore be mentioned in confession.

(a) Thus, by reason of difference in the persons cursed the species is
changed, for where special love or reverence is owed a special sin is
committed by hatred or irreverence. The gravest curse is that against
God, which is the sin of blasphemy (see 887 sqq.). Next in wickedness
is the curse against one’s parents, which is a sin of impiety.

(b) By reason of difference in the evils that are desired, the species
is also changed, since the essential malices of the will and of the
deed are the same (see 90, 242). In this respect cursing differs from
contumely and detraction, for in these sins the evils spoken are not
pleasing, but rather displeasing to the speaker (see 2103). Hence, he
who wishes death to his neighbor commits murder in his heart, he who
wishes loss of property is a thief at heart, etc. But if one curses a
neighbor in a general way, without mentioning any particular evil, one
sins by hatred.

2116. Numerical Multiplication in Sins of Cursing.--(a) By reason of
the specific difference in the evils wished (e.g., death, disgrace,
poverty), one is guilty of several sins by one and the same act; for,
though the act is physically one, it is morally many, as was said in
the previous paragraph. But some authors add that only one sin is
committed if all the evils wished are united in the mind as expressions
of the one sin of hate or as means of the one purpose of injury (see
217).

(b) By reason of the different persons cursed, one is also guilty of
several sins by one and the same act, or at least is guilty of one sin
that is equivalent to many; for he who curses a whole family or group,
formally and expressly intends evil to each member, and thus he differs
from a thief who steals from many persons, but does not will individual
injuries (see 218).

2117. The Cursing of Evil.--(a) It is not sinful to curse evil as such,
that is, to wish that sin or wrong may be defeated. Hence, it is lawful
to pray against the evil spirits, the enemies of God and man. But it is
sinful to curse any creature of God, even though he is among the lost,
for the nature of every creature is good, since it comes from God.

(b) It is not sinful to curse evil tropologically, that is, to curse a
creature of God that is taken to represent evil, as being its cause
(e.g., Job cursed the day of his birth, the beginning of many evils),
or location (e.g., David cursed Mount Gelboe, the spot where Saul and
Jonathan were slain), etc. But it would be a sin to curse these
creatures of God in themselves.

2118. It is not sinful to curse an irrational creature on account of
its relation to man, if there is a sufficient reason to curse man
himself (see 2112), either on account of the good of justice (e.g.,
when God cursed the earth as a punishment on Adam, when Christ cursed
the fig-tree as a sign of the curse on Judea), or on account of the
good of utility (e.g., when one wishes that the liquor ordered by a
drunkard may be lost).

2119. Unlawful Cursing of an Irrational Creature.--(a) It is unlawful
to curse an irrational creature, considered precisely as a creature of
God, for in so doing one reflects on God Himself, and incurs the guilt
of blasphemy.

(b) It is unlawful to curse an irrational creature, considered
precisely in relation to man, if there is no just cause to curse man.
Thus, if one wishes that a neighbor’s cattle may die, intending only
the harm that will be done the neighbor, one is guilty of sinful
cursing (see 2113).

(c) It is unlawful to curse an irrational creature, considered
precisely in itself, for such an act is vain and useless. Those who
curse the inclemency of the weather, the infertility of the soil, the
stubbornness of mules or other animals, the uselessness of a tool,
etc., do not generally speaking commit a grave sin, since they intend
only to voice their impatience with conditions that are displeasing.

2120. Murmuring.--Murmuring is the expression of unjust discontent or
complaint by inarticulate sounds or by secret words.

(a) It is unjust, and so it does not differ essentially from the sins
of speech given above. If it is an injustice to honor, it is reducible
to contumely; if it is an injury to fame, it pertains to defamation,
etc. The injustice of murmuring results either from the thing
complained of (e.g., a child murmurs against the just orders of its
parents), or from the manner of the complaint (e.g., a subordinate
complains against an unjust order, but angrily, contemptuously, or
uselessly).

(b) It is made by inarticulate sounds (e.g., by whistling, grunting),
or by secret words (e.g., in whispered, inaudible manner). This is an
accidental difference between murmuring and other vocal sins.

2121. Fraud.--Having discussed the various kinds of injustice that are
committed in involuntary commutations, we now pass on to the study of
those injustices that are done in voluntary transactions (see 1748).
These vices can be reduced to the following:

(a) injustices perpetrated against a person who is entirely unwilling
(viz., theft and robbery), as when one steals an object that had been
entrusted to one as a pledge or loan, or compels another, by fear or
violence, to sign a contract unfavorable to himself and which he does
not wish to agree to. It is unnecessary to speak of theft and robbery
in contracts, since the same principles apply to them as to theft and
robbery outside of contracts (see 1890 sqq.);

(b) injustices perpetrated against a person who is partly willing,
since he consents to a contract, but is also partly unwilling, since
unfairness or fraud is used against him. These injuries are of two
general kinds: fraud, a sin committed in buying and selling and other
contracts in which payment is made for some valuable consideration;
usury, a sin committed in the loan of money in which payment is made
for something that is nonexistent.

2122. Definition of Fraud.--By fraud (see 1677-1679) we here understand
any unlawful conduct on the part of one party to a contract that puts
the other party under a disadvantage in agreeing to the contract (e.g.,
misrepresentations about the excellence of merchandise), or that takes
away the equality that should exist between the parties (e.g., an
excessive price charged for merchandise; see 1750). The contract of
sale is the type of all onerous contracts (see 1749), and to it all the
others, whether certain or aleatory, can be reduced, for in every one
of them there is a thing that is purchased (e.g., in aleatory contracts
the hope of securing some prize), and a price that is paid for the
object of purchase. Hence, it will suffice to speak of the frauds that
are committed in sales, and the same principles that govern these can
be applied to other kinds of contract.

2123. Two Kinds of Injustices in Sales.--Equality between the buyer and
the seller requires that each give the other a good equivalent for what
he receives. Hence, the injustices committed in sales are reducible to
two kinds: (a) injustices in the prices charged or paid; (b) injustices
as to the goods furnished or taken.

2124. Injustice Regarding the Price.--Sin is committed in reference to
the price charged as follows:

(a) by fraud, when one of the parties uses deception against the other
party in order to charge more or pay less than is fair; for one who is
party to a contract has the right that no lying or trickery be used
against him, a contract being an agreement to which knowledge and
consent are requisite;

(b) by overcharge or underpayment; for sale has for its purpose the
mutual advantage of the buyer and seller, and hence one of them should
not be overburdened for the advantage of the other, but the burdens and
benefits should be equally distributed. Hence, it is unjust to sell an
object for more than it is worth, or to buy it for less than it is
worth.

2125. The Criteria of a Just Price.--(a) The constitutive norm of a
just price is not merely subjective, that is, the fairness does not
depend on the arbitrary wishes or on the special needs of the
contractants, or on some monopoly which controls the prices; it is
objective, that is, founded on the value of the thing sold, its
capacity to be of benefit and satisfaction to its possessor, its
rarity, the amount of labor put into its production and care, etc.

(b) The manifestative norm for commodities that are in common use (such
as the necessities of life and the more usual luxuries) is the common
judgment expressed either in law (legal price) or in the free custom of
buyers and sellers at a particular place and time (market price); for
objects that are not in common use and that have no settled price
(e.g., rare archeological finds, ancient documents or paintings) the
norm is the prudent and free judgment of the parties, or the decision
of an expert chosen by them.

2126. The Obligation of Observing Prices Settled by Law Or Custom.--(a)
The legal price (e.g., in some countries the prices on government
monopolies, such as tobacco and salt), which in modern times is rare,
is ordinarily obligatory in virtue of commutative justice, since its
disregard harms one of the parties to the sale. But in exceptional
cases the price may for reasons of equity be no longer obligatory
(e.g., when the lawgiver does not insist on its observance).

(b) The market price is ordinarily of like obligation, and for the same
reason. But it should be noted that the current price allows of some
latitude, since the common estimate does not agree on exactly the same
figure, and hence there is a highest, a lowest, and an average price.
Injustice is done when one sells above the highest market price, that
is, when one charges a sum notably in excess of that charged by others
at the same place and time; or when one buys below the lowest market
price, that is, when one pays a sum notably less than that paid by
other buyers. St. Alphonsus gives as a rule that when a commodity is
valued at 5, it may be sold for 6 or bought for 4; when valued at 10,
it may be transferred or acquired for 12 or 8; when valued at 100, it
may be exchanged for 105 or 95.

2127. When the Market Price May Be Disregarded Without Injustice.--In
some exceptional cases one may disregard the market price without
injustice, if there are reasons that justify this.

(a) Reasons that rest on the matter of the contract are that the thing
on sale has increased or decreased in value (e.g., the merchandise is
of extraordinary excellence or rarity), or that the contractant would
lose or risk loss from the sale itself by keeping to the market price
(e.g., the buyer would by his purchase deprive himself of money that
could be used more profitably in another transaction; the article if
sold would have to be replaced by the seller at a higher price; the
vendor by waiting can make a better sale later; the object which a
person wishes to purchase is especially prized by the owner and cannot
be duplicated). In these cases, however, the vendor should give notice
to the buyer that for special reasons a higher price is being asked, so
that the latter may have the choice of going elsewhere, if he prefers.

(b) Reasons that rest on the manner of the contract are that certain
exceptional forms of sales are justified by law or custom and do not
violate basic justice. Auction sales are of this kind, and, if the
conditions of aleatory contracts are observed so that the risk will be
equal on both sides, it is not unfair to take a price above the highest
current price or to bid and buy below the minimum price.

2128. If the reason for the increase is the accommodation of the sale
itself to the purchaser, because he specially prizes the article, does
it justify an increase above the market price?

(a) If the article has become of greater value to many because of its
own worth, the market value has also risen, and one may raise one’s
price; but if its greater value to many is due only to public distress,
as in time of war, it would be a cruel form of injustice known as
profiteering to raise the price exorbitantly.

(b) If the article has become of greater value to one person only, the
seller may not raise his price for that reason, since the special worth
the article has is not inherent in it, and hence it may not be sold by
the owner as if it were his own possession. If, however, the purchaser
wished to add something as a free gift, there would be no objection to
his doing so. The same principles apply to the purchase of an article
at less than its value, for the sole reason that ready money has
special value for the seller.

2129. Unjust Sales Based on Ignorance of Real Value.--There are also
cases in which an object is purchased at an unjust price because its
true value was unknown to the contractants or was hidden.

(a) If the value was unknown on account of substantial error (e.g., a
woman buys paste ornaments, thinking they are genuine diamonds), the
contract is invalid; if it was unknown on account of the individual
error of a contractant (e.g., a woman buys a diamond of great value for
a few dollars, because the seller did not know the value of the jewel),
the contract is unjust; if it was unknown on account of public error
reflected in the current price (e.g., an art dealer buys at a low price
a masterly painting, because his superior judgment enables him to
recognize in it qualities which others did not perceive), the contract
is both valid and just. It is also lawful to buy at the present prices
when one knows from sources that one can honorably use that the objects
purchased will soon rise greatly in value, for one is not bound to
share with others one’s personal knowledge.

(b) If the hidden value is no man’s property or is abandoned (e.g., a
man buys a field in which he, but not the owner, knows that a treasure
is concealed, or he buys a goose and finds gold pieces in its stomach
and cannot discover how they got there), the buyer is entitled to
acquisition; but if it has an owner who can be discovered (e.g., a man
buys a coat in a second-hand store and discovers a large quantity of
money in bills sewed inside the lining, and is able to trace back the
coat to its former wearer, if he tries), the buyer is bound to
restitution.

2130. Obligation of Restitution on Account of Unjust Prices.--(a)
Unjust Possession.--If there was bad faith without fraud, the seller
should restore the difference between what he received and the highest
current price, the buyer the difference between what he paid and the
lowest current price. Overcharges or underpayments in conventional
prices should be compensated for according to a reasonable standard,
such as the decision of the experts.

(b) Unjust Damage.--If there was bad faith and fraud with resultant
damages to one of the parties, the losses should be made good, even
though the just price itself was not violated by excess or defect (see
1762).

(c) Nullity.--If there was good faith on both sides, there is no
obligation of restoration, unless we suppose substantial error, lack of
proper consent, conditional agreement, etc., which make the sale null
or rescindable (see 1725).

2131. Injustice Regarding the Thing Sold.--Having spoken of the
injustices committed in reference to the price, we shall now treat of
the injustices committed in reference to the thing sold. The contract
supposes that the thing sold be of a certain character, and hence
injustice is done if one of the parties wilfully misleads the other
about that character.

(a) Thus, the species of the thing sold enters into the contract, and
so it is unjust to deceive another person about the nature of the thing
that is being sold (e.g., if the seller gives inferior substitutes or
adulterated goods to those who desire the genuine and pure article, or
if the buyer deceives an inexperienced merchant into thinking that the
high-grade clothing material he has for sale is low grade).

(b) The quantity of the thing sold is also a part of the contract, and
it is unjust to take advantage by giving less or taking more than is
agreed on: “Thou shalt not have divers weights in thy bag, a greater
and a less, neither shall there be in thy house a greater bushel and a
less” (Deut., xxv. 13, 14).

(c) The quality of the thing sold belongs to the contract, and hence
there is fraud if one of the parties deceives the other about it (e.g.,
if the horse sold is sickly or slow, when he is supposed to be healthy
and speedy).

2132. Defects in the Thing Sold.--If there are defects in an article
sold, but a fair reduction in the price is made on account of the
imperfection of the article, there is no injustice in the price. But
the seller is unjust, nevertheless, if he conceals the defects in spite
of a contrary condition in the contract, for he injures the buyer by
leading him into an agreement against his will.

(a) There is an indicated condition when the buyer inquires whether
there are defects in the article, having the intention to take nothing
that has any considerable defect. In such a case if the seller conceals
even an accidental defect (i.e., one that makes the article less
suitable for the buyer), the contract is null on account of lack of
consent, or at least, as others think, it is rescindable on account of
the fraud practised. But if a defect is inconsiderable, the contract,
unless it is expressly stipulated to the contrary, is good and lawful,
for there is hardly anything that has not some small defects.

(b) There is an implied condition when the buyer makes no inquiry, but
there is a substantial defect (i.e., one that makes the article
dangerous or unsuitable for the purchaser), and this defect is hidden,
either because it is of a kind that would escape most persons, or
because the purchaser is inexperienced or unable to perceive it for
himself. Since every person who buys intends to get something useful,
there is no consent and the contract is invalid, if one is given
something harmful (e.g., corrupted or poisonous food instead of good
food), or something entirely useless to him either for service or for
sale (e.g., a lame horse instead of a sound horse for one who deals in
race-horses).

2133. Circumstances in Which Defects Need Not Be Revealed.--Fairness of
price being supposed, the seller is not unjust in not calling attention
to defects in the thing he sells, if the buyer does not ask about
defects and there is no implied condition that the seller should
volunteer the information. This happens as follows:

(a) if the defect is hidden, but only accidental, there is no condition
that the seller shall point out the defect, for the understanding is
only that the buyer shall receive something serviceable at a fair
return for his money, Nevertheless, most merchants wish to please the
public and will take back or exchange an article that is not
satisfactory;

(b) if the defect is open, but accidental, there is no condition that
the seller shall instruct the buyer about things that the latter can
and should observe for himself; for it is supposed that the buyer will
exercise ordinary care and prudence in making purchases, nor is the
seller paid for supplying this, nor for assisting the buyer to make
good bargains. Thus, if a man were to buy a one-eyed horse, because he
had not examined the horse, he should blame his own negligence, not the
silence of the seller, for his bad bargain.

2134. Definition of Trading.--Trading (_negotiatio_) in the strict
sense is the purchase of an object with the intention of selling it
unchanged at a profit. If any one of the conditions mentioned in this
definition are lacking, there is trading in a wide sense. (a) Thus,
trading includes purchase, and hence he who sells the produce of his
own farm or vineyard is not strictly a trader; (b) there must be an
intention of reselling the thing bought, and hence there is trading
only in a wide sense if one buys an article for one’s own use but,
finding it unsuitable to that use, sells it to another person; (c) the
object must be sold unchanged, that is, in the same form in which it
was received, otherwise there is not strict negotiation, as when one
buys colors and canvas and makes them into a picture; (d) the object
must be sold at a higher price than was paid for it, and hence it is
not trading in the strict sense to let a customer have an article for
just what it has cost oneself.

2135. The Morality of Trading in the Strict Sense.--(a) In itself,
trading has the appearance of evil, inasmuch as money-making may be an
encouragement to avarice. But in reality profit as an end is morally
indifferent, neither good nor bad, and all will depend on the ultimate
reason for which one engages in business. He who makes the whole
purpose of his existence the acquisition of gain is a materialist, but
he who has some higher end, such as public benefit or private
maintenance, is virtuous in his aims. (b) For clerics, trading is
forbidden by Canon Law (Canon 142), and the reason is that clerics
should be free from the distractions and dangers of commerce, so as to
devote themselves entirely to their own spiritual duties (II Tim., ii.
4).

2136. Usury.--The sin of usury is committed in two ways.

(a) Usury in the strict sense is the taking of interest by reason of
intrinsic title (i.e., on account of the use) for money or other
fungible loaned on condition that it be restored in kind (_mutuum_).
This is unjust since it exacts payment for that which is nonexistent,
that is, for use, as a distinct value, of a fungible whose only value
is in its use (see Aristotle, _Politics_, Bk. I, Ch. 10, 1258b 2-8; St.
Thomas, Summa Theologica II-II, q. 78, a. 1). This was the opinion of
most medieval theologians based on the fact that money was solely a
medium of exchange. Interest was permitted, however, on the grounds of
extrinsic titles, e.g., compensation for the expense of a transaction
(_damnum emergens_), the loss of opportunity to make good bargains
(_lucrum cessans_).

(b) Usury in the wide sense, which is all too common, is the taking of
interest for a fungible loaned at _mutuum_, where there is an extrinsic
title (e.g., the loss or inconvenience suffered by the lender) for the
interest, but the rate charged is unjust, exceeding that fixed by law
or that which is fair and reasonable (see Canon 1543). This is unjust
when the lender takes more than his loan is worth; it is uncharitable
when the lender does not demand more than the worth of his loan, but
does exact what is due in a heartless manner. Examples of usury in the
wide sense are the acts of loan sharks who take advantage of the
distress of the poor to make them pay enormous interest for small
loans, or who hold the debtor to the strict letter of the agreement at
a great loss to him.

In recent years a new concept of usury in the wide sense has emerged.
It is based upon the fact that in modern times the function of money
has changed. In ancient times it was solely a medium or measure of
exchange that could not be turned easily into capital. With the
emergence of the capitalistic system, opportunities for investment
increased, and money assumed the role of a factor of production. Money
assumed a new value and function: it became virtually productive, and
so today money does fructify. To place money, then, at the disposal of
another to be employed in profitable ventures constitutes an economic
service and, as such, is worth its price as any other service. This
price of money constitutes modern interest, which seems to differ
radically from the old contract of interest and to be more one of hire
or lease. So viewed, interest, or the price of money, is determined in
the same way as the price of any other service; the unjust price, or
usury, is an excessive price. This is the modern concept of usury.

2137. Principles Obligatory in All Forms of Contract.--The principles
of equality and honesty that are morally obligatory in sales and loans
at interest are also obligatory in other forms of contract. The
following are examples of equality.

(a) Gratuitous Contracts.--Obviously these contracts do not require
equality in respect to recompense, since their nature is that no
recompense is given for what is received. But in other ways equality
must be observed. Thus, there must be mutual consent, offer on one side
and acceptance on the other; there must be mutual respect, for each
must honor the gratuitous promises made to the other; there must be a
return of the same thing in quality and quantity as was borrowed,
unless this would mean (as in _mutuum_) a loss to the borrower, etc.
Moreover, the fact that all the advantage is received by one party is
balanced by the fact that this party must bear the ordinary expenses
and is held to special care himself, but cannot exact special care in
the other party. Thus, a borrower has all the advantage from a loan,
and he is obliged to use extreme care in using the lender’s property,
while a depositor has all the advantage from the contract of deposit
and cannot demand more than ordinary diligence of the depositary in
guarding the goods left with him.

(b) Aleatory Contracts.--Aleatory contracts, or contracts of chance,
are concerned with some uncertain event whose outcome depends upon luck
or skill or a combination of both. The chief forms are betting, lottery
and gaming (all are considered as gambling), to which must be added
insurance and market speculations. All of these are indifferent in
themselves and obtain their morality from circumstances. However,
gambling, besides conforming to the requirements of contracts in
general, must observe some special conditions to guarantee its
lawfulness:

1) The outcome should be objectively uncertain and not a “sure thing”
to be truly a contract of chance. While the contractants may be
subjectively certain of winning, neither may so manipulate the matter
as to exclude the other’s chance of winning. Should one insist upon
betting against another’s assurance of a certain outcome, he is making
a gift, hardly a bet.

2) Each must stake what belongs to himself and is not needed for
satisfying other obligations, e.g., supporting one’s family, paying
creditors, etc. Failure to observe this condition leads to many sins of
theft or negligence. Should a person gamble with money belonging to
another, _per se_ he has a right to the winnings under the title of
industrial fruits. However, if it would be impossible for him to
restore in the event of a loss, the wager is void and the winnings must
be restored to the other player, since the amount bet could not be
lawfully won by the other contestant.

3) A reasonable proportion should be observed between what is bet and
the probable winnings, and all betting should offer a fair chance of
winning. Equality is not necessary, but odds and handicaps should be
offered by the favored side. However, the odds may be waived by other
bettors.

4) Honesty must prevail to exclude fixing the outcome or an unlawful
style of play. The conventions of each bet or game establish the norms
of cheating. Thus, hidden cards, marked cards, false dice void a bet.
But running a horse solely to “tighten him” or “round him into shape”
without full effort to win is expected in horse racing. Winnings
through cheating must be refunded.

5) The loser must pay. Since civil law forbids many forms of organized
gambling, the question arises whether a wager that has been outlawed
constitutes matter for a valid contract that must be fulfilled. If the
law is purely penal, the contract is valid and the obligations ensue;
if it is a law that binds morally, then the contract is invalid, and
the loser probably need not pay, but has acted sinfully in gambling.

Although not sinful in itself, gambling is so open to serious abuse
that it has been strictly regulated by civil laws which bind in
conscience.

Insurance is reduced to the category of contracts of chance, although
its purpose is different from gambling, for it is concerned not with an
uncertain good, i.e., to make money quickly, but with an uncertain evil,
i.e., to avoid loss. In many instances an individual who does not take
out insurance gambles more than one who does.

Conditions Requisite for Validity. The special conditions requisite for
the validity of an insurance contract are founded upon its aleatory
nature. This involves especially that the matter of the contract is in
some way outside the control of both insured and insurer and beyond
their power, both legal and moral, to govern beforehand. From this
follows the second essential condition, that there be some risk for
both parties. Some moralists today maintain that many insurance
contracts are unjust to the insured by reason of defect of
proportionate risk on the part of the insurer. They argue that the
insurer avoids all risks and makes increasing profits annually whenever
insurance is on such a large scale that the use of statistical tables
favors the insurer. The fact that insurance companies are listed among
the most wealthy corporations lends credence to the argument and
explains why some moralists favor the insured in cases of restitution
not involving fraud on the part of the beneficiary. Other moralists
insist that such injustice can not be proved, that high profits are
owing to increased efficiency and better service, that premiums are
adjusted when it becomes apparent that they are out of proportion to
the risks involved by the insurers.

On the part of the insurer is required the ability to pay indemnities
occurring at the normal rate, but not to cover all at once. His right
to the premiums is correlative to the obligation to pay the stipulated
indemnities, while his liabilities are based upon probable losses
occurring successively. In regard to the insured, his basic obligation
is to make an honest and complete disclosure of the risk involved.
Moral cases, for the most part, are concerned with error, innocent
misrepresentation, and fraud on the part of the insured. Both the
natural and civil law indicate the effect of these elements on an
insurance contract.

The natural law invalidates a contract in which consent of one or both
parties arises from substantial error concerning the nature or the
matter of the contract--in insurance, the risk involved. In general,
then, whenever the error of the insured is such that he would not have
contracted had he known the facts, the contract is invalid, even if the
error was due to innocent non-disclosure or misrepresentation on the
part of the insured. In such cases, the innocent insured has no right
to the indemnity owing to the invalidity of the contract; he has,
however, a natural right to all premiums paid out, since no contract is
involved and the insurer has no claim to them. In case of fraud, at
least after judicial decision, the insured would have no right to the
premiums and must also recompense the insurer for expenses sustained.

Error is considered accidental and as not invalidating in natural law
when the insurer, knowing the facts, would have issued a policy, but at
a higher premium. In this case the beneficiary may accept the
indemnity, but must return the difference in the amount owed in
premiums.

A special case of substantial error involving a disease unknown to the
insured and undiscovered or undiscoverable by the insurance company
doctors is considered by moralists as not invalidating a contract in
natural law. It is argued that the insurer must assume such risks and
that the insured intends to cover such unknown conditions. Moreover, an
invalidating clause concerning such a contingency may be considered
penal in nature and obligatory only after the sentence of a judge.

Insurance contracts and the civil laws governing them are so
complicated that expert legal knowledge is required to understand the
legal status of many insurance cases. However, a few dispositions of
the civil law which differ from the tenets of the natural law should be
kept in mind by the priest or confessor in dealing with the matters.
Two favor the insurance companies over the insured:

1) when fraud or misrepresentation lead to accidental error, the
contract is declared void or voidable;

2) innocent non-disclosure or misrepresentation in good faith leading
to accidental error also render the insurance contract voidable or
perhaps even void. It is probable that the beneficiary in such cases
might be permitted to claim the benefits due him according to the
naturally valid contract, since these civil law dispositions are
contrary to the conclusions of the natural law. He would be obliged,
however, to restitution for damages caused by his fraud or
misrepresentation committed with grave theological fault.

One prescription recognized by civil law and in some places made
mandatory favors the insured, the convalidating or incontestability
clause. The insurance company recognizes the validity of the policy
after a specified period of time has elapsed, even in cases involving
fraud on the part of the insured. If the contract prior to the time was
voidable, the company loses its right to contest its validity; if the
contract was void, it becomes convalidated. By terms of this clause,
the natural-law obligation to restore by reason of fraud ceases and the
beneficiary may lawfully keep the insurance money.

Obligations Arising after the Policy Is Issued. 1) The insured must pay
the premiums at the times and according to the terms stated in the
policy.

2) The insured must not increase the risk assumed by the company.
Concretely, in cases of property insured, the insured is bound in
commutative justice not to deliberately destroy or damage the property
covered by the policy under penalty of losing all rights to
compensation. Compensation could be claimed, however, if the damaging
or destructive action was only theologically right.

3) He must not claim or accept indemnity for articles not damaged; he
must not submit a claim beyond a just estimate of the real damage. Some
moralists maintain that a claim may be made for a higher amount with
the intention of getting a just value after the insurance adjustor has
made his investigation and lowered the estimated value. The adjustor’s
estimate, even if higher than the insured estimate, may be accepted
provided no means have been taken to prevent a full and free
examination of damage.

Operations on the stock market and similar markets are primarily
contracts of buying and selling; they become contracts of chance when
they assume the quality of speculation, i.e., gambling on future
changes of prices. It is generally conceded that such contracts are not
morally wrong in themselves and follow the laws of betting. Additional
justification is added on the ground that such transactions in many
instances supply the capital required for large-scale operations,
future deliveries, etc. Occasional dissenting voices insist that
certain aspects of such transactions, e.g., dealing in future values of
wheat, rye, and other commodities, are immoral since they tend to
determine prices independent of the real value of the products, the
laws of supply and demand, etc. However, the arguments seem to involve
more abuses controllable, if not actually controlled, by marketing laws
and civil laws rather than any immorality in the operations themselves.

(c) Onerous Contracts.--These contracts require that there be equality
between the recompense and the thing received. Thus, in a lease the
lessor must not charge excessive rent, and the lessee must pay the rent
faithfully; in a contract of labor, the employer must pay a fair wage
(that is, one that at the minimum will meet the primary needs of the
worker and his family to live in frugal comfort, and which will
moreover equal the special value of the service given; for a complete
treatment of the theology of the just wage, see Fr. Jeremiah Newman,
“The Just Wage,” _Theology Digest_, Vol. 2, Spring 1957, pp. 120-126,
and “A Note on the Living Wage,” by Edward Dui, S.J., in the same
issue), and the laborer on his part must give a fair day’s work as to
quantity and quality; in partnership, the members must divide the
profits and loss according to a reasonable distribution; in guaranty,
pledge, and mortgage, justice requires that the burden assumed be not
out of proportion to the benefit that is received.

2138. Fraudulent Contracts.--Examples of fraud in contracts are the
following:

(a) in gratuitous contracts, a donee who by false representations
obtains a gift, a lender who fails to make known to the borrower
defects or dangers in the thing loaned;

(b) in onerous contracts, a landlord who conceals defects from one who
is renting a house, members of a business concern who keep back
information from partners or who give out false statements in order to
entice investors, creditors who conceal their knowledge about the
unreliability of a man for whom surety is given them;

(c) in aleatory contracts, in a pure wager, a person who bets on a
thing supposed to be uncertain but about which he has certain
information, or who knows that he will be unable to pay should he lose,
or who will allow no odds though he knows that the probabilities are in
his favor; in gaming, a player who pretends to be ignorant in order to
inveigle another person into a game of skill, or who does not observe
the rules of the game, or who fixes the cards or dice for himself in a
game of chance; in lottery, a drawer who manipulates the lots so as to
favor some of the players, etc.




Art. 5: THE QUASI-INTEGRAL AND POTENTIAL PARTS OF JUSTICE; THE VIRTUE
OF RELIGION AND THE OPPOSITE VICES

(_Summa Theologica_, II-II, qq. 79-100.)

2139. The Quasi-Integral Parts of Justice.--The integral parts of a
virtue are certain functions necessary for the perfect use of the
virtue; for example, memory, perception, docility and quickness are
needed for the fullest exercise of prudence (see 1648 sqq.). These
parts are called here “quasi-integral,” so as not to be confused with
the properly integral parts, or divisions of quantity, in a material
composite. In its first use “integral part” is spoken of bodily things;
in its derived use of incorporeal things (such as virtues). The two
previous articles treated the subjective parts of justice; the present
article will begin with a consideration of the integral parts and the
opposite sins.

2140. The integral parts of justice are expressed in the words of Psalm
xxxiii. 15--“Turn away from evil, and do good”--for the perfectly just
man will both establish the equality of justice by giving others their
dues, and will preserve that equality by refraining from injuries.

(a) Thus, these integral parts are acts of virtue, and hence the
avoidance of evil here is not a purely negative attitude; it includes a
positive repudiation by the will of all wish to harm others, and it is
exercised especially when one is attacked and yet refuses to resort to
injustice.

(b) These integral parts of justice are also distinct, one from the
other. The other moral virtues regulate the passions by bringing them
to the moderation that lies midway between two evil extremes, and hence
in respect to those virtues to turn away from evil is the same thing as
to do good. But justice regulates human operations and external things
both by reducing them to due equality and also by avoiding that which
upsets the equality, and thus in the matter of justice it is one thing
to do good, another thing to avoid evil.

(c) These integral parts of justice are also special, that is, they are
distinct from other virtues. For, while every virtue turns away from
evil and does good, the two acts we are now considering do these things
with the express purpose of fulfilling justice. Thus, he who observes
the commands and prohibitions of the law in order to render to God and
the common good their dues, is perfect in general or legal justice; he
who gives to other individuals what is owed them and also avoids doing
them injury, is perfect in particular justice. To the two integral
parts of justice are opposed the two sins of transgression and omission
(see 35-39).

2141. The Potential Parts of Justice.--The potential parts of justice,
that is, its annexed virtues, are those good habits that are subsidiary
to justice, partaking in some degree, but not entirely, of its nature
or activity. We saw above (1664 sqq.) that wise deliberation and wise
decision belong to prudence, inasmuch as they are concerned with the
government of conduct by reason, but that they fall short of its
principal act, which is wise direction, and hence they are counted as
potential parts. In like manner, there are a number of virtues which
must be assigned to justice, since they regulate man’s will towards
others, but which must be considered as its potential parts, because
they do not share in one or the other of the two remaining essential
notes of strict justice, namely, that a return is given which is equal
to a debt, and that the debt is owed on account of a strict or legal
right (see 1692).

2142. In the following enumeration are given the chief potential parts
of justice in which there is a strict debt, but not an equal repayment.

(a) Thus, to God man owes whatever honor and veneration he manifests,
but with all his efforts man can never pay to God a worship that is
equal to the debt. Thus, man cannot sufficiently thank God for His
benefits: “What return can I make to the Lord for all that He has done
for me?” (Psalm cxv. 12). The virtue of religion, therefore, is a
potential part of justice.

(b) To parents children cannot make a full return for the benefits of
life and upbringing, and the same may be said of one’s country: “A due
return is out of the question in honors paid to the gods and to parents
... but a person is considered to be virtuous if he pays such regard
as lies within his power” (Aristotle, _Ethics_, lib. VIII, cap. 16).
Hence, the virtue of piety is also a potential part of justice. In
exceptional cases, however, a child may make an equal or even a greater
return to his parents for the benefits received from them; for example,
by saving his father from death he makes an equal return for the
benefit of life, and by converting his parents to the faith he gives
them spiritual life, which is more valuable than the natural life he
received from them.

(c) To men of virtue we are unable to make a sufficient return for the
good they do us by their instruction and example, and hence the honor
we show them is less than the benefit we receive from them. The virtue
of reverence (_observantia_) is then a potential part of justice.

2143. Degrees of Moral Debt.--The remaining potential parts of justice
are those in which there is not a legal debt, which is enforced by some
law, but a moral debt to which one is obliged from the decency or the
greater decency of virtue. There are, then, two degrees of moral debt.

(a) A moral debt is more urgent, when without its fulfillment one
cannot keep to the decency of virtue, that is, one cannot preserve the
character of a virtuous man. Thus, if a moral debt is considered from
the side of the debtor, he is obliged to show himself in words and
deeds to others what he really is, has been, or intends to be (virtue
of truthfulness); if the debt be viewed from the side of the creditor
to whom some recompense is owed, there is the duty of gratitude to him
for his benefits and of punishment for his injuries (virtues of
gratitude and vindication). These parts of justice just mentioned are
readily distinguishable from acts that pertain to general or particular
justice and that are owed as legal debts. Thus, truthful testimony on
the witness stand is a legal obligation, for the person who questions
has a strict right to hear the truth; but veracity in social
intercourse, or the habit of speaking the truth to others, is a moral
obligation, one imposed by God but not enforced legally. Compensation
for services bestowed according to contract is a legal duty, and the
debtor can be compelled to pay; but thankfulness for gifts or other
benefits is only a moral duty, and generally laws do not take account
of ingratitude. Punishment of a delinquent by public authority is an
act of commutative justice; but punishment meted out by a private
person in self-defense, who appeals to the law or who forcibly but
lawfully repels an injury, is an act of a virtue annexed to justice.

(b) A moral debt is less urgent, when without its fulfillment one can
preserve virtue, but not the more becoming or more perfect course of
virtue. The chief examples here are the virtues of friendship or
affability and of liberality. To treat others in a friendly manner and
to make oneself agreeable in company is suitable, not chiefly because
of any benefits one has received from others, but because one is better
for this oneself and by it the ways of life are made easier for all.
Likewise liberality is not due, but it shows a better disposition as to
money and other temporal goods to be willing to distribute them to
others willingly and generously. Without friendship and liberality the
peace and harmony of social intercourse may be maintained, but with
them it is maintained more easily and receives an added grace and
distinction.

2144. Epieikeia.--The above-mentioned potential parts of justice are
adjuncts of particular justice. There remains one more virtue to be
noted, that of epieikeia or equity, which pertains to legal justice.
This is a subjective part of justice, since it is the superior function
of legal justice, guiding it to follow what is substantial right, and
preserving it from the danger of mere legalism or over-strict
interpretation or application of Written law (see 358). With this, the
crowning virtue of justice, the enumeration of its parts is brought to
a close.

2145. The Virtue of Religion.--We shall now proceed to treat of the
various parts of justice in the order in which they were given above
(2142-2144), beginning with the virtue that renders to God His due.
Religion (holiness) is defined as “a moral virtue that disposes us to
offer to God the worship and honor that belong to Him as the supreme
Author of all things.”

(a) Thus, religion is a moral virtue, for, though it tends towards God,
it is not numbered among the theological virtues, but among the moral
virtues, being one of the potential parts of justice.

(b) It is an inclination, that is, it is a habit of the soul or the
exercise of that habit in some act. The acts of religion are either
elicited by it or commanded by it, according as they are its own proper
activities and proceed directly from it and are directed immediately to
God (e.g., acts of adoration, sacrifice, prayer), or belong to some
other virtue employed by religion for the honor of God; for example, to
visit the widows and orphans in their tribulation is an act of mercy,
to keep oneself unspotted from this world is an act of temperance, but
when used for the honor and glory of God these acts are also acts of
religion (James, i. 27).

(e) It is paid to God, that is, being an act of justice, it renders to
another what is His due. Religious honor given the saints or sacred
images refers to God, for whose sake they are venerated.

(d) It is paid to God as the Supreme Being, that is, just as we are
bound to tend to God and to serve Him, because He is our Last End, so
are we bound to honor Him, because He is our Maker and Ruler.

(e) It offers to God the tribute of worship, that is, some internal or
external work done in acknowledgment of God’s Majesty and with the
purpose of impressing the worshipper or others with the sense of His
greatness, or it is the sense of that greatness.

2146. Religion as a Moral Virtue.--(a) Religion takes its rank among
the moral, not among the theological, virtues. A theological virtue has
the Last End for its immediate object or subject-matter (e.g., faith is
concerned directly with God, since it believes Him and in Him), and has
no mean of virtue (e.g., faith cannot go to extremes by believing God
too much); whereas a moral virtue has the means to God for its
immediate object (e.g., justice is concerned directly with the actions
we owe to others) and it must observe the golden mean (e.g., justice
must pay the just price, neither more nor less, and at the proper time,
place, and to the proper person, etc.). Now, it is clear that religion
has for its immediate object the due performance of worship, although
God is the person for whose sake it is offered and His excellence the
foundation of its necessity; and also that one must observe moderation
in worship as to circumstances of place, time, etc., although it is
impossible to be extreme in the quantity or fervor one gives to
worship, since even the best efforts will fall short of the honor God
deserves (Ecclus., xliii. 33).

(b) Religion is the greatest of the moral virtues, since the person in
whose favor it is exercised is God Himself, and its obligation is
correspondingly stricter than that of the other virtues. General and
particular justice are owed to creatures, but the claim of a creature
is much less than that of God. There is no contradiction in making
religion a part of justice and then preferring it to justice, for it is
more correct to speak of the integral and potential parts of virtues as
quasi-parts, since they are called parts only from analogy to parts
that are found in material or living things, though they are not
similar to those parts in all respects (see 1647, 1648, 2139). Neither
does the fact that religion cannot pay in full make it inferior to
justice, since in matters of virtue good will take precedence over the
ability to pay. Since religion is the supreme moral virtue, irreligion
is the chief offense against the moral virtues (e.g., malicious
blasphemy is worse than injustice or intemperance).

2147. Superiority of Religion as a Virtue.--Religion, therefore, is
superior to the following virtues: (a) it is superior to legal justice,
the chief of the moral virtues that deal with human and natural good;
(b) it is superior to humility, the chief of the moral virtues
moderative of the passions; (c) it is superior to mercy, the greatest
of the virtues that relieve distress, for religion is offered to God,
not for His utility, but for His external glory and our benefit; (d) it
is greater than repentance, for it honors God, while repentance only
disposes or prepares for satisfaction to His honor; (e) it is greater
than large external offerings made to God without spirit, for
“obedience is better than victims” (I Kings, xv. 22); that is, the
internal acts of religion (reverence and devotion) are of more
importance than external acts of worship conducted with great pomp or
magnificence but without the inner reverence, the obedience or other
dispositions pleasing to God.

2148. Necessity of the Acts of Religion.--(a) The internal acts
(devotion and prayer) are chiefly necessary, for these are exercised by
the soul, and it is through them that the external acts are made
truthful: “God is a spirit and those who adore Him must adore in spirit
and in truth” (John, iv. 24).

(b) The external acts (adoration, sacrifice, etc.) are also necessary
to man. God does not need these acts (Psalm xlix. 13), it is true, for
no creature can add to the glory God has from Himself. But man needs
the elevation and perfection which he receives from communication with
the Supreme Being, and, as he is not all spirit, he must employ symbols
and ceremonies to arouse, hold and strengthen the affections of his
soul. Hence, although the ceremonial law of the Old Testament was
abolished by Christ (see 342), the Christian religion recognizes the
need of ceremonies, as is plain both from the Scriptures and the
teaching and practice of the Church at all times. In the New Testament
we read that Our Lord used vocal prayer, prayed on His knees, and made
use of sacred hymns; and like external acts of religion are ascribed to
Sts. Peter, Paul, and Stephen (Luke, xxii. 31; Matt., xxvi. 39; Acts,
ii. 42, vii. 59, ix. 40). Public worship is also a necessity on account
of the nature of the Church as a visible society.

2149. The Internal Acts of Religion.--These internal acts are offerings
made to God of the worship of the soul itself, and they may be reduced
chiefly to two: (a) devotion, which is the offering of the will and the
highest act of religion, since from the will the other acts arise; (b)
prayer, which is the offering of the intellect; for in prayer the
thoughts of the mind rise to God as an oblation made to Him.

2150. Definition of Devotion.--Devotion is defined as “the will to give
oneself readily to those things that pertain to the divine service.” We
find an example of it in Exod., xxxv. 21, where it is said that the
multitude offered first fruits to the Lord with a most ready and devout
mind. One who is devoted to another is strongly attached to that
other’s interests, and so one who is devout is zealous for the service
of God.

(a) Thus, devotion is an act of the will, that is, an offering of
oneself to the service of God, the Last End. But devotion will be found
in other acts in so far as they are done under the will’s impulse, such
as prayer, adoration, sacrifice. The looks, gestures, and voice of
those who pray or take part in services of divine worship are
influenced by internal devotion, and so become fitting expressions of
honor shown to God and an inspiration to beholders.

(b) Devotion contains a ready willingness, that is, the devout person
is quick to choose the divine honor as a purpose, quick also to select
and to employ suitable means for this purpose. The great model of this
is Our Lord, who declared that His very food was to serve His Father
(John, iv. 34).

(c) Devotion is exercised in things that pertain to the divine service,
that is, to the worship or honor of God. Thus, he who offers himself to
God intending the offering as an act of spiritual union or friendship
exercises the virtue of charity, while he who forms the intention of
doing good in order to glorify God exercises devotion. But devotion and
charity are not separated, for charity inspires devotion and devotion
nourishes charity.

2151. Devotion should not be confused with emotion, spiritual
consolation, or pious exercises known as devotions.

(a) Thus, emotion or pleasure of a non-religious kind is not devotion,
though sometimes mistaken for it when the emotion or pleasure is of an
elevating kind and occasioned by religious exercises. Neither esthetic
joy (e.g., over the music, the ceremonies, the architecture of the
church), nor literary pleasure (e.g. over a sublime passage of Holy
Writ or a charming liturgical composition), nor intellectual
satisfaction (e.g., over the refinement and culture imparted by
religious truths), is necessarily joined with that strong attachment to
God and inclination to do His will which is the soul of devotion.

(b) Spiritual consolations are sometimes called devotion, but they are
not the same thing as the devotion we now speak of. Substantial
devotion with which we are now concerned is in the will and consists in
the strong inclination to praise and honor God, whereas accidental
devotion is rather in the sensible appetite and consists in a feeling
of sweetness or elevation in exercises of piety which sometimes reacts
upon the body, as when a devout person weeps for joy at the thought of
God. Substantial devotion is essential and should be maintained, even
though there is no feeling of attraction or fervor. An example of this
is furnished by Our Lord, who prayed earnestly during the agony in the
garden and the desolation on the cross. Accidental devotion is not of
itself evil, nor useless, and it may be desired and prayed for; but it
is dangerous for those persons who are puffed up by it, or who become
inordinately attached to it, or who are disposed to mistake it for
substantial devotion, for, like the consoling vision of Thabor, it is
passing and is not an end in itself.

(c) Devotions are various forms of external cult shown to God, Christ,
the Blessed Virgin, the Saints, celebrated shrines, etc., whether of a
liturgical or a popular, of a public or a private kind. Examples are
the Forty Hours’ Devotion, novenas, consecrated days and months, the
use of scapulars, medals, etc., pilgrimages, and the like. All these
devotions that have the approval of the Church are good and useful in
themselves. But devotees often made a bad use of them, substituting
devotions for devotion and the non-essential for the essential, as when
religion is made to center in pictures or music or a sentimental
attachment for some favorite Saint. Persons who multiply external
observances may be without the least degree of real devotion.

2152. External and Internal Cause of Devotion.--The external cause of
devotion is God, who by grace bestows the will of serving Him gladly,
and therefore the Church prays God to bestow upon us the disposition of
piety and devotion, and to increase in us devotion unto salvation. But
there is also an internal cause, namely, mental prayer or consideration
of divine things, for the will follows on the intellect. Hence, it is
impossible to animate external acts of worship with true devotion,
unless one practises daily or frequent mental prayer. The subjects of
mental prayer that promote devotion are reducible to two:

(a) one should think on one’s own weakness (sins, dangers, temptations,
etc.) and one’s need of God, for this serves to remove the impediments
to devotion. Those who would be devoted to God must free themselves
from presumption and self-confidence in the spirit of the pilgrim going
up to the Temple who said; “I will raise my eyes to the mountains from
which help cometh to me” (Psalm cxx, 1);

(b) one should think on points that will excite the love of God, such
as the thought of His goodness, the memory of His benefits, the
mysteries of the life of Christ; for these considerations by inspiring
charity will thereby indirectly introduce devotion to God. “It is good
for me to cling fast to God and to place my hope in the Lord,” said the
Psalmist, after he had thought over the blessings received from
Providence (Psalm lxxii. 28).

2153. Prayer.--Prayer can be taken in various senses. (a) Thus, in the
widest sense prayer is any act of religion or a holy life. St.
Augustine says that a good life is the best of all prayers, and the
command of Christ that we pray always has been understood to mean that
we should always follow good. (b) In a less wide sense, prayer is the
raising of the mind to God, in order to praise, adore, thank Him, etc.
The motive of veneration here present distinguishes prayer from mere
thoughts about God as when one studies or discusses theological
subjects to satisfy curiosity or to impart information.

(c) In its strict sense, prayer is the asking for suitable things from
God. By suitable things are meant such as are lawful and becoming, and
hence it would not be a prayer, but a mockery, to ask God for help to
accomplish sin or for miracles in trivial matters. We are now
considering prayer in its strict and less wide senses.

2154. The Psychology of Prayer.--(a) Prayer in its nature is an act of
the reason, for it is a conversation or communication with God. It
belongs, however, not to the speculative, but to the practical reason,
since it is not a mere process of apprehension, judgment or reasoning,
but the arrangement and presentation of requests, plans, etc., before
God with a view to their acceptance by Him. By prayer, then, we do not
understand thinking on God, as in meditation and contemplation (though
these are known as mental prayer), but speaking to God.

(b) Prayer in its origin is an act of the will, for the practical
reason presents before God only such things as are desired by him who
prays. Prayer is the interpreter of desire. Indeed, God may take the
will for the request and grant what has not yet been asked: “The Lord
heard the desire of the poor” (Ps. ix. 17); “Before they cry I shall
hear them” (Is., lxv. 24). Moreover, prayer should spring out of an
inclination towards God Himself and a desire for union with Him (Ps.
xli. 1. 2; Ps. xxvi. 4).

2155. The Necessity of Prayer.--(a) Prayer is not necessary on God’s
account, as though He needed to be informed of our wants, or could not
be happy without our homage, or might be induced to change His plans;
(b) it is necessary for our own sakes, for, although God could and
sometimes does grant favors unasked, He wishes that ordinarily we
should have the double benefit of the prayer and of the favor given in
answer to the prayer. God could grant the crops of the fields without
human cultivation, or even tools and finished articles without human
invention or labor, but man would then lose the fruits that belong to
labor of mind and body. Prayer is most beneficial, even when
unanswered: it attracts man to perform his basic duty of honoring his
Creator, to keep in use his spiritual powers, and to exercise the
necessary virtues of faith, hope and charity; it gives him the
privilege of speaking directly with God and with Christ and of asking
for what he desires--an intimacy that must in time correct and elevate
man’s whole spiritual life; then prayer is a pouring out of the heart
to God the Heavenly Father, and this will afford relief in times of
misfortune or peril.

2156. The Duty of Prayer for all Adults.--(a) Prayer is necessary from
divine precept, as is declared in many passages of Scripture. Thus, we
are commanded to watch and pray (Matt, xxvi. 41), to pray always and
not to faint (Luke, xviii. 1), to ask and to knock (Matt., vii. 7
sqq.), to pray without ceasing (I Thess., v. 17), to watch in prayers
(I Peter, iv. 7). In the Mass the Lord’s Prayer is prefaced with the
words: “Commanded by salutary precepts and admonished by divine
instructions, we make bold to say: Our Father, etc.” There is, however,
no divine precept of vocal prayer or as to the use of the form of words
given by Christ, but one must pray at least mentally and in the manner
indicated by Christ.

(b) Prayer is also necessary as a means (see 360), at least generally
speaking; not that God could not save man without prayer, but that He
has made it an indispensable condition, as is true also of Baptism,
without which salvation is not conferred. This is the common opinion
and it rests on strong arguments. Thus, there are certain necessary
goods (such as perseverance) that cannot be had except through prayer,
and there are certain necessary duties (such as the acts of faith,
charity, and religion) that are not exercised apart from prayer. Then,
there is the teaching of the Church and of the Fathers and Doctors that
prayer is needed in order to observe the Commandments (Council of
Trent), that no one is assisted who does not pray (Gennadius), that
prayer is to the soul what breath is to the body (St. Benedict), that
he who prays will certainly be saved, while he who prays not will
surely be lost (St. Alphonsus).

2157. Times and Frequency of Prayer.--As to the times and frequency of
prayer, in fulfillment of the obligation, there are the same opinions
and conclusions as for the acts of faith, hope, and charity (see 929
sqq., 1095-1097, 1593 sqq.). On this point we may conclude as follows:

(a) directly, or by reason of the precept of prayer itself, there is a
duty to pray at the beginning of the moral life, frequently during life
(whether daily, weekly, monthly, yearly, etc. cannot be precisely
determined; but there is no practical difficulty, since those who
devoutly hear Mass at the times commanded comply with the duty of
prayer), and also in danger of death. At the outset of the moral life
the reason and will should turn to God, and this is prayer at least in
the widest sense; during life prayer should be frequent and continuous
according to the words of Scripture; at the hour of death, prayer is
necessary, since we are specially bidden to ask for perseverance till
the end;

(b) indirectly, or by reason of some precept distinct from that of
prayer, prayer is necessary whenever one needs to have recourse to God
to fulfill some command or avoid something prohibited. Thus, one should
pray at Mass, for according to church law Mass must be heard devoutly;
one should pray when a dangerous temptation assails one, or when there
are great calamities, especially of a public character, for according
to the precept of charity one must help oneself and others in
difficulties.

2158. Practical Corollaries about Prayer with Reference to
Confession.--(a) Practical Catholics, that is, those who comply with
the precepts of the Church, but who accuse themselves of neglecting
morning and evening prayers or grace at meals, cannot be judged guilty
of sin, even of venial sin, on account of this neglect; for there is no
common precept directly obliging to such prayers. But there may often
be a venial sin for other reasons, as when the omission is due to a
spirit of lukewarmness, or when indirectly there is a duty to pray at
those times for special reasons, such as daily needs or temptations. We
do not agree, then, with the opinion that omission of morning and
evening prayers, especially when it is habitual, is never sufficient
matter for absolution.

(b) Unpractical Catholics, that is, those who have been away from Mass
or the Sacraments contrary to the laws of the Church as habitual
transgressors, and who say nothing about their neglect of prayer,
should be questioned whether in all the years of absence from their
duties they have also omitted all prayers. For, if this be the case,
they have sinned against the duty of prayer. Morning and evening prayer
and grace at table should be earnestly recommended to all, because
these are customs that have come down from the earliest times, and also
because those who disregard them often come to neglect all prayer, or
at least expose themselves to dangers or to the loss of precious graces.

2159. To Whom May Prayer Be Offered?--Only God may be addressed as the
Bestower of favors (“The Lord giveth grace and glory,” Ps. lxxxiii.
12), but the Saints may be prayed to as intercessors before God (“The
smoke of incense of the prayers of the saints ascended up before God
from the hands of the angel,” Apoc., viii. 4). Hence, the Church asks
God to have mercy on us; it asks the Saints to pray for us. It is
lawful privately to invoke the prayers of an infant who died after
baptism, of a soul in Purgatory, and one may ask the prayers of those
who are still alive, as St. Paul frequently does in his Epistles. There
is no command that we pray to the saints, and hence one who did not
pray to them would not be guilty of grave sin _per se_; but there would
be grave sin, if their intercession was neglected on account of
contempt, and venial sin, if one failed to call on them (especially on
the Blessed Virgin, the Mediatrix of all graces) on account of
negligence about one’s own spiritual good.

2160. The Persons for Whom Prayer Is Offered.--There is an obligation
of charity to pray for ourselves and also for others, for we should ask
for the things that we are obliged to desire (see 2161). This duty is
taught in Holy Scripture (e.g., Our Lord prayed for Peter; St. Paul
asks for the prayers of his Churches; St. James, in v. 16, admonishes
us to pray for one another that we may be saved); also in the creed and
liturgy of the Church, for we profess belief in the communion of
saints, and offer Masses and suffrages for the living and the dead. One
should pray for enemies in common prayers that are offered for all, and
in special prayers for them in particular, when there is a special
reason, such as their grave necessity or the scandal that would be
given if one refused to join in a special prayer for one’s enemy
(Matt., v. 44); but one may not pray for the success of the evil
projects of an enemy, and one is not obliged to make special prayers
for him apart from necessity (see 1151). For the excommunicated one
should pray in private prayers and also in public prayers, when this is
permitted by the law, as in the services of Good Friday and under
certain conditions in Masses (Canon 2262). For sinners prayers should
be said, unless they are already lost. The souls in Purgatory are also
to be prayed for, although the obligation does not seem grave, since it
is not certain as to any particular soul that it is in need of our
prayers. As to the blessed, one may pray for their canonization or
accidental glory, not for their essential glory, which they already
possess.

2161. Things that May Be Prayed for.--(a) Evils.--One may never pray
for moral evil, even of the slightest kind, and it would be a grave
irreverence to beseech God to become our helper in the commission of
sin. As to physical evils, one may not ask them as evils or for their
own sake; but it is lawful to pray for them in the larger sense in
which they are goods. Thus, for oneself one may ask from God sickness,
poverty or death, in so far as these ills are means of correction,
improvement, merit, penance, or escape from sin; for an enemy one may
ask that God restrain him, even by the use of temporal misfortunes, if
this be necessary to keep him from sin.

(b) Indifferent Things.--One may not desire an indifferent thing, if
there is no moral purpose to justify it (see 83). Hence, one may not
ask God for the gratification of idle wishes (e.g., that one win a game
in which the only purpose in gain), but it does not seem that there is
grave irreverence in so doing.

(c) Temporal Goods.--These may not be asked for from a primary
intention, since we must seek first the kingdom of God and His justice
(Matt., vi. 33), which are more important; neither may we ask for any
determinate temporal thing unconditionally, since we are uncertain
whether it will prove beneficial or harmful. But temporal things may be
asked for from a secondary intention (that is, in so far as they are
means that assist us to attain spiritual goods) and conditionally (that
is, under the proviso that they will prove spiritually beneficial).
Thus, the Church prays for protection against storms and disturbances,
and asks for good weather, abundant harvests, peace, etc.

(d) Spiritual Goods.--Eternal salvation and the means thereto we should
pray for as the principal objects of our desire and should ask for them
unconditionally; for God is our true End, and the things that lead to
Him cannot be harmful to us. Miracles may be asked for, but it is wrong
to beg God for privileges that are reserved for others (e.g., to sit at
the right hand of Christ in glory).

2162. The Qualities of Prayer.--(a) As to its manner, prayer is either
unaccompanied or accompanied by external acts of worship, such as
bodily gestures or speech. But not infrequently the thoughts are voiced
in words, and we then have what is known as vocal prayer. Prayer made
by a private person for himself or others may be internal; but public
prayer that is offered by the ministers of the Church in the name of
the Church should be vocal, since it should be manifested to the people
for whom it is being offered. But the use of words or other external
signs is advantageous even in private prayer, since it excites greater
devotion in a person and is a help to attention.

(b) As to persistence, prayer is continuous or interrupted. Prayer
should be continuous if there is question of its cause, which is
prayerfulness of spirit, or desire of salvation; and in this sense may
be understood the words of Scripture that command us to pray always
(Luke, xviii. 1; Eph., vi. 18; I Thess., v. 17 ), But if we speak of
prayer itself, it is impossible to pray unceasingly in this life, as
there are many other things that have to be done and rest is a
necessity.

(c) As to quantity, prayers are lengthy or brief. Our Lord rejected the
belief of the pagans that the efficacy of prayer depends on many words
(Matt, vi. 7), but He did not forbid long prayers, since He often spent
nights in prayer. The rule about the length of private prayers is that
one should pray for such a space of time as is favorable to devotion,
and should cease from prayer as soon as it becomes tedious; similarly,
public devotions should not be so lengthened out that those present
become wearied and inattentive. The Fathers of the Desert were wont to
offer many brief but ardent ejaculatory prayers, fearing that prayer
long drawn out would fall away from the fervor of intention with which
it began. But, if devotion continues, prayer should not easily be
broken off.

2163. The Confidence Requisite for Successful Prayer.--(a) Confidence
must exclude doubt or distrust in reference to God or prayer itself:
“How shall they call on Him whom they have not believed?” (Rom., X.
14); “Let not that man (that wavereth) think that he shall receive
anything of the Lord” (James, i. 6, 7).

(b) Confidence does not exclude doubt about one’s own dispositions (“It
is not for our justice that we present our prayers before Thee, but for
the multitude of Thy tender mercies”); on the contrary, the prayer of
the Pharisee was not heard, because he trusted in himself (Luke, xviii.
9). Neither does confidence in prayer mean that one may ask
unconditionally for temporal things (see 2161 c).

2164. Intention and Attention.--Attention is the voluntary application
of the mind to that which is done, or the consideration or advertence
of the mind given to an act. It differs from intention, which is an
act, not of the reason, but of the will, consisting in the purpose to
perform an act. Prayer requires both intention and attention.

(a) There must be intention, for prayer in its origin is an act of the
will and it pertains to religion only because of the devotion by means
of which it is elicited. A man who, while reading aloud from a novel,
recites the words of a prayer contained in the novel, does not pray,
for his intention is pleasure or instruction, not worship. And even one
who says or answers prayers attentively during services does not really
pray if his motive is not one of religion. (b) There must be attention,
for prayer is of its nature an act of the mind (see 2154). A parrot or
a phonograph is not said to pray when it repeats the words of the Our
Father or Hail Mary.

2165. The Intention Required in Prayer.--(a) An actual intention is had
when one either expressly or implicitly wills to offer a prayer, as
when one says internally; “I will now say a prayer,” or when without
such express act one deliberately performs that which is a prayer,
making internal acts of faith, reciting the Rosary, reading from a
prayer-book, etc. This kind of intention is necessary at the beginning
of prayer, and is the best that may be had during the course of prayer.

(b) A virtual intention is had when one is occupied in prayer on
account of an actual intention previously formed and not retracted, but
here and now, on account of human weakness, one is thinking of
indifferent things impertinent to the prayer and its purpose. This kind
of intention continues unless withdrawn directly by contrary intention
or indirectly by the performance of acts inconsistent with prayer.
Virtual intention suffices during the course of prayer, for a
continuous and uninterrupted actual intention is humanly impossible.
The more the mind struggles to keep the thought fixed on one object
alone, the more do other thoughts arise to distract, as experience
proves.

(c) An habitual intention is had when one is occupied in prayer, not on
account of any actual intention previously formed, but on account of a
propensity or inclination resulting from previous acts. This is not
properly an intention and it does not suffice for prayer, since with it
the acts performed do not proceed actually or virtually from any
determination of the will. Thus, a person who is asleep or intoxicated
is not said to pray when he mechanically repeats well-known words of
prayer, for his will has no part in those words, any more than the will
of the somnambulist has part in the dangerous walks he takes.

2166. The Attention in Prayer.--(a) By reason of its object, attention
is external or internal, according as the mind is taken up only with
the externals of prayer (i.e., the exclusion of external acts
inconsistent with prayer and the proper bodily posture) or with the
things internal to prayer (i.e., the words, sense and purpose of the
prayer). Internal attention is called verbal or superficial when it is
directed only to the words, as when a person who does not understand
the meaning of a prayer says it carefully so as not to mispronounce the
words; it is literal, when it is directed only to the sense, as when a
person who says a very obscure prayer pays close attention so as to
follow its meaning; it is spiritual, when it is directed to the purpose
of prayer (i.e., the worship of God by an act of religion), or to the
objects of prayer (i.e., eternal salvation or the means thereto, such
as grace and the virtues, the mysteries of religion, etc.).

(b) By reason of its subject, attention is either perfect or imperfect.
Perfect attention excludes every distracting thought, even such as are
involuntary; imperfect attention excludes voluntary but not involuntary
distractions.

2167. Acts that Exclude External Attention.--What external actions are
inconsistent with external prayer and exclusive of external attention?

(a) Those acts exclude external attention which either from their
nature (on account of the great mental application they demand) or from
the weakness of a person’s mind (for it is not everyone who can like
Julius Caesar think on several things at the same time) make it
impossible to have recollection in prayer when those acts are being
performed. Acts of this kind are reading about other matters, painting,
writing, carrying on conversation with those around, boisterous
laughing, etc. But if the one who prays engages in these acts
inadvertently (e.g., if a person reciting the Breviary does not notice
that he is giving considerable attention to an inscription or
advertisement on an adjacent wall), the distraction is merely
involuntary and inculpable.

(b) Those acts do not exclude external attention that either not at all
or only in slight measure interfere with internal recollection in
prayer. Such acts are slow walking, riding, looking about at the
scenery, picking a flower now and then, dressing, undressing, bathing,
combing the hair, etc, The Church prescribes certain prayers to be said
while the priest vests for Mass, and it was an old rule among the monks
to join labor and prayer.

2168. When External Attention Is Sufficient.--Is external attention
sufficient in prayer when internal attention is voluntarily excluded?

(a) In public prayers external attention is sufficient as to a number
of effects. Thus, in the administration of the Sacraments the want of
internal attention in the minister does not make the Sacrament invalid,
since the Sacraments produce grace _ex opere operato_; in public
suffrages the indevotion and distraction of the priest do not deprive
the beneficiary of the impetratory fruit, since the public prayers are
offered in the name of the Church itself; in the Divine Office merely
external attention suffices to fulfill the positive obligation,
according to many, because it is not certain that the Church requires
more.

(b) In all prayers mere external attention is insufficient for the
personal effects of impetration, merit and satisfaction. For to pray
with willful indevotion is not an act deserving of remission, reward
and a favorable answer, but rather of punishment (“Before prayer
prepare thy soul and be not as a man that tempteth God,” Eeclus.,
xviii. 23); it is disrespectful to God and therefore cannot claim the
benefits of an act of worship.

2169. The Kind of Internal Attention Required in Prayer.--(a) The
minimum that suffices for the personal benefits of merit and
impetration is the verbal or the literal attention, and the imperfect
attention that is mixed with some unwilled distractions or mind
wanderings. Indeed, a person who intends to pray well, but whose whole
prayer is a continual distraction in spite of his efforts to be
recollected, does not lose, but rather by reason of his good will and
effort increases, his merit. But for spiritual refreshment there must
be freedom from distraction; for, just as a student gets no mental
nourishment from a lesson if his mind is many miles away, and a
listener gets no instruction from a discourse spoken in a foreign
language (I Cor., xiv. 4), so one who prays with an absent mind loses
the devotion and joy that are afforded by actual communion with
heavenly thoughts.

(b) The maximum that should be aimed at in prayer for the greater
blessing it brings is the spiritual attention fixed on the presence of
God and the perfect attention that keeps away as far as possible the
interruption from any vain, perverse or extraneous thoughts.

2170. Distractions.--Just as certain external acts exclude external
attention, so also certain internal states exclude internal attention.
These latter are known as distractions, and may be defined as internal
acts or omissions opposed to the nature or purpose of prayer, but
performed during prayer.

(a) Distractions are either acts or omissions. Thus, a person who
slumbers lightly or is partly asleep during prayer is inattentive or
wanting by omission; while the person who thinks out plots for stories
or plays during prayer time is distracted or wanting by commission.

(b) Distractions are sometimes opposed to the nature of prayer. To the
nature of vocal prayer belong the words and the sense, and hence, even
though one is rapt in meditation, there is no vocal prayer if words are
mispronounced or left out or so changed or transposed as to make
nonsense or no sense, though negligence about a word here and there
does not necessarily exclude superficial attention. Those who from long
familiarity with forms of prayer are able to repeat them automatically,
with no thought about the words or their meaning, direct or mystical,
are not distracted if their thoughts are on the motive of prayer. But
it would not be fitting to observe no order in these matters, for
example, to dwell always on the glorious mysteries during passiontide
prayer and on the sorrowful mysteries during paschal prayers.

(c) Distractions are sometimes opposed to the purpose of prayer. The
purpose of prayer itself is the union of the mind with God, while the
purpose of the one who prays is the special good to which he directs
his prayer. Union with God is necessary above all in prayer, and though
it need not be expressly thought on, as was said above (2169), yet
there must be no thought in the mind contrary to it. Thoughts, desires
and imaginations are contrary to the end of prayer when they are not
means to that end (e.g., sinful thoughts, idle thoughts, thoughts on
lawful occupations or affections that have nothing to do with the
prayer), or when they are means to that end but are perverted to a
purely natural use (e.g., when verbal attention is made an exercise in
voice culture, or literal attention a grammatical study, or attention
to the purpose of prayer means that one is speculating on foolish
questions about divinity or thinking on the money, food, or clothing,
for which one is praying as if they were the ends of prayer).
Scrupulous persons make attention itself a distraction, for they worry
all during prayer lest their thoughts be wandering, and so they are
thinking about themselves rather than about the words, meaning or
purpose of prayer.

(d) Distractions occur during prayer. Hence, an interruption is not a
distraction, as when one who is praying is called to attend to some
business or leaves off prayer for the moment to make a note of some
important thought that came to mind. Neither is the breaking off of
prayer a distraction, as when one starts to pray but feels so
distracted or unwell as to give over for the time being the attempt to
pray.

2171. Voluntary and Involuntary Distractions.--(a) Voluntary
distractions result in the first place from purpose, as when one who is
praying deliberately dozes at intervals when he feels drowsy, or
deliberately turns over in his mind the points of an address he intends
to give; they result in the second place from negligence, as when the
person who is praying does not expressly wish to be inattentive, but
hurries through his words with no pains to keep his thoughts on what he
is doing or why he is doing it. Those who rarely speak or read about
divine things, but give themselves much to foolish reading or talk,
prepare for themselves many distractions, unless they counteract this
by special aids to recollection, such as pictures or prayer books.

(b) Involuntary distractions are those that result neither from purpose
nor from carelessness, but from human weakness. Thus, a person who is
troubled with scruples or with a severe headache or nervous strain, who
is worn out bodily or much worried mentally, or who is surrounded by
noise or disturbance, is often physically unable to concentrate his
mind for any length of time, no matter how much he may desire to do so.
Indeed, St. Thomas says that it is hardly possible for anyone to say an
Our Father without some distraction, and many persons are distracted
against their will by every slight sound or movement that falls under
their notice.

2772. Sinfulness of Distraction in Prayer.--(a) Involuntary
distractions are not sinful, since one is not bound to the impossible.
Hence, a penitent who has nothing except these distractions to confess
may not be absolved, since there is no matter for absolution in his
confession.

(b) Voluntary distractions are sinful, since, though one is free to
address God at any time, one is bound to do this in a respectful manner
and in spirit and in truth, as God requires. Communion with God is by
means of the mind, and it is disrespectful to turn the mind away to
other things when the communion has been sought. Besides, lip service
is displeasing to God, just as burnt offerings were not acceptable when
made without love. But the sin is of its nature only venial; for the
intention to pray, together with the essential moral goodness of the
act, is retained, and the defect consists in the circumstance that the
intention is executed remissly (see 78).

2173. When is voluntary distraction a grave and when a venial sin? (a)
It is a venial sin when one says a non-obligatory prayer, even with the
express will to be inattentive, and also when one says an obligatory
prayer (such as the Divine Office) with distractions due to
carelessness, but without abandonment of the intention to pray. (b) It
is a mortal sin when one indulges in distractions from contempt, and
also when one says an obligatory prayer with distractions that last
during a notable part of the prayer and that are deliberately
entertained.

2174. Distractions during Divine Office are the absence of the
attention which the Church requires under grave sin for satisfaction of
the canonical obligation. There are two opinions about the kind of
distractions that make recitation insufficient and gravely sinful.

(a) According to the older opinion, internal attention is required, but
it seems that generally those who maintain this view do not hold that
internal distractions alone deprive the Office of its sufficiency.
Thus, they state that one who has had voluntary distractions may
consider that he has fulfilled his duty, unless he is certain that he
also adverted to his state of distraction and did nothing to end it.

(b) According to the opinion of many modern authors, external attention
suffices. Hence, in this view mortal sin is incurred by notable defect
in external, but not in internal attention.

2175. The External Acts of Religion.--We proceed now to those acts of
religion which are performed in an outward manner. But it should be
noted that just as devotion and prayer find external expression (as in
vocal prayer), so the external acts of religion should proceed from
internal devotion. The outward religious acts may be classified under
three groups: (a) the acts in which one offers one’s body as a mark of
veneration to God (adoration); (b) the acts in which one offers
external goods, whether given (sacrifices, offerings, first-fruits,
tithes) or promised (vows); (c) the acts in which one makes use of
divine things to honor God (Sacraments, oaths, adjuration, praises).

2176. Definition of Adoration.--Adoration or worship is honor shown to
God through bodily acts offered in acknowledgment of His supreme
excellence and of our dependence on Him.

(a) Thus, it is acknowledgment of dependence on God, and as such it
differs from mere honor, which may be shown even to an equal.

(b) It is an acknowledgment of supreme excellence, and so it differs
from veneration shown to creatures who are above us. Adoration
(_latria_), therefore, is not the same thing as the sacred cult or
veneration shown the Blessed Virgin (_hyperdulia_) and the Saints
(_dulia_) on account of their supernatural grace and glory; much less
is it the same thing as the civil cult shown to persons illustrious for
natural qualities, such as acquired knowledge, political dignity or
power, etc.: “The Lord thy God shalt thou adore and Him only shalt thou
serve” (Matt, iv. 10).

2177. Unity and Variety of Adoration.--Adoration is but one, though it
has various expressions. (a) The unity of adoration depends on the
unity of its object. There is but one God to whom belong the various
divine attributes, and the three Divine Persons share the same majesty.
Hence, there is but one adoration. (b) The variety in adoration is in
the expression. The higher expression of adoration is internal: it does
not depend on bodily acts or places, and it is offered by Angels as
well as by man. The lower expression of adoration is made through
bodily acts, such as genuflections, prostrations, prayer with face to
the east, and the use of sacred places for worship, all of which
externals are employed as aids to devotion and symbols of the divine
glory (Matt., xviii, 20; Luke, xix. 46). Some of the actions here
mentioned are sometimes used in the religious or civil cult shown to
creatures, but internal adoration belongs to God alone.

2178. Definition of Sacrifice.--Sacrifice is the offering to God and a
real changing of a sensible thing, made by a lawful minister, in
acknowledgment of God’s supreme dominion and of our subjection to Him.

(a) It is an offering or oblation; that is, one makes a gift directly
to God Himself. Thus, sacrifice differs from contributions of the
people made for the clergy or the church.

(b) It offers a sensible thing, that is, some object perceptible by the
senses or hidden under sensible species; for sacrifice is an outward
sign of the inner offering, by which the soul itself is subjected to
God.

(c) It is made by a lawful minister, for sacrifice is a public act
performed in the name of the community, and hence it may be offered
only by those who represent the community. St. Paul declares that a
high-priest is chosen from men to offer sacrifice, and that no one may
take the honor to himself unless he is called as Aaron was (Heb., v. 4).

(d) It is made to God alone, since God alone is our First Beginning and
Last End: “He who sacrifices to other gods besides the Lord shall be
put to death” (Exod., xxii. 20). Mass in honor of the Blessed Virgin or
the Saints means that sacrifice is offered God in thanksgiving for
their merits or in petition that we may imitate their virtues.
Oblations may be made to men, but sacrifice may be offered only to God.

(e) It is through a real change of the thing offered, which thus
becomes the victim of sacrifice; for the supreme act of worship
reserved to God acts upon the substance itself of an external thing to
signify that the worshipper offers his own being to God. The change in
the thing sacrificed consists in its being made sacred, or set apart as
the central object in the supreme act of worship.

(f) It is made in acknowledgment of God’s supreme dominion and of our
subjection to Him; that is, it is an act whose direct and proper end is
the exercise of the virtue of religion. Thus, sacrifice differs from
acts of self-sacrifice such as continence, abstinence, martyrdom, even
when they are offered in honor of God, for the direct and proper end of
these acts is some other virtue than that of religion. The act of
sacrifice may have no purpose except worship, but other virtuous acts
have their own ends to make them praiseworthy, even when they are used
as acts of worship.

2179. The Essentials of Sacrifice.--(a) The outward sign may be said to
consist of matter and form. The matter is some sensible thing used as
victim, whether it be inanimate (e.g., the bread and wine of
Melchisedech), or animate (e.g., the paschal lamb), or human (e.g., Our
Lord in His passion). The form is some sensible action that makes the
victim sacred by dedicating it to sacrificial oblation (e.g., the
breaking of bread, the libation of wine, the offering of the slain
lamb, the voluntary and visible acceptance of death by Our Lord). In
the Mass Christ is sacrificed, not as existing under His own
appearances, but as present under the sacramental species and offered
through His representatives; and hence in the Mass the Victim is
sensible by means of the species that signify and contain Him, while
the dedication by the Supreme Priest is made sensible through the words
of the ministering priest who acts for Christ.

(b) The inner thing that is signified in sacrifice is primarily the
offering of self to God, in recognition that from Him we have our being
and in Him is our happiness. But secondarily it signifies the fruits we
derive from union with God (e.g., the benefits of redemption and
salvation). Thus, the sacrificial death of Christ is also a symbol of
man’s death to sin and life in God (I Peter, iv. 1).

2180. The Obligation of Sacrifice.--(a) The internal or spiritual
sacrifice is obligatory for all, since all are bound to offer God
devotion of will, communion of mind, recognition of His supremacy. (b)
The external sacrifice improperly so called, which consists in the
practice of works of virtue, is obligatory for all in so far as
commanded acts are concerned, but not when virtuous deeds are of
supererogation. (c) The external sacrifice properly so called, which
consists in an outward sign indicative of internal worship of God, is
by natural law necessary, for reason itself shows to man that he is an
inferior and dependent being, and so should acknowledge the superiority
of God and his own submission by acts suitable to his nature as a being
composed of body and soul, and for whom sensible things are signs of
spiritual truths.

2181. Exemptions Based on the Natural Law.--Though the external
sacrifice strictly so called is obligatory from natural law, it is not
a primary precept of nature, nor does nature determine its details.

(a) Hence, the fact of the obligation may be unknown to an individual,
since (though reason indicates it) it is not evident and rests upon a
number of premises from which it has to be reasoned out. Unlike the
duty of honoring parents, which is immediately inferred from natural
principles, the duty of offering sacrifice is only remotely inferred,
and hence admits of invincible ignorance (see 320).

(b) The manner of fulfilling the obligation, since not defined by
natural law, has to be determined by positive laws, or, in the absence
of these, by suitability to the circumstances in which one lives.
Before the positive divine law was given, there was no obligatory rite
for sacrifice and the oblation was not entrusted to any special body of
men, and hence we read that in the times of the patriarchs there was
great freedom as to the ceremonies and the ministry employed in
sacrifice. But under the Mosaic Law the manner of sacrificing was
minutely prescribed and its office entrusted to the sons of Aaron, even
to the exclusion of monarchs; while under the law of Christ there is
but the one sacrifice of the Cross perpetuated in the Mass in an
unbloody manner, and the ministers who have power to offer sacrifice
are only the bishops and priests.

2182. Is Sacrifice Superior to All the Other Acts of Religion?--(a)
Sacrifice is not superior to the internal act of religion, for devotion
or the internal sacrifice is the soul that animates and moves the
external rites (see 2149): “The multitude offered victims and praises
and holocausts with a devout mind” (II Par., xxix. 31); “Obedience is
better than sacrifice” (I Kings, xv. 22).

(b) Sacrifice is preeminent among the external acts of religion. Some
acts of religion are optional (e.g., vows, oaths, adjurations), but
sacrifice is a natural obligation. Some acts of religion are
obligatory, but marks of respect similar to them may also be shown to
creatures (e.g., customary offerings, praises), whereas no kind of
sacrifice may be offered to a creature. Some acts of religion are
reserved to God, but they have no rite that is peculiar to the worship
of God and that may not be exercised by all (e.g., acts of adoration),
whereas sacrifice has a service reserved to God and which only priests
can perform. Sacraments are primarily for the welfare of man; sacrifice
is primarily for the honor of God. Non-sacrificial acts of religion may
be performed in the name of an individual (e.g., adoration), whereas
sacrifice is in the name of the community; other acts of religion may
signify dependence on God for temporal and corporal things (e.g.,
offering of first-fruits), but sacrifice signifies the dependence of
the soul itself on God for existence and beatitude.

2183. Offerings.--Offerings are gifts made immediately to God, to be
employed without change for divine worship or for the needs of the
ministers of divine worship, the purpose being to worship God by the
tribute paid.

(a) Thus, offerings are gifts; that is, they are offered to God without
the compulsion of any law, or at least without any determination by law
of the amount to be given. Natural reason teaches man that he should
bestow something from his goods in this manner as a thank offering for
the divine bounty, when there are representatives of God to whom the
gift may be given. The gift should be a free-will offering (Exod., xxv,
2), unless there are special circumstances that render it a debt, such
as contract, promise, custom, or the need of the ministers of the
Church.

(b) They are made immediately to God Himself, and so they differ from
tithes or other dues that are paid to the clergy for their support.

(c) They are not changed at all in the act of worship (e.g., an
offering of sacred vessels or altar furnishings), or at least they are
not changed into the sacred condition of a sacrificial victim (e.g.,
offerings of candles, incense, etc., that are consumed during Mass).
Thus, simple oblation differs from sacrificial oblation.

(d) They are devoted to the service of God, since they are gifts made
to Him. Hence, they are used in divine worship and, if consecrated
(e.g., chalices, vestments), may not be used for other purposes; or
they are used for the needs of the ministers of divine worship or of
the poor, since those who serve the altar should live by the altar (I
Cor., ix. 14), and Our Lord shared His purse with the poor (Matt.,
xxvi. 9, 11).

(e) They are given as a mark of honor to God, especially in recognition
of favors received from Him. Thus, in the Old Law the people were
obliged to give the first-fruits of their fields and crops to God, in
thanksgiving for the gift of the promised land and of its fruits
(Deut., xxvi. 10).

2184. Goods Unsuitable as Offerings to God.--There are certain goods,
however, that should not be used as offerings to God.

(a) Thus, those goods that are forbidden by positive law may not be
offered to God. In the Old Law certain animals could not be offered to
God, either because they were legally unclean (e.g., dogs were
associated with pagan rites and were regarded as symbols of rapacity),
or because they were of inferior quality (e.g., a blind or lame sheep
or other animal worthless to its owner).

(b) Those goods that the offerer has no right to give away or that are
unsuitable on account of circumstances may never be given as offerings
to God. Thus, one may not make an offering to God of money that belongs
to another (Ecclus., xxxiv. 21); a son may not give as a gift to God
the money he should spend on his needy parents (Matt., xv. 3-6).
Neither may one offer corrupted wine for the Mass, nor the wages of
prostitution to the church if there will be scandal, nor gifts that are
mean and contemptible, etc.

2185. Contributions.--Contributions to the support of the clergy and
church causes are neither sacrifices nor offerings in the strict sense
of these words, since they are given not directly to God but to the
ministers of God. The manner of making contributions to the Church has
varied with time.

(a) Thus, in the first ages of the Church clerics having the care of
souls were supported by the voluntary gifts of the people. These gifts
were made especially during Mass. Bread and wine and other things
necessary for divine worship and the support of the clergy were brought
at the Offertory (the origin of the present Offertory collection),
while food for the agapae or for the poor was presented for a blessing
towards the end of the Canon, or before Mass.

(b) After peace had been given to the Church and the number of the
faithful and of the clergy had greatly increased, it was found
necessary to devise means for a more regular and certain supply of
income. As early as the sixth century the ancient customs of
first-fruits and tithes were made the subjects of conciliar enactments
and imposed as specific taxes on crops or revenues. A more permanent
system of church support was that of endowments or benefices which,
owing to the increasing difficulties of older methods, sprang up about
the sixth century and became universal in the eleventh. Fees in
connection with the administration of sacred rites and stipends for
Masses were in use in the seventh century.

(c) Today the system of benefices is the rule, while first-fruits and
tithes are rare, though recognized by Canon Law. In some countries
where benefices have been confiscated, part compensation is made in the
form of pensions; in other countries (e.g., in the United States) the
free-will offerings of the faithful is the usual system.

2186. Obligation of Contributing to the Support of the Clergy.--(a)
Natural Law.--Those who serve the common welfare, whether in spiritual
or in temporal matters, should be supported by those whom they serve;
for, as their time and labor is given to others, it is a duty of
justice that these latter make a return for the benefits received.
Hence, just as citizens are naturally bound to contribute to public
officials, so are the faithful naturally bound to contribute according
to their means to the ministers of religion.

(b) Divine Law.--Our Lord commanded His disciples to depend for their
maintenance on those to whom they preached (“For the laborer is worthy
of his meat,” Matt., x. 10); and hence St. Paul says (I Cor., ix. 13,
14): “They who work in the holy place eat the things that are of the
holy place, and they that serve the altar partake with the altar. So
also the Lord ordained that they who preach the Gospel should live by
the Gospel.”

(c) Church Law.--The Canons reaffirm what is of natural and divine law,
namely, that the faithful are obliged to support the clergy (Canon
1496); and as to the manner of making contributions they sanction local
customs, such as parish payments (Canon 463) and tithes and
first-fruits (Canon 1502), command the payment of _cathedraticum_
(Canon 1504), etc.

2187. The Church, the Apostolic See, individual churches and moral
persons of ecclesiastical law have the right to the temporal means
requisite for their mission; and hence the faithful have the duty to
contribute to necessary church causes, such as divine worship, the
spread of the Gospel, and charity (Canons 1495 sqq.).

2188. Quality of the Obligation of Contributing to the Church.--(a) The
obligation is one of justice as well as of religion, for there is a
quasi-contract between the faithful on the one side and the Church and
its ministers on the other side, the latter being obliged to give
spiritual ministries and benefits, the former to supply the temporal
sustenance and means. Hence, St. Paul compares the salaries given to
the clergy to the wages or fruits paid to the laborer. It is not
strange that those who sow spiritual things for others, should reap
from the temporal things of the latter: for a soldier does not serve at
his own expense; a planter, a shepherd, a plowman, and a thresher
expect a share from their labors; indeed, even the animal that serves
man is worth its keep (cfr. I Cor., ix. 4 sqq.).

(b) The obligation is grave, because it arises both from justice and
from religion (see 1748, 2148). He who refuses to contribute to the
Church evades payment for services given him and also denies to divine
worship his share of support.

2189. Attitude Towards Persons Refusing to Contribute.--The duties of
the priest towards those who refuse to contribute their share to the
support of the Church may be defined as follows:

(a) as to absolution, it should not be denied unless there is certainty
that the penitent is in grave sin. Hence, according to Kenrick and the
common opinion, unless there is a law fixing a tax or the delinquent
church member is inflicting severe privation on the church or heavy
burdens on others who have to contribute more than their share, the
confessor should not enjoin payment under pain of denial of absolution.
Apart from these cases, the Church, for the sake of souls, does not
insist upon her right, as we see in the dealings of St. Paul with the
Corinthians who neglected to give towards his support. The Apostle did
not correct these men, although he would have done so had he considered
them guilty of mortal sin;

(b) as to restitution, it seems it should not be insisted on. One who
has guiltily refused to pay his church dues has offended justice, it is
true, but the Church is concerned more with spiritual than with
temporal things, and rather than place an obstacle to the conversion of
a sinner or occasion scandal to the weak, she prefers to forego what is
really her due (see 1487);

(c) as to administration of the Sacraments or sacramentals, it should
not be denied to those who are unable or unwilling to pay the customary
fees. The recipient of the rites disgraces himself by unwillingness to
do what others do, but religion itself would be degraded if the rites
were refused for reasons of money.

2190. Those to Whom Religious Contributions Are Due.--(a) The entire
Church should contribute to the support of the Pope, the Pastor of the
whole flock of Christ, who is charged with the welfare of all. In the
Old Law the Levites themselves were obliged to pay tithes to the
high-priest (Num, xviii. 26 sqq.); but the amount to be given to
Peter’s Pence is left to the generosity and religious devotion of the
contributors. (b) Each individual church or body in the Church should
contribute to its own bishop or superior a just amount for necessary
uses, as determined by law or lawful custom.

2191. Vows.--A vow is a promise made to God to perform that which is
better.

(a) It is a promise, that is, an agreement by which one binds oneself
under obligation to another to do or omit something (Eccles., v. 3, 4),
Thus, a vow differs from deliberation about doing good or the purpose
to do it, for it includes in addition to deliberation and purpose the
decree of the reason which places one under the moral necessity of
performing one’s promise. Thus, persons who make good resolutions or
who promise themselves that they will carry out certain good courses
(e.g., a drunkard who takes the pledge to abstain from intoxicants) do
not sin against a vow when they break their resolutions. Even a promise
or resolution made under oath is not necessarily a vow; and hence one
who swears to observe chastity may be freed from the obligation by an
ecclesiastical superior who has not the power of dispensing from a vow
of chastity (see 2234, 2262).

(b) A vow is a promise made to God; that is, the person who takes the
vow intends to honor God and to bind himself to God. A vow may be made
in honor of the Blessed Virgin or other Saint, in the sense that one
vows to God what one promises to the Saint, or that one calls on the
Saint to witness or to assist the vow, or that one offers the vow
principally to God and secondarily to the Saint. Hence, if one were to
make a promise to a Saint (e.g., if a girl promises perpetual virginity
to the Blessed Virgin) with no thought about God or no thought of
obliging oneself before God, the act would be a promise pertaining to
the virtue of veneration (_dulia_), but it would not be an act of
religion or a vow. Promises made to living persons even under solemn
circumstances (e.g., a death-bed promise made to a dying mother) are
sacred, but they have not the nature of a vow.

(c) A vow is a promise to perform that which is better; that is, since
a vow is a free promise made to God, to whom only good is pleasing and
to whom the lesser good is less pleasing, a vow does not promise God
what is evil or entirely indifferent or less pleasing. It would
dishonor a human being to promise him something offensive, it would not
honor him to promise something vain or useless, it would not show him
special honor to promise to do something less agreeable to him. Hence,
it would be irreligious to take a vow to steal, or to count one’s
steps, or to prefer marriage itself to celibacy. Certain solemn
promises are called vows (e.g., the vows of Baptism, the marriage
vows), but they are not vows in the strict sense as here understood,
for they do not promise that which is better, the promisors having no
intention to place on themselves the obligation of religion.

2192. The Various Kinds of Vows.--(a) By reason of its object, a vow is
either personal (i.e., the promise of some act or omission, such as a
fast or the avoidance of an occasion of sin), real (i.e., the promise
of some payment or object, such as an alms), or mixed (i.e., the
promise of some action and some object, such as pilgrimage to a shrine
with an offering).

(b) By reason of its subject, a vow is either singular (i.e., made by a
physical person) or common (i.e., made by a moral person or community).

(c) By reason of its duration, a vow is either temporary (e.g., a vow
taken for one year) or perpetual (i.e., a vow taken for life).

(d) By reason of its manner, a vow is either absolute (e.g., an
unconditional vow of chastity) or conditional (e.g., a vow to go on
pilgrimage, if one recovers one’s health; a vow to enter religion, if
parents consent). A conditional vow is either non-penal, as in the
example just given, or penal, in which the promise is that one shall
undergo a penalty if fault is committed (e.g., a vow to say the Rosary
every time one uses profane language, to fast every time one becomes
intoxicated, to give alms every time one is dishonest).

(e) By reason of its form a vow is either express (i.e., externally
manifested by words or other signs) or tacit (i.e., externally assumed
by reason of some office to which it is annexed, as when one takes the
subdiaconate in the Latin Church, to which is attached the duty of
celibacy. (It must be noted, however, that some authors consider
celibacy arising from the subdiaconate as a duty arising from
ecclesiastical law and not from a vow.) The express vow in turn is
explicit (i.e., manifested by signs that immediately express the vow,
as when the vower mentions poverty and chastity) or implicit (i.e.,
manifested by signs that express another vow which includes the
implicit vow, as when the vower mentions only obedience according to
the rule, but the rule includes the other two vows of poverty and
chastity). An explicit vow is either determinate (i.e., one in which
the thing promised is definitely indicated, as when one vows a
pilgrimage) or disjunctive (i.e., one in which the vower promises to
perform at his will one or more out of a number of things indicated, as
when he vows either to make a pilgrimage or to perform a fast).

(f) By reason of its position before the Church, a vow is either
private (i.e., one made without the intervention or acceptance of the
Church, as when a person in danger of shipwreck makes a vow for his
safety) or public (i.e., one made before the Church and accepted in its
name by an ecclesiastical superior, as in the essential vows made in
approved Orders or Congregations). The public vow is either simple or
solemn, according as the Church has determined for different religious
institutes.

2193. Vows in Canon Law.--The canonical dispositions in reference to
vows in general will be found in Canons 1307-1315, while religious vows
are treated in the section on religious (Canons 492 sqq.), and the
effects of vows on matrimony are declared in Canons 1072, 1073, 1058. A
fuller treatment of the canonical aspects of vows than can be given
here will be found in commentaries on these parts of the Code.

2194. Distinction between Solemn and Simple Vows.--Is the distinction
between a solemn and a simple vow one of divine or one of
ecclesiastical law?

(a) As to accidental solemnity (i.e., the conditions of time, place,
age, fitness, rubrics, etc.), the solemn vow depends on the Church, for
there is no doubt that the Church has the right to determine these
matters as circumstances may require. Hence, the Church may appoint
conditions for the validity of a solemn vow, and she may also change
these conditions as she sees fit.

(b) As to the essential solemnity (i.e., the internal characteristic
that distinguishes the solemn from other vows), the solemn vow depends,
not on the law of the Church, but on the divine law, since, unlike
other vows, it is not a mere promise of acts, but an irrevocable giving
over to God of one’s person itself and an internal spiritual
consecration or espousals accepted by the Church. This is denied,
however, by some authorities, who place the difference between the
solemn and the simple vow in the different juridical effects which they
produce in Canon Law, the solemn vow making acts opposed to it invalid
and the simple vow rendering opposed acts illicit, but not invalid (see
Canon 579). All agree that the Church may for just reasons dispense
even in solemn vows.

2195. Knowledge and Deliberation Necessary for Valid Vow.--In the
intellect of him who takes a vow there must be such knowledge and
deliberation as are required for making an important contract, for he
who takes a vow assumes a grave obligation (see 1883). The rule given
by many is that the deliberation which suffices for a mortal sin
suffices also for a vow, but this does not appear to be exact, since a
mortal sin may be committed when there is only a confused perception of
the gravity of the sin (see 177).

(a) Thus, a vow is invalidated by substantial ignorance or error (e.g.,
Titus, thinking his gold watch is brass, vows to give it as an alms;
Balbus, thinking that a distant sanctuary is not very far off, vows to
make a pilgrimage to it; Claudius, being wrongly informed that his
father is sick, makes a vow to go on a pilgrimage for his father’s
recovery), but not by ignorance or error that is merely accidental
(e.g., Sempronius, thinking that a sanctuary which is four miles away
is only three miles distant, vows to go there on pilgrimage, but he
would have made the vow, even though he had known the true distance;
Caius, intending chiefly to perform an act of religion, and secondarily
to visit a friend, vows a pilgrimage to a neighboring town, not being
aware that the friend has moved elsewhere). The vows of religion,
according to the common opinion, are not invalidated on account of
ignorance or error about accidentals, even though the vows would not
have been taken had these accidentals been known; for the common good
demands that the religious state, like the married state, have
stability, and that those who enter it intend to accept all the
obligations that go with it.

(b) A vow is invalidated by the absence of full deliberation (e.g.,
vows made by children who have not the perfect use of reason, by
persons who are only half-conscious or who are delirious or laboring
under a hysterical delusion or fixed idea, by persons who act on the
impulse of the moment without full advertence to the import or force of
the vow), but not by the absence of long or studious deliberation
(e.g., a vow is valid if one has thought over its meaning and
obligation, even though one has done this hurriedly and without
reflection on the details and has regretted the vow soon after its
pronouncement).

2196. Freedom of Will Necessary for Valid Vow.--In the will of the
person who takes a vow there must be freedom of choice, and the absence
of such impediments as take away self-determination or consent.

(a) Thus, the natural law itself invalidates a vow made under force or
under such fear as takes away the power of giving due deliberation to
the vow.

(b) The natural law, according to many, invalidates a vow made under
fear that is grave (though not disturbing to the reason), and that is
produced unjustly and with a view to coerce one into making the vow.
The reason for this opinion is that God cannot accept a promise to
Himself caused by injustice, nor can one be held to a promise made
under unjust pressure.

(c) The positive law (see Canon 1307, Sec.3) invalidates a vow given
under grave and unjust fear. Many canonists interpret this law as
meaning that even when the unjust fear is not employed as a means to
force one into taking the vow, but does in reality cause one to take
the vow, the promise is null in both forums in virtue of Canon Law.

2197. Cases in Which Fear Does Not Invalidate a Vow.--(a) All admit
that fear does not invalidate when it proceeds from a natural cause
(e.g., vows made during a storm at sea) or an internal cause (e.g.,
vows made under the influence of fear that one will fall into sin
without the protection of the vow); for in these cases one chooses a
lesser burden to avoid a greater one, and the thing chosen is
involuntary, not simply, but only in a certain respect (see 44).

(b) It is commonly admitted that fear does not invalidate when it
proceeds from an external and just cause (e.g., if a guilty person were
threatened with the penalties of law unless he vowed not to repeat the
offense), since the cause of the vow is then internal rather than
external, namely, the guilt of the person who takes the vow and his
wish to evade punishment.

2198. Vows of Doubtful Validity.--In the following cases it is disputed
whether fear invalidates a vow.

(a) It is disputed whether fear unjustly caused invalidates in the
forum of conscience when it is light (e.g., Titia constantly importuned
by her parents to enter religion makes a vow to follow their wishes).
Some answer in the negative, because a fear that is slight both in
itself and in its influence on the vower cannot be considered as the
real cause of the vow. Others answer in the affirmative, because light
reasons do move persons to take grave steps, and it is not reasonable
to think that God will accept a vow brought on by unjust, though light,
fear.

(b) It is also disputed whether grave fear unjustly caused invalidates,
when the person who causes the fear intends to force the vower, not to
the vow, but to something else (e.g., Balbus threatens to kill Caius
unless the latter pays a large sum of money, and Caius vows to give the
money to religion if he escapes the danger). Some hold for the
affirmative and refer to Canon 1307, mentioned above. Others hold for
the negative because the vow is taken, not to accommodate the
aggressor, but to honor God and benefit self. This is the
interpretation given the pre-Code legislation. Still others
distinguish, affirming invalidity for the case in which fear is the
cause of the vow and denying invalidity for the case when fear is only
the occasion of the vow.

2199. The Intention Necessary for a Valid Vow.--As was said in the
explanation of the definition, a vow must include a will to bind
oneself, that is, the intention to make a vow.

(a) The object of this intention is the obligation itself, not its
fulfillment. Hence, he who makes a vow, but intends not to oblige
himself, vows invalidly; for he has two contrary intentions and (unless
the intention to vow is stronger) the substance of the vow is excluded.
On the contrary, he who makes a vow, intending not to fulfill it, vows
validly but illicitly, since he really intends to oblige himself, but
he sins by his purpose not to keep his vow (see 1883).

(b) The quality of the intention must be such that the character of the
vow as a deliberate act and a sincere agreement to obligation will be
preserved. Hence, an habitual intention (e.g., Claudius intending to
take a vow on the morrow pronounces the words of promise while asleep)
does not suffice, because the act made with such an intention is not
deliberate or human. Likewise, an external intention (e.g., Balba
forced by her parents to enter a convent takes the vows, intending only
the external rite) and an indirect intention (e.g., Sempronius,
foreseeing that if he drinks certain liquors he will bind himself by
vow to a number of things, takes the drinks and makes the vows) are not
sufficient, because with them there is no real agreement to obligation.
On the other hand, it suffices to have an actual but implicit or tacit
intention (e.g., Titus receives subdeaconship intending the obligations
annexed to the office, but not knowing that celibacy is a duty vowed by
subdeacons), or a virtual intention (e.g., Caius intended to make
religious profession, but at the moment of pronouncing the vows he is
distracted and gives no attention to the words), for in either case
there is a human act and real agreement to obligation (see 2164, 2165).

2200. The Matter of a Vow.--(a) A vow is a free promise, and hence its
matter must not be something necessary. (b) A vow is made to God, and
hence its matter must not be something that is not pleasing to Him.

2201. Vows that Promise Something Necessary.--(a) If the necessity is
absolute, because a certain thing must be or cannot be, a vow is
invalid. A vow to die is null, because death is a necessity; a vow to
avoid venial sin, deliberate and indeliberate, is null, because it is
impossible without a special privilege from God to keep such a vow; a
vow that one’s child shall enter religion is also null, because one has
no power over that which depends on the will of another. The vows made
by communities do not oblige their successors or posterity as vows, but
only as laws or customs having the force of law, or as contracts to
which agreement is given, etc.

(b) If the necessity is hypothetical, because a certain thing must be
done or omitted if one is to observe the natural or positive law, the
vow is valid. For though it is necessary to observe a commandment
(e.g., to avoid intoxication), it is not necessary to add to the
existent obligation the new obligation of religion. The most suitable
matter for a vow, however, is something that is of counsel, but not of
precept, for example, to practise celibacy.

2202. When Fulfillment of Vow Is Only Partly Possible.--(a) If the
vower intended that his promise should be an entire one obliging him to
fulfillment of all the items, the vow is invalid, since its fulfillment
as intended is impossible. Thus, if one vowed to go on foot to a place
of pilgrimage but was unable to accomplish the journey on foot, or
vowed to go to Rome and became unable to go the full distance, there
would be no obligation.

(b) If the vower intended that his promise should be severable, the
difficulty can be settled as follows: he is held to nothing if the
matter is severable but the principal part impossible (e.g., if he
vowed to go on a pilgrimage and also to go barefooted, he is not bound
to go barefooted an equal distance if the pilgrimage becomes
impossible). He is held to the part that is possible, if it is really
severable and was intended as the principal part of the vow (e.g., if
he vowed to go on a pilgrimage and to go barefooted, but is unable to
go barefooted).

(c) If the intention of the vow-maker is uncertain, it seems he is held
to perform what is possible (e.g., if one has vowed to pay for the
erection of a church but becomes unable to pay for more than a part of
the expense); but if there is a good reason to presume that he intended
an entire vow, or a severable vow whose chief part has become
impossible, one may decide the doubt in the sense of that presumption
(cfr. 465).

2203. Vows that Promise Something Displeasing to God.--(a) Vows that
promise what is always evil (e.g., to steal) are invalid and, on
account of the irreverence, gravely sinful, at least if the sin
promised is mortal. (b) Vows that promise something that may turn out
either evil or good (e.g., Jepthe’s vow to immolate the first living
being that came before him) are imprudent, and should not be kept as to
the part that is sinful.

2204. What should be said of vows that promise something good, but that
have an evil end or other evil circumstances?

(a) The vow is invalid and illicit if the evil circumstance affects the
thing promised itself, so that the fulfillment of the vow must be
sinful, for example, when one promises to give an alms in order to
seduce the recipient into sin or to build a church in order to gratify
pride or spite. Similarly, invalid and illicit are vows made to obtain
something evil (e.g., the vow of an alms in order to obtain success in
a robbery) or to render thanksgiving for success in evil already done
(e.g., the vow to give God half the booty taken in robbery); for such
vows can not be fulfilled without the implicit protestation that God is
the author of sin.

(b) The vow is valid but illicit if the evil circumstance affects only
the act of vowing; for the thing promised is good and is to be
performed properly, but the disposition of the vower is not free from
sin as he makes his promise. It should be noted, however, that the evil
circumstance does not always deprive the act of vowing of substantial
goodness (see 78). Thus, if one vows to build a church and the sole
motive for making the vow is the applause one will receive, the vow is
substantially illicit; but if vainglory is only a secondary motive, the
vow is substantially licit.

(c) The vow is valid and licit if the evil circumstance affects neither
the act promised nor the act of vowing, both of these being good. Thus,
it is lawful to vow an alms for every time one yields to a sinful
habit. It is also lawful to vow an offering to God if one escapes
unhurt from a duel, for such a vow does not ask God to bless the duel
but to protect one’s life.

2205. Vows that Promise Something Indifferent.--(a) These vows are
invalid if there is no circumstance to make the promise honorable to
God (e.g., if one promises to save up a certain percentage of one’s
earnings each month). The sin committed by those who vow necessary,
impossible or indifferent things, does not seem to exceed venial fault
_per se_, for the vow is illicit, not because its matter is evil and
displeasing to God, but because it is not good and pleasing to Him. The
sin seems to be one of levity rather than of irreverence.

(b) These vows are valid and lawful if there is a circumstance that
makes the indifferent subject-matter honorable to God (e.g., if one
vows to save up so much each month in order to practise frugality, or
to set aside means for some charitable or pious cause).

2206. Meaning of a Better Good.--It is also necessary for validity of a
vow that the thing promised be a better good; for this is the will of
God, our sanctification (I Thess., iv. 3), and the vow is made to God.

(a) By the better good is not meant that which has no good superior to
it, for then one could vow only the most excellent good, which is not
true.

(b) By the better good, then, is understood that which is preferable to
its contrary good (e.g., virginity is better than marriage), that which
is absolutely or objectively preferable to its contradictory (e.g., it
is better to give an alms than not to give one, it is better to keep
the law of fasting than not to keep it), that which is relatively or
subjectively better than its contradictory (e.g., it is better to marry
than to commit fornication, or live in concubinage, or give scandal, or
leave children illegitimate). Generally, however, it is not advisable
to vow matrimony, for, even if the vow is not invalid, it seems to have
little advantage. If a person thinks marriage is better for him, let
him take the marriage vows or engage to marry the woman of his choice.

2207. Vows Invalidated by Promise of Lesser Good.--(a) The vow to do
what is less pleasing to God (e.g., never to make a vow, never to
embrace a counsel) is invalid _per se_. There may be cases, however, in
which a vow of this kind would be better and therefore valid (e.g.,
when a person who is prone to making vows is bidden by the confessor to
make no other vows without advice).

(b) The vow to do what may easily become less pleasing to God also
seems to be invalid. Thus, if one were to make a vow to play no more
games in order to give more time to prayer or to avoid temptations, the
vow might later be a cause of spiritual harm, for at times it is more
pleasing to God to take recreation than to abstain from it.

2208. Case in Which One Has Taken Two Opposite Vows.--(a) If the vows
are equally good, or if it is doubtful which is better, the first
prevails; the second being impossible does not oblige. (b) If the
second is certainly better, it prevails, and the first does not oblige,
being impossible. Thus, if one has first vowed to go on a pilgrimage
and next to stay at home and attend the sick during an epidemic, the
pilgrimage should not stand in the way of the more urgent good of
caring for those in distress.

2209. The Obligation of a Vow.--Every valid vow obliges to fulfillment,
for it is a promise, and loyalty to promises is a moral duty. Scripture
declares that one must pay one’s vows, and that it is better not to vow
than to vow and not fulfill (Eccles., v. 4), that God will hold as sin
the neglect of a vow (Deut., xxiii. 21), that a faithless promise
displeases Him (Eccles., V. 3).

(a) The Quality of the Obligation.--A vow is an act of religion, since
it promises to God a tribute of honor, even though the thing promised
(e.g., a fast, virginity) does not belong to worship but to some other
virtue. Hence, the violation of a vow is a sin against fidelity and
also against religion. But it seems that sacrilege is committed only by
sins against certain vows, namely, those whose matter is a sacred thing
dedicated to God; for example, the violation of the vow to fast would
not be sacrilegious, while the violation of a public vow of chastity is
a sacrilege. All transgressions of vows, as such, are sins of the same
species, namely, sins against religion.

(b) The Quantity of the Obligation.--A vow, as being a duty of religion
(see 2146, 2148), obliges under grave sin. But in an individual case
the sin committed may be only venial on account of lightness of matter
or imperfection of the act.

2210. Gravity of the Obligation of a Vow.--A vow has the nature of a
private law, since it is an obligation which the vow-maker voluntarily
imposes on himself. But a law obliges under grave sin when the
subject-matter itself and the intention of the lawgiver require strict
obligation (see 381 sqq.). Hence, gravity of matter in a vow depends on
the great importance of the thing vowed and on the will of the vower to
assume a grave obligation.

(a) Thus, the thing vowed must be of great importance, either in itself
(e.g., chastity) or from its relation to divine worship (e.g., a fast,
a communion). One cannot oblige oneself to a grave obligation under a
vow whose matter is absolutely and relatively of minor importance
(e.g., a daily Hail Mary, an alms of twenty-five cents; see 382).

(b) The intention of the vower must be to bind himself under grave sin.
He is free not to oblige himself by vow at all, and hence, should he
elect to vow, he may bind himself, even though the matter of the vow is
of great importance, either under grave or under light sin (or only to
penalty), as he wishes. Exception must be made, however, for public
vows taken in religious institutes and for the vow of chastity and
celibacy taken in the reception of subdeaconship, for the law of the
Church on account of the public good decrees that these vows oblige
under grave sin.

2211. Rules for Determining What Is Important Matter in a Vow.--(a) In
personal vows, an act of omission may be made the subject of grave
obligation, if it may be made the subject of grave precept by the
Church (e.g., the hearing of Mass, Confession, Communion, a fast or
abstinence, a Rosary).

(b) In real vows, some fix grave matter according to the standards for
commutative justice (see 1896 sqq.). But such a rule seems unsuitable.
The amounts absolutely and relatively grave in theft are determined by
the wealth of the person stolen from, but, since God is owner of all
things, we do not see how those amounts could be fixed in reference to
Him. On the other hand, the duty of religion obliges more strictly than
that of commutative justice, and hence it does not seem that grave
matter should be the same for both. In practice, the matter is not
grave when it is quite inconsiderable (say less than a dollar), or when
the vower intends only a light obligation. If the matter is not
inconsiderable and the intent of the vower is uncertain, one may decide
as to the obligation of the vow from presumptions based on custom, the
circumstances of the vow, or the rule that grave obligation is not to
be taken for granted (see 709, 714, 659).

2212. Coalescence of Light into Grave Matter.--(a) If the vower has
determined the relation of the items of the vow one to another,
coalescence can be judged from his intention. Thus, if the vower
intends that the items shall be parts of one whole, there is
coalescence (e.g., if he vows to give fifty cents in alms daily and
neglects this for a year, there is grave sin); but if he intends the
items as separate promises, there is no coalescence (e.g., if he vows
to say a Hail Mary every day and neglects this for a year, there are
many venial sins). If some of the items have been performed, others
omitted, and the omissions coalesce, there is grave sin according to
some as soon as a notable quantity is reached, but others believe that
there is grave sin only when a notable percentage (say one-third or
one-fourth) of the matter vowed has been neglected.

(b) If the vower has not determined the relation between the items of
the vow, the presumption as a rule favors coalescence in real vows,
non-coalescence in personal vows (as in the examples of a vow to give
fifty cents daily and of a vow to say a Hail Mary every day). But there
are exceptions, as when one vows to give a small alms every Saturday in
honor of the Blessed Virgin, for the chief intention in this case may
be to show respect to the Mother of God and not to give a certain
amount to the poor.

2213. The Time When a Vow Obliges.--(a) A negative vow (e.g., not to
drink certain intoxicants) obliges at once and always (see 371).

(b) An affirmative vow to which the vower has annexed a time for
fulfillment obliges at the time determined. If the time was intended as
a principal circumstance (e.g., a vow to say the Rosary on the Feast of
the Assumption), the vow ceases with that time, even though performance
was culpably neglected; but if the time was intended only as a
secondary circumstance (e.g., a vow to go to confession next week made
by one who needs it badly), the vow continues in force even after the
time set has elapsed without fulfillment (see 468 sqq.). Anticipation
of fulfillment on account of inability to fulfill at the time appointed
in the vow, is not necessary, unless the vow was attached to a certain
space and cannot be fulfilled in the latter part of this space; for
example, if one has vowed to say the Rosary today and foresees that the
whole afternoon will be occupied, one should say the Rosary in the
forenoon (see 470, 471).

(c) An affirmative vow for which the vower has fixed no special time
should be accomplished as soon as this can be conveniently done, for
such is the rule in every absolute promise, and, moreover, no better
time for fulfillment can be assigned; “When thou hast made a vow to the
Lord thy God, thou shalt not delay to pay it, because the Lord thy God
will require it. And if thou delay it shall be imputed to thee for a
sin” (Deut., xxiii. 21).

2214. Delay in Fulfilling Vow.--Sin may be committed by delaying to
keep a gravely obligatory vow for which no date was set.

(a) There is no sin if the delay is reasonable in view of the
subject-matter of the vow (e.g., to put off a Rosary or fast for two or
three days, a pilgrimage of 50 miles for a week, a pilgrimage of 1000
miles for several months, etc.) or of the circumstances (e.g., if one
has to delay entrance into religion until one has better health or has
closed up a business).

(b) There is venial sin if the delay is unreasonable but does not
notably diminish what is promised or endanger its fulfillment. Thus, a
Rosary, a fast, or a pilgrimage is as good next year as this year, and,
apart from danger of forgetting or omitting, no lapse of time seems to
constitute a notable delay in respect to such obligations.

(e) There is mortal sin if the delay is unreasonable and notably
depreciates what is promised or notably endangers performance of the
vow. Thus, to put off the fulfillment of a vow to enter religion
lessens the value of the thing promised, if one waits until old age; it
imperils the promise, if one remains in the world for several years
exposed to the danger of losing vocation. Moralists hold that three or
four years would be a considerable delay in reference to a vow to enter
religion.

2215. The Person Obliged to Fulfill a Vow.--(a) A personal vow obliges
only the vower, because by its nature a vow is a law which one imposes
on oneself (see 463, 1696, 188). But vows taken by a city or community
may be obligatory on the subjects in virtue of law, and vows taken by
ancestors may oblige posterity in virtue of lawful and obligatory
custom. (b) A real vow (and a mixed vow as to the part that is real)
obliges also the heirs, for this kind of vow is a debt of the vower’s
estate (see Canon 1310). The obligation of the heirs is one, not of
religion, but of justice, and they are not held beyond the resources of
the estate.

2216. The Manner of Fulfilling a Vow.--(a) As to Internal
Disposition.--It is not necessary that one have at the time of
fulfillment the purpose of fulfillment, provided there is no intention
exclusive of that purpose, for the vow binds one only to do what was
promised (cfr. 477). Hence, if one has vowed to hear Mass and then
hears a Mass out of devotion, not thinking of the vow, one may take
this assistance at Mass as a satisfaction of the vow.

(b) As to External Performance.--If a vow is personal, one must perform
it personally, for one’s own act was promised, and hence, if personal
performance becomes impossible, it is not necessary or valid to use a
proxy; if a vow is real, one may use goods given by others, but one is
not obliged in case of poverty to seek the goods of another, since
one’s own goods were promised.

2217. The Obligation of Certain Kinds of Vows.--(a) Conditional
Vow.--The vower is not obliged by the vow unless the condition is
fulfilled, and this is probably true even when the condition is
equivalently, but not formally, fulfilled (e.g., Titus, who has to
support his mother, vows to enter religion as soon as she contracts
marriage, but the mother unexpectedly dies and Titus is thus freed of
her support). The vower is not guilty of sin against the vow if he
prevents the fulfillment of the condition, unless he uses unlawful
means. Such means are not employed if one is not obliged to fulfill the
condition (e.g., a vow to pay an alms of $10 if one gets drunk), or if
non-fulfillment is due to weakness, not to the purpose to defeat the
vow (e.g., a vow to pay an alms of $100, if one remains sober for a
year, when the vower becomes intoxicated accidentally or through
frailty before the year is up), or if non-fulfillment is due to the
exercise of one’s right (e.g., a vow to enter religion if one’s parents
consent, when the vower in lawful ways persuades his parents not to
consent). The vower is guilty of sin against the vow, if he uses
unlawful means to prevent the condition’s fulfillment (e.g., if he gets
drunk purposely in order to evade the alms promised for sobriety, or if
he uses fraud or force to keep his parents from consenting to a vow
which he has made dependent on their consent).

(b) Penal Vow.--The vower is not obliged by the vow if the act against
which the vow is made is committed by him but is not sinful (e.g.,
Claudius vowed not to play cards, but on a certain occasion did play
after having received a dispensation), or is only materially sinful
(e.g., Balbus vowed not to use profane language, but on a certain
occasion did use such language inadvertently), or is not sinful against
the vow, at least if the penalty is for violation of the vow (e.g.,
Caius vowed not to quarrel under penalty of an alms for breaking the
promise, but on a certain occasion did quarrel, adverting to the sin
against charity, but not to the vow), or is venially sinful on account
of the imperfection of the act, at least if the penalty is grave. If
the vower has not determined the number of times the penalty is to be
paid, it seems that it should be paid only after the first fault, if
the penalty is grave and one that is not customarily repeated (e.g., a
distant pilgrimage, a large alms), but should be repeated after every
fault if the penalty is slight and one that is customarily repeated
(e.g., a decade of the Rosary, a small alms).

(c) Disjunctive Vow.--The vow is null if one of the objects to be
chosen from is evil, vain or impossible (e.g., a vow either to earn or
to steal the money for an alms). The vower is held to nothing if before
his choice one of the things to be chosen from has become impossible
(e.g., Claudius vows to give one or the other of two chalices he owns,
but before he makes his choice one of the chalices is stolen), or if
after his choice the thing chosen becomes impossible (e.g., Claudius
decided to give the larger of two chalices, but before he could give
it, it was stolen). The vower is held, however, if one of the things to
be chosen from has become impossible before choice through the vower’s
own fault (e.g., Claudius’ chalice was stolen before his choice because
he had culpably delayed to make a choice), or if the thing not chosen
has become impossible after the choice (e.g., Claudius decided to give
the large chalice and the small one was stolen afterwards).

(d) Doubtful Vow.--Doubts about the essentials, that is, whether a vow
was really made (e.g., whether it was a vow or only a resolution,
whether there was the requisite intention or deliberation, whether the
vow was invalid on account of fear, etc.), or whether a vow certainly
made was fulfilled, must be settled according to the principles for
directing a doubtful conscience (see 672 sqq.). Thus, if it is more
probable that a vow was made or that a vow was not fulfilled, the
decision must be for obligation according to the Probabiliorists; but
if there remains a positive doubt whether only a resolution was made,
or whether a vow was fulfilled, there is no obligation according to the
Probabilists. Doubts about accidentals, that is, whether a vow was of
this kind or that (e.g., the circumstances of quality, quantity,
number, etc.), must be settled according to reasonable rules of
interpretation of the mind of the vower.

2218. General Rules of Interpretation of Doubtful Vows.--(a) Private
vows must be interpreted according to the expressed or presumptive
intention of the vower, for a vow is a private law, and the vower the
lawmaker. (b) Public vows must be interpreted according to the sound
doctrine of approved authorities on theology and Canon Law.

2219. Special Rules for Interpreting the Mind of the Vower.--(a) A
doubtful vow should be interpreted from internal evidence, that is,
from the language of the vow itself and the significance usually
attached to the terms used, for the presumption is that the vower meant
to express himself in the ordinary speech used for vows. Thus, a vow of
“virginity” usually means the same as a vow of “chastity,” and should
be so understood unless there is reason for a stricter interpretation.
The language of a vow is to be understood in the light of the purpose
of the vower (e.g., a vow to give a chalice to a church does not mean a
glass chalice, since the Church employs only chalices of precious
metal); a vow to hear Mass daily does not mean that one must hear two
Masses on Sunday, since the purpose of the vow is to let no day pass
without assistance at Mass.

(b) A doubtful vow that cannot be sufficiently construed from internal
evidence should be judged from general presumptions, that is, from the
custom as regards the vow taken (e.g., one who vows an alms is
understood to promise the amount that others in his condition promise),
from the custom or law as regards the matter of the vow (e.g., one who
vows a perpetual fast is understood to promise a fast on days other
than Sundays and holydays, for the church law distinguishes between
fast days and feast days), from the rules governing the interpretation
of laws (e.g., since things odious are to be of strict interpretation,
he who vows to give something may himself determine what he wishes to
give, provided it is not ridiculously small), from the conditions that
are implied in every vow as to possibility, the rights of others,
change in circumstances, etc. (e.g., he who promises to become a
religious means that he will do so, if a Religious Order will accept
and keep him; he who promises a gift means that he will give without
prejudice to the claims of third parties, etc.).

2220. The Advantages of Vows to the Vowers.--(a) A first advantage is
that a vow strengthens the will of the vower to do good and avoid evil.
This is an important advantage, since human nature is so weak and
inconstant and so much in need of helps that will add resolution and
perseverance to its efforts. The vow is a promise binding not only in
honor but also as a religious duty, and an act that has a special claim
on divine assistance and a favorable answer, and hence it is a powerful
ally to a virtuous life. True, he who takes a vow is subject to greater
sin if he is unfaithful. But there is no good that has not some risk
attached to it, and the risk here is due, not to the vow itself, but to
the weakness of the will which may use it improperly. The person who
thinks only of the dangers of storms will neither sow nor reap
(Eccles., xi. 4).

(b) A second advantage is that a vow makes the good done more
meritorious and praiseworthy. It adds to the virtue practised (e.g.,
abstinence) the virtue that directs (viz, divine worship or religion,
the most excellent among the moral virtues); it offers God a more
perfect subjection, since it presents to Him, not only a single act
here and now, but the power itself of the will to do the opposite; it
acts from a greater resolution and firmness, a circumstance that gives
perfection to virtue. All this should be understood _per se_, or with
the qualification “other things being equal”; for if we suppose that a
person who has no vow serves God with great charity and fervor, there
is no doubt that he is better before God than one who has vows and
performs them carelessly and reluctantly.

2221. When a Good Vow May Be Sinful.--A vow good in itself may be
sinful or the occasion of sin on account of the dispositions of the
vower.

(a) Thus, in taking vows one commits sin if one acts imprudently in not
taking into consideration the circumstances. Hence, before making a vow
one should consider carefully and consult one’s confessor or director
or some other prudent man.

(b) After taking vows one commits sin by regrets, if these regrets
include the desire not to comply with obligations (e.g., when one
regrets having lived up to a vow in the past or intends not to live up
to it in the future, or when one keeps the vow only from human motives
and wishes one could violate it), or if they manifest ingratitude
towards God (e.g., when one regrets without good reason that one ever
took the vow). The sin committed by desire not to comply with
obligation is mortal or venial according to the nature of the
obligation; the sin of ingratitude is venial. There is no sin at all,
it seems, if for a reasonable cause one regrets having made a vow or
wishes there were no obligation to perform something of supererogation
that one vowed, unless by such wishes one is exposed to temptations and
the danger of sinning against the vow.

2222. Merit of Fulfilling a Vow that One Regrets.--If one regrets
having made a vow but intends to keep it, is the good work performed
better by reason of the vow?

(a) If the intention to keep the vow is prompted by a religious motive
(e.g., the desire to please God or the fear to offend Him), the good
work is more meritorious than if there were no vow, for it has the
double value of an act of religion and of an act of some other virtue,
of a good work done and of a vow to do it.

(b) If the intention to keep the vow is prompted by a human motive
(e.g., the desire to please some human person or to secure some
temporal benefit), the good work is not made more meritorious, but
indeed is not meritorious at all, since not done for God’s sake.

2223. Who Can Make a Vow?--Every person living in the state of mortal
existence, whether Catholic or non-Catholic, is able to take a vow,
unless there is an impediment of natural or positive law.

(a) Natural law excludes vows made by those who are not masters of
their own acts or who have not the use of reason; for, since a vow is a
law which one knowingly places on oneself, it cannot be made by those
who have not the right of disposition over their acts or who do not
understand the meaning of the obligation. Hence, religious and other
subject persons are restricted as to the right of making vows, while
infants and insane persons are utterly incapable of making a vow.

(b) Positive law of the Church has laid down certain conditions for the
validity of public vows (e.g., age, performance of the novitiate,
etc.), and hence those persons in whom the conditions are not found are
incapable of taking these vows. The power of binding and loosing has
been given the Church, and the regulations on public vows exercise this
power for the benefit of the Church as a whole and of the persons who
take vows, As to private vows, it is a matter of dispute whether the
Church has the power to appoint conditions for them, since they are
internal acts (see 426), but it seems that no such conditions have ever
been made.

2224. Twofold Dependence on the Will of Another.--Those who are not
masters of their own acts are unable to vow on account of their
subjection to or dependence on the will of another. There is a twofold
dependence of this kind.

(a) There is a dependence of the will of the subject, as in the case of
religious who have vowed obedience to their rule and superiors, and in
the case of those who have not attained the age of puberty and who must
be guided and ruled by their father or guardian. This dependence means,
not that the subject must have the positive consent of the superior for
every act, but that he must not will or do anything contrary to the
just will of the superior.

(b) There is a dependence of the matter of the vow, when it is subject
to the wishes of another person, as happens in the case of those who
have obligations to others. Thus, a wife cannot make a vow of chastity
without the consent of her husband, otherwise she infringes upon
conjugal rights; a servant cannot make a vow to spend in visiting
churches time for which he is paid; a son who lives with his parents
and is not emancipated cannot vow to give his earnings in alms, for he
owes them to his family.

2225. The Validity of Vows Made by Subjects.--(a) If the vow is against
the rights of another person, it is invalid without his consent. Thus,
if a wife makes a vow of chastity without her husband’s consent, the
vow obliges her to ask his consent, but it has no force if he refuses
his consent.

(b) If the vow is against the subjection due another, it is invalid if
he denies his consent. Thus, if a religious vows an act for which
according to his rule permission must be sought, the vow has no actual
force until the permission is obtained; if he vows an act that is good
in itself, but absolutely forbidden in his rule (e.g., if a novice
bound to remain in the cloister vowed to go on a pilgrimage), the vow
is null, since it is better to keep the rule.

(c) If the vow is neither against the right of another nor against the
subjection due, it seems that the vow is valid without the knowledge
and consent of the superior. Thus, if a religious privately vows to do
what is commanded in a particular law or rule, or what is counselled by
his superiors, or what is good and not forbidden, the vow is valid
until annulled by the superior; for, as was said in the previous
paragraph, the subject is not bound to have the positive consent of his
superior for all acts, and it is supposed now that the thing vowed is
not detrimental to the rights of the superior or others.

2226. Cessation of Vows.--Since a vow is a private law, it may cease,
just as a law ceases in certain cases (see 500 sqq.). There are,
therefore, two ways in which a vow ceases or ceases to oblige.

(a) The vow ceases from within, or from internal causes, when the
matter of the vow has so changed as to be detrimental or useless, or
the purpose of the vow is no longer served by the vow. For the nature
of a vow is that it promotes a better good to the greater glory of God.
It is clear also that a temporary vow ceases when the time limit fixed
to it has expired, and that a conditional vow ceases if the condition
is not fulfilled (e.g., one vows an alms of thanksgiving if one’s
mother recovers from sickness, but she dies).

(b) The vow ceases from without, or from external causes, when it is
removed or suspended by the authority of God to whom it was made
(dispensation) or by the authority of one who has power over the will
of the vower or over the matter of the vow (annulment), or even by the
authority of the vower himself in so far as belongs to him the right to
substitute some equal or better work for the work vowed (commutation).

2227. Public vows do not cease from intrinsic causes, for this would be
productive of many disadvantages to religious communities and to those
who take vows in them. The chief cases in which private vows cease for
internal reasons are as follows:

(a) They cease on a substantial change in the thing promised, for then
the subject-matter has become morally different. There is a substantial
change if the matter of the vow has become illicit (e.g., Titus vowed
an alms to a beggar, but he learns that the beggar will use the alms to
become drunk), or if it has become useless (e.g., Claudius vowed not to
visit a certain house on account of the bad language used there, but
the guilty parties have now moved away), or if it has become an
obstacle to a greater good (e.g., Balbus vowed to go on a pilgrimage,
but an epidemic has broken out and it is better for him to remain home
and care for the sick), or if it has become impossible (e.g.,
Sempronius vowed to give an alms, but lost his money and cannot afford
to keep the promise). Some also think there is a substantial change
when circumstances are so different that, had the vower been able to
foresee them, he would not have taken the vow.

(b) They cease on the disappearance of the principal reason that
induced the vower to make his promise. Thus, if Caius vows a sum of
money to an institution solely because it is poor and it becomes
wealthy before he has fulfilled his vow, his obligation is at an end
(see Canon 1311).

2228. Annulment of Vows.--The annulment of a vow is made in two ways,
directly and indirectly. A full treatment of this subject will be found
in commentaries on Canons 1312, 499, 88, 89, 675, 501.

(a) Direct annulment is the operation of a person distinct from the
vower which, by affecting immediately the vower’s act, recalls the vow
and makes it of no force. Hence, this kind of annulment may be
exercised by all those who have such private authority over the will of
the vower as to be able either to confirm or to cancel his acts.
Private authority over the will of another is contained in the paternal
power of the father over his children, in the domestic power of the
husband over his wife, and in the governing power of a religious
superior over his subjects. The paternal power may be exercised to
annul the vows of children (at least, of those who have not reached
puberty), since these children are incompetent to decide for
themselves. The governing power also may annul directly the private
vows of professed subjects made after profession, since these subjects
have made a quasi-contract of submission in this matter. The domestic
power of the husband, according to some, cannot directly annul the
post-matrimonial vows of the wife, since the wife is competent to
direct herself in these affairs, and has made no engagement of
subjection in their regard; but others argue that at least positive law
(Num., xxx. 2-17; Eph., v. 24) gives the husband this authority. The
paternal power in this matter is had, not only by the father, but also
by those who take his place (such as the guardian or the mother); the
governing power is had by religious superioresses, by immediate and
other regular superiors, by bishops in reference to their non-exempt
communities, and by the Pope in reference to all communities.

(b) Indirect annulment is the operation of a person distinct from the
vower which, by affecting the matter or object of the vow, suspends the
obligation produced by the vow. Hence, this kind of annulment may be
exercised by all those who have a right over the matter of the vow,
when and as long as the vow is prejudicial to their right. Thus, the
Pope may annul a vow of any of the faithful that is detrimental to his
rights or the rights of the Church; parents may annul the vows even of
their children who have attained puberty, when these vows interfere
with family order; religious superiors may annul the vows of novices
that are harmful to religious discipline; husbands and wives may annul
each other’s vows that trespass on conjugal rights; a master may annul
a vow of his servant that keeps the servant from performing work due
the master.

2229. Reason Necessary for Annulment of a Vow.--Is a just reason
necessary for annulment of a vow? (a) For validity it is not necessary
that there be a just reason, since there is always the implicit
condition in a vow: “unless the superior or other person whose consent
is necessary refuses.” (b) For lawfulness it is necessary that there be
a just reason, for it is not lawful to deprive God of honor promised
Him, unless one has a good reason to do so (see Canon 1312). But the
sin committed by one who annuls or who asks for annulment without
sufficient reason does not regularly exceed a venial sin.

2230. Differences between Direct and Indirect Annulment.--(a) Direct
annulment extinguishes a vow, since it affects the act of vowing
itself, and hence, if a father annuls the vow of his son who has not
reached the age of fourteen, the vow ceases entirely. Indirect
annulment, on the contrary, only suspends a vow, since it affects only
the matter of the vow and this matter may be withdrawn from the power
of him who annuls. Thus, if a master annulled the vow of his cook to
hear Mass daily, the vow would revive when the cook took service
elsewhere.

(b) He who has power to annul directly may exercise the power even
though he granted permission for the vow, or promised not to annul it,
or gave his approval to it; for he retains his power over his subject
and may change his own decision. But he who has only indirect power of
annulment more probably may not annul once he has given his permission
or ratification to a vow; for his power is only over the matter of the
vow, and this, after he has consented to its dedication to God, is no
longer under his control.

2231. Dispensation.--A dispensation is the relaxation of a vow granted
in the name of God by one who has competent jurisdiction.

(a) It is a relaxation, that is, it removes the obligation (see 401).
Thus, a dispensation differs from a mere declaration or interpretation
that a law is not binding.

(b) It is a relaxation of the vow, that is, the dispensation, at least
in modern practice, takes away not only the obligation but also the vow
itself. It is not merely a suspension or a commutation, but a total
removal of the vow.

(c) It is granted in the name of God; that is, the dispenser acting for
God remits the promise that was made to God. Thus, a dispensation
differs from an annulment, for the latter is made by the annuller in
his own name on account of the authority he has over the will of the
vower or over the matter of the vow.

(d) It is given by one who has competent jurisdiction, that is, public
spiritual authority in the Church over the external forum. For, as a
vow is an obligation to God, it cannot be removed without the act of
those whom God has appointed as His representatives in spiritual
matters. Here again a dispensation differs from an annulment, for the
latter requires, not the power of jurisdiction, but only dominative or
domestic power.

2232. Reasons Sufficient for a Dispensation.--A dispensation is granted
in the name of God, and therefore, unlike an annulment, it requires a
just reason for its validity; for the remission of a religious promise
cannot be satisfactory to God, unless there exists a justifying reason.
A dispensation conceded for insufficient reasons is invalid, even
though all the parties concerned were in good faith; but, in doubt, the
presumption is that the reasons were sufficient. The reasons sufficient
for a dispensation can be reduced to two classes: (a) the public good
of the community or of the Church (e.g., if a person bound by vow leads
a dissolute life to the scandal of the public); (b) the private good of
the vower (e.g., if he finds the observance of the vow too difficult,
if he took the vow without much deliberation or with such fear as is
insufficient to nullify, see 2195, 2196).

2233. Sinfulness of an Unnecessary Dispensation from Vows.--(a) The
superior who grants the dispensation is guilty if he is certain that
there is no sufficient reason for it, or if he doubts whether there is
any reason for it. But he dispenses validly and lawfully, if he is
certain that there is a reason for the dispensation, but doubts whether
the reason is sufficient (see 407), Usually, a superior who has been
asked for a dispensation should not be anxious about his right to give
it, for the very insistence of the subject indicates that the vow has
become harmful or useless.

(b) The subject is guilty if he asks for a dispensation while knowing
that he has no right to ask for it, or if he uses it while knowing that
there was manifestly no sufficient reason for it. But in case of doubt
whether the reason was sufficient, the subject should be guided by the
judgment of the superior, not by his own, for the decision belongs to
the superior.

2234. Persons Who Have the Power of Dispensation.--The Church has the
power to dispense both public and private vows, for Our Lord gave this
power when He said: “Whatsoever thou shalt loose upon earth, shall be
loosed in heaven” (Matt., xvi. 19), and the power thus given has been
exercised from the beginning (see 314). Those who have the power of
dispensation are the following:

(a) the Pope, since he is the Vicar of Christ, has the fullness of
dispensing power. He may dispense from every dispensable vow, solemn
vows included, and there are certain vows from which he alone may
dispense. The vows reserved to the Pope or his delegate are almost all
public vows and the two private vows of perfect and perpetual chastity
and of entrance into a Religious Order of solemn vows. The two latter
vows are reserved, however, only when made absolutely and with perfect
freedom by one who has completed his or her eighteenth year;

(b) local Ordinaries (and superiors with quasi-episcopal jurisdiction,
such as regular prelates) can dispense from the non-reserved vows. In
certain cases, such as urgent necessity or a doubtful vow, they can
also dispense from the two private vows reserved to the Pope. These
matters are treated more fully by canonists, especially in connection
with Canons 258 and 1045. It is the common opinion that regular
confessors who have the privileges of Mendicants can dispense, either
in confession or outside of confession, from all non-reserved vows not
made principally for the advantage of a third party and accepted by
him. Parish-priests and other confessors may dispense from a vow of
chastity discovered at the last moment when all preparations have been
made for marriage (see Canon 1045).

2235. Dispensation from Religious Vow of Chastity.--Does the Church
dispense from the vow of chastity taken in religious profession or in
the reception of Sacred Orders?

(a) There are no known examples of public dispensation of priestly
celibacy for the sake of contracting marriage, but dispensations are
granted from the religious vow of chastity.

(b) There have been cases in which subdeacons and deacons were
permitted to marry for the sake of some common good of the Church or of
a nation, and in which the marriages of priests were validated, as at
the time of the Anglican Schism and of the French Revolution. But the
clerics thus dispensed were forbidden the exercise of their clerical
powers.

2236. Dispensation from a Vow Made for the Benefit of a Third
Party.--(a) If the promise is gratuitous and not yet accepted by the
third party, the dispensation can be given; for in such a case the only
obligation is one arising from the vow, and the Church can dispense
from vows. Hence, if one vowed to have Masses said for the soul of a
deceased person or to give alms to the poor without determining any
particular persons, the vows can be dispensed.

(b) If the promise is gratuitous and accepted by the third party, but
is made chiefly in honor of God and only secondarily for the benefit of
the third party, it is probable that the dispensation can be given. For
that which is secondary in the promise should follow that which is
primary, and here the vow, which is the primary intention, is
dispensable.

(c) If the promise is gratuitous and accepted, but the purpose to
benefit the third party is not subordinate to the purpose to make a
vow, or if the promise is onerous, the dispensation cannot regularly be
given. The reason is that in these cases there is question not only of
a vow but also of a contract, not only of an obligation to God but also
of an obligation to man, and justice demands that the rights of a party
to a contract be not taken away without his consent. Thus, a vow of
stability made on entrance into a Congregation cannot be dispensed
without the consent of the Congregation itself, for the vow was also a
contract between the Congregation and the vower. There are exceptions,
however, as when the third party renounces his right, or when the Pope,
in virtue of his supreme authority over ecclesiastical goods or of his
dominative authority, grants a dispensation for which there are just
and sufficient reasons.

2237. Persons Who May Be Dispensed from Vows.--(a) Dispensation may be
granted to subjects and, in certain cases, even to non-subjects. Thus,
a superior whose faculty is not restricted may dispense himself (see
403); but it is advisable that dispensation be always sought from
another person on account of the danger of self-deception. A local
Ordinary also has the power to dispense, not only his own subjects, but
also outsiders who are in his territory (see Canon 1313).

(b) Dispensation may be given either in the confessional or outside of
the confessional, unless the contrary is stipulated in the faculty. It
is more suitable, however, that it be given in the confessional.

(e) Dispensation may not be granted except to those who are willing to
accept it, and in this respect it differs from an annulment, which may
be made even against the will of the vower. The reason for this is that
the vower placed the obligation on himself freely (see 403). This holds
at least as regards the dispensation of a private vow.

2238. Commutation of Vows.--The commutation of a vow is the
substitution of some good work for the one promised by vow with the
transfer of the religious obligation to the new work. Commutation
differs from annulment and dispensation, for these take away the
obligation while commutation only changes the matter, the obligation of
the vow remaining unchanged. Thus, if the vow to make a pilgrimage is
commuted into prayers, one is no longer obliged to make the pilgrimage,
but one is bound under vow to say the substituted prayers. The power of
the Church to commute vows is clear from what was said above about the
power of dispensation, for he who can do what is greater can also do
what is less.

2239. Kinds of Good Works that May Be Substituted for Vows.--(a) The
good work can be a better work than the old one, that is, a work which,
if not more difficult, is more pleasing to God and more spiritually
advantageous to the vower. Hence, if one has vowed to give an alms to a
poor stranger, the vow may be commuted, if the stranger has not
accepted the promise, in favor of another stranger who is poorer or in
favor of one’s father who is also poor.

(b) The good work may be a work equally good, that is, one which
morally speaking has the same difficulty or spiritual value. Thus, one
prayer may be exchanged for another of equal length, one alms for
another of equal amount, one pilgrimage for another of equal distance.
But equality is to be determined, not mathematically but morally, and
hence one kind of work may be exchanged for another, one kind of vow
for another, and it is not necessary that the works be of exactly the
same worth. In fact, the new work, which objectively is only equal, is
subjectively better, since it is more advantageous to the vower.

(c) The good work may be a work less good, that is, one which is
clearly less difficult or meritorious, as when a Mass is commuted into
a Rosary.

2240. Persons Who Have Authority to Commute a Vow.--(a) The commutation
of a non-reserved vow into something better or equally good may be made
by the vower himself, if there are no rights of a third party to forbid
this. For the ends of the original vow (viz., the honor of God and the
spiritual welfare of the vower) are thus better or at least equally
served. But ordinarily one should not commute one’s own vows, since for
most persons it is not an easy matter to decide what is a better or an
equal good. How many understand the respective rank of the virtues? And
even if one does know, for example, that religion is better than
temperance, one cannot decide from this alone that a Rosary is an equal
or a better substitute for a fast. One who wishes commutation for his
vow, therefore, should consult his confessor or another priest.

(b) The commutation of a vow into something less good can be granted
only by the one who has a special faculty; for this kind of commutation
partakes of the nature of a dispensation, inasmuch as it relaxes to
some extent the original vow. Those who have the power of dispensing
(e.g., regular confessors who have the privileges of Mendicants) have
also the power of commuting; but those who have only the power of
commuting may not change a vow into something that is of notably less
value. A good rule to follow in commuting a vow into something less is
that more frequent reception of the Sacraments be the substitute
ordered. The limitations on dispensations by reason of the rights of
third parties (see above 2236) apply also to commutations.

2241. The Cause Required for Commutation of a Vow.--(a) For commutation
into something better no cause is required, since the new work is its
own justification. (b) For commutation into something of equal value,
some cause is required, since it is a mark of inconstancy and therefore
displeasing to God to give over one’s promises without good reason. But
a light reason is sufficient, such as greater devotion or less danger
of violating the vow. (c) For commutation into something of less value,
a proportionate reason is necessary, not only for lawfulness, but also
more probably for validity, since this kind of commutation is a partial
dispensation. But the reason need not be so serious as that needed for
a full dispensation.

2242. Reversion to Original Vow.--The return to the original vow by one
whose vow has been commuted is always lawful, and in certain cases may
be obligatory.

(a) It is lawful, even though the vow was commuted into something
better; for a commutation is a privilege, and there is no obligation of
using a personal privilege (see 523). Some authors hold that this
doctrine does not apply when the vower himself commuted his vow into
something better, but the common opinion is that the principle of
privilege applies to every case, and that one may even choose between
different works if a vow has been commuted a number of times. Those who
make vows should be on their guard, however, against frequent and
needless changes, since inconstancy is harmful spiritually.

(b) The return to the original vow is obligatory according to some when
the vower commuted his own vow to something better and the new matter
has become impossible; for the effect of the commutation was not to
extinguish the old vow at once, but to offer a satisfaction in its
place, and hence when this satisfaction proves impossible the vow must
be performed. Others deny this and maintain that the old vow is
extinguished immediately, since one who commutes a former vow is
immediately held under vow to the substituted work. All agree, however,
that if the commutation is granted by authority, the old vow is
extinguished and there is no duty to return to it if the substituted
work becomes impossible, even though the impossibility is due to the
vower’s own fault. Hence, if a pilgrimage is commuted into a fast and
the vower through his carelessness becomes sick and unable to fast,
there is no obligation either to make the pilgrimage or to fast. It
should be noted, though, that private vows made before religious
profession are suspended only so long as the vower remains in the
institute he has joined, and hence, if he is dismissed or leaves, the
vows revive (Canon 1315).

2243. Duties of Confessors in Reference to Private Vows.--(a) A
confessor should not readily permit penitents to take private vows,
since a vow is a serious matter and should receive mature deliberation.
A vow taken hastily in a fit of fervor will likely be soon repented of
(see 2221). But if it seems that a penitent will be benefited by a vow,
the confessor should give permission, though it will frequently be
advisable to limit the duration of the vow at first to a month or a
year or other fixed period.

(b) Nor should a confessor be easy in recommending commutations of
private vows, lest those who have taken them be encouraged to make
continual changes. On the other hand, if there is a good reason for a
change (such as danger or difficulty in the old matter or greater
devotion in the new matter), the confessor should not stand in the way
of a commutation. Confessors who have not the faculties must have
recourse to authority for dispensations and dispensative commutations,
and the same course is advised for some difficult cases of annulment
(e.g., when a husband and wife have made a mutual vow of continence).

2244. External Acts of Religion in Honor of God.--We now pass on to
consider those external acts of religion in which the worshipper makes
use of divine things in order to show honor to God (see 2175). These
sacred things are of two classes, namely, objects whose use is the
sanctification of man (Sacraments and sacramentals) and words whose use
is the power they have on others or the manifestation of reverence
towards God (the Divine Name). Sacraments and sacramentals will be
dealt with later. For the present we shall speak of the honor shown to
God by the use of His Name, and hence we shall take up in turn the
following subjects: (a) use of the divine name to confirm before others
one’s declarations or promises (oaths); (b) use of the divine name to
move others to do or omit something (adjuration); (c) use of the divine
name to express praise and invocation.

2245. Oaths.--An oath is the calling upon God to witness the truth of
what we say.

(a) It is a calling upon God; that is, it is the selection of God as
the witness of what is said. The oath is not merely an address made to
others or a declaration that a fact is known to God (e.g., “God knows
she has been a good woman”); it is an address or invocation made to God
Himself. Neither is it a mere prayer that God will in some way bring
out the truthfulness of what is said; it is an appeal to Him to
corroborate that truthfulness by His own testimony. Neither does it
appeal to testimony already given (e.g., the words of God found in
Sacred Scripture), but to testimony to be given about the present
matter. A prayer to God to prove one’s innocence or the proof of a
theological proposition from the Word of God is not, therefore, an oath.

(b) It is a calling on God, and hence if appeal is made to some
creature (e.g., in the expression, “upon my word of honor”) or to some
false deity (e.g., “By Jove, I’ll do that”), there is no oath.

(c) It calls on God to bear witness; that is, it confirms the truth of
one’s words by God Himself, who can neither deceive nor be deceived. He
who swears does not ask that God intervene here and now by some visible
or miraculous sign, but that God confirm, where and when it pleases
Him, what is said, at least on that day when He will clear up the
hidden things of darkness and reveal the secrets of hearts (I Cor., iv.
5). The proving force of the oath is that one who believes in God will
not be so wicked or rash as to call upon the All-Holy to defend
iniquity and falsehood.

2246. The Various Kinds of Oaths.--(a) By reason of the matter, an oath
is either assertory or promissory. An assertory oath refers to the past
or present (e.g,, “I swear that I saw the accident,” “I swear that I am
insolvent”), a promissory oath to the future (e.g., “I swear that I
will execute my office faithfully”). The promissory oath is either
without a pact made with another (e.g., in the comminatory oath, “I
swear that I will prosecute, if you do that”) or with a pact. This
latter oath is called confirmatory, and, according as the pact is with
God or with man or with both, it is either a sworn vow, or a sworn
contract, or a sworn vow and contract.

(b) By reason of its mode, an oath is either contestatory (invocatory)
or execratory. The contestatory oath simply calls on God as a witness
(e.g., “God is my witness that this is true,” “I swear by God, etc.”).
The execratory oath asks God, even though the Divine Name is not
expressly mentioned, to punish the swearer in his own person or in the
persons or goods that pertain to him, if the statement made is not true
(e.g., “May God strike me dead, if this is not true!” “May the devil
take my children, if I swear falsely!”). The form commonly used, “So
help me God and these holy Gospels!” has an execratory sense, the
meaning being “May God help me if I speak truly, may He deny me help if
I speak falsely!”

(c) By reason of the person invoked, an oath is either explicit or
implicit. The former calls on God by name (e.g., “God is my witness,”
“I speak the truth in Christ”); the latter calls on some creature as
the reflection of a divine attribute, or in some other way the
representative of God (e.g., the oath of Moses in Deut., xxx. 19: “I
call upon heaven and earth this day to witness that I have offered you
life and death”).

(d) By reason of its legal form, an oath is either solemn or simple,
judicial or extra-judicial. The solemn oath is taken with ceremony
(e.g., before the altar, with hand placed on the Bible, with upraised
hand, etc.); the simple oath is taken privately, without special form
of words or ceremony. The judicial oath is taken in court or in
reference to the public decision of questions of right, fact or
delinquency (e.g., in Canon Law the oaths of calumny, malice, etc.,
which are treated in canonical works); the extra-judicial oath, solemn
or simple, is taken on other occasions (e.g., when two contractants
strengthen their compact by oath). Examples of solemn oaths in the
Bible are found in Gen., xiv. 22, xxiv. 2, 3; Jeremias, xxxiv. 18.

2247. Moral Difference between the Various Kinds of Oaths.--(a)
Essentially, there is no difference, since all the kinds agree in the
principal features mentioned in the definition. (b) Accidentally, there
is a difference in circumstances of form, solemnity, etc. Moreover, one
kind of oath may be more obligatory (e.g., the solemn oath on account
of the special deliberation given it and the scandal caused by its
non-observance is more sacred than the simple oath), or it may have
other species of obligation besides that of religion (e.g., the oath to
keep a compact binds in justice as well as religion).

2248. Lawfulness of Oaths.--(a) It is lawful to take an oath that has
the necessary qualities, for in Scripture God Himself is represented as
swearing (Gen, xxii. 16; Psalm cix. 4, Heb., vi. 13, vii. 21), holy men
swear and are praised for swearing as they should (II Cor., i. 23;
Psalm xiv. 4), and the Church has always made use of oaths. The origin
of oaths is man’s faith in God, and their purpose is the useful one of
lending authority to important assertions. Indeed, an oath is an act of
religion, for men swear only by one who is greater (Heb., vi. 13), and
hence an oath is a profession of reverence for God’s superior
knowledge, truth, and justice.

(b) It is not lawful to take an oath that lacks a necessary quality.
Here we should note an important difference between an oath and other
acts of religion, such as vows. An oath is not desirable for its own
sake, since it is occasioned by human weakness and unreliability;
hence, like medicine and other necessities occasioned by evil, it
should be used only in serious need and sparingly. A vow or other act
of religion, on the contrary, originates from the desire to honor God,
even apart from necessity, and hence it may be used oftener. This
explains why Scripture forbids the habit of swearing (Ecclus., xxiii.
9; Matt., v. 33; James, v. 12); but it is a wrong interpretation of
these texts that sees in them an absolute prohibition of oaths. From
the context and other passages it is clear that the Scriptures just
cited reprove the Pharisees who taught that promiscuous swearing was
lawful, provided only the matter was true or the Divine Name was not
used, and also those persons who delighted to swear on all occasions.

2249. Necessary Qualities of a Lawful Oath.--The necessary qualities
that should accompany an oath are expressed in Jeremias, iv. 2: “And
thou shalt swear, ‘As the Lord liveth,’ in truth, and in judgment and
in justice.” Judgment refers to the good dispositions of the person who
swears, truth and justice to the righteousness of the cause for which
he swears.

(a) Thus, an oath should have judgment; that is, the person who swears
should do so only from serious necessity, with faith and devotion, and
in a manner respectful to God whom he invokes. An oath that lacks
judgment is called incautious or disrespectful, as when one swears
about a trivial matter or swears jokingly.

(b) An oath should have truth; that is, one should not swear except to
that which one believes to be true, after reasonable diligence has been
used in seeking for the truth. An oath that lacks truth is called false
or perjured, as when one swears to what one knows or believes to be
false, or promises what one does not intend to fulfill, or swears that
one is certain when one has only opinion, or swears with a purely
mental reservation, or swears after insufficient investigation of a
matter.

(c) An oath should have justice; that is, one should not promise what
one has no right to promise (e.g., to tell a lie), and one should not
say what one has no right to say (e.g., what is defamatory). The matter
of the oath, then, both as to its object and its circumstances, must be
good, even though one is swearing truthfully and respectfully. An oath
that lacks justice is called a wicked oath, as when one promises under
oath to commit murder, or not to follow what is of counsel, or swears
about a real fact in such a way as to do unnecessary harm to another
person or to boast about one’s own crimes.

2250. Sinful Oaths.--(a) An incautious or disrespectful oath is from
its nature only a venial sin, since its malice consists, not in any
direct injury to the divine truth or other attribute, but only in
levity of mind; and, moreover, it is not opposed to the purpose of an
oath, which is to confirm the truth. But accidentally it may be a
serious sin on account of the scandal it gives (e.g., when a person of
standing swears without necessity), or on account of the danger to
which it exposes the swearer (e.g., when one swears habitually and is
thereby put in the occasion of swearing falsely or unjustly). On
account of the evils of familiarity, etc., to which habitual swearing
leads, Our Lord warn us to be content as a rule to support the truth
with simple assertion or denial (Matt., v. 2). At least for ordinary,
daily communications the word of a Christian or honest man ought to be
sufficient without his oath.

(b) A lying or perjured oath is from the nature of the act always (see
172) a mortal sin, since it consists essentially in contempt for God
and disrespect for His attributes. The perjurer dares to ask God to be
an accomplice in a lie, or else supposes that God can be deceived.
Hence, only by reason of the imperfection of the act can perjury ever
escape the guilt of mortal sin, as when one commits perjury without
sufficient reflection on or full consent to the oath or to its falsity.
Pope Innocent XI condemned the doctrine that perjury is only a light
sin (Denzinger, n. 1174). In Canon Law those who perjure themselves are
debarred from acting as witnesses or giving expert testimony, and are
subject to penalties at the discretion of the Ordinary (see Canons
1757, 1795, 2323). In American civil law perjury is a false oath given
before a tribunal and is a crime against public justice, while
subornation of perjury and false oaths given on private occasions are
also crimes or punishable offenses.

(c) A wicked oath, even though the thing sworn to be true and the oath
be given only after consideration and in a respectful manner, is a sin
against religion and any other virtue it offends. The sin committed by
reason of the oath is from its nature mortal according to some, since
the swearer gravely insults God by asking Him to become a partaker in
sin and by turning into an instrument of sin what should be an act of
religion; others hold that the sin is only venial, since it is not
serious disrespect to ask God to witness the truth of what is true;
others again make the gravity of the sin depend on the wickedness of
the matter or circumstances. This wickedness committed by reason of the
statement or promise is venial or mortal according to the case. Thus,
there is grave injustice in revealing a fact seriously detrimental to
another and which one is bound to keep as confidential; there is venial
scandal in swearing in order to lead another person into a slight fault
of detraction; there is a grave sin of impurity in promising to commit
adultery; there is a light sin of theft in promising to steal a small
sum of money. Finally, others hold that the oath is mortally sinful
when it furthers a grave sin (e.g., an oath confirming serious
detraction), and that it is venial in other cases (e.g., an oath
confirming a boast about past mortal sins).

2251. Mental Reservation in an Oath.-(a) Strict mental reservation
(i.e., the internal restriction of one’s words so that the listener
cannot gather the true meaning, as when one says one has seen Rome,
meaning a picture of Rome) is a lie, and hence cannot be used in an
oath without perjury. See propositions condemned by Innocent XI
(Denzinger, n. 1176).

(b) Wide mental reservation (i.e., the internal restriction of one’s
words that may be gathered by the listener from circumstances, as when
a servant says his master is not at home, meaning that he cannot be
seen) is lawful only when there is some reason of justice or charity
that demands it. Hence, it is a mortal sin to swear with this kind of
reservation when the questioner has the right to know the truth; it is
no sin at all when the questioner has no right to question and mental
reservation is the only escape from a serious evil. If the questioner
has no right to demand an oath and the deponent has no right to use
mental reservation (e.g., when the oath is only private and not
concerned with contract or other important matter), the sinfulness of a
mental reservation is a matter of dispute. Some think the oath is
mortally sinful, because it is gravely irreverent to God to call on Him
to witness testimony meant to deceive. Others think the oath is only
venially sinful, because the offense is not against truth or justice,
but only against judgment or discretion.

2252. Cooperation in Sinful Oaths.--(a) Formal cooperation is never
lawful, because it makes the cooperator will the guilt of what is done.
Thus, he who by command, counsel, promise, etc., induces another to
swear falsely is guilty as the principal or accessory to the crime (see
1513, 1778).

(b) Material cooperation is lawful when there is a sufficient reason
for it, as when a public official demands the oath according to law
from a person who, as he knows, will swear falsely. For the public good
demands that in certain cases oaths be administered, notwithstanding
that for some persons this will prove an occasion of perjury. But the
lawgiver should not multiply temptations by demanding sworn statements
unnecessarily; otherwise the oath becomes a mere formality deprived of
proving value, and the crime of perjury is made common.

2253. Sinful Oaths Demanded or Accepted by Private Persons.--(a)
Incautious or Disrespectful Oaths.--It is not lawful to ask or receive
an oath, when there is no great public or private need for it;
otherwise one makes a sacred act cheap and common. Neither is it lawful
to ask or receive an oath from those who do not believe in oaths (e.g.,
the Mennonites, some Quakers); otherwise one compels another to swear
against his conscience and indevoutly. Those who believe that oaths are
sinful may be required, nevertheless, to bind themselves on their
solemn word of honor, and may be punished in the same manner as
perjurers if they speak falsely.

(b) Perjured Oaths.--It is not lawful for a private person to ask or
receive an oath from another, if he is sure that the latter will commit
perjury; but one may ask and receive an oath, even though one does not
know whether the other person will swear truly or not, if one has a
sufficient reason.

(c) Wicked Oaths.--It is clearly unlawful to ask or receive a wicked
oath, in which something sinful is promised or stated; for the thing
itself is then desired and there is formal cooperation. But it is not
necessarily sinful to ask or receive a wicked oath, in which the
sinfulness is found, not in the matter of the oath, but in the
dispositions of the swearer, for there may be only material
cooperation. Thus, he who exacts a sworn promise of murder agrees to
murder, but he who demands a sworn statement against a third party for
which there is necessity does not necessarily agree to hatred, if the
person taking the oath swears out of hate or revenge.

2254. Fictitious Oaths.--A fictitious oath is one in which a person
swearing externally has no intention internally to call on God as a
witness.

(a) This kind of oath is invalid, for, as was just said, without a real
intention to swear there is no oath. Hence, a fictitious oath produces
no obligation of religion, but there may be an obligation of justice,
as when the oath is the unjust cause of damage to another.

(b) This kind of oath is sinful, for, if it testifies to error, it
includes the grave sin of external dishonor to God; if it testifies to
truth, it includes the venial sin of taking God’s name in vain. The
fictitious oath is a grave sin if the circumstances are such that a
sincere oath is gravely obligatory, as when a superior or judge
lawfully imposes an oath in a serious matter, or the parties to an
important onerous contract bind themselves by oath in order to
strengthen their pact.

2255. Expressions Confused with Oaths.--Expressions that are sometimes
mistakenly confused with sinful swearing are the following: (a) profane
or vulgar talk, such as “Hell,” “The devil,” “Doggone it”; (b) cursing,
such as “Go to hell,” “God damn you,” “Damn it”, (e) contumely, such as
“bastard,” “son of a bitch”; (d) vain use of the name of God, such as
“by God,” “Christ,” etc., when used as common exclamations; (e)
temptation of God, such as: “If there is a God, may He strike me
dead!”; (f) blasphemy, such as: “May God perish, if this is not true!”

The expressions, “This is as true as the Gospel,” “God’s own word is
not more truthful,” “I am as innocent as the Blessed Virgin,” etc., if
used to confirm the truth, are not meant to assert the speaker’s
equality to God and the Saints, and hence they are venial sins of
taking the Lord’s name in vain. But, if they are used to confirm error,
they are mortal sins of blasphemy.

2256. Obligation Imposed by Promissory Oath.--An assertory oath imposes
the obligation of telling the truth and of repairing any damage that
results from the falsity or injustice of the declaration. In addition,
a promissory oath binds one in virtue of religion to perform one’s
promise; for, as said above (2249), an oath must have truth. Hence,
Scripture bids those who have sworn to fulfill the promise (Matt., v.
33) not to make the word of no effect (Num, xxxi. 3). But the thing
promised must be possible and lawful, or otherwise the oath lacks
judgment or justice. (a) Thus, an impossible promise is not binding,
for no one can oblige himself to perform what he cannot perform (cfr.
2201); (b) an unlawful promise is not binding, for no one can oblige
himself to perform what he is bound not to do. Thus, an oath to revenge
murder by murder is null, and sin is committed both in taking and in
keeping it.

2257. Obligation Imposed by Negative Oaths.--The obligation of a sworn
promise not to do what is better (e.g., not to take a vow), or to do
what is vain and useless (e.g., an oath to count the steps one takes),
depends on the circumstances. (a) If there are no rights of a third
party involved, these oaths do not hold (e.g., he who swears not to vow
acts laudably in disregarding the oath). For one may not call God to
witness or be guarantee for that which is less pleasing to Him, or
which in no way honors Him, and for which there is no claim on the part
of a third person. (b) If there are rights of a third party involved,
these oaths oblige one to give the third party what he is entitled to
from the promise (e.g., a nurse who swears to remain with a sick person
may not violate the oath by entering religion).

2258. Obligation of Oath Is Personal.--An oath added to a promise made
to man and obligatory in justice is personal, and hence it binds the
one who makes the oath, but not his heirs (see 2216).

2259. Interpretation of Promissory Oaths.--(a) An oath should be
interpreted strictly, for the presumption is that the promisor intended
to place upon himself the least possible burden. Thus, if a person
swears to observe the statutes of a certain Congregation, it should be
understood that he pledges himself to present, not to future statutes;
if he swears not to gamble, the oath does not forbid games in which
money is not played for. But if the promisor acts deceitfully, the oath
is to be interpreted according to the intention of him who receives the
promise (Canon 1321).

(b) An oath is always subject to the limitations and reservations which
the nature of the case, law, or custom demands. Hence, even though an
oath is made unconditionally, the following conditions are understood:
“If fulfillment will be physically and morally possible,” “saving the
rights of superiors,” “unless the other party renounces his right,”
“unless the other party fails to keep his part of the agreement,”
“unless there comes a notable change in conditions.” If the promisor
explains beforehand to the promisee what he understands by the oath, he
swears only in the sense thus set forth by him.

(c) An oath follows the nature and conditions of the act (e.g.,
resolution, promise, vow, contract) that it confirms, for the accessory
follows the principal. Hence, if the act to which the oath is attached
cannot be obligatory (e.g., an act detrimental to eternal salvation, or
the public good, or the rights of a third party), the oath gives no
strength to this act (Canon 1318); if the act is naturally invalid
(e.g., a promise obtained through substantial fraud), the oath is also
invalid; if the act does not become effective (e.g., a promise not
accepted), neither does the oath become effective; if the act ceases to
oblige (e.g., a promise of secrecy made for a time), the oath also
ceases to oblige; if the act is not obligatory under grave sin, the
oath is not obligatory under grave sin (e.g., if one swears to observe
the statutes of a university, one is not bound to observe those that
are commonly neglected, one commits no sin by transgressing those that
are merely penal or optional, and one commits no grave sin by violating
those that oblige under venial sin).

2260. Kind of Obligation Produced by a Valid Promissory Oath.--(a) The
obligation is one of religion, because the significance of the oath is
that it adds the duty of respect owed to God to the duty of fidelity
owed to the promise. Men swear in order to make their promises more
trustworthy through the sacredness of the oath. The violation of a
promissory oath is, therefore, always a sin against religion. There are
other sins added in some species of oath, namely, a second sin against
religion in case of a sworn vow, a sin against justice and fidelity in
case of a sworn contract, a second sin against religion and a sin
against justice and fidelity in case of a sworn vow and contract (see
2246 a).

(b) The obligation, other things being equal, is less than that
produced by a vow, because the vow binds in virtue of fidelity to God,
but the oath only in virtue of respect. The obligation of fidelity
seems to be stronger, because unfaithfulness always contains
disrespect, but not vice versa. Moreover, in the case of a vow not only
the fulfillment of the promise, but the thing promised itself is
sacred, which is not true in the case of an oath. An assertory oath,
however, seems to be more binding than a vow, because it is a greater
injury to God to make Him the witness for falsehood than to break a
promise made to Him.

2261. Degree of the Obligation of a Valid Promissory Oath.--(a) The
obligation is grave, from the nature of an oath, because the virtue of
religion is preeminent among the moral virtues (see 2146). There is no
doubt that mortal sin is committed when one gives a sworn promise and
has no intention to fulfill it, for this is perjury (see 2250 b); and
also when one unjustly refuses to live up to an important engagement
made under oath, for this is irreligion and injustice in a serious
matter. The remarks on grave matter in vows (2211) apply here, but,
since the vow obliges more strictly, a somewhat greater amount is
needed for serious matter in violation of an oath.

(b) The obligation may be light on account of the smallness of the
matter involved. Even a vow, which is more binding than an oath, may be
of venial obligation in this way (see 2211). A person who makes a
promise under oath, fully intending to keep the promise, but who later
changes his mind without sufficient reason, does not show disrespect to
God, since when the oath was made he intended to abide by it, and does
not seriously injure his neighbor, since, as we suppose, the matter of
the oath is small. The sin, therefore, is one of inconstancy or levity,
and, if there is disrespect, it is slight. Thus, if a person who had
sworn to drink no more wine took a drop now and then, these
transgressions would be only venial. Some authors, however, believe
that every unfaithfulness to a promissory oath, no matter how small the
subject-matter, is a grave sin, because perjury is committed by the
breach of promise. This is commonly denied, because the meaning of a
promissory oath is that God is called on to witness the truth of a
present intention and the obligation (great or small) of a future
performance.

2262. Cessation of Obligation of Promissory Oath.--The obligation of a
promissory oath, like that of a vow (see 2226), ceases intrinsically or
extrinsically.

(a) Intrinsically, an oath ceases when there is a substantial change in
the matter (e.g., it is or has become impossible or unlawful, as in
Herod’s oath to Salome), when the principal reason for the oath has
ceased (e.g., Titus swore to give an alms to Sempronius because the
latter was poor, but before the alms was given Sempronius became rich),
or when the time or condition by which the oath was limited terminates
the obligation.

(b) Extrinsically, an oath ceases by condonation (e.g., when the State
or a private person to whom a sworn promise has been made yields the
right and remits the obligation), by annulment (e.g., when a father
nullifies the oath of his minor child), by dispensation (e.g., when the
Church absolves from an oath taken under grave compulsion), by
commutation (e.g., when the Church changes the matter of a sworn vow
into something more suitable). Those who can annul, dispense or commute
vows have the same power over oaths; but if the dispensation of an oath
is detrimental to others who are unwilling to forego the promise, only
the Apostolic See can dispense, and then on account of a necessary
reason (see Canon 1320).

2263. Adjuration.--Adjuration is the invocation of the name of God used
in a request or command to another person in order to move that person
to do or omit something.

(a) It is an invocation, and in this respect it is like an oath, for
both an oath and an adjuration call upon the name of God.

(b) It calls upon the name of God either explicitly (e.g., “I command
you in the name of God”) or implicitly (e.g., “I beseech you for the
sake of the passion of Christ”). If command or request is made in the
name of a creature and without reference to God’s attributes reflected
in them, there is not, properly speaking, an adjuration, as when one
implores a favor from another person in the name of a Patron Saint, or
of one’s country, parents, friendship, etc.

(c) It is used in a command or a request, and thus it differs from
prayer, which cannot be made in the form of a command. But adjuration
may be used in prayers to God Himself or to the Saints, as is done in
obsecrations.

(d) Its purpose is to move another to an act or omission, and thus it
is different from an oath. The end of an oath is to confirm one’s words
by the testimony of God; the end of an adjuration is to influence
another to a certain course through an appeal to his respect, fear or
love of God.

2264. The Species of Adjuration.--(a) Adjuration is solemn or simple
(private). The solemn adjuration is made in the name of the Church by
her ministers and in the ritual form prescribed by her, as in the
exorcisms of Baptism. The simple adjuration is made by private persons
and without ritual ceremony.

(b) Adjuration is imperative or deprecative. The imperative is given in
the form of a command to inferiors or demons, as when St. Paul writes
to the Thessalonians: “I charge you by the Lord that this epistle be
read” (I Thess., v. 27). The deprecative is given in the form of a
request made to God or to any creature not damned, as when St. Paul
writes to the Romans: “I beseech you, brethren, by the love of God that
you present your bodies a living sacrifice” (Rom., xii. 1).

2265. Qualities of Lawful Adjuration.--Adjuration is lawful and an act
of the virtue of religion, since it professes reverence for the divine
attributes in using them as the most efficacious motives of appeal.
But, like an oath, adjuration must be accompanied by qualities that
make it lawful.

(a) Thus, there must be judgment, and hence those persons are guilty of
sin who employ adjuration without necessity (e.g., those who constantly
urge the love of God and other religious motives when asking for any
favor), or without devotion (e.g., those who in anger are wont to
command “for God’s sake,” etc.). The sin committed does not seem grave,
since there is no great disrespect and the malice consists in taking
God’s name in vain, not in insult.

(b) There must be truth, and hence an adjuration is sinful when used
for a lying cause, as when a well-to-do person pretends to be indigent
and begs that alms be given him for the love of God. The sin committed
does not seem grave, since the act to which the other person is invited
is good, and the act of adjuration itself does not ask God to testify
to the lie, but only uses His name without reason. If the deception is
mortally sinful, however, some authorities think that the adjuration
added to it is a grave sin against religion.

(c) There must be justice, and therefore an adjuration is sinful when
used to obtain something unlawful, as when one demands in the name of
God that another person tell a lie or commit murder. The adjuration is
gravely irreverent to God if the thing sought (e.g., murder) is a
mortal sin; it is lightly irreverent, according to the common opinion,
if the thing sought (e.g., a harmless lie) is only a venial sin.

2266. Persons Who May Be Adjured.--God may be adjured, but only in a
deprecative manner, as is done in the obsecrations, “through Jesus
Christ,” “through Thy Passion and Death,” etc. The purpose of
adjurations addressed to God is not to change the divine decrees, but
to obtain through His goodness what He intended from eternity that we
should obtain by prayer. But the same form of adjuration cannot be used
for all creatures.

(a) Thus, deprecative adjuration may be used in reference to those who
are in some way one’s superiors. Hence, we may pray the Angels and
Saints to grant a prayer for the love of God, and a beggar may ask in
Our Lord’s name that a wealthy man give him an alms.

(b) Imperative adjuration may be used in addressing subjects or
inferiors. Adjuration of demons must not be made in friendly words, nor
with a view to obtaining services or knowledge from them, but in words
of reproach and only as a means to end their nefarious activities.

(e) No kind of adjuration may be used in regard to irrational
creatures, since they are without knowledge sufficient for receiving a
command or a request. The adjurations of animals, the elements,
inanimate objects, etc., that are contained in the Ritual, must be
understood as deprecative adjurations addressed to God, or imperative
adjurations addressed to evil spirits, that the creatures prayed over
may be to our benefit and not to our hurt. Examples are the exorcisms
of water, salt, mice, locusts, houses, or storms.

2267. The Use of Exorcisms.--(a) As to their effect, exorcisms are of
two kinds, exorcisms in the strict sense (i.e., the expulsion of demons
from possessed persons) and exorcisms in the wide sense (i.e., the
diminution of demonic influence). Examples of the former are found in
the Gospels, where Our Lord drives out many evil spirits from afflicted
persons; examples of the latter are found in the exorcisms administered
in Baptism and in the exorcisms of salt, water and other inanimate or
irrational creatures.

(b) As to their manner, exorcisms are also of two kinds, the solemn and
the private. The former are made in the name of the Church in the
manner prescribed by the Ritual, and their administration is reserved
to clerics who have a special and express permission from the Ordinary
(Canon 1151, Sec. 1). The latter kind may be made even by members of the
laity, and we read that certain Saints, like St. Anthony and St.
Catherine of Siena, had great power over evil spirits. It is
recommended that priests frequently use private exorcisms, at least
secretly, for persons who are vexed by temptations or scruples, and for
which they may use the form: “In the name of Jesus Christ, unholy
spirit, I command you to depart from this creature of God.”

2268. The Effects of Adjurations.--(a) Adjurations addressed to one’s
fellow-men upon earth impose no obligation of religion upon the persons
addressed. Hence, if a rich man turns a deaf ear to an appeal for
charity made in the name of God, he violates charity but not religion;
if a child disregards a command urged upon him for the love of God, he
violates obedience but not religion.

(b) Adjurations addressed to demons are not of infallible efficacy, at
least as to the entire effect intended, for power over the spirits of
darkness is given only in such measure as is needed for the propagation
of the Gospel. But we believe that an exorcism pronounced lawfully by
one who has the Order of Exorcist acts _ex opere operato_, at least to
restrain the wickedness of the demons: “In My name they shall cast out
demons” (Mark, xvi. 17).

2269. Praise of God.--Having discussed oaths and adjurations, in which
honor is shown the name of God, and the immediate end of which is or
may be some human advantage, we come now to the honor shown the name of
God by praise in which the immediate end is some spiritual advantage.
Praise is defined as “the declaration of another’s greatness with
approval.” The divine praises include the prayers of wonder, of honor,
of thanksgiving; but they differ from prayer properly so called or
petition (see 2153).

2270. Internal and External Praise of God.--(a) Internal praise is
expressed by the thoughts and affections of the soul. This is the most
important part of praise, and without it external praise loses much of
its value. Our Lord reproved the Pharisees for honoring God with their
lips, while their hearts were far from Him (Matt., xv. 8), and St. Paul
admonishes the Ephesians to sing and make melody to the Lord in their
hearts (Ephes, v, 19).

(b) External praise is expressed in words (“I will bless the Lord at
all times, His praise is always in my mouth,” Psalm xxxiii. 1), or in
song (“Admonishing one another in psalms, hymns and spiritual
canticles, singing in grace in your hearts to God,” Col., iii. 16), or
by music (“Praise Him with sound of trumpet, with psaltery and harp,
with timbrel and choir, with strings and organs, with high-sounding
cymbals,” Psalm cl).

2271. Excellence of Praise of God.--(a) Praise Is Due to God.--His
essence and attributes are ineffable and above all praise (Ecclus.,
xliii. 33), and they must be honored by the superior acts of worship
and reverence. But the effects of His goodness shown to us should be
declared and glorified: “I will remember the tender mercies of the
Lord, the praise of the Lord for all the things the Lord hath bestowed
upon us” (Is., lxiii. 7).

(b) Praise of God Is Advantageous to Man.--Internal praise lifts the
soul on high and prepares it to receive benefits from God, while
external praise helps the mind to keep its attention fixed on God,
excludes those things that are contrary to Him, and offers edification
to others. St. Augustine narrates in his _Confessions_ how profoundly
he was moved in spirit, even to tears, on hearing the hymns and
canticles of the Church.

2272. Qualities that Should Be Present in the Divine Praises.--(a)
Internally, there should be devotion. It is useful that those who
perform or assist at the praises of God understand what is said, but it
suffices for devotion that they know His greatness and goodness is
being proclaimed. The intention should be to honor God, and hence there
is no act of personal religion if in reciting or hearing God’s praises
one intends only ostentation or pleasure; attention should also be
given to what is said, and hence St. Augustine says that it is a sin to
think rather of the music than of the praise of God proclaimed by the
music (see 2164 sqq.).

(b) Externally, the divine praises should be respectful to God and
helpful to recollection and devotion. Hence, the law of the Church
excludes from her services all that is of a disturbing, profane or
sinful character, such as theatrical displays, musical instruments that
distract the mind from religious thoughts, lascivious airs or those
suggestive of the dance. The Code prescribes that impure music of every
kind must be eliminated from churches (Canon 1264), and Pius X in his
Motu Proprio of 1903 lays down the rule that there must be nothing in
the services of the Church that is calculated to diminish piety, give
reasonable scandal or disgust, or offend the decorum of sacred
functions or the sacredness of the place (see also Instruction on
Sacred Art [Holy Office, 30 June, 1952], AAS 44-542). The sin committed
by misbehavior or levity during divine services depends on the
seriousness of the disrespect shown to God or the scandal given the
beholders.

2273. The Sins against Religion.--Inasmuch as religion is a moral
virtue and therefore consists in the observance of a golden mean, the
sins opposed to it are the extremes of excess or defect. (a) The sins
of excess offend, not because they offer too much worship to God (a
thing that is impossible), but because they exceed by giving worship
where it is not due or in a manner that is not due (superstition). (b)
The sins of defect offend by denying due religious reverence to God
Himself (temptation of God, perjury) or to sacred things (sacrilege,
simony).

2274. Superstition.--Superstition is false religion, or a vice that
offers improper worship to the true God or divine worship to a false
god. Improper worship of the true God is either false or superfluous.

(a) False worship is opposed to the truth of religion (e.g., Old
Testament rites which signify that Christ is still to come), or of
rites (e.g., Mass by a layman, Mass according to a form disapproved by
the Church), or of facts (e.g., fictitious revelations, ecstasies,
mysticism, miracles, relies), or of morals (e.g., human sacrifice,
praises of God to the accompaniment of lascivious words or music, etc.).

(b) Superfluous worship is offered when an external observance in no
way serves the purposes of religion (viz., the glory of God, the
elevation of the soul to Him, the repression of the passions), or is
opposed to law or common custom. The purposes of religion are not
served by actions foolish in themselves (e.g., the repeated mumbling of
meaningless sounds) or in their intent (e.g., undue emphasis given to
minor details of a religious act, such as color of the candles on the
altar, the stature of the celebrant, the hour or condition of the
weather, etc., as if weighty consequences depended on them). The chain
prayer is another example of a superstition that places all the virtue
of an act of worship in some small external circumstance. The law and
custom are not followed in such superstitions as additional crosses,
alleluias, credos, etc., made in violation of Mass rubrics, or a
devotion consisting of fasts on Sundays, or new forms of piety that
lack ecclesiastical approval. There is no superstition, however, in
modes of worship approved by the Church (such as novenas, tridua,
Gregorian Masses, and the like), for the Church recognizes no devotion
or ceremony unless it is true and useful as an expression of religion.

2275. The Sinfulness of Improper Worship of God.--(a) False worship is
from its nature a grave sin; it is seriously insulting to God because
it offers Him dishonor as honor, and it is also seriously harmful to
man because it casts discredit by its falsity on the name of religion.
(b) Superfluous worship is from its nature a venial sin, since it
contains no notable irreverence towards God and, being outlawed, does
not reflect on religion. Accidentally, however, it may be a mortal sin,
as when it is performed in such a way as to cause great scandal.

2276. Worship of False Deity.--Worship of a false deity is performed by
offering a creature an act of homage due to God alone. Hence, there are
three species of this superstition: (a) a creature is recognized as
God, when it is offered a service (such as sacrifice) that testifies to
supreme and infinite excellence (idolatry); (b) a creature is given the
credit of divine knowledge, when instruction about hidden matters which
only God could bestow is asked from it (divination), (c) a creature is
treated as the supreme ruler, when assistance which only God can grant
is sought from it (vain observance).

2277. Definition of Idolatry.--Idolatry is the supreme worship of
_latria_ offered to a creature.

(a) It is supreme worship, and hence the inferior reverence of
_hyperdulia, dulia_, or civil honor, offered respectively to the
Blessed Mother, angels, saints, superiors, etc., is not idolatry. The
external signs of worship that belong to God alone (such as sacrifice,
temples, priesthood, altars, etc.), may never be used in the veneration
of creatures; nor the signs that are common to God and creatures (such
as genuflexions, prostrations, prayers, etc.), if the intention is to
adore.

(b) Idolatry is offered, that is, by it an act of worship is intended
or is at least performed in a serious manner. Hence, it would not be
idolatry so to enact a pagan ceremony that the onlookers could
understand that no religious rite was being performed (e.g., if it were
done on the stage, or in a joking manner).

(c) Idolatry is offered to a creature, and hence the relative honor
that is shown the images of the Trinity or of Christ on account of the
persons represented by them is not idolatry. The creature to whom
idolatry is shown is either a person (e.g., an Angel, the soul of a
departed person, a living human being), or an irrational creature
(e.g., the bull Apis, a sacred plant), or an inanimate substance (e.g.,
statues or pictures, the elements, the heavenly bodies), or a
fictitious being (e.g., Jupiter and the other gods of mythology).

2278. The Kinds of Idolatry.--(a) Idolatry is either internal or
external. Internal idolatry has the intention to adore a creature, as
when a Satanist offers sacrifice to demons. External idolatry performs
an outward rite that signifies adoration of a creature, although there
is no will to give adoration, as when a Christian out of fear of death
reluctantly burns incense before an idol. (b) Internal idolatry is
either perfect or imperfect. Perfect idolatry includes belief in a
false god, as when an ignorant pagan prays to the sun and moon.
Imperfect idolatry is committed when, without belief in a false god,
there is the will to offer it divine worship on account of hatred of
God, wish to obtain favors from demons, or the like.

2279. The Sinfulness of Idolatry.--(a) Idolatry is a most grievous
crime. It entails rebellion against the majesty of God, attack on the
virtue of religion, unbelief or denial of faith, and scandal; and hence
it is forbidden in the first commandment: “Thou shalt not have strange
gods before Me. Thou shalt not adore them, nor serve them” (Exod., xx.
3 sqq.).

(b) Idolatry in itself and in its highest degree is the most grievous
of sins, for it includes both hatred of God (since it would deprive Him
of His unique excellence by giving His honors to creatures) and
blasphemous unbelief (since the idolater publicly professes that God is
not above all). Now, it was said above that unbelief, hatred of God and
blasphemy are the most enormous of sins (see 820, 895, 1301, 1302), and
so it follows that the worst form of idolatry is graver than other sins.

(c) Idolatry, by reason of the dispositions of the person who commits
it, may be less grievous than other sins. Thus, it is worse to hate or
deny God internally than to worship an idol externally only; it is
worse to blaspheme with great hatred and contempt than to practise
idolatry with less malice. Imperfection of the act, as in cases of
ignorance or want of consent, makes the sin venial, or no formal sin at
all.

2280. Comparison of Different Sins of Idolatry.--(a) Internal idolatry
is worse than external idolatry, because the former, though not the
latter, includes approval of the superstition committed. (b) Imperfect
idolatry is worse than perfect idolatry, if both be considered
precisely as idolatry, since the former proceeds from malice, and the
latter from greater or less ignorance. (c) External idolatry is
aggravated when its motive is more sinful or makes the act more
voluntary (e.g., it is worse to pretend sacrifice to an idol if the
motive is to ingratiate oneself with the idolaters or to spite the
Christians, than if the motive is to escape death at the hands of the
pagans).

2281. Idolatry Possible in Christian Worship.--The guilt of idolatry
may be incurred even by Christians offering worship to God. (a) Thus,
in the adoration of the Eucharist there would be idolatry, at least
material, if an unconsecrated host were exposed for veneration or given
in communion. (b) In the veneration of the Saints there would be
idolatry, if they were honored or invoked as if they possessed divine
attributes.

2282. Definition of Divination.--Divination (soothsaying,
fortune-telling) is a form of superstition in which the evil spirits
are invoked explicitly or implicitly with a view to the discovery of
what is future or occult.

(a) It is a form of superstition, because it seeks to obtain through
natural means knowledge that cannot be had except from God, or
substitutes other teachers for God.

(b) It contains the invocation of evil spirits, for the information
sought surpasses the powers of nature and, being illicit, cannot be
expected from supernatural powers that are good (such as God, the
Angels, the Saints).

(c) The invocation is explicit or implicit. There is explicit calling
on the evil spirits when one prays to the demon or makes an agreement
with him; there is implicit invocation when one does not address an
evil spirit, but does employ means for the discovery of knowledge which
are not adequate, either from their nature or from the will of God, for
the desired effect.

(d) The knowledge desired is of future or occult things, that is, of
such things as cannot be foreseen in their causes or discovered by
natural means (such as the future acts of free beings, the secret
thoughts of the heart).

2283. Distinction between the Fact and Sin of Divination.--(a) The fact
of divination--that is, the actual manifestation by evil spirits of
things humanly unknowable--is not impossible, since the demons are far
superior to man in intelligence and knowledge, and it is the teaching
of revelation that they use their powers to mislead and seduce mankind.
Their knowledge, however, does not extend to future contingencies, nor
to the secrets of hearts, and their word cannot be relied on. A case of
real communication by an evil spirit is that of the girl of Philippi
possessed by a pythonical spirit (Acts, xiv. 16-18), and some think
that the same can be said of the Witch of Endor (I Kings, xxvii. 7-25);
but no doubt there have been many instances of divination in which the
intervention of demons was only imaginary.

(b) The sin of divination is committed when one has the will to receive
occult knowledge from forbidden sources, or uses the means to obtain
knowledge from those sources, even though there be no communication or
response on the part of the spirits of evil.

2284. Forms of Explicit Invocation.--Divination in which there is
explicit invocation of the demon is of various kinds according to the
medium through which instruction is given or expected.

(a) Thus, the medium is direct if it is an external sensible appearance
representing the demon (_praestigium_) or an internal picture in the
imagination or a dream containing his answer (oneiromancy).

(b) The medium is indirect and rational when it is a human being, dead
or living. Divination through the evocation of the departed is known as
necromancy, while that which is given through living possessed persons
is called pythonism. Modern Spiritism partakes of the character of both
necromancy (since the spirits of the departed are consulted) and
pythonism (since persons supposed to be under the control of familiar
spirits act as mediums).

(c) The medium is indirect and irrational when it is some solid body
(such as iron, stone or crystal) in which figures or signs appear;
idols from which oracles are received; tables or ouija boards from
which answers are given by raps or writing; divining rods supposed to
lead the way to any hidden person or thing, etc. (geomancy); or some
liquid body (hydromancy), or air (aeromancy), or fire (pyromancy), or
the entrails of sacrificial victims or natural prodigies, such as
lightning (haruspicy). Here also may be mentioned the superstition of
ordeal by fire, boiling water, combat, etc., once used to determine the
guilt or innocence of an accused person.

2285. Forms of Implicit Invocation.--Divination in which there is only
implicit invocation of evil spirits is manifold, just as the natural
causes from which preternatural knowledge is expected are manifold.
Among the principal forms are the following:

(a) that which is made from the human mind, when clairvoyance or
clair-audience is employed. It is supposed that certain persons have
the natural gift, at least when in a trance or hypnotic state, of
perceiving what is done or said at a distance without any of the normal
means of communication, and even of reading minds. This supposed inborn
gift is sometimes called second sight or telepathy. Some authorities
hold that there is sufficient evidence for vision at a distance as a
sixth sense in certain individuals, especially among primitive peoples
and persons bound by a tie of blood or intimate friendship. Moreover,
many facts learned through telepathy seem to have been verified
sufficiently to render telepathy probable. Accordingly, to believe
telepathy or to practice it, excluding all superstition and invocation
of demons, is not illicit.

(b) divination that is made from the human body in physiognomy,
phrenology, and chiromancy. The physiognomist pretends that he is able
to discover the hidden character, latent abilities or defects, secret
thoughts, etc., by a study of the features or expression of the
countenance. The phrenologist claims that he can read the mental and
moral traits of a person from the bumps or prominences of the skull.
The chiromantist, or palmist, promises to foretell the future, read the
past, discover the present secret character and aptitudes of an
individual from an inspection of the shape, lines and configuration of
his hand and of the character of the lines and marks of his palms;

(c) divination that is made from non-human and necessary events in
astrology. This pseudo-science gives predictions about the fortunes of
an individual drawn from a study of his horoscope (i.e., the aspect of
the heavenly bodies at the moment of his birth) and of certain rules of
interpretation;

(d) divination that is made from non-human and contingent events in
augury and auspice, which divine from the voices or manner of flight of
birds; in omen or portent, which divine the future from some chance
happening (such as meeting with a red-haired woman or a hunchback, a
sneeze, etc.), in sortilege, which divines by lots or signs arbitrarily
chosen (such as the letters that appear on opening a book at random,
the numbers or figures that appear when cards are drawn or dice
thrown). Superstitions about omens are of two kinds, some happenings
being regarded as signs of good luck (e.g., to find a pin), others as
signs of bad luck (e.g., to meet a black cat, to spill the salt, to
break a mirror, to raise an umbrella in the house).

2286. The Malice of the Sin of Divination.--(a) The Theological
Species.--If there is explicit invocation of evil spirits, divination
is of its nature a mortal sin that admits of no lightness of matter,
for it gives divine worship to a creature, acts on friendly terms with
the enemy of God, and prepares one for apostasy and eternal damnation.
If there is no explicit invocation of the spirits of evil, the sin is
of its nature mortal on account of the implicit commerce with the
devil; but generally the sin will be light on account of the
dispositions of the offender (e.g., because he is ignorant, or consults
divination as a joke or from curiosity, or has no faith in it). Hence,
the faithful should be warned not to go to fortune-tellers or put faith
in dreams, but, apart from such cases as serious scandal, habitual
direction of one’s life by superstition, cooperation in serious sin of
a diviner, etc., the sin will usually be venial, at least in young
people. Persons who occasionally act or omit to act in some indifferent
matter on account of dreams they have had are often excused from all
sin on account of the fear or hope which the dreams excited.

(b) The Moral Species.--All forms of divination, it is commonly held,
belong to the same species of worship of a false god (Deut., xviii.
10-12). Yet, the confessor should be told about an explicit pact with
evil spirits, if there was one, since thus he will be able to decide
the gravity of the sin and to make inquiries about other sins that
usually accompany such a pact (e.g., blasphemy, promise to serve the
devil, sacrileges, etc.).

2287. When Knowledge Is Obtained from God.--There is no sin of
divination when knowledge is obtained from God.

(a) Thus, God can communicate directly in a vision or dream, and there
are examples of this in Scripture, But generally one should not be
guided by dreams as if they were means for supernatural knowledge,
since nearly all dreams are produced by natural causes. It is not
sinful to believe that a dream of an extraordinary kind (e.g., one in
which the future is wonderfully foretold or a warning given, or which
produces great spiritual good) was sent by God.

(b) God can communicate through other human beings, and hence it is not
superstitious to put faith in the private visions or revelations that
have been recognized by the Church, or that have the marks of
genuineness required by the Church.

(c) God has sometimes communicated through the instrumentality of
irrational beings or by means of portents. Thus, Gedeon took the words
of enemy soldiers as a premonition of victory (Judges, vii. 15);
Eliezer chose a sign by which to recognize the woman who should be the
wife of Isaac (Gen, xxiv. 14); the ordeal of bitter waters was
prescribed in Numbers, v. 11 sqq.; Josue discovered the guilt of Achan
by lots (Josue, vii. 14), and St. Matthias was elected to the
Apostolate by lots (Acts, i. 23-26). But these were exceptional cases
in which men were inspired to consult God as they did, and it would be
superstitious to seek knowledge in these ways against the will of God.
Those who desire light and guidance should have recourse to the
teachers God has provided on earth and should pray to God, leaving to
Him the ways and means of His answer. Hence, the Church has declared it
unlawful, even in private, to call upon the good spirits to give
answers through automatic writing (_Collect. de Prop. Fide_, 1894), or
to interrogate the dead at spiritistic seances (AAS, 1917, IX, 268). It
is not superstitious, however, in a grave matter when there is no
ordinary means of instruction at hand, to offer a prayer to God and
then have recourse to lots to decide what course shall be followed
(Prov., xvi. 33).

2288. When Knowledge Is Obtained Through Natural Causes.--There is no
sin of divination when knowledge of the future or of hidden things is
obtained through proportionate natural causes or indications.

(a) Thus, knowledge of future happenings is naturally deducible from
their necessary causes, when these causes are known. The effect may be
predicted with certainty if the cause is so determined to one course
that its result is invariable (e.g., the revolution of the earth around
the sun always brings on the four seasons of the year); it may be
predicted with the greatest probability if the cause is so constituted
that almost always it has a certain consequence (e.g., a seed properly
planted usually grows into a tree). Hence, there is no superstition in
astronomical predictions, weather forecasts by meteorologists, tables
of life expectancy drawn up by insurance experts, etc., since these are
inferences from known scientific laws.

(b) Knowledge of hidden things is naturally deducible with more or less
certainty from the presence of their known causes, or effects, or
indications. Hence, a physician is not accused of superstition if he
reasons out the character or phase of an internal disease from the
symptoms that exhibit themselves. Moralists today generally agree that
the use of the magic wand (divining rod, dipping rod, dowser) for the
discovery of subterranean springs, mineral deposits, oil wells, etc.,
is not superstitious, although there is some difference of opinion and
uncertainty about the cause of the phenomenon. It is true that many
means of detection or discovery, supposedly scientific, are due to
misunderstanding of scientific principles or of logic; but their
authors, since they rely on natural causes, are guilty of ignorance or
quackery rather than superstition.

2289. Use of Lots.--Is it lawful to use lots in settlement of some
business, when there is no intention to seek preternatural oracle?

(a) It is lawful to do this, if there is some reason of necessity or
utility or amusement to justify the lots, and no injustice or
prohibition of law. Hence, if there is no other convenient method of
decision, one may use the drawing of straws or cards to decide how
lands or goods shall be divided between claimants, or which of several
competitors shall receive a reward or office.

(b) It is not lawful to do this, if there is a prohibition of law
(e.g., ecclesiastical elections may not be made by lot), or if there is
no necessity for the lots (e.g., it is at least foolish to use the
Gospels for deciding by lot matters that could be decided by
reflection), or if injury is done another person (e.g., to decide by
lot when the merits of two contestants are unequal, to practise
unfairness in the drawing).

2290. Vain Observance.--Vain observance is a superstition that ascribes
to certain things effects for which they have no natural or
communicated power.

(a) It ascribes the effects to natural things, but it supposes that in
some way supernatural forces, not of religion, are at work in or
through these things. Thus, just as in divination, there is in vain
observance either an express or an implied invocation of the spirits of
evil. The alchemists, who thought there was a philosopher’s stone able
to transmute base metals into gold or an elixir that could greatly
prolong life, looked to natural causes, and hence to that extent seem
to be guilty of false science, rather than of superstition. Scientific
materialism, though, is a crasser form of ignorance than any
superstition that trusts in super-material powers.

(b) The things which vain observance makes use of are persons, acts,
objects, circumstances, happenings, etc. Even sacred things may be
employed as the material for vain observance, as happens when some
accidental and unnecessary circumstance of a sacred rite (e.g., the
size or color of candles) is given the credit of the sacred results.
Here again vain observance and divination are alike, since the same
means are employed by both.

(c) The effects looked for in vain observance, or the purpose had in
view, is some fact or event. It is this characteristic that
distinguishes vain observance from divination: the latter aims at
occult knowledge, the former at supranatural results. The expected fact
or event is something that surpasses the natural powers of physical or
human agencies (e.g., sensation without sense excitants, mind-reading
without external indications, scientific knowledge without study,
bodily feats without corresponding bodily powers, detection of secret
and hidden things without human means for detection), or even of the
invisible world of spirits (e.g., creation, generation of new
substances, evocation of the dead, internal motion of man’s will).

(d) There is no natural power in the things used for producing the
substance or mode of the desired effects, that is, no inherent and
sufficient force or activity. Hence, vain observance is not to be
confused with scientific marvels or natural wonders whose explanation
is unknown to the general public, or which cannot be fully explained by
scientists themselves. Thus, the baffling tricks of white magic are due
to legerdemain, ventriloquism, ocular delusions, and the like; the
physiological changes (e.g., convulsions, hysteria, somnambulism,
bodily cures) produced in mesmerism, hypnotism, thought healing, etc.,
are explained by suggestion and the motor power of images excited to
produce bodily motions, passions, or changes; the mental phenomena
(e.g., hyperaesthesia, wondrous visions, increased vigor of mind) of
certain drugs such as hashish, mescal and opium, are caused by
properties of these drugs.

(e) There is no communicated power in the things employed, that is, no
instrumental virtue bestowed by a higher cause. Hence, since
Sacraments, sacramentals, and miracle-working relics have from God in a
greater or less degree an efficacy for results above nature, there is
no superstition in their proper use, But, as was noted just above,
sacred things themselves may be used superstitiously, as happens when
they are regarded as principal agents, or when, contrary to fact, they
are deemed to act infallibly or independently of any human cooperation
or disposition.

2291. Forms of Vain Observance.--Among the forms of vain observance are
the following:

(a) those by which one puts into use vain ceremonies or objects in the
expectation that they will secure certain desired effects, or puts an
exaggerated confidence in lawful rites or sacred objects;

(b) those by which one directs one’s life through fortuitous and
impertinent happenings in the belief that they have the power to
influence one’s fortunes favorably or adversely. This form of
superstition is like divination by omens; the difference is that in
using omens one chiefly seeks for knowledge of the future, while in
observing chance events one chiefly intends the direction of one’s
conduct. Examples are found in persons who fear to make a journey on
Friday or to begin any important affair during the dark of the moon.

2292. Vain Observances from which Desired Effects Are Expected.--(a)
Useful results are sometimes expected, such as knowledge for the mind
(notorious art) or health for the body (healing observances). The
notorious art consisted in the repeating of certain formulas or the
gazing upon certain figures, prayers and fasts at times being added,
and it was supposed that these practices would obtain infused knowledge
without the necessity of labor or study. Healing observances are
remedies used for man or beast that manifestly have no natural curative
properties (e.g., a buckeye or rabbit’s foot carried in the pocket to
ward off rheumatism).

(b) Wondrous results are sometimes expected, such as the power to bring
on storms, telekinesis, materialization, and levitation, through the
use of incantations, theurgic sacraments, spiritistic rites, etc. This
is known as the black art or black magic.

(c) Evil effects are sometimes expected, such as the power to blight
another by a glance (evil eye or fascination), the power to cast a
spell over another person by certain spoken words, to bring disease or
misfortune on a person by piercing or striking his effigy, to excite
impure love for a determinate person by the administration of love
philtres or charms, etc. (sorcery, witchcraft).

2293. Distinction between the Fact and the Sin of Vain Observance.--(a)
The Fact.--The demons have naturally powers over our world that surpass
those of human or physical agents, and it is not impossible for them to
produce prodigies or seeming miracles. The magicians of Egypt by
enchantments and certain secrets changed rods into serpents, etc.
(Exod., vii. 12, viii. 7); the New Testament narrates that Simon the
Magician bewitched the Samaritans by his magic (Acts, viii. 11), and it
clearly foretells the lying wonders of Satan and Antichrist (Matt.,
xxiv. 24; II Thess., ii. 9). But there are limits to the power of the
fallen spirits; for example, they cannot infuse knowledge, and
occultism has contributed nothing to the advancement of science or
civilization. Moreover, many effects that have been attributed to
demonic intervention were due to natural causes or to fraud (e.g., a
large proportion of spiritistic phenomena), or they were supposed to
exist only because the popular mind was carried away by excitement or
was bent on persecution (e.g., most of the witchcraft accusations of a
few centuries ago).

(b) The Sin.--Vain observance in which there is no express invocation
of evil spirits is common enough; even religious, educated and
practical persons are found to act on superstitious hopes or fears or
to put confidence in charms or amulets. But vain observance that
includes an express invocation of demons is a comparatively rare sin.
It is not impossible, however, that a person should come to such a pass
of despair or malice as to wish to have dealings with Satan, or should
be so carried away by curiosity, desire of wealth, power, fame, or
honor as to be willing to barter his soul in exchange for them. That
there were professional wizards from ancient times is a matter of
history, and Scripture contains severe prohibitions against dealings
with them (Levit., xix. 31, xx. 27; Deut., xviii. 10).

2294. Superstition in Religious Observances.--Superstition is sometimes
found even in religious observances. (a) Thus, there is superstition in
the observance itself when vain additions are made to an approved usage
(e.g., the addition to a prayer against sickness of gestures,
breathings, gibberish, etc., that have no significance of reverence for
God). (b) There is superstition in the manner of the observance when
one attributes the virtue of a sacred rite or object to some
unimportant circumstance (e.g., the shape of the reliquary in which a
relic is carried, the “propitious” day on which a sacramental was
received), or expects from a sacred thing an effect which it has no
power to produce (e.g., infallible certainty of salvation from the
performance of a certain devotion or the presence of a holy picture or
blessed object). It is not superstition, however, to attach
significance to circumstances that have a sacred meaning (e.g.,
holydays, figures that have a religious symbolism), or to put a
confidence in sacred things that is based on their character or
approved usage (e.g., the hope and trust that blessings will be
impetrated and salvation itself through fidelity to an authorized
devotion).

2295. Sinfulness of Vain Observance.--The malice of vain observance is
essentially the same as that of divination, for in both superstitions
the same virtue of religion is offended by the sinful cult that is
performed.

(a) Thus, there is mortal sin from the nature of the act, when vain
observance is exercised with invocation of evil spirits or with false
religious rites (for a serious injury is done to the honor due to God),
or when a vain observance is meant to bring a curse or grave misfortune
on a neighbor (for a serious injustice is willed).

(b) There is regularly only a venial sin, when a vain observance is of
a non-religious kind, consisting in foolish heed given to chance
happenings (such as a rabbit running across the road, the mention of
death, the presence of a person regarded as a Jonah), or the use of
improportionate means (e.g., to change one’s place at a card table in
order to change the luck). For usually there is no irreverence in such
practices, and at the worst they are foolish and idle acts. Often there
is no sin at all, the vain observance being due to ignorance or the
wish to joke.

(c) There is no sin at all, but rather subjective virtue, in religious
practices to which on account of simplicity or invincible ignorance too
much power is attributed, as when one who is faithful to the essential
duties of religion has greater confidence in some personal devotion of
his own than in them. But superstition of this kind, though in itself
it is the least reprehensible form of superstition, may be very harmful
and disedifying.

2296. Cooperation in Divination or Other Form of Superstition.--(a)
Formal cooperation is of course never lawful (e.g., to act as the
medium or one of the deceivers at a spiritistic meeting). (b) Material
cooperation is lawful only when there is a proportionately grave
reason, no danger of sin, and no scandal. Thus, it seems that no sin is
committed by a scientist who assists at a spiritistic seance in order
to discover the frauds that are resorted to, or who makes experiments
with table turning or planchette movements in order to examine into the
theory that the phenomena are due to the action of the persons present.

2297. Doubtful Cases of Vain Observance.--Cases in which it is a matter
of doubt or dispute whether divination or vain observance is present.

(a) There is sometimes uncertainty whether an extraordinary fact is due
to natural or supranatural causes, Thus, authorities commonly take the
position, it seems, that certain phenomena of Spiritism (e.g., the
apparently automatic movement of tables on which a group of persons
rest their finger tips, the answers to questions that are rapped out by
such tables), and of mental healing (e.g., the cure of bodily ailment
by sympathy or moral influence), are accomplished through natural
powers of matter or mind. But other authorities incline to a
supranaturalistic explanation.

(b) There is also at times uncertainty whether a fact or practice has a
religious or an irreligious character. As to facts, they sometimes
appear to be so marvellous as to pass the natural, and yet it is
difficult to determine whether their source is good or evil (e.g., when
an ignorant person not noted for piety seems to have a remarkable
ability for treating and curing all kinds of diseases). As to
practices, they are sometimes susceptible of a religious or a
superstitious interpretation. Thus, one who says, “God bless us,” at a
sneeze may intend a prayer against sickness; one who knocks on wood
after boasting may intend a prayer to Him who died on the wood of the
cross, lest he be punished for boasting.

2298. Licitness of Using Doubtfully Superstitious Means.--It is lawful
to use means that are only doubtfully superstitious if the following
conditions are present:

(a) internally or subjectively, there must be a good conscience about
the use of the means. The rule can be followed that what is not
certainly of a supranatural character may be regarded as natural, but
that what seems to be supranatural is not to be ascribed to God unless
it has the marks and fruits of a divine work. When lawfully using means
of a dubious character, it is advisable to make an inner protestation
that one acts from reasonable necessity, and has no wish to take part
in superstition;

(b) externally or objectively, there must be nothing in the object or
circumstances or results to make the use of the means illicit. Thus,
even though a practice be not superstitious, it may be unlawful because
of the immorality of its object or tendency (e.g., frauds used by
psychical researchers, obscene messages given by laboratory
telepathists), or of its purpose (e.g., table-rapping used as the
instrument of pretended religious revelations), or because of the evil
consequences for body or soul (e.g., devotees of the ouija board give
scandal to others and often end in insanity or suicide).

2299. Irreligiousness.--We now proceed to the four sins that offend
religion by defect, namely, temptation of God and perjury, which show
disrespect to God Himself, and sacrilege and simony, which show
disrespect to holy things (see 2273). Perjury has been treated above
(see 2249), and hence we shall consider now only the other three forms
of irreligiousness.

2300. Temptation of God.--Temptation of God is a word or deed that puts
God to the test to discover whether He possesses or will exercise some
perfection.

(a) It is a word or deed, such as a prayer whose purpose is to discover
whether God is possessed of knowledge, power or goodness, or an act of
defiance performed in order to prove that there is no God.

(b) It puts God to the test, that is, the temptation is not seductive
(since it is impossible to influence God to sin), but experimental. He
who tempts God desires that God give some proof of His attributes.

(c) It is concerned with God, hence there is no temptation of God if
one legitimately tests out the character of a human being. God Himself
tempted by trial holy men like Abraham, Job, and Tobias in order that
their virtue might be manifested and an example given to others. And of
spirits St. John says: “Believe not every spirit, but try the spirits
if they be of God, because many false prophets are gone out into the
world” (I John, iv. 1).

(d) The purpose is to discover, without regard to the ordinary means of
instruction and guidance appointed by God, whether God possesses or
will exercise an attribute; that is, temptation of God is due to
unbelief or to presumption.

2301. Cases Wherein There Is no Temptation of God.--(a) To seek a proof
of divine perfections is not temptation of God, if the purpose is only
to find new reasons for what one already accepts, or to experience in
an affective way what one already admits speculatively. Hence, a
theologian may study the attributes of God with a view to further
illumination; hence also, one may prove the sweetness of God or the
goodness of His will from the spiritual taste or relish for divine
things (Psalm xxxiii. 9; Rom., xii. 2).

(b) To seek a sign of God’s will or a manifestation of His perfections
is not temptation of God, if this is done, not from curiosity,
ostentation or other vain motive, but from some reason of necessity or
great utility, as when Gedeon prayed for a sign that the Lord had
spoken to him or was with him (Judges, vi. 17, 37), or when Elias
called on Jehovah to show His power before the worshippers of Baal (III
Kings, xviii. 37). Hence, he does not tempt God who, when ordinary
means of direction fail him in some critical affair, asks humbly for a
sign of God’s will; or who in a matter of great moment asks for
miraculous help if it be pleasing to God to grant it; or who exposes
himself to serious danger for some priceless good that cannot otherwise
be had, in the trust that God will be with him.

2302. Kinds of Temptation of God.--(a) In relation to its source,
temptation of God arises either from unbelief or from presumption. The
former, which is temptation of God in the strict sense, exists when one
disbelieves or doubts some attribute of God and seeks to put it to the
proof, as when the Israelites in the desert called into question the
providence and power of Jehovah (Exod., xvii. 7, Psalm lxxvii. 18, 19),
or when a person doubting the Real Presence asks for a miraculous sight
of Christ in the Eucharist. The latter sin, which is temptation of God
in the wide sense, is committed when a believing person asks without a
just cause for a miraculous manifestation of God’s will, or powers, or
of some other thing, as when a lazy man asks that his work be done in
some miraculous way, or a rash man neglects the ordinary care of his
health, asking that God supply for his carelessness. But temptation of
God is not to be identified with the theological sin of presumption
(see 1081).

(b) In relation to its manner, temptation of God is either express or
interpretative. It is express when one intends by one’s word or act to
put God to the proof in respect to knowledge, power, reliability, or
other perfection (as when the Jews demanded that Christ come down from
the Cross, if He were the Son of God) or to satisfy a vain curiosity or
boldness (as when Herod asked Christ to work some miracles for his
amusement). Temptation of God is interpretative when one does not
intend to discover God’s perfections or make presumptuous requests, but
nevertheless so acts or omits to act that one’s conduct is useful for
nothing except temptation of God, as when a believer rashly promises a
miracle to convince an unbeliever, a sick man refuses to use any
medical care (Ecclus., xxxviii. 4), a lecturer goes entirely unprepared
to his lecture, etc. Prayer made without the proper dispositions is a
quasi-temptation of God (Ecclus., xviii. 23), because it is
disrespectful and presumptuous; but it is not real temptation of God,
nor of its nature mortally sinful, the direct end of the act being
laziness or some other state of soul unsuitable to prayer.

2303. Causes that Exclude the Interpretative Temptation of God.--There
is no interpretative temptation of God strictly speaking if one acts
rashly or encounters danger, but does not at all expect miraculous or
special intervention from God. This happens as follows:

(a) when one is unconcerned whether evil results or not, or desires
that it may result (e.g., when a person who is tired of life seeks a
dangerous occupation for the diversion and excitement it affords, or
when a person practises abstinence from certain remedies as an act of
moderate mortification);

(b) when one does not wish the evil result, but is so stupid or rash as
to believe that an imprudent risk can be taken and evil escaped through
chance or good luck, as when a student goes up for a difficult
examination with slight preparation, trusting that only the things he
knows will be asked.

2304. Refusal of Medicine or Hygienic Care.--(a) If there is a
sufficient reason for this conduct, no sin is committed. There may be
sufficient reasons of a natural kind (e.g., that the remedies are
harmful or useless or too expensive), or of a supernatural kind (e.g.,
St. Agatha refused all medicines because God Himself was her physician,
certain Saints were divinely inspired to make no effort to remove
bodily maladies on account of the spiritual profit derived from them).

(b) If there is no sufficient reason for this conduct, it is sinful.
Thus, one sins against faith, if the reason for the conduct is
disbelief in the existence of evil (e.g., Christian Science or Eddyism
attributes sickness and pain to imagination, and says that the only
cure is “faith”); one sins by temptation of God, if the reason for the
conduct is vain expectation of miracles; one is guilty of suicide or
homicide, if the purpose is to end life, etc.

2305. The Sinfulness of Temptation of God.--(a) To doubt the
perfections of God, or to call upon the extraordinary Providence of God
in disregard of the ordinary Providence He has established is the
essence of temptation of God. It is sinful, because it includes either
unjustifiable doubt or vincible ignorance in the intellect or
presumption in the will. Hence the command given in Deuteronomy (vi.
16): “Thou shalt not tempt the Lord thy God.” But invincible ignorance
excuses from sin, and hence many of those who in times past resorted to
ordeals by painful or dangerous tests (e.g., walking on burning coals,
risking death in deep waters), in order that God might settle a
doubtful matter, were, on account of their good faith, guiltless of
temptation of God. The practice was condemned by the Church in the
ninth century.

(b) To doubt about the positive and unknown will of God, or to call
upon the extraordinary Providence of God (i.e., the direct intervention
of the First Cause), without disregard of the ordinary Providence
(i.e., of second causes appointed by God), is not sinful, if it is
justified by necessity. Thus, being unable to resist the nations
leagued against him, Josaphat prayed: “As we know not what to do, we
can only turn our eyes to Thee” (II Paral., xx. 12). And Our Lord
promised the disciples that, when they should be unable to prepare
their defense on account of the persecutions to which they were
subjected, the Spirit Himself would speak through them (Matt., X. 19),
and that He would enable them to do things as difficult as moving
mountains when real necessity called for it (Matt., xvii. 19). It is
not unbelief to doubt about matters pertaining to God that are really
doubtful (i.e., not His perfections, but His positive and unknown
will), and hence one does not tempt God who asks for divine guarantees
of a religion proposed as divinely revealed (see 795); it is not
presumption to ask God for a sign or proof, if God directs one to do
this (e.g., Abraham in Gen., xv. 8, was inspired to seek a sign that
the promised land would be given his posterity; Achaz in Isaias, vii.
11, was bidden for the sake of others to ask for a sign), or if, when a
sign from God seems necessary or very useful, one prays for it
prudently and on condition that the request is pleasing to God (e.g.,
the Apostles in Acts, iv. 30, prayed for signs and wonders in
confirmation of their preaching).

2306. The Malice of Temptation of God.--(a) It is a sin directly
against religion, for one shows contempt to God when one demands that
He prove His perfections, or when one takes the liberty to disregard
the ordinary means He has established and to call for others. The sin
is less, however, than that of superstition, since temptation of God
professes doubt, while superstition professes positive error.
Temptation of God offends also against other virtues, such as faith
(e.g., when one doubts the perfections of God), hope (e.g., when one
presumes that God will do all without one’s cooperation), charity
(e.g., when a person exposes his own life to risk or his neighbor to
scandal in a vain confidence that the danger will be miraculously
averted).

(b) It is a mortal sin from its nature, since it offends religion. But
it may be venial on account of the imperfection of the act, as when
from weakness of faith or without reflection one asks unnecessarily for
a sign (Luke, i. 11-20). It may be venial also from the lightness of
the matter, if the temptation is interpretative, as when one presumes
on the divine aid in a slight sickness, an unimportant talk, or other
small affair.

2307. As a rule temptation of God is only a venial sin, and in an
individual case it is rarely mortal, except in the following instances:

(a) when one intends a grave offense against God, as by doubting His
goodness, demanding or attempting a miracle to satisfy curiosity;

(b) when one exposes oneself to grave peril, as by leaping from the
roof of a high building, refusing all remedies or means of preserving
health, neglecting to provide for one’s sustenance, etc., in the
expectation that God will miraculously provide;

(c) when one causes grave harm to others, as when a person rashly
asking for signs exposes faith to the derision of unbelievers or
scandalizes believers.

2308. Sacrilege.--Sacrilege in the wide sense is any sin against the
virtue of religion. But in the strict sense, in which it is now taken,
it is defined as “the violation of a sacred thing.”

(a) Sacrilege is against a thing, that is, against some person, place
or object dedicated to divine worship as a possession of God. Sacrilege
differs from the two previous sins of irreligiosity (namely, temptation
of God and perjury); for they are against the reverence due to God
Himself, while sacrilege is against the reverence due to things on
account of their use in the worship of God.

(b) It is against a sacred thing, that is, against the sanctity which a
thing acquires from its dedication to God (e.g., when a church or a
chalice is consecrated to divine worship, when a virgin is dedicated to
God by vow), or from the immunity or privilege conferred on it by the
Church on account of its dedication to God (e.g., the clerical
privileges of forum and of canon in Church Law). But sacrilege is
present only when a sacred thing is attacked in that special quality or
relation in which it is sacred. Hence, he who violates the chastity of
a virgin consecrated to God is guilty of sacrilege, since it is her
chastity that was vowed to God; he who strikes her is also guilty of
sacrilege, since he attacks the sacred immunity which the law confers
on her; he who calumniates her or steals from her is not guilty of
sacrilege, since her name and goods are not consecrated to divine
worship nor protected by its special sacredness in law.

(c) Sacrilege is a violation, that is, an action or omission physically
or morally injurious to the sacred character of a person, place or
thing. The difference between the injury done in sacrilege and that
done in simony is that the former injustice belongs to the class of
wrongs inflicted in involuntary commutations, such as theft or robbery
(see 1748, 1815), whereas the latter injustice pertains to the category
of wrongs perpetrated in voluntary commutations, such as buying,
selling, or lending. In both cases there is an injury to the property
or possession of God, but the difference is that in sacrilege the
parties involved are the sacrilegious person acting as aggressor
against God, in simony the parties are two men bargaining together to
buy and sell the sacred things of God.

2309. What Kind of Consecration Must Be Violated to Constitute
Sacrilege?--There are various opinions about the kind of assignment to
worship necessary for the sacredness which is injured by sacrilege.

(a) The opinion that seems to be common today holds that the assignment
must be made through some public rite or consecration on the part of
the Church. Hence, according to this view, the violation of a private
vow or resolution is not sacrilegious, but rather perfidious or
disloyal. The argument for this opinion is that the public acceptance
of the Church, which has control over divine worship, is a necessary
factor in making anything sacred to that worship; and that many
absurdities would follow from the principle that each individual has
the power to give the sacredness in question to his own person, acts or
possessions.

(b) According to a stricter opinion, no public assignment is necessary
if the consecration is a personal one; and hence the violation of even
a private vow of chastity would be sacrilegious. The argument is that
even a private vow affecting the person sets it apart as a sacred thing.

(c) According to a still stricter view, no public assignment to worship
is necessary, whether the consecration be personal or non-personal, and
hence even the violation of a vow to fast would be sacrilegious. The
argument is that anything set apart for God’s honor, either publicly or
privately, becomes sacred to Him.

2310. Is Sacrilege a Special Sin?--(a) As regards its matter or subject
sacrilege may be called, though improperly, a general sin, in the sense
that many different classes of sins may be sacrilegious (e.g., murder
is sacrilegious when a sacred person is killed, lust is sacrilegious
when a person vowed to God is violated; theft is sacrilegious when
objects consecrated to divine worship are stolen, etc.).

(b) As regards its form or essence, and hence properly speaking,
sacrilege is a special sin, because there is a peculiar deformity
contained in the very nature of sacrilege that is not in other sins,
namely, the disrespect shown to God through contempt for things that
are sacred to Him. Moreover, there may be a sin of sacrilege that is
separate from other sins, such as murder, lust, and theft, for example,
when the right of asylum is violated.

2311. The Species of Sacrilege.--(a) Personal sacrilege is committed
when the sacredness of a person is violated. This happens in the first
place when bodily or real harm (e.g., gravely sinful striking, citing
before a secular tribunal, subjecting to civil duties or burdens, such
as military service) is done to a cleric; and in the second place when
a grave sin of unchastity is committed by or with a person dedicated to
God by a vow (at least by a public vow) of chastity. Sacrilege
committed through bodily or real harm is treated by canonists under the
questions of the privileges of canon (Canon 119), forum (Canon 120),
immunity (Canon 121). Sacrilegious impurity committed with a person
vowed to chastity and sacrilegious impurity committed by a person vowed
to chastity are grave sins of lust, even though they be only of thought
or desire.

(b) Local sacrilege is committed when the sacredness of a place is
injured. A place is considered sacred or religious when it possesses
sanctity as being consecrated or blessed for divine worship or for
burial of the faithful, namely, churches, public or semi-public
oratories, and consecrated cemeteries. Injury is done to the holiness
of the place by desecration or profanation. Desecration is the
performance in a sacred place of a notorious act of irreverence which
so spiritually contaminates it that the divine offices may not be
lawfully celebrated therein until the rite of reconciliation has been
performed. Canon 1172 enumerates four causes of desecration: the crime
of homicide; the injurious and serious shedding of human blood; impious
or sordid uses (e.g., if a church were turned into a brothel or
gambling den, a dump, or cattle stable), and burial of an infidel or
person excommunicated by condemnatory or declaratory sentence.
Profanation of a sacred place is a disregard for the religious respect
or immunity due to it which in some way materially contaminates it
(e.g., if a church is not kept nice and clean; if markets and fairs are
held in its precincts; if it is used for shows, plays, moving pictures,
banquets, court proceedings; if the right of asylum is violated; if the
church is broken into, seriously defaced, burned). These matters are
treated more fully in commentaries on Canons 1172 sqq.

(c) Real sacrilege is committed when the sacredness of an object is
violated. An object is sacred when it contains the Author of holiness
or confers holiness (viz., the Eucharist and the other Sacraments),
when it is naturally related to the Sacraments or sacred persons (e.g.,
the sacred vessels, images and relics of the Saints), when it is set
aside for the uses of worship (e.g., holy water and other sacramentals,
candles for the altar) or the maintenance of the Church or its
ministers (viz., movables and immovables of a parish, money left for
the support of the clergy, seminarians, etc.). Injury is done to the
holiness of an object by unworthy treatment or by unjust damage or
conversion. Examples of unworthy treatment are the following: the
invalid or sinful administration or reception of a Sacrament, parodies
of Sacred Scripture, scandalous manner of enacting sacred rites or
saying prayers, use of sacred chalices or other sacred vessels or of
blessed articles for profane purposes, use of unblessed holy articles
for sordid or ignoble purposes, handling of chalices, etc., by those
who have no right to touch sacred vessels (Canon 1306). Examples of
unjust damage or conversion are: contemptuous breaking or burning of
relics, oils, pictures used for worship; theft of moneys or goods
belonging to the Church.

2312. Special Cases Regarding Local Sacrilege.--Local sacrilege is not
committed by every sin, even though grave, that is done in a holy
place, for the character of this sacrilege is that it be such an injury
to the sacredness of the place as to make what should be hallowed seem
horrible, or contemptible, or common. Hence, there is no sacrilege in
detractions, lies, perjuries, blasphemies, or in most internal sins,
when committed in a church or cemetery. But there are two kinds of sins
which are sacrilegious profanations of holy places, namely, theft and
impurity.

(a) Theft in a holy place is certainly sacrilegious when the thing
taken is sacred (e.g., a chalice, money in the votive stands). It is
probably not sacrilegious when the thing taken is not sacred (e.g., the
pocketbook of a person kneeling in the church), and if the thing taken
was not left in the custody of the place. This matter, however, is
disputed.

(b) Impurity, if external and perfect (_voluntaria effusio seminis_),
is sacrilegious, though under the Code it does not seem to be a
desecration. The same is probably true of external but imperfect sins
(such as touches, looks, words, gestures). Internal acts of impurity
are not sacrilegious, unless they include a desire to sin externally in
a holy place.

2313. Cases Wherein There Is No Sacrilege.--In the following cases no
sacrilege is committed:

(a) when the thing violated is not sacred. There is no personal
sacrilege in an act of unchastity committed by a person privately vowed
to chastity (common opinon). While some authors teach that personal
sacrilege is committed by the violation of poverty and obedience (see
Merkelbach, _Summa Theologiae Moralis_ II, n.804, 4), it seems better
to hold the opposite opinion and restrict personal sacrilege to
violations of chastity by persons with religious vows or admitted to
the religious state. There is no local sacrilege in the profane use of
a place devoted to works of piety but not specially set apart for them
by Church authority (such as a private oratory, or a hospital conducted
by the laity), nor in the burial of infidels in an unblessed graveyard.
There is no real sacrilege in profane use of things which are not set
apart exclusively for sacred use (e.g., to use the candelabra and
candles of the altar to read by in one’s room), or which have not been
made sacred (e.g., to steal money promised but not delivered to the
Church or the personal belongings of a cleric);

(b) when the thing injured is sacred, but the action or omission is not
opposed to the attribute in which it is holy, or to a law made to
ensure respect for it. Thus, a person who has the vow of chastity does
not commit sacrilege if he becomes intoxicated or uses profane
language, for he was not consecrated against those sins; a sacred place
is not sacrilegiously violated by an act not opposed to its holiness or
the respect demanded for it by the law (e.g., organ recitals or awards
for Christian Doctrine in church, sale of candles in the vestibule,
physical violence against a disturber of divine service). Sacrilege is
not done in reverently destroying an old and tattered vestment, in
respectfully handling agnus deis, relics, unused palls, and other
objects that may be touched by all.

2314. Sacredness as Aggravating Circumstance of Sin.--But a sin that is
not sacrilegious is often made worse by reason of the sacredness of
some thing with which the sin is connected. (a) Thus, the sin is
aggravated by such circumstances as person and place. In this way it is
worse for a person vowed to God to blaspheme or lie than for one who
has no vow; it is worse to carry on frivolous or calumnious
conversations in church than on the street. (b) The sin receives the
additional malice of sacrilege if the sinner expressly intends the
circumstance of time, place, etc., in order to show contempt. Thus, it
is not sacrilege to get drunk on a Sunday or holyday, unless one wishes
by the sin to show dishonor to the sacred time; it is not sacrilege to
conduct oneself with levity in church, unless one wishes by the levity
to show contempt for the place.

2315. The Malice of Sacrilege.--(a) The moral malice of sacrilege is
that of irreligiousness (see 2299). The three kinds of sacrilege
(personal, local and real) are commonly regarded as three distinct
species of sin; for, just as injuries done to a man’s person, to his
immovable property, and to his movable goods are looked upon in law as
different kinds of offenses, so are injuries offered to the ministers
of God, the house of God, and the objects used in the service of God
unequal in the dishonor which they give to God before the public. More
probably there are no sub-species of these three classes of sacrilege.
Hence, in so far as the disrespect to God is concerned, there seems no
essential difference between the sin of violating and that of striking
a consecrated virgin.

(b) The theological malice of sacrilege is mortal from the nature of
the sin. Just as it is gravely insulting to a man to treat his
representatives or his home or chattels with contempt, likewise
disrespect for the things of God is disrespect for God Himself. The
seriousness of sacrilege is seen from the punishments visited on Core,
Dathan and Abiron (Num., xvi), on the sons of Heli (I Kings, ii. 17,
iv. 11), on King Balthasar (Dan., v. 2 sqq.), and on the sellers in the
temple (John, ii. 14). Sacrilege may be venial, however, on account of
the imperfection of the act (e.g., when one strikes a priest without
reflecting that he is a clergyman) or the smallness of the matter
(e.g., to quote Scripture in a decent joke, to use altar linen that is
only slightly soiled or torn, to touch the chalice without permission,
to steal a few pennies from a church).

2316. Conditions that Govern Gravity of Sacrilege.--To decide in a
concrete case whether a sacrilege is gravely or lightly sinful, one
should consider the internal state of mind of the offender and the
external character of the offense. (a) Thus, if the purpose is directly
and formally to dishonor God, the sin is grave, but, if there is some
other purpose, it may be light. (b) If the thing dishonored is more
closely related to God, or if the act of dishonor is in public
estimation more insulting, the sin is more serious. Unworthy treatment
of the Eucharist is the worst of sacrileges; ill-usage of a sacred
person is worse than disrespect for a sacred place; treading the Sacred
Species under foot is more contemptuous than an unworthy Communion, etc.

2317. Simony.--Simony derives its name from Simon Magus, the first
person in New Testament times, as far as we know, who committed this
crime. For it is written of Simon (Acts, viii. 18 sqq.) that he
attempted to buy from St. Peter the power of imposition of hands. But
the sin was not unknown in the Old Testament, as we see from the
examples of Baalam (Numb., xxii. 7), Giezi (IV Kings, v. 20 sqq.), and
Jason (II Mach., iv. 7 sqq.).

2318. Definition of Simony.--Simony is defined as “the studied will to
buy or sell for a temporal price or consideration something that is
spiritual either intrinsically or extrinsically.”

(a) Simony is in the will, for it is an act of injustice pretending to
have or to receive the right of dominion over spiritual things that
belong to God alone, and injustice is a vice of the will. Hence, simony
is not an internal sin of the intellect; for, though one who practises
simony externally makes to some extent a profession of belief in the
heresy that man is the owner of spirituals and gives grounds for the
suspicion that he holds that the sale of spirituals is lawful, yet he
may know well that the things of God are priceless and still wish to
give or receive a price for them. Again, simony is not to be identified
with the external act of bargaining for spirituals; for, though the law
punishes only external or completed simony, the guilt and malice of the
sin is present even when one has the desire to traffic in spiritual
things, but makes no overtures or compact.

(b) Simony is a studied will; that is, it is an act of free and
deliberate choice selecting some form of internal or external simony as
a desirable means. Hence, it is not sufficient for the sin of simony
that there be an internal wish not fully voluntary on account of
inculpable ignorance or imperfect consent; nor, on the other hand, is
it necessary for incurring the guilt of simony that there be a mutual
pact, but it suffices that one party alone have the will to make the
pact or to obligate another party to simony.

(c) It is a wish to buy or sell, that is, to give or receive a temporal
thing in exchange for a spiritual thing. There is question here, then,
not only of the contract of sale, but of any other form of onerous
contract, such as hire, rent, loan, exchange, _do ut des_, _facio ut
facias_, etc. To be simoniacal, however, a contract need not be
fulfilled or explicitly manifested; it suffices that it be unfulfilled
or tacitly made, if the sinful intent can be gathered from the
circumstances of the case. Hence, from the present part of the
definition it follows that there is no simony in a gratuitous contract
(e.g., when one gives a gift to another hoping and expecting that the
later from gratitude will give in return something spiritual which it
is lawful to bestow from gratitude; when a poor person offers to make a
novena for benefactors who give him an alms). It is simony, however, to
make an onerous contract under the guise of a gratuitous contract, for
example: “I give you this money as a pure gift on condition that you
will not be ungrateful but will give me this spiritual favor as a pure
gift.”

(d) The price or consideration in simony is some thing, action or
forbearance which in some way is of advantage to the recipient. Simony
in the strictest sense is committed when a temporal thing is offered
for a spiritual thing (e.g., money paid for a Sacrament); simony in the
wide sense is committed when, contrary to the law on simony, things
like in character are exchanged (2323 a). Thus, if the Church forbids
Mass to be exchanged for Mass, or benefice for benefice, or the office
of sacristan for that of sexton, transgressors are guilty of the second
form of simony.

(e) The matter of simony is something intrinsically or extrinsically
spiritual. In general, the spiritual is that which proceeds from God or
tends to Him as the Author or End of eternal salvation (viz., the
destiny, law, means, works, etc., proposed to us in Christian
revelation and religion). Among these things those are intrinsically
spiritual that pertain to the supernatural order on account of some
inherent character of their own (e.g., grace, Sacraments, Mass,
miracles) or some intimate union with things spiritual (e.g., benefices
attached to spiritual offices, consecration to be given a chalice);
those are extrinsically spiritual that are in themselves temporal, but
in church law are treated as spiritual for the sake of reverence to the
intrinsically spiritual (e.g., chrism in regard to the material itself
of the oil and other ingredients). If the matter of a contract is
neither intrinsically nor extrinsically spiritual, there is no simony
in buying or selling it (e.g., devotional books, household furnishings
of a rectory, personal effects of a cleric).

2319. Temporal Price in Simony.--The temporal price in simony is some
temporal good or advantage. St. Gregory the Great distinguishes three
kinds of simoniacal prices as follows:

(a) the price from the hand (_munus a manu_) is either money or things
that have a money value, such as movable or immovable property,
corporeal or incorporeal rights. It would be simony to give a benefice
in exchange for a sum of money, for a loan, for real estate;

(b) the price from the tongue (_munus a lingua_) is any kind of
patronage, such as praise, recommendation, protection, defense,
opposition to competitors, etc. It would be simony to confer a benefice
in exchange for the influence in one’s favor which the recipient of the
benefice would exercise with some powerful person, for his vote in an
election, etc.;

(c) the price in service (_munus ab obsequio_) is any kind of temporal
labor or assistance given for another’s benefit, such as the management
of his business or the instruction of his children. It would be simony
to grant a benefice in exchange for work done as secretary, treasurer,
or advisor.

2320. The Spiritual Thing in Simony.--The thing inherently spiritual in
simony is also of three kinds. (a) That which is spiritual from its
nature is a thing that is supernatural in itself, such as sanctifying
grace, the Gifts of the Holy Ghost, and the power of orders or of
jurisdiction. (b) That which is supernatural from its cause is a thing
produced by a supernatural agency or power, such as health obtained
through miracle. (c) That which is supernatural from its effect is a
thing having the virtue of producing supernatural results, _ex opere
operato_, or _ex opere operantis_, or as an occasion (e.g., Sacraments,
prayers, sermons).

2321. Temporal Thing United with Spiritual.--In the two following ways
things are made spiritual in reference to simony through intimate union
with spirituals: (a) by necessary connection, when a temporal thing is
so annexed with a spiritual thing that it cannot exist without it. This
includes the things annexed consequently, and perhaps also those
annexed concomitantly and intrinsically (see 2322); (b) by contractual
connection, when a spiritual and a temporal are the partial objects of
a contract, as when in the sale of a consecrated chalice the price is
raised on account of the consecration.

2322. Temporal Thing Annexed to Spiritual.--In three ways a temporal
thing is annexed to a spiritual thing.

(a) The temporal thing is annexed antecedently if it precedes the
spiritual thing as its prepared or appointed or presupposed matter or
subject. Thus, all things that receive a consecration or blessing
(e.g., chalices, rosaries) or a property to which a right of patronage
is attached are of this kind. Relics are properly of this category,
but, since they have usually no material value, it is customary to
include them amongst spirituals.

(b) The temporal thing is annexed concomitantly if it is simultaneous
with the spiritual thing as being the action or labor that produces it.
If the union is essential and inseparable, the temporal thing is said
to be annexed intrinsically (e.g., the work performed in saying Mass,
preaching, making a sick call); if the union is not essential, the
temporal thing is said to be annexed extrinsically (e.g., the special
work performed in saying Mass, if it has to be sung, or said in a
distant church, or at a determined hour).

(c) The temporal thing is annexed consequently when it presupposes the
spiritual thing as the cause on which it depends. Thus, the revenues of
a parish are a temporal thing, but they follow on the pastoral office
which is a spiritual thing.

2323. The Various Kinds of Simony.--(a) In reference to its matter or
the law violated, simony is either against natural and divine law or
against positive ecclesiastical law. Simony against divine law consists
in the exchange for temporalities of things that are spiritual or
intimately annexed to the spiritual (see 2321), such as Sacraments,
indulgences, or jurisdiction. Simony against church law consists in an
exchange that has the appearance of simony against divine law, or that
easily leads to simony against the divine law, and is consequently
forbidden by the Church in order to safeguard religious respect for
sacred things, as when one violates the law by taking money for holy
oils. In the former kind of simony, things of different orders
(spirituals and temporals) are exchanged one for the other; in the
latter kind of simony, things of the same sort (spirituals for
spirituals, temporals for temporals, etc.) are exchanged where the law
forbids (Canon 727).

(b) In reference to its manner, or the way in which it is committed,
simony is internal or external. Internal simony is the will, without
the external agreement, to exchange spirituals for temporals; it is
purely mental if nothing external is done by reason of the internal
will; it is not purely mental if something external is done by reason
of the internal will (e.g., if the person who desires to commit simony
makes a money present to another in the hope that the latter will feel
morally bound to give something spiritual in return, or if one gives
something spiritual looking for a substantial gift of money as
compensation). External simony is an outward pact freely entered into
between two parties to exchange spirituals for temporals. It is called
purely conventional, if neither party has as yet performed his part of
the agreement; it is semi-real or mixed, if one of the parties has
executed his part; it is real if both parties have performed, at least
in part, what they agreed to. A simoniacal compact is explicit, if
expressed by clear words or signs (e.g., “I will pay $100 for your
vote”); it is tacit, if circumstances indicate the evil intention
(e.g., very unusual presents given before an election).

2324. Confidential Simony.--Simony committed in reference to benefices
is called confidential because the contract is illegal, giving no
judicial protection, and there is only the confidence or reliance on
another’s word to give assurance that the agreement will be kept.
Canonists discuss at length the following contracts in which it is
committed:

(a) the contract _per accessum_ grants a benefice with the agreement
that the grantee will later resign, so that access to it may be had by
the grantor or a third party at present incapable;

(b) the contract _per ingressum_ resigns a benefice not yet taken
possession of with the understanding that the person who now enters
into possession will leave the place open for his predecessor if he
himself resigns or is promoted;

(e) the contract _per regressum_ resigns a benefice already possessed
with the understanding that it may be recovered by the person now
resigning or by a third party;

(d) the contract _per reservationem partis_ obtains a benefice for
another with the stipulation that he will pay a certain percentage of
its revenues to the person who obtains it for him or to a third party
(see Canon 1441).

2325. Simony Against Divine Law.--Simony against divine law is
committed in reference to spiritual things when a temporal price is
formally or virtually given or received for them.

(a) Thus, the temporal thing is formally set up as the price, when it
is regarded or treated as the end of the spiritual thing or action
itself (_finis operis_), one of the things exchanged being used as the
measure of value of the other. This happens when a person wills to buy
or sell a spiritual thing, either because he thinks that its value may
be expressed in terms of money or other temporal thing, or because he
judges that he should treat it as though money were its equivalent, as
when one fulfills a spiritual office and excludes every other motive
than that of lucre (Denzinger, n. 1196).

(b) The temporal thing is virtually set up as the price, when it is
intended as the sole proximate end of the agent himself (_finis
operantis_), though there is no explicit thought about values or prices
or comparisons. This happens when one gives a temporal thing and has no
other immediate personal purpose in this act than the acquisition of a
spiritual thing, or performs a pretendedly gratuitous service,
intending thereby to obligate the beneficiary to the grant of some
spiritual benefit, or bestows a “gratuitous” temporal favor as
compensation for a spiritual benefit or vice versa (Denzinger, n.
1195). This is simony, for he who explicitly intends only an exchange,
implicitly intends a price; and if it were not simony, then simony
would be almost entirely an entity of the mind, since it is a very
simple matter to will that the temporal thing exchanged shall be not
the price, but only the motive of the contract or gratuitous
compensation.

2326. The temporal thing is not made the virtual price of the spiritual
thing, if there is a lawful proximate motive (i.e., one recognized by
the Canons or legitimate custom) for giving the temporal thing and the
desire of receiving the spiritual thing is only the remote reason or
occasion of the act. For in such a case the temporal thing is given for
a lawful purpose and is not the price of a spiritual thing.

Examples: (a) If the recipient of the temporal thing has a right to it,
there is no simony. Thus, the ministers of the altar have a right to
their support (see 2186), and it is not simoniacal, when asking
spiritual things from them (e.g., the application of Mass to one’s
intention, the performance of Sacraments and sacred functions), to
offer a stipend or fee; (b) if the bestower of the temporal thing gives
it freely out of pure friendship, liberality, charity, gratitude or
good will, so that it is an absolute gift, there is no simony, even
though he hopes or expects that he will receive something spiritual as
a mark of appreciation. But “a charitable or friendly gift” may easily
be palliated simony; that is, there may be a pretense of liberality to
conceal the real purpose of purchasing spirituals with temporals.

2327. Rules of Alexander III for Determining Simony.--Alexander III
gave several rules for determining whether a gift is made from
liberality or with simoniacal intent.

(a) The following are marks of simoniacal intent: the quality of the
giver (e.g., that he is poor, or in great need, or not customarily
generous), the quantity of the gift (e.g., that it corresponds with the
value of a vacant benefice, that it is surprisingly large), the time of
the gift (e.g., that it is made when the donee is not in any special
need, or when he is about to confer an office, or after hints have been
made). If a gift is bestowed in connection with a spiritual thing
received, the presumption is for simoniacal intent, unless there was a
sincere and reasonable motive for the gift.

(b) The following, on the contrary, are marks of a liberal intent: the
quality of the giver (e.g., that he is wealthy, noted for kindness and
compassion, or liberal to all, or is a relative of the donee); the
quantity of the gift (e.g., that it is small or normal in size), the
time of the gift (e.g., if it is made when necessity, festal occasion,
or the like calls for it).

2328. Simony against Divine Law in Reference to Things Annexed to
Spirituals.--(a) It is simony against divine law to buy or sell things
annexed to spirituals consequently (e.g., the revenues of a benefice)
or concomitantly and intrinsically (e.g., the ordinary labor and
fatigue connected with preaching, saying Mass); for in the former case
the temporal grows out of a spiritual and is morally one with it, while
in the latter case the temporal has no value except in so far as it is
joined with the spiritual.

(b) It is not simony against divine law to buy or sell things annexed
to spirituals antecedently (e.g., blessed candles, sacred vestments),
if the price is not raised on account of the spiritual thing, or things
annexed concomitantly and extrinsically (e.g., the extraordinary labor
and fatigue caused by saying Mass in a distant place or at a late
hour); for in both cases the temporal has its own proper value and is
not considered as inseparable from the spiritual. There is simony
against divine law, however, if the price is raised on account of the
spiritual part (e.g., if something is added for the blessing given a
candle), and simony against church law if the transaction is forbidden
as simoniacal (e.g., deductions and payments made in the act of
preferment to a benefice are contrary to Canon 1441).

2329. Conditions Necessary for Simony against Ecclesiastical Law.--(a)
There must be an exchange through some kind of onerous contract, but it
suffices that the understanding be tacit and non-executed, as was
explained above (see 2323).

(b) There must be a law of the Church which, from a motive of respect
for sacred things, forbids the exchange.

(c) The simoniacal exchange is made, whether a temporal annexed to a
spiritual is given for another temporal annexed to a spiritual (e.g.,
benefice for benefice), or a spiritual for a spiritual, or a temporal
for a temporal. Canonists enumerate the following as examples of simony
of ecclesiastical law: gifts made in connection with a competitive
examination for a parochial benefice, with ordination or grant of
certain testimonial letters (Canon 545), with erection of
confraternities; sale of blessed oil or chrism, or of the right of
patronage (Canon 1470); remuneration for collection of stipends or for
expenses of Mass (Canons 840, 1303).

2330. Certain and Uncertain Simony.--(a) Cases in which simony is
certain are the administration of Sacraments or sacramentals to the
unworthy for the sake of the fee or favors, the sale of indulgences,
taxes or charges made contrary to law (e.g., for a Mass of bination).
Other examples are given in 2323 sqq. The Church demands that certain
ministrations (e.g., Confirmation, Eucharist, Penance, Extreme Unction,
Orders) be gratis, but there may be local customs or conditions that
justify exceptions. Some moralists teach that there is no simony when a
stipend is exacted for an obligatory ministry, if the simoniacal motive
is absent.

(b) Cases in which simony is controverted are those in which a tax or
stipend in excess of what is just or lawful is exacted (e.g., a Mass
stipend higher than custom permits). Some claim there is simony,
because the excess must be for the spiritual thing; others hold that
there is no simony, but only an unjust increase in the stipend allowed
for support; others say that there is no simony in the internal forum
if the intent is not simoniacal, but that there is simony in the
external forum on account of the presumption of simoniacal intent.

2331. Doubtful Cases of Simony.--In some gifts and payments the
presence or absence of simony depends on the object for which they are
given.

(a) Thus, when they are given for omission of a spiritual act, there is
simony if the omission includes the exercise of spiritual power (e.g.,
to omit absolution is to retain sins or censures); there is no simony
if the omission is the mere exercise of free will (e.g., to omit Mass,
confession).

(b) When they are given for omission of opposition or annoyance, so
that one may be able to obtain some office or benefice, there is simony
if the temporal thing is thereby given for the benefice itself or for
the way to it (i.e., if one has no strict right to the spiritual thing,
or if the opposition is just), as when the candidate for a benefice
pays a competitor to withdraw, or pays an accuser to keep silence;
there is no simony if the temporal thing is given for freedom from
unjust vexation (i.e., if one has a strict right to the spiritual thing
and the opposition is clearly unjust, as when one who has acquired a
right to an office pays an enemy to desist from placing impediments).
The payment made by Jacob to Esau for the birthright, to which Jacob
was entitled by divine disposition, may be regarded as having had for
its end, not the paternal blessing and other spiritual rights of the
first-born, but immunity from persecution by Esau.

(e) When they are given for instruction, there is simony if the
instruction has for its direct purpose the spiritual benefit of the
disciple (e.g., catechetical instructions, sermons, spiritual
direction); there is no simony if the instruction has for its direct
purpose the improvement of the mind or the utility or advantage which
the disciple will derive from it (e.g., instruction in theology,
preparation for examinations).

(d) When they are given for admission to religious life, there is
simony if the money is paid for the religious state itself, the vows,
or other spirituals; there is no simony if the money is paid for the
temporal support of the religious institute, that it may be able to
meet its expenses.

2332. Cases in Which a Transaction Is Not Simoniacal, but Lawful.--(a)
There is no simony when a temporal is given on the occasion of but not
for a spiritual. This happens when there is a just title for bestowal
of the temporal, such as right of support (e.g., pastors’ salaries,
Mass stipends, fees), extrinsic values in a work or object (e.g., the
special labor in saying Mass under certain conditions, and, according
to some, the special affection one has for a relic, the _lucrum
cessans_ on account of some function performed).

(b) There is no simony when something of value is given in exchange,
but not for a spiritual, nor in contravention of an anti-simony law.
This happens whether like be exchanged for like (e.g., Mass for Mass),
or a temporal for a thing associated with a spiritual as the latter’s
subject (e.g., money for a rosary or cemetery plot which has been
blessed). In the former case there is no prohibition; in the latter,
the temporalities have their own distinct values which may be paid for,
if the price is not raised on account of the spiritual (see Canons 730,
1539).

2333. Cases in Which a Transaction Is Not Simoniacal, but Is
Sinful.--(a) Sins against God.--One who performs functions of religion
primarily and principally, as far as his personal motive (_finis
operantis_) is concerned, for the salary, stipend or fee, is not guilty
of simony, since he does not regard the temporal even virtually as the
price of the spiritual. But he does sin by indevotion, and the sin may
even be mortal (e.g., a canon goes to choir chiefly because this yields
him a living). Offenses committed in the matter of Mass stipends are
not called simony in the Code, but the penal law classes them with
offenses against religion, as may be seen from Canon 2324. Nepotism,
favoritism in giving offices, and political and dishonest maneuvers to
obtain church dignities are not in themselves simoniacal; but they are
an unworthy and scandalous treatment of sacred things.

(b) Sins against Others.--It is not simony but injustice to deny the
Sacraments to parishioners who do not contribute, to overcharge in
lawful fees, and also, according to some, to take money for the
omission of a spiritual act owed in justice (e.g., for refusal to hear
the confession of a parishioner), or to demand money as the stipend for
the performance of such a spiritual act (e.g., for hearing a
confession). It is disobedience to take money in ways forbidden (e.g.,
to take Mass stipends in the confessional, to earn money by gambling or
trading forbidden in the Canons). Again, it is not strictly simony to
put up as the stakes in a game a spiritual thing (e.g., the recitation
of the Rosary) against a temporal thing (e.g., ten dollars), for there
is no intention to value the spiritual thing by the temporal; but such
a practice is scandalous. Greed about getting or keeping money pertains
to avarice, not necessarily to simony.

2334. Cases in Which a Transaction Is Not Simoniacal, but
Virtuous.--(a) Some acts done in God’s honor (e.g., to purchase a
spiritual object, such as a sacred vessel or relic, from a person who
would misuse it), when the purchaser intends the prevention of
profanation. It is certainly not irreverence to a sacred thing to use
means necessary to rescue it from such irreverence.

(b) Some acts done for the good of others (e.g., to give prizes to
children who frequent the Sacraments or Sunday school, dowries to young
girls that they may be able to enter religion, free education to worthy
young men as an inducement to embrace the ecclesiastical state). In all
these cases there is no purchase of a spiritual thing, because the
temporal is a pure gift, and the spiritual is received, not by the
giver of the temporal, but by another. There is no simony in the fees
imposed for dispensations or in the alms sometimes prescribed for
indulgences; for the temporal is not a price paid for the spiritual,
but in the one case either a penance or a charge for expenses, and in
the other a spiritual good work and duty prescribed as a condition for
a spiritual benefit.

(e) Some acts done for the spiritual good of self (e.g., if one were in
danger of death and could be baptized only by a person Who demanded
money for the service, it would not be simony to pay the money, since
the price would be offered, not for the Sacrament, but for the removal
of an unjust annoyance).

2335. Theological Malice of the Sin of Simony.--(a) Simony against the
divine law is a mortal sin from its nature and in every instance. No
matter how small the spiritual thing that is sold, it is priceless, and
a grave injury is done by putting a price on it. Simony is a serious
injury to God, since it usurps His place as the only Lord of spiritual
things (I Cor., iv, 1), to the spiritual things themselves, since it
estimates their worth by vile material gain (Prov., iii. 15; Acts,
viii. 20), and to the recipients, who should receive the gifts of God
freely (Matt, x, 8). Hence, St. Peter denounced Simon Magus as
deserving of perdition (Acts, viii. 20), and in law simony is spoken of
as the worst of pests, a cancer, leprosy, a scourge.

(b) Simony against ecclesiastical law is a mortal sin from its nature,
since it is forbidden as a protection to religion and under grave sin;
but in particular cases it may be only a venial sin, since the church
laws do not bind under grave sin, when the matter or the danger is not
serious, as was said in 382.

2336. Moral Malice of the Sin of Simony.--(a) Simony is reducible to
real sacrilege (see 2311 c). It is treated separately for the sake of
convenience, on account of the large number of questions that pertain
to it, and also because there is reason to consider it as a distinct
species of sin (2308 c). Hence, the moral malice of simony is that of
irreligiousness.

(b) Simony of divine law and simony of ecclesiastical law, according to
the more common and likely opinion, are alike in moral malice. For
although the mere prohibition of the Church does not make a non-sacred
thing sacred, it does make the non-sacred thing unsaleable precisely
because related to things that are sacred. In other words, the motive
of the law is the protection of sacred things against the appearance or
danger of simony, and the motive of the law is the factor that
determines the moral character of precepts and prohibitions of human
law. Thus, to miss Mass on Sunday is a sin against religion, because
the Church commands in virtue of religion that Mass be heard on Sunday;
to eat meat on Friday is a sin against temperance, because the Church
forbids the use of meat on Friday in virtue of temperance. Hence, it is
not merely disobedience, but simony, to violate a law which forbids a
certain contract because of its nearness to the sale of spirituals for
temporals. Moreover, he who willfully exposes himself to the immediate
danger of some sin wills the malice of that sin.

2337. Invalidity and Penalties of Simoniacal Contracts.--(a) Every
simoniacal contract is invalid and of no force either in the external
or in the internal forum, because it sells what is unsaleable under
divine or ecclesiastical law. If the contract has to do with benefices,
offices or dignities (e.g., “You vote as I wish and I will give you
such and such favors,” “You obtain for me such a dignity and I will pay
you well”), the appointment to them is rendered null and void, even
though the simoniacal act be done by a third party without the
knowledge of the beneficiary, unless it be done by that third party to
injure the beneficiary or against his protest (Canon 729). Invalidity
is also produced in case of simoniacal resignations (Canon 185),
commissions (Canon 1441), presentations (Canon 1465, Sec. 2), and
prescription does not operate for one who holds a benefice obtained
through simony (Canon 1446).

(b) Certain simoniacal contracts subject the guilty parties to special
punishments. Thus, the penalty for simony in appointments, elections or
promotions to office and dignities is excommunication _latae
sententiae_ reserved simply to the Holy See, and deprivation forever of
all right of nominating, voting, presenting, and suspension (Canon
2392); the penalty for simony in elevation to Orders or in use of other
sacraments is suspicion of heresy and suspension reserved to the Holy
See (Canon 2371).

2338. When the Canonical Penalties for Simony Do Not Apply.--(a) Purely
mental simony is not subject to ecclesiastical penalties, since the
Church does not pronounce on internal acts. But this does not take away
the serious guilt in the sight of God. (b) External simony is subject
to ecclesiastical penalties, but canonists dispute about the meaning of
certain Canons, for example, whether only real simony falls under the
punishments _latae sententiae_, whether the penalties of Canons 729 and
2392 apply only to simony of divine law, or to simony of ecclesiastical
law as well.

2339. Influence of Simony on Spiritual Effects.--(a) On Effects of the
Power of Orders.--Sacraments administered simoniacally are valid, for
the law nullifies only the contract made about the Sacrament, not the
Sacrament itself. It seems also that in the case of sacramentals (such
as simple blessings imposed on articles) the blessing is not lost by
sale of the article, provided the price is asked only for the object
and not for the blessing. A blessed or consecrated object loses its
blessing or consecration when it is put up for public sale (Canon 1305).

(b) On Effects of the Power of Jurisdiction.--Acts of jurisdiction are
valid in spite of simony, unless there is special provision to the
contrary. Indulgences are lost _ipso facto_, if anything temporal is
taken for the indulgenced object (Canon 924). Religious profession, it
seems, is valid, even though simoniacal.

2340. Restitution of the Temporal Price Received for a Spiritual
Thing.--(a) If the simoniacal contract is semi-real (that is, if the
spiritual consideration has not been received), the price must be
restored; for we have then the case of an immoral and unexecuted
contract (see 1878 d). (b) If the simoniacal contract is real (that is,
if the spiritual consideration has been received), the price should be
given back; for the case then is one of commutative justice, a temporal
price being taken for a thing (e.g., a blessing) that has no temporal
price, or for a service that one was bound to give gratis (e.g.,
parochial sermon by the pastor). But if a service was not obligatory,
it is held by some that there is no certain duty of restitution, if the
spiritual thing cannot be restored (e.g., when one received a stipend
for a Mass of bination or demanded an excessive fee for a sacred
function).

2341. Restitution of the Temporal Price Received for Temporal Things
Annexed to Spirituals.--Restitution is obligatory as follows: (a) when
commutative justice is violated, as when one charges for a blessed
candle or rosary in excess of its market value or just price, or when
by fear or force one compels another to exchange a chalice for a
ciborium; (b) when law or judicial sentence imposes restitution as a
penalty for an offense, as when for money one has resigned one’s
benefice in favor of another person.

2342. Circumstances of Restitution for Simony.--(a) The Time for
Restitution.--If simony is against natural law, restitution is due
before sentence; if against ecclesiastical law only, restitution is due
only after sentence.

(b) The Person to Whom Restitution Is to Be Made.--Satisfaction should
be given to the owner, or injured party (e.g., to the person who was
charged for a blessing), or, if this is impossible, to the poor or
pious causes. The revenues derived from a benefice simoniacally
obtained should be restored to the church to which the benefice
belongs, unless this is advantageous to the guilty parties, or probably
to charity, or religion, or the successor in the benefice.

(c) Excuses from Restitution.--Impossibility, condonation or the
permission of the Church, express or presumed, excuses from the duty of
restitution.

2343. Restitution of Spiritual Thing Simoniacally Received.--The
spiritual thing simoniacally received must be restored even before the
sentence of the judge (Canon 729, Sec.1). (a) Thus, if it is a benefice,
office or dignity that was obtained or conferred through simony, it
must be resigned; nor may the guilty party keep the fruits, unless he
was in good faith and permission is given. (b) If the spiritual thing
is something other than a benefice, it should likewise be given up,
provided it is of a kind that can be restored (e.g., it is impossible
to restore a Sacrament received or a consecration given to a church)
and restitution will not cause irreverence (e.g., it would be
irreverent to restore blessed objects or relics to the seller if he
meant to profane them).




Art. 6: THE REMAINING POTENTIAL PARTS OF JUSTICE; THE VIRTUE OF PIETY;
THE COMMANDMENTS

(_Summa Theologica_, II-II, qq. 101-122.)

2344. Having treated of religion, the chief potential part of justice,
we shall new consider the remaining subsidiary virtues of the present
group, namely, piety, reverence, truthfulness, gratitude, vindication,
friendship, liberality, equity (see 2141-2143).

2345. The Virtue of Piety.--In general, piety is the virtue that
inclines one to show due recognition of indebtedness to those from whom
one has received life and existence. There are three senses of the word:

(a) in its strictest meaning, it refers to the dutifulness owed to the
immediate or secondary causes of our being, namely, parents and country;

(b) in a derived meaning, it is applied to the religious duties owed to
God, who is our Heavenly Father and the First Author of our being.
Hence, those who are faithful to the worship of God are called pious
and the divine services are known as works of piety;

(c) in its widest meaning, piety is applied to works of mercy, since
they are most pleasing to God as a tribute of filial devotion. The
merciful man has pity (piety), because his kindness to the unfortunate
honors God more than victims or sacrifices. Hence, since God is
merciful, He Himself is sometimes called pious: “The Lord is
compassionate (_pius_) and merciful” (Ecclus., ii. 13).

2346. Definition of Piety.--Piety in the strictest sense is defined as
“a moral virtue that inclines one to pay to father and fatherland the
duty of respect and assistance that is owed them as the authors and
sustainers of our being.”

(a) It is a moral virtue, one pertaining to justice, and hence it
differs from the special duty of charity owed to parents and country
(see 1158, 1171 sqq.). Charity loves parents and country out of love
for God whose creatures they are; piety honors them in recognition of
the benefits received from them and the authority vested in them.

(b) Piety is shown to father and fatherland; that is, just as religion
gives worship to God in acknowledgment of His excellence and our
dependence upon Him, so does piety show due respect to those who hold
the place of God in our respect on earth. Filial piety is owed to the
mother as well as to the father, and in a less degree to other
relatives, inasmuch as they share or continue the blood of one’s
parents and may be regarded as representing them (e.g., brothers and
sisters, husband or wife). Patriotism belongs to one’s native land or
the country, nation, state, city, etc., of which one is a citizen; and
it should include, not only fellow-citizens, but also the friends and
allies of one’s country. He who is the adopted citizen of a country
should love the place of his birth, but loyalty and obedience are owed
to the nation to which he has transferred his allegiance.

(c) Piety offers respect and assistance. The first duty is owed to
parents on account of their position of progenitors and superiors; the
second is owed to their condition when they are infirm or destitute or
otherwise in need. It is more probable that filial piety is violated
only when the personal goods (e.g., life, health, body, fame, honor) of
parents are injured, and that injury to their real goods pertains to
fraud, theft or damage, rather than to impiety. Moreover, on account of
the community of goods that exists between parents and children, real
injuries between them are not rigorously acts of injustice and require
more than the ordinary grave matter for serious sin (see 1902).

(d) Piety is owed to parents and country as the authors and sustainers
of our being. Thus, it differs from legal justice, which is the duty
owed the State or community, precisely as it is the whole of which one
is a part. It differs likewise from commutative justice, which is
obligatory in agreements with parents or other superiors, for the duty
is then owed them as partners to a free contract. On account of this
nobility of the formal object, filial piety and patriotism are very
like to religion and rank next after it in the catalogue of virtues.

2347. The Reverence Required by Piety.--(a) Parents should be honored
internally by the esteem in which their parental dignity and merits
(not their personal failings) are held; externally, by the marks of
respect customarily shown to parents.

(b) Relatives should receive a lower degree of respect commensurate
with the nearness and quality of the kinship. Thus, parents should
treat their children with the consideration owed to members of the
family, and not as servants or strangers, brothers and sisters and
relatives of remoter degree should give one another that courtesy and
regard which respect for common parents or ancestors calls for. Lineal
relatives are nearer than collaterals, and elder relatives (such as
grandparents, uncles and aunts) are more entitled to respect than
younger relatives (such as grandchildren, nephews and nieces).

(e) Country should be honored, not merely by the admiration one feels
for its greatness in the past or present, but also and primarily by the
tender feeling of veneration one has for the land that has given one
birth, nurture and education. Even though a country be poor and humble,
it should be patriotically revered (Ps. cxxxvi). External
manifestations of piety towards country are the honors given its flag
and symbols, marks of appreciation of its citizenship (Acts, xxi. 39),
and efforts to promote its true glory at home and abroad.

2348. The Assistance Required by Piety.--(a) Parents should be helped
in their needs, spiritual or temporal. If they are sick, they should be
visited; if they are poor, they should be assisted; if they are in need
of the Sacraments or prayers or suffrages, these spiritual means should
be provided. But a son is not bound to pay the debts of his deceased
father who left him nothing, since the debt was a personal one.

(b) Relatives should also be assisted in their needs, especially if the
necessity is urgent and the relationship close (as in the case of
brothers and sisters). But this duty is not as strict as that owed to
parents, and, if the relationship is distant, there is no special
obligation of piety.

(c) Country is helped by the aid given to fellow-countrymen who are in
moral, mental or corporal need. The noblest patriots are those who
devote their lives, labors or substance to the promotion of religion,
education and contentment among their people, to the correction of real
evils that threaten decay or disaster to the national life, and to the
preservation of those special ideals and institutions that constitute
what is characteristic and best in the nation.

2349. Sins against Piety.--(a) By Excess.--Exaggerated respect for
relatives or country is a sin, since it is not according to order or
reason. Thus, while children should not dishonor their parents under
the pretext of religion (Matt., xv. 3-9), neither should they be more
devoted to their parents than to God (Luke, xiv. 26; Matt., viii. 22),
nor neglect God’s call when their parents do not need them (Matt., iv.
22). Thus also, patriotism should not degenerate into patriolatry, in
which country is enshrined as a god, all-perfect and all-powerful, nor
into jingoism or chauvinism, with their boastfulness or contempt for
other nations and their disregard for international justice or charity.

(b) By Defect.--Disrespect for parents is felt when they are despised
on account of their poverty, ignorance, or feebleness; it is shown by
word (e.g., when they are addressed in bitter, reproachful, or
contemptuous speech; or when they are ill spoken of to others), by
signs (e.g., when mocking gestures or mimicry are used to ridicule
them), by deeds (e.g., when they are threatened or struck), and by
omissions (e.g., when their children are too proud to recognize them or
to give them tokens of honor). Disrespect for one’s country is felt
when one is imbued with anti-nationalistic doctrines (e.g., the
principles of Internationalism which hold that loyalty is due to a
class, namely, the workers of the world or a capitalistic group, and
that country should be sacrificed to selfish interests; the principle
of Humanitarianism, which holds that patriotism is incompatible with
love of the race; the principle of Egoism which holds that the
individual has no obligations to society); it is practised when one
speaks contemptuously about country, disregards its good name or
prestige, subordinates its rightful pre-eminence to a class, section,
party, personal ambition, or greed, etc.

2350. Malice of Sins against Piety.--(a) The moral malice is distinct
from that of other sins, since injustice committed against the debt
owed to the human principle of existence has a special character of
wrong, as being opposed to a special kind of right. Parricide and
matricide have always been looked on as having a peculiar enormity
among sins of homicide; and similarly, disrespect to father and mother
are greater evils than disrespect to persons who have no like claim to
honor. Hence, he who has struck his father must mention the
circumstance of relationship in confession, since it is a circumstance
that changes the species of the sin. But he who has struck his fourth
cousin need not confess the relationship, for distant kinship, though
an aggravating circumstance, does not give the injury the character of
impiety.

(b) The theological malice of the sin is grave from the sin’s nature,
since piety ranks next to religion and is the object of a special
commandment and promise from God. But the sin may be venial on account
of lightness of the offense (e.g., when young children answer back or
speak saucily to their parents, but without contempt) or on account of
the lesser importance of the person offended (e.g., when a brother
slaps his brother, the sin is not as serious as when a child strikes
his parent). Children who have been seriously disrespectful to their
parents are obliged to beg pardon; but to impose the obligation
regularly in confession is deemed unwise, since insistence may only
lead the penitent to new sins, and moreover the forgiveness of parents
may generally be presumed when there is amendment.

2351. The Virtue of Reverence.--This virtue is known in Latin as
_observantia_, because its object is persons of authority, whom it
carefully observes in order to revere their dignity and to learn their
commands. It is defined as “a moral virtue which inclines one to render
to persons of higher position the tribute of honor and obedience that
is due their authority.”

(a) It is a moral virtue, that is, one concerned immediately with the
direction of human acts. Reverence belongs to justice because it
renders to others what is due them.

(b) The persons to whom it does justice are those of higher position,
that is, superiors who rule over us or over others, and men
distinguished for virtue, knowledge or other excellent qualities that
make them fit to govern. Superior here does not mean that the person
who receives reverence must be in every way better than the person who
shows reverence (e.g., he who is superior in jurisdiction owes some
reverence to a subject who is more learned or virtuous than himself),
or that there must be inequality between the one who gives and the one
who receives reverence (e.g., two distinguished persons of equal rank
and merit owe mutual reverence to each other on account of the
superiority which each has to many others).

(c) The reason for reverence is the authority vested in these persons,
that is, the excellence of their state, which gives them a higher
dignity than others, and their office of ruling, which empowers them to
direct a subject to his proper end. Here we see that reverence is a
distinct virtue, for, while piety and reverence are both forms of
veneration, the motive of each is different. Thus, a child owes to his
father piety, because from the father was received the beginning of his
life, and reverence, because from the father is received direction to
his end. Again, a subject owes the rulers of his country both piety and
reverence: piety, as regards their relation to the common good and the
nation (e.g., when the ruler is given his special salute), reverence,
as regards their personal rank and glory (e.g., when assistance is
given the ruler to lessen the burden of his office).

(d) The first tribute paid by reverence is honor, which is a testimony
given to worth, and is offered to the dignity or rank of the superior.
Honor differs from reverence as the effect differs from the cause, or
the means from the end; for it is reverence that prompts one to show
honor, and honor is meant to excite in others reverence for the person
honored. The debt of honor is due those who are superior in
jurisdiction, from legal justice; it is due to those who are superiors,
but not in jurisdiction, not from legal justice, since the law does not
enforce it, but from moral obligation, since it is decent and becoming.

(e) The second tribute of reverence is obedience, which is submission
to law, and is offered to the ruling power of the superior. This
tribute of reverence is paid only to one’s own ruling superior, since
others have no power to impose upon one their will or precept.

2352. Species of Honor.--(a) As to kinds, there is common honor which
is shown to all and by all (e.g., God honors the Saints, and Tobias and
Mardochaeus were honored by their sovereigns), and the special honor of
homage which includes submission and is shown only by inferiors or
servants to their superiors or masters.

(b) As to modes, there is honor in general and praise, which is a
special form of honor; Praise is given in speech or writing; honor is
shown not only by words, but also by deeds (e.g., by salutations,
prostrations) and things (e.g., by monuments, presents, banquets,
titles).

(c) As to motives, there is civil honor (i.e., the respect shown to the
temporal authority of rulers, teachers, employers, etc.), religious
honor (i.e., the respect shown to the spiritual authority of the Pope,
bishops, priests, etc.), and supernatural honor (i.e., the respect
given to the virtue of holy men). This last honor is known as _dulia_
(service) when offered to the Saints who reign with Christ in heaven,
as _hyperdulia_ (superior service) when offered to the Mother of God.

2353. Obligation of Showing Honor to Deserving Excellence.--(a) Common
honor should be given to all who are not irrevocably evil and
malignant, that is, it should be shown to all creatures, the damned
excepted. For, as was said above, there is no one who is not possessed
of superiority in some respect, and it is even reasonable to believe
that the most unpromising person is better than oneself in some quality
or other. Hence, the Scriptures admonish us to honor all (I Peter, ii.
17), to be beforehand in giving honor to one another (Rom., xii. 10),
and humbly to believe that others are superior (Phil., ii. 3). But in
bestowing honor, while one should have at least in general an honorable
opinion of others, the duty of external honor does not oblige at all
times or in all circumstances; and the same kind of honor is not to be
given by or to all persons. Those who show the ordinary signs of
charity (as they should) in greetings, salutations, courtesies, and the
like, comply sufficiently with the duty of common honor.

(b) Special honor should be given all those who have a right to it:
“Tribute to whom tribute is due, honor to whom honor is due” (Rom.,
xiii. 7). Thus, rulers and prelates should be given the respect due
their station, even though personally they are wicked, for in the honor
given their rank reverence is shown to God, whose ministers they are,
and to the community which they represent. There is a moral, though not
a legal, obligation to honor men distinguished for holiness for their
own sakes since, while honor is not a sufficient reward of virtue, it
is a distinguished mark of recognition, and for the sake of others,
since virtue in honor is like a lamp placed upon a stand and shining
for many (Matt., v. 15).

2354. Obligation of the Religious Cult of Dulia.--(a) There is no
strict duty of giving veneration to the Blessed Virgin, the Angels,
Saints, images, or relics, for absolutely speaking it suffices for
salvation to adore God. But it is of faith that the cult of these holy
persons and things is lawful and useful; hence he who should neglect it
would not merely disregard the earnest advice of the Church, but he
would also deny to God’s friends and heroes the honors they deserve
(Ecclus., xliv. 1; Heb., xi), and would deprive himself of precious
helps of intercession and inspiration. Some believe it is at least
venially sinful never to invoke the Blessed Virgin, and surely there
would be sin--and perhaps even grave sin, _per accidens_--if the
neglect was scandalous or perilous to salvation.

(b) There is an obligation in performing acts of cult to make the
veneration suitable to the dignity of the object (e.g., to the Mother
of God belongs _hyperdulia_, to the Saints of God _dulia_; to holy
persons is given absolute cult, to holy objects relative cult) and
conformable to the laws of the Church (e.g., the titles of Venerable,
Blessed, Saint are conferred only by the Church; public cult may be
performed only by those authorized to act in the name of the Church and
only by such rites as have been approved). It is lawful privately to
pray to infants who died after Baptism, and, according to many, to the
souls in Purgatory; but it would be superstitious to give to the damned
or false saints the cult that belongs only to the canonized Saints.

2355. Obedience.--Obedience is a moral virtue annexed to justice which
inclines one to comply promptly and willingly with the command of one’s
superior, because it is a command and obligatory.

(a) Obedience is prompt and willing, and so it differs from forced or
unwilling or tardy submission and from servile and politic obedience
(which would not obey were it not for fear or self-interest), for these
lack either the good will or the good motive required by virtue. Note
also that the virtue of obedience differs from the vow of obedience in
this, that the vow obliges to the external performance of a command,
while the virtue includes also internal submission.

(b) It is shown to a superior. Between equals there is not obedience in
the strict sense, though one of them may out of charity or friendship
yield to what the other desires.

(c) It is compliance with a command, that is, with a law or precept
imposed by authority. Some authorities hold that it is an act of
obedience to fulfill the known will of a superior, even though it has
not been imposed as obligatory; but others see in such a fulfillment,
not obedience, but the perfection or spirit of obedience. Thus, if a
son knows that his father wishes him to perform a certain work, but has
received no orders to do it and leaves it undone, this omission
according to the first opinion is disobedience, while according to the
second it is a want of the spirit of obedience.

(d) It obeys precisely because the superior’s will has been expressed
as a command. It is this intention that sets off obedience from other
acts of virtue about commanded matters. There is a material obedience
which is a circumstance of other virtues and may be called a general
virtue (e.g., when one keeps the first commandment out of love for God,
there is charity; when one keeps the seventh commandment out of love of
honesty, there is justice). The formal obedience of which we now speak
is a peculiar and distinct virtue, because it keeps the law simply
because it is law and as such should be kept.

2356. Power of Jurisdiction and Dominative Power.--There are two kinds
of power that confer moral authority to impose a command--the power of
jurisdiction and dominative power.

(a) The power of jurisdiction is had by one who rules in a perfect
society (Church or State), which has supreme authority and the right to
impose laws.

(b) Dominative power is had by one who rules in an imperfect society,
which has dependent authority and the right to impose precepts only.
This power arises either from the very nature of society as a body
composed of superior and subjects (e.g., in the family the children are
necessarily subject to the father), or from agreement between the
parties concerned (e.g., the wife by marrying becomes subject to her
husband, the servant by taking employment becomes subject to the
employer, the religious by entering a community or by vowing obedience
becomes subject to the superior).

2357. Degrees of Obedience.--Ascetical authors distinguish three
degrees of obedience: (a) external obedience, which performs with
exactness the thing commanded though there is no heart or willingness
in its act; (b) internal obedience, which joins willingness to external
submission though the judgment doubts the wisdom or value or good faith
of the command; (c) blind obedience, which submits the judgment itself
to the superior’s judgment, provided of course the thing ordered is not
clearly sinful (Matt, ix. 9; Gen., xxii. 3 sqq.; Matt., ii. 13 sqq.).

2358. Comparison of Obedience with the Other Virtues.--(a) Obedience,
as was explained above (2355), is distinct from the other virtues on
account of its different formal object. Its act is found sometimes
joined with other virtues (e.g., to fast during Lent in order to keep
the law is an act of obedience, but it is also an act of temperance if
actuated by love of moderation, or an act of religion if offered as
homage to God); but obedience may be separate from other virtues, as
when a superior commands or forbids something indifferent in order to
try a subject’s obedience (e.g., to take a walk solely because it has
been commanded is an act of obedience only).

(b) Obedience is less perfect than the theological virtues, since it
belongs to the moral virtues, which are not directly concerned with God
Himself but with the means to union with Him (I Tim., i. 5). Among
those moral virtues that consist in contempt of temporal things,
obedience which serves God in all things has a certain preeminence,
inasmuch as it contemns for God’s sake the noblest human good, one’s
own will, whereas the other virtues contemn lower goods (those of the
body and external things); on the other hand, obedience is inferior to
religion, since, while obedience consists in veneration of the law,
religion consists in veneration of God Himself. But acts of worship
performed without devotion or without regard for God’s will are not to
be compared with respectful obedience, since the former are sins and
the latter is both religious and obedient; hence, it is said that
obedience is better than sacrifice (I Kings, xv. 22), which means that
internal devotion is to be preferred to mere external worship.
Spiritual writers praise obedience as the guardian of all the virtues
and the safe road in which they walk (Prov., xxi. 28).

2359. Comparison of Acts of Obedience.--(a) All acts of obedience are
of the same species, since in spite of diversity of superiors or of
laws there is always in obedience the same essential character on
account of the motive. Whoever may be the superior or whatever may be
the law, the reason for obedience is always the authority that commands
and the obligation that it imposes. Thus, whether one obeys God, or the
Church, or the State, or parents, the virtue is always one and the same.

(b) All acts of obedience are not of the same perfection, for
circumstances (e.g., the willingness, the duration, the difficulty) add
to the merit of obedience. It should be noted, however, that to obey by
performing what one likes is not necessarily less virtuous than to obey
by performing what one dislikes; for the thing liked may be something
hard that appeals to few and may be performed from a spirit of willing
obedience, whereas the thing that is disliked may be something easy and
may be performed with less willingness.

2360. The Duty of Obedience.--Since obedience is obligatory because a
superior has the right to command, the extent of the duty depends on
the extent of the superior’s authority.

(a) Thus, God must be obeyed in all things that He commands, for He is
Lord of all and cannot command what is unlawful: “Let us do all that
the Lord has spoken and we shall be obedient” (Exod., xxiv. 7). Man is
not bound, however, to wish all that God wishes in particular, since
God wishes things from the viewpoint of the universal good, and the
creature from the viewpoint of the limited good known to him (e.g., it
is not lawful for man to wish the damnation or the misfortune of those
whom God will permit to suffer these evils); but man is bound to wish
that which God desires him to wish (e.g., that his neighbor will not be
lost, that his father will not now die). Neither is man bound to
perform what God proposed to him as a counsel. In certain instances
(Gen., xxii. 2; Exod., xii. 36; Osee, i. 2) it appears that God
commanded sin, but only a foolish or blasphemous person would interpret
the facts in that impossible sense. In the physical order, a miracle
wrought by God is not contrary to the law of nature established by Him,
but to the usual course of nature; and similarly the commands referred
to were not contrary to the laws of virtue, but to the usual manner of
virtue, as was explained in 308 sqq.

(b) Man must be obeyed in all those things in which he has lawful
authority to command, first, because God Himself requires this and he
who resists resists God (Rom, xii. 2); next, because without obedience
the peaceful order of society cannot be maintained. Even though the
superior be wicked or an infidel, obedience is due him, for it is given
him, not in his personal, but in his official capacity (Matt, xxiii. 2,
3). The Scriptures command obedience to all classes of lawful
superiors, whether ecclesiastical (Heb, xiii. 17), civil (Titus, iii.
1; I Peter, ii. 13), or domestic (Eph, vi. 1, v. 22-24, vi. 5-8).

2361. When Obedience Is Not Lawful or Obligatory.--Obedience to a human
superior is not lawful or not obligatory in those matters in which the
superior has no authority to command.

(a) It is not lawful to obey a human superior when his command is
clearly contrary to the command of a higher superior, and therefore
unlawful. Thus, one may not obey any human superior when he orders sin,
even a venial sin, for we must obey God rather than man (Acts, v. 29;
Rom., iii. 8); neither may one obey a subordinate official who commands
something clearly opposed to the law or to the regulations of his own
superior. It does not belong to the subject, however, to sit in
judgment on his superior, and hence, unless the unlawfulness of a
command is manifest, the subject must presume that it is lawful.

(b) It is not necessary to obey a human superior when his command
exceeds his competency, or when he orders things over which he has no
control. Thus, God alone has authority over the internal action of the
soul and over the natural state of the body; and as regards these
things all men are equal, one indeed being less perfect mentally or
bodily than another, but none being subject to another in these
matters. Divine law regulates the interior (e.g., the command to
believe, the prohibition to covet), but human law is confined to
external acts; divine law can regulate things pertaining to the nature
of the body (e.g., God could command an individual to marry, or to
observe virginity, or to abstain from all food), but human law is
concerned with external things, in which men are unequal, and it cannot
take away natural rights to life or the means thereto (see 292 on
Inalienable Rights). Moreover, even as regards external acts and
things, the authority of a superior is limited by the bounds which its
nature gives it; for example, temporal authority cannot command
spiritual acts, a ruler placed over one territory or group cannot
command for others, a constitutional body cannot make laws beyond the
powers conferred by its constitution, ecclesiastical laws or customs
rejected by the Code cannot be enforced, etc. It is clear, too, that no
superior may command the execution of what is physically or morally
impossible, and generally a subject should not be required to practise
heroic virtue (e.g., to expose his life to danger; see 374). If a
command is plainly ridiculous (that is, if it lacks a reasonable
motive), it would be more perfect to obey, but it seems it would not be
a sin to disregard it.

2362. Obedience in Cases Where There Is Normally No Obligation.--If a
superior oversteps his authority, the subject may obey when the matter
is lawful and the motive of submission is good. In certain cases it is
even obligatory to obey a superior in matters over which normally he
would not have authority. Such cases are the following:

(a) on account of a vow or other free and moral agreement, a subject is
held to obedience in matters pertaining to the nature of the body
(e.g., when he has made a vow of virginity). The Church cannot impose
virginity, but he who has vowed to observe it, must fulfill the
conditions and precautions necessary for its observance, and can be
ordered so to do;

(b) on account of circumstances, such as scandal or danger of great
evils, it is sometimes necessary to yield submission to a command that
is not of itself obligatory (see 376, 377).

2363. Internal Actions and Human Superiors.--Internal actions in
themselves do not fall under human authority, and hence the Apostle
says: “Judge not before the time until the Lord come, who will make
manifest the counsels of the heart” (I Cor., iv. 5). But in two ways
these actions may be dealt with authoritatively by human superiors.

(a) Thus, in the internal forum and there alone, internal acts
themselves are subject to a human superior; for the confessor knows and
acts there, not as man, but as the representative of God, and hence he
may pass on and prescribe internal thoughts and desires just as God may
pass on them and prescribe them.

(b) In the external forum, the Church deals with internal acts in so
far as they enter into an external act as a necessary ingredient of its
goodness or malice, as when she commands a devout communion or
pronounces censure against judges who are swayed by fear or favor. This
question was treated above in 426.

2364. Obligation of the Vow of Obedience.--(a) The vow obliges a
religious to observe the commands of superiors that are given according
to the rule which the religious professed. Hence, there would be no
obligation in virtue of the vow of performing commands that are not
authorized explicitly or implicitly in the rule (e.g., if a cloistered
religious were bidden to engage in hospital work), nor, unless
otherwise vowed, of keeping each prescription of the rule or
constitutions. A command to accept a relaxation from the rule is
obligatory, unless the dispensation is clearly invalid (cfr. 2225,
2237).

(b) The obligation is grave only when superiors command in a grave
matter and with the intention of imposing a grave precept. The
intention of a superior is indicated by a form of words and other
circumstances which the rule or constitutions prescribe for the
imposition of a grave precept.

2365. Sins against Obedience.--Since obedience is a moral virtue and
therefore observes a mean, there is both an excess and a defect that it
avoids.

(a) Thus, the sin of excess is not found in the quantity of obedience,
for the more obedient a subject is, the more is he worthy of praise. It
is found, therefore, in other circumstances of the act of submission,
as when one obeys a person or a command which one should not obey.
Sinful submission is just as foreign to obedience as superstition is to
religion; cringing submission or servility in matters where one should
think and judge for oneself is only a simulacrum of obedience.

(b) The sin of defect is found in disobedience to a lawful command.
This sin may also be said to include both excess and defect--the former
because the subject follows his own desires more than he should, and
the latter because the superior does not receive what he is entitled to
(see 1711 sqq.).

2366. Definition of Disobedience.--Disobedience is the transgression of
the lawful command of a superior.

(a) It is a transgression, that is, a voluntary neglect or refusal to
perform what is ordered or to omit what is forbidden, or to perform or
omit at the time or in the manner ordered. Thus, there is no
disobedience if fulfillment is impossible--for example, if a subject
who is summoned to present himself at a certain place does not receive
the notice or becomes too ill to make the journey, or if he is asked to
give what he cannot give, or if he is burdened with so many laws or
regulations that he cannot even know what they are, much less attempt
to observe them.

(b) Disobedience transgresses a lawful command, that is, one which is
morally good and issues from competent authority. It is not
disobedience to refuse to do what is evidently illicit (e.g., to lie or
steal), or what is illegally ordered (e.g., to submit to arrest
blindly, to perform what the law forbids the superior to order).

(c) It is violation of a command, that is, of a law or precept. Hence,
it is not disobedience to neglect advice or exhortations or requests
made by superiors, if the subject-matter is not otherwise obligatory
(e.g., a daughter is not disobedient if she does not choose the husband
picked out for her by her parents).

(d) It is against the command of a superior, and hence, if there is
opposition between laws or precepts, the higher law and the higher
superior prevails (288 sqq.).

2367. The Kinds of Disobedience.--(a) By reason of the subject,
disobedience is either material or formal, according as the
transgressor intends only the satisfaction of his sinful desire against
some other virtue, or intends the violation of obedience itself.
Material disobedience is found in every sin, since every sin is a
transgression, and in this sense the pride of the original sin is
called disobedience (Rom., v. 19); but formal disobedience is a special
sin, and it is committed only when the sinner transgresses purposely in
order not to submit.

(b) By reason of the object, formal disobedience is contempt either for
the law or for the superior. In the former case the transgressor
despises the commandment given him and vents his dislike in
disobedience; in the latter case the transgressor belittles the
authority of the lawmaker or superior who made the law or who gave the
precept; or scorns his sinfulness, ignorance, or low birth; or hates or
envies him, and therefore proceeds to break his laws or precepts. If
contempt moves one to rebel against every command, it is perfect; if it
extends to only one or another matter, it is imperfect.

2368. It is not sinful contempt of a person in authority, however, if
the subject does not admire his character, or agree with his opinions,
or approve of his courses, when the subject has good reason for his
view and does not forget the respect and obedience due to authority and
law.

2369. Theological Sinfulness of Formal Disobedience.--(a) From its
nature formal disobedience is a grave sin, since it is contrary to
charity, which is the life of the soul and the end of the law. Love of
God demands that we keep His commandments and be submissive to His
representatives (Rom., xiii. 2; John, xiv, 21; Rom., ii. 23, xiii. 2;
Luke, X. 16). Disobedience is classed by St. Paul with the worst sins
of the ancient pagans (Rom., i. 30) and of the sinners of the last days
(II Tim, iii. 1), with witchcraft and idolatry (I Kings, xv. 23).

(b) From the imperfection of the act formal disobedience is sometimes
only a venial sin, as when in a sudden fit of anger against his
superiors a child refuses to obey his teachers or parents.

(c) From the lightness of the matter, formal disobedience is only a
venial sin, if the contempt is imperfect and not directed against God,
and the matter of the command or transgression is not serious (e.g., if
one gets up a few minutes late in the morning once or twice as a
protest against a regulation). But, even though the matter is not
serious in itself, formal disobedience is a grave sin, when the
contempt is perfect (e.g., if in a spirit of defiance and of
anarchistic contempt for all his laws one pays no heed to some minor
regulation of a superior), and perhaps also when contempt is directed
against a divine precept (e.g., if with the feeling that the eighth
commandment is foolish or useless, one tells small lies); for in the
former case there is grave contempt, in the latter case blasphemy.

2370. Moral Species of Disobedience.--(a) In formal disobedience, if
the command belongs to some special virtue, there are two sins, namely,
that against obedience and that against the virtue intended by the
lawgiver (e.g., when out of contempt one violates the third
commandment); but, if the command was given for the sake of obedience
only, there is but the one sin of formal disobedience (e.g., when out
of stubbornness a child refuses to do the study or other work imposed
by parents or teachers).

(b) In material disobedience, if the command was given for the sake of
some special virtue, there is but the one sin against that virtue, as
when one breaks the fifth or sixth commandment to satisfy passion; but
if the command was given for the exercise of submission only, there is
but the one general sin of disobedience, as when a child eats between
meals against the command given by his mother.

2371. Circumstances that Aggravate Formal Disobedience.--One act of
formal disobedience can be worse than another such act in two ways:

(a) by reason of the rank of the person who gave the command. Thus, it
is more serious to disobey God than to disobey man, and more serious to
disobey a higher than a lower superior;

(b) by reason of the rank which the thing commanded has in the
intention of the superior. Thus, when disobeying God it is more serious
to transgress against the higher than against the lower good, for God
always prefers the better good; but in disobeying man alone it is more
serious to transgress against the good, higher or lower, which the
lawgiver has more at heart.

2372. Comparison of Formal Disobedience with Other Sins.--(a)
Disobedience against God (e.g., contempt for His law) is worse than
sins against the neighbor (e.g., murder, theft, adultery). This is true
when these latter sins do not include formal disobedience against God,
for, _per se_ and other things being equal, a sin against God is more
serious than a sin against a creature; it is also true when sins
against creatures include formal disobedience against God but offend a
less important commandment, as when the one sin is perjury and the
other theft.

(b) Contempt for the lawgiver, even without disobedience, is worse than
contempt for the law with disobedience, since the lawgiver is of
greater importance than his precept. Thus, it is worse to blaspheme God
than to despise His commandment; it is worse to hold a superior in
contempt than to disregard his precept.

2373. The Virtue of Gratitude.--Religion, piety, reverence and
obedience are annexed to justice on account of a legal debt; the
virtues that remain, beginning with gratitude, are assigned to justice
on account of a moral debt only (see 2143). Gratitude is defined as “a
moral virtue that inclines one to acknowledge with appreciation and to
repay with gladness the favors one has received.”

(a) The object of gratitude is favors received, that is, some good
useful and acceptable to the recipient and gratuitously bestowed. Thus,
gratitude is not owed for a thing that is harmful (e.g., for aid in the
commission of sin, for gifts offered with purpose of bribery or simony)
or useless (e.g., for old articles which the giver only wished to get
rid of and forced one to take). Neither is gratitude owed for presents
made with the purpose of ridicule or offense. Finally, no thanks are
due for what was owed in justice (e.g., wages for work performed),
though courtesy demands a pleasant response to every good one receives,
even when it is not a favor.

(b) The offices of gratitude are acknowledgment and repayment. The
former consists in thoughts or words, such as remembrance of
benefactors, praise of their good deeds, words of thanks; the latter
consists in acts or things, such as honor, service, assistance, and
gifts (Tob., xii. 2, 4).

2374. Two Kinds of Gratitude.--(a) In a wide sense, gratitude is the
recognition of favors received from superiors, and does not differ from
religion, piety and reverence, by which one gives due acknowledgment to
God as the first cause of all benefits, to parents as the second cause
of life and training, and to rulers as the second cause of direction or
guidance or of public and common benefits. (b) In its strict sense,
gratitude refers only to special and private benefits distinct from
those mentioned above. Gratitude, then, is a distinct virtue and
follows in order after reverence.

2375. Is greater gratitude due to God for the gift of innocence or for
the gift of repentance?

(a) If we consider only the greatness of the favor, the one who has
been preserved from sin owes more gratitude to God; for, _per se_ and
other things being equal, it is a greater favor to be kept from sin
than to be rescued from it.

(b) If we consider the liberality of the favor, the one who has
received the gift of repentance should be more thankful, for God is
more generous when He bestows His grace on one who deserved punishment.

2376. Circumstances of Gratitude.--(a) To Whom Gratitude Should Be
Shown.--Every benefactor should be repaid internally (e.g., by kind
remembrance and prayers) and also externally, unless this is impossible
(e.g., when he has become so depraved that one can have no dealings
with him). The internal debt is lessened if the benefactor was less
benevolent (e.g., if he gave grudgingly, or in an unkind manner, or
only with a view to self-advertisement), for the gift is esteemed
chiefly from the good will of the giver; the external debt is lessened
if the benefactor stands less in need of external help (e.g., if he is
wealthy or famous).

(b) By Whom Gratitude Should Be Shown.--Every person who is favored
should be thankful. There is no one so high that another cannot be his
benefactor, and the greatest or wealthiest person should not feel it
beneath his dignity to repay even small favors sincerely given. Neither
is there anyone so low, whether child or pauper, that he cannot to some
extent, by his respect, affection, prayers, etc., recompense his
benefactors.

(c) The Time for Gratitude.--Internal gratitude should be immediate,
and should be shown by the kindly manner in which a favor is received;
but external repayment should await a suitable time, as it seems forced
or unappreciative to give a favor in return as soon as one is received.

(d) The Degree of Gratitude Owed.--If the favor was bestowed by reason
of a friendship of utility, the gratitude should correspond with the
benefit received; but, if it was bestowed out of pure friendship or
liberality, the gratitude should be measured by the benevolence that
prompted the favor. Hence, as Seneca remarks, gratitude is sometimes
more due to one who bestows small favors, but with liberality and
willingness and disinterestedness.

[e] The Amount of Recompense for Favors.--It is suitable that one repay
benefactors by giving more than was received from them, if this is
possible; for otherwise one will seem only to give back all or part of
what was received. But in gratitude, as in benefits, the good will
counts for more than the favor; and hence if one cannot hope to surpass
the favor (e.g., the case of children in relation to parents), one can
at least surpass in desire and internal benevolence.

2377. The Sins against Gratitude.--(a) Since gratitude is a moral
virtue, the sins against it are either by excess (e.g., if one is
grateful for things one should not desire), or by defect (that is, by
ingratitude). Since gratitude inclines to surpass favors received, it
is more offended by lack of thanks or ingratitude than by excessive
thanks.

(b) As to its motive, ingratitude is twofold, material and formal.
Formal ingratitude consists in contempt for the benefit or the
benefactor, as when the person favored disdains what has been done for
him, and therefore omits to give thanks or commits some injury against
the benefactor. Material ingratitude is any injury done a benefactor
without contempt for him or his favor.

(c) As to its mode, formal ingratitude is also twofold, that by
omission and that by commission. The former is the culpable neglect of
the grateful act of repaying a benefactor, or of the grateful word of
thanking him, or of the grateful thought of remembering him with
affection; the latter is the culpable return of evil for good (Jerem.,
xviii. 20; Exod., xviii. 3) by an injurious act, or by a word in
contempt of the favor, or by a thought that it is a disfavor.

2378. The Moral Species of Ingratitude.--(a) Material ingratitude is
not a special sin, since it may be found in all kinds of sins committed
against a benefactor; for example, every violation of a commandment is
an act of ingratitude to God, and every injury done a human benefactor
is an act of ingratitude to man. But material ingratitude is an
aggravating circumstance, since it is worse to harm those to whom we
owe thanks than to harm others.

(b) Formal ingratitude is a special sin, for it is the denial of a
special debt owed in decency, and which a special virtue requires one
to pay (see 2374). St. Paul lists ingratitude with other special
classes of sin (II Tim., iii. 2).

2379. The Theological Species of Ingratitude.--(a) Formal ingratitude
from its nature seems to be a mortal sin, since it is against charity,
which bids us love our benefactors. It may be venial, however, on
account of the imperfection of the act or the smallness of the matter.
Thus, to offend a benefactor in some trifling matter would not be
mortal, even though there be some slight contempt in the act.

(b) Material ingratitude is venial or mortal according to the nature of
the injury done the benefactor. Thus, a small injury is done when one
gives a cheap present to a benefactor from whom one had received a
valuable gift, for his right to more was not strict, and hence the sin
is venial; but a grave injury is done when one seriously calumniates a
benefactor, and the sin is then mortal.

2380. Is It Right to Confer Favors on the Ungrateful?--(a) If the
favors will be of benefit, one should not desist merely because of the
ingratitude with which they are received. It is not always certain that
the beneficiary is ungrateful, and there may be reason to hope for his
improvement (Luke, vi. 35).

(b) If the favors are not beneficial, because the recipient is made
worse (e.g., arrogant, lazy) through them, they should be discontinued.

2381. The Virtue of Vengeance.--Just as gratitude returns good for
evil, so does vengeance (_vindicatio_) return evil for evil, that is,
the evil of punishment for the evil of sin. Vengeance is defined as “a
moral virtue that inclines a private person to use lawful means for the
punishment of wrongdoing, with a view to the satisfaction of public or
private justice.”

(a) Vengeance is a virtue of private persons; that is, it belongs to
those who are not charged officially with the punishment of offenses.
The duty of public persons, such as judges, is a much stricter one and
pertains to the virtue of vindictive justice, which is a form of
commutative justice; whereas vengeance is only a virtue annexed to
justice (see above, 2141 sqq.). Vindictive justice attends to the
equality between fault and punishment, vengeance to the protection of
the person who has been injured.

(b) Vengeance is concerned with the punishment of wrongdoing, or the
infliction of some painful retribution upon one who has already
committed an injury. Thus, this virtue is not strictly identical with
lawful self-defense, which is directed against an evil that is not past
but present, though self-defense may be rated as a secondary act of the
virtue of vengeance.

(c) Vengeance uses only lawful means; that is, it seeks redress or
reparation from the authorities who have the right to give it and
follows due process of law. This virtue differs, then, from private
revenge, vendetta, lynch law, exercise of the “unwritten law,” etc.,
which are acts of sinful violence, though sometimes subjectively
excusable on account of ignorance. The virtue of vengeance is also
exercised by those who desire that justice may be done against
malefactors, or who visit upon them with moderation such punishments as
are not forbidden to private persons (e.g., denial of friendship).
Parents also exercise this virtue whenever they properly correct and
chastise their children.

(d) Vengeance has for its ends public and private justice, that is, the
vindication of the right order of society or the compensation or
satisfaction of an injured person. If some other good motive causes one
to desire requital of evil deeds, the act will pertain to another
virtue: thus, if one aims at the amendment of the evil-doer, one’s act
pertains to charity; if one desires by the deterrent of punishment to
secure the peace and prosperity of the commonwealth, the act is one of
legal justice; if one seeks the honor of God, the act is one of
religion, etc. If an evil motive prompts the desire of punishment, the
wish is not virtuous at all, but sinful. Thus, he who labors to have a
criminal captured, sentenced and executed, and whose intention is not
the vindication of justice but the gratification of jealousy, hatred,
cruelty or other like passion, sins grievously and perhaps makes
himself worse than the criminal. To return evil for evil in this way is
to be overcome by evil (Rom., xii. 17-21).

2382. The Morality of Vengeance.--(a) Vengeance is lawful, since it
pertains to justice, and Our Lord declares that it is found in the just
and is approved by God (Luke, xviii. 7). It is, moreover, a special
virtue, for it regulates the special natural inclination which moves
man to attack what is harmful and injurious and has its own distinctive
ends (see 2381). It is closely related to fortitude and zeal, which
prepare the way for it; zeal, being a fervent love of God and man,
inspires indignation against injustice, while fortitude removes the
fear that might keep one back from attack on injustice. Accidentally,
however, on account of greater evils, vengeance is sometimes unlawful,
as when it would involve the innocent with the guilty, or fall more
heavily upon the less guilty (Matt., xiii. 29, 30).

(b) Vengeance is obligatory when an injury to oneself is also an injury
to a public or other necessary good (e.g., to the rights of God or of
the Church). Hence it was that Elias and Eliseus punished those who
maltreated them (IV Kings, i. 9 sqq., ii. 23, 24), that inspired
writers pray God to punish the wicked (Psalms xviii, xxxiv, lxviii,
cviii, lxxviii, cxxxvi; Jeremias, xi. 20, xvii, 18, xviii. 21, xx. 12),
and Pope Sylvester excommunicated those who sent him into exile. If an
injury to oneself is merely personal, one should be willing to forego
punishment of the guilty person, and should actually do so when this
course is expedient, as Our Lord teaches in Matthew, vi. 14, 15 (see
1198 sqq.). When no necessity requires one to vindicate a personal
wrong, the more perfect course is to pardon the wrong for the sake of
God; for in avenging injuries to self there is always the danger of
such evils as selfish motive, arrogance, hatred, scandal, and the loss
of such goods as peace of mind, conversion of the other party,
edification, and greater claim on God’s forgiveness of self. Hence,
vengeance is called “a little virtue,” since it is so often the less
perfect way.

2383. Excess and Defect.--Punitive justice is a moral virtue and hence
should be characterized by moderation as to all its circumstances. It
should avoid the extremes of excess and defect.

(a) The sin of excess here is cruelty, which in the quality or the
quantity of the punishment offends human rights or surpasses the
measure of the crime or the custom of the law. Thus, it is immoral to
associate young prisoners with hardened criminals, to deprive an
offender of religious opportunities; it is inhuman to treat a human
being as if he were a brute or less than a brute (e.g., by confinement
in a loathsome dungeon, by overwork with starvation, by torture); it is
unfair to use severe punishments unknown to law or custom, or whose
rigor far surpasses the degree of offense. There is excess even in
medicinal or reformatory penalties, if a higher good is sacrificed for
a lower (e.g., the spiritual for the temporal, a major for a minor good
quality), for then the remedy is worse than the disease.

(b) The sin of defect in punishments is laxity, which rewards crime, or
allows it to go unpunished, or imposes penalties which are agreeable to
offenders, or not a deterrent, or not at all equal to the offense.
Scripture condemns this lenity when it declares that the parent who
spares the rod spoils the child (Prov., xiii. 24). In weighing the
gravity of a delinquency account should be taken of the fault itself,
of the injury done and the scandal given. In the fault consideration
must be had of the objective element (i.e., the nature and importance
of the law violated), of the subjective element (i.e., the age,
instruction, education, sex, and state of mind of the offender), of the
circumstances (e.g., the time, the place, the persons involved, and the
frequency). See Canon 2218.

2384. Circumstances of Punitive Justice.--(a) Punishments that May Be
Used.--Punishment is virtuous only in so far as it restrains from evil
those who cannot be restrained by love of virtue, but only by fear of
penalty. Hence, penalties should consist in the deprivation of goods
that are more prized than the satisfactions obtained through
delinquencies. Both divine and human laws, therefore, have established
as punishments the loss of a bodily good (e.g., by death, flogging,
imprisonment) or of an external good (e.g., by exile, fine, infamy),
the chief inducements to crime being found in bodily or external
things. The extreme penalty of death should be reserved for extreme
cases, and the other penalties should be suited to the crime, so as to
remove the incentive or means (e.g., dishonesty should be punished by
loss of goods, calumny by infamy, lust by pain, etc.).

(b) Persons Who May Be Punished.--Punishment again is virtuous only
because it pertains to justice and rights the inequality caused by sin.
Accordingly, no one should be punished unless he has sinned or
voluntarily transgressed. It is unlawful to punish the innocent for the
guilty, or to punish an innocent person in order to keep him from
future sins. It should be noted, however, that God inflicts temporal
evils on the just for the sake of spiritual goods (e.g., that they may
not become attached to this world, may have opportunities of merit, and
may give good example); that one person may be punished for the sin of
another when he associates himself with or approves of that sin, as
when careless parents have bad children or careless subjects bad rulers
(Job, xxxiv. 30; Exod, xx. 5); that for a sufficient reason an innocent
person may be deprived of a good for which he is unfitted (e.g.,
ordination when one is irregular by defect) or to which he has no
personal or absolute claim (e.g., the family property when it is lost
to the children because the father is fined).

2385. The Virtue of Truthfulness.--Having treated the virtues of
gratitude and vengeance, which deal with moral obligations caused by an
act of the one owed, we now pass on to truthfulness, which is a moral
obligation arising from the acts of the one owing in which he
communicates with others. For he who speaks, writes, or otherwise
manifests his mind to others puts himself under a duty of not
deceiving. Truthfulness or veracity is defined as “a moral virtue that
inclines one duly and faithfully to express what is in one’s mind.”

(a) It is a virtue, that is, a good habit, and so it differs from
truth, which is the object of intellectual habits. Thus, the First
Truth or God is the object of faith. Truthfulness is not the object of
a virtue, but it is a virtue.

(b) It is a moral virtue. It deals with external things (viz., the
words or signs by which we express our thoughts), and so it is not a
theological virtue; moreover, though the knowledge of truth belongs to
the intellect, the right manifestation of truth depends on a good will,
and so truthfulness is not an intellectual virtue: the truthful man may
be unlearned, but he loves honesty.

(c) It regulates the expression of the mind, that is, the words,
writing, gestures, conduct, and other external signs, so as to make
them conformable to the mind which they stand for. Truthfulness deals
with internal things (e.g., when the speaker says that he has good
health or is well disposed towards another) and with external things as
they appear to the speaker (e.g., when he says that he is certain or
believes that a report is accurate).

(d) It is a faithful expression of what is in the mind or belief.
Hence, one may be truthful while making statements contrary to fact, or
untruthful while making statements agreeable to facts, for truthfulness
is sincerity, not correctness.

(e) It is a due expression of one’s mind or belief; that is, it is
given when and where and as it should be given. A person who speaks out
his mind on all occasions, with no regard for results, is not a liar,
but he is at least imprudent, and he cannot be said to possess the
virtue of truthfulness, for every virtue is prudent. Examples of this
are persons who unnecessarily indulge self-praise by telling their true
virtues or perfections (Prov., xxvii. 2), or who vaingloriously or
otherwise foolishly publish their true sins or imperfections (Is. iii.
9).

2386. The Excellence of Truthfulness.--(a) Truthfulness is a virtue,
since it makes right use of language and other signs by employing them
for the truth, and also serves society, which rests on the trust that
men have in the words and promises of their fellow-men. St. Paul
admonishes the Ephesians (iv. 25) that each one speak the truth to his
neighbor, since all are members of the other.

(b) It is a moral virtue, preserving moderation in conversations and
other interchanges of thought. This virtue sees that facts are neither
exaggerated nor understated, that truth is not manifested when it
should be concealed, nor concealed when it should be spoken.

(c) It is a special virtue, for, while the other moral virtues regulate
actions and external things, none of them except truthfulness regulates
those objects precisely in their character of media or instruments for
signifying and conveying thoughts, opinions, and decisions. And since a
great part of human life is occupied in conference or correspondence
with others, truthfulness is one of the most useful of the virtues and
one whose exercise is most frequently called for.

(d) It is a virtue annexed to justice. On the one hand, it is like
justice, since it pays a debt which one social being owes another of
speaking the truth; on the other hand, it falls short of justice, since
the debt is moral, not legal. This is said of truthfulness in ordinary
intercourse, for in judicial process and in contracts there is also a
legal obligation of justice to tell the truth.

2387. Sincerity and Fidelity.--Two virtues that pertain to truthfulness
are sincerity and fidelity.

(a) Sincerity (simplicity) is the virtue of one who is consistent with
himself, avoiding duplicity and double dealing of every kind, such as
lies, equivocations, sophistries, specious excuses, quibbles, dishonest
shifts, distractions, concealments, and the like.

(b) Fidelity (loyalty) is the virtue of one who fulfills promises that
are obligatory only in virtue of his word freely given. It differs from
constancy, which is concerned not with promises but resolutions, and
from virtues concerned with promises that are obligatory in virtue of
legal debt, such as contracts, promissory oaths (see 1692, 1749, 1753,
1888). Fidelity makes an honest man’s word as good as his bond, and it
is therefore one of the most appreciated of virtues (Matt., xxv. 21;
Psalm xiv). Horace calls it the sister of justice.

2388. Vices Opposed to Truthfulness.--(a) By defect one sins against
truth through lying and breach of promise; (b) by excess one sins
against truthfulness in violation of secret or other unjustifiable
disclosures.

2389. Lying.--A lie is a word spoken with the purpose of stating what
is not true.

(a) It is said to be a word, by which is meant any external sign
consisting in speech or its equivalent. A lie may be expressed by
language, oral or written, by signs, by gestures, by insinuation, by
expressive silence, by actions or conduct (see 2012, 2028).

(b) A lie is spoken, that is, expressed externally. But the guilt is
found in the will, and hence those who plan lies are guilty of
mendacity, even though they do not carry out their plans.

(c) A lie is told with purpose; that is, there is a comparison by the
intellect of the sign with the thing signified and a voluntary choice
of the insufficient sign to be used. An infant or an unconscious
person, therefore, may tell an untruth, but he cannot tell a lie.
Moreover, a person who has no good command of language or no clear
understanding of a subject is not guilty of lying when in spite of his
efforts to the contrary he gives misleading impressions. But those who
do not think before they speak, or who use language carelessly or
inaccurately, may be guilty of injustice and deception, or even of
indirect lying.

(d) The purpose of a lie is the statement of what is not true, or the
pretense that what is not in one’s mind is in one’s mind. Just as
truth is the agreement of the word with the thought, so a lie is the
disagreement of word with thought. But a lie need not be entirely
false, and indeed one of the most dangerous of lies is what is known as
a half-truth, in which some real facts are told in order to give
support to pretended facts, or in which valid arguments are adduced to
throw dust in the eyes as regards other arguments that are sophistical.

2390. Statements Liable to Misunderstanding or Misinterpretation.--A
word that sufficiently expresses one’s idea is not a lie or a
deception, even though another idea will be taken from it by a listener
or is conveyed by its mere letter.

(a) Thus, misunderstanding due to defect, not of the speaker, but of
the listener, does not make one’s words untruthful, any more than it
makes them scandalous (see 1462), as when the listener has not given
attention to what was said (John, xxi. 23). Even a speech worded
obscurely because the matter is obscure, or because the listener would
be harmed by plainer speech (see 1001), is not mendacious but prudent.

(b) Misinterpretation to which a statement is open on account of its
wording does not make the statement untruthful, if the context or
circumstances sufficiently disclose the true meaning of the words.
Examples: hyperbolical, ironical or other metaphorical speech; words
spoken in jest or in terms of customary politeness, such as “your most
obedient servant”, statements made inquiringly or hypothetically (e.g.,
when a judge or prosecutor accuses a defendant of crime in order to
discover the truth; cfr. Gen., xiii. 9), or by way of mere quotation or
of fictitious narrative (e.g., fairy tales, stories, reveries), or of
disputation as in school debates exercised for the sake of practice in
argumentation. It is not a lie to write under a pen-name, to speak
according to the personality one represents (Gen., xxxi. 13; Tob., v.
18), to answer according to the mind of a questioner, as when A says to
B: “Have you seen your father?” meaning, “Do you know where he is?” and
B replies: “I have not seen him,” meaning “I do not know where he is.”
Lying contests, in which fishermen, sportsmen, etc., vie with one
another to see who can tell the most incredible yarn or tall tale, are
not in themselves sinful, but there may be circumstances (for example,
scandal, deception, danger) that make them reprehensible.

2391. Divisions of Lies.--(a) Intrinsically, or in respect to its
nature as a departure from the speaker’s mind, every lie is either an
exaggeration, which tells more than the truth, or a suppression, which
tells less than the whole truth. He who affirms what he does not
believe, or who states as certain what he thinks is uncertain,
exaggerates; he who denies what he believes, or who states as doubtful
what he holds as certain, is guilty of suppression.

(b) Extrinsically, or in respect to purpose, mode, and result, lies are
of many kinds. As to mode, a lie is either spoken or acted, the former
being a falsehood and the latter a simulation or hypocrisy. As to its
immediate purpose, a lie is meant either to express falsehood only or
to deceive, the former being misrepresentation and the latter deceit
(e.g., if Claudius knows that he calumniated and that Sempronius heard
the calumny, and yet brazenly denies the calumny to Sempronius, there
is misrepresentation); if Claudius tries to mislead others who only
suspect him and gives false alibis, there is deceit. As to its ulterior
purpose, a lie is meant for good (an officious or jocose lie) or for
evil (a pernicious lie), or is directed to both good and evil. As to
its result, a lie sometimes produces and sometimes does not produce a
statement at variance with fact; it sometimes deceives and sometimes
does not deceive the auditors.

2392. Classification of Lies.--Every lie is harmful from its nature,
since it tends to deceive others and so to disturb the good order of
society. But the reason that moves persons to lie is not always evil,
and hence we have the following classes of lies.

(a) Some lies are told for a good purpose, as when one lies in order to
please (jocose lie) or to serve another (officious lie). Jocose lies
include all kinds of humorous and interesting narrations and
descriptions meant only to afford pleasure, but given out as facts by
one who does not believe them to be facts. Untruths told in such a way
(e.g., with a laugh or in a playful tone, especially if the auditors
have a sense of humor) that it is clear they are not meant to be taken
seriously, are not jocose lies or lies of any kind. Officious lies are
told with a view to assisting or accommodating a neighbor, that he may
receive some good (e.g., to hold out false promises as an inducement to
good conduct) or escape some evil (e.g., to fill the ears of a
despondent man with false reports of good news in order to revive his
spirits). It seems that we should regard as officious lies various
statements made by Jacob (Gen., xxvii. 35), David (I Kings, xx. 6, xxi.
2, xxvii. 10), and Judith (X. xi. xii).

(b) Some lies are told for an evil purpose, as when one lies merely to
indulge a propensity for falsehood or for the sheer pleasure of lying
(lies of inclination), or when one lies to injure another person
(pernicious lies).

2393. Motives for Lying.--The motives for lying are not always simple,
and it may happen that in one and the same lie there are several
motives of different character.

(a) Thus, an officious lie is not always dictated by pure benevolence.
It may be selfish (e.g., when one lies to conceal the delinquency of
another in which one was involved), as well as altruistic (e.g., when
the liar derives no benefit from the lie), or self-sacrificing (e.g.,
when the liar is put to expense, trouble or loss through his lie).

(b) An officious lie may also be pernicious and jocose, for it may
affect different persons in different ways. Thus, if Claudius
calumniates Julius in order to shield Balbus from the bad opinion of
Caius, who does not know Balbus, and to amuse Sempronius who knows the
truth, the lie is pernicious as regards Julius, officious as regards
Balbus, and jocose as regards Sempronius.

2394. Comparison of the Gravity of Various Lies.--(a) Lies of
exaggeration are not worse as lies than lies of suppression, for in
both cases the truth is departed from. But it is more imprudent to
overstate than to understate, and in this sense the lie of exaggeration
is worse.

(b) Lies are aggravated by the purpose to harm, and the greater the
harm, the greater the sin. Thus, the worst of all pernicious lies is
that which is directed against God, as in false religious doctrine; and
the lie that harms a man in spiritual goods is worse than a lie that
harms in temporal things only.

(c) Lies are mitigated by the purpose to help, and the greater the good
intended the less the sin. In other words, lies that are not pernicious
are not so bad as pernicious lies, officious lies are less sinful than
jocose lies, officious lies told for the sake of some great good are
not so grave as those told for the sake of a lesser good. Thus, it is a
less evil to lie in order to save a man’s life than to lie in order to
take his life; it is less sinful to lie in order to spare another the
shock of bad news than to lie for the sake of embellishing a tale; it
is a less offense to lie in order to ward off a bodily harm than to lie
in order to prevent a financial loss.

2395. Sinfulness of All Lies.--But though lies are unequal in
sinfulness, it remains that no lie, even the smallest (such as are
called fibs or white lies), is ever justified, even by the greatest
good (Job, xiii. 7), for a lie is intrinsically evil, and the end does
not justify the means.

(a) A lie is a sin, because it is an abuse of speech and other signs
given by God for the manifestation of truth; because it is an
unfriendly and unsocial act, tending to the disruption of kindly
relations between men; because it is directly opposed to truth, the
proper and distinctive good of the human mind. Even the pagans have
regarded liars with contempt and considered lies as disgraceful, and
even those who lay no claim to virtue feel gravely insulted if called
liars. In many places the Scriptures forbid lying (Exod., xxiii. 7;
Levit., Xix. 11; Prov., xii. 22; Ecclus., xx. 26; Col., iii. 9), and
St. Paul especially (Eph., iv. 25) is very clear on this point:
“Putting away lying, speak ye the truth every man with his neighbor,
for we are members one of another.” The Fathers and the theologians are
generally agreed that no necessity, not even the danger of death,
excuses a lie, any more than it excuses theft or adultery. If God could
approve of even one lie, would not that approval undermine our faith
in His own veracity? Surely we have no implicit confidence in one who
helps to deceive us even in a small matter.

(b) A lie, considered precisely as a lie, seems from its nature to be
only a venial sin, for the disorder of using signs against one’s mind
is not serious, and the harm done society by mere denial of truth is
not necessarily grave (the case would be otherwise if truth could be
denied on principle as a lawful thing). Even pious persons do not
regard harmless lies as very sinful (see 2143, 2386). Hence, as jocose
and officious lies have no other malice than that of untruthfulness and
as the malice is lessened by the intention, they are generally venial;
but some extrinsic circumstance (such as scandal, the fact that one
lies habitually and without scruple, or disastrous results) may render
them mortal. Pernicious lies have another malice besides that of
untruthfulness, and accordingly the case with them is different.

2396. When Lying Entails No Formal Sin.--Lies are sometimes free from
all formal sin on account of ignorance (as in the case of children or
uninstructed persons, who think they may use lies in case of great
difficulty) or on account of irresponsibility (as in the case of
certain defectives who seem to be born liars).

2397. Pernicious Lies.--Pernicious lies are mortal sins from their
nature, but may become venial from the imperfection of the act or the
lightness of the matter. For a pernicious lie sins not against truth
only, but also against justice or charity. Hence, it is said that the
liar destroys his own soul (Wis., i. 11), that a lie is abominated and
hated by the Lord (Prov., vi. 17, xii. 22), that it has the devil for
its father (John, viii. 44), that it brings down divine vengeance (Ps.
v. 7) and will receive its portion in the pool of fire and brimstone
(Apoc., xxi. 8). This sin is committed in two ways, as follows:

(a) a lie is pernicious when its matter is harmful, as being contrary
to sound doctrine, good morals or true science. Hence, a preacher sins
gravely if the substance of his pulpit teaching is mendacious (e.g., if
in a sermon he enunciates or defends erroneous principles of conduct),
venially if he lies about accidentals (e.g., if he gives the wrong
chapter or verse for a text); a scientist, a physician, a jurist, or
the like is similarly guilty of a pernicious lie when he misleads the
public by unreliable information. A penitent in the confessional and a
witness in court lie perniciously if their statements about relevant
matters are untrue, for the one injures the Sacrament and the other
injures public justice; but if the lie is about some matter of slight
importance, the sin is venial, unless there is no other matter in the
confession, or the testimony is under oath;

(b) a lie is also pernicious when the intention of the liar is to
injure God or his neighbor, even though the matter itself is not
opposed to true doctrine or is not official testimony. Examples are
found in those who lie in a humorous way in order to injure or sadden
others.

2398. Concealment of the Truth.--Truthfulness is offended not only by
the declaration of falsity (i.e., of what is not in the mind), but also
by the unlawful concealment of the truth (i.e., of what is in the
mind). The truth is concealed either negatively or positively.

(a) There is negative concealment of the truth, when one has recourse
to silence or evasion. Everyone admits that this kind of concealment is
lawful when there is no obligation to give information, or when there
is an obligation not to give it. Thus, a person who is besieged by
newspaper reporters does not feel obligated to answer all their
questions; a person who is interrogated by curious individuals about
his business or financial affairs, does not feel guilty if he evades
their questions by changing the subject, or by asking them similar
questions, or by putting them off till a more convenient time, etc.

(b) There is positive concealment of the truth, when one gives a reply
in language that is obscure to the listener or obscure in itself. If
the listener has no right to the truth, it is not wrong to speak to him
in words which he will not understand (e.g., in technical or scientific
terms); for if he is deceived, he can blame only his own impertinence
or dullness. The case is more difficult, however, if the reply is
obscure in itself, that is, if use is made of ambiguity or mental
reservation.

2399. Mental Reservation.--Mental reservation is an act of the mind by
which a speaker restricts or limits his words to a meaning which they
do not naturally or clearly convey; or it is an internal modification
of an external speech delivered without any or without clear external
modification. There are two kinds of mental reservation.

(a) Strict mental reservation is that in which the internal
modification is manifested by nothing external, neither by the natural
sense of the words (i.e., the meaning that ordinarily attaches to them)
nor by their accidental sense (i.e., the meaning they receive from
their context, such as the circumstances of time, place, usage, person
who questions, person who is questioned, etc.). Example: Titus, who
struck Balbus with a club, denies that he hit him, meaning that it was
the club which hit Balbus directly.

(b) Broad mental reservation is that in which the internal modification
can be perceived, at least by a prudent person, either from the natural
sense of the words (because they are known to be capable of different
meanings), or from the context (because circumstances indicate that the
words are not to be taken in their obvious sense). Example: Claudius
accidentally ran against and wounded Sempronius and the latter thinks
that someone struck him a blow. Claudius denies that he struck
Sempronius, or declares to those who have no right to ask that he knows
nothing about the matter.

2400. Lawfulness of Mental Reservation.--(a) Strict mental reservation
is unlawful and has been condemned by the Church (see Denzinger, nn.
1174-1178). The reasons are, first, that it is a lie, since it employs
words that do not at all express what the speaker has in mind, and his
mental reservation cannot give them a significance they do not possess;
secondly, that, if it were lawful, every dishonest person could easily
escape the guilt of lying and yet deceive at will. According to
Scripture the sophistical speaker is hateful (Ecclus., xxxvii. 23), but
the just man speaks and swears without guile (Ps. xxxiii. 14, xxiii. 4).

(b) Broad mental reservation is unlawful when there is a reason that
forbids its use, or when there is no sufficient reason to justify its
use. Reservation is forbidden when a questioner has the right to an
answer free from all ambiguity, for example, when a pastor questions
parties preparing for marriage, when a person who is about to be
inducted into office is asked about his freedom from disqualifications,
when a witness in court is interrogated about matters on which he can
testify, when one party to a contract seeks from the other necessary
knowledge about the contract; for in all these cases injury is done by
concealment of the truth. Reservation is not justified, unless it is
necessary in order to secure some good or avoid some evil, whether
spiritual or temporal, whether for self or for another, and the end
compensates by its importance for the deception that may be caused.
Apart from such necessity mental reservation is, to say the least, a
departure from the virtue of Christian sincerity or simplicity, which
pertains to truthfulness and which forbids one to conceal the truth
from others when there is no good reason for concealment (Matt, v. 37).
Moreover, the friendly relations of mankind would be impaired if it
were lawful to speak equivocally even when trifling things are
discussed or when there is no reason to be secretive.

(c) Broad mental reservation is lawful when there is a sufficient
reason for it, such as the public welfare (e. g., the preservation of
state secrets or of military plans), spiritual welfare (e.g., the
prevention of blasphemy or intoxication), bodily welfare (e.g., the
prevention of death or murder), or financial welfare (e.g., the
prevention of robbery). But the reservation must be necessary, as being
the only lawful means that will secure the end (e.g., one should not
use reservation when evasion or silence will suffice); and it should
not be injurious to the rights of another (e.g., it should not be
employed against the common good, in favor of a private good). The
reason for the present conclusion is found in the principle of double
result (see 103 sqq.) and in the fact that a broad mental reservation
is not intrinsically evil, since it contains no lie or insincerity and
causes no injury to individuals or society. There is no lie, because
the words correspond with the thought, either from their natural
signification (in case of double-meaning words), or from their
accidental signification (in case of words whose meaning is varied by
the context); there is no insincerity, for the aim is only to conceal a
truth that should not be made known; there is no injury to the listener
or questioner, since, if he is deceived, this is due to his own
heedlessness or dullness or unjustified curiosity; there is no injury
to society, since the general welfare demands that there be some honest
means of eluding unjust inquiries and of protecting important secrets.
Our Lord Himself, who is infinitely above all suspicion of duplicity or
insincerity, may have used broad mental reservations when He declared
(John, vii. 8-10) that He would not go up to Jerusalem, that the
daughter of Jairus was not dead but sleeping (Matt., ix. 24). Other
cases of mental reservation in Scripture are found in Eliseus (IV
Kings, vi. 19).

2401. When Is Broad Mental Reservation Lawful?--There is general
agreement that broad mental reservation is lawful in the following
cases:

(a) it is lawful and obligatory when one is bound to keep the truth
from the person who asks it. Hence, those who are questioned about
secrets which sacramental or professional confidence forbids them to
disclose (e.g., confessors, doctors, lawyers, statesmen, and
secretaries) should deny knowledge, or, if hard-pressed, even the
facts. The answer, “I do not know” or “No,” in these cases simply
means: “I have no personal or communicable knowledge.” In war time a
government has the right to censor the news in order to keep
information from the enemy. A reason of charity might also make it
obligatory to disguise the truth by mental reservation (e.g., when a
clear reply given to the question of a sick person would only weaken a
slender hope of saving his life, or when exact information given to a
gunman would enable him to overtake an intended victim);

(b) it is lawful when a reasonable local custom permits one to withhold
the truth. Thus, an accused person, even though guilty, has the right
to plead not guilty, which means that he does not confess guilt; a
person who has a visitor at an unseasonable hour may send word that he
is not at home, which means that she is not at home to visitors, a
person who is asked for an alms or a loan which he cannot conveniently
grant may answer, according to many, that he has not the money, which
means that he has no money to spare for those purposes (see 2251).

2402. Ambiguous Answers.--Are ambiguous answers which are not given
according to the questioner’s mind, and for which there are no
reasonable justifications, to be classed as lies?

(a) If the answer, even in the setting of its context, retains its
ambiguity or can be interpreted in two ways, there is not strictly
speaking a lie, for the words signify, though obscurely, what is in the
speaker’s mind. But this is a form of insincerity known as equivocation
or quibbling, which many regard almost as disreputable as plain lying.
The pagan oracles that made predictions that would suit any turn of
events and politicians who so word themselves as to be on opposite
sides at the same time are examples of equivocation.

(b) If the answer, though verbally susceptible of two senses, is
contextually limited to one sense, it is a lie; for it does not express
the speaker’s mind. Thus, if Titus knows that Balbus is good physically
or mentally but not morally, he equivocates by answering that Balbus is
good, if from the circumstances this indicates only that in some way or
other Balbus is good; but Titus lies by answering that Balbus is good
and restricting his meaning to physical goodness or industry, if the
question propounded referred to moral goodness.

2403. Simulation or Pretence.--A special form of untruthfulness is
simulation or pretence, which uses external deeds or things to signify
the contrary of what one thinks or intends internally.

(a) Simulation uses external deeds or things, and thus there is an
accidental difference between lying and simulation, the one being
untruthfulness in word and the other untruthfulness in deed (see 1678
sqq.).

(b) It employs deeds or things to signify. Unlike words, deeds and
things were not meant principally to signify, and hence not all conduct
at variance with one’s ideas is simulation. One may act without any
thought of the impression the act makes on others (e.g., when one keeps
sober, not from wish, but from necessity). And even when an act is done
with the intention to influence others by it, the purpose may be, not
to signify, but to conceal something (e.g., Josue fled from the troops
of Hai to keep them from a knowledge of his plans, Jos., viii. 1 sqq.;
David feigned insanity to conceal his identity, I Kings, xxi. 11.
sqq.). Thus, simulation teaches error, and dissimulation hides truth
from those who have no right to it. That dissimulation is generally
recognized as lawful is seen from such examples as stratagems,
ambushes, camouflage in war, disguises in detective work, and
concealment of marriage by couples not ready for housekeeping.

(c) It signifies the contrary of what one has in mind, as when one who
is sad laughs and jokes to make others think he is happy, or one who is
well apes the actions of a sick man so as to appear unwell, or when one
who hates his neighbor treats him as a friend in public. A special form
of simulation is hypocrisy, which makes a show of virtue that one does
not possess at all or in the degree pretended. There is no simulation
if the exterior corresponds with what one has is mind, for example, at
Emmaus Christ made as though He would go farther (Luke, xxiv. 28), but
He meant not to stop without an invitation.

2404. The Sinfulness of Simulation.--(a) In general, simulation is a
sin, since it is nothing else than an acted lie. But deeds, with the
few exceptions of bows, nods, gestures and the like, are not from their
nature signs of thoughts, and those employed to serve as signs are more
indeterminate and equivocal than words; hence, it is not always as easy
to decide that an act is simulatory as to decide that a word is a lie.
Thus, it is not simulation to make use of false hair, false teeth, or
false jewelry as means of protection or of adornment, there being no
intention to mislead; neither is it simulation for a wicked cleric to
wear the clerical garb, for the dress signifies primarily his state,
and not necessarily his personal moral character.

(b) In particular, simulation by hypocrisy and treachery is detestable;
for hypocrisy prostitutes works of virtue to the ignoble ends of
applause or lucre or worse, while treachery uses the intimacy or marks
of friendship as means for betrayal. The most stinging rebukes of Our
Lord were given the hypocritical Pharisees (“Blind guides, whited
sepulchres, serpents, generation of vipers,” Matt., xxiii. 23 sqq.),
and among the saddest words of Christ are those addressed to Judas
(“Dost thou betray the Son of man with a kiss?” Luke, xxii. 48).
Against the former he pronounced woes, and He declared that it were
better if the latter had never been born (Matt., xxvi. 24).

2405. Sinfulness of Hypocrisy.--(a) Hypocrisy in its strictest sense is
the simulation of one who wishes to seem but not to be virtuous. This
sin is mortal, since it cares nothing for virtue, and its external
pretense is but a mockery. It is this hypocrisy that is so scathingly
denounced in Scripture.

(b) Hypocrisy in a less strict sense is the simulation of one who is in
mortal sin, but wishes for some reason to appear virtuous or to lead a
double life. The sin is mortal or venial according to the motive; for
example, to act the hypocrite in order to seduce another is a mortal
sin, though, if the motive is only vanity, the sin is venial. It should
be noted that it is not hypocrisy for a just cause to conceal one’s sin
by dissimulation; indeed, Isaias severely blames those who scandalize
others by flaunting their wickedness before the public (Is, iii. 9).

(c) Hypocrisy in the widest sense assumes the appearance of a high
degree of sanctity above that requisite for salvation, as when a person
of ordinary goodness tries to gain the reputation of miracle-worker, or
to pass as one better than others in faith, zeal, humility, etc. This
sin is not mortal in itself, but it may become mortal on account of
some motive, some means, or some other circumstance. There is no
hypocrisy at all, however, in showing oneself for the virtue one really
has; on the contrary, he lies, who being good pretends that he is not
good, or who being free of a vice pretends that he is guilty of it.

2406. Self-Glorification and Self-Depreciation.--Two forms of lying
about self are self-glorification and self-depreciation.

(a) Braggadocio is untruthful self-glorification, as when one pretends
to be of royal descent, or makes a display of wealth beyond one’s
means, or poses as an authority on matters of which one is ignorant, or
tries by bluff to make one’s defects seem perfections. This sin is
mortal when the lie is seriously injurious to God or others (Ezech.,
xxviii. 2, Luke, xviii. 11), or when the motive is gravely sinful, such
as grave arrogance, ambition, or avarice.

(b) Feigning of defects (irony) is untruthful self-depreciation, as
when one falsely denies a good quality which one possesses (e.g., an
excessively humble man denies the good deeds that others ascribe to
him, though he knows they are real), or when one falsely admits a bad
quality which one lacks (e.g., a person who wishes to curry favor
accuses himself of misdeeds which he knows never happened). This sin is
usually less than braggadocio, since as a rule its purpose is to avoid
offense to others; but it may be serious sin on account of some
circumstance, as when one speaks ill of self in order to scandalize or
seduce another. At times the feigning of defects is a concealed
braggadocio, as when one dresses in rags, hoping by this expedient to
acquire repute as a person of great spirituality (Prov., xxvi, 25;
Matt., vi. 16; Ecclus., xix. 23).

2407. Infidelity and Violation of a Secret.--It remains to speak of the
vices of infidelity and violation of secret (see 2388 a). As to the
former, since it has been discussed elsewhere (1877 sqq., 1888, 1889;
see also the matter on Promissory Oaths), it will suffice here to ask
the question: Is the breach of a promise freely given a sin?

(a) If observance of the promise is due from fidelity only, there is no
legal fault, but there is moral fault, and hence the breach of the
promise is a sin. The malice is essentially the same as that of
untruthfulness (see 2395), for both the liar and the promise-breaker
show themselves unreliable, the former because his words do not square
with his mind and the latter because his deeds do not live up to his
plighted word. Breach of promise, then, seems _per se_ to be a venial
sin, though there are often circumstances (such as damage done) that
make it mortal.

(b) If observance of the promise is not due even from fidelity, on
account of the presence of some defect, there is no moral obligation to
keep the promise and no sin is committed by not keeping it. The defects
referred to are such as make the promise lack force from the beginning
(e.g., if it was immoral or extorted by force), or deprive it of the
force it had (i.e., inability on the part of the promisor or loss of
right on the part of the promisee). The promisor is unable to keep the
promise, if the thing promised has become physically impossible (e.g.,
he no longer has the strength or the means to perform what he
promised), or morally impossible (e.g., the thing promised has become
unlawful, or a notable change has taken place which, could it have been
foreseen, would have prevented the promise). The promisee loses his
right if the sole or principal reason that dictated the promise has
ceased, or if the promise has become useless to the promisee, or if the
promisor has been released, or if the promisee forfeits his claim by
his own perfidy towards the promisor (see 2256 sqq., 1889).

2408. Definition of a Secret.--A secret is a matter (e.g., an
invention, valuable information, concealed virtues, the fact that a
crime has been committed) known privately by only one person or by so
few that it is neither public property nor notorious. Moralists
distinguish the following kinds of secrets:

(a) a natural secret, which is one that cannot be revealed without
causing injury or annoyance to another, as when the revelation will
harm a person in his reputation, honor, influence property. It is
called natural for it arises from the very nature of the matter of the
secret and not from any promise or contract.

(b) a promised secret, which is one that a person has promised, but
only after he had already learned it, to guard inviolate. It makes no
difference whether the promisor learned the secret from the promisee or
from some other source;

(c) an entrusted or committed secret, which is one that a person
promised (and before he learned it) to keep from others. The promise
here is either implicit or explicit. An implicit promise of secrecy is
one that is demanded by the confidential nature of communications
between two parties (professional secret), as when physicians, lawyers,
priests, parents, or friends are told of private matters on account of
their position or relationship. An explicit promise is one that is
given in express terms, as when A says to B: “I have a matter of great
importance to tell you, but you must first promise that you will keep
it secret”; and on B promising, A confides to him the secret.

2409. Sinfulness of Violating a. Secret.--A secret is the property of
its owner, and to it he has a strict right; for if it is a good secret
(such as an original idea or discovery), it is the product of his labor
or at least a possession which he has lawfully come by; if it is an
evil secret (such as a crime of which he has been guilty), it may not
be made known without infringing on his right of reputation. It is no
more lawful to violate the right to a secret than to violate the right
to property, and, as there are three kinds of injuries to property, so
there are three kinds of injuries to a secret.

(a) Thus, the right of possession is injured by those who by fraud or
force or other illegal means deprive another of his secret (e.g., by
secretly intercepting private letters, by making a person drunk in
order to learn a secret).

(b) The right of use is injured by those who on acquiring knowledge of
a secret guide themselves or others by it to the detriment of the
owner’s rights.

(c) The right of disposition is injured by those who reveal a secret
which they were obliged not to reveal.

2410. Prying Into Others’ Secrets.--To seek to discover the secrets of
others is not lawful unless the following conditions are present:

(a) one must have a right to the knowledge. Hence, if there is question
about a crime that has been committed or that is about to be committed,
one has a right to investigate in order to prevent harm to public or
private good; in war one may try to discover the plans of the enemy.
But it is not lawful to pry into purely personal matters, to fish from
others natural or confidential secrets which they are bound to keep, to
steal from another the thoughts, plans, inventions, etc, which are his
own;

(b) one must use only honest means to discover secrets to which one has
a right (1504). Thus, it does not seem lawful generally to inebriate
another in order to learn his secret, and it is certainly sinful to
resort to lies or simulation or immorality.

2411. Reading Another’s Letters or Papers.--When is it lawful to read
the letters or other papers of another person?

(a) This is lawful when the writings are not intended to be secret to
anyone, as when a circular is meant for public use, when greetings are
written on a postcard which all may read, and when a letter is left
open and thrown away or otherwise abandoned. But a sealed letter, or
one left open in a private room, or one lost in a public place, is
secret. If a letter or manuscript has been torn up by its owner and
thrown away on the street or other public place, it does not seem
lawful to piece the fragments together and read the writing, for,
though the paper has been abandoned, the owner by destroying it has
indicated his will to keep the contents secret.

(b) It is also lawful to read the writing of others that are not secret
as regards oneself, as when one has received a just permission from the
writer to peruse a letter written by him, or when one may presume such
permission on account of friendship with the writer, or when rule or
lawful custom gives the superior of an institution the right to inspect
the correspondence of his subjects. Exception must be made for exempted
matter for which there is no permission, such as letters containing
conscience matters and letters directed to higher religious superiors
(see Canon 611).

(c) It is also lawful to read the writings of others that are meant to
be secret, if one has a right to know what is in them: for in such a
case the owner would be unreasonable if he wished to exclude one from
the knowledge. Thus, the public authority (e.g., in time of war) has
the right to open and read letters and private papers, when this is
necessary for the common good; parents and heads of boarding schools
may examine the correspondence of their subjects, though parents should
respect conscience matter and others should not read family secrets;
private individuals have the natural right, as a measure of
self-defense, to read another’s letter, when there is a prudent reason
for thinking that it contains something gravely and unjustly harmful to
themselves (such as conspiracy, a trap, calumny).

2412. Lawfulness of Utilizing Knowledge of Secret.--One is said to use
the knowledge obtained from a secret when one guides one’s conduct by
the knowledge, doing or omitting what one would not otherwise do or
omit. Is this use of a secret lawful?

(a) If there was a promise not to use the secret, such use is unlawful
(see 2414). Breach of promise is then, in case of a merely promised
secret, an act of infidelity at least, and in case of an entrusted
secret an act of injustice. Thus, when one consults a professional
person, there is a tacit understanding that the knowledge communicated
will not be used against one’s interests or without one’s consent, and
hence a lawyer would be unjust if, on learning in the course of work
for a client that the latter’s business was not prosperous, he gave
word of this to one of the client’s creditors.

(b) If there was no promise not to use the secret, the use of it is
nevertheless unjust, if it infringes a strict right (e.g., to make
money from a secret process on which another has a patent, to get
knowledge of another’s information and plans through reading his
letters and thereby to prevent him from securing a vacant position), or
if it is equivalent to unjust revelation of a secret. The use is
uneharitable if it harms another person without necessity (e.g., to
take away one’s trade from a deserving merchant solely because one has
learned that on one occasion he was accidentally intoxicated).

(c) If there was no promise to avoid use and no harm will be done by
use, it is lawful to use a secret for a non-necessary good (e.g., to
raise the price on one’s property when one accidentally learns through
overhearing a secret conversation that the property is worth the higher
price), and it is obligatory to use it for a necessary good (e.g., to
assist a neighbor when one is told under secret that he is in dire need
of one’s charitable help). Even though harm will result to another by
use of the secret, use is not sinful if it infringes no right and could
be sacrificed only at great inconvenience to oneself, as when one has
discovered by one’s own industry some important truth in an art or
science which another had previously discovered but had neglected to
make his own by exclusive right, or when one learns under secret that
another person is one’s enemy and has to be watched and avoided.

2413. The Sin Committed by Stealing or Unduly Using the Secret of
Another.--(a) From its nature (cases of mere fidelity excepted) the sin
is mortal, as being a violation of commutative justice or of charity.
Injury to property rights, whether in goods or in knowledge, is
violation of a strict right (see 1890, 1894). The sin is aggravated by
the greater import of the secret or by the greater damages or
displeasure caused.

(b) From the imperfection of the act or the lightness of the matter the
sin may become venial, as when one thoughtlessly reads another person’s
letters, or opens correspondence without authority, feeling morally
sure that there is nothing confidential in it, or makes use of an
unimportant secret without permission.

2414. The Obligation of Keeping a Secret.--(a) The natural secret
obliges _per se_ under grave sin; for violation of it offends charity
and justice by saddening and harming a neighbor. The sin may become
venial on account of lightness of matter, as when little sadness or
harm is caused.

(b) The promised secret obliges ordinarily under light sin only; for as
a rule the promisor intends to obligate himself in virtue of fidelity
alone (1888), and the obligation of fidelity, as said above (see 2407),
is not grave. But exceptionally the obligation may be grave, as when
the promisor intended to bind himself in virtue of justice and under
grave sin, or when the secret is natural as well as promised.

(c) The entrusted secret obliges _per se_ under grave sin; for there is
a duty of commutative and of legal justice to keep it, on account of
the rights of contract and of the common good that are involved. The
violator of an entrusted secret injures private good by disregard for
contract, and he injures public good by weakening confidence in
officials or professional persons to whom others must go for advice or
assistance. Violation of a committed secret may be only a venial sin on
account of the lightness of the matter. Thus, some think it is not a
serious injustice to reveal a secret to one very discreet person, if
the person whose secret is made known is not very much opposed to this
and no other damage will result (see 2065).

2415. Comparison of Secrets as Regards Binding Force.--(a) The promised
secret obliges less than the natural or the entrusted, as was said in
the previous paragraph. (b) The natural secret obliges less _per se_
than the entrusted secret, for the safeguarding of the latter is agreed
to in an onerous contract, while no engagement is made to keep the
former. (c) Some entrusted secrets are more sacred than others. Thus, a
secret confided from necessity is more binding than one confided
without necessity; a secret one has sworn to keep is more obligatory
than a secret one has given one’s word of honor to keep; a professional
secret is more imperious than a private secret; a state secret is far
more important than any secret of private individuals. The most
inviolable of all secrets is that of the confessional, because its
violation is always a sacrilege.

2416. Cases Wherein It Is Not Necessary to Keep a Secret.--(a) If there
has been no obligation from the time the secret was learned, it is not
necessary to keep it. Thus, if a merely promised secret was accepted
under compulsion and revelation will be advantageous and not harmful,
it does not seem necessary to keep the secret.

(b) If the obligation of the secret has ceased, it is not necessary to
be silent. Examples are cases in which secrecy was promised only for a
certain space of time, or in which a matter formerly secret has become
public, or in which the owner of the secret wishes it to be divulged,
or in which he has not kept faith with the possessor of the secret,
provided of course that in these cases no injury or unnecessary harm is
done by making known the secret. Similarly, if the recipient of the
secret cannot keep it without grave harm (e.g., death) to himself, he
is not bound by it, unless charity (see 1165, 1236) or justice calls
for the contrary. Commutative justice would demand silence (though many
make exception for a most grave reason, regarding a promise to the
contrary as prodigal) if there had been an express contract to guard
the secret at all risks; legal justice would demand it, if the safety
of the republic were involved.

2417. Cases Wherein It Is Not Lawful to Keep a Secret.--(a) If a secret
cannot be kept without greater harm to the common good, it may not be
kept, for legal justice requires that private good be subordinated to
public safety. The violation of secrets is a harm to the public good
and a greater harm than ordinary evils against the community (such as
the escape of a guilty person); but it is a less harm than serious
evils against the people (such as menace to public health, sedition, or
treason). The possessor of a natural or promised secret must make it
known at the command of lawful authority, as in court; but the superior
has no right to question about entrusted secrets of a necessary kind,
and this is usually recognized by positive law in the protection
extended to professional communications.

(b) If a secret cannot be kept without greater harm to the private good
of the owner of the secret, distinction is made between a non-entrusted
and an entrusted secret. In the former case the secret may not be kept,
for charity bids one to help a neighbor escape a greater evil, and the
owner of the secret would be unreasonable if he were opposed to its
revelation (see 501 sqq.). In the latter case, some are of the opinion
that the secret should be kept, if it is professional (since the public
good then takes precedence over the private good of the owner of the
secret), but this is denied by others. Example: Titus knows that Balbus
is about to marry with a secret impediment that will nullify the
marriage, but he cannot persuade Balbus to disclose this impediment to
the pastor.

(c) If a secret cannot be kept without greater harm to the private good
of a third party (i.e., one other than the owner of the secret),
distinction is made between cases, according as injury is or is not
done by the owner of the secret to the third party. If no injury is
done the third party, the secret should be kept (e.g., if one knows in
confidence that Sempronius has made an invention which will supersede
an invention made by Claudius, one is not at liberty to make this known
to the latter, for Sempronius has done no injury to Claudius). If,
however, injury is done the third party by the owner of the secret when
the secret is kept, one should not keep the secret; for charity
requires that one help an innocent person to escape from harm, even if
this has to be done at the expense of harm to the guilty cause of the
harm. Examples: If one knows as a secret that A, B and C have conspired
to murder D tomorrow night, and one cannot otherwise prevent the
murder, one should if possible break the secret, at least by sending
warning to D that his life is in danger tomorrow night. If a doctor
knows that a man who is about to contract marriage is syphilitic and
pretends that he is sound, and if the doctor cannot persuade this man
to make the facts known to the intended wife, the doctor himself should
give notice to the woman, according to some authorities, unless the
laws of the country forbid such use of professional knowledge.

2418. What should the possessor of an entrusted secret do, if from the
secret he knows that the one who entrusted it is guilty of a crime for
which an innocent third person is about to be convicted and sentenced?

(a) If the guilty party is responsible for the plight of the innocent
party (e.g., because he falsely accused him or threw suspicion on him),
natural law would require the possessor of the secret to make known the
true state of affairs; for the guilty party is then the unjust cause of
damage and is bound to accuse himself (see 1763). Revelation of the
true culprit would not be necessary, however, if there was some other
way of saving the innocent person.

(b) If the guilty person is not responsible for the difficulty in which
the innocent person finds himself, not having used any means to bring
the latter into suspicion, some believe that the secret should be kept,
since the guilty person has then the right to keep his secret and
therefore has also the right that his confidants keep it (see 1968).
But others, while granting that the guilty person is not obliged to
accuse himself, deny that the confidant is not obliged to accuse him;
for the right of the guilty that his secret be kept and the right of
the innocent that he be not deprived of life or liberty are in conflict
and unequal, and he who prefers the former right does an injury to the
innocent person (see 288).

2419. The previous question was concerned with an innocent third party.
If the holder of the secret is also the accused, it seems he is not
obliged, unless perhaps when he agreed to it, to prefer the
inviolability of the secret to his own justification; for the
acceptance of a secret does not mean that one binds oneself to grave
hardship for its preservation (see 2418). The thing to do would be to
warn the guilty person to escape in time, and then to exculpate oneself
by making known the truth.

2420. Lawfulness of Revealing a Secret Learned by Stealth or Force.--Is
it lawful, in order to avert some great evil, to use or reveal against
the interests or wishes of its owner a secret which one has learned by
stealth (e.g., by spying, eavesdropping, wiretapping, unauthorized
inspection of papers) or by force? Various answers are given to this
question, but to us the following seems the best:

(a) if the stealth or force would not be unjust here and now, because
the owner of the secret has a duty to disclose it (e.g., on account of
the public good, on account of the extreme need of a private person),
or the other party has a right to seek after it (e.g., because he
cannot otherwise defend himself against the unjust vexation of the
owner of the secret), the answer is in the affirmative; for in such a
case there is only applied the principle of lawful occupation or of
lawful self-defense (see 1920 sqq., 1819). But if the stealth or force
is excessive in its manner or productive of unnecessary harm, it is
sinful and induces the duty of restitution, nor is there any right to
make such use or such revelation of a secret as is sinful in itself
(e.g., on account of calumnies, scandals, disorders);

(b) if the stealth or force would be unjust here and now, the answer is
in the negative; for in such a case there is real theft of a secret, a
person’s most intimate possession, and a continuation of the original
injury by the use of the stolen property against its owner, or at least
an unlawful conversion of property. Hence, if there is no grave or
proportionate reason for the use of the secret, or if other and simpler
methods can be employed, the secret may not be used. Those who play the
detective ostensibly for other reasons but really for purposes of
blackmail or other personal advantage, are therefore in the same class
as thieves and are bound to restitution; their sin is _per se_ mortal,
for secrets are usually esteemed more highly than money, and it would
be seriously detrimental to the public weal if the practice of using
secrets unlawfully obtained (e.g., by secretly taking down privileged
communications or state secrets) were permissible.

2421. The Virtues of Affability and Liberality.--These two virtues,
though they are not so important as those that preceded, are still most
useful to human life (see 2143). Affability (friendliness, politeness)
is a virtue which inclines a person to show himself in serious matters
properly agreeable to others in order thus to fulfill a duty to society.

(a) Affability has for its object to be agreeable to others, that is,
in looks, manner, words and deeds to treat them with kindness and
consideration, and so to give them pleasure. Affability is more than
mere civility, which avoids rudeness and observes necessary
proprieties, but does not manifest a gracious spirit. The gentleman,
according to Cardinal Newman (“Idea of a University,” Discourse viii,
10), is one who does not inflict pain and whose great concern is to
make others at their ease and at home. The true gentleman is
considerate for all his company, guards against unseasonable allusions
or topics, is seldom prominent in conversation and never wearisome,
makes light of his own favors, never speaks of himself except when
compelled, avoids personalities and insinuations of evil, and is
indulgent towards opponents.

(b) Affability is as agreeable as is becoming, or proper; that is, it
observes the golden mean, attending to moderation and circumstances,
suiting its deportment to the time, place, occasion, and persons and
observing the recognized laws of etiquette for social, official,
business, religious, domestic and other relations. Indeed, there are
times when affability should not be shown, as when it is necessary to
display severity and displeasure, or even to sadden others, for the
sake of some higher good (II Cor., vii. 8, 9).

(c) Its purpose is to fulfill a social duty. Without affability the
ways of life are made rougher and more difficult for all, and
therefore, since man is a social being, it becomes obligatory that each
one should so conduct himself towards others as to avoid the
displeasing and to cultivate the pleasing. Thus, affability is less
than friendship (see 1110), since it does not include special
benevolence and is shown to friend and foe alike; but it is more than
polish, for it consists not merely in external good manners but chiefly
in an internal sense of responsibility to society and of deference to
its requirements. Affability is at its best, however, when prompted by
friendship and Christian charity. A modicum of courtesy, if accompanied
by sincerity and goodness of heart, is more appreciated than profuse
compliment and ceremony behind which there is little genuineness or
little affection.

(d) Affability regulates conduct in serious matters, for the regulation
of amusements or recreations pertain chiefly to modesty and falls under
temperance rather than justice. Aristotle calls the virtue directive of
games _eutrapelia_, which may also be called reasonable relaxation,
urbanity, or pleasantness.

2422. Offices of Affability.--All, and especially the clergy, should
practise courtesy, imitating St. Paul, who became all things to all
men, in order to gain all to Christ (I Cor., ix. 22), and following his
advice to be without offense to Jew or Gentile or to the Church of God
(I Cor., x. 32). The offices of affability can be reduced to the
negative and the positive, as follows: (a) the negative offices are the
avoidance of excess (adulation) and defect (surliness); (b) the
positive offices are the observance on special occasions of the
appropriate forms and usages and on all occasions the exercise of a
gentle and thoughtful regard for the feelings of others.

2423. The Sins against Affability.--(a) Adulation is the vice of those
who in the effort to please others go beyond what is proper, of the
complaisant man who aims to gratify by merely conventional or
extravagant compliments, and of the flatterer who seeks to win favors
for himself by expressions of fulsome admiration. Adulation is shown by
exaggerated debasement of self (servility, obsequiousness), as well as
by exaggerated exaltation of others (toadyism). The sin of adulation is
not grave from its nature, being only an excessive will to please; but
circumstances sometimes make it grave, such as its matter (e.g., when
one compliments another’s sins, Is., v. 20), its effect (e.g., when the
person flattered will be made proud), or its purpose (e.g., when the
flatterer means to seduce the other person, Prov., xxvii. 6). Like to
adulation in its exaggeration, but unlike it in manner, is the display
of friendliness by offensive familiarity or boisterous conduct.

(b) Surliness is the sin of those who are ungracious in their manners,
not because of hate or anger, but because of a desire to be unpleasant
and to make others yield to themselves. The surly man is always ready
to contradict or argue, he is hard to please, sensitive, sour in
visage, gruff in words, and much given to complaint or sullen silence.
Surliness is _per se_ worse than adulation but not a mortal sin; for it
is farther removed from affability than adulation, but does not
necessarily inflict a severe wound on charity. But the smooth palaverer
is usually a more dangerous character than the morose man (Ps. cxl. 5).
Like to surliness is the boorishness of those who from cynicism or
laziness despise refinement, or from greed neglect proper manners at
table. But entirely different from surliness is that dignity which can
be reserved without being distant or hard of approach, and that
seriousness which can be grave or silent without being ungracious.

2424. Liberality.--Liberality is a virtue that moderates the love of
riches and inclines one in ordinary affairs to bestow one’s own goods
upon others willingly, when and as right reason may dictate.

(a) It moderates the love of riches; that is, it makes one value and
esteem money at its true worth. In this respect it pertains at least
improperly to temperance inasmuch as the love of money is a passion.
Liberality is thus distinguished from mercy and beneficence. These
virtues are open-handed from charity, and give because another is in
need or is loved; liberality, on the contrary, may be without charity
and its bounty may be shown even to those who are not in need or who
are not liked, for it is free in using money precisely because it does
not prize external things excessively.

(b) It inclines one to bestow one’s own possessions, or freely to
communicate them. In this respect liberality is assigned to justice,
since its object is external things as owed by a certain moral debt to
others. Since liberality consists primarily in a generous inclination,
even the poor may have this virtue; in fact, the poor oftentimes, being
less wedded to money, are far more disposed to liberality than the rich.

(c) It functions in ordinary affairs, for there is a special virtue of
magnificence that makes wealthy men spend money lavishly in enterprise
of the greatest moment.

(d) The beneficiary of liberality is another, for no special virtue is
needed to make one use money freely for one’s own needs or comfort.

(e) Liberality bestows gladly, but according to right reason, for there
is no merit in unwilling gifts, and no virtue in gifts bestowed
unsuitably as to time, place, purpose, person, quantity, quality, etc.
Liberality, then, is not inconsistent with prudence about temporal
affairs, that is, with economy which adapts expenditures to income,
with thrift which puts something by for the future, and with frugality
which spares unnecessary expenses on self, especially in the matter of
luxuries (see 1681 sqq.).

2425. The Importance of Liberality.--(a) Liberality is not the greatest
virtue. It is less than temperance, for temperance regulates the
passions in reference to the body, while liberality regulates them in
reference to externals; it is less than fortitude and justice, which
serve the common good, whereas liberality regards individuals; it is
less than the virtues that are concerned with divine things, for
liberality has to do directly with temporals.

(b) Liberality is one of the most useful of virtues since it disposes
one to use money well in the service of God and humanity, and gives one
an influence that can be employed for good (Ecclus., xxxi. 28).
According to Aristotle, the virtues that chiefly attract fame are first
bravery, next justice, and then liberality. Moreover, this virtue of
generosity is one of the surest indexes of internal religion and
charity, as being the natural expression of devotion and benevolence
(see 2185, 1211), while miserliness is a sign of coldness towards God
and man.

2426. Vice of Avarice.--The vice which is opposed to liberality by
defect in giving is avarice, which, properly speaking or as
distinguished from theft and robbery, is an immoderate desire, love or
delight entertained in respect to external corporal goods, such as
lands or money.

(a) The Absolute Malice of Avarice.--This sin is _per se_ venial, since
it is only an excess in the love of a thing that is in itself
indifferent and lawful; but it becomes mortal if the affection for
money is so great that one is prepared to sacrifice grave obligations
for its sake (e.g., to stay away from church rather than contribute to
religion or the suffering poor). It is not merely carnal, since not
concerned with bodily pleasure; nor merely spiritual, since riches are
not a spiritual object; hence, it stands midway between spiritual and
carnal vices.

(b) The Comparative Malice of Avarice.--In regard to deformity, avarice
is not worse than other sins, but rather the contrary. The less the
good to which a vice is opposed, the less the deprivation caused by the
vice; and hence since external goods, to whose proper esteem avarice is
opposed, are less important than divine or human goods, it follows that
avarice is not so sinful as irreligion, homicide, theft, etc. In regard
to shamefulness, however, avarice is worse than other sins. The less
valuable the created good that a vice pursues, the more disgraceful the
vice; and hence since the miser sets his heart on external things,
which are the lowest of all goods, preferring them to goods of body and
of soul (e.g., to health, education) and even to divine goods, he is
rightly regarded as more contemptible than other sinners. Some forms of
avarice, too, are more despicable than others. Thus, in some persons
avarice shows itself in their fear to consume or expend for their own
necessary uses (parsimony, penuriousness); in others it shows itself by
an unwillingness to give to others (stinginess, niggardliness), or a
willingness to live at the expense of others (sponging); finally, the
most disgusting form of avarice is seen in those who cannot bear to
part with their possessions either for their own sake or for the sake
of others, and find their happiness in mere possession (miserliness).
In regard to influence, avarice has a pre-eminence among sins that
causes it to be numbered among the seven capital vices. A capital vice
is one of the chief sources of evil attraction that produces other
sins, and it is clear that immoderate love of riches is one of the most
prolific of sins. All are drawn to happiness, and money seems to secure
the requisites for happiness (Ecclus., x. 16); hence we see that for
the sake of holding to money men become hard of heart (Matt., xxiii.
14; Luke, xvi. 21), for the sake of acquiring it they become carnal and
restless in mind (Ecclus., xiv. 9; Matt., xiii. 22) and have recourse
to deeds of violence (III Kings, xxi. 2), of deception (Acts, xxiv.
26), of perjury (Matt., xxviii. 12 sqq.), of fraud (Luke, xvi. 4 sqq.),
and of treachery (Matt., xxvi. 15). Avarice is at the same time one of
the most dangerous of sins, for it will lead a man to sell even his own
soul (Ecclus., X. 10) and to commit any enormity (I Tim., vi. 9), and
one of the most incurable, for the miser never has enough (Prov., xxx.
15, 16) and is always able to make believe that his avarice is prudence
or some other virtue (Wis., xv. 12).

2427. Vice of Prodigality.--The vice opposed to liberality by excess in
giving is prodigality, which is an insufficient regard for temporal
things and an extravagant bestowal of them on others.

(a) It is an insufficient care for temporal things: that is, as the
miser loves money too much, so the prodigal esteems it too little; as
the miser is over-anxious to get and keep money, so the prodigal is
careless about earning or saving.

(b) It is an extravagant bestowal of temporal things; that is, the
prodigal gives more than he should, or else the circumstances do not
call for his gift, as when he gives when or where or to whom he should
not give.

2428. The Sinfulness of Prodigality.--(a) From its nature it is venial.
The prodigal is not the absolute owner of his goods, but a steward who
is held to administer them according to reason. But his sin is not
grave, since it does not injure others and the goods of which he
deprives himself are of the lowest kind.

(b) From its circumstances it may be mortal. Thus, it is made mortal on
account of the purpose (e.g., extravagant presents made with a view to
seduction or bribery), or the consequences (e.g., wastefulness which
makes one unable to pay debts or assist a relative who is in grave
need), or the special obligation of devoting superfluities to charity,
as when one squanders the excess revenues of a benefice (see 1252).

2429. Comparison of Avarice and Prodigality.--(a) They are associable,
for the same person may be both avaricious and prodigal, though in
different respects (e.g., some persons are spendthrifts in giving money
away, and are thus forced to be grasping to get money and ready to
obtain it by any means, foul or fair). (b) They are unequal in malice.
Prodigality is less sinful than avarice, because it is less removed
from liberality, less harmful to self and others, and less difficult to
cure. It is said that prodigality is the vice of youth, avarice the
vice of old age.

2430. The Virtue of Equity.--The virtues that have been so far treated
in the present Article are forms of particular justice, and they have
the status of adjuncts or potential parts. We shall conclude the list
of virtues grouped with justice by discussing equity, which belongs to
general (legal) justice and has the rank of a subjective part (see
above, 1635, 1636, 1745, 1701, 1704).

2431. Definition of Equity.--In law, equity is any court system of
extraordinary justice in which the standard is natural honesty as
declared by the conscience of the judge or by a body of rules and
procedures that supplement or override the usual rules and procedures
where these are too narrow or limited. Thus, in England and in the
United States courts of equity are those that take care of defined
special cases for which there is no remedy in the usual or common
law courts (Robinson, _Elementary Law_, Sec.348). But as here taken
equity is a moral virtue, and is of two kinds, particular equity which
pertains to particular justice (natural equity) and general equity
which belongs to legal justice (legal equity).

(a) Natural equity is a moral virtue that inclines one not to insist
unnecessarily on one’s strict or legal rights when to do so will be
unpleasant or burdensome to others. It is exemplified in the acts of an
employer who freely grants a bonus to deserving employees in addition
to the wage promised, and of a creditor who grants an extension of
time to a hard-pressed debtor. This virtue partakes of both charity
and justice; of charity, since it tempers justice with mercy; of
justice, since it is really identical with the virtue of affability
or friendliness mentioned above (2421). Its obligation as an act of
justice is not grave, since the debt is not of a rigorous kind.

(b) Legal equity is a moral virtue that inclines one to justice beyond
the common laws, or it is a correction of the law in that wherein the
law by reason of its universality is manifestly deficient. The law is
said to be deficient here when its application in a particular case
would be prejudicial to the supreme purpose of law (i.e., to the common
good or to equal justice). Some precepts of the natural law (e.g., the
prohibitions against lying and adultery) cannot be deficient in this
way and need no supervising equity. But other precepts of natural law,
according to some (e.g., the command that a deposit be returned to the
depositor), and also precepts of positive law are found to be
unsuitable in exceptional cases. The reason for this defect in a good
law lies in the nature of the case; for these laws must be made in view
of what happens in the majority of cases, and accordingly they are
couched in general terms and permit of exceptions which the lawgiver
himself would allow (see on Epieikeia, 411 sqq).

2432. The Greatness of Legal Equity.--(a) It is a distinct virtue,
since it inclines the will to do good and avoid iniquity in a matter of
special difficulty. It is not a transgression of law, since it upholds
the spirit when the letter departs from the spirit, and prizes the
lawgiver’s intention to do what is just and right above the lawgiver’s
words.

(b) It is a subjective part of common justice, since all that is
contained in the concept of justice belongs to equity. Thus, it differs
from the potential and integral parts of justice so far treated in
Articles 5 and 6.

(c) It pertains to the species, not of particular, but of general or
legal justice; for equity extends to all the virtues and is concerned
with the debt owed to the common good. Thus, _per se_ its obligation is
grave (see 1721).

(d) It is the higher part of legal justice. Just as prudence has two
parts--good judgment (_synesis_), which settles ordinary cases of
morals according to the usual rules of conduct, and acute judgment
(_gnome_), which passes on moral problems that are out of the ordinary
run--so legal justice has two acts, a lower which applies the law to
usual cases, and a higher (equity) which applies more remote principles
(viz., that the common good be not injured, nor injustice done) where
the immediate principles of the law are clearly inadequate. Thus, if a
madman demands from a depositary the return of his revolver in order to
commit murder, the letter of the law would uphold the madman, but
equity would decide against him; if the enemy are attacking a city and
one cannot repel them except by disregarding an ordinance of the city,
the law would forbid one to transgress the ordinance, while equity
would command one to transgress it.

(e) Equity is, therefore, the noblest act of strict justice. For legal
justice is preferred to particular justice (1703, 1715), and equity is
the superior act of legal justice. In will and intention the common
good and justice must take precedence over laws and statutes at all
times; but in act the supreme ends of law are served, except in
extraordinary cases, by obedience to law.

2433. The Complements of Justice.--To each of the various virtues
correspond certain complements, namely, Gifts of the Holy Ghost, Fruits
of the Holy Ghost, and Beatitudes (see 159).

(a) The Gift that corresponds to justice is piety, for, like justice,
piety is exercised towards another, and moreover piety is the
completion of the virtue of religion, the highest development of
justice. This Gift is defined as “an infused habit that renders the
soul well disposed towards God as its kind Father, and makes it quickly
responsive to the Holy Spirit when He moves it to acts of filial
affection towards God.” As the virtue of piety is shown to earthly
fathers, so the Gift of Piety is shown to the Father in heaven: “You
have received the spirit of adoption of sons, in which we cry: Abba,
Father” (Rom., viii. 15). Religion honors God as Lord, piety as Father;
filial fear reveres His majesty, piety His lovingkindness. And as a
child tenderly loves all that belongs to a good father, so piety makes
the soul rejoice and be glad in the things of God, in the Saints, the
Scriptures, the practices of religion, and the like.

(b) The Beatitudes assigned here are the fourth (Blessed are they that
hunger and thirst after justice, for they shall have their fill), which
agrees with justice, and the fifth (Blessed are the merciful, for they
shall obtain mercy), which is suitable for piety inasmuch as one who
finds his love and joy in God as Father will be compassionate to the
suffering creatures of God. Like justice, both of these Beatitudes are
exercised in reference to the neighbor (see 164).

(c) The Fruits that seem most appropriate here are good will and
kindness, which find a sweet joy in purposing and performing services
for others. Like justice, these acts have reference to others (163);
like piety, they see in their neighbors the children of the same
heavenly Father. Thus, justice when alone is guided by prudence; it
pays what is due to God as Lord, to man as neighbor; it acts perhaps
with pain, but from a sense of duty. But when justice is supernaturally
perfected, it is the Spirit of Piety which guides, and which makes one
to see in God one’s Father and in man the child of God; even that which
is not owed is given from mercy, and there is a hunger and thirst for
justice; and in the payment of duty to others there is at last a joy
found in the very difficulty itself.

2434. The Commandments of Justice.--The various precepts regarding
justice are contained in the Decalogue. For justice consists in the
fulfillment of duties towards others whether they be superiors, equals
or inferiors. The Ten Commandments sum up these duties of justice; the
first three prescribe the duties owed to God, the fourth the duties
owed to human superiors, and the other six the obligations which man
has to his equals or to all fellowmen.

2435. The order of the Commandments is most appropriate, for their
purpose is to form man to virtue and to lead him to perfection, which
consists in the love of God and neighbor (see 1118, 1553 sqq.), and
they therefore outline first the service that is owed to God
(Commandments of the First Table) and next the service that is owed to
man (Commandments of the Second Table).

(a) The Commandments of the First Table lay the foundation of the
edifice of justice, for they teach us that our first duty is to render
to God the things that are God’s. We must avoid, therefore, the excess
of superstition (Thou shalt not have strange gods before Me) and the
defect of irreligiousness (Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord Thy
God in vain); we must practise the virtue of religion (Remember thou
keep holy the Sabbath Day).

(b) The Commandments of the Second Table begin with the duties owed to
those to whom we are most bound after God, namely, parents, country,
superiors (Honor thy father and thy mother). Next follow prohibitions
against injuries done to any neighbor by deeds or words, whether the
harm be to his person (Thou shalt not kill), or to those who are as one
person with him (Thou shalt not commit adultery), or to a neighbor’s
external corporal goods (Thou shalt not steal), or to his external
incorporeal goods of fame and honor (Thou shalt not bear false witness
against thy neighbor). Finally, there are prohibitions against thoughts
or desires injurious to the neighbor, mention being made specially of
those internal sins that are most common on account of the utility
(Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor’s goods) or the pleasure (Thou shalt
not covet thy neighbor’s wife) they afford.

2436. We shall not give here any special treatment of the Decalogue.
Rather we refer the reader to the excellent explanations that are
contained in Part III of The Catechism of the Council of Trent.
Moreover, each of the Commandments has been treated in the present
work, chiefly in the Articles on justice, and supplementary matter can
be drawn from some others of its articles. For the sake of convenience,
however, we give here a list of references, showing the passages of
this Moral Theology in which the Commandments of the Decalogue are
explained.

(a) Thus, for the First Commandment read on superstition (2274 sqq.)
for the prohibitory part, on faith, hope and charity (746 sqq.) for the
perceptive part.

(b) For the Second Commandment read on irreligiousness (2299) for the
prohibitory part; on oaths, adjuration and praise (2245 sqq.) for the
preceptive part.

(c) For the Third Commandment as to its natural precept, read on the
virtue of religion (2145 sqq.); as to its positive precept, read on
positive laws (340 sqq., 352, 425) and on the first Commandment of the
Church (see 2575 sqq.).

(d) For the Fourth Commandment read on the virtues of piety, reverence,
obedience and gratitude (2344 sqq.). Other matter will be found under
charity (1158 sqq., 1211 sqq.) and under the duties of particular
states.

(e) For the Fifth Commandment read on homicide, suicide, and bodily
injury (1816-1871). Other matter will be found in the Articles on
charity (1579 sqq., 1193 sqq.) and on affability (2421 sqq.).

(f) For the Sixth Commandment read on injustice (1719 sqq.), on
restitution (1803), and on the virtue of temperance (2461 sqq.).

(g) For the Seventh Commandment read on commutative and distributive
justice (1745 sqq.), on restitution (1751 sqq.), on injuries to
property (1872-1938), on fraud (2121 sqq.), on liberality (2424 sqq.).

(h) For the Eighth Commandment read on judicial injustice (1939 sqq.),
on unjust words (2009 Sqq.), and on truthfulness (2385 sqq.).

(i) For the Ninth and Tenth Commandments read on internal sins (230
sqq.), and on the malice of the internal act of sin (89-93).




Art. 7: THE VIRTUE OF FORTITUDE

(_Summa Theologica_, II-II, qq. 123-140.)

2437. The Virtue of Fortitude.--This virtue ranks next after justice
and before temperance. Prudence has the greatest amount of goodness
since it deals directly with reason, the essential good of man; justice
is next because it realizes the dictates of reason in human affairs;
the other virtues uphold the reign of reason against the rebellion of
passion, fortitude repressing fear, the most powerful foe of reason,
and temperance subduing pleasure, which is after fear the strongest of
reason’s enemies (cfr. 157, 1627, 1688). Fortitude is nobler than
temperance because more closely related to reason; it is the more
difficult virtue, because it is harder to bear pain than to abstain
from pleasure.

2438. Fortitude in General.--Fortitude (etymologically, strength,
vigor, firmness) in general is a moral quality which makes a person
unshaken from the right by danger or difficulty. It has various senses.

(a) It is used for a seeming virtue, which has the act but not the
requisites (i.e., the knowledge and the free choice) of a moral virtue.
Thus, some are brave from ignorance or want of reflection, because they
do not realize the danger (e.g., intoxicated persons) or because habit
makes them act without thought, or because many successes have rendered
them over-sanguine; others are brave from compulsion, because cowardice
is severely punished, or from passion, because they are beside
themselves with pain, anger, desire, etc.

(b) It is used for an inchoate virtue or a natural fitness to withstand
attack or encounter danger. Thus, some persons are so constituted
physically that the thought of risk, pain, or death does not affect
them strongly (fearlessness, intrepidity), or even attracts them
(adventurousness). This kind of bodily bravery is a preparation or
predisposition for moral courage.

(c) Fortitude is also the name of a general virtue or rather of a
general condition which must be found in every virtue. For there is no
virtue without firmness and persistence in good, as the name virtue
(i.e., strength) indicates. Thus, a person who is weakly inclined to
temperance and opposes no strong resistance to temptation cannot be
said to possess the virtue of temperance.

(d) Finally, fortitude is the name of a special virtue which confers
vigor and steadfastness in a special kind of trial, such as perils and
pains which threaten or inflict severe evils. It is of this fortitude
that we now speak.

2439. Definition of Fortitude.--Fortitude is defined as “a virtue which
in the face of the greatest evils moderates the passions of fear and
confidence within the bounds dictated by right reason.”

(a) The primary object of fortitude is the passions, or motions of the
sensuous appetite through which the appetite is attracted or repelled
by an object brought before it as good or evil, agreeable or
disagreeable. Justice is concerned with operations, fortitude and
temperance with passions (see 1709).

(b) The passions that chiefly fall within the scope of fortitude are
fear and confidence; and thus it is set apart from temperance, which
deals with the passions of pleasure. Fortitude has to do with that
which is disagreeable to sense, temperance with that which is
agreeable. Fear is a disturbance of soul produced by the imminence of
an external evil that cannot be easily escaped; confidence is a feeling
of self-reliance impelling one to face or attack a threatening evil.

(c) The function of fortitude is to moderate fear and confidence, or to
keep them to the happy mean between excess and defect. The passions in
themselves are not evil, but they need regulation (see 121, 122); and
hence without fortitude one falls either into cowardice or rashness.

(d) Fortitude acts in the face of the greatest evils, that is, even
when death itself, the greatest of corporal evils and the king of
terrors, is at hand. Virtue is the act of a perfect man, and hence we
do not ascribe fortitude to a man who is not brave except in reference
to things that are fearful only slightly or not at all (such as having
a tooth pulled or a finger lanced). The right regulation of fear
springs, therefore, from different good qualities, according to the
kinds of objects that inspire alarm: to fortitude in the strictest
sense, if there is question of supreme natural evil (that is, death or
its equivalent in deadly disease, mortal wound or torture); to
fortitude in a wider sense, if there is question of lesser corporal
evils (e.g., blows, wounds or mutilation that do not cause death); to
some other virtue, if there is question of other kinds of evils (e.g.,
liberality regulates the fear of losing money).

(e) The motive of fortitude is conformity with right reason. The
courageous person despises dangers because he wishes to hold fast to
virtue and has for his last aim God and true beatitude. Fortitude is
exercised, then, only when one is courageous in a good cause; the end
of the work (_finis operis_), or at least the end of the agent (_finis
operantis_), must be virtuous. The aim of bravery itself is virtuous
when it is the common good (e.g., soldiers fighting in defense of
country) or the good of a particular virtue (e.g., a judge contending
for justice, a virgin for purity, a martyr for religion); the aim of
the brave man is good when he performs an indifferent act for virtue’s
sake (e.g., waits on another during pestilence because of friendship,
goes on a perilous journey because of a pilgrimage). On the contrary,
fortitude is not exercised if bravery has nothing to do with virtue
(e.g., the imperturbability during sickness or shipwreck of a person
who had resolved on suicide), or if it is opposed to virtue (e.g., the
daring and coolness of a pirate, bandit, gunman or dueller); to risk
ignoble death with bravado is not a virtue.

2440. The Two Acts of Fortitude.--(a) The moderation of fear is
followed by endurance or firmness in the midst of danger, as in the
case of the martyrs. This act in common speech is more especially
designated “fortitude.” It is not accurate to speak of it as passive
resistance or passive courage. By it, indeed, no external act is
performed, but this is due to a most firm internal resolution and
self-control, such as a refusal to accept defeat, surrender principles
or make peace with wrong. Endurance to undergo is not the same thing,
then, as stoical indifference or apathy.

(b) The moderation of confidence is followed, where circumstances call
for it, by prudent attack or even, when discretion is the better part
of valor, by retreat as in warriors. A truly brave man does not fear to
be called a coward, and hence he will not advance when reason forbids
nor hesitate to retire when reason commands. Brave endurance is a
nobler act of fortitude than brave attack; for endurance struggles
against superior strength, it feels the evil already present, and its
fight is long and continuous, whereas attack is borne on by a sense of
power, the object of dread is still in the distance, and its rush is
quick and passing (Prov., xvi. 32). Hence, not all who are courageous
in attack are courageous under attack. But both acts are noble, and
each is necessary at its proper time.

2441. The Excellence of Fortitude.--(a) Its Rank.--Fortitude is one of
the four principal or cardinal virtues. A principal virtue is one that
exercises in the most difficult circumstances one of the four qualities
that every moral virtue must have. These qualities are firmness (for
every virtue is a habit or strongly rooted quality), rectitude (since a
virtue inclines to the good as the right or obligatory), moderation
(since a virtue is moral, or measured according to reason), and
discretion (since good inclinations must be guided by true direction).
Now, just as rectitude is most difficult, on account of self-love, in
dealing with others, and moderation in governing the appetites, and
discretion in ruling one’s own actions, so firmness is most difficult
in the presence of the greatest dangers; and therefore with justice,
temperance, and prudence must also be associated fortitude as one of
the chief of all virtues. These four principal virtues are also called
cardinal virtues (from _cardo_, a hinge), because the whole moral life
of man hinges on them. Thus, though perils of death are comparatively
rare, the occasions of such perils are common and one is constantly
called on to exercise fortitude (e.g., to be prepared to incur mortal
enmities rather than forsake justice, or purity, or religion).

(b) Its Utility.--Fortitude has a certain general utility, for it is
found to be of advantage everywhere. Thus, brave men and just men are
admired in peace as well as in war, whereas liberal men are serviceable
only in certain matters (Aristotle). Fortitude is like a strong tower,
or like an army that protects the other virtues, and there are
continual demands for its exercise. The life of man is a warfare (Job,
vii. 1), and a manly spirit is needed to struggle against the
temptations, injuries, infirmities, and trials that threaten virtue.
Without fortitude, then, no one can be saved, for the kingdom of heaven
is captured only by the aggressive (Matt., xi. 12), and only those who
fight shall receive the crown (II Tim., ii. 5).

2442. Martyrdom.--As judgment is the chief act of justice (see 1727),
so martyrdom is the chief act of fortitude, and in a sense the most
perfect of all acts. For martyrdom is defined as “the voluntary
acceptance for the sake of God of a violent death inflicted out of
hatred of virtue.” Martyrdom belongs to fortitude which produces it, to
love of God which commands it (I Cor., xiii. 13), and to faith which
attracts it. Merely as an act of courage, it is inferior to some other
acts, since fortitude is not the highest virtue, and the goods for
which martyrdom is undergone must be preferable to martyrdom itself.
But in two ways martyrdom is the greatest act of virtue.

(a) Thus, internally it has charity for its end, and “greater love than
this no man hath, that a man lay down his life for his friends” (John,
xv. 13); it is the greatest sign of love of God.

(b) Externally it is a profession of faith in the superiority of the
invisible and future to the visible and present goods, and no more
efficacious proof of this faith can be given than martyrdom (Job, ii.
4; II Cor., iv. 11).

2443. Kinds of Martyrdom.--The word martyrdom is sometimes used loosely
or less accurately, and hence we distinguish the following kinds of
martyrdom:

(a) false martyrdom is death suffered in an evil cause, as when one
dies for erroneous principles or doctrines (e.g., for anarchy),
Martyrdom is testimony of blood given to the truth, not to error, and
hence it is not the suffering but the cause that makes the martyr.
Improper martyrdom is death suffered for some purely natural good, as
when a person dies for the cause of science or of a political party, or
in defense of natural truths about God but without a religious motive;

(b) true and proper martyrdom, which is not the virtue but the crown of
martyrdom, is death inflicted on an infant out of hatred for Christ, as
in the case of the Holy Innocents. This is baptism of blood for
infants, as the virtue is for adults, supplying the place of baptism of
water (Matt., x. 39);

(c) the virtue of martyrdom in the sight of God (theological martyrdom)
is either in desire or in act. Martyrdom of desire, which is the wish
to die for God, may have the same essential glory as martyrdom in act,
but it lacks the accidental glory, since it does not really suffer the
trial (see 89-93). Martyrdom in act, which is external suffering for
justice’s sake, has three degrees: the lowest degree is suffering that
lacks one or other of the essential conditions (see 2444) for supreme
self-sacrifice (imperfect martyrdom), the higher degree has all the
essential conditions (perfect martyrdom), while the highest degree has
also the accidentals that are most suitable for martyrdom (complete
martyrdom);

(d) the virtue of martyrdom in the sight of the Church (canonical
martyrdom) is that which, in addition to the conditions for perfect
martyrdom, possesses also external indications sufficient to prove
their existence and character.

2444. Conditions for Martyrdom.--Since martyrdom is a virtue and the
supreme testimony, it must have the following conditions:

(a) the cause of the martyrdom must be faith (e.g., persecution because
the martyr is a Catholic), or some virtue containing a profession of
faith, inasmuch as a divine good (e.g., chastity) or a human good
(e.g., the truth of a science, the safety of one’s country) is defended
for the sake of God;

(b) the persecutor must act from hatred of virtue, but it is not
necessary that he be an unbeliever, or that he avow his hatred of
virtue as the motive of persecution, or that he pronounce or execute
the sentence of death himself;

(c) the martyr must accept martyrdom willingly (actual or virtual
intention suffices, and perhaps also habitual); he must be free from
guilt that provoked the sentence, and must be in the state of grace or
at least repentant; he must die from a virtuous motive, not from
vainglory, despair, or other sinful reason. Some make non-resistance a
condition for what we called perfect martyrdom, while others make it a
condition for what we called complete martyrdom; according to the
former opinion the crusaders or other soldiers dying in a just war
cannot be called martyrs of religion, but according to the second
opinion they may be ranked with the martyrs;

(d) the punishment inflicted on the martyr must be death, either
instant (as in decapitation) or delayed (as in gradual starvation,
death by slow poisoning, mortal wounds, imprisonment or other
hardship), Hence, those who are not put to death, but who are tortured,
mutilated or imprisoned (e.g., St. John the Evangelist), are confessors
of the faith, but only in an imperfect sense are they martyrs. Some
believe that suffering is necessary for perfect martyrdom, and hence
that those who are put to death painlessly are not, strictly speaking,
martyrs; but others--and with better reason, it seems--deny this. Those
who are not killed (e.g., persons who die from disease contracted while
attending the sick or from austerities), or who are killed by
themselves (e.g., the Circumcellions who thought to win martyrdom by
suicide), are not martyrs (on the cases of Sts. Apollonia and Pelagia,
see 1856).

2445. Practical Questions about Martyrdom.--(a) The Desire of
Martyrdom.--A general desire for or the willingness to suffer martyrdom
if the necessity should arise is required for salvation (I John, iii.
16; Rom., x. 10). Apart from necessity, a special desire of martyrdom
is not of precept, since martyrdom is an act of perfection; but such a
desire is of counsel, since it is encouraged by Christ (I Peter, ii.
21), and many Saints have prayed for martyrdom.

(b) The Choice of Martyrdom.--Regularly it is not lawful to offer
oneself freely for martyrdom, for to do so gives the tyrant an occasion
of committing injustice, and as a rule there are not sufficient reasons
of public or private good for permitting his sin (see 103 sqq.).
Exceptionally it is lawful, when there is no danger that one will be
overcome and there are urgent reasons for the act, such as the glory of
God or the peace of the faithful.

(c) Provocation of Martyrdom.--Regularly it is not lawful to bring on a
persecution by aggression (e.g., by destroying idols), since generally
this will make one guilty of complicity and presumption. But there are
exceptional cases, when the good of souls demands attack on evils
(Dan., xiv. 26; Matt., xiv. 3, 4). It is not provocation of
persecution, however, to live virtuously (Tob., ii. 8, 9), or to
reprove a persecutor after one has been apprehended (II Mach., viii.
15-17; Acts, vii. 51-54).

(d) Flight from Martyrdom.--Flight is sometimes sinful, sometimes
obligatory, sometimes optional, according to circumstances, as was
explained in 1005, 1006.

2446. Sins Opposed to Fortitude.--(a) Number.--The vices opposed to
fortitude are four, two of excess and two of defect, according as fear
and confidence are not regulated as to time, place, manner and other
circumstances in the way of moderation. He who fears when or as he
should not, is timorous (e.g., one who kills himself because he fears
the hardships of life, one who neglects religion out of human respect);
he who does not fear when or as he should, is insensible (e.g., one who
exposes himself to peril of death for the sake of excitement). He who
does not dare when or as he should, is cowardly (e.g., a superior who
does not correct as he should); he who dares when or as he should not,
is foolhardy (e.g., a superior who corrects when there is no chance of
a good result).

(b) Malice.--These sins _per se_ are venial, since excess or defect in
emotions, which in themselves are indifferent, is not a serious
disorder. But they become mortal if they lead to grave evil (e.g., if
from fear of persecution one becomes a pagan), or to grave danger
(e.g., if from foolhardiness one exposes oneself to death or
mutilation). Insensibility and foolhardiness are caused by pride or
vainglory, by contempt for life or for the strength of others. Timidity
and cowardice diminish culpability, though they do not remove it.

2447. The Parts of Fortitude.--As has been said above, the parts of a
virtue are subjective, integral and potential (see 1635, 1636).

(a) Fortitude has no subjective parts, for it is concerned with a very
specialized matter, namely, the danger of death; and hence there is no
room for differences of kind, although there are differences of degree
(e.g., greater courage is needed to face an ignominious or cruel death
than to face death amid applause or with little suffering).

(b) The integral parts of fortitude are those that are necessary for
the perfect functioning of its offices in reference to major dangers
(i.e., of death). Now, the first act of fortitude, namely, attack,
requires greatness of soul (which makes one love the best things and
despise all that is opposed to them) and greatness of deed (which makes
one perform generously what was nobly willed). The second act of
fortitude, namely, endurance, requires patience (that the soul be not
thrown into dejection by difficulties) and steadfastness (that the soul
be not turned aside from its purpose or wearied by long-continued
opposition).

(c) The potential parts of fortitude are the four just named, but as
exercised in reference to minor dangers.

2448. Greatness of Soul.--Greatness of soul or nobility (Latin,
_magnanimitas_) is a virtue that inclines one to aspire after
excellence in things most honorable, but to esteem and use honors
themselves with moderation.

(a) The first act of this virtue is aspiration. It desires the higher
manifestations of every virtue--the things that are more difficult and
that befit a generous and elevated spirit, such as great austerity,
great labor, great sacrifice, etc. Thus, it resembles fortitude, for
both virtues are exercised in difficult circumstances.

(b) The second act of this virtue is moderation. It esteems honors at
their true worth, for it is greatly concerned to possess the higher
honors (i.e., good repute before God and godly men), knowing that these
are solid and lasting, but it is less concerned about lower honors
(i.e., the esteem and applause of the world), knowing that these are
frail, fleeting, and common to good and bad alike. Hence, the great of
soul are not elated in prosperity or dejected in adversity. This virtue
here differs from fortitude, since fortitude is concerned with dangers,
which are unpleasant, while greatness of soul is occupied with honors
which are pleasant.

2449. Comparison between Greatness of Soul and Humility.--Greatness of
soul and humility are different, but not contrary.

(a) Thus, greatness of soul makes one regard oneself as worthy of great
things, when one is indeed worthy of them on account of gifts bestowed
by God (Luke, i. 46). Hence, the great of soul put the good above the
profitable, they do not busy themselves unduly about lesser things,
they are slow to ask and quick to grant favors, they are not outdone in
generosity, they are not subservient before the mighty, and they are
familiar only with friends. But if they are truly great of soul, they
are also humble, knowing that the good is from God, and that of
themselves they are weak and sinful.

(b) Greatness of soul makes one regard oneself as superior to lower
things, for it makes one loathe anything that would be unbecoming the
gifts one has received from God. Hence, as St. Thomas says, the noble
character does not flaunt his ideals, nor obtrude himself into places
or offices of honor; he does not complain or remember injuries; he is
not haughty with inferiors but gentle and considerate with all; in
manner he is quiet and unhurried, speaks sincerely, and is not much
given either to praise or to blame others. But though the noble person
despises all that is petty, he is not proud; and hence he can see the
good that is in others, and he reveres those who are superior to
himself.

2450. Vices Opposed to Greatness of Soul by Excess.--The vices opposed
to greatness of soul by excess are such as desire great deeds, or
honors, or fame, when or where or how they should not be desired.

(a) Excessive desire of great deeds is presumption, which attempts to
do greater things than one is able to perform (cfr. 1075 sqq.), This
happens in conceited persons who overestimate their own abilities,
taking on themselves offices for which they are incompetent or
exercising powers for which they have no authority; also in vulgar
persons who mistake their fortuitous advantages, such as wealth or
influence or birth, for character and ability. Presumption is a mortal
sin when its cause is a grave sin (e.g., lack of faith) or when its
effects are very harmful (e.g., when one who is ignorant presumes to
teach or practise medicine, when one who is morally frail presumes to
enter occasions of sin). There is no sin if one attempts too much in
good faith and from inculpable ignorance.

(b) Excessive desire of honors (see 2010, 2011, 2351) is ambition, or
an inordinate hankering after distinctions and deference. The great of
soul desire honors when these are due to their station or when there is
a just reason, such as the glory of God or the advantage of the
neighbor (Matt., v. 15, 16; Heb., v. 4). The ambitious, on the contrary,
seek to be honored beyond their deserts (e.g., when an ignorant man
longs for academic degrees, a tyrant wishes to be respected on account
of his tyranny, an inferior man seeks to perpetuate himself in
temporary elective offices, a rich man or athletic hero expects that he
will be revered above those who are eminent for virtue or learning), or
they seek honor for its own or their own sake, like the Pharisees who
loved the first places at feasts and the first chairs in the
synagogues, and salutations in the market place, and to be called by
men Rabbi (Matt., xxiii. 7; cfr. I Tim., iii. 1 sqq.; Matt., xx. 25).
This sin, being excessive desire of something indifferent, is not _per
se_ mortal; but it is made mortal either by a cause that is seriously
sinful (e.g., if one’s whole life is but a mad chase for preferments)
or by a result that is seriously harmful (e.g., if one commits or is
ready to commit serious injustice or uncharitableness to win a coveted
dignity). Ambition is cured chiefly by charity, for charity is not
ambitious (I Cor., xiii. 5; cfr. Gal., v. 13).

(c) Excessive desire of praise or celebrity is vanity (see 2028, 2269).
The great of soul desire the good opinion of their fellow-men (see 1575
sqq.), but they also desire that their good reputation be well founded,
and their motive is the glory of God or the spiritual profit of man.
The vain, on the contrary, are eager for admiration and praise for
which there is no justification (e.g., those who wish to be praised for
virtues they do not possess) or which are valueless (e.g., those who
fish for compliments over things of no great importance, such as good
looks or dress, or who wish to appear learned among the uneducated, or
who crave notoriety), or seek admiration without a proper motive (e.g.,
those who advertise themselves for self-glorification alone). Vanity,
like ambition, is _per se_ only a venial sin, but it becomes mortal on
account of its cause (e.g., when the motive is to conceal crimes that
are planned), or its results (e.g., when the desire to be famous makes
one boast of one’s crimes, or refuse to repair injuries done to others,
or neglect the honor of God), or its matter (e.g., when one is vain
about a reputation for skillful injustice). Vanity is one of the
capital sins (see 268 sqq.), since it is one of the motives that
chiefly lead men into sin; for all desire excellence, and in
consequence the love of renown is one of the chief incentives to
action. Even the ambitious crave honors because of the glory honors
bring. The offspring of vanity includes the sins by which a man seeks
unlawfully to show off his good points, or to prove that he is not
inferior and thus capture popularity or glory. In the first class are
the publication by word or deed of one’s own true or pretended exploits
(boasting hypocrisy), the cultivation of novelties and eccentricities
designed to attract attention (such as singularity in opinion, in
pronunciation, in dress, etc.). In the latter class are sins of
intellect which make one hold obstinately to one’s views
(stubbornness), sins of will which make one resist desires of others
(discord), sins of word which make one loudly dispute (contention),
sins of deed which make one refuse to yield to authority (disobedience).

2451. Vice Opposed to Greatness of Soul by Defect.--The sin opposed to
greatness of soul by defect is pusillanimity (littleness of soul),
which does not desire great things when one should desire them.

(a) Pusillanimity is sinful, because it excludes nobility of soul,
springs from a lazy ignorance of one’s own ability and worth and from a
false fear of failure, and leads to the loss of great things that could
be done for God and humanity. The Scriptures reprove Jonas, who fled
from the great task set for him by God (Jonas, i. 1 sqq.), and the
fearful servant who hid his talent in a napkin (Matt, xxv. 24 sqq.).
Pusillanimity is not to be confused, therefore, with humility; for
humility excludes the unreasonable or immoderate desire of excellence,
whereas pusillanimity represses even that desire of greatness which is
reasonable and moderate. Indeed, meanness of spirit may be associated
with pride on account of obstinate refusal to take upon oneself what is
commanded (Prov., xxvi. 16). Thus, Moses and Jeremias showed humility
by their fears of unworthiness (Exod, iii. 11; Jerem., i. 6), but they
would have sinned by pusillanimity, and also by pride, had they held
out against God’s charge to them.

(b) Pusillanimity is _per se_ a venial sin (see 2450), but it may
become mortal on account of its matter or consequences, as when one is
so self-depreciative as to neglect grave obligations of correcting
abuses. It is essentially more evil than presumption, for it turns one
away from things and pursuits that are noble, and is thus more opposed
to greatness of soul; but radically presumption is more evil, as it
springs from pride (Ecclus., xxxvii. 3). The dread of attempting great
deeds or pursuits is sometimes no sin at all, as when it is due to
inculpable ignorance of what one can do or what one deserves, or from a
fear that overpowers judgment, or from bodily disease, or from a sense
of inferiority caused by education, excessive repression and habit
(Col., iii. 21).

2452. Greatness of Deed.--Greatness of deed is the execution of the
great things to which one is inclined by greatness of soul.

(a) The virtue is a general one, if it includes every kind of noble
performance; it is a special one, if restricted to princely generosity
in the expenditure of large sums for great works (virtue of
magnificence or munificence). The munificent person spends large sums
from his purse in behalf of the worship of God (e.g., in building
churches, monasteries, etc.), and for the common good (e.g., in
founding schools, in endowing educational institutions, hospitals,
etc.). This virtue resembles fortitude by the grandeur of its
accomplishment; it falls short of fortitude, since it deals not with
sacrifice of self but with sacrifice of goods. The Maecenases and the
generous patrons of religion are among the greatest benefactors of
humanity, for without them the best things would often languish for
want of support.

(b) The vices opposed to this virtue are meanness by deficiency and
vulgarity by excess. The mean man is unable to do things on a great
scale, and prefers to ruin a noble work rather than make the proper
outlay (e.g., after planning a beautiful church, he will spoil it by
using cheap materials). The vulgar man, on the contrary, is avid for
ostentation, or heavy expenditure when there is no call for it. He is
liberal to works of less importance (e.g., his own usual personal needs
or comforts), but penurious with works of great importance (e.g.,
charitable causes); or he lavishes money needlessly on great works, as
when his residence is over-ornamented and offensive to good taste, or
when his wedding breakfast is served with profuse extravagance and
waste in order to make a display of wealth. _Per se_, these sins are
venial, but they may be mortal on account of circumstances. Munificence
is the virtue of the rich, but even the poor may have the merit of this
virtue, by a good intention, especially when they show liberality to
great enterprises according to their means.

2453. Patience.--Patience is a virtue which from the love of moderation
so controls the sadness caused by present afflictions that this passion
neither excessively disturbs the internal powers of the soul nor
produces anything inordinate in the external conduct. Hence it differs
from the following:

(a) from temperance, for, although temperance also regulates sadness,
the sadness with which it deals is caused by lack of pleasures, while
that with which patience deals is caused by the presence of evils,
especially of those brought on by annoyances from others;

(b) from the endurance of fortitude, for fortitude regulates fear of
death, while patience regulates sadness caused by evils of whatever
nature, such as sickness, bereavements, loss of money, persecution;

(c) from longsuffering and constancy, for the matter of these virtues
is a good which cannot be obtained except by long waiting or a good
which must be continually exercised, whereas the matter of patience is
an evil that has to be endured in the present. But since the delay of a
desired good causes sadness (Prov., xiii. 12), and since continuance in
good is irksome to the flesh, both longsuffering and constancy are
included under patience.

2454. The Greatness of Patience.--(a) Its Rank.--Patience is less than
the theological virtues, and also is inferior to prudence and justice,
which perfect one in goodness; it is also less than fortitude and
temperance, which preserve from the greatest impediments to goodness;
for the office of patience is only to preserve one from lesser
impediments, namely, the common adversities of life. But, on the other
hand, patience is a part of fortitude--a potential part, because it
does not connote the supreme heroism of fortitude, and an integral
part, because courage in the face of death is bettered by the serenity
which patience imparts.

(b) Its Necessity.--Patience is a most useful virtue. Without it one
cannot long continue in the way of virtue on account of the many trials
man encounters (Heb., x. 36), whereas with it the enemies of other
virtues are destroyed; and hence it is called the root and guardian of
virtue (cfr. Rom., v. 3, 4; James, i. 2-4; Luke, xxi. 19). But there
are degrees of patience: the lowest is equanimity, which offends God
neither in thought, word nor deed even though sorely tried (Job, ii.
7-10); a higher degree is submission, which prefers adversity to
prosperity (Ps. cxviii. 71); the highest degree is joyful resignation,
which smiles at grief and rejoices in tribulation (II Cor., xii. 10,
vii. 4).

2455. The Vices Opposed to Patience.--(a) The sin of deficiency in
sorrow is stolidity, which is a brutal insensibility that is moved
neither by one’s own nor by others’ misfortunes. This is not a virtue,
but an inhuman and unnatural way of life, which takes no account of man
as a feeling as well as a reasoning being.

(b) The sin of excess in sorrow is impatience, which mourns excessively
under afflictions, or in looks, words or deeds expresses a complaining
and rebellious spirit (Prov. xiv. 17; Judith, viii. 24, 25). Stolidity
and impatience are _per se_ venial sins, but they become mortal _per
accidens_ on account of some circumstance, as when the unfeeling man
gives great scandal by his hardhearted acts, or the impatient man
blasphemes (see 2450, 2451).

2456. Steadfastness.--Steadfastness is a virtue which is so devoted to
the goodness of continuing in the right that it is not fatigued by the
length of time or the repeated effort required for a good work (virtue
of persistence or perseverance), nor disheartened by the opposition
which a good work encounters (virtue of manliness or constancy), but
goes on unmoved until the conclusion which right reason calls for has
been arrived at.

(a) The Virtue.--Steadfastness belongs to fortitude, since the essence
of both is a struggle against difficulty; but steadfastness is the
inferior, since it is nobler and more heroic to be undismayed by the
peril of death than to be unconquered by strain of monotony or
opposition. Steadfastness is a most important virtue, for it avails one
little to begin a work well if it is not carried to a successful
conclusion. Without it one puts hand to the plow but looks back (Luke,
ix. 62), or begins to build but does not finish (Like, xiv. 30); with
it the work begun is crowned, the harvest will be reaped (Gal., vi. 9,
10), and salvation secured (Matt., x. 22). Scripture abounds with
exhortations to steadfastness (I Cor., xv. 58; Phil., iv. i; II Tim.,
iii. 13; Ecclus., xi. 21, 22, v. 12; John, viii. 31; Heb., xii. 7); but
final perseverance is a special gift of God (I Peter, v. 10).

(b) The Opposite Vices.--Opposed to steadfastness by deficiency is the
vice of effeminacy or weakness, by excess the vice of pertinacity. The
effeminate person, lacking stamina to go on in a necessary good,
surrenders to weariness or opposition by abandoning the undertaking or
by taking up with evil (Matt., xi. 7, 8). The pertinacious person
continues in the course he has begun when right reason bids him to
discontinue, as when one has taken a vow and does not wish to accept
the dispensation which a change of circumstances necessitates. These
sins are venial unless they go counter to a grave duty, as when an
effeminate person gives up the resolution to avoid a very dangerous
occasion of sin, or the headstrong person determines to fast during the
remainder of Lent when this will seriously injure his health.

2457. The Complements of Fortitude.--We shall now speak of the Gift,
the Beatitude, and the Fruits that correspond to fortitude (see 159 and
2433).

(a) The Gift of Fortitude is an infused habit which makes the
appetitive powers readily responsive to the encouragement of the Holy
Spirit and filled with a courage that is more than human. Thus, the
Gift of Fortitude supplies for what is wanting in the virtue of
fortitude. The virtue is regulated by the rules and measure of human
prudence, but the Gift is inspired by the presence and command of the
Holy Spirit Himself (Ps. xliii. 4, xvii. 2, 3); the virtue strengthens
the soul, but the Gift supports even the weakness of the flesh, for the
Spirit helpeth our infirmity (Rom., viii. 26; cfr. Luke, xxii. 43); the
virtue aids one against the perils of death, but the Gift strengthens
in difficulties both of life and death, reinforcing not only courage
but also the allied virtues, greatness of soul, munificence, patience
and perseverance, for we can do all things in Him that strengthens us
(Phil., iv. 13); the virtue gives firm resolution to adhere to the
right in spite of death itself, but the Gift adds the unshaken
confidence that one shall surmount every difficulty and win the crown
of victory (Rom., viii. 31 sqq.).

(b) The Beatitude which is the special exercise of the Gift of
Fortitude is the eighth: “Blessed are they that suffer persecution for
justice’s sake, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven” (Matt, v 10). The
Gift of Fortitude makes the persecuted feel a great confidence and
security in the midst of the struggle, and this is a foretaste of the
copious, exceeding and eternal reward that follows this Gift (Gen., xv.
1; Rom., viii. 18; II Cor., iv. 17; Ps. xciii. 19; II Cor., i, 1).
Others assign to this Gift the Beatitudes of the meek and of those who
hunger and thirst for holiness.

(c) The Fruits that are most appropriate here are patience in bearing
evil and longsuffering in awaiting or performing good; for these are
acts that add a finish of maturity to fortitude (see 2447, 2454, 2456),
and in their most excellent state (see 2454) the performance of them is
no longer bitter but sweet.

2458. The Commandments of Fortitude.--(a) Fortitude itself is commanded
both in the Old and the New Testament. In the Old Testament are found
precepts of bravery in bodily warfare, as in Deut. xx. 3: “Hear, O
Israel, you join battle this day against your enemies. Let not your
heart be dismayed, be not afraid, do not give back, fear ye them not.”
The New Law commands courage before spiritual foes; “Your adversary the
devil goeth about like a roaring lion, seeking whom he may devour, whom
resist ye strong in faith” (I Peter, v. 8); “Resist the devil and he
will fly from you” (James, iv. 7); “Fight the good fight” (I Tim., vi.
12). It also commands fortitude in the presence of corporal dangers:
“Fear not them that kill the body, but cannot kill the soul” (Matt., x.
28).

(b) The annexed virtues are counselled when (as is the case with
greatness of soul and munificence) they incline to the excellent and
superabundant; they are commanded when (as in the case of patience and
perseverance) they are necessitated by normal conditions of earthly
existence. Greatness of soul is recommended in the invitations to be
perfect (Matt., v. 48), to love God more ardently (see 1560) and to
follow the counsels (see 364 sqq.), and in the praise bestowed on the
excellent virtue of Noe (Gen., vi. 9), of John the Baptist (Matt., xi.
11), and of Mary Magdalene (Luke x. 42). Munificence is recommended in
the eulogies of Solomon (Ecclus., xlvii. 20), of Magdalene (Mark, xiv.
9) and of Joseph of Arimathea (Luke, xxiii. 50 ff.). Patience is
commanded in Luke, xxi. 19 (In patience possess your souls), and in
Rom., xxii. 12 (Be patient in tribulation); perseverance in Ecclus.,
ii. 4 (In sorrow endure), in Matt., x. 22 (He that perseveres to the
end shall be saved), in I Cor., xv. 58 (Be steadfast and unmovable) and
in Heb. xxi. 7 (Persevere under discipline).

2459. Obligation of the Precepts of Fortitude and Annexed Virtues.--(a)
The precepts of fortitude are negative or prohibitory, and therefore it
is obligatory at all times to omit what they forbid (see 371). It is
never lawful to be timorous, insensible, cowardly, or foolhardy--to do
anything intrinsically wrong, even to escape death (see 317, 318). But
it is not necessary to sacrifice life for the fulfillment of an
affirmative precept, unless injury to God or the common safety, or an
extreme spiritual loss to self will otherwise result (see 317, 818,
361).

(b) The precepts of patience and perseverance are also negative, and
hence it is never lawful to be guilty of stolidity, impatience,
effeminacy or stubbornness. But since patience and perseverance are not
so difficult as fortitude, they have also affirmative precepts. These
latter laws oblige always, but not for every occasion (see 371). Thus,
one must be always willing to exercise patience, but one who is spared
trials has not the occasion to exercise the virtue. Patience itself
never ceases to be a virtue, but there is a pseudo-patience which
consists in toleration of evils that should not be tolerated, and which
is not a virtue but a kind of supineness or spinelessness that pertains
to effeminacy rather than to patience.

2460. Subjects of Fortitude.--(a) Laws have universal extension, and
hence it would not be true to say that active fortitude is a masculine,
passive fortitude or patience a feminine virtue. But greater courage is
expected in some than in others on account of greater strength (e.g.,
the adult, the physically well) or greater necessity (as in soldiers,
policemen, firemen, pastors, physicians, rulers).

(b) The counsel of munificence, however, is only for the rich as
regards exercise, since others have not the means wherewith to exercise
this virtue.




Art. 8: THE VIRTUE OF TEMPERANCE

(_Summa Theologica_, II-II, qq. 141-170.)

2461. Definition of Temperance.--Temperance is a moral virtue which
regulates according to reason the gratification of the lower pleasures
and desires of sense.

(a) It moderates pleasure and desire, and in consequence also the
sadness caused by the absence of pleasure. Just as a special virtue
(fortitude) is needed to check the strongest of the repelled emotions
(fear of death), so likewise a special virtue (temperance) is necessary
to bridle the most vehement of the attracted emotions (pleasure and
desire).

(b) It moderates sensible pleasure, that is, satisfactions derived from
the use of the external senses--sight, hearing, smell, taste, and
touch. Spiritual pleasures, which are derived from the loftier powers
of intellect, will and imagination (e.g., from the study of theology,
the reading of classical literature, the meeting of mother and child or
of friend and friend), have no opposition to reason, except
accidentally when a still higher activity which should be exercised is
impeded by them. Some of these (such as the pleasures of the intellect)
may be called purely spiritual, since they make little or no impression
on the sensible appetite; others, on the contrary (such as the
pleasures of the will), may be called mixed pleasures, since at times
they vehemently excite the sensitive appetite and powerfully affect the
body (e.g., mothers have been known to die of joy at the return of a
child who was thought to be dead).

(c) Temperance moderates the lower sensible pleasures, that is, the
satisfactions caused primarily by touch and taste, and secondarily by
other senses, in the activities necessary for preservation of the
individual (eating and drinking) and of the race (sexual intercourse).
These passions are called the lower, animal, or carnal pleasures, since
they are common to man and beast, and are strongly rebellious against
reason. The special virtue of temperance is necessary, then, to make
man follow reason, not Bacchus or Venus. The higher sensible pleasures,
on the other hand, are produced by a sensible object, not on account of
any relation to venereal or gustatory delight, but on account of a
perfection in the object that makes it suitable to the sense (e.g., the
enjoyment derived from beautiful scenery, classical music, fragrant
roses, or downy or velvety cloth). The esthete or the connoisseur
obtains from these agreeable sensations a pleasure unknown to the
animals, and one that is not from its nature refractory to reason nor
seductive to carnal excess. Hence, these higher sensual pleasures are
not gross, but refined; they should be moderated by prudence, but they
are not so dangerous as to demand a special virtue, like temperance,
for their regulation. Neither should we class with carnal pleasures the
joys of physical well-being, such as the refreshment of sleep, the
exhilaration of a sea bath or of a massage, the comfort of a balmy
breeze, the ease of strength, or the relaxation of exercise.

2462. The Rule of Moderation.--The rule of moderation which temperance
imposes on the carnal appetites is this: “Indulge only as necessity
requires and duty allows.” For pleasure is a means whose end is some
reasonable need of life, and it is therefore a perversion to make
pleasure an end by indulging it apart from need and duty (see 85). But
necessity is to be understood broadly, so as to include not only the
essentials, but also the conveniences of life (e.g., seasonings and
desserts with food).

(a) As to venereal pleasures, then, the rule means that they should not
be used outside matrimony, nor in matrimony except for the procreation
of children and the other lawful ends of marriage.

(b) As to the pleasures of the table, they should not be indulged
except for the benefit of mind and body, and in such manner, quantity,
quality, etc., as this purpose requires. But one may regulate one’s
food or drink by the higher purpose of mortification, and partake of
less than the body demands here and now.

2463. The Excellence of Temperance.--(a) Temperance is among the four
principal or cardinal virtues. It keeps in order one of the passions
that is most natural and most necessary for the present life, and among
the virtues it excels in the quality of moderation, since it chastens
the inclination that is hardest to hold within bounds, and guards the
senses, the gateways of the soul (see 2441). “Wisdom teaches
temperance, prudence, justice and fortitude, than which there is
nothing more useful in life” (Wis., viii. 7).

(b) In its nature temperance is not the chief but the least of the
moral virtues. For justice and bravery are of greater service to the
common welfare, and the good of the multitude, as Aristotle remarks, is
more divine than the good of the individual. But in accidental respects
temperance has a superiority; for it is more tender and graceful than
fortitude, more arduous than justice, and there is perhaps no other
virtue whose exercise is so constantly called for.

2464. The Vices Opposed to Temperance.--(a) The vice of deficiency has
been called insensibility, and consists in an unreasonable dislike of
the inferior sensible pleasures, which makes one unwilling to use them
when and as reason commands. Thus, the Stoics and Manichees believed
that material joys are intrinsically evil, and there have been
fanatical advocates of teetotalism (e.g., the Aquarians) and of purity
(e.g., the Puritans who would not permit a man to kiss his wife on
Sunday, the prudish and censorious who fear or suspect evil without
reason, the Pharisees who think they are defiled if a sinner speaks to
them, the misogynists who disapprove of marriage). The sin is venial
_per se_, since it does not submit to passion; but it may be mortal on
account of some circumstance, as when the marriage debt is unjustly
refused or necessary nourishment is not taken. This vice is rarer than
its opposite, and it must not be confused with austerity, which for the
sake of a spiritual good foregoes some lawful but unnecessary sensible
enjoyment.

(b) The vice of excess is immoderation, which includes gluttony and
impurity. This is the most disgraceful of sins, because the most
unworthy of a rational being; it enslaves man to pleasures of which the
lower animals are capable; unlike other vices, it contains in itself
nothing of intelligence, industry, generosity, and nothing that would
at all liken it to virtue. The lowest depths of degradation are reached
when immoderation is brutish even in its manner, as when one is
gluttonous of human flesh or desirous of sodomitic pleasure.
Immoderation is called by Aristotle a “childish sin,” because, as a
child is eager for pleasures and will follow them unduly unless
instructed and trained, so also an immoderate person thinks only of his
appetite, and will go from bad to worse unless he accepts the
discipline of reason. But the child is excusable, while the immoderate
man should know better. Immoderation is worse than timidity; for, while
the former seeks selfish delight and acts with willing unrestraint, the
latter seeks self-preservation and is under some external menace.

2465. The Parts of Temperance.--(a) The subjective parts or species of
temperance are two, since there are two distinct objects of the virtue.
These objects are the two delights of touch that are ruled by the
virtue, namely, those associated with the nutritive and those
associated with the generative function. The first subjective part of
temperance includes abstemiousness as to food and sobriety as to drink;
the second part includes chastity, as regards the principal sexual act
(copulation), and decency or pudicity, as regards the secondary acts
(kisses, touches, embraces, etc).

(b) The integral parts are also two, since there are two conditions for
the perfect exercise of temperance. These conditions are the fear and
avoidance of what is disgraceful (shamefacedness, reserve, or delicacy)
and the love of what is honorable (virtue of propriety or refinement).
Shamefacedness is a passion, but, as physical fearlessness is a
disposition for moral courage, so is the fear of incurring reproach a
preparation for virtue. Hence, this delicacy is a laudable passion, and
is ascribed chiefly to temperance, whose opposite is chief among things
disgraceful. Propriety is also assigned to temperance, because it is an
attraction towards that which is spiritually good and beautiful, a
habit most useful for temperance, which must subordinate the delightful
to the good, the carnal to the spiritual.

(c) The potential parts of temperance are its minor or servant virtues.
They resemble temperance inasmuch as their chief praise is in
moderation, but they are inferior to it inasmuch as that which is
moderated by them is less recalcitrant than the sexual or gustatory
appetites. First among these potential parts are those whose task of
moderating, while not of the greatest difficulty, is yet more than
ordinarily difficult; and here we have continence, which calms a will
agitated by immoderate passion, and meekness, which governs the passion
of anger. Next among the potential parts are those whose task of
moderating offers less or ordinary difficulty, because they keep in
order matters less removed from reason. All the virtues of this second
group are given the common name of modesty. They are reduced to four:
humility and studiosity, which moderate the internal appetites of
excellence and of learning respectively; modesty of bearing and modesty
of living, which regulate respectively the external acts of the body
and the external goods of food, drink, clothing, furnishings, etc.

2466. Abstemiousness.--Abstemiousness is a virtue that moderates
according to reason the desire and enjoyment of the pleasures of the
table.

(a) It is a special virtue, because the appetite it curbs is very
powerful, and on account of the body’s need of nourishment is often
tempted.

(b) It moderates by avoiding both defect and excess in meals as to
time, place, quantity, quality, etc. There is not, then, one standard
amount of food for all, since the needs and duties of all are not the
same, and hence he who takes more or less than is normal or usual
cannot from that alone be accused of being unabstemious. Neither is the
mean for an individual so rigidly fixed as not to permit some latitude
within certain limits. It should be noted here too that abstemiousness
is not the same thing as abstinence. Thus, a person who is immoderately
abstinent, denying himself the food necessary for life or for duty or
for optional works better than his abstinence, is not abstemious, since
he is not guided by prudence or obligation.

(c) It moderates according to reason; that is, it decides what is
proper for an individual, not merely from the viewpoint of bodily
health, vigor, and longevity, as is done by the arts of medicine and
hygiene, but also and chiefly from the viewpoints of higher goods, such
as mental power, control of passion, austerity.

(d) It moderates the pleasures of the table, that is, the desire for
and actual enjoyment of food and non-intoxicating beverages. Moderation
in intoxicants is the special virtue of sobriety, which will be
discussed later. Hence, a person who drinks too much ginger ale or
water, tea or coffee, sins against abstemiousness; he who drinks too
much whisky, beer, or wine sins against sobriety.

2467. Degrees of Abstemiousness.--(a) The lower degree practises
temperance, taking sufficient food and drink for the preservation, not
only of life and health, but also of the very pink of physical
condition, yet so as to avoid all excess.

(b) The higher degree practises austerity, taking less than is
necessary for the best condition, or strength or comfort of the body,
but sufficient for life and health. The austere person eats less than
he could reasonably take, but not less than his health and work demand.
The subtraction he makes in his food will more likely benefit his
health in the long run and promote longevity, for, in the wise words of
old Galen, “abstemiousness is the best medicine.” But even though this
austerity be slightly detrimental to health, or may slightly abbreviate
life, it is still lawful, since the higher goods of the mind and of
virtue may always be secured at such reasonable sacrifice of corporal
goods (see 1164 sqq., 1561 sqq.).

2468. Austerity.--The two chief forms of austerity in food and drink
are fasting and abstinence.

(a) Nature.--The natural fast is the omission of all eating and
drinking, or the omission to receive into the stomach anything whatever
that has the nature of food, drink or medicine. The moral fast is the
omission to take a certain quantity of food that could be taken without
intemperance. Abstinence is the omission to take a certain quality of
food, such as meat or eggs.

(b) Kinds.--Fast and abstinence are in respect to duration either
perpetual (e.g., the abstinence from meat of the Carthusians) or
temporary (e.g., the abstinence for Fridays and other appointed days of
the faithful generally); either voluntary (e.g., a fast which one
assumes under private vow) or obligatory (e.g., the fasts and
abstinences prescribed in the general or particular laws of the
Church). The ecclesiastical fast and abstinence will be spoken of later
when we treat of the precepts of the Church and Holy Communion.

2469. The Excellence of Fasting and Abstinence.--(a)
Lawfulness.--Fasting and abstinence are acts of virtue, for they subdue
the unruly flesh, fit the mind for divine contemplation (Dan, x. 3
sqq.), satisfy for sins (Joel, ii. 12), and add weight to prayers
(Tob., xii. 8; Judith, iv. 11; Matt., xvii. 20). The greatest men of
the Old and New Testaments practised fasting--Moses, Samson, Elias,
John the Baptist, and St. Paul. Our Lord Himself fasted forty days and
forty nights (Matt, iv. 2). St. Paul, therefore, numbers fasting with
other virtues: “In fastings, in knowledge, in chastity” (II Cor., vi.
5). Examples of abstinence are Daniel avoiding meat (Dan, i. 8 sqq.)
and Eleazar who died rather than eat forbidden swine flesh (II Mach.,
vi. 18 sqq.). Abstention from solid or liquid nourishment is not a
virtue, however, if practised from purely indifferent or evil motives,
for example, merely in order to recover health through diet, or to
train for an athletic contest, or to preserve shape and beauty, or to
commit suicide, or to simulate virtue, or to profess false doctrines or
if carried to extremes. The forty-day fasts of Moses, Elias and of Our
Lord are for our admiration, but very few are able to imitate these
examples.

(b) Obligation.--Fasting and abstinence in general are obligatory under
natural law, because without them certain necessary ends cannot be
obtained. They are remedies for past sins and preservatives against
future sins; and, as sin is the common state of man (James, iii. 2;
Gal., v. 17), it would be presumptuous to neglect these antidotes.
Under the positive law fasting and abstinence have been prescribed in
detail, and this was necessary since it is the duty of the Church to
determine the time, manner and other circumstances of natural duties of
religion which the natural law itself has not determined.

2470. The Sins Opposed to Abstemiousness.--(a) The sin of deficiency in
the matter of food is self-starvation. This is the sin of those who are
martyrs to fashion, who in order to have a frail figure follow a diet
(e.g., denying oneself all substantial food to reduce obesity) that
undermines their constitutions and leaves them a prey to disease. It is
also the sin of those who from unwise zeal for rigorous fasting deprive
themselves of the necessaries of life, or eat what their stomachs rebel
against. This sin does not differ from suicide or bodily injury treated
above (see 1566 sqq., 1857 sqq.). “It is the same thing to kill
yourself by slow degrees as to kill yourself in a moment. And he who
kills himself by fasting is like one who offers God a sacrifice from
stolen property” (St. Jerome).

(b) The sin of excess in food is gluttony. There is no sin in desiring
food or in taking food with satisfaction, for the Author of nature has
willed that such an essential act as eating should be pleasurable, and
it is a fact that digestion and health suffer when food is taken
without appetite or a peaceful frame of mind. But the glutton goes to
excess by the inordinate and unreasonable enjoyment he takes in feeding
himself.

2471. Ways of Committing Gluttony.--There are many ways of committing
gluttony, but they can all be reduced to two heads.

(a) Gluttony in food is excess in the substance, quantity, or quality
of the things eaten. The gourmet is extremely fastidious about the
substance of his food; he must have the most dainty or costly or rare
viands, and nothing else will satisfy him. Cannibalism seems to be
lawful in extreme necessity, but it is not lawful to kill human beings
in order to eat them. The gorger or gourmand may not be particular
about the kind of food that is given him, but he desires a large
quantity, more than is good for him. The epicure is too hard to please
as to quality; even when there is no festal occasion, he must have a
great variety of foods and they must be most carefully prepared, so
that he may get the utmost joy of the palate. We should not class among
gluttons, however, those who require special foods or special cooking
for a good reason, as when health or hard work forces one to observe a
strict diet.

(b) Gluttony in eating is excess as to the time or manner of taking
food. There is excess about the time when a person is over-eager about
the dinner bell, eats before or oftener than he should, or lingers too
long at table. There is excess about the manner when a person eats
greedily, hurriedly, or selfishly, rushing at his food like a tiger,
bolting it like a dog, or depriving others like a pig.

2472. The Sinfulness of Gluttony.--(a) Gluttony is a mortal sin when it
is so serious as to turn man away from his end itself, making him
prefer his appetite to God. Thus, those sin gravely who are such high
livers that they are unable to pay their debts, to the serious
detriment of creditors; or who gormandize so much that they can do
little work and have to spend most of their time in exercising or
taking cures; or whose heavy eating is the occasion of serious sins of
anger, impurity, or neglect of religious or other duties. To all these
apply the words of St. Paul (Phil., iii. 19): “Whose god is their
belly.” To eat until one vomits seems to be a mortal sin, if the vomit
is caused by the enormous quantity of food consumed, for such an act
seems to be gravely opposed to reason; but there is no grave sin if the
vomit is due to the quality of the food or the weakness of the stomach.

(b) Gluttony in itself is a venial sin since it is a disorder about the
means, and not a turning away from the end. This happens when one is
inordinately fond of gastronomic joys, but is not prepared to sacrifice
grave duties for their sakes. Thus, a person who gives too much
indulgence to a sweet tooth, or who likes to stuff himself now and
then, but who doesn’t disable himself or give scandal by his weakness,
sins venially.

2473. Gluttony as a Capital Sin.--(a) The first condition of a capital
sin is that it be one of the main sources of evil attraction. This
condition is verified of gluttony, for all seek happiness, and gluttony
contains one of the ingredients of happiness, namely, pleasure in an
unusual degree. Among all sensual delights those of the palate and
stomach are admitted to be, along with those of sexual love, the most
intense. The first of the three temptations with which Satan assailed
Christ was that of gluttony (Matt., iv. 1-4).

(b) The second condition of a capital vice is that it be the final or
motive cause of a large crop of sins. This condition is also verified
in gluttony, since the greedy man is so in love with his pet vice that
in order to pamper it he is ready to suffer various kinds of evils
which he should not permit. Evils of soul that are caused by gluttony
are: heaviness in the mind, for an overloaded stomach unfits the mind
to reflect on higher things or to consider the duty of moderation in
rejoicing, in words or in acts (Ecclus., ii. 3); absurd mirth in the
will, a feeling of security and gladness and unrestraint, for the
glutton thinks only of his present contentment and does not consider
the evils of his sin; loquacity in word, for his mental faculties being
dulled and his will hilarious the glutton gives free rein to his
tongue, often sinning by detraction, betrayal of secrets, contumely,
and blasphemy (Prov., X. 19); levity in act, for the glutton wishes to
give vent to his animal spirits, and he does so by unbecoming jokes and
clownishness. Evils of body due to gluttony are dirtiness and disease:
the glutton is often filthy in his manner of eating, his breath is
fetid, he is much occupied with natural necessities, excretion and
exgurgitation, and he suffers from gout or indigestion or one of the
numerous other maladies that are the price of overindulgence.

2474. Sobriety.--Sobriety in its strictest sense is a virtue that keeps
one to the moderation of temperance in the liking for intoxicating
liquors and in their use.

(a) Thus, sobriety is concerned with intoxicants, that is, with
substances that produce a poisonous effect upon the nerves and brain.
It is, therefore, a different virtue from abstemiousness, since it has
to subdue a vice far more alluring and deleterious than gluttony.
Alcohol has the same effect as a narcotic drug, for it benumbs both
mind and body, sometimes to the point of insensibility, so that those
who are under its influence are unable to think, speak or regulate
their movements properly; but it gives a feeling of exhilaration and
elevation and leaves behind it an insatiable craving, so that those who
have once taken too much are very likely to repeat the act. Habitual
intoxication breaks down both morals and health, and the toper goes to
a disgraceful and early grave.

(b) Sobriety is concerned with liquors, that is, with beverages and
medicines. But secondarily it also controls the appetite for narcotics,
such as opium, chloroform, tobacco, and the desire to inhale strong
liquors or vapors or gases which may produce intoxication.

2475. Obligation to Practise Sobriety.--Sobriety should be cultivated
by all, but certain ones are more bound to it than others.

(a) Thus, on account of the greater physical evils of insobriety in
their regard, the virtue should be especially cultivated by the young,
the old, women, and persons of sedentary life. Young people are greatly
harmed by too much alcohol, because it stunts their growth and affects
them more seriously in mind and body than adults. The old have not the
strength to throw off the poison of too much stimulation and are
accordingly more injured. Women, being more excitable than men, are
more easily affected by strong drink, and hence among the ancient
Romans females abstained from wine. Finally, those who lead a sedentary
or indoor life do not so easily get the poison out of their systems,
and they feel the evil effects more than those who live out of doors or
who engage in manual work. But there is no constitution, however iron
it may be, that is not conquered in the end by alcoholism.

(b) On account of the greater spiritual ills that result from their
insobriety, the virtue of soberness is more imperative in certain
individuals. Thus, there are some who do greater spiritual harm to
themselves by intoxication, for example, the young, whose passions are
more easily inflamed, and females, who are more readily taken advantage
of; and hence St. Paul recommends sobriety to women and young men
particularly (I Tim., iii. 11; Tit., ii. 6). There are also some who do
greater harm to others by intoxication, such as those who should
instruct others (Tit., ii. 2), or who should give good example (I
Tim., iii. 2), or who are rulers over the people (Prov., xxxi. 4).

2476. The Sins against Sobriety.--(a) The sin of excess may be called,
for want of a special name, over-sobriety. It is committed by those who
condemn all liking for or enjoyment of intoxicants as intrinsically
evil (e.g., the Manichees, who said that wine was the gall of the
devil); also by those who deny to themselves or others intoxicants when
the use of them is necessary (e.g., the Encratites, who would allow
only water for the Eucharist, or a fanatical teetotaler who would see a
man die rather than give him a necessary dose of whisky).

(b) The sin of deficiency against sobriety is drunkenness, which is a
voluntary and unjustified loss of the use of reason brought on by the
consumption of too much intoxicating liquor. Drunkenness as a sin
(active drunkenness), therefore, is to be distinguished from
drunkenness as a condition (passive drunkenness). There is active
drunkenness or the sin of drunkenness when intoxication is both
voluntary and inexcusable; there is passive drunkenness or the mere
state of drunkenness when one or the other of these two conditions is
lacking. Usually those who sin by drunkenness seek the pleasure or
forgetfulness which potations bring, but this is not essential, it
seems, to the sin of inebriety; the malice of drunkenness is found not
merely in the excessive pleasure, but especially in the subordination
of spirit to the flesh and in the damage done to mind and body. Hence,
a person who yields to the insistence of a banquet companion that he
drink wine which is disgusting to him, is guilty of drunkenness if he
takes too much.

2477. Cases of Mere Passive Drunkenness.--(a) Involuntary
Drunkenness.--This occurs when there is invincible ignorance of fact
(e.g., when an adult becomes intoxicated in good faith, because he had
no reason to suspect that a cocktail or eggnog was very strong, or that
his stomach was very weak), or of law (e.g., when a child gets drunk
because he does not know that it is wrong to do so), or when there is
lack of intention (e.g., when drink is forced on a person who does not
want it).

(b) Excusable Drunkenness.--This occurs according to most theologians
when there is a proportionately grave reason which justifies the evil
of intoxication (see 103 sqq.). Such grave reasons are the saving of
life (e.g., to escape death from snake bite), the cure of serious
disease (e.g., cholera or influenza), the avoidance or mitigation of
severe suffering (e.g., before a surgical operation, or after a very
painful accident, or when there is no other means of helping a grave
case of insomnia). In all these cases it is generally admitted that one
may bring on unconsciousness by the use of anesthetics and sedatives
(such as chloroform, ether, morphine, opium); and there is no reason
why we should not view intoxicants also in the light of remedies which
may be taken on the advice of physicians or other competent persons if
other remedies cannot be had. Some theologians, however, refuse to
excuse intoxication for any reason, since they regard drunkenness as
intrinsically evil. In addition to the excuses just mentioned some also
give that of escape from violent death, as when a burglar threatens to
kill unless those present make themselves helpless by intoxication. But
all agree that intoxication is not excused by ordinary advantages, such
as escape from slight physical pain (e.g., toothache, seasickness), nor
by the desire to avoid what can be avoided by other and more suitable
means (e.g., worry about one’s troubles, an unpleasant meeting or
conversation).

2478. The Morality of Total Abstinence.--(a) Obligation.--_Per se_,
there is no obligation of abstaining from every or any kind of
intoxicating beverage, either perpetually or temporarily, for food and
drink were intended by God for the use of man and the moderate use of
intoxicants, especially when the percentage of alcohol is light, is
found by many to be a help to digestion, a refreshing stimulant, an
excellent tonic and remedy. The example of Our Lord, who changed water
into wine, who partook of wine at banquets, and who made wine one of
the elements of the most sacred of rites, is proof that it is not
sinful to drink strong liquors. This is also clearly taught in the
Bible, which praises moderate drinking of wine (Ecclus., xxxi 36),
recommends that a little be taken for a weak stomach (I Tim., v. 23),
and declares that it is not what enters the mouth that defiles (Matt.,
xv. 2).

But, _per accidens_, there is an obligation of total abstinence when a
greater good requires that one sacrifice intoxicants, whether the good
be of self (e.g., when intoxicants are a serious danger to one’s health
or morals, or when one is bound by vow or pledge to abstain from them)
or of another (e.g., when the use of intoxicants gives serious scandal,
Rom., xiv. 21). If the common safety is seriously imperilled through
drunkenness, and obligatory abstinence can be enforced and will be the
most reasonable method of correcting the evil, we can see no objection
to prohibition laws. But whether these conditions exist in this or that
particular place or case is a question of fact and has to be decided by
impartial study.

(b) Lawfulness.--_Per se_, it is also permissible to abstain freely
from all intoxicants, for the sake of some higher good (e.g., in order
the better to apply the mind to studies, Ecclus., ii. 3), to silence
calumnious tongues, to practise mortification, or to give good example.
But, _per accidens_, it is not lawful to abstain when law (e.g., in the
celebration of Mass) or necessity (e.g., a man dying from influenza who
cannot be saved without whiskey) requires one to drink spirits.
Examples of total abstinence are the Nazarites (Num., vi. 3), Samson
(Judges, xiii. 7), Judith (Jud., xii. 2, 19), and John the Baptist
(Luke, i. 15).

2479. Degrees of the Sin of Drunkenness.--(a) The sin of perfect or
complete drunkenness is a voluntary excess in intoxicants carried so
far that one loses temporarily the use of reason. This does not mean
that one must become insensible or fall in a stupor or be unable to
walk or have delirium tremens (dead drunk), but only that one loses the
mental power to direct oneself morally, even though one still retains
enough judgment to direct oneself physically (e.g., to cross the street
or ascend the stairs safely, or to find one’s own quarters without
help). The indications of perfect drunkenness are that the intoxicated
person no longer distinguishes between right and wrong, perpetrates
evils he would abhor in his right senses (e.g., beats his wife, runs
down a pedestrian, blasphemes, or provokes quarrels), and cannot
remember on sobering up the chief things he said or did while drunk.

(b) The sin of imperfect or incomplete drunkenness is a voluntary
excess in intoxicants carried so far that one is somewhat confused in
mind, but does not lose the use of reason. Hence, a person who is
physically impeded though not mentally incapable on account of drink,
who staggers, speaks incoherently, or sees uncertainly, but who knows
that he should not beat his wife, or kill, or blaspheme, or quarrel,
etc., is imperfectly drunk. There are also circumstances that aggravate
the evil of perfect or imperfect drunkenness. Thus, it is worse to be a
toper or habitual drunkard than to be an occasional drunkard, and worse
to go on a long spree than to be drunk only for an evening.

2480. Malice of the Sin of Drunkenness.--(a) Perfect drunkenness is a
mortal sin, because it is a grave disorder to deprive oneself of moral
judgment and thus expose oneself to the danger of perpetrating serious
crimes and injuries. Moreover, it is a monstrous thing to despoil
oneself unnecessarily of reason, the greatest natural good of man, and
to make oneself for the time being a maniac, more like a beast than a
human being. St. Paul declares that those who would put on Christ must
put away drunkenness with other works of darkness (Rom., xiii. 13), and
that drunkards shall not inherit the kingdom of God (Gal, v. 21). The
opinion that perfect drunkenness is only venial if not habitual is now
obsolete, and the opinion that perfect drunkenness is not mortal unless
it lasts a considerable time (say, more than an hour) is commonly
rejected; for the essential malice of drunkenness depends on its
nature, not on its frequency or duration. A person who takes enough to
make himself completely drunk and then escapes the consequences by
artificial means (e.g., by using a drug or bringing on a vomit), does
not sin mortally by drunkenness; but it seems that such a swinish
person must sin mortally by reason of gluttony, injury to health, or
scandal.

(b) Imperfect drunkenness is a venial sin, because the harm done is not
considerable, for a tipsy man usually suffers nothing more than a
slightly fuddled brain and some unsteadiness of body. Indeed, if wine
or beer produces nothing more than a spirit of moderate hilarity and
talkativeness, there is no sin.

Accidentally, imperfect drunkenness may be a mortal sin by reason of
circumstances, as when the person who is intoxicated gives great
scandal on account of his position or office, or when the motive is to
inflame passion or to commit other serious sin, or when the drunkenness
is constantly repeated, or when the drunkard seriously neglects his
business, family, or religious duties, or does other grave harm in
consequence of his love of the bottle. In fact, there may be grave sin
when one is not intoxicated at all, but is only a tippler. For the
habit of drinking alcoholic beverages frequently (e.g., a nip or dram
of whisky several times a day) is, according to medical authority, more
harmful to the system (alcoholism) than intoxication at long intervals,
especially if the portion is generous and the drinker is young.

2481. Drunkenness Compared with Other Sins.--(a) It is not the worst of
sins. Sins against the theological virtues are more wicked, since they
offend against divine good, whereas drunkenness is against human good.
Many sins against the moral virtues are worse, since they injure a
greater human good; for example, it is more harmful to take away life
than to suspend the use of reason.

(b) It is one of the most ruinous of sins in its consequences (see
2472, 2473): first, for society, since a large percentage of crime,
insanity, destitution, and misery is due to intemperance; secondly, to
religion, since indulgence in one sensual pleasure sharpens the
appetite for others, while creating a distaste for spiritual things,
for effort and self-sacrifice; thirdly, to the intellect, for strong
drink steals away the mind and memory; fourthly, to the body, for
drunkenness not only prostrates the nervous system at the moment and
has most painful after-effects in bursting headaches and disabled
stomach, but it also causes permanent disasters (to brain, heart,
nerves, kidneys, and liver), weakens the resistance to disease and
brings on an early death; fifthly, to goods of fortune, since drunkards
squander their all for drink; sixthly, to posterity, since intemperate
parents transmit constitutional weakness to their children.

2482. Responsibility of Drunkard for Sins Committed While
Intoxicated.--(a) If the drunkenness is fully voluntary and culpable,
he is responsible for all the sins he foresaw or should have foreseen;
for then these sins are willed in their cause (see 94 sqq.). Hence one
who is accustomed while under the influence of liquor to blaspheme,
betray secrets, quarrel, etc., should confess that he committed them
while drunk, or that he was prepared to commit them in getting drunk.
Under similar conditions one who misses Mass because he was drunk is
responsible for the omission; one who is too drunk to attend to a
business appointment and thereby causes loss to another is held to
restitution. But, if grave sins are foreseen only in a very confused
way, generally they will be imputable only as venial in themselves.

(b) If the drunkenness is fully voluntary and culpable, but the sins
that ensued were not foreseen and could not humanly have been foreseen,
the drunkard is excused at least in part from the guilt of these sins.
Hence, a person who gets drunk for the first time or who usually sleeps
after getting drunk is not responsible for the bad language he uses, if
the thought of profanity was farthest from his mind when he became
drunk. But if this person was not completely drunk and had some
realization of the malice and scandal of bad language, he is at least
venially guilty of profanity and scandal.

(c) If the drunkenness was involuntary, the drunken person is excused
entirely in case of complete drunkenness; he is excused partially in
case of incomplete drunkenness that did not exclude some realization
of the sinfulness of what he said or did while intoxicated (see Canon
2201, Sec.3). In the civil law drunkenness is not held to be an excuse
for a criminal act, but it may negative a specific intent (Robinson,
_Elements of Law_, Sec.Sec.471, 525, 531).

2483. Material Cooperation in the Sin of Drunkenness--(a) If there is
no grave reason for the cooperation, it is illicit. Mere hospitality is
not a sufficient reason for furnishing a table with a great supply of
strong drinks when some of the guests are dipsomaniacs, and mere good
fellowship does not justify one who has been treated to order another
round of treats if some of the drinkers are already inebriated. Parents
or others in authority who get drunk before their subjects are guilty
of scandal; those who encourage drunkenness are guilty of seduction;
those who supply others with drink in order that these may become
drunkards are guilty of formal cooperation.

(b) If there is a grave reason for cooperation, it is not illicit (1515
sqq., 1538 sqq.). Whether it is lawful to persuade another to get
sinfully drunk in order to keep him from the commission of a greater
evil (e.g., homicide or sacrilege), is a disputed question (see 1502).

2484. Is it lawful to make another person drunk when he will be
guiltless of sin, and there is a grave reason?

(a) According to one opinion this is not lawful, because drunkenness,
like impurity, is intrinsically evil and never permissible, since the
end does not justify the means. Hence, just as it would be wrong to
induce a drunken person to impurity, so it would also be wrong to
intoxicate a child or an insane person (see 306).

(b) According to the common opinion, it is lawful to intoxicate oneself
for a grave reason (see 2477 b), and hence also it is lawful to
intoxicate another for a similar reason. Thus, if a criminal were about
to blow up a building and destroy many lives, it would be permissible
or even obligatory to put powerful intoxicants into his drink so as to
make him helpless. If one were about to be roasted by cannibals and
could escape by making the cannibals drunk, it would not be sinful to
make them drunk.

2485. Licit Use of Narcotics.--There are a great many substances that
produce the same effects on mind and body as intoxicating liquors,
namely, the narcotic poisons, such as morphine, opium, chloroform,
ether, or laughing gas. To them then will apply the principles given
above in reference to strong drink. Thus, it would be a serious sin to
make oneself insensible by using morphine, if there were no just
reason; but it is lawful to take ether for an operation, gas when
having a tooth pulled, morphine when it is ordered by a physician to
relieve pain, etc. In his address of Feb. 24, 1957 to a symposium of
the Italian Society of Anaesthesiology (_The Pope Speaks_, Summer,
1957, pp. 33 ff.) Pope Pius XII considered some special aspects of the
use of drugs in the practice of analgesis. Among the questions
submitted to him for consideration were the following:

1) Is there a general moral obligation to refuse analgesis and to
accept physical pain in a spirit of faith? After indicating that in
certain cases the acceptance of physical suffering is a matter of
serious obligation, the Pope responded that there was no conflict with
the spirit of faith to avoid pain by the use of narcotics. Pain can and
does prevent the achievement of higher goods and interests and may
licitly be avoided; obviously, too, the pain may be willingly accepted
in fulfillment of the Christian duty of renunciation and of interior
purification.

2) Is it lawful for the dying or the sick who are in danger of death to
make use of narcotics when there are medical reasons for their use? The
Pope responded; “Yes--provided that no other means exist, and if, in
the given circumstances, that action does not prevent the carrying out
of other moral and religious duties.” The duties referred to include
settling important business, making a will, or going to confession.
(Should a dying man refuse first to attend to these duties and persist
in asking for narcotics, the doctor can administer the drugs without
rendering himself guilty of formal co-operation in the fault committed,
which results, not from the narcotics but from the immoral will of the
patient.) Among the conditions and circumstances laid down for the
licit use of narcotics in the case in question are the following: “if
the dying person has received the last Sacraments, if medical reasons
clearly suggest the use of anaesthesia, if in delivering the dose the
permitted amount is not exceeded, if the intensity and duration of the
treatment is carefully reckoned, and finally, if the patient consents
to it, then there is no objection, the use of anaesthesia is morally
permissible.”

3) Can narcotics be used even if the lessening of pain probably be
accompanied by a shortening of life? The Pope responded that “every
form of direct euthanasia, that is, the administration of a narcotic in
order to produce or hasten death, is unlawful because in that case one
presumes to dispose directly of life ... If between the narcotics and
the shortening of life there exists no direct causal link, imposed
either by the intention of the interested parties or by the nature of
things (as would be the case if the suppression of the pain could be
attained only by the shortening of life), and if, on the contrary, the
administration of narcotics produces two distinct effects, one, the
relief of pain and the other the shortening of life, then the action is
lawful. However it must be determined whether there is a reasonable
proportion between these two effects and whether the advantages of the
one effect compensate for the disadvantages of the other. It is
important also to ask oneself whether the present state of science does
not make it possible for the same result to be obtained by other means.
Finally, in the use of the narcotics, one should not go beyond the
limits which are actually necessary.”

2486. The Virtue of Purity.--As abstemiousness and sobriety preside
over the pleasures of the self-preservative instinct, so purity governs
those that pertain to the species-preservative instinct. Purity is an
inclusive name for the virtues of chastity and decency or pudicity, and
its office is to regulate proximately the internal movements of the
soul (thoughts and desires) and remotely the external words and acts
that have to do with sexual delights.

(a) Chastity in its strictest sense is a virtue that moderates or
chastens through reason venereal pleasure, chiefly as to its principal
or consummated act (i.e., intercourse, semination) or as to its
principal bodily centers (i.e., the genital organs). Hence, there is a
twofold chastity, conjugal and celibate: conjugal chastity abstains
from unnatural pleasure, and uses the natural reasonably in marriage;
celibate chastity abstains from all venereal pleasure, as being
unlawful in the single state.

(b) Decency (_pudicitia_) in its strictest sense is a virtue that
moderates by the sense of shame venereal pleasure chiefly in its
secondary or non-consummated external acts (e.g., looks, conversations,
touches, embraces, kisses), which are related to the principal act as
being an enticement to it, its preparation, or its external sign and
accompaniment. The conjugal act, though lawful, occasions a feeling of
shame, and the same is true of the non-consummated acts; but decency is
especially concerned with these latter, because they are usually more
openly performed than the consummated act. Decency means, then, that
manifestations of carnal desire should be conducted with a sense that
this desire arises from a lower and rebellious passion, removed in
itself farthest from reason, and not more suited for unrestrained
expression or public exhibition than other lower animal acts. The sense
of shame and decency is a protection to the virtue of the unmarried and
the married, restraining the former from the unlawful and holding the
latter to moderation in the use of the lawful.

2487. Chastity and decency are not separate virtues; rather decency is
a circumstance of chastity. (a) Thus, chastity moderates also the
secondary acts, for reason must chastise the pleasure that is taken in
these acts, if this passion is to be kept in due bounds, (b) Decency
moderates also the primary act, for in the use of marriage there should
be nothing unworthy, nothing to bring a blush of confusion.

2488. Virginity.--The highest form of chastity is virginity, which is a
purity unblemished that retains the bloom of its original innocence.
Conjugal chastity uses venereal pleasures moderately and virtuously;
virginity abstains from them entirely and virtuously. Virginity is
threefold.

(a) Virginity of body is freedom from corruption in the genitals, which
means that a male has never had sexual intercourse, that the hymen of a
female is inviolate. This physical purity belongs to the virtue of
virginity accidentally, seeing that it is the result or indication of
the virtue; but it does not belong to the virtue essentially, since
virtue is in the soul, not in the body. Hence, one may be virginal in
body without the virtue of virginity (e.g., a new-born infant), or vice
versa (e.g., a woman vowed to virginity who has been raped).

(b) Virginity of the lower part of the soul (the passions) is freedom
from venereal pleasure voluntarily experienced. Primarily, this refers
to pleasure in consummated acts, secondarily to pleasure in
non-consummated acts and internal acts of thought and desire. This kind
of purity belongs to the virtue of virginity essentially, since sexual
pleasures are the material element or subject-matter of virginity,
whose office it is to exclude all indulgence of them. Hence, a person
who has had even one voluntary experience of these satisfactions,
lawful or gravely unlawful, has lost virginity permanently, though the
virtue of chastity may remain or may be recovered. For virginity cannot
continue when its subject-matter has been removed. It should be noted
that involuntary pleasures, as in nocturnal pollution or in rape or in
passive spermic discharges, are not detrimental to the virtue of
virginity.

(c) Virginity of the higher part of the soul (the mind) is the
intention to abstain from every venereal act in the future. This purity
of soul also belongs to the virtue of virginity essentially, being its
formal element, since acts of the sensitive appetites are made moral
and virtuous only from the direction and influence of reason and will.
Hence, one who has had no experience of voluntary carnal pleasure, but
who intends to marry and use its rights or to act unchastely, has not
in the first case the virtue of virginity, or in the second case the
virtue of chastity.

2489. Loss of Virginity.--Physical or bodily virginity once lost can
never be recovered, for this virginity means that a certain bodily
action or passion has not occurred, whereas the loss means that such
action or passion has occurred. Of course, a miracle could restore
bodily integrity. But a more important question is this: is moral
virginity, or the virtue of virginity, also irrecoverable?

(a) If the virtue has been lost as to its chief material element, it
cannot be recovered. This material element (i.e., the absence of all
voluntary seminal experience) cannot be restored, for even God cannot
make what has been experienced a non-actuality. However, it should be
noted once for all that loss of virginity does not necessarily imply
loss of conjugal chastity, and that lost chastity may be recovered by
repentance.

(b) If virginity has been lost as to its formal element, and the
intention not to abstain was unlawful and naturally, though not
actually, productive of semination (e.g., copulation of a completely
aspermatic adult, or internal and intense libidinous sin from which
accidentally pollution does not result), it seems that the virtue
cannot be recovered. For in these cases the sinner wills, at least
indirectly, the loss of the chief material element of virginity, and it
seems repugnant to reason to ascribe the glory of virginity to one who
has sinned in this way. Non expedit regulariter monere poenitentes de
eorum virginitate irreparabiliter amissa, sed praestat quaerentibus
respondere omnia peccata remitti de quibus contritio habeatur.

(c) If virginity has been lost as to its formal element and the
intention not to abstain was lawful (e.g., a maid not under vow decided
to marry and have children, but changed her mind and decided to remain
single), or was unlawful but neither naturally nor actually productive
of semination (e.g., external unchastity of a child incapable through
impuberty of emissions, or internal and only mildly exciting
unchastity of an adult), the virtue may be recovered, certainly in the
first case and probably also in the second case. For the matter of
virginity is certainly not taken away by the mere intention to have
lawful venereal pleasure, nor probably even by pleasures that do not
tend to semination. Recovery of virginity is made in the one case by
the retractation of contrary intention and in the other case by
repentance and renewal of good purpose.

2490. Conditions Necessary for the Virtue of Virginity.--(a) As to its
manner, it seems more probable that this purpose must be expressed as a
vow. The reason for this according to some is that virginity is a
special virtue only because of the sacred character which religion
gives it, and according to others also because of the unshakable
renunciation which is conferred by a vow. But it is also held as
probable that unvowed virginity may be called a lesser degree of the
special virtue of virginity, At least, it is a higher degree of the
virtue of chastity.

(b) As to its motive, virginity must be justified by an extrinsic
reason. Chastity is justified by its own end, which is reasonable
moderation. Virginity, on the contrary, is not self-justificatory,
since in itself it is unfruitful and without advantage. Hence, it is
not praiseworthy unless it serves some higher good than that of
propagation, such as a good of the mind (e.g., Plato remained single
for the sake of philosophy) or of the will (e.g., the New Testament
recommends virginity for the sake of greater devotion to the things of
God). Virginity that results from mere contempt for sensible pleasure
would be an excess, and continence embraced merely to escape the
burdens of marriage and to lead an easy, self-indulgent, irresponsible
life would be selfishness; but virginity followed from an ideal of
self-sacrifice which reason approves observes the golden mean (see Pius
XII, _Sacra Virginitas_, March 25, 1954).

2491. The Excellence of Virginity.-(a) Virginity has the highest rank
among the various forms of chastity. Every kind of chastity
(pre-nuptial, conjugal, vidual) is of great importance, because to this
virtue is entrusted the right propagation of the entire race and the
moral and physical health of the individual in the most insistent of
passions. The material reproduction of the race is indeed a more urgent
need than virginity, since without it the human species would die out;
and if there were danger of race extinction, it would be more
imperative to marry than to remain continent. But if we confine our
attention to the ordinary course of things and compare virginity and
non-virginal chastity from the viewpoint of nobility, it must be said
virginity is more valuable both to the community and to the individual
than the other kinds of chastity. It is more valuable to the community,
since the example of its excellence is a protection to public morals,
and its permanence gives the opportunity for a more general and ready
service of society. It is more valuable to the individual, since to be
occupied with the things of God is better than to be engrossed in the
things of the world, and the unmarried have the opportunity to devote
more time with less distraction to higher things. Scripture affirms the
superiority of virginity to marriage by its teaching (e.g., Our Lord in
Matt., xix. 12, counsels virginity; St. Paul in I Cor., vii. 7 sqq.,
says that it is the better and more blessed state), by its examples
(Our Lord, the Blessed Virgin, St. John the Baptist, St. John the
Evangelist, and in the Old Dispensation Josue, Elias, Eliseus,
Jeremias), and by its promised rewards (Apoc., xiv. 4). A popular
philosophy of materialism today makes repressed sex-urges responsible
for hysteria and other emotional disturbances, but experience proves
that continence benefits both psychical and physical health.

(b) Virginity does not rank first among all the virtues. The
theological virtues surpass it, being its goal; martyrdom and religious
obedience are greater, because they sacrifice the superior goods of
life and of the will. It may happen, then, that a person in the married
state or a penitent (Luke, vii. 36 sqq.) is personally more holy than
one dedicated to continence; a married person or penitent may surpass a
virgin in faith, hope and charity, and may be therefore, simply
speaking, more perfect.

2492. The Sin of Impurity.--This sin, which is also known as lust, is
an inordinate desire of sexual pleasure.

(a) Its object is sexual pleasure, that is, the sense of physical
enjoyment in the bodily organs or of psychical satisfaction in the
lower appetites of the soul derived from acts related to generation.
Hence, we should distinguish impurity from sensuality (which is an
inordinate attachment to esthetic pleasure or other higher
sense-pleasure), from luxury (which is an excessive desire of health
and comfort), and from the vice called curiosity (which is an
over-fondness for intellectual delights, see 2461). But it should be
noted that sensual pleasure easily leads to venereal delight, and that
intellectual curiosity about sex matters is dangerous, and hence this
sensuality and curiosity may be, and frequently are, a temptation to
impurity (see below on Temptations to Impurity).

(b) Impurity is in desire, for the passions in themselves are
indifferent (see 121), and they become sinful only when their abuse is
consented to by the will.

(c) Impurity is inordinate; that is, it takes pleasure against lhe
dictate of reason. This happens when sexual gratifications are indulged
by the unmarried, or by the married in unnatural ways. It is a
perversion and a sin to cheat the stomach in order to gratify the
palate, because God willed that the pleasure of eating should serve the
nourishment of the body, or, as the proverb has it, because man does
not live to eat, but eats to live. Now, sex pleasure has been ordained
by God as an inducement to perform an act which has for its purpose the
propagation and education of children, duties that cannot be rightly
attended to except in the married state. Hence, those who seek venereal
pleasure outside of matrimony, or outside the way intended by nature,
act unreasonably, for they sacrifice the end for the means. Instinct
guides the animal aright in these matters, but man is a nobler creature
and must guide himself by religion and reason.

2493. Kinds of Impurity.--(a) Impurity is consummated when the act is
continued to its natural conclusion and complete venereal satisfaction
is had. This occurs in semination, which is the termination of the
process set up by the impure thought and desire and the realization of
its full pleasure. Semination occurs either in the process of coition,
or in extracoitional issues known as “pollution.” Equivalent to
semination, morally speaking, are other emissions or secretions that
accompany complete or almost complete gratification, but in which the
fluid is not prolific (e.g., the urethral emissions in boys who have
not attained puberty or in eunuchs, the vaginal flow in women, urethral
distillations). Consummated impurity is either natural (that is,
suitable for reproduction, the end intended by nature), as in
fornication or adultery, or unnatural (that is, not suited for
reproduction), as in sodomy or pollution.

(b) Impurity is non-consummated when not carried to its natural
conclusion of complete satisfaction and semination. There are two
classes of the non-consummated sins, namely, the internal (as in
thoughts and desires) and the external or lewdness (as in words, looks,
kisses). This happens without carnal commotion (e.g., when a frigid old
man thinks with mental pleasure only on the wild deeds of his youth),
or with carnal commotion, that is, with an excitement and stimulation
in the genital organs that prepares the way for semination.

2494. Gravity of the Sin of Impurity.--(a) Impurity is a mortal sin,
because it is a disorder that affects a good of the highest importance
(viz, the propagation of the race), and brings in its train public and
private, moral and physical, evils of the most serious kind. Man has no
more right to degrade his body by lust than he has to kill it by
suicide, for God is the absolute Lord over the body and He severely
forbids impurity of every kind. Those who do the works of the flesh,
whether according to nature (e.g., fornicators and adulterers) or
against nature (e.g., sodomites) or by unconsummated sin (e.g., the
unclean, the impure), shall not obtain the kingdom of God (Gal., v. 19;
I Cor., vi. 9 sqq.), nor have any inheritance with Christ (Eph., v. 5).

(b) Impurity is not the worst of sins, because sins against God (e.g.,
hatred of God, sacrilege) are more heinous than sins against created
goods, and sins of malice are more inexcusable than sins of passion or
frailty. But carnal sins are peculiarly disgraceful on account of their
animality (see 2464 b, 224), and in a Christian they are a kind of
profanation, since his body has been given to Christ in Baptism and the
other Sacraments (I Cor., vi. 11-19).

(c) Impurity is one of the seven capital vices. The capital sins have a
preeminence in evil, as the cardinal virtues have a superiority in
good. The preeminence in evil is due, first, to some special
attractiveness of a vice that makes it an end for the commission of
other sins, which are used as means to it or are incurred for its sake;
or, secondly, to a power and influence that is so strong as to hurry
those under its sway into various kinds of sin. Now, impurity is a
moral disease that ravages every part of the soul, its deadly effects
appearing in the reason, the will and external speech; for the more one
subjects oneself to the dominion of passion, the less fitted does one
become for the higher and nobler things of life; and the more ignoble
the inner life, the more vulgar, cheap and degrading will be the
conversation.

Hence, the Fathers trace back to impurity the following sins of
imprudence in the mind: wrong apprehension, about the end or purpose of
life, and precipitancy in deliberation, thoughtlessness in decision,
inconstancy in direction, in reference to the means to the end (see
1693 sqq.). They also trace to impurity the following sins in the will:
as to the end, voluptuarism (which subordinates all to fleshly
pleasure) and hatred of God (which abhors the Supreme Lawgiver who
forbids and punishes lust); as to the means, love of the present and
horror of the future life (since the carnal man revels in bodily
pleasures and dreads the thought of death and judgment). Finally, they
trace the following sins of the tongue to the vice of impurity: the
subject of the lewd man’s talk is filthy, for out of the heart the
mouth speaketh (Matt., xii. 34), the expression itself is foolish,
since passion clouds his mind, the origin of his talk is emptiness of
mind which shows itself in frivolous words, and his purpose is
unsuitable amusement, which leads to farcical or vulgar jokes.

2495. Evil Fruits of Impurity.--In addition to these moral
consequences, impurity is also prolific of many other evil fruits.

(a) Thus, for the sinner himself it is like a cruel goad that
constantly annoys him and takes away his peace (St. Ambrose), like a
sword that kills the nobler instincts (St. Gregory the Great), like a
descent from human dignity to a condition below the beasts (St.
Eusebius of Caesarea).

(b) For society it is disastrous in many ways, since it propagates
dread mental and physical diseases, disrupts the peace of families,
brings disgrace and destitution on innocent children, eats away
fortunes and leads up to innumerable crimes of injustice and violence.

2496. Is Impurity Ever a Venial Sin?--(a) By reason of the imperfection
of the act, impurity is venial when there is no sufficient deliberation
or consent. Invincible ignorance in reference to the sixth commandment
itself sometimes happens, especially in reference to internal sins of
thought, to external sins of pollution if the person is young, and to
other external sins when there is some complication of circumstances
(e.g., kissing and other intimacy by engaged persons, onanism when
married persons are poor or the woman sickly); and more frequently
there is invincible ignorance about details of the sixth commandment
(e.g., about the precise theological or moral malice of what is known
to be sinful).

(b) By reason of the matter, impurity according to the common teaching
is always mortal if directly willed, but sometimes venial if only
indirectly willed. Impurity is directly willed when one posits an act
intending to obtain from it unlawful venereal delectation, or perceives
that such delectation is already present and consents to it. No matter
how brief this voluntary assent, no matter how slight the commotion of
the animal nature, no matter how far from the consummated is the impure
act in question, there is always a serious injury done to a great good
or at least (exception is made for the case of married persons) the
proximate danger of such injury, and hence mortal sin (see 260). That
even slight yielding to impurity is a serious peril is the teaching of
Scripture (which declares that lust has killed even the strongest,
Prov., vii. 26), of the Church (which condemns the opinion that
libidinous kisses are not dangerous, see Denzinger, Enchiridion, n.
1140), of theology (which reminds us that by original sin reason has
been darkened, the will enfeebled and the passions strengthened), and
of experience (which shows that those who expose themselves to
passion’s flame will be burnt). A small spark of fire is not trivial in
the vicinity of a powder magazine, a minute flaw in a machine is not
unimportant if it may bring on disaster, a first step is not safe if it
is made on a slippery downward declivity.

(c) Impurity is indirectly willed when deliberately and without
sufficient reason one posits an act which is not venereal pleasure
(whether the act be good, such as a prayer made with great sensible
fervor, or bad, such as gluttony, or indifferent, such as reading a
book, looking at a picture, taking a bath), but which produces foreseen
venereal pleasure (consummated or non-consummated) that one neither
intends nor directly consents to. Impurity thus indirectly willed is
sinful, because the pleasure is foreseen and permitted without
sufficient reason (see 102), or in other words because one exposes
oneself to danger of internal defilement (consent), or external
pollution without justification (see 260). Indirect impurity is mortal
when there is proximate danger of grave sin in the act done, that is,
when the posited act _per se_ or from its nature strongly incites the
agent to sexual passion, as when one gazes long and fixedly at obscene
pictures, knowing that always or nearly always this arouses impure
emotions. The sin is venial when there is only remote danger of grave
sin. This happens when the posited act is not of a venereal kind (an
unnecessary conversation on indifferent topics) or is only mildly
exciting (e.g., a passing glance at an obscene object), or when the
agent himself is not greatly affected by it (e.g., when an old man, or
one who is of very cold disposition, or an artist whose only thought is
the esthetic excellence, carefully studies a picture of the nude).

2497. Temptations to Impurity.--Before treating the various kinds of
impurity, we shall speak briefly of temptations that occasion this sin
and of the duties of the person tempted.

(a) External temptation comes from the devil or the world, and the duty
of struggling against it has been treated elsewhere (see 252, 1455
sqq., 1495 sqq.). Thus, he who finds that certain persons, places or
things are for him a temptation to impurity must be guided by the
principles given for occasions of sin (263 sqq.); he who finds that
another wishes to seduce him into impurity must refuse all internal
consent (see 254 sqq.), and must also resist violence when there is
hope of success, or when this is necessary to avoid giving scandal or
yielding consent (see on self-defense, 1841).

(b) Internal temptation comes from the flesh. It consists in inchoative
disturbances or excitements of the organs or fluids that serve
generation (e.g., erections, clitoral movements). Sometimes it is
produced involuntarily, without any intention or consent of the will,
by physiological states (e.g., conditions of the blood, nerves, etc.,
due solely to the weather, to disease, to aphrodisiac properties of
ailment, to clothing, or position) or by psychical states (e.g.,
spontaneous images or appetites of the soul mentioned in 129), and in
these cases the temptation is manifestly free from all sin. St. Pius V
condemned the teaching of Baius that those who suffer motions of
concupiscence against their will are transgressors of the command:
“Thou shalt not covet” (see Denziger, Enchiridion, nn. 1050, 1051,
1075). Sometimes the temptation is directly voluntary, as when the
passion is deliberately awakened for the purpose of sin, and then there
is grave guilt (see 2496 b). Sometimes the temptation is indirectly
voluntary, as when with the foresight of the passion but without desire
of it an action is performed that arouses it. In this last case, if
there is a just reason for the excitatory action (e.g., a physician
sees and hears things that are calculated to be a temptation, but his
reason is the exercise of his profession), no sin is committed; but if
there is no just reason for the action (e.g., a person reads an erotic
book, and curiosity is his only motive), sin is committed, and its
gravity depends on the amount of danger to which one exposes oneself
(see 2496 c).

2498. Resistance to Internal Temptations.--The fight against internal
temptations is of various kinds.

(a) By reason of its subject, the conflict is chiefly in the will, to
which it belongs to give or withhold consent; secondarily, in the other
powers of the soul and the body, which under command from the will
perform acts designed to overcome temptation.

(b) By reason of its manner, the conflict is either removal of the
temptation (i.e., cessation from an act which produces the temptation)
or resistance, passive or active. Passive resistance is the suspension
of activity relative to the temptation till it ends of itself, as when
internally the will neither consents nor dissents, or externally
nothing is done for or against the temptation. Active resistance is
positive opposition offered to temptation. It is made in two ways:
first, by way of flight, as when internally the mind turns away to
other thoughts (e.g., absorbing studies, meditation on the passion of
Christ), or the will devotes itself to other subjects of resolve (e.g.,
acts of love of God or of purity), or externally the body is removed or
freed from conditions that excite temptation; secondly, by way of
attack, as when internally the mind turns against the temptation (e.g.,
thinking of its dangers, calling on God to drive it away), or the will
rejects the temptation (e.g., by despising it, by expressing dislike,
disapproval and unwillingness, by firmly resolving not to yield, by
deciding on measures against the passion), or when externally the body
is subjected to pain or mortification.

(c) By reason of its circumstances, resistance to temptation is either
prolonged, as when the act by which the will resists is of considerable
duration or is renewed at frequent intervals, or is brief, as when the
act of rejection is momentary and is not repeated.

2499. What Opposition to Temptation Is Sufficient?--Opposition to
temptations of the flesh must be sufficient to remove the temptation,
when the temptation is due to the continuance of one’s own sinful or
unjustified act; for one is obliged to cease from sin or the
unreasonable. This happens (a) when the temptation is directly
voluntary--for example, one who wished to experience temptation and
therefore reads a very seductive book must give over this reading; or
(b) when the temptation is not directly voluntary and is without
sufficient reason--for example, one who experiences carnal temptation
due to a book which he reads from idle curiosity must desist from the
book. But one is not bound to omit or interrupt necessary or useful
acts, such as rest and sleep, prayer and charity; consent should be
denied the evil, but the good should be continued.

2500. Insufficient, Harmful and Unnecessary Opposition.--In other cases
opposition to temptations of the flesh must be such as is sufficient to
keep one from consent, that is, to protect one against the proximate
danger of sin.

(a) Hence, that resistance is insufficient which does not strengthen
the will. It seems that passive will-resistance is of this kind, since
it is most difficult for the will to remain inactive in the presence of
carnal stimulation or motions of the sensible appetites without being
moved by the evil suggestion. In external resistance, however, passive
opposition suffices when it alone is feasible, as when temptation grows
out of necessary work, or rest that cannot be discontinued or
interrupted by active resistance, provided the will registers
internally its displeasure or disapproval; but external passivity is
not permissible when the will needs the help of external resistance, as
in the case of vehement and prolonged temptations.

(b) That resistance is harmful which strengthens the temptation. Hence,
resistance by direct attack or by formal rejection is oftentimes to be
omitted in favor of resistance by flight or by contempt; for it is a
common teaching of the Fathers and Doctors confirmed by experience that
dwelling on reasons and means of repelling passion often adds to its
strength, and that resolving mightily and expressly to crush a weak and
passing temptation often serves only to give it a longer life. It is
better to brush a mosquito away than to risk one’s neck by chasing it
up and down stairs.

(c) That resistance is unnecessary which demands a physical or moral
impossibility. Thus, a prolonged act of resistance or one repeated at
intervals of a few minutes, or a resistance that includes extreme
corporal austerities, is not required in ordinary cases at least. When
a temptation is unusually vehement or is due to one’s own fault, there
should be proportionately greater resistance to offset the greater
danger; but when a temptation is only moderately dangerous, it suffices
to reject it firmly but briefly and to repeat this when there arises a
new crisis or danger and the renewal of resistance is useful.

2501. Weapons against Carnal Temptations.--The most powerful weapons
against carnal temptations are spiritual ones, and of these the most
necessary is grace, which should be asked in prayer (Wis., viii. 21),
especially through the intercession of the Blessed Virgin Mary (see
Pius XII, _Sacra Virginitas_, March 25, 1954). But corporal means,
chiefly of a preventive kind, should not be neglected.

(a) Physical measures are the observance of what are now often spoken
of as sex hygiene for normal and sex therapeutics for abnormal cases.
Special health rules whose observance conduces to good morals are
especially the cultivation of habits of bodily cleanliness, of hard
mental and physical work, of vigorous exercise and the avoidance of
unhealthful habits (such as constipation, drug or spirit stimulation),
unsuitable clothing or sleeping conditions. Surgical or medical
treatment for structural abnormalities or for mental or bodily diseases
that react unfavorably on sex life requires the service of a
conscientious and competent physician.

(b) Religious measures are various forms of corporal mortification,
such as custody of the eyes and other senses, deprivation in food
(fasting and abstinence) and sleep (vigils, night watches), afflictive
penances through the use of hairshirts, painful girdles, scourges or
disciplines. But austerities must be suited to the health, age,
condition, duties and other circumstances of the person who practises
them, and should not be used without the consent of one’s confessor or
spiritual director.

2502. Sinfulness of Negligence in Resisting Temptations.--It is sinful
not to struggle against temptation, since he who in no way resists, not
even passively, surrenders or yields to sin. Hence, the Church
condemned the quietistic indifference to temptation of Molinos
(Denzinger, nn. 1237, 1257, 1267). It is also sinful to resist, but
only insufficiently, as regards promptness, vigor, manner, etc.

(a) The Theological Malice.--It is mortally or venially sinful to be
negligent against temptation, according to the greatness or smallness
of the danger to which the negligence exposes one (see 256-262). Thus,
it is not a serious sin to omit all resistance to a weak and dying
temptation, or to neglect from indolence or other venial fault all
external resistance when the danger is made remote by the internal
displeasure or resolution; but it is a serious sin to trifle with any
very attractive temptation or to put off resistance until a progressing
temptation has grown formidable and made self-control difficult, and
this is true even though consent is not finally given to the impure
suggestion.

(b) The Moral Malice.--Negligences in reference to carnal temptations
do not differ specifically but only in degree, according to the
approach the stimuli make towards complete lust. Even when there is an
object (e.g., fornication, adultery) before the mind, the difference in
species of the object, it seems, does not induce a difference in
species of the sin, since the sin is the general one of carelessness in
presence of temptation. Hence, it suffices to confess that one has been
remiss in banishing impure emotions or thoughts.

2503. Applications.--(a) The principles here given in reference to
emotions of the sensible appetite and rebellions of the flesh should be
applied to other involuntary acts in the imagination, reason and will
(see 129). Thus, thoughts or images of impure scenes that pass through
the mind should be treated in the same way as temptations of the flesh.

(b) The principles here given about the person who suffers temptation
should also be applied to the person who causes temptation. Since it is
a mortal sin to commit impurity, it is also a mortal sin to solicit
impurity; since it is a mortal sin of lust to make oneself drunk in
order to experience carnal emotions, it is also a mortal sin of lust to
make another person drunk that he may become likewise inflamed; since
it is a mortal sin to expose oneself to extreme danger by reading a
pornographic work, it is also a mortal sin to wish to expose another to
a like danger. And this is true even though the temptation is
unsuccessful. Physicians who minimize the wrong of masturbation, or who
counsel fornication to young men on the absurd plea that continence is
unhealthy or productive of impotency, share in the guilt of pollution
or fornication which they counsel; and young persons who seek to win
the sinful love of others by nourishing their hair, painting their
faces, exposing their bodies, etc., have the guilt, if not the gain, of
seduction.

2504. Non-Consummated Sins of Impurity.--These include all those
preparatory sins in which unlawful sex pleasure is not carried to
completion by coition or pollution. We shall speak first of the
internal sins of thought, delight, and desire (see 232 sqq.), and next
of the external sins of unlawful looks, words, kisses, and embraces.

2505. Impure Thoughts.--Impure thoughts (_delectatio morosa_) are
representations in the mind or imagination of impure venereal objects
in which deliberate pleasure is taken.

(a) They are representations, that is, mental pictures or images of
things absent from the senses, but thought of or imagined as present.
Thus, impure thoughts differ from desires, which consist in attraction
with will to accomplish, and also from sense contact of various kinds
with objects present to the eyes, ears, or touch.

(b) They are joined with deliberate pleasure of the will, that is, one
intends them or consents even momentarily to them after perceiving
their presence and malice, even though carnal pleasure is not felt or
does not threaten. Thus, impure thoughts differ from tempting thoughts,
which are transient and unwished forms that appear in the mind, and are
thought on before their true character is adverted to, or which gain a
lodging in spite of efforts to eject them. A tempting thought is not
sinful, but an occasion of merit when resisted, no matter how long it
endures (see 2497 b).

(c) The pleasure is taken in a venereal object, that is, in the thought
of fornication, adultery or other carnal sin, committed by oneself or
by another. Hence, impure thoughts are not to be confused with the
pleasure taken in knowledge about impurity (e.g., a professor of
medicine or morality is not impure when he rejoices at the sexual
knowledge he possesses and which is necessary for his duties, or
willingly thinks about sex matters when it is necessary or useful for
him to do so), or with pleasure taken in the morally indifferent manner
of the venereal sin. For example, amusement over a ridiculous feature
of a sin which one detests is not an impure thought (see 233-236).

2506. The Malice of Impure Thoughts.--(a) The Theological
Malice.--Impure thoughts are mortal sins: for he who deliberately
rejoices at the thought of sin, loves sin and is therefore guilty of
it. They are venial sins when there is imperfect advertence, and also
when there is lightness of matter on account of the remoteness of the
danger of a thought only indirectly voluntary. They are mortal when
there is full deliberation and the impure thought is directly voluntary
or gravely dangerous (see 2496).

(b) The Moral Malice.--Impure thoughts have the same specific malice as
the representation of the object which is entertained as a welcome
guest in the mind; for not only is impurity given the hospitality of
the mind, but a particular kind of impurity (see 90, 235). Hence it
follows, first, that a specifically different object (as is the case
with different consummated sins) makes a specifically different sin
(e.g., to think pleasurably of unlawful intercourse is mental
fornication if the persons in mind are unmarried, and is mental
adultery if the person in mind is married); secondly, that objects not
specifically different--as is the case with different non-consummated
sins of lewdness--do not make specifically different sins (e.g., to
think pleasurably of a sinful kiss and to think sinfully of a sinful
touch are both mental lewdness or impure thoughts); thirdly, that
special malices of the object from which the mind can prescind--viz.,
those which in the external act do not change the species or do not
explain the venereal pleasure--and from which it does prescind, are not
incurred (e.g., to think pleasurably of sin with a woman who is married
and a relative, if the thought that she is married or one’s relative is
not pleasing or is displeasing, is mental fornication, not mental
adultery or mental incest). In praxi vero consulitur confessariis ut
regulariter abstineant a quaestionibus de specie morali delectationis
morosae; nam fideles plerumque nesciunt faciliter distinguere inter
species morales cogitationum, et sic interrogatio evaderet vel
inutilis, vel etiam ratione materiae perieulosa. Ad haec quum casus
crebriores sint, maximo esset incommodo, tum confessariis, tum
poenitentibus, si sacerdos exquireret quae vix cognosci possunt.
Sufficit igitur ordinarie sciscitari de specie theologica (utrum
voluntas complacuerit), vel de specie morali generali (utrum actus
internus delectatio morosa vel potius desiderium fuerit). See Canon
888, Sec.2; Norms for Confessors in Dealing with the Sixth Commandment,
Holy Office, May 16, 1943.

2507. Impure Rejoicing.--Impure rejoicing is a deliberate pleasure of
the mind yielded to the recollection of a past sin of impurity. Hence,
this sin of rejoicing is committed when one thinks with approval of a
fornication of former days, but the sin of rejoicing is not committed
when one confines one’s pleasure to some good consequence of a
fornication (e.g., the excellent child that was born), or to a lawful
pleasure of the past, as when a widower thinks without present carnal
commotion or danger of his former married life. The circumstances are
more readily willed here than in impure thoughts, for here the mind is
picturing an actual, not an imaginary case of sin, and the mental
representation will therefore be more distinct; nevertheless, in the
case of impure rejoicing the moral sub-species--at times even the
distinction between impure rejoicing and impure thoughts--is usually
not perceived. The principles of the previous paragraph apply to impure
rejoicing.

2508. Impure Desires.--Impure desire is a deliberate intention to
commit impurity in the future.

(a) It is a deliberate intention, that is, a purpose or will to which
consent is given internally. Hence, an impure desire is not the same
thing as a statement of fact, as when a passionate person declares that
he would sin, were it not for fear of the consequences, meaning only
that he is frail, not that he wishes to sin. Neither is it the same as
a mere velleity, which desires venereal pleasure under circumstances
that would make it lawful, as when a married man wishes that he were
lawfully married to a woman other than his present wife, or that both
he and the other woman were free to marry each other. But these
velleities are foolish and venially sinful, and often on account of
danger they are mortally sinful. An impure desire exists when the will
consents unconditionally (as when a person decides or wishes to
fornicate tomorrow) or conditionally under a proviso that does not take
away the malice (as when a person decides that he would fornicate were
it not for fear of punishment, or Wishes that it were lawful for him to
practise fornication).

(b) It is an intention to commit impurity, and hence there is no impure
desire in wishing what is not venereal pleasure (e.g., the spiritual,
mental or bodily relief that follows on an involuntary pollution), or
what is lawful venereal pleasure (e.g., when engaged persons think, but
without carnal commotion or danger, of the benefits of their future
married relationship).

2509. Malice of Impure Desires.--Impure desires are mortal sins and
have the malice of the object and of the circumstances that one has in
mind; that is, one commits the same kind of sin in desiring as in
performing impurity. Hence, Our Lord declares that he who looks upon a
woman to desire her unlawfully has already committed adultery in his
heart (Matt., v. 28), and hence also the ninth commandment forbids sins
of impure desire. The principles given in 2506, 2507, apply also to
impure desires with this difference that the mind when it wills
external performance considers the object as it is in itself, not as it
is mentally represented, and hence is less likely to prescind from
actual circumstances known to it, But even here confessional
investigation is sometimes not necessary on account of its moral
impossibility.

2510. Lewdness.--After the internal sins follow the external sins of
lewdness or indecency (_impudicitia_). These may be defined as
“external acts which are performed from or with deliberate venereal
pleasure that is not consummated, and which are not directed to the
conjugal act.”

(a) They are external acts of the body, such as the looks of the eye,
the speech of the tongue, kisses of the lips, touches, fondling,
embraces, pressure of the hand, etc. Those also are guilty of lewdness
who permit themselves to be petted, kissed or otherwise impurely
handled, unless it is morally impossible to resist, as when a woman who
gives no internal consent cannot defend herself against a forced kiss
without being killed, or cannot without great scandal refuse to shake
hands with one whose motive is impure love. Lewdness (e.g., an impure
look) may also be directed to one’s own person, or to an animal, or to
an artificial object, such as a statue or book.

(b) They are performed from or with pleasure; that is, passion either
causes or accompanies the impure look or other act. These
non-consummated acts are indifferent in themselves and may be licitly
performed for a just cause; they become sinful by reason of the evil
passion that animates them. The carnal motive appears either from the
end of the act (e.g., an indecent kiss naturally tends to impurity or
grave danger thereof, no matter what good purpose the kisser may have),
or from the end of the one acting (e.g., a decent kiss becomes an
impure act if the one who kisses is moved by carnal desire). Hence,
there is no sin of lewdness when one of the acts now considered is
performed becomingly as to externals and innocently as to the internal
motive and quality (e.g., from a sense of duty, not from pleasure).

(c) The pleasure intended or consented to is venereal; that is, such as
is consummated in copulation or pollution. Hence, there is no sin of
lewdness when the acts in question are performed becomingly and with
and for pleasure of a spiritual kind (as when members of a family give
one another the customary kiss or embrace of affection), or of a merely
sensual kind (e.g., when a nurse kisses the tender skin of an infant).
On the distinction of intellectual, sensual and venereal pleasures see
above (2461).

(d) The external act is not consummated by copulation or pollution.
These are often its result but they are a different degree of sin, and
lewdness is committed even without them (see 2486).

(e) Lewdness is an action not directed to the conjugal act. Coition
itself is lawful in the married state, and this legitimatizes all the
preparatory or accessory endearments. Hence, the rule as to married
persons is that venereal kisses and other such acts are lawful when
given with a view to the exercise of the lawful marriage act and kept
within the bounds of decency and moderation; that they are sinful,
gravely or lightly according to the case, when unbecoming or
immoderate; that they are venially sinful, on account of the inordinate
use of a thing lawful in itself (85 a), when only pleasure is intended;
that they are mortally sinful, when they tend to pollution, whether
solitary or not solitary, for then they are acts of lewdness. The
rights and duties during courtship and engagement will be treated below
in Question III.

2511. Cases Wherein No Sin Is Committed.--Since lewdness proceeds from
or is accompanied by culpable venereal pleasure, it does not exist in
the following cases:

(a) in children who have not attained puberty and the capacity for sex
pleasure, and hence there is no sin by reason of proximate danger in
looks or touches exercised by them, which would be gravely sinful in
those who have reached the age of puberty. These children may, however,
sin against modesty or obedience, at least venially. They should be
trained from their earliest years to reserve and decency, and it is a
most serious sin to scandalize their innocence. The question of sex
instruction for the young will be dealt with in the Question on the
Duties of Particular States. If an adult person were as unmoved as a
child by the stimulus of passion, such a one would incur no personal
guilt of lewdness by kissing and the like acts, but such an adult
person is very rare;

(b) in adult persons when a dangerous act is exercised by them, without
consent or proximate danger, and with a sufficient reason for the
exercise. Thus, a student of literature may read an erotic story from
the classics, if he is proof against the danger and intends only
improvement in style, though for the young such books should be
expurgated; a professor of medicine or moral theology may discourse
prudently to his students on venereal diseases or sins; an artist may
use naked models in painting, if and as far as this is necessary; farm
hands may attend to the service of female by male animals; looks and
touches that would otherwise be immodest are lawful for proportionate
reasons of utility, as in bathing oneself, in performing the services
of nurse or physician for others, etc. (see 2497 sqq.).

2512. Conditions Governing Propriety of External Acts.--The
becomingness of the external acts spoken of in 2510 b includes two
conditions.

(a) On the side of its object, the act must not be directed
unnecessarily to the parts of the body that are shameful and private
(i.e., the genitals and immediately adjacent parts). It is customary to
distinguish the remaining or non-shameful parts of the body into
becoming, which are uncovered (e.g., face, hands, feet), and less
becoming, which are covered (e.g., legs, breast, back). But as to less
decent parts much depends on local usage. For example, at a bathing
beach it is not unbecoming to appear in a mixed crowd with uncovered
legs or arms, and in very warm countries it is not improper to go about
in public with less clothing than is worn in colder climates.

(b) On the side of its subject, the act must be performed with
moderation and respect for reasonable custom. Thus, columbine
(popularly called “French”) kissing and the ardent or prolonged
embraces known as “necking” or “petting” are admittedly indecent, even
when not accompanied by sexual excitement. Oral abuse committed by or
with either sex is indecent both as to the object, i.e., the part of
the body involved, and as to the subject, i.e., the mode of action. It
is the filthiest form of lewdness and is usually joined with pollution
(irrumation).

2513. Morality of Kissing and Similar Acts.--(a) _Per se_, or from
their nature, these acts are indifferent, since they can be employed,
not only for evil (Job, xxxi. 27; Luke, xxii. 48), but also for good,
as we see from the examples of the kiss of peace (I Thess., v. 26), the
kiss of fraternal greeting (Gen., xxvii. 26, 27), and the kiss of
respectful homage (Luke, vii. 38, 45).

(b) _Per accidens_, or from their circumstances, these acts are often
venially or mortally sinful against purity or against some other
virtue, or against both. Thus, justice is offended by injuries or
violence (e.g., stolen kisses, unhygienic kisses that transmit venereal
or other disease); charity is offended by scandal given the object of
affection or the onlookers (e.g., kisses given by way of greeting to a
member of the opposite sex by an ecclesiastic or religious, kisses
forced upon children by grown-ups and which are harmful to the youthful
sense of modest reserve); purity itself is offended by familiarities
which, though not impure in themselves, constitute a peril for the
virtue of one or both parties, as is true especially in demonstrations
of sensual affection or pleasure. But even though there be some carnal
commotion, it is not unlawful to give with a pure intention the decent
salutation customary in one’s country (e.g., to shake hands with a
lady, to kiss one’s stepmother or sister-in-law).

2514. Morality of Sensual Gratification.--Sensual gratification, or the
pleasure experienced from the perfection in the sensible order of some
object, is indifferent and lawful in itself (see 2461, 2492). When it
is aroused by objects not venereally exciting (e.g., the beauty of the
heavens or scenery, the harmony of music, the tender softness of the
rose), it does not tempt to impurity; but when it is aroused by objects
that are venereally exciting (e.g., the beautiful face or eyes or sweet
voice or soft skin of a person much admired), it approaches so closely
to the confines of venereal gratification as to seem almost the same
thing. Hence arises the question; is deliberate sensual gratification
about objects sexually exciting always a mortal sin?

(a) Many theologians answer in the affirmative, and give as their
reason that in the state of fallen nature there is no one who can be
assured that such gratification is not for him or her a proximate
occasion of pollution, or of what is morally the same thing, of
inchoate pollution. This opinion does not include gratifications not
deliberately sought or yielded to, nor those in which experience has
shown that the venereal attraction of the object, at least for the
subject concerned, is nil or practically nil (e.g., sensual kisses of
an infant by a nurse.)

(b) Other theologians dissent from the rigorous view, and argue that,
since sensual and venereal attraction are really distinct, there is
always the possibility of intending the former and excluding consent to
the latter.

(c) To the present authors it seems that there is room for a middle way
between these two extreme views. As was said above (2497), it is
sometimes sinful and sometimes not sinful to encounter temptation,
according to the intention and reason one has, and a temptation willed
unjustifiably but only indirectly is a grave or a light sin according
to the great or small danger that is risked. Now, it seems that certain
forms of sensual gratification (e.g., those derived from beautiful but
modest music or paintings) have only a very slight sexual allurement
for even the passionate; whereas other forms (e.g., those derived from
the warm kiss or caress of a handsome adult person of the opposite sex)
are vehemently alluring. Hence, if sensual pleasure of the first kind
is sought inordinately, or if it is dangerous to purity, there is a
venial sin; if sensual pleasure of the second kind is sought, there is
very likely mortal sin.

2515. The Theological Species of the Sin of Lewdness.--(a) _Per se_, or
from its nature, this sin is mortal, even though the external act
(kiss, etc.) be decent (see 2512) and of the briefest duration; for
lewdness is consent to unlawful venereal pleasure, which from the
nature of the case is a serious matter, tending either to illicit
copulation or to pollution (see 2496). Hence, even a shake of the hand
made with lustful intent is a mortal sin. If the guilt of adultery is
found even in libidinous thoughts (Deut., v. 21) and glances (Matt., v.
28), much more is it found in lewd kisses, embraces, and conversations.
Scripture strongly condemns every form of lewdness: impure speech
(“Uncleanness let it not so much as be named among you, or obscenity,
or foolish talking,” Eph., v. 3, 4), impure reading (“Evil
communications corrupt good morals,” I Cor., xv. 33), impure looks
(“Whosoever shall look on a woman to lust after her hath already
committed adultery with her in his heart,” Matt., v, 28), impure kisses
and other touches (“It is good for a man not to touch a woman, but for
fear of fornication let every man have his own wife,” I Cor., vii. 1).

(b) _Per accidens_, this sin may be venial as follows: first, on
account of the imperfection of deliberation, as when a person under the
influence of liquor, drugs or sleep acts with only a partial
realization of what he is doing, especially if the lewd offense has not
occurred before; secondly, on account of the lightness of the matter,
when the lewd act is indirectly voluntary and the danger remote (see
2496), as when slight danger is risked in gratifying the sensual desire
to gaze at a famous painting, or in yielding to an impulse of
curiosity, levity, or playfulness, to indulge in suitable recreations
or even unnecessary conversations in which occur glances or touches
that arouse some small degree of sexual emotion. Were mortal guilt of
impurity incurred in these instances, very few could remain free from
it unless there was a general retirement into isolation. But even in
the _per accidens_ cases there may be other mortal sins (e.g., that of
drunkenness or of scandal).

2516. A large proportion of the sins of lewdness are only indirectly
voluntary, and hence they are mortal or venial according to the amount
of danger to which one exposes oneself. No ironclad rules, however, can
be given to determine universally what things are gravely and what
slightly dangerous, since the force and direction of concupiscence are
not the same in all persons. Some persons are oversexed or passionate,
others are undersexed or cold; some have normal, others abnormal
inclinations (e.g., homosexuality, sadism, masochism, sexual fetishism)
in matters venereal. Hypersexuality and abnormal sexuality are not in
themselves sinful, but are manifestations of that inordinate
concupiscence that is the effect of original sin and, if yielded to,
becomes the cause of actual sin. Proximately they may be due to
disease. But since these subjective differences do exist, what we shall
set down in the following paragraphs about gravity and lightness of
danger is to be understood of the average or normal person and in the
abstract, for it is impossible to consider every individual case.

2517. Circumstances That Increase or Lessen the Danger of Sin.--(a) The
Person Acting.--There is less danger before and after than during
puberty, less for an invalid than for a person full of health, less for
an inhabitant of a cold region than for a dweller in the tropics, less
for one habituated to suppress venereal passion (e.g., a bachelor) than
for one who has been accustomed to indulge it (e.g., a widower), less
in some cases for the married who can lawfully enjoy sexual intercourse
than for the single who cannot. Familiarity also can give a certain
amount of immunity (e.g., where naked bathing or naked statuary in
public places is according to custom, the natives are less disturbed by
these things than outsiders). Those who know (without self-deception)
from their experience that certain things excite them very little do
not run grave danger in encountering such things.

(b) The Person or Being Who Is the Object of the Act.--There is less
allurement in an animal than in a human, less in a small than in a
large animal, less in a representation than in the original, less in
young children than in adults, less in one’s own person or sex than in
another person or the opposite sex, less in an elderly or homely person
than in one who is young and attractive.

(c) The Sense Used.--Hearing (and, for a similar reason, reading) is
less dangerous than sight, for hearing is nearer to the immanent
activities of thought and desire, while sight has more of an emanant
character (e.g., to hear or read about an obscene act is farther
removed from it, and hence less seductive, than to see it in picture or
reality). Sight in turn is less dangerous than touch, for sight is a
more elevated and less material kind of perception, being exercised by
a cognitional, not by a physical contact with its object, as is the
case with touch (e.g., to behold others embrace is not so moving as to
give or receive an embrace). Thus, impure touches (kisses, embraces,
handling) are the most dangerous form of lewdness.

(d) The Sense-Object Acted Upon.--The degree of danger corresponds with
the approach made to the act of generation (e.g., smutty stories are
worse when they deal with consummated than with non-consummated acts)
or to the genitals (e.g., impure touches are worse when directed to the
organs of reproduction than to the non-shameful regions).

(e) The Manner.--There is greater danger when the act is prolonged than
when it is momentary, when it is ardent than when it is calm (e.g., a
passing glance or peep at an obscene picture is not as dangerous as a
leisurely inspection, a loose linking of arms not as dangerous as a
hug). The more exposed the object of attraction and the more secluded
the parties themselves, the greater the danger (e.g., love-making
between parties who are not fully clothed or who are alone in the dark
or in a closed and curtained room is more dangerous than love-making
between those who are properly dressed and seated among a crowd of
people).

2518. Cases Wherein the Danger of Sin Is Grave or Slight.--A physician
must know the difference between mortal and non-mortal diseases, and
likewise a priest must know the distinction between various kinds of
spiritual leprosies. But when certain cases are listed as less
dangerous, this does not mean that they are not dangerous at all and
that no account should be taken of them. Especially in the matter of
impurity should the warning of Scripture be remembered: “He that
contemneth small things shall fall by little and little” (Ecclus., xix.
1). With this in mind, we now subjoin some examples of grave and slight
danger for cases in which a lewd act is indirectly voluntary, but is
prompted only by curiosity, joke, levity or other such insufficient
reason.

(a) Speech.--Dirty or suggestive stories, conversations, songs, music,
or radio entertainments are a grave danger when the persons present are
very impressionable (e.g., on account of age or character), or if the
topic is utterly vile (e.g., descriptions of filthy or unnatural sex
acts), or if the manner is very seductive (e.g., the terms used are
unfit for polite society, or the story is very detailed, or sin is
boasted about, or the conversation is prolonged). On the other hand,
the danger is light when the persons present are of mature age and not
strongly inclined to impurity, especially if the topic and the language
are not very disgusting; but there may be serious sin on account of
circumstances, as when the speaker or approving listener is a person
from whom good example is expected. Obscene talk is generally not a
serious sin when the persons are husband and wife, or a group of
married men or of married women; on the contrary, it is generally a
serious matter when the persons are a group of young people of the same
sex, more serious when they are a mixed group, and still more serious
when they are a boy and a girl or a young man and a young woman. The
fact that those of the younger generation often do not admit this, does
not change its abiding truth.

(b) Reading.--The remarks made on speech apply also to reading, which
is a kind of silent speech. A noteworthy difference between the two in
the present matter, however, is that reading is often more dangerous
than conversation, since it is usually more protracted. Love letters
and romances were once the chief temptation in this line, but today
they seem mild in comparison with the supply of pornography that is
easily accessible to all (e.,g., the magazines and papers that pander to
depraved tastes, the stories and pseudo-scientific books that corrupt
the youth of every land). Even without grave danger to self, one may
still be guilty of grave sin in reading obscene books on account of the
cooperation with the vendors of immorality, or the scandal, or the
disobedience thereby shown to the Church (see 1455 sqq., 1529, 1530).

(c) Looks.--There is generally no danger in a look at the full nudity
of a small infant, or at the less becoming parts of a person of the
same sex; there is generally only slight danger when the object is the
privates of self or of another of the same sex, or the coition of
animals, unless the gaze be fixed, prolonged and the object near; there
is grave danger in beholding a completely non-infant naked person of
the opposite sex, or the coition or other grave external sex acts of
human beings (unless the glance be brief or not attentive), or even at
times the less becoming parts of the opposite sex, if the look is very
intent and continuous. Representations of the bodily parts or acts just
mentioned (pictures, drawings, diagrams, etc.) have generally the same
dangers as the originals, though the allurement in itself is less
vivid; circumstances may even make the representations equally or more
dangerous (e.g., on account of a thin veil of concealment in paintings
or sculpture that only increases the attraction; or on account of the
suggestive music, the voluptuous dance, the crowd atmosphere that
accompanies an immoral scene on the stage or screen). The saying of
Oscar Wilde that esthetics are above ethics is opposed both to morality
(since all conduct should be guided by reason) and to art (for the
highest beauty is that of virtue and the spirit and purity).

(d) Touches.--Kisses are seriously dangerous to purity when warmly or
lingeringly exchanged between adults of different sex who are attracted
to one another as male and female; in other cases, kisses, if impressed
on decent parts of the body and in a decent manner, may be only
slightly dangerous. Holding or grasping between such adults is also a
serious danger when it is vehement (e.g., the tight squeeze or hug of
certain dances) or long (e.g., the repeated or hour-long fondling of
love-makers); it is of slight or no danger in other cases, as in the
customary handclasp of greeting, Handling or feeling, if passing,
hurried or light, is generally not dangerous, when it has to do with
the becoming parts of another person, or with the less becoming parts
of a person of the same sex, or with personal private parts; it is only
slightly dangerous, under the same conditions, in reference to the
verenda of animals or small infants; it is gravely dangerous when
directed to the privates of another person who has passed infancy, or
to the less becoming parts of a person of opposite sex, or to the
breasts of a woman, unless it be entirely casual, passing, or light.
Tactile contact made under the clothing is of course more dangerous
than that which is external.

2519. The Moral Species of Lewdness.--(a) Theoretically, it is more
probable that the imperfect sins of impurity do not differ from the
perfect sins to which they tend; for the natural circumstances or
antecedents of an act have really the same morality as the act itself
(see 2486). In the physical order, the fetus, the infant, and the child
do not differ essentially from the full-grown man; and likewise, in the
moral order, the thought, the purpose and the external beginning do not
differ essentially from completed murder, even though for some reason
the act be not finished. Hence, immodest words, reading, looks and
touches belong to fornication, or adultery, or incest, or sodomy,
according to their tendency (e.g., to read an immodest love story with
another man’s wife and to kiss her is incipient adultery, and, if the
guilty person has a vow of chastity, it is also sacrilege). But the
species is taken only from the object, not from the purely accidental
circumstances, such as the elicitive faculty (e.g., an immodest look at
another does not differ essentially from an immodest touch) or the
intensity (e.g., incomplete pleasure in touches by one who has not
attained puberty does not differ essentially, according to some, from
the completed pleasure of which he is capable). Moreover, it seems
that, in regard to looks if not as regards touch, abstraction (see
2506) is easily made by the guilty person from various circumstances;
for example, one who looks immodestly on a person consecrated to God,
may be thinking only of his unlawful love for a person of the other
sex, and so may be guilty of incipient fornication, but not of
sacrilege, or he may be thinking, without any affection for the other
person, only of his own pleasure, and so may perhaps be guilty only of
incipient pollution. A less probable opinion makes lewdness a species
of sin distinct from pollution and the other consummated sins.

(b) Practically, penitents should confess that their sin was indecent
and not completed lust (such as pollution), and they should also
confess whether the lewdness was committed by speech, reading, looks,
kisses, embraces, or touches; and also the object of the sin, whether
male or female, whether married or single, relative or non-relative,
etc. Otherwise, since few penitents know how to distinguish the moral
species of sins, there will be great danger of incomplete confessions;
and, moreover, the additional sins usually committed in cases of
lewdness (e.g., scandals, injustices, and bad company keeping) will not
be disclosed. If a consummated sin of fornication, pollution, etc.,
followed the indecency, this consummated sin should be confessed
distinctly. Similarly, those who expose, incite or tempt others to
impure thoughts or to lewdness in word, reading, looks, kisses or
touches, should confess the kind of sin they intended (see 1497), even
though their purpose failed, whether it was incipient fornication,
sacrilege, sodomy, etc. But some authors admit a generic confession (in
which the penitent merely states that he sinned mortally or venially,
as the case was, by indecency), if the lewdness was solitary, or was
committed with another but certainly without scandal or lustful desire
of the other person.

2520. The Consummated Sins of Impurity.--There are in all seven species
of completed acts of impurity. (a) Thus, some sins of impurity are
against reason because they do not observe the ends of sexual
intercourse. These ends are, first, the begetting of children (to which
is opposed unnatural impurity), and, secondly, the rearing of children
(to which is opposed fornication).

(b) Other sins of impurity are against reason because they violate a
right of the person with whom intercourse is had (incest), or of a
third party to whom that person belongs. If the third party is injured
in conjugal rights, there is adultery; if in parental rights, there is
defloration or rape, according as the injury is done without or with
force; if in religious rights, there is sacrilege. This second category
of sins is classed under impurity rather than under injustice, because
the purpose of the guilty person and his act belong to venereal sin.

2521. Comparative Malice of the Sins of Consummated Lust.--(a) In the
abuse of an act, the worst evil is the disregard of what nature itself
determines as the fundamentals upon which all else depends, just as in
speculative matters the worst error is that which goes astray about
first principles. Now, the prime dictates of nature as to sexual
intercourse are that it serve the race and the family. Hence, the sin
of unnatural lust (which injures the race by defeating its propagation)
and the sin of incest (which injures the family by offending piety) are
the worst of carnal vices.

(b) In the abuse of an act a lesser evil is that which observes the
natural fundamentals, but disregards what right reason teaches about
things secondary, in the manner of performing the act. But reason
requires that in sexual intercourse the rights of the individual be
respected. A most serious violation of individual right is adultery,
which usurps the right of intercourse belonging to another; next in
gravity is rape, which violently seizes for lust a person under the
care of another or undefiled; next is defloration, which trespasses on
the right of guardianship, or removes bodily virginity, but without
violence; last among these sins is fornication, which is an injury done
not to the living, but to the unborn.

2522. Multiplication of Sins of Lust.--The various kinds of lust may be
combined in one and the same act, as when unnatural vice (e.g., sodomy)
is practised with a relative (incest). Sacrilege, of course, aggravates
every other kind of carnal sin, and thus there is sacrilegious sodomy,
sacrilegious adultery, sacrilegious incest, etc.

2523. Fornication.--Fornication is the copulation of an unmarried man
with an unmarried woman who is not a virgin.

(a) It is copulation, or sexual intercourse suited for generation of
children. Thus, it differs from lewdness, which consists in
unconsummated acts, and from sodomitic intercourse, which is
consummated but unsuited for generation. Onanism is an aggravating
circumstance of fornication, or rather a new sin of unnatural
intercourse. (b) It is committed by unmarried persons, and thus it
differs from adultery. (c) It is committed with a woman, and is thus
distinguished from sodomy. (d) It is committed with a woman who is not
a virgin, and thus differs from defloration.

2524. Sinfulness of Fornication.--It is of faith that fornication is a
mortal sin.

(a) Thus, it is gravely forbidden by the divine positive law. Hence,
whores and whoremongers are an abomination to the Lord (Deut., xxiii.
17); fornicators are worthy of death (Rom., i. 29-32), they shall not
enter the kingdom of God (Gal., V. 19-21; Eph., v. 5; Heb., xiii. 4;
Apoc., xxi. 8). The Fathers teach that fornication is a grave crime
(St. Fulgentius), and that it brings condemnation on the guilty person
(St. Chrysostom). The declarations of the Church on the evil of this
sin are found in the Council of Vienne and in the censures of Alexander
VII and Innocent XI (Denzinger, nn. 477, 1125, 1198).

(b) Fornication is gravely forbidden by the natural law. For it is
seriously against reason to cause an injury to the entire life of
another human being; but fornication does this very thing by depriving
the unborn child of its natural rights to legitimacy, to the protection
of both parents, and to education in the home circle. True, in some
cases there may be no prospect of a child, or there may be provision
for its proper rearing; but these cases are the exception, since
fornication from its nature tends to the neglect of the child, and the
morality of acts must be judged, not by the exceptional and accidental,
but by the usual and natural. Those who commit fornication are thinking
of their own pleasure rather than of duty, and will generally shirk the
difficult burdens of parenthood. Society also would be gravely wounded
if unmarried intercourse were at any time lawful. Hence, St. Paul
reproves the pagans, though ignorant of Scripture, for their sins of
fornication (I Cor., vi. 9-11; Eph., v. 1-6), since reason itself
should have taught them the unlawfulness of this practice. It seems,
though, that invincible ignorance of the wrong of fornication is
possible among very rude or barbarous people, since the injury to the
neighbor does not show itself so clearly in this sin as in many others.

2525. Fornication Compared with Other Sins.--(a) It is less serious
than those that offend a divine good (e.g., unbelief, despair, hatred
of God, irreligion), or human life (e.g., abortion), or the human goods
of those already in being (e.g., adultery). (b) It is more serious than
sins that offend only an external good (e.g., theft), or that are
opposed only to decency in the marriage state (e.g., unbecoming kisses
of husband and wife).

2526. Circumstances of Fornication.--(a) Circumstances that aggravate
the malice are the condition of the person with whom the sin is
committed (e.g., that the female is a widow, or the employee of the
man, or his ward, or a minor).

(b) Circumstances that add a new malice to fornication are of various
kinds. Thus, previous circumstances are the distinct desires of the sin
entertained beforehand, the solicitation and scandal of the other party
or parties with whom the sin was committed; concomitant circumstances
are the quality of the persons (e.g., fornication is sacrilegious if
one of the parties is consecrated to God, and also, according to some,
if one party is a Christian and the other an infidel; it is unjust if
one of the couple is betrothed to a third party), or the quality of the
act itself (e.g., if it is performed onanistically, though pollution
may be excused if it results accidentally from the good purpose to
discontinue the sinful act); subsequent circumstances are injury done
to the partner in sin (e.g., by refusal to pay the support or
restitution due) or to the offspring (e.g., by exposure, abortion,
neglect).

Whether the fornication of an engaged person with a third party is a
distinct species of sin is disputed. (a) According to some, it is a
distinct species, or at least a form of adultery on account of the
infidelity. (b) According to others, it is a distinct species if the
guilty party is the woman, but not if it is the man, for the infidelity
of the former is a far more serious matter than the infidelity of the
latter. (c) According to still others, it is never a distinct species,
since engagement to marry is a dissoluble agreement and the injury to
the contract is therefore not a notable one. In this last opinion the
manner of the sin is an aggravating circumstance, not a distinct
species that has to be declared in confession.

2527. Forms of Fornication.--There are three special forms of
fornication, which are all the same essentially, but which differ
accidentally in malice or in results.

(a) Thus, ordinary fornication is that which is committed with a woman
who is neither a harlot nor a concubine. This sin is in itself the
least grave of the three, since it is not so harmful as whoremongering,
nor so enduring as concubinage. Ordinary fornication also has its
degrees of bad and worse: thus, engaged persons who sin together
habitually are worse than those who sin only occasionally, and
circumstances such as artificial onanism and abortion add to the guilt.

(b) Whoremongering is fornication committed with a harlot, that is,
with a woman who makes a business of illicit intercourse and hires
herself out for pay to all comers. Rarely does a harlot choose her life
from passion or love, but is dragged in by white slavers, or enters
from poverty, or after disgrace, or the like. This sin is worse than
ordinary fornication from the viewpoint of propagation, since few
harlots become mothers. But its most dire consequences are visited on
the guilty persons themselves and on society: for the life of a
prostitute is a most degrading slavery; to her patrons she communicates
the most terrible diseases, which are then carried to innocent wives
and children, and to the innocent she often becomes a cause of ruin,
seeking her trade in the streets and public places. Today, according to
reliable newspaper reports, many men and women have become rich in the
terrible business known as the white-slave traffic. This horrible abuse
has grown into a vast international machine which is efficiently
organized, and which profits not only from prostitution, but from many
other kinds of crime. The patrons of brothels, therefore, cooperate
with the crying injustice that is often done the fallen woman, and with
the criminals who destroy souls and bodies for their own advantage.

(c) Free love is fornication committed with one’s concubine, that is,
with a woman who is not a public harlot but who has contracted with one
man for habitual sexual intercourse as if they were man and wife.
According to reports, this is quite common in Europe, where lawful
marriage is very often preceded by free unions. The trial marriage
advocated by some in this country, in which paramours agree to live
together as husband and wife for a certain term of years or at
pleasure, also falls under the category of concubinage. This sin is
worse than mere whoremongering in one respect, namely, that it includes
the purpose to continue in the state of sin, at least for a certain
length of time. Moreover, there is often the public scandal and
contempt for public opinion which other kinds of fornication may be
free from. One who practises concubinage is living in a proximate
occasion of sin, and hence he cannot be absolved unless he dismisses
the concubine, if they cohabit, or agrees to keep away from her, if
they do not cohabit.

2528. The State and Places of Prostitution.--It is clear that civil
government has no right to support or provide places of prostitution,
or to give permission for its practice, since fornication is
intrinsically evil. But what should be said of toleration or license
given to prostitutes by the public authority?

(a) Theoretically, the civil power has the right to give toleration or
license; for, if the common welfare will suffer from a greater evil
unless a lesser evil is suffered to go on, the lesser evil should be
endured, and it is certain that there are greater evils than
prostitution (such as rape and unnatural crimes of lust).

(b) Practically, the question is open to dispute. Older moralists held
that toleration was actually more beneficial to the common good than
suppression. But under the conditions of the present time many
moralists think it is a mistake to give any recognition to prostitutes,
and much less to houses of prostitution. Even in large cities, where
alone the license could be beneficial, the purposes of toleration are
not fulfilled; for the moral evil seems to be greater, since an
appearance of legality is given to prostitution, its practice is
facilitated, its habitats become dens of every kind of iniquity, and
the purpose of segregation is not realized; the physical evils also are
not lessened, but perhaps increased, for even with medical inspection
of prostitutes, syphilis and gonorrhea cannot be prevented.

2529. Defloration and Rape.--Defloration and rape are distinct species
of lust, for each of them in its very concept includes a special and
notable deformity not found in other species of impurity.

(a) Defloration is unlawful carnal knowledge of a woman who is virginal
in body (1488 a). It has the special deformity of depriving the woman
of the physical integrity that is most highly prized among all the
unmarried of her sex, or at least of her own self-respect, and of
setting her on the way to become a strumpet rather than an honorable
wife or spinster. Some authors do not consider defloration a special
sin unless it is done by violence, or unless injury is done the
parental right over the virgin; and even the authors who consider
unforced defloration a special sin hold that the new or additional
malice in it is slight and venial, and therefore not a necessary matter
of confession. The first sin of fornication by a male is not a special
sin, because the consequences are not so serious for the man as for the
woman, but of course seduction is always a special sin, whether the
injured party be male or female.

(b) Rape is physical or moral coercion (i.e., force or fear) employed
against any person (male or female, married or single, pure or
corrupt), or against his or her guardians, to compel him or her to an
act of lust. It has the special deformity of inflicting bodily injury
on the person ravished. The sin of rape should not be confused with the
canonical crime of rape, which consists in abduction, and which is an
impediment to marriage (Canon 1074); nor with seduction, as when an
innocent person is deceived into believing that an act of impurity is
lawful, or is tricked into sin by false promises of marriage.
Equivalent to rape is the carnal knowledge of a person drugged,
hypnotized, or otherwise unconscious, or the seduction of an infant. A
person who is ravished is obliged to deny all consent internally, and
to resist or make outcry when this is possible (see 2497 a).

2530. Adultery.--Adultery is also a distinct species of lust.--(a)
Definition.--Adultery is sexual intercourse with the husband or wife of
another. If the sin is committed only in desire, there is mental
adultery; if the paramours allow themselves unlawful familiarities
without intercourse, or if a married person is guilty of solitary lust,
there is imperfect adultery.

(b) Sinfulness of Adultery.--Adultery is a grave sin, since it is an
act of impurity and is expressly forbidden in the sixth commandment
(Exod., xx. 14), and is classed among the sins that exclude from the
kingdom of heaven (I Cor., vi. 9, 10). It is a special sin, because it
is a violation of the faith pledged in the contract and Sacrament of
Matrimony, and an injury to the right of one’s spouse and of the
conjugal state (Matt., xix. 5; Rom., vii. 3; I Cor., vii. 39). Even
though a husband gives his wife permission to commit adultery or vice
versa, the injustice remains, for though the individual is not formally
injured, the married state is injured, since no married person has the
right to give a permission opposed to the sacredness of the marriage
vows (Denzinger, n. 1200).

(c) Degrees of Malice.--There are three degrees of malice in adultery.
The first is that in which a married man sins with a single woman; the
second that in which a married woman sins with a single man; the third
that in which a married man sins with another man’s wife. The second is
worse than the first, on account of its consequences (e.g., sterility,
uncertainty of paternity, rearing of an illegitimate child in the
family); the third is worse than the second, because in addition to the
consequences just mentioned, it contains a double injustice (viz.,
unfaithfulness to an innocent wife and unfaithfulness to an innocent
husband), and it multiplies the sin. If an adulterer’s husband or wife
is also unfaithful, the injustice is lessened, but not removed; for not
merely the two married persons are to be considered, but also the
children, the family, society, and God; and the wrong done by one of
the parties does not take away the right to fidelity pledged absolutely
to all of these in marriage.

(d) Effects.--The party whose marriage rights have been injured by
adultery was permitted under some former civil codes to kill a wife
taken in adultery. But such laws were against justice and charity:
against justice since no guilty person should be put to death unheard,
and no injured person should be judge and accuser in his own case;
against charity, since by such summary vengeance the adulteress would
be sent to death in the midst of sin and without opportunity for
repentance. The remedies of Canon Law for the innocent spouse will be
noted below (2542).

2531. Incest.--Incest is impurity committed with a person related to
one within the degrees in which marriage is forbidden.

(a) It is impurity, internal or external. Internal desires are mental
incest, while external unconsummated (e.g., kisses) or consummated
(e.g., intercourse) acts are actual incest.

(b) It is committed with a relative, that is, with a person, male or
female, who is near to one by the tie of common ancestry (blood
relationship, kinship, consanguinity), or of marriage to one’s kin
(marriage relationship, affinity), or of sacramental administration
(spiritual relationship), or of adoption (legal relationship). Alias
species cognationis non pertinent ad incestum, sed novam aliquam
malitiam possunt tribuere; v.g., si partes sunt parochus et parochiana,
confessarius et poenitens, habetur scandalum, seductio.

(c) The relationship is within the canonical degrees. Thus, marriage
between blood relatives is forbidden in all degrees of the direct line
(e.g., as to all female ancestry and posterity of a man) and in the
first three degrees of the collateral line, which includes, for a man,
his sisters, nieces, grandnieces, aunts, first and second cousins,
grand aunts and their daughters and granddaughters. Marriage between
those who are relatives-in-law is forbidden in all degrees of the
direct line (e.g., as to wife’s mother, daughter, etc.) and in the
first two degrees of the collateral line (e.g., wife’s sister, first
cousin, aunt or niece). Spiritual relationship which is impedient of
marriage exists between a person baptized and his baptizer, and also
between the god-child and the god-parent in baptism. Legal relationship
exists between the adopter and the adopted, when and as the civil law
makes it a bar to marriage.

(d) Incest is committed within the forbidden degrees, and hence if a
dispensation from an impediment of relationship had been granted to
parties about to marry, a sin between them would not be incestuous.

2532. Incest as a Distinct Species of Sin.--(a) There is a specific
distinction between incest and other forms of lust, since incest
violates not only purity, but also the piety and respect due each other
by those who are so closely related as to be unable to contract a
lawful marriage. Nature itself abhors this sin; for, apart from the
exceptional cases in which a dispensation is given, even lawful
marriage with near relatives would be an incentive to many sins before
marriage and would prevent the widening circle of friendships between
mankind which marriage with non-relatives produces, and would cause a
physical and mental enfeeblement of the race. In Scripture incest is
spoken of with peculiar horror as a nefarious deed deserving of death
(Lev., xx. 11 sqq.), and as an act unworthy even of pagans (I Cor., v.
1 sqq.).

(b) There are three distinct sub-species of incest, namely, natural
incest (between kin by blood or marriage), spiritual incest (between
the baptized and his baptizer or god-parent), and legal incest (between
persons who are kin in virtue of 8, marriage-impeding adoption). The
first violates piety due to natural origin, the second that due to
spiritual origin, and the third that due to legal origin. And in each
species the nearer the relationship, the greater the sin (e.g., incest
with a sister-in-law is less than that with a sister, incest with a
sister is less than that with a mother).

2533. Carnal Sacrilege.--Carnal sacrilege is the violation by an act of
impurity of the sacredness of a person, place or thing.

(a) It is a violation of sacredness, and thus it is a special sin,
adding irreligion to lust (see 2308 sqq.).

(b) It is an act of impurity, internal or external, consummated or
non-consummated. The impurity, however, must be so related to that
which is sacred as to treat its sanctity with injury or contempt
(formal disrespect), and there is no sacrilege if the impurity is
associated with something holy in such a way as not to show any notable
irreverence (material disrespect).

(c) Its first species is personal sacrilege, and it is committed by a
sacred person (see 2309) when he is impure internally or externally, or
by a non-sacred person when in desire or act he commits impurity with a
sacred person. If two sacred persons sin together, there is a double
sacrilege, which multiplies the sin.

(d) Its second species is local sacrilege, and is committed when an
impure act is done in a sacred place (2311) in such a way as to show
formal disrespect. Hence, consummated acts done in a church are
sacrilegious, and the same is probably true of non-consummated acts, at
least if they are of an enormous kind (e.g., a lascivious dance), and
even of internal desires to sin in the sacred place. But impure
thoughts or passing glances of prurient curiosity in a church are not
sacrilegious.

(e) Its third species is real sacrilege, and it occurs when impurity is
committed in such a way as to show formal disrespect to a sacred object
(2311). Hence, there is sacrilege of this kind when one commits
impurity immediately after Communion, or when one uses the Sacrament of
Penance as a means to solicit impurity. But the fact that a person
commits impurity while wearing a scapular is not sacrilegious, unless
contempt for the scapular was intended.

2534. Unnatural Lust.--Worst among the sins of impurity, as such, are
crimes of unnatural lust, for they exercise the sexual act, not only
illicitly, but also in a manner that defeats its purpose of
reproduction. In some non-venereal respects, however, natural sins of
impurity may be worse than the unnatural; for example, adultery is
worse as regards injustice, sacrilegious lust as regards irreligion,
etc. There are four distinct species of unnatural impurities--
pollution, unnatural coition, sodomy, bestiality (see Denzinger, n.
1124).

(a) For procreation nature requires copulation, and hence pollution is
unnatural, for it exercises semination without copulation, either alone
(self-abuse, solitary vice, masturbation) or with another (softness).

(b) For procreation nature requires proper copulation, that is, one
that will permit of a fertile union between the two life elements, the
sperma and the ovum. Hence, unnatural coition does not comply with this
necessity, for it does not employ the proper organ of sexual union,
substituting rectal for vaginal intercourse, or else by some form of
natural or artificial onanism it frustrates the act of its destined
conclusion. This sin is worse than pollution, since pollution omits to
use intercourse, whereas unnatural coition positively abuses it.

(c) For procreation nature requires heterosexual intercourse, a
condition disregarded by sodomy, which is the lustful commerce of male
with male (pederasty, uranism), or of female with female (tribadism,
sapphism, Lesbian love). This sin is worse than unnatural coition, for
it is a greater perversity to neglect one of the two needed life
elements than to neglect the right process for their union (see Gen.,
xix. 24, 25; Lev., xx. 13; Rom., i. 26, 27).

(d) Finally, for procreation nature requires homogeneous intercourse, a
law violated by bestiality, which is coition of a human being, male or
female, with a brute animal. This is the worst of unnatural impurities,
since it sins against the most fundamental condition for the sexual
act, namely, that the participants be of the same nature (see Lev., xx.
15, 16). Similar to bestiality is the crime of necrophilism
(intercourse with a corpse).

2535. Pollution.--Pollution is the voluntary emission of semen apart
from coition.

(a) It is an emission, that is an external discharge. The internal
secretion in the so-called female semination is also included by many
under the head of pollution. The carnal motions spoken of in 2497 b are
a preparation for pollution.

(b) It is a discharge of semen, that is, of the male fluid that
fertilizes the female ovum. But equivalent pollution, from the moral
viewpoint, is found in the discharge of certain non-prolific fluids
that are accessory to generation or that produce in their movement a
venereal satisfaction, such as the vaginal fluid in females (female
semination), the urethral fluid in males capable or incapable of
procreation (distillation). There is no pollution, however, in natural
discharges such as menstruation and urination.

(c) It is apart from coition, and thus it differs from other
consummated sins. But pollution may be committed either alone (solitary
vice), or with another, and in the latter case it pertains reductively
to adultery, fornication, sodomy, etc., as the case may be.

(d) It is voluntary directly or indirectly: directly, when one intends
it as an end (e.g., for the sake of the pleasure) or as a means (e.g.,
as a relief from temptation or bodily itching, to obtain a specimen of
semen for medical diagnosis); indirectly, when one unjustifiably does
something from which one foresees that pollution will result. In all
these cases pollution is formal or sinful, and it is not to be confused
with material or natural pollution, which is a discharge of semen or
distillation that is involuntary or unimputable.

2536. Cases of Material or Non-Sinful Pollution.--(a) Involuntary
pollution is passive or active. The former happens even when one is
awake. It is evoked by such slight causes as physical movement and
exertion, and is unaccompanied by pleasure; when habitual, it is a
disease due to organic debility The latter happens during sleep, and
may be caused by a superfluity of fluid. It is accompanied by pleasure
and often by libidinous dreams. It is a means used by nature to relieve
the system, and is therefore healthful and beneficial, unless the
discharges are too frequent (e.g., nightly). There is no obligation of
repressing the continuance of a pollution that began involuntarily
during sleep, since it may be regarded as an act of nature; but consent
must be withheld (2498 sqq.). Moreover, if merely natural pollution be
considered, not as to its venereal gratification but solely as to its
good effects (e.g., that it ends a temptation, that it benefits the
mind or the health), there is no sin in rejoicing at its accomplishment
or in desiring its fulfillment, provided nothing is done to produce it
and the intention is good; for then the object of the will is
indifferent and the end is good.

(b) Unimputable pollution is caused by a lawful act from which one
foresees that pollution will ensue, there being no proximate danger of
consent to sin, and the pollution being only permitted, and that for a
proportionately grave reason.

2537. Unimputable Pollution.--In reference to unimputable pollution the
following distinctions should be noted:

(a) the danger risked by an act may be either of formal pollution
(i.e., with consent to sin) or of material pollution (i.e., without
consent to sin);

(b) the danger of pollution is either proximate or remote, the former
being that from which pollution naturally and usually results and the
latter that from which it does not naturally or usually result.
Remotely dangerous are acts of a non-venereal kind, such as horseback
riding, gymnastics, drinking alcoholic beverages, and also acts of a
sexual kind that are only mildly exciting, such as conversations or
books that are slightly “off color” when the parties are of mature age
(see 2517, 2518). Proximately dangerous are acts of a venereal kind
that notably inflame passion, such as warm and lingering kisses between
persons of opposite sexes (see 2517, 2518);

(c) the reason for running the danger of pollution is either grave,
serious, or slight. A grave reason is real necessity (e.g., the removal
of disease or pain or of a very painful or troublesome itch due to the
blood or disease) or great utility (e.g., the preservation of health,
cleanliness of body); a serious reason is an important convenience of
soul or body (e.g., the exercise of common politeness, the enjoyment of
reasonable comfort); a slight reason is one in which none of the
mentioned motives is found (e.g., the satisfaction of an idle
curiosity, the removal of a trifling irritation or itch).

2538. Proximate and Remote Occasions of Pollution.--It is never lawful
to expose oneself to the immediate danger of sin, for he who loves the
danger loves the sin (see 258, 260); but if one uses means to make the
danger remote, one may lawfully encounter it for a good reason (see
258, 260, 261). It is lawful to permit an evil effect when there is
sufficient justification according to the principle of double effect
(see 103 sqq.).

(a) Hence, if there is proximate danger of formal pollution (that is,
of consent to sin), no reason excuses an act even of a non-sexual kind,
such as horseback riding. But if the act is necessary, the danger must
be made remote by the use of special means, such as prayer, firm
resolves, etc. (see 2497 sqq.).

(b) If there is proximate danger of material pollution, a grave reason
suffices (e.g., the care of patients by physicians and nurses,
assistance of bathers by attendants, warm soporific drinks taken for
the sake of sleep).

(c) If there is remote danger of material pollution, a serious reason
suffices (e.g., customary salutations of the country, physical
exercises, moderate comfort in posture, seasoning in food.). A slight
reason may excuse at times from mortal sin (e.g., unnecessary curiosity
about the sciences of anatomy or sexology).

2539. The Theological Malice of Sinful Pollution.--(a) From its nature
pollution is a mortal sin, because it is an act of impurity (1494) and
a perversion of nature (2534). Moreover, its consequences are most
injurious to society (it tends to self-indulgence and the avoidance of
the burdens of marriage) and to the individual (when habitual, it
weakens mental and will power and often brings on a breakdown of bodily
vigor especially among young people), In Scripture it is represented as
gravely illicit (I Cor., vi. 10; Gal., v. 19; Eph., v. 3). Hence,
pollution is always a mortal sin when directly willed (e.g., when
practised deliberately in order to be rid of a temptation or of bodily
irritation or itch certainly due to superfluity of semen or to
passion), and also when indirectly willed if there is proximate danger
of consent to sin (e.g., when one who has always committed formal
pollution in certain company goes into that company without necessity,
or without use of means to prevent a fall) or grave danger of pollution
and no sufficient reason for permitting it (e.g., undue familiarities
from which nocturnal pollution is foreseen as most probable).

(b) From the imperfection of the internal act, pollution is sometimes
only a venial sin. This happens in case of invincible ignorance (e.g.,
young children who do not understand the evil of masturbation, students
who have been taught by instructors or physical directors that it is
necessary for health or that it is unsanitary but not sinful), or of
incomplete consent (e.g., when the person is only half awake and does
not ordinarily desire pollution, when he is a psychopathic and not
fully responsible for his acts).

(c) From the lightness of the matter pollution is venial when willed
indirectly and permitted without sufficient reason, if there is only
slight danger of it from the nature of the action performed (see 2496).
Examples are the reading for pastime of love stories before falling
asleep with the prevision that this may possibly bring on pollution
during sleep.

2540. If the action productive of pollution is gravely illicit, as
being seriously opposed to chastity (e.g., lewdness) or to some other
virtue (e.g., extreme intemperance in drugs or alcohol), is one thereby
guilty of the grave sin of pollution?

(a) If the case be considered in the abstract, the answer is in the
negative. For if the action in question is only remotely dangerous as
regards pollution (e.g., an action of a non-venereal kind such as
intemperance does not necessarily tend to impurity, an act of a
venereal kind that is momentary, such as a desire, does not strongly
affect the passions), the sin is only venial in so far as pollution is
concerned (see 2517, 2518).

(b) If the case be considered in the concrete, the answer is in the
affirmative as a rule when there is question of a habit. For generally
those who act habitually in this way yield consent to the pollution as
well as to the sin that precedes. Authorities note, however, that he
who repents of the cause of pollution before the pollution results is
not guilty of the actual pollution.

2541. The Moral Species of Sinful Pollution.--(a) The general species
of pollution is distinct from other consummated sins of impurity, since
it is unnatural, and this in a special way (see 2534, and Denzinger, n.
1124), But some authors regard equivalent pollution (see 2493, 2535) as
not a consummated sin, since it is without true semination, and hence
according to them it may be confessed simply as impure pleasure (see
2519 b).

(b) The particular species of pollution is derived from circumstances
that give it a new essential malice. If it is solitary, and committed
by one who is under no bond of marriage or vow, and accompanied by no
thought or desire except in reference to self or self-gratification
(autoerotism, narcissism), there is the single sin of pollution. But
there are other sins if it is committed by one under special obligation
(i.e., adultery or sacrilege), or if committed with another person
(e.g., seduction, cooperation, rape), or if committed with impure
thoughts or desires about others (e.g., mental adultery, fornication,
sodomy, bestiality). The manner in which pollution is performed (e.g.,
whether cooperative pollution is active or passive, by irrumation or
concubitus or touch, with or without an instrument) is _per se_ an
accidental circumstance. According to some authors, cooperative
pollution brought on by touch alone is not diversified in species, if
there is no special affection for the other person, but only the desire
of carnal gratification, and hence it may be declared simply as
pollution from touch.

2542. Penalties for Immorality Decreed in Canons 2357-2359.--(a) Laymen
who are guilty of certain offenses against the sixth commandment become
infamous on conviction and are excluded from legitimate ecclesiastical
acts. In case of adultery, the injured spouse may obtain a separation,
temporary or perpetual, from the offending spouse (Canon 1129). (b)
Clerics in minor orders are subject to special punishments, and may
even be dismissed from the clerical state. (c) Clerics in major orders
are subject to penalties named in law (e.g., suspension, infamy,
deposition) for graver crimes such as concubinage, adultery, and to
penalties decreed by the lawful superior for other delinquencies.

2543. The Potential Parts of Temperance.--The appetites of pleasure are
the most difficult to restrain, and there is need of a perfect virtue
like temperance to rule over them and keep them within the bounds of
reason. The analogous or potential virtues of temperance are that one
which is able to check, though it does not tame, the animal appetites
(continency), and those that preside and rule over the less violent
appetites for vengeance, exercise of authority, superior excellence,
knowledge, amusement and display (meekness, etc.). See above, 2465 c.

2544. Continence.--(a) Its Nature.--This quality, as here taken, is the
state of one who has not gained mastery over the passions sufficient to
keep down strong, frequent and persistent rebellions, but whose will is
firmly disposed to resist their attacks. It is less than a moral
virtue, then, since it does not tranquillize the lower appetites. The
temperate man has already subdued his passions, and hence he is less
disturbed by them, or at least he has less trouble in rejecting their
onsets.

(b) Its Relation to Temperance.--Greater difficulty increases merit, if
it is due to the presence of a corporal or external impediment (e.g., a
man of sickly constitution or one who suffers great opposition deserves
more credit for his work than a man of vigorous constitution or one who
enjoys great favors and opportunities); not, however, if it is due to
the absence of a spiritual excellence (e.g., a man who finds work hard
because he is lazy does not deserve more credit than another who finds
it easy because he is industrious). Hence, temperance is more deserving
than continence, for it controls passion with greater ease simply
because it has subjected not only the higher but also the lower
appetite to the dictates of reason.

(c) Its Opposite.--The vice opposed to continence is incontinence,
which does not follow the dictate of reason to resist the onslaughts of
passion; it sees and approves the higher things, but it follows the
lower. This sin is less grievous than intemperance, just as a passing
indisposition is less harmful than a settled malady. For passion comes
and goes, and the incontinent man quickly regrets his weakness; but a
sinful habit of gluttony or impurity is permanent, and is so like a
second nature that its votaries rejoice when they have satisfied their
desires (Prov., ii. 14). Incontinence in pleasure is more disgraceful
than incontinence in anger, for anger is less distant from reason; but
on the other hand the irascible man usually sins more grievously by the
greater harm he does to others. It is more difficult to contain oneself
from wrath than from intemperance in the sense that wrath storms the
soul by a more vehement and compelling attack; yet, it is harder to be
unconquered by pleasure, because it lays persistent siege to the soul
and demands a more unwearied vigilance.

2545. Meekness.--Meekness or mildness is the virtue that moderates
anger.

(a) It is a virtue, since it consists in moderation according to right
reason. Our Lord proclaims it blessed (Matt., v. 4). and St. Paul
numbers it among the Fruits of the Spirit (Gal., v. 23). Illustrious
models of mildness are Joseph (Gen., l. 20), Moses (Num., xii. 3),
David (I Kings, xxiv), Christ (Luke, xv; John, i. 29, viii. 11), St.
Paul (Acts, xx. 31).

(b) Its office is moderation, and hence in its manner, though not in
its matter, it is like temperance. It follows the middle way between
the extremes of sinful indignation and sinful indulgence.

(c) Its matter is the passion of anger, that is, the sensitive appetite
that inclines one to avenge an evil by punishing its author. Like other
passions (121), anger is indifferent in itself, but it is made good or
evil by its reasonableness or unreasonableness. The meek man is angry
at times, but only when and where and as he should be (Ps. iv. 5); his
anger is not a blind impulse, but a righteous zeal that attacks a wrong
only after reason has shown that this is the proper course.

2546. Anger.--Anger is sinful when it deviates from reason, as to its
matter or its manner.

(a) Thus, it is unreasonable as to its matter (i.e., its vengeance)
when it punishes unjustifiably (e.g., when the person punished is
innocent, when the penalty is excessive, when the legal order is not
followed, when the motive is not justice or correction, but hatred,
etc).

(b) It is unreasonable as to its manner (i.e., the degree of excitement
felt or shown) when temper goes beyond measure. Great anger is not
sinful when a great evil calls for it (e.g., the anger of Our Lord
against the money-changers in John, vi. 14 sqq.; that of Mathathias
against the idolatrous Jew in I Mach., ii. 24); but to fly into a rage
at nothings or trifles is sinful.

2547. Gravity of the Sin of Anger.--(a) If anger is sinful on account
of its matter, it is mortal from its nature as being opposed to charity
and justice. He that is angry against his brother is worthy of hell
fire (Matt., v. 21, 22). It may be venial, however, on account of
imperfection of the act (e.g., the sudden impulse to strike down those
who do not agree with one’s opinions) or the lightness of the matter
(e.g., a slap or push or box on the ears given a naughty child when a
word of reproof would have sufficed).

(b) If anger is sinful on account of its manner, it is venial from its
nature; for excess in an otherwise indifferent passion is not a serious
disorder (see 2450). But the sin may be mortal by reason of
circumstances, as when an angry person acts like a wild man, curses and
swears, breaks the furniture, gives serious scandal on account of his
position, or the time or place, or injures his health by the violence
of his paroxysm.

2548. Is Anger a Graver Sin than Hatred and Envy?--(a) As to its
matter, anger is less grave than hatred and envy, for it pursues evil
under the guise of spiritual good, pretending at least that the harm it
intends is just, whereas hatred and envy pursue evil precisely as it is
injurious to another, or as it is a means to one’s own temporal and
external good or glory. Likewise, anger is less grave objectively than
concupiscence, for the voluptuous man aims at utility or pleasure,
whereas the revengeful man aims at what he makes believe is just.

(b) As to its manner, anger surpasses the vices mentioned in certain of
its violent manifestations. The infuriated man, when crossed, creates a
scene and makes a fool of himself; his blood boils, his face is
flushed, his eyes dart fire, he froths at the mouth and trembles, he
pounds, stamps and bellows like an enraged bull.

2549. Anger as One of the Seven Capital Vices.--(a) It has a certain
preeminence in evil. Its matter is quite attractive, for revenge is
sweet and the cloak of just retaliation makes it seem good; its manner
is powerful, for it drives one on to dare even the most shocking crimes.

(b) It is the spring of many sins. In the heart anger produces
indignation against the object of displeasure, whom the angry man looks
upon as base and unworthy, and soreness about the treatment of self,
which fills the mind with plans of revenge. Sins of the mouth due to
anger are incoherent cries of rage, words of contumely and blasphemy
(Matt., v. 22), while its sinful deeds include quarrels and every kind
of injury.

2550. Sinful Indulgence.--Sinful indulgence, which is opposed to
meekness by excess, is often a mortal sin on account of the grave harm
it inflicts upon the common welfare and the protection it affords to
crime. Thus, Heli was seriously reproved and punished because he winked
at grave disorders, or at least was too easy-going in his corrections
(I Kings, ii, iii).

2551. Clemency.--Clemency is a virtue that inclines one, from a spirit
of kindness and moderation, to be as easy in inflicting punishments as
the claims of justice will allow.

(a) Clemency is a virtue, because it is reasonable, does good to
others, and makes the doer good. It is beneficial to public as well as
private interest: “Mercy and truth preserve the king, and his throne is
strengthened by clemency” (Prov., xx. 28).

(b) It inclines one to be easy, that is, to temper or relax the
severity of the law. Thus, it differs from the virtues of legal justice
and of charitable forgiveness, the former of which, when necessary,
insists on the full rigor of the law (see 2381 sqq.), whereas the
latter, when permissible, grants an enemy a full pardon (see 1198).

(c) Its matter is punishment, that is, the external evil of
chastisement visited on wrongdoers. Hence, it differs from meekness,
which deals with the internal emotion of anger, and from mercy, which
deals with external goods bestowed upon the suffering.

(d) It is easy only in so far as the claims of justice will allow; that
is, it acts from a sense of responsibility to the rights and claims of
the common good and of all the interests involved, and decides
according to an impartial and enlightened judgment that circumstances
of person, deed, cause, etc., call for a departure from the strict
requirements of law or custom. Clemency is not the same thing, then, as
arbitrary laxity or sentimentalism.

(e) It is moved in the first place by kindness to the offender, and
thus it differs both from the virtue of equity (which acts from the
sense of higher justice) and from the vices of favoritism, extortion,
and cowardice (which extend forbearance only to friends or to those who
offer bribes or who bring pressure to bear).

(f) It is moved secondly by a spirit of moderation. Many persons are
spoiled by authority: feeling their own importance, they desire to
exercise their powers to the limit and to keep others down as much as
possible. The clement man, on the contrary, keeps his poise and uses
his authority with moderation. Meekness should be practised by all, but
clemency is the proper virtue of superiors.

2552. The Vices Opposed to Clemency.--(a) The extreme of defect is
cruelty, which is a hardness of heart, not moved by the sufferings of
others, that disposes one to inflict excessive punishments. The worst
form of cruelty is savagery, which takes inhuman delight in the
sufferings of others and inflicts pain without regard for guilt or
innocence.

(b) The extreme of excess is undue leniency, which spares the rod when
it should be used. There are times when severity is necessary, as when
a crime was malicious and cold-blooded, when an offender is stubborn
and irreformable, and when mildness will harm the public welfare or
invite the sinner to repeat his offense. In such cases it would be
unwise and harmful to mitigate the sentence which wise statutes or
customs provide for the offense.

2553. Humility.--Humility is the virtue that makes one modest in the
desire of greatness.

(a) It is a virtue, that is, a moral excellence and a voluntary
disposition. Hence, it is not the same as physical humility (e.g., the
humble or lowly circumstances in which a person was born) or as
involuntary humility (e.g., the humiliation which comes upon those who
exalt themselves).

(b) It is concerned with greatness, that is, with the higher things
that pertain to greatness of soul (see 2448 sqq.). There is no
opposition between these two virtues, for greatness of soul makes one
set such a value upon the gifts one has received from God as to aspire
to the betterment for which they prepare one, while humility makes one
realize one’s own shortcomings so sincerely that it keeps one from the
desire of those excellences for which one is unsuited.

(c) It is modest; that is, it regulates according to the standard of
reason the passion for greatness, so that one may avoid the extremes of
pride and of abjectness or littleness of soul (see 2465 c).

2554. The Three Acts of Humility.--(a) Its regulatory act is in the
intellect, and consists in the knowledge and acknowledgment of one’s
infirmity and inferiority, not only in comparison with God, but also in
comparison with men.

(b) Its essential act is in the appetite and consists in a regulation
of the hope for greatness so that, recognizing one’s limitations, one
does not strive for that for which one is unfitted. Higher degrees of
humility are those which do not desire honor, or which are pained by
it, or which desire dishonor.

(c) Its expressive act is in the external conduct. St. Benedict says
that the humble person avoids singularity in deed, is sparing in his
words and not given to loudness, and bears himself modestly, not
staring about or laughing immoderately. But there is also a false
humility, which is only in externals, and this is really proud
hypocrisy (Ecclus., xix. 23).

2555. Two Requirements of Humility.--Humility is chiefly an abasement
of self before God (Gen., xviii. 27), and it is not opposed to truth or
to good order. Hence, the two following rules on the lowering of self
before fellow-creatures:

(a) in the internal act, humility requires that each one acknowledge
his neighbor as his better, if comparison is made between what the
former has from himself and what the latter has from God (Phil., ii. 3;
Osee, xiii. 9). But it is not against humility to believe that one has
more of divine grace or less of human imperfection than another, if
there are good reasons for the belief (Eph., iii. 5; Gal., ii. 15);

(b) in the external act, humility requires that one show proper signs
of respect to one’s betters. But of persons who are in authority St.
Augustine says that, while before God they should prostrate themselves
at the feet of all, before man they should not so demean themselves to
inferiors as to detract from their dignity or authority. Like the other
virtues, humility must be guided in its manifestations by prudence as
to place, time, and other circumstances.

2556. The Excellence of Humility.--(a) Humility is inferior to the
theological virtues, which tend immediately to the end itself, and also
to the intellectual virtues and legal justice, which rightly dispose
mind and will about the means to that end. Humility and the remaining
virtues incline one to follow the direction of mind and will, but with
this difference that, while humility makes one ready for submission in
all that is right, temperance, fortitude and the rest prepare one for
submission only in some one or other particular matter. To these latter
virtues, then, humility is superior.

(b) Humility is the groundwork of the spiritual edifice negatively or
indirectly; for, since God resists the proud and gives grace to the
humble (James, iv. 6), the obstacles to the other virtues are removed
by humility. But it is faith which positively and directly places the
cornerstone of the spiritual life, for faith is the first approach
towards God: “He who would come to God must believe” (Heb., xi. 6).

2557. Pride.--Pride is an inordinate desire of one’s own personal
excellence.

(a) It is a desire, for the object of pride is that which is pleasing
and yet not easy of attainment.

(b) The desire is concerned with excellence, that is, with a high
degree of some perfection (such as virtue, knowledge, beauty, fame,
honor) or with superiority to others in perfection.

(c) The excellence sought is personal; that is, the object of pride is
self as exalted on high or raised above others. Ambition seeks
greatness in honors and dignities, presumption greatness in
accomplishment, and vanity greatness in reputation and glory; pride,
from which these other vices spring, seeks the greatness of the ego or
of those things with which the ego is identified, such as one’s own
children, one’s own family, or one’s own race.

(d) The desire is inordinate, either as to the matter, when one desires
an excellence or superiority of which one is unworthy (e.g., equality
with Our Lord), or as to the manner, when one expressly desires to have
excellence or superiority without due subjection (e.g., to possess
one’s virtue without dependence on God or from one’s own unaided
merits). In the former case pride is opposed to greatness of soul, in
the latter case to humility. The contempt which is proper to pride is a
disdain for subjection, and the contempt which belongs to disobedience
is a disgust for a precept; but pride naturally leads to contempt for
law and for God and the neighbor (see 2367).

2558. The Acts of Pride.--(a) In his intellect, the proud man has an
exaggerated opinion of his own worth, and this causes his inordinate
desire of praise and exaltation. But pride may also be the cause of
conceited ideas, for those who are too much in admiration of themselves
often come to think that they are really as great as they wish to be.

(b) The will of the proud man worships his own greatness, and longs for
its recognition and glorification by others.

(c) In his external words and works, the proud man betrays himself by
boasting, self-glorification, self-justification, by his haughty
appearance and gestures and luxurious style, by arrogance, insolence,
perfidy, disregard of the rights and feelings of others, etc.

2559. The Sinfulness of Pride.--(a) Complete pride, which turns away
from God because it considers subjection detrimental to one’s own
excellence, is a mortal sin from its nature, since it is a manifest
rebellion against the Supreme Being (Ecclus., x. 14). Such was the
pride of Lucifer, but it is rare in human beings. Complete pride may be
venial from the imperfection of the act, when it is only a
semideliberate wish.

(b) Incomplete pride, which turns inordinately to the love of created
excellence but without disaffection to superiors, is in itself a venial
sin, for there is no serious disorder in the excess of an otherwise
indifferent passion. But circumstances may make this pride mortal
(e.g., when it is productive of serious harm to others).

2560. Pride Compared with Other Sins.--(a) Gravity.--Complete pride is
less than hatred of God, for the former has as its object personal
excellence, the latter separation from God. But after hatred of God
complete pride is worse disloyalty than any other mortal sin; it
separates from God directly, since it abjures allegiance to the Supreme
Being, while other sins separate from God only indirectly, since they
offend, not from contempt, but from ignorance, or passion or excessive
desire.

(b) Origin.--Pride was the first sin, because by it the angels and our
first parents fell, the angels desiring likeness to God in beatitude,
Adam and Eve likeness in knowledge (Ecclus., x. 15; Prov., xviii. 11;
Tob., iv. 14).

(c) Influence.--Pride is called the queen and mother of the seven
capital vices--namely, vainglory (2450), gluttony (2473), lust (2494),
avarice (2426), sloth (1322), envy (1342), and anger (2549)--not in the
sense that every sin is the result of pride (for many persons sin from
ignorance, passion, etc.), but in the sense that the inordinate desire
of personal excellence is a motive that can impel one to any kind of
sin, just as covetousness offers a means that is useful for every
temporal end (I Tim., vi. 10). Pride is also most dangerous, since it
steals away the reward of virtue itself (Matt., vi. 2); and, as
humility is the first step towards heaven, pride is the first step
towards hell.

2561. Abjection.--The other extreme of pride is abjection. (a) As a
turning away from these higher things to which one should aspire, this
sin is the same as littleness of soul, and it is opposed to greatness
of soul (see 2451). (b) As a turning to lower things or to a submission
to others which is unreasonable, this vice is directly opposed to
humility. Examples are persons of knowledge who waste their time on
menial labor when they should be more usefully employed in other
pursuits, or who permit themselves to be corrected and guided by the
errors and false principles of the ignorant.

2562. Studiousness.--Studiousness (_studiositas_) is the virtue that
makes one modest in the desire of knowledge.

(a) Its object is the desire of knowledge; for man is gifted with
powers of sensation and understanding, and nature inclines him to
desire the exercise of these powers to see, hear, picture, apprehend,
judge, reason, etc.

(b) Its function is to make one modest in this desire (see 2465 c);
that is, it regulates the inclination of nature according to reason, so
that one may avoid both excess and defect in the pursuit of knowledge.
On the one hand, the soul has the urge to discover and learn, but just
as bodily hunger leads to gluttony, if not restrained, so does mental
hunger become a vice (curiosity), if it is not moderated. On the other
hand, the body has a disinclination for the labor, weariness and
hardship which study demands, and, if this reluctance is not overcome,
one becomes guilty of the sin of negligence or ignorance (see 904,
1326, 1671).

(c) Its character, therefore, is that of a virtue, since it holds a
natural appetite within moderation, avoiding the extremes of excess and
defect, and keeping custody over senses and mind. This virtue is
praised in Prov., xxvii. 11: “Study wisdom, my son, and make my heart
joyful”; and in I Tim., iv. 13: “Attend to reading.” Essentially, it is
a potential part of temperance, for its chief characteristic is
moderation of an eager desire; but secondarily, it belongs to
fortitude, for great courage, persistence, and self-sacrifice are
necessary for a student.

2563. The Vices Opposed to Studiousness.--(a) The vice of excess is
called curiosity. It is a desire of knowledge that is inordinate on
account of the motive (e.g., when one is curious about the doings of
others because one wishes to injure them, when one gazes about to
satisfy impure desire) or on account of its circumstances (e.g., a
curiosity about the latest news or rumors that keeps one from duty or
more important matters, a curiosity that consults fortune-tellers, a
curiosity that tries to peer into the inscrutable mysteries of God,
Ecclus., iii. 22).

(b) The vice opposed to studiousness by defect is negligence, which is
a voluntary omission of study of those matters one is bound to know, as
when a schoolboy wastes his time in play and idleness. Curiosity and
negligence are usually found in the same person (e.g., those who pry
into the affairs of others without reason, do not, as a rule, mind
their own business well).

2564. The Malice of the Sins against Studiousness.--(a) Curiosity in
itself is venial, for it does not seem a serious offense to busy
oneself with things superfluous. But circumstances sometimes make it
mortal. Thus, the subject-matter may make it serious, as when one is
curious about obscene books, or has a prurient desire to gaze on
unbecoming pictures or plays, or tries to fish out of others
sacramental or other confidential secrets; or the purpose may make it
serious as when one is inquisitive or spying because one wishes to
blacken a neighbor (Prov., xxiv. 15), or the means may make it mortal
as when recourse is had to calumny, fraud, reading private papers,
etc., in order to get information.

(b) Negligence is mortal or venial according to the gravity of the duty
of knowledge. Thus, if a lawyer gave no study at all to a case and
thereby inflicted a grave loss on his client, the negligence would be a
mortal sin.

2565. Modesty.--Modesty should control not only the internal passions
for excellence and learning, but also the external movements of the
body (modesty of bearing) and the external use of corporal things
(modesty of living). (a) Thus, modesty of bearing moderates the bodily
actions, both in serious things (modest behavior) and in things playful
(modest relaxation).

(b) Modesty of living makes one temperate in the use of the externals
that serve life (modesty in style) and of the clothing one wears
(modesty in dress).

2566. Modest Behavior or Decorum.--(a) The Virtue.--The movements and
gestures of the body should be regulated by reason, both because they
are indications of one’s own character and disposition, and because
they express one’s disposition towards those with whom one lives.
Hence, they are not a matter of indifference, but reason demands that
they be suitable both to oneself (i.e., to one’s sex, age, position,
etc.) and to one’s neighbor (i.e., to the requirements of good social
usage in each business or affair of life). Thus, virtuous decorum
employs both sincerity, which makes one honestly respectful in act
(2403), and affability, which makes one agreeable in the company of
others (2421). That this is an important virtue for individuals and
society is declared both by sacred and human authority. Ecclesiasticus
(xix. 26, 27) calls attention to the importance for himself of a man’s
looks, laughter and gait; St. Augustine says that there should be
nothing offensive to others in one’s movements; and Aristotle mentions
among the qualities of the high-minded man that he is sedate and
dignified in demeanor.

(b) The Opposite Vices.--Modest behavior is offended by various vices
of excess and defect. Thus, sincerity is offended by bluntness and
affectation, self-respect by stiffness and servility, and consideration
for others by flattery and rudeness.

2567. Modest Relaxation.--(a) The Virtue.--Just as the body fatigued by
manual labor demands the refreshment of sleep and the recuperation
afforded by vacations or by intermissions of work, so also the mind
cannot be healthy or active unless from time to time it is relieved by
some kind of amusement or diversion. The desire for recreation is,
therefore, one of the chief inclinations of man, and there is special
need of its temperate management by right reason. The person who
prudently provides for pastimes and pleasures as a part of his life has
the virtue which Aristotle called eutrapelia (good wit, urbanity), and
which St. Thomas named gaiety or pleasantness.

(b) The Sin of Excess.--Relaxation is excessive in various ways.
Sometimes the entertainment itself is improper (e.g., obscene comedies,
scandalous dances, unjust games of chance). Sometimes the disposition
of the person himself is sinful (e.g., those who make recreation the
chief occupation of life, Wis., xv. 12; those who recreate only for
pleasure, or who enjoy themselves uproariously). Sometimes the
circumstances make an amusement unsuitable, such as the person (e.g.,
when a man of dignity belittles himself by acting as clown, when a
female takes part in sports unsuited to her sex), or the time (e.g.,
when the hours that should be given to divine services, or to study or
other Work, are spent in golfing or fishing; when Good Friday or a day
of bereavement or penance is chosen for a ball or picnic), or the place
(eg, when a church is used for sports or farces), or the quality (e.g.,
when the Scriptures or other sacred things are caricatured or
parodied), or the quantity (e.g., when one spends so much on theatres,
automobiles, trips and other enjoyments that one has nothing left for
duties of justice, charity or religion; when health is injured by
violent games).

(b) The Sin of Defect.--Those persons offend here who deprive
themselves of necessary relaxation (e.g., misers who fear to take a
holiday or go on an outing lest they lose some money), or who interfere
with the recreation of others (e.g., killjoys who wish to see others
miserable, fanatics who believe that all fun is of the devil). Those
who have little sense of humor or who suffer much may be excused to
some extent if they never laugh, but at least they should try to look
pleasant at times, or at least not frown on innocent happiness.

2568. Gravity of the Sins Opposed to Moderate Enjoyment.--(a) The
Absolute Gravity.--The sins just mentioned are mortal or venial
according to the character of what is done and the circumstances. Thus,
it is a mortal sin to find recreation in wild revelry and debauchery,
or to drive one’s children to the devil by forbidding them necessary
diversion; it is a venial sin to spend a little too much time at the
card table or to work rather too hard.

(b) The Comparative Gravity.--It is worse to relax too much than too
little, for amusement is not taken for its own sake, but is
subordinated to serious things. Just as it is more senseless to take
too much salt or other relish in food than to take too little, because
the salt is secondary, so it is more foolish to play too much than too
little.

2569. Modesty in Style of Living and Dress.-(a) The Virtue.--External
goods, such as dwellings and clothing, are necessary for body and soul,
as a protection to health and decency; others, such as furnishings,
decorations, ornaments, cars, radios, entertainments for guests, etc.,
are useful for convenience, beauty and the maintenance of one’s
station. But one may be immoderate in the use of these goods, and hence
there is need of a virtue to regulate their use, so that it may
truthfully be in keeping with one’s position and be not offensive to
others.

(b) The Sin of Excess.--This is committed when one’s style is
extravagant according to the standards of the community, or when like
Dives, clothed in purple and fine linen, one aims only at display or
sensual gratification, or when one is too much preoccupied with
externals (e.g., when too much time is spent before the mirror or too
much money at the dressmaker’s). Dignitaries and the ministers of the
altar are not guilty of excess in the pomp and splendor which the
Church sanctions, since the honor is intended for their station and the
divine worship they perform.

(c) The Sin of Defect.--This is committed when one’s mode of life is
not up to the reasonable standard of one’s community, especially if
this is due to negligence or itch for notoriety or disregard for
decency. Examples are those who through carelessness go about unwashed
or unshaven, who keep their quarters in a filthy and disorderly state,
or who wear their clothing untidily; also females who dress in male
attire, nudists who appear undressed in public places, and cynics who
scorn the conventions of refined society. It is not sinful, however,
but a virtuous act of temperance, to wear simpler and poorer garments
from the spirit of mortification and humility (Heb., xi. 37). The
clergy and religious, since they should be models of the penitential
spirit, are to be praised, therefore, when they give an example of
plainness and simplicity in personal style and dress.

2570. Morality of Self-Beautification.--Is it wrong to beautify oneself
in order to improve one’s looks or to win admiration?

(a) In itself there is no harm, especially for females, in using means
to improve one’s looks, such as remedies for deformities, facial
paints, powders and cosmetics, hair waves and dyes, and the like. But
accidentally there could be sin (e.g., deception). A poor man would be
a deceiver if he lived in great style to make a woman believe he was
wealthy, and likewise a woman would be a deceiver if she used an
artificial beauty to deceive a man about her age (see 2404).

(b) In itself also it is not sinful to desire that others approve one’s
appearance and dress. Thus, a wife should strive to be attractive to
her husband (I Cor., vii. 34), and modest ornamentation may be used to
win a suitor (I Tim., ii. 9). It is mortally sinful, however, to attire
oneself with the purpose or in a manner to arouse carnal temptation or
to awaken sinful desire in others--for example, if one wishes to
capture the sex love of others without marriage (Prov., vii. 10); it is
venially sinful to groom oneself well from mere vanity, that is, from a
silly ambition to be regarded as handsome and fashionable. By a Decree
of the Sacred Congregation of the Council (January 12, 1930),
parish-priests, parents, and teachers are admonished to oppose indecent
female dress; and it is ordered that women and girls improperly dressed
shall be excluded from Communion or even from church, and special
services and sermons on decency are prescribed for December 8 of each
year (see 1456, 1457).

2571. Complements of the Virtue of Temperance.--(a) The Gift of the
Holy Ghost that perfects temperance is fear of the Lord. The virtue of
temperance makes one abstain from unlawful pleasures because to do so
is reasonable; fear of the Lord inclines one to the same abstinence
from reverence. The Gift of Fear looks first to the greatness of the
Heavenly Father, before whom the nations are as a drop in the bucket
and are counted as the smallest grain of the balance and the islands as
but a little dust (Is., xl. 15); and in this respect it represses
presumption and serves the virtue of hope (see 1041 sqq.). But
secondarily it looks to the insignificance of every delight that is
apart from God, and sees that these inferior joys are passing, insipid
and bitter, like dust blown away by the wind, like a thin froth
dispersed by the storm, like smoke scattered by the breeze (Wis., v.
15), like a sweet poison that turns to gall and destroys (Job, xx. 12
sqq.); and in this respect fear of God sustains temperance, which must
regulate the cravings of the flesh and lower appetites. Fear of God,
then, makes one fly from those things which chiefly allure one to
offend Him, and hence the Psalmist (Ps. cxviii. 120) prays: “Pierce
Thou my flesh with Thy fear.”

(b) The Beatitude that corresponds to the present Gift is the second:
“Blessed are they that mourn, for they shall be comforted.” Those who
have the fear of God perceive the true nature of illicit joys and the
evil end that awaits those who chase after them. They prefer, then, to
be sorrowful, that is, to deprive themselves of every wicked pleasure
and love for the sake of the love of God in this life and the enjoyment
of God in the life to come: “Your sorrow shall be changed into joy”
(John, xx. 16).

(c) The fruits of fear of the Lord are modesty, continency and
chastity. Like a good tree that produces a rich harvest of delightful
fruits, filial reverence for God brings forth acts of virtue that have
in them a delicious savor more enjoyable and more lasting than the
fruits of the flesh. These goodly and pleasant fruits of the spirit of
fear of God are modesty in words, deeds and external things, continency
of the single and chastity of the married in thoughts and desires.

2572. The Commandments of Temperance.--(a) Negative Precepts.--In the
Decalogue the vices of intemperance that are most directly opposed to
the love of God and the neighbor (I Tim., i. 5) are expressly
forbidden, namely, adultery in act and adultery in desire. Elsewhere
other sins are forbidden. Thus, drunkenness (“Drunkards shall not
possess the kingdom,” I Cor., vi. 10), every kind of lust (“The works
of the flesh are fornication, uncleanness, immodesty, luxury ...
those who do such things shall not obtain the kingdom,” Gal., v. 19,
21), anger (“Let all bitterness and anger and indignation be put away
from you,” Eph., iv. 31), pride (“God resisteth the proud,” James, iv.
6), etc.

(b) Affirmative Precepts.--The positive modes of observing temperance
(i.e., rules on fasting) are not prescribed in the Decalogue. For the
law confines itself to general principles that, are of universal
application, whereas the manner of practising fasts and abstinences has
to be suited to conditions of time and place. Hence, it pertains to the
Church to settle by her legislation the details of mortification in
eating and drinking, so that they may be suited to the ever-changing
conditions of human life (2469).




Question III

THE DUTIES OF PARTICULAR CLASSES OF MEN

2573. The theological and moral virtues treated in the previous
Question are obligatory upon all states and conditions, for all men
have the same supernatural destiny, and all alike are bound to govern
their acts and their passions by the rule of reason. But not all have
the same calling or office, or consequently the same particular ends to
be striven for or the same special means to be used; wherefore, there
are moral duties proper to particular classes and particular ways of
life. Those special obligations, however, do not constitute new
virtues, but are applications of the seven general virtues to the
states of man diversified in reference to the acts and habits of the
soul. The diversities now spoken of may be reduced to the three
mentioned by St. Paul (I Cor., xii. 4 sqq.), namely, diversities of
graces (i.e., some are gifted to edify the Church in marvellous ways by
knowledge, speech or miracles), diversities of operations (i.e., some
are called to the life of contemplation, others to active life), and
diversities of ministries (i.e., there are various stations, ranks,
occupations, both in ecclesiastical and non-ecclesiastical life). The
higher graces and ways of the spiritual life of man are treated in
works of ascetical and mystical theology, and we shall confine
ourselves here to two subjects: (a) the duties of men as members of the
Church, that is, the general duties of the faithful and the special
duties of clerics and religious; (b) the duties of men as members of
domestic and civil society.

Before proceeding any further, a word is in order regarding the role of
the laity in the Church.

“We desire that all who claim the Church as their mother should
seriously consider that not only the sacred ministers and those who
have consecrated themselves to God in religious life, but the other
members as well of the Mystical Body of Jesus Christ, have the
obligation of working hard and constantly for the upbuilding and
increase of this Body” (Pius XII, _Mystici Corporis_).

The Catholic layman, long a silent partner in the Church’s apostolate,
has assumed a more active part in recent years. His role, his
apostolate, his milieu, his special claims to divine graces, his
spiritual prerogatives--all have been made subjects of theological
investigation particularly by European writers. Controversy,
uncertainty, at times even error have characterized their efforts as
they grope their way in a new area of theology. Their efforts
ultimately will lead to the elaboration of a developed theology of the
laity, an extremely important and equally necessary body of knowledge,
for “the laity are in the front line of the Church’s life; through them
the Church is the vital principle of human society. Accordingly they
especially must have an ever clearer consciousness not only of
belonging to the Church, but of being the Church....” (Pius XII,
_Allocution to the Sacred College, AAS_, 38-149).[1]

[1] To detail the advances made in this new area of theology would
demand a volume for itself. We shall have to be content with indicating
a select bibliography of the outstanding works available.

Francis M. Keating, S.J., “Theology of the Laity,” _Proceedings of the
Catholic Theological Society of America_, 1956, pp. 196 ff.; Ives M. J.
Congar, O.P., _Jalons pour une theologie du laicat_, (Paris, Cerf,
1953); translated as _Lay People in the Church_, (The Newman Press,
Westminster, Md., 1957); G. Philips, _Le role du laicat dans l’Eglise,
(Casterman, Tournai-Paris, 1954); translated as _The Role of the Laity
in the Church_. (Mercier, Cork, 1955); Karl Rahner, “The Apostolate of
Laymen,” _Theology Digest_, (Spring 1957), pp. 73 ff.; Jacques
Leclercq, “Can a Layman be a Saint?” _Theology Digest_, (Winter 1956),
pp. 3 ff. (This same issue contains a select bibliography on
spirituality of the laity, p. 8.); Paul Dabin, S.J., _Le sacerdoce
royal des fideles dans les livres saints_, (Blond et Gay, 1941); _Le
sacerdoce royal des fideles dans la tradition ancienne et moderne_,
(Les Editions Universelles, Brussels, 1950): Gustave Weigel, S.J., “The
Body of Christ and the City of God,” _Social Order_, (Vol. 5, 1955, p.
275 ff.).




Art. 1: THE DUTIES OF MEMBERS OF THE CHURCH

2574. The General Duties of the Faithful.--The Church has the power to
make laws which will promote the common good of the whole body and the
individual good of the members (see 418). Chief among the laws that
bind the faithful in general are the six known as the Precepts of the
Church, namely, the laws on the observance of Sundays and holydays, on
fasting and abstinence, on yearly confession, on Easter Communion, on
the support of pastors, and on marriage.

2575. The First Precept of the Church.--This precept commands that on
Sundays and holydays of obligation Mass be heard and servile and other
like works be omitted (Canons 1247-1249) by the subjects of church laws
(427 sqq.).

(a) This precept is of natural and divine law as to its purpose and
substance, for reason teaches and the Third Commandment of the
Decalogue prescribes that man set aside some time for the external
worship of God, and avoid those things that distract him from worship
(Catechism of the Council of Trent, pp. 396 sqq,). Hence, even
non-Catholics, though they do not sin by missing Mass (429, 430), are
guilty of sin if they do not from time to time worship God externally.

(b) This precept is of ecclesiastical law only as to its details (i.e.,
the time set apart and the manner of worship and sanctification
decreed). The Old Testament Law observed the Sabbath or last day of the
Week in memory of the creation of the World, and it abstained most
rigorously from work on the Sabbath, because there was a divine
prohibition and because this rest was a figure of things to come. But
in the New Law the ceremonial precepts of Judaism no longer have force,
and the Christian precepts substituted for them were not instituted by
Christ Himself but arose from the custom of the Church. During the
lifetime of the Apostles themselves Sunday (or the first day of the
week) came to be venerated as the Lord’s Day in memory of the
Resurrection, which completed the work of Redemption (Acts, ii. 46,
iii. 1, v. 12, xxi. 26); and from early times various special holydays
were appointed and made days of obligatory worship, as had been the
case with certain feasts in the Old Testament. As early as the third
and fourth centuries laws were made confirming the primitive customs of
assisting at Mass and resting on Sundays and holydays.

2576. The Affirmative and Negative Parts of the First Precept.--The
first precept of the Church has two parts, an affirmative (preceptive)
part which commands the hearing of Mass, and a negative (prohibitive)
part which forbids the doing of servile works. The law is therefore
most salutary and simple, requiring that one take part in the greatest
act of worship, the sacrifice which is a commemoration of Christ, and
that one rest from the labors and cares of the week and be spiritually
refreshed. In reference to the Mass, the precept requires that Mass
itself be heard, and that it be an entire Mass and the same Mass.

(a) Thus, Mass itself must be heard, and hence one does not satisfy the
Sunday obligation by attending other services that precede (e.g., the
Asperges, blessing of palm), accompany (e.g., sermon), or follow (e.g.,
Vespers, Benediction) the celebration of Mass. Neither does this
precept oblige one to attend other services on Sunday, although it is
most suitable to do this, also to make internal acts of faith, hope and
charity, and to read pious books and perform works of charity, and it
is sometimes necessary as a natural obligation to attend the sermon or
catechetical instruction (see 914 sqq.).

(b) A whole Mass must be heard, that is, all the ceremonies from the
prayers at the foot of the altar until the blessing at the end, and it
is irreverent to leave church without necessity before the priest has
left the altar. He who can assist at only the essential and integral
parts of the sacrifice (i.e., from the Consecration to the Communion),
is obliged to so much; but he who arrives after the Consecration and
cannot hear another Mass is not obliged according to one opinion to
remain for the present Mass, since the Consecration, the essential
part, is already past.

(c) The same Mass must be heard, and hence one cannot satisfy the
obligation by hearing the first half of one Mass being said on one
altar and the second half of another Mass being said simultaneously on
another altar (see Denzinger, n. 1203), nor by hearing the Consecration
in one Mass and the Communion in a previous or subsequent Mass, thus
dividing the sacrifice. But if one may have heard from the Consecration
to the end in one Mass, one may hear the omitted pre-Consecration
parts, it seems, in another Mass that follows, and one should do this
if possible.

2577. How Mass Must Be Heard.--In reference to the person who hears
Mass, the positive part of the precept calls for external assistance
and internal devotion.

(a) Thus, the external or bodily assistance must be such that one can
be said to take part in the divine worship. This happens when one is
physically present, that is, when one is in the same building or place
as the celebrant and can either see or hear him, or is morally present,
that is, not in the same building but able to see or hear him naturally
(e.g., by looking from the window of a neighboring house), or is unable
to see or hear him but joined with the congregation (e.g., those who
are outside the closed doors of the church but who can follow the bells
and choir to some extent, those who are inside with the congregation
but behind a pillar that shuts off the view). In a field Mass
amplifiers can carry the voice far out to the edge of a vast crowd. But
there does not seem to be a sufficient moral presence when Mass is
“seen” by television or “heard” over the radio, since in these cases
one is not present to the consecrated species or united to the
worshippers.

(b) Internal or mental assistance requires the actual or virtual
intention of the will to perform what the Church requires (see 2165),
and the attention of the mind, external according to some, internal
according to others (see 2166 sqq.). Thus, he who goes to church merely
to hear the music or look at the pictures does not hear Mass for lack
of intention; he who sleeps soundly all through the service does not
hear Mass for lack of attention. One who knows what is going on before
him, but whose thoughts are not on any religious matter, complies with
the precept of the Church according to some, but he sins by irreverence
and voluntary distraction. It suffices during Mass to think either on
the Mass itself (which is the best attention), or to think on other
pious subjects (e.g., to make an examination of conscience, to say the
Rosary). Certain actions (e.g., those that are related to the Mass,
such as ringing the bell, taking up the collection, playing the organ)
do not exclude external attention, but others certainly exclude it
(e.g., writing a letter), and others are doubtful (e.g., going to
Confession).

2578. Time and Place of Mass.--In reference to circumstances, the
precept requires that Mass be heard at the proper place and the proper
time.

(a) Place.--The precept may be complied with by attending Mass in any
Catholic rite (Latin, Greek, etc.), and it makes no difference whether
Mass is celebrated in the open air, in a church, or in a public or
semi-public oratory (Canon 1249). But private chapels are for the
benefit of the grantee alone.

(b) Time.--The precept must be complied with on the feast itself, that
is, during the period of twenty-four hours from midnight to midnight.
Sunday Mass cannot be anticipated on Saturday or put off till Monday.
Likewise servile works are unlawful from midnight to midnight.

2579. Servile Works.--The prohibitory part of the precept is concerned
with servile works, that is, labor of a kind that tends to make one
unfit for devotion or that shows disrespect for the sacredness of the
day, even though the labor be done gratis, or for recreation, or out of
devotion. Hence, the law forbids:

(a) works given to the service of the devil, that is, sins that deprive
one of holiness, such as riotous recreations, gambling, drunkenness,
reading improper matter, and attendance at evil movie performances. But
these works are opposed to the end, not to the text, of the law; and
hence the circumstance of time aggravates their malice but does not
give them a new species (see 2314);

(b) works given to the service of the body (servile works properly so
called) or to the service of external goods (forensic and commercial
works). Servile works in the strict sense cause bodily fatigue and are
taken up with material things, and hence they distract the mind from
religious thoughts. Such are manual labors (e.g., plowing, digging,
housecleaning) and mechanical or industrial labors (e.g., printing,
building, plastering, shoemaking). Forensic and commercial labors
(e.g., arguing in court, auctioneering) are also of a very worldly kind
and unsuitable for the quiet and recollection of Sundays and holydays.

2580. The prohibitory part of the Sunday precept does not affect works
which are no impediment to devotion and which cast no dishonor on the
day. Such are:

(a) works devoted immediately to the service of God. The purpose of the
law is to allow leisure for these works, and hence manifestly their
performance is not forbidden. Such works are saying Mass, preaching,
administering the Sacraments, singing in church, and visiting the poor
and sick (John, vii. 23; Matt., xii. 5). But works that are only
remotely related to divine worship (e.g., cleaning the church, painting
the altar, repairing the vestments, decorating the shrines) should not
be done on Sunday without necessity;

(b) works devoted to the service of the mind (liberal works). These
works are of a more elevated kind, do not require great bodily
exertion, and are not looked upon as unsuitable to the Sabbath. Such
are intellectual works (e.g., teaching, reading, writing, studying),
artistic works (e.g., playing the organ, singing, drawing, painting a
picture, embroidering), and works of recreation (moderate sports or
diversions such as baseball, tennis, and chess).

2581. Other Kinds of Works and Sunday Observance.--(a) Common works are
those that stand between the liberal and the servile, since they are
exercised equally by mind and body, such as walking, riding, hunting,
and fishing that is not very laborious. These are lawful.

(b) Doubtful works are those that are now non-servile, now servile,
according to the manner in which they are conducted, such as the work
of painters, sculptors, typists, seamstresses, and photographers. Thus,
it is a liberal work to paint a portrait, a servile work to paint the
walls of a house. In settling the character of various kinds of work,
one must be guided by the prudent opinion of one’s locality, and in
case of doubt and need must seek a dispensation. (For a history of the
theology of servile works see Franz X. Pettirsch, S.J., “A Theology of
Sunday Rest,” _Theology Digest_, Vol. VI, no. 2, Spring 1958, pp. 114
ff.; for a survey of modern studies on the problem see _Proceedings of
the Catholic Theological Society of America_, 1957).

2582. Is it lawful without necessity to hire the servile work of
non-Catholics on Sunday, if these persons are not thereby impeded from
the natural duty of worshipping God and no scandal is given? (a) If the
non-Catholics are infidels and not bound by church laws, this is
lawful. The same would be true of those who lack the use of reason (see
427 sqq.). (b) If the non-Catholics are heretics, it is not lawful in
the case given to make them work on Sunday.

2583. Obligation of First Precept.--The first precept of the Church
obliges under pain of grave sin, because it determines a necessary act
of religion (2148), and experience shows that where the Sabbath is
neglected the social, spiritual and physical interests of man are
seriously harmed (see Denzinger, n. 1202). There is always hope for
Catholics who attend Mass, whereas those who miss Mass soon become
Catholics only in name. But since neglect of worship may be only
slightly disrespectful, and since the end of the precept may be
substantially obtained without complete fulfillment, a transgression
may be only venial by reason of lightness of matter.

(a) Preceptive Part.--Grave matter is a part of the Mass that is
notable on account of dignity (i.e., the essential and integral parts
of the Mass, for example, the Consecration and Communion), or on
account of its duration (i.e., a third of the whole Mass, e.g., from
the beginning to the Offertory inclusively, from the beginning to the
Gospel and from the Communion to the end, from the Preface to the
Consecration, from the Consecration to the Agnus Dei, etc.). Hence, he
who is culpably absent or asleep during a notable part of the Mass sins
gravely, but he who is absent or asleep during an inconsiderable part
of the Mass (e.g., one who arrives just at the Offertory or who leaves
after the Communion) sins venially, unless he is so disposed that he
does not care how much he misses.

(b) Prohibitive Part.--Grave matter is labor that is notable on account
of its quality (e.g., forensic proceedings even for a brief space on
Sunday would be a serious distraction and scandal), or its quantity
(e.g., two and a half hours given to very exhausting manual work, such
as digging a ditch, three hours given to less arduous labor, such as
sowing). He who commands ten laborers to work an hour each on Sunday
cooperates in ten venial sins (see 219), but he may be guilty of mortal
sin on account of scandal.

2584. Excuses from Observance of First Precept.--These reasons may be
reduced to two classes, namely, external reasons (i.e., a dispensation
or a lawful custom) and internal reasons (i.e., one’s own inability or
necessity).

(a) External Reasons.--Dispensations may be given under certain
conditions by local Ordinaries, by parish-priests, and by superiors of
exempt clerical institutes (Canon 1245). Custom in certain places
excuses from Mass for a month women who have just given birth to a
child or who have lost their husband by death, and also--from the Mass
in which their banns are to be proclaimed--those women who are about to
marry. Custom further permits necessary labors, such as cooking,
ordinary housecleaning, barbering, the work of railroad and garage men,
etc.

(b) Internal Reasons.--Impossibility or serious inconvenience excuses
from hearing Mass (e.g., those who have to walk an hour’s journey to
church or ride a two hours’ journey, regarding which, in terms of
distance travelled, it has been suggested that the figures should be
more than three miles each way if one must walk, more than thirty miles
if a car is available and the roads are good; those who will suffer
great detriment to health, honor, fortune, etc., if they go; those who
are kept away by duties of charity or employment or office that cannot
be omitted). Necessity or duty to others permits one to work on Sunday
at least to some extent (e.g., those who must labor on a Sunday in
order to live, or to keep out of serious trouble, or to perform
services or works of charity that cannot easily be done at another
time). To avoid self-deception the faithful should consult their pastor
or other prudent person if there is doubt about the sufficiency of the
excuse.

2585. Though the Church does not impose excessive Sabbatarianism,
neither does she admit laxity in the important matter of the Lord’s Day.

(a) Hence, not every reason excuses from the church precept. Thus,
those are guilty who unnecessarily place themselves in the
impossibility of observing the law (e.g., by moving to a place where
there is no church, by taking a position that requires work all Sunday
morning, by starting on a vacation or auto trip to a churchless
region), or whose excuses are frivolous (e.g., those who stay away from
Mass because they dislike the priest, or who work on Sunday merely to
keep busy).

(b) Reasons that excuse from part of the ecclesiastical precept do not
excuse from all of it. Thus, those who are unable to hear Mass are not
thereby justified in doing servile work, those who can hear the
essential part of Mass (Consecration and Communion), but not the other
parts, should hear the essential part; those who can hear Mass only on
one Sunday a year are not excused on that Sunday.

(c) Reasons that excuse from the ecclesiastical precept do not excuse
from the divine precept (see 2575) of worshipping God. Hence, those who
are really obliged to work every Sunday should sanctify the Lord’s Day
by whatever private prayer or devotion they can substitute. Some
authors very rightly believe that those who can never go to Mass on
Sunday are held by divine law to hear Mass on weekdays three or four
times a year at least, when this is possible (see 2148, 2180).

2586. The Second Precept of the Church.--This precept commands that on
all Fridays of the year and certain other specified days (unless they
fall on a holyday outside of Lent) every baptized person who has
completed the age of seven and has attained the use of reason shall
abstain from eating flesh meat and from drinking the broth or soup made
from flesh meat (Canons 1250-1254).

(a) Under the name flesh are included all land and warm-blooded animals
(i.e., mammals and birds). The law does not include aquatic animals
(i.e., fishes, clams, oysters and other shellfish, lobsters, shrimps,
crabs and other crustaceans), nor cold-blooded animals (i.e., reptiles,
snails and amphibians, such as frogs, tortoises). Some authors include
under aquatic animals otters, beavers, seals, walruses, loons, and
coots, though generally the birds are regarded as flesh. In doubt
whether a food is fish or flesh, it may be judged to be fish, for in
doubts laws are to be interpreted benignly.

(b) Under the name meat are included all the parts of an animal (i.e.,
its flesh, blood, marrow, brains, lard, meat extracts, mince-pie,
pepsin) but not its fruit (e.g., eggs, milk, and things made from milk,
such as butter, cheese).

(c) Under the name broth is included any liquid made from the juice of
meat, such as beef tea, chicken broth, mutton soup, gravy, etc. But the
law does not forbid condiments made from animal fats (e.g., margarin).

2587. Obligation of the Second Precept of the Church.--(a) Origin of
the Obligation.--In substance this precept is of the natural law, but
in details (time, manner, etc.) it is of ecclesiastical law (2468 b)
and has come down from customs that began in the first ages of
Christianity. The church regulation on abstinence is most wise and
moderate: the foods forbidden are those whose deprivation is a
mortification to most persons, and at the same time a great benefit to
spiritual and bodily health; the times appointed are few but
appropriate (viz., days of sorrow, special prayer, penance,
preparation, such as Fridays, Ember Days, Lent, vigils), and they are
so distributed as to sanctify by mortification each week and each
season of the year. True, no food is evil in itself (Matt., xv. 11; I
Cor., viii, 8; I Tim., iv. 3; Col., ii. 16), but just as the physician
can forbid certain foods to his patient for the sake of temporal good,
so for the sake of spiritual good God forbade to Adam the fruit of one
tree and to the Jews the flesh of certain animals; and the Church from
the days of the Apostles (Acts, xv. 29) has exercised the same right.

(b) Gravity of the Obligation.--The abstinence required by the Second
Precept is a grave duty, because the Church makes it the necessary act
of the necessary virtue of abstemiousness and a serious duty of
obedience. But not every transgression is a serious injury to the
spirit of this law, and hence some sins against it are venial. Grave
matter is such a quantity of forbidden food as gives considerable
nourishment, and hence for practical purposes the rule may be given
that flesh meat which weighs two ounces (or, according to others, what
would be the size of a walnut or of a small hen’s egg) is grave matter.
Some hold for a more liberal interpretation when the food is not
strictly flesh meat, and believe that liquid from meat is not grave
matter at any time, or at least when it weighs less than four ounces.
Vegetables cooked or seasoned with meat or meat juice are also
considered light matter. He who eats meat twice on a Friday or other
abstinence day commits two sins, just as he who works twice on a Sunday
or holyday commits two sins. It is commonly held that many venial sins
against abstinence committed on the same day coalesce to form grave
matter, but on account of the separation between the eatings a larger
amount is necessary for grave matter.

(c) Exceptions to the Obligation.--Those are not bound to observe a day
of abstinence who have been exempted by indult (Canon 1253), who have
been dispensed by the Ordinary, pastor or superior (Canon 1245), or who
are excused on account of real impossibility (e.g., the poor, the sick,
those obliged to perform very hard work, those who are morally forced
to eat meat but not as a sign of contempt of the law). Persons
dispensed from abstinence may not eat meat oftener than once a day on
fast days, unless they have a special grant. The faithful should be
guided by the Lenten regulations of their dioceses, and in doubt they
should consult their pastors.

2588. The Obligation of Fasting.--The Second Precept also commands that
on the weekdays of Lent and certain other specified days (holydays
outside Lent excepted) every baptized person between the ages of
twenty-one years completed and sixty years begun shall eat not more
than one full meal a day (Canon 1251).

(a) The law speaks of eating, that is, of solid food, and hence the
Lenten and other similar fasts are not broken by liquids which are
beverages rather than foods, or which are used to allay thirst, or
carry food or assist digestion, and not chiefly to nourish (e.g.,
water, teas, coffee, light cocoa, wine, beer, lemonade, fruit juice).
Likewise, sirups taken as medicines are not considered foods, even
though they contain nourishment, unless one drinks a large quantity for
its food content. Light ices may be considered drink, but ice-cream is
food. On the contrary, liquids that are chiefly nourishing are regarded
as food (e.g., soup, oil, honey). Finally, some liquors vary between
food and drink, according to their richness or weakness, their great or
small quantity. Thus, hot chocolate as made in the United States
contains only a small amount of solid and may be considered as a drink,
but as made in Europe it is stronger and rather food than drink.

(b) The law admits as an indulgence on fast days, in addition to the
one meal, a small breakfast in the morning and a light collation to be
taken either around noon (lunch) or in the evening (supper). The
quality and quantity of these two repasts are left to local custom. The
Uniform Norm for Fast and Abstinence in the United States adopted by
the Hierarchy, Nov. 14, 1951, establishes the following norm for these
two meatless meals. They are to be “sufficient to maintain strength,
may be taken according to each one’s needs; but together they should
not equal another full meal.” This norm, called the relative standard,
was adopted by many Bishops of the United States, beginning with Lent
of 1952. Thus, the amount of food is dependent to some degree on a
person’s own needs and appetite. The relative standard is distinguished
from the absolute norm which allows about two ounces for the morning
collation and eight ounces for the evening.

(c) The law permits one to eat but once in the day (exception being
made for breakfast and collation), but it places no limits as to the
quality of the food at the principal meal (unless the day be also a day
of abstinence, when meat is forbidden), or as to its quantity, though
temperance bids one to eat at all times in moderation. On fast days,
therefore, one may not eat between meals, nor so divide or prolong the
dinner that it really becomes several meals. A notable interruption
(two or three hours) made without good reason divides a dinner into two
meals, and over two hours of uninterrupted eating, under ordinary
circumstances, seems to be more than the one full meal which the law
allows.

2589. The Obligation of the Precept of Fasting.--(a) Origin.--The
natural law commands fasting in general, since without some kind of
austerity above common temperance certain desirable ends (such as
atonement for past transgressions, conquest of unruly passions, and
elevation of the soul) cannot be attained; and as these ends are
necessary it is also necessary to use the means as far as one needs
them. The particularization of this natural law has been made by the
positive law of the Church, and with such wisdom as to promote the good
of both soul and body. The times appointed are most appropriate (e.g.,
the season when the Passion is commemorated, Luke, v. 35); the duration
of the long fast is modelled on that of Christ (Matt., iv. 1); the
curtailment of food required is not only beneficial (as an exercise of
self-control and a rest and change to the metabolism), but is moderate,
since it permits sufficient food for the day, and even in the fast of
Lent the Sundays occur to give a respite.

(b) Gravity.--The precept of fasting is grave, both from the purpose of
the law (see 2469), and from the express declaration of the lawgiver
(Denzinger, n. 1123). But the spirit of the precept is not notably
deviated from by every transgression, and hence even in reference to
matter there are minor or venial violations; and moreover the precept
is probably (unlike that of abstinence) an indivisible one, since it
consists in the limitation to one meal, and hence it cannot be violated
more than once a day. Grave matter, when the absolute norm is used,
seems to be about four ounces added to the collations or taken between
meals, either all at once or at different times during the day
(Denzinger, n.1129), But if the relative norm is used, a greater
quantity is needed to establish grave matter, e.g., one fourth of a
full meal. But he who has broken his fast (e.g., by a second full meal)
does not break it again by a third or fourth full meal on the same day,
for after the second full meal the fast has become impossible for that
day. He who accidentally takes too much at breakfast can still keep the
fast by proportionately diminishing his evening repast.

(c) Exceptions.--Physical or moral impossibility excuses from the fast,
and gives the right to eat meat as often as moderation allows on days
that are not meatless days. The chief persons who labor under
impossibility are those who are too weak to fast (e.g., the sick, the
convalescent, pregnant and nursing mothers, the nervous), those who are
too poor to get one square meal a day (e.g., street beggars who have
nothing may eat as often as they are given an alms, if it does not buy
them a dinner), and those who cannot do their necessary or customary
hard work if they fast. Hard work is such as is exercised for many
hours continuously, or for a less time if it is very intense, and which
is greatly fatiguing to the mind (e.g., daily teaching, lecturing,
studying, hearing confessions, preaching, etc.) or to the body (e.g.,
heavy manual labor, the difficult jobs in offices or stores, work that
requires one to be on one’s feet for hours at a time, necessary
journeys made under hardship). The confessor or physician can decide
about cases of impossibility that are not manifest, but dispensation
should be had from the pastor (Canon 1245). Those who are dispensed
from the ecclesiastical fast or abstinence should remember that they
are not dispensed from the natural law of temperance, and they should
practise some abstemiousness according to their ability (e.g., by
self-denial in alcoholic beverages, tobacco, sweets, etc., or
mortification in the quantity or quality of food).

2590. The Third Precept of the Church.--This precept commands that all
the faithful, male and female, who have reached the age of discretion
go to confession at least once a year (Canon 906).

(a) The subject of this precept is every baptized person who has
entered the Church through valid Baptism and who has the use of reason,
which begins usually at the age of seven. Infants are incapable of
committing sin, and the unbaptized are incapable of receiving the
Sacrament of Penance.

(b) The matter of the precept is a good sacramental confession of the
grave sins not yet confessed, made with the purpose of obtaining
absolution to any duly authorized priest. Hence, those who have only
venial sins on their conscience are not bound according to the common
opinion by this precept, and, on the other hand, those who make a
sacrilegious or voluntarily null confession do not fulfill the law
(Denzinger, n. 1114; Code, Canon 907). It seems that one who, after a
confession of venial sins at Easter, falls into grave sin is not bound
from this precept to confess again before the end of the year.

(c) The time for fulfillment of the precept is once during the year.
The law leaves one free to confess on any day during the twelvemonth,
and to count the year either civilly (i.e., from January 1 to December
31), or ecclesiastically (e.g., from Easter time to Easter time, as is
commonly done), or from the date of the last confession. The limit is
set, however, not to terminate but to insist upon obligation, and hence
it seems that he who has not made his 1957 confession must make it as
soon as possible in 1958, but the 1957 confession made in 1958 will
satisfy for the 1958 obligation also (see 468 sqq.).

2591. The Obligation of the Third Precept.--(a) Origin.--From divine
law sacramental confession is necessary for all who have fallen into
serious sin after Baptism, since Christ has given His Church the keys
of heaven and appointed His bishops and priests the physicians and
judges to cure and pardon (Matt., xviii. 18; John, xx. 23). But Our
Lord did not fix the frequency of confession, and it is this which the
present precept determines. The law of annual confession goes back to
the Fourth Lateran Council (1215).

(b) Gravity.--The precept of annual confession obliges under pain of
mortal sin, for its purpose is of vital importance and the Church has
always regarded it as a grave obligation. The purpose of the law is to
ensure the use of the Sacrament instituted by Christ for forgiveness
and to keep sinners from delaying their repentance too long. If a good
business man takes stock of his assets and liabilities at least once a
year, and those who are careful of their health have medical attention
or examination at least yearly, it is most reasonable that the faithful
should settle their spiritual accounts and attend to the well-being of
their souls within an equal period of time. In the early centuries when
fervor was greater and conditions different, no general church law on
the frequency of confession was needed; but there is no doubt that the
Lateran Decree met well the need that began after the change from the
early penitential discipline, The penalties for violation of this
precept were excommunication and exclusion from ecclesiastical burial,
and, though they are not enforced today, they show the intention of the
Church to impose a grave duty.

2592. The Fourth Precept of the Church.--This precept commands that all
the faithful, male and female, who have attained the use of reason, go
to Holy Communion at least once a year, and that during Easter time
(Canon 859).

(a) The subjects of this precept are the same as those of the previous
precept, and consequently children of seven years or thereabout, who
are able to understand, must make the Easter duty.

(b) The matter of the precept is a worthy Communion (Viaticum or
ordinary Communion) received in any parish, but preferably in one’s own
parish. Persons living in community (e.g., religious, soldiers, college
boarders) may make the Easter duty in their own chapels, strangers and
vagi in any church or chapel, and priests in the place where they say
Mass.

(c) The time of the precept is the Paschal Season (i.e., from Palm
Sunday to Low Sunday, but in the United States, by privilege, from the
First Sunday of Lent to Trinity Sunday). The Easter time may be
prolonged for an individual by his pastor or confessor for a just
reason. The year within which the Easter duty is to be made begins, it
seems, with the opening of one Paschal Season and ends with the opening
of the Paschal Season of the following calendar year. Since the law
requires that the Easter duty be made, not only within the Paschal
Season, but also once a year, it follows that he who neglects Communion
during the Easter period is still bound by the law to go to Communion
before the opening of the next Paschal Season, but probably he is not
bound to go at the first opportunity. As a rule, we believe those who
do not make their Easter duty during a year are guilty of but one sin,
since they do not think of distinct violations.

2593. The Obligation of the Fourth Precept.--(a) Origin.--There is a
divine precept of receiving Communion some time during life, since Our
Lord willed the Eucharist to be the necessary nourishment of the soul’s
journey (John, vi. 54) and the perpetual memorial of Himself (I Cor.,
xi. 24). The Church in the present precept has prescribed both the
frequency and the time for complying with the will of Christ. Since the
Eucharist is a daily bread, the law does not permit it to be abstained
from by anyone beyond a year; and, since the Paschal Season brings the
anniversary of Christ’s sacrifice and of the institution of the Blessed
Sacrament, it is the time most fitly chosen for the obligatory
Communion.

(b) Gravity.--The precept obliges under pain of grave sin, for it
determines a law given by Our Lord Himself and regulates the minimum in
the use of the Eucharist, the greatest of the Sacraments and the end of
all the others. The doctrine of theologians is that it is a grave sin
to delay culpably the Easter Communion for even a day beyond the
Paschal Season as prescribed.

2594. The Fifth and Sixth Precepts of the Church.--The Fifth Precept
commands the proper maintenance of the clergy by the laity. The manner
of giving the support is left to the special statutes and customs of
each country (Canons 1496, 1502). This ecclesiastical law is but a
determination of the natural law of justice and religion, and also of
the divine law; for even in the Old Testament the Levites were
supported by the people. The duty is, therefore, grave (see 2185 sqq.).
Respect and obedience in spiritual matters are owed the clergy, and it
is sinful to usurp their functions (see 2351, 2355 sqq., and Canons
119, 683, 1931, 166).

The Sixth Precept commands the proper solemnization of marriage and
prohibits the solemn blessing of marriages at stated times. Canon 1108,
Sec.2 specifies these times as “from the first Sunday of Advent until
the day of the Nativity of Our Lord inclusive, and from Ash Wednesday
until Easter Sunday inclusive.” It is to be noted that the forbidden
time excludes only the solemn blessing, and even this may be permitted
by the Ordinary for just cause, subject to liturgical laws (Canon 1108,
Sec.3).

2595. Two Other Important General Laws of the Church.--(a) The
prohibition of wicked and dangerous writings (Canons 1384 sqq.)
is based on the natural law, which requires one to avoid what is
proximately dangerous to faith or morals. This subject is treated above
in 1456, 849 sqq., 1529.

(b) The prohibition of the cremation of corpses (Canon 1203) is not
based on natural law or on any dogma, as though the burning of dead
bodies were intrinsically evil or repugnant to our faith in immortality
and resurrection. On the contrary, in exceptional cases (e.g., in time
of war or epidemic) cremation is permitted, if a real public necessity
requires it. The reasons for the anti-cremation law are: the tradition
of the Old and New Testaments (Gen., iii, 19; I Cor., xv. 42), and
especially the example of Christ whose body was consigned to the tomb;
the association of burial throughout the history of the Church with
sacred rites and the doctrine of the future life, and the contrary
association of cremation both in times past and today with paganism and
despair; the sacred dignity of the human body (Gen., i. 25; I Cor.,
iii. 16, vi. 5), and the feeling of affection for parents, relatives,
friends, which is outraged when their bodies are consigned to the
furnace. The practical arguments offered for cremation are chiefly
hygienic and economic; but it is certain that proper burial at sea or
in the grave is no menace to public health, and is not more expensive
or difficult than cremation. A most serious objection to cremation is
that it makes exhumation impossible, and is therefore a means of
concealing murder by poison. It is not lawful for a Catholic to
cooperate (except materially in case of necessity) with cremation, or
to belong to any society that promotes the incineration of corpses; it
is not lawful for a priest to give the last Sacraments or funeral rites
to those who ordered the cremation of their bodies.

2596. The Special Duties of Clerics.--From the duties of Catholics in
general we pass now to the special duties of clerics; for the clergy,
on account of their position as the salt of the earth and the light of
the world (Matt., v. 16), are bound to a greater internal and external
holiness and edification than the laity. The word “cleric” is
understood in a wide or in a strict sense. In the wide sense, a cleric
is any Christian specially set apart for the service of God, whether by
ordination or religious profession (e.g., lay brothers, nuns); in the
strict sense, a cleric (clergyman) is one who has been admitted to
Orders, or at least to their preparation through tonsure (Canon 108).

(a) Duties Before Entering the Clerical State.--The person who would
enter the clerical state must have a vocation and a right intention. As
to the latter, since the clerical state has for its ends the glory of
God and the salvation of souls, it would be a serious sin to choose it
principally for temporal ends, such as wealth, dignity or pleasure; but
it is not a sin to desire secondarily and moderately the necessary
support of the clerical state (I Cor., ix, 3).

(b) Duties After Entering the Clerical State.--The privileges of
clerics are treated in canonical works. Here we speak only of duties.
The obligations of a cleric are of two kinds--the positive, such as
celibacy, and the negative, such as the avoidance of unbecoming
amusements or occupations.

2597. Vocation to the Clerical State.--(a) Internal Vocation.--No one
should enter the religious or clerical state unless called thereto by
God (John, xv. 16; Acts, xiii. 2; Heb., v. 4, 5; I Cor., xii. 4 sqq.).
The foundation of the entire religious, priestly and apostolic life,
namely divine vocation, consists of two essential elements, the one
divine, the other ecclesiastical. As to the first element, God’s call
to embrace the priestly or religious life must be considered so
necessary that in its absence the foundation upon which the whole
structure is to rest is absent (Pius XII, _Sedes Sapientiae_). The
signs of a divine call do not necessarily or even ordinarily include a
feeling of inspiration or invitation from the Holy Spirit, but it
suffices that one may have a liking, a right intention, and fitness
(physical, mental, moral) for the life; for, where God gives a call, He
gives the means to fulfill the duties. Thus, those who will not be able
to say Mass, or who cannot master Latin or theology, or who cannot
observe celibacy, or who are vicious (e.g., mischief-makers, drunkards)
or unspiritual (e.g., the lazy, those who dislike exercises of piety),
do not show the signs of a priestly vocation.

(b) External Vocation.--No one should be admitted to the religious life
or to Orders unless he has given sufficient signs of a call from God.
Thus, a Bishop would sin most gravely and be a sharer in the sins of
others if he conferred Major Orders on anyone about whose unworthiness
he was morally certain on positive grounds (Canon 973); nor may a
Religious Superior receive to profession any novice about whom he is
doubtful (Canon 571). Scarcity of vocations is no excuse for laxity,
since it is better to have a few creditable clerics than a multitude of
unworthy ones (Benedict XIV). What St. Paul said of deacons (“Let these
first be proved, and so let them minister, having no crime,” I Tim.,
iii. 10), is therefore to be applied to all candidates for the clerical
life. A vocation is tested by the years of probation which the church
law provides for seminarians, novices and other aspirants to the
ecclesiastical state. No cleric has a right to ordination before he
receives the free call from a bishop, but on the other hand it is
criminal to prevent a suitable candidate from embracing the clerical
state (Canon 971). “By a divine vocation to the religious and clerical
state a person undertakes publicly to lead a life of holiness in the
Church, a visible and hierarchical society, and to exercise this
hierarchical ministry. Such a person, therefore, ought to be
authoritatively tested, approved and directed by the hierarchical
rulers to whom God has entrusted the administration of the Church”
(Pius XII, _Sedes Sapientiae_).

2598. Sinfulness of Disregarding Vocation.--(a) He who enters the
clerical state, not knowing that he has a vocation, is guilty of sin,
as is clear from the previous paragraph. According to some, anyone who
receives Major Orders, even with serious doubt about his vocation,
commits a mortal sin, since he inflicts a serious injury on the rights
of God, the Church, himself and his neighbor. According to others, the
sin is only venial when one enters the clerical state conscious of the
absence of vocation, but determined with the help of God to live up to
all the duties; for, though the act is rash, there is good will and
good intention, and grace will not be wanting.

(b) He who refuses to enter the clerical state, though knowing for
certain that he has a vocation, is also guilty of sin, for only
negligence or improper motives such as laziness, sensuality, or too
great love of liberty can produce such reluctance. The sin is grave or
light according to the circumstances. There is grave sin, if the
resistance to the call constitutes serious disobedience, pride or
uncharitableness (e.g., if there were a great scarcity of priests and
the bishop commanded a worthy layman to take Orders); there is venial
sin in other cases when the rejection is only dissent to an invitation
and exposes neither self nor other to grave peril of losing salvation.
Finally, if the signs of vocation do not produce certainty, there may
be no sin at all, but rather virtue, in refusal to ascend to the
clerical state, for no one is bound to take up grave obligations when
uncertain of his duties, and many holy persons from humility or fear of
unworthiness have decided, against the advice or invitation of others,
not to become clerics.

2599. The Positive Duties of Clerics.--(a) Duties to God.--All clerics
are held to frequent reception of the Sacrament of Penance, to daily
devotions (i.e., mental prayer, visit to the Blessed Sacrament, a third
part of the Rosary, examen), and to triennial spiritual retreats
(Canons 125, 126). Moreover, clerics in Sacred Orders, benefice
holders, and solemnly professed religious bound to the choir are
obliged to the daily recitation of the Canonical Hours, each one
according to his own rite and calendar (Canons 135, 213 sqq., 1475,
610). This obligation is grave, because its purpose is the important
one of consecrating each hour of the day by the public prayer of the
Church according to the usage that goes back to the earliest centuries.
But the choral obligation of simply professed religious is light,
unless the choir is impossible without their presence.

(b) Duties to Superiors.--Clerics are especially obliged to show
respect to their Ordinaries and to give them the obedience promised in
ordination (Canon 127).

(c) Duties to the Clerical State.--Clerics are required to cultivate
their minds by sacred and sound studies, and to this end examinations
and conferences are also prescribed (Canons 129-131); to keep
themselves pure in soul and body by the observance of celibate chastity
(Canons 132, 133); to conduct themselves in externals (dwelling, dress,
etc.) in a manner befitting their position (Canons 134, 136). The
clerical garb in this country is the cassock or habit in the house and
church, and dark clothes and the Roman collar, or other distinctive
sign for priests and brothers elsewhere. The dress of the clergy should
avoid the extremes of dudishness and slovenliness (Second Council of
Baltimore, 148; Third Council, 77). The duty of wearing clerical dress
at least away from home and regularly is of serious importance, since
its purpose is the honor of the clerical state and the protection of
its members. It is also forbidden to clerics to cultivate their hair
(e.g., to grow long locks, to use curling irons, to oil or perfume
their head in dandyish fashion), since this is unbecoming in the
followers of a thorn-crowned Leader. The use of the beard is a thing
indifferent in itself, and hence it is forbidden in some places
(generally in the Latin Church) and required in others (as in the
Orient), according to tradition and local usage.

2600. The Obligation of the Divine Office.--(a) Matter.--A cleric is
gravely obliged to recite the Office according to his own rite and in
the language of his rite, and not to make any notable change in the
Office prescribed by the Ordo, either as to quantity (e.g., by omission
of a Little Hour or of parts equally long) or as to quality (e.g., by
substitution of a minor office for that of one of the great
solemnities.) The omission of the Vespers of Holy Saturday, of
Pretiosa, or of the Rogation Litanies seems to be only a venial sin,
because in the first two cases the prayer is short, while in the third
case the precept seems to be _sub levi_. There is also lightness of
matter in the omission of an inconsiderable part of the day’s Office,
or in the substitution without good reason of an equal part for a
prescribed part.

(b) Manner.--Since the Office is a prayer, of a public and daily kind,
it must be said: mentally, that is, there must be at least virtual
intention (which is present from the fact that one takes up the
Breviary to fulfill the obligation) and at least external attention
(see 2166 sqq.); vocally, that is, the words must be consciously formed
by the lips, mouth, or tongue, but it is not necessary that they be
audible, unless two or more are saying the Office together; within the
limits of the day, that is, Matins and Lauds may be anticipated from 2
p.m. of the previous day, but the whole Office must be finished before
midnight of the current day. These are substantial requisites and bind
_sub gravi_, but there may be only venial sin when they are deviated
from inconsiderably. Next, since the Office has a continuity of
thought, an order of precedence among its hours and their subdivisions,
and a special dignity, it must be said uninterruptedly (i.e., without
break between the parts of an hour), in order (i.e., according to the
succession of Matins, Lauds, Prime, etc.), with external respect as to
place and posture (i.e., he who is bound to choral Office should say it
in choir and with the rubrical postures, while he who is bound only to
private Office should say it in church or some other becoming place,
and should observe the rubrical or at least a respectful posture).
These are accidental requisites and bind _sub levi_. For a good reason
one may interrupt the Office even for a notable part of the day (e.g.,
one may discontinue in the midst of a Psalm to pay a duty of politeness
or to attend to business), and for convenience one may invert the order
of hours or of parts of hours, or may say the evening hours in the
morning.

2601. Excuses from the Obligation of the Divine Office.--(a) For
Substitution.--A sufficient reason makes it permissible to substitute
another office not notably different in quantity or quality, as when
one lacks a new office, or has greater devotion for another office.
When substitution has been made unintentionally, the following rules
may be observed, though the last two are not admitted by all: office
counts for office, (e.g., he who through mistake has said the office of
another day may let that office stand for today’s office, but should
add enough to make up for any notable shortness in the office said);
hour does not count for hour (e.g., he who through mistake said Tierce
twice cannot count the second Tierce for Sext); an error should be
corrected when noticed (e.g., he who notices at Sext that he is not
saying the right office should change from Sext); an error is not
corrected by another error (e.g., he who said today’s office yesterday
should not say yesterday’s office today).

(b) For Omission.--The causes that excuse, in whole or in part, from
recitation of the Office are physical inability (e.g., loss of the
breviary, blindness of one who does not know the hours by heart,
sickness or convalescence which makes the recitation a grave hardship),
moral impossibility (e.g., when an urgent duty of charity or justice so
takes up one’s time that one cannot get in all the Office), just
dispensation or commutation given by the Pope or, for temporary
release, by the Ordinary.

2602. The Precept of Clerical Celibacy.--(a) Origin.--This law is not
divine but ecclesiastical, since it arose, not from any command of
Christ, but from a custom of the Church that goes back to the first
centuries. Nevertheless, celibacy of the clergy is an imitation of
Christ and the Apostles, a following of the counsel given by the Lord,
an honor to the sacrifice of the altar, and an example that single
chastity is possible. Moreover, by means of it the priest is freed from
domestic relations and better enabled to minister as the father,
pastor, confessor and counsellor of his people. The celibate is
unencumbered by family responsibilities and expenses, and is therefore
better able to respond to difficult and dangerous tasks, such as
mission work in pagan lands and ministrations to the dying in fire,
wreck, or plague, The Church does not denounce or condemn the married
clergy of non-Catholic bodies; on the contrary, she permits to some
extent a married clergy among the Oriental Catholics, who for many
centuries have been accustomed to a married priesthood. But the law of
celibacy for the Catholic clergy has not only proved itself more
suitable for their work, but it has also justified itself by the
general fidelity with which it has been observed and the attachment to
it of clergy and laity alike.

(b) Obligation.--The law commands chastity as a grave duty of religion
(Canon 132); it forbids the contract or use of marriage (Canon 1072).
It forbids, where there is danger to chastity or scandal, cohabitation
and companionship with women (Canon 133). Cohabitation refers to
dwelling in the same house, even though it be only during the day, and
the woman be a servant; companionship refers to visits, conversations,
signs of friendship, and the like. The danger to good name or virtue
depends on circumstances, such as age, beauty, levity, and privacy of
association; and the law presumes that a relationship is suspicious
unless a woman is a near relative by blood or by marriage (i.e., in the
first or second degree), or is mature in age (about forty years old)
and proved in virtue and of good repute.

2603. Negative Duties of Clerics.--The negative duties of clerics are
the avoidance of certain acts, occupations, or amusements forbidden as
worldly, undignified, dangerous, distracting or scandalous (I Thess.,
v. 22; II Tim., ii. 4).

(a) Forbidden Acts.--A cleric may not go surety without permission,
lest he or his church be involved in scandalous embarrassments (Canon
137); nor engage in trade, lest he be distracted from his spiritual
duties and exposed to the danger or suspicion of injustice or greed
(Canon 142; for penalty attached see Decree of the Sacred Congregation
of the Council, AAS, 42-33D).

(b) Forbidden Occupations.--These include, first, employments and
pursuits unbecoming to clerics (such as those of butcher, actor,
innkeeper); next, those that are incompatible with the ministry (such
as the practice for profit of the medical profession, public
magistracies, government jobs, civil court functions, legislative
offices, Canon 139); finally, those that are contrary to the mildness
that should distinguish clerics (viz, the occupation of fighting man or
soldier, Canon 141; see also Canon 984 on executioners). But exceptions
may be made for a just cause.

(c) Forbidden Amusements.--Clerics should not take part in undignified
diversions or cruel sports, such as the hunting of big game with great
uproar of dogs and guns (Canon 138) or in gambling, and they should not
enter saloons or similar places (Canon 138). Clerics are also forbidden
to assist at unbecoming shows, performances, dances, or at any
theatrical entertainment where their presence gives scandal (Canon
140). To gamble much (say, several times a week and for a considerable
time at each game) is considered a serious matter; but it is not sinful
to indulge in a game of chance now and then, if the stakes are moderate
and there is no scandal.

2604. The Prohibition against Trading.--(a) Meaning.--Trading as here
understood is purely gainful merchandizing (i.e., buying an article at
a lower price in order to sell it unchanged at a higher price) or
industrial merchandizing (i.e., buying an article in order to sell it
at a profit after it has been changed by hired labor). Hence, there is
no canonical trading in commerce which lacks one of the conditions
mentioned, for example, if one buys goods for one’s household or
community and, on discovering that a superfluity has been purchased,
sells at a profit what is left over (see 2134, 2135). Trading includes
not only a business conducted personally or for personal profit, but
also one conducted through agents or for the benefit of others, such as
the poor or pious causes.

(b) Obligation.--The violation of this law is grave in itself, but a
serious sin demands on the part of the subject that there be real
trading (i.e., a number of acts morally united and proceeding from a
purpose to continue in lucrative merchandizing), and on the side of the
object that there be a large amount involved. Hence, it would be venial
to engage in lucrative trading with a large profit once, and with a
small profit twice or thrice.

(c) Excuses.--Necessity (e.g., if a cleric needs the money to live or
to maintain his state, or if a business has fallen to him by
inheritance and cannot be given up without loss) justifies trading, if
there is permission.

2605. Is It Lawful for Clerics to Purchase and Sell Stocks and
Bonds?--(a) If this conduct has the character of gambling or trading
for profit, it is forbidden by Canon 138 or 142, as the case may be,
and is gravely or venially sinful according to the circumstances. Thus,
pure speculation or mere betting on the market is a game of chance, and
the frequent purchase of stocks with the thought of quick sales and
huge profits from sudden changes of the market is lucrative trading.

(b) If the gambling or trading element is absent, the conduct in
question is not forbidden by Canon Law. It is generally admitted that
bond investments are permissible, since they are only a loan of one’s
money at interest. There are two views about stock dealings: the
stricter view regards them as always containing the character of
forbidden trading (since all the notes of strict negotiation are found
in them), or at least as being a game of chance; the milder view, which
is common, holds that they are no more an affair of chance than many
other business undertakings, and that there is no strict negotiation,
if the stockholder is not a member or director of the corporation,
since the buying and selling is done neither directly nor indirectly by
him. Buying of stocks, then, may be nothing more than a prudent
investment of money in a deserving enterprise with the hope of a
reasonable return, and selling out the stocks at a large profit may be
nothing more than the disposal of superfluous goods which it would be
inconvenient to retain. It must be remembered, though, that it is
unlawful to cooperate with a company whose purpose is evil or suspect,
or to have part in frauds, or to give disedification.

2606. Special Duties of Clerical Superiors from Divine Law.--(a) As
individuals, they should strive to be personally more perfect than
their subjects, for they are supposed to give an example in faith,
religion, zeal, labor, and self-denial, “being made a pattern of the
flock from the heart” (I Peter, v. 3).

(b) As rulers, they must have the virtues of good superiors, such as
legal justice or firm devotion to the common good, distributive justice
or avoidance of partiality and prejudice, prudence or knowledge of how
to direct men and means successfully to the glory of God and the
salvation of souls, and commutative justice or respect for the rights
of subjects.

(c) As pastors, they must avoid the qualities of the wolf and of the
hireling, and cultivate those of the good shepherd, being kind and
amiable to Catholic and non-Catholic, and practising the spiritual and
corporal works of mercy.

2607. Special Duties from Canon Law of Those Who Have Care of
Souls.--(a) Bishops have grave obligations of residing in their see or
diocese (Canon 338), of attending to the instruction of their flock
(Canons 1327, 336), of applying the Mass _pro populo_ (Canon 339), of
making a diocesan report (Canon 340), of confirming and of ordaining
worthy candidates (Canon 785), of visiting their dioceses (Canon 343),
of making the _ad limina_ visit (Canons 340, 342), and of calling a
diocesan synod at least every tenth year (Canon 356).

(b) Pastors must reside generally in their parish (Canon 465), and, if
lawfully absent, they must make provision for the sick calls and other
spiritual necessities of their flocks. They must preach the word of God
on Sundays and holydays, and it would be a serious matter to neglect
this duty for a considerable time (e.g., a whole month) without good
reason (Canon 1344). It is also a serious obligation to attend to the
necessary catechetical instruction of young and old (Canons 1330,
1332), to apply the Mass _pro populo_ (Canon 466), and to administer
the Sacraments (at least Baptism, Penance, Extreme Unction) to those in
grave spiritual need (see 1167). Pastors are also obliged to know their
flock, to visit the sick and dying, to correct abuses, to see that the
customary administration of the Sacraments and the usual church
functions are attended to, to watch over the schooling of the children,
and to direct the temporalities and attend to the reports and records
of the parish. The duties of chaplains of hospitals, institutions,
soldiers, etc., are similar to those of pastors, but in particular
cases the former are subject to special prescriptions or to local usage
or to rules made by the Ordinary.

(c) Assistant pastors are subject in the care of souls to the
instruction and direction of the parish-priest. Their particular duties
are known from the diocesan statutes, the letters of the Ordinary, and
the commission of the pastor. Regularly, they are bound to reside in
the parish rectory and to assist the pastor or supply for him in all
the parish work, the Mass _pro populo_ excepted (Canon 476).

2608. The Duty of Charity to the Poor.--(a) According to Canon Law all
beneficed clergy (Cardinals excepted) must give all the superfluous
fruits of their benefice to charitable or pious causes (Canon 1473).
But it is an extremely strict view which holds that all the secular
clergy are beneficed.

(b) According to the divine law of charity (see 1226, 1252) even the
unbeneficed clergy have the duty of giving alms from their surplus
wealth. Thus, it would be unmerciful if a clergyman spent on himself
all the fortune he had inherited from his relatives without thought of
the poor; it would be often a source of scandal if a priest enriched
his relatives with money received in ministerial ways, but left nothing
to pious causes.

2609. Canon 1473 on the Disposition of Superfluous Wealth by Beneficed
Clergy.--(a) The Money to be Spent.--The Canon does not refer to the
property of the Church (i.e., the foundation or endowment of the
benefice), for of this the beneficed clergyman is only the
administrator, and he would be unjust if he alienated its funds to
other purposes; nor does it refer to the clergyman’s own property, such
as goods received by inheritance or other profane title
(_patrimonialia_), or by title of personal ministerial service, such as
stipends and fees (_quasi-patrimonialia_). It refers, then, to the
revenues of the benefice (e.g., the bishop’s or pastor’s salary) and to
the amount that is left over after the deduction of all reasonable and
customary expenses that have been made, or could have been made for
decent personal support.

(b) The Use of Surplus Money.--The alms should be given to any pious or
charitable cause, such as the promotion of divine worship, the
assistance of needy missions, the spiritual or corporal works of mercy.
The cleric is free to bestow his gift either during his lifetime (which
is better) or to leave it in his will.

2610. The Obligation of Canon 1473.--(a) The obligation is most
probably not one of justice, since the holder of the benefice owns the
superfluous fruits, but one of obedience to the Church. Some authors
also consider this precept as binding in virtue of religion and
charity, and regard its violation as a sacrilege or sin against
charity. The holder of the benefice is not held to restitution,
however, since neglect of the precept is not an injustice. As to his
successors through gift inter vivos or testament, they are not bound to
give the superfluities as an alms, since the church precept was for the
cleric himself. Successors to an intestate should observe the wishes of
the deceased, but, if the character of the goods they inherit is
doubtful, they may usually be left in good faith.

(b) The obligation is grave, since it is commanded as an act of
religion, or at least as an act of obedience in a very important
matter. From the time of the Apostles it was customary to distribute to
the poor what was left over of the goods of the Church, and the clergy
were regarded as the fathers and protectors of the needy. Again, since
the goods of a benefice originated in gifts offered to God Himself, it
is most becoming that their superfluities be devoted to the causes most
pleasing to God. Grave matter would be three times the amount required
in theft, because a violation of this precept is not the taking of what
is not one’s own, but the using in a forbidden way of what is one’s own.

2611. The Special Duties of Religious.--The particular obligations of
religious are declared in the proper rules of the various institutes,
just as the particular obligations of the secular clergy are set forth
in the statutes of local synods and councils. We shall outline here
only the general obligations of religious, to which they are held by
the common law of the Church.

(a) By reason of his profession, a religious is obliged to strive after
the perfection of charity (see 1560, 367) through the religious life,
that is, by means of the rules and constitutions of his own institute
(Canon 593). All religious, superiors and subjects, are bound to
observe their laws, but _per se_ these laws oblige under penalty, not
under sin (see 570). _Per accidens_, however, the transgression of rule
or constitutions may be sinful, as when the matter belongs also to
divine or church law or to the observance of a vow, or when the
transgression includes contempt, scandal, or demoralization of
discipline.

(b) By reason of the vows, a religious is obliged to follow the three
evangelical counsels (see 2191 sqq.) and any other vows of his
institute according to his rule (e.g., poverty is a renunciation of
even community possession in some rules and of individual possession in
others). The vows oblige _per se_ under grave sin, on account of the
duty of religion (see 2209) and the intention of the religious to bind
himself gravely; but there may be venial sin on account of imperfection
of act or lightness of matter.

2612. The Obligation of the Three Principal Vows.--(a) Poverty is a
renunciation of the independent use of external corporal goods, such as
money and lands and chattels (simple vow), or also of the radical
dominion (see 1697) or right of ownership of such goods (solemn vow).
Grave matter in the unjust violation of poverty seems to be the same as
in other acts of unjust damage or acquisition, and hence in thefts from
outsiders a less amount is grave matter, in domestic thefts from the
monastery a greater sum is required (see 1900, 1903). Grave matter in
the violation of poverty that is not unjust (e.g., in use of money
without permission) seems to be the same as absolutely grave matter for
thefts, unless the constitutions rule otherwise; but grave matter here
does not coalesce from many small violations. The virtue, but not the
vow, of poverty is offended by purely internal acts (e.g., attachment
to wealth), and there is no offense at all in dominion over spirituals
(such as fame, good reputation) which are not renounced by the vow of
poverty, and in certain acts of disposition (e.,g., acceptance of
deposit, distribution of alms) or proprietorship (e.g., of manuscripts)
permitted by rule.

(b) Chastity is a renunciation of all venereal pleasure, internal and
external, lawful and unlawful. Grave matter is the same as for the
virtue of chastity, but the vow could be violated without the violation
of the virtue (e.g., in the use of marriage by one simply professed).
For the protection of this vow the Church has made the law of cloister,
which forbids under certain conditions the entrance of outsiders into a
religious house or the egress of the religious (Canons 547, 598,
600-604, 679, 2342).

(c) Obedience is the renunciation of one’s own will with the duty of
submission to commands of a Superior given according to the rules and
constitutions. There is grave matter against the vow if one disobeys in
an important matter imposed by the Superior in the name of obedience
and according to the rite prescribed by the rule or constitutions (see
2364). The virtue, but not the vow, is offended by internal
insubordination (see 2357); neither virtue nor vow is offended when a
Superior commands what is above the rule (e.g., the accomplishment of
the impossible, heroic acts that do not pertain to the nature of the
institute), or against the rule, unless he has power to dispense, or
probably what is beneath the rule (such as things manifestly ridiculous
and useless). Since obedience is vowed to the precepts of the Superior,
the vow is not broken by transgression of points of the rule not
expressly included under the vow, nor by transgressions of the general
precepts of God and the Church.




Art. 2: THE DUTIES OF MEMBERS OF DOMESTIC AND CIVIL SOCIETY

2613. The Duties of Husbands and Wives.--Conjugal obligations may be
classed under three heads according to the three ends of marriage.

(a) Thus, the first blessing of marriage is offspring, and this imposes
upon parents the obligation of providing for their children and of
training them in mind and will (see 2630 sqq.).

(b) The second blessing of marriage is fidelity to the engagement made
by husband and wife to deliver to each other exclusive power over their
bodies for procreation (conjugal debt) and to love each other with a
special but pure affection: “The wife hath not power of her own body,
but the husband; and in like manner the husband hath not power of his
own body but the wife” (I Cor., vii. 4); “Husbands, love your wives as
Christ also loved the Church” (Eph., v. 25). Conjugal love admits no
rivals; the husband must prefer his wife to every other woman, and the
wife likewise must think more of her husband than of any other man (see
1179).

(c) The third blessing of marriage is the Sacrament or the unbreakable
bond of marriage: “The Lord commanded that the wife depart not from the
husband, and if she depart that she remain unmarried, or be reconciled
to her husband. And let not the husband put away his wife” (I Cor.,
vii. 10). This imposes the duties of a permanent domestic society in
which the spouses dwell together permanently and each has certain
special functions of assistance to the other.

2614. The Obligation of Paying the Conjugal Debt.--(a) The duty is one
of justice, since it arises from the contract of marriage, in which the
parties freely and solemnly bind themselves to it as the subject-matter
of their pact.

(b) The obligation is grave, since the marriage contract is one of the
most momentous of human agreements, its direct end being the
propagation of the race, while the denial of its essential right is
productive of most serious evils, such as incontinence, scandals and
the disruption of families. There is light matter, however, as when the
request is not imperative, or the denial is infrequent and without
danger of incontinence.

2615. Absence of Obligation.--The obligation of paying the conjugal
debt does not exist, however, when the right to make the request has
been lost or when the request is unreasonable.

(a) Thus, the right to make the request is lost when one party has
broken faith by committing adultery and has not been forgiven by the
innocent party, and also when one party is incapable (e.g., on account
of insanity or drunkenness) of asking in a rational manner.

(b) The request is unreasonable, first, when it is immoderate (e.g.,
when it cannot be granted without serious and unusual detriment to
health, or without danger of death, or without likelihood of abortion
or other great harm to a child conceived or to be conceived); secondly,
when it is seductive (e.g., when it is an invitation to commit onanism).

2616. Suspension of Obligation.--The obligation of granting and the
right of requesting conjugal relations are suspended when the marriage
is discovered to be null or uncertain.

(a) Thus, if the marriage is certainly null, abstinence is necessary
until the marriage is made valid; otherwise the parties are guilty of
fornication. But if nullity is due to a merely ecclesiastical
impediment, the impediment probably ceases in cases of most grave
inconvenience when the nullity is known to only one spouse and the
dispensation cannot be obtained at once.

(b) If the marriage is only doubtfully null, abstinence is not
necessary unless both parties have a serious doubt and no examination
has yet been made. Light doubts should not be considered, nor doubts
that have not been corroborated by investigation; while, if only one
party doubts, he or she cannot refuse the debt lest injustice be done
the other.

2617. Is There an Obligation of Requesting Conjugal Intercourse?--(a)
_Per se_, there is no obligation, since one may lawfully decide not to
enjoy one’s right, and not to use what belongs to one. As man and wife
were free to marry or not to marry, so are they free to agree either to
consummate or not consummate marriage. It is even lawful for married
people to contract together to abstain temporarily or permanently from
marriage relations (e.g., for the sake of health, or of economy, or of
mortification). By mutual consent one or both may make a vow of
chastity, as was done by St. Joseph and the Blessed Virgin, or the
husband may enter the priesthood and the wife become a nun.

(b) _Per accidens_, there is often an obligation of requesting
intercourse, for experience shows that continual non-use of marriage
often leads to incontinence or to loss of affection (see 2228).

2618. The Morality of Venereal Acts of Marriage.--(a) Non-consummated
Acts.--These acts, whether internal or external, are lawful _per se_
when they are used only as accessories to the act of marriage or as
means to foster or preserve conjugal love, for the acts are meant by
God to serve the purposes mentioned (2510). But _per accidens_ there
may be venial sin, on account of inordinateness in the motive (i.e.,
when only pleasure is intended), or in the manner (i.e., when due
decency is not observed). There is mortal sin when these acts are not
referred to the lawful conjugal act, but either directly or indirectly
to pollution, namely, when there is foreseen proximate danger of
pollution and the acts are either solitary or cooperative but performed
without sufficient reason (such as expressions of special affection),
for pollution is gravely sinful in the married, as well as in the
single state (see 2539 sqq.).

(b) Natural Consummated Act.--This act in itself is not only lawful,
but meritorious, because it exercises such virtues as obedience (Gen.,
i. 28), justice (I Cor., vii. 3 sqq.), and love of the common good and
religion (Tob., viii. 9). Since marriage intercourse has for its ends
not only reproduction, but also the expression of mutual love and the
allaying of concupiscence, it is lawful even when conception is
impossible or less probable, as when the parties are sterile, or the
woman is pregnant, or during the so-called agenesic period, or at the
time of lactation. It is a venial sin to exercise the conjugal act when
one excludes every motive except that of pleasure (Denziger, n. 1159);
and there may be even mortal sin on account of circumstances, such as
place (e.g., scandal to others present), manner (e.g., external
immoderation, internal desire of another person), evil consequences
(e.g., when one of the parties has a contagious or veneral disease,
when abortion will likely result, etc.).

(c) Unnatural Consummated Acts.--Pollution is mortally sinful (2535
sqq.), and is worse in married than in single persons, as being an
injury to the faith pledged in marriage; and hence it is not lawful to
practise it even for the purpose of artificial fecundation. Rectal
copulation is also gravely sinful, being unnatural lust (see 2534) and
a violation of conjugal faith. The usual forms of unnatural vaginal
coition, which are very much practised today, are contraceptive in
purpose, and are of two general kinds in the procedure--the
physiological or preventive, which uses instruments to keep the semen
from the uterus (such as sponges or pessaries for the female, condoms
or protectors for the male), or which employs douches or syringes to
remove semen from the vagina, or uses chemicals to devitalize it.

2619. Nota.--(a) Non habetur onanismus, nec peccatum, si copula
abrumpitur, ex necessitate (v.g., ad vitandum scandalum persona
inopinate supervenientis), vel ex utilitate, mutuo dato consensu et
periculo pollutionis excluso; nam seminatio extra vas, aut involuntaria
est, aut nulla.

(b) Non habetur contraceptio nec peccatum, sed potius actus honestus,
si, ob defectum physicum viri vel mulieris, naturae adjuvetur mediis
artificialibus ut copula fiat, vel ut semen introducatur in uterum; nam
fini matrimonii non obstat, sed obsecundat iste modus agendi.

(c) Artificial Insemination. The subject-matter of the latter part of
the preceding paragraph is distinguished from several unlawful
practices considered by moralists under the heading of artificial
insemination. Pope Pius XII on several occasions has given a clear,
accurate and complete statement of Catholic teaching on the subject. We
append here his texts:

1) The practice of artificial insemination, when it refers to man,
cannot be considered, either exclusively or principally, from the
biological and medical point of view, ignoring the moral and legal one.

Artificial insemination, outside of marriage, must be condemned as
essentially and strictly immoral.

Natural law and divine positive law establish, in fact, that the
procreation of a new life cannot but be the fruit of marriage. Only
marriage safeguards the dignity of the spouses (principally of the wife
in the present case) and their personal good. It alone provides for the
well-being and education of the child.

It follows that no divergence of opinion among Catholics is admitted on
the condemnation of artificial insemination outside of marriage. The
child conceived in those conditions would be, by that very fact,
illegitimate.

Artificial insemination produced in a marriage by the active element of
a third party is equally immoral and consequently to be condemned
without appeal.

Only the spouses have a reciprocal right upon each other’s body to
generate a new life: an exclusive, inalienable right, which cannot be
ceded. And so it must be, even out of consideration for the child. On
whoever gives life to a small being, nature imposes, by the very
strength of that tie, the duty to keep and educate it. But no ties of
origin, no moral or legal bonds of conjugal procreation, exist between
the legitimate husband and the child who is the fruit of the active
element of a third party (even if the husband has given his consent).

As far as the legitimacy of artificial insemination in marriage is
concerned, it suffices, for the moment, to recall these principles of
natural law: the simple fact that the result desired is obtained by
this means does not justify the use of the means itself; nor does the
desire of the husband and wife, in itself perfectly legitimate, to have
a child, suffice to establish the legitimacy of resorting to the
artificial insemination which would satisfy this desire.

It would be erroneous, therefore, to think that the possibility of
resorting to this means might render valid a marriage between persons
unable to contract it because of the _impedimentum impotentiae_.

On the other hand, it is superfluous to mention that the active element
can never be obtained legitimately by means of acts against nature.

Although new methods cannot be ruled out a priori for the sole reason
of their novelty, nonetheless, as far as artificial impregnation is
concerned, extreme caution is not enough; it must be absolutely
excluded. Saying this does not necessarily proscribe the use of certain
artificial means destined only to facilitate the natural act, or to
assure the accomplishment of the end of the natural act regularly
performed.

Let it never be forgotten that only the procreation of a new life
according to the will and the designs of the Creator brings with it, to
a marvelous degree of perfection, the accomplishment of the proposed
ends. It is at the same time in conformity with corporeal and spiritual
nature and the dignity of the married couple, as well as with the
healthy, normal development of the child (Address to Physicians, Sept.
29, 1949, _Discorsi e Radiomessaggi_, vol. xi, pp. 221 ff).

2) We also believe that it is of capital importance for you, gentlemen,
not to neglect this perspective when you consider the methods of
artificial fecundation. The means by which one tends toward the
production of a new life take on an essential human significance
inseparable from the desired end and susceptible of causing grave harm
to this very end if these means are not conformable to reality and to
the laws inscribed in the nature of beings.

We have been asked to give some directives on this point also. On the
subject of the experiments in artificial human fecundation “in vitro,”
let it suffice for Us to observe that they must be rejected as immoral
and absolutely illicit. With regard to the various moral problems which
are posed by artificial fecundation, in the ordinary meaning of the
expression, or “artificial insemination,” We have already expressed Our
thought in a discourse addressed to physicians on September 29, 1949
(_Discorsi e Radiomessaggi_, vol. xi. pp. 221 ff.). For the details We
refer you to what We said then and We confine Ourself here to repeating
the concluding judgment given there: “With regard to artificial
fecundation, not only is there reason to be extremely reserved, but it
must be absolutely rejected. In speaking thus, one is not necessarily
forbidding the use of certain artificial means destined solely to
facilitate the natural act or to achieve the attainment of the natural
act normally performed.” But since artificial fecundation is being more
and more widely used, and in order to correct some erroneous opinions
which are being spread concerning what We have taught, We have the
following to add:

Artificial fecundation exceeds the limits of the right which spouses
have acquired by the matrimonial contract, namely, that of fully
exercising their natural sexual capacity in the natural accomplishment
of the marital act. The contract in question does not confer on them a
right to artificial fecundation, for such a right is not in any way
expressed in the right to the natural conjugal act and cannot be
deduced from it. Still less can one derive it from the right to the
“child,” the primary “end” of marriage. The matrimonial contract does
not give this right, because it has for its object not the “child,” but
the “natural acts” which are capable of engendering a new life and are
destined to this end. It must likewise be said that artificial
fecundation violates the natural law and is contrary to justice and
morality [1] (_Marriage and Parenthood_, May 19, 1956). See _The Pope
Speaks_, Vol, III, No. 2, Autumn of 1956, pp. 194 ff.

[1] The Holy Father here spoke for several minutes in Latin as follows:

Alia nunc occurrit quaestio, ad quam pertractandam magis addecet
latinam linguam adhibere.

Quemadmodum rationalis animus noster artificiali inseminationi
adversatur, ita eadem ethica ratio, a qua agendi normo sumenda est,
pariter vetat, quominus humanum semen, peritorum examini subiciendum,
masturbatiouis ope procuretur.

Hanc agendi rationem attigimus Nostra quoque allocutione coram
Urologiae doctoribus coetum participantibus, die VIII mensis Octobris
anno MDCCCCLIII prolata, in qua haec habuimus, verba: “Du reste le
St-Office a decide deja le 2 aout 1929 (_Acta Ap. Sedis_, vol. XXI a.
1929, p. 490, II) qu’une “‘masturbatio directe procurata ut obtineatur
sperma’ n’est pas licite, ceci quel que soit le but de l’examen”
(_Discorsi e Radiomessaggi_ vol. XV, pag. 378). Cum vero Nobis allatum
sit, pravam huiusmodi consuetudinem pluribus in locis invalescere,
opportunum ducimus nunc etiam, quae tunc monuimus, commemorare atque
iterum inculcare.

Si actus huiusmodi ad explendam libidinem ponantur, eos vel ipse
naturalis hominis sensus sua sponte respuit, ac multo magis mentis
iudicium, quotiescumque rem mature recteque considerat. Iidem actus
tamen tunc quoque respuendi sunt, cum graves rationes eos a culpa
eximere videntur, uti sunt: remedia iis praestanda qui nimia nervorum
intentione vel abnormibus animi spasmis laborant; medicis peragenda,
ope microscopii, spermatis inspectio, quod venerei vel alius generis
morbi bacteriis infectum sit; diversarum partium examen, ex quibus
semen ordinarie constat, ut vitalium spermatis elementorum praesentia,
numerus, quantitus, forma, vis, habitus aliaque id genus dignoscuntur.

Eiusmodi procuratio humani seminis, per masturbationem effecta, ad
nihil aliud directe spectat, nisi ad naturalem in homine generandi
facultatem plene exercendam; quod quidem plenum exercitium, extra
conjugalem copulam peractum, secum fert directum et indebite usurpatum
eiusdem facultatis usum. In hoc eiusmodi indebito facultatis usu
proprie sita est intrinseca regulae morum violatio. Haudquaquam enim
homo ius ullum exercendi facultatem sexualem iam inde habet, quod
facultatem eandem a natura recepit. Homini nempe (secus ac in ceteris
animantibus rationis expertibus contingit) ius et potestas utendi atque
exercendi eandem facultatem tantummodo in nuptiis valide initis
tribuitut, atque in iure matrimoniali continetur, quod ipsis nuptiis
traditur et acceptatur. Inde elucet hominem, ob solam hanc causam quod
facultatem sexualem a natura recepit, non habere nisi potentiam et ius
ad matrimonium ineundum. Hoc ius tamen, ad objectum et ambitum quod
attinet, naturae lege, non hominum voluntate discribitur; vi huius
legis naturae, homini non competit ius et potestas ad plenum facultatis
sexualis exercitium, directe intentum, nisi cum coniugalem copulam
exercet ad normam a natura ipsa imperatam atque definitam. Extra hunc
naturalem actum, ne in ipso quidem matrimonio ius datur ad sexuali hac
facultate plene fruendum. Hi sunt limites, quibus ius, de quo diximus,
eiusque exercitium a natura circumscribuntur. Ex eo quod plenum
sexualis facultatis exercitium hoc absolute copulae coniugalis limite
circumscribitur, eadem facultas intrinsece apta efficitur ad plenum
matrimonii naturalem finem assequendum (qui non modo est generatio, sed
etiam prolis educatio), atque eius exercitum cum dicto fine colligatur.
Quae cum ita sint, masturbatio omnino est extra memoratam pleni
facultatis sexualis exercitii naturalem habilitatem, ideoque etiam
extra eius colligationem cum fine a natura ordinato; quamobrem eadem
omni iuris titulo caret atque naturae et ethices legibus contraria est,
etiamsi inservire intendat utilitati per se iustae nec improbandae.

Quae hactenus dicta sunt de intrinseca malitia cuiuslibet pleni usus
potentiae generandi extra naturalem coniugalem copulam, valent eodem
modo cum agitur de matrimonio iunctis vel de matrimonio solutis, sive
plenum exercitium apparatus genitalis fit a viro sive a muliere, sive
ab utraque parte simul agente; sive fit tactibus manualibus sive
coniugalis copulae interruptione; haec enim semper est actus naturae
contrarius atque intrinsece malus.

2620. Contraception.--Contraception in all its forms (onanism,
condonism, vaginal irrigation, spermatocide) is a grave crime.

(a) It is an Injury to God.--Marriage was instituted by God to
propagate the human race (Gen., i. 27, 28) and to bless homes with
children (Ps., cxxvi, cxxvii), and He has made it a sacred institution
and a Sacrament. Contraception defeats the ends of marriage and
degrades it to the level of a mere instrument of carnal gratification.
The hatred of God for this sin appears in general from the horror with
which Scripture speaks of unnatural lust, and in particular from the
case of Onan, whose sin is called detestable and whom God slew in
punishment (Gen., xxxviii. 10).

(b) It is an Injury to Society.--The perpetuation of the human race is
endangered as soon as marriage is abused as to its natural end. Hence,
after the crime of homicide which destroys human life already in
existence, contraception seems to rank next in enormity, since it
prevents human life from coming into existence. This vice spreads moral
degeneracy and decay from the home itself, and is rightly called
race-suicide, since it depopulates and destroys the nation by the act
of its own people.

(c) It is an Injury to the Family.--The happiness and success of the
home depend chiefly on the respect which its members have one for the
other and on the cultivation of the sturdy virtues that strengthen
character. The husband and wife who practise onanism or other similar
carnal vices cannot have the mutual respect they should have; the wife
is deprived of the treasure of her modesty and is treated as a
prostitute rather than as an honored wife and mother, and the husband
is brutalized by the removal of the natural restraint to his sex
passion. Such self-indulgent persons will either selfishly neglect the
one or two children they may have, or will spoil them for life by the
luxury and laziness in which they are reared.

(d) It is an Injury to the Individual.--As concerns the body, there is
a perversion of the sex act from its definite use and specific end, and
hence contraception has been described as “reciprocal masturbation.” As
regards the soul, its higher goods of will and intellect are
subordinated by the contraceptionist to the delight of passion, the
lower impulses are greatly strengthened and self-control made more and
more difficult, and the spiritual objectives that should prompt a
rational creature are sacrificed for the passing gratification that
moves the beasts.

2621. Some Arguments of Neo-Malthusians and Other Advocates of
Contraception.--(a) Necessity for the Individual.--“This practice is
demanded by comfort (e.g., in order to have a good and easy time, to
have more opportunity for pleasures and occupations outside the home,
to preserve form and beauty, to escape the troubles of child-bearing
and child-rearing), or by utility (e.g., in order that suffering wives
be freed from the slavery of excessive child-bearing, in order that
children receive more attention and care than is possible in large
families).” This argument from comfort is unworthy of any but a pagan
or materialist, for the end of existence is something higher than
pleasure or escape from all hardship. But even if happiness alone be
considered, the childless home is not the most cheerful, and it often
happens that parents who have sinfully limited their parenthood will
lose an only child and be left sterile and desolate. The argument from
utility proves only that sometimes (not often) it is inadvisable for a
couple to have any or many children, but it does not prove that family
limitation through means forbidden by the laws of God and of nature is
permissible. The normal woman is not harmed but helped by
child-bearing, whereas onanism and other unnatural vices are fearfully
damaging both to mental and physical health. Experience too shows that
mothers of five or more children live longer, and that children from
large families are very often superior in qualities and achievements
and stand a better chance in life. Exceptions only emphasize the rule.

(b) Necessity for the Family.--“Large families are impossible to many
persons because the high cost of children today (expenses for clothing,
food, medical care, schooling, etc.) is beyond their means.” The
inability to support many children is often due to extravagance or to
insufficient wages, and the remedy lies in prudent economy or in
improvement of the economic condition of workers, not in the abuse of
marriage. The weakness of the objection is shown from the fact that
race-suicide is more common among the well-to-do than among the poorer
classes. However, in a genuine case of inability to maintain a large
family, limitation of children is a duty, but not by means of the sin
of contraception or onanism.

(c) Necessity for the Community.--“The cause of unemployment,
destitution, famine and war is the overpopulation of the world.
Moreover, if the poorer classes would practise contraception and the
better-to-do classes have larger families, the standard of living of
the former would be raised, the culture of the latter would be
preserved, and the quality of the whole race be greatly improved.” The
resources of the earth are easily adequate to support many times the
present population, and the misfortunes referred to are due, not to the
number of people who inhabit the earth, but to accident or to human
greed or imprudence. The eugenic argument is a vain dream, for the
history of nations and modern facts show that the ideal of race
improvement makes little appeal when the easier way of indulgence has
been learned. As said above, it is the wealthy and educated classes who
have the fewest children.

(d) Necessity of a Moral Kind.--“Contraception is a useful control of
nature similar to that employed by physicians, surgeons and other
scientists; it is not a contradiction of nature, since it preserves the
end of the sexual faculty in expressing physical love. The motives of
those who use it are not necessarily carnal, but may be of a very
Christian kind (e.g., the need of limitation of family in order the
better to practise one’s vocation, or in order to spare one’s wife, or
to keep her from abortion), and they may sincerely believe it to be
lawful.” Contraception does not control, but defeats nature, by
voluntarily frustrating the primary end which nature has in view, and,
if permitted, it logically leads to every kind of sensual indulgence.
The motives or conscience of those who use it cannot change its
character, for the end does not justify the means and a wrong
conscience does not change the law. Those who have not been spoiled or
misled by contraceptive propaganda or advice, instinctively regard
artificial birth-control as well as onanism with disgust.

2622. Is Birth-Control Ever Lawful?--(a) If this refers to an end
(viz., the limitation of the number of children or the spacing of their
arrival), it is not unlawful in itself (see 2617); and it is sometimes
a duty, as when the wife is in very poor health or the family is unable
to take care of more. But in view of the decline and deterioration in
populations today, it seems that couples who are able to bring up
children well should consider it a duty to the common welfare to have
at least four children, and it should be easy for many to have at least
a dozen children. The example of those married persons of means who are
unable to have a number of children of their own, but who adopt or
raise orphaned little ones, is very commendable.

(b) If birth control refers to a means of family limitation, it is
lawful when that means is continence or abstinence from marital
relations, not if it is onanism or the use of mechanical or chemical
means to prevent conception. The objection that husbands cannot
restrain themselves is really an insult to God’s grace and is
contradicted by numerous facts. A man of manly character should be
ashamed to admit that he is the slave of passion, and the fact that God
commands chastity and that millions obey Him both in the wedded and
single state is sufficient proof that, even though hard, sexual
abstinence is not impossible, if there is a real resolve and the right
means are employed, such as rooming apart and concentration on other
and higher things.

Continence or abstinence is counselled by the Church should conditions
make the conception of children inadvisable. It is counselled, not
commanded, since it involves heroic sacrifice which makes it all the
more meritorious and praiseworthy: “It is wronging men and women of our
times to deem them incapable of continuous heroism. Today, for many
reasons--perhaps with the goad of hard necessity and even sometimes in
the service of injustice--heroism is exercised to a degree and to an
extent which would have been thought impossible in days gone by. Why.
then, should this heroism, if the circumstances really demand it, stop
at the borders established by the passions and inclinations of nature?
The answer is clear. The man who does not want to dominate himself is
incapable of so doing. He who believes he can do so, counting merely on
his own strength without seeking sincerely and perseveringly help from
God, will remain miserably disillusioned” (Pope Pius XII, _Allocution
to the Italian Catholic Union of Midwives_, Oct. 29, 1951).

Another lawful means of family limitation is “periodic continence” or
“rhythm,” the deliberate avoidance of conception by restricting
intercourse, temporarily or permanently, to the days of natural
sterility on the part of the wife. Many of the faithful are under the
impression that the system has received the unqualified approval of the
Church, that it constitutes a form of “Catholic Birth-Control.” This is
not completely true.

All theologians agree that the use of marriage during the sterile
period is not _per se_ illicit. The act is performed in the natural
way; nothing has been done positively to avoid conception; and the
secondary ends of matrimony, mutual love and the quieting of
temptation, have been fostered. “If the carrying out of this theory
means nothing more than that the couple can make use of their
matrimonial rights on the days of natural sterility, too, there is
nothing against it, for by so doing they neither hinder nor injure in
any way the consummation of the natural act and its further natural
consequences” (Pope Pius XII, ibid.).

“If, however, there is further question--that is, of permitting the
conjugal act on those days exclusively--then the conduct of the married
couple must be examined more closely” (ibid).

The following points summarize papal teaching on this aspect:

1) A premarital agreement to restrict the marital right and not merely
the use to sterile periods, implies an essential defect in matrimonial
consent and renders the marriage invalid. 2) The practice is not
morally justified simply because the nature of the marital act is not
violated and the couple are prepared to accept and rear children born
despite their precautions. 3) Serious motives, (medical, eugenic,
economic and social), must be present to justify this practice. When
present, they can exempt for a long time, perhaps even for the duration
of the marriage, from the positive obligations of the married state. 4)
The married state imposes on those who perform the marital act the
positive obligation of helping to conserve the human race. Accordingly,
to make use of the marital act continuously and without serious reason
to withdraw from its primary obligation would be a sin against the very
meaning of conjugal life (ibid.).

Pope Pius explicitly confirmed the common teaching of theologians: 1)
Rhythm, by mutual consent, for proportionate reasons, and with due
safeguards against dangers would be licit. 2) Without a good reason,
the practice would involve some degree of culpability. Not expressly
confirmed, but simply an expression of common moral principles is the
common agreement: 3) That the sin could be mortal by reason of
injustice, grave danger of incontinence, serious family discord, etc.

Since the Allocution, the more common opinion in this country asserts
that the Holy Father taught: 1) that married people who use their
marital right have a duty to procreate; 2) that this duty is binding
under pain of sin; 3) there are, however, reasons that excuse the
couples from this obligation and, should they exist for the whole of
married life, the obligation does not bind them at all; 4) the sin does
not consist in the exercise of marital rights during the sterile
periods; but in abstention from intercourse during the fertile periods
precisely to avoid conception, when the couple could have and should
have made its positive contribution to society. Sin is present when the
practice is unjustifiedly undertaken; 5) the formal malice of illicit
periodic continence is not against the sixth commandment; i.e., against
the procreation of children or the use of the generative faculty, but
against the seventh commandment, i.e., against social justice. The
couple is not making its contribution to the common good of society; 6)
from 4 and 5 above, it follows that the individual acts of intercourse
during a period of unjust practice of rhythm do not constitute
numerically distinct sins. Rather, granting the continuance of a single
will act to practice rhythm, there is one sin for the whole period of
illicit abstention during the fertile periods.

Since the Pope abstained from an explicit statement on the gravity of
the sin, the controversy of whether the practice intrinsically is a
mortal sin or not continued. The opinion in this country which holds
the greatest authority states that mortal sin is involved in the case
of continued practice with a total exclusion of children and frequent
use of marital rights during the sterile period.

Diversity of opinion has arisen as to the means of estimating when a
serious sin has been committed. Some have used a temporal norm, e.g.,
unjustified use of rhythm for five or six years would constitute a
serious matter. Undoubtedly most of the proponents of this norm would
not accuse a couple of certain mortal sin if they already have one or
more children; after that, indefinite use of the practice without
excusing causes would not be a mortal sin. (This is admitted by most
theologians.) Others have proposed a numerical norm as a basis to
determine whether or not a couple has made its contribution to the
conservation of the race. Concretely the proponents of this theory
regard four or five children as sufficient to satisfy the obligation in
such a way;

a) that the use of rhythm to limit the family to this number is licit
provided the couple is willing and morally able to practice it;

b) that the limitation through rhythm to less than four requires a
serious justifying cause. The intention involved to prevent conception
would be seriously sinful in itself, since it causes great harm to the
common good and involves in practice subordination of the primary to
the secondary end or ends of matrimony. At the present time this
opinion seems to be more favored in America than the first which places
the gravity of the sin in the unjustified practice of rhythm for five
years. (For a survey of recent opinion, see the _Conference Bulletin of
the Archdiocese of New York_, Vol. XXXIV, No. 1, pp. 36 ff.)

On the other hand, some European theologians have denied that the
practice constitutes a mortal sin in itself, independently of
circumstances such as injustice and danger of incontinence.

The present state of opinion, then, is definitely undecided and calls
for caution both in dealing too severely with penitents or too readily
recommending the practice. The response of the Sacred Penitentiary of
June 16, 1880, affords a safe guide in practice: “Married couples who
use their marriage rights in the aforesaid manner are not to be
disturbed, and the confessor may suggest the opinion in question,
cautiously, however, to those married people whom he has tried in vain
to dissuade from the detestable crime of onanism.”

As to the theological censure to be attached to “rhythm,” it is not
approved, nor recommended, but seems to be tolerated for sufficiently
grave reasons. “Instead of being freely taught and commended, it is
rather to be tolerated as an extreme remedy or means of preventing sin”
(Official Monitum, Patrick Cardinal Hayes, Sept. 8, 1936, _Conference
Bulletin of Archdiocese of New York_, Volume XIV, No. 2, p. 78).

2623. Cooperatio Uxoris ad Onanismum vel Contraceptionem.--(a)
Cooperatio formalis graviter illicita est, quum includat approbationem
ipsius peccati. Unde graviter peccat uxor quae suis quaeremoniis de
molestiis graviditatis virum cogit ad congressum onanisticum, vel quae
nec interdum conatur eum avertere ab iniquo consilio onanistice
congrediendi, vel quae active adjuvat abruptionem copulae, vel quae
interne gaudet de ipso peccato (1513).

(b) Cooperatio materialis ad onanismum ex gravi causa (e.g., ex metu
fundato rixarum, molestae cohabitationis, adulterii viri) licet; nam
actio mulieris, scil. copulam habere naturalem, honesta est, atque
causa sufficiens adest permittendi abusum factum a comparte (1515
sqq.). Imo uxor debitum petere potest a suo viro onanistico, si secus
diu abstinere cogeretur ab omni usu conjugii cum periculo
incontinentiae, quia caritas erga virum non obligat ad abstinentiam cum
tanto incommodo.

(c) Cooperatio mere materialis ad contraceptionem, non videtur
possibilis; nam copula contraceptiva est intrinsece et ab initio mala
(1517, 1527). Unde uxori nec petere debitum licet, nec passive se
habere. Sed qualibet vice tenetur positive pro viribus resistere. Sin
autem gravissima causa sit actum permittendi, ut puta periculum mortis,
eam tantum resistentiam opponere debet ad quam obligatur virgo oppressa
(2497), consensu ut patet denegato (See _Irish Ecclesiastical Record_,
June, 1940, pp. 634 ff., and March, 1948, pp. 244 ff.)

2624. Recapitulatio de Licitis et Illicitis in Conjugio.--(a) Illicita
graviter sunt extra matrimonium facta, v.g., moechia, mollities
solitaria, alienae conjugis concupiscentia; sed probabiliter actus
imperfecti et solitarii in proprium corpus exerciti leve non excedunt,
citra periculum pollutionis, siquidem in delectationem veneream quae in
conjugio licita est natura sua ordinentur, sicque minus indecentes
fiant.

(b) Illicita graviter sunt intra matrimonium facta sed contra finem,
i.e., naturae matrimonii seu generationi prolis repugnantia, ut sunt
pollutio mutua, onanismus, impudicitia quae non in copulam sed in
pollutionem tendit.

(c) Illicita leviter sunt intra matrimonium facta sed praeter finem,
i.e., qum generationi nec prosunt, nec obsunt, sed in circumstantiis
aliquam prae se ferunt inordinationem (e.g., copula ob solam voluptatem
habita), imprudentiam (e.g., copula tempore parum apto habita),
immoderantiam (e.g., impudicitia pudori nociva, situs innaturalis, ut
si stent vel vir succubet, ex levitate electus).

(d) Licita sunt intra matrimonium facta, quae tum ex parte objecti
(scil., quia actus ordinatur ad finem matrimonii), tum ex parte
circumstantiarum (scil., quia debito tempore, loco, modo, etc., ut
prudentia exigit, exercentur) rationi rectae concordant. Unde non
peccant conjuges sibi licita concupiscendo vel de iis gaudendo. Immo
mulier onanistae licite cooperata non est peccati arguenda si gavisa
sit de ipsa copula vel de bonis ejus effectibus, vel (saltem quando
probabile videtur se semen excipisse) si ad completam voluptatem se
excitaverit.

2625. Regulae pro Confessariis.--(a) Interrogationes.--Si nulla ratio
est suspicandi copulam modo innaturali exerceri, praestat ut plurimum
de circumstantiis (v.g., de motivo copulae) non quaerere, ne conjuges
taedio afficiantur vel bona fide inutiliter priventur. Si tamen fundata
suspicio est abusum matrimonii celari, hac de re confessarius inquirere
debet, sed prudenter, ne scandalo sit poenitentibus verbis indiscretis.

(b) Monitiones.--Si deprehenditur poenitentem onanistam esse, per
se severe reprehendendus est (quod de viro praesertim dicitur) nec
absolvendus nisi signa contritionis prius dederit; per accidens autem,
si datur ignorantia invincibilis et monitio nullatenus profutura
praevidetur, poenitens in bona fide relinquatur.

2626. Marriage as a Sacrament.--The third benefit of marriage is that
of the Sacrament. The union of man and wife is not merely a physical
union, but also a social one, and it should be modelled on the union
of Christ and the Church: “This is a great sacrament; but I speak in
Christ and the Church” (Eph., v. 32).

(a) Christ abides with the Church, and so the husband should dwell with
his wife (Matt., xix. 5). The cohabitation of the parties is demanded
by the very nature of the promises made in marriage, and hence it is
wrong for the husband to be absent from the home for notable periods of
time, or, what is worse, to drive his wife from home--or vice versa.
Grave reasons and mutual consent justify long absences, as when the
husband is called away on distant business; but, if he goes away for a
considerable part of the year, he should, if possible, take his wife
with him, or visit or write to her frequently. Very grave reasons
suffice for obtaining a separation, either permanent, on account of
adultery, or during the continuance of the reason, as when there is
serious unhappiness (Canons 1128 sqq.).

(b) Christ is the head of the Church, and so also the husband is
superior to the wife in authority (Eph., v. 23). Ordinarily man
excels in the qualities suited for rule of the home (such as physical
strength, decision, courage), and hence as every society, no matter how
small, must have a head, the husband is the natural head of the home.
But obedience is due a husband in domestic matters in which he is head
of the house--for example, the choice of the place of residence, the
management of the family income, the discipline of the children, but
not in the wife’s personal affairs (e.g., her conscience, her politics,
her property)--and only in commands that do not exceed his authority,
for he has no power to command if he is irrational, and he has no
claim to obedience if he orders something sinful or foolish. Moreover,
since the wife is a partner and not a servant, and since she usually
excels as sympathetic and wise adviser and careful household manager
and is naturally more virtuous, the husband should consult with her on
important family questions and decide them as far as possible by mutual
consent, and should gladly leave to her sole control and direction the
many things in which she is more competent than himself.

(c) Christ gave Himself for the Church (Eph., v. 25), and so also
the husband has the duty of providing for his wife, spiritually and
temporally. Usually the man should attend to the external affairs of
the family (such as its support and protection), while the wife should
take care of the internal affairs (such as the housekeeping and the
training of the children). It is to be regretted that the smallness
of the husband’s salary often compels the wife to work outside her
home. Women should not be compelled to take up occupations unsuited
to their sex, much less those that interfere with the supreme duty of
motherhood. Injury done the common personal goods of husband and wife
by one of them is unjust, if due to illegal action; it is at least
uncharitable, if due to carelessness. The family goods are usually
under the control of the head of the family. The wife has no right to
use the earnings of her husband without his consent, unless he fails to
provide suitably for his family, or uses his money extravagantly.

2627. The Duties of Persons Engaged to Marry.--We shall speak first of
the duty of entering into a nuptial engagement, and next of the duties
which engagement imposes.

(a) _Per se_, there is no obligation for an individual to marry, for
the need of marriage is not a personal but a social one, and social
duties do not all fall upon each particular person. Each person must
take necessary food, for without it the individual perishes, and eating
is thus an individual duty; but each person need not be a soldier,
or farmer, or builder, or merchant, or married; for it suffices that
these offices be fulfilled, one by one individual, another by another.
Indeed, if marriage is an impediment to a more urgent good of the
common welfare (e.g., perilous public service incompatible with married
life), or of private good (e.g., the duty of maintaining parents, the
wish to remain single because one feels oneself unsuited for marriage
or called to continence), marriage should not be chosen.

(b) _Per accidens_, there is sometimes a duty of marrying on account
of public or private necessity. Thus, if the community is depopulated
by race-suicide, the public good should move suitable persons to
marry in order to assist the birth rate; for, if those are considered
slackers who refuse their service or money in war time when the nation
is threatened with death from without, are not those also culpable who
will not assist a community threatened with extinction from within?
Marriage is also obligatory on those who feel that they are unable to
live continently, and will be lost unless they marry (I Cor., vii. 9).
In case of seduction, marriage is a form of restitution to the injured
girl, but since forced marriages are usually unhappy, the injury should
be atoned for in some other way if the seducer does not care for the
girl or is not desirable himself (see 1803).

2628. The Duties Imposed by Engagement to Marry.--(a) Before
Engagement.--Courtship is lawful for those who intend to marry, for
without it the mutual knowledge which is requisite for a prudent choice
is impossible. But courtship should be employed, not as a period of
pleasure and extravagance, but as an opportunity for learning the
suitability of the parties, one for the other, and their desirability
in virtue, religion, sanity, intelligence, health, wealth, position,
love of children, sobriety, steadiness, etc. Visits are lawful during
courtship, but not the same familiarity as is permissible after
engagement. The time of wooing should not be protracted, and as a rule
after a year the parties should either become engaged or decide they
are not well matched.

(b) At the Time of the Engagement.--The parties are gravely bound
to make known to each other all personal defects which cannot be
concealed without serious injustice, such as the lack of virginity or
other quality which one party makes a _conditio sine qua non_, or the
presence of a diriment impediment or of a very harmful or displeasing
characteristic (such as venereal disease, sterility, disgrace, race,
the fact that one is a widow, etc.). There is no duty of justice to
manifest defects whose concealment will not be detrimental (such as
poverty, lowly origin), but there may be a duty of charity to reveal
them, as when their concealment now will lead to an unhappy marriage.
As to fornication, the man is not obliged to confess it, unless
perhaps when he has an illegitimate child; nor the woman, unless she
is actually pregnant, or cannot keep the matter hidden afterwards and
can make it known without serious harm to herself (see Self-defamation,
1577; cfr. 1978, 2132). But those who have been guilty of these
mistakes should undergo a test on the question of physical health.

(c) During the Engagement.--Fidelity requires that an engaged person
be true to the other party, avoid paying court to a third person
(see 2526), and give the signs of affection that are usual between
engaged persons. The relationship between the engaged parties does not
give them the right to what is intrinsically evil (e.g., voluntary
pollution, proximate danger of consent to sin, continuance in a
familiarity which is a proximate occasion of sin), or to what is lawful
only to married persons (e.g., intercourse and the liberties pertinent
to it). But it does give them the right to manifest their affection by
acts indifferent in themselves (e.g., visits which are not private,
too frequent, or too prolonged; the decent kisses usual between
betrothed lovers on meeting and parting), even though unintentionally
pollution may follow (2538). Persons who intend to marry soon should
acquaint themselves before marriage and from reliable sources with the
fundamental physiological facts of sex, so as to avoid the mistakes
which often wreck conjugal happiness, beginning with the honeymoon
itself; they should have some money or the prospect of being able to
support themselves, and the woman should know how to take care of a
home.

(d) At the End of the Engagement.--A formal promise to marry (Canon
1017) imposes the duty of marriage within a reasonable time (i.e.,
at the appointed date, or, if no date was fixed, at the time when
one of the parties reasonably requests it), unless the engagement
be broken (e.g., by mutual consent, by a circumstance that makes
marriage impossible, such as marriage to a third party or choice
of the clerical state; or unnecessary, such as the fulfillment of
a resolutory condition, supervening impediment, Papal dispensation
given for a just cause); or unless one of the parties has a right
not to keep the engagement on account of a notable change in the
circumstances, or a breach of faith, or opposition of parents that will
make the marriage inadvisable, etc. The obligation to marry is one of
justice, and is grave when the contract was bilateral; it is one of
fidelity or justice, and grave or light according to the intention of
the promisor, when the contract was unilateral (see 1888). There is
no action to enforce an engagement, for forced marriages are unwise
(Canon 1017, n. 3); and in practice confessors and pastors should not
insist on fulfillment of the promise. But damages can be sued for, and
the confessor should deny absolution to one who refuses to make just
restitution in a case of breach of promise (see 1803). An informal
promise to marry (i.e., one invalid naturally or positively) produces
no obligation to marry in either forum (see 454); but it does produce a
duty of restitution in breach of promise, if there was force, fraud, or
deceit.

2629. Conditions for the Signs of Affection between Engaged
Persons.--(a) Objectively, these signs must be suited to the condition
of merely engaged, not of married persons. Brief and modest kisses are
proper for lovers, but greater intimacy, such as long and lone
conversations in secluded spots, are wrong.

The chaster the relations between the betrothed, the less occasion for
future regrets and recriminations. “Petting” purchases a cheap physical
thrill or excitement at the cost of present moral danger for two
persons, of the degradation of love to its lowest expression, and of
loss of self-respect, with the probable risk of a future ill-fated
marital career ending speedily in disillusionment and divorce. It is
essentially selfish and unwise.

(b) Subjectively, the signs of affection must not be a proximate
occasion of sin; nor may they be accompanied by consent to sin, or be
used for the sake of venereal pleasure. Joy at the thought of future
marriage intercourse and sensual pleasure in present kisses (2514) are
in themselves not sinful, but in practice they are as a rule gravely
dangerous. _Motiones carnales, quales sunt erectiones, signa sunt
delectationis venereae quando conjuguntur eum pollutione vel proxime
praeviis ad eam; sunt signa delectationis mere sensualis, quando amorem
sensibilem sequuntur ex motu sanguinis, quin in resolutionem seminis ex
se tendant_ (2497 b).

2630. The Duties of Parents and Children.--In addition to the duties
that belong to all superiors and subjects (see 2635 sqq.) there are
special obligations incumbent on parents and children by reason of the
special relationship between them. The duties of the parents are of two
kinds.

(a) Duties of Charity.--Parents should give their children special love
and special signs of affection, as the order of charity requires (see
1158 sqq.). Hence, those parents sin grievously who hate or curse their
children, even the illegitimate or wayward, or who drive the children
from home by unkindness.

(b) Duties of Piety.--Parents should, as far as they are able, give
their children the honor and help that belongs to members of the family
(see 2346 sqq.), though illegitimate children have not the right to
dwell in the home of the legitimate children or to share in the family
inheritance (see 1803 b). The help owed to children is spiritual and
material, and the obligation, which is natural and divine, is most
grave (Canon 1113). Spiritual help includes religious and moral
training and example (see 867 sqq.); material help includes food,
clothing, lodging, medical care, means to learn a necessary trade, art
or profession or to enter marriage or take up a suitable state in life,
protection and defense. Parents are bound to help their children, at
least in necessities, as long as the latter are in need. Sins are
committed also against the unborn (e.g., when the pregnant mother does
not take care of her health, or when she is ill-treated by her husband)
and young infants (e.g., when the child is unnecessarily suckled by
strangers and thus exposed to danger, or is placed in a foundling
asylum or other institution because the parents are unwilling to be
bothered). On the other hand, those parents sin through excess who
spoil or “sissify” their children by luxury and idleness, or who are
too indulgent to give needed correction and even moderate chastisement.

2631. Compensation of Children.--A child, even though subject to
parental authority, seems to have a right to compensation for
extraordinary services given his parents, and also to at least a fair
commission for gains made in the course of extraordinary services for
which he is receiving no compensation. In their wills, after satisfying
just debts and expenses, parents should leave their offspring who need
it enough to maintain their state in life.

2632. Sex Education of Children.--(a) Necessity.--Some moralists
believe that sex education of the young should be indirect. They hold
that it is dangerous to speak of venereal matters to the young; that
silence itself is to them a lesson of modesty; that the practice of
piety and mortification, along with parental watchfulness, will keep
them pure; that sufficient knowledge will come at the proper time as
God will provide. Others reject this theory as opposed to the tradition
of the Church as well as to experience. The defenders of direct sexual
education point to the evil of silence: the bad habits contracted and
grown strong before their sinfulness is understood, or the scruples and
misery into which ignorance will plunge young people entering the
crisis of puberty, the false and corrupt ideas with which unavoidably
the minds of the innocent will be indoctrinated by immoral companions
or physicians, the loss of confidence in parents who have refused
important knowledge and advice, and the ruin of innocent lives by
seducers which a timely word of warning would have prevented. Hence,
there is an invincible ignorance which cannot be removed without direct
education, and which is more harmful at least to well-reared children
than any evil that may be caused by the education.

(b) Preparation for Direct Education.--Training for purity should be
directed both to will and intellect, for knowledge without character is
powerless against temptation. Children should be trained from the
beginning morally (i.e., they should be kept as far as possible from
sources of contamination; should be taught to have implicit confidence
in parents and to bring to them their questions and difficulties;
should be trained to practise continual mortification and restraint and
to struggle against evil tendencies until the habit of self-control
becomes a second nature) and religiously (i.e., to use prayer, the
Sacraments and other means of grace until they are well formed in
piety). This previous moral education and religious conviction will
stand on guard as a protection against the suggestions of indulgence
which initiation into sex matters may suggest.

(c) The Subject-Matter of Sex Education.--The fundamentals of sex
instruction include such points as the diversity of sex, its origin
from God and its dignity, the beginning of life in plants and animals,
the organs of reproduction, the functions of maternity and paternity,
the grave reasons that demand sexual morality, respect for womankind,
the great sinfulness of masturbation and fornication, the meaning of
puberty and its accompaniments in male and female, the possibility and
healthfulness of continence, the moral dangers of the world and the
social diseases to be guarded against, and the hygienic aids to
chastity.

(d) The Method of Instruction.--It is clear that not all the details
just mentioned can be imparted at one time, for young children would
not understand or there would be scandal of little ones; but, while
fiction and exaggeration should be avoided, a strictly scientific and
technical instruction is not necessary or generally advisable. It is
clear also that parents, and especially mothers, are naturally suited
for the delicate task of early guardians of chastity, though the later
instruction should be supplemented in catechism class, sermon, school,
and an individual advice given in confession. It would be impossible in
brief space to outline sufficiently a program of sex instruction, but
parents and persons who are about to marry should read, study and apply
some of the excellent books prepared for their guidance.

2633. Duties of Children.--The duties of children to their parents can
also be classed under those of charity and piety.

(a) Duties of Charity.--Children owe their parents a special internal
and external love (see 1176 sqq.). Those children sin gravely who hate
their parents or wish them serious evil, or who treat them with great
unkindness or neglect, or bring them great sorrow or worry, or who
never visit or write to them.

(b) Duties of Piety.--Children must respect and assist their parents
(see 2347, 2348). It is a serious sin to have contempt for one’s
parents, or to show them serious dishonor in words (e.g., by injurious
or mocking names), in signs (e.g., by laughing at them, mimicking
them), in deeds (e.g., by striking them, speaking against them), in
omission (e.g., by refusing to acknowledge them or show them the usual
marks of courtesy). It is not disrespect, however, for a child to
dislike or protest against evils done by his parents. The assistance
owed to parents is both spiritual and corporal, and children sin when
they neglect the religious welfare of their parents (e.g., by not
respectfully admonishing them when the parents do not lead a good life,
by not obtaining for them the Sacraments, prayers and suffrages they
need), or deny them bodily aid (e.g., by refusing them help or comfort
when they are poor, persecuted, or suffering). Children who live at
home with their parents should contribute from their earnings or
individual property to the maintenance of the home, unless the parents
do not need this pay and do not wish it. See Catechism of the Council
of Trent, on the Fourth Commandment (pages 408 sqq.).

2634. Duties of Near Relatives.--There are similar duties of charity
and piety between other near relatives, for example, between brothers
and sisters, grandparents and grandchildren uncles and aunts and their
nephews and nieces, and between first cousins. The obligation seems, to
some authors, to be a grave one as far as the second degree of kinship,
but is light in the other degrees. The relationship and duty to kin by
marriage is not so strong.

2635. The Duties of Superiors and Subjects: Duties of
Superiors.--Superiors both in domestic and civil society need
especially prudence and justice in order to fulfill well their special
duties of ruling successfully and lawfully (Jerem., xxiii. 5).

(a) Prudence.--If every individual must use wise deliberation, decision
and direction to guide himself aright, much more does a ruler, whether
of the home or of the State, need these qualities; and hence it is the
prudent servant who is placed over his master’s household (Matt., xxiv.
45), whereas the imprudent ruler brings confusion upon his community
(Is., iii. 4 sqq). Parents, guardians, executives, lawmakers and
magistrates are, therefore, bound to fit themselves by competent
knowledge of their duties. At the minimum, they must know what
constitutes the welfare of their circle or community, and how it should
be promoted. For this, in positions of subordinate importance, common
sense with good will often suffices, but from those who are heads of
large organizations much more is expected. A chief who has to direct a
great multitude must have unusual ability and unusual knowledge or
unusual quickness to learn from study and conference what measures will
safeguard the interests of his body and promote the happiness and
prosperity of its members (see 1640 sqq.).

(b) Justice.--In their rule superiors must be lovers of the common
good; they must decree, judge and govern according to natural justice
and the law; in distributions of burdens and favors they must be guided
by fairness to all, avoiding partiality, bribery, peculation and every
form of political corruption; in discipline they must conscientiously
enforce the right; in personal life they must be a model to their
subjects, showing themselves moral, religious, truthful, dignified but
approachable and patient (not arrogant, stubborn, sensitive,
ill-humored or revengeful), given to work and duty rather than to
pleasure and display.

2636. Duties of Subjects.--The general duties of subjects to superiors
are chiefly honor and obedience (see 2351 sqq.).

(a) Honor.--Honor is owed to superiors on account of their position of
authority, which is derived from God, not on account of their personal
character, for personally they may be wicked. It is disrespectful even
in a democracy to deny them the honorable address, salutation or
courtesy which is customary, or to treat them insultingly by word,
manner or writing. But it is not disrespectful to disagree with the
personal views of a superior or to seek legitimately his removal from
office if he is unfit or less fit.

(b) Obedience.--Obedience is owed to superiors and their laws when they
strictly command what is not sinful or illegal or outside their
authority (see 375 sqq.). Unemancipated children are obliged to obey
their parents in all that falls under the parental authority, namely,
in what pertains to good morals (e.g., attendance at religious duties,
avoidance of bad companions) or the good order of the home (e.g., the
hours for meals, the time of retiring, the visitors to be received).
But parents have no authority to command fraud or other sin; nor are
children under subjection in the matter of taking up a state of life,
for this demands liking and fitness, and the command of a superior
cannot give liking and fitness. It is a serious sin for parents to
force a child to take up religious life or the priesthood, or to marry
a certain individual; but a child should yield when his parents are
reasonably opposed to his choice of a vocation, as when they need his
support, or wish him to test his vocation a little, or know that the
person selected for wife will disgrace the family.

2637. Taxes.--Citizens owe the government particularly the tribute of
taxation, and in war that of military service. Taxes are contributions
exacted by the public authority from subjects for the purpose of
defraying public expenses or promoting the public welfare.

(a) Thus, they are contributions, and hence a tax is not to be confused
with a payment (e.g., fares for passage on government railroads), or
with a fine (e.g., pecuniary penalty for evasion of customs).

(b) They are exacted from subjects (i.e., from citizens), who are
subject on account of their persons as being members of the State, and
from aliens, who are subject on account of their goods, as receiving
privileges of residence, commerce, passage, etc.

2638. Kinds of Taxes.--There are many kinds of taxes, but they can all
be reduced to two general categories.

(a) Direct taxes are those collected from the person on whom the burden
is ultimately to fall. Examples are poll or personal taxes and property
taxes (such as those on general property, incomes or inheritances), for
these charges remain an expense of the taxpayer himself.

(b) Indirect taxes are those collected from a person other than the one
on whom the burden is ultimately to fall. Examples are duties imposed
on outsiders (such as customs or tariffs, duties raised for revenues,
protection, etc.), external revenue taxes imposed on certain acts (such
as the manufacture or sale of commodities) or occupations (e.g.,
licenses for trades, sports, etc.). In these the charge falls
immediately on the taxpayer, but ultimately on a consumer.

2639. Just Taxes.--Tax laws, like other laws, must be just; that is,
they must be made by lawful authority and must promote the common good
(see 285). The common good requires that taxes be not imposed except
for just reasons, and that there be a fair distribution of the burden.

(a) Just reasons are those of public utility or necessity. A tax would
be unjust, if it were levied for unjust or unnecessary purposes.

(b) Fair distribution requires that citizens be assessed according to
their ability to pay (sacrifices for the public good, special benefits
from the use of a tax fund, etc.).

2640. Obligation to Pay Taxes.--The obligation in conscience of just
tax laws is admitted by all Catholic authorities.

(a) The teaching of Scripture is quite clear, since Our Lord, in answer
to the question whether it were lawful to pay tribute to Caesar,
replied: “Render to Caesar the things that are Caesar’s” (Matt., xxii.
17-21); and St. Paul teaches: “Be subject of necessity, not only for
wrath, but also for conscience’ sake. Render therefore to all men their
due, tribute to whom tribute is due, custom to whom custom” (Rom.,
xiii. 5, 6).

(b) Reason too shows the need of obligation in conscience, for, unless
these laws oblige thus, the common good will suffer through lack of
money needed for public purposes, and some individuals will be unjustly
burdened and others unjustly favored.

2641. Quality of the Obligation.--There are various opinions about the
quality of the obligation in conscience of taxation laws.

(a) Thus, according to one opinion they oblige in conscience and under
sin, that is, as preceptive laws (see 561 sqq.). For the natural law
and justice require that the members of society contribute the
necessaries to the social body organized for their benefit, or that the
people live up to their implicit contract with their government by
giving compensation for the services they receive.

(b) According to another opinion tax laws oblige in conscience only
under penalty, that is, as penal laws. The arguments for this view are,
first, the sufficiency of the penal obligation (i.e., the heavy fines
imposed) for the attainment of the laws’ purpose, and, secondly, the
common opinion of citizens that they commit no sin by merely evading
payment of taxes. Furthermore, it is added that, if these laws were
preceptive, conscientious citizens would be under a great disadvantage,
for they would be placed in the dilemma of either acting against their
conscience and committing sin or of paying more than their due on
account of the neglect of tax dues by citizens who are not
conscientious.

(c) According to a third opinion distinction has to be made between
different cases. Thus, some held that laws on direct taxes are
preceptive and laws on indirect taxes merely penal, while others say
that the kind of obligation depends on the will of the lawgiver, and
that tax laws that are preceptive in one country may be only penal in
another. If tax laws are merely penal, there is no obligation of
restitution, but there is an obligation of payment and of penalty after
sentence.

2642. Obedience to Tax Laws.--Obedience to just laws is owed either
from legal justice alone, or also from commutative justice with the
burden of restitution. There are various opinions about the case of tax
laws.

(a) According to the traditional opinion, the obligation is one of
commutative justice, because there is an implicit contract between the
government and the people, in virtue of which the former is bound to
provide for the safety of the people at home and abroad and to secure
those things that are necessary for the common welfare (such as roads,
postal service, etc.), while the latter are bound in return to pay the
expenses of the government.

(b) According to a recent opinion, the obligation is one of legal
justice only, because the imposition of taxes is an exercise of
authority by the government, and taxes themselves have the character of
a tribute from the part to the whole rather than of a wage or payment.
Hence, though he who evades taxes is not held to restitution, he sins
against justice, and sins gravely if the matter is considerable.

(c) According to other opinions, tax laws oblige sometimes from legal,
sometimes from commutative justice. Thus, some admit that in feudal
times there was a contract between the governed and the ruler, and
therefore an obligation of commutative justice to give services and
taxes; but in modern times they say there is no such contract, and the
duties of ruler and subjects rest on natural law and legal justice, not
on any compact. Others again distinguish between the obligation before
the quota has been determined, which is the duty of legal justice to
declare properly the value of one’s property, and the obligation after
assessment, which is a duty of commutative justice to pay just tax
bills.

2643. The Duty of Exercising the Electoral Franchise.--(a) There is a
grave duty of using the privilege granted to citizens of voting in
public elections, and especially primaries; for the welfare of the
community and the moral, intellectual and physical good of individuals
depend on the kind of men who are nominated or chosen to rule, and on
the ticket platforms voted for. Hence, those who neglect to vote
cooperate negatively with a serious harm (viz., evil in power), or at
least with public unconcern about public matters--for example, those
who neglect through laziness or indifference to condemn by their vote.
A grave inconvenience (e.g., sickness, ostracism, exile, persecution),
but not a slight inconvenience (such as loss of time, trouble,
ridicule), excuses from the duty; for an affirmative law has
exceptions. Neither is there an obligation to vote when an election is
a mere formality, as when there is but one candidate or party.

(b) The duty is not one of commutative justice, as the ballot is either
a privilege, or a thing commanded by authority, but not a service to
which the citizen has bound himself by contract or office. The
obligation is, therefore, one of legal justice, arising from the fact
that the common weal is everybody’s business and responsibility,
especially in a republic. Hence, representatives of the people who by
abstention from voting cause a serious damage which they were bound _ex
officio_ to prevent, are guilty of commutative injustice and are held
to restitution; but a citizen who stays away from the polls sins, and
perhaps gravely, against legal justice, though there is no duty of
restitution for the damages that result. Moreover, in a general
election the vote of one citizen is usually not of decisive influence,
and citizens do not make themselves responsible for all the acts of
their representatives.

2644. Manner of Voting.--(a) Object.--It is not necessary to vote for
the best candidate, provided one votes for a person who is fitted by
character, ability, record, experience, etc. for the office, and gives
indications, not merely promises, that he will serve the community
well. But in certain ecclesiastical elections the voters must take oath
beforehand to vote, not only for a worthy candidate, but also for the
person whom they honestly think, all things considered, most worthy. In
minor offices (such as constable or town clerk) it suffices that the
candidate be known as conscientious; but in major offices (such as
President, governor, congressman, legislator, or judge) the party
principles for which he stands have to be considered chiefly. _Per
accidens_, it is lawful to vote for an unworthy candidate when this is
necessary to prevent a greater evil, as when the opposing candidate is
much worse, or a good ticket cannot be elected unless some less worthy
candidates are included.

(b) Purpose.--The end which the voter should have in mind is the good
of the public, and hence it is not right to vote for candidates solely
or chiefly because they are personal friends, members of one’s own
race, organization or religion, or because one wishes to gain favor or
escape enmity.

(c) Circumstances.--The voter must avoid all that is contrary to
natural law (e.g., selling of votes, repeating, stuffing ballot boxes)
or positive law (e.g., state laws require not only citizenship and a
period of previous residence, but also other conditions such as
registration and freedom from bribery and other election crimes). The
opinion that politics is necessarily corrupt, and that all is fair that
helps to win, is a false and pernicious doctrine. The conditions for
ecclesiastical elections are given in Canons 160 sqq.

2645. Obligation to Seek Office.--A worthy man should run for office in
the following case: (a) when the public good calls for his candidacy
(e.g., when his election or candidacy will avert serious evils, and
there is no one else so available); and (b) there is no grave
impediment to his candidacy (such as supremely important private
affairs or ill-health that makes it impossible to run).

2646. Duties of Employers and Employees.--Between employers and their
domestic servants or workingmen there are general mutual duties as
between superiors and subjects, and special mutual duties as between
parties to an explicit and implicit contract. Of these latter duties we
shall now speak.

2647. Duties of Employers.--(a) Justice.--The labor assigned must not
be excessive (e.g., unduly perilous, exhausting, protracted) or
injurious (e.g., harmful to religion or morals, an unreasonable
impediment to marriage, to cultural opportunity or amusement); the wage
paid must be just (i.e., one that will enable the worker to support
himself and his family in reasonable comfort) and equitable (i.e., one
that rewards special merit and service by pensions or additional
compensation); the terms of the contract must be observed (e.g.,
arbitrary lowering of wages or dismissal are unjust).

(b) Charity.--Liberality should be shown by preference to employees,
since they have a special claim on the employ good will. The employer
should consider that he is responsible for the spiritual betterment and
material improvement of his workers, and should have them in mind when
making contributions to religious, educational or special causes, so
that his own employees will benefit in particular by his gifts to these
worthy causes. Trade schools and insurance against sickness and
unemployment are especially deserving of his assistance.

2648. Duties of Employees.--(a) Justice.--Workers are bound to give a
fair return in quantity and quality of labor for the pay they receive,
and to be loyal to their employer as regards his person, reputation,
and property. Hence, it is unjust to loaf or come late or leave early,
to turn out work too slowly or of an inferior grade, to damage
machinery or property, to waste food or provisions, to act as a
household spy or informer, to try to extort what is not due. (For a
consideration of the worker’s obligation to join unions see “Catholics
in Labor Unions” by Francis J. Connell, C.SS.R., _American
Ecclesiastical Review_, Vol. CXVI, no. 6 June, 1947, pp. 422 ff.)

(b) Charity.--Workers should be willing even at the expense of some
right or of some slight loss to help an employer who is in grave
necessity; for example, it would be uncharitable for farm hands to stop
work promptly on time when this will cause a serious damage to the
farmer’s crop, or for a cook to leave on her free day when her mistress
is very sick and will be left alone.

2649. Labor Disputes between Employers and Employees.--(a) In
themselves these disputes are indifferent, as they are a species of
industrial war (see 1380 sqq.) or of industrial self-defense (1826
sqq.). If the end, the means and the circumstances are not against
right reason, the disputes are lawful or even laudable.

(b) In the concrete, the strike is labor’s chief means for enforcing
demands. Since organized labor seeks to equalize the bargaining power
between employer and employee, the way to counteract refusal to pay
fairly is by a concerted refusal to work, i.e., a strike. A strike may
be defined as an organized cessation from work by a group of workers to
obtain advantages from an employer. Since an organized strike is a kind
of war, moral theologians apply the principles of a just war to
determine concretely the morality of a strike.

1) There must be a just reason for the strike. Too little pay, too long
hours, brutal treatment, unsafe or unsanitary conditions constitute
genuine grievances for what may be called a defensive strike, which
presupposes injustice in the part of the employer. On the other hand an
ameliorative strike does not presuppose an employer’s injustice, but
consists essentially in the worker’s attempt to better conditions,
e.g., a better salary, shorter working hours, etc. Such a strike seems
to be unlawful if it violates a just work contract in effect at the
time of the strike. If no such contract has been made, the ameliorative
strike can be lawful, granting a proportionately grave cause; but it is
never given unqualified approval owing to the fact that such a strike
involves many and grave losses both material and moral to the workers,
employer, and community. (See Merkelbach, _Summa Theologiae Moralis_ II,
n.556.)

2) The strike must be the last means. Owing to the fact that a strike
is a kind of warfare, all other peaceful means should be tried, e.g.,
arbitration, governmental inquiry boards, injunctions, fact-finding
boards etc. The moral principle involved is; if an evil is avoidable
but not avoided, it cannot be considered as merely incidental to a good
end.

3) The strike would be called by proper authority. The decision to
strike should be made by the men themselves freely and Without
intimidation. Organized labor must have the backing of a responsible
union in its strike, for this is the channel of bargaining or
arbitration that the employer must use, and it should be used by the
workers also. Accordingly, “wildcat” strikes are unlawful unless the
unions have ceased to represent the men and have been repudiated by
them.

4) The benefits expected from the strike must compensate for the evils
inseparable from it. In this matter not only the worker’s personal
gains are to be considered, but also the welfare of others, namely the
employers and the public. Thus, in a long-drawn-out strike the economic
advantage gained in a small salary increase for the worker can never be
proportionate to the financial losses inflicted on the workers
themselves in loss of income, on the employers, and particularly on a
community which suffers the loss of purchasing power of a number of its
members. Many strikes in which the products or services of the workers
are necessary to the public (transportation, food distribution, etc.)
seem to be more a strike against the community than against an
employer; and the harm inflicted on the innocent public is not
incidental as it must be in order to be justified. Only extraordinarily
grave reasons can justify such strikes.

5) The means employed must be just. The common means are work stoppage,
persuasion of other workers to keep the work stopped until the demands
are met, and picketing in a peaceful manner. Sabotage and violence
against an employer’s person or property constitute unjust means.
“Scabs,” or professional strike-breakers, may be prevented from
depriving the workers of their jobs to which the workers keep their
rights; but violence in defense of this right seems illicit, unless
violence is begun by the strike-breakers and the workers are forced to
defend themselves.

(c) Kinds of Strike. Thus far the analysis has been concerned with a
direct strike. Other kinds of strike demand special consideration.

1) Slow-down strike. Since it does not involve cessation from work, but
simply a reduction in production or services while the worker is
receiving full pay under contract, the strike seems to be immoral. The
striker is not giving the work paid for.

2) Sit-down strikes. Some authors justify these strikes by analogy with
an act of self-defense in which the person attacked seizes the weapon
from the attacker. The analogy seems defective since the place of work
is hardly a weapon. This strike seems to be immoral since it involves
an unjust invasion of property rights by way of excluding an owner from
the use of his property.

3) Sympathy strikes. There is a great diversity of opinion in this kind
of strike. A moderate view distinguishes between strikes of several
groups against the same employer and one or several groups against
different and unassociated employers. The first kind seems justified,
for it is directed against the same unjust employer, and the workers
are cooperators to defend the rights of one group against him. In the
second case of striking against different employers, the “sympathizers”
are striking against a just employer and are violating their work
contract which binds in commutative justice. Hence this type of strike
seems to be essentially unjust.

(d) The lockout is the employer’s strike. Unwilling to grant the
worker’s demand, the employer shuts down his plant, thus terminating
employment of both strikers and non-strikers. The same conditions and
restrictions that apply to the strike are applicable to lockouts. That
the lockout itself is not unjust, but at least morally indifferent,
appears to be evident in this, that as workers are not bound to submit
to injustice, neither is the employer. He cannot be expected to pay
wages when essential employers have quit or stalled production.

(e) A boycott is a mass refusal to patronize a certain business with
the effort to persuade others to join in the refusal. Historically it
has been used by labor to gain support from the public against an
employer or by elements of the public itself to protest some evil
practice of a business establishment, e.g., Legion of Decency boycotts
of indecent pictures, NODL boycotts of literature, etc. In itself, a
boycott is not immoral, since no one is obliged to trade in one place
in preference to another and may refuse to trade with persons who are
unjust or otherwise immoral. There seems to be no reason also to
prevent a person from lawfully persuading others to follow his cause.
The principles of a just strike are applicable to the justification of
boycotts, and the conditions of a sympathy strike are to be applied to
secondary boycotts, i.e., against other firms doing business with a
boycotted firm. These other firms are not themselves unjust and should
not be made to suffer for the injustice of another. Hence, a very grave
cause, co-operation in injustice, for example would be necessary to
bring pressure against them.

2650. Is There Any Obligation of Giving Employment?--(a) The State
certainly has an obligation in legal justice of offering opportunities
of work to those who cannot find it, if the public welfare is
compromised by widespread unemployment. Even if only one worker were
without work through no fault of his own, the duty of helping him would
seem to devolve on the State, since the laborer has a right to work and
the State has the duty of promoting the temporal welfare of its
subjects when they are unable to provide for themselves.

(b) Employers have a duty of commutative justice to give work to men
with whom they have made a contract of labor and not to keep work from
men unfairly; hence, arbitrary dismissal or blacklisting is a crime
against justice. They should also try to secure other employment for
good workers whom they are unable to keep, so as to tide over for the
men the slack seasons when some have to be laid off. Industry,
organized labor and individuals should interest themselves practically
in private movements and plans to remedy unemployment situations, for
these are matters that should not be left entirely to the State and
charity. Employment and honest wages are in the long run to the
advantage of employers as well as of employees, and are therefore good
business as well as good morals.

2651. Duties of Certain Professions.--(a) Judges and Lawyers.--The
duties of men of the law were discussed already in 1940 sqq. Clients on
their part owe their lawyers fair treatment and just compensation for
services, while those who have part in a judicial process must give
respect to the judge and other officials of the court and due obedience
to their directions.

(b) Teachers and Students.--Teachers must make themselves proficient in
their matter and in the art of pedagogy; must take care that their
teaching is accurate and beneficial; must be steady, punctual, orderly;
must give no example or advice but what is good; must be neither too
lenient nor too exacting; must preserve discipline in their classes by
correcting, punishing, or expelling as need requires; must be just,
neither petting nor bullying, and must award honors and averages
according to merit. There may be grave harm and sin in denying
important academic degrees (such as S.T.M., S.T.D., J.D.C., M.D.) to
the worthy or in conferring them on the unworthy. Students on their
part owe to their teachers respect and obedience in class matters, to
their parents and themselves diligence in study, and to their school
avoidance of cheating and of disorderly conduct. In athletics they
should not aim at winning for winning’s sake, or playing for playing’s
sake, but at the true goal of a sound mind in a sound body. In the
selection of preferred studies they should remember that nothing worth
while is won without hard work, and that the true objectives of
learning are not mere utility, or gain or diversion, but the culture of
mind and of spirit.

(c) Physicians, Surgeons, Nurses, and Druggists.--These persons must
have sufficient knowledge and skill, and must keep up with the progress
of medical science; they must not deny their services or delay to come
when there is urgent need; they must give a case diligence
proportionate to its seriousness; they must consult in case of doubt,
follow the safer opinions, and use the more likely remedies. In his
relations with his patient a doctor must be chaste (e.g., avoiding
immoral advice or operations, unnecessary psychoanalytic conversations,
or bodily exposures); loyal to the confidences received; honest and
charitable, not prescribing useless remedies, or overcharging, or
refusing service to the poor; mindful of the religious needs of his
patients, being not too ready to exempt them from church duties nor
slow to remind them when they should send for the priest. Patients on
their part should honor the physician, call him in need, obey his
directions, and properly compensate him for his services. What is here
said of physicians and surgeons is true also of nurses in their duties
and capacities. Pharmacists are bound to exercise great care in filling
prescriptions; they should not cooperate with abortion or contraception
by selling medicines, instruments or appliances to be used for those
purposes; they should not sell drugs, dopes, poisons, liquors, etc.,
forbidden by law.




Question IV

THE SACRAMENTS

2652. In the three Questions that preceded we spoke of the means by
which man is sanctified and is enabled to secure supernatural rewards
through the merits of his own works; for the virtues make their
possessor as well as his acts morally righteous, while through God’s
grace the good deeds done for His sake entitle the doer to the crown of
eternal life. In the present Question we pass on to consider certain
means by which God is honored by man and man is sanctified through the
application to his soul of the merits and passion of Christ; for the
Sacraments were instituted by Christ both as external acts of religion
(2175, 2244) and as most powerful agencies to begin, restore, and
increase the life of holiness.

2653. It should be observed, first, that the present work is concerned
with Moral Theology; and, secondly, that it must be confined within the
limited number of pages which a two-volume production of convenient
size necessitates. Hence the reader will understand why in the Question
now beginning we speak only of man’s duties in reference to the
Sacraments, and omit other points that do not so strictly pertain to
Moral. (a) Thus, the nature, institution, number and effects of the
Sacraments belong to Dogma, which the authors hope to treat later in a
similar work. (b) The administration of the Sacraments, their rites,
rubrics, ceremonies are set forth in ritual books and works on liturgy.
(c) The legal rights of ministers, canonical requirements on
registration, penal and processual legislation in reference to the
Sacraments, and like juridical questions are treated fully in
commentaries on pertinent sections of the Code.




Art. 1: THE SACRAMENTS IN GENERAL; THE SACRAMENTALS

(_Summa Theologica_, III, qq. 60-65.)

2654. Nature of a Sacrament.--In the New Law a Sacrament is an outward
sign instituted permanently by Christ to signify and convey grace.

(a) The internal cause or essence of a Sacrament is the outward sign,
which has two parts. The indeterminate part or matter is a visible
object (e.g., the water of Baptism, the chrism of Confirmation, the
bread and wine of the Eucharist, the oil of Extreme Unction, the
imposition of hands in Orders) or a perceptible act that looks to
another act for its perfectionment (e.g., the confession, etc., of the
penitent in penance; the giving of oneself as spouse in Matrimony).
The determining part, or form, is either the sacred formula spoken over
the material element (e.g., in Baptism the words “I baptize thee,
etc.”) or an act that completes another act (e.g., the acceptance of
another as spouse in Matrimony). As the matter must be visible or
otherwise sense-perceptible, so the form must be audible or at least
(in Matrimony) equivalently audible; for a Sacrament is a sensible
sign. The words are audible when they are heard or are capable of being
heard at least by the minister.

(b) The external efficient cause or instituter of the Sacraments is
Christ, the founder of the New Testament religion and the productive
and meritorious author of grace as our God and Saviour.

(c) The external final cause or purpose of the Sacraments is to
symbolize outwardly by their rite and to work inwardly by their
instrumental virtue the application of Christ’s redemption in the soul
of properly disposed recipients. It is the nature of Baptism and
Penance (Sacraments of the Dead) to produce first grace or forgiveness,
of the others to produce second grace or increase of holiness
(Sacraments of the Living). Furthermore, three of the Sacraments
(Baptism, Confirmation, Orders) have a second effect, since they sign
the soul with the indelible character of member or soldier or minister
of Christ, and hence these Sacraments cannot be repeated.

2655. Rules on the Invalid Use of the Matter and Form of the
Sacraments.--(a) Since the matter and form are essential constituents
without which the Sacraments are not had, it is sacrilegious to
invalidate a Sacrament by substantial changes in either of these parts.
The matter is changed substantially when it is so modified as currently
to be considered and called something different from the element
appointed by Christ. Thus, wine is unfit for the Eucharist if corrupted
into vinegar, or made unsuitable as a drink (e.g., probably as long as
it remains frozen), or notably adulterated (e.g., when it is mixed half
and half with water). The form is changed substantially when it is so
modified that to a listener it no longer conveys the sense intended by
Christ. This happens when the changed form does not express the chief
ideas of the correct form, as when it does not determine who is the
minister of Penance (e.g., “You are absolved”), or who is the subject
of Baptism (e.g., “Ego baptizo in nomine, etc.”), or what is the effect
of the Eucharist (e.g., “Hoc non est corpus meum,” “Hoc est corpus,”
“Hic meum est corpus”), or the action of the minister of Penance (e.g.,
“Ego abluo te a peccatis”), or the profession in Baptism of faith in
the Trinity (e.g., “Ego te baptizo, Amen”).

(b) Since the matter and form are parts of a single composite sign, it
is sacrilegious to invalidate a Sacrament by substantial separations,
which destroy the continuity or unity of signification. There is a
substantial separation within the form when such long intervals occur
between the pronunciation of its syllables or words that it is not in
common estimation a united sentence or proposition; for example, if the
celebrant says, “Hoc est cor-,” then sneezes two or three times, and
(instead of repeating the words) concludes “-pus meum,” or says “Hoc
est corpus” and after an interruption of several minutes (instead of
repeating) finishes with: “meum.” There is substantial separation
between the matter and form, if the former is applied by one minister
and the latter is spoken by another, although the form declares that
the matter is applied by the speaker of the form: for example, if Titus
pours the water while Claudius says: “I baptize thee, etc.” Even when
the same minister applies both matter and form, there is a substantial
separation between these parts when the form is not spoken at the same
time or for the same time that the matter is posited, and thereby, from
the special character of the Sacrament, leaves the signification of the
sacramental matter unsettled. This happens when the form is spoken too
long before or too long after the presence or application of the
matter, or when the form is limited by a future condition which will
not be verified during the continuance of the matter (see 2668).

2656. Simultaneity of Matter and Form.--The simultaneity of matter and
form which validity requires must be either moral or physical according
to the character of the Sacrament.

(a) There is physical simultaneity when matter and form are present in
the same instants of time. This kind of union is demanded in the
Eucharist, for it has the character of a transubstantiation of bread
and Wine present at the moments the words of consecration are said over
them. There would be no Sacrament if the bread were absent even during
a part of the consecration.

(b) There is a moral simultaneity like to the physical
contemporaneousness when the matter and form are partly present in the
same instants of time, and perhaps also (as some hold) when one follows
the other with such close succession that not more than a Pater or Ave
could be said between them. This kind of union is the maximum in
Penance and Matrimony, for absolution must follow after confession, and
conjugal acceptance must follow after conjugal offer. It suffices in
Baptism, Confirmation, Extreme Unction, and Orders; for these four
Sacraments do not consecrate the matter (and hence some little
separation is allowed), but they do signify in the present tense the
bestowal of grace through the application of the matter (and hence any
separation must be of the slightest).

(c) There is a purely moral simultaneity when the form follows the
matter after a somewhat considerable interval of time has elapsed, but
with a connection between the two based on human usage which carries
the matter on in human estimation over to the time the form is
employed. This suffices in Penance and Matrimony. Penance has the
character of a judicial process, whose unity is not destroyed by some
little delay between the discussion and the sentence; and hence it
seems that absolution could be given validly an hour after confession.
Matrimony has the character of a contract, whose unity is preserved
even in spite of a long interval between the date of consent of the
first party and the date of consent of the second party.

2657. Lawfulness of Moral Simultaneity in the Sacraments Other than the
Eucharist.--(a) In Baptism, Confirmation, Extreme Unction, and Orders,
it would seem on account of the danger of nullity to be a serious sin
to exclude all physical simultaneity between matter and form (e.g., to
pour all the water and then to begin the words: “I baptize thee, etc.,”
or vice versa). In practice the Rubrics should be followed.

(b) In Penance and Matrimony it is more or less sinful to make
needless, though not invalidating, delays. In ordinary practice the
confessor should absolve as soon as the confession has been heard and
the penance accepted, and the bride should express her consent
immediately after the bridegroom has expressed his.

2658. Accidental Changes or Separations as to Matter and Form.--(a)
These administrations are not invalid, for they preserve the essence of
the elements or the sense of the words appointed by Christ. Examples of
accidental change of matter are baptismal water to which a relatively
very small quantity of wine has been added, or wine for the Eucharist
to which a relatively trifling amount of water has been added. The form
is accidentally modified if translated into the vernacular or rendered
by synonymous words (e.g., “Ego abluo te, etc.”), or if an unimportant
word (e.g., “enim”) is added or subtracted, or if the words are
transposed or partially repeated or unintentionally mispronounced
without detriment to sense (e.g., “Hoc est meum corpus,” “Hoc, hoc,
est, est, etc.,” “Hoc est copus meum”). There is accidental separation
when slight pauses are made between words, or when an interval not
destructive of the sense falls between the use of the matter and the
use of the form (see 2655, 2656).

(b) These administrations are unlawful and from their nature mortally
sinful, since they are transgressions of a precept of the Church meant
to safeguard respect for the Sacraments of Christ, and they are
therefore opposed to the virtue of religion (2147). But the sin may be
venial by reason of lightness of matter (e.g., omission of the word
“enim”), or of imperfection of the act. Scandal, danger of invalidity,
contempt, and bad intention would make even a small change a serious
sin. In practice the rule to follow is to observe exactly the
prescribed matter and form and entire rite, to pronounce the words
clearly and slowly, to repeat the form when any involuntary
interruption happens between its essential parts, and to unite the
matter and form as closely as possible.

2659. Substantial Changes or Separations.--Substantial changes or
separations _a fortiori_ are grave sins. They offend against religion
(since they make a mockery of the sacred signs appointed by Christ),
against obedience (since they disregard a most serious precept of the
Church), against charity (since they deprive the recipient of
sacramental grace), and against justice (at least when the minister is
bound _ex officio_ to confer the Sacrament, since there is then a
quasi-contract with the recipient to administer the Sacrament
correctly).

2660. Doubtful Matter.--It is sometimes probable but not certain that
an element suffices for the matter of a Sacrament (e.g., coffee or tea
for Baptism, chrism for Extreme Unction). Hence the question: “Is it
lawful to use probable matter in the administration of a Sacrament?”

(a) If certain matter cannot be had and the Sacrament is urgently
necessary or very useful, probable matter may be used. For the
Sacraments were instituted by Christ to benefit man (“The Sacraments
are for men”), and hence it is not irreverent to give to one in need a
probably valid Sacrament when a certainly valid Sacrament is
impossible. Thus, a dying infant may and should be baptized with
coffee, if no pure water can be procured in time; the last anointing
may be conferred with chrism, if the oil of the sick cannot be had
before a dying man will have expired.

(b) If certain matter can be had, or if the Sacrament is not urgently
necessary or useful, probable matter may not be used without grave sin;
for there is then no reason of necessity to justify the risk to which
the Sacrament and perhaps also the recipient are exposed, Thus, it is
not lawful to baptize with coffee when pure water can be secured, or to
confirm with chrism not blessed by a bishop a dying man who had just
received the last Sacraments, even though other chrism is unobtainable
(see 661, 678, 711, and Denziger, n. 1151).

2661. What Sacraments Have a Necessity of Means (see 360, 786,
2156)?--(a) Those Sacraments have a necessity of means without which
sanctifying grace and salvation cannot be had. Hence the necessity for
individuals of Baptism (without which there is no regeneration), of
Penance (without which there is no reconciliation), of the Eucharist’s
effect (without which there is no incorporation with Christ), and for
the Church the necessity of Orders (without which there are no
ministers and dispensers of grace, Prov., xi, 14).

(b) Those Sacraments have no necessity of means without which
sanctifying grace and salvation can be had; but they have a necessity
of convenience, inasmuch as they perfect grace already had and make
salvation more easy. In this sense, then, Confirmation and Extreme
Unction may be called necessary for the individual, since the former
perfects the grace of Baptism and the latter the grace of Penance; and
Matrimony may be called necessary for the Church, since it perfects
with a sacramental grace the propagation of the children of the Church.

2662. Reception of Sacraments _in re_ or _in voto_.--The Sacraments
that have a necessity of means must be received either in themselves
(_in re_) or in desire (_in voto_).

(a) Thus, Baptism _in re_ is necessary for all infants (John, iii. 5),
Baptism _in re_ or _in voto_ for all adults (John, xiv. 21-23). Baptism
of desire consists in an act of perfect charity or contrition made by
an unbaptized person, which includes the will to do all that God has
commanded, and consequently at least an implicit or virtual desire of
Baptism of water. As is proved in Dogmatic Theology, Baptism may be
supplied for, as regards grace, by martyrdom in an infant and by
martyrdom joined with attrition in an adult.

(b) Penance _in re_ or _in voto_ is necessary for all who have
committed grave sin after Baptism. The desire of the Sacrament is an
act of perfect charity or contrition, which includes at least
implicitly the wish to receive absolution. Martyrdom joined with
attrition also suffices.

(c) The Sacrament of the Eucharist is not a necessary means for anyone,
either _in re_ or _in voto_; for the essential grace of justification
can be obtained through Baptism and Penance. But the proper result
(_res_) of the Eucharist, which consists in incorporation with Christ,
perseverance, and life eternal, is a necessary means _in voto_, tacitly
or interpretatively; for Baptism, as was said, is absolutely necessary
for salvation, and Baptism itself is a tacit or interpretative desire
of the result of the Eucharist, inasmuch as Baptism is but a means to
that result and the beginning of its accomplishment.

2663. What Sacraments Have a Necessity of Precept?--An act is said to
fall under precept _per se_, when it is directly commanded in a law
that mentions it specifically; it is said to fall under precept _per
accidens_, when it becomes obligatory in virtue of a law that does not
command it directly or specifically (cfr. 935, 1099, 1602).

(a) There is a divine precept obliging _per se_ and _sub gravi_ in
reference to Baptism (“Preach the Gospel to all nations, baptizing
them, etc.,” Matt., xxviii. 19), Penance (“Whose sins you shall
forgive, they are forgiven them, etc.”, John, xx. 23), and the
Eucharist (“Unless you eat the flesh of the Son of man, you shall not
have life in you,” John, vi. 54). According to some authorities there
is also a divine precept obliging at least _sub levi_ to receive
Confirmation (“He commanded them to await the promise of the Father,”
Acts, i. 4) and Extreme Unction (“Is there any man sick among you? Let
him bring in the priests of the Church,” James, v. 14).

(b) There is a divine precept obliging _per accidens_ and _sub gravi_
in reference to Confirmation and Extreme Unction, when they cannot be
omitted without peril to salvation, scandal to neighbors, or other such
inconvenience which one is seriously bound to prevent. Similarly, there
might be a _per accidens_ obligation of receiving Matrimony or Orders
(see 2627).

(c) There are ecclesiastical precepts determining the circumstances of
the reception of Penance and the Eucharist (see 2590-2593) and
prescribing Confirmation for candidates to Orders (Canon 974).
Moreover, the Code reminds us that no one may lawfully neglect
Confirmation when he has an opportunity to receive it (Canon 787), and
likewise that it is not lawful to neglect Extreme Unction (Canon 944).

2664. Twofold Ministry of the Sacraments.--(a) The ministry of
production (_confectio_) is the application of form to matter that
makes the Sacrament (e.g., the consecration of bread and wine); (b) the
ministry of bestowal (_administratio_) is the application of the
Sacrament to the human recipient (e.g., the Communion). The Eucharist
is a permanent object, whereas Baptism and the rest are transitory
actions. Hence it is that in the Eucharist, but not in the other
Sacraments, the two ministries are separated, and hence it is also that
the Eucharist may be validly given or validly received by those who
cannot validly consecrate.

2665. Requirements in the Minister for Valid Performance of a
Sacrament.--(a) The Person of the Minister.--As the minister represents
Christ, only those may perform a Sacrament to whom Christ has given
authority. Hence, ordinarily only mortals and human beings--not the
Angels or departed Saints--can administer a Sacrament. Further, as the
ministry of a Sacrament may include an act of power and authority,
there are various ranks of ministers. Thus, the ministry of Matrimony
supposes no power or orders or spiritual authority, and the ministers
are the parties themselves; that of Solemn Baptism, Eucharist, Penance,
and Extreme Unction supposes orders and lower authority, and the
minister is the priest; that of Confirmation and Orders supposes higher
authority, and the minister is the bishop.

(b) The Acts of the Minister.--As the minister acts as Christ’s
responsible agent to whose wise discretion the dispensation of the
Sacraments is committed, he must have at least the external attention
of mind sufficient to perform all that the rite demands and the
internal intention of will sufficient to make his ministry an act that
is human, sacred, and definitely symbolical of the sacramental effects.

2666. The Necessary Intention.--The intention or purpose of the
minister therefore must have the following qualities:

(a) objectively, there must be an intention of doing what the Church
does (i.e., of performing a sacred rite instituted by Christ, for the
minister acts in the name and authority of Christ). Hence a mock
sacrament--or even, more probably, a purely external performance with
no purpose to enact a sacred rite--does not suffice. But, on the other
hand, an unbeliever can administer validly if he really intends to do
what Christians do or what Christ commanded to be done. The intention
not to do what the Church does was the chief cause of the nullity of
Anglican Orders;

(b) subjectively, the intention must be at least virtual, so as to
ensure a deliberate act. An actual intention is not necessary, because
it is often impossible on account of its difficulty; while an habitual
intention is not sufficient, because it does not influence the act so
as to make it human (see 2165). The interpretative intention (i.e., a
purpose that never existed, but that would presumably have existed, had
attention been given the matter) is with greater reason insufficient;

(c) modally, the intention must be such as to make precise the
character of the action as a special sacred rite; for just as the
matter awaits the form or word to receive the imprint of a sacred
significance, so do the ceremonial words themselves look to the
internal purpose of the minister for their fixed meaning. Hence, the
Sacrament is invalid if the minister’s purpose is indeterminate (e.g.,
if a priest wills to consecrate ten undesignated hosts out of the
hundred contained in a ciborium, or to absolve one undesignated person
of a multitude); or if the purpose is self-exclusive (e.g., if a
bridegroom has two mutually incompatible intentions, namely, to marry
the bride and also to marry her only for a time); or if the purpose is
left in suspense (e.g., if a priest makes his absolution depend on
future restitution or any other non-existent condition, and most
probably also if the minister makes the Sacrament depend on the
recipient’s predestination or other such condition known only to God).

2667. Rules on Plurality of Intentions.--(a) When opposite intentions
are simultaneous, if one of them is predominant in the minister’s will
and not insociable with the Sacrament, that one prevails and the
Sacrament is valid; otherwise the Sacrament is null. (b) When opposite
intentions are successive, the later prevails over the earlier, unless
the earlier was stronger and meant to endure in spite of other
intentions, and it has not been recalled expressly by the will.

2668. Requisites for Use of Conditional Intention.--(a) The use must be
valid or non-suspensive (2666 e), and hence (Matrimony excepted on
account of its special character as a contract) the minister may not
confer a Sacrament under a condition _de futuro_. But conditions _de
praesenti_ (e.g., “I absolve you, if you are repentant”) or _de
praeterito_ (e.g., “I baptize you, if you have not received Baptism”)
are valid.

(b) The use of a conditional intention must be lawful, or justified by
a sufficient reason. Normally the minister should intend absolutely to
give a Sacrament, as the forms of the Sacraments are unconditional. But
if the absolute intention would be disrespectful, because there is
doubt whether all the requisites for the Sacrament are present, while
on the other hand denial of the Sacrament would be harmful because the
subject needs it, both disrespect to the Sacrament and harm to the
subject are avoided by conditional administration. The doubt spoken of
may refer to the recipient (e.g., whether he is living or otherwise
capable, whether he is contrite or otherwise disposed) or to the
Sacrament (e.g., whether it has been received or received validly,
whether the form has been rightly spoken, whether the present matter is
valid).

(c) The use of the conditional intention must be legal according to the
rules prescribed by the Church. Thus, according to the Ritual the
conditional intention in Baptism and Extreme Unction (“_Si non es
baptizatus_,” “_Si vivis_”) must be expressed vocally. Moreover,
conditional marriages are not permitted as a rule except there be a
grave reason and the bishop consents.

2669. Lawful Administration of Sacraments.--Lawful administration of a
Sacrament demands, in addition to the conditions for validity
(2665-2668), that the minister and his ministry be worthy, for even in
the Old Law it was strictly commanded that holy things be treated in a
holy manner (Isa., lii. 11; Lev., xxi. xxii). Hence, a person who
fulfilled the conditions for validity but who lacked one or other of
the qualities mentioned below would perform and confer a true
Sacrament, but he would sin more or less seriously on account of the
unworthy administration, unless good faith excused him.

(a) The Minister’s Worthiness before God.--The state of grace is
required in consecrated ministers when they minister solemnly and _ex
officio_ in performing a Sacrament; for they act then as
representatives of Christ, who is holy, and exercise most sacred
functions which He appointed as means of holiness and which they were
ordained to perform holily. The sin of unworthiness is a grave
sacrilege. It seems there is _per se_ no grave sin, if the minister is
not consecrated (e.g., in lay Baptism), or if the ministry is not _ex
officio_ (e.g., in a Baptism of necessity given by a priest but without
the solemn ceremonies), or if a Sacrament is not made or performed
(e.g., when confession is heard but absolution not given, when
Communion is administered, when the Blessed Sacrament is carried). It
is generally admitted that there is no grave sin even in a solemn and
official performance of a Sacrament, if the Sacrament is urgently
necessary and the state of grace cannot be recovered in time; also in
the exercise of a function which is not itself a Sacrament (e.g., to be
official witness at a marriage or deacon at Mass, to preach, bless,
give Minor Orders, chant or say the Office). When the state of grace is
necessary for his ministry, one who is in sin must to the best of his
ability recover that state by going to confession or at least by making
an act of contrition.

(b) The Minister’s Worthiness Before the Church.--Since the Church is
the custodian of the Sacraments, these cannot be lawfully performed or
administered by those who are under her censure or who have not
received her license. The excommunicated and the irregular sin gravely
if they administer Sacraments, unless the faithful lawfully request
administration from them (see 2683). Only priests are licensed to act
as ministers of Baptism, Penance, Extreme Unction and the Eucharist,
and the pastor of a place is the authorized minister for that
territory; but in case of need even the laity may administer Baptism, a
priest other than the pastor may give the Last Sacraments, and the sick
may confess to any confessor with due faculties.

(c) Worthiness of the Ministration.--Internally the ministry should be
devout and attentive; for, if private worship should be religiously
made, much more the worship contained in the Sacraments (see 2150,
2244). Voluntary distractions, however, do not seem to be gravely
sinful, unless the validity of the rite is imperilled by them.
Externally the ministry should be dignified and rubrical. Canon 733
requires that each one observe the accidental ceremonies of his own
Rite and liturgical books. Since ceremonies were instituted by the
Church from the earliest ages and are prescribed in virtue of religion
(Catechism of the Council of Trent, page 152), it is sinful to neglect
them unless a rubric is merely directive or optional, such as the rules
before and after Mass. The preceptive rubrics oblige _sub gravi_ as to
notable matter (e.g., the anointing in Baptism), _sub levi_ as to
inconsiderable matter (e.g., words, bows, crosses, etc. of minor
importance); but one may be excused from guilt, or grave guilt, on
account of imperfection of act (e.g., inadvertence caused by external
distractions) or impossibility (e.g., ceremonies curtailed because of
approaching death, scandal or wonder of the people). The Roman Ritual
(Title I, n. 10) advises the explanation of the ceremonies for the
benefit of those who assist at the administration of the Sacraments,
and recommends the Catechism of the Council of Trent for this purpose.

2670. Multiplication of Sins of Unworthy Administration.--How many sins
are committed by the minister when Sacraments are unworthily
administered to many recipients at one time, as when several children
are baptized together, or a large gathering of penitents are heard one
after the other, etc.?

(a) According to the strict view, there are as many distinct sins as
there are distinct administrations, for each Sacrament is separate from
the other. But in case of Communion, since the separate Communions are
parts of the one Eucharistic banquet, there is but one sin, mortal or
venial, according to the view taken of an administration that is not
also performance of a Sacrament.

(b) According to the mild view, there is but one sin, since sins are
not multiplied numerically when they form morally but one act on
account of the unity given them by the purpose of the agent and the
circumstances.

2671. Requirements for a Valid Sacrament in Reference to the
Recipient.--(a) The Person of the Recipient.--Since the Sacraments were
instituted as means of salvation, they can be given only to those who
are still wayfarers in the present mortal existence, and hence a
Sacrament administered to a brute animal or a corpse would be invalid,
or, in the case of Communion, would not be received sacramentally. As
Baptism is the preparation for the other Sacraments, but need not
presuppose personal sinfulness, its subject is any and every unbaptized
person, infant or adult, male or female. The other six Sacraments
presuppose Baptism, and only those who have been initiated into the
Church by Baptism can receive them validly. As to these six Sacraments
only males are capable of Orders, which is for the rulers of the
Church; only adults are capable of Penance, Extreme Unction and
Matrimony, which suppose personal sin or personal contract. Further,
the impotent and impeded are incapable of Matrimony, and those who are
not in danger of death from sickness are incapable of Extreme Unction.
Finally, those who have been baptized, confirmed, or ordained, cannot
be rebaptized, reconfirmed, or reordained, since these three Sacraments
can be given but once; he who is married cannot marry again while his
wife lives and the bond endures; he who has been anointed cannot be
reanointed during the same danger.

(b) The Acts of the Recipient.--If the recipient is an infant, no
disposition on his part is necessary, since he does not understand. If
the recipient is an adult, it is necessary in the performance of every
Sacrament (on the Eucharist see 2664) that he have some intention or
willingness to receive the Sacrament, since Christ does not wish to
confer benefits or impose certain grave burdens on those who are
unwilling. A forced Sacrament to which the subject yielded no internal
consent would be a null Sacrament. Further, since an essential part
(namely, the matter, or according to others a _conditio sine qua non_)
of Penance is the faith and repentance of the recipient, these
dispositions are necessary in that Sacrament.

2672. Qualities of the Recipient’s Intention.--(a) Objectively, the
recipient should intend to receive what the Church confers, and hence
intentions that are not serious, or are mistaken or external (e.g.,
Baptism received for the sake of rehearsal, or in the belief that it is
a profane ablution, or accepted as a pure formality), do not seem
sufficient (see 2666).

(b) Subjectively.--The recipient must positively will the Sacrament,
for it seems that the so-called neutral intention--in which the subject
neither consents nor dissents internally, but is passive and
indifferent, and acquiesces externally only to please another--is not a
true desire. But the strength or influence of the recipient’s intention
need not be so great as the minister’s, since the role of the minister
is to perform the rite, that of the subject only to receive the rite
(see 2665).

2673. When a Virtual Intention Is Necessary.--It is generally agreed,
therefore, that while the interpretative intention does not suffice,
the actual intention and even, for the most part, the virtual intention
are not necessary. But about the virtual intention the following should
be noted; (a) a virtual and explicit intention is necessary in
Matrimony if a party be considered, not precisely as recipient, but as
minister of the Sacrament (see 2666) and as maker of the contract (see
1883); (b) a virtual and at least implicit intention is necessary in
Penance, if a penitent is considered precisely as positing the
requisite matter or condition of the Sacrament, since this consists in
repentance, and repentance includes either an express or an implied
desire of sacramental absolution.

2674. When an Habitual Intention Suffices.--The habitual intention is
found in those who are not conscious (see 2165), but it suffices for
the reception of a Sacrament, since the recipient does not affect the
Sacrament, and it is enough that he had the good will to accept it and
has not retracted that will.

(a) An habitual and explicit intention suffices for the three
Sacraments that impose special obligations, namely, Baptism, Orders,
and Matrimony. Hence, he who has asked for Baptism is validly baptized
after he becomes delirious; he who has asked for Orders is validly
ordained even when unconscious; he who has sent his consent to a
marriage by proxy receives the Sacrament during his sleep, if the other
party’s consent closing the contract is given at that time.

(b) An habitual and implicit intention included in a particular will to
do a good act on which the Sacrament follows in natural course,
suffices for the other three Sacraments which do not impose special
obligations. Hence, a person who purposed to live as a Catholic is
validly confirmed while unconscious; a person who intended to die as a
Catholic is validly absolved and anointed, as far as intention is
concerned, at the moment of death, even though he be out of his mind.
Further, if an unbaptized person has resolved to become a Catholic but
has no knowledge of Baptism itself, he is validly baptized in virtue of
his implicit desire, even though he be unconscious.

(c) An habitual and implicit intention included in a general will to do
all that is necessary for salvation or a good life is taught by some
authors, and is by them considered sufficient for Baptism, since it is
the most necessary Sacrament, and the Sacraments are for men. An
unbaptized person of good will who has supernatural contrition or
charity is justified through Baptism of desire, but if he has only
supernatural attrition the Sacrament itself is necessary for him.
Hence, in case of urgent need conditional Baptism should be given a
dying and unconscious infidel who was well disposed; but, as the
intention is not certain, the Baptism should be repeated in case of
recovery. The same principle is extended by some moralists to the
administration of Penance and Extreme Unction to schismatics and
heretics who are in danger of death.

2675. Requirements for Lawful or Fruitful Reception of a Sacrament by
an Adult.--(a) Worthiness of the Recipient from Divine Law.--The two
Sacraments of the Dead, Baptism and Penance, were intended by Christ to
be means of forgiveness to the repentant, and hence they require at
least that the recipient believe himself attrite. The five Sacraments
of the Living were meant by Christ to strengthen grace and life already
had, and consequently he who approaches them must have no serious fault
on his conscience. Conscious unworthiness is a sacrilege, and only
extreme necessity can excuse reception in such a state (e.g., when a
sinner takes Communion to save the Host from profanation).

(b) Worthiness from Church Law.--The recipient must be free from church
censures (Canon 2260) or impediments, and must possess the preparation
or qualification which the church law prescribes (e.g., a certain age
is required for Confirmation; the Eucharist must be received fasting;
the candidate for Orders must be approved, etc.).

(c) Worthiness of Reception.--The Sacraments should be received
devoutly, with proper preparation, attention, and thanksgiving. In the
case of the Eucharist, though intention is not necessary for validity,
it is required for a sacramental or fruitful Communion; an habitual and
implicit intention suffices for the Viaticum (and Easter Communion), an
habitual explicit intention for Communion of devotion.

2676. When Is the Minister of the Sacraments Bound to Give Them?--(a) A
pastor is obliged to give a Sacrament to one of his own subjects who
reasonably requests it, and to do so willingly, freely (Canon 736),
and, if he has no substitute, in person; for a spiritual shepherd has a
grave duty of justice and charity to feed his flock. A request is not
reasonable, however, if compliance will put the pastor to an
inconvenience greater than that which the parishioner will suffer from
a refusal, for example, when Baptisms, Confessions, or Communions are
needlessly asked for outside the appointed hours, or when sick calls
that can be attended during the day are sent in at night. The
Sacraments necessary for salvation (Baptism and Penance) should be
given even at the risk of life, if the subject is in grave need and
there is assured hope of success (see 1167), and doubtless this should
be applied also to Extreme Unction or even the Viaticum.

(b) One who is not a pastor is obliged from charity to give the
Sacraments to those who reasonably ask. He would be obliged even to
risk his life to save a soul, if there were no one else to administer a
necessary Sacrament to a person in extreme spiritual peril who could be
saved by his ministry.

2677. When Is the Minister of the Sacraments Bound to Deny Them?--(a)
He must always deny them to those who are incapable, for otherwise he
insults the Sacrament. Under no circumstances, then, may a priest
baptize one who is already baptized, or absolve one who is unrepentant;
and he may not assist at the attempted marriage of a divorcee.
Likewise, as is manifest, he must always deny the Sacraments to those
who ask for them out of hatred or contempt for religion, for to grant
them in such circumstances would be an act intrinsically evil.

(b) He must deny them, as a rule, to those who to his knowledge are
certainly unworthy (e.g., on account of lack of requisite instruction
or moral disposition); otherwise, he casts pearls before swine,
cooperates in the sacrilege of others, and scandalizes the people.
Hence, a public sinner--that is, one whose unworthiness is notorious
(see 2053)--should not be given the Sacraments publicly, until he has
repaired the scandal he gave; and no unworthy person, even though he be
a hidden sinner whose guilt is known only to the minister, should be
given a Sacrament in private until he has shown signs of repentance.
Generally the minister is bound to assure himself beforehand of the
good disposition of the one who asks for a Sacrament, though in case of
Communion this is often impossible, and it suffices to presume that all
who approach the altar becomingly are in the state of grace.

2678. Administration to Unworthy Persons.--Since material cooperation
with sin is lawful for a sufficient reason (see 1515 sqq.), one may
administer a Sacrament to an unworthy person when refusal would cause a
greater evil than ministration. This happens in the following cases:

(a) when refusal will necessitate a more wicked sacrilege (viz., injury
to a Sacrament by the minister himself). This case occurs when the
minister knows the subject’s unworthiness only from the latter’s
sacramental confession, and hence cannot exclude him without violation
of the seal;

(b) when the refusal will bring on more widespread evils (viz.,
discouragement of the use of the Sacraments). This happens when the
subject who asks the Sacrament is not publicly known as a sinner, but
his request is public, so that a refusal will amount to a defamation of
him by the minister. If priests had the right to inflict public
disgrace on those who approached the Sacraments, it is easily seen what
grave scandals and disorders would follow, and that a ready excuse
would present itself for personal spite and neglect of religion. Our
Lord administered Communion to Judas rather than betray his secret
guilt to the other Apostles.

2679. Is the fear of bodily harm or of death a sufficient reason for
administering a Sacrament to an unworthy person? (a) If a greater evil
will be caused by bestowal of the Sacrament, it should not be bestowed.
This happens when the Sacrament is asked out of hatred or contempt of
religion, and when great scandal will result if the priest yields. (b)
If a greater evil will be caused by refusal of the Sacrament, it should
not be refused. Examples are those of the previous paragraph. The mere
private good of the minister is not preferable to the good of the
Sacrament.

2680. Simulation and Dissimulation of a Sacrament?--Is it lawful in
case of difficulty to give a Sacrament only in appearance? (a) If this
means simulation of a Sacrament, or the use of its externals in such a
way as to make it null (i.e., by withholding internal intention or
using invalid matter or form), the answer is in the negative; for
simulation is always an acted lie (see 2403, 2404), and when applied to
Sacraments it produces a sacrilegious mutilation and also, in the case
of the Eucharist (e.g., when an unconsecrated host is given to a
communicant), an occasion of idolatry. (b) If this means dissimulation
of a Sacrament, or the use of some nonsacramental act to conceal the
denial of a Sacrament, the answer is in the affirmative, for it is
lawful to keep from others knowledge to which they have no right. Thus,
a priest who wishes to conceal from onlookers that he has refused
absolution to a penitent, can lawfully say a prayer and make a sign of
the cross over this person.

2681. Administration of Penance and Extreme Unction to Heretics and
Schismatics.--(a) Regularly this is unlawful, even though these persons
are in good faith and ask for the Sacraments. They must first renounce
their errors and become reconciled with the Church (Canon 731).

(b) Exceptionally, according to some moralists, this is lawful when
there is extreme need. Hence, according to this view a priest may
secretly give conditional absolution to an unconscious heretic or
schismatic in danger of death who has given signs of repentance; he may
absolve and anoint a dying heretic or schismatic, even though
conscious, if this person appears to be in good faith and repentant and
willing to do all that God requires of him. But the priest should first
try to convert the dying person, if this is possible and the latter’s
good faith will not be disturbed; and he must also avoid giving scandal.

2682. Repetition of a Sacrament on Account of Invalid
Administration.--(a) This is unlawful when the fear of invalidity is
groundless and foolish; for it is seriously disrespectful to a
Sacrament and disedifying to others to repeat the rite without reason.
But scrupulous persons are sometimes free of grave sin, since they mean
well in repeating and are not accountable for their fears.

(b) This is lawful but not obligatory when there is a prudent misgiving
about a useful Sacrament (Confirmation, Matrimony, anointing of one who
is conscious); also when there is a slight reason of law or fact for
fear about a necessary or more important Sacrament (Baptism, Orders,
absolution of a dying person, anointing of an unconscious person,
consecration of the Eucharist). For the Sacraments are for men. But if
only a small loss or an unlikely loss will be caused by their
non-repetition, the duty of repeating them cannot be insisted on.

(c) This is gravely obligatory when there is a prudent fear about a
necessary or more important Sacrament; it is gravely or lightly
obligatory (to be determined in each case) when there is a well-founded
fear about a useful Sacrament, if charity, justice or religion calls
for repetition and the inconvenience will not be too great. In
Matrimony the alternate methods of convalidation or sanation may be
used as the case demands. Again, the Sacraments are for men, and hence,
if man will likely be subjected to a notable loss by the minister’s
neglect of repetition, the duty of repetition is clear.

2683. Reception of a Sacrament from an Unworthy Minister.--May a
Sacrament be received from a minister who, to one’s certain knowledge,
cannot give it without sin on account of unworthiness (such as a state
of sin or censure)?

(a) _Per se_, this is unlawful, for it is cooperation with sacrilege
and is often attended by scandal and danger of perversion to self.

(b) _Per accidens_, this is lawful, for material cooperation is
justified when a proportionately grave reason exists (1515 sqq.).
Moreover, often the minister can put himself in the state of grace
before he gives the Sacrament, or can be excused from sacrilege on
account of the necessity. The less the irreverence or danger of
scandal, the less need be the reason for asking or taking a Sacrament
from an unworthy person. If the minister is a sinner or is under
ordinary suspension or other censure, a serious reason of spiritual
advantage suffices (e.g., the opportunity to make the Easter duty); if
the minister is under sentence (Canon 2261 n. 3), only danger of death
suffices; if the minister is a heretic or schismatic, only extreme need
suffices, and the danger of scandal and perversion must be avoided.

2684. Sacramentals.--The sacramentals are the sacred things (e.g.,
rosaries, scapulars, agnus deis) and actions (e.g., consecrations,
blessings, exorcisms) used by the Church in imitation of the Sacraments
to obtain through her intercession blessings chiefly of a spiritual
sort (Canon 1144).

(a) Necessity.--Our Lord gave to the Church the power of instituting
sacramentals, and certain of those used by the Church are but
developments of the blessings and exorcisms that He used. Some of the
sacramentals are commanded by the Church (viz, those that are used in
the administration of the Sacraments or in other sacred services);
others are recommended, but not commanded.

(b) Use.--The virtue of religion requires that the sacramentals be
administered, received and treated with devotion and respect, the
extremes of irreligion and superstition being avoided (see 2244). The
laws of the Church on the ministers, recipients, and rites of the
sacramentals are treated in works on Canon Law and liturgy.




Art. 2: BAPTISM; CONFIRMATION; THE EUCHARIST; THE SACRIFICE OF THE MASS

(_Summa Theologica_, III, qq. 66-83.)

2685. The general duties of the ministers and recipients of the
Sacraments have been outlined in the previous Article. The principles
therein given are the basis of the special duties that pertain to each
of the seven Sacraments. In this and the remaining Articles, therefore,
it will suffice to apply without explaining anew the rules already
given and to add the special details proper to each Sacrament.

2686. The Sacrament of Baptism.--The first and most essential Sacrament
is Baptism (Greek, washing), which may be defined: “The Sacrament of
regeneration by water in the word” (Catechism of the Council of Trent,
page 163). The internal grace of the Sacrament is expressed by
regeneration, the external sign by water and the word.

(a) The effect of Baptism is regeneration, for it cleanses from sin and
penalty, and makes him who was a child of wrath to be a child of God
and a co-heir of Christ. Baptism also christens, since it seals one
with the indelible character of Christian, or member of the Church. As
all are under the original curse by birth from Adam, so all who would
inherit blessing are in need of this new birth through Christ (see
2661): “Unless a man be born again of water and the Holy Ghost, he
cannot enter into the kingdom of God” (John, iii. 5).

(b) The material element (remote matter) of Baptism is water, that is,
any and every form of liquid which in common estimation is pure and
unchanged water (e.g., water taken from the ocean, from streams,
fountains, or wells; water melted from snow, ice or hail; water
gathered from steam, dew, or mist; chemical and mineral water). But
animal and plant fluids, though they contain water, are looked upon as
distinct substances, and hence Baptism cannot be administered with
milk, blood, spittle, sweat, oil, flower or fruit juices (e.g., wine,
cider), or extracts of barks or roots. Doubtful matter are liquids
that, while in large part composed of water, seem to be generally
regarded as not water (e.g., thin soup, tea or coffee, light beer); and
hence only in necessity can these be lawfully used for Baptism.

(c) The formal element of Baptism is the word or the formula appointed
by Christ. In the Latin Church the words are: “I baptize thee in the
name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost,” Almost
every word in this form is necessary for the sense given by Christ, and
hence almost any omission makes it necessary, or at least lawful, to
repeat Baptism (see 2655, 2682). The declaration of the form demands
that the application of the water (proximate matter) be made in the
manner of an ablution (i.e., by sprinkling, pouring or immersion). If
sprinkling or pouring is used, the body of the recipient (i.e., the
skin of his head) must be washed (i.e., the water must touch the head
and flow thereon) by the baptizer (i.e., the person who pronounces the
words must pour or sprinkle the water). But in case of necessity one
may use the opinion that Baptism is valid when the water touches only
the hair or some part distinct from the head, or even the afterbirth of
a fetus.

2687. Solemn and Private Baptism.--Though in essentials Baptism is but
one, it is distinguished in reference to accidental ceremony into
solemn and private.

(a) Solemn Baptism is that which is administered with all the rites
prescribed by the Liturgy. It requires consecrated water, sponsors and
special ceremonies; its minister is a clergyman (ordinarily the
parish-priest or Ordinary, extraordinarily a delegated deacon); its
place is the baptistery or church. In the Baptism of adults even
greater solemnity may be used, for there is a special rite of
administration, and the Church recommends that this Baptism be
performed when possible by the Ordinary, or at least in cathedral
churches, and on the vigil of Easter or Pentecost.

(b) Private Baptism is given in danger of death, or when an adult
convert is rebaptized conditionally (Canon 759). It requires only true
and natural water, though the water should be as clean and decent as
possible, and baptismal or blessed water is preferable; generally the
simple form without other rite suffices; sponsors are not necessary,
unless they can be had without difficulty, but if possible at least one
or two witnesses should be present; the Baptism may be given in the
private home or the hospital or other place where the candidate is
staying; anyone who has the use of reason and is able to perform the
rite may act as minister. When several persons suitable to minister
private Baptism are present, the order of preference to be followed is:
priest, deacon, subdeacon, cleric, layman, woman; but a woman should be
preferred to a man if modesty calls for this, or if the woman is better
acquainted with the manner of baptizing. It is considered a serious sin
needlessly to prefer a non-priest to a worthy priest, a non-Catholic to
a Catholic, an outsider to the parish-priest. If possible, parents
should not baptize their own children, since it is more becoming that
the spiritual parent and the carnal parent be different persons.

2688. Duties of Parish-Priests as to Baptism.--(a) Before
Baptism.--Baptismal water should be blessed, added to or renewed, as
the ritual regulations of one’s place require; the faithful should be
frequently admonished in sermons of the serious duty of having their
infants baptized as soon as possible (Canon 770); the people should
also be told (especially midwives, physicians and surgeons) how lay
Baptism is to be given validly (Canon 743).

(b) At the Time of Baptism.--Converts preparing for Baptism should be
well instructed in the principal religious truths (viz, those contained
in the Creed), and precepts (viz., the laws of the Decalogue and of the
Church, see 914 sqq.), and prayers (viz, the Our Father, the acts of
faith, hope, charity, and contrition); and they should learn the nature
and effects of Baptism. The parish-priest may delegate a deacon to
baptize solemnly in his place, if there is a sufficient reason, as when
he himself is impeded by sickness, absence, or occupation (Canon 741).

(c) After Baptism.--The pastor in virtue of his office has the
responsibility of attending to the registration of baptisms in the
proper book (Canon 777). The registration should be made without
delay--that is, before the sponsors have departed, or immediately after
the ceremony, or at least on the same day, if possible; the entry
should be made accurately and legibly. The duty of keeping proper
baptismal records is considered grave, since important evils would
follow on their neglect.

2689. Duties of Parents and Guardians in Reference to Baptism.--(a) As
to Administration of Baptism.--Parents are obliged under grave sin not
to expose their children to the loss of salvation by undue delay of
Baptism (see 2344, 2630). If there is danger of death, a child must be
baptized at once; if there is no immediate danger of death, the child
must nevertheless, on account of the absolute necessity of Baptism, be
baptized as soon as possible. Some moralists consider a needless delay
gravely sinful if it exceeds three or four days; others, if it exceeds
ten or eleven days. Since infants can be baptized in the womb, a mother
is not obliged to undergo the Caesarean operation to ensure Baptism;
but she may permit the operation for the sake of a more certain
Baptism, unless her obligations to husband or other children will
suffer on account of the danger to her life. If a mother dies in
pregnancy, the fetus should be extracted and baptized. The duty here
rests with the relatives and the physician (Canon 746).

(b) As to Details of Baptism.--Parents should choose suitable names for
their children, avoiding such as are obscene, ridiculous, or impious.
It is advisable that the name of a Saint or of some other person
distinguished for holiness be chosen, for this will be of a spiritual
advantage to the child and an edification to others. Parents have the
right to appoint the sponsors of their infant children, and should
choose only those who are canonically admissible. If Baptism has been
administered at home, the parents should, if the child survives, bring
it as soon as possible to the church for conditional Baptism, or for
the baptismal ceremonies (Canons 759, 760).

2690. Sponsors.--From early times the Church has required in Baptism
the use of sponsors, and the reasons for this usage will appear from
the duties of these god-parents. The present law (Canons 762 sqq.)
retains the ancient tradition, and prescribes as a serious duty that in
Solemn Baptism (even of adults, whenever possible) there shall be at
least one sponsor (male or female), and that not more than two be used,
one a male and the other a female.

(a) Requirements for Validity--Since the sponsor takes obligations, he
must have the use of reason and give consent to the office; since he is
charged with the duty of spiritual guidance, he must be baptized and
not be a member of a heretical or schismatic sect; since he exercises
an office of honor, he must not be under the displeasure of the Church
by sentence of excommunication or the like; since he is to act as
spiritual father, he must not be the parent or spouse of the baptized;
since he is to stand for the baptized person, he must be designated by
the latter or his parents or by the minister. The sponsor must also
indicate (in person or by proxy) his acceptance of the care of the
baptized person by physically touching him at the moment of Baptism
(either by holding the infant over the font, or by placing a hand on
the candidate), or immediately after the Baptism (by raising from the
waters or receiving from the hands of the minister the one who has been
immersed, or by taking from the font one who has been baptized by
pouring). Non-Catholics, therefore, may not be sponsors, but to avoid
great offense or other serious evil they may sometimes be admitted as
witnesses or honorary sponsors (see 956 sqq.).

(b) Requirements for Lawfulness.--The sponsor should have reached his
fourteenth year (unless the minister sees fit for a just cause to admit
a younger person), and should know the rudiments of faith; he must be a
person of respectability among Catholics, and hence one who is
notorious on account of certain penalties or on account of crime or of
membership in the Freemasons is not acceptable; he must be free to act
as sponsor, and hence religious and clerics in Major Orders must have
permission of the superior qualified in each instance to grant this
permission.

2691. Duties of Sponsors.--(a) They are obliged to look upon their
spiritual children as their perpetual charges, to see to their
Christian education and to the fulfillment of the baptismal promises
for which they stood surety (Canon 769).

(b) These obligations are grave, since the matter is grave; but, as the
care of children falls principally upon the parents, it is only when
the parents neglect their duty that the sponsors are held to do what
they can for the instruction and correction of their god-children
(Catechism of Council of Trent, page 175).

2692. Duties of Adult Recipients of Baptism or of Those Who Have the
Use of Reason.--(a) Before Baptism.--An unbaptized person who has faith
and who sees the necessity of Baptism, is gravely obliged to ask for
Baptism at once, if he is in danger of death, or as soon as he
conveniently can, if he is not in danger of death; for since Baptism is
the divinely appointed means of entering the Church and of sharing in
its privileges, he who would delay it unduly would disobey an important
command of God and would be seriously neglectful of his own salvation.
For a sufficient reason, however (e.g., for the sake of instruction or
probation, or to avoid persecution), Baptism may be delayed even for
years; but the catechumen should then make at once an act of contrition
or charity so as to obtain the benefit of Baptism of desire. Converts
should prepare for Baptism by taking a course of instructions, or, when
there is danger of death, a summary instruction (791 sqq.).

(b) At Baptism.--The internal dispositions include, besides intention,
faith and repentance: “He that believeth and is baptized shall be
saved” (Mark, xvi. 16); “Do penance and be baptized” (Acts, ii. 38).
There must be an explicit faith in the four chief mysteries (see 789).
In this country converts who are being baptized conditionally make an
abjuration and profession of faith before Baptism, and go to confession
and receive conditional absolution after Baptism. The Code recommends
that those who are well receive Baptism fasting; and that, unless grave
reason excuses, the neophyte assist at Mass and receive Communion after
his Baptism (Canon 753).

(c) After Baptism.--Since Baptism makes one a member of the Church,
those who receive it are subject to church laws. The promises made in
Baptism are not strictly vows, but an engagement of loyalty to the
faith and the commandments (see 2191).

2693. Duties of the Minister of Baptism.--(a) In Reference to the
Parents.--If the parents insist on giving an unsuitable name to their
child, the pastor should silently add a suitable name of some Saint
chosen by himself, and should inscribe both names in the register
(Canon 761). A child of non-Catholic parents should not be baptized by
Catholics, unless this can be done without injury to the natural right
of the parents of training their own children and without danger to the
future perseverance of the child. Hence these children, if infants,
should not be baptized against the will of their parents unless they
are in danger of death and can be baptized without too great
inconvenience; but if a child is able to judge for himself, or if there
is no parental opposition (at least not of both parents), and there are
good reasons to believe that the child will be brought up as a
Catholic, he may be baptized (Canons 750, 751).

(b) In Reference to the Sponsors.--If a sponsor cannot be admitted, the
pastor must use great kindness and prudence, so as not to give offense.
If a non-Catholic has been appointed as sponsor, the difficulty may
sometimes be overcome by naming a sacristan or servant as sponsor and
permitting the non-Catholic to act as witness.

(c) In Reference to the Capacity of the Recipient.--The minister must
give the Sacrament only to those who are capable. Hence, he cannot
baptize what is not human (e.g., uterine growths which do not pertain
to a fetus), or not living (e.g., a stillborn infant), or not
unbaptized (e.g., a convert or an infant about whose valid Baptism
there is no reasonable doubt). Speculatively there is some difficulty
about Baptism of unborn fetuses, of abortive fetuses, and of
monstrosities (e.g., an infant with two heads or two hearts). For, as
to the first, it seems that the physically unborn are incapable of
spiritual rebirth; as to the second, it seems that the soul of an
undeveloped fetus may be sub-human; and, as to the third, it may be
doubtful whether a monstrosity is one individual or several
individuals. Practically, however, one should proceed on the principle
that the Sacraments are for men, and give the benefit of a doubt to the
infants by conditional Baptism. Intra-uterine Baptism should not be
used except in case of urgent necessity, and it is then permissible to
employ a mixture of one part of chloride of mercury with two parts of
water to avoid infection. Midwives, nurses, mothers, and physicians
should be especially careful to baptize abortive fetuses, and should
know how this can be done (see Commentaries on Canons 746-748).

(d) In Reference to the Willingness of the Recipient.--An infant is not
required to will the Sacrament, and hence the perpetually insane, who
are unable to distinguish between right and wrong, may be baptized
without any desire on their part. But an adult must intend to be
baptized (see 2671 b). Hence, the minister must inquire about the
wishes of an adult candidate, If an unbaptized person is now out of his
mind (insane, afflicted with lethargy or sleeping sickness, delirious),
but formerly had the use of reason, he is classed with adults, and his
intention has to be considered. He should not be baptized, therefore,
until he comes to himself, unless there is danger of death and signs of
a desire to receive Baptism were given before (Canons 745, 754).

(e) In Reference to the Worthiness of the Recipient.--The minister
should remind the candidate of the duty of attrition. If the person who
asks for Baptism wishes to retain certain habits (e.g., superstition,
concubinage, or unlawful business) which cannot be reconciled with
Christianity, he cannot be regarded as suited for Baptism. But in
danger of death good faith should not be uselessly disturbed.

(f) In Reference to the Pastor.--Solemn Baptism either in or out of
one’s territory may not be given without permission from the proper
pastor who has jurisdiction (Canons 738-740). And a minister who is not
the pastor of the baptized person must send notice of the Baptism to
the pastor, as soon as possible, if the latter was not present (Canon
778).

(g) In Reference to Himself and the Sacrament.--The minister should
inform himself, if necessary, about the existence or validity of a
previous Baptism, and he should observe the ceremonies, essential and
accidental, of his Rite. Foundlings should be baptized conditionally,
unless it is certain that they have been already baptized validly
(Canon 749). The internal dispositions of intention and state of grace
are necessary, while for baptism of adults fasting is advisable (Canon
753).

2694. The Sacrament of Confirmation.--Next to Baptism, not in necessity
or dignity but in likeness and in time, is Confirmation; for
Confirmation completes the work begun in Baptism, and it is also
frequently received immediately or next after Baptism. It may be
defined as “the Sacrament in which through the anointing with chrism
and the prayer of the bishop a baptized person is perfected and
strengthened in the grace received and signed indelibly with the
character of soldier of Jesus Christ.”

(a) The element of the Sacrament (remote matter) is chrism, that is, a
mixture of olive oil and balsam specially blessed by the bishop and
applied (proximate matter) by an anointing and the imposition of hands
on the forehead of the recipient. The law of the Church requires that
the chrism be new (i.e., made at the last previous consecration of
oils), and that the anointing be made with the right thumb in the form
of a cross.

(b) The form of Confirmation in the Latin Church is as follows: “I sign
thee with the sign of the cross, and I confirm thee with the chrism of
salvation in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy
Ghost.”

2695. The Minister of Confirmation.--(a) Qualifications.--The ordinary
minister of this Sacrament is only the bishop; but a priest may act as
extraordinary minister, either from the common law (viz., Cardinals,
Abbots, etc.), or from special indult (Canon 782). The bishop may
confirm outsiders in his own diocese, unless their own Ordinary
forbids, and with permission he may confirm outside his diocese (Canon
783). Since January 1, 1947, by force of the decree of the Congregation
of the Discipline of the Sacraments (_Spiritus Sanctus_) the following
were established as extraordinary ministers within the limits of their
territories and for subjects in danger of death.

1) “pastors having their own territories, therefore excluding personal
and family pastors, unless they have also their own territory.” Under
this heading are included secular and religious pastors. It is to be
noted that, since national parishes in the United States are assigned a
definite territory, pastors of such parishes enjoy the privilege of
this decree. Pastors of Negro and Indian parishes, even if they are
considered to be personal pastors, may be included, for the
jurisdiction is both personal and territorial. Military chaplains can
not confirm in virtue of this decree.

2) “the vicars spoken of in Canon 471, and also parochial
administrators (_vicarii oeconomi_).” The first group are canonically
innominate and authors adopt various titles for the personages
involved. However, the reference is always to the priests placed in
actual charge of _cura animarum_ in parishes which have been fully
incorporated. The second group mentioned are the _vicarii oeconomi_,
priests appointed canonically as administrators of vacant parishes (see
Canons 472, n.1; 473,1). All other vicars lack the power, namely, the
Diocesan Administrator (_vicarius capitularis_), Vicar General,
_Vicarius Substitutus_ (priest who takes place of absent pastor),
_Vicarius Adjutor_ (assists a disabled pastor), _Vicarius Cooperator_
(curate), those who according to Canon 472, n.2, take temporary charge
of a vacant parish prior to appointment of a true administrator,
chaplains of schools, hospitals, and other charitable institutions (by
rescript of Nov. 18, 1948, the faculty was extended also to chaplains
of maternity hospitals and foundling homes in the United States, and
this faculty is renewable), the seminary rector, religious superiors
even in exempt communities.

3) “priests to whom is entrusted exclusively and permanently within a
definite territory, and with a definite church, the complete care of
souls together with the rights and duties of pastors.” Such territorial
arrangements are not common in the United States. The reference may
be to priests established as quasi-pastors in Canon 216, Sec.3 (hence
pastors in missionary territory and prefectures), episcopal delegates
to the territories later to be erected as parishes or to maintain
the status of a perpetual vicarage. Perhaps the reference is only to
special arrangements made by particular diocesan laws.

(b) Duties.--The ordinary minister of this Sacrament should confer
it when his subjects reasonably request it, and the Ordinary should
see that the Sacrament is administered to his people, if possible, at
least every five years (Canon 785). It would be unreasonable, however,
to expect a bishop to go to every sick or dying person who desires
Confirmation, as the Sacrament is not necessary for salvation and the
task would be morally impossible, The Sacrament should be performed
validly, worthily, and rubrically. When Confirmation is given, fasting
is of counsel, not of precept. The use of a sponsor in Confirmation
seems to be a grave obligation, when possible. A recipient can have but
one sponsor, and a sponsor can act for only one or two confirmandi,
unless it appear to the minister that there is sufficient reason to
have a sponsor act for more (Canon 794). The pastor of the recipient,
if he is unaware of the Confirmation, should be notified as soon as
possible (Canon 799).

(c) Various prescriptions, some of them subjects of special study,
are attendant upon the grant of power to confirm to pastors and
“equivalent pastors.” The major ones are summarily stated here. The
pastor obtains this power when he acquires the office. It lasts as
long as he holds office. The exercise of his power becomes unlawful if
he falls under censure; in certain cases it may then even be invalid.
Theologians disagree as to the precise nature of the power, whether
it be of orders, of jurisdiction, of both, an intrinsic or extrinsic
modification of orders, etc. The common opinion holds that it is solely
a power of orders. Hence, Canon 209 may not be safely used here, and
an ordinary assistant who attempts to confirm would not fall under any
irregularity; a pastor, however, might, by misuse of his power, be not
only deprived of it, but be placed under an irregularity. Use of the
power is not dependent on the permission of the local Ordinary. It may
be necessary to inquire however, whether the bishop wishes to confirm
in particular cases. Episcopal instructions on this matter must be
complied with.

(d) Subjects of the Extraordinary Minister. The decree, _Spiritus
Sanctus_, in its second rule lays down a condition for the valid
administration of Confirmation by the extraordinary minister and
determines the proper subject. The new faculty is strictly personal
(hence it may not be delegated to others) and strictly territorial
(hence the administration must take place within the confines of the
minister’s district and therein extends even to exempt places). The
recipient must be “in real danger of death because of a serious illness
from which it is foreseen that he will die.”

Before treating the illness established as a condition for validity,
other conditions of the subject must be considered. The decree
describes the proper recipient as _fidelis_ in two places. The question
has been discussed whether this limits the subjects to Catholics and
excludes validly baptized Protestants. Authors are not agreed. Perhaps,
since the extraordinary minister can act only within the powers given
him in the decree, he would have to interpret _fidelis_ as extending
solely to Catholics. On May 1, 1948, the Congregation for the Oriental
Church issued a grant of powers to the Latin extraordinary ministers
to confer Confirmation under the same conditions to Catholics of the
Oriental rite who live under the jurisdiction of a Latin Ordinary,
who are in the territory of the Latin pastor and whose rite has no
established parish or mission in the locality. (This grant of power
was previously impossible by virtue of Canon 782, Sec.4.) In emergency
cases there would be no need to await the arrival of the proper pastor.
Since Ruthenian Catholics are not under the Latin Ordinaries in this
country, it seems that the decree might not extend to them. The point
is disputed, but it would be imprudent to act on the opinion that the
Ruthenians are included until the question is officially settled. The
recipient need not be a permanent resident in the territory by reason
of domicile or quasi-domicile; physical presence suffices.

The final condition of dangerous sickness is similar to the one in
Extreme Unction; it must arise from an intrinsic cause, not from an
extrinsic cause. and includes not only sickness, but also wounds and
accident cases. The decree speaks of the subject in “_vero mortis
periculo_.” Some thought that the wording distinguished the sickness
from mere “_periculo” mortis_, and hence must be certain, not doubtful
or probable. In response to the Cardinal of Palermo, on March 6,
1947, the Congregation of the Sacraments favored the opinion that the
norms for “_urgente mortis periculo_” (Canons 1043, 1044, 1046) are
applicable. As a rule of thumb, many authors propose: if the sickness
permits the administration of Extreme Unction, it also justifies the
giving of Confirmation in accordance with the terms of the decree.

2696. The Recipient of Confirmation.--(a) Qualifications.--The subject
of this Sacrament is only a baptized person, and in adults intention
is necessary. The general custom in the Latin Church is not to confirm
before the seventh year, or thereabout, has been attained; but the
Sacrament may be given even earlier, if an infant is in danger of
death, or if there seems to the minister to be a just and grave
reason for confirming one under seven years of age (Canon 788). Those
who have the use of reason should not be admitted to Confirmation
without previous instruction on the nature of the Sacrament and the
requirements for its proper reception.

(b) Duties.--There is an obligation to receive this Sacrament when one
has the opportunity (Canon 787); but apart from scandal, contempt,
or danger to salvation the obligation seems light. Hence, if a
person advanced in years is ashamed to receive Confirmation with the
children, he should be advised but not reproved; nor should he be
denied absolution as if he were certainly guilty of serious fault. The
recipient should be in the state of grace, and it is advisable that he
go to confession beforehand if he have serious sin on his conscience.
Though not necessary, it is more suitable that the recipient be
fasting. A new name may be taken in Confirmation, and it is proper that
those whose baptismal name is unsuitable should either have it changed
at this time or add the name of a Saint. Those who are being confirmed
should be present for the entire ceremony (Canon 789).

2697. The Sponsors in Confirmation.--(a) Qualifications.--The
requirements for validity are, _mutatis mutandis_, practically the same
as for baptismal sponsorship. Thus, the sponsor must be designated by
the parents or the candidate, or, in default of them, by the pastor or
minister; he must not be the parent or spouse of the confirmandus; he
must physically touch the confirmandus at the moment of Confirmation.
Further, it is required that the sponsor be already confirmed himself.
The requirements for licitness are the same as for Baptism, and
moreover, as a rule, the sponsor at Confirmation should be of the
same sex as the recipient and be different from the baptismal sponsor
(Canons 795, 796).

(b) Duties.--The godfather at Confirmation contracts a lifelong
spiritual relationship with his godchild (which does not constitute a
matrimonial impediment). The latter should have a special place in his
prayers according to the order of charity, and, if necessity arises,
should receive his protection and assistance in spiritual matters
(Canon 797).

2698. Duties of the Pastor in Reference to Confirmation.--(a) The
pastor should instruct his people on the nature and advantages of
Confirmation and should see to it that they receive the Sacrament in
due time (Canon 787). He should also instruct his parishioners about
the terms of _Spiritus Sanctus_. His power as extraordinary minister
imposes an obligation _per se_ grave to use it when the cases arise;
excusing causes, however, are possible, and neglect in a single case
would be only venial. At appointed times each year he should hold a
continuous course of instructions over a period of several days in
order to prepare the classes of children for the proper reception of
Confirmation (Canon 1300).

(b) The pastor should see that the Confirmations of his parishioners
are entered in a special book of record, and should also note in the
baptismal register the fact of Confirmation (Canons 798, 470, n. 2).

2699. The Sacrament of the Eucharist.--This is the chief Sacrament,
for, while the other Sacraments produce the grace or the grace and the
character of Christ, this one contains Christ Himself; and, while the
other Sacraments are means that prepare man to consecrate or to receive
the Eucharist or at least symbolize it, the Eucharist is the end of
them all. The Eucharist may be defined as follows: “The body and blood
of our Lord Jesus Christ present through the words of consecration
under the appearances of bread and wine to be offered to God and to
be received by man.” Thus, we may distinguish various aspects of the
Eucharist.

(a) It is a sacrifice, since the Mass is the supreme act of worship and
is one with the sacrifice of the cross (see 2178 sqq.).

(b) It is a permanent Sacrament, since unlike the other Sacraments
it does not consist in the passing application of a sacred sign to a
recipient, but in the abiding presence of a thing absolutely sacred
contained under sensible forms.

(c) It may be considered in its passing phases of beginning, in which
it is consecrated by the priest (performance of the Sacrament), and
termination, in which it is received by the communicant (application,
dispensation of the Sacrament).

2700. The Matter and Form of the Eucharist.--Since the essence of a
Sacrament is found in the outward sign, it is commonly held that the
Sacrament of the Eucharist consists in the species of bread and wine as
signifying the body and blood of the Saviour, which is really, truly
and substantially contained under them.

(a) The matter of the first consecration is that which Christ used,
namely, bread. The bread must be true bread in the strict and usual
Scriptural sense of the word. Hence, for validity it is necessary that
it be made from wheat flour (bread made from beans, peas or other
legumes, bread made from non-wheaten cereals such as corn, oats,
and probably also rye and barley, is not valid matter); that the
flour be mixed with water (bread made from a notable quantity, i.e.,
about one-third of other liquid, such as milk, oil, wine, is invalid
matter); further, that the mixture be sufficiently baked (dough or
half-baked cakes are invalid matter). The bread must be entire and
not substantially adulterated or changed; hence, bread from which all
the gluten has been abstracted, bread to which a notable amount of
foreign substance (such as sugar or non-wheaten flour) has been added,
bread so old that it has corrupted, cannot be consecrated. Accidental
qualities do not affect validity, and hence any kind of wheat may be
used (hard, soft, red, or white). But the church law strictly requires
that a priest observe the tradition of his own Church (i.e., among
Latins the bread must be unleavened and the host round), and that all
consecrated matter be new (i.e., not baked more than fourteen days, or,
according to others, twenty or forty days), clean, and unbroken. The
small particles for the laity should be about one inch in diameter, the
large hosts about two or three inches; and all altar breads should be
of moderate thickness.

(b) The matter of the second consecration is likewise that appointed by
Christ at the Last Supper, namely, wine. Only wine strictly so called
according to Scriptural and common usage is valid matter. Hence, the
Eucharistic wine must be made from grapes, and consequently cherry
wine, currant wine, peach wine, blackberry wine, cider, wild grape
wine, artificial wine, etc., are insufficient; the grapes must be
ripe, and verjuice is therefore invalid matter. The wine must also be
entire, unadulterated, and uncorrupted; and hence wine from which all
the alcohol has been removed, brandy or cognac (i.e., spirits distilled
from wine), wine to which a notable quantity of water, tartaric acid,
sugar, alcohol or other substance has been added, and wine which has
become vinegar, are not fit matter for the Sacrament. Accidental
qualities are of no importance to validity, and hence the wine may be
red or white, dry or sweet; it may be made either from ripe or dry
grapes (raisin wine); and the Church permits the fortification of weak
wine by a process of heating that does not prevent fermentation, or
by the addition when fermentation has begun to subside of grape or
wine alcohol on condition that the final alcoholic strength does not
exceed 12%, or in some cases, if the wine possessed so much, 17% or
18%. But the church law strictly requires for licit matter that wine be
fermented, though must or new wine is permissible in case of necessity,
if it have about 5% alcohol; that it be neither souring nor frozen, nor
mixed with substances added for the sake of aroma, color or sweetness,
nor with water poured in before Mass. The tradition and law of the
Church, based on the example of Christ, make it a grave obligation that
a few drops of water be added to the wine at the altar, but, if the
water equals a third part of the wine, the matter becomes of doubtful
sufficiency.

(c) The form is contained essentially in the words of consecration
used by Christ at the institution of the Eucharist, namely, “_Hoc est
corpus meum_” over the bread, and “_Hic est calix sanguinis mei_” over
the wine. But a grave precept of the Church requires that all the other
principal words of the consecration be pronounced (i.e., the “_novi et
aeterni testamenti_, etc.,” the “_Haec quotiescumque_, etc.,” the “_Qui
pridie_,” the “_Simili modo_”). The omission of the particle “_enim_”
would be only venially sinful.

2701. The Minister of Consecration.--(a) Qualifications.--Every priest
and only a priest can consecrate validly, for only to the Apostles and
their successors in the priesthood were spoken the words of Christ: “Do
this in commemoration of Me.” But only those priests can consecrate
lawfully who have the faculty of celebrating Mass (see 2709).

(b) Duties as regards Valid Consecration.--Internally, there must be
the intention (actual or virtual) of acting in the name of Christ,
and of effecting what the words of consecration signify; and hence a
merely narrative recitation of the form is insufficient. This actual
or virtual intention must also determine the individual matter to be
consecrated, and hence a host placed on the corporal is not consecrated
if the priest neither saw it nor took it up for consecration. Small
crumbs in the ciborium and small drops of wine on the inner side of the
chalice are consecrated, unless excluded by the priest’s intention;
but drops of wine on the outside of the chalice should be considered
unconsecrated, since it is unlawful to consecrate what is not contained
in the chalice.

Externally, bread and wine must be physically present to the priest,
that is, so within his reach or range that according to human usage
they can be correctly designated by the demonstrative pronoun “this”
used in the form. Accordingly, they must be near the minister; how
near cannot be mathematically defined, and authors variously assign
about ten, twenty, thirty, forty and fifty paces as the extreme limit.
Again, the bread and wine must not be separated from the minister by
any dividing partition, such as a wall, or the altar, or perhaps even
the closed door of the tabernacle, though a closed container (such as
a covered ciborium or chalice) would not put the matter away from the
minister’s presence. Finally, they must not be behind the minister’s
back, and, even if they are before him but hidden (e.g., hosts under
the corporal or chalice), the consecration is doubtful.

(c) Duties as regards Lawful Consecration.--Internally, there must be
the state of grace, which the divine law prescribes, Further, one who
is conscious of grave sin certainly committed and certainly unconfessed
(unless inculpably omitted in confession) must go to confession
beforehand, unless there be need to celebrate at once (e.g., because
otherwise there will be no parochial Mass on a day of precept, or
because grave scandal or defamation will result, or a dying person will
be deprived of the Viaticum) and confession is impossible (i.e., there
is no confessor present who has jurisdiction, or who can be resorted to
without a serious inconvenience extrinsic to confession, and moreover
it is very difficult on account of distance, health, weather, or other
like reasons to go elsewhere to confession). Under these circumstances,
he may make an act of perfect contrition and then proceed to celebrate.
But one who has consecrated without confession because of such
necessity must go to confession as soon as possible--i.e., within three
days, or, if circumstances so require, earlier than that (e.g., if a
confessor can be had the same day, but not again for a week) or later
(e.g., if a confessor cannot be had for a week). These rules about
confession are of grave obligation, from Church law at least (Canon
807). On account of disrespect, it seems that grave sin is committed
when the celebrant is voluntarily and advertently distracted during
consecration, but he should not repeat the form unless it is certain or
very probable that something essential has been omitted. Externally,
consecration must be made only during Mass, both species must be
consecrated, a larger quantity must not be consecrated than can be
conveniently used, the matter at the moment of consecration must rest
on the corporal and above the stone of the altar, and a ciborium must
be uncovered while its bread is being consecrated.

2702. Inadvertent Neglect of Grave Liturgical Precept.--Is the
consecration valid when the minister inadvertently neglects some grave
liturgical precept as to the matter or manner of consecration?

(a) Some authors reply in the negative, because they feel that
no priest has the will to consecrate in a way forbidden by the
Church under pain of grave sin. According to this opinion, then, if
accidentally no water were placed in the chalice, or if the chalice
were unconsecrated, or if the ciborium were left off the corporal, the
consecration would be invalid.

(b) Other authors distinguish as follows: if the celebrant intended not
to consecrate with a material breach of grave liturgical prescription,
the consecration would be null; if the celebrant had only the intention
to consecrate all valid matter before him, the consecration would be
valid. This latter intention, it seems, should be formed by all priests
once for all, since it ensures the validity of their consecrations and
is not sinful, as it does not aim to violate the rubrics, but only to
provide for exceptional cases when a rubric is unintentionally violated.

2703. The Minister of Communion.--(a) Qualifications.--The ordinary
minister of Communion is a priest, the extraordinary minister a deacon.
Pastors and other priests to whose custody the Blessed Sacrament
is entrusted have the right to give Communion, and others also who
have express or presumed permission. The celebrant of Mass may give
Communion during his Mass, and, if Mass is private, just before and
just after it. A sick priest who is unable to say Mass may communicate
himself, at least when there is no other minister at hand; and even
a layman may, in the absence of a major cleric, give himself the
Viaticum, or consume the Host to save it from profanation (Canons
845-850).

(b) Duties.--Internally, the minister is bound _sub levi_ to be in
the state of grace, and _sub gravi_ to be free from censures (such as
suspension) which forbid him the exercise of the ministry. Externally,
he must observe the church laws on the manner, time and place for
distribution of the Sacrament (Canons 851, 852, 867-869), and also
the liturgical rules for Communion during and outside of Mass, for
Communion of the sick and the dying, and for the avoidance of defects
in giving Communion (Rituale Rom., Tit. IV; Missale Rom., de defectibus
Missae).

2704. The Recipient of the Eucharist.--(a) Those Who May Receive
Communion.--According to divine law, every living person who has
received Baptism of water is capable of receiving the Eucharist,
infants and the insane not excluded. Ecclesiastical law requires other
conditions, which are justified by considerations of respect for the
Blessed Sacrament or other good reason. Communion may not be given,
first, to those who have not the use of reason (i.e., to infants and
the perpetually insane), nor to those who are unable to understand the
essential truths of religion and morality (i.e., to those who have
always been deaf and dumb or blind, and who are uninstructed); for, on
the one hand, the Sacrament is not necessary for these persons, and,
on the other hand, there is great danger of irreverence if it be given
them. Secondly, Communion may not be given to those who cannot receive
without grave peril of unbecoming treatment of the Sacrament, as in
the case of those who cough or vomit continually or frequently, or of
those who are delirious, or unconscious, or insane, But if the danger
is certainly slight (e.g., if the person can swallow an unconsecrated
host without spitting it out), Communion may be given, at least the
Viaticum or Easter Communion. Next those persons are denied Communion
who cannot receive without scandal (e.g., those who are infamous, such
as prostitutes or defamers, persons intoxicated or insufficiently
dressed). Finally, no one may receive Communion who has already
received it that day, lest the Sacrament become common and be taken
without due preparation; but exception is made when it is necessary
to communicate a second time in order to comply with the divine law
of receiving Viaticum or of saving the Host from profanation (Canons
853-858).

(b) Those Who Must Receive Communion.--There is a divine precept that
adults receive the Eucharist worthily (John, vi. 54). It obliges _per
se_, when one is certainly or almost certainly in proximate danger of
death, unless one has recently (that is, according to some, within a
week’s time) received Communion; for this Sacrament is the wayfarer’s
provision for his journey to eternity. It obliges also now and then
during life, since the Eucharist is man’s spiritual nourishment for
the journey of life. It obliges _per accidens_, when Communion is
necessary to avoid grave sin, for charity to self obliges one to use
the means without which serious spiritual harm cannot be escaped. The
church law determines the details for the fulfillment of the divine
precept. All the faithful who have reached the age of reason, even
though they be under seven years, must fulfill the yearly Easter duty
(see 2592, 2593). In reference to First Communion, the Church requires
that children who are not in danger of death must have a mental and
moral fitness, consisting in a knowledge of the chief mysteries of
faith and a devotion towards the Eucharist such as is possible at their
time of life. In reference to the last Communion, or Viaticum, the Code
declares that it is obligatory, no matter what be the cause of the
danger of death; it reminds us that the duty should not be put off too
long; it recommends that the Viaticum be administered even to those who
had communicated the same day before the danger of death arose, and
that it be given on distinct days during the danger. For children who
are in danger of death it suffices that they are able to distinguish
the Eucharist from ordinary food and to adore it reverently (Canons
859-865, 854).

2705. Dispositions for Worthy Communion.--(a) Dispositions of
Soul.--The divine law requires the state of grace (I Cor., xi. 27
sqq.), and probably also the previous sacramental confession which the
Church prescribes _sub gravi_ for one who is conscious of serious sin
not yet remitted through absolution. But he is excused from the duty
of previous confession who cannot omit Communion now (e.g., because
while at the rails he remembers a grave sin and cannot leave without
being disgraced) and who is unable to go to confession (see 2701 c).
The recipient must also have a knowledge of the Sacrament suited to
his mental capacity, and he must desire it, at least habitually. Since
the Sacraments are fruitful in proportion to the cooperation given
them, and since the presence and visit of Christ deserves honor and
recognition, Communion should be received devoutly, and should be
preceded by a preparation and followed by a thanksgiving (Canons 856,
731). The faithful may receive in any Rite, but their own Rite is
advised for Easter Communion and strongly urged for the Viaticum (Canon
866).

(b) Dispositions of Body.--The communicant must observe the Eucharistic
fast and must conduct himself with external reverence.

By ecclesiastical law a person is bound to the fasting from midnight
to receive the Holy Eucharist lawfully (Canons 808, 858). Despite the
changes made by the Apostolic Constitution, _Christus Dominus_ (Jan.
16, 1953) and the _Motu Proprio, “Sacram Communionem_” (Mar. 19, 1957),
priests and the faithful who are able to do so are exhorted to observe
this venerable and ancient form of Eucharistic fast before Mass or
Holy Communion. The legislation of these two papal documents, intended
to increase devotion to the Blessed Sacrament by fostering frequent
Communion, decrees:

1) that natural water does not break the fast;

2) that the period for observing the Eucharist fast before Mass,
at whatever hour it may be said (morning, afternoon, midnight), is
three hours from solid food and alcoholic beverages, and one hour
from non-alcoholic beverages. The priest who is to celebrate computes
his time from the beginning of Mass; the faithful, from the time of
Communion;

3) that the sick, although not confined to bed, may consume
non-alcoholic beverages and real and appropriate medicines, liquid or
solid, without any restriction of time.

The Eucharistic fast is based on primitive tradition and is enjoined by
the Church as a grave obligation that admits of no lightness of matter.
The fast is violated by the smallest portion of food or alcoholic
drink. Food is any solid which the physician considers digestible or
alterable by the stomach, and hence the fast is not broken if wood,
string, paper, hairs or fingernails are swallowed. But the food or
drink must be eaten or drunk, that is, it must come from outside the
mouth and be taken into the stomach in the way of consumption, and
hence the fast is not broken by what comes from within the mouth (e.g.,
blood from the gums, food remaining in the teeth from the previous day)
or by what is taken into the stomach in the way of saliva (e.g., the
accidental remnants of a mouth wash or of a throat gargle, or spray,
or of a chew of tobacco or gum, when one has spit out the contents as
much as possible), or in the way of breathing (e.g., snuff, tobacco
smoke inhaled, an insect or a raindrop blown into the mouth). A solid,
like a caramel, however, which is dissolved in the mouth before it is
swallowed, can not be considered as a liquid. The liquid of the _Sacram
Communionem_ must be a liquid before it enters the mouth. (See “Some
Further Elucidations on Sacram Communionem” by Cardinal Ottaviani,
_American Ecclesiastical Review_, Vol. CXXXXVII, No, 2, August 1957, p.
74.)

The reasons that excuse from the Eucharist fast, in regard to solids or
alcoholic beverages, in lay Communion, are, in case of the well, the
good of the Sacrament (i.e., its preservation from profanation), or the
good of self (e.g., avoidance of serious disgrace, as when one who is
at the altar rail remembers only then that he is not fasting); in the
case of the ill, the danger of death (the Viaticum may be received even
daily after nourishment). The salt taken in Baptism does not break the
fast, and one who has a papal indult, which is granted for sufficient
reasons, may receive Communion when not fasting.

External reverence means that one should approach Communion with
cleanliness of body, respectability of dress, and modesty of behavior.
No one is unfitted for Communion because of inculpable unsightliness
(e.g., a sick man who has irremovable scars or deformities, a poor man
who cannot afford any but the simplest garb, a crippled person whose
gait is awkward). But unwashed hands and face, dirty mouth or teeth,
worn or torn dress, and the like, which one avoids elsewhere as
unsuited for human company, should be avoided when receiving the
Eucharist. Women immodestly dressed should be refused Communion, if
otherwise scandal will result (Canon 858).

2706. Frequent Communion.--What dispositions are required for frequent
Communion (i.e., Communion made several times a week) and daily
communion?

(a) The necessary dispositions are the same as for rare Communion,
namely, the state of grace and a right intention. Right intention means
positively that one have in view the ends that Christ intended when He
instituted the Sacrament, namely, that by means of Communion one may
please Him, may be more closely united to Him, and may receive a remedy
for one’s defects and infirmities. Those who receive devoutly have
these purposes at least implicitly, which suffices; but it would be a
serious sin wilfully to exclude all these ends. Right intention means
negatively that one must not frequent Communion merely from routine, or
from vanity, or from purely human motives, such as pecuniary profit or
advantage. If the true ends are not excluded, these improper motives do
not exceed a venial sin.

(b) Useful, but not necessary, dispositions are freedom from venial
sins, especially such as are deliberate, and freedom from affection for
venial sins.

2707. Duties of Parents, Pastors, Confessors in Reference to
Communion.--(a) Parents.--The obligation of the Easter duty for boys
under fourteen and for girls under twelve rests morally and juridically
upon the consciences of those who are charged with their care, namely,
parents, guardians, pastors, and confessors (see 2630, 2631). The
parents are the best judges of the mental development, moral
disposition and instruction of their children, and therefore of their
fitness for First Communion (Canons 860, 854, n. 4).

(b) Confessors.--The decision or counsel about the fitness of children
for First Communion, of penitents for frequent or daily Communion,
about the frequency of the Viaticum, is left by the Church to the
prudence of the confessor (Canons 860, 863, 864, 858, n.2).

(c) Pastors.--The Code prescribes that pastors be especially zealous in
the matter of holding Lenten classes for the instruction of children in
order that they may receive their First Communion worthily; it vests in
the pastor the duty of seeing that no child approaches First Communion
who has not the use of reason or proper dispositions, as well as of
seeing that those children who are fit receive Communion without delay;
it also requires that he provide for the fuller instruction in
Christian doctrine of children who have made their First Communion
(Canons 1330, 854, n. 5, 1331). Pastors should recommend to their
people the practices of frequent Communion and of worthy Communion at
every Mass they hear, and should take care that the dying receive the
Viaticum while they are in possession of their mental faculties (Canons
863, 865). On the duty of administering Communion see 2676.

2708. Reservation of the Blessed Sacrament.--Having considered the
duties owed to the consecration and communion of the Eucharist, we
shall conclude by mentioning those that are owed to the Sacrament in
its permanency or to Christ dwelling in the tabernacle.

(a) The Duty of Custody.--The Blessed Sacrament must be reserved in
cathedral, abbatial, parochial, and religious churches; and it may be
reserved with due permission of the Ordinary in collegiate churches and
in certain public oratories; but there must be someone in charge, and
it is not allowed to reserve the Eucharist in private homes or to carry
it about when travelling. Churches which have the Blessed Sacrament
should be open at least a few hours daily to the faithful. It is not
lawful to reserve the Sacrament habitually on more than one altar of
the church, and that altar should be the one that is most honorable or
most suited for worship, and it should be suitably decorated. The
tabernacle should be as precious as possible and be carefully guarded,
and the Hosts should be reserved inside in a solid pyx or ciborium.
Before the tabernacle should burn day and night a sanctuary lamp fed by
olive or other oil (Canons 1265-1271).

(b) The Duty of Renewal of the Hosts.--The consecrated species kept for
Communion and adoration should be frequently renewed, lest they be
corrupted. It would be a serious sin of irreverence to neglect this
duty for over one or two months, or even for a shorter time if the
danger of corruption is great on account of local conditions, such as
dampness (Canon 1272).

(c) The Duty of Worship.--Pastors and others in charge of religious
instruction should encourage devotion to the Eucharist, and especially
the practice of assistance at Mass even on weekdays and of visits to
the Blessed Sacrament. Benediction may be given frequently, and at
least once a year there should be held in every parish church the
Devotion of the Forty Hours, or at least some more solemn exposition of
the Blessed Sacrament for a number of hours (Canons 1273-1275).

2709. The Sacrifice of the Mass.--In the Eucharist is contained not
only a Sacrament which confers the grace of spiritual nutrition on its
recipients, but also a sacrifice which offers to God Christ’s oblation
as an act of adoration, thanksgiving, satisfaction and intercession. It
is this sacrifice--which is one with the sacrifice of the cross, though
offered unbloodily--that is known as the Mass. The chief persons who
have duties in reference to the Mass are the celebrant and the
assistants.

(a) The celebrant is the priest, who acts in the name and person of
Christ. To say Mass validly one must have the power of Orders conferred
in the presbyterate or priesthood, and must intend to consecrate (see
2701 b); to say Mass licitly one must be free from impediments which
debar from Mass, such as suspension or irregularity. Strange priests
who wish to say Mass are required to present a celebret or testimonial
letter to the rector of the church (Canon 804), without prejudice,
however, to their right to say Mass once or twice when they present
themselves in clerical garb and sign the visiting priest’s book.

(b) The assistants are all those who hear Mass. Their duties were
already explained in the question on the first precept of the Church
(2576 sqq.). We shall confine ourselves here, therefore, to the duties
of the celebrant.

2710. The Obligation of Saying Mass.--(a) The Obligation by reason of
Orders or Priesthood.--Divine law imposes on priests as a body a grave
obligation of celebrating Mass with such frequency that the memory of
Christ’s passion be kept alive, which is the purpose of the priesthood,
according to the words: “Do this in commemoration of Me.” Divine law
also imposes on each individual priest the obligation of saying Mass at
frequent intervals (i.e., at least, it would seem, on the greater
feasts and at dates not more than six months apart); for a priest is
ordained primarily to give glory to God and to impart blessings to man
by the Sacrifice of the Mass (Heb., v. 1). It seems, therefore, that a
priest receives grace in vain or neglects the sacrifice (II Cor., vi.
1, II Mach., iv. 14) if he omits Mass on the most solemn occasions of
the year when nearly all the faithful are accustomed to receive
Communion, or if he omits it for such a notable period as more than six
months. It seems that the sin is _per se_ venial, as being opposed to
fervor rather than to charity; but it may be mortal _per accidens_, as
when serious scandal is given. There is no sin, however, if a priest
has no opportunity to celebrate, or is lawfully impeded (e.g., on
account of humility, scrupulosity, illness, or censure). The law of the
Church recalls this obligation in Canon 805, and calls on bishops and
religious superiors to exhort their subjects to say Mass at least on
all Sundays and holydays. Daily Mass is quite customary today, and
there might be serious scandal if without reason Mass were said only
exceptionally.

(b) The Obligation by Reason of Special Offices or Duties.--Pastors are
bound to say or provide Mass for their people on days of obligation as
a duty of justice, and it seems on other days also as a duty of charity
if there is a great need or demand and no reasonable impediment. There
is an obligation of justice to celebrate Mass, if one has contracted to
do so; an obligation of fidelity, if one has freely promised; an
obligation of religion, if one has vowed; an obligation of obedience,
if one has been lawfully commanded by one’s superior.

2711. Dispositions for the Celebration of Mass.--(a) Dispositions of
Soul.--The celebrant must be in the state of grace, and must go to
confession before Mass if he has a serious sin on his conscience (see
2701 c). He must have the intention and attention which the validity of
the consecration requires (2701 b), and the reverence and devotion
which is due the prayers of the Mass (2153 sqq.), Voluntary and fully
deliberate distractions entertained for a considerable time during the
Canon seem to be seriously sinful. It is most suitable, though
apparently not commanded by the Church, that Matins and Lauds be said
before Mass. There is, however, a duty of religion and of charity to
self to make a suitable preparation and thanksgiving; but negligence
here is a light sin, unless there be contempt or serious scandal.
Fifteen minutes or a half-hour is recommended by ascetical writers, and
the prayers may be taken from those given in the Breviary and Missal,
Internal prayer, however, is more important than external recitation
(Canon 810).

(b) Dispositions of Body.--The Eucharistic or natural fast is of grave
obligation for the celebration of Mass (Canon 808). The only excuses
are necessity according to divine law or exemption by ecclesiastical
law. Necessity occurs when one must complete the sacrifice (e.g., when
after the Communion the priest notices that he consecrated one species
invalidly), or must avoid scandal (e.g., when a priest remembers after
going to the altar that he is not fasting), or must consecrate for the
Viaticum (e.g., when there is no consecrated host for a dying person).
Since the law is ecclesiastical, the Church could dispense for a grave
reason (e.g., to enable a sickly priest to say Masses on Sunday at
widely separated points of his missions). It is clear that the
celebration of Mass calls for cleanness of body, suitableness of dress,
neatness and rubrical correctness of vestments (Canon 811). The
omission of a principal vestment (i.e., blessed alb, stole or chasuble)
is a serious sin, except in grave necessity; the omission of minor
vestments (e.g., amice) is a venial sin, unless there is a just reason.
The color of the day is not gravely obligatory, except by reason of
scandal, and a good reason makes it lawful to use another color.

2712. Gravity of Regulations Concerning Circumstances of Mass.--Serious
disrespect or serious scandal is caused by disregard of important
regulations concerning the circumstances of the Mass. Hence, the
following rules oblige under grave sin, though exceptions are permitted
for cases of grave or very grave necessity.

(a) The Time of Mass.--Mass may not be said on Good Friday, nor private
Masses on Holy Thursday and Holy Saturday. Only one Mass may be said a
day, except on Christmas Day and All Souls’ Day, and on other days when
there is reason for bination or trination allowed by the Church.
Ordinarily the hour for beginning Mass should not be earlier than one
hour before dawn (i.e., in the latitude of New York from about 1:27
a.m. to 5:00 a.m., according to the season), nor later than one hour
after noon. But the time is to be understood morally, and it is not a
grave sin in being earlier or later than the times fixed, unless there
is a difference of an entire hour (e.g., if one began Mass at 2:00
p.m.) and not just excuse or dispensation. The Holy See has extended to
local Ordinaries the power to permit the daily celebration of Mass
after noon, if the spiritual good of a considerable number of the
faithful demands it (_Sacram Communionem_). The Holy See has also
granted permission to Ordinaries to allow the celebration of an evening
Mass on Palm Sunday accompanied by the blessing of palms and
procession. On Holy Thursday the Mass of the Lord’s Supper must be
celebrated at the most convenient hour, but not before 4:00 p.m. and
not after 9:00 p.m.; Ordinaries may grant permission for one or even
two low Masses (besides the principal Mass) to be celebrated in
churches and public oratories, and for one in semi-public oratories
within the same hours, 4:00-9:00 p.m. The proper hour for the Easter
Vigil is that which permits the Mass of the Easter Vigil to be started
around midnight. Permission may be granted to conduct the vigil at a
time not before sunset (Dispositions and Regulations concerning the
Holy Week Liturgy, Feb. 1, 1957, Sacred Congregation of Rites). One
Christmas may be said at midnight. It is a serious sin to say Mass in
less than a quarter of an hour, and a private Mass should not be
prolonged beyond a half-hour.

(b) Place.--Mass may not be celebrated regularly except in a church or
oratory that is at least blessed and is not polluted, execrated or
interdicted. It must be said on an altar, and it would be a serious
sin, except in grave or very grave necessity, to celebrate without at
least one altar cloth or one lighted wax candle, or without a rubrical
chalice, paten, or corporal (Canons 822, 823).

(c) Rites.--The principal rubrics of the Mass are gravely obligatory,
for example, to use an acolyte unless excused by dispensation or
necessity, to say each prayer of the Canon, and each part outside the
Canon that occurs in every Mass (e.g., the prayers at the foot of the
altar, the Gospel), to perform the main liturgical actions (e.g., the
Offertory, the breaking of the host, the purification of the chalice).
The secondary rubrics oblige under venial sin (see Canons 803, 812-819).

2713. Is it Lawful to Discontinue a Mass?--(a) To terminate Mass before
the end has been reached is unlawful unless there be a serious reason;
otherwise, disrespect is shown the Holy Sacrifice. A grave reason
(e.g., sudden sickness) suffices if Mass be discontinued before the
Consecration; a most grave reason (i.e., danger of death or of
profanation of the Sacrament) if Mass be discontinued between the
Consecration and the Communion. But a Mass that is broken off after the
Consecration and before the Communion must be completed by the
celebrant or another, at least if this can be done within an hour from
the time of cessation; else the sacrifice is mutilated.

(b) To interrupt Mass is also unlawful without serious cause. Thus, a
grave reason excuses an interruption outside the Canon, for example, to
preach a sermon after the Gospel or Communion; but only a very grave
reason excuses an interruption during the Canon, for example, a sick
call to give a necessary Sacrament (Baptism, Penance, Extreme Unction,
or Viaticum) to a dying person.

2714. Application of the Mass.--All the faithful, especially those who
are present and also the celebrant himself, benefit by the Mass, but
there is a special fruit reserved to those for whose intention the Mass
is offered by the priest; for the Mass is a sacrifice of intercession,
propitiation, and satisfaction, and since the priest acts in the person
of Christ he may apply its benefits specially to some particular person
or persons. In the following cases the celebrant is bound to make this
application of the ministerial fruit of the Mass.

(a) In virtue of their office, pastors are seriously obliged to say
Mass for their flocks. There is a natural obligation on account of the
relationship between the pastor and the people, and there is also a
divine obligation, inasmuch as the priest is appointed to offer gifts
and sacrifices for sin (Heb., v, 1). The details of this duty, as to
the time, place and person, are prescribed in Canons 306, 339, 466.
There is a grave duty of saying for the people the number of Masses
which the Church orders; but the non-observance of the circumstances is
not a mortal sin, unless it happens frequently and without reason.

(b) In virtue of justice, a priest who has received a stipend is bound
to apply the Mass for the intention of the donor, and to observe the
conditions of the agreement (i.e., the time, place, and kind of Mass
specified by the donor). The duty of application is a grave one,
because the loss inflicted on the donor by non-application of the Mass
to his intention is serious; the duty of observance of the accidental
conditions, however, is not generally grave, but it becomes grave if
its neglect inflicts serious harm (e.g., if the donor makes the date of
the Mass a _conditio sine qua non_, or if the Mass must be said at once
on account of an urgent and immediate necessity). Restitution is
obligatory if the Mass is not applied, or if essential conditions are
not complied with; it is obligatory _sub gravi_, if the stipend equals
what is relatively grave matter in theft.

(c) In virtue of obedience, subjects are held to apply Masses for the
intention of their prelates, secular or religious, though bishops are
counselled to exact this most rarely. The obligation is grave or light
according to the intention of the superior, but if the application is
also due in justice to the giver of the stipend, there is a serious
duty.

(d) In virtue of religion or fidelity, there is an obligation of
application when a priest has vowed this to God, or freely promised it
to man. The duty is grave or light according to the intention of the
vower or promisor (see 2210, 2407). But if there is an onerous promise
(e.g., in a society of priests whose members agree to say Mass for
fellow-members who have died), the duty is one of justice. One Mass
satisfies several free promises, if distinct Masses were not promised.

2715. Duties of the Priest as to the Application of Mass.--(a) For Whom
May Mass Be Applied?--Mass may be offered for all objects not
forbidden. From the divine law it is forbidden to offer Mass for those
who are incapable of receiving its benefits (e.g., the demons, infants
who died without Baptism, the Saints), or for intentions that are
displeasing to God (e.g., for success in evil). From the ecclesiastical
law certain restrictions are made on the application of Mass in order
to safeguard reverence and prevent scandal. Thus, Mass may be said only
privately (that is, without publicity or special liturgical solemnity)
and prudently (that is, with avoidance of scandal, for example, by the
declaration that Mass is said for the faithful departed with the
purpose of aiding also a departed unbeliever, if this is pleasing to
God) for the living and dead outside the Church, such as infidels,
heretics, schismatics, and the excommunicated. Moreover, for a
_vitandus_ Mass may be applied only when the intention is his
conversion (Canon 809).

(b) How Mass Must Be Applied.--The intention must be formed by the
priest, since he represents Christ. But since his application does not
produce but only bestows the fruits, it suffices that his applicatory
intention be habitual and implicit, as when the celebrant has forgotten
the intention formed before Mass, or applies according to the mind of
his superior. The person or purpose to which Mass is applied must be at
least implicitly determined, and the application must be made at least
before the second consecration. If there are two conflicting
intentions, the stronger prevails (2667), and, if it is doubtful which
one was stronger, Mass should be next offered for the intention which
God knows was not satisfied. It is unlawful to apply Mass by
anticipation for the next person who will offer a stipend.

2716. Mass Stipends.--It is not unlawful to receive a stipend for the
application of Mass, but irreligion, injustice, avarice, scandal and
disobedience must be avoided. (a) Irreligion is committed if the
stipend is offered or taken as the price of the Mass, or if Mass is
said only because of the stipend, or is requested only for the sake of
human favor (see 2333); (b) injustice is committed, if an excessive
stipend is exacted; (c) avarice is committed when one is over-anxious
about large stipends; (d) scandal is given when there is commercialism
or the appearance of it in dealing with stipends; (e) disobedience is
incurred when the laws of the Church on the amount of a stipend, the
number of stipends that may be taken, their distribution, satisfaction,
etc., are violated (see Canons 824-844). It is forbidden to require two
stipends for one Mass, or one stipend for mere celebration and another
for application.




Art. 3: REPENTANCE; PENANCE; EXTREME UNCTION

(_Summa Theologica_, III, qq. 84-90; Supplement, qq. 1-33.)

2717. Penance is the name both of a virtue and of a Sacrament of the
New Law. The virtue was at all times necessary; the Sacrament is
necessary since its institution by Christ. Having considered in the
previous Article how the spiritual life is begotten, matured and
preserved through the Sacraments of Baptism, Confirmation and
Eucharist, we shall consider in the present Article how spiritual death
and infirmity are overcome by the remedies of Penance and Extreme
Unction. But first we shall speak of the virtue of penance or
repentance which is a requisite for the fruitful reception of the
Sacrament of Penance and of its complement, Extreme Unction.

2718. The Virtue of Repentance.--This virtue is a gift of God and a
permanent habit of the soul, but there are certain acts by which man
cooperates with God and prepares himself for the gift. Sometimes a
sinner is converted through consideration of God’s goodness or of the
rewards of heaven; but usually those who have been drawn by sinful
delights are first deterred from them by the thought of God’s justice,
and amendment begins from fear. Faith, hope, fear and love, at least
virtually, are always found in the process of turning to God, and
usually they follow one another in that process in the order here
given. (a) The beginning of conversion is with God who draws the heart:
“Convert us to Thee, O Lord, and we shall be converted” (Lament, v.
21). (b) Then follows the movement of faith, for he that would come to
God must first believe that He is (Heb., xi. 6). (c) Next follow
servile fear, which removes one from sin, and hope, which leads one to
God, for faith holds out both threats of punishment and promises of
mercy. (d) Then come the movements of love, which detests sin for its
own sake, and of filial fear, which offers satisfaction to God out of
reverence.

2719. Repentance.--Repentance may be defined as “a moral virtue that
inclines the will of one who is subject to sin to grieve over it and to
make reparation to God for the injury it does to His rights.”

(a) Thus, repentance has its remote subject in one who is subject to
sin, that is, in a person who has sinned or who is able to sin. Hence,
it is not in Christ, who is impeccable, nor in the holy Angels, whose
wills are fixed in good; but it is found in the Saints, inasmuch as
their former sin is displeasing to them and their former contrition and
satisfaction pleasing.

(b) The proximate subject of repentance is the will, for its acts of
regret, resolution, and reparation belong to the higher appetitive
faculty, Hence, repentance does not consist in emotional sorrow, and it
does not need to be sensibly felt or joined with tears.

(c) The formal object or motive of repentance is reparation to Goal for
the injury done Him by one’s own personal sin. Sin may be considered as
opposed to the divine goodness, and in this respect it is detested by
charity; or as opposed to the good of man himself, and so hope detests
it; or as opposed to the moral goodness of some particular virtue, and
in this respect it is hated by that virtue, as temperance shuns
intemperance; or as opposed to the right which belongs to God, the Last
End, that all actions be done for Him, and in this respect sin is
considered by repentance. One may regret original sin or sins done by
others, but one is not properly said to repent of them.

(d) The material object or subject-matter of repentance is the acts by
which reparation is made to God, namely, grief over sin and its
accompaniments, hatred of moral wickedness in the present, regrets for
the past, and good resolutions for the future. Thus, repentance differs
from religion, for religion looks upon God as Lord and Benefactor and
offers Him worship, while repentance considers Him as the Last End who
has been offended and offers Him satisfaction. The difference between
filial fear and repentance is seen in this, that the former falls back
upon its own littleness, whereas the latter throws itself at the feet
of God.

2720. The Character of Repentance.--(a) It is a virtue, since it is
commanded (“Do penance,” Matt., iii. 2), and also since it moderates
according to reason the sorrow felt for sin, keeping it from the
extreme of despair, lest it become the remorse of a Cain or a Judas.

(b) It is a moral virtue, since its direct object is the human acts by
which reparation is made to God, and its office the regulation of those
acts within the bounds of moderation.

(c) It belongs to justice, being a compensation offered for injury to
another’s right; but it is only a potential part of justice, as there
is not perfect justice between an inferior and the superior to whose
power the former is subject (2142). It is classed under commutative
justice on account of the return that is offered for the offense;

2721. The Excellence of Repentance.--(a) Its Dignity.--Repentance ranks
below other virtues, for, while they are naturally advantageous to man,
repentance is beneficial only hypothetically, namely, in the
supposition of sin. In one respect, however, it holds a certain
preeminence, for the infused virtues are bestowed only in
justification, whereas the acts of repentance that prepare for
justification come before those virtues.

(b) Its Necessity.--In the actual providence of God no mortal sin is
remitted unless it be first repented of, and hence it is said: “Unless
you do penance, you shall all likewise perish” (Luke, xiii. 5). This is
reasonable, since it is fitting that he who has turned away from God by
his own act, should also return to God by his own act. As to venial
sin, since it consists in an inordinate cleaving to created things and
must be removed by its contrary, there is need of an actual rejection
of the exaggerated attachment, and hence need of repentance; moreover,
since one should be restored to God’s friendship before being restored
to His familiarity, penitence in regard to a venial sin does not avail,
unless the penitent is in the state of grace. The act of repentance
need not be formal (i.e., one in which a person expressly thinks of his
sins and expressly detests them), but a virtual act suffices, that is,
an act of love of God which implicitly includes repentance, though the
latter is not expressly taken into consideration.

2722. Is Repentance Necessary as a Means or as a Precept?--(a) It is
necessary as a means of salvation because, if it be omitted, salvation
cannot be attained. God desires that the sinner assist in and consent
to his own forgiveness, and repentance, as we saw, is the most suitable
way in which the sinner can do this. (b) It is also necessary as a
precept. The natural law requires that those who have done an injury,
make reparation; the divine law calls on sinners to repent and be
converted to God (Acts, ii. 38, iii. 19, viii. 22), and the church law
prescribes annual confession.

2723. How Soon Does the Precept of Repentance Oblige?--(a) It obliges
at once (i.e., without any delay), when there is immediate necessity
for it. This happens _per se_, when one is in grave danger of death,
for at that moment one is bound to prepare immediately to meet God,
which supposes repentance. It happens _per accidens_, when by reason of
some urgent precept distinct from that of repentance one is obligated
here and now to rid oneself of sin (e.g., when one is called on to
administer a Sacrament and must have a pure conscience, or when one is
gravely tempted and will surely fall unless one repents of the past).

(b) It obliges soon (i.e., without any unreasonable delay), when there
is no immediate necessity. It is not a new sin to put off repentance
until tomorrow or next week in such a case; for the commandment of
repentance, being affirmative, does not bind for each instant, but only
for a reasonable time. But the common opinion is that a new sin is
committed when repentance is delayed for a considerable time, since
this exposes the sinner to further sins, impenitence, and damnation.
Practically, it seems that those who comply with the church law of
yearly confession commit no sin of unrepentance, though some consider
it a mortal sin to delay repentance beyond a month.

2724. Accompaniments of Repentance as to Mortal Sin.--(a) When one
mortal sin is forgiven, every other mortal sin is forgiven at the same
time. For no one can be truly repentant unless he grieves over his
separation from God, and this means that he grieves over each
individual mortal sin. But, since venial sin does not separate from
God, it is possible to be sorry for one venial sin without being sorry
for another.

(b) When mortal sin is forgiven, the eternal punishment is also
forgiven, for forgiveness makes man a friend of God and an heir to
heaven. But the temporal punishment may remain due, as is proved by the
examples of Adam (Gen., iii. 23; Wisd., x. 2), of Mary, the sister of
Moses (Num., xii.), of Moses (Num., xx. 12), of David (II Kings, xii.
13, 14), and of others. God is not only a merciful Father, but also a
just Ruler, and it is fitting that He should exact satisfaction even
for sin forgiven. But if repentance is very perfect like that of
Magdalen and St. Paul, even the temporal punishment is forgiven.

2725. The Fruits of Repentance.--(a) Every sin, no matter how grievous,
is removed by repentance (Is., i. 18), and hence there is always room
for forgiveness. For man is always able to repent and God is always
ready to pardon the penitent (Joel, ii. 13). The unpardonable sin is
refusal to repent of sin, if one continues in that refusal, but even
impenitence is forgiven when laid aside (see 900).

(b) Sin once forgiven does not return, for God does not regret His
gifts (Rom, xi. 29), and His pardon means that the guilt of a sin is
destroyed and wiped out forever, But he who falls into the same sins
after pardon increases his guilt by reason of his ingratitude.

(c) The repentant sinner recovers the infused virtues he lost by sin
and also his former merits (Luke, XV. 22; Joel, ii. 25; Ezech., xxxiii.
12; Heb., vi. 10). Virginity of body and innocence of soul are not
recovered as to their material elements (i.e., bodily integrity and
freedom from all sin), but they are restored as to their formal part,
which is the resolve to abstain from all venereal pleasure or to avoid
all sin. It seems that former merits are also recovered, not
necessarily in their entirety, but in a degree that corresponds with
the greater or less excellence of repentance.

2726. Forgiveness of Sin through the Use of the Sacraments.--(a) Mortal
sins are forgiven by the Sacraments in virtue of the rite itself (_ex
opere operato_) and immediately; that is, the Sacraments either _per
se_ or _per accidens_ (according as they are Sacraments of the Dead or
Sacraments of the Living) produce in the soul first grace or
justification, which is the opposite of mortal sin.

(b) Venial sins are forgiven by the Sacraments in virtue of the rite
itself but not immediately; that is, the Sacraments produce directly
either first or second grace, and indirectly through this grace they
may awaken fervor, which is the opposite of venial sin. The
sacramentals, on the contrary, remit venial sins, not in virtue of the
rite itself but in virtue of the intercession of the Church attached to
the rite (_ex opere operantis Ecclesiae_); for the prayers of the Church
are acceptable to God and can obtain from Him a grace of repentance
that will remove venial sin.

2727. The Sacrament of Penance.--For those who lose grace after Baptism
the Sacrament of Penance is necessary as a part of repentance and a
means of forgiveness. This Sacrament may be defined as “a Sacrament of
the New Law instituted by Christ in the form of a judicial process, in
which, through the absolution of the priest, sins committed after
Baptism are forgiven to penitents who confess them with sorrow.”

(a) The remote matter of this Sacrament is the personal sins committed
after Baptism, for Baptism washes away all sins committed before its
reception. Of this remote matter, some is necessary (i.e., sins that
must be confessed), namely, post-baptismal mortal sins not yet declared
or directly absolved in confession; some is free (i.e., sins that may,
but need not be confessed), namely, post-baptismal mortal sins already
forgiven in confession, and post-baptismal venial sins, whether already
remitted or not (Canon 902). Imperfections which are not sins, or whose
sinfulness is doubtful, are not sufficient matter for absolution; and
if they alone are confessed, absolution may not be given, unless there
is necessity, and then it may be granted conditionally (see 185, 186).

(b) The proximate matter of this Sacrament, according to the view
commonly held, is the three acts of the penitent--contrition in the
heart, confession in words, and satisfaction in work. Contrition must
exist actually, but the other two acts in case of necessity need not
exist actually, but are included implicitly in the act of contrition.

(c) The form of the Sacrament is contained in the words of absolution
spoken by the priest. Certainly the words, “_Ego te absolvo a peccatis
tuis_,” are sufficient for validity. But lawfulness requires that one
use the entire form and the other accompanying prayers as given in
one’s approved Ritual. In case of necessity, as in shipwreck or sudden
danger of death, an abbreviated form is permitted. Absolution must be
spoken or vocal, for the Church has never recognized absolution by
signs or in writing. It must be given to one who is present, that is,
one who is in the same place and not too far away to hear and be heard.
Those who are in different rooms that do not open on each other are not
in the same place; those who are more than twenty feet apart are too
far away for presence, according to the common opinion; but in great
need a more liberal view may be followed, and even absolution by
speaking tube or telephone may be resorted to.

(d) The subject of the Sacrament of Penance is every baptized person
who has committed venial or mortal sin after Baptism. If there is doubt
about the Baptism or about the sin, absolution may be given
conditionally. Besides the conditions given for the Sacraments in
general, the recipient of Penance must exercise the three acts of
contrition, confession and satisfaction. The first is essential in
every case, and the second when possible; and without the third the
Sacrament is not integral or complete.

2728. Probabilism in Administration of the Sacrament.--In the
administration and reception of the Sacrament of Penance it is lawful
to follow opinions that are truly probable except in the following
cases: (a) when the validity of the Sacrament is at stake (678), unless
there is a case of emergency (679). Hence, as the law of material
integrity pertains to the lawful, not to the valid use of Penance, one
may use probable opinions in its regard (see 2740); (b) when the seal
of the Sacrament is involved, lest confession become odious.

2729. Contrition.--The first act of the penitent is contrition. It is
defined by the Council of Trent as a sorrow and hatred for sin
committed, with a resolution of sinning no more and a desire of doing
what is necessary for the proper reception of the Sacrament of Penance.

(a) Thus, it presupposes a hatred of personal past transgressions, for
one grieves only about that which displeases one, and the acts of the
will begin with likes and dislikes.

(b) It consists essentially in sorrow or affliction of spirit, for
contrition, being the chief act of repentance, looks to reparation to
God for the injury done Him, and it therefore punishes the sinner by
sadness for his misdeeds.

(c) It includes as a property or consequence the resolution to avoid
future sin and to do what God requires for forgiveness; for no one is
sincerely sorry for the past unless this sorrow makes him decide not to
repeat the offense, and makes him desire to fulfill the conditions that
God lays down for reconciliation.

2730. The Two Kinds of Contrition.--(a) Perfect contrition is that
which is caused by charity, or the love of benevolence or of friendship
(1109, 1110) towards God. This love is had, whether the object of one’s
affection is the divine being or persons, the divine and infinite
perfections, or a single attribute; for all of these are really God
Himself. This contrition justifies the sinner at once, for it includes
charity and the will (at least implicit) to do what God wishes, and God
takes up His abode with those who love Him (John, xiv. 23). Perfect
contrition is necessary, both as a means and as a divine precept,
whenever the duty of repentance or of the Sacrament of Penance obliges
with a like necessity, and there is no opportunity of receiving the
Sacrament; for it is then the only way of recovering grace.

(b) Imperfect contrition, or attrition, is contrition caused by a
supernatural motive inferior to that of charity, i.e., by a less
perfect motive suggested by faith that leads one to grieve over sin
committed, for example, the heinousness of sin in itself, its eternal
punishment by God (i.e., the pain of loss or the pain of sense), or its
temporal punishment by God in this life or in Purgatory. This
contrition does not justify the sinner without the Sacrament, for it
does not rectify or retract the disorder introduced by sin as far as
lies within the sinner’s power (that is, _ex opere operantis_). By his
sin the sinner preferred the creature to God; by his attrition he does
not go so far as to prefer God positively to every created good, else
his contrition would be perfect. But attrition suffices for
justification of the sinner with the Sacrament of Penance, for it
includes the essentials of contrition in general, and thus removes the
impediments to the activity of the Sacrament (that is, the production
of grace _ex opere operato_). The same holds good also of the
sufficient disposition for Baptism, and more probably of that for the
Sacraments of the Living received in good faith by one who is not in
grace.

2731. Is Attrition Based Solely on Fear of Punishment Laudable?--(a)
Fear of the world is sinful, because it offends God to escape evil
(1044); slavish fear of God is sinful also, because it makes self the
last end, avoiding sin solely because of the harm it will bring on self
(1053). Sorrow for sin caused by slavish fear is not attrition, and is
not laudable.

(b) Servile fear of God in itself is good and supernatural (1050), and
the sorrow for sin or attrition based on such fear is also good; and if
it includes a resolution of amendment, it suffices for justification
with the Sacraments. The end (i.e., to escape punishment) is good
(Matt., x. 28); the means (i.e., sorrow for sin) is good; and the use
of the means for the end is good, for desertion of sin is the way to
escape unhappiness (Luke, iii. 7, 8). Nor is it wrong to make a nobler
good (such as avoidance of sin) a means to a lesser good (such as
escape from punishment) when the lesser good is not made the last end,
but only the immediate end, of the greater good. Thus, when we pray for
temporal goods, we make a spiritual thing a means to a material end,
but the Last End of the prayer is God Himself. Servile fear, unlike
slavish fear (_timor serviliter servilis_), does not make self the last
end (Denzinger, 818, 1146, 1525).

2732. Attrition in the Sacrament of Penance.--Must attrition based on
fear of punishment be joined with love of God to justify in the
Sacrament?

(a) Some form of love is required, for all contrition is detestation of
sin, and sin is not hated unless its opposite is loved. Hence, just as
attrition must be accompanied by faith and hope, so it must also be
accompanied by some form of love of God (2718).

(b) Disinterested love is not required. This is certain as regards love
of friendship, for even the smallest degree of that love is charity and
justifies even without the Sacrament (1112, 2730). This is commonly
held in reference to love of benevolence, which seems practically to be
always united with love of friendship or charity. A love that inclines
to God for His own sake but that does not predominate over other loves
is held by some to be necessary, but it is difficult to understand such
a love or to see its possibility.

(c) Interested love (the love of concupiscence or of hope) is therefore
necessary. The common opinion today seems to be that it also suffices,
and that it need be only virtual or implicit. In other words, the
prevalent view is that every attrition prompted by fear of punishment
contains an initial love of God which suffices to turn the sinner to
God and to remove any obstacle to the action of the Sacrament. For “the
fear of God is the beginning of His love” (Ecclus., xxv. 16), the hope
of pardon is a beginning of love of the Author of pardon and justice,
the resolve to amend is an inclination to keep the great command of
love of God (1556).

2733. The Conditions for Valid Contrition and Attrition.--(a) It must
be internal, for contrition is an act of repentance and must be in the
heart. Merely pretended sorrow, and sorrow which one mistakenly thinks
one has, are insufficient.

(b) It must be supernatural, for contrition is a disposition for the
reception of the supernatural habit of grace. Sorrow for sin induced by
natural motives, such as the punishments inflicted by human agencies,
if these are not viewed in the light of faith, is not sufficient.

(c) It must be universal, that is, there must be sorrow for all mortal
sins not yet forgiven, for it is impossible to be really sorry for one
serious sin while retaining affection for another. But it is not
necessary to repent of all venial sins before one is forgiven (see
2724).

(d) It must be sovereign, that is, if the contrition is perfect, God
must be loved above every other good; if it is imperfect, sin must be
hated above every evil that could lead to sin. If the sinner does not
detest his dishonesty more than the privation he will suffer by being
honest, he is not really contrite. It is, however, not necessary that
contrition be sensibly felt, or be of supreme intensity, or that its
act be of long duration; and it is rash to call to mind the kinds of
evils or torments one would prefer to suffer rather than commit sin
(see 1556).

2734. Valid and Fruitful Reception of the Sacrament.--Some theologians,
distinguishing between contrition as matter of the Sacrament and
contrition as a disposition of the penitent, hold that it is possible
to have a valid but unfruitful reception of the Sacrament, and that
revival of its grace is possible. They explain thus:

(a) the contrition required for the matter and the validity of the
Sacrament must be such as can be known with moral certainty by the
confessor from external indications, and hence it suffices for validity
that the sorrow be true and sincere and supernatural;

(b) the contrition required for the disposition of the penitent and the
fruitfulness of the Sacrament must be such as excludes all affection
for every grave sin and includes the resolution to avoid all mortal sin
in the future, and hence it is required for fruitfulness that sorrow be
also universal and sovereign. (This opinion has very few, if any at
all, adherents among modern theologians. It is retained here solely as
a matter of record.)

2735. Properties of Contrition.--Since contrition belongs to the matter
of Penance, it must have the properties of sacramental matter (2655
sqq.).

(a) Thus, the matter must be sensible, and hence contrition must be
shown in some external way, as by a sorrowful confession, devout
request for absolution, or, in the case of those who are unconscious,
by a call for a priest or the practices or prayers of a Christian life.

(b) The matter must be united with the form, and hence contrition must
be elicited at the moment of absolution, or a short time before (not
more than a few hours before, according to some, or even a few days
before, according to others). But if a penitent recalls immediately
after absolution a forgotten mortal sin, and is then absolved from it
also, more probably he is not obliged to renew his act of contrition,
because the act just made virtually continues; in practice, however, he
might be told to make another act of contrition and a new penance or
the same penance may be imposed before the second absolution. Moreover,
for absolution when one is unconscious and in danger of death, since an
habitual intention suffices (2674), it seems that contrition made long
ago, but not retracted, is sufficient.

(c) The matter must have at least a moral unity of its own parts, and
hence the contrition must in some way be directed to the confession;
that is, either before or during or after the act of contrition there
must be an intention to confess with the sorrow for sin contained in
that act of contrition, or to apply that sorrow to the confession just
made. Otherwise it does not appear that one has the purpose to make a
sacramental confession. But there is no practical difficulty, as every
act of contrition contains implicitly the will to confess, or every
sincere confession includes the will to use the contrition one has
exercised or will exercise.

2736. Resolution of Amendment.--The resolution of amendment which true
contrition calls for is at least implicit in the hatred of sin, but it
is advisable that the penitent expressly resolve to avoid sin in the
future. This determination should have the following qualities:

(a) it should be firm, that is, the penitent should make up his mind
not to relapse into deliberate sin. Yet, it is not necessary that he
feel certain of his perseverance, and his resolve does not cease to be
firm, if he foresees that he will fall again, provided he is decided to
do the best he can;

(b) it should be efficacious, that is, the penitent must decide to use
suitable means to fulfill his good intentions as to reparation for
scandal, calumny, and injustice, as to the avoidance of sinful
occasions, etc.;

(c) it should be universal, that is, the penitent must resolve at least
generically to avoid each and every grave sin in the future. If only
free matter (2727) is confessed, the penitent may direct his resolution
of amendment to all past mortal sins confessed, or to one of the
present venial sins declared, or he may resolve to do better in
reference to a certain class of sins (e.g., deliberate sins, faults of
speech), or he may resolve to diminish the frequency of his venial sins.

2737. Confession.--The second act of the penitent is confession, that
is, the declaration of one’s sins made to a duly authorized priest with
the purpose of obtaining absolution. Confession is obligatory both from
divine and ecclesiastical law.

(a) According to divine law, the forgiveness of grave post-baptismal
sins is subject to the power of the keys, which is exercised in the
form of a judgment and requires confession (Matt., xviii, 18; John, xx.
23). This law obliges _per se_ in danger of death, and occasionally
during life; _per accidens_, when one in sin intends to receive
Communion, when one is unable without confession to recover the
necessary state of grace or overcome a serious temptation or bad habit.

(b) According to church law, the faithful must go to confession once a
year (2590), and confession is also prescribed at times for those who
wish to receive Communion (2705) or celebrate Mass (2701 c, 2711).

2738. The Qualities of Confession.--(a) Confession is an act of virtue
and should have the conditions of a virtue; that is, it should be
discreet (e.g., the penitent should not reveal the names or sins of
others), willing, and pure in motive (e.g., the penitent should not
confess for temporal ends, such as the good opinion of the confessor),
and courageous (i.e., the penitent should not be deterred by shame).

(b) Confession is an act of penitence, and, as penitence includes
hatred and regret for sin and abasement of self, confession should not
be boastful, jocular or proud, but shamefaced, sorrowful and humble.

(c) Confession is essentially a declaration of fact, and hence it
should avoid the defects that make a declaration valueless or
imperfect, namely, falsehood, obscurity, digression, or concealment.
Confession, then, should be truthful, clear, to the point, and entire.

(d) Confession belongs to the Sacrament of Penance, which is the forum
of conscience, and hence the penitent accuses himself, submits to the
judgment of the father confessor, and is heard in secret. Public
confession is valid but not obligatory. Hence, one who does not speak
the language of the confessor is not bound to use an interpreter.
Regularly confession should be vocal, but for grave reasons (e.g., if
the penitent is dumb, or the confessor is deaf, or there is danger of
being heard by those nearby) it may be made by signs or in writing. In
case of a written confession the penitent should declare orally, if
possible, that the writing contains his confession (see Canon 903).

2739. Is it a Grave Sin to Lie to the Confessor?--(a) There is a grave
sin when the lie deceives the confessor about necessary matter (e.g.,
when a circumstance changing the theological species of a sin is
denied), or about free matter which is the only sin confessed (e.g.,
when a penitent lyingly accuses himself of only one sin and that a
venial one), or about free matter which the confessor asks about and
needs to know (e.g., about habits or occasions of sin). He who falsely
accuses himself of a grave sin, or who exaggerates the number of his
grave sins, _per se_ sins mortally; but he is excused if he is ignorant
or is under a momentary excitement or delusion. Not only is there grave
sin in the cited cases, but the confession is made invalid by the
defect in essential matter which the lie produces; for the confessor
does not understand the true state of the penitent’s soul.

(b) There is mortal sin when the lie deceives the confessor about
matter that is impertinent to the confession, but is grave in itself,
as when the penitent seriously calumniates a neighbor to the priest. In
this case the confession is made invalid by the want of disposition on
the part of the penitent.

(c) There is light sin when the lie deceives the confessor about free
matter which is not the only sin confessed, or which the confessor does
not need to know in order substantially to pass judgment and give
direction; also when the lie is not serious and is impertinent to the
confession. In these cases the Sacrament is not made invalid, for the
insincerity does not change the confessor’s decision.

2740. Integral Confession.--The completeness or integrity of confession
is twofold.

(a) Material completeness consists in the declaration of all mortal
sins committed and not yet confessed and absolved. This kind of
completeness is sometimes impossible, and therefore unnecessary. For
completeness is obligatory in virtue of a positive law of Christ, and
positive laws do not bind in case of impossibility (361).

(b) Formal completeness consists in the declaration of all the mortal
sins which here and now, all things considered, one can and should
mention. This kind of completeness is necessary for a valid and
fruitful confession, because the law of Christ calls for a complete
confession, as far as possible, and formal completeness is possible.
Since he who is obliged by a law is also obliged to use the means to
keep the law, those who are going to confession should examine their
consciences beforehand, unless this is impossible or unnecessary. The
time and diligence to be given this examination depends on the person
and his circumstances; but all should be careful about it, while
avoiding scrupulosity, and should also remember that contrition is even
more important than confession.

2741. Manner of Confession.--Completeness of confession as regards
mortal sins extends to the following points:

(a) the theological and the lowest moral species of a sin (197 sqq.)
must be given, for otherwise the confessor does not understand the case
before him. He who has committed a mortal theft does not satisfy by
confessing a venial theft; he who is guilty of the specific sin of
calumny does not satisfy by the generic accusation of sins of the
tongue. But impossibility excuses, as when the penitent has only a
general recollection about a sin;

(b) the number of the sins must be given exactly or, if this is
impossible, approximately. He who unintentionally exaggerates the
number or tells a sin of which he is not guilty, is not bound to
correct this, but he who unintentionally lowers the number to a notable
extent should tell in his next confession what was omitted (see 202
sqq.);

(c) the circumstances that change the species of a sin must be
declared, for example, the fact that the person who was scandalized was
one’s subject, that the person who was treated disrespectfully was
one’s superior, that the amount stolen was large (see 72);

(d) the external act that completed an internal sin must be declared,
and hence he who committed impurity does not confess properly by saying
that he gave consent to impure desires (see 89-93).

2742. Disputed Cases.--(a) Circumstances that Notably Aggravate a Sin
without Changing Its Species.--For the obligation of confessing these
circumstances, it is argued that, if the confessor does not know them,
he is unable to guide the penitent properly. Against obligation, it is
argued that the species of the sin gives the confessor sufficient
knowledge, and that the obligation of confessing aggravating
circumstances would make the burden too heavy for the penitent. But all
admit that _per accidens_ there may be a duty of confessing a
circumstance of this kind, as when it makes a sin reserved, or consists
in an occasion of sin or evil habit, or when it produces a great change
in reference to satisfaction (e.g., the theft of $10,000 is quite
different from the theft of $1000).

(b) As to the Imputable External Effects of a Sin.--One opinion is that
these must be confessed, since they are willed in their cause (96,
102); another opinion is that they need not be confessed since they are
not sins, but results that followed on a sin; a third opinion answers
that they must be confessed if the evil will was not retracted before
they happened, but otherwise not. All agree, however, that the sinner
in this case should confess that he sinned with foresight of the
consequence, and that he should confess the consequence itself if there
is attached to it something that should be known to the confessor
(e.g., censure, irregularity, etc.).

(c) Sins Whose Commission, or Gravity, or Remission is Uncertain.--If
the uncertainty is about the fact or gravity of the sin, there is no
obligation to confess the sin, even though its commission or its
gravity be probable; for the obligation cannot be proved. But if it is
certain that grave sin has been committed and uncertain whether the sin
has been confessed, a mere doubt or suspicion in favor of confession
does not exempt from obligation; a probable opinion in favor of
confession excuses according to Probabilism, but it does not excuse
according to Equiprobabilism, unless the doubt is about a confession
made long ago by one who was careful in making his confessions, or
unless there is question of a scrupulous person (655 sqq., 708, 709).

2743. When Material Integrity Is Not Necessary.--Material integrity is
not due because of real impossibility in the following cases:

(a) when there is physical impossibility, as when one is at the point
of death and too weak to make confession, or is deaf and dumb, or
cannot speak the confessor’s language correctly, or cannot finish
confession on account of shipwreck or other great peril;

(b) when there is moral impossibility, as when material integrity
cannot be had except at the expense of a great temporal or spiritual
evil distinct from the inconvenience intrinsic to the confession
itself, and there is some serious reason that makes it necessary to go
to confession here and now (e.g., the desire of not remaining long in
the state of sin). Examples are: great spiritual harm, as when a
penitent is scrupulous; great temporal harm, as when the penitent has
to flee to escape assassination. Some affirm, while others deny, the
duty of mentioning a sin that will defame an accomplice with the
confessor, and in practice it seems the duty cannot be insisted on
(cfr. 2065).

2744. Completion or Repetition of Past Incomplete Confessions.--(a)
Completion of past confessions must be made when they lacked material
integrity, if the impossibility has ceased.

(b) Particular repetition is necessary when a confession lacked formal
integrity or other essential; that is, if a sin was unlawfully
concealed or unrepented of in confession, the sacrilege must be
confessed and the previous confession made over, since it was invalid.
But if the new confession is made to the same confessor and he has a
general remembrance of it, the new confession may be made summarily.

(c) General repetition is necessary when several past confessions were
certainly invalid on account of lack of formal integrity or other
defect. Thus, he who has made bad confessions for three months must
make a general confession of that period of time. General confession is
advisable when there is a prudent doubt about the worth of past
confessions; it is permissible when it will help a penitent to be more
contrite and lead a better life; it is not lawful when it will do harm,
as when a scrupulous penitent will be harrowed and maddened by the
thought of his past sins.

2745. Satisfaction.--The third act of the penitent is satisfaction,
which is defined as “a compensation for the injury done to God by sin,
appointed by God’s minister in the Sacrament of Penance and accepted
and performed by the penitent.”

(a) This act is a compensation or payment made to God as an act of
reparation and justice.

(b) The compensation is appointed by the confessor, for its chief
purpose is restoration of friendship between God and the sinner, and
hence equality is not sought, but the good will to do what God’s
minister imposes.

(c) The compensation is accepted and performed. This is required for
the completeness, not for the essence, of the Sacrament. He who is
really contrite desires to satisfy, he who confesses offers to satisfy;
and hence, if for any reason he does not actually satisfy, his
satisfaction of desire suffices for the validity of the Sacrament, but
his omission to perform the satisfaction makes the Sacrament incomplete.

2746. The Effects of Actual Satisfaction.--(a) There is a remissive
effect, consisting in the _ex opere operato_ release of a portion or of
all the temporal punishment due to sin forgiven.

(b) There is a medicinal effect, consisting in the appreciation of the
evil of sin, the caution and vigilance against future relapse, and the
removal of evil tendencies, which the penitential works inculcate and
promote.

2747. The Conditions for Effective Satisfaction.--(a) For validity
(that is, for discharge of the obligation) the penitent must perform
the penance as to essentials in the way prescribed by the confessor,
and he must perform it personally, unless the confessor permits or
enjoins fulfillment by proxy (Canon 887). A penance performed during
the actual commission of or with actual affection for sin, is not a
satisfaction, but a new offense.

(b) For fruitfulness it is necessary that the penitent be in the state
of grace when he fulfills the penance, for the works of His enemies are
not supernaturally pleasing to God. Or, more exactly, a penance done in
the state of sin, but without affection for sin and under the influence
of actual grace, has no strict right either of justice or of friendship
to divine acceptance; but it seems fitting that such penance be
accepted by the divine liberality in part satisfaction for sins
forgiven.

2748. The Obligation of Accepting and Performing a Penance.--(a) _Per
se_, the obligation is grave, since the penance belongs to the
integrity of the Sacrament, and hence its refusal or neglect is an
injury to a sacred thing. (b) _Per accidens_, the obligation may be
light, and this is held to be the case when the penance was imposed for
free matter, or when the satisfaction prescribed is a light work (such
as one or two Hail Marys). A penitent is not bound to accept an
unreasonable penance, and he may seek a commutation if such a penance
is imposed. As a rule, negligence about the circumstances of a penance
(e.g., the time, or posture) is not a grave sin, but exceptionally it
may be serious (e.g., if one delays a gravely obligatory penance six
months, or so long as to be in danger of forgetting it; if one omits to
say a prayer on bended knees when this was chiefly intended by the
confessor).

2749. Causes That Excuse from a Penance Imposed.--(a) Commutation.--If
there is a just reason (e.g., the over-severity of the penance), the
penitent may have his penance changed to something lighter. The
confessor who imposed the penance may be asked to change it, even
probably after and outside of confession, and after a long time, and
though he does not remember the confession. Another confessor may
lessen the penance, but only in confession and after he has heard at
least a summary repetition of the sins for which the penance was given.

(b) Cessation.--There is no obligation to fulfill a penance in case of
impossibility, whether physical (e.g., if the penitent is dying and can
neither say the prayers ordered nor ask for a commutation), or moral
(e.g., if the penitent has forgotten the penance and cannot
conveniently ask the confessor about it).

2750. Requirements in the Minister for Valid Absolution.--(a) The
divine law requires the power of Orders, for only priests were
appointed by Christ as the ministers of Penance, (b) The natural law
requires the power of jurisdiction, since the Sacrament of Penance is
exercised in the form of a judicial process, which supposes authority
to judge. (c) The law of the Church requires the approval of the
Bishop, or his decision that the priest is a fit person to hear
confessions. Approbation is always given along with jurisdiction.

2751. Power of Jurisdiction.--The power of jurisdiction is so necessary
that without it absolution is null.

(a) Jurisdiction in general is treated in Canons 872 sqq. of the Code.
Ordinary jurisdiction is had by the Pope for the whole Church, and by
Ordinaries, parish-priests, exempt religious superiors, etc., for their
own subjects. Delegated jurisdiction comes from the law itself in favor
of penitents who are dying (Canon 882), or who are making a sea voyage
(Canon 883), a privilege extended recently also to those who are making
air journeys, or who are outside their domicile (Canon 881), etc.;
while delegated jurisdiction from man is had by those priests who have
obtained faculties orally or in writing from the competent superior
(Canon 879).

(b) Jurisdiction in special cases is treated in Canons 874, 875, 876,
519 sqq. Religious women living in community should have for each house
one ordinary confessor and one extraordinary confessor who comes four
times a year. Further, the bishop should appoint supplementary
confessors to whom the Religious may freely make their confessions, and
special confessors for individual Sisters when spiritual progress is
aided by such an arrangement.

2752. When the Church Supplies Jurisdiction.--In certain cases the
Church, for the good of souls, supplies jurisdiction for the time being
to priests who lack it:

(a) in case of common error, that is, when all or many of the faithful
in a place think that a priest has jurisdiction, as when he is seated
in the confessional of a public church hearing or waiting to hear those
who are going to confession. The common error is not of law, but of
fact;

(b) in case of uncertainty of law (e.g., whether a certain sin is
reserved) or of fact (e.g., whether the confessor’s jurisdiction has
expired) about the confessor’s jurisdiction, if the confessor has a
positive or probable reason in favor of his right to absolve. The
Church supplies jurisdiction in the absolution of a reserved censure
whose reservation was not known to the priest, unless it be _ab homine_
or most specially reserved to the Holy See (Canon 2247, n. 3);

(c) in case of danger of death, when full jurisdiction is granted to
every priest (Canon 882).

2753. Limitation of jurisdiction.--(a) Reserved Sins or Cases.--For the
sake of discipline and the good of souls the absolution of certain more
atrocious or pernicious crimes is reserved to higher superiors, namely,
to the Pope or the Ordinary. Reservation is not incurred in a case
reserved on account of censure, if the penitent’s act was not gravely
imputable; nor probably in a case reserved for its own sake (unless the
reserving authority willed otherwise), if the penitent was ignorant
(though not crassly or supinely) of the reservation (Canon 2229). To
fall under reservation, a sin must be mortal, consummated (i.e. not
merely attempted) certain and formal (i.e., perpetrated with knowledge
of the special malice that caused reservation). Reservation ceases when
confession is made by the sick who are unable to leave the house or by
those who are about to be married; when the Superior has refused the
request for faculties to absolve a reserved case, or the confessor
prudently decides that the request for faculties cannot be made without
grave detriment to the penitent or danger to the seal; when confession
is made outside the territory of the Superior who reserves the sin
(Canon 900).

(b) Reserved Persons.--Those who have not special faculties cannot
validly hear the confessions of nuns (Canon 876), for the director of
consciences of these Religious should be endowed with special virtue,
knowledge and prudence. Religious Superiors, novice-masters, and
rectors of seminaries or colleges should not act habitually as
confessors of their subjects (Canons 518, n. 2, 891), lest the
distinction between the internal and the external forum be forgotten.
Finally, to prevent abuse of the Sacrament and occasions of relapse, a
confessor cannot validly absolve his accomplice in a sin against the
Sixth Commandment, consummated or unconsummated, or from the sin of
complicity itself, as necessary matter of the Sacrament, if the sin was
on both sides external, certain, and both internally and externally
grave (Canons 884, 2367).

2754. Absolution from Reserved Cases.--(a) In danger of death, any
priest can absolve every reserved sin and censure, but, should the
penitent recover, there is a duty in certain specified cases of having
recourse to the lawful superior (Canons 882, 2252). The latter Canon
specifies two cases in which recourse is necessary after the person
recovers, namely, a censure _ab homine_ and one most specially reserved
to the Holy See. A third case has been added by the Sacred
Penitentiary, namely, when a priest who has attempted marriage and is
unable to separate asks for absolution from the censure of Canon 2388,
Sec.1, in danger of death.

(b) In urgent cases, namely, if censures _latae sententiae_ cannot be
observed externally without grave danger of scandal or infamy, or if it
is hard for the penitent to remain in the state of grave sin for such
time as may be necessary in order that the competent superior may
provide, then any confessor can, in the sacramental forum, absolve from
these censures, no matter how they are reserved, imposing, under pain
of falling back into the censure, the obligation of having recourse
within a month (at least by letter and through the confessor, if it can
be done without grave inconvenience), without mentioning the name, to
the Sacred Penitentiary or to a Bishop or other superior who has the
faculty. The confessor imposes also the obligation of fulfilling his
injunctions (Canon 2254, Sec.1). It is to be noted:

1) the circumstances constituting an urgent case are the two specified
in the Canon: the difficulty of observing the censure; the hardship of
remaining in sin.

2) the object of the absolution is all censures _latae sententiae_,
however reserved, with one exception, namely, the censure incurred
under Canon 2388, Sec.1, the case of a priest who, after an attempted
marriage, is unable to separate. No absolution as an urgent case under
this Canon can be given. The censure _latae sententiae_ for false
denunciation can be absolved under this Canon only if the conditions of
Canon 2363 have been fulfilled (actual formal retraction and
reparation; imposition of a grave and long penance; and the sin itself
remains reserved _ratione sui_ to the Holy See).

3) Sufficient extrinsic authority is available to make safe in practice
the extension of the grant of power of this Canon to censures _ab
homine_ which are _ferendae sententiae_.

4) Sections 2 and 3 of this Canon indicate the right of the penitent to
go afterwards to a privileged confessor without making the recourse to
the superior enjoined upon him or observing the _mandata_ from the
superior in case he has already made recourse, and the procedure to be
followed when recourse is morally impossible.

(c) Outside of necessity, only those can absolve who have ordinary or
delegated faculties. The law itself grants to pastors the power to
absolve during the whole of paschal time from all sins which the
Ordinary has reserved to himself, and missionaries have the same power
during the time they are giving a mission (Canon 899, n. 3). This does
not apply to censures nor to cases reserved to the Ordinary by the
Apostolic See or by law, such as the excommunication _latae sententiae_
which Canon 2350 declares against the procurers of abortion.

2755. Absolution Given by One Not Possessed of Jurisdiction.--(a)
Effect.--Absolution of mortal sins given without jurisdiction is
invalid; and of venial sins, is unlawful and probably invalid. In some
cases, however, the Church supplies jurisdiction, as was said above
(2752).

(b) Guilt.--There is no sin if the absolution is given in good faith,
as when a confessor is inculpably ignorant of a reservation. If
absolution is given in bad faith and the confessor knows that the
Church does not supply, there is a grave sin on account of the
irreverence to the Sacrament and the harm to the penitent. If the
confessor knows that he lacks jurisdiction, but that the Church
supplies on account of common error, it seems that no sin is committed
if there is a good reason for giving absolution (e.g., the absence of
other priests); but otherwise there is mortal or venial sin according
to circumstances.

(c) Penalty.--He who with presumption hears confessions without
jurisdiction or absolves from a reserved case for which he has no
faculties, incurs in the former case _ipso facto_ suspension from the
power of Orders, and in the latter case _ipso facto_ suspension from
hearing confessions (Canon 2366).

2756. Duties of the Confessor before Confession.--(a) Fitness to Hear
Confessions.--The confessor should have sufficient knowledge to be able
readily to solve the usual cases and to work out or find the solution
of the more difficult cases; sufficient prudence to be able to apply
his knowledge well and to avoid what is dangerous or suspicious;
sufficient goodness to be sincerely desirous of the spiritual advantage
of the penitent, and to be patient in hearing him and firm in
correcting him.

(b) Willingness to H ear Confessions.-The confessor is obliged either
from justice or charity (2676) to hear the confessions of those who
reasonably request it. He should observe the rules of the Ritual and of
the Code as to the manner and place of confession (Canons 908-910).

2757. Duties of the Confessor as Judge in Hearing the Case.--(a) Since
confession should be entire, the confessor is gravely bound to question
the penitent, when there is reason to think that the confession is not
entire. With pious and well-instructed persons, of course, there is no
need of questioning, and, since the duty of integrity rests primarily
on the penitent, the confessor’s negligence may be regarded as venial
when he is burdened by a great multitude of confessions.

(b) Since confession must not be made onerous or harmful to penitents,
the confessor is bound to be very discreet in the questions he asks,
and to follow the rule that it is far better to say too little than to
say too much. He must avoid any word or remark that might teach sin to
the young or scandalize the old; he must be very reserved when speaking
of matters that pertain to the Sixth Commandment, and, if there is need
to question about them, should begin with very general queries. Neither
directly nor indirectly may he inquire the name of an accomplice of the
penitent (Canon 888); but he is allowed to investigate matters which he
has a right to know, even though the accomplice thereby becomes known
to him. If the common good requires that a complaint be lodged against
the accomplice, the confessor may oblige the penitent to make this
complaint to the proper superior; but it is seldom advisable that the
confessor agree to perform this duty himself, and then he should
require that the penitent speak to him about the affair outside of
confession, if this can be done (see 1287).

(c) Since the penitent acts as the accuser in confession, he should be
believed both for and against himself. But should it happen that the
confessor knows for certain that his penitent is lying, his procedure
will depend on the source of his knowledge. If the knowledge is not of
sacramental origin but comes from the confessor’s own reliable
experience (e.g., because he saw the penitent commit a sin and is sure
that the silence about the sin is not due to forgetfulness, ignorance
or previous confession of it), he should try to induce the penitent to
confess, and, if the latter refuses, should deny absolution. If the
confessor is morally certain on account of the word of a third person
that the penitent is now concealing a sin, it seems to some authorities
that absolution may be either granted or refused, to others that it
must be refused. Finally, if the confessor’s knowledge comes from a
previous sacramental confession or other obligatory secret, he is held
to respect the secret; he may not ask any questions which he would not
have asked otherwise, and, if the penitent will not confess, he must
either grant absolution, as some hold, or dissimulate its denial, as
others think.

2758. Duties of the Confessor-Judge in Deciding about the Case.--(a)
The confessor should pass judgment on the past state of the penitent’s
soul as declared to him, but defect or mistake here would not make the
Sacrament null. The objective malice of the sins (i.e., their
theological and moral malice) will be recognized by the priest from his
knowledge of theology, and the subjective malice from the declarations
or replies of the penitent. At times the confessor will have to rest
satisfied with the decision that the sin or its character is uncertain.

(b) The confessor should pass judgment on the present dispositions of
the penitent, or the sincerity of his sorrow and resolution; but it
suffices that the judgment be probable, and there be no strong
suspicion against it. The penitent’s devout confession, or his promise
of amendment, the trouble he took to make his confession, etc., are
indexes of good faith, just as boastful confession, disregard for
former promises, and unwillingness or carelessness about coming to
confession are signs of bad faith.

2759. Duties of the Confessor-Judge in Passing Sentence.--(a) The Duty
of Binding.--The confessor must impose upon the penitent such duties as
are necessitated by the essence of the Sacrament (e.g., there is no
true contrition without willingness to make due restitution,
reparation, or satisfaction, and to avoid sinful occasions and to
struggle against bad habits), or such penalties as are required for its
integrity (i.e., the priest must impose a suitable penance). To
safeguard morals, the law of the Church gravely obliges a confessor to
require his penitent _sub gravi_ to denounce another confessor
certainly guilty of the crime of solicitation, unless there be a grave
reason that excuses the penitent; and, if the penitent refuses,
absolution must be denied. On the details of this law and on the
penalties for solicitation, refusal to denounce, and false accusation,
see Commentaries on Canons 904, 2368 and 2363 of the Code.

(b) The Duty of Loosing.--The confessor is bound _sub gravi_ to give
absolution at once to one who is properly disposed, for there is a
tacit contract between the penitent and the confessor that absolution
will be granted if the penitent is worthy; the penitent puts himself to
considerable trouble to obtain forgiveness, and he is deprived of a
great good if absolution is refused (Canon 886). If only free matter is
confessed, it is a venial sin now and then to deny absolution without
reason, but no sin to deny it for a good reason if the penitent
consents.

(c) The Duty of Retaining.--The confessor should always refuse
absolution to those who are certainly not contrite and in whom he
cannot awaken true repentance, for absolution would be of no benefit to
such persons and would make the confessor an encourager of sin.
Likewise, absolution should be denied those who are incapable (e.g.,
those who have not as yet committed sin or who confess only
imperfections). If there is doubt about the fitness or capacity of the
penitent, absolution should generally be delayed; but it may be granted
conditionally for a serious reason (e.g., if the penitent is in a state
of sin and cannot return to confession for a long time), and it should
be granted conditionally for a very serious reason (e.g., if the
penitent will probably not return, or if he is confessing in
preparation for marriage).

2760. Penitents to Whom Absolution Should Be Denied.--There are three
classes of penitents especially to whom absolution should be frequently
denied on account of their lack of repentance:

(a) those who refuse to abandon a proximate and voluntary occasion of
grave sin, for these are impenitent and unworthy of absolution. But
absolution may be given those who promise to abandon a proximate and
voluntary occasion, or to use the proper means of safety if they are in
a proximate and necessary occasion of sin (see 263 sqq.);

(b) those who have contracted the habit of some grave sin, if they are
unwilling to use the proper means to overcome it; but if they seriously
promise to use means prescribed by the confessor, they should be
considered as well disposed. A sin is habitual when it is committed
often--that is, for an external sin about five times a month, and for
an internal sin about five times a week-and when the sinner acts for
the proper motive of the vice, e.g., in injustice for disorder, in
intemperance for pleasure of the sense, in sins against charity out of
hatred, etc. But consideration should be taken also of the character of
the person (i.e., a weak-willed person is enslaved by habit more
readily than a strong-willed person) and of the vice (i.e., an alluring
sin like impurity becomes a habit more quickly than other sins);

(c) those backsliders or recidivists who have confessed the same grave
sin in three or four previous confessions and have relapsed into it
again without any improvement. These persons should be absolved if they
are sincere now and give some special indication as proof of sincerity
(e.g., some effort made to conquer their habit); otherwise (except in
great necessity, when they may be given the benefit of the doubt and be
granted conditional absolution) they should not be absolved but should
be put off kindly for a short space, since there is no reason to
believe that the present sorrow is any better than that of the past.

2761. The Sacramental Penance.--(a) Obligation.--The confessor is bound
to impose a penance in order to provide for the integrity of the
Sacrament and the good of the penitent. Exceptions to this rule are the
cases when the penitent cannot perform any penance, as when he is at
the point of death, and when the penitent after the imposition of a
penance and absolution remembers new and necessary matter. It is at
least a venial sin to delay the giving of a penance till after the
absolution, and it is a grave sin to give no penance at all, unless (as
some hold) only a light penance was due.

(b) Quantity.--The amount of the penance should be suited as a
punishment to the degree of the penitent’s guilt, that is, a heavier
penance should be given for necessary matter and a lighter penance for
free matter. The penance should also take into consideration the moral
malice and the frequency of the sins. Works that the Church may order
under pain of serious sin suffice for necessary matter (such as a Mass,
a fast, five decades of the Rosary, or the Litany of the Saints). Light
penances are the _De Profundis_, the Litany of St. Joseph, five Paters
and five Aves. For a sufficient reason (e.g., the sickness of the
penitent, the probability that a grave penance will keep him from
future confession, the fact that his sorrow is very great or that he
has gained a plenary indulgence, the performance of satisfaction for
him by the confessor himself) the quantity of a penance may be
lessened. A grave penance may be lightened by joining it with some duty
already owed (e.g., by requiring the penitent to say the Rosary while
hearing Sunday Mass, by obliging him to hear Mass on Sunday and also to
say a few prayers after the Mass).

(c) Quality.--The character of the penance should make it suitable as a
remedy for the spiritual disease of the penitent; that is, as far as
possible he should be required to perform works that tend to correct
his chief failings. Thus, for those who are uncharitable or avaricious
an alms or other work of mercy is a good penance; for those who are
given to pleasures of sense, a fast or other corporal austerity; for
those who are lax or irreligious, a prayer, a visit to the Blessed
Sacrament, a meditation, or frequentation of the Sacraments. Ordinarily
it suffices to impose prayers as penances, since prayer is a universal
remedy. Penances unsuitable to the penitent (e.g., fasts for one who
needs nourishment on account of labors), those that are too difficult
(e.g., perpetual or long-continued practices), those that are harmful
(e.g., penances that will bring the penitent into suspicion or
ridicule), must be avoided.

2762. The Duties of the Confessor as Spiritual Physician.--(a) General
Remedies.--The confessor should give much attention to the study of
moral and ascetical works, so as to be able to suggest suitable means
to his penitents for overcoming their spiritual infirmities and
avoiding future relapses. Thus, if a penitent desires to know or ought
to be told how to struggle against anger, drunkenness or impurity, the
confessor should know how to advise him and what measures to recommend
to him.

(b) Special Remedies.--Certain classes of penitents need special
attention. Thus, the tempted and afflicted should be told the means of
fighting temptation and sadness; the scrupulous should be forbidden to
examine their consciences too carefully, or to accuse themselves
minutely, or to spend too much time at devotions; the sick and the
dying should be encouraged to dispose themselves well and to put aside
thoughts of fear and discouragement; pious persons often need
assistance when they suffer temptations to tepidity or spiritual
desolation. The careless, lazy, malicious, and hardened should be
reproved, but sternness should not be unmingled with kindness, lest the
penitent be driven away from his duty altogether.

2763. The Duties of the Confessor as Teacher and Guide.--(a)
Instruction.--The confessor should teach children and other ignorant
persons if he finds that they do not know truths necessary to be known
for a fruitful reception of the Sacrament--that is, the mysteries of
faith that must be believed explicitly and the dispositions for
receiving absolution (924). He should instruct about duties when this
will be for the penitent’s good--that is, when the penitent falsely
believes something to be sinful which is not sinful, or to be gravely
sinful that is only lightly sinful, or when the penitent’s ignorance of
an obligation is gravely culpable, or when he is invincibly ignorant
but will be kept from a sin without graver evil if he is instructed
now. If an instruction will probably do no good, a confessor should not
instruct an invincibly ignorant penitent about his duties, unless
silence will be productive of greater evils than instruction. Thus, if
the confessor foresees that the penitent will only be put in bad faith
if he is told about a duty of restitution, it would be useless and
wrong to speak to him about it; but if he should foresee that, if he
does not speak, the penitent will do worse things with great injury or
scandal to others, it would be necessary to instruct him.

(b) Direction.--In spiritual matters a confessor should be willing and
able to counsel and advise, for example, about the choice of a state of
life (marriage, clerical state, religious life), about voluntary rules
or practices (vows, austerities), and about the performance of duties
(e.g., training of children). For advice on temporal matters a priest
should either direct his penitents to lawyers, physicians or other
professional advisers, or, if he can give prudent direction himself
(e.g., on artistic, educational, or business questions), he should
preferably discuss the matter elsewhere than in the confessional.

2764. The Duties of the Confessor After Confession.--(a) _Per se_, or
by reason of his office itself, the confessor is held to guard
inviolate the secret of the confessional--that is, he may not disclose,
or use to the penitent’s disadvantage, any information received from
sacramental confession. This duty is a grave one imposed by natural law
(since there is a quasi-contract that the confessor will treat the
penitent’s confession as confidential), by divine law (since Christ, in
willing that confession be used, implicitly willed that it be so
conducted as not to become a thing odious, scandalous and harmful), and
by church law (for Canons 889, 890, 1757, 2369 strictly forbid
revelations or use of sacramental knowledge and decree severe penalties
against transgressors). Since God wipes out from remembrance the sins
He has pardoned, the confessor, being God’s representative, must treat
what he has heard as not known to him. The obligation of the seal is so
strict that no one may dispense from it, that neither Probabilism nor
epieikeia may be applied to it, and that no exception is allowed unless
the penitent himself freely, unmistakably and for a serious reason
gives permission for it to the confessor.

(b) _Per accidens_, or by reason of a mistake committed by him (e.g.,
absolution mistakenly refused or invalidly given, erroneous notion
about the gravity of a sin imparted or not corrected, restitution
imposed where not due or not imposed where due), a confessor is held to
see that the mistake is corrected and that the penitent or a third
party is spared or rescued from the harm which will follow from the
mistake. The obligation is one of justice in those cases where there is
a violation of implicit agreement (e.g., absolution unreasonably
withheld), or damage positively and culpably caused (e.g., erroneous
advice about the gravity of a sin or about the duty of restitution); it
is one of charity in other cases where the confessor can without undue
inconvenience assist the spiritual or temporal need of the penitent or
of another (e.g., penitent’s misunderstanding about his duty of
restitution which the confessor failed to clear up). The duty of
repairing mistakes is grave when there is grave damage (e.g., invalid
absolution of mortal sins) and grave guilt was contracted by the
mistake (e.g., if the invalidity was voluntary) or will be contracted
by refusal to prevent the consequences of the mistake (e.g., if the
invalidity has been discovered, and one knows that the penitent will
die unabsolved, if one does not rectify the error). The duty is light
if there is light damage (e.g., invalid absolution of free matter, or
of necessary matter confessed by a person who will go to the Sacraments
soon again), or light culpability (e.g., failure to question about the
species or number of sins, or to impose a penance, when the failure is
due to distraction or forgetfulness).

2765. Manner of Repairing Defects Made in Hearing a Confession.--(a)
The Reparation to be Made.--If the penitent has been deprived of
absolution, he should be absolved; if he has been wrongly instructed,
he should be set right; if temporal loss has been caused, temporal
restitution should be made.

(b) The Person to Whom Restitution Should Be Made.--The injured person
should be compensated. Hence if restitution was mistakenly imposed on
the penitent and he cannot recover his property, the confessor should
reimburse him; if the penitent was mistakenly excused from restitution,
payment is due the third party who loses by the advice.

(e) The Manner of Making Reparation.--If possible, the reparation
should be made in the penitent’s next confession, as this is less
troublesome to all concerned. But if the confessor has wrongly
instructed the penitent in an important matter, he is bound more
probably (after obtaining the penitent’s permission to speak about
confession matter) to retract, even outside of the confessional, if
this can be done without scandal or other serious evil, which would be
rare.

2766. Excuses from the Duty of Repairing Mistakes.--(a) Physical
Impossibility.--If the confessor does not know who the penitent is or
cannot find him, there is nothing to do but to repent over the mistake
and to pray for the penitent that God may provide for him.

(b) Moral Impossibility.--Grave inconvenience excuses, unless the
confessor has been seriously at fault against justice (e.g., by
omitting absolution, by giving incorrect instruction in an important
matter, by neglecting to warn against an occasion of serious sin, by
wrongly advising on restitution of a large sum), or the salvation of a
soul is at stake, as when an unabsolved penitent is dying (see 1797
sqq.)

2767. The Obligation of the Seal of Confession.--(a) Its
Subject.--Primarily the duty of the seal obliges the confessor,
secondarily all others to whom the matter of sacramental confession in
any way becomes known, such as bystanders, interpreters, or those who
have spied into a confession. The penitent on his part is bound to keep
as a natural secret the words of the confessor which the latter would
rightly wish to be kept confidential (e.g., it would not be fair to
excuse oneself in making necessary corrections, by saying that one was
acting under advice of one’s confessor, especially since the confessor
cannot defend himself).

(b) Its Object.--Primarily, the seal extends to all sins confessed,
whether they be light or grave, private or public; and a confessor may
not confirm from his knowledge as confessor what he also knows from
other knowledge. Secondarily, it extends to all that is declared for a
fuller explanation of the sins, such as circumstances, purpose,
occasion, cooperation, and to all those things whose revelation would
endanger the seal or make the Sacrament odious, such as the denial of
absolution, the penance given, the insincerity, impatience or
scrupulosity shown in confessing, the fact that a confession was long
or a general review. Other matters not generally known and which the
penitent reasonably wishes to be confidential (e.g., the fact that he
made his confession, his natural defects of illegitimacy or deafness)
should be kept as natural secrets. But there is no duty of sacramental
or natural silence about matters which the confessor knows from other
sources and which he is free to mention (e.g., facts learned from a
non-sacramental confession made to the priest and others with a view to
its use, or from the confessor’s own perception of a theft committed by
the penitent in the act of confession).

2768. Sins against the Seal of Confession.--(a) Direct violation
happens if a confessor declares, either to the penitent himself or to
another, matter protected by the seal, and with such clearness that
both the penitent and his sin can be recognized. This occurs even
though no names are mentioned, or the penitent is unknown to the
listeners, or is no longer living, or when the listeners do not
perceive that sacramental knowledge is being used. The sin is grave,
and, since the injury to religion and the public is always serious, it
admits of no lightness of matter. The penalty is excommunication most
specially reserved to the Pope (Canon 2369).

(b) Indirect violation happens if a confessor so speaks or acts as to
create a danger of direct violation (e.g., if he speaks so loud in the
confessional that those outside can hear, or if he is suspiciously
silent when the penitent is being commended, or if he warns the parents
of a penitent to be specially watchful of him, or if he refuses to hear
a confession because he knows from a previous confession that the
person is very scrupulous, or if he shows less confidence or regard for
the penitent). The sin admits of lightness of matter, since the danger
of direct violation may be remote; but if there is grave culpability,
suspension or even severer penalties may be inflicted (Canons 2369,
2368).

(c) Unlawful use of sacramental knowledge happens if there is no direct
or indirect violation of the seal, but the confessor’s conduct is such
as to make confession distasteful either to the penitent or to others,
as when a superior is guided in giving his vote or directing his
subject by information gathered from confession. This is forbidden in
Canon 890.

(d) Apparent violation of the seal happens if there is really no direct
or indirect violation of the seal, or unlawful use of confessional
knowledge, but a priest’s language is calculated to arouse a reasonable
suspicion that some such sin is being committed (e.g., if a preacher or
retreat master or writer of moral cases uses illustrations from
confessions heard by him which will excite distrust in his own or other
penitents). Serious scandal and defamation may also be caused by public
statements unfavorable to the morals of a certain city or community or
class.

2769. Special Abuses.--Two abuses to which confession is especially
exposed are defamation and impurity, and hence the law of the Church
provides special safeguards against these dangers (see 2753, 2757,
2759).

(a) Defamation.--The fame of third parties is protected by the law
which forbids the confessor to inquire about the penitent’s accomplice,
the fame of the penitent by the law of the sacramental seal, and the
fame of the confessor by the law which subjects those who bring a false
accusation of solicitation against a confessor to excommunication
specially reserved to the Pope, to retractation, reparation, and severe
penance (Canons 888, n. 2, 889 sqq., 2363).

(b) Impurity.--The danger that a confessor will be tempted to
solicitation by his knowledge of the frailty of a penitent is provided
for by the law which severely commands formal denunciation of those
guilty of solicitation (Canon 904); the danger that a penitent may be
induced to yield to solicitation by a promise to absolve the sin is met
by the law which invalidates absolution of an accomplice (Canon 884).

2770. Absolutio Complicis.--Absolutio complicis in peccato turpi
invalida est praeterquam in mortis periculo (Canon 884).

(a) Objectum legis est peccatum turpe, i.e., quodvis peccatum contra
sextum, consummatum vel non consummatum, colloquiis, aspectibus vel
factis patratum. Necesse est autem quod peccatum sit utrinque certum
(quoad factum et jus), externum, et grave (qua internum et qua
externum). Unde non agitur de peccatis contra alias virtutes, neque de
peccatis luxuriae mere internis vel levibus.

(b) Subjectum de quo in lege est complex seu socius immediatus et
formalis in ipso actu peccati; et sic non sufficit ad complicitatem
cooperatio etiam proxima (1507), nec peccatum mere materiale, quale fit
ab amente, dormiente, ebrio, infante, renitente. Non requiritur tamen
quod compar sit puber vel alius sexus, neque quod confessarius tempore
complicitatis jam inter clericos adscriptus sit.

2771. Effectus Legis de Absolutione Complicis.--(a) Quoad
Absalutionem.--Invalida et illicita est absolutio directa peccati
nondum remissi si extra periculum mortis datur. Est valida sed
illicita: absolutio directa peccati nondum remissi, in periculo mortis
data, quando alius sacerdos confessionem recipere potest; necnon
absolutio indirecta peccati nondum remissi, extra periculum mortis
data, quando poenitens bona fide peccatum reticet. Est valida et licita
absolutio directa peccati nondum remissi, in periculo mortis vel in
gravissima necessitate (utputa urgente praecepto ecclesiastico et divino
confessionis et communionis annuae) data, quando alius sacerdos aut
nullimode aut nonnisi cum gravi incommodo (scil. infamiae, scandali,
periculi confessionis sacrilegae) haberi potest; necnon absolutio
directa peccati jam remissi, etiam extra hoc periculum et hanc
necessitatem facta. Non una tamen est sententia auctorum in
interpretandis dubiis hujus legis, nec omnes conveniunt cum placitis
hic positis, nam de dubiis alii strictius, alii mitius judicant.

(b) Quoad Censuram.--Excommunicatio specialissime reservata S. Sedi
ipso facto incurritur a confessario qui illicite absolvit vel fingit
absolvere, sive directe, sive (quando poenitens ad tacendum inductus
est a confessario ipso) indirecte. Censura non incurritur igitur si
confessio tantum auditur, si poenitens propria sponte peccatum reticet,
si sacerdos dubitat num poenitens complex sit (Canon 2367).

2772. Sacerdos reus delicti sollicitationis in confessione intra mensem
denuntiandus est a poenitente loci Ordinario vel S.C.S. Officii (Canon
904).

(a) Delictum sollicitationis est provocatio, etiam inefficax,
poenitentis eujuscumque ut actum quemcumque gravem contra castitatem
committat. Provocatio fit vel per verba (e.g., declarationes amoris,
invitationes, laudes), per facta (e.g., dona), per sermones (e.g.,
colloquia de turpibus a poenitente confessis), per tractatus (scil.
colloquia de re turpi agenda), per consensum internum-externum
sollicitationi poenitentis datum.

(b) Delictum sollicitationis est provocatio quae ordinem habet ad
confessionem, i.e., quae fit tempore factae confessionis (i.e., inter,
immediate ante, immediate post confessionem), vel tempore confessionis
faciendae (i.e., occasione confessionis petitae a poenitente, praetextu
confessionis falso allegatae a confessario, in loco confessionis cum
confessionis simulatione).

2773. Confessarius debet, graviter onerata ejus conscientia, de onere
denuntiationis poenitentem monere.

(a) Obligatio confessarii gravis est. Sed antequam moneat, serio
consideret utrum poenitens persona fide digna sit, utrum certo constet
de facto, de turpitudine, de gravitate, de ordine ad confessionem,
utrum detur causa excusans (e.g., mors sollicitantis; probabiliter,
ejus plena emendatio per plures annos manifestata; grave damnum
poenitentis quoad vitam, famam, fortunam, nisi gravius damnum simul
immineat bono communi). Si de delicto sollicitationis et de obligatione
poenitentis nullum dubium est, confessarius moneat, etiamsi poenitens
in bona fide sit et praevideatur certo non obtemperaturus, mortis
periculo autem excepto. Si poenitens irrationabiliter renuat
denuntiare, absolvi non potest, sed confessarius de casu consulere
debet Ordinarium.

(b) Obligatio poenitentis etiam gravis est. Denuntiatio facienda est
intra mensem a cognita obligatione., Ordinario sollicitantis, vel loci
delicti, vel poenitentis, personaliter et judicialiter. Poenitens qui
nec comparere nec scribere potest, interea excusatur; sed ille qui
justa causa exemptionis carens scienter omittit denuntiare intra
terminum unius mensis incurrit in excommunicationem latae sententiae
nemini reservatum, non absolvendus nisi postquam obligationi
satisfecerit aut se satisfacturum serio promiserit (Canon 2368, n. 2).
Confessarius non tenetur in se suscipere onus denuntiationis, nisi
secus gravissimum damnum bono publico inferretur.

2774. The Sacrament of Extreme Unction.--As Confirmation perfects
Baptism by bringing to maturity the new life of grace, so Extreme
Unction perfects Penance by strengthening against the spiritual
debility that remains after sin itself has been wiped away.
Confirmation makes ready for the battle of life, Extreme Unction
assists during the struggle of death. The fifth Sacrament is defined:
“A Sacrament of the New Law in which through the anointing with oil and
the prayer of the priest adult persons who are in danger of death
receive health of soul, and also at times health of body.”

(a) The remote matter or element of the Sacrament is oil (James, v, 14,
15). For validity it is required that this be olive oil, blessed by a
bishop or by a priest having special papal delegation, with the special
blessing for the oil of the sick (O. I.); for lawfulness, _sub gravi_
that it be oil blessed the previous Holy Thursday (Canon 734), _sub
levi_ at least that it be blessed by the bishop of the diocese, or, in
case of vacancy, by the neighboring bishop. In necessity the old oils
may be lawfully used, while chrism and the oil of the catechumens may
be used as doubtful matter. Unblessed oils and oils blessed by an
unauthorized priest do not suffice for validity.

(b) The proximate matter is the anointing of the sick man with blessed
oil. In urgent necessity it suffices to anoint one sense, or rather the
forehead; in other cases the various senses should be anointed in the
order given in the Ritual. Each anointing of a double sense should
begin with the right organ (e.g., the right eye) and should be given
with the right thumb in the form of a cross. If one organ is missing
(e.g., a hand amputated), the anointing should be made, if possible,
near to its place (e.g., on the wrist); if there is danger of
contagion, the anointing may be made by means of an instrument, such as
a brush or small stick. The anointing of the reins should always be
omitted and the anointing of the feet may be omitted for any good
reason, such as inconvenience to the dying person.

(c) The form of the Sacrament is the prayer used by the priest. In the
Latin Church the ordinary form is contained in the words: “_Per istam
sanctam unctionem_, etc. By this holy anointing and His most tender
mercy may the Lord forgive thee whatever sin thou hast committed by
sight (by hearing, by smell, by taste and speech, by touch, by thy
steps). Amen.” The extraordinary rite for use when there is not time to
give all the anointings is bestowed on the forehead in the words: “Per
istam sanctam unctionem et suam piissimam misericordiam indulgeat tibi
Dominus quidquid deliquisti. Amen.” The essential words of the form
are: “Per istam unctionem indulgeat tibi Dominus quidquid deliquisti,”
because they express the intercession and the effect of the rite. It
would probably be a grave sin to omit the reference to the senses in
the ordinary form, as that seems to be a notable part of the form; but
it would be a light sin, apart from contempt or scandal, to omit an
unimportant word such as “Amen.” If there is doubt about the
recipient’s capacity (i.e., whether he has reached the use of reason,
whether he is in danger of death, whether he is already dead, whether
he is impenitent and unwilling to receive the Sacrament), the form
should be conditional. The condition should be “_si es capax_,” not
“_si es dispositus_,” even in the last-mentioned case. For the
Sacrament is given validly even to one who is not well disposed (i.e.,
who lacks repentance) and there is thus the possibility, when validity
is not made dependent on the condition of good disposition, that
sacramental fruitfulness will follow later when impenitence, the
obstacle to the Sacrament’s activity, shall have been removed.

(d) The recipient of the Sacrament is a Catholic who after attaining
the use of reason has come into the danger of death through sickness or
old age. No one is capable of receiving this Sacrament unless he is
baptized, for Baptism is the gateway of the Sacraments (2671); unless
he has reached the use of reason, for the Sacrament is a remedy against
personal sin and supposes that the recipient can or formerly could
distinguish between right and wrong; unless he is in danger of death
through the infirmity of disease or of decrepitude, for St. James
teaches that the anointing is for those who are enfeebled by illness
dangerous unto death. Hence Extreme Unction cannot be administered
validly to the unbaptized, to young children who have not come to the
use of reason, to the perpetually insane, to those who are sick but not
in danger of death, to those who are in danger of death but not sick
(e.g., a strong man going to the gallows or to battle). But the
Sacrament may be administered to children who have not yet made their
first confession, if they are capable of sin, and to the insane who
once had the use of reason. The danger of death need not be immediate,
and hence Extreme Unction may be given when the disease is mortal but
the patient will last for several months or even a year, as in
tuberculosis. Illness includes not only chronic sickness, but also
fatal disorders caused by wounds, accidents, poison. The rule about the
old is that those who have reached sixty years and show some signs of
approaching death, such as great feebleness or fainting spells, even
though they have no special malady, may be anointed; for their old age
itself is a disease.

(e) The minister of Extreme Unction is the priest, since St. James
directs that the presbyters (i.e., the priests) of the Church be called
to anoint the sick. Extreme Unction, unlike Penance, is not exercised
in the form of a judicial process, and hence the power of Orders
suffices for its valid administration, and any priest, even one who
lacks jurisdiction, gives it validly. But for lawful administration
church law prescribes that the minister regularly be the ecclesiastical
superior or spiritual director (i.e., the pastor for his parish, the
head of a clerical religious institute for his house, the parish-priest
or chaplain for a lay religious body, the confessor for nuns), and that
the minister extraordinarily (i.e., in necessity) be any other priest
who has permission, or reasonably presumed permission.

(f) The effects of Extreme Unction are _per se_ an increase of
sanctifying grace, since this is a Sacrament of the Living; _per
accidens_ (i.e., when the recipient is not in the state of grace, but
is in good faith and has attrition) the forgiveness of sins and first
grace. Extreme Unction produces first grace more surely than does
absolution, if the penitent is unconscious, since it does not call for
any external manifestation of contrition; hence the importance of
anointing those who are dying but unconscious. The special benefit of
Extreme Unction is immediate preparation of the soul for entrance to
heaven, though restoration of the health of the body is sometimes
vouchsafed when this is for the spiritual good of the sick person.
Venial sins and the remains of past sins (i.e., the debility left by
them) are removed and the soul is strengthened with confidence as to
things past and future and with peace and resignation as to present
suffering. Since the Sacrament is given for the period of danger of
death, it cannot be repeated during the same danger; but should the
patient recover and relapse into a distinct danger through the same or
another sickness, there arises a new need and the Sacrament may then be
repeated.

2775. Special Duties.--In addition to the duties that are common in all
the Sacraments, the following duties should be noted in reference to
Extreme Unction.

(a) The Recipient.--_Per se_, Extreme Unction is not necessary as a
means to salvation, for sanctifying grace may be had or recovered
without it; but _per accidens_ it would be necessary as a means, if a
dying person were in mortal sin and could not recover grace except
through it. He who omits Extreme Unction unwillingly or for a good
reason (e.g., because he is well prepared for death and cannot get a
priest without very grave inconvenience) does not sin. He who omits the
Sacrament voluntarily and without good reason, is guilty of grave sin
if he acts from contempt, or gives scandal, or exposes himself to
eternal damnation; but if there is no contempt, scandal or danger to
salvation, sin is indeed committed by the neglect at such a crisis of
so important a spiritual aid, but only venial sin, since there is no
grave precept to receive this Sacrament. The recipient of Extreme
Unction should be in the state of grace; and hence, if he has mortal
sin on his conscience, he must beforehand make an act of contrition or
receive absolution with attrition, or, if neither is possible, he must
make an act of attrition. The custom of the Church calls for confession
before Extreme Unction, and divine law commands confession if one is in
mortal sin and in danger of death.

(b) The Minister.--The pastor is gravely bound in justice to give or
have given the Sacrament of Extreme Unction to all his subjects who
reasonably request it; other priests not charged with the spiritual
care of the dying person are held in charity to anoint him, if he has
not received the last rites and cannot otherwise be anointed. It is
clear that sick calls should be attended to promptly, and it would be a
serious matter to delay so long as to put the sick person in danger of
dying without Extreme Unction or of receiving it when he had become
unconscious and could not dispose himself properly. If the person has
been pronounced dead before the priest’s arrival, he should
nevertheless be absolved and anointed conditionally if the last breath
was not long before; because physicians teach that death takes
possession gradually, life lingering in the body for some time after
its external signs have ceased, for about a half hour when the end has
come after long illness, for one or two hours when death is sudden or
accidental. The ceremonies are obligatory under pain of sin, and it is
considered a serious matter to neglect the more notable parts, that is,
without reason to omit all or nearly all the prayers, or to give the
Sacrament without any sacred vestment.

(c) The Pastor.--The oil of the sick should be kept in a neat and
properly decorated place, and should be contained in a vessel of silver
or white metal. Only in exceptional cases is it lawful to keep it in
the rectory (Canon 946). The Catechism of the Council of Trent (page
307) declares that Extreme Unction should form a subject of frequent
instruction. It is important to exhort the people not to delay in
sending for the priest till the sick person has become insensible, nor
to omit to send for him in case of sudden death, since, as already
said, life remains for some time in the body after apparent death.

(d) The People.--All those who are responsible for the good of the
dying person, such as members of the family, physicians, nurses,
relatives, friends, or neighbors, should beware of deceiving him about
his condition and his need of preparation for death; on the contrary,
they should see to it as far as they can, that he receives the last
Sacraments in good time and while he has the full use of his senses,
when the spiritual benefit and the comfort of mind will be of greater
assistance and the bodily cure more likely.




Art. 4: HOLY ORDERS; MATRIMONY

(_Summa Theologica_, Supplement, qq. 34-68.)

2776. The first five Sacraments arc necessary for the spiritual welfare
of individuals, the remaining two, which are the subject of this
Article, are needful, not for each person, but for the Church as a
body. A member of the Church may save his soul though he remains
outside the priesthood and the married state, but the spiritual good of
the Church itself requires both Orders and Matrimony. Without Orders
the Church would be deprived of her rulers, teachers and ministers of
divine things; without Matrimony the family would lack that sacramental
protection which is so important for the Christian home and the right
rearing of members of society.

2777. The Sacrament of Orders.--The spiritual office and power of a
member of the clergy is called Orders on account of the order or rank
of superiority which it gives in the Church. The rite or Sacrament by
which an Order is conferred is strictly called Ordination, and hence it
is more correct to speak of the Sacrament of Ordination than of the
Sacrament of Orders. Ordination may be defined as “a Sacrament of the
New Law in which a member of the clergy receives spiritual power in
reference to the Eucharist and the grace to exercise properly the
duties of his office.”

(a) Orders is conferred only on a member of the clergy. Just as Baptism
is preceded by catechumenate and Matrimony by espousals or engagement,
so is Ordination preceded by tonsure, a ceremony instituted by the
Church whereby a man is separated from the laity and enrolled among
clerics with a view to prepare him for Holy Orders. The candidate for
tonsure must be a male who has received Baptism and Confirmation (_sub
levi_), and who has begun his course of theology; he sins if he
approaches without a divine vocation or with the purpose not to go on
for the priesthood. The privileges of clerics are those of forum and
canon, and they are capable of receiving Orders, jurisdiction and
benefice (Canons 108 sqq). In the reception of tonsure the cleric is
admonished to make his life agree with the garb which he then assumes,
or, in other words, to cultivate the special virtues of his state (see
2596 sqq.).

(b) Ordination confers spiritual power in reference to the Eucharist,
the Sacrament of Sacraments. Just as the sacred vessels of the altar
receive a permanent consecration, so likewise the ministers of the
altar are set apart by Ordination, which confers upon them an indelible
character with the power to exercise higher or lower offices in
reference to the supreme Sacrament and the sole Sacrifice of the New
Law. Hence, an Order once conferred is eternal and the Ordination
cannot be repeated.

(c) Ordination confers grace, which is _per se_ second grace, or an
increase of holiness. The special feature of the grace of Orders is its
suitability for the duties of the person ordained, for, where God
imposes a special obligation, He confers also a special grace. It is
clear that the duties of the ordained in reference to the real Body of
Christ (i.e., duties as to the Eucharist and divine worship) and the
mystical Body of Christ (i.e., duties to the faithful who receive the
Eucharist and the other Sacraments) call for a high degree of virtue
and a life edifying to all. Hence the need of a special grace in
Ordination.

2778. Distinction of the Orders.--The following distinctions of the
orders or ranks of the clergy should be noted:

(a) an Order is either sacramental or non-sacramental, according as it
was instituted by Christ Himself or by the Church. It is the teaching
of St. Thomas that all of the Orders are sacramental in character, but
there is not the same degree of certainty in each case. As to the
priesthood, there is the certainty of defined dogma; as to the
diaconate (and also episcopal consecration according to many) there is
theological certainty, but no definition of faith; as to the
subdiaconate, and the lower Orders, there is probability;

(b) an Order is Major (sacred) or Minor (non-sacred) according as its
functions are concerned with consecrated or non-consecrated matter in
the celebration of the Eucharist. The Major Orders, therefore, are the
priesthood (whose office is to consecrate the Body and Blood of
Christ), diaconate (whose office is to dispense Communion to the
faithful), and sub-diaconate (whose office is to prepare the bread and
wine of the sacrifice in the consecrated vessels, that is, the chalice
and paten). The Minor Orders are those that prepare the matter of the
Eucharist in non-consecrated vessels (acolythate), or that dispose the
people for the Eucharist by freeing them from the impediments of
demonic influence (exorcistate) or of ignorance (lectorate), or that
exclude unbelievers from participation in the sacred rites
(portership). To the Sacred Orders, on account of their closer approach
to the Eucharist, are annexed the duties of celibacy and of the Divine
Office.

2779. The Hierarchy of Orders and Jurisdiction.--The Orders of the
clergy may be considered, not only in reference to power over the real
Body of Christ (i.e., the Eucharist), but also in reference to power
over the mystical Body of Christ (i.e., the Church). Those who have
power over the members of the Church belong to the hierarchy, and this
is understood in two senses:

(a) the hierarchy of Orders is composed of those who receive in
Ordination a permanent superiority over others in reference to the
worship of God and the sanctification of souls by the ministry of the
Sacraments. From divine institution this hierarchy is composed of the
three ranks of bishops, priests, and deacons; and from ecclesiastical
institution of the lower clergy in Orders. Thus, the deacon is able to
baptize and administer Communion as extraordinary minister; the priest
is the ordinary minister of Baptism and the Eucharist, and only a
priest can act as minister of Penance and Extreme Unction; the bishop
is the minister, not only of the Sacraments mentioned, but also of
Confirmation and Orders;

(b) the hierarchy of jurisdiction is composed of those members of the
Church who receive in their accepted election or canonical commission a
power over the faithful which can be lost or resigned, and which
relates to the instruction and government of subjects in matters of
faith and morals. From divine law this hierarchy is composed of the
Supreme Pontificate and the subordinate Episcopate; from ecclesiastical
law there are other ranks of authority, such as those of parish-priest,
prelate, abbot, archbishop, primate, patriarch and cardinal.

2780. The Matter and Form of the Various Orders in the Latin
Church.--(a) In the Minor Orders the matter consists in the bestowal of
the symbols of office, and the form in the words of ordination that
accompany this bestowal. The porter is ordained when he touches with
his right hand the keys of the church which the bishop presents to him
with the words: “Conduct yourself as one who must give an accounting
for the things that are under those keys”, the reader, when he touches
the lectionary (i.e., Missal, Breviary, Bible) offered him by the
bishop with the form: “Receive this book and announce well the Word of
God, knowing that, if you perform your office faithfully and usefully,
you shall receive a portion with those who from the beginning have been
good ministers of God’s word”; the exorcist, when he touches the book
of exorcisms (e.g., the Ritual, Pontifical or Missal) presented to him
with the words: “Receive and commit to memory and have power to impose
hands on the possessed, whether baptized or catechumens”, the acolyte,
when he touches the symbols of his office (i.e., first the candle and
candlestick, next the empty cruet), while the words are said: “Receive
this candlestick and candle and know that you are deputed to light the
lamps of the church, in the name of the Lord”; “Receive this cruet to
furnish the wine and water for the Eucharist of the blood of Christ, in
the name of the Lord.” “Amen” should be added by the acolyte after each
form.

(b) In the subdiaconate, ordination is given when the candidate touches
the empty chalice and the paten (the Bishop saying: “See what a
ministry is committed to you; I admonish you, therefore, so to conduct
yourselves that you may be pleasing to God”) and the Book of Epistles,
such as Missal or Bible (the Bishop saying: “Receive the Book of
Epistles and have power to read them in the holy Church of God, both
for the living and for the dead. In the name of the Father, and of the
Son, and of the Holy Ghost”).

(c) Pope Pius XII in an official decree, an Apostolic Constitution of
Nov. 30, 1947 (see AAS, 40-5), determined the essential elements of
ordination to diaconate, priesthood and episcopate. Formerly this had
been a matter of discussion among theologians. In the diaconate
ordination is given by the single imposition of the hands of the Bishop
that occurs in the rite with the words of the “Preface,” of which these
are the essential: “Send into him, We ask, O Lord, the Holy Spirit, by
which he shall be strengthened by the gift of Thy sevenfold grace for
the faithful performance of the work of the ministry.”

(d) The matter of the priesthood is the first imposition of hands of
the Bishop which is made in silence. The form consists in the words of
the “Preface” of which these are the essential and required for
validity: “Give, we ask Thee, omnipotent Father, to this Thy servant
the dignity of the priesthood ...”

(e) In episcopal consecration the matter is the imposition of the
hands of the consecrating Bishop; the form is the “Preface,” the
essential words being: “Fill out in Thy priest the fullness of the
ministry....”

It is a disputed matter whether the episcopacy is a distinct Order from
the priesthood or simply an extension of it. The common opinion favors
the negative side and consequently maintains that the consecration of a
Bishop is not sacramental. Accordingly, the supreme Order of Priesthood
includes the simple priests or presbyters and the high priests or
bishops. The episcopacy confers no new power in reference to the
Eucharist, but it extends the character of the priesthood to new powers
in reference to Christ’s Mystical Body, the Church.

2781. The Minister of Ordination.--(a) For validity it is necessary
that the minister be a consecrated bishop; but the Orders of
ecclesiastical institution (i.e., subdiaconate and Minor Orders) may be
given by a priest authorized by law, or by special indult of the
Apostolic See. Thus, Cardinals, Vicars and Prefects Apostolic, and
Abbots have the power of conferring tonsure and Minor Orders from Canon
239.

(b) For lawfulness it is necessary that the consecrator of a bishop be
the Pope or a bishop designated by him; that the ordainer to other
ranks of the clergy be the proper bishop of the candidate (i.e., the
bishop of his place of origin and residence or of his place of
domicile), or a delegated bishop (i.e., the bishop who has received
dimissorial letters from the proper bishop or religious superior). See
Canons 951-967.

2782. The Special Duties of the Minister.-(a) As to the ordinandus, the
ordaining prelate must be morally certain from positive arguments that
the candidate is suitable according to the Canons; otherwise he would
be guilty of a very grievous sin and would expose himself to the danger
of sharing in the sins of others (I Tim., v. 22; Canon 973, n. 3).

(b) As to the ordination, the minister is bound to observe the law on
time and place, and to follow carefully and exactly the ceremonies of
his own Rite. If anything essential is omitted, it has to be supplied,
absolutely or conditionally, according as there is certain or only
doubtful lack. The omission of an accidental but notable ceremony
(e.g., the anointing of hands) would be seriously culpable (Canons
1002-1009).

2783. The Recipient of Orders.--(a) For validity it is necessary that
the recipient be of the male sex, for the divine law has reserved
sacerdotal and ministerial functions to men, and the church law has
properly followed this example in regard to the Orders that are of
church institution; the recipient must be baptized, for without Baptism
one has no capacity for other Sacraments; if he is an adult, he must
have at least an habitual intention freely formed of receiving the
Order to which he is raised.

(b) For lawfulness it is not sufficient that the recipient be in the
state of grace, since Ordination is not merely a personal matter, but
also a matter of great consequence to the whole Church. The recipient
of Orders takes his place among the representatives and ministers of
the Church, and therefore he should have the special qualities that fit
him for his dignity and office. Intellectually, the ordinandus must be
competent in theological and profane knowledge, and must have made a
satisfactory course of studies (Canons 972, 1364 sqq., 589-591).
According to the Code, first tonsure should not be given before the
study of theology has begun, Minor Orders may be given during the first
and second years of theology, subdeaconship only towards the end of the
third year, deaconship only after the beginning of the fourth year, and
priesthood only after the first half of the fourth year (Canon 976).
Morally, the ordinandus should be of commendable life and have the
internal and external excellence which is supposed by the Order he is
to receive. Virtues to which the Pontifical especially exhorts clerics
at their ordination are love and labor given to the Church and the
things of God’s house (porter), devotion to the Scriptures and sacred
study (lector), conquest of passion (exorcist), the light of good
example and the self-sacrifice of good works (acolyte), temperance,
vigilance, prayerfulness (subdeacon), liberality to the poor, chastity,
fortitude, zeal for preaching the word of God (deacon), elderliness in
dignity, leadership in virtue, and justice in stewardship (priesthood).
No one should be admitted to a Sacred Order who is unable to overcome a
serious habit of sin (especially _in materia turpi_), even though
secret; and if there is doubt about amendment, a test during a suitable
period of time should be made.

2784. Canonical Requirements for Ordination.--(a) Positive requirements
are: proper age (that is, the twenty-first, twenty-second, and
twenty-fourth years completed are necessary for subdeaconship,
deaconship, priesthood, respectively); Confirmation should have been
received before Ordination, for it is suitable that those who are to
strengthen others in the faith should have the character of soldier of
Christ; promotion from Order to Order should be from lower to higher in
proper succession, that fitness may be shown in lesser offices before
the greater are received; an interval must elapse between certain
Orders, which will give to clerics the opportunity to exercise the
powers they have received (e.g., between acolythate and subdiaconate a
year, between subdiaconate and diaconate three months); the candidate
for sacred ordination must have a title or some canonical means of
support (i.e., for secular clergy the title of benefice, or patrimony
or ministerial service; for religious the title of profession, common
life, etc.). The law allows certain dispensations from some of these
requirements (Canons 974 sqq.).

(b) Negative requirements are freedom from certain disabilities
introduced by the Church for the sake of the honor and dignity of the
sacred ministry. Some of these disqualifications are of their nature
permanent, and they are removed only by dispensation or by disposition
of the law (e.g., in certain cases by cessation of the cause, or by
baptism, or by religious profession), and these are known as
irregularities; other disqualifications, which are of their nature
temporary and cease with lapse of time or changes in circumstances, are
known as simple impediments. The effect of disqualification is to make
it unlawful to receive an Order, or to exercise an Order already
received. Irregularities are produced either by deficiency or by
delinquency, but the cause in either case must be certain; and, in case
of delinquency, it must be a personal sin committed after Baptism,
which is mortal, external, and consummated in act. The irregularities
from defect are: illegitimate birth; mental imperfection (such as
epilepsy, insanity, possession); bodily imperfection that makes one
unsuited for the service of the altar, on account of mutilation (e.g.,
those who have lost hand or foot, or thumb or index finger), or of
unsoundness (e.g., the blind, the deaf, the dumb, cripples,
paralytics), or of very noticeable deformity that excites ridicule or
horror (e.g., dwarfs, giants, noseless persons, those who are
hunchbacked); successive bigamy, that is, the fact that one has been
twice validly married, for St. Paul ruled that a cleric should be a man
of not more than one wife (I Tim., iii. 2, 12; Tit., i. 5, 6); infamy
of law, that is, the commission of certain crimes which the law
declares infamous _ipso facto_ or after sentence (such as profanation
of the Eucharist or of graves, violence done to the Pope or a Cardinal,
duelling, simultaneous bigamy, and certain sexual sins); participation
in capital punishment by pronouncing (i.e., as judge or juryman) or
executing the sentence of death. The irregularities from delinquency
are: apostasy, heresy, schism; reception of Baptism from a
non-Catholic; attempt at adulterous or sacrilegious marriage; voluntary
homicide, cooperation in an abortion, mutilation of self or of another,
attempt to commit suicide; unlawful exercise of medicine or surgery by
a cleric with fatal results; unlawful exercise of the powers of Major
Orders by a cleric or layman. The simple impediments are found in the
following: in those who may be weak in faith, namely, persons whose
parents are non-Catholics, or who are themselves converts (I Tim., iii.
6); in those who are prevented by other occupations, namely, persons
held by marriage, business forbidden to clerics, slavery, military
service (II Tim., ii. 4); in those who are actually in bad repute
before the community on account of misconduct (I Tim., iii. 7). See
Canons 983-991.

2785. Duties of Ordinandi According to Canon Law.--(a) Before
Ordination.--Application to the bishop must be made beforehand at an
opportune time, and testimonials of Baptism, Confirmation, Orders
already received, certificates of good character and studies, and
letters from superiors testifying to freedom from impediments and
general fitness must be presented. The candidate must undergo a special
examination and make a spiritual retreat before the day of his
ordination. The profession of faith is made before subdeaconship.

(b) During Ordination.--All the ceremonies should be observed, and
especially the physical touching of the instruments (chalice and paten,
etc.), which seems to be essential in Minor Orders and the
Subdiaconate. In the imposition of the hands in the other Major Orders,
the head of the subject should be touched physically, although even
moral touch is sufficient for validity of the Sacrament (Pius XII,
Apostolic Constitution already cited). The law requires that the
recipients of Major Orders receive Communion, and the obligations seems
to be grave for the new priests, since they celebrate with the bishop.

(c) After Ordination.--The nocturn (three Psalms and their antiphons)
which the ordaining prelate imposes on the newly ordained subdeacons
and deacons should be taken from the first nocturn of the day, whether
it be feria, feast or Sunday, unless the bishop appoints otherwise. The
three Masses of the Holy Ghost, Blessed Virgin, and for the dead,
imposed on the newly ordained priests, need not be applied for the
bishop’s intention, and a stipend may be taken when they are said; but
it is fitting that they be applied in thanksgiving and for the benefit
of the bishop as well as of the whole Church on earth and in Purgatory.
These prayers and Masses do not seem to oblige under sin, though some
hold them to bind _sub gravi_. On the life duties of the clergy, see
above (2596 sqq.).

2786. Registration of Ordinations.--As in the case of marriage,
ordinations should be registered in a special book and notice of them
(if subdiaconate was received) should be sent to the pastor of the
parish of Baptism. A certificate of ordination is also to be given to
the cleric ordained (Canons 1010, 1011).

2787. The Sacrament of Matrimony.--Marriage in general is defined as
“the conjugal union of man and woman, contracted between two qualified
persons, which obliges them to one another for life.”

(a) The word union may be taken actively for the passing act of
internal and external consent, and then it refers to marriage in its
state of becoming, as it is a contract and (among Christians) a
Sacrament; or it may be taken, as it were passively, for the bond that
results from the mutual consent pledged by the parties, and then it
refers to marriage as a permanent state of life.

(b) The marriage union is conjugal; that is, its end is the procreation
and rearing of children, or the making of a family, and it therefore
gives the right to the natural acts of generation. A contract which has
other ends (e.g., a business agreement of labor or of partnership), or
which excludes procreation (e.g., an agreement of onanistic
concubinage), is not a marriage.

(c) Marriage is between qualified persons, for certain individuals are
excluded by natural, divine or human law from making a valid contract
of marriage.

(d) Marriage is between two, one man and one woman. This unity of
marriage is its first property, resulting from its nature as a
relationship intended primarily for the propagation of the race and its
proper upbringing, and secondarily for the peace and contentment of the
married couple, their mutual assistance to one another, and their
protection against carnal temptations (299). For polyandry is opposed
to both these ends, and therefore to natural law, while polygamy does
not accord well with the secondary ends of matrimony and is forbidden
for all by the law of Christ (“They shall be two in one flesh,” Matt.,
xix. 3 sqq.). On the permission of polygamy in the later Old Testament
ages, see 303, 311.

(e) Marriage obliges the parties to one another for life. This
indissolubility of marriage is its second property, and also follows
from the natural ends of marriage. For the right propagation of the
human race is a matter that concerns not merely the married couple or
human society, but also God Himself, who is matrimony’s immediate
author and lawgiver, and God has decreed that marriage be unbreakable
except in the few instances allowed by Himself: “What God hath joined
together let no man put asunder” (Matt., xix. 6). Since the good of
marriage is inferior to the good of faith, the divine law permits a
dissolution of the bond in the case known as the Pauline Privilege (I
Cor., vii. 12-15); similarly, in a very few instances where there is a
serious good more important than the preservation of the bond (the
faith of a convert from infidelity, the observance of the counsel of
chastity, the public welfare), and where the bond itself has not the
strength of sacramentality (i.e., in a non-Christian marriage), or has
not been consummated in a Christian marriage, the divine law authorizes
the Church, the representative of God, to decree a dissolution (see
363, 314). Not only are these cases few, but the conditions are strict
(see Canons 1120-1127), and hence these exceptions are no menace to the
ends of marriage. But once consummation has been added to consent in a
Christian marriage, thereby perfecting the natural contract and
extending the sacramental signification from the mystical and severable
union of Christ with the soul by grace to the physical and perpetual
union of Christ with the Church by the Incarnation, the indissolubility
becomes complete and admits of no exception. The bill of divorce under
the Mosaic Law seems to have been a true and complete dissolution of
the marriage tie, but there is good reason to think that it was a
toleration of the Jewish civil code, not a permission given by God. The
valid marriages of infidels as such are not subject to the judgment of
the Church; and the civil authority has no power to dissolve them (even
when they are childless), otherwise individuals and the family and the
State will suffer, as experience proves.

2788. Distinctions.--(a) In reference to validity, marriage may be true
(i.e., validly contracted), or presumed (i.e., taken by the law to be
validly contracted on account of some fact, as when the validity of a
marriage was not attacked during the lifetime of the parties), putative
(i.e., really invalid, but contracted in good faith by at least one of
the spouses and not yet known by both to be certainly null), attempted
(i.e., contracted invalidly in bad faith, at least one of the parties
being aware of an invalidating impediment).

(b) In reference to perfection, marriage is legitimate (when it is
validly contracted between non-baptized persons), ratified or
sacramental (when it is celebrated between baptized persons),
consummated (when the consent given in the contract is subsequently
completed by the conjugal act). It seems that marriage lawfully
contracted between a baptized and a non-baptized person is not ratified
or sacramental, for, as the consent must be mutual, so should the
Sacrament be mutual. But a marriage free from substantial defects is
always a Sacrament, even though the contractants do not wish this, when
it is contracted between Christians, whether they be Catholics or
non-Catholics; and a marriage contracted between non-Christians becomes
a Sacrament on the Baptism of the parties.

(c) In reference to its manner, marriage may be clandestine (i.e., not
celebrated before the pastor and two witnesses), or secret (i.e.,
celebrated before the pastor and two witnesses pledged to secrecy, and
without the publicity the Church ordinarily requires), public (i.e.,
celebrated before pastor and witnesses and with publicity such as
announcement to the people and registration in the usual marriage
book). The secret marriage is also known as a marriage of conscience
(Canons 1104-1107).

(d) In reference to the law under which it is performed, marriage is
either canonical or civil. A purely civil marriage between Catholics is
invalid, as far as the bond is concerned, since their contract, as
being a Sacrament, is subject to the Church. But the civil marriage, as
far as the purely civil consequences are concerned, is a lawful
ceremony, and is obligatory if required by law. A morganatic marriage
is made between two persons of unequal condition (e.g., between a king
and a plebeian woman) on condition that the inferior spouse and progeny
shall not share entirely in the titles and property of the superior
spouse.

2789. The Elements of the Contract of Marriage.--(a) The subject-matter
of the contract is the conjugal right or the lawful power of exercising
with the other party acts suitable for generation.

(b) The ends of the contract are, primarily, the good of the race and
of the children, and secondarily the good of the couple through mutual
assistance and protection in spiritual and temporal matters. To these
general ends may be added others which a particular person has in view,
such as dignity, wealth, honor, lawful pleasure.

(c) The essence of the contract is the consent, for every pact consists
in mutual agreement. But if marriage be regarded as a permanent state,
its essence is the bond of union, and consent is the efficient cause
productive of the bond. Marriage consent must have the qualities
(internal, external, mutual, free) that are necessary in every
contract, as explained in 1883.

2790. Requirements for Valid Marriage Consent.--(a) Internal
Consent.--If both or one of the parties internally and positively wills
to exclude marriage, or the right to the conjugal act, or an essential
property of marriage, the contract is null, since there is no purpose
to contract a real marriage. Similarly, if both or one of the parties
negatively (or by lack of all intention) excludes consent, there is no
marriage. It should be noted that he who intends to get a divorce later
on does not intend a permanent union or marriage, whereas he who
intends to be unfaithful or to practise onanism may nevertheless intend
to oblige himself to the duties of fidelity and of the lawful use of
marriage, and therefore to a true marriage. Fictitious consent, unless
a serious reason excuses (e.g., when one is forced under grave fear to
marry, when one becomes aware of a diriment impediment at the altar and
cannot retire without great scandal), is a mortal sin, as being a lie
in a very important matter and an injustice. If the other party was
deceived, the party guilty of feigned consent is bound to make
reparation for the damage done, and, unless the marriage has become
impossible or inadvisable, the means of reparation should be a genuine
consent revalidating the marriage. This is especially true when there
is a conflict between the internal and the external forums on account
of the inability to establish juridically the nullity of the invalid
marriage.

(b) External Consent.--Both as contract and as Sacrament, matrimony
requires some sensible manifestation of the internal consent. Since the
contract of marriage between Christians falls under the jurisdiction of
the Church, the manner of expressing the consent is regulated by Canon
Law. The solemnities required for valid and lawful marriage will be
treated below in 2826, 2827.

(c) Mutual Consent.--Both parties must agree to the marriage, since no
one is obliged by a contract without his consent. But mutuality does
not imply simultaneity, for, if the previous consent given by one party
continues, the subsequent consent given by the other is joined to it
and the consent becomes mutual.

(d) Free Consent.--If every contract must be deliberate and voluntary,
this is especially true in the case of marriage, since it entails very
heavy duties and its obligations are lifelong (cfr. 2195). In marriage
there must be full and perfect consent, though it is not necessary that
one think expressly on the essentials of the contract when assenting to
it.

2791. Defects in Consent.--Consent supposes sufficient knowledge, and
hence it may be vitiated by a defect as to knowledge.

(a) Mental Derangement.--Those who are not in possession of their
mental faculties cannot marry, whether the derangement be habitual
(e.g., idiots, the completely insane, monomaniacs on the subject of
marriage) or actual (e.g., infants, those who are completely drunk or
doped, the hypnotized or delirious, somnambulists). But defectives who
are not unbalanced all the time or on all subjects, may be able now and
then to realize the meaning of marriage and to give deliberate consent,
though the presumption is against them. Those whose mentality is of a
low grade, but who are able to judge and reason correctly (e.g., stupid
persons, the deaf and dumb, or blind), and those who have some little
fanaticism or eccentricity are not excluded; otherwise very few of
either sex could marry.

(b) Ignorance.--Substantial ignorance, or the absence of knowledge
about the essentials of marriage (viz., that it is a permanent
association of man and woman for the purpose of raising children of
their own), makes the contract null, for one does not consent to what
one does not know. Accidental ignorance, on the contrary, does not
nullify, for he who understands the main facts about marriage can
intend to contract it as others do, even though he does not know its
details or secondary features. Ignorance invalidates marriage,
therefore, if one of the parties does not know that marriage is meant
for the procreation of children or that children are procreated by
carnal intercourse; but it does not invalidate if the parties are
ignorant about physiology or scientific explanations. Substantial
ignorance in persons of marriageable age (especially young women) is
not uncommon even in these days, but it is not presumed after puberty
(Canon 1082, Sec.2).

(c) Error.--Error which excludes consent to the essential object of
the contract nullifies, and hence a substantial error about the person
with whom one is contracting makes marriage of no effect (e.g., if
Titus thinks he is marrying Claudia, but is really marrying her twin
sister, Sempronia; if Balbus intends to marry Caia only on condition
that she is a virgin and she is not a virgin; if Julius intends to
marry the woman who is present solely as differentiated by a personal
or individual characteristic which he mistakenly believes her to
have, such as seniority among her sisters). Error which does not
prevent essential consent does not nullify the contract. Hence, a mere
accidental error about the other party (e.g., Titus marries Claudia,
thinking she is rich, whereas she is poor, and he would never have
married her had he known her poverty) does not make marriage null,
though the Church makes the marriage of no effect when a slave is
married in the belief that he or she is free (Canon 1083, Sec.2, n, 2).
A mere speculative error about the properties of marriage (e.g., if one
believes that marriage may be lawfully dissolved for adultery) or about
the validity of one’s own marriage (e.g., if the bride erroneously
believes that the marriage she is contracting is null) does not deprive
the contract of its force, if there is really a purpose to marry as
best one may; for such an error does not act upon the will or take away
consent.

2792. Forced Consent.--Consent also supposes self-determination, and
hence in certain cases force or fear makes a marriage null and unlawful.

(a) Effect on Validity.--Coercion nullifies marriage from natural law,
when overpowering physical might extorts an external assent, or when
moral violence so terrifies as to unsettle the reason; from church law
at least, when being grave, external and unjustly caused, it compels
one to marry in order to escape the evil it inflicts or threatens. In
other cases fear does not void marriage, even though it be the cause of
the contract, as when the fear is slight, or when it is induced by
shipwreck or by the fear of sin, or when a seducer marries only because
he is threatened with prosecution unless he marries the girl whom he
seduced.

(b) Effect on Lawfulness.--He who by intimidation impels another to
marry, sins gravely if the fear is unjust and grave, or unjust and
productive of serious evils; he sins venially if the fear, though
unjust, is light and not productive of serious evils; he sins not at
all; if the fear is justly caused, unless he offends charity by his
manner of acting; revengeful spirit, etc. He who marries knowing that
the other party is forced into the contract, is guilty of serious
injustice; and he who marries unwillingly, but with the purpose to live
as if he were validly married, sins gravely by his will to live in
impurity.

2793. Conditional Consent.--Conditional consent is that in which the
agreement to marriage is made dependent on some fact or event.

(a) A condition makes marriage invalid if it neutralizes consent (e.g.,
if the condition is _de praesenti_ but unfulfilled; if it is _de
futuro_ and against the substance of marriage; if it is impossible but
seriously added); it suspends marriage if it is _de futuro_, possible,
and not against the substance of marriage; it neither nullifies nor
suspends if it is _de praesenti_ or _de praeterito_ and fulfilled.
In law the presumption is that _de futuro_ necessary or impossible
conditions and shameful conditions are not serious, or are modes
rather than conditions (see 1886), and of course in the external forum
invalidity on account of a condition has to be proved. Conditions
against the substance of marriage are such as deny essential conjugal
rights or duties (i.e., the right to have conjugal intercourse,
the duty of fidelity to the consort, of loyalty to the bond); but
they should not be confused with the purpose to violate marriage
engagements, or with a resolution, or a vow, or a pact in the form of a
mode, not to make use of the right to conjugal intercourse.

(b) A condition added to marriage consent is gravely sinful, unless
there is a very urgent reason for it; otherwise most serious evils
would result. Moreover, there is responsibility in justice for culpable
damages, as when one party gives consent conditionally without the
knowledge or against the will of the other party. A suspensive
condition (e.g., “if my parents will consent”) is regularly unlawful
without the bishop’s permission, and marriage rights may not be used in
a marriage dependent on a condition whose fulfillment is not known to
the parties. It is unlawful to make a vow or promise of chastity in the
married life unless there is moral certainty that it will be kept.

2794. The Elements of Marriage as a Sacrament.--(a) The matter and form
of marriage are found in the contract, for the Sacrament is the natural
pact elevated to the dignity of a sacred sign productive of grace. The
remote matter is, therefore, the bodies of the spouses, or the bodily
rights which they give one another (I Cor., vii. 4). Since the
indeterminate part of a contract is the offer or bestowal, and the
determinate part the approval, the proximate matter of Matrimony is
found in the grant of mutual conjugal rights externally manifested, and
the form in the acceptance of that right externally manifested.

(b) The ministers and the recipients of Matrimony are the parties
themselves, since it is they alone who make and receive the contract.
In order to be a recipient of the Sacrament it is necessary that a
person be baptized and be free from all natural, divine and human
impediments that make one incapable of the contract of marriage.

(c) The effects of Matrimony are _per se_ second grace, which increases
sanctity and is of help especially for the due performance throughout
life of the duties of the conjugal state and for domestic blessedness
and happiness.

2795. Duties in Connection with Marriage.--The duties in reference to
marriage as a permanent state of life were treated already in 2613
sqq., and we shall consider here only the duties that have to do with
marriage as a contract and a Sacrament. These duties can be arranged
under three heads: (a) before marriage, there are obligations in
reference to the preparation for marriage, which consists remotely in
engagement or espousals, and proximately in compliance with duties owed
to divine, ecclesiastical, and civil law (e.g., license from the State,
establishment of freedom to marry, proclamation of banns,
dispensations, confession); (b) during marriage, in addition to the
common obligations of intention and a state of grace, there are special
duties in reference to the external form or rite of marriage; (c) after
marriage, there is a duty of making canonical records and of validating
defective marriages.

2796. Betrothal or Engagement.--Engagement is a promise of their future
marriage made by competent persons.

(a) It is a promise, either unilateral or bilateral, the latter being
espousals or betrothal in the strict sense of the word (1749). Like
every promise, engagement is not binding unless it be made with
requisite deliberation and freedom from force and fear. But a valid
engagement to marry has not the same strength, either from divine or
from human law, as a contract of marriage, and hence fraud or light
fear unjustly produced and which induces one to become engaged leaves
the engagement rescindable at the will of the innocent party. Canon Law
requires certain formalities for a valid engagement, and without them
there is no obligation in either forum. The law is that the contract of
betrothal be in writing, and be signed by the parties and also by the
pastor or local Ordinary or two witnesses, and that, if one or both of
the parties be unable to write, this be noted in the document and an
extra witness be added (Canon 1017).

(b) It is a promise made by competent persons. Hence, there is no valid
engagement if a party is incapable either naturally (e.g., one who has
not the use of reason) or canonically (e.g., one who has not attained
the age of seven years). It is against good morals to be engaged to two
persons at the same time, with the understanding that one will marry
the second after the expected death of the first; and much more is it
immoral for a married person to become engaged to marry another, the
marriage to take place after the death of the present consort. Some
canonists hold that engagements are not valid before the age of
puberty, on account of the lack of sufficient discretion.

(c) It is a promise of future marriage, that is, a contract to marry,
not a contract of marriage. A nuptial engagement is invalid if the
marriage promised is invalid or unlawful, for no one can bind himself
to sin. An invalid marriage is promised if there is a diriment and not
dispensable impediment in the way, or if in spite of a removable
impediment the engagement is unconditional, unless the mind of the
parties is to marry after the impediment has ceased. The Church seems
to regard as null an engagement made on the condition that the Pope
will dispense an impediment. An unlawful marriage is promised when the
parties cannot marry without sin (e.g., when the marriage will bring
great sorrow or disgrace on parents), or when they promise to marry in
a sinful way (e.g., with the understanding that they will abuse
marriage). But an unlawful promise of a lawful marriage is not
necessarily invalid, and hence an engagement dependent on an immoral
condition not opposed to the substance of marriage would become
obligatory on fulfillment of the condition (see 1878 d, 1886).

2797. It should be noted that the former diriment and impedient
impediments produced by espousals are no longer in force, and even a
valid engagement gives no right to an action for the celebration of
marriage.

2798. Is an Engagement Necessary before Marriage?--(a) An engagement is
not strictly necessary. Neither the validity nor the lawfulness of
marriage depends on espousals, for there is no law that requires this.
Hence, if for a reasonable cause a man and woman married without any
previous binding pledge on either side, the marriage would be good and
lawful. The formal engagements of Canon Law are not common in this
country, but an informal engagement usually precedes matrimony.

(b) Engagement is most suitable and useful. Men are accustomed to fit
themselves by long and serious study for the business of a profession
or calling, and to enter into preliminary agreements about contracts of
major importance (as in contracts to sell), and certainly marriage, a
contract and vocation that binds until death and upon which the
spiritual and temporal welfare of society and individuals rests, is
among the most momentous of human agreements. The special advantage of
engagement is that it affords a means of preventing hasty and
ill-advised unions, of discovering impediments, of securing the consent
of parents, and of preparing oneself in knowledge and virtue for the
duties of the married state. If engagements were regarded and treated
as a period of training for serious and sacred duties, not as a time
for frivolity or enjoyment, there would be fewer divorces and less talk
about trial marriages. On the duties of engaged persons to one another,
see 2628, 2629.

2799. Duties to Parents or Guardians in Reference to Marriage.--(a)
There is, _per se_, a duty of consulting with one’s parents about one’s
marriage; for he who marries without their knowledge, generally exposes
himself to the danger of making a serious mistake, and moreover as a
rule the interests of parents themselves are bound up intimately with
the marriages of their children. Hence, unless a very serious reason
excuses, he who marries without advising with his parents sins
grievously by his rashness or want of filial affection. The same is
true, if a child wilfully disregards the wishes of his parents by
stubbornly marrying when for a good reason they disapprove. If their
opposition is imperative and emphatic, or if they are grief-stricken at
thought of the imprudent marriage, the sin is serious; but if their
opposition is mild and the match not a very bad one, the sin is venial.
The consent or counsel of parents is not necessary for validity,
however, since it is not they who are getting married, and no law makes
their consent or counsel an essential part of the compact. _Per
accidens_, their consent or counsel is not even necessary for
lawfulness, as when the children live far away from their parents, or
when marriage has to be contracted without delay, or when the parents
are unreasonable in their opposition.

(b) There is, _per se_, no duty of obeying one’s parents in the matter
of marriage: first, because marriage supposes choice, admiration, and
love, and these do not submit to dictation, even from parents; next,
because in things that pertain to nature, such as self-preservation and
procreation, children are not subject to their parents; finally,
because the authority of parents does not extend to the whole lifetime
of their children and marriage is a lifelong union. Hence, parents may
not compel their children to marry or to remain single; they may not
make the match for their children against the latters’ will, they may
not force a child to marry a person whom he or she detests, they may
not veto a marriage that does not appeal to them if the son or daughter
has good reasons for it. Those parents sin, then, who refuse their
blessing to a marriage out of selfishness, and those parents sin
gravely who force their children into loveless unions and so make them
unhappy in this world and endanger their salvation for the world to
come. _Per accidens_, there is a duty of obeying parents in reference
to marriage when one is obliged even apart from their command to do
what they prescribe, when the marriage which they forbid is also
forbidden by law (e.g., if the child is needed at home to support his
indigent parents, if the mate selected will bring disgrace upon the
family and the match can easily be broken off), or when the marriage
which they require is also demanded by duty (e.g., if a son will surely
enter upon a wild and reckless life unless he marries). See above,
2228, 2627, 2633, 2636, 2347, 2348, 2361 sqq.

2800. Duties of Parents in Reference to Marriage.--(a) If there is
question of the marriage of a child, parents should guide themselves by
the rule of St. Paul: “Let her marry whom she will, only in the Lord”
(I Cor., vii. 39). Undue pressure should be avoided, but bad marriages
should be opposed, and parents should assist their children to marry
well. (b) If there is question of a parent’s second marriage, the
children’s interests should be considered in making the choice of the
step-father or step-mother, and, if the children are grown up, they
should be consulted, or at least they should not be unreasonably
saddened or harmed by the new marriage.

2801. Obstacles to Marriage.--Since marriage is a most important
contract and a Sacrament, it is necessary to ascertain beforehand with
moral certainty that there is no obstacle to its valid and lawful
celebration. This imposes duties on the pastor, the couple themselves,
and the faithful who know them.

(a) The pastor in virtue of his office is gravely obliged to make
inquiries about the competency and fitness of the prospective husband
and wife, and even in a death-bed marriage the obligation does not
cease. Church law prescribes the method of inquiry, which should
include an examination and instruction of the couple and a publication
of the marriage. Of course, there is an obligation of confidential
secrecy.

(b) The couple are bound to present themselves to the pastor within a
reasonable time before the marriage in order to make these
arrangements, and should bring with them the necessary papers (for
example, their baptismal certificates, license to marry, testimonials).
They are gravely obliged to make known either to the pastor or to the
confessor any impediment, even though it be of a secret and culpable
nature, in order that their marriage may be valid and lawful, unless
they wish to give up the marriage or seek a dispensation in some other
way.

(c) The people who know of an impediment to a marriage are bound under
pain of mortal sin to make it known in time to the pastor or Ordinary;
for the natural and divine laws, as well as the law of the Church, hold
one to speak when this will prevent irreverence to the Sacrament of
Matrimony, sin and other serious evils to the neighbor. The obligation
ceases, however, when the revelation is either impossible or useless.
Cases of impossibility are those in which revelation will cause great
spiritual harm (e.g., public scandal), or great temporal harm of a
public kind (e.g., violation of professional secret), or a great
temporal harm of a private kind (e.g., persecution), unless a more
serious evil will result from concealment. Revelation is useless when
the marriage can be stopped or made legal in some other way (e.g., by
persuading the couple to break their engagement or get a dispensation),
or when one foresees that the revelation will have no effect.

2802. Duties of the Pastor in the Examination of Engaged Persons.--(a)
He should question both the man and the woman separately and prudently
about their freedom to marry, even though he is certain that there are
no impediments. He should inquire especially whether there has been a
previous marriage, and should also ask specifically about any
impediment that seems likely. About impediments of a defamatory kind he
should not interrogate before others, leaving that matter if necessary
to his doctrinal instruction or to the confessor. (b) He should ask
both of them, and especially the woman, whether they have decided on
marriage freely, without force or pressure from any person. But
children who live with their parents should be asked whether or not
they have obtained their parents’ consent to the proposed marriage.

2803. Special Proofs of Freedom to Marry.--(a) Proof of Baptism.--A
baptismal certificate should be presented by the parties (if baptized
in another parish), even by one who is a baptized non-Catholic. If a
certificate cannot be had, other proofs are necessary. In danger of
death, the sworn testimony of the parties suffices; outside danger of
death, the testimony of a reliable witness, or of the person himself,
if he can remember his Baptism, or, it seems, a certificate of
Confirmation or First Communion will do. If Baptism cannot be proved
and there is a prudent doubt, it should be administered conditionally.

(b) Proof of Single State.--If it is manifest that a previous civil
marriage was null and was dissolved by divorce, the proof of the facts
suffices. If the husband or wife of a previous marriage has died, but
the pastor has no personal knowledge of this, positive proof of the
decease in the form of a public document or of sworn testimony of two
or at least one reliable witness is necessary, and if the pastor cannot
obtain these he must have recourse to the Ordinary.

2804. Matrimonial Impediments.--(a) Definition.--An impediment is a
circumstance directly affecting the contract of marriage and rendering
it illicit or invalid. Thus, an impediment differs from an unfitness
that refers immediately to marriage as a sacred rite or Sacrament (such
as lack of proper intention or a state of mortal sin), or that does not
directly affect the parties (such as forbidden time).

(b) Division.--In reference to effects, an impediment is either
impedient (i.e., one that forbids marriage under pain of grave sin but
does not render it null and void) or diriment (i.e., one that not only
forbids marriage, but also makes it null and void).

2805. Sinfulness of Marrying with an Impediment.--(a) If the impediment
is certain, grave sin is committed; for deception and disobedience are
committed in a grave and sacred matter, and, if the impediment is
diriment, the marriage contract is made null. Great necessity, however,
would sometimes excuse.

(b) If the impediment is uncertain, no sin is committed when the
impediment is one of ecclesiastical law and the doubt is one of law,
for in such a case the legislator removes the obligation (Canon 15);
nor when the impediment is impotency (Canon 1068), in view of the fact
that the general law of propagation of the race leaves a natural
presumption against impotency, which can be overcome only by a certain
impediment. It would be an intolerable hardship if marriage were made
impossible by a doubt where proof is so difficult. There is a serious
sin, however, in other cases, because one is either exposing the
Sacrament to nullity or is refusing, contrary to a serious command of
the Church, to seek a dispensation.

2806. The Impedient or Prohibitive Impediments (Canons 1058-1066).--(a)
Vow.--The following simple vows make marriage illicit: the vow of
virginity, that of perfect chastity, the vow not to marry, the vow to
receive Sacred Orders, the vow to enter religious life, the simple vows
of religion. A vow to abstain from the use of marriage is not against
the substance of marriage, but it is difficult to keep in the married
state; the vows to enter religion, or take Sacred Orders, or not to
wed, are incompatible with marriage. Hence, the Church forbids one who
has these vows to marry, unless the vow be first dispensed. Those who
marry while bound by one of these vows sin gravely, and are held to
keep the vow if this is possible or the other party’s rights do not
prevent.

(b) Legal Relationship.--In those countries where relationship from
adoption makes marriage illicit, there is also an impedient impediment
of Canon Law. The Church wishes, in so far as possible, to preserve
harmony between her own law and that of the State. Hence, she includes
in her Code the civil law regulations that forbid marriage to certain
persons on account of the intimate relation that exists between them
through civil law adoption. The law of some European (e.g., France,
Germany, Switzerland) and South American countries have a prohibitive
impediment of adoption, but in the United States, the British Empire,
and many other countries adoption is no such hindrance to marriage.

(c) Mixed Religion.--Marriage between two baptized persons, one a
Catholic and the other a member of an heretical or schismatical sect,
is severely forbidden by the Church. Mixed marriages in themselves are
opposed to divine and natural law, inasmuch as they offer an occasion
for communication in false worship and a danger of perversion; and
hence they have been disapproved from the very beginning of the Church
(II John, X. 11; I Cor., v. 10; Tit., iii. 10). But the divine
prohibition ceases if appropriate measures are used to safeguard the
faith of the Catholic and the children, and the Church will grant a
dispensation, though reluctantly and only for just and grave causes.

2807. Duties in Reference to Mixed Marriages.--(a) The Pastor.--A
dispensation should not be sought unless there is first a sufficient
reason, all things considered, and generally the reason should be the
public good (such as the relative fewness of Catholics in a district,
hope of conversion of the non-Catholic, avoidance of scandal).
Secondly, there must be guarantees given by the non-Catholic that the
faith of the Catholic will not be interfered with, and both parties
must promise that all the children will receive Catholic and no other
baptism and education. Finally, these promises must be such as to
produce moral certainty of fulfillment, and as a rule it should be
required that they be given in writing. After the marriage has been
celebrated the pastor is held both in charity and in justice to do what
he can to have the promises faithfully lived up to.

(b) The Parties.--Neither before nor after the marriage in the Catholic
Church is it lawful to have any non-Catholic religious ceremony (see
956 sqq.); and if the pastor knows that this has been done or will be
done, he may not assist at the marriage without permission from the
Ordinary, which is granted for a most grave reason (scandal being
avoided). After the marriage the parties are bound in justice to keep
the promises made, and the Catholic is held in charity to seek
prudently, by good example and advice, to convert the non-Catholic.

2808. Marriages with Bad Catholics.--(a) If the bad Catholic is
unworthy in the matter of faith, because he has notoriously given up
the Church (even though he has not joined any other religion), or
because he is a member of a forbidden society, there is a danger of
perversion. In such a case the pastor may not assist at the marriage
unless the Ordinary decides that there is a sufficient reason, that the
danger of perversion is made remote, and that the Catholic education of
the children is provided for.

(b) If the bad Catholic is unworthy in the matter of morals, because he
is a public sinner (e.g., one who neglects the Easter duty), or
notoriously under censure and therefore a person to whom the Sacraments
must be denied, the pastor is confronted with the law that one may not
cooperate formally, even by assistance, in the profanation of a
Sacrament. As the guilt of the unworthy person is public in these
cases, there must be public reparation before the marriage can be
sanctioned by the presence of the Church’s representative. The
reparation is to be made either by the sinner going to confession or by
the censured person obtaining absolution. But since the priest’s
presence can be only a material cooperation, it may be permitted by the
Ordinary for a grave reason when the unworthy person refuses to comply
with the conditions.

2809. Other Obstacles to Marriage.--Other obstacles which forbid
marriage, though they are not strictly canonical impediments, are the
following:

(a) valid engagement gravely forbids marriage with a third party. This
is a natural obstacle which results from the very nature of a binding
promise;

(b) special prohibition of the Church at times gravely forbids a
particular marriage, as when the Holy See in granting a dispensation
for a present marriage forbids a future marriage. If an irritant clause
is added, the prohibition has the force of a diriment impediment. The
Ordinary also may forbid a particular marriage for a time, as when
there is suspicion of a secret impediment, or when great damage will
likely ensue from a marriage. This prohibition is for a special case or
time or person, and thus it differs from the impediments of the law;

(c) closed times (Lent and Advent) are the seasons when, on account of
the penitential and mournful character of the liturgy then in use, the
solemn blessing of marriage is not regularly permitted. This is not
really an impediment, since marriage itself may be contracted at any
time of the year, according to the general law.

2810. Diriment Impediments to Marriage.--The diriment or nullifying
impediments to marriage are personal incapacities in a person which
render him or her incapable, from divine or ecclesiastical law, of
contracting marriage with anyone (absolute impediments), or of
contracting marriage with a certain individual (relative impediments).

2811. The absolute diriment impediments are the following: (a) those
that are due to a personal defect making one unable to promise with
sufficient discretion (impediment of age) or to perform what is
promised (impediment of impotency); (b) those that are due to a
voluntary act which consecrates one to God with the obligation of
perpetual celibacy (the impediments of Orders and vows).

2812. The relative impediments are the following: (a) that one which is
due to an obligation to one’s present husband or wife (the impediment
of bond); (b) that one which is due to too great a difference between
two parties (impediment of disparity of cult); those that are due to
too close a kinship between two parties, whether natural (impediments
of consanguinity and affinity) or like to the natural (impediments of
public decency, spiritual kinship, legal kinship); (d) those that are
due to a relationship caused by a crime that makes it unsuitable for
two parties to marry. If one party is perpetrator and the other the
victim, there is the impediment of abduction; if the two parties are
accomplices, there is the impediment of crime.

2813. The Impediment of Age.--(a) Nature.--This impediment exists in
males who have not completed their sixteenth year, and in females who
have not completed their fourteenth year. These ages are set by the
general law, because all parts of the world have to be considered and
sufficient discretion may be presumed at those ages everywhere. But
substantial ignorance even after those years invalidates consent, and
moreover, in colder countries where development is slower, marriage is
generally inadvisable before the parties are 18 and 16 respectively.
The marriageable ages according to the statute law in most of our
States are 18 and 16 with parental consent, and 21 and 18 without it.

(b) Effect.--This impediment is of ecclesiastical law in so far as the
precise determination of age is concerned, but of natural law in so far
as the use of reason is demanded. Hence, the Church may dispense, and
hence also the impediment as ecclesiastical does not bind the
unbaptized, even when being underaged they marry Christians.

2814. The Impediment of Impotency.--(a) Nature.--Impotency is the
inability to exercise the sexual act in a way suitable for procreation.
The requisites for this act are _immissio membri virilis in vaginam
mulieris cum seminis effusione_, and hence those are impotent who lack
sexual organs (such as the emasculated or spayed), or who on account of
psychical or physical abnormalities are unable to have complete
intercourse (e.g., anaphrodisiacs, some hermaphrodites, those who
suffer from hypospadias, vaginism, etc.). Sterility, or the mere
inability to procreate from sexual intercourse (as in old persons), is
not the same thing as impotency, and is not an impediment to marriage.
Authorities are not agreed whether or not the operations of male
vasectomy and evariotomy produce impotency or sterility. But many
regard the former operation as unlawful except for a most grave cause
(such as the saving of life), since it takes away a power given by
nature for the benefit of society, exposes the individual to very
serious temptations, and opens the way to terrible abuses.

(b) Effect.--Impotency anterior to marriage and perpetual, whether in
the man or in the woman, whether known to the other party or not, voids
marriage from the law of nature itself, and hence is not dispensable.
But impotency that arises after marriage or that is only temporary does
not invalidate, and impotency that is relative (i.e., in reference to
one person only) does not nullify marriage except in reference to a
determinate person. In justice to the other spouse, married persons who
have an easily curable impotency should have this defect removed.

2815. The Impediments of Orders and Vows.--(a) Orders.--Those who are
in Sacred Orders (priesthood, deaconship and, in the Latin Church,
subdeaconship) cannot marry validly. The impediment is decreed by
ecclesiastical law alone, and hence the Church has the power to
dispense. One who was ordained through compulsion or in ignorance of
the duty of celibacy, is permitted to marry, if he does not wish to
ratify his ordination; but he then loses all right to exercise his
Order (2235).

(b) Vows.--Professed religious with solemn vows or simple vows that
annul marriage cannot marry validly. It is more probable that this
impediment, in so far as solemn vows are concerned, is of divine right;
but the Pope, as the Vicar of Christ, is able to dispense (see 2194,
2234, 2235, 1787 e).

2816. The Impediment of Bond.--(a) A person who is already validly
married cannot marry again until the bond of the existing marriage is
removed by the death of the other spouse or by dissolution. An
exception is the case of the Pauline Privilege; but even then the bond
of the first marriage remains till the second is contracted (see 2787
e).

(b) This impediment is of natural and divine law, and it binds all men,
the unbaptized as well as the baptized. No dispensation can be granted
from the impediment as long as it continues; and moreover those who
would contract a second marriage must offer proof that the bond of the
first marriage was non-existent, or that it has ceased. Nullity of a
previous marriage must be established by canonical process (Canons 1986
sqq.); dissolution of an unconsummated marriage through vow or Papal
dispensation is proved sufficiently by an authentic document; cessation
of bond through death of consort must be demonstrated with moral
certainty, if it is not manifest (see 2803). The procedure to be
observed in cases of the Pauline Privilege is explained by commentaries
on Canons 1120 sqq. of the Code.

2817. The Impediment of Disparity of Cult.--(a) A marriage of a
Catholic (i.e., of a person baptized in or converted to the Catholic
Church) with an unbaptized person is null and void. This impediment
bars the marriage of a professed ex-Catholic with an infidel, but not
the marriage of a non-Catholic with an infidel; and by infidel is
understood here not only a non-Christian (such as a Jew), but also a
Christian unbaptized or invalidly baptized. A person accidentally
baptized by a Catholic is not considered a Catholic if born of
heretical or schismatical parents and reared by them in their sect.

(b) This impediment as prohibitive is of divine ordinance, for the same
reasons as in the case of mixed marriages (see 2806 c): “Bear not the
yoke with unbelievers” (II Cor., vi. 14). But neither natural nor
divine law nullifies such a marriage with unbelievers; for the
substantial ends of marriage (i.e., procreation and education of
children) can be had even in such unions, and very holy personages have
contracted marriage even with pagans (e.g., Jacob with the daughters of
Laban, Joseph with the daughter of Putiphar, Moses with the daughter of
Jethro, Esther with Assuerus, St. Cecilia with Valerian, St. Monica
with Patricius, St. Clotilda with Clovis, etc.). The Church, however,
has made disparity of cult a diriment impediment on account of the
special danger, and it grants no dispensation unless the precautions
decreed for mixed marriages be observed (see 824, 2807).

2818. The Impediments of Kinship.--(a) Consanguinity.--Marriage is null
when contracted between blood relatives, that is, persons descended
from one another or from one common ancestor within certain limits. In
the direct line consanguinity invalidates marriage between all
ascendants and descendants, legitimate or natural, that is, between a
man and all his female ancestry (mother, grandmother, etc.) and
posterity (daughter, etc.), and between a woman and all her male
ancestors and posterity. In the collateral line it invalidates to the
third degree inclusively, that is, between a man and a woman whose
parents are related as first cousins or even more closely. The degree
of consanguinity between this man and woman is first, second or third,
according as one, two or three generations separate them (i.e., both or
the one farthest removed) from the nearest ancestor of both (see Canons
96 and 1076). Consanguinity is multiplied when two parties are
descended from several common stocks. This impediment is of the natural
law as regards the first, and probably all the other degrees of the
direct line; for reverence due to parents forbids one to marry them.
Marriage between brother and sister is not opposed to the absolute or
primary law of nature, but to the relative or secondary law (see 303);
for natural inclination teaches that it is unbecoming for members of
the same family to intermarry, and further the children of their unions
are very apt to be weakly or defective. In other degrees consanguinity
is an impediment of church law only, and may be dispensed for a good
reason, but a more serious reason is necessary for nearer relationship.

(b) Affinity.--Marriage is null when contracted between
relatives-in-law, or those who are kin by valid, even though
unconsummated, marriage. But the impediment exists only between the
husband and his wife’s blood relatives, and vice versa. In the direct
line it includes all degrees; in the collateral line it extends to the
second degree inclusive. Hence, a widower is impeded from marrying all
the lineal relatives of his deceased wife (her mother, grandmother,
daughter, granddaughter, etc.), and the following of her collateral
relatives: her sisters, her aunts, her nieces, her first cousins.
Affinity is multiplied by multiplication of the consanguinity on which
it is based (e.g., when a woman is doubly related to one’s deceased
wife), and by successive marriages (e.g., when a woman is the sister of
a man’s two deceased wives). The impediment of affinity is justified by
moral reasons--by the mutual reverence that should exist between those
who are closely related by marriage, by the dangers to which their
relationship would be exposed if they were able to marry, and by the
good of society, which is promoted when marriage is not confined within
to narrow a circle. But the impediment is entirely ecclesiastical, for
the Church can dispense in all degrees, and the relationship is only an
imperfect copy of consanguinity.

(c) Public Decency.--This impediment, also known as quasi-affinity,
arises from an invalid, even though unconsummated, marriage, and from
public or notorious concubinage; and it annuls marriage in the first
and second degrees of the direct line between the man and the blood
relatives of the woman, and vice versa. The reason for the impediment
is the unbecomingness of marriage with the near relatives (i.e., the
mother, daughter, grandmother, granddaughter of the woman, and the
father, son, grandfather, grandson of the man) of a person with whom
one has lived in putative marriage or concubinage. The impediment is
less strict than that of affinity, and is of ecclesiastical law only.

(d) Spiritual Relationship.--This impediment nullifies marriage between
a baptized person and the person who baptized him or her or who stood
for him or her in Baptism. The minister and the sponsor contract a
relationship of spiritual parenthood to the baptized person, since
Baptism is a supernatural birth and the godparents are charged with the
religious welfare of the godchild. Reasons of respect and of intimate
relationship make marriage between such persons unbecoming, and hence
the Church from early times has ruled against it.

(e) Legal Relationship.--Persons who in civil law are unable to marry
one another on account of the relationship arising from legal adoption
are also barred from marriage in Canon Law. The relations between an
adopted person and the members of the family into which he is adopted
are so close that human lawmakers have often felt it necessary to
declare adoption an impediment to marriage.

2819. Matrimonial Impediments Produced through Misdeeds.--(a)
Abduction.--There can be no valid marriage between a man who holds a
woman under restraint in order to compel her to marry him, if she has
been abducted by him or is violently detained by him in her residence
or elsewhere. If the woman who has been carried away or who is held
against her will marries unwillingly, the marriage is invalid according
to natural law; if she marries willingly, the marriage is invalid from
church law. Hence the impediment of abduction is of positive law only
and does not oblige infidels (see Canon 1064).

(b) Crime.--There can be no valid marriage between the following: those
who during a legitimate marriage have consummated adultery together and
have mutually promised future marriage or have attempted marriage, even
though only civilly (Canon 1075); those who during the same lawful
marriage have consummated adultery together, and of whom one has
committed conjugicide; those who have cooperated physically or morally,
even though they are not adulterers, to murder the spouse of one of
them. The purpose of this impediment is to safeguard the fidelity and
rights of married persons, and to punish those who resort to adultery
or murder in the hope of a new marriage. The impediment is
ecclesiastical and does not affect infidels.

2820. Duties of the Pastor After the Inquiry about Impediments.--(a)
Dispensation.--If the pastor finds an impediment of natural or divine
law (e.g., the bond of an existing marriage), or an impediment which is
never dispensed (e.g., consanguinity in the first degree of the
collateral line, notorious conjugicide, when there is no danger of
death), he cannot proceed with the marriage. If he discovers another
impediment, he must inquire whether or not there is sufficient reason
for dispensation. For the impediments of occult crime, disparity of
cult outside of mission countries, age, Sacred Orders and religious
profession (also for neglecting the form of marriage), a grave reason
is necessary to permit marriage; but for the remaining impediments, a
less grave reason is required. The usual or grave reasons for
dispensation include the public good (e.g., peace between peoples,
prevention of serious litigations), a great private good (e.g., a
suitable marriage offered to a woman who on account of age or locality
can hardly find another such chance), great spiritual good (e.g.,
prevention of a mixed or civil marriage or great scandal, termination
of open concubinage), great temporal good (e.g., means to support the
family of a poor widow); but other and lesser reasons sometimes
suffice, as when the woman is illegitimate, an orphan, deflowered,
sickly, or homely, or the man needs someone to take care of him or of
his small children from a previous marriage, or when the marriage has
already been announced or will be of great advantage to the parents of
one of the parties. In case of urgent necessity or of danger of death,
the pastor and also the confessor or priest who assists at the marriage
are empowered to grant certain dispensations; in other cases
dispensation can be granted only by the local Ordinary or by the Holy
See. The petition for a dispensation must state the facts truthfully,
but must conceal the identity of the petitioner when the impediment is
occult. In executing a dispensation one must observe the conditions
laid down by the superior who granted it (see commentaries on Canons
1043 sqq.).

(b) Publication.--Even though it is morally certain that there is no
impediment, the banns of marriage should be proclaimed beforehand and
in the place where the parties have their domicile or quasi-domicile
(or residence, if they are _vagi_), and also, if necessary, in other
places where they have lived. This is a grave duty, since its purpose
is to ensure the validity and lawfulness of marriages. If it is morally
certain that there is no impediment, the Ordinary may dispense for a
good reason (see commentaries on Canons 1022 sqq.).

2821. After the Examination and Proclamation.--(a) If it is certain
that there is an impediment, the procedure will be that given in 2820
a; (b) if it is doubtful whether there is a diriment impediment, the
matter should be investigated more fully, but without defamation of the
parties, and if the doubt remains, the question should be submitted to
the Ordinary (see above, 2805 b); (c) if no impediment, certain or
doubtful, has been discovered, the pastor should approve the parties
for marriage.

2822. Duties of the Pastor as Regards the Religious Instruction of the
Engaged Couple.--(a) The pastor should require those who are not
confirmed to receive Confirmation before their marriage, if they can do
this without serious inconvenience.

(b) He should instruct the parties in the essentials of Christian
doctrine, if they are ignorant in these matters (see 920 sqq.), and he
should point out to them the nature of marriage as a contract and as a
Sacrament, its purposes and properties, the grace it confers and the
conjugal and parental duties it imposes, the necessity of preparing for
the Sacrament and of receiving it in the state of grace. He should also
speak about the impediments, so that the couple may understand the
disqualifications for a valid and lawful marriage; but this should be
done prudently, so as not to shock the innocent or to help others to
evade the law. But ignorance of the Catechism is not strictly an
impediment; and if the parties are unwilling to take instruction, they
should be married without it. In a mixed marriage it is often very
useful to give the non-Catholic a short course in Catholic teaching,
and all couples who are preparing for marriage would do well to read
some of the good works prepared especially for the use of engaged or
newly married people. The Code requires of pastors that in their
sermons they instruct the people on marriage and exhort them to avoid
mixed marriages and marriages with the unworthy (Canons 1018, 1064,
1065).

2823. The Pastor and the Duties of Engaged Couple.--The pastor should
also inquire about duties owed by the couple to others.

(a) Duties to Parents.--He should seriously admonish minors subject to
parental authority not to marry without the knowledge or against the
reasonable wishes of their parents. If the parents are opposed to the
marriage, the pastor should decide from the circumstances whether the
opposition is justified or not; if one parent only is unwilling, the
wishes of the father _per se_ have preference over those of the mother,
as he is the head of the family. If the engaged couple will not heed
the pastor, he is seriously bound to refuse to marry them until the
case has been presented to the Ordinary for decision (Canon 1034).

(b) Duties to Civil Law.--The State has no power over the Sacrament of
Matrimony, its bond, or its inseparable temporal effects (such as the
rights and duties of spouses, legitimacy of children and the like), but
it is competent in reference to merely civil effects and conditions,
which are temporal circumstances separable from the substance of
marriage. Hence, those who are getting married should comply with civil
formalities that do not trespass on church rights, such as registration
or marriage license.

2824. Opposition of Parents to Marriage.--In deciding whether the
parental opposition to a marriage is reasonable or not, the pastor
should take into consideration both the motives for the opposition and
the reasons in favor of the marriage.

(a) The motives for the opposition are reasonable, if the parents
object because of the undesirability of one of the couple, or their
incompatibility, or the evil consequences that will follow the
marriage. A person is undesirable on account of defects of soul (e.g.,
an atheist, a drunkard, a libertine, a man or woman of ill-fame, a
cruel man, an ill-tempered woman), or of body (e.g., a person who is
deformed, or malodorous, or afflicted with syphilis or other serious
disease), or of mind (e.g., a half-witted person), or of economical
ability (e.g., a man who is a gambler or spendthrift, or who is unable
to earn a living; a woman who is loaded with debts or who cannot take
care of a home). There is incompatibility when the ages of the couple
or their rank in life, their race, their education, their tastes, or
their dispositions are utterly different. There are evil consequences
when scandals, hatreds, disgrace, or loss of temporal goods will ensue.

(b) The reason for the marriage, however, may suffice to prevail over
the parental objections. Thus, if the strong disapproval of relatives
is the only reason against a marriage and its abandonment will make the
couple unhappy for life, charity does not oblige to such a sacrifice.
And the temporal advantage of a family should not be preferred to the
spiritual benefit, if their son who is wild wishes to marry a poor girl
who has a good influence over him rather than a wealthy girl whom he
does not admire.

2825. Religious Duties before Marriage.--(a) Confession.--A public
sinner (e.g., one who has been living in concubinage) is obliged to go
to confession before marriage in order to repair his scandal. A sinner
whose guilt is not public must repent before receiving the Sacrament of
Matrimony, since it is a Sacrament of the Living and supposes the state
of grace; but an act of contrition strictly suffices. It is
recommended, however, that all persons go to confession as a
preparation and that they make a general confession. The confessor
should be told of any occult or incriminating impediment that was not
disclosed to the pastor, and it is therefore advisable that the
confession precede the ceremony by several days, so as to allow time
for possible dispensations.

(b) Communion.--It is better that Communion be received on the day of
one’s marriage, but, if this is not convenient, it may be received
several days before or several days after. There is no command as to
this, but the Church’s counsel is most earnest.

2826. The Celebration of Marriage.--(a) Requisites for Validity.--In
order to be valid, a Catholic’s marriage must be celebrated in the
presence of the parish-priest or Ordinary, or of a priest delegated by
either, and of at least two witnesses. There are two exceptions to this
law, namely, in danger of death when the priest cannot be had and in
the case of inability to appear before a priest within a month. This
law is most suitable, since marriage is not a mere profane contract,
but a Sacrament subject to the Church; the law is also necessary, since
secret or clandestine marriages would be impossible of proof, and
society and the family would be seriously harmed if they were permitted
except in very extraordinary cases.

(b) Requisites for Lawfulness.--The pastor assists lawfully at a
marriage if he has assured himself of the freedom of the parties to
marry and of his own right to assist officially at their marriage. The
pastor has the right to witness a marriage when the parties are his
subjects by reason of their location in his parish, or when he has
permission from their pastor or Ordinary to assist at the nuptials.
When the bride is from one parish and the groom from another, the rule
is that the marriage should be held before the bride’s pastor (Canons
1094 sqq.)

2827. The Rite of Marriage.--(a) The essential rite consists in the
words of consent spoken by the bride and groom. The assisting priest
asks for this consent, and then (except in a mixed marriage) blesses
the newly married pair and the ring. Marriage by sign language or
through an interpreter or proxy is not lawful without special
permission, and marriage by letter is not recognized (Canons 1088 sqq.).

(b) The accidental rite is the nuptial blessing bestowed during the
Nuptial Mass that follows on the marriage. This is omitted in mixed
marriages, and also as a rule during Advent and Lent. The place for
marriage is regularly in the parish church, if it is a Catholic
marriage, but outside the church if it is a mixed marriage (see Canons
1100 sqq.). The Ordinary may dispense from the requirements of place
(Canon 1109).

2828. Cooperation in an Unworthy Marriage.--(a) The Priest.--The
clergyman acts as the official representative of the Church, and hence
only a serious reason will permit his assistance when the unworthiness
of one of the parties is known to him in an extra-confessional way. A
serious reason would be a threat of bodily harm to the priest or great
spiritual detriment to the parties, such as their continuance in the
state of sin. A more serious reason is required if one of the parties
is an _excommunicatus vitandus_. Finally, at times only passive
assistance is permitted, as in certain mixed marriages in which the
non-Catholic refuses to give guarantees, but there is greater danger of
perversion without than with the assistance (see 2677 sqq.).

(b) The Spouses.--The bride and groom are the ministers as well as the
recipients of Matrimony, and hence, if one of the parties knows that
the other is not in the state of grace, there is an administration of a
Sacrament to an unworthy recipient. But only charity would bid one to
deny the Sacrament to that other party, if one could not induce him to
dispose himself, and charity does not oblige with great inconvenience.
Hence the worthy party, if he or she has a suitable reason for
marrying, does not sin by reason of the other party’s unworthiness.

(c) The Witnesses.--The cooperation of the witnesses is less than that
of the priest and of the worthy party, and hence only in an
extraordinary case do the witnesses sin by assisting at a marriage
contracted before the Church. They may presume that all is well, if the
pastor has agreed to the marriage; and even though they are certain
that the bride or groom is in mortal sin, the fear of incurring
displeasure or harm will ordinarily excuse the best man or bridesmaid
from all sin, or at least from grave sin.

2829. Registration of Marriages.--The Code requires that marriages be
recorded in the matrimonial and baptismal registers, and that
notification be sent to the pastors of the parishes where the bride and
the groom were baptized. This duty seems to be grave, since its end is
to provide for stable conditions and secure proof of freedom to marry.
The entries should be made without delay (i.e., within three days at
least), lest they be overlooked or be made incorrectly (Canon 1103).

2830. When an Impediment Is Discovered after Marriage.--A diriment
impediment or other invalidating defect is sometimes discovered after
the celebration of marriage. There are various solutions of this
difficulty.

(a) If the marriage can be validated (or made valid), this should be
done. The manner of simple validation of marriages null on account of
diriment impediment, defective consent or lack of form, is declared in
Canons 1133-1137.

(b) If the marriage cannot be validated simply, it may be made valid in
certain cases by the special validation known as a _sanatio in radice_.
This supposes that a consent naturally sufficient, but juridically
insufficient, was given, and that a renewal of consent cannot be
obtained (see Canons 1138-1141).

(c) If marriage cannot be validated in any way (as in the case of an
indispensable impediment), the parties should be separated, or
permitted to live together as brother and sister, or left in good
faith. Thus, if the nullity of the marriage is public, the parties
should be separated after a declaration of nullity; if the nullity is
secret and unprovable, the parties may be permitted to live together as
brother and sister, if they know the marriage is null, but are not
exposed to the danger of incontinence; if the parties are in good faith
about their marriage and it is foreseen that serious evils would result
were they told the truth (such as bad faith, or misfortunes for the
children), they may be left as they are.

2831. The Lawfulness of Divorce and Separation.--(a) Complete divorce,
or dissolution of the bond with the right to remarry during the
lifetime of the other spouse, is never lawful, except in the cases
mentioned in 2787 e. Moreover, the civil lawgiver has no right ever to
dissolve the marriage tie, for the marriage bond of Christians is
sacramental and not subject to the State, while the marriage bond of
non-Christians is indissoluble by human authority. On the death of one
spouse, however, the survivor is free to marry again, though chaste
widowhood is more honorable.

(b) Incomplete divorce, or separation from bed and board, is allowed
permanently to the innocent spouse in case of adultery, and temporarily
when there are other good reasons. Thus, if one of the parties becomes
an apostate, or gives non-Catholic education to the children, or leads
a criminal or disgraceful life, or makes common life too hard by his
cruelty, or endangers the other party in soul or body, the innocent
spouse may separate after appealing to the Ordinary, or may depart on
his or her own authority, if the facts are certain and there is danger
in delay (Canons 1118 sqq.). With permission one may even seek a civil
divorce, if it is a separation only, in order to be free as regards
civil effects of marriage (1950).




APPENDIX I

SUMMARY OF COMMON LAW ON PROHIBITION OF BOOKS
(Holy Office, 17 Apr., 1943)
[placed at end of Volume I, after section 1625, in print edition]

Seeing that delays and omissions in denouncing the books frequently
occur, and that many of the faithful are in a state of deplorable
ignorance regarding the denunciation and prohibition of harmful books,
the Supreme Sacred Congregation of the Holy Office deems it appropriate
to call to mind the principal provisions of the sacred canons on this
subject; for it is beyond doubt that bad or harmful writings expose
purity of faith, integrity of morals, and the very salvation of souls
to the greatest dangers.

Certainly the Holy See cannot by itself, with adequate care and in due
time, prohibit the numberless writings against faith and morals which,
especially in our time, are being published almost daily in various
languages all over the world. Hence it is necessary that the Ordinaries
of places, whose business it is to preserve sound and orthodox doctrine
and to protect good morals (C, 343, Sec.1), should, either personally
or through suitable priests, be watchful as to the books which are
published or sold in their territory (C. 1397, Sec.4), and forbid to
their subjects those which they judge should be condemned (C. 1395,
ASec.1). The right and duty to forbid books for just cause belongs also
to an Abbot of an independent monastery and to the Superior General of
a clerical exempt Institute acting with his Chapter or Council; nay,
in case of urgency, it belongs also to the other Major Superiors with
their proper Council, it being understood, however, that these must as
soon as possible report the matter to the Superior General (C. 1395,
Sec.3). Nevertheless, books which require a more expert scrutiny, or
in regard to which, for salutary results, the judgment of the supreme
authority seems to be required, should be referred by the Ordinaries to
the judgment of the Holy See (C. 1397, Sec.5).

It is, of course, the duty of all the faithful, and especially of
clerics, to denounce pernicious books to the proper authority; but this
duty is especially incumbent on clerics who have some ecclesiastical
dignity, such as the Legates of the Holy See and the Ordinaries of
places, and on those who are eminent in doctrine, as for example the
Rectors and Professors of Catholic Universities.

The denunciation is to be made either to this Congregation of the Holy
Office or to the Ordinary of the place, giving by all means the reason
why it is thought the book should be forbidden. The persons to whom
such a report is made have a strict duty to keep secret the names of
those who make it (C. 1397, Sec.1, 2, 3).

Finally, Ordinaries of places and others who have the care of souls
should duly inform the faithful of the following:

a) The prohibition of books has the effect that, unless due permission
is obtained, the forbidden book may not be published, nor republished
(without making the corrections and obtaining due approbation), nor
read, nor retained, nor sold, nor translated into another language, nor
in any way communicated to other persons (C. 1398, Sec.1, 2);

b) Books condemned by the Holy See are considered as forbidden
everywhere and in whatever language they may be translated (C. 1396);

c) The positive ecclesiastical law forbids not only those books which
are individually condemned by a special decree of the Holy See and
placed on the Index of Forbidden Books, or which are proscribed by
particular Councils or Ordinaries for their subjects, but also the
books which are forbidden by the common law itself, that is, in virtue
of the rules contained in Canon 1399, which forbids in a general manner
nearly all books which are bad and harmful in themselves;

d) The natural law forbids the reading of any book which occasions
proximate spiritual danger, since it forbids anyone to place himself in
danger of losing the true faith or good morals; accordingly, permission
to use forbidden books, from whomsoever it be obtained, in no way
exempts from this prohibition of the natural law (C. 1405, Sec.1).




APPENDIX II

The “Ecumenical Movement”
[placed at end of Volume I, after the preceding Appendix, in print
edition]

On December 20, 1949 the Holy Office issued an instruction on the
“Ecumenical Movement” addressed to all local Ordinaries. In its
prefatory remarks the Instruction insisted upon the Church’s intense
interest to attain to the full and perfect unity of the Church. It
noted as an occasion of joy the desire of many separated from the
Church to return to the unity of Christ’s fold, a good intention,
indeed, which, however, in being put into practice has not been
regulated by right principles. Accordingly the Holy Office prescribed
that local Ordinaries maintain due vigilance over the associations
seeking Church Unity, that they designate well-qualified priests to
pay close attention to everything which concerns the “Movement,” and
that they supervise publications on this matter by Catholics or by
non-Catholics, in as far as these are published, or read, or sold by
Catholics. The manner and method of proceeding in this work is to be
regulated by the Ordinaries, who are cautioned to prevent the growth of
indifference to Catholic truth and fallacious hopes of unity based upon
false or impossible foundations. With regard to mixed assemblies of
Catholics and non-Catholics, when there seems to be hope of spreading
knowledge of Catholic doctrine, the Ordinary is instructed to designate
well-qualified priests, to explain and defend the Church’s teaching.
Special permission, however, must be obtained from Ecclesiastical
Authority if Catholic laymen are to attend. Where no hope of good
results exists, the meetings are to be ended or gradually suppressed.

The following specific instructions are given for the conduct of
“Ecumenical meetings.”

All the aforesaid conferences and meetings, public and non-public,
large and small, which are called for the purpose of affording an
opportunity for the Catholic and the non-Catholic party, for the
sake of discussion, to treat of matters of faith and morals, each
presenting on even terms the doctrine of his own faith, are subject
to the prescriptions of the Church which were recalled to mind in the
_Monitum, “Cum compertum_” of this Congregation under date of 5 June,
1948. Hence, mixed congresses are not absolutely forbidden; but they
are not to be held without the previous permission of the competent
Ecclesiastical Authority. The _Monitum_, however, does not apply to
catechetical instructions, even when given to many together, nor to
conferences in which Catholic doctrine is explained to non-Catholics
who are prospective converts, even though the opportunity is afforded
for the non-Catholics to explain also the doctrine of their church so
that they may understand clearly and thoroughly in what respect it
agrees with the Catholic doctrine and in what it differs therefrom.

Neither does the said _Monitum_ apply to those mixed meetings of
Catholics and non-Catholics in which the discussion does not turn upon
faith and morals, but upon ways and means of defending the fundamental
principles of the natural law or of the Christian religion against the
enemies of God who are now leagued together, or where the question is
how to restore social order, or other topics of that nature. Even in
these meetings, as is evident, Catholics may not approve or concede
anything which is in conflict with divine revelation or with the
doctrine of the Church even on social questions.

As to local conferences and conventions which are within the scope of
the _Monitum_ as above explained, the Ordinaries of places are given,
for three years from the publication of this Instruction, the faculty
of granting the required previous permission of the Holy See on the
following conditions:

1. That _communicatio in sacris_ be entirely avoided;

2, That the presentations of the matter be duly inspected and directed;

3. That at the close of each year a report be made to this Supreme
Sacred Congregation, stating where such meetings were held and what
experience was gathered from them.

4. As regards the colloquies of theologians above mentioned, the same
faculty for the same length of time is granted to the Ordinary of the
place where such colloquies are held, or to the Ordinary delegated for
this work by the common consent of the other Ordinaries, under the same
conditions as above, but with the further requirement that the report
to this Sacred Congregation state also what questions were treated, who
were present, and who the speakers were for either side.

As for the interdiocesan conferences and congresses, either national
or international, the previous permission of the Holy See, special for
each case, is always required; and, in the petition asking for it,
must also be stated what are the questions to be treated and who the
speakers are to be. And it is not allowed, before this permission has
been obtained, to begin the external preparation of such meetings or to
collaborate with non-Catholics who begin such preparation.

5. Although in all these meetings and conferences any communication
whatsoever in worship must be avoided, yet the recitation in common of
the Lord’s Prayer or of some prayer approved by the Catholic Church, is
not forbidden for opening or closing the said meetings.

6. Although each Ordinary has the right and duty to conduct, promote,
and preside over this work in his own diocese, yet the cooperation of
several Bishops will be appropriate or even necessary in establishing
offices and works to observe, study, and control this work as a
whole. Accordingly it will rest with the Ordinaries themselves to
confer together and consider how a proper uniformity of action and
coordination can be obtained.

7. Religious Superiors are bound to watch and to see to it that their
subjects adhere strictly and faithfully to the prescriptions laid down
by the Holy See or by the local Ordinaries in this matter.

In order that so noble a work as the “union” of all Christians in one
true faith and Church may daily grow into a more conspicuous part of
the entire care of souls, and that the whole Catholic people may more
earnestly implore this “union” from Almighty God, it will certainly
be of assistance that in some appropriate way, for example through
Pastoral Letters, the faithful be instructed regarding these questions
and projects, the prescriptions of the Church in the matter, and the
reasons on which they are based. All, especially priests and religious,
should be exhorted and warmly encouraged to be zealous by their prayers
and sacrifices to ripen and promote this work, and all should be
reminded that nothing more effectively paves the way for the erring to
find the truth and to embrace the Church than the faith of Catholics,
when it is confirmed by the example of upright living.




INDEX TO VOLUMES I-II

The numbers refer to the sections in the text. Nos. 1-1625 are
contained in Volume I [of the print edition].

Abjectedness, definition, 2561.

Abnormal Mental States, as obstacles to voluntariness of acts, 40, 55;
effect on voluntariness of acts, 55.

Abortion, canonical penalties for, 1851 a.

Absolute Standard, in grave matter, 1899.

Abstemiousness, subjective part of temperance, 2465 a; definition,
2466; degrees of abstemiousness, 2467 a; austerity, 2468; excellence of
fasting and abstinence, 2469 a; sins opposed to abstemiousness, 2470 a.
See also Gluttony; Sobriety.

Abstinence, excellence of, 2469 a.

Abstinence, Total, see Sobriety.

Accession, title to private ownership, 1872 a; principles of accession,
1874.

Accusation, Judicial, obligation, 1966; when a malefactor is bound to
accuse himself, 1968; ethical conditions for lawful accusation or
denunciation, 1969; persons who may not act as accusers, 1970; judicial
accusation and fraternal correction, 1972; unjust accusation, 1973;
cessation of duty of accusation, 1794. See also Complaint.

Accused, see Defendant.

Act, Virtuous, intrinsic and extrinsic modes of performing, 1554;
essential and ideal modes, 1555.

Acts, Human, 22-62; definition, 23; knowledge requisite for, 24;
ignorance renders them involuntary, 28; effect of error, forgetfulness
and inadvertence on, 32-33; consent requisite for, 34; free and
necessary, 35 a; perfectly and imperfectly voluntary, 35 b; voluntary
absolutely and under a certain aspect, 35 c; voluntary in themselves or
directly and in their cause or indirectly, 35 d; voluntary, approvingly
and permissively, 36; omissions, 37-39; obstacles which destroy or
lessen voluntariness, 40 sqq.; voluntary acts either elicited or
commanded by the will, 56-62; intellectual, 61-62; sensible, 61-62;
external corporal, 61-62; morality of, 63 sqq.; acts forbidden to
clerics, 2603 a.

Acts, Meritorious, 106 sqq.

Acts, Moral, 63 sqq.; good, 76-78; bad, 79-80; indifferent, 82 sqq.;
morality of external act, 89 sqq.; morality of act indirectly willed,
94-95; morality of consequences of act, 96, imputability, 97 sqq,;
imputability in cases of double result, 103 sqq.; acts that are
objectively efficaciously and subjectively unjust, 1763 a, b, c. See
also Acts, Meritorious.

Acts of Charity, see Charity.

Acts of Faith, see Faith.

Acts of Hope, see Hope.

Acts, Voluntary, 35-39. See also Acts, Human.

Adjuration, definition, 2263; species of adjuration, 2264; solemn or
simple adjuration, 2264 a; imperative or deprecative adjuration, 2264
b; qualities of lawful adjuration, 2265; persons who may be adjured,
2266; use of exorcisms, 2267; effects of adjurations, 2268.

Adoration, see Religion.

Adornment, when lascivious, 1456 b.

Adulation, sin against affability, 2423 a.

Adultery, definition, 2530; sinfulness of adultery, 2530 b; degrees of
malice, 2530 c.

Advertence, full and partial, 174 sqq., 153, 196.

Advisor, implicit, 1779 c.

Aeromancy, form of divination, 2284 G.

Affability, virtue of, 2143 b; definition, 2421; offices of affability,
2422; sins against affability, 2423.

Affectation, vice opposite to modesty, 2566 b.

Afflictions, Medicinal, as remedies against sin, 283.

_Agapae_, in Early Church, 2185 a.

Age of Reason, Puberty and Majority, 433.

Agency, 1749 a.

Aggression, Unjust, 1831.

Albigensianism, 822 c.

Almsgiving, external effect of charity, 1210; definition, 1216; manner
of giving, 1217; forms of almsgiving, 1218; seven corporal works of
mercy, 1221; seven spiritual, 1222; comparison of corporal and
spiritual alms, 1224; duty of almsgiving, 1226 sqq.; three classes of
needy persons distinguished, 1233; three degrees of corporal need,
1236; rules on giving alms, 1237; gravity of the obligation, 1238;
refusal of alms and restitution, 1240; alms from ill-gotten goods, 1241
sqq.; almsgiving from the goods of another, 1244-1246; order of charity
in almsgiving, 1247; amount to be given, 1249, 1253; employment as
alms, 1249 b; when alms are excessive, 1250; clerics and almsgiving,
1252; time for almsgiving, 1255; manner, 1256; public charity cannot
take the place of almsgiving, 1257.

Alphonsus Liguori, Saint, preference for Equiprobabilism, 696, 697,
698; on obligation of judge when evidence is contrary to his personal
knowledge, 1951 c.

Ambiguous Answers, lawfulness of, 2402.

Ambition, as incentive to envy, 1330; vice against greatness of soul,
2450 b.

Amendment, Resolution of, 2736.

American Law on Bankruptcy, 1788.

Amusements, forbidden to Clerics, 2603 c.

Anarchists, condemned by Church, 947 b.

Anger, 269; immediate cause of fighting, 1431; a cause of contumely,
2017 c; definition, 2546; gravity of the sin of anger, 2547; anger
compared with hatred and envy, 2548; one of the seven capital vices,
2549.

Annuities, 1749 b.

Anti-Nationalism, sin against piety, 2349 b.

Anti-Tutiorism, 672 b.

Apology, as reparation for contumely, 2023 b; manner of apologizing,
2024.

Apostasy, definition, 835; comparative gravity of sins of apostasy,
837; objectively speaking, no reason can justify apostasy, 838;
apostasy to non-Catholic and anti-Catholic sects, 839.

Appeal, right of accused, 1982.

Appetites, Sensible, 46.

Appetites, Sensitive, as subject of sin, 231.

Appetites, Spiritual, 46.

Arianism, 822 c.

Art, intellectual virtue, 146 b; one of the two practical virtues of
intellect, 1627 a.

Assent, External and Internal, 760 a, b; objects, 761 d.

Assistant Priest, special duties of, 2607 c.

Astrology, a form of divination, 2285 c.

Astuteness, a form of evil prudence, 1651 a.

Attrition, see Contrition.

Augury, a form of divination, 2285 d.

Auspice, a form of divination, 2285 d.

Austerity, nature and kinds, 2468.

Authority, can supply indirect certitude, 652; kind necessary to make
opinion solidly probable, 707.

Avarice, 269; opposed to liberality, 2426; comparison of avarice and
prodigality, 2429.

Backbiting, see Defamation.

Bailments, 1749.

Bankruptcy in American Law, 1788.

Baptism, Sacrament of, faith necessary for adult candidate, 791;
the most necessary Sacrament, 2686; effect is regeneration, 2686 a;
material element of Baptism, 2686 b; formal element, 2686 c; Solemn
Baptism, 2637 a; Private Baptism, 2687 b; duties of pastors, 2688;
duties of parents and guardians, 2689; sponsors required by Church
from very early times, 2690; requirements for validity and lawfulness
of sponsors, 2690 a, b; duties of sponsors, 2691; duties of adult
recipients of Baptism, 2692; duties of minister of Baptism, 2693.

Barter, 1749 c.

Beatitudes, 159 c, 164, 1662; rewards promised, 165; Third, 811; First,
1058; Seventh, 1619; Sixth, 1662; Fourth and Fifth, 2433; Eighth, 2457;
Second, 2571.

Beneficence, external effect of charity, 1211 sqq.; regulated by
the order of charity, 1213-15; sins against, 1444 sqq. See Scandal;
Obscenity; Seduction; Cooperation.

Benefices, Ecclesiastical, 1758; institution of benefices, 2185 h.

Bestiality, form of impurity, 2534 d.

Betrothal, duties of persons engaged to marry, 2627; duties imposed by
engagement to marry, 2628; courtship, 2628; duty to manifest defects,
2628 b; fidelity during the engagement, 2628 c; right to manifest
affection, 2628 c; formal promise to marry imposes duty of marriage
within a reasonable time, 2628 d; breaking of engagement, 2628 d; duty
of restitution in breach of promise, 2628 d; signs of affection between
engaged persons, 2629.

Bills, unjust refusal to pay, 1794.

Birth-Control, see Matrimony, Sacrament of.

Bishop, interpreter of diocesan laws, 486; special duties, 2607 a.

Blackstone, on purely penal character of civil laws, 570 b.

Blasphemy, Sin of, 887 sqq.; heretical and non-heretical, 889;
interpreting cases of doubtful blasphemy, 894; sinfulness of blasphemy,
895; the greatest sin against faith, 895 b; species of blasphemy, 897;
circumstances which aggravate, 897 d; blasphemies against the Three
Divine Persons, 898; despair and presumption as blasphemy, 899 a; sin
against Holy Ghost, 900; state of malicious sin, 901; remedies against
blasphemy, 902; absolution, 903.

Blessed Sacrament, Confraternities of, 955 a.

Bluntness, vice opposite to modesty, 2566 b.

Bonaventure, Saint, on obligation of judge when evidence is contrary to
his personal knowledge, 1951 c.

Bond, definition of, 1886 a.

Bonds, purchase by clerics, 2605 e.

Books, when obscene, 1456 e; forbidden, see Writings, Forbidden.

Booty, obligation to make restitution, 1414.

Borrowing, Sinful, 1879 b.

Brahmanism, 822 a.

Breach of Promise, damages resultant on, 1888 a.

Bribery, Judicial, see Judge.

Broth, use forbidden on Friday, 2586 c.

Buddhism, 822 a.

Buying and Selling, 1749 b.

Calumny, definition, 2030 e; worst kind of defamation, 2032 d. See also
Defamation.

Candidates for Public Office, lawfulness of revelations about, 2071.

Capital Vices, Seven, 269 sqq.

Carbonari, forbidden by Church, 947 h.

Cardinal Virtues, 150. See also Prudence; Justice; Fortitude;
Temperance.

Carelessness, caused by sloth, 1324, 1326 c, 1327.

Casuistic Method, in Moral Theology, 13.

Catholic Daughters of America, 955 b.

Caution, integral part of prudence, 108 b.

Celibacy, origin and obligation, 2602 a.

Censorship, Government, not desirable, 1458 e.

Censures, by the Church, 761 c.

Ceremonial Law, see Law, Mosaic.

Certainty, of knowledge, 1630; certainty of practical truth, 1630.

Certitude, necessary for prudence, 1630.

Certitude of Conscience, necessity, 641-642; kinds, 643 sqq.;
metaphysical, physical and moral, 644 sqq.; speculative and practical,
647; demonstrative and probable, 649; direct and indirect, 651;
principle of authority and reflex principles supply indirect certitude,
652.

Charity, theological virtue of, 151; compared with faith and hope,
157; remains in the blessed, 158; Fruit of the Holy Ghost, 163;
definition, 1105; charity and natural love, 1106 sqq.; true friendship
with God, 1112; uncreated and created charity, 1113-1114; excellence
of, 1115; charity and beatific vision, 1116; production of charity,
1121; origin, 1122; may be increased, 1124; perfect charity, 1129;
three degrees, 1130; decline of charity, 1131; loss of, 1132; object
of, 1133; love of creatures not always charity, 1134; sinful, natural
and supernatural self-love, 1136; friendship and charity, 1137-1141;
love of neighbor, 1139; charity for sinners, 1142-1147; for enemies,
1148 sqq.; common signs of charity, 1154; refusal of greeting a lack
of charity, 1157; general order of charity, 1158; character of love of
God, 1160 sqq.; sacrifice of spiritual goods for neighbor’s sake, 1163;
love of the body, 1164; order of charity between neighbors, 1171 sqq.;
order of charity between relations, 1176 sqq.; acts of, 1183 sqq.;
exercise of act, 1184; internal effects of charity, 1103; joy, 1194;
peace, 1195 sqq.; reconciliation with God effected by charity, 1196;
what reconciliation with enemies demands, 1198; manner and time of
seeking reconciliation, 1202 sqq.; external effects of charity, 1210;
beneficence (q.v.), 1211; almsgiving (q.v.), 1216; fraternal correction
(q.v.), 1258 sqq.; hate (q.v.), 1295 sqq.; sins against peace, 1347
sqq.; opposition between schism and charity, 1371; schism greatest sin
against neighbor, 1372; duty of owner towards one in dire need, 1925 a.

Charity, Commandments of, in Old Testament, 1547 a; in New Testament,
1547 b; precepts of secondary acts of charity, 1551; prohibitions of
uncharitableness, 1552; commandment of love of God, 1553 sqq.; modes
of performing act of love of God, 1554-1555; must be subjectively
and objectively great, 1556; actual and habitual, 1557; degrees of
perfection of this act, 1560; commandment of love of self, 1561;
pursuit of supernatural, intellectual and corporal goods, 1563-1564;
care of the mind, 1564; commandment of love of neighbor, 1579 sqq.;
conditions, 1582; fulfillment of the commandments of charity, 1585
sqq.; various ways of fulfillment, 1586; external acts must be
accompanied by internal love, 1588; internal act must be explicit,
1589; proper intention, 1590; obligation is universal, 1592; times
when the precepts of charity oblige, 1593 sqq.; ignorance as excuse
for omission, 1596; cases when love of neighbor must be explicit,
1603; necessity of habit of charity, 1604; order of charity is also
commanded, 1606.

Chastity, Fruit of the Holy Ghost, 163; subjective part of temperance,
2465 a; definition of chastity, 2486; fruit of Fear of the Lord, 2571
c; vow and virtue of chastity, 2612 b.

Chauvinism, sin against piety, 2349 a.

Children, compensation of, 2631; sex education of children, 2632;
duties of children, charity and piety, 2633; special love of parents,
2633 a; respect and assistance owed to parents, 2633 b.

Chiromancy, form of divination, 2285 b.

Christian Doctrine, Confraternities of, 955 a.

Christian Science, 823 b; refusal of medicine or hygienic care, 2304.

Circumspection, 1638 b.

Clairvoyance, form of divination, 2285 a.

Clemency, definition, 2551; vices opposed to clemency, 2552 a.

Clergy, duty of charity to the poor, 2608 a; disposition of superfluous
wealth by beneficed clergy, 2609 a. See also Clerics.

Clerics, special duties of, 2596; duties before entering clerical
state, 2596 a; duties after entering clerical state, 2596 b; internal
vocation, 2597 a; external vocation, 2597 b; sinfulness of disregarding
vocation, 2598 a; positive duties of clerics, 2599 a; obligation of
Divine Office, 2600 a; excuses from the obligation of Divine Office,
2601 a; precept of clerical celibacy, 2602 a; negative duties of
clerics, 2603; forbidden acts, 2603 a; forbidden occupations, 2603 b;
forbidden amusements, 2603 c; prohibition against trading, 2604 a;
clerics and purchase and sale of stocks and bonds, 2605 a; duties of
clerical superiors, 2606 a; special duties of those who have care of
souls, 2607 a.

Clients, duties to lawyers, 2651 b.

Coercion, as obstacle to consent, 40; effect on voluntariness of acts,
52.

Coition, Unnatural, form of impurity, 2534 b.

Commandments, natural and supernatural, 330; of faith, 913 sqq.; hope,
1092 sqq.; charity, 1547 sqq.; prudence, 1657; justice, 2434-2436;
fortitude, 2458-2460; temperance, 2572.

Commandments, Ten, 2436 sqq.

_Commodatum_, 1749 a.

Communication, Dangerous, 882 sqq.; civil and religious communication,
882; when non-religious communication is sinful, 883; when religious
communication is sinful, 884; communication in worship, 956 sqq.;
private and public, 956; participation of non-Catholics in Catholic
worship, 957-958; restriction of this participation, 959; performance
of Catholic rites by non-Catholics, 960.

Communion, Holy, minister, 2703; recipient of the Eucharist, 2704;
persons who may receive Communion, 2704 a; persons who must receive
Communion, 2704 b; requirements in candidates for First Communion, 2704
b; dispositions for worthy Communion, 2705; confession, preparation and
thanksgiving, 2705 a; Rite in which Communion may be received, 2705
a; dispositions of body (Eucharistic fast and external reverence),
2705 b; necessary dispositions for frequent Communion, 2706 a; useful
dispositions for frequent Communion, 2706 b; duties of parents, pastors
and confessors in reference to Communion, 2707. See also Eucharist,
Holy.

Commutations, involuntary, 1748 a; voluntary, 1748 b.

Commutative Justice, see Justice.

Compensation, various kinds of, 1927; lawfulness of occult
compensation, 1928; unlawful occult compensation and restitution,
1929; conditions required by commutative justice for occult
compensation, 1930; occult compensation in doubt of law, 1931 b;
where there is strict right to compensation, 1932; where there is no
right to compensation, 1933; compensation of children and employees,
1934; conditions required by legal justice for occult compensation,
1935; conditions required by charity for occult compensation, 1936;
lawfulness of open compensation, 1937.

Compensationism, 731 sqq. See also Systems, Moral.

Complaint, duty of making complaint about private wrongs, 1967; persons
in whose favor one may denounce a private wrong, 1971. See also
Accusation, Judicial.

Complicity, see Cooperation.

Concupiscible Passions, 118-119. See also Passions.

Condemnations, of error by the Church, 761 b.

Condign Merit, see Merit.

Condiments, not forbidden on Friday, 2586 c.

Confession, see Penance, Sacrament of.

Confessors, duties of, regarding obligation of restitution, 1760; need
of prudence, 1650 a. See also Penance, Sacrament of.

Confirmation, Sacrament of, 2694; remote and proximate matter,
2694 a; form, 2694 b; minister of Confirmation, 2695; recipient of
Confirmation, 2696; sponsors in Confirmation, 2697; qualifications
and duties of sponsors, 2697 a, b; duties of pastor in reference to
Confirmation, 2698.

Confucianism, 822 a.

Congruous Merit, see Merit.

Conscience, and Moral Theology, 2; definition, 575; variously divided,
576; true or false, 577; good (right) or bad (wrong), 578 a; certain
or uncertain, 578 b; obligation of, 580; authority not unlimited, 581;
no autonomous morality, 581 a; when conscience must be followed, 582;
erroneous and doubtful conscience, 585; results of following erroneous
conscience, 588; results of disobeying erroneous conscience, 589-591;
a good conscience, 593 sqq.; antecedent and consequent conscience,
594; vigilant, tender and timorous conscience, 595; scrupulous
conscience, 596; lax conscience, 596 sqq.; malicious or non-malicious
laxity (reprobate or weak conscience), 598; partial or entire laxity,
599-600; Pharisaic conscience, 600; inculpable and culpable laxity,
601; causes of a lax conscience, 601; dangers of lax conscience, 602;
rules regarding sins due to lax conscience, 603-604; opinion as state
of conscience, 662 sqq.; remedies for lax conscience, 605; scrupulous
differs from strict (tender) conscience, 607 a; scrupulous conscience
differs from scrupulosity, 607 b; rules regarding scrupulous conscience
and sins, 608; dangers of scrupulous conscience, 609; perplexed
conscience, 611 sqq.; directions of St. Alphonsus regarding perplexed
conscience, 612; scrupulosity, 614 sqq.; distinct from scrupulous
conscience, 614 a; from a tender conscience, 614 b; from anxious,
doubtful or guilty conscience, 614 c; chief subjects of scruples, 615;
signs of scrupulosity, 616; internal causes of scrupulous conscience,
617; external causes, 618; sometimes tolerated by God, 619; dangers of
scrupulosity, 620; rules for the scrupulous, 621; qualities necessary
for successful direction of scrupulous, 625; scrupulous and past
confessions, 626; scrupulous and present confessions, 627; scrupulous
and performance of duties, 628; scrupulous and commission of sin,
630; remedies for scruples, 632 sqq.; signs of a good conscience,
638; certain conscience, 640 sqq.; kinds of certitude, 643 sqq.;
uncertain conscience, 654-655; doubt and suspicion, 656; presumption,
658; reflex principles to settle doubts, 657 sqq.; opinion, 662
sqq.; accusing or excusing, 668 a; forbidding or permitting, 668 b;
the moral systems, 672 sqq.; Tutiorism, 676 sqq.; Laxism, 680 sqq.;
Probabiliorism, 683 sqq.; Equiprobabilism, 688 sqq.; Probabilism, 701
sqq.; Compensationism, 731 sqq.; respective merits and use of the rival
systems of conscience, 740 sqq.; use by confessors, 741.

Conscience, Systems of, see Systems, Moral, and Conscience.

Consent, act of will, 59; consent of the will, condition of mortal
sin, 178, 184, 196; obstacles to, see Obstacles to Consent; qualities
necessary for valid consent, 1883; defects that invalidate consent,
1884.

Consolations, Spiritual, differ from devotion, 2151 b.

Contention, definition, 1355; sinfulness, 1357; causes, 1362.

Continence, potential part of temperance, 2465 c; nature of, 2544.

Continency, fruit of Fear of the Lord, 163, 2571 c.

Contraception, see Matrimony, Sacrament of.

Contract, forms of, 1749; gratuitous contracts, 1749 a; contract
as title to private ownership, 1892 b; elements of contract, 1877;
subject-matter of contract, 1878; when contracts are immoral, 1878
a; sinful contracts, 1879; qualities necessary for valid consent,
1833; defects that invalidate consent, 1884; when fear invalidates
consent to contract, 1884 c; form of contract, 1885; accidentals
of a contract, 1886; conditions added to contract, 1886 c; modes
of contract, 1886 d; obligation of entering into contract, 1887 a;
obligation of valid contract, 1888; quality of obligation in onerous
and gratuitous contracts, 1588 a; quantity of obligation in onerous and
gratuitous contracts, 1888 b; objects of obligation of contract, 1888
d; obligation of quasi-contract, 1888 d; cessation of obligation, 1889;
unilateral and bilateral contracts, 1749 a; onerous contracts, 1749
b, c; subsidiary contracts, 1749 d; immoral contracts, 1878 d; sinful
contracts, 1879; illegal contracts, 1880; unenforceable contracts, 1880
a; voidable contracts, 1880 c; contracts _ipso facto_ void, 1880 d;
qualities necessary in the parties contractant, 1881; legal privileges
of minors in connection with contracts, 1882; principles obligatory in
all forms of contracts, 2137; gratuitous contracts, 2137 a; onerous
contracts, 2137 b; aleatory contracts, 2137 c; fraudulent contracts,
2138.

Contractor’s Agreement, 1749 b.

Contrition, the first act of the penitent, 2729; perfect contrition,
2730 a; imperfect contrition or attrition, 2730 b; attrition based
solely on fear of punishment, 2731; servile fear of God, 2731 b;
slavish fear, 2731 b; attrition in the Sacrament of Penance, 2732;
disinterested love not required in Penance, 2732 b; interested love
necessary in Penance, 2732 e; conditions for valid contrition and
attrition, 2733; internal sorrow; 2733 a; supernatural sorrow, 2733
b; universal sorrow, 2733 c; sovereign sorrow, 2733 d; properties of
contrition, 2735.

Contumely, definition, 2010; various forms of, 2012; manner of
confessing contumely in Sacrament of Penance, 2013; sinfuless of
contumely, 2014; gravity of matter in contumely, 2015; causes of
contumely, 2017; duty of bearing with contumely, 2018; reasons for
resistance to contumely or detraction, 2019; duty of one who answers
contumely or detraction, 2020; duty of restitution for contumely, 2021;
what kind of reparation should be made, 2023; method of apologizing
for contumely, 2024; cessation of obligation of restitution, 2026; the
differences between defamation and contumely, 2029.

Cooperation, and restitution, 1775; positive cooperators in injury,
1779; negative cooperators, 1780; distinction between cooperators
as equal or unequal causes of injury, 1782; cooperation in suicide,
1855; cooperation in defamation, 2076 sqq.; cooperation in sinful
oaths, 2252; cooperation in divination or other form of superstition,
2296; cooperation in the sin of drunkenness, 2483 a; cooperation and
restitution, see Restitution. See also Cooperation in Sin.

Cooperation in Religious Activities, 976 sqq.; immediate and mediate,
976 sqq.; lawfulness of material cooperation, 978; most usual cases
of cooperation, 980; contributions to false worship, 981; building of
houses of false worship, 983-984; preparing for non-Catholic services,
985-986; resemblance to scandal, 1460 b.

Cooperation in Sin, definition, 1506; how it differs from complicity,
1507; formal or material, 1508 a; positive or negative, 1508 b;
occasional or effective, 1509 a; immediate or mediate, 1509 b;
indispensable or not indispensable, 1509 c; unjust or unlawful, 1510;
explicit or implicit, 1511; proximate or remote, 1512; sinfulness,
1513; lawfulness of material cooperation, 1515; gravity of reasons
necessary for cooperation, 1520 sqq.; lawfulness of immediate
cooperation, 1526; special cases, 1528; formal cooperation with evil
reading matter, 1529; with evil dances or plays, 1531; material
cooperation with evil dances or plays, 1532; cooperation by manufacture
of sinful objects, 1533 sqq.; cooperation in supplying food and
drink, 1537-1539; in renting houses, rooms, etc., 1540-1541; lawful
and unlawful cooperation of employees, 1542; duties of confessors,
1545-1546.

Correction, Fraternal, definition, 1258; distinct from judicial
correction and censure of vice, 1258 a, e; includes prevention of sin,
1258 d; duty, 1259-1261, 1282, 1284; when advisable and inadvisable,
1262-1263; doubtful cases, 1264; sin committed by omission or delay,
1265-1266; when person not a superior should make correction, 1267;
obligation of inquiring into suspected wrongdoing, 1269; private spying
uncharitable, 1269 c; faults that call for correction, 1270 sqq.;
correction of vincibly and invincibly ignorant, 1273 sqq.; past sins do
not demand correction, 1276; persons to be corrected, 1277; correction
of superior, 1278; persons to administer correction, 1279; persons
excused from duty, 1283; manner of correction, 1285-1291; secret and
public corrections, 1286; obligation of reporting an occult sin, 1287;
duties of superior when subject is reported for fraternal correction,
1292-1293; obligations for private individuals summarized, 1294.

Council of Trent, Catechism of the, points about which explicit faith
is required, 765.

Counsel, Gift of the Holy Ghost, 160 a.

Counsels of New Testament, 7, 364 sqq.; the three chief, 368;
superiority of, 366.

Counterclaim, definition, 1927 a.

Courage, inferior to justice, 1716 a.

Courtship, see Betrothal.

Cowardice, caused by sloth, 1324; sin against fortitude, 2446 b.

Creditors, order of preference among, 1787.

Credulity, 847.

Creed, knowledge of necessary, 920.

Creeds, summarize formulas of Christian teaching, 767; what articles
deal with, 767; Apostles’, Nicene and Athanasian Creeds, 769; Summary
of teaching of Apostles’ Creed, 770 sqq.

Cremation, societies for the promotion of, forbidden by Code, 946 b;
cremation of corpses, 2595 b.

Criticism, when sinful, 2038; when injustice is committed by
professional critics, 2075.

Cruelty, vice opposed to clemency, 2552 a.

Culpability, see Guilt.

Cunning, 1651 a.

Curiosity, compared with impurity, 2492 a.

Cursing, definition, 2111; when cursing is not sinful, 2112; sinfulness
of cursing, 2113; gravity of sin of cursing, 2114; circumstances that
change moral species of cursing, 2115; numerical multiplication in
sins of cursing, 2116; cursing of evil, 2117; unlawful cursing of an
irrational creature, 2119.

Custom, effect on law, 391 sqq.; kinds of, 392. See also Customs in
Canon Law.

Customs in Canon Law, 506 sqq.; may interpret, abrogate or introduce
law, 506; kinds of, 507; origin of, 508 a; legal force of, 508 b; time
required for acquisition of legal force, 511; cessation of, 513.

_Damnum_, definition, 1724 b.

Dances, when obscene, 1456 d; evil, formal cooperation with, 1531;
evil, material cooperation with, 1532.

Danger, of formal sin, 675 a, 678; of material sin, 675 b.

Dangerous Reading, see Reading, Dangerous.

Debates on Religion, generally inexpedient, 998.

Debt, moral and legal debt, 1692, 2141-43; moral degrees of, 2143.

Debt, Conjugal, 2614-17.

Decalogue, invincible ignorance of generally impossible, 321; Laws
of the First and Second Tables, 338; the precepts contained in the
Decalogue, 2436.

Deceit, form of lying, 2391 b.

Decency, subjective part of temperance, 2465 a; definition of decency,
2486 b.

Decision, Wise, potential part of prudence, 1646 b.

Defamation, definition, 2028; self-defamation, 2028 e; different forms
of defamation, 2030; differences between defamation and contumely,
2029; implicit and explicit defamation, 2030 b; direct and indirect
defamation, 2030 d; examples of indirect defamation, 2031; examples of
direct defamation, 2032; defamation by innuendo, 2033 a; defamation by
plain speech, 2033 b; sinfulness of detraction, 2036; right to true and
false reputation, 2037; sinfulness of gossip or criticism about real
and known defects, 2038; moral species of defamation, 2039; species
of sins of defamation, 2040; numerical multiplication of defamations,
2041; theological species of defamation, 2042; harm done by defamation,
2043; comparison of defamation with other injuries against neighbor,
2044; rule for determining seriousness of defamation, 2046; harm done
by reason of defects revealed, 2047; revelation of secret faults,
2048; harm done by reason of person defamed, 2049; meaning of the
expression “infamous in a certain place,” 2051 sqq.; revelation about
a person juridically in disrepute elsewhere, 2054; revelation about a
person actually in disrepute elsewhere, 2055; notoriety in a closed
community, 2057; revelation about a person formerly in disrepute,
2058; when the name of person defamed is not given, 2059; defamation
of deceased and legal persons, 2060; harm done by reason of person of
defamer, 2061; defamation at second hand, 2062; harm done by reason of
listeners, 2063; detraction to one discreet person, 2065; belittling
a person to himself, 2066; disclosing matters detrimental to third
party, 2067; rights that have precedence over false reputation, 2068;
unlawful attack on another’s false reputation, 2069; conditions that
justify revelation of another’s defects, 2070; revelations about
public officials or candidates for public office, 2071; revelations
about historical personages, 2072; revelations about persons who
figure in news of day, 2074; injustice in professional critics, 2075;
cooperation in defamation, 2076; direct consent to defamation, 2077;
persons who listen to defamation from curiosity, 2078; sinfulness of
indirect consent to defamation, 2079; guilt of superior who consents to
defamation, 2080; circumstances which lessen guilt of indirect consent,
2082; inaction in face of defamation, 2083; ways of opposing defamation
made in one’s presence, 2084; restitution for defamation, 2085; gravity
of obligation of restitution, 2086; conditions which entail duty of
restitution, 2087; cooperators and restitution, 2088; circumstances
of restitution, 2089; persons by whom restitution must be made, 2089,
2090; persons to whom restitution must be made, 2001; responsibility
of defamer for spread of defamation, 2092; first way of making
restitution, 2093; other methods of making restitution, 2094; legal
reparation for defamation, 2095; time when restitution for defamation
is to be made, 2096; cessation of duty of restitution, 2097; excuses
from restitution, 2098 sqq.; right of defamed person to condone injury,
2101. See also Derision; Tale-Bearing; Reputation.

Defects, Natural, of fallen man, 283.

Defendant, definition, 1975; duties of defendant in civil cases, 1976;
duties in criminal cases, 1977; duty of accused to plead guilty, 1978;
rights and duties of accused in conducting own defense, 1980; rights
and duties of accused who has been found guilty, 1982.

Defense of Self, see Self-Defense.

Definitions of the Church, solemn and ordinary, 761 b; by the Church,
761 c.

Defloration, definition, 2529.

Deism, 847 b.

Deliberation, Wise, potential part of prudence, 1646 a.

Delight, 119.

Demerit, definition, 107.

Demon, The, 284.

Denunciation, see Accusation, Judicial; Complaint.

Deposit, 1749 a.

Derision, definition, 2106; distinction between derision and jesting,
2107; sinfulness of derision, 2109.

Desire, 119; sinful, 237 sqq.

Desires, Evil, 232, 240 sqq.

Desires, Impure, see Impurity.

Despair, definition, 1061; despondency, 1062; pusillanimity and
spiritual sloth, 1064; despair of unbelief, 1065; signs indicating
despair, 1057; malice of despair, 1068; despair compared with other
sins, 1070; causes of despair, 1071; remedies for, 1074; caused by
sloth, 1324.

Detraction, reasons for resistance to contumely or detraction, 2019;
duty of one who answers contumely or detraction, 2020; definition, 2030
c. See also Defamation.

Devotion, definition of, 2150; differs from emotion, 2151 e; from
spiritual consolations, 2151 b; external and internal cause of
devotion, 2152.

Devotions, different forms of, 2151 c.

Discord, 1347 sqq.; definition, 1348; sinfulness of intentional and
unintentional, 1350-1351; origin, 1354; prohibition against, 1552.

Disobedience, see Obedience.

Dispensation from Law, 401; who may be dispensed? 403.

Dispensations, in the strict or wide sense, 309, 524 sqq.; differ from
privileges, 524; persons who can grant dispensations, 525-530; manner
of seeking, 531; how invalidated, 533; when dispensation is refused,
534; interpretation of faculty of dispensing, 536-537; cessation of,
537-541.

See also Matrimony, Sacrament of; Vows.

Distractions, see Prayer.

Distributive Justice, see Justice.

Divination, see Religion, Sins against.

Divining Rods, and divination, 2284 c.

Divorce, books in favor of divorce forbidden, 855 b. See also
Matrimony, Sacrament of.

Docility, integral part of prudence, 1637 b.

Doctors, as source of Moral Theology, 10.

Domicile, true and quasi-domicile, 436.

Double Result, effect on imputability of acts, 103 sqq.

Doubt, 655 sqq.; positive or negative, 655; as state of conscience,
656 sqq.; reflex principles for solution of doubt, 657 sqq.; cases of
negative doubt to be settled in favor of obligation, 661; negative
doubt of law, 709 a; of fact, 709 b-c; rash doubts, 1743; supervening
doubt of possessor in doubtful faith, 1776; antecedent doubt of
possessor in doubtful faith, 1777.

Doubt, Sin of, 840 sqq.; methodical and real, 840-841; involuntary,
indeliberate, unwelcome and ignorant, 842; negative, 844; positive,
845; passing and permanent, 846.

Dress, when lascivious, 1456 b; modesty in, 2569 a.

Druggists, duties of, 2651 c.

Drunkenness, sin against sobriety, 2476 b; passive drunkenness, 2477
a; degrees of the sin of drunkenness, 2479 a; malice of the sin, 2480
a; drunkenness compared with other sins, 2481 a; responsibility of
drunkard for sins committed while intoxicated, 2482 a; cooperation in
the sin of drunkenness, 2483.

Duelling, books in favor of, forbidden, 855 b; definition, 1435;
morality of, 1436; fallacy of arguments for, 1437; penalties against,
1438.

Dulia, species of reverence, 2325 c; obligation of religious cult of
dulia, 2354.

Duties, with regard to habits, 140; of man, 744 sqq.

Easter Communion, obligation of, 2592 sqq.

Eastern Star, among societies forbidden by Church, 946 b.

Education, neglect a sin against self, 1565.

Effects of Omissions, may be directly and indirectly voluntary, 38-39.

Egoism, sin against piety, 2349 b.

Election, act of will, 59.

Embezzlement, definition, 1893 a.

Emotion, differs from devotion, 2151 a.

Employees, duties in justice and charity, 2648. See also Employers.

Employers, duties in justice and charity, 2647; duties of, 2648; labor
disputes, 2649; obligation of giving employment, 2650.

Emulation, distinct from envy, 1331 a, 1339; when it is a sin, 1332.

Enemies, charity towards, 1148; general and special love of, 1151.

Enfeeblement, definition, 1866 c.

Engagement to Marry, see Betrothal.

Enjoyment, see Relaxation.

Envy, 269; sin against charity, 1328 sqq.; definition, 1328; objects
of, 1329; subjects of, 1330; distinct from emulation, fear and
indignation, 1331; lawful and unlawful emulation, 1332; lawful and
unlawful jealousy, 1333; lawful and unlawful grief at another’s
prosperity, 1334-1337; envy by nature a mortal sin, 1338; degrees of
gravity, 1341; one of capital vices, 1342; how preeminent among sins,
1344; useful considerations and practices against envy, 1345-1346;
as origin of discord, 1354; origin of contention, 1362; prohibition
against, 1552.

Epieikeia, 358; in human laws, 385, 411 sqq.; definition, 412; limits
on use, 414 sqq.; use in determining obligation of ecclesiastical laws,
503; a. subjective part of justice, 2144. See also Equity.

Equiprobabilism 688 sqq. See also Systems, Moral.

Equity, subjective part of justice, 2430; greatness of legal equity,
2432; definition of equity, 2431.

Error, resembles ignorance, 32; practical and speculative, effect on
gravity of sin, 249; may diminish theological guilt, 1764 b.

Escape from Prison, when licit, 1982 b.

Espousals, see Betrothal.

Ethics, and Moral Theology, 2.

Eucharist, Holy, 2699; the chief Sacrament of the Church, 2699;
matter and form of the Eucharist, 2700; qualities of the bread, 2700
a; qualities of the wine, 2700 b; grave precept of Church regarding
the form, 2700 c; minister of consecration, 2701; duties of minister
as regards valid consecration, 2701 b; confession as preparation for
consecration, 2701 c; effect on consecration of inadvertent neglect of
grave liturgical precept, 2702; reservation of the Blessed Sacrament,
2708; duty of custody, 2708 a; duty of renewal of hosts, 2708 b; duty
of worship, 2708 c; visits to the Blessed Sacrament, 2708 c; Forty
Hours’ Devotion, 2708 c. See also Communion, Holy; Mass, Sacrifice of
the.

Eugenical Sterilization, 1869 c.

Euthanasia, definition, 2485.

Eutrapelia, virtue, 2421 e, 2567.

Exaggeration, form of defamation, 2032 c.

Executioners, become irregular by Canon Law, 1825.

Exorcisms, use of, 2267.

Extreme Unction, see Unction, Extreme.

Faith, Theological Virtue of, and Moral Theology, 2; definition, 151;
compared with charity, 157; ceases in the blessed, 158; excellence,
747; utility, 748-749; meaning, 750; St. Paul’s definition, 751;
St. Chrysostom’s definition, 751 a; St. Thomas’ definition, 751 b;
definition by Vatican Council, 798; material and formal objects, 754;
divine and Catholic faith, 755; divine and ecclesiastical faith,
756; private revelations, 757; human faith, 758 d; external and
internal assent, 760; solemn and ordinary definitions of Church, 761
b; condemnations of error, 761 b; definitions and censures, 761 c;
religious assent, 761 d; explicit and implicit, 763 sqq.; obligation of
explicit faith, 928; points about which explicit faith is required by
Catechism of Council of Trent, 765; faith is necessary for salvation,
766; formulas summarized in Creeds, 767; increase in articles of faith,
768; Apostles/ Nicene and Athanasian Creeds, 769; summary of teaching
of Apostles’ Creed, 770 sqq.; internal and external acts of faith, 782
sqq.; supernatural and natural truths to which assent must be given,
784; act of faith necessary, 785 sqq.; what must be believed with
implicit and explicit faith, 786; mysteries that must be believed, 787
sqq., 918, 920; substantial and scientific knowledge of mysteries, 790;
faith necessary for absolution, 792; merit of the act of faith; assent
of credibility, 795 a; preambles of faith, 795 b; habit of faith, 797;
properties of faith, 799; living and dead faith, 800; persons who have
or had faith, 801; persons who have not faith, 802; how faith must be
supreme, 803 a; faith must be universal but not necessarily explicit,
803 b; growth and decline of faith, 804-805; cause of faith, 806;
effects, 807; internal and external dangers to, 848; dangerous reading,
849 sqq.; dullness of understanding as sin, 912; blindness of mind as
sin, 912; Commandments of, 913 sqq.; commandment of knowledge, 914;
means of communicating knowledge, 915; degree of knowledge necessary,
919; knowledge of Creed, Decalogue, virtues, Sacraments, duties of
one’s state, Lord’s Prayer, 920; means for retention of knowledge, 922;
memorizing of Catechism, 923; commandment of internal acts of faith,
925; primary and secondary truths of revelation, 927; obligation of
affirmative commandment, 929; when and how often act of faith should
be made, 933-935; formal and virtual act of faith, 936; commandment of
external profession, 938 sqq.; denial of faith, 939; ways of denying
faith, 941; commandment of external profession, 987 sqq.; divine
precept of profession, 989; secret, private and public profession, 992
sqq,; obligation to give instruction on matters of faith and morals,
1001; ecclesiastical precept of profession, 1003; flight to avoid
profession, 1005; when concealment of one’s faith is lawful, 1007; sins
of unbelief, see Unbelief, Sin of. See also Unbelief; Heresy; Apostasy;
Doubt; Credulity; Rationalism.

Fame, see Reputation.

Fare, travelling without paying, 1907.

Fasting, excellence of, 2409 a. See also Abstemiousness.

Favoritism, sinfulness declared by Revelation, 1805; sinfulness
declared by reason, 1806; gravity of sin of favoritism, 1807;
favoritism in spiritual matters, 1809; favoritism in secular matters,
1812; favoritism in marks of esteem or honor, 1813; favoritism in
judges, umpires, arbitrators and the like, 1814 a.

Fear, as obstacle to consent, 40, 44; acts done with and through fear,
43; two moral species (fear of the world and of God), 1043; habitual
and actual fear, 1044; worldly fear as sin, 1045; servile and filial
fear of God, 1048 sqq.; initial and perfected fear, 1055; divine
commandments concerning fear, 1103; compared with envy, 1331 b, 1339.

Fear of the Lord, Gift of the Holy Ghost, 160 b; perfects hope, 1041;
distinct from other kinds of fear, 1042; corresponds to First Beatitude
and Fruits of modesty, continency and chastity, 1058; complement of
temperance, 2571 a.

Fecundation, Artificial, 2618 c.

Fees, in connection with administration of sacred rites, 2185 b.

Feigning of Defects, form of lying, 2406 b.

Fenians, Society forbidden by Church, 947 b.

Fidelity, Fruit of the Holy Ghost, 163. See also Truthfulness.

Fighting, definition, 1428; kinds, 1429; sinfulness, 1430; causes,
1431; hatred as cause of fighting, 1432; frequent occasions, 1433; evil
consequences, 1434.

First-Fruits, and tithes, 2185 b.

Fitness, the right standard for distributive justice, 1804 c.

Flattery, vice opposite to modesty, 2566 b.

Flesh Meat, 2586 sqq.

Foolhardiness, sin against fortitude, 2466 b.

Foolishness, sin of, opposed to Gift of Wisdom, 1621; description of
sin, 1624; causes, 1625; cause of contumely, 2017 b.

Foresight, 1638 b.

Forgetfulness, resembles ignorance, 32.

Form, Sacramental, see Sacrament. Formal Sin, 248.

Fornication, definition, 2543; sinfulness of fornication, 2534;
fornication compared with other sins, 2525 a; circumstances of
fornication, 2526 a; fornication of engaged person, 2526 b; forms of
fornication, 2527; the State and places of prostitution, 2528.

Fortitude, 150; golden mean in, 154 a, 157 b; Gift of the Holy Ghost,
160 b; rank among moral virtues, 2437; definition of fortitude,
2439; two acts of fortitude, 2440; excellence, 2441; sins opposed to
fortitude, 2446; integral and potential parts of fortitude, 2447;
differs from patience, 2453 b; complements of fortitude, 2457; Gift
of Fortitude, 2457 a; fortitude and the Eighth Beatitude, 2457 b;
fortitude and the Fruits of Patience and Longsuffering, 2457 c;
commandments of fortitude, 2458; subjects of fortitude, 2460. See also
Martyrdom.

Franchise, Electoral, see Voting.

Fraternal Correction, see Correction, fraternal.

Fraud, invalidates consent of contract, 1884 b; injustice in voluntary
commutations, 2121; definition of fraud, 2122; two kinds of injustice
in sales, 2123; injustice regarding price, 2124; criteria of a just
price, 2125; obligation of observing prices settled by law or custom,
2126; when market price may be disregarded without injustice, 2127;
unjust sales based on ignorance of real value, 2129; obligation of
restitution on account of unjust price, 2130; injustice regarding thing
sold, 2131; defects in the thing sold, 2132.

Free Love, definition, 2527 c.

Freemasonry, 823 b; books in favor of, forbidden, 855 b; Society
forbidden by Code, 947 a.

Friday Abstinence, 2586 c.

Friendship, 1110; friendship of utility, pleasure and virtue, 1111;
five marks of true friendship, 1137; human friendship not a distinct
virtue, 1140; virtue of friendship, 2143 b.

Fruition, as act of will, 58.

Fruits of the Holy Ghost, 159 b; twelve in number, 163, 811, 1058,
1619, 1662, 2433, 2457, 2571.

Gambling, sinful, 1879 d; gambling forbidden to clerics, 2603 c.

Geomancy, form of divination, 2284 c.

Gift, sinful, 1879 a; when are free gifts to judges permissible? 1945 d.

Gifts of the Holy Ghost, 159 a; intellectual, 160 a; appetitive, 159,
160, 160 b; Understanding and Knowledge, 808-810; Fear of the Lord,
1041-1057; Wisdom, 1609 sqq.; Counsel, 1662; Piety, 2433; Fortitude,
2457; Fear of the Lord, 2571.

Gluttony, 269; sin opposed to abstemiousness, 2470 b; ways of
committing gluttony, 2471; sinfulness of gluttony, 2472 a; gluttony as
capital sin, 2473 11.

Gnome, part of judgment, 2432 d.

Gnosticism, 822 c.

Gnostics, 823 b.

God, belief in His existence and providence necessary for salvation,
787.

Golden Mean, in virtues, 153-154.

Good, Common. 285 c.

Goods, external, not last end of man, 20; of the body, not last end
of man, 20; of the soul, not last end of man, 20; when temporal goods
should be surrendered to avoid scandal, 1483.

Goods, Abandoned, when they may be occupied, 1873 e; when vacant goods
may be occupied, 1873 f.

Good Templars, Independent Order of, forbidden by Church, 946 b.

Good Will, Fruit of the Holy Ghost, 163.

Gossip, sinfulness of, 2038.

Grace, 284.

Gratitude, virtue of, 2143 a; definition of virtue, 2373; two kinds
of gratitude, 2374; circumstances of gratitude, 2376; sins against
gratitude, 2377; moral species of ingratitude, 2378; theological
species of ingratitude, 2379; is it right to confer favors on the
ungrateful? 2380.

Grave Matter, absolute and relative standards, 1899; opinions on the
amounts that are grave matter, 1900 a.

Greatness of Deed, integral part of fortitude, 2447 b; definition of
virtue, 2452.

Greatness of Soul, integral part of fortitude, 2447 b; definition of
virtue, 2448; greatness of soul and humility, 2449; vices opposed to,
2450 sqq.

Grief, at another’s prosperity, when lawful and unlawful, 1334-1337.

Guaranty, 1749 d.

Guilt, formal guilt, 248; material guilt, 248; causes that remove or
diminish theological guilt, 1764 a.

Habits, as obstacle to voluntariness of acts, 40, 53; definition, 53;
antecedent and consequent, 53; in general, 132 sqq.; definition, 133;
entitative and operative, 134 a; good and evil, 134 b; infused and
acquired, 134 c, 135-136; strengthening and weakening of, 137 sqq.;
exercise great influence on morality, 140; our duties regarding, 141.
See also Virtue; Vice.

Half-Truths, form of lying, 2030 c.

Haruspicy, form of divination, 2284 c.

Hate, 119 (see also Passions, concupiscible); sin against charity,
1295; definition and kinds, 1296; hatred of God, 1297; interpretative
and formal hatred, 1299, 1315; hatred of God as a special sin,
1300; gravity of this sin, 1301; degrees of malice, 1303; hatred of
creatures, 1304; dislike of self, 1305, 1307; may one wish evil to
self or others? 1308; wish for death or spiritual evil, 1310-1311;
gravity of sin of hatred of neighbor, 1312; comparison with other sins,
1313; hatred not a capital vice, 1314; species of sin, 1317; manner
of confessing sin, 1318-1319; as cause of fighting, 1432; prohibition
against, 1552.

Health, Injury to, a form of injustice, 1871.

Heresy, 822 c, 826 sqq.; as a sin and canonical crime, 827; positive
and negative, 828 a; internal and external, 828 b; occult and public,
828 c; material and formal, 828 d, 829-830; sinfulness of, 831;
circumstances that modify guilt, 832; penalties, 833; books in favor
of, forbidden, 855 b; heresy compared with schism, 1370.

Hibernians, Ancient Order of, 955 b.

Hire of Labor, form of onerous contract, 1 749 b.

Historical Personages, lawfulness of revelations about, 2072.

Holy Ghost, Fruits of, see Fruits of the Holy Ghost.

Holy Ghost, Gifts of, see Gifts of the Holy Ghost.

Homicide, definition, 1816; when homicide is lawful, 1819; unlawful
killing of offenders, 1823; lawfulness of tyrannicide, 1824 a;
homicide in self-defense, 1826; killing of the innocent, 1844 sqq.;
unintentional killing of the innocent, 1847; destruction of the unborn,
1848 sqq.; canonical penalties for, 1851 a; accidental homicide, 1862;
moral and legal guilt of homicide, 1865. See also Punishment, Capital,
1820.

Honor, definition, 2010 b; persons who are deserving of honor, 2011;
species of honor, 2352; obligation of showing honor, 2353; honor due to
superiors, 2636 a.

Honors, Pursuit of, sometimes demanded by charity to self, 1574.

Hope, Theological Virtue of, 151, 157, 158, 1009 sqq.; definition,
1009-1012; supernatural and natural hope, 1013; animated and inanimated
hope, 1016; disinterested and interested hope, 1017 b, 1033; object of,
1018; excellence of, 1027; comparison with faith, 1029; with charity,
1030; pseudo-hope (egotistical, Epicurean, and utilitarian), 1032; hope
overcomes spiritual discouragement and aridity, 1034; means for growth
in hope, 1035; subject of hope, 1036; certainty of, 1040; perfected by
Fear of the Lord (q.v.), 1041; sins against hope, 1059 sqq.; despair
(q.v.), 1061 sqq.; spiritual desolations, 1064; pusillanimity and
spiritual sloth, 1064; presumption (q.v.), 1075 sqq,; commandments
of hope, 1092; acts of hope obligatory, 1093; unlawful to surrender
beatitude, 1094; when the commandment of hope obliges, 1095 sqq.

Horror, 119. See also Passions, concupiscible.

Houses of Study, courses of theology must follow St. Thomas Aquinas, 10.

Human Acts, see Acts, Human.

Humanitarianism, sin against piety, 2349 b.

Humility, greatness of soul and humility, 2449; potential part of
temperance, 2465 c; definition, 2553; the three acts of humility, 2554
a; two requirements of humility, 2555; excellence of humility, 2556 a.

Hunting, forbidden to clerics, 2603 c.

Husbands, see Matrimony, Sacrament of.

Hussism, 822 c.

Hydromancy, form of divination, 2284 c.

Hyperdulia, species of reverence, 2352 c.

Hypocrisy, form of lying, 2391 b; sinfulness of hypocrisy, 2405.

Iconoclasm, 822 c.

Idleness, 1326 e.

Idolatry, see Religion, Sins against.

Ignorance, various kinds, 24 sqq.; concomitant, consequent and
antecedent, 26, 29; vincible and invincible, 27, 30; influence on
voluntariness of acts, 28; effect on sin, 249; sins of ignorance, see
Ignorance, Sin of; invincible, in relation to Natural Law, 320; of
Christian Law, possibility of, 356; confessors should examine penitents
who show signs of ignorance, 924.

Ignorance, Sin of, 250 b, 904 sqq,; culpable ignorance as distinct sin,
907. See also Ignorance.

Images, when obscene, 1456 a.

Immoderation, vice opposed to temperance, 2464 b.

Immorality, see Impurity.

Impatience, vice opposed to patience, 2455 b.

Impediments, simple impediments to reception of Holy Orders, 2784 b;
matrimonial impediments, 2804 sqq.

Imperfections, Moral, 185; when they become sin, 186.

Impossibility, Physical, 361 a; moral, 361 b.

Impurity, definition, 2492; sensuality, luxury and curiosity, 2492 n;
kinds of impurity, 2493 a; gravity of sin, 2494 a; one of the capital
vices, 2494 c; evil fruits of impurity, 2495; when venial and mortal,
2496 a; when directly willed, 2496 b; when indirectly willed, 2496 c;
temptations to impurity, 2497; resistance to internal temptations,
2498; what opposition to temptation is sufficient, 2499; insufficient,
harmful and unnecessary opposition, 2500; weapons against carnal
temptations, 2501; sinfulness of negligence in resisting temptations,
2502; non-consummated sins of impurity, 2504; impure thoughts, 2505;
malice of impure thoughts, 2506 a; impure rejoicing, 2507; impure
desires, 2508; malice of impure desires, 2509; sins of lewdness, 2510;
consummated sins of impurity, 2520; comparative malice of the sins
of consummated lust, 2521 a; multiplication of sins of lust, 2522;
fornication, 2523; incest, 2532; carnal sacrilege, 2533; unnatural
lust, 2534; pollution, 2535; non-sinful pollution, 2536; unimputable
pollution, 2537; proximate and remote occasions of pollution, 2538;
theological malice of sinful pollution, 2539; moral species of sinful
pollution, 2541; canonical penalties for immorality, 2542. See also
Lewdness; Fornication.

Imputability of Acts, 97 sqq.

Inadvertence, resembles ignorance, 32.

Incest, definition, 2531.

Inconvenience, degrees of, 1520.

Index of Forbidden Books, 862 c.

Indifferentism, 823 a.

Indignation, differs from envy, 1331 c, 1339.

Indolence, 1326 d.

Infamy, 2051 sqq.

Infidelity, 822 ff.

Ingratitude, see Gratitude.

Inhabitant, definition, 437; when subject to laws, 438.

Inheritance, title of private ownership, 1872 b.

Inhibition, of passions, 131.

_Injuria_, definition, 1724 b.

Injuries, Bodily, a form of injustice, 1866.

Injustice, definition, 1719; species of legal and particular injustice,
1720; theological species of legal and particular injustice, 1721;
when injury to private or public right is mortal sin, 1722 a, b; moral
species of injustice, 1723; profitable and unprofitable injustice,
1724 c; when injury is no injustice, 1725; internal injustice, 1726;
distributive injustice alone does not oblige to restitution, 1754;
cooperators in injustice and restitution, 1778 sqq.; mandator of act
of injustice, 1779 a; advisor of act of injustice, 1779 b; protector
in act of injustice, 1779 d; consenter in act of injustice, 1779 e;
partaker in injustice, 1779 f; sin of injustice, 1866 s; judicial
injustice, 1939; principal sins of verbal injustice, 2009.

Injustice in Buying and Selling, see Fraud.

Innocent, unintentional killing of, 1847.

Insensibility, sin against fortitude, 2446 b; vice opposed to
temperance, 2464.

Insurance, 1749 c.

Intellect, art and prudence the two practical virtues of, 1627.

Intention, as act of will, 58. See also Prayer.

Internationalism, False, sin against piety, 2349 b.

Interpretation, of law, 315 sqq.; verbal or emendatory, 315; by private
or public authority, 316; of ecclesiastical laws, 483 sqq.; rules for
doctrinal interpretation, 485.

Invocation, of a demon, 2284; invocation of spirits, see Religion, Sins
against.

Irascible Passions, 118, 120.

Irregularities, as disqualifications for reception of Holy Orders, 2784
b.

Irreligiousness, see Religion, Sins against.

Jail-breaking, and restitution, 1983.

Jealousy, lawful and unlawful, 1333.

Jesting, distinction between derision and jesting, 2107.

Jingoism, sin against piety, 2349 a.

Joy, Fruit of the Holy Ghost, 163; sinful, 237; as effect of charity,
1193-1194.

Judaism, 822 b.

Judaizers, 823 b.

Judge, office of, 1940; qualifications, 1943; conduct, 1944; accepting
gifts from litigants, 1945; obligation to restore bribes, etc., 1946;
duties during a trial, 1947; duties on conclusion of a trial, 1948;
obligation in connection with a law manifestly unjust, 1949; Catholic
judge and degrees of divorce, 1950; obligation when evidence is
contrary to his personal knowledge, 1951; when judge is unjust cause of
damaging evidence, 1952; obligation in doubtful criminal cases, 1955;
obligation in doubtful civil cases, 1956; standard by which he should
weigh evidence, 1958; when a judge is bound to restitution, 1962; when
he is not bound to restitution, 1963; right to question prisoner about
his guilt, 1979; judges who pass death sentence become irregular by
Canon Law, 1825. See also Witness.

Judgment, virtue of, 1727; public and private judgment, 1727 a; three
conditions of righteous judgment, 1729-1731; necessary quality of
lawful oath, 2249 e.

Judgment, Rash, 1731 b; sinfulness of rash judgment, 1734; rules
on perfect advertence to rashness of judgment, 1736; rules on
insufficiency of reasons for unfavorable judgments, 1737; rules on
gravity of matter in rash judgments, 1738; moral species of the sin of
rash judgment, 1739; chief reasons for rash conclusions about character
of others, 1742; rash doubts, 1743.

Judgments, Moral, 672 sqq.; the safer and more likely, 673.

Jurisdiction, of a judge, 1942.

Justice, 150; golden mean in, 154 a, 157 b; precedence over charity,
291 b; compared with other virtues, 1714; private justice, 1715 b;
legal justice, 1715 a; justice superior to courage, 1716 a; superior to
liberality, 1716 b; regarded by some as inferior to virtue of religion
and mercy, 1718 a, b; justice demands proper motives in those who seek
or pass judgment, 1728 a; legal justice distinct from distributive
and commutative, 1745 a; distributive justice, 1745 b; commutative
justice, 1745 c; resemblance between distributive and commutative
justice, 1746; special differences between distributive and commutative
justice, 1747; commutations of commutative justice, 1748; equality
sought by commutative justice, 1750; distributive justice and violation
of individual rights, 1755; commutative justice and violation of
individual rights, 1756; vice opposed to distributive justice, 1804;
distributive injustice frequently accompanied by commutative injustice,
1808; vices against commutative justice, 1815; legal justice, classes
of courts, 1941; jurisdiction of 9, judge, 1942; quasi-integral parts
of justice, 2139; potential parts of justice, 2141; degrees of moral
debt, 2143; necessary qualities of lawful oath, 2249 c; complements of
justice, 2433; Beatitudes that correspond to justice, 2433 b; Fruits
of the Holy Ghost that correspond to justice, 2433 c; commandments of
justice, 2434; justice, a duty of superior, 2635 b. See also Equity;
Restitution.

Killing, of animals, 1818 a; of human beings, see Homicide.

Kindness, Fruit of the Holy Ghost, 163.

Kinsfolk, order of charity between, 1176 sqq.

Kissing, morality of kissing and similar acts, 2513.

Knights of Columbus, 955 b.

Knights of Pythias, Society forbidden by Church, 946 b.

Knowledge, Gift of the Holy Ghost, 160 a; given to perfect theological
virtues, 808.

Lands, how they may be occupied, 1873 b.

Larceny, definition of, 1893 b; petit and grand larceny, 1893 b.

Last End of Man, existence of, 19; nature of, 20; how attained, 21.

Latitudinarianism, 823 a.

Law, 284 sqq.; definition, 285; eternal, natural and positive divine,
286; collision of laws, 288; precedence, 289 sqq,; basis of all laws,
293; customs may interpret, abrogate or introduce law, 506.

Law, Christian, comparison with Mosaic Law, 346 sqq.; as regards their
aims, 347; as regards their precepts, 348; as regards their difficulty
of observance, 349; as regards external and internal works, 350-351;
moral, ceremonial and judicial precepts of New Testament, 352; duration
of, 354; subjects of, 355; ignorance of, 356; dispensation from, 357;
interpretation of, 358-359; when observance of law is impossible,
360-361; Counsels of (q.v.), 364 sqq.; the three chief Counsels, 369.
See also Law, Mosaic.

Law, Civil, 542 sqq.; persons in whom legislative authority is vested,
543; acceptance by people not necessary for obligation of law in
itself, 544; obligation of laws made by one without authority, 545;
subject-matter, 546; relation to natural law, 547; relation to divine
and ecclesiastical law, 548; and human rights and liberties, 549;
persons subject to, 550; obligation of, 551; when penalty is incurred
before sentence, 552; special kinds, 557 sqq.; laws that determine
ownership, 557; irritant or voiding laws, 558; four kinds of laws with
reference to penalty, 561; moral obligation, 561 sqq. See also Laws,
Human.

Law, Ecclesiastical, precedence over civil, 290, 418 sqq.; charter
of, 418; character of, 419; general law of Church, 420; effects of
Code on liturgical and disciplinary laws and customs, 421; rules
governing interpretation of Code, 422; lawgivers in Church, 423-429;
subject-matter of Church Law, 425; kinds of acts governed by Church
Law, 426; persons bound by general laws, 427 sqq.; persons bound by
particular laws, 435; promulgation, 447; acceptance of, 448; irritant
laws, 450 sqq.; effects of ignorance, force or fear on acts irritated
by law, 456; when an irritant law ceases to bind, 457; obligation
of law based on presumption of common danger, 460; obligation of
law based on presumption of particular fact, 461; personal, minute,
partial and simultaneous fulfillment of laws, 462 sqq.; time of
fulfillment, 468 sqq.; unwilling fulfillment, 476; intention required
in fulfillment, 477 sqq.; virtuous dispositions in fulfillment, 480
sqq.; interpretation of, 483; cessation of obligation, 487; exemption
from, 488; ignorance and impossibility as excuses for non-observance,
489 sqq.; cessation of, 500 sqq.; use of epieikeia in determining
obligation, 503.

Law, Eternal, The, basis of all laws, 293.

Law, Mosaic, began with promise to Abraham, 332 a; promulgation, 332
b; excellence, 333; subjects of, 334; duration of obligation, 335;
precepts, ceremonies and judgments, 336 sqq.; ceremonial laws, 340;
sacred times and places, sacraments and customs, 340; four periods of
ceremonial law, 342; four kinds of judgments or judicial laws, 343-345;
comparison with Christian Law, 346 sqq.

Law, Natural, precedence over positive, 289; definition, 295; relation
to other laws, 296; division, 297; common and proper, 297 b; primary
and secondary, 298; first principle and secondary principles, 300 a;
precepts (axiomatic and inferred, general and particular), 300-301;
necessary and contingent laws, 302; absolute and relative laws, 303;
properties of, 305; of universal obligation, 306; unchangeable, 307
sqq,; possibility of dispensation from, 309, 314 sqq.; possibility of
modification, 313; when observance is physically or morally impossible,
317-318; promulgated by light of reason, 319; ineradicable from human
heart, 324; wrong applications of, 326.

Law, Positive Divine, definition, 328; necessity, 328 c; differs
from Natural Law in certain respects, 329; natural and supernatural
commandments, 330; division of, 331; in state of original innocence,
331 a; in law of nature, 331 b; Mosaic Law, 332 sqq.; Christian Law,
346 sqq.

Lawgivers, in the Church, 423-424.

Laws, Administration of, see Judge.

Laws, Ceremonial, of Old Testament, 340 sqq., See also Law. Mosaic.

Laws, Ecclesiastical, in a wide sense, 514 sqq.; precepts, 519;
rescripts, 520; privileges, 521-523; dispensations, 524.

Laws, Human, 370 sqq.; definition, 370; divisions, 371; qualities,
372; should not prescribe what is too difficult, 372; obligation,
375; necessity, 375; when unjust, 376; obedience to unjust laws not
obligatory, 377; degrees of obligation, 373 sqq.; interpretation,
385-386; epieikeia, 385; those subject to law, 387-388; change of, 389;
constitutional law, 390; effects of custom on law, 391; dispensation
from, 401 sqq. See also Law, Civil.

Laws of New Testament, 7.

Laws of the First and Second Tables, 338. See also Decalogue.

Lawyer, general duties, 1995; qualifications, 1996; duties in
introducing case, 1997, obligation in charity towards persons in
distress, 1998-99; duty when cause is unjust, 2000; duties when justice
of cause is doubtful, 2001; duty when he discovers case is really
unjust, 2003; duties towards client, 2004; duties toward other parties,
2005; concealment of truth in presenting case, 2006; sinfulness
of introducing false or corrupted documents, 2007; when bound to
restitution, 2008.

Laxism, see Systems, Moral.

Laziness, as distinct from sloth, 1326; various forms, 1326 a-e.

Lease, 1749 b.

Leniency, Undue, vice, 2552 b.

Lenten Fast, 2588.

Lesbian Love, form of impurity, 2534 c.

Lewdness, definition, 2510; propriety of external acts, 2512; morality
of kissing and similar acts, 2513; morality of sensual gratification,
2514; theological species of the sin of lewdness, 2515; circumstances
that increase or lessen the danger of sin, 2517; cases wherein the
danger of sin is grave or slight, 2518; lewd books, 2518 b; lewdness in
speech, 2518 a; in reading, 2518 b; in looks, 2518 c; in touches, 2518
d; moral species of lewdness, 2519 a.

Libel, definition, 2030 d.

Liberality, inferior to justice, 1716 b; virtue of liberality, 2143 b;
definition of virtue, 2424; importance of liberality, 2425. See also
Avarice; Prodigality.

Lies, see Lying.

Lipstick, morality of use, 2570.

Liquids, may or may not break fast, 2588.

Loans, 1749 a; loan at interest, 1749 b.

Longsuffering, Fruit of the Holy Ghost, 163.

Looting, forbidden by modern international law, 1415.

Loss, definition, 1724 b.

Lots, Use of, when lawful, 2289.

Lottery, when lawful, 1879 e.

Love, definition, 119; root of all appetites of soul, 1106; effects,
1107; degrees, 1108; love of desire and love of benevolence, 1109; love
of creatures not always charity, 1134; kinds of self-love (q.v.), 1136;
obligatory, 1608 a; of supererogation, 1608 b.

Love of God, see Charity.

Love of Neighbor, see Neighbor, Love of.

Love of Self, see Self-Love.

Lukewarmness, 1327.

Lust, 269. See also Impurity.

Luxury, compared with impurity, 2492 a; modesty in luxury, 2569 a.

Lying, definition, 2389; misunderstanding a form of lying, 2390 a;
misinterpretation a form of lying, 2390 b; divisions of lies, 2391;
hypocrisy, 2391 b; simulation, 2301 b; misrepresentation and deceit,
2391 b; classification of lies, 2392; lies of inclination, 2392 b;
pernicious lies, 2392 b; motives for lying 2393; jocose lie, 2392
a; officious lie, 2392 a; comparison of gravity of various lies,
2394; sinfulness of all lies, 2395; when lying entails no formal
sin, 2396; pernicious lies, 2397; concealment of the truth, 2398;
mental reservation, 2399; morality of strict mental reservation,
2400; morality of broad mental reservation, 2400 b; when broad mental
reservation is lawful, 2401; ambiguous answers, 2402; simulation or
pretence, 2403; sinfulness of simulation, 2404.

Macedonianism, 822 c.

Magnanimity, see Greatness of Soul.

Majority, Age of, 433.

Malefactor, when bound to accuse himself, 1968.

Malice, sins of, 250 e; caused by sloth, 1324.

_Mandatum_, 1749 a.

Manicheans, 823 b.

Manicheism, 822 c.

Marriage, see Matrimony, Sacrament of.

Marriage, Trial, definition, 2527 c.

Marriages, Dangerous, 875; canonical consequences, 879; prenuptial
guarantees, 880; remedies against mixed and dangerous marriages, 881.

Martyrdom, definition, 2442; kinds of martyrdom, 2443; conditions for
martyrdom, 2444; practical questions about martyrdom, 2445.

Mass, Sacrifice of the, 2709; obligation of saying Mass, 2710;
dispositions for the celebration of Mass, 2711; confession before
Mass, 2711 a; distractions during the Canon, 2711 b; preparation and
thanksgiving before Mass, 2711 a; Eucharistic or natural fast, 2711
b; rubrical vestments, 2711 b; time of Mass, 2712 a; place, 2712 b;
rites, 2712 c; when it is lawful to discontinue Mass, 2713; application
of the Mass, 2714; obligation of pastors to say Mass for flocks, 2714
a; obligation of Mass stipends, 2714 b; persons for whom Mass may be
applied, 2715; how Mass must be applied, 2715 b; lawfulness of Mass
stipends, 2716.

Masturbation, form of impurity, 2534 a.

Material Sin, 248.

Matrimony, Sacrament of, first blessing of marriage (offspring), 2613
a; second blessing of marriage (fidelity), 2613 b; third blessing
of marriage (sacrament), 2613 c; obligation of paying the conjugal
debt, 2614; absence of obligation, 2615; suspension of obligation,
2616; obligation of requesting conjugal intercourse, 2617; morality
of venereal acts of marriage, 2618; unnatural consummated acts,
2618 c; artificial fecundation, 2618 c; rectal copulation, 2618 c;
contraception, 2620; contraception an injury to God, 2620 a; an injury
to society, 2620 b; an injury to the family, 2620 c; an injury to the
individual, 2620 d; arguments of Neo-Malthusians and other advocates of
contraception, 2621; is birth-control ever lawful? 2622; _cooperatio
uxoris ad onanismum vel contraceptionem_, 2623; _recapitulatio de
licitis et illicitis in conjugio_, 2624; marriage as a Sacrament,
2626; reasons that justify separation, 2626 a; husband superior to
wife in authority, 2626 b; husband has duty of providing for wife,
2626 c; no obligation for individual to marry, 2627 a; unity of
marriage its first property, 2787 d; indissolubility of marriage its
second property, 2787 e; Pauline Privilege, 2787 e; dissolution, 2787
e; divorce under Mosaic Law, 2787 e; marriages of infidels, 2787 e;
true, presumed, putative and attempted marriage, 2788 a; legitimate,
ratified, consummated marriage, 2788 b; clandestine, secret, public
marriage, 2788 c; marriage of conscience, 2788 c; marriage is canonical
or civil, 2788 d; elements of contract of marriage, 2789 a; ends of
contract, 2789 b; essence of contract is the consent, 2789 c; valid
consent, 2790; defects in consent, 2791; mental derangement as defect,
2791 a; ignorance as defect, 2791 b; error as defect, 2791 c; effect
of forced consent on validity, 2792 a; effect of forced consent on
lawfulness, 2792 b; conditional consent, 2793; elements of marriage
as Sacrament, 2794; ministers and recipients of Matrimony, 2794 b;
effects of Matrimony, 2794 c; duties in connection with marriage, 2795;
obligation of betrothal or engagement, 2796; is engagement necessary
before marriage? 2798; duties to parents or guardians in reference
to marriage, 2799; duties of parents in reference to marriage,
2800; obstacles to marriage, 2801; duty to make known impediment to
marriage, 2801 c; duties of pastor in examination of engaged persons,
2802; special proofs of freedom to marry, 2803; proof of Baptism,
2803 a; proof of single state, 2803 b; matrimonial impediments,
2804; sinfulness of marrying with an impediment, 2805; impedient or
prohibitive impediments, 2806; vow as impediment, 2806 a; impediment
of legal relationship, 2806 b; impediment of mixed religion, 2806
e; duties of pastor and parties in connection with mixed marriages,
2807; valid engagement forbids marriage with third party, 2809 a;
special prohibition of particular marriage by the Church, 2809 b;
closed times, 2809 e; diriment impediments to marriage, 2810; absolute
diriment impediments, 2811; impediment of age, 2813; impediment of
impotency, 2814; impediment of bond, 2816; impediment of difference
of religion, 2817; impediment of kinship, 2818; consanguinity, 2818
a; affinity, 2818 b; public decency, 2818 c; spiritual relationship,
2818 d; legal relationship, 2818 e; matrimonial impediments produced
through misdeeds, 2819; impediment of abduction, 2819 a; impediment
of crime, 2819 b; duties of pastor after inquiry about impediments,
2820; dispensation, 2820 a; publications of banns of marriage, 2820
b; duties of pastor after examination and proclamation, 2821; duties
of pastor as regards religious instruction of engaged couple, 2822;
pastor and duties of engaged couple, 2823; pastor’s duties to parents,
2823 a; pastor’s duties to civil law, 2823 b; opposition of parents
to marriage, 2824; religious duties of parties before marriage, 2825;
confession, 2825 a; Communion, 2825 b; celebration of marriage, 2826;
requisites for validity, 2826 a; requisites for lawfulness, 2826 b;
rite of Matrimony, 2827; Nuptial Blessing and Nuptial Mass, 2827 b;
cooperation in unworthy marriage, 2828; registration of marriages,
2829; when impediment is discovered after marriage, 2830; lawfulness of
divorce and separation, 2831. See also Betrothal.

Matter of Sin, grave, 171-172; light, 182.

Matter, Sacramental, see Sacrament.

Meanness, vice against greatness of deed, 2452 b.

Medicinal Afflictions, as remedies against sin, 283.

Meekness, Fruit of the Holy Ghost, 163; potential part of temperance,
2465 c; definition, 2545.

Memory, 1637 a.

Mental Derangement, removes theological guilt, 1764 a.

Mercy, result of charity, 1193; definition, 1193 c; natural and
supernatural, 1205; causes of unmerciful spirit, 1206; mercy compared
with other moral virtues, 1207; compared with charity, 1208;
obligation, 1209; seven corporal works of mercy, 1221; seven spiritual
works, 1222-1223; regarded by some as superior to justice, 1717 b.

Merit, definition, 107; human and divine, 108; natural and
supernatural, 109; condign and congruous, 110; the right standard for
distributive justice, 1804 c.

Merits, former merits recovered by repentance, 2725 c.

Methods in Moral Theology, Casuistic, Positive and Scholastic, 13.

Minors, legal privileges in connection with contracts, 1882.

Misrepresentation, form of lying, 2391 b.

Moderation, see Temperance.

Modernism, 822 c, 841 b.

Modesty, Fruit of the Holy Ghost, 163; of bearing and living potential
part of temperance, 2465 e; definition of modesty, 2565; modest
behavior or decorum, 2566 a; vices opposed to modesty, 2566 b; modesty
in style of living and dress, 2569 a; morality of self-beautification,
2570; fruit of the Fear of the Lord, 2571 c.

Mohammedanism, 822 a.

Monophysitism, 822 c.

Morality, definition, 64; constitutive norm, 65; manifestative norm,
67; perceptive norm, 68; three species of, 69; three sources, the
object, circumstances, and end, 70 sqq.; moral value of passions, 121
sqq.; important influence of habits on, 140.

Moral Science, office of, 1631 b.

Moral Systems, see Systems, Moral.

Moral Theology, objects, 4; medium, 4; sources, 6; use of natural
reason, philosophy and natural sciences in, 11-12; Positive, Scholastic
and Casuistic Methods, 13; history of, 15; Patristic Period, 15 a;
Medieval Period, 15 b; Modern, 15 c; division and order of parts, 17;
General and Special, 18.

Mormonism, 823 b.

Mortgage, 1749 d.

Motions of the Soul, First and Second, 129.

Motives of Sin, 268 sqq.

Munificence, virtue, 2452 e.

Murder, see Homicide.

Murmuring, definition and sinfulness of, 2120.

Mutilation, definition, 1866 a; when lawful, 1867.

_Mutuum_, definition, 1749 a.

Mysteries, that must be believed, 787 sqq., 918, 920; substantial and
scientific knowledge of, 790.

Narcotics, licit use, 2485.

Naturalism, 847 b.

Necessity, Spiritual, degrees of, 1165.

Necessity, Temporal, degrees of, 1236; extreme necessity justifies
conversion of others’ property, 1921 a.

Necromancy, form of divination, 2284 b.

Necrophilism, form of impurity, 2534 d.

Negligence, 1326 a.

_Negotiorum gestio_, definition, 1749 a.

Neighbor, Love of, three kinds, 1139 sqq.; sacrifice of spiritual goods
or bodily welfare for neighbor’s sake, 1163 sqq.; order of charity
between neighbors, 1171 sqq. See Charity; Friendship; Emulation;
Jealousy; Hate; Correction, Fraternal.

Neo-Malthusians, arguments in favor of contraception, 2821.

Nestorianism, 822 c.

New Testament, ordinances, 7; counsels, 7; laws, 7; temporary
regulations, 7; law of, see Law, Christian.

Nihilists, society forbidden by Church, 947 b.

Non-Catholics, participation in Catholic rites, 957 sqq.

Non-Combatants, treatment during war, 1412.

Nurses, duties of, 2651 c.

Oaths, moral effects of accidentals added to contracts, 1886 b;
definition of an oath, 2245; assertory or promissory oaths, 2246 a;
comminatory or confirmatory oaths, 2246 a; contestatory or execratory
oaths, 2246 b; explicit or implicit oaths, 2246 b; solemn or simple,
judicial or extrajudicial oaths, 2246 d; moral difference between
various kinds of oaths, 2247; lawfulness of oaths, 2248; necessary
qualities of a lawful oath, 2249; sinful oaths, 2250; incautious
oath, 2250 a; perjured oaths, 2250 b; wicked oaths, 2250 c; mental
reservation in oaths, 2251; cooperation in sinful oaths, 2252; sinful
oaths demanded or accepted by private persons, 2253; fictitious oaths,
2254; expressions confused with oaths; obligation imposed by promissory
oath, 2256; obligation imposed by negative oath, 2257; obligation of
oath is personal, 2258; interpretation of promissory oath, 2259; kind
of obligation produced by a valid promissory oath, 2260; cessation of
obligation of promissory oath, 2262. See also Adjuration.

Obedience, definition of virtue, 2355; power of jurisdiction and
dominative power, 2356; degrees of obedience, 2357; comparison of
obedience with other virtues, 2358; comparison of acts of obedience,
2359; duty of obedience, 2360; when obedience is not lawful or
obligatory, 2361; internal actions and human superiors, 2363;
obligation of vow of obedience, 2364; sins against obedience, 2365;
definition of disobedience, 2366; kinds of disobedience, 2367;
theological sinfulness of formal disobedience, 2369; moral species of
disobedience, 2370; circumstances that aggravate formal disobedience,
2371; comparison of formal disobedience with other sins, 2372; vow and
virtue of obedience, 2612 c; obedience due to superiors, 2636 b.

Objects, Sinful, formal cooperation by manufacture of, 1533; material
cooperation, 1534 sqq.

Obscenity, definition, 1455; internal and external, 1455 a-b; general
rules for determining what is obscene, 1456; persons who give scandal
through obscenity, 1458; government suppression of obscenity aim of
League of Nations, 1458 e.

Obstacles to Consent, 40 sqq.; fear, 41; ignorance, 40, 24 sqq.

Occasions of Sin, 263 sqq.

Occult Heresy, 828 c.

Occult Sin, 1287.

Occupation, title to private ownership, 1872 a; chief ways of
occupation, 1873; when occupation of others’ goods is lawful, 1921 sqq.
See also Theft.

Occupations, forbidden to clerics, 2603 b.

Odd Fellows, Society forbidden by Church, 946 b.

Offerings, act of religion, 2183.

Office, Divine, distractions during, 2174; obligation of matter and
manner, 2600 a; excuses from the obligation of the Divine Office, 2601
a.

Officials, Public, lawfulness of revelations about, 2071.

Offset, definition of, 1927 a. Old Testament, moral precepts still
binding, 7; ceremonial laws no longer obligatory, 7.

Omen, form of divination, 2285 d.

Omissions, voluntary, 37; effect of may be voluntary, 38.

Oneiromancy, form of divination, 2284 a.

Opinion, as state of conscience, 662 sqq.

Ordeal by Fire, sin against religion, 2284 c.

Order of Charity, 1158; between neighbors, 1171 sqq.; in almsgiving,
1247.

Orders, Holy, Sacrament of, 2777; distinction of the Orders, 2778;
Major and Minor Orders, 2778 b; hierarchy of Orders, 2779 a; hierarchy
of jurisdiction, 2779 b; matter and form of the various Orders in
the Latin Church, 2780; episcopal consecration, 2780 a; minister of
ordination, 2781; special duties of minister, 2782; recipient of
Orders, 2783; conditions for validity of reception, 2783 a; conditions
for lawfulness of reception, 2783 b; canonical requirements for
ordination, 2784; irregularities, 2784 b; simple impediments, 2784
b; irregularities from defect or delinquency, 2784 b; duties of
ordinandi according to Canon Law, 2785 a; registration of ordinations,
2786; ordination of acolyte, 2780 a; ordination of exorcist, 2780 a;
ordination of porter, 2780 a; ordination of reader, 2780 a; ordination
of subdeacon, 2780 b; ordination of deacon, 2780 c; ordination of
priest, 2780 d.

Ordinances, of the New Testament, 7.

Orientals, 822 c.

Original Sin, 272 sqq.

Ouija Boards, form of divination, 2284 c.

Ownership, Private, allowed by natural and divine law, 1872; chief
titles to private ownership, 1872.

Pacifism, Extreme, not inculcated by Christ, 1381.

Pain, of loss, 281 a; of sense, 281 b.

_Palpo_, definition, 1779 e.

Pan-Christianism, 823 b.

Parents, duties of charity and piety, 2630; compensation of children,
2631; sex education of children, 2632.

Participation of Catholics in Non-Catholic Services, 961; active
and passive participation, 962-973; things wherein communication is
possible; 963; simulated active assistance, 965; cases of communication
in false worship, 967 sqq.; cases where a communication in another
Catholic Rite is allowed, 970; participation in non-sacramental rites,
971; participation in religious places, times and objects, 972.

Partnership, 1749 b.

Passion, as obstacle to consent, 40, 45; antecedent, makes act less
free, 48; consequent, does not affect voluntariness of acts, 49; when
it removes or diminishes theological guilt, 1764 a.

Passions, definition, 45, 116 sqq.; definition, 117; concupiscible,
118-119; irascible, 118, 120; moral value of, 121 sqq.; physical,
mental and moral dangers of, 126; antecedent or involuntary (first
motions of the soul), 129; consequent or voluntary (second motions of
the soul), 129; inhibition of, 131; important influence of habits on,
140.

Pastor, duty to give Sacraments, 2676 a; duties in reference to
Baptism, 2688; to Confirmation, 2698; to Communion, 2707 c; to worship,
2708 c; to celebration of Mass, 2710 b; to application of Mass _pro
populo_, 2714 a; jurisdiction for confession, 2751 a; on reserved
cases, 2754 b; duty to hear confessions, 2756 b; to give Extreme
Unction, 2775 c; rank among the clergy, 2779 b; duties in reference to
marriage, 2802, 2807, 2808, 2820 sqq., 2826, 2829.

Pathological States, see Abnormal Mental States.

Patience, Fruit of the Holy Ghost, 163; act of fortitude, 2447 b;
definition, 2453; patience differs from temperance, 2453 a; differs
from longsuffering and constancy, 2453 c; greatness of patience, 2454;
vices opposed to patience, 2455; virtue of steadfastness, 2456.

Patriolatry, sin against piety, 2349 a.

Patriotism, very like to religion, 2346 d.

Pawn, 1749 d.

Pawning, unjustifiable, 1879 g.

Peace, Fruit of the Holy Ghost, 163; as effect of charity, 1195 sqq.;
reconciliation with God, 1196; reconciliation with enemies, 1196;
reconciliation with enemies demanded by charity, 1198; what duty of
reconciliation demands, 1199; what this duty necessitates, 1199 sqq.;
person who should make the first advances, 1202; manner and time of
seeking reconciliation, 1203-04; sins against peace, 1347 sqq. See
Discord; Contention; Schism; War; Fighting; Duelling; Sedition.

Pederasty, kind of impurity, 2534 c.

Pelagianism, 822 c.

Penance, Sacrament of, 2727; remote matter, 2727 a; proximate
matter, 2727 b; form of, 2727 c; subject of, 2727 d; Probabilism in
administration of Sacrament, 2728; contrition the first act of the
penitent, 2729; valid and fruitful reception of the Sacrament of
Penance, 2734; resolution of amendment, 2736; confession, second act
of penitent, 2737; qualities of confession, 2738; gravity of lying
to confessor, 2739; integral confession, 2740; material and formal
completeness, 2740 a, b; moral species of sin must be confessed, 2741
a; number of sins must be given, 2741 b; circumstances that change
the species must be declared, 2741 c; external act that completed an
internal sin must be declared, 2741 d; circumstances that notably
aggravate a sin without changing its species, 2742 a; external effects
of a sin must be confessed, 2742 b; uncertain sins must be confessed,
2742 c; when material integrity is not necessary, 2743; completion
or repetition of past incomplete Confessions, 2744; when a general
Confession should be made, 2744 c; satisfaction, the third act of the
penitent, 2745; effects of actual satisfaction, 2746; conditions for
effective satisfaction, 2747; obligation of accepting and performing
a penance, 2748; causes that excuse from a penance imposed, 2749;
requirements in the minister for valid absolution, 2750; power of
jurisdiction, 2751; when the Church supplies jurisdiction (cases of
common error and of uncertainty of law or fact), 2752; limitation
of jurisdiction, 2753; reserved sins, 2753 a; reserved persons,
2753 b; absolution from reserved cases, 2754; absolution given by
one not possessed of jurisdiction, 2755; duties of confessor before
confession, 2756; duties of confessor as judge in hearing the case,
2757; duties of confessor in deciding about cases, 2758; duties of
confessor in passing sentence, 2759; penitents to whom absolution
should be denied, 2760; backsliders (recidivists), 2760 c; obligation,
quality and quantity of sacramental penance, 2761; duties of the
confessor as spiritual physician, 2762; duties of the confessor as
teacher and guide, 2763; spiritual direction, 2764 b; duties of the
confessor after confession, 2764; Probabilism or epieikeia may not be
applied to sacramental seal, 2764 a; attitude of confessor to tempted
and afflicted, 2762 b; attitude to scrupulous, 2762 b; treatment of
sick and dying, 2762 b; attitude towards the pious, 2762 b; attitude
towards the hardened sinner, 2762 b; manner of repairing defects made
in hearing a confession, 2765; excuses from duty of repairing mistakes,
2766; obligation of seal of confession, 2767; sins against the seal of
confession, 2768; special abuses to which confession is exposed, 2769;
danger of defamation, 2769 a; danger of impurity, 2769 b; _absolutio
complicis_, 2770; _effectus legis de absolutione complicis_, 2771;
_sollicitatio in confessione_, 2772; _denuntiatio sollicitantis_, 2773.

Perception, 1637 b.

Pessimism, defective judgment, 1731 f.

Philanthropy, as distinguished from almsgiving, 1219.

Philosophy, use in Moral Theology. 11, 12.

Phrenology, form of divination, 2285 b.

Physicians, duties of, 2651 c.

Physiognomy, divination by, 2285 b.

Pictures, when obscene, 1456 a.

Piety, Gift of the Holy Ghost, 160 b; a potential part of justice,
2142 b; various senses of, 2345; definition of virtue of piety, 2346;
reverence required by piety, 2347; assistance required by piety, 2348;
sins against piety, 2349; malice of sins against piety, 2350; Gift of
Piety directed to Our Father in Heaven, 2433 a.

Plants, when they may be occupied, 1873 b.

Plays, when obscene, 1456 c; formal cooperation with evil plays, 1531;
material cooperation with, 1532.

Pleasures, Sensible, and temperance, 2461 b.

Pleasures, Spiritual, and temperance, 2461 b.

Pledge, 1749 d.

Pollution, see Impurity.

Pope, authentic interpreter of all ecclesiastical laws, 486; three ways
of rejecting papal decisions, 1369.

Positive Method, in Moral Theology, 13.

Possessors, Unlawful, three kinds of, 1770 sqq.; obligations in
reference to the property and its fruits, 1771 sqq.

Poverty, vow and virtue, 2612 a.

Power of Jurisdiction, and dominative power, 2356.

Practicality, 1645.

Praise of God, 2269; internal and external praise of God, 2270;
excellence of praise of God, 2271; qualities that should be present in
the divine praises, 2272.

Prayer, definition, 2153; the psychology of prayer, 2154; the necessity
of prayer, 2155; a duty for all adults, 2156; times and frequency
of prayer, 2157; corollaries about prayer and confession, 2158; to
whom prayer may be offered, 2159; persons for whom prayer is offered,
2160; things that may be prayed for, 2161; qualities of prayer, 2162;
confidence requisite for successful prayer, 2163; attention and
intention in prayer, 2164; actual, virtual and habitual intention in
prayer, 2165 a, b, c; internal or external, verbal or superficial,
literal, spiritual, perfect or imperfect attention in prayer, 2166;
acts that exclude external attention, 2167; when external attention is
sufficient, 2168; kind of internal attention required in prayer, 2169;
distractions in prayer, 2170; voluntary and involuntary distractions,
2171; sinfulness of distraction in prayer, 2172; distractions during
Divine Office, 2174.

Precepts, axiomatic and inferred, 300; general and particular, 301;
ecclesiastical, 515-519.

Precepts of the Church, First derived from natural and divine as well
as ecclesiastical law, 2575 a; affirmative and negative parts of First
Precept, 2576; how Mass must be heard, 2577; external and bodily
assistance, 2577 a; internal or mental assistance requires actual
or virtual intention of will, 2577 b; the necessary attention, 2577
b; time and place of Mass, 2578; servile works, 2579; forensic and
commercial labors forbidden, 2579 b; liberal works tolerated, 2580 b;
definition of common works, 2581 a; doubtful works, 2581 b; lawfulness
of hiring non-Catholics to do servile work, 2582; obligation of First
Precept, 2583; excuses from observance of First Precept, 2584; scope
of Second Precept, 2586; definition of flesh meat, 2586 a; broth and
condiments, 2586 c; obligation of Second Precept, 2587 21; exceptions
to the obligation, 2587 c; the obligation of fasting, 2588 sqq.; scope
of Third Precept, 2590; subject and matter of Third Precept, 2590 a;
time for fulfillment of Third Precept, 2590; origin and gravity of
Third Precept, 2591; scope of Fourth Precept, 2592; origin and gravity
of Fourth Precept, 2593 a; Fifth Precept, 2594; Sixth Precept of the
Church, 2594.

Prescription, title to private ownership, 1872 b; conditions for valid
prescription, 1875; may terminate the obligation of contract, 1889 b.

Presumption, sin of, 1075 sqq.; definition, 1078; objects of, 1079;
comparison with temptation of God and blasphemous hope, 1081; malice
of, 1082; gravity compared with other sins, 1083; presumption and
unbelief, 1084; presumption takes away virtue of hope, 1085; causes of,
1091; vice against greatness of soul, 2450 a.

Presumption of a Pact, 652.

Pretence, see Simulation.

Price, just and unjust, see Fraud.

Pride, as origin of discord, 1354; origin of contention, 1362; cause of
contumely, 2017 a; definition of pride, 2557; acts of pride, 2558 a;
sinfulness of pride, 2559 a; pride compared with other sins, 2560 n;
pride mother of the seven capital sins, 2560 c.

Principles, first and secondary, 300 a; reflex, see Reflex Principles.

Prison, escape from, lawfulness, 1982 b.

Prisoners, treatment during war, 1412, 1417.

Privilege, Pauline, see Matrimony, Sacrament of.

Privileges, 521 sqq.; definition, 521; wide and strict interpretation
of, 522; obligation to accept and use, 523.

Probabiliorism, see Systems, Moral.

Probability, intrinsic signs of, 665 a; extrinsic signs of, 665 b;
kinds of, 703; of law, 711 a; of fact, 711 b, 712.

Probabilism, see Systems, Moral.

Prodigality, a vice opposed to liberality, 2427; sinfulness, 2428;
comparison of avarice and prodigality, 2429.

Promotion of Undeserving Candidates, 1758.

Profession of Faith, commandment of, 938 sqq. See Faith.

Propensities, Natural, effect on voluntariness of acts, 54.

Property, Private, chief ways in which it may be occupied, 1873; when
lost property may be occupied, 1873 d; conversion of property against
the wishes of owner, 1891 b; conversion of property, 1891.

Propriety, integral part of temperance, 2405 b; propriety of external
acts, 2512.

Protestantism, 822 e.

Providence, 1638 b.

Prudence, 146, 150; ranked first among cardinal virtues, 1626;
definition of prudence, 1627; one of the two practical virtues of
intellect, 1627 a; inferior to the Gift of Wisdom, 1627 b; objects of
act of prudence, 1628 a; prudence concerned with application of truths
and first principles of morality to contingent and particular cases,
1628 b; formal object of prudence, 1629 a; material object, 1629 a;
prudence needs certitude, 1630; relation of prudence to the other moral
virtues, 1631 a; prudence rules the inferior virtues and serves the
superior, 1632; prudence and the intellectual virtues, 1632 a; prudence
and the theological virtues, 1632 b; the exercise of prudence, 1633;
the three acts of prudence, deliberation, decision, direction, 1633;
qualities of prudence, 1634; moral, integral, subjective, potestative
parts of prudence, 1635, 1636; integral parts of prudence, 1637;
prudence knows how to reason correctly, 1638 a; subjective parts of
prudence, 1639; individual prudence, 1639 a, 1644 a; social prudence,
1639 b; political prudence, 1640 a, 1644 c, 1648; domestic prudence,
1640 b, 1644 b, 1650; governmental prudence, 1642 a; military prudence,
1642 b, 1644 d; utility of prudence for society, 1643; potential parts
of prudence, 1646; persons who possess prudence, 1648; evil prudence,
1651 a; imperfect prudence, 1651; indifferent prudence, 1651 b; good
prudence, 1651 c; infused prudence, 1654 a; prudence in young people,
1655 a; formed habit of prudence, 1655 a; prudence a duty of superior,
2635 a; formative prudence, 1655 b.

Puberty, Age of, 433.

Punishment, eternal and temporal, 280.

Punishment, Capital, lawfulness of, 1820; when it should not be
imposed, 1821; unlawful killing of offenders, 1823 a.

Punishments, Bodily, 1870.

Punitive Sterilization, 1869 b.

Purity, Virtue of, 2486; definition, 2486; definition of chastity, 2486
a; definition of decency, 2486 b. See also Virginity; Impurity.

Purpose, Wrong, may make venial sin mortal, 191; or mortal venial, 195.

Pusillanimity, 1084; as incentive to envy, 1330; vice against greatness
of soul, 2451 a.

Pyromancy, form of divination, 2284 c.

Pythian Sisters, Society forbidden by Church, 946 b.

Pythonism, form of divination, 2284 b.

Quickness, 1637 b.

Rancor, caused by sloth, 1324.

Rape, 2529.

Rash Opinion, 1733. See also Judgment, Rash.

Rationalism, 847.

Reason, Age of, 433.

Reason, Natural, use in Moral Theology, 11; as subject of sin, 231.

Reading, Dangerous, 849 sqq.; forbidden by natural and ecclesiastical
law, 850.

Rebeccas, Society forbidden by Church, 946 b.

Rebellion, not schism, 1364.

Recoupment, definition of, 1927 a.

Reflex Principles, for solution of doubts, 657 sqq.; may supply
indirect certitude, 652 b.

_Regulae pro confessariis de licitis et illicitis, in conjugio_, 2625.

Relationships, various kinds, 1175.

Relatives, order of charity among, 1176 sqq.; duties of near, 2634.

Relaxation, as virtue, 2567 a, b; sins opposed to moderate enjoyment,
2568 a.

Religion, Virtue of, regarded by some as superior to justice, 1717
a; a potential part of justice, 2142 a; definition of the virtue,
2145; religion as a moral virtue, 2146; superiority of religion as a
virtue, 2147; necessity of the acts of religion, 2148; internal acts
of religion, 2149; definition of devotion, 2150; external and internal
causes of devotion, 2152; external acts of religion, 2175; definition
of adoration, 2176; difference between _latria_ and _hyperdulia_ and
_dulia_, 2671 b; difference between _latria_ and civil homage, 2176
b; unity and variety of adoration, 2177; definition of sacrifice,
2178; essentials of sacrifice, 2179; obligation of sacrifice, 2180;
exemptions from sacrifice based on the natural law, 2181; sacrifice
compared with the other acts of religion, 2182; goods unsuitable as
offerings to God, 2184; contributions to religion, 2185; obligation
of contributing to the support of the clergy, 2186; quality of the
obligation of contributing to the Church, 2188; priest’s attitude
towards persons refusing to contribute, 2189; those to whom religious
contributions are due, 2190; external acts of religion in honor of God,
2244.

Religion, Sins against, 2273; superstition, 2274; false worship, 2274
a; superfluous worship, 2274 b; sinfulness of improper worship of God,
2275; worship of false deity, 2276; definition of idolatry, 2277;
kinds of idolatry, 2278; sinfulness of idolatry, 2279; comparison
of different sins of idolatry, 2280; idolatry possible in Christian
worship, 2281; definition of divination, 2282; distinction between the
fact and sin of divination, 2283; forms of explicit invocation, 2284;
forms of implicit invocation, 2285; malice of the sin of divination,
2286; when knowledge is obtained from God, 2287; when knowledge
is obtained through natural causes, 2288; use of lots, 2289; vain
observance, 2290; forms of vain observance, 2291; distinction between
fact and sin of vain observance, 2293; superstition in religious
observances, 2294; sinfulness of vain observance, 2295; cooperation in
divination or other form of superstition, 2296; doubtful cases of vain
observance, 2297; licitness of using doubtfully superstitious means,
2298; irreligiousness, 2299; temptation of God, 2300; cases wherein
there is no temptation of God, 2301; kinds of temptation of God, 2302;
causes that exclude the interpretative temptation of God, 2303; refusal
of medicine or hygienic care, 2304; sinfulness of temptation of God,
2305; malice of temptation of God, 2306. See also Sacrilege; Simony.

Religious, special duties of, 2611; perfection of charity, 2611 a;
evangelical counsels, 2611 b; obligation of the three principal vows,
2612 a.

Remorse of Conscience, penalty of sin, 279.

Repentance, Virtue of, 2718; character of repentance, 2720; excellence,
2721; dignity, 2721 a; necessity, 2721 b; repentance as a means and as
a precept, 2722; accompaniments of repentance, 2724; fruits of, 2725;
restores infused virtues and former merits, 2725 c; removes every sin,
2725 a.

Reproach, definition, 2012 b.

Reprisals, in war, 1417.

Reputation, when charity requires one to seek good reputation, 1575;
when sacrifice of reputation is lawful and unlawful, 1576; when
self-detraction is lawful, 1577; definition of good, true, false,
ordinary and extraordinary reputation, 2034 a-c; right to good
reputation, 2035; right to true and false reputation, 2037; meaning of
the expression “infamous in a certain place,” 2051; rights that have
precedence over a false reputation, 2068; unlawful attack on another’s
false reputation, 2069; conditions that justify revelation of another’s
defects, 2070; revelations about public officials or candidates for
public office, 2071. See also Defamation.

Rescripts, 520.

Reservation, strict and broad mental reservation in an oath, 2251. See
also Lying.

Resident, definition, 437; when subject to laws, 438.

Restitution, distinct from payment, restoration and satisfaction,
1751; difference between satisfaction and restitution, 1752; when
restitution is due, 1753; confessor’s duties regarding the obligation
of restitution, 1760; roots of restitution, 1762; when unjust damage
obliges to restitution, 1763; restitution for damages that are
only venially sinful but seriously harmful, 1765; for damages only
juridically culpable, 1766; for careless discharge of fiduciary
duties, 1768; restitution when culpability seems doubtful, 1769;
cooperators and restitution, 1778; circumstances of restitution, 1781;
restitution _in solidum_ or _pro rata_, 1783; order of restitution
among cooperators, 1784; person to whom restitution must be made, 1786;
creditors with right _in re_ have preference over creditors with right
_ad rem_, 1787; “thing” to be restored, 1789; “amount” of restitution
in certain cases, 1790; “manner” of making restitution, 1791; second
restitution, 1792; “time” when restitution must be made, 1793; unjust
refusal to make restitution, 1794; “place” where restitution must be
made, 1795, 1796; causes that excuse temporarily from restitution,
1797; causes that excuse permanently from restitution, 1798; excuse
from restitution on account of doubtfulness of obligation, 1800;
restitution for frustration of another’s good, 1802 a; restitution for
injury done to goods of fortune, 1802 b; restitution for injury done
to goods of body or personal goods, 1802 c; restitution for unjust
homicide or mutilation, 1803; restitution for fornication or adultery,
1803 b; restitution for injuries of soul, 1803 c; restitution for
occupied goods, 1922; restitution of bribes, etc., 1946 c; restitution
for jail-breaking, 1983; obligation of witness to make restitution,
1992; when a lawyer is bound to restitution, 2008; restitution for
contumely, 2021 sqq.; cessation of obligation of restitution for
contumely, 2026; restitution for defamation, 2085 sqq.; restitution
of temporal price received for spiritual thing, 2340; restitution of
temporal price received for temporal things annexed to spirituals,
2341; circumstances of restitution for simony, 2342; restitution of
spiritual thing simoniacally received, 2343; restitution necessitated
by breach of promise to marry, 2628 d; restitution for theft. See also
Compensation.

Restraint, definition, 1866 d.

Revelations, private, 757.

Reverence, potential part of justice, 2142 c; definition of virtue,
2351; species of honor, 2352; obligation of religious cult of _dulia_,
2354.

Revilement, definition, 2012 b.

Rights, precedence in case of collision, 292.

Robbery, comparison with theft, 1892 a; kinds of theft and robbery,
1893 a; what constitutes grave matter in robbery, 1896. See also Theft;
Injustice.

Rubrics, directive and preceptive, in administration of the Sacraments,
2669 c.

Rudeness, vice opposite to modesty, 2566 b.

Sacraments, of Old Testament, 339; denial of Christian Sacraments in
cases of scandal, 1493; nature of Sacrament, 2654; outward sign, 2654
a; instituter of Sacraments, 2654 b; purpose of Sacraments, 2654 c;
Sacraments of the Dead and of the Living, 2654 c; indelible character
of some Sacraments, 2654 c; matter and form of the Sacraments, 2655;
substantial changes in matter or form, 2655 a; substantial separations
of matter and form, 2655 b; simultaneity of matter and form, 2656;
accidental changes or separations of matter and form, 2658; substantial
changes or separations, 2659; doubtful matter, 2660; Sacraments that
have a necessity of means, 2661; reception of Sacraments _in re_ or
_in voto_, 2662; Sacraments that have a necessity of precept, 2663;
twofold ministry of the Sacraments (production and bestowal), 2664;
requirements in the minister for valid performance of Sacrament, 2665;
necessary intention, 2666; virtual, actual, habitual and interpretative
intention, 2666 b; rules on plurality of intentions, 2667; requisites
for use of conditional intention, 2668; lawful administration of
Sacraments, 2669; minister’s worthiness before God, 2669 a; minister’s
worthiness before Church, 2669 b; worthiness of ministration, 2669 c;
directive and preceptive rubrics, 2669 c; explanation of ceremonies
advised, 2669 c; multiplication of sins by unworthy administration,
2670; requirements for valid Sacrament in recipient, 2671; qualities of
recipient’s intention, 2672; neutral intention, 2672 b; when virtual
intention is necessary, 2673; when habitual and explicit intention
suffices, 2674 b; when habitual and implicit intention suffices, 2674
b; requirements for lawful or fruitful reception of Sacrament by adult,
2675; obligation of minister to confer Sacraments, 2676; obligation of
pastor to confer Sacraments, 2676 a; when minister is bound to deny
them, 2677; administration to unworthy persons, 2678; simulation and
dissimulation of Sacrament, 2680; administration of Penance and Extreme
Unction to heretics and schismatics, 2681; repetition of Sacrament on
account of invalid administration, 2682; reception of Sacrament from
unworthy minister, 2683; forgiveness of sin through use of Sacraments,
2726.

Sacrament, Blessed, see Eucharist, Holy.

Sacramentals, definition, 2684; necessity and use, 2684 a, b.

Sacrifice, see Religion, Virtue of.

Sacrilege, definition, 2308; violation of what kind of consecration
involves sacrilege? 2309; is sacrilege a special sin? 2310; species
of sacrilege, 2311; personal sacrilege, 2311 a; local sacrilege,
2311 b; desecration, a form of sacrilege, 2311 b; profanation, a
form of sacrilege, 2311 b; real sacrilege, 2311 c; special cases
regarding local sacrilege, 2312; cases wherein there is no sacrilege,
2313; sacredness as aggravating circumstance of sin, 2314; malice of
sacrilege, 2315; conditions that govern gravity of sacrilege, 2316;
carnal sacrilege, 2533; personal sacrilege, 2533 c; local sacrilege,
2533 d; real sacrilege, 2533 e.

Sadness, concupiscible passion, 119.

Sapphism, form of impurity, 2534 c.

Satisfaction, for sin, 283. See also Penance, Sacrament of.

Scandal, various uses of word, 1445-46; definition, 1447; causes of,
1448; directly intentional (diabolical) and indirectly intentional,
1450; active and passive, 1453; acts that give scandal, 1454; obscenity
(q.v.), 1455 sqq.; results of scandal, 1459; scandal resembles
solicitation and complicity, 1460; persons apt to be scandalized,
1461; scandal given and scandal taken, 1464; Pharisaic scandal and
“scandal of little ones,” 1464 b; sinfulness, 1465; is scandal a
distinct species of sin? 1466; how scandal should be confessed, 1467;
responsibility of scandalizer for injuries to third parties, 1470-71;
gravity of sin, 1472; is any person immune from scandal? 1475; duty of
avoiding, 1477; scandal of the weak forbidden by the natural law, 1479;
surrender of temporal goods to avoid scandal, 1483; surrender of Church
goods to avoid scandal, 1486-87; duty of repairing scandal, 1488; ways
of repairing, 1489; public and private scandal, 1490 a; ordinary and
extraordinary, 1490 b; denial of Sacraments in cases of scandal, 1493;
prohibition against, 1552.

Schism, books in favor of, forbidden, 855 b; definition, 1364;
principal schismatic movements, 1365; directly and indirectly voluntary
schism, 1366; schism committed in two ways, 1368; three ways of
rejecting decisions of Pope, 1369; schism compared with heresy, 1370;
opposition between schism and charity, 1371; greatest sin against
neighbor, 1372 a; not so serious as unbelief, 1372 b; formal and
material schism, 1373.

Schismatics, spiritual powers of, 1374.

Scholastic Method, in Moral Theology, 13.

Schools, Dangerous, 867 sqq.; sectarian and neutral, 867; absolution of
parents of children attending, 872; Catholic teachers in non-Catholic
schools, 874.

Sciences, Natural, use in Moral Theology, 12.

Scripture, as Source of Moral Theology, 7.

Scrupulous, see Conscience.

Seal of Confession, see Penance, Sacrament of.

Second Sight, 2285 a.

Secret, violation of (infidelity), 2407; definition of a secret, 2408;
natural, promised, entrusted or committed secret, 2408; sinfulness of
violating secret, 2409; prying into others’ secrets, 2410; reading
another’s letters or papers, 2411; lawfulness of utilizing knowledge
of secret, 2412; sin committed by stealing or unduly using secret
of another, 2413; obligation of keeping secret, 2414; comparison
of secrets as regards binding force, 2415; cases wherein it is not
necessary to keep secret, 2416; cases wherein it is not lawful to keep
secret, 2417; lawfulness of revealing secret learned by stealth or
force, 2420.

Sedition, definition, 1440; distinct species of sin, 1441; resistance
to tyrannical government not sinful, 1443.

Seduction, 1495 sqq.; definition, 1496; malice, 1497; differs from mere
permission to sin, 1500; sinful request, 1501; advice to commit evil,
1502; prearrangement of circumstances that lead to sin, 1504.

Self-Abuse, form of impurity, 2534 a.

Self-Beautification, morality of, 2570.

Self-Defamation, sin opposed to charity, 2028 e.

Self-Defense, Right of, 1826; conditions for exercise of this right,
1826 a; self-defense must be moderate, 1833; when it is obligatory,
1836; when it is not obligatory, 1837; defense of neighbor’s life
against unjust aggressor, 1838; defense of material goods against
unjust aggressor, 1840; defense of bodily purity against an unjust
aggressor, 1841; defense of bodily integrity against an unjust
aggrossor, 1842; defense of honor or reputation, 1843.

Self-Depreciation, form of lying, 2406.

Self-Glorification, form of lying, 2406.

Self-Love, commandment of, 1561; understood in many senses, 1561;
sinful, natural and supernatural, 1136; charity demands an elicited
supernatural self-love, 1562; demands pursuit of all goods necessary
for attainment of happiness, 1563; care of the mind, 1564; neglect of
education sinful, 1565; care of the body and health, 1566; care as to
food and drink, 1567; fresh air, rest, physical exercise, 1568-1573;
pursuit of honors and good name, 1574-1575; when self-detraction is
lawful, 1577; dislike of self, 1305, 1307; may one wish evil to self?
1308.

Self-Starvation, sin opposed to abstemiousness, 2470 a.

Seminaries, courses of theology must follow St. Thomas Aquinas, 10.

Sensuality, 232, 117 sqq.; compared with impurity, 2492 a.

Sentence, Judicial, when it may be resisted, 1982 c; moral obligation
when this is certainly just, 1959; moral obligation when this is
certainly unjust, 1960.

Separation, see Matrimony, Sacrament of.

Servility, vice opposite to modesty, 2566 b.

Set-off, definition, 1927 a.

Shamefacedness, integral part of temperance, 2465 b.

Shintoism, 822 a.

Simony, origin of name, 2317; definition, 2318; temporal price in
simony, 2319; spiritual thing in simony, 2320; temporal thing united
with spiritual, 2321; temporal thing annexed to spiritual, 2322;
various kinds of simony, 2323; confidential simony, 2324; simony
against divine law, 2325; rules of Alexander III for determining
simony, 2327; simony against divine law in reference to things annexed
to spirituals, 2328; simony against ecclesiastical law, 2329; certain
and uncertain simony, 2330; doubtful cases of simony, 2331; cases
in which transaction is not simoniacal, 2332; theological malice of
simony; 2335; moral malice of simony, 2336; invalidity and penalties
of simoniacal contracts, 2337; canonical penalties for simony, 2338;
influence of simony on spiritual effects, 2339; restitution of temporal
price received for spiritual thing, 2340; restitution of temporal price
received for temporal things annexed to spirituals, 2341; circumstances
of restitution for simony, 2342; restitution of spiritual thing
simoniacally received, 2343.

Simulation, form of lying, 2391 b; definition, 2403; sinfulness of
simulation, 2404. See also Hypocrisy.

Sin, definition, 167; spiritual and carnal, 168 a, 224 sqq.; against
God, neighbor or self, 168 h; mortal and venial, 168 c, 169; of
commission or omission, 168 d; stages of (heart, mouth, work), 168 e;
by excess or defect, 168 f; original and actual, 168 g; when matter
of sin is grave, 171-172; advertence and consent conditions of mortal
sin, 174 sqq.; mortal, condition of, 169 sqq.; venial, definition, 180;
conditions, 181 sqq.; when imperfections become a sin, 186; when venial
sin becomes mortal, 187-189; coalescence of, 189; multiplication of,
190; possible effect of wrong purpose, circumstances and harm foreseen,
191 sqq,; when mortal sin becomes venial, 194 sqq,; causes of sin,
246; effect of ignorance, passion and malice on, 249; external causes
of, 252; distinct from temptation, 253; proximate and remote danger
of, 258; possibility of, 259; guilt of one who exposes himself to sin,
2150; occasions of (proximate or remote, necessary or free, present or
absent), 263 sqq.; motives of, 268 sqq.; results and penalties of, 272
sqq.; original and actual, 272 sqq.; stain of, 276; every sin removed
by repentance, 2725 a; forgiveness of sin through the use of the
Sacraments, 2726. See also Sins.

Sincerity, see Truthfulness.

Sinners, charity for, 1142; association with, 1145; friendship with,
1146.

Sins, theological and moral species, 197; specific distinction,
198; numerical multiplication, 197, 202 sqq.; rules of numerical
distinction, 207 sqq.; comparison of, 220; sins against God, 227;
against creatures, 228; subjects of (sensitive appetites, reason,
will), 230 sqq,; sins of sensuality, 232; sins of thought, 233 sqq.;
sins of desire, 237 sqq.; material (or objective) and formal (or
subjective), 248; sins of weakness, ignorance and malice, 250. See also
Sin.

Slander, definition, 2030 d. See also Defamation.

Sloth, 269; spiritual, 1064, capital sin, 1320 sqq.; definition, 1320;
sinfulness, 1321; qualities of sin, 1322; sins that spring from sloth,
1324; conquest of sloth, 1325; prohibition against, 1552.

Sluggishness, sin opposed to diligence, 1326 b.

Sobriety, subjective part of temperance, 2465 a; definition, 2474;
obligation to practise sobriety, 2475; sins against sobriety, 2476 a;
morality of total abstinence, 2478 a; licit use of narcotics, 2485. See
also Drunkenness.

Societies, Forbidden, 945 sqq.; forbidden by Code, 946; absolution of
members, 949.

Sodomy, form of impurity, 2534 c.

Softness, 2534 a.

Solicitation, resemblance to scandal, 1460 a. See Seduction.

Sons of Temperance, Society forbidden by Church, 946 b.

Soul, First and Second Motions of the, 129.

Sortilege, form of divination, 2285 d.

Speculation, Sinful, 1879 f.

Spiritism, 823 b; sin against religion, 2284 b.

Sponsors, see Baptism, Sacrament of; Confirmation, Sacrament of.

Stain of Sin, 276.

State of Life, Duties of, knowledge of obligatory, 920.

Statesmanship, 1642 a, 1649 a.

States of Man, Four Historical, 331.

Steadfastness, act of fortitude, 2447 b.

Sterilization, morality of, 1869 a.

Stiffness, vice opposite to modesty, 2566 b.

Stipends, Mass, institution of, 2185 b. See also Mass, Sacrifice of the.

Stocks, purchase by clerics, 2605 a.

Stocks and Bonds, 1749 b.

Stolidity, vice opposed to patience, 2455.

Stranger, definition, 437; when subject to laws, 439-446.

Students, duties of, 2651 b.

Studiosity, potential part of temperance, 2465 c; definition of
studiousness, 2562; vices opposed to studiousness, 2563 a; malice
of the sins against studiousness, 2564 a; negligence, a sin against
studiousness, 2564 b.

Subjects, duties to domestic and civil superiors, 2636.

Suffrage, Power of, 1649 b. See also Voting.

Suicide, books in favor of, forbidden, 855 b; voluntary and
involuntary, direct and indirect, 1852 a; sinfulness of suicide, 1854;
cooperation in suicide, 1855; authorization to commit suicide, 1856;
when indirect suicide is lawful, 1857, 1858; when indirect suicide
is unlawful, 1859; is it suicidal to refuse s necessary surgical
operation? 1860; canonical penalties for suicide, 1861 a.

Sunday, Sanctification of, see Precepts of the Church.

Superfluities, from which alms must be given, 1227-1229.

Superior, Clerical, duties of, 2606 a; special duties to flock, 2607 a.

Superiors, Domestic and Civil, duties of, 2635. See also Employers;
Subjects.

Superstition, see Religion, Sins against.

Surety, 1749 d.

Surgeons, duties of, 2651 c.

Surliness, sin against affability, 2423 b.

Syncretism, 823 b.

Synesis, part of judgment, 2432 d.

Synteresis, and Moral Theology, 2; directs the moral virtues, 1631 a.

Systems, Moral, 672 sqq.; Tutiorism, 672 a, 676 sqq.; Anti-tutiorism,
672 b; condemned by Church, 676; Laxism, 680 sqq.; condemned by Church,
681; Probabiliorism, 683 sqq.; Equiprobabilisrn, 688; Probabilism, 701
sqq.; Compensationism, 731 sqq.; practical conclusions, 739; respective
merits and use of the rival systems, 740; use by confessors, 741.

Tale-Bearing, definition, 2103; sinfulness, 2104; circumstances which
affect the species of tale-bearing, 2105.

Taoism, 822 a.

Taunting, form of contumely, definition, 2012 b.

Taxes, definition, 2637; kinds of taxes, 2638; just taxes, 2639;
obligation to pay taxes, 2640 sqq.; obedience to tax laws, 2642.

Teachers, duties of, 2651 b.

Telepathy, and the virtue of religion, 2285 a.

Temperance, 150; golden mean in, 154 a, 157 b; differs from patience,
2453 a; definition of temperance, 2461; temperance and sensible
pleasures, 2461 b; temperance and spiritual pleasures, 2461 b; rule
of moderation, 2462; excellence of temperance, 2463; vices opposed to
temperance, 2464; subjective parts of temperance, 2465 a; potential
parts of temperance, 2465 c; integral parts of temperance, 2465 b;
sobriety, 2476 sqq.; continence, 2544; incontinence, 2544 c; sinful
indulgence, 2550; complements of the virtue of temperance, 2571 a;
commandments of temperance, 2572 a.

Temptation, not a sin, 253; implicit or explicit, internal or
external, direct or indirect, virtual or actual resistance to, 255;
rules regarding resistance to, 256; exterior and interior temptations
to impurity, 2497; resistance to internal temptations, 2498; what
opposition to temptation is sufficient, 2499; insufficient, harmful and
unnecessary opposition, 2500; weapons against carnal temptations, 2501;
negligence in resisting temptations, 2508.

Temptation of God, see Religion, Sins against.

Tepidity, consequence of sloth, 1327.

Testament, New, see New Testament.

Testament, Old, see Old Testament.

Testimony, see Witness.

Theft, sin of injustice, 1872; definition of theft, 1890; plagiarism
is form of theft, 1890 c; copyright infringement, a form of theft,
1890 c; kidnapping, a form of theft, 1890 c; comparison of theft and
robbery, 1892 a; kinds of theft, 1893 a; sinfulness of theft, 1894
a; grave matter in theft of sacred objects, 1901; grave matter in
domestic theft, 1903 a; theft by wife or minor child, 1904 a; theft
by employees, 1905 a; theft of things about whose loss owner is less
concerned, 1906 a; travelling without paying fare, 1907; when small
thefts amount to grave matter, 1908 sqq.; moral connection between
repeated acts of theft, 1912; interval of time between acts of theft,
1913; theft from joint owners, 1917; restitution in cases of theft,
1918 a; cases of doubt as to grave matter, 1919 a; occult compensation,
1920 b; when conversion of others’ property is permissible, 1920;
conditions for lawful occupation of others’ goods, 1921 a; restitution
for occupied goods, 1922; occupation in case of merely grave necessity,
1923; occupation of large sum by one in dire need, 1924 a; lawfulness
of receiving support from thief, 1926; compensation for theft, see
Compensation; condonation of domestic thefts, 1799.

Theologians, as source of Moral Theology, 10.

Theological Virtues, 151; golden mean in, 154 c; rank among virtues,
156. See Faith, Hope and Charity.

Theology, Ascetical and Mystical, 2573.

Theology, Moral, definition, 1; relation to Dogmatic Theology, 3.

Theosophical Societies, forbidden by Church, 946 b.

Theosophy, 823 b.

Third Orders, Secular, 955 a.

Thomas Aquinas, Saint, as source of Moral Theology, 10; arrangement of
Moral Theology, 17; opinion on obligation of judge when evidence is
contrary to his personal knowledge, 1951 c.

Thought, Sins of, 233 sqq.

Thoughts, Impure, see Impurity.

Thoughts, Sinful, 234.

Timidity, sin against fortitude, 2446 b.

Trading, definition, 2134; morality of trading in the strict sense,
2135; trading forbidden to clerics, 2604 a.

Tradition, 8; divine, Apostolic, ecclesiastical, 9.

Treasure Trove, when it may be occupied, 1873 c.

Tribadism, form of impurity, 2534 c.

Truth, necessary quality of lawful oath, 2249 b. See also Truthfulness;
Lying.

Truthfulness, 2143 a; definition of virtue, 2385; excellence, 2386;
sincerity and fidelity, 2387; vices opposed to truthfulness, 2388. See
also Lying.

Truths, Natural and Supernatural, to which assent must be given, 784.

Tutiorism, see Systems, Moral.

Tyrannicide, lawfulness of, 1824 a.

Unbelief, Sin of, negative and positive, 813; ordinary and apostasy,
814; direct and indirect, 815-816; non-assent, 817; dissent (private
and contrary unbelief), 818; infidelity, 822 a; order of gravity in
unbelief, 824; dangers which lead to external expression of unbelief,
944 sqq. See also Heresy; Apostasy.

Unction, Extreme, Sacrament of, 2774; remote matter, 2774 a; proximate
matter, 2774 b; form, 2774 c; recipient, 2774 d; minister, 2774 e;
effects of, 2774 f; special duties of recipient, 2775 a; special duties
of minister, 2775 b; special duties of pastor, 2775 c; special duties
of faithful, 2775 d.

Understanding, integral part of prudence, 1637 a.

Understanding, Gift of, 160 a; given to perfect theological virtues,
808.

Unity of the Church, threefold, 1367.

Uranism, form of impurity, 2534 c.

Use, act of will, 59.

Usury, definition, 2136.

_Vagus_, definition, 437; when subject to laws, 438.

Vainglory, as origin of discord, 1354; origin of contention, 1362.

Vanity, vice against greatness of soul, 2450 c.

Vengeance, definition, 2381; morality of vengeance, 2382; excess and
defect in vengeance, 2383; circumstances of vengeance, 2384.

Viaticum, see Communion, Holy.

Vice, definition, 167; and sin, see Sin.

Vices, Capital, Seven, 269 sqq.

Vindication, virtue, 2143 a. See also Vengeance.

Violence, invalidates consent to contract, 1884 d. See also Coercion.

Virginity, definition, 2488; loss of virginity, 2489; conditions
necessary for virtue of virginity, 2490 a; excellence of virginity,
2491 a.

Virtue, subjective parts, 1639 h, 1745; integral parts, 1637, 2139;
potential parts, 1646, 2141; parts, 1635, 1636, 2447, 2465.

Virtues, definition, 142; division, 143; practical intellectual,
146-148; moral, definition, 149; four cardinal virtues, 150;
theological, 151; three causes of virtues (nature, practice and
infusion), 152; inchoative and perfected, 152; properties of, 153;
golden mean in, 154 b; rank among virtues, 156-157; in the blessed,
158; complements of, 159; properties of seven infused virtues, 745;
order of theological virtues, 746; priority of a virtue in duration,
by nature, and in excellence, 1028. See also Faith; Hope; Charity;
Cardinal Virtues; Act, virtuous.

Vision, Beatific, relation to charity, 1116.

Vocation, internal, 2597; external, 2597 b; vocation to the clerical
state, 2597 a; sinfulness of disregarding vocation, 2598 a.

Volksverein, 955 b.

Voting, duty of exercising the electoral franchise, 2643; manner of
voting, 2644; obligation to seek office, 2645.

Vow, definition, 2191; personal, real and mixed vows, 2192; singular
and common vows, 2192 b; temporary and perpetual vows, 2192 c; absolute
and conditional vows, 2192 d; penal and non-penal vows, 2192 d;
explicit and implicit vows, 2192 e; determinate and disjunctive vows,
2192 e; private and public vows, 2192 f; simple and solemn vows, 2192
f; vows in Canon Law, 2193; distinction between solemn and simple
vows, 2194; knowledge and deliberation necessary for valid vow, 2195;
freedom of will necessary for valid vow, 2196; cases in which fear does
not invalidate vow, 2197; vows of doubtful validity, 2198; intention
necessary for valid vow, 2199; matter of vow, 2200; vows that promise
something necessary, 2201; when fulfillment of vow is only partly
possible, 2202; vows that promise something displeasing to God, 2203;
vows that promise something indifferent, 2205; meaning of better good
in vow, 2206; vows invalidated by promise of lesser good, 2207; when
one has taken two opposite vows, 2208; obligation of vow, 2209; gravity
of obligation, 2210; rules for determining what is important matter in
vow, 2211; coalescence of light into grave matter in vow, 2212; delay
in fulfilling vow, 2214; time when vow obliges, 2213; person obliged
to fulfill a vow, 2215; manner of fulfilling vow, 2216; obligation of
certain kinds of vows, 2217; interpretation of doubtful vows, 2218;
advantages of vows to vowers, 2220; when good vow may be sinful, 2221;
merit of fulfilling vow that one regrets, 2222; persons who can make
vow, 2223; dependence of vower on will of another, 2224; validity of
vows made by subjects, 2225; cessation of vows, 2226; annulment of
vows, 2228; reason necessary for annulment of vow, 2229; differences
between direct and indirect annulment of vow, 2230; dispensation of
vow, 2231; reasons sufficient for dispensation, 2232; sinfulness of
unnecessary dispensation, 2233; persons who have power of dispensation,
2234; dispensation from religious vow of chastity, 2235; dispensation
from vow made for benefit of third party, 2236; commutation of vows,
2238; good works that may be substituted for vows, 2239; persons who
have authority to commute vow, 2240; cause required for commutation of
vow, 2241; reversion to original vow, 2242; duties of confessors in
reference to private vows, 2243; obligation of vow of obedience, 2364;
religious vows, obligation of the three principal vows, 2612 a.

Vulgarity, vice against greatness of deed, 2452 b.

Wagers, Sinful, 1879 c.

Waldensianism, 822 c.

War, definition, 1376; just and unjust, 1377; offensive and defensive,
1378; not against law of God, 1380; nor against law of nature, 1383;
three conditions for lawfulness, 1384; who may declare war? 1385; what
is just cause of war? 1386; sufficient causes, 1389 sqq.; insufficient
causes, 1393; when justice of cause is doubtful, 1394; can there be
justice on both sides? 1396; duties before beginning war, 1398-99;
duties during war, 1401 sqq.; lawful means of warfare, 1403; acts
of war and sacred times, 1405; and sacred places, 1406; and sacred
persons, 1407; combatants, non-combatants and neutrals, 1408; killing
or wounding of combatants, 1409; of non-combatants, 1410; punishment of
military crimes, 1411; imprisonment and restraint of enemy subjects,
1412; destruction and seizure of property, 1413; booty and looting,
1414-1415; lawfulness of stratagems, 1416; of reprisals, 1417; duties
of victor, 1418; rights, 1419; obligation of victor whose cause was
unjust, 1420-21; indemnities, 1422; guarantees for future, 1424;
punishment for crimes committed during war, 1425; preparation for
future wars, 1426; preparation for peace, 1427.

Weakness, Sins of, 250 a.

Whispering, form of defamation, 2103 sqq.

Whoremongering, definition, 2526 b.

Wicliffism, 822 c.

Will, acts elicited or commanded by, 56-62; three acts of, 58; consent
of, condition of mortal sin, 174, 184, 196; as subject of sin, 231.

Will (Testament), definition, 1876; defects of a will, 1876.

Wisdom, intellectual virtue, 157 c.

Wisdom, Gift of, 160 a; corresponds with and serves charity, 1609;
nature of Gift, 1610; object of, 1610 d; in its cause, Wisdom belongs
to the will, 1611 a; in its essence, to the intellect, 1611 b; Wisdom
is both speculative and practical, 1612; practical uses of, 1613;
likeness to the other Gifts, 1614 a; difference from, 1614 b; persons
who possess Wisdom, 1615; differs from the “word of wisdom,” 1616 b;
varying degrees, 1617; exercise of Gift, 1618; corresponds to Seventh
Beatitude, 1619 a; and to certain Fruits, 1619 b; direction given by
Wisdom to human actions, 1620; sins opposed to Wisdom, 1621; false
wisdom, 1623.

Wish, as act of will, 58.

Witness, reliability of, 1984; obligation of freely appearing as
witness, 1985; obligation of appearing under lawful citation, 1986;
obligation to answer truthfully, 1987; witness and concealment of
facts, 1993; payment of witnesses, 1994; matters regarding which
witness should not testify, 1988; sinfulness of false testimony, 1990;
obligation of witness to make restitution, 1992; concealment of truth
in presenting case, 2006; sinfulness of introducing false or corrupted
documents, 2007.

Wives, see Matrimony, Sacrament of.

“Word of Wisdom,” 1616 b.

Words, Unjust, see Injustice.

Works of Mercy, seven corporal, 1221; seven spiritual, 1222.

Worship, False, communication in, 956 sqq.; cooperation in, 976 sqq.;
contributions to, 981; building of houses of false worship, 983. See
also Religion, Sins against.

Wounding, definition, 1866 b.

Writings, Forbidden, 861; when use allowed, 862; permission to read,
865; censures incurred through use, 866; formal cooperation with, 1529.
See Books and Reading, Dangerous.

Y.M.C.A., Society forbidden by Church, 946 b.

Young Men’s Institute. 955 b.

Zoroastrianism, 822 a.