Produced by Jonathan Ingram, Christine P. Travers and the
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[Transcriber's note: Obvious printer's errors have been corrected, all
other inconsistencies are as in the original. The author's spelling has
been maintained.]




[Illustration: _The Signatories to the Peace Treaty on behalf of the South
African Republic._]

[Illustration: _The Signatories to the Peace Treaty on behalf of the
Orange Free State._]




ARMY HEADQUARTERS, SOUTH AFRICA.

PRETORIA. 4th March, 1902.


Your Honour,

By direction of His Majesty's Government, I have the honour to forward
enclosed copy of an Aide-Mémoire communicated by the Netherland Minister
to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, together with his reply
thereto.

      I have the honour to be,
  Your Honour's Obedient Servant,

                         [Signature of Kitchener.]

                                          General.

                   Commanding-in-Chief, South Africa.


  To
      His Honour,
          Mr. Schalk Burger.

_Facsimile of the letter from Lord Kitchener upon which the Peace
Negotiations were entered into._




THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS

  _Between the Governments of the South African Republic
  and the Orange Free State, and the Representatives
  of the British Government, which terminated
  in the Peace concluded at Vereeniging
  on the 31st May, 1902_


BY

REV. J. D. KESTELL

_Secretary to the Orange Free State Government_


AND

D. E. VAN VELDEN

_Secretary to the Government of the South African Republic_


TRANSLATED AND PUBLISHED BY

D. E. VAN VELDEN




_WITH PHOTOS AND FACSIMILES OF ORIGINAL DOCUMENTS_




  LONDON
  RICHARD CLAY & SONS, LTD., BRUNSWICK STREET, S.E.
  1912


  RICHARD CLAY AND SONS, LIMITED
  BRUNSWICK ST., STAMFORD ST., S.E., AND
  BUNGAY SUFFOLK




CONTENTS


                                                                  Page

  PREFACE                                                           ix

  Introduction by S. W. Burger, M.L.A., Acting State President
  of the Late South African Republic                              xiii

  TRANSLATOR'S NOTE                                                xix


  CHAPTER I
  Preliminary Correspondence                                         1


  CHAPTER II
  Proceedings at Klerksdorp                                         18


  CHAPTER III
  First Negotiations at Pretoria                                    33


  CHAPTER IV
  Vereeniging                                                       46


  CHAPTER V
  Further Negotiations at Pretoria                                  98


  CHAPTER VI
  Vereeniging and Peace                                            138


  APPENDIX--The Middelburg Proposals                               210




LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS


  The Signatories to the Peace Treaty on behalf of the South
  African Republic.                                     _Frontispiece_

  The Signatories to the Peace Treaty on behalf of the Orange Free
  State.                                                _Frontispiece_

  Facsimile of the letter from Lord Kitchener upon which
  the Peace Negotiations were entered into         _Facing Title page_

                                                         _Facing page_

  Facsimile of the copy of the reply from the Government
  of the South African Republic to Lord Kitchener's letter
  dated 4th March, 1902                                              6

  Facsimile of Safe Conduct granted by Lord Kitchener               44

  Facsimile of the Oath subscribed to at Vereeniging by
  the Delegates of the South African Republic                       46

  Facsimile of the Oath subscribed to at Vereeniging by
  the Delegates of the Orange Free State                            46

  Facsimile of a page of the Peace Proposals as submitted by the
  British Representatives and amended by the Boer Representatives.
  The alterations are in the handwriting of Generals Smuts and
  Hertzog                                                          112

  Facsimile of a page of the Peace Proposals as submitted
  by the British Representatives and amended by the Boer
  Representatives. The alterations are in the handwriting of
  General Smuts and Mr. Advocate N. J. de Wet                      117

  Facsimile of the original proposal by Commandant H. P. J.
  Pretorius, seconded by General Chris. Botha, to accept the
  British Peace Proposals                                          202

  Facsimile of the document on which the voting on the proposal
  by Commandant H. P. J. Pretorius, seconded by General Chris.
  Botha, to accept the British Peace Proposals was recorded        206




PREFACE


The want has been repeatedly expressed of an official publication of
the Minutes of the Negotiations which led to the Peace concluded at
Vereeniging on May 31, 1902, events which have hitherto been a closed
page in the history of the Boer War. As the Republics had ceased to
exist, the question arose: Who could publish such Minutes? It is true
that some very incomplete Minutes appeared in General de Wet's book,
but although they were in all probability reliable, yet they had not
the seal of an official document.

The only way in which the want could be met appeared to be for the
Secretaries, who had been appointed by the two Republican Governments
to minute the Negotiations, to publish those Minutes after they had
been read and approved of as authentic by persons competent to do so.

This is what has been done by this publication, which places the
reader in possession of all the correspondence leading up to the
Negotiations, exact reports of what was said and done, not only at
Vereeniging, but also previously at Klerksdorp, and, finally, all the
Negotiations which took place at Pretoria between the two Republican
Governments and the British Government, represented by Lord Kitchener
and Lord Milner.

We, however, were not satisfied to publish this record, which we had
most carefully taken down, merely on our own authority. We felt that,
if only this and nothing more were done, the world would after all
have only our word to rely upon, and that, although the record thus
published would always serve as a highly reliable book of reference,
it would lack the authority of a document properly authenticated by a
body competent to do so.

In order, therefore, to obtain this desirable seal of authenticity to
our record, we submitted our manuscript to President Steyn, Acting
President Burger, the Chairman of the Meeting of Representatives of
the People at Vereeniging (General C. F. Beyers), Generals Botha and
Smuts for the South African Republic, and Generals de Wet and Hertzog
for the Orange Free State, with the result that they all found our
record to be a true and correct account of the Peace Negotiations.

So this book sees the light with their _imprimatur_, and we therefore
publish it with the greatest confidence.

The Reader's attention is drawn to the following particulars:--

     In respect of the speeches made by the members of the Republican
     Governments at Klerksdorp, and the speeches delivered later at
     Vereeniging by them and by the Delegates from the various
     Commandos, the reports are almost _verbatim_. The addresses of
     the Presidents and principal Generals especially were transcribed
     from the stenographic notes of D. E. van Velden, and revised by
     J. D. Kestell.

     This completeness does not extend to what is published of the
     _First_ Conference between the two Republican Governments and
     Lord Kitchener and Lord Milner, because no Secretaries were
     admitted to that Conference. Lord Kitchener had expressed the
     desire that no official notes should be taken, as the parties
     would first confer informally. What was discussed, however, has
     not been lost, for an account of what took place at this
     Conference was taken down by J. D. Kestell from the dictation of
     General Hertzog immediately after the conference was over, and
     revised by President Steyn and Mr. W. J. C. Brebner (Acting
     Government Secretary, Orange Free State), and appears in this
     book.

     With reference to the _Second_ Conference, however, we were
     present, and what is given is a _verbatim_ account of the
     discussion.

Of some official documents in our possession, reproductions or
facsimiles are given in the hope that the reader will find them of
interest.

                                        J. D. K.
                                        D. E. v. V.

  _Pretoria,
       October, 1908._




INTRODUCTION


DEAR READER,

In connection with the publication, by the Rev. J. D. Kestell and Mr.
D. E. van Velden, of the official minutes of the Peace Negotiations
(together with the official correspondence relating thereto) between
the British Government and the Governments of the Orange Free State
and the South African Republic, which terminated in the Peace
concluded at Vereeniging on May 31, 1902, I do not wish in this
introduction to enter into details, but merely to confine my remarks
to the great responsibility which rested upon us and to the question,
"Was it necessary to conclude Peace?"

If it was a task of supreme importance to decide to enter upon the
struggle which had been waged, if it was an arduous and difficult duty
to carry on the struggle, it was much harder and more difficult to
foresee what the result of that struggle would be, and still harder
and more difficult to decide to give it up. With how much hope, fear,
and anxiety was not the end looked forward to! And when the end came,
what did it not cost us to persuade the head to do what the heart
refused to perform? What was realised of that hope for which there had
been such a struggle, for which so much had been suffered, so much
endured, so much sacrificed--the Reader will find in this book. He
will also find in it the correspondence which led up to, and was
carried on during, the Peace Negotiations; the proceedings at our
meetings at Klerksdorp, Pretoria, and Vereeniging; the opinions,
views, and grounds upon which the leaders of the people acted, in so
far as those were expressed. You will not, however, find here the
struggle that took place at Vereeniging within every Delegate between
the heart and the head; the intense effort which it cost us to bring
ourselves to acknowledge to our powerful enemy that we had been
overpowered, exhausted, and were unable to continue the struggle any
longer; to acknowledge to ourselves and posterity that our sacrifices,
the blood and tears that had been shed, the indescribable anxiety for
wife and children, the suffering and death of the thousands of
innocent women and children, the awful evils which had fallen to the
lot of the rebels, had been all in vain; that we were about to lose
all for which we had suffered and sacrificed. All this, I say, you do
not find recorded here, but you may read it in the grey hairs of the
Delegates to Vereeniging and of our people, in the deep wrinkles on
their faces, and in the expression on the countenance of every
Boer--that expression which cannot conceal what the soul had to
endure. We had already sacrificed much, yet, in spite of all, the hope
had inseparably clung to us that no sacrifice, no privation, no loss
would be in vain. There at Vereeniging, however, we had to surrender
what was dearest to us, we had to stand at the open grave of the two
Republics, and we had to say with bowed heads: "We had not hoped,
expected, willed for this, but--Thy will be done!"

We are asked: "Why did you make peace? Why did you not persevere? Was
there no hope? Had the last resources been exhausted, and was all your
strength spent?" To these questions I must emphatically reply "Yes";
there was no means that had not been resorted to, no strength, no
reasonable hope left. As rational beings we could see no grounds upon
which to continue the struggle with any hope of success. It was,
however, not the arms of the enemy which directly compelled us to
surrender, but another sword which they had stretched out over
us--namely, the sword of hunger and nakedness, and, what weighed most
heavily of all, the awful mortality amongst our women and children in
the Concentration Camps. I, as Acting State President, upon whom great
responsibility rested, was convinced that it was time for us to
conclude peace, not for the sake of ourselves, the leaders, but for
the sake of the People, who were so faithful, in order to preserve the
root that still remained, and in order not to allow our nation to be
entirely exterminated; out of the ruins of our country to endeavour
later on to develop a South African nationality, to build up the
nation again, and to preserve the unity of the People. It was our
conviction that the further prosecution of the war would mean the
destruction of our national existence. Whether that conviction was
correct or not, we confidently leave to the judgment of posterity.

Allow me also a reply to the question: "Why did we not conclude peace
sooner?" A question which by some is even put reproachfully. My answer
is that, as we fought for the retention of our Fatherland and our
National honour, we, as men, could not give up the struggle before we
had convincing proof that we had persevered and resisted to the
uttermost. That proof was thrust upon us at Vereeniging, and now every
one who defended his Fatherland to the last can bear his fate with an
easy conscience, and the world is convinced with us that we fought to
the bitter end. With all our disappointments we had further to
experience that Great Britain, in addition to the tremendous forces
with which her mighty Empire supplied, also availed herself of natives
and other unjustifiable means. I wish merely to mention this.

At Vereeniging we began by looking up prayerfully to God, Who decides
the destinies of men and nations, and became convinced that it was the
right time to make peace, and that we were on the right road by
concluding the Treaty of Vereeniging. My closing words at Vereeniging
were: "Comrades, we stand beside the grave of both Republics, but not
at the grave of our People. We have laid down our arms and concluded
the struggle which has brought death, misery, and destruction. But now
we have to enter upon another struggle, much greater and much nobler.
It will be our duty to labour with vigour and sacrifice at the
rebuilding of our nation. Therein lies a great work before us.
Although our former functions have now lapsed, our calling and duty
still remain. The People who have looked up to us and remained so
faithful to the end will continue to look up to us, and rightly expect
assistance and advice under the altered circumstances. Let it always
be our aim to serve our People."

Have subsequent events not proved that our view was correct?

Peace! How was it received?

I think the answer must be: "With deep disappointment." The victors
did not exult. Was it perhaps because they involuntarily felt that
from the time when they, principally upon distorted representations,
unjustifiably interfered with the affairs of the South African
Republic, up to the Conference at Vereeniging, they had achieved no
honour? Our People, especially the women and daughters in the
Concentration Camps, were deeply dismayed. I have never seen a more
impressive and sadder scene than the sight of the 4,000 women and
children in the Merebank Concentration Camp, Natal, when I informed
them that we had concluded peace, by which we had had to sacrifice our
country. The question: "Is it for _this_ that I sacrificed my husband,
my son, my child?"--which resounded in my ears from the lips of the
weeping women made the discharge of this, my last duty, also the most
painful one. The deep conviction was there wrought in me that it was
only their faith in God that enabled these women and children to
endure what they had had to endure. May their patience, their courage,
their faith, be transmitted to their descendants!

I would further like to say that it was hard for us all, especially
for me, to be deprived, during the Negotiations at Vereeniging, of
the advice and support of President Steyn, who was forced by illness
to leave us during the early days of the negotiations. The absence of
his strong shoulder made our task so much harder.

                                        S. W. BURGER.

  _Pretoria,
      October, 1907._




TRANSLATOR'S NOTE


In response to wishes very generally expressed, an English translation
of "De Vredesonderhandelingen tusschen Boer en Brit in Zuid Afrika"
(The Peace Negotiations between Boer and Briton in South Africa) is
now placed before the Public.

Though the greatest care has been taken to ensure that the translation
conveys to the reader exactly what the Dutch original contains, the
latter remains the official record, from the Boer side, of the Peace
Negotiations. The translator accepts all responsibility for the
English translation.

In anticipation of any critical remarks that may be made, it is only
due to state that the addition to the English translation of a few
facsimiles of original documents and the few verbal improvements are
by no means due to a desire to differentiate between the publications
in the two languages, but are merely the improvements which, as every
author knows, suggests themselves and are rendered possible by the
publication of a later edition.

The Reader will not always find the translation of the speeches in
idiomatic English, but it may be pointed out that in most cases that
defect is due to the translator having aimed at preserving, as far as
possible the stamp of originality as it exists in the original.

  _Pretoria,
      September, 1911._




THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS




CHAPTER I.

PRELIMINARY CORRESPONDENCE.


                                      ARMY HEADQUARTERS, SOUTH AFRICA.
                                                      PRETORIA,
                                                      _March 4, 1902_.

YOUR HONOUR,

By direction of His Majesty's Government, I have the honour to forward
enclosed copy of an Aide-Mémoire communicated by the Netherlands
Minister to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, together with
his reply thereto.

  I have the honour to be,
    Your Honour's obedient servant,
                                  KITCHENER, General,
                       _Commanding-in-Chief, South Africa_.

TO HIS HONOUR, MR. SCHALK BURGER.


Aide-Mémoire communicated by the Netherlands Minister, January 25,
1902:--

1. It is the opinion of the Government of Her Majesty the Queen that
the exceptional circumstances in which one of the belligerent parties
in South Africa is situated, which prevents it from placing itself in
communication with the other party by direct means, constitutes one of
the causes for the continuance of this war, which continuously without
interruption or termination harasses that country, and which is the
cause of so much misery.

2. The circumstances are indeed exceptional, where one of the
belligerent parties is entirely enclosed and isolated from the rest of
the world; and where the representatives of the Boers in Europe are
precluded from all communication with their Generals. This state of
affairs has called into existence the difficulty that those in
authority, who ought to negotiate in the interests of the Boers, are
divided in two, and deprived of all means of deliberating with each
other. It is plain that the Boer Delegates in Europe can do nothing
because they are not acquainted with the condition of affairs in
Africa, and that the Boers, who are under arms, must refrain from
taking the initiative because they are not informed on the condition
of affairs in Europe.

3. Further, the Delegates in Europe are tied by their credentials,
which were issued in March, 1900, and which bind them so closely to
the independence of the Republics, that they would not be warranted
even to accept the restoration of the _status quo ante bellum_, if the
method (of settling) the differences, which might arise, was not at
the same time arranged.

4. These circumstances cause the question to arise whether an offer of
good services could not be made by a neutral Power with the object of
at least making it possible to open the way to negotiation, which
could otherwise not be begun.

5. For these reasons it would be of importance to know whether it
would be agreeable to the Government of His Britannic Majesty to make
use of the good services of a neutral Power, if these good services
would confine themselves to the task of bringing the negotiators
appointed by both parties into communication with each other.

6. Perhaps the Government of Her Majesty the Queen could be
considered as indicated to fulfil this task, because the Delegates of
the Boers are on Netherland's ground and are accredited only to this
Government.

7. If the Government of His Britannic Majesty concurs with this idea,
there would be ground for the Government of Her Majesty the Queen to
approach the Delegates of the Boers with the question whether they
would undertake to proceed to Africa with the object of conferring
with the heads of the Boers there, to return to Europe, after staying
a limited time (say a fortnight), invested with authority making
provision for every possible event, and giving them power to conclude
a Treaty of Peace, which would be inviolably binding on the Boers in
Europe as well as on the Boers in Africa.

8. In case of an answer in the affirmative, it would be necessary for
the Government of His Britannic Majesty to give the Government of the
Netherlands three safe-conducts, allowing the Boer Delegates to
proceed free to South Africa, to remain there free for the stipulated
time, and to return free to Europe. Further, it would be necessary
that the British Government allow the use of a telegraphic code to
indicate the place where the said Delegates could meet the Leaders of
the Boers.

9. After their return the Government of Her Majesty the Queen would
place them in communication with the Plenipotentiaries designated for
that purpose by the Government of His Britannic Majesty, and
voluntarily undertake to place at the disposal of these gentlemen all
that is necessary for their meeting.

10. The Government of Her Majesty would then consider its task as
completed.

11. It is very clear that, in spite of everything, the negotiations
thus commenced might lead to nothing; but the possibility of the
contrary is by no means excluded; and under the circumstances it
appears to be desirable to try to open negotiations in the hope that
they will bear fruit. And with the difficulty in view which exists for
all belligerent parties to take the first step in this direction, it
might be useful that a third party undertook to do so, and offered
itself as mediator.


_Confidential._

                        _The_ Marquis of LANSDOWNE _to_ Baron GERICKE.

                                                 FOREIGN OFFICE,
                                                   _January 29, 1902_.

SIR,

You were good enough to lay before me on the 29th instant a
communication from the Netherlands Government, in which it was
proposed that, with the object of bringing the war to an end, His
Majesty's Government might grant a safe conduct to the Boer Delegates
now in Holland for the purpose of enabling them to confer with the
Boer Leaders in South Africa. It is suggested that after the
conference the Delegates might return to Europe with power to conclude
a Treaty of Peace with this country, and the Netherlands Government
intimate, in this event, they might at a later stage be instrumental
in placing the Boer Plenipotentiaries in relation with the
Plenipotentiaries who might be appointed by His Majesty's Government.

The Netherlands Government intimate that if this project commends
itself to His Majesty's Government, they will inquire of the Delegates
whether they are prepared to make the suggested visit to South Africa.

It may therefore be inferred that the communication which I received
from you was made on the responsibility of the Netherlands Government
alone, and without authority from the Boer Delegates or Leaders. His
Majesty's Government have given it their best consideration, and
whilst they entirely appreciate the motives of humanity which have led
the Netherlands Government to make this proposal, they feel that they
must adhere to the decision adopted and publicly announced by them
some months after the commencement of hostilities by the Boers, that
it is not their intention to accept the intervention of any foreign
Power in the South African war.

Should the Boer Delegates themselves desire to lay a request for safe
conduct before His Majesty's Government, there is no reason why they
should not do so. But His Majesty's Government are obviously not in a
position to express an opinion on any such application until they have
received it, and are aware of its precise nature and the grounds on
which the request is made.

I may, however, point out that it is not at present clear to His
Majesty's Government that the Delegates retain any influence over the
Representatives of the Boers in South Africa or have any voice in
their councils. They are stated by the Netherlands Government to have
no letters of credence or instructions later in date than March, 1900.
His Majesty's Government had, on the other hand, understood that all
powers of Government, including those of negotiation, were now
completely vested in Mr. STEYN for the Boers in the Orange River
Colony, and Mr. SCHALK BURGER for those in the Transvaal.

If this be so, it is evident that the quickest and most satisfactory
means of arranging a settlement would be by direct communication
between the Leaders of the Boer forces in South Africa and the
Commander-in-Chief of His Majesty's forces, who has already been
instructed to forward immediately any offers he may receive for the
consideration of His Majesty's Government.

In these circumstances His Majesty's Government have decided that, if
the Boer Leaders should desire to enter into negotiations for the
purpose of bringing the war to an end, these negotiations must take
place not in Europe, but in South Africa.

It should, moreover, be borne in mind that, if the Boer Delegates are
to occupy time in visiting South Africa, in consulting with the Boer
Leaders in the field, and in returning to Europe for the purpose of
making known the result of their errand, a period of at least three
months would elapse, during which hostilities would be prolonged, and
much human suffering, perhaps needlessly, occasioned.

                                   I have, &c.,
                                        (Signed) LANSDOWNE.


To this letter Acting-President Schalk W. Burger, with the advice and
consent of the Executive Council, replied as follows:--


  _To His Excellency_ Lord KITCHENER, _Commander-in-Chief of the
                   British Troops, Pretoria_.

                                             GOVERNMENT LAGER,
                                             IN THE VELD, S.A.R.,
                                                     _March 10, 1902_.

YOUR EXCELLENCY,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's
letter dated the 4th inst., and to thank you for the transmission of
the therein enclosed Confidential Memoranda exchanged between the
Netherlands Minister and the Marquis of Lansdowne.

With reference to this communication, I have to say that I am desirous
and prepared to make peace proposals, but, in order to be able to
decide upon the terms thereof, it is indispensable that I should meet
His Honour President Steyn, to enable us to make a proposal jointly,
and, to expedite matters, I therefore respectfully request Your
Excellency to give me and the Members of my Government a safe conduct
through Your Excellency's lines to His Honour President Steyn and
back.

  I have the honour to be,
       Your Excellency's obedient servant,
                                          S. W. BURGER,
                                   _Acting State President_.


[Illustration: _Facsimile of the copy of the reply from the Government
of the South African Republic to Lord Kitchener's letter dated 4th
March, 1902._]

In reply to this letter Acting State President Burger received the
following communication:--


                                             PRETORIA,
                                                 _March 13, 1902_.

YOUR HONOUR,

I beg to acknowledge the receipt of Your Honour's letter of the 10th
March, and to inform Your Honour that I shall be pleased to allow the
safe conduct you ask for.

I shall be obliged if Your Honour would inform me of the number you
propose to bring with you, and that you will send in to Balmoral a day
in advance, so that an officer whom I shall designate for the purpose
may meet Your Honour and see that all proper arrangements are made for
your reception.

I shall order my troops immediately to withdraw from the neighbourhood
in which Your Honour now is, and inform them of the safe conduct that
is hereby given to Your Honour.

  I have the honour to be,
    Your Honour's obedient servant,
                                  KITCHENER,   _General,
                           Commanding-in-Chief South Africa_.

TO HIS HONOUR, MR. S. W. BURGER.


Before making use of the opportunity thus obtained of meeting
President Steyn, the Government of the South African Republic
considered it necessary to ascertain where President Steyn with his
Government was, so that he might be informed that the Transvaal
Government, under safe conduct from Lord Kitchener, was _en route_ to
meet him and his Government. In the following letter Acting-President
Burger requested Lord Kitchener to transmit the following telegram to
President Steyn:--


  _To His Excellency_ LORD KITCHENER, _Commander-in-Chief of the
                       British Troops, Pretoria_.

                                             GOVERNMENT LAGER,
                                             IN THE VELD, S.A.R.,
                                                     _March 17, 1902_.

YOUR EXCELLENCY,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's
letter of the 13th inst.

I thank Your Excellency for consenting to our travelling through Your
Excellency's lines, and also for the order given to your troops to
immediately withdraw from the neighbourhood where I at present am, and
for the notice given them of the safe conduct extended to us.

In order to obviate delay I respectfully request Your Excellency to
transmit the enclosed telegram to President Steyn, and to put me in
possession of His Honour's reply thereto, on receipt of which I shall
immediately inform Your Excellency a day in advance, as requested by
you, of the time when we shall arrive at Balmoral.

Pending the receipt of Your Excellency's reply we shall remain at
Roodepoort, near Rhenosterkop.

  I have the honour to be,
        Your Excellency's obedient servant,
                                          S. W. BURGER,
                                   _Acting State President_.


TELEGRAM.

  FROM S. W. BURGER,
     _Acting State President,
       Rhenosterkop, distr. Pretoria_.

                           TO HIS HONOUR PRESIDENT STEYN,
                                            IN THE VELD.

With reference to confidential Memoranda exchanged between the
Netherlands Minister and Lord Lansdowne, which correspondence was
kindly sent to me by His Excellency Lord Kitchener, I with the members
of my Government, wish to proceed to meet you. For that purpose a safe
conduct has been granted to us by Lord Kitchener. Be so good as to
inform me as soon as possible where and when such meeting can take
place.


To this the following reply was received by Acting-President Burger:--


                                      ARMY HEADQUARTERS, SOUTH AFRICA.
                                                         PRETORIA,
                                                     _March_ 18, 1902.

YOUR HONOUR,

I am placed in some difficulty by the receipt of Your Honour's
dispatch enclosing a telegram which you request me to forward to His
Honour Mr. Steyn.

Owing to recent military operations in the country South of the Vaal
and East of the Railway, His Honour Mr. Steyn, with a following
estimated at about Thirty Burghers, has left that district, and was
last reported travelling in the vicinity of Bothaville. It is
therefore not easy for me to communicate with him, especially as he
does not at present make a prolonged stay in any one part of the
country. For this reason I venture to suggest, for Your Honour's
consideration, that it might save time, if you came now to Balmoral,
where a special train would be placed at Your Honour's disposal. You
might then travel to the neighbourhood of Kroonstad, where my Officers
would give you every assistance to go out and meet His Honour Mr.
Steyn, according to the latest information.

It will be understood that the safe conduct I had the pleasure of
forwarding to Your Honour was for a definite purpose of passing my
lines to meet Mr. Steyn, and will have to be renewed if any delay
takes place in taking advantage of it.

  I have the honour to be,
    Your Honour's obedient servant,
                               KITCHENER, General,
                      _Commanding-in-Chief, South Africa_.

HIS HONOUR MR. SCHALK BURGER.


The Transvaal Government then wrote to Lord Kitchener as follows:--


     _To His Excellency_ LORD KITCHENER, _Commander-in-Chief of the
                        British Troops, Pretoria_.

                                   ROODEPOORT, NEAR RHENOSTERKOP,
                                            DIST. PRETORIA, S.A.R.,
                                                     _March 20, 1902_.

YOUR EXCELLENCY,

I acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's communication dated the
18th inst., and have the honour to inform you in reply that we shall
arrive at Balmoral on Saturday morning the 22nd inst., at 10 o'clock,
to avail ourselves of Your Excellency's kind offer to allow us to
travel to Kroonstad by rail, and to assist us from there to meet His
Honour President Steyn.

I shall be accompanied to Kroonstad by five gentlemen, four white
attendants, and one native servant. Furthermore we shall be escorted
to Balmoral by some men who will take our vehicles and horses back
from there.

I also wish to inform Your Excellency that my guard is still here,
where it will remain until our return.

  I have the honour to be,
    Your Excellency's obedient servant,
                                     S. W. BURGER,
                              _Acting State President_.


At this stage of the negotiations an express messenger was despatched
to Commandant General Louis Botha, who was then in the South-Eastern
districts of the South African Republic, to acquaint him with the
decision of the Government, and with the correspondence with Lord
Kitchener (of which copies were sent to him). Unfortunately, as it
appeared later, the despatch rider did not reach General Botha.

On the morning of March 22nd, 1902, at ten o'clock the Members of the
Executive Council, consisting of Acting State President S. W. Burger,
State Secretary F. W. Reitz, and Messrs. L. J. Meyer and J. C. Krogh,
arrived at Balmoral Station. The Executive Council was also
accompanied by Mr. L. J. Jacobsz, Assistant State Attorney, and Mr. D.
van Velden, Secretary of the Executive Council (the latter had arrived
at Balmoral the previous day with the despatch of March 20th, 1902.)

When they approached the Station, Captain Marker, A.D.C. to Lord
Kitchener, Major Leggett, who was connected with the Imperial Military
Railways, and Captain Baird of the Intelligence Department, rode out
to meet them. At 12 o'clock they left by special train for Kroonstad.
There was an hour's delay at Pretoria while another train was being
prepared. During this delay the Executive Council paid a visit to Lord
Kitchener at his request. After that the journey was continued, and
Kroonstad reached in the night.

On the following morning two despatch riders, Robberts and Hattingh,
who had been brought with the Executive Council for that purpose, were
sent out to find President Steyn. They took with them the following
letter with annexures, consisting of copies of the letter of Lord
Kitchener, dated March 4th, 1902, and the above-mentioned
correspondence between the Netherlands and British Governments, which
had been forwarded to Acting President Burger.


     _His Honour_ M. T. STEYN, _State President, O.F.S.,
                        in the Veld_.

                                                    KROONSTAD,
                                                     _March 24, 1902_.

YOUR HONOUR,

Herewith I send you copies of correspondence which has passed between
us and Lord Kitchener, as a result of which I, with the Members of the
Executive Council, have proceeded hither with the object of meeting
Your Honour.

We learn that Lord Kitchener has sent, or that he intended to send,
the same correspondence to Your Honour, but did not know where to find
you. His opinion was, that you were somewhere to the west of the
railway. I have therefore obtained a copy of the communication
intended for Your Honour and send this also herewith.

We shall wait here until we learn where and when we can meet Your
Honour.

Will you let us have this information as soon as possible and by the
shortest way.

  I have the honour to be,
    Your Honour's obedient servant,
                                  S. W. BURGER,
                           _Acting State President_.


The despatch riders reached President Steyn on March 26th, and handed
him the correspondence. The President thereupon immediately sent a
despatch to General de Wet--who was at the moment on his way to
General Badenhorst--summoning him to attend the proposed meeting, and
replied to the Transvaal Government as follows:--


     _To His Honour_ S. W. BURGER, _Acting State President of the
                    S.A. Republic, Kroonstad_.

                                            PRESIDENT'S LAGER,
                                                     IN THE VELD,
                                                     _March 28, 1902_.

YOUR HONOUR,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Honour's despatch
of the 24th inst., enclosing correspondence between Your Honour and
His Excellency Lord Kitchener.

As I have been suffering from my eyes for six or seven weeks, and
since, as you know, almost all our doctors have been captured or have
left us, I was obliged to proceed to General de la Rey in order to
place myself here under the medical treatment of Dr. von Rennenkampff.

I am still under that treatment and am therefore obliged to meet Your
Honour in the South African Republic.

I am prepared to meet Your Honour in the neighbourhood of Klerksdorp
or Potchefstroom, on any farm in that neighbourhood which His
Excellency Lord Kitchener may consider most suitable, or even in one
of those towns, if desirable. When fixing the place of meeting, I wish
to leave it to Your Honour to obtain a guarantee from His Excellency
Lord Kitchener for me and my Government, with the necessary
attendants, that we shall be allowed quietly and unhindered to
continue our work there for a definite time, as well as a safe-conduct
to proceed unhindered to the place of meeting and to return thence
unhindered.

  I have the honour to be,
    Your Honour's obedient servant,
                                      M. T. STEYN,
                              _State President, O.F.S._


On receipt of the above letter the Government addressed the following
communication to Lord Kitchener:--


  _To His Excellency_ LORD KITCHENER, _Commander-in-Chief of the
                        British Troops, Pretoria_.

                                                       KROONSTAD,
                                                     _March 31, 1902_.

YOUR EXCELLENCY,

Herewith I have the honour to send you copy of the letter this day
received by me from President Steyn.

With reference thereto I request your Excellency to be so good as to
furnish President Steyn with the safe-conduct desired by him, and
further to inform us as well as His Honour where, in your opinion, the
intended meeting can take place. Possibly Potchefstroom would be the
most suitable place therefor.

As His Honour the Commandant-General and General de la Rey are both
members of the Executive Council, I request Your Excellency kindly to
send them the enclosed message, and also to furnish each of them with
a safe-conduct to and from the place of meeting.

I further take the liberty of requesting you to forward the enclosed
letter to President Steyn.

  I have the honour to be,
    Your Excellency's obedient servant,
                                      S. W. BURGER,
                                _Acting State President_.


The above-mentioned message to General Botha and to General de la Rey
read as follows:--


  _From_                                     _To_
  ACTING STATE PRESIDENT,
  S.A.R.
                               (1) COMMANDANT GENERAL LOUIS BOTHA.
                               (2) GENERAL DE LA REY.

With reference to confidential memoranda exchanged between the
Netherlands Minister and Lord Lansdowne, which was sent to us by His
Excellency Lord Kitchener, we have come under a safe conduct to meet
President Steyn. This meeting will take place in a locality to be
decided upon by Lord Kitchener. As we consider your presence necessary
there, we have requested His Excellency to furnish you also with a
safe-conduct thither and back.

Be so good as to come without delay on receipt hereof.

  KROONSTAD,                       S. W. BURGER,
    _March 31, 1902_.                   _Acting State President_.


The letter to President Steyn referred to above was as follows:--


              _To His Honour_ PRESIDENT STEYN.
                                                   KROONSTAD,
                                                     _March 31, 1902_.

YOUR HONOUR,

Acknowledging the receipt of Your Honour's letter of the 28th inst., I
have, in pursuance of the desire therein expressed by you, requested
Lord Kitchener to furnish you with a safe-conduct to such place as may
be considered most suitable by His Excellency for the proposed meeting
between us.

  I have the honour to be,
    Your Honour's obedient servant,
                                     S. W. BURGER,
                           _Acting State President, S.A.R._


On April 1st, 1902, Lord Kitchener wrote as follows to Acting State
President Burger:


                                   ARMY HEADQUARTERS, SOUTH AFRICA.
                                                   PRETORIA,
                                                      _April 1, 1902_.

YOUR HONOUR,

The letters and safe-conducts Your Honour has requested me to send out
to Mr. Steyn, Commandant General L. Botha, and General de la Rey will
be forwarded at once. I consider Klerksdorp would be the best place
for your meeting with these gentlemen.

  I have the honour to be,
    Your Honour's obedient servant,
                                     KITCHENER, General,
                             _Commanding-in-Chief, South Africa_.

TO HIS HONOUR MR. S. W. BURGER.


The following letter was forwarded by Lord Kitchener to President
Steyn:--


                                   ARMY HEADQUARTERS, SOUTH AFRICA.
                                                     PRETORIA,
                                                      _April 1, 1902_.

YOUR HONOUR,

At the request of His Honour Mr. S. W. Burger, I beg to forward the
enclosed letter, and at the same time to provide you with this a
safe-conduct for Your Honour and your Executive to come to Klerksdorp
and to return thence after your meeting with Mr. Burger and the
Transvaal Government.

  I have the honour to be,
    Your Honour's obedient servant,
                                      KITCHENER, General,
                              _Commanding-in-chief, South Africa_.

HIS HONOUR MR. M. T. STEYN.


President Steyn then addressed the following letter to Acting
President Burger:--


     _To His Honour the Acting State President, S.A.R.,_
                 S. W. BURGER, _Klerksdorp_.

                                           PRESIDENT'S LAGER,
                                                    IN THE VELD,
                                                      _April 7, 1902_.

YOUR HONOUR,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Honour's letter,
d.d. March 31st, 1902, with the safe-conduct from Lord Kitchener, to
whom I have replied direct.

I hope to be at Klerksdorp on Wednesday, the 9th inst., if not
prevented, with General de la Rey and my Executive Council.

  I have the honour to be,
    Your Honour's obedient servant,
                                     M. T. STEYN,
                              _State President, O.F.S._




CHAPTER II.

PROCEEDINGS AT KLERKSDORP.


On April 6th the Government of the South African Republic left
Kroonstad by rail, and arrived at Klerksdorp the next day, where they
received the letter from President Steyn, mentioned above, as well as
the following from General de la Rey:--


                                                 IN THE VELD,
                                                      _April 7, 1902_.

     _His Honour The Acting State President, S.A.R., Klerksdorp._

YOUR HONOUR,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Honour's telegram
forwarded to me by His Excellency Lord Kitchener. I leave to-day with
His Honour President Steyn for Klerksdorp, and hope, D.V., to arrive
there on Wednesday next.

  I have the honour to be, &c.,
                              J. H. DE LA REY,
                        _Asst. Commandant General_.


On the evening of April 7th Commandant General L. Botha also arrived
at Klerksdorp.

President Steyn, accompanied by his Executive Council and by General
de la Rey, left the farm Weltevreden on April 7th, and arrived at
Klerksdorp at 12 o'clock on April 9th.

The British authorities gave accommodation to the Free State
Government in the Old Town, while the Transvaal Government was
accommodated in the New Town.

The first meeting between the two Governments took place on Wednesday
afternoon, April 9th, at three o'clock, in a large tent which had been
pitched for that purpose some little distance out of the town.

There were present, representing the South African Republic:--

  The Acting State President, S. W. Burger.
  The State Secretary, F. W. Reitz.
  The Commandant General, Louis Botha.
  General de la Rey.
  Mr. L. J. Meyer.
  Mr. J. C. Krogh.

Also Mr. L. J. Jacobsz, Asst. State Attorney; Mr. N. J. de Wet,
Military Secretary of the Commandant General; Mr. I. S. Ferrerra,
Military Secretary of General de la Rey, and Mr. D. van Velden,
Secretary of the Executive Council.

Representing the Orange Free State:--

  President M. T. Steyn.
  Chief Commandant C. R. de Wet.
  General J. B. M. Hertzog.
  General C. H. Olivier.
  Acting Government Secretary W. J. C. Brebner.

Further: Revd. J. D. Kestell, Acting Secretary of the Executive
Council, and Mr. B. J. du Plessis, Private Secretary to President
Steyn.

The Acting State President of the South African Republic was elected
Chairman.

After the meeting had been opened with prayer, the Chairman spoke as
follows:--

As you are aware, we have for some time been desirous of meeting one
another. The correspondence between the Netherlands Minister and Lord
Lansdowne was sent us by Lord Kitchener, under instructions from his
Government. I consider the transmission by the British Government of
this correspondence as an invitation from England to the two Republics
to discuss the question of peace. Having placed this interpretation
upon England's action, I requested a safe-conduct from Lord
Kitchener, in order to be enabled to meet the President and Government
of the Orange Free State. These circumstances suggested to us that the
opportune time to meet one another had arrived. When we see another
Government trying to do something for us, I think that we ought to
make use thereof. It was impossible for us to meet the Free State
Government in another way, and though it was hard for us to make use
of the enemy, our cause is of too great importance for us to consider
that. I regret that we had to remain at Kroonstad for such a long
time. This was certainly not desirable. Faithful, however, to our
compact, we can do nothing without the Orange Free State. I considered
that it was time for us, the Leaders of the People, to meet each other
and discuss matters fully, with our eyes fixed on God. We must face
our condition as it really is. Our object is to make a proposal for
the restoration of peace. The terms of such a proposal must be
discussed by us. If we had not availed ourselves of this opportunity,
I would not have been able to justify my actions to the People. I
believe all will agree with me that it has become necessary for us to
take such a step.

The Meeting then desired to have a brief review from the three
Generals of the conditions in their respective districts.

The Commandant General of the South African Republic said, that after
the fight at Bakenlaagte the enemy proceeded against him with eighteen
columns. Almost all the cattle in his District was taken. By the
building of block houses the space on the High Veld was limited very
much. The lines of block houses were only about three or four hours'
ride from each other. He had to leave the High Veld to try to lead
the enemy away, and proceeded to the Vryheid district. He explained
how the block house lines on the High Veld ran. In the course of their
last operations the enemy captured about 1,000 men on the High Veld,
of which the half were good men. The speaker then enumerated the
numerical strength of his commandos. He had eight commandos under him,
numbering 5,200 men. Food, he said further, was scarce. There was
hardly a sheep to be seen in his division, and in one district, which
he mentioned, there were only 20 head of cattle. In some other
districts conditions were more favourable, and they could not complain
of want. There were no mealies whatever, except what was standing in
the fields. The question of horses also caused anxiety. Four hundred
of his men went on foot. He concluded by bringing to the notice of the
Governments the fact that Zulus had been armed against him. The
Swazies, with the exception of a small number, were well disposed. On
the whole the spirit of the burghers was good. Only here and there
could dejection be discerned.

Chief Commandant de Wet said that innumerable hostile forces had
continually operated against him during the last eight or ten months.
He, with his Government, were so surrounded by the enemy in the
North-eastern districts of the Free State, that they had to fight
their way out. Seven hundred burghers were then captured, but among
them there were many grey-beards, boys, and other men not capable of
serving, so that the number of serviceable burghers captured was not
more than 250. As regards cattle, if one compared the present
condition with that before the war, you would have to say, "There are
no cattle." However, there were sufficient for the burghers and
families. In the Western and South-western portions of the Free State
almost all the burghers laid down their arms when the great forces of
the enemy marched through there for the first time. The Commandos
there were consequently very weak. They had enough corn in those
districts for a full year. Cattle, however, were so scarce that bulls
and rams were slaughtered. From the division where General Brand
commanded, the enemy at an earlier stage of the war removed all
cattle, but now they had large herds again and sufficient corn to last
for a year. In the South-eastern portion of the Free State matters
were much the same as in the South-western. In the districts of Boshof
and Hoopstad there were many sheep and cattle, and there was no want
of mealies. The numerical strength in the entire State amounted to
5,000 men, and there were many burghers in the Cape Colony. The spirit
of all the burghers was splendid.

General de la Rey informed the meeting that he still had 2,000 men
under arms. By means of a line of block houses the enemy had divided
the Western districts, and thus made matters difficult for him.
Zeerust and Rustenburg were still intact. The approach to his
food-districts was also hampered by block houses, much to his
detriment. There were between 1,800 and 2,000 men who fought. There
were also others who had no horses. These he concealed, and if a
burgher fell or was wounded, one of them was brought out to take his
place. The burghers were also destitute of the necessary clothes.
Mealies were still abundant, and they had a fair number of cattle, but
at the present moment the British had all the mealie and Kaffir-corn
fields in their possession, and if they should cut these fields off by
a block house line, his food would be in their hands. With reference
to the Cape Colony, he had about 1,800 men there, and General de Wet
about 600. He saw a chance of still continuing the war.

The Members of the Transvaal Government then reported that they had
met General Kritzinger at Kroonstad. He had received permission from
the British to see President Steyn, and he had greatly regretted that
the President had not been there. With regard to the Cape Colony he
had not given a hopeful prospect to the Transvaal delegates. He stated
that the entire force there amounted to from 1,800 to 2,000 men. There
was a great want of horses, and the enemy made it impossible for the
commandos to get them, as not only horses and mules, but also donkeys
were taken possession of by the enemy. He also said that many
Colonists had laid down their arms.

To this President Steyn and General de Wet replied that at the time
when General Kritzinger made the above statements he was not competent
to express an opinion on the state of affairs in the Cape Colony from
personal observation, because after his rather protracted visit to the
Free State he had barely returned to the Cape Colony when he was
captured at Hanover, badly wounded.

The Meeting then proceeded to the discussion of the question whether
they would request a personal interview with Lord Kitchener, or make
him a proposal in writing.

President Steyn said that, as far as he was concerned, there was only
one condition upon which he could make peace, and that was:
Independence. His opinion was still the same as a year ago, and he saw
nothing to make him change. It was plain to him that the enemy
continually climbed down from the position they had taken up. If the
enemy did not wish the Republics to remain independent, the struggle
must continue. This was what the burghers also desired. Rather than
make terms with the British he would submit unconditionally to them
for ever.

State Secretary Reitz said that to make terms and to give up the
country were two distinct matters. They should try to grasp the
position in which England stood. If England consented to the existence
of the independence of the Republics, she would be done for. For that
reason it was probable that England would not lend her ear to the two
Republican Governments if independence was immediately insisted upon.
The question therefore was whether terms could not be offered. The
Republics were the weaker party, and therefore they could make the
offer. That would also be proof that they were prepared to make peace.
They should make a proposal of some kind or other. The making of such
a proposal did not signify that thereby their independence was
sacrificed, but that the question of independence was not for the
time being under discussion.

President Steyn was of opinion that the enemy should be compelled to
state what terms they were prepared to give.

Mr. Krogh thought that a conference with the British should first be
requested, but no proposals made for the present.

General de la Rey said that the Republics should make a proposal for
the restoration of peace, especially after what the Netherlands
Government had done. It could not be expected that the British would
now make a peace proposal.

The Acting State President of the South African Republic said the war
had done away with the _Status quo ante bellum_. Other proposals
should therefore be made. The question was: what proposals? If Lord
Kitchener agreed to a conference with them, he would ask: what do you
propose? In his opinion the two Governments should ask and concede as
much as it was in their power to do. To retain their independence,
they should concede something. It was better for them to make a
proposal first. If the enemy made the first proposal it would be much
more difficult for them (the Boers) to get some point or other
conceded, than to obtain the alteration of a proposal made from the
Republican side. The matter should be considered from all sides, and
its seriousness, especially, should not be lost sight of. If no change
came, many of the burghers, forced by sheer necessity, would go over
to the enemy. Amongst the people there were always the courageous and
the disheartened. And the two elements were still amongst them. A
burgher who was with them to-day went to lay down his arms to-morrow.
The cause became weaker day by day. Every man who was lost was gone,
and his place could not be filled up. The question was whether it was
better to continue until the people were exterminated, man, woman and
child, than to try to come to terms. Or, on the other hand, to
continue until they obtained what they wanted, only to find that the
people were extirpated. For whose benefit would the struggle then have
been carried on? It should seriously be considered whether the
decision taken last year should be adhered to, or whether an attempt
should be made to obtain for the people what was possible to obtain.
If they must surrender unconditionally, the time should be fixed for
doing so, and not delayed till all were captured or killed. They
should not be lead away too much by their feelings. If he acted
emotionally he would say, "Continue." But they should use their heads.

After this the meeting adjourned to the following morning.


THURSDAY, APRIL 10, 1902.

The meeting was resumed. General L. J. Meyer was the first speaker. He
said that if anyone intended to continue the struggle he would stand
by him, but they should first consider how great the responsibility
was that rested on the two Republican Governments. The principal
matter that should be taken into consideration was what is to the
advantage of the people. Unless a miracle occurred nothing could save
the people. He knew what their condition was as regarded food and
ammunition. Their cause--whatever might be said--had not improved
since June, 1901, but had gone backward. They should not shut their
eyes to facts. The rebellion in the Cape Colony was, after all,
feeble, and the cause was not progressing there. Would it not be
possible to conclude a federal union with the two Colonies? An
offensive and defensive treaty? Friendship in trade? If all attempts
in these directions came to nothing, could they not be satisfied with
an "encumbered independence"? and if England did not want this, and
refused to concede anything, the time would have arrived for the
matter to be laid before the people.

Chief Commandant de Wet said he did not wish to boast when he said
that the enemy had concentrated their greatest forces against him, and
that he had at his disposal the smallest forces; but as far as he was
concerned there could be no mention of the surrender of their
independence. Their cause had progressed since last June. The places
of the burghers whom they lost in the Republics were filled by
recruits in the Cape Colony. He had sufficient food, clothes, and
ammunition for more than a year. Before he conceded an iota of their
independence he would allow himself to be banished for ever.

State Secretary Reitz asked whether they should not discuss some
questions first. Should they not, for example: (1) Request an
armistice; (2) Try to get into communication with their Deputation;
(3) Make proposals in which the following points were raised: (_a_)
Customs Convention; (_b_) Postal Union; (_c_) The Franchise; (_d_)
Their Foreign Affairs; (_e_) Amnesty for Colonial Burghers; (_f_)
Their relation to other Powers; (_g_) The Paramount Power of England,
and (4) In order that they did not at once repulse the British by
using the word "Independence," would it not be better to use another
word instead, for instance, "Self-government"?

General Hertzog said that the Constitution of the Republics did not
permit the Governments to meddle with the independence. That was most
severely punishable under Roman-Dutch law. The Governments could not
part with the independence of the Republics without authority from the
people. They should request a conference with Lord Kitchener on the
basis of their independence. All they heard was from British sources,
and they therefore did not know what the true condition of affairs
was. What assurance had they that England was not willing to give them
their independence, if she could retain the Cape Colony?

General de la Rey also thought that they should demand their
independence. They should concede only what was forced from them.

General Hertzog, seconded by General Olivier, then submitted a draft
resolution to the meeting, which was referred to a committee
consisting of the two Presidents, the State Secretary, and General
Hertzog.

After an adjournment the committee handed in a draft resolution, which
was accepted and dispatched to Lord Kitchener.

The resolution read as follows:--


Resolution passed at Klerksdorp by the Governments of the South
African Republic and the Orange Free State.

"The Governments of the South African Republic and the Orange Free
State having met with reference to the transmission to them of the
correspondence which passed in Europe between the Government of His
Majesty the King of England and the Government of Her Majesty the
Queen of the Netherlands concerning the desirability of giving the
Governments of these Republics an opportunity of communicating with
their plenipotentiaries in Europe, who still continue to enjoy the
confidence of both the Republics;

"Considering the spirit of reconciliation (_rapprochement_) which is
apparent on the part of the Government of His Britannic Majesty, as
well as to the desire therein expressed by Lord Lansdowne on behalf of
his Government to cause this struggle to come to an end;

"Are of opinion that this is a suitable time to again show their
willingness to do all in their power to terminate this war; and

"Consequently resolve to make certain proposals to Lord Kitchener as
representing the Government of His Britannic Majesty, which can serve
as a basis for further negotiations with the object of establishing
the desired peace;

"It is further the view of both these Governments that in order to
accelerate the attainment of the desired object, and to prevent
misunderstandings as much as possible, His Excellency Lord Kitchener
be requested to meet the two Republican Governments personally, at a
time and place to be appointed by him, in order to enable them to
submit to him direct peace proposals, which they are prepared to make,
in order thus by means of direct discussion and conference with him
immediately to solve all questions which may arise, and thereby to
ensure that this meeting shall bear the desired fruit."


This resolution was forwarded to Lord Kitchener under covering letter
signed by the two Presidents.


In the afternoon, after a general discussion, the same Committee was
appointed to make a draft of the points which could be conceded to the
British.

The meeting adjourned till the following morning.


APRIL 11, 1902.

On meeting again the following morning, the Committee submitted the
following document:--

"Proceeding from the basis that they do not recognise the annexation,
the two Governments are prepared to conclude peace by conceding the
following matters:--

     1. The concluding of a perpetual Treaty of friendship and peace,
     including:--

       (_a_) Arrangements relative to a Customs Convention.

       (_b_) Post, Telegraph and Railway Union,

       (_c_) Fixing of the Franchise.

     2. Dismantling of all State Forts.

     3. Arbitration in all future differences between the contracting
     parties, an equal number of arbitrators to be appointed by each
     party from their subjects, with an umpire to be chosen by both
     parties.

     4. Equal educational rights for both the English and Dutch
     languages.

     5. Mutual amnesty.

Mr. Krogh asked whether the following could not be included in the
proposal:--"The conclusion of an offensive and defensive Treaty with
England."

President Steyn remarked that if they themselves offered to conclude
an offensive and defensive treaty with England, they would thereby
alienate all other nations from them. England would use such proposal
to kill all the sympathy other nations had for them.

The meeting did not consider it advisable to add anything to the
proposal, and accepted it as submitted by the Committee.

Mr. L. J. Jacobsz inquired whether, although it was plain that the
Governments were not competent to decide on questions touching the
independence of the Republics, they could not raise the point. If
England did not accept the proposal of the Republican Governments, and
the matter had to be laid before the people, it would be well if those
Governments knew what England was prepared to give instead of the
independence. The question should be thoroughly taken into serious
consideration by their Governments, because, in his opinion, matters
had not improved, but become worse since June, 1901.

General Hertzog was of opinion that the Republican outlook had
improved during the past year. As proof thereof he pointed to the good
spirit that prevailed amongst the burghers. They were determined to
persevere. He also pointed to the engagements that had taken place
since June, 1901. Then it had also been said that the cause was
hopeless, and that no engagement of any importance could still be
fought. He also showed that they knew nothing of the real condition of
the enemy. The Republics being so shut off made that impossible. They
should bear in mind that the enemy also had a hard time of it. England
could not continue indefinitely to enlist soldiers and to borrow
money. He was not yet prepared to surrender his independence.

Commandant General Botha said that they could not take it amiss in one
another if there was no unanimity of views. They had gathered together
confidentially, and should treat one another open-heartedly. There was
nothing that urged him personally to terminate the struggle. He could
flee about as well as anyone else, but when he considered the
circumstances, he was bound to say, "We are becoming weaker." They
were being forced out of those parts of the country which were the
best for them, and to which they had clung most tenaciously. He wished
to prove from facts that they had become weaker. In the Northern and
South-eastern parts of the Republic they had 9,570 men a year ago. Now
they had there only 5,200 men, a reduction thus of 4,370 men. At their
meeting on June 20th last year he had said that they should throw the
responsibility of the continuance of the war more upon the people.
They should then have said plainly that only faith and perseverance
could save them, and that there was no other means of salvation.
However, the majority of them had taken another view. What he then
specially relied upon was the Cape Colony, on the strength of the
reports that they received from there. Their reports were to the
effect that 2,000 burghers had risen in the Cape Colony. Now,
according to the statements of Generals de Wet and de la Rey, there
were about 600 of his (General Botha's) burghers and of the Free State
burghers together in the Cape Colony; altogether there were about
2,600 burghers under arms there. There has therefore been no further
rising during the past year. He was firmly convinced that they could
expect nothing from the rebellion in the Cape Colony. The time for a
big rising there was past. It appeared that their men were scattered
over that Colony in small groups, and effected nothing. They had to
live on those people who were well disposed towards them (the Boers),
and the result was that those people were treated very harshly by the
enemy, and would be compelled later to assist the latter to drive
those groups of rebels out of the country. Already many Colonists had
been hanged. Their cause was often compared to that of the American
Colonists, but it was not clear to him how that comparison could be
made. The enemy (the British) had about 40,000 men in America, and
America had more than one million inhabitants. She also had the
support of France, and a means of importing supplies. They (the Boers)
had no such means of importing what was necessary, and there was no
proper communication with the outside world. The forces of the enemy
in the country were much greater than the entire male population of
the two Republics. Their population had now been reduced to 15,000 or
16,000 men. Had they grounds for saying that they with 15,000 men
could achieve what 50,000 burghers could not do? They were becoming so
weak that he was afraid that they would afterwards no longer be
considered a party that had to be reckoned with. It was not impossible
that they would afterwards be declared rebels, and then a mutual
murdering would take place. He did not think that it could be expected
of him to co-operate towards that end. They could not speak of
"right," because they knew from sad experience that the stronger party
did just what it wanted to. Their people were too good to allow
matters to proceed so far. Scheepers was already under the sod, and
whom must they shoot for him? Not an ordinary soldier, but an officer,
for only officers were equal to their burghers. If the enemy continued
to capture burghers as they had done during the last year, then they
would within a short time become too weak to effect anything. They had
indeed during the last year had such successful engagements that they
could hardly account for it themselves, but it was also equally true
that the best part of their country was being made uninhabitable for
their commandos. In the High Veld there was no more food for their
people. They could not bring food there either, because if wagons with
provisions were sent thither the enemy captured the greater part of
them. He had already informed his Government and General de la Rey
that he would be obliged to give up certain portions of the country,
and they would have to discuss whither the commandos of those parts
had to go.

How must this war end? Must they wait until everyone had been
captured? or should they, for the sake of their people, adopt another
course? His Government, his officers, and he himself, could say: "Let
the enemy carry out their proclamations concerning us. We have nothing
more to lose. We have fought for nothing else than our country, and
wish to have that back or nothing else. Banish us, banish the
Government." But then, what about the People? The People could not be
banished. Was there now not still a chance to save something for the
People? He considered this point worthy of consideration. For their
Leaders he thought it would be easier to continue till they died a
manly death, or till they were banished to far-off islands, than to
submit to the yoke of the enemy; but they had a duty towards the
People.

The State Secretary thought it would be best for the People themselves
to elect persons to make their views clear to the Government.


At this juncture a telegram was received from Lord Kitchener stating
that he was prepared to have a personal interview with the two
Republican Governments, and requesting them to come to Pretoria that
same evening.




CHAPTER III.

FIRST NEGOTIATIONS AT PRETORIA.


Early the next morning, Saturday, April 12th, 1902, the two Republican
Governments, travelling in separate trains, arrived at Pretoria, and
at nine o'clock a meeting with Lord Kitchener took place in his house.

Lord Kitchener expressed the desire that they should first confer
informally, and that the Secretaries should withdraw.

The Secretaries then left the chamber, and therefore the discussion
that ensued between Lord Kitchener and the Governments cannot be
communicated officially.

However, we publish the following report, embracing what took place at
the interview on April 12th, 1902, with Lord Kitchener, and at the
interview with Lord Kitchener and Lord Milner on April 14th and
following days, which was taken down by the Rev. J. D. Kestell
immediately afterwards, as communicated to him by General Hertzog. The
report was immediately revised by President Steyn and by the
Government Secretary, Mr. W. J. C. Brebner. This report can therefore
be considered as secondary evidence of great value.

After a few everyday observations, President Steyn remarked that Lord
Kitchener might begin.

Thereupon Lord Kitchener began. He spoke in the tone of a person who
had a grievance. He wished, he said, to say something concerning what
he had been reported as having said in February, 1901, when he
negotiated with General Louis Botha. In connection with those
negotiations, he declared that he had been misrepresented, wrong
motives having been imputed to him. It had been said, for instance,
that he had aimed at the destruction of the Boers. He could, however,
assure them that no such thing had ever been his intention. Those who
said so grossly misrepresented him. (Whether what he said was aimed at
General Botha, nobody can say--he mentioned no names. He spoke,
however, in the tone of a person who considered that he had been
unfairly treated.) "But," he suddenly said, "that is past. I only say
this because no official minutes are being kept, everything must take
place here informally and in a friendly manner ... I understand that
you have something to propose. You can do so now."

Acting President S. W. Burger then introduced the question. He said
that both the Governments had drawn up a proposal at Klerksdorp, and
then proceeded to read the proposal, article by article.

(State-Secretary F. W. Reitz acted as interpreter between the two
parties.)

Then President Steyn spoke. He thanked Lord Kitchener for the
readiness with which he had consented to meet the Governments, and
assured him that they were earnestly desirous that the war should
cease. He also wished, he said, to make an explanation, and this was
with respect to a misunderstanding which the British Government was
apparently labouring under in regard to the position of the Deputation
in Europe in relation to the Leaders of the burghers in South Africa.
From the correspondence of Lord Lansdowne with the Netherlands
Government, it seemed as if the Government of His Britannic Majesty
were in doubt as to whether the Deputation in Europe still represented
the Boers in the field. That they still represented the Boers
President Steyn declared was most certainly the case. They still
enjoyed the fullest confidence of both Governments. Coming to the
matter at issue, the President said that the Governments and the
People were very desirous that Peace should be restored. But the Peace
that was to be restored should be a lasting one, and that was the
reason for the proposals being of the nature submitted by the
Governments. They had come there to attain no other object than that
for which the People had fought until this moment.

Here Lord Kitchener interrupted President Steyn with a question which
seemed to express great astonishment. He drew up his shoulders, threw
his head forward to one side, and asked, "Must I understand from what
you say that you wish to retain your Independence?"

President STEYN: Yes, the people must not be reduced to such a
condition as to lose their self-respect, and be placed in such a
position that they will feel themselves humiliated in the eyes of the
British.

Lord KITCHENER: But that could not be; it is impossible for a people
that has fought as the Boers have done to lose their self-respect; and
it is just as impossible for Englishmen to regard them with contempt.
What I would advise you is, that you submit to the British flag, and
now take advantage of the opportunity to obtain the best terms as
regards self-government and other matters.

President STEYN: I would like to know from Your Excellency what sort
of self-government it would be? Would it be like that of the Cape
Colony?

Lord KITCHENER: Yes, precisely so.

President STEYN: I thank Your Excellency. I put the question merely
for information.

Lord Kitchener then proceeded to say that one should bear in mind the
case of the British Colonies. "The Colonies," he said, "were proud of
their own nationality. If anyone, for instance, asked a Colonist in
Australia whether he was an Englishman, then his answer would be, 'No,
I am an Australian.' And yet such a man felt himself to be one with
the British nation, and was proud to call himself a British subject."

President Steyn then said that this comparison would not hold. In the
case of British Colonies one had to do with communities which from
the beginning had grown up under the British flag, with all the
limitations attached thereto. These Colonies had not possessed
anything which they had had to surrender, and having had nothing to
lose they could have nothing to complain of. In the case of the Boers
it was quite different. The Africanders in the two Republics were an
independent people. And if that independence were taken away from them
they would immediately feel themselves humiliated, and a grievance
would arise which would necessarily lead to a situation similar to
that now existing in Ireland, which situation was mainly due to the
fact that Ireland was a conquered country.

Lord Kitchener replied that Ireland could not serve as a parallel,
seeing that it had never had self-government.

To this President Steyn replied that the Irish had self-government,
and that in a measure that had never yet been granted to any Colony,
seeing that they were represented in the Imperial Parliament. Their
power also in this respect was so great that the Irish vote, under a
strong man like Parnell, could turn the scale in a Parliamentary
question one way or another.

Lord Kitchener then said that he was himself an Irishman, and
therefore better able to judge in regard to Irish affairs. He
proceeded to say that what was contemplated by the British Government
was self-government for the Boers, preceded by military rule for a
certain period; that this military rule as a preliminary measure was
indispensable at the commencement of Peace for the establishment and
maintenance of law and order; that as soon as this period had elapsed
self-government would be substituted for it, and that then the Boers
could annul any measure or law made by the military authorities. He
remarked, however, that he felt sure that much that was good would be
introduced by the military government, which they would not desire
afterwards to rescind. But the People would have it in their power to
decide in every case.

A desultory discussion followed now, and Lord Kitchener urged that
the Governments should make a proposal in accordance with what he had
suggested; and both the Presidents replied that the Governments,
according to the constitutions of the Republics, were not qualified to
make any proposals whereby the Independence of the Republics would be
touched.

When Lord Kitchener saw that he could make no progress he moved about
impatiently in his chair, and said, again with the same gesture as
before: that if the Governments wished he would telegraph their
proposal to his Government, but he could surmise--he did not know
officially what they would do in England--what he said was merely his
own opinion--but he could surmise what the answer would be.

The Presidents then expressed their desire that Lord Kitchener should
transmit the proposal that had been made by them; but the latter
thought that it was not desirable to communicate it in the form in
which it had been laid before him. He thought it could be drafted in a
more acceptable form. Thereupon he took a pencil and roughly drafted
the preamble of a cablegram. He read it aloud, and asked whether
anybody wished to make any remark upon it, in order to make the
cablegram still more acceptable, and whether they wished to appoint
anyone for this purpose. Mr. Reitz was nominated, and the preamble of
Lord Kitchener, with the points of the proposal (modified, as will be
observed), was thus drawn up, approved of by all, and, on the
adjournment of the meeting, transmitted to the British Government.

The telegram read as follows:--


         FROM LORD KITCHENER TO SECRETARY OF STATE.
                                                   PRETORIA,
                                                     _April 12, 1902_.

"... The Boer Representatives wish to lay before His Majesty's
Government that they have an earnest desire for peace, and that they
have consequently decided to ask the British Government to end
hostilities and to enter into an agreement of peace with them. They
are prepared to enter into an agreement by which, in their opinion,
all future wars between them and the British Government in South
Africa will be prevented. They consider this object may be attained by
providing for the following points:--

  1. Franchise.

  2. Equal rights for Dutch and English languages in
  educational matters.

  3. Customs Union.

  4. Dismantling of all forts in Transvaal and Free State.

  5. Post, Telegraph, and Railway Union.

  6. Arbitration in case of future differences, and only
  subjects of the parties to be the arbitrators.

  7. Mutual amnesty.

... But if these terms are not satisfactory, they desire to know what
terms the British Government would give them in order to secure the
end they all desire."


After this conversation with Lord Kitchener the two Republican
Governments consulted with each other, and agreed that when they again
met the representative of the British Government they would very
clearly declare their standpoint, namely, that in the matter of
Independence it was the People alone that could constitutionally
decide.

Early on Monday morning, April 14th, Lord Kitchener sent to the
members of both Governments a copy of the following cablegram which he
had received from his Government. He also stated that Lord Milner
would take part with him in the conference.

The cablegram was as follows:--


              FROM SECRETARY OF STATE TO LORD KITCHENER.
                                                     LONDON,
                                                     _April 13, 1902_.

"... His Majesty's Government sincerely share the earnest desire of
the Boer Representatives, and hope that the present negotiations may
lead to that result. But they have already stated in the clearest
terms, and must repeat, that they cannot entertain any proposals which
are based on the continued Independence of the former Republics which
have been formally annexed to the British Crown. It would be well for
you and Milner to interview Boer Representatives and explain this. You
should encourage them to put forward fresh proposals, excluding
Independence, which we shall be glad to receive."


At ten o'clock the members of the two Republican Governments again
assembled in Lord Kitchener's house.

Lord Milner entered the room after the members of the Governments had
assembled, and was introduced to them by Lord Kitchener. He (Lord
Milner) greeted the Presidents as "Mr. Steyn and Mr. Burger." But
later, during the conference, he addressed each (was it
inadvertently?) as "President."

Before the conference was continued, Lord Milner spoke a few words. He
also wished to remove erroneous impressions. He declared that it had
been alleged that he was not well disposed towards the Boers. That was
incorrect. He could give the assurance that he wished to promote the
interest of the Boers; and that he, like themselves, desired peace.

Thereupon Lord Kitchener laid on the table the cablegram, dated April
13th, from the British Government. Without entering into discussion on
it, the President pointed out that it was impossible for the
Republican Governments to act in accordance with the desire of the
British Government, seeing that, as had already been said on Saturday,
they were not qualified to discuss the question of Independence before
having consulted the People.

Lord MILNER: May I ask if the prisoners-of-war will also be consulted?

President STEYN: Your Excellency surely cannot be in earnest in
putting this question?

Lord MILNER (in a tone of annoyance): Yes, certainly.

President STEYN: How can the prisoners-of-war be consulted?--they are
civilly dead. To mention one practical difficulty: suppose the
prisoners should decide that the war should be continued, and the
burghers on commando that it should not--what then?--

Lord Kitchener and Lord Milner, seeing the absurdity of it, laughed
aloud. They quite agreed with President Steyn, and admitted that the
difficulty raised by him was to the point.

Lord Kitchener, however, wished to draw attention to the word
"excluding" in the answer of the British Government. He put it that
the words "excluding Independence" rendered a discussion, as to
Dependence or Independence, superfluous. The question should now be
discussed as if Independence were finally excluded; and assuming this,
such proposals should be made as it was thought would be acceptable as
well for the Boers as for the British Government.

President Steyn then pointed out again that it was beyond the power of
the Government to do so. They had no right to make a proposal that
even assumed the exclusion of Independence.

Lord Kitchener and Lord Milner here again agreed with the President.
Both said at the same time, "We agree--we agree."

Meanwhile it had been urged several times that Lord Kitchener should
request his Government to make such proposals as might be regarded as
some measure of compensation, and which could, as such, be laid before
the People, in case the question of surrendering their Independence
were laid before them. This looked as if the Republican Governments
were convinced that their cause was hopeless, and as if they, not
being competent to sacrifice the independence, only waited for the
decision of the people on that point. The fact, however, is that the
members of the Governments never thought of such a thing, and that
they were convinced that if they consulted the People, the People to a
man would say: "We want to retain our Independence, and if England
does not agree to that, we shall go on with the war."

The Representatives of the British Government would not, however, be
persuaded that their Government should make any proposals, and after
much discussion Lord Milner said that it appeared to him that they had
come to a "dead-lock."

"It seems so to me too," said Lord Kitchener, "and that is just what I
wish to avoid. Would the gentlemen not," he continued, "first consult
about this privately? If so, Lord Milner and I can retire from the
room for a while, and the result of your deliberations can, when you
are ready, be communicated to me."

It was then agreed to adjourn till three o'clock in the afternoon.

At three o'clock they again met the Representatives of the British
Government.

President Steyn then began by saying (in the spirit of the resolution
that had been taken), that the Republican Governments, having taken
the reply of the British Government into consideration, had concluded
that they could make no proposal on the basis therein suggested; but
as they were desirous of seeing Peace restored, they requested (1)
that one of their delegates [in Europe] should obtain a safe-conduct
to come hither, and that, if it were deemed inadvisable to allow him
to return, he might remain somewhere in South Africa, on parole, till
the war was over; (2) that an armistice should be agreed upon in order
to enable the Republican Governments to consult the People regarding
the question of Independence.

Lord Kitchener said, "This comes as a surprise on us!"

The question as to allowing a member of the Deputation to come over
was now left unanswered. It had already been discussed in the
forenoon, and then Lord Kitchener had said, that it concerned a
military question regarding which he himself had to decide, and that
he could not grant the request, because it would be an exceptional
mode of proceeding to which he could not consent.

As to an armistice, he now also at first said nothing; but after some
moments' reflection he said, as if the thought had just occurred to
him, that it seemed better for him to ask his Government to make
proposals which could be regarded as compensation to the Boers for the
surrender of their Independence.[1] What he suggested was, of course,
immediately accepted, and the following cablegram, drafted in
accordance therewith, was sent by him to his Government:--

         [Footnote 1: What the Republican Governments had repeatedly
         requested.]


                 FROM LORD KITCHENER TO SECRETARY OF STATE.
                                                       PRETORIA,
                                                     _April 14, 1902_.

"A difficulty has arisen in getting on with proceedings. The
Representatives state that constitutionally they have no power to
discuss terms based on the surrender of Independence, inasmuch as only
the burghers can agree to such a basis, therefore if they were to
propose terms it would put them in a false position with regard to
their people. If, however, His Majesty's Government could state the
terms that, subsequent to a relinquishment of Independence, they would
be prepared to grant, the Representatives, after asking for the
necessary explanations, without any expression of approval or
disapproval, would submit such conditions to their people."


On the following (Thursday) morning, April 17th, Lord Kitchener
requested the members of the Republican Governments to meet him again,
and laid before them the following cablegram which he had received the
previous day:--


                  FROM SECRETARY OF STATE TO LORD KITCHENER.
                                                   LONDON,
                                                     _April 16, 1902_.

"We have received with considerable surprise the message from the Boer
leaders contained in your telegram. The meeting has been arranged at
their request, and they must have been aware of our repeated
declarations that we could not entertain any proposals based on the
renewed Independence of the two South African States. We were
therefore entitled to assume that the Boer Representatives had
relinquished the idea of Independence and would propose terms of
surrender for the forces still in the field. They now state they are
constitutionally incompetent to discuss terms which do not include a
restoration of Independence, but ask us to inform them what conditions
would be granted if, after submitting the matter to their followers,
they were to relinquish the demand for Independence.

"This does not seem to us a satisfactory method of proceeding, or one
best adapted to secure at the earliest moment a cessation of the
hostilities which have involved the loss of so much life and treasure.
We are, however, as we have been from the first, anxious to spare the
effusion of further blood and to hasten the restoration of peace and
prosperity to the countries afflicted by the war, and you and Lord
Milner are authorised to refer the Boer leaders to the offer[2] made
by you to General Botha more than twelve months ago, and to inform
them that although subsequently great reduction in the strength of the
forces opposed to us and the additional sacrifices thrown upon us by
the refusal of that offer would justify us in proposing far more
onerous terms, we are still prepared, in the hope of a permanent peace
and reconciliation, to accept a general surrender on the lines of that
offer, but with such modifications in details as may be mutually
agreed upon."

         [Footnote 2: For the Middelburg Proposals, see p. 210.]


The conference was not long. The Governments left the room to consult
with one another. They resolved again to ask Lord Kitchener that a
member of the Deputation should be allowed to come over to them, and
that an armistice should be agreed upon, to enable them to consult the
people.

On returning they submitted to Lord Kitchener and to Lord Milner as
their reply the following resolution, which they had taken at their
private conference:--

"The Governments, considering that the People have hitherto fought,
and sacrificed everything for their Independence, and that they
constitutionally have not the power to make any proposals affecting
the Independence, and since the British Government now ask for other
proposals from them, which they cannot make without having previously
consulted the People, they propose that an armistice be agreed upon to
enable them to do so. At the same time they request that a member of
the Deputation in Europe should be allowed to come over to see them."

Lord Kitchener, without hesitation, replied that considering the
matter from a military point of view he could by no means allow one or
more of the members of the Deputation to come to South Africa. He
asked, why that should be done, as there was really nothing happening
in Europe that could help the Boers. This, he said, the Governments
could see for themselves from the newspapers. He could also give them
the assurance of it on his word of honour. Lord Kitchener also gave
his decision with regard to an armistice. He could not grant it; but
said he was willing to do what he could. He was prepared to give the
Governments every possible opportunity and assistance to enable them
to obtain the views of the people, by means of delegates, as requested
by them. For that purpose he would give the Generals the use of the
railway and telegraph. They could go to the people, and call them
together to meetings where they could ascertain what the burghers
thought on the matter in question, and elect delegates.

The Republican Governments then decided to lay the whole matter before
their people, who would elect delegates, to decide as to the
continuance or otherwise of the war, and to instruct their Governments
in accordance with the decision to be taken by them.

[Illustration: _Facsimile of Safe-Conduct granted to Members of the
Republican Governments by Lord Kitchener._]

It was decided that the South African Republic and the Orange Free
State should each elect thirty delegates. This division was adopted
irrespective of the number of burghers in the field in the
respective Republics, because each Republic was considered as a
separate Power.

A meeting then took place between Lord Kitchener and Generals Botha,
de Wet, and de la Rey, at which it was decided where the various
meetings would be held in the two Republics for the purpose of
electing delegates. Lord Kitchener also undertook not to operate in
the vicinity of the places where the various meetings would be held
during the time of the meeting, and further that he would attack no
commandos of which the Chief Officer might be elected as a delegate,
provided the persons who conducted the meetings notified him of the
election of such Officer.

It was further decided that the Delegates would meet at Vereeniging on
Thursday, May 15th, 1902. A promise was also given that the Government
Camps would not be attacked until the meeting began at Vereeniging on
May 15th.

In the Orange Free State, Chief Commandant de Wet and General Hertzog
conducted the meetings, at which the elections took place. In the
South African Republic these meetings were conducted as follows:--On
the High Veld by the Commandant General; in the Western districts by
the Acting State President and General J. H. de la Rey; in the
North-eastern districts by General L. J. Meyer and Mr. J. C. Krogh;
and in the districts of Zoutpansberg and Waterberg by State Secretary
Reitz, the Assistant State Attorney L. J. Jacobsz, and General C. F.
Beyers.

The districts were represented as much as possible in proportion to
the numerical strength of the various commandos.

Each of the Leaders who conducted the meetings was supplied with a
_résumé_ of the negotiations as set forth above, as well as with a
copy of the Peace proposals made by Lord Kitchener to General Botha in
March, 1901 (known as the "Middelburg Proposals"), which documents
were read out to the burghers at each meeting.




CHAPTER IV.

VEREENIGING.


On the morning of Thursday, May 15th, 1902, the members of both the
Governments and all the delegates had arrived at Vereeniging, and
business was at once proceeded with.

Tents, &c., had been pitched there by Lord Kitchener for their
accommodation during the deliberations. In the middle of this camp
stood a large tent, which could easily accommodate the sixty
representatives, and the members of the Republican Governments. On the
one side were the tents for the Government and delegates of the Orange
Free State, and on the other side for the Government and delegates of
the South African Republic.

[Illustration: _Facsimile of the Oath subscribed to at Vereeniging by
the Delegates of the South African Republic._]

[Illustration: _Facsimile of the Oath subscribed to at Vereeniging by
the delegates of the Orange Free State._]

The following delegates represented the South African Republic:--

            NAME.                             COMMANDO REPRESENTED.

   1--General H. A. Alberts                 Heidelberg.
   2--Commandant J. J. Alberts              Standerton and Wakkerstroom,
                                              south-west of the Natal
                                              Railway.
   3--Commandant J. F. de Beer              Bloemhof.
   4--General C. J. Brits                   Standerton.
   5--Acting Landrost H. J. Bosman          Wakkerstroom.
   6--General Chris. Botha                  Swazieland, and portion of
                                            State Artillery under Captain
                                              von Wichman.
   7--C. Birkenstock                        Vryheid.
   8--Assistant-Commandant General
       C. F. Beyers                         Waterberg.
   9--Field-Cornet B. H. Breytenbach        Utrecht.
  10--J. de Clercq                          Middelburg (south of railway).
  11--General J. G. Cilliers                Lichtenburg.
  12--Field-Cornet T. A. Dönges             Heidelberg (town) and Corps
                                              Capts. Hindon and McKenny.
  13--Commandant H. S. Grobler              Bethel.
  14--J. L. Grobler                         Carolina.
  15--General J. N. H. Grobler              Ermelo.
  16--Field-Cornet B. J. van Heerden        Rustenburg.
  17--Captain J. F. Jordaan                 Vryheid Corps and First
                                              Scouting Corps.
  18--General J. Kemp                       Krugersdorp.
  19--General P. J. Liebenberg              Potchefstroom.
  20--General C. H. Muller                  Boksburg and Middleburg (north
                                              of railway).
  21--J. Naudé                              Pretoria (town) and detached
                                              Commando under General de
                                              la Rey.
  22--Commandant D. J. E. Opperman          Pretoria (south of railway).
  23--Field-Cornet P. D. Roux               Marico.
  24--Commandant D. J. Schoeman             Lydenburg.
  25--Landrost Stoffberg                    Zoutpansberg.
  26--General S. P. Du Toit                 Wolmaransstad.
  27--Commandant P. L. Uys                  Pretoria (north of railway).
  28--Commandant W. J. Viljoen              Johannesburg.
  29--P. R. Viljoen                         Heidelberg.
  30--Field-Cornet B. Roos                  Piet Retief.

The following delegates represented the Orange Free State:--

   1--Assistant-Chief Commandant G. C. F.
        Badenhorst                          Boshof, Hoopstad (west),
                                              Bloemfontein, Winburg,
                                              and Kroonstad.
   2--Commandant A. J. Bester               Bethlehem.
   3--Commandant A. J. Bester               Bloemfontein.
   4--Commandant L. P. H. Botha             Harrismith.
   5--Assistant-Chief Commandant G. A.
        Brand                               Bethulie, Caledon River,
                                            Rouxville, Wepener, and
                                            Bloemfontein (east).
   6--Commandant H. J. Bruwer               Bethlehem.
   7--Commandant D. H. van Coller           Heilbron.
   8--Commandant F. R. Cronje               Winburg.
   9--Commandant D. F. H. Flemming          Hoopstad.
  10--Assistant-Chief Commandant C. C.
        Froneman                            Winburg and Ladybrand.
  11--Assistant-Chief Commandant F. J.
        W. J. Hattingh                      Kroonstad (east) and
                                              Heilbron.
  12--Commandant J. A. M. Hertzog           Philippolis.
  13--Commandant J. N. Jacobs               Boshof.
  14--Commandant F. P. Jacobsz              Harrismith.
  15--Commandant A. J. de Kock              Vrede.
  16--Commandant J. J. Koen                 Ladybrand.
  17--Field-Cornet H. J. Kritzinger         Kroonstad.
  18--Commandant F. E. Mentz                Heilbron.
  19--Commandant J. A. P. van der Merwe     Heilbron.
  20--Commandant C. A. van Niekerk          Kroonstad.
  21--Commandant H. van Niekerk             President Steyn's Guard.
  22--Commandant J. J. van Niekerk          Ficksburg.
  23--Assistant-Chief Commandant T. K.
        Nieuwoudt                           Philippolis, Fauresmith,
                                              Jacobsdal, and portion
                                              Bloemfontein.
  24--Commandant H. P. J. Pretorius         Jacobsdal.
  25--Assistant-Chief Commandant A. M.
        Prinsloo                            Bethlehem and Ficksburg.
  26--Commandant L. J. Rautenbach           Bethlehem.
  27--Commandant F. J. Rheeder              Rouxville.
  38--Commandant A. Ross                    Vrede.
  29--Commandant P. W. de Vos               Kroonstad.
  30--Assistant-Chief Commandant W. J.
        Wessels                             Harrismith and Vrede.

At the request of the Government of the South African Republic, and
with the assistance of Lord Kitchener, General J. C. Smuts, the State
Attorney, had also come from the Cape Colony to assist his Government
as legal adviser.

At eleven o'clock all the delegates met in the large tent and took and
subscribed to the following oath before the Acting State President of
the South African Republic:--


OATH.

"We the undersigned swear solemnly that we, as special representatives
of the people, will be faithful to our people and country and
Government, and serve them faithfully, and that we will diligently
perform our duties with the necessary secrecy, as behoves faithful
burghers and representatives of the people. So help us God Almighty.

"Vereeniging, South African Republic, May 15th, 1902."


After a few matters concerning the conduct of the meeting had been
settled, a discussion arose on the question whether the
representatives had come with definite instructions from their
electors or whether they should decide here for the people according
to circumstances.

President Steyn, Chief Commandant de Wet, and General de la Rey
thought that the delegates had definite instructions.

Commandant-General Botha said that before they separated at Pretoria
the understanding was that the delegates should decide here at
Vereeniging. It could not be expected that the people could give them
definite instructions, because they were not fully acquainted with the
circumstances all over the country. Here the delegates should
ascertain from the Governments and from their fellow-delegates what
the condition was in both the Republics and in the Cape Colony, and
then, taking everything into account, come to a decision.

General Meyer was also of opinion that the delegates could not be
tied. Suppose, for instance, that the Governments could retain the
independence of the Republics by surrendering a portion of their
territory, then those delegates who had a definite instruction to vote
only for independence could not vote for such a surrender, because
that would not be the maintenance of their full independence. And then
at the elections the leaders had also told the people that the
Governments could not communicate everything to them, but that they
would do so to the delegates here.

President Steyn remarked that the meeting stood before an accomplished
fact, from which they could not get away, because as far as he knew
the most of the delegates had definite instructions how to vote.

General de la Rey said that if they still had hopes of retaining their
independence, it was a good thing that the delegates had definite
instructions, because these instructions were in the most cases to
retain independence. This the enemy knew, and therefore the Republican
Governments had so much more power.

Acting State President Burger thought that the matter was fraught with
danger on both sides. If, for instance, the majority of the
representatives had been instructed to vote for terms, this would
hamper the Governments very much if the enemy came to know about it.
On the other hand, if it was decided here to continue the war, it
would be said that the leaders kept the people in the field. Where he
had been, the people had unanimously decided to give up everything,
but not the independence. However, they were now together to get a
general view of their whole position, and each one should then decide
as he thought proper, unto which decision the minority must bow.

General Hertzog said that he had acted as General Botha had done.
Where he had conducted elections the burghers had left everything in
the hands of their representatives. These should know how to justify
to their electors the vote which they would cast.

General Botha asked what the delegates came to do? On the basis of
their independence the British did not wish to negotiate. The
representatives should thus decide whether the people could continue
with the struggle, or whether they should come to terms with the
enemy. The people themselves could not take a proper resolution
because they were not properly informed.

General Hertzog said that this was a legal matter. It was a legal
principle that a delegate could not be considered a mere mouthpiece of
his constituents, but that in matters of a public nature he was
virtually a plenipotentiary. The delegates could thus form their
opinions according to what they learnt here, provided they adhere to
what was the spirit of the people, and provided they are convinced
from the facts laid before them, that if those facts were known to the
people, the people would have instructed them to vote as they did.

General Smuts concurred fully with the opinion of General Hertzog.

As appeared from the disposition of the delegates, they acted in the
spirit of this legal opinion.

The Acting State President acted as temporary Chairman, and caused the
meeting to elect a permanent Chairman.

The following gentlemen were nominated as candidates:--General Beyers,
J. de Clercq, General Brand, General Froneman, and General Wessels.

General Beyers was elected Chairman with 19 votes, while the others
obtained 13, 11, 10, and 6 votes respectively.

After a short address, the Chairman adjourned the meeting till the
afternoon.


In the afternoon the meeting was opened with prayer by the Rev. J. D.
Kestell.

Acting State President S. W. Burger then addressed the meeting as
follows:--We are here under peculiar circumstances. Many who commenced
this struggle with us are no longer with us. The war has claimed its
victims, and many who were highly esteemed by us have fallen or have
been captured, or, alas, have become unfaithful. We have only reached
the foot of the mountain, and everything now depends upon you as
representatives of the people. Here we shall have to decide whether,
under the circumstances, we can or must continue the war. We may not
deny that our position is very critical and gloomy. Let us conduct
ourselves as behoves comrades who have a common cause at heart. We
shall have to say much about the future. Opinions will be widely
divergent, and therefore it is important that we bear with one another
and be not afraid to express our opinions in a manly way. You know
what gave occasion for this meeting. A copy of the correspondence
between the Netherlands and British Governments was sent to us by Lord
Kitchener under instructions from his Government. When the Government
of the South African Republic received this correspondence they
thought it should be considered as an invitation to negotiate. They
also considered that the opportunity should be availed of to discuss
matters with the Orange Free State, and requested Lord Kitchener to
enable them to meet the Government of that Republic to consider the
advisability of making peace proposals to Britain. We met and
discussed the matter at Klerksdorp. Then we negotiated with Lord
Kitchener and Lord Milner, and the outcome of it all was the document
(with the correspondence between the two Governments and the British
Government attached), which was submitted to all the commandos. We
felt that we had no power to decide with reference to the question of
independence, and that it was only in our power to conclude a peace by
which the independence would be maintained. As to the independence,
only the people could decide. And for that purpose you are here. We,
the members of the Governments, are here to give you advice and
explanation. As you know, the enemy will not hear of letting us retain
our independence, but they are willing to negotiate for terms on the
basis of the relinquishment of our independence. If we consider all we
have sacrificed and suffered, and for what we have sacrificed and
suffered, it is very hard for us to think of giving up our
independence, but we are not here to consult our hearts but our heads.
You must now give an account of the condition of our country and of
our women and children. You must determine whether, after all the
sacrifices that we have made, we are prepared to make further
sacrifices. If we have no prospects, we cannot proceed and allow our
people to be further exterminated. It will be hard after all that we
have done to surrender our independence, but we must consult our
heads. The Governments will do nothing without the people, and it is
for you now to consider all the circumstances and decide, and if you,
for instance, arrive at the conclusion that we have resorted to our
last expedient, will it be right to continue? Let each one frankly
express his opinion. As far as I am concerned, I do not flinch yet.
But I wish to know what the people say. A year ago the Governments
decided never to give up the independence, but to continue the
struggle until we could do so no longer, and then to surrender
unconditionally; but if we become convinced that our strength and
resources are exhausted we should consider whether we should not still
try to do something for our people. Or shall we continue until all the
leaders and many burghers are banished or killed? By a frank
expression of opinion we shall be enabled to decide what course to
pursue.

Here I must draw your attention to a difficulty that has arisen. Some
of you have received definite instructions from the people from which
it appears you consider you cannot deviate. Others have received
authority to act according to circumstances. Now I believe that this
need not cause a difference; in any case let it not cause a split
among us. We must be unanimous here, and if we are, then the people
will also be unanimous. If we are divided here, what will the people
be?

At this juncture a letter was read, written five months before by the
Deputation in Europe, and safely brought out by a person whose name
was not mentioned. The letter contained much, and maintained, among
other things, that in Europe the Boer cause was then more favourable
than ever before.

The Chairman now gave the Generals and Delegates an opportunity of
laying before the meeting the general condition in their respective
divisions.

Commandant General Botha said: In the Utrecht district there are not
sufficient mealies to support the commandos long, and then there could
be no question of supplying the horses with mealies. There was still a
considerable number of slaughter cattle. In Swazieland there was no
grain, nor was there any in Wakkerstroom, so that the commandos could
not exist there for another month. In Ermelo and Carolina there was
still sufficient corn to exist on for some little time, say two or
three months, and sufficient slaughter-cattle for the winter, if the
cattle and sheep belonging to the burghers were indiscriminately
taken. Most of the grain belonged to the Kaffirs. What had been sown
was too near the enemy, otherwise they would have provisions for a
considerable time still. In Bethal, Standerton, and Middelburg there
was no corn whatever, and they could still hold out for one month at
the utmost. The Heidelberg and Pretoria commandos have no corn to live
on. In the neighbourhood of Boksburg and Springs there was a
considerable quantity of mealies--the old mealie-cobs of last
year--but the commandos have been squeezed out from those parts by the
blockhouses. They had absolutely no slaughter-cattle. In a great area
there was no living animal except horses, and when he was with the men
a few days ago, three days had passed since they had had meat. All
that Middelburg (south-east of the railway) possessed of
slaughter-cattle was 36 goats. Wakkerstroom also was entirely without
slaughter-cattle. The condition on the High Veld as regards horses was
very bad. The burghers were hard pressed by the enemy, and many were
unmounted. The horses were now so weak that the commandos could not
undertake a long journey. The Kaffir question became daily more
serious. Shortly before his departure for Vereeniging 56 burghers were
murdered in Vryheid by Kaffirs who came from the English lines. All
the Kaffirs in the South-eastern portion of the Republic were more or
less under arms, and this had an unfavourable influence on the spirit
of the burghers. Furthermore they had a considerable number of
families who were in a most lamentable condition. The entire High Veld
was divided up by the lines of blockhouses, and the commandos were so
cornered that they had continually to cross these lines of the
railway, and then a fortnight often passed before the husbands could
return to attend to their families. It had happened that women had to
flee to Kaffirs to be helped by them. Many were attacked and raped by
the Kaffirs. Truly the condition of these women was the saddest thing
with which he had had to do in this war.

Coming to the numerical strength of the burghers, they had in the
field in the South African Republic 10,816 men, of which 3,296 were
unmounted, leaving thus only 7,520 men who were available for use.
Since last June their numbers had been diminished by 6,084 men. The
most of these had been captured, but the number included the
surrenders and killed. They still had about 2,540 families. What their
condition was he had already described, and what the difficulties were
to support them, the delegates could imagine themselves. Summoning up
all in one word the Commandant General concluded by saying that the
greatest difficulties lay in the questions concerning horses and food,
and the maintenance of the families.

Chief Commandant de Wet said that he would leave it to the delegates
who were officers to give an account of the conditions obtaining in
their respective districts. They came from far and near, and knew what
the condition of matters was. He could, however, inform the meeting
that the number of burghers in the Orange Free State was 6,100, of
which about 400 were not serviceable. The Basutos were as well
disposed towards the Boers as ever before.

General de la Rey said that he did not know exactly what was expected
of him, and that it was the duty of the delegates to give an account
of the condition of affairs. He could say this, however, that food was
scarce in his division a year ago, and that was so still, but no one
had suffered hunger yet. If a burgher had no food he had to fetch it
from the enemy. He also thought it would be better to leave it to the
delegates to give an account of the conditions in their respective
divisions.

General Beyers said, I shall be brief. As regards food, we obtain
supplies from the hostile Kaffirs, who are all, with the exception of
one tribe, in rebellion against us. In Waterberg all the Kaffirs are
sitting on the fence, and are in a way still well disposed, so that we
cannot take anything from them, but must purchase what we want. What
we require in Zoutpansberg we take. The Kaffirs fire on us, but then
we shoot back. It is our good fortune that there is no co-operation
between the Kaffirs in Zoutpansberg, otherwise they could make matters
difficult for us. When the British forces are operating against us the
Kaffirs are very troublesome, because the English use the Kaffirs. The
greatest difficulties with which we have to cope are: fever,
horse-sickness, and the Kaffirs. Food we have in abundance. I think
there is sufficient food in the Zoutpansberg district to support the
burghers of the South African Republic and of the Orange Free State
for a year. The British, however, are buying up much grain there now
at 10s. a bag and removing it.

General Muller remarked that everything was scarce with him, but that
the burghers had never suffered hunger yet. He had cattle for two
months still, if he slaughtered everything. His great difficulty was
in connection with the families when the Kaffirs were rebellious. If
provisions became scarce he intended to obtain these from the Kaffirs.
In his opinion he could still hold out to the end of the winter.

General Froneman (Winburg and Ladybrand) had no reason to complain.
They had sufficient food still. There were many women and children in
his division, altogether about 80 families, who had to be supported.
The Kaffirs were particularly peaceable, and always prepared to assist
in supplying them with clothing out of Basutoland. When he ran short
of cattle he took some again from the enemy. He saw his way clear to
continue the struggle for another year.

Commandant Hattingh (Kroonstad) informed the meeting that he still had
much cattle, sheep and grain, sufficient for a year. The district of
Heilbron had been entirely depleted of provisions, but he had supplied
them again from the Bethlehem district.

Commandant Badenhorst (portion Bloemfontein, Boshof and Kroonstad)
stated that in his districts there were still thousands of cattle and
sheep, and therefore he could hold out for another year. The farmers
had cattle on their farms, and then there was always a chance of
capturing from the enemy. On one occasion he captured 1,500 cattle
from the enemy, and he also saw a chance of obtaining cattle by this
means for other parts. Hundreds of cattle and thousands of sheep could
still be spared in his district for other districts. Grain was not so
plentiful as it had been the previous year, but they could still raise
so much that they could even supply others.

General Nieuwoudt (S.W. and S. portions of O.F.S.) said that during
the last seven months the enemy had destroyed everything in his
districts. The Fauresmith district had been totally devastated. No
cattle had been left there. There were only about 70 bags of grain
left, but they still managed to live well. He had found out that even
when they had nothing they managed to get along. His horses were now
in excellent condition. If they could sow he saw a chance of raising
food for another year. In his division there were only about three
women.

General Prinsloo (Ficksburg and Bethlehem) stated that he would not be
speaking the truth if he said that there was no food, in his division.
He had no cause for complaint yet on that score. Latterly many forces
of the enemy had operated against him, and all the cattle had been
removed from the Southern Ward, but in the other Wards there was still
much cattle. They could help other districts from there.
Unfortunately, however, cattle could not be moved from those Wards on
account of the blockhouses. Further, he thought that the Lord would
provide for them. Recently one of his Commandants had discovered what
he might call a gold mine, in which there were 150 bags of mealies.

General Brand (Rouxville, &c.) said that the enemy had overrun his
districts very much, built blockhouses, removed cattle, and destroyed
grain. Portions of his division had been totally ruined. Everything
had been removed, and not even a sheep was left. It frequently
happened that for two or three days they were without food, but then
they fortunately captured some food again. There were only nine women
in his division. He had the means to continue for another year.

General Wessels (Vrede, Harrismith, and Frankfort) informed the
meeting that the Khakis had latterly dealt fearfully with him. They
moved up and down in his division, and he thought that nothing would
be left, but he always found food still. It was a marvel to him that
sheep, cattle and grain were still to be found there. Even if the
enemy removed all the cattle he saw a chance of maintaining the
struggle on the grain that would be left, and he knew for certain that
he would be able to capture much cattle from the enemy. Only recently
he had brought 300 head of cattle from Natal, and they had also
discovered a cave containing 300 bags of mealies. As regards
slaughter-cattle, he thought he had enough to last them for another
three months.

Commandant van Niekerk (Vredefort) had to admit that his district had
been entirely devastated, and that he had been forced out of it, so
that they could neither plough nor sow. However, in Hoopstad and
Kroonstad they had sown 35 bags of grain. The enemy had built
blockhouses right through the middle of his division. There was no
cattle, but he had captured 1,000 sheep and 52 head of cattle, and
thought that in some way or other he would still manage to obtain food
for another year.

Commandant van der Merwe said that matters with him were much the same
as in the districts of Commandant van Niekerk. Everything was scarce,
but they had not yet suffered hunger.

General J. C. Smuts related how his expedition to the Cape Colony had
originated, and how it had been carried out. Last year, he said, it
was the opinion of President Kruger and of their Deputation in Europe
that there was good hope for their cause from the Cape Colony. On that
ground and also on the reports that they received from there, it was
decided to send General de la Rey thither to assume the supreme
command as soon as the Cape was strong enough to be considered a third
party in the struggle. Later, however, they came to the conclusion
that it would be best to act more cautiously, that General de la Rey
could hardly be missed in the Western Transvaal, that he (General
Smuts) should go with a small commando to ascertain what the
possibilities in the Cape Colony were. "I went," he continued, "with
300 men, while 100 men followed me, but 100 men I had to leave behind
with General Kritzinger because their horses were too poor. We had a
very difficult journey, certainly the most difficult that I and my
people ever experienced. I went through the whole of the Cape Colony.
I proceeded to Grahamstown, then to Graaff Reinet, and down to the
coast again. With a few exceptions I met all the commandos in the Cape
Colony. I questioned the leaders and thus came to be well informed on
everything. Commandant Kritzinger did not follow me according to
agreement, and as I saw that there was a danger of disorder arising I
took everything under my command. I found that there were about 1,400
or 1,500 men under arms, and not 3,000 as had been reported. To obtain
the exact numbers, however, was almost impossible. Commandant Lotter
was captured with his whole commando of 100 men. I have now been in
the Cape Colony for about a year, and the number that joined us in
that time was about 1,400. The number of men under arms had thus been
doubled, and but for the losses there would now have been 3,000 men.
There are now about 2,600 men under my command, but then there is
another division sent in by General de la Rey under General de
Villiers in Griqualand West, about 700 strong, and another in
Bechuanaland under Commandant van der Merwe. There are thus about
3,300 men operating in the Cape Colony, and this does not include the
men under Myburgh, Wessels, and van Reenen, of whom I know nothing.

The question now is: What help can be expected from the Cape Colony
for our cause? There will be no general rising in the Cape. We had
very good expectations, and thought that it would not be difficult to
cause a general rising there. The people are very enthusiastic--more
so than with us; but they have peculiar difficulties. The first is
with reference to horses. The British have taken all the horses that
could be used, and shot the useless ones. There is, therefore, a
great scarcity of horses in the Cape Colony. And, further, it is
extraordinarily difficult for the Colonist to rise if he has to fight
on foot with the knowledge that if he is captured he will have to
undergo heavy punishment. Unmounted men cannot fight in the Cape
Colony. You can operate only with mounted commandos, and as we have no
horses we cannot accept a tenth of those who are willing to join us.
On account of this deficiency of horses, we cannot expect a general
rising. Another great difficulty is the absence of grass. The veld
over the entire Cape Colony is overgrown with bushes (scrub). There is
no grass as in the Republics. Where you have no forage, therefore, the
horses cannot exist. Where I have been latterly there is wheat, and I
fed my horses on that, but now the wheat is becoming scarce, and there
is no prospect of obtaining any more on account of the proclamations
of the British, which prohibit all sowing. We have, indeed, issued a
counter proclamation, but that has not helped. The question of horses
and forage is thus a great stumbling-block for our cause in the Cape.
In my opinion, the small commandos in the Cape Colony have done their
best. Three British camps were lately taken by them.

The question now arose whether commandos from the Republics could
proceed to the Cape Colony, and whether there was an opening for them
there.--Yes, there was an opening, but the difficulty was how to get
there. More of our commandos from the Republics would be able to exist
in the Cape Colony if food became too scarce here, but the great
trouble was how to get there. The British have now about 50,000
English and Dutch Africanders under arms.--These conditions have led
me to the conclusion that there will be no general rising in the Cape
Colony, and that the continuance of the war will depend more on the
Republics than upon the Cape Colony."

The meeting was then adjourned till the evening.

On re-assembling, the first speaker was Commandant P. L. Uys
(district Pretoria), who said that in his commando there were only 153
mounted men; the other 128 burghers were unmounted. There were still
about 2,000 head of cattle, and grain enough to last them for a month.
All the Kaffirs in his district were hostile, with the exception of
the captain Matello. In the portion of Middelburg under him there were
26 mounted men and 38 burghers on foot.

Commandant H. S. Grobler (Bethal) stated that during all the summer he
had had no rest. He still had a commando of 150 men, but no food, and
he could trek nowhere, because his horses were too poor. Only recently
he had to break through a cordon (kraal), and managed to get through
with only 153 men, while 63 were captured. The Bethal district had
been devastated from the one end to the other. There was no food left
for his commandos, nor for the 300 women and children, who were in a
pitiable condition. They were not only without the necessaries of
life, but also exposed to danger from the Kaffirs, who had already
raped some of the women, which drove some of them to take refuge in
the blockhouses.

General Chris. Botha remarked that he represented Swazieland. With
regard to provisions, the supply of mealies was almost exhausted. They
lived on what they could get from the Kaffirs as a favour. There were
no more women with them. His commando of 113 men was still in the Piet
Retief district. They had no grain, and had to proceed from one
Kaffir-kraal to another to purchase food, which required money.
However, they still managed to live. In this way he had helped the
Transvaal for two and a half years, and now that he heard that there
was food in the Orange Free State he would proceed thither and help
them for two and a half years. In the Piet Retief district they had
grain for about two months, but no cattle, and they had to live on
what they could capture from the enemy. There were 65 families still
there, and it was hard to provide for them. Their position was very
critical.

Mr. Birkenstock (Vryheid) said that he would go more fully into a few
points relating to his district than the Commandant General had been
able to do in his general review. In Vryheid during the last six or
eight months they had been much harassed by large forces, and the
district had been completely devastated. The presence of the families
caused the greatest difficulties. Latterly the British refused to
receive any more families. They were also continually in danger from
Kaffirs, who were decidedly hostile to them. Horses and corn were
scarce. But yet, as far as grain was concerned, they would manage, if
the enemy did not again make incursions into that district. Recently
in the early morning, before daybreak, a Kaffir commando had attacked
a Boer commando consisting of 70 men, of whom they had killed 56. The
families in that district had said to him: "You must make peace in any
case," and he felt it his duty to inform the meeting of this.

General Alberts (Heidelberg) said that for the last twelve months they
had had no rest in his district. During the past year they had not
been able to plough and sow at all, and a commando could no longer
exist there. Three times had they been enclosed in a cordon (kraal),
but had fortunately always managed to get out. They had no
slaughter-cattle themselves, but had received some from Commandant
Roos, of the Orange Free State. His horses were in a most deplorable
condition.

Landrost Bosman (Wakkerstroom) informed the meeting how matters stood
in the Wakkerstroom district. They were dependent upon the Kaffirs for
grain; in fact, for everything except meat. They bartered meat from
the Kaffirs for mealies. But this year there were scarcely any
mealies, and what there were had been badly spoilt by the enemy. With
the supply they had, they would be able to manage for another two
months, and out of this the families with them would also have to be
supported. The supply of slaughter-cattle was also running short, and
the horses were in such a poor condition that they could not be used
against the enemy for a fortnight. It would perhaps become necessary
for the commando to leave the district, and then the great question
arose: What would become of the families there?

Mr. de Clercq (Middelburg) regretted that he had not the privilege of
several members of the meeting of being able to present a rosy report.
The portion of Middelburg which he represented was entirely exhausted.
They had indeed some grain left, but that would last them for only a
short time. They had no slaughter-cattle whatever. With the horses
they still had, they could not operate. They were in too poor
condition to enable the commando to escape if it became necessary to
get out of the way of the enemy. The condition of the burghers was
disheartening. If they should have to leave their district it was very
doubtful whether they would reach their destination, on account of the
condition their horses were in. There were only about 100 burghers
left out of 500. They also had about 50 families with them, and these
were in a miserable plight. The district would have to be abandoned,
and then came the question: What would become of these families? Even
now they were very badly provided for. Some women wished to proceed on
foot to the British, but he had advised them not to do so until the
result of these negotiations were known.

Commandant D. J. Schoeman (Lydenburg) said that until recently they
had about 800 head of cattle, but these had all been removed now by
the enemy. There was no grain at all. As they had no more food for the
men, what would become of the families if the struggle was to be
continued?

Commandant D. J. Opperman (Pretoria, South of the railway) gave an
account of how matters were situated in that part of the district
represented by him. His remarks were to the same effect as those of
Commandant Alberts (see above).

General Liebenberg (Potchefstroom) spoke about the commandos of
Potchefstroom under his command. During the past eight or nine months
blockhouses had been established in his division, and he had only a
narrow space of about twelve miles wide where he could exist. A
considerable amount of corn had been sown, but their fields had
recently fallen into the hands of the enemy, and now everything had
been destroyed, burnt, and trampled down by the horses. They had still
93 families. Some women from the Orange Free State had been placed on
the boundary between the districts of Lichtenburg and Potchefstroom by
the British. These were in a most deplorable condition, and were
almost dying from misery. These women had informed him that unless
matters improved they would proceed to Klerksdorp on foot. He had
advised them to wait until after the completion of the negotiations.
His commando consisted of 400 mounted men and about 100 dismounted. He
would be able to continue the struggle for some little time yet, and
then he would have to seek salvation elsewhere.

General du Toit (Wolmaransstad) informed the meeting that provisions
were very scarce with him, and that they had 500 families to support.
The horses were in a very poor condition, but by making _détours_ he
could always manage to get out of tight corners. His commando was not
large--it consisted of only about 450 mounted men--and the cattle they
had were in good condition, but grain was scarce.

Commandant de Beer (Bloemhof) stated that he had 444 mounted men and
about 165 unmounted burghers. Grain was not plentiful in his district,
nor cattle, but Bloemhof had never had much cattle. The families with
them were not yet suffering very much from scarcity of provisions, and
he thought he would be able to continue the struggle for another year.

General Kemp said that he had under his command portions of the
commandos of Krugersdorp and Rustenburg, and portions of the commandos
of Pretoria and Johannesburg. In the Krugersdorp district they could
not sow any more, and the majority of the cattle had been taken from
them. And yet they were not suffering from want. Indeed, he thought
they should never be in want if they had such a large commissariat
upon which they could draw, namely, the Zoutpansberg district, where
General Beyers was in command. He took from the Kaffirs what he
required, but what he took was not the property of the natives, but
what they had stolen from the burghers. He could hold out for two
years longer.

Chief Commandant de Wet asked why those commandos in the eastern
portions of the Transvaal could not do the same as those under command
of General Kemp, and re-take their property from the Kaffirs?

General Botha replied that the native tribes with which General Kemp
had to do could not even remotely be compared with the tribes with
which they had to deal in the south-east. There the natives were in
contact with the British. Whatever they looted from the Boers they
handed over to the British, who sold the loot. If cattle were
therefore taken from the Kaffirs in the south-eastern districts, they
would be taking cattle the lawful property of the natives. Besides
this, he had to point out that the Zulu was an entirely different kind
of native from the Kaffir with whom General Kemp had to do. The Zulus
were much stronger, and, further, the Republic had an agreement with
the Swazies that they (the Boers) would not trek into their country
with a commando to fight against them. They had to govern themselves
as long as the war lasted. Most of the cattle of the Swazies also had
been moved to behind the Lebombo mountains and to Zambaansland, and
were therefore beyond the reach of the commandos.

General Chris. Botha also declared that no cattle belonging to the
burghers in the eastern parts of the Transvaal were in possession of
the natives.

Mr. J. L. Grobler (Carolina) next related how matters stood in his
district. They had always had cattle and grain, but the British had
cut off the best part of their fields by means of blockhouses. What
they had now sown would stand them in good stead if nothing happened
to prevent them reaping. The Kaffirs were not well disposed. He
thought they could still hold out for seven or eight months, if
nothing unforeseen occurred. They still had 300 horses for the
burghers, but they were weak, and there were a good many burghers for
whom they had no mounts.

Mr. Naudé said that he was delegated by a portion of the Pretoria
commando and by the detached commando under General Kemp. They sowed
and reaped as usual. Fortunately he had no women and children to deal
with. His commandos had no large supply of cattle, but yet there was
no want.

After this the meeting was closed with prayer, and adjourned to the
following morning.


FRIDAY, MAY 16TH, 1902.

The delegates met again shortly after nine o'clock.

The meeting was opened with prayer by the Rev. J. D. Kestell.

General Chris. Botha asked whether it was not desirable to attempt to
get into communication with the Deputation in Europe.

After some discussion on this matter, the following two proposals were
made:--

I. Assistant Chief Commandant Froneman, seconded by Commandant
Flemming:--

"That the Republican Governments be instructed to thank the
Governments of His Majesty the King of England and of Her Majesty the
Queen of the Netherlands, through Lord Kitchener, for interesting
themselves in connection with the opening up of peace negotiations, as
appears from the correspondence between the said Governments, and to
express their regret that His Majesty's Government did not accept the
proposal of Her Majesty's Government to place their representatives in
Europe, who still enjoy their full confidence, in a position to come
to the Republics, and also that Lord Kitchener has refused a similar
request made by our Governments."

II. Acting Landdrost H. J. Bosman, seconded by Commandant J. N.
Grobler:--

"The Representatives of the people here assembled resolve to record
their regret that the request of their Governments to meet one or more
of the members of their Deputation had been refused by Lord Kitchener,
and instruct their Governments to try to send the Deputation a
cablegram informing them that a meeting is now taking place to discuss
the possibility of bringing about peace, and further to instruct their
Governments to thank the Government of Her Majesty the Queen of the
Netherlands for interceding in the interests of peace."


On being put to the vote, the first proposal was carried by 36 votes
to 23.

The Chairman now laid before the meeting for discussion the document
which had been drawn up by the Republican Governments relative to the
negotiations in March and April last, and which had been read to all
the commandos at the election of delegates.

Mr. P. R. Viljoen (Heidelberg) then addressed the meeting. He laid
stress on the great seriousness of the matter before the delegates.
The ground whereon they stood, he said, was holy ground. And, indeed,
it was so when they considered how it had been soaked with the tears
and the blood of their fathers and of so many others in the present
struggle. It was extremely hard for him even to think of relinquishing
the independence after all the blood and tears that had been shed, and
all the hardships that had already been endured, but from the
information given them yesterday it was a matter they had to look in
the face. It had been plainly shown that if they wished to continue
the war they would be obliged to abandon some ten districts. By doing
so they would be more concentrated, and that was exactly what the
enemy wanted, for then they would be able to concentrate all their
forces against the Republican commandos. According to what had been
reported in this meeting, matters appeared to be going comparatively
well in the Orange Free State. Here in the Transvaal, however, they
were differently situated. The outlook was very dark, and it appeared
to him that they should try to end the war. If there was a chance of
retaining the independence then they could still continue, and they
would be willing to undergo the bitterest suffering. But the question
was whether there was any prospect of their retaining their
independence. They knew nothing of how matters stood in Europe. The
report from the Deputation that had been laid before the meeting was
six months old. If there were any events in Europe in their favour it
would have come to their knowledge by this time. It was plain that
they should try to obtain peace in an honourable way. But how? They
should still try to retain their independence, and for that purpose it
would be as well if they instructed the Governments to ascertain once
more what the British Government would give if they (the Boers)
relinquished their independence, and that they should know this before
they took a final decision. He did not see much chance to continue the
war. Though it was bitter for him to have had to speak as he had done,
he had felt that it was his duty to do so.

Mr. de Clercq (Middelburg) said he held the same opinion as the last
speaker. They were confronted with great difficulties. The question
was whether they should or should not continue the war. It was
necessary to look into the future, and if they did so they must ask
themselves what would be the consequences of a continuance of the war,
and what the consequences would be if they terminated the struggle
now. He drew the attention of the meeting to the fact that they had at
present about 15,000 men against 250,000 of the enemy. They should
also consider what had been said about the scarcity of food and horses
and the other difficulties. All these matters made it difficult to
prosecute the struggle, and before he could decide in favour thereof
it would have to be shown him that the continuance of the war would
mean the retention of their independence, and if that could be done,
he was prepared to make still further sacrifices. But if there was no
probability of retaining their independence, and if by the continuance
of the struggle all would ultimately only be killed or captured, could
there be a more lamentable termination? He considered that the most
sensible course was to save what could still be saved. Their national
existence should not be sacrificed. Who knew what was still to fall to
the lot of their people in the future? But if everything was
eradicated, they would cease to exist as a people. Was it a good thing
that they should allow a people that had struggled as the Africander
people had done to share such a fate?

Commandant Rheeder (Rouxville) said that though the circumstances were
dark, yet there were some rays of light. If, however, they gave up
their independence, where then could they look for a ray of light? He
was prepared to give his last drop of blood for his country. It had
been asked whether they should continue until they were eventually
annihilated. But he would ask: Should they not continue until they
were all delivered? There were three things possible: deliverance,
annihilation, or surrender to the enemy. The retention of their
independence must take the first place. They should fight on until
they were dead, captured, or delivered.

General Kemp (Krugersdorp) remarked that the matter was most serious.
It was beyond doubt that to a certain extent their circumstances were
dark. But when they commenced the war the chances were not on their
side. They should continue. If they considered what the war had
already cost them, how much blood had been shed, they could not give
up the struggle. As far as he was concerned he wished to continue
until he was dead or saved. They should not look at the dark side
only. In some districts food was indeed scarce, but they could still
find food everywhere. Those districts where they were threatened with
famine they should give up. So many had been captured or killed, but
that gave him so much the more courage. Because the struggle had cost
them so much it could not be given up. If once they were vanquished,
it was all over with the Africander people, and all chance of a
revival would be gone for ever. Why should they not continue to place
their trust in God? They had no right to distrust the God Who had
helped them hitherto.

Mr. Breytenbach (Utrecht) thought that they should not brag. All this
tall talk did not help them. They should consider each other's
feelings. He also had received an instruction from the burghers whom
he represented, and that instruction was that if he could adduce
proofs after this meeting that they were able to continue the war,
then Utrecht would continue to fight; but if he could not do that,
Utrecht would fight no longer. And he could not. They should take a
note of what had been said here yesterday. There were ten districts in
the Transvaal that could not keep up the struggle any longer. Could
they give up these districts? They should not consult their hearts
only, but also their heads, and what did his head tell him? That they
could not continue the war. If they decided that the struggle must go
on, they should be able to carry out that decision as they had done
from the beginning. But they could not. It had been said that they
should trust the Lord, but they could not enter into the decrees of
Providence. They could to some extent understand what God's answer to
their prayers had been. With the Mauser and with Prayer they had
commenced the war, and what had God's answer to those prayers been? He
had led them on ways on which they had not expected to be led. If they
continued now, they would, in his opinion, be dealing a death blow to
the nation. They had seen that ten districts could not keep up the
struggle any longer; should they now say: "We must continue and leave
those districts to their lot?" Would it be right to let those
districts, with the men, women and children who were still in them be
lost? No; they should try to save what could still be saved.

General P. Liebenberg (Klerksdorp) concurred in the views of Mr.
Viljoen and Mr. de Clercq. If they could secure their independence he
would gladly pay for it with his blood. The future appeared dark to
him. They should keep their eyes on God, but also use their brains,
and consider where their present course was leading them to. The
commission he had received from those whom he represented was: "Secure
our independence if it is in any way possible, but be careful and see
to it that our national existence be not destroyed." If they could not
do otherwise they should save what could still be saved, and obtain
peace on the best terms.

Commandant P. L. Uys (Pretoria) spoke as follows: Comrades, we are
faced with a most serious matter. If we continue the struggle I must
leave my district, and hand over the families there a prey to the
Kaffirs, because the British will not receive them. My mounted men I
can always save, but if I did so what would become of the unmounted
men, and what of the women and children? And under these circumstances
it is a question whether all the mounted men would follow me. It now
rests with the delegates and no longer with the Governments to decide
this matter. Never yet have I experienced a day like this, on which I
am called to such a great task. This is no time to criticise each
other. We cannot blame one another, but must bear with one another.
The Bible has been quoted here, but if we do this we must not omit the
text in which reference is made to the King who ought to consider
whether he was competent to proceed with 10,000 men against him who
was marching on him with 20,000 men. A further consideration is, what
will become of the widows and orphans if we do not come to terms, and
thus no longer remain their natural protectors? Oh, we must open our
eyes and observe that God's hand is stretched forth against us, and
not continue to add to the number of widows and orphans.

General J. N. H. Grobler (Ermelo) spoke in the same strain.

The meeting was then adjourned until the afternoon.

On resuming in the afternoon, a letter was read from General Malan,
who was operating in the Cape Colony, and also one from General
Kritzinger. General Malan reported on his operations, and General
Kritzinger advised that the struggle be given up.

General S. P. du Toit was the next speaker, and said: The matter
before us is so serious that I hardly know how to discuss it. We must
bear with one another and remember that we stand here as responsible
people. I have been delegated to this meeting by a portion of the
people who have suffered heavily, and I have a definite instruction.
The people wish to retain their independence, but if that is
impossible, then I am instructed to do the best I can. The state of
matters in my division is, indeed, not so bad as to oblige us to give
up the struggle, but the question is not only what must I do with a
view to the condition in my district alone, but I must also take into
consideration how other districts are situated. We must be specially
on our guard against disunion. What will the future be if a portion of
this meeting decides to make peace and another portion to continue the
war? What will be the position of those who return to continue the
war? Should we not rather all co-operate to obtain from the enemy what
we can, and try to retain a portion of our independence? The eyes of
the enemy are upon us, and what will be the effect if we are divided?
We must consider whether we should not approach the enemy with
proposals, and in that way enter into negotiations with them. If we
cannot prosecute the war we must see what terms we can get. Let us,
above all, guard against internal disunion. If we as one man can
decide to continue the war I shall support the resolution, but if we
cannot be unanimous I am in favour of conceding more to the British
than what our Governments have already offered. I mean we should do
what we can to restore peace, and I would like to add that I am
greatly disappointed in regard to the course matters have taken in the
Cape Colony. It appears to me that the situation was not properly
represented to us from there, but I am glad that we are now well
informed.

Mr. F. W. Reitz, State Secretary of the South African Republic, said:
The future of our country depends upon this opportunity. It is known
what the Governments have already done, and the question I put myself
now is whether there is still something that can be offered to the
enemy consistent with the retention of our independence, and I think
there is. Should we not offer the British the Witwatersrand and
Swazieland? We can also sacrifice our foreign policy and say "We
desire to have no foreign policy, but only our internal independence."
We can then become a protectorate of England. What have we got in the
Witwatersrand? After the Franco-Prussian war France surrendered Alsace
and Lorraine to Germany to retain her independence. What has the
wealth from Johannesburg done for us? That money has only injured the
noble character of our people. This is common knowledge. And the cause
of this war originated in Johannesburg. I could adduce more arguments,
but let me only say that the money obtained from there was to our
detriment. It would now tend to our advantage to be rid of
Johannesburg. We shall then have heard the last of Liquor-jews and
other matters. I do not grudge England that inheritance. And then what
have we in Swazieland? Our object was to get nearer the sea, but I do
not believe that even from that point of view it has now any more
value for us. We have had more loss than gain from Swazieland. As
regards a protectorate, what does that mean? It means that England
undertakes the obligation to defend the country against foreign
attacks. And with reference to our foreign policy, only difficulties
have originated out of that for us. Washington said that his country
must have no foreign policy, and his country became strong enough to
say that other Powers must not interfere with America.

General Muller (Boksburg) agreed with State Secretary Reitz. If they
made a proposal in the terms suggested by Mr. Reitz they would also
prove to the world that they were not fighting for gold or for honour,
but only to be free. His burghers were prepared to surrender the
Witwatersrand and Swazieland, but nothing of their independence.
Rather than do that they would fight to the finish.

Field Cornet Roux (Marico) said: My instruction is that I can concede
much, but we must retain our independence. I stand or fall by that.

Landrost Stofberg (Zoutpansberg) said: Disunion must not even be
mentioned with us. We must strive to be unanimous. I make this remark
with reference to what General du Toit said. Zoutpansberg has said to
me: "Our independence we will not surrender. We are prepared to
concede much, but not that." If we can satisfy the British in some way
or other and retain our independence, I will support such a course.
Some of the burghers are of opinion that the Gold Fields can be
surrendered for a time, and others point out that gold was the cause
of the war. The gold has indeed injured us all, and I agree that we
can give up the Gold Fields. What has the gold done for us? You may
say: "It has enriched us." Yes, but it has been much more of a
stumbling block. If there had been no Johannesburg, there would also
never have been a war. Is it not better for us to be a poor but
independent people than rich and a subject nation? The gold is only a
temptation, and has a pernicious moral influence on our national
character. Let the Gold Fields be given up. We shall in any case
retain the Johannesburg market.

Commandant Mentz (Heilbron) I must ask the indulgence of the meeting,
as I regret that I am not able to present such a rosy report as my
fellow delegates from the Free State. From ten to fifteen columns are
trekking about in my district, devastating everything. There is but
little grain, but my greatest trouble is the families who are still
with us. We have 200 families, and how and on what must they live?
Some months ago I had 200 burghers. Now I have only 80. If we must
continue the war I with my men can leave my district, but what must I
then do with my 200 families? My instruction was: "Do not surrender
the independence," but more than half the burghers who gave me this
instruction have been captured, and subsequently others have asked me
to try to arrive at a satisfactory arrangement, and to act according
to circumstances. I am at one with the proposal of State Secretary
Reitz. Let us even give up a portion of our country if we can thereby
retain our independence. I recollect when I was still a child the late
President Jan Brand saying: "Give up the Diamond Fields! You will
profit more from them than England; you plough and sow and farm." This
we can do now, too.

Commandant Fleming (Hoopstad) said that Hoopstad had been considerably
devastated, and few cattle had been left, but there were still other
cattle with which they had escaped. Matters in his district were not
in such a state that they could not continue the war. There was also
sufficient game for them to live on. The burghers had said to him: "We
have sacrificed wives and children, fathers and mothers, brothers and
sisters, money and blood, and if we must now surrender our
independence too, we give up everything, and rather than do that we
will fight to the finish." However, he had to admit that the burghers
were not acquainted with the conditions in other parts of the country
and in the Transvaal, and now that he knew what these conditions were
he could support the proposal of State Secretary Reitz to give up a
portion of the country to save the independence. They should, if
possible, make an end to the war out of sympathy with the poor
families who suffered so grievously from the enemy and from the
Kaffirs.

Acting State President Burger spoke as follows: The Governments must
receive an instruction from the delegates after they have heard and
considered everything. We should now make a fresh proposal to the
British and see what will come of it. If our proposals are rejected
then we stand exactly where we were before. If any one of you is
attached to his independence, I am too, and I shall very seriously
consider the matter before I surrender it. If any one of you has
sacrificed everything and is prepared to sacrifice still more I am
prepared to do so too. Some say: "We must retain our independence or
continue to fight. We can continue the struggle for another six months
or nine months or a year." But supposing we did that, what would we
gain thereby? Only this, that the enemy would be stronger and we
weaker. If I take everything into consideration I must say it appears
to me impossible to prosecute the war any longer. We can, indeed,
proceed and say: "Let come what will," but who of us can declare
to-day with an upright and clear conscience that we can continue the
struggle with any chance of success? God works miracles, but who can
assure me that He will do so in our case? It is argued that European
complications may arise, but that is a mere hope without foundation.
We must view the matter from all sides, and there is this other point
to which I wish to draw your attention. In a wonderful way the Lord
has hitherto preserved and spared us, and kept us standing, so that we
are still acknowledged as a party, and can speak and negotiate for our
people. Now we should ask ourselves whether this is not the last
chance we shall have of being able to do so. If this opportunity is
allowed to pass, I fear all chances will for ever be gone for us to
negotiate as a party for the entire people. Commandant Rheeders said
that we must fight till we are dead, captured, or saved. That would be
manly and would redound to the honour of ourselves and of our
descendants; but must we act from lust of glory? Would that be
sensible and right towards our people? Can we let the people be
annihilated for the sake of honour and fame for ourselves? If I
sacrifice my person for my people it would bring me true honour, but
not otherwise. If after discussion and consideration we become
convinced that we can only continue the war for a little while longer,
it is our duty to make an end to it now. What would further
unnecessary torture avail us? Have we not now arrived at that stage
when we should pray: "Thy will be done"? and then when we feel what
His will is, surrender ourselves to it? That is a prayer of faith, and
one must be prepared to abide by His will. We have already effected
supernatural things at which the world stands amazed. Shall we now
allow a people, who have sacrificed even women and children, to be
exterminated? If we do not arrive at a proper peace now, then when the
last shot shall have been fired, and the war terminates in another
way, what will become of our women and children and of our prisoners
of war? We shall have rejected the proposals of the British
Government, and what right will we have to intercede for these
unfortunate people? We must think seriously over this. If we see that
we have no ground for hope upon which we can continue the war, then we
must now try to get for our people the best that can be got. We were
proud and despised the enemy, and is it not perhaps God's will to
humble us and cast down the pride in us by allowing us to be oppressed
by the English people? The time will come when we shall again exist as
a people. If you decide to proceed with the war, I shall stand or fall
with your decision, although I would not approve of it. I think we
should draft a proper peace proposal, in which we concede as much as
possible, in order to retain our independence. If England refuses to
accept our proposals we can consider further what course to pursue.
Reference has been made to the confiscation of farms, but there can be
no confiscation, as long as we are in possession of the whole country.
However, if we have to abandon ten districts of the Transvaal, and
some in the Orange Free State, then, according to legal advice, those
confiscation Proclamations could be carried into effect, and where
would we then stand? I say it would be criminal of us to continue the
struggle till everything is destroyed and everyone dead if we are now
convinced that it is a hopeless struggle. Our people do not deserve to
be annihilated.

After this the following proposal was handed in by General Kemp,
seconded by Mr. Naudé, which was unanimously adopted:--

"In order to expedite the business this meeting resolves to appoint
General J. C. Smuts and General Hertzog as a committee to draft a
resolution in consultation with the two State Presidents, and submit
same to the meeting to-morrow."

The meeting was then adjourned until the evening at 7.30 o'clock.

After a short service conducted during the adjournment by the Rev. J.
D. Kestell, the meeting re-assembled at 7.30 p.m.

General Celliers (Lichtenburg) reported as follows: Circumstances in
my district are favourable. We have abundant provisions and our horses
are good. The burghers are also well organised. But I wish to take
into account the circumstances in which the other districts are
situated. My burghers are just at present a little fiery, and say:
"Stand firm for the independence." But when they said that, they were
not acquainted with the circumstances elsewhere, and the question is:
To what extent can the other districts who are worse off than we are,
co-operate with us? Well, the other districts say that, if the war is
continued they cannot join in maintaining the struggle. I wish to act
on the lines that will be best for my people and for the future. Now,
what would be best--to say we shall fight to the finish, or to
approach the enemy with a proposal, the acceptance of which will
preserve us as a people? A further question is: Are we as leaders of
the people justified in making further sacrifices? Personally, I must
reply: "Yes, certainly, because we commenced with our trust in God,
Who has preserved us miraculously hitherto." It was painful to me to
hear a comrade say to-day that God's hand was against us. As far as I
am concerned I say we must proceed, but as it appears that all of us
are not able to keep up the struggle, we must jointly try to pursue a
course by which we can in some measure retain our independence. If we
give that up, what can we offer instead to the women and children who
have suffered so grievously?

General Froneman (Winburg and Ladybrand) spoke as follows: I have not
much to say, but it appears to me that matters in my division are
viewed too favourably. The condition is not so rosy there as might be
deduced from what has been said here. I am, however, tied by an
instruction. In a word, my burghers have said to me: "We wish to hear
of nothing else but the retention of our independence, and that
intact." They do not wish to trample on the blood that has already
been shed, but to persevere until deliverance comes. I sympathise with
the comrades from those divisions where matters are so serious, but
our deliverance is from the Lord. It grieves me to observe a doubt
amongst some of us whether God is indeed with us. I would only ask:
Has there ever been a greater miracle than this, that we have been
able hitherto to maintain the struggle against such overwhelming odds?
What has maintained us to this moment? It is the faith of those who in
privacy prayed God to ward off the war, and who when they saw that
such was not God's will, but that He ordained that there should be
war, trusted in Him, and fought bravely. The Lord has indeed hitherto
helped us. The enemy cut us off entirely from the outside world, and
yet these two small Republics have been enabled to maintain the
struggle. Is that not a marvel? I should like to hear what Generals
Botha, de Wet, and de la Rey have to say, for they can throw much
light on the subject for us.

Commandant General Botha said: I am glad to have this opportunity of
expressing my views. It has been observed that we must not be divided,
but when I consider the information that has been given us here, then
there cannot but be a difference of opinion, because in those
divisions where the circumstances are favourable the delegates cannot
flinch at anything. They must declare that they will maintain the
struggle for our independence. If the delegates from those divisions,
where they cannot hold out any longer, differ from the others with
reference to the possibility of continuing the war, we must not
ascribe that to indifference or cowardice or slackness, but to facts
which have wrought a sincere conviction in them. Where I differ from
one or other of you, I do so simply on facts. If I should maintain
silence as to the true state of affairs, and matters went wrong later
on, I, as Head, could be accused of having suppressed facts.
Difference of opinion, however, need not cause any division. We have
commenced this war together and prosecuted it with unanimity. There
should, therefore, be no mention of discord. It is my duty and the
duty of everyone to bow to the decision of the majority. Even though I
may differ in opinion, the decision of the majority is my decision.

Some of the speakers have said that they, as delegates, are tied by
the instructions received from their burghers, notwithstanding the
legal advice given us here, that such an instruction is not binding.
If we should adhere to an instruction given to us by a portion of the
people, that was not acquainted with the position of affairs over the
whole country, then we should not be acting honestly towards that
people in general. We stand here before the question whether our
people shall die a national death, or whether they shall live, and I
am of opinion that no one can judge as to what course we should pursue
unless the facts as to the true conditions obtaining over the entire
country are laid before him, and only in this meeting will these facts
come before us. Let us therefore not say that we are tied by an
instruction.

On the great question before us, I would first ask: How are we now
situated? For more than two and a half years we have fought for our
just rights, and what do we see if we take a retrospective view? Are
we making progress, or are we gradually going down the precipice? I
have been in correspondence with my officers in all parts of the
country, and have received information from them as to the condition
of affairs, but I must tell you that from all that information there
is nothing to show me that our cause is progressing, not even by the
smallest stride. Instead of the large fighting force we had last year,
we have now only 10,000 men. In the course of the last year we have
lost 6,000 men either through death or capture.

When I consider our decline during the past ten months, I must say
that the enemy has in that time learnt to fight better against us, and
to do our people more damage. Ten months ago there was not a single
blockhouse in my division; now lines of blockhouses intersect the
entire division. You can cross these lines only at night, and then
only with difficulty. The whole division is cut up into large areas.
We are now obliged to split up our forces into small groups, so that
the enemy may not be able to ascertain where the commando really is.
Through being so intersected by these lines of blockhouses, which we
cannot cross by daylight, we run a great risk of being captured, and,
indeed, many burghers are captured.

It has been remarked that we can still obtain provisions here and
there. Meat is almost our only food now, and everyone knows what it
means to cross a blockhouse line with cattle. Latterly the commandos
have been supporting themselves principally on cattle looted from the
enemy, but recently the enemy has sent almost all their loot cattle
down to Natal. The cattle, for instance, that was at Ladysmith has
been removed to Estcourt, so that there is now very little opportunity
for looting. To a large extent also we have lived on cattle purchased
from the Kaffirs, but the enemy has now removed even the Kaffirs with
their cattle. The danger is that these districts, forced thereto by
hunger, will later be obliged to say, that however bitter, they must
conclude peace on any terms. We have tried to obtain cattle from other
districts, but that has been proved to be no longer possible. Our
position has thus in this respect become much worse. The blockhouses
are not the only cause of this, but the decline is also to be
attributed to the weakening of our horses, which are driven about so
by the overwhelming force of the enemy, that they are in a very poor
condition and weak, the more so because we have no more forage for
them.

They are so poor that it is difficult, almost impossible, to travel
any distance with them. Another reason is also, that most of the
burghers have now only one horse which must always do service, so that
there is no chance to let it have a proper rest. It has been suggested
that those commandos that can no longer exist in their own districts
should proceed to other parts of the country, but I may say that the
majority of our horses are not able to cover a long distance. If that
is attempted many burghers will be captured on account of their horses
giving up.

I always heard that the Cape Colony is waiting for a suitable
opportunity to rise in great numbers, but according to information now
obtained by me from General Smuts, I am convinced that the cause is
hopeless there. General Smuts also says, after having seen our horses,
that it is absolutely impossible for us to reach the Cape Colony, as
our idea was. We cannot, therefore, rely on the Cape Colony any more.
Our cause has been a failure there. Colonials are also so harshly
treated that they have not the chance or desire to rise. There are not
many Colonists under arms, and it appears to me that lately there are
more Africanders against us, than fighting for us.

In the beginning of the war I hoped and believed that the other
European Powers would not allow one Power to become master of the
Goldfields. But we cherished a false hope. In the letters received
from our Deputation last year they wrote us, that we should not hope
for intervention, because there was for the time being no prospect of
it. From the correspondence between the British and Netherlands
Governments it appears that our Deputation was accredited only to the
Netherlands Government, and therefore that Government alone was in a
position to take upon itself to procure the termination of the war.
The Deputation was accredited by both Republics to all the European
Powers. It appears, however, that only to the Netherlands Government
did they hand in their credentials. This fact has a particularly great
significance for me. It proves that they were advised not to present
their credentials to other Powers. We know that the Deputation would
have left no stone unturned to help us, but after they have been in
Europe for two years they had had to inform us that they had obtained
no help for us, and further, that they could hold out no prospect of
help. We must therefore cherish no hope whatever of help from Europe.
And it is apparent that if no nation came to our assistance when the
enemy introduced a new principle into warfare, namely, to remove women
and children by force, crowd them in camps, and let them die in
thousands, then we need not ever expect any help from other nations.
Their inaction makes me think that they do not care what becomes of
us, even though we all die. They ought to have known that if the
British were tacitly allowed to introduce such a new principle into
warfare, that principle would establish a precedent. We have only the
sympathy of the European Powers, and that sympathy threatens to
smother us, and there the matter remains.

I now come to another matter which lies very near to the heart of each
one of us, namely, our families. If this meeting should decide to
continue the war, then some provision or other must be made for them.
We shall have to decide what to do with them. When I think over this
matter my mind is at a standstill. Their condition is most pitiable,
and they are exposed to all kinds of danger. I have lately tried to
send them in to the British, but without success, because the British
would not receive them. The position has now become such that I am
beginning to think that the fathers of these families must accompany
them into the British lines, because then the enemy receives them. But
even this suggestion offers a great difficulty, namely this, that we
have with us many wives of prisoners-of-war, and what can we do with
them? Where could we find men to "hands up" with them? These families
are in a terrible condition, and something must be done for them.

It has been said that we must fight "to the bitter end," but no one
tells us where that bitter end is. Is it there where everyone lies in
his grave or is banished? In my opinion we must not consider the time
when everyone lies in his grave as the "bitter end." If we do so, and
act upon that view, we become the cause of the death of our people. Is
the bitter end not there, where the people have struggled till they
can struggle no more? Personally, there is nothing that hinders me to
prosecute the war still further. My family is well provided for. I
have good horses, and when I consider what the enemy has done, then I
say: "Rather die than surrender," and that is also my inclination. But
I must not regard myself, but my people and the other men who must
fight.

I assure you that our position is serious, and when I lay matters bare
to you, I do not do so to discourage you, but to give you a clear
insight into them, as it is my duty to do, because you must take a
very important decision here. I have always thought that when matters
came to such a pass with us, that we were driven by hunger to
surrender we should, before going under, and while we were still a
nation, accept terms. We cannot wait until our numbers are reduced to
a few thousand men and then try to negotiate. It would then be too
late. If we wish to negotiate, now is the time. If the Lord God wills
it, then, however bitter, we must come to terms. We cannot simply go
on blindly and say that we trust in God. Miracles can happen, but it
is not for me or for you to say what God's will is with us, or that
the Lord will allow us to retain our independence. If we proceed, it
will be a bitter cup for us to see that the one commando after the
other is forced to surrender. Our responsibility will only be the
greater if we go on and ultimately yet lose. We hear continually of
the death of this one or that one, and it is asked who will care for
the widows if we make peace now? But does not this question remain if
we prosecute the war?

If we have to give up eleven districts--and that means the half of the
South African Republic--then as far as I can see the war must end
disastrously for our people. If a great victory is gained over us we
shall not be able to stand it. All will immediately be over with us.
There is a military reason why we have been able to carry on such a
great war for such a long time against such overwhelming forces, and
that is, because we have commandos in each district, which compels the
British to divide their forces. But if we abandon eleven districts, as
we shall have to do shortly, that will mean the concentration of our
forces, which will give the enemy an opportunity of concentrating
their troops against us, and the consequences thereof will be fatal
for us.

In only one portion of our country, namely, in Zoutpansberg, is there
still food, but how do we obtain our provisions there? It must be
taken, and thereby we create more enemies. Our safety in Zoutpansberg
lay in this: that hitherto the Kaffirs were divided, but if the enemy
were to pour into that district the Kaffirs will join them against us.
I therefore foresee danger for our commandos if they proceed to
Zoutpansberg.

I feel that our people have defended themselves and have fought better
than any people in the world. Our little nation has already sacrificed
proportionately more in this struggle than any other nation known in
history, and I should regret it bitterly if this people should be
destroyed, or have to fight till all are dead or captured, and the
independence lost. If we become convinced that it is impossible for us
to proceed, that it is impossible for us to retain our independence,
then we must inform the people to that effect, and they can then
decide what they wish to do. By continuing blindly we shall certainly
fall. During the last year more than 20,000 women and children died in
the concentration camps, and their suffering there was terrible. Then
there are also some of our own people, who have taken up arms against
us, and if matters go on as at present there will shortly be more
Africanders fighting against us than for us.

The question now is: What must we do? There are only a few courses
open to us. If we can retain our independence by the surrender of a
portion of our territory, then, however hard it may be, let us do so.
The State Secretary has made a few suggestions in this respect, and
however detrimental it may be to us to have a Government within a
Government in the country, it would nevertheless be better than to
lose everything, for humanly speaking it is impossible for us to
retain our independence by force of arms. Swazieland is a great
country, and yet it is of no value to us, and we can well give it up.
And let us also surrender the Witwatersrand--that cancer in our
country--if we can save ourselves thereby. If by these means we do not
succeed in our object it is for you to say whether the war must still
be continued or not. The conditions show me plainly that we are going
backward. In the Orange Free State we have only 6,000 men under arms,
and in the South African Republic only 10,000. Compare these with the
numbers with which we commenced. Are we not going down the precipice?
Let us not co-operate to that end. Let us rather do what we can to
save our people if we must lose our independence. If we must give up
the struggle, are we then to say to the enemy: "We have fought for our
independence only, and since we cannot get that, here we are, do with
us as you please." That we can do for ourselves as leaders, but we
cannot say that for our people. We must interpose for our people. We
must try to get for them what we can, because they are absolutely
ruined, and if we make no terms we place them unconditionally in the
hands of their bitterest enemies. Would that be desirable? If we
cannot retain our independence, let us try to get responsible
Government. Then we will be governed by leaders from amongst ourselves
who can keep their hands over the heads of the people. Let us also try
to secure the rights of our language, the Dutch language. You know how
long it took before the rights of that language were in a measure
acknowledged in the Cape Colony. Shall we not try to get those rights
acknowledged here now we have the chance? Let us stand firm for these
two points, and for the payment of all direct debts, as is done in the
Cape Colony and Natal. We need not trouble ourselves about smaller
matters for they are of such a nature that a Government must attend to
them in the interests of the people.

Some argue that we must accept no terms, because we would thereby bind
ourselves for the future, but that we should go over into a condition
of passive resistance. But can we do that? It is a fact that when the
war ceases there will be famine in the country, and what will be
easier for the British Government than to supply the people with food
on condition that the men take the oath of allegiance? Therefore I
think that it is much better for us, the leaders, to try and stipulate
certain terms for our people. Should we not now co-operate to that
end, or should we wait until we are entirely overpowered and then have
to wait some thirty years before we can be on our legs again. In my
opinion there can be no question of unconditional surrender. You
cannot say that you will accept no terms. We may not say: "Do with us
what you please." If we do that, then our children will be a standing
protest against us. Let us respect each other's opinions. I cannot,
and may not, on account of your opinions, suspect anyone here
to-night, who hitherto in spite of all hardship and bitterness, has
faithfully stood under arms, of being afraid. Only by standing firmly
together and taking one another by the hand can we extricate ourselves
from the deep abyss in which we now stand. Believe me, it is bitter
for me to have to speak as I do, and if you can remove my difficulties
I shall be sincerely thankful.

General de la Rey said: I shall be brief and only touch upon a few
points. You can understand that after the success that has crowned our
arms lately, I have a definite instruction from the burghers in my
division to stand by our independence. And they have grounds for such
an instruction. The burghers have, indeed, lost over 300 men from
deaths and captures, but they have performed deeds of heroism. I do
not say this to boast, but to make the position of myself and of my
fellow delegates clear to you. These victories have naturally had a
particularly good effect on the burghers and also upon the enemy. I do
not wish to convey that these victories have such an effect upon the
enemy that they will cause the scales in this struggle to turn in our
favour, but I say it to show that no one can take it amiss in the
burghers if they give such instructions as they have done.

However, since my arrival, and since I have learnt how matters are
situated in other districts, I feel the difficulties that are brought
forward against the continuance of the war. Under my command I have
also districts, such as Potchefstroom and Krugersdorp, where the
burghers cannot maintain the struggle, but they have the opportunity
there of withdrawing to other parts where they can exist. I have
always been of opinion that I may not lay down my arms as long as I
have any food, even though that food consists of nothing else but
mealies. But it appears to me that certain districts will be compelled
by hunger to surrender. Therefore I am pleased that leaders speak
openly here, and do not arrogantly say: "We can still continue," and
then, when we return, lay down their arms, and put everything upon the
shoulders of only some of us.

Referring to intervention, I may say that the Commandant General and
other members of the Government know what my views have always been on
that matter. I was certain of it that there would never be any
intervention for us, and said so before the war. If Britain becomes
the owner of the Republics, then South Africa would be owned partly by
Germany and partly by England. If Britain becomes the owner of a
portion, then the German possession was guaranteed. That would not be
the case if the Republics won the struggle. The German possessions
would then also be in danger. Will German statesmen therefore
intervene to check England to their own detriment? We need not,
therefore, give intervention even a thought.

There is another point. It is argued that we must fight to the bitter
end. The Commandant General has asked whether that bitter end has
arrived. I think each one must decide that for himself. It must be
borne in mind that everything--cattle, goods, money, man, woman and
child--has been sacrificed. In my division many people go almost
naked. There are men and women who wear nothing more than plain skins
on the naked body. Is this not the bitter end? Only the fighting
burghers are supplied with the necessary clothing, which they take
from the enemy. Therefore I think that the time for negotiating has
now arrived. If this opportunity is not availed of, the door will be
closed. England will never again allow us to meet in this way, or give
us an opportunity to conclude an agreement.

The question is: How shall we negotiate? I hardly know how to proceed.
It is the duty of this meeting to instruct the two Governments, and I
advise you to be sensible. If we cannot obtain what we desire I am
prepared to fight to the finish, whatever that may be.

The proposals made by the State Secretary and supported by the
Commandant General, namely, to surrender the Gold Fields, I cannot
favour, and for two reasons. The first is because I am convinced that
even though we should offer the Gold Fields, the British will refuse
to accept them, because by doing so they would prove to the whole
world that they only wanted the Gold Fields. The second reason is that
we would be parting with our biggest source of revenue, and how shall
we materially rescue the people from the impoverished circumstances in
which we now find ourselves? How shall we pay our debts? I think we
should try to obtain other and better terms.

Chief Commandant de Wet addressed the meeting as follows: I intended
to say nothing on this great matter, because my opinions on it are no
secret. I still have the same opinion which I had when the war
threatened us. In the Orange Free State you find the same critical
conditions that existed in the South African Republic. There are nine
districts which were entirely abandoned by us for a time, but which
were later on again occupied by the burghers. The only food there was
some corn which had been hidden. Meat had to be taken from the enemy.

I deeply respect the feelings of Commandant General Botha, although I
differ from him and others, who are of opinion that we must stop the
war. I believe what has been said about the general misery in so many
districts of the South African Republic and about the difficulty in
keeping up the struggle there, but you must not take it amiss in me if
I point out that that unfortunate correspondence between our two
Governments which fell into the hands of the British at Reitz, painted
the conditions in more or less the same colours as those in which they
are now represented. That was a year ago. I wish, however, to accept
what has been said as true. Still the Free State does not wish to give
up the war. I wish to speak openly, and let no one consider it as a
reproach when I say that this is really a Transvaal war. I say this in
a friendly and brotherly spirit, because, for me, the waters of the
Vaal River never existed. I always was an advocate of closer union.
There are unfaithful burghers amongst us, too, unfaithful to the
Compact between the two Republics, but I cling to that Compact, and
say that the entire war is our common cause.

What is now the mood prevailing amongst the burghers of the Orange
Free State? The meetings held there were attended by 6,000 burghers. I
myself was present at various meetings at which altogether 5,000
attended, while General Hertzog met the remaining 1,000. At these
meetings a voice as of thunder was given for the independence. The
resolution was: "Continue. We have always been prepared to sacrifice
everything for our independence, and are still prepared to do so." Not
a single man spoke differently. There is thus only one course open to
me. We must see what can be done for those parts of the country which
are helpless. I do not wish to be the man to say what must be done,
but I shall do everything I can to help. It would be very hard for me
if we have to adopt the suggestion of General Botha to send men into
the enemy's lines with their families. But we must continue the war.
Let us consider what our numbers were when we commenced. Let us assume
that there were 60,000 burghers able to bear arms. We knew that
England had an army of about 750,000 men. Of this she has sent about
250,000 here, namely, one-third. And experience teaches that she
cannot send out much more than a third. Have we not also still got
about a third of our fighting force?

I am also prepared to give up something for the sake of retaining our
independence, but with reference to the suggestion of offering the
Gold Fields, I agree with General de la Rey on that point. We can have
no other Government, no English Colony, in the midst of our country.
That will cause friction. It is said that the Gold Fields have been a
curse and a cancer for us. Well, they need not remain a curse. And
then, how shall we materially rescue our people without the Gold
Fields? Swazieland is not of much importance. That we can give up.

The war is a matter of faith. If I had not been able to do so in
faith, I would never have taken up arms. Let us again renew our
covenant with God. If we fix our eyes on the past we have more ground
for our faith than I ever expected, and we have ground to continue in
faith. The entire war has been a miracle, and without faith it would
have been childish to commence the war. We must not think of
intervention. That there has been no intervention is a proof that God
does not will it, because through this war he wishes to form us into a
people. Our help and our deliverance must come from Him alone, and
then we shall not become proud. I cannot see into the future, but this
I know, that behind me it is light. What lies before me I do not know.
There it is dark, but we must go on trusting God, and then, when
victory comes, we shall not be proud.

With reference to the Cape Colony, I may say that I am also
disappointed, not with the reports from there, but because there has
been no general rising. People who sent us information have not kept
their word. We must accept the report of General Smuts, and he says
we must not depend upon the Cape Colony; but he does not say that our
cause is declining there. The Cape Colony has been of great assistance
to us, because it compelled the enemy to withdraw about 50,000 troops
from the Republics.

I feel for the poor families who are suffering so grievously, and also
for our burghers in the camps. I think anxiously of their misery, but
I have nothing to do with facts. The entire war is a matter of faith.
I have to do with a fact only when I have to remove it.

I must still make this one remark, that if we surrender, as
vanquished, we shall be able to depend on small mercy from England. We
shall then in any case have dug the grave of our independence. Well,
then, what is the difference between going into our graves in reality,
and digging the grave for our national existence?

Mr. C. Birkenstock (Vryheid) said: We must be careful how we deal with
the Gold Fields. Our country is dreadfully impoverished, and I fail to
see how we can give up that source of income.

The meeting was then adjourned, after prayer, to the following day.


SATURDAY, MAY 17TH, 1902.

At the request of the Chairman the meeting was opened with prayer by
Chief Commandant de Wet at 9.30 o'clock.

A private report from Mr. Schmorderer, who had brought the despatch
from Europe from the deputation, was read, after which Landdrost
BOSMAN (Wakkerstroom) said: We do not know what the future will bring
us, but we can gauge the future by the past. The commando, of the
district which I represent, namely, Wakkerstroom, had 600 men a year
ago. Now that number has been reduced by more than 300. Then, we had
more than sufficient horses. Everyone could simply catch a horse, and
Vryheid got more than 400 horses from us. Now there are burghers of
Wakkerstroom who have no horses, and it is impossible for them to
obtain one. With regard to food, there were then 3,000 to 4,000 bags
of mealies; now we have barely 300 to 400, and these are scarcely
within our reach. If matters have proceeded thus in the course of a
year, what will be our position twelve months hence? What will then
become of the burghers who have no horses? We must also consider the
condition of our families. They have no clothing. That, however, is
not of great consequence. The principal matter is the want of food.
More than one woman has been obliged to live for weeks on fruit alone.
I myself have lived for days simply on mealie-pap (porridge). We must
obtain mealies from the Kaffirs by using nice words. When the enemy
operates in the district we must leave the families to the mercy of
the British and the armed Kaffirs. If we supply them with provisions,
the enemy simply removes those provisions, and they are left without a
morsel of food. If we decide to continue the war some provision must
be made for these families. Their husbands declare that if peace is
not made now there is no other course open to them than to go over to
the enemy, for they cannot any longer look on to see their families
dying of hunger or being murdered.

Then we must also keep in view the condition of the families in the
hands of the enemy. They have submitted to much anguish and suffering,
but always in the belief that we had good hopes of deliverance. If
they knew how matters were situated with us they would adopt other
views. More than 2,000 women and children die per month in the camps,
and if we prosecute the struggle without hope, we become accessory to
their death.

The Kaffir question is also a serious matter.

Of intervention there is no hope. Some time ago I thought that we
would get help from the British people, but that nation becomes more
and more indifferent under all the occurrences of the war, and it
appears to me that their Government will be able to prosecute the war
to the finish.

What will now be the result if we decide to continue the struggle? We
have seen how England has during the past year weakened us more and
more; we have seen how many burghers have become unfaithful and
strengthened the enemy. If it were not for those unfaithful people out
of our midst we would never have had such a hard time of it. If we go
on we shall ever become weaker and weaker, and ultimately dwindle
away. What shall we then have gained by continuing the struggle?
To-day we are still in a position to obtain something from the enemy,
and to stipulate for assistance for our ruined people, who cannot get
on their legs again without help. The burghers are prepared to proceed
and to suffer still more if there is any ground upon which we can
continue the war. If we have no well-founded grounds then I must warn
this meeting that we shall lose many Wakkerstroom burghers. We have
this opportunity for negotiating, and now is the time that we can
still obtain something from the enemy. We shall never have this
opportunity again. If it is clear to us that our independence is lost
then we have still our people to consider. If we simply dwindle away,
our people will sink and become of no account.

The matter has also been considered from a religious point of view. I
am not ashamed to confess that I also serve God, but God has given us
reason, and if we see that, humanly speaking, there is no prospect of
our deliverance, we cannot expect that God will simply grant us our
desire. If we desire to have our independence for the honour of God,
He will let us retain it, but I fear that we desire it more for
ourselves, more for our own honour, than for the honour of God. Unless
some other light is thrown on the matter, I fear it will be wrong of
us to continue the struggle. Reference is made to the blood that has
been shed and to the sacrifices that have been made; but what about
the women and children who will still have to give up their lives if
we now continue, and yet ultimately have to give the matter up as
hopeless? The persons who are still living are of more importance to
me than those who have already given their lives. I say we may not
proceed unless we can give ourselves and our people good reasons for
doing so.

At this stage the Committee appointed to draft a resolution handed in
their draft. It was read, and after some discussion, adopted.

The draft resolution was as follows:--

"This meeting of representatives of the people from both Republics,
having considered the correspondence and the negotiations that passed
between the Governments of both Republics and His Excellency Lord
Kitchener on behalf of the British Government;

"Having heard the information supplied by the delegates from the
various parts of both Republics;

"Having heard the latest reports from their Representatives in Europe;

"Considering the fact that the British Government has refused to
conclude peace, on the basis of their independence, and has refused to
accept the proposals of their Governments made on that basis; yet, in
spite of the above-mentioned refusal of the British Government, this
meeting nevertheless desires to comply with the ardent wishes of the
people to retain their independence, for which so many material and
personal sacrifices have been made;

"RESOLVES, on behalf of the people of both Republics, to authorise the
Governments to conclude peace on the following basis, to wit: The
retention of a limited independence with the offer, in addition to
what has already been offered by the Governments in their
negotiations, dated April 15th, 1902, of:--

  (_a_) Surrender of all foreign relations and embassies;

  (_b_) acceptance of the protectorate of Great Britain;

  (_c_) surrender of portions of the territory of the South
  African Republic;

  (_d_) the conclusion of a defensive treaty with Great Britain
  with reference to South Africa."

During the discussion of this draft resolution the Governments were
clearly given to understand that the portions of the territory which
they could surrender were those already mentioned, namely, the Gold
Fields and Swazieland.

The question was put whether the South African Republic alone should
have to pay for the retention of independence, as these areas formed a
portion of that territory.

To this Mr. de Clercq (Middelburg) replied "Yes, and if I could secure
the independence of the Orange Free State with all I possess, I would
do so." Other Transvaal delegates spoke in the same sense, indicating
that the sacrifices made by the Free State during the war were most
highly appreciated by them.

General Froneman thanked the Transvaal delegates on behalf of the Free
State, remarking that there could be no further mention of the two
States having divergent interests.

With reference to the resolution, General de la Rey declared that he
was opposed to the surrender of Johannesburg.

Commandant Ross (Vrede) remarked: "I am surprised that the meeting
takes such a resolution. What the people demand is total independence,
and we can do nothing else but comply with that demand. Otherwise we
act in a childish way. My commando is prepared to do everything to
secure peace provided they retain their independence. If we part with
that we cease to be a people."

Commandant J. J. van Niekerk (Ficksburg) declared that the meeting
could not even think of surrendering their independence.

General H. A. Alberts (Heidelberg) said: I have a free hand to act
according to circumstances. We shall be committing suicide if we
continue the war without any hope and without any prospect of
attaining our object, and not only suicide, but a murder also of women
and children. If I could to-day purchase the independence of the Free
State with all that I still possess, even with my life, I would do it
with pleasure, but we cannot do what is impossible.

General P. R. Viljoen (Heidelberg) agreed with what General Alberts
had said, and was of opinion that they had to reckon with facts.

The meeting was now adjourned to two o'clock in the afternoon.


The meeting resumed at two o'clock p.m.

After some discussion, the following proposal, made by General Brand
and seconded by Mr. de Kock, was carried with the dissentient vote of
General Kemp:--

"This meeting of representatives of the people of both the Republics
resolve to instruct the two Governments to appoint a Commission with
instructions to negotiate with His Excellency Lord Kitchener on behalf
of His Britannic Majesty's Government on any subject in order to try
to arrive at a satisfactory peace, and to submit their attempts
through the two Governments to this meeting for approval."

After this the meeting was closed with prayer.


In pursuance of the above-mentioned resolution the two Governments
appointed the following gentlemen as a Commission to negotiate with
Lord Kitchener:--

  Commandant General Louis Botha.
  Chief Commandant C. R. de Wet.
  General J. H. de la Rey.
  General J. C. Smuts.
  General J. B. M. Hertzog.




CHAPTER V.

FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS AT PRETORIA.


Conference between the Commission appointed to represent the meeting
of Delegates at Vereeniging, and Lord Kitchener and Lord Milner.


Lord Kitchener was informed that the Meeting representing the two
Republics had delegated Commandant General Louis Botha, Chief
Commandant C. R. de Wet, General J. H. de la Rey, General J. C. Smuts,
and General J. B. M. Hertzog to confer with the representatives of the
British Government, and in the afternoon of Saturday, May 17, the
Governments received a reply from Lord Kitchener that he and Lord
Milner, on behalf of the British Government, were prepared to meet the
Commission, who were requested to proceed to Pretoria immediately for
that purpose.

The Commission left Vereeniging that same evening for Pretoria, where
they arrived at 8 o'clock p.m. They were accommodated in "Park zicht,"
the residence of Mr. Carl Rood, corner of Maré and van der Walt
Streets.

On Monday morning, May 19, 1902, the Commission assembled early and
wrote the following letter to be submitted to Lord Kitchener and Lord
Milner, and in which the wishes of the peoples' Representatives were
expressed:--


     _To their Excellencies_ Lord KITCHENER _and_ Lord MILNER,
                        _Pretoria_.
                                             PRETORIA, _May 19, 1902_.

YOUR EXCELLENCIES,

With the object of finally terminating the existing hostilities, we
have the honour, by virtue of the authority from the Governments of
both the Republics, to propose the following points as a basis of
negotiations, in addition to the points already offered during the
negotiations in April last:--

     (_a_) We are prepared to give up our independence as far as
     foreign relations are concerned;

     (_b_) We wish to retain internal self-government under British
     supervision;

     (_c_) We are prepared to give up a portion of our territory.

     If Your Excellencies are prepared to negotiate on this basis, the
     above-mentioned points can be more fully set forth.

  We have the honour to be,
     Your Excellencies' obedient servants,
          LOUIS BOTHA,
          C. R. DE WET,
          J. H. DE LA REY,
          J. B. M. HERTZOG,
          J. C. SMUTS.


_Minutes of Conference held at Pretoria on Monday, May 19, and
following days between_ Lord KITCHENER _and_ Lord MILNER,
_representing the British Government, and_ Commandant-General Louis
BOTHA, Chief Commandant C. R. DE WET, General J. H. DE LA REY, General
J. B. M. HERTZOG, _and_ General J. C. SMUTS, _representing the Meeting
of the People's Delegates assembled at Vereeniging on May 15, 1902_.


Mr. Advocate N. J. de Wet acted as interpreter, and as secretaries:
for the British Representatives, Mr. O. Walrond, and for the
Commission representing the Republics, the Rev. J. D. Kestell and Mr.
D. E. van Velden.

The Commission met the British Representatives in Lord Kitchener's
house at 10 a.m. After the parties had taken their seats, General
BOTHA said: To begin with, I wish to say that although the
negotiations have occupied a longer time than we expected, I
nevertheless wish to give Your Excellencies the assurance of our good
faith, and that everything is done seriously with the object of
concluding the desired peace.

Further, I wish to say that everything we agree upon here must be
submitted to the Representatives of our People for approval.

Thereupon the British Representatives said that they would like to
hear what proposals the Commission had to make, and the letter (see
page 98) written by the Committee was read.

Lord MILNER: On account of the wide difference between this proposal
and that made by His Majesty's Government when we separated, I must
say that I foresee no hope for good results from negotiation on this
basis. I think that Lord Kitchener shares my view.

Lord KITCHENER: We can take these proposals into consideration, but I
cannot see how we can bring them into accord with those of His
Majesty's Government.

General BOTHA: If you take up that attitude, we would like to have a
final answer from you on our proposal.

Lord MILNER: Do you wish your proposal to be referred to His Majesty's
Government?

General BOTHA: Yes, unless you have authority to give a final reply.

Lord MILNER: I am convinced that your proposal will not be accepted,
and if you wish to make another proposal, it will injure you to refer
this proposal to His Majesty's Government.

General BOTHA: If you have authority to reject our proposed basis, we
would like to see you do so.

Lord MILNER: I have no hesitation to take upon myself to reject your
proposals. The instructions received by me and Lord Kitchener are so
clear on this point.

General BOTHA: Must I then understand that when Lord Salisbury said
some time ago that this war was not waged with a view to obtaining
territory he did not mean it?

Lord KITCHENER: There is now no question of territory, as the
annexation stands.

General BOTHA: I fail to see that our proposal is in conflict with the
annexation.

Lord MILNER: I do not recollect the exact words of Lord Salisbury, but
it is true that Lord Salisbury said that his Government did not
commence the war with the object of obtaining territory, but in the
course of the war circumstances developed in such a manner that no
other course was open than to annex the Republics, and my Government
have expressed their fixed intention not to go back on their decision.

General HERTZOG: I would like to know what is really the difference
between the basis now laid down by us and that laid down by His
Majesty's Government in the negotiations last year? I do not mean so
much in detail as in general principle.

Lord KITCHENER: Does your proposal assume that the Boers become
British citizens?

General SMUTS: I do not see that our proposal is necessarily in
conflict with the proposal of last year. Our proposal only makes
provision as regards the government.

Lord MILNER then read out the following clause from the terms offered
last year (the Middelburg proposals, March 7, 1901)[3]: "At the
earliest possible date military administration will cease and be
replaced by civil administration in the form of a crown colony
government. In each of the new colonies there shall be at first a
Governor and Executive Council consisting of the principal officials,
with a Legislative Council consisting of a certain number of official
members, to whom will be added a nominated non-official element. But
it is the desire of His Majesty's Government, as soon as circumstances
permit, to introduce a representative element and ultimately to extend
to the new colonies the privilege of self-government." "It may be," he
remarked, "that I do not quite understand your proposal; but it
appears to me to differ from the scheme here set forth not only in
details but also in principle."

         [Footnote 3: See Appendix, p. 210.]

General HERTZOG: I fully agree with you that it can be taken to differ
in principle, but a principle that is found to vary even from
principles adopted in Colonies of the same State. In other words, you
find that one principle was conceded to one colony, while another
principle was applied to another colony, and yet they belong to the
same Empire.

Lord MILNER: Absolutely. There are different principles in different
colonies, but it appears to me that the principle laid down in your
proposal differs from that laid down by His Majesty's Government.

General HERTZOG: I believe that I express the opinion of the entire
Commission when I say that we desire to have peace, and the remarks I
have made were intended to show that I consider that if we mutually
really wish to arrive at peace, we must not attach too much value to
theoretical differences as long as the practical object be attained.
For instance, in the various colonies now constituting the United
States of America, there were different principles for different
colonies. Now the principle laid down in our proposal does not differ
so much from your proposal that a practical difference would be
created thereby, as would be the case if negotiations were confined
strictly to your basis. I suppose that England's position towards
South Africa is to arrive at a certain result with us, and that that
result will now be equally well attained through our proposal as
through the Middelburg proposals. And therefore I ask you whether the
difference is so great that an entirely new situation will be created
whereby England would not attain the object she has in view?

Lord MILNER: We compare two different matters. Here in the Middelburg
proposals there are a number of definite proposals, which go into a
great mass of details. I do not say that these details are perfect or
are perfectly expressed. And I understand that it is entirely within
the authority of Lord Kitchener and myself to confer further with you
with reference to details, with the object of explaining anything that
might be doubtful, and perhaps to make alterations which would not
fundamentally affect the scheme. If you say that your proposals are
not in conflict with the Middelburg proposals, there is no reason why
you should not put your proposal aside and discuss the Middelburg
proposals, which are definite.

General HERTZOG: I entirely admit that you are entitled to say that
there is a fundamental difference between our proposals; but whether
for the purpose for which we are together here that difference is of
such a nature that if we are mutually inclined to make peace, we shall
not arrive at something that would satisfy us both, and, further, that
if we negotiated on the basis proposed by us, the same result would
not be attained as by negotiating on the Middelburg proposals, I
cannot see.

Lord MILNER: I understand that you grant that there is a fundamental
difference between the two bases. Well, then I consider that we are
not authorised to negotiate on a basis differing from that laid down
in the last despatch from H.M. Government, and also differing from
that contained in the Middelburg proposals. I may say that in their
last message H.M. Government went as far as they possibly could to
meet you. The whole spirit of the cablegram was to that effect.

Chief Commandant DE WET: You must understand that if I speak I do not
do so as a lawyer. (Lord Kitchener, laughing: "It's the same case with
me.") I fully agree with what General Botha and General Hertzog have
said with reference to our being in earnest to establish peace; but to
be brief I must say I did not understand that His Excellency Lord
Milner could have intended, as I also view the matter, that we went to
the people with the Middelburg proposals with the idea of returning
with those proposals.

Lord MILNER: If I have given that impression it is not quite what I
mean. But I think that you went to the people with the last message
from His Majesty's Government in your minds, and it was clear from
that message that His Majesty's Government were not prepared to take
any terms into consideration which differed widely from the principle
laid down in the Middelburg proposals.

Chief Commandant DE WET: So I understand the matter, too, and
therefore we have come with a proposal that does not differ so much
from those proposals.

General SMUTS: I had thought that the vital principle for your
Government was to get the independence out of the way. And here the
independence of the two Republics, as far as foreign relations are
concerned, is given away. I therefore thought that possibly the two
parties would come to an arrangement on that basis. I did not think
that the Middelburg terms were essential for the establishment of
peace.

Lord MILNER: Not in details, but in general principles. If the British
Government has laid down a basis, and you have had weeks to consider
the matter, it will never do that you simply set it aside. Lord
Kitchener has given you considerable time to consult the people; and
now you come back and without even referring to the Middelburg
proposals, you set aside those terms or that basis, and propose
entirely different terms, and say: "Let us negotiate on them." I do
not think that I and Lord Kitchener ought to do it; but if he takes
another view the British Government can be asked whether they are
prepared to set aside all the previous discussions and to commence now
on a new basis.

Chief Commandant DE WET: We naturally cannot prevent Lord Kitchener
from putting any question he pleases to his Government, but at the
same time it is our request that you cable our request to the British
Government.

General BOTHA: I cannot see that we have come here with a new basis,
because in consequence of the negotiations during last April you were
instructed by the British Government to encourage us to put forward
new proposals. Our proposal stands in direct connection with that
desire.

Lord MILNER: I did my best to get new proposals from you. But you
would not make them. You forced the British Government to make
proposals.

General BOTHA: I am of opinion that both parties should co-operate.

Lord KITCHENER: You were asked to put forward proposals, but you
refused, and now after the British Government has made proposals you
come forward with a proposal.

General DE LA REY: I think it was in consequence of the correspondence
between the Netherlands and British Governments that we made our
proposals. That correspondence was the commencement of the
negotiations.

Chief Commandant DE WET: If we had had to make new proposals in April
we would not have been able to put forward a proposal so reasonable
and advantageous to the British Government as we do now, because
unless the people consented we would have had to insist on retaining
our entire independence.

Lord MILNER: I wish to remind you of what has taken place, and I do
not do so to put you in the wrong, but to make the position clear, for
these matters are very plain. You came and made a certain proposal.
The British Government gave a clear reply--they refused to accept it.
The reply was entirely straightforward and quite intelligible; and at
the same time the British Government said: "We are desirous of peace;
will you make other proposals?" You said: "No, we have no authority to
do so without consulting the people." We admitted that argument. Then
you said: "Let the British Government make proposals." The British
Government did so, and they are equally entitled to an answer. What is
the position you place Lord Kitchener and me in? You return with an
entirely new proposal and say nothing of ours. This is not a
reasonable treatment of the British Government, and we ought not to
take your proposal into consideration.

General HERTZOG: I have attempted to point out that our reply really
cannot be taken as no reply to the proposals of the British
Government, because the great question raised in the correspondence
last April between us and the British Government turned on the
independence, and now after having consulted the people we come and
say: "We are prepared to abandon the independence, and we define to
what extent." And now, as General Smuts has said, that is exactly the
basis that we lay down here in our proposal.

Lord MILNER: You say you abandon the independence as far as foreign
relations are concerned?

General HERTZOG: Yes, but you must understand that this is only a
basis, which we shall more fully specify later.

General SMUTS: The independence is abandoned as far as foreign
relations are concerned, and with reference to the internal
government, that is placed under the supervision of the British
Government, so that the effect of these two clauses is: That the
independence is abandoned and that the two Republics cannot after that
be considered as sovereign States.

Lord MILNER: I understand very well that they would not then be
sovereign States, but my mind is not clear enough to be able to say
what they would virtually be.

Lord KITCHENER: They would be a new kind of "International Animal."

General SMUTS: As history teaches us, it has happened before that
questions were solved by compromises. And this draft proposal is as
near as we can come to colonial government.

Lord KITCHENER: Do you accept the annexations?

General SMUTS: Not formally, but I do not understand that this
proposal would be in conflict with the annexation proclamations.

Lord KITCHENER: I fear that my mind is not clear enough to understand
this. There will have to be two Governments in one State. And how do
you propose that the government should be carried on?

General SMUTS: A fuller explanation would have to be given to the word
_supervision_; and I thought that this was exactly the point which
could be further discussed, and on which we could negotiate.

Lord MILNER: I shall certainly not depart from a clear basis to accept
a vague basis.

Lord KITCHENER: I feel convinced that your proposal could never be
carried out in the practical government of a country.

Chief Commandant DE WET: I am also of opinion that our proposal is not
developed, just as little as the Middelburg proposals. This was
clearly intimated by Lord Kitchener and Lord Milner when those
proposals were made; and they were only considered as a basis on which
we could negotiate, so that the matter could be set going. We
naturally cannot bind the British Government to accept our
explanations; but it is in any case a basis.

Lord MILNER: I am very anxious that these discussions should not end
in smoke, and would not allow any formal point to stand in the way;
but to depart from the definite proposals of Middelburg (March 7th,
1901) to a thing like this, and to begin discussions anew thereon on
something that is very vague, will certainly land us in difficulties.
I believe that we are entitled to hold you to the Middelburg
proposals, which we can modify as far as details are concerned.

General BOTHA: Perhaps it will be well that you first reply to our
proposal.

Chief Commandant DE WET: I understand that unless Your Excellencies
are prepared to give a final answer to our proposals it would not be
unreasonable of us to request that you first submit them to your
Government.

General BOTHA: We have come here with the earnest desire to conclude
peace, and I think that if our proposal is developed Boer and Briton
will be able to live here side by side; and I assume that it is the
desire of both parties not to suppress one race. We wish to conclude a
peace, with which both parties are satisfied, and which will be
permanent in South Africa.

Lord MILNER: Our object is the same.

Lord KITCHENER: Your proposal will cause important alterations in our
proposals, to which we, in my opinion, cannot agree.

General BOTHA: I think that especially because a proposal has been
made from your side you must give a decided answer to our proposal.

Lord KITCHENER and Lord MILNER: Then alter your proposal into ours.

Lord MILNER: I do not believe that the British Government is prepared
to go further to meet you than they have gone in their last proposals.
In their opinion they went far on the way to peace, further than the
views of the British public.

Lord KITCHENER: The difference between our proposals, appears to me,
to be too wide.

General BOTHA: We always remain under the supervision of the British
Government.

Lord KITCHENER: Will you then consider yourselves as British subjects?
"Supervision" is a new word, and "Suzerainty" has given us too much
trouble.

General HERTZOG: The idea is not so new. There are, indeed, various
kinds of States which all belong to the British Empire, Basutoland,
for instance.

Lord MILNER: There are various kinds, but this is a new kind.

General HERTZOG: I trust Your Excellencies will understand us. We came
here not to lose a minute of time. We have been to the people. We know
what the people want and what the spirit prevailing amongst them is.
If we therefore hand in a proposal we have to take two matters into
consideration: (1) A proposal that will meet the British Government in
a reasonable manner; and (2) A proposal which we have reasonable
ground for believing our people will accept. For these reasons we
have submitted a proposal, and now we are in the disadvantageous
position that we are here before Your Excellencies, who have not full
authority to decide finally.

Lord KITCHENER: We are in the same position as you.

General HERTZOG: We suggest something which we know to be in
accordance with the spirit of our people, but it is impossible for us
to do something that is contrary to that spirit.

Lord MILNER: Must we understand that the Middelburg proposals are not
in the spirit of what your people wish?

General SMUTS: No answer has yet been given thereon. The only
resolution taken by the meeting of representatives is that which we
have submitted here.

Lord KITCHENER: Are you prepared to drop your proposal and to hand in
another nearer to the Middelburg proposals? We must try to find a
middle way. If we are here to try to arrive at something, let us try
to get something that we can discuss. Shall we make a new proposal?

General SMUTS: If there is a final answer to our proposal, then we can
take into consideration the question of putting forward a new one.

Lord MILNER: I believe the fact that you have refused to entertain the
proposals from the British Government does not justify us to deal with
your proposal. No, let us say that your reply is contained therein.

General SMUTS: I understand the position as follows: The British
Government has rejected our proposals, and at the same they point to
the old basis but without precluding us from making new proposals.

Lord MILNER: The entire difference between you and me is that I read
the letter of March 7th, 1901, as being the extreme concession that
the British Government could make, not so much to bind us to every
clause and sentence of the proposals contained therein, but as an
indication of how far they were prepared generally to go. Your reply
now is no reply.

Lord KITCHENER read out his telegram, dated "April 14th, 1902: A
difficulty has arisen in getting on with the proceedings. The
representatives state that constitutionally they have no power to
discuss terms based on the surrender of independence, inasmuch as only
the burghers can agree to such a basis; therefore, if they were to
propose terms, it would put them in a false position with regard to
their people. If, however, His Majesty's Government could state the
terms that subsequent to relinquishment of independence, they would be
prepared to grant, the representatives, after asking for the necessary
explanations, without any expression of approval or disapproval, would
submit such conditions to their people." He continued: "You have
evidently not adhered to what you undertook in this telegram."

Chief Commandant DE WET: If it was the intention that we should give
an answer only to the basis given us in the British proposals, it
would not have been necessary for the people to come to Vereeniging.
But yet we have virtually come with something which in the proper
sense of the word is almost similar to the Middelburg proposals, and
which meets the British Government as far as possible.

General BOTHA: I do not see why we should so insist on our proposal.
If it is not to the satisfaction of Your Excellencies, if it is not
acceptable, give us a definite reply.

Lord MILNER: We want to have a reply to the proposal made by us.

General SMUTS: I do not understand that a proposal was made by the
British Government. A certain basis only was laid down, and no formal
answer is therefore necessary.

Lord MILNER: Our proposals are six times as definite as yours, and I
am of opinion that the British Government are entitled to know whether
your people are inclined to come to terms on the general lines of
their proposals.

Lord KITCHENER: This is an entirely new proposal. How would it be if
you went back to the people and asked them whether they would not
accept our proposals?

General SMUTS: You must understand that the Middelburg proposals, with
all that took place here in April, was read out to the people. Their
reply was neither yes nor no, but the election of delegates. These
delegates have given no reply yet. They are still considering the
matter, and to save time they have delegated us to see whether we
could not come to an agreement.

Lord MILNER: We are deviating from the agreement. Tell us what
alterations you desire, and then lay our proposals before your people.

Lord KITCHENER: If you agree that your proposal is not in conflict
with the annexation, then we have done something.

General SMUTS: Is it your opinion that our proposal must be set aside?

Lord KITCHENER: Yes, certainly. It is impossible for us to act on it.

Lord MILNER: We cannot take your proposal into consideration. We can
send it to England, but it will certainly contribute to injure the
negotiations. This is my personal opinion, which, of course, you need
not accept. We can only say that this is all the reply that we can get
out of you.

Lord KITCHENER: It will be better to draft a new document in which we
note what is important and what not, and omit the unimportant.

General SMUTS: But Point 3 of our proposal has not even been touched
upon. We are prepared to give up a portion of our territory.

Lord MILNER: That would be inconsistent with the annexation of the
whole. If the whole is annexed by us, how can you part with a portion
of it?

General SMUTS: The portion we gave up would then become a crown
colony. The rest would be governed as proposed here.

Lord MILNER: You mean that one portion would become a British Colony
of the ordinary type, and the other portion a Protected Republic?

Lord KITCHENER: Two forms of government in the same country would
cause great friction. Our proposals are too divergent. From a military
point of view, the two forms of government could not exist. We would
be at war again in a year's time.

The meeting then adjourned until the afternoon.

During the adjournment the Republican Commission discussed the
situation and sent General Smuts to talk over a few matters with Lord
Kitchener and Lord Milner.


The Conference resumed at 4 o'clock.

Lord MILNER: In consequence of an informal conversation between
General Smuts and ourselves, Lord Kitchener and I have drafted a
document, which indicates the form in which we think the only
agreement which can be entered into must be worded. This is a draft
document which we think the Governments can subscribe to. Our idea is
that after it has been considered here, it can be submitted to the
burghers, and you can ask them: "Do you agree to our signing it?"

The document read as follows:

"The undersigned Leaders of the Burgher forces in the Field, accepting
on behalf of themselves and the said Burghers the Annexations notified
in Lord ROBERTS' Proclamations, dated respectively, the 24th day of
May in the year of our LORD 1900, and No. 15 dated the 1st day of
September in the year of our LORD 1900, and accepting as a result
thereof their position as British Citizens, agree forthwith to lay
down their arms, handing over all Guns, Rifles, and Munitions of war
in their possession or under their control, and to desist from any
further resistance to the Authority of His Majesty King Edward VII. or
his successors.

"They take this course on the faith of the Assurances of His Majesty's
Government that they and the Burghers surrendering with them will not
be deprived of their personal freedom or their property, and that the
future action of His Majesty's Government in dealing with the
results of the war will be in accordance with the declaration set
forth below.

"It is clearly understood that all Burghers, now Prisoners of war,
must, in order to participate in the benefits of the aforesaid
Assurances, signify their acceptance of the position as British
Citizens."

[Illustration: _Facsimile of a page of the Peace Proposals as
submitted by the British Representatives, and amended by the Boer
Representatives. The alterations are in the handwriting of Generals
Smuts and Hertzog._]

General BOTHA: Must we understand that our proposal has now been
entirely rejected?

Lord MILNER and Lord KITCHENER: Yes.

General BOTHA: Then I must understand that you are going to adhere to
the Middelburg proposals only?

Lord KITCHENER: No, we can alter them.

Lord MILNER: This draft document was originally drawn up to be
attached to the Middelburg proposals; but instead of the Middelburg
proposals, this document has now been substituted to enable us to cast
those proposals in another form.

General SMUTS: If, then, the idea is to alter the Middelburg
proposals, would it not be best to do so now and to attach them to
this document?

Lord MILNER: What takes the place of the Middelburg proposals must be
attached to this document as a schedule, and we must jointly work out
the schedule.

General SMUTS: I think it would be better if you alter the proposal
yourselves and then submit it to us for consideration, so that we can
consider what we shall do with it.

Lord KITCHENER: I am of opinion that a sub-committee out of yourselves
should be appointed to do that.

Lord MILNER: My idea is that the schedule can be drafted by two or
three of us, to be then considered by us as a whole.

General SMUTS: We would like to consider first whether we shall
assist.

Lord MILNER: I am willing to draft it with you or to let you draw it
up alone, but on the ground of my experience I do not wish to do it
alone.

General SMUTS: If we sign this document, would not the effect of it be
that we leaders would make ourselves responsible for the burghers
laying down their arms?

Lord MILNER: Yes, if the arms are not laid down, everything is a
failure.

Lord KITCHENER: I do not think so. If all do not lay down their arms,
the signatories cannot help it. There will always be some dissatisfied
ones.

General SMUTS: The document does not say so.

Lord KITCHENER: You can draft it differently.

General DE LA REY: Then there will be no peace, for a portion of the
burghers will remain to continue the war.

Lord MILNER: If the meeting of Representatives agrees to your signing
this document, then it certainly means that the burghers as a body
agree to it. And those who do not agree to it--I do not know what I
shall call them--"outlaws." We cannot suppose such a thing.

General BOTHA: That is why we want a peace that will be honourable for
both parties. And as I understand this document, we are now going
further; we are not only giving up our independence, but every burgher
is bound hand and foot. And where is, then, the honourable peace for
us? If we make peace we must do so as people who must live and die
here. We must not conclude a peace that is offensive to the feelings
of one party. I wish to do everything that is in my power to attain
that object, but it appears to me that this document demands too much,
because, if I understand aright, we must give up the independence,
everyone must lay down his arms, and the leaders must, in addition,
sign a promise.

Lord MILNER: All that we want is that those persons must live together
in peace as British citizens. If we do not attain that, I do not know
what we shall get.

Lord KITCHENER: I believe that the Commandant General does not realise
what the schedule contains. We say therein what we shall give.
Perhaps it will be best if the schedule comes first, and then you will
see that an honourable peace is proposed.

General BOTHA: Set the document forth more fully.

Lord KITCHENER and Lord MILNER: You must help us. We do not know what
the burghers desire.

Chief Commandant DE WET: To sign this document will place us in the
position which the Commandant General has described in plain words.

General DE LA REY: We cannot form an opinion about a thing that has
not been worked out. I have no objection to the appointment of a
sub-committee from our midst to assist.

General BOTHA: I also have no objection, for I clearly understand that
no one is bound.

Lord KITCHENER: No, no one is bound.

General DE LA REY: We also wish to have the matter at an end, and to
know what we have before us.

Chief Commandant DE WET: I wish it to be plainly understood that I see
no chance to accept a body of which I have here only seen the head.
This appears to me to be an unsurmountable difficulty. Holding this
opinion, it would not be honest of me to remain silent; it would not
be honest to Your Excellencies.

Lord KITCHENER: I think it would be better that General de Wet first
saw the entire document before he gives his opinion.

It was then agreed that General Hertzog and General Smuts would act as
a sub-committee to make a complete draft with Lord Kitchener and Lord
Milner, advised by Sir Richard Solomon.

The meeting then adjourned.


WEDNESDAY, MAY 21, 1902.

The Conference was resumed.

Lord Milner submitted the document which had been drawn up during the
adjournment with the assistance of the sub-committee.

The names of the members of the two Republican Governments were now
filled in.

The document given hereunder was telegraphed to the British
Government, the last paragraph of Clause II, which deals with the
Government notes, the receipts and the sum of £3,000,000, having been
added during the Conference between all the representatives of both
parties on the terms drafted by the sub-committee. (See page 125.)

[Illustration: _Facsimile of a page of the Peace Proposals as
submitted by the British and amended by the Boer Representatives. The
alterations are in the handwriting of General Smuts and Mr. Advocate
N. J. de Wet._]

The document was read out in English and Dutch, and was as follows:--


  General Lord KITCHENER OF KHARTOUM,
                        _Commanding in Chief_,

and

  His Excellency Lord MILNER,
                     _High Commissioner_,
    on behalf of the BRITISH GOVERNMENT,

and

  Messrs. S. W. BURGER, F. W. REITZ, LOUIS BOTHA, J. H. DE LA REY,
                   L. J. MEYER, and J. C. KROGH,
    acting as the GOVERNMENT of the SOUTH AFRICAN REPUBLIC,

and

  Messrs. M. T. STEYN, W. J. C. BREBNER, C. R. DE WET, J. B. M.
                    HERTZOG, and C. OLIVIER,
    acting as the GOVERNMENT of the ORANGE FREE STATE,
    on behalf of their respective BURGHERS,

Desirous to terminate the present hostilities, agree on the following
articles:--

1. The BURGHER Forces in the Field will forthwith lay down their Arms,
handing over all Guns, Rifles, and Munitions of War in their
possession or under their control, and desist from any further
resistance to the Authority of His MAJESTY KING EDWARD VII., whom they
recognise as their lawful SOVEREIGN.

The manner and details of this surrender will be arranged between
Lord Kitchener and Commandant General Botha, Assistant Commandant-General
de la Rey, and Chief Commandant de Wet.

2. BURGHERS in the Field outside the limits of the TRANSVAAL or ORANGE
RIVER COLONY, on surrendering, will be brought back to their homes.

3. All Prisoners of War, at present outside of South Africa, who are
Burghers, will, on their declaring their acceptance of the position of
Subjects of His MAJESTY KING EDWARD VII., be brought back to the
places where they were domiciled before the War.

4. The BURGHERS so surrendering or returning will not be deprived of
their personal liberty or their property.

5. No Proceedings, CIVIL or CRIMINAL, will be taken against any of the
BURGHERS so surrendering or returning for any Acts in connection with
the prosecution of the War.

6. The DUTCH language will be taught in public schools in the
TRANSVAAL and the ORANGE RIVER COLONY where the Parents of the
Children desire it, and will be allowed in COURTS of LAW when
necessary for the better and more effectual Administration of Justice.

7. The Possession of RIFLES will be allowed in the TRANSVAAL and
ORANGE RIVER COLONY to persons requiring them for their Protection, on
taking out a licence according to Law.

8. MILITARY ADMINISTRATION in the TRANSVAAL and ORANGE RIVER COLONY
will at the earliest possible date be succeeded by CIVIL GOVERNMENT,
and, as soon as circumstances permit, Representative Institutions,
leading up to Self-Government, will be introduced.

9. The question of granting the Franchise to natives will not be
decided until after the Introduction of Self-Government.

10. No Special Tax will be imposed on Landed Property in the TRANSVAAL
and ORANGE RIVER COLONY to defray the Expenses of the War.

11. A JUDICIAL COMMISSION will be appointed to which Government Notes
issued under Law No. 1 of 1900 of the SOUTH AFRICAN REPUBLIC may be
presented within six months.

All such notes as are found to have been duly issued in the terms of
that law, and for which the persons presenting them have given
valuable consideration, will be paid, but without interest.

All receipts given by the Officers in the Field of the late Republics,
or under their orders, may likewise be presented to the said
Commission within six months, and if found to have been given _bona
fide_ for goods used by the Burgher Forces in the Field, will be paid
out to the persons to whom they were originally given. The sum payable
in respect of the said Government Notes and Receipts shall not exceed
£3,000,000 sterling, and if the total amount of such Notes and
Receipts approved by the Commission is more than that sum, there shall
be a _pro rata_ diminution. Facilities will be afforded the Prisoners
of War to present their Government Notes and Receipts within the six
months aforesaid.

12. As soon as conditions permit, a Commission, on which the local
inhabitants will be represented, will be appointed in each district of
the TRANSVAAL and ORANGE RIVER COLONY, under the Presidency of a
Magistrate or other Official, for the purpose of assisting the
restoration of the people to their homes, and supplying those who,
owing to war losses, are unable to provide for themselves with food,
shelter, and the necessary amount of seed, stock, implements, &c.,
indispensable to the resumption of their normal occupations. Funds for
this purpose will be advanced by Government free of interest and
repayable over a period of years.


Lord MILNER: If we agree, it is the English document that will be
telegraphed to England, and it is that document upon which His
Majesty's Government will decide and which will be signed.

General BOTHA: Will a Dutch translation not be attached to it?

Lord MILNER: I have no objection that a Dutch translation be
annexed. Well, that is the document that we are prepared to submit to
the British Government.

General BOTHA: There are a few points I wish to talk about. The first
is with reference to receipts given by our officers. I would like to
have them added to the paragraph referring to the Government notes.
These receipts were given on instructions issued by our Government for
the purchase of cattle or grain or necessaries, for the support of our
commandos, and the chief officers now here, as well as all other
officers, have acted in accordance with these instructions and issued
receipts. For this reason, I make this request. Some of these receipts
were discharged in full, and others in part, in Government notes, but
many were not paid at all. I do not think that the amount is large,
but it will strengthen our hands by enabling us honourably to
terminate this matter, because our honour is in so far concerned that
we have signed these receipts. It will be a great point for us if we
can meet the delegates, most of whom are officers, and inform them
that they have been protected in this matter.

Lord KITCHENER: I understand that General Botha does not refer to
commandeer, or requisition notes, but only to actual receipts given on
the Treasury.

Lord MILNER: I do not see the difference between these receipts and
commandeer notes. The willingness of people to sell goods does not in
my opinion make any difference in a legal document.

Lord KITCHENER: I think that it does make a difference if it is an
order on the Treasury or a requisition note. I should limit this to
receipts on the Treasury, issued in accordance with the law, which
allowed that a certain sum could be spent.

Chief Commandant DE WET: In the Free State no resolution was taken
fixing the amount that could be spent.

Lord KITCHENER: Do you mean that this is an undefined amount, or that
it falls under the amount fixed by the Volksraad?

General SMUTS: The Volksraad authorised the Government to issue notes
to a certain amount, which was done. Apart from this law, the officers
in the field had the right to make purchases on behalf of the
commandos and to grant receipts therefor.

Lord MILNER: I see no difference between these receipts and
requisition notes, and, besides, it is for an unlimited amount.

General SMUTS: These receipts were issued under an entirely different
law. They were not paid out of the credit voted by the Volksraad.

Chief Commandant DE WET: I wish it to be plainly understood that I
fully agree with what has been said by the Commandant General, that
the honour of every officer is affected by these documents. And if
Your Excellencies agree, you give us a powerful weapon with which we
can return to the Delegates.

Lord MILNER: The proposal is, in fact, that the British Government
must pay all the money borrowed by the Republics to fight them.

Chief Commandant DE WET: But we were an honourable party in the fight,
and if we cease to be a party, it is only reasonable that we are met
on this matter.

General BOTHA: Must I understand from your attitude that we must hand
over everything, and that you must walk off with the assets of our
country, which amount to millions and millions, and take no
responsibility on yourselves for the debts? We are acknowledged by you
as a belligerent party, and, therefore, we have the more right to
expect that if you walk off with the assets of the country, you must
also take upon yourselves the responsibility for the debts; if the
British Government attains its great object, then a minor matter like
this ought not to stand in the way. We do not come here to haggle at
little things, but to contend for something that is an actual
difficulty, and you must agree that if we tell you something here, we
really mean it. And if we wish to make peace, every one must not draw
his own line, but we must take each other by the hand. Now we say that
this matter stands in our way. We personally have not signed so many
receipts, but the inferior officers who have signed the most mainly
constitute the meeting at Vereeniging. In some cases special persons
were appointed entrusted with this work.

Lord MILNER: We do not take over the assets of the country without its
liabilities. We take over all the debts which the country had before
the war, and we have even agreed to take over a debt--a lawful
debt--in the shape of notes, the contracting of which we are aware was
necessary only on account of the war, and therefore we already pay a
share of the expenses incurred to fight us. I thought that this was a
very great concession, and when I agreed to put it down, I said that I
thought, and I still think so, that the British Government would take
exception to it, although I hope that they will not do so. But to go
further than that and to ask that we shall pay not only a debt
incurred for the purposes of the war, but every debt incurred by every
officer of both armies for the purpose of fighting us, is in my
opinion a very extreme proposal. In reply to what General Botha has
said, I must say that the Commission appear to think that we have no
one behind us whose feelings and prejudices (if you wish it) we must
consider. If this will cause you difficulty with your burghers, the
proposal now made will, I am sure, cause the British Government the
greatest difficulties with the people whose feelings they must
consider.

Chief Commandant DE WET: I would like to explain the position of the
Orange Free State. In the Transvaal a law was passed authorising the
Government to issue £1,000,000 in notes. In the Orange Free State this
was not done, because the Government had the right to pay with
receipts, and we thought that a receipt was as good and lawful as the
notes. And therefore these matters have the same importance for me.

General BOTHA: I don't think that we should be so technical,
especially not in your case, because our being together here is with
the object of causing hostilities which involve great expenditure of
money every month, to cease, and our meeting can have the result of
speedily putting an end to these costs. And therefore, by accepting
our proposal and paying the receipts, you will greatly reduce your
expenses. It will be much cheaper to terminate the war by co-operation
than to let the negotiations be broken off; and therefore I think that
we must accede to points which stand in the way.

Chief Commandant DE WET: I can give His Excellency Lord Milner the
assurance that the idea always lived with the people that, even if
everything was lost, they would still, after the war, receive the
money in payment of the receipts. And therefore if this is not
conceded I cannot conceive what the result will be. I fear that
result, and hope that you will try to obviate it.

General BOTHA: It cannot be a particularly large amount; but we do not
know how much it is.

Chief Commandant DE WET: You can well imagine that our expenditure was
as a drop in a bucket compared with yours. And if I am not mistaken,
the Orange Free State had three-quarters of a million pounds when we
commenced the war; and the expenditure by means of receipts began
after that amount was exhausted. Your Excellencies must therefore
admit that these receipts impose upon us the same obligation towards
creditors as any other debt would have done.

General BOTHA: You have already many of our notes in your possession.
In one place, for instance, 50,000 were hidden and found by you.

General SMUTS: I have already privately used the argument with Lord
Milner that what we are now contending for has in principle already
been conceded by Lord Kitchener. In the Middelburg proposals the
payment of the Government notes was refused, but it was laid down that
receipts to the value of £1,000,000 would be paid out, and if this
should now be withdrawn it would certainly be a deviation from the
Middelburg proposals. The payment of notes is something lawful, and
stands on another footing; and I cannot understand how the payment
thereof could have been refused in the Middelburg proposals, and
therefore an agreement to pay them now is reasonable. But with
reference to receipts, the payment of them was partially acceded to,
and now it is withdrawn. I think that when we have arrived at such a
stage in the negotiations as we have now, then a point such as this,
which was as good as agreed upon, must no longer be a stumbling-block
to a final agreement. I believe that this amount is small. I was with
General de la Rey for one year in command of the half of the South
African Republic. Accounts were kept of all receipts, and where the
books are no longer in our possession they are in your possession. The
issue of these receipts took place in proper order and under proper
regulations, and books thereof were kept. As far as I have been able
to go into the matter the amount of receipts is really small. And
although Lord Milner recoils from the payment of an enormous amount
which may be presented for payment if our proposal be accepted, yet I
personally think that the fear is vain, and that the amount will prove
to be much less than you probably think.

Lord MILNER: I do not think it is so much a question of the amount.
This payment of Government notes and requisition notes is, in my
opinion, very reprehensible. I believe that in this respect I feel
what the great majority of the British people feels, that it would
rather expend a large sum after the war to improve the condition of
the people that has fought against them, than pay a smaller amount
towards the expenses incurred in fighting them. Whether this be right
or wrong, it is a strong feeling with which you must reckon. We do not
wish to pay the accounts of both parties, and the clause in the
Middelburg proposals with reference thereto was, in my opinion, always
one of the bad ones in that document. If something of this kind must
be done, then I think that the payment of the Government notes is not
so bad as the payment of the requisition notes. I put the point with
reference to the payment of notes in this draft proposal, because I
thought that if a choice had to be made between the payment of the
one or the other, you would consider it better that the Government
notes were paid. If it is considered better to go back to the
Middelburg proposals on this point, then, however much I object to it,
I would agree, if Lord Kitchener agrees.

General SMUTS: I fear that we cannot agree to that, because we
consider the Government notes indisputable.

General HERTZOG: I do not think that Your Excellency represents the
matter fairly when you say, for instance, that you do not wish to pay
the accounts of both parties. There is one matter with reference to
the Orange Free State which we must specially note. We have contracted
no loans and we have issued no Government notes. The notes we used
were South African Republic notes, of which some were sent to the
Orange Free State also. Our (Orange Free State) law is based on the
principle that in case of war, all cost could be met by commandeering
notes. This was acted on in the Orange Free State, and receipts in the
usual form or in the shape of requisition notes were given. If we take
this into consideration, and at the same time also the fact that we
have always acted, and still act, as a party which is a lawful
belligerent party, then we come and only say: from our side we give
all that we possess, and ask the other party to acknowledge only that
which if we had concluded a loan would in any case, in the shape of a
public loan, have fallen on the British Government, which takes over
everything from us. Lord Milner will thus understand that from our
point of view it is of as much importance for us to obtain payment of
these receipts as it will be for the South African Republic to obtain
the taking over by the British Government of the liability of a loan
concluded before the war. But I can even go further and give Lord
Milner the assurance that if we had also concluded a loan before the
war, we could never have acted so economically as we have done by
using receipts. That was also actually the reason why the Orange Free
State never wished to conclude a loan beforehand, because now we have
purchased only what was absolutely necessary for the day and for the
circumstances. So that really Lord Milner will have to admit that we
stand in the same position in respect to those who now hold receipts
as we would have stood to any other creditor that we may have had
before the war. I have already informally pointed this out to Lord
Milner, and can now only express my agreement with what the Commandant
General has said that this difficulty is almost insurmountable.

Lord MILNER: We can refer this to our Government; but your proposal is
entirely in conflict with the Middelburg proposals, because in them it
was absolutely refused to take over all State debts.

Lord KITCHENER: I wish that we could know the amount.

General DE LA REY: I issued Government notes to the value of between
£20,000 and £40,000; but to what amount receipts were issued I cannot
say.

Lord MILNER: There is really a compromise possible, namely, to allow
these notes and receipts to be presented, and to introduce again the
limit of £1,000,000.

Lord KITCHENER: Would that meet your difficulty?

General BOTHA: No.

Lord KITCHENER: Would £2,000,000 or £3,000,000 meet you? We want to
have a limit, so as to know what to do.

Chief Commandant DE WET: It is impossible to fix an amount.

Lord KITCHENER: If you could fix a limit it would clear up the matter.

Chief Commandant DE WET: With that I fully agree. I appreciate your
standpoint, but it is an absolute impossibility to name the amount.
Let us withdraw for a moment to discuss this point.


The meeting then adjourned and met again at 2.30 o'clock.


Chief Commandant DE WET: We have agreed to fix an amount of £3,000,000
for Government notes and receipts, which can be reduced _pro rata_ if
this amount is not sufficient. We have drafted a clause to submit to
you.

General Smuts read the draft, which is embodied in the last paragraph
of Clause 11 of the draft agreement. (See p. 117.)

In reply to Lord Kitchener:

Chief Commandant DE WET said: The prisoners-of-war on the various
islands who hold such notes ought also to have the opportunity for
presenting them.

Lord MILNER: What is your next point? We now understand what your
views are on this matter.

General BOTHA: Must I understand that we pass from this point?

Lord MILNER: That document contains your views which we now know.

General BOTHA: We must know what we must say to our delegates.

Lord KITCHENER: Is that the only point or will other points be raised?

General BOTHA: There is another point with reference to the protection
of debtors. This is a serious, a vital question for us.

Lord MILNER: There must be a good understanding between us.... Let
everything be embodied in one document.

General SMUTS: Most of the debts incurred before the war will be
payable at the conclusion of the war. And, if the debtors cannot pay,
we are afraid it will be ruination for a large proportion of the
population. And we would like to see that steps are taken to prevent
this. If Lord Milner intends to take such steps we should like to be
informed what they are.

Lord MILNER: I think it would be better if you made a proposal on this
point.

General SMUTS: Our proposal generally would be: that all interest
which became payable during the war be added to the principal sum, and
that the payment of the principal be put off until twelve months after
the conclusion of the war.

Lord KITCHENER: Is it necessary to have this as a proposal?

General SMUTS: If the Government is prepared to meet this difficulty
it is unnecessary to make a formal clause of it in the draft
agreement.

Lord MILNER: According to my view our Government makes certain
promises in this document, and I am of opinion that all promises to
which reference will later on be made must be embodied herein. Any
matter on which it is desired to bind the Government must be in this
document and not outside it. I will not say that I want further
clauses, but above all I wish to prevent misunderstanding.

General SMUTS: In that case we are prepared to propose a clause to
meet this difficulty.

General BOTHA: We raise this point so that early measures may be taken
if we come to an understanding. If a great portion of the population
become subjects of His Majesty, it is to the interest of everyone,
especially of the Government, to see that these people are not ruined.
They will be thrown on the Government, who will have to care for them.
If we do not take any steps now then speculators who have bought up
debts will demand payment immediately after peace is concluded; and as
soon as the courts of law are open they can sue the debtors, and we
want to guard against that.

Lord MILNER: I agree with the Commandant General that this is the view
which I take of the matter, and that as soon as these people become
subjects of His Majesty they must be cared for. But I think it is
neither necessary nor advisable to lay down in all particulars the way
in which His Majesty's Government must care for these people. I think
that there is perhaps an idea--perhaps a natural idea--that because we
have fought the burghers therefore when peace is concluded there will
be a feeling of enmity towards them. The contrary, however, is the
truth. From the moment hostilities cease our desire would naturally be
to try to gain the confidence of the burghers, and to attend to the
interests of the people. But if we must bind ourselves beforehand with
reference to the manner with which we shall deal with all sorts of
complicated legal questions, this will certainly lead to
misunderstanding. Naturally if a certain amount of confidence is not
reposed in us, that we shall try to be a just government, and try to
keep the balance even between the various classes of His Majesty's
subjects, then all I can say is this: Put in writing all that you can
possibly think of, and let us submit it to His Majesty's Government
and see what they think of it.

Chief Commandant DE WET: I hope it will not be presumed that we sit
here to bind the hands of His Majesty's Government. Sufficient other
points will continually crop up by means of which the Government can
gain the confidence of the population. But with reference to the
financial condition of the burghers who have been entirely ruined, we
feel ourselves obliged to make some arrangement which will be a weapon
in our hand when we return to the delegates.

General BOTHA: I do not quite understand Lord Milner. I did not
understand from Chamberlain's telegram that we should make new
proposals to bind your hands. I understood that proposals should be
made with the object and the wish to secure peace.

Lord KITCHENER: I do not think it quite necessary to embody this
proposal in the document. It concerns a very complicated legal
question, as to what the rights of creditors and debtors will be, and
what the law in the Transvaal precisely is on this subject. I think
that everyone may feel assured that the interests of the Boers will be
protected equally well by the Government in every possible way,
whether this point is actually stipulated or whether it is left over
to the Government with the recommendation of this Commission to take
the matter into serious consideration. I think that my suggestion is a
better way of dealing with such a complicated question. Let the
attention of the Government rather be drawn to it. I may be wrong, but
as far as I know this will be an intricate question for lawyers, and
it would take a long time to state it clearly. It is the desire of us
all that you should go to the meeting of your delegates so equipped
that you will be able to come to a decision; and I would therefore
suggest that you be satisfied that the matter has been brought before
us, and entered on the minutes of the meeting. That is, I believe, as
far as it is necessary for you to go. The matter can then be taken
into serious consideration, not only here, but also in England. And
you can be perfectly assured that your interests will be considered in
every possible way.

General DE LA REY: I think that the matter has been sufficiently
brought to the notice of Your Excellencies, and that it need not be
embodied in the draft contract, because by doing so one might possibly
be infringing on legal principles.

Chief Commandant DE WET: I proceed from this standpoint: There are two
parties, and the one ceases entirely to exist, and it is thus natural
that that party cannot allow such a vital question to pass by
unobserved. And therefore I cannot approve of it that the matter be
not inserted in the draft contract. It will not be necessary to bind
the Military Government that exists at present and will continue to
exist after the war.

Lord KITCHENER: But this question will have to be dealt with by the
civil Government. It is a matter for lawyers, and will have to be
submitted to them and demand much consideration.

General BOTHA: If hostilities are terminated now a burgher can be sued
for debt incurred before the war. I prefer this request, because our
law lays down that no burgher can be sued until sixty days after the
conclusion of peace.

Lord KITCHENER: You may rest fully assured that when the war is over
every burgher will have the absolute right to have his position taken
into consideration on all points, and that his interests will be
protected by the Government just as much, I believe, under the new as
under the old _régime_.

General BOTHA: I understand that quite well; but the possibility
exists that syndicates may be formed to buy up all debts, and the
people be ruined before a single burgher is in a position to earn
something or to establish his position.

Lord KITCHENER: I quite agree with the Commandant General, and he does
right to raise this question. But I do not believe that the draft
contract is the place in which to bring the question forward. When
there is peace, it is the duty of everyone to draw the attention of
the Government to what is necessary to help the people. But to imagine
difficulties now, and to try to put them right, appears to me to be an
endless matter, for which this document is not intended.

Chief Commandant DE WET: I understand that this is something that must
be settled by a proclamation, but I want to have as many weapons as
possible in my hand when I go back to the Delegates; and one of the
first questions which they will put is: "What guarantees have we that
we shall not be ruined by our creditors?" And what objection is there
that a draft proclamation be given to us to take to Vereeniging, which
will be promulgated as soon as peace is concluded?

Lord KITCHENER: But this will be something apart from this agreement.

Chief Commandant DE WET: Yes.

Lord MILNER: What is the good of it then?

Chief Commandant DE WET: It is such a vital question for us that it
cannot be taken amiss in us if we insist upon it, because we must give
up everything.

Lord KITCHENER: Of course no one takes it amiss in you.

Lord MILNER: But I must point out without taking it amiss in anyone
that the effect of what you propose would be that another clause would
have to be embodied in the draft contract undertaking to promulgate
such a proclamation.

Lord KITCHENER: I believe that if the Delegates received the assurance
that the Government will take this matter into consideration in the
interests of their subjects, whom they must protect, that this will be
sufficient for them. There will be no written obligation, but only an
obligation that the matter will be considered. It is not advisable to
press this matter with the Government, after it has been brought
before them. The opinions of the burghers will be brought before Lord
Milner in other ways also.

Chief Commandant DE WET: There are many other small points which we
could take up, which it would, however, not be desirable to do, but we
are now speaking of a vital question.

Lord KITCHENER: This is one of those questions which, if brought to
the attention of the Government, cannot be set aside. And you may
inform the burghers that their interests will be protected as much as
possible. I think that this ought to be sufficient for you on such a
complicated matter. What is spoken here is being taken down, and the
minutes will be considered not only here, but also in England. Are you
satisfied with that?

General BOTHA: As far as I am personally concerned, yes.

Chief Commandant DE WET: So am I.

Lord MILNER: I hope it is understood that if the matter is left here,
there is no obligation on my Government to deal with the matter in a
particular way.

Lord KITCHENER: But there is a pledge that the matter will be properly
considered.

Lord MILNER: Yes, of course, if we are going to put an understanding
on record. Solemnly I think it is necessary that we understand that
this document contains everything concerning which there is anything
in the form of a "pledge."

Lord KITCHENER: There is thus a "pledge" that this point which you
have raised will be considered in your interest.

General SMUTS: Now the question with reference to the payment of
receipts still remains.

Lord KITCHENER: That will be referred to the British Government. As
regards the amount, that is an essential point, but I am of opinion
that the amount is high. I would like to know whether it is understood
now that we are agreed on all these draft proposals with your
amendment? And that there are not any other matters? Because they
will have to be telegraphed to England.

Chief Commandant DE WET: We have no other matters.

Lord MILNER: The proposed telegram which I wish to transmit reads as
follows: "The Commission is prepared to submit the following document
to the meeting of representatives of their Burghers (if it is approved
of by His Majesty's Government), and to ask that meeting for a 'yes'
or 'no' vote." Is that good?

Chief Commandant DE WET: Yes, naturally, except that I cannot say that
that document is approved of by me; but I will abide by what the
Delegates do.

General HERTZOG: I would not like it to be understood that we will use
our influence with the Delegates.

Lord MILNER: I think that that is quite understood. I do not
understand that this binds the members of the Commission with
reference to the opinion which they may express before the Burghers.
It only binds them to lay this document before the people, if the
British Government approves of it. The telegram which I have just
read, and propose to send, makes this clear. I further wish to say
that we have departed very much from the Middelburg proposals, and I
believe it is fully understood that the Middelburg proposals are
absolutely dead, and if this document is agreed to and signed, there
can then be no attempt to explain this document or the terms thereof
by anything in the Middelburg proposals.

The meeting then adjourned.


WEDNESDAY, MAY 28, 1902.

The Commission again met Lord Milner and Lord Kitchener at 11 a.m. to
hear the reply of the British Government to the draft proposal
submitted to them by their Lordships.

Lord Milner read the following Memorandum: "In reply to our last
telegram drafted at our last meeting with the consent of the
Commission, and of which they have received a copy, the following
message has been received from His Majesty's Government: 'His
Majesty's Government approves of submitting to the Meeting for a "yes"
or "no" vote the document drafted by the Committee, and transmitted to
the Secretary of State for War by Lord Kitchener on May 21, with the
following alterations[4]:

         [Footnote 4: Compare the first document, page 116, with what
         follows here.]

  General Lord KITCHENER OF KHARTOUM,
                       _Commanding-in-Chief_,

and

  His Excellency Lord MILNER,
                        _High Commissioner_,
      on behalf of the BRITISH GOVERNMENT,

and

  Messrs. S. W. BURGER, F. W. REITZ, Louis BOTHA, J. H. DE LA REY,
              L. J. MEYER, and J. C. KROGH,
    acting as the GOVERNMENT of the SOUTH AFRICAN REPUBLIC,

and

  Messrs. M. T. STEYN, W. J. C. BREBNER, C. R. DE WET, J. B. M.
                 HERTZOG, and C. OLIVIER,
    acting as the GOVERNMENT of the ORANGE FREE STATE
    on behalf of their respective BURGHERS,

desirous to terminate the present hostilities, agree on the following
Articles:--

1. The BURGHER Forces in the Field will forthwith lay down their Arms,
handing over all Guns, Rifles, and Munitions of War, in their
possession or under their control, and desist from any further
resistance to the Authority of HIS MAJESTY KING EDWARD VII., whom they
recognise as their lawful SOVEREIGN.

The manner and details of this Surrender will be arranged between Lord
Kitchener and Commandant-General Botha, Assistant Commandant-General
de la Rey, and Chief Commandant de Wet.

2. Burghers in the Field outside the limits of the TRANSVAAL and
ORANGE RIVER COLONY, and all Prisoners of War at present outside South
Africa, who are Burghers, will, on duly declaring their acceptance of
the position of subjects of HIS MAJESTY KING EDWARD VII. be gradually
brought back to their homes as soon as transport can be provided and
their means of subsistence ensured.

3. The BURGHERS so surrendering or so returning will not be deprived
of their personal liberty or their property.

4. No Proceedings, CIVIL or CRIMINAL, will be taken against any of the
BURGHERS so surrendering or so returning for any Acts in connection
with the prosecution of the War. The benefit of the Clause will not
extend to certain Acts contrary to the usages of War which have been
notified by the Commander-in-Chief to the Boer Generals, and which
shall be tried by Court Martial immediately after the close of
hostilities.

5. The DUTCH language will be taught in Public Schools in the
TRANSVAAL and the ORANGE RIVER COLONY, where the Parents of the
Children desire it, and will be allowed in COURTS of LAW when
necessary for the better and more effectual Administration of Justice.

6. The Possession of Rifles will be allowed in the TRANSVAAL and
ORANGE RIVER COLONY to persons requiring them for their protection, on
taking out a licence according to Law.

7. MILITARY ADMINISTRATION in the TRANSVAAL and ORANGE RIVER COLONY
will at the earliest possible date be succeeded by CIVIL GOVERNMENT,
and, as soon as circumstances permit, Representative Institutions,
leading up to Self-Government, will be introduced.

8. The question of granting the Franchise to natives will not be
decided until after the introduction of Self-Government.

9. No Special Tax will be imposed on landed Property in the TRANSVAAL
and ORANGE RIVER COLONY to defray the Expenses of War.

10. As soon as conditions permit, a Commission, on which the local
inhabitants will be represented, will be appointed in each District of
the TRANSVAAL and ORANGE RIVER COLONY, under the Presidency of a
Magistrate or other official, for the purpose of assisting the
restoration of the people to their homes and supplying those who,
owing to war losses, are unable to provide for themselves, with food,
shelter, and the necessary amount of seed, stock, implements, &c.,
indispensable to the resumption of their normal occupations.

His Majesty's Government will place at the disposal of these
Commissions a sum of three million pounds sterling for the above
purposes, and will allow all notes, issued under Law No. 1 of 1900 of
the GOVERNMENT of the SOUTH AFRICAN REPUBLIC, and all receipts, given
by the officers in the field of the late Republics or under their
orders, to be presented to a JUDICIAL COMMISSION, which will be
appointed by the Government, and if such notes and receipts are found
by this Commission to have been duly issued in return for valuable
consideration, they will be received by the first-named Commissions as
evidence of War losses suffered by the persons to whom they were
originally given. In addition to the above-named free grant of three
million pounds, His Majesty's Government will be prepared to make
advances as loans for the same purposes, free of interest for two
years, and afterwards repayable over a period of years with 3 per
cent. interest. No foreigner or rebel will be entitled to the benefit
of this Clause."


Lord MILNER: In submitting this communication to the Commission, we
are instructed to add that if this opportunity of concluding an
honourable peace is not availed of within a time to be fixed by us,
the Conference will be considered at an end, and that His Majesty's
Government will not in any way be bound by the present terms. In order
that there may be no misunderstanding with reference to these terms, I
have made a copy of the document and of Lord Kitchener's telegram,
with the additions and alterations made by His Majesty's Government
with a memorandum of what I have now said.

A discussion followed over the time that would be required to consider
the matter at Vereeniging, and it was agreed that General Botha would
propose a time-limit before the Committee left Pretoria that day.

This was done later on, and the time was fixed for Saturday evening,
May 31, 1902, at the latest.

General Botha asked whether there would be any objection to the
Delegates deleting some clause or other from the proposal now
submitted by the British Government?

Lord MILNER: There can be no alteration. There must simply be a reply
of "yes" or "no."

General Botha thought that they had the right to alter one or more of
the clauses, because the burghers in the field had the right to
surrender unconditionally.

Lord Milner said that the burghers could naturally do so. But the
document from the British Government could not be altered.


THE COLONIAL REBELS.

Privately, much discussion had already taken place in the interests of
the Colonials who had fought on the Republican side, and an informal
conversation now followed on this subject.

Lord Milner communicated what the British Government intended to do
with these Colonists, which intention appears from the following
document which he read:--

"HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT must place it on record that the treatment
of CAPE and NATAL Colonials who have been in Rebellion, and who now
surrender, will, if they return to their Colonies, be determined by
the Colonial Governments and in accordance with the Laws of the
Colonies, and that any BRITISH Subjects who have joined the Enemy will
be liable to trial under the Law of that part of the BRITISH EMPIRE to
which they belong.

"HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT are informed by the Cape Government that the
following are their views as to the terms which should be granted to
BRITISH Subjects of the Cape Colony who are now in the Field or who
have surrendered or have been captured since April 12, 1901. With
regard to Rank and File, that they should all upon surrender after
giving up their Arms sign a document before the Resident Magistrate of
the District in which surrender takes place acknowledging themselves
guilty of High Treason, and that the Punishment to be awarded to them,
provided they shall not have been guilty of Murder or other acts
contrary to the usages of Civilised Warfare, should be that they shall
not be entitled for life to be registered as Voters or to vote at any
Parliamentary, Divisional Council, or Municipal Election.

"With reference to Justices of the Peace, and Field Cornets of the
Cape Colony and all other persons holding an Official Position under
the Government of the Cape Colony, or who may occupy the Position of
Commandant of Rebel or Burgher Forces, they should be tried for High
Treason before the ordinary Court of the Country or such special
Courts as may be hereafter constituted by Law, the Punishments for
their Offence to be left to the discretion of the Court, with this
proviso, that in no case shall the penalty of Death be inflicted.

"The NATAL Government are of opinion that Rebels should be dealt with
according to the Law of the Colony."

The Conference then broke up. The secretaries, assisted by Advocates
N. J. de Wet and Igns. S. Ferreira immediately commenced with the task
of making copies and translations of the proposals of the British
Government for the use of the Meeting of the Delegates at Vereeniging.
This work occupied them till the evening.

At 9 o'clock p.m. the Commission left for Vereeniging by special
train.




CHAPTER VI.

VEREENIGING AND PEACE.


  MINUTES

  _of the meeting of the Special Delegates at Vereeniging,
  South African Republic, on Thursday, May 29, 1902,
  and following days_.

The Meeting commenced at 9 a.m., and, at the request of the Chairman,
was opened with Prayer by the Rev. J. D. Kestell.

Having declared the Meeting open, the Chairman requested the
Commission, which had been delegated to negotiate with Lord Kitchener
and Lord Milner, to report on what they had done.

The acting State President S. W. Burger, on rising to do so, first
requested the Secretary of the Meeting (Mr. D. E. van Velden) to read
the following report of the COMMISSION:--


                                             _Pretoria, May 28, 1902._

     _To the Governments of the Orange Free State and South African
                              Republic._

GENTLEMEN,

In accordance with the instructions received by us from the two
Governments, we proceeded to Pretoria to negotiate with the British
Representatives on the question of peace, and have the honour to
report as follows:--

Our meetings with the British Authorities lasted from Monday, May 19,
till Wednesday, May 28, and the delay was principally due to the long
time required for cable correspondence with the British Government.

At first we made a proposal[5] in which we tried to establish a
restricted independence by the surrender of a portion of our territory
as a basis of negotiation. Lord Kitchener and Lord Milner, however,
decidedly refused to negotiate on that basis, and informed us that if
that proposal were cabled to the British Government, it would be
detrimental to the negotiations.

         [Footnote 5: See p. 98.]

At the same time we were informed that, as had already been intimated
to both Governments, the British Government were prepared to negotiate
only on the basis of the Middelburg proposals, subject to alterations
as to details.

In order to prepare this proposal in a final form, Lord Milner
requested the assistance of some members of our Committee, to which we
acceded, with the understanding that the assistance of these members
of the Commission would be rendered without prejudice.

As the result of the labours of this Sub-Committee, Lord Milner
submitted a draft proposal, in which we insisted in the incorporation
of a new clause, which was embodied therein (Clause No. 11). The draft
proposal which is attached to this[6] was then cabled to the British
Government, and was altered by them and communicated to us in a final
form. This final proposal is attached hereto.[7]

         [Footnote 6: See p. 116.]

         [Footnote 7: See p. 133.]

We were informed on behalf of the British Government that this
proposal could not be further altered, but must be accepted or
rejected in its entirety by the Delegates of both Republics. At the
same time, we were informed that this acceptance or rejection must
take place within a definite time.

We thereupon informed Lord Kitchener that this final decision would be
communicated to him by next Saturday evening at the latest.

During the formal negotiations some informal discussions also took
place with reference to the British subjects in the Cape Colony and
Natal who had fought on our side. As the result of these informal
discussions, we received a communication from the British Government
which we attach hereto.[8]

         [Footnote 8: See p. 136.]

  We have, &c.,

  (Signed)

  LOUIS BOTHA,
  C. R. DE WET,
  J. H. DE LA REY,
  J. B. M. HERTZOG,
  J. C. SMUTS.


Acting President S. W. BURGER said: If some point or other in the
documents that have just been read to you is not clear, one or other
of the members of the Commission will give the necessary explanations.
You will observe that the Commission tried to negotiate more or less
in the spirit of this meeting. The Representatives of the British
Government declared that they could not negotiate on any other basis
than the surrender of the independence. We have now before us a
document upon which the British Government thinks peace can be
concluded. The question before us now is: how must we set to work? I
think there are three courses open to us upon which we must decide
before Saturday evening. The three courses are:--

(1) To continue the struggle. Is this possible for us under the
circumstances in which we find ourselves; what are the prospects; and
what will the consequences be? This we must consider.

(2) Accept the proposal of the British Government and conclude peace
thereon.

(3) Surrender unconditionally.

On these questions the Meeting must now decide.

On the proposal of General S. P. du Toit, seconded by Commandant
Mentz, it was resolved that minutes of the discussions be kept as
briefly as possible, and also that all proposals and resolutions be
recorded.

Mr. J. DE CLERCQ (Middelburg): I would like to have some elucidation
of Clause 2. Whom does it include?

General SMUTS: The words are: "in the veld." It is thus plain that
other persons are not included in it.

Mr. DE CLERCQ: What, then, becomes of persons who have been banished?

General SMUTS: Clause 3 provides for persons who, according to the
British, have been banished.

Commandant JACOBSZ: Clause 2 deals with "burghers." I should like to
know whether officers are also included.

General SMUTS: "Burghers" includes officers also. "Rebels" is the term
in contra-distinction to "burghers."

General S. P. DU TOIT: In clause 4, I read: "The benefit of this
clause will not extend to certain acts." May I know what acts are here
referred to?

General BOTHA: As communicated by Lord Kitchener to the Commission,
three persons are excluded from the benefit of Clause 4 of the peace
proposals. They are namely: Mr. van Aswegen for the shooting of
Captain Mears; Mr. Cilliers for the shooting of Capt. Boyle; and a
certain Muller for the alleged murder of a certain Rademeyer in the
district of Vrede. These three persons will have to stand their trial
on the conclusion of peace.

Chief Commandant DE WET: Lord Kitchener arranged this matter
informally with General Botha without reference to me, as I think he
should have done, because two of the cases mentioned are of Free
Staters. It is not down in black and white, that the three persons
mentioned will be the only exceptions, and if more exceptions are made
later I do not wish to be held responsible.

General BOTHA: I should like further to explain this matter. This
point in Clause 4 was raised by the British representatives. Lord
Kitchener asked to see me personally and informally, and at the
suggestion of General de la Rey I went to him. Lord Kitchener then
informed me that certain three alleged murders in the course of the
war had attracted much attention in England, and that the British
Government, on account of the feelings of the English people, did not
see their way open to leave these three cases untried. The three cases
already mentioned here were then communicated to me by Lord Kitchener.
On a later occasion I took General Smuts with me, and Lord Kitchener
repeated in the presence of both of us that only these three persons
would be excluded from the benefit of Clause 4.

General HERTZOG: I am quite prepared to accept Lord Kitchener's word
given to Generals Botha and Smuts.

General BRAND: Why are the names of these cases not inserted in the
peace proposal?

General HERTZOG: They could not be inserted because as laid down by
the British Government it could not be altered.

General DE LA REY: Only the three persons mentioned are excluded from
the benefit of Clause 4, and because we were afraid that there might
be more cases General Botha went and satisfied himself.

Chief Commandant DE WET: I did not wish to remain silent on this
point, because there was only the word of Lord Kitchener and no other
guarantee that other persons will not be prosecuted. I, of course,
entirely believe what Generals Botha and Smuts have stated.

General HERTZOG: I am fully satisfied on this point.

Mr. C. BIRKENSTOCK (Vryheid) asked with reference to Clause 1 whether
having regard to the large number of Kaffirs in many districts it
would not be dangerous for the burghers to part with all their arms.

General BOTHA replied that the Commission had seen Lord Kitchener
informally on this point, and pointed out this danger to him, and he
had then agreed that in the districts on the boundaries where there
were many Kaffirs, the landed proprietors and their sons could retain
their arms under a licence, and that if there was a laying down of
arms, he would send persons immediately to return the arms to these
landed proprietors under a licence.

General DE LA REY: On this point I spoke out freely to Lord Kitchener.
I said that I would never agree that burghers in the frontier
districts should be entirely disarmed, and thus made lower than the
Kaffirs. Lord Kitchener then said that he would take the arms from
landed proprietors with one hand and return them immediately with the
other.

Mr. BIRKENSTOCK: Clause 2 says: "The prisoners of war will gradually
be brought back to their homes." Has a time been fixed, or will it be
done in the course of years? I have heard that the British have an
objection to sending back 30,000 persons.

General SMUTS: The Committee tried to get a time fixed within which
all prisoners of war must be brought back, but the British had a great
objection to binding themselves, because it would depend upon the
number of transport ships they would be able to obtain to convey the
30,000 prisoners of war back, and also because it would not be
advisable on account of the scarcity of food in the two Republics to
bring back so many people at once.


The meeting then adjourned till two o'clock in the afternoon, when the
proceedings were resumed.


Mr. L. JACOBSZ: Does Clause 2 provide for the return of the deputation
and other persons in Europe?

General SMUTS: The members of our deputation and other burghers in
Europe, if they wish to return, also fall under this Clause.

Mr. BIRKENSTOCK: What property is referred to in Clause 3?

General SMUTS: The word "property" includes every form of property.

Commandant VAN NIEKERK (Kroonstad): What course will be pursued with
reference to the farms which have been sold?

Mr. J. L. GROBLER (Carolina): How many farms have been sold?

General SMUTS: Twenty farms, as stated unofficially.

Mr. J. L. GROBLER: Where?

General SMUTS: In the Orange Free State.

General HERTZOG: The Commission spoke informally to Lord Milner about
the farms which have already been sold or confiscated by the British.
He replied that they could not be returned to the former owners, but
that the purchase-price would be refunded to them. About twenty farms
had been thus sold, all situate in the Orange Free State.

Landdrost STOFBERG: Does Clause 5 signify that the medium of
instruction will be Dutch?

General SMUTS: There is nothing against it in this Clause. According
to this Clause the Dutch language will be taught, but it is not
stipulated that Dutch will be the medium of instruction. My own
impression is that the language in the schools will be English, but if
the parents desire it, Dutch.

Landdrost STOFBERG: It means therefore that the language medium will
be English, but that Dutch will also be allowed.

General HERTZOG: Lord Milner declared that he wanted only one language
in South Africa, and that was English. English will be the medium.

Landdrost STOFBERG: A foreign language therefore?

General DU TOIT: What will be the Constitution of the Civil
Government?

General BOTHA: It will be that of a Crown Colony.

General KEMP: Is no time fixed within which Civil Government must be
introduced?

General BOTHA: No.

General DU TOIT: In Clause 9 mention is made of war taxes. Will there
be no other taxes?

General BOTHA: The British Government says that they will not defray
their expenses out of a tax on the farms.

Commandant ALBERTS: No war tax--therefore there will be other taxes?

General SMUTS: Yes, certainly, but they will be imposed on all
inhabitants.

Mr. P. R. VILJOEN: If anyone has a Government note or receipt must he
prove how he obtained it?

General SMUTS: Clause 10 is directed against speculators who have
bought up notes.

Commandant JACOBSZ: What course will be pursued in cases where notes
have passed from hand to hand?

General BOTHA: The Clause is directed only against speculators.

Mr. BIRKENSTOCK: Do the words: "to assist those who are not able to
assist themselves," mean that widows, orphans and maimed will be
assisted?

General BOTHA: Yes.

Mr. BIRKENSTOCK: A pension, for instance?

General BOTHA: No pension.

Commandant FLEMMING: Was nothing said about receipts issued by the
British themselves?

General DE WET: Lord Kitchener said that they would not be paid out
till after the war, but not to speculators.

Commandant FLEMMING: There is therefore hope for British receipts?

General DE WET: Yes.

Mr. NAUDÉ: Is a man a burgher who became such after the commencement
of the war?

Advocate L. J. JACOBSZ: No one is a burgher who became such after the
war had begun.

Mr. BIRKENSTOCK asked a question with reference to creditors.

General BOTHA: In reply to Mr. Birkenstock I may say that we discussed
that question formally, but the British representatives would not bind
themselves with reference to the new Government's future policy, but
asked us to trust that new Government to protect debtors.

General DU TOIT: Does Natal hold another view regarding the rebels?

General DE WET: Yes.

General DU TOIT: If the rebels remain outside the boundaries of their
Colonies will they then be free?

General SMUTS: Yes, if they remain outside the Cape Colony and Natal.

Commandant OPPERMAN: Will their property be confiscated?

General SMUTS: In the Cape Colony there is no law providing for
confiscation.

General BOTHA: Lord Kitchener said to me that at the coronation of the
King he would recommend a general amnesty.

The Chairman at this stage asked the meeting to confine itself to the
following questions:--

  (1) Whether it would accept the document at present before them.

  (2) Whether it would decide to continue the war.

  (3) Or, whether it would decide to surrender unconditionally.

Mr. J. DE CLERCQ (Middelburg) said: I have already expressed my
opinion on the question as to whether we shall continue the war. If we
cannot proceed, then the question is whether we shall accept the
proposals of the British Government, or whether we shall surrender
unconditionally. It cannot be denied that these proposals are not so
good as we wished, but the question is whether in the circumstances we
can get anything better. If we surrender unconditionally and return to
the burghers and they ask us: "What have you obtained for us on
surrendering?" and we reply: "We have done nothing except surrendering
you and ourselves unconditionally to the enemy," then we shall be in
difficulties, and how shall we be able to justify ourselves? The
burghers expect that we shall obtain the best terms possible for them,
and I say that it is a greater honour for a people to negotiate than
to surrender themselves unconditionally. If we get terms we shall be
better able to satisfy the people than if we can only inform them
that we have handed them over to the mercy of the enemy. I do not
believe that anyone will be able to convince me that unconditional
surrender will be better for the burghers. Unless I can be convinced
of the contrary, I think it will be best to accept the proposal of the
British Government.

General NIEUWOUDT: I think that the matter is now plain, and propose
that we immediately proceed to vote whether we shall continue the war
or not. If the majority is not in favour of continuing the struggle,
then we can discuss the question whether we shall accept terms or
surrender ourselves unconditionally.

This proposal was seconded by General Froneman.

Mr. C. BIRKENSTOCK: We must not act with undue haste in this important
matter. Every Republican knows what the sentiment of freedom is, for
which everything has already been sacrificed, and therefore it is not
so easy to approve of, or to reject, a document such as the one now
before us. I cannot agree with General Nieuwoudt that we should
immediately decide as to whether we shall or shall not continue the
war. We must consider the question of our independence as something
sacred. We should consider whether we can continue the war, or whether
we cannot continue it, and whether by proceeding we can obtain better
terms. Are we now able to continue the war? Are there not at least two
or three districts that cannot proceed with the struggle? Co-operation
is the all-important matter for us. To think that a portion of the
country can continue the war alone is certainly wrong. Let us calmly
consider whether our strength and resources are such that we can
maintain the struggle for a year. If we cannot do so, let us rather
accept terms, for half a loaf is better than no bread. With my heart I
cannot part with our independence, and it is hard for me to make our
people so unhappy, but for the sake of the people and of the widows
and orphans we must make the best we can of the matter.

Commandant JACOBSZ also could not agree with the proposal of General
Nieuwoudt, because the matter was far too weighty to be disposed of so
hastily.

Mr. P. R. VILJOEN (Heidelberg): The document that lies before us is
painful. We are so tied up by it, so "knee-haltered," that it appears
to me that we shall never get loose again. But I must admit that if we
continue the war we may later be hobbled instead of "knee-haltered." I
have already been informed that all my properties have been
confiscated. If this had happened to my properties only I would not
mention it, but I fear there are more people whose properties are
threatened in the same way. I think we must instruct the Governments
to conclude peace on the best terms.

General S. P. DU TOIT (Wolmaransstad): We are passing through critical
moments. We must respect each other's opinion because everyone thinks
that he has grounds for his views, and here especially it is expected
that everyone will express his opinion honestly and freely. If that is
done we shall be able to decide what course to pursue. We must not be
over-hasty, because we are on the eve of a most important decision,
and if a delegate declares that he is not able to prosecute the war
any further we must not consider him cowardly or unfaithful. His
Honour the Acting State President S. W. BURGER, said: There are three
questions before us, but I think that we must for the present put
aside the question of unconditional surrender, and only discuss the
document before us or the continuance of the war. When I left my
commandos it was my opinion, and that of my burghers, that unless we
retain our independence we must continue to fight, and my instructions
were to that effect. But my burghers gave me those instructions
because they were not acquainted with the true conditions of the
country, as I have learnt them here now. We received but few reliable
reports from other parts. We fixed our eyes on God and on the leading
commandos in the Eastern portions of the country. If the burghers had
known that those leading commandos cannot continue the war they would
have thought differently. We cannot deny that there are commandos
which, if the war must proceed, must take some great step or other. We
always expect that when it comes to voting the minority must submit to
the majority. This is the general principle, and also the best in
times of peace. But we are here under other circumstances. If it were
decided here by a majority of say, twenty, to continue the war, then I
ask: why do the others vote in the minority? Is it because they are
afraid, or tired out, or do not wish to co-operate? No; it is because
they cannot proceed any further. And can the majority then go on
alone? No, they are too weak for that. If we cannot all continue to
co-operate, it means that we cannot continue with the struggle. And
therefore I say that here to-day the majority must bow to the
minority. We must speak out freely, for no one of us here stands now
under the orders of General Botha or of General de la Rey. Everyone
stands here with his own vote, and is himself responsible. I am of
opinion that if we continue the war our people will die a national
death, and also run a great risk of dying a moral death. On what
grounds can we hope to prosecute the war to a successful issue? If
such grounds can be pointed out to me, I shall very willingly decide
to go on manfully, but as far as I can see there is no hope for us. I
feel that we cannot continue, and if I had to continue now I would do
so in a very disheartened manner. If I return to my commando and
inform them that the British proposal has been rejected, they will ask
me on what grounds have we done so, and what reasons have we for
hoping for better results. Then I must be able to state our grounds,
and I cannot say that I have read this or that in a cutting from a
newspaper, or that the opinion or this one or that one is so or so, or
that there is hope that war will break out in Europe. If I were to do
that they will say: "You have built on sand." I do not see my way open
to do that, and if it were done, what I fear with heart and soul will
come to pass, namely, that small parties of burghers will make terms
for themselves with the enemy, and surrender, and where shall we then
stand? Almost all the burghers of some districts have already been
captured, and our position becomes daily worse, and it depends upon us
whether our people will be preserved, or whether we shall later be so
reduced that there will be an unconditional surrender. What will then
become of us and of our officers? Will they not be banished? I am not
thinking of myself. If I knew that by being banished I could save my
people, I, and many with me, would willingly sacrifice ourselves. It
is plain to me that if we decide to continue, unconditional surrender
will follow of itself, and the Lord preserve us from that. Our people
will then simply die as such, because there will be no one to help
them. I will never lay down my arms if the majority decides to
prosecute the struggle. No. I will occupy myself somewhere, and
operate here or there with other Generals. But we cannot take such a
decision unless we have good grounds. Mention is made of faith. Yes,
and we had faith, but in my opinion faith must have its grounds. When
Abraham went to sacrifice Isaac he knew that, even if Isaac were
killed, God's promise would nevertheless be carried out. If we believe
that God will ultimately deliver us, we must use our brains.

I do not see a chance of continuing the war, but must associate myself
with those who say: "I have done what I could for my people and
myself, and now I can do no more." I see no other course open to us
than to accept the proposal before us.

Commandant RHEEDER (Rouxville): The British refuse to allow our
Deputation to come out to see us. Many ask on what grounds we can
continue the war, and to them I reply that this refusal is one of the
grounds, because, on the face of it, it is obvious that something good
is brewing for us. Let us take everything into consideration. If we
accept these terms we have a dismal future. And what can we expect
from the coming generation, who cannot now understand what is being
done? Later they will read that there were still so many burghers in
the field, and that the conditions were such and such, and then they
will read that a free people surrendered. If the next generation
should say: "There were so many burghers in the field, and yet we are
not free; where is our country?" we shall have to reply: "We laid down
our arms when we should have fought." We shall have to say that we did
that because our faith deserted us, because we feared the enemy's
strength. I think that we have better prospects now of good results
from the continuance of our struggle than when we commenced. When we
are forced as a People to lay down our arms, then I shall be satisfied
to bow to the will of the Lord, but I cannot be satisfied to proceed
to surrender as a divided people. Our families are prepared to suffer
for another year to retain our freedom, and how shall we meet them if
we now make peace on these terms? Our State President is so
indispensable to us, and now the Lord lays His hand upon him, but this
trial is a proof to me that the Lord is still with us. If a commando
cannot remain in its district, it can go somewhere else where it can
exist. We must not give up the struggle until we get back our
independence.

Acting State President S. W. BURGER remarked: Commandant Rheeder says
that we must go on with the struggle, but he has not pointed out the
way to us, nor mentioned any ground upon which we can continue.

Commandant RHEEDER: The time for surrender is past. If we wished to
surrender, we should have done so while the burghers still had all
their possessions. Now they have nothing more, but we have still space
enough, and, therefore, we must fight until we have our country back.

Commandant P. L. UIJS (Pretoria): So much is said about our Deputation
and about what they have perhaps done for us or can still do, but we
must remember that they are in continuous communication with the
Netherlands Government, and I am convinced that the correspondence
between the Netherlands Minister and Lord Lansdowne was sent to our
Government with the cognisance of the Deputation. I think that we must
banish from our minds the hope of obtaining any benefit through the
mediation of our Deputation. The correspondence in question between
the Netherlands and British Governments probably took place with their
co-operation.

The Meeting was adjourned till 7.15 that evening.


At 7.15 the Meeting resumed, and was opened with Prayer.

Commandant CRONJE (Winburg) said: I only wish to say a few words. It
has been rightly stated that we are passing through a serious
stage--in my opinion the most important stage--in the history of the
South African people. The Delegates represent the South African
people, and we must now decide for that people. It is asked: "What are
our prospects?" but I ask, "What were our prospects when we commenced
the war? Were there grounds then?" It was indeed believed that right
was might, and trust was put in God. And God helped us. If we want
grounds, we must look back. When the enemy entered our country,
everything was dark and gloomy. There was a time when more than 4,000
men surrendered. They said: "Our struggle is hopeless." Those who
would not surrender with the 4,000, but continued the struggle, were
called mad. Two years ago the difficulty was raised that there was no
more food. A year ago the same difficulty was raised, with the
addition that the enemy was too strong, and that we would have to give
in. And yet the fight was continued. We, as representatives of a free
people, must not act hastily to repent a few days later of a step we
have taken and upon which we cannot go back. I never had hopes of
intervention, and it was never said by the Government or by the
Generals that they had hopes of intervention. I have always said that
we must put our trust in God. When I return from here I shall be able
to say to my burghers that the ground upon which we are going on with
the struggle still is: Trust in God. We have no right to give up the
struggle now. In some parts of the Free State, also, there was no
food, and yet deliverance was always at hand. We have sent our
Deputation to Europe, and President Kruger is there now, too. I ask:
"Have we, then, no more faith in them?" If they find that there is no
chance for help for us in Europe, will they not inform us to that
effect soon enough? I ask you, who would acquaint us thereof sooner
than they? And we must note that the enemy will not allow us to have
any communication with our Deputation, or that one of the members
should come out here. It is said that by continuing the struggle we
shall exterminate our people, but I say that by accepting this
proposal we shall utterly destroy our people. We have nothing more to
lose now, but everything to gain. We may be able to retain our
independence yet, which is so dear to us. In the verbal message from
our Deputation they say we must not treat with the enemy without
giving them notice. And when President Kruger left, it was his request
also that we should not negotiate without his cognisance. I say we
have no right to conclude peace on this basis. By doing so we shall
deliver a death-blow to the Africander race. I think that there is
something brewing in Europe. Five years ago there was an Armenian
question, and it took five years before the Powers stepped in and made
them conclude peace. I wish to ask you not to take a step which you
may regret later. Let us ponder before we part with our freedom. I
must also point out that our comrades in the Cape Colony are not
safeguarded by the terms offered. They will have to leave their
country, and they have lost all they have. Those who remain with us
will have to be supported by the British, their enemies. Then the
farms of some burghers have been sold, for which they will receive
nothing. With reference to the £3,000,000 offered for compensation,
that is not even sufficient to cover a fifth or even a tenth part of
our losses. For these and many other reasons the British proposals are
quite unacceptable to me, and we cannot and may not do anything else
but vigorously continue the struggle.

General FRONEMAN (Ladybrand): What I wish to say breathes the same
spirit as the words of the last speaker. My country is dear to me, and
I cannot think of parting with it. An answer is insisted upon to the
question: "What grounds have we for continuing the war?" But I ask in
turn: "What grounds had we when we commenced the war?" I have taken
part in the struggle since it began, and have never had more grounds
for continuing it than now. My division was also entirely exhausted,
but the Lord has made provision again. I was present when 4,000
burghers gave up the struggle in despair, and I was also present at
the surrender of General Cronje, and all I can say is that we
commenced the war with prayer and with faith in God. We have suffered,
but it was the Lord Who allowed this war to come over us. We prayed
that the war might be warded off, but God disposed otherwise. One of
our Generals has rightly said that the Lord would reveal Himself only
after all human resources have been exhausted. Although we only number
hundreds where the enemy has millions, we must nevertheless stand firm
in our trust in God. If we accept this proposal, our name as
"Republicans" is lost for ever and always. We, two small Republics,
are offering resistance only to defend the possession which we have
received from our forefathers, and I can never think of giving up our
dearly bought rights. Even if I were the only one, I would never give
my vote for that. I have consulted my burghers and also their wives,
and they said to me: "Bring us peace." I then asked what kind of peace
they desired, and their reply was that our independence was not to be
sacrificed. I thus have a clear instruction, and before I can part
with our independence, I shall first have to return to my burghers to
consult them.

Field Cornet B. H. BREYTENBACH (Utrecht) said: On the question whether
the war must be continued a reply of "yes" or "no" must be given. The
general condition of our country has been laid before us by the
Delegates, and the Meeting now stands before the stubborn fact that
the war cannot be continued. Hitherto not one of the facts which
indicate that we cannot prosecute the war has been removed or
controverted. The facts still stand, and I thus ask on what grounds
can we decide to go on with the war? I am not going to proceed blindly
or in the dark. We, as responsible persons, cannot step blindly over
facts. If we are going to continue, we must have good grounds for
believing that the future will bring us light. If not, my instruction
is to vote for a settlement for peace. It would, in my opinion, be
criminal of me to vote for the continuance of the war, if our
circumstances remain as laid before us here. Our attention is directed
to the grounds we had when we commenced the war, and we are asked what
our hopes and prospects were then. I say, whatever they may have been,
what have we gained? We must now declare that there is no progress in
our cause. On the contrary, are we not gradually going backwards? I
say "Yes," and we may not go on unless the facts and difficulties laid
before this meeting are removed. It is plain that at least 11, and
perhaps 14, commandos cannot continue the struggle, and if we decide
to continue, it speaks for itself what the consequences will be. What
will it profit us to resolve to go on if we have no people to fight?
Who can take the people by the throat and say to them: "Do this or
that"?--especially if we ourselves see the true state of affairs. If
we decide to continue, the war will in any case cease of itself in the
course of a few months, and the end will be far more fatal and pitiful
than if we make peace now.

Commandant W. J. VILJOEN (Witwatersrand): Some are in favour of
continuing the war, others are against it. I do not stand here with a
ready-made opinion, but with a mind that is open to be convinced by
facts. Those who are for peace have given facts and grounds upon which
they base their opinions. The others only speak of faith. A year ago
we decided to continue the war on faith, and now, having fought for
another year, we are convinced that we must make peace. If it is
desired to proceed, the way must be indicated and the grounds stated
which can convince us that we act wisely. Otherwise we must make peace
now.

General DE LA REY: It is my custom to speak briefly. I do not use
three words where one is sufficient. I went to meet the people with
definite instructions neither to approve of nor to reject what might
be said at the meetings, and I have adhered to them. There are now
here 8 representatives from my districts, with one from the Cape
Colony, and they represent almost the half of the South African
Republic. I need not say anything about the spirit of my burghers, but
everyone can understand that after the recent victories they are
courageous, as all the Delegates can testify.

With reference to our cause, I do not wish to shut my ears and eyes to
facts. If there is deliverance for the Africander people, then I am
with them, and if a grave must be dug for that people, then I go into
it with them. You can talk and decide here as you choose, but I tell
you that this meeting is the end of the war. But the end may come in
an honourable or in a dishonourable way. If we decide to continue the
war without grounds before us, the end will be a dishonourable one.

You speak of faith. What is faith? Faith is: "Lord, _Thy_ will be
done--not _my_ will to be the victor." I must kill my will, and I must
act and think as He directs and leads me. That is what I understand by
the faith in which God's children must live.

There are three courses open to us this evening, and one of these must
be chosen by the Delegates. Which course must be chosen? You may
accept the proposal of the British, or you may decide on unconditional
surrender. If you do the latter, know, then, that the matter is not
disposed of, for then the question arises: "What will become of our
people?" After those people have fought so faithfully, after all the
sacrifices they have made, to hand them over now unconditionally into
the hands of the enemy? That must not be! Do consider clearly where
the decision you may take will lead you to. If it was desired to
surrender unconditionally, the time for that would have been while the
people still had all their possessions with which they could help
themselves, but not now that the people have been deprived of
everything. There is not one in a hundred who can help himself now. It
is therefore hard for me to think of unconditional surrender.

There is another course which can be followed: to go on with the
struggle. But I am convinced that if we do that, one district after
the other will lay down their arms--will have to lay down their
arms--and the war will thus terminate in a dishonourable manner. If
you can indicate a way to me, or show me grounds upon which we can
hope for good results, I am prepared to go and fight again.

I have a responsibility, a very great responsibility, resting upon me.
The proposal before us, the terms which the British wish to grant us,
are not of great value, but yet they stipulate a few things. The
prisoners of war must be brought back, the Government must provide the
families with food and other necessaries, until they can care for
themselves. The terms also provide that many hundreds will not be
considered as criminals and be convicted as such. If any one can say:
"We can go on," I and my officers can do so, but I shall never allow
such words to pass over my lips, because I may not decide for one part
of the country only. I must consider our condition as a whole. We have
had some successful encounters, but I put myself the question: "What
have I actually effected by these victories?" Since they have been
fought, the enemy has sent down about 40,000 mounted troops against
me, which have deprived me of all my cattle. During the last three
months I have lost more than 600 men, killed, wounded, or captured. It
is plain to me that the enemy wish to attain their object at whatever
cost.

Many speak of hope from the Deputation in Europe. About a year ago the
Deputation wrote us that they expected our deliverance only from our
own perseverance, and now a year later we must not continue saying
that we have hope from the Deputation, who themselves had no hope of
intervention. If they have not been able to do anything in two years,
they will never be able to effect anything.

When I speak thus you must not think that I do so from cowardice,
because I can assure you that I fear no man or power in the whole
world. Neither do I wish to take it amiss in anyone here who thinks or
speaks differently. There are some who have come with a definite
instruction to hold out for independence only. But I am now well
informed on the condition of affairs over the whole country, and I
challenge any Delegate to go with me on a platform before the people.
I am convinced that, out of the three courses open to us, the people
will approve of the course which I am going to choose, because I shall
prove to them that in following that course I have done or obtained
something for them at the last moment. And is that not better than to
say to the people: "You must continue fighting, but the future is dark
and without hope, and I cannot point out to you even a small ray of
light"? By deciding differently, we shall force our people who were so
faithful to become "handsuppers," and in that way the war will come to
a dishonourable end. Therefore, Delegates, reflect on what you are
about to do.

Landdrost BOSMAN (Wakkerstroom): I am thankful that General de la Rey
has spoken out so frankly. It will give more than one of us light on
what we have to decide. As several speakers have already remarked, the
matter before us is very important and difficult, because not only
does the future of our people rest upon us, but that future depends
upon what we shall decide.

I must say frankly that I am against the continuance of the war, and
my reasons are briefly these: It is stated that we did not commence
the war with the hope of intervention, but with faith in the Lord. I
cannot quite agree with that, and I say that we did begin the war with
the hope of intervention, and now we find that that hope will not be
realised. If we did not cherish that hope, why did we send the
Deputation to Europe? And why, while we were still in Natal, was it
stated in war reports that the Deputation were doing good work? That
was said to encourage the Burghers. Many took up arms in that hope.
Who was the cause of that hope originating amongst the people I do not
know, but many Volksraad members spoke as if our independence had been
guaranteed by European Powers. The truth of what I say was proved when
the meetings to elect delegates for this meeting were held. I was
present at several of those meetings, and at each one of them the
burghers insisted that we should try to get into communication with
our Deputation. Why should they have done that if there was no hope of
intervention? That hope dwindled away when we noticed that there was
no ground for it. It is thus plain that we did not commence the war
with faith in God alone. A further proof of this is that we hoped and
expected much from what our comrades in the Cape Colony would
accomplish. That hope has also vanished, now that General Smuts has
declared that we must not expect much from the Cape Colony, and that
there will be no general rising there.

Another reason why I am in favour of peace is because our commandos
have been much weakened. From 50,000 men our number has fallen to
15,000, and that number is fast decreasing. Another reason is the
scarcity of foodstuffs. Last year this scarcity was also spoken of,
but that was nonsense. Now it is only too true. You can now ride from
Vereeniging to Piet Relief, and only here and there will you come
across a few cattle. I may say that you will see scarcely any cattle.
Then we must think of the suffering of the women and children still
with us, and especially of those in the Concentration Camps.

If we decide to continue, many of the 15,000 men still under arms will
be lost to us, and our numbers will decrease month by month. Many say
we may not so trample on the blood already shed as to make peace by
surrendering our independence, but that for the sake of that blood we
must continue the struggle. This is a serious matter, and I hope that
I shall never be guilty of trampling on such costly blood. But there
is something more costly than the blood which has already been shed,
and about which we can do nothing now, and that is the blood of
burghers and of women and children which will still have to be shed if
we decide to continue. And that blood will be given for a cause,
which, so far as human beings can see, is hopeless. That is a much
more serious matter to me. If we continue the war, we become the cause
of still more widows and orphans who will have no one to care for
them.

I did not intend to speak on the religious side of the question, but
it has been touched upon, and for that reason I also wish to say
something upon it. It is difficult for us to find out what course God
wishes us to pursue in this matter. We do not know whether it is God's
decree that we must retain our independence or not. It may be God's
will that we should give it up. What we know for certain is that God
desires us to do right. Everyone who does right is on the right road.
There is no doubt about that. I am convinced that if I vote for the
continuance of the struggle under the existing circumstances, and in
that way cause more suffering, then I am not on the right road, and
thus not on God's way. On the other hand, when I see no hope or
prospect of prosecuting the war with good results, and I vote for
giving up the struggle, then I am on the right road, and thus also on
God's road.

There is another course open to us--namely, unconditional
surrender--but I cannot vote for that. If we do that, then one of the
first things that the enemy will do after the restoration of peace
will be to represent to our people that their leaders did not do what
they could have done, and I am of opinion that thereby mistrust and
suspicion will be raised in the minds of many of our burghers.
Therefore, after all that we have suffered and done, I think that,
however hard it may be, we can now do nothing else but choose what is
best and most acceptable to us. Our feelings and love for our country
and people rise up against that, but if we allow ourselves to be led
by our feelings, and by our love, without using our reason, we shall
find ourselves on the wrong road. Everything will work together for
our good.

I conclude by warning all that we can only too easily mistake a
will-o'-the-wisp for a star, and that we should thus decide very
honestly and carefully.

Commandant H. S. GROBLER (Bethel): There are three courses open to us,
and if ever an important choice had to be made, it is now. As far as I
am concerned, I must say that it is in my opinion impossible for us to
continue the war. My district must be abandoned, and if I, as an
officer, cannot state other reasons to my burghers upon which we can
go on, how can I expect them to continue? There are about 12 districts
in the South African Republic which must be evacuated if the war is to
go on. That means that we shall have to resort to our furthermost
boundaries and leave the enemy in possession of the heart of our
country. But by fleeing about we shall not be able to retain our
independence. We must fight for that. It is asked what prospects we
had when we commenced the war, and it is answered: Faith. Yes, we must
have faith, but the means must be there too. Then we had burghers,
cannon, food, and war material, but now we lack all those means. It
appears to me that the time for fighting is past, and that we must
think about the people. I am a born son of the soil, and have once
before fought for my independence, so that it is very hard for me now
to think of giving it up; but with the facts before us, I shall have
to vote for the acceptance of the British proposals. Our families are
in a pitiable condition, and the enemy uses those families to force us
to surrender. The burghers who have sent us to this meeting are in an
equally pitiable condition. What will it avail us to resolve to
continue the struggle if the burghers cannot hold out any longer? We
must also not lose sight of the fact that, by accepting this proposal,
we get our prisoners of war back. What would otherwise become of them?
And we burghers in the field are threatened with the sale of our
properties, which hangs as a sword over our heads. If that threat were
carried into execution, what would become of us? Further, our burghers
and families in the Concentration Camps are dying a moral death. These
are all facts which force me to accept the proposal before us. If we
can prosecute the war vigorously and with a chance of success, I shall
be the first to say: let us do so for the sake of our burghers, our
families, and ourselves.

Commandant VAN NIEKERK (Ficksburg): It is impossible for me to vote
for the acceptance of this proposal. The last word of my burghers to
me was: "Do not part with our independence; we are prepared to die for
that," and that is our opinion still. Grounds are asked for the
continuance of the struggle, and it is difficult for me to state such
grounds, but I can point out that there is a difference between this
proposal and the Middelburg proposal of a year ago, and that is a
proof to me that the enemy is now more prepared to meet us, and the
longer we hold out, the better terms we shall get, until we obtain
what we want. Let us thus not be too hurried, but stand firm as men
and hold on. I am convinced that if we hold out for our independence
we shall soon be in a better position, and that the enemy will again
approach us for the purpose of opening negotiations.

General J. G. CILLIERS (Lichtenburg): I have already informed the
meeting what my instructions were from the burghers with reference to
our independence. Naturally, I do not feel myself bound by those
instructions, because I am here to make the best of the circumstances
for my people, and I am sure that I have the confidence of my
burghers.

The other evening it was asked whether we are justified in continuing
the struggle. I then answered: Yes, if we considered the justness of
our cause, we are indeed justified. But when we consider our cause
further and take our general position into consideration, then the
question arises whether we are not perpetrating a murder on our people
if we continue the war. The position in both the Republics has been
made clear to us, and that condition is very pitiful. As far as my
district and burghers are concerned, we with some other districts are
still in a position to continue the war, but must I not consider the
situation in other districts? And shall we accuse those men who have
up till now stood faithfully with us of cowardice because they cannot
go on any longer? No, we may not do that. I, of course, long for peace
with the retention of our independence, but we cannot get that, and
nobody can get that for us. We have delegated a Commission who enjoy
our fullest confidence, and they have tried to get all that they
possibly could from the British Government, and there lie the terms
now upon which we can conclude peace. Who of us is in a position
to-night to say we can continue the struggle and thereby obtain
something better for our people than these terms now before us? It is
thought that the Deputation are doing good work because the enemy will
not allow us to get into communication with them, but the last we
heard from our Deputation was to the effect that our salvation lay in
our having to fight to the utmost, and till our last cartridge has
been fired. If, now, we were to go so far as to sacrifice the last man
and to fire our last cartridge, what have we then? Is such a message
from the Deputation encouraging to you? To me it is by no means
encouraging.

Further, some argue about Faith, and it is said that we commenced the
war in faith. To that I wish to say that we must not believe one thing
and not the other. We must not believe that if we persevere we shall
obtain the victory. We must also believe that it is possibly God's
will that we must for a time bow to the power of the enemy. Our
Commission to the Representatives of the British Government have done
their best to obtain as much as possible for the people, and I see no
other way than to accept the proposal before us. It is indeed true
that the voices of our families call to us: "Do not give up the
struggle on our account." But they also say: "Do not go on if the
future becomes dark to you." If my burghers had known what I know now
they would have given me a different instruction. Must we demand more
sacrifices from the burghers and families if we see no light for the
future? However hard it may be, we cannot fight against
impossibilities. We must only consider what is best for our people and
take care that we give no one the opportunity to say: "You could have
saved us, but you have left us in the lurch." Just because our cause
is dark and difficult, we must use our minds and keep only the welfare
of our people in view. I can only agree to accept the proposals that
lie before us.

Chief Commandant DE WET then said: I feel myself compelled to express
my feelings too. The last speaker declared that the last word we had
from our Deputation was that we must fight till the last man was dead
and the last cartridge fired. I must say that I never heard of such a
message. What I know is that the Deputation let us know last year that
they saw no hope of intervention, but that we should hold out till the
last means of resistance had been exhausted. But I did not understand
from that that we must continue till the last man was dead and the
last cartridge fired.

I wish to express my feelings briefly but candidly, and I must go back
to the beginning of the war. I must say that when we began the war I
had not so much hope of intervention as now. In saying this, I do not
wish to intimate that I now have hope of intervention, but that we did
not then know whether we had the slightest sympathy in England or in
Europe. And now we have found out that we have indeed sympathy, and
although no one intervenes on our behalf, our cause is nevertheless
strongly supported, so that even English newspapers give reports of
"pro-Boer" meetings over the whole world. This information we obtain
from Europe through a man sent hither by the Deputation, and I have no
reason to say or to think that our informant is not trust-worthy. He
brought the last letter from the Deputation, and thus certainly enjoys
their confidence. This man is acquainted with public feeling in Europe
towards the two Republics, and informs us that our cause is daily
gaining ground in Europe and even in England. The question may now be
asked: Why have the Deputation not sent us a report on these
conditions? The reason is clear as daylight to me. We sent the
Deputation to seek help for us. They went to ascertain from the other
Powers what could be done for us, and thus came to know what the
policy of those Powers was. Will they now be able to lay bare that
policy to us? No, certainly not, because there is a great danger that
their letters will fall into the hands of the enemy. Even though the
Members of the Deputation were here themselves, I doubt whether they
would be free to explain to us the future policy of the European
Powers. It is therefore significant to me that the Deputation is
silent, and this should not discourage, but rather encourage us.

If there is any man who feels the pitiful condition of our country,
then I am that man. And I believe every word that has been said here
about the conditions in the various divisions. It is asked: What
prospect have we of continuing the fight with success? To reply to
that I must go back to the beginning of the war, and ask what hope and
prospects had we then? My reply is: Only Faith, nothing more. And that
Faith we still have. How weak we were in comparison with that Power,
our enemy, with its three-quarters of a million of soldiers, of which
it has sent some 250,000 to fight us! How could we have entered into
such a struggle if we had not done so in Faith? We could only
speculate on help from Natal and the Cape Colony. Some said that Natal
and the Cape Colony would stand by us, but now we miss the persons who
said that. They are lost to us, but we have not lost them on the
battlefield, for they sit amongst the enemy, and many of them are even
in arms against us. However, I never built on that help, although I
hoped from what history teaches us that we should not stand alone to
defend our rights by force of arms.

I feel why some, taking into consideration our position, seek for
tangible grounds upon which we can justify a continuance of the
struggle; but then the question arises again: What tangible grounds
had we when we began? Has the way become darker or lighter to us? It
is still all Faith, and we know what a small people can by Faith
triumph over the most powerful enemy. And if we, a small people,
overcome by Faith, we shall not be the only people that has done so.
Those who say that the struggle must be given up want tangible grounds
from us for the continuance of it, but what grounds had we at the
commencement? Has it become darker now? On the contrary, the history
of the last 22 months has given me strength. A year ago General Botha
wrote to me, and correctly too, that the scarcity of ammunition gave
him anxiety. We also had that anxiety, because our ammunition was
exhausted as well. There was a time when I feared and trembled when a
burgher came to me with an empty bandolier and asked me for
ammunition. But what happened? Since September last ammunition in
large and small quantities has miraculously poured in, so that, to use
an expression of the late General Joubert's, I was agreeably surprised
(_Ik met een blijde schaamte moest staan_). And what happened with
ammunition occurred also with horses. We always obtained a supply from
the enemy. I do not take it amiss in those who want grounds for our
Faith. I have mentioned some grounds, but those are only a thousandth
part of what might be mentioned. I may add this further reason. The
enemy has approached us. I agree that this proposal is an improvement
on the Middelburg proposal of last year. The enemy have made further
advances. How have they not approached us since the commencement of
the war, when they forced themselves into our country? When our
Governments negotiated with Lord Salisbury at the beginning of the war
in April, 1900, the British Government would hear of nothing but
unconditional surrender. To-day England is negotiating with us. Before
we accept this proposal, let us once more take up this struggle, and
do our duty--do what our hands find to do, and I have no doubt that
the enemy will afterwards approach us again with more favourable
proposals, if they do not leave us our entire independence. The
Deputation said to us: "Persevere," but I do not think that they can
lay bare to us on what grounds this advice was based. Remember, too,
that in the first (Boer) war the South African Republic stood alone
against the powerful England, without any assistance. There were
wavering ones then also--the so-called loyalists. It was then also a
struggle in Faith only, and what was the result? They fought in Faith
only and won. Is our Faith, then, going to be so much weaker than that
of our forefathers?

It is asked: What about our families? Certainly we must care for them,
but only as far, and as well, as we can. More we cannot do. It has
been said that we must let the men lay down their arms to save the
families, but it is a hard matter to say to a Boer: "Take your family,
go to the enemy, and lay down your arms." However, we could do that
rather than to see an entire people fall.

We can learn much from the history of America. It has been said that
our circumstances cannot be compared with those of the Americans, and
yet a comparison is not out of place. Even the powerful England had to
give in to them. It may be said that America is much larger than the
two Republics, but we are not bound to the territories of the two
Republics. The Orange Free State offers many difficulties on account
of her situation. The railway passes through the entire country, and
on the borders we have the Basutos, a powerful nation. We have no
Bushveld like the South African Republic, and have thus to find our
way through the British forces.

The matter is a very grave one for us, but we cannot part with our
arms. Everything else is of minor importance to me, but if we give up
our arms we are no longer men. Let us persevere. Three or six or
twelve months hence or later, a time may dawn when we may be able to
do everything with our arms. But if we give up our arms and such a
time dawns, we shall all stand as women.

Now, I wish to ask you: Why has Lord Kitchener refused to allow our
deputation to come out? And why did he say that we could see from the
papers that there was nothing brewing in Europe? Which papers,
however, did he refer to? _The Star_, _The Cape Times_, _The Natal
Witness_, and other Jingo papers, which, you must moreover bear in
mind, are all censored. If we can accept his word that the deputation
can bring us no favourable news it would have been to the interest of
England to let the deputation come out, or to allow all newspapers
through. But there is no question of allowing certain European and
even certain English newspapers through. If we therefore give up the
struggle now, we do so in the dark. We do not know what is going on in
the outside world. We cannot say that the enemy are making their terms
more and more onerous, because that is not so. They are conceding.

Considering all this, and also the fact that the tension in England
can be looked upon as an indirect intervention, I believe that we
should continue with the bitter struggle. By standing manfully we
shall get our just rights. When the time arrives that we cannot go on
any further, we can again open negotiations. Let us keep up this
bitter struggle and say as one man: We persevere--it does not matter
how long--but until we obtain the establishment of our independence!

General C. F. BEYERS (Waterberg) said: The matter presents itself to
me thus: Which must I follow: my conscience or my reason? To that I
have only one reply--I must follow my conscience, because if I fall,
and I have followed my reason and not my conscience, I do not know
whither I go. But if I follow my conscience I am at any time prepared
for my death. History, as you all know, tells us about many men who
have been martyrs, and who have been burnt for the sake of their
faith, but it seems to me that only in books do we read of such great
things, and that they do not occur any more in our time. I respect
everyone's opinion on our great cause, which is most important and
serious, but we must not forget to observe how much welfare and
salvation was born out of all the great sufferings of the heroes of
old, although when the martyrs died it seemed as if everything was
lost with them. But observe how much welfare and salvation arose from
the circumstance that those men laid down their lives for what they
considered right. Are we not convinced that our cause is right? If we
did not have this conviction at the beginning of the war we would not
have taken up arms. Then we were all prepared to give our lives for
our cause, but now that the hour of death has arrived we recoil. I
cannot express myself differently.

Our national existence is spoken of, but the Lord will care for that.
That is not a matter for us. Our cause was right, and will remain
right, and might shall not triumph over right. For that reason I wish
to persevere in the struggle. I wish to see that right triumphs, even
though that triumph is realised only after my death.

It is said that we shall never get such an opportunity again for
negotiating. General de Wet has touched upon this matter, and I agree
with him, and others, that we shall always be able to negotiate again.
This is proved by what has already taken place, and I may further
point out that there was a time when General Botha wished to see Lord
Roberts, and when the latter replied that it was not necessary. And
now the British are negotiating with us; in fact, they opened up these
negotiations.

I am open to conviction, but if I had to vote how I should be able to
vote only for the continuance of the war. Facts are stated, but none
of the difficulties mentioned are to my mind insurmountable. The
difficulty about the women and families we can surmount. Similarly the
difficulty about food, horses, ammunition, &c. But there is one matter
that troubles me, and that is the spirit that seems to be animating
our people. From the speeches it appears that there is a large
portion of our people who will go over to the enemy, and surrender;
and when such a spirit animates the burghers it is impossible to take
them by the neck and say: Go and fight. What I want is that if the
majority decide to continue the war, that decision must be taken with
enthusiasm. The great danger, however, that I foresee is that such a
decision will lack enthusiasm. I will even go so far as to say that
some of our brothers in the Free State, although they declare that it
is a matter of faith, and in spite of what General de Wet and others
may say, are also animated by a spirit which will drive them to go
over to the enemy, however good and brave they may be.

General de la Rey challenges anyone to come on a platform with him and
to put the true condition of the country before the people and to
induce them to reject this proposal of the enemy. That is so. The
spirit of which I speak is infectious, and if burghers on Commando
learn that the spirit of their fellow-burghers elsewhere is in favour
of giving up the struggle, many will become disheartened. When once a
spirit gets hold of a people it works marvels, and this fact we must
take into consideration. I know it will be of no use to continue the
war if everybody around me lays down his arms. It would be ridiculous
for me to go on. We must be very sensible in this matter, and have no
disunion. You know repentance always comes too late.

I repeat, my conscience is Number 1 with me, and as long as that
remains so I must vote against this proposal.

After Prayer the meeting was adjourned to the following day.


FRIDAY, MAY 30TH, 1902.

At nine o'clock the meeting resumed after a Prayer by the Rev. J. D.
Kestell.

Acting State President S. W. BURGER said: Before we begin I consider
it my duty to inform the Delegates and the members of both
Governments, that President Steyn had to tender his resignation as
President of the Orange Free State yesterday, on account of illness,
and that he was forced to give the enemy his parole to enable him to
obtain medical treatment. General de Wet has been appointed in his
place as Acting State President, and, on behalf of the members of my
Government, on behalf of you all, and on behalf of myself, I wish to
assure him of our deep sympathy, and to express our heartfelt regret
at the loss of a man who has hitherto been the support and the rock of
our good cause. His retirement is a great loss to us all.

Chief Commandant de Wet thanked the Acting State President of the
South African Republic for his sympathetic references, and assured the
meeting that as far as his poor powers enabled him he would do
everything in his power for the Africanders.

Mr. J. NAUDÉ (Detached Commando under General Kemp) desired some
information about the rebels, and an explanation of the document in
which the British set forth how they would treat the rebels, if their
peace proposals were accepted.

General Smuts furnished the desired information.

Mr. NAUDÉ further asked whether it rested with the Delegates to decide
to surrender the independence, or whether they could only carry out
their instructions.

General BOTHA replied, that from the documents before the meeting it
was very clear in the opinion of the Governments, as expressed to Lord
Kitchener and to Lord Milner at their first meeting, that only the
people or their special Delegates had the power to decide on the
independence. They had gone to the people, and the people were now
represented by the Delegates here in this meeting.

Mr. NAUDÉ said: I thus understand that, when the members of the
Governments left Pretoria to have the special Delegates elected they
knew that the persons elected would have to decide whether the
independence would have to be given up or not. I find myself now in a
difficulty, and I must say that some Delegates have (by an oversight,
perhaps) been misled. I have been chosen with a definite instruction,
and with all respect for the explanation of our legal advisers, who
say that we can speak and act here according to circumstances, I must
say that I have come here with a definite instruction from my burghers
to instruct the Governments not to sacrifice the independence.
Further, the burghers gave the Government the right to negotiate, but
then it was to be stipulated in the negotiations that they could
retain their arms, that the rights of the Dutch language should be
guaranteed, which rights are of such great significance to the people,
and a means by which they could again become a people. But in the
terms offered these questions are entirely ignored. I also notice that
provision is made for those burghers who have property, but very
little provision is made for the poor man. And the burghers whom I
represent are not rich. They are not landowners. Three million pounds
are indeed offered, but how much is that among so many? Nor is it
stipulated that the Government notes which have been issued must be
paid, so that the poor will get very little. I cannot therefore vote
for the acceptance of the proposals before us.

As regards our prospects, I wish to bring to your recollection the
address which the Commandant General delivered to the burghers at the
Warmbaths towards the end of 1900. The situation was very gloomy then.
He said: "We have nothing more to lose and everything to gain. Let us
thus go on." No ground for perseverance were then given or asked. And
to say now that we are not going a step further without grounds and
facts before us is in conflict with what we have hitherto done. We
have seen how in the past relief was always at hand. When Pretoria
fell the outlook was darker than now, but there was then a spirit
which animated the people. There was faith and a trust that we must
persevere. And there is no one now who has been put to shame because
he maintained the struggle. I can state no definite grounds upon which
we can build, but when I consider the past, I can say to my burghers
that we can still continue the struggle, and we will do that too.
There is nothing more for us to lose, whereas we have the opportunity
of persevering with our arms in our hands till better days dawn.

General DE LA REY: I must remark that I never misled anyone at any
meeting. Every document that was handed to me by the Government I
caused to be read out at every meeting, and on that the people had to
decide. The last speaker asks whether the responsibility rests on him
to-day to decide on the question of independence. My answer is: "Yes,
and not only on him, but on every one of you." The responsibility
rests upon you generally. You do not represent a certain village or
district, but the whole country, and it is the duty of everyone to
decide according to the general condition of circumstances all over
the country.

Mr. NAUDÉ: I am not indifferent in this matter, and I do not wish to
shirk my responsibility; on the contrary, I will gladly bear it. But I
am not here in the same position as a member of the Volksraad, who is
entrusted to deal with all matters. I have a definite commission to
submit the views of my burghers, and do not feel myself justified to
take upon myself the responsibility of deciding upon the surrender of
our independence.

General HERTZOG: Although I am not a delegate, I wish to state which
course I would pursue if I were one. The Delegate is here for the
people, and what he should ask himself is: Suppose that that portion
of the people which has delegated me was fully acquainted with the
situation in both Republics, how would that portion decide? That
appears to me to be the point upon which the Delegates must decide.

As regards the great question before us, I wish to be fair and view it
as clearly as possible from both sides. The one party says: "Stop the
war," and they continually ask on what grounds can the struggle be
continued? But I think it is for you, who say: "Stop the war," to
state your grounds. Those who wish to go on say: "We are at war; show
us why we are to stop." It is also asked what prospects have we if we
go on. This would have been a very good question when we commenced the
war. It is argued: We have grown weaker. On that I ask: "Has the
enemy not grown weaker too?" That is clearly the case, especially
financially. England has already spent over 200 million pounds, and
she can spend another 100 million. Yes, if the people wish it. But how
long will the people wish it? Have we not the right to assume that
England is already in difficulties financially? No one who is
acquainted with English history can do otherwise than feel the
significance of an imposition of a tax on wheat. That is not done
unless matters are serious. In 1831 there was a revolution over this
tax. It presses very severely on the people, and the people are
beginning to feel that they are incurring debt for which they will
have to suffer later.

With reference to the Deputation it is said: "They have been away two
years now, and have effected nothing yet; how can we still hope that
they will be able to effect something for our good?" But I say just
because they have already been two years in Europe, we are nearer the
time when a great war must break out. It is a known fact that the
nations are arming themselves more and more and building ships of war,
which is all done in preparation for the day when war will break out
in Europe. A year ago the Deputation sent us a telegram which amounted
to this: "Keep on." Why will the enemy not allow us to hear from our
Deputation? It would have taken the members of the Deputation only a
fortnight to come out and be with us. It is said that it would
constitute an irregular military procedure. But is this meeting not
also an irregular military procedure? I am thus forced to the
conclusion that there is something behind this refusal. We know who
the three members of the Deputation are. Mr. Fischer is a man who
fought against the war up to the last. He even went to the South
African Republic for that object. So is Mr. Wessels. They are both men
in whom you can place your full confidence; and have all their
interests, and large interests, in this country. Mr. Wolmarans I do
not know personally, but it is generally known that he is a man upon
whom you can depend. I am convinced of it, that these men will give
the fullest attention to our interests. If they saw that we were being
ruined by holding out, they would inform us to that effect. But they
let us continue. What their reasons are for doing so I do not know,
but I depend upon them.

I am open to conviction, and if I can be convinced that our struggle
is hopeless, I shall side with those who wish to give it up. There is
another aspect to the question; but let me first say that it grieves
me that on every public meeting the question of religion is touched
upon. It is continually said that this or that is God's finger. Now,
although I also have my belief, I say that neither you nor I know in
the least what is the finger of God! God has given each one of us
reason and a conscience, and if these lead us we need not follow
anything else.

I must further say that we are undeniably in a pitiful condition. Food
is scarce. We are exhausted, but still we all live. Almost all our
horses have been taken, so that what we require we have to take from
the enemy. Thousands of our people are prisoners-of-war. We have some
thousands of our own people, who are in arms against us. Our women and
children have been cooped up for almost two years in the Concentration
Camps, where they die by thousands. Not only do they die, but they are
exposed to destructive moral influences. The Kaffirs are armed against
us, and only recently 56 burghers were murdered by Kaffirs. Truly, our
prospects are not bright. In how far all this must weigh with the
Delegates, I leave to you. As far as I am concerned, I must confess
that all these things have made a tremendous impression on me. No one
with a heart can feel differently. I shall always respect Commandant
General Botha, because he has proved to have a heart that feels all
these matters, and because he has had the courage to lay before his
people and before us with great honesty precisely how matters stand.

We are here under exceptional circumstances. Awful wars have already
been fought, but I do not believe that a war has ever been waged in
which the people have proportionally suffered so much and sacrificed
so much as our people have done in this war. In the American War of
Independence the people did not suffer a third of what we have
suffered. But all this has not yet turned the scales as far as I am
concerned. We consider all these matters, but we must consider
particularly what awaits us if we give up our country. What will our
future be? Will there then be such satisfaction in the Orange Free
State and in the South African Republic that we shall be able to say:
We will await the day of deliverance from God's hand? If I knew that
there would be a rising in a few years, I would rather fight on till I
am dead. If I conclude peace I want a lasting peace.

There is a matter that weighs more heavily with me than all this, and
that is the holding of this meeting. I regret from the bottom of my
heart that it ever took place. This meeting gives us a death blow. I
also experienced hard times, when my burghers surrendered in hundreds,
but I always found comfort in the thought that I was not fighting
alone, and I knew that when I had a hard time of it, my comrades in
the struggle elsewhere had an easy time. However, I do not wish to
blame anyone for the holding of this meeting, because I am convinced
that everything was done with the best intentions. Now, what has been
the result of this meeting? The Commandant General has had to express
his views, and expose the situation, and this has had the effect of
disheartening some of our burghers. If we now decide to continue,
hundreds and thousands will go over to the enemy who would otherwise
have remained with us. I would have suggested that the discouraged
ones leave us, but now those who were not discouraged have also become
so.

Although all these facts have made me dubious, I am not yet convinced
that we should stop the war. If I were a delegate, I should say: "Go
on," because I think that if we are in doubt we should lay down this
as an axiom: "Proceed on the road we are on." In the proposal before
us we get nothing at all of what we have the right to lay claim to.

General L. J. MEYER (Member of the S.A.R. Government) said: According
to General Hertzog, the persons who went to the various commandos to
have delegates elected explained the situation of the country to the
people. But that was not done. We said to the burghers: "You must
elect someone whom you can trust as a delegate to the meeting at
Vereeniging. To him the situation of the country as a whole will be
laid bare, and then he must act according to circumstances."

Now I want to express my views also. The question of independence is
so dear to every Africander that this word can hardly be spoken. Our
condition, however, has now become such that we must express our
opinions on this matter. I am well acquainted with the condition of
the commandos north of the Eastern Railway to the other side of the
Sabi River, and I can assure you that every commando finds it very
difficult to obtain food. All officers complain that clothing, horses,
and food are scarce. All burghers long for peace, if they can retain
their flag and their Mauser, but after the accounts which have been
given us here, every responsible person must feel that a great
portion, if not the half, of the South African Republic is not able to
continue the war. Now if half of the South African Republic must be
abandoned, the burghers must move from there to the other districts,
and it is clear that those districts which still have food have only
barely sufficient for their own commandos. What will happen if the
burghers from the other parts of the Transvaal resort to those
districts also?

Our burghers have done what almost no other nation has ever done. Our
bitterest enemies acknowledge this. Then we still have to contend with
the large hordes of Kaffirs who go about to murder and plunder. The
people expect from us that we will save what can still be saved.
Everyone takes the matter up seriously, and it is so serious that if
we pass an ill-considered resolution we shall exterminate the
Africander people. It has rightly been remarked that everything is
dark. If I was sure what to do I would be very glad. The Lord,
however, has given us reason, and in my opinion we have now got to
such a stage that we must do what we can to keep the head of the
Africander people above water, so that later on they can develop
again.

The position of our families is a very tender point with me. They are
dying out in the Concentration Camps, and must submit to much misery.
We have already sacrificed much blood, and if we had hopes and ground
for a favourable result we could sacrifice still more. My blood, which
is no better than the blood of so many others that has been shed, can
also be shed, but my conscience tells me that we may not allow one
more man to be shot, if there is no hope for us.

If we were to decide now to go on, we should never get the opportunity
to negotiate again. The end would be that we should all be dead or
captured or shall have surrendered to the enemy. It is asked what will
future generations say, if they read that we decided to make peace and
to give up our independence? My reply is: We do not fight for name and
honour, but for our people. What will future generations say, if we do
not save what can still be saved? They will say that we fought
bravely, but without wisdom.

With reference to the terms offered, I must say that I expected more.
The three millions are nothing, but yet there is a promise that our
people will later have a vote again, and be allowed to govern
themselves, and further--God will help us. Some are of opinion that we
must show our manliness by continuing the struggle. It may, however,
be more manly to conclude peace. In the Volksraad I was in favour of
granting the franchise, after a five years' residence, but that
proposal was rejected by twenty-one votes to seven, and three of those
seven persons are now here with us. We did not vote as we did because
we were afraid, but because we did not wish to drench the soil with
blood, and we knew that England sought cause for war. Shall we now
continue to shed blood?

Before Lord Roberts entered Pretoria the Government considered whether
the time had not arrived to put an end to the war. That was, of
course, a secret. But the Orange Free State would not agree, and I am
convinced that we would have obtained better terms then than now. The
people were then not so ruined and exterminated. The Government in its
wisdom decided to continue the war. A year later the two Governments
met each other again at Waterval, in the Standerton district. It was
again resolved to go on with the war. Later we again suggested that we
should make peace proposals to the British. President Steyn agreed,
but no agreement had yet been arrived at with reference to the time
and conditions, and the enemy operated against us with such great
forces that we could not make any progress in the matter. Now, as far
as human judgment goes, there is no chance for us to continue the war.
There is no hope of intervention, for the big Powers do not make war
so easily. We have now come to such a pass that we must save the
seedling, otherwise I fear it is all over with the Africander people.
It is argued that we must go on because so many have already given
their lives for their country, but everyone must admit that unless a
miracle is worked, we shall not get the enemy out of our country by
force of arms. We have taught the British how to wage war. Our own
people are with them, and show them how to trek in the night, and
where the footpaths are.

Much reference is made to the American War of Independence, but this
war cannot be compared to that one. The enemy had only 40,000 troops
in America, whereas they have 240,000 here. And then Americans a large
country, and had harbours through which to import, and had in addition
the assistance of France. I am convinced that our struggle cannot be
maintained.

Commandant VAN NIEKERK (Kroonstad): With reference to the Cape
Colonists, I wish to say that we expected much help from them, and
they did assist us largely. Must we now jump out of the door and leave
them in the lurch? Many of them have already been banished, some shot,
and others hanged. It is sad to think of laying down our arms. The
promise that landed proprietors can retain their arms is more of a
comfort than a reality. If I consider everything I must say--let us
rather offer passive resistance, but concede nothing.

General BOTHA was the next speaker. He first explained his attitude at
the various meetings of the people, and said that he had caused them
to elect Delegates with power to act. He continued: When the war
began, we had about 60,000 burghers, and we further relied upon help
from the Cape Colony. We expected that that Colony would not allow her
railways to be used to convey troops to fight against us. I also hoped
that the Powers would interfere, but they were silent spectators of
how Britain waged war against us, and how she introduced all kinds of
new methods into that warfare--methods contrary to international law.
Further, we had provisions in abundance, and commandos could be
supported for weeks in the same place. However, matters have now so
changed that a man must consider himself fortunate if his family is
away. It is argued that to save the families still with us, the
husbands of such families can surrender with their families. The
husbands, however, of most are unfortunately already in the hands of
the enemy. Whom can I send to care for those whose natural protectors
are already prisoners of war? These families are thus thrown upon us,
and we must care for them. As long as we had plenty of food, the enemy
gladly received our families into their Camps, but now that they are
in want, and they (the enemy) can do something for them, their
kindness has come to an end. What shall we now do with these families?
That is the great difficulty.

It is stated that we do not rely on help through the medium of the
Deputation in Europe, but when the enemy refuses to let the Members
of the Deputation come out to see us, it is at once said that that is
a proof that the Deputation are doing something to our advantage.
Reliance is thus placed upon the Deputation, because they can only
tell us that there is hope of intervention. The Deputation have
already been in Europe for more than two years, and our State
President is there too, and up to this day the Deputation have not yet
succeeded in getting itself acknowledged by any other Power than the
Netherlands Government. They were accredited by us to all the Powers,
but it appears that they did not consider it advisable to hand in
their credentials to any Power except to Holland, naturally because
they were given to understand that they would not be acknowledged.
Now, if a Power refuses to acknowledge our Deputation, what help can
we as a nation expect from such a Power? There is another point.
Before President Kruger left us we received letters from the
Deputation, from which it clearly appeared that they could do nothing
for us, and in which they informed us that they would return and land
in Delagoa Bay. The Government, however, in consultation with
President Steyn, who was with us then, decided to ask the Deputation
not to return, even though they could effect nothing, because, if they
came back, it would be a death blow to our people, who were always
still expecting something good from the efforts of the Deputation. I
say these things, so that the people may not be misled. In my opinion,
we have nothing else than the sympathy of the European nations, and
than that we shall get nothing else, but that will not save us. A year
ago we were in communication with the Deputation, and all they could
then tell us was that we should persevere, on the ground of all the
personal and material sacrifices which had already been made, until
all means of resistance were exhausted. Well, we have done that, and
it is very plain to me that there is no hope of any help from the
Deputation. But I wish to go further. We know that there is one
friendly Power, and that it wishes to help us as much as possible.
That Power is the Netherlands Government. What did the Netherlands
Minister write to the British Government on the 1st of January, 1902?
He wrote as follows:--

"The Government of her Majesty the Queen is of opinion that the
exceptional circumstances, in which one of the belligerent parties in
South Africa is situated, and which prevents it from putting itself
into communication with the other party by direct means, constitutes
one of the causes of the prolongation of the war, which continuously,
without interruption or termination, harasses that country, and is the
cause of so much misery."

Thus wrote the Power in Europe who is best disposed towards us, a few
months ago; and in that same letter they suggested that our Deputation
should come out here with the object of meeting the leaders of the
people, in order to bring about peace. It was certainly never the
intention that peace would be concluded on the basis of the
independence of the Republics. Can we thus cherish any hopes of
assistance from European nations? I am convinced that we can arrive at
a decision in this matter without worrying ourselves for a moment with
the idea that we shall obtain help elsewhere. A war in Europe is, of
course, possible, but the war we are engaged in has opened the eyes of
all the Powers, so that every European Government now avoids war as
much as possible. I will even go so far as to say that it is in the
interest of more than one Power that this war continues.

A great difficulty is also the unfaithfulness of our own burghers, and
much injury is done us by those who lay down their arms. A year ago we
took a resolution at Waterval, in the Standerton district, to continue
the war vigorously. We kept it up for a year, and fought and
sacrificed. What have we gained by it? I say we are now so broken up
and weakened that if matters go on like this a little longer we shall
no more be able to assert ourselves as a party. It is maintained that
this proposal goes further than the proposal made to us at Middelburg
in March, 1901, but I do not think that that argument is correct,
because we did not negotiate on that proposal. We simply replied that
we could not negotiate on the basis proposed. If we had negotiated
then we might perhaps have obtained better terms than now. But even
granted that the present proposals are more favourable, what have we
not sacrificed for such improvement? Twenty thousand women and
children have been laid in their graves in the Concentration Camps.
Almost the half of our burghers are prisoners of war; we have had to
bury hundreds of our comrades. When I review the past year, I must say
that we have lost ground tremendously. We can only gauge the future by
the past. We now stand face to face with the fact that we shall have
to abandon a large tract of our country, and I do not see any chance
of retaining our independence in that way. We commenced with 60,000
men, and now we have only 15,000 in the field. Our Information-bureau
in Pretoria informs me that the enemy has already 31,400 of our
burghers as prisoners of war, and that 600 have already died in the
prisoner-of-war camps. Three thousand eight hundred of our burghers
have fallen during the war. Is it not a serious matter that so many
fell in the course of two and a half years? What must not the
sufferings of our women and children in the Concentration Camps have
been at the death of so many of their number?

The question is asked, and rightly too: What about the Cape Colonists
who have thrown in their lot with us? I have always said that if we
lose our independence it will be our first and foremost duty to care
for them because they have got into trouble through us. I was always
prepared to say: "Banish me, but give terms to the Cape Colonists."
And now there is a chance for us to-day to save those comrades. Would
it therefore be advisable to miss that chance, and simply to say that
we must persevere in the struggle? I say it is not advisable. The
other members of our Commission and I did our best at Pretoria for
those Colonists. Let us now take what we can get. If we decide to
continue, it would only be honest to these Colonists to say that they
must stop fighting and accept these terms. A few thousand men become
free with the temporary loss of the franchise. If we can get no better
terms for them they cannot blame us, nor will they do so if the facts
are put before them.

I am referred to what I said about a year ago at the Warmbaths, but
let me remind you that, when I spoke there, the commando of that
division was 2,000 men strong. What is the situation there to-day? The
commando consists of only 480 men. I said then that the war must
continue till famine stared us in the face. Now I do not stand here to
dishearten anyone, but I must acquaint you fully with all
circumstances, and I tell you that there are districts in our country
where famine truly and actually stares the commandos in the face, and
many of the Delegates can testify to this. Our great strength always
lay in this, that we could keep a commando, however small, in each
district, which compelled the enemy to divide its enormous armies over
the entire country. But if we must give up portions of our country we
must trek to other parts; in other words, we must concentrate, and
therein lies great danger for us, because that will enable the enemy
to concentrate their large forces against us, and our fall will
speedily follow. Some say we can go to the Cape Colony. I also know
something about that. Chief Commandant de Wet could not get into the
Cape Colony in good times with good horses and with a large force. How
shall we get there, now that winter is approaching and our horses are
so poor that we can only ride at a walk, and the distance for most of
us is so much further? I tell you we shall not get there. On the way
there, most of the commandos will dwindle away.

The question is asked: "What will the future bring us if we
surrender?" Well, that is a most vital question, and for every
Africander who has done his duty, surrender is a terribly bitter cup.
But we must take the situation as it is, and, however bitter, we must
choose the better of two bad roads. It is maintained that we must
persevere, but unless we can do so for ten or twelve years, I do not
see any grounds for hoping that we shall be able to retain our
independence, and I do not see any chance whatever of keeping up the
struggle so long. What chance have we of persevering so long? If in
two years' time we have been reduced from 60,000 men to a fourth of
that number, to what number shall we have sunk in another two years? A
hopeless perseverance may also later bring us to a forced surrender,
which will be very fatal to us. Let us use our reason, and not stand
in relation to each other as two parties. Let us try to find a common
way. I shall remain in the field as long as fighting goes on.
Personally, I have no objection to persevere.

It is further asked: What will become of our widows and orphans if we
make peace? But I in turn ask: Who will care for them if we are later
forced to surrender? Even though we conclude peace now we remain in
existence as a people, though under the British flag, and if we in
surrendering stand by each other we can, after the surrender, also
stand by each other, and devise means to assist the widows and
orphans. If, on the other hand, we entirely cease to exist, we can do
nothing more. We cannot, for instance, even send people to Europe to
seek financial help to build up the fortunes of our people again.

There are three ways open to us, and I shall submit to the decision of
the majority, but I shall feel it keenly if we are not unanimous in
our decision. I must say I can see no salvation for us in the
continuance of the war, but only the extermination of our people. The
other two ways are: Surrender _with_, and surrender _without_
conditions.

I always held the opinion that when the day dawned that we could not
maintain the struggle any longer, it would be best to stop without
making any terms, and to say to the enemy: "Here we are. We cannot go
on any longer. Banish the leaders, deal with the people as you wish;
we refuse to submit." But the question is whether we can to-day adopt
that course and act accordingly. I think we cannot. Our people have
been totally ruined, and will therefore be entirely exposed to the
mercy of the enemy. They must be financially assisted, and if the
enemy do so they can stipulate what they like and demand an oath to
their taste from every one they help. The enemy will then also be able
to carry out all their proclamations, and so destroy our national
existence. They can banish all the leaders, and further, they can
refuse to let the prisoners of war return until such time as it suits
them. In these terms the return of all prisoners of war is at least
stipulated, and all the enemy's proclamations against our persons and
property nullified. I am thus of opinion that it will be better for us
to accept these terms than to surrender unconditionally. Our cup is
bitter, but do not let us make it more bitter still. If we are
convinced that our cause is hopeless, it is a question whether we have
the right to allow one more burgher to be shot. Our object must be to
act in the interest of our people.

General HERTZOG remarked that in his opinion the extract from the
letter from the Netherlands Government to Lord Lansdowne read by
General Botha had not been well translated. Instead of "... the war
which raged in the country _without object or termination_," the
translation should be: "... the war, which _without interruption or
termination_ rages in that country," and that this made a difference.

The meeting was adjourned till two o'clock that afternoon.


At two o'clock the meeting resumed.

General MULLER (Boksburg) said: The burghers suspect something from
Lord Kitchener's refusal to allow the Deputation to come out, and have
instructed me to try and come into communication with the Deputation.
Some of my burghers commissioned me to stand for our independence, but
others gave me a free hand, to act according to circumstances, and, if
there was no other course, to accept the best possible terms. I have
always pointed my burghers to the Lord, and told them that as we were
at present situated it was impossible for us to succeed in the
struggle in our own strength and by means of our own arms, but that we
should trust in God, and that He would help us in His own way and in
His own fashion. If I now return to my burghers and inform them that I
have not been in communication with the Deputation, and that the
proposal before us has been accepted, there will be awful
dissension--I cannot think of surrender. It will be a painful matter
for me, if I must vote for making peace on these terms, but, taking
into consideration what I have heard here about the situation in the
other districts and from the Commandant General, it will be difficult
for me to go and continue the fight alone, although I and my burghers
are still prepared to go on. They also have a hard time of it, and all
necessaries are scarce, but provision is always forthcoming. If we
cannot agree with reference to the terms before us, I can suggest only
one course, and that is, that we all together make a compact with the
Lord. Then we shall have something to stand on, which we can make
clear to the people. We commenced the war with faith in the Lord.
Where then shall we stand with regard to Him if our faith now forsakes
us?

I wish to say, further, that the three million pounds, which the enemy
offers, will go only to the burghers who have remained in the field,
and to the prisoners of war. What will become of all the other
thousands of poor in the country? I represent some of the poorest in
the land. They have lost everything in the war, and no provision is
made for them. With the instructions I have and according to the
dictates of my conscience I do not know whether I can vote for this
proposal.

Commandant DE KOCK (Vrede) pointed out that the 30 Free State
Delegates represented 5,000 or 6,000 burghers, and the 30 Transvaal
Delegates 10,000, and General Smuts' 3,000 burghers of the Cape
Colony, and asked what the position would be if the 30 Free Staters,
who represented a minority, decided to continue the war? Would those
representing the majority have to submit?

The CHAIRMAN replied that although the Free State Delegates
represented a smaller number of burghers, the Free State had an equal
vote with the Transvaal in this matter.

General J. C. SMUTS spoke as follows: Hitherto I have not taken part
in the discussion, although my views are not unknown to my Government.
We have arrived at a dark stage in the development of the war, and our
cause is all the darker and more painful to me because I, as a member
of the Government of the South African Republic, was one of the
persons who entered into the war with England. A man may, however, not
shrink from the consequences of his acts, and on an occasion like
this, we must restrain all private feelings, and decide only and
exclusively with a view to the permanent interests of the Africander
people. These are great moments for us, perhaps the last time when we
meet as a free people, and a free Government. Let us thus rise to the
magnitude of the opportunity and arrive at a decision for which the
future Africander generation will bless and not curse us. The great
danger before this meeting is, that it will come to a decision from a
purely military point of view. Almost all the representatives here are
officers who do not know fear, who have never been afraid, nor will
ever become afraid of the overwhelming strength of the enemy, and who
are prepared to give their last drop of blood for their country and
their people. Now, if we view the matter merely from a military
standpoint, if we consider it only as a military matter, then I must
admit that we can still go on with the struggle. We are still an
unvanquished military force. We have still 18,000 men in the field,
veterans, with whom you can do almost any work. We can thus push our
cause, from a military point of view, still further. But we are not
here as an army, but as a people; we have not only a military
question, but also a national matter to deal with. No one here
represents his own commando. Everyone here represents the Africander
people, and not only that portion which is still in the field, but
also those who are already under the sod and those who will live after
we have gone. We represent, not only ourselves, but also the thousands
who are dead, and have made the last sacrifice for their people, the
prisoners of war scattered all over the world, and the women and
children who are dying out by thousands in the Concentration Camps of
the enemy; we represent the blood and the tears of an entire nation.

They all call upon us, from the prisoner-of-war camps, from the
Concentration Camps, from the grave, from the field, and from the womb
of the future, to decide wisely and to avoid all measures which may
lead to the decadence and extermination of the Africander people, and
thus frustrate the objects for which they made all their sacrifices.
Hitherto we have not continued the struggle aimlessly. We did not
fight merely to be shot. We commenced the struggle, and continued it
to this moment, because we wished to maintain our independence, and
were prepared to sacrifice everything for it. But we may not sacrifice
the Africander people for that independence. As soon as we are
convinced that, humanly speaking, there is no reasonable chance to
retain our independence as Republics, it clearly becomes our duty to
stop the struggle in order that we may not perhaps sacrifice our
people and our future for a mere idea, which cannot be realised. What
reasonable chance is there still to retain our independence? We have
now fought for almost three years without a break. Without deceiving
ourselves we can say that we have exerted all our powers and employed
every means to further our cause. We have given thousands of lives, we
have sacrificed all our earthly goods; our cherished country is one
continuous desert; more than 20,000 women and children have already
died in the Concentration Camps of the enemy. Has all this brought us
nearer to our independence? On the contrary, we are getting ever
further from it, and the longer we continue, the greater will be the
gap between us and the object for which we have fought. The manner in
which the enemy has carried on this war and still carries it on has
reduced us to a condition of exhaustion which will ultimately make the
continuance of the war a physical impossibility. If no deliverance
comes from elsewhere, we must certainly succumb. When a year ago I, on
behalf of my Government, communicated our condition to His Honour
President Kruger in Europe, he expressed the opinion that, with a view
to the situation in the Cape Colony, and to the feelings of the
European peoples, we should continue with the struggle till the last
means of resistance was exhausted. With reference to foreign politics,
I only wish to direct your attention to the indisputable facts. (The
speaker here discussed fully the political developments in America and
of the principal European Powers during the last two years, and then
proceeded.) For us the foreign situation is and remains that we enjoy
much sympathy, for which we are, of course, heartily thankful. That is
all we get, nor shall we receive anything more for many years. Europe
will sympathise with us till the last Boer hero lies in his last
resting-place, till the last Boer woman has gone to her grave with a
broken heart, till our entire nation shall have been sacrificed on the
altar of history and of humanity.

With reference to the situation in the Cape Colony, I have stated
fully on a former occasion what that is. We have made mistakes, and
the Cape Colony was perhaps not ripe for these events. In any case we
cannot expect any general rising there. The 3,000 men who have joined
us are heroes, whom we cannot sufficiently honour, for having
sacrificed their all for us, but they will not regain our
independence.

We have now for twelve months acted on the advice of President Kruger,
and have tried both the means indicated by him, and in both cases we
have become convinced that, if we still wish to fight, we have only
ourselves to depend upon.

The facts laid before this meeting by the Delegates from both the
Republics convince me that it will be a crime for us to continue this
struggle without the assurance of help from elsewhere. Our country has
already been ruined to its foundations, and by our continuance,
without any reasonable prospect of success, we shall hopelessly ruin
our people also.

Now the enemy approaches us with a proposal which, however
unacceptable, is coupled with the promise of amnesty for the Colonial
comrades who have joined us. I fear that the day will come when we
shall no more be able to rescue the so-called rebels, and then they
will have just grounds to reproach us that we have sacrificed their
interests also for our already hopeless cause. And I am afraid that
the rejection of the proposal of the British Government will cause us
to lose much sympathy abroad and greatly weaken our position.

Comrades, we decided to stand to the bitter end. Let us now, like men,
admit that that end has come for us, come in a more bitter shape than
we ever thought. For each one of us death would have been a sweeter
and a more welcome end than the step which we shall now have to take.
But we bow to God's will. The future is dark, but we shall not
relinquish courage and our hope and our faith in God. No one will ever
convince me that the unparalleled sacrifices laid on the altar of
Freedom by the Africander people will be vain and futile. The war of
freedom of South Africa has been fought, not only for the Boers, but
for the entire people of South Africa. The result of that struggle we
leave in God's hand. Perhaps it is His will to lead the people of
South Africa through defeat and humiliation, yea, even through the
valley of the shadow of death, to a better future and a brighter day.

Commandant A. J. BESTER (Bloemfontein) said: I have been delegated by
a commando of 800 men, and although General de Wet clearly explained
our position to them, these 800 men declared that they would not
submit to England. My commando has been taking part in the war since
the commencement, and we have sacrificed everything already that was
dear to us, all for our national existence and independence. Eight
months ago my commando was in very bad circumstances. We were badly
supplied with horses and clothing, but now we are furnished with all
we want, almost as well as when we commenced the war. Every burgher
has at least two horses, and some have five, and they are all full of
courage. Where they get the courage from is a riddle to me, because
dark days have passed over them.

Arguments with reference to our circumstances are piled up, but I must
point out that we did not commence with arguments. In 1880 the South
African Republic dared to rise against the powerful England. The view
then taken was that the Africander, who had settled here, and who had
shed his blood for his country, had a just claim to this country, and
by the London Convention the enemy had acknowledged that right, that
claim. Now the enemy has broken that Convention, and we took up arms
in the hope that right would triumph. The war was forced upon the
South African Republic and her confederate, the Orange Free State, and
why? For the sake of the franchise? No, but for the gold of
Johannesburg. That is what England wished to have, just as formerly
she wanted the diamond fields of Kimberley and scooped them in.

We commenced the war knowing that London alone had about 5,600,000
inhabitants, and we barely 200,000, but we relied on the justness of
our cause, and on the firm conviction that a just cause could never be
put down. The facts which have been summed up against the continuance
of the war cannot be reasoned away, but neither can the fact be
reasoned away that for two years and eight months we had pitted
against us the greatest Power, with unheard-of forces, with Kaffirs
and with even our own people against us, and yet they cannot
exterminate us. And how does the enemy fare? A force or 500 or even of
1,000 men dare not trek out, or 200 burghers make mincemeat of them.
We have already performed such deeds that they cannot be otherwise
described than as miracles. We must only be unanimous. I stand or fall
with my freedom.

Mr. C. BIRKENSTOCK asked whether the proposal of the British could not
be accepted under protest.

General J. C. SMUTS replied that the meeting could authorise the
Governments to sign the proposal under certain conditions.

Commandant A. J. BESTER was of opinion that it was not necessary to
discuss the matter further, and proposed that the discussion be
closed.

His proposal received no seconder.

Commandant J. E. MENTZ (Heilbron) said: I represent the Vechtkop
division of the Heilbron district. I believe there is nothing else for
us to discuss than the questions: Shall we continue the war, or shall
we accept the terms before us? In my opinion, unconditional surrender
is out of the question, and I must say that after my experiences, and
taking into consideration the general condition in which, according to
the communications made to us here, we are in, I do not see a chance
of going on further with the struggle. The conditions in Heilbron,
Kroonstad, and parts of Vrede and Bloemfontein are most pitiable. Not
five cattle have remained over in these districts for the families to
slaughter. In my division, there are between 200 and 300 women and
children, and the husbands of most of them are prisoners-of-war. Many
are widows, whose husbands have sacrificed their lives, and now they
are helpless. If the war must continue I shall have to leave my
district; but will it be right and honest of me to leave the families
there to the mercy of the enemy? There is, indeed, a chance of getting
cattle through the block house lines of the enemy, but in about half a
day the cattle are retaken from us. I can assure you that when I left
my commando they had nothing to live on except a little mealies. Our
horses are also poor, and we have no forage for them. Since March the
enemy has continually been surrounding us, and we have been very much
harassed. We are beginning to be so hard pressed that we are obliged
even by day to break through the cordon which the enemy draws round
us. A week before I came here I had to fight my way twice through a
cordon, and 40 of my burghers, whose horses were poor, were captured.

I was surprised to learn that our Deputation wished to return, because
we were always hoping that they would be able to do something for us.
I am afraid that if we do not accept these terms we shall crumble away
bit by bit. I see no other prospect for us if we continue the
struggle, and fear that the longer we continue the worse we shall
fare.

General J. KEMP (Krugersdorp) spoke as follows: Although I have
already expressed my opinion, I wish to do so again. This is a grave
moment for every Africander, because if we take a wrong step, it can
have fatal consequences for our people. As far as my division is
concerned, I still see a chance of going on with the struggle, and the
instruction of my burghers was: "Stand for the independence." In spite
of the legal opinion given here, I must ask: Where shall I stand, if I
vote for this proposal, and my burghers do not approve of it, since
they gave me a definite instruction? The document before us is so
vague and unintelligible, that it will enable the enemy to suppress us
altogether. The three millions for payment of Government Notes and
receipts will not cover a third of the amounts owing. I say that the
enemy will make the payment of these three millions so troublesome
that the poor will see very little or nothing of it. The Dutch
language will be allowed where the parents of the children desire it,
but what does that avail against the declaration of Lord Milner, that
he wants only one language in South Africa? It is plain that it is
intended to entirely suppress and Anglicise the whole Africanderdom.
We have struggled so long for our independence, and although our
situation is difficult and dark we may not give up the fight. Two
years ago everything was just as dark. If we accept these terms, our
people will go under entirely, while by continuing we may still be
able to right matters. If we stand together we are invincible; if we
accept these terms, then all our suffering and struggling and
sacrifices will have been in vain. I must carry out my instruction and
stand for our independence.

Acting State President S. W. BURGER said: I intended not to say a
single word more on this question, because I have already expressed my
opinion, but in these grave moments there are a few points I wish to
put forward. There are in this meeting two parties, as it were, and
that is to be regretted. We must stand together as one man, one in
heart, one in opinion, and with only one object in view--the future
salvation and welfare of our people.

I notice that most of those speakers who plead for the continuance of
the war are still young men, and it is perhaps the first time that
they have had to decide on such a weighty matter. I ask you: Can we
under the existing circumstances prosecute the war? And to that I must
reply that, according to my views, based on what I have seen, on what
I have heard here, on what I have experienced myself, there is no
reasonable possibility for us to prosecute the war with the
expectation that the result will be favourable to us. We are referred
to the war of 1880-1881, but that cannot be compared with the present
struggle. I took part in it from beginning to end. We were then a
small people, and we triumphed--yes, but not with our arms. There were
other circumstances, which gave us the victory. President Brand, of
our sister State, who remained neutral, assisted us, and Gladstone in
England stood by us, and did us justice. There were then better men in
England than now. It was not by the sword that we gained the victory.

It is argued that we have carried on the struggle for more than two
years, and that we can still go on. But if we observe with what we
commenced, and how we are situate now, it must be seen that we are
going to certain ruin, as has already been explained. If I take into
consideration the means we had and our numerical strength when we
commenced, and our present condition, then I can cherish no hope of
gaining the victory. Every man we lose makes the enemy stronger, and
the troops against us have not been reduced, but increased, since Lord
Roberts entered Pretoria, and the enemy is being taught by us, and by
our people who fight for them, how to carry on war against us. I do
not even wish to mention all the Kaffirs which the enemy have on their
side and who help them. If you do not see facts it is impossible for
me and others to open your eyes to them.

It is stated that we commenced the war with faith and trust in God,
but is that quite correct? Let each one ask himself whether he had
such faith and trust only. Was there not also a spirit of
self-confidence, of trust in our own arms, and our efficiency to
handle those arms? Was there not also a contempt of our great enemy?
There was also a spirit of war amongst the people without considering
what war could bring us. Only victory and not defeat was thought of.
No one may deny this. But the question is, what must we do now? I do
not think much of the document that lies before us. What is offered us
in it does not urge me to make peace. On me, as acting Head of the
Transvaal, there rests a great responsibility, especially towards all
those who with me have hitherto tried to do their duty to their
country and people, and if I am convinced that by the continuance of
the war we dig a grave for our people for ever and aye, can I then
vote for the continuance of it? Am I not called upon to guard the
interests of that people committed to my guidance by my reason? I say
it is my holy duty to stop this struggle now that it has become
hopeless, and not to allow one more man to be shot, and not to allow
the innocent, helpless women and children to remain any longer in
their misery in the plague-stricken Concentration Camps. We are now
called upon to sacrifice our freedom, just as Abraham was called upon
to sacrifice his son; and faith is to walk on the path on which we are
led, however dark it may be.

If we decide to continue, two facts stare us in the face. The one is,
that many burghers will be compelled to lay down their arms, and the
other, that we shall have to abandon parts of the South African
Republic, as well as of the Orange Free State. Is that progress? If
parts of the country are abandoned by us, they, of course, fall
entirely into the hands of the enemy, who will certainly make use of
that circumstance.

It is asked whether we shall not later on get an opportunity again for
negotiating if we desire to do so. I say: No. We must not lose sight
of the position in which the enemy stands towards us, and their power.
If we separate now without making peace, the enemy will never again
acknowledge us as a party, and a later opportunity for negotiation
will in my opinion be out of the question. This is probably our last
meeting. The time for unconditional surrender is past, and in reply to
the question, What will become of our people if we accept these terms?
I say: "There remains a root, and that root will again sprout up as a
child, and the time will arrive when we shall again have the right to
speak in the government of our country. Let us thus preserve the root,
because, if that is eradicated, it is all over with us. Chop off a
tree, and it will sprout again; but root it out, and it is no more.
And surely our people have not deserved to be rooted out.

Other speakers have clearly pointed out what the continuance of the
war will bring us. Those who are in favour of its prosecution speak
only of hope. But on what do they build that hope? On our arms? No one
says that. On intervention? No, every one declares he does not believe
in that. Upon what, then, is the hope founded? Speaking of
intervention, I wish to say that I do not believe or expect that any
Power will help us. My experience is that the Powers make use of the
difficulty in which England is situated in South Africa to settle all
their outstanding questions with that country. They profit by this
war, and will therefore not lift a finger for us.

There are men among you who will not hear of giving up the struggle.
But they follow the dictates of their hearts, and not of their heads.
However painful it is, I must say, with the facts before us, we must
give up the fight.

I very much regret that, since the Orange Free State, our confederate,
threw in her lot with us, the Transvaal should to-day exhibit the
greater weakness, and is obliged to say that she cannot go on any
more, while many of our Free State comrades still wish to maintain
the struggle. But you must know that the enemy have latterly specially
applied themselves to subjugate the Transvaal first, and for that
purpose have concentrated all their forces upon us. However painful it
is to me, my reason tells me that we cannot go on any further, but
that it is better to bow to a foreign flag and to save our people,
than to continue and to allow our people to be entirely exterminated."

Mr. L. J. JACOBSZ (Acting State Attorney of the South African
Republic) said: I have not yet expressed an opinion, because I am not
a fighting burgher. I have, indeed, suffered great privations and been
in great danger, but I consider that as nothing compared to what
others have suffered. I also maintained silence from fear that my
views might make a wrong impression on others, and in that way
prejudice our cause, while those who do the actual fighting know what
they can still effect.

I have heard all the discussions, but I have heard nothing that has
made me change the opinion which I have long held and which I
expressed at Klerksdorp, viz., that we cannot continue the struggle
any longer. My opinions have been voiced by our military leaders. We
have heard the opinions of Generals de la Rey, Louis Botha, and J. C.
Smuts, and also of some of the Free State Delegates, and I fail to see
how it will be possible for us, if we should decide to continue and
return to our burghers, not to convey to them the impression made on
us by these opinions. And if these opinions become known, what will
the result be? Dissatisfaction and paralysis will at once follow, with
the result that the burghers will not be able to prosecute the
struggle any further. Those opinions are based on facts, and will
undoubtedly dissipate the courage which so many still had. We all know
what the condition of our country is. The country cannot support the
commandos any longer. This has been proved. And, further, what is the
condition of our women and children? We have officially been informed
that over 20,000 have already died, and there is another more
important matter, viz., the immorality in the Concentration Camps,
about which we hear from various sources. This is the worst cancer
which can attack a people. Our female sex stands under the influence
of the enemy, and is beginning to deviate from the morals of their and
our forefathers, and that deviation touches the root of our national
existence. No one can argue that away.

If we were more or less certain that by perseverance we should succeed
in our object, then let us persevere and defy all privations and
dangers. Many of us have hoped for and built on intervention, but
personally I see no ground for such hope.

I have great sympathy for men like Commandant Bester, who do not even
think of laying down their arms, but we stand face to face with facts,
and we must not proceed with our head against the wall. It is argued
that we must have faith, but faith must have grounds, and what grounds
have we? We cannot compare our people to the Israelites of old. Israel
had definite promises. General de Wet has attempted to adduce some
grounds, but they were, in my opinion, not satisfactory or sufficient.

The idea of accepting terms from the enemy never occurred to our
Government at first, and an unconditional surrender is what will be
agreeable to our feelings, but what our reason dissuades us from. For
the sake of our people, we must take what we can get in order to help
them, even though the three millions is so trifling and the terms
before us so disappointing. The Commission delegated by us did what
they could, and all the members have our perfect confidence. Our
people are longing for peace, and if they know that we did our best,
they will be satisfied.

I want to add further that I am of the same opinion as Advocates
Hertzog and Smuts with reference to the difficulty of some of the
Delegates, that they have a definite instruction, and must vote
accordingly.

Commandant J. J. ALBERTS (Standerton) spoke more or less in the
strain of his former speech. He was in favour of terminating the war
by sacrificing some territory, but if that was impossible, the war
should in any case be concluded.

General DE WET was of opinion, with a view to the limited time within
which the Meeting had to decide, that, if possible, proposals should
be submitted to the Meeting.

General G. A. BRAND held the same view.

Field Cornet D. J. E. OPPERMAN (Pretoria) said: I have no definite
instruction from my burghers, except that I must make the best of the
situation when we have considered all the circumstances. It is well
that in this important matter we have men of different opinions, which
they express, because in that way we become well posted on all
matters, and are thus enabled to arrive at a good decision.

Unconditional surrender we can put out of our minds, because, in my
opinion, we have gone too far for that. It is as difficult for me to
decide to continue the war as to accept these terms before us. Before
I came here I was of opinion that we should continue the struggle
because we have already experienced too many hardships and too much
bitterness to have to give up our country to the enemy after all. My
burghers will stand by me if I tell them that we must go on, but if
they are informed of the condition of affairs over the entire country
as we know them now, then I do not believe that they will follow me or
any officer in maintaining the fight. My great difficulty is the
condition of the families with us. Formerly, when we still had food in
abundance, the enemy gladly took the families into their Concentration
Camps, but now that they know that our supply of food is almost
entirely exhausted, they refuse to receive any more families, in order
to force us to surrender on account of their fatal condition. All
provisions with which we supply them are looted by the enemy, who
leave them deprived of everything. My conscience will therefore not
allow me to say that we must continue the war, because that will mean
that the families will have to die of hunger. We men can make some
arrangement to help ourselves, for we can move about from one place to
another to look for food, and if it came to a push, we could take
provisions from the enemy; but the women and children are helpless
victims. According to the dictates of my conscience, therefore, I must
vote for the acceptance of these terms before us in order to save our
families, but I shall record my vote only under protest and with
notification that I give it thus for the said reasons.

On the motion of Field Cornet B. J. VAN HEERDEN, seconded by Field
Cornet B. J. ROOS, it was unanimously resolved to close the
discussion, after which the Meeting was closed with Prayer till the
following morning.


SATURDAY, MAY 31ST, 1902.

At 9.30 o'clock in the morning the Meeting was opened with Prayer.

The following two proposals were handed in:--

(1) By General NIEUWOUDT, seconded by General BRAND:--

"This Meeting of special Delegates from both the Republics having
considered the proposal by His Britannic Majesty's Government for the
restoration of peace, and considering--

"(_a_) The wishes and the instructions of the Burghers in the Field;

"(_b_) That they do not feel themselves justified to conclude a peace
on the basis laid down by His Majesty's Government before having been
placed in communication with the Delegates of the Republics at present
in Europe, Resolves--

"That they cannot accept the proposal of His Majesty's Government, and
instructs the Governments to communicate this Resolution to His
Britannic Majesty's Government through their Representatives here."

(2) By General P. R. VILJOEN, seconded by General H. A. ALBERTS:--

"That this Meeting resolves to accept the Proposal of the British
Government."

State Secretary F. W. REITZ now addressed the Meeting, and said: I
consider it a duty to myself, as State Secretary and as burgher, to my
nation, and to posterity, to say that if this Meeting decides to
conclude the war and to accept the British terms, they will have to
make provision for the signing thereof, because I shall affix my
signature to no document by which our independence is relinquished.
But I must also say that if this Meeting does not see its way clear to
go on with the war, they ought not to accept any terms from the enemy,
but should simply say: "Here we are, here are our people. We cannot
continue the war any further; take us." I do not wish to hurt
anybody's feelings. On the contrary, I have the greatest respect for
the feelings of those brave men here who have fought so well and so
faithfully for their country and people, but I consider that it would
be wrong of us to make terms with England.

The CHAIRMAN remarked that the State Secretary was out of order.

General P. R. VILJOEN said: I have prayed that God may grant that I
shall not trample on the precious blood that has been shed, on the
blood of my own son, but after all that I have heard here I have
become convinced that we must terminate this war. I have tabled a
proposal from which the future generations can see that we are obliged
and forced to sacrifice our independence. I only trust that we shall
be unanimous in our resolution.

[Illustration: _Facsimile of the original proposal by Commandant H. P.
J. Pretorius, seconded by General Chris. Botha, to accept the British
Peace Proposals._]

General DE WET said: The time is too short to admit of further
discussion on these proposals, and we must arrive at a decision. I
propose that we appoint a committee, consisting of Advocates Smuts and
Hertzog, to draft a proposal embodying the views of this Meeting. I do
not say what the proposal must embrace. Let us then adjourn for an
hour, and let the Delegates of the South African Republic and of the
Orange Free State meet each other separately, in order to try to come
to unanimity. We must arrive at a unanimous decision, because
that will be of incalculable value to us for the future.

General BOTHA: I think we must adopt General de Wet's suggestion. We
have fought and suffered together; let us now decide together. In this
matter we can and must devise means to be unanimous.

General DE WET'S proposal was unanimously adopted by the Meeting, and
the Orange Free State Delegates withdrew to the tent of General de
Wet, while those of the South African Republic remained in the tent in
which the meeting was held.

Fully an hour later all the Delegates met again, and the following
resolution drafted by Generals HERTZOG and SMUTS was read:--

"This Meeting of Representatives of the people of both the South
African Republic and the Orange Free State, held at Vereeniging from
May 15 to 31, 1902, has with regret taken cognisance of the proposal
made by His Majesty's Government relative to the termination of the
existing hostilities, and of its communication that this proposal must
be accepted or rejected without alteration. It deplores the fact that
His Majesty's Government has absolutely refused to negotiate with the
Governments of the Republics on the basis of their independence, or to
permit their Governments to communicate with their Deputation. Our
People have, indeed, always been of opinion that not only on the
ground of Right, but also of the great material and personal
sacrifices made for their independence, they had a well-founded claim
to that Independence.

"This Meeting has seriously weighed the condition of their Country and
People, and has specially noted the following facts:--

"1. That the Military policy followed by the British Military
Authorities has led to the entire devastation of the territory of both
the Republics with the burning of farms and villages, the destruction
of all means of subsistence, and the exhaustion of all sources
necessary for the support of our families, for the existence of our
troops, and for the continuation of the war.

"2. That the placing of our captured families in the Concentration
Camps has led to an unheard-of condition of suffering and disease, so
that in a comparatively short time about 20,000 of our dear ones have
perished in those camps, and the horrible prospect has arisen that by
the continuance of the war our entire race may in that way die out.

"3. That the Kaffir tribes within and without the boundaries of the
territory of both Republics have almost all been armed, and have taken
part in the struggle against us, and, by perpetrating murders and
committing all kinds of atrocities, have brought about an impossible
state of affairs in many districts of both the Republics, as has only
been recently proved in the Vrijheid district, where on a single
occasion 56 burghers were murdered and mutilated in an awful manner.

"4. That by the proclamations of the enemy to which they have already
begun to give effect the burghers who are still fighting are menaced
with the loss of all their movable and immovable property, and thus
with entire material ruin.

"5. That through the circumstances of the war it has long ago become
impossible for us to retain the many thousands of prisoners of war
taken by our forces, and that we can thus do comparatively little
damage to the British Forces while the burghers who are captured by
the British are sent out of the country, and that after the war has
been raging for almost three years there remains only an insignificant
portion of the fighting force with which we commenced the war.

"6. That this struggling remnant, which constitutes only a small
minority of our entire people, has to fight against overwhelming odds
of the enemy, and is, moreover, practically in a state of famine and
privation, wanting even the indispensable necessaries of life, and
that in spite of the application of our utmost endeavours and the
sacrifice of all that was dear and precious to us, we cannot
reasonably expect ultimate victory.

"This Meeting is therefore of opinion that there is no reasonable
ground to expect that by carrying on the war the People will be able
to retain their independence, and considers that, under the
circumstances, the People are not justified in proceeding with the
war, since such can only tend to the social and material ruin, not
only of ourselves, but also of our posterity.

"Forced by the above-mentioned circumstances and motives, this Meeting
instructs both Governments to accept the proposal of His Majesty's
Government, and to sign the same on behalf of the People of both the
Republics.

"This Meeting of Delegates expresses the belief that the conditions
thus created by the acceptance of the proposal of His Majesty's
Government may speedily be so ameliorated that our People will thereby
attain the enjoyment of those privileges to which they consider they
can justly lay claim, on the ground not only of their past history,
but also of their sacrifices in this war.

"This Meeting has noted with satisfaction the decision of His
Majesty's Government to grant a large measure of amnesty to those
British subjects who took up arms on our side, and to whom we are
bound by ties of blood and honour, and expresses the wish that it may
please His Majesty to extend this amnesty still further."

This proposal was moved by Commandant H. P. J. PRETORIUS (Jacobsdal),
and seconded by General Chris. BOTHA.

General NIEUWOUDT withdrew his proposal, which was, however,
immediately adopted by General C. C. J. BADENHORST (Boshof), and
seconded by Commander A. BESTER (Bloemfontein).

The Meeting then adjourned till two o'clock.


At two o'clock the Meeting was resumed.

The proposal of Commandant H. P. J. PRETORIUS, seconded by General
Chris. BOTHA, was then put to the vote.

The voting was as follows:--

  FOR.

  H. A. Alberts.
  A. J. Bester (Bethlehem).
  L. P. H. Botha.
  G. A. Brand.
  H. J. Bruwer.
  J. F. de Beer.
  C. J. Brits.
  H. J. Bosman.
  Chris. Botha.
  C. Birkenstock.
  C. F. Beyers.
  B. H. Breytenbach.
  F. R. Cronje.
  D. H. van Coller.
  J. de Clercq.
  J. G. Cilliers.
  T. A. Dönges.
  C. C. Froneman.
  D. F. H. Flemming.
  H. S. Grobler.
  J. L. Grobler.
  J. N. H. Grobler.
  F. J. W. J. Hattingh.
  J. A. M. Hertzog.
  B. J. van Heerden.
  J. N. Jacobs.
  F. P. Jacobsz.
  J. F. Jordaan.
  J. J. Koen.
  H. J. Kritzinger.
  A. J. de Kock.
  P. J. Liebenberg.
  J. A. P. Van der Merwe.
  F. E. Mentz.
  C. H. Muller.
  T. K. Nieuwoudt.
  H. van Niekerk.
  J. J. van Niekerk.
  D. J. E. Opperman.
  A. M. Prinsloo.
  H. P. J. Pretorius.
  A. Ross.
  L. J. Rautenbach.
  P. D. Roux.
  F. J. Rheeder.
  B. Roos.
  D. J. Schoeman.
  T. Stofberg.
  S. P. du Toit.
  P. L. Uijs.
  W. J. Viljoen.
  P. W. de Vos.
  W. J. Wessels.
  P. R. Viljoen.

  AGAINST.

  J. J. Alberts (S.A.R.).
  J. Kemp (S.A.R.).
  J. Naudé (S.A.R.).
  A. J. Bester (Bloemfontein), (O.F.S.).
  C. C. J. Badenhorst (O.F.S.).
  C. A. van Niekerk (O.F.S.).

By 54 votes to 6 the proposal was adopted.

When this resolution had been passed there were not many tearless eyes
in the tent.

Acting President S. W. BURGER then addressed the following words to
the Meeting: We stand here at the graveside of the two Republics. Much
remains for us to do, even though we cannot do what lies before us in
the official positions which we have hitherto occupied. Let us not
withdraw our hands from doing what is our duty. Let us pray God to
guide us and to direct us how to keep our people together. We must
also be inclined to forgive and to forget when we meet our brothers.
We may not cast off that portion of our people who were unfaithful.
With these words I wish officially to bid farewell to you, our
respected Commandant General, General de Wet, Members of both
Executive Councils, and Delegates.

With this the last meeting of the two Republics terminated. It was
closed with Prayer.

[Illustration: _Facsimile of the document on which the voting on the
proposal by Commandant H. P. J. Pretorius, seconded by General Chris.
Botha, was recorded._]

The Secretary, Mr. D. E. van Velden, was then instructed to request
Lord Kitchener's representatives in the camp--namely, Captain P. J.
Marker and Major Henderson--to come to the tent in which the meeting
was held in order that the decision of the Meeting might be
communicated to them.

They speedily arrived, and under a death-like silence General Botha
informed them that the Meeting had accepted the peace proposals of the
British Government.

Immediately afterwards the British Authorities made the necessary
arrangements for the conveyance by rail to Pretoria of the members of
both Republican Governments to sign the Treaty of Peace in accordance
with the instruction of the Meeting.

That night, shortly before 11 o'clock, the said Governments duly
arrived at Pretoria.

On arrival at the Railway Station they were conveyed in great haste to
the residence of Mr. George Heys in Maré Street, which was occupied by
Lord Kitchener, and served as the Army Headquarters in South Africa.

For a few moments the members of the two Republican Governments, who
were accompanied by the two Secretaries, Rev. J. D. Kestell and Mr. D.
E. van Velden, were left alone in the spacious dining-room, as they
wished to read the resolution of the Delegates once more in order to
satisfy themselves that it was correct.

When this had been done, Lord Kitchener and Lord Milner entered.

The two Representatives of the British Government sat at the head of
the table next to each other at the south side of the apartment. On
the left of Lord Milner sat Acting President S. W. Burger, State
Secretary F. W. Reitz, Commandant General Louis Botha, General J. H.
de la Rey, Mr. J. C. Krogh, and General L. J. Meyer. On Lord
Kitchener's right sat Acting President C. R. de Wet, General C. H.
Olivier, General J. B. M. Hertzog, and Acting Government Secretary Mr.
W. J. C. Brebner.

The Peace Treaty had been typed in quadruple on parchment. One copy
was intended for the King of England, one for Lord Kitchener, one to
be preserved in the Archives in Pretoria, and one in the Archives in
Bloemfontein.

There was perfect silence when Acting President S. W. Burger took up
the pen.

It was five minutes past eleven on May 31, 1902.

Acting President Burger signed. After him the members of the
Government of the South African Republic. Then Acting President de Wet
and the Members of the Orange Free State Government. Lord Kitchener
followed, and last of all Lord Milner signed.

Before signing State Secretary Reitz rose in his seat, pen in hand,
and stated that he signed only in his official capacity, and not as F.
W. Reitz.

President Steyn was not there. Physical prostration due to his serious
illness prevented him from doing what he had always said he would
never do, viz., put his hand on paper to sign away the Independence of
his People.

The document was signed.

Everything was silent in the apartment where so much had taken place.

For a few moments everyone sat still.

As the members of the Governments of the now late Republics stood up,
as men stupefied, to leave the apartment, Lord Kitchener rose, and,
going up to each of them, offered his hand, saying, "We are good
friends now."

They then left the apartment and proceeded to the adjoining house (the
residence of Mr. Carl Rood), which had been placed at their disposal.

       *       *       *       *       *

After the resolution of the meeting had been communicated to the
British Representatives, the Delegates met again, when the following
proposal by Commandant Jacobsz, seconded by General Muller, was
unanimously adopted:--

     "This meeting of Delegates, considering the pressing necessity to
     collect means to provide for the wants of the suffering women and
     children, widows and orphans, and other necessitous persons who
     have been reduced to a state of indigency by the war,

     "And considering the desirability of appointing a Head Committee,
     whose duty it shall be to take the necessary steps to make
     provision herein and to decide finally about the Administration
     and application of the means to be collected,

     "Resolves to appoint Messrs. M. T. Steijn, S. W. Burger, L.
     Botha, C. R. de Wet, J. H. de la Rey, Rev. A. P. Kriel, and Rev.
     J. D. Kestell (Secretary), a Head Committee, to make all such
     further arrangements for carrying out the said objects as may
     appear desirable and practical to them, and especially to add new
     members to their number, to appoint Sub-Committees and an
     Executive Committee, which is authorised to draw up Statutes and
     amend the same whenever necessary."

It was further proposed by Commandant Jacobsz, seconded by General
Muller, and carried by the meeting:--

"This meeting further resolves to delegate General C. R. de Wet,
General Louis Botha, and General J. H. de la Rey, of the said Head
Committee, to proceed to Europe to collect the said funds."




APPENDIX

THE MIDDELBURG PROPOSALS.


                                            _Pretoria, March 7, 1901._

YOUR HONOUR,

With reference to your conversation at Middelburg on February 28, I
have the honour to inform you that, in the event of a general and
complete cessation of hostilities, and the surrender of all rifles,
ammunition, cannon, and other munitions of war in the hands of the
burghers, or in Government _depôts_ or elsewhere, His Majesty's
Government is prepared to adopt the following measures:--

His Majesty's Government will at once grant an amnesty in the
Transvaal and Orange River Colony for all _bona fide_ acts of war
committed during the recent hostilities. British Subjects belonging to
Natal and Cape Colony, while they will not be compelled to return to
those Colonies, will, if they do so, be liable to be dealt with by the
laws of those Colonies specially passed to meet the circumstances
arising out of the present war. As you are doubtless aware, the
special law in the Cape Colony has greatly mitigated the ordinary
penalties for High Treason in the present case.

All prisoners of war now in St. Helena, Ceylon, or elsewhere, being
burghers or Colonists, will, on the completion of the surrender, be
brought back to their country as quickly as arrangements can be made
for their transport.

At the earliest practicable date military administration will cease,
and will be replaced by civil administration in the form of Crown
Colony Government. There will, therefore, be, in the first instance,
in each of the new Colonies, a Governor and an Executive Council,
composed of the principal officials, with a Legislative Council
consisting of a certain number of official members to whom a nominated
unofficial element will be added. But it is the desire of His
Majesty's Government, as soon as circumstances permit, to introduce a
representative element, and ultimately to concede to the new Colonies
the privilege of self-government. Moreover, on the cessation of
hostilities, a High Court will be established in each of the new
Colonies to administrate the laws of the land, and this Court will be
independent of the Executive.

Church property, public trusts, and orphan funds will be respected.
Both the English and Dutch languages will be used and taught in public
schools when the parents of the children desire it, and allowed in
Courts of Law.

As regards the debts of the late Republican Governments, His Majesty's
Government cannot undertake any liability. It is, however, prepared,
as an act of grace, to set aside a sum not exceeding one million
pounds sterling to repay inhabitants of the Transvaal and Orange River
Colony for goods requisitioned from them by the Republican
Governments, or subsequent to annexation, by Commandants in the field
being in a position to inforce such requisitions. But such claims will
have to be established to the satisfaction of a Judge or Judicial
Commission, appointed by the Government, to investigate and assess
them, and, if exceeding in the aggregate one million pounds, they will
be liable to reduction _pro rata_.

I also beg to inform your Honour that the new Government will take
into immediate consideration the possibility of assisting by loan the
occupants of farms, who will take the oath of allegiance, to repair
any injuries sustained by destruction of buildings or loss of stock
during the war, and that no special war tax will be imposed upon
farms to defray the expense of the war.

When Burghers require the protection of firearms, such will be allowed
to them by licence, and on due registration, provided they take the
oath of allegiance. Licences will also be issued for sporting rifles,
guns, &c., but military firearms will only be allowed for purposes of
protection.

As regards the extension of the franchise to Kaffirs in the Transvaal
and Orange River Colony, it is not the intention of His Majesty's
Government to give such franchise before representative Government is
granted to those Colonies, and if then given it will be so limited as
to secure the just predominance of the white race. The legal position
of coloured persons will, however, be similar to that which they hold
in the Cape Colony.

In conclusion, I must inform your Honour that, if the terms now
offered are not accepted after a reasonable delay for consideration,
they must be regarded as cancelled.

  I have, &c.,
                        KITCHENER, GENERAL,
               _Commander-in-Chief, British Forces, South Africa_.

To his Honour COMMANDANT-GENERAL LOUIS BOTHA.