Produced by David Widger





THE STRUGGLE FOR MISSOURI

BY JOHN McELROY

     States are not great except as men may make them,
     Men are not great, except they do and dare.
     --Eugene F. Ware.

WASHINGTON, D. C:

THE NATIONAL TRIBUNE CO.

1909

DEDICATED

TO THE UNION MEN OF MISSOURI





THE STRUGGLE FOR MISSOURI.

[Illustration: 003-The Struggle for Missouri.]


3



CHAPTER I. A SALIENT BASTION FOR THE SLAVERY EMPIRE.

WHATEVER else may be said of Southern statesmen, of the elder school,
they certainly had an imperial breadth of view. They took in the whole
continent in a way that their Northern colleagues were slow in doing.
It cannot be said just when they began to plan for a separate Government
which would have Slavery as its cornerstone, would dominate the
Continent and ultimately absorb Cuba, Mexico and Central America as far
as the Isthmus of Panama.

Undoubtedly it was in the minds of a large number of them from the
organization of the Government, which they regarded as merely a
temporary expedient--an alliance with the Northern States until the
South was strong enough to "assume among the Powers of the Earth the
separate and equal station to which the laws of Nature and of Nature's
God entitle them."


4

They achieved a great strategic victory when in 1818 they drew the
boundaries of the State of Missouri.

The Ordinance of 1787 dedicated to Freedom all of the immense territory
which became the States of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan and
Wisconsin. The wonderful growth of these in population, wealth and
political influence alarmed the Slave Power--keenly sensitive, as bad
causes always are, to anything which may possibly threaten,--and it
proceeded to erect in the State of Missouri a strong barrier to the
forward march of the Free Soil idea.

When the time for the separation came, the Northern fragment of the
Republic would find itself almost cut in two by the northward projection
of Virginia to within 100 miles of Lake Erie. It would be again nearly
cut in two by the projection of the northeast corner of Missouri to
within 200 miles of Lake Michigan.

In those days substantially all travel and commerce was along the lines
of the rivers. For the country between the Alleghany Mountains and
the Mississippi the Ohio River was the great artery. Into it empty the
Alleghany, Monongahela, Muskingum, the Kanawhas, Big Sandy, Scioto,
the Miamis, Licking, Kentucky, Green, Wabash, Cumberland and Tennessee
Rivers, each draining great valleys, and bringing with its volume of
waters a proportionate quota of travel and commerce. The Illinois River
also entered the Mississippi from the east with the commerce of a great
and fruitful region.


5

West of the Mississippi the mighty Missouri was the almost sole highway
for thousands of miles.

The State was made unusually large--68,735 square miles, where the
previous rule for States had been about 40,000 square miles--stretching
it so as to cover the mouths of the Ohio and the Illinois, and to lie on
both sides of the great Missouri for 200 miles. A glance at the map will
show how complete this maneuver seemed to be. Iowa and Minnesota were
then unbroken and unvisited stretches of prairie and forest, railroads
were only dreamed of by mechanical visionaries, and no man in Ohio,
Indiana, Illinois, Kentucky or Tennessee could send a load of produce
to market without Missouri's permission; he could make no considerable
journey without traversing her highways, while all of the imperial
area west of the Mississippi was made, it seemed, forever distinctly
tributary to her.

New Orleans was then the sole mart of the West, for the Erie Canal had
not been dug to convert the Great, Lakes into a colossal commercial
highway.

Out of a country possessing the unusual combination of surpassing
agricultural fertility with the most extraordinary mineral wealth they
carved a State larger in area than England and Wales and more than
one-fourth the size of France or Germany.

All ordinary calculations as to the development of such a favored region
would make of it a barrier which would effectively stay the propulsive
waves of Free Soilism.


6

So far as man's schemes could go there would never be an acre of free
soil west of Illinois.

The Anti-Slavery men were keenly alive to this strategic advantage of
their opponents. Though the opposition to Slavery might be said to be
yet in the gristle, the men hostile to the institution were found in all
parties, and were beginning to divide from its more ardent supporters.

Under the ban of public opinion Slavery was either dead or legally dying
in all the older States north of Mason and Dixon's line. In the kingly
stretch of territory lying north of the Ohio and between the Alleghanies
and the Mississippi there was no taint of the foot of a slave, and the
settlers there wanted to "set the bounds of Freedom wider yet."

The Anti-Slavery men everywhere, and at that time there were very many
in the Southern States, protested vigorously against the admission
of Missouri into the Union as a Slave State, and the controversy soon
became so violent as to convulse the Nation. In 1818, when the bill
for the admission of Missouri was being considered by the House of
Representatives, Gen. James Tallmadge, of New York, introduced the
following amendment:

And provided, That the introduction of slavery, or involuntary
servitude, be prohibited, except for the punishment of crimes, whereof
the party has been duly convicted; and that all children born within
the said State, after the admission thereof into the Union, shall be
declared free at the age of 25 years.


7

This was adopted by practically all the votes from the Free States, with
a few from the Border States, which constituted a majority in the House.
But the Senate, in which the Slave States had a majority, rejected the
amendment, and the struggle began which was only ended two years
later by the adoption of the famous Missouri Compromise of 1820, which
admitted Missouri as a Slave State, but prohibited for the future any
"Slavery or involuntary servitude" outside the limits of that State
north of 36 degrees 30 minutes.

As in all compromises, this was unsatisfactory to the earnest men on
both sides of the dispute.

The Anti-Slavery men, who claimed that Freedom was National and Slavery
local, were incensed that such an enormous area as that south of 36
degrees 30 minutes had been taken from Freedom by the implication that
it was reserved for Slavery.

The Pro-Slavery men, on the other hand, who had shrewdly made Slavery
extension appear one of the fundamental and cherished rights of the
South, set up the clamorous protest, which never ceased till Appomattox,
that the denial of the privilege of taking property in Slaves to any
part of the National domain won by the arms or purchased by the money
of the whole country, was a violation of the compact entered into at
the formation of the Government, guaranteeing to the citizens of all the
States the same rights and privileges.

They also complained that under this arrangement the Free-Soilers gained
control of 1,238,025 square miles of the Nation's territory, while
Slavery only had 609,023 square miles, or less than half so much. This
complaint, which seemed so forceful to the Pro-Slaveryites, appeared as
rank impudence to their opponents, since it placed Slavery on the same
plane with Freedom.


8

The great State, however, did not flourish in accordance with the
expectations based upon its climate, natural resources and central
position. The tide of immigration paused before her borders, or swept
around under colder skies to Iowa and Minnesota, or to the remote
prairies of Kansas and Nebraska. Careless as the average home-seeker
might seem as to moral and social questions so long as he found fertile
land at cheap prices, yet he appeared reluctant to raise his humble
cabin on soil that had the least taint of Slavery. In spite of her long
frontage on the two greatest rivers of the continent, and which were
its main highways; in spite of skies and soils and rippling streams
unsurpassed on earth; in spite of having within her borders the great
and growing city of St. Louis, the Metropolis of the Mississippi Valley,
Missouri in 1860, after 40 years of Statehood, had only 1,182,012
people, against 1,711,951 in Illinois, 1,350,428 in Indiana, 674,913
in Iowa, 172,023 in Minnesota, 2,329,511 in Ohio, 749,113 in Michigan,
775,881 in Wisconsin, with nearly 150,000 in Kansas and Nebraska.

More than a million settlers who had crossed the Mississippi within
a few years had shunned her contaminated borders for the free air of
otherwise less attractive localities.

Nor had the Slaveholders gone into the country in the numbers that were
expected. Less than 20,000 had settled there, which was a small showing
against nearly 40,000 in Kentucky and 55,000 in Virginia. All these had
conspicuously small holdings. Nearly one-third of them owned but one
slave, and considerably more than one-half had less than five. Only one
man had taken as many as 200 slaves into the State.


9

The Census of 1860 showed Missouri to rank eleventh among the Slave
States, according to the following table of the number of slaves in
each:

     1.  Virginia.........490,865     10. Texas..........182,566

     2.   Georgia.........462,198     11. Missouri.......114,931

     3.   Mississippi.....436,631     12. Arkansas.......111,114

     4.   Alabama.........435,080     13. Maryland....... 87,189

     5.   South Carolina..402,406     14. Florida.........61,745

     6.   Louisiana.......331,726     15. Delaware.......  1,798

     7.  North Carolina...331,059     16. New Jersey......    18

     8.   Tennessee.......275,719     17. Nebraska.......     15

     9.   Kentucky........225,483     18. Kansas.........      2

There were 3,185 slaves in the District of Columbia and 29 in the
Territory of Utah, with all the rest of the country absolutely free.

The immigrant Slaveowners promptly planted themselves where they could
command the great highway of the Missouri River, taking up broad tracts
of the fertile lands on both sides of the stream. The Census of 1860
showed that of the 114,965 slaves held in the State, 50,280 were in the
12 Counties along the Missouri:

     Boone........... ....5,034     Jackson..............3,944

     Calloway.............4,257     Lafayette............6,357

     Chariton.............2,837     Pike.................4,056

     Clay.................3,456     Platte...............3,313

     Cooper...............3,800     St. Charles..........2,181

     Howard...............5,889     Saline...............4,876


Two-thirds of all the slaves in the State were held within 20 miles of
the Missouri River.

As everywhere, the Slaveowners exerted an influence immeasurably
disproportionate to their numbers, intelligence and wealth.


10

A very large proportion of the immigration had not been of a character
to give much promise as to the future.

The new State had been the Adullam's Cave for the South, where "every
one that was in distress, and every one that was in debt and every one
that was discontented gathered themselves." Next to Slavery, the South
had been cursed by the importation of paupers and criminals who had been
transported from England for England's good, in the early history of the
Colonies, to work the new lands. The negro proving the better worker in
servitude than this class, they had been driven off the plantations to
squat on unoccupied lands, where they bred like the beasts of the field,
getting a precarious living from hunting the forest, and the bolder
eking out this by depredations upon their thriftier neighbors. Their
forebears had been paupers and criminals when sent from England, and the
descendants continued to be paupers and criminals in the new country,
forming a clearly marked social class, so distinct as to warrant the
surmise that they belonged to a different race. As the eastern part of
the South and the administration of the laws improved, this element
was to some extent forced out, and spread in a noisome trail over
Mississippi, Arkansas and Missouri. While other immigrants went into the
unbroken forest with a few rude tools and in the course of several years
built up comfortable homes, their's never rose above abject squalor. The
crudest of cabins sufficed them for shelter, beds of beech leaves were
all the couches they required; they had more guns in their huts than
agricultural or mechanical implements; they scarcely pretended to raise
anything more than a scanty patch of corn; and when they could not put
on their tables the flesh of the almost wild razor-back hog which roamed
the woods, they made meat of woodchucks, raccoons, opossums or any other
"varmint" their guns could bring down. They did not scorn hawks or owls
if hunger demanded and no better meat could be found.


11

It was this "White Trash" which added so much to the horrors of the war,
especially in Missouri, and so little to its real prosecution. Wolf-like
in ferocity, when the advantages were on their side, they were wolf-like
in cowardice when the terms were at all equal. They were the Croats,
Cossacks, Tolpatches, Pandours of the Confederacy--of little value in
battle, but terrible as guerrillas and bushwhackers. From this "White
Trash" came the gangs of murderers and robbers, like those led by the
Youngers, Jameses, Quantrils and scores of other names of criminal
memory.

As has been the case in all times and countries, these dregs of society
became the willing tools of the Slaveholding aristocrats. With dog-like
fidelity they followed and served the class which despised and overrode
them. Somehow, by inherited habits likely, they seemed to avoid the
more fertile parts of the State. They thus became "Bald Knobbers"
and "Ozarkers" in Missouri, as they had been "Clay Eaters" in South
Carolina, or "Sang Diggers" in Virginia.

With these immigrants from the South came also large numbers of a far
better element even than the arrogant Slaveowners or the abject "White
Trash."


12

The Middle Class in the South was made up of much the same stock as
the bulk of the Northerners--that is of Scotch, Scotch-Irish and North
English--Congregationalists, Presbyterians, Baptists and Dissenters
generally--who had been forced out of Great Britain by the intolerant
Episcopalians when the latter gained complete power after the
suppression of the Rebellion of 1745. With these were also the
descendants of the sturdy German Protestants who had been driven
from Europe during the religious wars when the Catholics gained the
ascendency in their particular country. These were the backbone of the
South, and had largely settled along the foothills of the Alleghanies
and in the fruitful valleys between the mountains, while the "White
Trash" lived either on the barren parts of the lowlands or the bare and
untillable highlands.


13

It is a grave mistake to confound these two classes of Non-Slaveholding
whites in the South. They were as absolutely unlike as two distinct
races, and an illustration of the habits of the two in migrating will
suffice to show this. It was the custom in the Middle Classes when a boy
attained majority that he chose for his wife a girl of the same class
who was just ripening into vigorous womanhood. Both boy and girl had
been brought up to labor with their own hands and to work constantly
toward a definite purpose. They had been given a little rudimentary
education, could read their Bibles and almanacs, "cipher" a little,
write their names and a letter which could be read. When quite a lad the
boy's father had given him a colt, which he took care of until it became
a horse. To this, his first property, was added a suit of stout homespun
cloth, which, with a rifle, an ax and some few other necessary tools,
constituted his sole equipment for married life. The girl had been given
a calf, which she had raised to a heifer; she had also a feather bed and
some blankets of her own making and a little stock of the most obvious
housekeeping utensils. With this simple outfit the young couple were
married, and either went in debt for a little spot of land near home or
pushed out into the new country. There they built a rude log cabin to
shelter them from the storm, and by the time their children had reached
the age they were when they married they had built up an unpretentious
but very comfortable home, with their land well cleared and fenced, and
stocked with cattle, pigs, sheep and poultry sufficient to maintain them
in comfort. From this class came always the best and strongest men in
the South. Comparatively few of them became Slaveowners, and then but
rarely owned more than one or two negroes. A very large proportion found
homes in the great free States north of the Ohio River.


14

On the other hand, none of this accession to comparative wealth seemed
possible to the "White Trash." The boys and girls mated, squatted on
any ground they could find unoccupied, raised there the merest shelter,
which never by any chance improved, no matter how long they lived there,
and proceeded to breed with amazing prolificacy others like themselves,
destined for the same lives of ignorance and squalor. The hut of the
"Clay Eater" in South Carolina, the "Sand Hiller" in Georgia, the "Sang
Digger" in Virginia was the same as that his grandfather had lived in.
It was the same that his sons and grandsons to the third and fourth
generations built on the bleak knobs of the Ozarks or the malarious
banks of the Mississippi. The Census of 1850 showed that about 70,000
of the population of Missouri had come from Kentucky, 45,000 from
Tennessee, 41,000 from Virginia, 17,000 from North Carolina and 15,000
from the other Southern States. Nearly 40,000 had gone from Ohio,
Indiana and Illinois, but a very large proportion of this number was the
same element which had streamed across the southern parts of those
States on its way to Missouri. Only 13,000 had entered from the great
States of New York and Pennsylvania, and but 1,100 from New England.
Nearly 15,000 Irishmen, mostly employed along the rivers, had settled
in the State.

While the Slaveowners and their "White Trash" myrmidons were Pro-Slavery
Democrats, the Middle Class were inclined to be Whigs, or if Democrats,
belonging to that wing of the party less subservient to Slavery which in
later years was led by Stephen A. Douglas.


15

Upon these three distinct strata in society, which little mingled
but were all native Americans, was projected an element of startling
differences in birth, thought, speech and manners. The so-called
Revolution of 1848 in Germany was a movement by the educated,
enthusiastic, idealistic youth of the Fatherland to sweep away the horde
of petty despots, and unite their pigmy Principalities and Duchies into
a glorious and wide-ruling Germany. They were a generation too soon,
however, and when the movement was crushed under the heavy hand of
military power, hundreds of thousands of these energetic young men
thought it safest and best to make new homes in the young Republic
beyond the seas. The United States therefore received a migration of the
highest character and of inestimable benefit to the country.

Somewhere near 150,000 of these went to Missouri. They had none of the
antipathy of Northern Americans to a Slave State. They were like their
Gothic forebears, to whom it was sufficient to know that the land was
good. Other matters could be settled by their strong right arms. The
climate and fertility of Missouri pleased them; they saw the State's
possibilities and flocked thither. Possibly one-half settled in the
pleasant valleys and on the sunny prairies, following the trail of good
land in the Southwest clear down to the Arkansas line. The other half
settled mostly in St. Louis, and through them the city experienced
another of its wonderful transformations. Beginning as a trading post
of the French with the Indians, it had only as residents merchant
adventurers from sunny France, officers and soldiers of the royal army
and the half-breed voyageurs and trappers who served the fur companies.
Next the Americans had swarmed in, and made the trading post a great
market for the exchange of the grain and meat of the North, for the
cotton and sugar of the South. Its merchants and people took their tone
and complexion from the plantations of the Mississippi Valley.


16

Now came these Germans, intent upon reproducing there the
characteristics of the old world cities beyond the Rhine. They brought
with them lager beer, to which the Americans took very readily, and a
decided taste for music, painting and literature, to which the Americans
were not so much inclined. German signs, with their quaint Gothic
lettering and grotesque names, blossomed out on the buildings, military
bands in German uniforms paraded the streets, especially on Sundays.
German theaters also open on Sunday represented by astonishingly good
companies the popular plays of the Fatherland, and newsboys cried the
German newspapers on the streets. Those who went into the country
were excellent farmers, shrewd in buying and selling, and industrious
workers. They dreamed of covering the low hills of the western part of
the State with the vineyards that were so profitable on the Rhine and
of rivaling the products of Johannesburg and the Moselle on the banks of
the Gasconade and the Maramec.


17

The newcomers were skilled men in their departments of civilized
activities--far above the average of the Americans. They were good
physicians, fine musicians, finished painters, excellent actors and
skillful mechanics, and each began the intelligent exercise of his
vocation, to the great advantage of the community, which was, however,
shocked at many of the ways of the newcomers, particularly their
devoting Sunday to all manner of merrymaking. Still more shocking was
their attitude toward the Slavery question. Even those Americans who
were opposed to Slavery had a respect approaching awe of the "Sacred
Institution." It had always been in the country; it was protected by a
network of laws, and so feared that it could only be discussed with
the greatest formality and circumspection. The radical Germans had
absolutely none of this feeling. In their scheme of humanity all
Slavery was so horrible that there could be no reason for its longer
continuance, and it ought to be put to an end in the most summary
manner. The epithet "Abolitionists," from which most Americans shrank
as from an insult, had no terrors for them. It frankly described their
mental attitude, and they gloried in it as they did in being Free
Thinkers. They had not rebelled against timeworn traditions and
superstitions in Germany to become slaves to something worse in this.

Vigorous growths as they were, they readily took root in the new soil,
became naturalized as fast as they could, and entered into the life
of the country which they had elected for their homes. They joined the
Republican Party from admiration of its Free Soil principles, and in the
election of 1860 cast 17,028 votes for Abraham Lincoln.


18

Such were the strangely differing elements which were fermenting
together in the formation of the great Commonwealth during those
turbulent days from 1850 to 1860, and which were to be fused into
unexpected combinations in the fierce heat of civil war. The same
fermentation--minus the modifying influences of the radical Germans--was
going on in all the States of the South except South Carolina, where the
Middle Class hardly existed. Everywhere the Middle Class was strongly
attached to the Union, and averse to Secession. Everywhere the
Slaveowners, a small minority, but of extraordinary ability and
influence, were actively preaching dissatisfaction with the Union,
bitterly complaining of wrongs suffered at the hands of the North, and
untiring in their machinations to win over or crush the leaders of those
favorable to the Union. Everywhere they had the "White Trash" solidly
behind them to vote as they wished, and to harry and persecute the Union
men. As machinery for malevolence the "White Trash" myrmidons could
not be surpassed. Criminal instincts inherited from their villain
forefathers made them ready and capable of anything from maiming a Union
man's stock and burning his stacks to shooting him down from
ambush. They had personal feeling to animate them in this, for their
depredations upon the hogs and crops of their thriftier neighbors had
brought them into lifelong collisions with the Middle Class, while they
had but little opportunity for resentment against the owners of the
large plantations. In every State in the South the story was the same,
of the Middle Class Union men being harassed at the command of the
Slaveowners by the "White Trash" hounds. They had been sent into Kansas
to drive out the Free State immigrants there and secure the territory
for Slavery, but though backed up by the power of the Administration,
they had been signally defeated by the numerically inferior but bolder
and hardier immigrants from the North.


19

Force rules this world; it always has; it always will. Not merely
physical force, but that incomparably higher type--intellectual
force--Power of Will. It seemed that in nearly all the States of the
South the Slaveowners by sheer audacity and force of will succeeded in
dominating the great majority which favored the Union, and by one device
or another committing them hopelessly to the rebellion. This was notably
the case in Tennessee, Virginia, North Carolina and Georgia, where the
majority repeatedly expressed itself in favor of the Union, but was
dragooned into Secession.

In Missouri, however, the Secessionists encountered leaders with will
and courage superior to their own. Many of these were Slaveowners
themselves, and nearly all of them were of Southern birth. Head and
shoulders above these, standing up among them like Saul among the
Sons of Israel, was Frank P. Blair, then in the full powers of perfect
manhood. He was 42 years old, tall and sinewy in body, blue-eyed and
sandy-haired. He came of the best Virginia and Kentucky stock, and had
long been a resident and slaveowner in Missouri. As a boy he had served
in the ranks in the Mexican War, had an adventurous career on the
Pacific Coast, had gone back to Missouri to achieve prominence at the
bar, and as early as 1848 had come to the front as the unflinching
advocate of Emancipation and the conversion of Missouri into a Free
State. Against his perfect panoply of courage and resource all the
lances of the Slaveowners were hurled in vain. Their violence recoiled
before him, their orators were no match for him upon the stump, and
their leaders not his equal in party management. In 1852 he was elected
to the Missouri Legislature as a Free Soiler, was re-elected in 1854,
and in 1856 to Congress. His value to the Union was immeasurable, for
he was a leader around whom the Union men could rally with the utmost
confidence that he would never weaken, never resort to devious ways, and
never blunder. As a Southerner of the best ancestry, he was not open to
the charge of being a "Yankee Abolitionist," which had so much effect
upon the Southern people of his State.

[Illustration: 056-General Francis P Blair]


20

A very dangerous element was composed of a number of leaders who
belonged to the Pro-Slavery wing, but desiring to be elected to offices,
masked their designs under the cover of the Douglas Democracy. The most
important of these was Claiborne F. Jackson, a politician of moderate
abilities and only tolerable courage, but of great partisan activity. He
professed to be a Douglas Democrat, and as such was elected Governor at
the State election. Born in Kentucky 54 years before, he had resided in
Missouri since 1822. A Captain in the Black Hawk War, his service had
been as uneventful and brief as that of Abraham Lincoln, who was two
years his junior, and he was one of the Pro-Slavery clique who had
hounded the great Thomas H. Benton out of politics on account of his
mild Free Soilism. In person he was tall, erect, with something of
dignity in his bearing. He essayed to be an orator, had much reputation
as such, but his speeches developed little depth of thought or anything
beyond the customary phrases which were the stock in trade of all the
orators of his class south of Mason and Dixon's line.


21

The fermentation period culminated in the Presidential campaign of 1860,
the hottest political battle this country had ever known.

The intensity of the interest felt in Missouri was shown by the bigness
of the vote, which aggregated 165,618. As the population was but
1,182,012, of which 114,965 were slaves, it will be seen that
substantially every white man went to the polls.

The newly-formed Republican Party, mostly confined to the radical
Germans of St. Louis, cast 17,028 votes for Abraham Lincoln.

The Slaveowners and their henchmen--"Southern Rights Democrats"--cast
31,317 votes for John C. Breckinridge.

The "Regular Democrats" polled 58,801 votes for Stephen A. Douglas and
"Squatter Sovereignty."

The remains of the "Old Line Whigs," and a host of other men who did not
want to be Democrats and would not be Republicans, cast 58,372 votes for
John Bell, the "Constitutional Union" candidate.

Thus it will be seen that out of every 165 men who went to the polls 17
were quite positive that the extension of Slavery must cease; 31 were
equally positive that Slavery should be extended or the Union dissolved;
59 favored "Squatter Sovereignty," or local option in the Territories in
regard to Slavery; 58 thought that "all this fuss about the nigger
was absurd, criminal, and dangerous. It ought to be stopped at once by
suppressing, if necessary, by hanging, the extremists on both sides, and
letting things go on just as they have been."


22

Thus so great a proportion as 117 out of the total of 165--nearly
five-sevenths of the whole--professed strong hostility to the views of
the "extremists, both North and South."

The time was at hand, however, when they must make their election as to
which of these opposite poles of thought and action they would drift.
They could no longer hold aloof, suggesting mild political placeboes,
lamenting alike the wickedness of the Northern Abolitionists and the
madness of the Southern Nullifiers, and expressing a patriotic desire to
hang selected crowds of each on the same trees.

South Carolina had promptly responded to the election of Abraham Lincoln
as President of the United States by passing an Ordinance of Secession,
and seizing all the United States forts, arsenals and other places,
except Fort Sumter, within her limits.

The rest of the Cotton States were hastening to follow her example.

To the 117 "Middle-of-the-Road" voters out of every total of 165 it
was therefore necessary to choose whether they would approve of the
withdrawal of States and seizures of forts, and become Secessionists,
or whether they would disapprove of this and ally themselves with the
much-contemned Black Republicans.

It was the old, old vital question, asked so many times of neutrals with
the sword at their throats:

"Under which King, Bezonian? Speak, or die."


23

[Illustration: 023-The War Clouds Gather]



CHAPTER II. THE WAR CLOUDS GATHER

The storm-clouds gathered with cyclonic swiftness. South Carolina
seceded Dec. 20, 1860, and sent a Commission to Washington to negotiate
for the delivery of all the forts, arsenals, magazines, lighthouses,
and other National property within her boundaries, organizing in the
meanwhile to seize them. Her Senators and Representatives formally
withdrew from Congress; the Judges and other Federal officials solemnly
resigned their places; and Maj. Robert Anderson, recognizing the
impossibility of defending the decrepit Fort Moultrie against assault,
transferred his garrison to Fort Sumter.

President Buchanan announced the fatal doctrine that while no State had
the right to secede, the Constitution gave no power to coerce a State
which had withdrawn, or was attempting to withdraw from the Union.

Mississippi seceded Jan. 9, 1861; Florida, Jan. 10; Alabama, Jan. 11;
Georgia, Jan. 19; Louisiana, Jan. 26; and Texas, Feb. 1;--all the Cotton
States precipitately following South Carolina's example.


24

Each made haste--before or after Secession--to seize all the United
States forts and property within her borders.

In the midst of this political cataclysm the Legislature of Missouri met
on the last day of 1860.

The Senate consisted of 25 Democrats, seven Unionists, and one
Republican; the House of 85 Democrats, 35 Unionists, and 12 Republicans.

The retiring Governor--Robert M. Stewart--sent in his final message
Jan. 3, and the same day his successor--Claiborne F. Jackson--was
inaugurated, and delivered his address. Gov. Stewart was a typical
Northern Democrat, born in New York, but long a resident of Missouri. He
was a strong Douglas man, and believed that the Southern people had the
Constitutional right to take their slaves into the Territories and hold
them there, and that this right ought to be assured them. He had
never pretended to be in love with Slavery, but he believed that the
Constitution and laws granted full protection to the Institution. He
denied the right of Secession, particularly as to Missouri, which had
been bought with the money of the whole country. In his final message
he did not hesitate to clearly set this forth, and to denounce South
Carolina as having acted with consummate folly. He recognized the Union
as the source of innumerable blessings, and would preserve it to the
last. He said:

As matters are at present Missouri will stand by her lot, and hold to
the Union as long as it is worth an effort to preserve it. So long as
there is hope of success she will seek for justice within the Union.
She cannot be frightened from her propriety by the past unfriendly
legislation of the North, nor be dragooned into secession by the extreme
South. If those who should be our friends and allies undertake to render
our property worthless by a system of prohibitory laws, or by reopening
the slave trade in opposition to the moral sense of the civilized world,
and at the same time reduce us to the position of an humble sentinel to
watch over and protect their interests, receiving all the blows and none
of the benefits, Missouri will hesitate long before sanctioning such an
arrangement She will rather take the high position of armed neutrality.
She is able to take care of herself, and will be neither forced nor
flattered, driven nor coaxed, into a course of action that must end in
her own destruction.


25

The inaugural address of the new Governor was, under a thin vail of
professed love for the Union, a bitter Secession appeal. He said that
the destiny of the Slaveholding States was one and the same; that what
injured one necessarily hurt all; that separate action meant certain
defeat by the insolent North, which was alone and wholly responsible for
the present deplorable conditions. He applauded the "gallantry" of South
Carolina, urged that she be not condemned for "precipitancy," and said
significantly: "If South Carolina has acted hastily, let not her error
lead to the more fatal one--an attempt at coercion."

With reference to the Republican Party and the future policy of
Missouri, he said:

The prominent characteristic of this party * * * is that it is purely
sectional in its locality and its principles. The only principle
inscribed upon its banner is Hostility to Slavery;--its object not
merely to confine Slavery within its present limits; not merely to
exclude it from the Territories, and prevent the formation and admission
of any Slaveholding States; not merely to abolish it in the District of
Columbia, and interdict its passage from one State to another; but to
strike down its existence everywhere; to sap its foundation in public
sentiment; to annoy and harass, and gradually destroy its vitality,
by every means, direct or indirect, physical and moral, which human
ingenuity can devise. The triumph of such an organization is not the
victory of a political party, but the domination of a Section. It
proclaims in significant tones the destruction of that equality among
the States which is the vital cement for our Federal Union. It places 15
of the 33 States in the position of humble recipients of the bounty,
or sullen submissionists to the power of a Government which they had no
voice in creating, and in whose councils they do not participate.


26

It cannot, then, be a matter of surprise to any--victors or
vanquished--that these 16 States, with a pecuniary interest at stake
reaching the enormous sum of $3,600,000,000 should be aroused and
excited at the advent of such a party to power.

Would it not rather be an instance of unprecedented blindness and
fatuity, if the people and Governments of these 16 Slaveholding States
were, under such circumstances, to manifest quiet indifference, and to
make no effort to avoid the destruction which awaited them?

The meeting of the Legislature naturally brought to the State Capital at
Jefferson City all of the powerful coterie which was self-charged with
the work of taking Missouri into the road whither South Carolina was
leading the Cotton States. This coterie included the Judges of the
Supreme Court and all the State officials, and the United States
Senators and Representatives. Ever since the Anti-Benton faction had
accomplished the great Senator's defeat, the shibboleth for admission
into the higher circles of Missouri Democracy had been "Southern
Rights." As the mass of the Middle Class Democrats favored Senator
Douglas's plan of letting the settlers in each Territory decide for
themselves whether they would have Slavery, it was highly politic for
every candidate to claim that he was a Douglas Democrat. It must be
known to the inner ring, however, that he was at heart fully in accord
with the views of the extreme Pro-Slavery men, and ready at the word to
join the Secessionists. So thorough was this preliminary organization,
that while in Missouri tens of thousands of professed Union men went
over to Secession when the stress came, there was no instance of an
avowed Pro-Slavery man cleaving to the side of the Union.


27

Next to Gov. Jackson,--surpassing him in intellectual acuteness and
fertile energy,--was Lieut.-Gov. Thos. C. Reynolds, then in his 40th
year, a short, full-bodied man, with jet-black hair and eyes shaded by
gold-rimmed glasses. He boasted of being born of Virginia parents in
South Carolina, but some of the Germans claimed to know that his right
name was Reinhold, and that he was a Jew born in Prague, the Capital of
Bohemia, and brought to this country when a child. He was a man of more
than ordinary ability, and had accomplishments quite unusual in that
day.

He spoke French, German and Spanish fluently, wrote profusely and with
considerable force, and prided himself on being a diplomat. He had seen
some service as Secretary of Legation and Charge d' Affaires at
Madrid. He had been elected as a Douglas Democrat, but was an outspoken
Secessionist, and as he was ex-officio President of the Senate, he had
much power in forming committees and shaping legislation. He clung to
the wrecked rebel ship of state to the last, went with Gov. Jackson
and the rest when they were driven out of the State, assumed the
Governorship when Jackson--worn out by the terrible strains and
vicissitudes--died at Little Rock, Ark., in December, 1862--and was last
heard from near the end of the war, with the shattered and melancholy
remnants of the Missouri State Government and troops, on the banks of
the Rio Grande, writing furious diatribes against Gen. Sterling Price,
the admired leader of the Missouri Confederates.


28

Another man of great influence in the State was United States Senator
James S. Green, a Virginian by birth, but who had been a resident of
Missouri for about a quarter of a century. He was a lawyer of fine
talents, and in the Senate ranked as a debater with Douglas, Seward,
Chase, Toombs, Wigfall, Fessenden, Wade, and others of that class. In
Missouri he was one of the leaders of the Ultra-Slavery "Softs" against
Thos. H. Benton; had been Minister to New Granada, and Representative
in Congress, and in the Senate belonged to the Jefferson
Davis-Toombs-Wigfall cabal, which was planning the disruption of the
Union. His term expiring March 3, 1861, he was now in Jefferson City for
the rather irreconcilable purposes of securing his re-election to the
United States Senate and of fulfilling his pledge to his Secessionist
colleagues to carry Missouri out of the Union.

His colleague--Senator Trusten Polk--a strong, kindly, graceful man--was
there to assist him in both purposes. Born in Delaware, he had been a
resident of Missouri since 1835, elected Governor of the State in 1856,
resigned to accept Benton's seat in the Senate, from which he was to be
expelled in 1862 for disloyalty, and to follow the failing fortunes of
the Missouri Confederates to the banks of the Rio Grande.

The problem of absorbing intensity for the Secession leaders--Messrs.
Jackson, Reynolds, Green, Polk and others--was to win over, entrap or
constrain a sufficient number of the 117 "Doubtful" voters out of every
165, to give them a working majority in the State. There was fiery zeal
enough and to spare on the Secession side; what was needed was skillful
management to convince the Union-loving peace-loving majority that the
Northern "Abolitionists," flushed with victory, meant unheard-of wrongs
and insults to the South; that Missouri must put herself in shape
to protect her borders, call a halt on the insolent North, and in
connection with the other Border States be the arbiter between the
contending sections, and in the last resort ally herself with the other
Slave States for mutual protection.


29

A man to be reckoned with in those days was the Commander of the
Department of the West, which included all that immense territory
stretching from the Mississippi to the Rocky Mountains, except Texas,
New Mexico, and Utah. This man was the embodiment of the Regular Army
as it was developed after the War of 1812. At this time that Army was
a very small one--two regiments of dragoons, two of cavalry, one of
mounted riflemen, four of artillery, and 10 of infantry, making, with
engineers, ordnance and staff, a total of only 12,698 officers and
men--but its personnel and discipline were unsurpassed in the world.
Among its 1,040 commissioned officers there was no finer soldier than
William Selby Harney. A better Colonel no army ever had. A Colonel, mind
you--not a General; there is a wide difference between the two, as we
found out during the war. There are very many Americans--every little
community has at least one--who, given a regiment, where every man is
within reach of his eye and voice, will discipline it, provide for it,
rule it, and fight it in the very best fashion. Give him some piece of
work to do, of which he can see the beginning and the end, and he will
make the regiment do every pound of which it is capable. But put in
command of a brigade, anything beyond voice and eye, set to a task
outreaching his visual horizon, he becomes obviously unequal to the
higher range of duty.

[Illustration: 029-The Harney Mansion]


30

A form of commanding hight (sp.), physique equal to any test of activity
or endurance, a natural leader of men through superiority of courage
and ability, William Selby Harney had for 43 years made an unsurpassed
record as a commander of soldiers. He had served in the everglades of
Florida, on the boundless plains west of the Mississippi, and in Mexico,
during the brilliantly spectacular war which ended with our "reveling
in the Halls of the Montezumas." He it was, who, eager for his country's
honor and advancement, had, while the diplomats were disputing with
Great Britain, pounced down upon and seized the debatable island of
San Juan in Vancouver waters. For this he was recalled, but the island
remained American territory. He was soon assigned to the Department of
the West, with headquarters at St. Louis.


31

He had been for 12 years the Colonel of the crack 2d U. S. Dragoons, and
for three years one of the three Brigadier-Generals in the Regular Army,
his only seniors being Maj.-Gen. and Brevet Lieut.-Gen. Winfield Scott,
the General-in-Chief; Brig.-Gen. John E. Wool, commanding the Department
of the East; and Brig.-Gen. David E. Twiggs, commanding the Department
of Texas.

Gen. Harney's assignment, while a recognition of his eminent fitness
for ruling the territory over which he had campaigned for more than a
quarter of a century, was highly gratifying to him inasmuch as he
was married to a wealthy St. Louis woman, and in that city he had an
abundance of the luxurious social enjoyment so dear to the heart of the
old warrior. A Southerner by birth and education, a large Slave-owner,
with all his interests in the South, and at all times seemingly in
full sympathy with the Southern spirit that dominated the Army, the
Secessionists sanguinely expected that he would prove as pliant to their
proposals as had Gen. Twiggs, the Commander of the Department of
Texas. We shall see how soldierly instincts and training measurably
disappointed them.


32

To return to the Missouri Legislature: Lieut.-Gov. Reynolds could, as a
lieutenant always can, be more outspoken and radical than his chief,
who labored under responsibility. On the day the Legislature met he
published an important letter which thoroughly indicates the feeling
of the Secessionists at that period. He urged the General Assembly to
promptly express the determination of Missouri to resist every attempt
by the Federal Government to coerce any State to remain in the Union, or
to use force in any way to collect revenues or execute the laws in any
seceding State. He denounced President Buchanan's distinction between
"coercing a State" and "compelling the citizens of the State to obey
the laws of the United States" as a "transparent sophistry." "To levy
tribute, molest commerce, or hold fortresses, are as much acts of war as
to bombard a city." He also urged immediate and thorough organization
of the militia and other preparations for "putting the State in complete
condition for defense." If the present controversy could not be adjusted
before March 4, the State of Missouri "should not permit Mr. Lincoln to
exercise any act of Government" within her borders.

This was certainly distinctly defiant, and shrewdly calculated to gather
about the new administration all the wavering men who could be attracted
by inflammatory appeals to their prejudices against the North, to their
State pride, and to their hopes of making Missouri the arbiter in
the dispute. Lieut.--Gov. Reynolds followed up his pronunciamento by
carefully organizing the Senate committees with radical Secessionists at
the head, and the immediate introduction of bills ably contrived to put
the control of the State in the hands of those who favored Secession.
These committees promptly reported several bills.


33

One provided for calling a State Convention, an effective device by
which the other Southern States had been dragged into Secession. Another
provided for the organization of the Militia of the State, which would
be done by officers reliable for Secession, and the third was intended
to extinguish resistance by taking away much of the police power of the
Republican Mayor of St. Louis, who had at his back the radical Germans,
organized into semi-military Wide-Awake Clubs. All these bills seemed to
be heartily approved all over the State, and the Southern Rights leaders
were exultant at their success. Apparently the 117 "Doubtfuls" were
flocking over to them.

It seemed for a few momentous days in the opening of 1861 that Missouri
would be inevitably swept into the tide of Secession, and even in St.
Louis, the stronghold of Republicanism, a monster mass meeting, called
and controlled by such afterwards--strong loyalists as Hamilton R.
Gamble, later the Union Governor of the State, Nathaniel Paschall,
James E. Yeatman, and Robert Campbell, unanimously passed resolutions
declaring slave property to be held as a Constitutional right which the
Government should secure, and if it did not, Missouri "would join with
her sister States and share their duties and dangers," and that the
Government should not attempt to coerce the seceding States. This word
"coerce" had an extraordinarily ugly sound to all ears, and was a potent
enchantment in taking many of the professedly Union men into the ranks
of the rebellion. Even Horace Greeley recoiled from "a Union held
together by bayonets."


34

The bill "to call a Convention to consider the relations of the State of
Missouri to the United States, and to adopt measures for vindicating the
sovereignty of the State, and the protection of her institutions," was
promptly reported back to both Houses on the 9th of January, and as
promptly passed by them, with only two adverse votes in the Senate and
18 in the House. Of the latter 11 were from St. Louis.

The Secessionists proceeded to a joyful celebration of this new triumph.
They hastened at once to another step to ally Missouri with the South.
A Commissioner arrived from the State of Mississippi to ask the
co-operation of Missouri in measures of common defense and safety. The
Governor received him with the distinction accredited an Embassador from
a foreign power, and recommended the Legislature to do likewise. The
serviceable Lieut.-Gov. Reynolds carried out this idea by putting
through a joint resolution to receive the Commissioner in the House
Chamber, with both bodies, the Governor and other chief officers of the
State, and the Judges of the Supreme Court in attendance, and with every
other honor. He dictated that upon the announcement of the entrance of
the Commissioner, the whole body should respectfully rise. The radical
Union men from St. Louis resisted this vehemently, and did not hesitate
to apply the ugly word "traitor" to the Commissioner, and those who were
aiding and abetting him.


35

The Commissioner made a long address, in which he said that the
Union had been dissolved, could never be reconstructed; that war was
inevitable, and the people of Mississippi earnestly invited those of
Missouri to unite with their kindred for common defense and safety. A
few days later the Legislature adopted a resolution against coercion,
and another introduced by George Graham Vest, of the Committee on
Federal Relations, afterwards Senator in the Confederate House from
Missouri, and for 24 years representing Missouri in the Senate of the
United States. This resolution declared that so "abhorrent was the
doctrine of coercion, that any attempt at such would result in the
people of Missouri rallying on the side of their Southern brethren to
resist to the last extremity." There was only one vote against this in
the Senate, and but 14 in the House.

The eager young Secessionists were impatient to emulate their brethren
farther south, and strike a definite blow--seize something that would
wreck the sovereignty of the United States. Forts there were none. In
the historic old Jefferson Barracks, below St. Louis, there were only
a small squad of raw recruits, and a few officers, mostly of Southern
proclivities, whom it would be cruel to turn out of house and home while
they were waiting "for their States to go out."


36

There were but two Arsenals in the State; a small affair at Liberty, in
the northwest, near the Missouri River, which contained several hundred
muskets, a dozen cannon, and a considerable quantity of powder. The
other was the great Arsenal at St. Louis, one of the most important in
the country. It covered 56 acres of ground, fronting on the Mississippi
River, was inclosed by a high stone wall on all sides but that of the
river, and had within it four massive stone buildings standing in a
rectangle. In these were stored 60,000 stands of arms, mostly Enfield
and Springfield rifles, 1,500,000 cartridges, 90,000 pounds of powder, a
number of field pieces and siege guns, and a great quantity of munitions
of various kinds. There were also machinery and appliances of great
value. The Arsenal was situated on rather low ground, and was commanded
from hills near by. At the beginning of 1861 the only persons in it were
some staff officers, with their servants and orderlies, and the unarmed
workmen. The officer in command was Maj. Wm. Haywood Bell, a North
Carolinian, graduate of West Point, and Ordnance Officer, but who
had spent nearly the whole of his 40 years' service in Bureau work,
attending meanwhile so providently to his own affairs that he was quite
a wealthy man, with most of his investments in St. Louis.

Gov. Claiborne F. Jackson had as his military adviser and executant
Maj.-Gen. Daniel M. Frost, a New Yorker by birth and a graduate of West
Point. He had served awhile in the Mexican War, where he received a
brevet as First Lieutenant for gallantry at Cerro Gordo, and then became
Quartermaster of his regiment. He had been sent to Europe as a student
of the military art there, but resigned in 1853, to take charge of a
planing mill and carpentry work in St. Louis. He subsequently became
a farmer, was elected to the Missouri Senate, entered the Missouri
Militia, rose to be Brigadier-General, and was sanguinely expected to
become for Missouri what Lee and Jos. E. Johnston were for Virginia,
Beauregard for South Carolina, and Braxton Bragg for Louisiana. He was
really a good deal of a soldier, with foresight and initiative force,
and had the Governor had the courage to follow his bold counsels, the
course of events might have been different.

[Illustration: General Claiborne Jackson]


37

As early as Jan. 8 he visited the Arsenal, and had an interview with its
commandant, which he reported to the Governor as entirely satisfactory.
Maj. Bell was wholly in sympathy with the South, and regarded the
Arsenal as being virtually Missouri's property when she should choose to
demand it. His honor as a soldier would compel him to resist any attack
from an irresponsible mob, but a summons from the sovereign State
of Missouri would meet with the respectful obedience to which it was
entitled. It was therefore decided that this was the best shape in which
to leave matters. Maj. Bell would hold the Arsenal in trust against both
the radical St. Louis Germans and over-zealous Secessionists, who wanted
to seize it and arm their particular followers. When Gen. Frost had
organized the Missouri Militia to his satisfaction, he would march into
the Arsenal, and under the plea of protecting it from mobs, use its
contents to thoroughly arm and equip his Militia, which would thus be
put in very much better shape than the troops of any other State.

Meanwhile, Gen. Frost recommended that as little as possible be said
about the Arsenal, in order to avoid attracting attention to it.

All the same, the Arsenal was intently watched by both sides, and for
the next four months it was the great stake for which they played, since
its possession would go far toward giving possession of the State. There
were but 150,000 stands of arms in the rest of the South, while here
were 60,000.


38

Even before South Carolina seceded the ardent young Secessionists of St.
Louis had begun the organization of "Minute Men" to "protect the State."
Naturally, their first step in protecting the State would be to seize
the Arsenal, to prevent its arms being used to "coerce the people."
Their headquarters were in the Berthold House, a fine residence at the
corner of Fifth and Pine streets, over which floated the Secession flag.

Into these companies went numbers of young men from the best families
of the South, who had come to St. Louis to take advantage of business
opportunities, and young Irishmen, of whom there were many thousands
in the city, and who; having in their blood an antipathy to "the Dutch"
dating from William of Orange's days, were skillfully wrought upon by
the assertion that the "infidel, Sabbath-breaking, beer-drinking Dutch
who had invaded St. Louis" were of the same breed as those who harried
Ireland and inflicted innumerable persecutions in 1689. Very effective
in this was one Brock Champion, a big-hearted, big-bodied young
Irishman, of much influence among his countrymen, who played little
part, however, in the war which ensued. More conspicuous later was Basil
Wilson Duke, a bright Kentucky lawyer, 25 years old, who was Captain of
one of the companies, and afterwards became the second in command and an
inspiration to John H. Morgan, the great raider. The Captain of another
company was Colton Greene, a South Carolinian, a year or two younger
than Duke, a merchant, a man of delicate physique and cultivated mind,
but of great courage and constancy of purpose.


39

Everywhere in the State began a systematic persecution of the
Unconditional Union men and the bullying of the Conditional Union men.
Secession flags in numbers floated from buildings in St. Louis, Rolla,
Lexington, Jefferson City, Kansas City, and elsewhere. Union meetings
were disturbed and broken up in all the larger towns, the Star Spangled
Banner torn down and trampled upon, and the borders of Kansas and Iowa
were thronged with Union refugees telling how they had been robbed,
maltreated, and threatened with death, their stock killed, their houses
and crops burned by the "White Trash" which the Slave Power had turned
loose upon them.

When Maj. Bell had talked of "irresponsible mobs," he may have thought
of premature young fire-eaters like Duke, Greene, and Champion, eager
for the distinction of capturing the Arsenal, covetous of distributing
its arms to their followers. Most likely, however, he had in mind forays
from Illinois, or by the radical Germans of St. Louis, who were ill
disposed toward seeing their enemies equipped from its stores.

Gen. Frost had the Germans in mind as early as Jan. 8, probably
immediately following his interview with Maj. Bell, for he sent out a
secret circular to his trusted subordinates instructing them that "upon
the bells of the churches sounding a continuous peal, interrupted by
a pause of five minutes, they should assemble with their men in their
armories, and there await further orders." One of these circulars fell
into the hands of a good Union man, who immediately took it to Frank
P. Blair. It was found that it was the Catholic church bells that were
relied upon to do the ringing, implying that the enthusiastic, reckless
Irishmen were to take the initiative.


40

The Archbishop of St. Louis was immediately seen, to prohibit the bells
of the churches being used as a tocsin to light the flames of civil war.
Mr. Blair sent the circular with other information to Gen. Scott, with
an urgent request that an officer of sounder loyalty supersede Maj.
Bell, and that some troops be sent to Jefferson Barracks against an
emergency. Mr. Montgomery Blair, brother of F. P. Blair, Jr., and soon
to be Postmaster-General, Gov. Yates, of Illinois, and President-elect
Lincoln supported this request. A fortnight later Maj. Bell was
relieved, and assigned to duty in the East.

A gallant one-armed Irish First Lieutenant of the 2d U. S., one Thomas
W. Sweeny, of whom we shall hear more later, was ordered to Jefferson
Barracks, where it was supposed his influence with his countrymen might
offset that of Mr. Champion. A small squad of Regulars was sent him from
Newport Barracks.

Maj. Bell foreseeing that the Army was to be no longer a place for a
quiet gentleman with business tastes, resigned his commission, to remain
with his well-placed investments in St. Louis.


41

All this disturbed the Secessionists. They saw that the Government had
an eye on the important Arsenal, and did not intend to give it up as
tamely as it had other places in the South. The arrival of the Regulars
was made the basis of inflammatory appeals that the Government
was trying to "overawe and coerce the people." Two days later this
"intimidation" became flagrant. Isaac H. Sturgeon, Assistant United
States Treasurer at St. Louis, a Kentuckian and Secessionist, had for
reasons of his own reported to President Buchanan that he was concerned
about the safety of $400,000 in gold in his vaults. The President handed
the letter to Gen. Scott, who sent an order to Jefferson Barracks which
resulted in a Lieutenant with 40 men being sent to the Post Office
Building to protect the removal of the gold. The city was thrown into
the greatest excitement as the troops marched through the streets, the
papers issued extras, and it required all the efforts of the officials
and the leaders on both sides to preserve the peace.

Gov. Claiborne Jackson took advantage of the occasion to send a message
to the Legislature, in which he said that this was an "act insulting to
the dignity and patriotism of the people."

The gold having been removed, Gen. Harney ordered the troops back to the
Arsenal, and quiet was restored.

Maj. Peter B. Hagner, of the District of Columbia, who graduated from
West Point in 1832, and had distinguished himself in the Mexican War,
succeeded Maj. Bell in the command of the Arsenal. His sympathies were
strongly with the South, but not so strongly as to overmaster his desire
to retain his commission and its emoluments. He was willing to go any
length in serving the Secessionists that did not involve his dismissal
from the Army. He had two brothers in the service, and all three held on
to their commissions until forced from their hands by the grim grasp of
death.


42

Meanwhile, Lieut.-Gov. Reynolds was pushing the Legislative work to
carry Missouri out of the Union. The acts which proved so successful
in the other Southern States in binding the people hand and foot and
dragging them over to the rebellion were closely imitated. One of these
was the celebrated "Military Bill" introduced in the Senate, Jan. 5,
1861. This put every man of military age in the State into the Militia,
and at the disposal of the Governor, who was given $150,000 outright
to enable him to carry out his plans. It made everybody owe paramount
allegiance to the State, and prescribed severe penalties, including even
death, to be inflicted by drum-head court martial for "treason" to
the State--for even the utterance of disrespectful words against the
Governor or Legislature. This went a little too far for many of the
members, and by obstinate fighting the passage of the bill was postponed
from time to time and at last defeated.

Another bill was generally understood as one to stamp out Republicanism
in St. Louis, but officially designated as "An Act to amend an act for
the suppression of riot in St. Louis City and County." This took out
of the hands of the Republican Sheriff and Mayor most of their
peace-preserving powers, which were given to a Board to be appointed by
the Governor, thereby to tie their hands when the time came for taking
the Arsenal. One of the Governor's Police Commissioners was Basil Duke,
the leader of the "Minute-Men."


43

Though they had none of the noisy aggressiveness of the Secessionists,
the leaders of the Unionists, during those bitterly intense Winter
days, were no less able, courageous, and earnest. Blair had a masterful
courage and determination not equalled by any man opposed to him. He was
one of those men of mighty purpose who set their faces toward an object
with the calm resolution to die rather than fail. Against the hardened
steel of his relentless will the softer iron of such thrasonic
Secessionists as Gov. Jackson, Lieut.-Gov. Reynolds, United States
Senators James S. Green and Trusten Polk, Gen. Frost and lesser leaders,
clashed without producing a dent.

Blair had skill and tact equal to his courage. He foresaw every movement
of his antagonists and met it with a prompt countermove. To their
inflammatory rhetoric he opposed clear common sense, loyalty and wise
judgment as to the future. When occasion demanded, he did not hesitate
to publicly express the hope "that every traitor among them would be
made to test the strength of Missouri hemp." He was swift to subordinate
himself and "the Cause," when anything could be gained. There were many
prominent men who wanted to save the Union, but would deny to Frank
Blair the credit of it. He unhesitatingly gave them the highest places,
and took the subordinate one for himself. There were tens of thousands
of Whigs and Democrats who loved the Union, but shuddered at the thought
of becoming Black Republicans. He abolished the Republican Party, that
they might form a Union Party, the sole principle of which should be
support of the Government.


44

Next to Blair was the famous "Committee of Safety," which did such
high work for the Union during those fermenting days. These and their
birthplaces were:

O. D. Filley, New England.

John How, Pennsylvania.

Samuel T. Glover, Kentucky.

James O. Broadhead, Virginia.

J. J. Witzig, Germany.

These self-denying, self-sacrificing patriots worked together with Blair
in perfect harmony and with the utmost skill. They were more than a
match for their Secession opponents in organization and management, and
lost very few points in the great game that was played throughout the
Winter, with the possession of the City, the State, and the Arsenal for
the main prizes.

The Committee of Safety had its Home Guards to offset the Minute Men.
Where there were hundreds of these latter drilling more or less openly,
with much fifing and drumming and flaunting of Secession flags, there
were thousands of Home Guards meeting and training with greatest secresy
in old foundries, breweries, and halls, with pickets out to prevent
surprise, sawdust on the floors to drown the sound of their feet, and
blankets at the windows to arrest the light and the words of command.
The drill hall was only approached at night, and singly or by twos or
threes, to avoid attracting attention. Most of these Home Guards were
Germans, and a large proportion had had military training in Europe. The
great problem with them, as with the Minute Men, was to get arms, and
both sides watched the Arsenal with its 60,000 rifles and 1,500,000
cartridges with sharp covetousness.


45

The Governor of Illinois loaned the Home Guards a few arms, but it was
expected that these would be repaid with interest from the stores of the
Arsenal.

The appointment of Maj. Hagner to the command of the Arsenal was
satisfactory to the Secessionists, but there was naturally a good deal
of interest as to the bias of Capt. Thomas W. Sweeny. One day a man
presented himself at the west gate of the Arsenal and asked to see Capt.
Sweeny. Sweeny went to the gate and recognized an old acquaintance, St.
George Croghan, the son of that Lieut. Croghan who had so brilliantly
defended Fort Stephenson, at Lower Sandusky, in the War of 1812, and
who afterwards was for many years Inspector-General of the United
States Army. Croghan's grandfather had been a gallant officer in the
Revolution. It was a cold day, and Croghan wore a citizen's overcoat.
On their way to the quarters, the guards properly saluted Sweeny as they
passed. Said Croghan, "Sweeny, don't you think those sentinels ought to
salute me--my rank is higher than yours?" at the same time throwing open
his overcoat and revealing the uniform of a rebel field officer.

"Not to such as that, by heavens!" responded Sweeny; and added: "If that
is your business, you can have nothing to do with me. You had better not
let my men see you with that thing on."

Croghan assured him his business in calling was one of sincere
friendship; but he would remark while on the subject, that Sweeny had
better find it convenient to get out of there, and very soon, too.

"Why?" asked Sweeny.

Replied Croghan: "Because we intend to take it."


46

Sweeny in great excitement exclaimed: "Never! As sure as my name is
Sweeny, the property in this place shall never fall into your hands.
I'll blow it to hell first, and you know I am the man to do it."

Nine months later this Croghan was to fall mortally wounded at the
head of a cavalry regiment while attacking the Union troops near
Fayetteville, W. Va., while Sweeny was to do gallant service in the
Union army, rising to the rank of Brigadier-General of Volunteers,
and command of a Division, and being retired in 1870 with the rank of
Brigadier-General.




CHAPTER III. NATHANIEL LYON'S ENTRANCE ON THE SCENE

The Secessionists were in the meanwhile hardly making the headway in
the Legislature that they had anticipated, in spite of the stimulating
events in the extreme Southern States.

A curious situation developed in the Legislature leading to the arrest
for a while of Lieut.-Gov. Reynolds's plans for organizing the State
for rebellion. The term of Senator James S. Green expired on the 3d
of March, and he was desirous of being his own successor. The first
consideration was whether Missouri was likely to stay in the Union and
have a Senator. At the moment this seemed probable enough to warrant
going on and electing a Senator, and the Pro-Slavery men made strenuous
efforts to re-elect Mr. Green, but it was significant that he was deemed
too ultra a Secessionist, and Waldo P. Johnson was elected in his stead.
Among the many things in the war which turned out surprisingly different
from what men had confidently expected was that Mr. Green took the
selfish politician's view of the "ingratitude" of those who refused to
re-elect him, sullenly retired to private life, and did not raise his
hand nor his voice for the South during the war, while Mr. Johnson, who
was elected because he was a better Union man, soon resigned his seat
in the United States Senate, entered the Confederate army, became
Lieutenant-Colonel of the 4th Mo. (Confederate), and fought till the
close of the war.


48

Jan. 18, after a prolonged debate, both Houses passed a bill to call a
Convention "to consider the relations of Missouri to the United States."
This was the successful device which had been used in carrying other
States out of the Union, and despite the conservatism of the language
of the act it was hoped that it would be successful in this instance. In
the Senate there were only 26 votes against it, and in the House but 18,
of whom 11 were from St. Louis. The Southern Rights men regarded this as
a great triumph, however, and made much jubilation throughout the State.
The election for members to the Convention was fixed for Feb. 18, and
the Convention was to meet on the last day of the month. This act was
followed by the adoption of a joint resolution which expressed profound
regret that the States of New York and Ohio had tendered men and money
to the President for "the avowed purpose of coercing certain sovereign
States of the South into obedience to the Federal Government," and
declaring that the people of Missouri would rally to the side of their
Southern brethren to "resist the invaders and to the last extremity."
Only 14 votes were cast against this resolution.

The main interest now centered upon the election of delegates to the
Convention. New political lines ran among the people, dividing them into
Secessionists, "Conditional Union" men and "Unconditional Union" men.


49

Blair's leadership was able to efface the Republican Party for the time
being, and carry all of the members over to the Unconditional Unionists.
The result of the election was a blow to the Secessionists, not one of
whose candidates was elected.

In St. Louis the Unconditional Union candidates were elected by over
5,000 majority.

The bitterly-disappointed Secessionists denounced the majority as
"Submissionists," and threatened all manner of things.

The election occurred on the same day that Jefferson Davis was
inaugurated President of the Southern Confederacy.

When the State Convention met at Jefferson City, it was found that of
its 99 members 53 were natives of either Virginia of Kentucky, and all
but 17 had been born in Slave States. Only 13 were natives of the North,
three were Germans, and one an Irishman. A struggle at once ensued for
the organization of the Convention, which resulted in a victory for the
Union men, ex-Gov. Sterling Price being elected President by 75 votes,
to 15 cast for Nathaniel W. Watkins, a half-brother of Henry Clay, and
a strenuous advocate of Southern Rights. As soon as the Convention
completed its organization it adjourned to St. Louis, to avoid the
badgering of the pronounced Secessionists, who constituted the State
Government, and the clamorous bullying of the crowd assembled in the
State Capital to influence its action.


50

On assembling at St. Louis the Convention immediately addressed itself
to the duty for which it had assembled. Judge Hamilton R. Gamble,
a Virginian, leader of the Unconditional Union men, and afterwards
Governor of the State, as Chairman of the Committee on Federal
Relations, made a long report, in which it was denied that the
grievances complained of were sufficient to involve Missouri in
rebellion; that in a military sense Missouri's union with the Southern
Confederacy meant annihilation; that the true position of the State
was to try to bring back her seceding sisters, and to this effect a
Convention of all the States was recommended, to adopt the Crittenden
Proposition. An attempt to amend this report by the declaration that
if the Northern States refused to assent to the Crittenden Compromise
Missouri would then side with her sister States of the South received
only 23 votes, but among them was that of Sterling Price, who had begun
to drift southward.

The Convention adopted Gamble's report, and a few days afterward
adjourned subject to call of the committee.

The Secessionists were greatly discouraged by the result, and the
Legislature also adjourned. Then came another fluctuation in public
opinion. The great majority wanted peace. The attitude of the Governor
and his faction, who seemed to look toward peace by putting Missouri in
a state of defense to prevent the new Republican President from making
war, appealed to many, and in the Spring elections the Unconditional
Union men were defeated by a small majority, and St. Louis passed from
their official control to that of the Conditional Union Men.


51

While these events were occupying public attention there occurred
another, little noted at the time, but which was soon to be of
controlling importance. Feb. 6 there marched up from the steamboat
landing to the Arsenal a company of 80 Regular soldiers of the 2d U.
S., from Fort Riley, Kan., at the head of which was a Captain, under the
average hight, and a well knit but rather slender frame. He had a long,
narrow face, with full, high forehead, keen, deep-set blue eyes, and
hair and whiskers almost red. His face was thoughtful but determined,
his manner quick and nervous. He bore himself towards his men as an
exact and rigid disciplinarian, mingled with thoughtful kindness for all
who did their duty and tried their best This was Capt. Nathaniel Lyon,
born in Connecticut, descended from old Puritan stock, with the blood of
Cromwell's Ironsides flowing in his veins. He was then 42 years old, and
before another birthday was to fill the country with his fame, and fall
in battle-face to the front. He had graduated from West Point in 1841,
the 11th in his class. That his intellectual abilities were of high
order is shown by his standing in that class, of which Zealous B. Tower,
an eminent engineer, and brevet Major-General, U. S. A., was the head,
and Horatio G. Wright, who commanded the Sixth Corps during the last and
greatest year of its history, was the second.

[Illustration: 010-General Lyon]

Gen. John F. Reynolds, the superb commander of the First Corps and of
the Right Wing of the Army of the Potomac, with which he brought on the
battle of Gettysburg, where he was killed, graduated 26th in the class,
and Gen. Don Carlos Buell, who organized and commanded the Army of the
Ohio, graduated 32d. Gen. Robert Garnett, the first Confederate General
officer to fall in the struggle,--killed July 13, 1861, at Carrick's
Ford,--was the 27th in the class. Julius P. Garesche, who graduated 16th
in the class, became Chief of Staff to Gen. Rosecrans, and was killed at
Stone River.


52

Besides being thoroughly versed in all that related to his profession
of arms, Capt. Lyon was well informed in history and general literature;
was a devoted student of the Bible and Shakspere, and wrote well and
forcibly. What was very rare among the officers of the old Army, he was
a radical Abolitionist, and believer in the National Sovereignty. He was
so outspoken in these views as to render his position quite unpleasant,
where nearly every one was so antagonistic. A weaker-willed man would
have been forced either out of the Army or into tacit acquiescence with
the prevailing sentiment.

Upon graduation he had been assigned to the 2d U. S., and sent to get
his first lessons in actual war fighting the Florida Indians. There his
superiors found occasion to remark that his zeal sometimes outran
his discretion--not an infrequent fault of earnest young men. He had
distinguished himself and received a brevet in the Mexican War for
gallantry at Contreras and Churubusco, and had then been sent to
California. With a slender force he was charged with the duty of keeping
a long frontier in order against turbulent Indians. He accomplished this
by making the Indians more afraid of him than the whites could possibly
be of them. No quick retreat, no impregnable fastness, could shelter
them from his inexorable pursuit. On one occasion he carried boats on
wagons over a mountain range to cross a river and strike an Indian lair
where the marauders were resting in the fullest sense of security.
His company had next been transferred to Kansas in the midst of the
political troubles there, where, while doing his official duty with
strict impartiality, his sympathies were actively with the Free State
settlers.


53

For 42 years he had been growing and fitting himself for a great
Opportunity.

For once Opportunity and the Man equal to it met.

Immediately after settling his company in the Arsenal, Capt. Lyon went
to the city to meet Frank P. Blair. The two strong men recognized each
the other's strength, and at once came into harmonious cooperation.

The fate of the Arsenal, of the City of St. Louis, and of the State of
Missouri, was settled.

Before Capt. Lyon arrived, the Committee of Safety had had an alarm
about the Arsenal, and rallied a strong force of their Home Guards in
waiting to go to the assistance of Capt. Sweeny and his 40 men, should
the Minute Men attack him. But the Secessionist leaders had such
confidence in Maj. Hagner that they dissuaded the impatient Basil Duke,
Colton Greene, Brock Champion and other eager young Captains from making
the attack.

Capt. Lyon was soon reinforced. Lieut. Warren L. Lothrop, of the 4th U.
S. Art., a Maine man, who had risen from the ranks, came in with 40 men.
He was afterwards to succeed Frank P. Blair, jr., as Colonel of the 1st
Mo. Light Art. Next came Capt. Rufus Saxton, also of the 4th Art., a
Massachusetts man, later to rise to brevet Major-General of Volunteers,
and to play an important part in caring for the freedmen of the South
Carolina coast.


54

Still later came Capt. James Totten, of the 2d U. S. Art., with his
company. He had been born in Pennsylvania, but was appointed to West
Point from Virginia, and was in command of the Arsenal at Little Rock
until he evacuated his post, Feb. 8, before a large force of rebels,
and retired with his command to the Indian Territory, by virtue of
the agreement with the Governor of the State. While Lothrop and Saxton
appear to have been taken at once into the councils of Capt. Lyon, Capt.
Totten does not, probably because the uncompromising Lyon did not like
his methods in Arkansas. He was, however, true to his loyalty, and rose
eventually to the rank of Brigadier-General.

There were now in the Arsenal nine officers and 484 men. Hagner and Lyon
at once came into collision. Though Hagner belonged to the Ordnance,
and not therefore regarded as eligible to command troops, he secured
an order assigning himself to command according to his brevet rank
of Major, which made him superior to Lyon. Hagner had been five years
longer in the service than Lyon, but his commission as Captain was 20
days junior to Lyon's. Lyon energetically protested against Hagner's
assignment in a letter to Blair, who was then in Washington, D. C,
looking out for matters at that end of the line, in which he said:


55

     It is obvious that the fine stone wall inclosing our grounds
     affords us an excellent defense against attack, if we will
     take advantage of it; and for this purpose platforms should
     be erected for our men to stand on and fire over; and that
     artillery should be ready at the gates, to be run out and
     sweep down a hostile force; and sand-bags should be prepared
     and at hand to throw up a parapet to protect the parties at
     these pieces of artillery; inside pieces should be placed to
     rake the whole length, and sweep down each side a party that
     should get over the walls, traverses being erected to
     protect parties at these pieces.   A pretty strong field
     work, with three heavy pieces, should be erected on the side
     toward the river, to oppose either a floating battery or one
     that might be established on the island; and, finally,
     besides our houses, every building should be mined, with a
     train arranged so as to blow them up successively, as
     occupied by the enemy. Maj. Hagner refuses, as I mentioned
     to you, to do any of these things, and has given his orders
     not to fly to the walls to repel an approach, but to let the
     enemy have all the advantages of the wall to lodge himself
     behind it, and get possession of all outside buildings
     overlooking us, and to get inside and under shelter of our
     outbuildings, which we are not to occupy before we make
     resistance.    This is either  imbecility or  d----d
     villainy,   and  in   contemplating the risks we run and the
     sacrifices we must make in case of an attack in contrast to
     the vigorous and effective defense we are capable of, and
     which, in view of the cause of our country and humanity, the
     disgrace and degradation to which the Government has been
     subject by pusillanimity and treachery, we are now called
     upon to make, I get myself into a most unhappy state of
     solicitude and irritability. With even less force and proper
     disposition, I am confident we can resist any force which
     can be brought against us; by which I mean such force as
     would not be overcome by our sympathizing friends outside.
     These needful dispositions, with proper industry, can be
     made in 24 hours. There cannot be, as you know, a more
     important occasion nor a better opportunity to strike an
     effective blow at this arrogant and domineering infatuation
     of Secessionism than here; and must this all be lost, by
     either false notions of duty or covert disloyalty? As I have
     said, Maj. Hagner has no right to the command, and, under
     the 62d Article of War, can only have it by a special
     assignment of the President, which I do not believe has been
     made; but that the announcement of Gen. Scott that the
     command belongs to Maj. Hagner is his own decision, and done
     in his usual sordid spirit of partisanship and favoritism to
     pets, and personal associates, and toadies; nor can he, even
     in the present straits of the country, rise above this, in
     earnest devotion to justice and the wants of his country.

Lyon went to Gen. Harney to urge his right to command, from seniority
of commission; but Harney sustained Hagner, who was in some things much
more Harney's style than Lyon. Lyon thereupon appealed to President
Buchanan, which meant to Gen. Scott, who, of course, sustained Hagner.
Lyon was, therefore, forced to submit until Lincoln was inaugurated.


56

There was no vanity or self-seeking in this urgency of Lyon's. In the
Army he was distinguished for his readiness to subordinate himself to
carry out any plans which commended themselves to him. He had repeatedly
offered to subordinate himself to Hagner if the latter would take
what Lyon thought only the most necessary steps at that crisis for the
defense of the position and stores of priceless importance.

What Lyon dreaded above all things was something akin to that which had
freshly occurred at Little Rock, where Capt. Totten had withdrawn from
the Little Rock Arsenal with his company in the face of a large mob of
Secessionists, upon a receipt by the Governor for the arms and stores,
and the promise that he would account for them to the United States
Government. Lyon was determined to bury himself and his men in the
ruins of the Arsenal before it should pass into the hands of the
Secessionists.

Basil Duke, Colton Greene, and the other chafing young Captains had
matured a plot with the connivance of Gen. Frost, of the Militia,
probably somewhat at his instigation, which would brush aside the
network of intrigue which Claiborne Jackson and others were spinning,
bring matters to a focus, and in one blow crush Union sentiment, overawe
the timid, fasten the wavering, seize the Arsenal and launch Missouri
upon the tide of Secession with the Cotton States.


67

The police powers of the city of St. Louis had been taken away from
the Mayor, Frost had his Militia in readiness, the Irish were
properly worked up to a state of exasperation against the "infidel,
Sabbath-breaking Dutch," and hosts of Americans were in the same net
when on the day of Lincoln's inauguration the Secession flag was boldly
hoisted from the roof of the Berthold Mansion, in the most prominent
part of the city. At once excitement burned to fever heat. Incensed by
the wanton insult, the Germans and other Unconditional Union men raged
that the flag should be torn down, and crowds gathered around the
Berthold Mansion for that purpose. The house had, however, been
converted into an arsenal, with all the arms and ammunition that could
at that time be gathered, and filled with determined men under the
leadership of Duke, Greene and others, eager to precipitate a riot,
under the cover of which the Irish and Americans could be hurled against
the Germans, and the Arsenal seized.

Blair and the Committee of Safety saw the danger of this. Their
followers were not so ready for battle as the enemy was, and in
conjunction with the more conservative leaders of the other side they
succeeded in restraining their indignant friends from opening up a day
of blood which would have been forever memorable in the history of St.
Louis. Blair at once hastened back to Washington, and a few days
after the Inauguration secured from the new Secretary of War an order
assigning Capt. Lyon to the command of the Arsenal. This had to come
through Gen. Harney's hands, and in transmitting it he informed Capt.
Lyon:

You shall not exercise any control over the operations of the Ordnance
Department. The arrangements heretofore made for the accommodation of
the troops at the Arsenal and for the defense of the place will not be
disturbed without the sanction of the Commanding General.


58

This was to save Hagner's pride, as well as propitiate Gen. Harney's
Secession friends in St. Louis, who were becoming very uneasy at the way
the "Yankee Abolitionist" was taking hold.

The dilemma into which Gen. Harney was becoming daily more involved was
far more perplexing than any he had encountered in his fighting days.
A question that could be settled sword in hand never had troubled
him much. Alas! this could not be--not then. On the one side were the
lifelong associations and habits of thought of the plain old soldier.
All of his friends were Southerners and Slaveholders, as he himself
was. Nearly all of the public men he knew, the officials of the State
of Louisiana, which he called his home; of Missouri, which was almost
equally his home, had either gone over irrevocably to Secession, or were
preparing to do so. In his real home, the Army, it was almost as
bad. The next Brigadier-General above him, Daniel E. Twiggs, had just
surrendered all the men and property under his command to the State
of Texas. The men who controlled the War Department,--Secretary Floyd,
Adjutant-General Samuel Cooper, Quartermaster-General Joe E. Johnston,
Assistant Adjutants-General John Withers and George Deas, had gone into
the Confederate army. Robert E. Lee, Gen. Scott's prime favorite, was
preparing to do so.

On the other hand were the deep, ineradicable instincts of soldierly
loyalty to the Flag under which he had fought for 40 years. The man
who had hanged 60 men at one time in Mexico for deserting the Flag was
likely to have a severe struggle before he could bring himself to do the
same. He was deeply incensed at the "Black Republicans" for irritating
the Southerners so that they felt compelled to secede, but did not
believe that the latter should have seceded. At least, until Missouri
seceded he was going to maintain, as best he could, the National
authority in his Department.


59

A flashlight is thrown on his mental attitude by his reply to
Lieut, (afterwards General) Schofield, when informed by him of the
above-mentioned preparations for seizing the Arsenal under the cover of
a riot. "A -------- outrage," he exclaimed in his usual explosive way.
"Why, the State has not yet passed the Ordinance of Secession. Missouri
has not gone out of the United States."

The limitations placed by Gen. Harney upon Lyon's assignment to command
were aggravating. Hagner commanded the buildings, the arms, ammunition,
and other stores, and the strong walls surrounding the grounds. Lyon
commanded merely the men. He could not draw a musket, a cannon, or a
cartridge for either, not even a hammer, a spade nor an ax, without
a requisition duly approved by Harney. Nor could he change a single
arrangement of the grounds without Harney's approval.

Lyon was almost nightly meeting with the Committee of Safety, and
visiting the drill-rooms of the Home Guards, where he advised,
encouraged and drilled the men. The Secessionists were extremely fearful
that in some way he would manage to get the arms and ammunition, and
besought Harney and Hagner to omit no precaution to prevent this.

When away from his Secessionist environment, Harney's soldierly
instincts asserted themselves. Lyon's vigorous, uncompromising course
was far more to his mind than the dull, shifty Hagner's.


60

One was zealous in the performance of his duty, and the other a red-tape
bureaucrat, whose first thought always seemed to be to clog and hamper
the men in the field. Harney had suffered too much from these "office
fellows" to be especially enamored of them. Therefore he had moods, when
he gave Lyon a free hand, which the latter made the most of until the
General's mood changed.

During one of these Lyon had undermined the walls of the buildings,
placed batteries, built banquettes for the men to fire over the
walls, cut portholes, reinforced the weaker places with sandbags, and
established a vigilant sentry system to prevent surprise.

The Secessionists were equally full of plans, though not of
performances. Minute Men were organizing throughout the State to rush
in at the given day by every train and overwhelm St. Louis, taking the
Arsenal by sheer force of numbers. Many of the Captains of the large
steamboats which carried on the trade between St. Louis and New Orleans
were zealous Secessionists, and mooted plans for assailing the Arsenal
on the river side with cannon mounted on boats, backed up by large
crowds of men. But Gov. Jackson and his coterie still relied mainly upon
inciting some form of riot in the city, which would allow Gen. Frost
to get possession of the Arsenal with his Militia and "protect it from
violence." Once in Gen. Frost's hands--then!

The Secessionists scored a point and carried dismay to the Unionists by
securing an order from Gen. Scott for Capt. Lyon to attend a Court of
Inquiry at Fort Leavenworth. While he was gone they might carry out
their plans with comparative ease and safety. Blair, however, succeeded
in getting Gen. Scott to revoke the order.


61

To find out precisely what the position of affairs inside the Arsenal
was, and to spy out its defenses, a number of prominent citizens, among
whom was James S. Rains, afterwards Brigadier-General in the Confederate
army, calling themselves Grand Jurors for the United States District
Court, presented themselves at the Arsenal and attempted an entrance.
The Sergeant of the Guard held them awhile till he could communicate
with Capt. Lyon, and they went away in anger.

There were other officers in the Arsenal whom Lyon could trust as little
as he could Maj. Hagner, but Capts. Saxton and Sweeny and Lieut. Lothrop
stood firmly by him in every movement, going so far as to mutually agree
that they would shoot Maj. Hagner before he should be allowed to turn
over the arms to the Secessionists.

The bombardment and surrender of Fort Sumter and the President's call
for troops threw the country into a tumult of excitement, and changed
the political relations everywhere. All over the South the Secessionists
were jubilant, and those in Missouri particularly exultant. Very many
of the waverers at once flocked over to the Secessionists, while others
sided with the Union. To what extent this change took place was as yet
unknown, nor which side had a majority. Public sympathy as voiced by the
leading papers seemed to be that the Union had "been riven asunder by
the mad policy of Mr. Lincoln, and that it was necessary for Missouri to
take a stand with the other Border States to prevent his attempting to
subjugate them."


62

Gen. Frost submitted a memorial to Governor Jackson, in which were the
following recommendations:

1. Convene the General Assembly at once.

2. Send an agent to the South to procure mortars and siege guns.

3. Prevent the garrisoning of the United States Arsenal at Liberty.

4. Warn the people of Missouri "that the President has acted illegally
in calling out troops, thus arrogating to himself the war-making power,
and that they are therefore by no means, bound to give him aid or
comfort in his attempt to subjugate by force of arms a people who are
still free; but, on the contrary, should prepare themselves to maintain
all their rights as citizens of Misouri."

5. Order me (Frost) to form a military camp of instruction at or near
the city of St. Louis; to muster military companies into the service of
the State; and to erect batteries and do all things necessary and proper
to be done in order to maintain the peace, dignity, and sovereignty of
the State.

6. Order Gen. Bowen to report with his command to me (Frost) for duty.

He proposed to form a camp of instruction for the Militia on the river
bluffs near the Arsenal, from which it could be commanded by guns and
mortars to be obtained from the South when Frost with his brigade and
that of Gen. John S. Bowen, who was afterwards to be a Major-General
in the Confederate army and command a division at Vicksburg, with what
volunteers they could obtain, would force Lyon to surrender the Arsenal
and its stores.

While considering these recommendations the Governor received a request
from the Secretary of War for four regiments of infantry, Missouri's
quota of the 75,000 men the President had called for. To this Governor
Jackson replied the next day:


63

Your dispatch of the 13th instant, making a call upon Missouri for four
regiments of men for immediate service, has been received. There can be,
I apprehend, no doubt but these men are intended to form a part of the
President's army to make war upon the people of the seceded States.
Your requisition, in my judgment, is illegal, unconstitutional, and
revolutionary in his objects, inhuman and diabolical, and cannot be
complied with. Not one man will the State of Missouri furnish to carry
on such an unholy crusade.

The same day he sent Capts. Greene and Duke to Montgomery with a letter
to the President of the Confederacy, requesting him to furnish the
siege guns and mortars which Gen. Frost wanted, and another messenger to
Virginia with a similar request. He also called the Legislature to meet
at Jefferson City May 2, to take "measures to perfect the organization
and equipment of the Militia and raise the money to place the State in
a proper attitude for defense." He did not dare order Gen. Frost to
establish his military camp of instruction in St. Louis, but he took
the more prudent and strictly legal course of ordering the commanding
officers of the several Militia Districts of the State to assemble their
respective commands at some convenient place, and go into encampment for
six days for drilling and discipline. This order authorized Gen. Frost
to establish his camp wherever he pleased within the City or County of
St. Louis.

Gen. Bowen, who was in command of a force in the southwest to guard
the State against the marauders from Kansas, was ordered to report with
certain of his troops to Gen. Frost. The Arsenal at Liberty was at once
seized by the Secessionists in that neighborhood, who secured several
hundred muskets, four brass guns, and a large amount of powder. These
proceedings of the Governor disturbed Gen. Harney greatly, and he wrote
at once to Gen. Scott asking him for instructions.


64

Capt. Lyon did not ask or wait for instructions. He wrote at once to
Gov. Dick Yates, of Illinois, to obtain authority to hold in readiness
for service in St. Louis the six regiments which Illinois was called
upon to furnish. Gov. Yates acted promptly, and received authority to
send two or three regiments "to support the garrison of the St. Louis
Arsenal." Lyon received orders to equip these troops, and to issue
10,000 additional stands of arms to the agent of the Governor of
Illinois.

Mr. Blair reached St. Louis from Washington, April 17, and at once began
acting with the boldness and foresight that the situation demanded.
By his advice Col. Pritchard and other Union officers of the Militia
resigned. He procured from the War Department an order placing
5,000 stands of arms at the disposal of Lyon for arming "the loyal
citizens"--the Home Guards--and requested orders by telegraph for Capt.
Lyon to muster men into the service to fill Missouri's requisition, and
to have Hagner removed.

Lyon, determined not to be taken by surprise, had the streets leading to
the Arsenal nightly patrolled and pickets stationed outside the walls.
Gov. Jackson's Police Board complained that this was a violation of
the City ordinances and in direct interference with their duties. They
demanded that he should obey the law, but he refused. When they appealed
to Harney, he at once ordered Lyon to quarter his men in the Arsenal
and forbade him to issue arms to anyone without Harney's sanction.
This brought Blair and Lyon to a parting of the ways with Harney. They
demanded his removal, and April 21 Harney was removed from the command,
and ordered to repair to Washington and report to the General-in-Chief.


65

On the same day Capt. Lyon was instructed to immediately execute the
order previously given to "arm loyal citizens." He was also ordered to
muster into the service four regiments, which the Governor had refused
to furnish. As the men had long been in waiting, Lyon quickly organized
the four regiments, which elected him their Brigadier-General. Some of
the field officers of these regiments were notable men, and were to have
brilliant careers during the war. The Colonel of the 1st Regiment was
F. P. Blair, afterwards to become Major-General commanding a corps; the
Lieutenant-Colonel was George L. Andrews, afterwards to be a Colonel
in the Regular Army; the Major was John M. Schofield, later to be
Major-General commanding the Twenty-third Corps, and still later
Lieutenant-General commanding the Army of the United States. The Colonel
of the 3d Regiment was Franz Sigel, afterwards Major-General commanding
the Eleventh Corps and the Army of the Shenandoah.

The four regiments having been filled to the maximum, there were large
numbers yet demanding muster. From these a fifth regiment of Missouri
Volunteers and five regiments of "United States Reserves" were formed.
The most notable among the field officers of these were John McNeil,
Colonel of the 3d Regiment, who afterwards became a Brigadier-General,
and B. Gratz Brown, Colonel of the 4th U. S. Reserves, afterwards Vice
Presidential nominee on the Greeley ticket. These additional
regiments formed another brigade, and elected Capt. Sweeny their
Brigadier-General. After arming these 10,000 men Lyon secured the
balance of the stores from all danger of treachery or capture by
transferring them to Alton, Ill.., where they would be under the
guardianship of loyal men.


66

Thus, in a few, swift weeks after the inauguration of President Lincoln,
Blair and Lyon, bold even to temerity, and even more sagacious than
bold, had snatched away from the sanguine Secessionists the great
Arsenal, with its momentous contents, which were placed at the service
of the Union.

More than 10,000 loyal men of Missouri were standing, arms in hand, on
her soil to confront their enemies.

Above all, the Government showed that it would no longer tamely submit
to being throttled and stabbed, but would fight, then, there, and
everywhere, for its life.


67



CHAPTER IV. THE CAPTURE OF CAMP JACKSON

Up to the time that Gen. Harney was relieved and ordered to Washington,
and Capt. Lyon was given a free hand, Gen. D. M. Frost's course
and advice were worthy of his reputation as a resolute, far-seeing
commander. With the organized military companies of his district and the
Minute Men he had a good nucleus for action, and had he made a rush
on the Arsenal at any of the several times that he seems to have
contemplated, it would have been backed up by several thousand young
Irishmen and Americans in St. Louis, as well as by tens of thousands
from the country swarming in as fast as they could have gotten railroads
and steamboats to carry them.

Then the capture of the Arsenal would have opened the war instead of the
firing on Fort Sumter.

He was then, however, restrained by Gov. Jackson and his coterie, who
expected to gain their ends by intrigues and manipulations which had
proved so successful in the other States.

After, however, Capt. Lyon had equipped some 10,000 Missourians from
the Arsenal and sent most of the rest of the arms across the river into
Illinois, Frost seems to have suddenly become doddering. The Rev. Henry
W. Beecher used to tell a very effective story about an old house dog
named Noble. Some time in the dim past Noble had found a rabbit in a
hole under an apple tree. Every day ever after, for the rest of his
life, Noble would go to the hole and bark industriously at it for an
hour or so, with as much zeal as if he had found another rabbit there,
which he never did.


68

There seemed to be something of this in Gen. Frost's carrying out
his idea of establishing a camp ostensibly for the instruction of his
Militia, on the hills near the Arsenal, which he did May 3. It is hard
to reconcile this with any clear purpose. If he intended to assault and
capture the Arsenal, the force that he gathered was absurdly inadequate,
in view of what he must have known Lyon had to oppose him. Accounts
differ as to the highest number he ever had assembled, but it must have
been less than 2,000.

His camp, which was in a beautiful grove, then in the first flush of
the charms of early Springtime, was quite an attractive place for the
"knightly" young Southerners who, filled with the chivalrous ideas of
Sir Walter Scott's novels, then the prevalent romantic literature of the
South, had made much ado before their "ladye loves" of "going off to
the warres," and the aforesaid "ladye loves," decorated with Secession
rosettes and the red-white-and-red colors then emblematic of Secession,
followed their "true-loves" to the camp, and made Lindell Grove bright
with the gaily-contrasting hues in bonnets and gowns. There were music
and parades, presentations, flags and banners, dancing and feasting,
and all the charming accessories of a military picnic. But some how
the material for common soldiers did not flock to the Camp as the
Secessionists had hoped. Possibly the stern uprising of the loyal
people of the North in response to the firing upon Fort Sumter, and the
mustering of solid battalions in Illinois, Iowa, and Kansas, immediately
around the Missouri borders, had a repressing effect upon those who had
at first thought of going with a light heart into Secession. It began to
look as if there were going to be something more serious than a Fourth
of July barbecue about this work of breaking up the Union.


69

Certainly, recruits had not come to Camp Jackson, which Frost had so
named in honor of the Governor of the State, as they had flocked into
similar camps farther South. Nor had they come in the numbers which were
assembled around Lyon and Blair, appealing for arms. Still, the men
in Camp Jackson had a resolute purpose, under all the frivolity and
merry-making of the gay camp, and presently Capts. Colton Greene
and Basil Duke returned with the cheering news that their mission to
Jefferson Davis had been entirely successful. Heavy artillery would be
furnished with which to batter down the walls of the Arsenal, and
force the Home Guards to fight or surrender. They brought with them
the following encouraging letter from the President of the Southern
Confederacy:

     Montgomery, Ala., April 23, 1861. His Excellency C. F.
     Jackson, Governor of Missouri.

     Sir: I have the honor to acknowledge yours of the 17th
     Instant, borne by Capts. Greene and Duke, and have most
     cordially welcomed the fraternal assurances it brings.

     A misplaced but generous confidence has, for years past,
     prevented the Southern States from making the preparation
     required by the present emergency, and our power to supply
     you with ordnance is far short of the will to serve you.
     After learning as well as I could from the gentlemen
     accredited to me what was most needful for the attack on the
     Arsenal, I have directed that Capts. Greene and Duke should
     be furnished with two 12-pounder howitzers and two 32-
     pounder guns, with the proper ammunition for each. These,
     from the commanding hills, will be effective, both against
     the garrison and to breach the inclosing walls of the place.
     I concur with you as to the great importance of capturing
     the Arsenal and securing its supplies, rendered doubly
     important by the means taken to obstruct your commerce and
     render you unarmed victims of a hostile invasion.



70

     We look anxiously and hopefully for the day when the star of
     Missouri shall be added to the constellation of the
     Confederate States of America.

     With best wishes, I am, very respectfully, yours,

     JEFFERSON DAVIS.

This promise was at once made good by a letter to the Governor of
Louisiana to deliver the required war material from the stores in the
lately-captured arsenal at Baton Rouge. These, carefully disguised as
marble, ale, and other innocent stores, were shipped upon the steamboat
J. C. Swan, and consigned to a well-known Union firm in St. Louis, with
private marks to identify them to the Secessionists, who, on the watch
for them, had them at once loaded on drays and taken to Camp Jackson.
Their movements, however, were made known to Blair and the Committee of
Safety by their spies, and Capt. Lyon was urged to seize the stores
upon their arrival at the wharf, but he preferred to allow them to reach
their destination, where they would serve to fix the purpose of the camp
upon those commanding the garrison.

Lyon, who as a soldier had naturally chafed under the insulting presence
on the hills of a force hardly concealing its hostility under a thin
vail of professed loyalty, at once resolved upon the capture of the
camp. The more cautious of the Union men tried to restrain him. They
argued that the camp would expire by legal limitation within a few days.
To this Lyon opposed the probability that the Legislature would pass the
military bill in some form and make the camp a permanent one.


71

Then, those timorous ones insisted that the forms of the law should
be employed, and that the United States Marshal, armed with a writ of
replevin to recover United States property, should precede the attack
upon the camp. Lyon fretted under this; The writ of replevin was a
tiresome formality to men who talked of fighting and were ready to
fight; furthermore, if served and recognized, Frost might put off the
Marshal with some trumpery stuff of no value. Still further came the
news that Harney, with Gen. Scott's assistance, had reinstated himself
in favor at Washington, and would return the following Sunday. It was
now Wednesday, the 8th of May.

Above all, Lyon saw with a clearer insight than the strict law-abiders
the immense moral effect of his contemplated action. Heretofore all the
initiativeness, all the aggressiveness, all the audacity, had been on
the side of the Secessionists. They were everywhere taking daring steps
to the confusion and overthrow of the conservative Unionists, and so
dragging with them hosts of the wavering. He longed to strike a quick,
sharp blow to teach the enemies of the Government that they could no
longer proceed with impunity, but must expect a return blow for every
one they gave, and probably more.


72

On Wednesday evening, May 8, Capt. Lyon requested Mr. J. J. Witzig, one
of the Committee of Safety, to meet him at 2 o'clock the next day with
a horse and buggy. At the appointed hour Witzig went to Lyon's quarters
and inquired for the "General," by which title Lyon was known after his
election as Brigadier-General of the Missouri Militia. As he entered
Lyon's room, Witzig saw a lady seated near the door, vailed and
evidently waiting for some one. He inquired if she was waiting for the
General to come in, and seating himself near the window awaited the
coming of Lyon. A few minutes later the lady arose, lifted her vail, and
astonished Mr. Witzig with the very unfeminine features of Lyon himself.
Mrs. Alexander had loaned him the clothes, and succeeded in attiring him
so that the deception was complete. Taking a couple of heavy revolvers,
Gen. Lyon entered a barouche belonging to the loyal Franklin Dick, and
was driven by Mr. Dick's servant leisurely out to Camp Jackson, followed
by Mr. Witzig in a buggy. Lyon saw everything in the camp that he wished
to see; noticed that the streets were named Davis Avenue, Beauregard
Avenue, and the like; took in the lay of the ground, and returning
toward the Arsenal, stopped and directed Witzig to summon the other
members of the Committee of Safety to immediately meet him at the
Arsenal.

He stated to them, when they gathered, the necessity of at once
capturing the camp, and his determination to do so and hold all in it
as prisoners of war. Blair and Witzig warmly approved this; Filley and
Broadhead finally acquiesced, while How and Glover were opposed to both
the manner and time and wanted a writ of replevin served by the United
States Marshal. If Gen. Frost refused to respect this, Lyon could then
go to his assistance.


73

Lyon yielded so far as to allow Glover to get out the writ of replevin,
but he was not disposed to dally long with that subterfuge, and his line
of battle would not be far behind the Marshal. Even before he went out
to the camp he had sent an Aid to procure 36 horses for his batteries
from the leading livery stables in the city, because he feared that
Maj. McKinstry, the Chief Quartermaster of the Department, could not
be trusted; a doubt which seems to have been well founded, for Maj.
McKinstry afterwards refused to pay for the horses until he was
compelled to do so by a peremptory order from Lyon. The Secessionist
spies were as vigilant and successful as those of the Unionists, and
Gen. Frost was promptly informed of the designs upon him, whereupon on
the morning of the fateful May 10 he dispatched Col. Bowen, his Chief of
Staff, with the following letter to Gen. Lyon:

     Headquarters, Camp Jackson,

     Missouri Militia, May 10, 1861. Capt. N. Lyon, Commanding
     United States troops in and about St. Louis Arsenal.

     Sir: I am constantly in receipt of information that you
     contemplate an attack upon my camp. Whilst I understand you
     are impressed with the idea that an attack upon the Arsenal
     and the United States troops is intended on the part of the
     Militia of Missouri, I am greatly at a loss to know what
     could justify you in attacking: citizens of the United
     States, who are in the lawful performance of duties
     devolving upon them, under the Constitution, in organizing
     and instructing the Militia of the State in obedience to her
     laws, and therefore have been disposed to doubt the
     correctness of the information I have received.

     I would be glad to know from you personally whether there is
     any truth in the statements that are constantly poured into
     my ears. So far as regards any hostility being intended
     toward the United States or its property or representatives,
     by any portion of my command, or as far as I can learn (and
     I think I am fully informed) of any other part of the State
     forces, I can say positively that the idea has never been
     entertained. On the contrary, prior to your taking command
     of the Arsenal, I proffered to Maj. Bell, then in command of
     the very few troops constituting its guard, the services of
     myself and all my command, and, if necessary, the whole
     power of the State to protect the United States in the full
     possession of all her property. Upon Gen. Harney's taking
     command of this Department I made the same proffer of
     services to him and authorized his Adjutant-General, Capt.
     Williams, to communicate the fact that such had been done to
     the War


74

     Department. I have had no occasion to change any of the
     views I entertained at that time, neither of my own volition
     nor through orders of my constitutional commander.

     I trust that after this explicit statement we may be able,
     by fully understanding each other, to keep far from our
     borders the misfortunes which so unhappily afflict our
     common country.

     This communication will be handed you by Col. Bowen, my
     Chief of Staff, who may be able to explain anything not
     fully set forth in the foregoing.

     I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

     D. M. FROST,

     Brigadier-General, Commanding Camp Jackson, M. V. M.

It is an almost impossible task for the historian to reconcile this
extraordinary letter with Gen. Frost's standing as an officer and a
gentleman. It certainly passes the limits of deception allowable in war,
and has no place in the ethics of civil life.

The camp was located where it was for the generally understood purpose
of attacking the Arsenal, and this purpose had been recommended to the
Governor of the State by Gen. Frost himself. Every Secessionist, North
and South, understood and boasted of it. Jefferson Davis approved of
this, and he sent artillery with which to attack the Arsenal, which was
then in Frost's camp. Gen. Lyon refused to receive the letter. He was
busily engaged in preparations to carry its answer himself. He had under
arms almost his entire force. Two regiments of Home Guards were left
on duty protecting the Arsenal, and to be ready for any outbreak in the
city, and a majority of the Regulars were also so employed.


75

Gen. Lyon was a thorough organizer, and had his work well in hand with
every one of his subordinates fully instructed as to his part. The
previous military training of the Germans here came into good play,
and regiments formed quickly and moved promptly. Col. Blair, with his
regiment and a battalion of Regulars, marched to a position on the west
of the camp. Col. Schuttner with his regiment went up Market street;
Col. Sigel led his column up Olive street; Col. Brown went up Morgan
street; and Col. McNeil up Clark avenue. A battery of six pieces went
with a Regular battalion, at the head of which rode Gen. Lyon. The news
of the movement rapidly diffused through the city; everybody was excited
and eagerly expectant; and the roofs of the houses were black with
people watching events. Not the least important, factor were the
Secessionist belles of the city, whose lovers and brothers were in Camp
Jackson, and who, with that inconsequence which is so charming in the
young feminine mind, were breathlessly expectant of their young heroes
each surrounding himself with a group of "Dutch myrmidons," slain by his
red right hand.

So admirably had Lyon planned that the heads of all his columns appeared
at their designated places almost simultaneously, and Gen. Frost found
his camp entirely surrounded in the most soldierly way. The six light
pieces galloped into position to entirely command the camp. With a
glance of satisfaction at the success of his arrangements, Gen. Lyon
rode up to Sweeny, his second in command, and said:

"Sweeny, if their batteries open on you, deploy your leading company as
skirmishers, charge on the nearest battery, and take it."

Sweeny turned to the next two companies to him, and ordered them to move
their cartridge-boxes to the front, to prepare for action. Lyon then
sent Maj. B. G. Farrar with the following letter to Gen. Frost:


76

     Headquarters United States Troops,

     St. Louis, Mo., May 10, 1861. Gen. D. M. Frost, Commanding
     Camp Jackson.

     Sir: Your command is regarded as evidently hostile to the
     Government of the United States.

     It is for the most part made up of those Secessionists who
     have openly avowed their hostility to the General
     Government, and have been plotting at the seizure of its
     property and the overthrow of its authority. You are openly
     in communication with the so-called Southern Confederacy,
     which is now at war with the United States; and you are
     receiving at your camp, from said Confederacy and under its
     flag, large supplies of the material of war, most of which
     is known to be the property of the United States. These
     extraordinary preparations plainly indicate none other than
     the well-known purpose of the Governor of this State, under
     whose orders you are acting, and whose purpose, recently
     communicated to the Legislature, has just been responded to
     in the most unparalleled legislation, having in direct view
     hostilities to the General Government and cooperation with
     its enemies.

     In view of these considerations, and of your failure to
     disperse in obedience to the proclamation of the President,
     and of the eminent necessities of State policy and welfare,
     and the obligations imposed upon me by Instructions from
     Washington, it is my duty to demand, and I do hereby demand
     of you, an immediate surrender of your command, with no
     other conditions than that all persons surrendering under
     this demand shall be humanely and kindly treated. Believing
     myself prepared to enforce this demand, one-half hour's time
     before doing so will be allowed for your compliance
     therewith. Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

     N. LYON, Captain, 2d United States Infantry,
     Commanding Troops.


There were a few anxious minutes following this, but it must be said to
Frost's credit as a soldier that he promptly recognized the situation
and acted upon it. Soon a horseman rode out from the camp, and
approaching Lyon handed him the following note:


77

     Camp Jackson, Mo., May 10, 1861. Capt. N. Lyon, Commanding
     U. S. Troops.

     Sir: I, never for a moment having conceived the Idea that so
     illegal and unconstitutional a demand as I have just
     received from you would be made by an officer of the United
     States Army, am wholly unprepared to defend my command from
     this unwarranted attack, and shall therefore be forced to
     comply with your demand.

     I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

     D. M. FROST, Brigadier-General, Commanding Camp Jackson,
     Missouri Volunteer Militia.


Lyon read it, turned to his second in command and remarked: "Sweeny,
they surrender."

Sweeny turned to his men with the order to replace their
cartridge-boxes, which they did with an air of disappointment. There
had been so much talk during the weeks and months of preparation about
fighting and such irritating threatenings, that the Union troops were
anxious to "take a fall" out of their opponents, and see what would be
the result. Lyon dismounted, and unfortunately the fractious horse of
one of his Aids at that instant kicked him in the stomach, knocking
him senseless. While in this condition, Wm. D. Wood, Frost's
Adjutant-General, rode up and inquired for Gen. Lyon. Gen. Sweeny,
desiring to conceal Lyon's condition from the enemy, replied that he
would receive any message intended for the General. Col. Wood then said:

     "Gen. Frost sends his compliments to Gen. Lyon, and wishes
     to know if the officers will be allowed to retain their
     side-arms, what disposition shall be made of Government
     property, and if a guard will be sent to relieve his men now
     on post, and take possession of everything when the camp
     shall be evacuated?"


78

Sweeny replied affirmatively, when Wood rode off and Sweeney returned to
Lyon, to find him slowly recovering. Lyon approved of Sweeny's answer,
and directed Sweeny to take possession of the camp with two companies of
Regulars. Frost's men stacked arms and marched off through a lane formed
by the 1st Mo., which faced inward. Up to this time everything had gone
on peacefully. The surrendered Militia, without any special protest or
demonstration, took their places quietly under guard. Not so with
the immense mob which had gathered, expecting to see the Militia make
sanguinary havoc of their assailants. These were deeply chagrined at the
tame issue of the affair, and after exhausting all the vile epithets
at their command, began throwing stones, brickbats, and other missiles,
which the soldiers received as patiently as they did the contumely, when
the bolder of the mob began firing with revolvers. Presently one of
Co. F, 3d Mo., commanded by Capt. C. Blandowski, was shot dead, several
severely wounded, and the Captain himself fell with a bullet through his
leg. As he fell he ordered his men to fire, which resulted in about 20
of the rioters dropping under a volley from the soldiers' muskets. The
mob fled in dismay, and Gen. Lyon ordered his troops to cease firing.

One of the leaders of the mob had deliberately fired three times at
Capt. Saxton, of the Regulars, and had laid his revolver across his
arm for a fourth more deliberate shot, when one of Capt. Saxton's men
bayoneted while another shot him. When the smoke cleared away, it was
found that 15 had been killed. Three of these were prisoners from Camp
Jackson, and two were women whose morbid curiosity, or worse, had led
them to mingle with the mob, One was a child.

Capt. Blandowski died of his wounds the next day.


79

At 6 o'clock the troops and prisoners marched back to the Arsenal,
leaving Gen. Sweeny with his Regulars in charge of Camp Jackson. On the
way rioters thronged the line of march and vilely abused the soldiers,
but Lyon was vigilant in restraining his men, and prevented their making
any return by firing upon their assailants.

During the night and the next day the prisoners were all released,
the privates taking an oath not to serve in any capacity against the
Government during the war, and the officers giving a parole not to serve
in any military capacity against the United States. It was provided
that the parole should be returned upon anyone surrendering himself as a
prisoner of war, and was accompanied with a protest against the justice
of executing it. One exception, Capt. Emmett MacDonald, who had been
efficient in bringing the Irishmen into opposition to the "Dutch,"
refused to accept the parole on the ground taken by all the others that
they had done nothing wrong, and finally secured his release through a
writ of habeas corpus.

The excitement that night in St. Louis was fearful, with the
Secessionists raging. It is to the credit, however, of James McDonough,
whom Governor Jackson's Secessionist Police Commissioners had appointed
Chief of Police, that, whatever his sympathies, he did not allow them to
interfere with his official duties, and exerted himself to the utmost to
preserve the municipal peace. The violent Secessionists started to mob
the offices of the Republican papers, and to attack the residences of
Union leaders, but were everywhere met by squads of police backed up
by an armed force of Home Guards, which, with the appeals of the
conservative men of influence on both sides, managed to stay the storm.


80

McDonough could not, however, prevent a number of outrages, and several
of the Home Guards caught alone were killed by the rowdies that night
and the next day--Saturday. This incensed the Germans terribly, and
stories reached the Secession parts of the city that they contemplated
fearful revenge, which they could wreak, having arms in their own
hands, while the "natural protectors" of the people--Frost's military
companies--were prisoners of war and disarmed.

The Mayor issued a proclamation to quiet the people, and requested all
keepers of drinking places to at once close and remain closed during the
excitement. All minors were ordered to remain in doors for three days,
and all good citizens were requested to remain in doors after nightfall
and to avoid gatherings and meetings.

As was usual, a good many people who meant no evil obeyed this
proclamation, while the mobites, who meant a great deal of harm, paid no
attention to it. Saturday afternoon, the 5th Regiment of United States
Reserves, under the command of Lieut-Col. Robert White, attempted to
go to their barracks, when they were assailed by a mob with stones,
brickbats and pistol shots. The patience of the soldiers finally
gave way, and they fired into the crowd, killing several persons--and
wounding many others.


81

[Illustration: General John C. Fremont]

Sunday the Secessionists were in a panic, and began a wild flight
from the city. Every vehicle that could be obtained was employed at
exorbitant prices to carry men, women and children, baggage and personal
effects, to the depots and wharves, where the railroads and steamboats
were ready to receive them. The Mayor attempted to stay the stampede by
a speech at the Planters' House, in which he assured the people that the
Home Guards were entirely under the control of their officers, and would
only be used to preserve the peace and protect property.

What was more effective was the news that Gen. Harney, hurrying back
from Washington, had arrived the preceding evening and resumed command.
Harney had reached the city on Saturday evening, May 11, and Sunday
morning called at the Arsenal on Col. Blair, not Gen. Lyon, whom he
informed of his intentions to remove the Home Guards from the Arsenal
and disband them. Blair succeeded in convincing him that this was beyond
his authority, and did not hesitate to say that his attempt to do so
would be resisted. Being convinced, Harney sent a messenger to the Board
of Police Commissioners, who were anxiously awaiting the result of his
visit, to the effect that he had "no control over the Home Guards,"
which was intended to mean that he could not remove or disband them, but
which the Commissioners and the people understood to mean that he had
lost control over them.


82

The panic at once resumed its former proportions, and Gen. Harney found
it necessary to issue a proclamation, in which he said that the public
peace must and would be preserved, and the lives and property of the
people protected, but he trusted that he would not be compelled to
resort to martial law. He would avoid all cause of irritation and
excitement whenever called upon to aid the local authorities by using
in preference the Regular troops. Therefore he began by restricting the
Home Guards to the German parts of the city, while he moved about 250
Regulars, under the command of Capts. Totten and Sweeny and Lieuts.
Saxton and Lothrop, with four pieces of artillery, into a central
position, where they went into quarters, to the great relief of
everybody.

It will be perceived that a remarkable change had come over the people
since a few weeks before, when the arrival of a little squad of Regulars
at the Sub-Treasury to protect its gold had thrown the city in the
wildest excitement over "the attempt to overawe and cow the people of
Missouri."

Confidence was restored, and quiet ensued. Gen. Frost lodged a protest
with Gen. Harney, in which he recited the circumstances of Lyon's attack
upon him, claimed that every officer and soldier in his command had
taken, with uplifted hand, the following oath:

     You, each and every one of you, do solemnly swear that you
     will honestly and faithfully serve the State of Missouri
     against her enemies, and that you will do your utmost to
     sustain the Constitution and laws of the United States and
     of this State against all violence, of whatsoever kind or
     description, and you do further swear that you will well and
     truly execute and obey the legal orders of all officers
     properly placed over you whilst on duty; so help you God.

A casual inspection shows how cunningly this was framed. It will be
perceived that every one solemnly swore to "serve the State of Missouri
against all her enemies," and to "obey the orders of the officers"
placed over him, while he was merely enjoined to do his utmost to
sustain the Constitution and laws of the United States and this State
against all violence.


83

It is easy to see how such an obligation would be construed.

Gen. Frost recited again that he had offered to help Gen. Lyon protect
the United States property with his whole force, and if necessary
with that of Missouri, and appealed to Gen. Harney not to require the
indignity of a parole, but to order the restoration of all the officers
and men to liberty, and of all the property of the State and of private
individuals. The language of this protest did as little to enhance the
reputation of Gen. Frost as his letter to Gen. Lyon.

It was an intense disappointment to the Secessionists everywhere that
he made no show of a fight before surrendering. It would have been the
greatest satisfaction to all of them had he chosen to make Camp Jackson
a Thermopylae or an Alamo. Such a sacrifice would have been of priceless
worth in firing the Southern heart, and placing him high among the
world's heroes. Somehow the idea of martyrdom did not appeal to him, as
it has not to millions of other men placed in critical positions. The
wonder to the calm student of history is that, having made such a bold
bluff at Lyon, he did not "fill his hand" better, to use a sporting
phrase, and prevent Lyon from "calling" him so effectually. The frost
which was in his name settled on this "young Napoleon" thereafter--the
country was filled with young Napoleons at that time--and though he
commanded a brigade in the Confederate army for some two years or more,
his name is only "mentioned" afterward in the Rebellion Records.


84

Lyon's decisive act did not meet with the unanimous approval of the
Union men of the State. There began then that unhappy division between
the "Conservative Union men" and the "Radicals" which led to so many
collisions, and sorely distracted President Lincoln. The "Radicals" who
fell under the lead of F. P. Blair, and had their representative in
the Cabinet at Washington in the shape of Montgomery Blair, the
Postmaster-General, dubbed their opponents "Claybanks," while the
latter, whose representative in the Cabinet was Edward Bates, the
Attorney-General, tainted with the name of "Charcoals" their opponents.
The "Conservatives," who represented a very large portion of the wealth
and education of the State, had for leaders such men as Hamilton R.
Gamble, Robert Campbell, James E. Yeatman, H. S. Turner, Washington
King, N. J. Eaton, and James H. Lucas. They at once sent a delegation to
Washington to represent to Mr. Lincoln that Lyon, while undoubtedly "a
loyal and brave soldier," was "rash," "imprudent," and "indiscreet."
This representation carried great weight, for they were all men of the
highest character and standing, and at their instance Gen. Harney was
pushed further to the front again.

The "Old Dragoon" now asserted itself in Harney, as it was likely to
when there was the smell of gunpowder in the air. Lyon's course was, in
spite of the intense influence of Harney's Secession convives, very much
to the taste of the old fighter. He wrote to Gen. Scott that he approved
Lyon's action, and replied to the Judge in the habeas corpus writ of
Capt. McDonald, that the man had been properly arrested. May 14 he
issued a proclamation in which he said:


85

     It is with regret that I feel it my duty to call your
     attention to the recent act of the General Assembly of
     Missouri, known as the "Military Bill," which is the result,
     no doubt, of the temporary excitement that now pervades the
     public mind. This bill cannot be regarded in any other light
     than an indirect Secession ordinance, Ignoring even the form
     resorted to by other States. Manifestly, its most material
     provisions are in conflict with the Constitution and laws of
     the United States. To this extent it is a nullity, and
     cannot and ought not to be upheld or regarded by the good
     citizens of Missouri. There are obligations and duties
     resting upon the people of Missouri under the Constitution
     and laws of the United States which are paramount, and which
     I trust you will carefully consider and weigh well before
     you will allow yourselves to be carried out of the Union
     under the form of yielding obedience to this military bill,
     which is clearly in violation of your duties as citizens of
     the United States.

     It must be apparent to every one who has taken a proper and
     unbiased view of the subject that, whatever may be the
     termination of the unfortunate condition of things in
     respect to the so-called Cotton States, Missouri must share
     the destiny of the Union. Her geographical position, her
     soil, productions, and, in short, all her material
     interests, point to this result. We cannot shut our eyes
     against this controlling fact. It is seen and its force is
     felt throughout the Nation. So important is this regarded to
     the great interests of the country, that I venture to
     express the opinion that the whole power of the Government
     of the United States, if necessary, will be exerted to
     maintain Missouri in her present position in the Union. I
     express to you, in all frankness and sincerity, my own
     deliberate convictions, without assuming to speak for the
     Government of the United States, whose authority here and
     elsewhere I shall at all times and under all circumstances
     endeavor faithfully to uphold. I desire above all things
     most earnestly to invite my fellow-citizens dispassionately
     to consider their true interests as well as their true
     relations to the Government under which we live and to which
     we owe so much.

     In this connection I desire to direct attention to one
     subject which, no doubt, will be made the pretext for more
     or less popular excitement. I allude to the recent
     transactions at Camp Jackson, near St. Louis. It is not
     proper for me to comment upon the official conduct of my
     predecessor in command of this Department, but it is right
     and proper for the people of Missouri to know that the main
     avenue of Camp Jackson, recently under the command of Gen.
     Frost, had the name of Davis; and a principal street of the
     same camp that of Beauregard, and that a body of men had
     been received into that camp by its commander which had been
     notoriously organized in the interests of the Secessionists,
     the men openly wearing the dress and badge distinguishing
     the Army of the so-called Southern Confederacy. It is also a
     notorious fact that a quantity of arms had been received
     into the camp which were unlawfully taken from the United
     States Arsenal at Baton Rouge, and surreptitiously passed up
     the river in boxes marked "Marble."


86

     Upon facts like these, and having in view what occurred at
     Liberty, the people can draw their own inferences, and it
     cannot be difficult for any one to arrive at a correct
     conclusion as to the character and ultimate purpose of that
     encampment. No Government in the world would be entitled to
     respect that would tolerate for a moment such openly
     treasonable preparations. It is but simple justice, however,
     that I should state the fact that there were many good and
     loyal men in the camp who were in no manner responsible for
     its treasonable character. Disclaiming as I do all desire or
     intention to interfere in any way with the prerogatives of
     the State of Missouri or with the functions of its executive
     or other authorities, yet I regard it as my plain path of
     duty to express to the people, In respectful but at the same
     time decided language, that within the field and scope of my
     command and authority the "supreme law" of the land must and
     shall be maintained, and no subterfuges, whether in the
     forms of legislative acts or otherwise, can be permitted to
     harass or oppress the good and law-abiding people of
     Missouri. I shall exert my authority to protect their
     persons and property from violations of every kind, and
     shall deem it my duty to suppress all unlawful combinations
     of men, whether formed under pretext of military
     organizations or otherwise.

     WM. S.  HARNEY. Brigadier-General, United States Army,
     Commanding.


These were certainly "brave words, my masters," and had great influence
upon the people of Missouri. Unhappily there was reason to think
afterwards that Gen. Harney was not quite living up to them.

When the account of stock of the capture of Camp Jackson came to be
taken, the invoice was as follows:

Three 32-pounders.

Three mortar-beds.

A large quantity of balls and bombs in ale barrels.

Artillery pieces, in boxes of heavy plank, the boxes marked "Marble,"
"Tamaroa, care of Greeley & Gale, St Louis--Iron Mountain Railroad."

Twelve hundred rifles, of late model, United States manufacture.

Tents and camp equipage.

Six brass field pieces.

Twenty-five kegs of powder.

Ninety-six 10-Inch bombshells.

Three hundred six-inch bombshells. ..


87

Six brass mortars, six inches diameter.

One iron mortar, 10 inches.

Three iron cannon, six inches.

Five boxes of canister shot.

Fifty artillery swords.

Two hundred and twenty-seven spades.

Thirty-eight hatchets.

Eleven mallets.

One hundred and ninety-one axes.

Forty horses.

Several boxes of new muskets.

A very large number of musket stocks and musket barrels; together with
lots of bayonets, bayonet scabbards, etc.

One thousand one hundred and ten enlisted men were taken prisoners,
besides from 50 to 75 officers.

Nothing legislates so firmly and finally as a successful sword-blow
for the right. Gen. Lyon's capture of Camp Jackson was an epoch-making
incident. In spite of the protests of the wealthy and respectable
Messrs. Gamble, Yeatman, and others, it was the right thing, done at
the right time, to stay the surging sweep of the waves of Secession.
It destroyed the captivating aggressiveness of the "Disunionists," and
threw their leaders upon the defensive. Other people than they had wants
and desires which must be listened to, or the Loyalists would find a way
to compel attention. The Secessionists must now plead at their bar; not
they in the court of those who would destroy the Government.


88

[Illustration: 088-The Scott-Harney Agreement]



CHAPTER V. THE SCOTT-HARNEY AGREEMENT

The General Assembly of Missouri met at Jefferson City, in obedience to
the Governor's call, on the 2d of May, and the Governor, after calling
attention of the body to the state of the country, made an out-and-out
appeal for Secession, saying that the interests and sympathies of
Missouri were identical with those of other Slaveholding States, and she
must unquestionably unite her destiny with theirs. She had no desire for
war, but she would be faithless as to her honor and recreant as to her
duty if she hesitated a moment to make complete preparations for the
protection of her people, and that therefore the Legislature should
"place the State at the earliest practicable moment in a complete state
of defense." As this is what the Legislature had expected, and what it
had met for, no time was lost in going into secret session to carry out
the program.


89

The first of these was the odious Military Bill, the passage of which
was stubbornly resisted, step by step, by the small band of Union men.
This, it will be recollected, put every able-bodied man into the
Militia of Missouri, under the orders of officers to be appointed by
the Governor; compelled him to obey implicitly the orders received from
those above him, and prescribed the heinous crime of "treason to
the State," which extended even to words spoken in derogation of the
Governor or Legislature. Offenses of this kind were to be punished by
summary court-martial, which had even the power to inflict death. Other
bills perverted the funds for the State charitable institutions into the
State military chest, seized the school fund for the same purpose, and
authorized a loan from the banks of $1,000,000 and another of $1,000,000
of State bonds, to provide funds by which to carry out the program.

On the evening of Friday, May 10, while these measures were being fought
over, the Governor entered the House with a dispatch which he handed to
Representative Vest, afterwards United States Senator from Missouri, who
sprang upon a chair and thrilled all his hearers by reading that "Frank
Blair, Capt. Lyon and the Dutch" had captured Camp Jackson, seized
all the property there, and marched the State troops prisoners to the
Arsenal. The wild scene that followed is simply indescribable. For many
months there had been much talk about "firing the Southern heart," and
here was something of immediate and furnace heat.

As soon as the members recovered from the stun of the blow, they went
into paroxysms of passion. In a few minutes the Military Bill was rushed
through, followed by the others, and a new one to appropriate $10,000
for the purpose of securing an alliance with the Indians on the borders
of the State. This done, the members bolted out in search of weapons
with which to arm themselves, as there was a rumor that the awful Blair
and Lyon with their "mercenaries" were on the march to subject the
Legislature to the same treatment that they had Frost's Militia.


90

Muskets, shotguns, rifles, pistols and pikes were brought out, cleaned
up, bullets molded and cartridges made, and the Governor ordered the
members of his staff to seize a locomotive and press on as fast as
possible towards St. Louis to reconnoiter the advance of the enemy; if
necessary, to destroy the bridges over the Gasconade and Osage Rivers to
obstruct the march.

No enemy was found, but the zealous Basil Duke, in order not to be
guilty of any sin of omission, burnt a part of the Osage bridge. The
meeting of the Legislature in the evening was grotesque, as every member
came with a more or less liberal supply of arms, usually including
a couple of revolvers and a bowie-knife in belt. During the exciting
session which followed, rifles stood by the desks or were laid across
them, with other arms, and it was good luck more than anything else
that no casualty resulted from accidental discharge of fire-arms. The
excitement grew over the stirring events in St. Louis of Saturday and
Sunday, and the Governor immediately proceeded to the exercise of the
extraordinary powers conferred upon him by the Military Bill.


91

As the star of Gen. D. M. Frost sank ingloriously below the horizon of
Camp Jackson, that of Sterling Price rose above it to remain for four
years the principal luminary in the Confederate firmament west of the
Mississippi.

[Illustration: 038-General Sterling Price]

That does not seem to depend upon intellectual superiority, upon greater
courage or devotion, or even upon clearer insight. A man leads
his fellows--many of whom are his superiors in most namable
qualities--simply because of something unnamable in him that makes him
assume the leadership, and they accept it. There was hardly a prominent
man in Missouri who was not Price's superior in some quality usually
regarded as essential. For example, he was a pleasing and popular
speaker, but Missouri abounded in men much more attractive to public
assemblages. He was a fair politician, but rarely got more than the
second prize. He had distinguished himself in the Mexican War,
but Claiborne Jackson made more capital out of his few weeks of
inconsequential service in the Black Hawk War than Price did out of the
conquest of New Mexico and the capture of Chihuahua.

He served one term in Congress, but had failed to secure a renomination.
He had been elected Governor of Missouri while his Mexican laurels were
yet green, but when he tried to enter the Senate, he was easily defeated
by that able politician and orator, James S. Green.

Though he belonged to the dominant Anti-Benton faction of the Missouri
Democracy and the Stephen A. Douglas wing, he never was admitted to the
select inner council, nor secured any of its higher rewards, except one
term as Governor.

At the outbreak of the war he was holding the comparatively unimportant
place of Bank Commissioner. For all that, he was to become and
remain throughout the struggle the central figure of Secession in the
trans-Mississippi country.


92

Officers of high rank and brilliant reputation like Ben McCulloch, Earl
Van Dorn, Richard Taylor and E. Kirby Smith were to be put over him, yet
his fame and influence outshone them all.

Unquestionably able soldiers such as Marmaduke, Shelby, Bowen, Jeff
Thompson, Parsons, M. L. Clark and Little, were to serve him with
unfaltering loyalty as subordinates.

The Secessionist leaders of Missouri, headed by Gov. Reynolds, were to
denounce him for drunkenness, crass incapacity, gross blundering, and a
most shocking lack of discipline and organization.

Very few commanding officers ever had so many defeats or so few
successes. He was continually embarking upon enterprises of the greatest
promise and almost as continually having them come to naught; generally
through defeats inflicted by Union commanders of no special reputation.

Yet from first to last his was a name to conjure with. No other than his
in the South had the spell in it for Missourians and the people west of
the Mississippi. They flocked to his standard wherever it was raised,
and after three years of failures they followed him with as much eager
hope in his last disastrous campaign as in the first, and when he died
in St. Louis, two years after the war, his death was regretted as a
calamity to the State, and he had the largest funeral of any man in the
history of Missouri.


93

Sterling Price was born in 1809 in Prince Edward County, Va., of a
family of no special prominence, and in 1831 settled upon a farm
in Chariton County, Mo. He went into politics, was elected to the
Legislature, and then to Congress for one term, after which he commanded
a Missouri regiment in Doniphan's famous march to the Southwest, where
he showed great vigor and ability. He was a man of the finest physique
and presence, six feet two inches high, with small hands and feet and
unusually large body and limbs; a superb horseman; with a broad, bland,
kindly face framed in snow-white hair and beard. His name would indicate
Welsh origin, but his face, figure, and mental habits seemed rather
Teutonic. He had a voice of much sweetness and strength, and a paternal
way of addressing his men, who speedily gave him the sobriquet of "Pap
Price." He appeared on the field in a straw hat and linen duster in the
Summer, and with a blanket thrown over his shoulders and a tall hat in
Winter. These became standards which the Missourians followed into
the thick of the fight, as the French did the white plume of Henry of
Navarre.

He had been elected as a Union man to the Convention, which at once
chose him for President, but his Unionism seemed to be a mere varnish
easily scratched off by any act in favor of the Union.

Thus, immediately after the occurrences in St. Louis, he went to the
Governor with the remark that "the slaughter of the people of Missouri"
in St. Louis had proved too much for him, and his sword was at the
service of the State.


94

It is significant of the way men were swayed in those days, that the
murder of the German volunteers patriotically rallying to the defense
of the Arsenal, and the murder and outrages upon the Union people
throughout the State, did not affect Gen. Price at all, but he was moved
to wrath by the shooting down of a few rioters.

His going over was welcomed as a great victory by the Secessionists,
offsetting the capture of Camp Jackson. Gov. Jackson promptly availed
himself of the offer, and at once appointed Gen. Price Major-General
in command of the forces of Missouri to be organized under the Military
Bill.

Though even to Gen. Harney's eyes the Military Bill was repugnant and he
denounced it as direct Secession, the Governor proceeded with all speed
to execute it.

Each Congressional District in the State was made a Military Division.
A Brigadier-General was appointed to the command of each, and ordered to
immediately proceed to the enrollment of the men in it who were fit for
military duty, and to prepare them for active service.

The able and witty Alexander W. Doniphan--"Xenophon" Doniphan of Mexican
fame--who had made the astonishing march upon New Mexico and Chihuahua,
was appointed to command one of the Divisions, but he was too much of a
Union man, and declined. It was significant from the first that all
the officers commissioned were more or less open Secessionists, and
commissions were refused to some who sought them because they would not
swear to make allegiance to Missouri paramount to that of the United
States.


95

As finally arranged the Divisions were commanded as follows:

First Division, M. Jeff Thompson.

Second Division, Thos. A. Harris.

Third Division, M. L. Clark.

Fourth Division, Wm. Y. Slack.

Fifth Division, A. E. Steen.

Sixth Division, M. M. Parsons.

Seventh Division, J. H. McBride.

Eighth Division, Jas L. Rains.

All of these were men of decided ability and standing, and Parsons, M.
L. Clark and Slack had served with credit in the Mexican War. Parsons
became a Major-General in the Confederate army, and Clark, Slack, Steen
and Rains Brigadier-Generals.

A striking figure among them was M. Jeff Thompson, called the "Missouri
Swamp Fox" by his admirers, and who aspired to become the Francis Marion
of the Southern Confederacy. He was a tall, lank, wiry man, at least
six feet high, about 35 years old, with a thin, long, hatchet face, and
high, sharp nose, blue eyes, and thick, yellow hair combed behind his
ears. He wore a slouch white hat with feather and a bob-tailed coat,
short pantaloons, and high rough boots. A white-handled bowie-knife,
stuck perpendicularly in his belt in the middle of his back, completed
his armament, and he was never seen without it. His weakness was for
writing poetry, and he "threw" a poem on the slightest provocation.
Fortunately none of these has been preserved.


96

Each Brigadier-General soon raised in his Division several regiments and
battalions of infantry, troops of cavalry, and batteries of artillery,
composed of very excellent material, for the young men of the Middle
Class were persuaded that it was their duty to respond to the State's
call to defend her. The strongest political, social and local influences
were brought to bear to bring them into the ranks, and the Missouri
State Guard was formed, which was to fight valorously against the
Government on many bitterly contested fields.

The White Trash, always impatient of the restrains of law and
organization, did not enter so largely into these forces, but remained
outside, to form bands of bushwhackers and guerrillas, to harry
Union men and curse the State with their depredations, in which the
Secessionists were scarcely more favored than the Union men.

The influence of Gen. Scott and Attorney-General Bates, added to the
passionate representations of the Gamble-Yeatman delegation, and the
frantic telegrams from Missouri, had restored Harney to full power, with
Lyon, who had been commissioned a Brigadier-General of Volunteers, as
his subordinate.

Harney was exerting himself to the utmost to restore peace and
confidence in Missouri, and when free from the social influence of
the Secessionists who surrounded him his soldierly instincts made him
perceive that the emergency was greater than he had calculated upon. In
one of these better moods he telegraphed to the Adjutant-General, May
17, that he ought to have 10,000 stand of arms placed at his disposal
to arm the Union men of Missouri; that Iowa be called upon to send him
6,000, and Minnesota 3,000 men. Then the Secessionists would get hold
of him again, and induce another mood, such as brought about a conference
between him and Gov. Jackson and Gen. Price, leading to an agreement
which Gen. Harney published in a proclamation. The agreement was as
follows:

[Illustration: 090-General Franz Sigel]


97

     Saint Louis, May 21, 1861.

     The undersigned, officers of the United States Government
     and of the Government of the State of Missouri, for the
     purpose of removing misapprehensions and allaying public
     excitement, deem it proper to declare publicly that they
     have this day had a personal interview in this city, in
     which it has been mutually understood, without the semblance
     of dissent on either part, that each of them has no other
     than a common object equally interesting and important to
     every citizen of Missouri--that of restoring peace and good
     order to the people of the State in subordination to the
     laws of the General and State Governments. It being thus
     understood, there seems no reason why every citizen should
     not confide in the proper officers of the General and State
     Governments to restore quiet, and, as among the best means
     of offering no counter-influences, we mutually recommend to
     all persons to respect each other's rights throughout the
     State, making no attempt to exercise unauthorized powers, as
     it is the determination of the proper authorities to
     suppress all unlawful proceedings, which can only disturb
     the public peace.

     Gen. Price, having by commission full authority over the
     Militia of the State of Missouri, undertakes, with the
     sanction of the Governor of the State, already declared, to
     direct the whole power of the State officers to maintain
     order within the State among the people thereof, and Gen.
     Harney publicly declares that, this object being thus
     assured, he can have no other occasion, as he has no wish,
     to make military movements, which might otherwise create
     excitements and jealousies which he most earnestly desires
     to avoid.

     We, the undersigned, do mutually enjoin upon the people of
     the State to attend to their civil business of whatever sort
     it may be, and it is to be hoped that the unquiet elements
     which have threatened so seriously to disturb the public
     peace may soon subside and be remembered only to be
     deplored.

     STERLING PRICE, Major-General Missouri State Guard.
     WILLIAM S. HARNEY, Brigadier-General Commanding.


Harney was convinced of the sincerity of Jackson and Price in carrying
out this agreement, which he submitted for approval to the War
Department.


98

F. P. Blair wrote to the Secretary of War urging that the four regiments
assigned to Missouri for three years' service, which Lyon was to
command, should not be officered by the Governor of Missouri, but that
it would be better that they be nominated by Gen. Lyon, subject to the
approval of the President, and he said: "The agreement between Harney
and Gen. Price gives me great disgust and dissatisfaction to the Union
men; but I am in hopes we can get along with it, and think that Harney
will insist on its execution to the fullest extent, in which case it
will be satisfactory."

In spite of Gen. Harney's faith, he was inundated with complaints from
all parts of the State as to loyal citizens in great numbers being
outraged, persecuted, and driven from their homes. These complaints also
reached the President, and Adjutant-General Thomas called Gen. Harney's
attention to them in a strong letter May 27, in which he said: "The
professions of loyalty to the Union by the State authorities of Missouri
are not to be relied upon. They have already falsified their professions
too often, and are too far committed to Secession to be entitled to
your confidence, and you can only be sure of desisting from their wicked
purposes when it is out of their power to prosecute them."


99

Two days later Gen. Harney replied that the State was rapidly becoming
tranquilized; that he was convinced that his policy would soon restore
peace and confidence in the ability of the Government to maintain its
authority. He asserted that the agreement between himself and Price
was being carried out in good faith. At the same time he called the
attention of Gen. Price to the reports that the Secessionists had seized
15,000 pounds of lead at Lebanon, a lot of powder elsewhere, had
torn down the American Flag from several post offices, and hoisted
Secessionist flags in their places, and that troops and arms were coming
into Missouri from Arkansas and elsewhere, etc., etc. Price replied that
he was satisfied that the information was incorrect; that neither he nor
the Governor knew of any arms or troops coming into the State from any
quarter; that he was dismissing his troops, and that Gen. Harney had
better not send out any force, as it would exasperate the people.

Again Gen. Harney wrote Gen. Price reciting fresh acts of disloyalty and
outrage, and saying that unless these ceased, he would feel justified
in authorizing the organization of Home Guards among the Union men to
protect themselves. Price replied at length opposing the organization
of Home Guards as having a tendency to "excite those who now hold
conservative peace positions into exactly the contrary attitude, an
example of which we have in St. Louis. It would undoubtedly, in my
opinion, lead to neighborhood collision, the forerunner of civil war."
Price finished by calling attention to his orders to all citizens to
scrupulously protect property and rights, irrespective of political
opinion, denying the reports which had reached Gen. Harney, and
reiterating that he was carrying out the agreement in good faith.


100

Lyon, Blair and the other Unconditional Union leaders had become
convinced of what they feared; to wit, that the agreement simply tied
Harney's hands, and prevented any assertion of the Government's power to
protect its citizens, while leaving the Secessionists free to do as they
pleased and mature their organization until they were ready to attack
the Union men and sweep the State into Secession.

In spite of Gen. Scott and Attorney-General Bates, the Administration
at Washington was rapidly coming to this conclusion, and sent a special
messenger to St. Louis from Washington with dispatches to Col. Blair.
In an envelope was found a notice from the War Department to Capt. Lyon
that he had been appointed a Brigadier-General to rank from the 18th of
May, and there was also an order relieving Gen. Harney from the command
of the Department of the West, and granting him leave of absence
until further orders. There was a private letter to Col. Blair in the
handwriting of President Lincoln, in which he expressed his anxiety in
regard to St. Louis and Gen. Harney's course. He was, however, a little
in doubt as to the propriety of relieving him, but asked Col. Blair to
hold the order until such time as in his judgment the necessity for such
action became urgent. This for several reasons:

     We had better have him for a friend than an enemy. It will
     dissatisfy a good many who would otherwise remain quiet.
     More than all, we first relieved him, then restored him; now
     If we relieve him again the public will ask: "Why all this
     vacillation?"

Col. Blair fully understood and sympathized with the President. He put
the letter and order in his pocket and talked confidentially to Lyon in
regard to it. They decided not to publish the order until it would be
wicked to delay it. They both liked and admired Harney, and if he could
be decisively separated from his Secession environment, he could be
of the greatest possible value. They would give him the opportunity of
thoroughly testing his policy.


101

Blair tried his best to arouse Gen. Harney to a sense of what was
going on, and particularly to demand suspension of the execution of the
Military Bill, but without effect. He sent to Gen. Harney telegrams
and correspondence, showing that the Brigadier-Generals were rapidly
organizing their forces, that emissaries were stirring up the Indians,
and that Chief Ross, of the Cherokee Nation, had promised 15,000
well-armed men to help the Secessionists. When Harney called Price's
attention to this, Price calmly pooh-poohed it all as of no consequence.

Therefore, on May 30, Blair decided that the emergency for the delivery
of the order had come, and sent it to Gen. Harney, and at the same time
wrote to the President in explanation of what he had done.

Gen. Harney wrote the Adjutant-General of the Army a pathetic letter, in
which he said:

     My confidence in the honor and integrity of Gen. Price, in
     the purity of his motives, and in his loyalty to the
     Government, remains unimpaired. His course as President of
     the State Convention that voted by a large majority against
     submitting an Ordinance of Secession, and his efforts since
     that time to calm the elements of discord, have served to
     confirm the high opinion of him I have for many years
     entertained.

     My whole course as Commander of the Department of the West
     has been dictated by a desire to carry out in good faith the
     instructions of my Government, regardless of the clamor of
     the conflicting elements surrounding me, and whose advice
     and dictation could not be followed without involving the
     State in blood and the Government in the unnecessary
     expenditure of millions. Under the course I pursued Missouri
     was secured to the Union, and the triumph of the Government
     was only the more glorious, being almost a bloodless
     victory; but those who clamored for blood have not ceased to
     impugn my motives. Twice within a brief space of time have
     I been relieved from the command here; the second time in a
     manner that has inflicted unmerited disgrace upon a true and
     loyal soldier. During a long life, dedicated to my country,
     I have seen some service, and more than once I have held her
     honor in my hands; and during that time my loyalty,


102

     I believe, was never questioned; and now, when in the
     natural course of things I shall, before the lapse of many
     years, lay aside the sword which has so long served my
     country, my countrymen will be slow to believe that I have
     chosen this portion of my career to damn with treason my
     life, which is so soon to become a record of the past, and
     which I shall most willingly leave to the unbiased judgment
     of posterity. I trust that I may yet be spared to do my
     country some further service that will testify to the love I
     bear her, and that the vigor of my arm may never relax while
     there is a blow to be struck in her defense.

     I respectfully ask to be assigned to the command of the
     Department of California, and I doubt not the present
     commander of the Division is even now anxious to serve on
     the Atlantic frontier.

     I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

     WM. S. HARNEY, Brigadier-General, U. S. Army.

He started for Washington, but the train on which he was going was
captured at Harper's Ferry by a Secession force, and he was taken a
prisoner to Richmond, where the authorities immediately ordered his
release.

The Government made no further use of him; he was retired in 1863 as a
Brigadier-General. At the conclusion of the struggle, in which he took
no further part, he was brevetted a Major-General, and died in the
fullness of years May 9,1889, at his home at Pass Christian, Miss.

Once more Gen. Lyon was in the saddle, this time for good, with Frank
Blair and the Radicals massed behind him.


103



CHAPTER VI. THE LAST WORD BEFORE THE BLOW

Brig.-Gen. Nathaniel Lyon was now in full command, not only of the City
of St. Louis and the State of Missouri, but of all the vast territory
lying between the Mississippi and the Rocky Mountains, except Texas, New
Mexico, and Utah.

His sudden elevation from a simple Captain heading a company to wide
command did not for an instant dizzy him as it seemed to McClellan and
Fremont, who had made similar leaps in rank. Where McClellan surrounded
himself with all the pomp and circumstance of glorious war as he had
seen it exemplified by officers of his rank in Europe, where he was
followed at all times by a numerous and glittering staff, resplendent
with military millinery; and where Fremont set up a vice-regal court,
in which were heard nearly all the tongues of the Continent, spoken by
pretentious adventurers who claimed service in substantially every war
since those of Napoleon, and under every possible flag raised in those
wars, Lyon did not change a particle from the plain, straightforward,
earnest soldier he had always been. His common dress was the private
soldier's blouse with the single star of his rank, and a slouch hat. He
was accoutered for the real work of war, not its spectacular effects.
Grant was not simpler than he. Dominated by a great purpose, he made
himself and every one and every thing about him tend directly towards
that focus. He had only enough of a staff to do the necessary work, and
they must be plain, matter-of-fact soldiers like himself, devoting their
energies through all their waking hours to the cause he had at heart.


104

His first Chief of Staff was Chester Harding, a Massachusetts man, a
thoroughgoing, practical, businesslike Yankee, animated by intense love
of the Union. He preferred, however, service in the field, and became
Colonel of the 10th Mo., then of the 25th, and later of the 43d
Mo., doing good service wherever placed, and receiving at the last a
well-earned brevet as Brigadier-General of Volunteers.

While Gen. Lyon was organizing the Home Guards into volunteer regiments
at the Arsenal, there came to his assistance a rather stockily-built
First Lieutenant of the Regular Army, who was in the prime of manhood,
with broad, full face and well-developed and increasing baldness, a
graduate of West Point, and of some eight years' experience in the
military establishment.

John McAllister Schofield was born in Illinois, the son of an itinerant
Baptist preacher, who mainly devoted himself to the cause of church
extension. Schofield's name would indicate Germanic extraction. His face
and figure supports the same theory, as do most of his mental habits.
The McAllister in his name hints at an infusion of Celtic blood, of
which we find few if any intellectual traces. Without any special
enthusiasm or public demonstration of his attachment to principle, with
a great deal of the courtier in his ways, he was yet firm, courageous
and persistent in the policy he had marked out for himself. He was
true to the Union cause, in his own way, from the time he offered his
services to Gen. Lyon, was obedient and helpful to his superiors, always
did more than respectably well what was committed to his charge, and no
failure of any kind lowers the high average of his performance.


105

When after four years of the most careful scrutiny and tutelage the
Military Academy at West Point graduates a young man, it assumes that it
has absolutely determined his X--that is, has sounded and measured
his moral and intellectual depth, and settled his place in any human
equation.

It will, therefore, be quite interesting in making our estimate of Gen.
Schofield, to examine the label attached to him upon his graduation from
West Point in the class of 1853.

At the head of that class was the brilliant James B. McPherson, who was
to rise to the command of a corps and then to the Army of the Tennessee,
and fall before Atlanta, to the intense sorrow of every man in the army
who had come in contact with him.

The second in the class was William P. Craighill, a fine engineer
officer, who, however, rose no higher during the war than a brevet
Colonel.

The third in the class was Joshua W. Sill, a splendid soldier, who died
at the head of his brigade on the banks of Stone River.

The fourth in the class was William R. Boggs, a Georgian, who became
a Brigadier-General in the Confederate army and achieved no special
distinction.


106

The fifth in the class was Francis J. Shunk, of Pennsylvania, who went
into the ordnance and became a brevet Major.

The sixth in the class was William Sooy Smith, an Ohio man, who attained
the rank of Brigadier-General, and who achieved prominence in civil life
as an engineer.

The seventh in the class was John M. Schofield, who was commissioned
in the artillery, and who had had some years of army experience in the
forts along the South Atlantic coast.

In the 45 who graduated below Schofield were many names afterwards to
become very prominent in history.

John S. Bowen, of Georgia, who commanded a regiment of the Home Guards,
and who did his utmost to drag his State into Secession, afterward be-.
coming a Major-General in the Confederate army, graduated 13th in the
class.

William R. Terrill, of Virginia, killed at Perryville while in command
of a Union brigade, was the 16th.

John R. Chambliss, of Virginia, who was killed while commanding a
Confederate brigade at Deep Bottom, Va., was the 31st, and William McE.
Dye, who commanded a brigade with success in the Trans-Mississippi,
afterwards helped to organize the Khedive's army, and who died while in
command of the Korean army, was the 32d.

Philip H. Sheridan, one of the most brilliant commanders the world ever
saw, stood 34th in the class, and Elmer Otis, of Philippine fame, was
the 37th.


107

John B. Hood, who rose to the rank of a full General in the Confederate
army, and commanded the forces arrayed against Sherman and Thomas at
Atlanta and Nashville, was the 44th.

It is very interesting to study this list and compare it with the
confident markings made by the West Point Faculty when the young men
were dismissed to the active life for which the Academy had prepared
them. It at least shows that, judged by West Point standards,
Schofield's intellectual equipment was of the very best. He had married
the daughter of his Professor of Physics, and children had come to
them; promotion was very slow; he had wearied of the dull routine of
the artillery officer in seacoast forts, and had seriously thought of
resigning and entering the profession of law. Friends had dissuaded
him from this, secured him a position as Professor of Physics in the
Washington University at St. Louis, and Gen. Scott, who liked him,
induced him to remain in the service and obtained for him a year's leave
of absence to enable him to accept the professorship. He was engaged in
his duty of teaching at the University and of writing a work on physics,
of which he was very proud, when the firing on Fort Sumter took place.
His political views were those of the Douglas wing of the Democracy, and
he remained a Democrat ever after. He made no public profession of his
views on the Slavery question or Secession, but immediately wrote to
Washington offering to cancel his leave of absence, and was directed to
report to Gen. Lyon for the duty of mustering in the volunteers.


108

Inasmuch as the Governor, with much contumely, had refused to supply
the four regiments from Missouri which the President had called for,
Schofield, with his unfailing respect for the law, saw no way to fulfill
his duty, until Gen. Scott, who was dimly perceiving the gigantic nature
of the emergency, reluctantly gave authority to muster in and arm the
Home Guards, adding the indorsement, pathetically eloquent as to his
aged slowness of recognition that old things were passing away and new
being born in volcanic travail--"This is irregular, but, being times of
revolution, is approved."

Schofield showed his heart in the matter by becoming a Major of the
first regiment organized.

The whole atmosphere at once changed with Lyon's permanent assignment to
command.

The Union people of Missouri, those who really believed that the
Government was worth fighting for, no longer had to retire, as they had
from Harney's presence, with cold comfort, and advice to stop thinking
about fighting and attend to their regular business, but were welcomed
by Lyon, had their earnestness stimulated by his own, and were given
direct advice as to how they could be of the most service. They were
encouraged to put themselves in readiness, strike blow for blow, and
if possible to give two blows for one. The work of preparation
was systematized, and everything made to move toward the one great
event--the Government's overwhelming assertion of its power.

Home Guards were organized in every County where Union men wanted to do
so, and began presenting a stubborn front to their opponents, who were
being brought together under the Military Bill.


109

Gov. Jackson and Gen. Price did not lose all heart at the change in
commanders. They seemed to have hopes that they might in some way mold
Lyon to their wishes as they had Harney, and sought an interview with
him. Gen. Lyon was not averse to an interview, and sent to Jackson and
Price the following passport:

     Headquarters, Department of the West,

     St. Louis, June 8, 1861.

     It having been suggested that Gov. Claiborne F. Jackson and
     ex-Gov. Sterling Price are desirous of an interview with
     Gen. Lyon, commanding this Department, for the purpose of
     effecting, if possible, a pacific solution of the domestic
     troubles of Missouri, it is hereby stipulated on the part of
     Brig.-Gen. N. Lyon, U. S. A., commanding this Military
     Department, that, should Gov. Jackson or ez-Gov. Price, or
     either of them, at any time prior to or on the 12th day of
     June, 1861, visit St. Louis for the purpose of such
     interview, they and each of them shall be free from
     molestation or arrest on account of any charges pending
     against them, or either of them, on the part of the United
     States, during their journey to St. Louis and their return
     from St Louis to Jefferson City.

     Given under the hand of the General commanding, the day and
     year above written.

     N. LYON,

     Brigadier-General, Commanding.


Accordingly on June 12, 1861, Price and Jackson arrived at St. Louis by
special train from Jefferson City, put up at the Planters' House, and
informed Gen. Lyon of their arrival. The old State pride cropped out
in a little dispute as to which should call upon the other. Jackson as
Governor of the "sovereign and independent" State of Missouri and Price
as Major-General commanding the forces, felt that it was due them that
Lyon, a Brigadier-General in the United States service, should visit
them rather than they him at the Arsenal. Lyon's soul going direct to
the heart of the matter, was above these technicalities, waved them
aside impatiently, and said that he would go to the Planters' House and
call on them.


110

Accompanied by Col. Frank P. Blair and Maj. Conant, of his Staff, he
went at once to the Planters' House, and there ensued a four hours'
interview of mightiest consequences to the State and the Nation.

Jackson and Price were accompanied by Col. Thomas L. Snead, then an
Aid of the Governor, afterwards Acting Adjutant-General of the Missouri
State Guards, Chief of Staff of the Army of the West, and a member of
the Confederate Congress. He makes this statement as to the opening of
the conference:

"Lyon opened it by saying that the discussion on the part of his
Government 'would be conducted by Col. Blair, who enjoyed its confidence
in the very highest degree, and was authorized to speak for it.' Blair
was, in fact, better fitted than any man in the Union to discuss with
Jackson and Price the grave questions then at issue between the United
States and the State of Missouri, and in all her borders there were
no men better fitted than they to speak for Missouri on that momentous
occasion.

"But despite the modesty of his opening, Lyon was too much in earnest,
too zealous, too well informed on the subject, too aggressive, and too
fond of disputation to let Blair conduct the discussion on the part of
his Government. In half an hour it was he who was conducting it, holding
his own at every point against Jackson and Price, masters though they
were of Missouri politics, whose course they had been directing and
controlling for years, while he was only the Captain of an infantry
regiment on the Plains. He had not, however, been a mere soldier in
those days, but had been an earnest student of the very questions that
he was now discussing, and he comprehended the matter as well as any
man, and handled it in the soldierly way to which he had been bred,
using the sword to cut knots that he could not untie."


111

Really the interview soon became a parley between the two strong men who
were quickly to draw their swords upon one another. The talking men, the
men of discussion and appeal passed out, and the issue was in the hands
of the men who were soon to hurl the mighty weapons of war.

Jackson, who was a light, facile politician, used to moving public
assemblies which were already of his mind, had but little to say in
the hours of intense parley, but interjected from time to time with
parrot-like reiteration, that the United States troops must leave the
State and not enter it. "I will then disband my own troops and we shall
certainly have peace."

Blair, an incomparably stronger man, but still a politician and rather
accustomed to accomplishing results by speeches and arguments, soon felt
himself obscured by the mightier grasp and earnestness of Lyon, and took
little further part. There remained, then, the stern, portentous parley
between Lyon and Price, who weighed their words, intending to make every
one of them good by deadly blows. They looked into one another's eyes
with set wills, between which were the awful consequences of unsheathed
swords.

Gen. Price stated at some length his proposals, and claimed that he
had carried out his understanding with Gen. Harney in good faith, not
violating it one iota.


112

Gen. Lyon asked him sharply how that could be, according to Gen.
Harney's second proclamation in which he denounced the Military Bill as
unconstitutional and treasonable?

Gen. Price replied that he had made no agreement whatever with Gen.
Harney about the enforcement or carrying out of the Military Bill.

Gen. Lyon answered this by presenting a copy of the following memorandum
which had been sent by Gen. Harney as the only basis on which he would
treat with Jackson and Price:

     Memorandum for Gen. Price.--May 21, 1861.

     Gen. Harney is here as a citizen of Missouri, with all his
     interests at stake in the preservation of the peace of the
     State.

     He earnestly wishes to do nothing to complicate matters, and
     will do everything in his power, consistently with his
     Instructions, to preserve peace and order.

     He is, however, compelled to recognize the existence of a
     rebellion in a portion of the United States, and in view of
     it he stands upon the proclamation of the President itself,
     based upon the laws and Constitution of the United States.

     The proclamation demands the dispersion of all armed bodies
     hostile to the supreme law of the land.

     Gen. Harney sees in the Missouri Military Bill features
     which compel him to look upon such armed bodies as may be
     organized under its provisions as antagonistic to the United
     States, within the meaning of the proclamation, and
     calculated to precipitate a conflict between the State and
     the United States.

     He laments the tendency of things, and most cordially and
     earnestly invites the co-operation of Gen. Price to avert
     it.

     For this purpose Gen. Harney respectfully asks Gen. Price to
     review the features of the bill, in the spirit of law,
     warmed and elevated by that of humanity, and seek to
     discover some means by which its action may be suspended
     until some competent tribunal shall decide upon its
     character.

     The most material features of the bill calculated to bring
     about a conflict are, first, the oath required to be taken
     by the Militia and State Guards (an oath of allegiance to
     the State of Missouri without recognizing the existence of
     the Government of the United States); and, secondly, the
     express requirements by which troops within the State not
     organized under the provisions of the Military Bill are to
     be disarmed by the State Guards.

     Gen. Harney cannot be expected to await a summons to
     surrender his arms by the State troops.

     From this statement of the case the true question becomes
     immediately visible and cannot be shut out of view.

     Gen. Price Is earnestly requested to consider this, and Gen.
     Harney will be happy to confer with him on the subject
     whenever It may suit his convenience.

     N. B.--Read to Gen. Price, In the presence of Maj. H. B.
     Turner, on the evening of the 21st of May.

[Illustration: 100-General David Hunter]


113

Naturally this threw Gen. Price into much confusion, and his face
reddened with mortification, but after a few minutes he said that he did
not remember hearing the paper read; that it was true that Hitchcock and
Turner had come from Gen. Harney to see him, but he could recall nothing
of any such paper being presented. The discussion grew warmer as Gen.
Lyon felt more strongly the force of his position. Gen. Price insisted
that no armed bodies of Union troops should pass through or be stationed
in Missouri, as such would occasion civil war. He asserted that Missouri
must be neutral, and neither side should arm. Gov. Jackson would protect
the Union men and would disband his State troops.

Gen. Lyon opposed this by saying, in effect, "that, if the Government
withdrew its forces entirely, secret and subtle measures would be
resorted to to provide arms and perfect organizations which, upon
any pretext, could put forth a formidable opposition to the General
Government; and even without arming, combinations would doubtless form
in certain localities, to oppress and drive out loyal citizens, to
whom the Government was bound to give protection, but which it would
be helpless to do, as also to repress such combinations, if its forces
could not be sent into the State. A large aggressive force might be
formed and advanced from the exterior into the State, to assist it in
carrying out the Secession program; and the Government could not, under
the limitation proposed, take posts on these borders to meet and repel
such force.


114

The Government could not shrink from its duties nor abdicate its
corresponding right; and, in addition to the above, it was the duty of
its civil officers to execute civil process, and in case of resistance
to receive the support of military force. The proposition of the
Governor would at once overturn the Government privileges and
prerogatives, which he (Gen. Lyon) had neither the wish nor the
authority to do. In his opinion, if the Governor and the State
authorities would earnestly set about to maintain the peace of the
State, and declare their purposes to resist outrages upon loyal citizens
of the Government, and repress insurrections against it, and in case of
violent combinations, needing co-operation of the United States
troops, they should call upon or accept such assistance, and in case of
threatened invasion the Government troops took suitable posts to
meet it, the purposes of the Government would be subserved, and no
infringement of the State rights or dignity committed. He would take
good care, in such faithful co-operation of the State authorities to
this end, that no individual should be injured in person or property,
and that the utmost delicacy should be observed toward all peaceable
persons concerned in these relations."

Gen. Lyon based himself unalterably upon this proposition, and could not
be moved from it by anything Price or Jackson could say.

Gov. Jackson entered into the discussion again to suggest that they
separate and continue the conference further by correspondence; but
Lyon, who felt vividly that the main object of the Secessionists was to
gain time to perfect their plans, rejected this proposition, but said
that he was quite willing that all those present should reduce their
views to writing and publish them; which, however, did not strike
Jackson and Price favorably. As to the close of the interview, Maj.
Conant says:


115

"As Gen. Lyon was about to take his leave, he said: 'Gov. Jackson,
no man in the State of Missouri has been more ardently desirous of
preserving peace than myself. Heretofore Missouri has only felt the
fostering care of the Federal Government, which has raised her from the
condition of a feeble French colony to that of an empire State. Now,
however, from the failure on the part of the Chief Executive to comply
with constitutional requirements, I fear she will be made to feel its
power. Better, sir, far better, that the blood of every man, woman and
child of the State should flow than that she should successfully defy
the Federal Government.'"

Col. Snead has published this account of the close of the conference:

"Finally, when the conference had lasted four or five hours, Lyon closed
it, as he had opened it. 'Rather,' said he (he was still seated, and
spoke deliberately, slowly, and with a peculiar emphasis), 'rather than
concede to the State of Missouri the right to demand that my Government
shall not enlist troops within her limits, or bring troops into the
State whenever it pleases, or move its troops at its own will into, out
of, or through the State; rather than concede to the State of Missouri
for one single instant the right to dictate to my Government in any
matter however unimportant, I would (rising as he said this, and
pointing in turn to every one in the room) see you, and you, and you,
and you, and every man, woman, and child in the State, dead and buried.'


116

"Then turning to the Governor, he said: 'This means war. In an hour one
of my officers will call for you and conduct you out of my lines.'

"And then, without another word, without an inclination of the head,
without even a look, he turned upon his heel and strode out of the room,
rattling his spurs and clanking his saber, while we, whom he left,
and who had known each other for years, bade farewell to each other
courteously and kindly, and separated--Blair and Conant to fight for the
Union, we for the land of our birth."

When the great American painter shall arise, one of the grandest themes
for his pencil will be that destiny-shaping conference on that afternoon
in June, 1861. He will show the face of Gov. Jackson as typical of that
class of Southern politicians who raised the storm from the unexpected
violence of which they retreated in dismay. There will be more than a
suggestion of this in Jackson's expression and attitude. He entered
the conference full of his official importance as the head of the great
Sovereign State, braving the whole United States, and quite complacent
as to his own powers of diction and argument. He quickly subsided,
however, from the leading character occupying the center of the stage
to that of chorus in the wings, in the deadly grapple of men of mightier
purpose--Lyon and Price, who were to ride the whirlwind he had been
contriving, and rule the storm he had been instrumental in raising.


117

Even Blair, immeasurably stronger mentally and morally than
Jackson--Blair, tall, sinewy, alert, with face and pose revealing
the ideal leader that he was--even he felt the presence of stronger
geniuses, and lapsed into silence.

The time for talking men was past Captains of hosts were now uttering
the last stern words, which meant the crash of battle and the death and
misery of myriads. Hereafter voices would be in swords, and arguments
flame from the brazen mouths of cannon hot with slaughter.

Sterling Price, white-haired, large of frame, imposing, benignant,
paternal, inflexible as to what he considered principle, was to point
the way which 100,000 young Missourians were to follow through a
thousand red battlefields.

Nathaniel Lyon, short of stature, red-haired, in the prime of manhood
and perfected soldiership, fiery, jealous for his country's rights and
dignity, was to set another 100,000 young Missourians in battle array
against their opponents, to fight them to complete overthrow.

After they withdrew from the conference, Gov. Jackson, as Price's
trumpeter, sounded the call "to arms" in a proclamation to the people of
Missouri.


118

[Illustration: 118-The St Louis Levee]



CHAPTER VII. GEN. LYON BEGINS AN EFFECTIVE CAMPAIGN

Gen. Sterling Price was soldier enough to recognize that Gen. Lyon was a
different character from the talking men who had been holding the center
of the stage for so long. When his trumpet sounded his sword was sure to
leap from its scabbard. Blows were to follow so quickly upon words as to
tread upon their heels.

At the close of the interview of June 11, Gen. Lyon, with Col. Blair and
Maj. Conant, returned to the Arsenal, while Gov. Jackson and Gen. Price
hurried to the depot of the Pacific Railroad, where they impressed a
locomotive, tender and cars, and urged the railroad men to get up steam
in the shortest possible time. Imperative orders cleared the track ahead
of them, and they rushed away for the Capital of the State with all
speed.

At the crossing of the Gasconade River they stopped long enough to
thoroughly burn the bridge to check Lyon's certain advance, and while
doing this Sterling Price cut the telegraph wires with his own hands.
The train then ran on to the Osage River, where, to give greater
assurance against rapid pursuit, they burnt that bridge also.

Arriving at Jefferson City about 2 o'clock in the morning, the rest
of the night was spent in anxious preparation of a proclamation by the
Governor to the people of Missouri, which was intended to be a trumpet
call to bring every man capable of bearing arms at once to the support
of the Governor and the furtherance of his plans.


119

According to the Census of 1860 there were 236,402 men in Missouri
capable of bearing arms, and if the matter could be put in such a way
that a half or even one-third of these would respond to the Governor's
mandate, a host would be mustered which would quickly sweep Lyon and his
small band out of the State. The proclamation to effect this which was
elaborated by the joint efforts of Gov. Jackson and Col. Snead,
the editor of the St. Louis Bulletin, a Secessionist organ, and the
Governor's Secretary and Adjutant-General, together with Gen. Price.

Considered as a trumpet call it was entirely too verbose. Col. Snead
could not break himself of writing long, ponderous editorials. The more
pertinent paragraphs were:

     To the People of Missouri:

     A series of unprovoked and unparalleled outrages have been
     inflicted upon the peace and dignity of this Commonwealth
     and upon the rights and liberties of its people, by wicked
     and unprincipled men, professing to act under the authority
     of the United States Government. The solemn enactments
     of your Legislature have been nullified; your volunteer
     soldiers have been taken prisoners; your commerce with your
     sister States has been suspended; your trade with your
     fellow-citizens has been, and is, subjected to the harassing
     control of an armed soldiery; peaceful citizens have been
     imprisoned without warrant of law; unoffending and
     defenseless men, women, and children have been ruthlessly
     shot down and murdered; and other unbearable indignities
     have been heaped upon your State and yourselves....

     They (Blair and Lyon) demanded not only the disorganization
     and disarming of the State Militia, and the nullification of
     the Military Bill, but they refused to disarm their own Home
     Guards, and insisted that the Federal Government should
     enjoy an unrestricted right to move and station its troops
     throughout the State, whenever and wherever that might, in
     the opinion of its officers, be necessary, either for  the
     protection of the "loyal subjects" of the Federal Government
     or for the repelling of invasion; and they plainly announced
     that it was the intention of the Administration to take
     military occupation, under these pretexts, of the whole
     State, and to reduce it, as avowed by Gen. Lyon himself, to
     the "exact condition of Maryland."


120

     The acceptance by me of these degrading terms would not only
     have sullied the honor of Missouri, but would have aroused
     the Indignation of every brave citizen, and precipitated the
     very conflict which it has been my aim to prevent. We
     refused to accede to them, and the conference was broken
     up....

     Now, therefore, I, C. F. Jackson, Governor of the State of
     Missouri, do, in view of the foregoing facts, and by virtue
     of the power invested in me by the Constitution and laws of
     this Commonwealth, issue this, my proclamation, calling the
     Militia of the State, to the number of 60,000, into the
     active service of the State, for the purpose of repelling
     said invasion, and for the protection of the lives, liberty,
     and property of the citizens of this State. And I earnestly
     exhort all good citizens of Missouri to rally under the flag
     of their State, for the protection of their endangered homes
     and firesides, and for the defense of their most sacred
     rights and dearest liberties.

This proclamation was given out to the press, but even before it
appeared the Governor had telegraphed throughout the State to leading
Secessionists to arm and rush to his assistance.

This did not catch Gen. Lyon at all unawares. He had long ago determined
upon a movement to Springfield, which, being in the midst of the farming
region, was the center of the Union element of southwest Missouri.
Immediately, upon reading the Governor's proclamation, he saw the
necessity of forestalling the projected concentration by reaching
Jefferson City with the least possible delay. Before he retired that
night he had given orders for the formation of a marching column, and
had placed the affairs of his great Department outside of this column,
of which he proposed to take personal command, in the hands of Col.
Chester Harding, to whom he gave full powers to sign his name and issue
orders.


121

Having thought out his plans well beforehand, Gen. Lyon began his
campaign with well-ordered celerity. Part of the troops he had at
command were sent down the southwestern branch of the Pacific Railroad
to secure it. Others were sent to points at which the militia were known
to be gathering to disperse them.

Gen. Lyon himself, with his staff, the Regulars, infantry and artillery,
and a force of volunteers, embarked on two steamboats to move directly
upon Jefferson City by the way of the Missouri River.

They arrived at the Capital of Missouri about 2 o'clock in the afternoon
of June 15, and were met with an enthusiastic reception from the loyal
citizens, of whom a large proportion were Germans. Gov. Jackson had only
been able to assemble about 120 men, with whom he made a hasty retreat
to Boonville, about 50 miles further up the river, which had been
selected by Gen. Price as one of his principal strategic points.
Boonville is situated on the highlands at a natural crossing of the
Missouri, and by holding it communication could be maintained between
the parts of the State lying north and south of the river, and thus
allow the concentration of the Militia, which Gov. Jackson had called
out. The hights on the river bank would enable the river to be blockaded
against expeditions ascending it, and the entire length of the stream to
Kansas City, about 100 miles in a direct line, could be thus controlled.

The Missouri River divides the State unequally, leaving about one-third
on the north and two-thirds on the south. Of the 99 Counties in the
State, 44 are north of the Missouri River, but these are smaller than
those south.


122

Gov. Jackson had telegraphed orders for the Brigade-Generals commanding
the districts into which the State had been divided to concentrate their
men with all haste at Boonville and at Lexington, still further up the
river, nearly midway between Boonville and Kansas City. The beginnings
of an arsenal were made at Boonville, to furnish arms and ammunition.

Gen. Lyon saw the strategic importance of the place, and did not propose
to allow any concentration to be made there. He did not, as most Regular
officers were prone, wait deliberately for wagons and rations and other
supplies, but with a truer instinct of soldiership comprehended that
his men could live wherever an enemy could, and leaving a small squad
at Jefferson City, immediately started his column for Boonville, sending
orders to other columns in Iowa and Kansas to converge toward that
place.

Progress up the Missouri River was tedious, as the water was low, and
the troops had to frequently disembark in order to allow the boats to
go over the shoals. It was reported to Gen. Lyon that about 4,000
Confederates had already concentrated at Boonville.

While Gen. Price was the Commander-in-Chief, several prominent
Secessionists were commanders upon the field of the whole or parts
of the force. The man, however, who was the most in evidence in the
fighting was John Sappington Marmaduke, a native Missourian, born in
Saline County in 1833, and therefore 28 years old. He was the son of a
farmer, had been at Yale and Harvard, and then graduated from West Point
in 1857, standing 30 in a class of 38. He had been on frontier duty with
the 7th U. S. until after the firing on Fort Sumter, when he resigned to
return to Missouri and raise a regiment for the Southern Confederacy.
He was to rise to the rank of Major-General in the Confederate army,
achieve much fame for military ability, and be elected, in 1884,
Governor of the State.


123

The column immediately under the command of Gen. Lyon consisted
of Totten's Light Battery (F, 2d U. S. Art.); Co. B, 2d U. S.; two
companies of Regular recruits; Col. Blair's Missouri regiment and
nine companies of Boernstein's Missouri regiment; aggregating somewhere
between 1,700 and 2,000 men. On the evening of Sunday, June 16, the
boats carrying the command arrived within 15 miles of Boonville, and
lay there during the night. The next morning they proceeded up to within
about eight miles of the town, when all but one company of Blair's
regiment and an artillery detachment disembarked and began a land march
upon the enemy's position. The remaining company and the howitzer were
sent on with the boats to give the impression that an attack was to be
made from the river side.

The people in the country reported to Gen. Lyon that the enemy was fully
4,000 strong, and intended an obstinate defense. He therefore moved
forward cautiously, arriving at last at the foot of a gently undulating
slope to a crest one mile distant, on which the enemy was stationed,
with the ground quite favorable for them. Gen. Lyon formed a line of
battle about 300 yards from the crest, with Totten's battery in the
rear and nine companies of Boernstein's regiment on the right, under
the command of Lieut.-Col. Schaeffer, and the Regulars and Col. Blair's
regiment on the left. It was a momentous period, big with Missouri's
future.


124

The engagement opened with Capt. Totten shelling the enemy's position
and the well-drilled German infantry advancing with the Regulars, firing
as they went. The question was now to be tried as to the value of the
much-vaunted Missouri riflemen in conflict with the disciplined
Germans. The former had been led to believe that they would repeat the
achievements of their forefathers at New Orleans.

Under the lead of Col. Marmaduke, the Confederates stood their ground
pluckily for a few minutes, but the steady advance of the Union troops,
with the demoralizing effect of the shells, were too much for them. Col.
Marmaduke attempted to make an orderly retreat, and at first seemed
to succeed, but finally the movement degenerated into a rout, and the
Confederates scattered in wild flight, led by their Governor, who, like
James II. at the battle of the Boyne, had witnessed the skirmish from a
neighboring eminence. The losses on each side were equal--two killed
and some eight or nine wounded.

Lyon pushed on at once to the camp of the enemy, and there captured some
1,200 pairs of shoes, 20 to 30 tents, and a considerable quantity of
ammunition, with quite a supply of arms, blankets and personal effects.


125

The detachment which had gone by the river on the boats aided in
securing the victory by a noisy bombardment with their howitzer,
and landing at the town, captured two six-pounders, with a number of
prisoners. The Mayor of Boonville came out and formally surrendered
the town to Gen. Lyon and Col. Blair. Parties were sent out the various
roads to continue the pursuit, and Gen. Lyon issued the following
proclamation, admirable in tone and wording, to counteract that of the
Governor and quiet the people, especially as to interference with slave
property:

     To the People of Missouri:

     Upon leaving the city of St. Louis, In consequence of the
     declaration of war made by the Governor of this State
     against the Government of the United States, because I would
     not assume in its behalf to relinquish its duties and
     abdicate its rights of protecting loyal citizens from the
     oppression and cruelties of Secessionists in this State, I
     published an address to the people, in which I declared my
     intention to use the force under my command for no other
     purpose than the maintenance of the authority of the General
     Government and the protection of the rights and property of
     all law-abiding citizens. The State authorities, in
     violation of an agreement with Gen. Harney, on the 21st of
     May last, had drawn together and organized upon a large
     scale the means of warfare, and having made declaration of
     war, they abandoned the Capital, issued orders for the
     destruction of the railroad and telegraph lines, and
     proceeded to this point to put in execution their purposes
     toward the General Government. This devolved upon me the
     necessity of meeting this issue to the best of my ability,
     and accordingly I moved to this point with a portion of the
     force under my command, attacked and dispersed hostile
     forces gathered here by the Governor, and took possession of
     the camp equipage left and a considerable number of
     prisoners, most of them young and of immature age, who
     represent that they have been misled by frauds ingeniously
     devised and industriously circulated by designing leaders,
     who seek to devolve upon unreflecting and deluded followers
     the task of securing the object of their own false ambition.
     Out of compassion for these misguided youths, and to correct
     impressions created by unscrupulous calumniators, I have
     liberated them, upon condition that they will not serve in
     the impending hostilities against the United States
     Government. I have done this in spite of the known facts
     that the leaders in the present rebellion, having long
     experienced the mildness of the General Government, still
     feel confident that this mildness cannot be overtaxed even
     by factious hostilities having In view its overthrow; but
     if, as in the case of the late Camp Jackson affair, this
     clemency than still be misconstrued, it is proper to give
     warning that the Government cannot be always expected to
     indulge it to the compromise of its evident welfare.


126

     Having learned that those plotting against the Government
     have falsely represented that the Government troops intended
     a forcible and violent invasion of Missouri for the purposes
     of military despotism and tyranny, I hereby give notice to
     the people of this State that I shall scrupulously avoid all
     interferences with the business, rights, and property of
     every description recognized by the laws of this State, and
     belonging to law-abiding citizens; but that it is equally my
     duty to maintain the paramount authority of the United Sates
     with such force as I have at my command, which will be
     retained only so long as opposition shall make it necessary;
     and that it is my wish, and shall be my purpose, to devolve
     any unavoidable rigor arising in this issue upon those only
     who provoke it.

     All persons who, under the misapprehensions above mentioned,
     have taken up arms, or who are now preparing to do so, are
     invited to return to their homes, and relinquish their
     hostile attitude to the General Government, and are assured
     that they may do so without being molested for past
     occurrences.

     N. LYON,

     Brigadier-General, U. S. Vols., Commanding.


Several thousand of Jackson's Militia had already assembled at
Lexington, nearly midway between Boonville and Kansas City. When they
heard of the affair at Boonville they realized that they were in danger
of being caught between the column advancing from that direction and
the one under Maj. Sturgis, which Gen. Lyon had ordered forward from
Leavenworth through Kansas City, while a third, under Col. Curtis, was
approaching from the Iowa line. They dispersed at once, to fall back
behind the Osage River, at Gen. Price's direction. Thus Lyon gained
complete control of the Missouri River in its course through the State,
enabling him to cut off the Confederates in the northern from those in
the southern part of the State.


127

Another success which came to him was the seizure of the office of
the St. Louis Bulletin, and the discovery there of a letter from Gov,
Jackson to the publisher, which completely proved all the allegations
that had been made as to the Governor's action, decisively contradicted
the material assertions in his proclamations and vindicated Gen. Lyon
from the charges against him of undue precipitancy. The letter was long,
personal and confidential. In it he said:

     I do not think Missouri should secede today or tomorrow, but
     I do not think it good policy that I should so disclose. I
     want a little time to arm the State, and I am assuming every
     responsibility to do it with all possible dispatch. Missouri
     should act in concert with Tennessee and Kentucky. They are
     all bound to go out, and should go together, if possible. My
     judgment is that North Carolina, Tennessee and Arkansas will
     all be out in a few days, and when they go Missouri should
     follow. Let us, then, prepare to make our exit. We should
     keep our own counsels. Every man in the State is in favor of
     arming the State. Then let it be done. All are opposed to
     furnishing Mr. Lincoln with soldiers. Time will settle the
     balance.

     Nothing should be said about the time or the manner in which
     Missouri should go out. That she ought to go, and will go at
     the proper time, I have no doubt. She ought to have gone out
     last Winter, when she could have seized the public arms and
     public property, and defended herself. That she has failed
     to do, and must wait a little while. Paschall is a base
     submissionist, and desires to remain with the North, if
     every Slave State should go out. Call on every country paper
     to defend me, and assure them I am fighting under the true
     flag. Who does not know that every sympathy of my heart is
     with the South? The Legislature, in my view, should sit in
     secret session, and touch nothing but the measures of
     defense.

     Though in point of fighting and losses this initial campaign
     ending with the skirmish at Boonville had been
     insignificant, its results far surpassed those of many of
     the bloodiest battles of the rebellion. The Governor of the
     State was in flight from his Capital; his troops had been
     scattered in the first collision; control had been gained of
     the Missouri River, cutting the enemy's line in two; and
     above all, there was the immense moral effect of the defeat
     in action of the boastful Secessionists by the much
     denounced "St. Louis Dutch."   This alone accounted for the
     acquisition of many thousand wavering men to the side of the
     Union. Missourians were not different from the rest of
     mankind, and every community had its large proportion of
     those who, when the Secessionists seemed to have everything
     their own way, inclined to that side, but came back to their
     true allegiance at the first sign of the Government being
     able to assert its supremacy. The Government was now aroused
     and striking--and striking successfully. Its enemies were
     immensely depressed, and its friends correspondingly elated.


129

     Gen. Lyon's next thought was to drive Gov. Jackson and his
     Secession clique out of Missouri into Arkansas, free the
     people from their pernicious influence, protect the Union
     people, especially in the southwestern part of the State,
     and keep tens of thousands of young men from being persuaded
     or dragged into the rebel army.

     He would demonstrate the Government's position so
     convincingly that there would be no longer any doubt of
     Missouri's remaining in the Union.


129

[Illustration: 129-The Storm Gathers]




CHAPTER VIII. STORM GATHERS IN SOUTHWESTERN MISSOURI

The Osage River enters Missouri from Kansas about 60 miles south of the
Missouri River, and flowing a little south of east empties into that
river a few miles below Jefferson City. It thus forms a natural line of
defense across the State, which Gen. Price's soldierly eye had noted,
and he advised the Governor to order his troops to take up their
position behind it, gain time for organization, and prepare for battle
for possession of the State.

Gen. Lyon had also noticed the strategic advantages of the Osage River,
and did not propose to allow his enemies to have the benefit of them.
He did not intend to permit them to concentrate there, and be joined in
time by heavy forces already coming up from Arkansas, Indian Territory,
and Texas. While he was collecting farm wagons around Boonville
to move his own columns forward, laboring to gather a sufficient stock
of ammunition and supplies, and planning to make secure his holding of
the important points already gained, he began moving other columns under
Gen. Sweeny and Maj. Sturgis directly upon Springfield, the central
point of the southwestern part of the State, which would take the Osage
line in the rear, and compel Jackson and Price to retreat with their
forces across the Missouri line into Arkansas.


130

This would clear the State of the whole congerie of Secession leaders,
remove the young men from their influence, stop the persecutions of
the Union men in that section, and cement Missouri solidly in the Union
line. He also wrote Gen. B. M. Prentiss, in command of the troops
at Cairo, asking co-operation by clearing out the rebels from the
southeastern portion of the State. Lyon's far-reaching plans did not
stop with Missouri. He also contemplated pushing his advance directly
upon Little Rock, through the Union-loving region in northwestern
Arkansas, and clinching that State as firmly as Missouri.

The next day after the decisive little victory at Boonville occurred an
event which greatly raised the drooping spirits of the Secessionists,
and was much exaggerated by them in order to offset their defeat at
Boonville by Lyon.

Benton is one of the interior Counties of the State, lying on both sides
of the Osage River. In 1860 its people had cast 74 votes for Lincoln,
306 for Bell and Everett, 100 for Breckinridge, and 574 for Stephen A.
Douglas. All the County officials and leading men were Secessionists,
and doing their utmost to aid the rebellion; still, the Union people,
under the leadership of A. H. W. Cook and Alex. Mackey, were undaunted
and earnestly desirous of doing effective service for the United States.
Cook and Mackey had been warned to leave the State, and Cook had done
so, but returned to take part in the capture of Camp Jackson, and
afterward went back to his home to organize the Germans and Americans
there for their own defense.


131

A meeting was held at which the Stars and Stripes were raised, and nine
companies of Home Guards organized, sworn into service, and given arms.
These companies went into camp in a couple of barns some three miles
south of Cole Camp, where their presence and support to the
Union sentiment was the source of the greatest irritation to the
Secessionists, who attempted to disperse them by legal processes, and
failing in this, determined to attack them. In the meanwhile all but
about 400 of the men were allowed to return to their homes to put their
affairs in order for a prolonged absence.

About 1,000 Secessionists, under the command of Walter S. O'Kane,
marched on June 19 to attack them. Col. Cook was informed of the
intended attack and prepared for it by throwing out pickets and
summoning his absentees.

At 3 o'clock in the morning of June 20 the Secessionists reached the
pickets, whom they bayonetted to prevent their giving the alarm, and
rushed in upon the sleeping Unionists, pouring volley after volley
into the barns. The men in one of the barns had been warned, but were
prevented from firing by the Union Flag which the Secessionists carried.
Many of them who managed to get out of the barns were rallied behind the
corn cribs, and began an obstinate fight which lasted till daylight. The
absentees, whom Col. Cook had summoned, came up during the engagement,
but not being able to comprehend the situation, rendered no assistance.
Finally all the Union men got together and retreated in good order,
repulsing their pursuers.


132

The reports as to this affair are so conflicting that it is difficult
to determine the truth. It seems pretty certain that Col. Cook had
only about 400 men. He reports that he was attacked by 1,200, but the
Secessionists say that O'Kane's force was only 350. Cook reports his
loss as 23 killed, 20 wounded, and 30 taken prisoners, while Pollard,
the Secessionist historian, insists that we lost 206 killed, a large
number wounded, and over 100 taken prisoners, with the Secession loss
of 14 killed and 15 or 20 wounded. Probably the truth lies between
these two extremes, the only definite thing being that the Secessionists
captured 362 muskets.

There were five or six prominent Secessionists among the killed, one of
them being Mr. Leach, the editor of the Southwestern Democrat.

Col. Cook gathered up his men, received some additional recruits, some
arms and ammunition, and pushed on to Warsaw, on the Osage, one of the
points of concentration indicated by Gen. Price, capturing 1,500 pound
cans and 1,500 kegs of fine rifle powder, many tons of pig-lead, 70
stand of small-arms, a steamboat-load of tent cloth, a lot of State
Guard uniforms, four Confederate flags, and 1,200 false-faces which
had been used by the "border ruffians" in their political operations
in Kansas. A little further on they surrounded and captured 1,000
Secessionists, and paroled them on the spot.

The Secessionists, on the other hand, took much comfort out of the
surprise and defeat and the acquisition of 362 new muskets and 150 more
which they had beguiled from a German company in a neighboring County.


133

In the meanwhile the Conservatives, aided by Lieut-Gen. Scott, whose
distrust of "Capt." Lyon never abated, secured the addition of Missouri
to the Department commanded by McClellan, whom it was thought would hold
the "audacious" officer in check. Lyon, though he felt that McClellan,
then far distant in West Virginia, could not give matters in the State
the attention they needed, yet loyally accepted the assignment, wrote at
once to McClellan cordially welcoming him as his commander, and giving
full information as to the conditions, with suggestions as to what
should be done. Col. Blair and the Radicals were much displeased at
this move, and began efforts to have Missouri erected into a separate
Department and placed under the command of John C. Fremont, lately
appointed a Major-General, and from whose military talents there were
the greatest expectations.

As the first Presidential candidate of the Republican Party Fremont
had a strong hold upon the hearts of the Northern people. During the
campaign of 1856 there had been the customary partisan eulogies of the
candidates, which placed "the Great Pathfinder" and all he had done in
the most favorable light before the American people. Above all he was
thought to be thoroughly in sympathy with the policy which Blair and his
following desired to pursue.

In reality Fremont was a man of somewhat more than moderate ability, but
boundless aspirations. He was the son-in-law of Senator Benton, and
his wife, the queenly, ambitious, handsome Jessie Benton Fremont, was
naturally eager for her husband to be as prominent in the National
councils as had been her father. What Fremont was equal to is one of
the many unsolved problems of the war, but certainly he was not to the
command of the great Western Department, including the State of Illinois
and all the States and Territories west of the Mississippi River and
east of the Rocky Mountains, to which he was assigned by General Orders,
No. 40, issued July 3,1861.


134

Fremont's father was a Frenchman, who had married a Virginia woman, and
followed the occupation of a teacher of French at Norfolk, Va., but
died at an early age, leaving the members of his family to struggle for
themselves. Fremont became a teacher of mathematics on a sloop of war,
then Professor of Mathematics for the Navy, and later a surveyor and
engineer for railroad lines, and was commissioned by President Van Buren
a Second Lieutenant in the Corps of Engineers. Owing to the opposition
of Senator Benton, his daughter had to be secretly married to Lieut.
Fremont in 1841, but soon after the Senator gave his son-in-law the
benefit of his great influence.

Fremont was designated to conduct surveys across the continent into the
unknown region lying between the Rocky Mountains and the Pacific, and
made several very important explorations. He was in California prior to
the outbreak of the Mexican War, and became involved in hostilities
with the Mexicans. When the war did break out he assumed command of the
country around under authority from Commodore Stockton, and proceeded
to declare the independence of California. A quarrel between him and
Stockton followed, and later another quarrel ensued with Gen. Kearny,
who had been sent into this country in command of an expedition.


135

He was court-martialed by Gen. Kearny's orders and found guilty of
mutiny, disobedience, and conduct prejudicial to good order and military
discipline. He was sentenced to be dismissed, but the majority of the
court recommended him to the clemency of President Polk, who refused
to approve the verdict of mutiny, but did approve the rest, though
he remitted the penalty. Fremont, refusing to accept the President's
pardon, then resigned from the Army, settled in California, and bought
the famous Mariposa estate, containing rich gold mines. He became a
leader of the Free-Soil Party in California, and was elected to the
Senate for a brief term of three weeks. He was nominated by the first
Republican Convention in Philadelphia, June 17, 1856, and in his letter
of acceptance expressed himself strongly against the extension of
Slavery, and in favor of free labor. The hot campaign of 1856 resulted
in a surprising showing of strength by the new party. Fremont received
114 electoral votes from 11 States to 174 from 19 States for Buchanan
and eight votes from Maryland for Fillmore. The popular vote was 874,000
for Fillmore, 1,341,000 for Fremont, and 1,838,000 for Buchanan.

Lyon welcomed the appointment of Fremont to command, because he felt
the need of having a superior officer at hand who would appreciate the
urgency of the situation, and stand between him and the authorities at
Washington, who apparently did not understand the emergency, were not
honoring his requisitions for money, arms, and supplies, and who were
drawing to the eastward the troops that Lyon felt ought to be sent to
him. It was also satisfactory to him that the State of Illinois was
in the Department, since the important point of Cairo should be
administered with reference to controlling the situation in southeastern
Missouri.


136


The first distrust of Fremont came from his deliberation in repairing to
his command. The people of Missouri felt very keenly that no time should
be lost in the General arriving on the spot and getting the situation in
hand, but in spite of all importunities, Fremont lingered for weeks
in New York, and it required a rather sharp admonition from the War
Department to start him for St. Louis, where he arrived as late as July
25.

Lyon's prompt advance upon Jefferson City now bore fruit in another
direction. The Union people of Missouri decided that as Gov. Jackson,
Lieut-Gov. Reynolds and other State officials had abandoned the State
Capital to engage in active rebellion against the United States, the
State Convention, which had been called to carry the State out of the
Union, but which had so signally disappointed the expectations of its
originators, should reconvene, declare the State offices vacant, and
instate a loyal Government A strong party desired that a Military
Governor should be appointed, and urged Col. Frank P. Blair for that
place, but he refused to countenance the project. The Convention, by a
vote of 56 to 25, declared the offices of Governor, Lieutenant-Governor
and Secretary of State vacant, and elected Hamilton R. Gamble Governor,
Willard P. Hall Lieutenants Governor, Mordecai Oliver Secretary of
State, and George A. Bingham Treasurer. An oath of loyalty was adopted
to be required of all citizens before being allowed to vote, and to be
taken by all incumbents of office and all who should be qualified for
office thereafter.


137

Gov. Jackson established his Capital at Lamar, in Barton County, about
30 miles south of the Osage, and the men who had been appointed to
command the Militia Districts began to come in with their contingents.
None seemed to know about the flanking columns which had been sent out
toward Springfield, to take the line of the Osage in the rear, and they
were astounded when forces under Sweeny and Sigel, which had dispersed
the gathering Militia before them at Holla, Lebanon, and other
intervening points, reached Springfield, and began sending out from
there expeditions to Neosho, Ozark, Sarcoxie and other towns in the
southwestern corner. Col. Franz Sigel, who had shown much activity and
enterprise, learned at Sarcoxie that several divisions of State Guards
under Gens. Rains, Parsons, Slack and Clark were to the north of him,
and the Governor and Gen. Price were endeavoring to bring them together
in order to turn upon and crush Gen. Lyon in his advance from Boonville.
Sigel's men, who were anxious to accomplish something decisive before
the expiration of their three months' term, brought about a decision
in their commander's mind to march upon the force encamped upon Pool's
Prairie, whip and scatter it, and then attack the other forces in turn.


138

After making the necessary detachments to guard his flanks and rear,
Col. Sigel had under his command nine companies of the 8d Mo., 550 men
under Lieut.-Col. Hassendeubel; seven companies of the 5th Mo., under
Col. Charles E. Salomon, 400 men, and two batteries of light artillery,
four guns each, under Maj. Backof.

After a hard day's march of 22 miles in very hot weather, Col. Sigel
came, on the evening of July 4, about one mile southeast of Carthage,
on the south side of Spring River. He made preparations to attack the
enemy, reported to be from 10 to 15 miles in his front.

That night Gov. Jackson received news of Sigel's advance, and gathered
his forces to resist him. He had already concentrated many more men than
Sigel had expected, and had with him seven pieces of artillery. Most
of his men carried the arms which they had brought from home, and
were arranged, according to the provisions in the Military Bill, into
divisions, of which there were no less than four present. The Second
Division, commanded by Brig.-Gen. James S. Rains, who afterward attained
much reputation in the Confederate army, had present 1,208 infantry and
artillery and 608 cavalry. The Third Division, commanded by Gen. John B.
Clark, also to attain eminence in the Confederate army, had 365
present. The Fourth Division, commanded by Gen. Wm. Y. Slack, later
a Brigadier-General in the Confederate army, had 500 cavalry and 700
infantry. The Sixth Division, commanded by Gen. Monroe M. Parsons, who
served with distinction throughout the war, had altogether about 1,000
men and four pieces of artillery. The official returns show that Gov.
Jackson had thus 4,375 men with seven guns to oppose something over
1,000 men with eight guns under Col. Sigel. The Union force was strong in
artillery, while the Confederates were powerful in cavalry, of which
the Unionists had none. Both sides were poorly supplied with ammunition,
especially for the cannon, and loaded these with railroad spikes, bits
of trace chains, etc.


139

Early on the morning of July 5 Sigel marched out of camp, crossing the
Spring River about one mile north of Carthage, and soon came upon an
open prairie. He advanced slowly and cautiously along the Lamar Road,
with his wagons under a small escort following a mile or so in the rear.
Nine miles north of Carthage and three miles north of Coon Creek he came
in sight of the Governor's troops drawn up in line of battle on a slight
rise of the prairie, and about one mile and a half away. The enemy's
skirmish line, which was under the command of Capt. J. O. Shelby, of
whom we shall hear much more later, opened fire on Sigel's advance, but
was soon driven across the creek and through the narrow strip of timber
less than one-half mile wide, followed by Sigel's men in line of battle.
They came out on the smooth prairie, covered with a fine growth of
grass, and offering unequalled facilities for manuvering, except that
from the ridge Sigel's line could be accurately observed and its numbers
known.

Sigel formed his line of battle within a half mile of the enemy's
position, distributed his artillery along it, then ordered an advance,
and opened the battle with a fire from his guns, which was promptly
responded to by the enemy's pieces. The distance was so close that
the Union guns could fire canister and shell very effectively; but the
enemy, perceiving that Sigel had no cavalry, sent out their numerous
mounted force on a flank movement, which soon compelled the retirement
of the line across the creek, where the battle was renewed and
maintained for two hours, during which time the enemy suffered some loss
from the artillery fire.


140

Again the enemy made a flank movement with their cavalry, reaching this
time back toward the baggage-train, to which Sigel retreated. The Union
men broke up the cavalry formation, and Sigel followed this with a
charge which scattered his enemies and enabled him to continue his
retreat unmolested across the prairie in full sight of his foes. Sigel
could also see the rallied cavalry making a wide circuit over the
prairie to gain the hights of Spring River and cut off his retreat Gen.
Rains, who led this movement, succeeded in reaching the road at Spring
River, but in coming up Sigel at once attacked with his artillery, and
after a brisk little engagement of half an hour drove the enemy out of
the woods, and marched on to Carthage, which he reached about 5 o'clock,
and there prepared to give a short rest to his men, who were worn out by
18 miles of marching under a hot sun and almost continual fighting
and manuvering. The Secessionists renewed their attack, but were again
driven off by the infantry and artillery, and the march was resumed.

Again Gens. Slack, Parsons, and Clark pushed their men forward on the
Union flank, while Rains renewed his attack, and again they were all
repulsed, largely by the skillful handling of the artillery. As darkness
came on the Secessionists disappeared, but Sigel moved on to Sarcoxie,
12 miles distant, and went into camp.


141

Gov. Jackson's forces camped in and around Carthage, and the next day
marched to Neosho, where they met Gen. Ben McCulloch coming up from
Arkansas with a force of Arkansans and Texans and also 1,700 of the
State Guards, which Gen. Price had brought forward. In the fighting the
Union side had lost 13 killed and 21 wounded. The Confederates report
74 killed and wounded in the four divisions under the command of Gov.
Jackson.

[Illustration: 141-Sigel Crossing the Osage]

The battle of Carthage produced a great sensation over the country,
the Confederates rejoicing that they had cut through the Union line
and forced it to retreat, while Sigel received unstinted praise for his
skillful retreat and the masterly handling of his artillery. While one
battery would hold the enemy in check, another would be placed at the
most advantageous position in the rear, where it would withdraw behind
it to repeat the manuver. Several times during the day the batteries
were cunningly masked, and the enemy rushed up to the muzzle, to receive
the death-dealing discharge full in the faces of the compact mass.


142

This brings Gen. Sigel prominently before us. Of the many
highly-educated Germans who had migrated to this country in consequence
of their connection with the Revolution of 1848, Franz Sigel had, far
and away, the most brilliant reputation as a soldier. A slight, dark,
nervous man, with a rather saturnine countenance, he was born at
Zinsheim, Baden, Nov. 18, 1824, and was therefore in his 37th year. He
graduated from the Military School at Carlsruhe with high promise, which
he filled by becoming one of the Chief Adjutants in the Grand Duke's
army. He ardently shared the aspirations of the young Germans for German
Unity, and resigned his commission in 1847 to become one of the leaders
in the revolutionary forces. He was appointed to chief command of the
army sent from the Grand-Duchy to the assistance of the revolutionists
in Hesse-Darmstadt, but a disagreement arose, another was appointed to
the command, and Sigel assumed the position of Minister of War. Upon the
defeat of the expedition by the Prussian forces, he resumed the chief
command of the demoralized men, and conducted a brilliantly successful
retreat to a place of safety in the fortress of Rastadt. This
achievement at the age of 24 seemed to stamp the character of his
military career.


143

At the collapse of the revolution he escaped to Switzerland, which
expelled him, and he then came to New York, where he supported himself
as a teacher of mathematics, later engaging in the same occupation in
St. Louis, where he was living when the war broke out, and rendered
invaluable service in organizing and leading the Germans in support of
Blair and Lyon.

Unfortunately for his reputation, the war upon which he had now entered
was to be carried on by stern aggressiveness, to which he seemed
unsuited. He had a strong hold on the affections of the Germans, whose
support of the Union was exceedingly valuable, and in spite of repeated
failures to satisfy the expectations of his superior officers, he was
promoted and given high commands, in all of which his misfortune was
the same. After Rastadt he seemed bent only upon conducting brilliant
retreats, and that from Carthage greatly helped to confirm this
tendency. He was finally relegated to the shelf, which contained so many
men who had started out with brilliant promise, and died in New York
in 1902, supported during his later years by a pension of $100 a month
granted him by Congress.

After resting his men a few hours at Sarcoxie, Sigel marched on to
Springfield, where Gen. Sweeny was, and to which point Gen. Lyon hurried
with all the force he could gather, to forestall the junction of Gen.
Ben McCulloch's Arkansas column with the force that Price and Jackson
would bring to him.


144

There was strong need of his presence there and of his utmost efforts.
He had rolled back the Secession tide only to have it gather volume
enough to completely submerge him. Not only had Gov. Jackson and
Sterling Price concentrated many more men than he had, but a still
stronger column composed of Arkansans and Texans under the noted Gen.
Ben. McCulloch was near at hand and pushing forward with all speed.

Benjamin McCulloch, a tall, bony, sinewy man of iron will and dauntless
courage, was easily a leader and master of the bold, aggressive spirits
who had wrested Texas away from Mexico and erected her into a great
State. He had achieved much reputation in the command of the Texan
Rangers during the Mexican War and in the Indian fights which succeeded
that struggle. As a soldier and a fighter he had the highest fame of
any living Texan, except Sam Houston, and when he espoused the cause of
Secession he drew after him many thousands of the adventurous,
daring young men of the State. The Confederate army had immediately
commissioned him a Brigadier-General, and he had set about organizing,
with his accustomed energy and enterprise, a strong column for
aggressive service west of the Mississippi. Warlike young leaders,
ambitious for distinction, hastened to join him with whatever men they
could raise, for such was their confidence that they felt his banner
would point to the most direct road to fame and glory. Many of these,
then Captains and Colonels, afterward rose to be Generals in the
Confederate army. He had proposed to the Confederate Government to aid
the situation in Virginia by active operations in Missouri, and to this
plan the Governors of Louisiana, Texas, and Arkansas gave their hearty
consent and co-operation. McCulloch had another motive for aggressive
action, as it would determine the position of the Indians.

[Illustration: 145-Genereal Henry W. Halleck]


145

The wisest among the Chiefs of the Cherokees, Chickasaws, Creeks and
Seminoles desired to remain neutral in the struggle, since they did not
wish to bring down upon them the wrath of the Kansas people, who
were within easy striking distance. By prompt action these wavering
aborigines could be brought into the Confederate ranks and be made to
render important assistance.

He had already crossed the Missouri line with 3,000 mounted men, and on
the night of the 4th of July came to Buffalo Creek, 12 miles southwest
of Neosho, where he was joined by Gen. Price with 1,700 mounted men, and
he sent urgent messages back to the rest of his men to hurry forward
to him. These were so well obeyed that he shortly had, independent of
Price's men, fully 5,000 men from Arkansas, Texas, and Louisiana, who
were better equipt and organized than the Missourians.

Gov. Jackson and Gen. Price also sent urgent messages for concentration,
which were as promptly responded to. The result was that there were
shortly assembled Confederates under Gen. McCulloch and "State Guards"
under Gov. Jackson and Gen. Price, a total estimated by Maj. Sturgis and
others at 23,-000 men. For lack of proper arms and organization, many
of these were not very effective. McCulloch says that the great horde of
mounted men "were much in the way," and hindered rather than helped
But they were certainly very effective in harrying the Union people; in
impressing recruits; in embarrassing Lyon's gathering of supplies; in
driving in the small parties he sent out, and confining his operations
to the neighborhood of Springfield.


146

In the meanwhile the great disaster of Bull Run had occurred to depress
the Union people and fill the Secessionists with unbounded enthusiasm
and confidence. The thoughts of the Government and of the loyal
people of the country became concentrated upon securing the safety of
Washington. Troops were being rushed from every part of the country to
the National Capital. Lyon's forces were constantly dwindling, from
the expiration of the three months for which the regiments had been
enlisted. The men felt the need of their presence at home, to attend
to their hastily-left affairs, and could see no prospect of a decisive
battle as a reason for remaining. Gen. Lyon importuned Gen. Fremont and
the War Department for some regiments, for adequate supplies for those
he had, and money with which to pay them. The War Department, however,
could apparently think of nothing else than making Washington safe,
while Gen. Fremont, deeming St. Louis and Cairo all-important, gathered
in what troops he could save from the eastward rush, for holding those
places. Gen. Scott even proposed to deprive Gen. Lyon of his little
squad of Regulars, and sent orders for seven companies to be forwarded
East.

Laboring with all these embarrassments, Gen. Lyon confronted the storm
rising before him with a firm countenance.


147



CHAPTER IX. EVE OF THE BATTLE OF WILSON'S CREEK

Mountainous perplexities and burdens weighed upon Gen. Lyon during the
last days of July.

The country was hysterical over the safety of the National Capital, and
it seemed that the Administration was equally emotional. Every regiment
and gun was being rushed to the heights in front of Washington, and all
eyes were fixed on the line of the Potomac.

The perennial adventurer in Gen. Fremont did not fail to suggest to him
that the greatest of opportunities might develop in Washington, and he
lingered in New York until peremptorily ordered by Gen. Scott to his
command. He did not arrive in St. Louis until July 25.

Like Seward, Chase, McClellan, and many other aspiring men, Fremont
had little confidence that the untrained Illinois Rail Splitter in the
Presidential chair would be able to keep his head above the waves in the
sea of troubles the country had entered. The disaster at Bull Run was
but the beginning of a series of catastrophes which would soon call for
a stronger brain and a more experienced hand at the helm.

Then?


148

Mrs. Jessie Benton Fremont was not the only one to suggest that the man
for the hour would be found to be the first Republican candidate for
President--the Great Pathfinder of the Rocky Mountains!

Upon his arrival at St Louis Gen. Fremont was immediately waited upon by
the faithful Chester Harding and others who had been awaiting his coming
with painful anxiety. They represented most energetically Gen. Lyon's
predicament, without money, clothing or rations, and with a force even
more rapidly diminishing than that of the enemy was augmenting. They
revealed Gen. Lyon's far-reaching plans of making Springfield a base
from which to carry the war into Arkansas, and begged for men, money,
arms, food; shoes and clothing for him.

Fremont was too much engrossed in forming in the Brant Mansion that
vice-regal court of his--the main requirement for which seemed to be
inability to speak English--to feel the urgency of these importunities.

The country was swarming with military adventurers from Europe, men with
more or less shadow on their connection with the foreign armies, and
eager to sell their swords to the highest advantage. They swarmed around
Fremont like bees around a sugar barrel, much to the detriment of the
honest and earnest men of foreign birth who were rallying to the support
of the Union.

Next to his satrapal court of exotic manners and speech, Fremont was
most concerned about the safety of Cairo, Ill., a most important
point, then noisily threatened by Maj.-Gen. Leonidas Polk, the militant
Protestant Episcopal Bishop of Louisiana, and his subordinate, the
blatant Gen. Gideon J. Pillow, of Mexican War notoriety.


149

Gen. Fremont made quite a show of reinforcing Cairo, sending a most
imposing fleet of steamboats to carry the 4,000 troops sent thither.

Pretense still counted for much in the war. Later it burnt up like dry
straw in the fierce blaze of actualities.

Not being Fremont's own, nor contributing particularly to his
aggrandizement, Gen. Lyon's plans and aims had little importance to his
Commanding General.

Gen. Lyon saw clearly that the place to fight for St. Louis and Missouri
was in the neighborhood of Springfield, and by messenger and letter he
importuned that St. Louis be left to the care of the loyal Germans of
the Home Guards, who had shown their ability to handle the city, and
that all the other troops there and elsewhere in the State be rushed
forward to him, with shoes and clothing for his unshod, ragged soldiers,
and sufficient rations for the army, which had well-nigh exhausted the
country upon which it had been living for so long.

But Fremont frittered away his strength in sending regiments to chase
guerrilla bands which dissolved as soon as the trail became too hot.

Two regiments were ordered to Lyon from points so distant that they
could not make the march in less than 10 days or a fortnight, and some
scanty supplies sent to Rolla remained there because of lack of wagons
to carry them forward to Springfield, 120 miles away.


150

Later Gen. Fremont testified before the Committee on the Conduct of the
War that he had ordered Gen. Lyon, if he could not maintain himself at
Springfield, to fall back to Rolla, but singularly he did not produce
this order.

Though Gen. Lyon had marched his men 50 miles in one day to prevent the
junction of Gen. Ben Mc-Culloch's Arkansas column with the hosts Gen.
Sterling Price was gathering from Missouri, he was not able to interpose
between them.

On Saturday, Aug. 3, the Confederates had all gotten together on the
banks of Crane Creek, 55 miles southwest of Springfield, with general
headquarters in and around the village of Cassville.

How many were concentrated is subject to the same obscurity which
usually envelops Confederate numbers. Lyon estimated there were 30,000.
Later estimates by competent men put the number at 23,000. Gen. Snead,
Price's Adjutant-General, put the number at 11,000, which would be a
severe reflection on the loyalty of the Missouri Secessionists to their
Governor, since Gen. McCulloch certainly brought up about 5,000 from
Arkansas, which would leave only 6,000 to respond to Gov. Jackson's
proclamation, and gather under the standards set up by his seven
Brigadier-Generals--Parsons, Rains, Slack, J. B. Clark, M. L. Clark,
Watkins and Randolph.

While Lyon had incomparable troubles, there was far from concord in the
camp of his opponents. Like thousands of other men, McCulloch's ambition
far transcended his abilities. He at once assumed the attitude that as a
Brigadier-General in the Confederate army he out-ranked Sterling Price,
who was a Major-General of state troops. This, at that early period
of the war, was a humorous reversal of the State Sovereignty idea, so
flagrant in the minds of those precipitating Secession.


151

Jefferson Davis and his school of thought had been fierce in their
contention that the part was greater than the whole, and that the
States were greater than the General Government. Yet Gen. McCulloch
was unflinching in his insistence that a Confederate Brigadier-General
outranked a State Major-General. The dispute became quite acrimonious,
but was at last settled by Price's yielding to McCulloch, so anxious was
he that something decisive should be done toward driving back Lyon and
"redeeming the State of Missouri." According to Gen. Thomas L. Snead,
his Chief of Staff, he went to Gen. McCulloch's quarters on Sunday
morning, Aug. 4, and after vainly trying to persuade McCulloch to attack
Lyon, he said:

     "I am an older man than you, Gen. McCulloch, and I am not
     only your senior in rank now, but I was a Brigadier-General
     in the Mexican War, with an independent command, when you
     were only a Captain; I have fought and won more battles
     than you have ever witnessed; my force is twice as great as
     yours; and some of my officers rank, and have seen more
     service than you, and we are also upon the soil of our own
     State; but, Gen. McCulloch, if you will consent to help us
     to whip Lyon and to repossess Missouri, I will put myself
     and all my forces under your command, and we will obey you
     as faithfully as the humblest of your own men. We can whip
     Lyon, and we will whip him and drive the enemy out of
     Missouri, and all the honor and all the glory shall be
     yours,  All that we want is to regain our homes and to
     establish the independence of Missouri and the South. If you
     refuse to accept this offer, I will move with the
     Missourians alone against Lyon; for it is better that they
     and I should all perish than Missouri be abandoned without a
     struggle. You must either fight beside us or look on at a
     safe distance and see us fight all alone the army which you
     dare not attack even with our aid. I must have your answer
     before dark, for I intend to attack Lyon tomorrow."


152

Gen. McCulloch replied that he was expecting dispatches from the East,
but would make known his determination before sundown. At that time,
accompanied by Gen. Mcintosh, in whose abilities Gen. McCulloch had
the highest confidence, and was largely influenced by him, he went
to Price's headquarters and informed him that he had just received
dispatches that Gen. Pillow was advancing into the southeastern part of
the State from New Madrid with 12,000 men, and that he would accept the
command of the united forces and attack Lyon. Price at once published an
order that he had turned over the command of the Missouri troops to Gen.
McCulloch, but reserved the right to resume command at any time he might
see fit.

Their friends in Springfield kept Price and McCulloch well-informed as
to Lyon's diminishing force and perplexities.

Brilliant as McCulloch may have been in command of 100 or so men, he was
clearly unequal to the leadership of such a host. He was as much feebler
in temper to Lyon as he was inferior in force and grasp to Sterling
Price.


153

An audacious stroke by Lyon on Friday, Aug. 2, quite unsettled his
nerves. Getting information that his enemies were moving on him by three
different roads, Lyon formed the soldierly determination to move out
swiftly and attack one of the columns and crush it before the other
could come to its assistance.

Putting Capt. D. S. Stanley--of whom we shall hear much hereafter--at
the head with his troop of Regular cavalry, and following him with a
battalion of Regulars under Capt. Frederick Steele--of whom we shall
also hear a great deal hereafter--and a section of Totten's Regular
Battery, he marched out the Cassville Road with his whole force and at
Dug Springs, 20 miles away, came up with McCulloch's advance, commanded
by Brig.-Gen. J. S. Rains, of the Missouri State Guards, of whom, too,
we shall hear much. Col. Mcintosh, McCulloch's adviser, was also on the
ground with 150 men.

Rains attempted to put into operation the tactics employed against Sigel
at Carthage, but Steele and Stanley were men of different temper, and
attacked him so savagely as to scatter his force in wild confusion.

Lyon marched forward to within six miles of the main Confederate
position, and lay there 24 hours, when, not deeming it wise to attack so
far from his base, retired unmolested to Springfield.

This startling aggressiveness quite overcame Gen. McCulloch, and
the conduct of the Missourians disgusted him. He was strong in his
denunciation of them and quite frank in his reluctance to attack
Gen. Lyon without further information as to "his position and
fortifications," and complained bitterly that he could get no
information as to the "barricades" in Springfield and other positions
he might encounter. He said that "he would not make a blind attack on
Springfield," and "would order the whole army back to Cassville rather
than bring on an engagement with an unknown enemy."


154

Gen. Price was strenuous in his insistence upon attack, and
finally McCulloch consented to meet all the general officers at his
headquarters. In the council McCulloch was plain in his unwillingness to
engage Lyon or to enter on any aggressive campaign, but Price, seconded
by Gens. Parsons, Bains, Slack and McBride, were most determined that
Lyon should be attacked at once, and declared that if McCulloch
would not do it he would resume command and fight the battle himself.
McCulloch finally yielded, and ordered a forward movement, and on
the morning of Aug. 6 the entire force was in camp along the bank of
Wilson's Creek, about six miles south of Springfield. This position
was taken largely because of its proximity to immense cornfields, which
would supply the troops and animals with food.

Wilson's Creek, rising in the neighborhood of Springfield, flows west
some five miles, and then runs south nine or 10 miles in order to empty
into the James River, a tributary of White River. Tyrel's Creek and
Skegg's Branch, which have considerable valleys, are tributaries of
Wilson's Creek. Above Skegg's Branch rises a hill, since known as Bloody
Hill, nearly 100 feet high. Its sides are scored with ravines, the rock
comes to the surface in many places, and the hight was thickly covered
with an overgrowth of scrub-oak. There are other eminences and ravines,
generally covered with scrub-oak and undergrowth, and the Confederates
were camped in an irregular line along these for a distance of about
three miles up and down Wilson's Creek, from the extreme right to the
extreme left. Here they remained three days, with the much-disturbed
McCulloch riding out every day with his Maynard rifle slung over his
shoulder for a personal reconnoissance, which, as far as could be judged
from his conversation on his return, was quite unsatisfactory.


155

He had little stomach for the attack, and naturally found reasons
against it.

Price and his Generals, on the other hand, were fretting over the delay.
Price's accurate information of Lyon's condition made him sure that Lyon
would do the obvious thing--retreat. It was the warlike thing to do
to attack at once, which had every chance of success. Success meant as
telling a stroke for Secession in the West as Bull Run had been in
the East It would be quite as sensational, for there was no refuge or
rallying point for the beaten Union army short of Rolla, 120 miles away,
and the rough country, cut by innumerable valleys, gorges and streams,
would enable the swarming mounted force to get in its wild work, and not
permit the escape of a man, a gun or a wagon.

McCulloch, yielding to Price's importunities, ordered the army forward,
and at dawn of Aug. 19 he and Mcintosh were sitting down to breakfast
with Price and Snead, preparatory to leading their forces forward, when
they were startled by their pickets being driven in. McCulloch, who had
hated Rains from Old Army days, and despised him and his Missourians
since the Dug Springs affair, remarked contemptuously, "O, it's only one
of Rains's scares," and turned to his meal.


156

But the matter instantly became more pressing than breakfast. Gen.
Lyon had returned to Springfield Monday, Aug. 5, to meet an intense
disappointment. Not a thing had been sent to meet his desperate needs.
Fremont had ordered one regiment from Kansas and from the Missouri River
to go forward to him, but they could hardly reach him in less than
a fortnight. There were at that time some 44 regiments in
Missouri--regiments commanded by men whose names afterward shine in
history--U. S. Grant, John Pope, S. A. Hurlbut, John M. Palmer, John
B. Turchin, S. B. Curtis, Morgan L. Smith, O. E. Salomon, John McNeil,
etc.,--but they were kept garrisoning posts, chasing guerrillas, and at
almost everything else than hurrying forward toward him, as they should
have been.

Two of his regiments--the 3d and 4th Mo.--took their discharge and
started for St. Louis. The 1st Iowa's time was out, but Lyon asked the
men to stay with him a few days longer, and they did to a man.

Aside from the military reasons for holding Springfield there were
others which appealed to Lyon's mind with equal power. His heart had
bled over the outrages committed by the Secessionists upon the Union
people in that section of the State. The presence of his army was the
only security that the loyal people had that their farms would not
be robbed and themselves murdered. Hundreds of them had gone into
Springfield to be under his protection. How they could be ever gotten
back to a place of safety in retreat was the gravest of problems. Gen.
Schofield, at that time his Adjutant-General, and who disapproved of
fighting the battle of Wilson's Creek, thinks that this consideration
had more weight with him than the military reasons, and induced him to
fight where the judgment of the soldier was against it.


157

Four anxious days longer Lyon remained at Springfield. He called a
council of his principal officers, and the unanimous decision was that
the army should retreat.

On Aug. 9 he sent the following letter to Gen. Fremont, the last he ever
wrote:

     General: I retired to this place, as I before informed you,
     reaching here on the 5th. The enemy followed to within 10
     miles of here. He has taken a strong position, and is
     recruiting his supply of horses, mules, and provisions by
     forages Into the surrounding country, his large force of
     mounted men enabling him to do this without much annoyance
     from me. I find my position extremely embarrassing, and am
     at present unable to determine whether I shall be able to
     maintain my ground or be forced to retire. I can resist any
     attack from the front, but if the enemy move to surround me
     I must retire. I shall hold my ground as long as possible,
     though I may, without knowing how far, endanger the safety
     of my entire force, with its valuable material, being
     induced by the valuable considerations involved to take the
     step. The enemy showed himself in considerable force
     yesterday five miles from here, and has doubtless a full
     purpose of attacking me.

     N. LYON, Commanding.


168

The simple, soldierly dignity of this is pathetic. There is no murmur of
complaint, such as a man treated as he had been was eminently justified
in making. After sending this note, Gen. Lyon received intelligence that
one of his cavalry parties had been attacked by rebel cavalry, but
after a brief fight had beaten them off. He thereupon sent out a
reconnoitering party to learn if the Secessionists had moved forward,
and the party presently returned with two Texan and two Tennesseean
prisoners, from whom Lyon learned for the first time of the junction of
McCulloch's forces and Price's. He at once decided upon a bold stroke.
Everything was prepared as if in readiness for retreat, with the tents
struck and the Quartermaster's and Commissary's stores in the wagons.
Quartermaster Alexis Mudd went to headquarters and asked Gen. Lyon:

"When do we start back?"

The General fixed his keen blue eyes upon the Quartermaster and said,
clearly and firmly:

"When we are whipped back, and not until then."

An order was at once issued for every man to be prepared to march at 6
o'clock that evening, without any luggage, and with all the ammunition
he could carry.

Calling a council of officers, Gen. Lyon announced his intention to move
out and attack the enemy in his chosen position. Gen. Sigel proposed
that he be allowed to take his regiment and Col. Salomon's to move
independently and take the enemy in flank and rear. The other officers
strongly opposed this, while Gen. Lyon withheld his consent, but finally
yielded to Sigel's entreaties and authorized the movement, giving Sigel
1,400 infantry, two companies of cavalry and six pieces of artillery, to
move along the Fayetteville Road until he should reach the right flank
and rear of the enemy, and at daybreak attack them vigorously.

Lyon was to retain 3,700 men and 10 pieces of artillery and move down
the Mount Vernon Road and attack in the morning on the left front and
flank simultaneously with Sigel's attack on the right.


159

A force of 250 Home Guards with two pieces of artillery was left at
Springfield to guard the trains and public property. Col. Sigel's column
moved out at 6:30 o'clock in the evening by the left and arrived at
daybreak of the 10th within two miles of the extreme right and rear of
the enemy's camp, where they proceeded to cut off and bring into camp
some 40 stragglers who were out foraging. This was done to prevent their
carrying intelligence into camp.

Gen. Lyon with the First, Second and Third Brigades, set out about the
same hour, and by 1 o'clock in the morning came within sight of the
enemy's camp-fires, where they halted until morning. Capt. Plummer was
ordered to deploy his battalion to act as skirmishers on the left, while
Maj. Osterhaus did the same on the right with his battalion of the 2d
Mo.


160



CHAPTER X. BATTLE OF WILSON'S CREEK

If the idea of an attack by Gen. Lyon was remote from Gen. McCulloch's
thoughts, it was entirely absent from those of Gen. Sterling Price.
Gen. Price's mind was concentrated upon the plan to which he had wrung
McCulloch's reluctant consent of advancing that morning upon Lyon in
four columns, and thereby crushing him, probably capturing his army
entire or driving him into a ruinous retreat The first messengers
bringing the news of Lyon's close proximity were received with
contemptuous disbelief by McCulloch, but on their heels came an Aid from
Gen. Rains with the announcement that the fields in front of Rains
were "covered with Yankees, infantry and artillery." This roused all to
soldierly activity. Neither Price nor McCulloch lacked anything of
the full measure of martial courage, and both at once sped to their
respective commands to lead them into action.

After breaking up the council of war, the previous afternoon, Gen.
Lyon said very little beyond giving from time to time, as circumstances
called, sharp, precise, practical orders. Naturally talkative and
disputatious, he was, when action was demanded, brief, sententious, and
sparing of any words but what the occasion demanded. He had carefully
thought out his plan of march and battle to the last detail--determined
exactly what he and every subordinate, every regiment and battery
should do, and his directions to them were clear, concise, prompt and
unmistakable.

[Illustration: 165-Battlefield of Wilson's Creek]


161

He rode with Maj. Schofield, his Chief of Staff, to the place where they
halted about midnight in sight of the rebel campfires and slept with
him in the brief bivouac under the same blanket. To Schofield he seemed
unusually depressed. The only words he said, beyond necessary orders,
were almost as if talking to himself:

"I would give my life for a victory."

Again, in response to Schofield's discreet criticism of the wisdom of
dividing his forces and giving Sigel an independent command, he said
briefly:

"It is Sigel's plan."

Sige's theoretical knowledge of war and his experience were then felt to
be so overshadowing to everybody else's as to estop criticism.

The men of Lyon's little army lay down on their grassy bivouac with
feelings of tensest expectation. With the exception of the few of the
Regulars who had been in the Mexican and Indian wars, not one of them
had ever heard a gun fired in anger. They had been talking battle for
three months. Now it was upon them, but none of them could realize how
sharp would be the combat, nor how exceedingly well they were going to
acquit themselves.

At the first streak of dawn Lyon was up--all activity and
anticipation--to open the battle. He had wisely selected the two men who
were to strike the first blows.


162

Capt. Jos. B. Plummer, who commanded the Regulars deployed as
skirmishers on the left, and who sun should set, was a man after Lyon's
own heart He was strongly in favor of the battle, and afterward defended
it as the wisest thing to do under the circumstances. He was born in
Massachusetts, and had graduated in 1841 in the same class with Lyon
and Totten, whose battery was to do magnificent service, and avenge the
insults and humiliations of Little Rock. Rummer's standing in his class
was 22, where Lyon's was 11 and Totten's 25. He had been in garrison in
Vera Cruz during the Mexican War, and so had escaped getting the brevets
"for gallant and meritorious conduct" which had been so freely bestowed
on all who had been "present" at any engagement, but had reached the
rank of Captain in 1862, a year later than Capt Lyon. He was to rise
to Colonel of the 11th Mo. and Brigadier-General of Volunteers, and
everywhere display vigor and capacity in important commands, but to have
his career cut short by his untimely death near Corinth, Miss., Aug.
9,1862, at the age of 43 years. Maj. Peter Joseph Osterhaus, who
commanded the two companies of his regiment--the 2d Mo.--deployed on
the right, was the best soldier in that wonderful immigration of bright,
educated, enthusiastic young Germans who took refuge in this country
after the failure of the Revolution of 1848. At least, he was tried
longer in large commands, and rose to a higher rank than any of them.
Sigel and Carl Schurz became, like him, Major-Generals of Volunteers,
but his service was regarded as much higher than theirs, and he was
esteemed as one of the best division and corps commanders in the Army of
the Tennessee. After long service as a division commander he commanded
the Fifteenth Corps on the March to the Sea. He was born in Prussia,
educated as a soldier, took part in the Revolution, migrated to this
country, and was invaluable to Lyon in organizing the Home Guards among
the Germans to save the Arsenal He still lives, a specially honored
veteran, at Mannheim, in Prussia.


163

Capt. Jas. Totten, whose battery was placed in the center, was to win a
Lieutenant-Colonel's brevet for his splendid service during the day, but
got few honors during the rest of the war. He became a Brigadier-General
of Missouri Militia, and received the complimentary brevets of Colonel
and Brigadier-General when they were generally handed round on March 13,
1865, but his unfortunate habits caused his dismissal from the Army in
1870. He was then Lieutenant-Colonel and Assistant Inspector-General.

There were many men among Lyon's subordinates whose conduct during the
day brought them prominence and started them on the way to distinction.

Maj. Samuel D. Sturgis, of the 4th U. S. Cav., a Pennsylvanian, who was
that day to win the star of a Brigadier-General of Volunteers, and
who commanded the First Brigade, afterward rose to the command of a
division, fought with credit at Second Manassas, South Mountain and
Fredericksburg, for which he received brevets, and was overwhelmingly
defeated, while in command of an independent expedition, by Forrest,
at Guntown, Miss., June 10, 1864, and passed into retirement. He became
Colonel of the 7th U. S. Cav. after the war. He was a graduate of West
Point in 1882.


164

Lieut-Col. I. F. Shepard, who was Lyon's Aid, became a Brigadier-General
of Volunteers.

Maj. John M. Schofield, Lyon's Adjutant-General, has been spoken of
elsewhere.

Capt Gordon Granger, 3d U. S. Cav., a New Yorker and a graduate of the
class of 1841, was Lyon's Assistant Adjutant-General, and won a brevet
for his conduct that day. He was a man of far more than ordinary
abilities--many pronounced him a great soldier, and said that only his
unbridled tongue prevented him rising higher than he did. He became
a Major-General and a Corps Commander, led the troops to Thomas's
assistance at the critical moment at Chickamauga, but fell under the
displeasure of Sherman, who relieved him. He afterward commanded the
army which captured Forts Gaines and Morgan, and received the surrender
of Mobile.

Capt Frederick Steele, 2d U. S., Gen. Grant's classmate and lifelong
friend, who had won brevets in Mexico, commanded a battalion of two
companies. He was to become Colonel of the 8th Iowa, Brigadier and
Major-General, and render brilliant service at Vicksburg and in
Arkansas.

Maj. John A. Halderman, 1st Kan., who succeeded to the command of
the regiment when Col. Deitzler was wounded, was commended by all his
superior officers, for his handsome conduct. He had been appointed
by Gen. Lyon Provost Marshal-General of the Western Army, and was
afterwards commissioned a Major-General. He entered the diplomatic
service under President Grant; became Minister to Siam, and was praised
all over the world for his success in bringing that country into touch
with civilization.


165

Lieut.-Col. G. L. Andrews, who in the absence of Col. F. P. Blair,
commanded the 1st Mo., was a Rhode Island man, who afterward entered the
Regular Army, fought creditably through the war, and in 1892 was retired
as a Colonel.

In the 1st Mo. was Capt. Nelson Cole, who was severely wounded. He
served through the war, rose to be a Colonel, became Senior Vice
Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Army of the Republic, and was a
Brigadier-General of Volunteers in the war with Spain.

In the 1st Kan. were Col. Geo. W. Detzler, who later became a
Brigadier-General; Capt. Powell Clayton, who was to become a Colonel,
Brigadier-General, Governor of Arkansas, Senator, and Embassador to
Mexico, and Capt. Daniel McCook, who was to become Brigadier-General,
and fall at Kene-saw.

In the 2d Kan. were Col. Robert B. Mitchell, of Ohio, who rose to be
Brigadier-General and did gallant service in the Army of the Cumberland;
Maj. Charles W. Blair, who became a Brigadier-General, and Capt. Samuel
J. Crawford, who became a Colonel, a brevet Brigadier-General, and
Governor of Kansas.

In the 1st Iowa were Lieut.-Col. W. H. Merritt, a New Yorker, who
commanded the regiment and afterwards became a Colonel on the staff, and
Capt. Francis J. Herron, who became a Major-General of Volunteers and
commanded a division at Prairie Grove, Vicksburg, and in Texas.


166

There were very many in these regiments serving as privates and
non-commissioned officers who afterwards made fine records as
commanders of companies and regiments and became distinguished in
civil life. Taken altogether, Lyon's army was an unusually fine body of
fighting men. The Iowa and Kansas men were ardent, enthusiastic youths,
accustomed to the use of the gun, and who hunted their enemies as they
did the wild beasts they had to encounter. They were free from the
superstition inculcated in the Eastern armies that the soldier's duty
was to stand up in the open and be shot at. When it was necessary to
stand up they stood up gallantly, but at other times they took advantage
of every protection and lay behind any rock or trunk of tree in wait for
the enemy to come within easy range, and then fired with fatal effect.

The older Regulars trained to Indian fighting were equally effective,
and speedily brought the mass of recruits associated with them into
similar efficiency.

Nowhere else at that early period of the war was the fire of the Union
soldiers so deliberate and deadly as at Wilson's Creek.

The Confederates had no pickets out--not even camp-guards. They had
been marched and countermarched severely for days, and were resting
preparatory to advancing that morning on Springfield. Many were at
breakfast, many others starting out to get material for breakfast in the
neighboring fields. Rains's Division was the most advanced, and Rains
reports that he discovered the enemy when about three miles from camp,
and that he put his Second Brigade--mounted men commanded by Col.
Caw-thorn, of the 4th Mo.--into line to resist the advance. He says that
the brigade maintained its position all day, which does not agree with
the other accounts of the battle.


167

Before Gen. Lyon--a mile and a half away--rose the eminence, afterward
known as "Bloody Hill," which overlooked the encampment of the
Confederates along Wilson's Creek, and on which substantially all the
fighting was to take place. From it the Confederate trains were in short
reach, and the rout of the enemy could be secured. Its central position,
however, made it easy to concentrate troops for its defense and bring up
reinforcements.

Capt. Plummer sent forward Capt. C. C. Gilbert, 1st U. S., with his
company to guard the left of the advance, cross Wilson's Creek, and
engage the right of the enemy. Capt. Gilbert was a soldier of fine
reputation, who was to win much credit on subsequent fields; to rise to
the rank of Brigadier-General and the brief command of a corps, and then
to fall under the displeasure of his commanding officers. Capt. Gilbert
moved forward rapidly until he came to Wilson's Creek, where his
skirmishers were stopped by swamps and jungles of brushwood, when Capt.
Plummer caught up with him, and the whole battalion finally crossed
the creek and advanced into a cornfield, easily driving away the first
slight force that attempted to arrest them.

In the meanwhile quite a number of the enemy was discovered assembling
on the crest of the ridge, and Gen. Lyon forming the 1st Mo. into line
sent them forward on the right to engage these, while the 1st Kan. came
up on the left and opened a brisk fire, with Totten's battery in the
center, which also opened fire.


168

This was about 10 minutes past 5, when the battle may be said to
have fairly opened. The 1st Iowa and the 2d Kan., with Capt. Steele's
battalion of Regulars, were held in reserve. Rains's Missourians
responded pluckily to the fire, and Gen. Price began rushing up
assistance to them until he says that he had over 2,000 men on the
ridge. The 1st Kan. and the 1st Mo. pressed resolutely forward,
delivering their fire at short range, and after a sharp contest of 20
minutes the Missourians gave way and fled down the hill.

There was a brief lull, in which the Union men were encouraged by
hearing Sigel's artillery open two miles away, on the other flank of
the enemy, and Lyon found his line preparatory to pushing forward and
striking the trains. Already there were symptoms of panic there, and
some of the wagons were actually in flames.

Gen. Rains soon succeeded in rallying his men.

Gens. Slack, McBride, Parsons and Clark rushed to his assistance with
what men they could hastily assemble, and Gen. Price led them forward in
a line covering Gen. Lyon's entire front. Both sides showed an earnest
disposition to come to close quarters, and a fierce fight lasting for
perhaps half an hour followed. Sometimes portions of the Union troops
were thrown into temporary disorder, but they only fell back a few
yards, when they would rally and return to the field. The enemy strove
to reach the crest of the ridge and drive the Union troops back, but
were repulsed, while the Union troops, following them to the foot of the
ridge, were driven back to the crest.


169

The Confederates brought up a battery, which, however, was soon silenced
by the fire concentrated upon it from Totten's battery and that of
Lieut. Du Bois. In the meanwhile Capt. Plummer had been pushing his
Regulars thru the corn and oat fields toward the battery which he wanted
to take, and was within 200 yards of it when Capt. Mcintosh, an officer
of the Old Army, and now Adjutant-General for McCulloch, saw the danger
and rushed up the 3d La. and the 2d Ark. against Plummer's left The
Regulars made a stubborn resistance for a few minutes, but their line
was enveloped by the long line of the two regiments, and they fell back
with considerable haste across the creek toward Totten's battery.

Mcintosh saw his advantage and pursued it to the utmost, sending his
Louisianians and Arkansans forward on the double-quick to prevent
Plummer from rallying. The watchful DuBois saw the trouble the Regulars
were in, and turning his guns upon his pursuers enfiladed them with
canister and shell with such effect that they in turn ran, and were
rallied by Mcintosh behind a little log house, into which DuBois put a
couple of shells and sent them further back.

By this time the battle was two hours old and the roar of the conflict
died down, except on the extreme right, where the 1st Mo. was still
having a bitter struggle with a superior force of fresh troops with
which Price was endeavoring to turn the Union right flank.


170

Gen. Lyon, who had watched every phase of the battle closely, ordered
Capt. Totten to move part of his battery to the support of the 1st
Mo., but as the Captain was about to open he was restrained by seeing
a regiment advancing to within a distance of about 200 yards, carrying
both a Federal and a Confederate flag. It was the direction from which
Sigel had been anxiously expected, and as the uniform of the advancing
regiment was similar to that of Sigel's men, both the infantry and the
artillery withheld their fire until the enemy revealed his character by
a volley, when Capt Totten opened all his guns upon them with canister
and inflicted great slaughter.

Capt Cary Gratz, of the 1st Mo., was so indignant at this treachery that
he dashed out and shot down the man who was carrying the Union flag,
only to be shot down himself almost immediately afterwards by several
bullets from the Confederates. The 2d Kan. was also hurried forward to
support the 1st Mo. Capt Steele's battalion was brought up and the
1st Iowa was sent in to relieve the 1st Kan., which had suffered quite
severely and was nearly out of ammunition.

The battle was renewed with much greater fierceness than ever, the
Confederates advancing in three or four ranks, lying down, kneeling,
standing, sometimes getting within 30 or 40 yards of the Union line
before they were forced back.

Gen. Lyon was everywhere where his presence was needed to encourage the
troops, rally them, and bring them back into line. His horse was shot,
and he received a wound in the head and one on the ankle. He continued
to walk along the line, but he was evidently much depressed by the way
in which Price and McCulloch succeeded in bringing forward fresh troops
to replace those which had been driven from the field. He said to
Maj. Schofield sadly, "I fear the day is lost." Schofield replied
encouragingly, dismounted one of his orderlies and gave the horse to
Lyon, when they separated, each to lead a regiment It was now 9 o'clock,
or little after, and there was a lull in the fight, during which
time the enemy seemed to be reorganizing his force, and Lyon began
concentrating his into a more compact form on the crest of the ridge.


171

Capt. Sweeny called Lyon's attention to his wounds, but Lyon answered
briefly, "It is nothing."

Schofield moved off to rally a portion of the 1st Iowa, which showed
a disposition to break under the terrific fire, and lead it back into
action. Gen. Lyon rode for a moment or two with the file closers on the
right of the 1st Iowa, and then turned toward the 2d Kan., which was
moved forward under the lead of Col. Mitchell. In a few moments the
Colonel fell, wounded, and Gen. Lyon shouted to the regiment to come on,
that he would lead them. The next instant, almost, a bullet pierced his
breast and he fell dead. Lehman, his faithful orderly, was near him when
he fell, and rushed to his assistance, raising a terrible outcry,
which some of the officers near promptly quieted lest it discourage the
troops.

After a bitter struggle of fully half an hour the Confederates were
driven back all along the line, and the battle ceased for a little
while. The Confederates retired so completely that it looked as if the
battle was won, and Maj. Schofield, finding Maj. Sturgis, informed him
that he was in command, and the principal officers were hastily gathered
together for a consultation. The first and most anxious inquiry of all
was as to what had become of Sigel. It was all-important to know that.
If a junction could be formed with him the army could advance and drive
the enemy completely from the field.


172

Sigel had crossed Wilson's Creek and come into line within easy range
of McCulloch's headquarters, where Capt Shaeffer opened with his battery
upon a large force of Arkansan, Texan and Missourian troops who were
engaged in getting breakfast. They were so demoralized by the awful
storm of shells that at least one regiment--Col. Greer's of Texas--did
not recover its composure during the day, and took little if any part in
the rest of the engagement.

Col. Churchill succeeded in rallying his Arkansas regiment, but before
he could return and engage Sigel he received urgent orders to hurry over
to the right and help drive back Lyon. Sigel's men moved forward into
the deserted camp, but unfortunately broke ranks and began plundering
it.

McCulloch had rushed over to his headquarters in time to meet the
fugitives, and by great exertions succeeded in rallying about 2,000 men,
with whom he attacked Sigel's disorganized men in the camps, and
drove them out. Sigel succeeded in rallying a portion of his men, when
McCulloch advanced upon them with a regiment the uniforms of which were
so like that of the volunteers under Lyon that his men could not be
persuaded that it was not a portion of Lyon's troops advancing to their
assistance, and they withheld their fire until the Confederates were
within 10 paces, when the latter poured in such a destructive volley
that men and horses went down before it, and Sigel's Brigade was utterly
routed, with a loss of some 250 prisoners and a regimental flag, which
was afterwards used to deceive the Union troops.


173

With the exception of the two troops of Regular cavalry under Capt.
E. A. Carr, which seem to have done nothing during this time, Sigel's
Brigade disappeared completely from the action, and Sigel and Salomon,
with a few men, rode back to Springfield, where it is said that they
went to bed. This inexplicable action by Sigel bitterly prejudiced the
other officers against him, and was continually coming up in judgment
against him.

There is no doubt of Sigel's personal courage, but why, with the sound
of Lyon's cannon in his ears, and knowing full well the desperate
struggle his superior officer was engaged in, he made no effort to
rally his troops or to take any further part in the battle, is beyond
comprehension. Col. Salomon, who accompanied him in his flight to
Springfield, afterward became Colonel of a Wisconsin regiment, and made
a brilliant record.

It was yet but little after 9 o'clock, and despite the stubbornness of
the fighting no decisive advantage had been gained on either side.

The Union troops were masters of the savagely contested hill, but all
their previous efforts to advance beyond, pierce the main Confederate
line, and reach the trains below had been repulsed. Had they better make
another attempt?

The hasty council of war decided that it would be unsafe to do so until
Col. Sigel was heard from. The army was already badly crippled, for the
1st Kan. and the 1st Mo. had lost one-third of their men and half their
officers, the others had suffered nearly as severely, and everybody was
running short of ammunition. They had marched all night, and gone
into battle without breakfast, had been fighting five hours, and were
suffering terribly from heat, thirst and exhaustion.


174

The council was suddenly brought to an end by seeing a large force which
Price and McCulloch had rallied come over the hill directly in the Union
front A battery which Gen. Price had established on the crest of the
hill somewhat to the left opened a fire of canister and shrapnel, but
the Union troops showed the firmest front of any time during the day,
and Totten's and DuBois's batteries hurled a storm of canister into the
advancing infantry. Gen. Price had brought up fresh regiments to replace
those which had been fought out, and it seemed as if the Union line
would be overwhelmed. But the officers brought up every man they could
reach. Capt Gordon Granger threw three companies of the 1st Mo., three
companies of the 1st Kan., and two companies of the 1st Iowa, which had
been supporting DuBois's battery, against the right flank of the enemy
and by their terrible enfilade fire sent it back in great disorder. On
the right Lieut.-Col. Blair, with the 2d Kan., was having an obstinate
fight, but with the assistance of a section of Totten's battery under
Lieut. Sokalski the enemy was at last driven back clear out of sight.

The battle had now raged bitterly for six hours, with every attempt of
the enemy to drive foe stubborn defenders from the crest of the hill
repulsed. The slope on the eminence was thickly strewn with the dead and
wounded. The Confederates had suffered fearfully. Cols. Weightman and
Brown, who commanded brigades, had been killed, and Gens. Price,
Slack and Clark wounded. The loss of subordinate officers had been very
heavy. They had been clearly fought to a finish, and an attempt of their
cavalry to turn the Union right flank had been repulsed with great loss
by Totten's battery and several companies of the 1st Mo. and the 1st
Kan. The shells produced the greatest consternation among the horses and
men, as they were delivered at short range with unerring aim. The entire
Confederate line left the field, disappearing thru the thick woods in
the valley to their camp on Wilson's Creek, somewhat to the right of the
Union center.


175

Another brief council of war resulted in an order from Maj. Sturgis to
fall back. Nothing could be heard from Sigel, the men were exhausted,
the ammunition nearly gone, and it seemed best to retire while there was
an opportunity left. As subsequently learned this was a great mistake,
because the Confederate army was in full retreat, and an advance from
the Union army would have sent them off the field for good.

The Union officers did the best they could according to their light, and
their retirement was in the best order and absolutely unmolested.

The retreat began about 11:30 and continued two miles to a prairie
northeast of the battleground, where a halt was made to enable the
Surgeons to collect the wounded in ambulances. Gen. Lyon's body had been
placed in an ambulance, but by someone's order was taken out again and
left on the prairie with the rest of the dead.

About 5 o'clock in the afternoon the army reached Springfield, and
there found Sigel and Salomon and most of their brigade, with the others
coming in from all directions.


176

In spite of his conduct on the battlefield, Sigel's great theoretical
knowledge and experience in European wars decided that the command
should be turned over to him, and he was formally placed at the head.

According to official reports the casualties in the Union army were as
follows:

[Illustration: 176-Table of Union Casualties]

The official reports give the casualties in the Confederate army as
follows:

[Illustration: 177-Table of Confederate Casualties]


177



CHAPTER XI. THE AFTERMATH OF WILSON'S CREEK

An analytical study of the losses in the preceding chapter will aid in a
more thoro appreciation of the most bitter battle fought on the American
Continent up to that time, and by far the severest which had ever been
waged west of the Allegheny Mountains. It will be perceived that the
loss in the Union army was almost wholly in Gen. Lyon's column of 4,000
men, or less, which suffered to the extent of almost one-third of
its number. In the 1,300 men in Gen. Sigel's command the loss was
insignificant, except in prisoners.

Both sides fought with a stubbornness absolutely unknown in European
wars, but the regiments of the Union army seemed to be inspired with
that higher invincibility of purpose which characterized their great
leader.

Judged by the simple equation of losses, the Union regiments displayed a
far greater tenacity of purpose than the Confederates. We have no exact
figures as to the number in each Union regiment, as there were constant
changes taking place; a great many men had served their time out and
more were claiming and receiving their discharges.

Aug. 4, 1861, six days before the battle, Gen. Lyon gave from
"recollection" the following estimate of the strength of his command,
which must have been considerably reduced in the seven days between that
and the battle, and from which must be deducted some 250 men left to
guard the trains and property in Springfield:


178

[Illustration: 179-Table]


179

It is altogether unlikely that the 1st Mo., for example, took into
battle within 100 or more of the 900 men assigned to it, and the same
thing is true of the 900 men given for the 1st Iowa, and the 700 each
for the two Kansas regiments.

If we assume that the 1st Mo. and the 1st Iowa had 800 men each and the
Kansas regiments 600 each, we find that the loss of 295 for the 1st
Mo., 284 for the 1st Kan., and 154 for the 1st Iowa to be appalling. The
Regulars suffered severely, but not so badly as the volunteers.

Among those who were noted for gallant conduct in the battle of Wilson's
Creek was Eugene F. Ware, then a private in the 1st Iowa, and who
afterward became a Captain in the 7th Iowa Cav. In civil life
he attained a leading place at the Kansas bar, and was appointed
Commissioner of Pensions by President Roosevelt.


180

None of the Confederate regiments engaged suffered to anything like
the same extent, and as they were driven from the field, while the
Union regiments maintained their position and were even ready for
further aggression, the palm of higher purposes and more desperate
fighting must be unhesitatingly conceded to the Union volunteers. Few of
the Confederate commanders give reports of the number they carried into
action, but many of their regiments must have been approximately as
strong as those of the Union, and they had many more of them.

The moral effect of the battle was prodigious on both sides. The Union
troops were conscious of having met overwhelming forces and fought them
to a stand-still, if not actual defeat. Every man felt himself a victor
as he left the field, and only retreated because the exigencies of the
situation rendered that the most politic move.

It was consequently a great encouragement to the Union sentiment
everywhere, and did much to retrieve the humiliation of Bull Run. The
Confederates naturally made the very most of the fact that they had been
left masters of the field, and they dilated extensively upon the killing
of Gen. Lyon and the crushing defeat they had administered upon Sigel,
with capture of prisoners, guns and flags. They used this to so good
purpose as to greatly stimulate the Secession spirit thruout the State.


181

Gen. McCulloch's dispatches to the Confederate War Department are, to
say the least, disingenuous. His first dispatch that evening stated
that the enemy was 12,000 strong, but had "fled" after eight hours' hard
fighting. His second official report, dated two days after the battle,
gave his "effective" forces at 5,300 infantry, 15 pieces of artillery
and 6,000 horsemen, armed with flintlock muskets, rifles and shotguns.
He says: "There were, other horsemen with the army, but they were
entirely unarmed, and instead of being a help they were continually
in the way." He repeatedly pronounces the collisions at the different
periods of the battle as "terrific," and says: "The incessant roar of
musketry was deafening, and the balls fell as thick as hailstones." His
next sentences are at surprising variance with the concurrent testimony
on the Union side; for he says: "Nothing could withstand the impetuosity
of our final charge. The enemy fell back and could not again be rallied,
and they were seen at 12 m. fast retreating among the hills in the
distance. This ended the battle. It lasted six hours and a half."

By this time Gen. McCulloch had reduced the Union force to between 9,000
and 10,000, and he claims the Union loss to have been 800 killed, 1,000
wounded and 300 prisoners. He gave his own loss at 265 killed, 800
wounded and 30 missing. His colleague, Gen. Price, he curtly dismisses
with this brief laudation: "To Gen. Price I am under many obligations
for assistance on the battlefield. He was at the head of his force,
leading them on and sustaining them by his gallant bearing."


182

Gen. Price's report is more accurate and soldierlike, but he says that
after several "severe and bloody conflicts" had ensued, and the battle
had been conducted with the "greatest gallantry and vigor on both
sides for more than five hours, the enemy retreated in great confusion,
leaving their Commander-in-Chief, Gen. Lyon, dead upon the battlefield,
over 500 killed and a great number wounded." He claims that his forces
numbered 5,221 officers and men, of whom 156 were killed and 517
wounded. This would make the loss of his whole division of 5,000 men
673, or about the same lost by the 1st Mo. and the 1st Kan., with these
two regiments still maintaining their position, while the enemy retired.

It seems difficult to understand why, if the enemy "retreated in great
confusion," as reported by Mc-Culloch and Price, the several thousand
horsemen who did little or nothing during the battle were not let loose
to complete the ruin of the Union forces. No matter how poorly armed or
disciplined these might have been, their appearance on the flank of the
retiring column would have been fatal to any orderly retreat such as was
conducted. The universal testimony of the Union officers and soldiers is
that there was no enemy in sight when they started to leave the field,
and that they suffered no molestation whatever, though they halted two
miles from the field and in plain sight for some time.

It also passes comprehension that this horde of irregular horsemen
were not employed during the long hours of the battle in making some
diversion in the rear of the Union army.

Both Price and McCulloch seem to have had their attention so fully
engrossed in bringing up new regiments to keep Lyon from breaking thru
their lines and reaching their trains that they had no opportunity to
give orders or organize manuvers by the horsemen, and nobody seems to
have suggested to the mounted men that they could employ their time
better than by standing back and watching the progress of the terrible
conflict between the two opposing lines of infantry.


183

It appears that the Union officers in the council called by Gen. Sturgis
were not at all unanimous for retreat. Capt. Sweeny, altho severely
wounded, vehemently insisted upon pursuing the enemy, and Capt. Gordon
Granger, also severely wounded, rode up to Sturgis, pointed out that
there was not a man in sight and that the fire could be seen from where
the retreating foe was burning his wagons, and he urged the pursuit so
vigorously that Sturgis had to repeat his order for him to leave the
field.

Col. Sigel, in his report made at Rolla eight days after the battle,
made a long and labored explanation of his operations during the day. He
thus explained his failure to do more:

     In order to understand clearly our actions and our fate, you
     will allow me to state the following facts:

     1st. According to orders, it was the duty of this brigade to
     attack the enemy in the rear and to cut off his retreat,
     which order I tried to execute, whatever the consequences
     might be.

     2d. The time of service of the 6th Regiment Mo. Volunteers
     had expired before the battle. I had induced them, company
     by company, not to leave us in the most critical and
     dangerous moment, and had engaged them for the time of eight
     days, this term ending on Friday, the 9th, the day before
     the battle.

     3d. The 3d Regiment, of which 400 three-months men had been
     dismissed, was composed for the greatest part of recruits,
     who had not seen the enemy before and were only
     insufficiently drilled.

     4th. The men serving the pieces and the drivers consisted of
     infantry taken from the 3d Regiment and were mostly
     recruits, who had had only a few days' instruction.

     5th. About two-thirds of our officers had left us. Some
     companies had no officers at all; a great pity, but a
     consequence of the system of the three months' service.

Later, when Gen. Sigel was seeking promotion, Maj. Schofield, then a
Brigadier-General, sent the following communication to Gen. Halleck:


184

     St Louis, Mo.. Feb. 18, 1862. Maj.-Gen.   Halleck,
     Commanding  Department  of  the   Missouri.

     General: The question of the merits of Brig.-Gen. Franz
     Slgel as a commander having assumed such shape as to deeply
     involve the interests of the service, I deem it my duty to
     make a statement of facts which came to my knowledge during
     the campaign of last Summer in the Southwest, ending in the
     death of Gen. Lyon and the retreat of his army from
     Springfield.

     Soon after the capture of Camp Jackson, in May, Gen. Lyon
     sent Col. Slgel, with his two regiments of infantry and two
     batteries of artillery, to the southwestern part of the
     State, by way of Rolla, to cut off the retreat of Price's
     force which he (Lyon) was about to drive from Boonville. Col.
     Sigel passed beyond Springfield, reaching a point not far
     from the Kansas line, and on the main road used by Price's
     men in their movement south to join him. Here he left a
     single company of infantry in a small town, with no apparent
     object, unless that It might fall in the hands of the enemy,
     which it did the next day (6th of July). Sigel met Price the
     next day, and fought the celebrated "battle of Carthage."
     Sigel had about two regiments of infantry, well armed and
     equipped, most of the men old German soldiers, and two good
     batteries of artillery. Price had about twice Sigel's number
     of men, but most of them mounted, armed with shotguns and
     common rifles, and entirely without organization and
     discipline, and a few pieces of almost worthless artillery.
     Sigel retreated all day before this miserable rabble,
     contenting himself with repelling their irregular attacks,
     which he did with perfect ease whenever they ventured to make
     them. The loss on either side was quite insignificant. Price
     and McCulloch were thus permitted to join each other
     absolutely without opposition; Sigel, who had been sent
     there to prevent their Junction, making a "masterly
     retreat."

     Several days before the battle of Wilson's Creek it was
     ascertained beyond a doubt that the enemy's strength was
     about 22,000 men, with at least 20 pieces of artillery,
     while our force was only about 5,000. About the 7th of
     August the main body of the enemy reached Wilson's Creek,
     and Gen. Lyon decided to attack him. The plan of attack was
     freely discussed between Gen. Lyon, the members of his
     staff, CoL Sigel, and several officers of the Regular Army.
     Col. Sigel, apparently anxious for a separate command,
     advocated the plan of a divided attack.   All others, I
     believe, opposed it.

     On the 8th of August the plan of a single attack was
     adopted, to be carried out on the 9th. This had to be
     postponed on account of the exhaustion of part of our
     troops. During the morning of the 9th Col. Sigel had a long
     interview with Gen. Lyon, and prevailed upon him to adopt
     his plan, which led to the mixture of glory, disgrace and
     disaster of the ever-memorable 10th of August Slgel, in
     attempting to perform the part assigned to himself, lost his
     artillery, lost his infantry, and fled alone, or nearly so,
     to Springfield, arriving there long before the battle was
     ended. Yet he had almost nobody killed or wounded. One piece
     of his artillery and 500 or 600 infantry were picked up and
     brought in by a company of Regular cavalry.   No effort was
     made by Sigel or any of his officers to rally their men and
     join Lyon's Division, altho the battle raged furiously for
     hours after Sigel's rout; and most of his men in their
     retreat passed in rear of Lyon's line of battle.


185

     On our return to Springfield, at about 5 o'clock p. m., Maj.
     Sturgis yielded the command to Col. Sigel, and the latter,
     after consultation with many of the officers of the army,
     decided to retreat toward Rolla; starting at 2 o'clock a. m.
     in order that the column might be in favorable position for
     defense before daylight. At the hour appointed for the
     troops to move I found Col. Sigel asleep in bed, and his own
     brigade, which was to be the advance guard, making
     preparations to cook their breakfast It was 4 o'clock before
     I could get them started. Sigel remained in command three
     days, kept his two regiments in front all the time, made
     little more than ordinary day's marches, but yet did not get
     in camp until 10, and on one occasion 12 o'clock at night.
     On the second day he kept the main column waiting, exposed
     to the sun on a dry prairie, while his own men killed beef
     and cooked their breakfast. They finished their breakfast at
     about noon, and then began their day's march.

     The fatigue and annoyance to the troops soon became so
     intolerable that discipline was impossible. The officers,
     therefore, almost unanimously demanded a change. Maj.
     Sturgis, in compliance with the demand, assumed the command.

     My position as Gen. Lyon's principal staff officer gave mo
     very favorable opportunities for judging of Gen. Sigel's
     merits as an officer, and hence I appreciate his good as
     well as his bad qualities more accurately than most of those
     who presume to judge him. Gen. Sigel, in point of
     theoretical education, is far above the average of
     commanders in this country. He has studied with great care
     the science of strategy, and seems thoroly conversant with
     the campaigns of all the great captains, so far as covers
     their main strategic features, and also seems familiar with
     the duties of the staff; but in tactics, great and small
     logistics, and discipline he is greatly deficient. These
     defects are so apparent as to make it absolutely impossible
     for him to gain the confidence of American officers and men,
     and entirely unfit him for a high command in our army. While
     I do not condemn Gen. Sigel in the unmeasured terms so
     common among many, but on the contrary see in him many fine
     qualities, I would do less than my duty did I not enter my
     protest against the appointment to a high command in the
     army of a man who, whatever may be his merits, I know cannot
     have the confidence of the troops he is to command.

     I am, General, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

     J. M. SCHOFIELD, Brigadier-General. U. S. Volunteers.


This was accompanied by a statement embodying the same facts and signed
by substantially all the higher officers who had been with Lyon.


186

At the first halt of the army, about two miles from the battlefield,
while the dead and wounded were being gathered up, it was discovered
that Gen. Lyon's body had been left behind. The Surgeon and another
officer volunteered to take an ambulance and return to the battlefield
for it They were received graciously by Gen. McCulloch; the body was
delivered to them and they reached Springfield with it shortly after
dark. The Surgeon made an attempt to embalm it by injecting arsenic
into the veins, but decomposition, owing to exposure to the hot sun, had
progressed too far to render it practicable, and they were compelled to
leave it when the army moved off.

Mrs. Phelps, wife of the member of Congress from that District, and
a true Union woman, obtained it and had it placed in a wooden coffin,
which was hermetically sealed in another one of zinc. Fearing that it
might be molested by the Confederate troops when they entered the city,
Mrs. Phelps had the coffin placed in an out-door cellar and covered with
straw. Later she took an opportunity of having it secretly buried at
night.

Thinking that the remains had been brought on, Mr. Danford Knowlton,
of New York, a cousin, and Mr. John B. Hasler, of Webster, Mass., a
brother-in-law of Gen. Lyon, came on at the instance of the Connecticut
relatives to obtain the remains. Not finding them at St. Louis,
they went forward to Rolla, where Col. Wyman furnished them with an
ambulance, with which they proceeded to Springfield under a flag
of truce. They were kindly received by Gen. Price, and also by Gen.
Parsons, whose brigade was encamped on the ground where the body was
buried, and exhuming it, brought it to St. Louis. The city went into
mourning, and the remains were conducted by a military and civic
procession to the depot, where they were delivered to the Adams Express
Company to be conveyed East under an escort of officers and enlisted
men.


187

At every station on the road crowds gathered to pay their tribute of
respect to the deceased hero and distinguished honors were paid at
Cincinnati, Pittsburg, New York, and Hartford. The body was taken to
Eastford, Conn., where the General was born, and in the presence of
a large assemblage was interred in a grave beside his parents, in
accordance with the desire the General expressed while in life.

Upon opening Lyons' will it was found that he had bequeathed all his
savings, prudent investments and property, amounting to about $50,000,
to the Government to aid it in the prosecution of the war for its
existence.

Aug. 25, Gen. Fremont issued congratulatory orders, in which he said:

     The General Commanding laments, in sympathy with the
     country, the loss of the indomitable Gen. Nathaniel Lyon.
     His fame cannot be better eulogized than in these words in
     the official report of his gallant successor, Maj. Sturgis,
     U. S. Cavalry: "Thus gallantly fell as true a soldier as
     ever drew a sword; a man whose honesty of purpose was
     proverbial; a noble patriot, and one who held his life as
     nothing where his country demanded it of him. Let us emulate
     his prowess and undying devotion to his duty!"

     The order also permitted the regiments and other
     organizations engaged to put "Springfield" on their colors,
     and directed that the order should be read at the head of
     every company in the Department of Missouri.


188

Dec. 30, 1861, Congress passed a joint resolution, in which it said:

     That Congress deems it just and proper to enter upon its
     records a recognition of the eminent and patriotic services
     of the late Brig-Gen. Nathaniel Lyon.   The country to whose
     service he devoted his life will guard and preserve his fame
     as a part of its own glory.

     2. That the thanks of Congress are hereby given to the brave
     officers and soldiers who, under the command of the late
     Gen. Lyon, sustained the honor of the flag, and achieved
     victory against overwhelming numbers at the battle of
     Springfield, in Missouri, and that, in order to commemorate
     an event so honorable to the country and to themselves, it
     is ordered that each regiment engaged shall be authorized to
     bear upon its colors the word "Springfield," embroidered in
     letters of gold. And the President of the United States is
     hereby requested to cause these resolutions to be read at
     the head of every regiment in the Army of the United States.


189



CHAPTER XII. A GALAXY OF NOTABLE MEN

The Union commanders were naturally very apprehensive that as soon as
Price and Mc-Culloch realized that the field had been abandoned they
would precipitate upon them their immense horde of vengeful horsemen.
Such was not the case. Nothing tells so eloquently of the severity of
the blow which Lyon had dealt his enemies than that it was two whole
days before Price and McCulloch were in a frame of mind to move forward
10 miles and occupy Springfield, the goal of their campaign. This delay
was golden to the Union commanders, hampered as they were by hosts of
Union refugees fleeing from the rebel wrath, and incumbering the column
with all manner of vehicles and great droves of stock. Considering the
activity of the Missourians in guerrilla warfare, and the vicious way
they usually harried the Union forces, it is incomprehensible, except on
the theory that the Confederate forces had been stunned into torpor
by the blow. The Union column was able to make its long retreat of
125 miles from Springfield to Rolla and traverse an exceedingly rough
country cut up every few miles by ravines, gorges and creeks, without
the slightest molestation from the six or eight thousand horsemen whom
McCulloch had complained were so much in the way during the battle on
the banks of Wilson's Creek.


190

Gen. McCulloch made a number of lengthy and labored explanations to the
Confederate War Department of his failure to make any pursuit, but in
the light of facts that then should have been attainable none of these
was at all satisfactory. He admits that he did not enter Springfield
until after his scouts had brought him satisfactory assurances that the
Union army had abandoned the town. Aug. 12 he advanced to Springfield,
and issued proclamations to the people announcing himself as their
deliverer, and that his army "by great gallantry and determined courage"
had entirely "routed the enemy with great slaughter."

If he expected to be received and feted as a liberator he was sorely
disappointed, and in one of his letters he says in connection with his
customary uncomplimentary allusions to Gen. Price's army, "and from all
I can see we had as well be in Boston as far as the friendly feelings of
the inhabitants are concerned."

The truth was that the advance of the Confederates had had a blighting
effect upon that large portion of the people which had hoped to remain
neutral in the struggle.

Gen. Lyon, with all his intensity of purpose, had kept uppermost in mind
that he was an agent of the law, and his mission was to enforce the
law. He had kept his troops under excellent discipline, had permitted
no outrages upon citizens, and had either paid for or given vouchers for
anything his men needed, and had generally conducted himself in
strict obedience of the law. His course was a crushing refutal of the
inflammatory proclamations of Gov. Jackson and others about the Union
soldiers being robbers, thieves, ravishers and outragers.


191

Quite different was the course of the twenty or more thousand men whom
Price and McCulloch led into Springfield. They were under very little
discipline of any kind, and were burning with a desire to punish and
drive out of the country not merely those who were outspoken Unionists,
but all who were not radical Secessionists. They knew that the sentiment
in Springfield and the country of which it was the center was in favor
of the Union, and they wanted to stamp this out by terror.

While this brought to their ranks a great many of the more pliant
neutrals, it drove away from them a great number, and put into the ranks
of the Union many who had been more or less inclined to the pro-slavery
element.

The soreness between Price and McCulloch which had been filmed over
before the battle by Price subordinating himself and his troops to
McCulloch, became more inflamed during the stay at Springfield. In spite
of the fact that the Missouri troops had done much better fighting, and
suffered severer losses in the battle than McCulloch, he persisted in
denouncing them as cowards, stragglers and mobites, without soldierly
qualities.

The following extracts from a report to J. P. Benjamin, Confederate
Secretary of War, will show the temper which pervaded all his
correspondence, and was probably still more manifest in his personal
relations with the Missourians:

     It was at this point that I first saw the total inefficiency
     of the Missouri mounted men under Brig.-Gen. Rains. A
     thousand, more or less, of them composed the advance guard,
     and whilst reconnoiterlng the enemy's position, some eight
     miles distant from our camp, were put to flight by a single
     cannon-shot, running in the greatest confusion, without the
     loss of a single man except one who died of overheat or
     sunstroke, and bringing no reliable information as to the
     position or fore of the enemy; nor were they of the
     slightest service as scouts or spies afterwards.


192

     As evidence of this I will mention here the fact of the
     enemy being allowed to leave his position, six miles distant
     from us, 20 hours before we knew it; thus causing us to make
     a night march to surprise the enemy, who was at that time
     entirely out of our reach. A day or two previous to this
     march the Generals of the Missouri forces, by common consent
     on their part and unasked on mine, tendered me the command
     of their troops, which I at first declined, saying to them
     it was done to throw the responsibility of ordering a
     retreat upon me if one had to be ordered for the want of
     supplies, their breadstuffs giving out about this time; and,
     in truth, we would have been in a starving condition had it
     not been for the young corn, which was just in condition to
     be used.    *    *    *

     The battle over, it was ascertained that the camp followers,
     whose presence I had so strongly objected to, had robbed our
     dead and wounded on the battlefield of their arms, and at
     the same time had taken those left by the enemy. I tried to
     recover the arms thus lost by my men, and also a portion of
     those taken from the enemy, but in vain. Gen. Pearce made an
     effort to get back those muskets loaned to Gen. Price before
     we entered Missouri the first time. I was informed he
     recovered only 10 out of 615. I then asked that the battery
     be given me, which was one taken by the Louisiana regiment
     at the point of the bayonet. The guns were turned over by
     the order of Gen. Price, minus the horses and most of the
     harness. I would not have demanded these guns had Gen. Price
     done the Louisiana regiment justice in his official report
     The language used by him was calculated to make the
     impression that the battery was captured by his men Instead
     of that regiment    *    *    *

McCulloch was a voluminous writer, both to the Confederate War
Department and to personal and official friends, and few of these
communications are without some complaint about the Missouri troops.
Everything that he had failed to do was due to their inefficiency,
their lack of soldierly perceptions, and conduct. They would give him
no information, would not scout nor reconnoiter, and he was continually
left in the dark as to the movements of the enemy. When they were
attacked he claimed that they would run away in a shameful manner. His
dislike of Gen. Rains seemed to grow more bitter continually.

[Illustration: 195-General Samuel R. J. Curtis]


193

Gen. Price saw a great opportunity and was anxious to improve it. The
retreat of the Union forces from Springfield opened up the whole western
part of the State, and a prompt movement would carry the army forward to
the Missouri River again, where it could control the navigation of
that great stream, receive thousands of recruits now being assembled at
places north of the river, separate the Unionists of Missouri from the
loyal people in Kansas and Nebraska, and hearten up the Secessionists
everywhere as much as it disheartened the Union people, and possibly
recover St. Louis.

He pressed this with all earnestness upon Gen. McCulloch, only to have
it received with cold indifference or strong objections. He proposed
that if McCulloch would undertake the movement, that he, Price, would
continue in subordination to him and give him all the assistance that
his troops could give.

There is no doubt that Price was entirely right in his views, and that
a prompt forward movement with such forces as he and McCulloch commanded
would have been a very serious matter for the Union cause and carry
discouragement everywhere to add to that which had been caused by the
disaster of Bull Run.

The relations between the two Generals constantly became more strained,
and for the latter part of the two weeks which McCulloch remained at
Springfield there was little communication between them. Gen. Price made
good use of the time to bring in recruits from every part of the State
which was accessible and to organize and discipline them for further
service.

At the end of a fortnight Gen. McCulloch suffered Gen. Pearce to return
to Arkansas with his Arkansas Division, while Gen. McCulloch retired
with his brigade of Louisianians and Texans, and Price was left free to
do as he pleased.


194

The death of Gen. Lyon at last aroused Gen. Fremont to a fever of energy
to do the things that he should have done weeks before. He began a
bombardment of Washington with telegrams asking for men, money and
supplies, and sent dispatches of the most urgent nature to everybody
from whom he could expect the least help. He called on the Governors of
the loyal Western States to hurry to him all the troops that they could
raise, and asked from Washington Regular troops, artillery, $3,000,000
for the Quartermaster's Department, and other requirements in
proportion. He made a requisition on the St. Louis banks for money, and
showed a great deal of fertility of resource.

Aug. 15, five days after the battle, President Lincoln, stirred up by
his fusillade of telegrams, dispatched him the following:

     Washington, Aug. 15, 1861. To Gen. Fremont:

     Been answering your messages ever since day before
     yesterday. Do you receive the answers? The War Department
     has notified all the Governors you designate to forward all
     available force. So telegraphed you. Have you received these
     messages?    Answer immediately.

                    A. LINCOLN.


With relation to his conduct toward Gen. Lyon, Gen. Fremont afterward
testified to this effect before the Committee on the Conduct of the War:

     A glance at the map will make it apparent that Cairo was the
     point which first demanded immediate attention. The force
     under Gen. Lyon could retreat, but the position at Cairo
     could not be abandoned; the question of holding Cairo was
     one which involved the safety of the whole Northwest. Had
     the taking of St. Louis followed the defeat of Manassas, the
     disaster might have been irretrievable; while the loss of
     Springfield, should our army be compelled to fall back upon
     Rolla, would only carry with it the loss of a part of
     Missouri--a loss greatly to be regretted, but not
     irretrievable. Having reinforced Cape Girardeau and Ironton,
     by the ut-most exertions, I succeeded in getting together
     and embarking with a force of 3,800 men, five days after my
     arrival in St Louis.


195

     From St. Louis to Cairo was an easy day's Journey by water,
     and transportation abundant To Springfield was a week's
     march; and before I could have reached it Cairo would have
     been taken and with it, I believe, St Louis.

     On my arrival at Cairo I found the force under Gen. Prentiss
     reduced to 1,200 men, consisting mainly of a regiment which
     had agreed to await my arrival. A few miles below, at New
     Madrid, Gen. Pillow had landed a force estimated at 20,000,
     which subsequent events showed was not exaggerated. Our
     force, greatly increased to the enemy by rumor, drove him
     to a hasty retreat and permanently secured the position.

     I returned to St. Louis on the 4th, having in the meantime
     ordered Col. Stephenson's regiment from Boonville, and Col.
     Montgomery's from Kansas, to march to the relief of Gen.
     Lyon.

     Immediately upon my arrival from Cairo, I set myself at
     work, amid incessant demands upon my time from every
     quarter, principally to provide reinforcements for Gen.
     Lyon.

     I do not accept Springfield as a disaster belonging to my
     administration. Causes wholly out of my jurisdiction had
     already prepared the defeat of Gen. Lyon before my arrival
     at St Louis.


The ebullition of the Secession sentiment in Missouri following the news
of the battle of Wilson's Creek made Gen. Fremont feel that the most
extraordinary measures were necessary in order to hold the State. He
had reasons for this alarm, for the greatest activity was manifested
in every County in enrolling young men in Secession companies and
regiments. Heavy columns were threatening invasion from various points.
One of these was led by Gen. Hardee, a Regular officer of much ability,
who had acquired considerable fame by his translation of the tactics in
use in the Army. He had been appointed to the command of North Arkansas,
and had collected considerable force at Pocahontas, at the head of
navigation on the White River, where he was within easy striking
distance of the State and Lyon's line of retreat, and was threatening
numberless direful things.


196

McCulloch and Price had sent special messengers to him to urge him to
join his force with theirs to crush Lyon, or at least to move forward
and cut off Lyon's communications with Rolla. They found Hardee within
400 yards of the Missouri State line. He had every disposition to do as
desired, but had too much of the Regular officer in him to be willing
to move until his forces were thoroly organized and equipped. There was
little in him of the spirit of Lyon or Price, who improvised means for
doing what they wanted to do, no matter whether regulations permitted it
or not.

Hardee complained that though he had then 2,300 men and expected to
shortly raise this force to 5,000, one of his batteries had no horses
and no harness, and none of his regiments had transportation enough for
field service, and that all regiments were badly equipped and needed
discipline and instruction.

Later, Hardee repaired many of these deficiencies, and was in shape to
do a great deal of damage to the Union cause, and of this Fremont and
his subordinates were well aware. Gens. Polk and Pillow, with quite
strong forces at Columbus, were threatening Cairo and southeast
Missouri, and an advance was made into the State by their picturesque
subordinate, Gen. M. Jeff Thompson, the poet laureate of the New Madrid
marshes and the "Swamp Fox" who was to emulate the exploits of Francis
Marion. Thompson moved forward with a considerable force of irregular
mounted men, the number of which was greatly exaggerated, and it was
reported that behind him was a column commanded by Pillow, ranging all
the way from 8,000 to 25,000.


197

Gen. Fremont set an immense force of laborers to work on an elaborate
system of fortification for the city of St. Louis, and also began the
construction of fortifications at Cape Girardeau, Ironton, Rolla and
Jefferson City. He employed laborers instead of using his troops, in
order to give the latter opportunity to be drilled and equipped.
He issued the following startling General Order, which produced the
greatest commotion in the State and outside of it:

     Headquarters of the Western Department,

     St Louis, Aug. 31, 1861.

     Circumstances in my judgment of sufficient urgency render it
     necessary that the Commanding General of this Department
     should assume the administrative power of the State. Its
     disorganized condition, the devastation of property by bands
     of murderers and marauders who infest nearly every County in
     the State, and avail themselves of the public misfortunes
     and the vicinity of a hostile force to gratify private and
     neighborhood vengeance, and who find an enemy wherever they
     find plunder, finally demand the severest measures to
     repress the daily increasing crimes and outrages which are
     driving off the inhabitants and ruining the State. In this
     condition the public safety and the success of our arms
     require unity of purpose, without let or hindrance to the
     prompt administration of affairs.

     In order, therefore, to suppress disorders, to maintain, as
     far as now practicable, the public peace, and to give
     security and protection to the persons and property of loyal
     citizens, I do hereby extend and declare established martial
     law thru-out the State of Missouri. The lines of the army of
     occupation in this State are, for the present, declared to
     extend from Leavenworth, by way of the posts of Jefferson
     City, Rolla and Ironton to Cape Girardeau, on the
     Mississippi River. All persons who shall be taken with arms
     in their hands within these lines shall be tried by court-
     martial, and, if found guilty, will be shot. The property,
     real and personal, of all persons in the State of Missouri
     who shall take up arms against the United States, or shall
     be directly proven to have taken active part with their
     enemies in the field, is declared to be confiscated to the
     public use; and their slaves, if any they have, are hereby
     declared free men.

     All persons who shall be proven to have destroyed, after the
     publication of this order, railroad tracks, bridges or
     telegraphs, shall suffer the extreme penalty of the law.

     All persons engaged in treasonable correspondence, in giving
     or procuring aid to the enemies of the United States, in
     disturbing the public tranquility by creating and
     circulating false reports or incendiary documents, are in
     their own interest warned that they are exposing themselves.


198

     All persons who have been led away from their allegiance are
     required to return to their homes forthwith; any such
     absence, without sufficient cause, will be held to be
     presumptive evidence against them.

     The object of this declaration is to place in the hands of
     the military authorities the power to give Instantaneous
     effect to existing laws, and to supply such deficiencies as
     the conditions of war demand. But it is not intended to
     suspend the ordinary tribunals of the country, where the law
     will be administered by the civil officers in the usual
     manner and with their customary authority, while the same
     can be peaceably exercised.

     The Commanding General will labor vigilantly for the public
     welfare, and, in his efforts for their safety, hopes to
     obtain not only the acquiescence, but the active support, of
     the people of the country.

     J. C. FREMONT,

     Major-General Commanding.


Another man who appeared on the scene as Colonel of the 2d Iowa was
Samuel R. Curtis, an Ohio man, who graduated from West Point in 1831, in
the same class with Gens. Ammen, Humphreys and W. H. Emory. He resigned
the next year and became a prominent civil engineer in Ohio. He served
in the Mexican War as Colonel of the 2d Ohio, and at the close of that
struggle returned to his profession of engineering, removed to Iowa, and
at the outbreak of the war was a member of Congress from that State. He
was a man of decided military ability, and the victory won at Pea Ridge
was his personal triumph. He was to rise to the rank of Major-General
and command an independent army, but become involved in the factional
fights in Missouri and have his further career curtailed.


199

Still another name which appears with increased frequency about this
time is that of U. S. Grant, an Ohio man, who had graduated from West
Point in 1843, and had shown much real enterprise and soldiership in
Mexico, but had fallen under the disfavor of his commanding officers;
had been compelled to resign while holding the rank of Captain in the
4th U. S., and for eight years had had a losing struggle in trying to
make a living in civil pursuits. A happy accident put him at the head of
the 21st Ill., with which he had entered Missouri to guard the Hannibal
& St. Joseph Railroad, and incidentally to dispose of one Thomas A.
Harris, a very energetic and able man who held a Brigadier-Generalship
from Gov. Jackson, and who was making himself particularly active in
the neighborhood of that railroad. Grant showed much energy in chasing
around for Harris, but had never succeeded in bringing him into battle,
though when he left for other scenes Harris was hiding among the knobs
of Salt River, with his command reduced to three enlisted men and his
staff.

Though he was out of favor with Gen. McClellan and many others who
were directing military operations, in some way a Brigadier-General's
commission came to U. S. Grant, and he was assigned to the District of
Southeastern Missouri, with headquarters at Cape Girardeau, where his
duty was to hold in check the poetical M. Jeff Thompson, the noisy
Gideon J. Pillow and the prelatic Leonidas J. Polk in their efforts to
get control of the southeastern corner of the State and menace Cairo and
St. Louis.

Maj. Sturgis was promptly made a Brigadier-General to date from Wilson's
Creek, and assigned to the command of Northeast Missouri, where he had
five or six thousand men under him.

Capt. Fred Steele had accepted a commission as Colonel of the 8th Iowa;
Capt. Jos. B. Plummer shortly took the Colonelcy of a new regiment, the
11th Mo.; Capt. Totten became Lieutenant-Colonel and Colonel of the 1st
Mo. Art., of which Schofield was Major.


200

Notwithstanding the feeling of the officers and soldiers who had
participated in the battle of Wilson's Creek against Sigel, it was found
so necessary to "recognize the Germans" and hold them strongly for the
Union cause that he was made a Brigadier-General to date from May 17,
1861, which put him in the same class of Volunteer Brigadier-Generals as
Hunter, Heintzelman, Fitz John Porter, Wm. B. Franklin, Wm. T. Sherman,
C. P. Stone, Don Carlos Buell, John Pope, Philip Kearny, Joseph
Hooker, U. S. Grant, John A. McClernand and A. S. Williams, all of whose
volunteer commissions bore the date of May 17. This was subsequently a
cause of trouble.

There appeared also another of those figures so common among the State
builders of this country, and upholding to the fullest the character
of a leader of pioneers. James H. Lane was an Indiana man, son of a
preacher; had served with credit as Colonel of Indiana troops in Mexico,
and had been Lieutenant-Governor of Indiana and Member of Congress, but
getting at odds with his party had migrated to Kansas, where his natural
talents and fiery, aggressive courage speedily brought him to the front
as the leader of the warlike Free State men, who resisted with force and
arms the attempts of the Pro-slavery men to dominate the Territory.
His instant readiness for battle and the unsparing energy with which he
prosecuted his enterprises so endeared him to the Free State men that
when the State was admitted there was no question about his election as
her first United States Senator.


201

Kansas had promptly raised two regiments, which had fought superbly
at Wilson's Creek and afterwards joined in the retrograde movement to
Rolla. This left Kansas without any protection, and the people naturally
reasoned that in the advance upon the territory left unguarded by the
retirement of the Union army, Gen. Price and his Missourians would
embrace the opportunity to pay back with interest the debt of vengeance
which had been running since the wars of '56 and '57. Therefore Lane
received the authority to recruit five regiments in Kansas, and went
about his work with his characteristic energy.

The 3d, 4th, 5th, 6th and 7th Kan. at once began organizing, receiving
many recruits from the young Union men who had been forced to leave
Missouri, and within a week or more after the battle of Wilson's Creek
Gen. Lane had mustered an effective force of about 2,500 men, who had
received some clothing and equipment and much instruction from the
Regular officers and men at Forts Scott, Riley and Leavenworth.

With these forces in hand under a man of Lane's well-known character,
neither Gen. Price nor his men had much disposition to meddle with
Kansas, even if the General had not other and more comprehensive views.

Gen. Price was not waiting for Fremont's plans to develop before
executing his own. He employed the two weeks after the battle in
diligently organizing his men, and Aug. 26 left Springfield at the head
of a column of about 10,000 enthusiastic young Missourians, who had
in that brief time made great progress in soldiership. He caused great
alarm at Fort Scott, by pointing the head of his column toward that
place, and arriving within 10 miles of it on the night of the 1st
of September, sent Rains's Division, which was made up of men from
southwest Missouri, forward to reconnoiter.


202

Rains's advance of 30 mounted men under Capt. Rector Johnson pushed
forward to within sight of Fort Scott, on the morning of Sept. 1, and
captured a drove of 80 Government mules which had been sent out to graze
on the prairies. They also carried off all the able-bodied men that they
could find on their line of march. Two companies of the newly-raised
Kansas cavalry promptly attacked Johnson's command, which fell back
across the line toward the main body, encamped at Dry Wood. Gen. Lane
gathered up such of his volunteers as were in reach, and moved to Dry
Wood, where he offered Gen. Rains battle, but the latter declined to be
drawn from the shelter in the woods in which he had formed his lines,
and Lane did not think it was prudent to attack a force the strength of
which he could not ascertain.

A noisy, long-range skirmish ensued, which terminated at nightfall by
Lane withdrawing his forces to Fort Scott. The next day, leaving Col.
Jennison with 400 cavalry in Fort Scott, Lane crossed the Little Osage
and threw up fortifications on its banks to oppose Price's further
advance and give him battle should he attempt to move into Kansas.

Gen. Price declined to fight him in his chosen position, but drew his
forces together and started to execute his cherished plan of advancing
to the Missouri River and forming connection there with the troops
which Gens. Harris and Green had been raising in northern Missouri, not
seriously molested in their work by the Union forces under Gens.
Pope and Sturgis. The action at Dry Wood was made the most of by the
Secessionists, who claimed a defeat for the terror-striking "Jim" Lane.
The casualties were insignificant for the forces engaged, as there were
but five killed and 12 wounded on the Union side, and four killed and 16
wounded on the Confederate.


203

It was feared that after Gen. Price had moved forward to the Missouri
River McCulloch would come up from Arkansas and take Fort Scott, which
he had been authorized to do by the Confederate Secretary of War;
but McCulloch seems to have had other ideas, and spent the weeks in
inaction.

The situation of the Union men of southwest Missouri became gloomy in
the extreme. The whole country was overrun with guerrilla bands hunting
down the Union men, and not infrequently shooting them on sight.

Gen. Fremont had seriously alarmed Polk, Pillow and Thompson by his
showy reinforcement of Cairo with 3,800 men. Though Pillow was reputed
to have about 20,000 troops at his disposal, he was seized with a great
fear, wrote to Hardee at Pocahontas urging him to come to his help, and
limited the sphere of the operations of his dashing lieutenant, M. Jeff
Thompson. Maj.-Gen. Polk seems to have also been deeply impressed,
for he wrote to Pillow urging him to put his troops in trenches in the
neighborhood of New Madrid, strongly fortify that place and stretch a
chain across the river to prevent the passage of gunboats.

Then Polk had another tremor, and ordered Pillow to evacuate New Madrid
at once, taking his men and heavy guns across the river to the strong
works of Fort Pillow. Pillow, however, as insubordinate and self-seeking
as he had been in the Mexican War, and thirsting for the distinction of
taking Cape Girardeau, did not obey his superior's orders, but retained
his forces at New Madrid. He had the audacity to write to his superior,
"Withdraw your control over me for a few hours."


204

Pillow, merely hanging on to the remotest fringe of the State, assumed
the title of "Liberator of Missouri", and his correspondence, orders and
proclamations were headed, "Headquarters Army of Liberation."

About the same time an old acquaintance, Lieut-Gov. Thos. C. Reynolds,
he of the ready pen and fluent phrases, taking advantage of a hasty
journey of Gov. Jackson to Richmond, assumed full gubernatorial powers,
set up his capital in Pillow's camp at New Madrid, and proceeded to
clothe him with the most extraordinary prerogatives. He made himself the
whole of the "Sovereign people of Missouri," and issued a proclamation
withdrawing the State from the Union. He said that "disregarding the
forms and considering only realities, I view an ordinance for the
separation from the North and union with the Confederate States as
a mere outward expression giving notice to others of an act already
consummated in the hearts of the people." He then proceeded to establish
a military despotism which made the worst of what had been said of
Fremont pale before it. He clothed all the military commanders--not
merely those of Missouri provided by the odious Military Act, but
such Confederate commanders as Pillow and Hardee, who should enter the
State--with a most absolute power over the lives and property of the
people of Missouri.


205

The following oath was prescribed which all citizens were to be
compelled to take by any officer of the Missouri State Guards or
Confederate army who might come upon them:

     Know all men, that I------------, of the County of----------,
     State of Missouri, do solemnly swear that I will bear
     true faith and allegiance to the State of Missouri, and
     support the Constitution of the State, and that I will not
     give aid, comfort, information, protection or encouragement
     to the enemies or opposers of the Missouri State Guards, or
     their allies, the armies of the Confederate States, upon the
     penalty of death for treason.

In the meanwhile Gen. Price, more practical and capable than any of
them, with true military foresight was rushing his troops toward the
Missouri River, gaining recruits and arousing enthusiasm with every
day's march. Leading his own advance he hurried towards Warrensburg, the
County seat of Johnson County, about 30 miles south of Lexington,
where he hoped to seize about $100,000 deposited in the State banks.
He arrived too late for this however, because the Union troops had the
same object in view, and had anticipated him, carrying the money off
with them and leaving behind some very clever caricatures, drawn by the
skillful artists among the Germans, which irritated Price and his men
more than it was reasonable they should.

The Union commander at Warrensburg, Col. Everett Peabody, of the
13th Mo., had kept himself well informed as to Price's movements, and
retreated from Warrensburg to Lexington, burning the bridges after he
had crossed them. He sent notice to Fremont of Price's movements.

Col. James A. Mulligan, with the 23d 111., an Irish regiment, was
ordered forward to Lexington to Col. Peabdy's assistance, and to hold
the place to the last.


206

The 1st Ill. Cav., Col. Thos. A. Marshall, and fragments of Home Guard
regiments in process of organization, were drawn back to Lexington, in
face of the advance of Price's columns. There was also a mongrel field
battery, consisting of one 4-pounder, three 6-pounders, one 12-pounder
and two little 4-inch howitzers, the latter being useless on account of
having no shells.

The cavalry was only armed with pistols and sabers.

No official Union reports are on file as to the affair, but the total
strength of the garrison is given unofficially at from 2,640 to 3,300.
The correspondent of the Missouri Republican gives these figures:

     23d 111., Col. Mulligan...............................    800

     Home   Guards,   Col.   White..........................   500

     13th Mo., Col. Peabody................................    840

     1st Ill. Cav., CoL Marshall...........................    500

     Total...................................................2,040

Col. Mulligan assumed command of the whole by seniority of commission.
He was an Irishman with all his race's pugnacity, and also its
effervescence. He was born in Utica, N. Y., in 1830, had graduated from
a Roman Catholic college, studied law, and edited the principal Roman
Catholic paper in the West, "The Tablet."


207

Lexington, which is the County seat of Lafayette County, was a
very important place in frontier times, and the center of the great
hemp-growing region of Missouri. It is situated on the south bank of the
Missouri River, about 300 miles by its course above St. Louis, and about
84 miles below Kansas City by water, or 42 miles by rail. It consisted
of two towns, Old and New Lexington, about a mile apart, having
altogether about 5,000 people. It had some manufactories and two or
three colleges, one of which, the Masonic College, situated on high
ground between Old and New Lexington, a half mile from the river, was
taken by Col. Mulligan for his position, which he proceeded to fortify
with high, substantial works to accommodate 10,000 men, inclosing about
15 acres on the summit of the bluffs. Between 2,000 and 3,000 horses and
other animals of the trains were gathered inside this inclosure.

A week before Col. Mulligan's arrival, on Sept. 9, Gov. Jackson had
briefly set up his Capital there, and held a session of that portion
of the Legislature which adhered to him. The approach of Col. Pea-body
caused a precipitate adjournment, and there was left behind $800,000 in
coin, which was buried in the cellar of the college, with the great seal
of the State of Missouri.

At dawn on Sept. 12, Gen. Price, riding with his advance, Rains's
Division, struck the Union pickets stretching through the cornfields
outside of Lexington, but though he brought up all his infantry within
reach, and McDonald's, Guibor's, and Clark's batteries, his heads of
columns were beaten back everywhere by the stubborn Union soldiers, who
had been waiting three days for him, and he wisely decided to withdraw
two or three miles and wait for the rest of his forces and ammunition
wagons to come up.


208

Col. Mulligan telegraphed to Col. Jeff C. Davis, at Jefferson City--120
miles away--the fact of Price's advance and his need for help, and Davis
sent the news to Fremont, who ordered forward three regiments and two
batteries to Davis, and directed him to reinforce Mulligan, which he
could do by rail and river. Fremont also sent orders to Pope and Sturgis
to help Mulligan out, but there was not much urgency in the orders, and
each of his subordinates seems to have taken his own time and way of
obeying or not obeying.

Jeff C. Davis had at that time something over 5,000 men at Jefferson
City, and subsequent reinforcements raised this number, it was claimed,
to 11,000--certainly to 8,000. Davis afterward became a valuable
division and corps commander, but he certainly did not show up well in
this transaction. He, also, had too much of the "Regular" in him. He
complained of a lack of wagons and harness, commissary supplies and
ammunition, to enable him to make a forward movement. He had none of the
spirit of Lyon and Price, to impress teams and supplies and make means
to do what ought to be done.

It was harvest time in that fertile part of Missouri, and his army need
not have suffered for food, wherever he went. But all that he did was
to send forward a couple of regiments to occupy points and prevent the
Secessionists from crossing the river at those places. They had all
either crossed or found other unguarded places.

Pope showed similar incapacity. He had 5,000 men in easy reach of
Lexington, but he was more engrossed in the Hannibal & St Joseph
Railroad and in matters in Keokuk and Canton than in Lexington. He
telegraphed to Gen. Fremont that he would move forward 4,000 men to
Lexington, and actually did send forward Lieut.-Col. Scott with the 3d
Iowa and Robt. F. Smith with the 16th 111., with instructions to form
a junction at liberty, in Clay County, and then proceed to Lexington.
Lieut-Col. Scott pushed on to the Blue Mills Landing on the Missouri
River, where he came in contact with a large Secession force. Six
regiments of the Missouri State Guard were there, making their way to
Lexington.


209

D. R. Atchison, former Senator from Missouri, President of the United
States Senate, and of much notoriety during the Kansas and Nebraska
troubles, took command of this force and attacked Col. Scott, compelling
rapid retreat. Atchison reported to Price the usual story about the
small number under his command and the large force of the Yankees
routed, but this does not harmonize with his praises to Cols. Sanders,
Patten, Childs, Cundliff, Wilfley, and Maj. Gause, each of whom he says
handled his "regiment" with great gallantry.

Col. Smith met Col. Scott in his retreat, learned from him the
overwhelming force in front, and retreated with him, so that portion of
the relief came to naught.

Gen. Sturgis moved forward from Mexico with about 4,000 men and reached
the Missouri River, but finding no means for crossing, and surveying the
host that was gathered around the city, retired with such haste as to
leave his tents and camp equipage.

Gen. Price proceeded with astonishing deliberation, when we consider
that he must have known that Fremont had something over 20,000 men
within striking distance.

Retreat was still open for Col. Mulligan, as he had two steamboats
at his command, but he felt that his orders obliged him to remain in
Lexington for the protection of much public property which had been
gathered there, and that as his situation was known to Gen. Fremont,
relief would be speedily sent to him.


210

In the meantime, every hour had swelled Gen. Price's forces. Some of
the Secession writers have claimed that there were actually as many as
38,000 men gathered in his camps. Of course, a large proportion of his
force was useless unless to help beat off a relieving column, because,
owing to the small extent of the position occupied by Col. Mulligan,
only a limited number of men could be employed against it, and 10,000
were as effective as 100,000. A very large portion of Gen. Price's
forces were men who flocked to his camp as to a picnic or a barbecue,
because something was going on, and they fell away from him again when
he began a backward movement, as rapidly as they came.

Then ensued for six days a very strange battle. Swarms of Missourians
crowded the ravines in the bluffs, behind trees, stones, the walls,
fences and chimneys of the houses, and whatever else would afford
adequate protection, and kept up an incessant fusillade upon the
garrison safely ensconced behind thick banks of earth. When a squad
occupying a secure shelter grew tired, or had fired away all its
ammunition, it would go back to camp for dinner, when their places would
be taken by others eager to share in the noise and excitement and have
a story to take back home of the number of Yankees who had fallen under
their deadly aim. If all these stories of the men "who had been at
Lexington" could have been true, more men would have been sent to
the grave than answered Lincoln's call for 500,000 volunteers. The
artillerists were as enthusiastic and industrious as the men with
"Yager" rifles and shotguns, and banged away with unflagging zeal and
corresponding lack of mortality. The walls of the college were badly
scarred, but the worst effect was that an occasional shell would take
effect among the horses, and drop on the ground carcasses which speedily
putrified under the hot sun, and added an unbearable stench to the
other hardships of the garrison.


211

This went on day and night, for the moon was bright, and there was
no reason why a man who had powder and shot, and could not get an
opportunity at any of the coverts during the day, should not put in
pleasantly a few hours at night.

Naturally a rain of bullets, even though they might hit rarer than
lightning strokes, had a wearing effect on the garrison.

While this noisy fusillade by the mob of truculent bushwhackers was
going on, there were much more soldierly occurrences by the more
soldierly men on both sides.

There were sorties and counter-sorties in which the greatest gallantry
was displayed on both sides, and in which substantially all the losses
occurred. The Secessionists captured a Union flag in one of these, which
was balanced by a Secession flag captured by the 1st 111. Cav. Owing to
the great superiority of the enemy in numbers, the finality of all these
was against the garrison, which was everywhere pushed back from
the edges of the bluff, and also from some buildings on the bluffs
overlooking the works.

Gen. Rains's Division invested the eastern and northeastern position of
Mulligan's works; Gen. Parsons the southwestern, with Clark's Division,
commanded by Col. Congreve Jackson, and Steen's Division as reserves.


212

Col. Rives, commanding Gen. Slack's Division, occupied the west along
the river bank and captured the steamboats by which Mulligan could
escape or receive reinforcements; Gens. Harris and Mc-Bride extended
this line along the north, cutting off the garrison from all access to
the river and water. This became very effective in forcing surrender, as
not only the men but the animals suffered terribly from thirst.

By the morning of Sept. 18, six days after the first encounter with the
pickets, Gen. Price had all his forces up and properly disposed about
the garrison. He and his principal subordinates were very weary of
the noisy and fruitless bushwhacking, and eager for something more
conclusive.

Orders were issued for the whole line to close in upon the Union works,
and they were gallantly responded to and met as gallant resistance from
the beleaguered garrison in the 52 hours of stubborn fighting which
ensued. Col. Congreve Jackson, commanding Gen. John B. Clark's Third
Division, reported that he succeeded in getting to within 460 yards of
the College.

Col. Benj. A. Rives, commanding Gen. Slack's Fourth Division, says
that after having been driven back by a gallant counter-assault, he got
within 100 yards of the College.

Gen. Steen lays claim for his division of having defeated Lieut.-Col.
Scott, after which he passed back into the reserve.


213

Gen. Mosby M. Parsons, commanding the Sixth Division, says that he
reached to within 500 yards of the College, and also crossed the river
with 3,000 men, to repel Sturgis, who "retired in confusion, leaving 200
of their tents."

Gen. J. H. McBride, commanding the Seventh Division, says that he
succeeded in forming a breastwork with hemp bales "100 yards from the
enemy's works."

Gen. Jas. S. Rains says that with the Second Division, numbering 3,025
rank and file, he succeeded in gaining a position 350 yards north and
500 yards east of the College.

Gen. Thos. A. Harris does not give the point he reached, but the
concurrent testimony is that he was the closest of all, and is supported
by the fact that his division sustained the heaviest loss. To his
division is due the credit of the famous device of hemp bales as
advancing breastworks.

Gen. Price quietly appropriates the credit for the device to himself,
saying in his report:

On the morning of the 20th inst I caused a number of hemp bales to
be transported to the river nights, where moveable breastworks were
speedily constructed out of them by Cols. Harris, McBride, Rives and
Maj. Winston, and their respective commands. Capt. Kelly's battery
was ordered at the same time to the position occupied by Gen. Harris's
force, and quickly opened an effective fire under the direction of its
gallant Captain.

These demonstrations, particularly the continued advance of the hemp
breastworks, which were as efficient as the cotton bales at New Orleans,
quickly attracted attention and excited and alarmed the enemy. They
were, however, repulsed in every instance by the unflinching courage and
fixed determination of the men.

Gen. Harris says in his report to Gen. Price: "I then directed Capt.
Geo. A. Turner, of my staff, to request of you 132 bales of hemp, which
you promptly credited.


214

"I directed the bales to be wet in the river to protect them against the
casualties of fire of our troops and the enemy's, and soon discovered
that the wetting was so materially increasing the weight as to prevent
our men in their exhausted condition from rolling them to the crest of
the hill. I then adopted the idea of wetting the hemp after it had been
transported to this position."

The credit has also been stoutly claimed for Col. Thomas Hinkle, of
Wellington County, Mo., who two years later was killed in command of
a guerrilla organization. No matter whose, the idea was singularly
effective, and despite the most gallant efforts of the garrison, the
hemp bales were steadily rolled nearer, until by 2 o'clock in the
afternoon of the 20th they were in places as close as from 50 to 75
yards of the Union works. At this distance it would be easy to mass
an overpowering force behind their cover to rush upon and instantly
overwhelm the garrison.

The garrison, which had now been fighting for eight long days; which was
so short of ammunition that most of the cartridge boxes were empty, and
there was no supply from which to refill them; which was tortured with
thirst, surrounded with hundreds of animals dying from lack of water, at
last raised the white flag.

After eight days of waiting there was no more sign of rescue than there
was on the first, and everywhere they could look their enemies swarmed
in apparently limitless numbers. Gen. Price granted the garrison
honorable terms. The officers were to remain as prisoners of war, the
men to lay down their arms, take the oath not to fight any more against
Missouri, and to be sent across the river and allowed to go whither they
would.


215

With shrewd policy he allowed Col. Mulligan to retain his sword and
showed him a great many civilities. Mulligan was a representative
Irishman, and this would bear fruit in the attitude of the Irish toward
the war. In his report to Gov. Jackson Gen. Price sums up the fruits of
his victory as follows:

Our entire loss in this series of engagements amounts to 25 killed and
72 wounded. The enemy's loss was much greater.

The visible fruits of this almost bloodless victory are very
great--about 3.500 prisoners, among whom are Cols. Mulligan, Marshall,
Peabody, White, and Grover, Maj. Van Horn and 118 other commissioned
officers, five pieces of artillery and two mortars, over 8,000 stands of
Infantry arms, a large number of sabers, about 750 horses, many sets of
cavalry equipments, wagons, teams and ammunition, more than 8100,-000
worth of commissary stores, and a large amount of other property. In
addition to all this, I obtained the restoration of the great seal
of the State and the public records, which had been stolen from their
proper custodian, and about $900,-000 in money, of which the bank at
this place had been robbed, and which I have caused to be returned to
it.

Of Gen. Price's characteristics that of under-statement was certainly
not one; but there is no use caviling about this, since the disaster was
in all conscience bad enough for the Union side.

Col Mulligan's official report is not included in the Rebellion Records.
It was quite a rhetorical statement of the affair, with unstinted praise
for his own regiment and Irish valor generally, much condemnation for
the Germans, between whom and the Irish there was at that time a great
deal of feeling, and absolutely ignoring all the rest who participated
in the defense. This was particularly unjust to the 1st ID. Cav. While
the 23d 111. had taken the best and strongest part of the line, the 1st
111. Cav. had defended the weakest and most exposed part, that, too,
with only pistols and sabers, and had captured the only flag taken
during the siege.


216

The total loss of the garrison is usually given as 39 killed and 120
wounded.

Probably Gen. Price in his report only mentioned the losses in his
organized forces. If his wounded did not exceed 72, his men showed
unusual ability in keeping under cover.

While the loss did not approach that of the desperate fight at Wilson's
Creek, yet it was respectably large according to European standards, the
garrison having lost about six per cent before surrendering.

Gen. Fremont announced this calamity to Washington in the following
telegrams:

     Headquarters Western Department, St. Louis, Sept. 28, 1861.
     I have a telegram from Brookfleld that Lexington has fallen
     into Price's hands, he having cut off Mulligan's supply of
     water. Reinforcements 4,000 strong, under Sturgis, by
     capture of ferryboats, had no means of crossing the river in
     time. Lane's force from the southwest and Davis's from the
     southeast upwards of 11,000, could not get there in time. I
     am taking the field myself, and hope to destroy the enemy
     either before or after the junction of forces under
     McCulloch. Please notify the President immediately.

     J. C. FREMONT,

     Major-General Commanding. Col. E. D. Townsend, Assistant
     Adjutant-General, Headquarters of the Army, Washington, D.C.


     Headquarters Western Department, Sept 23, 1861. Nothing
     since my dispatch of this morning. Our loss 39 killed, 120
     wounded. Loss of enemy, 1,400 killed and wounded. Our non-
     commissioned officers and privates sworn and released.
     Commissioned officers held as prisoners. Our troops are
     gathering around the enemy. I will send you from the field
     more details in a few days.

     JOHN   C. FREMONT, Major-General   Commanding. Hon. S.
     Cameron, Secretary of War.

The patient and much enduring President answered as follows:

     Headquarters of the Army, Washington, Sept. 23, 1861. John
     C. Fremont, Major-General Commanding, St Louis, Mo.: Your
     dispatch of this day is received. The President is glad that
     you are hastening to the scene of action. His words are "He
     expects you to repair the disaster at Lexington without loss
     of time."                                WINFIELD SCOTT.

Fremont began to topple to his fall.


217



CHAPTER XIII. FREMONT'S MARVELOUS INEFFECTIVENESS.

Gen. Sterling Price had scored a victory which gave him an enduring hold
upon the confidence and esteem of the Missourians. With the least means
he had achieved the most success of any Confederate General so far. His
conduct at the battle of Wilson's Creek had endeared him to the men he
commanded. He exposed himself with utmost indifference to the fiercest
firing, showed good judgment as to movements, was not discouraged after
repeated repulses, and was everywhere animating and encouraging the men
and bringing them forward into line of battle.

He sympathized with those who were wounded, and had them cared for, and
immediately returned to the fighting with fresh troops.

It is true, however, that he had shown no generalship, but merely
demonstrated himself a good Colonel, in leading up one regiment after
another and putting them into the fight.

Lexington brought an immensity of prestige to Price and encouragement to
the Secessionists and did a corresponding injury to the Union cause. It
added immeasurably to the burdens which President Lincoln had to bear.
He could make Brigadier-and Major-Generals, but he could not endow them
with generalship.

The Senate could confirm them, but they were still more confirmed in the
dull, unenterprising routine of camp and administrative regulations.


218

The modest bars of a Captain on their shoulder straps had been, as it
were, changed in the twinkling of an eye into the refulgent stars of
a General, but they seemed to take this as a deserved tribute to their
personal worth, rather than as an incentive and opportunity for the
greater things which had made their predecessors illustrious.

Fremont, in the palatial Brandt Mansion, for which the Government was
paying the very unusual rent of $6,000 per year, was maintaining a vice
regal court as difficultly accessible as that of any crowned head
of Europe. His uncounted and glittering staff, which seemed to have
received the Pentecostal gift of tongues--in which English was not
included--was headed by a mysterious "Adlatus,"--a title before unknown
in America or to the dictionaries, and since retired to oblivion.
Naturally, the Adlatus's command of English was limited. His knowledge
of Missouri was even more so. Though commanding Missouri and dealing
intensely with Missouri affairs, the men surrounding Fremont were
everything but Missourians or those acquainted with Missouri affairs. It
would have been surprising to find one of them who could bound the State
and name its principal rivers.

This, too, in the midst of a multitude of able, educated, influential
Missourians who were ardent Unionists and were burning with zeal to
serve the cause. Not one of them appears in the Fremont entourage.


219

Gens. Pope, Sturgis, Jeff C. Davis, Hunter,--all Regulars and trained
to war; Sigel, with his profound theoretical knowledge and his large
experience; Curtis, lately returned to the Army with his military
training supplemented by wide experience in civil life; Hurlbut, the
brilliant orator and politician, were all busily engaged in something
or other that kept them from interfering with Price while he lingered on
the Missouri River gathering up recruits and stripping the Union farmers
of that rich agricultural region of cattle and grain sufficient to feed
his army during the coming Winter, and of horses and wagons to haul off
his spoils and thoroly equip his army with transportation.

The only really soldierly thing done at this time was by the "political
General,"--the erratic, demagogic, trumpet-sounding "Jim" Lane. He
was commanding men who had come out from home to do something toward
fighting the war and not to stay in camp and be drilled into automatons.
He could only maintain his hold on them and his ascendency in Kansas
politics by action.

Learning that Price had left a large stock of ammunition at the
important little town of Osceola, the head of navigation on the Osage
River, under strong guard, Lane led his brigade a swift march from
Kansas upon the town, and succeeded in surprising the garrison, which,
after a brief resistance, retreated and left it to Lane's mercy,
whereupon he proceeded to not only destroy the very considerable
quantity of stores which Price had accumulated there, but to burn down
the town. This was an exceedingly ill-advised ending to a piece of
brilliant soldiership, because not only was it injustice to an enemy,
but it was a severe blow upon Union men who owned full one-third of the
property destroyed.


220

A large number of these were engaged in the trade of the Southwest, for
which Osceola was a distributing center. Goods were brought up the river
during the high water and then shipped through the country by wagons.
The town was also the County seat of St. Clair County, and contained the
public records, etc.

Still more unfortunate was it that Lane's act was taken as an excuse for
the Missouri guerrillas to retaliate upon Kansas towns and the property
of the Union people in their own State. Lane says in his report: "The
enemy ambushed the approaches to the town, and after being driven from
them by the advance under Cols. Montgomery and Weer, they took refuge in
the buildings of the town to annoy us. We were compelled to shell them
out, and in doing so the place was burned to ashes, with an immense
amount of stores of all descriptions. There were 15 or 20 of them
killed and wounded; we lost none. Full particulars will be furnished you
hereafter."

This shows that even he felt the necessity of apologizing for the act,
but the apology is too transparent. The fact was that the Kansas men
saw an opportunity to pay back some of their old scores against the
Missourians and did not fail to improve it.

In spite of Gen. Fremont's promise to the President to "take the field
himself and attempt to destroy the enemy," he moved with exceeding
deliberation. It is true that he left St. Louis for Jefferson City,
Sept. 27, a week after Mulligan's surrender, but that week had been
well employed by Price in gathering up all that he could carry away and
making ready to avoid the blow which he knew must fall.


221

After arriving at Jefferson City, Fremont, instead of taking the troops
which were near at hand and making a swift rush upon his enemy, the
only way in which he could hope to hurt him, began the organization of
a "grande armée" upon the European model, and that which McClellan was
deliberately organizing in front of Washington.

The impatient people, who were paying the $3,000,000 a day which the war
was now beginning to cost, and who had begun to murmur for results, were
amused by stories of plans of sweeping down the Mississippi clear to
New Orleans, taking Memphis, Vicksburg and other strongholds on the way,
severing the Southern Confederacy in twain, so that it would fall into
hopeless ruin.

This was entirely possible at that time with the army that had been
given Fremont, had it been handled with the ability and boldness of
Sherman's March to the Sea.

Two weeks after Mulligan's surrender Fremont announced the formation of
this grand "Army of the West," containing approximately 50,000 men. This
was grouped as follows:

The First Division, to which Gen. David Hunter was assigned, consisted
of 9,750 men, and was ordered to take position at Versailles, about 40
miles southwest of Jefferson City, and became the Left Wing of the Army.

Gen. John Pope was given command of the Second Division of 9,220 men and
ordered to take station at Boonville, 50 miles northwest of Jefferson
City. His position was to be the Right Wing of the army.

The Third Division, 7,980 strong, was put under command of Gen. Franz
Sigel, and made the advance of the army, with its station at Sedalia and
Georgetown, 64 miles west of Jefferson City.


222

The Fifth Division, commanded by Gen. Asboth, had 6,461 men, and
constituted the reserve at Tipton, on the railroad, 38 miles west of
Jefferson City.

The Fifth Division, 5,388 men, under Gen. Justus McKinstry, formed the
center and was posted at Syracuse, five miles west of Tipton.

Beside these, Gen. Sturgis held Kansas City with 3,000 men and Gen.
Jas. H. Lane, with 2,500 men, was to move in Kansas down the State line,
between Fort Scott and Kansas City, to protect Kansas from an incursion
in that direction, and as opportunity offered attack Price's flank.

Thus, there were 38,789 effectives in the five divisions, which with
Sturgis's and Lane's forces made a total force of 44,289, not including
garrisons which swell the total of the army to over 90,000.

Among these Division Commanders were two whom Fremont had discovered and
created Brigadier-Generals out of his own volition, without consultation
at Washington.

These were Gens. Asboth and McKinstry. Gen. Alexander (Sandor)
Asboth, born in 1811, was a Hungarian and an educated engineer, with
considerable experience in and against the Austrian army. He had entered
ardently into the Revolution of 1848, and built a bridge in a single
night by which the Revolutionary army crossed and won the brilliant
victory of Nagy Salo. He became Adjutant-General of the Hungarian army,
and when the Revolution was crushed by Russian troops, escaped with
Kossuth into Turkey, came to this country, and became a naturalized
citizen. He was by turns farmer, teacher, engineer, and manufacturer of
galvanized articles. He sided with the Union Germans, went on Fremont's
staff, and was appointed a Brigadier-General. The Senate refused to
recognize the appointment, but in consideration of his good service
he was reappointed, served creditably through the war, was brevetted
a Major-General, and after the war sent as Minister to the Argentine
Confederation, where he died in 1868.


223

The other, Justus McKinstry, was born in New York and appointed to the
Military Academy from Michigan, where he graduated 40th in the class of
1838, of which Beauregard, Barry, Irvin McDowell, W. J. Hardee, R. S.
Granger, Henry H. Sibley, Edward Johnson and A. J. Smith were members.
He had served creditably in the Mexican War, receiving a brevet for
gallantry at Contreras and Churubusco, and at the outbreak of the war
was a Major and Quartermaster at St. Louis, where he did very much to
frustrate Lyon's plans and was regarded by him as a Secessionist
at heart. He continued to hold his position, however, as Chief
Quartermaster of the Department of the West until Fremont appointed him
Brigadier-General.

Shortly after Fremont's removal he was placed under arrest at St. Louis
and ordered before a court-martial, which did not convene, and he was
at last summarily dismissed for "neglect and violation of duty, to the
prejudice of good order and military discipline." He became a stock
broker in New York City, and afterwards a land agent at Rolla, Mo.

It will be seen by the map that the disposition of the troops was good,
and that Fremont had the advantage of short lines from Sedalia and Rolla
to cut Price's line of retreat, recapture the spoils he was hastening to
a place of safely, and destroy, or at least disperse, his army.


224

Fremont, however, made no use of this advantage, and Price seems to have
had no apprehension that he would. Price remained in Lexington until
Oct 1, serenely contemplating the gigantic preparations made for his
destruction, and then having gathered up all that he could readily get,
and reading Fremont's order for a forward movement of the Army of the
West, thought, like the prudent meadow lark, that probably something
would be now done, and the time had come for moving. He began a
deliberate retreat, crossing the Osage River at Osceola, and reaching
Greenfield, 150 miles away, at the very comfortable pace of 15 miles a
day.

Gen. Fremont ordered the Army of the West forward, but the so-called
pursuit was very much like hunting a fox on a dray. He was encumbered
with immense trains, for which bridges had to be built over numerous
streams and roads made thru the rough country. The trains seemed to
contain a world of unnecessary things and an astonishing lack of those
necessary. Apparently almost anybody who had anything to sell could find
purchasers among the numerous men about Fremont's headquarters who had
authority to buy, or assumed it.

One astonishing item in the purchases was a great number of half barrels
for holding water, rather an extraordinary provision in a country like
Missouri, where in the month of October water is disposed to be in
excessive quantities.

Notwithstanding the astonishing purchase of mules by everybody and
anybody, none of the Division Commanders seem to have had mules enough
to pull their wagons.


225

The division started out like the horses of a balky team. Gen. Pope, of
the Right Wing, left Jefferson City Oct. 11, Sigel got away from Sedalia
with the Third Division Oct. 13, the same day Hunter left Tipton with
the Left Wing, and Asboth followed on Oct 14. Even when they started
their progress was very slow, for the columns were halted at streams
to build bridges and in the rough countries to wait for the sappers and
miners to make passable roads.

When one column was halted, all the rest had to do likewise, for though
Price kept the safe distance of 100 miles away, Fremont was in constant
apprehension of battle, and held his columns in close supporting
distance. He did not get across the Osage River until Oct. 25, or nine
days after Price's leisurely crossing that important stream, on the
banks of which it was confidently expected that he would give battle.

Price, with his diminishing forces, had no such intention, but fell
back toward Neosho, to cover as long as possible the Granby Mines, seven
miles from that place, which were the most important source of lead
for the Southern Confederacy, to which they supplied 200,000 pounds per
month.

Gov. Jackson took advantage of this breathing spell to call the
Legislature together at Neosho, where it held a two weeks' "rump"
session of the small minority of that body which favored Secession.
They passed an ordinance of Secession and elected Senators and
Representatives to the Confederate Congress, adjourning when they heard
that Fremont had at last passed the Osage.


226

Then Price took up his line of retreat toward the southern boundary of
the State to get near Gen. Ben McCulloch, who had posted his forces at
Cross Hollow, in Benton County, northwest Arkansas. Gen. Price took
up his position at Pineville, in the extreme southwestern corner of
Missouri, where the rough, hilly country offered great chances to the
defense, and again began communication with Gen. McCulloch to induce him
to unite his force with his own and attack the Union army.

He had correctly estimated Fremont's generalship, and thought there was
a possibility of massing his and McCulloch's forces, to attack a portion
of Fremont's army, drive it back and defeat him in detail. McCulloch,
in spite of his ranger reputation, entirely lacked Price's aggressive
spirit, and thought that it would be much better to fall back to the
Boston Mountain, about 50 miles farther south, and make a stand there.
He so informed Gen. Price.

While McCulloch had no disposition to enter Missouri and defend it
against the Union troops, he had no hesitation about treating it as
part of Confederate territory. Desiring to embarrass and delay Fremont's
advance as much as possible, he sent forward his Texas cavalry to burn
the mills, forage and grain as far in the direction of Springfield as
they could safely go, and urged Price to do the same. McCulloch's Texans
soon lighted up the southwest country with burning mills, barns and
stacks.

To this Gen. Price was bitterly opposed. The mills and grain were in
many instances the property of the Secessionists, and to destroy them
would be to inflict worse punishment on his own people than the Union
commanders had ever done, and would embitter them against his cause.


227

Price repeatedly represented to McCulloch that altogether they would
have 25,000 men, and if McCulloch did not desire to go forward they
could make a good defensive battle inside the State on the hills around
Pineville. To leave it would cause the loss of very many Missourians who
had enlisted in the State Guard to defend Missouri, and who would feel
that they had no cause to fight outside of the State.

After crossing the Osage Fremont halted near Connersville, about 25
miles south of Warsaw, where he crossed the river, and then advanced
with Sigel to Bolivar, on the Springfield road, and sent forward Maj.
Charles Zagonyi with 150 of his famous Body Guard and Maj. F. J. White
with 180 men of the 1st Mo. Cav., to make a reconnoissance in the
direction of Springfield.

Fremont's Body Guard had played a large part in the pomp and
circumstance of his administration. Maj. Chas. Zagonyi was a picturesque
and effervescent Hungarian, who recounted fascinating stories of
his experience as a subordinate to Gen. Bern during the Hungarian
Revolution. Fremont had authorized him to raise a body guard, in
imitation of the famous troops of Europe, and the novelty of the
organization attracted to it a great number of quite fine young men,
most of whom were from the country around Cincinnati--one company being
from Kentucky. They were formed into three companies, mounted on fine
blooded bay horses, showily uniformed and each armed with two navy
revolvers, a five-barreled rifle and a saber.

All the officers were Americans except three--one Hollander and two
Hungarians. The members of the Guard, in addition to their expensive
and showy outfit, did not conceal from the other soldiers that they were
picked men and considered themselves superior to the ordinary run, which
did not enhance their popularity with their comrades.


228

Majs. Zagonyi and White marched all that night, and the next day, about
noon, when about eight miles north of Springfield, learned that there
was a force of at least 1,500 Confederates in the town.

One of the rebel pickets who had not been captured hastened back
to Springfield and gave the alarm, so that the Confederates were in
readiness for them. Feeling that this would be so, Majs. Zagonyi and
White determined to move around the town and approach it from the west
on the Mt. Vernon road. In this movement White became separated from
Zagonyi, who, about 4 o'clock in the afternoon, came most unexpectedly
upon the Secessionists drawn up in line at the end of a long lane.

A heavy rail fence intervened between Zagonyi and the head of the lane,
and an opening had to be made through this under a heavy fire from the
enemy. The moment a gap was made, Zagonyi shouted to his men to follow
him, and do as he did, raising the battle cry, "Fremont and the Union."
He dashed gallantly forward, straight for the center of the rebel line,
followed at a gallop by his command. The Confederate fire did fearful
execution upon the Guard as it was crowded in the lane, but in a few
seconds the lane was passed and the cavalry saber began doing its wild
work.


229

The center of the enemy's lines was at once broken by the terrible
impact of galloping horses and the Confederates began a panicky retreat,
followed by the vengeful horsemen shooting and sabering them as they
ran. The infantry ran through the town to the shelter of the woods, and
the Confederate cavalry fell back down the road, pursued by the Guard
until it was getting nightfall, when Zagonyi recalled them and returned
to the Court House, raised the Union flag from it, released the Union
prisoners confined in the jail, gathered up his dead and wounded, and
after dark decided to fall back until he met the advance of the army.

He had lost 15 men killed and 26 wounded, and reported that he had found
23 Confederates dead after the charge was over. This brilliant action,
which was then compared with the Charge of the Light Brigade at
Balaklava, redeemed the soldiers of the Guards in the eyes of their
comrades, and it became an honor to belong to that organization.

The next morning Maj. White reached Springfield with a few Home Guards,
where he found the Confederates still dazed by the occurrences of the
day before, and he was careful not to undeceive them as to his strength.
He solemnly received the flag of truce, said that he would have to refer
the matter to Gen. Sigel, threw out his men as pickets, permitted the
people to bury their dead, and then prudently fell back to meet the
advance of the army.

Fremont took up his quarters in Springfield, and began ostentatious
preparations for an immediate decisive battle, though Price was then
more than 50 miles away from him. This Fremont should have known, for
in some mysterious manner he was within ready communication with him,
so much so as to be able to conclude the following remarkable convention
which was duly published in a joint proclamation:


230

     To All Peaceably-Disposed Citizens of the State of Missouri,
     Greeting:

     Whereas a solemn agreement has been entered into by and
     between Maj.-Gens. Fremont and Price, respectively,
     commanding; antagonistic forces in the State of Missouri, to
     the effect that in the future arrests or forcible
     interference by armed or unarmed parties of citizens within
     the limits of said State for the mere entertainment or
     expression of political opinions shall hereafter cease; that
     families now broken up for such causes may be reunited, and
     that the war now progressing shall be exclusively confined
     to armies in the field:

     Therefore, be it known to all whom it may concern:

     1.  No arrests whatever on account of political opinions, or
     for the merely private expression of the same, shall
     hereafter be made within the limits of the State of
     Missouri, and all persons who may have been arrested and are
     now held to answer upon such charges only shall be forthwith
     released; but it is expressly declared that nothing in this
     proclamation shall be construed to bar or interfere with any
     of the usual and regular proceedings of the established
     courts under statutes and orders made and provided for such
     offenses.

     2.  All peaceably disposed citizens who may have been driven
     from their homes because of their political opinions, or who
     may have left them from fear of force and violence, are
     hereby advised and permitted to return, upon the faith of
     our positive assurances that while so returning they shall
     receive protection from both the armies in the field
     wherever it can be given.

     3.  All bodies of armed men acting without the authority or
     recognition of the Major-Generals before named, and not
     legitimately connected with the armies in the field, are
     hereby ordered at once to disband.

     4.  Any violation of either of the foregoing articles shall
     subject the offender to the penalty of military law,
     according to the nature of the offense.

     In testimony whereof the aforesaid Maj.-Gen. John Charles
     Fremont, at Springfield, Mo., on this 1st day of November,
     A. D. 1861, and Maj.-Gen. Sterling Price, at Cassville, Mo.,
     on this 6th day of November, A. D. 1861, have hereunto set
     their hands, and hereby mutually pledge their earnest
     efforts to the enforcement of the above articles of
     agreement according to their full tenor and effect, to the
     best of their ability.

     J. C FREMONT, Major-General   Commanding.

     STERLING PRICE, Major-General Commanding.


The practical effect of this was that Price was allowed to send such of
his men as he wished home for the Winter, with a safeguard against their
being molested by the Union troops, but it had no effect in protecting
Union men from being harassed by guerrilla tormentors, who cared as
little for conventions and proclamations as for the Sermon on the Mount.


281

In the meanwhile Fremont's astonishing ill success in purely military
matters, the freely expressed opinion of all who came in contact with
him as to his glaring incompetence, added to the fearful stories of
the corruption of the men immediately surrounding him, were making
his position very insecure. President Lincoln sent his intimate and
life-long friend, David Davis, whom he was about to elevate to the
Supreme Bench, to St. Louis with a commission to investigate the
rank-smelling contracts and disbursements. No report was ever made
public, but it was generally known that they found even worse than they
feared.

The Secretary of War, Simon Cameron, undertook a tour of investigation
on his own account, accompanied by Adj't-Gen. Lorenzo Thomas. Some of
the things which they found are set forth in the following extracts from
the memorandum from Gen. Thomas to his superior officer:

Gen. Curtis said of Gen. Fremont that he found no difficulty in having:
access to him, and when he presented business connected with his
command, it was attended to. Gen. Fremont never consulted him on
military matters, nor informed him of his plans. Gen. Curtis remarked
that while he would go with freedom to Gen. Scott and express his
opinions, he would not dare to do so to Gen. Fremont. He deemed Gen.
Fremont unequal to the command of an army, and said that he was no more
bound by law than by the winds.

Col. Andrews, Chief Paymaster, called and presented irregularities in
the Pay Department, and desired instruction from the Secretary for his
government, stating: that he was required to make payments and transfers
of money contrary to law and regulations. Once, upon objecting to what
he conceived an improper payment, he was threatened with confinement by
a file of soldiers. He exhibited an order for the transfer of $100,000
to the Quartermaster's Department, which was irregular. Exhibited
abstract of payment by one Paymaster (Maj. Febiger) to 42 persons,
appointed by Gen. Fremont, viz: one Colonel, three Majors, eight
Captains, 15 First lieutenants, 11 Second Lieutenants, one Surgeon,
three Assistant Surgeons; total 42. Nineteen of these have appointments
as engineers, and are entitled to cavalry pay.


282

Maj. Allen, Principal Quartermaster, had recently taken charge at
St Louis, but reported great irregularities in his Department, and
requested special Instructions. These he deemed important, as orders
were communicated by a variety of persons, in a very irregular manner,
requiring disbursements of money. These orders were often verbally
given. He was sending, under Gen. Fremont's orders, large amounts of
forage from St. Louis to.... where corn was abundant and very cheap. The
distance was 160 miles. He gave the indebtedness of the Quartermaster's
Department in St. Louis to be $4,606,809.73.

By direction of Gen. Meigs, advertisements were made to furnish grain
and hay, and contracts made for specific sums--28 cents per bushel for
corn, 30 cents for oats, and $17.95 per ton for hay. In face of this
another party at St. Louis--Balrd, or Baird A Palmer (Palmer being of
the old firm in California of Palmer, Cook & Co.)--were directed to
send to Jefferson City (where hay and corn abound) as fast as possible
100,000 bushels of oats, with a corresponding amount of hay, at 33 cents
per bushel for grain and $19 per ton for hay.

Capt Edward M. Davis, a member of his staff, received a contract by the
direct order of Gen. Fremont for blankets. They were examined by a board
of army officers consisting of Capt Hendershott, 4th U. S. Art,
Capt Haines, Commissary of Subsistence, and Capt Turnley, Assistant
Quartermaster. The blankets were found to be made of cotton and were
rotten and worthless. Notwithstanding this decision they were purchased,
and given to the sick and wounded soldiers in hospitals.

One week after the receipt of the President's order modifying Gen.
Fremont's proclamation relative to emancipation of slaves, Gen. Fremont
by note to Capt McKeever, required him to have 200 copies of the
original proclamation and address to the army, of same date, printed
and sent immediately to Ironton, for the use of Maj. Gavitt, Indiana
Cavalry, for distribution through the country. Capt McKeever had the
copies printed and delivered. The order is as follows:

     "Adjutant-General will have 200 copies of proclamation of
     Commanding General, dated Aug. 30, together with the address
     to the army of same date, sent immediately to Iron-ton, for
     the use of Maj. Gavitt Indiana Cavalry. Maj. Gavitt will
     distribute it through the country.

     "J. C. Ft.

     "Commanding General.

     "Sept. 23, 1861."

As soon as I obtained a view of the several encampments at Tipton,
I expressed the opinion that the forces there assembled could not be
moved, as scarcely any means of transportation were visible. I saw Gen.
Hunter, second in command, and conversed freely with him. He stated that
there was great confusion, and that Fremont was utterly incompetent;
that his own division was greatly scattered, and the force then present
defective in many respects; that he required 100 wagons, yet he was
ordered to march that day, and some of his troops were already drawn
out on the road. His cavalry regiment (Ellis's) had horses, arms
(indifferent), but no equipments; had to carry their cartridges in their
pockets; consequently, on their first day's march from Jefferson
City, in a heavy rain, the cartridges carried about their persons were
destroyed. This march to Tipton (36 miles) was made on a miry, heavy
earth road parallel to the railroad, and but a little distance from it.
The troops were directed by Gen. Fremont to march without provisions or
knapsacks, and without transportation. A violent rainstorm came up, and
the troops were exposed to it all night, were without food for 24 hours,
and when food was received the beef was found to be spoiled.


283

Gen. Hunter stated that he had just received a written report from one
of his Colonels, informing him that but 20 out of 100 of his guns would
go off. These were the guns procured by Gen. Fremont in Europe. I may
here state that Gen. Sherman, at Louisville, made a similar complaint
of the great inferiority of these European arms. He had given the men
orders to file down the nipples. In conversation with Col. Swords,
Assistant Quartersmaster-General; at Louisville, just from California,
he stated that Mr. Selover, who was in Europe with Gen. Fremont, wrote
to some friend In San Francisco that his share of the profit of the
purchase of these arms was $30,000.

Gen. Hunter expressed to the Secretary of War his decided opinion that
Gen. Fremont was incompetent and unfit for his extensive and important
command. This opinion he gave reluctantly, owing to his position as
second in command.

President Lincoln sent the following characteristic letter to Gen. S. R.
Curtis, who, being in command at St. Louis, was directly accessible, and
a man in whose discretion the President felt he might trust:


     Washington, Oct 24, 1861. Brig.-Gen. S. R. Curtis.

     Dear Sir: On receipt of this with the accompanying
     incisures, you will take safe, certain and suitable measures
     to have the inclosure addressed to Maj.-Gen. Fremont
     delivered to him with all reasonable dispatch, subject to
     these conditions only, that if, when Gen. Fremont shall be
     reached by the messenger--yourself or anyone sent by you--he
     shall then have, in personal command, fought and won a
     battle, or shall then be actually in battle, or shall then
     be in the immediate presence of the enemy in expectation of
     a battle, it is not to be delivered, but held for further
     orders. After, and not until after, the delivery to Gen.
     Fremont, let the inclosed addressed to Gen. Hunter be
     delivered to him.

     Tour obedient servant,
                                A. LINCOLN.

The following decisive order was one of the inclosures:


     Headquarters of the Army, Washington, Oct. 24, 1861.

     General Orders No. 18.

     Maj.-Gen. Fremont, of the U. S. Army, the present Commander
     of the Western Department of the same, will, on the receipt
     of this order, call Maj.-Gen. Hunter, of the U. S.
     Volunteers, to relieve him temporarily in that command, when
     he (Maj.-Gen. Fremont) will report to General Headquarters,
     by letter, for further orders.
                  WINFIELD SCOTT.


284

A special messenger arrived at Springfield, Nov. 2, with the order,
which created consternation at Fremont's headquarters. It is more than
probable that Fremont felt his elevation to be such that he could try
conclusions with the Administration, and refuse to obey the order.

There was considerable talk at that time about military headquarters as
to a dictator, and this was so rife about McClellan's that his journal
constantly abounds in allusions which indicate that he was putting the
crown away from him with increasing gentleness each time. There was much
of the same atmosphere about the headquarters of the Army of the West,
and it is claimed that Fremont at first decided not to obey the order,
but on Sigel's urgent representations finally concluded to do so, and
issued the following farewell order to his troops:

     Headquarters Western Department,

     Springfield, Mo., Nov. 2, 1861. Soldiers of the Mississippi
     Army:

     Agreeably to orders this day received I take leave of you.
     Altho our army has been of sudden growth, we have grown up
     together, and I have become familiar with the brave and
     generous spirit which you bring to the defense of your
     country, and which makes me anticipate for you a brilliant
     career. Continue as you have begun, and give to my successor
     the same cordial and enthusiastic support with which you
     have encouraged me. Emulate the splendid example which you
     have already before you, and let me remain, as I am, proud
     of the noble army which I had thus far labored to bring
     together.

     Soldiers, I regret to leave you. Most sincerely I thank you
     for the regard and confidence you have invariably shown me.
     I deeply regret that I shall not have the honor to lead you
     to the victory which you are just about to win, but I shall
     claim to share with you in the joy of every triumph, and
     trust always to be fraternally remembered by my companions
     in arms.

     J. C. FREMONT,

     Major-General, U. S. Army.


285

He left at once for St Louis, with his Body Guard for an escort. Though
these men had been enlisted for three years, they were ordered by
Gen. McClellan to be mustered out, and Maj. Zagonyi was offered the
Colonelcy of a new regiment.

The time and manner of the removal enabled Gen. Fremont's ardent
partisans to complain loudly that he was relieved on the eve of a battle
in which he would have accomplished great things, and was thus denied an
opportunity to achieve lasting fame and render essential service to the
country. The evidence, however, is conclusive that at that time Price
was at Pineville, fully 50 miles away, and in the midst of a very rough
country, instead of being in Fremont's immediate front, as Fremont
certainly supposed.

Whether he would have accepted battle after Fremont had reached him at
Pineville, is a matter of conjecture. The pressure in favor of Fremont
continued strong enough, however, to bring about the offer of a new
command to him the following year, but it was grotesquely shrunken from
the proud proportions of that from which he had been relieved. It was
styled the Mountain Department, and embraced a large portion of
West Virginia. Even in this restricted area he again failed to give
satisfaction.

June 8, 1862, he fought an indecisive battle against Stonewall Jackson
at Cross Keys, took umbrage at being placed under the command of
Gen. John Pope, whom he had once commanded, asked to be relieved
from command, and joined the ranks of the bitter critics of President
Lincoln's Administration, though still retaining his commission and pay
as a Major-General.

He still thought his was a name to conjure with, and May 31,1864,
accepted the nomination for President from a convention of dissatisfied
Republicans assembled at Cleveland, resigning his commission at last,
June 4, 1864.


286

The chill reception with which the country received his nomination at
last disillusionized even him, and in September he withdrew from the
field, to clear the way for Lincoln's re-election. He then became
connected with the promotion of a Pacific railway over the southern of
the routes which he had surveyed, lost his money and property in the
course of time, appealed to Congress for relief, and in 1890 was
by special act put on the retired list of the Army with the rank of
Major-General.


237



CHAPTER XIV. THE SAD RETREAT FROM SPRINGFIELD.

The partisans of Gen. Fremont bitterly blamed Gen. David Hunter for
having intrigued to succeed Fremont, and they rejoiced that his tenure
of that office proved to be so short-lived. This was both fallacious and
unjust.

Gen. David Hunter, while not of the highest type of military ability,
was yet far above mediocrity. He was one of the best examples of the Old
Regular Army officer--thoroughly devoted to his profession, a master of
all its details, incorruptible, inflexible, and intolerant to all whose
character and conduct lowered the standard of what Hunter thought an
American officer should be.

He was born in the District of Columbia, graduated from West Point in
1822, 25th in a class of 40 members, and had an extensive experience in
Indian fighting, commanding for several years a troop of dragoons. He
resigned in 1836, but re-entered the Army in 1842 as a Paymaster and
served as Chief Paymaster of Gen. Wool's Division in the Mexican War.

At the outbreak of the war of the rebellion he had been made Colonel
of the 6th U. S. Cav.--a new regiment--and commanded a division at Bull
Run, where he showed great gallantry and was wounded. He had been sent
out to Fremont as his second in command and adviser, in the hope that
he would control in some measure the commander's erratic course and be
instrumental in promoting better methods in his administration.


238

He was true to his duties in communicating to his superiors just what he
found in the Department of the West and properly representing Fremont's
incompetence. It was not intended that he should have permanent command
of the army, and probably no man was less desirous that he should be
than he himself, for he had a modest opinion of his own abilities and
never hesitated to subordinate himself when he thought another man would
do better in the place.

The command was given him merely as a stop-gap until another commander
could be determined upon.

In the same envelope which contained Lincoln's letter to Gen. Curtis
inclosing the order for the supersedure of Gen. Fremont, was another
reading as follows:

     Washington, Oct. 24, 1861. To the Commander of the
     Department of the West

     Sir:   The command of the Department of the West having
     devolved upon you, I propose to offer you a few suggestions.
     Knowing how hazardous it is to bind down a distant commander
     in the field to specific lines and operations, as so much
     always depends on a knowledge of localities and passing
     events, it is intended, therefore, to leave a considerable
     margin for the exercise of your judgment and discretion.
     The main rebel army (Price's) west of the Mississippi is
     believed to have passed Dade County in full retreat upon
     northwestern Arkansas, leaving Missouri almost freed from
     the enemy, excepting in the southeast of the State.
     Assuming this  basis of fact, it seems desirable, as you are
     not likely to overtake Price, and are in danger of making
     too long a   line from your own base of supplies and
     reinforcements, that  you should give up the pursuit halt
     your main army, divide   it into two corps of observation,
     one occupying Sedalla and    the other Rolla, the present
     termini of railroad; then recruit the condition of both
     corps by reestablishing and improving their discipline and
     instruction, perfecting their clothing and  equipments, and
     providing less uncomfortable quarters.    Of course, both
     railroads must be guarded and kept open, judiciously
     employing just so much force as is necessary for this. 'From
     these two points, Sedalia and Rolla, and especially in
     judicious cooperation with Lane on the Kansas border, it
     would be so easy to concentrate and repel an army of the
     enemy returning on Missouri from the southwest that It is
     not probable any such attempt to return will be made before
     or during the approaching cold weather.


289

     Before Spring the people of Missouri will probably be in no
     favorable mood to renew for next year the troubles which
     have so much afflicted and impoverished them during this. If
     you adopt this line of policy, and if, as I anticipate, you
     will see no enemy in great force approaching, you will have
     a surplus of force, which you can withdraw from these points
     and direct to others, as may be needed, the railroads
     furnishing ready means of reinforcing their main points, if
     occasion requires. Doubtless local uprisings will for a time
     continue to occur, but these can be met by detachments and
     local forces of our own, and will ere long tire out of
     themselves.

     While, as stated in the beginning of the letter, a large
     discretion must be and is left with yourself, I feel sure
     that an indefinite pursuit of Price or an attempt by this
     long and circuitous route to reach Memphis will be
     exhaustive beyond endurance, and will end in the loss of the
     whole force engaged.   Your obedient servant,

     A. LINCOLN.


This letter, undoubtedly dictated by McClellan, who was then
the dominant military influence at Washington, is yet strikingly
characteristic of President Lincoln, and abounds in that profound common
sense which made him easily the first General of the War.

The army was already 125 miles away from its base of suppliess on the
railroad, with a terrible rough intervening country. Consequently, the
problem of supplying it was of momentous seriousness and the expense
appalling.

Though in the midst of a region of wonderful fertility, with its crops
gathered in barns, no one seems to have though of utilizing these. They
left them for Price to gather in, while they hauled their supplies from
Rolla. Our officers as yet were only in the primer class in war.


240

The letter also shows the firm hold of the prevailing opinion that
Secession was only a temporary madness, from which the people would
recover when the Winter gave them time to reflect and reason. Probably
this would have been the case had the Government put forth its power
with crushing effectiveness. But the first year of the war was to end
with the Secessionists successful almost everywhere, and big scores
to their credit in Missouri. The fresh disaster at Ball's Bluff on the
Potomac unnerved many loyal people.

Possibly President Lincoln did not anticipate that his suggestions would
be carried out so literally. His best information was that Price's army
had virtually gone to pieces, and that by taking post at Sedalia
and Rolla the central and southwestern parts of the State could be
effectually controlled by parties sent out from there. He could not
have conceived that Price had a strong, compact, aggressive army well
in hand, and that the new commander of the Department of the West would
march away from it without striking a blow or making a manuver to reduce
its capacity for harmfulness.

Certainly some shreds of Lyon's mantle must have fallen on that proud
array of new-made Generals, and they would insist on striking a quick,
sharp blow, as a return for Lexington, for the honor of the Union
army, and to curb Price's rising conviction that he was an irresistible
conqueror.

But the next day after receiving his assignment to command, Gen. Hunter
made a reconnoissance in force to the battlefield of Wilson's Greek,
where Fremont had persisted in believing that Price was waiting to give
him battle. He found no enemy on the scene of the terrible battle of two
months before. Instead, all his information was to the effect that Price
was among the rugged fastnesses about Pineville, 50 miles away, with
McCulloch still farther off in the Boston Mountains.


241

Hunter therefore ordered his columns to countermarch and proceeded to
carry out the President's instructions promptly and exactly.

This backward movement, without a blow at Price, abandoned the whole of
the Union loving country of southwestern Missouri to the Secessionists,
and was a measureless calamity.

The Union people, taking heart from the advance of Fremont with his
great army, had returned to their homes and attempted to re-establish
themselves upon their farms and in their business. All these hopes were
suddenly dashed to the ground by the retirement of the army, and they
had to flee again in haste before the immediate advance of Price to
occupy the abandoned region.

It was not his army which was so terrible, but the horde of guerrilla
bands, which rushed out like venomous serpents after a warm rain, intent
upon rapine, outrage and murder. It was the "Poor White Trash" let
loose under such leaders as Quantrill, the Young-ers, Jameses, Haywards,
Freemans, and a thousand others of bandit infamy.

Aside from these calamities, the retreat, added to Price's victory at
Lexington, was a most stifling moral depression of the Union sentiment
in Missouri.

While the condition of things in the greater central and southwestern
parts of Missouri had been grievously unsatisfactory for many weeks,
and seemed to be growing steadily more so, it was otherwise in the
southeastern section.


242

The so-called Ozark Mountains, which are really a series of rough,
picturesque highlands, separating the watersheds of the Missouri and the
Arkansas Rivers, begin on the Mississippi at the mouth of the Meramec
River, 20 miles below St. Louis, and extend along the Mississippi,
rising frequently into cliffs of limestone 350 feet high, to Gape
Girardeau, 44 miles above Cairo, Ill.

This range, less than 100 miles wide, one of the richest in the world in
minerals, sinks away on the north and west to the valleys of the Osage
and the Missouri and the prairies which stretch across Kansas and the
Indian Territory to the Rocky Mountains. To the southeast it falls into
the lowlands and swamps along the Mississippi, making there a separate
and distinct section--about the size of Connecticut--and of entirely
different character from the rest of the State. Over 3,000 square miles
of this--or nearly three times the size of Rhode Island--are swamps
thickly wooded with towering cypresses, and covered with jungles
impenetrable to man. The principal town In the region was New Madrid, a
fever-smitten little village on the banks of the Mississippi, 44 miles
below Cairo. It had once much promise, but the terrible earthquakes
of 1811-12 had seamed the surrounding country with great crevices and
gulches, adding hopelessly to its forbidding character, and giving a
mortal blow to New Madrid's expectations.

The region was drained--as far as it was drained--by the St. Francis
River, a considerable stream, navigable nearly to the Missouri line, and
emptying into the Mississippi nine miles above Helena, Ark.

Besides the Mississippi River there were then two routes of access from
St. Louis to this region. One was by the Iron Mountain Railroad, which
ran through the Ozarks to Pilot Knob, 84 miles from the city, and the
other by common road through Fredericktown, 105 miles from St. Louis.


243

Gen. Albert Sidney Johnston--regarded by Jefferson Davis as a great
military genius, and appointed to command the entire Confederate army
in the West--had some idea of moving an army up through the swamps to
these roads, flanking the Union position at Cairo and taking St. Louis.
The St. Francis River would aid in supplying the army. His immediate
subordinate, Maj. Gen. Polk, was still more in favor of the plan, and it
went in this proportion down through Gen. Gideon Pillow, with his "Army
of Liberation," to the most enthusiastic advocate, of the scheme,
our poetical acquaintance, Gen. M. Jeff Thompson, file "Swamp Fox of
Missouri." The idea was to move in concert with Price coming up from the
southeast.

Maj.-Gen. Leonidas Polk, C. S. A., who had been placed in command of
the Mississippi River, and subsequently had the States of Arkansas
and Missouri added to his Department, had gathered about him in the
neighborhood of Memphis some 25,000 or 30,000 Mississippi, Louisiana,
Tennessee and other troops, with which, scorning Kentucky's claim of
neutrality, he advanced to Columbus, Ky., the terminus of the Mobile &
Ohio Railroad, and 20 miles from Cairo, Ill. Upon the high bluff there
he proceeded to construct one of those "Gibraltars" so numerous in the
early history of the war.

With the force at his command and the opposition he was likely to meet
from the Union commanders in southeast Missouri, a march on St. Louis
by the roads indicated was a promising venture. Besides the forces
immediately around him, he had control of McCulloch's, Pearce's and
Hardee's columns in Arkansas, and potential control of Price's and
Thompson's Missouri forces, making altogether an aggregate approaching
70,000 men.


244

But he hesitated, while Pillow fretted and fumed, and wrote that while
he honored his superior officer as a prelate and admired him as a
patriot, he had small opinion of his military judgment.

M. Jeff Thompson, who had no mean opinion of his own abilities, wrote
to Jefferson Davis that what the Southern Confederacy needed in that
quarter was "a first-class leader," and he cast a unanimous vote for
himself for that position.

In the meantime an event occurred as to the significance of which Polk,
Pillow and Thompson were as unappreciative as the country at large.

In August, U. S. Grant, lately commissioned a Brigadier-General, was
sent down to Cape Girardeau to look after matters in southeast Missouri,
including Cairo, Ill., and he took with him his former regiment,
the 21st Ill., to the command of which Col. John W. S. Alexander had
succeeded. A peculiarity of Gen. Grant, which President Lincoln speedily
noticed, was that wherever he was "things kept moving." There were no
grand reviews, no sounding proclamations, no sensational announcements
of plans, but somehow everybody about him was found to be speedily
employed in an effective way against the enemy. But little clamor ever
came from Grant for reinforcements or additional strength. If he was
given a thousand men he at once set them to work doing all that 1,000
men were capable of. Given 2,000 men he would do twice as much, and
so on. If supplies were not furnished him, he gathered them from the
surrounding country, giving vouchers carefully based on the prevailing
market rates. If no wagons or teams were at hand, he impressed them and
gave vouchers.


245

As unassertive and modest as Grant seemed to be, he had a remarkable
faculty for bringing in everybody near him and securing from them prompt
and energetic obedience to his orders.

Among Gen. Grant's subordinates was our old acquaintance, Capt. J. B.
Plummer, who had done such good work at Wilson's Creek and who was now
in command of the 11th Mo. There was also Col. W. P. Carlin, a Captain
in the Regular Army, whom the Governor of Illinois had wisely made
Colonel of the 88th 111. Carlin, a graduate of West Point in the class
of 1850, was a somewhat austere, highstrung man, wrapped up in his
profession, an excellent soldier, and feverishly anxious to do his duty
and justify his promotion to the important position he held.

Like all Regulars he was jealously sensitive about his rank, and one
of his first performances was insistence that he outranked Col. C. E.
Hovey, of the 33d Ill., and should therefore have command of the post.
Hovey, who had been Principal of the Normal Institute before becoming
a Colonel, felt that his position had been quite as high as that of a
Captain in the Regular Army, and his men, who entered warmly into the
dispute, could hardly understand how the Colonel of the 38th Ill. could
outrank the Colonel of the 33d, and though they at last gave way, there
was some bitterness of feeling.


246

Though Gen. Grant had only about 14,000 men all told, he kept Johnston,
Polk and Thompson, with their 30,000, so well employed guarding points
that he threatened, or might take without threatening, that their
superiority was neutralized and they were kept on the defensive.

Burning with desire to do something, M. Jeff Thompson, who, in spite of
his gasconade, was really a brave, enterprising man, and a good deal of
a soldier, started out from Columbus early in October with some 2,000
men, expecting to be joined by other forces on the way, capture Ironton
and Frederick-town, open up the road for Pillow's columns to St. Lous,
and to co-operate with Gen. Price.

He went down the river in boats to New Madrid and there began a march
across the country toward Bloomfield, which was to become the base of
so many of his subsequent operations. Leaving his infantry under the
command of Col. Aden Lowe, of the 3d Mo. State Guards, a prominent young
attorney and politician, to follow more slowly, Thompson pushed on with
500 mounted men, whom he calls "dragoons," made a wide circuit, and
struck the railroad north of Ironton at Big River Bridge, only about
40 miles from St Louis. He had made astonishing progress so far, and
jubilantly reported to Gen. Albert Sidney Johnston, who had come to
Columbus to watch the movement, that his men were so anxious to fight
that he reached his objective point two days ahead of the appointed
time.


247

At the Big River Bridge he struck a small company of a somewhat noted
regiment, the 33d Ill. (the Normal Regiment), largely made up of
students and teachers in the Normal Institute of Illinois, who, despite
the disparity in numbers, gave him a sharp little fight, in which he
lost two killed and quite a number wounded. He reported having captured
45 prisoners, with a quantity of supplies, and succeeded in burning
the bridge across the river. While engaged in distributing the supplies,
another company of the 33d Ill., hearing the noise, came up to the
assistance of their comrades, and Thompson had another fight on his
hands, in which he admits he lost four men killed and quite a number
wounded, but insists that he "killed another lot of the enemy and took
10 prisoners." He said he "had the enemy terribly frightened," and that
if Albert Sidney Johnston had the rest of his men in striking distance
that he could take Ironton, with its 12,000,000 rations stored for the
Winter, in an hour.

Johnston transmitted Thompson's report to Richmond with a complimentary
indorsement. Thompson also reported having received several hundred
recruits and captured about 17,000 pounds of lead. These were destined
to be the last of his rejoicings for some time.

Thompson sent word to all the commanders of Confederate forces in the
neighborhood to join in his attack on Ironton, promising them victory
and unlimited spoils.

Gen. Grant ordered Col. Carlin to move forward with his force from Pilot
Knob and attack Thompson's main body, which was then in the neighborhood
of Fredericktown. He also ordered Col. J. B. Plum-mer to march from Cape
Girardeau, strike at Thompson's line of retreat, and endeavor to capture
his whole force.


248

Thompson had cunningly magnified the number of his troops, and Plummer
and Carlin were both impressed with the idea that he had somewhere in
the neighborhood of 5,000 or 6,000 men and was likely to be joined by
Gen. Hardee's column from Pocahontas, Ark., with many more.

Grant, with that accurate knowledge of his enemy which was one of his
conspicuous traits and never failed him at any time during the war,
informed them that Thompson had only between 2,000 and 3,000 men. As
usual in Grant's operations, the columns moved on time and arrived when
expected.

Col. Carlin moved Oct. 20 from Pilot Knob with about 3,000 men made up
of the 21st Ill., Col. Alexander; 33d HI., Col. C. E. Hovey; 38th Ill.,
Maj. Gilman; 8th Wis., Col. Murphy; part of the 1st Ind. Cav., Col.
Conrad Baker, and some of the guns of the 1st Mo. Art., under the charge
of Maj. Schofield.

Col. Plummets column, about 1,500 strong, consisted of the 17th Ill.,
Col Ross; 20th Ill., Col. Marsh; 11th Mo., Lieut.-Col. Panabaker; Lieut.
White's section of Taylor's Illinois Battery, and two companies of
cavalry commanded by Capts. Stewart and Lan-gen.

Col. Plummer moved to Dallas, on Johnston's line of retreat, and there
sent through a messenger to Col. Carlin, stating where he was and
what his intentions were, so that the two forces could cooperate.
The messenger was captured by some of the Missourians, and therefore
Thompson came into possession of the plans of his enemies. He moved back
with his train until he saw it safely on its way to Greenville, and
then returned with his command toward Fredericktown to accommodate his
opponents with a fight if they desired it and to gain time for his train
to get back to Bloomfield and New Madrid.


249

Not finding Thompson at Dallas, Col. Plummer moved up to Fredericktown,
arriving there at noon, Monday, Oct. 21, and found that Col. Carlin
had arrived with his forces about 8 o'clock in the morning. There was
immediately one of those squabbles over rank which were so frequent
on both sides during the early part of the war and not absent from its
history at any time.

In spite of being a younger man than Col. Plummer, a younger Captain in
the Regular Army, and in spite of Plummer's experience in the Mexican
War and at Wilson's Creek, Carlin insisted upon the command of the
whole, upon the grounds that he had been commissioned a Colonel Aug.
15, and by the Governor of Illinois; while Plummer's commission was from
Fremont. Carlin insisted that he had a plan by which Thompson's whole
force could be captured, but was at length induced to yield the command
to Plummer, who went ahead with the combined force to attack Thompson,
leaving Carlin, who was exhausted and ill, in town with a portion of his
command.

Possibly, what helped induce Carlin to yield was the knowledge of an
agreement between Col. Plummer and Col. Ross, of the 17th Ill., who
outranked both of them, that if Carlin persisted in his claim, Ross
should assert his seniority and take command of the whole. Carlin
retained the 8th Wis. and two 24-pound howitzers in Fredericktown to
hold the place, while Plummer took the rest of the force and started out
in search of Thompson.

He did not have to go very far.


250

A half mile from town shots were heard, and the cavalry came back with
the information that the enemy was just ahead. The leading infantry
regiment, the 17th Ill., went into line to the left and moved forward
into a cornfield, where the enemy's skirmishers were immediately
encountered.

Lieut. White came up with his section of artillery and opened fire upon
a hill about 600 yards distant where it was likely that Thompson had his
artillery masked. Thompson's guns could not stand the punishment quietly
and opened up only to be speedily suppressed by other guns which Maj.
Schofield hurried up to join two which had been firing.

Col. Lowe, commanding the Missouri State Guards, first engaged, was soon
shot through the head and his regiment began falling back before the
steady advance of the 17th Ill., to which was soon added the fire of the
33d Ill. and a part of the 11th Mo.

At first the Missourians fell back steadily, but after the rough
handling of the artillery their retreat became a rout and Col. Baker
dashed forward with the 1st Ind. Cav. in pursuit.. A half mile in the
rear Thompson succeeded in rallying his men and also brought one piece
of artillery into action, receiving the cavalry with a fierce volley, by
which Maj. Gavitt, who had been active and prominent in the operations
in that section, and Capt. Highman were killed.

Notwithstanding this, the cavalry rallied, charged, and took the gun,
which they had, however, to soon give up under a charge led by Thompson
himself.


251

The 17th Ill. had already secured one gun, and now as the infantry
came up Thompson's men broke and retreated rapidly in every direction.
Hearing the noise of the fighting, Col. Carlin arose from a sick-bed,
galloped to the battlefield, and took command of a part of the troops.
The pursuit was continued by the infantry for 10 miles, and by the
cavalry 12 miles farther, when it was decided that Thompson's men had
scattered and gained a refuge in the swamps, and that further pursuit
would be useless.

Plummer recalled his forces to Fredericktown. He claims that he took 80
prisoners, of whom 38 were wounded, and buried 158 of Thompson's dead,
with other bodies being found from time to time in the woods. His own
loss he reports as six killed and 16 wounded.

Thompson reported that he had lost 20 killed, 27 wounded, and 15
prisoners, but that he "had mowed down the enemy as with a scythe;"
that "they acknowledge a loss of 400 killed and wounded," etc, etc. He
admitted he had lost one cannon by its being disabled so that it could
not be brought from the field. He said that his "dragoons" had stampeded
in a shameful way, but that his infantry had behaved very well.
Later, he reported from New Madrid that his command was "very much
demoralized."

Gen. Polk seems to have been much depressed by the news of Thompson's
defeat, because he ordered an abandonment of the post at New Madrid and
the bringing over of the men and guns to his "Gibraltar" at Columbus.

Gen. Grant, though probably disappointed at the failure of his plans to
capture Thompson's force, was careful to write complimentary letters to
all the commanders, recognizing their good services in the expedition.


262

The fight at Fredericktown quieted things pretty effectually in
southeastern Missouri, and ended for a long while the project of
capturing St Louis by the New Madrid route.

Gen. Grant was preparing some startling things to occupy the attention
of Johnston, Polk and Pillow in quite another quarter.


263



CHAPTER XI. GEN. H. W. HALLECK IN COMMAND.

Henry Wager Halleck, who succeeded Gen. Fremont in command of the
Department of Missouri, Nov. 9, 1861, had been pointed to as a
brilliantly shining example of what West Point could produce. He was
born in 1819 near Utica, N. Y., of a very good family, and had graduated
July 1, 1839, from West Point, third in a class of which Isaac
I. Stevens, afterward to conclude a brilliant career by dying a
Major-General on the field of battle, was the head. Other conspicuous
members of the class were Maj.-Gens. James B. Ricketts, E. O. C. Ord,
H. J. Hunt, and E. R. S. Can-by, of the Union army, and A. R. Lawton, a
Confederate Brigadier-General. Halleck was commissioned in the Corps of
Engineers, and during the Mexican War received a couple of the brevets
so easily won in that conflict.

With his attainments and cast of mind, he made an admirable staff
officer for Commodore Shubrick and Gens. Mason and Riley in their
administration of California while the territory was being reduced to an
American possession. He became a Captain in his Corps in 1852, but the
opportunities in California were so tempting, that he resigned to enter
the practice of the law and embark in various business enterprises of
railroad building and quicksilver mining. He was unusually successful
in all these, becoming Director-General of the New Almaden Quicksilver
Mining Company, President of a railroad, and a member of a leading law
firm. He kept up his military connection by accepting the commission of
Major-General commanding the California Militia.


264

He was a constant student and a ready writer, and during this time
published a number of military and scientific books, some of which were
original and others translations.

Intellectually, professionally and socially he stood very high, and
the bestowal of a Major-General's commission upon him, dating from Aug.
19,1861, met with universal approval, though it gave him seniority in
that coveted rank to many distinguished soldiers. At that time Halleck
was in his 46th year and the very prime of his powers. He was tall,
spare, and commanding in figure, with a clean-shaven, authoritative,
intellectual face in which men read great things. He had large,
searching eyes, which seemed to penetrate the one with whom he was
talking. As far as education and observation could go, Halleck was
as complete a soldier as could be produced. Whatever could be done by
calculation and careful operation, he could do on a high plane. He only
lacked military instinct and soldierly intuition. Of that moral force
which frequently overleaps mere physical limitation he seems to have had
little, nor could he understand it in others.

There was in him none of the fiery zeal of Lyon, or the relentless
pugnacity of Grant; apparently these qualities were so absent in him
that he did not know how to deal with them in others. He never put
himself at the head of his troops to lead them in battle.


255

He could build up, block by block, with patient calculation, without
comprehension that somewhere might be a volcanic energy suddenly
unloosed which would scatter his blocks like straws.

If he had political convictions, they were so unobtrusive as to be
rarely mentioned in connection with him. Probably his views were the
same as generally prevailed among the Regular Army officers of that day
which were represented by the attitude of the Douglas Democrats and "Old
Line Whigs."

He believed, above all things, in law and system, and wanted all the
affairs of this world to go ahead in strict accordance with them. The
soldier epithet of "Old Brains" was bestowed upon him, and he seemed to
relish the appellation.

In the long and specific letter of instructions accompanying his
assignment to command, Gen. McClellan directed him to carefully
scrutinize all commissions and appointments, and revoke those not
proceeding from the President or Secretary of War; to stop all pay and
allowances to them, and if the appointees gave any trouble, send them
out of the Department, and if they returned, place them in confinement.
He was to examine into the legality of all organizations of troops
serving in the Department, and deal with those unauthorized in a similar
summary way. All contracts were to be rigidly probed, and payment
suspended on those of which there was the slightest doubt. All officers
who had in any way violated their duty to the Government were to be
arrested and brought to prompt trial.


256

Halleck began at once to justify the high expectations entertained
of him. Order and system followed the erratic administration of his
predecessor. Soldiers were subjected to vigorous discipline, but they
were given the supplies to which they were entitled, and they were made
to feel that they were being employed to some purpose.

The futile and aggravating marches made in pursuit of the elusive
guerrillas and bushwhackers, who were never caught, were replaced by
well-directed movements striking at the heart of the trouble.

Acting under Gen. Price's orders sometimes, but frequently under their
own impulses to commit outrages, inflict blows, and create excitement, a
large part of the State was covered by bands of guerrillas who appeared
as citizens, were well armed, rode good horses, and were annoyingly
successful in sweeping down on the railroad stations, water tanks,
bridges, and settlements of Union people, burning, destroying, and
creating havoc generally.

Gen. Halleck proclaimed martial law, and issued an order that any
man disguised as a peaceful citizen, if caught in the act of burning
bridges, etc., should be immediately shot. The troops proceeded to
execute this order with good hearts. A large number of the offenders
were shot down in the neighborhoods where they had committed their
offenses; others were taken before a military commission and condemned
to the same fate.

Gens. Pope, Prentiss, Schofield and Henderson were given sufficient
forces and ordered to move directly upon the more important bodies of
Secessionists who formed a nucleus and support for these depredators.
They all did so with good effect.

Gen. Prentiss moved against a force about 3,000 strong operating in
Howard, Boone and Calloway Counties, and succeeded in striking them very
heavily at Mount Zion Church, where they were dispersed with a loss of
25 killed, 150 wounded, 30 prisoners, 90 horses, and 105 stands of arms.


257

Gen. Pope operating from Sedalia achieved even better success, capturing
Col. Robinson's command of 1,300 men and about 60 officers, 1,000 horses
and mules, and 73 wagons loaded with powder, lead and supplies and 1,000
stands of arms.

Gen. Prentiss very effectually cleaned out the State north of the
Missouri River, and in conjunction with Gen. Pope's operations south of
it, made it so threatening for Gen. Price, who had advanced to the Osage
River to support the Secessionists there, that he broke up his camp and
rather hurriedly retreated to Springfield.

The year 1861 therefore ended with the Union men again in possession of
nearly four-fifths of the State, with their hands full of prisoners and
supplies captured from the enemy.

The Secessionists of St. Louis had been encouraged by the untoward
course of events in the East. After Bull Run had come the shocking
disaster of Ball's Bluff, and with Gen. Price only a short distance away
on the Osage threatening Jefferson City and north Missouri, they felt
their star in the ascendant, and became unbearably insolent. Gen.
Halleck repressed them with a vigorous hand, yet without causing
the wild clamor of denunciation which characterized Gen. Butler's
Administration of New Orleans.


258

It will be remembered that at that time it was thought quite the thing
for young Secessionist women to show their "spirit" and their devotion
to the South by all manner of open insult to the Yankee soldiers.
Spitting at them, hurling epithets of abuse, and contemptuously
twitching aside their skirts were regarded as quite the correct thing
in the good society of which these young ladies were the ornaments.
This had become so intolerable in New Orleans, that Gen. Butler felt
constrained to issue his famous order directing that women so offending
should be treated as "women of the town plying their vocation." This
was made the pretext of "firing the Southern heart" to an unwarranted
degree, and Jeff Davis issued a proclamation of outlawry against Ben
Butler, with a reward for his head.

Sanguine Secessionists hoped that this "flagrant outrage" by "Beast
Butler" would be sufficient cause for the recognition of the Southern
Confederacy by France and England.

Gen. Halleck met the same difficulty as Butler very shrewdly. The Chief
of Police of St. Louis had some measure of control over the disreputable
women of the city, and made law for them. Under Gen. Hal-leek's order he
instructed these women to vie with and exceed their respectable sisters
in their manifestations of hostility to the Union cause and of devotion
to the South. Where the fair young ladies of the Southern aristocracy
were wearing Secession rosettes as big as a rose, the women of the
demimonde sported them as big as a dahlia or sunflower. Where the
young belle gave a little graceful twitch to her skirts to prevent any
possible contamination by touching a passing Yankee, the other class
flirted theirs' aside in the most immodest way. It took but a few days
of this to make the exuberant young ladies of uncontrollable rebel
proclivities discard their Secession rosettes altogether, and subside
into dignified, self-respecting persons, who took no more notice of a
passing Union soldier than they did of a lamp-post or tree-box.


259

Another of Gen. Halleck's orders did not result so happily. It will be
remembered that Gen. Fremont declared free the slaves of men in arms
against the Government, and that their freedom would be assured them
upon reaching the Union lines.

In the inflamed condition of public sentiment in the Border States on
the negro question this was very impolitic, and the President promptly
overruled the order.

Gen. Halleck went still further in the issuance of the following
order, which created as intense feeling in the North as Gen. Fremont's
"Abolition order" had excited in the Border States:

It has been represented that important information respecting: the
number and condition of our forces is conveyed to the enemy by means of
fugitive slaves who are admitted within our lines. In order to remedy
this evil, it is directed that no such persons be hereafter permitted to
enter the lines of any camp, or of any forces on the march, and that any
now within such lines be immediately excluded therefrom.

It was particularly distasteful to the Radicals in Missouri who had been
represented by Gen. Fremont. During his administration the Union
party in the State had divided into two wings--the Radicals and the
Conservatives, who soon came to hate each other almost if not quite as
badly as they did the Secessionists. The Radicals, or, as their enemies
called them, "the Charcoals," were largely made up, as before stated, of
the young, aggressive, idealistic Germans who had poured into Missouri
after the suppression of the Rebellion of 1848, and who looked upon
slavery as they did on "priest-craft" and "despotism"--all monstrous
relics of barbarism. They had absolutely no patience with the "peculiar
institution," and could not understand how any rational, right-thinking
man could tolerate it or hesitate about sweeping it off the earth at
the first opportunity. Those of them who had gone into the army had only
done so to fight for freedom, and without freedom the object of their
crusade was lost.


260

The German newspapers attacked Halleck with the greatest bitterness,
meetings were held to denounce him and secure his removal, and strong
efforts were made to obtain Sigel's promotion to a Major-General and his
assignment to the command.

Gen. Halleck, in a letter to F. P. Blair, explained and justified this
order, as follows:

Order No. 3 was, in my mind, clearly a military necessity. Unauthorized
persons, black or white, free or slave, must be kept out of our camps,
unless we are willing to publish to the enemy everything we do or intend
to do. It was a military, and not a political order.

I am ready to carry out any lawful instructions in regard to fugitive
slaves which my superiors may give me, and to enforce any law which
Congress may pass. But I cannot make law, and will not violate it. You
know my private opinion on the policy of confiscating the slave property
of the rebels in arms. If Congress shall pass it, you may be certain
that I shall enforce it.

Among other well-taken measures was the passage of a law by Congress
authorizing the enrollment of citizens of Missouri into regiments to
be armed, equipped and paid by the United States, but officered by the
Governor of Missouri, and employed only in the defense of the State.
This had many advantages besides giving the services to the Government
of about 13,000 very good soldiers. It brought into the ranks many
wavering young men who did not want to fight against the Union, nor did
they want to fight against the South. To enlist for the "defense of the
State" satisfied all their scruples.


261

The time had come when every young man in the State had to be lined up
somewhere. He could not remain neutral; if he was not for the Union he
would inevitably be brought into the Secession ranks.

The law authorized the necessary staff and commanding officers for
this force, and prescribed that it should be under the command of a
Brigadier-General of the United States selected by the Governor of
Missouri.

Our old acquaintance, John M. Schofield, Gen. Lyon's Chief of Staff at
the battle of Wilson's Creek, who had since done good work in command of
a regiment of Missouri artillery, was commissioned a Brigadier-General
to date from Nov. 21, 1861, and put in command of the Missouri Enrolled
Militia, beginning thus a career of endless trouble, but of quite
extended usefulness.

It will be remembered that Brig.-Gen. U. S. Grant, recently promoted
from the Colonelcy of the 21st Ill., had been relieved from his command
at Jefferson City, and sent to that of a new district consisting of
southeast Missouri and southern Illinois. He had made his headquarters
temporarily at Cape Girardeau, to attend to M. Jeff Thompson, who was
determined to lead the way for Gens. Leonidas Polk and Gideon Pillow
into St. Louis by the Mississippi River route. Grant, as we have seen,
organized his movements so well that Thompson was driven back from
Fredericktown and Ironton with some loss, and returned to his old
stamping-ground at New Madrid, below Columbus, Ky., where Polk had
established his headquarters and the fighting center of the Confederacy
in the West.


262

Polk was reputed to have at that time some 80,000 men under his command,
and Grant, following his usual practice of getting into proximity to his
enemy, transferred his headquarters to Cairo, where, also in accordance
with his invariable habit, he begun to furnish active employment for
those under him in ways unpleasant for his adversary. An enemy in the
territory assigned to Gen. Grant was never allowed much opportunity to
loll in careless indolence. This idiosyncrasy of Gen. Grant made him
rather peculiar among the Union Generals at that stage of the war.

Two days after Grant arrived at Cairo he learned that Gen. Polk was
moving to take Paducah, at the mouth of the Tennessee River, 45 miles
above Cairo. This was a most important point, as a lodgment there would
have stopped navigation on the Ohio, and absolutely controlled that
on the Cumberland and Tennessee. Grant at once decided that he would
anticipate him and telegraphed for permission to St. Louis, but his
telegram and another one still more urgent received no attention, and
he proceeded to act on his own volition, loading his men on the steamers
and starting for Paducah in the night, arriving there in the morning,
thereby anticipating the rebel advance some six or eight hours. This was
characteristic of Grant's other operations around Cairo, and it was not
long until he had that point not only free from apprehension as to what
Polk might do against it with his mighty army, but he had Polk becoming
anxious as to what Grant might do against him at Columbus, which he had
proclaimed as the "Gibraltar of the West."


263

Everywhere in his district Grant had introduced the best discipline
into the force of 20,000 men which he had collected. He had looked
out carefully for their wants, and had them well supplied, and he was
gaining their confidence as well as his own by well directed movements
which always led to considerable results.

Fremont, who had at last started out in his grand movement against
Price, was fearful that Price's army might be strongly reinforced by
Polk from Columbus, and it was made Grant's duty to prevent this.

Grant with his habitual boldness had been desirous of moving directly
against Columbus, but the reputed strength of the works and the force
there made the suggestion carry shivers to the minds of his superiors,
where the memories of Bull Run and Ball's Bluff were so painfully
recent. But if Grant was not allowed to do one thing, he would always
do another. He heard of a force under M. J. Thompson, numbering about
3,000, on the St. Francois River, about 50 miles to the southwest of
Cairo, and promptly started Col. Richard J. Oglesby with about 3,000 men
to beat up Jeff Thompson and destroy him.

Later he ordered Col. W. H. L. Wallace to take the remainder of the
11th Ill., and some other troops to move after Oglesby, to give him help
should he need it.

Soon after, believing that Jeff Thompson had gotten out of Col.
Oglesby's reach, he sent another order to Oglesby to move directly upon
New Madrid and take the place. This was a bold performance, for the
capture of New Madrid would have placed him on the Mississippi below
Columbus and cut off Polk's principal line of supplies.


264

Urgent dispatches continued to come from Fremont to prevent any
reinforcement of Price from Columbus, and Grant started in to impress
Gen. Polk with the idea that he would have quite enough to attend to at
home. He sent orders to Gen. C. F. Smith, commanding at Paducah, to send
a column out to threaten Columbus from that side, and to Col. Marsh to
advance from Mayfield, Ky., and Grant himself, gathering up about 3,000
men from the troops he had around Cairo, embarking them on steamers, and
under the convoy of two gunboats (the Lexington and Tyler), steamed down
the river directly for Columbus, 20 miles away.

Nov. 6 the flotilla dropped down the river to within six miles and in
full view of Columbus, and landed a few men on the Kentucky side. This
was to still further confuse the mind of Gen. Polk, and make him believe
that he must expect an attack on the land side in co-operation with the
forces advancing from Paducah and from Mayfield directly in front of
Cairo.

Gen. Grant says that when he started out he had no intention of making
a fight, and of course did not contemplate any such thing as a direct
attack with the force he had upon the immensely superior numbers at
Columbus, but he saw his men were eager to do something, and that
they would be greatly discontented if they returned without a fight.
Therefore, on learning that the enemy was crossing troops to the little
hamlet of Belmont, opposite Columbus, presumably with the intention
of cutting off and crushing Oglesby, he resolved to strike a blow, and
determined to break up the small camp at Belmont, which would give the
enemy something else to think about.


265

About an hour after daybreak he began landing his men on the west side
of the Mississippi River, while the gunboats moved down a little further
and waked up the enemy by throwing shells into the works at Columbus.
Grant handled his men with the skill he always displayed on the field of
battle, pushing forward the main body through the corn fields and
woods, but leaving a regiment in a secure position in a dry slough as
a resource for an emergency. They with the gunboats were to protect the
transports.

Gen. Polk probably saw all this, but interpreted it as a mere feint
to get him to send troops across the river and thus strip his
fortifications so as to make easier the work of the columns advancing
from Paducah and Mayfield. He therefore held his men with him and did
not interfere with Grant's movements.

Grant pushed on through the cornfields and woods for a mile or more,
and then rearranged his lines and pushed forward a heavy line of
skirmishers. By this time the enemy in camp at Belmont had learned of
the movement, and started out to meet it. The two lines of skirmishers
soon came in contact, and there was a spiteful, bickering fire opened
between them. Both sides were expert woodsmen and riflemen, and thoroly
at home at this kind of work. The Union line pressed the Confederates
slowly back for four hours, receiving and inflicting considerable
losses. Grant's horse was shot under him, but he got another, and kept
his place in the advance, directing and encouraging the men, whom he
says acted like veterans and behaved as well as any troops in the world
could have done.


266

He pushed the enemy so closely that when the latter reached the abatis
they broke into confusion and rushed over the river bank for shelter,
yielding possession of their camp to the victorious Unionists.

This triumph completely intoxicated the victors. They broke ranks, threw
down their guns, began rummaging through the camps for trophies, running
up and down and cheering wildly. Their officers were no better than
they. Many of them had been political "spellbinders" in civil life and
very naturally proceeded to "improve the occasion" by getting on
stumps and delivering enthusiastic Union speeches and addresses of
congratulation over the gallantry of their men and the wonderful victory
achieved. In vain did Gen. Grant try to recall them to a sense of
soldierly duty and discipline. He alone appeared to comprehend the
object of the expedition, and what was necessary to be next done. He
could not rally enough men to go down the river bank and capture
the garrison which was sheltered there. A number of the men who were
attracted by the captured cannon began firing them with great jubilation
down the river at steamboats which they saw there, and Grant tried to
have them, since they would fire guns, turn them upon the steamers which
were coming across from Columbus loaded with troops. Polk had at last
waked up to what was being done across the river, and began a fire upon
Belmont from his siege guns, while he hurried troops aboard steamers to
recover the lost position.


267

The shells began to startle the exultant soldiers, and Grant took
advantage of this to employ them in setting fire to the tents and other
camp equipage. Presently the sky of victory was overcast by the sudden
announcement that the rebels were in line of battle between them and the
transports, and that they were cut off and surrounded. The exultation of
victory was followed by almost a panic, but Grant steadied them with
the quiet assurance "We have cut our way in here, and we can cut it out
again." This was taken up by the officers as they reformed their men for
the battle.

Again the skirmish line was pushed forward in search of the enemy, but
he offered only a moderate resistance, and the troops made their way
back to the transports with little difficulty, though the excitement was
tremendous.

The commanders of the gunboats had kept alert, and came promptly forward
to engage the guns on the Columbus bluffs and later to discourage the
pursuing rebels with liberal volleys of grape and canister, which, as
the bend of the river gave them an enfilade on the river line, were
delivered with great effect and considerable slaughter.

The troops were gotten again on board the transports without any
particular trouble, though about 25 wounded were left in the hands of
the enemy. The Union troops had brought off about 175 prisoners and two
guns, besides spiking four other cannon.

While the wounded were being gathered up and brought aboard, Gen. Grant
rode out some distance to reconnoiter, and almost rode into a body of
the enemy. He turned and made his way back to the transports, which
were just starting; the Captain recognized him, and held his boat for
a moment while Gen. Grant's horse slipped down the steep bank and then
trotted on board over the single gangway. The expedition returned to
Cairo immediately.


268

Gen. Grant officially reported his losses as 485 in killed, wounded
and missing. Gen. Polk officially reported his losses as killed, 105;
wounded, 419; missing, 117; total, 641. He estimated the Union losses
at 1,500; "fourteen-fifteenths of that number must have been killed,
wounded or drowned." He also said that he had a stand of colors,
something over 1,000 stand of arms, with knapsacks, ammunition, and
other military stores.

Medical Director J. H. Brinton gives the following list of losses by
regiments:

     Command.                                  Killed.              Wounded

     27th Ill. Vol..........................     11                     47

     80th Ill. Vol.........................       9                     27

     31st Ill. Vol..........................     10                     70

     22d Ill. Vol...........................     23                     74

     7th Iowa Vol...........................     26                     93

     Cavalry and Artillery.................       1                     11

     Total..................................     80                    322

While Gen. Grant and the officers and men under him regarded the
affair as a great victory, and deservedly plumed themselves upon their
achievements that day, there was a decidedly different opinion taken
in the North, and the matter has been the subject of more or less sharp
criticism ever since. It was pronounced by the McClellan-Halleck school
of military men as a useless waste of men in gaining no object, and
probably the most charitable of Gen. Grant's critics could find no
better excuse for him than that he was like the man in the Bible who had
bought two yoke of oxen and wanted to go and try them. All this did not
disturb the equanimity of Gen. Grant and his men in the least. He
knew he had accomplished what he had set out to do, to give Gen. Polk
something else to occupy his mind than capturing Oglesby or reinforcing
Thompson and Price.


269

Col. Oglesby made his way unmolested back to Cairo. Polk was probably
beginning to think that he would have quite enough to do to stay in
Columbus, and his dreams as to St. Louis were dissipated.

Gen. Grant's men knew that they had met their enemies on equal terms in
the open field, and had driven them, whether they were in their front or
rear, and so they were content.

The Confederates of course proclaimed a great victory, and made the
most of it. Albert Sidney Johnston enthusiastically congratulated Polk,
Jefferson Davis did the same, and the Confederate Congress passed
a resolution of thanks to Maj.-Gen. Polk and Brig.-Gens. Pillow and
Cheatham and the officers and soldiers under their commands.

The battle was the occasion of still further increasing the bitterness
between Polk and his insubordinate subordinate, Gideon J. Pillow, who
resigned his commission, and sent to the Confederate War Department a
long and bitter complaint against Gen. Polk, a large part of which was
taken up with charges against his superior for non-support when he,
Pillow, was engaged in a terrible struggle on the west side of the
river with a force "three times my own." Pillow asserted that he had
repeatedly driven back the Unionists at the point of the bayonet, after
his ammunition had been exhausted, and no more was furnished him by Gen.
Polk. He said that Polk had thus needlessly sacrificed many brave men,
and that a like, if not greater, calamity was possible if he were to
continue in command. "His retention is the source of great peril to
the country." Pillow said: "As a zealous patriot, I admire him; as
an eminent minister of the Gospel, I respect him; but as a Commanding
General I cannot agree with him."


270

Southeastern Missouri had, therefore, a season of rest for some time.


271



CHAPTER XVI. HUNTER, LANE, MISSOURI AND KANSAS.

Maj.-Gen. David Hunter felt that fortune was not smiling on him
according to his deserts. He had graduated from West Point in 1822,
and had been in the Army 39 years, or longer than any but few of the
officers then in active employment. He was a thorough soldier, devoted
to his profession, highly capable, inflexibly upright, strongly
loyal, an old-time friend of President Lincoln, and enjoyed his full
confidence. He had done a very painful piece of necessary work for the
Administration in investigating the conditions in Gen. John C. Fremont's
command, faithfully reporting them, and in relieving that officer,
thereby incurring the enmity of all his partisans. Then he had handed
the command over to Maj.-Gen. H. W. Hal-leck, who had graduated 17 years
later than he, and who had been seven years out of the Army.

Gen. Hunter had been assigned to Kansas, which was created a Department
for him, but it had few troops, and was remote from the scene of
important operations. He was particularly hurt that Brig.-Gen. Don
Carlos Buell, 19 years his junior, should be assigned to the command
of a splendid army of 100,000 men in Kentucky; and Brig.-Gen. Thos. W.
Sherman, 14 years his junior, should be selected to lead an important
expedition to the coast of South Carolina and Georgia.


272

Like the faithful soldier he was, however, he made little plaint of his
own grievances, but addressed himself earnestly to the work to which he
was assigned. He soon had other troubles enough to make him forget his
own. His hardest work was to keep the Kansans off the Missourians. In
the strained and wavering conditions of public opinion, every effort had
to be made to prevent any pretext or incentive to take the young men
of Missouri into the ranks of Price's army. Gen. Halleck estimated that
indignation at the border raids of Lane, Jennison and Montgomery had
given Price fully 20,000 men. The years of strife along the borders
had arrayed the people in both States against one another. Every Kansan
considered every Missourian the enemy of himself and the State, and the
feeling was reciprocated by the Missourians.

For years Kansas had been inflicted with raids by the "Poor White
Trash," "Border Ruffians," and "Bald Knobbers," who had, beside
committing other outrages, carried off into Missouri horses, cattle,
furniture, farm implements, and other portable property.

The Kansans held all Missourians responsible for these crimes by
the worser element, and the war seemed a chance to get even. When
opportunity offered, Kansas parties invaded Missouri, bringing back with
them everything which they could load on wagons or drive along the road.


273

The great mass of the Missourians still held aloof from both sides,
remaining as neutral as they would be allowed. Douglas Democrats,
Bell-and-Everett Old-Line Whigs, two-thirds of the entire population,
were yet halting between their attachment for the Union and their
political and social affiliations. It was all-important that they should
be kept loyal, or at least out of the Confederate camps, hence the
stringency of Halleck's orders against any spoliations or depredations
by Union troops, and hence his orders that the negroes should be kept
out of the camps, and their ownership settled by the civil courts. Every
offense by Union soldiers was made the most of by Price's recruiting
agents to bring into their ranks the young men for the "defense of the
State."

At the head of the vengeful Kansas element was the meteoric James H.
Lane, who had for years ridden the whirlwind in the agitation following
the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Bill, and the rush of settlers into
those Territories. Volumes have been written about "Jim Lane," but the
last definitive word as to his character is yet to be uttered. Arch
demagogue he certainly was, but demagogues have their great uses in
periods of storm and stress. We usually term "demagogues" those men
active against us, while those who are rousing the people on our
own side are "patriotic leaders." No man had more enemies nor more
enthusiastic friends than "Jim Lane."

As with all real leaders of men, the source of his power was a mystery.
Tall, thin, bent, with red hair, a rugged countenance and rasping voice,
he had little oratorical attractiveness, and what he said never read
convincingly in print. No man, however, ever excelled him before an
audience, and he swayed men as the winds do the sea.


274

Lane was born in Lawrenceburg, Ind., in 1814, and was therefore 47 years
of age. His father was Amos Lane, a lawyer of great ability, a member of
Congress, and conspicuous in Indiana. James H. Lane went into politics
at an early age, and entered the Mexican War as Colonel of the 3d Ind.,
distinguishing himself at Buena Vista, where he was wounded. Upon the
expiration of the term of service of his regiment he raised the
5th Ind., and became its Colonel. This gave him quite a prestige in
politics, and he was elected Lieutenant-Governor, and Representative
in Congress. The atmosphere of Indiana was, however, too quiet for his
turbulent spirit. He broke with his party, joined in the rush to Kansas,
and speedily became the leader of the out-and-out Free State men. On the
strength of his Mexican War reputation these elected him Major-General
of their troops, in the troubles they were having with the Pro-Slavery
men and the United State troops sent to assist in making the Territory a
Slave State. When the Free State men gained control of the Territory,
he was made Major-General of the Territorial troops. His principal
lieutenants were James Montgomery and Dr. Charles R. Jenni-son, brave,
daring men, colleagues of "Old Osawatomie Brown," entertaining the same
opinions as he with regard to slavery, and with even fewer scruples than
he as to other forms of property.


275

When the United States troops were assisting the Pro-Slavery men,
Montgomery and Jennison went into active rebellion at the head of some
hundreds of bold, fighting men--"Jayhawkers"--who carried terror into
the ranks of their adversaries. They insisted that they were acting
according to the light of their own consciences and the laws of God.
So terrible did they become that, Nov. 26, 1860, Geo. M. Beebe,
Acting Governor of the Territory, reported to President Buchanan
that Montgomery and Jennison, at the head of between 300 and 500
"well-disciplined and desperate Jayhawkers," equipped with "arms of the
latest and most deadly character," had hung two citizens of Linn
County, and frightened 500 citizens of that County into flight from the
Territory. One of their number having been captured, was about to be
brought to trial before the United States District Court at Fort Scott,
and what they alleged was a packed jury. They had proceeded to so
frighten the court that the Judge and Marshals incontinently fled to
Missouri, leaving a notice on the door that there would be no session
of the court. Therefore Gov. Beebe humanely recommended to the President
that Montgomery and Jennison be immediately killed, as there would be no
peace in the Territory until they were.

In spite of Lane's constant prominence, there was always a faction in
Kansas as bitterly his enemies as his friends were enthusiastic for
him, and it was ever a question which of the two were the stronger. It
demanded his utmost activity and cunning to keep himself on top. Upon
the admission of the State, Lane succeeded in having himself elected
Senator, but the legality of the proceeding was questioned and this
called for more activity to keep himself at the front.


276

When the Union army retreated after the battle of Wilson's Creek, Aug.
10, there went back with it the 1st and 2d Kan.--all the organized
troops the State had in the field. This left the border exposed to the
vengeance of Price's on-sweeping hordes, who made loud threats of what
they proposed to do. Lane sounded the trumpet. Wilson's Creek with Bull
Run had awakened the people to the stern realities of the contest, and
there speedily gathered into camp the men who formed the 3d, 4th, 5th,
6th and 7th Kan., Montgomery becoming Colonel of the 3d Kan.; Jennison
of the 7th (Jennison's Jayhawkers). Lane took command of the troops
assembled at Fort Scott, moved out aggressively on Price's flank, gave
Rains, who was in command there, a sharp skirmish at Dry Wood, and his
manuvers were so menacing that Price called Rains back when within five
miles of the Kansas line, relinquishing his cherished idea of "scourging
the Abolitionist nest," and pushed on to Lexington. Lane then made
a dash into Missouri in Price's rear, fought a lively skirmish at
Papinsville, and followed up the retreating Confederates, capturing
Osceola, as has been previously stated.

After Gen. Hunter assumed command Lane reappeared with a commission
as Brigadier-General of Volunteers, of which he had beguiled President
Lincoln, and began playing a game which gave intense annoyance to the
bluff, straightforward old soldier. To Hunter he represented that he was
there merely as a Senator and a member of the Senate Military Committee,
which latter he was not. To the President and War Department he
represented that he and Hunter were in brotherly sympathy and
confidence, and planning a movement of mighty importance. The "sympathy"
and "confidence" part were believed so completely, that the War
Department did not take the trouble to communicate with Hunter in regard
to the details of the proposed movement.


277

To his friends and to the press he talked magniloquently about a grand
"Southern expedition" to be made up of 8,000 or 10,000 Kansas troops,
4,000 Indians, seven regiments of cavalry, three batteries of artillery,
and four regiments of infantry from Minnesota and Wisconsin, which he
would command. It would move from Kansas down into Texas, and there
meet an expedition coming up from the Gulf of Mexico. The War Department
seems to have been impressed with the feasibility of this, and began
ordering troops, officers and supplies to Fort Leavenworth to report to
"Brig.-Gen. James H. Lane."

Lane's enemies as well as his friends in Kansas heartily approved of
this, as it would take him away from Kansas, and the Kansas Legislature
united in a request to have him appointed a Major-General, as that would
vacate his seat in the Senate.

General-in-Chief McClellan "invited" Gen. Hunter's attention to the
proposed expedition, and suggested that he prepare for it and report
what might be necessary. Gen. Hunter replied that he had had no official
information as to the expedition, and gently complained that the War
Department seemed entirely unmindful of the Commander of the Department,
and had consistently ignored him. As to the expedition, he regarded it
as impracticable. It was 440 miles from Leavenworth to the nearest point
in Texas, and the road was over a wild, barren country, which would
require an immense train of supplies for the troops. He had in the
Department only about 3,000 men, entirely too few to successfully defend
Fort Leavenworth and its valuable supplies against a raid such as Price
and McCulloch were continually threatening. He said he knew no such
person as "Brig.-Gen. J. H. Lane," to whom so many came with orders
to report. He also said that Lane himself now saw that he had raised
expectations which he could not fulfill, and that he was seeking to
pick a quarrel with the Department Commander to give him an excuse for
dropping the whole business, and was making himself very annoying in a
thousand ways.


278

Secretary Stanton was profoundly distrustful of Lane, and said that
he would leave the Cabinet rather than put him in independent command.
Finally the matter came to President Lincoln, who wrote the following
characteristic letter:

     Executive Mansion, Washington, Feb. 10. Maj.-Gen. Hunter and
     Brig.-Gen. Lane, Leavenworth, Kan.:

     My wish has been and is to avail the Government of the
     services of both Gen. Hunter and Gen. Lane, and, so far as
     possible, to personally oblige both. Gen. Hunter is the
     senior officer, and must command when they serve together;
     tho in so far as he can, consistently with the public
     service and his own honor, oblige Gen. Lane, he will also
     oblige me. If they cannot come to an amicable understanding,
     Gen. Lane must report to Gen. Hunter for duty, according to
     the rules, or decline the service.

     A.   LINCOLN.


Lane, who then thought his seat in the Senate safe, decided that he
would rather serve his country in the forum than in the field, and his
commission was cancelled. Five years later, dismayed to find he had lost
his hold on the people of Kansas by his support of Andrew Johnson, he
ended his strange, eventful history with a pistol-shot from his own
hand.

Gen. Hunter having reported that the division of Kansas from Missouri
was unwise, the Department was merged into Gen. Halleck's command, and
Gen. Hunter assigned to duty in South Carolina.


279

Gen. Halleck's laboriously elaborate system received a little shock so
ludicrous as to be almost incredible were it not solemnly told in an
official communication by himself to Gen. Sterling Price:

     St Louis, Jan. 27, 1862. Maj.-Gen. Sterling Price,
     Commanding, etc., Springfield, Mo. General: A man calling
     himself L. V. Nichols came to my headquarters a day or two
     since, with a duplicate of your letter of the 12th instant.
     On being questioned, he admitted that he belonged to your
     service; that he had come in citizen's dress from
     Springfield, avoiding some of our military posts and passing
     through others in disguise, and without reporting himself to
     the Commander. He said that he had done this by your
     direction. On being asked for his flag of truce, he pulled
     from his pocket a dirty pocket-handkerchief, with a short
     stick tied to one corner.

Gen. Halleck then proceeded to read Gen. Price a lecture on the
etiquette of flags of truce.

A feature of peculiar pathos was the war storms' reaching and rending of
the haven of refuge which the Government had provided for its wards in
the Indian Territory. More than a century of bitter struggling between
the Creeks, Seminoles, Cherokees, Choctaws, and Chickasaws, and the
Carolinians, Georgians, Floridians, Alabamians, and Mississippians,
marked by murderous massacres and bloody retaliations, had culminated
in the Indians being removed in a body from their tribal domains,
and resettled hundreds of miles west of the Mississippi, where it was
confidently hoped they would be out of the way of the advancing wave of
settlement and out of the reach of the land-hungry whites. Their mills,
churches, and school houses were reerected there, and the devoted
missionaries, the Congregationalists, Methodists, Baptists, Moravians
and Jesuits resumed with increased zeal the work of converting them to
Christianity and civilization, which had been so far prosecuted with
gratifying success.


280

In their new home they had prospered wonderfully. Their numbers
increased until they were estimated from 100,000 to 120,000. Many of
them lived in comfortable houses, wore white men's clothes, and tilled
fields on which were raised in the aggregate great quantities of wheat,
corn, cotton and potatoes. They had herds of horses, cattle, sheep and
swine large beyond any precedent among the whites. It was common for
an Indian to number his horses and cattle by the thousands, while the
poorest of them owned scores which foraged in the plenty of limitless
rich prairies and bottom land. Churches, school houses and mills
abounded, and they had even a printing press, from which they issued a
paper and many religious and educational works in an alphabet invented
by a full-blood Cherokee. Each tribe constituted an individual Nation
under a written Constitution, with a full set of elective officers.
Slavery had been introduced by the half-breeds, and the census of
1860 shows the following number of slaves and slave-owners in the five
Nations:

                                        Owners.               Slaves.

     Choctaws..........................385                   2,297

     Cherokees.........................384                   2,604

     Creeks............................287                   1,661

     Chickasaws........................118                     917

     Semlnoles..................... ....--                  ------.

One Choctaw owned 227 negroes.

Into the Territory the Government also gathered other tribes and
remnants of tribes, Quapaws, Kiowas, Senecas, Comanches, etc., mostly
in the "blanket" stage of savagery.


281

The dominant sentiment in the civilized tribes was strongly averse to
the war and in favor of peace. The memories and traditions as to the
meaning of war were too fresh and grievous. The object lessons as to the
advantage of peace were everywhere striking and overwhelming. They hoped
to maintain a complete neutrality in the struggle, and pleaded to be
allowed to do so. June 17, 1861, John Ross, Principal Chief of the
Cherokees, wrote a long official letter to Gen. Ben. McCulloch, in which
he said that his people had done nothing to bring about the war, were
friends to both sides, and only desired to live in peace.

As in the rest of the South, the Confederates were not listening to any
talk of neutrality, and they proceeded as energetically to stifle it as
they had the Union and peace advocates in the several Southern States.
All the Indian Agents and officials were ardent Secessionists, and
at the head of them was Superintendent Albert Pike, originally a
Massachusetts Yankee, and the son of a poor shoemaker. He had gone South
as one of the numerous "Yankee schoolmasters" who invaded that section
in search of a livelihood, had become a States Rights Democrat, and,
as usual with proselytes, was the most zealous of believers. He was a
lawyer of some ability, a successful politician, an active worker in
Masonry, and made much pretense as a poet. Nothing that he ever wrote
survives today.

[Illustration: 281-General Albert Pike]

Each of the Indian Agents began enlisting men into the Confederate
service and using them to impose Secession ideas upon their
fellow-tribesmen who were either indifferent or actually hostile.


282

The missionaries, being mostly from the North, were strongly for the
Union, and their influence had to be encountered and broken down.

The Indian Agents were commissioned Colonels in the Confederate service,
and were expected to raise regiments, with the Chiefs as subordinate
officers. The leader among the Agents was Douglas H. Cooper, Agent for
the Choctaws, a man of courage, decision and enterprise, who raised a
regiment mainly of the half-breeds of the Choctaws and Chickasaws.

The Cherokee regiment was almost wholly half-breeds, with Stand Waitie,
a half-breed, courageous, implacable, merciless, as its Colonel. Albert
Pike was rewarded for his great service in bringing the Indians into
line with a commission of Brigadier-General, C. S. A., and placed in
command of the whole force.

Principal Chief John Ross temporarily bowed to superior force and gave
his adhesion to the Southern Confederacy. A large portion of his people
would not do this. They, with a similar element in the other Nations,
gathered around the venerable Chief Hopoeithleyohola, nearly 100 years
old, and whose span of life began before the Revolutionary War. He had
been a dreaded young war leader against Gen. Jackson in the sanguinary
scenes at Fort Mimms, Tallapoosa, and Red Sticks in 1813-14. When he was
a boy his people were allied with the Spaniards in Florida to resist the
British encroachments upon their tribal empire in Georgia. When he was
a War Chief, the British at Pensacola and Mobile had put muskets and
ammunition into his hands for his men to resist the North Carolinians,
Georgians, Tennesseeans and Kentuckians. In every decade he had fought
and treated with the grandfathers and fathers of the same men who were
trying to coerce him.


283

Every battle and every treaty had ended in a further spoliation of the
"hunting grounds" of his people. He was now to end his career as
he began, and consistently pursued it, in stern resistance to his
hereditary enemies. He calculated that he could put into the field about
1,500 reliable, well-armed warriors, who would be more than a match for
the Indians who had entered into the Confederate service. If the white
Confederates came to their assistance, he could make an orderly retreat
into Kansas, where he hoped to receive help from Union troops, if they
should not have advanced before then.

Col. Douglas H. Cooper was sent against him, and at first tried
diplomacy, but the wily old Hopoeithleyohola had seen the results of
too many conferences, and refused to be drawn into one. Cooper then
assembled a force of 1,400 men, consisting of some companies of white
Texas cavalry and the Chickasaw, Creek, and Seminole regiments, under
their War Chiefs, D. N. Mcintosh and John Jumper, and moved out to
attack Hopoeithleyohola, who beat them back with considerable loss.

The advance of Gen. Fremont called for the concentration of every
available man to oppose him, so Hopoeithleyohola was given a few weeks'
respite. As soon, however, as the Union army retreated to Rolla and
Sedalia, Col. Cooper resumed his operations against Hopoeithleyohola,
who at Chusto-Talasah, Dec. 9, inflicted such a severe defeat upon him
that Cooper retreated in a crippled condition to Fort Gibson. There Col.
James Mcintosh, commanding the Confederate forces at Van Buren, Ark.,
went to his assistance with some 1,600 mounted Texans and Arkansans, and
the combined force closed in upon the Union Indians at Shoal Greek.


284

Hopoeithleyohola and his Lieutenant, Haleck-Tustenugge, handled their
men with the greatest skill and courage in an obstinate battle, but
after four hours of resistance the overpowered Union Indians were
driven, pursued by Stand Waitie's murderous half-breeds, who took no
men and but few women and children prisoners. Back over the wide,
shelterless prairie, bitten by the cruel cold and pelted by the storms
of an unusually severe Midwinter, Hopoeithleyohola led his defeated
band to a refuge in far-away Kansas. The weather was so severe that Col.
Cooper reports some his men as frozen to death as they rode along, but
the scent of blood was in the half-breed Stand Waitie's nostrils, and he
pressed onward remorselessly.

More than 1,000 men, women and children of Hopoeithleyohola's band
left their homes to whiten and mark the dismal trail, and the aged Chief
himself died shortly after reaching Fort Scott, where he was buried with
all the honors of war.

Upon the fertile Indian Territory descended the war storm which
blighted the work of the missionaries, and completely ruined the
fairest prospects in our history for civilizing and Christianizing
the aborigines. When the storm ended, one-quarter of the people had
perished, the fences, houses, mills, schoolhouses and churches were all
burnt, and the hundreds of thousands of horses, cattle, sheep and hogs
had disappeared so completely that the Government was compelled to
furnish the Indians with animals to stock their farms anew.


285

Sterling Price had reached his zenith in the capture of Lexington, Sept
20, 1861. In substantial results it was the biggest achievement of the
war that far. Bull Run had been, indeed, a much larger battle, but at
Lexington Price had captured 3,000 prisoners, including five Colonels
and 120 other commissioned officers; 1,000 horses and mules; 100 wagons;
seven pieces of artillery; 3,000 stands of arms; $900,000 in money, and
a very large quantity of Commissary and Quartermaster's supplies.

Though he was to fight nearly four years longer with the greatest
enterprise and determination, though he was to command vastly stronger
forces, and though he was to be followed by myriads of Missourians with
unfaltering courage and enthusiasm, he was never to approach a parallel
to this shining achievement.

It was felt that Lexington was only the earnest of incomparably greater
things he was going to do in delivering Missouri from the hated Yankees,
and making hers the brightest star in the Southern Confederacy, paling
with her military glory even historic Virginia. Then McCulloch would
come up with his Texans, Louisianians and Arkansans, and Albert
Pike with his horde of Indians. There would be such an overthrow and
annihilation of their enemies as the world had never before seen,
followed by a race to get to St. Louis before Polk, Pillow and M. Jeff
Thompson could reach her from down the Mississippi.

Sterling Price was eager to fight Fremont among the rough, high lands
south of Springfield, and his ardent followers wanted a repetition
of the triumph of Lexington; but McCulloch would not come up from his
fastness at Cross Hollows. Without him Sterling Price, his strength
depleted by defections on his long retreat, did not feel warranted in
offering battle, even with the advantage of the defensive hills.


286

McCulloch was importuned to come forward without success. The best
comfort he could give Sterling Price was to destroy that part of
Missouri and make it worthless to the enemy. McCulloch wanted to advance
into Kansas, however, and utterly destroy that Territory, to strike
terror to the Abolitionists. It speaks very badly for their intelligence
system that both Price and McCulloch maintained, that neither of them
was aware for days that the Union army had left Springfield, Nov. 8, on
its retreat to Rolla and Sedalia. Although their camps were only some 70
miles from Springfield, they did not learn of the retreat until Nov. 16,
when McCulloch, seized at last with a sudden desire to enter Missouri,
rushed all his mounted men forward in hopes to capture trains and
detachments. They were disgusted to find upon arriving at Springfield
that the last Union soldier and wagon had left there more than a week
previous.

After some destruction of property, McCulloch sullenly returned to
his old position in Arkansas, where, leaving his command to Col. James
Mcintosh, lately Captain in the United States Army, he departed for
Richmond to give the Confederate War Department his version of the
occurrences in his territory.

Sterling Price had learned the same day, Nov. 16, of the departure of
the Union army, and set his columns in motion northward, announcing that
he was going to winter on the Missouri River. Again he sent an appeal to
McCulloch to cooperate, but Col. Mcintosh declined, on the ground that
the troops were not properly clad for the rigorous weather so far north,
and, besides, he did not think that the expedition would do any good.


287

Sterling Price simply let loose his army on the country evacuated by the
Union troops, and a reign of indescribable misery ensued for the Union
people and those who were vainly trying to keep the neutral middle of
the road. The army was spread out as much as possible in order to gather
in recruits and supplies and assert its influence most widely.

From Marshall, in Saline Co., Sterling Price issued a most remarkable
proclamation to the people, calling for 50,000 volunteers. He reminded
them that their harvests had been reaped, their preparation for Winter
had been made, and now they had leisure to do something to relieve
the people from the "inflictions of a foe marked with all the
characteristics of barbarian warfare." He admitted that the great
mass of the people were not in the war, and especially the
substantial portion of the population, for, he said, "boys and small
property-holders have in the main fought the battles." He begged,
he implored that the herdsman should leave his folds, the lawyer his
office, and come into camp to win the victory. He even dropped into
poetry in his tearful earnestness, quoting the school boy's declamation
from Marco Bozarris:

     Strike, till the last armed foe expires; Strike, for your
     altars and your fires! Strike for the green graves of your
     sires, God, and your native land!

An infinitely harmful part of the proclamation was the following:

     Leave your property at home. What if it be taken--all taken?
     We have $200,000,000 worth of Northern means in Missouri
     which cannot be removed. When we are once free the State
     will indemnify every citizen who may have lost a dollar by
     adhesion to the cause of his country. We shall have our
     property, or its value, with interest.


288

This was naturally interpreted as meaning that all those not distinctly
favorable to Secession forfeited their property to those who were.

This seemed ample warrant to the Poor White Trash banditti for seizure
of the property of any man whose principles might not be of exactly the
right shade.

Experience teaches us that that class of people are pretty certain to
find heterodox the opinions of any man who has something they may want.
It certainly made a very dark outlook for anybody in Missouri to hold
moveable property.

The turbid thrasonics of the proclamation shows that it was not written
by Price's Adjutant-General, Thomas L. Snead, who was a literary man. He
was then absent at Richmond looking after the fences of his General. The
proclamation sounds the more as if it came from the pen of our poetical
acquaintance, M. Jeff Thompson, the "Swamp Fox" of the Mississippi. It
concluded in this perfervid style:

But, in the name of God and the attributes of manhood, let me appeal to
you by considerations infinitely higher than money! Are we a generation
of driveling, sniveling, degraded slaves? Or are we men who dare assert
and maintain the rights which cannot be surrendered, and defend those
principles of everlasting rectitude, pure and high and sacred, like God,
their author? Be yours the office to choose between the glory of a free
country and a just Government, and the bondage of your children! I will
never see the chains fastened upon my country. I will ask for six and
one-half feet of Missouri soil in which to repose, but will not live to
see my people enslaved.

Do I hear your shouts? Is that your war-cry which echoes through the
land? Are you coming? Fifty thousand men! Missouri shall move to victory
with the tread of a giant! Come on, my brave boys, 50,000 heroic,
gallant, unconquerable Southern men! We await your coming.


289

Sterling Price established his headquarters again at Osceola, on the
banks of the Osage, but sent forward Gens. Rains and Steen to Lexington,
the best point on the Missouri to hold the river and afford a passage
for recruits coming in from the northern part of the State.

The results of the proclamation were not commensurate with the desperate
urgency of the appeal. Large parties of recruits, it is true, tried to
make their way toward Price's camp, but many of them were intercepted,
and dispersed; strong blows were delivered against Price's outlying
detachments, driving them in from all sides. Meanwhile those he had in
camp were melting away faster than hew ones were coming in.

Sterling Price had other troubles. He was not a favorite in Richmond.
Jefferson Davis was a man never doubtful as to the correctness of his
own ideas, and he was most certain of those relating to military men
and affairs. He had had extraordinary opportunities for familiarizing
himself with all the fighting men, and possible fighting men, in the
country. He graduated from West Point in 1828, 23d in a class of 33;
none of whom, besides himself, became prominent. He had served seven
years as a Lieutenant in the Regular Army on frontier duty, and as
Colonel of a regiment in the Mexican War, where he achieved flattering
distinction. He had been four years Chairman of the Senate Committee on
Military Affairs, and four years Secretary of War. It must be admitted
that his judgment with regard to officers was very often correct; yet
he was a man of strong likes and dislikes. His reputation was that of
"having the most quarrels and the fewest fights of any man in the Army."


290

Undoubtedly his partialities drew several men into the Confederate army
who would otherwise have remained loyal, and his antipathies retained
some men in the Union army who would otherwise have gone South. His
reasons for disliking Price are obscure, further than that Price was a
civilian, who had had no Regular Army training or experience, and that
he believed Price to be in conspiracy to set up a Trans-Mississippi
Confederacy. But little evidence of such intention is to be found
anywhere, yet that little was sufficient for a man of Davis's jealous,
suspicious nature. Repeatedly, at the mere mention of Price's name, he
flew into an undignified passion and denounced him unsparingly.

Price's men were carrying havoc as far as they could reach. Nov. 19 they
burned the important little town of Warsaw, the County seat of Benton
County and a Union stronghold. In 1860 the people of Benton County had
cast but 74 votes for Lincoln and but 100 for Breckinridge, while they
gave Bell and Everett 306 votes and Douglas 574. Dec 16 Platte City,
County seat of Piatt County, was nearly destroyed by them. This was
another Union community, and a large majority of the people were
Bell-and-Everett Unionists or Douglas Democrats. Dec. 20 a concerted
foray of guerrillas and bushwhackers burnt the bridges and otherwise
crippled nearly 100 miles of Northern Railroad. But Halleck's splendid
systematizing had begun to tell.


291

The northern part of Missouri was made unbearably hot for bridge-burners
and other depredators by the swift execution of a number of "peaceful
citizens" caught red-handed, and the probability that others would be
caught and served in the same way. Gen. John Pope, commanding in Central
Missouri, began at last to show the stuff that was in him, and by a
skillful movement got into the rear of Bains and Steen, compelling them
to hurriedly abandon the line of the Missouri River, and striking them
so sharply in their flight as to capture 300 prisoners, 70 wagons,
with loads of supplies for Price's army, and much other valuable booty.
Another of Pope's columns, under Col. Jeff C. Davis, surprised a camp
at Mil-ford, Dec. 18, and forced its unconditional surrender, capturing
three Colonels (one of whom was a brother of Gov. Magoffin, of
Kentucky), 17 Captains, and over 1,000 prisoners, 1,000 stands of arms,
1,000 horses and mules, and a great amount of supplies, tents, baggage,
and ammunition. In a couple of weeks Gen. Pope, with a loss of about 100
men, captured 2,500 prisoners.

Jan. 2 Gen. Fred Steele, commanding at Sedalia, and a level-minded man,
who kept himself well informed, telegraphed to Gen. Halleck:

Price's whole force not over 16,000. In all 63 pieces of artillery, none
rifled. Horses very poor. Price says he is going to Jefferson City
as soon as they are organized. At present he has no discipline; no
sentinels or picket to prevent passing in and out. Rains drinking all
the time. Price also drinking too much.

Clearly Price had in him none of the startling aggressiveness which
distinguished Lyon and Stonewall Jackson. He made no effort to suddenly
collect his forces and inflict an overwhelming blow upon one after
another of the columns converging upon him and defeat them in detail.
Instead, he lost heart, and, abandoning the strong lines of the Osage
and the Pomme de Terre, fell back to Springfield, where comfortable
quarters were built for his men, and he gathered in an abundance of
supplies from the Union farmers of the surrounding country, expecting
that he would be left undisturbed until Spring.


292

Thus the year 1861 ended with some 61 battles and considerable
skirmishes having been fought on the soil of Missouri, with a loss
to the Union side of between 500 and 600 killed, treble that number
wounded, and about 3,600 prisoners.

The Confederate loss was probably in excess in most of the engagements.
Besides, they had lost fully four-fifths of the State, and were in
imminent danger of being driven from the restricted foothold they still
retained in the southwestern corner.

The Union State Government, with the conservative, able Hamilton R.
Gamble at the head, was running with tolerable smoothness. Courts were
sitting in most of the Counties to administer justice. Under Halleck's
orders Judges, Sheriffs, Clerks, jurors, parties and witnesses had to
take the oath of allegiance. Gen. Schofield was rapidly organizing his
13,000 Missouri Militia to maintain peace in the State, and incidentally
to keep many of the men enrolled out of the rebel army.


293



CHAPTER XVII. PRICE DRIVEN OUT OF THE STATE.

When he abandoned the strong line of the Osage and took up his position
at Springfield, Gen. Sterling Price, like the Russians against Napoleon,
relied upon his powerful allies, Gens. January, February and March. At
that time the roads in Missouri were merely rough trails, running over
hills and deep-soiled valleys of fertile loam, cut every few miles by
rapid streams. The storms of Winter quickly converted the hills into
icy precipices, the valleys into quagmires, and the streams into raging
torrents. The Winters were never severe enough to give steady cold
weather, and allow operations over a firmly-frozen footing. Rain, sleet
and snow, hard frosts and warm thaws alternated with each other so
frequently as to keep the roads in a condition of what the country
people call a "breakup," when travel is very difficult for the
individual and next to impossible for an army.

When, therefore, at the last of December, Gen. Price returned to
Springfield, in the heart of the rich farming district of southwest
Missouri, and 125 miles or more distant from the Union bases--Rolla and
Sedalia, at the ends of the railroads, he had much reason for believing
he would be left undisturbed for at least two months, which rest he
very much needed to prepare for the strenuous campaign that he knew the
industrious Halleck was organizing against him. He wanted the rest for
many reasons. Yielding to the strong pressure of Missourians, Jefferson
Davis had agreed to appoint Price a Major-General, C. S. A., but upon
the condition that he bring in the Confederate service a full division
of Missouri troops.


294

With his towering influence in Misssouri this would not have been a
difficult thing to do with the whole State to draw from. It was quite
otherwise with three-fourths of Missouri held by the Union troops and
Halleck's well-laid nets everywhere to catch parties of recruits trying
to make their way to Price.

Still, Price was justified in his confidence that the Union troops
would be satisfied with holding northern and central Missouri during
the Winter, and would not venture far from their base of supplies on the
Missouri River and the termini of the railroads at Rolla and Sedalia.

Whatever aggressive disposition they might have which the condition
of the roads would not dampen would be quelled by the knowledge that
McCulloch's army of Texans, Louisianians, Arkansans and Indians lay at
Cross Hollow, within easy supporting distance of him.

Therefore, Price settled down at Springfield, and his men built
comfortable cabins in which to pass the time until Spring. The Union
farmers in the country roundabout were stripped of their grain and
cattle for supplies, and Price proceeded with the organization of his
Confederate division.

Jefferson Davis's feelings toward Price and Missouri are in a measure
revealed in the following querulous letter, which also indicates Mr.
Davis's tendencies to pose as a much-enduring, martyr-like man:


295

     Hon. W. P. Harris, Confederate States Congress.

     My Dear Sir: Language was said by Talleyrand to be useful
     for the concealment of one's thoughts; but in our day it
     falls to communicate any thought. If it had been otherwise,
     the complaint in relation to Gen. Price of which you speak
     could not have been made. The Commissioners of Missouri were
     informed that when that State offered troops they would be
     organized according to our military laws, and Generals would
     be appointed for brigades and divisions. Until then I have
     no power to appoint Generals for those troops. The same
     statements, substantially, were made to the members of
     Congress from Missouri who called on me yesterday. They were
     also informed that, from conversation with Informed persons
     and from correspondence now on file in the War Department, I
     was convinced that it was needful to the public interest
     that a General should be sent to the Arkansas and Missouri
     Division who had not been connected with any of the troops
     on that line of operations; and to the statement that the
     Missouri troops would not fully enlist under any one except
     Gen. Price, I asked if they required their General to be put
     in command of the troops of Arkansas, of Texas, and of the
     other Southern States. To bring these different forces into
     harmonious co-operation is a necessity. I have sought to
     effect it by selecting Gen. Heth to command them in
     combination. If it is designed, by calling Heth a West Point
     Cadet, merely to object to his education in the science of
     war, it may pass for what it is worth; but if it be Intended
     to assert that he is without experience, his years of active
     and distinguished service on the frontier of Missouri and
     the territory west of it will, to those who examine before
     they censure, be a sufficient answer. The Federal forces are
     not hereafter as heretofore to be commanded by pathfinders
     and holiday soldiers, but by men of military education and
     experience in war. The contest is therefore to be on a scale
     of very different proportions than that of the partisan
     warfare witnessed during the past Summer and Fall. I have
     long since learned to bear hasty censure, in hope that
     justice, if tardy, is sure; and in any event to find
     consolation in the assurance that all my ends have been my
     country's.

     With high respect,

     JEFFERSON DAVIS.


296

Gen. Ben McCulloch thought best to go on to Richmond to explain his
course since Wilson's Creek, and also to look after the very tender
subject of his rank and powers. He left Gen. James S. Mcintosh in
command of his troops. Mcintosh had grievances of his own. He was not
being recognized by the Confederate authorities as he thought a man of
his abilities and soldierly experience should have been, and he seems to
have liked cooperation with Gen. Price very much less even than did Gen.
McCulloch. In no very gentlemanly terms he repelled Price's proposition
to combine their forces and push forward to the Missouri River. The best
that Price could get out of him was the assurance that if the Federals
advanced upon him at Springfield he, Mcintosh, would come forward to his
assistance.

Price had greatly underestimated Gen. Halleck's energy and
aggressiveness. Gen. Halleck was the first of our commanders to really
rise to the level of the occasion and take a comprehensive grasp upon
affairs. Unlike some others, he wasted no time in sounding proclamations
or in lengthy letters of advice to the Administration as to the
political conduct of the war. He was a soldier, proud of his profession,
true to his traditions, and possibly had ambition to be reckoned among
the great commanders. He had been noted for high administrative ability,
and this trait was well illustrated in his grasp of the situation in
Missouri and on the borders of the State. His main communications to the
people were orders, plain, practical, and to the point. Whatever he did
was on the highest plane of the science of warfare as he understood it.

Proper military discipline and subordination were introduced everywhere
and a rigid system of accountability. He had troubles with his own men
to add to his difficulties with the enemy. We find the most note of this
with reference to the Germans.


297

The Missouri Germans were a splendid lot of men, taken as a whole,
and had an unusual number of officers who were trained soldiers of
considerable military experience. At the head of this class was Gen.
Peter J. Osterhaus, who had been a private soldier under Lyon in
securing the Arsenal, and had commanded a battalion with high credit to
himself at Wilson's Creek. He was now a Colonel commanding a brigade.

With this excellent material there was a large per cent that ranged
from worthless to actually criminal. Many adventurers from the European
armies had hastened to this country to sell their swords to the best
advantage, and many black sheep, who had been forced out of their
armies, sought in our troubles and our ignorance of military matters an
opportunity for their own exaltation and profit. Halleck dealt with all
with a firm, unsparing hand. He began to weed out the worthless officers
and to court-martial the rascals. Company, battalion and regimental
organizations which he found too mutinous and disorderly for hopeful
management, he either disarmed and set to hard labor or discharged from
the service.

The raids of the vengeful Kansans across the Missouri borders gave
him excessive annoyance, and he issued orders that all Kansas parties
entering the State should be arrested and disarmed. That he might
have more complete control of them, however, he recommended that the
Department of Kansas be merged with his command, and as this was in
had mony with Gen. Hunter's ideas, it was subsequently done. In the
meanwhile he had to look out for the Mississippi River and the highly
important point of, Cairo. He started to construct a fleet of gunboats
to help control the river and assist the Army in its operations.


298

His next neighbor to the eastward was Maj. Gen. Don Carlos Buell,
commanding the Department of the Ohio, which extended from the
Cumberland River to the Allegheny Mountains. Gen. Buell's complete
cooperation was necessary to the management of affairs in the
Mississippi Valley, but this seems to have been difficult to secure.
Buell had his own ideas, and they frequently did not harmonize with
those of Gen. Halleck. Halleck recommended that Buell's Department be
put under his own command, which was also done later.

Bridge-burning and other outrages by straggling bands claiming to be
Confederates seriously disturbed the peace, embarrassed operations, and
worried the Commanding General. Halleck reported that within 10 days
prior to Jan. 1, 1862, these bridge-burners had destroyed $150,000
worth of railroad property and that they had concocted a plan to burn,
simultaneously, every railroad bridge in the State, and set fire to
the city of St. Louis in a number of places. In his comprehensive order
advising summary and severe punishment against these marauders he took
careful guards against such being made the pretext for any private
vengeance or official malice, and instituted Military Commissions of not
less than three responsible officers, acting under the solemnity of
an oath, and making written reports of their proceedings. This
order brought down a storm of abuse from the Secessionist and
semi-Secessionist press, which Halleck calmly disregarded.

Gen. Sterling Price on Jan. 12 wrote Gen. Halleck a strong letter
protesting against the order and asking the question whether
"individuals and parties of men specially appointed and instructed by me
to destroy railroads, culverts, bridges, etc." were, if captured, to be
regarded as deserving of death.


299

Gen. Halleck in reply said:

     You also complain that "individuals and parties of men
     specially appointed and instructed by you to destroy
     railroads, culverts and bridges by tearing them up, burning,
     etc., have been arrested and subjected to a general court-
     martial for alleged crimes." This statement is in the main
     correct. Where "individuals and parties of men" violate the
     laws of war they will be tried, and if found guilty will
     certainly be punished, whether acting by your "special
     appointment and instruction" or not. You must be aware,
     General, that no orders of yours can save from punishment
     spies, marauders, robbers, incendiaries, guerrilla bands,
     etc., who violate the laws of war. You cannot give immunity
     to crime. But let us fully understand each other on this
     point. If you send armed forces wearing the garb of soldiers
     and duly organized and enrolled as legitimate belligerents
     to destroy railroads, bridges, etc., as a military act, we
     shall kill them, if possible, in open warfare, or, if we
     capture them, we shall treat them as prisoners of war.

     But it is well understood that you have sent numbers of your
     adherents in the garb of peaceful citizens, and under false
     pretenses, through our lines into northern Missouri, to rob
     and destroy the property of Union men and to burn and
     destroy railroad bridges, thus endangering the lives of
     thousands, and this, too, without any military necessity or
     possible military advantage. Moreover, peaceful citizens of
     Missouri, quietly working on their farms, have been
     instigated by your emissaries to take up arms as insurgents,
     to rob and plunder and to commit arson and murder. They do
     not even act under the garb of soldiers, but in false
     pretenses and in the guise of peaceful citizens. You
     certainly will not pretend that men guilty of such crimes,
     although "specially appointed and instructed by you," are
     entitled to the rights and immunities of ordinary prisoners
     of war. If you do, will you refer me to a single authority
     on the laws of war which recognizes such a claim?

     You may rest assured, General, that all prisoners of war not
     guilty of crime will be treated with all proper
     consideration and kindness. With the exception of being
     properly confined, they will be lodged and fed, and where
     necessary clothed, the same as our own troops. I am sorry to
     say that our prisoners who have come from your camps do not
     report such treatment on your part. They say that you gave
     them no rations, no clothing, no blankets, but left them to
     perish with want and cold. Moreover, It is believed that you
     subsist your troops by robbing and plundering the non-
     combatant Union inhabitants of the southwestern Counties of
     this State. Thousands of poor families have fled to us for
     protection and support They say that your troops robbed them
     of their provisions and clothing, carrying away their shoes
     and bedding, and even cutting cloth from their looms, and
     that you have driven women and children from their homes to
     starve and perish in the cold. I have not retaliated such
     conduct upon your adherents here, as I have no intention of
     waging such a barbarous warfare; but I shall, whenever I
     can, punish such crimes, by whomsoever they may be
     committed.


300

An examination of the correspondence leads to the conclusion that
Halleck possessed very superior talents as a letter writer.

Contrasted with Fremont, McClellan, Buell and others, Halleck gave great
satisfaction in Washington, and Secretary Stanton telegraphed him as
follows:

Your energy and ability receive the strongest commendation of this
Department You have my perfect confidence, and may rely upon the utmost
support in your undertakings. The pressure of my engagements have
prevented me from writing, but I shall do so fully in a day or two.

Though he made the most of every resource, Halleck was sorely pressed
for money and supplies for his force. His letters and messages mention
the shipment of pantaloons to this one, shoes to another, blankets to a
third, as he could get hold of articles to supply present wants, and of
counsels of patience as to delays in paying off, since the Paymasters
were far behind in their work. Jan. 17 he telegraphed to Gen. Curtis:

General: Yours of yesterday received. I regret to inform you that
neither the Pay nor Quartermaster's Departments have any money. Troops
are sent from here to Cairo without pay. I can do no better for you.
The moment money is received the forces under your command shall be
supplied. They were all paid to the 31st of October. Some here and
in north Missouri are not paid for September and October. I have done
everything in my power for the troops at Rolla, and they have no cause
to complain of me.

The truth is that Congress is so busy discussing the eternal nigger
question that they fail to make any appropriations, and the financial
departments are dead broke. No requisitions for money are filled.

The extra-duty pay will be forthcoming as soon as we get any money.
Assure these men that they will be paid, but they must have patience. I
am doing everything in my power for them.

We must all do the best we can to make the men comfortable and contented
till we get more means. I rely upon you to use all your powers of
conciliation, especially with the German troops. You told me you could
manage them, and I rely upon you to do it At present we have more
difficulties to conquer with our own men than with the enemy.


301

While engaged in these numberless activities Gen. Halleck came down with
a severe attack of measles, and was confined to his room for two weeks,
but there does not appear to have been any intermittence in his energy.

Gen. Halleck's plans contemplated sending forward a column sufficient to
crush Price, if he could be brought to battle, and drive him out of
the State anyway. Another column was to advance from Ironton or
Fredericktown and interpose between Polk at Columbus and Price, to
prevent the former from assisting the latter. In the meanwhile Gen. Polk
would have sufficient to occupy his attention in his "Gibraltar," as
Gen. Grant would make a flank movement up the Tennessee and Cumberland
Rivers. Halleck had come to the conclusion that Columbus would cost too
much in life and blood to be taken by a direct assault, and it would be
better therefore to turn it.

This plan was an excellent one, as Halleck's plans usually were, at that
time, and it was subsequently carried out substantially as conceived.

There were the most conflicting reports as to the number of men Price
had with him at Springfield at that time, but it was supposed all the
way from 25,-000 to 50,000, with rather the stronger emphasis on the
greater number. The Secessionists insisted upon the immensity of the
army which had flocked to Price encouraged by the events untoward to the
Union cause of the last half of 1861 and the indignation aroused by the
invasion and depredations of the Kansas Jayhawkers and the "St. Louis
Dutch."


302

It was reasonable to suppose, from the state of feeling in Missouri,
that Price might have from 40,000 to 50,000 men, but Halleck, who was
unusually well-informed for our Generals at that period of the war,
decided that a column of about 10,000 men would be sufficient for the
work. In this he was at a disagreement with Gen. Curtis and others
in nearer contact with Price, who estimated the Secessionist force at
Springfield in the neighborhood of 20,000 or 25,000. Yielding to their
urgent representations, he increased his force to about 15,000, of which
3,000 were required to guard the lengthening line of communications,
leaving a movable column of 12,000 to move directly against Price. This
force was officially designated the "Army of the Southwest," and there
was assigned to its command our old acquaintance, Brig.-Gen. Samuel R.
Curtis, West Point graduate, lawyer, Mexican veteran, railroad engineer,
and Congressman. This made more or less heart-burning among Brig.-Gens.
Franz Sigel, B. M. Prentiss, S. A. Hurlbut, S. D. Sturgis and others
who had hopes in that direction. Sigel stood no chance for the place,
however, for Halleck had conceived a strong distrust of him growing out
of his action at Wilson's Creek, and also because he was a leader among
the radical Germans who wanted to pull slavery up by the roots. Sturgis
felt that more consideration should have been given to him as commander
of the army at Wilson's Creek after Lyon fell. Curtis, in turn, gave
strong dissatisfaction to some of the brigade commanders by selecting
Jeff C. Davis, a Captain in the Regular Army and Colonel of the 22d
Ind., and Eugene A. Carr, also a Captain in the Regular Army and Colonel
of the 3d Ill. Cav., to command two of his four divisions.


303

In its forward movement the commanders had the benefit of the burning
zeal of the young volunteers. These, who had enlisted to put down the
rebellion, wanted to lose no time in doing their work. They were not
minded to lie around camps, no matter how comfortable, during the long
Winter months. In the Northern homes from which they came the Winter had
always been a season of great activity. They could not understand why it
should not be so in Missouri and they hungered for active employment to
the great end of suppressing the rebellion. Their recent successes had
inspired them with hopes that they might be able to finish up the work
and get back home in time for their Spring duties.

Though the Winter of 1861-'62 was an exceptionally hard, disagreeable
one in Missouri, the volunteers left their camps with alacrity, pressing
forward through the storms and mud with sanguine hopefulness that they
were now about to accomplish their great purpose. Gen. Curtis selected
his first base at Lebanon, 55 miles distant from Springfield, and sent
forward Col. Carr with about 1,700 infantry and cavalry to occupy that
point, gain information as to the condition of things in Price's camp,
and to set on foot preparation for supplying the advancing army from the
surrounding country.

The Union commanders were to learn a lesson from Price, who did not
encumber himself with long trains, but "compelled war to support war" by
drawing his supplies from the country through which he operated. Under
Halleck's orders Gen. Curtis directed that the cavalry should locate
all the mills convenient to the line of march, set them to work grinding
grain, and encourage the Union farmers to bring in their grain, hogs
and cattle, for which the Quartermaster would pay them fair prices. This
work was an admirable education for Halleck's Chief Quartermaster, a
young Captain named Philip H. Sheridan, who was to turn the lessons then
learned to magnificent account afterwards.


304

Lebanon was taken possession of without more resistance than a running
fight in which a notorious Capt. Tom Craig, of the Confederate army, was
killed. Gen. Curtis arrived at Lebanon Jan. 31, leaving Sigel and Asboth
at Rolla to follow as fast as the roads would permit. The recent severe
storms of sleet and snow had been quite trying to the men and animals,
but the columns were pressed forward, and on Feb. 7 Sigel's and Asboth's
men were all in Lebanon, where they were joined by Jeff C. Davis's
Division marching from Otterville by the way of Linn Creek.

Halleck's orders to Curtis were clear, comprehending and purposeful.
Curtis seems to have been not a little apprehensive of the force he
might have to encounter, but Halleck constantly urged him forward, at
the same time enjoining him to keep his troops well in hand, and not
allow Price to attack him in detail. He was to "throw out his cavalry
carefully, like fingers to the hands." Most particularly he was not
to allow Sigel to go off on any independent expedition and serve him as
Sigel had served Lyon at Wilson's Creek. Halleck urged Hunter to advance
his Kansas troops down through his department so as to threaten Price's
left flank, and he told Curtis that if he, Curtis, would take care of
Price, that he himself would look out for Johnson, Polk, Beauregard and
Hardee.


305

The splendid young Missouri, Iowa and Illinois volunteers, welded into
superb regiments by months of service, with the worthless of their
officers removed by Halleck's rigid pruning, pressed forward with
an enthusiasm that no storms could diminish or wretchedness of roads
discourage. They forded swollen, icy streams, pulled their wagons up
steep hills, or pried them out of quagmires, and bore the fury of
the storm with sanguine cheerfulness, believing they were now moving
directly forward to the great end of crushing the enemies of the
Government and closing the war.

Price's outlying detachments were come up with and struck with a
suddenness and vigor that sent them flying in utter rout. It speaks very
ill for Price, with all his means for accurate information, that he
knew nothing of this rapid advance of the Union army until the heads of
Curtis's columns were at his very pickets. He was entirely unready for
battle, and could only hastily gather his men together and make a quick
retreat to the rough hills south of Springfield, leaving all his stores
and his laboriously-constructed cantonments for the Union army. Feb. 13
Curtis had the satisfaction of reporting to Hal-leck as follows:

The Flag of the Union floats over the Court House of Springfield, Mo.
The enemy attacked us with small parties at 10:30 o'clock 12 miles out,
and my front guards had a running Are with them most of the afternoon.
At dusk a regiment of the Confederate cavalry attacked the outer picket,
but did not move it. A few shots from a howitzer killed two and wounded
several. The regiment retreated to this place, and the enemy immediately
commenced the evacuation of the city. I entered the city at 10 a. m.
My cavalry is in full pursuit. They say the enemy is making a stand
at Wilson's Creek. Forage, flour and other stores in large quantities
taken. Shall pursue as fast as the strength of the men will allow.


306

In Gen. Sheridan's "Memoirs" he gives this sidelight on the advance upon
Springfield:

     By hard work we soon accumulated a sufficient quantity of
     flour and corn meal to justify the resumption of our march
     on Springfield, at or near which point the enemy was
     believed to be awaiting us, and the order was given to move
     forward, the Commanding General cautioning me, in the event
     of disaster, to let no salt fall into Gen. Price's hands.
     Gen. Curtis made a hobby of this matter of salt, believing
     the enemy sadly in need of that article, and he impressed me
     deeply with his conviction that our cause would be seriously
     injured by a loss which would inure so greatly and
     peculiarly to the enemy's benefit; but we discovered
     afterward, when Price abandoned his position, that about all
     he left behind was salt.

     When we were within about eight miles of Springfield Gen.
     Curtis decided to put his troops in line of battle for the
     advance on the town, and directed me to stretch out my
     supply train in a long line of battle, so that in falling
     back, in case the troops were repulsed, he could rally the
     men on the wagons. I did not like the tactics, but, of
     course, obeyed the order.

The line moved on to Springfield, and took the town without resistance,
the enemy having fled southward, in the direction of Pea Ridge, the
preceding day. Of course, our success relieved my anxiety about the
wagons; but fancy has often pictured since the stampede of six-mule
teams that, had we met with any reverse, would have taken place over the
prairies of southwest Missouri.

It was felt almost certain that Price had only abandoned Springfield in
order to offer battle more advantageously in the rough hills south of
the town where Wilson's Creek had been fought. The spirit of the army
was up, and it moved promptly forward to engage him in his chosen
fastness. The Secessionist historians and the admirers of Price,
Marmaduke, Shelby and others give thrillingly sanguinary stories of
the fierce resistance offered in the defiles and passes through the
foothills of the Ozarks, but these statements are not supported by
either the official reports or the regimental histories of the Union
army. These all concur in the statement that while there was a great
deal of noisy cannonading, Price's troops yielded ground quite easily,
and all were surprised that no more effective resistance was made at
places that offered such wonderful opportunities for defense.


307

In his report to Gov. Jackson Gen. Price gives this succinct statement
of his share in the movement:

     About the latter part of January my scouts reported that the
     enemy were concentrating in force at Rolla, and shortly
     thereafter they occupied Lebanon. Believing that this
     movement could be for no other purpose than to attack me,
     and knowing that my command was inadequate for such
     resistance as the Interest of my army and the cause
     demanded, I appealed to the commanders of the Confederate
     troops In Arkansas to come to my assistance. This from
     correspondence I was confidently led to expect, and, relying
     upon it, I held my position to the very last moment, and, as
     the sequel proved, almost too long, for on Wednesday, Feb.
     12, my pickets were driven in, and reported the enemy
     advancing upon me in force. No resource was now left me
     except retreat, without hazarding all with greatly unequal
     numbers upon the result of one engagement. This I deemed it
     unwise to do. I commenced retreating at once. I reached
     Cassville with loss unworthy of mention in any respect. Here
     the enemy in my rear commenced a series of attacks running
     through four days. Retreating and fighting all the way to
     Cross Hollows, in this State, I am rejoiced to say my
     command, under the most exhausting fatigue all that time,
     with but little rest for either man or beast and no sleep,
     sustained themselves and came through, repulsing the enemy
     upon every occasion with great determination and gallantry.
     My loss does not exceed four to six killed and some 15 to 18
     wounded. That of the enemy we know to be ten times as great.

Gen. Price's estimate of the losses he inflicted is widely divergent
from that of Gen. Curtis, who does not admit any losses in killed in
the noisy engagements while pushing Price back through the rough gorges,
until he arrived at the Sugar Creek Crossing, six miles into Arkansas,
where he lost 13 killed and 15 or 20 wounded in a very spirited little
fight with the combined troops of Price and McCulloch, and camped that
night upon the battlefield from which the enemy had retreated. Here Col.
Cyrus Bussey joined him with five companies of the 3d Iowa Cav., having
made a forward march from Rolla, Mo., in four days.


308

Curtis was so encouraged by his success that he kept on pushing Price
back upon McCulloch, even upon the boasted "Gibraltar" at Cross Hollows,
and then, to the astonishment and delight of himself and the whole army,
forced the evacuation of this stronghold by a flank movement The rebels'
abandonment of it was so complete that they burned all their stores and
the great array of cabins built for quarters, leaving only the chimneys
to mark the long rows.

Thus any expectation of a sanguinary battle fell in disappointment.
So much had been said about Cross Hollows that the Union troops were
certain that they would have to fight a desperate battle at or near it.
It was known that at least 4,000 regularly-organized troops had been
quartered there for months, subjected to thorough drill and discipline.
Gen. McCulloch had boasted that he had prepared a trap in which to catch
and ruin the Federal General if he ventured that far south. McCulloch's
only fear was of being unable to draw the Federal General into the trap.

The Confederates left their sick and wounded behind them in the
hospitals, and the untiring Gen. Asboth, commanding the cavalry, pushed
the rear guard rapidly through to Bentonville. Returning to Curtis's
camp a day or two later, Gen. Asboth was sent with a force of cavalry to
Fayetteville, a most important town in northwestern Arkansas, where he
learned that his enemies had hid themselves in the Boston Mountains.


309

Gen. Curtis had completed his work of driving Price from Missouri and
some distance beyond her borders. He then drew his forces together and
established himself at Cross Hollows, with the ultimate intention of
retiring to the better position of Sugar Creek Crossing, in the event of
the enemy concentrating any force against him. In the meanwhile he would
hope that the turning movements which Halleck had planned would occupy
Price's and McCulloch's attention, and draw them away from him.


310



CHAPTER XVIII. GEN. EARL VAN DORN TAKES COMMAND.

Jefferson Davis carried out his determination to appoint an officer
superior in rank to both Gens. McCulloch and Price. After first
appointing Gen. Harry Heth, and then offering the appointment to Gen.
Braxton Bragg, he selected another of his favorites, Gen. Earl Van Dorn,
who had been a fiery partisan among the officers of the Regular Army
for States Rights and Secession, was a native of Mississippi, and had
graduated from West Point in 1842, 52d in a class of 56. Whatever his
intellectual qualities may have been, he was a man of great force and
energy, and had won two brevets for distinguished gallantry in the
Mexican War. He gained still more distinction by his successful
expeditions against the fierce Comanches, a tribe then in the hight of
its power. In one of these his small command killed 56 Indians. In his
engagements with the Comanches he had received four wounds, two of
which were quite serious. He had been very active in bringing about Gen.
Twiggs's disgraceful surrender of his command in Texas.

When Jefferson Davis, as Secretary of War, organized the additional
regiments for the Regular Army he took particular pains to promote
into them men of his way of thinking on States Rights, and who would be
useful in the coming contest which he foresaw.


311

One of these new regiments,--then called the 2d U. S. Cav., later
changed to the 5th U. S. Cav., was quite remarkable for this selection,
as it showed Mr. Davis's thorough acquaintance with the character of
the Regular officers, and what they could be relied upon to do when
Secession should be brought about. He made Colonel of the regiment
Albert Sidney Johnston, later General, C. S. A.; Lieutenant-Colonels,
Robert E. Lee, afterward General, C. S. A.; W. J. Hardee,
Lieutenant-General, C. S. A., and E. Kirby Smith, General, C. S. A., and
the Majors were George H. Thomas, W. H. Emory, Major-Generals, U. S. A.,
and Earl Van Dorn, Major-General, C. S. A.

Mississippi seceded Jan. 9,1861. Earl Van Dorn promptly tendered his
resignation and became active, if he had not been before, in bringing
about the surrender by Gen. Twiggs of the United States troops, stores
and munitions of war in Texas, by which we lost nearly half of the
entire strength of the Regular Army, besides some $2,000,000 of
supplies, the control of the Mexican frontier, and a large portion
of Indian frontier. Van Dorn had been commissioned Colonel in the
Confederate army, and hoped to add the surrendered troops to the
military establishment of the Southern Confederacy. He put a great deal
of pressure upon the officers and men to induce them to change their
allegiance, but was remarkably unsuccessful in the latter, not a single
enlisted man accepting his offers of promotion and increased pay. Only
those officers went over whose course had been predetermined. None of
previous loyalty wavered for an instant.


312

Gen. Twiggs had made a capitulation with Gen. McCulloch, of Texas, as if
treating with another Nation. The terms were that the troops should be
conveyed to the nearest seaport, and thence sent home. The steamer "Star
of the West," which had come into notoriety as being the object at which
the first gun of the rebellion was aimed, had been sent to Indianola,
Tex., to receive Twiggs's troops. Van Dorn, enraged by his failure
to accomplish his purpose, violated the terms of the capitulation. He
marched his forces upon the unarmed troops gathered near Indianola,
compelled them to surrender, and captured the "Star of the West." The
officers and men were kept prisoners in Texas for months afterwards, and
subjected to much hardship.

Halleck wrote to Curtis: "Beware of Van Dorn. He is an energetic
officer."

Van Dorn was not to justify the high expectations entertained of him,
and after several failures to improve great opportunities he finally
fell, in 1863, at the age of 42, before the pistol of an injured
husband.

Van Dorn promptly repaired to his command, and seems to have been
welcomed with entirely loyal subordination by both Price and McCulloch,
though both were much older than he, and had held higher commands, Gen.
Price having been a Brigadier-General at a time when Van Dorn was only a
First Lieutenant.


313

At first Van Dorn meditated moving into Missouri by the Pocahontas
route, intermediate between the Mississippi route and that by the way
of Springfield. He began assembling troops at Jacksonport, Ark., to move
directly up through the Ozark Mountains. Then the isolated situation
of Gen. Curtis's little army, with scattered detachments thrown out in
every direction, tempted him to concentrate suddenly his forces and make
the effort to cut off the outlying Union detachments and finally crush
the main body. Therefore, he hastened to the Boston Mountains, sending
messages to the scattered Confederates to meet him there, and was
welcomed on a chilly, snowy March 3 with the Major-General's salute of
40 guns, which were heard by Gen. Curtis at Cross Hollow.

After driving Gen. Price off into the Boston Mountains and successfully
flanking Gen. McCulloch out of his "Gibraltar" at Cross Hollow, Gen.
Curtis prudently halted his army there to consider his next move. The
line of Sugar Creek offered fine opportunities for defense, and from
there he could hope to maintain his communications along the great road
leading to Springfield and Holla. Not having been able to force either
McCulloch or Price to a decisive battle in which he might destroy or at
least cripple them, it did not seem discreet to venture further forward
where every step made them stronger and him weaker.

Halleck had relied upon Gen. Hunter sending down a flanking column from
Leavenworth by the way of Fort Scott, but this had not materialized,
owing to the disputes between Gens. Hunter and Jas. H. Lane. Thus 5,000
men who should have been effectively employed, either in menacing
Van Dorn's flank or increasing Curtis's strength, were held idly, at
Leavenworth.

     [Transcriber's Note: The print copy has a
     two page error in numbering.]


316

Halleck had also relied upon the effect of Gen. Grant's startling
victory at Fort Donelson, which shattered the first Confederate line,
to withdraw a large portion of the forces west of the Mississippi, and
relieve pressure upon Curtis. Nor had this at that time resulted. Though
the general Confederate the roads leading northward crossed Sugar Greek,
and several of them came together some two or three miles north of
a country hostelry known as Elkhorn Tavern on the main road to
Springfield, at the northeastern end of Pea Ridge.

[Illustration: 316-Battle of Pea Ridge]

At 2 p. m., March 4, Gen. Curtis was at Gross Hollow with Col. Carr's
Fourth Division. The extreme left of his army was Col. Wm. Vandever,
of the 9th Iowa, at War Eagle Mills, near White River, 42 miles to the
southeast. The extreme right--the First and Second Divisions, under Gen.
Franz Sigel--was at Cooper's Farm, four miles in front of Bentonville
and 14 miles to the southwest of Sugar Creek. The Third Division, under
Col. Jefferson C. Davis, had moved back to the line selected in rear of
Sugar Creek, where Col. Bussey with his regiment was in camp.

By 2 o'clock scouts and fugitives had convinced Gen. Curtis that Van
Dorn had concentrated his forces, and was in rapid march upon him, only
a few miles away. He sent orders by swift riders to all his outlying
parties to march at once to the designated rendezvous at Sugar Creek,
and started back himself with Carr's Division, arriving on the crest
about 2 a. m. of March 5, and immediately setting his men to work
preparing for the battle. Col. Dodge worked until midnight blockading
with fallen trees the road from Bentonville to Springfield west of
Leetown.


317

In spite of their wide dispersion, Gen. Van Dorn brought McCulloch's,
Pike's and Price's forces together with great rapidity. How many
fighting men he was able to assemble is a question. Gen. Curtis gravely
estimated it at 30,000. Gen. Van Dorn in his reports after the battle,
when he was putting the best face upon matters, stated his force at one
time at 16,000 men, and again at "less than 14,000."

Probably if we follow an old arithmetical device, adding Curtis's
overstatement and Van Dom's understatement together and dividing the sum
by two--the number of statements--we may get somewhat near the truth.
This would give Van Dorn 22,000 men. Students since the war have arrived
at the conclusion that he actually had 26,000 men.

Analysis of the various reports points to this being nearly correct.

Feb. 24--nine days before the battle--Van Dorn reported to Albert Sidney
Johnston that with the combined forces of McCulloch, Pike and Price, he
would "be able to take about 26,000 men into battle."

The best organized and drilled troops west of the Mississippi were
McCulloch's. March 2 he reported his "effective total" to be 8,384 men,
with 18 cannon. He received some accessions after that, raising his
whole force to nearly 10,000 men.

His division was organized as follows:

FIRST BRIGADE.

Col. James Mcintosh commanding:--1st Ark. M. R., Col. T. J. Churchill;
2d Ark. M. R., Col. James Mcintosh; 4th (9th) Tex. Cav., Col. W. B.
Sims; 6th Tex. Cav., Col. B. W. Stone; South Kansas-Texas Regiment, Col.
E. Greer; Lamar Cav., Capt. H. S. Bennett.

SECOND BRIGADE.

Col. Louis Hebert commanding--4th Ark., Col. E. McNair; 14th Ark., Col.
M. C. Mitchell; 16th Ark., Col. Hill, 17th Ark., Col. Frank Rector; 21st
Ark., Col. D. McRae; 1st Ark. Battery, Maj. W. H. Brooks; 3d La.,
Col. Louis Hebert; Tex. Cav., Col. W. C. Young; Tex. M. R., Maj. J. W.
Whitfield; Art. Bat. (four companies), Capt. W. R. Bradfute.


318

Nothing definite can be ascertained as to Albert Pike's force. A short
time before the battle he wrote confidently about having 10,000 men. The
force he actually brought up is generally stated at 6,000, two of the
regiments being white.

The following extract from Gen. Sterling Price's report of March
22--eight days after the battle--gives us the best obtainable idea of
the strength and organization of his force:

My forces consisted of the First Brigade, Missouri Volunteers,
Col. Henry Little commanding; the Second Brigade, Brg.-Gen. Slack
commanding; a battalion of cavalry, under command of Lieut.-Col.
Cearnal, and the State troops, under the command of Brig.-Gens. Rains,
Green, and Frost, Cols. John B. Clark, Jr., and James P. Saunders, and
Maj. Lindsay; numbering in all 6,818 men, with eight batteries of light
artillery.

Price, most probably, did not differ from other beaten commanders in
minimizing his force to the utmost, so that it is entirely reasonable to
assume that he had 2,000 or 3,000 more than he reported. Probably he and
Van Dorn excluded from their fighting strength thousands, like Pike's
In-lians, who proved themselves worthless in the actual shock of battle.

Therefore we have the following aggregate of minimum strength:

     McCulloch......................................   10,000

     Pike...........................................    6,000

     Price..........................................    9,000

                                                       26,000

It seems, therefore, entirely fair to say that Van Dorn had at least
double Curtis's 10,000 when he left Cove Greek on the morning of March
4, with three days' cooked rations in his men's haversacks, and the
intention of destroying the invaders and recovering the State of
Missouri.


319

Both sides were keenly eager for battle. The Confederates had been
harangued with stories of great victories in the East, which they
were to emulate; the Indians were fierce for scalps and plunder; the
Missourians burning to march back to their homes m triumph.

On the other hand, Curtis's men, weary of interminable marching and
skirmishing, longed to deliver a decisive blow which would end all.

Van Dorn's plan of battle was well-conceived, and if his immense
preponderance of force had been adequately handled it would have won a
crushing victory.

McCulloch, during his long stay at Cross Hollow, had familiarized
himself with the ground, and Price was also well acquainted with it. In
the conference held in Gen. Van Dorn's tent it was decided not to attack
in front, where Gen. Curtis had prepared, and where he had in addition
to his obstructions the advantage of the steep side of the ridge.
Instead, a movement would be made on Bentonville, to the southwest of
Curtis, where it was hoped to catch Sigel and destroy him before he
could receive assistance, then destroy Curtis before Vandever's
Brigade could reach him from Huntsville. Pike's Indians were to follow
McCulloch's Division, and when Curtis was beaten the wild Indian riders
would be let loose to exterminate the fugitives.


320

Sigel, with his usual indifference to orders, did not immediately obey
Curtis's command to abandon his camp four miles west of Bentonville and
move back to Sugar Creek. Instead he deferred starting his troops from
Cooper's Farm until 2 o'clock of the morning of the 6th, and stopped
himself with a small force at Bentonville while his troops and train
were passing through the town, and he was attacked about 11 o'clock. Van
Dorn reports that it was 11 o'clock before he could get the head of his
column to Ben-tonville, and "we had the mortification of seeing Sigel's
Division, 7,000 strong, leaving it as we entered. Had we been an hour
sooner we should have cut him right off with his whole force, and
certainly have beaten the enemy the next day."

Sigel had kept back about 600 men. His troops were part of the 12th
Mo. and seven companies of cavalry, besides five field guns. They were
resting with stacked arms when the rebel cavalry swarmed in upon the
town from various directions. Sigel was able, however, to get his
men together and march out of town to cover of some woods, where his
artillery drove back the Confederates, who charged them, and the retreat
was resumed.

This performance was repeated several times along the road, which ran
around the ridges through a growth of scrubby blackjacks, which broke up
Sigel's men and also the eager Confederates who were trying to cut them
off.

Col. Elijah Gates, 1st Mo. Cav., Price's Division, led the pursuers with
great activity and skill. There were incessant assaults with constant
volleys of artillery, until Col. Osterhaus, who had reached Curtis's
line, was ordered back to his relief, preceded by Col. Bussey with the
3d Iowa Cav. When they met Gen. Sigel he had just broken through the
Confederate cavalry, which was still making efforts to surround him, but
the arrival of the reinforcements caused the Confederates to withdraw,
and the Union troops marched back to the camp which had been formed at
Sugar Creek. The Union loss in this affair was reported as 35 killed and
wounded.


321

After a forced march of 42 miles from Huntsville, Col. Vandever's
Brigade reached Pea Ridge at dusk, and Curtis had his whole army
together. A night attack from the south was confidently expected, and
every preparation was made for it.

When night came on Van Dorn built fires, pretending to go into camp,
but moved forward until he came upon the blocked road, which halted
him until after midnight, when he moved forward much embarrassed by the
obstructions Dodge had placed in the wretched roads. Dodge on his return
from blockading the roads notified Gen. Curtis of Price's movement to
the rear, but Gen. Curtis did not believe it, as other reports were to
the effect that Van Dorn's attack would be on the Sugar Creek front.

Price having been delayed until after midnight, did not reach the
telegraph road, a mile or so north of Elkhorn Tavern, until 7 o'clock on
the morning of the 7th.

McCulloch, in the meanwhile, was forming his men in the fields and woods
near Leetown, west of Pea Ridge, with Albert Pike's Indians behind him.

While, therefore, Curtis's men were straining their eyes southward from
his strongly fortified position on Sugar Creek for the advance of the
enemy, the whole Confederate army had gained their flank and rear,
with Price's Division directly across their line of communication and
retreat.


322

Seeing no enemy in front, Curtis's men had a good, leisurely breakfast,
but about 7 o'clock their commander was startled to learn of McCulloch's
position on his right and Van Dorn and Price in his rear. With great
promptness he faced his men about and swung his line back so that his
new right--formerly his left--rested on Elkhorn Tavern, while his left
rested where his old right had been, on the slope above Sugar Creek.
This reversed the order of the divisions--Col. Carr's being the right at
Elkhorn Tavern and Gen. Asboth's the extreme left, with Col. Osterhaus's
and Col. Davis's in the center.

It was now about 8:80 o'clock, and Gen. Curtis directed Col. Osterhaus
to advance a force of cavalry, artillery and infantry and bring on the
battle.

There was soon after a swelling up of the firing about Elkhorn Tavern,
where Carr was, which disturbed Curtis. He wanted the battle where he
was preparing for it, and hoped that his opening it would stop any flank
movements to his right. While Osterhaus was getting ready to advance,
Curtis rode over to Elkhorn Tavern to see what the trouble was with
Carr.

During the early morning Price's troops getting into position on the
main road had run afoul of the Union pickets about a mile northeast of
Elkhorn Tavern. A little after 7 o'clock two companies of cavalry and
one of infantry were sent out in that direction to investigate. They
found a force of cavalry, which they drove back until they saw the woods
full of Confederates, when they took cover behind trees and rocks and
began a noisy skirmish, with the enemy slowly pressing forward and
extending out on both flanks, as Van Dorn and Price brought their troops
up and put them into line.


323

The affair showed such seriousness that Col. Dodge came up about 9
o'clock with his brigade, and formed in line of battle to the right
of Elkhorn Tavern, with the 85th Ill. on the left, the 4th Iowa in the
center, the 3d Ill. Cav. on the right, and the pieces of the 1st Iowa
Battery distributed along the line, and immediately moved forward and
engaged the enemy.

In the meanwhile Van Dorn and Price were placing their strong force
of eight batteries in advantageous positions to crush out the Union
artillery and pave the way for the advance of the infantry. When the
storm burst the Confederate artillery quickly overwhelmed the Union
guns, but Col. Dodge was able, after a sharp struggle, to beat back
across the open fields the advance of the very much superior forces of
the Missouri divisions, commanded by Gens. Steen, Clark, Frost,
Rains and Green. He was so hard pressed, however, that Col. Carr,
who accompanied Col. Dodge, sent back for his other brigade--Col.
Vandever's--a mile and a half away, which arrived and went into position
near Elkhorn Tavern in time to aid in repelling a fresh assault.

More artillery had been brought up, but not enough to successfully
contend with Van Dorn's massed guns.

The Union infantry lay behind the cover of fences, logs and stumps, and
when the Confederate infantry was pushed forward waited until it was
within 100 paces, and then poured a deadly fire into it which shattered
the ranks and drove it in retreat. Gen. Slack, one of Price's ablest
brigade commanders, was killed and Lieut.-Col. Cearnal severely wounded.


324

There was a lull in the battle about 2 o'clock while Van Dorn and Price
were reforming their men for a fresh and more determined assault. The
brunt of it fell upon Col. Vandever on the crest of a hill about 300
yards north of Elkhorn Tavern. Vandever succeeded in driving back the
enemy, though at a great cost, since the 9th Iowa lost upward of 100 men
and Col. Phelps's 26th Mo. about 75.

Though the enemy was repulsed, Col. Vandever deemed it better to fall
back to Elkhorn Tavern, leaving the battleground in the possession of
the enemy.

Col. Carr sent to Gen. Curtis for reinforcements, but Curtis, still
believing that the main fighting was in front of Leetown, could only
spare him his headquarters guard, with two howitzers. He also sent
urgent counsel to Carr to "persevere" and hold his ground with the
utmost obstinacy.

Another lull in the battle occurred while Van Dorn and Price were
bringing up and forming fresh troops. This time it was Gen. Clark's
Missouri Division, reinforced by other troops. The Union soldiers
received it, as they had the others, lying behind fences and logs and
waiting until the enemy was where every shot would tell.

It was about 3 o'clock when this charge was repulsed.

Again Col. Carr sent to Gen. Curtis for reinforcements, and this time
the General sent him five companies of the 8th Ind., under Lieut.-Col.
Shunk, and three rifled cannon.


325

Van Dorn and Price now brought up everything, and concentrated their
energies for a supreme effort to drive the stubborn Yankees from the
field and achieve a victory before darkness should intervene. Their
artillery speedily overpowered and drove off the Union guns, but when
the infantry advanced it met the same terrific fire. This time the
rebels did not give way, but pressed on around the left flank so that
the Second (Vandever's) Brigade had to fall back. The First Brigade
(Dodge's) held its position until night. The log barricades it had built
enabled it to defeat charge after charge of the enemy, and when they
swung around this flank a part of the 8th Ind. and 3d Ill., in a
countercharge, drove the enemy back, protecting and holding that flank
until dusk. In this bloody melee Lieut.-Col. Herron and Lieut.-Col.
Chandler were wounded and captured, and nearly all the field officers
were more or less severely wounded. Col. Dodge had three horses shot
under him, and was himself wounded, and Col. Carr received the fourth
wound of that day. Three of the Union guns were taken.

The Second Brigade when it fell back took up a new and strong position
a quarter of a mile to the rear, facing open ground, and resumed the
battle.

As evening was coming on, Curtis became at last convinced that the
fighting in his front was over, and started the First and Second
Divisions over to the right to the assistance of the Fourth. Gen. Asboth
hurried forward in person with four companies of the 2d Mo. and four
guns of the 2d Ohio Battery, and assisted in checking and driving back
the last assault.

Gen. Curtis came up, formed a new line along the edge of the timber,
with the fields in front, and the men lay down on their arms for the
night.

Let us return to the left, in front of Leetown, where the main battle
had been expected by both sides.


326

Col. Osterhaus does not seem to have formed any very dear plan when
he went out from the center at 9 o'clock to open the battle with
McCulloch's and Pike's forces. Gen. Curtis sent Col. Bussey out in
advance with five companies of the 3d Iowa Cav., four of the 5th Mo.
Cav., four companies of the 1st Mo. Cav., and two companies of the 4th
Mo. Cav., with three pieces of Capt. Elbert's Battery. Col. Greuset's
Brigade of infantry followed the cavalry at a short distance.

Col. Bussey went out to Leetown and thence to the open fields about half
a mile north. The infantry took position in the fields north of Leetown.
Col. Osterhaus came up to the head of the cavalry column where Col.
Bussey was, and they saw the Confederates in plain view about a quarter
of a mile away. It was Van Dorn's trains and cavalry guards which
they saw moving towards the telegraph road. They did not see, however,
McCulloch's troops, Mcintosh's Brigade of cavalry and Pike's Indians
formed in heavy masses to the right and close to them.

Col. Osterhaus ordered Capt. Welfley to open on the men in front, and
the shells caused a very visible stampede. Osterhaus then ordered Col.
Bussey to send two companies down the road to investigate the position.
Col. Bussey ordered Lieut-Col. Trimble, who commanded the 3d Iowa Cav.,
to execute this order, while he gave his attention to the Fremont and
Benton Hussars, then coming forward and forming line in rear of the
guns.

Lieut-Col. Trimble started with five companies of the 3d Iowa Cav., only
to run into a heavy line of battle at close musket range, receiving a
deadly fire which killed several of his men and was himself severely
wounded in the face.


327

A minute later Mcintosh, at the head of five regiments of cavalry,
and Pike leading three Indian and two Texas regiments, burst upon the
cavalry and over the guns with appalling yells and a tempest of bullets.
The Union cavalry was simply ridden down by overwhelming numbers and
mixed up in a hand-to-hand conflict, but fought their way out and
retreated through the open field to Osterhaus's infantry, where Col.
Bussey rallied them and formed in line.

The yelling Confederates rushed on until they came upon Greusel's line,
where their yells were hushed by a storm of canister and bullets which
stopped their advance. The Union line moved into the timber, where
McCulloch was found working his way towards Curtis's camp. A terrible
battle was fought with varying success until at 11 o'clock Col. Jeff
Davis came to Osterhaus's assistance with the Third Division. The
fighting was obstinate and bloody, generally duels between opposing
regiments which crept slowly toward one another until they got within 60
or 70 yards, when they would open fire, maintaining it until one or the
other gave way. The irregular lines thus surged back and forward for
perhaps an hour, with the Union troops generally gaining ground.

During this fighting Gens. McCulloch and Mcintosh were both shot
through the heart by Union sharpshooters. Gen. McCulloch, who was easily
distinguished by his peculiarly-colored clothes, was killed by Peter
Pelican, of Co. B, 36th Ill. How Gen. Mcintosh was killed does not
appear, further than he was shot through the heart. The shooting that
day was remarkably accurate. The men who held the rifles were perfectly
accustomed to their use.


328

After four hours of constant and desperate fighting there was a
noticeable fading in the vim of the Confederate assaults and diminishing
stubbornness of resistance to the Union blows. When the Union soldiers
pushed on through the woods after their enemies they found them falling
back across the fields beyond in great disorder. A few shells from the
Union guns frustrated all attempts to rally them. Osterhaus and Davis
pushed their skirmishers through the woods for a mile, and the cavalry
went still further, finding the three guns of the flying battery with
the carriages burned off, and reporting back that everything seemed to
be in full retreat for Bentonville.

One squad of cavalry came back with Col. Hebert, the next in command to
Gen. Mcintosh; Col. Mitchell and Maj. W. F. Tunnard, of the 3d La., of
the same division; a Major, two Captains and 33 privates, all having
been separated from their commands in the rush through the woods, and
unable to regain them.

After the fall of Gens. McCulloch and Mcintosh the command in that part
of the field devolved upon Gen. Albert Pike, and it is rare that so
great a responsibility falls upon one so unfit. Something of a poet Pike
certainly was; much more of a successful politician and place-hunter,
but nothing of a leader of men upon the battlefield. His soldiership
became sicklied o'er when he went beyond the parade ground. Apparently
he did not know what to do, nor, if he did, how to do it.

Regimental commanders reported that they were unable to find him.


329

His own verbose report, made six days after the battle, is quite full of
unintentional humor. He says that after the first charge the field was
"a mass of the utmost confusion, all talking, riding this way and that,
and listening to no orders from any one." He could get no one to pay any
attention to what he said. His Indians, who had stopped in the charge to
scalp the dead and wounded, would at once stampede whenever a shell was
thrown in their direction. He devoted himself for a couple of hours to
what has been described as "heavy standing around."

Then he fell back with some of the troops a short distance and did some
more standing around, until a Union artillerist noticed him and threw a
shell in his direction, when he fell back out of range, and again stood
around until some one informed him that a body of 7,000 Federals was
moving around the left flank. He quickly decided that the "position was
not tenable," and fell back still more, "when the officers assured me
that the men were in such condition that it would be worse than useless
to bring them into acton again that day." Such is the demoralization of
"standing around."

Finally, it occurred to him to take what troops he could gather and join
Gen. Van Dorn, whose cannon had been thundering two or three miles
away all this time. First, however, he decided to march them back some
distance to a creek, "where they could all get a drink, and join Gen.
Van Dorn in the morning."

Col. E. Greer, 3d Tex. Cav., who became the senior officer of
McCulloch's Division, reported that he gathered up fragments of
regiments to the number of 3,000 after the casualties to his superiors,
and being informed that Gen. Pike had left the field with the remainder
of the command, retired some distance, sending word to Gen. Van Dorn
that, unless he ordered otherwise, he would march to join him at 1:30 in
the morning. Van Dorn approved of this.


330

The night of March 7 closed down with a tumult of widely-varying
emotions in the 33,000 men who joined battle in the morning. All of
Gen. Pike's Indians, except a portion of Col. Standwaitie's regiment
of Cherokee half-breeds, and several thousand whites were rushing off
toward the Arkansas River at full speed. The remnant of McCulloch's
Division, which Col. Greer had rallied, and which had some fight left
in it, unutterably weary, hungry and depressed, bivouacked near the
battlefield, awaiting Van Dora's orders. Price's Missourians, who were
no less weary and hungry than their comrades, from a night of severest
marching and a day of sharp fighting, camped on the ground which they
had wrung from Carr's Division by seven hours of bitter struggling and
the cost of a number of prominent officers and several hundred men.
Their success, though dearly bought, was sufficient to encourage them.
They had captured several hundred prisoners and two pieces of artillery.
They had driven Carr's Division back a quarter of a mile, were across
the Union line of retreat, and Van Dorn had his headquarters at Elkhorn
Tavern.


331

Price had greatly endeared himself to his troops by his conduct during
the day. He was everywhere at the front, leading and encouraging his
men, and though wounded in the arm had refused to quit the field. His
generalship was not so conspicuous as his soldiership. With him and Van
Dorn it was the story of Wilson's Creek over again. Instead of lining up
their superior force and sending all forward with a crushing solidarity,
they had personally led detachments, and when these had been fought out,
gone back and brought up fresh forces, Van Dorn had shown generalship
only in the concentration of his artillery. He had been so engrossed
in this, and in pushing forward detachments he had better left to the
Missouri leadership that he neglected his powerful right wing, which had
gone to pieces, as there was no one left to take the place of McCulloch
and Mcintosh. He hoped, though, with the aid of 3,000 men whom Greer was
bringing to him, to complete his victory in the morning.

There was much to depress Curtis's men in their tireless bivouac south
of Elkhorn Tavern. Dodge's and Vandever's Brigades had been very roughly
handled in the long struggle. Rebel bullets had made sad havoc in their
ranks. They had lost two guns and over a quarter of their force in
killed and wounded. Osterhaus's and Davis's Divisions, in the center,
had had costly encounters with the enemy, and had lost five pieces
of artillery. They did not then know that in reality the victory was
theirs, but believed that most of the enemy had merely left their front
to augment the mass which was formed across their line of retreat They
therefore looked forward to the morrow with well-grounded apprehension.
They had no rations in their haversacks, and their animals had been
without forage for two or three days. Unless the enemy could be driven
from their "cracker line" the very next day, starvation for man and
beast stared them in the face.


332



CHAPTER XIX. THE VICTORY IS WON.

Gen. Curtis's army was far from realizing as the night closed down on
that exciting March 7 how completely it had whipped the overwhelming
numbers of Van Dorn, Price, McCulloch, Mcintosh and Pike. Those of Jeff
C. Davis's and Osterhaus's Divisions, who had done the heavy fighting on
the Leetown front, knew that they had driven away the mass of the enemy
in their front until there was no longer any show of opposition. They
of Carr's Division, on the extreme right, the brigades of Dodge and
Vandever, realized that they had had a terrible fight, in which they had
generally defeated the enemy, inflicting great slaughter, though they
had suffered heavily themselves. Still, the enemy had gained a little
ground. The men of Carr's Division felt that now, since the rest of the
army was coming to their help, they would undoubtedly win a victory
in the morning, and clear the rebels from the road leading back to
Springfield. This confidence was shared by the men of Jeff C. Davis's
and Osterhaus's Divisions, who had come to their assistance, and they
all felt more hopeful than did Sigel and Asboth's Division, which had
taken little or no part in the fighting. The following remarkable letter
from Gen. Asboth to Gen. Curtis, written at 2 o'clock in the morning of
March 8, reveals the general belief of that portion of the army that the
condition was desperate and it would require extraordinary efforts to
release the army from a very hazardous situation:


333

     Headquarters Second Division, Camp Near Sugar Creek, Ark.,

     March 8, 1862; 2 a. m. General: As Oen. Sigel, under whose
     command you have placed me, with my division, has not yet
     returned to our camp, I beg to address you, General,
     directly, reporting that all the troops of the Second
     Division were yesterday, as well as now, in the night,
     entirely without forage; and as we are cut off from all
     supplies by the enemy, outnumbering our forces several
     times, and as one more day without forage will make our
     horses unserviceable, consequently the cavalry and artillery
     as well as the teams, of no use at all, I would respectfully
     solicit a decided concentrated movement, with the view of
     cutting our way through the enemy where you may deem it more
     advisable, and save by this, if not the whole, at least the
     larger part of our surrounded army.

Gen. Curtis seems to have realized quite early in the afternoon the
condition of affairs on his left in front of Leetown, and that the fight
there was over. He therefore directed the cavalry under Col. Bussey to
take up the best positions, holding the ground. All the infantry and
artillery were ordered over toward the Springfield road to form a new
line of battle, substantially a prolongation of that established at
the close of the fighting by the stubborn resistance of Dodge's and
Vandever's Brigades, which had so decisively repulsed the last attacks
upon them the previous evening.


384

Sigel, who had a remarkable faculty for incurring criticism in every
battle, had not made use of Gen. Asboth's Division at any time to
relieve the pressure upon Davis and Osterhaus, so that it had hardly
fired a shot. He now had trouble about getting his troops into line, and
it was 8 o'clock in the morning before he finally took his place on the
left, notwithstanding the fact that he was ordered to have his divisions
in line before daylight. Curtis had now all his artillery up, and though
it was not so numerous as that opposed to him, it was better equipped
and drilled, and promptly opened the battle with a fire to which the
Confederate guns could make no adequate reply. The whole line then
moved forward with blazing rifles, sweeping unchecked up the hillsides,
straight for the enemy's front. In a few minutes the Confederate line
parted in the center and disappeared. Most of the Missourians fell back
toward Keetsville, directly north. Greer and his remnants ran around our
left toward Bentonville, pursued by Col. Bussey's cavalry. Van Dorn
and Price with another remnant broke around our right, going through
an obscure hollow and taking the road to Huntsville. Like most men of
impetuous initiative, Van Dorn when he was whipped was badly whipped. He
sent riders post haste to order his trains burned, but Gen. Green,
who commanded the train guard, was of cooler mettle, and succeeded in
getting the trains away safely.

Gen. Sigel pursued the central portion through Keetsville, seven miles
to the north, capturing nearly 200 prisoners and a great quantity of
arms and stores. He believed Curtis would retreat, and was well on his
way to Springfield when ordered back by Curtis to make his camp on the
battlefield with the rest. Gen. Curtis officially reported his loss as
follows:


335

UNION LOSSES.

Command.

Killed.

Wounded

It will be noticed by the above figures that Davis's Division lost
four officers and 42 men killed, 18 officers and 256 men wounded, while
Sigel's two divisions lost only three officers and 28 men killed, seven
officers and 149 men wounded.

The heaviest loss fell upon the 9th Iowa, which had 39 killed, 176
wounded and four missing. The next heaviest was upon the 4th Iowa, which
had 18 killed, 139 wounded and three missing.

Gen. Van Dorn estimated his loss at 1,000 killed and wounded and 300
missing. This is known to be inaccurate, because more Confederate than
Union dead were buried on the battlefield, and Gen. Curtis sent 500
prisoners to the rear.

The question naturally occurs: Why did Van Dorn relinquish such a
supreme effort with such a small loss?


336

Our amusing acquaintance, Gen. Pike, does not conceal the fact that he
and those around him were very badly whipped. After joining Van Dorn
he resumed his old habit of standing around "observing the enemy." He
reports that he did this for two hours at a stretch when Curtis was
delivering the final crushing blows upon Van Dorn. He then moved
with much promptness toward the rear, for an officer came up with the
stunning intelligence, "You are not safe here, for the enemy's
cavalry are within 150 yards of you." This seemed to have escaped his
"observation" up to that time. He rode on, and his pace was accelerated
by hearing another officer cry out "Close up; close up; or you will all
be cut to pieces."

He halted presently, but had to start again, for a shell was sent by the
enemy up the road from the point of the hill around which he had just
passed. The cry of "The cavalry are coming was raised, and everything
became confusion." He escaped the "enemy's cavalry by rapid riding,"
but was unable to get ahead of his fastgoing troops and stop them,
until they reached Elm Spring, many miles away. He came to this sage
conclusion:

     The enemy, I learn, had been encamped at Pea Vine Ridge for
     three weeks, and Sigel's advance was but a ruse to induce
     our forces to march northward and give them battle in
     positions selected by themselves.

There were others who shared his feelings; for he says:

     Just before night, Saturday afternoon, I had met Col. Rector
     in the hills, who told me he had about 500 men with him;
     that they were in such condition that they could not go more
     than six or eight miles a day, and that he thought he would
     take them into the mountains, hide their arms in a secure
     place, and, as he could not keep them together and feed
     them, let them disperse. He asked my opinion as to this, and
     I told him that no one knew where the rest of the army was;
     that Gens. Van Dorn and Price were supposed to be captured
     and the train taken; that if his men dispersed with their
     arms they would throw them away, and that I thought the
     course he proposed was the wisest one under the
     circumstances. The enemy were pursuing on all the roads, and
     as it was almost impossible for even a dozen men in a body
     to procure food, I still do not see what better he could
     have done.


337

Curtis's cavalry found these guns and brought them into camp; also, all
the artillery that was captured the day before from Davis's and Carr's
Divisions.

Gen. Van Dorn made several reports which are strangely inconsistent
with one another, and seem the natural efforts of a man to find the best
excuses that will present themselves from day to day for his failure
in a great effort. His first report, which was to Gen. Albert Sidney
Johnston and the Confederate War Department, and sent two days after the
battle, reads as follows:

     Headquarters Trans-Mississippi District, March 9, via Hog
     Eye; March 10, 1862.

     Fought the enemy, about 20,000 strong, 7th and 8th, at
     Elkhorn, Ark. Battle first day from 10 a. m. until after
     dark; loss heavy on both sides. Gens. McCulloch and Mcintosh
     and Col. Hebert were killed; Gens. Price and Slack were
     wounded (Gen. Price flesh wound in the arm); the others
     badly wounded, if not mortally; many officers killed and
     wounded; but as there are some doubts in regard to several I
     cannot yet report their names. Slept on the battlefield
     first night, having driven the enemy from their position.
     The death of Gens. McCulloch and Mcintosh and Col. Hebert
     early in the action threw the troops on the right under
     their commands in confusion. The enemy took a second and
     strong position. Being without provisions and the right wing
     somewhat disorganized, determined to give battle on the
     right on their front for the purpose only of getting off the
     field without the danger of a panic, which I did with
     success, but with some losses.

     I am now encamped with my whole army 14 miles west of
     Fayetteville, having gone entirely around the enemy. I am
     separated from my train, but think it safe on the Elm
     Springs road to Boston Mountains. The reason why I
     determined to give battle at once upon my arrival to assume
     command of the army I will give in report at an early day.


338

In this it will be seen that he disclaimed any intention on the second
day of making more than a fight to cover his retreat. This is clearly an
afterthought to excuse the poor battle that he put up. There is no
doubt that he had still hoped to whip Curtis's army, and that he had men
enough to do it, if they had been handled properly and had fought with
the same determination and aggressiveness that the Union troops did. For
some weeks he continued to send in reports, explanatory and partially
contradictory of his first.

Gen. Sterling Price's report, made March 22, gives no idea that the
retreat was determined on after the events of the first day, but says
with relation to the close of the struggle on the evening of March 7:

     The fiercest struggle of the day now ensued; but the
     impetuosity of my troops was Irresistible, and the enemy was
     driven back and completely routed. My right had engaged the
     enemy's center at the same time with equal daring and equal
     success, and had already driven them from their position at
     Elkhorn Tavern. Night alone prevented us from achieving a
     complete victory of which we had already gathered some of
     the fruits, having taken two pieces of artillery and a
     quantity of stores.

     My troops bivouacked upon the ground which they had so nobly
     won, almost exhausted and without food, but fearlessly and
     anxiously awaiting the renewal of the battle in the morning.

     The morning disclosed the enemy strengthened in position and
     numbers and encouraged by the reverses which had unhappily
     befallen the other wing of the army when the brave Texan
     chieftain, Ben McCulloch, and his gallant comrade, Gen.
     Mcintosh, had fallen, fearlessly and triumphantly lead-. ing
     their devoted soldiers against the Invaders of their native
     land. They knew, too, that Hebert--the accomplished leader
     of that veteran regiment, the Louisiana Third, which won so
     many laurels on the bloody field of the Oak Hills, and which
     then as well as now sustained the proud reputation of
     Louisiana--was a prisoner in their hands. They were not slow
     to renew the attack; they opened upon us vigorously, but my
     trusty men faltered not. They held their position unmoved
     until (after several of the batteries not under my command
     had left the field) they were ordered to retire. My troops
     obeyed it unwillingly, with faces turned defiantly against
     the foe.


339

It will be noticed that Price is not as frank as usual in giving reasons
for his rapid retirement at the moment when, he claims, he was in the
full flush of victory. "The retirement of several batteries not under my
command" is a conspicuously inadequate excuse.

In the course of a month or so Van Dorn managed to gather himself
together again so as to begin voluminous communications with Richmond,
explaining that "I was not defeated, but only foiled in my intentions."

He proposed to return to his old Pocahontas plan, "relieve Gen.
Beauregard by marching my army upon the Federals at New Madrid or Cape
Girardeau, and thence on to St. Louis." He would turn his cavalry loose
on Gen. Curtis's long line of communications, and send Gen. Pike with
his Indians to harry southwestern Missouri and Kansas.

The Confederate War Department did not think highly of this, but shortly
transferred him and his troops east of the Mississippi.

Gen. Price was also transferred east of the Mississippi, with the
Missouri troops he had taken into the Confederate army, and his farewell
to the Missouri State troops is worth reproducing as a specimen of the
heated rhetoric customary in those days:

     Headquarters Missouri State Guard,

     Des Arc, Ark., April 8, 1862. (General Orders No. 79.)

     Soldiers of the State Guard: I command you no longer. I have
     this day resigned the commission which your patient
     endurance, your devoted patriotism and your dauntless
     bravery have made so honorable. I have done this that I may
     the better serve you, our State and our country--that I may
     the sooner lead you back to the fertile prairies, the rich
     woodlands and majestic streams of our beloved Missouri--that
     I may the more certainly restore you to your once happy
     homes and to the loved ones there.

     Five thousand of those who have fought side by side with us
     under the Grizzly Bears of Missouri have followed me into
     the Confederate camp. They appeal to you, as I do, by all
     the tender memories of the past, not to leave us now, but to
     go with us wherever the path of duty may lead, till we shall
     have conquered a peace and won our independence by brilliant
     deeds upon new fields of battle.


340

     Soldiers of the State Guards!    Veterans of six pitched
     battles and nearly 20 skirmishes! Conquerors in them all!
     Tour country, with Its "ruined hearths and shrines," calls
     upon you to rally once more In her defense, and rescue her
     forever from the terrible thraldom which threatens her. I
     know that she will not call In vain. The Insolent and
     barbarous hordes which have dared to Invade our soil and to
     desecrate our homes have Just met with a signal overthrow
     beyond the Mississippi Now Is the time to end this unhappy
     war. If every man will but do his duty, his own roof will
     shelter him In peace from the storms of the coming; Winter.

     Let not history record that the men who bore with patience
     the privations of Cowskln Prairie, who endured
     uncomplainingly the burning heat of a Missouri Summer and
     the frosts and snows of a Missouri Winter; that the men who
     met the enemy at Carthage, at Oak Hills, at Fort Scott, at
     Lexington and on numberless lesser battlefields In Missouri,
     and met them but to conquer them; that the men who fought so
     bravely and so well at Blkhorn; that the unpaid soldiery of
     Missouri were, after so many victories and after so much
     suffering, unequal to the great task of achieving the
     Independence of their magnificent State.

     Soldiers, I go but to mark a pathway to our homes. Follow
     me!


Very few but those who had already been cajoled into the Confederate
service followed.

A great deal of bitterness was developed from the discovery upon the
battlefield of a number of Union dead who had been scalped by
Pike's Indians. Many of these belonged to the 3d Iowa Cav., and the
investigation of the matter was conducted by order of Col. Bussey, by
his Adjutant, John W. Noble, afterwards Secretary of the Interior. Col.
Bussey became Assistant Secretary of the Interior.


341

The bodies of at least eight of the 3d Iowa Cav. were exhumed and found
to have been scalped and the bodies otherwise maltreated after their
deaths by the scalping knives and tomahawks of merciless Indians. The
matter was made subject of a strong communication from Gen. Curtis
to Gen. Van Dorn, and the latter's Adjutant-General, Dabney H. Maury,
replied, cordially condemning any such deeds, but claiming that, on
the other hand, many prisoners of war had been killed in cold blood by
Curtis's men, who were alleged to be Germans. The letter said:

The General commanding feels sure that you will do your part as he will
in preventing such atrocities in the future, and that the perpetrators
of them will be brought to justice, whether Germans or Choctaws.

Gen. Curtis was promoted to Major-General for his victory, and well
deserved that honor, in spite of some bitter critics. Sigd was also
made a Major-General, with much less reason. Asboth had his withheld
Brigadier-Generalcy confirmed to him. Cols. Carr, Davis and Dodge were
made Brigadier-Generals, but Cols. Osterhaus, White and Bussey, who had
done conspicuous fighting, had to wait some months for their promotion,
and Cols. Greusel and Pattison never received it.

Among those who received praise for their gallantry that day was
Maj. John Charles Black, of the 37th Ill., later a Colonel and
Brigadier-General, Commissioner of Pensions under President Cleveland,
Representative-at-large from Illinois, Commander-in-Chief of the Grand
Army of the Republic, and now President of the United States Civil
Service Commission. Maj. Black was severely wounded in the sword arm in
the fight, but refused to leave the field until Gen. White ordered him
to do so.

Another was Maj. Phillip Sidney Post, of the 59th Ill. He later became
Colonel and Brigadier-General; was left for dead on the field at
Nashville, but recovered, to be Consul-General at Vienna and represent
Illinois for many years in Congress. He was also wounded in the sword
arm, and also refused to leave the field until he was peremptorily
ordered to do so.


342

The moral effect of the victory was prodigious and far-reaching. High
expectations had been raised by Van Dora, McCulloch, Mcintosh, Price
and Albert Pike, which were abjectly prostrated. The mass of fugitives,
white and red, who scattered over Missouri, Arkansas and the Indian
Territory, each with his tale of awful slaughter and disheartened
defeat, had a blighting effect upon the Secessionists, and greatly
strengthened the Union sentiment.

It was a desperate two-days' wrestle between the very best that the
Southern Confederacy could produce west of the Mississippi River--the
ablest commanders and the finest troops--and a small Union army. It was
breaking, test, under the fairest conditions, of the fighting qualities
of the two combatants.

Though bitter, merciless, sanguinary fighting was to perturb the State
for three years longer, it was no longer war, but guerilla raiding and
bandittism, robbery and murder under a pretext of war. Price, indeed,
made an invasion of the State two years later, but it was a hurried
raid, without hope of permanent results.

At the conclusion of the battle Missouri was as firmly anchored to the
Union as her neighbors, Illinois, Iowa and Kansas.

The battle for Missouri had been fought and won.






End of Project Gutenberg's The Struggle for Missouri, by John McElroy