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THE UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

by

JOHN HOLLADAY LATANÉ
PH. D., LL. D.

Professor of American History and Dean of the
College Faculty in the Johns Hopkins University

Author of "From Isolation to Leadership,"
"America as a World Power," etc.







[Illustration]


Garden City      New York
Doubleday, Page & Company
1920

Copyright, 1920, by
Doubleday, Page & Company
All Rights Reserved, Including That of Translation
into Foreign Languages, Including the Scandinavian




[Illustration: SOUTH AMERICA]




  TO THE MEMORY OF
  MY FATHER

  WHOSE DAILY COMMENTS ON PUBLIC QUESTIONS
  WERE MY FIRST LESSONS IN THE STUDY
  OF POLITICS

  AND TO
  MY MOTHER

  WHO IMPARTED TO ME A LOVE OF HISTORY
  AND WHOSE APPROVAL IS STILL THE RICHEST
  REWARD OF MY EFFORTS




PREFACE


This book is based on a smaller volume issued by the Johns Hopkins Press
in 1900 under the title "The Diplomatic Relations of the United States
and Spanish America," which contained the first series of Albert Shaw
Lectures on Diplomatic History. That volume has been out of print for
several years, but calls for it are still coming in, with increasing
frequency of late. In response to this demand and in view of the
widespread interest in our relations with our Southern neighbors I have
revised and enlarged the original volume, omitting much that was of
special interest at the time it was written, and adding a large amount
of new matter relating to the events of the past twenty years.

Chapters I, II and V are reprinted with only minor changes; III, IV and
VI have been rewritten and brought down to date; VII, VIII and IX are
wholly new.

  J. H. L.

  BALTIMORE,
  May 7, 1920.




CONTENTS

  CHAPTER                                                      PAGE

  I    THE REVOLT OF THE SPANISH COLONIES                         3

  II   THE RECOGNITION OF THE SPANISH-AMERICAN
       REPUBLICS                                                 48

  III  THE DIPLOMACY OF THE UNITED STATES IN
       REGARD TO CUBA                                            83

  IV   THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE PANAMA
       CANAL                                                    144

  V    FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO                            193

  VI   THE TWO VENEZUELAN EPISODES                              238

  VII  THE ADVANCE OF THE UNITED STATES IN
       THE CARIBBEAN                                            261

  VIII PAN AMERICANISM                                          292

  IX   THE MONROE DOCTRINE                                      320

       INDEX                                                    335


  MAPS

  SOUTH AMERICA                                      _Frontispiece_

  THE CARIBBEAN                                   _Facing page 262_




THE UNITED STATES

AND

LATIN AMERICA




THE UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA




CHAPTER I

THE REVOLT OF THE SPANISH COLONIES


The English colonies of North America renounced allegiance to their
sovereign more through fear of future oppression than on account of
burdens actually imposed. The colonies of Spain in the southern
hemisphere, on the other hand, labored for generations under the burden
of one of the most irrational and oppressive economic systems to which
any portion of the human race has ever been subjected, and remained
without serious attempt at revolution until the dethronement of their
sovereign by Napoleon left them to drift gradually, _in spite of
themselves_, as Chateaubriand expressed it, into the republican form of
government. To carry the contrast a step further, when the conditions
were ripe for independence, the English colonies offered a united
resistance, while the action of the Spanish colonies was spasmodic and
disconcerted. The North American revolution gave birth to a federal
republic, that of the South to a number of separate and independent
republics, whose relations with one another have at times been far from
amicable. The causes for these striking differences are to be explained
not alone by race psychology, but by a comparison of the English and
Spanish colonial systems and of the two revolutions as well. The history
of the English colonies and of their revolt has been pretty well
exploited, but information in regard to the Spanish-American revolution
and its causes, although the sources are abundant, is not easily
accessible to English-speaking people.

By virtue of the celebrated Bull of Pope Alexander VI, the
Spanish-American colonies were looked upon as possessions of the crown,
and not as colonies of Spain. Their affairs were regulated by the king,
with the assistance of a board called the Council of the Indies. This
council, which was on a footing of equality with the Council of Castile,
was established by Ferdinand as early as 1511, and was modified by
Charles V in 1524. It was to take cognizance of all ecclesiastical,
civil, military, and commercial affairs relating to the colonies. From
it proceeded the so-called Laws of the Indies, and all colonial offices
in the gift of the crown were conferred by it. In the course of time,
however, the personnel of this council became merged with that of
Castile, and for all practical purposes the colonies became dependencies
of the Spanish nation.

There were from the first establishment of Spanish rule in America, two
viceroyalties on the continent. The viceroy of New Spain ruled over
Mexico and Central America, whilst all South America subject to Spanish
control was for about two centuries under the viceroy of Peru. In
regions too remote to be under his immediate control, _audiencias_, or
courts of justice, were established, the president of the _audiencia_
being known by the title of captain-general. Thus _audiencias_ were
established at Quito in 1542, at Charcas (in modern Bolivia) in 1559, in
New Granada in 1564, in Chile in 1568, and later at Caracas and at
Buenos Aires. In 1740, New Granada was raised to the rank of a
viceroyalty, with its capital at Bogota; and in 1776 the same dignity
was conferred on Buenos Aires. There were thus on the southern continent
three viceroyalties widely separated: one on the Main, one on the
Atlantic, and one on the Pacific.

The powers of the viceroy, or captain-general, as the case might be,
were limited only by the _audiencia_, consisting of from three to five
members, always of Spanish birth, whose functions were largely advisory,
but who had the privilege of corresponding directly with the Council of
the Indies, and who in case of emergency sometimes went so far as to
depose the viceroy.

It should be borne in mind that in Spanish America the native Indian
races were not driven beyond the frontier of civilization, as they were
by the English settlers, but became, and remain to this day, an integral
part of the population. There was thus in the Spanish colonies an
unusual admixture of races. There were (1) European Spaniards; (2)
Creoles, or children born in America of Spanish parents; (3) Indians,
the indigenous race; (4) Negroes of African race; (5) Mestizos, children
of whites and Indians; (6) Mulattoes, children of whites and negroes;
and (7) Zambos, children of Indians and negroes.

The maladministration of Spain's colonies may be summarized under two
heads: (1) acts of oppression against the native Indian race, and (2)
regulations of a commercial and political character, which acted in
restraint of the economic and social development of her own offspring in
America.

Under the first head may be mentioned the _mita_, or forced labor in
mines, farms, and factories, and the _repartimiento_, or _encomienda_,
which was an allotment to Spaniards of territory including the native
inhabitants as peons or vassals. In spite of humane restrictions placed
by law upon them, these institutions degenerated into systems of fearful
oppression, which led, in 1781, to the heroic but unsuccessful efforts
of Tupac Amaru, the last of the Incas, to free the land of his fathers
from the cruel rule of the Spaniard. So deep-seated was the
dissatisfaction and so formidable the revolt, that it was not suppressed
for more than two years. The unfortunate Inca and most of his family
were cruelly put to death.

The economic and commercial restrictions imposed upon the colonies
require fuller notice. The whole object of Spain's colonial policy was
to extract gold and silver from America and to force Spanish
manufactures and products upon that country. Commerce was confined to
Spain and to Spanish vessels.

      No South American could own a ship, nor could a cargo be
      consigned to him; no foreigner was allowed to reside in the
      country unless born in Spain; and no capital, not Spanish,
      was permitted in any shape to be employed in the colonies.
      Orders were given that no foreign vessel, on any pretence
      whatever, should touch at a South American port. Even ships
      in distress were not to be received with common hospitality,
      but were ordered to be seized as prizes, and the crews
      imprisoned.[1]


As late as 1816, when the United States protested against the blockade
established by General Morillo, as contrary to international law, M.
Onis, the Spanish minister, replied that the object of the blockade was
to maintain the laws of the Indies, which during the Napoleonic wars had
been somewhat relaxed, adding:

      You are aware that, agreeably to those laws, no foreign
      vessel was allowed to trade with the dominions of his
      majesty on that continent without a special license, and
      that vessels found near or evidently shaping a course
      towards them were liable to confiscation as interlopers.

When, later in the year, a United States commissioner was sent to
Cartagena to reclaim American vessels so seized, the Spanish viceroy
gave him to understand that he did not pretend to be acquainted with the
law of nations.[2]

Not only were the colonists prohibited from engaging in manufactures
which interfered with those of Spain, but restrictions were even placed
on agriculture in the interests of the Spanish producer. Thus the
cultivation of flax, hemp, and saffron was forbidden under severe
penalty; the cultivation of tobacco was not allowed; and grapes and
olives could be raised only for table use, so that oil and wine had to
be imported from Spain. Upon one occasion (in 1803) orders were sent "to
root up all the vines in certain provinces, because the Cadiz merchants
complained of a diminution in the consumption of Spanish wines."[3]

The carrying out of this commercial system in all its details was
entrusted to the _Casa de Contratacion_, or House of Trade, which
was located at Seville until 1717, when it was transferred to
Cadiz. The India House, as it was called, was established by warrant
of Queen Joanna in 1503.[4] To this house were to be brought all
merchandise for the colonies and all products from them of whatever
character. The colonial trade was thus limited to one Spanish port. The
affairs of the house were in charge of three commissioners or judges,
who had jurisdiction, civil and criminal, over all cases arising out of
the trade with America. Their authority was subordinated to no other
court or council but that of the Indies.

Not only were no foreigners allowed to go to the Spanish colonies, but
careful restrictions were placed on the movement of Spaniards to and
from America. In 1511 King Ferdinand had by a special order permitted
all subjects of Spain without distinction to go over to the Indies upon
entering their names at the India House; but in the years 1518, 1522,
1530, and 1539 several orders were passed "that no person reconciled, or
newly converted to our holy Catholic faith, from Judaism or
Mahometanism, nor the children of such, nor the children or grandsons of
any that had worn the St. Andrew's Cross of the Inquisition, or been
burnt or condemned as heretics, or for any heretical crime, either by
male or female line, might go over to the Indies, upon pain of
forfeiting all their goods, of an hundred lashes, perpetual banishment
from the Indies, and their bodies to be at the king's disposition."[5]

The commissioners might "grant passes to merchants to go over, or return
if they came from thence, including married merchants, provided they
have leave from their wives, and give 1,000 ducats security to return
within three years."[6]

There were also strict rules about passing from one province in America
to another. This could not be done without special leave from the
king.[7] "The inhabitants of the Indies may not come to Spain without
leave from the viceroys, presidents or governors of the places of their
habitation, in which they are to express the causes of their coming, and
whether it is to stay here or return."[8] "In the Indies, the
magistrates are directed to apprehend any persons they find are gone
over without leave, to imprison them till they can send them back into
Spain, upon pain of losing their employments."[9] In 1594 and 1602 it
was decreed that persons going over without leave should be sent to the
galleys for four years. In 1622 King Philip IV decreed that a person
simply going aboard a ship bound for the Indies without leave should be
immediately sent to the galleys for eight years.[10] Other decrees
equally severe were issued from time to time.

In order to keep the trade strictly under control and to properly
protect it, intercourse with the colonies was held only once a year. Two
squadrons, consisting of merchant ships and convoys under command of an
admiral and vice-admiral, made the trip each year. The fleet for New
Spain (Mexico) sailed in the spring, and that for the mainland in the
early fall. The first touched at some of the islands and then went to
Vera Cruz; the latter touched first at Cartagena and passed on thence to
Porto Bello, where the fair was held about the middle of March. This
fair was the great event of the year, and lasted forty days from the
time of the arrival of the fleet. From this point goods were distributed
by way of Panama to Peru, Chile, and even across the continent to Buenos
Aires. The gold bullion was sent in turn to this point by the viceroy of
Peru. It came in fifteen days from Potosi to Arica, thence by sea in
eight days to Callao, and in twenty days from Callao to Panama. The
viceroy of Peru was to take care to have the plate at Panama by the
middle of March. At Porto Bello it was taken aboard the galleons. About
the middle of June the galleons met the fleet from New Spain at Havana,
and from that point the two fleets with their convoys proceeded in
greater safety to Spain. Thus for two centuries all intercourse between
Spain and her colonies at one end of the line was limited at first to
Seville, and then to Cadiz; and at the other to Vera Cruz and Porto
Bello.[11] At a later period this arrangement was modified to some
extent, and Buenos Aires was made a port of entry. The reason for not
permitting trade with Buenos Aires during the earlier period was the
fear that the British and Dutch would smuggle through that port.

While the relations of the colonies with Spain were kept under the
strictest control, intercourse with foreign nations, although
absolutely prohibited under the severest penalties, could not be
entirely prevented. In speaking of Spain's restrictive policy, a British
naval officer, who was on the South American station during the
revolution, says:

      Unfortunately, however, for that system, the South
      Americans, notwithstanding the network of chains by which
      they were enveloped, had still some sparks of humanity left,
      and, in spite of all their degradation, longed earnestly for
      the enjoyments suitable to their nature; and finding that
      the Spaniards neither could nor would furnish them with an
      adequate supply, they invited the assistance of other
      nations. To this call the other nations were not slow to
      listen; and, in process of time, there was established one
      of the most extraordinary systems of organized smuggling
      which the world ever saw. This was known under the name of
      the contraband or forced trade, and was carried on in armed
      vessels, well manned, and prepared to fight their way to the
      coast, and to resist, as they often did with effect, the
      _guarda costas_, or coast blockades of Spain. This singular
      system of warlike commerce was conducted by the Dutch,
      Portuguese, French, English, and latterly by the North
      Americans. In this way goods to an immense value were
      distributed over South America; and although the prices were
      necessarily high, and the supply precarious, that taste for
      the comforts and luxuries of European invention was first
      encouraged, which afterwards operated so powerfully in
      giving a steady and intelligible motive to the efforts of
      the Patriots in their struggle with the mother-country.
      Along with the goods which the contraband trade forced into
      the colonies, no small portion of knowledge found entrance,
      in spite of the increased exertions of the Inquisition and
      church influence, aided by the redoubled vigilance of
      government, who enforced every penalty with the utmost
      rigor. Many foreigners, too, by means of bribes and other
      arts, succeeded in getting into the country, so that the
      progress of intelligence was gradually encouraged, to the
      utter despair of the Spaniards, who knew no other method of
      governing the colonies but that of mere brute force,
      unsupported by the least shadow of opinion, or of good
      will.[12]

The trade carried on by foreign interlopers grew to such alarming
proportions that before the middle of the eighteenth century Spain found
it necessary to relax the restrictions upon the private trade of her own
subjects. This led, about 1748, to the discontinuance of the annual
fleets or galleon trade.

The political administration of the country was absolutely in the hands
of Spaniards, who as a rule were not allowed to marry, acquire property,
or form any permanent ties in America. In the summary of charges against
Spain appearing in the Argentine Manifesto of 1817, one of the
specifications is, that of one hundred and sixty viceroys who had
governed in America, four natives of the country alone were numbered;
and of six hundred and two captains-general, all but fourteen had been
Spaniards.

The monopoly of Spanish trade in South America was partially surrendered
by the treaty of Utrecht, signed in 1713, at the close of the War of the
Spanish Succession. By this treaty England agreed to recognize Philip V
as king of Spain and the Indies, and in turn was granted the _assiento_,
or contract for supplying the Spanish colonies with African slaves.[13]
The importation of negroes into the Spanish possessions had been carried
on under contract from the very first. The _assiento_, which had been
previously granted to Spanish subjects, was, in 1696, granted to the
Portuguese Company of Guinea, and in 1702 to the Royal Guinea Company
of France; but in 1713 England secured this lucrative monopoly and
became the great slave-trading power of the world.

The _assiento_ of 1713, which was very carefully drawn up in 42
articles, granted to an English company the sole right of supplying
slaves to the Spanish West Indies and to South America for the period of
thirty years from May 1, 1713. By it the Queen of England undertook to
see that the company chartered by her should introduce into the Spanish
West Indies, including South America, 144,000 negroes of both sexes and
all ages within thirty years, at the rate of 4,800 a year. The company
was to pay a duty of 33-1/3 pieces of eight (dollars) for each negro
imported. In addition to the 4,800 a year, other negroes might be
imported at a duty of 16-2/3 dollars each, thus encouraging larger
importations. The negroes could be brought in either Spanish or English
vessels, manned with English or Spanish sailors, provided only no cause
of offense be given to the Catholic religion. The majority of the
negroes were to be taken to Cuba and Porto Rico, and to the ports on the
Main; but of the 4,800, the company had the right to take 1,200 to
Buenos Aires, 800 to be sold there and 400 to be carried to the
provinces up the Plata and to the kingdom of Chile. They were also
allowed to carry negroes across the isthmus from Porto Bello to Panama,
and there re-ship them to Peru. Either Englishmen or Spaniards could be
employed in the business, provided that there were not more than four or
six Englishmen in any port, and that these should be amenable to the
laws in all respects as Spanish subjects. By no means the least
remarkable provision of this treaty was that their British and Catholic
majesties were each to receive one-fourth of the profits of this
traffic.

Ships engaged in this trade were to be searched on arrival at port, and
all merchandise found on board was to be confiscated and heavy penalties
inflicted. On condition, however, that the company should not attempt
any unlawful trade, his Catholic Majesty granted them the privilege,
during thirty years, of sending annually a ship of 500 tons to the fair
at Porto Bello. The Spanish king was to be concerned one-fourth in the
profits.[14] It seems that the company stretched this privilege to the
utmost. The ship always stopped at Jamaica, took on all the goods she
could, and carried along with her five or six smaller vessels laden with
goods. When she got near Porto Bello, all her provisions were put in the
tenders and the goods these bore taken aboard. She then entered the
harbor laden down to the water's edge. Thus this single ship was made to
carry more than five or six of the largest galleons.[15]

Thirty years before the Spanish colonies began their war of
independence, the British government had entertained the idea of
revolutionizing and separating them from Spain. This idea seems to have
arisen in 1779, during the administration of Lord North, when Spain
joined France in the alliance with the American colonies against Great
Britain.[16] It was suggested at first, no doubt, as a measure of
retaliation, but was frequently agitated in later years with the avowed
object of opening up South America to British commerce. The same idea
was the basis of Miranda's scheme for the liberation of his native
land.

Francisco de Miranda[17] (1754-1816), a native of Caracas, Venezuela,
was the first Spanish-American patriot. He was with the American army
for a time during the Revolutionary War, but in what capacity is not
quite settled. It is stated by some writers that he held a commission
under LaFayette. The success of our war inspired him with the hope of
freeing his own country from Spanish control. He confided his views to
his friends in the United States, particularly to Alexander Hamilton,
"upon whom he fixed his eyes as a coadjutor in the great purpose of his
life." Shortly after Miranda had returned to his native land his schemes
were discovered. He fled to the United States, and later to England,
where he had repeated conferences with Pitt. Finding no help for his
revolutionary schemes in England, he went to the continent and traveled
through France, Germany, Turkey, and Russia. At the Russian court he was
warmly received, but was soon dismissed at the demand of the Spanish
minister. At news of the dispute between England and Spain about Nootka
Sound in 1790, he hastened to England and communicated his scheme to the
British ministry. Pitt lent a ready ear to his views as long as the
dispute lasted, with the intention of making use of him in the event of
a rupture with Spain. But when the dispute was peaceably settled,
Miranda's hopes fell to the ground and he left England. His scheme was
only temporarily abandoned, however. He considered himself to have been
ill-used by Pitt on this occasion, as he subsequently stated to Rufus
King, the American minister to England.

The French Revolution was now well under way, and the wars upon which
the republic was entering offered an attractive field for a soldier of
republican ideas. In April, 1792, Miranda went to Paris with
introductions to Pétion and the leading Girondists, hoping that the
revolutionary party might help him in his plans. He was given a
commission as brigadier-general in the French army, and served in
responsible posts under Dumouriez on the eastern frontier. He conducted
the siege of Maestricht and commanded the left wing of the French army
at the disastrous battle of Neerwinden, March, 1793, in which Belgium
was reconquered by the Austrians. Dumouriez now declared against the
Convention, but his troops having refused to follow him, he went over to
the Austrians in company with the Duke of Chartres, Louis Philippe.
Miranda fell under suspicion of treason and was forced to undergo a
court-martial, but was acquitted. For some unexplained reason he was
shortly after thrown into prison. He soon secured his release, but for
several years disappears from public view. His services in behalf of the
republic received in time due recognition. His name appears on the Arc
de Triomphe in Paris in the list of the heroes of the Revolution.

In January, 1798, Miranda returned to England. As Spain was now the
close ally of France, he hoped to secure the coöperation of Great
Britain in his scheme. He also hoped to secure aid from the United
States. The people of Kentucky and Tennessee were far from satisfied
with the provisions of the Spanish treaty of 1795 in regard to the
navigation of the Mississippi River. Then, too, just at this time, war
between the United States and France seemed inevitable, on account of
the resentment by France of the Jay treaty and her treatment of the
American representatives. Washington had been called from his retirement
at Mt. Vernon to assume the post of commander-in-chief of the army,
while the active command was to be given to Hamilton. Hamilton had
expressed great interest in Miranda's projects and was a man of known
ambition. His appointment, therefore, as the virtual commander-in-chief
of the American army made Miranda hopeful of his coöperation.

Mr. King, the American minister at London, entered heartily into the
plans of General Miranda, and his correspondence on that subject, during
the year 1798, with his government and with Hamilton is quite
voluminous.[18] For a time it seemed as if Great Britain and the United
States would coöperate for the purpose of revolutionizing Spanish
America. The plan, as entertained by Miranda and Hamilton, was for
England to supply the naval force and the United States the land forces.
Miranda believed that six or eight vessels of the line and four or five
thousand troops would be sufficient,[19] though Hamilton thought it
would require ten thousand troops. England's participation in the scheme
depended upon the relations between France and Spain. Mr. King wrote to
his government, February 26, 1798:

      Two points have within a fortnight been settled in the
      English cabinet respecting South America. If Spain is able
      to prevent the overthrow of her present government and to
      escape being brought under the entire control of France,
      England (between whom and Spain, notwithstanding the war, a
      certain understanding appears to exist) will at present
      engage in no scheme to deprive Spain of her possessions in
      South America. But if, as appears probable, the army
      destined against Portugal, and which will march through
      Spain, or any other means which may be employed by France,
      shall overthrow the Spanish government, and thereby place
      the resources of Spain and of her colonies at the disposal
      of France, England will immediately commence the execution
      of a plan long since digested and prepared for the complete
      independence of South America. If England engages in this
      plan, she will at Philadelphia propose to the United States
      to coöperate in its execution, Miranda will be detained
      here, under one pretense or another, until events shall
      decide the conduct of England.[20]

England's policy in regard to South America for the next twenty years
substantially confirmed the interpretation of her motives here given by
Mr. King.

During the summer of 1798 Mr. King had several conferences with the
British ministry in regard to the Spanish-American question, but it was
always understood that they were personal and wholly unauthorized. What
occurred at these interviews was, of course, always communicated to the
American government, but as they were unofficial and communicated merely
in the nature of information, the State Department preferred to keep the
matter on the same basis and did not refer to the matter in its
dispatches to Mr. King. This caused him no little annoyance.[21] In the
same way no notice was taken of General Miranda's letter to President
Adams.

Hamilton, however, was very frank in the expression of his views both to
General Miranda and to Mr. King. Under date of August 22, 1798, he wrote
to the latter:

      I have received several letters from General Miranda. I have
      written answers to some of them, which I send you to deliver
      or not, according to your estimate of what is passing in the
      scenes where you are. Should you deem it expedient to
      suppress my letter, you may do it and say as much as you
      think fit on my part in the nature of a communication
      through you. With regard to the enterprise in question, I
      wish it much to be undertaken, but I should be glad that the
      principal agency was in the United States--they to furnish
      the whole land force necessary. The command in this case
      would very naturally fall upon me, and I hope I should
      disappoint no favorable anticipation.

The United States, however, succeeded in coming to an understanding with
France, while England was unwilling to deal such a serious blow to Spain
as long as there was a chance of arraying her against Napoleon. The
communication of the views of the British government at Philadelphia, to
which Mr. King referred as a preliminary, was never made. Miranda's
hopes finally fell through at the reëstablishment of peace in Europe by
the treaty of Amiens, which lasted until 1803. He lingered in Europe
some time longer, until, wearied out by years of fruitless negotiation
with the British government, he, for the time being, gave up all hope
of success in that quarter and returned once more to the United States.

Arriving in New York from England in November, 1805, Miranda proceeded
to lay his cause once more before Mr. King, who had so warmly befriended
him in London, and to solicit his coöperation in fitting out an
expedition for South America. While expressing his full sympathy with
the cause, Mr. King stated emphatically that he could render him no
assistance, nor could any individuals safely do so, without the
countenance of the government. He, therefore, advised Miranda to go to
Washington and lay his plans before the administration. This Miranda
did. He was admitted to informal conferences both with President
Jefferson and Secretary of State Madison. Upon his return to New York he
represented to those interested in his schemes that he had secured from
the government a secret sanction of his project, and that the
administration, though unwilling to take the initiative, would support
the undertaking so soon as the standard of revolution should once have
been raised on the Spanish Main. Miranda's chief supporter was Colonel
Smith, surveyor of the port of New York, whose influence as a public
official in close touch with the administration was decisive in
persuading many adventurous spirits to join the expedition with the
belief that it was really secretly backed by the government of the
United States.

Miranda left New York in the early part of February, 1806, in the
_Leander_, with an imperfectly equipped force of about 200 men, most of
whom were commissioned as officers and promised commands in the South
American army, which was expected to spring from the soil at the magic
touch of Miranda's step upon the shores of his native land. The ship
proceeded to Jacquemel, San Domingo, where Miranda expected to get the
necessary supplies and reinforcements. Here disappointments awaited him,
disputes with the ship's captain ensued, and over a month was
fruitlessly spent, while the Spanish authorities on the Main had time to
put themselves on the alert. It was not until the last of April that the
expedition, reinforced by two schooners, appeared off the coast of
Venezuela near Porto Cabello. They were attacked by two Spanish vessels,
which captured the schooners with about sixty men and large stores,
while the _Leander_ ignominiously took to flight.

Miranda then sailed for Barbados, where he solicited aid from the
British admiral, Lord Cochrane, in command on the West Indian station.
Lord Cochrane, without definite instructions from his government, but
acquainted with its general policy in regard to South America, and
knowing of the close relations in which Miranda had stood for years with
the British ministry, decided to assist him in landing. With this
understanding he signed with Miranda an agreement to the effect that in
the event of the success of the expedition, Great Britain should always
be held on a footing with the most favored nation, and that British
ships should receive a deduction of ten per cent. upon duties paid by
all other nations, except the United States.[22] On the twentieth of
June, the expedition left Barbados under convoy of a part of Admiral
Cochrane's squadron, and on August 2, 1806, effected a landing near
Coro, Venezuela. They easily took possession of the town, the unarmed
inhabitants fleeing before them. Here Miranda remained about ten days,
issuing proclamations and vainly waiting for the natives to join him.
His position, meanwhile, was becoming unsafe, so he abandoned it and
took possession of the little island of Aruba off the coast. Lord
Cochrane, seeing that the expedition was a failure, and not wishing
further to compromise his government, sent no reinforcements and finally
ordered the withdrawal of the ships that had accompanied the expedition.
Miranda was offered a convoy back to Trinidad, which he accepted,
leaving Aruba, September 27, 1806. At Trinidad the members of the
expedition dispersed.[23]

The Americans who had taken part in the expedition and survived were
prosecuted in the United States courts for violation of the neutrality
laws. They claimed that they had enlisted in the undertaking with the
connivance of the government at Washington. Jefferson's enemies made
great political capital of the affair. Members of the cabinet were
summoned as witnesses, but refused to appear. Privately Jefferson and
Madison both denied most emphatically having in any way committed the
government to Miranda's undertaking, or having acted in any way in
disregard of our obligations to Spain.[24]

Aside from accomplishing nothing, the expedition of 1806 was a great
injury to Miranda's cause. He himself lost prestige as a military leader
and brought his character into question as having misrepresented his
connection both with the British and United States governments.
However, upon the occupation of Spain by Napoleon in 1808, Miranda again
hastened to England and urged upon the ministry the claims of his
country, in whose interests he had now been laboring incessantly as an
exile for more than twenty years. We cannot but admire his tenacity of
purpose in the face of the most disheartening failures.

Not only did the British government lend its encouragement, through Lord
Cochrane, to the filibustering expedition from the United States with
which Miranda hoped to revolutionize Venezuela, but about the same time
it sent an expedition against the provinces of the Plate. This attack,
like the assistance given to Miranda, was ill-timed and not properly
followed up. The policy seems to have been outlined by Pitt, but was put
into execution after his death by the short-lived ministry of Grenville
and Fox. The government of the Duke of Portland, which succeeded after a
few months, and in which Castlereagh and Canning were the most
conspicuous figures, did not deem it expedient to follow up the
undertaking.[25] In fact, the fate of the expedition was already sealed
when Portland came into power.

The victory of Trafalgar had given the English control of the Atlantic.
A force of some 6,000 men was dispatched to the South Atlantic without
its destination being known. It proceeded to Rio Janeiro, Portugal then
being in alliance with England. The viceroy of the Plate became alarmed
and prepared to defend Montevideo, which he thought would be the first
point of attack. The expedition, however, passed by and proceeded to the
Cape of Good Hope, which it wrested from the Dutch. In 1806 a dash was
made from the Cape for the river Plate. Sir Home Popham commanded the
fleet, and General Beresford the land force, which amounted to 1,635
men. On June 6 the squadron arrived at the mouth of the Plate. The ships
had some difficulty in ascending the river, but on the 25th they came to
anchor at a point fifteen miles below Buenos Aires. The city was
captured with little or no resistance, the inhabitants having been led
to believe that the British had come to liberate them. The contents of
the public treasury were handed over to the invaders. The inhabitants
were required to swear allegiance to George III, private property was
respected, the free exercise of their religion was allowed, and all
officials who took the oath were continued in office. When Beresford
refused to proclaim the independence of the province, or to give any
assurance for their future independence, the inhabitants, who had now
learned how insignificant the invading force really was, began to
prepare for resistance. A leader was readily found in the person of
Jacques Liniers, a Frenchman, who had been for thirty years in the
service of Spain. He and Juan Martin de Puyrredon began an organized
movement for the expulsion of the English. On the 12th of August,
Beresford, who had remained all this time without reinforcements, was
compelled to surrender. Troops ordered to his support from the Cape did
not arrive until later.

Sobremonte, the viceroy, had deserted Buenos Aires and established
himself at Montevideo. The people of Buenos Aires, therefore, deposed
him and chose Liniers in his place.

During the fall other English reinforcements arrived, and in January,
1807, Montevideo was taken by assault. As soon as the defeat of
Beresford was known, General Whitelocke was sent to take command of the
united English forces of the Plate, now some twelve thousand in number.
He arrived in the spring. The reconquest of Buenos Aires now seemed an
easy matter. It had been taken in the first instance by sixteen hundred
men; there were now ten thousand available. On June 28 the British
landed at the small port of Enseñada, forty-eight miles below Buenos
Aires. The fighting continued on the outskirts of the city in a
desultory manner and without any decisive action for several days. But
finally, owing to the bad generalship and incompetency of Whitelocke,
his troops got into such a muddle that half the force was captured or
disabled. On July 6, Liniers decided to send a flag of truce with the
proposal to surrender all the English prisoners, including those taken
with Beresford, provided Whitelocke would evacuate the territory of
Buenos Aires. One of Liniers' associates, Alzaga, insisted that the
terms of surrender should include Montevideo. This demand seemed
preposterous, but the clause was finally inserted, and to their surprise
agreed to, so complete was the demoralization of the English. On July 7
the terms of capitulation were signed.[26] Thus through a lack of
decision in the cabinet and a display of incapacity in the field,
without parallel in British annals, the empire of the Plate was
lost.[27]

With Napoleon's invasion of Spain in 1808, the Spanish-American
question came to the front once more. Miranda returned to London and was
detained there by the cabinet, as before by Pitt, with a view to using
him if occasion should require. At the same time Castlereagh, now
Foreign Secretary, had other solutions of the question in view. It was
proposed, and the matter seriously discussed in the cabinet, to alienate
the colonies from Spain, if possible, without revolution; and, instead
of establishing republics according to Miranda's plans, to unite them
all under a prince of the House of Bourbon. Louis Philippe, Duke of
Orleans, was suggested as the most suitable person for the new crown.
Some thirty years prior to this, immediately upon the recognition by
Spain of the independence of the United States, Count de Aranda had
advised Charles III to forestall the movement for independence, which
must inevitably come in his own provinces, by establishing among them
three great empires--one in Mexico, one in Peru, and one on the
Main--each to be ruled by a prince of the royal family of Spain.[28]

Chateaubriand brought forward a similar plan several years later at the
Congress of Verona. The present scheme was suggested by General
Dumouriez in the interests of his friend, the Duke of Orleans. Several
memorials on the subject, both by Dumouriez and the duke, were presented
to the British government in 1807 and 1808.[29]

Napoleon's invasion of Spain constitutes at once the most contemptible
and the most disastrous chapter in his career. In 1807, under the terms
of an agreement with Godoy, the unworthy favorite of the queen and the
virtual ruler of Spain, a French army was introduced into the kingdom
for the nominal purpose of punishing Portugal for her refusal to join
the continental system. The Portuguese royal family, fully appreciating
the danger in which they stood, fled to America and founded the empire
of Brazil, which in 1815 was declared independent of Portugal. The
Spanish rulers attempted to follow their example, but their intended
flight became known and they were prevented by the populace from leaving
the capital. In the meantime a disgraceful quarrel having arisen between
the old king, Charles IV, and Prince Ferdinand, Napoleon, whose troops
were now firmly established in Spain, stepped in as arbiter between
father and son and summoned them both to meet him on the northern
frontier. Having purposely lingered in France beyond the appointed time,
he succeeded in enticing them over the border to Bayonne, where he
compelled both to renounce forever the crown of Spain and the Indies,
which he forthwith bestowed upon his brother Joseph. When the truth
dawned upon them, the Spanish nation rose to a man. Napoleon had
unwittingly aroused the latent principle of nationality; he had put into
action a force which was new and one which the statesmen of Europe had
hitherto left out of account, but which was to prove the most potent
factor in the new epoch of political history introduced by the French
Revolution.

Provisional juntas were rapidly organized in the various provinces of
the kingdom of Spain and affairs administered in the name of Ferdinand
VII. The Junta, or as it is better known, the Regency of Cadiz, rapidly
gained a position of national importance and became the chief executive
body of the Spanish nation. The American provinces, which had long been
restive under Spanish rule, now claimed the same right of
self-government that the provinces of the Peninsula had assumed, and
began to depose the Spanish governors and to set up juntas of their own,
still acting in the name of Ferdinand VII. The Americans claimed that
they were not politically a part of Spain, but connected only through
the sovereign, and that with the removal of the sovereign the connection
ceased. The Regency of Cadiz, on the other hand, maintained that the
colonies were integral parts of Spain, and claimed, therefore, the right
to govern them in the absence of the sovereign.

The first throes of revolution were felt in 1809, almost simultaneously
in Upper Peru, Quito, and Mexico. These movements were quickly
suppressed with great cruelty. In the year 1810 the revolution opened
upon a vast scale. All the Spanish colonies on the mainland, with the
exception of Lower Peru, revolted at the same time and proclaimed their
independence of Spain, although still professing allegiance to Ferdinand
VII, the dethroned king.

The colonial authorities were deposed in most cases by force of public
opinion and without violence. The revolution was municipal in character,
that is to say, the _cabildos_, or town councils, the only popularly
constituted political bodies in the colonies, assumed the initiative in
the work of revolution and named the juntas. The junta of the capital
city in each province was usually recognized as the chief executive body
for that province, and assumed for the time being all the functions of
government. National conventions were then called in many cases to
decide upon the form of government. These in most cases entrusted the
executive power to regencies or triumvirates, almost all of which
rapidly gave way to military dictatorships.

The Regency of Cadiz had anticipated trouble from the colonies and had
recognized their rights as freemen by inviting them to send deputies to
the national Cortes, but at the same time had abridged those rights by
allowing them only a very limited representation, absurdly out of
proportion to their population and commercial importance. Upon the
establishment of the provisional governments or juntas in the colonies,
the Regency refused them the freedom of trade that had been promised,
declined the proffered mediation of England, and proceeded to stigmatize
the Americans as rebels and to declare them guilty of high treason,
although they had been guilty only of the same conduct that the
Spaniards themselves were pursuing at home.

Venezuela then (1811) declared herself independent of both the Spanish
nation and of the Spanish monarch, and adopted a republican
constitution. The promulgation of the Spanish constitution of 1812
further encouraged the spirit of independence in the colonies, but when
Ferdinand was restored in 1814, the colonies were still governed in his
name, for the revolution of Venezuela, which alone had declared for
independence, had been crushed out. Had Ferdinand acted with any
moderation or judgment, his American possessions would have been saved
to his crown. But the refusal of the colonies, which had now enjoyed
practical self-government for several years, to take upon them without
conditions the yoke of absolute authority, was met with the proclamation
of a war of reconquest. Reconciliation was thereafter no longer
possible, and independence only a question of time. By the close of 1815
the revolution had been put down in all the provinces except La Plata.
There it was never suppressed. For this reason we shall first trace
rapidly the course of the revolution in the south, of which San Martin
was the directing power.

José de San Martin was born in 1778 in Paraguay, his father being the
governor of Misiones. When eight years of age, his family went to Spain
and he was entered as a pupil in the Seminary of Nobles at Madrid. At
the age of twelve, he joined a regiment as cadet and saw his first
service in Africa. He served in the Spanish army for more than twenty
years, and won promotion as well as special distinction for bravery. In
the battle of Baylen, where a detachment of Napoleon's disciplined
troops was beaten by an army of recruits inspired by patriotism, San
Martin, then a captain, won a gold medal and a commission as
lieutenant-colonel for his conduct. Hearing of the struggle for liberty
in his native land, he resigned his commission and returned to America.
He was almost unknown personally, but his reputation as a brave soldier
and a skilful tactician procured for him immediate employment. At this
time the Argentine Republic had two armies in the field, the one
operating near at home against the Portuguese in Uruguay and the Spanish
in Montevideo, and the other in Upper Peru (Bolivia) against the forces
sent by the viceroy of Peru to suppress the Argentine revolution. San
Martin was soon given the command of this army in the north, succeeding
General Belgrano. He soon placed his army in an excellent state of
discipline and put a check to the advances of the Peruvian army.[30]

On May 16, 1814, the Argentine naval force, under command of an Irishman
named Brown, defeated and almost entirely destroyed the Spanish squadron
stationed at Montevideo, and that city soon after surrendered to the
besieging army of Alvear, San Martin's old comrade in the Spanish army.
Alvear, whose political influence was much greater than San Martin's,
now aspired to the conquest of Peru, and therefore desired the command
in the north. This San Martin willingly relinquished to him. He had
other plans in mind, and the state of his health demanded rest. Upper
Peru had been the high-road from Peru to Buenos Aires in times of peace,
and was, therefore, naturally looked upon as the line of advance for the
liberating army. San Martin, however, after a careful study of the
question, had become convinced that this was not the strategic line of
approach, that the Argentine Republic would never succeed in conquering
Peru from this quarter. His idea was to carry the war to the west, to
cross the Andes, occupy Chile, and, having secured a naval base there,
to attack Peru from the coast, continuing military operations in the
north merely as a diversion. The success of this plan depended upon the
performance of two apparently impossible tasks--the passage of the Andes
and the creation of a navy on the Pacific. San Martin was by far too
shrewd a man to advocate such an undertaking before maturing his plans.
He, therefore, confided it only to a few of his intimate friends, and,
taking advantage of his ill health, asked, as a favor for himself, the
government of the obscure province of Cuyo, where from its capital of
Mendoza he could place himself in communication with the Chilean
patriots.

On August 10, 1814, San Martin was appointed governor of Cuyo, and at
once devoted himself to the development of the plans which led to the
emancipation of half a continent and gave him his place in the world's
history. The revolutionary movement in Chile had just been crushed out.
It was begun in 1810 and the general course of events had been somewhat
similar to the Argentine movement, but it had fallen a victim first to
disputes between the Patriot leaders and finally to the troops of the
viceroy of Peru. It would require more space than we can give to trace
the varying fortunes of the cause in Chile through the stirring events
that marked the leadership of Dr. Rosas, of the Carrera brothers, and of
Bernardo O'Higgins. After the final collapse, O'Higgins, with a number
of other Patriots, fled over the Andes to Mendoza and readily entered
into the plans of San Martin. It took the latter two years to organize
and equip an army and to convince the government of Buenos Aires of the
practicability of his plan.

At length, on January 17, 1817, he began the passage of the Andes with
about 5,000 men, 1,600 horses, and 9,000 mules, the latter carrying the
field artillery, ammunition, and provisions. The summit of the Uspallata
Pass is 12,700 feet above the sea-level, 5,000 feet higher than the
Great St. Bernard, by which Napoleon led his army over the Alps. In many
other respects San Martin's achievement was more remarkable. Each piece
of artillery had to be carried suspended on a pole between two mules,
or, where the road was particularly dangerous, dragged by ropes. There
were chasms that could be crossed only by cable bridges. The march over
the Andes occupied three weeks. Both men and animals suffered greatly
from _soroche_, the illness caused by rarefied atmosphere.

At the foot of the mountain, at Chacabuco, the vanguard of San Martin's
army defeated a body of 4,000 Royalists, and thus opened the road to
Santiago, which San Martin entered February 14, 1817. The Chileans chose
him Supreme Director of their government, but he declined the office,
and O'Higgins was chosen.

San Martin's great object was to crush the colonial power of Spain in
its stronghold, Peru. Having by the successful passage of the Andes and
the victory of Chacabuco in a measure justified his plan of campaign, he
returned to Buenos Aires for reinforcements. The Royalists meanwhile
retreated to the south. On February 18, 1818, the independence of Chile
was proclaimed. A month later the Patriots were surprised at
Cancha-Rayada and almost routed, but within two weeks the army was again
ready for action, and on April 5, 1818, encountered the Royalists at
Maipo. This battle was a complete victory for the Patriots and decided
the fate of Chile. Only one or two fortresses in the south were now held
for Spain. Five days after the battle of Maipo, San Martin returned once
more to Buenos Aires and began organizing an expedition for the
liberation of Peru. Puyrredon, now Supreme Director, supported his
undertaking.

While San Martin was soliciting aid from the Argentine Republic, the
Chileans were not idle. They saw that the only way of insuring their
independence was by the creation of a navy. Through its agent in London,
the Chilean government secured the services of Lord Cochrane, an English
naval officer of great distinction and remarkable talents, who by a
curious turn of fortune had been brought into unmerited disgrace and
dismissed from the British service.[31] He reached Valparaiso in
November and hoisted his flag on board the _O'Higgins_, December 22,
1818. During the course of the next year, Cochrane made two attempts to
take Callao, the seaport of Peru, but without success beyond harassing
the enemy in some of the smaller coast towns. In February, 1820, by a
brilliant move, he captured Valdivia, a strongly fortified town still
held by the Spaniards in southern Chile.

San Martin returned to Chile in January, 1820, and began to assemble at
Valparaiso the army destined for the invasion of Peru. Of the 5,000 men,
two-thirds were from Buenos Aires, while nearly all of the officers were
Argentine or European volunteers. Of 65 foreign officers, 37 were
British and 3 were from the United States. There were, besides, 30
English officers in the Chilean navy. The expedition sailed on August
21, 1820, on board the fleet commanded by Cochrane. San Martin landed
his army at Pisco, to the south of Lima, and sent an expedition into the
interior under General Arenales, who had served the Patriots for years
in Upper Peru. In October, San Martin reëmbarked his troops and landed
them again at Huacho, a point seventy miles north of Lima. Meanwhile the
Spanish squadron, completely demoralized by the appearance on the
Pacific of Lord Cochrane, whose daring exploits were well known, was
lying under the guns of Callao Castle. On the night of November 5, 1820,
Lord Cochrane led a force of volunteers, consisting of 180 seamen and
100 marines, in open boats right under the batteries of Callao,
surprised and overpowered the crew of the _Esmeralda_, the largest
Spanish frigate, and, cutting her loose, carried her off to his own
squadron.

After Cochrane's exploit at Callao, the moral effect of which was very
great, he urged upon San Martin an immediate advance upon Lima, but San
Martin had two campaigns before him, the one military, the other
political. On first landing at Pisco he had issued an order to his army
in which he said, "Remember that you are come not to conquer, but to
liberate a people; the Peruvians are our brothers." And in spite of the
impatience and restlessness of his officers, he steadily adhered to his
plan, to the no small loss of his military prestige and ultimately to
his retirement from the scene of activity. His purpose was by the
presence of the liberating army to give the people of Peru a chance to
rise and throw off the yoke of Spain. To this end he scattered
proclamations and addresses of a revolutionary character broadcast
through the land and quietly awaited results. The contest in Peru, he
said, was not a war of conquest and glory, but entirely of opinion; it
was a war of new and liberal principles against prejudice, bigotry, and
tyranny.

      People ask why I don't march to Lima at once; so I might,
      and instantly would, were it suitable to my views, which it
      is not. I do not want military renown; I have no ambition to
      be the conqueror of Peru; I want solely to liberate the
      country from oppression. Of what use would Lima be to me if
      the inhabitants were hostile in political sentiment? How
      could the cause of independence be advanced by my holding
      Lima, or even the whole country, in military possession? Far
      different are my views. I wish to have all men thinking with
      me, and do not choose to advance a step beyond the gradual
      march of public opinion. The capital is now ripe for
      declaring its sentiments, and I shall give them the
      opportunity to do so in safety. It was in sure expectation
      of this movement that I have hitherto deferred advancing;
      and to those who know the full extent of the means which
      have been put in action, a sufficient explanation is
      afforded of all the delays that have taken place. I have
      been gaining, indeed, day by day, fresh allies in the hearts
      of the people, the only certain allies in such a war. In the
      secondary point of military strength, I have been, from the
      same causes, equally successful in augmenting and improving
      the liberating army; while that of the Spaniards has been
      wasted by want and desertion. The country has now become
      sensible of its true interests, and it is right the
      inhabitants should have the means of expressing what they
      think. Public opinion is an engine newly introduced into
      this country; the Spaniards, who are utterly incapable of
      directing it, have prohibited its use; but they shall now
      experience its strength and importance.[32]

The campaign of Arenales in the interior was successful. In the presence
of the liberating army, the people everywhere rose in revolt. San
Martin's method of conducting the campaign was the correct one. Public
opinion was soon aroused in the capital itself, and the Royalists
finally decided to evacuate Lima. The viceroy retired with his forces to
Cuzco in the highlands. In response to an invitation from the city
authorities, the Patriots entered Lima July 6, 1821. San Martin himself
entered without ceremony after dark a few days later. The independence
of Peru was proclaimed July 28 with imposing ceremonies in the great
square of Lima. San Martin was proclaimed Protector of Peru. He
proceeded to organize a civil government, and established the celebrated
_Order of the Sun_, distinctively aristocratic in character.

San Martin had played a great part thus far, but he had reached the
zenith of his influence and power. Dissensions soon arose. The task he
had undertaken was difficult in the extreme. It was much easier to
acquire power than to use it. At the time of the evacuation of Lima by
the Spaniards, he said to Captain Hall:

      For the last ten years I have been unremittingly employed
      against the Spaniards; or rather in favor of this country,
      for I am not against any one who is not hostile to the cause
      of independence. All I wish is that this country should be
      managed by itself, and by itself alone. As to the manner in
      which it is to be governed, that belongs not at all to me. I
      propose simply to give the people the means of declaring
      themselves independent, and of establishing a suitable form
      of government; after which I shall consider I have done
      enough and leave them.[33]

When the time came he kept his word.

While San Martin was leading the army of liberation from the Argentine
Republic to Chile, and from Chile to Peru, Simon Bolivar, the liberator
of the north, was pursuing his chequered career in Venezuela and
Colombia, unfurling the standard of revolution wherever he could get a
foothold. He was a man, in every respect, the opposite of San Martin,
fiery, impetuous, wholly given over to personal ambition, neither a
statesman nor a soldier, but one of the greatest revolutionary leaders
of any age or country. His ignorance of military affairs led him into
undertakings from which an experienced soldier would have held back, but
his indomitable pluck carried him safely through all calamities, and his
wonderful enthusiasm fired his followers even in the midst of disaster.

This remarkable man, whose reputation in the new world stands second to
that of Washington alone, was, like Miranda, a native of Caracas. Sprung
from a family of wealth and influence he had, like most young South
Americans of his class, received his education abroad, and had for
several years led a dissipated life in Paris. At first he held himself
aloof from the revolutionary leaders, but after the accomplishment of
the revolution of Caracas, April 19, 1810, he was persuaded to join the
Patriot cause, and was sent to London to solicit assistance from Great
Britain.[34]

The junta of Caracas, like those subsequently formed in the south,
professed to act in the name of Ferdinand VII, and fearing the influence
of Miranda, then in London, whose advocacy of absolute independence had
been open and avowed, they instructed Bolivar and their other agents not
to allow him to come to Venezuela. Miranda came in spite of them,
however, under an assumed name, and was everywhere received with
enthusiasm. Under his influence a congress was elected which, on July 5,
1811, declared Venezuela a republic, free and independent of all foreign
dominion. Miranda was appointed Director. This was the first South
American declaration of independence. The formal independence of the
Argentine Republic was not declared until July 9, 1816, although the
country had been self-governing for several years.

The Patriot cause was ruined, however, by the earthquake of March 25,
1812, which almost destroyed the city of Caracas and several towns of
importance. Twenty thousand people are supposed to have perished. As the
disaster occurred on Holy Thursday, the clergy were not slow to turn it
to political account and to persuade the people that it was a direct
chastisement of Heaven upon them for their rebellion against Spain. The
cause of the Patriots steadily lost ground until the fall of Porto
Cabello, through the inefficiency of Bolivar, caused its complete
collapse. Miranda was forced to sign with Monteverde the treaty of
Vittoria, July 26, 1812, on the basis of complete submission and a
general amnesty. It is hardly necessary to add that the Spanish general
did not abide by the terms of the capitulation. Miranda himself was
detained by Bolivar, as he was on the point of embarking for England,
accused of having received bribes from the Spaniards and of being
unwilling to share the fate of his followers, and treacherously handed
over to the Spaniards. He was sent to Spain and after languishing for
three years in a dungeon at Cadiz, died July 14, 1816. His fate was a
sad blot upon the reputation of Bolivar.

The revolution in New Granada, which had been inaugurated July 20, 1810,
was still holding out and thither Bolivar proceeded to offer his
services to the Patriots of that province. As soon as he had firmly
established himself in influence and power, he persuaded the government
that their only safety lay in the reconquest of Venezuela. He was
provided with troops, and in May, 1813 crossed the frontier and took
several important cities. He now assumed a new attitude and became a
self-appointed dictator. He proclaimed a war of extermination against
Spaniards and adopted a new system of dates: "3d year of Independence
and 1st of the War to the Death." He entered Caracas in triumph August
6, 1813. He proclaimed himself dictator with the title of Liberator.
Meanwhile Marino, another Patriot leader, had landed in the eastern part
of Venezuela near Cumana and declared himself dictator. There were thus
two dictators and no cordiality between them. Before they could come to
an agreement the enemy had recovered their position. In December, 1814,
the last Patriot force was defeated.

Bolivar and Marino retired once more to New Granada. Bolivar was made
captain-general of the forces of New Granada, his title of Liberator was
recognized, and another, that of Illustrious Pacificator, bestowed upon
him. A second time he undertook the conquest of Venezuela from the west.
Dissensions soon arose between Bolivar and the other leaders. He was
refused reinforcements and foolishly marched against the Patriot
garrison of Cartagena. He was now forced to give up his command, and
embarked for Jamaica, May, 1815.

Meanwhile Ferdinand had been restored to the throne of Spain, and an
army of 10,000 men, commanded by Marshal Morillo, the ablest Spanish
general of the time, had been sent to reduce the provinces on the Main.
This expedition reached Cumana in April, 1815, and before the end of the
year all the colonies, with the exception of the provinces of the River
Plate, were reduced to submission.

Far from giving up hope, however, Bolivar proceeded to Haiti, and from
that island, in May, 1816, made a descent upon the eastern part of
Venezuela, but was routed by the Spaniards in July, and soon returned to
Haiti. A few of the Patriots still kept the field, and towards the close
of the year Bolivar's partisans secured his recall. On December 21 he
left Haiti with a second expedition for the relief of his native land.
He determined now to direct all his efforts, not as hitherto, to the
support of the Patriot cause in the capital, but to the holding of the
great plains of the Orinoco. With this territory as a base, he carried
on, during the year 1817, in conjunction with the Llanero horsemen of
General Paez, a desperate struggle with the Spaniards. When the rainy
season of 1818 began, Bolivar's army had been cut almost to pieces, he
had lost prestige as a general, and his civil authority amounted to
nothing. Only the cavalry of Paez maintained the Patriot cause. Still
the position of the Spaniards was not much better. Morillo had 12,000
men scattered about, but neither money, arms, nor supplies. He reported
to the viceroy of Peru: "Twelve pitched battles, in which the best
officers and troops of the enemy have fallen, have not lowered their
pride or lessened the vigor of their attacks upon us."

In February, 1819, the second Congress of Venezuela convened at
Angostura. The Dictator resigned, but was unanimously elected President
and given absolute power in all provinces which were the actual theater
of war. The army was reorganized by the accession of foreign troops, in
particular the British legion, consisting of 2,000 well equipped men,
which achieved much of the success of the next year. Bolivar now
conceived the idea of crossing the Cordillera and reconquering New
Granada. General Paez was to attract the attention of Morillo on the
plains in front, and a demonstration was to be made on the coast near
Caracas, while Bolivar marched to the west. This movement changed the
whole face of affairs and had a similar effect to the passage of the
Andes by San Martin. New Granada was won by the battle of Boyaca, August
7, 1819. Morillo was now isolated in Venezuela. In December, 1819, a
congress of delegates from Venezuela and New Granada met and decreed the
union of the two provinces in the Republic of Colombia. Bolivar was
named provisional President. An armistice was signed by Bolivar and
Morillo in November, 1820, which gave the Patriots breathing time. The
Spanish troops remaining in Venezuela were defeated by Bolivar in the
battle of Carabobo, June 23, 1821. Only a few fortresses on the coast
were still held by the Spaniards.

Bolivar entered Caracas once more in triumph and tendered his
resignation, an act always considered by him necessary for giving the
proper dramatic setting to such occasions. Congress took no notice of
it, but drew up a constitution providing for a limited presidential term
of four years. The Liberator, "as he feared," was elected President. He
repeated his resignation, but added that he would yield if Congress
persisted. Congress did persist.

After the battle of Boyaca, Bolivar had sent General Sucre by sea to
Guayaquil, nominally to aid the new state against the Royalists, but in
reality to induce it to join the Republic of Colombia. Sucre met with
reverses, and had to call on San Martin for assistance from Peru.
Meanwhile Bolivar was advancing by land. On July 11, 1822, he entered
Guayaquil in triumph, and two days later, on his own responsibility,
announced its incorporation with Colombia. The junta resigned and took
refuge on board the Peruvian squadron in the harbor. On the 25th San
Martin arrived by sea, and Bolivar sent two of his aides to welcome him
"on Colombian soil." On the following day San Martin went ashore and he
and Bolivar met for the first and last time. They had two private
interviews, after which San Martin sent his baggage aboard his ship and
announced that he would sail after attending the ball to be given that
night in his honor. At the public banquet that evening Bolivar rose and
proposed a toast: "To the two greatest men of South America--General San
Martin and myself." San Martin also proposed a toast: "To the speedy
conclusion of the war; to the organization of the different republics of
the continent; and to the health of the Liberator of Colombia"--words
which well contrasted the personal and political aims of the two men.
San Martin and Bolivar had been unable to agree upon any plan for the
expulsion of the Spaniards from the highlands of Peru. The self-denying
patriot gave way before the man of ambition. To O'Higgins he wrote: "The
Liberator is not the man we took him to be."

Upon his return to Peru, San Martin wrote to Bolivar: "My decision is
irrevocable. I have convened the first Congress of Peru; the day after
its installation I shall leave for Chile, convinced that my presence is
the only obstacle which keeps you from coming to Peru with your army."
On the 20th of September, 1822, he laid his resignation before the
Congress, and issued an address to the nation. "The presence of a
fortunate soldier," he said, "however disinterested he may be, is
dangerous to a newly founded state. I have proclaimed the independence
of Peru. I have ceased to be a public man." These words, whether
intentionally so or not, were prophetic of Bolivar's subsequent career.
San Martin wrote to O'Higgins: "I am tired of hearing them call me
tyrant, that I wish to make myself king, emperor, the devil. On the
other hand, my health is broken, this climate is killing me. My youth
was sacrificed to the service of Spain; my manhood to my own country. I
think I have now the right to dispose of my old age."

Bolivar's jealousy of San Martin prolonged the war, which might have
been brought to a close in a few months, for nearly three years. After
the withdrawal of San Martin, Bolivar became Dictator of Peru. On
December 9, 1824, was fought the last battle for South American
independence. On the little plain of Ayacucho, 11,600 feet above the
sea, General Sucre defeated and captured the forces of the viceroy.
Upper Peru was organized as a separate republic, with the name of
Bolivia.

Bolivar had been proclaimed President of Peru for life, but the
unpopularity of this measure led him to leave the country in 1826, never
to return. That same year he summoned the Congress of Panama, but his
plans for the union of South America in one republic failed. San
Martin's idea finally triumphed. In 1829 Venezuela separated itself from
Colombia and passed a decree of perpetual banishment against Bolivar.
In April, 1830, through pressure of public opinion, Bolivar resigned the
presidency of Colombia and retired into private life. Congress voted him
an annual pension of $30,000. A month later Quito and Guayaquil
separated from Colombia and formed the independent state of Ecuador.
Even the name Colombia was dropped by the remaining state, and the old
name of New Granada adopted. In 1857 the name Colombia was assumed once
more.

Bolivar died in a small house near Santa Martha, December 17, 1831,
having witnessed the failure of his most cherished plans. San Martin had
retired to Europe in 1823 with his only child, a daughter named
Mercedes. They lived a retired life in Brussels. Once only, in 1828, he
returned to his native land, but was received with such denunciation by
the press of Buenos Aires that he quickly turned his face towards Europe
again. He died at Boulogne, August 17, 1850. Thirty years later the
Argentine people had his remains brought back to his native land. In
May, 1880, with imposing ceremonies, they were laid to rest in the
Cathedral of Buenos Aires.

Mexico was twice revolutionized. The first struggle began in 1809 and
1810, and was carried on spasmodically until 1817. The second revolution
broke out in 1820 on receipt of the news from Spain of the revolution of
March, 1820, and the re-adoption of the constitution of 1812. The old
revolutionists demanded the proclamation of this constitution in Mexico,
but the Viceroy Apodaca opposed them. Augustin de Iturbide, a native
Mexican, who in the first revolution had steadfastly adhered to the
cause of the king, now defected to the popular side with a large body
of troops which the viceroy had entrusted to his command. On February
24, 1821, he issued the celebrated document known as the Plan of Iguala,
from the town of that name. In it he proposed the maintenance of the
Roman Catholic religion to the exclusion of all others, the independence
of Mexico from Spain, and the establishment of a limited monarchy. The
Imperial Crown of Mexico was to be offered first to Ferdinand VII; in
the event of his declining, to the younger princes of his house; and in
the event of their refusal, the duty of naming an emperor was to fall to
the representative assembly of Mexico. The personal and property rights
of Spaniards in Mexico were carefully guaranteed. In securing the
interests of Spaniards and of the clergy, those who had most to lose,
this plan differed essentially from the revolutionary policy of the
other Spanish colonies. On the other hand, the Creole element was
satisfied with the promise of independence and a representative
government. The revolutionary army became known as "the Army of the
Three Guarantees," these being (1) the maintenance of the religious
establishment in its present form, (2) independence, and (3) the union
of Americans and Spaniards.[35] This ingenious document received
immediately the widest approval.

The Viceroy Apodaca had practically abdicated when his successor,
General O'Donaju, arrived from Spain. As the latter had come without
troops, there was nothing left but for him to recognize the revolution
as an accomplished fact and make the best terms for his country he
could. Accordingly he met Iturbide in conference at Cordova, and after
a brief discussion signed the treaty bearing that name, August 24, 1821.
It was agreed that a provisional junta should be appointed, that
O'Donaju should be a member, and that the junta should proceed to carry
into effect the plan of Iguala. O'Donaju then persuaded the Royalists to
open the gates of the capital, and on September 27, 1821, Iturbide
entered. Shortly thereafter O'Donaju died from the yellow fever, thus
leaving Iturbide free to carry out his plans. The Spanish government, of
course, repudiated the treaty of Cordova.

The Congress, which assembled in pursuance of the program of Iguala, was
divided between Imperialists and Republicans. In spite of the opposition
of the latter, Iturbide had himself proclaimed emperor and his family
ennobled. Congress soon fell into disputes with the emperor, who
finally, in October, 1822, dissolved it by force. A few months later
Santa Anna inaugurated a counter-revolution from Vera Cruz, which
resulted in the abdication of the emperor. Iturbide was allowed to leave
the country. He retired to Italy, where he resided until toward the
close of 1823, when he went to London. In May, 1824, at the solicitation
of certain of his partisans, he sailed again for Mexico,[36] ignorant of
the decree of perpetual banishment passed against him by the Congress a
few weeks before. He landed at Tampico July 12, but was seized and
executed a few days later. The new assembly then in session adopted a
constitution, and the Republic of Mexico was launched upon what was to
prove, for years to come, a career of turbulence and anarchy.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] Hall's "Journal on Chili, Peru, and Mexico," 2 Vols. Edinburgh,
1824, Vol. I, p. 249.

[2] Am. St. Pap., For. Rel., Vol. IV, pp. 156-159.

[3] Hall's "Journal," Vol. I, p. 296. See also Rodney's report on South
America, in Vol. IV, Am. St. Pap., For. Rel.

[4] A full history of the India House and an account of its regulations
is given by Veitia Linage in his "Norte de la Contratacion," Seville,
1672; translated into English by Captain John Stevens under the title,
"Spanish Rule of Trade to the West Indies," London, 1702. Linage was for
a number of years Treasurer and Comptroller of the India House. A good
summary of the history and regulations of the House is given by Prof.
Bernard Moses in his "Casa de Contratacion" in the Papers of the Am.
Hist. Ass. for 1894, and in the third chapter of his "Establishment of
Spanish Rule in America."

[5] Linage, "Norte de la Contratacion," p. 107.

[6] _Ibid._, p. 110.

[7] _Ibid._, p. 113.

[8] _Ibid._, p. 114.

[9] _Ibid._, p. 109.

[10] _Ibid._, p. 109.

[11] Linage, "Norte de la Contratacion," pp. 191-193.

[12] Hall's "Journal," Vol. I, pp. 253-254.

[13] "The Assiento; or Contract for Allowing to the Subjects of Great
Britain the Liberty of Importing Negroes into the Spanish America."
Printed by John Baskett, London, 1713.

[14] "The Assiento; or Contract for Allowing to the Subjects of Great
Britain the Liberty of Importing Negroes into the Spanish America."
London, 1713.

[15] Ulloa, "Voyage to South America." English translation, London,
1806, Vol. I, p. 105.

[16] "Letters and Despatches of Castlereagh," Vol. VII, p. 266 ff. This
volume is rich in information in regard to England's Spanish-American
policy.

[17] W. S. Robertson, "Francisco de Miranda and the Revolutionizing of
Spanish America" (1909).

[18] "Life and Correspondence of Rufus King," New York, 1894, Vol. II,
App. 5. For further information regarding his relations with Miranda,
see extracts from his Memorandum Book, in Vol. III, App. 3.

[19] See Miranda's letter to President Adams, March 24, 1798. "Life and
Corresp. of King," Vol. II, p. 654.

[20] "Life and Corresp. of King," Vol. II, p. 650.

[21] See King's letter to Hamilton, March 4, 1799. "Life and Corresp.,"
p. 662.

[22] "Letters and Despatches of Castlereagh," Vol. VII.

[23] See Sherman, "General Account of Miranda's Expedition," N. Y.,
1808.

[24] H. A. Washington, "Writings of Thomas Jefferson," Vol. V, p. 474;
"Madison's Writings," Vol. II, pp. 220, 225.

[25] "Letters and Despatches of Castlereagh," Vol. VII, p. 314 ff.

[26] See Watson, "Spanish and Portuguese South America." 2 Vols. London,
1884, Vol. II, p. 271 ff.

[27] See "Letters and Despatches of Castlereagh," Vol. VII, p. 316 ff.

[28] Romero, "Mexico and the United States," Putnam, 1898, p. 287.

[29] "Letters and Despatches of Castlereagh," Vol. VII.

[30] Mitre, "The Emancipation of South America." Translated by Pilling.
London, 1893.

[31] See Cochrane (Earl Dundonald), "Service in Chili." 2 Vols. London,
1859.

[32] Hall's "Journal," Vol. I, p. 181. Report of Conversation with San
Martin in Callao Roads.

[33] Hall's "Journal," Vol. I, p. 194.

[34] Holstein, "Life of Bolivar." Boston, 1829.

[35] Hall's "Journal," Vol. II, p. 188.

[36] See the statement of Iturbide in regard to his political life
published in the _Pamphleteer_, London, 1827.




CHAPTER II

THE RECOGNITION OF THE SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS


The struggle of the South American peoples for independence was viewed
from the first with feelings of profound satisfaction and sympathy in
the United States. From the commencement of the revolution South
American vessels were admitted into the ports of the United States under
whatever flag they bore. It does not appear that any formal declaration
according belligerent rights to the said provinces was ever made, though
a resolution to that effect was introduced into the House by committee
as early as December 10, 1811.[37] Such formal action was apparently not
deemed necessary and, as there was no Spanish minister resident in the
United States at that time to protest, our ports were probably thrown
open, as a matter of course.[38] The fact that they were accorded full
belligerent rights from the first was afterwards stated by President
Monroe in his annual messages of 1817 and 1818 and in his special
message of March 8, 1822.[39]

At an early date of the revolution commissioners arrived in Washington
seeking recognition of independence, and agents were forthwith
dispatched to South America to obtain information in regard to the
state of the revolutionary governments and to watch the movements of
England and other European powers. Joel R. Poinsett was sent to Buenos
Aires in 1811, and the following year Alexander Scott was sent to
Venezuela.[40] In 1817 Cæsar A. Rodney, Theodorick Bland, and John
Graham were dispatched as special commissioners to South America. They
proceeded to Buenos Aires, where they arrived in February, 1818, and
remained until the last of April. Rodney and Graham then returned to the
United States while Bland proceeded across the continent to Chile. Their
reports were transmitted to Congress November 17, 1818.[41] In 1820
Messrs. J. B. Prevost and John M. Forbes were sent as commercial agents
to Chile and Buenos Aires. Reports from them on the state of the
revolutions were transmitted to Congress, March 8 and April 26,
1822.[42]

In the meantime a strong sentiment in favor of the recognition of South
American independence had arisen in the United States. The struggling
colonies found a ready champion in Henry Clay, who, for a period of ten
years labored almost incessantly in their behalf, pleading for their
recognition first with his own countrymen and then, as secretary of
state under the Adams administration, with the governments of Europe.
His name became a household word in South America and his speeches were
translated and read before the patriot armies.

In spite of the fact that our own political interests were so closely
identified with the struggling republics, the President realized the
necessity of following a neutral course, and in view of the aid the
colonies were receiving from citizens of the United States, called upon
Congress for the enactment of a more stringent neutrality law. Clay
delivered a vigorous speech in opposition to this measure in January,
1817. His greatest effort in behalf of South America, however, was his
speech of March 25, 1818, on the general appropriation bill. He moved an
amendment appropriating $18,000 for the outfit and year's salary of a
minister to the United Provinces of the Plate. Without waiting to hear
the report of the three commissioners who had been sent to inquire into
the state of the revolutionary governments, he urged that a minister be
regularly accredited to Buenos Aires at once. In a speech, three hours
in length, he concluded the arguments he had begun the day before.
Painting with even more than his usual fire and enthusiasm the beauties
and resources of the Southern continent, he said:

      Within this vast region, we behold the most sublime and
      interesting objects of creation; the loftiest mountains, the
      most majestic rivers in the world; the richest mines of the
      precious metals; and the choicest productions of the earth.
      We behold there a spectacle still more interesting and
      sublime--the glorious spectacle of eighteen millions of
      people struggling to burst their chains and be free.[43]

He went on to say that in the establishment of the independence of the
South American states the United States had the deepest interest. He had
no hesitation in asserting his firm belief that there was no question in
the foreign policy of this country, which had ever arisen, or which he
could conceive as ever occurring, in the decision of which we had so
much at stake. This interest concerned our politics, our commerce, our
navigation. There could be no doubt that Spanish America, once
independent, whatever might be the form of the governments established
in its several parts, those governments would be animated by an American
feeling and guided by an American policy. They would obey the laws of
the system of the new world, of which they would compose a part, in
contradistinction to that of Europe.[44] The House turned a deaf ear to
his brilliant rhetoric. The motion was defeated by a vote of 115 to 45,
but Clay did not abandon the cause of South America.

Two years later he reopened the question in a direct attack on the
policy of the administration, which greatly disturbed President Monroe.
On May 20, 1820, he again introduced a resolution declaring it expedient
to send ministers to the "governments in South America which have
established and are maintaining their independence of Spain." His
arraignment of the administration became more violent than ever:

      If Lord Castlereagh says we may recognize, we do; if not, we
      do not. A single expression of the British minister to the
      present secretary of state, then our minister abroad, I am
      ashamed to say, has molded the policy of our government
      toward South America.

A charge of dependence upon Great Britain in affairs of diplomacy was as
effective a weapon then as it has been since in matters financial.
Clay's resolution passed the House by a vote of 80 to 75, but still the
executive arm of the government did not move. In 1817 and 1818 the
question of South American independence was continually before the
cabinet for discussion. President Monroe seemed strongly inclined toward
recognition, but in this he was opposed by Adams and Calhoun, who were
unwilling to act in the matter without some understanding with England,
and if possible with France. Our relations with Spain in regard to the
Indian troubles in Florida were in a very strained condition and any
action taken at that time in recognition of South America would have
involved us in war with Spain and almost inevitably with other European
powers. The President, therefore, as a matter of expediency postponed
the action which his sympathy prompted, and, in his annual message of
November 16, 1818, expressed his satisfaction at the course the
government had hitherto pursued and his intention of adhering to it for
the time being.[45] Under the President's direction, however, efforts
were made to secure the coöperation of Great Britain and France in
promoting the independence of South America.[46]

In 1819 an amicable adjustment of our differences with Spain seemed to
have been reached by the negotiation of a treaty providing for the
cession of the Floridas to the United States and the settlement of
long-standing claims of American citizens against Spain. An unforeseen
difficulty arose, however, which proved embarrassing to the
administration. The Spanish monarch very shrewdly delayed ratifying the
treaty for two years and thus practically tied the hands of the
administration during that time as far as the South American question
was concerned.

In spite of the awkward position in which the administration found
itself, Clay, who was opposed to the treaty on account of its
unwarranted surrender of our claims to Texas, continued to plead the
cause of South America. Early in the year, 1821, a declaration of
interest in the South American struggle, introduced by him, was carried
by an overwhelming majority (134 to 12), but the administration held
back another year until the _de facto_ independence of the colonies no
longer admitted of reasonable doubt. Meanwhile the Florida treaty had
been ratified. On March 8, 1822, President Monroe, in a special message
to Congress, expressed the opinion that the time had come for
recognition and asked for the appropriations necessary for carrying it
into effect. The President's recommendation was received with approval,
and in due course the sum of $100,000 was appropriated for "such
missions to the independent nations on the American continent as the
President of the United States may deem proper." In accordance with this
act Mr. R. C. Anderson of Kentucky was appointed minister to Colombia,
Mr. C. A. Rodney of New Jersey to the Argentine Republic, and Mr. H.
Allen of Vermont to Chile, in 1824, and Mr. Joel R. Poinsett of South
Carolina to Mexico in 1826.

While the United States government was concerning itself with the
political interests of the Spanish provinces, Great Britain was quietly
reaping all the commercial advantages to be derived from the situation
and was apparently well satisfied to let things follow the drift they
had taken. By the destruction of the combined fleets of France and
Spain at Trafalgar, in 1805, Nelson had won for Great Britain undisputed
control of the Atlantic and laid open the route to South America. Ever
since the _assiento_ of 1713 had placed the slave trade in her hands,
Great Britain had realized the possibilities of South American commerce,
and the intercourse, which had been kept up with that country after the
termination of the slave monopoly by smugglers, now that the danger was
removed, became more regular and profitable. During the changes of
ministry that followed the death of Pitt, the policy of England in
regard to South America was weak and vacillating. We have already called
attention to the political indecision that marked the attack upon the
provinces of the Plate. With Napoleon's invasion of Spain and the
national uprising it occasioned, British policy became once more
intelligible. It was wisely deemed of more importance to spare the
colonies and to win Spain over to the European alliance against
Napoleon, than to take her colonies at the cost of driving her
permanently into the arms of France. Meanwhile British commerce with the
South American states was steadily growing and that too with the
connivance of Spain.

At the close of the Napoleonic wars, Spain, fearing that England,
through her desire to keep this trade, would secretly furnish aid to the
colonies in their struggle for independence, proposed to the British
government to bind itself to a strict neutrality. This England agreed
to, and when the treaty was signed, there was, according to Canning, "a
distinct understanding with Spain that our commercial intercourse with
the colonies was not to be deemed a breach of its stipulations."[47]
Notwithstanding this tacit compact, British commerce suffered greatly at
the hands of Spanish privateers and even Spanish war vessels. Numbers of
British merchantmen were captured by Spanish ships, carried into the few
ports left to Spain on the Main, and condemned as prizes for trading
with the insurgent colonies. Thus at the time of the acknowledgment of
South American independence by the United States, a long list of
grievances had accumulated in the hands of the British ambassador at
Madrid, and in spite of urgent and repeated remonstrances, remained
unredressed.

Canning was deterred from making final demands upon the government of
Madrid by the consideration that he did not wish to hamper the
constitutional government of Spain, which had come into being by the
revolution of March, 1820, and against which the other powers of Europe
were preparing to act. The condition of affairs on the Spanish Main was,
however, critical and demanded instant redress. He decided, therefore,
to take matters into his own hands without harassing the government of
Spain, and to dispatch a squadron to the West Indies to make reprisals.
In a memorandum to the cabinet on this subject, November 15, 1822, in
which he outlines his policy, he commends the course of the United
States in recognizing the _de facto_ independence of the colonies,
claiming a right to trade with them and avenging the attempted
interruption of that right by making reprisals, as a more
straightforward and intelligible course than that of Great Britain,
forbearing for the sake of Spain to recognize the colonies, trading with
them in faith of the connivance of Spain and suffering depredations
without taking redress. It was not necessary, he thought, to declare war
against Spain, for "she has perhaps as little direct and available power
over the colonies which she nominally retains as she has over those
which have thrown off her yoke. Let us apply, therefore, a local remedy
to a local grievance, and make the ships and harbors of Cuba, Porto
Rico, and Porto Cabello answerable for the injuries which have been
inflicted by those ships, and the perpetrators of which have found
shelter in those harbors." In conclusion, he says that the tacit
compact, which subsisted for years, by which Spain was to forbear from
interrupting British trade with the South American colonies having been
renounced by Spain, and the old colonial system having been revived in
as full vigor as if she had still a practical hold over her colonies and
a navy to enforce her pretensions, "no man will say that under such
circumstances our recognition of those states can be indefinitely
postponed."[48]

While Great Britain was thus considering the expediency of following the
example of the United States in the recognition of Spain's revolted
colonies, the powers of central Europe had taken upon them the task of
solving the difficulties of that unfortunate country both at home and in
America. The restored rule of the Bourbons in Spain had been far from
satisfactory to the great mass of the people. In March, 1820, the army
which Ferdinand had assembled at Cadiz to be sent against the rebellious
colonies, suddenly turned against the government, refused to embark, and
demanded the restoration of the constitution of 1812. The action of the
army was everywhere approved and sustained by the mass of the people,
and the king was forced to proclaim the constitution and to swear to
uphold it. The March revolution in Spain was followed in July by a
constitutional movement in Naples, and in August of the same year by a
similar movement in Portugal; while the next year saw the outbreak of
the Greek struggle for independence. Thus in all three of the peninsulas
of Southern Europe the people were struggling for the right of
self-government. The movement in Greece was, it is true, of an
altogether different character from the others, but it was a revolt
against constituted authority and therefore incurred the ill-will of the
so-called legitimists. The powers of Europe at once took alarm at the
rapid spread of revolutionary ideas and proceeded to adopt measures for
the suppression of the movements to which these ideas gave rise. The
principle of joint intervention on the part of allied governments in the
internal affairs of European states had been developed in the years
immediately following the overthrow of Napoleon and was the outcome of
the wholly anomalous condition in which he had left the politics of
Europe. In the hands of Prince Metternich, the genius of reaction
against French revolutionary ideas, this principle had become the most
powerful weapon of absolutism and now threatened the subversion of
popular institutions throughout Europe.

The rapid development of this doctrine of intervention in the seven
years immediately following the second fall of Napoleon not only
seriously menaced the liberties of Europe, but also threatened to
control the destiny of the new world. At the Congress of Vienna
Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia had formed a close
union and had signed the treaty upon which the peace of Europe rested
for the next half century. The agreement made at Vienna was reaffirmed
with some minor changes, after the second overthrow of Napoleon, at
Paris, November 20, 1815. France was now practically excluded from the
alliance. This treaty undertook especially to guard against any further
disturbance of the peace of Europe by Napoleon or France. One of the
most significant features of the treaty, or what was to prove so, was
the agreement definitely laid down in the sixth article, providing for
meetings of the powers at fixed periods.

The first conference held in accordance with this understanding was that
at Aix-la-Chapelle in October, 1818. France was readmitted as a member
of the alliance and her territory evacuated by the allied armies. The
quintuple alliance thus formed declared that it had no other object than
the maintenance of peace; that the repose of the world was its motive
and its end. The language of the declaration had been in a large measure
neutralized to suit the views of the British government. Lord Liverpool
had said to Castlereagh before the meeting of the conference: "The
Russian must be made to feel that we have a parliament and a public, to
which we are responsible, and that we cannot permit ourselves to be
drawn into views of policy which are wholly incompatible with the spirit
of our government." The members of the British cabinet, except Canning,
did not object seriously to the system of congresses at fixed intervals,
but to the declarations publicly set forth by them. Canning, on the
other hand, objected to the declarations and to the conferences
themselves, "meetings for the government of the world," as he somewhat
contemptuously termed them.

It had been generally supposed that the question of the Spanish colonies
would come up for discussion at Aix-la-Chapelle. Castlereagh assured the
United States, through Bagot, the British minister at Washington, that
while England would act with the allied powers at Aix-la-Chapelle in
mediation between Spain and her colonies, her mediation would be limited
entirely to the employment of her influence and good offices and that
she would not take any measures that might assume a character of
force.[49]

The revolutions that took place in Spain, Naples, and Portugal in 1820
presented an occasion for another meeting of the allies. In November the
representatives of Austria, Russia, and Prussia met in conference at
Troppau, and issued a circular setting forth what they had already done
for Europe in overthrowing the military tyranny of Napoleon and
expressing the determination "to put a curb on a force no less
tyrannical and no less detestable, that of revolt and crime." The
conference then adjourned to Laybach, where they could, with greater
dispatch, order the movements they had decided to take against the
revolutionists of Naples. Austria, being more intimately concerned with
the political condition of the Italian peninsula than either of the
other two powers, was entrusted with the task of suppressing the
Neapolitan revolution. The Austrian army entered Naples March 23, 1821,
overthrew the constitutional government that had been inaugurated, and
restored Ferdinand II to absolute power. The revolution which had broken
out in Piedmont was also suppressed by a detachment of the Austrian
army.

England held aloof from all participation in the proceedings at Troppau
and Laybach--though Sir Charles Stuart was present to watch the
proceedings. In a circular dispatch of January 21, 1821, the British
government expressed its dissent from the principles set forth in the
Troppau circular.

The next meeting of the allied powers was arranged for October, 1822, at
Verona. Here the affairs of Greece, Italy, and, in particular, Spain
came up for consideration. At this Congress all five powers of the
alliance were represented. France was uneasy about the condition of
Spain, and England had to send a delegate out of self-defense, as her
interests were largely involved. Castlereagh was preparing to depart for
the congress, when his mind gave way under the stress of work and more
remotely of dissipation, and he committed suicide. Canning then became
secretary for foreign affairs, and Wellington was sent to Verona.

The congress which now assembled at Verona was devoted largely to a
discussion of Spanish affairs. Wellington had been instructed to use all
his influence against the adoption of measures of intervention in Spain.
When he found that the other powers were bent upon this step and that
his protest would be unheeded, he withdrew from the congress. The four
remaining powers signed the secret treaty of Verona, November 22, 1822,
as a revision, so they declared in the preamble, of the "Treaty of the
Holy Alliance." This treaty of the Holy Alliance, signed at Paris,
September 26, 1815, by Austria, Russia, and Prussia, is one of the most
remarkable political documents extant. It sprang from the erratic brain
of the Czar Alexander under the influence of Madame Crudner, who was
both an adventuress and a religious enthusiast. Its object was to uphold
the divine right of kings and to counteract the spirit of French
revolutionary ideas by introducing "the precepts of justice, of charity,
and of peace" into the internal affairs of states and into their
relations with one another. No one had taken it seriously except the
Czar himself and it had been without influence upon the politics of
Europe. The agreement reached at Verona gave retrospective importance to
the Holy Alliance, and revived the name, so that it became the usual
designation of the combined powers. The following alleged text of the
secret treaty of Verona soon became current in the press of Europe and
America. Although it has never been officially acknowledged and its
authenticity has been called in question, it states pretty accurately
the motives and aims of the powers. The first four articles are as
follows:

      The undersigned, specially authorized to make some additions
      to the Treaty of the Holy Alliance, after having exchanged
      their respective credentials, have agreed as follows:

      ARTICLE I. The high contracting parties being
      convinced that the system of representative government is
      equally incompatible with the monarchical principles as the
      maxim of the sovereignty of the people with the divine
      right, engage mutually, and in the most solemn manner, to
      use all their efforts to _put an end_ to the system of
      _representative_ _governments_, in whatever country it may
      exist in Europe, and to prevent its being introduced in
      those countries where it is not yet known.

      ART. II. As it cannot be doubted that the _liberty
      of the press_ is the most powerful means used by the
      pretended supporters of the rights of nations, to the
      detriment of those of Princes, the high contracting parties
      promise reciprocally to adopt all proper measures to
      suppress it not only in their own states, but also, in the
      rest of Europe.

      ART. III. Convinced that the principles of religion
      contribute most powerfully to keep nations in the state of
      passive obedience which they owe to their Princes, the high
      contracting parties declare it to be their intention to
      sustain, in their respective states, those measures which
      the clergy may adopt, with the aim of ameliorating their own
      interests, so intimately connected with the preservation of
      the authority of Princes; and the contracting powers join in
      offering their thanks to the Pope, for what he has already
      done for them, and solicit his constant coöperation in their
      views of submitting the nations.

      ART. IV. The situation of Spain and Portugal unites
      unhappily all the circumstances to which this treaty has
      particular reference. The high contracting parties, in
      confiding to France the care of putting an end to them,
      engage to assist her in the manner which may the least
      compromise them with their own people and the people of
      France, by means of a subsidy on the part of the two
      empires, of twenty millions of francs every year, from the
      date of the signature of this treaty to the end of the war.

      Signed by Metternich for Austria, Chateaubriand for France,
      Bernstet for Prussia, and Nesselrode for Russia.[50]

Such was the code of absolutism against which England protested and
against which President Monroe delivered his declaration.

The Congress broke up about the middle of December, and the following
April, the Duc d'Angoulême led a French army across the Pyrenees. By
October the constitutional party had been overthrown and absolutism
reigned supreme once more in western Europe. In England alone was there
still any semblance of constitutional government.

The Congress of Verona was the last of the joint-meetings of the powers
for the discussion of the internal affairs of states. It marked the
final withdrawal of England from the European alliance. Henceforth she
took up a position distinctly hostile to the principles advocated by her
former allies and her policy in relation to Spanish America practically
coincided with that of the United States.

The great majority of the English people sympathized deeply with the
constitutional movement in Spain and were ready to take up arms in
support of the Spanish people. The protest of England having been
disregarded by the powers at Verona, it became necessary for the
cabinet, in view of the preparations going on in France for the invasion
of the Peninsula, to say what they contemplated doing. In February,
1823, Lord Liverpool circulated among his colleagues a minute prepared
by Canning, which gave at length the reasons, military and other, why it
would be unwise for England to undertake the defense of Spain. In the
first place, the war against Spain was unpopular in France, and if Great
Britain should take part in the war, the French government would avail
itself of the fact to convert it into an English war and thus render it
popular. Second, England would have to undertake the defense of Spain
against invasion by land, and her naval superiority would not
materially aid the Spaniards or baffle the French. Third, the
continental powers were committed to the support of France. Fourth,
there was a possibility that the invasion of Spain would be
unsuccessful. Fifth, on the other hand, it might meet with success, in
which event France might assist Spain to recover her American colonies.
Here, he says, England's naval superiority would tell, "and I should
have no difficulty in deciding that we ought to prevent, by every means
in our power, perhaps Spain from sending a single Spanish regiment to
South America, after the supposed termination of the war in Spain, but
certainly France from affording to Spain any aid or assistance for that
purpose." Sixth, in case of the invasion of Portugal by France and
Spain, he thought England would be in honor bound to defend her, in case
she asked for aid. The military defense of Portugal would not be so
difficult as a land war in Spain.[51]

In accordance with this determination Canning dispatched a letter to Sir
Charles Stuart, British ambassador at Paris, March 31, 1823, in which he
spoke of recognition of the colonies as a matter to be determined by
time and circumstances, and, disclaiming all designs on the part of the
British government on the late Spanish provinces, intimated that
England, although abstaining from interference in Spain, would not allow
France to acquire any of the colonies by conquest or cession. To this
note the French government made no reply and England took this silence
as a tacit agreement not to interfere with the colonies. The British
government continued, however, to watch closely the movements of
France.[52]

As the invasion of Spain drew near to a successful termination, the
British government had reason to suspect that the allied powers would
next direct their attention to the Spanish colonies with a view to
forcing them back to their allegiance or of otherwise disposing of them,
that is, by cession to some other European power. It was already in
contemplation to call another European congress for the discussion and
settlement of this question. As this was a subject of vital interest to
the United States, Canning invited the American minister, Mr. Rush, to a
conference, August 16, 1823, in which he suggested the expediency of an
understanding on this question between England and the United States. He
communicated to Mr. Rush the substance of his dispatch of March 31 to
Sir Charles Stuart. Mr. Rush said he understood the import of this note
to be that England would not remain passive to any attempt on the part
of France to acquire territory in Spanish America. Mr. Canning then
asked what the United States would say to going hand in hand with
England in such a policy. Mr. Rush replied that his instructions did not
authorize him to give an answer, but that he would communicate the
suggestion informally to his government. At the same time he requested
to be enlightened as to England's policy in the matter of recognizing
the independence of the colonies. Mr. Canning replied that England had
taken no steps in the matter of recognition whatever, but was
considering the question of sending commissioners to the colonies to
inquire into the condition of affairs. For the present these
commissioners would be sent to Mexico alone.[53]

Mr. Stapleton in his "Life of Canning" simply says that as Mr. Rush was
not authorized to enter into any formal agreement, Canning thought the
delay of communicating with Washington would render such proceeding of
no effect, and so the matter was dropped.[54] This, however, we learn
from Mr. Rush's dispatches, is not the whole truth. Several
communications passed between them after the conversation above given,
which throw a totally different light upon the affair.

In an unofficial and confidential letter to Mr. Rush, dated August 20,
1823, Canning asked again if the moment had not arrived when the two
governments might come to an understanding in regard to the
Spanish-American colonies. He stated the views of England as follows:
(1) That the recovery of the colonies by Spain was hopeless; (2) That
the question of their recognition as independent states was one of time
and circumstances; (3) That England was not disposed, however, to throw
any obstacle in the way of an arrangement between the colonies and the
mother-country by amicable negotiation; (4) That she aimed at the
possession of no portion of the colonies for herself; and (5) That she
could not see the transfer of any portion of them to any other power
with indifference. He added "that if the United States acceded to such
views, a declaration to that effect on their part, concurrently with
England, would be the most effectual and least offensive mode of making
known their joint disapprobation of contrary projects; that it would at
the same time put an end to all jealousies of Spain as to her remaining
colonies, and to the agitation prevailing in the colonies themselves by
showing that England and the United States were determined not to profit
by encouraging it."[55]

Prior to the formal recognition of South America, the United States had
repeatedly expressed the wish to proceed in the matter hand in hand with
Great Britain,[56] but that act placed the United States on an
altogether different footing from England. Canning seemed to forget in
the wording of his proposal that the United States had already, in the
most formal manner, acknowledged the independence of the Spanish
colonies. In reply Mr. Rush reminded him of this fact and of the desire
of the United States to see the colonies recognized by England. In other
respects, he believed that the views unfolded by Mr. Canning in his note
were shared by the United States, but he added that he had no authority
to avow these principles publicly in the manner suggested.

As soon as Rush's first dispatch was received President Monroe realized
fully the magnitude of the issue presented by the proposal of an
Anglo-American alliance. Before submitting the matter to his cabinet he
transmitted copies of the dispatch to ex-Presidents Jefferson and
Madison and the following interesting correspondence took place. In his
letter to Jefferson of October 17th, the President said:

      I transmit to you two despatches which were receiv'd from
      Mr. Rush, while I was lately in Washington, which involve
      interests of the highest importance. They contain two
      letters from Mr. Canning, suggesting designs of the holy
      alliance, against the Independence of So. America, &
      proposing a co-operation, between G. Britain & the U States,
      in support of it, against the members of that alliance. The
      project aims, in the first instance, at a mere expression of
      opinion, somewhat in the abstract, but which, it is expected
      by Mr. Canning, will have a great political effect, by
      defeating the combination. By Mr. Rush's answers, which are
      also enclosed, you will see the light in which he views the
      subject, & the extent to which he may have gone. Many
      important considerations are involved in this proposition.
      1st Shall we entangle ourselves, at all, in European
      politicks, & wars, on the side of any power, against others,
      presuming that a concert, by agreement, of the kind
      proposed, may lead to that result? 2d If a case can exist
      in which a sound maxim may, & ought to be departed from, is
      not the present instance, precisely that case? 3d Has not
      the epoch arriv'd when G. Britain must take her stand,
      either on the side of the monarchs of Europe, or of the U
      States, & in consequence, either in favor of Despotism or of
      liberty & may it not be presum'd that, aware of that
      necessity, her government has seiz'd on the present
      occurrence, as that, which it deems, the most suitable, to
      announce & mark the commenc'ment of that career.

      My own impression is that we ought to meet the proposal of
      the British govt. & to make it known, that we would view an
      interference on the part of the European powers, and
      especially an attack on the Colonies, by them, as an attack
      on ourselves, presuming that, if they succeeded with them,
      they would extend it to us. I am sensible however of the
      extent & difficulty of the question, & shall be happy to
      have yours, & Mr. Madison's opinions on it.[57]

Jefferson's reply dated Monticello, October 24th, displays not only a
profound insight into the international situation, but a wide vision of
the possibilities involved. He said:

      The question presented by the letters you have sent me, is
      the most momentous which has ever been offered to my
      contemplation since that of Independence. That made us a
      nation, this sets our compass and points the course which we
      are to steer through the ocean of time opening on us. And
      never could we embark on it under circumstances more
      auspicious. Our first and fundamental maxim should be, never
      to entangle ourselves in the broils of Europe. Our second,
      never to suffer Europe to intermeddle with cis-Atlantic
      affairs. America, North and South, has a set of interests
      distinct from those of Europe, and peculiarly her own. She
      should therefore have a system of her own, separate and
      apart from that of Europe. While the last is laboring to
      become the domicil of despotism, our endeavor should surely
      be, to make our hemisphere that of freedom. One nation, most
      of all, could disturb us in this pursuit; she now offers to
      lead, aid, and accompany us in it. By acceding to her
      proposition, we detach her from the bands, bring her mighty
      weight into the scale of free government, and emancipate a
      continent at one stroke, which might otherwise linger long
      in doubt and difficulty. Great Britain is the nation which
      can do us the most harm of any one, or all on earth; and
      with her on our side we need not fear the whole world. With
      her then, we should most sedulously cherish a cordial
      friendship; and nothing would tend more to knit our
      affections than to be fighting once more, side by side, in
      the same cause. Not that I would purchase even her amity at
      the price of taking part in her wars. But the war in which
      the present proposition might engage us, should that be its
      consequence, is not her war, but ours. Its object is to
      introduce and establish the American system, of keeping out
      of our land all foreign powers, of never permitting those of
      Europe to intermeddle with the affairs of our nations. It is
      to maintain our own principle, not to depart from it. And
      if, to facilitate this, we can effect a division in the body
      of the European powers, and draw over to our side its most
      powerful member, surely we should do it. But I am clearly of
      Mr. Canning's opinion, that it will prevent instead of
      provoking war. With Great Britain withdrawn from their scale
      and shifted into that of our two continents, all Europe
      combined would not undertake such a war. For how would they
      propose to get at either enemy without superior fleets? Nor
      is the occasion to be slighted which this proposition
      offers, of declaring our protest against the atrocious
      violations of the rights of nations, by the interference of
      any one in the internal affairs of another, so flagitiously
      begun by Bonaparte, and now continued by the equally lawless
      Alliance, calling itself Holy.[58]

Madison not only agreed with Jefferson as to the wisdom of accepting the
British proposal of some form of joint action, but he went even further
and suggested that the declaration should not be limited to the American
republics, but that it should express disapproval of the late invasion
of Spain and of any interference with the Greeks, who were then
struggling for independence from Turkey.[59] Monroe, it appears, was
strongly inclined to act on Madison's suggestion, but his cabinet took a
different view of the situation. From the diary of John Quincy Adams,
Monroe's secretary of state, it appears that almost the whole of
November was taken up by cabinet discussions on Canning's proposals and
on Russia's aggressions in the northwest. Adams stoutly opposed any
alliance or joint declaration with Great Britain. The composition of the
President's message remained in doubt until the 21st, when the more
conservative views of Adams were, according to his own statement of the
case, adopted. He advocated an independent course of action on the part
of the United States, without direct reference to Canning's proposals,
though substantially in accord with them. Adams defined his position as
follows: "The ground that I wish to take is that of earnest remonstrance
against the interference of the European powers by force with South
America, but to disclaim all interference on our part with Europe; to
make an American cause and adhere inflexibly to that."[60] Adams's
dissent from Monroe's position was, it is claimed, due partly to the
influence of Clay, who advocated a Pan American system, partly to the
fact that the proposed coöperation with Great Britain would bind the
United States not to acquire some of the coveted parts of the Spanish
possessions, and partly to the fear that the United States as the ally
of Great Britain would be compelled to play a secondary part. He
probably carried his point by showing that the same ends could be
accomplished by an independent declaration, since it was evident that
the sea power of Great Britain would be used to prevent the reconquest
of South America by the European powers. Monroe, as we have seen,
thought that the exigencies of the situation justified a departure from
the sound maxim of political isolation, and in this opinion he was
supported by his two predecessors in the presidency.

The opinions of Monroe, Jefferson, and Madison in favor of an alliance
with Great Britain and a broad declaration against the intervention of
the great powers in the affairs of weaker states in any part of the
world, have been severely criticised by some historians and ridiculed by
others, but time and circumstances often bring about a complete change
in our point of view. Since our entrance into the great world conflict
several writers have raised the question as to whether the three elder
statesmen were not right and Adams and Clay wrong.[61] If the United
States and England had come out in favor of a general declaration
against intervention in the concerns of small states and established it
as a world-wide principle, the course of human history during the next
century might have been very different, but Adams's diary does not tell
the whole story. On his own statement of the case he might be justly
censured by posterity for persuading the President to take a narrow
American view of a question which was world-wide in its bearing. An
important element in the situation, however, was Canning's change of
attitude between the time of his conference with Rush in August and the
formulation of the President's message. Two days after the delivery of
his now famous message Monroe wrote to Jefferson in explanation of the
form the declaration had taken: "Mr. Canning's zeal has much abated of
late." It appears from Rush's correspondence that the only thing which
stood in the way of joint action by the two powers was Canning's
unwillingness to extend immediate recognition to the South American
republics. On August 27th, Rush stated to Canning that it would greatly
facilitate joint action if England would acknowledge at once the full
independence of the South American colonies. In communicating the
account of this interview to his government Mr. Rush concluded:

      Should I be asked by Mr. Canning, whether, in case the
      recognition be made by Great Britain without more delay, I
      am on my part prepared to make a declaration, in the name of
      my government, that it will not remain inactive under an
      attack upon the independence of those states by the Holy
      Alliance, the present determination of my judgment is that I
      will make such a declaration explicitly, and avow it before
      the world.[62]

About three weeks later Canning, who was growing restless at the delay
in hearing from Washington, again urged Rush to act without waiting for
specific instructions from his government. He tried to show that the
proposed joint declaration would not conflict with the American policy
of avoiding entangling alliances, for the question at issue was American
as much as European, if not more. Rush then indicated his willingness to
act provided England would "immediately and unequivocally acknowledge
the independence of the new states." Canning did not care to extend full
recognition to the South American states until he could do so without
giving unnecessary offense to Spain and the allies, and he asked if Mr.
Rush could not give his assent to the proposal on a promise of future
recognition. Mr. Rush refused to accede to anything but immediate
acknowledgment of independence and so the matter ended.[63] As Canning
could not come to a formal understanding with the United States, he
determined to make a frank avowal of the views of the British cabinet to
France and to this end he had an interview with Prince Polignac, the
French ambassador at London, October 9, 1823, in which he declared that
Great Britain had no desire to hasten recognition, but that any foreign
interference, by force, or by menace, would be a motive for immediate
recognition; that England "could not go into a joint deliberation upon
the subject of Spanish America upon an equal footing with other powers,
whose opinions were less formed upon that question." This declaration
drew from Polignac the admission that he considered the reduction of the
colonies by Spain as hopeless and that France "abjured in any case, any
design of acting against the colonies by force of arms."[64] This
admission was a distinct victory for Canning, in that it prepared the
way for ultimate recognition by England, and an account of the interview
was communicated without delay to the allied courts. The interview was
not communicated to Rush until the latter part of November, and
therefore had no influence upon the formation of Monroe's message of
December 2.[65]

Before the close of the year the British government appointed consuls to
the South American states, and about the time of their departure, an
invitation was sent to the courts of St. Petersburg, Paris, and Vienna
to a conference to be held at Paris to "aid Spain in adjusting the
affairs of the revolted colonies." A copy of this invitation was also
handed to the British ambassador at Madrid, but in such a form as to
leave him in doubt as to whether his government was invited to the
conference or not.[66] While the discussion as to the proposed
conference was going on and before Canning had announced what action his
government would take in the matter, President Monroe's message arrived
in Europe.

Spanish America was not the only part of the western continent
threatened at this time by European aggression. On the 4th of
September, 1821, the emperor of Russia had issued an ukase, in which he
claimed the northwestern coast of North America down to the 51st degree.
This claim was incompatible with the pretensions of both England and the
United States, and was stoutly opposed by them. This was a part of the
territory known as the Oregon country, which continued in dispute
between England and the United States until 1846. In July, 1823, Adams
declared to Baron Tuyll, the Russian minister to the United States,
"that we should contest the right of Russia to any territorial
establishment on this continent, and that we should assume distinctly
the principle that the American continents are no longer subjects for
any new European colonial establishments." This language was
incorporated substantially in the President's message.

The Monroe Doctrine is comprised in two widely separated paragraphs that
occur in the message of December 2, 1823. The first, relating to
Russia's encroachments on the northwest coast, and occurring near the
beginning of the message, was an assertion to the effect that the
American continents had assumed an independent condition and were no
longer open to European colonization. This may be regarded as a
statement of fact. No part of the continent at that time remained
unclaimed. The second paragraph relating to Spanish America and
occurring near the close of the message, was a declaration against the
extension to the American continents of the system of intervention
adopted by the Holy Alliance for the suppression of popular government
in Europe.

The language used by President Monroe is as follows:

      1. At the proposal of the Russian Imperial Government, made
      through the minister of the emperor residing here, a full
      power and instructions have been transmitted to the minister
      of the United States at St. Petersburg to arrange by
      amicable negotiation the respective rights and interests of
      the two nations on the northwest coast of this continent. A
      similar proposal had been made by His Imperial Majesty to
      the government of Great Britain, which has likewise been
      acceded to. The government of the United States has been
      desirous by this friendly proceeding of manifesting the
      great value which they have invariably attached to the
      friendship of the emperor and their solicitude to cultivate
      the best understanding with his government. In the
      discussions to which this interest has given rise and in the
      arrangements by which they may terminate, the occasion has
      been judged proper for asserting, as a principle in which
      the rights and interests of the United States are involved,
      that the American continents, by the free and independent
      condition which they have assumed and maintain, are
      henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future
      colonization by any European powers.[67]

      2. In the wars of the European powers in matters relating to
      themselves we have never taken any part, nor does it comport
      with our policy so to do. It is only when our rights are
      invaded or seriously menaced that we resent injuries or make
      preparation for our defense. With the movements in this
      hemisphere we are of necessity more immediately connected,
      and by causes which must be obvious to all enlightened and
      impartial observers. The political system of the allied
      powers is essentially different in this respect from that of
      America. This difference proceeds from that which exists in
      their respective governments; and to the defense of our own,
      which has been achieved by the loss of so much blood and
      treasure, and matured by the wisdom of their most
      enlightened citizens, and under which we have enjoyed
      unexampled felicity, this whole nation is devoted. We owe
      it, therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations
      existing between the United States and those powers to
      declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to
      extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as
      dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing
      colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not
      interfered and shall not interfere. But with the governments
      who have declared their independence and maintained it, and
      whose independence we have, on great consideration and on
      just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any
      interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or
      controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any
      European power in any other light than as the manifestation
      of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States. In
      the war between those new governments and Spain we declared
      our neutrality at the time of their recognition, and to this
      we have adhered, and shall continue to adhere, provided no
      change shall occur which, in the judgment of the competent
      authorities of this government, shall make a corresponding
      change on the part of the United States indispensable to
      their security.[68]

The President's message reached England while the discussion in regard
to the proposed congress at Paris was still going on. It was received
with enthusiasm by the liberal members of Parliament. Lord Brougham
said:

      The question with regard to South America is now, I believe,
      disposed of, or nearly so; for an event has recently
      happened than which none has ever dispersed greater joy,
      exultation, and gratitude over all the free men of Europe;
      that event, which is decisive on the subject, is the
      language held with respect to Spanish America in the message
      of the President of the United States.

Sir James Mackintosh said:

      This coincidence of the two great English commonwealths (for
      so I delight to call them; and I heartily pray that they may
      be forever united in the cause of justice and liberty)
      cannot be contemplated without the utmost pleasure by every
      enlightened citizen of the earth.[69]

They evidently had reference to the second clause alone, the one
relating to Spanish America. The other clause, the one against European
colonization in America, seems not to have attracted much attention.
Canning, however, saw the bearing of it and objected to the principle it
set forth, which was directed against England as much as against the
allies. He was evidently a little taken aback at the turn his proposal
had taken. The President's message really settled the question before
Canning had announced what action his government would take. Some little
chagrin is apparent in the tone of his letter to Sir William à Court,
British minister at Madrid, December 21, 1823.

      While I was yet hesitating [he says], what shape to give to
      the declaration and protest which ultimately was conveyed in
      my conference with P. de Polignac, and while I was more
      doubtful as to the effect of that protest and declaration, I
      sounded Mr. Rush (the American minister here) as to his
      powers and disposition to join in any step which we might
      take to prevent a hostile enterprise on the part of the
      European powers against Spanish America. He had no powers;
      but he would have taken upon himself to join with us if we
      would have begun by recognizing the Spanish-American states.
      This we could not do, and so we went on without. But I have
      no doubt that his report to his government of this
      _sounding_, which he probably represented as an overture,
      had a great share in producing the explicit declaration of
      the President.[70]

The conference with Prince Polignac here referred to was that of October
9th quoted above. It was not until after the receipt of President
Monroe's message in Europe that Canning framed his answer to the Spanish
communication informing him of the proposed meeting in Paris for the
discussion of the South American question. In that reply he stated to
the Spanish government very fully his views upon the question at issue.
He said that while England did not wish to precede Spain in the matter
of recognition, yet she reserved to herself the privilege of recognizing
the colonies when she deemed it best for her interests and right to
them. He said that these views had been communicated fully from time to
time to the powers invited to the congress and he concluded with the
statement: "It does not appear to the British cabinet at all necessary
to declare that opinion anew, even if it were perfectly clear (from the
tenor of M. Ofalia's instruction) that Great Britain was in fact
included in the invitation to the conference at Paris."[71]

While Canning and Monroe acted independently of each other, the
expression that each gave to the views of his government was rendered
more emphatic and of more effect by the knowledge of the other's
attitude in the matter. Another point to be noted is that Monroe's
message was made public, while Canning's answer was for some time known
only to the diplomatic corps.

The determination of both England and the United States to oppose the
intervention of the allies in South America had the desired effect.
Conferences in answer to the invitation of Spain were held in Paris, but
they were participated in only by the ordinary representatives of the
powers invited, resident in that capital, and their only result was to
advise Spain not to listen to the counsels of England.

All further discussion that took place between England and Spain in
reference to recognition of the colonies by Great Britain was confined
to the status of the revolutionary governments, and upon this point
their views were so divergent that Canning finally announced to the
Spanish government that, "His Majesty would, at his own time, take such
steps as he might think proper in respect to the several states of
Spanish America without further reference to the court of Madrid; but at
the same time without any feeling of alienation towards that court, or
of hostility towards the real interests of Spain."[72]

The French troops continuing to occupy Spain after the time stipulated
by treaty, Canning sought an explanation from France, but without
satisfactory results. He therefore determined at a cabinet meeting held
December 14, 1824, to recognize Mexico and Colombia forthwith. On
January 1, 1825, after the ministers had left England with instructions
and full powers, the fact of recognition was communicated officially to
the diplomatic corps and two days later it was made public. That this
recognition was a retaliatory measure to compensate England for the
French occupation of Spain was understood at the time and was distinctly
avowed by Canning two years later.[73] In a speech delivered December
12, 1826, in defense of his position in not having arrested the French
invasion of Spain, he said:

      I looked another way--I sought for compensation in another
      hemisphere. Contemplating Spain, such as our ancestors had
      known her, I resolved that, if France had Spain, it should
      not be Spain _with the Indies_. I called the New World into
      existence to redress the balance of the Old.

In spite of the great indebtedness of South America to Canning, this
boast falls somewhat flat when we remember that the Spanish colonies had
won their independence by their own valor and had been recognized as
independent governments by the United States two years before Great
Britain acted in the matter.

Mr. Stapleton, Canning's private secretary and biographer, says that the
recognition of Spanish-American independence was, perhaps, the most
important measure adopted by the British cabinet while Canning was at
the head of the foreign office. He sums up the reasons and results of
the act as follows:

      First, it was a measure essentially advantageous to British
      interests; being especially calculated to benefit our
      commerce. Next, it enabled this country to remain at peace,
      since it compensated us for the continued occupation of
      Spain by a French force, a disparagement to which,
      otherwise, it would not have become us to submit. Lastly, it
      maintained the balance between conflicting principles; since
      it gave just so much of a triumph to popular rights and
      privileges, as was sufficient to soothe the irritation felt
      by their advocates at the victory, which absolute principles
      had obtained by the overthrow of the constitutions of
      Spain, Portugal, and Naples; and it dealt a death-blow to
      the Holy Alliance, by disabusing its members of the strange
      fancy, with which they were prepossessed, that the
      differences between them and the British ministers (where
      they did differ) were merely feints on the part of the
      latter to avoid a conflict with public opinion.[74]

The United States government did not relax its efforts in behalf of the
South American states with the recognition of England, but continued to
exert itself in order to secure the acknowledgment of their independence
by the other powers of Europe, particularly Spain.[75] Mr. Clay tried to
get the other members of the alliance, especially the emperor of Russia,
to use their good offices with Spain for the purpose of inducing her to
recognize her late colonies, but the emperor of Russia, the head of the
alliance, continued to preach to Spain "not only no recognition of their
independence, but active war for their subjugation." To the request of
the United States he replied that, out of respect for "the indisputable
titles of sovereignty," he could not prejudge or anticipate the
determination of the king of Spain.[76] It was some ten years before
Spain could be persuaded to renounce her ancient claims.

FOOTNOTES:

[37] Am. St. Papers, For. Rel., Vol. III, p. 538.

[38] Wharton's Digest, Sec. 69, and Moore's Digest of Int. Law, Vol. I,
p. 177.

[39] "Messages and Papers of the Presidents," Vol. II, pp. 13, 58, and
116.

[40] Lyman, "Diplomacy of the United States." 2 Vols. Boston, 1828, Vol.
II, p. 432. Romero, "Mexico and the United States."

[41] Given in full in Am. St. Papers, For. Rel., Vol. IV, pp. 217-270.

[42] Am. St. Papers, For. Rel., Vol. IV, pp. 818-851.

[43] Benton's "Abridgment," Vol. VI, p. 139.

[44] Benton's "Abridgment," Vol. VI, p. 142.

[45] "Messages and Papers of the Presidents," Vol. II, p. 44.

[46] "Adams's Diary," September, 1817, to December, 1818. "Letters and
Despatches of Castlereagh," Vol. XI, pp. 404 and 458.

[47] Stapleton, "Political Life of Canning," Vol. II, p. 10.

[48] Stapleton, "Official Correspondence of Canning," Vol. I, p. 48 ff.

[49] Bagot to Castlereagh, October 31, 1818. Mem. of a Conversation with
Adams. "Letters and Despatches of Castlereagh," Vol. XII, p. 66.

[50] For the Congresses of Aix-la-Chapelle, Troppau, Laybach, and
Verona, see "Letters and Despatches of Castlereagh," Vol. XII; "Life of
Lord Liverpool," Vol. III; "Political Life and Official Correspondence
of Canning"; Chateaubriand's "Congrès de Verone," and W. A. Phillips,
"The Confederation of Europe. 1813-1823." The text of the treaty of
Verona is published in Niles' Register, August 2, 1823, Vol. 24, p. 347,
and in Elliot's "American Diplomatic Code," Vol. II, p. 179.

[51] "Life of Lord Liverpool," Vol. III, p. 231. "Official
Correspondence of Canning," Vol. I, p. 85.

[52] Stapleton, "Political Life of Canning," Vol. II, p. 18.

[53] Rush's "Residence at the Court of London," p. 406.

[54] "Political Life of Canning," Vol. II, p. 24.

[55] Rush's "Residence at the Court of London," p. 412.

[56] "Letters and Despatches of Castlereagh," Vol. XI, p. 458. Bagot's
reports of interviews with Adams.

[57] Hamilton, "Writings of James Monroe," Vol. VI, pp. 323-325.

[58] Ford, "Writings of Thomas Jefferson," Vol. X, pp. 277-278.

[59] Hamilton, "Writings of James Madison," Vol. IX, pp. 161-162.

[60] W. C. Ford, "Genesis of the Monroe Doctrine," in Mass. Hist. Soc.
_Proceedings_, second series, Vol. XV, p. 392.

[61] See especially G. L. Beer, "The English-Speaking Peoples," p. 79.

[62] Rush's "Residence at the Court of London," p. 419.

[63] _Ibid._, pp. 429, 443.

[64] "Political Life of Canning," Vol. II, p. 26.

[65] Rush's "Residence at the Court of London," p. 448.

[66] "Political Life of Canning," Vol. II, p. 33.

[67] "Messages and Papers of the Presidents," Vol. II, p. 209.

[68] "Messages and Papers of the Presidents," Vol. II, p. 218.

[69] "Wharton's Digest," Sec. 57, Vol. I, p. 276.

[70] "Wharton's Digest," Sec. 57, Vol. I, p. 272.

[71] "Political Life of Canning," Vol. II, p. 42.

[72] "Political Life of Canning," Vol. II, p. 54.

[73] "Official Corresp. of Canning," Vol. II, p. 242. Letter to
Granville. On the general question of recognition, see "Life of Lord
Liverpool," Vol. III, pp. 297-304.

[74] "Political Life of Canning," Vol. II, p. 1.

[75] Am. St. Papers, For. Rel., Vol. V, pp. 794-796, and Vol. VI, pp.
1006-1014.

[76] Am. St. Papers, For. Rel., Vol. V, p. 850 ff.




CHAPTER III

THE DIPLOMACY OF THE UNITED STATES IN REGARD TO CUBA


The Cuban question had its origin in the series of events that have been
narrated in the two preceding chapters--the Napoleonic invasion of Spain
and the resulting paralysis of Spanish power in America. The declaration
of President Monroe, enforced by the well-known attitude of England,
dealt the death-blow to Spanish hopes of recovering the Southern
continent. Hence the islands of Cuba and Porto Rico, which had remained
loyal to the king, were clung to with all the greater tenacity as the
sole remains of the imperial possessions over which the successors of
Ferdinand and Isabella had ruled for three centuries. The "Ever-faithful
Island of Cuba" was rewarded for her loyalty by the concession of
certain liberties of trade and invited to send representatives to the
Spanish Cortes--a privilege which was subsequently withdrawn. Spain was
now too weak to protect her two West Indian dependencies--the remains of
her former glory, but her very weakness secured their possession to her.
The naval and commercial importance of Cuba, "the pearl of the
Antilles," made it a prize too valuable to be acquired by any one of the
great maritime powers without exciting the jealousy and opposition of
the others. Henceforth, to borrow the figure of a contemporary
journalist, Cuba was to be the trans-Atlantic Turkey, trembling to its
fall, but sustained by the jealousies of those who were eager to share
the spoils.

The strategic importance of Cuba, commanding to a large extent the
commerce of the West Indies and of the Central American states, and,
what was of vital interest to us, the traffic of the Mississippi valley,
attracted at an early period the attention of American as well as of
European statesmen. In a letter to President Madison in 1809, Jefferson,
in speaking of Napoleon's policy in regard to the Spanish-American
colonies, said:

      That he would give up the Floridas to withhold intercourse
      with the residue of those colonies cannot be doubted. But
      that is no price; because they are ours in the first moment
      of the first war; and until a war they are of no particular
      necessity to us. But, although with difficulty, he will
      consent to our receiving Cuba into our Union, to prevent our
      aid to Mexico and the other provinces. That would be a
      price, and I would immediately erect a column on the
      southern-most limit of Cuba, and inscribe on it a _ne plus
      ultra_ as to us in that direction.[77]

President Madison expressed his views on the Cuban question in a letter
to William Pinkney, October 30, 1810:

      The position of Cuba gives the United States so deep an
      interest in the destiny, even, of that island, that although
      they might be an inactive, they could not be a satisfied
      spectator at its falling under any European government,
      which might make a fulcrum of that position against the
      commerce and security of the United States.[78]

This was the first statement in the evolution of a Cuban policy
consistently adhered to by the United States until the successes of the
Mexican war super-induced larger ideas of the mission and destiny of the
Union.

As early as 1817 fears as to the fate of Cuba were raised in the minds
of the American public by newspaper reports to the effect that England
had proposed a relinquishment of her claim against Spain for the
maintenance of the British army during the Peninsular campaign,
amounting to £15,000,000, in return for the cession of the island.[79]
Reports of this nature were circulated for several months on both sides
of the Atlantic, but the question did not assume any very great
importance until 1819, when the treaty for the cession of the Floridas
to the United States was being negotiated with Spain. It was then
insisted by the British press that the acquisition of the Floridas would
give the United States such a preponderating influence in West Indian
affairs as to render necessary the occupation of Cuba by Great Britain
as the natural and only offset.[80] The Florida treaty was ratified
after some delay, which, however, does not appear to have been caused by
the British government, as was supposed at the time. The British papers,
nevertheless, continued to condemn in strong terms the treaty as well as
the inaction of their government in not making it a pretext for the
seizure of Cuba.

As the preparations of France for the invasion of Spain in 1823
progressed the fate of Cuba became a question of absorbing interest in
America. There was little hope that the island would continue a
dependency of Spain. It was rumored that Great Britain had engaged to
supply the constitutional government of Spain with money in her struggle
with France and would occupy Cuba as a pledge for its repayment. Both
Spanish and French journals spoke of British occupation of Cuba as a
matter no longer to be doubted, and the presence in the West Indies of a
large British squadron, sent nominally for the purpose of suppressing
piracy, seemed to lend color to the reports.[81] The British press was
clamoring for the acquisition of Cuba. The _Packet_ declared: "The
question then comes to this, shall England occupy Cuba, or by permitting
its acquisition by the United States (which they have long desired)
sacrifice her whole West India trade? There can be no hesitation as to
the answer."

The British government, however, officially disclaimed all designs upon
Cuba, but this disclaimer did not fully reassure the American
government, and our representatives abroad were instructed to exercise a
close scrutiny upon all negotiations between Spain and England. In the
spring of 1823 Mr. Forsyth was succeeded by Mr. Nelson at the court of
Madrid. In his instructions to the new minister, which went much beyond
the usual length and were occupied almost exclusively with a discussion
of the Cuban question, John Quincy Adams used the following remarkable
words:

"In looking forward to the probable course of events for the short
period of half a century, it seems scarcely possible to resist the
conviction that the annexation of Cuba to our Federal Republic will be
indispensable to the continuance and integrity of the Union itself." We
were not then prepared for annexation, he continued, "but there are laws
of political as well as physical gravitation; and if an apple, severed
by the tempest from its native tree, cannot choose but fall to the
ground, Cuba, forcibly disjoined from its own unnatural connection with
Spain, and incapable of self-support, can gravitate only towards the
North American Union, which, by the same law of nature, cannot cast her
off from its bosom."[82]

President Monroe consulted Jefferson on the subject of Spanish-American
affairs and the entanglements with European powers likely to arise
therefrom. Jefferson replied, June 11, 1823:

      Cuba alone seems at present to hold up a speck of war to us.
      Its possession by Great Britain would indeed be a great
      calamity to us. Could we induce her to join us in
      guaranteeing its independence against all the world, except
      Spain, it would be nearly as valuable as if it were our own.
      But should she take it, I would not immediately go to war
      for it; because the first war on other accounts will give it
      to us, or the island will give itself to us when able to do
      so.[83]

During the summer of 1825 a large French squadron visited the West
Indies and hovered for several weeks about the coasts of Cuba. This
action on the part of the French government, without explanation,
excited the alarm of both England and the United States and drew forth
strong protests from Mr. Canning and from Mr. Clay. Canning wrote to
Granville, the British minister at Paris, that he could not consent to
the occupation of Havana by France, even as a measure of protection
against possible attacks from Mexico and Colombia.[84] Again some two
months later he wrote:

      As to Cuba you cannot too soon nor too amicably, of course,
      represent to Villèle the impossibility of our allowing
      France (or France us, I presume) to meddle in the internal
      affairs of that colony. We sincerely wish it to remain with
      the mother-country. Next to that I wish it independent,
      either singly or in connection with Mexico. But what cannot
      or must not be, is that any great maritime power should get
      possession of it. The Americans (Yankees, I mean) think of
      this matter just as I do.[85]

The expressions of the United States, as to the designs of France, were
as emphatic as those of England. Mr. Clay declared "that we could not
consent to the occupation of those islands by any other European power
than Spain under any contingency whatever."[86]

In this connection Canning wished to bring about the signature, by
England, France, and the United States, of "ministerial notes, one
between France and the United States, and one between France and Great
Britain, or one tripartite note signed by all, disclaiming each for
themselves, any intention to occupy Cuba, and protesting against such
occupation by either of the others."[87] The government of the United
States held this proposal under advisement, but on France declining, it
was dropped.[88] In 1826 when an attack upon Portugal was feared
Canning advised, in case of such an attack, the immediate seizure of
Cuba by Great Britain as more effective than half a dozen Peninsular
campaigns.[89]

The Cuban question was involved in the long debate on the proposal of
the executive of the United States to send delegates to the congress of
Spanish-American republics assembled at Panama in 1826. This debate
occupied the attention of Congress during the winter and spring of 1826,
and was engaged in with great earnestness. One of the chief objections
to the proposed mission was the fact that the question of Cuba and Porto
Rico would come up and that the United States government had already
committed itself to the foreign powers on that subject. The report of
the Senate committee on foreign relations declared that,

      The very situation of Cuba and Porto Rico furnishes the
      strongest inducement to the United States not to take a
      place at the contemplated congress, since, by so doing, they
      must be considered as changing the attitude in which they
      hitherto have stood as impartial spectators of the passing
      scenes, and identifying themselves with the new
      republics.[90]

The Southern members were united in their opposition to the Panama
mission, and in fact to any closer alliance with the new republics, for
the reason that the latter had adopted the principle of emancipation and
any further extension of their influence would jeopardize the
institution of slavery in the United States. For the same reason they
were opposed to the transfer of Cuba to any other European power. If a
change from its connection with Spain were necessary they favored
annexation by the United States, and meantime they were strongly opposed
to the government entering into any engagement with foreign powers or in
any way committing itself on the Cuban question.[91]

The declaration of Mr. Clay against the interference of England and
France in the affairs of Cuba was consistently adhered to under the
administrations of Jackson and Van Buren.

In 1838-39, the British government dispatched special commissioners to
Cuba and Porto Rico to report on the condition of the slave trade. The
presence of these agents in Cuba gave rise to reports that Great Britain
contemplated revolutionizing the island, or at least occupying it for
the purpose of suppressing the slave trade. The United States gave Spain
to understand that we would not consent to British control in whatever
way it might be brought about. Mr. Forsyth wrote to Mr. Vail, our
representative at Madrid, July 15, 1840:

      You are authorized to assure the Spanish government, that in
      case of any attempt, from whatever quarter, to wrest from
      her this portion of her territory, she may securely depend
      upon the military and naval resources of the United States
      to aid her in preserving or recovering it.[92]

Again, Mr. Webster in January, 1843, wrote to Mr. Campbell, United
States consul at Havana:

      The Spanish government has long been in possession of the
      policy and wishes of this government in regard to Cuba,
      which have never changed, and has repeatedly been told that
      the United States never would permit the occupation of that
      island by British agents or forces upon any pretext
      whatever; and that in the event of any attempt to wrest it
      from her, she might securely rely upon the whole naval and
      military resources of this country to aid her in preserving
      or recovering it.[93]

A copy of this letter was also sent to Washington Irving, our
representative at Madrid to make such use of as circumstances might
require.[94]

During the first period of our Cuban diplomacy the efforts of this
government were directed toward preventing the acquisition of the
island, or the establishment of a protectorate over it, by Great Britain
or France. With the Mexican war, however, and the growing conviction of
"manifest destiny," our foreign policy assumed a much bolder and more
aggressive character, and during the next fifteen years all manner of
schemes for the southward extension of our territory were suggested and
many of them actually undertaken. Cuba became an object of desire, not
only in the eyes of the slave-holding population of the South as an
acquisition to slave territory, but of a large part of the nation,
because of its strategic importance in relation to the inter-oceanic
transit routes of Central America, which seemed the only feasible line
of communication with our rapidly developing interests in California.
Consequently various attempts were made to annex the island to the
United States, both by purchase from Spain and forcibly by filibustering
expeditions.

In June, 1848, under the administration of President Polk, Mr. Buchanan,
secretary of state, wrote to our minister at Madrid, directing him to
open negotiations with the Spanish government for the purchase of Cuba.
After referring to the dangers of British occupation and to the
advantages of annexation, he said: "Desirable, however, as this island
may be to the United States, we would not acquire it except by the free
will of Spain. Any acquisition not sanctioned by justice and honor would
be too dearly purchased." He stated that the President would stipulate
for the payment of $100,000,000, as a maximum price.[95] This offer was
rejected by the Spanish government. The minister of state after several
months' delay finally replied "that it was more than any minister dare
to entertain any such proposition; that he believed such to be the
feeling of the country, that sooner than see the island transferred to
any power, they would prefer seeing it sunk in the ocean."

Under the Whig administration of Taylor and Fillmore no effort was made
for the purchase of Cuba. On August 2, 1849, Mr. Clayton wrote to Mr.
Barringer that the government did not desire to renew the negotiation
for the purchase of Cuba made by the late administration, since the
proposition had been considered by the Spanish government as a national
indignity; that should Spain desire to part with Cuba, the proposal must
come from her.

About this time active preparations were going on for the invasion of
Cuba by an armed expedition under the Cuban patriot Narciso Lopez. On
August 11, 1849, President Taylor issued a proclamation warning all
citizens of the United States against taking part in such expedition and
saying, "No such persons must expect the interference of this government
in any form on their behalf, no matter to what extremities they may be
reduced in consequence of their conduct."[96] A few days later the
entire force of Lopez was arrested by the United States marshal just as
it was on the point of leaving New York.

Nothing daunted, Lopez traveled through the southern and southwestern
states secretly enlisting men and making arrangements for their
transportation to Cuba. Many men of prominence at the South were in open
and avowed sympathy with the enterprise. In the spring of 1850, Lopez
called upon Gen. John A. Quitman, governor of Mississippi, who had
served with great distinction in the Mexican war, and offered him, in
the name of his compatriots, the leadership of the revolution and the
supreme command of the army. Quitman's sympathies were thoroughly
enlisted in the movement, but he declined the honor on account of the
serious aspect of political affairs, particularly what he considered the
encroachments of the federal government upon the rights of the states.
He made liberal contributions of money, however, and gave Lopez sound
advice about his undertaking, insisting that he must have an advance
column of at least 2,000 men to maintain a footing on the island until
reinforcements could go to their aid.[97]

Unfortunately for Lopez he did not follow the advice of Quitman. A
company of volunteers altogether inadequate for the successful
accomplishment of the enterprise was collected at New Orleans. There
Lopez chartered a steamer, the _Creole_, and two barks, the _Georgiana_
and the _Susan Loud_. Three-fourths of the volunteers had served in the
Mexican war. The first detachment comprising 250 men left New Orleans in
the bark _Georgiana_, April 25, 1850, under the command of Col. Theodore
O'Hara. They proceeded to the island of Contoy off the coast of Yucatan
in the territory of Mexico. There they were joined three weeks later by
Lopez and 450 followers in the _Creole_. The entire command, with the
exception of the crews of the two barks and a few others to guard the
stores, embarked in the _Creole_ and effected a landing at Cardenas, but
the natives did not come to the aid of Lopez and after holding the town
for twelve hours he reluctantly reëmbarked and headed for Key West. The
_Creole_ was pursued by the _Pizarro_, a Spanish war vessel, which
steamed into the harbor just as she cast anchor. For a few moments the
Spaniards seemed to be on the point of preparing to open fire on the
_Creole_, but when they saw the United States custom-house officers
take possession of her they changed their minds and left the harbor.

The two barks, which had been left with a small guard at the island of
Contoy, were captured by Spanish warships, taken to Havana, condemned as
prizes and the men put on trial for participation in the Lopez
expedition. As these men had committed no act of hostility against
Spain, and had, moreover, been seized on neutral territory, the United
States government at once issued its protest and demanded their release.
The Spanish government replied that these men had been described as
pirates by the President of the United States in his proclamation
warning citizens against joining the expedition and were, therefore,
beyond the pale of the protection of the United States. After heated
negotiations which lasted several months and seriously threatened the
peace of the two countries, the prisoners were released, but it was
declared to be an act of grace on the part of the Queen and not a
concession to the demands of the United States.[98]

Lopez was prosecuted by the United States government for violation of
the neutrality laws, but escaped conviction and at once set about
organizing another expedition. On August 3, 1851, the third and last
expedition of Lopez, consisting of over 400 men, left New Orleans. After
touching at Key West the steamer proceeded to the coast of Cuba and
landed the expedition at Bahia Honda. The main body under Lopez
proceeded into the country where they had been led to expect a general
uprising of the Cubans. Col. W. S. Crittenden, who had served with
bravery in the Mexican war, was left in command of a smaller body to
bring up the baggage. This detachment was attacked on the 13th and
forced to retreat to the place where they had landed, where about fifty
of them obtained boats and tried to escape. They were, however,
intercepted off the coast, taken to Havana, sentenced before a military
court, and executed on the 16th.

The main body under Lopez was overcome and dispersed by Spanish troops
on the 24th. Lopez was taken prisoner, tried, and executed. Many of his
followers were killed or died of hunger and fatigue and the rest made
prisoners. Upon receipt of this news Commodore Parker was at once
ordered to proceed in a frigate to Havana to inquire into the charges
against the prisoners executed, and the circumstances of their capture,
trial, and sentence. To these inquiries the captain-general replied that
he considered those executed as pirates, that they had been so denounced
by the President of the United States in his proclamation, that he was
not at liberty to furnish a copy of the court records, but would send
them to Madrid and to the Spanish minister at Washington.[99]

When the news of the executions at Havana reached New Orleans the
excitement was intense. The office of the Spanish consul was broken
into, portraits of the Queen and Captain-General of Cuba defaced, the
Spanish flag torn in pieces, and the consul burned in effigy in
LaFayette Square. The consul had to flee from the city for safety and
the property of certain Spaniards residing in New Orleans was destroyed.
A long correspondence ensued between the two governments. The United
States agreed to pay an indemnity for injuries to the public property
of Spain, but not for the destruction of property belonging to Spanish
residents, who were entitled only to the same protection afforded our
own citizens.[100]

A few weeks after the last Lopez expedition the British and French
representatives at Washington notified our government that orders had
been issued to their squadrons in the West Indies to repel by force any
attempts at the invasion of Cuba from any quarter. Our government
replied that such action on the part of England and France could "not
but be regarded by the United States with grave disapproval, as
involving on the part of European sovereigns combined action of
protectorship over American waters."[101]

In order to allay the uneasiness caused by the attempts of filibusters,
supposed to be encouraged or at least connived at by the government of
the United States, the Spanish government requested Great Britain and
France, in January, 1852, to secure the signature by the American
government in conjunction with them of an abnegatory declaration with
respect to Cuba.[102] Accordingly in April, 1852, the British and French
ministers at Washington brought the subject to the attention of this
government in notes of the same date, suggesting a tripartite convention
for the guarantee of Cuba to Spain.[103]

To this proposal Mr. Webster replied in part as follows:

      It has been stated and often repeated to the government of
      Spain by this government, under various administrations, not
      only that the United States have no design upon Cuba
      themselves, but that, if Spain should refrain from a
      voluntary cession of the island to any other European power,
      she might rely on the countenance and friendship of the
      United States to assist her in the defense and preservation
      of that island. At the same time it has always been declared
      to Spain that the government of the United States could not
      be expected to acquiesce in the cession of Cuba to an
      European power.

He reminded them, furthermore, that "the policy of the United States has
uniformly been to avoid, as far as possible, alliances or agreements
with other states, and to keep itself free from national obligations,
except such as affect directly the interests of the United States
themselves."[104]

The matter was again urged upon the United States by the British and
French governments in notes to Mr. Webster, dated July 9, 1852, in which
the indefensibility of the Spanish title to the island and its bearings
upon the neutrality of the proposed Central American canals were dwelt
upon. The death of Mr. Webster postponed for some time the answer of the
United States, but the proposal was finally rejected in a notable
dispatch prepared by Webster's successor, Edward Everett.

With the growth of the slavery conflict, which had now become paramount
to all other questions, the annexation of Cuba had become a party issue,
and the return of the Democratic party to power, in 1853, was hailed by
the southern extremists as a signal for the acquisition of the long
coveted prize. This expectation was further heightened by the
declaration of President Pierce, in his inaugural address, that the
policy of his administration would "not be controlled by any timid
forebodings of evil from expansion," and that the acquisition of certain
possessions not within our jurisdiction was "eminently important for our
protection, if not in the future essential for the preservation of the
rights of commerce and the peace of the world."

William L. Marcy, of New York, was appointed secretary of state and for
the mission to Spain the President selected Pierre Soulé of Louisiana, a
Frenchman by birth and education, who had been exiled for political
reasons. His appointment under the circumstances created unfavorable
comment both in this country and in Europe, and his sojourn of several
days at Paris on the way to his post at Madrid caused the French
government some annoyance. Louis Napoleon advised the court of Madrid
not to receive him, as his views on the Cuban question were well known
to be of a radical character.

In his instructions to Mr. Soulé, July 23, 1853, Mr. Marcy emphasized
the importance of our relations with Spain in view of the rumors of
contemplated changes in the internal affairs of Cuba and of the recent
interposition of England and France. He directed him to try to negotiate
a commercial treaty with Spain favorable to our trade with Cuba, and
pointed out the urgent necessity of allowing a "qualified diplomatic
intercourse between the captain-general of that island and our consul at
Havana, in order to prevent difficulties and preserve a good
understanding between the two countries."[105] The difficulty of
settling disputes arising in Cuba had been the subject of frequent
remonstrances on the part of the United States. The captain-general was
clothed with almost "unlimited powers for aggression, but with none for
reparation." He exercised no diplomatic functions and was in no way
subject to the authority of the Spanish minister at Washington.

Upon the arrival of Mr. Soulé in Spain, he found that Mr. Calderon, the
head of the cabinet, was strongly opposed to any commercial treaty or
agreement which would promote intercourse between the United States and
the dependencies of Spain, and equally averse to allowing the
captain-general any diplomatic powers.[106] Mr. Soulé was by nature
hot-headed and impetuous and could suffer anything sooner than enforced
inactivity. Whatever may have been the intentions of the executive in
sending him, he had come to Madrid for the purpose of consummating the
long cherished scheme of acquiring Cuba. Accordingly, on February 23,
1854, he wrote to Mr. Marcy that the affairs of the Spanish government
were about to reach a crisis, that a change of ministry was imminent,
and that contingencies involving the fate of Cuba were likely to arise
which might be of great interest to the United States. He, therefore,
asked for definite instructions. Relying upon these representations and
upon Mr. Soulé's judgment, Mr. Marcy transmitted in due time the
necessary powers, authorizing him to negotiate with Spain for the
purchase of Cuba, or for its independence, if such an arrangement would
be more agreeable to Spanish pride, in which event the United States
would be willing to contribute substantial aid to the result.

In the meantime, however, the _Black Warrior_ affair had strained the
relations of the two countries almost to the point of rupture. This
case, involving the seizure of an American steamer by Spanish officials
at Havana for an unintentional violation or neglect of custom-house
regulations, was of an unusually exasperating character.

As soon as the department at Washington was fully informed of this
outrage, Mr. Marcy forwarded all the documents in the case to Mr. Soulé
and directed him to demand of the Spanish government a prompt disavowal
of the act and the payment of an indemnity to the owners of the vessel
and of the cargo, the extent of the injury being estimated at $300,000.
On April 8 Mr. Soulé presented a formal demand on the part of his
government. No answer to this note having been received, on the 11th he
repeated his demands much more emphatically, calling for an indemnity of
$300,000, insisting that all persons, whatever their rank or importance,
who were concerned in the perpetration of the wrong, be dismissed from
her majesty's service, and finally declaring that non-compliance with
these demands within forty-eight hours would be considered by the
government of the United States as equivalent to a declaration that her
majesty's government was determined to uphold the conduct of its
officers.

Mr. Calderon replied, on the 12th, that whenever her majesty's
government should have before it the authentic and complete data, which
it then lacked, a reply would be given to the demand of the United
States conformable to justice and right; that the peremptory tone of Mr.
Soulé's note suggested to the government of her majesty "a suspicion
that it was not so much the manifestation of a lively interest in the
defense of pretended injuries, as an incomprehensible pretext for
exciting estrangement, if not a quarrel between two friendly powers." To
this note Mr. Soulé replied that the suggestion made as to the motives
of the United States in seeking redress was "but little creditable to
the candor of her Catholic majesty's government, and comes in very bad
grace from one who, like your excellency, cannot but be aware that the
records of this legation, as well as those of her Catholic majesty's
department of state, are loaded with reclamations bearing on grievances
most flagrant, which have never been earnestly attended to and were met
at their inception with precisely the same dilatory excuses through
which the present one is sought to be evaded."

Meanwhile the aspects of the case were altogether changed by a private
agreement between the Havana officials and the owners of the _Black
Warrior_, by which the ship and her cargo were released. Mr. Soulé
continued, however, according to instructions from Washington, to demand
compensation for the damages sustained by the owners and passengers not
compensated for by the return of the ship and cargo, and also reparation
for the insult to the United States flag. The Spanish government,
however, refused to recognize any ground for reparation after the
restitution of the ship and cargo, and persisted in contradicting,
without the support of any evidence whatever, the facts as presented by
the United States, although they were all certified to in proper legal
form.

On June 24 Mr. Marcy wrote that the President was far from satisfied
with the manner in which our demands were treated by the Spanish
government, but that before resorting to extreme measures he was
determined to make a final appeal to Spain for the adjustment of past
difficulties and for the guarantee of more friendly relations in the
future. Although satisfied with the spirited manner in which Mr. Soulé
had performed the duties of his mission, the President was considering
the expediency of reinforcing the demands of the United States by the
appointment of an extraordinary commission of two distinguished citizens
to act in conjunction with him. He instructed him, therefore, not to
press the affair of the _Black Warrior_, but to wait until the question
of the special commission could be laid before Congress.

During the summer there was a change of ministry in the Spanish
government, which, as was not infrequently the case, was attended with
more or less serious disorders. In August Mr. Marcy wrote that in view
of the unsettled condition of affairs in Spain and for other reasons not
stated, the purpose of sending a special mission had, for the present at
least, been abandoned. Without pressing matters Mr. Soulé was,
nevertheless, to avail himself of any opportunity which might be
presented, of settling the affairs in dispute and of negotiating for the
purchase of Cuba.

Under the same date he proposed to Mr. Soulé the plan of consulting with
Mr. Mason and Mr. Buchanan, our ministers at Paris and London, for the
purpose of overcoming any obstacles that England and France might
interpose. This suggestion led to the celebrated meeting at Ostend and
the so-called manifesto.

In accordance with the instructions of the President, Messrs. Soulé,
Mason, and Buchanan proceeded to make arrangements for the proposed
conference, which was held at Ostend, in Belgium, October 9, 10, 11,
1854. They then adjourned to Aix-la-Chapelle for a week, where the
reports of their proceedings were prepared.

The greater part of the report is taken up with an enumeration of the
advantages that would accrue to the United States from the acquisition
of Cuba, and an elaborate exposition of the ways in which the interests
of Spain would be promoted by the sale. The only specific recommendation
of the report was that a proposal should be made through the proper
diplomatic channel to the Supreme Constituent Cortes about to assemble,
to purchase Cuba from Spain, the maximum price to be $120,000,000. The
report then proceeds to discuss the question, what ought to be the
course of the American government should Spain refuse to sell Cuba? The
ministers declared:

      After we shall have offered Spain a price for Cuba far
      beyond its present value, and this shall have been refused,
      it will then be time to consider the question, does Cuba, in
      the possession of Spain, seriously endanger our internal
      peace and the existence of our cherished Union?

      Should this question be answered in the affirmative, then,
      by every law, human and divine, we shall be justified in
      wresting it from Spain if we possess the power; and this
      upon the very same principle that would justify an
      individual in tearing down the burning house of his neighbor
      if there were no other means of preventing the flames from
      destroying his own home.

The report also recommended that all proceedings in reference to the
negotiations with Spain "ought to be open, frank, and public." This
recommendation, together with the general character of the report,
indicates that its authors were rather bent on making political capital
of the affair at home than on seriously furthering negotiations at
Madrid. As a matter of fact the Ostend Manifesto made Buchanan an
acceptable presidential candidate to the southern wing of the Democratic
party and played no small part in securing for him the nomination in
1856.[107]

The objectionable features of the report were politely but firmly
repudiated by the administration in Marcy's reply to Soulé and Soulé
promptly resigned his mission. This fact was generally overlooked at the
time, while the unfortunate publicity given to the proceedings at Ostend
brought endless censure upon President Pierce and Secretary Marcy.

In spite of the "jingo" policy attributed to the Pierce administration,
the complications arising out of the seizure of the _Black Warrior_ were
not made a _casus belli_, as might easily have been done. After Mr.
Soulé's return to the United States the negotiations were continued by
his successor. The conduct of the officials concerned in the seizure was
disavowed, and the indemnity claimed by the American citizens concerned
was paid. The administration closed on terms of comparative friendship
with Spain, although there were numbers of claims still unadjusted. The
Cuban question figured conspicuously in the campaign of 1856. The
platform of the Democratic party was strongly in favor of acquisition,
while the new Republican platform stigmatized the Ostend manifesto as
the highwayman's plea.

Until the Buchanan administration all negotiations for the purchase of
Cuba had been undertaken on the authority of the executive alone. An
effort was now made to get the two houses of Congress to concur in an
appropriation for this purpose. It was thought that united action on the
part of the legislative and executive branches of the government would
produce some impression on Spain. Accordingly, in his second, third and
fourth annual messages, President Buchanan brought the matter to the
attention of Congress, but his appeal met with little encouragement. In
January, 1859, Senator Slidell, the chairman of the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations, reported a bill carrying $30,000,000, to be placed at
the disposal of the President as a preliminary sum for the purchase of
Cuba.[108]

This report created violent opposition, and in February the bill was
withdrawn by Mr. Slidell at the urgent request of his friends.

The annexationist and filibustering schemes of the decade immediately
preceding the War of Secession were prompted by two motives. The one was
the extension of slave territory, or at least the thwarting of the
schemes of emancipation for Cuba which Great Britain was urging upon the
Spanish government. The other was to secure, by the occupation of this
strong strategic position, undisputed control over the proposed
interoceanic canal routes of Central America and communication by this
means with the new states on the Pacific coast. These motives for
annexation were removed, the one by the abolition of slavery in the
United States, and the other by the construction of the great
transcontinental railroads which established direct overland
communication with the Pacific states. During the period following the
civil war, therefore, our policy was mainly concerned in urging upon the
Spanish government the abolition of slavery in Cuba, the establishment
of a more liberal form of government through independence or autonomy,
and the promotion of more untrammelled commercial intercourse with the
United States.

The abolition of slavery in the southern states left the Spanish
Antilles in the enjoyment of a monopoly of slave labor, which in the
production of sugar, especially, gave them advantages which overcame all
competition. This led to the formation of a strong Spanish party, for
whom the cause of slavery and that of Spanish dominion were identical.
These were known as Peninsulars or Spanish immigrants. They were the
official class, the wealthy planters and slave-owners and the real
rulers of Cuba. On the other hand there was a party composed of Creoles,
or native Cubans, whose cry was "Cuba for the Cubans!" and who hoped to
effect the complete separation of the island from Spain, either through
their own efforts or through the assistance of the United States. Not
infrequently in the same family, the father, born and brought up in the
Peninsula, was an ardent loyalist, while the son, born in Cuba, was an
insurgent at heart, if not actually enlisted in the ranks.

The Spanish revolution of September, 1868, was the signal for an
uprising of the native or Creole party in the eastern part of the
island. This movement was not at first ostensibly for independence, but
for the revolution in Spain, the cries being "Hurrah for Prim!" "Hurrah
for the Revolution!" Its real character was, however, apparent from the
first and its supporters continued for a period of ten years, without
regard to the numerous vicissitudes through which the Spanish government
passed--the provisional government, the regency, the elective monarchy,
the republic, and the restored Bourbon dynasty--to wage a dogged, though
desultory warfare against the constituted authorities of the island.
This struggle was almost coterminous with President Grant's
administration of eight years.

At an early stage of the contest the Spanish authorities conceived it to
be necessary to issue certain decrees which were contrary to public law
and, in so far as they affected citizens of the United States, in
violation of treaty obligations. On March 24, 1869, the captain-general
issued a decree authorizing the capture on the high seas of vessels
carrying men, arms, munitions, or effects in aid of the insurgents, and
declaring that "all persons captured in such vessels without regard to
their number will be immediately executed."[109] By another decree the
estates of American citizens suspected of sympathy with the insurgents
were confiscated.[110] Secretary Hamilton Fish protested against these
decrees so far as they affected citizens of the United States, as they
were in violation of the provisions of the treaty of 1795.

On July 7, 1869, the captain-general issued another decree closing
certain ports, declaring voyages with arms, ammunition, or crew for the
insurgents illegal, and directing cruisers on the high seas to bring
into port all vessels found to be enemies. On July 16 Mr. Fish called
the attention of the Spanish minister to this decree, saying that it
assumed powers over the commerce of the United States that could be
permitted only in time of war; that the United States would not yield
the right to carry contraband of war in time of peace, and would not
permit their vessels to be interfered with on the high seas except in
time of war; that if Spain was at war she should give notice to the
United States to that effect, and that a continuance of the decree or
any attempt to enforce it would be regarded as a recognition by Spain of
a state of war in Cuba. This declaration produced a prompt modification
of the decree so far as it concerned the search of vessels on the high
seas.

As our commercial interests at large, as well as the interests of
individual citizens, were deeply affected by the condition of the
island, President Grant determined at the beginning of his
administration to offer to mediate between Spain and the insurgents.
General Daniel E. Sickles was appointed minister to Spain and his
instructions, under date of June 29, 1869, directed him to offer to the
cabinet at Madrid the good offices of the United States for the purpose
of bringing to a close the civil war then ravaging the island and
establishing the independence of Cuba. Mr. Fish instructed General
Sickles to explain to the Spanish government that he used the term civil
war advisedly, not as implying any public recognition of belligerent
rights, but a condition of affairs that might not justify withholding
much longer those rights from the insurgents.[111] In reply Spain
agreed to accept the good offices of the United States, but on
conditions that were impracticable and unsatisfactory. At the same time
the Spanish government allowed the purport of General Sickles's note
tendering the good offices of the United States to get out, and it was
accepted by the press as indicating the purpose of the United States to
recognize the Cubans as belligerents if its offer of mediation were
refused. No Spanish cabinet could possibly endure the odium of having
made a concession to the Cubans under a threat from an outside power.
The Spanish government therefore requested the withdrawal of the
American note.

After the rejection of the offer of mediation President Grant decided to
recognize the Cuban insurgents and in August, 1869, while on his way
from New York to New England on the Fall River boat he signed a
proclamation of Cuban belligerency which he forwarded to Washington with
a note to Secretary Fish, requesting him to sign, seal, and issue it.
Mr. Fish disapproved of this step, and while he affixed the seal and
signed the document, he did not issue it, but kept it in a safe place to
await further developments. Grant's attention was diverted by Wall
Street speculations in gold and the crisis that followed on "Black
Friday." He failed to notice at the time that the secretary of state did
not carry out his instructions, and later he thanked Mr. Fish for having
saved him from a serious mistake.[112]

For some time the United States had been urging upon Spain the
importance of abolishing slavery in Cuba as a necessary condition to
the complete pacification of the island. During the fall of 1869 Spain
gave repeated assurances to the United States of her readiness to effect
emancipation in Cuba as soon as hostilities should cease, but the
Spanish government could never be brought to enter into any definite
engagement on the subject. In fact as regarded the slavery question the
cabinet of Madrid found itself unable to choose between the horns of the
dilemma. The United States and Great Britain were urging the immediate
abolition of slavery, while the most influential upholders of Spanish
rule in Porto Rico as well as in Cuba were the slaveholders themselves.
The insurgents on the other hand had abolished slavery by a decree of
the assembly of February 26, 1869, promising indemnity to the owners in
due time and providing for the enrolment of liberated slaves in the
army.[113] On January 26, 1870, Mr. Fish wrote to General Sickles:

      It becomes more apparent every day that this contest cannot
      terminate without the abolition of slavery. This government
      regards the government at Madrid as committed to that
      result.... You will, therefore, if it shall appear that the
      insurrection is regarded as suppressed, frankly state that
      this government, relying upon the assurances so often given,
      will expect steps to be taken for the emancipation of the
      slaves in the Spanish colonies.

The British representative at Madrid, Mr. Layard, was instructed to
second the suggestions of the United States minister in regard to the
abolition of slavery in the Spanish colonies.

From the outbreak of the insurrection the Cuban patriots had the
sympathy of the great mass of the American people, and that of the
administration, although the latter was kept within the bounds of public
law and treaty obligation, so as to avoid giving offense to Spain. The
government did all that treaty obligations demanded of it to prevent the
violation of the neutrality laws. Numbers of filibustering expeditions
did, however, escape from American ports, and those that were arrested
at the instance of the Spanish government through its representatives in
this country usually escaped conviction in our courts for want of
evidence.

In June, 1870, the question of granting belligerent rights to the Cubans
was brought before Congress in the form of a joint resolution introduced
into the House. Personally General Grant sympathized with the Cubans and
was disposed to grant them the rights of belligerents, but his judgment
was again overruled by the counsels of Mr. Fish. On June 13, during the
heat of the debate on the question of belligerency, the President sent
to Congress a message embodying the views of the executive. At Mr.
Fish's instance the message took the ground that the facts did not
justify the recognition of a state of war, although Mr. Fish himself had
made use of the term civil war in his instructions to General Sickles.
The Secretary had almost to force the President to sign this message,
though General Grant was afterwards satisfied as to the wisdom of the
measure.[114] The message said in part:

      The question of belligerency is one of fact not to be
      decided by sympathies with or prejudices against either
      party. The relations between the parent state and the
      insurgents must amount, in fact, to war in the sense of
      international law. Fighting, though fierce and protracted,
      does not alone constitute war; there must be military forces
      acting in accordance with the rules and customs of
      war--flags of truce, cartels, exchange of prisoners,
      etc.,--and to justify belligerency there must be, above all,
      a _de facto_ political organization of the insurgents
      sufficient in character and resources to constitute it, if
      left to itself, a state among nations capable of discharging
      the duties of a state, and of meeting the just
      responsibilities it may incur as such toward other powers in
      the discharge of its international duties.

This message provoked a long and animated discussion in the House next
day and sharp criticism on the part of the Cuban sympathizers of the
President's conduct in thus "intruding himself into the House for the
purpose of controlling their deliberations." The debate continued until
June 16, when the resolution passed the House by a vote of 80 to
68.[115] It was taken up by the Senate, discussed and amended, but
finally lost.

The conclusion of an agreement on February 12, 1871, for the submission
to a mixed commission of claims of American citizens arising in
Cuba,[116] took away all our pressing grievances against Spain and for
more than two years our diplomatic relations were on a comparatively
friendly basis. Good feeling between the two countries was further
promoted by the proclamation of the Spanish republic in 1873 and by the
prompt action of General Sickles in extending to it the recognition of
the United States. After striving in vain for more than two years to
reconcile and unite the contending factions of Spain, King Amadeus on
February 11, 1873, abdicated the royal authority and returned to the
nation the powers with which he had been intrusted. The Cortes at once
proclaimed a republic. General Sickles had on January 30 telegraphed to
Washington for instructions in case the republicans should succeed in
their efforts. On the day after the abdication, he received directions
to recognize the republican government when it was fully established and
in possession of the power of the nation. Three days later, in the
uniform of a major-general of the United States army he was given an
audience by the president of the assembly and formally recognized the
republic.

On March 6, Congress by joint resolution, in behalf of the American
people, tendered its congratulations to the people of Spain. It seemed
at last as if our relations with Spain were on a good footing. General
Sickles urged upon the new republican government the abolition of
slavery and the concession of self-government to Cuba.

But such cordial relations did not long continue. On October 31, 1873,
the steamer _Virginius_, sailing under American colors and carrying a
United States registry, was captured on the high seas by the _Tornado_,
a Spanish war vessel, and on the afternoon of the first of November
taken into the port of Santiago de Cuba. The men and supplies she bore
were bound for the insurgents, but the capture did not occur in Cuban
waters. General Burriel, the commandant of the city, summoned a
court-martial, and in spite of the protests of the American consul,
condemned to death at the first sitting four of the passengers, General
W. A. C. Ryan, an Irish patriot and three Cubans. They were shot on the
morning of November 4. On the 7th twelve other passengers were executed
and on the 8th, Captain Fry and his entire crew, numbering thirty-six,
making the total number of executions fifty-three. As soon as news of
the capture reached Madrid, General Sickles called upon President
Castelar and represented to him the difficulties that might arise in
case the ship had been taken on the high seas bearing United States
colors. Upon General Sickles's suggestion the President of the Spanish
republic at once telegraphed to the captain-general to await orders
before taking any steps in regard to the captured vessel and crew.

In accordance with instructions from Mr. Fish, General Sickles on
November 14 protested by note against the executions as brutal and
barbarous and stated that ample reparation would be demanded. The next
day he received from the minister of state an ill-tempered reply,
rejecting the protest as inadmissible when neither the cabinet at
Washington nor that of Madrid had sufficient data upon which to ground a
complaint. On the day this reply was received General Sickles, following
out telegraphic instructions from Washington, made a formal demand by
note for the restoration of the _Virginius_, the surrender of the
survivors, a salute to the United States flag, and the punishment of the
guilty officials. In case of a refusal of satisfactory reparation within
twelve days, General Sickles was instructed by his government, at the
expiration of that period, to close the legation and leave Madrid.

The formal reply to General Sickles's demand for reparation was received
November 18. The Spanish government declared that it would make no
reparation until satisfied that an offense had been committed against
the flag of the United States, and that when so convinced through her
own sources of information or by the showing of the United States, due
reparation would be made.

The representations made at Washington by the Spanish minister were of a
much more satisfactory character than those made to General Sickles at
Madrid. Mr. Fish, therefore, instructed General Sickles to remain at his
post until the 26th, and if no accommodation were reached by that time
he could demand his passports. By the time this dispatch reached Madrid
General Sickles had already asked for his passports, but had not
received the reply of the Spanish government. On the 26th he received a
note from the Spanish minister asking for a postponement to December 25
and promising that if by that time Spain could not show that she had the
right on her side--i.e., that the _Virginius_ was not entitled to sail
under the United States flag--she would comply with the demands of the
United States. General Sickles replied that he could not accept such a
proposal, but that he would inform his government of it and take the
responsibility of deferring his departure.

Meanwhile the Spanish minister at Washington had proposed arbitration,
but Mr. Fish declined to submit to arbitration the question of an
indignity to the United States flag. The minister then asked for a
delay, but Mr. Fish told him that delay was impossible in view of the
approaching meeting of Congress. Unless settled beforehand the question
would have to be referred to Congress. This firm stand brought the
Spanish minister to time and on November 27 a proposition was submitted
and accepted by Mr. Fish, by the terms of which Spain stipulated to
restore the vessel forthwith, to surrender the survivors of her
passengers and crew, and on the 25th of December to salute the flag of
the United States. If, however, before that date Spain should prove to
the satisfaction of the United States that the _Virginius_ was not
entitled to carry the flag of the United States, the salute should be
dispensed with, but in such case the United States would expect a
disclaimer of intent of indignity to its flag.

The Spanish envoy submitted to the state department a large number of
documents and depositions to show that the _Virginius_ had no right to
sail under the United States flag. These were referred to the
attorney-general, and on December 17 he gave his opinion that the
evidence was conclusive that the _Virginius_, although registered in New
York on September 26, 1870, in the name of one Patterson, who made oath
as required by law that he was the owner, was in fact the property of
certain Cubans and was controlled by them. In conclusion the
attorney-general said:

      Spain, no doubt, has a right to capture a vessel, with an
      American register, and carrying the American flag, found in
      her own waters assisting, or endeavoring to assist, the
      insurrection in Cuba, but she has no right to capture such a
      vessel on the high seas upon an apprehension that, in
      violation of the neutrality or navigation laws of the United
      States, she was on her way to assist said rebellion. Spain
      may defend her territory and people from the hostile attacks
      of what is, or appears to be, an American vessel; but she
      has no jurisdiction whatever over the question as to whether
      or not such vessel is on the high seas in violation of any
      law of the United States. Spain cannot rightfully raise that
      question as to the _Virginius_, but the United States may,
      and, as I understand the protocol, they have agreed to do
      it, and, governed by that agreement and without admitting
      that Spain would otherwise have any interest in the
      question, I decide that the _Virginius_, at the time of her
      capture, was without right, and improperly carrying the
      American flag.[117]

This decision was communicated to the Spanish authorities and, according
to the agreement, the salute to the United States flag was dispensed
with, and on January 3, 1874, the Spanish minister, on behalf of his
government, expressed a disclaimer of an intent of indignity to the flag
of the United States. Spain later paid indemnities to Great Britain and
the United States for the families of those who had been executed.

Meanwhile General Sickles offered his resignation by cable in
consequence of certain reports that his conduct had been disapproved.
Mr. Fish replied that such reports were unauthorized, that no
dissatisfaction had been expressed or intimated and that it was deemed
important that he remain at his post. Ten days later, General Sickles
requested that the telegram tendering his resignation and the reply be
published. Mr. Fish declined to do so, as the resignation was
hypothetical. On December 20, General Sickles again tendered his
resignation and it was accepted.

After the settlement of the _Virginius_ affair the government of the
United States addressed itself once more to the task of forcing a
settlement of the Cuban question in general. In his instructions to Mr.
Cushing, who succeeded General Sickles, Secretary Fish expressed the
policy of the administration at considerable length. After reviewing the
main facts of the insurrection which had then lasted more than five
years, with little or no change in the military situation, and after
referring to the rejection by Spain of the offers of mediation made by
the United States at an early day of the trouble, he said:

      In these circumstances, the question what decision the
      United States shall take is a serious and difficult one, not
      to be determined without careful consideration of its
      complex elements of domestic and foreign policy, but the
      determination of which may at any moment be forced upon us
      by occurrences either in Spain or in Cuba.

      Withal the President cannot but regard independence, and
      emancipation, of course, as the only certain, and even the
      necessary, solution of the question of Cuba. And, in his
      mind, all incidental questions are quite subordinate to
      those, the larger objects of the United States in this
      respect.

      It requires to be borne in mind that, in so far as we may
      contribute to the solution of these questions, this
      government is not actuated by any selfish or interested
      motive. The President does not meditate or desire the
      annexation of Cuba to the United States, but its elevation
      into an independent republic of freemen, in harmony with
      ourselves and with the other republics of America.[118]

For some months Mr. Cushing was occupied with the settlement of the
indemnities in the _Virginius_ case. After nearly two years had elapsed
since the instructions above quoted, the Grant administration
determined, in view of the unchanged condition of the Cuban struggle,
to bring matters to an issue and to force, if need be, the hand of the
Spanish government. On November 5, 1875, Mr. Fish addressed a long
letter of instruction to Mr. Cushing. After reviewing the course of the
insurrection, the interests of the United States affected thereby, the
numerous claims arising therefrom, many of them still unsettled, the
persistent refusal of Spain to redress these grievances and the general
neglect on her part of treaty obligations, he concluded:

      In the absence of any prospect of a termination of the war,
      or of any change in the manner in which it has been
      conducted on either side, he (the President) feels that the
      time is at hand when it may be the duty of other governments
      to intervene, solely with a view to bringing to an end a
      disastrous and destructive conflict, and of restoring peace
      in the island of Cuba. No government is more deeply
      interested in the order and peaceful administration of this
      island than is that of the United States, and none has
      suffered as the United States from the condition which has
      obtained there during the past six or seven years. He will,
      therefore, feel it his duty at an early day to submit the
      subject in this light, and accompanied by an expression of
      the views above presented, for the consideration of
      Congress.

Mr. Cushing was instructed to read this note to the Spanish minister of
state. At the same time a copy was sent to General Robert C. Schenck,
United States minister at London, with instructions to read the same to
Lord Derby, and to suggest to him that it would be agreeable to the
United States if the British government would support by its influence
the position assumed by the Grant administration. In the course of a
few days copies of this note were sent to our representatives at Paris,
Berlin, Vienna, Rome, Lisbon, and St. Petersburg, with instructions to
communicate its purport orally, or by reading the note, to the
governments to which they were accredited and to ask their intervention
with Spain in the interests of terminating the state of affairs existing
in Cuba.

As the result of Mr. Cushing's friendly representations and in view of
the President's message discountenancing recognition of either
independence or belligerency, the Spanish minister, Mr. Calderon,
received the communication of November 5 threatening intervention, in
good part, and expressed his intention of answering it after he should
have had time to consider it carefully.

The reply of Great Britain was given to General Schenck in an interview
with Lord Derby on January 25, 1876. It was in substance that he was
convinced that Spain would not listen to mediation, and that the British
government was not prepared to bring pressure to bear upon her in case
she refused; that the Spanish government hoped to finish the Carlist war
in the spring and would then be in a position to put forth its whole
military strength for the reduction of Cuba; in conclusion, therefore,
Lord Derby thought "that if nothing were contemplated beyond an amicable
interposition, having peace for its object, the time was ill-chosen and
the move premature." The answers of the other powers were unsatisfactory
or evasive, none of them being willing to bring pressure to bear upon
the government of young Alfonso, while the Carlist war was on his hands.

The answer of Spain was finally given in the form of a note dated
February 3, 1876, addressed to the representatives of Spain in other
countries, including the United States, communicated to Mr. Cushing
February 19. This answer, written by Mr. Calderon was in good temper. He
stated that the insurrection was supported and carried on largely by
negroes, mulattoes, Chinese, deserters, and adventurers; that they
carried on a guerrilla warfare from their mountain retreats, that Spain
had sufficient forces in the island to defeat them in the field; that
the triumph of Spain would soon be followed by the total abolition of
slavery and the introduction of administrative reforms. The number of
vessels of war and troops in Cuba was enumerated to show that Spain was
putting forth a reasonable effort to bring the rebellion to a close, and
statistics were quoted to show that the trade between Cuba and the
United States, as well as the general trade of the island, had actually
increased largely since the outbreak of the insurrection. Finally he
declared that while individual foreigners had suffered, Spain had done
justice to all claims presented.

In conversation with Mr. Cushing, Mr. Calderon intimated that Spain,
although she would resist to the uttermost armed intervention, might be
willing under certain circumstances to accept the mediation of the
United States in Cuba, and he invited a frank statement of what the
United States would advise or wish Spain to do with regard to Cuba. In
reply to this suggestion, Mr. Fish, after disclaiming on the part of the
United States all intention of annexing Cuba, stated the following
points as the wish of his government:

(1) The mutual and reciprocal observance of treaty obligations, and a
full, friendly, and liberal understanding and interpretation of all
doubtful treaty provisions, wherever doubt or question might exist.

(2) Peace, order, and good government in Cuba, which involved prompt and
effective measures to restore peace, and the establishment of a
government suited to the spirit and necessities of the age.

(3) Gradual but effectual emancipation of slaves.

(4) Improvement of commercial facilities and the removal of the
obstructions then existing in the way of trade and commerce.

In reply to these suggestions Mr. Calderon handed Mr. Cushing a note,
dated April 16, 1876, in which he represented that his majesty's
government was in full accord with Mr. Fish's suggestions.

This assurance on the part of the Spanish government completely thwarted
Mr. Fish's plans, and, together with Lord Derby's reply, put all further
attempts at intervention out of the question.

The substance of Mr. Fish's note threatening intervention appeared
unofficially in the press of Europe and America in December, 1875, and
attracted such general attention that in January the House asked for the
correspondence. In reply Mr. Fish submitted to the President for
transmission the note of November 5, together with a few carefully
chosen extracts from the correspondence between himself and Mr.
Cushing,[119] but nothing was given that might indicate that the United
States had appealed to the powers of Europe to countenance intervention.
As rumors to this effect had, however, appeared in the press, the House
called the next day for whatever correspondence had taken place with
foreign powers in regard to Cuba. Mr. Fish replied that "no
correspondence has taken place during the past year with any European
government, other than Spain, in regard to the island of Cuba," but that
the note of November 5 had been orally communicated to several European
governments by reading the same.[120] This was putting a very strict and
a very unusual construction upon the term "correspondence," to say the
least. The dispatches, notes, and telegrams that pass between a
government and its representatives abroad are the generally recognized
means of communicating with foreign powers, and are always spoken of as
the correspondence with those powers. The whole affair reveals a curious
lack of candor and of courage on the part of Mr. Fish. He was trying to
shield either the administration or himself, and did not wish the
American public to know that he had reversed the time-honored policy of
the state department by appealing to the powers of Europe to intervene
in what had been uniformly treated, from the days of John Quincy Adams
and Henry Clay, as a purely American question.

This correspondence was suppressed for twenty years. On March 24, 1896,
the Senate called for "copies of all dispatches, notes, and telegrams in
the department of state, from and after the note from Secretary Fish to
Mr. Cushing of November 5, 1875, and including that note, until the
pacification of Cuba in 1878, which relate to mediation or intervention
by the United States in the affairs of that island, together with all
correspondence with foreign governments relating to the same topic." On
April 15 President Cleveland transmitted the "correspondence" called
for, which forms a document of 137 pages.[121]

The Cuban struggle continued for two years longer. In October, 1877,
several leaders surrendered to the Spanish authorities and undertook the
task of bringing over the few remaining ones. Some of these paid for
their efforts with their lives, being taken and condemned by
court-martial by order of the commander of the Cuban forces. Finally, in
February, 1878, the terms of pacification were made known. They embraced
representation in the Spanish Cortes, oblivion of the past in respect of
political offenses committed since the year 1868, and the freedom of
slaves in the insurgent ranks.[122] In practice, however, the Cuban
deputies were never truly representative, but were men of Spanish birth
designated usually by the captain-general. By gradual emancipation
slavery ceased to exist in the island in 1885. The powers of the
captain-general, the most objectionable feature of Spanish rule,
continued uncurtailed.

In February, 1895, the final insurrection against Spanish rule in Cuba
began, and soon developed the same features as the "Ten Years' War." The
policy of Maximo Gomez, the insurrectionary chief, was to fight no
pitched battles but to keep up incessant skirmishes, to destroy sugar
plantations and every other source of revenue with the end in view of
either exhausting Spain or forcing the intervention of the United
States. With the opening of the second year of the struggle, General
Weyler arrived in Havana as governor and captain-general, and
immediately inaugurated his famous "Reconcentration" policy. The
inhabitants of the island were directed by proclamation to assemble
within a week in the towns occupied by Spanish troops under penalty, if
they refused, of being treated as rebels. The majority of those who
obeyed the proclamation were women and children who, as a result of
being cooped up in crowded villages under miserable sanitary conditions
and without adequate food, died by the thousands.[123] In the province
of Havana alone 52,000 perished.

Public opinion in the United States was thoroughly aroused by the
execution of policies which not only excited sympathy for the
unfortunate inhabitants of Cuba, but which paralyzed the industries of
the island and destroyed its commerce. American citizens owned at least
fifty millions of property in the island, and American commerce at the
beginning of the insurrection amounted to one hundred millions annually.
Furthermore, numbers of persons claiming American citizenship were
thrown into prison by Weyler's orders. Some of them were native
Americans, but the majority were Cubans who had sought naturalization in
the United States in order to return to Cuba and claim American
protection.

Other Cubans, including many who were still Spanish subjects,
established themselves in American ports and furnished the insurgents
with arms and supplies. On June 12, 1895, President Cleveland issued a
proclamation calling attention to the Cuban insurrection and warning all
persons within the jurisdiction of the United States against doing any
of the acts prohibited by the American neutrality laws. Notwithstanding
all the efforts of the administration, illegal expeditions were
continually being fitted out in the United States, and while the great
majority of them were stopped by port officials or intercepted by the
navy, some of them succeeded in reaching the coasts of Cuba. President
Cleveland's proclamation recognized insurgency as a status distinct from
belligerency. It merely put into effect the neutrality laws of the
United States. It did not recognize a state of belligerency and
therefore did not bring into operation any of the rules of neutrality
under international law. President Cleveland consistently refused to
recognize the Cubans as belligerents. In February, 1896, Congress passed
a joint resolution, by a vote of 64 to 6 in the Senate and 246 to 27 in
the House, recognizing a state of war in Cuba, and offering Spain the
good offices of the United States for the establishment of Cuban
independence. Notwithstanding the overwhelming majority which this
resolution had received, the President ignored it, for it is a well
recognized principle that Congress has no right to force the hand of the
President in a matter of this kind. It amounted merely to an expression
of opinion by Congress.

In April, 1896, Secretary Olney addressed a note to the Spanish minister
in which the United States offered to mediate between Spain and the
insurgents for the restoration of peace on the basis of autonomy. Spain
rejected this offer, claiming that Cuba already enjoyed "one of the most
liberal political systems in the world," and suggesting that the United
States could contribute greatly to the pacification of the island by
prosecuting "the unlawful expeditions of some of its citizens to Cuba
with more vigor than in the past."[124] In his last annual message to
Congress, President Cleveland reviewed the Cuban situation at length
and, in conclusion, declared:

      When the inability of Spain to deal successfully with the
      insurgents has become manifest and it is demonstrated that
      her sovereignty is extinct in Cuba for all purposes of its
      rightful existence, and when a hopeless struggle for its
      reëstablishment has degenerated into a strife which means
      nothing more than the useless sacrifice of human life and
      the utter destruction of the very subject-matter of the
      conflict, a situation will be presented in which our
      obligations to the sovereignty of Spain will be superseded
      by higher obligations, which we can hardly hesitate to
      recognize and discharge.

The McKinley administration, which began March 4, 1897, soon directed
its attention to the Cuban question. It was unfortunate that with this
question rapidly approaching a crisis the State Department was in feeble
hands. John Sherman, the veteran senator from Ohio, was appointed
secretary of state by McKinley in order to make a place in the Senate
for Mark Hanna, who had so successfully conducted McKinley's campaign.
General Woodford was sent to Madrid to succeed Hannis Taylor, and he was
instructed to tender again the good offices of the United States, to
remind Spain of the resolution passed by the previous Congress, and to
warn her that another Congress was soon to assemble.[125] Six days after
the receipt of General Woodford's note the Spanish ministry resigned,
and on October 14 the liberal ministry of Sagasta assumed office. Its
first act was to recall General Weyler, and to appoint General Blanco
to succeed him as governor and captain-general of Cuba. The new ministry
promised to grant autonomy to Cuba, and President McKinley in his
message of December 6, 1897, declared his intention of allowing time for
the new policy to be tested.

It was soon evident that the grant of autonomy had come too late. The
Cubans would no longer be satisfied with anything short of independence.
On January 13, 1898, there was serious rioting in Havana, deliberately
planned as a demonstration against the autonomy scheme, and
Consul-General Fitzhugh Lee cabled his government that it was evident
that autonomy would prove a failure, that he doubted whether Blanco
could control the situation, and that it might be necessary to send
warships for the protection of Americans in Havana. The suggestion as to
warships met with a prompter response than General Lee had expected. The
United States battleship _Maine_ was immediately dispatched to Havana,
where she arrived January 25 and was assigned an anchorage by the port
officials.[126] While she was lying quietly at anchor in Havana harbor,
attention was suddenly diverted from Cuba to Washington by the Dupuy de
Lôme incident. On February 9, 1898, the New York _Journal_ published in
facsimile a letter from the Spanish minister at Washington to a friend
in Cuba which severely criticized President McKinley's policy and
referred to him as "a would-be politician who tries to leave a door open
behind him while keeping on good terms with the jingoes of his party."
The letter was genuine, though surreptitiously acquired, and was of such
a character that it could not be overlooked. When called on for an
explanation, Señor de Lôme admitted having written the letter but
questioned the accuracy of the translation. He claimed that the language
which he had used was permissible under the seal of private
correspondence. When General Woodford, acting under instructions from
Washington, informed the Spanish minister of foreign affairs that the
President expected the immediate recall of Señor de Lôme, he was
informed that the latter's resignation had already been accepted by
cable.[127]

Before the excitement over this incident had subsided, the battleship
_Maine_ was suddenly blown up in Havana harbor on the night of February
15, and two of her officers and two hundred and fifty-eight of her crew
were killed. After a careful examination of witnesses and of the wreck,
an American naval court of inquiry reported that the destruction of the
ship was due to a submarine mine.[128] A Spanish board of inquiry, after
examining a number of witnesses who had seen or heard the explosion,
made a brief report the following day to the effect that the ship had
been destroyed by an explosion in the forward magazine. It is generally
admitted that the American report was correct, but the responsibility
for the mine has never been disclosed.

As soon as the report of the court of inquiry was made public, the
American people, who had displayed great self-control, threw aside all
restraint and the country witnessed an outburst of patriotic fervor such
as had not been seen since 1861. "Remember the _Maine_" became a
watchword, and the demand for war was overwhelming. President McKinley
decided, however, to make one more effort at a diplomatic settlement. He
proposed an armistice between Spain and the insurgents pending
negotiations for a permanent adjustment through the friendly offices of
the President of the United States. In reply the Spanish government made
counter-propositions to the effect that the questions arising out of the
destruction of the _Maine_ be submitted to arbitration and that the
pacification of the island be left to a Cuban parliament. Meanwhile, the
governor-general would be authorized to accept a suspension of
hostilities, provided the insurgents should ask for it and agree to
disarm. This was simply an invitation to the insurgents to submit, in
which case Spain would consider what degree of autonomy was needed or
practicable. The President considered the Spanish reply as a rejection
of his proposal and determined to submit the entire question to
Congress.[129] This meant war, for public feeling in America was at the
highest pitch of excitement, the "yellow" press was clamoring for war,
and it was with the greatest difficulty that the President, who really
wanted peace, had held Congress in check. The message to Congress was
held back a few days in consequence of a telegram from General Lee, who
urged that he be given time to get Americans safely out of Havana.
During this period of delay the representatives of Germany,
Austria-Hungary, France, Great Britain, Italy, and Russia made a formal
appeal to the President for peace, and the Pope persuaded the Queen of
Spain to authorize General Blanco to suspend hostilities. This
concession did not meet fully the American ultimatum and seemed too much
like another play for time. The Spanish minister was, therefore, simply
informed that the President would notify Congress of this latest
communication. President McKinley was later severely criticized for not
giving greater consideration to this note and for merely alluding to it
in his message instead of transmitting it in full. Had he given it
greater consideration, war might have been delayed a few months, but it
would not have been averted, for Spain was not willing to make
concessions that the Cubans at this late date would have regarded as
satisfactory.

In his message to Congress of April 11, 1898, President McKinley
referred to the _Maine_ only incidentally as "a patent and impressive
proof of a state of things in Cuba that is intolerable." He suggested
forcible intervention as the only solution of the question and declared
that it was justified, not only on grounds of humanity, but as a measure
for the protection of the lives and property of American citizens in
Cuba, and for the purpose of putting a stop to a conflict which was a
constant menace to our peace.[130] Two days later the House passed a
resolution by vote of 324 to 19, directing the President to intervene at
once to stop the war in Cuba with the purpose of "establishing by the
free action of the people thereof a stable and independent government of
their own in the island." On the same day the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations reported a resolution demanding the immediate
withdrawal of Spain from the Island of Cuba, but the minority report
urging in addition the immediate recognition of the Cuban republic as
then organized was at first embodied in the Senate resolution by a vote
of 67 to 21. It was feared by members of the Senate that if we liberated
Cuba without first recognizing the so-called republic of Cuba, the
island would inevitably be annexed by the United States. After two days
of hot debate, the Senate reconsidered, and the House resolution
prevailed. On April 19, the anniversary of the battle of Lexington and
of the first bloodshed of the Civil War in the streets of Baltimore, the
fateful resolutions were adopted in the following terms:

      Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
      United States in Congress assembled,

      _First_, That the people of the island of Cuba are, and of
      right ought to be, free and independent.

      _Second_, That it is the duty of the United States to
      demand, and the Government of the United States does hereby
      demand, that the Government of Spain at once relinquish its
      authority and government in the island of Cuba, and withdraw
      its land and naval forces from Cuban waters.

      _Third_, That the President of the United States be, and he
      hereby is, directed and empowered to use the entire land and
      naval forces of the United States, and to call into the
      actual service of the United States the militia of the
      several States to such extent as may be necessary to carry
      these resolutions into effect.

      _Fourth_, That the United States hereby disclaims any
      disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty,
      jurisdiction, or control over said island except for the
      pacification thereof, and asserts its determination, when
      that is accomplished, to leave the government and control of
      the island to its people.[131]

As soon as these resolutions were approved by the President, the Spanish
minister asked for his passports, thus severing diplomatic relations,
and Woodford was directed to leave Madrid. The North Atlantic Squadron,
then at Key West under command of Rear-Admiral William T. Sampson, was
immediately ordered to blockade the northern coast of Cuba, and
Commodore George Dewey was ordered from Hong Kong to Manila Bay for the
purpose of capturing or destroying the Spanish fleet. During the war
that followed, foreign public opinion, outside of England, was decidedly
hostile to the United States, but in the face of the victories of
Santiago and Manila Bay this sentiment underwent a marked change, and
Spain abandoned whatever hopes she had cherished of European
intervention. By the end of July, 1898, the American as well as the
European press was beginning to ask why the war should not be brought to
a close.

After the surrender of Santiago General Miles embarked for Porto Rico
with a force of 16,000 men, and in a two-weeks' campaign overran most of
that island with the loss of three killed and forty wounded. A large
number of troops had also been sent to the Philippines. It was evident,
therefore, that while the war had been undertaken for the liberation of
Cuba, the United States did not feel under any obligation to confine its
military operations to that island. Having met all the demands of honor,
Spain asked the French government to authorize the French ambassador at
Washington to arrange with the President of the United States the
preliminary terms of peace. The negotiations begun on July 26 resulted
in the protocol of August 12, in which Spain agreed to the following
demands: first, the immediate evacuation of Cuba and the relinquishment
of Spanish sovereignty; second, the cession of Porto Rico and one of
the Ladrones by way of indemnity; and third, the occupation by the
United States of "the city, bay and harbor of Manila pending the
conclusion of a treaty of peace which shall determine the control,
disposition, and government of the Philippines."[132]

By the terms of the protocol Paris was selected as the place of meeting
for the peace commissioners, and here negotiations were opened on
October 1. The United States delegation was composed of William R. Day,
who resigned the office of Secretary of State to head the mission;
Cushman K. Davis, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations;
William P. Frye, President _pro tem_ of the Senate; Senator George Gray
of Delaware; and Whitelaw Reid, editor of the New York _Tribune_; with
John Bassett Moore, Assistant Secretary of State, as Secretary. An
entire month was taken up with the Cuban question, the Spanish
commissioners striving in vain to saddle the Cuban debt either on the
United States or on the people of Cuba. The Philippine question occupied
most of the next month. When the commissioners were appointed, President
McKinley had not fully made up his mind on this important question. His
first intention seems to have been to retain the bay and city of Manila
as a naval base and a part or possibly the whole of Luzon. Public
sentiment in the United States in favor of acquiring the whole group
made rapid headway, and after an extended trip through the South and
West, during which he sounded opinion on this question, the President
instructed the commissioners to demand the entire group. The
commissioners were later authorized to offer $20,000,000 for the
cession. This offer, which was recognized by the Spanish commissioners
as an ultimatum, was finally accepted under protest. On other points the
United States secured what had been demanded in the protocol, and the
treaty was signed December 10, 1898.[133]

The treaty was submitted to the Senate January 4, 1899, and precipitated
a memorable debate which lasted until February 6. The principal
opposition came from Senator Hoar of Massachusetts, who declared that
the proposal to acquire and govern the Philippine Islands was in
violation of the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and the
whole spirit of American institutions. The treaty could not be ratified
without the aid of Democrats, and the result was in doubt when Bryan
went to Washington and advised his friends in the Senate to vote for
ratification, saying that the status of the Philippines could be
determined in the next presidential campaign. The outbreak of
hostilities between the Filipinos and the American troops occupying
Manila put an end to the debate, and on February 6 the treaty was
ratified.

When the United States demanded the withdrawal of Spain from Cuba, it
was with the declaration that "The United States hereby disclaims any
disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or
control over said island except for the pacification thereof, and
asserts its determination, when that is accomplished, to leave the
government and control of the island to its people." Never has a pledge
made by a nation under such circumstances been more faithfully carried
out. The administration of Cuba during the period of American military
occupation was a model of its kind. General Leonard Wood, the military
governor, and his associates found the cities and towns crowded with
refugees and reconcentrados, and governmental affairs in a state of the
utmost confusion. They established order, relieved distress, organized
hospitals and charitable institutions, undertook extensive public works,
reorganized the system of public schools, and put Havana, Santiago, and
other cities in a sanitary condition. In a hospital near Havana Major
Walter Reed, a surgeon in the United States army, demonstrated the fact
that yellow fever is transmitted by the bite of a mosquito. This
discovery was at once put to the test in Havana, and the city was
rendered free from yellow fever for the first time in one hundred and
forty years.[134]

In the organization of a government for the island, the first step was
to take a census of the inhabitants, determine the proper basis of
suffrage, and hold municipal elections for the purpose of organizing
local government. This work having been successfully accomplished, a
constitutional convention, summoned by General Wood, convened in the
city of Havana, November 5, 1900. By February 21, 1901, the convention
had agreed upon a constitution modelled in general after that of the
United States. The new constitution provided for the recognition of the
public debts contracted by the insurgent government, but was silent on
the subject of future relations with the United States. This subject had
been brought to the attention of the convention early in February by
General Wood, who had submitted for incorporation in the constitution
certain provisions which had been drafted in Washington. The convention
objected to these proposals on the ground that they impaired the
independence and sovereignty of the island, and that it was their duty
to make Cuba "independent of every other nation, the great and noble
American nation included."

The United States, however, had no intention of withdrawing from the
island until this matter was satisfactorily adjusted. A provision, known
as the Platt Amendment, was therefore inserted in the army appropriation
bill of March 2, 1901, directing the President to leave the control of
the island to its people so soon as a government should be established
under a constitution which defined the future relations with the United
States substantially as follows:

      I. That the government of Cuba shall never enter into any
      treaty or other compact with any foreign power or powers
      which will impair or tend to impair the independence of
      Cuba, nor in any manner authorize or permit any foreign
      power or powers to obtain by colonization or for military or
      naval purposes or otherwise, lodgment in or control over any
      portion of said island.

      II. That said government shall not assume or contract any
      public debt, to pay the interest upon which, and to make
      reasonable sinking fund provision for the ultimate discharge
      of which, the ordinary revenues of the island, after
      defraying the current expenses of government shall be
      inadequate.

      III. That the government of Cuba consents that the United
      States may exercise the right to intervene for the
      preservation of Cuban independence, the maintenance of a
      government adequate for the protection of life, property,
      and individual liberty, and for discharging the obligations
      with respect to Cuba imposed by the treaty of Paris on the
      United States, now to be assumed and undertaken by the
      government of Cuba.

      IV. That all acts of the United States in Cuba during its
      military occupancy thereof are ratified and validated, and
      all lawful rights acquired thereunder shall be maintained
      and protected.

      V. That the government of Cuba will execute, and as far as
      necessary extend, the plans already devised or other plans
      to be mutually agreed upon, for the sanitation of the cities
      of the island....

      VI. That the Isle of Pines shall be omitted from the
      proposed constitutional boundaries of Cuba, the title
      thereto being left to future adjustment by treaty.

      VII. That to enable the United States to maintain the
      independence of Cuba, and to protect the people thereof, as
      well as for its own defense, the government of Cuba will
      sell or lease to the United States lands necessary for
      coaling or naval stations at certain specified points, to be
      agreed upon with the President of the United States.

      VIII. That by way of further assurance the government of
      Cuba will embody the foregoing provisions in a permanent
      treaty with the United States.[135]

These articles, with the exception of the fifth, which was proposed by
General Leonard Wood, were carefully drafted by Elihu Root, at that time
Secretary of War, discussed at length by President McKinley's cabinet,
and entrusted to Senator Platt of Connecticut, who offered them as an
amendment to the army appropriation bill. In order to allay doubts
expressed by members of the convention in regard to the third article,
General Wood was authorized by Secretary Root to state officially that
the intervention described in this article did not mean intermeddling in
the affairs of the Cuban government, but formal action on the part of
the United States, based upon just and substantial grounds. With this
assurance the convention adopted the Platt amendment June 12, 1901, and
added it as an appendix to the constitution.

On May 20, 1902, Tomas Estrada Palma was inaugurated as first president
of the Republic of Cuba, and General Wood handed over to him the
government of the island.[136] The Americans left a substantial balance
in the Cuban treasury. The total receipts for the entire period were
$57,197,140.80, and the expenditures $55,405,031.28. The customs
service, which furnished the principal part of the revenues during the
period of military occupation, was ably administered by General Tasker
H. Bliss.[137]

While the Platt amendment determined the political relations that were
to exist between Cuba and the United States, there had been no agreement
on the subject of commercial relations. The sugar industry, which had
been almost destroyed by the insurrection, was dependent upon the
willingness of the United States to arrange for a reduction of its
tariff in favor of the Cuban product. Otherwise Cuban sugar could not
compete with the bounty-fed beet sugar of Europe or with the sugars of
Porto Rico and Hawaii, which were now admitted to the American market
free of duty. President Roosevelt had hoped to settle this question
before the withdrawal of American troops, and he had urged upon Congress
the expediency of providing for a substantial reduction in tariff duties
on Cuban imports into the United States, but a powerful opposition,
composed of the beet-sugar growers of the North and West and of the
cane-sugar planters of Louisiana, succeeded in thwarting for two years
the efforts of the administration to do justice to Cuba. All attempts to
get a bill through Congress failed.[138]

In the meantime a reciprocity convention was agreed upon in the ordinary
diplomatic way December 11, 1902, under which Cuban products were to be
admitted to the United States at a reduction of twenty per cent. As the
Senate failed to act on this treaty before the 4th of March, 1903,
President Roosevelt convened an extra session of the Senate which
ratified the treaty with amendments, and with the very unusual provision
that it should not go into effect until approved by Congress. As the
House was not then in session, this meant that the treaty had to go over
until the fall. The Cuban situation grew so bad that the President
finally convened Congress in extra session November 9, 1903. In a
special message he urged prompt action on the treaty on the ground that
the Platt amendment had brought the island of Cuba within our system of
international policy, and that it necessarily followed that it must also
to a certain degree come within the lines of our economic policy. The
House passed the bill approving the treaty November 19 by the
overwhelming vote of 335 to 21, but the Senate, although it had already
ratified the treaty, permitted the extra session to expire without
passing the measure which was to give the treaty effect. When the new
session began December 7, the Cuban treaty bill was made the special
order in the Senate until December 16, when the final vote was taken
and it passed. Under the reciprocity treaty commercial relations with
Cuba were established on a firm basis and the volume of trade increased
rapidly.

In August, 1906, President Palma was reëlected for another term, but the
Cubans had not learned the primary lesson of democracy, submission to
the will of the majority, and his opponents at once began an
insurrectionary movement which had for its object the overthrow of his
government. About the middle of September President Roosevelt sent
Secretary Taft to Havana for the purpose of reconciling the contending
factions, but Mr. Taft's efforts proved unavailing and President Palma
resigned. When the Cuban Congress assembled, it was found impossible to
command a quorum. Under these circumstances Secretary Taft assumed
control of affairs on September 29 and proclaimed a provisional
government for the restoration of order and the protection of life and
property. A body of United States troops under command of General
Franklin Bell was sent to Cuba to preserve order and to uphold the
provisional government. On October 3, 1906, Secretary Taft was relieved
of the duties of provisional governor in order that he might resume his
duties in Washington, and Charles E. Magoon was appointed to take his
place at Havana.[139] In his message to Congress December 3, 1906,
President Roosevelt declared that while the United States had no desire
to annex Cuba, it was "absolutely out of the question that the island
should continue independent" if the "insurrectionary habit" should
become "confirmed." The second period of American occupation lasted a
little over two years, when the control of the government was again
restored to the people of the island and the American troops were
withdrawn.

FOOTNOTES:

[77] H. A. Washington, "Writings of Thomas Jefferson," Vol. V, p. 443.

[78] "Madison's Works," Vol. II, p. 488.

[79] Niles's "Register," under date November 8, 1817.

[80] For a full discussion of the question see the pamphlet by J.
Freeman Rattenbury, entitled, "The Cession of the Floridas to the United
States of America and the Necessity of Acquiring the Island of Cuba by
Great Britain." London, 1819.

[81] Niles's "Register," March and April, 1823.

[82] H. Ex. Doc. No. 121, Thirty-second Cong., First Sess.; also Brit.
and For. St. Pap., Vol. XLIV, pp. 114-236.

[83] H. A. Washington, "Writings of Jefferson," Vol. VII, p. 288.

[84] "Official Corresp. of Canning," Vol. I, p. 265.

[85] _Ibid._, Vol. I, p. 275.

[86] Am. St. Pap., For. Rel., Vol. V, p. 855. Also "Wharton's Digest,"
Sec. 60.

[87] Stapleton, "Political Life of Canning," Vol. III, p. 154.

[88] Mr. Clay to Mr. King, October 25, "Wharton's Digest," Sec. 60.

[89] Canning to Earl of Liverpool, October 6, 1826.

[90] Am. St. Pap., For. Rel., Vol. V, p. 863.

[91] Benton's "Abridgment," Vol. VIII, pp. 427, 428, and Vol. IX, pp.
90, 218.

[92] H. Ex. Doc. No. 121, Thirty-second Cong., First Sess.; also
"Wharton's Digest," Sec. 60.

[93] "Wharton's Digest," Sec. 60.

[94] Mr. Upshur, who succeeded Mr. Webster as secretary of state, wrote
to Mr. Irving to the same effect, October 10, 1843.

[95] Mr. Buchanan to Mr. Saunders, June 17, 1848. H. Ex. Doc. No. 121,
Thirty-second Cong., First Sess.; also Brit. and For. St. Pap., Vol.
XXVI.

[96] "Messages and Papers of the Presidents," Vol. V, p. 7.

[97] J. F. H. Claiborne, "Life and Corresp. of John A. Quitman," Vol.
II. pp. 55-56, and Appendix, p. 385.

In June the Grand Jury of the United States Circuit Court at New Orleans
found a bill against John A. Quitman, John Henderson, Governor of
Louisiana, and others, for setting on foot the invasion of Cuba.
Quitman's view of state sovereignty did not admit the right of the
United States Courts to proceed against the chief executive of a
sovereign state. He sought the advice of friends throughout the South as
to what course he should pursue. None of them admitted the right of the
United States Courts to indict him and several of them advised him that
it was his duty to assert the principle of state sovereignty even to the
point of calling out the state militia to protect him against arrest.
Others advised him to submit under protest so as to avoid an open
breach. This course was finally adopted, and when the United States
marshal appeared on the 3rd of February, 1851, to take him into custody,
he yielded, causing at the same time an address to be issued to the
people of Mississippi, in which he resigned the office of governor.
After proceedings which lasted two months, Henderson was acquitted and
the charges against Quitman and the others dismissed.

[98] Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 41, Thirty-first Cong., Second Sess.

[99] H. Ex. Doc. No. 1, Thirty-second Cong., First Sess.; also 2d Annual
Message of Fillmore, December 2, 1851. "Messages and Papers of the
Presidents" Vol. V, p. 113.

[100] H. Ex. Doc. No. 1, Thirty-second Cong., First Sess.

[101] Mr. Crittenden to Comte de Sartiges, October 22, 1851. See also
Pres. Fillmore to Mr. Webster and Mr. Webster's reply. 2 Curtis's "Life
of Webster," p. 551.

[102] Brit. and For. St. Pap., Vol. XLIV, Lord Howden to Earl Granville,
January 9, 1852.

[103] Comte de Sartiges to Mr. Webster, April 23, 1852. Sen. Ex. Doc.
No. 13, Thirty-second Cong., Second Sess.

[104] Mr. Webster to Comte de Sartiges, April 29, 1852. To Mr. Crampton,
same date, to same effect.

[105] H. Ex. Doc. No. 93, Thirty-third Cong., Second Sess., p. 3.

[106] Mr. Soulé to Mr. Marcy, November 10, and December 23, 1853, and
January 20, 1854.

[107] The correspondence relating to the _Black Warrior_ case and to the
Ostend conference is contained in H. Ex. Doc. No. 93, Thirty-third
Cong., Second Sess.

[108] Sen. Report No. 351, Thirty-fifth Cong., Second Sess., Vol. I.

[109] Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 7, Forty-first Cong., Second Sess.

[110] _Ibid._

[111] House Ex. Doc. No. 160, Forty-first Cong., Second Sess.

[112] C. F. Adams, "The Treaty of Washington," in "Lee at Appomattox and
Other Papers," p. 119.

[113] Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 113, Forty-first Cong., Second Sess.

[114] Private journal of Mr. Fish, quoted by Prof. J. B. Moore in the
_Forum_, May, 1896.

[115] Congressional Globe, Forty-first Cong., Second Sess., p. 4438.

[116] "Treaties and Conventions of the United States" (Malloy's Ed.),
Vol. II, p. 1661.

[117] The correspondence relating to the case of the _Virginius_ is in
Foreign Relations for the years 1874, 1875, and 1876.

[118] Foreign Relations, 1874-75, p. 859.

[119] House Ex. Doc. No. 90, Forty-fourth Cong., First Sess.

[120] House Ex. Doc. No. 100, Forty-fourth Cong., First Sess.

[121] Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 213, Fifty-fourth Cong., First Sess.

[122] Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 79, Forty-fifth Cong., Second Sess.

[123] Sen. Doc. No. 25, p. 125, Fifty-eighth Cong., Second Sess.

[124] Spanish Dipl. Corresp. and Docs. (translation, Washington, 1905),
pp. 7, 8.

[125] Foreign Relations, 1898, p. 568.

[126] Foreign Relations, 1898, p. 1025.

[127] Foreign Relations, 1898, pp. 1007-1020.

[128] Sen. Doc. No. 207, Fifty-fifth Cong., Second Sess.

[129] Foreign Relations, 1898, p. 731.

[130] Richardson, "Messages and Papers of the Presidents," Vol. X, p.
147.

[131] "U. S. Statutes at Large," Vol. XXX, p. 738.

[132] Spanish Dipl. Corresp. and Docs., p. 206; Foreign Relations, 1898,
p. 819.

[133] Senate Doc. No. 62, Fifty-Fifth Cong., Third Sess.

[134] Report of the Military Governor of Cuba, 8 vols., 1901.

[135] U. S. Statues at Large, Vol. XXXI, p. 897.

[136] Documentary History of the Inauguration of the Cuban Government,
in Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1902, Appendix A.

[137] Documentary History of the Inauguration of the Cuban Government,
in Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1902, Appendix B.

[138] Senate Docs. Nos. 405 and 679, Fifty-Seventh Cong., First Sess.

[139] Secretary Taft's report on the Cuban situation was sent to
Congress December 17, 1906.




CHAPTER IV

THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE PANAMA CANAL


The cutting of the isthmus between North and South America was the dream
of navigators and engineers from the time when the first discoverers
ascertained that nature had neglected to provide a passage. Yet the new
continent which so unexpectedly blocked the way of Columbus in his
search for the Indies opposed for centuries an insurmountable barrier to
the commerce of the East and the West. The piercing of the isthmus
always seemed a perfectly feasible undertaking, but the difficulties in
the way proved greater than at first sight appeared. There were (1) the
physical or engineering problems to be solved, and (2) the diplomatic
complications regarding the control of the canal in peace and its use in
war. The weakness of the Spanish-American states, whose territories
embraced the available routes, and their recognized inability either to
construct or protect a canal made what might otherwise have been merely
a question of domestic economy one of grave international import. In
this respect, as in others, the problem presented the same features as
the Suez canal. To meet these difficulties three plans were successively
developed during the nineteenth century: (1) a canal constructed by a
private corporation under international control, (2) a canal constructed
by a private corporation under the exclusive control of the United
States, and (3) a canal constructed, owned, operated, and controlled by
the United States as a government enterprise. The Clayton-Bulwer treaty
provided for the construction of a canal in accordance with the first
plan; several unsuccessful attempts were made to raise the necessary
capital under the second plan; while the third plan was the one under
which the gigantic task was actually accomplished.

The comparative merits of the Nicaragua and Panama routes long divided
the opinion of experts. American engineers generally favored that
through Nicaragua. The length of the Nicaragua route, from Greytown on
the Atlantic to Brito on the Pacific by way of the San Juan river and
through Lake Nicaragua, is about 170 miles. The elevation of the lake
above the sea is about 110 feet. Its western shore is only twelve miles
from the Pacific, with an intervening divide 154 feet above the sea.
From the southeast corner of the lake flows the San Juan river, 120
miles to the Atlantic, with an average fall of about 10 inches to the
mile. The serious objections to this route are: (1) the lack of harbors
at the terminals, Brito being a mere indentation on the coast, rendering
the construction of immense breakwaters necessary, while at Greytown the
San Juan broadens out into a delta that would require extensive
dredging; and (2) the enormous rainfall at Greytown, exceeding that
known anywhere else on the western continent--nearly 25 feet.

The Panama route from Colon on the Atlantic to Panama on the Pacific is
about 50 miles in length, with a natural elevation nearly double that of
Nicaragua. There are natural harbors at each end which are capacious and
able to accommodate the heaviest shipping. The Panama Railroad, built
along the line of the proposed canal, in 1850-55, gave this route an
additional advantage. There were, however, certain disadvantages: (1)
the unhealthfulness of the vicinity, rendering labor scarce and
inefficient; (2) the heavy rainfall, 10 to 12 feet at Colon; and (3) the
treacherous character of the geologic structure, due to its volcanic
origin, through which the cut had to be made. The impossibility of
making even approximate estimates of the cost of the work in such a
deadly climate and through such an uncertain geologic formation was one
of the greatest difficulties to be overcome. The De Lesseps plan
provided for an open cut throughout at the sea-level, at an estimated
cost of $170,000,000. The work was begun in 1884 and prosecuted until
1888, when the gigantic scheme collapsed, after the company had expended
about $300,000,000 and accomplished less than one-third of the work.

Great as the engineering problems of the various canal schemes have been
shown to be, the importance to the world's commerce of the object in
view would, in all probability, have led to their solution and to the
construction of a canal long before the United States undertook the
Panama enterprise, had it not been for difficulties of an altogether
different character, complications arising out of the question as to the
status of the canal in international law. The diplomatic difficulties in
the case of an interoceanic canal are very great. It cannot be regarded
as a natural strait, like the Dardanelles, the Danish Belts, or the
Straits of Magellan, which were for a long time held under exclusive
jurisdiction, but are now free to all nations. Nor, on the other hand,
could an isthmian canal be compared to the Kiel canal, which is within
the territory of Germany, and which, although open to commerce, was
specially designed to meet the needs of the German navy. Such canals as
this are built by the capital of the country through which they pass,
and are protected and controlled by its government.

No one of the republics to the south of us, through whose territory it
was proposed to build a canal, could raise the capital for its
construction or insure its protection when completed. No company
chartered by one of these governments could have raised the necessary
capital without some further guarantee. Hence it was that all companies
organized for this purpose had to secure their charters from some more
powerful nation, such as the United States or France, and their
concessions from one of the Central American states. This rendered
necessary a treaty between the state granting the concession or right to
construct a canal through its territory and the state chartering the
company. The claims of other states to equality of treatment in the use
of such a canal constituted another element that had to be considered.

With the establishment of the independence of the Spanish-American
republics the question of the construction of a ship canal across the
isthmus became a matter of general interest, and it was one of the
proposed subjects of discussion at the Congress of American Republics
summoned by Bolivar to meet at Panama in 1826. In the instructions to
the United States commissioners to that congress, Mr. Clay authorized
them to enter into the consideration of that subject, suggesting that
the best routes would likely be found in the territory of Mexico or of
the Central Republic. As to the diplomatic status of the canal, he said:

      If the work should ever be executed so as to admit of the
      passage of sea vessels from ocean to ocean, the benefits of
      it ought not to be exclusively appropriated to any one
      nation, but should be extended to all parts of the globe
      upon the payment of a just compensation or reasonable
      tolls.[140]

In 1835, and again in 1839, the United States Senate passed resolutions
authorizing the President to enter into negotiations with other nations,
particularly Central America and New Granada, for the purpose of
protecting by treaty either individuals or companies who might undertake
to open communication between the two oceans, and of insuring "the free
and equal navigation of the canal by all nations." Presidents Jackson
and Van Buren both commissioned agents with a view to carrying out these
resolutions, but without success.

While a prisoner at Ham in 1845, Prince Louis Napoleon Bonaparte secured
from the government of Nicaragua a concession granting him power to
organize a company for the construction of a waterway to be known as "Le
Canale Napoléon de Nicaragua." After his escape from Ham, he published
in London a pamphlet entitled "The Canal of Nicaragua, or a Project for
the Junction of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans by means of a
Canal."[141]

Although the United States government was a party to endless
negotiations in regard to an inter-oceanic canal, there were only three
treaties of any practical importance prior to the close of the
nineteenth century, by which it acquired rights and assumed obligations
on that account.[142] These were (1) the treaty with New Granada
(Colombia) of 1846; (2) the Clayton-Bulwer treaty with England of 1850;
and (3) the treaty with Nicaragua of 1867. We shall proceed to examine
these in detail.

The treaty with New Granada was signed at Bogota, December 12, 1846, and
ratified by both governments in 1848. It did not differ materially from
the general draft of treaties, except in the thirty-fifth article, which
was of a special character and related to the Isthmus of Panama. By this
article "the government of New Granada guarantees to the government of
the United States that the right-of-way or transit across the Isthmus of
Panama, upon any modes of communication that now exist or that may be
hereafter constructed, shall be open and free to the government and
citizens of the United States," for the transportation of all articles
of lawful commerce upon the same terms enjoyed by the citizens of New
Granada.

      And in order to secure to themselves the tranquil and
      constant enjoyment of these advantages, and for the favors
      they have acquired by the 4th, 5th, and 6th articles of this
      treaty, the United States guarantee positively and
      efficaciously to New Granada, by the present stipulation,
      the perfect neutrality of the before-mentioned isthmus, with
      the view that the free transit from the one to the other sea
      may not be interrupted or embarrassed in any future time
      while this treaty exists; and, in consequence, the United
      States also guarantee, in the same manner, the rights of
      sovereignty and property which New Granada has and
      possesses over the said territory.[143]

This treaty was to remain in force for twenty years, and then, if
neither party gave notice of intended termination, it was to continue in
force, terminable by either party at twelve months' notice. This treaty
was in full force when the Panama revolution of 1903 took place. Under
the protection of this treaty the Panama Railroad Company, composed
mainly of citizens of the United States, secured a charter from New
Granada, and between 1850 and 1855 constructed a railroad across the
isthmus along the line of the proposed Panama canal. In consequence of
the riot at Panama in 1856, efforts were made by the United States to
modify this treaty so as to give the United States greater control and
power to protect the means of transit, but without success.[144] Other
attempts to modify it in 1868 and 1870 likewise failed.[145]

In 1862 the Granadian government, through its representative at
Washington, notified the United States that a revolutionary chief, who
was then trying to subvert the Granadian confederation, had sent an
armed force to occupy the Isthmus of Panama, and the government of
Granada called upon the United States to enforce its guarantee.
Simultaneously the same information was received from the United States
consul at Panama, and the President instructed the United States naval
commander at that port to protect at all hazards and at whatever cost
the safety of the railroad transit across the isthmus.

The Granadian government, however, was not satisfied with this action,
and urged the United States to land a body of troops at Panama,
suggesting that it consist of 300 cavalry. Under the circumstances,
President Lincoln hesitated to take such action without consulting Great
Britain and France, and Mr. Seward instructed our representatives at
London and Paris to seek an understanding with those governments in
regard to the matter. He declared:

      This government has no interest in the matter different from
      that of other maritime powers. It is willing to interpose
      its aid in execution of its treaty and for the benefit of
      all nations. But if it should do so it would incur some
      hazard of becoming involved in the revolutionary strife
      which is going on in that country. It would also incur
      danger of misapprehension of its object by other maritime
      powers if it should act without previous consultation with
      them.[146]

In a conference between Mr. Adams and Lord John Russell, the latter
declared that he did not consider that the contingency had arisen which
called for intervention; that so far as he could learn, no attempt had
been made to obstruct the free transit across the isthmus. The French
government took substantially the same view.[147] In questions of a
similar nature that arose later, the attorney-general of the United
States expressed the opinion that the guarantee by the United States of
Granadian sovereignty and property in the territory of the isthmus was
only against foreign governments, and did not authorize the United
States to take sides with one or the other party in the intestine
troubles of that nation.

In April, 1885, the Colombian government, which was embarrassed by civil
war, called upon the United States for the fulfillment of the treaty of
1846, to secure the neutrality and sovereignty of the isthmus. President
Cleveland at once sent a body of troops to the isthmus with instructions
to confine their action to preventing the transit and its accessories
from being interrupted or embarrassed. As soon as peace was
reëstablished, the troops of the United States were withdrawn.[148]

Four years after the signature of the above treaty with Colombia, and
two years after its ratification by the Senate, the United States and
Great Britain executed what is popularly known as the Clayton-Bulwer
treaty. It is of great importance to understand clearly the
circumstances under which this treaty was negotiated.

For very obvious reasons, the Isthmus of Panama was for many years the
objective point of all canal schemes, but as the engineering
difficulties of this route began to be fully appreciated, attention was
directed more and more to that through Nicaragua. The occupation by
Great Britain, under the assumption of a protectorate, of the territory
about the mouth of the San Juan river, which belonged to Nicaragua and
Costa Rica, and in which the Atlantic terminus of the canal would fall,
was a source of no little uneasiness and perplexity to the United
States. In June, 1849, Mr. Hise, chargé d'affaires of the United States
in Central America, negotiated without the authorization or knowledge of
his government, a treaty with Nicaragua which gave the United States
exclusive rights in the construction of a canal through the territory of
that state.[149] This treaty was not submitted to the Senate, but was
made use of in the negotiations that were opened shortly thereafter with
Great Britain for the purpose of ousting her from her position of
control over the mouth of the San Juan. A few months later, September
28, 1849, Mr. Squier signed with Honduras a treaty which ceded Tiger
Island, in the Bay of Fonseca, to the United States, thus giving us a
naval station on the Pacific side of the isthmus. This treaty, like that
negotiated by Mr. Hise, was unauthorized and never submitted to the
Senate.[150] Both treaties were used, however, in bringing England to
the signature of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty. This activity in
treaty-making was occasioned by the acquisition of California and the
rush to the gold fields by way of the isthmus.

During the period that elapsed between Mr. Bancroft's withdrawal from
London and Mr. Lawrence's arrival as the representative of the United
States, Mr. Clayton instructed Mr. Rives, who was on his way to Paris,
to stop in London and hold a conference with Lord Palmerston on the
Central American question. At this date the United States was striving
simply for equal rights in any waterway that might be opened through the
isthmus and not for any exclusive rights. Mr. Rives declared to Lord
Palmerston "that citizens of the United States had entered into a
contract with the state of Nicaragua to open, on certain conditions, a
communication between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans by the river San
Juan and the Nicaragua lake; that the government of the United States,
after the most careful investigation of the subject, had come
undoubtedly to the conclusion that upon both legal and historical
grounds the state of Nicaragua was the true territorial sovereign of the
river San Juan as well as of the Nicaragua lake, and that it was,
therefore, bound to give its countenance and support, by all proper and
reasonable means, to rights lawfully derived by their citizens under a
grant from that sovereign." He further said:

      That the United States would not, if they could, obtain any
      exclusive right or privilege in a great highway, which
      naturally belonged to all mankind, for they well knew that
      the possession of any such privilege would expose them to
      inevitable jealousies and probable controversies which would
      make it infinitely more costly than advantageous; that while
      they aimed at no exclusive privilege for themselves, they
      could never consent to see so important a communication fall
      under the exclusive control of any other great commercial
      power; that we were far from imputing to Her Britannic
      Majesty's government any views of that kind, but Mosquito
      possession at the mouth of the San Juan could be considered
      in no other light than British possession, and his lordship
      would readily comprehend that such a state of things, so
      long as it was continued, must necessarily give rise to
      dissatisfaction and distrust on the part of other commercial
      powers.[151]

The negotiations thus opened by Mr. Rives were continued by Mr. Lawrence
upon his arrival in England, but were shortly thereafter transferred to
Washington, where Mr. Clayton succeeded in arranging with Sir Henry
Lytton Bulwer the terms of a convention which was signed April 19, 1850.
The intention of the two governments, as declared in the preamble, was
to set forth "their views and intentions with reference to any means of
communication by ship canal which may be constructed between the
Atlantic and Pacific oceans by the way of the river San Juan de
Nicaragua, and either or both of the lakes of Nicaragua or Managua, to
any port or place on the Pacific ocean."

By the first article Great Britain and the United States bound
themselves never to obtain or maintain any exclusive control over the
said ship canal; never to erect or maintain any fortifications
commanding the same or in the vicinity thereof, or to colonize or
exercise dominion over Nicaragua, Costa Rica, the Mosquito coast, or any
part of Central America; and never to make use of any alliance,
connection or influence with any of these states to obtain any unequal
advantages in regard to commerce or navigation through the said canal.

The second article provided for the neutralization of the canal in the
event of war between the contracting parties. The third guaranteed
protection for the persons and property of the parties legally
undertaking the construction of the canal. The fourth related to gaining
the consent of the states whose territory the canal should traverse. The
fifth article provided for the neutralization and protection of the
canal so long as it was managed without discrimination against either of
the contracting parties, and stipulated that neither of them would
withdraw its protection without giving the other six months' notice. In
the sixth article the contracting parties promised to invite every state
with which they were on terms of friendly intercourse to accede to this
convention. In the seventh article the contracting parties agreed to
lend their support and encouragement to the first company offering to
construct the canal in accordance with the spirit and intention of this
convention. The eighth article was of special importance. It declared
that "the governments of the United States and Great Britain having not
only desired, in entering into this convention, to accomplish a
particular object, but also to establish a general principle, they
hereby agree to extend their protection, by treaty stipulations, to any
other practicable communication, whether by canal or railway, across the
isthmus which connects North and South America, and especially to the
interoceanic communications, should the same prove practicable, whether
by canal or railway, which are now proposed to be established by the way
of Tehuantepec or Panama."[152]

Such are the main stipulations of the celebrated Clayton-Bulwer treaty,
which remained in force until 1901, and which during that period
probably called forth more discussion than any treaty which the United
States had ever signed.

In after years a large number of people on this side of the Atlantic,
forgetting the object and aim of the treaty and the circumstances under
which it was negotiated, thought that the United States conceded too
much and violated the principle of the Monroe Doctrine in giving England
a position and interest in America which she did not before possess.
This opinion was held by some prominent statesmen at the time the treaty
was negotiated, notably by Buchanan, who poured forth severe criticism
and ridicule upon it. While it was before the Senate for ratification,
he wrote to a friend:

      If Sir Henry Bulwer can succeed in having the two first
      provisions of this treaty ratified by the Senate, he will
      deserve a British peerage. The consideration for our
      concessions is the relinquishment of the claim to the
      protectorate of the Mosquito shore--so absurd and unfounded
      that it has been ridiculed even by the London _Times_. Truly
      Sir Henry has brought this claim to a good market when he
      found a purchaser in Mr. Clayton. The treaty altogether
      reverses the Monroe Doctrine, and establishes it against
      ourselves rather than European governments.[153]

Let us see what the interests of the two signatory powers were at that
time in Central America. The United States had recently acquired
California by the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, and the rapid development
of the Pacific states made the canal a question of greater importance to
the United States than ever before. The great transcontinental
railroads, which some fifteen years later established direct overland
communication with the Pacific states, were then hardly thought of.

England's interest in the canal, on the other hand, was rather a
prospective one, but farsighted as usual, she had provided for future
contingencies by occupying several years before, under the guise of a
protectorate over the Mosquito Indians, Greytown at the mouth of the San
Juan river, the Atlantic terminus of the canal. In addition to the
Mosquito coast, England at this time held the Bay Islands and Belize, or
British Honduras. The United States, it is true, had never recognized
the claims of Great Britain to dominion over the Mosquito coast. These
claims, which dated back to the eighteenth century, when British
wood-cutters in search of mahogany, and smugglers entered the territory
occupied by the Mosquito Indians and established cordial relations with
them, had been abandoned by the treaty of 1786 with Spain, but were
revived in 1841, when a ship of war was sent to San Juan del Norte to
announce the protection of England over the lands of the Mosquito king
and to raise the Mosquito flag.[154] In 1848 the English and Indians
drove the Nicaraguans out of the town and changed the name to Greytown.

The United States uniformly denied the rights of the Mosquito king to
sovereignty over the district, and consequently the pretensions of the
inhabitants of Greytown to political organization or power derived in
any way from the Mosquitos. In his instructions to Mr. Hise soon after
the occupation of Greytown, Secretary Buchanan said:

      The object of Great Britain in this seizure is evident from
      the policy which she has uniformly pursued throughout her
      history, of seizing upon every available commercial point in
      the world whenever circumstances have placed it in her
      power. Her purpose probably is to obtain control of the
      route for a railroad or canal between the Atlantic and
      Pacific oceans by way of Lake Nicaragua.... The government
      of the United States has not yet determined what course it
      will pursue in regard to the encroachment of the British
      government.... The independence as well as the interests of
      the nations on this continent require that they should
      maintain an American system of policy entirely distinct from
      that which prevails in Europe. To suffer any interference on
      the part of the European governments with the domestic
      concerns of the American republics, and to permit them to
      establish new colonies upon this continent, would be to
      jeopard their independence and ruin their interests. These
      truths ought everywhere throughout this continent to be
      impressed upon the public mind; but what can the United
      States do to resist such European interference whilst the
      Spanish-American republics continue to weaken themselves by
      civil divisions and civil war, and deprive themselves of
      doing anything for their own protection.

Whatever the rights of the case, Great Britain was in actual possession
of the Atlantic terminus of the proposed canal, and the United States
was not prepared forcibly to oust her, even if such a course had been
deemed advisable. The United States had no rights in the case at this
time by treaty with Nicaragua or otherwise, none of the statesmen of
that day having been broad enough in their views or bold enough to
consider the territory of Nicaragua as "a part of the coast-line of the
United States." All that could be opposed to England's _de facto_
possession was the Monroe Doctrine, and England held that her claim
antedated the declaration of that principle of American diplomacy. Mr.
Clayton cannot, therefore, be justly charged with a violation of the
Monroe Doctrine, for the effect of the treaty was to leave England
weaker territorially on this continent than she was before.

The Clayton-Bulwer treaty left open several minor questions that
required adjustment before the canal enterprise could be pushed forward
with success. Chief among these were the dispute between Nicaragua and
Costa Rica in regard to their boundary line and the controversy between
Great Britain and Nicaragua in regard to the territory claimed by the
Mosquito Indians. In April, 1852, Mr. Webster and Sir John Crampton
agreed upon a basis for the settlement of Central American affairs, and
drew up and signed a proposal to be submitted to Nicaragua and Costa
Rica.[155] This proposed basis for a treaty was rejected by Nicaragua,
which left the questions involved in the same unsettled position.

A much more serious obstacle to the accomplishment of the objects of the
Clayton-Bulwer treaty than the failure of the above proposal arose from
the wide divergence of opinion between the British and American
governments in regard to its interpretation. The discussion involved two
principal points: (1) Whether the abnegatory clauses of the first
article were merely prospective in character and directed against future
acquisitions in Central America, or whether they required Great Britain
to abandon her protectorate over the Mosquito coast at once; and (2)
whether the Bay Islands came within the purview of the treaty. It was
expressly stipulated that Belize or British Honduras was not included in
Central America and therefore not affected by the treaty one way or the
other. A declaration to this effect was filed at the state department by
the British minister, Sir Henry Bulwer. In reply, Mr. Clayton, after
conference with the chairman of the Senate committee on foreign
relations, acknowledged that British Honduras did not come within the
scope of the treaty, but at the same time carefully refrained from
affirming or denying the British title to that settlement or its alleged
dependencies.[156] This left open the question as to whether the Bay
Islands were dependencies of Belize or of the Republic of Honduras.

Shortly after the failure of the Crampton-Webster proposals, Great
Britain took advantage of the uncertainty that existed in regard to the
status of the Bay Islands and by a formal proclamation, issued July 17,
1852, converted her settlements on those islands into "The Colony of the
Bay Islands." When the United States government expressed its surprise
at this proceeding, the British government replied that the Bay Islands
were dependencies of Her Majesty's settlement at Belize and therefore,
by explicit agreement, not within the scope of the Clayton-Bulwer
treaty.[157]

In 1856 an effort was made to terminate the difficulties arising out of
the different constructions put upon the Clayton-Bulwer treaty by the
negotiation of a supplementary convention. On October 17 of that year a
treaty was signed in London by the American minister and Lord Clarendon,
known as the Dallas-Clarendon treaty. It provided (1) for the withdrawal
of the British protectorate over the Mosquito Indians; (2) it regulated
the boundaries of the Belize settlements on the basis of a compromise;
and (3) it provided for a cession of the Bay Islands to Honduras, upon
condition of the ratification of a treaty already negotiated between
Great Britain and Honduras, which virtually erected an independent state
of the islands, exempt in many particulars from the sovereignty of
Honduras, and under the protectorate of Great Britain.

The first two clauses were acceptable to the United States Senate, but
it was deemed proper to amend the third by striking out all that part of
it which contemplated the concurrence of the United States in the
British treaty with Honduras, and simply to provide for a recognition by
the two governments of the sovereignty of Honduras over the islands in
question.[158] Great Britain rejected this amendment and the
Dallas-Clarendon treaty fell through. Great Britain and the United
States were thus thrown back upon the Clayton-Bulwer treaty with its
conflicting interpretations.

In October, 1857, the President was notified informally that the British
government had decided to dispatch Sir Wm. Ouseley, a diplomatist of
well-recognized authority and experience, to Central America to make a
definite settlement of all matters in dispute between the United States
and England; that the efforts of the new plenipotentiary would be
directed to those objects which had been dealt with in the
Dallas-Clarendon treaty of 1856, viz., the cession of the Bay Islands to
Honduras, the substitution of the sovereignty of Nicaragua for the
protectorate of England over the Mosquitos and the regulation of the
frontiers of Belize; that it was the intention of Her Majesty's
government to carry the Clayton-Bulwer treaty into execution according
to the general tenor of the interpretation put upon it by the United
States, but to do so by separate negotiation with the Central American
republics, in lieu of a direct engagement with the federal
government.[159]

President Buchanan replied that he would be satisfied with this course
and that upon receiving an official assurance to that effect, he would
change the character of the message he had already prepared for
Congress. On the 30th of November, 1857, the British government
submitted to the United States the alternative of referring the
Clayton-Bulwer treaty to the arbitration of any European power which the
United States might prefer to select or of adjusting matters by
negotiations with the Central American republics, as already outlined in
Sir William Ouseley's prospective mission.[160]

At this stage of the negotiations matters were further complicated (1)
by the negotiation of the Cass-Yrissari treaty of November 16, 1857,
between the United States and Nicaragua for protection of the transit
route and (2) by the invasion of Nicaraguan territory by a band of
filibusters under General Walker, bent on the subversion of the lawful
government of the country. The treaty was not ratified, however, and the
Walker expedition was arrested by the interposition of the United States
navy.

The United States government not having given any definite answer to the
British proposal to submit the treaty to arbitration, the British
government delayed dispatching Sir William Ouseley on his mission. In
the negotiations which took place during this delay the question of the
abrogation of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty was discussed between the two
governments. In his message of December 8, 1857, President Buchanan had
suggested the abrogation of the treaty by mutual consent as the wisest
course that could be pursued in view of the increasing complications to
which the varying constructions of it were giving rise. The British
government took up this suggestion and expressed its willingness to
concur in such a course, but also expressed the opinion that the
initiative should be taken by the government which was dissatisfied with
its provisions.

The British minister was, however, directed by his government to make it
perfectly clear to the government of the United States, that to abrogate
the treaty was to return to the _status quo ante_ its conclusion in
1850; that Great Britain had no kind of jealousy respecting American
colonization in Central America, and did not ask or wish for any
exclusive privileges whatever in that quarter.[161] Finally, Sir William
Ouseley was dispatched on his mission and during the years 1859 and 1860
succeeded in negotiating treaties with Guatemala, Honduras, and
Nicaragua, the provisions of which were in substantial accord with the
rejected Dallas-Clarendon treaty.[162]

The treaty with Nicaragua signed at Managua, January 28, 1860, though
restoring to that republic nominal sovereignty over the Mosquito
territory, reserved to the Indians the right of retaining their own
customs, assigned boundaries to that reservation in all probability
greatly beyond its true limits, and confirmed grants of land previously
made in that territory. Notwithstanding these facts, in his annual
message of December 3, 1860, President Buchanan declared that the United
States government was satisfied with the final settlement. His words
were:

      The discordant constructions of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty
      between the two governments, which at different periods of
      the discussion bore a threatening aspect, have resulted in a
      final settlement entirely satisfactory to this
      government.[163]

The Clayton-Bulwer treaty was negotiated with the expectation that the
construction of a ship canal would rapidly follow, but the unfortunate
entanglements that grew out of the variant constructions put upon that
treaty by the contracting powers deferred to an indefinite period the
accomplishment of the object it was designed to promote. By the time
these differences were adjusted the attention of the American public was
centered upon the first throes of the gigantic struggle of the war of
secession and the canal question was for several years completely
overshadowed. The government of the United States emerged from that
struggle with larger ideas of its position among the powers of the world
and with broader views of national policy. Mr. Seward gave expression to
that feeling in the purchase of Alaska, in his interposition in Mexico
and in his efforts to secure a position for the United States in the
West Indies. In order to strengthen the position of the United States he
wished to purchase Tiger Island, a possession of Honduras in Fonseca bay
on the Pacific coast. As this island lay in Central America, Mr. Seward
could not take any steps in the matter without the consent of Great
Britain, on account of the renunciatory clause with respect to that
territory in the Clayton-Bulwer treaty. He, therefore, directed Mr.
Adams, April 25, 1866, to sound Lord Clarendon as to the disposition of
the British government toward the United States acquiring a coaling
station in Central America. In this dispatch we find the first
suggestion of a repudiation of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty on the ground
that it was a special and not a general contract, and that the work for
which it had been negotiated had never been undertaken. Mr. Seward uses
these words:

      At the time the treaty was concluded there was every
      prospect that that work would not only soon be begun, but
      that it would be carried to a successful conclusion. For
      reasons, however, which it is not necessary to specify, it
      never was even commenced, and at present there does not
      appear to be a likelihood of its being undertaken. It may be
      a question, therefore, supposing that the canal should never
      be begun, whether the renunciatory clauses of the treaty are
      to have perpetual operation. Technically speaking, this
      question might be decided in the negative. Still, so long as
      it should remain a question, it would not comport with good
      faith for either party to do anything which might be deemed
      contrary to even the spirit of the treaty.[164]

The subject was brought to the attention of Lord Clarendon in a casual
way by Mr. Adams, but it was not pressed and Mr. Seward refrained from
disregarding the renunciatory clause of the treaty.

In 1867, a treaty between the United States and Nicaragua, covering the
case of an interoceanic canal, was negotiated and ratified by both
parties. It granted to the United States the right of transit between
the Atlantic and Pacific oceans on any lines of communication, natural
or artificial, by land or by water, then existing, or that might
thereafter be constructed, upon equal terms with the citizens of
Nicaragua, and the United States agreed to extend its protection to all
such routes of communication, and "to guarantee the neutrality and
innocent use of the same." The United States further agreed to employ
its influence with other nations to induce them to guarantee such
neutrality and protection.[165]

This treaty, like the treaty with Colombia of 1846 and the
Clayton-Bulwer treaty, contemplated the neutralization of the canal. It
in no way infringed our engagements with England under the
Clayton-Bulwer treaty, but in providing for the joint guarantee of other
powers, was in accord with the provisions of that treaty.

In 1873, Mr. Hamilton Fish directed General Schenck to remonstrate, if
upon investigation he found it to be necessary, against British
encroachments upon the territory of Guatemala as an infringement of the
Clayton-Bulwer treaty.[166]

In spite of the doubts expressed by Mr. Seward in the dispatch to Mr.
Adams above quoted, as to the perpetual character of the obligations
imposed by the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, the obligatory force of that
instrument after the readjustment of 1860 was not seriously questioned
until interest in the canal question was suddenly aroused anew by the
concession granted by Colombia to Lieutenant Wyse in 1878, and the
subsequent organization of a French construction company under the
presidency of Ferdinand de Lesseps, the promoter of the Suez canal.

The prospect of the speedy construction of a canal under French control,
for which De Lesseps' name seemed a sufficient guarantee, produced a
sudden and radical change of policy on the part of the United States.
In a special message to Congress, March 8, 1880, President Hayes made
the following statement of what he conceived to be the true policy of
this country in regard to a Central American canal:

      The policy of this country is a canal under American
      control. The United States cannot consent to the surrender
      of this control to any European power, or to any combination
      of European powers. If existing treaties between the United
      States and other nations, or if the rights of sovereignty or
      property of other nations stand in the way of this policy--a
      contingency which is not apprehended--suitable steps should
      be taken by just and liberal negotiations to promote and
      establish the American policy on this subject, consistently
      with the rights of the nations to be affected by it.

      The capital invested by corporations or citizens of other
      countries in such an enterprise must, in a great degree,
      look for protection to one or more of the great powers of
      the world. No European power can intervene for such
      protection without adopting measures on this continent which
      the United States would deem wholly inadmissible. If the
      protection of the United States is relied upon, the United
      States must exercise such control as will enable this
      country to protect its national interests and maintain the
      rights of those whose private capital is embarked in the
      work.

      An interoceanic canal across the American isthmus will
      essentially change the geographical relations between the
      Atlantic and Pacific coasts of the United States, and
      between the United States and the rest of the world. It will
      be the great ocean thoroughfare between our Atlantic and our
      Pacific shores, and virtually a part of the coast-line of
      the United States. Our merely commercial interest in it is
      greater than that of all other countries, while its relation
      to our power and prosperity as a nation, to our means of
      defense, our unity, peace, and safety, are matters of
      paramount concern to the people of the United States. No
      other great power would, under similar circumstances, fail
      to assert a rightful control over a work so closely and
      vitally affecting its interests and welfare.

      Without urging further the grounds of my opinion, I repeat,
      in conclusion, that it is the right and the duty of the
      United States to assert and maintain such supervision and
      authority over any interoceanic canal across the isthmus
      that connects North and South America as will protect our
      national interests. This I am quite sure will be found not
      only compatible with, but promotive of, the widest and most
      permanent advantage to commerce and civilization.[167]

The message itself was accompanied by a report from the secretary of
state, Mr. Evarts, in which he called attention to the mutual
engagements entered into between the United States and Colombia by the
treaty of 1846 in reference to a transit route across the isthmus and
declared that the guarantee of the neutrality of the isthmus and of the
sovereignty of Colombia over the same would be a very different thing
when the isthmus should be opened to the interests and ambitions of the
great commercial nations.[168]

President Garfield, in his inaugural address, approved the position
taken by his predecessor on the canal question,[169] and very soon after
assuming the portfolio of state, Mr. Blaine outlined the new policy to
our representatives in Europe, cautioning them, however, against
representing it as the development of a new policy and affirming that it
was "nothing more than the pronounced adherence of the United States to
principles long since enunciated by the highest authority of the
government."

This dispatch of Mr. Blaine is remarkable for several reasons, but
chiefly for the fact that it completely ignores the existence of the
Clayton-Bulwer treaty, there being no allusion to that celebrated
convention either open or implied. Aside from this there are three
points to be noted. In the first place Mr. Blaine calls attention to the
rights and duties devolving upon the United States from the treaty with
Colombia of 1846, and states that in the judgment of the President the
guarantee there given by the United States requires no reënforcement, or
accession, or assent from any other power; that the United States in
more than one instance had been called upon to vindicate the neutrality
thus guaranteed; and that there was no contingency, then foreseen or
apprehended, in which such vindication would not be within the power of
the nation.

In the second place, Mr. Blaine declared with emphasis that during any
war to which the United States of America or the United States of
Colombia might be a party, the passage of armed vessels of a hostile
nation through the canal of Panama would be no more admissible than
would the passage of the armed forces of a hostile nation over the
railway lines joining the Atlantic and Pacific shores of the United
States, or of Colombia. This declaration was in direct opposition to the
second article of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty. Mr. Blaine then proceeded
to expatiate upon the remarkable development of our Pacific slope and
the importance of the canal in facilitating communication between our
Atlantic and Pacific states, alluding to the canal in this connection,
in the very apt phrase of President Hayes, as forming a part of the
_coast-line_ of the United States. It does not appear to have occurred
to Mr. Blaine that the same arguments applied with equal force to Great
Britain's American possessions to the north of us, which likewise
extended from the Atlantic to the Pacific, and were likewise entering
upon a period of unusual development.

The third point to be noted in the dispatch is the statement that the
United States would object to any concerted action of the European
powers for the purpose of guaranteeing the canal or determining its
status.[170] This declaration was supposed to be nothing more than a
reaffirmation of the Monroe Doctrine.

A copy of this document was left by Mr. Lowell at the British foreign
office on the 12th of July, 1881. No formal notice of the dispatch was
taken by the British government until November, when Lord Granville
replied that, as Mr. Blaine had made the statement that the government
of the United States had no intention of initiating any discussion upon
this subject, he did not propose to enter into a detailed argument in
reply to Mr. Blaine's observations. He wished, however, merely to point
out that the position of Great Britain and the United States with
reference to the canal, irrespective of the magnitude of the commercial
relations of the former power, was determined by a convention signed
between them at Washington on the 19th of April, 1850, commonly known as
the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, and her majesty's government relied with
confidence upon the observance of all the engagements of that
treaty.[171]

Before this reply reached Washington, Mr. Blaine had again taken up the
question of the canal in a special dispatch of November 19, 1881. In
this dispatch he addressed himself specifically to a consideration of
the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, and urged upon the consideration of the
British government modifications of such a radical character as to
amount to a complete abrogation of the treaty. The grounds of objection
to the treaty were stated in full. In the first place it was declared
that the treaty had been made more than thirty years before under
exceptional and extraordinary conditions, which were at least temporary
in their nature and had long since ceased to exist. The remarkable
development of the United States on the Pacific coast since that time
had created new duties and responsibilities for the American government
which required, in the judgment of the President, some essential
modifications in the treaty. The objections to the perpetuity of the
treaty were then stated in full. First and foremost was the objection
that the treaty by forbidding the military fortification of the proposed
canal practically conceded its control to Great Britain by reason of her
naval superiority. The military power of the United States in any
conflict on the American continent was irresistible, yet the United
States was restrained from using this power for the protection of the
canal, while no restrictions could be placed upon the natural advantages
that England enjoyed in this regard as a great naval power. A more
serious objection to the treaty, however, was urged in the statement
that it embodied a misconception of the relative positions of Great
Britain and the United States with respect to interests on this
continent. The United States would not consent to perpetuate any treaty
that impeached "our right and long-established claim to priority on the
American continent."

In the third place, at the time the convention was agreed upon, Great
Britain and the United States were the only nations prominent in the
commerce of Central and South America. Since that time other nations not
bound by the prohibitions of that treaty had become interested in
Central America, and the republic of France had become sponsor for a new
canal scheme. Yet by the treaty with England the United States was
prevented from asserting its rights and the privileges acquired through
treaty with Colombia anterior to the Clayton-Bulwer treaty.

In the fourth place, the treaty had been made with the implied
understanding that British capital would be available for the
construction of a canal. That expectation had never been realized, and
the United States was now able to construct a canal without aid from
outside resources.

In conclusion, Mr. Blaine proposed several modifications of the treaty
which would leave the United States free to fortify the canal and to
hold political control of it in conjunction with the country in which it
might be located.[172]

A few days after the dispatch was written, Lord Granville's answer to
Mr. Blaine's first dispatch reached Washington, and on the 29th of
November, Mr. Blaine wrote a second dispatch equally voluminous with the
one of November 19. In this he reviewed the discussions which had taken
place between 1850 and 1860 in regard to the treaty with a view to
showing that it had never been satisfactory to the United States and
had been the cause of serious misunderstanding. He failed, however, to
make mention of the settlement of 1860 and the declaration of President
Buchanan that the United States was satisfied with that adjustment.

The full reply of the British government to Mr. Blaine's arguments was
given in two dispatches dated respectively January 7 and 14, 1882. Lord
Granville took exception to certain conclusions which Mr. Blaine had
sought to establish by analogy with the conduct of Great Britain in
regard to the Suez canal. His lordship fully concurred in what Mr.
Blaine had said as to the unexampled development of the United States on
the Pacific coast, but reminded him that the development of her
majesty's possessions to the north of the United States, while less
rapid, had been, nevertheless, on a scale that bore some relation even
to that of the Pacific states. In the view of her majesty's government,
the changes desired by the United States would not improve the situation
as regarded the canal, while the declaration that the United States
would always treat the waterway connecting the two oceans "as part of
her coast-line" threatened the independence of the territory lying
between that waterway and the United States.

Her majesty's government believed that the only way to relieve the
situation was to extend the invitation to all maritime states to
participate in an agreement based on the stipulations of the convention
of 1850.[173]

The task of replying to Lord Granville's two dispatches fell upon Mr.
Blaine's successor in the State Department, Mr. Frelinghuysen. Mr.
Frelinghuysen's voluminous dispatch of May 8, 1882, reiterated in the
main the arguments advanced by Mr. Blaine. He adduced evidence at great
length to try to show that the Clayton-Bulwer treaty was a special
contract for the accomplishment of a specific object, which had never
been achieved, and was no longer binding; that Great Britain had
violated the treaty by converting her _settlement_ of British Honduras
into a _possession_ without ever receiving the assent of the United
States, and that such act would entitle the United States to renounce
the treaty. The dispatch was further characterized by a direct appeal to
the Monroe Doctrine in these words:

      The President believes that the formation of a protectorate
      by European nations over the isthmus transit would be in
      conflict with a doctrine which has been for many years
      asserted by the United States. This sentiment is properly
      termed a doctrine, as it has no prescribed sanction and its
      assertion is left to the exigency which may invoke it. It
      has been repeatedly announced by the executive department of
      this government, and through the utterances of distinguished
      citizens; it is cherished by the American people, and has
      been approved by the government of Great Britain.

After quoting a part of President Monroe's message of December 2, 1823,
and reviewing the circumstances under which it was delivered, Mr.
Frelinghuysen said:

      Thus the doctrine of non-intervention by European powers in
      American affairs arose from complications in South America,
      and was announced by Mr. Monroe on the suggestion of the
      official representative of Great Britain.[174]

In his reply of December 30, 1882, Lord Granville proved conclusively
that Article VIII. of the treaty was understood by the American
government during the discussions of 1850-1860 as establishing a general
principle applicable to all waterways connecting the two oceans. In
answer to the second point, Lord Granville adduced the notes exchanged
between Mr. Clayton and Sir Henry Bulwer in July, 1850, which made it
perfectly clear that, in the understanding of both governments at that
time, the claims of Great Britain to Belize or British Honduras were not
affected one way or the other by the treaty.[175]

In a later dispatch, August 17, 1883, Lord Granville briefly touched
upon Mr. Frelinghuysen's appeal to the Monroe Doctrine, reminding him
very pertinently that neither the American administration which
negotiated the treaty nor the Senate which ratified it considered that
they were precluded by the utterances of President Monroe from entering
into such a treaty with one or more of the European powers.[176]

The correspondence on the treaty closed with Mr. Frelinghuysen's
dispatch of November 22, 1883, in which he reiterated with no small
degree of bluntness and pertinacity the arguments of his earlier
dispatches.

The Clayton-Bulwer treaty was designed at the time of its execution to
establish a permanent principle of control over interoceanic
communication in Central America. No provision was made, as in most
treaties, for its abrogation, and the American government could not
terminate it without the consent of Great Britain for fear that she
would return to her position of vantage at the time the treaty was made.
For this reason, while Mr. Frelinghuysen claimed that the treaty was
voidable, he did not actually declare it void.

Mr. Blaine's efforts to secure a modification were the result of the
development of a new policy by the United States and the arguments
presented by Mr. Blaine and Mr. Frelinghuysen in support of this policy
were disingenuous and flimsy. It may be safely said that no state papers
have ever emanated from our government on so serious a question equally
lacking in logical consistency and moral force.

The result was that Great Britain refused to consent to a modification
of the treaty and the United States saw before her the alternative of
abiding by the terms of the treaty or ultimately resorting to war with
England.

In December, 1884, Mr. Frelinghuysen negotiated a treaty with Nicaragua
providing for the construction of a canal by the United States to be
under the joint ownership and protection of the United States and
Nicaragua. The United States also guaranteed the integrity of the
territory of Nicaragua. When Mr. Cleveland became president this treaty
was still before the Senate for consideration. Mr. Cleveland withdrew
the treaty, and in his first annual message, December 8, 1885, reverted
to our traditional policy. He declared himself opposed to entangling
alliances with foreign states and declared:

      Whatever highway may be constructed across the barrier
      dividing the two greatest maritime areas of the world, must
      be for the world's benefit, a trust for mankind, to be
      removed from the chance of domination by any single power,
      nor become a point of invitation for hostilities or a prize
      for warlike ambition.[177]

No discussion as to the validity of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty took place
between the two governments after the close of President Arthur's
administration. Mr. Cleveland's message above quoted was accepted as a
reaffirmation of the treaty on the part of the American government.

Upon two occasions subsequently questions arose between the two
governments involving the stipulations of the treaty. In 1888, and again
in 1894, the United States felt called upon to protest against British
interference in the affairs of the Mosquito coast.[178] The ground of
interposition on the part of Great Britain was alleged to be found in
the treaty of Managua, signed between Great Britain and Nicaragua on the
28th of January, 1860. This convention, it will be remembered, was one
of the three treaties entered into by Great Britain with Central
American republics with a view to removing the causes of dispute in the
construction of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty. The treaty of Managua
assigned a district to the Mosquito Indians within the limits of the
republic of Nicaragua. The sovereignty of Nicaragua over the district
was recognized, but the Indians were secured in the possession and
enjoyment of their own domestic customs and regulations. It was agreed,
however, that nothing in the treaty should prevent the Mosquitos at any
subsequent date from voluntarily agreeing to absolute incorporation with
the republic of Nicaragua. By the terms of the treaty the protectorate
of Great Britain over the Mosquito coast was to cease three months after
the exchange of ratifications.

In reply to the protest of 1888, Lord Salisbury said that her majesty's
government had no intention to assert a protectorate in substance or in
form over the Mosquito nation, but that according to the convention with
Nicaragua of 1860, Great Britain undertook "to secure certain rights and
privileges to the Mosquito Indians, and in the event, which has arisen,
of the Mosquito Indians complaining that their rights are infringed by
Nicaragua, by whom is remonstrance to be made to Nicaragua unless by
Great Britain, with whom she has concluded the convention in
question?"[179]

In the spring of 1894, yet more serious trouble arose. The Mosquito
territory was invaded by the troops of Nicaragua and Bluefields was
surrounded. The British consul at that point protested against this act
as contrary to the treaty of Managua. The protest being unheeded, a
force of troops was landed from the British ship _Cleopatra_ and on
March 9, the Nicaraguans were forced to retire. Mr. Bayard was
instructed by telegraph "to ascertain and report fully by cable the
occasion for this action." The British government disavowed all
intention of violating the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, which it recognized
"as extant and in full force."

In July, 1894, United States marines were landed at Bluefields to
protect American interests and to restore order. Later the British
government assured Mr. Bayard that its action had been wholly
unconnected with any political or conventional question touching the
Mosquito reservation, but simply to protect British interests.

By a convention signed November 20, 1894, the Mosquito Indians
surrendered their rights under the treaty of 1860 and were incorporated
with Nicaragua. This voluntary incorporation took away all further
occasion for interposition on the part of Great Britain, and Mr. Bayard
reported that it was received with "the most open expression of
satisfaction at the foreign office."[180]

The attempts of Blaine and Frelinghuysen to bring about a modification
of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty were, as we have seen, unsuccessful. In
fact, their only effect was to strengthen the British government for the
time being in the determination to hold us more strictly to the terms of
that convention. In 1896 Secretary Olney in a review of the situation
declared:

      Upon every principle which governs the relations to each
      other, either of nations or of individuals, the United
      States is completely estopped from denying that the treaty
      is in full force and vigor. If changed conditions now make
      stipulations, which were once deemed advantageous, either
      inapplicable or injurious, the true remedy is not in
      ingenious attempts to deny the existence of the treaty or to
      explain away its provisions, but in a direct and
      straightforward application to Great Britain for a
      reconsideration of the whole matter.[181]

It was precisely in this spirit that Secretary Hay undertook in 1899 to
negotiate a new treaty with England. The original draft of the
Hay-Pauncefote treaty, signed February 5, 1900, provided for a
neutralized canal and drafted for its control rules substantially in
accord with the Constantinople convention of 1888, providing for the
regulation of the Suez canal. The most important provision of the new
treaty was that authorizing the United States to construct and to assume
the management of an isthmian canal, either directly or through a
company. The United States Senate, however, amended the treaty in three
important particulars: (1) by declaring that the Clayton-Bulwer treaty
was thereby superseded; (2) by providing that the restrictions in the
regulations governing the use of the canal should not apply to measures
which the United States might adopt for its own defense and for the
maintenance of public order along the canal; and (3) by cutting out
entirely the article providing for the adherence of other powers. The
British government refused to accept these amendments, and a year
elapsed before an agreement was finally reached.[182] The revised treaty
which was ratified by the Senate December 16, 1901, was a compromise
between the original draft and the Senate amendments. The new treaty
abrogated in express terms the Clayton-Bulwer convention, and provided
that the United States might construct a canal under its direct
auspices, to be under its exclusive management. The principle of
neutralization was nominally retained, but under the sole guarantee of
the United States, with power to police the canal, and the clause of the
first draft forbidding fortifications was omitted.[183]

This convention removed the principal diplomatic obstacles which stood
in the way of constructing a canal through the isthmus. For several
years the United States had been investigating the cost of constructing
a canal through Nicaragua, that route being the one which had always
been considered most feasible by the great majority of American
engineers. Two commissions, one in 1895 and another in 1897, had
reported favorably on the practicability of that route. A third
commission, headed by Admiral John G. Walker, was appointed under act of
March 3, 1899, which authorized an expenditure of $1,000,000 for the
purpose of making a thorough investigation of all available routes.
While the Walker commission was carrying on investigations in Nicaragua,
at Panama, and along the Atrato river, the various financial interests
concerned in the choice of routes were actively at work in Washington,
each trying to influence Congress in favor of its particular project.
The New Panama Canal Company had secured, at the time of the
reorganization, an extension of its concession to October, 1904, and
subsequently another concession to October, 1910, but the validity of
the latter arrangement was in doubt. The company could not raise the
necessary funds to continue the work at Panama and was therefore
threatened with the forfeiture of its franchise and property. It
concluded, therefore, that its only hope lay in transferring its
concession and property to the American government. With this end in
view, an active lobby was maintained at Washington for the purpose of
influencing public opinion in favor of the Panama route.

But the Panama Company had a powerful rival in the Maritime Canal
Company, which held a charter from Congress and had secured a concession
from Nicaragua. This company had started work at Greytown in 1890, but
having been forced from lack of funds to stop work in 1893, was now
urging Congress to make its enterprise a national one. It found a ready
champion in Senator Morgan of Alabama, who had for years taken a lively
interest in the canal question and who had strong convictions as to the
superiority of the Nicaragua route. In 1900 Nicaragua declared the
concession of the Maritime Canal Company null and void, and granted a
new concession to a group of New York capitalists known as the
Grace-Eyre-Cragin Syndicate. The Maritime Canal Company, however,
refused to abandon its claims, and a contest between the two concerns
was carried to the lobbies of Congress. The opposition of the
transcontinental railroads to a canal at either point brought into play
another set of powerful interests, usually arrayed against the plan
which appeared for the time being most likely to succeed.[184]

On November 16, 1901, the Walker commission after a thorough
investigation of the Nicaragua and Panama routes made its report. It
estimated the cost of construction of the Nicaragua canal at
$189,864,062, and the cost of completing the Panama canal at
$144,233,358. To this latter sum had to be added the cost of acquiring
the rights and property of the French company, which had stated to the
commission that it estimated its interests at $109,141,500, making the
total cost of the Panama canal $253,374,858. The commission expressed
the opinion that the interests of the French company were not worth
over $40,000,000. In conclusion the report stated:

      After considering all the facts developed by the
      investigations made by the commission and the actual
      situation as it now stands, and having in view the terms
      offered by the New Panama Company, this commission is of the
      opinion that the most practicable and feasible route for an
      isthmian canal, to be under the control, management, and
      ownership of the United States, is that known as the
      Nicaragua route.[185]

A bill was promptly introduced into the House of Representatives by Mr.
Hepburn providing for the construction of the canal through Nicaragua,
and on January 9, 1902, this bill passed the House by the almost
unanimous vote of 308 to 2. The report of the commission had meanwhile
created great consternation among the stockholders of the New Panama
Canal Company, and on January 4, 1902, a definite offer to sell out to
the United States at $40,000,000 was made to the commission by cable. On
January 18, the commission filed a supplementary report which
recommended the adoption of the Panama route instead of that through
Nicaragua.

When the Hepburn bill came up for discussion in the Senate, the
situation had thus been radically changed, and a long debate ensued as
to the relative merits of the two routes. Senator Morgan continued to
fight for Nicaragua as the traditional American route, declaring that
the Panama Company could not give a valid transfer of its property and
interests. But this objection was cleverly met by Senator Spooner, who
offered an amendment, which was virtually a substitute, authorizing the
President to acquire the rights and property of the French company at a
cost not exceeding $40,000,000; to acquire from the Republic of
Colombia, upon such terms as he might deem reasonable, perpetual control
of a strip of land, not less than six miles in width, extending from the
Caribbean Sea to the Pacific Ocean, with jurisdiction over said strip;
and to proceed as soon as these rights were acquired, to construct a
canal. But should the President be unable to obtain a satisfactory title
to the property of the French company and the control of the necessary
strip of land from the Republic of Colombia "within a reasonable time
and upon reasonable terms," then he was instructed to secure control of
the necessary strip through Nicaragua and to proceed to construct a
canal there. The bill as amended passed the Senate June 19, 1902, by a
vote of 67 to 6. The House at first refused to concur in the Spooner
amendment, but after a conference it finally gave way and the measure
was adopted by a vote of 260 to 8. The act was signed by President
Roosevelt June 28.[186]

Attorney-General Knox was sent to Paris to make a thorough investigation
of the affairs of the Panama Company. He reported that it could give a
clear title. The next step was to secure a right of way through
Colombia. After considerable delay Secretary Hay and Mr. Herran, the
Colombian chargé d'affaires, signed, January 22, 1903, a canal
convention, by the terms of which the United States agreed to pay
Colombia $10,000,000 in cash and an annuity of $250,000 for the lease of
a strip of land six miles wide across the isthmus. Objection was raised
to this treaty because it failed to secure for the United States full
governmental control over the canal zone, but it was considered the best
that could be gotten and it was ratified by the United States Senate
March 17, 1903.

The Colombian Senate, however, did not regard the treaty with favor.
They felt that Panama was their greatest national asset, and they knew
perfectly well that in spite of threats to the contrary President
Roosevelt was determined not to adopt the alternative of the Spooner
amendment and go to Nicaragua. After discussing the treaty for nearly
two months, they finally rejected it August 12 by the unanimous vote of
all the senators present.[187] They probably thought that they could get
better terms from the United States and particularly that they might
reserve a fuller measure of sovereignty over the isthmus. President
Roosevelt declared that the action of the Colombian Senate was due to an
"anti-social spirit" and to the cupidity of the government leaders, who
merely wished to wait until they could confiscate the $40,000,000 worth
of property belonging to the French company and then sell out to the
United States. This view is not borne out by the dispatches of Mr.
Beaupré, the American minister, who repeatedly warned Secretary Hay that
there was a "tremendous tide of public opinion against the canal
treaty," which even the Colombian government could not ignore. The
charge of bad faith against Colombia does not come in good grace from a
country whose constitution also requires the ratification of treaties by
the Senate.

As soon as the Hay-Herran convention was rejected by the Colombian
Senate, the advocates of the Nicaragua route began to take courage and
to demand that as the "reasonable time" allowed in the Spooner act for
the President to acquire the right of way through Panama had expired, it
was now his duty to adopt the Nicaragua route. The directors of the
French company were again in a state of consternation. If they could not
sell to the United States they would have to sacrifice their property
entirely, or sell to some other purchaser at a lower figure. It was
rumored that Germany was willing to buy their interests. The directors
of the company were so completely demoralized that William Nelson
Cromwell, their American attorney, hastened to Paris to dissuade them
from taking any rash step. The rejection of the Hay-Herran treaty was a
great disappointment to the inhabitants of the isthmus, who considered
this action a sacrifice of their interests, and some of the foremost
citizens conferred with the American agent of the Panama Railroad
Company as to the advisability of organizing a revolution. Before taking
any step in this direction, it was considered advisable to send one of
their number to the United States, and Dr. Amador was selected for this
mission. He had conferences with William Nelson Cromwell and with
Secretary Hay. The latter merely outlined what he considered the rights
and duties of the United States under the treaty of 1846, but refused of
course to commit the government to a definite support of the
revolutionary project. Amador was somewhat discouraged at the result of
his conference with Hay, but his hopes were revived by the sudden
arrival of Philippe Bunau-Varilla, the former chief engineer of the
French company, who entered with enthusiasm into the revolutionary
scheme.[188]

The Colombian Congress adjourned October 30 without any reconsideration
of the treaty, and President Roosevelt at once ordered the _Boston_,
_Dixie_, _Atlanta_, and _Nashville_ to proceed within easy reach of the
isthmus. Their commanders received orders to keep the transit open and
to "prevent the landing of any armed force with hostile intent, either
government or insurgent, at any point within fifty miles of Panama." The
_Nashville_ arrived off Colon November 2. It can hardly be denied that
these measures created a situation very favorable to revolution.[189]

The revolutionists had been greatly disappointed at Dr. Amador's failure
to get a definite promise of support from the American government, but
their spirits revived when they learned of the presence of American war
vessels. Still they were slow in taking advantage of their opportunities
and the government at Washington was growing impatient. At 3.40 P.
M. November 3 the following dispatch was sent to the American
consuls at Panama and Colon: "Uprising on isthmus reported. Keep
Department promptly and fully informed. Loomis, Acting." At 8.15 a reply
was received from the consul at Panama: "No uprising yet. Reported will
be in the night. Situation is critical." At 9 P. M. a second
dispatch was received from the same source: "Uprising occurred to-night,
6; no bloodshed. Army and navy officials taken prisoners. Government
will be organized to-night."[190]

Before the _Nashville_ received the order to prevent the landing of
armed forces, 450 Colombian troops arrived at Colon. The principal
officers were provided with a special train to take them across the
isthmus to Panama. When they arrived they were seized by the
revolutionary leaders and locked up for safe-keeping, while the railroad
officials saw to it that there were no trains for their troops to use.
The next day Commander Hubbard landed fifty marines from the _Nashville_
at Colon, and a day later the officer in charge of the Colombian forces
was persuaded by a generous bribe to reëmbark his troops and leave.
Events continued to follow one another with startling rapidity. On the
6th the _de facto_ government was recognized and a week later
Bunau-Varilla was received by President Roosevelt as envoy extraordinary
and minister plenipotentiary of the Republic of Panama. Such hasty
recognition of a new government was of course without precedent in the
annals of American diplomacy, and it naturally confirmed the rumor that
the whole affair had been prearranged. On October 10 President Roosevelt
had written a personal letter to Dr. Albert Shaw, editor of the _Review
of Reviews_, who was a strong advocate of the Panama route, in which he
said:

      Privately, I freely say to you that I should be delighted if
      Panama were an independent state, or if it made itself so at
      this moment; but for me to say so publicly would amount to
      an instigation of a revolt, and therefore I cannot say
      it.[191]

This letter throws an interesting light on an article in the _Review of
Reviews_ for November of the same year in which Dr. Shaw discussed the
question, "What if Panama should Revolt?" and outlined with remarkable
prophetic insight the future course of events.

In his annual message of December 7, 1903, the President discussed the
Panama revolution and undertook to justify his course under the treaty
of 1846. This message failed to allay public criticism, and on January
4, 1904, he sent a special message to Congress in defense of his action.
He held that Colombia was not entitled "to bar the transit of the
world's traffic across the isthmus," and that the intervention of the
United States was justified, (1) by our treaty rights, (2) by our
international interests, and (3) by the interests of "collective
civilization." The "legal" argument in this message, if we may dignify
it by that name, is reported to have been prepared by Root and Knox,
both at that time members of the Cabinet. Several years later, after Mr.
Roosevelt had retired from the presidency, he expressed the real truth
in a public speech when he said:

      If I had followed traditional conservative methods I should
      have submitted a dignified state paper of probably two
      hundred pages to the Congress and the debate would be going
      on yet, but I took the Canal zone and let Congress debate,
      and while the debate goes on the canal does also.

The reason why the President did not wish the matter to go before
Congress again was that he had decided upon the Panama route, and he
knew that when Congress convened in December, the situation remaining
unchanged, action would be taken to compel him to adopt the alternative
of the Spooner amendment and go to the Nicaragua route. His object in
the hasty recognition of the Panama revolution was therefore to make the
Panama route an accomplished fact before Congress should meet. This was
the attitude definitely assumed in the message of January 4, 1904, in
the course of which he said:

      The only question now before us is that of the ratification
      of the treaty. For it is to be remembered that a failure to
      ratify the treaty will not undo what has been done, will not
      restore Panama to Colombia, and will not alter our
      obligation to keep the transit open across the Isthmus, and
      to prevent any outside power from menacing this transit.

The treaty referred to was the convention with Panama which had been
signed November 18, 1903, and which was ratified by the Senate February
23, 1904, by a vote of 66 to 14. By the terms of this agreement the
United States guaranteed the independence of the Panama Republic, and
agreed to pay the Panama Republic a sum of $10,000,000 upon the exchange
of ratifications and an annual rental of $250,000 a year beginning nine
years thereafter. Panama on her part granted to the United States in
perpetuity a zone of land ten miles wide for the construction of a
canal, the United States receiving as full power and authority over this
strip and the waters adjacent as if it were the sovereign of the said
territory.[192] The construction of the canal was at once undertaken and
the work was carried through successfully by General Goethals and a
corps of army engineers. It was opened to commerce August 15, 1914,
though it was not completed at that time and traffic was subsequently
interrupted by landslides.

Colombia naturally felt aggrieved at the course pursued by President
Roosevelt and refused to recognize the Republic of Panama. She objected
to his interpretation of the convention of 1846. In this convention the
United States pledged itself to keep the isthmian transit open and
guaranteed Colombia's sovereignty over the same. This treaty established
an obligation to Colombia alone, and it is difficult to accept the
President's view that it established an obligation to the world at large
against Colombia. Colombia demanded that the whole question be submitted
to arbitration. As the United States had always held the ground that
disputes arising out of the interpretation of treaties should be settled
by arbitration, it was inconsistent for the United States to refuse to
arbitrate. But President Roosevelt did refuse. The Panama episode
created strained relations with Colombia and made a very bad impression
throughout Latin America. The United States has since been eyed with
suspicion by its weaker Southern neighbors. The Taft and Wilson
administrations both tried to appease Colombia by a money payment, but
this subject will be discussed in a subsequent chapter.

FOOTNOTES:

[140] Report of International American Conference, Vol. IV (Hist. App.),
p. 143.

[141] Snow: "Treaties and Topics in American Diplomacy," p. 328.

[142] Our treaties with Mexico and Honduras, although covering the case
of canal constructions, were of no practical importance, as the routes
through these countries were not feasible.

[143] Correspondence in relation to the Proposed Interoceanic Canal, the
Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, and the Monroe Doctrine. Government Printing
Office, 1885, p. 5. Referred to hereafter as "Collected Correspondence."

[144] _Ibid._, pp. 23-27.

[145] _Ibid._, pp. 27 and 40.

[146] Seward to Adams, July 11, 1862.

[147] "Collected Correspondence," pp. 7 and 8.

[148] Mr. Scruggs to Mr. Bayard, April 16, 1885, For. Rel., also
"Messages and Papers of the Presidents," Vol. VIII, p. 326.

[149] "Collected Correspondence," p. 94.

[150] _Ibid._, p. 14.

[151] "Collected Correspondence," pp. 11 and 12.

[152] "Collected Correspondence," p. 99.

[153] Mr. Buchanan to Hon. John A. McClernand, April 2, 1850, "American
Hist. Rev.," Oct., 1899.

[154] "Wharton's Digest," Sec. 295.

[155] "Collected Correspondence," p. 102.

[156] _Ibid._, p. 234, also Wharton's Digest, Vol. II, p. 190.

[157] "Collected Correspondence," p. 248.

[158] "Collected Correspondence," p. 286.

[159] _Ibid._, p. 262-263.

[160] _Ibid._, p. 276.

[161] "Collected Correspondence," p. 280.

[162] _Ibid._, pp. 294-302.

[163] "Messages and Papers of the Presidents," Vol. V, p. 639.

[164] "Collected Correspondence," p. 303.

[165] "Collected Correspondence," p. 132.

[166] _Ibid._, pp. 310-12.

[167] "Messages and Papers of the Presidents," Vol. VII, p. 585.

[168] "Collected Correspondence," p. 313.

[169] "Messages and Papers of the Presidents," Vol. VIII, p. 11.

[170] "Collected Correspondence," pp. 322-326.

[171] _Ibid._, p. 326.

[172] "Collected Correspondence," pp. 327-332.

[173] "Collected Correspondence," pp. 340-352.

[174] "Collected Correspondence," pp. 160-161.

[175] "Collected Correspondence," pp. 353-359.

[176] _Ibid._, p. 364.

[177] "Messages and Papers of the Presidents," Vol. VIII, p. 327.

[178] See Mr. Bayard to Mr. Phelps, Nov. 23, 1888. For. Rel., 1888, Pt.
I, pp. 759-768.

[179] For. Rel., 1889, p. 468.

[180] See Foreign Relations, 1894, App. 1. "Affairs at Bluefields," pp.
234-363.

[181] Senate Doc. No. 160, Fifty-sixth Cong., First Sess.

[182] Moore, "Digest of Int. Law," Vol. III, p. 211.

[183] Foreign Relations, 1901, p. 245.

[184] Johnson, "Four Centuries of the Panama Canal," Chap. VIII.

[185] Report of the Isthmian Canal Commission (Sen. Doc. No. 54,
Fifty-seventh Cong., First Sess.).

[186] U. S. Statutes at Large, Vol. XXXII, Pt. I, p. 481.

[187] Senate Doc. No. 51, Fifty-eighth Cong., Second Sess., p. 56.

[188] Johnson, "Four Centuries of the Panama Canal," pp. 162-171.

[189] Senate Doc. No. 53, Fifty-eighth Cong., Second Sess.

[190] House Doc. No. 8, Fifty-eighth Cong., First Sess.

[191] _Literary Digest_, October 29, 1904.

[192] Foreign Relations, 1904, p. 543.




CHAPTER V

FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO


The attempt of Louis Napoleon to establish a European monarchy in Mexico
under the tutelage of France was the most serious menace that republican
institutions in the new world have had to face since the schemes of the
Holy Alliance were checked by Monroe and Canning. The thwarting of that
attempt may be accounted one of the greatest triumphs of American
diplomacy. The internal disorders common to South and Central American
republics have always been a fruitful source of embarrassment to the
United States, on account of the liability to European intervention to
which these governments continually subject themselves in such periods
by their open and flagrant disregard of international obligations. Of no
country is this statement truer than of Mexico, where the well-nigh
interminable strife of parties gave rise between the years 1821 and 1857
to thirty-six different governments. In 1857 a favorable change occurred
in the affairs of the republic. A constituent congress, elected by the
people of the different states, framed and adopted a republican
constitution which promised better things for the future. Under the
provisions of this constitution an election was held in July (1857) and
General Comonfort chosen president almost without opposition. His term
of office was to begin December 1, 1857, and to continue four years.
Within one brief month, however, President Comonfort was driven from
the capital, and ultimately from the country, by an uprising headed by
General Zuloaga. As soon as Comonfort abandoned the presidency, General
Benito Juarez, the president of the Supreme Court of Justice, became
according to the constitution, the president _de jure_ of the republic
for the remainder of the unexpired term, that is, until December 1,
1861. General Zuloaga had, however, assumed the name of president, with
indefinite powers, and the entire diplomatic corps, including the
minister of the United States, had recognized his government. But
Zuloaga was speedily expelled, and the supreme power seized by General
Miramon, the head of the church party, whom the diplomatic corps
likewise recognized. Meanwhile Juarez, the constitutional president, had
proceeded to Vera Cruz, where he put his administration into successful
operation.

For several months, Mr. John Forsyth, the American minister, continued
at the city of Mexico in the discharge of his duties. In June, 1858,
however, he suspended his diplomatic connection with the Miramon
government. Our relations, which had been bad under former governments,
were now rendered almost intolerable under that of Miramon by outrages
towards American citizens and personal indignities to Mr. Forsyth
himself. His action was approved by President Buchanan, and he was
directed to return to the United States. All diplomatic intercourse was
thus terminated with the government of Miramon, but as yet none was
established with the Juarez government. The ultimate success of the
latter became, however, so probable that the following year the
President sent a confidential agent to Mexico to inquire into and
report upon the actual condition of the belligerents, and in consequence
of his report, Mr. Robert M. McLane was dispatched to Mexico, March 8,
1859, "with discretionary authority to recognize the government of
President Juarez, if on his arrival in Mexico he should find it entitled
to such recognition according to the established practice of the United
States." On the 7th of April, Mr. McLane presented his credentials to
President Juarez, having no hesitation, he said, "in pronouncing the
government of Juarez to be the only existing government of the
republic." He was cordially received by the authorities at Vera Cruz,
and during all the vicissitudes of the next eight years the United
States government continued to extend its sympathy and moral support to
the government of Juarez as the only one entitled to the allegiance of
the people of Mexico.

Juarez thus came forward, in the rôle of reformer, as the champion of
constitutionalism and the supremacy of the state against the
overreaching power, influence, and wealth of the church party. He was a
full-blooded Indian, without the slightest admixture of Spanish blood.
In December, 1860, he finally succeeded in overthrowing the party of
Miramon and driving the latter into exile. Immediately, on reoccupying
the city of Mexico, the Constitutionalists proceeded to execute with
severity the decree issued at Vera Cruz nationalizing or sequestrating
the property of the church.

The most difficult question which the new government had to face was
that of international obligations recklessly contracted by the various
revolutionary leaders who had successively been recognized as
constituting the government of Mexico. In consequence of debts
contracted and outrages and enormities perpetrated, for the most part
during the régime of Miramon and the church party, the governments of
England, France, and Spain determined to intervene in Mexico.

The grievances of the British government were based on the following
facts: non-settlement of claims of British bondholders; the murder of
the British vice-consul at Tasco; the breaking into the British legation
and the carrying off £152,000 in bonds belonging to British subjects,
besides numerous other outrages committed on the persons and property of
individuals.[193]

The claims of the British bondholders referred to had been recognized by
the Pakenham convention of October 15, 1842, and formed into a
consolidated fund of $250,000, which was to be paid off, principal and
interest, by a percentage on import duties at the custom-houses of Vera
Cruz and Tampico. This convention was not carried out by the Mexican
government, and on December 4, 1851, Mr. Doyle signed on behalf of Great
Britain a new convention, in which not only the claims under the
Pakenham convention, but others, recognized by both governments, were
likewise formed into a consolidated fund, on which the Mexican
government bound itself to pay five per cent. as a sinking fund and
three per cent. as interest until the debt should be paid off. This five
and three per cent. were to be met by a percentage of customs receipts.
In 1857 the sinking fund was to be raised to six per cent. and the
interest to four per cent.

Two days after the signing of this Doyle convention the Spanish minister
in Mexico also signed a convention on behalf of some Philippine
missionaries, known as the "Padre Moran" convention, on almost the same
basis as the British. The consolidated fund in this case was $983,000,
the sinking fund five per cent., and the interest three per cent.

The interest was paid on both funds in almost the whole amount, but the
sinking fund was not kept up. Succeeding agreements were made in 1858,
in 1859, and in 1860, by which the custom-house assignments to satisfy
both conventions (British and Spanish) were raised from twelve per cent.
in 1851, to twenty-nine per cent. in 1860.[194]

It will thus be seen that the British and Spanish claims were perfectly
legitimate. The French claims, however, were of a somewhat different
character. During Miramon's administration arrangements were made
through the agency of Jecker, a Swiss banker, by which $750,000 were to
be raised through an issue of $15,000,000 of bonds. These bonds fell
into the hands of Jecker's French creditors and were pressed by the
French government, which thus demanded the repayment of twenty times the
original sum advanced. A claim was made also for $12,000,000 for torts
on French subjects.[195]

When the Liberal party came into power again in 1860, they were unable
to meet the situation and showed a disposition to question the
obligatory force of engagements entered into by their various
revolutionary predecessors. The British government had undertaken to
provide against this contingency upon the occasion of extending
recognition to the Juarez administration. Under date of March 30, 1861,
Lord John Russell wrote to Sir Charles Wyke, recently appointed minister
to Mexico, as follows:

      The instructions addressed to Mr. Mathew, both before and
      since the final triumph of the Liberal party, made the
      recognition by Great Britain of the constitutional
      government contingent upon the acknowledgment by that
      government of the liability of Mexico for the claims of
      British subjects who, either in their persons or in their
      property, for a long series of years, can be proved to have
      suffered wrong at the hands of successive governments in
      Mexico.[196]

And further on in the same communication the attitude of the British
government is expressed yet more strongly:

      Her majesty's government will not admit as an excuse for
      hesitation in this respect the plea that the robbery was
      committed by the late government. For, as regards this, as
      indeed all other claims, her majesty's government cannot
      admit that the party who committed the wrong is alone
      responsible. Great Britain does not recognize any party as
      constituting the republic in its dealing with foreign
      nations, but holds the entire republic, by whatever party
      the government of it may from time to time be administered,
      to be responsible for wrongs done to British subjects by any
      party or persons at any time administering the powers of
      government.

Mexico, however, was slow to admit this principle of international law.
In a letter to Lord John Russell, June 25, 1861, and in other
communications, Sir Charles Wyke urged the necessity of a naval
demonstration against Mexico. His plan was to take possession of the
custom-houses of Vera Cruz, Tampico, and Matamoros on the Atlantic, and
of one or two on the Pacific, lower the duties so as to attract the
great bulk of trade from other ports, and pay themselves by the
percentage to which they were entitled by treaty stipulation.

On the 17th of July, 1861, President Juarez brought matters to a crisis
by the publication of a decree, the first article of which declared that
"all payments are suspended for two years, including the assignments for
the loan made in London and for the foreign conventions."[197]

On the 23rd, Sir Charles Wyke, the British minister, demanded the repeal
of this law within forty-eight hours. On the 24th, the French minister
demanded its repeal within twenty-four hours. These demands were not
complied with and diplomatic relations were immediately broken off by
the British and French representatives.

The Spanish government had acted somewhat in advance of the other
governments and was already preparing to back its claims by an armed
expedition against Mexico. The rupture with the British and French
governments very naturally pointed to joint action with Spain as the
best means of securing their interests. The United States government,
which had just entered upon one of the greatest struggles of modern
times and had its hands practically tied as far as Mexico was concerned,
regarded the contemplated intervention of European powers in Mexico
with grave apprehension, not to say suspicion. So great was the
uneasiness occasioned in the United States by the measures in
contemplation and so strong was the desire to ward off the threatened
danger to republican institutions on this continent, that Mr. Seward
authorized (September 2, 1861) the negotiation of a treaty with Mexico
for the assumption by the United States of the payment of the interest,
at three per cent., upon the funded debt of Mexico (the principal of
which was about $62,000,000) for the term of five years from the date of
the decree of the Mexican government suspending such payment, "provided
that the government of Mexico will pledge to the United States its faith
for the reimbursement of the money so to be paid, with six per cent.
interest thereon, to be secured by a specific lien upon all the public
lands and mineral rights in the several Mexican states of Lower
California, Chihuahua, Sonora, and Sinaloa, the property so pledged to
become absolute in the United States at the expiration of the term of
six years from the time when the treaty shall go into effect, if such
reimbursement shall not have been made before that time."[198] All this,
of course, was subject to the confirmation of the Senate.

This step was communicated informally to the British and French
governments, and the validity of the convention was to be conditioned
upon those governments engaging not to take any measures against Mexico
to enforce the payment of the interest of the loan until time should
have been given to submit the convention to the ratification of the
United States Senate at its approaching session. It was also to be a
condition that, if the convention should be ratified, Great Britain and
France should engage, on their part, not to make any demand upon Mexico
for the interest, except upon its failing to be punctually paid by the
United States.[199]

Grave objections to Mr. Seward's plan of paying the interest on the
Mexican debt were entertained both in Paris and in London. The French
minister of state, M. Thouvenel, said to the British minister at Paris:

      It might not be possible to prevent the United States
      offering money to Mexico, or to prevent Mexico receiving
      money from the United States, but neither England nor France
      ought in any way to recognize the transaction.[200]

Lord Lyons declared to Mr. Seward:

      That her majesty's government were as apprehensive as Mr.
      Seward himself could be, of an attempt to build upon a
      foundation of debts due, and injuries inflicted, by Mexico,
      a pretension to establish a new government in that country.
      Her majesty's government thought, however, that the most
      effectual mode of guarding against this danger would be for
      Great Britain, the United States, and France to join Spain
      in a course of action, the objects and limits of which
      should be distinctly defined beforehand. This certainly
      appeared more prudent than to allow Spain to act alone now,
      and afterwards to oppose the results of her operations, if
      she should go too far.[201]

The British government avoided beforehand the necessity of a point-blank
refusal of the plan of Mr. Seward, in case the treaty should go through,
by declaring that the interest on the funded debt was not the only cause
of complaint, but that there remained over and above that the outrages
perpetrated upon British subjects still unredressed.

Mr. Charles Francis Adams, the United States minister to England, did
not approve the plan of guaranteeing the Mexican interest, and in his
dispatch to Mr. Seward of November 1, 1861, he expressed his opinion
rather more frankly than is usual for a minister to do in discussing an
instruction from the state department.

      You will permit me here, however, to make a single remark in
      this connection upon the importance of appearing to divest
      the United States of any personal and selfish interest in
      the action it may think proper to adopt. The view
      customarily taken in Europe is that their government is
      disposed to resist all foreign intervention in Mexico, not
      upon any principle, but simply because it is itself
      expecting, in due course of time, to absorb the whole
      country for its own benefit. Hence any proposal like that
      which I had the honor to receive, based upon the mortgage of
      portions of Mexican territory as security for engagements
      entered into by the United States, naturally becomes the
      ground of an outcry that this is but the preliminary to an
      entry for inevitable foreclosure. And then follows the
      argument that if this process be legitimate in one case, why
      not equally in all. As against Great Britain and France, it
      would be difficult to oppose to this the abstract principle
      contained in what has been denominated the Monroe Doctrine,
      however just in substance.[202]

While Mr. Corwin was still in negotiation with the Mexican government
in reference to some method of releasing Mexico from her complications
with the allied governments of Europe, the United States Senate, in
reply to two successive messages of the President, passed a resolution,
February 25, 1862, declaring the opinion "that it is not advisable to
negotiate a treaty that will require the United States to assume any
portion of the principle or interest of the debt of Mexico, or that will
require the concurrence of European powers." This effectually put an end
to Mr. Seward's plan.

Meanwhile Sir Charles Wyke had reopened negotiations with the Mexican
government and negotiated a treaty which might have satisfied British
claims, but the treaty was thrown out by the Mexican congress by a large
majority, and also disapproved by the British government in view of an
agreement entered into with France and Spain unknown to Sir Charles
Wyke.[203]

The agreement referred to was the convention signed at London, October
31, 1861, between Spain, France, and Great Britain, in reference to the
situation of affairs in Mexico and looking to armed intervention for the
purpose of securing their rights. The preamble of the convention recites
that the three contracting parties "being placed by the arbitrary and
vexatious conduct of the authorities of the republic of Mexico under the
necessity of exacting from those authorities a more efficient protection
for the persons and property of their subjects, as well as the
performance of the obligations contracted toward them by the republic of
Mexico, have arranged to conclude a convention between each other for
the purpose of combining their common action." The most important
article of the convention in view of its subsequent violation by the
Emperor Napoleon, was the second, which declared that:

      The high contracting parties bind themselves not to seek for
      themselves, in the employment of coercive measures foreseen
      by the present convention, any acquisition of territory, or
      any peculiar advantage, and not to exercise in the
      subsequent affairs of Mexico any influence of a character to
      impair the right of the Mexican nation to choose and freely
      to constitute the form of its own government.

The fourth article, recognizing that the United States also had claims
against Mexico, provided:

      that immediately after the signing of the present
      convention, a copy of it shall be communicated to the
      government of the United States, that that government shall
      be invited to accede to it.... But, as the high contracting
      parties would expose themselves, in making any delay in
      carrying into effect articles one and two of the present
      convention, to fail in the end which they wish to attain,
      they have agreed not to defer, with a view of obtaining the
      accession of the government of the United States, the
      commencement of the above-mentioned operations beyond the
      period at which their combined forces may be united in the
      vicinity of Vera Cruz.[204]

The advisability of inviting the coöperation of the United States had
been the subject of considerable discussion and difference of opinion
among the three European governments. England and France had urged the
coöperation of the United States, while Spain had opposed it.

In compliance with the fourth article the convention was submitted to
the government of the United States by a note dated November 30, 1861,
signed jointly by the representatives of Spain, France, and Great
Britain at Washington.

Mr. Seward's reply conveying the declination of the United States to the
invitation to coöperate with the three allied European powers in the
demonstration against Mexico was dated December 4, 1861. After reviewing
the substance of the convention, he said:

      First. As the undersigned has heretofore had the honor to
      inform each of the plenipotentiaries now addressed, the
      President does not feel himself at liberty to question, and
      he does not question, that the sovereigns represented have
      undoubted right to decide for themselves the fact whether
      they have sustained grievances, and to resort to war against
      Mexico for the redress thereof, and have a right also to
      levy the war severally or jointly.

In the second place, Mr. Seward expressed the satisfaction of his
government that the allied powers had clearly repudiated in the
convention all idea of carrying on the war for their own ambitious ends
and all intention of exercising in the subsequent affairs of Mexico any
influence of a character to impair the right of the Mexican people to
choose and freely to constitute the form of their own government.

      It is true, as the high contracting parties assume, that the
      United States have, on their part, claims to urge against
      Mexico. Upon due consideration, however, the President is of
      opinion that it would be inexpedient to seek satisfaction of
      their claims at this time through an act of accession to the
      convention. Among the reasons for this decision which the
      undersigned is authorized to assign, are, first, that the
      United States, so far as it is practicable, prefer to adhere
      to a traditional policy recommended to them by the father of
      their country and confirmed by a happy experience, which
      forbids them from making alliances with foreign nations;
      second, Mexico being a neighbor of the United States on this
      continent, and possessing a system of government similar to
      our own in many of its important features, the United States
      habitually cherish a decided good-will toward that republic,
      and a lively interest in its security, prosperity, and
      welfare. Animated by these sentiments, the United States do
      not feel inclined to resort to forcible remedies for their
      claims at the present moment, when the government of Mexico
      is deeply disturbed by factions within, and exposed to war
      with foreign nations. And of course, the same sentiments
      render them still more disinclined to allied war against
      Mexico, than to war to be waged against her by themselves
      alone.

In conclusion, Mr. Seward referred to the fact that the United States
government had authorized their representative in Mexico to enter into a
treaty conceding to the Mexican government material aid, which might, he
hoped, enable that government to satisfy the just claims and demands of
the allied sovereigns and so to avert the war which they have agreed
among each other to levy against Mexico.[205]

As already related, the efforts of the executive in this direction were
not approved by the Senate and the negotiations in regard to
guaranteeing the interest on the Mexican loan were broken off. The
treaty negotiated by Mr. Corwin was in fact never submitted to the
Senate, for by the time it was ready the French forces occupied a part
of Mexican territory, and it was feared that a loan to Mexico under
such conditions would be considered a breach of neutrality.

In pursuance of the London convention, Vera Cruz was occupied in the
early part of 1862 by a Spanish force of 6,000 men under command of
Marshal Prim; a French force of 2,500, which was largely reinforced soon
afterward; and a force of 700 British marines.

The first intimation of the real purposes of the Emperor Louis Napoleon
was given in the letter of instructions of M. Thouvenel to the admiral
commanding the French expedition to Mexico, dated November 11, 1861. He
said that in case of the withdrawal of the Mexican forces from the coast
into the interior of the country, an advance upon the capital might
become necessary. He reminded the admiral of the self-abnegatory
character of the second article of the convention, but continued:

      There are, however, certain hypotheses which present
      themselves to our foresight and which it was our duty to
      examine. It might happen that the pressure of the allied
      forces upon the soil of Mexico might induce the sane portion
      of the people, tired of anarchy, anxious for order and
      repose, to attempt an effort to constitute in the country a
      government presenting the guarantees of strength and
      stability which have been wanting to all those which have
      succeeded each other since the emancipation.

To such efforts the admiral was expressly told that he was not to refuse
his encouragement.[206]

In view of this order, the British government at once instructed its
agent, Sir Charles Wyke, that, while there was nothing to be said
against the reasoning of the French government in reference to the
probable necessity of marching against the city of Mexico, he was to
decline to take part in the advance into the interior, and that the
fact, that the whole available British force was only 700 marines, would
be sufficient reason for declining.[207]

The seriousness of the situation was fully appreciated by the United
States government. Shortly after the occupation of Vera Cruz by the
Spanish forces and the announcement of the outfit of a French force to
follow up the advantage, Mr. Charles Francis Adams wrote to his
government from London:

      It is no longer concealed that the intention is to advance
      to the capital, and to establish a firm government, _with
      the consent of the people_, at that place. But who are meant
      by that term does not appear. This issue is by no means
      palatable to the government here, though it is difficult to
      imagine that they could have been blind to it. Feeble
      murmurs of discontent are heard, but they will scarcely be
      likely to count for much in the face of the obligation under
      which the action of the emperor in the Trent case has placed
      them. The military occupation will go on, and will not cease
      with the limits now assigned to it. It is not difficult to
      understand the nature of the fulcrum thus obtained for
      operations in a new and a different quarter, should the
      occasion be made to use it. The expedition to the city of
      Mexico may not stop until it shows itself in the heart of
      the Louisiana purchase.[208]

About this time reports began to be circulated that the Archduke
Ferdinand Maximilian of Austria would be invited by a large body of
Mexicans to place himself on the throne of Mexico, and that the Mexican
people would gladly hail such a change. To whatever extent such reports
might be credited, the United States could not call into question the
good faith of the parties to the London convention. The British
government, as the issue showed, acted with perfect sincerity in the
matter; and the Spanish government, whatever may have been its original
intentions, followed the lead of Great Britain. When the reports in
regard to Maximilian were first circulated, the British government
declared to its agent, Sir Charles Wyke, that:

      If the Mexican people, by a spontaneous movement, place the
      Austrian Archduke on the throne of Mexico, there is nothing
      in the convention to prevent it. On the other hand, we could
      be no parties to a forcible intervention for this purpose.
      The Mexicans must consult their own interests.[209]

At the time, however, the attitude of the British government was not at
all understood. Mr. Adams wrote:

      Great Britain occupies the post of holding the door, whilst
      her two associates, with her knowledge, go in, fully
      prepared, if they can, to perpetrate the act which she, at
      the outset, made them denounce, at the same time that she
      disavowed every idea of being made to participate in
      it.[210]

In the face of armed invasion, the Mexican government assumed a more
reasonable attitude, and on the 19th day of February, 1862, the
plenipotentiaries of Spain, Great Britain, and France signed, at
Soledad, with the secretary of state of the Mexican government a
preliminary agreement or convention, in which they recognized the
constitutional government as then organized. Declaring that they had "no
designs against the independence, sovereignty and integrity of the
Mexican republic," they agreed to open negotiations for the settlement
of all the demands which they had to make at Orizaba. During the
negotiations the forces of the allies were to be allowed to leave the
unhealthy locality of Vera Cruz and occupy the three towns of Cordova,
Orizaba, and Tehuacan, with their natural approaches. In the event of
negotiations being broken off, the allies agreed to abandon the towns
above named before reopening hostilities.[211]

The convention of Soledad proved, however, of short duration. On the 9th
of April, 1862, the representatives of the allies announced in a formal
note to the Mexican government, "that not having been able to agree
about the interpretation which ought to be given in the present
circumstances to the convention of the 31st of October, 1861 (the
convention of London), they have resolved to adopt for the future an
entirely separate and independent line of action. In consequence, the
commander of the Spanish forces will immediately take the necessary
measures to reimbark his troops. The French army will concentrate in
Paso Aucho as soon as the Spanish troops have passed from this position,
that is to say, probably about the 20th of April, thereupon beginning
their operations."[212] According to instructions already alluded to,
the British force, which was limited to 700 marines, had declined to
advance into the interior, and hence was not present when the breach
occurred.

In spite of all appearances to the contrary, the French government still
persisted in disavowing to the United States government, in the most
emphatic terms, all designs upon the independence of the Mexican
republic. Even after the rupture at Orizaba, M. Thouvenel assured Mr.
Dayton, the United States minister at Paris, that all that France wanted
was that there should be a stable government in Mexico, not an anarchy
with which other nations could have no relations.

      That if the people of that country chose to establish a
      republic it was all well; France would make no objection. If
      they chose to establish a monarchy, as that was the form of
      government here, it would be charming (charmant), but they
      did not mean to do anything to induce such a course of
      action. That all the rumors that France intended to
      establish the Archduke Maximilian on the throne of Mexico
      were utterly without foundation.[213]

M. Thouvenel's disclaimer to the British government was equally
emphatic.[214]

To return to the situation of affairs at Orizaba, the disagreement
between the allies requires some explanation. The immediate cause of the
rupture and of the withdrawal from the convention of London was the
protection extended by the French agents to General Almonte, Padre
Miranda, and other leading men of the reactionary or church party who
had been banished from the country and who now from the French camp
maintained an active correspondence with Marquez, Cobos, and other
notorious chiefs of the armed bands then in open rebellion against the
constituted government of the country. Almonte and his associates openly
favored the scheme of placing Maximilian on the throne.

The Mexican government demanded the removal of General Almonte and his
associates from the camp of the allies, and in this demand the British
and Spanish representatives concurred. A somewhat stormy conference was
held between the commissioners of the allied powers at Orizaba, April 2,
1862, at which the French agents virtually said that they did not regard
the convention of London or the preliminaries of Soledad as binding upon
them. Specifically then the two causes of the rupture were (1) the
persistency of the French commissioners in opposing the removal of the
Mexican exiles, and (2) their refusal to take part in the conferences
which had been arranged by the convention of Soledad to be held with the
Juarez government at Orizaba, April 15, 1862. The British government
heartily approved of the action of its agent, Sir Charles Wyke, in
breaking up the conference and putting an end to the joint action of the
three powers.[215] The policy of Spain was completely in accord with
that of England.

The French government was not satisfied with the convention of Soledad,
but did not dispute its validity, and declared that if the negotiations
should be broken off, its provisions in regard to the withdrawal of the
troops from their vantage ground must be observed. The French government
further assumed that, when negotiations with the Mexican government
should be broken off, the allied forces would proceed to act jointly
under the convention of London.[216] The British and Spanish
governments, however, having become convinced of the duplicity of the
French government in the matter, terminated the London convention
without further discussion and ordered the immediate withdrawal of their
forces and agents from Mexican territory.

The government of Louis Napoleon, thus left to its own devices by the
withdrawal of Great Britain and Spain, and by the helpless condition,
for the time being, to which the war of secession had reduced the
government of the United States, greatly reinforced its Mexican
expedition and placed General Forey in command. Soon after the
withdrawal of the British and Spanish contingents, General Almonte
instituted a government in the territory occupied by the French and
assumed the title of "Supreme Chief of the Nation," but it soon became
evident, as Mr. Dayton expressed it, that instead of the emperor having
availed himself of the services of General Almonte, Almonte had availed
himself of the services of the emperor. Accordingly, shortly after
General Forey assumed command, he issued an order dissolving the
ministry of Almonte, depriving him of his title and limiting him
thereafter "in the most exact manner to the instructions of the emperor,
which are to proceed as far as possible, with other Mexican generals
placed under the protection of our flag, to the organization of the
Mexican army."

The misfortunes which had overtaken Mexico and the dangers that
threatened the permanence of her republican institutions, had now
thoroughly alarmed her sister republics of Central and South America,
and a correspondence began between them relative to organizing an
international American conference to oppose European aggression.

During the remarkable series of events that took place in Mexico in the
spring of 1862, Mr. Seward consistently held to the opinion well
expressed in a dispatch to Mr. Dayton, June 21, 1862:

      France has a right to make war against Mexico, and to
      determine for herself the cause. We have a right and
      interest to insist that France shall not improve the war she
      makes to raise up in Mexico an anti-republican and
      anti-American government, or to maintain such a government
      there. France has disclaimed such designs, and we, besides
      reposing faith in the assurances given in a frank, honorable
      manner, would, in any case, be bound to wait for, and not
      anticipate a violation of them.[217]

For some months the French troops gradually extended their military
operations and occupied a greater extent of territory without, however,
any material change in the situation. The Juarez government still held
the capital. In the spring of 1863, however, military operations were
pushed forward with greater activity, and in June, General Forey
organized a junta of government composed of thirty-five Mexican citizens
designated by decree of the French emperor's minister. The members of
this supreme junta were to associate with them two hundred and fifteen
citizens of Mexico to form an assembly of two hundred and fifty
notables. This assembly was to occupy itself with the form of the
permanent government of Mexico. The junta appointed an executive body of
three, of whom General Almonte was the head.

On the 10th of July, 1863, the capital of Mexico was occupied by the
French army, and on the following day the Assembly of Notables declared:

      1. The Mexican nation adopts as its form of government a
      limited hereditary monarchy, with a Catholic prince.

      2. The sovereign shall take the title of Emperor of Mexico.

      3. The imperial crown of Mexico is offered to his imperial
      and royal highness the Prince Ferdinand Maximilian, Archduke
      of Austria, for himself and his descendants.

      4. If, under circumstances which cannot be foreseen, the
      Archduke of Austria, Ferdinand Maximilian, should not take
      possession of the throne which is offered to him, the
      Mexican nation relies on the good will of his majesty,
      Napoleon III, Emperor of the French, to indicate for it
      another Catholic prince.[218]

The crown of Mexico was formally offered to Maximilian by a deputation
of Mexicans headed by Señor Estrada, October 3, 1863; but Maximilian
replied that he could not accept the proffered throne until the whole
nation should "confirm by a free manifestation of its will the wishes of
the capital." This was a wise decision, had it been given in good faith
and had it been wisely adhered to, but the sequel shows that the
archduke was either not sincere in his protestations or else was
woefully deceived by representations subsequently made to him. Six
months later he accepted the crown without the question having been
submitted to the wishes of any but a very small portion of the Mexican
people.

In spite of the declaration of the Mexican Assembly, which showed so
unmistakably the hand of Napoleon, the French government continued to
repudiate the designs imputed to it against the independence of Mexico,
and Mr. Seward continued to express, officially at least, the
satisfaction of the American government at the explanations vouchsafed
by France. September 11, 1863, he stated the case as follows:

      When France made war against Mexico, we asked of France
      explanations of her objects and purposes. She answered, that
      it was a war for the redress of grievances; that she did not
      intend to permanently occupy or dominate in Mexico, and that
      she should leave to the people of Mexico a free choice of
      institutions of government. Under these circumstances the
      United States adopted, and they have since maintained entire
      neutrality between the belligerents, in harmony with the
      traditional policy in regard to foreign wars. The war has
      continued longer than was anticipated. At different stages
      of it France has, in her intercourse with us, renewed the
      explanations before mentioned. The French army has now
      captured Pueblo and the capital, while the Mexican
      government, with its principal forces, is understood to have
      retired to San Luis Potosi, and a provisional government has
      been instituted under French auspices in the city of Mexico,
      which being supported by arms, divides the actual dominion
      of the country with the Mexican government, also maintained
      by armed power. That provisional government has neither made
      nor sought to make any communication to the government of
      the United States, nor has it been in any way recognized by
      this government. France has made no communication to the
      United States concerning the provisional government which
      has been established in Mexico, nor has she announced any
      actual or intended departure from the policy in regard to
      that country which her before-mentioned explanations have
      authorized us to expect her to pursue.[219]

The probable acceptance of the crown by Maximilian was, however, the
subject of frequent communications between the governments of France and
the United States. In the course of a somewhat familiar conversation
with M. Drouyn de Lhuys, the French minister of state, in August, 1863,
Mr. Dayton expressed the fear that in quitting Mexico France might leave
a _puppet_ behind her. De Lhuys replied: "No; the strings would be too
long to work."

The chances of Maximilian's success in Mexico had been from the first
deliberately calculated on the basis of the probable success of the
Southern Confederacy; and, therefore, the cause of the Juarez government
and the cause of the Union were considered the same. The active sympathy
of the Unionists with the Mexican republic made it difficult for the
administration to maintain neutrality. This difficulty was further
enhanced by the doubt entertained in the United States as to the
intentions of France. In this connection Mr. Seward wrote to Mr. Dayton,
September 21, 1863, as follows:

      The President thinks it desirable that you should seek an
      opportunity to mention these facts to Mr. Drouyn de Lhuys,
      and to suggest to him that the interests of the United
      States, and, as it seems to us, the interests of France
      herself, require that a solution of the present
      complications in Mexico be made, as early as may be
      convenient, upon the basis of the unity and independence of
      Mexico.[220]

In reply, the French minister declared that the question of the
establishment of Maximilian on the Mexican throne was to be decided by a
majority vote of the entire nation; that the dangers of the government
of the archduke would come principally from the United States, and the
sooner the United States showed itself satisfied, and manifested a
willingness to enter into peaceful relations with that government, the
sooner would France be ready to leave Mexico and the new government to
take care of itself, which France would, in any event, do as soon as she
with propriety could; but that she would not lead or tempt the archduke
into difficulty, and then desert him before his government was settled.
He said that the early acknowledgment of that government by the United
States would tend to shorten, or perhaps to end, all the troublesome
complications of France in that country; that they would thereupon quit
Mexico.[221]

To this communication, Mr. Seward replied that the French government had
not been left uninformed of the opinion of the United States that the
permanent establishment of a foreign and monarchical government in
Mexico would be found neither easy nor desirable; that the United States
could not anticipate the action of the Mexican people; and that the
United States still regarded Mexico as the scene of a war which had not
yet ended in the subversion of the government long existing there, with
which the United States remained in the relation of peace and
friendship.[222]

Before formally accepting the crown, the archduke visited England with a
view to securing a promise of recognition for his new position. He was,
of course, to pass through Paris, and in view of his approaching visit,
Mr. Dayton asked for instructions as to his conduct on the occasion. Mr.
Seward replied, February 27, 1864:

      I have taken the President's direction upon the question. If
      the Archduke Maximilian appears in Paris only in his
      character as an imperial prince of the house of Hapsburg,
      you will be expected to be neither demonstrative nor
      reserved in your deportment toward him. If he appears there
      with any assumption of political authority or title in
      Mexico, you will entirely refrain from intercourse with him.
      Should your proceeding be a subject of inquiry or remark,
      you will be at liberty, in the exercise of your own
      discretion, to say that this government, in view of its
      rights and duties in the present conjuncture of its affairs,
      has prescribed fixed rules to be observed, not only by this
      department, but by its representatives in foreign countries.
      We acknowledge revolutions only by direction of the
      President, upon full and mature consideration.[223]

The archduke visited London in company with his father-in-law, Leopold
of Belgium. The British government declined to act on the subject at
that juncture, "but gave them reason to hope that, so soon as the action
in Mexico would appear to justify it, they would acknowledge him."[224]
Spain and Belgium were ready to follow in the wake of France.

About the time of this visit of Maximilian to England, Mr. McDougall, of
California, introduced in the Senate a resolution declaring "that the
movements of the government of France, and the threatened movement of
an emperor, improvised by the Emperor of France, demand by this
republic, if insisted upon, war." This resolution was not carried, but
some days later, on the 4th of April, 1864, the House of Representatives
passed by a unanimous vote a resolution declaring its opposition to the
recognition of a monarchy in Mexico. Mr. Seward, fearing a rupture with
France on this account, took pains to inform the government of that
country, through Mr. Dayton, that this action of the House was in no way
binding on the executive, even if concurred in by the Senate.

The formal acceptance of the crown of Mexico by Maximilian took place
April 10, 1864, at Miramar, the palace he had built near Trieste, in the
presence of the Mexican deputation. The next day the Emperor and Empress
of Mexico, as they styled themselves, set out for their new dominions by
way of Rome, where they received the blessing of the Pope. Before
leaving Europe Maximilian signed with the Emperor of the French a
convention in the following terms:

The French troops in Mexico were to be reduced as soon as possible to
25,000 men.

The French troops were to evacuate Mexico in proportion as the Emperor
of Mexico could organize troops to replace them.

The "foreign legion," composed of 8,000 men, was to remain in Mexico six
years after all the other French troops should have been recalled.

The expenses of the French expedition to Mexico, to be paid by the
Mexican government, were fixed at the sum of two hundred and seventy
million francs for the whole duration of the expedition down to July 1,
1864. From July 1st all expenses of the Mexican army were to be met by
Mexico.[225]

The resolution of the House referred to above came very near producing
the rupture that Mr. Seward was striving to avert, or at least to
postpone, during the continuance of the war of secession. When Mr.
Dayton visited M. Drouyn de Lhuys just after the resolution reached
Europe, the remark which greeted Mr. Dayton when he entered the room
was: "Do you bring us peace, or bring us war?" Mr. Dayton replied that
he did not think France had a right to think that the United States was
about to make war against her on account of anything contained in that
resolution; that it embodied nothing more than the principles which the
United States had constantly held out to France from the beginning.

The Confederate agents were taking advantage of the resolution to stir
up trouble between the United States and France. In fact they had long
caused reports to be spread in Europe, and had succeeded in gaining
credence for them, to the effect that the United States government was
only awaiting the termination of domestic troubles to drive the French
from Mexico. The French naturally concluded that if they were to have
trouble with the United States, it was safest for them to choose their
own time.[226] Napoleon was all the while coquetting with the
Confederate government, and holding above Mr. Seward's head a veiled
threat of recognition of Confederate independence. The Confederate
government quickly caught at the suggestion of an alliance between
Maximilian and the South with the power of France to back them. A
Confederate agent was actually accredited to the government of
Maximilian, but did not reach his destination. Although Napoleon's
calculations were based on the overthrow of the Union, and although he
had assumed at the outset, with England and Spain, an attitude decidedly
unfriendly to the Federal government, nevertheless he was not willing to
go the full length of recognizing the Confederacy as an independent
power while the issue of the conflict was still in doubt.

In speaking of Slidell's movements in Europe and the encouragement given
him in France, Mr. Bigelow wrote to Mr. Seward, February 14, 1865:

      I am strongly impressed with the conviction that, but for
      the Mexican entanglement, the insurgents would receive very
      little further countenance from the imperial government, and
      that a reconciliation of the national policies of the two
      countries on that question would speedily dispose of all
      other sources of dissatisfaction.

As the war of secession seemed nearing its end, the French papers became
uneasy in view of possible intervention in Mexico by the United States
on the ground of the Monroe Doctrine. This principle of American
diplomacy, which was likened to the sword of Damocles suspended over the
head of Maximilian, was discussed in all its bearings on the present
case by the journals of Europe.[227]

Throughout all this period of turmoil, the United States recognized no
authority in Mexico but that of the Juarez government. In April, 1864,
the French minister at Washington complained that serious complications
with France were likely to arise out of grants of land made by
"ex-President Juarez" in Sonora to emigrants from California. The French
government regarded these grants as illegal and proposed to send forces
there to prevent the parties from taking "illicit possession."

In May, 1864, the French government sought explanations in regard to a
club formed in New Orleans, called the "D. M. D.," Defenders of the
Monroe Doctrine. Mr. Seward replied that the object of the club, so far
as the government had been able to ascertain, was to bring moral
influences to bear upon the government of the United States in favor of
a maintenance of the Monroe Doctrine, but not to act in violation of the
law, or of the well-understood governmental policy of neutrality in the
war which existed between France and Mexico. Members of the association
did, however, actually start on an expedition to Brownsville, but the
steamer was taken possession of by United States officials. During the
year 1864 constant complaint was made by the French government of
shipments of arms to the Juarez government from California and from
various points along the Rio Grande, particularly Brownsville, in
violation of American neutrality.

Shortly after the surrender of General Lee, several Confederate officers
of high position and influence went to Mexico and identified themselves
with the government of Maximilian. Dr. Wm. M. Gwin, a former United
States Senator from California, organized a plan for colonizing the
states of northern Mexico with ex-Confederates. This scheme was the
subject of several representations to the French government on the part
of Mr. Seward. He reminded them that the sympathies of the American
people were already considerably excited in favor of the republic of
Mexico; that they were disposed to regard with impatience the continued
intervention of France in that country; and that any favor shown to the
proceedings of Dr. Gwin by the titular Emperor of Mexico or by the
imperial government of France would tend greatly to increase the popular
impatience. He further requested an assurance that the pretenses of Dr.
Gwin and his associates were destitute of any sanction from the Emperor
of France.

Among the most prominent Confederates connected with this scheme were
Matthew F. Maury, the distinguished geographer and naval officer, who
became a naturalized Mexican citizen and was appointed Imperial
Commissioner of Immigration and an honorary councillor of state; and
General John B. Magruder, who was charged with the supervision of the
survey of lands for colonization. It was hoped that the prominence of
these men and the high rank they had held under the Confederate
government would, in the general uncertainty that prevailed as to the
treatment of the South by the victorious Union party, induce many
persons to emigrate to Mexico. Maximilian issued a special decree,
September 5, 1865, regarding colonization with a view to inducing
Southern planters to emigrate to Mexico with their slaves--the latter to
be reduced to a state of _peonage_, regular slavery being prohibited by
the laws of the empire. This scheme was altogether impracticable.

In July, 1865, Maximilian finally made an effort to secure recognition
of his government by the United States. On the 17th of July, the Marquis
de Montholon, the French minister at Washington, called at the
department of state and informed Mr. Seward that a special agent had
arrived at Washington, bearing a letter signed by Maximilian and
addressed to the President of the United States, a copy of which the
marquis presented to the secretary of state. On the 18th, Mr. Seward
delivered back the copy of the letter to the Marquis de Montholon, and
said that, as the United States were on friendly relations with the
republican government of Mexico, the President declined to receive the
letter or to hold any intercourse with the agent who brought it. The
French government expressed to its representative at Washington its
annoyance and embarrassment at this step, and said that Maximilian
should have taken measures to learn the disposition of the United States
before sending the agent.[228]

Mr. Tucker, in his book on the Monroe Doctrine, makes the statement that
Mr. Bigelow, who succeeded Mr. Dayton as minister to France, announced
to the French government that the United States would recognize the
empire of Maximilian upon the immediate withdrawal of the French troops
from the territory of Mexico, but that this statement, made upon the
envoy's own authority, was disavowed by the President. This is hardly a
correct version of the case. It seems that Mr. Bigelow, in the course of
a conversation with M. Drouyn de Lhuys, asked him, "in his own name, and
without prejudicing the opinion of his government, if he did not think
that the recognition of Maximilian by the United States would
facilitate and hasten the recall of the French troops."[229]

On the 3rd of October, 1865, Maximilian issued a decree at the city of
Mexico, the first article of which declared:

      All persons belonging to armed bands or corps, not legally
      authorized, whether they proclaim or not any political
      principles, and whatever be the number of those who compose
      the said bands, their organization, character and
      denomination shall be tried militarily by the
      courts-martial; and if found guilty even of the only fact of
      belonging to the band, they shall be condemned to capital
      punishment, within the twenty-four hours following the
      sentence.[230]

The United States, through Mr. Bigelow, protested to France against this
decree, as repugnant to the sentiments of modern civilization and the
instincts of humanity. M. Drouyn de Lhuys replied with a touch of
sarcasm:

      Why do you not go to President Juarez? We are not the
      government of Mexico and you do us too much honor to treat
      us as such. We had to go to Mexico with an army to secure
      certain important interests, but we are not responsible for
      Maximilian or his government. He is accountable to you, as
      to any other government, if he violated its rights, and you
      have the same remedies there that we had.[231]

The American government was now relieved from the burden of civil war,
and for several months the correspondence of Mr. Seward had been
assuming a more decided tone. On September 6, 1865, he reminded the
French government that the attention of the country was now no longer
occupied by the civil war, and that henceforth both the Congress and the
people of the United States might be expected to give a very large share
of their attention to questions of foreign policy, chief among which was
likely to be that of their relations with France in regard to Mexico.
About this time Major General Schofield was sent to Paris on a mission,
the precise object of which was long a matter of mystery. It appears
from John Bigelow's memoirs that Grant, Schofield, and a number of other
army officers were bringing great pressure to bear upon the government
to intervene by force and drive Maximilian from Mexico. Seward, with his
usual political sagacity, concluded that the best method of holding
Grant and his followers in check was to send Schofield to Paris on an
informal mission. According to the latter, Seward said to him: "I want
you to get your legs under Napoleon's mahogany and tell him he must get
out of Mexico." Seward knew perfectly well that Schofield would not be
as belligerent in the presence of the Emperor as he was in Washington,
and above all he had confidence in Bigelow's tact and ability to handle
Schofield when he arrived in Paris. The plan worked beautifully. Neither
Bigelow nor Schofield reported just what took place at the interview
with the Emperor, but we may be sure that Schofield did not say in Paris
what he had intended to say when he left Washington. After Bigelow
returned from Paris in 1867, he had a conversation with Seward in which
the latter said:

      I sent General Schofield to Paris to parry a letter brought
      to us from Grant insisting that the French be driven head
      over heels and at once out of Mexico. It answered my
      purpose. It gave Schofield something to do, and converted
      him to the policy of the Department by convincing him that
      the French were going as fast as they could. That pacified
      Grant and made everything easy.[232]

On November 6 Seward wrote:

      The presence and operations of a French army in Mexico, and
      its maintenance of an authority there, resting upon force
      and not the free will of the people of Mexico, is a cause of
      serious concern to the people of the United States.... They
      still regard the effort to establish permanently a foreign
      and imperial government in Mexico as disallowable and
      impracticable. For these reasons they could not now agree to
      compromise the position they have hitherto assumed. They are
      not prepared to recognize any political institutions in
      Mexico which are in opposition to the republican government
      with which we have so long and so constantly maintained
      relations of amity and friendship.

Finally, on December 16, 1865, Seward addressed what was practically an
ultimatum to France. He pointed out the likelihood that Congress, then
in session, would direct by law the action of the executive on this
important subject, and stated that:

      It has been the President's purpose that France should be
      respectfully informed upon two points, namely: First, that
      the United States earnestly desire to continue and to
      cultivate sincere friendship with France. Second, that this
      policy would be brought into imminent jeopardy, unless
      France could deem it consistent with her interest and honor
      to desist from the prosecution of armed intervention in
      Mexico, to overthrow the domestic republican government
      existing there, and to establish upon its ruins the foreign
      monarchy which has been attempted to be inaugurated in the
      capital of that country.

In conclusion he added:

      It remains now only to make known to M. Drouyn de Lhuys my
      profound regret that he has thought it his duty to leave the
      subject, in his conversation with you, in a condition that
      does not authorize an expectation on our part that a
      satisfactory adjustment of the case can be effected on any
      basis that thus far has been discussed.

As late as November 29, 1865, the French government, through the Marquis
de Montholon, still insisted on recognition of Maximilian by the United
States as the only basis for an arrangement for the recall of the French
troops.[233]

The formal reply to Mr. Seward's note of December 16 was received
through the Marquis de Montholon, January 29, 1866. M. Drouyn de Lhuys
still insisted that the French expedition had in it nothing hostile to
the institutions of the new world, and assuredly still less to those of
the United States. He called attention to the fact that the United
States had acknowledged the right of France to make war on Mexico, and
continued: "On the other part, we admit, as they do, the principle of
non-intervention; this double postulate includes, as it seems to me, the
elements of an agreement." He also contended that the right to make war
implied the right to secure the results of war; that they had to demand
guarantees, and these guarantees they could not look for from a
government whose bad faith they had proven on so many occasions; that
they found themselves engaged in the establishment of a regular
government, which showed itself disposed to keep its engagements; that
the Mexican people had spoken, and that the Emperor Maximilian had been
called to the throne by the will of the people of the country.[234]

Mr. Seward's counter-reply was dated February 12, 1866. He declared that
the proceedings in Mexico were regarded in the United States as having
been taken without the authority, and prosecuted against the will and
opinions of the Mexican people; that the United States had not seen any
satisfactory evidence that the people of Mexico had spoken and called
into being or accepted the so-called empire, and that the withdrawal of
the French troops was deemed necessary to allow such a proceeding to be
taken. He added, however, that:

      France need not for a moment delay her proposed withdrawal
      of military forces from Mexico, and her putting the
      principle of non-intervention into full and complete
      practice in regard to Mexico through any apprehension that
      the United States will prove unfaithful to the principles
      and policy in that respect which, on their behalf, it has
      been my duty to maintain in this now very lengthened
      correspondence.[235]

He concluded with a virtual ultimatum:

      We shall be gratified when the Emperor shall give to us ...
      definite information of the time when French military
      operations may be expected to cease in Mexico.

Napoleon finally decided that, in view of the European situation, he
could not risk a war with the United States, and in the issue of April
5, 1866, the _Moniteur_ announced that the Emperor had decided that the
French troops should evacuate Mexico in three detachments: the first to
leave in November, 1866; the second in March, 1867; and the third in
November, 1867. In the course of a conversation with Mr. Bigelow the day
following M. Drouyn de Lhuys acknowledged that this statement was
official.[236] The decision of the emperor was officially made known to
the United States in a note of April 21, 1866. Seward had very
fortunately left a loophole in his dispatch of February 12, in the
statement that the United States would continue to pursue its policy of
neutrality after the French evacuation. De Lhuys said:

      We receive this assurance with entire confidence and we find
      therein a sufficient guarantee not any longer to delay the
      adoption of measures intended to prepare for the return of
      our army.[237]

American historians have usually attributed Napoleon's backdown to
Seward's diplomacy supported by the military power of the United States,
which was, of course, greater then than at any other time in our
history. All this undoubtedly had its effect on Napoleon's mind, but it
appears that conditions in Europe just at that particular moment had an
even greater influence in causing him to abandon his Mexican scheme.
Within a few days of the receipt of Seward's ultimatum Napoleon was
informed of Bismarck's determination to force a war with Austria over
the Schleswig-Holstein controversy. Napoleon realized that the
territorial aggrandizement of Prussia, without any corresponding gains
by France, would be a serious blow to his prestige and in fact endanger
his throne. He at once entered upon a long and hazardous diplomatic game
in which Bismarck outplayed him and eventually forced him into war. In
order to have a free hand to meet the European situation he decided to
yield to the American demands.

About the time that the French government announced its intention of
withdrawing its forces from Mexico, it was found that troops were being
enlisted in Austria for the Mexican "foreign legion." The United States
government at once took measures to prevent the French troops from being
replaced by Austrians by declaring to the Austrian government through
Mr. Motley, "that in the event of hostilities being carried on hereafter
in Mexico by Austrian subjects, under the command or with the sanction
of the government of Vienna, the United States will feel themselves at
liberty to regard those hostilities as constituting a state of war by
Austria against the republic of Mexico; and in regard to such war, waged
at this time and under existing circumstances, the United States could
not engage to remain as silent and neutral spectators."[238]

Mr. Motley seems to have been somewhat surprised and puzzled at the
sudden and emphatic change of tone in the instructions of his
government, and failed to carry them out in the spirit intended by Mr.
Seward. This brought forth a sharp reprimand. Mr. Seward expressed his
strong disapproval of the position taken by Mr. Motley in his
communication of the instructions of the department to the Austrian
government, and directed him to carry out his instructions according to
the strict letter, adding:

      I refrain from discussing the question you have raised,
      "Whether the recent instructions of this department
      harmonize entirely with the policy which it pursued at an
      earlier period of the European intervention in Mexico."

Mr. Motley was instructed to withdraw from Vienna in case troops were
sent from Austria to Mexico. The embarkation of troops for this purpose
was stopped. Austria was in a great state of excitement over the
approaching war with Prussia, and, besides needing all her available
troops at home, did not care to antagonize the United States.

It was now a question of great interest in this country and in Europe,
whether Maximilian would withdraw from Mexico with the French troops or
attempt to maintain himself there without foreign support. Napoleon sent
one of his aides to Mexico to make known his intentions to Maximilian.
This fact was communicated to the United States government, October 16,
1866:

      Mr. de Castelnau has for his mission to make it well
      understood that the limit of our sacrifices is reached and
      that if the Emperor Maximilian, thinking to find in the
      country itself a point of sufficient support, may wish to
      endeavor to maintain himself there, he cannot for the future
      count on any succor on the part of France. But it may happen
      that, deeming it impossible to triumph through his own
      resources over the difficulties which surround him, this
      sovereign may determine to abdicate. We will do nothing to
      dissuade him from this, and we think that on this hypothesis
      there would be ground to proceed, by way of election, in the
      establishment of a new government.[239]

When the time came for the withdrawal of the first contingent of French
troops, no action to that end was taken by the French government, and
the United States had once more to seek an explanation. The Emperor
assured the American government, however, that he had decided from
military considerations to withdraw all his troops in the spring in a
body, as the recent successes of the insurgents would render any large
reduction of his forces perilous to those who remained. He further
stated that he had counselled Maximilian to abdicate.[240] To the
surprise of everyone, however, Maximilian seemed to think that honor
demanded that he should remain in Mexico and share the fate of his
supporters.

After the withdrawal of Mr. Corwin, owing to the unsettled state of
affairs in Mexico, the United States had no one accredited to that
government until May, 1866, when Mr. Lewis D. Campbell, of Ohio, was
appointed. He left New York for his post in November, 1866, accompanied
by Lieutenant General William T. Sherman of the army. They proceeded in
the U. S. S. _Susquehanna_ by way of Havana, but as they found the
principal Mexican ports on the Atlantic still occupied by the French,
they proceeded to New Orleans, from which point Mr. Campbell tried to
establish regular communication with President Juarez. The President had
first decided to dispatch General Grant with Mr. Campbell, in the hope
"that some disposition might be made of the land and naval forces of the
United States without interfering within the jurisdiction of Mexico, or
violating the laws of neutrality, which would be useful in favoring the
restoration of law, order and republican government in that country."
This demonstration was intended to insure the withdrawal of the French
army according to the promises of the Emperor. A hitch occurred through
some question raised by General Grant and General Sherman was
substituted.[241]

The French army was withdrawn in the spring of 1867, and it very soon
became evident that Maximilian's cause would speedily collapse. In view
of the almost inevitable capture of Maximilian, Mr. Seward telegraphed
to Mr. Campbell at New Orleans, April 6, 1867:

      You will communicate to President Juarez, promptly and by
      effectual means, the desire of this government, that in case
      of capture, the prince and his supporters may receive the
      humane treatment accorded by civilized nations to prisoners
      of war.

Some of the prisoners already taken had been summarily executed.

Mr. Campbell at once dispatched a special messenger, who succeeded in
getting through to the headquarters of Juarez, and who returned with an
answer from the Mexican government, dated April 22, 1867. This answer
not only undertook to defend the execution of prisoners above referred
to, but also intimated that similar severity would be practiced on
Maximilian and his leading associates, if captured, on the ground that,
by his harsh decrees, he had placed himself beyond the pale of the law
of nations.[242]

Maximilian and his chief supporters were taken prisoners, May 15, 1867.
This information was received in the United States toward the last of
the month, and along with it a report, not well authenticated and which
afterward proved to be false, that they had been executed on the 16th.
As soon as these rumors reached Washington, Mr. Seward telegraphed to
Mr. Campbell, then at New Orleans, June 1, 1867, directing him to
proceed at once to the residence of the President of Mexico and enter on
his mission, and if necessary to urge clemency to Maximilian and the
other prisoners of war. Mr. Campbell failed to act under these
instructions. He requested first that a public vessel of the United
States should be detailed to carry him to Mexico. When it was found that
no ship was available for this purpose, he was ordered to proceed to
Havana and thence by the British or French line of steamers to Vera
Cruz. He replied that under the circumstances he did not think it
becoming the dignity of the representative of the United States to
return to Mexico under the flag of a nation which had shown such
hostility to that country. He thus remained at New Orleans from the
first to the fifteenth of June. He was then ordered peremptorily to
proceed at once according to instructions. He replied that he was ill
and was afraid to go by way of Havana, where yellow fever was raging;
that he would resign, if desired. The same day Mr. Seward telegraphed
him that his resignation would be accepted.

Mr. Seward then informed Mr. Romero, the Mexican minister at Washington,
that Austria, France, and Great Britain had appealed to the United
States to use its good offices to avert the execution of Prince
Maximilian. He strongly recommended clemency to President Juarez, as
good policy, and requested Mr. Romero to make the same known to his
government at once. This was June 15, the same day that Mr. Campbell's
resignation was accepted. On the 21st, Mr. Seward requested Mr. Romero
to inform President Juarez that the Emperor of Austria would restore
Maximilian to all his rights of succession upon his release and
renouncing forever all projects in Mexico.[243]

Meanwhile Maximilian of Hapsburg, Miguel Miramon, and Tomas Mejia had
been tried by court-martial and sentenced to death, June 14. The
sentence was confirmed by the government on the 15th, and the execution
fixed for the 16th, but at the request of Maximilian's counsel, it was
suspended by order of President Juarez until the 19th, in order to allow
the prince to arrange certain business affairs of a private character.
At seven o'clock on the morning of June 19 the prisoners were shot.

FOOTNOTES:

[193] Brit. and For. St. Pap., 1861-62, Vol. LII. Also House Exec. Doc.
No. 100, Thirty-seventh Cong., Second Sess.

[194] Brit. and For. St. Pap., Vol. LII, p. 359.

[195] Wharton's Digest, Sec. 58, Vol. I, p. 312.

[196] Brit. and For. St. Pap., Vol. LII, p. 237.

[197] Brit. and For. St. Pap., Vol. LII, p. 294.

[198] Mr. Seward to Mr. Corwin, Sept. 2, 1861. House Exec. Doc. No. 100,
p. 22, Thirty-seventh Cong., Second Sess.

[199] Brit. and For. St. Pap., Vol. LII, p. 325.

[200] Earl Cowley to Earl Russell, Sept. 24, 1861. Brit. and For. St.
Pap., Vol. LII, p. 329.

[201] Earl Lyons to Earl Russell, Oct. 14, 1861. Brit. and For. St.
Pap., Vol LII, p. 375.

[202] Thirty-Seventh Cong., Second Sess., House Exec. Doc. No. 100, p.
201.

[203] Sir C. Wyke to Earl Russell, Nov. 25, 1861. Brit. and For. St.
Pap., Vol. LII, p. 398.

[204] Thirty-Seventh Cong., Second Sess., House Exec. Doc. No. 100, pp.
186-7.

[205] House Exec. Doc. No. 100, pp. 187-190, Thirty-seventh Cong.,
Second Sess. Brit. and For. St. Pap., Vol. LII. p. 394.

[206] House Exec. Doc. No. 100, p. 174, Thirty-seventh Cong., Second
Sess.

[207] Brit. and For. St. Pap., Vol. LII, p. 381.

[208] Adams to Seward, January 24, 1862. House Ex. Doc. No. 100 p. 206,
Thirty-seventh Cong., Second Sess.

[209] Brit. and For. St. Pap., Vol. LII, p. 418.

[210] H. Ex. Doc. No. 100, p. 209, Thirty-seventh Cong., Second Sess.

[211] H. Ex. Doc No. 54, p. 46, Thirty-seventh Cong., Third Sess.

[212] _Ibid._, p. 48.

[213] Dayton to Seward, April 22, 1862.

[214] Earl Cowley to Earl Russell, May 15, 1862, H. Ex. Doc. No. 54, p.
746, Thirty-seventh Cong., Third Sess.

[215] Earl Russell to Sir C. Wyke, May 22, 1862.

[216] Earl Cowley to Earl Russell, April 25, 1862, H. Ex. Doc. No. 54,
p. 694, Thirty-seventh Cong., Third Sess.

[217] H. Ex. Doc. No. 54, p. 530, Thirty-seventh Cong., Third Sess.

[218] Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 11, pp. 254-268, Thirty-eighth Cong., First
Sess.

[219] Seward to Motley, Sept. 11, 1863, Dipl. Corr., 1863; Sen. Ex. Doc.
No. 11, p. 479, Thirty-eighth Cong., First Sess.

[220] Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 11, p. 464, Thirty-eighth Cong., First Sess.

[221] Dayton to Seward, Oct. 9, 1863, Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 11, p. 471,
Thirty-eighth Cong., First Sess.

[222] Seward to Dayton, Oct. 23, 1863. _Ibid._

[223] Dip. Corr., 1864.

[224] Adams to Seward, March 24, 1864.

[225] Dipl. Corr., 1865, Part III, pp. 356-849.

[226] Dipl. Corr., 1864; also Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 11, Thirty-eighth Cong.,
First Sess.

[227] Dipl. Corr., 1865, Part III, pp. 380-385.

[228] Dipl. Corr. 1865, Part III.

[229] Tucker, p. 104; Dipl. Corr., 1865, Part III.

[230] Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 5, p. 3. Thirty-ninth Cong., First Sess.

[231] Mr. Bigelow to Mr. Seward, Nov. 30, 1865, Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 5,
Thirty-ninth Cong., First Sess.

[232] Bigelow, "Retrospections of an Active Life," Vol. IV, p. 42;
Bancroft, "Life of Seward," Vol. II, p. 435.

[233] Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 6, p. 98, Thirty-ninth Cong., First Sess.

[234] House Ex. Doc. No. 93, Thirty-ninth Cong., First Sess.

[235] Dipl. Corr., 1865, Part III; also H. Ex. Doc. No. 93, Thirty-ninth
Cong., First Sess.

[236] H. Ex. Doc. No. 93, p. 42, Thirty-ninth Cong., First Sess.

[237] _Ibid._

[238] Wharton's Digest, Sec. 58, Vol. I, p. 328.

[239] Dipl. Corr., 1866, Part I, p. 387.

[240] H. Ex. Doc. No. 30, Fortieth Cong., First Sess.

[241] Dipl. Corr., 1866, Part III.

[242] Dipl. Corr., 1866, Part III.

[243] Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 20, Fortieth Cong., First Sess.




CHAPTER VI

THE TWO VENEZUELAN EPISODES


As a result of Blaine's unsuccessful attempt to force Great Britain to
relinquish her rights under the Clayton-Bulwer treaty the Monroe
Doctrine had fallen somewhat into disrepute when in 1895 it was suddenly
revived in a striking and sensational way by President Cleveland's
intervention in the Venezuelan boundary controversy. The dispute between
Great Britain and Venezuela in regard to the boundary line between the
latter and British Guiana was of long standing. In 1814, by treaty with
the Netherlands, Great Britain acquired "the establishments of Demerara,
Essequibo, and Berbice," now known as British Guiana. From that time on
the boundary line between British Guiana and Venezuela was a matter of
dispute. Venezuela always claimed the line of the Essequibo river.

In 1840, Sir Robert Schomburgk, acting under the instructions of the
British government, established a line some distance to the west of the
Essequibo river and marked it by monuments on the face of the country.
Venezuela at once protested. The British government explained that the
line was only tentative and the monuments set up by Schomburgk were
removed.

Various other lines were from time to time claimed by Great Britain,
each one extending the frontier of British Guiana farther and farther to
the west. The _British Colonial Office List_, a government publication,
in the issue for 1885, put the area of British Guiana at about 76,000
square miles. In the issue of the same list for 1886 the same statement
occurs in reference to British Guiana with the change of area to "about
109,000 square miles." Here was a gain of 33,000 square miles without
any statement whatever in explanation of how this additional territory
had been acquired.

After the failure of repeated efforts on the part of Venezuela to secure
an adjustment with England, she finally came to the conclusion in 1882
that the only course open to her was arbitration of the controversy. She
persistently urged arbitration, but Great Britain refused to submit to
arbitration any but a comparatively small part of the territory in
dispute. In 1887 Venezuela suspended diplomatic relations with Great
Britain, protesting "before her British majesty's government, before all
civilized nations, and before the world in general, against the acts of
spoliation committed to her detriment by the government of Great
Britain, which she at no time and on no account will recognize as
capable of altering in the least the rights which she has inherited from
Spain and respecting which she will ever be willing to submit to the
decision of a third power."

After repeated efforts to promote the reëstablishment of diplomatic
relations between Venezuela and Great Britain and after repeated offers
of its good offices for the purpose of bringing about an adjustment of
the controversy, President Cleveland finally determined to intervene in
a more positive manner with a view to forcing, if need be, a settlement
of the controversy. This resolution on the part of the American
executive, with a full statement of its views on the general principles
involved in the dispute, was forwarded to Mr. Bayard for transmission to
the British government in Mr. Olney's dispatch of July 20, 1895.[244]
After reviewing the history of the controversy Mr. Olney stated in the
following concise form what he considered the important features of the
situation as it then existed:

      1. The title to territory of indefinite but confessedly very
      large extent is in dispute between Great Britain on the one
      hand and the South American republic of Venezuela on the
      other.

      2. The disparity in the strength of the claimants is such
      that Venezuela can hope to establish her claim only through
      peaceful methods--through an agreement with her adversary
      either upon the subject itself or upon an arbitration.

      3. The controversy, with varying claims on the part of Great
      Britain, has existed for more than half a century, during
      which period many earnest and persistent efforts of
      Venezuela to establish a boundary by agreement have proved
      unsuccessful.

      4. The futility of the endeavor to obtain a conventional
      line being recognized, Venezuela for a quarter of a century
      has asked and striven for arbitration.

      5. Great Britain, however, has always and continuously
      refused to arbitrate, except upon the condition of a
      renunciation of a large part of the Venezuelan claim and of
      a concession to herself of a large share of the territory in
      controversy.

      6. By the frequent interposition of its good offices at the
      instance of Venezuela, by constantly urging and promoting
      the restoration of diplomatic relations between the two
      countries, by pressing for arbitration of the disputed
      boundary, by offering to act as arbitrator, by expressing
      its grave concern whenever new alleged instances of British
      aggression upon Venezuelan territory have been brought to
      its notice, the government of the United States has made it
      clear to Great Britain and to the world that the controversy
      is one in which both its honor and its interests are
      involved and the continuance of which it cannot regard with
      indifference.

The greater part of the dispatch was taken up with a discussion of the
bearing of the Monroe Doctrine upon the case and the most striking
feature of it was that the Monroe Doctrine was appealed to by name. Mr.
Olney's statement of the Monroe Doctrine is worthy of the most careful
consideration as it was the fullest and most definite official
construction of its meaning and scope that had been given to the world.
He said:

      That America is in no part open to colonization, though the
      proposition was not universally admitted at the time of its
      first enunciation, has long been universally conceded. We
      are now concerned, therefore, only with that other practical
      application of the Monroe Doctrine the disregard of which by
      an European power is to be deemed an act of unfriendliness
      towards the United States. The precise scope and limitations
      of this rule cannot be too clearly apprehended. It does not
      establish any general protectorate by the United States over
      other American states. It does not relieve any American
      state from its obligations as fixed by international law,
      nor prevent any European power directly interested from
      enforcing such obligations or from inflicting merited
      punishment for the breach of them. It does not contemplate
      any interference in the internal affairs of any American
      state or in the relations between it and other American
      states. It does not justify any attempt on our part to
      change the established form of government of any American
      state or to prevent the people of such state from altering
      that form according to their own will and pleasure. The
      rule in question has but a single purpose and object. It is
      that no European power or combination of European powers
      shall forcibly deprive an American state of the right and
      power of self-government and of shaping for itself its own
      political fortunes and destinies.

Lord Salisbury's reply to Mr. Olney was given in two dispatches of the
same date, November 26, 1895, the one devoted to a discussion of the
Monroe Doctrine, the other to a discussion of the rights of the
controversy as between Great Britain and Venezuela. In the first
dispatch Lord Salisbury argued that Mr. Olney's views went far beyond
the scope of the Monroe Doctrine, that no attempt at colonization was
being made, and that no political system was being imposed upon any
state of South America. He also denied that the Monroe Doctrine was a
part of international law, since it had not received the consent of
other nations, and he utterly repudiated Mr. Olney's principle that
"American questions are for American discussion."

In the second dispatch of the same date Lord Salisbury enters fully into
the rights of the controversy between Great Britain and Venezuela,
controverting the arguments of the earlier part of Mr. Olney's dispatch,
which he characterizes as _ex parte_.

In view of the very positive character of Mr. Olney's dispatch and of
the assertion that the honor and interests of the United States were
concerned, the refusal of Great Britain to arbitrate placed the
relations of the two countries in a very critical position. The American
executive, however, had intervened for the purpose of settling the
controversy, peaceably if possible, forcibly if need be, and President
Cleveland did not now shrink from the logic of events. In a message to
Congress, December 17, 1895,[245] he laid before that body Mr. Olney's
dispatch of July 20, together with Lord Salisbury's reply. He not only
reaffirmed the soundness of the Monroe Doctrine and its application to
the case in question, but claimed for that principle of American
diplomacy a place in the code of international law.

In regard to the applicability of the Monroe Doctrine to the Venezuelan
boundary dispute Mr. Cleveland declared:

      If a European power by an extension of its boundaries takes
      possession of the territory of one of our neighboring
      republics against its will and in derogation of its rights,
      it is difficult to see why to that extent such European
      power does not thereby attempt to extend its system of
      government to that portion of this continent which is thus
      taken. This is the precise action which President Monroe
      declared to be "dangerous to our peace and safety," and it
      can make no difference whether the European system is
      extended by an advance of frontier or otherwise.

In regard to the right of the United States to demand the observance of
this principle by other nations, Mr. Cleveland said:

      Practically the principle for which we contend has peculiar,
      if not exclusive, relation to the United States. It may not
      have been admitted in so many words to the code of
      international law, but since in international councils every
      nation is entitled to the rights belonging to it, if the
      enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine is something we may
      justly claim, it has its place in the code of international
      law as certainly and as securely as if it were specifically
      mentioned; and when the United States is a suitor before the
      high tribunal that administers international law the
      question to be determined is whether or not we present
      claims which the justice of that code of law can find to be
      right and valid. The Monroe Doctrine finds its recognition
      in those principles of international law which are based
      upon the theory that every nation shall have its rights
      protected and its just claims enforced.

Mr. Cleveland concluded that the dispute had reached such a stage as to
make it incumbent upon the United States to take measures to determine
with sufficient certainty for its justification what was the true
divisional line between the republic of Venezuela and British Guiana. He
therefore recommended that Congress make an appropriation for the
expenses of a commission, to be appointed by the executive, which should
make the necessary investigations and report upon the matter with the
least possible delay. "When such report is made and accepted," he
continued, "it will, in my opinion, be the duty of the United States to
resist by every means in its power, as a willful aggression upon its
rights and interests, the appropriation by Great Britain of any lands or
the exercise of governmental jurisdiction over any territory which after
investigation we have determined of right belongs to Venezuela." "In
making these recommendations," he added, "I am fully alive to the
responsibility incurred and keenly realize all the consequences that may
follow."

The publication of this message and the accompanying dispatches created
the greatest excitement both in the United States and in England, and
called forth the severest criticism of the President's course.

The main grounds of this criticism were the contentions:

(1) That the Monroe Doctrine was not a part of international law and
therefore its observance as such could not be urged upon other nations.

(2) That it was not even an established principle of American diplomacy,
since the original declaration was merely a protest against apprehended
aggression on the part of a combination of European powers which had
long since ceased to threaten this continent.

(3) That even granting that the Monroe Doctrine was a declaration of
American policy, it was merely a policy and imposed no obligation on the
government to enforce it except where our interests were directly
concerned.

(4) That the occupation of a few thousand acres of uninhabited territory
by Great Britain, even if it did rightfully belong to Venezuela, was not
a matter that affected the interests of the United States one way or the
other or that threatened the permanence or stability of American
institutions.

(5) That granting the wisdom and correctness of the President's
position, the language of his message and of Mr. Olney's dispatch was
indiscreet at best and unnecessarily offensive to British pride.

It may be well to consider these objections in detail. In regard to the
first point it may be said that neither President Cleveland nor Mr.
Olney asserted or maintained that the Monroe Doctrine was a part of
international law by virtue of its assertion by President Monroe and
succeeding presidents. The position they took was that the Monroe
Doctrine was an American statement of a well recognized principle of
international law, viz., the right of a state to intervene in a
controversy between other states, when it deems its own interests
threatened. Mr. Cleveland declared: "The Monroe Doctrine finds its
recognition in those principles of international law which are based
upon the theory that every nation shall have its rights protected and
its just claims enforced." Mr. Olney's analysis of the doctrine was
clearer and more specific. He said: "That there are circumstances under
which a nation may justly intervene in a controversy to which two or
more other nations are the direct and immediate parties is an admitted
canon of international law." After discussing the general principle of
intervention, he adds: "We are concerned at this time, however, not so
much with the general rule as with a form of it which is peculiarly and
distinctively American."[246]

In answer to the second objection it is only necessary to refer to
accepted works on public law and to the official correspondence of the
state department to show that the Monroe Doctrine had for three-quarters
of a century been the cardinal principle of American diplomacy.[247]

The third point, namely as to the expediency of enforcing the Monroe
Doctrine in all cases of European aggression on this continent, raises
an important question. If, however, the Monroe Doctrine is a wise
principle and one which it is our interest to maintain, it is right that
it should be asserted on every occasion of its violation. The force of
precedent is so great that in the present state of international law,
it would be dangerous to do otherwise.

In the fourth place while it was perfectly true that the occupation of
the disputed territory by Great Britain could not in itself conceivably
endanger the peace and integrity of the United States, yet as the open
violation of a principle upon which we had laid so much stress we could
not in honor and dignity have overlooked it.

As to the tone of Mr. Olney's dispatch and of Mr. Cleveland's message,
it must be acknowledged that while the positions assumed were in the
main correct, the language was in some cases unfortunate, either from
vagueness or generalization. Thus Mr. Olney's statement, that "3,000
miles of intervening ocean make any permanent political union between a
European and an American state unnatural and inexpedient,"--whatever he
may have meant by it--appears in view of Great Britain's connection with
Canada, to have been both untrue and calculated to give offense.
Likewise Mr. Cleveland's reference to "the high tribunal that
administers international law" was too rhetorical a figure for a state
paper.

It has, indeed, been suggested that President Cleveland and Mr. Olney
deliberately undertook to play a bluff game in order to browbeat the
British government. In any case, it should be remembered that the test
of a diplomatic move is its success, and judged from this standpoint Mr.
Cleveland's Venezuelan policy was vindicated by the results. The British
government at once adopted the most friendly attitude and placed
valuable information in its archives at the disposal of the
commissioners appointed by President Cleveland to determine the true
boundary line. On November 12, 1896, before the final report of this
commission was made, a complete accord was reached between Great Britain
and the United States by which the terms of a treaty to be ratified by
Great Britain and Venezuela were agreed on, the provisions of which
embraced a full arbitration of the whole controversy. Lord Salisbury's
sudden change of front has been the subject of much interesting
speculation. How far he was influenced by the South African situation
has never been revealed, but it undoubtedly had its effect. President
Cleveland's message was sent to Congress December 17. Before the end of
the month came Dr. Jameson's raid into the Transvaal, and on the 3rd of
January the German Kaiser sent his famous telegram to Paul Kruger. The
attention of England was thus diverted from America to Germany, and Lord
Salisbury doubtless thought it prudent to avoid a rupture with the
United States in order to be free to deal with the situation in South
Africa.

The Anglo-Venezuelan treaty provided that an arbitral tribunal should be
immediately appointed to determine the true boundary line between
Venezuela and British Guiana. This tribunal was to consist of two
members nominated by the judges of the Supreme Court of the United
States and two members nominated by the British Supreme Court of Justice
and of a fifth selected by the four persons so nominated, or in the
event of their failure to agree within three months of their
appointment, selected by the king of Sweden and Norway. The person so
selected was to be president of the tribunal, and it was expressly
stipulated that the persons nominated by the Supreme Court of the
United States and England respectively might be members of said courts.
Certain general rules were also laid down for the guidance of the
tribunal.[248]

A treaty embodying substantially these proposals was signed by the
British and Venezuelan representatives at Washington, February 2, 1897.
The decision of the tribunal which met in Paris gave a large part of the
disputed area to Great Britain and this occasioned further criticism of
President Cleveland's action in bringing the United States and England
to the verge of war on what was termed an academic issue. The award was
a matter of secondary importance. The principle for which the United
States contended was vindicated when Great Britain agreed to arbitrate.
It was a great triumph of American diplomacy to force Great Britain just
at this time to recognize in fact, if not in words, the Monroe Doctrine,
for it was not long before Germany showed a disposition to question that
principle of American policy, and the fact that we had upheld it against
England made it easier to deal with Germany.

The attention of Europe and America was drawn to Venezuela a second time
in 1902 when Germany made a carefully planned and determined effort to
test out the Monroe Doctrine and see whether we would fight for it. In
that year Germany, England, and Italy made a naval demonstration against
Venezuela for the purpose of forcing her to recognize the validity of
certain claims of their subjects which she had persistently refused to
settle. How England was led into the trap is still a mystery, but the
Kaiser thought that he had her thoroughly committed and that if she
once started in with him she could not turn against him. But he had
evidently not profited by the experience of Napoleon III in Mexico forty
years earlier under very similar circumstances.

In the case of Germany, though the facts were somewhat obscured, the
real purpose of the intervention was to collect claims which originated
in contract between German subjects and the government of Venezuela. One
claim was for the recovery of interest seven years in arrears on five
per cent. bonds, for which Venezuelan customs were pledged as security.
Another was for seven per cent. dividends guaranteed by the Venezuelan
government on the capital stock of a railroad built by German subjects
at a cost of nearly $20,000,000. There were still other claims amounting
to about $400,000 for forced loans and military requisitions.[249]

These claims were brought to the attention of the United States
government by the German ambassador on December 11, 1901. Their dubious
character, regarded from the standpoint of international law, led
Germany to make what purported to be a frank avowal of her intentions to
the United States, and to secure for her action the acquiescence of that
government. Her ambassador declared that the German government had "no
purpose or intention to make even the smallest acquisition of territory
on the South American continent or the islands adjacent." This
precaution was taken in order to prevent a subsequent assertion of the
Monroe Doctrine. In conclusion the German ambassador stated that his
government had decided to "ask the Venezuelan government to make a
declaration immediately, that it recognizes in principle the correctness
of these demands, and is willing to accept the decision of a mixed
commission, with the object of having them determined and assured in all
their details." At the same time the British government demanded a
settlement of claims for the destruction of property and for the
ill-treatment and imprisonment of British subjects in the recent civil
wars, as well as a settlement of the foreign debt.

On December 16, 1901, Mr. Hay replied to the German note, thanking the
German government for its voluntary and frank declaration, and stating
that he did not consider it necessary to discuss the claims in question;
but he called attention to the following reference to the Monroe
Doctrine in President Roosevelt's message of December 3, 1901:

      This doctrine has nothing to do with the commercial
      relations of any American power, save that it in truth
      allows each of them to form such as it desires. In other
      words, it is really a guarantee of the commercial
      independence of the Americas. We do not ask under this
      doctrine for any exclusive commercial dealings with any
      other American state. We do not guarantee any state against
      punishment if it misconducts itself, provided that
      punishment does not take the form of the acquisition of
      territory by any non-American power.

A year later, after fruitless negotiations, the German government
announced to the United States that it proposed, in conjunction with
Great Britain and Italy, to establish a pacific blockade of Venezuelan
harbors. The United States replied that it did not recognize a pacific
blockade which adversely affected the rights of third parties as a
valid proceeding. The powers then proposed to establish a "warlike
blockade," but "without any declaration of war." This device was
resorted to at the suggestion of the German government, in order to
avoid a formal declaration of war, which could not be made without the
consent of the Bundesrath. Meanwhile, Venezuela's gunboats had been
seized and her ports blockaded, acts which Mr. Balfour admitted on the
floor of the House of Commons constituted a state of war; and on
December 20 a formal blockade was announced in accordance with the law
of nations, which created a status of belligerency.[250]

The hostilities thus commenced were brought to a close by the diplomatic
intervention of the United States. Acting under instructions from
Washington, the American minister Herbert W. Bowen succeeded in
persuading Venezuela to recognize in principle the claims of the foreign
powers and to refer them to mixed commissions for the purpose of
determining the amounts.[251] Great Britain and Italy agreed to this
arrangement, but the German Kaiser remained for a time obdurate. What
followed Germany's refusal to arbitrate is described in Thayer's "Life
and Letters of John Hay" in the following words:

      One day, when the crisis was at its height, [President
      Roosevelt] summoned to the White House Dr. Holleben, the
      German Ambassador, and told him that unless Germany
      consented to arbitrate, the American squadron under Admiral
      Dewey would be given orders, by noon ten days later, to
      proceed to the Venezuelan coast and prevent any taking
      possession of Venezuelan territory. Dr. Holleben began to
      protest that his Imperial master, having once refused to
      arbitrate, could not change his mind. The President said
      that he was not arguing the question, because arguments had
      already been gone over until no useful purpose would be
      served by repeating them; he was simply giving information
      which the Ambassador might think it important to transmit to
      Berlin. A week passed in silence. Then Dr. Holleben again
      called on the President, but said nothing of the Venezuelan
      matter. When he rose to go, the President asked him about
      it, and when he stated that he had received nothing from his
      government, the President informed him in substance that, in
      view of this fact, Admiral Dewey would be instructed to sail
      a day earlier than the day he, the President, had originally
      mentioned. Much perturbed, the Ambassador protested; the
      President informed him that not a stroke of a pen had been
      put on paper; that if the Emperor would agree to arbitrate,
      he, the President, would heartily praise him for such
      action, and would treat it as taken on German initiative;
      but that within forty-eight hours there must be an offer to
      arbitrate or Dewey would sail with the orders indicated.
      Within thirty-six hours Dr. Holleben returned to the White
      House and announced to President Roosevelt that a dispatch
      had just come from Berlin, saying that the Kaiser would
      arbitrate. Neither Admiral Dewey (who with an American fleet
      was then manoeuvering in the West Indies) nor any one else
      knew of the step that was to be taken; the naval authorities
      were merely required to be in readiness, but were not told
      what for.

      On the announcement that Germany had consented to arbitrate,
      the President publicly complimented the Kaiser on being so
      stanch an advocate of arbitration. The humor of this was
      probably relished more in the White House than in the Palace
      at Berlin.[252]

The Holleben incident, as narrated for the first time by Thayer, was
immediately called in question. It will be noted that Thayer does not
in any way quote Hay in the matter, and in the three volumes of "Diaries
and Letters" of John Hay, privately printed by Mrs. Hay in 1908, there
is no reference of any kind to the incident. It is evident that Thayer
got his report of the interview directly from Roosevelt himself. It is
said on good authority that while Colonel Roosevelt had no documentary
evidence to support his statements at the time that he gave them to
Thayer, such evidence came to hand in an interesting way shortly after
the appearance of the book. Two German-Americans who had been intimate
friends of Holleben promptly wrote to Colonel Roosevelt protesting, not
against the facts as stated, but against the use that was made of them.
Both correspondents stated that they had been told of the interview at
the time by Holleben. Admiral Dewey confirmed the statement as to the
preparedness of the fleet in a letter dated May 23, 1916, which was
published four days later in the New York _Times_. In it he said:

      I was at Culebra, Porto Rico, at the time in command of a
      fleet consisting of over fifty ships, including every
      battleship and every torpedo-boat we had, with orders from
      Washington to hold the fleet in hand and be ready to move at
      a moment's notice. Fortunately, however, the whole matter
      was amicably adjusted and there was no need for action.

In a speech delivered to several thousand Republican "Pilgrims" at
Oyster Bay, May 27, Colonel Roosevelt made the following interesting
comments on Dewey's letter:

      Just today I was very glad to see published in the papers
      the letter of Admiral Dewey describing an incident that
      took place while I was President. When we were menaced with
      trouble I acted up to my theory that the proper way of
      handling international relations was by speaking softly and
      carrying a big stick. And in that particular case Dewey and
      the American fleet represented the big stick. I asked, on
      behalf of the nation, the things to which we were entitled.
      I was as courteous as possible. I not only acted with
      justice, but with courtesy toward them. I put every
      battleship and every torpedo-boat on the sea under the
      American flag and Dewey, with instructions to hold himself
      ready in entire preparedness to sail at a moment's notice.
      That didn't mean that we were to have war. Dewey was the
      greatest possible provocative of peace.[253]

After the agreement to arbitrate had been made, the situation was
further complicated by the demands of the blockading powers that the
sums ascertained by the mixed commissions to be due them should be paid
in full before anything was paid upon the claims of the peace powers.
Venezuela insisted that all her creditors should be treated alike. The
Kaiser, from what motives it is not quite clear, suggested that this
question should be referred to President Roosevelt, but as the United
States was an interested party, Secretary Hay did not think it would be
proper for the President to act, and it was finally agreed that the
demands for preferential treatment should be submitted to the Hague
Court.

During the summer of 1903 ten mixed commissions sat at Caracas to
adjudicate upon the claims of as many nations against Venezuela. These
commissions simply determined the amount of the claims in each case. The
awards of these commissions are very instructive, as they show the
injustice of resorting to measures of coercion for the collection of
pecuniary claims which have not been submitted to arbitration. Belgian
claimants demanded 14,921,805 bolivars and were awarded 10,898,643;
British claimants demanded 14,743,572 and were awarded 9,401,267; German
claimants demanded 7,376,685 and were awarded 2,091,908; Italian
claimants demanded 39,844,258 and were awarded 2,975,906; Spanish
claimants demanded 5,307,626 and were awarded 1,974,818; United States
claimants demanded 81,410,952 and were awarded 2,313,711.[254]

The decision of the Hague Court, which was rendered February 22, 1904,
held that the three allied powers were entitled to preferential
treatment; that Venezuela had recognized in principle the justice of
their claims while she had not recognized in principle the justice of
the claims of the pacific powers; that the neutral powers had profited
to some extent by the operations of the allies, and that their rights
remained for the future absolutely intact.[255] This decision, emanating
from a peace court, and indorsing the principle of armed coercion, was
received with no small degree of criticism.

During the discussions on the Venezuelan situation that took place in
Parliament in December, 1902, the members of the government repeatedly
repudiated the charge of the opposition that they were engaged in a
debt-collecting expedition, and tried to make it appear that they were
protecting the lives and liberties of British subjects. Lord Cranborne
declared:

      I can frankly tell the House that it is not the claims of
      the bondholders that bulk largest in the estimation of the
      government. I do not believe the government would ever have
      taken the strong measures to which they have been driven if
      it had not been for the attacks by Venezuela upon the lives,
      the liberty, and the property of British subjects.

During the same discussion, Mr. Norman said:

      This idea of the British fleet being employed to collect the
      debts of foreign bondholders is assuredly a mistaken one. It
      was said by Wellington once that the British army did not
      exist for the purpose of collecting certain debts. It is
      still more true of the British fleet that it does not exist
      for the purpose of collecting debts of bondholders. People
      who lend money to South American republics know what the
      security is and what they are likely to get in return, and
      they ought not to have the British fleet at their backs.

To this Mr. Balfour, the prime minister, replied:

      I do not deny--in fact, I freely admit--that bondholders may
      occupy an international position which may require
      international action; but I look upon such international
      action with the gravest doubt and suspicion, and I doubt
      whether we have in the past ever gone to war for the
      bondholders, for those of our countrymen who have lent money
      to a foreign government; and I confess that I should be very
      sorry to see that made a practice in this country.

Against President Roosevelt's contention that the coercion of an
American state was not contrary to the Monroe Doctrine, provided that it
did "not take the form of acquisition of territory by any non-American
power," Signor Drago, Minister of Foreign Relations of the Argentine
Republic, vigorously protested in a note dated December 29, 1902.[256]
This note contained a restatement of the "Calvo doctrine," which takes
its name from a celebrated Argentine publicist. In his well-known book
on international law, Calvo contends that a state has no right to resort
to armed intervention for the purpose of collecting the private claims
of its citizens against another state. This doctrine, which has received
the indorsement of most of the Latin-American states, was applied to
public bonds in the note above referred to and is now usually known as
the "Drago doctrine." Signor Drago held, first, "that the capitalist who
lends his money to a foreign state always takes into account the
resources of the country and the probability, greater or less, that the
obligations contracted will be fulfilled without delay. All governments
thus enjoy different credit according to their degree of civilization
and culture, and their conduct in business transactions," and these
conditions are measured before making loans. Second, a fundamental
principle of international law is the entity and equality of all states.
Both the acknowledgment of the debt and the payment must be left to the
nation concerned "without diminution of its inherent rights as a
sovereign entity."

He said further:

      As these are the sentiments of justice, loyalty, and honor
      which animate the Argentine people and have always inspired
      its policy, your excellency will understand that it has felt
      alarm at the knowledge that the failure of Venezuela to meet
      the payment of its public debt is given as one of the
      determining causes of the capture of its fleet, the
      bombardment of one of its ports and the establishment of a
      rigorous blockade along its shores. If such proceedings were
      to be definitely adopted they would establish a precedent
      dangerous to the security and the peace of the nations of
      this part of America. The collection of loans by military
      means implies territorial occupation to make them effective,
      and territorial occupation signifies a suppression or
      subordination of the governments of the countries on which
      it is imposed.

The doctrine so ably expounded by Dr. Drago attracted much attention
during the next few years and was given a place on the program of the
Third Pan American Conference held at Rio de Janeiro in July, 1906. Dr.
Drago had made his proposal as "a statement of policy" for the states of
the American continents to adopt. After full discussion the Rio
Conference decided to recommend to the governments represented "that
they consider the point of inviting the Second Peace Conference at The
Hague to consider the question of the compulsory collection of public
debts; and, in general, means tending to diminish between nations
conflicts having an exclusively pecuniary origin."[257]

As a result of this action the United States modified the regular
program prepared by Russia for the Second Hague Conference by reserving
the right to introduce the question of an "agreement to observe certain
limitations in the use of force in collecting public debts accruing from
contracts." General Horace Porter presented to The Hague Conference a
resolution providing that the use of force for the collection of
contract debts should not be permitted until the justice of the claim
and the amount of the debt should have been determined by arbitration. A
large number of reservations were introduced, but the following
resolutions were finally adopted by the votes of thirty-nine states,
with five states abstaining from voting:

      The contracting powers agree not to have recourse to armed
      force for the recovery of contract debts claimed from the
      government of one country by the government of another
      country as being due to its nationals.

      This undertaking is, however, not applicable when the debtor
      state refuses or neglects to reply to an offer of
      arbitration, or, after accepting the offer, prevents any
      "compromis" from being agreed on, or, after the arbitration,
      fails to submit to the award.[258]

FOOTNOTES:

[244] For. Rel., 1895-96, Part I, p. 552.

[245] "Messages and Papers of the Presidents," Vol. IX, p. 655.

[246] Olney to Bayard, July 20, 1895.

[247] Moore's "Digest of Int. Law," Vol. VI, pp. 368-604, especially Mr.
Fish's Report on Relations with the Spanish-American Republics of July
14, 1870, pp. 429-431.

[248] Foreign Relations, 1896, p. 254.

[249] Foreign Relations, 1901, p. 193; 1903, p. 429.

[250] Foreign Relations, 1903, pp. 419, 454; Moore, "Digest of Int.
Law," Vol. VII. p. 140.

[251] Moore, "Digest of Int. Law," Vol. VI, p. 590.

[252] Thayer, "Life and Letters of John Hay," Vol. II, pp. 286-288.

[253] Washington _Post_, May 28, 1916.

[254] Venezuelan Arbitrations of 1903 (Sen. Doc. No. 316, Fifty-eighth
Cong., Second Sess.); Foreign Relations, 1904, p. 871.

[255] Foreign Relations, 1904, p. 506. For a full report of the case see
Sen. Doc. No. 119, Fifty-eighth Cong., Third Sess.

[256] Foreign Relations, 1903, p. 1.

[257] _Am. Journal of Int. Law_, Vol. II, p. 78.

[258] _Am. Journal of Int. Law_, Vol. II, Supplement, p. 82.




CHAPTER VII

THE ADVANCE OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE CARIBBEAN


At the beginning of the nineteenth century Spain was still in possession
of all the shores of the Caribbean Sea and the Gulf of Mexico, but the
downfall of her vast colonial empire was rapidly approaching. By the
secret treaty of San Ildefonso she agreed to cede Louisiana back to
France, and in 1803 Napoleon sold the entire province to the United
States. This was our first acquisition of territory on the Gulf of
Mexico, and it insured a free outlet for the vast region of the
Mississippi valley. The boundaries of the province were indefinite, and
there ensued a long controversy with Spain as to whether Louisiana
included West Florida on the one hand and Texas on the other. These
questions were finally adjusted by the Florida treaty of 1819, which
ceded both East and West Florida to the United States and fixed the
western boundary of Louisiana on the Gulf at the Sabine river. By this
treaty the United States gained undisputed possession of the region
extending from Mobile bay to the Mississippi, but abandoned the claim to
Texas.

[Illustration: THE CARIBBEAN]

It was not many years before American settlers began pouring into Texas
and came into conflict with the government of Mexico, which had by this
time become independent of Spain. There followed the war of
independence and the establishment of the Republic of Texas in 1836.
Texas promptly applied for admission to the United States, but mainly
through the opposition of the Abolitionists she was kept waiting for
nine years. The new republic was recognized by the United States and by
the principal powers of Europe, but Mexico refused to concede
independence. Texas was thus in constant danger of attack from Mexico
and unable to secure admission to the American Union. In April, 1844, a
treaty providing for the annexation of Texas was submitted to the Senate
by President Tyler, but it was rejected by that body. Under these
circumstances the public men of Texas lent a ready ear to British and
French intrigues. Great Britain wished to encourage the development of
Texas as a cotton-growing country from which she could draw a large
enough supply to make her independent of the United States. If Texas
should thus devote herself to the production of cotton as her chief
export crop, she would naturally adopt a free trade policy and thus
create a considerable market for British goods. Great Britain,
therefore, consistently opposed the annexation of Texas by the United
States and entered into negotiations with France, Mexico, and the
Republic of Texas for the express purpose of preventing it. Lord
Aberdeen proposed that the four powers just mentioned should sign a
diplomatic act, or perpetual treaty, securing to Texas recognition from
Mexico and peace, but preventing her from ever acquiring territory
beyond the Rio Grande or joining the American Union. While the United
States would be invited to unite in this act, it was not expected that
the government of that country would agree to it. Despairing of being
received into the American Union, Texas was apparently ready to accept
the British proposal, but Lord Aberdeen's plan was defeated by the
refusal of Mexico to recognize under any conditions the independence of
Texas. Aberdeen was willing to coerce Mexico and, if need be, to fight
the United States, but Louis Philippe was not willing to go that far.
Meanwhile the Texas question had become the leading political issue in
the United States. The Democratic platform of 1844 demanded "the
reannexation of Texas at the earliest practicable period," and on this
platform Polk was elected President. Tyler, however, did not wait for
his successor to carry out this mandate of the American people, but in
the last days of his administration pushed through Congress a joint
resolution providing for the admission of Texas.[259]

Mexico promptly severed diplomatic relations with the United States. As
Mexico had never recognized the independence of Texas, she had of course
never agreed upon any boundary with the new republic. This was a matter
which had to be adjusted and there were also a number of private claims
of American citizens against the government of Mexico which that
government refused to settle. President Polk took up both questions with
characteristic vigor, and on the refusal of Mexico to receive a special
minister sent by him for the purpose of discussing these questions, he
ordered General Taylor to occupy the disputed area between the Nueces
river and the Rio Grande. Thus began the Mexican War, which established
the boundary of the United States on the Rio Grande and added the vast
region of New Mexico and California to the Union. Here the tide of
American expansion to the South was stayed for a full half century.

With the decline of the Spanish power Great Britain had succeeded to
naval supremacy in the Caribbean. As has been related in previous
chapters, the United States and Great Britain long regarded Cuba with
jealous eyes and had a controversy lasting for half a century over the
control of the proposed Isthmian canal. Secretary Seward at the close of
the civil war sought to strengthen the position of the United States in
the Caribbean by the acquisition of Santo Domingo and the Danish West
Indies. In 1867 a treaty was concluded with Denmark providing for the
cession of the islands of St. Thomas and St. John for $7,500,000, on
condition that the inhabitants should by popular vote give their
consent. In undertaking these negotiations the United States was
influenced on the one hand by the desire to acquire a naval base, and on
the other by the fear that these islands might fall into the hands of
one of the greater European powers. The plebiscite in St. John and St.
Thomas was overwhelmingly in favor of the cession, and the treaty was
promptly ratified by the Danish Rigsdag, but the Senate of the United
States took no action until March, 1870, when Senator Sumner presented
an adverse report from the Committee on Foreign Relations and the treaty
was rejected.

In 1867 Admiral Porter and Mr. F. W. Seward, the assistant secretary of
state, were sent to Santo Domingo for the purpose of securing the lease
of Samana bay as a naval station. Their mission was not successful, but
the following year the president of the Dominican Republic sent an agent
to Washington proposing annexation and requesting the United States to
occupy Samana bay at once. In his annual message of December 8, 1868,
President Johnson advocated the annexation of Santo Domingo and a joint
resolution to that effect was introduced into the House, but it was
tabled without debate by an overwhelming vote. President Grant became
much interested in this scheme, and soon after entering the White House
he sent one of his private secretaries, Colonel Babcock, to the island
to report on the condition of affairs. Babcock negotiated a treaty for
the annexation of the Dominican Republic, and another for the lease of
Samana bay. As Colonel Babcock was without diplomatic authority of any
kind, the Cabinet received the treaties in silent amazement, and
Hamilton Fish, who was secretary of state, spoke of resigning, but Grant
persuaded him to remain in office. The annexation treaty was submitted
to the Senate in January, 1870, but encountered violent opposition,
especially from Sumner, Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations.
It was finally rejected June 30 by vote of 28 to 28.

The advance of the United States into the Caribbean was thus delayed
until the Spanish War. As a result of that conflict the United States
acquired Porto Rico and a protectorate over Cuba. The real turning-point
in the recent history of the West Indies was the Hay-Pauncefote treaty
of 1901, under the terms of which Great Britain relinquished her claim
to an equal voice with the United States in the control of an Isthmian
canal on which she had insisted for half a century. While the
Hay-Pauncefote treaty was limited in terms to the canal question, it was
in reality of much wider significance. It amounted in effect to the
transference of naval supremacy in the West Indies to the United States,
for since its signature Great Britain has withdrawn her squadron from
this important strategic area. So marked was Great Britain's change of
attitude toward the United States at this time that some writers have
concluded that a secret treaty of alliance was made between the two
countries in 1897. The absurdity of such a statement was pointed out by
Senator Lodge several years ago. England's change of attitude is not
difficult to understand. For one hundred years after the battle of
Trafalgar England had pursued the policy of maintaining a navy large
enough to meet all comers. With the rapid growth of the navies of
Russia, Japan, and Germany during the closing years of the nineteenth
century, England realized that she could no longer pursue a policy of
isolation. Our acquisition of the Philippines, the Hawaiian Islands, and
Porto Rico and our determination to build an Isthmian canal made a large
American navy inevitable. Great Britain realized, therefore, that she
would have to cast about for future allies. It was on considerations of
this kind that she signed the Hay-Pauncefote treaty with the United
States in 1901, and the defensive alliance with Japan in 1902. In view
of the fact that the United States was bent on carrying out the long
deferred canal scheme, Great Britain realized that a further insistence
on her rights under the Clayton-Bulwer treaty would lead to friction
and possible conflict. She wisely decided, therefore, to recede from the
position which she had held for half a century and to give us a free
hand in the acquisition and control of the canal at whatever point we
might choose to build it. In signing the Hay-Pauncefote treaty she
gracefully recognized the fact that the United States had paramount
interests in the Caribbean which it was unwise for her to contest. Since
the signature of that treaty American supremacy in this area has not
been seriously questioned.

The determination to build a canal not only rendered inevitable the
adoption of a policy of naval supremacy in the Caribbean sea, but led to
the formulation of new political policies to be applied in the zone of
the Caribbean--what Admiral Chester calls the larger Panama Canal
Zone--that is, the West Indies, Mexico and Central America, Colombia and
Venezuela. The policies referred to included the establishment of
protectorates, the supervision of finances, the control of all naval
routes, the acquisition of naval stations, and the policing and
administration of disorderly countries.

The advance of the United States in the Caribbean since the Spanish War
has been rapid. The acquisition of Porto Rico and the establishment of a
protectorate over Cuba were the natural outcome of that struggle. In
1903 we acquired the canal zone under circumstances already described.
The following year President Roosevelt established financial supervision
over the Dominican Republic. In 1915 the United States landed marines in
Haiti and a treaty was soon drafted under which we assumed financial
supervision and administrative control over the affairs of that
country. In 1916 we acquired by treaty from Nicaragua an exclusive right
of way for a canal through her territory and the lease of a naval
station on Fonseca bay, and in 1917 we acquired by treaty from Denmark
her holdings in the West Indies known as the Virgin Islands. These
successive steps will be considered in detail.

The methods employed by President Roosevelt in the acquisition of the
Panama Canal Zone described in a previous chapter caused indignation and
alarm throughout Latin America and created strained relations with
Colombia. The Colombian government refused to recognize the independence
of the Republic of Panama and demanded that her claim to Panama as well
as her interests in the canal should be submitted to arbitration.
Colombia claimed that President Roosevelt had misinterpreted the treaty
of 1846, which established mutual obligations between the United States
and Colombia with reference to the isthmus, by construing its provisions
as obligations to the world at large against Colombia. As the United
States had always advocated the submission to arbitration of questions
involving the construction of treaties, the demand of Colombia proved
embarrassing, but both Secretary Hay and his successor, Secretary Root,
rejected the demand for arbitration on the ground that the questions
involved were of a political nature.[260]

In January, 1909, shortly before the close of the Roosevelt
administration, Secretary Root undertook to reëstablish friendly
relations with Colombia through the negotiation in the city of
Washington of three treaties, one between the United States and the
Republic of Colombia, one between the United States and the Republic of
Panama, and one between Colombia and Panama. In the treaty between
Colombia and Panama the Republic of Colombia recognized fully the
independence of Panama, and the Republic of Panama made an assignment to
Colombia of the first ten installments of $250,000, the amount due
annually to the Republic of Panama from the United States as rental for
the canal. According to the treaty between the United States and the
Republic of Panama, concluded November 18, 1903, the payment of this
annual sum was to begin nine years from date. It was now agreed that the
first annual payment should be regarded as due four years from the
exchange of ratifications of the said treaty, so that of the $2,500,000
to be paid to Colombia, half would be paid by the United States and half
by Panama. In the new treaty between the United States and Panama the
necessary modification of the treaty of 1903 was made so as to permit of
this assignment of the first ten installments to Colombia. In the treaty
between the United States and Colombia the most important provision was
as follows:

      The Republic of Colombia shall have liberty at all times to
      convey through the ship canal now in course of construction
      by the United States across the Isthmus of Panama the
      troops, materials for war, and ships of war of the Republic
      of Colombia, without paying any duty to the United States;
      even in the case of an international war between Colombia
      and another country.


It was further provided that the products of the soil and industry of
Colombia should be admitted to the canal zone subject only to such duty
as would be payable on similar products of the United States under
similar conditions, and Colombian mails were to have free passage
through the canal zone on payment of such duties or charges as were laid
on the mails of the United States.[261]

These tripartite treaties were of course to stand or fall together. The
United States and Panama promptly ratified the agreements to which they
were parties, but Colombia rejected the arrangement with indignation. In
fact, when the terms of the settlement were made public, the Colombian
administration that urged their acceptance was overthrown, and the
Colombian envoy who participated in the negotiation of the treaties was
forced to flee from the country with an indignant mob at his heels.
Colombia was not to be appeased by the paltry sum of $2,500,000.

The Taft administration made repeated efforts to placate Colombia, but
without success. On September 30, 1912, Mr. Du Bois, the American
minister to Colombia, submitted to Secretary Knox an interesting review
of the whole question in the course of which, after referring to the
friendly relations that had so long subsisted between the two countries,
he said:

      Nine years ago this was changed suddenly and unexpectedly
      when President Roosevelt denied to Colombia the right to
      land her troops upon her own soil to suppress a threatened
      revolt and maintain a sovereignty guaranteed by treaty
      stipulations. The breach came and it has been growing wider
      since that hour. By refusing to allow Colombia to uphold her
      sovereign rights over a territory where she had held
      dominion for eighty years, the friendship of nearly a
      century disappeared, the indignation of every Colombian, and
      millions of other Latin-Americans, was aroused and is still
      most intensely alive. The confidence and trust in the
      justice and fairness of the United States, so long
      manifested, has completely vanished, and the maleficent
      influence of this condition is permeating public opinion in
      all Latin-American countries, a condition which, if remedial
      measures are not invoked, will work inestimable harm
      throughout the Western Hemisphere.[262]

Mr. Du Bois reported that on inquiry of prominent Colombians of the
causes of the rejection of the Root proposals he received replies to the
following effect:

      Five years after President Roosevelt had taken Panama from
      us with rank injustice, your government, still under his
      chief magistracy, offered us a paltry $2,500,000 if Colombia
      would recognize the independence of her revolted province,
      fix our frontier at a further loss of territory, open all
      our ports free to the refuge of vessels employed in the
      canal enterprise, and exempt them from anchorage or tonnage
      dues, renounce our rights to all of our contracts and
      concessions relating to the construction and operation of
      the canal or railroad across the isthmus, release Panama
      from obligation for the payment of any part of our external
      debt, much of which was incurred in the interest of Panama,
      and enter into negotiations for the revision of the treaty
      of 1846, which five years before had been openly violated by
      the United States in their failure to help maintain the
      sovereignty over the rebellious province which they had
      solemnly guaranteed. The reply was to this, banishment of
      our minister who negotiated the treaty, and all South
      America applauded our attitude.[263]

Mr. Du Bois then proceeded to state at length Colombia's claims which he
summarized as follows: "Panama Railroad annuities, $16,000,000; value of
railroad, $16,446,942; Panama Canal rights, $17,500,000; cost of Costa
Rican boundary arbitration, $200,000; total, $50,446,942. [The total
should be $50,146,942.] Besides this sum, Colombia has lost the Province
of Panama, whose value cannot be readily estimated."[264]

In conclusion he urged the importance of a speedy adjustment of the
differences with Colombia in the following words:

      South America is advancing along commercial lines with giant
      strides. The character of the future relations of the United
      States with that country will be of signal importance.
      Friendly intercourse with all Latin America should be
      carefully developed and maintained, and especially is this
      important with Colombia, which borders the isthmus, has fine
      ports on both oceans, and is destined to become an
      influential factor in the political and commercial life of
      South America, especially in all countries bordering on the
      Caribbean sea. To approach Colombia in a conciliatory spirit
      and seek a renewal of her ancient friendship would not only
      be a wise and just move on the part of the United States,
      but as Colombia and all South and Central America firmly
      believe that the government of the United States was unjust
      in the Panama incident, from which has come infinite
      distress to Colombia, it would be a benevolent and fraternal
      act, and the time to move is the present, before the canal
      opens and while the public sentiment of both countries is in
      harmony with the movement.[265]

At the time that the above report on relations with Colombia was
prepared by Mr. Du Bois he was in this country, having come home to
confer with the Department of State as to the program to be followed in
the settlement of the differences with Colombia. On his return to
Bogota, Mr. Du Bois submitted the following proposals to the Colombian
government: (1) ratification of the Root treaties, involving the payment
to Colombia of the first ten installments of the annual rental of the
canal zone amounting to $2,500,000; (2) the payment of $10,000,000 by
the United States to Colombia for the right to build an interoceanic
canal by the Atrato route and for the lease of the islands of Old
Providence and St. Andrews as coaling stations; (3) the good offices of
the United States on behalf of Colombia in bringing about an adjustment
of the boundary line between Colombia and Panama; (4) the submission to
arbitration of the claims of Colombia to reversionary rights in the
Panama Railroad assumed by the United States under Article XXII of the
treaty of 1903 between the United States and Panama, estimated by Mr.
Taft's secretary of war at over $16,000,000; and (5) the granting of
preferential rights to Colombia in the use of the Panama Canal.

The Colombian government promptly rejected these proposals and in reply
demanded "arbitration of the whole question of Panama or a direct
proposition on the part of the United States to give Colombia
compensation for all the moral, physical, and financial losses which she
sustained as a result of the separation of Panama." The Colombian
minister declared:

      Should Colombia grant any territorial privileges to the
      United States after the wrong that country has inflicted
      upon this republic, it would result in intense agitation and
      possible revolution. It seems as though your people have
      never fully realized the enormity of the wrong the United
      States has perpetrated against the Colombian people.

Mr. Du Bois then asked whether Colombia would accept $10,000,000, the
good offices of the United States in settling the differences with
Panama, arbitration of the reversionary rights in the Panama Railroad,
and preferential rights in the canal, without granting to the United
States any privileges or concessions whatever. Receiving a negative
reply to this proposal, Mr. Du Bois, acting on his own responsibility,
then inquired informally whether $25,000,000 without options of any kind
would satisfy Colombia. The answer was that Colombia would accept
nothing but the arbitration of the whole Panama question. Mr. Du Bois
was instructed February 20, 1913, to stop negotiations. In reporting the
matter to the President, Secretary Knox said that Colombia seemed
determined to treat with the incoming Democratic administration.[266]

When the Wilson administration came in, Secretary Bryan took up the
negotiations with Colombia where Knox dropped them, and concluded a
treaty according to the terms of which the United States was to express
"sincere regret that anything should have occurred to interrupt or to
mar the relations of cordial friendship that had so long subsisted
between the two nations," and to pay Colombia $25,000,000. The treaty
further granted Colombia the same preferential rights in the use of the
canal which the Taft administration had proposed, and in return Colombia
agreed to recognize the independence of Panama and to accept a boundary
line laid down in the treaty. This treaty was submitted to the Senate
June 16, 1914. As soon as its terms were made public ex-President
Roosevelt denounced it as blackmail, and wrote a letter to the chairman
of the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs requesting to be heard before
any action was taken on the treaty. During the first session of the
Sixty-sixth Congress in 1919 the Colombian treaty was reported from the
Committee on Foreign Relations with important amendments. Article I,
containing expressions of regret on the part of the United States for
the events that had taken place on the isthmus, was entirely stricken
out. The clause giving Colombia the right to transport through the canal
its troops, materials of war, and ships of war, "even in case of war
between Colombia and another country," was amended by the elimination of
the words in quotations. The sum of $25,000,000, instead of being paid
in cash, was to be paid in five annual installments. The Senate refused,
however, to give its consent to the ratification of the treaty even in
this form, and it is understood that it was proposed to cut the payment
to Colombia down to $15,000,000.

A great nation like the United States, which has always professed to be
guided in international questions by high standards of justice and
morality, cannot afford to delay indefinitely the settlement of a
dispute of this kind with a weak nation like Colombia. President
Roosevelt's action in the Panama matter made a bad impression throughout
Latin America and caused our policy in the Caribbean to be regarded with
grave suspicion. As to Colombia's rights in the matter, Secretary Bryan
made the following statement in his argument before the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations in support of the treaty:

      It is contended by some that the action taken by the United
      States was based upon the necessities of the case, and those
      necessities, as stated by those who take this position are,
      that Colombia was not able to build the canal herself and
      was not willing to sell to the United States upon reasonable
      terms the right to build the canal. Those who take this
      position put the United States in the attitude of exercising
      the right of eminent domain in the interest of the world's
      commerce; but the exercise of the right of eminent domain
      does not relieve those who exercise it of liability for
      actual damages suffered. Take, for illustration, the
      condemning of a block of ground for a public building.
      Suppose that every lot owner excepting one is willing to
      sell his land to the government at its market value, but
      that one of the lot owners, whose lot is necessary to the
      erection of the building, asks more than the land is worth.
      The government proceeds to condemn the property, but it does
      not attempt to escape from paying what the land is actually
      worth, and the actual value of the property is not reduced
      one dollar by any effort that the owner may make to obtain
      for it more than it is worth. If it is contended that the
      price offered by the United States prior to Panama's
      separation was a reasonable one, and that Colombia ought to
      have accepted it, that valuation cannot be reduced merely
      because Colombia was not willing to accept the offer. This
      illustration is based upon the theory adopted by those who
      say that Colombia was entirely in the wrong in refusing to
      accept the offer made by the United States, but this theory,
      it will be remembered, is disputed by the people of
      Colombia, who defend the position their government then took
      and, as has been said before, they have ever since asked
      that the controversy be arbitrated by some impartial
      tribunal.[267]

In 1904 President Roosevelt made a radical departure from the
traditional policy of the United States in proposing that we should
assume the financial administration of the Dominican Republic in order
to prevent certain European powers from resorting to the forcible
collection of debts due their subjects. On September 12, 1904, Minister
Dawson reported to the State Department that the debt of Santo Domingo
was $32,280,000, the estimated revenues from customs receipts
$1,850,000, and the proposed budget for current expenses $1,300,000,
leaving only $550,000 with which to meet payments of interest, then
accruing and in arrears, amounting to $2,600,000. About $22,000,000 of
this debt was due to European creditors. Most of this indebtedness had
been incurred by revolutionary leaders who had at various times taken
forcible possession of the government and hastened to raise all the
money they could by the sale of bonds, leaving the responsibility with
their successors. The European creditors of Santo Domingo were pressing
for the recognition of their claims. Germany seemed especially
determined to force a settlement of her demands, and it was well known
that Germany had for years regarded the Monroe Doctrine as the main
hindrance in the way of her acquiring a foothold in Latin America. The
only effective method of collecting the interest on the foreign debt
appeared to be the seizure and administration of the Dominican
custom-houses by some foreign power or group of foreign powers.
President Roosevelt foresaw that such an occupation of the custom-houses
would, in view of the large debt, constitute the occupation of American
territory by European powers for an indefinite period of time, and would
therefore be a violation of the Monroe Doctrine. He had before him also
the results of a somewhat similar financial administration of Egypt
undertaken jointly by England and France in 1878, and after Arabi's
revolt continued by England alone, with the result that Egypt soon
became a possession of the British Crown to almost as great a degree as
if it had been formally annexed. President Roosevelt concluded,
therefore, that where it was necessary to place a bankrupt American
republic in the hands of a receiver, the United States must undertake to
act as receiver and take over the administration of its finances.

The policy that he was about to adopt was stated as follows in his
annual message of December 6, 1904:

      Any country whose people conduct themselves well can count
      upon our hearty friendship. If a nation shows that it knows
      how to act with reasonable efficiency and decency in social
      and political matters, if it keeps order and pays its
      obligations, it need fear no interference from the United
      States. Chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in
      a general loosening of the ties of civilized society, may in
      America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by
      some civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere, the
      adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may
      force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant
      cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an
      international police power.

About the same time Minister Dawson was directed by Secretary Hay to
suggest to the Dominican government that it request the United States to
take charge of its customs. As the Dominican government saw no other way
out of its difficulties, it responded to this suggestion, and on
February 4, 1905, a protocol was signed by Mr. Dawson and the Dominican
foreign minister which provided that the United States should guarantee
the territorial integrity of the Dominican Republic, take charge of its
custom-houses, administer its finances, and settle its obligations,
foreign as well as domestic. In calling the new agreement a "protocol"
instead of a "treaty," the President had probably not intended to submit
it to the Senate, but the proposal to depart so radically from our past
policy created so much criticism that the Senate was finally asked to
ratify the protocol in regular form. This they failed to do, but the
President did not propose to be thwarted in this way. As the Senate
would not sanction his appointment of a receiver of customs for Santo
Domingo, he drafted a _modus vivendi_, under the terms of which the
President of the Dominican Republic appointed a receiver of customs
named unofficially by President Roosevelt, who proceeded to administer
the affairs of the republic under the protection of the United States
navy, whose ships the President could as commander-in-chief order
wherever he pleased. The President's course met with determined
opposition both in and out of Congress, but as he was bent on having his
way and continued to carry out his policy without the sanction of the
Senate, that body finally decided that it would be best to give the
arrangement a definite legal status. On February 25, 1907, the Senate
agreed to the ratification of a revised treaty which omitted the
territorial-guarantee clause, but provided that the President of the
United States should appoint a general receiver of Dominican customs and
such assistants as he might deem necessary; that the government of the
United States should afford them such protection as might be necessary
for the performance of their duties; and that until the bonded debt
should be paid in full, the Dominican government would not increase its
debt except with the consent of the United States. In the meantime,
under the _interim_ arrangement, conditions in Santo Domingo had greatly
improved, the customs receipts had nearly doubled, and the creditors had
agreed to compromise their claims, so that the total debt at the time
the above treaty was ratified amounted to not more than
$17,000,000.[268]

In spite of the criticism that President Roosevelt's policy encountered,
the Taft administration not only continued it in Santo Domingo, but
tried to extend it to Nicaragua and Honduras. The five republics of
Central America had been for years in a state of political and economic
disorder as the result of wars and revolutions. In 1906 there was a war
between Guatemala and Salvador, in which Honduras became involved as the
ally of Salvador. President Roosevelt invited President Diaz of Mexico
to unite with him in an offer of mediation, which resulted in a peace
conference held aboard the U. S. S. _Marblehead_. At this conference the
belligerents agreed to suspend hostilities and to attend another
conference for the purpose of drafting a general treaty of peace. The
second conference was held at San José, Costa Rica, but President Zelaya
of Nicaragua declined to send a representative because he was unwilling
to recognize the right of the United States to intervene in Central
American affairs. At this time Zelaya was systematically interfering in
the internal affairs of the other Central American states, and exercised
such complete control over the government of Honduras that Guatemala and
Salvador were endeavoring to stir up revolutions against him in that
state and in Nicaragua. War was about to break out in the summer of 1907
when President Roosevelt and President Diaz again intervened
diplomatically and persuaded the Central American governments to suspend
warlike preparations and to attend a conference in the city of
Washington. In November the delegates of the five Central American
states met in the Bureau of American Republics and were addressed by
Secretary Root and the Mexican ambassador. The delegates adopted a
general treaty of peace, providing for the settlement of existing
differences and for the establishment of a Central American court of
justice composed of five judges, one to be elected by the legislature of
each state. The five republics agreed to submit to this tribunal all
controversies of whatever nature that might arise between them which
could not be settled through ordinary diplomatic channels.

But President Zelaya of Nicaragua, who still controlled Honduras,
continued his interference in the affairs of the other republics by
encouraging revolutionary movements and sending out filibustering
expeditions. He was also hostile to the Central American court of
justice, and it became evident that there was little chance of permanent
peace as long as Zelaya remained in power. When, therefore, in October,
1909, members of the conservative party started a revolution at
Bluefields against Zelaya's government, the movement was regarded with
sympathy in the other Central American republics and in Washington.
Conditions became so intolerable that many people in Nicaragua and
Honduras appealed to the United States to intervene for the purpose of
restoring order. President Diaz of Mexico was friendly to Zelaya and
informed the United States that he did not care to take any further
action. This brought to an end the coöperative efforts of the two
governments and thereafter the United States had to act alone. Nothing
was done, however, until two Americans were executed by Zelaya's order
in November, 1909. As a result of these executions, which were without
legal excuse and attended by barbarous cruelties, President Taft
promptly severed diplomatic relations with Zelaya's government. In a
dispatch to the Nicaraguan chargé, December 1, 1909, Secretary Knox
said:

      Since the Washington conventions of 1907, it is notorious
      that President Zelaya has almost continuously kept Central
      America in tension or turmoil; that he has repeatedly and
      flagrantly violated the provisions of the conventions, and,
      by a baleful influence upon Honduras, whose neutrality the
      conventions were to assure, has sought to discredit those
      sacred international obligations, to the great detriment of
      Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Guatemala, whose governments
      meanwhile appear to have been able patiently to strive for
      the loyal support of the engagements so solemnly undertaken
      at Washington under the auspices of the United States and
      Mexico.

He added that under the régime of President Zelaya republican
institutions had ceased to exist in Nicaragua except in name, that
public opinion and the press had been throttled, and that prison had
been the reward of any tendency to real patriotism. The government of
the United States was convinced, he said, "that the revolution
represents the ideals and the will of a majority of the Nicaraguan
people more faithfully than does the government of President
Zelaya."[269]

This note caused the speedy downfall of Zelaya's government. He tried to
perpetuate his party in power by resigning the presidency to Dr. Madriz,
but President Taft refused to recognize the Madriz government, and a few
months later it was overthrown and the revolutionary party came into
power, first under the presidency of Estrada and then under that of
Adolfo Diaz.

The revolution had paralyzed agriculture and commerce and thrown the
country into financial chaos. In October, 1910, the United States
government sent Thomas C. Dawson to Managua to investigate conditions
and to straighten out the political and financial affairs of Nicaragua.
While he was engaged in this task, Secretary Knox negotiated at
Washington two treaties, one between the United States and Honduras,
signed January 10, 1911, and a similar treaty between the United States
and Nicaragua, signed June 6. These treaties were intended to place the
two countries concerned under the financial supervision of the United
States. They provided for the appointment in each case of a collector of
customs approved by the President of the United States, and made the
customs receipts responsible for loans to be advanced by American
bankers. The collectorship of customs was immediately established in
Nicaragua without waiting for the ratification of the treaty by the
Senate, and through the efforts of the State Department American
bankers made preliminary loans to the Nicaraguan government. When the
Senate rejected the treaty, the bankers refused to make further loans,
and the situation was almost as bad as ever. In October, 1911, General
Mena, minister of war and head of a faction of his own, was elected by
the Assembly president of the republic, but as this was contrary to an
agreement which had been made with Dawson, it did not meet with the
approval of the United States, and President Diaz removed Mena from
office and forced him to flee from the capital. Shortly afterwards Mena
was taken seriously ill, and the opposition to President Diaz fell again
under the control of Zelaya's followers. As President Diaz was unable to
guarantee protection to the life and property of foreigners, he asked
the United States for assistance. In answer to this request American
marines were landed at Corinto and assumed control of the national
railway which connected that port with the capital and the principal
cities. The American minister made a public announcement to the effect
that the United States intended to keep open the routes of communication
and to protect American life and property. This announcement was a great
blow to the revolutionists. Some of their leaders surrendered
voluntarily to the American marines, while others were attacked and
forced to surrender positions along the railroad which they insisted
upon holding. In these operations seven American marines lost their
lives. Since 1912 a legation guard of one hundred marines has been
maintained at the capital of Nicaragua and a warship has been stationed
at Corinto.

After the revolutionary movement was thus overthrown, Secretary Knox
negotiated a new treaty for the purpose of helping the Nicaraguan
government out of the financial straits in which it found itself. Great
Britain was threatening to force the payment of its claims and certain
German interests, which were operating banana plantations in Costa Rica,
were trying to secure from the Nicaraguan government a concession for
the construction of a canal from the Great Lake to the Atlantic along
the San Juan river. According to the terms of the Knox treaty the United
States was to pay Nicaragua $3,000,000 in return for an exclusive right
of way for a canal through her territory, a naval base on the Gulf of
Fonseca, and the lease for ninety-nine years of the Great Corn and
Little Corn Islands in the Caribbean. This treaty was submitted to the
Senate February 26, 1913, but the close of the Taft administration was
then at hand, and no action was taken.

The Wilson administration followed the same policy, however, and in
July, 1913, Secretary Bryan submitted a third treaty with Nicaragua
containing the provisions of the second Knox treaty and in addition
certain provisions of the Platt Amendment which defines our protectorate
over Cuba. This treaty aroused strong opposition in the other Central
American States, and Costa Rica, Salvador, and Honduras filed formal
protests with the United States government against its ratification on
the ground that it would convert Nicaragua into a protectorate of the
United States and thus defeat the long-cherished plan for a union of the
Central American republics. They also claimed that the treaty infringed
their own rights. In 1858 Costa Rica had been granted perpetual rights
of free navigation in the lower part of the San Juan river, and
Nicaragua had agreed to consult her before granting any concessions for
the construction of an interoceanic canal. Salvador and Honduras
objected to the establishment of a naval base in the Gulf of Fonseca in
close proximity to their coasts. They also asserted proprietary rights
in the Gulf of Fonseca, claiming that Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua,
as successors of the old Central American Federation, exercised joint
ownership over the gulf. Efforts were made by the United States to
arrive at a settlement with Costa Rica and Salvador on the basis of a
money payment, but without success. Moreover, the Senate of the United
States objected to the protectorate feature of the treaty and refused to
ratify it, but the negotiations were renewed, and on August 5, 1914, a
new treaty, which omits the provisions of the Platt Amendment, was
signed at Washington. This treaty, which was finally ratified by the
Senate, February 18, 1916, grants to the United States in perpetuity the
exclusive right to construct a canal by way of the San Juan river and
Lake Nicaragua, and leases to the United States for ninety-nine years a
naval base on the Gulf of Fonseca, and also the Great Corn and Little
Corn Islands as coaling stations. The consideration for these favors was
the sum of $3,000,000 to be expended, with the approval of the Secretary
of State of the United States, in paying the public debt of Nicaragua,
and for other purposes to be agreed on by the two contracting parties.

In consenting to the ratification of the treaty the Senate, in order to
meet the objections raised by Costa Rica, Salvador, and Honduras,
attached to their resolution of ratification the proviso "that nothing
in said convention is intended to affect any existing right of any of
the said states." This reservation did not satisfy Costa Rica and
Salvador, who took their cases to the Central American Court of Justice,
requesting that Nicaragua be enjoined from carrying out the provisions
of the treaty. Nicaragua refused to be a party to the action, but the
court nevertheless assumed jurisdiction. Its decision in the case of
Costa Rica was announced September 30, 1916. It declared that Nicaragua
had violated Costa Rica's rights, but, as the court had no jurisdiction
over the United States, it declined to declare the treaty void. A
similar decision in the case of Salvador was handed down on March 2,
1917.[270]

Neither Nicaragua nor the United States has paid any attention to the
decision of the Central American Court of Justice, which was set up
under such favorable auspices by the Washington conventions. As a matter
of fact, the court had not fulfilled the expectations of those who had
been interested in its establishment, but it was unfortunate that it
should have received its _coup de grâce_ from the United States.
Furthermore, it has been charged that the State Department, under the
Knox régime, exploited the situation in Central America for the benefit
of American capitalists, and that the Wilson administration has for
years maintained a minority party in power through the presence of a
body of American marines at the capital and a warship at Corinto. On the
other hand, it cannot be denied that as a result of American policy,
Central America has been freer from wars and revolutions for a longer
period than at any other time in its history. The better element of the
population appears to be satisfied with the situation.[271]

The treaty with the negro republic of Haiti, ratified by the Senate
February 28, 1916, carries the new Caribbean policies of the United
States to the farthest limits short of actual annexation. Shortly before
the outbreak of the European war, Haitian finances were in such bad
shape as the result of internal disorders that there was grave danger of
European intervention, and the United States was considering the
question of acquiring supervision over the finances of the republic. In
June, 1915, a crisis in the internal affairs of Haiti seemed imminent
and, at the request of the State Department, Rear-Admiral Caperton was
ordered to Haitian waters. Towards the latter part of July the
government of President Guillaume was overthrown, and he and members of
his cabinet took refuge in the French and Dominican legations. These
buildings were entered by a mob, President Guillaume was slain at the
gate of the French legation, his body cut in pieces, and dragged about
the town. Admiral Caperton at once landed a force of marines at Port au
Prince in order to protect the lives and property of foreigners. An
additional force was brought from Guantanamo and the total number raised
to two thousand and placed under the command of Colonel Waller. There
was but slight resistance to the landing of the marines, but a few days
later a conflict occurred in which two Americans were killed.[272] On
August 12 a new president was elected who coöperated with the American
forces in their efforts to establish peace and order, and on September
16 a treaty with the United States was signed at Port au Prince. This
treaty provides for the establishment of a receivership of Haitian
customs under the control of the United States similar in most respects
to that established over the Dominican Republic. It also provides for
the appointment, on the nomination of the President of the United
States, of a financial adviser, who shall assist in the settlement of
the foreign debt and direct expenditures of the surplus for the
development of the agricultural, mineral, and commercial resources of
the republic. It provides further for a native constabulary under
American officers appointed by the President of Haiti upon nomination of
the President of the United States. And it extends to Haiti the main
provisions of the Platt Amendment. By controlling the internal financial
administration of the government the United States hopes to remove all
incentives for those revolutions which have in the past had for their
object a raid on the public treasury, and by controlling the customs and
maintaining order the United States hopes to avoid all possibility of
foreign intervention. The treaty is to remain in force for a period of
ten years and for another period of ten years if either party presents
specific reasons for continuing it on the ground that its purpose has
not been fully accomplished.

The latest acquisition of the United States in the Caribbean is that of
the Danish West Indies, or Virgin Islands. Reference has already been
made to the treaty negotiated by Secretary Seward in 1867 for the
purchase of these islands, which was unfortunately rejected by the
Senate. Another attempt at purchase was made by President Roosevelt in
1902. A treaty providing for the cession of the group to the United
States was signed at Washington on January 24 of that year and approved
by the Senate February 17, but this time the Danish Rigsdag refused to
give its approval. President Roosevelt was moved by the consideration
that the Danish Islands were of great strategic importance in connection
with the problem of guarding the approaches to the Panama canal. The
commercial value of the islands is also great. Moreover, the United
States was confronted by the possibility of their falling under the
control of Germany or some other European power, which might use them as
a naval base. Had Germany been successful in the recent war, she might
have forced Denmark to sell or cede the islands to her. In view of this
possibility, negotiations were taken up again with Denmark in 1916, and
on August 4 Secretary Lansing concluded a treaty by which the United
States acquired the islands of St. Thomas, St. John, and St. Croix,
together with some adjacent small islands and rocks, for the sum of
$25,000,000. This treaty was duly ratified by the Senate and the
ratifications were exchanged January 17, 1917.

The rapid advance of the United States in the Caribbean, described in
the preceding pages, naturally aroused the fears of the smaller
Latin-American states and lent color to the charge that the United
States had converted the Monroe Doctrine from a policy of benevolent
protection to one of imperialistic aggression. As a matter of fact, the
Monroe Doctrine has never been regarded by the United States as in any
sense a self-denying declaration. President Monroe said that we should
consider any attempt on the part of the European powers "to extend their
system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and
safety." The primary object of the policy outlined by President Monroe
was, therefore, the peace and safety of the United States. The
protection of Latin-American states against European intervention was
merely a means of protecting ourselves. While the United States thus
undertook to prevent the encroachment of European powers in Latin
America, it has never admitted any limitation upon the possibility of
its own expansion in this region. The silence of the Monroe Doctrine on
this question has been remedied to some extent by President Wilson, who,
at the outset of his administration, gave the assurance that "the United
States will never again seek one additional foot of territory by
conquest." This declaration, followed by his refusal to be forced into
war with Mexico, has done much to remove the suspicion with which our
recent policies in the Caribbean have been regarded by our Southern
neighbors. His sincerity was further attested by his ready acceptance of
the proffered mediation of the A B C powers in the Mexican embroglio and
by the encouragement which he has given to the Pan American movement.

FOOTNOTES:

[259] E. D. Adams, "British Interests and Activities in Texas,
1838-1845" (1910); Justin H. Smith, "The Annexation of Texas" (1911) and
"The War with Mexico," 2 vols. (1919); Diplomatic Correspondence of the
Republic of Texas, edited by G. P. Garrison (Annual Reports, Am. Hist.
Ass'n, 1907, 1908).

[260] House Doc. No. 1444, Sixty-second Cong., Third Sess., pp. 2, 3;
Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 1, Sixty-fifth Cong., Special Sess., pp. 47, 48.

[261] Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 1, Sixty-fifth Cong., Special Sess., pp. 24-34.

[262] Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 1, Sixty-fifth Cong., Special Sess., p. 35.

[263] _Ibid._, p. 41.

[264] Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 1, Sixty-fifth Cong., Special Sess., p. 44.

[265] _Ibid._

[266] Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 1, Sixty-fifth Cong., Special Sess., pp. 53-79.

[267] Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 1, Sixty-fifth Cong., Special Sess., pp. 87-88.

[268] Foreign Relations, 1905, p. 298; Moore, "Digest of Int. Law," Vol.
VI, pp. 518-529; _Am. Journal of Int. Law_, Vol. I, p. 287, and
Documentary Supplement, p. 231.

[269] Foreign Relations, 1909, p. 455.

[270] D. G. Munro, "The Five Republics of Central America," p. 257.

[271] For recent and authoritative information on Central American
affairs, see the volume by Dana G. Munro, "The Five Republics of Central
America." (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1918.)

[272] Secretary of the Navy, Annual Report 1915, pp. 15-17.




CHAPTER VIII

PAN AMERICANISM


The Pan American movement, which has for its object the promotion of
closer social, economic, financial, and political relations between the
independent republics of the Western Hemisphere, has attracted much
attention in recent years. The Pan American ideal is an old one, dating
back, in fact, to the Panama Congress of 1826. The object of this
congress was not very definitely stated in the call which was issued by
Simon Bolivar, but his purpose was to secure the independence and peace
of the new Spanish-American republics either through a permanent
confederation or through a series of diplomatic congresses. Henry Clay,
who was secretary of state at the time, was enthusiastically in favor of
accepting the invitation extended to the United States to participate in
the congress. President Adams agreed, therefore, to the acceptance of
the invitation, but the matter was debated at great length in both House
and Senate. In the Senate the debate was particularly acrimonious. The
policy of the administration was denounced as dangerous, and it was
asserted that a participation in the congress at Panama could be of no
benefit to the United States and might be the means of involving us in
international complications. One of the topics proposed for discussion
was "the manner in which all colonization of European powers on the
American continent shall be restricted." The Senate Committee on
Foreign Affairs objected strenuously to the United States in any way
committing itself to guaranteeing the territory of any other American
state. The slavery question also projected itself into the debate,
mainly because the negro Republic of Haiti was to be represented and
because most of the other states had proclaimed the emancipation of
slaves. The Senate finally agreed to the nomination of Richard C.
Anderson, of Kentucky, and John Sergeant, of Pennsylvania, as envoys
extraordinary and ministers plenipotentiary to the assembly of American
nations at Panama, and Congress made the necessary appropriation. The
delay proved fatal to the plan, however, for the American delegates did
not reach Panama until after the congress had adjourned.

In view of the opposition which the plan encountered in Congress, the
instructions to the American delegates were very carefully drawn by
Secretary Clay and their powers were strictly limited. They were
cautioned against committing their government in any way to the
establishment of "an amphictyonic council, invested with power finally
to decide controversies between the American states or to regulate in
any respect their conduct. Such a council might have been well enough
adapted to a number of small contracted states, whose united territory
would fall short of the extent of that of the smallest of the American
powers. The complicated and various interests which appertain to the
nations of this vast continent cannot be safely confided to the
superintendence of one legislative authority. We should almost as soon
expect to see an amphictyonic council to regulate the affairs of the
whole globe. But even if it were desirable to establish such a
tribunal, it is beyond the competency of the government of the United
States voluntarily to assent to it, without a previous change of their
actual constitution."

The delegates were also instructed to oppose the formation of an
offensive and defensive alliance between the American powers, for, as
Mr. Clay pointed out, the Holy Alliance had abandoned all idea of
assisting Spain in the conquest of her late colonies. Continuing, he
said:

      Other reasons concur to dissuade the United States from
      entering into such an alliance. From the first establishment
      of their present constitution, their illustrious statesmen
      have inculcated the avoidance of foreign alliances as a
      leading maxim of their foreign policy. It is true, that in
      its adoption, their attention was directed to Europe, which
      having a system of connections and of interests remote and
      different from ours, it was thought most advisable that we
      should not mix ourselves up with them. And it is also true,
      that long since the origin of the maxim, the new American
      powers have arisen, to which, if at all, it is less
      applicable. Without, therefore, asserting that an exigency
      may not occur in which an alliance of the most intimate kind
      between the United States and the other American republics
      would be highly proper and expedient, it may be safely said
      that the occasion which would warrant a departure from that
      established maxim ought to be one of great urgency, and that
      none such is believed now to exist. Among the objections to
      such alliances, those which at all times have great weight
      are, first, the difficulty of a just and equal arrangement
      of the contributions of force and of other means between the
      respective parties to the attainment of the common object;
      and secondly, that of providing beforehand, and determining
      with perfect precision, when the _casus foederis_ arises,
      and thereby guarding against all controversies about it.
      There is less necessity for any such alliance at this
      juncture on the part of the United States, because no
      compact, by whatever solemnities it might be attended, or
      whatever name or character it might assume, could be more
      obligatory upon them than the irresistible motive of
      self-preservation, which would be instantly called into
      operation, and stimulate them to the utmost exertion in the
      supposed contingency of an European attack upon the
      liberties of America.[273]

The British government sent a special envoy to reside near the congress
and to place himself in frank and friendly communication with the
delegates. Canning's private instructions to this envoy declared that,

      Any project for putting the U. S. of North America at the
      head of an American Confederacy, as against Europe, would be
      highly displeasing to your Government. It would be felt as
      an ill return for the service which has been rendered to
      those States, and the dangers which have been averted from
      them, by the countenance and friendship, and public
      declarations of Great Britain; and it would probably, at no
      distant period, endanger the peace both of America and of
      Europe.

The Panama Congress was without practical results, and it possesses
merely an historical interest. As a matter of fact, only four republics,
Colombia, Central America, Peru, and Mexico, were represented. Several
treaties and conventions were drafted with the view mainly of combined
defense against Spain, but ratification was withheld by all of the
states except Colombia, which gave only a partial approval to what had
been done. Before adjourning, the Congress of Panama decided to meet
again at the town of Tacubaya, near the city of Mexico, and to continue
its sessions at stated intervals. But as the result of the failure of
the states represented at the congress to ratify the agreements arrived
at, and as the result of internal disorders, the plan was not carried
out, although Mexico issued invitations for another congress in 1831,
1838, 1839, and 1840.

In 1847 the republics of Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, New Granada, and Peru
held a so-called "American Congress" at Lima, which drafted a treaty of
confederation, one of commerce and navigation, a consular convention,
and a postal convention. These treaties were not ratified and,
therefore, the congress was without practical results. The preamble of
the proposed treaty of confederation referred to the nations assembled
as being "bound to each other by the ties of a common origin, a common
language, a common religion, common customs, and the common cause for
which they have struggled, as well as by their geographical position,
the similarity of their institutions, and their analogous ancestors and
reciprocal interests." It is evident, therefore, that this particular
congress was Spanish-American rather than Pan American.[274]

In 1856 the republics of Peru, Chile, and Ecuador signed at Santiago a
treaty of confederation, known as "the Continental Treaty," for the
purpose of "cementing upon substantial foundations the union which
exists between them, as members of the great American family, which are
bound together by the ties of a common origin, similar institutions, and
many other signs of fraternity." This treaty was not ratified. It seems
to have been dictated by a spirit of hostility to the United States as
the result of the filibustering enterprise of William Walker in Central
America.

The question of a "continental" league was discussed between Costa Rica
and Colombia in 1862. After stating that, "There are not always at the
head of the Great Republic moderate, just, and upright men as those who
form the administration of President Lincoln," Costa Rica continued:

      If our Republics could have the guaranty that they have
      nothing to fear from the United States of North America, it
      is indubitable that no other nation could be more useful and
      favorable to us. Under the shelter of her powerful eagles,
      under the influence of her wise institutions, and under the
      spur of her astonishing progress our newly-born
      nationalities should receive the impulse which they now
      need, and would be permitted to march with firm step,
      without experiencing the troubles and difficulties with
      which they have had to struggle.... In view of the above
      considerations, the idea has occurred to my government that
      a new compact might be draughted by which the United States
      of North America should bind themselves solemnly to respect,
      and cause others to respect, the independence, sovereignty,
      and territorial integrity of the sister republics of this
      continent; not to annex to their territory, either by
      purchase or by any other means, any part of the territory of
      the said republics; not to allow filibustering expeditions
      to be fitted up against the said nations, or to permit the
      rights of the latter to be in any way abridged or
      ignored.[275]

In January, 1864, the government of Peru issued invitations to all the
governments of the Spanish nations of America to join in a congress to
be held at Lima. The objects of the meeting as stated in the invitation
were "to declare that the American nations represented in this congress
form one single family," to improve postal facilities, to exchange
statistical data, to provide for the settlement of all boundary
disputes, and "to irrevocably abolish war, superseding it by
arbitration, as the only means of compromising all misunderstandings and
causes for disagreements between any of the South American republics."
In accepting the invitation to the congress Colombia expressed the
opinion that "the United States ought not to be invited, because their
policy is adverse to all kind of alliances, and because the natural
preponderance which a first-class power, as they are, has to exercise in
the deliberations, might embarrass the action of the congress." So far
as definite results were concerned, this congress at Lima was of no
greater importance than its predecessors.

The French invasion of Mexico and the war between Spain and the
republics on the west coast of South America in 1865-66 brought about a
realization of their danger on the part of the Spanish-American
republics and a fuller appreciation of the friendship of the United
States. In the war between Spain on the one hand and the allied
republics of Peru, Chile, Bolivia, and Ecuador on the other, the United
States declared its neutrality as usual, but at an early period of the
struggle Secretary Seward offered to mediate between the warring
nations. Spain refused to accept this offer, and the war dragged on in a
state of "technical continuance" merely. The offer of mediation was
again renewed by Secretary Fish, with the result that a conference was
held at the State Department in 1870 attended by the representatives of
Spain, Peru, Chile, and Ecuador. While it was found impossible to
conclude a formal peace, the delegates signed an armistice April 11,
1871, by which the de facto suspension of hostilities was converted into
an armistice which was to continue indefinitely and could not be broken
by any of the belligerents without three years' notice, given through
the government of the United States, of intention to renew
hostilities.[276]

Within ten years of the signature of this perpetual armistice, war broke
out between Chile, on the one hand, and Peru and Bolivia, on the other
(1879-83). The subject of dispute was the nitrate deposits of northern
Chile. In 1880 Chile signed with Colombia an arbitration treaty which
provided that in case the two parties should be unable in any given case
to agree upon an arbitrator, the matter should be referred to the
President of the United States. Article III of this treaty was as
follows:

      The United States of Colombia and the Republic of Chile will
      endeavor, at the earliest opportunity, to conclude with the
      other American nations conventions like unto the present, to
      the end that the settlement by arbitration of each and every
      international controversy shall become a principle of
      American public law.

A few weeks later, without waiting for the ratification of this treaty,
Colombia issued invitations to the other Spanish-American republics to
attend a conference at Panama for the purpose of securing their
adherence to the treaty. The failure to include the United States in
the invitation to the conference was explained by our minister to
Colombia as being due "to the reason that the position assigned to the
government of the United States by the proposed treaty is to maintain
and exercise a friendly and judicial impartiality in the differences
which may arise between the powers of Spanish America."[277] The
continuance of the war between Chile and Peru led to the indefinite
postponement of the conference.

On November 29, 1881, Secretary Elaine extended "to all the independent
countries of North and South America an earnest invitation to
participate in a general congress, to be held in the city of Washington
on the 24th day of November, 1882, for the purpose of considering and
discussing the methods of preventing war between the nations of
America." He expressed the desire that the attention of the congress
should be strictly confined to this one great object, and he expressed
the hope that in setting a day for the assembling of the congress so far
ahead, the war that was then in progress on the South Pacific coast
would be ended, and the nations engaged would be able to take part in
the proceedings.[278] In this expectation Mr. Blaine was disappointed.
The war between Chile and Peru continued, and the invitations to the
conference were withdrawn.

Toward the close of President Cleveland's first administration, the
Congress of the United States passed an act authorizing the President to
invite the republics of Mexico, Central and South America, Haiti, Santo
Domingo, and the Empire of Brazil, to join the United States in a
conference at Washington on October 2, 1889. Among the subjects proposed
for discussion were the adoption of a customs union, the improvement of
the means of communication between the various countries, uniform
customs regulations, a uniform system of weights and measures, laws for
the protection of patents and copyrights, extradition, the adoption of a
common silver coin, and the formulation of a definite plan for the
arbitration of international disputes of every character. When the
conference assembled, Mr. Blaine was again secretary of state, and
presided over its opening sessions. The conference formulated a plan for
international arbitration and declared that this means of settling
disputes was "a principle of American international law." Unfortunately
this treaty was not ratified by the governments whose representatives
adopted it. The most lasting achievement of the conference was the
establishment of the Bureau of American Republics in Washington. While
the conference was in session Brazil went through a bloodless
revolution, which converted the empire into a republic. Thus disappeared
the only independent monarchy of European origin which ever existed on
American soil.

Scarcely had the Washington conference adjourned, when the United States
and Chile got into an ugly wrangle and were brought to the verge of war
over an attack on American sailors on shore leave at Valparaiso. During
the civil war between President Balmaceda and the Congressional party,
the American minister, Mr. Egan, admitted to the American legation
certain adherents of the President. The people of Chile resented the
action of the American minister, and were further aroused against the
United States by the detention of the _Itata_, a vessel which left San
Diego, California, with a cargo of arms for the Congressional party and
was overhauled by an American warship. The United States cruiser
_Baltimore_ was lying in the harbor of Valparaiso when news of this
incident was received. Members of her crew who happened to be on shore
leave were attacked by the populace and several of them killed. As this
attack upon American sailors appeared to be due to resentment against
the official acts of their government, an apology was immediately
demanded, but refused. After considerable delay, President Harrison had
just laid the matter before Congress when a belated apology from Chile
arrived, and war was fortunately averted. The charge that the United
States had interfered in behalf of one of the parties in a civil strife
created an unfavorable impression throughout Latin America and
counteracted, to a considerable extent, the good effects of the
Washington conference.

The Second International American Conference was held in the city of
Mexico 1901-02. This conference arranged for all Latin-American States
to become parties to the Hague Convention of 1899 for the pacific
settlement of international disputes, and drafted a treaty for the
compulsory arbitration of pecuniary claims, the first article of which
was as follows:

      The High Contracting Parties agree to submit to arbitration
      all claims for pecuniary loss or damage which may be
      presented by their respective citizens, and which cannot be
      amicably adjusted through diplomatic channels and when said
      claims are of sufficient importance to warrant the expenses
      of arbitration.

This treaty was signed by the delegates of seventeen states, including
the United States of America.[279]

The Third International American Conference was held at Rio de Janeiro
in 1906. Among other things it extended the pecuniary claims convention
drafted by the previous conference for another period of five years, and
recommended to the governments represented that they invite the Second
Hague Conference, which had been called for 1907, "to examine the
question of the compulsory collection of public debts, and, in general,
means tending to diminish between nations conflicts having an
exclusively pecuniary origin."[280] Added significance was given to the
Rio conference by the presence of Secretary Root who, although not a
delegate, made it the occasion of a special mission to South America.
The series of notable addresses which he delivered on this mission gave
a new impetus to the Pan American movement.

The Fourth International American Conference was held at Buenos Aires in
1910. It drafted treaties relating to patents, trade-marks, and
copyrights. It extended the pecuniary claims convention for an
indefinite period. And finally, it enlarged the scope of the Bureau of
American Republics and changed its name to the Pan American Union.[281]
A fifth conference was called to meet at Santiago, Chile, in 1914, but
was postponed on account of the European war.

The conferences above described were political or diplomatic in
character. Besides these there have been held two Pan American
scientific congresses in which the United States participated, one at
Santiago, Chile, in 1908, and one at Washington, December, 1915, to
January, 1916. There have also been held two Pan American financial
conferences in the city of Washington, the first in May, 1915, and the
second in January, 1920. These conferences have accomplished a great
deal in the way of promoting friendly feeling and the advancement of
science and commerce among the republics of the Western Hemisphere. The
First Financial Conference recommended the establishment of an
International High Commission, to be composed of not more than nine
members resident in each country appointed by the Minister of Finance of
such country for the purpose of carrying on the work of the conference.
This recommendation was adopted by the various countries, and the
Congress of the United States, by act of February 7, 1916, authorized
the establishment of a section in this country. The International High
Commission carries on its labors largely through the various national
sections. Its first general meeting was held at Buenos Aires in April,
1916.

The American Institute of International Law, organized at Washington in
October, 1912, is a body which is likely to have great influence in
promoting the peace and welfare of this hemisphere. The Institute is
composed of five representatives from the national society of
international law in each of the twenty-one American republics. At the
suggestion of Secretary Lansing the Institute at a session held in the
city of Washington, January 6, 1916, adopted a Declaration of the Rights
and Duties of Nations, which was as follows:

      I. Every nation has the right to exist and to protect and to
      conserve its existence; but this right neither implies the
      right nor justifies the act of the state to protect itself
      or to conserve its existence by the commission of unlawful
      acts against innocent and unoffending states.

      II. Every nation has the right to independence in the sense
      that it has a right to the pursuit of happiness and is free
      to develop itself without interference or control from other
      states, provided that in so doing it does not interfere with
      or violate the rights of other states.

      III. Every nation is in law and before law the equal of
      every other nation belonging to the society of nations, and
      all nations have the right to claim and, according to the
      Declaration of Independence of the United States, "to
      assume, among the powers of the earth, the separate and
      equal station to which the laws of nature and of nature's
      God entitle them."

      IV. Every nation has the right to territory within defined
      boundaries, and to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over its
      territory, and all persons whether native or foreign found
      therein.

      V. Every nation entitled to a right by the law of nations is
      entitled to have that right respected and protected by all
      other nations, for right and duty are correlative, and the
      right of one is the duty of all to observe.

      VI. International law is at one and the same time both
      national and international; national in the sense that it is
      the law of the land and applicable as such to the decision
      of all questions involving its principles; international in
      the sense that it is the law of the society of nations and
      applicable as such to all questions between and among the
      members of the society of nations involving its
      principles.[282]

This Declaration has been criticized as being too altruistic for a world
in which diplomacy has been occupied with selfish aims.

On the same day that the above Declaration was made public, President
Wilson delivered a notable address before the Second Pan American
Scientific Conference then in session at Washington. In the course of
this address he said:

      The Monroe Doctrine was proclaimed by the United States on
      her own authority. It has always been maintained, and always
      will be maintained, upon her own responsibility. But the
      Monroe Doctrine demanded merely that European governments
      should not attempt to extend their political systems to this
      side of the Atlantic. It did not disclose the use which the
      United States intended to make of her power on this side of
      the Atlantic. It was a hand held up in warning, but there
      was no promise in it of what America was going to do with
      the implied and partial protectorate which she apparently
      was trying to set up on this side of the water, and I
      believe you will sustain me in the statement that it has
      been fears and suspicions on this score which have hitherto
      prevented the greater intimacy and confidence and trust
      between the Americas. The states of America have not been
      certain what the United States would do with her power. That
      doubt must be removed. And latterly there has been a very
      frank interchange of views between the authorities in
      Washington and those who represent the other states of this
      hemisphere, an interchange of views charming and hopeful,
      because based upon an increasingly sure appreciation of the
      spirit in which they were undertaken. These gentlemen have
      seen that, if America is to come into her own, into her
      legitimate own, in a world of peace and order, she must
      establish the foundations of amity, so that no one will
      hereafter doubt them. I hope and I believe that this can be
      accomplished. These conferences have enabled me to foresee
      how it will be accomplished. It will be accomplished, in the
      first place, by the states of America uniting in
      guaranteeing to each other absolute political independence
      and territorial integrity. In the second place, and as a
      necessary corollary to that, guaranteeing the agreement to
      settle all pending boundary disputes as soon as possible and
      by amicable process; by agreeing that all disputes among
      themselves, should they unhappily arise, will be handled by
      patient, impartial investigation and settled by arbitration;
      and the agreement necessary to the peace of the Americas,
      that no state of either continent will permit revolutionary
      expeditions against another state to be fitted out in its
      territory, and that they will prohibit the exportation of
      the munitions of war for the purpose of supplying
      revolutionists against neighboring governments.

President Wilson's Pan Americanism went further than some of the
Latin-American states were willing to go. A treaty embodying the above
proposals was actually drafted, but some of the states held back through
the fear that, though equal in terms, it would in fact give the United
States a plausible pretext for supervising the affairs of weaker
states.[283]

President Wilson has not hesitated to depart from many of the
fundamental ideas which have hitherto guided so-called practical
statesmen. His handling of the Mexican situation, although denounced as
weak and vacillating, has been in full accord with his new
Latin-American policy. On February 18, 1913, Francisco Madero was seized
and imprisoned as the result of a conspiracy formed by one of his
generals, Victoriano Huerta, who forthwith proclaimed himself dictator.
Four days later Madero was murdered while in the custody of Huerta's
troops. Henry Lane Wilson, the American ambassador, promptly urged his
government to recognize Huerta, but President Taft, whose term was
rapidly drawing to a close, took no action and left the question to his
successor.

President Wilson thus had a very disagreeable situation to face when he
assumed control of affairs at Washington. He refused to recognize Huerta
whose authority was contested by insurrectionary chiefs in various parts
of the country. It was claimed by the critics of the administration that
the refusal to recognize Huerta was a direct violation of the well known
American policy of recognizing _de facto_ governments without
undertaking to pass upon the rights involved. It is perfectly true that
the United States has consistently followed the policy of recognizing
_de facto_ governments as soon as it is evident in each case that the
new government rests on popular approval and is likely to be permanent.
This doctrine of recognition is distinctively an American doctrine. It
was first laid down by Thomas Jefferson when he was secretary of state
as an offset to the European doctrine of divine right, and it was the
natural outgrowth of that other Jeffersonian doctrine that all
governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed.
Huerta could lay no claim to authority derived from a majority or
anything like a majority of the Mexican people. He was a
self-constituted dictator, whose authority rested solely on military
force. President Wilson and Secretary Bryan were fully justified in
refusing to recognize his usurpation of power, though they probably made
a mistake in announcing that they would never recognize him and in
demanding his elimination from the presidential contest. This
announcement made him deaf to advice from Washington and utterly
indifferent to the destruction of American life and property.

The next step in the President's course with reference to Mexico was the
occupation of Vera Cruz. On April 20, 1914, the President asked Congress
for authority to employ the armed forces of the United States in
demanding redress for the arbitrary arrest of American marines at Vera
Cruz, and the next day Admiral Fletcher was ordered to seize the custom
house at that port. This he did after a sharp fight with Huerta's troops
in which nineteen Americans were killed and seventy wounded. The
American chargé d'affaires, Nelson O'Shaughnessy, was at once handed his
passports, and all diplomatic relations between the United States and
Mexico were severed.

A few days later the representatives of the so-called A B C powers,
Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, tendered their good offices for a peaceful
settlement of the conflict and President Wilson promptly accepted their
mediation. The resulting conference at Niagara, May 20, was not
successful in its immediate object, but it resulted in the elimination
of Huerta who resigned July 15, 1914. On August 20, General Venustiano
Carranza, head of one of the revolutionary factions, assumed control of
affairs at the capital, but his authority was disputed by General
Francisco Villa, another insurrectionary chief. On Carranza's promise to
respect the lives and property of American citizens the United States
forces were withdrawn from Vera Cruz in November, 1914.

In August, 1915, at the request of President Wilson the six ranking
representatives of Latin America at Washington made an unsuccessful
effort to reconcile the contending factions of Mexico. On their advice,
however, President Wilson decided in October to recognize the government
of Carranza, who now controlled three-fourths of the territory of
Mexico. As a result of this action Villa began a series of attacks on
American citizens and raids across the border, which in March, 1916,
compelled the President to send a punitive expedition into Mexico and
later to dispatch most of the regular army and large bodies of militia
to the border.[284]

The raids of Villa created a very awkward situation. Carranza not only
made no real effort to suppress Villa, but he vigorously opposed the
steps taken by the United States to protect its own citizens along the
border, and even assumed a threatening attitude. There was a loud and
persistent demand in the United States for war against Mexico. American
investments in land, mines, rubber plantations, and other enterprises
were very large, and these financial interests were particularly
outraged at the President's policy of "watchful waiting." The President
remained deaf to this clamor. No country had been so shamelessly
exploited by foreign capital as Mexico. Furthermore it was suspected and
very generally believed that the recent revolutions had been financed by
American capital. President Wilson was determined to give the Mexican
people an opportunity to reorganize their national life on a better
basis and to lend them every assistance in the task. War with Mexico
would have been a very serious undertaking and even a successful war
would have meant the military occupation of Mexico for an indefinite
period. President Wilson's refusal to become involved in war with Mexico
convinced the world of his sincerity and gave him a hearing during the
Great War such as no political leader of any nation ever before
commanded.

It has been charged that there was a lack of consistency between the
President's Mexican policy and his Haitian policy. The difference
between the two cases, however, was that the Haitian situation, if taken
in time, could be handled without bloodshed, while the same method
applied to Mexico would have led to a long and bloody conflict. It would
be easy enough to go into Mexico, but exceedingly difficult to get out.
The most novel feature of the President's Mexican policy was his
acceptance of the mediation of the A B C powers and his subsequent
consultation with the leading representatives of Latin America. This
action has brought the Pan American ideal to the point of realization.
It has been received with enthusiasm and it has placed our relations
with Latin America on a better footing than they have been for years.

It has been suggested by more than one critic of American foreign policy
that if we are to undertake to set the world right, we must come before
the bar of public opinion with clean hands, that before we denounce the
imperialistic policies of Europe, we must abandon imperialistic policies
at home. The main features of President Wilson's Latin-American policy,
if we may draw a general conclusion, have been to pledge the weaker
American republics not to do anything which would invite European
intervention, and to secure by treaty the right of the United States to
intervene for the protection of life, liberty, and property, and for
the establishment of self-government. The test of such a policy is the
degree of unselfishness with which it is carried out.

The loyalty of the Latin-American states to the principles of Pan
Americanism was put to a severe test when the United States entered the
Great War. When President Wilson announced to Congress the severance of
relations with Germany and declared his intention of protecting our
commerce on the high seas, he expressed the confident hope that all
neutral governments would pursue the same course. He probably had
especially in mind our Latin-American neighbors, but if so, his
expectation was not fully realized. Only eight of the twenty
Latin-American republics eventually entered the war: Brazil, Costa Rica,
Cuba, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama. Five others
broke off relations with Germany: Bolivia, Peru, the Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, and Uruguay. Seven remained neutral: Argentina, Chile,
Colombia, Mexico, Salvador, Venezuela, and Paraguay.[285]

Only two Latin-American states, Brazil and Cuba, took an active part in
the war. At the request of the British government in December, 1917,
Brazil sent two cruisers and four destroyers to European waters to
coöperate with the British navy, and a few months later a group of
Brazilian aviators took their place on the Western front. A number of
physicians and several Red Cross units from Brazil also coöperated with
the Allies. Cuba turned over to the United States several German
steamships interned in her waters. A compulsory military service law
was passed and a number of training camps established. In October, 1918,
the Cuban government announced that it had 25,000 troops ready to send
to France, but the armistice was signed before arrangements could be
made for their transportation. The only active service rendered by
Cubans was in the field of aviation, where several individuals won high
distinction.

Of the A B C powers Argentina and Chile remained neutral. So also did
Mexico. Brazil was thus the only one of the larger states that actually
entered the war. The relations between Brazil and the United States have
almost always been peculiarly close and friendly. From the outbreak of
the European war strong sympathy for the allied cause was manifested in
Brazil, and a league for aiding the Allies through the agency of the Red
Cross was organized under the presidency of Ruy Barbosa, the most
distinguished statesman of Brazil and one of the most brilliant orators
of Latin America. Brazil's experience during the period of neutrality
was very similar to that of the United States. Her commerce was
interfered with and her ships were sunk by German submarines. A few
weeks after the United States entered the war, Brazil severed relations
with Germany and seized the forty-six German ships interned in Brazilian
harbors. In a circular note of June 2 the Brazilian government declared
to the world that it had taken this step because the Republic of Brazil
was bound to the United States "by a traditional friendship and by a
similarity of political opinion in the defense of the vital interests of
America and the principles accepted by international law," and because
it wished to give to its foreign policy, in this critical moment of the
world's history, "a practical form of continental solidarity--a policy
indeed which was that of the old régime on every occasion on which any
of the other friendly sister nations of the American continent were in
jeopardy." President Wilson's reply to this note expressed the deep
appreciation of the United States and the hope that the act of the
Brazilian Congress was "the forerunner of the attitude to be assumed by
the rest of the American states." On October 26, 1917, on the receipt of
the news of the torpedoing of another Brazilian ship by a German
submarine, a resolution recognizing "the state of war initiated by the
German Empire against Brazil" was adopted by the unanimous vote of the
Brazilian Senate and by a vote of 149 to 1 in the Chamber of
Deputies.[286] Brazil's enthusiastic support of the United States and of
the allied cause has been recognized by those powers in giving her
representation on the Council of the League of Nations. In fact at the
first meeting of the Council in London in February, 1920, Brazil was the
sole American power represented.

Argentina, the largest and most important of the states of Spanish
origin, remained neutral throughout the war, notwithstanding the fact
that a large part of the population and some of the leading newspapers
were strongly pro-Ally. When the United States declared war, Señor
Drago, the former minister of foreign affairs and author of the doctrine
that bears his name, issued a statement in which he said:

      The war between Germany and America is a struggle of
      democracy _versus_ absolutism, and no American nation can
      remain neutral without denying its past and compromising its
      future.

About the same time a note was sent through Ambassador Naón stating that
"in view of the causes which have prompted the United States to declare
war against the government of the German Empire," the Argentine
government recognizes "the justice of that decision." But German
propaganda, which had its headquarters in Buenos Aires, and the attitude
of President Irrigoyen kept the country out of the war. Popular
indignation was aroused by the Luxburg disclosures, which revealed the
fact that the German representative, after coming to an understanding
with the President, had advised his government that two Argentine ships
then approaching the French coast "be spared if possible, or else sunk
without a trace being left" (_spurlos versenkt_). The Senate and Chamber
of Deputies passed by large majorities a resolution severing relations
with Germany, but to the surprise of everybody President Irrigoyen
expressed himself as satisfied with Germany's disavowal of Luxburg's
conduct and continued his policy of neutrality.

Chile was so far removed from the scene of the war in Europe and had so
few ships engaged in European trade that her government did not have the
same provocation that others had. Furthermore, German propaganda had
made great headway in Chile and the Chilean army, trained by German
officers, was strongly pro-German. In the navy, on the other hand,
sentiment was strongly in favor of the Allies. This was a matter of
tradition, for since the days of Lord Cochrane, whose exploits have
been described in an earlier chapter of this book, the Chilean navy has
followed English ideals. Under these circumstances Chile remained
neutral, though before the end of the war public sentiment had shifted
to the side of the Allies.[287]

Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Uruguay in severing relations with Germany
proclaimed their adherence to the principle of American solidarity.
Paraguay's neutrality was due to her isolation. Colombia, still smarting
under the loss of the Isthmus, was not disposed to take sides with the
United States. In Venezuela most of the government officials were under
German influence. Panama and four of the five Central American republics
declared war on Germany, Salvador alone remaining neutral. Cuba and
Haiti also declared war on Germany, while the Dominican Republic severed
consular relations. Mexico proclaimed its neutrality, but permitted its
soil to become a hot-bed of German intrigue and President Carranza
exhibited at times a spirit of hostility to the United States which
tended to increase the tension that already existed between the two
countries.

In an article on "The European War and Pan Americanism"[288] Ambassador
Naón of the Argentine Republic draws the following interesting
conclusions, conclusions that are all the more interesting because his
country was not one of those that took the course to which he gives his
approval. He says: "The political action developed by the different
governments of the continent in the presence of the European conflict,
especially since the breaking out of hostilities between the United
States and Germany, has not been either the best advised or the most
propitious for achieving the consolidation of Pan Americanism." The
situation created by the European war, he continues, "affected the
entire continent in the same manner and with the same political and
economic intensity as the United States, and both self-interest and
moral obligations ought to have counseled the consummating of
solidarity, here and now, by making common cause and endorsing the
attitude of the United States to the extreme limit, until the disturbing
force should be overcome. The political action of America did not take
this direction, however. Some of the most important governments of the
continent, going counter to the political aspirations and doubtless to
the political interests of their own countries, adhered to the policy of
neutrality. In America this was equivalent to a policy of isolation, and
thus the solidarity of the continent was broken, with consequent
prejudice to Pan Americanism. Yet even if in those countries, the action
of the governments could not be counted upon, nevertheless, the
sentiment, expressed in eloquent manifestations of public opinion and in
complete disagreement with that attitude of the governments, persisted
throughout the crisis. Thus the _spirit_ of Pan Americanism was saved,
and we are justified in believing that there will come a reaction which
will restore the disturbed equilibrium and save the mighty interests
involved."

Ambassador Naón believes, however, that Pan Americanism has many
obstacles in the way of its complete realization. Among them he
mentions "the recognition of politico-intellectual inferiorities" by the
peace conference at Paris in the classification of nations as great
powers and small powers. The fundamental principle of Pan Americanism he
believes to be the doctrine of equality. He further points out that as
long as American states remain, whether as the result of their own
shortcomings or not, in these conditions of inferiority in world
politics, "there will continue to exist for the United States the causes
that gave rise to the Monroe Doctrine and consequently all its
objections will continue to exist." Finally he says that "the idea of
solidarity is being weakened or thwarted by another idea, the
unwholesome one of Latin Americanism, which is a Teutonic idea in its
tendencies, and which is trying to replace it, basing itself upon
supposed antagonisms of interests and ideals between the other countries
of America and the United States. This purpose, which is anarchical,
might cause American solidarity to fail if, in virtue of neglecting to
foster this tendency, it should succeed, by pandering to paltry
prejudices and flattering national vanities, in gaining a footing in the
thought of the other governments of the continent to the extent of
constituting itself a political force, capable of replacing the system
of solidarity which Pan Americanism seeks, by a system of a continental
equilibrium: a system which has just failed in the European conflict."

This summary of the views of the distinguished Argentine statesman is
sufficient to show that his analysis of the situation is correct. The
weakness and backwardness of certain states, specifically those in the
zone of the Caribbean, lies at the heart of the difficulty. As long as
they remain in their present condition the United States must continue
to protect them against European intervention and, when occasion arises,
supervise their affairs in order to prevent them from provoking such
intervention. As long as it is necessary to pursue this course the
United States will have to rest under the suspicion of having
imperialistic designs on its weaker neighbors, and it is this suspicion
which perpetuates the spirit of Latin Americanism which in turn must be
overcome before we can fully realize the ideal of Pan Americanism.

FOOTNOTES:

[273] International American Conference, Vol. IV (Historical Appendix),
p. 122. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1890.

[274] International American Conference, Vol. IV (Historical Appendix),
p. 202.

[275] International American Conference, Vol. IV (Historical Appendix)
p. 208.

[276] Moore, "Digest of International Law," Vol. VII, pp. 9-10.

[277] International American Conference, Vol. IV (Historical Appendix),
p. 217.

[278] _Ibid._, p. 255.

[279] Second International American Conference, English text (Mexico,
Government Printing Office, 1902), p. 309.

[280] Third International American Conference, Minutes, Resolutions,
Documents (Rio de Janeiro, Imprensa Nacional. 1907), P. 605.

[281] Bulletin of the Pan American Union, Vol. 31, p. 796.

[282] _Am. Journal of International Law_, Vol. 10, p. 212.

[283] John Bassett Moore, "Principles of American Diplomacy," pp.
407-408.

[284] "Affairs in Mexico," Sixty-fourth Cong., First Sess., Sen. Doc.
No. 324. The World Peace Foundation has issued two pamphlets containing
documents on Mexico under the title of "The New Pan Americanism," Parts
I and II (February and April, 1916).

[285] Percy A. Martin, "Latin America and the War" (issued by the World
Peace Foundation, August, 1919).

[286] Martin, "Latin America and the War," pp. 13-15.

[287] Enrique Rocuant, "The Neutrality of Chile and the Grounds that
Prompted and Justified It," (Valparaiso, 1919).

[288] Reprinted in International Conciliation, Inter-American Division,
Bulletin No. 20 (April, 1919).




CHAPTER IX

THE MONROE DOCTRINE


In the foregoing chapters we have discussed the origin and the more
important applications of the Monroe Doctrine. There remain, however,
certain general aspects of the subject which require special
consideration. In any discussion of the Monroe Doctrine it is important
to bear in mind that it was in its origin and has always remained purely
an executive policy. Neither house of Congress has ever expressly
sanctioned the language of President Monroe or attempted to formulate a
new definition of the policy. On January 20, 1824, a few weeks after
Monroe's famous message, Henry Clay made an effort to get Congress to
endorse the policy announced by the executive, but his resolution was
tabled.[289] In 1856 Senator Clayton, who as secretary of state had
negotiated the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, declared that he would be willing
to vote to assert the Monroe Doctrine and maintain it, but that he would
"not expect to be sustained in such a vote by both branches of Congress.
Whenever the attempt has been made to assert the Monroe Doctrine in
either branch of Congress, it has failed." And he added, "You cannot
prevail on a majority, and I will venture to say that you cannot prevail
on one-third, of either house of Congress to sustain it."[290] In fact,
the Monroe Doctrine never received anything approaching legislative
sanction until 1895, when, in response to President Cleveland's message
on the Venezuelan boundary dispute, Congress appropriated $100,000 to
pay the expenses of the commission which he proposed to appoint.

For nearly a hundred years we have successfully upheld the Monroe
Doctrine without resort to force. The policy has never been favorably
regarded by the powers of continental Europe. Bismarck described it as
"an international impertinence." In recent years it has stirred up
rather intense opposition in certain parts of Latin America. Until
recently no American writers appear to have considered the real nature
of the sanction on which the doctrine rested. How is it that without an
army and until recent years without a navy of any size we have been able
to uphold a policy which has been described as an impertinence to Latin
America and a standing defiance to Europe? Americans generally seem to
think that the Monroe Doctrine has in it an inherent sanctity which
prevents other nations from violating it. In view of the general
disregard of sanctities, inherent or acquired, during the past few
years, this explanation will not hold good and some other must be
sought. Americans have been so little concerned with international
affairs that they have failed to see any connection between the Monroe
Doctrine and the balance of power in Europe. The existence of a European
balance of power is the only explanation of our having been able to
uphold the Monroe Doctrine for so long a time without a resort to force.
Some one or more of the European powers would long ago have stepped in
and called our bluff, that is, forced us to repudiate the Monroe
Doctrine or fight for it, had it not been for the well-grounded fear
that as soon as they became engaged with us some other European power
would attack them in the rear. What other satisfactory explanation is
there for Louis Napoleon's withdrawal from Mexico, for Great Britain's
backdown in the Venezuelan boundary dispute, and for the withdrawal of
the German fleet from Venezuela in 1902?

While England has from time to time objected to some of the corollaries
deduced from the Monroe Doctrine, she has on the whole been not
unfavorably disposed toward the essential features of that policy. The
reason for this is that the Monroe Doctrine has been an open-door
policy, and has thus been in general accord with the British policy of
free trade. The United States has not used the Monroe Doctrine for the
establishment of exclusive trade relations with our Southern neighbors.
In fact, we have largely neglected the South American countries as a
field for the development of American commerce. The failure to cultivate
this field has not been due wholly to neglect, however, but to the fact
that we have had employment for all our capital at home and consequently
have not been in a position to aid in the industrial development of the
Latin-American states, and to the further fact that our exports have
been so largely the same and hence the trade of North and South America
has been mainly with Europe. There has, therefore, been little rivalry
between the United States and the powers of Europe in the field of South
American commerce. Our interest has been political rather than
commercial. We have prevented the establishment of spheres of influence
and preserved the open door. This situation has been in full accord with
British policy. Had Great Britain adopted a high tariff policy and been
compelled to demand commercial concessions from Latin America by force,
the Monroe Doctrine would long since have gone by the board and been
forgotten. Americans should not forget the fact, moreover, that at any
time during the past twenty years Great Britain could have settled all
her outstanding difficulties with Germany by agreeing to sacrifice the
Monroe Doctrine and give her rival a free hand in South America. In the
face of such a combination our navy would have been of little avail.

Contrary to a widely prevailing opinion the Monroe Doctrine has
undergone very little change since the original declaration, and the
official statements of the doctrine have on the whole been very
consistent. The only important extension was made less than two years
after the original declaration, when, in October, 1825, Secretary Clay,
acting under the direction of President John Quincy Adams, who assisted
in formulating the doctrine, notified the French government that we
could not consent to the occupation of Cuba and Porto Rico "by any other
European power than Spain under any contingency whatever." Similar
declarations were made to the other European powers, the occasion being
the fear that Spain would transfer her sovereignty over these islands to
some other government. President Monroe had declared that the American
continents were closed to colonization from Europe, meaning by
colonization very probably, as Professor John Bassett Moore says, "the
acquisition of title to territory by original occupation and
settlement."[291] He had made no declaration against the transfer of
sovereignty in America from one European power to another. In fact he
positively renounced any such idea, when he said: "With the existing
colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered,
and shall not interfere." Here, then, within two years we have a
distinct advance upon the position taken by President Monroe. Yet this
advanced ground was held by succeeding administrations, until President
Grant could say in the case of the same islands in his first annual
message:

      These dependencies are no longer regarded as subject to
      transfer from one European power to another. When the
      present relation of colonies ceases, they are to become
      independent powers, exercising the right of choice and of
      self-control in the determination of their future condition
      and relations with other powers.[292]

And Secretary Hamilton Fish said a few months later that the President
had but followed "the teachings of all our history" when he made this
statement.[293]

The failure of Blaine and Frelinghuysen to oust Great Britain from her
interests in the canal under the Clayton-Bulwer treaty by an appeal to
the Monroe Doctrine and the successful enforcement of the doctrine by
President Cleveland and Secretary Olney in 1895 have been discussed at
sufficient length in previous chapters. While the policy of Cleveland
and Olney was vehemently denounced at the time, it is now generally
approved by American writers of authority on international law and
diplomacy.

When President McKinley decided to demand from Spain the cession of the
Philippine Islands, the opposition that the step encountered was based
to some extent on the fear that it would amount to a repudiation of the
Monroe Doctrine, that if we invaded the Eastern Hemisphere we could not
expect to keep Europe out of the Western. The use of the term
hemispheres in connection with the Monroe Doctrine has, of course, been
merely a figure of speech. The Monroe Doctrine dealt with the relations
between Europe and America, and Eastern Asia never came within its
purview. As a matter of fact, the Monroe Doctrine has been more fully
and more frequently asserted since the acquisition of the Philippines
than ever before. The participation of the United States in the First
Peace Conference at The Hague was taken by many Americans to mark the
end of the old order and the introduction of a new era in American
diplomacy, but, contrary to their expectations, this meeting was made
the occasion for an emphatic and effective declaration before the
assembled body of European nations of our adherence to the Monroe
Doctrine. Before the Convention for the Pacific Settlements of
International Disputes was adopted, the following declaration was read
before the conference and the treaty was signed by the American
delegates under this reservation:

      Nothing contained in this convention shall be so construed
      as to require the United States of America to depart from
      its traditional policy of not intruding upon, interfering
      with, or entangling itself in the political questions or
      policy or internal administration of any foreign state; nor
      shall anything contained in the said convention be construed
      to imply a relinquishment by the United States of America of
      its traditional attitude toward purely American
      questions.[294]

Prior to the Roosevelt administration the Monroe Doctrine was regarded
by the Latin-American states as solely a protective policy. The United
States did not undertake to control the financial administration or the
foreign policy of any of these republics. It was only after their
misconduct had gotten them into difficulty and some foreign power, or
group of foreign powers, was on the point of demanding reparation by
force that the United States stepped in and undertook to see to it that
foreign intervention did not take the form of occupation of territory or
interference in internal politics. The Monroe Doctrine has always been
in principle a policy of American intervention for the purpose of
preventing European intervention, but American intervention always
awaited the threat of immediate action on the part of some European
power. President Roosevelt concluded that it would be wiser to restrain
the reckless conduct of the smaller American republics before disorders
or public debts should reach a point which gave European powers an
excuse for intervening. He held that since we could not permit European
powers to restrain or punish American states in cases of wrongdoing, we
must ourselves undertake that task. As long as the Monroe Doctrine was
merely a policy of benevolent protection, which Latin-American states
could invoke after their unwise or evil conduct had brought European
powers to the point of demanding just retribution, it was regarded with
favor and no objection was raised to it; but the Roosevelt declaration,
that if we were to continue to protect Latin-American states against
European intervention, we had a right to demand that they should refrain
from conduct which was likely to provoke such intervention, was quite a
different thing, and raised a storm of criticism and opposition.

The Roosevelt interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine was undoubtedly a
perfectly logical step. It was endorsed by the Taft administration and
has been extended by the Wilson administration and made one of our most
important policies in the zone of the Caribbean. President Roosevelt was
right in drawing the conclusion that we had arrived at a point where we
had either to abandon the Monroe Doctrine or to extend its application
so as to cover the constantly increasing number of disputes arising from
the reckless creation of public debts and loose financial
administration. It was absurd for us to stand quietly by and witness the
utterly irresponsible creation of financial obligations that would
inevitably lead to European intervention and then undertake to fix the
bounds and limits of that intervention. It is interesting to note that
President Wilson has not hesitated to carry the new policy to its
logical conclusion, and he has gone so far as to warn Latin-American
countries against granting to foreign corporations concessions which, on
account of their extended character, would be certain to give rise to
foreign claims which would, in turn, give an excuse for European
intervention. In discussing our Latin-American policy shortly after the
beginning of his administration, President Wilson said:

      You hear of concessions to foreign capitalists in Latin
      America. You do not hear of concessions to foreign
      capitalists in the United States. They are not granted
      concessions. They are invited to make investments. The work
      is ours, though they are welcome to invest in it. We do not
      ask them to supply the capital and do the work. It is an
      invitation, not a privilege, and the states that are obliged
      because their territory does not lie within the main field
      of modern enterprise and action, to grant concessions are in
      this condition, that foreign interests are apt to dominate
      their domestic affairs--a condition of affairs always
      dangerous and apt to become intolerable.... What these
      states are going to seek, therefore, is an emancipation from
      the subordination which has been inevitable to foreign
      enterprise and an assertion of the splendid character which,
      in spite of these difficulties, they have again and again
      been able to demonstrate.

These remarks probably had reference to the oil concession which Pearson
& Son of London had arranged with the president of Colombia. This
concession is said to have covered extensive oil interests in Colombia,
and carried with it the right to improve harbors and dig canals in the
country. However, before the meeting of the Colombian Congress in
November, 1913, which was expected to confirm the concession, Lord
Cowdray, the president of Pearson & Son, withdrew the contract, alleging
as his reason the opposition of the United States.

Prior to the Great War, which has upset all calculations, it seemed
highly probable that the Platt Amendment would in time be extended to
all the weaker states within the zone of the Caribbean. If the United
States is to exercise a protectorate over such states, the right to
intervene and the conditions of intervention should be clearly defined
and publicly proclaimed. Hitherto whatever action we have taken in Latin
America has been taken under the Monroe Doctrine,--a policy of doubtful
legal sanction,--which an international court might not recognize.
Action under a treaty would have the advantage of legality. In other
words, the recent treaties with Caribbean states have converted American
policy into law.

The imperialistic tendencies of our Caribbean policy, whether they be
regarded as logical deductions from the Monroe Doctrine or not, have
undoubtedly aroused the jealousies and fears of our Southern neighbors.
One of the results has been the formation of the so-called A B C
Alliance, based on treaties between Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, the
exact provisions of which have not been made public. This alliance
doubtless serves a useful purpose in promoting friendly relations
between the three great states of South America, and since the
acceptance of the mediation of these powers in Mexico by President
Wilson there is no reason to regard it as in any sense hostile to the
United States. While the United States may very properly accept the
mediation of other American states in disputes like that arising out of
the Mexican situation, the United States would not feel under any
obligation to consult other American states or accept their advice on
any question involving the enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine. The
United States has always maintained the Monroe Doctrine as a principle
of self-defense, and, consequently, on its own authority. In 1825 the
Brazilian government proposed that the United States should enter into
an alliance with it in order to maintain the independence of Brazil in
case Portugal should be assisted by any foreign power in her efforts to
reconquer Brazil. Secretary Clay replied that while President Adams
adhered to the principles set forth by his predecessor, the prospect of
peace between Portugal and Brazil rendered such an alliance
unnecessary.[295]

In recent years the proposal has been more than once made that the
Monroe Doctrine be Pan Americanized. This proposal was discussed by Mr.
Root in his address before the American Society of International Law in
1914 in the course of which he said:

      Since the Monroe Doctrine is a declaration based upon this
      nation's right of self-protection, it cannot be transmuted
      into a joint or common declaration by American states or any
      number of them. If Chile or Argentina or Brazil were to
      contribute the weight of its influence toward a similar end,
      the right upon which that nation would rest its declaration
      would be its own safety, not the safety of the United
      States. Chile would declare what was necessary for the
      safety of Chile. Argentina would declare what was necessary
      for the safety of Argentina. Brazil, what was necessary for
      the safety of Brazil. Each nation would act for itself and
      in its own right and it would be impossible to go beyond
      that except by more or less offensive and defensive
      alliances. Of course such alliances are not to be
      considered.[296]

President Wilson in his address before the Second Pan American
Scientific Congress in 1916 agreed in part with this when he said: "The
Monroe Doctrine was proclaimed by the United States on her own
authority. It has always been maintained, and always will be maintained,
upon her own responsibility."

The relation of the Monroe Doctrine to the Declaration of Rights and
Duties of Nations, drafted by the American Institute of International
Law, was discussed by Mr. Root in his address before the American
Society of International Law in 1916. He said in part:

      Whether the United States will soon have occasion or will
      long have the ability or the will to maintain the Monroe
      Doctrine lies in the uncertain future. Whether it will be
      necessary for her to act in defense of the doctrine or
      abandon it, may well be determined by the issue of the
      present war. Whether when the occasion comes she will prove
      to have the ability and the will to maintain the doctrine,
      depends upon the spirit of her people, their capacity for
      patriotic sacrifice, the foresight and character of those to
      whose initiative in foreign affairs the interests of the
      people are entrusted. Whether the broader doctrine affirmed
      by the American Institute of International Law is to be made
      effective for the protection of justice and liberty
      throughout the world depends upon whether the vision of the
      nations shall have been so clarified by the terrible lessons
      of these years that they can rise above small struggles for
      advantage in international affairs, and realize that
      correlative to each nation's individual right is that
      nation's duty to insist upon the observance of the
      principles of public right throughout the community of
      nations.[297]

It is not probable that our participation in the Great War will result
in any weakening of the Monroe Doctrine. That principle has been fully
justified by a century of experience. It has saved South America from
the kind of exploitation to which the continents of Africa and Asia
have, during the past generation, fallen a prey. It would be strange
indeed if the United States, having insisted on the non-interference of
European powers in America when it was itself a weak power from the
military point of view, should now in the plenitude of its power relax
what has been for so many years the cardinal principle of its foreign
policy. The abandonment of our policy of neutrality and isolation does
not by any means mean the abandonment of the Monroe Doctrine. President
Wilson made this quite clear in his address to the Senate on January 22,
1917, when he said:

      I am proposing, as it were, that the nations should with one
      accord adopt the doctrine of President Monroe as the
      doctrine of the world; that no nation should seek to extend
      its polity over any other nation or people, but that every
      people should be left free to determine its own polity, its
      own way of development, unhindered, unthreatened, unafraid,
      the little along with the great and powerful. I am proposing
      that all nations henceforth avoid entangling alliances which
      would draw them into competitions of power, catch them in a
      net of intrigue and selfish rivalry, and disturb their own
      affairs with influences intruded from without. There is no
      entangling alliance in a concert of power.

The policy of isolation or the avoidance of entangling alliances, which
so many Americans confuse with the Monroe Doctrine, is in principle
quite distinct from it and is in fact utterly inconsistent with the
position and importance of the United States as a world power. The
difference in principle between the two policies can perhaps be best
illustrated by the following supposition. If the United States were to
sign a permanent treaty with England placing our navy at her disposal in
the event of attack from some European power, on condition that England
would unite with us in opposing the intervention of any European power
in Latin America, such a treaty would not be a violation of the Monroe
Doctrine, but a distinct recognition of that principle. Such a treaty
would, however, be a departure from our traditional policy of isolation,
originally announced by Washington and Jefferson.

The participation of the United States in the League of Nations would,
if that League be considered an entangling alliance, be a departure from
the policy of isolation but not a violation of the Monroe Doctrine. In
order to allay the fears of Americans on this point, President Wilson
caused to be inserted in the constitution of the League of Nations the
following clause:

      Nothing in this Covenant shall be deemed to affect the
      validity of international engagements, such as treaties of
      arbitration or regional understandings like the Monroe
      Doctrine, for securing the maintenance of peace.

This clause did not serve the purpose for which it was intended, and a
heated controversy at once arose as to the meaning of the language
employed. When the treaty came before the Senate this clause was the
object of attack, and Senator Lodge included among the fourteen
reservations which he proposed the following one on the Monroe Doctrine:

      The United States will not submit to arbitration or to
      inquiry by the assembly or by the council of the League of
      Nations, provided for in said treaty of peace, any questions
      which in the judgment of the United States depend upon or
      relate to its long-established policy, commonly known as the
      Monroe Doctrine; said doctrine is to be interpreted by the
      United States alone and is hereby declared to be wholly
      outside the jurisdiction of said League of Nations and
      entirely unaffected by any provision contained in the said
      treaty of peace with Germany.

The recognition of the Monroe Doctrine by the League of Nations, taken
in connection with the Senate's assertion of the exclusive right to
interpret its meaning, has caused some of the Latin-American countries
to delay joining the League until the Monroe Doctrine is clearly
defined. In February, 1920, Salvador brought this subject to the
attention of the United States in a formal note in which she argued
that, as the Monroe Doctrine was so variously interpreted by prominent
thinkers and public men even in the United States, it should be
officially defined.[298] In reply Salvador was referred to what
President Wilson had said on the subject of the Monroe Doctrine in his
address of January 6, 1916, before the Pan American Scientific Congress
at Washington.[299] These remarks have already been quoted in Chapter
VIII.[300] Salvador was informed that no further definition was deemed
necessary. The speech referred to may, therefore, be considered the
latest official interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine.

FOOTNOTES:

[289] Moore, "Digest of International Law," Vol. VI, p. 404.

[290] _Ibid._, p. 427.

[291] _Political Science Quarterly_, Vol. XI. p. 3.

[292] "Messages and Papers of the Presidents," Vol. VII, p. 32.

[293] Foreign Relations, 1870, pp. 254-260; Moore, "Digest of
International Law," Vol. VI, p. 431.

[294] "Treaties and Conventions of the United States" (Compiled by W. M.
Malloy), vol. II, p. 2032.

[295] Moore, "Digest of International Law," Vol. VI, p. 427.

[296] "Addresses on International Subjects," Elihu Root, p. 120.

[297] "Addresses on International Subjects," by Elihu Root, p. 425.

[298] The New York _Times_, February 8, 1920.

[299] The New York _Times_, March 2, 1920.

[300] Ante, pp. 306-307.




THE END




INDEX


  A B C Alliance,
    offers to mediate in Mexican crisis, 309;
    divided in Great War, 313;
    attitude towards United States, 329.

  Aberdeen, Lord, tries to prevent annexation of Texas by United States,
    262, 263.

  Abolitionists, oppose admission of Texas, 262.

  Adams, C. F.,
    minister to England, views on the Mexican situation, 202;
    warns his government against designs of Louis Napoleon on Mexico, 208;
    on Mexican policy of Great Britain, 209.

  Adams, John Quincy,
    opposes joint action with England, 70, 71;
    influence on Monroe's message of December 2, 1823, 72;
    informs Russia that American continents are no longer open to European
      colonization, 75;
    views on Cuba, 86;
    appoints delegates to Panama Congress, 292, 293.

  Aix-la-Chapelle, conference of 1818, 58, 59.

  Alexander I, Czar of Russia, and Holy Alliance, 61.

  American Institute of International Law, 304;
    adopts Declaration of Rights and Duties of Nations, 305-306.

  Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 266.

  Arbitration, international,
    of Venezuelan boundary dispute, 248, 249;
    of pecuniary claims against Venezuela, 255, 256.

  Argentina,
    British invasion of, 23-25;
    beginnings of revolution in, 30;
    remains neutral in Great War, 314, 315.

  _Assiento_, contract for supplying slaves to Spanish colonies, 12-14.

  _Audiencia_, in Spanish colonies, 4, 5.

  Austria,
    suppresses revolution in Naples and in Piedmont, 59, 60;
    warned not to send troops to assistance of Maximilian in Mexico,
      232, 233.


  Balfour, A. J., on forcible collection of pecuniary claims, 257.

  _Baltimore_, U. S. Cruiser, members of crew attacked by Chileans, 302.

  Barbosa, Ruy, Brazilian statesman, 313.

  Bay Islands, British claims to, 157, 160, 161.

  Beaupré, A. M., minister to Colombia, 186.

  Belize, British claims to, 157, 160, 161.

  Bell, J. Franklin, in Cuba, 142.

  Belligerent rights,
    accorded to Spanish colonies, 48;
    withheld from Cubans, 110-113;
    House resolution, 113;
    joint resolution of Congress, 127.

  Bigelow, John, minister to France, 222, 225, 227.

  Bismarck, Prince, on Monroe Doctrine, 321.

  "Black Friday," 110.

  _Black Warrior_, case of, 101-103.

  Blaine, J. G.,
    outlines new canal policy, 169-171;
    proposes modifications of Clayton-Bulwer treaty, 172-173;
    calls International American Conference at Washington, 300;
    presides at opening session, 301.

  Blanco, Ramon, governor of Cuba, 129.

  Bliss, Tasker H., in charge of Cuban customs, 140.

  Bolivar, Simon, character, 37;
    joins patriot cause, 38;
    career in Venezuela and Colombia, 39-42;
    in Ecuador and Peru, 43, 44;
    interest in Isthmian canal, 147;
    summons Panama Congress, 292.

  Bonaparte, Louis Napoleon,
    interest in Isthmian canal, 148;
    designs on Mexico, 207;
    places Maximilian on the throne, 214-220;
    forced to withdraw troops, 226-232.

  Bonaparte, Napoleon,
    invasion of Spain, 26-28;
    cedes Louisiana to United States, 261.

  Bowen, Herbert W., minister to Venezuela, 252.

  Brazil,
    becomes a republic, 301;
    stands by United States in war with Germany, 312-314.

  British Guiana, dispute over boundary of, 238-249.

  British Honduras. See Belize.

  Brougham, Lord, on Monroe's message of December 2, 1823, 77.

  Bryan, William J.,
    favors ratification of Spanish treaty, 136;
    tries to adjust differences with Colombia resulting from Panama
      Revolution, 274-276;
    negotiates treaties with Nicaragua, 285, 286;
    refuses to recognize Huerta, 308.

  Buchanan, James,
    proposes purchase of Cuba, 92;
    connection with Ostend Manifesto, 104, 105;
    recommends congressional action on Cuban question, 106;
    criticises Clayton-Bulwer treaty, 157;
    suggests abrogation of, 163; by prior usage
    announces satisfactory adjustment of disputes growing out of, 165.

  Buenos Aires, captured by the British, 24.

  Bulwer, Sir Henry Lytton, signs canal treaty, 154.

  Bunau-Varilla, Philippe,
    and Panama revolution, 187;
    first minister from Republic of Panama, 189.

  Bureau of American Republics, 301, 303.


  California, acquisition of, 264.

  Campbell, L. D., minister to Mexico, 234-236.

  Canal. See Panama Canal, Nicaragua Canal.

  Canning, George,
    on commercial relations with Spanish colonies, 54-55;
    on recognition of, 55-56;
    on European congresses, 58, 59;
    on French intervention in Spain, 63, 64;
    conferences with Rush on schemes of the Holy Alliance, 65-67, 72;
    interviews with Prince Polignac on Spanish-American situation, 73, 74;
    comments on Monroe's message of December 2, 1823, 78, 79;
    decides to recognize Mexico and Colombia, 80, 81;
    opposes French occupation of Cuba, 88.

  Caribbean Sea,
    naval supremacy in, 261, 264-266;
    new American policies in, 267.

  Carranza, Venustiano,
    succeeds Huerta, 309;
    recognized by United States, 310;
    permits German intrigue, 316.

  _Casa de Contratacion_, 8.

  Castelar, Emilio, President of the Spanish Republic, 115.

  Central American Court of Justice, 281-287.

  Chile,
    liberation of, 32, 33;
    war with Spain, 298;
        with Peru, 299-300;
    quarrel with United States, 301, 302;
    remains neutral in Great War, 315, 316.

  Claims. See Pecuniary claims.

  Clay, Henry,
    advocates recognition of South American independence, 49-51, 82;
    Cuban policy of, 88;
    views on Isthmian Canal, 148;
    and Panama Congress, 292-295;
    applies Monroe Doctrine to Cuba and Porto Rico, 323.

  Clayton, J. M.,
    secretary of state, signs canal treaty, 154;
    criticised by Buchanan, 157;
    on refusal of Congress to endorse Monroe Doctrine, 320.

  Clayton-Bulwer treaty, 154-156;
    disputes arising out of, 159-165;
    attempts of Blaine and Frelinghuysen to secure modifications of,
      172-177;
    alleged British violation of, 178-180;
    abrogated, 181.

  Cleveland, Grover,
    transmits to Congress correspondence of Secretary Fish on Cuba, 125;
    recognizes state of insurgency in Cuba, 126;
    ignores resolution of Congress recognizing belligerency, 127;
    message on Cuba, 128;
    canal policy of, 177;
    asserts Monroe Doctrine in Venezuelan boundary dispute, 238-239.

  Cochrane, Lord (Earl Dundonald), commander of Chilean navy, 34, 35.

  Colombia (New Granada),
    war of liberation, 39-42;
    signs canal treaty of 1846, 149, 150;
    rejects Hay-Herran convention, 186;
    demands arbitration of Panama question, 192;
    strained relations with United States arising out of Panama
      Revolution, 268-276;
    remains neutral in the Great War, 312, 316.

  Commerce, British, with Spanish colonies, 53-55.

  Conference. See International American.

  Convention of London of 1861, providing for joint intervention in
    Mexico, 203.

  Costa Rica, protests against protectorate over Nicaragua, 285-287.

  Cromwell, W. N., attorney for French Panama Canal Company, 187.

  Cuba,
    British or French acquisition opposed by United States, 84-90;
    annexation schemes, 91-106;
    "Ten Years' War" in, 107-125;
    insurrection of 1895, 125-129;
    intervention of the United States in, 130-133;
    American occupation of, 136-140;
    reciprocity with, 140-142;
    second period of American occupation, 142, 143;
    enters war against Germany, 312, 313.

  Cushing, Caleb, mission to Spain, 119-124.


  Dallas-Clarendon treaty, amended by Senate and rejected by Great
    Britain, 161, 162.

  Danish West Indies,
    annexation proposed by Seward, 264;
    purchased by United States, 289, 290.

  Davis, Cushman K., commissioner to negotiate peace with Spain, 135.

  Dawson, T. C., minister to Dominican Republic, negotiates treaty
    establishing financial supervision, 277-279.

  Day, W. R., commissioner to negotiate peace with Spain, 135.

  Dayton, W. L., minister to France, 214, 217, 219, 221.

  De Lesseps, Ferdinand,
    begins construction of Panama canal, 146;
    effect on canal policy of United States, 167-169.

  De Lhuys, Drouyn, French minister of state, 217, 221, 225, 231.

  Dewey, George,
    at Manila Bay, 134;
    prepared to arrest German action against Venezuela, 253, 254.

  Diaz, Porfirio, president of Mexico, joint mediator with President
    Roosevelt in Central American affairs, 280-282.

  Dominican Republic, under financial supervision of United States,
    276-280.

  Drago, L. M., Argentine minister, on war between Germany and United
    States, 314, 315.

  Drago Doctrine, 257-260.

  DuBois, J. T., minister to Colombia, efforts to settle differences
    arising out of Panama Revolution, 270-274.


  Evarts, W. M., report on obligations of United States with respect to
    Isthmus of Panama, 169.


  Ferdinand VII, of Spain,
    dethroned by Napoleon, 27;
    restoration of, 29;
    attempts to recover American colonies, 40.

  Filibusters, Cuban, 92-96.

  Financial supervision,
    over Dominican Republic, 276-280;
    over Nicaragua, 283;
    over Haiti, 289.

  Fish, Hamilton, secretary of state,
    Cuban policy of, 108-124;
    on British infringement of Clayton-Bulwer treaty, 167;
    acts as mediator in war between Spain and republics on West coast of
      South America, 298, 299.

  Florida treaty, 52, 85, 261.

  Fonseca Bay, naval base on,
    offered to United States by Honduras, 153;
    leased from Nicaragua, 286.

  Forsyth, John,
    secretary of state, 90;
    minister to Mexico, 194.

  France,
    interest in Cuba, 87, 88, 97;
    claims against Mexico, 197;
    severs diplomatic relations with Juarez government, 199;
    decides on joint intervention in Mexico, 203;
    supports Maximilian on Mexican throne, 220-234.

  Frelinghuysen, F. T.,
    correspondence with Lord Granville on Clayton-Bulwer treaty, 175, 176;
    signs canal treaty with Nicaragua, 177.

  Frye, W. P., commissioner to negotiate peace with Spain, 135.


  Garfield, J. A., canal policy of, 169.

  Germany,
    intervention in Venezuela, 249-252;
    forced to withdraw, 252-255.

  Goethals, G. W., in charge of construction of Panama Canal, 191.

  Gomez, Maximo, leader of Cuban insurrection, 125.

  Grace-Eyre-Cragin Syndicate, secures concession for canal through
    Nicaragua, 183.

  Grant, Ulysses S.,
    Cuban policy of, 108-124;
    favors driving French from Mexico, 227;
    proposes annexation of Santo Domingo, 265;
    on Monroe Doctrine, 324.

  Gray, George, commissioner to negotiate peace with Spain, 135.

  Great Britain,
    secures monopoly of slave trade, 12-14;
    entertains idea of revolutionizing Spanish America, 14-22, 26;
    sends expedition to the Plate, 23-25;
    commercial relations with Spanish America, 53-55;
    attitude towards Holy Alliance, 60, 63;
    recognizes independence of Mexico and Colombia, 80;
    attitude towards Cuba, 85, 86, 90, 97;
    signs Clayton-Bulwer treaty, 154;
    disagrees with United States as to interpretation of the treaty,
      160-164;
    refuses to relinquish rights under treaty, 174;
    interferes in affairs of Mosquito Indians, 178-180;
    claims against Mexico, 196;
    severs diplomatic relations with Juarez government, 199;
    decides on joint intervention in Mexico, 203;
    grows suspicious of France, 207-209;
    withdraws troops from Mexico, 212, 213;
    controversy with Venezuela over boundary of British Guiana, 238-249;
    intervenes in Venezuela for collection of claims, 249-252;
    opposes annexation of Texas by United States, 262-263;
    attitude towards Monroe Doctrine, 322, 323.

  Greytown, British occupation of, 157-160.

  Guiana. See British Guiana.

  Gwin, W. M., plan for colonizing ex-Confederates in Mexico, 223.


  Hague Conference of 1907, resolutions on forcible collection of contract
    debts, 259-260.

  Hague Court, decision in Venezuelan case, 256.

  Haiti,
    occupied by U. S. Marines, 288;
    agrees to American financial supervision, 289;
    declares war on Germany, 316.

  Hamilton, Alexander, interested in Miranda's projects, 17-19.

  Harrison, Benjamin, dispute with Chile, 302.

  Hay, John, secretary of state,
    negotiates new canal treaty with England, 180, 181;
    negotiates canal treaty with Colombia, 185;
    calls Germany's attention to Monroe Doctrine, 251;
    advises submission of Venezuelan case to Hague Court, 255.

  Hay-Herran convention,
    signed, 185;
    rejected by Colombia, 186, 187.

  Hay-Pauncefote treaty,
    provisions, 180, 181;
    practical recognition of American supremacy in Caribbean, 265-267.

  Hayes, R. B., announces new canal policy, 168.

  Hepburn Bill, 184.

  Hoar, G. F., on acquisition of the Philippines, 136.

  Holleben incident, 252-254.

  Holy Alliance, treaty of the, 61.

  Honduras,
    Knox treaty establishing financial supervision over, 283;
    protests against protectorate over Nicaragua, 285.

  Huerta, Victoriano, Mexican dictator, 307-309.


  India House, 8.

  Indies,
    Council of the, 4, 5;
    laws of the, 4.

  International American Conference,
    at Washington, 300, 301;
    at Mexico, 302;
    at Rio de Janeiro, 303;
    at Buenos Aires, 303.

  International High Commission, 304.

  Intervention, European doctrine of, 57.

  Isthmian canal,
    difficulties of, 144;
    comparative merits of Panama and Nicaragua routes, 145, 146;
    international questions involved in, 146, 147.

  Italy, intervention in Venezuela, 249-252.

  _Itata_, case of the, 302.

  Iturbide, Augustin de,
    leads revolution against Spain in Mexico, 45, 46;
    proclaims himself emperor, 47.


  Jefferson, Thomas,
    interview with Miranda, 20;
    letter to President Monroe on Canning's proposals, 68-70;
    views on Cuba, 84, 87;
    on recognition of _de facto_ governments, 308.

  Juarez, Benito,
    president of Mexico, 194;
    recognized by United States, 195;
    suspends payment on foreign debt, 199;
    driven from capital by the French, 214, 215;
    urged by United States to spare Maximilian's life, 235;
    orders his execution, 237.


  King, Rufus, correspondence with Miranda, 17-20.

  Knox, P. C.,
    investigates title of Panama Canal Company, 185;
    tries to settle differences with Colombia resulting from Panama
      Revolution, 270-274;
    Central American policy, 282-285.

  Lansing, Robert, secretary of state,
    negotiates treaty for purchase of Danish West Indies, 290;
    suggests adoption of Declaration of Rights and Duties of Nations, 305.

  Latin America, and the Great War, 312-318.

  Laybach, conference of powers at, 59.

  League of Nations, and Monroe Doctrine, 333, 334.

  Lee, Fitzhugh, consul-general at Havana, 129.

  Lincoln, Abraham, views on Panama canal, 151.

  Liverpool, Lord,
    on conference at Aix-la-Chapelle, 58;
    on French intervention in Spain, 63.

  Lodge, H. C.,
    on alleged secret alliance with England, 266;
    reservation of Monroe Doctrine, 333.

  Lôme, Enrique Dupuy de, incident and recall, 129, 130.

  Loomis, F. B., acting secretary of state, 188.

  Lopez, Narciso, Cuban patriot, 92-96.

  Louis Napoleon. See Bonaparte.

  Louis Philippe,
    suggested as possible ruler for Spanish America, 26;
    and annexation of Texas, 262, 263.

  Louisiana, ceded to United States, 261.


  McKinley, William,
    Cuban policy of, 128-132;
    demands cession of Philippine Islands, 135.

  McLane, R. M., minister to Mexico, 195.

  Mackintosh, Sir James, on Monroe's message of December 2, 1823, 78.

  Madero, Francisco, murder of, 307.

  Madison, James,
    receives Miranda informally, 20;
    favors joint action with England against intervention of powers in
      Spanish America, 70;
    views on Cuba, 84.

  Magoon, C. E., provisional governor of Cuba, 142.

  Magruder, J. B., accepts office under Maximilian in Mexico, 224.

  _Maine_, U. S. battleship,
    sent to Havana, 129;
    blown up, 130.

  Marcy, William L., secretary of state, Cuban policy of, 99-105.

  Maritime Canal Company, secures concessions from Nicaragua, 183.

  Mason, John Y., connection with Ostend Manifesto, 104.

  Maury, M. F., accepts office under Maximilian in Mexico, 224.

  Maximilian, Archduke Ferdinand,
    suggested for Mexican throne, 208-211;
    offered the position of Emperor of Mexico, 215;
    not recognized by the United States, 218, 219;
    career in Mexico, 220-234;
    death, 237.

  Mexico,
    becomes independent of Spain, 45-47;
    frequent changes of government in, 193;
    claims of foreigners against, 196;
    joint intervention of England, France, and Spain, 203-212;
    war with United States, 263, 264;
    relations with United States under Huerta, 307-309;
    under Carranza, 309-311;
    hot-bed of German intrigue, 316.

  Miles, Nelson A., occupies Porto Rico, 134.

  Miranda, Francisco de,
    plans for revolutionizing Spanish America, 15-19;
    organizes expedition in New York, 20;
    attempts to land in Venezuela, 21, 22;
    takes part in Venezuelan revolution, 38;
    imprisonment and death, 39.

  Monroe, James,
    attitude toward South American struggle for independence, 52, 53;
    letter to Jefferson on Canning's proposals, 67, 68;
    message of December 2, 1823, 76, 77.

  Monroe Doctrine,
    text of message of December 2, 1823, 76-77;
    and Clayton-Bulwer treaty, 157, 159, 175, 176;
    and French intervention in Mexico, 222, 223;
    asserted by President Cleveland in Venezuelan boundary dispute,
      238-249;
    tested by Germany, 249-255;
    imperialistic tendencies of, 290, 291, 329;
    President Wilson's statement of, before Pan American Scientific
      Conference, 306-307;
    an executive policy, 320;
    relation to European balance of power, 321, 322;
    attitude of England toward, 322;
    consistently interpreted, 323;
    does not permit transfer of American colonies from one European
      power to another, 323, 324;
    reservation of, at Hague Conference, 325, 326;
    as applied by President Roosevelt, 326, 327;
    proposals to Pan Americanize, 330;
    probable effects of Great War on, 331, 332;
    distinct from policy of isolation, 332, 333;
    recognized in covenant of League of Nations, 333;
    Lodge reservation, 333;
    definition of, demanded by Salvador, 334.

  Moore, John Bassett,
    secretary of commission to negotiate peace with Spain, 135;
    on Monroe Doctrine, 323.

  Morgan, J. T., advocates Nicaragua canal route, 184.

  Mosquito Coast,
    Great Britain's claims to, 157-159;
    British interference in, 178-180.

  Motley, J. L., minister to Austria, 232, 233.


  Naón, R. S., Argentine ambassador to the United States, on "European
    War and Pan Americanism," 316-318.

  Napoleon. See Bonaparte.

  New Granada. See Colombia.

  Nicaragua,
    signs canal treaty of 1867 with United States, 166;
    canal treaty of 1884 withdrawn from Senate by Cleveland, 177;
    sovereignty over Mosquito Coast, 178-180;
    relations with United States under Roosevelt, 280, 281;
    under Taft, 282-285;
    under Wilson, 285-288;
    treaty of 1916, 286.

  Nicaragua Canal,
    comparative merits of Nicaragua and Panama routes, 145, 146;
    draft of treaty for construction of canal, 152, 153;
    route investigated by Walker commission, 182.


  O'Higgins, Bernardo, Chilean patriot, 32, 33.

  Olney, Richard, secretary of state,
    on Cuba, 127;
    on Clayton-Bulwer treaty, 180;
    interpretation of Monroe Doctrine in Venezuelan boundary dispute, 240.

  Ostend Manifesto, 104, 105.

  Ouseley, Sir William, mission to Central America, 162-164.


  Palma, T. E., first president of Cuba, 140, 142.

  Panama, Republic of,
    recognized by President Roosevelt, 189;
    leases Canal Zone to United States, 191.

  Panama Canal,
    comparative merits of Panama and Nicaragua routes, 145, 146;
    treaty of 1846 with Colombia, 149;
    opened to commerce, 191.

  Panama Canal Company,
    organized by De Lesseps, 167;
    reorganization and extension of concession, 182;
    offers to sell to United States, 184, 185.

  Panama Congress, 292-295.

  Panama Railroad, 146, 150.

  Panama Revolution, 187-189.

  Pan American Financial Conferences, 304.

  Pan American Scientific Conferences, 304.

  Pan American Union, 303.

  Pan Americanism,
    definition of, 292;
    promoted by President Wilson's Mexican policy, 309, 311;
    put to test in the Great War, 312-317.

  Pecuniary Claims,
    against Mexico, 196, 197;
    British policy in regard to, 198;
    attempt to collect by force from Venezuela, 249-257;
    Resolutions of Second Hague Conference, 259, 260;
    considered by International American Conferences, 302, 303.

  Peru,
    liberation of, 33-37;
    war with Spain, 298;
    war with Chile, 299, 300;
    severs relations with Germany, 316.

  Philippine Islands, ceded to United States, 135, 136.

  Pierce, Franklin, Cuban policy of, 99-105.

  Platt Amendment,
    text of, 138-139;
    treaty with Nicaragua embodying, defeated by Senate, 285, 286;
    applied in part to Haiti, 289.

  Poinsett, Joel R., 49, 53.

  Polk, J. K., and Mexican War, 263, 264.

  Porter, Horace, presents resolution to Hague Conference of 1907 on
    forcible collection of pecuniary claims, 259.

  Porto Rico, cession of, demanded by United States, 135.


  Quitman, John A., relations with Lopez, 93-94.


  Recognition, withheld from Huerta, 308. See Belligerent Rights.

  Reed, Walter, yellow-fever investigations, 137.

  Reid, Whitelaw, commissioner to negotiate peace with Spain, 135.

  Roosevelt, Theodore,
    and Cuban reciprocity, 140-142;
    signs canal bill, 185;
    denounces Colombia's rejection of Hay-Herran convention, 186;
    recognizes Republic of Panama, 189;
    on acquisition of Canal Zone, 190;
    creates strained relations with Colombia, 192;
    on Monroe Doctrine, 251;
    interview with Holleben on German intervention in Venezuela, 252-254;
    refuses to arbitrate Panama question, 268;
    denounces Bryan treaty with Colombia as blackmail, 275;
    establishes financial supervision over Dominican Republic, 276-280;
    Central American policy, 280, 281;
    attempts to purchase Danish West Indies, 290;
    interpretation of Monroe Doctrine, 326, 327.

  Root, Elihu,
    author of Platt Amendment, 139;
    attempts to settle differences with Colombia, 268-270;
    visits South America, 303;
    on Monroe Doctrine, 330, 331.

  Rush, Richard, minister to England, conferences with Canning on schemes
    of Holy Alliance, 65-67, 72, 73.

  Russia, claims to northwestern coast of America, 75.


  Sagasta, P. M., Spanish minister, Cuban policy of, 128.

  Salisbury, Lord,
    reply to Olney's dispatch on Venezuelan boundary dispute, 242;
    agrees to arbitration of the boundary dispute, 248.

  Salvador,
    protests against protectorate over Nicaragua, 285-287;
    requests official definition of Monroe Doctrine, 334.

  Sampson, W. T., blockades Cuba, 134.

  San Ildefonso, secret treaty of, 261.

  San Martin, José de,
    takes part in Argentine revolution, 30-32;
    liberates Chile, 32, 33;
    liberates Peru, 33-37;
    relations with Bolivar, 43, 44;
    death, 45.

  Santo Domingo,
    annexation proposed by Seward, 264;
    annexation proposed by Grant, 265. See Dominican Republic.

  Schenck, Robert C., minister to England, 120.

  Schofield, J. M., informal mission to France, 227.

  Seward, W. H.,
    views on Panama canal, 151;
    favors expansion, 165;
    raises question as to binding force of Clayton-Bulwer treaty, 166;
    proposes to assume payment of interest on foreign debt of Mexico, 200;
    declines to unite with European powers in measures against Mexico,
      205, 206;
    attitude towards French in Mexico, 214-231;
    efforts to annex Santo Domingo and Danish West Indies, 264, 265.

  Shaw, Albert, and Panama Revolution, 189.

  Sherman, John, secretary of state, 128.

  Sherman, W. T., selected for special mission to Mexico, 234, 235.

  Sickles, Daniel E., mission to Spain, 109-118.

  Slave trade, 12-14.

  Slavery, in Cuba, 89, 90, 106, 107, 111.

  Slidell, John, introduces bill for purchase of Cuba, 106.

  Smuggling, in Spanish colonies, 11.

  Soulé, Pierre, mission to Spain, 99-105.

  Spain,
    colonial policy of, 4-12;
    revolution of 1820, 56,
      suppressed by French army, 63;
    revolution of 1868, 107;
    republic proclaimed in, 113;
    treaty of 1898 with United States, 136;
    claims against Mexico, 197;
    decides on joint intervention in Mexico, 203;
    withdraws troops from Mexico, 212, 213;
    extent of colonial empire at beginning of nineteenth century, 261;
    war with Chile, Peru, Bolivia, and Ecuador, 298, 299.

  Spanish-American republics,
    accorded belligerent rights, 48;
    recognized as independent by United States, 53,
                              by England, 80.

  Spanish Colonies, revolt of, 28.

  Spooner, J. C., offers amendment to canal bill, 184.

  Sucre, Antonio José de, Venezuelan general, 42-44.

  Suez Canal Convention, and Hay-Pauncefote treaty, 181.

  Sumner, Charles, opposes annexation of Danish West Indies and Santo
    Domingo, 264, 265.


  Taft, W. H.,
    proclaims provisional government in Cuba, 142;
    tries to settle differences with Colombia resulting from Panama
      Revolution, 270-274;
    relations with Nicaragua and Honduras, 280-285;
    and Huerta revolution, 308.

  Taylor, Hannis, minister to Spain, 128.

  Taylor, Zachary,
    issues proclamation warning Americans against aiding Lopez expedition
      against Cuba, 93;
    and Mexican War, 263.

  Texas,
    claim to, abandoned by the United States, 261;
    establishment of independence of, 262;
    admitted to Union, 263.

  Thayer, W. R., version of Holleben incident, 252-254.

  Trade, with Spanish colonies, monopoly of, 12-14.

  Troppau, conference of 1820, 59.

  Tupac Amaru, last of the Incas, 6.

  Tyler, John, and annexation of Texas, 262, 263.


  Utrecht, treaty of, 12.


  Venezuela,
    declares independence, 38;
    war of liberation, 39-42;
    dispute with Great Britain over boundary of British Guiana, 238-249;
    intervention of Germany, England, and Italy in, 249-252;
    neutral in Great War, 312, 316.

  Vera Cruz, landing of American Marines at, 309.

  Verona, Congress of, 60-63.

  Viceroy, office of, in Spanish colonies, 4, 5, 12.

  Vienna, Congress of, 58.

  Villa, Francisco, Mexican insurrectionary chief, 309, 310.

  Virgin Islands. See Danish West Indies.

  _Virginius_, case of the, 114-118.


  Walker, J. G.,
    head of commission to investigate canal routes, 182;
    report of, 183, 184.

  Walker, William, invasion of Central America, 163.

  Webster, Daniel, Cuban policy of, 90, 97.

  Wellington, Duke of, withdraws from Congress of Verona, 60.

  Weyler, Valeriano, captain-general of Cuba, 125, 126, 129.

  William II, Emperor of Germany,
    intervention in Venezuela, 249-252;
    forced to withdraw, 252-255.

  Wilson, Henry Lane, ambassador to Mexico, 307.

  Wilson, Woodrow,
    submits treaty with Colombia adjusting differences resulting from
      Panama Revolution, 274, 275;
    Central American policy, 285-287;
    Haitian policy, 288, 289;
    relations with Latin America, 291;
    interpretation of Monroe Doctrine, 306, 307;
    Mexican policy of, 307-311;
    Latin-American policy, 309, 311;
    opposes concessions to foreign capitalists in Latin America, 328;
    proposes to extend Monroe Doctrine to the world, 332.

  Wood, Leonard, military governor of Cuba, 137-140.

  Woodford, S. L., minister to Spain, 128, 130, 134.

  Wyke, Sir Charles, British minister to Mexico, 198, 199, 203, 207.

  Wyse, L. N. B., secures concession for Panama Canal, 167.


  Zelaya, president of Nicaragua, 280-283.




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