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DIARY, FROM MARCH 4, 1861, TO NOVEMBER 12, 1862.

by

ADAM GUROWSKI.







Boston:
Lee and Shepard,
Successors to Phillips, Sampson & Co.
1862.

Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1862, by
Lee and Shepard,
In the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the District of
Massachusetts.




Dedicated

TO

THE WIDOWED WIVES, THE BEREAVED MOTHERS, SISTERS,

SWEETHEARTS, AND ORPHANS

IN

THE LOYAL STATES.




_On doit à son pays sa fortune, sa vie, mais avant tout la Vérité._


In this Diary I recorded what I heard and saw myself, and what I heard
from others, on whose veracity I can implicitly rely.

I recorded impressions as immediately as I felt them. A life almost
wholly spent in the tempests and among the breakers of our times has
taught me that the first impressions are the purest and the best.

If they ever peruse these pages, my friends and acquaintances will
find therein what, during these horrible national trials, was a
subject of our confidential conversations and discussions, what in
letters and by mouth was a subject of repeated forebodings and
warnings. Perhaps these pages may in some way explain a phenomenon
almost unexampled in history,--that twenty millions of people, brave,
highly intelligent, and mastering all the wealth of modern
civilization, were, if not virtually overpowered, at least so long
kept at bay by about five millions of rebels.

                                                             GUROWSKI.

WASHINGTON, NOVEMBER, 1862.




CONTENTS.


  MARCH, 1861.                                                      13

Inauguration day -- The message -- Scott watching at the door of the
Union -- The Cabinet born -- The Seward and Chase struggle -- The New
York radicals triumph -- The treason spreads -- The Cabinet pays old
party debts -- The diplomats confounded -- Poor Senators! -- Sumner is
like a hare tracked by hounds -- Chase in favor of recognizing the
revolted States -- Blunted axes -- Blair demands action, brave fellow!
-- The slave-drivers -- The month of March closes -- No foresight! no
foresight!


  APRIL, 1861.                                                      22

Seward parleying with the rebel commissioners -- Corcoran's dinner --
The crime in full blast! -- 75,000 men called for -- Massachusetts
takes the lead -- Baltimore -- Defence of Washington -- Blockade
discussed -- France our friend, not England -- Warning to the
President -- Virginia secedes -- Lincoln warned again -- Seward says
it will all blow over in sixty to ninety days -- Charles F. Adams --
The administration undecided; the people alone inspired -- Slavery
must perish! -- The Fabian policy -- The Blairs -- Strange conduct of
Scott -- Lord Lyons -- Secret agent to Canada.


  MAY, 1861.                                                        37

The administration tossed by expedients -- Seward to Dayton --
Spread-eagleism -- One phasis of the American Union finished -- The
fuss about Russell -- Pressure on the administration increases --
Seward, Wickoff, and the Herald -- Lord Lyons menaced with passports
-- The splendid Northern army -- The administration not up to the
occasion -- The new men -- Andrew, Wadsworth, Boutwell, Noyes, Wade,
Trumbull, Walcott, King, Chandler, Wilson -- Lyon jumps over formulas
-- Governor Banks needed -- Butler takes Baltimore with two regiments
-- News from England -- The "belligerent" question -- Butler and Scott
-- Seward and the diplomats -- "What a Merlin!" -- "France not bigger
than New York!" -- Virginia invaded -- Murder of Ellsworth -- Harpies
at the White House.


  JUNE, 1861.                                                       50

Butler emancipates slaves -- The army not organized -- Promenades --
The blockade -- Louis Napoleon -- Scott all in all -- Strategy! -- Gun
contracts -- The diplomats -- Masked batteries -- Seward writes for
"bunkum" -- Big Bethel -- The Dayton letter -- Instructions to Mr.
Adams.


  JULY, 1861.                                                       60

The Evening Post -- The message -- The administration caught napping
-- McDowell -- Congress slowly feels its way -- Seward's great
facility of labor -- Not a Know-Nothing -- Prophesies a speedy end --
Carried away by his imagination -- Says "secession is over" -- Hopeful
views -- Politeness of the State department -- Scott carries on the
campaign from his sleeping room -- Bull Run -- Rout -- Panic --
"Malediction! Malediction!" -- Not a manly word in Congress! -- Abuse
of the soldiers -- McClellan sent for -- Young-blood -- Gen. Wadsworth
-- Poor McDowell! -- Scott responsible -- Plan of reorganization --
Let McClellan beware of routine.


  AUGUST, 1861.                                                     78

The truth about Bull Run -- The press staggers -- The Blairs alone
firm -- Scott's military character -- Seward -- Mr. Lincoln reads the
Herald -- The ubiquitous lobbyist -- Intervention -- Congress adjourns
-- The administration waits for something to turn up -- Wade -- Lyon
is killed -- Russell and his shadow -- The Yankees take the loan --
Bravo, Yankees! -- McClellan works hard -- Prince Napoleon -- Manassas
fortifications a humbug -- Mr. Seward improves -- Old Whigism --
McClellan's powers enlarged -- Jeff. Davis makes history -- Fremont
emancipates in Missouri -- The Cabinet.


  SEPTEMBER, 1861.                                                  92

What will McClellan do? -- Fremont disavowed -- The Blairs not in
fault -- Fremont ignorant and a bungler -- Conspiracy to destroy him
-- Seward rather on his side -- McClellan's staff -- A Marcy will not
do! -- McClellan publishes a slave-catching order -- The people move
onward -- Mr. Seward again -- West Point -- The Washington defences --
What a Russian officer thought of them -- Oh, for battles! -- Fremont
wishes to attack Memphis; a bold move! -- Seward's influence over
Lincoln -- The people for Fremont -- Col. Romanoff's opinion of the
generals -- McClellan refuses to move -- Manoeuvrings -- The people
uneasy -- The staff -- The Orleans -- Brave boys! -- The Potomac
closed -- Oh, poor nation! -- Mexico -- McClellan and Scott.


  OCTOBER, 1861.                                                   104

Experiments on the people's life-blood -- McClellan's uniform -- The
army fit to move -- The rebels treat us like children -- We lose time
-- Everything is defensive -- The starvation theory -- The anaconda --
First interview with McClellan -- Impressions of him -- His distrust
of the volunteers -- Not a Napoleon nor a Garibaldi -- Mason and
Slidell -- Seward admonishes Adams -- Fremont goes overboard -- The
pro-slavery party triumph -- The collateral missions to Europe --
Peace impossible -- Every Southern gentleman is a pirate -- When will
we deal blows? -- Inertia! inertia!


  NOVEMBER, 1861.                                                  115

Ball's Bluff -- Whitewashing -- "Victoria! Old Scott gone overboard!"
-- His fatal influence -- His conceit -- Cameron -- Intervention --
More reviews -- Weed, Everett, Hughes -- Gov. Andrew -- Boutwell --
Mason and Slidell caught -- Lincoln frightened by the South Carolina
success -- Waits unnoticed in McClellan's library -- Gen. Thomas --
Traitors and pedants -- The Virginia campaign -- West Point --
McClellan's speciality -- When will they begin to see through him?


  DECEMBER, 1861.                                                  129

The message -- Emancipation -- State papers published -- Curtis Noyes
-- Greeley not fit for Senator -- Generalship all on the rebel side --
The South and the North -- The sensationists -- The new idol will cost
the people their life-blood! -- The Blairs -- Poor Lincoln! -- The
Trent affair -- Scott home again -- The war investigation committee --
Mr. Mercier.


  JANUARY, 1862.                                                   137

The year 1861 ends badly -- European defenders of slavery -- Secession
lies -- Jeremy Diddlers -- Sensation-seekers -- Despotic tendencies --
Atomistic Torquemadas -- Congress chained by formulas -- Burnside's
expedition a sign of life -- Will this McClellan ever advance? -- Mr.
Adams unhorsed -- He packs his trunks -- Bad blankets -- Austria,
Prussia, and Russia -- The West Point nursery -- McClellan a greater
mistake than Scott -- Tracks to the White House -- European stories
about Mr. Lincoln -- The English ignorami -- The slaveholder a
scarcely varnished savage -- Jeff. Davis -- "Beauregard frightens us
-- McClellan rocks his baby" -- Fancy army equipment -- McClellan and
his chief of staff sick in bed -- "No satirist could invent such
things" -- Stanton in the Cabinet -- "This Stanton is the people" --
Fremont -- Weed -- The English will not be humbugged -- Dayton in a
fret -- Beaufort -- The investigating committee condemn McClellan --
Lincoln in the clutches of Seward and Blair -- Banks begs for guns and
cavalry in vain -- The people will awake! -- The question of race --
Agassiz.


  FEBRUARY, 1862.                                                  151

Drifting -- The English blue book -- Lord John could not act
differently -- Palmerston the great European fuss-maker -- Mr.
Seward's "two pickled rods" for England -- Lord Lyons -- His pathway
strewn with broken glass -- Gen. Stone arrested -- Sumner's
resolutions infuse a new spirit in the Constitution -- Mr. Seward
beyond salvation -- He works to save slavery -- Weed has ruined him --
The New York press -- "Poor Tribune" -- The Evening Post -- The Blairs
-- Illusions dispelled -- "All quiet on the Potomac" -- The London
papers -- Quill-heroes can be bought for a dinner -- French opinion --
Superhuman efforts to save slavery -- It is doomed! -- "All you
worshippers of darkness cannot save it!" -- The Hutchinsons --
Corporal Adams -- Victories in the West -- Stanton the man! --
Strategy (hear!)


  MARCH, 1862.                                                     165

The Africo-Americans -- Fremont -- The Orleans -- Confiscation --
American nepotism -- The Merrimac -- Wooden guns -- Oh shame! -- Gen.
Wadsworth -- The rats have the best of Stanton -- McClellan goes to
Fortress Monroe -- Utter imbecility -- The embarkation -- McClellan a
turtle -- He will stick in the marshes -- Louis Napoleon behaves nobly
-- So does Mr. Mercier -- Queen Victoria for freedom -- The great
strategian -- Senator Sumner and the French minister -- Archbishop
Hughes -- His diplomatic activity not worth the postage on his
correspondence -- Alberoni-Seward -- Love's labor lost.


  APRIL, 1862.                                                     180

Immense power of the President -- Mr. Seward's Egeria -- Programme of
peace -- The belligerent question -- Roebucks and Gregories scums --
Running the blockade -- Weed and Seward take clouds for camels --
Uncle Sam's pockets -- Manhood, not money, the sinews of war --
Colonization schemes -- Senator Doolittle -- Coal mine speculation --
Washington too near the seat of war -- Blair demands the return of a
fugitive slave woman -- Slavery is Mr. Lincoln's "_mammy_" -- He will
not destroy her -- Victories in the West -- The brave navy --
McClellan subsides in mud before Yorktown -- Telegraphs for more men
-- God will be tired out! -- Great strength of the people --
Emancipation in the District -- Wade's speech -- He is a monolith --
Chase and Seward -- N. Y. Times -- The Rothschilds -- Army movements
and plans.


  MAY, 1862.                                                       198

Capture of New Orleans -- The second siege of Troy -- Mr. Seward
lights his lantern to search for the Union-saving party --
Subserviency to power -- Vitality of the people -- Yorktown evacuated
-- Battle of Williamsburg -- Great bayonet charge! -- Heintzelman and
Hooker -- McClellan telegraphs that the enemy outnumber him -- The
terrible enemy evacuate Williamsburg -- The track of truth begins to
be lost -- Oh Napoleon! -- Oh spirit of Berthier! -- Dayton not in
favor -- Events are too rapid for Lincoln -- His integrity -- Too
tender of men's feelings -- Halleck -- Ten thousand men disabled by
disease -- The Bishop of Orleans -- The rebels retreat without the
knowledge of McNapoleon -- Hunter's proclamation -- Too noble for Mr.
Lincoln -- McClellan again subsides in mud -- Jackson defeats Banks,
who makes a masterly retreat -- Bravo, Banks! -- The aulic council
frightened -- Gov. Andrew's letter -- Sigel -- English opinion -- Mr.
Mill -- Young Europa -- Young Germany -- Corinth evacuated -- Oh,
generalship! -- McDowell grimly persecuted by bad luck.


  JUNE, 1862.                                                      218

Diplomatic circulars seasoned by stories -- Battle before Richmond --
Casey's division disgraced -- McClellan afterwards confesses he was
misinformed -- Fair Oaks -- "Nobody is hurt, only the bleeding people"
-- Fremont disobeys orders -- N. Y. Times, World, and Herald,
opinion-poisoning sheets -- Napoleon never visible before nine o'clock
in the morning -- Hooker and the other fighters soldered to the mud --
Senator Sumner shows the practical side of his intellect -- "Slavery a
big job!" -- McClellan sends for mortars -- Defenders of slavery in
Congress worse than the rebels -- Wooden guns and cotton sentries at
Corinth -- The navy is glorious -- Brave old Gideon Welles! -- July
4th to be celebrated in Richmond! -- Colonization again -- Justice to
France -- New regiments -- The people sublime! -- Congress -- Lincoln
visits Scott -- McDowell -- Pope -- Disloyalty in the departments.


  JULY, 1862.                                                      233

Intervention -- The cursed fields of the Chickahominy -- Titanic
fightings, but no generalship -- McClellan the first to reach James
river -- The Orleans leave -- July 4th, the gloomiest since the birth
of the republic -- Not reinforcements, but brains, wanted; and brains
not transferable! -- The people run to the rescue -- Rebel tactics --
Lincoln does not sacrifice Stanton -- McClellan not the greatest
culprit -- Stanton a true statesman -- The President goes to James
river -- The Union as it was, a throttling nightmare! -- A man needed!
-- Confiscation bill signed -- Congress adjourned -- Mr. Dicey --
Halleck, the American Carnot -- Lincoln tries to neutralize the
confiscation bill -- Guerillas spread like locusts.


  AUGUST, 1862.                                                    245

Emancipation -- The President's hand falls back -- Weed sent for --
Gen. Wadsworth -- The new levies -- The Africo-Americans not called
for -- Let every Northern man be shot rather! -- End of the Peninsula
campaign -- Fifty or sixty thousand dead -- Who is responsible? -- The
army saved -- Lincoln and McClellan -- The President and the
Africo-Americans -- An Eden in Chiriqui -- Greeley -- The old lion
begins to awake -- Mr. Lincoln tells stories -- The rebels take the
offensive -- European opinion -- McClellan's army landed -- Roebuck --
Halleck -- Butler's mistakes -- Hunter recalled -- Terrible fighting
at Manassas -- Pope cuts his way through -- Reinforcements slow
incoming -- McClellan reduced in command.


  SEPTEMBER, 1862.                                                 258

_Consummatum est!_ -- Will the outraged people avenge itself? --
McClellan satisfies the President -- After a year! -- The truth will
be throttled -- Public opinion in Europe begins to abandon us -- The
country marching to its tomb -- Hooker, Kearney, Heintzelman, Sigel,
brave and true men -- Supremacy of mind over matter -- Stanton the
last Roman -- Inauguration of the pretorian regime -- Pope accuses
three generals -- Investigation prevented by McClellan -- McDowell
sacrificed -- The country inundated with lies -- The demoralized army
declares for McClellan -- The pretorians will soon finish with liberty
-- Wilkes sent to the West Indian waters -- Russia -- Mediation --
Invasion of Maryland -- Strange story about Stanton -- Richmond never
invested -- McClellan in search of the enemy -- Thirty miles in six
days -- The telegrams -- Wadsworth -- Capitulation of Harper's Ferry
-- Five days' fighting -- Brave Hooker wounded -- No results -- No
reports from McClellan -- Tactics of the Maryland campaign -- Nobody
hurt in the staff -- Charmed lives -- Wadsworth, Judge Conway, Wade,
Boutwell, Andrew -- This most intelligent people become the
laughing-stock of the world! -- The proclamation of emancipation --
Seward to the Paisley Association -- Future complications -- If Hooker
had not been wounded! -- The military situation -- Sigel persecuted by
West Point -- Three cheers for the carriage and six! -- How the great
captain was to catch the rebel army -- Interview with the Chicago
deputation -- Winter quarters -- The conspiracy against Sigel --
Numbers of the rebel army -- Letters of marque.


  OCTOBER, 1862.                                                   288

Costly infatuation -- The do-nothing strategy -- Cavalry on lame
horses -- Bayonet charges -- Antietam -- Effect of the Proclamation --
Disasters in the West -- The Abolitionists not originally hostile to
McClellan -- Helplessness in the War Department -- Devotedness of the
people -- McClellan and the proclamation -- Wilkes -- Colonel Key --
Routine engineers -- Rebel raid into Pennsylvania -- Stanton's
sincerity -- Oh, unfighting strategians -- The administration a
success -- _De gustibus_ -- Stuart's raid -- West Point -- St. Domingo
-- The President's letter to McClellan -- Broad church -- The
elections -- The Republican party gone -- The remedy at the polls --
McClellan wants to be relieved -- Mediation -- Compromise -- The
rhetors -- The optimists -- The foreigners -- Scott and Buchanan --
Gladstone -- Foreign opinion and action -- Both the extremes to be put
down -- Spain -- Fremont's campaign against Jackson -- Seward's
circular -- General Scott's gift -- "Oh, could I go to a camp!" --
McClellan crosses the Potomac -- Prays for rain -- Fevers decimate the
regiments -- Martindale and Fitz John Porter -- The political balance
to be preserved -- New regiments -- O poor country!


  NOVEMBER, 1862.                                                  311

Empty rhetoric -- The future dark and terrible -- Wadsworth defeated
-- The official bunglers blast everything they touch -- Great and holy
day! McClellan gone overboard! -- The planters -- Burnside --
McClellan nominated for President -- Awful events approaching --
Dictatorship dawns on the horizon -- The catastrophe.




DIARY.




MARCH, 1861.

     Inauguration day -- The message -- Scott watching at the door of
     the Union -- The Cabinet born -- The Seward and Chase struggle --
     The New York radicals triumph -- The treason spreads -- The
     Cabinet pays old party debts -- The diplomats confounded -- Poor
     Senators! -- Sumner is like a hare tracked by hounds -- Chase in
     favor of recognizing the revolted States -- Blunted axes -- Blair
     demands action, brave fellow! -- The slave-drivers -- The month
     of March closes -- No foresight! no foresight!


For the first time in my life I assisted at the simplest and grandest
spectacle--the inauguration of a President. Lincoln's message good,
according to circumstances, but not conclusive; it is not positive; it
discusses questions, but avoids to assert. May his mind not be
altogether of the same kind. Events will want and demand more
positiveness and action than the message contains assertions. The
immense majority around me seems to be satisfied. Well, well; I wait,
and prefer to judge and to admire when actions will speak.

I am sure that a great drama will be played, equal to any one known in
history, and that the insurrection of the slave-drivers will not end
in smoke. So I now decide to keep a diary in my own way. I scarcely
know any of those men who are considered as leaders; the more
interesting to observe them, to analyze their mettle, their actions.
This insurrection may turn very complicated; if so, it must generate
more than one revolutionary manifestation. What will be its
march--what stages? Curious; perhaps it may turn out more interesting
than anything since that great renovation of humanity by the great
French Revolution.

The old, brave warrior, Scott, watched at the door of the Union; his
shadow made the infamous rats tremble and crawl off, and so Scott
transmitted to Lincoln what was and could be saved during the
treachery of Buchanan.

By the most propitious accident, I assisted at the throes among which
Mr. Lincoln's Cabinet was born. They were very painful, but of the
highest interest for me, and I suppose for others. I participated some
little therein.

A pledge bound Mr. Lincoln to make Mr. Seward his Secretary of State.
The radical and the puritanic elements in the Republican party were
terribly scared. His speeches, or rather demeanor and repeated
utterances since the opening of the Congress, his influence on Mr.
Adams, who, under Seward's inspiration, made his speech _de lana
caprina_, and voted for compromises and concessions,--all this spread
and fortified the general and firm belief that Mr. Seward was ready to
give up many from among the cardinal articles of the Republican creed
of which he was one of the most ardent apostles. They, the
Republicans, speak of him in a way to remind me of the dictum, "_omnia
serviliter pro dominatione_," as they accuse him now of subserviency
to the slave power. The radical and puritan Republicans likewise dread
him on account of his close intimacy with a Thurlow Weed, a Matteson,
and with similar not over-cautious--as they call them--lobbyists.

Some days previous to the inauguration, Mr. Seward brought Mr. Lincoln
on the Senate floor, of course on the Republican side; but soon Mr.
Seward was busily running among Democrats, begging them to be
introduced to Lincoln. It was a saddening, humiliating, and revolting
sight for the galleries, where I was. Criminal as is Mason, for a
minute I got reconciled to him for the scowl of horror and contempt
with which he shook his head at Seward. The whole humiliating
proceeding foreshadowed the future policy. Only two or three
Democratic Senators were moved by Seward's humble entreaties. The
criminal Mason has shown true manhood.

The first attempt of sincere Republicans was to persuade Lincoln to
break his connection with Seward. This failed. To neutralize what was
considered quickly to become a baneful influence in Mr. Lincoln's
councils, the Republicans united on Gov. Chase. This Seward opposed
with all his might. Mr. Lincoln wavered, hesitated, and was bending
rather towards Mr. Seward. The struggle was terrific, lasted several
days, when Chase was finally and triumphantly forced into the
Cabinet. It was necessary not to leave him there alone against Seward,
and perhaps Bates, the old cunning Whig. Again terrible opposition by
Seward, but it was overcome by the radicals in the House, in the
Senate, and outside of Congress by such men as Curtis, Noyes, J. S.
Wadsworth, Opdyke, Barney, &c., &c., and Blair was brought in. Cameron
was variously opposed, but wished to be in by Seward; Welles was from
the start considered sound and safe in every respect; Smith was
considered a Seward man.

From what I witnessed of Cabinet-making in Europe, above all in France
under Louis Philippe, I do not forebode anything good in the coming-on
shocks and eruptions, and I am sure these must come. This Cabinet as
it stands is not a fusion of various shadowings of a party, but it is
a violent mixing or putting together of inimical and repulsive forces,
which, if they do not devour, at the best will neutralize each other.

Senator Wilson answered Douglass in the Senate, that "when the
Republican party took the power, treason was in the army, in the navy,
in the administration," etc. Dreadful, but true assertion. It is to be
seen how the administration will act to counteract this ramified
treason.

What a run, a race for offices. This spectacle likewise new to me.

The Cabinet Ministers, or, as they call them here, the Secretaries, have
old party debts to pay, old sores to avenge or to heal, and all this by
distributing offices, or by what they call it here--patronage. Through
patronage and offices everybody is to serve his friends and his party,
and to secure his political position. Some of the party leaders seem to
me similar to children enjoying a long-expected and ardently wished-for
toy. Some of the leaders are as generals who abandon the troops in a
campaign, and take to travel in foreign parts. Most of them act as if
they were sure that the battle is over. It begins only, but nobody, or
at least very few of the interested, seem to admit that the country is
on fire, that a terrible struggle begins. (Wrote in this sense an
article for the National Intelligencer; insertion refused.) They, the
leaders, look to create engines for their own political security, but no
one seems to look over Mason and Dixon's line to the terrible and with
lightning-like velocity spreading fire of hellish treason.

The diplomats utterly upset, confused, and do not know what god to
worship. All their associations were with Southerners, now traitors.
In Southern talk, or in that of treacherous Northern Democrats, the
diplomats learned what they know about this country. Not one of them
is familiar, is acquainted with the genuine people of the North; with
its true, noble, grand, and pure character. It is for them a terra
incognita, as is the moon. The little they know of the North is the
few money or cotton bags of New York, Boston, Philadelphia,--these
would-be betters, these dinner-givers, and whist-players. The
diplomats consider Seward as the essence of Northern feeling.

How little the thus-called statesmen know Europe. Sumner, Seward, etc.
already have under consideration if Europe will recognize the secesh.
Europe recognizes _faits accomplis_, and a great deal of blood will
run before secesh becomes _un fait accompli_. These Sewards, Sumners,
etc. pay too much attention to the silly talk of the European
diplomats in Washington; and by doing this these would-be statesmen
prove how ignorant they are of history in general, and specially
ignorant of the policy of European cabinets. Before a struggle decides
a question a recognition is bosh, and I laugh at it.

The race, the race increases with a fearful rapidity. No flood does it
so quick. Poor Senators! Some of them must spend nights and days to
decide on whom to bestow this or that office. Secretaries or Ministers
wrangle, _fight_ (that is the word used), as if life and death
depended upon it.

Poor (Carlylian-meaning) good-natured Senator Sumner, in his earnest,
honest wish to be just and of service to everybody, looks as a hare
tracked by hounds; so are at him office-seekers from the whole
country. This hunting degrades the hounds, and enervates the patrons.

I am told that the President is wholly absorbed in adjusting,
harmonizing the amount of various salaries bestowed on various States
through its office-holders and office-seekers.

It were better if the President would devote his time to calculate
the forces and resources needed to quench the fire. Over in Montgomery
the slave-drivers proceed with the terrible, unrelenting, fearless
earnestness of the most unflinching criminals.

After all, these crowds of office-hunters are far from representing
the best element of the genuine, laborious, intelligent people,--of
its true healthy stamina. This is consoling for me, who know the
American people in the background of office-hunters.

Of course an alleviating circumstance is, that the method, the system,
the routine, oblige, nay force, everybody to ask, to hunt. As in the
Scriptures, "Ask, and you will get; or knock, and it will be opened."
Of course, many worthy, honorable, deserving men, who would be
ornaments to the office, must run the gauntlet together with the
hounds.

It is reported, and I am sure of the truth of the report, that
Governor Chase is for recognizing, or giving up the revolted Cotton
States, so as to save by it the Border States, and eventually to fight
for their remaining in the Union. What logic! If the treasonable
revolt is conceded to the Cotton States, on what ground can it be
denied to the thus called Border States? I am sorry that Chase has
such notions.

It is positively asserted by those who ought to know, that Seward,
having secured to himself the Secretaryship of State, offered to the
Southern leaders in Congress compromise and concessions, to assure, by
such step, his confirmation by the Democratic vote. The chiefs
refused the bargain, distrusting him. All this was going on for weeks,
nay months, previous to the inauguration, so it is asserted. But
Seward might have been anxious to preserve the Union at any price. His
enemies assert that if Seward's plan had succeeded, virtually the
Democrats would have had the power. Thus the meaning of Lincoln's
election would have been destroyed, and Buchanan's administration
would have been continued in its most dirty features, the name only
being changed.

Old Scott seems to be worried out by his laurels; he swallows incense,
and I do not see that anything whatever is done to meet the military
emergency. I see the cloud.

Were it true that Seward and Scott go hand in hand, and that both, and
even Chase, are blunted axes!

I hear that Mr. Blair is the only one who swears, demands, asks for
action, for getting at them without losing time. Brave fellow! I am
glad to have at Willard's many times piloted deputations to the doors
of Lincoln on behalf of Blair's admission into the Cabinet. I do not
know him, but will try to become nearer acquainted.

But for the New York radical Republicans, already named, neither Chase
nor Blair would have entered the Cabinet. But for them Seward would
have had it totally his own way. Members of Congress acted less than
did the New Yorkers.

The South, or the rebels, slave-drivers, slave-breeders, constitute
the most corrosive social decompositions and impurities; what the
human race throughout countless ages successively toiled to purify
itself from and throw off. Europe continually makes terrible and
painful efforts, which at times are marked by bloody destruction. This
I asserted in my various writings. This social, putrefied evil, and
the accumulated matter in the South, pestilentially and in various
ways influenced the North, poisoning its normal healthy condition.
This abscess, undermining the national life, has burst now. Somebody,
something must die, but this apparent death will generate a fresh and
better life.

The month of March closes, but the administration seems to enjoy the
most beatific security. I do not see one single sign of
foresight,--this cardinal criterion of statesmanship. Chase measures
the empty abyss of the treasury. Senator Wilson spoke of treason
everywhere, but the administration seems not to go to work and to
reconstruct, to fill up what treason has disorganized and emptied.
Nothing about reorganizing the army, the navy, refitting the arsenals.
No foresight, no foresight! either statesmanlike or administrative.
Curious to see these men at work. The whole efforts visible to me and
to others, and the only signs given by the administration in concert,
are the paltry preparations to send provisions to Fort Sumpter. What
is the matter? what are they about?




APRIL, 1861.

     Seward parleying with the rebel commissioners -- Corcoran's
     dinner -- The crime in full blast! -- 75,000 men called for --
     Massachusetts takes the lead -- Baltimore -- Defence of
     Washington -- Blockade discussed -- France our friend, not
     England -- Warning to the President -- Virginia secedes --
     Lincoln warned again -- Seward says it will all blow over in
     sixty to ninety days -- Charles F. Adams -- The administration
     undecided; the people alone inspired -- Slavery must perish! --
     The Fabian policy -- The Blairs -- Strange conduct of Scott --
     Lord Lyons -- Secret agent to Canada.


Commissioners from the rebels; Seward parleying with them through some
Judge Campbell. Curious way of treating and dealing with rebellion,
with rebels and traitors; why not arrest them?

Corcoran, a rich partisan of secession, invited to a dinner the rebel
commissioners and the foreign diplomats. If such a thing were done
anywhere else, such a pimp would be arrested. The serious diplomats,
Lord Lyons, Mercier, and Stoeckl refused the invitation; some smaller
accepted, at least so I hear.

The infamous traitors fire on the Union flag. They treat the garrison
of Sumpter as enemies on sufferance, and here their commissioners go
about free, and glory in treason. What is this administration about?
Have they no blood; are they fishes?

The crime in full blast; _consummatum est._ Sumpter bombarded;
Virginia, under the nose of the administration, secedes, and the
leaders did not see or foresee anything: flirted with Virginia.

Now, they, the leaders or the administration, are terribly startled;
so is the brave noble North; the people are taken unawares; but no
wonder; the people saw the Cabinet, the President, and the military in
complacent security. These watchmen did nothing to give an early sign
of alarm, so the people, confiding in them, went about its daily
occupation. But it will rise as one man and in terrible wrath. _Vous
le verrez mess. les Diplomates._

The President calls on the country for 75,000 men; telegram has
spoken, and they rise, they arm, they come. I am not deceived in my
faith in the North; the excitement, the wrath, is terrible. Party
lines burn, dissolved by the excitement. Now the people is in fusion
as bronze; if Lincoln and the leaders have mettle in themselves, then
they can cast such arms, moral, material, and legislative, as will
destroy at once this rebellion. But will they have the energy? They do
not look like Demiourgi.

Massachusetts takes the lead; always so, this first people in the
world; first for peace by its civilization and intellectual
development, and first to run to the rescue.

The most infamous treachery and murder, by Baltimoreans, of the
Massachusetts men. Will the cowardly murderers be exemplarily
punished?

The President, under the advice of Scott, seems to take coolly the
treasonable murders of Baltimore; instead of action, again parleying
with these Baltimorean traitors. The rumor says that Seward is for
leniency, and goes hand in hand with Scott. Now, if they will handle
such murderers in silk gloves as they do, the fire must spread.

The secessionists in Washington--and they are a legion, of all hues
and positions--are defiant, arrogant, sure that Washington will be
taken. One risks to be murdered here.

I entered the thus called Cassius Clay Company, organized for the
defence of Washington until troops came. For several days patrolled,
drilled, and lay several nights on the hard floor. Had compensation,
that the drill often reproduced that of Falstaff's heroes. But my
campaigners would have fought well in case of emergency. Most of them
office-seekers. When the alarm was over, the company dissolved, but
each got a kind of certificate beautifully written and signed by
Lincoln and Cameron. I refused to take such a certificate, we having
had no occasion to fight.

The President issued a proclamation for the blockade of the Southern
revolted ports. Do they not know better?

How can the Minister of Foreign Affairs advise the President to resort
to such a measure? Is the Minister of Foreign Affairs so willing to
call in foreign nations by this blockade, thus transforming a purely
domestic and municipal question into an international, public one?

The President is to quench the rebellion, a domestic fire, and to do
it he takes a weapon, an engine the most difficult to handle, and in
using of which he depends on foreign nations. Do they not know better
here in the ministry and in the councils? Russia dealt differently
with the revolted Circassians and with England in the so celebrated
case of the Vixen.

The administration ought to know its rights of sovereignty and to
close the ports of entry. Then no chance would be left to England to
meddle.

Yesterday N---- dined with Lord Lyons, and during the dinner an
anonymous note announced to the Lord that the proclamation of the
blockade is to be issued on to-morrow. N----, who has a romantic turn,
or rather who seeks for _midi à 14-3/4 heures_, speculated what lady
would have thus violated a _secret d'État_.

I rather think it comes from the Ministry, or, as they call it here,
from the Department. About two years ago, when the Central Americans
were so teased and maltreated by the filibusters and Democratic
administration, a Minister of one of these Central American States
told me in New York that in a Chief of the Departments, or something
the like, the Central Americans have a valuable friend, who, every
time that trouble is brewing against them in the Department, gives
them a secret and anonymous notice of it. This friend may have
transferred his kindness to England.

How will foreign nations behave? I wish I may be misguided by my
political anglophobia, but England, envious, rapacious, and the
Palmerstons and others, filled with hatred towards the genuine
democracy and the American people, will play some bad tricks. They
will seize the occasion to avenge many humiliations. Charles Sumner,
Howe, and a great many others, rely on England,--on her anti-slavery
feeling. I do not. I know English policy. We shall see.

France, Frenchmen, and Louis Napoleon are by far more reliable. The
principles and the interest of France, broadly conceived, make the
existence of a powerful Union a statesmanlike European and world
necessity. The cold, taciturn Louis Napoleon is full of broad and
clear conceptions. I am for relying, almost explicitly, on France and
on him.

The administration calls in all the men-of-war scattered in all
waters. As the commercial interests of the Union will remain
unprotected, the administration ought to put them under the protection
of France. It is often done so between friendly powers. Louis Napoleon
could not refuse; and accepting, would become pledged to our side.

Germany, great and small, governments and people, will be for the
Union. Germans are honest; they love the Union, hate slavery, and
understand, to be sure, the question. Russia, safe, very safe, few
blackguards excepted; so Italy. Spain may play double. I do not expect
that the Spaniards, goaded to the quick by the former fillibustering
administrations, will have judgment enough to find out that the
Republicans have been and will be anti-fillibusters, and do not crave
Cuba.

Wrote a respectful warning to the President concerning the unavoidable
results of his proclamation in regard to the blockade; explained to
him that this, his international demonstration, will, and forcibly
must evoke a counter proclamation from foreign powers in the interest
of their own respective subjects and of their commercial relations.
Warned, foretelling that the foreign powers will recognize the rebels
as belligerents, he, the President, having done it already in some
way, thus applying an international mode of coercion. Warned, that the
condition of belligerents, once recognized, the rebel piratical crafts
will be recognized as privateers by foreign powers, and as such will
be admitted to all ports under the secesh flag, which will thus enjoy
a partial recognition.

Foreign powers may grumble, or oppose the closing of the ports of
entry as a domestic, administrative decision, because they may not
wish to commit themselves to submit to a paper blockade. But if the
President will declare that he will enforce the closing of the ports
with the whole navy, so as to strictly guard and close the maritime
league, then the foreign powers will see that the administration does
not intend to humbug them, but that he, the President, will only
preserve intact the fullest exercise of sovereignty, and, as said the
Roman legist, he, the President, "_nil sibi postulat quod non aliis
tribuit_." And so he, the President, will only execute the laws of
his country, and not any arbitrary measure, to say with the Roman
Emperor, "_Leges etiam in ipsa arma imperium habere volumus._" Warned
the President that in all matters relating to this country Louis
Napoleon has abandoned the initiative to England; and to throw a small
wedge in this alliance, I finally respectfully suggested to the
President what is said above about putting the American interests in
the Mediterranean under the protection of Louis Napoleon.

Few days thereafter learned that Mr. Seward does not believe that
France will follow England. Before long Seward will find it out.

All the coquetting with Virginia, all the presumed influence of
General Scott, ended in Virginia's secession, and in the seizure of
Norfolk.

Has ever any administration, cabinet, ministry--call it what name you
will--given positive, indubitable signs of want and absence of
foresight, as did ours in these Virginia, Norfolk, and Harper's Ferry
affairs? Not this or that minister or secretary, but all of them ought
to go to the constitutional guillotine. Blindness--no mere
short-sightedness--permeates the whole administration, Blair excepted.
And Scott, the politico-military adviser of the President! What is the
matter with Scott, or were the halo and incense surrounding him based
on bosh? Will it be one more illusion to be dispelled?

The administration understood not how to save or defend Norfolk, nor
how to destroy it. No name to be found for such concrete incapacity.
The rebels are masters, taking our leaders by the nose. Norfolk gives
to them thousands of guns, &c., and nobody cries for shame. They ought
to go in sackcloth, those narrow-sighted, blind rulers. How will the
people stand this masterly administrative demonstration? In England
the people and the Parliament would impeach the whole Cabinet.

Charles Sumner told me that the President and his Minister of Foreign
Affairs are to propose to the foreign powers the accession of the
Union to the celebrated convention of Paris of 1856. All three
considered it a master stroke of policy. They will not catch a fly by
it.

Again wrote respectfully to Mr. Lincoln, warning him against a too
hasty accession to the Paris convention. Based my warning,--

1st. Not to give up the great principles contained in Marcy's
amendment.

2d. Not to believe or suppose for a minute that the accession to the
Paris convention at this time can act in a retroactive sense;
explained that it will not and cannot prevent the rebel pirates from
being recognized by foreign powers as legal privateers, or being
treated as such.

3d. For all these reasons the Union will not win anything by such a
step, but it will give up principles and chain its own hands in case
of any war with England. Supplicated the President not to risk a step
which logically must turn wrong.

Baltimore still unpunished, and the President parleying with various
deputations, all this under the guidance of Scott. I begin to be
confused; cannot find out what is the character of Lincoln, and above
all of Scott.

Governors from whole or half-rebel States refuse the President's call
for troops. The original call of 75,000, too small in itself, will be
reduced by that refusal. Why does not the administration call for more
on the North, and on the free States? In the temper of this noble
people it will be as easy to have 250,000 as 75,000, and then rush on
them; submerge Virginia, North Carolina, etc.; it can be now so easily
done. The Virginians are neither armed nor organized. Courage and
youth seemingly would do good in the councils.

The free States undoubtedly will vindicate self-government. Whatever
may be said by foreign and domestic croakers, I do not doubt it for a
single minute. The free people will show to the world that the
apparently loose governmental ribbons are the strongest when everybody
carries them in him, and holds them. The people will show that the
intellectual magnetism of convictions permeating the million is by far
stronger than the commonly called governmental action from above, and
it is at the same time elastic and expansive, even if the official
leaders may turn out to be altogether mediocrities. The self-governing
free North will show more vitality and activity than any among the
governed European countries would be able to show in similar
emergencies. This is my creed, and I have faith in the people.

The infamous slavers of the South would even be honored if named
Barbary States of North America.

Before the inauguration, Seward was telling the diplomats that no
disruption will take place; now he tells them that it will blow over
in from sixty to ninety days. Does Seward believe it? Or does his
imagination or his patriotism carry him away or astray? Or, perhaps,
he prefers not to look the danger in the face, and tries to avert the
bitter cup. At any rate, he is incomprehensible, and the more so when
seen at a distance.

Something, nay, even considerable efforts ought to be made to
enlighten the public opinion in Europe, as on the outside,
insurrections, nationalities, etc., are favored in Europe. How far the
diplomats sent by the administration are prepared for this task?

Adams has shown in the last Congress his scholarly, classical
narrow-mindedness. Sanford cannot favorably impress anybody in Europe,
neither in cabinets, nor in saloons, nor the public at large. He looks
and acts as a _commis voyageur_, will be considered as such at first
sight by everybody, and his features and manners may not impress
others as being distinguished and high-toned.

Every historical, that is, human event, has its moral and material
character and sides. To ignore, and still worse to blot out, to reject
the moral incentives and the moral verdict, is a crime to the public
at large, is a crime towards human reason.

Such action blunts sound feelings and comprehension, increases the
arrogance of the evil-doers. The moral criterion is absolute and
unconditional, and ought as such unconditionally to be applied to the
events here. Things and actions must be called by their true names.
What is true, noble, pure, and lofty, is on the side of the North, and
permeates the unnamed millions of the free people; it ought to be
separated from what is sham, egotism, lie or assumption. Truth must be
told, never mind the outcry. History has not to produce pieces for the
stage, or to amuse a tea-party.

Regiments pour in; the Massachusetts men, of course, leading the van,
as in the times of the tea-party. My admiration for the Yankees is
justified on every step, as is my scorn, my contempt, etc., etc., of
the Southern _chivalrous_ slaver.

Wrote to Charles Sumner expressing my wonder at the undecided conduct
of the administration; at its want of foresight; its eternal parleying
with Baltimoreans, Virginians, Missourians, etc., and no step to tread
down the head of the young snake. No one among them seems to have the
seer's eye. The people alone, who arm, who pour in every day and in
large numbers, who transform Washington into a camp, and who crave for
fighting,--the people alone have the prophetic inspiration, and are
the genuine statesmen for the emergency.

How will the Congress act? The Congress will come here emerging from
the innermost of the popular volcano; but the Congress will be
manacled by formulas; it will move not in the spirit of the
Constitution, but in the dry constitutionalism, and the Congress will
move with difficulty. Still I have faith, although the Congress never
will seize upon parliamentary omnipotence. Up to to-day, the
administration, instead of boldly crushing, or, at least, attempting
to do it; instead of striking at the traitors, the administration is
continually on the lookout where the blows come from, scarcely having
courage to ward them off. The deputations pouring from the North urge
prompt, decided, crushing action. This thunder-voice of the twenty
millions of freemen ought to nerve this senile administration. The
Southern leaders do not lose one minute's time; they spread the fire,
arm, and attack with all the fury of traitors and criminals.

The Northern merchants roar for the offensive; the administration is
undecided.

Some individuals, politicians, already speak out that the slaveocratic
privileges are only to be curtailed, and slavery preserved as a
domestic institution. Not a bit of it. The current and the development
of events will run over the heads of the pusillanimous and
contemptible conservatives. Slavery must perish, even if the whole
North, Lincoln and Seward at its head, should attempt to save it.

Already they speak of the great results of Fabian policy; Seward, I am
told, prides in it. Do those Fabiuses know what they talk about?
Fabius's tactics--not policy--had in view not to expose young,
disheartened levies against Hannibal's unconquered veterans, but
further to give time to Rome to restore her exhausted means, to
recover political influences with other Italian independent
communities, to re-conclude broken alliances with the cities, etc. But
is this the condition of the Union? Your Fabian policy will cost
lives, time, and money; the people feels it, and roars for action.
Events are great, the people is great, but the official leaders may
turn out inadequate to both.

What a magnificent chance--scarcely equal in history--to become a
great historical personality, to tower over future generations. But I
do not see any one pointing out the way. Better so; the principle of
self-government as the self-acting, self-preserving force will be
asserted by the total eclipse of great or even eminent men.

The administration, under the influence of drill men, tries to form
twenty regiments of regulars, and calls for 45,000 three years'
volunteers. What a curious appreciation of necessity and of numbers
must prevail in the brains of the administration. Twenty regiments of
regulars will be a drop in water; will not help anything, but will be
sufficient to poison the public spirit. Citizens and people, but not
regulars, not hirelings, are to fight the battle of principle.
Regulars and their spirit, with few exceptions, is worse here than
were the Yanitschars.

When the principle will be saved and victorious, it will be by the
devotion, the spontaneity of the people, and not by Lincoln, Scott,
Seward, or any of the like. It is said that Seward rules both Lincoln
and Scott. The people, the masses, do not doubt their ability to
crush by one blow the traitors, but the administration does.

What I hear concerning the Blairs confirms my high opinion of both.
Blair alone in the Cabinet represents the spirit of the people.

Something seems not right with Scott. Is he too old, or too much of a
Virginian, or a hero on a small scale?

If, as they say, the President is guided by Scott's advice, such
advice, to judge from facts, is not politic, not heroic, not thorough,
not comprehensive, and not at all military, that is, not broad and
deep, in the military sense. It will be a pity to be disappointed in
this national idol.

Scott is against entering Virginia, against taking Baltimore, against
punishing traitors. Strange, strange!

Diplomats altogether out of their senses; they are bewildered by the
uprising, by the unanimity, by the warlike, earnest, unflinching
attitude of the masses of the freemen, of my dear Yankees. The diplomats
have lost the compass. They, duty bound, were diplomatically obsequious
to the power held so long by the pro-slavery party. They got accustomed
to the arrogant assumption and impertinence of the slavers, and,
forgetting their European origin, the diplomats tacitly--but for their
common sense and honor I hope reluctantly--admitted the assumptions of
the Southern banditti to be in America the nearest assimilation to the
chivalry and nobility of old Europe. Without taking the cudgel in
defence of European nobility, chivalry, and aristocracy, it is
sacrilegious to compare those infamous slavers with the old or even with
the modern European higher classes. In the midst of this slave-driving,
slave-worshipping, and slave-breeding society of Washington, the
diplomats swallowed, gulped all the Southern lies about the
Constitution, state-rights, the necessity of slavery, and other like
infamies. The question is, how far the diplomats in their respective
official reports transferred these pro-slavery common-places to their
governments. But, after all, the governments of Europe will not be
thoroughly influenced by the chat of their diplomats.

Among all diplomats the English (Lord Lyons) is the most sphinx; he is
taciturn, reserved, listens more than he speaks; the others are more
communicative.

What an idea have those Americans of sending a secret agent to Canada,
and what for? England will find it out, and must be offended. I would
not have committed such an absurdity, even in my palmy days, when I
conspired with Louis Napoleon, sat in the councils with Godefroi
Cavaignac, or wrote instructions for Mazzini, then only a beginner
with his _Giovina Italia_, and his miscarried Romarino attempt in
Savoy.

Of what earthly use can be such _politique provocatrice_ towards
England? Or is it only to give some money to a hungry, noisy, and not
over-principled office-seeker?




MAY, 1861.

     The administration tossed by expedients -- Seward to Dayton --
     Spread-eagleism -- One phasis of the American Union finished --
     The fuss about Russell -- Pressure on the administration
     increases -- Seward, Wickoff, and the Herald -- Lord Lyons
     menaced with passports -- The splendid Northern army -- The
     administration not up to the occasion -- The new men -- Andrew,
     Wadsworth, Boutwell, Noyes, Wade, Trumbull, Walcott, King,
     Chandler, Wilson -- Lyon jumps over formulas -- Governor Banks
     needed -- Butler takes Baltimore with two regiments -- News from
     England -- The "belligerent" question -- Butler and Scott --
     Seward and the diplomats -- "What a Merlin!" -- "France not
     bigger than New York!" -- Virginia invaded -- Murder of Ellsworth
     -- Harpies at the White House.


Rumors that the President, the administration, or whoever has it in
his hands, is to take the offensive, make a demonstration on Virginia
and on Baltimore. But these ups and downs, these vacillations, are
daily occurrences, and nothing points to a firm purpose, to a decided
policy, or any policy whatever of the administration.

A great principle and a great cause cannot be served and cannot be
saved by half measures, and still less by tricks and by paltry
expedients. But the administration is tossed by expedients. Nothing is
hitherto done, and this denotes a want of any firm decision.

Mr. Seward's letter to Dayton, a first manifesto to foreign nations,
and the first document of the new Minister of Foreign Affairs. It is
bold, high-toned, and American, but it has dark shadows; shows an
inexperienced hand in diplomacy and in dealing with events. The
passages about the frequent changes in Europe are unnecessary, and
unprovoked by anything whatever. It is especially offensive to France,
to the French people, and to Louis Napoleon. It is bosh, but in Europe
they will consider it as _une politique provocatrice_.

For the present complications, diplomatic relations ought to be
conducted with firmness, with dignity, but not with an arrogant,
offensive assumption, not in the spirit of spread-eagleism; no brass,
but reason and decision.

Americans will find out how absolute are the laws of history, as stern
and as positive as all the other laws of nature. To me it is clear
that one phasis of American political growth, development, &c., is
gone, is finished. It is the phasis of the Union as created by the
Constitution. This war--war it will be, and a terrible one,
notwithstanding all the prophecies of Mr. Seward to the contrary--this
war will generate new social and constitutional necessities and new
formulas. New conceptions and new passions will spring up; in one
word, it will bring forth new social, physical, and moral creations:
so we are in the period of gestation.

Democracy, the true, the noble, that which constitutes the
signification of America in the progress of our race--democracy will
not be destroyed. All the inveterate enemies here and in Europe, all
who already joyously sing the funeral songs of democracy, all of them
will become disgraced. Democracy will emerge more pure, more powerful,
more rational; destroyed will be the most infamous oligarchy ever
known in history; oligarchy issued neither from the sword, nor the
gown, nor the shop, but wombed, generated, cemented, and sustained by
traffic in man.

The famous Russell, of the London Times, is what I always thought him
to be--a graphic, imaginative writer, with power of description of all
he sees, but not the slightest insight in events, in men, in
institutions. Russell is not able to find out the epidermis under a
shirt. And they make so much fuss about him; Seward brings him to the
first cabinet dinner given by the President; Mrs. Lincoln sends him
bouquets; and this man, Russell, will heap blunders upon blunders.

The pressure on the administration for decided, energetic action
increases from all sides. Seldom, anywhere, an administration receives
so many moral kicks as does this one; but it seems to stand them with
serenity. Oh, for a clear, firm, well-defined purpose!

The country, the people demands an attack on Virginia, on Richmond,
and Baltimore; the country, better than the military authorities,
understands the political and military necessities; the people has the
consciousness that if fighting is done instantly, it will be done
cheaply and thoroughly by a move of its finger. The administration can
double the number of men under arms, but hesitates. What slow
coaches, and what ignorance of human nature and of human events. The
knowing ones, the wiseacres, will be the ruin of this country. They
poison the sound reason of the people.

What the d---- is Seward with his politicians' policy? What can
signify his close alliance with such outlaws as Wikoff and the Herald,
and pushing that sheet to abuse England and Lord Lyons? Wikoff is, so
to speak, an inmate of Seward's house and office, and Wikoff declared
publicly that the telegram contained in the Herald, and so violent
against England and Lord Lyons, was written under Seward's dictation.
Wikoff, I am told, showed the MS. corrected in Seward's handwriting.
Lord Lyons is menaced with passports. Is this man mad? Can Seward for
a moment believe that Wikoff knows Europe, or has any influence? He
may know the low resorts there. Can Seward be fool enough to irritate
England, and entangle this country? Even my anglophobia cannot stand
it. Wrote about it warning letters to New York, to Barney, to Opdyke,
to Wadsworth, &c.

The whole District a great camp; the best population from the North in
rank and file. More intelligence, industry, and all good national and
intellectual qualities represented in those militia and volunteer
regiments, than in any--not only army, but society--in Europe.
Artisans, mechanics of all industries, of trade, merchants, bankers,
lawyers; all pursuits and professions. Glorious, heart-elevating
sight! These regiments want only a small touch of military
organization.

Weeks run, troops increase, and not the first step made to organize
them into an army, to form brigades, not to say divisions; not yet two
regiments manoeuvring together. What a strange idea the military chief
or chiefs, or department, or somebody, must have of what it is to
organize an army. Not the first letter made. Can it be ignorance of
this elementary knowledge with which is familiar every corporal in
Europe? When will they start, when begin to mould an army?

The administration was not composed for this emergency, and is not up
to it. The government hesitates, is inexperienced, and will
unavoidably make heaps of mistakes, which may endanger the cause, and
for which, at any rate, the people is terribly to pay. The loss in men
and material will be very considerable before the administration will
get on the right track. It is painful to think, nay, to be sure of it.
Then the European anti-Union politicians and diplomats will credit the
disasters to the inefficiency of self-government. The diplomats,
accustomed to the rapid, energetic action of a supreme or of a
centralized power, laugh at the trepidation of ours. But the fault is
not in the principle of self-government, but in the accident which
brought to the helm such an amount of inexperience. Monarchy with a
feeble head is even in a worse predicament. Louis XV., the Spanish and
Neapolitan Bourbons, Gustavus IV., &c., are thereof the historical
evidences.

May the shock of events bring out new lights from the people! One day
the administration is to take the initiative, that is, the offensive,
then it recedes from it. No one understands the organization and
handling of such large bodies. They are to make their apprenticeship,
if only it may not to be too dearly paid. But they cannot escape the
action of that so positive law in nature, in history, and, above all,
absolute in war.

Wrote to Charles Sumner, suggesting that the ice magnates send here
from Boston ice for hospitals.

The war now waged against the free States is one made by the most
hideous _sauvagerie_ against a most perfectioned and progressive
civilization. History records not a similar event. It is a hideous
phenomenon, disgracing our race, and it is so, look on it from
whatever side you will.

A new man from the people, like Governor Andrew, of Massachusetts,
acts promptly, decisively; feels and speaks ardently, and not as the
rhetors. Andrew is the incarnation of the Massachusetts, nay, of the
genuine American people. I must become acquainted with Andrew.
Thousands of others like Andrew exist in all the States. Can anybody
be a more noble incarnation of the American people than J. S.
Wadsworth? I become acquainted with numerous men whom I honor as the
true American men. So Boutwell, of Massachusetts, Curtis Noyes,
Senator Wade, Trumbull, Walcott, from Ohio, Senator King, Chandler,
and many, many true patriots. Senator Wilson, my old friend, is up to
the mark; a man of the people, but too mercurial.

Captain or Major Lyon in St. Louis, the first initiator or revelator
of what is the absolute law of necessity in questions of national
death or life. Lyon jumped over formulas, over routine, over clumsy
discipline and martinetism, and saved St. Louis and Missouri.

It is positively asserted that General Scott's first impression was to
court-martial Lyon for this breach of discipline, for having acted on
his own patriotic responsibility.

Can Scott be such a dried-up, narrow-minded disciplinarian, and he the
Egeria of Lincoln! Oh! oh!

Diplomats tell me that Seward uses the dictatorial I, speaking of the
government. Three cheers for the new Louis XIV.!

Governor Banks would be excellent for the _Intendant Général de
l'Armée_: they call it here _General Quartermaster_. Awful disorder
and slowness prevail in this cardinal branch of the army. Wrote to
Sumner concerning Banks.

Gen. Butler took Baltimore; did what ought to have been done a long
time ago. Butler did it on his own responsibility, without orders.
Butler acted upon the same principle as Lyon, and, _horrabile dictu_,
astonished, terrified the parleying administration. Scott wishes to
put Butler under arrest; happily Lincoln resisted his boss (so Mr.
Lincoln called Scott before a deputation from Baltimore). Scott,
Patterson, and Mansfield made a beautiful _strategical_ horror! They
began to speak of strategy; plan to approach Baltimore on three
different roads, and with about 35,000 men. Butler did it one morning
with two regiments, and kicked over the senile strategians in council.

The administration speaks with pride of its forbearing, that is,
parleying, policy. The people, the country, requires action.
_Congressus impar Achilli_: Achilles, the people, and _Congressus_ the
forbearing administration.

Music, parades, serenades, receptions, &c., &c., only no genuine
military organization. They do it differently on the other side of the
Potomac. There the leaders are in earnest.

Met Gov. Sprague and asked him when he would have a brigade; his
answer was, soon; but this soon comes very slow.

News from England. Lord John Russell declared in Parliament that the
Queen, or the English government, will recognize the rebels in the
condition of "belligerents." O England, England! The declaration is
too hasty. Lord John cannot have had news of the proclamation of the
blockade when he made that declaration. The blockade could have served
him as an excuse for the haste. English aristocracy and government
show thus their enmity to the North, and their partiality to slavers.
What will the anglophiles of Boston say to this?

Neither England or France, or anybody in Europe, recognized the
condition of "belligerents" to Poles, when we fought in Russia in
1831. Were the Magyars recognized as such in 1848-'49? Lord
Palmerston called the German flag hard names in the war with Denmark
for Schleswig-Holstein; and now he bows to the flag of slavers and
pirates. If the English statesmen have not some very particular reason
for this hasty, uncalled-for condescension to the enemies of humanity,
then curse upon the English government. I recollect that European
powers recognized the Greeks "belligerents" (Austria opposed) in their
glorious struggle against the slavers, the Turks. But then this
stretching of positive, international comity,--this stretching was
done in the interest of freedom, of right, and of humanity, against
savages and slaughterers. On the present occasion England did the
reverse. O England, England, thou Judas Iscariot of nations! Seward
said to John Jacob Astor, and to a New York deputation, that this
English declaration concerning "belligerents" is a mere formality,
having no bearing at all. I told the contrary to Astor and to others,
assuring them that Mr. Seward will soon find, to the cost of the
people and to his own, how much complication and trouble this _mere
formality_ will occasion, and occasion it before long. Is Seward so
ignorant of international laws, of general or special history, or was
it only said to throw dust?

Wrote about the "belligerents" a warning letter to the President.

Butler, in command of Fortress Monroe, proposes to land in Virginia
and to take Norfolk; Scott, the highest military authority in the
land, opposes. Has Scott used up his energy, his sense, and even his
military judgment in defending Washington before the inauguration? He
is too old; his brains, _cerebellum_, must be dried up.

Imbecility in a leader is often, nay always, more dangerous than
treason; the people can find out--easily, too--treason, but is
disarmed against imbecility.

What a thoughtlessness to press on Russia the convention of Paris?
Russia has already a treaty with America, but in case of a war with
England, the Russian ports on the Pacific, and the only one accessible
to Americans, will be closed to them by the convention of Paris.

The governors of the States of Ohio, Illinois, Pennsylvania assure the
protection of their respective States to the Union men of the Border
States. What a bitter criticism on the slow, forbearing policy of the
administration. Mr. Lincoln seems to be a rather slow intellect, with
slow powers of perception. However, patience; perhaps the shock of
events will arouse and bring in action now latent, but good and
energetic qualities. As it stands now, the administration, being the
focus of activity, is tepid, if not cold and slow; the circumference,
that is, the people, the States, are full of fire and of activity.
This condition is altogether the reverse of the physiological and all
other natural laws, and this may turn out badly, as nature's laws
never can be with impunity reversed or violated.

The diplomats complain that Seward treats them with a certain
rudeness; that he never gives them time to explain and speak, but
interrupts by saying, "I know it all," etc. If he had knowledge of
things, and of the diplomatic world, he would be aware that the more
firmness he has to use, the more politeness, even fastidiousness, he
is to display.

Scott does not wish for any bold demonstration, for any offensive
movement. The reason may be, that he is too old, too crippled, to be
able to take the field in person, and too inflated by conceit to give
the glory of the active command to any other man. Wrote to Charles
Sumner in Boston to stir up some inventive Yankee to construct a
wheelbarrow in which Scott could take the field in person.

In a conversation with Seward, I called his attention to the fact that
the government is surrounded by the finest, most complicated, intense,
and well-spread web of treason that ever was spun; that almost all
that constitutes society and is in a daily, nay hourly, contact with
the various branches of the Executive, all this, with soul, mind, and
heart is devoted to the rebels. I observed to him that _si licet
exemplis in parvo grandibus uti_. Napoleon suffered more from the
bitter hostility of the _faubourg St. Germain_, than from the armies
of the enemy; and here it is still worse, as this hostility runs out
into actual, unrelenting treason. To this Mr. Seward answered with the
utmost serenity, "that before long all this will change; that when he
became governor of New York, a similar hostility prevailed between the
two sections of that State, but soon he pacified everything." What a
Merlin! what a sorcerer!

Some simple-minded persons from the interior of the State of New York
questioned Mr. Seward, in my presence, about Europe, and "what they
will do there?" To this, with a voice of the Delphic oracle, he
responded, "that after all France is not bigger than the State of New
York." Is it possible to say such trash even as a joke?

Finally, the hesitations of General Scott are overcome. "Virginia's
sacred soil is invaded;" Potomac crossed; looks like a beginning of
activity; Scott consented to move on Arlington Heights, but during two
or three days opposed the seizure of Alexandria. Is that all that he
knows of that hateful watchword--strategy--nausea repeated by every
ignoramus and imbecile?

Alexandria being a port of entry, and having a railroad, is more a
strategic point for the invasion of Virginia than are Arlington
Heights.

The brave Ellsworth murdered in Alexandria, and Scott insisted that
Alexandria be invaded and occupied by night. In all probability,
Ellsworth would not have been murdered if this villanous nest had been
entered by broad daylight. As if the troops were committing a crime,
or a shameful act! O General Scott! but for you Ellsworth would not
have been murdered.

General McDowell made a plan to seize upon Manassas as the centre of
railroads, the true defence of Washington, and the firm foothold in
Virginia. Nobody, or only few enemies, were in Manassas. McDowell
shows his genuine military insight. Scott, and, as I am told, the
whole senile military council, opposed McDowell's plan as being too
bold. Do these mummies intend to conduct a war without boldness?

Thick clouds of patriotic, well-intentioned harpies surround all the
issues of the executive doors, windows, crevasses, all of them ready
to turn an honest, or rather dishonest, penny out of the fatherland.
Behind the harpies advance the busy-bodies, the would-be
well-informed, and a promiscuous crowd of well-intentioned
do-nothings.




JUNE, 1861.

     Butler emancipates slaves -- The army not organized -- Promenades
     -- The blockade -- Louis Napoleon -- Scott all in all --
     Strategy! -- Gun contracts -- The diplomats -- Masked batteries
     -- Seward writes for "bunkum" -- Big Bethel -- The Dayton letter
     -- Instructions to Mr. Adams.


The emancipation of slaves is virtually inaugurated. Gen. Butler, once
a hard pro-slavery Democrat, takes the lead. _Tempora mutantur et
nos_, &c. Butler originated the name of _contrabands of war_ for
slaves faithful to the Union, who abandon their rebel masters. A
logical Yankee mind operates as an _accoucheur_ to bring that to
daylight with which the events are pregnant.

The enemies of self-government at home and abroad are untiring in
vaticinations that a dictatorship now, and after the war a strong
centralized government, will be inaugurated. I do not believe it.
Perhaps the riddle to be solved will be, to make a strong
administration without modifying the principle of self-government.

The most glorious difference between Americans and Europeans is, that
in cases of national emergencies, every European nation, the Swiss
excepted, is called, stimulated to action, to sacrifices, either by a
chief, or by certain families, or by some high-standing individual,
or by the government; here the people forces upon the administration
more of all kinds of sacrifices than the thus called rulers can grasp,
and the people is in every way ahead of the administration.

Notwithstanding that a part of the army crossed the Potomac, very
little genuine organization is done. They begin only to organize
brigades, but slowly, very slowly. Gen. Scott unyielding in his
opposition to organizing any artillery, of which the army has very,
very little. This man is incomprehensible. He cannot be a clear-headed
general or organizer, or he cannot be a patriot.

As for the past, single regiments are parading in honor of the
President, of members of the Cabinet, of married and unmarried
_ladies_, but no military preparatory exercise of men, regiments, or
brigades. It sickens to witness such _incurie_.

Mr. Seward promenading the President from regiment to regiment, from
camp to camp, or rather showing up the President and himself. Do they
believe they can awake enthusiasm for their persons? The troops could
be better occupied than to serve for the aim of a promenade for these
two distinguished personalities.

Gen. Scott refuses the formation of volunteer artillery and of new
cavalry regiments, and the active army, more than 20,000 men, has a
very insufficient number of batteries, and between 600 and 800
cavalry. Lincoln blindly follows his boss. Seward, of course, sustains
Scott, and confuses Lincoln. Lincoln, Scott, Seward and Cameron
oppose offers pouring from the country. To a Mr. M----, from the State
of New York, who demanded permission to form a regiment of cavalry,
Mr. Lincoln angrily answered, that (patriotic) offers give more
"trouble to him and the administration than do the rebels."

The debates of the English Parliament raise the ire of the people,
nay, exasperate even old fogyish Anglo-manes.

Persons very familiar with the domestic relations of Gen. Scott assure
me that the vacillations of the old man, and his dread of a serious
warfare, result from the all-powerful influence on him of one of his
daughters, a rabid secessionist. The old man ought to be among relics
in the Patent office, or sent into a nursery.

The published correspondence between Lord Lyons and Lord Russell
concerning the blockade furnishes curious revelations.

When the blockade was to be declared, Mr. Seward seems to have been a
thorough novice in the whole matter, and in an official interview with
Lord Lyons, Mr. Seward was assisted by his chief clerk, who was
therefore the quintessence of the wisdom of the foreign affairs, a man
not even mastering the red-tape traditions of the department, without
any genuine instruction, without ideas. For this chief clerk, all that
he knew of a blockade was that it was in use during the Mexican war,
that it almost yearly occurred in South American waters, and every
tyro knows there exists such a thing as a blockade. But that was all
that this chief clerk knew. Lord Lyons asked for some special
precedents or former acts of the American government. The chief, and
his support, the chief clerk, ignored the existence of any. Lord Lyons
went home and sent to the department American precedents and
authorities. No Minister of Foreign Affairs in Europe, together with
his chief clerk, could ever be caught in such a _flagrante delicto_ of
ignorance. This chief clerk made Mr. Seward make _un pas de clerc_,
and this at the start. As Lord Lyons took a great interest in the
solution of the question of blockade, and as the chief clerk was the
_oraculum_ in this question, these combined facts may give some clue
to the anonymous advice sent to Lord Lyons, and mentioned in the month
of April.

Suggested to Mr. Seward to at once elevate the American question to a
higher region, to represent it to Europe in its true, holy character,
as a question of right, freedom, and humanity. Then it will be
impossible for England to quibble about technicalities of the
international laws; then we can beat England with her own arms and
words, as England in 1824, &c., recognized the Greeks as belligerents,
on the plea of aiding freedom and humanity. The Southern insurrection
is a movement similar to that of the Neapolitan brigands, similar to
what partisans of the Grand Dukes of Tuscany or Modena may attempt,
similar to any--for argument's sake--supposed insurrection of any
Russian bojàrs against the emancipating Czar. Not in one from among
the above enumerated cases would England concede to the insurgents the
condition of belligerents. If the Deys of Tunis and Tripoli should
attempt to throw off their allegiance to the Sultan on the plea that
the Porte prohibits the slave traffic, would England hurry to
recognize the Deys as belligerents?

Suggested to Mr. Seward, what two months ago I suggested to the
President, to put the commercial interests in the Mediterranean, for a
time, under the protection of Louis Napoleon.

I maintain the right of closing the ports, against the partisans of
blockade. _Qui jure suo utitur neminem lædit_, says the Roman
jurisconsult.

The condition of Lincoln has some similarity with that of Pio IX. in
1847-48. Plenty of good-will, but the eagle is not yet breaking out of
the egg. And as Pio IX. was surrounded by this or that cardinal, so is
Mr. Lincoln by Seward and Scott.

Perhaps it may turn out that Lincoln is honest, but of not
transcendent powers. The war may last long, and the military spirit
generated by the war may in its turn generate despotic aspirations.
Under Lincoln in the White House, the final victory will be due to the
people alone, and he, Lincoln, will preserve intact the principle
which lifted him to such a height.

The people is in a state of the healthiest and most generous
fermentation, but it may become soured and musty by the admixture of
Scott-Seward vacillatory powders.

Scott is all in all--Minister or Secretary of War and
Commander-in-chief. How absurd to unite those functions, as they are
virtually united here, Scott deciding all the various military
questions; he the incarnation of the dusty, obsolete, everywhere
thrown overboard and rotten routine. They ought to have for Secretary
of War, if not a Carnot, at least a man of great energy, honesty, of
strong will, and of a thorough devotion to the cause. Senator Wade
would be suitable for this duty. Cameron is devoted, but I doubt his
other capacities for the emergency, and he has on his shoulders
General Scott as a dead weight.

Charles Sumner, Mr. Motley, Dr. Howe, and many others, consider it as
a triumph that the English Cabinet asked Mr. Gregory to postpone his
motion for the recognition of the Southern Confederacy. Those
gentlemen here are not deep, and are satisfied with a few small crumbs
thrown them by the English aristocracy. Generally, the thus-called
better Americans eagerly snap at such crumbs.

It is clear that the English Cabinet wished this postponement for its
own sake. A postponement spares the necessity to Russells,
Palmerstons, Gladstones, and _hoc genus omne_, to show their hands.
Mr. Adams likewise is taken in.

_Military organization_ and _strategic points_ are the watchwords.
_Strategic points_, strategy, are natural excrescences of brains which
thus shamefully conceive and carry out what the abused people believe
to be _the_ military organization.

Strategy--strategy repeats now every imbecile, and military fuss
covers its ignorance by that sacramental word. Scott cannot have in
view the destruction of the rebels. Not even the Austrian Aulic
Council imagined a strategy combined and stretching through several
thousands of miles.

The people's strategy is best: to rush in masses on Richmond; to take
it now, when the enemy is there in comparatively small numbers.
Richmond taken, Norfolk and the lost guns at once will be recovered.
So speaks the people, and they are right; here among the wiseacres not
one understands the superiority of the people over his own little
brains.

Warned Mr. Seward against making contracts for arms with all kinds of
German agents from New York and from abroad. They will furnish and
bring, at the best, what the German governments throw out as being of
no use at the present moment. All the German governments are at work
to renovate their fire-arms.

The diplomats more and more confused,--some of them ludicrously so.
Here, as always and everywhere, diplomacy, by its essence, is
virtually _statu quo_; if not altogether retrograde, is conservative,
and often ultra conservative. It is rare to witness diplomacy _in
toto_, or even single diplomats, side with progressive efforts and
ideas. English diplomacy and diplomats do it at times; but then
mostly for the sake of political intrigue.

Even the great events of Italy are not the child of diplomacy. It went
to work _clopin, clopan_, after Solferino.

Not one of the diplomats here is intrinsically hostile to the Union.
Not one really wishes its disruption. Some brag so, but that is for
small effect. All of them are for peace, for _statu quo_, for the
grandeur of the country (as the greatest consumer of European
imports); but most of them would wish slavery to be preserved, and for
this reason they would have been glad to greet Breckinridge or Jeff.
Davis in the White House.

Some among the diplomats are not virtually enemies of freedom and of
the North; but they know the North from the lies spread by the
Southerners, and by this putrescent heap of refuse, the Washington
society. I am the only Northerner on a footing of intimacy with the
diplomats. They consider me an _exalté_.

It must be likewise taken into account,--and they say so
themselves,--that Mr. Seward's oracular vaticinations about the end of
the rebellion from sixty to ninety days confuse the judgment of
diplomats. Mr. Seward's conversation and words have an official
meaning for the diplomats, are the subject of their dispatches, and
they continually find that when Mr. Seward says yes the events say no.

Some of the diplomats are Union men out of obedience to a lawful
government, whatever it be; others by principle. The few from Central
and South American republics are thoroughly sound. The diplomats of
the great powers, representing various complicated interests, are the
more confused, they have so many things to consider. The diplomatic
tail, the smallest, insignificant, fawn to all, and turn as whirlwinds
around the great ones.

Scott continually refused the formation of new batteries, and now he
roars for them, and hurries the governors to send them. Governor
Andrew, of Massachusetts, weeks ago offered one or two rifled
batteries, was refused, and now Scott in all hurry asks for them.

The unhappy affair of Big Bethel gave a shock to the nation, and
stirred up old Scott, or rather the President.

Aside of strategy, there is a new bugbear to frighten the soldiers;
this bugbear is the masked batteries. The inexperience of commanders
at Big Bethel makes already _masked batteries_ a terror of the
country. The stupid press resounds the absurdity. Now everybody begins
to believe that the whole of Virginia is covered with masked
batteries, constituting, so to speak, a subterranean artillery, which
is to explode on every step, under the feet of our army. It seems that
this error and humbug is rather welcome to Scott, otherwise he would
explain to the nation and to the army that the existence of numerous
masked batteries is an absolute material and military impossibility.
The terror prevailing now may do great mischief.

Mr. Seward was obliged to explain, exonerate, expostulate, and
neutralize before the French Cabinet his famous Dayton letter. I was
sure it was to come to this; Mr. Thouvenel politely protested, and Mr.
Seward confessed that it was written for the American market (alias,
for _bunkum_). All this will make a very unfavorable impression upon
European diplomats concerning Mr. Seward's diplomacy and
statesmanship, as undoubtedly Mr. Thouvenel will semi-officially
confidentially communicate Mr. Seward's _faux pas_ to his colleagues.

Mr. Seward emphatically instructs Mr. Adams to exclude the question of
slavery from all his sayings and doings as Minister to England. Just
to England! That Mr. Adams, once the leader of the constitutional
anti-slavery party, submits to this obeisance of a corporal, I am not
astonished, as everything can be expected from the man who, in support
of the compromise, made a speech _de lana caprina_; but Senator
Sumner, Chairman of the Committee of Foreign Affairs, meekly swallowed
it.




JULY, 1861.

     The Evening Post -- The message -- The administration caught
     napping -- McDowell -- Congress slowly feels its way -- Seward's
     great facility of labor -- Not a Know-Nothing -- Prophesies a
     speedy end -- Carried away by his imagination -- Says "secession
     is over" -- Hopeful views -- Politeness of the State department
     -- Scott carries on the campaign from his sleeping room -- Bull
     Run -- Rout -- Panic -- "Malediction! Malediction!" -- Not a
     manly word in Congress! -- Abuse of the soldiers -- McClellan
     sent for -- Young blood -- Gen. Wadsworth -- Poor McDowell! --
     Scott responsible -- Plan of reorganization -- Let McClellan
     beware of routine.


It seems to me that the destinies of this admirable people are in
strange hands. Mr. Lincoln, honest man of nature, perhaps an empiric,
doctoring with innocent juices from herbs; but some others around him
seem to be quacks of the first order. I wish I may be mistaken.

The press, the thus called good one, is vacillating. Best of all, and
almost not vacillating, is the New York Evening Post. I do not speak
of principles; but the papers vacillate, speaking of the measures and
the slowness of the administration.

The President's message; plenty of good, honest intentions; simple,
unaffected wording, but a confession that by the attack on Sumpter,
and the uprising of Virginia, the administration was, so to speak,
caught napping. Further, up to that day the administration did not
take any, the slightest, measure of any kind for any emergency; in a
word, that it expected no attacks, no war, saw no fire, and did not
prepare to meet and quench one.

It were, perhaps, better for Lincoln if he could muster courage and
act by himself according to his nature, rather than follow so many, or
even any single adviser. Less and less I understand Mr. Lincoln, but
as his private secretary assures me that Lincoln has great judgment
and great energy, I suggested to the secretary to say to Lincoln he
should be more himself.

Being _tête-à-tête_ with McDowell, I saw him do things of details
which in any, even half-way organized army, belong to the speciality
of a chief of the staff. I, of course, wondered at it. McDowell, who
commands what in Europe would be called a large corps, told me that
General Scott allowed him not to form a complete staff, such a one as
he, McDowell, wished.

And all this, so to speak, on the eve of a battle, when the army faces
the enemy. It seems that genuine staff duties are something altogether
unknown to the military senility of the army. McDowell received this
corps in the most chaotic state. Almost with his own hands he
organized, or rather put together, the artillery. Brigades are
scarcely formed; the commanders of brigades do not know their
commands, and the soldiers do not know their generals--and still they
consider Scott to be a great general!

The Congress, well-intentioned, but entangled in formulas, slowly
feels its way. The Congress is composed of better elements than is the
administration, and it is ludicrous to see how the administration
takes airs of hauteur with the Congress. This Congress is in an
abnormal condition _for the task of directing a revolution_; _a
formula can be thrown in its face_ almost at every bold step. The
administration is virtually irresponsible, more so than the government
of any constitutional nation whatever. What great things this
administration could carry out! Congress will consecrate, legalize,
sanction everything. Perhaps no harm would have resulted if the Senate
and the House had contained some new, fresher elements directly from
the boiling, popular cauldron. Such men would take a _position_ at
once. Many of the leaders in both Houses were accustomed for many
years to make only opposition. But a long opposition influences and
disorganizes the judgment, forms not those genuine statesmen able to
grasp great events. For such emergencies as are now here, terrible
energy is needed, and only a very perfect mind resists the enervating
influence of a protracted opposition.

Suggested to Mr. Seward that the best diplomacy was to take possession
of Virginia. Doing this, we will find all the cabinets smooth and
friendly.

I seldom saw a man with greater facility of labor than Seward. When
once he is at work, it runs torrent-like from his pen. His mind is
elastic. His principal forte is argument on _any_ given case. But the
question is how far he masters the variegated information so necessary
in a statesman, and the more now, when the country earnestly has such
dangerous questions with European cabinets. He is still cheerful,
hopeful, and prophesies a speedy end.

Seward has no Know-Nothingism about him. He is easy, and may have many
genuine generous traits in his character, were they not compressed by
the habits of the, not lofty, politician. At present, Seward is a moral
dictator; he has Lincoln in his hand, and is all in all. Very likely he
flatters him and imposes upon his simple mind by his over-bold,
dogmatic, but not over-correct and logical, generalizations. Seward's
finger is in all the other departments, but above all in the army.

The opposition made to Seward is not courageous, not open, not
dignified. Such an opposition betrays the weakness of the opposers,
and does not inspire respect. It is darkly surreptitious. These
opponents call Seward hard names, but do this in a corner, although
most of them have their parliamentary chair wherefrom they can speak.
If he is bad and mischievous, then unite your forces and overthrow
him; if he is not bad, or if you are not strong enough against him, do
not cover yourself with ridicule, making a show of impotent malice.
When the Senate confirmed him, every one throughout the land knew his
vacillating policy; knew him to be for compromise, for concessions;
knew that he disbelieved in the terrible earnestness of the struggle,
and always prophesied its very speedy end. The Senate confirmed Seward
with open eyes. Perhaps at the start his imagination and his
patriotism made him doubt and disbelieve in the enormity of
treason--he could not realize that the traitors would go to the bitter
end. Seemingly, Seward still hopes that one day or another they may
return as forlorn sheep. Under the like impressions, he always
believed, and perhaps still believes, he shall be able to patch up the
quarrel, and be the savior of the Union. Very probably his
imagination, his ardent wishes, carry him away, and confuse that clear
insight into events which alone constitutes the statesman.

Suggested to Sumner to demand the reduction of the tariff on certain
merchandises, on the plea of fraternity of the working American people
with their brethren the operatives all over Europe; by it principally
I wished to alleviate the condition of French industry, as I have full
confidence in Louis Napoleon, and in the unsophisticated judgment of
the genuine French people. The suggestion did not take with the
Senate.

When the July telegraph brought the news of the victory at Romney
(Western Virginia), it was about midnight. Mr. Seward warmly
congratulated the President that "_the secession was over_." What a
far-reaching policy!

When the struggle will be over, England, at least her Tories,
aristocrats, and politicians, will find themselves baffled in their
ardent wishes for the breaking of the Union. The free States will
look tidy and nice, as in the past. But more than one generation will
pass before ceases to bleed the wound inflicted by the lies, the
taunts, the vituperations, poured in England upon this noble,
generous, and high-minded people; upon the sacred cause defended by
the freemen.

These freemen of America, up to the present time, incarnate the
loftiest principle in the successive, progressive, and historical
development of man. Nations, communities, societies, institutions,
stand and fall with that principle, whatever it be, whereof they are
the incarnation; so teaches us history. Woe to these freemen if they
will recede from the principle; if they abandon human rights; if they
do not crush human bondage, this sum of all infamies. Certainly the
question paramount to all is, to save and preserve pure
self-government in principle and in its direct application. But
although the question of slavery seems to be incidental and
subordinate to the former, virtually the question of slavery is twin
to the former. Slavery serves as a basis, as a nurse, for the most
infamous and abject aristocracy or oligarchy that was ever built up in
history, and any, even the best, the mildest, and the most honest
oligarchy or aristocracy kills and destroys man and self-government.

From the purely administrative point of view, the principle whose
incarnation is the American people, the principle begins to be
perverted. The embodiment of self-government fills dungeons,
suppresses personal liberty, opens letters, and in the reckless
saturnalias of despotism it rivals many from among the European
despots. Europe, which does not see well the causes, shudders at this
_delirium tremens_ of despotism in America.

Certainly, treason being in ebullition, the holders of power could not
stand by and look. But instead of an energetic action, instead of
exercising in full the existing laws, they hesitated, and treason,
emboldened, grew over their heads.

The law inflicted the severest capital punishment on the chiefs of the
revolt in Baltimore, but all went off unharmed. The administration one
day willingly allows the law to slide from its lap, and the next
moment grasps at an unnecessary arbitrary power. Had the traitors of
Baltimore been tried by court-martial, as the law allowed, and
punished, few, if any, traitors would then have raised their heads in
the North.

Englishmen forget that even after a secession, the North, to-day
twenty millions, as large as the whole Union eight years ago, will in
ten years be thirty millions; a population rich, industrious, and
hating England with fury.

Seward, having complete hold of the President, weakens Lincoln's mind
by using it up in hunting after comparatively paltry expedients.
Seward-Scott's influence neutralizes the energetic cry of the country,
of the congressmen, and in the Cabinet that of Blair, who is still a
trump.

The emancipation of slaves is spoken of as an expedient, but not as a
sacred duty, even for the maintenance of the Union. To emancipate
through the war power is an offence to reason, logic, and humanity;
but better even so than not at all. War power is in its nature
violent, transient, established for a day; emancipation is the highest
social and economical solution to be given by law and reason, and
ought to result from a thorough and mature deliberation. When the
Constitution was framed, slavery was ashamed of itself, stood in the
corner, had no paws. Now-a-days, slavery has become a traitor, is
arrogant, blood-thirsty, worse than a jackal and a hyena; deliberately
slavery is a matricide. And they still talk of slavery as sheltered by
the Constitution; and many once anti-slavery men like Seward, etc.,
are ready to preserve it, to compromise with the crime.

The existence of nations oscillates between epochs when the substance
and when the form prevails. The formation of America was the epoch
when substance prevailed. Afterward, for more than half a century, the
form was paramount; the term of substance again begins. The
Constitution is substance and form. The substance in it is perennial;
but every form is transient, and must be expanded, changed, re-cast.

Few, if any, Americans are aware of the identity of laws ruling the
universe with laws ruling and prevailing in the historical development
of man. Rarely has an American patience enough to ascend the long
chain from effect to cause, until he reaches the first cause, the
womb wherein was first generated the subsequent distant effect. So,
likewise, they cannot realize that at the start the imperceptible
deviation from the aim by and by widens to a bottomless gap until the
aim is missed. Then the greatest and the most devoted sacrifices are
useless. The legal conductors of the nation, since March 6th, ignore
this law.

The foreign ministers here in Washington were astonished at the
_politeness_, when some time ago the Department sent to the foreign
ministers a circular announcing to them that armed vessels of the
neutrals will be allowed to enter at pleasure the rebel blockaded
ports. This favor was not asked, not hoped for, and was not necessary.
It was too late when I called the attention of the Department to the
fact that such favors were very seldom granted; that they are
dangerous, and can occasion complications. I observed that during the
war between Mexico and France, in 1838, Count Mole, Minister of
Foreign Affairs, and the Premier of Louis Philippe, instructed the
admiral commanding the French navy in the Mexican waters, to oppose,
even by force, any attempt made by a neutral man-of-war to enter a
blockaded port. And it was not so dangerous then as it may be in this
civil war. But the chief clerk adviser of the Department found out
that President Polk's administration during the Mexican war granted a
similar permission, and, glad to have a precedent, his powerful brains
could not find out the difference between _then_ and _now_.

The internal routine of the ministry, and the manner in which our
ministers are treated abroad by the Chief at home, is very strange,
humiliating to our agents in the eyes of foreign Cabinets. Cassius
Clay was instructed to propose to Russia our accession to the
convention of Paris, but was not informed from Washington that our
ministers at Paris, London, etc., were to make the same propositions.
When Prince Gortschakoff asked Cassius Clay if similar propositions
were made to the other cosigners of the Paris convention, our minister
was obliged to confess his utter ignorance about the whole proceeding.
Prince Gortschakoff good-naturedly inquired about it from his
ministers at Paris and London, and enlightened Cassius Clay.

No ministry of foreign affairs in Europe would treat its agents in
such a trifling manner, and, if done, a minister would resent it.

This mistake, or recklessness, is to be credited principally to the
internal chief, or director of the department, and not to the minister
himself. By and by, the chief clerks, these routinists in the former
coarse traditions of the Democratic administrations, will learn and
acquire better diplomatic and bureaucratic habits.

If one calls the attention of influential Americans to the
mismanagement in the organization of the army; to the extraordinary
way in which everything, as organization of brigades, and the inner
service, the quartermaster's duty, is done, the general and inevitable
answer is, "We are not military; we are young people; we have to
learn." Granted; but instead of learning from the best, the latest,
and most correct authorities, why stick to an obsolete, senile, musty,
rotten, mean, and now-a-days impracticable routine, which is
all-powerful in all relating to the army and to the war? The Americans
may pay dear for thus reversing the rules of common sense.

General Scott directs from his sleeping room the movements of the two
armies on the Potomac and in the Shenandoah valley. General Scott has
given the order to advance. At least a strange way, to have the
command of battle at a distance of thirty and one hundred miles, and
stretched on his fauteuil. Marshal de Saxe, although deadly sick, was
on the field at Fontenoy. What will be the result of this
experimentalization, so contrary to sound reason?

Fighting at Bull Run. One o'clock, P. M. Good news. Gen. Scott says
that although we were 40-100 in disadvantage, nevertheless his plans
are successful--all goes as he arranged it--all as he foresaw it.
Bravo! old man! If so, I make _amende honorable_ of all that I said up
to this minute. Two o'clock, P. M. General Scott, satisfied with the
justness and success of his strategy and tactics--takes a nap.

_Evening._--Battle lost; rout, panic. The army almost disbanded, in
full run. So say the forerunners of the accursed news. Malediction!
Malediction!

What a horrible night and day! rain and cold; stragglers and
disbanded soldiers in every direction, and no order, nobody to gather
the soldiers, or to take care of them.

As if there existed not any military or administrative authority in
Washington! Under the eyes of the two commanders-in-chief! Oh,
senility, imbecility, ignominy! In Europe, a commander of a city, or
any other military authority whatever, who should behave in such a
way, would be dismissed, nay, expelled, from military service. What I
can gather is, that the enemy was in full retreat in the centre and on
one flank, when he was reinforced by fresh troops, who outflanked and
turned ours. If so, the panic can be explained. Even old veteran
troops generally run when they are outflanked.

Johnston, whom Patterson permitted to slip, came to the rescue of
Beauregard. So they say. It is _en petit_ Waterloo, with
Blucher-Johnston, and Grouchy-Patterson. But had Napoleon's power
survived after Waterloo, Grouchy, his chief of the staff, and even
Ney,[1] for the fault at Quatre-bras, would have been court-martialed
and shot. Here these blind Americans will thank Scott and Patterson.

    [Footnote 1: That such would have been the presumed fate of Ney at
    the hands of Napoleon, I was afterwards assured by the old Duke of
    Bassano, and by the Duchess Abrantes.]

Others say that a bold charge of cavalry arrived on our rear, and
threw in disorder the wagons and the baggage gang. That is nothing
new; at the battle of Borodino some Cossacks, pouncing upon the French
baggage, created a panic, which for a moment staggered Napoleon, and
prevented him in time from reinforcing Ney and Davoust. But McDowell
committed a fault in putting his baggage train, the ambulances
excepted, on a road between the army and its reserves, which, in such
a manner, came not in action. By and by I shall learn more about it.

The Congress has made a worse Bull Run than the soldiers. Not a single
manly, heroic word to the nation and the army. As if unsuccess always
was dishonor. This body groped its way, and was morally stunned by the
blow; the would-be leaders more than the mass.

Suggested to Sumner to make, as the Romans did, a few stirring words
on account of the defeat.

Some mean fellows in Congress, who never smelt powder, abused the
soldiers. Those fellows would have been the first to run. Others,
still worse, to show their abject flunkeyism to Scott, and to humbug
the public at large about their intimacy with this fetish, make
speeches in his defence. Scott broadly prepared the defeat, and now,
through the mouths of flunkeys and spit-lickers,[2] he attempts to
throw the fault on the thus called politicians.

    [Footnote 2: Foremost among them was the editor of the New York
    Times, publishing a long article wherein he proved that he had
    been admitted to General Scott's table, and that the General
    unfolded to him, the editor, the great anaconda strategy. Exactly
    the thing to be admired and gulped by a man of such _variegated_
    information as that individual.

    That little villianish "article" had a second object: it was to
    filch subscribers from the Tribune, which broke down, not over
    courageously.]

The President telegraphed for McClellan, who in the West, showed
_rapidity of movement_, the first and most necessary capacity for a
commander. Young blood will be infused, and perhaps senility will be
thrown overboard, or sent to the Museum of the Smithsonian Institute.

At Bull Run the foreign regiments ran not, but covered the retreat.
And Scott, and worse than he, Thomas, this black spot in the War
Department, both are averse to, and when they can they humiliate, the
foreigners. A member of Congress, in search of a friend, went for
several miles up the stream of the fugitive army; great was his
astonishment to hear spoken by the fugitives only the unmixed, pure
Anglo-Saxon.

My friend, J. Wadsworth, behaved cool, brave, on the field, and was
devoted to the wounded. Now, as always, he is the splendid type of a
true man of the people.

Poor, unhappy McDowell! During the days when he prepared the army, he
was well aware that an eventual success would be altogether attributed
to Scott; but that he, McDowell, would be the scapegoat for the
defeat. Already, when on Sunday morning the news of the first
successes was known, Scott swallowed incense, and took the whole
credit of it to himself. Now he accuses the politicians.

Once more. Scott himself prepared the defeat. Subsequent elucidation
will justify this assertion. One thing is already certain: one of the
reasons of the lost battle is the exhaustion of troops which
fought--and the number here in Washington is more than 50,000 men.
Only an imbecile would divide the forces in such a way as to throw
half of it to attack a superior and entrenched enemy. But Scott wished
to shape the great events of the country in accordance with his
narrow, ossified brains, and with his peculiar patriotism; and he did
the same in the conduct of the war.

I am sure some day or other it will come out that this immense
fortification of Manassas is a similar humbug to the masked batteries;
and Scott was the first to aggrandize these terrible national
nightmares. Already many soldiers say that they did not see any
fortifications. Very likely only small earthworks; if so, Scott ought
to have known what was the position and the works of an enemy encamped
about thirty miles from him. If he, Scott, was ignorant, then it shows
his utter imbecility; if he knew that the fortifications were
insignificant, and did not tell it to the troops, then he is worse
than an incapable chief. Up to the present day, all the military
leaders of ancient and modern times told their troops before a battle
that the enemy is not much after all, and that the difficulties to
overcome are rather insignificant. After the battle was won,
everything became aggrandized. Here everybody, beginning with Scott,
ardently rivalled how to scare and frighten the volunteers, by stories
of the masked batteries of Manassas, with its several tiers of
fortifications, the terrible superiority of the Southerners, etc.,
etc. In Europe such behavior would be called treason.

The administration and the influential men cannot realize that they
must give up their old, stupid, musty routine. McClellan ought to be
altogether independent of Scott; be untrammelled in his activity; have
large powers; have direct action; and not refer to Scott. What is this
wheel within a wheel? Instead of it, Scott, as by concession, cuts for
McClellan a military department of six square miles. Oh, human
stupidity, how difficult thou art to lift!

Scott will paralyze McClellan as he did Lyon and Butler. Scott always
pushed on his spit-lickers, or favorites, rotten by old age. But Scott
has pushed aside such men as Wool and Col. Smith; refused the services
of many brave as Hooker and others, because they never belonged to his
flunkeys.

Send to McClellan a plan for the reorganization of the army.

1st. True mastership consists in creating an army with extant
elements, and not in clamoring for what is altogether impossible to
obtain.

2d. The idea is preposterous to try to have a large thus-called
regular army. A small number, fifteen to twenty thousand men, divided
among several hundreds of thousands of volunteers, would be as a drop
of water in a lake. Besides, this war is to be decided by the great
masses of the volunteers, and it is uncivic and unpatriotic to in any
way nourish the wickedly-assumed discrimination between regulars and
volunteers.

3d. Good non-commissioned officers and corporals constitute the sole,
sound, and easy articulations of a regiment. Any one who ever was in
action is aware of this truth. With good non-commissioned officers,
even ignorant lieutenants do very little harm. The volunteer regiments
ought to have as many good sergeants and corporals as possible.

4th. To provide for this want, and for reasons mentioned above, the
relics of the regular army ought to be dissolved. Let us have one
army, as the enemy has.

5th. All the rank and file of the army ought to be made at once
corporals and sergeants, and be distributed as much as possible among
the volunteers.

6th. The non-commissioned regulars ought to be made commissioned
officers, and with officers of all grades be distributed and merged in
the one great army.

For the first time since the armaments, I enjoyed a genuine military
view. McClellan, surrounded as a general ought to be, went to see the
army. It looks martial. The city, likewise, has a more martial look
than it had all the time under Scott. It seems that a young, strong
hand holds the ribbons. God grant that McClellan may preserve his
western vigor and activity, and may not become softened and dissolved
by these Washington evaporations. If he does, if he follows the
routine, he will become as impotent as others before him. Young man,
beware of Washington's corrupt but flattering influences. To the camp!
to the camp! A tent is better for you than a handsome house. The tent,
the fumes of bivouacs, inspired the Fredericks, the Napoleons, and
Washingtons.

Up to this day they make more history in Secessia than here. Jeff.
Davis overshadows Lincoln. Jeff. Davis and his gang of malefactors are
pushed into the whirlpool of action by the nature of their crime;
here, our leaders dread action, and grope. The rebels have a clear,
decisive, almost palpable aim; but here * *




AUGUST, 1861.

     The truth about Bull Run -- The press staggers -- The Blairs
     alone firm -- Scott's military character -- Seward -- Mr. Lincoln
     reads the Herald -- The ubiquitous lobbyist -- Intervention --
     Congress adjourns -- The administration waits for something to
     turn up -- Wade -- Lyon is killed -- Russell and his shadow --
     The Yankees take the loan -- Bravo, Yankees! -- McClellan works
     hard -- Prince Napoleon -- Manassas fortifications a humbug --
     Mr. Seward Improves -- Old Whigism -- McClellan's powers enlarged
     -- Jeff. Davis makes history -- Fremont emancipates in Missouri
     -- The Cabinet.


The truth about Bull Run will, perhaps, only reach the people when it
becomes reduced to an historical use. I gather what I am sure is true.

About three weeks ago General McDowell took upon himself the
responsibility to attack the enemy concentrated at Manassas. Deciding
upon this step, McDowell showed the determination of a true soldier,
and a cool, intelligent courage. According to rumors permeating the
whole North; rumors originated by secessionists in and around
Washington, and in various parts of the free States; rumors gulped by
a part of the press, and never contradicted, but rather nursed, at
headquarters, Manassas was a terrible, unknown, mysterious something;
a bugbear, between a fortress made by art and a natural fastness,
whose approaches were defended for miles by numberless masked
batteries, and which was filled by countless thousands of the most
ferocious warriors. Such was Manassas in public opinion when McDowell
undertook to attack this formidable American Torres Vedras, and this
with the scanty and almost unorganized means in men and artillery
allotted to him by the senile wisdom of General Scott. General
McDowell obtained the promise that Beauregard alone was to be before
him. To fulfil this promise, General Scott was to order Patterson to
keep Johnston, and a movement was to be made on the James River, so as
to prevent troops coming from Richmond to Manassas. As it was already
said, Patterson, a special favorite of General Scott, kindly allowed
Johnston to save Beauregard, and Jeff. Davis with troops from Richmond
likewise was on the spot. McDowell planned his plan very skilfully; no
European general would have done better, and I am sure that such will
be the verdict hereafter. Some second-rate mistakes in the execution
did not virtually endanger its success; but, to say the truth,
McDowell and his army were defeated by the imbecility of the supreme
military authority. Imbecility stabbed them in the back.

One part of the press, stultified and stupefied, staggered under the
blow; the other part showed its utter degradation by fawning on Scott
and attacking the Congress, or its best part. The Evening Post
staggered not; its editors are genuine, laborious students, and, above
all, students of history. The editors of the other papers are
politicians; some of them are little, others are big villains. All,
intellectually, belong to the class called in America more or less
well-read men; information acquired by reading, but which in itself is
not much.

The brothers Blair, almost alone, receded not, and put the defeat
where it belonged--at the feet of General Scott.

The _rudis indigestaque moles_, torn away from Scott's hands, already
begins to acquire the shape of an army. Thanks to the youth, the
vigor, and the activity of McClellan.

General Scott throws the whole disaster on politicians, and abuses
them. How ungrateful. His too lofty pedestal is almost exclusively the
work of politicians. I heard very, very few military men in America
consider Scott a man of transcendent military capacity. Years ago,
during the Crimean campaign, I spent some time at West Point in the
society of Cols. Robert Lee, Walker, Hardee, then in the service of
the United States, and now traitors; not one of them classed Scott
much higher above what would be called a respectable capacity; and of
which, as they said, there are many, many in every European army.

If one analyzes the Mexican campaign, it will be found that General
Scott had, comparatively, more officers than soldiers; the officers
young men, full of vigor, and in the first gush of youth, who
therefore mightily facilitated the task of the commander. Their names
resound to-day in both the camps.

Further, generals from the campaign in Mexico assert that three of the
won battles were fought against orders, which signifies that in Mexico
youth had the best of cautious senility. It was according to the law
of nature, and for it it was crowned with success.

Mr. Seward has a very active intellect, an excellent man for current
business, easy and clear-headed for solving any second-rate
complications; but as for his initiative, that is another question.
Hitherto his initiative does not tell, but rather confuses. Then he
sustains Scott, some say, for future political capital. If so it is
bad; worse still if Mr. Seward sustains Scott on the ground of high
military fitness, as it is impossible to admit that Mr. Seward knows
anything about military affairs, or that he ever _studied_ the
description _of any battle_. At least, I so judge from his
conversation.

Mr. Lincoln has already the fumes of greatness, and looks down on the
press, reads no paper, that dirty traitor the New York Herald
excepted. So, at least, it is generally stated.

The enemies of Seward maintain that he, Seward, drilled Lincoln into
it, to make himself more necessary.

Early, even before the inauguration, McDowell suggested to General
Scott to concentrate in Washington the small army, the depots
scattered in Texas and New Mexico. Scott refused, and this is called a
general! God preserve any cause, any people who have for a savior a
Scott, together with his civil and military partisans.

If it is not direct, naked treason which prevails among the nurses,
and the various advisers of the people, imbecility, narrow-mindedness,
do the same work. Further, the way in which many leech, phlebotomize,
cheat and steal the people's treasury, is even worse than rampant
treason. I heard a Boston shipbuilder complain to Sumner that the
ubiquitous lobbyist, Thurlow Weed, was in his, the builder's, way
concerning some contracts to be made in the Navy Department, etc.,
etc. Will it turn out that the same men who are to-day at the head of
affairs will be the men who shall bring to an end this revolt or
revolution? It ought not to be, as it is contrary to logic, and to
human events.

Lincoln alone must forcibly remain, he being one of the incarnated
formulas of the Constitution, endowed with a specific, four years'
lasting existence.

The Americans are nervous about foreign intervention. It is difficult
to make them understand that no intervention is to be, and none can be
made. Therein the press is as silly as the public at large. Certainly
France does not intend any meddling or intervention; of this I am
sure. Neither does England seriously.

Next, if these two powers should even thirst for such an injustice,
they have no means to do it. If they break our blockades, we make war,
and exclude them from the Northern ports, whose commerce is more
valuable to them than that of the South. I do not believe the foreign
powers to be forgetful of their interest; they know better their
interests than the Americans.

The Congress adjourned, abandoning, with a confidence unparalleled in
history, the affairs of the country in the hands of the not over
far-sighted administration. The majority of the Congress are good, and
fully and nobly represent the pure, clear and sure aspirations,
instincts, nay, the clear-sightedness of the people. In the Senate, as
in the House, are many, very many true men, and men of pure devotion,
and of clear insight into the events; men superior to the
administration; such are, above all, those senators and
representatives who do not attempt or aim to sit on a pedestal before
the public, before the people, but wish the thing to be done for the
thing itself. But for _the formula_ which chains their hands, feet,
and intellect, the Congress contained several men who, if they could
act, would finish the secession in a double-quick time. But the whole
people move in the treadmill of formulas. It is a pity that they are
not inspired by the axiom of the Roman legist, _scire leges non est
hoc verba earum tenere, sed vim ac potestatem_. Congress had positive
notions of what ought to be done; the administration, Micawber-like,
looks for that something which may turn up, and by expedients patches
all from day to day.

What may turn up nobody can foresee; matter alone without mind cannot
carry the day. The people have the mind, but the official legal
leaders a very small portion of it. Come what will, I shall not break
down; I shall not give up the holy principle. If crime, rebellion,
_sauvagerie_, triumph, it will be, not because the people failed, but
it will be because mediocrities were at the helm. Concessions,
compromises, any patched-up peace, will for a century degrade the name
of America. Of course, I cannot prevent it; but events have often
broken but not bent me. I may be burned, but I cannot be melted; so if
secesh succeeds, I throw in a cesspool my document of naturalization,
and shall return to Europe, even if working my passage.

It is maddening to read all this ignoble clap-trap, written by
European wiseacres concerning this country. Not one knows the people,
not one knows the accidental agencies which neutralize what is grand
and devoted in the people.

Some are praised here as statesmen and leaders. A statesman, a leader
of such a people as are the Americans, and in such emergencies, must
be a _man_ in the fullest and loftiest comprehension. All the noblest
criteria of moral and intellectual manhood ought to be vigorously and
harmoniously developed in him. He ought to have a deep and lively
moral sense, and the moral perception of events and of men around him.
He ought to have large brains and a big heart,--an almost
all-embracing comprehension of the inside and outside of events,--and
when he has those qualities, then only the genius of foresight will
dwell on his brow. He ought to forget himself wholly and
unconditionally; his reason, his heart, his soul ought to merge in
the principles which lifted him to the elevated station. Who around me
approaches this ideal? So far as I know, perhaps Senator Wade.

I wait and wait for the eagle which may break out from the White
House. Even the burning fire of the national disaster at Bull Run left
the egg unhatched. _Utinam sim falsus_, but it looks as if the slowest
brains were to deal with the greatest events of our epoch. Mr. Lincoln
is a pure-souled, well-intentioned patriot, and this nobody doubts or
contests. But is that all which is needed in these terrible
emergencies?

Lyon is killed,--the only man of initiative hitherto generated by
events. We have bad luck. I shall put on mourning for at least six
weeks. They ought to weep all over the land for the loss of such a
man; and he would not have been lost if the administration had put him
long ago in command of the West. O General Scott! Lyon's death can be
credited to you. Lyon was obnoxious to General Scott, but the
General's influence maintains in the service all the doubtful
capacities and characters. The War Department, as says Potter,
bristles with secessionists, and with them the old, rotten,
respectable relics, preserved by General Scott, depress and nip in the
bud all the young, patriotic, and genuine capacities.

As the sea corrodes the rocks against which it impinges, so egotism,
narrow-mindedness, and immorality corrode the best human
institutions. For humanity's sake, Americans, beware!

Always the clouds of harpies around the White House and the
Departments,--such a generous ferment in the people, and such
impurities coming to the surface!

Patronage is the stumbling stone here to true political action. By
patronage the Cabinet keeps in check Congressmen, Senators, etc.

I learn from very good authority that when Russell, with his shadow,
Sam. Ward, went South, Mr. Seward told Ward that he, Seward, intends
not to force the Union on the Southern people, if it should be
positively ascertained that that people does not wish to live in the
Union! I am sorry for Seward. Such is not the feeling of the Northern
people, and such notions must necessarily confuse and make vacillating
Mr. Seward's--that is, Mr. Lincoln's--policy. Seward's patriotism and
patriotic wishes and expectations prevent him from seeing things as
they are.

The money men of Boston decided the conclusion of the first national
loan. Bravo, my beloved Yankees! In finances as in war, as in all, not
the financiering capacity of this or that individual, not any special
masterly measures, etc., but the stern will of the people to succeed,
provides funds and means, prevents bankruptcy, etc. The men who give
money send an agent here to ascertain how many traitors are still kept
in offices, and what are the prospects of energetic action by the
administration.

McClellan is organizing, working hard. It is a pleasure to see him, so
devoted and so young. After all, youth is promise. But already
adulation begins, and may spoil him. It would be very, very saddening.

Prince Napoleon's visit stirs up all the stupidity of politicians in
Europe and here. What a mass of absurdities are written on it in
Europe, and even by Americans residing there. All this is more than
equalled by the _solemn_ and _wise_ speculations of the Americans at
home. Bar-room and coffee-house politicians are the same all over the
world, the same, I am sure, in China and Japan. To suppose Prince
Napoleon has any appetite whatever for any kind of American crown!
Bah! He is brilliant and intelligent, and to suppose him to have such
absurd plans is to offend him. But human and American gullibility are
bottomless.

The Prince is a noble friend of the American cause, and freely speaks
out his predilection. His sentiments are those of a true Frenchman,
and not the sickly free-trade pro-slaveryism of Baroche with which he
poisoned here the diplomatic atmosphere. Prince Napoleon's example
will purify it.

As I was sure of it, the great Manassas fortifications are a humbug.
It is scarcely a half-way fortified camp. So say the companions of the
Prince, who, with him, visited Beauregard's army. So much for the
great Gen. Scott, whom the companions of the Prince call a
_magnificent ruin_.

The Prince spoke with Beauregard, and the Prince's and his companions'
opinion is, that McDowell planned well his attack, but failed in the
execution; and Beauregard thought the same. The Prince saw McClellan,
and does not prize him so high as we do. These foreign officers say
that most probably, on both sides, the officers will make most correct
plans, as do pupils in military schools, but the execution will depend
upon accident.

Mr. Seward shows every day more and more capacity in dispatching the
regular, current, diplomatical business affairs. In all such matters
he is now at home, as if he had done it for years and years. He is no
more spread-eagle in his diplomatic relations; is easy and prompt in
all secondary questions relating to secondary interests, and daily
emerging from international complications.

Hitherto the war policy of the administration, as inspired and
directed by Scott, was rather to receive blows, and then to try to
ward them off. I expect young McClellan to deal blows, and thus to
upturn the Micawber policy. Perhaps Gen. Scott believed that his name
and example would awe the rebels, and that they would come back after
having made a little fuss and done some little mischief. But Scott's
greatness was principally built up by the Whigs, and his hold on
Democrats was not very great. Witness the events of Polk's and
Pierce's administrations. His Mississippi-Atlantic strategy is a
delirium of a softening brain. Seward's enemies say that he puts up
and sustains Scott, because in the case of success Scott will not be
in Seward's way for the future Presidency. Mr. Lincoln, an old Whig,
has the Whig-worship for Scott; and as Mr. Lincoln, in 1851, stumped
for Scott, the candidate for the Presidency, the many eulogies
showered by Lincoln upon Scott still more strengthened the worship
which, of course, Seward lively entertains in Lincoln's bosom. Thus
the relics of Whigism direct now the destinies of the North. Mr.
Lincoln, Gen. Scott, Mr. Seward, form a triad, with satellites like
Bates and Smith in the Cabinet. But the Whigs have not the reputation
of governmental vigor, decision, and promptitude.

The vitiated impulse and direction given by Gen. Scott at the start,
still prevails, and it will be very difficult to bring it on the right
track--to change the general as well as the war policy from the
defensive, as it is now, to the offensive, as it ought to have been
from the beginning. The North is five to one in men, and one hundred
to one in material resources. Any one with brains and energy could
suppress the rebellion in eight weeks from to-day.

Mr. Lincoln in some way has a slender historical resemblance to Louis
XVI.--similar goodness, honesty, good intentions; but the size of
events seems to be too much for him.

And so now Mr. Lincoln is wholly overshadowed by Seward. If by miracle
the revolt may end in a short time, Mr. Seward will have most of the
credit for it. In the long run the blame for eventual disasters will
be put at Mr. Lincoln's door.

Thank heaven! the area for action and the powers of McClellan are
extended and increased. The administration seems to understand the
exigencies of the day.

I am told that the patriotic and brave Senator Wade, disgusted with
the slowness and inanity of the administration, exclaimed, "I do not
wonder that people desert to Jeff. Davis, as he shows brains; I may
desert myself." And truly, Jeff. Davis and his gang make history.

Young McClellan seems to falter before the Medusa-_ruin_ Scott, who is
again at his tricks, and refuses officers to volunteers. To carry
through in Washington any sensible scheme, more boldness is needed
than on the bloodiest battle-field.

If Gen. Scott could have disappeared from the stage of events on the
sixth of March, his name would have remained surrounded with that halo
to which the people was accustomed; but now, when the smoke will blow
over, it may turn differently. I am afraid that at some future time
will be applied to Scott * * * _quia turpe ducunt parere minoribus, et
quæ imberbi didicere, senes perdenda fateri_.

Not self-government is on trial, and not the genuine principle of
democracy. It is not the genuine, virtual democracy which conspired
against the republic, and which rebels, but an unprincipled, infamous
oligarchy, risen in arms to destroy democracy. From Athens down to
to-day, true democracies never betrayed any country, never leagued
themselves with enemies. From the time of Hellas down to to-day, all
over the world, and in all epochs, royalties, oligarchies,
aristocracies, conspired against, betrayed, and sold their respective
father-lands. (I said this years ago in America and Europe.)

Fremont as initiator; he emancipates the slaves of the disloyal
Missourians. Takes the advance, but is justified in it by the
slowness, nay, by the stagnancy of the administration.

Gen. Scott opposed to the expedition to Hatteras!

If it be true that Seward and Chase already lay the tracks for the
Presidential succession, then I can only admire their short-sightedness,
nay, utter and darkest blindness. The terrible events will be a
schooling for the people; the future President will not be a schemer
already shuffling the cards; most probably it will be a man who serves
the country, forgetting himself.

Only two members in the Cabinet drive together, Blair and Welles, and
both on the right side, both true men, impatient for action, action.
Every day shows on what false principle this Cabinet was constructed,
not for the emergency, not in view to suppress the rebellion, but to
satisfy various party wranglings. Now the people's cause sticks in the
mud.




SEPTEMBER, 1861.

     What will McClellan do? -- Fremont disavowed -- The Blairs not in
     fault -- Fremont ignorant and a bungler -- Conspiracy to destroy
     him -- Seward rather on his side -- McClellan's staff -- A Marcy
     will not do! -- McClellan publishes a slave-catching order -- The
     people move onward -- Mr. Seward again -- West Point -- The
     Washington defences -- What a Russian officer thought of them --
     Oh, for battles! -- Fremont wishes to attack Memphis; a bold
     move! -- Seward's influence over Lincoln -- The people for
     Fremont -- Col. Romanoff's opinion of the generals -- McClellan
     refuses to move -- Manoeuvrings -- The people uneasy -- The staff
     -- The Orleans -- Brave boys! -- The Potomac closed -- Oh, poor
     nation! -- Mexico -- McClellan and Scott.


Will McClellan display unity in conception, and vigor in execution?
That is the question. He seems very energetic and active in organizing
the army; but he ought to take the field very soon. He ought to leave
Washington, and have his headquarters in the camp among the soldiers.
The life in the tent will inspire him. It alone inspired Frederick II.
and Napoleon. Too much organization may become as mischievous as the
no organization under Scott. Time, time is everything. The levies will
fight well; may only McClellan not be carried away by the notion and
the attempt to create what is called a perfect army on European
pattern. Such an attempt would be ruinous to the cause. It is
altogether impossible to create such an army on the European model,
and no necessity exists for it. The rebel army is no European one.
Civil wars have altogether different military exigencies, and the
great tactics for a civil war are wholly different from the tactics,
etc., needed in a regular war. Napoleon differently fought the
Vendeans, and differently the Austrians, and the other coalesced
armies. May only McClellan not become intoxicated before he puts the
cup to his lips.

Fremont disavowed by Lincoln and the administration. This looks bad. I
have no considerable confidence in Fremont's high capacities, and
believe that his head is turned a little; but in this question he was
right in principle, and right in legality. A commander of an army
operating separately has the exercise of full powers of war.

The Blairs are not to be accused; I read the letter from F. Blair to
his brother. It is the letter of a patriot, but not of an intriguer.
Fremont establishes an absurd rule concerning the breach of military
discipline, and shows by it his ignorance and narrow-mindedness. So
Fremont, and other bungling martinets, assert that nobody has the
right to criticise the actions of his commander.

Fremont is ignorant of history, and those around him who put in his
head such absurd notions are a pack of mean and servile spit-lickers.
An officer ought to obey orders without hesitation, and if he does not
he is to be court-martialed and shot. But it is perfectly allowable to
criticise them; it is in human nature--it was, is, and will be done in
all armies; see in Curtius and other historians of Alexander of
Macedon. It was continually done under Napoleon. In Russia, in 1812,
the criticism made by almost all the officers forced Alexander I. to
leave the army, and to put Kutousoff over Barclay. In the last Italian
campaign Austrian officers criticised loudly Giulay, their commander,
etc., etc.

Conspiracy to destroy Fremont on account of his slave proclamation.
The conspirators are the Missouri slaveholders: Senator Brodhead, old
Bates, Scott, McClellan, and their staffs. Some jealousy against him
in the Cabinet, but Seward rather on Fremont's side.

McClellan makes his father-in-law, a man of _very_ secondary capacity,
the chief of the staff of the army. It seems that McClellan ignores
what a highly responsible position it is, and what a special and
transcendent capacity must be that of a chief of the staff--the more
so when of an army of several hundreds of thousands. I do not look for
a Berthier, a Gneisenau, a Diebitsch, or Gortschakoff, but a Marcy
will not do.

Colonel Lebedeef, from the staff of the Emperor Alexander II., and
professor in the School of the Staff at St. Petersburg, saw here
everything, spoke with our generals, and his conclusion is that in
military capacity McDowell is by far superior to McClellan. Strange,
if true, and foreboding no good.

Mr. Lincoln begins to call a demagogue any one who does not admire all
the doings of his administration. Are we already so far?

McClellan under fatal influences of the rampant pro-slavery men, and
of partisans of the South, as is a Barlow. All the former associations
of McClellan have been of the worst kind--Breckinridgians. But perhaps
he will throw them off. He is young, and the elevation of his
position, his standing before the civilized world, will inspire and
purify him, I hope. Nay, I ardently wish he may go to the camp, to the
camp.

McClellan published a slave-catching order. Oh that he may discard
those bad men around him!

Struggles with evils, above all with domestic, internal evils, absorb
a great part of every nation's life. Such struggles constitute its
development, are the landmarks of its progress and decline.

The like struggles deserve more the attention of the observer, the
philosopher, than all kinds of external wars. And, besides, most of
such external wars result from the internal condition of a nation. At
any rate, their success or unsuccess almost wholly depends upon its
capacity to overcome internal evils. A nation even under a despotic
rule may overcome and repel an invasion, as long as the struggle
against the internal evils has not broken the harmony between the
ruler and the nation. Here the internal evil has torn a part of the
constitutional structure; may only the necessary harmony between this
high-minded people and the representative of the transient
constitutional formula not be destroyed. The people move onward, the
formula vacillates, and seems to fear to make any bold step.

If the cause of the freemen of the North succumbs, then humanity is
humiliated. This high-spirited exclamation belongs to Tassara, the
Minister from Spain. Not the diplomat, but the nobly inspired _man_
uttered it.

But for the authoritative influence of General Scott, and the absence
of any foresight and energy on the part of the administration, the
rebels would be almost wholly without military leaders, without naval
officers. The Johnsons, Magruders, Tatnalls, Buchanans, ought to have
been arrested for treason the moment they announced their intention to
resign.

Mr. Seward has many excellent personal qualities, besides his
unquestionable eminent capacity for business and argument; but why is
he neutralizing so much good in him by the passion to be all in all,
to meddle with everything, to play the knowing one in military
affairs, he being in all such matters as innocent as a lamb? It is not
a field on which Seward's hazarded generalizations can be of any
earthly use; but they must confuse all.

Seward is free from that coarse, semi-barbarous know-nothingism which
rules paramount, not the genuine people, but the would-be something,
the half-civilized _gentlemen_. Above all, know-nothingism pervades
all around Scott, who is himself its grand master, and it nestles
there _par excellence_ in more than one way. It is, however, to be
seen how far this pure American-Scott military wisdom is something
real, transcendent. Up to this day, the pure Americanism, West Point
schoolboy's conceit, have not produced much. The defences of
Washington, so much clarioned as being the product of a high
conception and of engineering skill,--these defences are very
questionable when appreciated by a genuine military eye. A Russian
officer of the military engineers, one who was in the Crimea and at
Sebastopol, after having surveyed these defences here, told me that
the Russian soldiers who defended Sebastopol, and who learned what
ought to be defences, would prefer to fight outside than inside of the
Washington forts, bastions, defences, etc., etc., etc.

Doubtless many foreigners coming to this country are not much, but the
greatest number are soldiers who saw service and fire, and could be of
some use at the side of Scott's West Point greenness and presumption.

If we are worsted, then the fate of the men of faith in principles
will be that of Sisyphus, and the coming generation for half a century
will have uphill work.

If not McClellan himself, some intriguers around him already dream,
nay, even attempt to form a pure military, that is, a reckless,
unprincipled, unpatriotic party. These men foment the irritation
between the arrogance of the thus-called regular army, and the pure
abnegation of the volunteers. Oh, for battles! Oh, for battles!

Fremont wished at once to attack Fort Pillow and the city of Memphis.
It was a bold move, but the concerted civil and military wisdom
grouped around the President opposed this truly great military
conception.

Mr. Lincoln is pulled in all directions. His intentions are excellent,
and he would have made an excellent President for quiet times. But
this civil war imperatively demands a man of foresight, of prompt
decision, of Jacksonian will and energy. These qualities may be latent
in Lincoln, but do not yet come to daylight. Mr. Lincoln has no
experience of men and events, and no knowledge of the past. Seward's
influence over Lincoln may be explained by the fact that Lincoln
considers Seward as the alpha and omega of every kind of knowledge and
information.

I still hope, perhaps against hope, that if Lincoln is what the masses
believe him to be, a strong mind, then all may come out well. Strong
minds, lifted by events into elevated regions, expand more and more;
their "mind's eye" pierces through clouds, and even through rocks;
they become inspired, and inspiration compensates the deficiency or
want of information acquired by studies. Weak minds, when transported
into higher regions, become confused and dizzy. Which of the two will
be Mr. Lincoln's fate?

The administration hesitates to give to the struggle a character of
emancipation; but the people hesitate not, and take Fremont to their
heart.

As the concrete humanity, so single nations have epochs of gestation,
and epochs of normal activity, of growth, of full life, of manhood.
Americans are now in the stage of manhood.

Col. Romanoff, of the Russian military engineer corps, who was in the
Crimean war, saw here the men and the army, saw and conversed with the
generals. Col. R. is of opinion that McDowell is by far superior to
McClellan, and would make a better commander.

It is said that McClellan refuses to move until he has an army of
300,000 men and 600 guns. Has he not studied Napoleon's wars? Napoleon
scarcely ever had half such a number in hand; and when at Wagram,
where he had about 180,000 men, himself in the centre, Davoust and
Massena on the flanks, nevertheless the handling of such a mass was
too heavy even for his, Napoleon's, genius.

The country is--to use an Americanism--in a pretty fix, if this
McClellan turns out to be a mistake. I hope for the best. 600 guns!
But 100 guns in a line cover a mile. What will he do with 600? Lose
them in forests, marshes, and bad roads; whence it is unhappily a fact
that McClellan read only a little of military history, misunderstood
what he read, and now attempts to realize hallucinations, as a boy
attempts to imitate the exploits of an Orlando. It is dreadful to
think of it. I prefer to trust his assertion that, once organized, he
soon, very soon, will deal heavy and quick blows to the rebels.

I saw some manoeuvrings, and am astonished that no artillery is
distributed among the regiments of infantry. When the rank and file
see the guns on their side, the soldiers consider them as a part of
themselves and of the regiment; they fight better in the company of
guns; they stand by them and defend them as they defend their colors.
Such a distribution of guns would strengthen the body of the
volunteers. But it seems that McClellan has no confidence in the
volunteers. Were this true, it would denote a small, very small mind.
Let us hope it is not so. One of his generals--a martinet of the first
class--told me that McClellan waits for the organization of _the
regulars_, to have them for the defence of the guns. If so, it is
sheer nonsense. These narrow-minded West Point martinets will become
the ruin of McClellan.

McClellan could now take the field. Oh, why has he established his
headquarters in the city, among flunkeys, wiseacres, and spit-lickers?
Were he among the troops, he would be already in Manassas. The people
are uneasy and fretting about this inaction, and the people see what
is right and necessary.

Gen. Banks, a true and devoted patriot, is sacrificed by the stupidity
of what they call here the staff of the great army, but which
collectively, with its chief, is only a mass of conceit and
ignorance--few, as General Williams, excepted. Banks is in the face of
the enemy, and has no cavalry and no artillery; and here are immense
reviews to amuse women and fools.

Mr. Mercier, the French Minister, visited a considerable part of the
free States, and his opinions are now more clear and firm; above all,
he is very friendly to our side. He is sagacious and good.

Missouri is in great confusion--three parts of it lost. Fremont is not
to be accused of all the mischief, but, from effect to cause, the
accusation ascends to General Scott.

Gen. Scott insisted to have Gen. Harney appointed to the command of
Missouri, and hated Lyon. If, even after Harney's recall, Lyon had
been appointed, Lyon would be alive and Missouri safe. But hatred,
anxiety of rank, and stupidity, united their efforts, and prevailed.
Oh American people! to depend upon such inveterate blunderers!

Were McClellan in the camp, he would have no flatterers, no
antechambers filled with flunkeys; but the rebels would not so easily
get news of his plans as they did in the affair on Munson's Hill.

The Orleans are here. I warned the government against admitting the
Count de Paris, saying that it would be a _deliberate_ breach of good
comity towards Louis Napoleon, and towards the Bonapartes, who prove
to be our friends; I told that no European government would commit
itself in such a manner, not even if connected by ties of blood with
the Orleans. At the start, Mr. Seward heeded a little my advice, but
finally he could not resist the vanity to display untimely
spread-eagleism, and the Orleans are in our service. Brave boys! It is
a noble, generous, high-minded, if not an altogether wise, action.

If a mind is not nobly inspired and strong, then the exercise of
power makes it crotchety and dissimulative in contact with men. To my
disgust, I witness this all around me.

The American people, its institutions, the Union--all have lost their
virginity, their political innocence. A revolution in the
institutions, in the mode of life, in notions begun--it is going on,
will grow and mature, either for good or evil. Civil war, this most
terrible but most maturing passion, has put an end to the boyhood and
to the youth of the American people. Whatever may be the end, one
thing is sure--that the substance and the form will be modified; nay,
perhaps, both wholly changed. A new generation of citizens will grow
and come out from this smoke of the civil war.

The Potomac closed by the rebels! Mischief and shame! Natural fruits
of the dilatory war policy--Scott's fault. Months ago the navy wished
to prevent it, to shell out the rebels, to keep our troops in the
principal positions. Scott opposed; and still he has almost paramount
influence. McClellan complains against Scott, and Lincoln and Seward
flatter McClellan, but look up to Scott as to a supernatural military
wisdom. Oh, poor nation!

In Europe clouds gather over Mexico. Whatever it eventually may come
to, I suggested to Mr. Seward to lay aside the Monroe doctrine, not to
meddle for or against Mexico, but to earnestly protest against any
eventual European interference in the internal condition of the
political institutions of Mexico.

Continual secondary, international complications, naturally growing
out from the maritime question; so with the Dutch cheesemongers, with
Spain, with England--all easily to be settled; they generate fuss and
trouble, but will make no fire.

Gen. Scott's partisans complain that McClellan is very disrespectful
in his dealings with Gen. Scott. I wonder not. McClellan is probably
hampered by the narrow routine notions of Scott. McClellan feels that
Scott prevents energetic and prompt action; that he, McClellan, in
every step is obliged to fight Gen. Scott's inertia; and McClellan
grows impatient, and shows it to Scott.




OCTOBER, 1861.

     Experiments on the people's life-blood -- McClellan's uniform --
     The army fit to move -- The rebels treat us like children -- We
     lose time -- Everything is defensive -- The starvation theory --
     The anaconda -- First interview with McClellan -- Impressions of
     him -- His distrust of the volunteers -- Not a Napoleon nor a
     Garibaldi -- Mason and Slidell -- Seward admonishes Adams --
     Fremont goes overboard -- The pro-slavery party triumph -- The
     collateral missions to Europe -- Peace impossible -- Every
     Southern gentleman is a pirate -- When will we deal blows? --
     Inertia! inertia!


As in the mediæval epoch, and some time thereafter, anatomists and
physiologists experimented on the living villeins, that is, on
peasantry, serfs, and called this process _experientia in anima vili_,
so this naïve administration experiments in civil and in military
matters on the people's life-blood.

McClellan, stirred up by the fools and peacocks around him, has sent
to the War Department a project of a showy uniform for himself and his
staff. It would be to laugh at, if it were not insane. McClellan very
likely read not what he signed.

The army is in sufficient rig and organization to take the field; but
nevertheless McClellan has not yet made a single movement imperatively
prescribed by the simplest tactics, and by the simplest common sense,
when the enemy is in front. Not a single serious reconnoissance to
ascertain the real force of the enemy, to pierce through the curtain
behind which the rebels hide their real forces. It must be conceded to
the rebel generals that they show great skill in humbugging us.
Whenever we try to make a step we are met by a seemingly strong force
(tenfold increased by rumors spread by the secessionists among us, and
gulped by our stupidity), which makes us suppose a deep front, and a
still deeper body behind. And there is the humbug, I am sure. If, on
such an extensive line as the rebels occupy, the main body should
correspond to what they show in front, then the rebel force must
muster several hundreds of thousands. Such large numbers they have
not, and I am sure that four-fifths of their whole force constitutes
their vanguard, and behind it the main body is chaff. The rebels treat
us as if we were children.

McClellan fortifies Washington; Fremont, St. Louis; Anderson asks for
engineers to fortify some spots in Kentucky. This is all a defensive
warfare, and not so will the rebel region be conquered. We lose time,
and time serves the rebels, as it increases their moral force. Every
day of their existence shows their intrinsic vitality.

The theory of starving the rebels out is got up by imbeciles, wholly
ignorant of such matters; wholly ignorant of human nature; wholly
ignorant of the degree of energy, and of abnegation, which criminals
can display when firmly decided upon their purpose. This absurdity
comes from the celebrated anaconda Mississippi-Atlantic strategy.

Oh! When in Poland, in 1831, the military chiefs concentrated all the
forces in the fortifications of Warsaw, all was gone. Oh for a dashing
general, for a dashing purpose, in the councils of the White House!
The constitutional advisers are deaf to the voice of the people, who
know more about it than do all the departments and the military
wiseacres. The people look up to find as big brains and hearts as are
theirs, and hitherto the people have looked up in vain. The radical
senators, as a King, a Trumbull, a Wade, Wilson, Chandler, Hale, etc.,
the true Republicans in the last session of Congress--further, men as
Wadsworth and the like, are the true exponents of the character, of
the clear insight, of the soundness of the people.

McClellan, and even the administration, seem not to realize that pure
military considerations cannot fulfil the imperative demands of the
political situation.

_October 6th._--I met McClellan; had with him a protracted
conversation, and could look well into him. I do not attach any value
to physiognomies, and consider phrenology, craniology, and their
kindred, to be rather humbugs; but, nevertheless, I was struck with
the soft, insignificant inexpressiveness of his eyes and features. My
enthusiasm for him, my faith, is wholly extinct. All that he said to
me and to others present was altogether unmilitary and inexperienced.
It made me sick at heart to hear him, and to think that he is to
decide over the destinies and the blood of the people. And he already
an idol, incensed, worshipped, before he did anything whatever.
McClellan may have individual courage, so has almost every animal; but
he has not the decision and the courage of a military leader and
captain. He has no real confidence in the troops; has scarcely any
idea how battles are fought; has no confidence in and no notion of the
use of the bayonet. I told him that, notwithstanding his opinion, I
would take his worst brigade of infantry, and after a fortnight's
drill challenge and whip any of the best rebel brigades.

Some time ago it was reported that McClellan considered this war had
become a duel of artillery. Fools wondered and applauded. I then
protested against putting such an absurdity in McClellan's mouth; now
I must believe it. To be sure, every battle is in part a duel of
artillery, but ends or is decided by charges of infantry or cavalry.
Cannonading alone never constituted and decided a battle. No position
can be taken by cannonading alone, and shells alone do not always
force an enemy to abandon a position. Napoleon, an artillerist _par
excellence_, considered campaigns and battles to be something more
than duels of artillery. The great battle of Borodino, and all others,
were decided when batteries were stormed and taken. Eylau was a battle
of charges by cavalry and by infantry, besides a terrible cannonading,
etc., etc. McClellan spoke with pride of the fortifications of
Washington, and pointed to one of the forts as having a greater
profile than had the world-renowned Malakoff. What a confusion of
notions, what a misappreciation of relative conditions!

I cannot express my sad, mournful feelings, during this conversation
with McClellan. We spoke about the necessity of dividing his large
army into corps. McClellan took from the table an Army Almanac, and
pointed to the names of generals to whom he intended to give the
command of corps. He feels the urgency of the case, and said that Gen.
Scott prevented him from doing it; but as soon as he, McClellan, shall
be free to act, the division will be made. So General Scott is
everywhere to defend senile routine against progress, and the
experience of modern times.

The rebels deserve, to the end of time, many curses from outraged
humanity. By their treason they forced upon the free institutions of
the North the necessity of curtailing personal liberty and other
rights; to make use of despotism for the sake of self-defence.

The enemy concentrates and shortens his lines, and McClellan dares not
even tread on the enemy's heels. Instead of forcing the enemy to do
what we want, and upturn his schemes, McClellan seemingly does the
bidding of Beauregard. We advance as much as Beauregard allows us to
do. New tactics, to be sure, but at any rate not Napoleonic.

The fighting in the West and some small successes here are obtained by
rough levies; and those imbecile, regular martinets surrounding
McClellan still nurse his distrust in the volunteers. All the wealth,
energy, intellect of the country, is concentrated in the hands of
McClellan, and he uses it to throw up entrenchments. The partisans of
McClellan point to his highly scientific preparations--his science. He
may have some little of it, but half-science is worse than thorough
ignorance. Oh! for one dare-devil in the Lyon, or in the old-fashioned
Yankee style. McClellan is neither a Napoleon, nor a Cabrera, nor a
Garibaldi.

Mason and Slidell escaped to Havana on their way to Europe, as
commissioners of the rebels. According to all international
definitions, we have the full right to seize them in any neutral
vessel, they being political contrabands of war going on a publicly
avowed errand hostile to their true government. Mason and Slidell are
not common passengers, nor are they political refugees invoking the
protection of any neutral flag. They are travelling commissioners of
war, of bloodshed and rebellion; and it is all the same in whatever
seaport they embark. And if the vessel conveying them goes from
America to Europe, or _vice versa_, Mr. Seward can let them be seized
when they have left Havana, provided he finds it expedient.

We lose time, and time is all in favor of the rebels. Every day
consolidates their existence--so to speak, crystallizes them.
Further--many so-called Union men in the South, who, at the start,
opposed secession, by and by will get accustomed to it. Secession
daily takes deeper root, and will so by degrees become _un fait
accompli_.

Mr. Adams, in his official relations with the English government,
speaks of the rebel pirates as of lawful privateers. Mr. Seward
admonished him for it. Bravo!

It is so difficult, not to say impossible, to meet an American who
concatenates a long series of effects and causes, or who understands
that to explain an isolated fact or phenomenon the chain must be
ascended and a general law invoked. Could they do it, various
bunglings would be avoided, and much of the people's sacrifices
husbanded, instead of being squandered, as it is done now.

Fremont going overboard! His fall will be the triumph of the
pro-slavery party, headed by the New York Herald, and supported by
military old fogies, by martinets, and by double and triple political
and intellectual know-nothings. Pity that Fremont had no brilliant
military capacity. Then his fall could not have taken place.

Mr. Seward is too much ruled by his imagination, and too hastily
discounts the future. But imagination ruins a statesman. Mr. Seward
must lose credit at home and abroad for having prophesied, and having
his prophecies end in smoke. When Hatteras was taken (Gen. Scott
protested against the expedition), Mr. S. assured me that it was the
beginning of the end. A diplomat here made the observation that no
minister of a European parliamentary government could remain in power
after having been continually contradicted by facts.

Now, Mr. Seward devised these collateral missions to Europe. He very
little knows the habit and temper of European cabinets if he believes
that such collateral confidential agents can do any good. The European
cabinets distrust such irresponsible agents, who, in their turn,
weaken the influence and the standing of the genuine diplomatic
agents. Mr. S., early in the year, boasted to abolish, even in Europe,
the system of passports, and soon afterwards introduced it at home. So
his imagination carries him to overhaul the world. He proposes to
European powers a united expedition to Japan, and we cannot prevent at
home the running of the blockade, and are ourselves blockaded on the
Potomac. All such schemes are offsprings of an ambitious imagination.
But the worst is, that every such outburst of his imagination Mr.
Seward at once transforms into a dogma, and spreads it with all his
might. I pity him when I look towards the end of his political career.
He writes well, and has put down the insolent English dispatch
concerning the _habeas corpus_ and the arrests of dubious, if not
treacherous, Englishmen. Perhaps Seward imagines himself to be a
Cardinal Richelieu, with Lincoln for Louis XIII. (provided he knows as
much history), or may be he has the ambition to be considered a
Talleyrand or Metternich of diplomacy. But if any, he has some very,
very faint similarity with Alberoni. He easily outwits here men around
him; most are politicians as he; but he never can outwit the statesmen
of Europe. Besides, diplomacy, above all that of great powers, is
conceived largely and carried on a grand scale; the present diplomacy
has outgrown what is commonly called (but fallaciously) Talleyrandism
and Metternichism.

McClellan and the party which fears to make a bold advance on the
enemy make so much fuss about the country being cut up and wooded; it
proves only that they have no brains and no fertility of expedients.
This country is not more cut up than is the Caucasus, and the woods
are no great, endless, primitive forests. They are rather groves. In
the Caucasus the Russians continually attack great and dense forests;
they fire in them several round shots, then grape, and then storm them
with the bayonet; and the Circassians are no worse soldiers than are
the Southrons.

European papers talk much of mediation, of a peaceful arrangement, of
compromise. By intuition of the future the Northern people know very
well the utter impossibility of such an arrangement. A peace could not
stand; any such peace will establish the military superiority of the
arrogant, reckless, piratical South. The South would teem with
hundreds of thousands of men ready for any piratical, fillibustering
raid, enterprise, or excursion, of which the free States north and
west would become the principal theatres. Such a marauding community
as the South would become, in case of success, will be unexampled in
history. The Cylician pirates, the Barbary robbers, nay, the Tartars
of the 12th, 13th, and 14th centuries, were virtuous and civilized in
comparison with what would be an independent, man-stealing, and
man-whipping Southern agglomeration of lawless men. The free States
could have no security, even if _all_ the thus _called_ gentlemen and
men of honor were to sign a treaty or a compromise. The Southern
pestilential influence would poison not only the North, but this whole
hemisphere. The history of the past has nothing to be compared with
organized, legal piracy, as would become the thus-called Southern
chivalry on land and on sea; and soon European maritime powers would
be obliged to make costly expeditions for the sake of extirpating,
crushing, uprooting the nest of pirates, which then will embrace about
twelve millions,--_every_ Southern gentleman being a pirate at heart.

This is what the Northern people know by experience and by intuition,
and what makes the people so uneasy about the inertia of the
administration.

Mr. Lincoln, Mr. Seward, Gen. Scott, and other great men, are soured
against the people and public opinion for distrusting, or rather for
criticising their little display of statesmanlike activity. How
unjust! As a general rule, of all human sentiments, confidence is the
most scrutinizing one. If _confidence_ is bestowed, it wants to
perfectly know the _why_. But from the outset of this war the American
people gave and give to everybody full, unsuspecting confidence,
without asking the why, without even scrutinizing the actions which
were to justify the claim.

Up to this day Secesh is the positive pole; the Union is the
negative,--it is the blow recipient. When, oh, when will come the
opposite? When will we deal blows? Not under McClellan, I suspect.




NOVEMBER, 1861.

     Ball's Bluff -- Whitewashing -- "Victoria! Old Scott gone
     overboard!" -- His fatal influence -- His conceit -- Cameron --
     Intervention -- More reviews -- Weed, Everett, Hughes -- Gov.
     Andrew -- Boutwell -- Mason and Slidell caught -- Lincoln
     frightened by the South Carolina success -- Waits unnoticed in
     McClellan's library -- Gen. Thomas -- Traitors and pedants -- The
     Virginia campaign -- West Point -- McClellan's speciality -- When
     will they begin to see through him?


The season is excellent for military operations, such as any Napoleon
could wish it. And we, lying not on our oars or arms, but in our beds,
as our _spes patriæ_ is warmly and cosily established in a large
house, receiving there the incense and salutations of all flunkeys.
Even cabinet ministers crowd McClellan's antechambers!

The massacre at Ball's Bluff is the work either of treason, or of
stupidity, or of cowardice, or most probably of all three united.

No European government and no European nation would thus coolly bear
it. Any commander culpable of such stupidity would be forever
disgraced, and dismissed from the army. Here the administration, the
Cabinet, and all the Scotts, the McClellans, the Thomases, etc.,
strain their brains and muscles to whitewash themselves or the
culprit--to represent this massacre as something very innocent.

Victoria! Victoria! Old Scott, Old Mischief, gone overboard! So
vanished one of the two evil genii keeping guard over Mr. Lincoln's
brains. But it will not be so easy to redress the evil done by Scott.
He nailed the country's cause to such a turnpike that any of his
successors will perhaps be unable to undo what Old Mischief has done.
Scott might have had certain, even eminent, military capacity; but,
all things considered, he had it only on a small scale. Scott never
had in his hand large numbers, and hundreds of European generals of
divisions would do the same that Scott did, even in Mexico. Any one in
Europe, who in some way or other participated in the events of the
last forty years, has had occasion to see or participate in one single
day in more and better fighting, to hear more firing, and smell more
powder, than has General Scott in his whole life.

Scott's fatal influence palsied, stiffened, and poisoned every noble
or higher impulse, and every aspiration of the people. Scott
diligently sowed the first seeds of antagonism between volunteers and
regulars, and diligently nursed them. Around his person in the War
Department, and in the army, General Scott kept and maintained
officers, who, already before the inauguration, declared, and daily
asserted, that if it comes to a war, few officers of the army will
unite with the North and remain loyal to the Union.

He never forgot to be a Virginian, and was filled with all a
Virginian's conceit. To the last hour he warded off blows aimed at
Virginia. To this hour he never believed in a serious war, and now
_requiescat in pace_ until the curse of coming generations.

McClellan is invested with all the powers of Scott. McClellan has more
on his shoulders than any man--a Napoleon not excepted--can stand; and
with his very limited capacity McClellan must necessarily break under
it. Now McClellan will be still more idolized. He is already a kind of
dictator, as Lincoln, Seward, etc., turn around him.

In a conversation with Cameron, I warned him against bestowing such
powers on McClellan. "What shall we do?" was Cameron's answer;
"neither the President nor I know anything about military affairs."
Well, it is true; but McClellan is scarcely an apprentice.

Again the intermittent fear, or fever, of foreign intervention. How
absurd! Americans belittle themselves talking and thinking about it.
The European powers will not, and cannot. That is my creed and my
answer; but some of our agents, diplomats, and statesmen, try to made
capital for themselves from this fever which they evoke to establish
before the public that their skill preserves the country from foreign
intervention. Bosh!

All the good and useful produced in the life and in the economy of
nations, all the just and the right in their institutions, all the ups
and downs, misfortunes and disasters befalling them, all this was, is,
and forever will be the result of logical deductions from
pre-existing dates and facts. And here almost everybody forgets the
yesterday.

A revolution imposes obligations. A revolution makes imperative the
development and the practical application of those social principles
which are its basis.

The American Revolution of 1776 proclaimed self-government, equality
before all, happiness of all, etc.; it is therefore the peremptory
duty of the American people to uproot domestic oligarchy, based upon
living on the labor of an enslaved man; it has to put a stop to the
moral, intellectual, and physical servitude of both, of whites and of
colored.

Eminent men in America are taunted with the ambition to reach the
White House. In itself it is not condemnable; it is a noble or an
ignoble ambition, according to the ways and means used to reach that
aim. It is great and stirring to see one's name recorded in the list
of Presidents of the United States; but there is still a record far
shorter, but by far more to be envied--a record venerated by our
race--it is the record of truly _great men_. The actually inscribed
runners for the White House do not think of this.

No one around me here seems to understand (and no one is familiar
enough with general history) that protracted wars consolidate a
nationality. Every day of Southern existence shapes it out more and
more into a _nation_, with all the necessary moral and material
conditions of existence.

Seeing these repeated reviews, I cannot get rid of the idea that by
such shows and displays McClellan tries to frighten the rebels in the
Chinaman fashion.

The collateral missions to England, France, and Spain, are to add
force to our cause before the public opinion as well as before the
rulers. But what a curious choice of men! It would be called even an
unhappy one. Thurlow Weed, with his offhand, apparently sincere, if
not polished ways, may not be too repulsive to English refinement,
provided he does not buttonhole his interlocutionists, or does not pat
them on the shoulder. So Thurlow Weed will be dined, wined, etc. But
doubtless the London press will show him up, or some "Secesh" in
London will do it. I am sure that Lord Lyons, as it is his paramount
duty, has sent to Earl Russell a full and detailed biography of this
Seward's _alter ego_, sent _ad latus_ to Mr. Adams. Thurlow Weed will
be considered an agreeable fellow; but he never can acquire much
weight and consideration, neither with the statesmen, nor with the
members of the government, nor in saloons, nor with the public at
large.

Edward Everett begged to be excused from such a false position offered
to him in London. Not fish, not flesh. It was rather an offence to
proffer it to Everett. The old patriot better knows Europe, its
cabinets, and exigencies, than those who attempted to intricate him in
this ludicrous position. He is right, and he will do more good here
than he could do in London--there on a level with Thurlow Weed!

Archbishop Hughes is to influence Paris and France,--but whom? The
public opinion, which is on our side, is anti-Roman, and Hughes is an
Ultra Montane--an opinion not over friendly to Louis Napoleon. The
French clergy in every way, in culture, wisdom, instruction, theology,
manners, deportment, etc., is superior to Hughes in incalculable
proportions, and the French clergy are already generally anti-slavery.
Hughes to act on Louis Napoleon! Why! the French Emperor can outwit a
legion of Hugheses, and do this without the slightest effort. Besides,
for more than a century European sovereigns, governments, and
cabinets, have generally given up the use of bishops, etc., for
political, public, or confidential missions. Mr. Seward stirs up old
dust. All the liberal party in Europe or France will look astonished,
if not worse, at this absurdity.

All things considered, it looks like one of Seward's personal tricks,
and Seward outwitted Chase, took him in by proffering a similar
mission to Chase's friend, Bishop McIlvaine. But I pity Dayton. He is
a high-toned man, and the mission of Hughes is a humiliation to
Dayton.

Whatever may be the objects of these missions, they look like petty
expedients, unworthy a minister of a great government.

Mason and Slidell caught. England will roar, but here the people are
satisfied. Some of the diplomats make curious faces. Lord Lyons
behaves with dignity. The small Bremen flatter right and left, and do
it like little lap-dogs.

Governor Andrew of Massachusetts, ex-Governor Boutwell, are tip-top
men--men of the people. The Blairs are too heinous, too violent, in
their persecution of Fremont. Warned M. Blair not to protect one whom
Fremont deservedly expelled. But M. Blair, in his spite against
Fremont, took a mean adventurer by the hand, and entangled therein the
President.

The vessel and the crew are excellent, and would easily obey the hand
of a helmsman, but there is the rub, where to find him? Lincoln is a
simple man of the prairie, and his eyes penetrate not the fog, the
tempest. They do not perceive the signs of the times--cannot embrace
the horizon of the nation. And thus his small intellectual insight is
dimmed by those around him. Lincoln begins now already to believe that
he is infallible; that he is ahead of the people, and frets that the
people may remain behind. Oh simplicity or conceit!

Again, Lincoln is frightened with the success in South Carolina, as in
his opinion this success will complicate the question of slavery. He
is frightened as to what he shall do with Charleston and Augusta,
provided these cities are taken.

It is disgusting to hear with what superciliousness the different
members of the Cabinet speak of the approaching Congress--and not one
of them is in any way the superior of many congressmen.

When Congress meets, the true national balance account will be
struck. The commercial and piratical flag of the secesh is virtually
in all waters and ports. (The little cheese-eater, the Hollander, was
the first to raise a fuss against the United States concerning the
piratical flag. This is not to be forgotten.) 2d. Prestige, to a great
extent, lost. 3d. Millions upon millions wasted. Washington besieged
and blockaded, and more than 200,000 men kept in check by an enemy not
by half as strong. 4th. Every initiative which our diplomacy tried
abroad was wholly unsuccessful, and we are obliged to submit to new
international principles inaugurated at our cost; and, summing up,
instead of a broad, decided, general policy, we have vacillation,
inaction, tricks, and expedients. The people fret, and so will the
Congress. Nations are as individuals; any partial disturbance in a
part of the body occasions a general chill. Nature makes efforts to
check the beginning of disease, and so do nations. In the human
organism nature does not submit willingly to the loss of health, or of
a limb, or of life. Nature struggles against death. So the people of
the Union will not submit to an amputation, and is uneasy to see how
unskilfully its own family doctors treat the national disease.

Port Royal, South Carolina, taken. Great and general rejoicing. It is
a brilliant feat of arms, but a questionable military and war policy.
Those attacks on the circumference, or on extremities, never can
become a death-blow to secesh. The rebels must be crushed in the
focus; they ought to receive a blow at the heart. This new strategy
seems to indicate that McClellan has not heart enough to attack the
fastnesses of rebeldom, but expects that something may turn up from
these small expeditions. He expects to weaken the rebels in their
focus. I wish McClellan may be right in his expectations, but I doubt
it.

Officers of McClellan's staff tell that Mr. Lincoln almost daily comes
into McClellan's library, and sits there rather unnoticed. On several
occasions McClellan let the President wait in the room, together with
other common mortals.

The English statesmen and the English press have the notion deeply
rooted in their brains that the American people fight for empire. The
rebels do it, but not the free men.

Mr. Seward's emphatical prohibition to Mr. Adams to mention the
question of slavery may have contributed to strengthen in England the
above-mentioned fallacy. This is a blunder, which before long or short
Seward will repent. It looks like astuteness--_ruse_; but if so, it is
the resource of a rather limited mind. In great and minor affairs,
straightforwardness is the best policy. Loyalty always gets the better
of astuteness, and the more so when the opponent is unprepared to meet
it. Tricks can be well met by tricks, but tricks are impotent against
truth and sincerity. But Mr. Seward, unhappily, has spent his life in
various political tricks, and was surrounded by men whose intimacy
must have necessarily lowered and unhealthily affected him. All his
most intimates are unintellectual mediocrities or tricksters.

Seward is free from that infamous know-nothingism of which this Gen.
Thomas is the great master (a man every few weeks accused of treason
by the public opinion, and undoubtedly vibrating between loyalty here
and sympathy with rebels).

All this must have unavoidably vitiated Mr. Seward's better nature. In
such way only can I see plainly why so many excellent qualities are
marred in him. He at times can broadly comprehend things around him;
he is good-natured when not stung, and he is devoted to his men.

As a patriot, he is American to the core--were only his domestic
policy straightforward and decided, and would he only stop meddling
with the plans of the campaign, and let the War Department alone.

Since every part of his initiative with European cabinets failed,
Seward very skilfully dispatches all the minor affairs with
Europe--affairs generated by various maritime and international
complications. Were his domestic policy as correct as is now his
foreign policy, Seward would be the right man.

Statesmanship emerges from the collision of great principles with
important interests. In the great Revolution, the thus called fathers
of the nation were the offsprings of the exigencies of the time, and
they were fully up to their task. They were vigorous and fresh; their
intellect was not obstructed by any political routine, or by tricky
political praxis. Such men are now needed at the helm to carry this
noble people throughout the most terrible tempest. So in these days
one hears so much about constitutional formulas as safeguards of
liberty. True liberty is not to be virtually secured by any framework
of rules and limitations, devisable only by statecraft. The perennial
existence of liberty depends not on the action of any definite and
ascertainable machinery, but on continual accessions of fresh and
vital influences. But perhaps such influences are among the noblest,
and therefore among the rarest, attributes of man.

Abroad and here, traitors and some pedants on formulas make a noise
concerning the violation of formulas. Of course it were better if such
violations had been left undone. But all this is transient, and evoked
by the direst necessity. The Constitution was made for a healthy,
normal condition of the nation; the present condition is abnormal.
Regular functions are suspended. When the human body is ruined or
devoured by a violent disease, often very tonic remedies are
used--remedies which would destroy the organism if administered when
in a healthy, normal condition. A strong organism recovers from
disease, and from its treatment. Human societies and institutions pass
through a similar ordeal, and when they are unhinged, extraordinary
and abnormal ways are required to maintain the endangered society and
restore its equipoise.

Examining day after day the map of Virginia, it strikes one that a
movement with half of the army could be made down from Mount Vernon by
the two turnpike roads, and by water to Occoquan, and from there to
Brentsville. The country there seems to be flat, and not much wooded.
Manassas would be taken in the rear, and surrounded, provided the
other half of the army would push on by the direct way from here to
Manassas, and seriously attack the enemy, who thus would be broken,
could not escape. This, or any plan, the map of Virginia ought to
suggest to the staff of McClellan, were it a staff in the true
meaning. Dybitsch and Toll, young colonels in the staff of Alexander
I., 1813-'14, originated the march on Paris, so destructive to
Napoleon. History bristles with evidences how with staffs originated
many plans of battles and of campaigns; history explains the paramount
influence of staffs on the conduct of a war. Of course Napoleon wanted
not a suggestive, but only an executive staff; but McClellan is not a
Napoleon, and has neither a suggestive nor an executive staff around
him. A Marcy to suggest a plan of a campaign or of a battle, to watch
over its execution!

I spoke to McDowell about the positions of Occoquan and Brentsville.
He answered that perhaps something similar will be under
consideration, and that McClellan must show his mettle and capacity. I
pity McDowell's confidence.

Besides, the American army as it was and is educated, nursed, brought
up by Gen. Scott,--the army has no idea what are the various and
complicated duties of a staff. No school of staff at West Point;
therefore the difficulty to find now genuine officers of the staff.
If McClellan ever moves this army, then the defectiveness of his staff
may occasion losses and even disasters. It will be worse with his
staff than it was at Jena with the Prussian staff, who were as
conceited as the small West Point clique here in Washington.

West Point instructs well in special branches, but does not
necessarily form generals and captains. The great American Revolution
was fought and made victorious by men not from any military schools,
and to whom were opposed commanders with as much military science as
there was possessed and current in Europe. Jackson, Taylor, and even
Scott, are not from the school.

I do not wish to judge or disparage the pupils from West Point, but I
am disgusted with the supercilious and ridiculous behavior of the
clique here, ready to form prætorians or anything else, and poisoning
around them the public opinion. Western generals are West Point
pupils, but I do not hear them make so much fuss, and so
contemptuously look down on the volunteers. These Western generals
pine not after regulars, but make use of such elements as they have
under hand. The best and most patriotic generals and officers here,
educated at West Point, are numerous. Unhappily a clique, composed of
a few fools and fops, overshadows the others.

McClellan's speciality is engineering. It is a speciality which does
not form captains and generals for the field,--at least such instances
are very rare. Of all Napoleon's marshals and eminent commanders,
Berthier alone was educated as engineer, and his speciality and high
capacity was that of a chief of the staff. Marescott or Todleben would
never claim to be captains. The intellectual powers of an engineer are
modeled, drilled, turned towards the defensive,--the engineer's brains
concentrate upon selecting defensive positions, and combine how to
strengthen them by art. So an engineer is rather disabled from
embracing a whole battle-field, with its endless casualties and space.
Engineers are the incarnation of a defensive warfare; all others, as
artillerists, infantry, and cavalry, are for dashing into the
unknown--into the space; and thus these specialities virtually
represent the offensive warfare.

When will they begin to see through McClellan, and find out that he is
not the man? Perhaps too late, and then the nation will sorely feel
it.

Mr. Seward almost idolizes McClellan. Poor homage that; but it does
mischief by reason of its influence on the public opinion.




DECEMBER, 1861.

     The message -- Emancipation -- State papers published -- Curtis
     Noyes -- Greeley not fit for Senator -- Generalship all on the
     rebel side -- The South and the North -- The sensationists -- The
     new idol will cost the people their life-blood! -- The Blairs --
     Poor Lincoln! -- The Trent affair -- Scott home again -- The war
     investigation committee -- Mr. Mercier.


McClellan is now all-powerful, and refuses to divide the army into
corps. Thus much for his brains and for his consistency.

The message--a disquisition upon labor and capital; hesitancy about
slavery. The President wishes to be pushed on by public opinion. But
public opinion is safe, and expects from the official leader a decided
step onwards. The message gives no solution, suggests none, accounts
not for the lost time--foreshadows not a vigorous, energetic effort to
crush the rebellion; foreshadows not a vigorous, offensive war. The
message is an honest paper, but says not much.

The question of emancipation is not clear even in the heads of the
leading emancipationists; not one thinks to give freeholds to the
emancipated. It is the only way to make them useful to themselves and
to the community. Freedom without land is humbug, and the fools speak
of exportation of the four millions of slaves, depriving thus the
country of laborers, which a century of emigration cannot fill again.
All these fools ought to be sent to a lunatic asylum.

To export the emancipated would be equivalent to devastation of the
South, to its transformation into a wilderness. Small freeholds for
the emancipated can be cut out of the plantations of rebels, or out of
the public lands of each State--lands forfeited by the rebellion.

State papers published. The instructions to the various diplomatic
agents betray a beginner in the diplomatic career. By writing special
instructions for each minister, Mr. Seward unnecessarily increased his
task. The cause, reasons, etc., of the rebellion are one and the same
for France or Russia, and a single explanatory circular for all the
ministers would have done as well and spared a great deal of labor.
Cavour wrote one circular to all cabinets, and so do all European
statesmen. So, as they are, the State papers are a curious
agglomeration of good patriotism and confusion. So the Minister to
England is to avoid slavery; the Minister to France has the contrary.
All this is not smartness or diplomacy, but rather confusion,
insincerity, and double-dealing. One must conclude that Lincoln and
Seward have themselves no firm opinion. The instructions to Mexico
would sound nobly-worded but for the confusion and the veil ordered to
be thrown upon the cause of secession. That to Italy, above all to
Austria, has a smack of a schoolmaster displaying his information
before a gaping boy. It is offensive to the Minister going to Vienna.
It may be suspected that some of these instructions were written to
make capital at home, to astonish Mr. Lincoln with the knowledge of
Europe and the familiarity with European affairs. All this display
will prove to Europeans rather an ignorance of Europe. The
correspondence on the Paris convention is splendid, although the
initiative taken by Seward on this question was a mistake. But he
argued well the case against the English and French reservations.

Never any government whatever treated so tenderly its worst and most
dangerous enemies as does this government the Washington
secessionists, spies for the enemy, and spreading false news here to
frighten McClellan.

The old regular, but partly worn-out Republican leaders throttle and
neutralize the new, fresh, vigorous accessions. So Curtis Noyes, one
of the most eminent and devoted men, could not come into the Senate
because Greeley wished to be elected.

No living man has rendered greater services to the people during the
last twenty years than Greeley; but he ought to remain in his
speciality. Greeley is no more fit for a Senator than to take the
command of a regiment. Besides, the events already run over his head;
Greeley is slowly breaking down.

McClellan is beset with all kinds of inventors, contractors, etc. He
mostly endorses their suggestions, and on this authority the most
extravagant orders are given by the War Department. All this ought to
be investigated. Somebody back of McClellan may be found as being the
real patron of these leeches.

If the genius or capacity of a commander consists not only in closely
observing the movements of the enemy, but likewise in penetrating the
enemy's plans and in modifying his own in proportion as they are
deranged by an unexpected movement or a rapid march, then the
generalship is altogether on the other side, and on ours not a sign,
not a breath of it.

A civil war is mostly the purifying fire in a nation's existence. It
is to be hoped that this great convulsion will purify the free States
by sounding the death-knell of these small intriguing politicians. The
American people at large will acquire earnestness, knowledge of men,
and clear insight into its own affairs. Tricky politicians will be
discarded, and true men backed by majorities.

The South has for its leaders the chiefs who for years organized the
secession, who waged everything on its success, as life, honor,
fortune, and who incite and carry with them the ignorant masses.

The reverse is in the North. Mr. Lincoln was not elected for
suppressing the rebellion, nor did he make his Cabinet in view of a
terrible national struggle for death or life. Neither Lincoln nor his
Cabinet are the inciters or the inspiring leaders of the people, but
only expressions--not _ad hoc_--of the national will. This is one
reason why the administration is slower than the people, and why the
rebel administration is quicker than ours.

The second reason, and generated by the first, is, that every rebel
devotes his whole soul and energy to the success of the rebellion,
forcibly forgetting his individuality. Our thus called leaders think
first of their little selves, whose aggrandizement the public events
are to secure, and the public cause is to square itself with their
individual schemes.

Such is the policy of almost all those at the helm here. Not one among
them is to be found deserving the name of a statesman, endowed with a
great devotion, and with a great power, for the service of a great and
noble aim. From the solemn hour that the fatherland honorably chains
him to its service, the genuine statesman exists no more for himself,
but for his country alone. If necessary, he ought to consider himself
a victim to the public good, even were the public unjust towards him.
He is to treat as enemies all the dirty, tricky, and mean passions and
men. His enemies will hate, but the country, his enemies included,
will esteem him. Such a man will be the genuine man of the American
people, but he exists not in the official spheres.

It is for the first time in history that a young, insignificant man,
without a past, without any reason, is put in such a lofty position as
has been McClellan; he is to be literally kicked into greatness, and
into showing eventually courage. All this is a psychological problem!

Kent's Commentary upon the qualifications of a President is the best
criticism upon Lincoln.

These mosquitoes of public opinion, the sensation-seekers, the
sentimental preachers, the lecturers, the amateurs of the thus called
representative men, these oratorical falsifiers of history, but
considered here as luminaries, are already at their pernicious, nay,
accursed work.

They poison the judgment of the people. These hero-seekers for their
sermons, lectures, and sensation productions, have already found all
the criteria of a hero in McClellan, even in his chin, in the back of
his horse, etc., etc., and now herald it all over the country. Curses
be upon them.

No nation has ever raised idols with such facility as do the
Americans. Nay, I do not suppose that there ever existed in history a
nation with such a thirst for idols as this people. I may be a false
prophet; but this new idol, McClellan, will cost them their
life-blood.

The Blairs are now staunch supporters of McClellan. It is
unpardonable. They ought to know, and they do know better. But Mr.
Blair wishes to be Secretary of War in Cameron's place, and wishes to
get it through McClellan.

And poor Lincoln! I pity him; but his advisers may make out of him
something worse even than was Judas, in the curses of ages.

Polybius asserts that when the Greeks wrote about Rome they erred and
lied, and when the Romans wrote of themselves they lied or boasted.
The same the English do in relation to themselves, and to Americans.
Above all, in this Trent affair, or excitement, all European writers
for the press, professors, doctors, etc., pervert facts, reason, and
international laws, forget the past, and lie or flatter, with a slight
exception, as is Gasparin.

The Trent affair finished. We are a little humbled, but it was
expedient to terminate it so. With another military leader than
McClellan, we could march at the same time to Richmond, and invest
Canada before any considerable English force could arrive there. But
with such a hero at our head, better that it ends so. Europe will
applaud us, and the relation with England will become clarified.
Perhaps England would not have been so stiff in this Trent affair but
for the fixed idea in Russell's, Newcastle's, Palmerston's, etc.,
heads that Seward wishes to pick a quarrel with England.

The first weeks of Seward's premiership pointed that way. Mr. Seward
has the honors of the Trent affair. It is well as it is; the argument
is smart, but a little too long, and not in a genuine diplomatic
style. But Lincoln ought to have a little credit for it, as from the
start he was for giving the traitors up.

The worst feature of the whole Trent affair is, that it brought back
home from France this old mischief, General Scott. He will again
resume his position as the first military authority in the country,
confuse the judgment of Lincoln, of the press, and of the people, and
again push the country into mire.

The Congress appointed a War Investigating Committee, Senator Wade at
the head. There is hope that the committee will quickly find out what
a terrible mistake this McClellan is, and warn the nation of him. But
Lincoln, Seward, and the Blairs, will not give up their idol.

Louis Napoleon said his word about the Trent affair. All things
considered, the conduct of the Emperor cannot be complained of. The
Thouvenel paper is serious, severe, but intrinsically not unfriendly.
Quite the contrary. Up to this time I am right in my reliance on Louis
Napoleon, on his sound, cool, but broad comprehension.

Mr. Mercier behaves well, and he is to be relied on, provided we show
mettle and fight the traitors. Now, as the European imbroglio is
clarified, _at them_, _at them_! But nothing to hope or expect from
McClellan. I daily preach, but in the wilderness. Prince de Joinville
made a very ridiculous fuss about the Trent affair.

Americans believe that a statesman must be an orator. Schoolboy-like,
they judge on English precedents. In England, the Parliament is
omnipotent; it makes and unmakes administrations, therefore oratory is
a necessary corollary in a statesman; but here the Cabinet acts
without parliamentary wranglings, and a Jackson is the true type of an
American statesman. Washington was not an orator, nor was Alexander
Hamilton.




JANUARY, 1862.

     The year 1861 ends badly -- European defenders of slavery --
     Secession lies -- Jeremy Diddlers -- Sensation-seekers --
     Despotic tendencies -- Atomistic Torquemadas -- Congress chained
     by formulas -- Burnside's expedition a sign of life -- Will this
     McClellan ever advance? -- Mr. Adams unhorsed -- He packs his
     trunks -- Bad blankets -- Austria, Prussia, and Russia -- The
     West Point nursery -- McClellan a greater mistake than Scott --
     Tracks to the White House -- European stories about Mr. Lincoln
     -- The English ignorami -- The slaveholder a scarcely varnished
     savage -- Jeff. Davis -- "Beauregard frightens us -- McClellan
     rocks his baby" -- Fancy army equipment -- McClellan and his
     chief of staff sick in bed -- "No satirist could invent such
     things" -- Stanton in the Cabinet -- "This Stanton is the people"
     -- Fremont -- Weed -- The English will not be humbugged -- Dayton
     in a fret -- Beaufort -- The investigating committee condemn
     McClellan -- Lincoln in the clutches of Seward and Blair -- Banks
     begs for guns and cavalry in vain -- The people will awake! --
     The question of race -- Agassiz.


An ugly year ended in backing before England, having, at least,
relative right on our side. Further, the ending year has revealed a
certain incapacity in the Republican party's leaders, at least its
official leaders, to administer the country and to grasp the events.
If the new year shall be only the continuation of the faults, the
mistakes, and the incapacities prevailing during 1861, then the worst
is to be expected.

The lowest in moral degradation is an European defending slavery here
or in Europe. Such Europeans are far below the condemned criminals.
Still lower are such Europeans who become defenders of slavery after
having visited plantations, where, in the shape of wines and
delicacies, they tasted human blood, and then, hyenas-like, smacked
their lips And thirsted for more.

Always the same stories, lies, and humbugs concerning the hundreds of
thousands of rebels in Manassas. These lies are spread here in
Washington by the numerous secessionists--at large, by such ignoble
sheets as the New York Herald and Times; and McClellan seems to
willingly swallow these lies, as they justify his inaction and c----.

The city is more and more crowded with Jeremy Diddlers, with
lecturers, with sensation-seekers, all of them in advance discounting
their hero, and showing in broad light their gigantic stupidity. One
of this motley finds in McClellan a Norman chin, the other muscle, the
third a brow for laurels (of thistle I hope), another a square,
military, heroic frame, another firmness in lips, another an
unfathomed depth in the eye, etc., etc. Never I heard in Europe such
balderdash. And the ladies--not the women and gentlewomen--are worse
than the men in thus stupefying themselves and those around them.

The thus called arbitrary acts of the government prove how easily, on
the plea of patriotic necessity, a people, nay, the public opinion,
submits to arbitrary rule. All this, servility included, explains the
facility with which, in former times, concentrated and concrete
despotisms have been established. Here every such arbitrary action is
submitted to, because it is so new, and because the people has the
childish, naïve, but, to it, honorable confidence, that the power
entrusted by the people is used in the interest and for the welfare of
the people. But all the despots of all times and of all nations said
the same. However, in justice to Mr. Lincoln, he is pure, and has no
despotical longings, but he has around him some atomistic Torquemadas.

It will be very difficult to the coming generations to believe that a
people, a generation, who for half a century was outrunning the time,
who applied the steam and the electro-magnetic telegraph, that the
same people, when overrun by a terrible crisis, moved slowly, waited
patiently, and suffered from the mismanagement of its leaders. This is
to be exclusively explained by the youthful self-consciousness of an
internal, inexhaustible vital force, and by the child-like
inexperience.

The Congress, that is, the majority, shows that it is aware of the
urgency of the case, and of the dangerous position of the country. But
still the best in Congress are chained, hampered by the formulas.

The good men in both the houses seem to be firmly decided not to
quietly stand by and assist in the murder of the nation by the
administrative and military incapacity. This was to be expected from
such men as Wade, Grimes, Chandler, Hale, Wilson, Sumner (too
classical), and other Republicans in the Senate, and from the numerous
pure, radical Republicans in the House.

Burnside's expedition is a sign of life. But all these expeditions on
the circumference, even if successful, will be fruitless if no bold,
decided movement is at once made at the centre, at the heart of the
rebellion. But McClellan, as his supporters say, matures his
_strategical_ plans. O God! General Scott lost _by strategy_
three-fourths of the country's cause, and very probably by strategy
McClellan will jeopardize what remains of it.

Will this McClellan ever advance? If he lingers, he may find only rats
in Manassas. McClellan is ignorant of the great, unique rule for all
affairs and undertakings,--it is to throw the whole man in one thing
at one time. It is the same in the camp as in the study, for a captain
as for a lawyer, the savant, and the scholar.

It is to be regretted that some of the men truly and thoroughly
devoted to the cause of freedom and of humanity, mix with it such an
enormous quantity of personal, almost childish vanity, as to puzzle
many minds concerning the genuine nobleness of their devotion. It is
to be regretted that those otherwise so self-sacrificing patriots
discount even their martyrdom and persecutions, and credit them to
their frivolous self-satisfaction.

Most of the thus-called well-informed Americans rather skim over than
thoroughly study history. Above all, it applies to the general history
of the Christian era, and of our great epoch (from the second half of
the 18th century). Most of the Americans are only very superficially
familiar with the history of continental Europe, or know it only by
its contact with the history of England. Many of them are more
familiar with the classical wars of Alexander, Hannibal, Cæsar, etc.,
than with those of Gustavus, Frederick II., and even of Napoleon. Were
it otherwise, _strategy_ would not to such an extent have taken hold
of their brains.

Mr. Adams was terribly unhorsed during the Trent excitement in
England; he literally began to pack up his trunks, and asked a
personal advice from Lord John Russell.

What a devoted patriot this Sandford in Belgium is; he has continual
_itchings in his hand_ to pay a _higher price_ for bad blankets that
they may not fall into the hands of secesh agents; so with cloth, so
perhaps with arms. _Oh, disinterested patriot!_

Austria and Prussia whipped in by England and France, and at the same
time glad to have an occasion to take the airs of maritime powers.
Austria and Prussia sent their advice concerning the Trent affair. The
kick of asses at what they suppose to be the dying lion.

Austria and Prussia! Great heavens! Ask the prisons of both those
champions of violated rights how many better men than Slidell and
Mason groaned in them; and the conduct of those powers against the
Poles in 1831! Was it neutral or honest?

I am sure that Russia will behave well, and abstain from coming
forward with uncalled-for and humiliating advice. Russia is a true
great power,--a true friend,--and such noble behavior will be in
harmony with the character of Alexander II., and with the friendliness
and clear perception of events held by the Russian minister here. I
hope that when the war is over the West Point nursery will be
reformed, and a general military organization introduced, such a one
as exists in Switzerland.

McClellan is a greater mistake than was even Scott. McClellan knows
not the A B C of military history of any nation or war, or he would
not keep this army so in camp. He would know that after recruits have
been roughly instructed in the rudiments of a drill, the next best
instructor is fighting. So it was in the thirty years' war; so in the
American Revolution; so in the first French revolutionary wars.
Strategians, martinets, lost the battles, or rather the campaigns, of
Austerlitz, of Jena, etc. In 1813 German rough levies fought almost
before they were drilled, and at Bautzen French recruits were
victorious over Prussians, Russians, and Austrians. The secesh fight
with fresh levies, etc.

Numerous political intriguers surrounding McClellan are busily laying
tracks for him to the White House. What will Seward and Chase say to
it, and even old Abe, who himself dreams of re-election, or at least
his friends do it for him? All these candidates forget that the surest
manner to reach the White House is not to think of it--to forget
oneself and to act.

It is amusing to find in European papers all the various stories about
Mr. Lincoln. There he is represented as a violent, blood-thirsty
revolutionaire, dragging the people after him. In this manner, those
European imbeciles are acquainted with American events, character,
etc. They cannot find out that in decision, in clear-sightedness and
soundness of judgment, the people are far ahead of Mr. Lincoln and of
his spiritual or constitutional conscience-keepers. And the same
imbeciles, if not _canailles_, speak of a mob-rule over the President,
etc. Some one ought to enlighten those French and English supercilious
ignorami that something like a mob only prevails in such cities as New
York, Philadelphia, and Baltimore; and nine-tenths of such a mob are
mostly yet unwashed, unrepublicanized Europeans. The ninety-nine
one-hundredths of the freemen of the North are more orderly, more
enlightened, more law-abiding, and more moral than are the English
lordlings, somebodies, nobodies, and would-be somebodies. In the West,
lynch-law, to be sure, is at times used against brothels, bar-rooms,
gambling-houses, and thieves. It would be well to do the same in
London, were it not that most of the lynch-lawed may not belong to the
people. If the European scribblers were not past any honest impulse,
they would know that the South is the generator and the congenial
region for the mob, the filibusters, the revolver and the bowie-knife
rule. In the South the proportion of mobs to decency is the reverse of
that prevailing in the free States. The _slavery gentleman_ is a
scarcely varnished savage, for whom the highest law is his reckless
passion and will.

If Jeff. Davis succeeds, he will be the founder of a new and great
slaveholding empire. His name will resound in after times; but history
will record his name as that of a curse to humanity.

And so Davis is making history and Lincoln is telling stories.
Beauregard gets inspired by the fumes of bivouacs; McClellan by the
fumes of flatterers. Beauregard frightens us, McClellan rocks his
baby. Beauregard shares the camp-fires of his soldiers; he sees them
daily, knows them, as it is said, one by one; McClellan lives
comfortably in the city, and appears only to the soldiers as the great
Lama on special occasions. Camp-fellowship inspired all the great
captains and established the magnetic current between the leader and
the soldier.

McClellan organized a board of generals, arriving daily from the
camps, to discuss some new fancy army equipment. And Lincoln, Seward,
Blair, and all the tail of intriguers and imbeciles, still admire him.
In no other country would such a futile man be kept in command of
troops opposed to a deadly and skilful enemy.

For several weeks, McClellan and his chief of the staff (such as he
is) are sick in bed, and no one is _ad interim_ appointed to attend to
the current affairs of our army of 600,000, having the enemy before
their nose. Oh human imbecility! No satirist could invent such things;
and if told, it would not be believed in Europe.

The McClellan-worship by the people at large is to be explained by the
firm, ardent will of the people to crush the rebels, and by the
general feeling of the necessity of a man for that purpose. Such is
the case with the true, confiding people in the country; but here,
contractors, martinets, and intriguers are the blowers of that
worship. Lincoln is as is the people at large; but a Seward, a Blair,
a Herald, a Times, and their respective and numerous tails,--as for
their motives, they are the reverse of Lincoln and of the people.

Victories in Kentucky, beyond the circumference or the direct action
from here; they are obtained without strategy and by rough levies. But
this voice of events is not understood by the McClellan tross.

Change in the Cabinet: Stanton, a new man, not from the parlor, and
not from the hacks. His bulletin on the victory in Kentucky
inaugurated a new era. It is a voice that nobody hitherto uttered in
America. It is the awakening voice of the good genius of the people,
almost as that which awoke Lazarus. This Stanton is the people; I
never saw him, but I hope he is the man for the events; perhaps he may
turn out to be _my_ statesman.

I wish I could get convinced of the real superiority of Fremont. It is
true that he was treated badly and had natural and artificial
difficulties to over come; it is true that to him belongs the credit
of having started the construction of the mortar fleet; but likewise
it is true that he was, at the mildest, unsurpassingly reckless in
contracts and expenditures, and I shall never believe him a general.
With all this, Fremont started a great initiative at a time when
McClellan and three-fourths of the generals of his creation considered
it a greater crime to strike at a _gentleman_ slaveholder than to
strike at the Union.

The courtesies and hospitalities paid to Thurlow Weed by English
society are clamored here in various ways. These courtesies prove the
high breeding and the good-will of a part, at least, of the English
aristocracy and of English statesmen. I do not suppose that Thurlow
Weed could ever have been admitted in such society if he were
travelling on his own merits as the great lobbyist and politician. At
the utmost, he would have been shown up as a _rara avis_. But
introduced to English society as the master spirit of Mr. Seward, and
as Seward's semi-official confidential agent, Thurlow Weed was
admitted, and even petted. But it is another question if this palming
of a Thurlow Weed upon the English high-toned statesmen increased
their consideration for Mr. Seward. The Duke of Newcastle and others
are not yet softened, and refuse to be humbugged.

Whoever has the slightest knowledge of how affairs are transacted, is
well aware that the times of a personal diplomacy are almost gone. The
exceptions are very rare, very few, and the persons must be of other
might and intellectual mettle than a Sandford, Weed, or Hughes. Great
affairs are not conducted or decided by conversations, but by great
interests. Diplomatic agents, at the utmost, serve to keep their
respective governments informed about the run of events. Mr. Mercier
does it for Louis Napoleon; but Mr. Mercier's reports, however
friendly they may be, cannot much influence a man of such depth as
Louis Napoleon, and to imagine that a Hughes will be able to do it! I
am ashamed of Mr. Seward; he proves by this would-be-crotchety policy
how little he knows of events and of men, and how he undervalues Louis
Napoleon. Such humbug missions are good to throw dirt in the eyes of a
Lincoln, a Chase, etc., but in Europe such things are sent to
Coventry. And Hughes to influence Spain! Oh! oh!

Dayton frets on account of the mission of Hughes. Dayton is right.
Generally Dayton shows a great deal of good sense, of good
comprehension, and a noble and independent character. He is not a
flatterer, not servile, and subservient to Mr. Seward, as are
others--Mr. Adams, Mr. Sandford, and some few other diplomatic agents.

The active and acting abolitionists ought to concentrate all their
efforts to organize thoroughly and efficiently the district of
Beaufort. The success of a productive colony there would serve as a
womb for the emancipation at large.

Mr. Seward declares that he has given up meddling with military
affairs. For his own sake, and for the sake of the country, I ardently
wish it were so; but--I shall never believe it.

The Investigating Committee has made the most thorough disclosures of
the thorough incapacity of McClellan; but the McClellan men, Seward,
Blair, etc., neutralize, stifle all the good which could accrue to the
country from these disclosures. And Lincoln is in their clutches. The
administration by its influence prevents the publication of the
results of this investigation, prevents the truth from coming to the
people. Any hard name will be too soft for such a moral prevarication.

McClellan is either as feeble as a reed, or a bad man. The disorder
around here is nameless. Banks compares it to the time of the French
Directory. Banks has no guns, no cavalry, and is in the vanguard. He
begs almost on his knees, and cannot get anything. And the country
pays a chief of the staff, and head of the staffers.

The time must come, although it be now seemingly distant, that the
people will awake from this lethargy; that it will perceive how much
of the noblest blood of the people, how much time and money, have been
worse than recklessly squandered. The people will find it out, and
then they will ask those Cains at the wheel an account of the innocent
blood of Abel, the country's son, the country's cause.

The defenders of, and the thus called moderate men on the question of
slavery, utter about it the old rubbish composed of the most thorough
ignorance and of disgusting fallacies, in relation to this pseudo
science, or rather lie, about races. More of it will come out in the
course of the Congressional discussions. Not one of them is aware that
independent science, that comparative anatomy, physiology,
psychology, anthropology, that philosophy of history altogether and
thoroughly repudiate all these superficially asserted, or
tried-to-be-established, intrinsic diversities and peculiarities of
races. All these would-be axioms, theories, are based on sand. In true
science the question of race as represented by the Southern school
partisans of slavery, with Agassiz, the so-called professor of
Charleston by European savans, at their head,--that question is at the
best an illusive element, and endangers the accuracy of induction. As
it presents itself to the unprejudiced investigator, race is nothing
more than the single manifestation of anterior stages of existence,
the aggregate expression of the pre-historic vicissitudes of a people.

If those would-be knowing arguers on slavery, race, etc., were only
aware of the fact that such people as the primitive Greeks, or the
ancestors of classical Greeks, that the ancestors of the Latins, that
even the roving, robbing ancestors of the Anglo Saxons, in some way or
other, have been anthropophagi, and worshipped fetishes; and even as
thus called already civilized, they sacrificed men to gods,--could our
great pro-slavers know all this, they would be more decent in their
ignorant assertions, and not, so self-satisfied, strut about in their
dark ignorance.

Those who are afraid that the freed negroes of the South will run to
the Northern free States, display an ignorance still greater than the
former. When the enslaved colored Americans in the South shall be
_all_ thoroughly emancipated in that now cursed region, then they will
remain in the, to them, congenial climate, and in the favorable
economical conditions of labor and of existence. Not only those
emancipated will not run North, but the colored population from the
free States, incited and stirred up by natural attractions, will leave
the North for the South, as small streamlets and rivulets run into a
large current or river.

The rebels extend on an immense bow, nearly one hundred miles, from
the lower to the upper Potomac. Our army, two to one, is on the span
of the arc, and we do nothing. A French sergeant would be better
inspired than is McClellan.




FEBRUARY, 1862.

     Drifting -- The English blue book -- Lord John could not act
     differently -- Palmerston the great European fuss-maker -- Mr.
     Seward's "two pickled rods" for England -- Lord Lyons -- His
     pathway strewn with broken glass -- Gen. Stone arrested --
     Sumner's resolutions infuse a new spirit in the Constitution --
     Mr. Seward beyond salvation -- He works to save slavery -- Weed
     has ruined him -- The New York press -- "Poor Tribune" -- The
     Evening Post -- The Blairs -- Illusions dispelled -- "All quiet
     on the Potomac" -- The London papers -- Quill-heroes can be
     bought for a dinner -- French opinion -- Superhuman efforts to
     save slavery -- It is doomed! -- "All you worshippers of darkness
     cannot save it!" -- The Hutchinsons -- Corporal Adams --
     Victories in the West -- Stanton the man! -- Strategy (hear!
     hear!)


We are obliged, one by one, to eat our official high-toned assertions
and words, and day after day we drift towards putting the rebels on an
equal footing with ourselves. We declared the privateers to be pirates
(which they are), and now we proffer their exchange against our
colonels and other honorable prisoners. So one radical evil generates
numberless others. And from the beginning of the struggle this radical
evil was and is the want of earnestness, of a firm purpose, and of a
straight, vigorous policy by the administration. _Paullatim summa
petuntur_ may turn out true--but for the rebels.

The publication of the English blue book, or of official
correspondence between Lord Lyons and Lord John Russell, throws a new
light on the conduct of the English Cabinet; and, anglophobe as I am,
I must confess that, all things considered, above all the
unhappily-justified distrust of England in Mr. Seward's policy,--from
the first day of our troubles Lord John Russell could not act
differently from what he did. Lord John Russell had to reconcile the
various and immense interests of England, jeopardized by the war, with
his sincere love of human liberty. Therein Lord John Russell differs
wholly from Lord Palmerston, this great European fuss-maker, who hates
America. As far as it was possible, Lord J. Russell remained faithful
to the noble (not hereditary, but philosophical) traditions of his
blood. Lord John Russell's letter to Lord Lyons (No. 17), February 20,
1861, although full of distrust in the future policy of Mr. Lincoln's
Cabinet towards England, is nevertheless an honorable document for his
name.

Lord J. Russell was well aware that the original plan of Mr. Seward
was to annoy and worry England. Everything is known in this world, and
especially the incautious words and conversations of public men.
Months before the inauguration, Mr. Seward talked to senators of both
parties that he had in store "two pickled rods" for England. The one
was to be Green (always drunken), the Senator from Missouri, on
account of the colored man Anderson; the other Mr. Nesmith, the
Senator from Oregon, and the San Juan boundaries. Undoubtedly the
Southern senators did not keep secret the like inimical forebodings
concerning Mr. Seward's intentions towards England. Undoubtedly all
this must have been known to Lord J. Russell when he wrote the
above-mentioned letter, No. 17.

More even than Lord John Russell's, Lord Lyons's official
correspondence since November, 1860, inspires the highest possible
respect for his noble sentiments and character. Above all, one who
witnessed the difficulties of Lord Lyons's position here, and how his
pathway was strewn with broken glass, and this by all kinds of hands,
must feel for him the highest and most sincere consideration. From the
official correspondence, Lord Lyons comes out a friend of humanity and
of human liberty,--just the reverse of what he generally was supposed
to be. And during the whole Trent affair, Lord Lyons's conduct was
discreet, delicate, and generous. Events may transform Lord Lyons into
an official enemy of the Union; but a mind soured by human meanness is
soothingly impressioned by such true nobleness in a diplomat and an
Englishman.

Gen. Stone, of Ball's Bluff infamous massacre, arrested. Bravo! At the
best, Stone was one of those conceited regulars who admired slavery,
and who would have wished to save the Union in their own peculiar way.
I wish he may speak, as in all probability he was not alone.

Sumner's resolutions infuse a new spirit in the Constitution, and
elevate it from the low ground of a dead formula. The resolutions
close the epoch of the Stories, of the Kents, of the Curtises, and
inaugurate a higher comprehension of American constitutionalism.
During this session Charles Sumner triumphantly and nobly annihilated
the aspersions of his enemies, representing him as a man of one hobby,
but lacking any practical ideas. His speech on currency was among the
best. Not so with his speech about the Trent affair. It is
superficial, and contains misconceptions concerning treaties, and
other blunders very strange in a would-be statesman.

Ardently devoted to the cause of justice and of human rights, Sumner
weakens the influence which he ought to exercise, because he impresses
many with the notion that he looks more to the outside effect produced
by him than to the intrinsic value of the subject; he makes others
suppose that he is too fond of such effect, and, above all, of the
effect produced in Europe among the circle of his English and European
acquaintances.

It is positively asserted that Lincoln agreed to take Mr. Seward in
the Cabinet, because Weed and others urgently represented that Mr.
Seward is the only man in the Republican party who is familiar with
Europe, with her statesmen, and their policy. O Lord! O Lord! And
where has Seward acquired all this information? Mr. Seward had not
even the first A B C of it, or of anything else connected with it.
And, besides, such a kind of special information is, at the utmost, of
secondary necessity for an American statesman. Marcy had it not, and
was a true, a genuine statesman. Undoubtedly, nature has endowed
Seward with eminent intellectual qualities, and with germs for an
eminent statesman. But the intellectual qualities became blunted by
the long use of crotchets and tricks of a politician, by the
associations and influence of such as Weed, etc.; thereby the better
germs became nipped, so to speak, in the bud. Mr. Seward's acquired
information by study, by instruction, and by reading, is quite the
reverse of what in Europe is regarded as necessary for a statesman.
Often, very often, I sorrowfully analyze and observe Mr. Seward, with
feelings like those evoked in us by the sight of a noble ruin, or of a
once rich, natural panorama, but now marred by large black spots of
burned and dead vegetation, or by the ashes of a volcano.

Now, Mr. Seward is beyond salvation--a "disappointed man," as he
called himself in a conversation with Judge Potter, M. C.; he changed
aims, and perhaps convictions. For Mr. Seward, slavery is no more the
most hideous social disease; he abandoned that creed which elevated
him in the confidence of the people. Now he works to preserve as much
as possible of the curse of slavery; he does it on the plea of Union
and conservatism; but in truth he wishes to disorganize the pure
Republican party, which he hates since the Chicago Convention and
since the days of the formation of the Cabinet. Under the advice of
Weed, Mr. Seward attempts to form a (thus called) Union and
conservative party, which at the next turn may carry him into the
White House.

Seward considers Weed his good genius; but in reality Weed has ruined
Seward. Now Mr. Seward supports _strategy_, imbecility, and McClellan.
The only explanation for me is, that Seward, participating in all
military counsels and strategic plans, and not understanding any of
them, finds it safer to back McClellan, and thus to deceive others
about his own ignorance of military matters.

The press--the New York one--worse and worse; the majority wholly
degraded to the standard of the Herald and of the Times. The _poor_
Tribune, daily fading away, altogether losing that bold, lofty spirit
of initiative to which for so many years the Tribune owed its
all-powerful and unparalleled influence over the free masses. Now, at
times, the Tribune is similar to an old, honest sexagenarian,
attempting to draw a night-cap over his ears and eyes. The flames of
the holy fire, so common once in the Tribune, flash now only at
distant, very distant epochs. The Evening Post towers over all of
them. If the Evening Post never at a jump went as far as once did the
Tribune, the Evening Post never made or makes a retrograde step; but
perhaps slowly, but steadily and boldly, moves on. The Evening Post is
not a paper of politicians or of jobbers, but of enlightened,
well-informed, and strong-hearted patriots and citizens.

Mr. Blair, after all, is only an ambitious politician. My illusion
about both the brothers is wholly dispelled and gone. I regret it, but
both sustain McClellan, both look askant on Stanton, and belong to
the conditional emancipationists, colonizationists, and other RADICAL
preservers of slavery. All such form a class of superficial
politicians, of compromisers with their creed, and are corrupters of
others.

How ardently I would prefer not to so often accuse others; but more
than forty years of revolutionary and public life and experience have
taught me to discriminate between deep convictions and assumed
ones--to highly venerate the first, and to keep aloof from the second.
Gold is gold, and pinchbeck is pinchbeck, in character as in metal.

McClellan acts as if he had taken the oath to some hidden and veiled
deity or combination, by all means not to ascertain anything about the
condition of the enemy. Any European if not American old woman in
pants long ago would have pierced the veil by a strong reconnoissance
on Centreville. Here "all quiet on the Potomac." And I hear generals,
West Pointers, justifying this colossal offence against common sense,
and against the rudiments of military tactics, and even science. Oh,
noble, but awfully dealt with, American people!

At times Mr. Seward talks and acts as if he lacked altogether the
perception of the terrible earnestness of the struggle, of the dangers
and responsibilities of his political position, as well now before the
people as hereafter before history. Often I can scarcely resist
answering him, Beware, beware!

Lincoln belittles himself more and more. Whatever he does is done
under the pressure of events, under the pressure of the public
opinion. These agencies push Lincoln and slowly move him,
notwithstanding his reluctant heaviness and his resistance. And he a
standard-bearer of this noble people!

Those mercenary, ignorant, despicable scribblers of the London Times,
of the Tory Herald, of the Saturday Review, and of the police papers
in Paris, as the Constitutionnel, the Pays, the Patrie, all of them
lie with unparalleled facility. Any one knows that those hungry
quill-heroes can be got for a good dinner and a _douceur_.

I am sorry that the Americans ascribe to Louis Napoleon and to the
French people the hostility to human rights as shown by those
_échappés des bagnes de la littérature_. Louis Napoleon and the French
people have nothing in common with those literary blacklegs.

The _Journal des Débats_, the _Opinion Nationale_, the _Presse_, the
_Siècle_, etc., constitute the true and honest organs of opinion in
France. In the same way A. de Gasparin speaks for the French people
with more authority than does Michel Chevalier, who knows much more
about free trade, about canals and railroads, but is as ignorant of
the character, of the spirit, and of the institutions of the American
people, as he is ignorant concerning the man in the moon. So the
lawyer Hautefeuille must have received a fee to show so much ill-will
to the cause of humanity, and such gigantic ignorance.

_Who began the civil war?_ is repeatedly discussed by those quill
cut-throats and allies on the Thames and on the Seine.

Here some smaller diplomats (not Sweden, who is true to the core to
the cause of liberty), and, above all, the would-be fashionable
_galopins des légations_, are the cesspools of secession news, picked
up by them in secesh society. Happily, the like _galopins_ are the
reverse of the opinions of their respective chiefs.

What superhuman efforts are made in Congress, and out of it, in the
Cabinet, in the White House, by Union men,--Seward imagines he leads
them,--by the weak-brained, and by traitors, to save slavery, if not
all, at least a part of it. Every concession made by the President to
the enemies of slavery has only one aim; it is to mollify their urgent
demands by throwing to them small crumbs, as one tries to mollify a
boisterous and hungry dog. By such a trick Lincoln and Seward try to
save what can be saved of the peculiar institution, to gratify, and
eventually to conciliate, the South. This is the policy of Lincoln, of
Seward, and very likely of Mr. Blair. Such political _gobe-mouche_ as
Doolittle and many others, are, or will be, taken in by this
manoeuvre.

Scheme what you like, you schemers, wiseacres, politicians, and
would-be statesmen, nevertheless slavery is doomed. Humanity will have
the best against such pettifoggers as you. I know better. I have the
honor to belong to that European generation who, during this half of
our century, from Tagus and Cadiz to the Wolga, has gored with its
blood battle-fields and scaffolds; whose songs and aspirations were
re-echoed by all the horrible dungeons; by dungeons of the
blood-thirsty Spanish inquisition, then across Europe and Asia, to the
mines of Nertschinsk, in the ever-frozen Altai. We lost all we had on
earth; seemingly we were always beaten; but Portugal and Spain enjoy
to-day a constitutional regime that is an improvement on absolutism.
France has expelled forever the Bourbons, and universal suffrage,
spelt now by the French people, is a progress, is a promise of a great
democratic future. Germany has in part conquered free speech and free
press. Italy is united, Romanism is falling to pieces, Austria is
undermined and shaky, and broken are the chains on the body of the
Russian serf. All this is the work of the spirit of the age, and our
generation was the spirit's apostle and confessor. And so it will be
with slavery, and all you worshippers of darkness cannot save it.

Not the one who strikes the first blow begins a civil war, but he who
makes the striking of the blow imperative. The Southern robbers cannot
claim exemption; they stole the arsenals, and struck the first blow at
Sumpter. So much for the infamous quill-heroes of the London Times,
the Herald, and _tutti quanti_.

The highest crime is treason in arms, and this crime is praised and
defended by the English would-be high-toned press. But sooner or later
it will come out how much apiece was paid to the London Times, the
Herald, and the Saturday Review for their venomous articles against
the Union.

McClellan expelled from the army the Hutchinson family. It is mean and
petty. Songs are the soul and life of the camp, and McClellan's
_heroic deeds_ have not yet found their minstrel.

After all, McClellan has organized--nothing! McDowell has, so to
speak, formed the first skeletons of brigades, divisions, of parks of
artillery, etc. The people uninterruptedly poured in men and
treasures, and McClellan only continued what was commenced before him.

I positively know that already in December Mr. Lincoln began to be
doubtful of McClellan's generalship. This doubtfulness is daily
increasing, and nevertheless Mr. Lincoln keeps that incapacity in
command because he does not wish _to hurt McClellan's feelings_.
Better to ruin the noble people, the country! I begin to draw the
conclusion that Mr. Lincoln's good qualities are rather negative than
positive.

Mr. Adams complains that he is kept in the dark about the policy of
the administration, and cannot answer questions made to him in London.
But the administration, that is, Lincoln and Seward, are a little _a
la_ Micawber, expecting what may turn up. And, besides this, the great
orator _de lana caprina_ (Mr. Adams) deliberately degraded himself to
the condition of a corporal under Mr. Seward's orders.

Victories in the West, results of the new spirit in the War
Department. Stanton will be the man.

It is a curious fact that such commanders as Halleck, etc., sit in
cities and fight through those under them; and there are ignoble
flatterers trying to attribute these victories to McClellan, and to
his _strategy_. As if battles could be commanded by telegraph at one
thousand miles' distance. It is worse than imbecility, it is idiotism
and _strategy_.

Stanton calls himself a man of one idea. How he overtops in the
Cabinet those myrmidons with their many petty notions! One idea, but a
great and noble one, makes the great men, or the men for great events.
Would God that the people may understand Stanton, and that
pettifoggers, imbeciles, and traitors may not push themselves between
the people and Stanton, and neutralize the only man who has _the one
idea_ to break, to crush the rebellion.

Every day Mr. Lincoln shows his want of knowledge of men and of
things; the total absence of _intuition_ to spell, to see through, and
to disentangle events.

If, since March, 1861, instead of being in the hands of pettifoggers,
Mr. Lincoln had been in the hands of _a man of one idea_ as is
Stanton, nine-tenths of the work would have been accomplished.

McClellan's flunkeys claim for him the victories in the West. It is
impossible to settle which is more to be scorned in them, their
flunkeyism or their stupidity.

_Lock-jaw_ expedition. For any other government whatever, in one even
of the most abject favoritism, such a humbug and silly conduct of the
commander and of his chief of the staff would open the eyes even of a
Pompadour or of a Dubarry. Here, _our great rulers and ministers_ shut
the more closely their mind's (?) eyes * * * * *

For the first time in one of his dispatches Mr. Corporal Adams _dares_
to act against orders, and mentions--but very slightly--slavery. Mr.
Adams observes to his chief that in England public opinion is very
sensitive; at last the old freesoiler found it out.

How this public opinion in America is unable to see the things as they
naturally are. Now the public fights to whom to ascribe the victories
in the West. Common sense says, Ascribe them, 1st, to the person who
ordered the fight (Stanton); 2d, exclusively to the generals who
personally commanded the battles and the assaults of forts. Even
Napoleon did not claim for himself the glory for battles won by his
generals when in his, Napoleon's, absence.

For weeks McClellan and his thus called staff diligently study
international law, strategy (hear, hear!), tactics, etc. His aids
translate for his use French and German writers. One cannot even apply
in this case the proverb, "Better late than never," as the like
hastily scraped and undigested sham-knowledge unavoidably must
obfuscate and wholly confuse McClellan's--not Napoleonic--brains.

The intriguers and imbeciles claim the Western victories as the
illustration of McClellan's great _strategy_. Why shows he not a
little _strategy_ under his nose here? Any old woman would surround
and take the rebels in Manassas.

Now they dispute to Grant his deserved laurels. If he had failed at
Donelson, the _strategians_ would have washed their hands, and thrown
on Grant the disaster. So did Scott after Bull Run.

Mr. Lincoln, McClellan, Seward, Blair, etc., forget the terrible
responsibility for thus recklessly squandering the best blood, the
best men, the best generation of the people, and its treasures. But
sooner or later they will be taken to a terrible account even by the
Congress, and at any rate by history.

It is by their policy, by their support of McClellan, that the war is
so slow, and the longer it lasts the more human sacrifices it will
devour, and the greater the costs of the devastation. Stanton alone
feels and acts differently, and it seems that the rats in the Cabinet
already begin their nightly work against him. These rats are so
ignorant and conceited!

The celebrated Souvoroff was accused of cruelty because he always at
once stormed fortresses instead of investing them and starving out the
inhabitants and the garrisons. The old hero showed by arithmetical
calculations that his bloodiest assaults never occasioned so much loss
of human life as did on both sides any long siege, digging, and
approaches, and the starving out of those shut up in a fortress. This
for McClellan and for the intriguing and ignorant RATS.




MARCH, 1862.

     The Africo-Americans -- Fremont -- The Orleans -- Confiscation --
     American nepotism -- The Merrimac -- Wooden guns -- Oh shame! --
     Gen. Wadsworth -- The rats have the best of Stanton -- McClellan
     goes to Fortress Monroe -- Utter imbecility -- The embarkation --
     McClellan a turtle -- He will stick in the marshes -- Louis
     Napoleon behaves nobly -- So does Mr. Mercier -- Queen Victoria
     for freedom -- The great strategian -- Senator Sumner and the
     French minister -- Archbishop Hughes -- His diplomatic activity
     not worth the postage on his correspondence -- Alberoni-Seward --
     Love's labor lost.


Men like this Davis, Wickliffe, and all the like _pecus_, roar against
the African race. The more I see of this doomed people, the more I am
convinced of their intrinsic superiority over all their white
revilers, above all, over this slaveholding generation, rotten, as it
is, to the core. When emancipated, the Africo-Americans in immense
majority will at once make quiet, orderly, laborious, intelligent, and
free cultivators, or, to use European language, an excellent
peasantry; when ninety-nine one-hundredths of slaveholders, either
rebels or thus called loyal, altogether considered, as human beings
are shams, are shams as citizens, and constitute caricatures and
monsters of civilization.

Civilization! It is the highest and noblest aim in human destinies
when it makes the man moral and true; but civilization invoked by,
and in which strut traitors, slaveholders, and abettors of slavery,
reminds one of De Maistre's assertion, that the devil created the red
man of America as a counterfeit to man, God's creation in the Old
World. This so-called civilization of the slaveholders is the devil's
counterfeit of the genuine civilization.

The Africo-Americans are the true producers of the Southern
wealth--cotton, rice, tobacco, etc. When emancipated and transformed
into small farmers, these laborious men will increase and ameliorate
the culture of the land; and they will produce by far more when the
white shams and drones shall be taken out of their way. In the South,
bristling with Africo-American villages, will almost disappear
fillibusterism, murder, and the bowie knife, and other supreme
manifestations of Southern _chivalrous high-breeding_.

Fremont's reports and defence show what a disorder and insanity
prevailed under the rule of Scott. Fremont's military capacity perhaps
is equal to zero; his vanity put him in the hands of wily flatterers;
but the disasters in the West cannot be credited to him. Fremont
initiated the construction of the mortar flotilla on the Mississippi
(I positively know such is the fact), and he suggested the capture of
various forts, but was not sustained at this sham, the headquarters.

These Orleans have wholly espoused and share in the fallacious and
mischievous notions of the McClellanites concerning the volunteers.
Most probably with the authority of their name, they confirm
McClellan's fallacious notions about the necessity of a great regular
army. The Orleans are good, generous boys, but their judgment is not
yet matured; they had better stayed at home.

Confiscation is the great word in Congress or out of it. The property
of the rebels is confiscable by the ever observed rule of war, as
consecrated by international laws. When two sovereigns make war, the
victor confiscates the other's property, as represented by whole
provinces, by public domains, by public taxes and revenues. In the
present case the rebels are the sovereigns, and their property is
therefore confiscable. But for the sake of equity, and to compensate
the wastes of war, Congress ought to decree the confiscation of
property of all those who, being at the helm, by their political
incapacity or tricks contribute to protract the war and increase its
expense.

Mr. Lincoln yields to the pressure of public opinion. A proof: his
message to Congress about emancipation in the Border States. Crumb No.
1 thrown--reluctantly I am sure--to the noble appetite of freemen. I
hope history will not credit Mr. Lincoln with being the initiator.

American nepotism puts to shame the one practised in Europe. All
around here they keep offices in pairs, father and son. So McClellan
has a father in-law as chief of the staff, a brother as aid, and then
various relations, clerks, etc., etc., and the same in some other
branches of the administration.

The Merrimac affair. Terrible evidence how active and daring are the
rebels, and we sleepy, slow, and self-satisfied. By applying the
formula of induction from effect to cause, the disaster occasioned by
the Merrimac, and any further havoc to be made by this iron
vessel,--all this is to be credited to McClellan.

If Norfolk had been taken months ago, then the rebels could not have
constructed the Merrimac. Norfolk could have been easily taken any day
during the last six months, _but for strategy_ and the _maturing of
great plans_! These are the sacramental words more current now than
ever. Oh good-natured American people! how little is necessary to
humbug thee!

Oh shame! oh malediction! The rebels left Centreville,--which turns
out to be scarcely a breastwork, with wooden guns,--and they slipped
off from Manassas.

When McClellan got the news of the evacuation, he gravely considered
where to lean his right or left flanks, and after the consideration,
two days after the enemy _wholly_ completed the evacuation, McClellan
moves at the head of 80,000 men--to storm the wooden guns of
Centreville. Two hours after the news of the evacuation reached the
headquarters, Gen. Wadsworth asked permission to follow with his
brigade, during the night, the retreating enemy. But it was not
_strategy, not a matured plan_. If Gen. Wadsworth had been in command
of the army, not one of the rats from Manassas would have escaped.
The reasons are, that Gen. Wadsworth has a quick, clear, and
wide-encompassing conception of events and things, a clear insight,
and many other inborn qualities of mind and intellect.

The Congress has a large number of very respectable capacities, and
altogether sufficient for the emergencies, and the Congress would do
more good but for the impediments thrown in its way by the
double-dealing policy prevailing in Mr. Lincoln's Cabinet and
administration. The majority in Congress represent well the spirit of
self-government. It is a pity that Congress cannot crush or purify the
administration.

All that passes here is maddening, and I am very grateful to my father
and mother for having endowed me with a frame which resists the blows.

The pursuit of the enemy abandoned, the basis of operations changed.
The rats had the best of Stanton. _Utinam sim falsus propheta_, but if
Stanton's influence is no more all-powerful, then there is an end to
the short period of successes. Mr. Lincoln's council wanted to be
animated by a pure and powerful spirit. Stanton was the man, but he is
not a match for impure intriguers. Also McClellan goes to Fortress
Monroe, to Yorktown, to the rivers. This plan reveals an utter
military imbecility, and its plausibility can only catch ----.

1st. Common sense shows that the rebels ought to be cut off from their
resources, that is, from railroads, and from communication with the
revolted States in the interior, and to be precipitated into the
ocean. To accomplish it our troops ought to have marched by land to
Richmond, and pushed the enemy towards the ocean. Now McClellan pushes
the rebels from the extremity towards the centre, towards the focus of
their basis,--exactly what they want.

I am sure that McClellan is allured to this strategy by the success of
the gunboats on the Mississippi. He wishes that the gunboats may take
Richmond, and he have the credit of it.

The Merrimac is still menacing in Hampton Roads, and may, some day or
other, play havoc with the transports. The communications by land are
always more preferable than those by water--above all for such a great
army. A storm, etc., may do great mischief.

McClellan assures the President, and the other intriguers and fools
constituting his supporters, that in a few days he will throw 55,000
men on Yorktown. He and his staff to do such a thing, which would be a
masterpiece even for the French military leaders and their staffs! He,
McClellan, never knew what it was to embark an army. Those who believe
him are even greater imbeciles than I supposed them to be. Poor
Stanton, to be hampered by imbecility and intrigue! I went to
Alexandria to see the embarkation; it will last weeks, not days.

From Yorktown to Richmond, the country is marshy, very marshy;
McClellan, a turtle, a _dasippus_, will not understand to move quick
and to overcome the impediments. Faulty as it is to drive the rebels
from the sea towards their centre, this false move would be corrected
by rash and decisive movements. But McClellan will stick in the
marshes, and may never reach Richmond by that road.

Any man with common sense would go directly by land; if the army moves
only three miles a day it will reach Richmond sooner than by the other
way. Such an army in a spell will construct turnpike roads and
bridges, and if the rebels tear up the railroads, they likewise could
be easily repaired. Progressing in the slowest, in the most genuine
McClellan manner, the army will reach Richmond with less danger than
by the Peninsula.

The future American historian ought to record in gold and diamonds the
names of those who in the councils opposed McClellan's new strategy.
Oh! Mr. Seward, Mr. Seward, why is your name to be recorded among the
most ardent supporters of this _strategy_?

Jeff. Davis sneers at the immense amount of money, etc., spent by Mr.
Lincoln. As he, Jeff. Davis, is still quietly in Richmond, and his
army undestroyed, of course he is right to sneer at Mr. Lincoln and
McClellan, whom he, Jeff. Davis, kept at bay with wooden guns.

Senator Sumner takes airs to defend or explain McClellan. The Senator
is probably influenced by Blair. The Senator cannot be classed among
traitors and intriguers supporting the _great strategian_. Perhaps
likewise the Senator believes it to be _distingué_ to side with
_strategy_.

If the party and the people could have foreseen that civil war was
inevitable, undoubtedly Mr. Lincoln would not have been elected. But
as the cause of the North would have been totally ruined by the
election of Lincoln's Chicago competitor, Mr. Lincoln is the lesser of
the two evils.

A great nuisance is this competition for all kinds of news by the
reporters hanging about the city, the government, and the army. Some
of these reporters are men of sense, discernment, and character; but
for the sake of competition and priority they fish up and pick up what
they can, what comes in their way, even if such news is altogether
beyond common sense, or beyond probability.

In this way the best among the newspapers have confused and misled the
sound judgment of the people; so it is in relation to the overwhelming
numbers of the rebels, and by spreading absurdities concerning
relations with Europe. The reporters of the Herald and of the Times
are peremptorily instructed to see the events through the perverted
spectacles of their respective bosses.

Mr. Adams gets either frightened or warm. Mr. A. insists on the
slavery question, speaks of the project of Mason and Slidell in London
to offer certain moral concessions to English anti-slavery
feeling,--such as the regulations of marriage, the repeal of laws
against manumission, etc. Mr. Adams warns that these offers may make
an impression in England.

When all around me I witness this revolting want of energy,--Stanton
excepted,--this vacillation, these tricks and double-dealings in the
governmental spheres, then I wish myself far off in Europe; but when I
consider this great people outside of the governmental spheres, then I
am proud to be one of the people, and shall stay and fall with them.

How meekly the people accept the disgrace of the wooden guns and of
the evacuation of Manassas! It is true that the partisans of
McClellan, the traitors, the intriguers, and the imbeciles are
devotedly at work to confuse the judgment of the people at large.

Mr. Dayton's semi-official conversation with Louis Napoleon shows how
well disposed the Emperor was and is. The Emperor, almost as a favor,
asks for a decided military operation. And in face of such news from
Europe, Lincoln, Seward, and Blair sustain the _do-nothing
strategian_!

Until now Louis Napoleon behaves nobly, and not an atom of reproach
can be made by the American people against his policy; and our policy
many times justly could have soured him, as the acceptation of the
Orleans, etc. No French vessels ran anywhere the blockade; secesh
agents found very little if any credit among French speculators. Very
little if any arms, munitions, etc., were bought in France. And in
face of all these positive facts, the American wiseacres here and in
Europe, all the bar-room and street politicians here and there, all
the would-be statesmen, all the sham wise, are incessant in their
speculations concerning certain invisible, deep, treacherous schemes
of Louis Napoleon against the Union. This herd is full of stories
concerning his deep hatred of the North; they are incessant in their
warnings against this dangerous and scheming enemy. Some Englishmen in
high position stir up this distrust. On the authority of letters
repeatedly received from England, Senator Sumner is always in fits of
distrust towards the policy of France. The last discovery made by all
these deep statesmen here and in France is, that Louis Napoleon
intends to take Mexico, to have then a basis for cooperation with the
rebels, and to destroy us. But Mexico is not yet taken, and already
the allies look askance at each other. Those great Anglo-American
Talleyrands, Metternichs, etc., bring down the clear and large
intellect of Louis Napoleon to the atomistic proportions of their own
sham brains. I do not mean to foretell Louis Napoleon's policy in
future. Unforeseen emergencies and complications may change it. I
speak of what was done up to this day, and repeat, _not the slightest
complaint can be made against Louis Napoleon_. And in justice to Mr.
Mercier, the French minister here, it must be recorded that he
sincerely seconds the open policy of his sovereign. Besides, Mr.
Mercier now openly declares that he never believed the Americans to be
such a great and energetic people as the events have shown them to be.
I am grateful to him for this sense of justice, shared only by few of
his diplomatic colleagues.

In one word, official and unofficial Europe, in its immense majority,
is on our side. The exceptions, therefore, are few, and if they are
noisy, they are not intrinsically influential and dangerous. The
truest woman, Queen Victoria, is on the side of freedom, of right, and
of justice. This ennobles even her, and likewise ennobles our cause.
Not the bad wishes of certain Europeans are in our way, but our
slowness, the McClellanism and its supporters.

_Quidquid delirant reges, plectuntur achivi!_ The _achivi_ is the
people, and the McClellanists are the _reges_.

Mr. Seward, elated by victories, insinuates to foreign powers that
they may stop the "recognition of belligerents." Oh imagination! Such
things ought not even to be insinuated, as logic and common sense
clearly show that the foreign cabinets cannot do it, and thus stultify
themselves. Seward believes that his rhetoric is irresistible, and
will move the cabinets of France and of England. * * * Not the
"recognition of belligerents;" let the rebels slip off from Manassas,
etc. Mr. Seward would do better for himself and for the country to
give up meddling with the operations of the war, and backing the
bloodless campaigns of the _strategian_. But Mr. Seward, carried away
by his imagination, believes that the cabinets will yield to his
persuasive voice, and then, oh! what a feather in his diplomatic cap
before the befogged Mr. Lincoln, and before the people. But _pia
desideria_.

In all the wars, as well as in all the single campaigns and battles,
every _captain_ deserving this name aimed at breaking his enemy in the
centre or at seizing his basis of operations, wherefrom the enemy
draws its resources and forces. The great _strategian_ changed all
this; he goes directly to the circumference instead of aiming at the
heart.

Mr. Seward, answering Mr. Dayton's dispatch concerning his, Dayton's,
conversation with Louis Napoleon, points to Europe being likewise
menaced by revolutionists. Unnecessary spread-eagleism, and an awful
want of any, even diplomatic, tact. I hope that Mr. Dayton, who has so
much sound sense and discernment, will keep to himself this freak of
Mr. Seward's untamable imagination.

Under the influence of insinuations received from his English friends,
Senator Sumner said to Mr. Mercier (I was present) that with every
steamer he expects a joint letter of admonition directed by the French
and English to our government. Mr. Mercier retorted, "How can you,
sir, have such notions? you are too great a nation to be treated in
this way. Such letters would do for Greece, etc., but not for you." I
was sorry and glad for the lesson thus given.

Archbishop Hughes was not over-successful in France, and went off
rather second-best in the opinion of the press, of the public, and of
the Catholic, even ultra-Montane clergy of France. All this on
account of his conditional anti-slaverism and unconditional
pro-slaverism. All this was easily to be foreseen. His Eminence is in
Rome, and from Rome is to influence Spain in our favor.

Oh diplomacy! oh times of Capucine and Jesuit fathers and of Abbes!
We, the children of the eighteenth century, we recall you to life. I
do not suppose that the whole diplomatic activity of his Eminence is
worth the postage of his correspondence. But Uncle Sam is generous,
and pays him well. So it is with Thurlow Weed, who tries to be
economical, is unsuccessful, and cries for more monish. A schoolboy on
a spree!

It seems that Weed loses not his time, and tries with Sandford to turn
_a penny_ in Belgium. Oh disinterested saviors of the country, and
patriots!

But for this violent development of our domestic affairs, Mr. Seward
would have appeared before the world as the mediator between the Pope
and the insubordinate European nations, sovereigns, and cabinets.

Oh, Alberoni! oh, imaginary! It beats any of the wildest poets. In
justice it must be recorded, that this great scheme of mediation was
dancing before Mr. Seward's imagination at the epoch when he was sure
that, once Secretary of State, his speeches would be current and read
all over the South; and they, the speeches, would crush and extinguish
secession. This Mr. Seward assured one of the patriotic members of
Buchanan's expiring Cabinet.

Mr. Seward is now busy building up a conservative Union party North
and South to preserve slavery, and to crush the rampant Sumnerism, as
Thurlow Weed calls it, and advises Seward to do so.

Mr. Seward's unofficial agents, Thurlow Weed, his Eminence, and
others, are untiring in the incense of their benefactor. Occasionally,
Mr. Lincoln gets a small share of it.

Sandford in Paris and Brussels, Mr. Adams and Thurlow Weed in London,
work hard to assuage and soften the harsh odor in which Mr. Seward is
held, above all, among certain Englishmen of mark. It seems, however,
that _love's labor is lost_, and Mr. Adams, scholar-like, explains the
unsuccess of their efforts by the following philosophy: That in great
convulsions and events it is always the most eminent men who become
selected for violent and vituperative attacks. This is Mr. Seward's
fate, but time will dispel the falsehoods, and render him justice.
Well, be it so.

Weed tried hard to bring the Duke of Newcastle over to Mr. Seward; but
the Duke seems perfectly unmoved by the blandishments, etc. To think
that the strict and upright Duke, who knows Weed, could be shaken by
the ubiquitous lobbyist! Rather the other way.

One not acquainted with Mr. Seward's ardent republicanism may suspect
him of some dictatorial projects, to judge from the zeal with which
some of the diplomatic agents in Europe, together with the unofficial
ones there, extol to all the world Mr. Seward's transcendent
superiority over all other eminent men in America. Are the European
statesmen to be prepared beforehand, or are they to be befogged and
prevented from judging for themselves? If so, again is _love's labor
lost_. European statesmen can perfectly take Mr. Seward's measure from
his uninterrupted and never-fulfilled prophecies, and from other
diplomatic stumblings; and one look suffices European men of mark to
measure a Hughes, a Weed, a Sandford, and _tutti quanti_.

In Mr. Lincoln's councils, Mr. Stanton alone has the vigor, the
purity, and the simplicity of a man of deep convictions. Stanton alone
unites the clear, broad comprehension of the exigencies of the
national question with unyielding action. He is the _statesman_ so
long searched for by me. He, once a friend of McClellan, was not
deterred thereby from condemning that do-nothing _strategy_, so
ruinous and so dishonorable. Stanton is a Democrat, and therefore not
intrinsically, perhaps not even relatively, an anti-slavery man, but
he hesitates not now to destroy slavery for the preservation of the
Union. I am sure that every day will make Stanton more clear-sighted,
and more radical in the question of Union and rebellion. And Seward
and Blair, who owe their position to their anti-slavery principles,
_arcades ambo_, try now to save something of slavery, and turn against
Stanton.




APRIL, 1862.

     Immense power of the President -- Mr. Seward's Egeria --
     Programme of peace -- The belligerent question -- Roebucks and
     Gregories scums --Running the blockade -- Weed and Seward take
     clouds for camels --Uncle Sam's pockets -- Manhood, not money,
     the sinews of war --Colonization schemes -- Senator Doolittle --
     Coal mine speculation --Washington too near the seat of war --
     Blair demands the return of a fugitive slave woman -- Slavery is
     Mr. Lincoln's "_mammy_" -- He will not destroy her -- Victories
     in the West -- The brave navy --McClellan subsides in mud before
     Yorktown -- Telegraphs for more men -- God will be tired out! --
     Great strength of the people --Emancipation in the District --
     Wade's speech -- He is a monolith --Chase and Seward -- N. Y.
     Times -- The Rothschilds -- Army movements and plans.


If the military conduct of McClellan, from the first of January to the
day of the embarkation of the troops for Yorktown--if this conduct
were tried by French marshals, or by the French chief staff, or by the
military authorities and chief staffs of Prussia, Russia, and even of
Austria, McClellan would be condemned as unfit to have any military
command whatever. I would stake my right hand on such a verdict; and
here the would-be strategians, the traitors, the intriguers, and the
imbeciles prize him sky-high.

Only by personal and close observation of the inner working of the
administrative machinery is it possible to appreciate and to
understand what an immense power the Constitution locates in the
hands of a President. Far more power has he than any constitutional
sovereign--more than is the power of the English sovereign and of her
Cabinet put together. In the present emergencies, such a power in the
hands of a Wade or of a Stanton would have long ago saved the country.

Mr. Seward looks to all sides of the compass for a Union party in the
South, which may rise politically against the rebels. That is the
advice of Weed, Mr. Seward's Egeria. I doubt that he will find many,
or even any. First kill the secesh, destroy the rebel power, that is,
the army, and then look for the Union men in the South. Mr. Seward, in
his generalizations, in his ardent expectations, etc., etc., forgets
to consider--at least a little--human nature, and, not to speak of
history, this _terra incognita_. Blood shed for the nationality makes
it grow and prosper; a protracted struggle deepens its roots, carries
away the indifferent, and even those who at the start opposed the
move. All such, perhaps, may again fall off from the current of
rebellion, but that current must first be reduced to an imperceptible
rivulet; and Mr. Seward, sustaining the do-nothing strategian, acts
against himself.

Mr. Seward's last programme is, after the capture of Richmond and of
New Orleans, to issue a proclamation--to offer terms to the rebels, to
restore the old Union in full, to protect slavery and all. For this
reason he supports McClellan, as both have the same plan. Of such a
character are the assurances given by Mr. Seward to foreign diplomats
and governments. He tries to make them sure that a large Union party
will soon be forthcoming in the South, and again sounds his
vaticinations of the sacramental ninety days. I am sorry for this his
incurable passion to play the Pythoness. It is impossible that such
repeated prophecies shall raise him high in the estimation of the
European statesmen. Impossible! Impossible! whatever may be the
contrary assertions of his adulators, such as an Adams, a Sandford, a
Weed, a Bigelow, a Hughes, and others. When Mr. Seward proudly
unveiled this his programme, a foreign diplomat suggested that the
Congress may not accept it. Mr. Seward retorted that he cares not for
Congress; that he will appeal to the people, who are totally
indifferent to the abolition of slavery.

Why does Mr. Seward deliberately slander the American people, and this
before foreign diplomats, whose duty it is to report all Mr. Seward's
words to their respective governments? Such words uttered by Mr.
Seward justify the assertions of Lord John Russell, of Gladstone,
those true and high-minded friends of human liberty, that the North
fights for empire and not for a principle. The people who will answer
to Mr. Seward's appeal will be those whose creed is that of the New
York Herald, the Boston Courier, the people of the Fernando and Ben
Woods, of the Vallandighams, etc.

What is the use of urging on the foreign Cabinets--above all, England
and France--to rescind the recognition of belligerents? They cannot
do it. It does not much--nay, not any--harm, as the English
speculators will risk to run the blockade if the rebels are
belligerent or not. And besides, the English and French Cabinets may
throw in Mr. Seward's face the decisions of our own prize courts, who,
on the authority of Mr. Seward's blockade, in their judicial
decisions, treat the rebels as belligerents. The European statesmen
are more cautious and more consequential in their acts than is our
Secretary.

As it stands now, the conduct of the English government is very
correct, and not to be complained of. I do not speak of the infamous
articles in the Times, Herald, etc., or of the Gregories and such
scums as the Roebucks; but I am satisfied that Lord John Russell
wishes us no harm, and that it is our own policy which confuses and
makes suspicious such men as Russell, Gladstone, and others of the
better stamp.

As for the armaments of secesh vessels in Liverpool and the Bahamas,
it is so perfectly in harmony with the English mercantile character
that it is impossible for the government to stop it.

The English merchant generally considers it as a lawful enterprise to
run blockades; in the present case the premium is immense; it is so in
a twofold manner. 1st, the immediate profits on the various cargoes
exchanged against each other by a successful running of the blockade;
such profits must equal several hundred per cent. 2d, the prospective
profits from an eventual success of the rebellion for such friends as
are now supporting the rebels. These prospects must be very alluring,
and are partly justified by our slow war, slow policy. I am sure that
the like armaments for the secessionists are made by shares owned by
various individuals; the individual risk of each shareholder being
comparatively insignificant when compared with the prospective gains.

If Seward, McClellan, and Blair had not meddled with Stanton, not
weakened his decisions, nor befogged Mr. Lincoln, Richmond would be in
our hands, together with Charleston and Savannah; and all the
iron-clad vessels built in England for secesh would be harmless.

Mr. Weed and Mr. Seward expect Jeff. Davis to be overthrown by their
imaginary Southern Union party. O, wiseacres! if both of you had only
a little knowledge of human nature--not of that one embodied in
lobbyists--and of history, then you would be aware that if Jeff. Davis
is to be deposed it will be by one more violent than he, and you would
not speculate and take clouds for camels. During the weeks of
embarkation for Yorktown, the thorough incapacity of McClellan's chief
of the staff was as brilliant as the cloudless sun. It makes one
shudder to think what it will be when the campaign will be decidedly
and seriously going on.

It is astonishing, and psychologically altogether incomprehensible, to
see persons, justly deserving to be considered as intelligent, deny
the evidence of their own senses; forbid, so to speak, their sound
judgment to act; to be befogged by thorough imbeciles; to consider
incapacity as strategy, and to take imbecility for deep, mysterious,
great combinations and plans. Even the Turks could not long be
humbugged in such a way.

No sovereign in the world, not even Napoleon in his palmiest days,
could thus easily satisfy his military whims concerning the most
costly and variegated material for an army, as does McClellan. He
changes his plans; every such change is gorgeously satisfied and
millions thrown away. Guns, mortars, transports, spades, etc., appear
at his order as if by charm; and all this to veil his utter
incapacity. This Yorktown expedition uncovers Washington and the
North, and such a deep plan could have been imagined only by a
_strategian_.

What are doing in Europe all these various agents of Mr. Seward, and
paid by Uncle Sam? all these Weeds, Sandfords, Hughes, Bigelows, and
whoever else may be there? They cannot find means in their brains to
better direct, inform, or influence the European press. Almost all the
articles in our favor are only defensive and explanatory; the
offensive is altogether carried by the secesh press in England and in
France. But to deal offensive blows, our agents would be obliged to
stand firm on human principles, and show up all the dastardly
corruption of slavery, of slaveholders, and of rebels. Such a warfare
is forbidden by Mr. Seward's policy; and perhaps if such a Weed should
speak of corruption, some English secesh may reprint Wilkeson's
letter. In one word, our cause in Europe is very tamely represented
and carried on. Members of the Chamber of Deputies in Paris complain
that they can nowhere find necessary information concerning certain
facts. There Seward's agents have not even been able to correct the
fallacies about the epoch of the Morrill tariff,--fallacies so often
invoked by the secesh press,--and many other similar statements. I
shall not wonder if the public opinion in Europe by and by may fall
off from our cause. Our defensive condition there justifies the
assumptions of the secesh. As we dare not expose their crimes, the
public in Europe must come to this conclusion, that secesh may be
right, and may begin to consider the North as having no principle.

And to think that all these agents heavily phlebotomize Uncle Sam's
pockets to obtain such contemptible results!

Many persons, some among them of influence and judgment, still speak
and speculate upon what they call the starving of the rebellion. They
calculate upon the comparative poverty of the rebels, repeating the
fallacious adage, that money is the sinews of war. Money is so, but
only in a limited degree, and more limited than is generally supposed;
more limited even now when war is a very expensive pastime.

This fallacy, first uttered by the aristocrat Thucydides, was repeated
over and over again until it became a statesmanlike creed. But even
Thucydides gave not to that _dictum_ such a general sense, and
Macchiavelli scorned the fallacy and exposed it. When poor, the
Spartans have been the bravest. The historical halo surrounding the
name of Sparta originated at that epoch when the use of money and of
gold had been almost forbidden. The wealth of Athens began after the
victories over the Persians; but those victories were won when the
Athenians were comparatively poor. So it was with the Romans until the
subjugation of Carthage, and in modern Europe the Swiss, etc., etc.,
etc.

Manhood in a people, and self-sacrifice, are the genuine sinews of
war; wealth alone saved no nation from disgrace and from death, nay,
often accelerated the catastrophe.

The colonization of Africo-Americans is still discussed; very likely
inspired by Seward and by his Yucatan schemes. Senator Doolittle runs
himself down at a fearful rate. I regret Doolittle's mistake. Those
colonizers forget that if they should export even 100,000 persons a
year, an equal number will be yearly born at home, not to speak of
other impossibilities. If carried on on a small scale, this scheme
amounts to nothing; and on a grand scale it is altogether impossible,
besides being as stupid as it is recklessly cruel. Only those persons
insist on colonization who hate or dread general emancipation.

When the slaves shall be emancipated, then the owners of plantations
will be forced to offer very acceptable terms to the newly made free
laborers to have their plantations cultivated, which otherwise must
become waste and useless lands, and the planters themselves poor
starving wretches. With very little of governmental interference, the
mutual relation between planter and laborer can be regulated, and the
planter will be the first to oppose colonization.

Look from whatever side you like, a colonization schemer is a cruel
deceiver, he is an enemy of emancipation, and if he claims to be an
emancipator then he is an enemy of the planter and of the prosperity
of the southern region.

Besides, the present scheme of colonization to Chiriqui is an infamous
speculation to help some Ambrosio Thompson to work coal mines in that
part of Central America. That individual has a grant for some lands in
Chiriqui, and there these poor victims are to be exported. The grant
itself is contested by the New Grenadian government. Those poor
coolies will be the prey of speculators; there will arise claims
against the Grenadian government--a rich mine for lobbyists and
claimants. Infamy! and these fathers of the country are as blind as
moles. Central America is always in convulsions, and of course the
colonists will be robbed by every party of those semi-savages. The
colonists being Methodists, etc., will be pointed out by the stupid
Catholic clergy as being heretics and miscreants.

Washington's proximity to the theatre of war in Virginia is the
greatest impediment for rapid movements; it is the ruin of generals
and of armies.

Being within reach of the seat of government and of the material
means, the generals are never ready, but always have something to
complete, something to ask for, and so days after days elapse. In all
other countries and governments of the world the commanders move on,
and the objects of secondary necessity are sent after them.

In all other countries and wars the principal aim of commanders is to
become conspicuous by rapidity of movements. The paramount glory is to
have achieved and obtained important results with comparatively
limited means. Here, the greater the slowness with which they move,
the greater captains they are; and the more expensive their
operations, the surer they are of the applause of the administration,
and of a great many f----.

After all, the above is the result of pre-existing causes. Slowness,
indecision, and waste of money, are the prominent features of this
administration.

Stanton excepted, I again think of the dictum of Professor Steffens,
and every day believe it more.

Mr. Blair worse and worse; is more hot in support of McClellan, more
determined to upset Stanton, and I heard him demand the return of a
poor fugitive slave woman to some of Blair's Maryland friends.

Every day I am confirmed in my creed that whoever had slavery for
_mammy_ is never serious in the effort to destroy it. Whatever such
men as Mr. Lincoln and Mr. Blair will do against slavery, will never
be radical by their own choice or conviction, but will be done
reluctantly, and when under the unavoidable pressure of events.

Mr. Seward restive and bitter against all who criticise. Mr. Seward
assumes that everybody does his best, and ought therefore to be
applauded. But Mr. Seward forgets the proverb about hell being paved
with good intentions. In this terrible emergency the people want men
who _really_ do the best, and not those who only try and intend to do
it.

McClellan had the full sway so long--appointed so many, perhaps more
than sixty, brigadier generals--that it is not astonishing when those
appointees prefer rather not to see for themselves, but blindly
"hurrah" for their creator.

Victories in the West, triumphantly establishing the superiority of
our soldiers in open battle-fields, and the superiority of all
generals who are distant from any contact with Washington, as Pope,
Grant, Curtis, Mitchell, Sigel, and others. The brave navy,--this pure
democratic element which assures the greatest results, and makes the
less laudatory noise. The navy is admirable; the navy is the purest
and most glorious child of the people.

The destruction of the rebellion saves the future generations of the
Southern whites. Secession would for centuries have bred and raised
only formidable social hyenas.

McClellan subsided in mud before Yorktown. Any other, only even
half-way, military capacity commanding such forces would have made a
lunch of Yorktown. But our troops are to dig, perhaps their graves,
to the full satisfaction of Mr. Lincoln, Mr. Seward, and Mr. Blair.

McClellan telegraphs for more men, and he has more already than he can
put in action, and more than he has room for. He subsides in digging.
The rebels will again fool him as they fooled him in Manassas. If
McClellan could know anything, then he would know this--that nothing
is so destructive to an army as sieges, as diggings, and camps, and
nothing more disciplines and re-invigorates men, makes them true
soldiers, than does marching and fighting. Poor Stanton! how he must
suffer to be overruled by imbeciles and intriguers. McClellan
telegraphing for reinforcements plainly shows how unmilitary are his
brains. He and a great many here believe that the greater the mass of
troops, the surer the victory. History mostly teaches the contrary;
but speak to American wiseacres about history! He, McClellan, and
others on his side, ignore the difficulty of handling or swinging an
army of 100,000 men.

A good general, confident in his troops, will not hesitate to fight two
to three. But McClellan feels at ease when he can, at the least, have
two to one. In Manassas he had three to one, and conquered--wooden guns!
We will see what he will conquer before Yorktown.

Louis Napoleon always well disposed, but of course he cannot swallow
Mr. Seward's demand about belligerents. I am so glad and so proud that
up to this day events justify my confidence in the French policy,
although our policy may tire not only Louis Napoleon, but tire the God
whom we worship and invoke. I should not wonder if God, tired by such
McClellans, Lincolns, Sewards, Blairs, etc., finally gives us the cold
shoulder. This demand concerning belligerents is a diplomatic and
initiative step made by Mr. Seward; it is unsuccessful, as are all his
initiatives, and no wonder.

Mr. Lincoln, incited by Mr. Seward and by Mr. Blair, overrules the
opinion of the purest, the ablest, and the most patriotic men in
Congress--that of Stanton, and of the few good generals unbefogged by
McClellanism. Such a power as the Constitution gives to a President is
the salvation of the people when in the hands of a Jackson, but when
in the hands of a Lincoln, ----!

The muscular strength of the American people, and the strength of its
backbone, beat all the Herculeses and Atlases supporting the globe.
Any other people would have long ago broke down under the policy and
the combined weight of Lincoln, Seward, and McClellan.

Mr. Lincoln is forced out again from one of his pro-slavery
entrenchments; he was obliged to yield, and to sign the hard-fought
bill for emancipation in the District of Columbia; but how
reluctantly, with what bad grace he signed it! Good boy; he wishes not
to strike his _mammy_; and to think that the friends of humanity in
Europe will credit this emancipation not where it is due, not to the
noble pressure exercised by the high-minded Northern masses, but to
this Kentucky ----.

Senator Wade made a powerful speech in relation to the arrest of
General Stone. It was powerful, patriotic, and rises to the skies over
the Lilliputian oratory of the thus-called scholars, etc. Wade is a
monolith,--he is cut out full in a rock.

It seems that the new law increasing the number of judges for the
Supreme Court weakened many backbones. Congress ought to have added
the clause that a senator can be nominated only after six years from
the day of the promulgation.

Mr. Seward again chalked before the dazzled eyes of foreign powers
certain future military operations; but again events have been so
impolite as to upturn Mr. Seward's prophecies.

The report of the Senate committee on the destruction of Norfolk
speaks of the "insane delusion" of the administration. I am proud to
have considered it in the same light about a year ago.

Mr. Thouvenel politely but logically refuses to acquiesce in Mr.
Seward's demand concerning the belligerents. Thouvenel's reasons are
plausible. The support given to strategy by Mr. Seward,--that support
does more mischief to us than do all the pirates and all the
violations of blockade. Let us take Richmond,--a thing impossible with
McClellan,--and take by land Charleston, Savannah, etc.; then the
pirates and belligerents are strangulated. And--as says Gen.
Sherman--Savannah and Charleston could have been taken several months
ago. Orders from Washington forbade to do it; and it would be curious
to ascertain how far Mr. Seward is innocent in the perpetration of
these orders.

Chase and Seward dear-dearing each other! Amusing! Kilkenny cats! At
this game Seward will have the best of Chase, who is not a match for
tricks.

The New York Times attacks Capt. Dahlgren, of the Navy Yard. It is in
the nature of the "little villain" to bespatter men of such devotion,
patriotism, and eminent capacity as is Captain Dahlgren.

Thurlow Weed calls the Tribune "infernal," because it wishes a serious
war, and thus prevents the raising of a Union party in the South, so
flippantly looked for by him and Mr. Seward, his pupil. I see the time
coming when all these _gentlemen_ of the concessions, of the
not-hurting policy,--when all these conservative seekers for the Union
party will try, Pilatus-like, to wash their hands of the innocent
blood; but you shall try, and not succeed, to whitewash your stained
hands; you have less excuses on your side than had the Roman proconsul
on his side.

When Mr. Mercier was in Richmond, some of the rebel leaders and
generals told him that they believed not their senses on learning that
McClellan was going to Yorktown; that he never could have selected a
better place for them, and that they were sure of his destruction on
the Peninsula.

Perhaps McClellan wished to try his hand and rehearse the siege of
Sebastopol.

If McClellan's ignorance of military history were not so well
established, he would know that since Archimedes, down to Todleben,
more genius was displayed in the defence than in the attack of any
place. The making of approaches, parallels, etc., is an affair of
engineering school routine. Napoleon took Toulon rather as an
artillerist, who, having, calculated the reach of projectiles, put his
battery on a spot wherefrom he shelled Toulon. Napoleon took Mantua by
destroying the Austrian army which hastened to the relief of the
fortress. But the great American strategian knows better, and
satisfies (as said above) the rebels.

The New York Herald, the New York Times, and other staunch supporters
of McClellan, again and again trumpet that the rebels fear McClellan,
that they consider him to be the ablest general opposed to them. The
rebels are smart, and so is their ally, the New York Herald. As for
the Times, it is only a flunkeying "little villain."

McDowell, Banks, Fremont have about 70,000 men; the last two are
nearly at the head of the Shenandoah valley; they could unite with
McDowell, and march and take Richmond. They beg to be ordered to do
it, and so wishes Stanton; but, fatally befogged by McClellan, by
McClellan's clique in the councils, or by strategians, Lincoln
emphatically forbids any junction, any movement; the President forbids
McDowell to take Fredericksburg, or to throw a bridge across the
river. And thus McClellan prevents any glorious military operation; is
losing in the mud a hundred men daily by disease, and Mr.
Lincoln--still infatuated. But infatuation is the disease of small and
weak brains.

Rothschild in Paris, and very likely the Rothschilds in London, are
for the North. But if the Rothschilds show that they well understand
and respect the Old Testament, whose spirit is anti-slavery, they show
they understand better the true Christian spirit than do the
Christians. The Rothschilds show themselves more thoroughly of our
century than are such Michel Chevaliers, or such impure Roebucks, and
all the supporters of free trade in human flesh.

McClellan's supporters, and such strategians as Blair and Seward,
assert that McClellan's plan was ruined by not sending McDowell to
Gloucester; that then the whole rebel army would have been caught in a
trap. That silly plan to go to the Peninsula is defended in a still
more silly way.

By McDowell's going to Gloucester, Washington would have been wholly
at the mercy of an army of thirty to forty thousand men; the
celebrated defences of Washington, this result of the united wisdom of
Scott and McClellan, facilitating to the rebel army a raid on
Washington.

Further; McClellan, in concocting and _maturing_ his thus called
plans, probably believes that the rebels will do just the thing which,
in his calculations, he wishes them to do; and such erroneous
suppositions are the sole basis of his _plans_. But the rebels
repeatedly showed themselves by far too smart for his _Napoleonic_
brains; and besides, not much wit to the rebel generals was necessary
to see through and through what the great Napoleon was about, by
ordering McDowell to Gloucester. Of course, the rebel generals would
not have had the politeness towards McClellan to sheepishly accede to
his wishes, and go into the trap. The whole plan was worse than
childish, and I am glad to learn that several generals showed brains
to condemn it. The whole plan was up to the comprehension of
McClellanites, of consummate strategians in McClellan's official
tross, for those in the Cabinet and out of it.

Would God that all this ends not in disasters. If it ends well it will
be the first time success has crowned such transcendent incapacity.




MAY, 1862.

     Capture of New Orleans -- The second siege of Troy -- Mr. Seward
     lights his lantern to search for the Union-saving party --
     Subserviency to power -- Vitality of the people -- Yorktown
     evacuated -- Battle of Williamsburg -- Great bayonet charge! --
     Heintzelman and Hooker -- McClellan telegraphs that the enemy
     outnumber him -- The terrible enemy evacuate Williamsburg -- The
     track of truth begins to be lost -- Oh Napoleon! -- Oh spirit of
     Berthier! -- Dayton not in favor -- Events are too rapid for
     Lincoln -- His integrity -- Too tender of men's feelings --
     Halleck -- Ten thousand men disabled by disease -- The Bishop of
     Orleans -- The rebels retreat without the knowledge of McNapoleon
     -- Hunter's proclamation -- Too noble for Mr. Lincoln --
     McClellan again subsides in mud -- Jackson defeats Banks, who
     makes a masterly retreat -- Bravo, Banks! -- The aulic council
     frightened -- Gov. Andrew's letter -- Sigel -- English opinion --
     Mr. Mill -- Young Europa -- Young Germany -- Corinth evacuated --
     Oh, generalship! -- McDowell grimly persecuted by bad luck.


The capture of New Orleans. The undaunted bravery of the Navy--this
most beautiful leaf in the American history. The Navy fights without
talk and _strategy_, because it does not look to win the track to the
White House. The capture of New Orleans may lead the rebels to
evacuate Yorktown and to fool the great strategian.

It is a very threatening symptom, that no genuine harmony--nay, no
sympathy--exists between the best, the purest, the most intelligent,
the most energetic members of both the Houses of Congress and the
President, including the leading spirit of his Cabinet. The New York
Herald is the principal supporter of Mr. Lincoln and Mr. Seward; in
the Congress their supporters are the Democrats, and all those who
wish to make concessions to the South, who ardently wish to preserve
slavery, and in any way to patch up the quarrel.

In times as trying as are the present ones, such a shameful and
dangerous anomaly must, in the long run, destroy either the government
or the nation. If it turns out differently here, the exclusive reason
thereof will be the great vitality of the people. All the deep and
dangerous wounds inflicted by the policy of the administration will be
healed by the vigorous, vital energy of the people.

"For Heaven's sake finish quick your war!" Such are the
exclamations--nay, the prayers--coming from the French statesmen, as
Fould and others, from our devoted friends, as Prince Napoleon, and
from all the famishing, but nevertheless nobly-behaving, operatives in
England. And here McClellan inaugurates before Yorktown a second siege
of Troy or of Sebastopol; Lincoln forbids the junction of McDowell
with Banks and Fremont, by which Richmond could be easily taken from
the west side, where it ought to be attacked; and Mr. Seward reads the
like dispatches and backs McClellan; Mr. S. lights his lantern in
search North and South of the Union-saving party!

Speak to me of subserviency to power by European aristocrats,
courtiers, etc.! What almost every day I witness here of subserviency
of influential men to the favored and office-distributing power, all
things compared and considered, beats whatever I saw in Europe, even
in Russia at the Nicolean epoch.

General Cameron, in his farewell speech, said that at the beginning of
the civil war General Scott told him, Cameron, that he, Scott, never
in his life was more pained than when a Virginian reminded him of his
paramount duties to his State. I take note of this declaration, as it
corroborates what a year ago I said in this diary concerning the
disastrous hesitations of General Scott.

It is said that Turtschininoff is all in all in General Mitchell's
command. Turtschininoff is a genuine and distinguished officer of the
staff, and educated in that speciality so wholly unknown to
West-Pointers. Several among the foreigners in the army are thoroughly
educated officers of the staff, and would be of great use if employed
in the proper place. But envy and know-nothingism are doubly in their
way. Besides, the foreign officers have no tenderness for the Southern
cause and Southern chivalry, and would be in the cause with their
whole heart.

By the insinuations of an anonymous correspondent in the Tribune, Mr.
Seward tries to re-establish his anti-slavery reputation. But how is
it that foreign diplomats, that the purest of his former political
friends, consider him to be now the savior of what he once persecuted
in his speeches?

At every step this noble people vindicates and asserts the vitality of
self-government, continually jeopardized by the inexhaustible errors
of the policy followed by the master-spirits in the administration.
European doctors, prophets, vindictive enemies like the London Times,
the Saturday Review, etc., and the French journals of the police, all
of them are daily--nay, hourly--baffled in their expectations--paper
money and no bankruptcy, no inflation, bonds equal to gold, etc., etc.
And all this, not because there is any great or even small statesman
or financier at the head of the administration, but because the people
at large have confidence in themselves, in their own energies; because
they have the determination to succeed, and not to be bankrupt; not to
discredit their own decisions. All these phenomena, so new in the
history of nations, are incomprehensible to European wiseacres; they
are too much for the hatred and dulness of the Europeans in France,
England, and for that of the many Europeans here.

Yorktown evacuated!--under the nose of an army of 160,000 men, and
within the distance of a rifle shot!--evacuated quietly, of course,
during several days. One cannot abstain from saying Bravo! to the
rebel generals. Their high capacity forces the mind to an involuntary
applause. Traitors, intriguers, and imbeciles applaud, extol the
results of the bloodless strategy. McClellan is used by the rebels
only to be fooled by them. It must be so. It is one proof more of the
transcendent capacity of the strategian, and, above all, of the
capacity and efficiency of the chief of the staff of the great army.
Such an operation as that of Yorktown, anywhere else, would be
considered as the highest disgrace; here, glorifications of strategy.
McClellan's bulletins from Yorktown describe the rebel fortifications
as being almost impregnable. Of course impregnable! but only to him.

Battle at Williamsburg; and McClellan and his so perfect staff
altogether ignorant of the whole bloody but honorable affair as fought
against terrible odds by Heintzelman and Hooker; but the great
Napoleon's bulletin mentions a _real_--Oh hear! hear the great
Mars!--_charge with the bayonet_, made at the other extremity of
Williamsburg, and in which from twenty to forty men were killed!

Heintzelman's and Hooker's personal conduct, and that of their troops,
was heroic beyond name. McClellan ignored the battle; ignored what was
going on, and, as it is said, gave orders to Sumner not to support
Heintzelman.

McClellan telegraphs that the enemy far outnumbers him (fears count
doubly), but that he will do his utmost and his best. This Napoleon of
the New York Herald's manufacture in everything is the reverse of all
the leaders and captains known in history: all of them, when before
the battle they addressed their soldiers, represented the enemy as
inferior and contemptible; after the battle was won, the enemy was
extolled.

From the first of his addresses to this his last dispatch from
Williamsburg, McClellan always speaks of the terrible enemy whom he is
to encounter; and in this last dispatch he tries to frighten not only
his army, but the whole country. During the night _the terrible enemy_
evacuated Williamsburg; McClellan breathes more free, takes fresh
courage, and his bulletin estimates the enemy's forces at 50,000.

The track of truth begins to be lost. By comparing dates, bulletins,
and notes, it results that at the precise minute when McClellan
telegraphed his wail concerning the large numbers of the enemy and the
formidable fortifications of Williamsburg, the rebels were evacuating
them, pressed and expelled therefrom by Hooker, Kearney, and
Heintzelman. Oh Napoleon! Oh spirits not only of Berthier and of
Gneisenau, but of the most insignificant chiefs of staffs, admire your
caricature at the head of the army commanded by this freshly-backed
Napoleon!

A foreign diplomat was in McClellan's tent before Yorktown, on the eve
of the day when the rebels wholly evacuated it. One of McClellan's
aids suggested to the general that the comparative silence of the
rebel artillery might forebode evacuation. "Impossible!" answered the
New York Herald's Napoleon. "I know everything that passes in their
camp, and I have them fast." (I have these details from the
above-mentioned diplomat.) In the same minute, when the strategian
spoke in this way, at least half of the rebel army had already
withdrawn from Yorktown. Comments thereupon are superfluous.

Dayton, from Paris, very sensibly objects to the policy of insisting
that England and France shall annul their decision concerning the
belligerents. Dayton considers such a demand to be, for various
reasons, out of season. I am sure that Dayton is respected by Louis
Napoleon and by Thouvenel on account of his sound sense and rectitude,
although he _parleys not_ French. Dayton must impress everybody
differently from that French parleying claims' prosecutor and
itinerant agent of a sewing machine, who breakfasts in Brussels with
Leopold, and the same day dines in Paris with Thouvenel, and may
take his supper in h----l, so far as the interest of the cause is
concerned. But Dayton seems not to be in favor with the department.

The admirers of McClellan assert that one parallel digged by him was
sufficient to frighten the rebels and force them to evacuate. Good for
what it is worth for such mighty ignorant brains. The mortars, the
hundred-pounders, frightened the rebels; they break down not before
parallels, strategy, or Napoleon, but before the intellectual
superiority of the North, in the present case embodied in mortars and
other armaments.

Following the retreating enemy, McClellan loses more prisoners than he
makes from the enemy. A new and perfectly original, perfectly _sui
generis_ mode of warfare, but altogether in harmony with all the other
martial performances of the pet of the New York Herald, of Messrs.
Seward and Blair, and of the whole herd of intriguers and imbeciles.

People who approach him say that Mr. Lincoln's conceit groweth every
day. I guess that Seward carefully nurses the weed as the easiest way
to dominate over and to handle a feeble mind.

Since Mr. Mercier judges by his own eyes, and not by those of former
various Washington associations, his inborn soundness and perspicacity
have the upper hand. He is impartial and just to both parties; he is
not bound to have against the rebels feelings akin to mine, but he is
well disposed, and wishes for the success of the Union.

The events are too grand and too rapid for Lincoln. It is impossible
for him to grasp and to comprehend them. I do not know any past
historical personality fully adequate to such a task. Happily in this
occurrency, the many, the people at large, by its grasp and
forwardness, supplies and neutralizes the inefficiency or the
tergiversations, intrigues and double-dealings of the few, of the
official leaders, advisers, etc.

I willingly concede to Mr. Lincoln all the best and most variegated
mental and intellectual qualities, all the virtues as claimed for him
by his eulogists and friends. I would wish to believe, as they do, Mr.
Lincoln to be infallible and impeccable. But all those qualities and
virtues represented to form the residue of his character, all shining
when in private life, some way or other are transformed from positives
into negatives, since Mr. Lincoln's contact with the pulsations and
the hurricane of public life. Thus Mr. Lincoln's friends assert that
all his efforts tend to conciliate parties and even individuals. This
candor was beneficial and efficient in the court or bar-rooms, or
around a supper table in Springfield. It was even more so, perhaps,
when seasoned with stories more or less * * * But one who tries to
conciliate between two antipodic principles, or between pure and
impure characters, unavoidably must dodge the principal points at
issue. Such is the stern law of logic. Who dodges, who biasses,
unavoidably deviates from that straight and direct way at the end of
which dwells truth. Further: feeble, expectative and vacillating
minds, deprived of the faculty to embrace in all its depth and
extension the task before them,--such minds cannot have a clear
purpose, nor the firm perception of ways and means leading to the aim,
and still less have they the sternness of conviction so necessary for
men dealing with such mighty events, on which depend the life and
death of a society. Such men hesitate, postpone, bias and deviate from
the straight way. Such men believe themselves in the way to truth,
when they are aside of it. It results therefrom, that when certain
amiable qualities, such as conciliation, a little dodging, hesitation,
etc., are practised in private life and in a very restrained area,
their deviations from truth are altogether imperceptible, and they are
then positive good qualities, nay, virtues. But such qualities,
transported and put into daily friction with the tempestuous
atmosphere of human events, lose their ingenuousness, their innocence,
their good-naturedness; the imperceptibility of their intrinsic
deviation becomes transparent and of gigantic dimensions.

Mr. Lincoln's crystal-pure integrity prevented not the most frightful
dilapidation, nay, robbing of the treasury by contractors, etc., etc.
Nor has it kept pure his official household. His friend Lamon and the
to-be-formed regiments; the splendid equipages and _coupes_ of his
youthful secretaries, to be sure, came not from Springfield, etc.,
etc., nor sees he through the rascally scheme of the Chiriqui
colonization.

Mr. Lincoln, his friends assert, does not wish to hurt the feelings of
any one with whom he has to deal. Exceedingly amiable quality in a
private individual, but at times turning almost to be a vice in a man
entrusted with the destinies of a nation. So he never could decide to
hurt the feelings of McClellan, and this after all the numerous proofs
of his incapacity. But Mr. Lincoln hurts thereby, and in the most
sensible manner, the interests, nay, the lives, of the twenty millions
of people. I am sure that McClellan may lose the whole army, and why
not if he continues as he began? and Mr. Lincoln will support and keep
him, as to act otherwise would hurt McClellan's, Marcy's, Seward's,
and perhaps Blair's feelings.

Finally, Mr. Lincoln, advised, they say, by Mr. Seward, holds in
contempt public opinion as manifested by the press, with the exception
of the incense burnt to him by the New York Herald. If this is true,
Mr. Lincoln's mind is cunningly befogged.

It is very soothing for the quiet of private life to ignore
newspapers; but all over Europe men in power, sovereigns and
ministers, carefully and daily study and watch the opinions of the
newspapers, and principally of those which oppose and criticise them.

Such, Mr. Lincoln, is the wisdom of the truly experienced statesman.
Better ask Louis Napoleon than Seward.

I am astonished that concerning Mexico Louis Napoleon was taken in by
Almonte. Experience ought to have fully made him familiar with the
general policy of political refugees. This policy was, is, and will be
always based on imaginary facts.

Political refugees befog themselves and befog others. And this Mr. de
Saligny must be a d----; Louis Napoleon ought to expel him from the
service.

Halleck likewise seems to lay the track to the White House. Nothing
has been done since he took the command in person. Halleck, as does
also McClellan, tries to make all his measures so sure, so perfect,
that he misses his aim, and becomes fooled by the enemy. In war, as in
anything else, after having quickly prepared and taken measures, a man
ought to act, and rely as much as possible on fortune--that is, on his
own acuteness--how to cut the knot when he meets it in his path.

Halleck before Corinth, and McClellan before Manassas and Yorktown,
both spend by far more time than it took Napoleon from Boulogne and
Bretagne to march into the heart of Germany, surround and capture Mack
at Ulm, and come in view of Vienna.

The French and English naval officers in the Mississippi assured our
commanders that it was impossible to overcome the various defences
erected by the rebels. Our men gave the lie to those envious
forebodings. McClellan, in a dispatch, assures the Secretary of War
that he, McClellan, will take care of the gunboats. _Risum teneatis._

The most contemptible flunkeys on the face of the earth are the
wiseacres, and the thus-called framers of public opinion. Until yet
McClellan, literally, has not stood by when a cartridge was burned,
and they sing hosanna for him.

Ten thousand men have been disabled by diseases before Yorktown; add
to it the several thousands in a similar way disabled in the camp
before Manassas, and it makes more than would have cost two battles,
fought between the Rappahannock and Richmond,--battles which must have
settled the question.

Although ultra-Montane, the Bishop of Orleans nobly condemns slavery.
The Bishop's pastoral is an answer to H. E., Archbishop of New York.
The French bishop therein is true to the spirit of the Catholic
church. The Irish archbishop, compared to him, appears a dabbler in
Romanism.

During the administration of Pierce and of Buchanan, the Democratic
senators ruled over the President and the Cabinet. Perhaps it is not
as it ought to be; but for the salvation of the country it were
desirable that a curb be put on Mr. Lincoln, Mr. Seward, Mr. Blair, by
the Republican senators, by men like Wade, Wilson, Chandler, Grimes,
Fessenden, Hale, and others.

The retreat of the rebels was masterly conducted, and their pursuit by
McClellan has no name. Nowhere has this Napoleon got at them. The
affair at Williamsburg was bravely done by Heintzelman and Hooker; but
it was done without the knowledge of McNapoleon, and contrary to his
expectations and strategy. This he confesses in one of his _masterly_
bulletins. Perhaps McNapoleon ignored Heintzelman's corps' heroic
actions, because neither Heintzelman, nor Hooker, nor Kearney worship
_strategy, and the deep, well-matured plans of Mc_.

General Hunter's proclamation in South Carolina is the greatest social
act in the course of this war. How pale and insignificant are Mr.
Lincoln's disquisitions aside of that proclamation, which is greeted
in heaven by angels and cherubim--provided they are a reality.

Of course Mr. Lincoln overrules General Hunter's proclamation. It is
too human, too noble, too great, for the tall Kentuckian. Many say
that Seward, Blair, Seaton from the Intelligencer, and other Border
State patriots, pressed upon Lincoln. I am sure that it gave them very
little trouble to put Mr. Lincoln straight ---- with slaveocracy.
Henceforth every Northern man dying in the South is to be credited to
Mr. Lincoln!

Mr. Lincoln again publishes a disquisition, and points to the signs of
the times. But does Mr. Lincoln perceive other, more awful, signs of
the times? Does he see the bloody handwriting on the wall, condemning
his unnatural, vacillating, dodging policy?

All things considered, it will not be astonishing in Europe if they
lose patience and sneer at the North, when they learn that McClellan
is continually doing strategy; when they will read his bulletins; when
they will find out that from West Point to Richmond he pursued the
enemy at the _enormous_ speed of two miles a day,--and that of course
nobody was hurt,--and finally, that, surrounded by a brilliant and
costly staff, he was ignorant of the condition of the roads, and of
the existence of marshes and swamps into which he plunged the army.

The President repeatedly speaks of his strong will to restore the
Union. Very well; but why not use for it the best, the most decided,
and the most thorough means and measures?

Continually I meet numbers and numbers of soldiers who are discharged
because disabled in the camps during winter. Thus McClellan's
bloodless strategy deprived several thousands of their health, without
in the least hurting the enemy. And daily I meet numbers of
able-bodied Africo-Americans, who would make excellent soldiers. I
decided to try to form a regiment of the Africo-Americans, and, after
whipping the F. F. V.'s, establish, beyond doubt, the perfect equality
of the thus called races.

McClellan subsides in mud,--digs,--and the sick list of the army
increases hourly at a fearful ratio. And McClellan refuses to slaves
admittance within his lines. If, at least, McClellan was a fighting
general; but a mud-mole as he ------. Any other general in any other
country, in Asia, in Africa, etc., would use any elements whatever
within his grasp, by using which he could strengthen his own and
weaken the enemy's resources. McNapoleon knows better!

One of the best diplomatic documents by Mr. Seward is that on Mexico;
and so is also the policy pursued by him. Why does Mr. Seward dabble
in war and strategy at home?

McClellan digs, and by his wailings has disorganized the corps of
McDowell, and of Banks, who retreats and is pressed by Jackson. The
men who advised, or the McClellan worshippers who prevented the union
of McDowell with Banks and Fremont, are as criminal as any one can be
in Mr. Lincoln's councils.

Now Jackson is reorganized; he penetrated between Fremont and Banks,
who were sorely weakened by transferring continually divisions from
one to another army, and this between the Chickahominy and the lower
Shenandoah.

New diplomatic initiative by Mr. Seward. France and England are
requested to declare to the rebels that they have no support to
expect from the above-mentioned powers.

This initiative would be splendid if it could succeed; but it cannot,
and for the same logical reasons as failed the recent initiative about
belligerents. Such unsuccessful initiatives are lowering the
consideration of that statesman who makes them. Such failures show a
want of diplomatic and statesmanlike perspicacity.

The nation is assured by Mr. Lincoln and by Mr. Seward that a perfect
harmony prevails in the Cabinet. Beautiful if true.

General Banks attacked by Jackson and defeated; but, although
surrounded, makes a masterly retreat, without even being considerably
worsted. Bravo, Banks! Such retreats do as much honor to a general as
a won battle.

This bold raid of Jackson--a genuine general--wholly disorganized that
army which, if united weeks ago, could have taken Richmond, and
rendered Jackson's brilliant dash impossible. The military aulic
council of the President is frightened out of its senses, and asks the
people for 100,000 defenders. General Wadsworth advised not to thus,
without any necessity, frighten the country.

On this occasion Governor Andrew, of Massachusetts, wrote a scorching
letter to the administration on account of General Hunter's
proclamation. Governor Andrew always acts, speaks, and writes to the
point.

This alarming appeal, so promptly responded to, has its good, as it
will show to Europe the untired determination of the free States.

The President took it into his head to direct himself, by telegraph,
the military operations from Fredericksburg to Shenandoah. The country
sees with what results. The military advisers of the President seem no
better than are his civil advisers--Seward, Blair, etc. If the
President earnestly wishes to use his right as Commander-in-Chief,
then he had better take in person the command of the army of the
Potomac.

There McClellan's diggings and strategy neutralize the gallantry of
the generals and of the troops. There action, not digging, is needed.
I wrote to the President; suggesting to make Sigel his chief of the
staff (Sigel has been educated for it), and then to let our generals
fight under his, the President's, eyes.

Great injustice was and is done to Mr. Seward by the lying and very
extensively spread rumor that he is often intoxicated. I am sure that
it is not so, and I contradict it with all my might. At last I
discovered the reason of the rumor. It is Mr. Seward's unhappy passion
for generalizations. He goes off like a rocket. Most people hearing
him become confused, understand nothing, are unable to follow him in
his soarings, and believe him to be intoxicated. His devotees alone
get in ecstacies when these rockets fly.

Every time after any success of our troops, that perfidious sheet, the
London Times, puts on innocent airs, and asks, "Why are the Americans
so bitter against England?" Why? At every disaster the Times pours
upon the North the most malicious, poisonous, and lacerating
derisions; derisions to pierce the skin of a rhinoceros. When in that
strain no feeling is respected by this lying paper.

Derision of the North was the Times's order of the day even before the
civil war really began. People, who probably have it from the fountain
itself, assert that in one of his hours of whiskey expansion the great
Russell let the cat out, and confessed that the Times's firm purpose
was, and is, to definitely break the Union.

Until this hour that reptile's efforts have been unsuccessful; it
could not even bring the Cabinet over to its heinous purposes. A
counterpoise and a counter poison exist in England's higher spheres,
and I credit it to that noblest woman the queen, to Earl Russell, and
to some few others.

The would-be English _noblesse_, the Tories, and all the like genuine
nobodies, or _would-be_ somebodies, affect to side with the South.
They are welcome to such an alliance, and even parentage. _Similis
simili gaudet._ Nobody with his senses considers the like
_gentlemen_ as representing the progressive, humane, and enlightened
part of the English nation; the American people may look down upon
their snobbish hostility. J. S. Mill--not to speak of his
followers--has declared for the cause of the North. His intellectual
support more than gorgeously compensates the cause of right and of
freedom, even for the loss or for the sneers of the whole
aristocracy, and of snobdom, of somebodies and of would-be gentlemen
of the whole Britannia Empire, including the Canadian beggarly
manikins.

By their arrogance the Englishmen are offensive to all the nations of
the world; but they are still more so by their ingrained snobbyism.
(See about it Hugo Grotius.) Further: During the last thirty years the
London Times and the Lord Fussmaker Palmerston have done more to make
us hate England than even did the certain inborn and not over-amiable
traits in the English character.

A part of the young foreign diplomacy here have a very strong secesh
bend; they consider the slaveholders to be aristocrats, and thus like
to acquire an aristocratic perfume. But, aristocratically speaking,
most of this promiscuous young Europa are parvenus, and the few titled
among them have heraldically no noble blood in their veins. No wonder
that here they mistake monstrosities for real noblesse. Enthusiastic
is young Germany--that is, young Bremen.

Young European Spain here is remarkably discreet, as in the times of a
Philip II., of an Alba.

Corinth evacuated under the nose of Halleck, as Manassas and Yorktown
have been evacuated under the nose of McClellan. Nay, Halleck, equally
strong as was the enemy, the first day of the evacuation ignores what
became of Beauregard with between sixty and eighty thousand men. Oh
generalship! Gen. Halleck is a gift from Gen. Scott. If Halleck makes
not something better, it will turn out to be a very poor gift. _Timeo
Danaos_, etc., concerning the North and the gifts from "_the highest
military authority in the land_."

McDowell is grimly persecuted by bad luck. Since March, twice he
organized an excellent and strong corps, with which he could have
marched on Richmond, and both times his corps was wholly
disorganized--first by McClellan's wails for more, the second time by
the President and his aulic council. And now all the ignorance and
stupidity, together with all the McClellanites, accuse McDowell. Pity
that he was so near Washington; otherwise his misfortune could not
have so thoroughly occurred.




JUNE, 1862.

     Diplomatic circulars seasoned by stories -- Battle before
     Richmond -- Casey's division disgraced -- McClellan afterwards
     confesses he was misinformed -- Fair Oaks -- "Nobody is hurt,
     only the bleeding people" -- Fremont disobeys orders -- N. Y.
     Times, World, and Herald, opinion-poisoning sheets -- Napoleon
     never visible before nine o'clock in the morning -- Hooker and
     the other fighters soldered to the mud -- Senator Sumner shows
     the practical side of his intellect -- "Slavery a big job!" --
     McClellan sends for mortars -- Defenders of slavery in Congress
     worse than the rebels -- Wooden guns and cotton sentries at
     Corinth -- The navy is glorious -- Brave old Gideon Welles! --
     July 4th to be celebrated in Richmond! -- Colonization again --
     Justice to France -- New regiments -- The people sublime! --
     Congress -- Lincoln visits Scott -- McDowell -- Pope --
     Disloyalty in the departments.


Mr. Seward takes off from Mr. Adams the gag on the question of
slavery. Perhaps even Mr. Adams might have been a little fretting. A
long speculative dispatch, wherein, among some good things, one finds
some generalizations and misstatements concerning the distress in
Ireland, generated by want of potatoes (vide Parl. De.), and not from
want of cotton, as says Mr. Seward--a confession that the government
"covers the weakness of the insurgents" and "takes care of the welfare
of the insurgents." What a tenderness, and what an ingratitude of the
rebels to acknowledge it by blows! Another confession, more precious,
that the poor slaves are the best and the only bravely devoted Union
men in the South, although occasionally shot for their devotion by our
generals, expelled from the lines (vide Halleck's order No. 3), and
delivered to the tender mercies of their masters. Finally, _immediate_
emancipation is held before the eyes of the English statesmen rather
as a Medusa head; then a kind of story--perhaps to please Mr.
Lincoln--or quotation from _some_ writer, etc. So far as I recollect,
it is for the first time that diplomatic circulars are seasoned by
stories. But, _dit moi qui tu hante je te dirai qui tu es_.

Mr. Seward repeatedly asserts, in writing and in words, that he has no
eventual views towards the White House. Well, it may be so or not. But
if his friends may succeed in carrying his nomination, then, of
course, reluctantly, he will bend his head to the people's will,
and--accept. When in past centuries abbots and bishops were elected,
they _reluctantly_ accepted fat abbeys and bishoprics; the investiture
was given in the sacramental words, _accipe onus pro peccatis_.

A battle by Richmond. McClellan telegraphs a victory, and it comes out
that we lost men, positions, camps, and artillery. The President
patiently bears such humbugging, and the country--submits.

McClellan disgraces a part of the brave General Casey's division.
Whatever might have been the conduct of the soldiers in detail, one
thing is certain, that the division was composed of rough levies;
that they fought three hours, being almost surrounded by overwhelming
forces; that they kept ground until reinforcements came; that the
breaking of the division cannot be true, or was only partial, and that
McClellan was not at all on the ground.

This battle of Fair Oaks is another evidence of the transcendent
incapacity of the chief of the staff of the army of the Potomac, and
of Gen. McClellan's veracity. In a subsequent bulletin the general
confesses that he was misinformed concerning the conduct of Gen.
Casey's division.

In any other army in the world, a chief of the staff who would assign
to a division a post so advanced, so isolated, so cut off from the
rest of the army, as was Gen. Casey's position,--such a chief of the
staff would be at once dismissed. Here, oh here, nobody is hurt,
nobody is to be hurt--only the bleeding people.

As to the conduct of the soldiers, they fought well; thorough veterans
scarcely could have behaved better. McClellan turns out worse even
than I expected.

The President's campaign against Jackson--very unsuccessful. Fremont
came not up to the mark; disobeyed orders. No excuse whatever for such
disobedience.

One is at a loss which is to be more admired, the ignorance or the
impudence of such opinion-confusing and opinion-poisoning sheets as
the New York Times, the World, the Herald, etc. They sing _hosanna_
for McClellan's victories. In advance they praise the to-be-fought
battles on selected fields of battle, and after the plans have been
matured for weeks, nay for months.

A plan of a whole campaign, a general survey of it, may be prepared
and matured long before the campaign begins. But to mature for weeks a
plan of a battle! All the genuine great captains seldom had the
selection of a field of battle, as they rapidly moved in search of or
to meet their enemies, and fought them where they found them. For the
same reason, they scarcely had more than forty-eight hours to mature
their plans. Such is the history and the character of nine-tenths of
the great battles fought in the world.

When Napoleon overthrew Prussia and Austria, he beforehand prepared
those campaigns; but neither Jena, Eylau, Friedland, Austerlitz or
Wagram were the fields of battle of his special choice. But Napoleon
moved his armies as did all the great captains before him, and as must
do all great captains after him. Only American great captains sit down
in the mud and dig.

At times in the West, Pope, Mitchell, Nelson, Grant moved their
forces, and beat the enemy. I am sure that these brave generals and
the braves of the army of the Potomac most certainly are early risers.
A certain Napoleon never is visible before nine o'clock in the
morning. So I hear from a French officer who is not in the service,
but follows the movements of the Potomac army.

In McClellan's army Heintzelman, Hooker, Kearney, Sumner, and many
others, would move quick, would fight and beat; but a leaden weight
presses, and solders them to the mud. I must write an article to the
press concerning the rapidity of movements,--this golden rule for any
conduct of a war.

Since he was in the field, McNapoleon neither planned nor assisted in
person in any encounter. When are his great plans to burst out?

In one of his recently published dispatches, Mr. Seward makes an awful
mistake in trying to establish the difference between a revolution and
a civil war, as to their respective relations to foreign interference
and support. A little knowledge of history, and a less presumption,
would have spared to him such an exposure. A revolution in a nation
can be effected, and generally is effected, without a foreign
intervention, and without even an appeal to it. Most of the civil wars
look to foreign help. So teaches history, whatever may be Mr. Seward's
contrary generalizations.

Mr. Seward is unrelenting in his efforts to build up the Union-saving
slavery party, and is sure, as he says, to be able to manage the
Republicans, in and out of Congress. We shall see.

Senator Sumner very well discusses the tax-bill, and again shows the
practical side of his intellect. Sumner proves that a laborious
intellect can grasp and master the most complicated matters. If Sumner
could only have more experience of men and things, he would not be so
Germanly--_naïve_.

Mr. Seward triumphantly publishes the Turkish hatti, by which pirates
are excluded from the Ottoman ports. Oh, Jemine! to be patronized by
the Turks! Misfortune brings one with strange bedfellows.

On the occasion of the organization of slaves at Beaufort, Mr. Lincoln
exclaimed, "Slavery is a big job, and will smother us!" It will, if
dealt with in your way, Mr. President.

McClellan sends for mortars and hundred-pounders; these monsters are
to fight, but not he. Well, even so, if possible.

The Southern leaders send to Europe officers of artillery to buy arms
and ammunition, and are well served. Our good administration sends
speculators, railroad engineers, agents of sewing machines, and the
arms bought by them kill our own soldiers, and not the enemies.

English papers taunt the Americans that in one hundred years the
country must become a monarchy. The Americans have now a foretaste of
some among the features of monarchy, among others of favoritism. The
Pompadours and the Dubarrys could not have sustained a McClellan at
the cost of so many lives and so many millions. Then the dabbling in
war, and other etc.'s, performed in the most approved Louis XIV.'s or
Nicolean style.

Worse than the rebels, and by far more abject and degraded, are the
defenders of slavery, of treason, and of rebellion in the Congress, in
the press, and in the public opinion. No gallows high enough for
them.

McClellan crowds the marshes with heavy artillery, and may easily lose
them at the smallest disaster. His army is overburdened with artillery
in a country where the moving of guns must be exceedingly difficult,
nay, often impossible. And then the difficulty of having such a large
number of men drilled for the service of guns. Scarcely any army in
Europe possesses artillerists in such numbers as are now required
here. Few guns well served make more execution than large numbers of
them fired at random.

Instead of concentrating his army and attacking at once the rebels in
Richmond, McClellan extends his army over nearly sixty miles! To keep
such an extensive line more than 300,000 would be required. Oh,
heavens! this man is more ignorant of warfare than his worst enemies
have suspected him.

It is reported that at Corinth the rebels had not only wooden guns,
but cotton manikins as sentries. God grant it may not be true, as it
would make the slow, pedantic Halleck even below McClellan.

The future historian will be amazed, bewildered, nay, he may lose his
senses, discovering the heaps of confusion and of ignorance which
caused the disasters of Banks, the escape of Jackson, etc., etc.

It is impossible to resist the admiration inspired by the skill, the
daring, the fertility of intellectual resources displayed by the
rebels; all this is so thoroughly contrasted by what is done by our
legal chiefs.

Pity that such manhood is shown in the defence of the most infamous
cause ever known in the history of the world. To conquer an
independence with the sole object to procreate, to breed, to traffic
in, and to whip slaves!

The navy is glorious everywhere, and not fussy. The people can never
sufficiently remunerate the navy, if patriotic services are to be
remunerated. The same would be with the army but for the Napoleons!

The published correspondence between the rebels Rust and Hunter fully
justifies my confidence in Louis Napoleon's sound judgment. That
publication clearly establishes how the press here is wholly unable to
conceive or to comprehend the policy of the great European nations.
The press heaps outrages and nurses suspicions against Napoleon. The
Sandfords and others knowingly stir up suspicions to make believe that
their smartness averts the evil. Poor chaps! When great interests are
at stake, neither their fuss, nor any dispatch, however elaborate, can
exercise a shadow of influence.

It seems that a Babylonian confusion prevails in the movements, in the
distribution, and in the combination of the various parts of the army
under McClellan. I should wonder if it were otherwise, with such a
general and supported by such a chief of the staff.

Brave old Gideon Welles (Neptune) instructing his sailors to fight,
and not to calculate, and "not to deliver anybody against his personal
wish."

These imbecile reporters and letter-writers for the press, and other
sensationists, make me enraged with their sneers at the poverty of the
rebels. If so, the more heroism. They forget the "beggars" of the
Dutch insurrection against Philip II.

The cat is out, and I am sorry for it. The world is informed that the
revolution is finished, and now the civil war begins. Oh generalizer!
oh philosopher of history! oh prophet as to the speedy end of the
civil _war_! Oh stop, oh stop! Not by digging will your pet McClellan
bring the war to a speedy close.

I am often enraged against myself not to be able to admire Mr. Seward,
and to be obliged to judge his whole policy in such, perhaps too
severe, a manner. What can I do, what can I do? No one, not even Gen.
Scott and Mr. Lincoln, since January, 1861, has exercised an influence
equal to Mr. Seward's on the affairs of the country, and _amicus
Plato, etc., sed magis amica veritas_.

Mr. Seward believes that July 4th will be celebrated by us in
Richmond. He and McClellan spread this hope; Doolittle believes it. We
could be in Richmond any day under any other general, not a Napoleon;
we may never be there if led on by McClellan, inspired by Mr. Seward's
policy.

The French amateur in McClellan's army is disgusted with McNapoleon,
and speaks with contempt of the reckless waste of men, of material,
etc. He calls it cruel, brainless, and uses a great many other
exclamations.

The healthful activity of Stanton, his broad and clear perception of
almost all exigencies of these critical times, are continually baffled
and neutralized by the allied McClellan, Blair, Seward, New York Times
and New York Herald. Such an alliance can easily confuse even the
strongest brains.

The colonization again on the _tapis_, and all the wonted display of
ignorance, stupidity, ill-will, and phariseeism towards genuine
liberty.

Seward gave up his Yucatan scheme. Chiriqui has the lead. And finally,
some foreign diplomats try to make conspicuous their little royalties.
So Denmark tries to cultivate the barren rocks of St. Thomas with the
poor captives. It will be a new kind of apprenticeship under cruel
masters. I hear that Mr. Lincoln is caught in the trap, and that a
convention _ad hoc_ is soon to be concluded. This time, at least, Mr.
Seward's name will remain outside.

I am uneasy, fearing we may commit some spread-eagleism towards France
during this present Mexican imbroglio. I will do my utmost to explain
to influential senators the truth concerning Louis Napoleon's
political conduct towards the North, the absurdity of any hostile
demonstration against France, and the dirt constituting the substratum
of the new Mexican treaty.

"French policy may change towards us," say the anti-Napoleons; "Louis
Napoleon will unmask his diplomatic batteries," etc., etc.

Well, Louis Napoleon may change when he finds that we are incorrigible
imbeciles, and that the great interests, which to defend is his duty,
are jeopardized; but not before. As for masked batteries, I considered
worse than fools all those who believed in masked batteries at
Manassas; and in the same light I consider all the believers in
diplomatic masked batteries. I was not afraid of the one, and am not
of the other.

Not one single French vessel has run, or attempted to run, the
blockade; not one has left the ports of France, or of the French West
Indies, loaded with arms or ammunition for the insurgents. As for the
barking of French papers, or of some second or third rate saloons,
barkings thus magnified by American letter-writers, I know too much of
Paris and of society to take notice of it. I am sure that the whole
rebel tross in Paris, male and female, have not yet been admitted into
any single saloon of the _real_ good or high society in Paris, and
never will be. A thus called _highly accomplished and fashionable
lady_ from New Orleans, or from Washington, may easily be taken for a
country dress-maker, or for a chamber-maid, not fit for first families
of the genuine good and high society in Paris, and all over Europe.

Stanton, the true patriot, frets in despair at McClellan's keeping the
army in the unhealthiest place of Virginia. Stanton's opponents, the
rats, find all right, even the deaths by disease. In the end
McClellan is to be all the better for it. Is there no penitentiary for
all this mob?

New regiments pour in, the people are sublime in their devotion; only
may these regiments not become sacrificed to the Jaggernaut of
imbecility.

Whatever may say its revilers, this Congress will have a noble and
pure page in American history. I speak of the majority.

The Congress showed energy, clear and broad comprehension and
appreciation of the events and of men. The Congress was ready for
every sacrifice, and would have accelerated the crushing of the
rebellion but for the formulas, and for the inadequacy of the majority
in the administration. If the Congress had no great leaders, the
better for it; it had honest and energetic men, and their leader was
their purpose, their pure belief in the justice of their cause and in
the people. Such leaders elevate higher any political body than could
ever a Clay, a Webster, etc., etc.

The Congress is palsied by the inefficiency of the administration, and
but for this, the Congress would have done far more for the salvation
of the country. All the best men in Congress support Stanton, and this
alone speaks volumes. It is a curse that the administration is so
independent of the Congress. Oh, why this Congress possesses not the
omnipotence of an English Parliament? Then the Congress would have
prevented all the evils hitherto brought upon the country by the
vacillating military and general policy. Step by step this policy
brings the country to the verge of an abyss, and it will tax all the
energy of the people not to be precipitated in it.

Mr. Lincoln has gone to get inspiration and information from Gen.
Scott. Good God! Can this man never go out from this rotten treadmill?
One more advice from the "great ruin," and the country will also be a
ruin.

Flatterers, sensation writers, and all this _magna clientum caterva_
extol to the skies Mr. Lincoln's firmness and straightforwardness. The
firmness is located, and is to be discovered in various places--in the
lips, in the chin, in the jaw, and God knows where else. I cannot
detect any firmness in his actions beyond that of sticking to
McClellan,--of whom he has the worst opinion,--and of resisting the
emancipation and the arming of Africo-Americans. He has firmness in
letting the country be ruined.

McClellan's bulletins constitute the most original and strange
collection of style in general, and of military style in particular.
Capt. Morin says that the first thing is to teach McClellan how to
write military bulletins.

Mr. Seward's crew of politicians is busily at work among congressmen,
etc., to prepare a strong party in support of the administration's
eventual concessions to slavery, in case Richmond is taken. Ultra
Democratic, half secession Senators are sounded.

The more the events complicate, the more they require a powerful,
all-embracing mind, but in the same proportion subside Mr. Lincoln,
Mr. Seward, Mr. Weed, and all the rest of the great men. Alone the
people and their true men subside not.

Poor McDowell suffers for the sins of others--above all, for those of
Mr. Lincoln and of his aulic council. He is internally broken down,
but behaves nobly; not as does this poor Fremont, whose disappearance
from the military scene cannot and must not be regretted. He is not a
military capacity; he was again badly surrounded, and his last battle
was fought at random, without any unity. I spoke about it with various
foreign officers serving under him, and all agree in the incapacity of
Fremont and of his staff.

Gen. Pope, a man for the circumstances, acted well in the West; at
last a new man.

McClellan inaugurated new tactics. It is to approach the enemy's army
by parallels and by trenches. He will not take or scare the enemy, but
he will immortalize his name far above the immortality of all not
great generals.

Night and day ambulances are conveying the sick and wounded here, and
large numbers, thousands upon thousands, going north. One must cry
tears of blood to witness such destruction, such a sacrifice of the
noblest people on the shrine of utter military incapacity. And the
traitors, the imbeciles, and the intriguers sing _hallelujah_ to
McClellan, and daily throw their slime at Stanton.

From time to time rumors and complaints are made concerning the
ill-will or disloyalty of some of the _employés_ in the Departments.
The explanation thereof may be that some of the thus called old
fogies, above all in the War Department, may be unfriendly to the war
without being disloyal. Such venerables took root in comfortable
situations; they slowly trod in the easy path of rusty and musty
routine, and at once the war shook them to the bone, exposing the
incapacity and the inefficiency of many; it forced upon them the
horror of _cogitandi_ about new matters, and an amount of daily duties
to be performed in offices which formerly equalled sinecures. Further,
these relics dread to be superseded by more active and intelligent
men; and _inde iræ_.




JULY, 1862.

     Intervention -- The cursed fields of the Chickahominy -- Titanic
     fightings, but no generalship -- McClellan the first to reach
     James river -- The Orleans leave -- July 4th, the gloomiest since
     the birth of the republic -- Not reinforcements, but brains,
     wanted; and brains not transferable! -- The people run to the
     rescue -- Rebel tactics -- Lincoln does not sacrifice Stanton --
     McClellan not the greatest culprit -- Stanton a true statesman --
     The President goes to James river -- The Union as it was, a
     throttling nightmare! -- A man needed! -- Confiscation bill
     signed -- Congress adjourned -- Mr. Dicey -- Halleck, the
     American Carnot -- Lincoln tries to neutralize the confiscation
     bill -- Guerillas spread like locusts.


When at epochs of great social convulsions events and circumstances
put certain individuals into an eminent or elevated position, their
names become intertwined with the great epoch. In the eyes of the
masses and of the vulgar observers, such names acquire a high
importance on account of the commonly made confusion between
circumstances and personal merit, and, moonlight-like, such names
reverberate not their own, but a borrowed splendor. Thus much for the
official pilots of this great people.

The usual paroxysm of the foreign intervention fever. It ought to be
so easy to understand, that out of self-respect foreign powers will
not risk any intervention on paper; and to make an effective
intervention a hundred thousand men will be necessary, as the first
course. For such a service no foreign power is prepared. Intervention
is silly talk. McClellan and all kinds of his supporters do more for
the South than could England and France united.

It was a poor trick to gather by telegraph the signatures of the
governors for an offer of troops to the President. It was done for
effect in Europe; but events seem to have a grudge against Mr. Seward;
the same steamer carried over the Atlantic the news of our defeats in
the Chickahominy swamps.

To attempt a change of such an extensive basis as was occupied by our
army under the eyes of a daring, able, skilful enemy, in a country
wooded and marshy, and without roads! This movement was perhaps
necessary, and could not be avoided; but why at the start had such a
basis been selected? Such a selection made disasters inevitable, and
they followed.

All kinds of accounts pour in from these cursed fields of the
Chickahominy. Foreign officers--whose veracity I can believe--speak
enthusiastically of the undaunted bravery of the volunteers and of
their generals; _but a general generalship_ was not to be found during
those titanic fightings. What I gathered from the _suite_ of the
Orleans is, that Gen. McClellan was totally confused, was totally
ignorant of the condition of the corps, was never within distance to
give or to be asked for orders, and was the first to reach the banks
of the James and to sleep on board the gunboat Galena. At Winchester,
Banks in person covered the retreat.

The Orleans left. I pity them; they will be hooted in Europe. They
shared some of McClellan's fallacious and petty notions, and very
likely they have been gulled by the McClellan-Seward expectations of
taking Richmond before July 4th.

Gen. Hunter's letter about fugitive slaves, and rebels fugitive from
the flag of the Union, is the noblest contra distinction. No rhetor
could have invented it. Hang yourselves, oh rhetors!

_July 4th._--The gloomiest since the birth of this republic. Never was
the country so low, and after such sacrifices of blood, of time, and
of money; and all this slaughtered to that Juggernaut of strategy, and
to the ignoble motley of his supporters.

Oh you widows, bereaved mothers, sisters, and sweethearts, cry for
vengeance! Cry for vengeance, you shadows of the dead of the malaria,
or fallen in the defence of your country's honor. Stupidity has
stabbed in the back more deadly wounds than did the enemy in front.
This is the 4th of July. Oh! my old heart and my, not weak, mind are
bursting with grief.

The people, the masses, sacrifice their blood, their time, their
fortune. What sacrifice the official leaders and pilots? All is net
gain for them. Thousands and thousands of families will be
impoverished for life, nay, for generations. It is those nameless
heroes on the fields of battle who alone uphold the honor of the
American name, as it is the people at large who have the true
statesmanship, and not the appointed guardsmen.

Rats, hounds, all the vermin, all the impure beasts, are after
Stanton, for his not having sent reinforcements to McClellan; but none
existed, and McClellan has exhausted and devoured all the reserves.
Not reinforcements, but brains, were wanted, and brains are not
transferable.

The people, sublime, runs again to the rescue, and Mr. Seward is so
sacrilegious, so impious, as to say that the people is generally slow.
He is fast on the road of confusion.

I am sure that the whole movement and attack of the rebels was made,
as it could be made, at the utmost with 60,000 to 70,000 men, if even
with such a number. The rebels never attacked our whole line, but
always threw superior forces on some weak and isolated point. This the
rebels did during the last battles. The rebels showed great
generalship. Jackson is already the legendary hero, and deserves to
be.

McClellan never attacked, but _always_ was surprised and forced to
fight, so the rebels were sure that he would not dare anything to
counteract and counter-manoeuvre their daring; so the rebel generals
had perfect ease for the execution of their bold but skilful plans.

Lincoln sacrifices not Stanton, not even to Seward, to Blair, and to
the slaveocrats in Congress. That is something.

McClellan publishes a pompous order of the day for the 4th of July,
and apes the phraseology of Napoleon's bulletins from times when by a
blow Napoleon overthrew empires.

What I can gather from the accounts of the seven days' fighting is,
that during the battle at Gaines' Mills (to speak technically),
positively the whole army was without any basis. But traitors,
imbeciles and intriguers rend the air and the skies with their praises
of the great strategy and of the brilliant generalship.

I am aware how difficult it will be to convince the heroic army--that
is, its rank and file--that their disasters result from want of
generalship, and not from any inferiority in numbers. All over the
world incapable commanders raise the outcry of deficiency in numbers
to cover therewith their personal deficiency of brains. Similar events
to McClellan's wails, and the confusion they create in the armies and
in the people, are nothing new in the history of wars.

A fleet of gunboats covers the army on the James river. Once McClellan
condescendingly boasted that he would take care of the gunboats. The
worst is, that these gunboats could have done service against
Charleston, Mobile, Savannah, etc.

After all, McClellan is not the greatest culprit. It is not his fault
that he is without military brains and without military capacity. He
tried to do the best, according to his poor intellect. The great,
eternally-to-be-damned malefactors are those who kept him in command
after having had repeated proofs of his incapacity; and still greater
are those constitutional advisers who supported McClellan against the
outcry of the best in the Cabinet and in the nation. A time may come
when the children of those malefactors will be ashamed of their
fathers' names, and--curse them.

I have not scorn enough against the revilers and accusers of Stanton.
If Stanton could have had his free will, far different would be the
condition of affairs. Stanton's first appearance put an end to the
prevailing lethargy, and marked a new and glorious era. But, ah! how
short! The rats and the vermin were afraid of him, and took shelter
behind the incarnated strategy. Stanton embraced and embraces the
_ensemble_ of the task and of the field before him. And this
politician, Blair, to be his critic! If Stanton had been left
undisturbed in the execution of his duties as the Secretary of War,
McClellan would have been obliged to march directly to Richmond, and
the brainless strategy in the Peninsula would have been crushed in the
bud. If Stanton had not been undermined, not only the people would
have been saved from terrible disasters, but McClellan, Lincoln,
Seward, and Blair would have been saved from reproaches and from
malediction.

Stanton likewise shows himself to be a true statesman. A Democrat in
politics, he very likely never was such a violent and decided opponent
of slavery as the Sewards and Blairs professed to be throughout their
whole lives. But now Stanton pierces the fog, perceives the
unavoidable exigencies, and is an emancipationist, when the Sewards
and the Blairs try to compromise, nay, virtually to preserve slavery.

_July 10th._--The rebels won time to increase and gather their forces
from the south. McClellan's army may not prevent their turning against
Pope, who has too small a body to resist or to cover the whole line
from Fredericksburg to the Shenandoah. If the rebels attack Pope he
must retreat and concentrate before Washington; and then again begins
the uphill work. The people generally pour in blood, time and money;
but brains, brains are needed, and, without violating the formulas,
the people cannot inaugurate brains. Whatever the people may do, the
same quacks and bunglers will over again commit the same blunders.
Nothing can teach a little foresight to the helmsman and to some of
his seconds. Rocked by his imagination, Mr. Seward never sees clearly
the events before him and what they generate.

The call for three hundred thousand men will be responded to. The men
will come; but will statesmanship and generalship come with them? I am
afraid that the rebels, operating with promptness and energy, may give
no time to the levies to be fully organized; the rebels will press on
Washington.

McClellan reports to the President that he has only 50,000 men left.
The President goes to James river, and finds 83,000 ready for action.
Was it ignorance in McClellan, or his inborn disrespect of truth, or
disrespect of the country, or something worse, that made him make such
a report? And all this passes, and Mr. Lincoln cannot hurt McClellan,
although a gory shroud extends over the whole country.

A secretary of the French consul is here, and confirms my speculations
concerning the numbers of the rebels in the last battles on the
Chickahominy. The current and authoritative opinion in Richmond is,
that from the Potomac to the Rio Grande the rebel force never exceeded
300,000 men. If so, the more glory; and it must be so, according to
the rational analysis of statistics.

Mr. Seward writes a skilful dispatch to explain the battles on the
Chickahominy. But no skill can succeed to bamboozle the cold,
clear-sighted European statesmen.

No doubt Mr. Seward sincerely wished to save the Union in his own way
and according to his peculiar conception, and, after having
accomplished it, disappear from the political arena, surrounded by the
halo of national gratitude.

But even for this aim of reconstruction of the Union as it was, Mr.
Seward, at the start, took the wrong track, and took it because he is
ignorant of history and of the logic in human affairs. To save the
Union as it was, it was imperatively necessary to strike quick and
crushing blows, and to do this in May, June, etc., 1861. Mr. Seward
could have realized then what now is only a throttling nightmare--_the
Union as it was_. But Mr. Seward sustained a policy of delays and not
of blows; the struggle protracts, and, for reasons repeatedly
mentioned, the suppression of rebellion becomes more and more
difficult, and the reconstruction of the old Union as it was a
_mirage_ of his imagination.

But it is not Thurlow Weed, and others of that stamp, who could
enlighten Mr. Seward on such subjects--far, far above their vulgar and
mean politicianism. It is now useless to accuse and condemn Congress
for its so-called violence, as does Mr. Seward, and to assert that but
for Congress he, Mr. Seward, would have long ago patched up the
quarrel. The Congress may be as tame as a lamb, and as subject as a
foot-sole. Mr. Seward may on his knees proffer to the rebels a
compromise and the most stringent safeguards for slavery; to-day the
rebels will spurn all as they would have spurned it during the whole
year. The rebels will act as Mason did when in the Senate hall Mr.
Seward asked the traitor to be introduced to Mr. Lincoln.

The country is in more need of a man than of the many hundreds of
thousands of new levies.

Some time ago Mr. Seward gathered around him his devotees in Congress
(few in number), and unveiled to them that nobody can imagine what
superhuman efforts it cost him to avert foreign intervention. Very
unnecessary demonstration, as he knows it well himself, and, if it
gets into the papers, may turn out to be offensive to the two
cabinets, as they give to Mr. Seward no reason for making such
statements. Should England and France ever decide upon any such step,
then Mr. Seward may write as a Cicero, have all the learning of a
Hugo Grotius, of a Vattel, and of all other publicists combined; he
may send legions of Weeds and Sandfords to Europe, and all this will
not weigh a feather with the cabinets of London and of Paris.

Further, no foreign powers occasioned our defeats _in the
Chickahominy_, but those who were enraptured with the Peninsula
strategy.

Mr. Seward's letter to the great meeting in New York shows that not
his patriotism, but his confidence in success, is slightly notched.

Nobody doubts his patriotism; but Mr. Seward tried to shape mighty
events into a mould after his not-over-gigantic mind, and now he frets
because these events tear his sacrilegious hand.

After much opposition, vacillation, hesitation, and aversion, the
President signed the confiscation and emancipation bill. A new
evidence of how devotedly he wishes to avert any deadly blows from
slavery,--this national shame.

The Congress adjourned after having done everything good, and what was
in its power. It separated, leaving the country's cause in a worse
condition than it was a year ago, after the Bull Run day. Many, nay,
almost all the best members of both houses are fully aware in what
hands they left the destinies of the nation. Many went away with
despair in their hearts; but the constitutional formula makes it
impossible for them to act, and to save what so badly needs a savior.

Intervention fever again. The worst intervention is perpetrated at
home by imbeciles, by intriguers, by traitors, and by the--spades.

Mr. Dicey, an Englishman who travelled or travels in this
country,--Mr. D. is the first among his countrymen who understands the
events here, and who is just toward the true American people;--Mr. D.
truly says that the people fight without a general, and without a
statesman, and are the more to be admired for it.

Mr. Seward tries to appear grand before the foreign diplomats, and
talks about Cromwell, Louis Napoleon, _coup d'États_ against the
Congress, and about his regrets to be in the impossibility to imitate
them. Only think, Cromwell, Napoleon I., Napoleon III., Seward! Such
dictatorial dreams may explain Mr. Seward's partiality for General
McClellan, whom Seward may perhaps wish to use as Louis Napoleon used
Gen. St. Arnoud.

Halleck is to be the American Carnot. But any change is an
improvement. If Halleck extricates the army on the James river, and
saves it from malaria,--this enemy more deadly than Jackson and
McClellan combined,--then for this single action Halleck deserves well
of the country, and his Corinth affair will, at least in part, be
atoned for.

Mr. Lincoln makes a new effort to save his _mammy_, and tries to
neutralize the confiscation bill. Mr. Lincoln will not make a step
beyond what is called the Border-States' policy; and it may prove too
late when he will decide to honestly execute the law of Congress. Mr.
Seward gets into hysterics at the hateful name of Congress. Similar
spite he showed to a delegation from the city of New York, upbraiding
some of its members, and assuring them that delegations are not
needed,--that the administration is fully up to the task. Yes, Stanton
is, but how about some others?

Poor Mr. Lincoln! he must stand all the mutual puffs of Seward and
Sandford, and some more in store for him when the Weeds and Hughes
will come and give an account of their doings in Europe.

The report of the battle against Casey, as published by the rebel
General Johnston, is a masterpiece of military style, and shows how
skilfully the attack was combined. The Southern leaders have
exclusively in view the triumph of their cause. With many of our
leaders, the people's cause is made to square with their little
selfishness.

Guerillas spread like locusts. Perhaps they are the results of our
Union-searching, slavery-saving policy.




AUGUST, 1862.

     Emancipation -- The President's hand falls back -- Weed sent for
     -- Gen. Wadsworth -- The new levies -- The Africo-Americans not
     called for -- Let every Northern man be shot rather! -- End of
     the Peninsula campaign -- Fifty or sixty thousand dead -- Who is
     responsible? -- The army saved -- Lincoln and McClellan -- The
     President and the Africo-Americans -- An Eden in Chiriqui --
     Greeley -- The old lion begins to awake -- Mr. Lincoln tells
     stories -- The rebels take the offensive -- European opinion --
     McClellan's army landed -- Roebuck -- Halleck -- Butler's
     mistakes -- Hunter recalled -- Terrible fighting at Manassas --
     Pope cuts his way through -- Reinforcements slow in coming --
     McClellan reduced in command.


_Vulgatior fama est_, that Mr. Lincoln was already raising his hand to
sign a stirring proclamation on the question of emancipation; that
Stanton was upholding the President's arm that it might not grow weak
in the performance of a sacred duty; that Chase, Bates, and Welles
joined Stanton; but that Messrs. Seward and Blair so firmly objected
that the President's outstretched hand slowly began to fall back; that
to precipitate the mortification, Thurlow Weed was telegraphed; that
Thurlow Weed presented to Mr. Lincoln the Medusa-head of Irish riots
in the North against the emancipation of slaves in the South; that Mr.
Lincoln's mind faltered (oh, Steffens) before such a Chinese shadow,
and that thus once more slavery was saved. _Relata refero._

General Wadsworth is the good genius of the poor and oppressed race.
But for Wadsworth's noble soul and heart the Lamons and many other
blood-hounds in Washington would have given about three-fourths of the
fugitives over to the whip of the slavers.

Within the last four weeks 600,000 new levies are called to arms. With
the 600,000 men levied previously, it is the heaviest draft ever made
from a population. No emperor or despot ever did it in a similar lapse
of time. The appreciation current here is, that the twenty millions of
inhabitants can easily furnish such a quota; but the truth is that the
draft, or the levy, or the volunteering, is made from about three
millions of men between the ages of twenty and forty years. One
million two hundred thousand in one year is equal to nearly 36-100,
and this from the most vital, the most generative, and most productive
part of the population.

The same analysis and percentage applied to the statistics of the
population in the rebel States gives a little above 300,000 men under
arms; however, the percentage of the drafts from the full-aged
population in the South can be increased by some 15-100 over the
percentage in the North. This increase is almost exclusively
facilitated by the substratum of slavery, and our administration
devotedly takes care _ne detrimentum capiat_ that peculiar
institution.

The last draft could be averted from the North if the four millions of
loyal Africo-Americans were called to arms. But Mr. Lincoln, with the
Sewards, the Blairs, and others, will rather see every Northern man
shot than to touch the palladium of the rebels.

These new enormous masses will crush the rebellion, provided they are
not marshalled by strategy; but nevertheless the painful confession
must be made, that our putting in the field of three to one rebel may
confuse a future historian, and contribute to root more firmly that
stupid fallacy already asserted by the rebels, and by some among their
European upholders, of the superiority of the Southern over the
Northern thus called race. Such a stigma is inflicted upon the brave
and heroic North by the strategy, and by the vacillating, slave-saving
policy of the administration.

This is the more painful for me to record, as most of the foreign
officers in our service, and who are experienced and good judges, most
positively assert the superior fighting qualities of the Union
volunteers over the rebels. Our troops are better fed, clad and armed,
but over our army hovers the thick mist of strategy and indecision;
the rebels are led not by anaconda strategians, but by fighting
generals, desperate, and thus externally heroic; energy inspires their
councils, their administration, and their military leaders.

If Stanton and Halleck succeed in extricating the army on the James
river, then they will deserve the gratitude of the people. The malaria
there must be more destructive than would be many battles.

Events triumphantly justify Stanton's opposition to the Peninsula
strategy and campaign. So ends this horrible sacrifice; between fifty
and sixty thousand killed or dead by diseases. The victims of this
holocaust have fallen for their country's cause, but the
responsibility for the slaughter is to be equally divided between
McClellan, Lincoln, Seward and Blair. Even Sylla had not on his soul
so much blood as has the above quatuor. When, after the victory over
the allied Samnites and others, at the Colline gate of Rome, Sylla
ordered the massacre of more than four thousand prisoners who laid
down their arms; when his lists of proscription filled with blood Rome
and other cities of Italy, Sylla so firmly consolidated the supremacy
of the _Urbs_ over Italy and over the world, that after twenty
centuries of the most manifold vicissitudes, transformations and
tempests, this supremacy cannot yet be upturned. But the holocaust to
strategy resulted in humiliating the North and in heaping glory on the
Southern leaders.

If the newly called 600,000 men finish the rebellion before Congress
meets, then slavery is saved. To save slavery and to avoid
emancipation was perhaps the secret aim of Mr. Lincoln, Seward, and
Blair; who knows but that of Halleck, when the administration called
for the additional 300,000 men?

Persons who approach Halleck say that he is a thorough pro-slavery
partisan. His order No. 3, the opinion of some officers of his staff,
and his associations, make me believe in the truth of that report.

Mr. Seward says _sub rosa_ to various persons, that slavery is an
obsolete question, and he assures others that emancipation is a fixed
fact, and is no more to be held back; that he is no more a
conservative. How are we to understand this man? If Mr. Seward is
sincere, then his last transformation may prove that he has given up
the idea of finding a Union party in the South, or that he wishes to
reconquer--what he has lost--the confidence of the party. But this
return on his part may prove _troppo tardi_.

The army of the Potomac is saved; the heroes, martyrs, and sufferers
are extricated from the grasp of death. This epopee in the history of
the civil war will immortalize the army, but the strategian's
immortality will differ from that of the army.

England and France firm in their neutrality. Lord John Russell's
speeches in Parliament are all that can be desired.

Will it ever be thoroughly investigated and elucidated why, after the
evacuation of Corinth, the onward march of our everywhere-victorious
Western armies came at once to a stand-still? The guerillas, the
increase of forces in Richmond, and some eventual disasters, may be
directly traced to this inconceivable conduct on the part of the
Western commanders or of the Commander-in-chief. Was not some
Union-searching at the bottom of that stoppage? When, months ago, a
false rumor was spread about the evacuation of Memphis and Corinth,
Mr. Seward was ready to start for the above-mentioned places, of
course in search of the Union feeling. Perhaps others were drawn into
this Union-searching, Union and slavery-restoring conspiracy.

I have most positive reasons to believe that Gen. Halleck wished to
remove Gen. McClellan from the command of the army. The President
opposed to it. Men of honor, of word, and of truth, and who are on
intimate footing with Mr. Lincoln, repeatedly assured me that, in his
conversation, the President judges and appreciates Gen. McClellan as
he is judged and appreciated by those whom his crew call his enemies.
With all this, Mr. Lincoln, through thin and thick, supports McClellan
and maintains him in command. Such a double-dealing in the chief of a
noble people! Seemingly Mr. Seward and Mr. Blair always exercise the
most powerful influence. Both wished that the army remain in the
malarias of the James river. Whatever be their reasons, one shudders
in horror at the case with which all those culprits look on this
bloody affair. Oh you widowed wives, mothers, and sweethearts! oh you
orphaned children! oh you crippled and disabled, you impoverished and
ruined, by sacrificing to your country more than do all the Lincolns,
McClellans, Blairs, and Sewards! Some day you will ask a terrible
account, and if not the present day, posterity will avenge you.

It is very discouraging to witness that the President shows little or
no energy in his dealings with incapacities, and what a mass of
intrigues is used to excuse and justify incapacity when the nation's
life-blood runs in streams. Without the slightest hesitation any
European government would dismiss an incapable commander of an army,
and the French Convention, that type of revolutionary and
nation-saving energy, dealt even sharper with military and other
incapacities.

Regiments after regiments begin to pour in, to make good the deadly
mistakes of our rulers. The people, as always, sublime, inexhaustible
in its sacrifices! God grant that administrative incompetency may
become soon exhausted!

Mr. Seward told a diplomat that his (Seward's) salary was $8,000, and
he spends double the amount; thus sacrificing to the country $8,000.
When I hear such reports about him, I feel ashamed and sorrowful on
his account. Such talk will not increase esteem for him among
foreigners and strangers; and although I am sure that Mr. Seward
intended to make a joke, even as such it was worse than a poor one.

In his interview with a deputation composed of Africo-Americans, Mr.
Lincoln rehearsed all the clap-trap concerning the races, the
incompatibility to live together, and other like _bosh_. Mr. Lincoln
promised to them an Eden--in Chiriqui. Mr. Lincoln promised them--what
he ought to know is utterly impossible and beyond his power--that they
will form an independent community in a country already governed by
orderly and legally organized States, as are New Grenada and Costa
Rica. Happily even for Mr. Lincoln's name, the logic of human events
will save from exposure his ignorance of international laws, and his
too light and too quick assertions. I pity Mr. Lincoln; his honesty
and unfamiliarity with human affairs, with history, with laws, and
with other like etceteras, continually involve him in unnecessary
scrapes.

The proclamation concerning the colonization is issued. It is a
display of ignorance or of humbug, or perhaps of both. Some of the
best among Americans do not utter their condemnation of this
colonization scheme, because the President is to be allowed _to carry
out his hobby_. The despots of the Old World will envy Mr. Lincoln.
Those despots can no more _carry out their hobbies_. The _Roi s'amuse_
had its time; but the _il bondo can_ of some here, at times, beats
that of the _Italina in Algero_.

The two letters of Greeley to the President show that the old,
indomitable lion begins to awake. As to Mr. Lincoln's answer, it reads
badly, and as for all the rest, it is the eternal dodging of a vital
question.

Mr. Lincoln's equanimity, although not so stoical, is unequalled. In
the midst of the most stirring and exciting--nay, death-giving--news,
Mr. Lincoln has always a story to tell. This is known and experienced
by all who approach him. Months ago I was in Mr. Lincoln's presence
when he received a telegram announcing the crossing of the Mississippi
by Gen. Pope, at New Madrid. Scarcely had Mr. Lincoln finished the
reading of the dispatch, when he cracked (that is the sacramental
word) two not very washed stories.

When the history of this administration shall become well known,
contemporary and future generations will wonder and be puzzled to know
how the most intelligent and enlightened people in the world could
produce such fruits and results of self-government.

The rebel chiefs take the offensive; they unfold a brilliancy in
conception and rapidity in execution of which the best generals in any
army might be proud. McClellan's army was to be prevented from uniting
with Pope. But it seems that Pope manoeuvres successfully, and
approaches McClellan.

If only our domestic policy were more to the point, England and France
could not be complained of. Mr. Mercier behaves here as loyally as can
be wished, and carefully avoids evoking any misunderstandings
whatever. So do Louis Napoleon, Mr. Thouvenel, Lord John Russell,
notwithstanding Mr. Seward's all-confusing policy. Mr. Mercier never,
never uttered in my presence anything whatever which in the slightest
manner could irritate even the _thinnest-skinned_ American.

As I expected, Louis Napoleon and Mr. Thouvenel highly esteem Mr.
Dayton; and it will be a great mistake to supersede Mr. Dayton in
Paris by the travelling agent of the sewing machine. It seems that
such a change is contemplated in certain quarters, because the agent
parleys poor French. Such a change will not be flattering, and will
not be agreeable to the French court, to the French cabinet, and to
the French good society.

On the continent of Europe sympathy begins to be unsettled, unsteady.
As independence is to-day the watchword in Europe, so the cause of the
rebels acquires a plausible justification. Various are the reasons of
this new counter current. Prominent among them is the vacillating, and
by Europeans considered to be INHUMAN, policy of Mr. Lincoln in regard
to slavery, the opaqueness of our strategy, and the brilliancy of the
tactics of the rebel generals, and, finally, the incapacity of our
agents to enlighten European public opinion, and to explain the true
and horrible character of the rebellion. Repeatedly I warned Mr.
Seward, telling him that the tide of public opinion was rising against
us in Europe, and I explained to him the causes; but of course it was
useless, as his agents say the contrary, and say it for reasons easily
to be understood.

McClellan's army landed, and he is to be in command of all the troops.
I congratulate all therein concerned about this new victory. Bleed, oh
bleed, American people! Mr. Lincoln and _consortes_ insisted that
McClellan remain in command. SISTE TANDEM CARNIFEX!

Mr. Roebuck, M. P., the gentleman! About thirty years ago, when
entering his public career as a member for Bath, Mr. Roebuck was
publicly slapped in the face during the going on of the election. A
few years ago Mr. Roebuck went to Vienna in the interests of some
lucrative railroad or Lloyd speculation, and returned to England a
fervent and devoted admirer of the Hapsburgs, and a reviler of all
that once was sacred to the disciple of Jeremy Bentham.

General Halleck may become the savior of the country. I hope and
ardently wish that it may be so, although his qualifications for it
are of a rather doubtful nature. Gen. Halleck wrote a book on military
science, as he wrote one on international laws, and both are laborious
compilations of other people's labors and ideas. But perhaps Halleck,
if not inspired, may become a regular, methodical captain. Such was
Moreau.

Also, Gen. Halleck is not to take the field in person. I am told that
it was so decided by Mr. Lincoln, against Halleck's wish. What an
anomalous position of a commander of armies, who is not to see a field
of battle! Such a position is a genuine, new American invention, but
it ought not to be patented, at least not for the use of other
nations. It is impossible to understand it, and it will puzzle every
one having sound common sense.

Gen. Butler commits a mistake in taunting and teasing the French
population and the French consul in New Orleans. When Butler was going
there, Mr. Seward ought to have instructed him concerning our friendly
relations with Louis Napoleon, and concerning the character of the
French consul in New Orleans, who was not partial to secesh. There may
be some secesh French, but the bulk, if well managed, would never take
a decided position against us as long as we were on friendly terms
with Louis Napoleon.

The President is indefatigable in his efforts to--save slavery, and to
uphold the policy of the New York Herald.

It is said that General Hunter is recalled, and so was General Phelps
from New Orleans; General Phelps could not coolly witness the
sacrilegious massacre of the slaves. The inconceivable partiality of
the President for McClellan may, after all, be possibly explained by
the fact that Mr. Lincoln and Mr. Seward see in McClellan a--savior of
slavery.

During two days' terrible fighting at Manassas, at Bull Run, and all
around, Pope cut his way through, but the reinforcements from
McClellan's army in Alexandria are _slow_ in coming. McClellan and his
few pets among the generals may not object to see Pope worsted. Such
things happened in other armies, even almost under the eyes of
Napoleon, as in the campaign on the Elbe, in 1813. Any one worth the
name of a general, when he has no special position to guard, and hears
the roar of cannon, by forced marches runs to the field of battle. Not
any special orders, but the roar of cannon, attracted and directed
Desaix to Marengo, and Mac Mahon to Magenta. The roar of cannon shook
the air between Bull Run and Alexandria, and ---- General McClellan
and others had positive orders to run to the rescue of Pope.

I should not wonder if the President, enthusiasmed by this new exploit
of McClellan, were to nominate him for his, the President's, eventual
successor; Mr. Blair will back the nomination.

It is said that during these last weeks, Wallach, the editor of the
unwashed _Evening Star_, is in continual intercourse with the
President. _Arcades ambo._

McClellan reduced in command; only when the life of the nation was
almost breathing its last. This concession was extorted from Mr.
Lincoln! What will Mr. Seward say to it?




SEPTEMBER, 1862.

     _Consummatum est!_ -- Will the outraged people avenge itself? --
     McClellan satisfies the President -- After a year! -- The truth
     will be throttled -- Public opinion in Europe begins to abandon
     us -- The country marching to its tomb -- Hooker, Kearney,
     Heintzelman, Sigel, brave and true men -- Supremacy of mind over
     matter -- Stanton the last Roman -- Inauguration of the pretorian
     regime -- Pope accuses three generals -- Investigation prevented
     by McClellan -- McDowell sacrificed -- The country inundated with
     lies -- The demoralized army declares for McClellan -- The
     pretorians will soon finish with liberty -- Wilkes sent to the
     West Indian waters -- Russia -- Mediation -- Invasion of Maryland
     -- Strange story about Stanton -- Richmond never invested --
     McClellan in search of the enemy -- Thirty miles in six days --
     The telegrams -- Wadsworth -- Capitulation of Harper's Ferry --
     Five days' fighting -- Brave Hooker wounded -- No results -- No
     reports from McClellan -- Tactics of the Maryland campaign --
     Nobody hurt in the staff -- Charmed lives -- Wadsworth, Judge
     Conway, Wade, Boutwell, Andrew -- This most intelligent people
     become the laughing-stock of the world! -- The proclamation of
     emancipation -- Seward to the Paisley Association -- Future
     complications -- If Hooker had not been wounded! -- The military
     situation -- Sigel persecuted by West Point -- Three cheers for
     the carriage and six! -- How the great captain was to catch the
     rebel army -- Interview with the Chicago deputation -- Winter
     quarters -- The conspiracy against Sigel -- Numbers of the rebel
     army -- Letters of marque.


The intrigues, the insubordination of McClellan's pets, have almost
exclusively brought about the disasters at Manassas and at Bull Run,
and brought the country to the verge of the grave. But the people are
not to know the truth.

CONSUMMATUM EST! The people's honor is stained--the country's cause on
the verge of the grave. Will this outraged people avenge itself on the
four or five diggers?

Old as I am, I feel a more rending pain now than I felt thirty years
ago when Poland was entombed. Here are at stake the highest interests
of humanity, of progress, of civilization. I find no words to utter my
feelings; my mind staggers. It is filled with darkness, pain, and
blood.

Mr. Lincoln is the standard-bearer of the policy of the New York
Herald. So, before him, were Pierce and Buchanan.

It is said that General McClellan fully satisfied the President of his
(the General's) complete innocence as to the delays which exclusively
generated the last disasters; also Gen. McClellan has justified
himself on military grounds. I wish the verdict of innocence may be
uttered by a court-martial of European generals. At any rate, the
country was thrown into an abyss.

_After a year!_--One hundred thousand of the best, bravest, the most
devoted men slaughtered; hundreds and hundreds of millions squandered;
the army again in the entrenchments of Washington; everywhere the
defensive and losses; the enemy on the Potomac, perhaps to invade the
free States; but McClellan is in command, his headquarters as
brilliant and as numerous as a year ago; the mean flunkeys at their
post; only the country's life-blood pours in streams; but--that is of
no account.

No acids are so dissolving and so corrosive as is the air of
Washington on patriotism. How few resist its action! Among the few are
Stanton, Chase (a passive patriot), Wadsworth, Dahlgren, and those
grouping around Stanton; so is Welles; likewise Fox; but they are
powerless. Washington is likewise the greatest garroter of truth; and
I am sure that the truth about the last battles will be throttled and
never elucidated.

_September 3._--The Cabinets of France and of England will have a very
hard stand to resist the pressure of public opinion, carried away by
the skill and by the plausible heroism of the rebels. Public opinion
will be clamorous that something be done in favor of the rebels.
Happily, nothing else can be done but a war, and this saves us. But if
the rebels succeed without Europe, the more glory for their chiefs,
the more ignominy for ours. Public opinion begins to abandon us in
Europe. Already I have explained some of the reasons for it.

The country is marching to its tomb, but the grave-diggers will not
confess their crime and their utter incapacity to save it. This their
stubbornness is even a greater crime. Will Halleck warn the country
against McClellan's incapacity?

We have such generals as Hooker, Heintzelman, Kearney, etc., who
fought continually, and with odds against them, and who never were
worsted. Those three, among the best of the army, fought under Pope
and mutineered not. In any other country such men would receive large,
even the superior command; here the palm belongs to the incapable,
the _slow_, and to the flatterer. The same with Sigel. His corps is
reduced to 6,000 men; common sense shows that he ought to have at
least 25,000 under him. Sigel begged the President to have more men;
the President sent him to Halleck and McClellan, who both snubbed him
off. By my prayer Sigel, although disheartened, went to Stanton, who
received him friendly and warmly, and promised to do his utmost.
Stanton will keep his word, if only the West Point envy will not
prevent him.

Hooker, Kearney, and Heintzelman were not in favor at the headquarters
in the Peninsula, and their commands have been continually
disorganized in favor of the pets of the Commander-in-Chief. The
country knows what the three braves did since Yorktown down to the
last day--the country knows that at the last disasters at Bull Run
these heroic generals did their fullest duty. But not even their
advice is asked at the double headquarters. Stanton alone cannot do
everything. Rats may devour a Hercules.

It seems certain that the rebel generals have various foreign officers
in their respective staffs. The rebels wish to assure the success of
their cause; here many have only in view their personal success. The
President, although not a Blucher, may make a Gneisenau out of Sigel,
who has in view only the success of the cause, and no prospects
towards the White House. Sigel would understand how to organize a
genuine staff.

Most of the foreigners who came to serve here came with the intention
to fight for the sacred principle of freedom, and without any further
views whatever of career and aggrandizement. In this respect Americans
are not just towards these foreigners, and the great men at
headquarters will prefer to see all go to pieces than to use the
capacity of foreigners, above all in the artillery and for the staff
duties.

The mind--that is, Jeff. Davis, Jackson, Lee, etc.--has the best of
the matter--that is, Lincoln, McClellan, Blair, and Seward; however,
these positions are reversed when one considers the masses on both
sides. But on our side the matter commands and presses down the mind;
on the rebel side the mind of the chiefs vivifies, exalts, attracts,
and directs the matter. And the results thereof are, that not the
rebellion, but the North, is shaking.

As _a_, not only as _the_ President, Mr. Lincoln represents nothing
beyond the unavoidable constitutional formula. For all other purposes,
as an acting, directing, inspiring, or combining power or agency, Mr.
Lincoln becomes a myth. His reality is only manifested by preserving
slavery, by sticking to McClellan, by distributing offices, by
receiving inspirations from Mr. Seward, and by digging the country's
grave. So it is from March 4, 1861, up to this, September 5th, 1862.
What else Mr. Lincoln may eventually incarnate is not now perceptible.

Mr. Lincoln and Mr. Seward piloted the country among breakers and
rocks, from which to extricate the country requires a man who is to be
the burning focus of the whole people's soul.

Other nations at times reached the bottom of an abyss, and they came
up again when from the tempest rending them emerged such a savior. But
here the formula may render impossible the appearance of such a
savior. The formula is the nation's hearse. The formula has
neutralized the best men in Congress, the best men in the Cabinet, as
is Stanton.

The people have decided not, _propter vitam vivendi perdere causas_;
but the various formulas, the schemers, the grave-diggers, and the
aspirants for the White House, think differently.

The almost daily changes made by Mr. Lincoln in the command of the
forces are the best evidences of his good-intentioned--debility.

Harmony belongs to the primordial laws of nature; it is the same for
human societies. But here no harmony exists between the purest, the
noblest, and the most patriotic portion of the people, and the
official exponent of the people's will, and of its higher and purer
aspirations. So here all jars dissonantly; all is confusion, because
avenged must be every violation of nature's law.

I cannot believe that at this deadly crisis the salvation can come
from Washington. The best man here has not his free action. And the
rest of them are the country's curse. Mr. Lincoln, with McClellan,
Seward, Blair, Halleck, and scores of such, are as able to cope with
this crisis as to stop the revolution of our planet.

_Up to this day_, from among those foremost, the only man whose hands
remain unstained with the country's, his mother's, and his brethren's
blood, the last Roman, is Stanton.

_September 7._--During last night troops marched to meet the enemy,
saluting with deafening shouts and cheers the residence of McClellan;
spit-lickers as a Kennedy, giving the sign by waving his hat. Such
shouts would cheer up the mind but for the fact that they were mostly
raised for the victory over those who demanded an investigation of the
causes of _slowness_ and insubordination,--those exclusive causes of
the defeat of Pope's army. Those shouts were thrown out as defiance to
justice, to truth, and to law. Those shouts marked the inauguration of
the _pretorian regime_. General McClellan and other generals have
forced the President to _postpone_ the investigation into the conduct
of the _slow_ and of the insubordinate generals, all three special
favorites of McClellan. General McClellan appeared before the soldiers
surrounded by his _old identical staff_, by a tross of flatterers,
and, Oh heavens! in the cortege Senator Wilson! Oh, _sancta_ not
_simplicitas_, but ---- Oh, clear-sighted Republican!

Subsequently, I learned that Senator Wilson was present for a moment,
and only by a pure accident, at that ovation.

_Laeszt Dich dem Teufel bey'm Haare packen, so hat Er Dich bey'm
Kopfe_, says Lessing, and so it may become here with this first
success of the pretorians, or even worse than pretorians; these here
are Yanitschars of a Sultan.

Pope and his army accuse three generals of insubordination and mutiny
on the field of battle. McClellan prevents investigation; the brutal
rule of Yanitschars is inaugurated, thanks to you, Messrs. Seward and
Blair.

McDowell sacrificed to the Yanitschars; he is the scapegoat and the
victim to popular fallacy, to the imbecility of the press, and, above
all, to the intriguers and to the conspiracy of the mutinous pets of
McClellan. Weeks and weeks ago, I foretold to McDowell that such would
be his fate, and that only in after-times history will be just towards
him.

The country begins to be inundated and opinion poisoned by all kinds
of the most glaring lies, invented and spread by the staffs, and the
imbecile, blind partisans of McClellan. Here are some from among the
lies.

In January (oh hear, oh hear!) General McClellan with 50,000 men
intended to make a _flying_ (oh hear, oh hear!) expedition to
Richmond, but Lincoln and Stanton opposed it. This lie divides itself
into two points. 1st lie. In January, nobody opposed General
McClellan's will, and, besides, he was sick. 2d lie. If he was so
pugnacious in January, why has he not made with the same number of men
a flying expedition only to Centreville, right under his nose?

Emanating from the staff, such a lie is sufficient to show the
military capacity of those who concocted it.

Second lie. That the expedition to Yorktown and the Peninsula strategy
were forced upon McClellan. I hope that the Americans have enough
memory left, and enough self-respect to recollect the truth.

Further, the above staff asserts that, when the truth will be known
about the campaign, and the fightings in the Chickahominy, then
justice will be done to McClellan.

Always and everywhere lost battles, bad and ignorant generalship,
require explanations, justifications, and commentaries. Well-fought
battles are justified on the spot, the same day, and by results. No
one asks or makes comments upon the fighting of Jackson. Austerlitz,
Jena, were commented on, explained, some of the chiefs were justified,
but--by Austrian and Prussian commentators.

Until to-day French writers discuss, analyze, and comment upon the
fatal battle of Waterloo. At Waterloo Napoleon was in the square of
his heroic guards; but during the seven days' fighting on the
Chickahominy, what regiment, not to say a square, saw in its midst the
American Napoleon?

A thousand others, similar to the above-mentioned lies, will be or are
already circulated; the mass of the people will use its common sense,
and the lies must perish.

On September 7th, Gen. McClellan gave his word to the President to
start to the army at 12 o'clock, but started at 4 P. M. with a long
train of well-packed wagons for himself and for his staff. To be
sure, Lee, Jackson, and all the other rebel chiefs together, have not
such a train; if they had, they would not be to-day on the Potomac and
in Maryland. Most certainly those quick-moving rebels start at least
an hour earlier than they are expected to do.

_September 9._--Up to this day Mr. Lincoln ought to have discovered
whose advice transformed him into a standard-bearer of the policy of
the New York Herald, and made him push the country to the verge of the
grave; and, nevertheless, Mr. Lincoln is deaf to the voice of all true
and pure patriots who point out the malefactors.

Secondary events; as a lost battle, etc., depend upon material causes;
but such primordial events as is the thorough miscarriage of Mr.
Lincoln's anti-rebellion policy,--such events are generated by moral
causes.

Jefferson Davis, Lee, Jackson, and all the generals down to the last
Southern bush-whacker, incarnate the violent and hideous passion of
slavery, now all-powerful throughout the South. Here, Lincoln, Seward,
McClellan, Blair, Halleck, etc., incarnate the negation of the purest
and noblest aspirations of the North. Stanton alone is inspired by a
national patriotic idea. No unity, no harmony between the people and
the leaders; this discord must generate disasters.

All over the country the lie is spread that the army demanded the
reappointment of McClellan. First, the three mutinous generals did it;
but not a Kearney, the Bayard of America; very likely not Hooker and
Heintzelman--all of them soldiers, patriots, and men of honor; nor
very likely was it demanded by Keyes. I do not know positively what
was the conduct of Gen. Sumner. Gen. Burnside owes what he is, glory
and all, to McClellan. Burnside's honest gratitude and honest want of
judgment have contributed more than anything else to inaugurate the
regime of the pretorians, to justify mutiny. Halleck's conduct in all
this is veiled in mystery; it is so at least for the present; and as
truth will be kept out of sight, the country may never know the truth
about those shameful proceedings.

I learn that Heintzelman, against his own judgment, agreed in the
McClellan movement. Well, if this is true, then, of course, the army,
for a long time misled by uninterrupted intrigues, misled by papers
such as the New York Herald and the Times,--the army or the soldiers
mightily contributed to bring about this fatal crisis. An army
composed of intelligent Americans, blinded, stultified by intriguers,
declares for a general who never, up to this day, covered with glory
his or the army's name. After this nothing more is to be expected, and
no disaster on the field of battle, no dissolution of a national
principle, can astonish my mind. Cursed be those who thus demoralized
the sound judgment of the soldiers! Cursed be my personal experience
of men and of things which makes me despair! But when an army or
soldiers become intellectually brought down to such a standard, then
the holiest cause will always be lost. Oh for a man to save the cause
of humanity! But if even such a man should appear, these pretorians
will turn against him.

The pretorians, with the New York Herald as their flag, will soon
finish with liberty at home. McClellan, Barlow, the brothers Wood, and
Bennett, may very soon be at the helm, with the 100,000 pretorians for
support. _Similia similibus_; and here disgrace is to cure disgrace.

These helpless grave-diggers, above all, Seward, are on the way to
pick a quarrel with England, sending a flying gunboat fleet under
Wilkes into the West Indian waters. At this precise moment it were
better to be very cautious, and rather watch strongly our coasts with
the same gunboats.

_September 11._--A military genius at once finds out the point where
blows are to be struck, and strikes them with lightning-like speed.
The rebels act in this manner; but what point was found out, what
blows were ever dealt by McClellan?

Individuals similar to McClellan were idolized by the Roman
pretorians, and this idolatry marks the epoch of the utmost
demoralization and degradation of the Roman empire. Witnessing such a
phenomenon in an army of American volunteers, one must give up in
despair any confidence in manhood and in common sense.

The Journal of St. Petersburg of August 6th semi-officially refutes
the insinuations that Russia intends to recognize the South, or to
unite with France and England for any such purpose, or for mediation.
The language of the article is noble and friendly, as is all which up
to this day has been done by Alexander II. Mr. Stoeckl, the Russian
minister here, considerably contributes that such sound and friendly
views on the condition of our affairs are entertained by the Russian
Cabinet.

_September 11._--Imbeciles agitate the question of mediation. European
cabinets will not offer it now, and nobody, not even the rebels, would
accept. No possible terms and basis exist for any mediation. A Solomon
could not find them out. If Jackson and Lee were to shell Washington,
then only the foreign ministers may be requested to step in and to
settle the terms of a capitulation or of an evacuation. The foreign
ministers here could act as mediators only if asked; not otherwise. I
am sure it will come out that the invasion of Maryland by the rebels
is made under the pressure exercised in Richmond by the Maryland
chivalry in the service of the rebellion. These runaways probably
promised an insurrection in Maryland, provided a rebel force crosses
the Potomac. (Wrote it to England.)

All around helplessness and confusion. Conscientiously I make all
possible efforts to record what I believe to be true, and then truth
will take care of herself.

After the study of the campaigns of Frederick II., above all, after
the study of those marvellous campaigns, combinations, manoeuvres of
Napoleon, to witness every day the combinations of McClellan is more
disgusting, more nauseous for the mind, than can be for the stomach
the strongest dose of emetic.

The last catastrophe at Bull Run and at Manassas has a slight
resemblance with the catastrophe at Waterloo. The conduct of the
mutinous generals here is similar to the conduct of some of the French
generals during the battle of Ligny and Quatre-Bras. But here was
mutiny, and there demoralization produced by general and deeply rooted
and fatally unavoidable causes. The demoralization of the French
generals came at the end of a terrible epoch of struggles and
sacrifices, of material exhaustion, when the faith in the destinies of
Napoleon was extinct; here mutiny and demoralization seize upon the
newly-born era.

_September 13._--What a good-natured people are the Americans! A
regiment of Pennsylvania infantry quartered for the night on the
sidewalk of the streets; officers, of course, absent; the poor
soldiers stretched on the stones, when so many empty large buildings,
when the empty (intellectually and materially empty) White House could
have given to the soldiers comfortable night quarters. It can give an
idea how they treat the soldiers in the field, if here in Washington
they care so little for them. But McClellan has forty wagons for his
staff, and forty ambulances--no danger for the latter to be used. In
European armies aristocratic officers would not dare to treat soldiers
in this way--to throw them on the pavement without any necessity.

More than once in my life, after heavy fighting, I laid down the
knapsack for a cushion, snow for a mattrass and for a blanket; but by
the side of the soldiers, the generals, the staffs, and the officers
shared similar bedsteads.

I hear strange stories about Stanton, and about his having ruefully
fallen in McClellan's lap. If so, then one more _man_, one more
illusion, and one more creed in manhood gone overboard, drowned in
meanness, in moral cowardice, and subserviency.

The worshippers of strategy and of Gen. McClellan try to make the
public swallow, that the investment of Richmond by him was a
magnificent display of science, and would have been a success but for
50,000 more men under his command.

To invest any place whatever is to cut that place from the principal,
if not from all communications with the country around, and thus
prevent, or make dangerous or difficult, the arrival of provisions, of
support, etc.

Our gunboats, etc., in the York and the James rivers have virtually
invested Richmond on the eastern side; but that part of the Peninsula
did not constitute the great source of life for the rebel army. The
principal life-arteries for Richmond ran through four-fifths of a
circle, beginning from the southern banks of the James river and
running to the southern banks of the Rapidan and of the Rappahannock.
Through that region men, material, provisions poured into Richmond
from the whole South, and that whole region around Richmond was left
perfectly open; but strategy concentrated its wisdom on the
comparatively indifferent eastern side of the Chickahominy marshes,
and cut off the rebels from--nothing at all.

_September 13._--General McClellan, in search of the enemy, during the
first six days makes thirty miles! Finds the enemy near Hagerstown. No
more time for strategy.

_September 14._--General McClellan telegraphs to General Halleck
(_meliores ambo_) that he, McClellan, has "_the most reliable
information that the enemy is 190,000 strong in Maryland and in
Pennsylvania, besides 70,000 on the other side of the Potomac_." (The
same bosh about the numbers as in the Peninsula.)

The Generals Burnside, Hooker, Sumner, Reno, fought the battle at
Hagerstown, and drove the enemy before them. General McClellan reports
a victory, _but expects the enemy to renew the fighting next day in a
considerable force_--(as at Williamsburg). McClellan telegraphs to
Halleck, "_Look for an attack on Washington._" The enemy retreats to
recross the Potomac!

_September 15._--General Wadsworth suggested to the President one of
those bold movements by which campaigns are terminated by one blow:
"To send Heintzelman and him, Wadsworth, with some 25,000 men, to
Gordonsville (here and in Baltimore about 90,000 men), and thus cut
off the enemy from Richmond, and prevent him from rallying his
forces." But General Halleck opposes such a Murat's dash, on account
of McClellan's "looked-for attack on Washington"--by his,
McClellan's, imagination.

_September 17._--When I wrote the above about Wadsworth and
Heintzelman, I was under the impression that the victory announced by
McClellan, Sept. 14, was more decisive; that as he had fresh the whole
corps of Fitz John Porter, and the greatest part of that of Franklin,
and other supports sent him from Washington, he would give no respite
to the enemy, and push him into the Potomac. It turned out
differently.

The loss by capitulation of Harper's Ferry. It is a blow to us, and
very likely a disgraceful affair, not for the soldiers, but for the
commanders.

_September 19._--Five days' fighting. Our brave Hooker wounded;
tremendous loss of life on both sides, and no decisive results. These
last battles, and those on the Chickahominy, that of Shiloh, in one
word all the fightings protracted throughout several consecutive days,
are almost unexampled in history. These horrible episodes establish
the bravery, the endurance of the soldiers, the bravery and the
ability of some among the commanders of the corps, of the divisions,
etc., and the absence of any _generalship in the commander_.

_September 20._--Until this day Gen. McClellan has not published one
single detailed report about any of his operations since the
evacuation of Manassas in March. Thus much for the staff of the army
of the Potomac. We shall see what detailed report he will publish of
the campaign in Maryland. McClellan's bulletins from Maryland are
twins to his bulletins from the Peninsula; and there may be very
little difference between the _gained_ victories. To-day he is
ignorant of the movements of the enemy, and has more than 30,000 fresh
troops in hand.

As in the Peninsula, so in Maryland. Although having nearly one-third
more men than the enemy, General McClellan never forced the enemy to
engage at once its whole force, never attacked the rebels on their
whole line, and never had any positive notion about the number and the
position of the opposing forces.

The rebels had the Potomac in their rear; our army pressed them in
front, and--the rebels escaped.

I appeal to such military heroes as Hooker; I appeal to thousands of
our brave soldiers, from generals down to the rank and file, and
further I appeal to all women with hearts and brains here and in
Europe.

_September 20._--Gen. Mansfield killed at the head of his brigade. I
ask his forgiveness for all the criticism made upon him in this diary.
Last year, at the beginning of the war, Gen. Mansfield acted under the
orders of Gen. Scott. This explains all.

As in the slaughters of the Chickahominy, so in the Maryland
slaughters, _nobody hurt_ in McClellan's numerous staff. Thank Heaven!
Not only his life is charmed, but the charm extends over all who
surround him,--men and beasts.

A malediction sticks to our cause. Hooker badly, very badly wounded.
Hooker fought the greatest number of fights,--was never worsted in the
Peninsula, nor in the August disasters, and he alone has the supreme
honor of a nick-name, by the troopers' baptism: the _Fighting Joe_.
Hooker, not McClellan, ought to command the army. But no pestilential
Washington clique, none of the West-Pointers, back him, and the pets,
the pretorians, may have refused to obey his orders.

After the escape of the rebels from Manassas in March, and after the
evacuation of Yorktown, all the intriguers and traitors grouped around
the New York Herald, and the imbeciles around the New York Times,
prized high _the masterly strategy_ and its bloodless victories. Now,
in dead, by powder and disease, in crippled, etc., McClellan destroyed
about 100,000 men, and the country's honor is bleeding, the country's
cause is on the verge of a precipice.

How rare are men of civic heroism, of fearless civic courage; men of
the creed: _perisse mon nom mais que la patrie soit sauvée._

General Wadsworth feels more deeply and more painfully the disasters,
nay, the disgrace, of the country, than do almost all with whom I meet
here. During the Congress, similar were the feelings of Senator Wade,
Judge Potter, and of many other Congressmen in both the Houses. So
feel Boutwell, Andrew, the Governor of Massachusetts, and I am sure
many, many over the country. But the sensation-men and preachers,
lecturers, etc., all are to be * * * *

_September 22._--By Mr. Seward's policy and by McClellan's strategy
and war-bulletins the bravest and the most intelligent people became
the laughing-stock of Europe and of the world. And thus is witnessed
the hitherto in history unexampled phenomenon of a devoted and brave
people of twenty millions, mastering all the wealth and the resources
of modern civilization, worsted and kept at bay by four to five
million rebels, likewise brave, but almost beggared, and cut off from
all external communications.

_Sept. 23._--Proclamation _conditionally_ abolishing slavery from
1863. The _conditional_ is the last desperate effort made by Mr.
Lincoln and by Mr. Seward to save slavery. Poor Mr. Lincoln was
obliged to strike such a blow at his _mammy_! The two statesmen found
out that it was dangerous longer to resist the decided, authoritative
will of the masses. The words "resign," "depose," "impeach," were more
and more distinct in the popular murmur, and the proclamation was
issued.

Very little, if any, credit is due to Mr. Lincoln or to Mr. Seward for
having thus late and reluctantly _legalized_ the stern will of the
immense majority of the American people. For the sake of sacred truth
and justice I protest before civilization, humanity, and posterity,
that Mr. Lincoln and Mr. Seward intrinsically are wholly innocent of
this great satisfaction given to the right, and to national honor.

The absurdity of colonization is preserved in the proclamation. How
could it have been otherwise?

But if the rebellion is crushed before January 1st, 1863, what then?
If the rebels turn loyal before that term? Then the people of the
North will be cheated. Happily for humanity and for national honor,
Mr. Lincoln's and Mr. Seward's benevolent expectations will be
baffled; the rebels will spurn the tenderly proffered leniency; these
rebels are so ungrateful towards those who "cover the weakness of the
insurgents," &c. (See the celebrated, and by the American press much
admired, despatch in May or June, 1862, Seward to Adams.)

The proclamation is written in the meanest and the most dry routine
style; not a word to evoke a generous thrill, not a word reflecting
the warm and lofty comprehension and feelings of the immense majority
of the people on this question of emancipation. Nothing for humanity,
nothing to humanity. Whoever drew it, be he Mr. Lincoln or Mr. Seward,
it is clear that the writer was not in it either with his heart or
with his soul; it is clear that it was done under moral duress, under
the throttling pressure of events. How differently Stanton would have
spoken!

General Wadsworth truly says, that never a noble subject was more
belittled by the form in which it was uttered.

Brazilian m----s are much disturbed by the proclamation.

_Sept. 23._--In his answer to the Paisley Parliamentary Reform
Association, Mr. Seward complains that the sympathy of Europe turns
now for secession.

O Mr. Seward, Mr. Seward, who is it that contributed to turn the
current against the cause of right and of humanity? Months ago I and
others warned you; the premonitory signs and the reasons of this
change have been pointed out to you. Now you slander Europe, of which
you know as little as of the inhabitants of the moon. The generous
populations of the whole of Europe expected and waited for a positive,
unhesitating, clear recognition of human rights; day after day the
generous European minds expected to see some positive, authoritative
fact confirm that lofty conception which, at the start of this
rebellion, they had of the cause of the North. But the pure, generous
tendencies of the American people became officially, authoritatively
misrepresented; the public opinion in Europe became stuffed with empty
generalizations, with official but unfulfilled prophecies, and with
cold declamations. Those official generalizations, prophecies, and
declamations, the supineness shown by the administration in the
recognition of human rights, all this began to be considered in Europe
as being sanctioned by the whole American people; and generous
European hearts and minds began to avert in disgust from the
_misrepresented_ cause of the North.

Two issues are before history, before the philosophy of history, and
before the social progress of our race. The first issue is the
struggle between the pure democratic spirit embodied in the Free
States, and the fetid remains of the worst part of humanity embodied
in the South. The second issue is between the perennial vitality of
the principle of self-government in the people, and the transient and
accidental results of the self-government as manifested in Mr.
Lincoln, in Mr. Seward, and their followers. I hope that this Diary
will throw some light on the second issue, and vindicate the perennial
against the transient and the accidental.

_Sept. 24._--If the events of this war should progress as they are
foreshadowed in the proclamation of September 22, then the application
of this proclamation may create inextricable complications. Not only
in one and the same State, but in one and the same district, nay, even
in the same township, after January 1st, 1863, may be found
Africo-Americans, portions of whom are emancipated, the others in
bondage. But the stern logic of events will save the illogical,
pusillanimous, confused half-measure, as it now is. (O Steffens!)

General McClellan confesses that if Hooker had not been wounded, then
_the road_, by which the retreat of the rebels might have been cut
off, would have been taken. Such a declaration is the most emphatic
recognition of Hooker's superior military capacity. Seldom, however,
has the loss of a general commanding only _en second_, or a wing, as
did Hooker, decided the fortunes of the day. Why did not McClellan
take _the road_ himself, after Hooker was obliged to leave the field?
When Desaix, Bessières, and Lannes fell, Napoleon nevertheless won
the respective battles.

_Sept. 25._--The military position of the rebels in Winchester seems
to me one of the best they ever held in this war. Winchester is the
centre of which Washington, Harper's Ferry, Williamsport, nay, even
Wheeling, seem to be the circumference. Our army under McClellan is
almost beyond the circle, crosses not the Potomac, and is now only to
watch the enemy. So much for the great McClellan's victory. Truly, the
enemy may be taken in the rear, its communications with Richmond, &c.,
cut off and destroyed; but _we are safe_ on the Potomac, and this is
sufficient. McClellan is _the man of large conceptions and rapid
execution_. The best generals are _hors de combat_; as to Halleck, O,
it is not to think, not to speak. Well, I may be mistaken, but I
clearly see all this on the map of Virginia.

_Sept. 25._--The West Point spirit persecutes Sigel with the utmost
rage. The West Point spirit seemingly wishes to have Sigel dishonored,
defeated, even if the country be thereby destroyed. The Hallecks, &c.,
keep him in a subordinate position; _three days ago_ his corps was a
little over seven thousand, almost no cavalry, and most of the
artillery without horses, and he in front.

The more I scrutinize the President's thus called emancipation
proclamation, the more cunning and less good will and sincerity I find
therein. I hope I am mistaken. But the proclamation is only an act of
the military power,--is evoked by military necessity,--and not a
civil, social, humane act of justice and equity.

The only good to be derived from this proclamation is, that for the
first time the word _freedom_, and a general comprehension of
"emancipation," appear in an official act under the sanction of the
formula, and are inaugurated into the official, the constitutional
life of the nation. In itself it is therefore a great event for a
people so strictly attached to legality and to formulas.

I do not recollect to have read in the history of any great, or even
of a small captain,--above all of such a one when between thirty-four
and thirty-six years old,--that he followed the army under his command
in a travelling carriage and six, when the field of operations
extended from fifty to seventy miles. Three cheers for McClellan, for
his carriage and six!

     HOW THE GREAT CAPTAIN WAS TO CATCH THE WHOLE REBEL ARMY IN
     MANASSAS, IN FEBRUARY AND MARCH, A. D. 1862.

It was to have been done by a brilliant and unsurpassable stroke of
combined strategy, tactics, manoeuvres, marches, and swimmings; also
on land and water. (O, hear! O, hear!)

As every body knows, the rebels were encamped in the so _fearful_
strongholds of Centreville and Manassas, all the time fooling the
commander-in-chief of the federal army in relation to their _immense_
numbers. To attack the rebels in front, or to surround them by the
Occoquan and Brentsville, would have been a too--simple operation; by
a special, an immense, space-embracing anaconda strategy, the rebel
army was to be cut off from the whole of rebeldom, and forced to
surrender _en masse_ to the inventor of (the not yet patented, I hope)
bloodless victories. To accomplish such an immense result, a fleet of
transports was already ordered to be gathered at Annapolis. On them in
ten or fifteen days (O, hear!) an army of fifty to sixty thousand,
most completely equipped, was to be embarked, plus forty thousand in
Washington, all this to sail under the personal command of the
general-in-chief, and sail towards Richmond. Richmond taken, the rebel
army at Manassas would have been cut off, and obliged to surrender on
any terms.

The above splendid conception was, and still is, peddled among the
army and among the nation by the admirers of, and the devotees of,
anaconda strategy.

The expedition was to land at the mouth of the Tappahannock, a small
port, or rather a creek, used for shipping of a small quantity of
tobacco. As the port or creek has only some small attempts at wharves,
the landing of such an enormous army, with parks of artillery, with
cavalry, pontoons, and material for constructing bridges,--the landing
would not have been executed in weeks, if in months; but the projector
of the plan, perfectly losing the notion of time, calculated for ten
days. From that port the _flying_ expedition was to march directly on
Richmond through a country having only common field and dirt roads,
and this in a season when all roads generally are in an impassable
condition, through a country intersected by marshy streams, principal
among them the Matapony and the Pamunkey--to march towards Richmond
and the Chickahominy marshes. It seems that Chickahominy exercised an
attractive, Armida-like charm on the great strategian. An army loaded
with such immense trains would have sufficiently destroyed all the
roads, and rendered them impassable for itself; and the _flying_
expedition would at once have been transformed into an expedition
sticking in the mud, similar to that subsequent in the peninsula. The
enemy was in possession of Fredericksburg and of the railroad to
Hanover Court House on one flank, and of all the best roads north of
and through Chickahominy marshes on the other flank. The _flying_
expedition would have had for base Tappahannock and a dirt road. O
strategy! O stuff!

The much-persecuted General McDowell exposed the worse than crudity of
the brilliant conception. By doing this, McDowell saved the country,
the administration, and the strategian from immense losses and from a
nameless shame. It is due to the people that the administration lay
before the public the scheme and the refutation. A look on the map of
Virginia must convince even the simplest mind of the brilliancy of
this conception.

During all this time spent in such masterly operations, the rebel army
in Manassas was to quietly look on, to wait, and not move, not
retreat on Richmond. Early in March, at once the rebel army, always
undisturbed, quietly disappeared from Manassas; and this is the best
evidence of the depth of that brilliant combination, peddled under the
name of the _flying expedition to Richmond_, projected for January,
February, or March. I appeal to the verdict of sound reason; the
parties are, common sense _versus_ anaconda strategy and bloodless
victories.

_Sept. 27._--The proclamation issued by the war power of the President
is not yet officially notified to those who alone are to execute
it--the armies and their respective commanders. Who is to be taken in?
The papers publish a detailed account of an interview between the
President and an anti-slavery deputation from Chicago. The deputation
asked for stringent measures in the spirit of the law of Congress,
which orders the emancipation of the slaves held by the rebels. The
President combated the reasons alleged by the deputation, and tried to
establish the danger and the inefficiency of the measure. A few days
after the above-mentioned debate, the President issued the
proclamation of September 22. Are his heart, his soul, and his
convictions to be looked for in the debate, or in the proclamation?

The immense majority of the people, from the inmost of its heart,
greets the proclamation--a proof how deeply and ardently was felt its
necessity. The gratitude shown to Mr. Lincoln for having thus executed
the will of his master,--this gratitude is the best evidence how this
whole people is better, has a loftier comprehension of right and duty,
than have its elected servants.

McClellan already speaks that the campaign is finished, and the army
is to go into winter quarters. If the people, if the administration,
and if the army will stand this, then they will justly deserve the
scorn of the whole civilized and uncivilized world. But with such
civil and military chiefs all is possible, all may be expected to be
included in their programme of--vigorous operations.

_Sept. 28._--For some weeks I watch a conspiracy of the West Pointers,
of the commanders-in-chief, of the staffs, and of the double
know-nothing cliques united against Sigel. The aim seems to be to put
Sigel and his purposely-reduced and disorganized forces in such a
condition and position that he may be worsted or destroyed by the
enemy. To avoid dishonoring the forces under him, to avoid exposing
them to slaughter, and to avoid being thus himself dishonored, Sigel
ought to resign, and make public the reasons of his resignation. A few
days ago, I wrote and warned the Evening Post; but--but--

The Richmond papers confirm what I supposed concerning the motives
which pushed the rebel army across the Potomac. As the Marylanders
rose not in arms, and joined not the rebel army, the invaders had
nothing else to do but to retreat and to recross the Potomac.
McClellan ought to have thrown them into the river, which Hooker, if
not wounded, would have done, or if he had the command of our army.

The rebels would have retreated into Virginia, even without being
attacked by McClellan, even if he only followed them, say at one day's
distance. Not having destroyed the rebels, McClellan, in reality, and
from the military stand point, accomplished very little--near to
nothing. Hooker estimates the rebel force, at the utmost, at eighty
thousand men, and that is all that they could have. McClellan had
about one hundred and twenty thousand. And--and he is to be considered
the savior of Maryland and of Pennsylvania. O, good American people!
The genuine Napoleon won all his great battles against armies which
considerably outnumbered his.

Mr. Seward menaces England with issuing _letters of marque_ against
the Southern privateers. The menace is ridiculous, because it will not
be carried out, and, if carried out, it will become still more
ridiculous; it would be a very poor compliment to the navy to use the
whole power of private enterprise against a few rovers, and it would
be an official recognition of the rebels in the condition of
belligerents. _Quousque tandem_--O SEWARD--_abutere patientiam
nostram?_

_Sept. 30._--Nearly three weeks after the battle of Antietam, General
McClellan publishes what he and they call a report of his operations
in Maryland; in all not twenty lines, and devoted principally to
establish--on probabilities--the numerical losses of the enemy. The
report is a fit _pendant_ to his bulletins; is excellent for bunkum,
and to make other people justly laugh at us.




OCTOBER, 1862.

     Costly Infatuation -- The do-nothing strategy -- Cavalry on lame
     horses -- Bayonet charges -- Antietam -- Effect of the
     proclamation -- Disasters in the West -- The abolitionists not
     originally hostile to McClellan -- Helplessness in the War
     Department -- Devotedness of the people -- McClellan and the
     proclamation -- Wilkes -- Colonel Key -- Routine engineers --
     Rebel raid into Pennsylvania -- Stanton's sincerity -- O,
     unfighting strategians! -- The administration a success -- _De
     gustibus_ -- Stuart's raid -- West Point -- St. Domingo -- The
     President's letter to McClellan -- Broad church -- The elections
     -- The Republican party gone -- The remedy at the polls --
     McClellan wants to be relieved -- Mediation -- Compromise -- The
     rhetors. -- The optimists -- The foreigners -- Scott and Buchanan
     -- Gladstone -- Foreign opinion and action -- Both the extremes
     to be put down -- Spain -- Fremont's campaign against Jackson --
     Seward's circular -- General Scott's gift -- "O, could I go to a
     camp!" -- McClellan crosses the Potomac -- Prays for rain --
     Fevers decimate the regiments -- Martindale and Fitz John Porter
     -- The political balance to be preserved -- New regiments -- O,
     poor country!


With what a bloody sacrifice of men this people pays for its
infatuation in McClellan, for the moral cowardice of its official
leaders, and the intrigues and the imbecility of the regulars, of some
among the West Pointers, of traitors led by the New York Herald, by
the World, and by certain Unionists on the outside, and secessionists
at heart! All these combined nourish the infatuation. All things
compared, Napoleon cost not so much to the French people, and at least
Napoleon paid it in glory. Mind and heart sicken to witness all this
here. The question to-day is, not to strengthen other generals, as
Heintzelman and Sigel, and to take the enemy in the rear, but to give
a _chance_ to McClellan to win the ever-expected, and not yet by him
won, _great battle_. McClellan continually calls for more men; all the
vital forces of the people are absorbed by him; and when he has large
numbers, he is incapable of using and handling them; so it was at the
Chickahominy, so it was at Antietam. In the way that McClellan acts
now, he may use up all the available forces of the people, if nobody
has the courage to speak out; besides, any warning voice is drowned in
the treacherous intrigues of the clique, in imbecility and
infatuation.

At the meeting of the governors, at the various public conventions, in
the thus called public resolutions--platforms, in one word--wherever,
in any way. North, West, and East, the public life of the people has
made its voice heard: _a vigorous prosecution of the war_ was, and is,
earnestly recommended to the administration. All this will be of no
avail. By this time, by bloody and bitter experience, the American
people ought to have learned it. With his civil and military aids and
lieutenants, as the McClellans, the Hallecks, the Sewards, Mr. Lincoln
has been at work; and at the best, they have shown their utter
incapacity, if not ill-will, to carry the war on vigorously and upon
strictly military principles. Many persons in Washington know that Mr.
Seward last winter firmly backed the _do-nothing_ strategy, in the
firm belief that the rebels would be worried out, and submit without
fighting. To those statesmen and Napoleons, Carnots, &c., it is as
impossible to manoeuvre with rapidity, to strike boldly and decidedly,
as to dance on their _well-furnished_ heads. Only such a good-natured
people as the Americans can expect _something_ from that whole
_caterva_. To expect from Mr. Lincoln's Napoleons, Carnots, &c.,
vigorous and rapid military operations, is the same as to mount
cavalry on thoroughly lame horses, and order it to charge _à fond de
train_.

The worshippers of McClellan peddle that the Antietam victory became
neutralized because the enemy fell back on its second and third line.
Whatever may be in this falling back on lines, and accepting all as it
is represented, one thing is certain, that when commanders win
victories, generally they give no time to the enemy to fall back in
order on its second and third lines. But every thing gets a new stamp
under the new Napoleon. A few hours after the Antietam battle, General
McClellan telegraphed that he "_knew not_ if the enemy retreated into
the interior or to the Potomac." O, O!

Many from among the European officers here have some experience of the
manoeuvring of large bodies--experience acquired on fields of battle,
and on reviews, and those camp manoeuvres annually practised all over
Europe. In this way the European officers, more or less, have the
_coup d'oeil_ for space and for the _terrain_, so necessary when an
army is to be put in positions on a field of battle, and which _coup
d'oeil_ few young American officers had the occasion to acquire. If
judiciously selected for the duties of the staffs, such European
officers would be of use and support to generals but for jealousy and
the West Point cliques.

During this whole war I hear every body, but above all the West Point
wiseacres and strategians, assert that charges with the bayonet and
hand-to-hand fighting are exceedingly rare occurrences in the course
of any campaign. It is useless to speak to all those great judges of
experience and of history.

In the account of the battles of Ligny and of Waterloo, Thiers
mentions four charges with the bayonet and hand-to-hand fighting at
Ligny, and nine at Waterloo, wherein one was made by the English, one
was made by Prussians and by French, and one by the French with
bayonet against English cavalry. In 1831 the Poles used the bayonet
more than it was used in any one campaign known in history. O, West
Point!

It deserves to be noticed that the conspirators against Pope and
McDowell, and the pet pretorians of September 6 and 7, distinguished
themselves not very much in the battle of Antietam. Hooker commanded
McDowell's corps.

To the number of evils inflicted upon this country by the McClellan
infatuation, must be added the fact that many young men, with
otherwise sound intellects, have been taken in, stultified, poisoned
beyond cure, by high-sounding words, as strategy, all-embracing
scientific combinations, &c.--words identified with incapacity,
defeats, and intrigue.

In all probability, Hooker alone, when he fought, had a fixed plan at
the Antietam battle. As for a general plan, aiming either to throw the
enemy into the river, or to cut him from the river, or to accomplish
something final and decisive, seemingly no such plan existed. It looks
as if they had ignored, at the headquarters, what kind of positions
were occupied by the enemy; and the only purpose seems to have been to
fight, but without having any preconceived plan. This, at least, is
the conclusion from the manner in which the battle was fought. If any
plan had existed, the brave army would have executed it; but the enemy
retreated in order, and rather unmolested. _As always, so this time,
the bravery of the army did every thing; and, as a matter of course,
the generalship did--nothing._

_Oct. 4._--The proclamation of September 22 may not produce in Europe
the effect and the enthusiasm which it might have evoked if issued a
year ago, as an act of justice and of self-conscientious force, as an
utterance of the lofty, pure, and ardent aspirations and will of a
high-minded people. Europe may see now in the proclamation an action
of despair made in the duress of events; (and so it is in reality for
Mr. Lincoln, Seward, and their squad.) And in this way, a noble deed,
outpouring from the soul of the people, is reduced to pygmy and mean
proportions by ----. The name is on every body's lips.

But it was impossible to issue this proclamation last year; at that
time the master-spirit of Mr. Lincoln's administration emphatically
assured the diplomats that the Union will be preserved, _were
slavery--to rule in Boston_.

The continued disasters in the West can easily be explained by the
fact, that those rotten skeletons, Crittenden, Davis, and Wickliffe
control the operations of the generals.

_Among the countless lies peddled by McClellan's worshippers, the most
enormous and the most impudent is that one by which they attempt to
explain, what in their lingo they call, the hostility of the
abolitionists towards McClellan. Concerning this matter, I can speak
with perfect knowledge of almost all the circumstances._

_Not one abolitionist of whatever hue, not one republican whatever,
was in any way troubled or thought about the political convictions of
General McClellan at the time when he was put at the head of the army.
All the abolitionists and republicans, who then earnestly wished, and
now wish, to have the rebellion crushed, expected General McClellan to
do it by quick, decisive, soldier-like, military operations,
manoeuvres, and fights. Senators Wade, Chandler, Trumbull, &c., in
October, 1861, principally aided McClellan to become independent of
General Scott. When, however, weeks and months elapsed without any
soldier-like action, manifestation, or enterprise whatever, all those
who were in earnest began to feel uneasy, began to murmur, not in
reference to any political opinions, whatever, held by General
McClellan, but solely and exclusively on account of his military
supineness. All those who ardently wished, and wish, that neither
slaveholders nor slavery be hurt in any way, such ones early grouped
themselves around General McClellan, believing to have found in him
the man after their own heart. That cesspool of all infamies, the New
York Herald, became the mouthpiece of all the like hypocrites. They
and the Herald were the first to pervert and to misrepresent the
indignation evoked by the do-nothing or nobody-hurt strategy, and to
call it the abolition outcry against their fetish._

Scarcely will it be believed what disorder, what helplessness, and
what incapacity rule paramount in the expedition of any current
business in the strictly military part of the War Department. It is
worse than any imaginable red-tape and circumlocution. And all this,
being considered a speciality and a technicality, is in the exclusive
hands of the adjutant general, a master spirit among the West
Pointers. Generally, all relating to the thus celebrated organization
of the army is an exclusive work of the West Point wisdom--is handled
by West Pointers; and, nevertheless, the general comprehension of all
details in relation to an army, how it is to be handled, all the
military details of responsibility, of higher discipline, &c., all
this is confusion, and strikes with horror any one either familiar
with such matters or using freely his sound sense. A narrow routine
which may have been innocuous with an army of sixteen thousand with
General Scott and in peace, became highly mischievous when the army
increased more than fifty times, and the war raged furiously. All this
confusion is specially produced by the wiseacres and doctors of
routine. Undoubtedly it reacts on the army, and shows of what use for
the country is, and was, that whole old nursery.

Wherever one turns his eyes, every where a deep line separates the
patriotic activity of the people from the official activity. With the
people all is sacrifice, devotion, grandeur, and purity of purpose, by
great and small, by rich and poor, and with the poor, if possible,
even more than with the rich. With the highest and higher officials it
is either weakness, or egotism, or coolness, or intrigue, or
ignorance, or helplessness. The exceptions are few, and have been
repeatedly pointed out.

_Oct. 8._--General McClellan's order to the army concerning the
President's proclamation shows up the man. Not a word about the object
in the proclamation, but rather unveiled insinuations that the army is
dissatisfied with emancipation, and that it may mutiny. The army ought
to feel highly honored by such insinuations in that lengthy
disquisition about his (McClellan's) position and the duties of the
army. For the honor of the brave, armed citizen-patriots it can be
emphatically asserted that the patriotic volunteers better know their
duties than do those who preach to them. Some suspect that Mr. Seward
drew the paper for McClellan, but I am sure this cannot be. It may
have been done by Bennett or some other of the Herald, or by Barlow.
If this order is the result of Mr. Lincoln's visit to the camp, and of
a transaction with Mac-Napoleon, then the President has not thereby
increased the dignity of his presidential character.

Wilkes's Spirit of the Times incommensurably towers above the New York
Press by its dauntless patriotism; by its clear, broad, and deep
comprehension of the condition of the country.

Colonel Key's disclosures concerning the McClellan-Halleck programme,
not to destroy the rebels and the rebellion until the next
presidential election, are throttled by the dismissal of the colonel.
But what he said, if put by the side of the words of the order to the
army, that "the remedy for political errors, if any are committed, is
to be found only in the action of the people at the polls,"--all this
ought to open even the most obtuse intellects.

Poor (Carlyle fashion) old Greeley hurrahs for McClellan and for the
order No. 163 to the army. O for new and young men to swim among new
and young events!

_Oct. 11._--Will any body in this country have the patriotic courage
to reform the army? that is, to dismiss from the service the West
Point clique in Washington and in the army of the Potomac. Such a
proof of strong will cannot be expected from the President; but
perhaps Congress may show it. Those first and second scholars or
graduates from West Point are all routine engineers; and who ever
heard of whole armies commanded, moved, and manoeuvred by engineers?
American invention; but not to be patented for Europe.

_Oct. 11._--The rebel raid into Pennsylvania, under the nose of
McClellan. Is there any thing in the world capable of opening this
people's eyes?

I doubt if at any time, and in the life of any great or small people,
there existed such a galaxy of civil and military rulers, chiefs, and
leaders, stripped of nobler manhood, as are the _great men_ here. The
blush of honor never burned their cheeks! O, the low politicians! Some
persons doubt Stanton's sincerity in his dealings with individuals. I
am not a judge thereof; but were it so, it can easily be forgiven if
he only remains sincere and true to the cause.

One is amazed and even aghast at the impudence of the McClellan and
West Point cliques. In their lingo, heroes like Kearney, like Hooker
and Heintzelman, all such are superciliously mentioned as _only
fighting generals_. O, unfighting strategians!

Stuart's brilliant raid was executed the day of McClellan's bombastic
proclamation about his having cleared Pennsylvania and Maryland of the
enemy. On the same day McClellan and other generals straggled about
the country, visiting cities hundreds of miles distant from the camp.
And such generals complain of straggling! Make the army fight!
inspire with confidence the soldier--then he will not straggle.

The Evening Post, October 13, demonstrates that up to this day Mr.
Lincoln's administration is "a grand and brilliant success." Well, _de
gustibus non est disputandum_. Others may rightly think that the
achievements enumerated by the Evening Post are exclusively due to the
people; that by the people they were forced upon the administration,
(Stanton and the navy excepted;) and that the numerous failures, the
waste of human life, of money, and of time, are to be logically and
directly traced to the administration. O, subserviency!

The McClellanites are indignant against the Pennsylvanians for not
having caught Stuart and his three thousand horses. Bravo! And what is
the army for? and, above all, what are the so expensive commander and
his staff for?

It is perhaps natural that many from among the republican leaders
attempt to prop up the reputation of Mr. Lincoln's administrative
capacity, to kindle a halo around his name, and to sponge the waste of
blood, of means, and of time, from the tracks of his Seward-Scott-Blair
administration; but stern historical justice shall not, and cannot, do
it.

Whatever be the high _military and scientific prowess_ shown by the
first West Point graduates and scholars, all this in no way
compensates for the _summum_ of perverted notions which are reared
there, and for the mock, sham, and clownish aristocracy by which a
high-toned West Pointer is easily recognized. Of course many and many
are the exceptions; many West Point pupils are animated by the noblest
and purest American spirit; but the genuine West Point spirit consists
in sneering and looking down with contempt at the mother and nurse;
that is, at the purely republican, purely democratic political
institutions, at the broad political and intellectual freedom to which
those clown-aristocrats owe their rearing, their little bit of
information, and those shoulder-stripes by which they are so mightily
inflated.

What silly talk, to compare the St. Domingo insurrection with the
eventual results of emancipation in the South! In St. Domingo the
slaves were obliged to tear their liberty from the slaveholding
planter, and from a government siding with the oppressor. Here the
lawful government gives liberty to a peaceful laborer, and the planter
is an outlawed traitor. But the genuine pro-slavery democrat is
stupidly obtuse.

_Oct. 18._--A few days ago the President wrote a letter to McClellan,
with ability and lucidity, exposing to view the military urgency of a
movement on the enemy with an army of one hundred and forty thousand
men, as has now McClellan at Harper's Ferry. But the letter ends by
saying that all that it contains is _not_ to be considered by
McNapoleon as being an order. Of course Mac obeys--the last injunction
of the letter. Mr. Lincoln wishes not to hurt the great Napoleon's
feelings; as for hurting the country, the people, the cause, this is
of--no consequence! Ah! to witness all this is to be chained, and to
die of thirst within the reach of the purest water.

Reverend Dr. Unitarian Sensation's broad church, admirer of the
Southern gentleman, and a Jeremy Diddler.

_Oct. 18._--The elections in several of the States evidence the deep
imprint upon the country of Lincoln-Seward disorganizing, because from
the first day vacillating, undecided, both-ways policy. The elections
reverberate the moral, the political, and the belligerent condition in
which the country is dragged and thrown by those two _master spirits_.
No decided principle inspires them and their administration, and no
principle leads and has a decided majority in the elections; neither
the democrats nor the republicans prevail; neither freedom nor
submission is the watchword; and finally, neither the North nor the
South is decidedly the master on the fields of battle. All is
confusion!

Scarcely one genuine republican was, or is, in the cabinet; the
republican party is completely on the wane--and perhaps beyond
redemption; all this is a logical result, and was easily to be
foreseen by any body,--only not by the wiseacres of the party, not by
the republican papers in New York, as the Times, the Tribune, and the
Evening Post, only not by the Sumners, Doolittles, and many of the
like leaders, all of whom, when, about a year ago, warned against such
a cataclysm, self-confidently smiled; but who soon will cry more
bitter tears than did the daughters of Judah over the ruins of
Jerusalem.

And now likewise the phrase in McClellan's order No. 163, about "the
remedy at the polls," the disclosures made by Colonel Key, receive
their fullest, but ominous and cursed, signification; and now the
blind can see that it is policy, and not altogether incapacity, in
McClellan to have made a war to preserve slavery and the rebels. And
thus McClellan outwitted Mr. Lincoln.

In general, human nature is passionately attracted, nay, is subdued,
by energy, above all by civic intrepidity. It would have been so easy
for Mr. Lincoln to carry the masses, and to avoid those disasters at
the polls! But stubbornness is not energy.

From a very reliable source I learn that a few days after the battle
of Antietam, General McClellan, or at least General or Colonel Marcy,
of McClellan's staff, insinuated to the President that General
McClellan would wish to be relieved from the command of the army, and
be assigned to quiet duties in Washington--very likely to supersede
Halleck. And the President seized not by the hairs the occasion to get
rid of the nation's nightmare, together with the pets of the commander
of the army of the Potomac. McClellan acted honestly in making the
above insinuation; he is now, in part at least, irresponsible for any
future disaster and blood.

_Oct. 20._--I have strong indications that European powers, as England
and France, are very sanguine to mediate, but would do it only if, and
when, _asked_ by our government. Those two governments, or some other
half-friendly, may, semi-officially, insinuate to Mr. Seward to make
such a demand. A few months ago, already Mr. Dayton wrote from Paris
something about such a step. Mr. Seward is desperate, downcast, and
may believe he can serve his country by committing the cabinet to some
such combination. I must warn Stanton and others.

In the Express and in the World the New York Herald found its masters
in ignominy.

More or less mean, contemptible ambition among the helmsmen, but
patriotism, patriotic ambition are below zero--here in Washington. For
the sake and honor of human nature, I pray to destiny Stanton may not
fail, and still count among the Wadsworths, the Wades, and the like
pure patriots.

The democratic elections and majorities united to Mr. Seward may
enforce a compromise, and God knows if Mr. Lincoln will oppose it to
the last. Then the only seeming salvation of the north will be the
indomitable decision of the rebels not to accept any terms except a
full recognition.

_Oct. 22._--The incapacity of the military wiseacres borders on
idiotism, if not on something worse. To do nothing McClellan absorbs
every man, and keeps one hundred and forty thousand men on the
Maryland side of the Potomac. Sigel has only a small command of twelve
thousand men, in a position where, with one quarter of what is useless
under McClellan, with his skill, his activity, and the _truly_
patriotic devotion of his troops, of his officers, and of the
commanders under him, Sigel would force the rebels to retreat from
Winchester, and otherwise damage them far more than _will_ or can do
such McClellans, Hallecks, and all this c----e.

One of the greatest misfortunes for the American people is to have
considered as statesmen the rhetors, the petty politicians, and the
speech-makers. Now, those rhetors, petty politicians, and
speech-makers are at the helm, are in the Senate, and--ruin the
country.

The optimists and the subservients still console themselves and
confuse the people by asserting that Mr. Lincoln will yet _come out_
as a man and a statesman. Previous to such a happy change the
country's honor and the country's political and material vitality will
_run out_.

More than a year ago Mr. Seward said to the Prince Salm and to me,
that this war ought to be fought out by foreigners; that the Americans
fought the revolutionary war, but now they are devoted to peaceful
pursuits; and that it is the duty of Europeans to save this refuge
from the thraldoms in the old world.

Now, I see that Mr. Seward was right, although in a sense different
from that in which he uttered the above sentence.

The Irish excepted, all the other foreign-born Americans, but
preëminently the Germans, are more in communion with the lofty, pure,
and humane element in the thus called American principle, are
therefore more in communion with the creed of the immense majority of
Americans, than are they, the present dabblers in politics, the
would-be leaders, (civil and military,) the would-be statesmen, all of
whom are eaten up by the admixture into what is vital and perennial in
the signification of America, of all that in itself is local, muddy,
petty, accidental, and transient.

_Oct. 23._--The recent publication of General Scott's letter, and of a
writing to President Buchanan, confirms my opinion that "the highest
military authority in the land" faltered after March 4, 1861, and
inaugurated that defensive warfare wherein we _stick_ on the Potomac
until this day.

Pseudo-liberal right-honorable Gladstone asserts that Jeff. Davis "has
made the South a nation;" then Abraham Lincoln, with W. H. Seward and
G. B. McClellan, have destroyed a noble and generous nation.

England may now recognize the South, France may join in it, but other
great European powers, as Russia, Spain, Prussia, Austria, will not
follow in such a wake. The recognition will not materially improve the
condition of the rebels, nor raise the blockade. But as soon as
recognized, Jeff. D. may ask for a mediation, which the people--if not
Mr. Seward--will spurn. An armed mediation remains to be applied,
wherein, likewise, the other European powers will not concur. An armed
mediation between the two principles will be the _summum_ of infamy to
which English aristocracy and English mercantilism can degrade itself;
if Louis Napoleon joins therein, then his crown is not worth two
years lease, provided the Orleans have ----

If we should succumb under the united efforts of imbecility, of
pro-slavery treason, of Anglo-Franco-European and of American perjury,
then

  Ultima coelestis terram Astræa reliquit.

_Oct. 25._--Only two or three days ago, in a conversation with a
diplomat, Mr. Seward asserted that both the extreme parties will be
mastered--that is, the secessionists and the abolitionists. So Mr.
Seward confesses the _credo_ and the gospel of the New York Herald,
the World, the Journal of Commerce, the National Intelligencer, and
other similar organs of secession.

Notwithstanding the numerous complications naturally generated by the
vicinity of Cuba to Secessia, the Spanish government, Count Serrano,
the captain-general of Cuba, and Tassara, the Spanish minister here,
all have maintained the most loyal relations towards the Federal
government. It were to be very much regretted if a drunkard or a
brute, as in the affair of the Montgomery, should disturb such
relations.

_Oct. 26._--McClellan-Blair-Seward tactics are crowned with splendid
success. By his _simplicity_ Mr. Lincoln aided therein as much as he
could. The bad season is in; any successful campaign impossible. The
rebels will be safe, and Gladstone justified.

It is so difficult to find out the truth concerning Fremont's campaign
against Jackson, that some generalship may, after all, be credited to
him. At any rate Fremont is a better general than McClellan and the
pets in command under him, and Fremont is with his heart and soul in
the cause, of which the McClellanites cannot be accused, all of them,
their fetish included, having no heart and no soul.

Old Europe, and, above all, official Europe, and even the Gladstones,
must be vindicated. Official Europe generally appreciates nations by
their leaders. Europe demands from such leaders actions and proofs of
statesmanship, of high capacity, if not of heroism. The attempt to
astonish Europe by speeches, by oratory, and, still worse, by
second-rate legal arguments, by what is called papers here, and in
Europe diplomatic circulars and despatches, is the same as the attempt
to eclipse bright sunlight with a burning candle. But our orators,
and, above all, Mr. Seward, flooded the European and the English
statesmen with their, at the best, indifferent productions. Official
Europe was favored with a shower of three various editions of _papers
relating to foreign relations_ in 1862, issued by the _State
Department_, together with the Sanfords, the Weeds, the Hugheses, _et
hoc genus omne_. Undoubtedly, the traitor Mason shows in England more
of fire than does the cold, stiff, prickly, and dignified son and
grandson of Presidents; and then the average of our press! O, Jemima!

In his circular, September 22, to our agents in Europe, Mr. Seward
belies not himself. The emancipation is rather coldly announced, and
it is visible that neither Mr. Seward's heart nor soul is in it.

The President has now the most reliable information that when Corinth
was invested by Halleck, the rebel troops were wholly demoralized, and
the enemy was astonished not to be attacked, as very little resistance
would have been made. So much for General Scott's gift in Halleck.

The almost daily occurrences here long ago would have exasperated the
hot-headed and warm-hearted nations in Europe, and treason would have
become their watchword. O American people! thou art warm-hearted, but
of _unparallelled endurance_!

No European nation, not even the Turks, would patiently bear such a
condition of affairs. Every where the sovereign would have been forced
to change, or to modify, the _personnel_ of his ministers and
advisers; and Mr. Lincoln is in the hands of Messrs. Seward and Blair,
both worse even than McClellan, and--cannot shake them off.

Now, for the first time in my life, I realize why, during the last
stages of the dissolution of the Roman empire, honest men escaped into
monasteries, or why, at certain epochs of the great French revolution,
the best men went to the army.

Ah! to witness here the meanest egotism, imbecility, and intrigue,
coolly, one by one, destroy the honor and the future of this noble
people. Curse upon my old age! above all, curse upon my obesity!
Curse upon my poverty! What a cesspool! what a mire! Only legal
slaughterers all around! O, could I go to a camp! but, of course, not
to one under McClellan. Sigel's camp. Sigel's men are not soulless;
they fight for an idea, without an eye to the White House.

The rhetors, the stump-speakers, the politicians, and the intriguers
hold the power, and--humanity and history shudder at the results.

_Oct. 29._--McClellan, with his wonted intrepidity and rapidity,
crossed the Potomac from all directions, pushes on Winchester,
and--will find there wherefrom every animal willingly discharges
itself.

A foreign diplomat, one of the most eminent in the whole _corps_, said
yesterday, "No living being so ardently prays for rain as does
McClellan; rain will prevent fighting, marching, &c." Such is the
estimation of our hero.

Fevers decimated many regiments at Harper's Ferry. If McClellan would
have marched only five miles a day, fighting even such battles without
any generalship, as he did at Antietam, the army would be healthier,
and by this time would be in Richmond.

The decision of the court of inquiry between a patriot and the
incarnation of West Point McClellanism, between Martindale and that
Fitz-John Porter, ought to open the eyes of any one, but--not those of
Mr. Lincoln.

Only two days ago Mr. Lincoln declared, that the reason why McClellan
and his pets are not removed is, not any confidence in McClellan's
capacity, but to preserve the political balance between the republican
and the democratic parties.

If there exist such spiritual creations as providence, genii, or
angels watching over the destinies of nations, then, at the sight of
Lincoln-Seward-Blair doings, providence, angels, genii avert their
faces in despair.

_Oct. 30._--New regiments coming in. It cuts into the deepest of the
heart to see such noble and devoted fellows going to be again wantonly
slaughtered by the combined military and civic inefficiency of
McClellan-Lincoln-Seward, and, above all, by their utter
heartlessness.

When the rebels invaded Maryland, the _fighting_ generals, as
Heintzelman, advised to mass the troops between the rebels and the
Potomac, cut them from their bases and communications, push them
towards the North without a possibility of escape, instead of throwing
them back on the Potomac. Harper's Ferry would have been saved. Every
progress made by the rebels in a Northern direction would have assured
their ruin; soon their ammunition would have been exhausted, and
surrender was inevitable. But this bold plan of a _fighting_ general
could not be comprehended by pets and pretorians. Since, daily and
daily occasions occur to destroy the rebels; but that is not the game.
Instead of cutting the rebels from Gordonsville and Richmond, which
could have been done any time during the last five weeks if
Heintzelman and Sigel were not so thoroughly weakened by an ignorant,
or worse, distribution of troops, McClellan with all his might pushes
the rebels back to Richmond, back on their bases and their resources.
O, poor country!

Even I feel humiliated to continually ascertain, by various direct and
indirect sources from Europe, in what little estimation--if not
worse--is held our administration by the principal statesmen and
governments of the old world.




NOVEMBER, 1862.

     Empty rhetoric -- The future dark and terrible -- Wadsworth
     defeated -- The official bunglers blast every thing they touch --
     Great and holy day! McClellan gone overboard! -- The planters --
     Burnside -- McClellan nominated for President -- Awful events
     approaching -- Dictatorship dawns on the horizon -- The
     catastrophe.


O God, O God! to witness how, by the hands of
Lincoln-Seward-McClellan, this noblest human structure is
crumbled--and, perhaps, soon

  Pulvere vix tactæ poterunt monstrare ruinæ.

May God preserve this people--those noble patriots, of which
Wadsworth, Wade, Potter of Wisconsin, Stanton, Governor Andrew, and
many others are the types, when the country will be ruined and rended
by the firm, Lincoln-Seward-McClellan, to realize the pang,--

  Nessun maggior' dolor' che ricordarsi dell tempo felice
  Nella miseria.

O, I know what it is!

Mr. Seward's letter, October 28, to Messrs. Connover and Palmer, is a
display of that empty rhetoric whose dust he is wont to throw into the
eyes of the good-natured masses. His plea for united action--of course
with him--is the most bitter irony on himself. Mr. Seward's policy and
action are at the helm, and he piloted "our noble ship of state" on
worse breakers than those "of eighteen months ago."

Mr. Seward's letter is dumb on the object of the Cooper meeting. Of
course, Mr. Seward would rather swallow a viper than applaud the
abolition of slavery.

_Nov. 5._--Lincoln-Seward politically slaughtered the republican
party, and with it the country's honor. The future looks dark and
terrible. I shudder. Dishonor on all sides. Lincoln will not
understand to use the lease of power left to him--or to fall as a man.
But to be candid, most of the thus called leaders prepared this
defeat, and most of them at the last moment may lack decision and
dignity. How repeatedly I warned the Sumners, Wilsons, and other
wiseacres, that such will be the end, that the people at large will
become exasperated by Lincoln's administration!

The issue brought before the people was all but dignified. It would
have been better to make a straightforward issue against the
incapacity and the democratic ill-will of McClellan, than to dodge the
question, and force honest and noble men to speak against their
convictions. The issue, as made, was concocted by journalists, by
politicians; but not by statesmen, not by genuine great leaders.

Seward triumphs. His insincerity preëminently contributed to defeat
Wadsworth. Mephisto-like, he rejoices in thus having humbled the pure
and radical patriots.

At any rate, I shall try to expose Seward. _Arrive que pourra._ But
for him the sacred cause would have been victorious, and now--horror!
horror!

The pro-Romanist clergy is more furiously and savagely pro-slavery
than are the Rhetts, the Yanceys, in the South; the poor
Africo-Americans are, if not the truest Christians in this country, at
any rate their Christianity is sublime when compared with the
pro-Romanism.

O, for civic intrepidity, or all is lost! High-minded, intrepid,
self-forgetful civism and abnegation alone can avert the catastrophe.
Such is the mass of the people--but its leaders!

_Nov. 8._--Hooker has the military instinct in him which lights the
fire, and the inspiration of the god of battles; as Halleck has
nothing of the one and of the other, and as Mr. Lincoln is--Mr.
Lincoln, so Hooker is not to be put in command of the army. Lincoln
and Halleck will find out their man. _Similis simili gaudet_, or,
_przywitala sie dupa z wiechciem_.

_Nov. 9._--The official bunglers have blasted every thing they
touched: the people's virgin enthusiasm and unparalleled devotion;
they have endangered the country's safety. It is to hope for a miracle
to expect any thing for the better at the hands of the bunglers. Will
the shallow rhetors, will the would-be leaders in the Congress, be as
subservient to the bunglers as they have been up to this hour?

_Nov. 9._--Great and holy day! McClellan gone overboard! Better late
than never. But this belated act of justice to the country cannot
atone for all the deadly disasters, will not remove the fearful
responsibility from Lincoln-Seward-Blair, for having so long sustained
this horrible vampire. Now is Seward's turn to jump.

It must be acknowledged, in justice to the average of the better class
of planters, that the superficial, sociable intercourse with them is
more easy, and what is commonly considered more European, than is
similar intercourse with any corresponding class in the North. Therein
consists the whole attraction exercised by the Southerners on
Europeans visiting America--the diplomats included. I, for one, am
always uneasy, anxious, as if touching hot iron, when in intercourse
here with men with whom I am very intimate, (on the outside,) and who
now are in power. I never felt so out of the track when--once--in
intercourse with sovereigns, and with eminent men in Europe.

_Nov. 11._--General Burnside succeeds to McClellan--gives a military
ovation to his predecessor. In his order of the day, Burnside pays
homage to McClellan, and thus implicitly condemns the government.
Burnside permits McClellan to issue such a parting word as must shake
the army and the country.

_Nov. 12._--The democrats nominate McClellan for the next presidency.
Thus Mr. Lincoln's helplessness, Seward's hatred of the republican
creed, the treason, the imbecility, the intrigues of various others,
the lack of civic energy in the New York republican press and in the
republican politicians, except some repeatedly mentioned in this
Diary,--all this combined has built up a pedestal for such a
McClellan!

Strange and awful events may occur even before the end of Mr.
Lincoln's administration. The democratic leaders are perverse,
unprincipled, reckless, daring beyond conception; success is their
creed, and no conscience, no honor restrain them; and in the
management of the public opinion and of their party the democrats have
evidenced a skill far above that of the republican leaders; further,
the democrats evoke the vilest, the most brutish passions dormant in
the masses; the democrats are supported by all that is brutal, savage,
ignorant, and sordid; and, to crown and strengthen all, the democrats,
united to Romanist priesthood, rule over the Irishry.

And thus the relentless hatred with which the democrats persecute any
elevated, noble, humane aspiration; the helplessness, the incapacity
of the official and unofficial leaders of the republican party: both
these agencies combined may deal such a blow to the pure and humane
republican creed that it may not recover therefrom during the next
twenty-five years.

To sum up,--

_Dictatorship with McClellan_ seems to dawn upon the horizon; the
smallest disaster--Burnside, ah!--will precipitate the catastrophe. I
pray to God (and for the first time) that I may be mistaken.