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  THE LIFE OF GORDON

  MAJOR-GENERAL, R.E., C.B.; TURKISH FIELD-MARSHAL, GRAND
  CORDON MEDJIDIEH, AND PASHA; CHINESE TITU (FIELD-MARSHAL),
  YELLOW JACKET ORDER.


  "_'Tis a name which ne'er hath been dishonour'd,
  And never will, I trust--most surely never
  By such a youth as thou._"

                            --SWINTON ON ADAM GORDON.


  BY

  DEMETRIUS C. BOULGER

  AUTHOR OF "THE HISTORY OF CHINA;" "ENGLAND AND RUSSIA IN CENTRAL
  ASIA;" "LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK," ETC., ETC.


  WITH PORTRAIT


  VOLUME II


  LONDON
  T. FISHER UNWIN
  PATERNOSTER SQUARE

  MDCCCXCVI

  [_All rights reserved._]


[Illustration: Portrait of C. G. Gordon with signature.]




CONTENTS.


VOLUME II.

  CHAP.                                           PAGE

  VIII. GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF THE SOUDAN               1

    IX. MINOR MISSIONS--INDIA AND CHINA             38

     X. THE MAURITIUS, THE CAPE, AND THE CONGO      65

    XI. THE LAST NILE MISSION                       97

   XII. KHARTOUM                                   136




CHAPTER VIII.

GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF THE SOUDAN.


When General Gordon left Egypt for England in December 1876 it was
with the expressed determination not to return; but the real state of
his mind was not bitterness at any personal grievance, or even desire
for rest, although he avowed his intention of taking six months'
leave, so much as disinclination to leave half done a piece of work in
which he had felt much interest, and with which he had identified
himself. Another consideration presented itself to him, and several of
his friends pressed the view on him with all the weight they
possessed, that no signal success could be achieved unless he were
placed in a position of supreme authority, not merely at the Equator,
but throughout the vast province of the Soudan. Such was the decision
Gordon himself, influenced no doubt by the views of two friends whose
names need not be mentioned, but who were well known for their zeal in
the anti-slavery cause, had come to a few weeks after his arrival in
England; and not thinking that there was any reasonable probability of
the Khedive appointing him to any such post, he telegraphed to the
British Consul-General, Mr Vivian, his determination not to return to
Egypt. This communication was placed before the Khedive Ismail, who
had a genuine admiration for Gordon, and who appreciated the value of
his services. He at once took the matter into his own hands, and wrote
the following letter, which shows that he thoroughly understood the
arguments that would carry weight with the person to whom they were
addressed:--

     "MY DEAR GORDON,--I was astonished yesterday to learn of the
     despatch you had sent to Mr Vivian, in which you inform me that
     you will not return; all the more so when I recall your interview
     at Abdin, during which you promised me to return, and complete
     the work we had commenced together. I must therefore attribute
     your telegram to the very natural feelings which influenced you
     on finding yourself at home and among your friends. But I cannot,
     my dear Gordon Pasha, think that a gentleman like Gordon can be
     found wanting with regard to his solemn promise, and thus, my
     dear Gordon, I await your return according to that promise.--Your
     affectionate

                                             "ISMAIL."

To such a letter as this a negative reply was difficult, if not
impossible; and when General Gordon placed the matter in the hands of
the Duke of Cambridge, as head of the army, he was told that he was
bound to return. He accordingly telegraphed to the Khedive that he was
willing to go back to the Soudan if appointed Governor-General, and
also that he would leave at once for Cairo to discuss the matter. On
his arrival there, early in February 1877, the discussion of the terms
and conditions on which Gordon would consent to return to the Upper
Nile was resumed. He explained his views at length to the Minister,
Cherif Pasha, who had succeeded Nubar as responsible adviser to the
Khedive, concluding with the ultimatum: "Either give me the Soudan, or
I will not go." The only compromise that Gordon would listen to was
that the Khedive's eldest son should be sent as Viceroy to Khartoum,
when he, for his part, would be willing to resume his old post at the
Equator. The Egyptian Ministers and high officials were not in favour
of any European being entrusted with such a high post, and they were
especially averse to the delegation of powers to a Christian, which
would leave him independent of everyone except the Khedive. But for
the personal intervention of the Khedive, Gordon would not have
revisited Cairo; and but for the same intervention he would never have
been made Governor-General, as, after a week's negotiation with
Cherif, an agreement was farther off than ever, and Gordon's patience
was nearly exhausted. The Khedive, really solicitous for Gordon's
help, and suspecting that there was something he did not know, asked
Mr Vivian to explain the matter fully to him. On hearing the cause of
the difficulty, Ismail at once said: "I will give Gordon the Soudan,"
and two days later he saw and told General Gordon the same thing,
which found formal expression in the following letter, written on 17th
February 1877, the day before Gordon left for Massowah:--

     "MY DEAR GORDON PASHA,--Appreciating your honourable character,
     your energy, and the great services that you have already
     rendered to my Government, I have decided to unite in one great
     Governor-Generalship the whole of the Soudan, Darfour, and the
     Equatorial Provinces, and to entrust to you the important mission
     of directing it. I am about to issue a Decree to this effect.

     "The territories to be included in this Government being very
     vast, it is necessary for good administration that you should
     have under your orders three Vakils--one for the Soudan properly
     so called and the Provinces of the Equator, another for Darfour,
     and the third for the Red Sea coast and the Eastern Soudan.

     "In the event of your deeming any changes necessary, you will
     make your observations to me.

     "The Governor-Generalship of the Soudan is completely independent
     of the Ministry of Finance.

     "I direct your attention to two points, viz.--the suppression of
     slavery, and the improvement of the means of communication.

     "Abyssinia extends along a great part of the frontiers of the
     Soudan. I beg of you, when you are on the spot, to carefully
     examine into the situation of affairs, and I authorise you, if
     you deem it expedient, to enter into negotiations with the
     Abyssinian authorities with the view of arriving at a settlement
     of pending questions.

     "I end by thanking you, my dear Gordon Pasha, for your kindness
     in continuing to Egypt your precious services, and I am fully
     persuaded that, with the aid of your great experience and your
     devotion, we shall bring to a happy end the work we are pursuing
     together.

     "Believe, my dear Gordon Pasha, in my sentiments of high esteem
     and sincere friendship.--Your affectionate

                                             ISMAIL."

Nothing could be more gracious than this letter, which made General
Gordon independent of the men who he feared would thwart him, and
responsible to the Khedive alone. It was followed up a few weeks
later--that is to say, after the new Governor-General had left for his
destination--by the conferring of the military rank of Muchir or
Marshal. At the same time the Khedive sent him a handsome uniform,
with £150 worth of gold lace on the coat, and the Grand Cordon of the
Medjidieh Order, which, it may be worth noting here, General Gordon
only wore when in Egyptian uniform. These acts on the part of the
Khedive Ismail show that, whatever may have been his reasons for
taking up the slavery question, he was really sincere in his desire to
support Gordon, who fully realised and appreciated the good-will and
friendly intentions of this Egyptian ruler. When an unfavourable
judgment is passed on Ismail Pasha, his consistent support of General
Gordon may be cited to show that neither his judgment nor his heart
was as bad as his numerous detractors would have the world believe.

Having settled the character of the administration he was to conduct,
General Gordon did not waste a day at Cairo. The holiday and rest to
which he was fully entitled, and of which there can be no doubt that
he stood greatly in need, were reduced to the smallest limits. Only
two months intervened between his departure from Cairo for London on
coming down from the Equator, and his second departure from Cairo to
the Soudan. Much of that period had been passed in travelling, much
more in exhausting and uncongenial negotiation in the Egyptian
capital. All the brief space over enabled him to do was to pass the
Christmas with several members of his family, to which he was so
deeply attached, to visit his sisters in the old home at Southampton,
and to run down for a day to Gravesend, the scene of his philanthropic
labours a few years before. Yet, with his extraordinary recuperative
force, he hastened with fresh strength and spirit to take up a more
arduous and more responsible task than that he had felt compelled to
relinquish so short a period before. With almost boyish energy,
tempered by a profound belief in the workings of the Divine will, he
turned his face once more to that torrid region, where at that time
and since scenes of cruelty and human suffering have been enacted
rarely surpassed in the history of the world.

Having thus described the circumstances and conditions under which
General Gordon consented to take up the Soudan question, it is
desirable to explain clearly what were the objects he had in his own
mind, and what was the practical task he set himself to accomplish.
Fortunately, this description need not be based on surmise or
individual conjecture. General Gordon set forth his task in the
plainest language, and he held the clearest, and, as the result
showed, the most correct views as to what had to be done, and the
difficulties that stood in the way of its accomplishment. He wrote on
the very threshold of his undertaking these memorable sentences:--

     "I have to contend with many vested interests, with fanaticism,
     with the abolition of hundreds of Arnauts, Turks, etc., now
     acting as Bashi-Bazouks, with inefficient governors, with wild
     independent tribes of Bedouins, and with a large semi-independent
     province lately under Zebehr Pasha at Bahr Gazelle.... With
     terrific exertion, in two or three years' time I may, with God's
     administration, make a good province, with a good army, and a
     fair revenue and peace, and an increased trade, and also have
     suppressed slave raids."

No one can dispute either the Titanic magnitude of the task to be
accomplished or the benefit its accomplishment would confer on a
miserably unhappy population. How completely the project was carried
out by one man, where powerful Governments and large armies have
failed both before and since, has now to be demonstrated.

General Gordon proceeded direct from Cairo to Massowah, which route he
selected because he hoped to settle the Abyssinian dispute before he
commenced operations in the Soudan. Both the Khedive and the British
Government wished a termination to be put to the troubles that had for
some time prevailed in the border lands of Abyssinia and the Eastern
Soudan, and it was hoped that Gordon's reputation and energy would
facilitate the removal of all difficulties with King John, who, after
the death of Theodore, had succeeded in obtaining the coveted title of
"Negus."

In order to understand the position, a few historical facts must be
recorded. By the year 1874 King John's authority was established over
every province except in the south, Shoa, where Menelik retained his
independence, and in the north, Bogos, which was seized in the year
stated by Munzinger Bey, a Swiss holding the post of Governor of
Massowah under the Khedive. In seizing Bogos, Munzinger had
dispossessed its hereditary chief, Walad el Michael, who retired to
Hamaçem, also part of his patrimony, where he raised forces in
self-defence. Munzinger proposed to annex Hamaçem, and the Khedive
assented; but he entrusted the command of the expedition to Arokol
Bey, and a Danish officer named Arendrup as military adviser, and
Munzinger was forced to be content with a minor command at Tajoura,
where he was killed some months later. The Egyptian expedition
meantime advanced with equal confidence and carelessness upon Hamaçem,
Michael attacked it in several detachments, and had the double
satisfaction of destroying the troops and capturing their arms and
ammunition. Such was the disastrous commencement of those pending
questions to which the Khedive Ismail referred in his letter to
General Gordon.

The Khedive decided to retrieve this reverse, and to continue his
original design. With this object a considerable number of troops were
sent to Massowah, and the conduct of the affair was entrusted to Ratib
Pasha and an American soldier of fortune, Colonel Loring Pasha. By
this time--1876--Michael had quarrelled with King John, who had
compelled him to give up the weapons he had captured from the
Egyptians, and, anxious for revenge, he threw in his lot with his
recent adversaries. The Egyptian leaders showed they had not profited
by the experience of their predecessors. They advanced in the same
bold and incautious manner, and after they had built two strong forts
on the Gura plateau they were induced, by jealousy of each other or
contempt for their enemy when he appeared, to leave the shelter of
their forts, and to fight in the open. The Egyptian Ratib had the good
sense to advise, "Stay in the forts," but Loring exclaimed: "No! march
out of them. You are afraid!" and thus a taunt once again sufficed to
banish prudence. The result of this action, which lasted only an hour,
was the loss of over 10,000 Egyptian troops, of 25 cannon, and 10,000
Remington rifles. The survivors took refuge in the forts, and
succeeded in holding them. Negotiations then followed, and King John
showed an unexpected moderation and desire for peace with Egypt, but
only on the condition of the surrender of his recalcitrant vassal
Michael. Michael retaliated by carrying raids into King John's
territory, thus keeping the whole border in a state of disorder, which
precluded all idea of a stable peace.

Such was the position with which General Gordon had to deal. He had to
encourage the weakened and disheartened Egyptian garrison, to muzzle
Michael without exposing the Khedive to the charge of deserting his
ally, and to conclude a peace with Abyssinia without surrendering
either Bogos or Michael. At this stage we are only called upon to
describe the first brief phase of this delicate question, which at
recurring intervals occupied Gordon's attention during the whole of
his stay in the Soudan. His first step was to inform Michael that the
subsidy of money and provisions would only be paid him on condition
that he abstained from attacking the Abyssinian frontier; his next to
write a letter to King John, offering him fair terms, and enclosing
the draft of a treaty of amity. There was good reason to think that
these overtures would have produced a favourable result if it had been
possible for General Gordon to have seen King John at that time, but
unfortunately a fresh war had just broken out with Menelik, and King
John had to proceed in all haste to Shoa. He did not reply to Gordon's
letter for six months, and by that time Gordon was too thoroughly
engaged in the Soudan to take up the Abyssinian question until the
force of events, as will be seen, again compelled him to do so.

Having decided that the Abyssinian dispute must wait, General Gordon
proceeded by Kassala on his journey to Khartoum. Travelling not less
than thirty miles a day, in great heat, organising the administration
on his way, and granting personal audience to everyone who wished to
see him, from the lowest miserable and naked peasant to the highest
official or religious personage, like the Shereef Said Hakim, he
reached Khartoum on the 3rd May. He did not delay an hour in the
commencement of his task. His first public announcement was to abolish
the _courbash_, to remit arrears of taxation, and to sanction a
scheme for pumping the river water into the town. The _Kadi_ or mayor
read this address in the public square; the people hailed it with
manifestations of pleasure, and Gordon himself, carried away by his
enthusiasm for his work, compresses the long harangue into a brief
text: "With the help of God, I will hold the balance level."

But the measures named were not attended by any great difficulty in
their inception or execution. They were merely the preliminaries to
the serious and risky disbandment of the Bashi-Bazouks, and the steps
necessary to restrict and control, not merely the trade in, but the
possession of, slaves. As General Gordon repeatedly pointed out, his
policy and proceedings were a direct attack on the only property that
existed in the Soudan, and justice to the slave could not be equitably
dispensed by injustice to the slave-owner. The third class of slave
raider stood in a separate category, and in dealing with him Gordon
never felt a trace of compunction. He had terminated the career of
those ruthless scourges of the African races at the Equator, and with
God's help he was determined to end it throughout the Soudan. But the
slave question in Egypt was many-sided, and bristled with difficulties
to anyone who understood it, and wished to mete out a fair and equable
treatment to all concerned.

It was with the special object of maintaining the rights of the owners
as well as of the slaves that Gordon proposed a set of regulations,
making the immediate registration of slaves compulsory, and thus
paving the way for the promulgation of the Slave Convention already
under negotiation. His propositions were only four in number, and read
as follows:--

     1. Enforce the law compelling runaway slaves to return to their
     masters, except when cruelly treated.

     2. Require masters to register their slaves before 1st January
     1878.

     3. If the masters neglect to register them, then Regulation 1 not
     to be enforced in their favour.

     4. No registration to be allowed after 1st January 1878.

By these simple but practical arrangements General Gordon would have
upheld the rights of the slave-owners, and thus disarmed their
hostility, at the same time that he stopped the imposition of
servitude on any fresh persons. In the course of time, and without
imposing on the Exchequer the burden of the compensation, which he saw
the owners were in equity entitled to, he would thus have put an end
to the slave trade throughout the Soudan.

The Anglo-Egyptian Convention on the subject of the slave trade,
signed on 4th August 1877, was neither so simple nor so practical,
while there was a glaring inconsistency between its provisions and the
Khedivial Decree that accompanied it.

The second article of the Convention reads: "Any person engaged in
traffic of slaves, either directly or indirectly, shall be considered
guilty of stealing with murder (_vol avec meurtre_)," and consequently
punishable, as General Gordon assumed, with death.

But the first and second clauses of the Khedive's Decree were to a
different effect. They ran as follows:--

     "The sale of slaves from family to family will be prohibited.
     This prohibition will take effect in seven years in Cairo, and in
     twelve years in the Soudan.

     "After the lapse of this term of years any infraction of this
     prohibition will be punished by an imprisonment of from five
     months to five years."

The literal interpretation of this decree would have left Gordon
helpless to do anything for the curtailment of the slave trade until
the year 1889, and then only permitted to inflict a quite insufficient
punishment on those who broke the law. General Gordon pointed out the
contradiction between the Convention and the Decree, and the
impossibility of carrying out his original instructions if he were
deprived of the power of allotting adequate punishment for offences;
and he reverted to his original proposition of registration, for which
the Slave Convention made no provision, although the negotiators at
Cairo were fully aware of his views and recommendations expressed in
an official despatch three months before that Convention was signed.
To these representations Gordon never received any reply. He was left
to work out the problem for himself, to carry on the suppression of
the slave trade as best he could, and to take the risk of official
censure and repudiation for following one set of instructions in the
Convention in preference to those recorded in the Decree. The outside
public blamed the Khedive, and Gordon himself blamed Nubar Pasha and
the Egyptian Ministry; but the real fault lay at the doors of the
British Government, which knew of Gordon's representations and the
discrepancy between the orders of the Khedive and the Convention they
had signed together, and yet did nothing to enforce the precise
fulfilment of the provisions it had thought it worth while to resort
to diplomacy to obtain. The same hesitation and inability to grasp the
real issues has characterised British policy in Egypt down to the
present hour.

If Gordon had not been a man fearless of responsibility, and resolved
that some result should ensue from his labours, he would no doubt have
expended his patience and strength in futile efforts to obtain clearer
and more consistent instructions from Cairo, and, harassed by
official tergiversation and delay, he would have been driven to give
up his task in disgust if not despair. But being what he was--a man of
the greatest determination and the highest spirit--he abandoned any
useless effort to negotiate with either the English or the Egyptian
authorities in the Delta, and he turned to the work in hand with the
resolve to govern the Soudan in the name of the Khedive, but as a
practical Dictator. It was then that broke from him the characteristic
and courageous phrase: "I will carry things with a high hand to the
last."

The first and most pressing task to which Gordon had to address
himself was the supersession of the Turkish and Arab irregulars, who,
under the name of "Bashi-Bazouks," constituted a large part of the
provincial garrison. Not merely were they inefficient from a military
point of view, but their practice, confirmed by long immunity, had
been to prey on the unoffending population. They thus brought the
Government into disrepute, at the same time that they were an element
of weakness in its position. Gordon saw that if the Khedive had no
better support than their services, his authority in the Soudan was
liable at any moment to be overthrown. It had been the practice of the
Cairo authorities to send up, whenever reinforcements were asked for,
Arnaut and Arab loafers in that city, and these men were expected to
pay themselves without troubling the Government. This they did to
their own satisfaction, until Gordon resolved to put an end to their
misdeeds at all cost, for he found that not merely did they pillage
the people, but that they were active abettors of the slave trade. Yet
as he possessed no military force, while there were not fewer than
6000 Bashi-Bazouks scattered throughout the provinces, he had to
proceed with caution. His method of breaking up this body is a
striking illustration of his thorough grasp of detail, and of the
prudence, as well as daring, with which he applied what he conceived
to be the most sensible means of removing a grave difficulty. This
considerable force was scattered in numerous small garrisons
throughout the province. From a military point of view this
arrangement was bad, but it enabled each separate garrison to do a
little surreptitious slave-hunting on its own account. General Gordon
called in these garrisons, confined the Bashi-Bazouks to three or four
places, peremptorily stopped the arrival of recruits, and gradually
replaced them with trustworthy black Soudanese soldiers. Before he
laid down the reins of power, at the end of 1879, he had completely
broken up this body, and as effectually relieved the Soudanese from
their military tyrants as he had freed them from the whip.

Having put all these matters in trim, Gordon left Khartoum in the
middle of the summer of 1877 for the western province of Darfour,
where a number of matters claimed his pressing attention. In that
province there were several large Egyptian garrisons confined in two
or three towns, and unable--through fear, as it proved, but on account
of formidable enemies, as was alleged--to move outside them. The
reports of trouble and hostility were no doubt exaggerated, but still
there was a simmering of disturbance below the surface that portended
peril in the future; and read by the light of after events, it seems
little short of miraculous that General Gordon was able to keep it
under by his own personal energy and the magic of his name. When on
the point of starting to relieve these garrisons, he found himself
compelled to disband a regiment of 500 Bashi-Bazouks, who constituted
the only force at his immediate disposal. He had then to organise a
nondescript body, after the same fashion as he had adopted at the
Equator, and with 500 followers of this kind--of whom he said only 150
were any good--he started on his march for the districts which lie
several hundred miles west of the White Nile, and approach most nearly
of the Khedive's possessions to Lake Tchad.

The enemies with whom General Gordon had to deal were two. There was
first Haroun, who claimed, as the principal survivor after Zebehr's
invasion of Darfour, already described, to be the true Sultan of that
State; and secondly, Suleiman, the son of Zebehr, and the nominal
leader of the slave-dealers. While the former was in open revolt, the
latter's covert hostility was the more to be dreaded, although
Suleiman might naturally hesitate to throw off the mask lest his
revolt might be the signal for his father's execution at Cairo--Zebehr
having been detained there after his too confiding visit a few years
before. It was therefore both prudent and necessary to ignore Suleiman
until Haroun had been brought into subjection, or in some other way
compelled to desist from acts of hostility.

General Gordon's plan was simple in the extreme. Leaving the Nile with
500 men, he determined to collect _en route_ the efficient part of the
scattered garrisons, sending those who were not efficient to the river
for transport to Khartoum, and with this force to relieve the garrison
at Fascher, the most distant of the large towns or stations in
Darfour. It will be understood that these garrisons numbered several
thousand men each, while Gordon's relieving body was only a few
hundreds; but their _morale_ had sunk so low that they dared not take
the field against an enemy whom their own terror, and not the reality,
painted as formidable. Even before he began his advance, Gordon had
taken a fair measure of the revolt, which he expressed himself
confident of suppressing without firing a shot. At Dara, the place
which in the Mahdist war was well defended by Slatin Pasha, he
released 1800 troops; but he was kept in inactivity for some weeks
owing to the necessity of organising his force and of ascertaining how
far Suleiman, with his robber confederacy of 10,000 fighting men at
Shaka--only 150 miles south-east of Dara--might be counted on to
remain quiet. During this period of suspense he was compelled to take
the field against a formidable tribe called by the name of the
Leopard, which threatened his rear. It is unnecessary to enter upon
the details of this expedition, which was completely successful,
notwithstanding the cowardice of his troops, and which ended with the
abject submission of the offending clan.

Having assembled a force of a kind of 3,500 men, he resolved to make a
forced march to Fascher, and then with the same promptitude to descend
on Shaka, and settle the pending dispute with Suleiman. These plans he
kept locked in his own bosom, for his camp was full of spies, and his
own surroundings were not to be trusted.

Leaving the main portion of his troops at Dara, he advanced on Fascher
at the head of less than 1000 men, taking the lead himself with the
small bodyguard he had organised of 150 picked Soudanese. With these
he entered Fascher, where there were 3000 troops, and the Pasha,
Hassan Helmi, had 10,000 more at Kolkol, three days' journey away.
Gordon found the garrison quite demoralised, and afraid to move
outside the walls. He at once ordered Hassan Pasha to come to him,
with the intention of punishing him by dismissal for his negligence
and cowardice in commanding a force that, properly led, might have
coerced the whole province, when the alarming news reached the
Governor-General that Suleiman and his band had quitted Shaka, and
were plundering in the neighbourhood of Dara itself. The gravity of
this danger admitted of no delay. Not a moment could be spared to
either punish an incapable lieutenant or to crush the foe Haroun,
whose proceedings were the alleged main cause of trouble in Darfour.
Gordon returned with his bodyguard as fast as possible, and, leaving
even it behind, traversed the last eighty-five miles alone on his
camel in a day and a half. Here may be introduced what he wrote
himself on the subject of these rapid and often solitary camel
journeys:--

     "I have a splendid camel--none like it; it flies along, and quite
     astonishes even the Arabs. I came flying into this station in
     Marshal's uniform, and before the men had had time to unpile
     their arms, I had arrived, with only one man with me. I could not
     help it; the escort did not come in for an hour and a half
     afterwards. The Arab chief who came with me said it was the
     telegraph. The Gordons and the camels are of the same race--let
     them take an idea into their heads, and nothing will take it
     out.... It is fearful to see the Governor-General arrayed in
     gold clothes, flying along like a madman, with only a guide, as
     if he were pursued.... If I were fastidious, I should be as many
     weeks as I now am days on the road; I gain a great deal of
     prestige by these unheard-of marches. It makes the people fear me
     much more than if I were slow."

The situation was in every way as serious as was represented. The Dara
garrison as a fighting force was valueless, and with the exception of
his small bodyguard, still on the road from Fascher, Gordon had not a
man on whom he could count. Suleiman and his whole force were encamped
not three miles from the town. Gordon quite realised the position; he
saw that his own life, and, what he valued more, the whole work on
which he had been so long engaged, were at stake, and that a moment's
hesitation would mean ruin. He rose to the crisis. At daybreak,
attired in his official costume, with the Medjidieh gleaming on his
breast, he mounted his horse and rode off to Suleiman's camp. Suleiman
meditated treachery, and a trifle would have decided him to take the
step of seizing Gordon, and holding him as hostage for his father. Had
Gordon delayed even a few hours, there is no doubt that the
slave-hunters would have executed their original design; but his
extraordinary promptitude and self-confidence disconcerted them, and
probably saved his own life. Gordon rode down the brigand lines;
Suleiman, described as "a nice-looking lad of twenty-two," received
him with marks of respect, and the Governor-General, without giving
them a moment to think, at once summoned him and his chief lieutenants
to an audience in the tent placed at his disposal. Here Gordon went
straight to the point, accusing them of meditated rebellion, and
telling them that he meant to break up their confederacy. After
listening to this indictment, they all made him submission very
abjectly; but Gordon saw that Suleiman had not forgiven him, and when
the truth came afterwards to be known, it was found that he did not
carry out his project only because his principal lieutenants had
deserted him. When the negotiations were over, Suleiman retired with
1500 men to Shaka, where we shall hear of him again, and Gordon took
into his pay the other half of the brigand force. In this remarkable
manner did he stave off the greatest peril which had yet threatened
him in the Soudan.

The following corroborative account of this incident was furnished
long afterwards by Slatin Pasha:--

     "In the midst of all this discussion and difference of opinion,
     Gordon, travelling by Keriut and Shieria, had halted at a spot
     about four hours' march from Dara; and having instructed his
     escort to follow him as usual, he and his two secretaries started
     in advance on camels. Hearing of his approach, Suleiman had
     given orders to his troops to deploy in three lines between the
     camp and the fort, and while this operation was being carried
     out, Gordon, coming from the rear of the troops, passed rapidly
     through the lines, riding at a smart trot, and, saluting the
     troops right and left, reached the fort. The suddenness of
     Gordon's arrival left the leaders no time to make their plans.
     They therefore ordered the general salute; but even before the
     thunder of the guns was heard, Gordon had already sent orders to
     Suleiman and his chiefs to appear instantly before him.... Thus
     had Gordon, by his amazing rapidity and quick grasp of the
     situation, arrived in two days at the settlement of a question
     which literally bristled with dangers and difficulties. Had
     Suleiman offered resistance at a time when Darfour was in a
     disturbed state, Gordon's position and the maintenance of
     Egyptian authority in these districts would have been precarious
     in the extreme."

What Gordon's own opinion of this affair was is revealed in the
following extremely characteristic letter written to one of those
anti-slavery enthusiasts, who seemed to think that the whole
difficulty could be settled by a proclamation or two, and a rigid
enforcement of a strict law sentencing every one connected with the
slave trade without discrimination to death:--

     "There are some 6000 more slave-dealers in the interior who will
     obey me now they have heard that Zebehr's son and the other
     chiefs have given in. You can imagine what a difficulty there is
     in dealing with all these armed men. I have separated them here
     and there, and in course of time will rid myself of the mass.
     Would you shoot them all? Have they no rights? Are they not to be
     considered? Had the planters no rights? Did not our Government
     once allow slave-trading? Do you know that cargoes of slaves came
     into Bristol Harbour in the time of our fathers? I would have
     given £500 to have had you and the Anti-Slavery Society in Dara
     during the three days of doubt whether the slave-dealers would
     fight or not. A bad fort, a coward garrison, and not one who did
     not tremble--on the other side a strong, determined set of men
     accustomed to war, good shots, with two field-pieces. I would
     have liked to hear what you would all have said then. I do not
     say this in brag, for God knows what my anxiety was."

The drama, of which the first act took place in Suleiman's camp
outside Dara, was not then ended. Gordon knew that to leave a thing
half done was only to invite the danger to reappear. Suleiman had
retired with his 1500 men to Shaka, the followers of Zebehr from all
sides throughout the province would flock to his standard, and in a
little time he would be more formidable and hostile than before. Four
days after Suleiman left Dara, Gordon set out for the same place, at
the head of four companies, and after a six days' march through
terrible heat he reached Shaka. The slave-hunters had had no time to
recover their spirits, they were all completely cowed and very
submissive; and Suleiman craved favour at the hands of the man against
whose life he had only a few days before been plotting. Unfortunately
Gordon could not remain at Shaka, to attend in person to the
dispersion of Suleiman's band, and after his departure that young
leader regained his confidence, and resorted to his hostile and
ambitious designs; but the success of General Gordon's plans in the
summer of 1877 was complete, and sufficed to greatly diminish the
gravity of the peril when, twelve months later, Suleiman broke out
afresh, and fell by the hands of Gessi.

While General Gordon was facing these personal dangers, and coping
with difficulties in a manner that has never been surpassed, and that
will stand as an example to all time of how the energy, courage, and
attention to detail of an individual will compensate for bad troops
and deficient resources, he was experiencing the bitter truth that no
one can escape calumny. The arm-chair reformers of London were not at
all pleased with his methods, and they were quite shocked when they
heard that General Gordon, whom they affected to regard as the nominee
of the Anti-Slavery Society, and not as the responsible lieutenant of
a foreign potentate, was in the habit, not merely of restoring
fugitive slaves to their lawful owners, but even of purchasing slaves
with his own and the Government money, in order to convert them into
soldiers. From their narrow point of view, it seemed to them that
these steps were a direct encouragement of the slave-trade, and they
denounced Gordon's action with an extraordinary, but none the less
bitter, ignorance of the fact that he was employing the only practical
means of carrying out the mission which, in addition to his
administrative duties, had been practically imposed on him as the
representative of civilization. These good but misinformed persons
must have believed that the Egyptian garrison in the Soudan was
efficient, that communications were easy, and the climate not
unpleasant, and that Gordon, supported by zealous lieutenants, had
only to hold up his hand or pass a resolution, in the fashion of
Exeter Hall, for the chains, real and metaphysical, to fall from the
limbs of the negro population of Inner Africa. That was their dream.
The reality was a worthless and craven army, a climate that killed
most Europeans, and which the vigour and abstemiousness of Gordon
scarcely enabled him to endure, communications only maintained and
represented by the wearying flight of the camel across the desert,
treachery and hostility to his plans, if not his person, among his
colleagues--all these difficulties and dangers overcome and rendered
nugatory by the earnestness and energy of one man alone. Well might
his indignation find vent in such a grand outburst as this:--

     "I do not believe in you all. You say this and that, and you do
     not do it; you give your money, and you have done your duty; you
     praise one another, etc. I do not wonder at it. God has given you
     ties and anchors to this earth; you have wives and families. I,
     thank God, have none of them, and am free. Now understand me. If
     it suit me, I will buy slaves. I will let captured slaves go down
     to Egypt and not molest them, and I will do what I like, and what
     God, in His mercy, may direct me to do about domestic slaves; but
     I will break the neck of slave raids, even if it cost me my life.
     I will buy slaves for my army; for this purpose I will make
     soldiers against their will, to enable me to prevent raids. I
     will do this in the light of day, and defy your resolutions and
     your actions. Would my heart be broken if I was ousted from this
     command? Should I regret the eternal camel-riding, the heat, the
     misery I am forced to witness, the discomforts of everything
     around my domestic life? Look at my travels in seven months.
     Thousands of miles on camels, and no hope of rest for another
     year. You are only called on at intervals to rely on your God;
     with me I am obliged continually to do so. Find me the man and I
     will take him as my help who utterly despises money, name, glory,
     honour; one who never wishes to see his home again; one who looks
     to God as the Source of good and Controller of evil; one who has
     a healthy body and energetic spirit, and one who looks on death
     as a release from misery; and if you cannot find him, then leave
     me alone. To carry myself is enough for me; I want no other
     baggage."

Gordon's troubles were not only with English visionaries. The Egyptian
officials had always regarded the delegation of supreme powers to him
with dislike, and this sentiment became unqualified apprehension when
they saw how resolute he was in exercising them. Ismail Pasha was
disposed to place unlimited trust in his energetic Governor-General,
but he could not but be somewhat influenced by those around him while
Gordon was far away. When, therefore, Gordon took into his own hands
the power of life and death, and sentenced men to be hanged and shot,
he roused that opposition to the highest point of activity, and
received repeated remonstrances by telegraph from Cairo. To these he
replied firmly, but quietly, that on no other condition could the
administration be carried on, and that his authority as Viceroy would
be undermined if he could not dispense prompt justice. Notwithstanding
all his representations, he never obtained the ratification of his
right to pass death sentences; but with that strong will that he
showed in every crisis, he announced his determination to act on his
own responsibility. On at least two occasions he expresses a feeling
of gratification at having caused murderers to be hung.

This is a suitable moment to lay stress on the true views Gordon held
on the subject of bloodshed. While averse to all warfare by
disposition, and without the smallest trace of what might be called
the military spirit, General Gordon had none of that timid and
unreasoning shrinking from taking life, which is often cruel and
always cowardly. He punished the guilty without the least false
compunction, even with a death sentence, and if necessity left no
choice, he would have executed that sentence himself, provided he was
quite convinced of its justice. As a rule, he went unarmed in the
Soudan, as in China; but there were exceptions, and on at least one
occasion he took an active and decisive part in a conflict. He was
being attacked by one of the tribes, and his men were firing wildly
and without result. Then Gordon snatched a rifle from one of his men,
and firing at the hostile leader, killed him. There are at least two
other incidents that will show him in a light that many of his
admirers would keep suppressed, but that bring out his human nature. A
clumsy servant fired off his heavy duck-gun close to his head, and
Gordon very naturally gave him a smart box on the ears which the
fellow would remember for a week. Excited by the misery of a
slave-gang, he asked the boy in charge of them to whom they belonged,
and as he hesitated, he struck him across the face with his whip.
Gordon's comment on this act is that it was "cruel and cowardly, but
he was enraged, and could not help it." One feels on reading this that
one would have done so oneself, and that, after all, Gordon was a man,
and not a spiritual abstraction.

Thus ended the first eventful year of General Gordon's tenure of the
post of Governor-General of the Soudan. Some idea of the magnitude of
the task he had performed may be gathered from the fact that during
this period he rode nearly 4000 miles on his camel through the desert.
He put before himself the solution of eight burning questions, and by
the end of 1877 he had settled five of them more or less permanently.
He had also effected many reforms in the military and civil branches
of the administration, and had formed the nucleus of a force in which
he could put some confidence. By the people he was respected and
feared, and far more liked than he imagined. "Send us another Governor
like Gordon" was the burden of the Soudanese cry to Slatin when the
shadow of the Mahdi's power had already fallen over the land. He had
respected their religion and prejudices. When their Mahommedan
co-religionists had ground them down to the dust, even desecrating
their mosques by turning them into powder magazines, General Gordon
showed them justice and merciful consideration, restored and endowed
their mosques, and exhorted them in every way to be faithful to the
observance of their religion. He was always most exact in payment for
services rendered. This became known; and when some of the Egyptian
officials--a Pasha among others--seized camels for his service without
paying for them, the owners threw themselves on the ground, kissing
Gordon's camel's feet, told their tale, and obtained prompt redress.
What more striking testimony to his thoughtfulness for others could be
given than in the following anecdote? One of his native lieutenants, a
confirmed drunkard, but of which Gordon was ignorant, became ill, and
the Governor-General went to see and sit by him in his tent. All the
man asked for was brandy, and General Gordon, somewhat shocked at the
repeated request, expostulated with him that he, a believer in the
Koran, should drink the strong waters so expressly forbidden by that
holy book. But the man readily replied, "This is as medicine, and the
Prophet does not forbid us to save life." Gordon said nothing, but
left the tent, and some hours later he sent the man two bottles of
brandy from his own small store. Even the Soudanese, who were afraid
of him in his terrible mood, knew the many soft corners he kept in his
heart, and easily learnt the way to them. For misfortune and suffering
of every kind his sympathy was quickly won, and with his sympathy went
his support, to the utmost limit of his power.

After the campaign in Darfour, Gordon returned to Khartoum, where he
was preparing for fresh exertions, as well as for a settlement of the
Abyssinian difficulty, when a sudden and unexpected summons reached
him to come down to Cairo and help the Khedive to arrange his
financial affairs. The Khedive's telegram stated that the Egyptian
creditors were trying to interfere with his sovereign prerogative, and
that His Highness knew no one but Gordon who could assist him out of
this position. The precise date on which this telegram reached Gordon
was 25th January 1878, when he was passing Shendy--the place on the
Nile opposite Metammeh, where the British Expedition encamped in
January 1885--but as he had to return to Khartoum to arrange for the
conduct of the administration during his absence, he did not arrive at
Dongola on his way to the capital until the 20th of the following
month. He reached Cairo on 7th March, was at once carried off to dine
with the Khedive, who had waited more than an hour over the appointed
time for him because his train was late, and, when it was over, was
conveyed to one of the finest palaces, which had been specially
prepared in his honour. The meaning of this extraordinary reception
was that the Khedive Ismail thought he had found a deliverer from his
own troubles in the man who had done such wonders in the Soudan. That
ruler had reached a stage in his affairs when extrication was
impossible, if the creditors of Egypt were to receive their dues. He
was very astute, and he probably saw that the only chance of saving
himself was for some high authority to declare that the interests of
himself and his people must be pronounced paramount to those of the
foreign investors. There was only one man in the world likely to come
to that conclusion, with a spotless reputation and a voice to which
public opinion might be expected to pay heed. That man was Gordon.
Therefore he was sent for in post haste, and found the post of
President of "An Inquiry into the State of the Finances of the
Country" thrust upon him before he had shaken off the dust of his long
journey to Cairo.

The motives which induced the Khedive to send for General Gordon
cannot be mistaken; nor is there any obscurity as to those which led
General Gordon to accept a task in which he was bound to run counter
to the views of every other European authority, and still more to the
fixed policy of his and other Governments. In the first place, Gordon
being the servant of the Khedive, it would have been impossible for
him to have said no to a request which was entitled to be regarded as
a command. In the second place, Gordon did not know all the currents
of intrigue working between Cairo and the capitals of Europe, and he
convinced himself that a sound workable plan for the benefit of Egypt
and her people would command such general approval that "the financial
cormorants," as he termed the bondholders, or rather their leaders,
would have to retire beaten from the field. He had no doubt that he
could draw up such a plan, based on a suspension and permanent
reduction of interest, and the result will convince any disinterested
person of the fact, but Gordon was destined to find that all persons
cannot be guided by such disinterestedness as his, of which the way he
treated his Egyptian salary furnished such a striking instance. When
sent to the Equator, he was offered £10,000 a year, and accepted
£2000; as Governor-General, he was nominated at £12,000 a year, and
cut it down to a half; and when, during this very Cairo visit, a new
and unnecessary official was appointed under the Soudan
Administration, he insisted that his own salary should be further
reduced to £3000, to compensate for this further charge. Such an
example as this did not arouse enthusiasm or inspire emulation in the
Delta. General Gordon never dealt with a question in which abstract
justice was deemed more out of place, or had less chance of carrying
the day.

As the matter was very important, and interested persons might easily
have misrepresented his part in it, General Gordon drew up a
memorandum explaining every incident in the course of the affair.
This document was published by his brother, Sir Henry Gordon, in 1886,
and the following description merely summarises its contents.

As far back as the year 1875 the Khedive Ismail began to discover that
the financial position of his Government was bad, and that it would be
impossible to keep up the payment of the interest on the debt at the
high rate of seven per cent., which Egypt had bound itself to pay. He
therefore applied to the British Government for advice and assistance.
In response to his representations, a Financial Commission, composed
of three members--Mr Cave, Colonel Stokes, and Mr Rivers Wilson--was
sent to Egypt for the purpose of inquiring into the financial position
of that country. They had no difficulty in coming to the conclusion
that it was unsound, and that the uneasiness of Ismail Pasha had not
been expressed a day too soon. They recommended that an arrangement
should be come to with the bondholders by which all the loans were to
be placed on the same footing, and the rate of interest reduced to
some figure that might be agreed upon. It then became necessary to
negotiate with the bondholders, who appointed Mr Goschen for the
English section, and M. Joubert for the French, to look after their
rights. The result of their efforts in 1876 was that they united the
loans into one, bearing a uniform rate of six per cent, instead of
seven, and that four Commissioners were appointed to look after the
debt in the interests of the bondholders, while two other European
officials were nominated--one to control the receipts, the other the
expenditure. In less than two years Ismail Pasha discovered that this
arrangement had not remedied the evil, and that the Government was
again on the verge of bankruptcy. It was at this juncture that the
Khedive applied to General Gordon, in the hope that his ability and
reputation would provide an easy escape from his dilemma.

General Gordon agreed to accept the post of President of this
Commission of Inquiry, and he also fell in with the Khedive's own wish
and suggestion that the Commissioners of the Debt should not be
members of the Commission. This point must be carefully borne in mind,
as the whole negotiation failed because of the Khedive's weakness in
waiving the very point he rightly deemed vital for success. Having
laid down the only principle to which he attached importance, the
Khedive went on to say that M. de Lesseps would act in conjunction
with General Gordon, and that these two, with some vague assistance
from financial experts, were to form the Commission. It soon became
evident that M. de Lesseps had no serious views on the subject, and
that he was only too much disposed to yield to external influences.

On the very threshold of his task, which he took up with his usual
thoroughness and honest desire to get at the truth, General Gordon
received a warning that the greatest difficulties were not those
inherent to the subject, but those arising from the selfish designs of
interested persons. As soon as it became known that General Gordon had
accepted this task, and that he had agreed to the Khedive's suggestion
that the Debt Commissioners were not to sit on the Commission, there
was a loud outburst of disapproval and dismay in diplomatic and
financial circles. This part of the story must be given in his own
words:--

     "Mr Vivian, the English Consul-General, said to me, 'I wonder you
     could accept the Presidency of the Commission of Inquiry without
     the Commissioners of the Debt.' I said, 'I was free to accept or
     refuse.'

     "I then called on the German Consul-General, and when there the
     French and Austrian Consuls-General, and also Vivian, came in,
     and attacked me for having accepted the post of President. I said
     'I was free.' And then they said, 'I was risking his Highness his
     throne; that he ran a very serious risk personally, if he formed
     the Commission of Inquiry without the creditors' representatives,
     viz. the Commissioners of the Debt.' I said, 'Why do you not tell
     him so?' They said, 'You ought to do so.' I said, 'Well, will you
     commission me to do so, from you, with any remarks I like to make
     as to the futility of your words?' They all said, 'Yes, we
     authorise you to do so--in our names.'"

General Gordon went that evening to the Abdin Palace, where he was
engaged to dine with the Khedive; and having asked permission to make
an important communication, saw Ismail before dinner, when words to
this effect were exchanged:--

Gordon said: "I have seen the four Consuls-General to-day, and they
told me to tell your Highness from them that you run a serious
personal risk if you have a Commission of Inquiry without the
Commissioners of Debt being upon it."

The Khedive replied as follows: "I do not care a bit. I am only afraid
of England, and I feel sure she will not move. You will see Lesseps
to-morrow, and arrange the _enquête_ with him." Encouraged by the
Khedive's firmness, and fully convinced that no good result would
follow if the Debt Commissioners, who only considered the bondholders'
interests, were on this inquiry, Gordon met Lesseps the next morning
in the full expectation that business would now be begun. The further
ramifications of the intrigue, for it soon became one, for the
discomfiture and discrediting of Gordon, must be told in his own
words:

     "The next day Lesseps came to my Palace with Stanton (Stokes's
     old Danube Secretary, now Resident-Commissioner for the British
     Government Suez Canal Shares at Paris, an old friend of mine).
     Lesseps began, 'We must have the Commissioners of the Debt on the
     _enquête_.'

     "I said, 'It is a _sine quâ non_ that they are not to be upon
     it.' Lesseps replied, 'They must be upon it.'

     "Then in came Cherif Pasha (the Premier), and said, 'Are you
     agreed?' I left Lesseps to speak, and he said, 'Yes,' at which I
     stared and said, 'I fear not.' Then Lesseps and Cherif discussed
     it, and Lesseps gave in, and agreed to serve on the Commission
     without the Commissioners of the Debt, but with the proviso that
     he would ask permission to do so from Paris. Cherif Pasha was
     pleased.

     "But I instinctively felt old Lesseps was ratting, so I asked
     Cherif to stop a moment, and said to Stanton, 'Now, see that
     Lesseps does not make a mess of it. Let him say at once, Will he
     act without the Commissioners of Debt or not? Do this for my
     sake; take him into that corner and speak to him.' Stanton did
     so, while I took Cherif into the other corner, much against his
     will, for he thought I was a bore, raising obstacles. I told him
     that Lesseps had declared before he came that he would not act
     unless with the Commissioners of the Debt. Cherif was huffed with
     me, and turned to Lesseps, whom Stanton had already dosed in his
     corner of the room, and he and Lesseps had a close conversation
     again for some time; and then Cherif came to me and said,
     'Lesseps has accepted without the Commissioners of the Debt.'

     "I disgusted Cherif as I went downstairs with him by saying, 'He
     will never stick to it.'"

If Gordon was not a diplomatist, he was at least very clear-sighted.
He saw clearly through M. de Lesseps, who had no views on the subject,
and who was quite content to play the part his Government assigned
him. A few minutes after the interview described he obtained further
evidence of the hostility the projected inquiry without the
Commissioners had aroused. He met Major Evelyn Baring, then beginning
the Egyptian career which he still pursues as Lord Cromer, who was
desirous of knowing what decision had been arrived at. On hearing that
the Commissioners were to be excluded, Major Baring remarked, "It was
unfair to the creditors," which seems to have drawn from Gordon some
angry retort. There is no doubt that at this moment Gordon lost all
control over himself, and employed personalities that left a sore
feeling behind them. That they did so in this case was, as I am
compelled to show later on, amply demonstrated in December 1883 and
January 1884. The direct and immediate significance of the occurrence
lay in its furnishing fresh evidence of the unanimity of hostility
with which all the European officials in the Delta regarded the
Khedive's proposal, and his attempt to make use of General Gordon's
exceptional character and reputation. It is a reflection on no
particular individual to assert that they were all resolved that
General Gordon's appeal to the abstract sense of justice of the world
should never be promulgated.

The first practical proposal made was to telegraph for Mr Samuel
Laing, a trained financier, who had acted in India at the head of the
finances of that country; but General Gordon refused to do this,
because he knew that he would be held responsible for the terms he
came on; and instead he drew up several propositions, one of them
being that the services of Mr Laing should be secured on conditions to
be fixed by the Khedive. During this discussion, it should be noted,
Lesseps paid no attention to business, talking of trivial and
extraneous matters. Then Gordon, with the view of clinching the
matter, said:

     "There are two questions to decide:

     "_First_, How to alleviate the present sufferings of the unpaid
     civil employés and of the army, as well as the pressing claims of
     the floating debt.

     "_Second_, And afterwards to inquire into the real state of the
     revenue by a Commission."

This was the exact opposite of the bondholders' view, for the
settlement of the grievances of the public and military service and of
the floating debt would _then_ have left nothing for the payment of
the coupons on the permanent external debt of a hundred millions. In
fact, General Gordon boldly suggested that the funds immediately
wanted must be provided by the non-payment of the next coupon due.

It is impossible to resist the conclusion that if General Gordon had
had his way, the Arabi revolt would have been averted; the Khedive
Ismail, the ablest member of his house, would not have been deposed;
and an English occupation of Egypt, hampered by financial and
diplomatic shackles that neutralise the value of its temporary
possession, need never have been undertaken. But _dis aliter visum_.
It is equally impossible to resist the conclusion that the forces
arrayed against Gordon on this occasion were such as he could not
expect to conquer.

The concluding scenes of the affair need only be briefly described. M.
de Lesseps had never swerved from his original purpose to refer the
matter to Paris, but even Gordon was not prepared for the duplicity he
showed in the matter, and in which he was no doubt encouraged by the
prevalent feeling among the foreigners at Cairo. The first point in
all tortuous diplomacy, Eastern or Western, is to gain time; and when
General Gordon, intent on business, called on Lesseps the next
day--that is to say, two days after his arrival from Khartoum--the
French engineer met him with the smiling observation that he was off
for a day in the country, and that he had just sent a telegram to
Paris. He handed Gordon a copy, which was to this effect: "His
Highness the Khedive has begged me to join with M. Gordon and _the
Commissioners of the Debt_ in making an inquiry into the finances of
Egypt; I ask permission." Gordon's astonished ejaculation "This will
never do" was met with the light-hearted Frenchman's remark, "I must
go, and it must go."

Then General Gordon hastened with the news and the draft of the
telegram to the Khedive. The copy was sent in to Ismail Pasha in his
private apartments. On mastering its contents, he rushed out, threw
himself on a sofa, and exclaimed, "I am quite upset by this telegram
of Lesseps; some one must go after him and tell him not to send it."
Then turning to Gordon, he said, "I put the whole affair into your
hands." Gordon, anxious to help the Khedive, and also hoping to find
an ally out of Egypt, telegraphed at great length to Mr Goschen, in
accordance with the Khedive's suggestion. Unfortunately, Mr Goschen
replied with equal brevity and authority, "I will not look at you; the
matter is in the hands of Her Majesty's Government." When we remember
that Gordon was the properly-appointed representative of an
independent Prince, or at least of a Prince independent of England, we
cannot wonder at his terming this a "rude answer." Mr Goschen may have
had some after-qualms himself, for he telegraphed some days later in a
milder tone, but Gordon would not take an affront from any man, and
left it unanswered.

At this crisis Gordon, nothing daunted, made a proposal which, if the
Khedive had had the courage to carry it out, might have left the
victory with them. He proposed to the Khedive to issue a decree
suspending the payment of the coupon, paying all pressing claims, and
stating that he did all this on the advice of Gordon. Failing that,
Gordon offered to telegraph himself to Lord Derby, the Foreign
Secretary, and accept the full responsibility for the measure. Ismail
was not equal to the occasion. He shut himself up in his harem for two
days, and, as Gordon said, "the game was lost."

General Gordon was now to experience the illimitable extent of human
ingratitude. Even those who disagreed with the views he expressed on
this subject cannot deny his loyalty to the Khedive, or the magnitude
of the efforts he made on his behalf. To carry out the wishes of the
Prince in whose service he was for the time being, he was prepared to
accept every responsibility, and to show an unswerving devotion in a
way that excited the opposition and hostility even of those whom he
might otherwise have termed his friends and well-wishers. By an
extreme expedient, which would either have ruined himself or thwarted
the plans of powerful statesmen, and financiers not less powerful, he
would have sealed his devotion to Ismail Pasha; but the moral or
physical weakness of the Oriental prevented the attempt being made.
The delay mentioned allowed of fresh pressure being brought to bear on
the Khedive; and while Gordon emphatically declared, partly from a
sense of consistency, and partly because he hoped to stiffen the
Khedive's resolution that he would not act with the Debt Commissioners
on the Inquiry, Ismail Pasha was coerced or induced into surrendering
all he had been fighting for. He gave his assent to the Commissioners
being on the Inquiry, and he turned his back on the man who had come
from the heart of Africa to his assistance. When Gordon learnt these
facts, he resolved to return to the Soudan, and he was allowed to do
so without the least mark of honour or word of thanks from the
Khedive. His financial episode cost him £800 out of his own pocket,
and even if we consider that the financial situation in the Delta,
with all its cross-currents of shady intrigue and selfish designs, was
one that he was not quite qualified to deal with, we cannot dispute
that his propositions were full of all his habitual nobility of
purpose, and that they were practical, if they could ever have been
put into effect.

This incident serves to bring out some of the limitations of Gordon's
ability. His own convictions, strengthened by the solitary life he had
led for years in the Soudan, did not make him well adapted for any
form of diplomacy. His methods were too simple, and his remedies too
exclusively based on a radical treatment, to suit every complaint in a
complicated state of society; nor is it possible for the majority of
men to be influenced by his extraordinary self-abnegation and
disregard for money. During this very mission he boasted that he was
able to get to bed at eight o'clock, because he never dined out, and
that he did not care at everyone laughing at him, and saying he was in
the sulks. This mode of living was due, not to any peculiarity about
General Gordon--although I trace to this period the opinion that he
was mad--but mainly to his honest wish not to be biassed by any
European's judgment, and to be able to give the Khedive absolutely
independent advice, as if he himself were an Egyptian, speaking and
acting for Egypt. Enough has been said to explain why he failed to
accomplish a really impossible task. Nor is it necessary to assume
that because they differed from him and strenuously opposed his
project, the other Englishmen in authority in the Delta were
influenced by any unworthy motives or pursued a policy that was either
reprehensible or unsound.

From this uncongenial task General Gordon returned to the work which
he thoroughly understood, and with regard to which he had to apprehend
no serious outside interference, for the attraction of the flesh-pots
of Egypt did not extend into the Soudan. Still, he felt that his
"outspokenness," as he termed it, had not strengthened his position.
He travelled on this occasion by the Red Sea route to Aden, thence to
Zeila, with the view of inspecting Harrar, which formed part of his
extensive Government. During this tour Gordon saw much that disquieted
him--a large strip of country held by fanatical Mahommedans, the slave
trade in unchecked progress where he had not thought it to exist--and
he wrote these memorable words: "Our English Government lives on a
hand-to-mouth policy. They are very ignorant of these lands, yet some
day or other they or some other Government will have to know them, for
things at Cairo cannot stay as they are. His Highness will be curbed
in, and will no longer be absolute sovereign; then will come the
question of these countries."

At Harrar, Gordon dismissed the Governor Raouf, whom he describes as a
regular tyrant, but who, none the less for his misdeeds, was
proclaimed Governor-General of the Soudan when Gordon left it less
than two years after this visit to Harrar. When this affair was
settled, General Gordon proceeded _via_ Massowah and Souakim to
Khartoum, where he arrived about the middle of June. On his way he had
felt bound to remove eight high military officers from their commands
for various offences, from which may be gathered some idea of the
colleagues on whom he had to depend. He reached Khartoum not a moment
too soon, for the first news that greeted him was that Suleiman had
broken out in open revolt, and was practically master of the Province
of Bahr Gazelle, which lies between Darfour and the Equatorial
Province.

But before describing the steps he took to suppress this formidable
revolt, which resembled the rising under the Mahdi in every point
except its non-religious character, some notice may be given of the
financial difficulties with which he had to cope, and which were much
increased by the Khedive's practice of giving appointments in a
promiscuous manner that were to be chargeable on the scanty and
inadequate revenues of the Soudan.

In the year 1877 the expenditure of the Soudan exceeded the revenue by
over a quarter of a million sterling; in 1878 Gordon had reduced this
deficit to £70,000. In the return given by the Khedive of his
resources when foreign intervention first took place, it was stated
that the Soudan furnished a tribute of £143,000. This was untrue; it
had always been a drain on the Cairo exchequer until in 1879 General
Gordon had the satisfaction, by reducing expenditure in every possible
direction and abolishing sinecures, of securing an exact balance. The
most formidable adversary Gordon had to meet in the course of this
financial struggle was the Khedive himself, and it was only by
sustained effort that he succeeded in averting the imposition of
various expenses on his shoulders which would have rendered success
impossible. First it was two steamers, which would have cost £20,000;
then it was the so-called Soudan railway, with a liability of not less
than three quarters of a million with which the Khedive wished to
saddle the Soudan, but Gordon would have neither, and his firmness
carried the day. When the Cairo authorities, in want of money, claimed
that the Soudan owed £30,000, he went into the items, and showed that,
instead, Cairo owed it £9000. He never got it, but by this he proved
that, while he was the servant of the Khedive, he would not be
subservient to him in matters that affected the successful discharge
of his task as that Prince's deputy in the Soudan.

We must now return to the revolt of Suleiman, the most serious
military peril Gordon had to deal with in Africa, which was in its
main features similar to the later uprising under the Mahdi. At the
first collision with that young leader of the slave-dealers, Gordon
had triumphed by his quickness and daring; but he had seen that
Suleiman was not thoroughly cowed, and he had warned him that if he
revolted again the result would inevitably be his ruin. Suleiman had
not taken the warning to heart, and was now in open revolt. His most
powerful supporters were the Arab colonies, long settled in interior
Africa, who, proud of their descent, were always willing to take part
against the Turco-Egyptian Government. These men rallied to a certain
extent to Suleiman, just as some years later they attached themselves
to the Mahdi. As General Gordon wrote in 1878: "They were ready, and
are still ready, to seize the first chance of shaking off the yoke of
Egypt." It was during Gordon's absence at Cairo that Suleiman's plans
matured, and he began the campaign by seizing the province of Bahr
Gazelle. Immediately on receiving this intelligence, General Gordon
fitted out an expedition; and as he could not take the command
himself, he intrusted it to his best lieutenant, Romolo Gessi, an
Italian of proved merit.

Natural difficulties retarded the advance of the expedition. Heavy
floods kept Gessi confined in his camp during three months, and the
lukewarm supporters of the Government regarded this inaction as proof
of inferiority. They consequently rallied to Suleiman, who soon found
himself at the head of a force of 6000 men, while Gessi had only 300
regulars, two cannon, and 700 almost useless irregulars. It was as
difficult for him to let the Governor-General know that he needed
reinforcements as it was for General Gordon to send them. Some of his
subordinates, in command of outlying detachments, refused to obey his
summons, preferring to carry on a little slave-hunting on their own
account. His troops were on the verge of mutiny: he had to shoot one
ringleader with his own hand.

At last the floods fell, and he began his forward movement, fighting
his way against detached bodies of slave-hunters, but after each
success receiving the welcome of the unfortunate natives, of whom
Suleiman had consigned not fewer than 10,000 in the six previous
months to slavery. At last Gessi was himself compelled to halt at a
place called Dem Idris, fifty miles north of the fort which Suleiman
had constructed for his final stand, and named after himself. These
places are about 200 miles south of both Dara and Shaka, while between
them runs the considerable stream called Bahr Arab. Gessi was now in
close proximity to the main force under Suleiman, but he had to halt
for five months before he felt in any way equal to the task of
attacking it. During that period he had to stand on the defensive, and
sustain several attacks from Suleiman, who had made all his plans for
invading Darfour, and adding that province to the Bahr Gazelle.

The first of these engagements was that fought on 28th December 1878,
when Suleiman, at the head of 10,000 men, attacked Gessi's camp at Dem
Idris. Fortunately, he had neglected no precaution, and his regulars,
supported by a strong force of friendly natives, nobly seconded his
efforts. Suleiman's force was repulsed in four assaults, and had to
retire with a loss of 1000 men. But Gessi's difficulties were far from
removed by this victory. Suleiman's losses were easily repaired, while
those of Gessi could not be replaced. His men were also suffering from
fever, and the strain on himself, through the absence of any
subordinates to assist him, was terrible. It was a relief to him when
Suleiman delivered his second attack, fifteen days after the first. On
this occasion Suleiman appealed to the religious fanaticism of his
followers, and made them swear on the Koran to conquer or die; and the
black troops, as the less trustworthy, were placed in the van of
battle and driven to the assault by the Arabs. Gessi made an excellent
disposition of his troops, repulsing the two main attacks with heavy
loss; and when the attack was resumed the next day, his success was
equally complete. Unfortunately, Gessi was unable to follow up this
advantage, because his powder was almost exhausted, and his men were
reduced to pick up bullets from the field of combat. Tidings of his
position reached Suleiman, who made a final attack on the 28th of
January 1879, but owing to the fortunate arrival of a small supply of
powder, Gessi was able to fight and win another battle.

It was not until the 11th March, however, that Gessi received a
sufficient supply of ammunition to enable him to assume the offensive.
Suleiman's camp or fort was a strongly barricaded enclosure,
surrounded by a double row of trunks of trees. The centre of the
enclosure was occupied by an inner fort, which was Suleiman's own
residence. On Gessi attacking it, his first shell set fire to one of
the huts, and as the wood was dry, the whole encampment was soon in a
blaze. Driven to desperation, the brigands sallied forth, only to be
driven back by the steady fire of Gessi's troops, who by this time
were full of confidence in their leader. Then the former broke into
flight, escaping wherever they could. Suleiman was among those who
escaped, although eleven of his chiefs were slain, and the unfortunate
exhaustion of Gessi's powder again provided him with the respite to
rally his followers and make another bid for power.

This further period of enforced inaction terminated at the end of
April, when the arrival of a full supply of powder and cartridges
enabled Gessi to take the field for the last time. On the 1st May the
Egyptian commander started to attack the slave robber in his last
stronghold, Dem Suleiman. Three days later he fought the first of
these final battles outside that fort, and succeeded in cutting off
the retreat of the vanquished Arabs into that place of shelter. He
then broke into the fort itself, where there were only a few men, and
he almost succeeded in capturing Suleiman, who fled through one gate
as Gessi entered by another. Thanks to the fleetness of his horse,
Suleiman succeeded in making good his escape. Before his hurried
flight Suleiman murdered four prisoners sooner than allow of their
recapture, and throughout the long pursuit that now began all slaves
or black troops who could not keep up were killed. These were not the
only crimes perpetrated by these brigands. Superstition, or the mere
pleasure of cruelty, had induced them when their fortunes were getting
low to consecrate a new banner by bathing it in the blood of a
murdered child. For these iniquities the hour of expiation had now
arrived.

After the capture of Dem Suleiman, Gessi began a pursuit which,
considering the difficulties of the route owing to heavy rain,
topographical ignorance, and the deficiency of supplies, may be
characterised as remarkable. Gessi took with him only 600 men, armed
with Remington rifles; but they could carry no more than three or four
days' provisions, which were exhausted before he came up with even the
rearmost of the fugitive Arabs. There the troops turned sulky, and it
was only by promising them as spoil everything taken that he restored
them to something like good temper. Six days after the start Gessi
overwhelmed one band under Abou Sammat, one of the most active of the
slave-hunters, and learnt that Suleiman himself was only twenty-four
hours ahead. But the difficulties were such that Gessi was almost
reduced to despair of the capture of that leader, and as long as he
remained at large the rebellion could not be considered suppressed.

Fortune played the game into his hand at the very moment that the
result seemed hopeless. In the middle of the night several men came to
his camp from Sultan Idris, one of the Arab chiefs, thinking it was
that of Rabi, the chief of Suleiman's lieutenants. Gessi sent one of
them back to invite him to approach, and at once laid his own plans.
He resolved to destroy Rabi's force, which lay encamped close by,
before the other band could come up; and by a sudden assault at
daybreak he succeeded in his object. The whole band was exterminated,
with the exception of Rabi himself, who escaped on a fast horse. Then
Gessi laid his ambuscade for Sultan Idris, who marched into the trap
prepared for him. This band also was nearly annihilated, but Sultan
Idris escaped, leaving, however, an immense spoil, which put the
Egyptian soldiers in good humour. For the disposal of this booty, and
for other reasons, Gessi resolved to return to Dem Suleiman.

At this point it was alone possible to criticise the action of the
energetic Gessi during the whole course of the campaign, and General
Gordon no doubt thought that if he had paid no attention to the spoil
captured from Rabi and Sultan Idris, but pressed the pursuit against
Suleiman, he might then and there have concluded the campaign. On the
other hand, it is only fair to state that Gessi had to consider the
sentiment of his own troops, while he was also ill from the mental
strain and physical exertion of conducting the campaign virtually by
himself. The spoil, moreover, did not benefit him in the least. It
went into the coffers of the Government, or the pockets of the
soldiers, not into his. So little reward did he receive that Gordon
intended at first to give him £1000 out of his own pocket, and
eventually found himself able to increase it to a sum of £2000 out of
the Soudan exchequer.

But Suleiman was still at large, and the slave-dealers were fully
determined to preserve their profitable monopoly, if by any means they
could baffle the Government. The Egyptian officials were also inclined
to assist their efforts, and while Gessi was recovering his strength,
he had the mortification of seeing the fruits of his earlier success
lost by the inaction or more culpable proceedings of his lieutenants.
It was not until July 1879 that Gessi felt able to take the field in
person, and then with less than 300 men, while Suleiman's band alone
numbered 900. But there was no time to wait for reinforcements if
Suleiman, who had advanced to within a short distance of Gessi's camp,
was to be captured. Owing to the promptitude of his measures, Gessi
came up with Suleiman in three days' time at the village of Gara,
which he reached at daybreak on 16th of July. His measures were prompt
and decisive. Concealing his troops in a wood, so that the smallness
of their numbers might not be detected, he sent in a summons to
Suleiman to surrender within ten minutes. Surprised, and ignorant of
the strength of the Egyptian force, he and his followers agreed to lay
down their arms: but when Suleiman saw the mere handful of men to whom
he had yielded, he burst out crying. The situation suggested to him
the hope of escape. Gessi learnt that when night came Suleiman and his
men had arranged to break their way through. He therefore resolved to
anticipate them. He held in his hands the ringleaders of the
rebellion. If they escaped, all his work was lost; a summary act of
justice would conclude the affair, and secure the Government against
fresh attacks for a long time. To use his own words, Gessi "saw that
the time had come to have done with these people once for all."

He divided the captives into three bands. The first, composed of the
black soldiers, little better than slaves, he released on the
condition that they left at once and promised to settle down to a
peaceful life. This they agreed to joyfully. Having got rid of these,
the larger number of Suleiman's band, he seized the smaller body of
slave-dealers--157 in number--and having chained them, sent them under
a guard as prisoners to his own camp. Then he seized Suleiman and ten
of his chief supporters, and shot them on the spot. Thus perished
Suleiman, the son of Zebehr, in whose name and for whose safety he had
gone into revolt, in the very way that Gordon had predicted two years
before in the midst of his brigand power at Shaka; and thus, with a
remarkable combination of skill and courage, did Gessi bring his
arduous campaign of twelve months' duration to a victorious
conclusion.

Although the credit of these successful operations was entirely due to
Gessi, it must not be supposed that General Gordon took no part in
controlling them; but, for the sake of clearness, it seemed advisable
to narrate the history of the campaign against Suleiman without a
break. Early in 1879, when Gessi, after obtaining some successes, had
been reduced to inaction from the want of ammunition, Gordon's anxiety
became so great on his account that he determined to assume the
command in person. His main object was to afford relief to Gessi by
taking the field in Darfour, and putting down the rebels in that
province, who were on the point of throwing in their lot with
Suleiman. Gordon determined therefore to march on Shaka, the old
headquarters of Zebehr and his son. On his march he rescued several
slave caravans, but he saw that the suppression of the slave trade was
not popular, and the contradictory character of the law and his
instructions placed him in much embarrassment. Still, he saw clearly
that Darfour was the true heart of the slave trade, as the supply from
Inner Africa had to pass through it to Egypt, and he thought that a
solution might be found for the difficulty by requiring every one of
the inhabitants to have a permission of residence, and every traveller
a passport for himself and his followers. But neither time nor the
conditions of his post allowed of his carrying out this suggestion. It
remains, however, a simple practical measure to be borne in mind when
the solution of the slave difficulty is taken finally in hand by a
Government in earnest on the subject, and powerful enough to see its
orders enforced.

General Gordon reached Shaka on 7th April, and at once issued a notice
to the slave-dealers to quit that advantageous station. He also sent
forward reinforcements of men and stores to Gessi, but in a few days
they returned, with a message from Gessi that he had received enough
powder from his own base on the Nile to renew the attack on Suleiman.
Within one week of Gordon's arrival not a slave-dealer remained in
Shaka, and when envoys arrived from Suleiman, bearing protestations
that he had never been hostile to the Egyptian Government, he promptly
arrested them and sent them for trial by court-martial. Their guilt as
conspirers against the Khedive was easily proved, and they were shot.
Their fate was fully deserved, but Gordon would have spared their
lives if Suleiman had not himself slain so many hostages and helpless
captives.

Gordon's final operations for the suppression of the slave trade in
Darfour, carried on while Gessi was engaged in his last struggle with
Suleiman, resulted in the release of several thousand slaves, and the
dispersal and disarmament of nearly 500 slave-dealers. In one week he
rescued as many as 500 slaves, and he began to feel, as he said, that
he had at last reached the heart of the evil.

But while these final successes were being achieved, he was recalled
by telegraph to Cairo, where events had reached a crisis, and the days
of Ismail as Khedive were numbered. It may have been the instinct of
despair that led that Prince to appeal again to Gordon, but the
Darfour rebellion was too grave to allow of his departure before it
had been suppressed; and on the 1st July he received a telegram from
the Minister Cherif, calling on him to proclaim throughout the Soudan
Tewfik Pasha as Khedive. The change did not affect him in the least,
he wrote, for not merely had his personal feelings towards Ismail
changed after he threw him over at Cairo, but he had found out the
futility of writing to him on any subject connected with the Soudan,
and with this knowledge had come a feeling of personal indifference.

On his return to Khartoum, he received tidings of the execution of
Suleiman, and also of the death of the Darfourian Sultan, Haroun, so
that he felt justified in assuming that complete tranquillity had
settled down on the scene of war. The subsequent capture and execution
of Abdulgassin proved this view to be well founded, for, with the
exception of Rabi, who escaped to Borgu, he was the last of Zebehr's
chief lieutenants. The shot that killed that brigand, the very man who
shed the child's blood to consecrate the standard, was the last fired
under Gordon's orders in the Soudan. If the slave trade was then not
absolutely dead, it was doomed so long as the Egyptian authorities
pursued an active repressive policy such as their great English
representative had enforced. The military confederacy of Zebehr, which
had at one time alarmed the Khedive in his palace at Cairo, had been
broken up. The authority of the Khartoum Governor-General had been
made supreme. As Gordon said, on travelling down from Khartoum in
August 1879, "Not a man could lift his hand without my leave
throughout the whole extent of the Soudan."

General Gordon reached Cairo on 23rd August, with the full intention
of retiring from the Egyptian service; but before he could do so there
remained the still unsolved Abyssinian difficulty, which had formed
part of his original mission. He therefore yielded to the request of
the Khedive to proceed on a special mission to the Court of King John,
then ruling that inaccessible and mysterious kingdom, and one week
after his arrival at Cairo he was steaming down the Red Sea to
Massowah. His instructions were contained in a letter from Tewfik
Pasha to himself. After proclaiming his pacific intentions, the
Khedive exhorted him "to maintain the rights of Egypt, to preserve
intact the frontiers of the State, without being compelled to make any
restitution to Abyssinia, and to prevent henceforth every encroachment
or other act of aggression in the interests of both countries."

In order to explain the exact position of affairs in Abyssinia at this
period, a brief summary must be given of events between Gordon's first
overtures to King John in March 1877, and his taking up the matter
finally in August 1879. As explained at the beginning of this chapter,
those overtures came to nothing, because King John was called away to
engage in hostilities with Menelik, King of Shoa, and now himself
Negus, or Emperor of Abyssinia. In the autumn of the earlier year King
John wrote Gordon a very civil letter, calling him a Christian and a
brother, but containing nothing definite, and ending with the
assertion that "all the world knows the Abyssinian frontier." Soon
after this Walad el Michael recommenced his raids on the border, and
when he obtained some success, which he owed to the assistance of one
of Gordon's own subordinates, given while Gordon was making himself
responsible for his good conduct, he was congratulated by the Egyptian
War Minister, and urged to prosecute the conquest of Abyssinia.
Instead of attempting the impossible, he very wisely came to terms
with King John, who, influenced perhaps by Gordon's advice, or more
probably by his own necessities through the war with Menelik, accepted
Michael's promises to respect the frontier. Michael went to the King's
camp to make his submission in due form, and in the spring of 1879 it
became known that he and the Abyssinian General (Ras Alula) were
planning an invasion of Egyptian territory. Fortunately King John was
more peacefully disposed, and still seemed anxious to come to an
arrangement with General Gordon.

In January 1879 the King wrote Gordon a letter, saying that he hoped
to see him soon, and he also sent an envoy to discuss matters. The
Abyssinian stated very clearly that his master would not treat with
the Khedive, on account of the way he had subjected his envoys at
Cairo to insult and injury; but that he would negotiate with Gordon,
whom he persisted in styling the "Sultan of the Soudan." King John
wanted a port, the restoration of Bogos, and an Abouna or Coptic
Archbishop from Alexandria, to crown him in full accordance with
Abyssinian ritual. Gordon replied a port was impossible, but that he
should have a Consul and facilities for traffic at Massowah; that the
territory claimed was of no value, and that he certainly should have
an Abouna. He also undertook to do his best to induce the British
Government to restore to King John the crown of King Theodore, which
had been carried off after the fall of Magdala. The envoy then
returned to Abyssinia, and nothing further took place until Gordon's
departure for Massowah in August, when the rumoured plans of Michael
and Ras Alula were causing some alarm.

On reaching Massowah on 6th September, Gordon found that the
Abyssinians were in virtual possession of Bogos, and that if the
Egyptian claims were to be asserted, it would be necessary to retake
it. The situation had, however, been slightly improved by the downfall
of Michael, whose treachery and covert hostility towards General
Gordon would probably have led to an act of violence. But he and Ras
Alula had had some quarrel, and the Abyssinian General had seized the
occasion to send Michael and his officers as prisoners to the camp of
King John. The chief obstacle to a satisfactory arrangement being
thus removed, General Gordon hastened to have an interview with Ras
Alula, and with this intention crossed the Abyssinian frontier, and
proceeded to his camp at Gura. After an interview and the presentation
of the Khedive's letter and his credentials, Gordon found that he was
practically a prisoner, and that nothing could be accomplished save by
direct negotiation with King John. He therefore offered to go to his
capital at Debra Tabor, near Gondar, if Ras Alula would promise to
refrain from attacking Egypt during his absence. This promise was
promptly given, and in a few days it was expanded into an armistice
for four months.

After six weeks' journey accomplished on mules, and by the worst roads
in the country, as Ras Alula had expressly ordered, so that the
inaccessibility of the country might be made more evident, General
Gordon reached Debra Tabor on 27th October. He was at once received by
King John, but this first reception was of only a brief and formal
character. Two days later the chief audience was given at daybreak,
King John reciting his wrongs, and Gordon referring him to the
Khedive's letters, which had not been read. After looking at them, the
King burst out with a list of demands, culminating in the sum of
£2,000,000 or the port of Massowah. When he had finished, Gordon asked
him to put these demands on paper, to sign them with his seal, and to
give the Khedive six months to consider them and make a reply. This
King John promised to do on his return from some baths, whither he was
proceeding for the sake of his health.

After a week's absence the King returned, and the negotiations were
resumed. But the King would not draw up his demands, which he realised
were excessive, and when he found that Gordon remained firm in his
intention to uphold the rights of the Khedive, the Abyssinian became
offended and rude, and told Gordon to go. Gordon did not require to be
told this twice, and an hour afterwards had begun his march, intending
to proceed by Galabat to Khartoum. A messenger was sent after him with
a letter from the King to the Khedive, which on translating read as
follows: "I have received the letters you sent me by _that man_ (a
term of contempt). I will not make a secret peace with you. If you
want peace, ask the Sultans of Europe." With a potentate so vague and
so exacting it was impossible to attain any satisfactory result, and
therefore Gordon was not sorry to depart. After nearly a fortnight's
travelling, he and his small party had reached the very borders of the
Soudan, their Abyssinian escort having returned, when a band of
Abyssinians, owning allegiance to Ras Arya, swooped down on them, and
carried them off to the village of that chief, who was the King's
uncle.

The motive of this step is not clear, for Ras Arya declared that he
was at feud with the King, and that he would willingly help the
Egyptians to conquer the country. He however went on to explain that
the seizure of Gordon's party was due to the King's order that it
should not be allowed to return to Egypt by any other route than that
through Massowah.

Unfortunately, the step seemed so full of menace that as a precaution
Gordon felt compelled to destroy the private journal he had kept
during his visit, as well as some valuable maps and plans. After
leaving the district of this prince, Gordon and his small party had to
make their way as best they could to get out of the country, only
making their way at all by a lavish payment of money--this journey
alone costing £1400--and by submitting to be bullied and insulted by
every one with the least shadow of authority. At last Massowah was
reached in safety, and every one was glad, because reports had become
rife as to King John's changed attitude towards Gordon, and the danger
to which he was exposed. But the Khedive was too much occupied to
attend to these matters, or to comply with Gordon's request to send a
regiment and a man-of-war to Massowah, as soon as the Abyssinian
despot made him to all intents and purposes a prisoner. The neglect to
make that demonstration not only increased the very considerable
personal danger in which Gordon was placed during the whole of his
mission, but it also exposed Massowah to the risk of capture if the
Abyssinians had resolved to attack it.

The impressions General Gordon formed of the country were extremely
unfavourable. The King was cruel and avaricious beyond all belief, and
in his opinion fast going mad. The country was far less advanced than
he had thought. The people were greedy, unattractive, and quarrelsome.
But he detected their military qualities, and some of the merits of
their organisation. "They are," he wrote, "a race of warriors, hardy,
and, though utterly undisciplined, religious fanatics. I have seen
many peoples, but I never met with a more fierce, savage set than
these. The King said he could beat united Europe, except Russia."

The closing incidents of Gordon's tenure of the post of
Governor-General of the Soudan have now to be given, and they were not
characterised by that spirit of justice, to say nothing of generosity,
which his splendid services and complete loyalty to the Khedive's
Government demanded. During his mission into Abyssinia his natural
demands for support were completely ignored, and he was left to
whatever fate might befall him. When he succeeded in extricating
himself from that perilous position, he found that the Khedive was so
annoyed at his inability to exact from his truculent neighbour a
treaty without any accompanying concessions, that he paid no
attention to him, and seized the opportunity to hasten the close of
his appointment by wilfully perverting the sense of several
confidential suggestions made to his Government. The plain explanation
of these miserable intrigues was that the official class at Cairo,
seeing that Gordon had alienated the sympathy and support of the
British Foreign Office and its representatives by his staunch and
outspoken defence of Ismail in 1878, realised that the moment had come
to terminate his, to them, always hateful Dictatorship in the Soudan.
While the Cairo papers were allowed to couple the term "mad" with his
name, the Ministers went so far as to denounce his propositions as
inconsistent. One of these Ministers had been Gordon's enemy for
years; another had been banished by him from Khartoum for cruelty;
they were one and all sympathetic to the very order of things which
Gordon had destroyed, and which, as long as he retained power, would
never be revived. What wonder that they should snatch the favourable
opportunity of precipitating the downfall of the man they had so long
feared! But it was neither creditable nor politic for the
representatives of England to stand by while these schemes were
executed to the detraction of the man who had then given six years'
disinterested and laborious effort to the regeneration of the Soudan
and the suppression of the slave trade.

When Gordon discovered that his secret representations, sent in cipher
for the information of the Government, were given to the Press with a
perverted meaning and hostile criticism, he hastened to Cairo. He
requested an immediate interview with Tewfik, who excused himself for
what had been done by his Ministers on the ground of his youth; but
General Gordon read the whole situation at a glance, and at once sent
in his resignation, which was accepted. It is not probable that, under
any circumstances, he would have been induced to return to the Soudan,
where his work seemed done, but he certainly was willing to make
another attempt to settle the Abyssinian difficulty. Without the
Khedive's support, and looked at askance by his own countrymen in the
Delta, called mad on this side and denounced as inconsistent on the
other, no good result could have ensued, and therefore he turned his
back on the scene of his long labours without a sigh, and this time
even without regret.

The state of his health was such that rest, change of scene, and the
discontinuance of all mental effort were imperatively necessary, in
the opinion of his doctor, if a complete collapse of mental and
physical power was to be avoided. He was quite a wreck, and was
showing all the effects of protracted labour, the climate, and
improper food. Humanly speaking, his departure from Egypt was only
made in time to save his life, and therefore there was some
compensation in the fact that it was hastened by official jealousy and
animosity.

But it seems very extraordinary that, considering the magnitude of the
task he had performed single-handed in the Soudan, and the way he had
done it with a complete disregard of all selfish interest, he should
have been allowed to lay down his appointment without any
manifestation of honour or respect from those he had served so long
and so well. Nor was this indifference confined to Egyptians. It was
reflected among the English and other European officials, who
pronounced Gordon unpractical and peculiar, while in their hearts they
only feared his candour and bluntness. But even public opinion at
home, as reflected in the Press, seemed singularly blind to the fresh
claim he had established on the admiration of the world. His China
campaigns had earned him ungrudging praise, and a fame which, but for
his own diffidence, would have carried him to the highest positions in
the British army. But his achievements in the Soudan, not less
remarkable in themselves, and obtained with far less help from others
than his triumph over the Taepings, roused no enthusiasm, and received
but scanty notice. The explanation of this difference is not far to
seek, and reveals the baser side of human nature. In Egypt he had hurt
many susceptibilities, and criticised the existing order of things.
His propositions were drastic, and based on the exclusion of a costly
European _régime_ and the substitution of a native administration.
Even his mode of suppressing the slave trade had been as original as
it was fearless. Exeter Hall could not resound with cheers for a man
who declared that he had bought slaves himself, and recognised the
rights of others in what are called human chattels, even although that
man had done more than any individual or any government to kill the
slave trade at its root. It was not until his remarkable mission to
Khartoum, only four years after he left Egypt, that public opinion
woke up to a sense of all he had done before, and realised, in its
full extent, the magnitude and the splendour of his work as
Governor-General of the Soudan.




CHAPTER IX.

MINOR MISSIONS--INDIA AND CHINA.


General Gordon arrived in London at the end of January 1880--having
lingered on his home journey in order to visit Rome--resolved as far
as he possibly could to take that period of rest which he had
thoroughly earned, and which he so much needed. But during these last
few years of his life he was to discover that the world would not
leave him undisturbed in the tranquillity he desired and sought.
Everyone wished to see him usefully and prominently employed for his
country's good, and offers, suitable and not suitable to his character
and genius, were either made to him direct, or put forward in the
public Press as suggestions for the utilization of his experience and
energy in the treatment of various burning questions. His numerous
friends also wished to do him honour, and he found himself threatened
with being drawn into the vortex of London Society, for which he had
little inclination, and, at that time, not even the strength and
health.

After this incident he left London on 29th February for Switzerland,
where he took up his residence at Lausanne, visiting _en route_ at
Brussels, Mr, afterwards Lord, Vivian, then Minister at the Belgian
Court, who had been Consul-General in Egypt during the financial
crisis episode. It is pleasant to find that that passage had, in this
case, left no ill-feeling behind it on either side, and that Gordon
promised to think over the advice Mrs Vivian gave him to get married
while he was staying at the Legation. His reply must not be taken as
of any serious import, and was meant to turn the subject. About the
same time he wrote in a private letter, "Wives! wives! what a trial
you are to your husbands! From my experience married men have more or
less a cowed look."

It was on this occasion that Gordon was first brought into contact
with the King of the Belgians, and had his attention drawn to the
prospect of suppressing the slave trade from the side of the Congo,
somewhat analogous to his own project of crushing it from Zanzibar.
The following unpublished letter gives an amusing account of the
circumstances under which he first met King Leopold:--


                                   "HOTEL DE BELLE-VUE, BRUXELLES,
                                   "_Tuesday, 2nd March 1880_.

     "I arrived here yesterday at 6 P.M., and found my baggage had not
     come on when I got to the hotel (having given orders about my
     boxes which were to arrive to-day at 9 A.M.). I found I was
     _detected_, and a huge card of His Majesty awaited me, inviting
     to dinner at 6.30 P.M. It was then 6.20 P.M. I wrote my excuses,
     telling the truth. Then I waited. It is now 9.30 A.M., and no
     baggage. King has just sent to say he will receive me at 11 A.M.
     I am obliged to say I cannot come if my baggage does not arrive.

     "I picked up a small book here, the 'Souvenirs of Congress of
     Vienna,' in 1814 and 1815. It is a sad account of the festivities
     of that time. It shows how great people fought for invitations to
     the various parties, and how like a bomb fell the news of
     Napoleon's descent from Elba, and relates the end of some of the
     great men. The English great man, Castlereagh, cut his throat
     near Chislehurst; Alexander died mad, etc., etc. They are all in
     their 6 feet by 2 feet 6 inches.... Horrors, it is now 10.20
     A.M., and no baggage! King sent to say he will see me at 11 A.M.;
     remember, too, I have to dress, shave, etc., etc. 10.30 A.M.--No
     baggage!!! It is getting painful. His Majesty will be furious.
     10.48 A.M.--No baggage! Indirectly Mackinnon (late Sir William)
     is the sinner, for he evidently told the King I was coming.
     Napoleon said, 'The smallest trifles produce the greatest
     results.' 12.30 P.M.--Got enclosed note from palace, and went to
     see the King--a very tall man with black beard. He was very
     civil, and I stayed with him for one and a half hours. He is
     quite at sea with his expedition (Congo), and I have to try and
     get him out of it. I have to go there to-morrow at 11.30 A.M. My
     baggage has come."

During his stay at Lausanne his health improved, and he lost the
numbed feeling in his arms which had strengthened the impression that
he suffered from _angina pectoris_. This apprehension, although
retained until a very short period before his final departure from
England in 1884, was ultimately discovered to be baseless. With
restored health returned the old feeling of restlessness. After five
weeks he found it impossible to remain any longer in Lausanne. Again
he exclaims in his letters: "Inaction is terrible to me!" and on 9th
April he left that place for London.

Yet, notwithstanding his desire to return to work, or rather his
feeling that he could not live in a state of inactivity, he refused
the first definite suggestion that was made to him of employment.
While he was still at Lausanne, the Governor of Cape Colony sent the
following telegram to the Secretary of State for the Colonies:--"My
Ministers wish that the post of Commandant of the Colonial Forces
should be offered to Chinese Gordon." The reply to this telegram read
as follows:--"The command of the Colonial Forces would probably be
accepted by Chinese Gordon in the event of your Ministers desiring
that the offer of it should be made to him." The Cape authorities
requested that this offer might be made, and the War Office
accordingly telegraphed to him as follows: "Cape Government offer
command of Colonial Forces; supposed salary, £1500; your services
required early." Everyone seems to have taken it as a matter of course
that he would accept; but Gordon's reply was in the negative: "Thanks
for telegram just received; I do not feel inclined to accept an
appointment." His reasons for not accepting what seemed a desirable
post are not known. They were probably due to considerations of
health, although the doubt may have presented itself to his mind
whether he was qualified by character to work in harmony with the
Governor and Cabinet of any colony. He knew very well that all his
good work had been done in an independent and unfettered capacity, and
at the Cape he must have felt that, as nominal head of the forces, he
would have been fettered by red tape and local jealousies, and
rendered incapable of doing any good in an anomalous position. But
after events make it desirable to state and recollect the precise
circumstances of this first offer to him from the Cape Government.

While at Lausanne, General Gordon's attention was much given to the
study of the Eastern Question, and I am not at all sure that the real
reason of his declining the Cape offer was not the hope and
expectation that he might be employed in connection with a subject
which he thoroughly understood and had very much at heart. He drew up
a memorandum on the Treaties of San Stefano and Berlin, which, for
clearness of statement, perfect grasp of a vital international
question, and prophetic vision, has never been surpassed among State
papers. Although written in March 1880, and in my possession a very
short time afterwards, I was not permitted to publish it until
September 1885, when it appeared in the _Times_ of the 24th of that
month. Its remarkable character was at once appreciated by public men,
and Sir William Harcourt, speaking in the House four days later,
testified to the extraordinary foresight with which "poor Gordon"
diagnosed the case of Europe's sick man. I quote here this memorandum
in its integrity:--

     "The Powers of Europe assembled at Constantinople, and
     recommended certain reforms to Turkey. Turkey refused to accede
     to these terms, the Powers withdrew, and deliberated. Not being
     able to come to a decision, Russia undertook, on her own
     responsibility, to enforce them. England acquiesced, provided
     that her own interests were not interfered with. The
     Russo-Turkish War occurred, during which time England, in various
     ways, gave the Turks reason to believe that she would eventually
     come to their assistance. This may be disputed, but I refer to
     the authorities in Constantinople whether the Turks were not
     under the impression during the war _that England would help
     them, and also save them, from any serious loss eventually_.
     England, therefore, provided this is true, did encourage Turkey
     in her resistance.

     "Then came the Treaty of San Stephano. It was drawn up with the
     intention of finishing off the rule of Turkey in Europe--there
     was no disguise about it; but I think that, looking at that
     treaty from a Russian point of view, it was a very bad one for
     Russia. Russia, by her own act, had trapped herself.

     "By it (the Treaty of San Stephano) Russia had created a huge
     kingdom, or State, south of the Danube, with a port. This new
     Bulgarian State, being fully satisfied, would have nothing more
     to desire from Russia, but would have sought, by alliance with
     other Powers, to keep what she (Bulgaria) possessed, and would
     have feared Russia more than any other Power. Having a seaport,
     she would have leant on England and France. Being independent of
     Turkey, she would wish to be on good terms with her.

     "Therefore I maintain, that _once_ the Russo-Turkish War had been
     permitted, no greater obstacle could have been presented to
     Russia than the maintenance of this united Bulgarian State, and I
     believe that the Russians felt this as well.

     "I do not go into the question of the Asia Minor acquisitions by
     Russia, for, to all intents and purposes, the two treaties are
     alike. By both treaties Russia possesses the strategical points
     of the country, and though by the Berlin Treaty Russia gave up
     the strip south of Ararat, and thus does not hold the road to
     Persia, yet she stretches along this strip, and is only distant
     two days' march from the road, the value of which is merely
     commercial.

     "By both treaties Russia obtained Batoum and the war-like tribes
     around it. Though the _only port_ on the Black Sea between Kertch
     and Sinope, a distance of 1000 miles, its acquisition by Russia
     was never contested. It was said to be a worthless
     possession--'grapes were sour.'

     "I now come to the changes made in the San Stephano Treaty (which
     was undoubtedly, and was intended to be, the _coup de grâce_ to
     Turkish rule in Europe) by the Treaty of Berlin.

     "By the division of the two Bulgarias we prolonged, without
     alleviating, the agony of Turkey in Europe; we repaired the great
     mistake of Russia, from a Russian point of view, in making one
     great State of Bulgaria. We stipulated that Turkish troops, with
     a hostile Bulgaria to the north, and a hostile Roumelia to the
     south, should occupy the Balkans. I leave military men, or any
     men of sense, to consider this step. We restored Russia to her
     place, as the protector of these lands, which she had by the
     Treaty of San Stephano given up. We have left the wishes of
     Bulgarians unsatisfied, and the countries unquiet. We have forced
     them to look to Russia more than to us and France, and we have
     lost their sympathies. And for what? It is not doubted that ere
     long the two States will be united. If Moldavia and Wallachia
     laughed at the Congress of Paris, and united while it (the
     Congress) was in session at Paris, is it likely Bulgaria will
     wait long, or hesitate to unite with Roumelia, because Europe
     does not wish it?

     "Therefore the union of the two States is certain, only it is to
     be regretted that this union will give just the chance Russia
     wants to interfere again; and though, when the union takes place,
     I believe Russia will repent it, still it will always be to
     Russia that they will look till the union is accomplished.

     "I suppose the Turks are capable of appreciating what they gained
     by the Treaty of Berlin. _They were fully aware that the Treaty
     of San Stephano was their_ coup de grâce. But the Treaty of
     Berlin was supposed to be beneficial to them. Why? By it Turkey
     lost _not only Bulgaria_ and _Roumelia_ (for she has virtually
     lost it), but _Bosnia_ and _Herzegovina_, while she gained the
     utterly impossible advantage of occupying the Balkans, with a
     hostile nation to north and south.

     "I therefore maintain that the Treaty of Berlin did no good to
     Turkey, but infinite harm to Europe.

     "I will now go on to the Cyprus convention, and say a few words
     on the bag-and-baggage policy. Turkey and Egypt are governed by a
     ring of Pashas, most of them Circassians, and who are perfect
     foreigners in Turkey. They are, for the greater part, men who,
     when boys, have been bought at prices varying from £50 to £70,
     and who, brought up in the harems, have been pushed on by their
     purchasers from one grade to another. Some have been dancing boys
     and drummers, like Riaz and Ismail Eyoub of Egypt. I understand
     by bag-and-baggage policy the getting rid of, say, two hundred
     Pashas of this sort in Turkey, and sixty Pashas in Egypt. These
     men have not the least interest in the welfare of the countries;
     they are aliens and adventurers, they are hated by the
     respectable inhabitants of Turkey and Egypt, and they must be got
     rid of.

     "Armenia is lost; it is no use thinking of reforms in it. The
     Russians virtually possess it; the sooner we recognise this fact
     the better. Why undertake the impossible?

     "What should be done? Study existing facts, and decide on a
     definite line of policy, and follow it through. Russia, having a
     definite line of policy, is strong; we have not one, and are weak
     and vacillating. 'A double-minded man is unstable in all his
     ways.'

     "Supposing such a line of policy as follows was decided upon and
     followed up, it would be better than the worries of the last four
     years:--

     "1. The complete purchase of Cyprus.

     "2. The abandonment of the Asia Minor reforms.

     "3. The union of Bulgaria and Roumelia, with a port.

     "4. The increase of Greece.

     "5. Constantinople, a State, under European guarantees.

     "6. Increase of Montenegro, and Italy, on that coast.

     "7. Annexation of Egypt by England, _either directly or by having
     paramount and entire authority_.

     "8. Annexation of Syria by France--ditto--ditto--ditto. (By this
     means France would be as interested in stopping Russian progress
     as England is.)

     "9. Italy to be allowed to extend towards Abyssinia.

     "10. Re-establishment of the Turkish Constitution, and the
     establishment of a similar one in Egypt (these Constitutions, if
     not interfered with, would soon rid Turkey and Egypt of their
     parasite Pashas).

     "I daresay this programme could be improved, but it has the
     advantage of being _definite_, and a definite policy, however
     imperfect, is better than an unstable or hand-to-mouth policy.

     "I would not press these points at once; I would keep them in
     view, and let events work themselves out.

     "I believe, in time, this programme could be worked out without a
     shot being fired.

     "I believe it would be quite possible to come to terms with
     Russia on these questions; I do not think she has sailed under
     false colours when her acts and words are generally considered.
     She is the avowed enemy of Turkey, she has not disguised it. Have
     _we_ been the friend of Turkey? How many years have elapsed
     between the Crimean war and the Russo-Turkish war? What did we do
     to press Turkey to carry out reforms (as promised by the Treaty
     of 1856) in those years? _Absolutely nothing._

     "What has to be done to prevent the inevitable crash of the
     Turkish Empire which is impending, imperilling the peace of the
     world, is _the re-establishment of the Constitution of Midhat,
     and its maintenance, in spite of the Sultan_. By this means, when
     the Sultan and the ring of Pashas fall, there would still exist
     the chambers of representatives of the provinces, who would carry
     on the Government for a time, and at any rate prevent the foreign
     occupation of Constantinople, or any disorders there, incident on
     the exit of the Sultan and his Pashas."

Having partially explained how General Gordon declined one post for
which he appeared to be well suited, I have to describe how it was
that he accepted another for which neither by training nor by
character was he in the least degree fitted. The exact train of
trifling circumstances that led up to the proposal that Gordon should
accompany the newly-appointed Viceroy, the Marquis of Ripon, to India
cannot be traced, because it is impossible to assign to each its
correct importance. But it may be said generally, that the prevalent
idea was that Lord Ripon was going out to the East on a great mission
of reform, and some one suggested that the character of that mission
would be raised in the eyes of the public if so well known a
philanthropist as Gordon, whose views on all subjects were free from
official bias, could be associated with it. I do not know whether the
idea originated with Sir Bruce Seton, Lord Ripon's secretary, while at
the War Office, but in any case that gentleman first broached the
proposition to Sir Henry Gordon, the eldest brother of General Gordon.
Sir Henry not merely did not repel the suggestion, but he consented to
put it before his brother and to support it. For his responsibility in
this affair Sir Henry afterwards took the fullest and frankest blame
on himself for his "bad advice." When the matter was put before
General Gordon he did not reject it, as might have been expected, but
whether from his desire to return to active employment, or biassed by
his brother's views in favour of the project, or merely from coming to
a decision without reflection, he made up his mind at once to accept
the offer, and the official announcement of the appointment was made
on 1st May, with the additional statement that his departure would
take place without delay, as he was to sail with Lord Ripon on the
14th of that month.

It was after his acceptance of this post, and not some months before,
as has been erroneously stated, that General Gordon had an interview
with the Prince of Wales under circumstances that may be described.
The Prince gave a large dinner-party to Lord Ripon before his
departure for India, and Gordon was invited. He declined the
invitation, and also declined to give any reason for doing so. The
Prince of Wales, with his unfailing tact and the genuine kindness with
which he always makes allowance for such little breaches of what ought
to be done, at least in the cases of exceptional persons like Gordon,
sent him a message: "If you won't dine with me, will you come and see
me next Sunday afternoon?" Gordon went, and had a very interesting
conversation with the Prince, and in the middle of it the Princess
came into the room, and then the Princesses, her daughters, who said
they would "like to shake hands with Colonel Gordon."

Before even the departure Gordon realised he had made a mistake, and
if there had been any way out of the dilemma he would not have been
slow to take it. As there was not, he fell back on the hope that he
might be able to discharge his uncongenial duties for a brief period,
and then seek some convenient opportunity of retiring. But as to his
own real views of his mistake, and of his unfitness for the post,
there never was any doubt, and they found expression when, in the
midst of a family gathering, he exclaimed: "Up to this I have been an
independent comet, now I shall be a chained satellite."

The same opinion found expression in a letter he wrote to Sir Halliday
Macartney an hour before he went to Charing Cross:--

     "MY DEAR MACARTNEY,--You will be surprised to hear that I have
     accepted the Private Secretaryship to Lord Ripon, and that I am
     just off to Charing Cross. I am afraid that I have decided in
     haste, to repent at leisure. Good-bye.--Yours,

                                             C. G. GORDON."

His own views on this affair were set forth in the following words:--

"Men at times, owing to the mysteries of Providence, form judgments
which they afterwards repent of. This is my case. Nothing could have
exceeded the kindness and consideration with which Lord Ripon has
treated me. I have never met anyone with whom I could have felt
greater sympathy in the arduous task he has undertaken."

And again, writing at greater length to his brother, he explains what
took place in the following letter:--

     "In a moment of weakness I took the appointment of Private
     Secretary to Lord Ripon, the new Governor-General of India. No
     sooner had I landed at Bombay than I saw that in my irresponsible
     position I could not hope to do anything really to the purpose in
     the face of the vested interests out there. Seeing this, and
     seeing, moreover, that my views were so diametrically opposed to
     those of the official classes, I resigned. Lord Ripon's position
     was certainly a great consideration with me. It was assumed by
     some that my views of the state of affairs were the Viceroy's,
     and thus I felt that I should do him harm by staying with him. We
     parted perfect friends. The brusqueness of my leaving was
     unavoidable, inasmuch as my stay would have put me into the
     possession of secrets of State that--considering my decision
     eventually to leave--I ought not to know. Certainly I might have
     stayed a month or two, had a pain in the hand, and gone quietly;
     but the whole duties were so distasteful that I felt, being
     pretty callous as to what the world says, that it was better to
     go at once."

If a full explanation is sought of the reasons why Gordon repented of
his decision, and determined to leave an uncongenial position without
delay, it may be found in a consideration of the two following
circumstances. His views as to what he held to be the excessive
payment of English and other European servants in Asiatic countries
were not new, and had been often expressed. They were crystallised in
the phrase, "Why pay a man more at Simla than at Hongkong?" and had
formed the basis of his projected financial reform in Egypt in 1878,
and they often found expression in his correspondence. For instance,
in a letter to the present writer, he proposed that the loss accruing
from the abolition of the opium trade might be made good by reducing
officers' pay from Indian to Colonial allowances. With Gordon's
contempt for money, and the special circumstances that led to his not
wanting any considerable sum for his own moderate requirements and few
responsibilities, it is not surprising that he held these views; but
no practical statesman could have attempted to carry them out. During
the voyage to India the perception that it would be impossible for
Lord Ripon to institute any special reorganisation on these lines led
him to decide that it would be best to give up a post he did not like,
and he wrote to his sister to this effect while at sea, with the
statement that it was arranged that he should leave in the following
September or October.

He reached Bombay on the 28th of May, and his resignation was received
and accepted on the night of the 2nd June. What had happened in that
brief interval of a few days to make him precipitate matters? There is
absolutely no doubt, quite apart from the personal explanation given
by General Gordon, both verbally and in writing, to myself, that the
determining cause was the incident relating to Yakoob Khan.

That Afghan chief had been proclaimed and accepted as Ameer after the
death of his father, the Ameer Shere Ali. In that capacity he had
signed the Treaty of Gandamak, and received Sir Louis Cavagnari as
British agent at his capital. When the outbreak occurred at Cabul, on
1st September, and Cavagnari and the whole of the mission were
murdered, it was generally believed that the most guilty person was
Yakoob Khan. On the advance of General Roberts, Yakoob Khan took the
first opportunity of making his escape from his compatriots and
joining the English camp. This voluntary act seemed to justify a doubt
as to his guilt, but a Court of Inquiry was appointed to ascertain the
facts. The bias of the leading members of that Court was
unquestionably hostile to Yakoob, or rather it would be more accurate
to say that they were bent on finding the highest possible personage
guilty. They were appointed to inquire, not to sentence. Yet they
found Yakoob guilty, and they sent a vast mass of evidence to the
Foreign Department then at Calcutta. The experts of the Foreign
Department examined that evidence. They pronounced it "rubbish," and
Lord Lytton was obliged to send Mr (afterwards Sir) Lepel Griffin, an
able member of the Indian Civil Service, specially versed in frontier
politics, to act as Political Officer with the force in Afghanistan,
so that no blunders of this kind might be re-enacted.

But nothing was done either to rehabilitate Yakoob's character or to
negotiate with him for the restoration of a central authority in
Afghanistan. Any other suitable candidate for the Ameership failing to
present himself, the present ruler, Abdurrahman, being then, and
indeed until the eve of the catastrophe at Maiwand, on 27th July 1880,
an adventurous pretender without any strong following, Lord Lytton had
been negotiating on the lines of a division of Afghanistan into three
or more provinces. That policy, of which the inner history has still
to be written, had a great deal more to be said in its favour than
would now be admitted, and only the unexpected genius and success of
Abdurrahman has made the contrary policy that was pursued appear the
acme of sound sense and high statesmanship. When Lord Ripon reached
Bombay at the end of May, the fate of Afghanistan was still in the
crucible. Even Abdurrahman, who had received kind treatment in the
persons of his imprisoned family at Candahar from the English, was not
regarded as a factor of any great importance; while Ayoob, the least
known of all the chiefs, was deemed harmless only a few weeks before
he crossed the Helmund and defeated our troops in the only battle lost
during the war. But if none of the candidates inspired our authorities
with any confidence, they were resolute in excluding Yakoob Khan.
Having been relieved from the heavier charge of murdering Cavagnari,
he was silently cast on the not less fatal one of being a madman.

Such was the position of the question when Lord Ripon and his
secretary landed at Bombay. It was known that they would alter the
Afghan policy of the Conservative Government, and that, as far as
possible, they would revert to the Lawrentian policy of ignoring the
region beyond the passes. But it was not known that they had any
designs about Yakoob Khan, and this was the bomb they fired on arrival
into the camp of Indian officialdom.

The first despatch written by the new secretary was to the Foreign
Department, to the effect that Lord Ripon intended to commence
negotiations with the captive Yakoob, and Mr (now Sir) Mortimer
Durand, then assistant secretary in that branch of the service, was at
once sent from Simla to remonstrate against a proceeding which "would
stagger every one in India." Lord Ripon was influenced by these
representations, and agreed to at least suspend his overtures to
Yakoob Khan, but his secretary was not convinced by either the
arguments or the facts of the Indian Foreign Department. He still
considered that Afghan prince the victim of political injustice, and
also that he was the best candidate for the throne of Cabul. But he
also saw very clearly from this passage of arms with the official
classes that he would never be able to work in harmony with men who
were above and before all bureaucrats, and with commendable promptness
he seized the opportunity to resign a post which he thoroughly
detested. What he thought on the subject of Yakoob Khan is fully set
forth in the following memorandum drawn up as a note to my biography
of that interesting and ill-starred prince in "Central Asian
Portraits." Whether Gordon was right or wrong in his views about
Yakoob Khan is a matter of no very great importance. The incident is
only noteworthy as marking the conclusion of his brief secretarial
experience, and as showing the hopefulness of a man who thought that
he could make the all-powerful administrative system of India decide a
political question on principles of abstract justice. The practical
comment on such sanguine theories was furnished by Mr Durand being
appointed acting private secretary on Gordon's resignation.

General Gordon's memorandum read as follows:--

     "Yacoob was accused of concealing letters from the Russian
     Government, and of entering into an alliance with the Rajah of
     Cashmere to form a Triple Alliance. Where are these letters or
     proof of this intention? They do not exist.

     "Yacoob came out to Roberts of his own free will. He was
     imprisoned. It was nothing remarkable that he was visited by an
     Afghan leader, although it was deemed evidence of a treacherous
     intention. Roberts and Cavagnari made the Treaty of Gandamak. It
     is absurd to say Yacoob wanted an European Resident. It is
     against all reason to say he did. He was coerced into taking
     one. He was imprisoned, and a Court of Enquiry was held on him,
     composed of the President Macgregor, who was chief of the staff
     to the man who made the Treaty, by which Cavagnari went to Cabul,
     and who had imprisoned Yacoob. This Court of Enquiry asked for
     evidence concerning a man in prison, which is in eyes of Asiatics
     equivalent to being already condemned. This Court accumulated
     evidence, utterly worthless in any court of justice, as will be
     seen if ever published. This Court of _Enquiry_ found him guilty
     and sentenced him to exile. Was that their function? If the
     secret papers are published, it would be seen that the despatches
     from the Cabulese chiefs were couched in fair terms. They did not
     want to fight the English. They wanted their Ameer. Yacoob's
     defence is splendid. He says in it: 'If I had been guilty, would
     I not have escaped to Herat, whereas I put myself in your hands?'
     The following questions arise from this Court of Enquiry. Who
     fired first shot from the Residency? Was the conduct of Cavagnari
     and his people discreet in a fanatical city? Were not those who
     forced Cavagnari on Yacoob against his protest equally
     responsible with him? Yacoob was weak and timid in a critical
     moment, and he failed, but he did not incite this revolt. It was
     altogether against his interests to do so. What was the
     consequence of his unjust exile? Why, all the trouble which
     happened since that date. Afghanistan was quiet till we took her
     ruler away. It was an united Afghanistan. This mistake has cost
     £10,000,000, all from efforts to go on with an injustice. The
     Romans before their wars invoked all misery on themselves before
     the Goddess Nemesis if their war was unjust. We did not invoke
     her, but she followed us. Between the time that the Tory
     Government went out, and the new Viceroy Ripon had landed at
     Bombay, Lytton forced the hand of the Liberal Government by
     entering into negotiations with Abdurrahman, and appointing the
     Vali at Candahar, so endeavouring to prevent justice to Yacoob.
     Stokes, Arbuthnot, and another member of Supreme Council all
     protested against the deposition of Yacoob, also Sir Neville
     Chamberlaine."

Lest it should be thought that Gordon was alone in these opinions, I
append this statement, drawn up at the time by Sir Neville
Chamberlaine:--

     "An unprejudiced review of the circumstances surrounding the
     _émeute_ of September 1879 clearly indicates that the spontaneous
     and unpremeditated action of a discontented, undisciplined, and
     unpaid soldiery had not been planned, directed, or countenanced
     by the Ameer, his ministers, or his advisers. There is no
     evidence to prove or even to suspect that the mutiny of his
     soldiers was in any way not deplored by the Ameer, but was
     regarded by him with regret, dismay, and even terror. Fully
     conscious of the very grave misapprehensions and possible
     accusation of timidity and weakness on our part, I entertain,
     myself, very strong convictions that we should have first
     permitted and encouraged the Ameer to punish the mutinous
     soldiers and rioters implicated in the outrage before we
     ourselves interfered. The omission to adopt this course
     inevitably led to the action forced on the Ameer, which
     culminated in the forced resignation of his power and the total
     annihilation of the national government. The Ameer in thus
     resigning reserved to himself the right of seeking, when occasion
     offered, restoration to his heritage and its reversion to his
     heir. Nothing has occurred to justify the ignoring of these
     undeniable rights."

Gordon's resignation was handed in to Lord Ripon on the night of the
2nd of June, the news appeared in the London papers of the 4th, and it
had one immediate consequence which no one could have foreseen. But
before referring to that matter I must make clear the heavy pecuniary
sacrifice his resignation of this post entailed upon Gordon. He repaid
every farthing of his expenses as to passage money, etc., to Lord
Ripon, which left him very much out of pocket. He wrote himself on the
subject: "All this Private Secretaryship and its consequent expenses
are all due to my not acting on my _own_ instinct. However, for the
future I will be wiser.... It was a living crucifixion.... I nearly
burst with the trammels.... A £100,000 a year would not have kept me
there. I resigned on 2 June, and never unpacked my official dress."

The immediate consequence referred to was as follows: In the drawer of
Mr J. D. Campbell, at the office at Storey's Gate of the Chinese
Imperial Customs, had been lying for some little time the
following telegram for Colonel Gordon from Sir Robert Hart, the
Inspector-General of the Department in China:--

     "I am directed to invite you here (Peking). Please come and see
     for yourself. The opportunity of doing really useful work on a
     large scale ought not to be lost. Work, position, conditions, can
     all be arranged with yourself here to your satisfaction. Do take
     six months' leave and come."

As Mr Campbell was aware of Gordon's absence in India, he had thought
it useless to forward the message, and it was not until the
resignation was announced that he did so. In dealing with this
intricate matter, which was complicated by extraneous considerations,
it is necessary to clear up point by point. When Gordon received the
message he at once concluded that the invitation came from his old
colleague Li Hung Chang, and accepted it on that assumption, which in
the end proved erroneous. It is desirable to state that since Gordon's
departure from China in 1865 at least one communication had passed
between these former associates in a great enterprise. The following
characteristic letter, dated Tientsin, 22nd March 1879, reached Gordon
while he was at Khartoum:--

     "DEAR SIR,--I am instructed by His Excellency the Grand
     Secretary, Li, to answer your esteemed favour, dated the 27th
     October 1878, from Khartoum, which was duly received. I am right
     glad to hear from you. It is now over fourteen years since we
     parted from each other. Although I have not written to you, but I
     often speak of you, and remember you with very great interest.
     The benefit you have conferred on China does not disappear with
     your person, but is felt throughout the regions in which you
     played so important and active a part. All those people bless you
     for the blessings of peace and prosperity which they now enjoy.

     "Your achievements in Egypt are well known throughout the
     civilized world. I see often in the papers of your noble works on
     the Upper Nile. You are a man of ample resources, with which you
     suit yourself to any kind of emergency. My hope is that you may
     long be spared to improve the conditions of the people amongst
     whom your lot is cast. I am striving hard to advance my people to
     a higher state of development, and to unite both this and all
     other nations within the 'Four Seas' under one common
     brotherhood. To the several questions put in your note the
     following are the answers:--Kwoh Sung-Ling has retired from
     official life, and is now living at home. Yang Ta Jên died a
     great many years ago. Na Wang's adopted son is doing well, and is
     the colonel of a regiment, with 500 men under him. The Pa to'
     Chiaow Bridge, which you destroyed, was rebuilt very soon after
     you left China, and it is now in very good condition.

     "Kwoh Ta jên, the Chinese Minister, wrote to me that he had the
     pleasure of seeing you in London. I wished I had been there also
     to see you; but the responsibilities of life are so distributed
     to different individuals in different parts of the world, that it
     is a wise economy of Providence that we are not all in the same
     spot.

     "I wish you all manner of happiness and prosperity. With my
     highest regards,--I remain, yours very truly

               "(For LI HUNG CHANG),        TSÊNG LAISUN."

Under the belief that Hart's telegram emanated from Li Hung Chang, and
inspired by loyalty to a friend in a difficulty, as well as by
affection for the Chinese people, whom in his own words he "liked best
next after his own," Gordon replied to this telegram in the following
message: "Inform Hart Gordon will leave for Shanghai first
opportunity. As for conditions, Gordon indifferent."

At that moment China seemed on the verge of war with Russia, in
consequence of the disinclination of the latter power to restore the
province of Kuldja, which she had occupied at the time of the
Mahommedan uprising in Central Asia. The Chinese official, Chung How,
who had signed an unpopular treaty at Livadia, had been sentenced to
death--the treaty itself had been repudiated--and hostilities were
even said to have commenced. The announcement that the Chinese
Government had invited Gordon to Peking, and that he had promptly
replied that he would come, was also interpreted as signifying the
resolve to carry matters with a high hand, and to show the world that
China was determined to obtain what she was entitled to. Those persons
who have a contemptuous disregard for dates went so far even as to
assert that Gordon had resigned because of the Chinese invitation.
Never was there a clearer case of _post hoc, propter hoc_; but even
the officials at the War Office were suspicious in the matter, and
their attitude towards Gordon went near to precipitate the very
catastrophe they wanted to avoid.

On the same day (8th June) as he telegraphed his reply to the Chinese
invitation, he telegraphed to Colonel Grant, Deputy Adjutant-General
for the Royal Engineers at the Horse Guards: "Obtain me leave until
end of the year; am invited to China; will not involve Government."
Considering the position between China and Russia, and the concern of
the Russian press and Government at the report about Gordon, it is not
surprising that this request was not granted a ready approval. The
official reply came back: "Must state more specifically purpose and
position for and in which you go to China." To this Gordon sent the
following characteristic answer: "Am ignorant; will write from China
before the expiration of my leave." An answer like this savoured of
insubordination, and shows how deeply Gordon was hurt by the want of
confidence reposed in him. In saying this I disclaim all intention of
criticising the authorities, for whose view there was some reasonable
justification; but the line they took, while right enough for an
ordinary Colonel of Engineers, was not quite a considerate one in the
case of an officer of such an exceptional position and well-known
idiosyncrasies as "Chinese" Gordon. On that ground alone may it be
suggested that the blunt decision thus given in the final official
telegram--"Reasons insufficient; your going to China is not approved,"
was somewhat harsh.

It was also impotent, for it rather made Gordon persist in carrying
out his resolve than deterred him from doing so. His reply was thus
worded: "Arrange retirement, commutation, or resignation of service;
ask Campbell reasons. My counsel, if asked, would be for peace, not
war. I return by America." Gordon's mind was fully made up to go, even
if he had to sacrifice his commission. Without waiting for any further
communication he left Bombay. As he had insisted on repaying Lord
Ripon his passage-money from England to India which, owing to his
resignation, the Viceroy would otherwise have had to pay out of his
own pocket, Gordon was quite without funds, and he had to borrow the
sum required to defray his passage to China. But having made up his
mind, such trifling difficulties were not likely to deter him. He
sailed from Bombay, not merely under the displeasure of his superiors
and uncertain as to his own status, but also in that penniless
condition, which was not wholly out of place in his character of
knight-errant. But with that solid good sense, which so often
retrieved his reputation in the eyes of the world, he left behind him
the following public proclamation as to his mission and intentions. It
was at once a public explanation of his proceedings, and a declaration
of a pacific policy calculated to appease both official and Russian
irritation:

     "My fixed desire is to persuade the Chinese not to go to war with
     Russia, both in their own interests and for the sake of those of
     the world, especially those of England. In the event of war
     breaking out I cannot answer how I should act for the present,
     but I should ardently desire a speedy peace. It is my fixed
     desire, as I have said, to persuade the Chinese not to go to war
     with Russia. To me it appears that the question in dispute cannot
     be of such vital importance that an arrangement could not be come
     to by concessions upon both sides. Whether I succeed in being
     heard or not is not in my hands. I protest, however, at being
     regarded as one who wishes for war in any country, still less in
     China. Inclined as I am, with only a small degree of admiration
     for military exploits, I esteem it a far greater honour to
     promote peace than to gain any paltry honours in a wretched war."

With that message to his official superiors, as well as to the world,
Gordon left Bombay on 13th June. His message of the day before saying,
"Consult Campbell," had induced the authorities at the Horse Guards to
make inquiries of that gentleman, who had no difficulty in satisfying
them that the course of events was exactly as has here been set forth,
and coupling that with Gordon's own declaration that he was for peace
not war, permission was granted to Gordon to do that which at all cost
he had determined to do. When he reached Ceylon he found this
telegram: "Leave granted on your engaging to take no military service
in China," and he somewhat too comprehensively, and it may even be
feared rashly if events had turned out otherwise, replied: "I will
take no military service in China: I would never embarrass the British
Government."

Having thus got clear of the difficulties which beset him on the
threshold of his mission, Gordon had to prepare himself for those that
were inherent to the task he had taken up. He knew of old how averse
the Chinese are to take advice from any one, how they waste time in
fathoming motives, and how when they say a thing shall be done it is
never performed. Yet the memory of his former disinterested and
splendid service afforded a guarantee that if they would take advice
and listen to unflattering criticism from any one, that man was
Gordon. Still, from the most favourable point of view, the mission was
fraught with difficulty, and circumstances over which he had no
control, and of which he was even ignorant, added immensely to it.
There is no doubt that Peking was at that moment the centre of
intrigues, not only between the different Chinese leaders, but also
among the representatives of the Foreign Powers. The secret history of
these transactions has still to be revealed, and as our Foreign Office
never gives up the private instructions it transmits to its
representatives, the full truth may never be recorded. But so far as
the British Government was concerned, its action was limited to giving
the Minister, Sir Thomas Wade, instructions to muzzle Gordon and
prevent his doing anything that wasn't strictly in accordance with
official etiquette and quite safe, or, in a word, to make him do
nothing. The late Sir Thomas Wade was a most excellent Chinese scholar
and estimable person in every way, but when he tried to do what the
British Government and the whole arrayed body of the Horse Guards,
from the Commander-in-Chief down to the Deputy-Adjutant General, had
failed to do, viz. to keep Gordon in leading strings, he egregiously
failed. Sir Thomas Wade went so far as to order Gordon to stay in the
British Legation, and to visit no one without his express permission.
Gordon's reply was to ignore the British Legation and to never enter
its portals during the whole of his stay in China.

That was one difficulty in the situation apart from the Russian
question, but it was not the greatest, and as it was the first
occasion on which European politics re-acted in a marked way on the
situation in China, such details as are ascertainable are well worth
recording at some length.

There is no doubt that the Russian Government was very much disturbed
at what seemed an inevitable hostile collision with China. The
uncertain result of such a contest along an enormous land-frontier,
with which, at that time, Russia had very imperfect means of
communication, was the least cause of its disquietude. A war with
China signified to Russia something much more serious than this, viz.,
a breach of the policy of friendship to its vast neighbour, which it
had consistently pursued for two centuries, and which it will pursue
until it is ready to absorb, and then in the same friendly guise, its
share of China. Under these circumstances the Russian Government
looked round for every means of averting the catastrophe. It is
necessary to guard oneself from seeming to imply that Russia was in
any sense afraid, or doubtful as to the result of a war with China;
her sole motives were those of astute and far-seeing policy. Whether
the Russian Ambassador at Berlin mooted the matter to Prince
Bismarck, or whether that statesman, without inspiration, saw his
chance of doing Russia a good turn at no cost to himself is not
certain, but instructions were sent to Herr von Brandt, the German
Minister at Peking, a man of great energy, and in favour of bold
measures, to support the Peace Party in every way. He was exactly a
man after Prince Bismarck's own heart, prepared to go to any lengths
to attain his object, and fully persuaded that the end justifies the
means. His plan was startlingly simple and bold. Li Hung Chang, the
only prominent advocate of peace, was to rebel, march on Peking with
his Black Flag army, and establish a Government of his own. There is
no doubt whatever that this scheme was formed and impressed on Li Hung
Chang as the acme of wisdom. More than that, it was supported by two
other Foreign Ministers at Peking, with greater or less warmth, and
one of them was Sir Thomas Wade. These plots were dispelled by the
sound sense and candid but firm representations of Gordon. But for
him, as will be seen, there would have been a rebellion in the
country, and Li Hung Chang would now be either Emperor of China or a
mere instance of a subject who had lost his head in trying to be
supreme.

Having thus explained the situation that awaited Gordon, it is
necessary to briefly trace his movements after leaving Ceylon. He
reached Hongkong on 2nd July, and not only stayed there for a day or
two as the guest of the Governor, Sir T. Pope Hennessey, but found
sufficient time to pay a flying visit to the Chinese city of Canton.
Thence he proceeded to Shanghai and Chefoo. At the latter place he
found news, which opened his eyes to part of the situation, in a
letter from Sir Robert Hart, begging him to come direct to him at
Peking, and not to stop _en route_ to visit Li Hung Chang at Tientsin.
As has been explained, Gordon went to China in the full belief that,
whatever names were used, it was his old colleague Li Hung Chang who
sent for him, and the very first definite information he received on
approaching the Chinese capital was that not Li, but persons whom by
inference were inimical to Li, had sent for him. The first question
that arises then was who was the real author of the invitation to
Gordon that bore the name of Hart. It cannot be answered, for Gordon
assured me that he himself did not know; but there is no doubt that it
formed part of the plot and counter-plot originated by the German
Minister, and responded to by those who were resolved, in the event of
Li's rebellion, to uphold the Dragon Throne. Sir Robert Hart was a man
of long-proved ability and address, who has rendered the Chinese
almost as signal service as did Gordon himself, and on this occasion
he was actuated by the highest possible motives, but it must be
recorded that his letter led to a temporary estrangement between
himself and Gordon, who I am happy to be able to state positively did
realise long afterwards that he and Hart were fighting in the same
camp, and had the same objects in view--only this was not apparent at
the time. Gordon went to China only because he thought Li Hung Chang
sent for him, but when he found that powerful persons were inciting
him to revolt, he became the first and most strenuous in his advice
against so imprudent and unpatriotic a measure. Sir Robert Hart knew
exactly what was being done by the German Minister. He wished to save
Gordon from being drawn into a dangerous and discreditable plot, and
also in the extreme eventuality to deprive any rebellion of the
support of Gordon's military genius.

But without this perfect information, and for the best, as in the end
it proved, Gordon, hot with disappointment that the original summons
was not from Li Hung Chang, went straight to that statesman's yamen at
Tientsin, ignored Hart, and proclaimed that he had come as the friend
of the only man who had given any sign of an inclination to regenerate
China. He resided as long as he was in Northern China with Li Hung
Chang, whom he found being goaded towards high treason by persons who
had no regard for China's interests, and who thought only of the
attainment of their own selfish designs. The German Minister, thinking
that he had obtained an ally who would render the success of his own
plan certain, proposed that Gordon should put himself at the head of
Li's army, march on Peking, and depose the Emperor. Gordon's droll
comment on this is: "I told him I was equal to a good deal of
filibustering, but that this was beyond me, and that I did not think
there was the slightest chance of such a project succeeding, as Li had
not a sufficient following to give it any chance of success." He
recorded his views of the situation in the following note: "The only
thing that keeps me in China is Li Hung Chang's safety--if he were
safe I would not care--but some people are egging him on to rebel,
some to this, and some to that, and all appears in a helpless drift.
There are parties at Peking who would drive the Chinese into war for
their own ends." Having measured the position and found it bristling
with unexpected difficulties and dangers, Gordon at once regretted the
promise he had given his own Government in the message from Ceylon. He
thought it was above all things necessary for him to have a free hand,
and he consequently sent the following telegram to the Horse Guards:
"I have seen Li Hung Chang, and he wishes me to stay with him. I
cannot desert China in her present crisis, and would be free to act
as I think fit. I therefore beg to resign my commission in Her
Majesty's Service." Having thus relieved, as he thought, his
Government of all responsibility for his acts--although they responded
to this message by accusing him of insubordination, and by instructing
Sir Thomas Wade to place him under moral arrest--Gordon threw himself
into the China difficulty with his usual ardour. Nothing more remained
to be done at Tientsin, where he had effectually checked the
pernicious counsel pressed on Li Hung Chang most strongly by the
German Minister, and in a minor degree by the representatives of
France and England. In order to influence the Central Government it
was necessary for him to proceed to Peking, and the following
unpublished letter graphically describes his views at the particular
moment:--

     "I am on my way to Peking. There are three parties--Li Hung Chang
     (1), the Court (2), the Literary Class (3). The two first are for
     peace, but dare not say it for fear of the third party. I have
     told Li that he, in alliance with the Court, must coerce the
     third party, and have written this to Li and to the Court Party.
     By so doing I put my head in jeopardy in going to Peking. I do
     not wish Li to act alone. It is not good he should do anything
     except support the Court Party morally. God will overrule for the
     best. If neither the Court Party nor Li can act, if these two
     remain and let things drift, then there will be a disastrous war,
     of which I shall not see the end. You know I do not mourn this.
     Having given up my commission, I have nothing to look for, and
     indeed I long for the quiet of the future.... If the third party
     hear of my recommendation before the Court Party acts, then I may
     be doomed to a quick exit at Peking. Li Hung Chang is a noble
     fellow, and worth giving one's life for; but he must not rebel
     and lose his good name. It is a sort of general election which is
     going on, but where heads are in gage."

Writing to me some months later, General Gordon entered into various
matters relating to this period, and as the letter indirectly throws
light on what may be called the Li Hung Chang episode, I quote it
here, although somewhat out of its proper place:--

     "Thanks for your kind note. I send you the two papers which were
     made public in China, and through the Shen-pao some of it was
     sent over. Another paper of fifty-two articles I gave Li Hung
     Chang, but I purposely kept no copy of it, for it went into--

     "1. The contraband of salt and opium at Hongkong.

     "2. The advantages of telegraphs and canals, not railways, which
     have ruined Egypt and Turkey by adding to the financial
     difficulties.

     "3. The effeteness of the Chinese representatives abroad, etc.,
     etc., etc.

     "I wrote as a Chinaman for the Chinese. I recommended Chinese
     merchants to do away with middle-men, and to have Government aid
     and encouragement to create houses or firms in London, etc.; to
     make their own cotton goods, etc. In fact, I wrote as a Chinaman.
     I see now and then symptoms that they are awake to the situation,
     for my object has been always to put myself into the skin of
     those I may be with, and I like these people as much--well, say
     nearly as much--as I like my countrymen.

     "There are a lot of people in China who would egg on revolts of A
     and B. All this is wrong. China must _fara da se_. I painted this
     picture to the Chinese of 1900: 'Who are those people hanging
     about with jinrickshas?' 'The sons of the European merchants.'
     'What are those ruins?' 'The Hongs of the European merchants,'
     etc., etc.

     "People have asked me what I thought of the advance of China
     during the sixteen years I was absent. They looked superficially
     at the power military of China. I said they are unchanged. You
     come, I must go; but I go on to say that the stride China has
     made in commerce is immense, and commerce and wealth are the
     power of nations, not the troops. Like the Chinese, I have a
     great contempt for military prowess. It is ephemeral. I admire
     administrators, not generals. A military Red-Button mandarin has
     to bow low to a Blue-Button civil mandarin, and rightly so to my
     mind.

     "I wrote the other day to Li Hung Chang to protest against the
     railway from Ichang to Peking along the Grand Canal. In making it
     they would enter into no end of expenses, the coin would leave
     the country and they would not understand it, and would be
     fleeced by the financial cormorants of Great Britain. They can
     understand canals. Let them repair the Grand Canal."

Having arrived at Peking, Gordon was received in several councils by
Prince Chun, the father of the young Emperor and the recognised leader
of the War Party. The leading members of the Grand Council were also
present, and Gordon explained his views to them at length. In the
first place, he said, if there were war he would only stay to help
them on condition that they destroyed the suburbs of Peking, allowed
him to place the city in a proper state of defence, and removed the
Emperor and Court to a place of safety. When they expressed their
opinion that the Taku forts were impregnable, Gordon laughed, and said
they could be taken from the rear. The whole gist of his remarks was
that "they could not go to war," and when they still argued in the
opposite sense, and the interpreter refused to translate the harsh
epithets he applied to such august personages, he took the dictionary,
looked out the Chinese equivalent for "idiocy," and with his finger on
the word, placed it under the eyes of each member of the Council. The
end of this scene may be described in Gordon's own words: "I said make
peace, and wrote out the terms. They were, in all, five articles; the
only one they boggled at was the fifth, about the indemnity. They said
this was too hard and unjust. I said that might be, but what was the
use of talking about it? If a man demanded your money or your life,
you have only three courses open. You must either fight, call for
help, or give up your money. Now, as you cannot fight, it is useless
to call for help, since neither England nor France would stir a finger
to assist you. I believe these are the articles now under discussion
at St Petersburg, and the only one on which there is any question is
the fifth." This latter statement I may add, without going into the
question of the Marquis Tsêng's negotiations in the Russian capital,
was perfectly correct.

Gordon drew up several notes or memorandums for the information of the
Chinese Government. The first of these was mainly military, and the
following extracts will suffice:--

     "China's power lies in her numbers, in the quick moving of her
     troops, in the little baggage they require, and in their few
     wants. It is known that men armed with sword and spear can
     overcome the best regular troops equipped with breech-loading
     rifles, if the country is at all difficult and if the men with
     spears and swords outnumber their foe ten to one. If this is the
     case where men are armed with spears and swords, it will be much
     truer when those men are themselves armed with breech loaders.
     China should never engage in pitched battles. Her strength is in
     quiet movements, in cutting off trains of baggage, and in night
     attacks _not pushed home_--in a continuous worrying of her
     enemies. Rockets should be used instead of cannon. No artillery
     should be moved with the troops; it delays and impedes them.
     Infantry fire is the most fatal fire; guns make a noise far out
     of proportion to their value in war. If guns are taken into the
     field, troops cannot march faster than these guns. The degree of
     speed at which the guns can be carried dictates the speed at
     which the troops can march. As long as Peking is the centre of
     the Government of China, China can never go to war with any
     first-class power; it is too near the sea."

The second memorandum was of greater importance and more general
application. In it he compressed the main heads of his advice into the
smallest possible space, and so far as it was at all feasible to treat
a vast and complicated subject within the limits of a simple and
practical scheme, he therein shows with the greatest clearness how the
regeneration of China might be brought about.

     "In spite of the opinion of some foreigners, it will be generally
     acknowledged that the Chinese are contented and happy, that the
     country is rich and prosperous, and that the people are _au fond_
     united in their sentiments, and ardently desire to remain a
     nation. At constant intervals, however, the whole of this human
     hive is stirred by some dispute between the Pekin Government and
     some foreign Power; the Chinese people, proud of their ancient
     prestige, applaud the high tone taken up by the Pekin Government,
     crediting the Government with the power to support their strong
     words. This goes on for a time, when the Government gives in, and
     corresponding vexation is felt by the people. The recurrence of
     these disputes, the inevitable surrender ultimately of the Pekin
     Government, has the tendency of shaking the Chinese people's
     confidence in the Central Government. The Central Government
     appreciates the fact that, little by little, this prestige is
     being destroyed by their own actions among the Chinese people,
     each crisis then becomes more accentuated or difficult to
     surmount, as the Central Government know each concession is
     another nail in their coffin. The Central Government fear that
     the taking up of a spirited position by any pre-eminent Chinese
     would carry the Chinese people with him, and therefore the
     Central Government endeavour to keep up appearances, and to skirt
     the precipice of war as near as they possibly can, while never
     intending to enter into war.

     "The Central Government residing in the extremity of the Middle
     Kingdom, away from the great influences which are now working in
     China, can never alter one iota from what they were years ago:
     they are being steadily left behind by the people they govern.
     They know this, and endeavour to stem these influences in all
     ways in their power, hoping to keep the people backward and in
     ignorance, and to retard their progress to the same pace they
     themselves go, if it can be called a pace at all.

     "It is therefore a maxim that 'no progress can be made by the
     Pekin Government.' To them any progress, whether slow or quick,
     is synonymous to slow or quick extinction, for they will never
     move.

     "The term 'Pekin Government' is used advisedly, for if the
     Central Government were moved from Pekin into some province where
     the pulsations and aspirations of the Chinese people could have
     their legitimate effect, then the Central Government and the
     Chinese people, having a unison of thought, would work together.

     "From what has been said above, it is maintained that, so long as
     the Central Government of China isolates itself from the Chinese
     people by residing aloof at Pekin, so long will the Chinese
     people have to remain passive under the humiliations which come
     upon them through the non-progressive and destructive disposition
     of their Government. These humiliations will be the chronic state
     of the Chinese people until the Central Government moves from
     Pekin and reunites itself to its subjects. No army, no purchases
     of ironclad vessels will enable China to withstand a first-class
     Power so long as China keeps her queen bee at the entrance of her
     hive. There is, however, the probability that a proud people like
     the Chinese may sicken at this continual eating of humble pie,
     that the Pekin Government at some time, by skirting too closely
     the precipice of war may fall into it, and then that sequence may
     be anarchy and rebellion throughout the Middle Kingdom which may
     last for years and cause endless misery.

     "It may be asked--How can the present state of things be altered?
     How can China maintain the high position that the wealth,
     industry, and innate goodness of the Chinese people entitle her
     to have among the nations of the world? Some may say by the
     revolt of this Chinaman or of that Chinaman. To me this seems
     most undesirable, for, in the first place, such action would not
     have the blessing of God, and, in the second, it would result in
     the country being plunged into civil war. The fair, upright, and
     open course for the Chinese people to take is to work, through
     the Press and by petitions, on the Central Government, and to
     request them to move from Pekin, and bring themselves thus more
     into unison with the Chinese people, and thus save that people
     the constant humiliations they have to put up with, owing to the
     seat of the Central Government being at Pekin. This
     recommendation would need no secret societies, no rebellion, no
     treason; if taken up and persevered in it must succeed, and not
     one life need be lost.

     "The Central Government at Pekin could not answer the Chinese
     people except in the affirmative when the Chinese people say to
     the Central Government--'By your residing aloof from us in Pekin,
     where you are exposed to danger, you separate our interests from
     yours, and you bring on us humiliation, which we would never have
     to bear if you resided in the interior. Take our application into
     consideration, and grant our wishes.'

     "I have been kindly treated by the Central Pekin Government and
     by the Chinese people; it is for the welfare of both parties that
     I have written and signed this paper. I may have expressed myself
     too strongly with respect to the non-progressive nature of the
     Pekin Government, who may desire the welfare of the Middle
     Kingdom as ardently as any other Chinese, but as long as the
     Pekin Government allow themselves to be led and directed by those
     drones of the hive, the Censors, so long must the Pekin
     Government bear the blame earned by those drones in plunging
     China into difficulties. In the insect world the bees get rid of
     the drones in winter."

There was yet a third memorandum of a confidential nature written to
Li Hung Chang himself, of which Gordon did not keep a copy, but he
referred to it in the letter written to myself which I have already
quoted.

Having thus accomplished his double task, viz.: the prevention of war
between Russia and China, and of a rebellion on the part of Li Hung
Chang under European advice and encouragement, Gordon left China
without any delay. When he reached Shanghai on 16th August he found
another official telegram awaiting him: "Leave cancelled, resignation
not accepted." As he had already taken his passage home he did not
reply, but when he reached Aden he telegraphed as follows: "You might
have trusted me. My passage from China was taken days before the
arrival of your telegram which states 'leave cancelled.' Do you insist
on rescinding the same?" The next day he received a reply granting him
nearly six months' leave, and with that message the question of his
alleged insubordination may be treated as finally settled. There can
be no doubt that among his many remarkable achievements not the least
creditable was this mission to China, when by downright candour, and
unswerving resolution in doing the right thing, he not merely
preserved peace, but baffled the intrigues of unscrupulous
diplomatists and selfish governments.

With that incident closed Gordon's connection with China, the country
associated with his most brilliant feats of arms, but in concluding
this chapter it seems to me that I should do well to record some later
expressions of opinion on that subject. The following interesting
letter, written on the eve of the war between France and China in
1882, was published by the _New York Herald_:--

     "The Chinese in their affairs with foreign nations are fully
     aware of their peculiar position, and count with reason that a
     war with either France or another Power will bring them perforce
     allies outside of England. The only Power that could go to war
     with them with impunity is Russia, who can attack them by land. I
     used the following argument to them when I was there:--The
     present dynasty of China is a usurping one--the Mantchou. We may
     say that it exists by sufferance at Pekin, and nowhere else in
     the Empire. If you look at the map of China Pekin is at the
     extremity of the Empire and not a week's marching from the
     Russian frontier. A war with Russia would imply the capture of
     Pekin and the fall of the Mantchou dynasty, which would never
     dare to leave it, for if they did the Chinamen in the south would
     smite them. I said, 'If you go to war then move the Queen
     Bee--_i.e._ the Emperor--into the centre of China and then fight;
     if not, you must make peace.' The two Powers who can coerce China
     are Russia and England. Russia could march without much
     difficulty on Pekin. This much would not hurt trade, so England
     would not interfere. England could march to Taku and Pekin and no
     one would object, for she would occupy the Treaty Ports. But if
     France tried to do so England would object. Thus it is that China
     will only listen to Russia and England, and eventually she must
     fear Russia the most of all Powers, for she can never get over
     the danger of the land journey, but she might, by a great
     increase of her fleet, get over the fear of England. I say China,
     but I mean the Mantchou dynasty, for the Mantchous are despised
     by the Chinese. Any war with China would be for France expensive
     and dangerous, not from the Chinese forces, which would be soon
     mastered, but from the certainty of complications with England.
     As for the European population in China, write them down as
     identical with those in Egypt in all affairs. Their sole idea is,
     without any distinction of nationality, an increased power over
     China for their own trade and for opening up the country as they
     call it, and any war would be popular with them; so they will egg
     on any Power to make it. My idea is that no colonial or foreign
     community in a foreign land can properly, and for the general
     benefit of the world, consider the questions of that foreign
     State. The leading idea is how they will benefit themselves. The
     Isle of Bourbon or Réunion is the cause of the Madagascar war. It
     is egged on by the planters there, and to my idea they (the
     planters) want slaves for Madagascar. I have a very mean opinion
     of the views of any colonial or foreign community: though I own
     that they are powerful for evil. Who would dare to oppose the
     European colony in Egypt or China, and remain in those
     countries?"

In a letter to myself, written about this time, very much the same
views are expressed:--

     "I do not think I could enlighten _you_ about China. Her game is
     and will be to wait events, and she will try and work so as to
     embroil us with France if she does go to war. For this there
     would be plenty of elements in the Treaty Ports. One may say,
     humanly speaking, China going to war with France must entail our
     following suit. It would be a bad thing in some ways for
     civilization, for the Chinese are naturally so bumptious that any
     success would make them more so, and if allied to us, and they
     had success, it would be a bad look-out afterwards. This in
     private. Li Hung Chang as Emperor, if such a thing came to pass,
     would be worse than the present Emperor, for he is sharp and
     clever, would unite China under a Chinese dynasty, and be much
     more troublesome to deal with. Altogether, I cannot think that
     the world would gain if China went to war with France. Also I
     think it would be eventually bad for China. China being a queer
     country, we might expect queer things, and I believe if she did
     go to war she would contract with Americans for the destruction
     of French fleet, and she would let loose a horde of adventurers
     with dynamite. This is essentially her style of action, and Li
     Hung Chang would take it up, but do not say I think so."

In a further letter from Jaffa, dated 17th November 1883, he wrote
finally on this branch of the subject:--

     "I fear I can write nothing of any import, so I will not attempt
     it. To you I can remark that if I were the Government I would
     consider the part that should be taken when the inevitable fall
     of the Mantchou dynasty takes place, what steps they would take,
     and how they would act in the break-up, which, however, will only
     end in a fresh cohesion of China, for we, or no other Power,
     could never for long hold the country. At Penang, Singapore,
     etc., the Chinese will eventually oust us in another generation."

There was one other question about China upon which Gordon felt very
strongly, viz., the opium question, and as he expressed views which I
combated, I feel bound to end this chapter by quoting what he wrote on
this much-discussed topic. On one point he agrees with myself and his
other opponents in admitting that the main object with the Chinese
authorities was increased revenue, not morality. They have since
attained their object not only by an increased import duty, but also
in the far more extensive cultivation of the native drug, to which the
Emperor, by Imperial Edict, has given his formal sanction:--

                                   "PORT LOUIS, _3rd February 1882_.

     "About the opium article, I think your article--'History of the
     Opium Traffic,' _Times_, 4th January 1884--reads well. But the
     question is this. The Chinese _amour propre_ as a nation is hurt
     by the enforced entry of the drug. This irritation is connected
     with the remembrance of the wars which led to the Treaties about
     opium. Had eggs or apples been the cause of the wars, _i.e._ had
     the Chinese objected to the import of eggs, and we had insisted
     on their being imported, and carried out such importation in
     spite of the Chinese wish by force of war, it would be to my own
     mind the same thing as opium now is to Chinese. We do not give
     the Chinese credit for being so sensitive as they are. As Black
     Sea Treaty was to Russia so opium trade is to China.

     "I take the root of the question to be as above. I do not mean to
     say that all that they urge is fictitious about morality; and I
     would go further than you, and say I think they would willingly
     give up their revenue from opium, indeed I am sure of it, if they
     could get rid of the forced importation by treaty, but their
     action in so doing would be simply one of satisfying their _amour
     propre_. The opium importation is a constant reminder of their
     defeats, and I feel sure China will never be good friends with us
     till it is abolished. It is for that reason I would give it up,
     for I think the only two alliances worth having are France and
     China.

     "I have never, when I have written on it, said anything further
     than this, _i.e. the Chinese Government will not have it_, let us
     say it is a good drug or not. I also say that it is not fair to
     force anything on your neighbour, and, therefore, morally, it is
     wrong, even if it was eggs.

     "Further, I say that through our thrusting these eggs on China,
     this opium, we caused the wars with China which shook the
     prestige of the Pekin Government, and the outcome of this war of
     1842 was the Taeping Rebellion, with its deaths of 13,000,000.
     The military prestige of the Mantchous was shaken by these
     defeats, the heavy contributions for war led to thousands of
     soldiers being disbanded, to a general impoverishment of the
     people, and this gave the rebel chief, Hung-tsew-tsiuen, his
     chance.

     "A wants B to let him import eggs, B refuses, A coerces him;
     therefore I say it is wrong, and that it is useless discussing
     whether eggs are good or not.

     "Can anyone doubt but that, if the Chinese Government had the
     power, they would stop importation to-morrow? If so, why keep a
     pressure like this on China whom we need as a friend, and with
     whom this importation is and ever will be the sole point about
     which we could be at variance? I know this is the point with Li
     Hung Chang.

     "People may laugh at _amour propre_ of China. It is a positive
     fact, they are most-pigheaded on those points. China is the only
     nation in the world which is forced to take a thing she does not
     want. England is the only nation which forces another nation to
     do this, in order to benefit India by this act. Put like this it
     is outrageous.

     "Note this, only certain classes of vessels are subject to the
     Foreign Customs Office at Canton. By putting all vessels under
     that Office the Chinese Government would make £2,000,000 a year
     more revenue. The Chinese Government will not do this however,
     because it would put power in hands of foreigners, so they lose
     it. Did you ever read the letters of the Ambassador before
     Marquis Tsêng? His name, I think, was Coh or Kwoh. He wrote home
     to Pekin about Manchester, telling its wonders, but adding,
     'These people are wonderful, but the masses are miserable far
     beyond Chinese. They think only of money and not of the welfare
     of the people.'

     "Any foreign nation can raise the bile of Chinese by saying,
     'Look at the English, they forced you to take their opium.'

     "I should not be a bit surprised did I hear that Li Hung Chang
     smoked opium himself. I know a lot of the princes do, so they
     say. I have no doubt myself that what I have said is the true and
     only reason, or rather root reason. Put our nation in the same
     position of having been defeated and forced to accept some
     article which theory used to consider bad for the health, like
     tea used to be, we would rebel as soon as we could against it,
     though our people drink tea. The opium trade is a standing,
     ever-present memento of defeat and heavy payments; and the
     Chinese cleverly take advantage of the fact that it is a
     deleterious drug.

     "The opium wars were not about opium--opium was only a _cheval de
     bataille_. They were against the introduction of foreigners, a
     political question, and so the question of opium import is now.
     As for the loss to India by giving it up, it is quite another
     affair. On one hand you have gain, an embittered feeling and an
     injustice; on the other you have loss, friendly nations and
     justice. Cut down pay of all officers in India to Colonial
     allowances _above_ rank of captains. Do not give them Indian
     allowances, and you will cover nearly the loss, I expect. Why
     should officers in India have more than officers in Hongkong?"

In a subsequent letter, dated from the Cape, 20th July 1882, General
Gordon replied to some objections I had raised as follows:--

     "As for the opium, to which you say the same objection applies as
     to tea, etc., it is not so, for opium has for ages been a tabooed
     article among Chinese respectable people. I own reluctance to
     foreign intercourse applies to what I said, but the Chinese know
     that the intercourse with foreigners cannot be stopped, and it,
     as well as the forced introduction of opium, are signs of defeat;
     yet one, that of intercourse, cannot be stopped or wiped away
     while the opium question can be. I am writing in a hurry, so am
     not very clear.

     "What I mean is that no one country forces another country to
     take a drug like opium, and therefore the Chinese feel the
     forced introduction of opium as an intrusion and injustice;
     thence their feelings in the matter. This, I feel sure, is the
     case.

     "What could our Government do _in re_ opium? Well, I should say,
     let the clause of treaty lapse about it, and let the smuggling be
     renewed. Hongkong is a nest of smugglers.

     "Pekin would, or rather could, never succeed in cutting off
     foreign intercourse. The Chinese are too much mixed up (and are
     increasingly so every year) with foreigners for Pekin even to try
     it. Also I do not think China would wish to stop its importation
     altogether. All they ask is an increased duty on it."




CHAPTER X.

THE MAURITIUS, THE CAPE, AND THE CONGO.


There was a moment of hesitation in Gordon's mind as to whether he
would come home or not. His first project on laying down the Indian
Secretaryship had been to go to Zanzibar and attack the slave trade
from that side. Before his plans were matured the China offer came,
and turned his thoughts in a different channel. On his arrival at
Aden, on the way back, he found that the late Sir William Mackinnon, a
truly great English patriot of the type of the merchant adventurers of
the Elizabethan age, had sent instructions that the ships of the
British India Steam Packet Company were at his disposal to convey him
whereever he liked, and for a moment the thought occurred to him to
turn aside to Zanzibar. But a little reflection led him to think that,
as he had been accused of insubordination, it would be better for him
to return home and report himself at headquarters. When he arrived in
London at the end of October 1880, he found that his letters, written
chiefly to his sister during his long sojourn in the Soudan, were on
the eve of publication by Dr Birkbeck Hill. That exceedingly
interesting volume placed at the disposal of the public the evidence
as to his great work in Africa, which might otherwise have been buried
in oblivion. It was written under considerable difficulties, for
Gordon would not see Dr Hill, and made a stringent proviso that he was
not to be praised, and that nothing unkind was to be said about
anyone. He did, however, stipulate for a special tribute of praise to
be given to his Arab secretary, Berzati Bey, "my only companion for
these years--my adviser and my counsellor." Berzati was among those
who perished with the ill-fated expedition of Hicks Pasha at the end
of 1883. To the publication of this work must be attributed the
establishment of Gordon's reputation as the authority on the Soudan,
and the prophetic character of many of his statements became clear
when events confirmed them.

After a stay at Southampton and in London of a few weeks, Gordon was
at last induced to give himself a short holiday, and, strangely
enough, he selected Ireland as his recreation ground. I have been told
that Gordon had a strain of Irish blood in him, but I have failed to
discover it genealogically, nor was there any trace of its influence
on his character. He was not fortunate in the season of the year he
selected, nor in the particular part of the country he chose for his
visit. There is scenery in the south-west division of Ireland, quite
apart from the admitted beauty of the Killarney district, that will
vie with better known and more highly lauded places in Scotland and
Switzerland, but no one would recommend a stranger to visit that
quarter of Ireland at the end of November, and the absence of
cultivation, seen under the depressing conditions of Nature, would
strike a visitor with all the effect of absolute sterility. Gordon was
so impressed, and it seemed to him that the Irish peasants of a whole
province were existing in a state of wretchedness exceeding anything
he had seen in either China or the Soudan. If he had seen the same
places six months earlier, he would have formed a less extreme view of
their situation. It was just the condition of things that appealed to
his sympathy, and with characteristic promptitude he put his views on
paper, making one definite offer on his own part, and sent them to a
friend, the present General James Donnelly, a distinguished engineer
officer and old comrade, and moreover a member of a well-known Irish
family. Considering the contents of the letter, and the form in which
Gordon threw out his suggestions, it is not very surprising that
General Donnelly sent it to _The Times_, in which it was published on
3rd December 1880; but Gordon himself was annoyed at this step being
taken, because he realised that he had written somewhat hastily on a
subject with which he could scarcely be deemed thoroughly acquainted.
The following is its text:--

     "You are aware how interested I am in the welfare of this
     country, and, having known you for twenty-six years, I am sure I
     may say the same of you.

     "I have lately been over to the south-west of Ireland in the hope
     of discovering how some settlement could be made of the Irish
     question, which, like a fretting cancer, eats away our vitals as
     a nation.

     "I have come to the conclusion that--

     "1. A gulf of antipathy exists between the landlords and tenants
     of the north-west, west, and south-west of Ireland. It is a gulf
     which is not caused alone by the question of rent; there is a
     complete lack of sympathy between these two classes. It is
     useless to inquire how such a state of things has come to pass. I
     call your attention to the pamphlets, letters, and speeches of
     the landlord class, as a proof of how little sympathy or kindness
     there exists among them for the tenantry, and I am sure that the
     tenantry feel in the same way towards the landlords.

     "2. No half-measured Acts which left the landlords with any say
     to the tenantry of these portions of Ireland will be of any use.
     They would be rendered--as past Land Acts in Ireland have
     been--quite abortive, for the landlords will insert clauses to do
     away with their force. Any half-measures will only place the
     Government face to face with the people of Ireland as the
     champions of the landlord interest. The Government would be bound
     to enforce their decision, and with a result which none can
     foresee, but which certainly would be disastrous to the common
     weal.

     "3. My idea is that, seeing--through this cause or that, it is
     immaterial to examine--a deadlock has occurred between the
     present landlords and tenants, the Government should purchase up
     the rights of the landlords over the whole or the greater part of
     Longford, Westmeath, Clare, Cork, Kerry, Limerick, Leitrim,
     Sligo, Mayo, Cavan, and Donegal. The yearly rental of these
     districts is some four millions; if the Government give the
     landlords twenty years' purchase, it would cost eighty millions,
     which at three and a half per cent. would give a yearly interest
     of £2,800,000, of which £2,500,000 could be recovered; the lands
     would be Crown lands; they would be administered by a Land
     Commission, who would be supplemented by an Emigration
     Commission, which might for a short time need £100,000. This
     would not injure the landlords, and, so far as it is an
     interference with proprietary rights, it is as just as is the law
     which forces Lord A. to allow a railway through his park for the
     public benefit. I would restrain the landlords from any power or
     control in these Crown land districts. Poor-law, roads, schools,
     etc., should be under the Land Commission.

     "4. For the rest of Ireland, I would pass an Act allowing free
     sale of leases, fair rents, and a Government valuation.

     "In conclusion, I must say, from all accounts and my own
     observation, that the state of our fellow-countrymen in the parts
     I have named is worse than that of any people in the world, let
     alone Europe. I believe that these people are made as we are,
     that they are patient beyond belief, loyal, but, at the same
     time, broken-spirited and desperate, living on the verge of
     starvation in places in which we would not keep our cattle.

     "The Bulgarians, Anatolians, Chinese, and Indians are better off
     than many of them are. The priests alone have any sympathy with
     their sufferings, and naturally alone have a hold over them. In
     these days, in common justice, if we endow a Protestant
     University, why should we not endow a Catholic University in a
     Catholic country? Is it not as difficult to get a £5 note from a
     Protestant as from a Catholic or Jew? Read the letters of ----
     and of ----, and tell me if you see in them any particle of kind
     feeling towards the tenantry; and if you have any doubts about
     this, investigate the manner in which the Relief Fund was
     administered, and in which the sums of money for improvements of
     estates by landlords were expended.

     "In 1833 England gave freedom to the West Indian slaves at a cost
     of twenty millions--worth now thirty millions. This money left
     the country. England got nothing for it. By an expenditure of
     eighty millions she may free her own people. She would have the
     hold over the land, and she would cure a cancer. I am not well
     off, but I would offer ---- or his agent £1000, if either of them
     would live one week in one of these poor devil's places, and feed
     as these people do. Our comic prints do an infinity of harm by
     their caricatures--firstly, the caricatures are not true, for the
     crime in Ireland is not greater than that in England; and,
     secondly, they exasperate the people on both sides of the
     Channel, and they do no good.

     "It is ill to laugh and scoff at a question which affects our
     existence."

This heroic mode of dealing with an old and very complicated
difficulty scarcely came within the range of practical achievement.
The Irish question is not to be solved by any such simple
cut-and-dried procedure. It will take time, sympathy, and good-will.
When the English people have eradicated their opinion that the Irish
are an inferior race, and when the Irish realise that the old
prejudice has vanished, the root-difficulty will be removed. At least
Gordon deserves the credit of having seen that much from his brief
observation on the spot, and his plea for them as "patient beyond
belief and loyal," may eventually carry conviction to the hearts of
the more powerful and prosperous kingdom.

The Irish question was not the only one on which he recorded a written
opinion. The question of retaining Candahar was very much discussed
during the winter of 1880-81, and as the Liberal Government was very
much put to it to get high military opinion to support their proposal
of abandonment, they were very glad when Gordon wrote to _The Times_
expressing a strong opinion on their side. I think the writing of that
letter was mainly due to a sense of obligation to Lord Ripon, although
the argument used as to the necessity of Candahar being held by any
_single_ ruler of Afghanistan was, and is always, unanswerable. But
the question at that time was this: Could any such single ruler be
found, and was Abdurrahman, recognised in the August of 1880 as Ameer
of Cabul, the man?

On 27th July 1880, less than eight weeks after Gordon's resignation of
his Indian appointment, occurred the disastrous battle of Maiwand,
when Yakoob's younger brother, Ayoob, gained a decisive victory over a
British force. That disaster was retrieved six weeks later by Lord
Roberts, but Ayoob remained in possession of Herat and the whole of
the country west of the Helmund. It was well known that the rivalry
between him and his cousin Abdurrahman did not admit of being patched
up, and that it could only be settled by the sword. At the moment
there was more reason to believe in the military talent of Ayoob than
of the present Ameer, and it was certain that the instant we left
Candahar the two opponents would engage in a struggle for its
possession. The policy of precipitate evacuation left everything to
the chapter of accidents, and if Ayoob had proved the victor, or even
able to hold his ground, the situation in Afghanistan would have been
eminently favourable for that foreign intervention which only the
extraordinary skill and still more extraordinary success of the Ameer
Abdurrahman has averted. In giving the actual text of Gordon's letter,
it is only right, while frankly admitting that the course pursued has
proved most successful and beneficial, to record that it might well
have been otherwise, and that as a mere matter of argument the
probability was quite the other way. Neither Gordon nor any other
supporter of the evacuation policy ventured to predict that
Abdurrahman, who was then not a young man, and whose early career had
been one of failure, was going to prove himself the ablest
administrator and most astute statesman in Afghan history.

     "Those who advocate the retention of Candahar do so generally on
     the ground that its retention would render more difficult the
     advance of Russia on, and would prevent her fomenting rebellion
     in, India, and that our prestige in India would suffer by its
     evacuation.

     "I think that this retention would throw Afghanistan, in the hope
     of regaining Candahar, into alliance with Russia, and that
     thereby Russia would be given a temptation to offer which she
     otherwise would not have. Supposing that temptation did not
     exist, what other inducement could Russia offer for this
     alliance? The plunder of India. If, then, Russia did advance, she
     would bring her auxiliary tribes, who, with their natural
     predatory habits, would soon come to loggerheads with their
     natural enemies, the Afghans, and that the sooner when these
     latter were aided by us. Would the Afghans in such a case be
     likely to be tempted by the small share they would get of the
     plunder of India to give up their secure, independent position
     and our alliance for that plunder, and to put their country at
     the mercy of Russia, whom they hate as cordially as they do us?
     If we evacuate Candahar, Afghanistan can only have this small
     inducement of the plunder of India for Russia to offer her. Some
     say that the people of Candahar desire our rule. I cannot think
     that any people like being governed by aliens in race or
     religion. They prefer their own bad native governments to a
     stiff, civilized government, in spite of the increased worldly
     prosperity the latter may give.

     "We may be sure that at Candahar the spirit which induced
     children to kill, or to attempt to kill our soldiers in 1879,
     etc., still exists, though it may be cowed. We have trouble
     enough with the fanatics of India; why should we go out of our
     way to add to their numbers?

     "From a military point of view, by the retention we should
     increase the line we have to defend by twice the distance of
     Candahar to the present frontier, and place an objective point to
     be attacked. Naturally we should make good roads to Candahar,
     which on the loss of a battle there--and such things must be
     always calculated as within possibility--would aid the advance of
     the enemy to the Indus. The _débouché_ of the defiles, with good
     lateral communications between them, is the proper line of
     defence for India, not the entry into those defiles, which cannot
     have secure lateral communications. If the entries of the defiles
     are held, good roads are made through them; and these aid the
     enemy, if you lose the entries or have them turned. This does not
     prevent the passage of the defiles being disputed.

     "The retention of Candahar would tend to foment rebellion in
     India, and not prevent it; for thereby we should obtain an
     additional number of fanatical malcontents, who as British
     subjects would have the greatest facility of passing to and fro
     in India, which they would not have if we did not hold it.

     "That our prestige would suffer in India by the evacuation I
     doubt; it certainly would suffer if we kept it and forsook our
     word--_i.e._ that we made war against Shere Ali, and not against
     his people. The native peoples of India would willingly part with
     any amount of prestige if they obtained less taxation.

     "India should be able, by a proper defence of her present
     frontier and by the proper government of her peoples, to look
     after herself. If the latter is wanting, no advance of frontier
     will aid her.

     "I am not anxious about Russia; but, were I so, I would care much
     more to see precautions taken for the defence of our Eastern
     colonies, now that Russia has moved her Black Sea naval
     establishment to the China Sea, than to push forward an
     outstretched arm to Candahar. The interests of the Empire claim
     as much attention as India, and one cannot help seeing that they
     are much more imperilled by this last move of Russia than by
     anything she can do in Central Asia.

     "Politically, militarily, and morally, Candahar ought not to be
     retained. It would oblige us to keep up an interference with the
     internal affairs of Afghanistan, would increase the expenditure
     of impoverished India, and expose us chronically to the reception
     of those painfully sensational telegrams of which we have had a
     surfeit of late."

During these few months Gordon wrote on several other subjects--the
Abyssinian question, in connection with which he curiously enough
styled "the Abyssinians the best of mountaineers," a fact not
appreciated until their success over the Italians many years later,
the registration of slaves in Egypt, and the best way of carrying on
irregular warfare in difficult country and against brave and active
races. His remarks on the last subject were called forth by our
experiences in the field against the Zulus in the first place, and the
Boers in the second, and quite exceptional force was given to them by
the occurrence of the defeat at Majuba Hill one day after they
appeared in the _Army and Navy Gazette_. For this reason I quote the
article in its entirety:--

     "The individual man of any country in which active outdoor life,
     abstinence, hunting of wild game, and exposure to all weathers
     are the habits of life, is more than a match for the private
     soldier of a regular army, who is taken from the plough or from
     cities, and this is the case doubly as much when the field of
     operations is a difficult country, and when the former is, and
     the latter is not, acclimatised. On the one hand, the former is
     accustomed to the climate, knows the country, and is trained to
     long marches and difficulties of all sorts inseparable from his
     daily life; the latter is unacclimatised, knows nothing of the
     country, and, accustomed to have his every want supplied, is at a
     loss when any extraordinary hardships or difficulties are
     encountered; he has only his skill in his arms and discipline in
     his favour, and sometimes that skill may be also possessed by his
     foe. The native of the country has to contend with a difficulty
     in maintaining a long contest, owing to want of means and want of
     discipline, being unaccustomed to any yoke interfering with
     individual freedom. The resources of a regular army, in
     comparison to those of the natives of the country, are infinite,
     but it is accustomed to discipline. In a difficult country, when
     the numbers are equal, and when the natives are of the
     description above stated, the regular forces are certainly at a
     very great disadvantage, until, by bitter experience in the
     field, they are taught to fight in the same irregular way as
     their foes, and this lesson may be learnt at a great cost. I
     therefore think that when regular forces enter into a campaign
     under these conditions, the former ought to avoid any unnecessary
     haste, for time does not press with them, while every day
     increases the burden on a country without resources and
     unaccustomed to discipline, and as the forces of the country,
     unprovided with artillery, never ought to be able to attack
     fortified posts, any advance should be made by the establishment
     of such posts. All engagements in the field ought, if possible,
     to be avoided, except by corps raised from people who in their
     habits resemble those in arms, or else by irregular corps raised
     for the purpose, apart from the routine and red-tape inseparable
     from regular armies. The regular forces will act as the back-bone
     of the expedition, but the rock and cover fighting will be done
     better by levies of such specially raised irregulars. For war
     with native countries, I think that, except for the defence of
     posts, artillery is a great incumbrance, far beyond its value. It
     is a continual source of anxiety. Its transport regulates the
     speed of the march, and it forms a target for the enemy, while
     its effects on the scattered enemy is almost _nil_. An advance of
     regular troops, as at present organised, is just the sort of
     march that suits an active native foe. The regulars' column must
     be heaped together, covering its transport and artillery. The
     enemy knows the probable point of its destination on a particular
     day, and then, knowing that the regulars cannot halt definitely
     where it may be chosen to attack, it hovers round the column like
     wasps. The regulars cannot, from not being accustomed to the
     work, go clambering over rocks, or beating covers after their
     foes. Therefore I conclude that in these wars[1] regular troops
     should only act as a reserve; that the real fighting should be
     done either by native allies or by special irregular corps,
     commanded by special men, who would be untrammelled by
     regulations; that, except for the defence of posts, artillery
     should be abandoned. It may seem egotistical, but I may state
     that I should never have succeeded against native foes had I not
     had flanks, and front, and rear covered by irregular forces.
     Whenever either the flanks, or rear, or front auxiliaries were
     barred in their advance, we turned the regular forces on that
     point, and thus strengthening the hindered auxiliaries, drove
     back the enemy. We owed defeats, when they occurred, to the
     absence of these auxiliaries, and on two occasions to having
     cannon with the troops, which lost us 1600 men. The Abyssinians,
     who are the best of mountaineers, though they have them, utterly
     despise cannon, as they hinder their movements. I could give
     instance after instance where, in native wars, regular troops
     could not hold their own against an active guerilla, and where,
     in some cases, the disasters of the regulars were brought about
     by being hampered by cannon. No one can deny artillery may be
     most efficient in the contention of two regular armies, but it is
     quite the reverse in guerilla warfare. The inordinate haste which
     exists to finish off these wars throws away many valuable aids
     which would inevitably accrue to the regular army if time was
     taken to do the work, and far greater expense is caused by this
     hurry than otherwise would be necessary. All is done on the
     '_Veni, vidi, vici_' principle. It may be very fine, but it is
     bloody and expensive, and not scientific. I am sure it will occur
     to many, the times we have advanced, without proper breaches,
     bridges, etc., and with what loss, assaulted. It would seem that
     military science should be entirely thrown away when combating
     native tribes. I think I am correct in saying that the Romans
     always fought with large auxiliary forces of the invaded country
     or its neighbours, and I know it was the rule of the Russians in
     Circassia."

          [1] In allusion more particularly to the Cape and China.

Perhaps Gordon was influenced by the catastrophes in South Africa when
he sent the following telegram at his own expense to the Cape
authorities on 7th April 1881: "Gordon offers his services for two
years at £700 per annum to assist in terminating war and administering
Basutoland." To this telegram he was never accorded even the courtesy
of a negative reply. It will be remembered that twelve months earlier
the Cape Government had offered him the command of the forces, and
that his reply had been to refuse. The incident is of some interest as
showing that his attention had been directed to the Basuto question,
and also that he was again anxious for active employment. His wish for
the latter was to be realised in an unexpected manner.

He was staying in London when, on visiting the War Office, he casually
met the late Colonel Sir Howard Elphinstone, an officer of his own
corps, who began by complaining of his hard luck in its just having
fallen to his turn to fill the post of Engineer officer in command at
the Mauritius, and such was the distastefulness of the prospect of
service in such a remote and unattractive spot, that Sir Howard went
on to say that he thought he would sooner retire from the service. In
his impulsive manner Gordon at once exclaimed: "Oh, don't worry
yourself, I will go for you; Mauritius is as good for me as anywhere
else." The exact manner in which this exchange was brought about has
been variously described, but this is the literal version given me by
General Gordon himself, and there is no doubt that, as far as he could
regret anything that had happened, he bitterly regretted the accident
that caused him to become acquainted with the Mauritius. In a letter
to myself on the subject from Port Louis he said: "It was not over
cheerful to go out to this place, nor is it so to find a deadly sleep
over all my military friends here." In making the arrangements which
were necessary to effect the official substitution of himself for
Colonel Elphinstone, Gordon insisted on only two points: first, that
Elphinstone should himself arrange the exchange; and secondly that no
payment was to be made to him as was usual--in this case about
£800--on an exchange being effected. Sir Howard Elphinstone was thus
saved by Gordon's peculiarities a disagreeable experience and a
considerable sum of money. Some years after Gordon's death Sir Howard
met with a tragic fate, being washed overboard while taking a trip
during illness to Madeira.

Like everything else he undertook, Gordon determined to make his
Mauritius appointment a reality, and although he was only in the
island twelve months, and during that period took a trip to the
interesting group of the Seychelles, he managed to compress an immense
amount of work into that short space, and to leave on record some
valuable reports on matters of high importance. He found at Mauritius
the same dislike for posts that were outside the ken of headquarters,
and the same indifference to the dry details of professional work that
drove officers of high ability and attainments to think of resigning
the service sooner than fill them, and, when they did take them, to
pass their period of exile away from the charms of Pall Mall in a
state of inaction that verged on suspended animation. In a passage
already quoted, he refers to the deadly sleep of his military friends,
and then he goes on to say in a sentence, which cannot be too much
taken to heart by those who have to support this mighty empire, with
enemies on every hand--"We are in a perfect Fools' Paradise about our
power. We have plenty of power if we would pay attention to our work,
but the fault is, to my mind, the military power of the country is
eaten up by selfishness and idleness, and we are trading on the
reputation of our forefathers. When one sees by the newspapers the
Emperor of Germany sitting, old as he is, for two long hours
inspecting his troops, and officers here grudging two hours a week for
their duties, one has reason to fear the future."

During his stay at Mauritius he wrote three papers of first-rate
importance. One of them on Egyptian affairs after the deposition of
Ismail may be left for the next chapter, and the two others, one on
coaling stations in the Indian Ocean, and the second on the
comparative merits of the Cape and Mediterranean routes come within
the scope of this chapter, and are, moreover, deserving of special
consideration. With regard to the former of these two important
subjects, Gordon wrote as follows, but I cannot discover that anything
has been done to give practical effect to his recommendations:--

     "I spoke to you concerning Borneo and the necessity for coaling
     stations in the Eastern seas. Taking Mauritius with its large
     French population, the Cape with its conflicting elements, and
     Hongkong, Singapore, and Penang with their vast Chinese
     populations, who may be with or against us, but who are at any
     time a nuisance, I would select such places where no temptation
     would induce colonists to come, and I would use them as maritime
     fortresses. For instance, the only good coaling place between
     Suez and Adelaide would be in the Chagos group, which contain a
     beautiful harbour at San Diego. My object is to secure this for
     the strengthening of our maritime power. These islands are of
     great strategical importance _vis à vis_ with India, Suez, and
     Singapore. Remember Aden has no harbour to speak of, and has the
     need of a garrison, while Chagos could be kept by a company of
     soldiers. It is wonderful our people do not take the views of our
     forefathers. They took up their positions at all the salient
     points of the routes. We can certainly hold these places, but
     from the colonial feelings they have almost ceased to be our own.
     By establishing these coaling stations no diplomatic
     complications could arise, while by their means we could unite
     all our colonies with us, for we could give them effective
     support. The spirit of no colony would bear up for long against
     the cutting off of its trade, which would happen if we kept
     watching the Mediterranean and neglected the great ocean routes.
     The cost would not be more than these places cost now, if the
     principle of heavily-armed, light-draught, swift gunboats with
     suitable arsenals, properly (not over) defended, were followed."

Chagos as well as Seychelles forms part of the administrative group of
the Mauritius. The former with, as Gordon states, an admirable port in
San Diego, lies in the direct route to Australia from the Red Sea, and
the latter contains an equally good harbour in Port Victoria Mahé. The
Seychelles are remarkably healthy islands--thirty in number--and
Gordon recommended them as a good place for "a man with a little money
to settle in." He also advanced the speculative and somewhat
imaginative theory that in them was to be found the true site of the
Garden of Eden.

The views Gordon expressed in 1881 as to the diminished importance of
the Mediterranean as an English interest, and the relative superiority
of the Cape over the Canal route, on the ground of its security, were
less commonly held then than they have since become. Whether they are
sound is not to be taken on the trust of even the greatest of
reputations; and in so complicated and many-sided a problem it will be
well to consider all contingencies, and to remember that there is no
reason why England should not be able in war-time to control them
both, until at least the remote epoch when Palestine shall be a
Russian possession.

     "I think Malta has very much lost its importance. The
     Mediterranean now differs much from what it was in 1815. Other
     nations besides France possess in it great dockyards and
     arsenals, and its shores are backed by united peoples. Any war
     with Great Britain in the Mediterranean with any one Power would
     inevitably lead to complications with neutral nations. Steam has
     changed the state of affairs, and has brought the Mediterranean
     close to every nation of Europe. War in the Mediterranean is _war
     in a basin_, the borders of which are in the hands of other
     nations, all pretty powerful and interested in trade, and all
     likely to be affected by any turmoil in that basin, and to be
     against the makers of such turmoil. In fact, the Mediterranean
     trade is so diverted by the railroads of Europe, that it is but
     of small importance. The trade which is of value is the trade
     east of Suez, which, passing through the Canal, depends upon its
     being kept open. If the entrance to the Mediterranean were
     blocked at Gibraltar by a heavy fleet, I cannot see any advantage
     to be gained against us by the fleets blocked up in it--at any
     rate I would say, let our _first care_ be for the Cape route, and
     secondly for the Mediterranean and Canal. The former route
     entails no complications, the latter endless ones, coupled with a
     precarious tenure. Look at the Mediterranean, and see how small
     is that sea on which we are apparently devoting the greater part
     of our attention. Aden should be made a Crown colony. The
     Resident, according to existing orders, reports to Bombay, and
     Bombay to _that_ Simla Council, which knows and cares nothing
     for the question. A special regiment should be raised for its
     protection."

While stationed in the Mauritius, Gordon attained the rank of
Major-General in the army, and another colonel of Engineers was sent
out to take his place. During the last three months of his residence
he filled, in addition to his own special post, that of the command of
all the troops on the station, and at one time it seemed as if he
might have been confirmed in the appointment. But this was not done,
owing, as he suggested, to the "determination not to appoint officers
of the Royal Artillery or Engineers to any command;" but a more
probable reason was that Gordon had been inquiring about and had
discovered that the colonists were not only a little discontented, but
had some ground for their discontent. By this time Gordon's
uncompromising sense of justice was beginning to be known in high
official quarters, and the then responsible Government had far too
many cares on its shoulders that could not be shirked to invite others
from so remote and unimportant a possession as the Mauritius.

Even before any official decision could have been arrived at in this
matter, fate had provided him with another destination.

Two passages have already been cited, showing the overtures first made
by the Cape Government, and then by Gordon himself, for his employment
in South Africa. Nothing came of those communications. On 23rd
February 1882, when an announcement was made by myself that Gordon
would vacate his command in a few weeks' time, the Cape Government
again expressed its desire to obtain the use of his services, and
moreover recollected the telegram to which no reply had been sent. Sir
Hercules Robinson, then Governor of the Cape, sent the following
telegram to the Colonial Secretary, the Earl of Kimberley:--

     "Ministers request me to inquire whether H.M.'s Government would
     permit them to obtain the services of Colonel Charles Gordon.
     Ministers desire to invite Colonel Gordon to come to this Colony
     for the purpose of consultation as to the best measures to be
     adopted with reference to Basutoland, in the event of Parliament
     sanctioning their proposals as to that territory, and to engage
     his services, should he be willing to renew the offer made to
     their predecessors in April 1881, to assist in terminating the
     war and administering Basutoland."

Lord Kimberley then sent instructions by telegraph to Durban, and
thence by steamer, sanctioning Gordon's employment and his immediate
departure from the Mauritius. The increasing urgency of the Basuto
question induced the Cape Government to send a message by telegraph to
Aden, and thence by steamer direct to Gordon. In this message they
stated that "the services of some one of proved ability, firmness, and
energy," were required; that they did not expect Gordon to be bound by
the salary named in his own telegram, and that they begged him to
visit the Colony "at once"--repeating the phrase twice. All these
messages reached Gordon's hands on 2nd April. Two days later he
started in the sailing vessel _Scotia_, no other ship being
obtainable.

The Cape authorities had therefore no ground to complain of the
dilatoriness of the man to whom they appealed in their difficulty,
although their telegram was despatched 3rd of March, and Gordon did
not reach Cape Town before the 3rd of May. It will be quite understood
that Gordon had offered in the first place, and been specially invited
in the second place, to proceed to the Cape, for the purpose of
dealing with the difficulty in Basutoland. He was to find that, just
as his mission to China had been complicated by extraneous
circumstances, so was his visit to the Cape to be rendered more
difficult by Party rivalries, and by work being thrust upon him which
he had several times refused to accept, and for the efficient
discharge of which, in his own way, he knew he would never obtain the
requisite authority.

Before entering upon this matter a few words may be given to the
financial agreement between himself and the Cape Government. The first
office in 1880 had carried with it a salary of £1500; in 1881 Gordon
had offered to go for £700; in 1882 the salary was to be a matter of
arrangement, and on arrival at Cape Town he was offered £1200 a year.
He refused to accept more than £800 a year; but as he required and
insisted on having a secretary, the other £400 was assigned for that
purpose. In naming such a small and inadequate salary Gordon was under
the mistaken belief that his imperial pay of £500 a year would
continue, but, unfortunately for him, a new regulation, 25th June
1881, had come into force while he was buried away in the Mauritius,
and he was disqualified from the receipt of the income he had earned.
Gordon was very indignant, more especially because it was clear that
he was doing public service at the Cape, while, as he said with some
bitterness, if he had started an hotel or become director of a
company, his pay would have gone on all the same. The only suggestion
the War Office made was that he should ask the Cape Government to
compensate him, but this he indignantly refused. In the result all his
savings during the Mauritius command were swallowed up, and I believe
I understate the amount when I say that his Cape experience cost him
out of his own pocket from first to last five hundred pounds. That sum
was a very considerable one to a man who never inherited any money,
and who went through life scorning all opportunities of making it.
But on this occasion he vindicated a principle, and showed that
"money was not his object."

As Gordon went to the Cape specially for the purpose of treating the
Basutoland question, it may be well to describe briefly what that
question was. Basutoland is a mountainous country, difficult of
access, but in resources self-sufficing, on the eastern side of the
Orange Free State, and separated from Natal and Kaffraria, or the
Transkei division of Cape Colony, by the sufficiently formidable
Drakensberg range. Its population consisted of 150,000 stalwart and
freedom-loving Highlanders, ruled by four chiefs--Letsea, Masupha,
Molappo, and Lerothodi, with only the three first of whom had Gordon
in any way to deal. Notwithstanding their numbers, courage, and the
natural strength of their country, they owed their safety from
absorption by the Boers to British protection, especially in 1868, and
they were taken over by us as British subjects without any formality
three years later. They do not seem to have objected so long as the
tie was indefinite, but when in 1880 it was attempted to enforce the
regulations of the Peace Preservation Act by disarming these clans,
then the Basutos began a pronounced and systematic opposition. Letsea
and Lerothodi kept up the pretence of friendliness, but Masupha
fortified his chief residence at Thaba Bosigo, and openly prepared for
war. That war had gone on for two years without result, and the total
cost of the Basuto question had been four millions sterling when
Gordon was summoned to the scene. Having given this general
description of the question, it will be well to state the details of
the matters in dispute, as set forth by Gordon after he had examined
all the papers and heard the evidence of the most competent and
well-informed witnesses.

His memorandum, dated 26th May 1882, read as follows:--

     "In 1843 the Basuto chiefs entered into a treaty with Her
     Majesty's Government, by which the limits of Basutoland were
     recognised roughly in 1845. The Basuto chiefs agreed by
     convention with Her Majesty's Government to a concession of land
     on terminable leases, on the condition that Her Majesty's
     Government should protect them from Her Majesty's subjects.

     "In 1848 the Basuto chiefs agreed to accept the Sovereignty of
     Her Majesty the Queen, on the understanding that Her Majesty's
     Government would restrain Her Majesty's subjects in the
     territories they possessed.

     "Between 1848 and 1852, notwithstanding the above treaties, a
     large portion of Basutoland was annexed by the proclamation of
     Her Majesty's Government, and this annexation was accompanied by
     hostilities, which were afterwards decided by Sir George Cathcart
     as being undertaken in support of unjustifiable aggression.

     "In 1853, notwithstanding the treaties, Basutoland was abandoned,
     leaving its chiefs to settle as they could with the Europeans of
     the Free State who were settled in Basutoland and were mixed up
     with the Basuto people.

     "In 1857, the Basutos asked Her Majesty's Government to arbitrate
     and settle their quarrels. This request was refused.

     "In 1858 the Free State interfered to protect their settlers, and
     a war ensued, and the Free State was reduced to great
     extremities, and asked Her Majesty's Government to mediate. This
     was agreed to, and a frontier line was fixed by Her Majesty's
     Government.

     "In 1865 another war broke out between the Free State and the
     Basutos, at the close of which the Basutos lost territory, and
     were accepted as British subjects by Her Majesty's Government for
     the second time, being placed under the direct government of Her
     Majesty's High Commissioner.

     "In 1871 Basutoland was annexed to the _Crown_ Colony of the Cape
     of Good Hope, without the Basutos having been consulted.

     "In 1872 the _Crown_ Colony became a colony with a responsible
     Government, and the Basutos were placed virtually under another
     power. The Basutos asked for representation in the Colonial
     Parliament, which was refused, and to my mind here was the
     mistake committed which led to these troubles.

     "Then came constant disputes, the Disarmament Act, the Basuto
     War, and present state of affairs.

     "From this chronology there are four points that stand out in
     relief:--

     "1. That the Basuto people, who date back generations, made
     treaties with the British Government, which treaties are equally
     binding, whether between two powerful states, or between a
     powerful state and a weak one.

     "2. That, in defiance of the treaties, the Basutos lost land.

     "3. That, in defiance of the treaties, the Basutos, without being
     consulted or having their rights safeguarded, were handed over to
     another power--the Colonial Government.

     "4. That that other power proceeded to enact their disarmament, a
     process which could only be carried out with a servile race, like
     the Hindoos of the plains of India, and which any one of
     understanding must see would be resisted to the utmost by any
     people worth the name; the more so in the case of the Basutos,
     who realised the constant contraction of their frontiers in
     defiance of the treaties made with the British Government, and
     who could not possibly avoid the conclusion that this disarmament
     was only a prelude to their extinction.

     "The necessary and inevitable result of the four deductions was
     that the Basutos resisted, and remain passively resisting to this
     day.

     "The fault lay in the British Government not having consulted the
     Basutos, their co-treaty power, when they handed them over to the
     Colonial Government. They should have called together a national
     assembly of the Basuto people, in which the terms of the transfer
     could have been quietly arranged, and this I consider is the root
     of all the troubles, and expenses, and miseries which have sprung
     up; and therefore, as it is always best to go to the root of any
     malady, I think it would be as well to let bygones be bygones,
     and to commence afresh by calling together by proclamation a
     Pitso of the whole tribe, in order to discuss the best means of
     sooner securing the settlement of the country. I think that some
     such proclamation should be issued. By this Pitso we would know
     the exact position of affairs, and the real point in which the
     Basutos are injured or considered themselves to be injured.

     "To those who wish for the total abandonment of Basutoland, this
     course must be palatable; to those who wish the Basutos well, and
     desire not to see them exterminated, it must also be palatable;
     and to those who hate the name of Basutoland it must be
     palatable, for it offers a solution which will prevent them ever
     hearing the name again.

     "This Pitso ought to be called at once. All Colonial officials
     ought to be absent, for what the colony wants is to know what is
     the matter; and the colony wishes to know it from the Basuto
     people, irrespective of the political parties of the Government.

     "Such a course would certainly recommend itself to the British
     Government, and to its masters--the British people.

     "Provided the demands of the Basutos--who will, for their own
     sakes, never be for a severing of their connection with the
     colony, in order to be eventually devoured by the Orange Free
     State--are such as will secure the repayment to the colony of all
     expenses incurred by the Colonial Government in the maintenance
     of this connection, and I consider that the Colonial Government
     should accept them.

     "With respect to the Loyals, there are some 800 families, the
     cost of keeping whom is on an average one shilling per diem each
     family, that is £40 per diem, or £1200 per month, and they have
     been rationed during six months at cost of £7200. Their claims
     may therefore be said to be some £80,000. Now, if these 800
     families (some say half) have claims amounting to £30 each
     individually (say 400 families at £30), £12,000 paid at once
     would rid the colony of the cost of subsistence of these
     families, viz. £600 a month (the retention of them would only add
     to the colonial expenditure, and tend to pauperise them).

     "I believe that £30,000 paid at once to the Loyals would reduce
     their numbers to one-fourth what they are now. It is proposed to
     send up a Commission to examine into their claims; the Commission
     will not report under two months, and there will be the delay of
     administration at Cape Town, during all which time £1200 a month
     are being uselessly expended by the colony, detrimentally to the
     Loyals. Therefore I recommend (1) that the sum of £30,000 should
     be at once applied to satisfy the minor claims of the Loyals; (2)
     that this should be done at once, at same time as the meeting of
     the National Pitso.

     "The effect of this measure in connection with the meeting of the
     National Pitso would be very great, for it would be a positive
     proof of the good disposition of the Colonial Government. The
     greater claims could, if necessary, wait for the Parliamentary
     Commission, but I would deprecate even this delay, and though for
     the distribution of the £30,000 I would select those on whom the
     responsibility of such distribution could be put, without
     reference to the Colonial Government, for any larger sums perhaps
     the colonial sanction should be taken.

     "I urge that this measure of satisfying the Loyals is one that
     presses and cannot well wait months to be settled.

     "In conclusion, I recommend (1) that a National Pitso be held;
     (2) that the Loyals should at once be paid off.

     "I feel confident that by the recommendation No. 1 nothing could
     be asked for detrimental to colonial interests, whose Government
     would always have the right of amending or refusing any demands,
     and that by recommendation No. 2 a great moral effect would be
     produced at once, and some heavy expenses saved."

Attached to this memorandum was the draft of a proclamation to the
chiefs, etc., of Basutoland, calling on them to meet in Pitso or
National Assembly without any agent of the Colonial Government being
present. It was not very surprising that such a policy of fairness and
consideration for Basuto opinion, because so diametrically opposite to
everything that Government had been doing, should have completely
taken the Cape authorities aback, nor were its chances of being
accepted increased by Gordon entrusting it to Mr Orpen, whose policy
in the matter had been something more than criticised by the Ministers
at that moment in power at the Cape. Gordon's despatch was in the
hands of the Cape Premier early in June, and the embarrassment he felt
at the ability and force with which the Basuto side of the question
was put by the officer, who was to settle the matter for the Cape
Government, was so great that, instead of making any reply, he passed
it on to Lord Kimberley and the Colonial Office for solution. It was
not until the 7th of August that an answer was vouchsafed to Gordon on
what was, after all, the main portion of his task in South Africa. In
the interval Gordon was employed on different military and
administrative matters, for he had had thrust on him as a temporary
charge the functions of Commandant-General of the Cape forces, which
he had never wished to accept, but it will be clearer to the reader to
follow to the end the course of his Basuto mission, which was the
essential cause of his presence in South Africa.

On the 18th July the Ministers requested Gordon to go up to
Basutoland. At that moment, and indeed for more than three weeks
later, Gordon had received no reply to the detailed memorandum already
quoted. He responded to this request with the draft of a convention
that would "save the susceptibilities of Mr Orpen between whom and
Masupha any _entente_ would seem impossible." The basis of that
convention was to be the semi-independence of the Basutos, but its
full text must be given in order to show the consistency, as well as
the simplicity, of Gordon's proposed remedy of a question that had
gone on for years without any prospect of termination.

     CONVENTION BETWEEN COLONY, CAPE OF GOOD HOPE, AND THE CHIEF AND
                            PEOPLE OF BASUTOLAND.

     "The Colonial Government having nominated as their
     representatives, Colonel C. Griffiths and Dr J. W. Matthews, the
     Basuto nation having nominated the Chief Letsea Moshesh and
     Masupha Moshesh as their representatives, the following
     convention has been agreed upon between these representatives:--

     "Art. 1. There shall be a complete amnesty on both sides to all
     who have taken part in the late hostilities.

     "Art. 2. The question of the succession to Molappo Moshesh's
     chieftainship shall be decided by the Chief of the Basuto Nation.

     "Art. 3. The Colonial Government engages to respect the integrity
     of the Basuto nation within the limits to be hereafter decided
     upon, and also to use its best endeavours to have these limits
     respected by the Orange Free State.

     "Art. 4. The Colonial Government will appoint a Resident to the
     Basuto nation, with two sub-residents. The Resident will consult
     with the leading Chief of the Basuto Nation on all measures
     concerning the welfare of that country, but the government of the
     Basutos in all internal affairs will remain under the
     jurisdiction of the chiefs.

     "Art. 5. The Supreme Council of Basutoland will consist of the
     leading chiefs and the Resident; the minor chiefs of Basutoland
     will form a council with the sub-residents. These minor councils
     can be appealed against by any non-content to the Supreme
     Council.

     "Art. 6. A hut-tax will be collected of 10s. per hut by the
     chiefs, and will be paid to the Resident and sub-resident. The
     sum thus collected will be used in paying the Resident £2000 a
     year, all included: the sub-residents £1200 a year, all included;
     in providing for the education of people (now costing £3320 a
     year); in making roads, etc.

     "Art. 7. The chiefs collecting hut-tax will be paid 10 per cent.
     of the sums they collect.

     "Art. 8. The frontier line will be placed under headmen, who will
     be responsible that no thieving be permitted, that spoors are
     followed up. For this these headmen will be paid at the rate of
     £20 to £60 per annum, according to the length of frontier they
     are responsible for.

     "Art. 9. All passes must be signed by Residents or sub-residents
     for the Orange Free State, or for the Cape Colony.

     "_Query_--Would it be advisable to add chiefs and missionaries
     after sub-residents?

     "Art. 10. Colonial warrants will be valid in Basutoland, the
     chiefs being responsible that prisoners are given up to Resident
     or sub-residents.

     "Art. 11. All communications between Basutoland and the Orange
     Free State to be by and through the Resident.

     "Art. 12. This Convention to be in quadruplicate, two copies
     being in possession of the Colonial Government, and two copies in
     possession of the Basuto chiefs.

     "Art. 13. On signature of this Convention, and on the fulfilment
     of Art. 1, amnesty clause, the Colonial Government agrees to
     withdraw the military forces and the present magisterial
     administration."

To this important communication no answer was ever vouchsafed, but on
7th August, long after it was in the hands of Ministers, Mr Thomas
Scanlan, the Premier, wrote a long reply to the earlier memorandum of
26th May. The writer began by quoting Lord Kimberley's remarks on that
memorandum, which were as follows:--

     "I have received the memorandum on the Basuto question by
     Major-General Gordon. I do not think it necessary to enter upon a
     discussion of the policy suggested in this memorandum, but it
     will doubtless be borne in mind by your Ministers that, as I
     informed you by my telegram of the 6th of May last, H.M.'s
     Government cannot hold out any expectation that steps will be
     taken by them to relieve the colony of its responsibilities in
     Basutoland."

The interpretation placed, and no doubt correctly placed, on that
declaration of Government policy was that under no circumstances was
it prepared to do anything in the matter, and that it had quite a
sufficient number of troubles and worries without the addition of one
in remote and unimportant Basutoland. Having thus got out of the
necessity of discussing this important memorandum, under the cloak of
the Colonial Office's decision in favour of inaction, the Premier went
on to say that he was "most anxious to avoid the resumption of
hostilities on the one hand or the abandonment of the territory on the
other." There was an absolute ignoring in this statement of Gordon's
deliberate opinion that the only way to solve the difficulty was by
granting Basutoland semi-independence on the terms of a Convention
providing for the presence of a British Resident, through whom all
external matters were to be conducted. At the same time Mr Scanlan
informed Gordon that he was sending up Mr Sauer, then Secretary for
Native Affairs, who was a nominee of Mr Orpen, the politician whose
policy was directly impugned.

On Mr Sauer reaching King William's Town, where Gordon was in
residence at the Grand Depôt of the Cape forces, he at once asked him
to accompany him to Basutoland. Gordon at first declined to do this on
two grounds, viz. that he saw no good could ensue unless the
convention were granted, and also that he did not wish Mr Sauer, or
any other representative of the Cape Government, as a companion,
because he had learnt that "Masupha would only accept his proposed
visit as a private one, and then only with his private secretary and
two servants."

After some weeks' hesitation Gordon was induced by Mr Sauer to so far
waive his objection as to consent to accompany him to Letsea's
territory. This Basuto chief kept up the fiction of friendly relations
with the Cape, but after Gordon had personally interviewed him, he
became more than ever convinced that all the Basuto chiefs were in
league. Mr Sauer was of opinion that Letsea and the other chiefs might
be trusted to attack and able to conquer Masupha. There was no
possibility of reconciling these clashing views, but Gordon also
accompanied Mr Sauer to Leribe, the chief town of Molappo's territory,
north of, and immediately adjoining that of, Masupha. Here Gordon
found fresh evidence as to the correctness of his view, that all the
Basuto leaders were practically united, and he wrote a memorandum,
dated 16th September, which has not been published, showing the
hopelessness of getting one chief to coerce the others.
Notwithstanding the way he had been treated by the Cape Government,
which had ignored all his suggestions, Gordon, in his intense desire
to do good, and his excessive trust in the honour of other persons,
yielded to Mr Sauer's request to visit Masupha, and not only yielded
but went without any instructions or any prior agreement that his
views were to prevail. The consequence was that Mr Sauer deliberately
resolved to destroy Gordon's reputation as a statesman, and to ensure
the triumph of his own policy by an act of treachery that has never
been surpassed.

While Gordon went as a private visitor at the special invitation of
Masupha to that chief's territory, Mr Sauer, who was well acquainted
with Gordon's views, and also the direct author of Gordon's visit at
that particular moment, incited Letsea to induce Lerothodi to attack
Masupha. At the moment that the news of this act of treachery reached
Masupha's ears, Gordon was a guest in Masupha's camp, and the first
construction placed upon events by that chief was, that Gordon had
been sent up to hoodwink and keep him quiet, while a formidable
invasion was plotted of his territory. When Masupha reported this news
to Gordon, he asked what he advised him to do, and it has been
established that the object of the question was to ascertain how far
Gordon was privy to the plot. Gordon's candid reply--"Refuse to have
any dealings with the Government until the forces are withdrawn," and
his general demeanour, which showed unaffected indignation, convinced
Masupha of his good faith and innocence of all participation in the
plot.

A very competent witness, Mr Arthur Pattison (letter in _The Times_,
20th August 1885), bears this testimony: "Gordon divined his character
marvellously, and was the only man Masupha had the slightest regard
for. Masupha, if you treat him straightforwardly, is as nice a man as
possible, and even kind and thoughtful; but, if you treat him the
other way, he is a fiend incarnate."

Had Masupha not been thus convinced, Gordon's death was decided on,
and never in the whole course of his career, not even when among the
Taepings on the day of the Wangs' murder in Soochow, nor among
Suleiman's slave-hunters at Shaka, was he in greater peril than when
exposed by the treacherous proceedings of Sauer and Orpen to the wrath
of Masupha. On his return in safety he at once sent in his
resignation, but those who played him false not merely never received
their deserts for an unpardonable breach of faith to a loyal
colleague, but have been permitted by a lax public opinion at the Cape
to remain in the public service, and are now discharging high and
responsible duties.

Gordon's mission to the leading Basuto chief, and the policy of
conciliation which he consistently and ably advocated from the
beginning to the end of his stay at the Cape, were thus failures, but
they failed, as an impartial writer like Mr Gresswell says, solely
because "of Mr Sauer's intrigues behind his back." It is only
necessary to add what Gordon himself wrote on this subject on his
return, and to record that practically the very policy he advocated
was carried into force, not by the Cape Government, but over its head
by the British Government, two years later, in the separation of
Basutoland from the Cape Colony, and by placing it in its old direct
dependence under the British Crown.

     "I have looked over the Cape papers; the only thing that is
     misrepresented, so far as I could see in a ten minutes' glance at
     them, is that Sauer says I knew of his intentions of sending an
     expedition against Masupha. He puts it thus: 'Gordon knew that an
     expedition was being organised against Masupha.' He gives
     apparently three witnesses that I knew well. It is quite true;
     but read the words. _I knew Sauer was going_ to try the useless
     expedient of an expedition against Masupha, and _before he did
     so_ we _agreed I should go and try and make peace_. While
     carrying on this peace mission, Sauer sends the expedition. So
     you see he is verbally correct; yet the deduction is false; in
     fact, who would ever go up with peace overtures to a man who was
     to be attacked during those overtures, as Masupha was? Garcia
     knew well enough what a surprise it was to him and me when we
     heard Sauer was sending the expedition. Garcia was with me at the
     time."

And again, when at Jaffa, General Gordon adds further, on the 27th of
July 1883:--

     "I saw Masupha one day at 10 A.M., and spoke to him; Sauer was
     twenty miles away. At 1 P.M. I came back, and wrote to Sauer an
     account of what had passed; before I sent it off I received a
     letter from Sauer. I believe it is wished to be made out that
     Sauer wrote this letter after he had heard what had passed
     between Masupha and me. This is not the case, for Sauer, having
     let me go to Masupha, changed his mind and wrote the letter, but
     this letter had nothing to do with my interview with Masupha."

With this further quotation of Gordon's own words I may conclude the
description of the Basuto mission, which, although deemed a failure at
the time, was eventually the direct cause of the present
administrative arrangement in that important district of South Africa.

     "In order you should understand the position of affairs, I recall
     to your memory the fact that Scanlan, Merriman, and yourself all
     implied to me doubts of Orpen's policy and your desire to remove
     him; that I deprecated any such change in my favour; that I
     accepted the post of Commandant-General on Merriman's statement
     that the Government desired me to eradicate the red-tape system
     of the colonial forces; that I made certain reports to the
     Government upon the settlement of the Basuto question in May and
     July, showing my views; that the Government were aware of the
     great difference between my views and those of Orpen, both by
     letter and verbally to Merriman; also to my objections to go up.
     Sauer was told by me the same thing. I conversed with him _en
     route_, and I told him if I visited Masupha I could not
     afterwards fight him, for I would not go and spy upon his
     defences. Sauer asked me to go to Masupha; he knew my views; yet
     when I was there negotiating, he, or rather Orpen, moved
     Lerothodi to attack Masupha, who would, I believe, have come to
     terms respecting the acceptance of magistrates, a modified
     hut-tax, and border police. The reported movement of Lerothodi
     prevented my coming to any arrangement. I told Masupha, when he
     sent and told me of Lerothodi's advance, not to answer the
     Government until the hostile movements had ceased. The Government
     sent me up, knowing my views, and against my wish, and knowing I
     was not likely to mince matters. There are not more than two
     Europeans in Basutoland who believe in Orpen or his policy, while
     the natives have lost all confidence in him. Sauer shut his eyes
     to all this, and has thrown in his lot with Orpen. Masupha is a
     sincere man, and he does not care to have placed with him
     magistrates, against whom are complaints, which Sauer ignores. To
     show you I was in earnest, I offered to remain as magistrate with
     Masupha for two years, so much did I desire a settlement of the
     Basuto question. I did not want nor would I have taken the post
     of Governor's Agent. The chiefs and people desire peace, but not
     at any price. They have intelligence enough to see through
     wretched magistrates like some of those sent up into the native
     territories. They will accept a convention like the one I sent
     down to the Colonial Secretary on the 19th of July, and no other.
     I do not write this to escape being a scapegoat--in fact, I like
     the altar--only that you may know my views. As long as the
     present magistrates stay there, no chance exists for any
     arrangement. As to the Premier's remark that I would not fight
     against Masupha, is it likely I could fight against a man with
     whom I am life and soul? Would I fight against him because he
     would not be controlled by some men like ---- and ----? Even
     suppose I could sink my conscience to do so, what issue would
     result from the action of undisciplined and insubordinate troops,
     who are difficult to keep in order during peace-time, and about
     whom, when I would have made an example of one officer, a
     Minister telegraphs to me to let him down easy. I beg to recall
     to you that Her Majesty's Government disapproved of the former
     Basuto war; therefore, why should I, who am an outsider to the
     colony, even pretend I could make war against a noble people, who
     resist magistrates of no capacity? The Government were well
     warned by me, and they cannot, therefore, plead being led
     astray."

Intimately connected with the Basuto question was the larger one of
the right treatment to be generally extended to the natives, and on
that subject General Gordon drew up, on 19th October 1882, the
following masterly note, which elicited the admiration of one of the
Cape Premiers, Mr Merriman, who said--"As a Colony we must try to
follow out the ideas sketched by General Gordon."

The following is the full text of this interesting and valuable state
paper:--

                           THE NATIVE QUESTION.

     "1. The native question of South Africa is not a difficult one to
     an outsider. The difficulty lies in procuring a body of men who
     will have strength of purpose to carry out a definite policy with
     respect to the natives.

     "2. The strained relations which exist between the colonist and
     the native are the outcome of employing, as a rule, magistrates
     lacking in tact, sympathy, and capacity to deal with the natives,
     in the Government not supervising the action of these
     magistrates, and in condoning their conduct, while acknowledging
     those faults which come to their cognisance.

     "3. The Colonial Government act in the nomination of native
     magistrates as if their duties were such as any one could
     fulfil, instead of being, as they are, duties requiring the
     greatest tact and judgment. There can be no doubt but that in a
     great measure, indeed one may say entirely, disturbances among
     the natives are caused by the lack of judgment, or of honesty, or
     of tact, on the part of the magistrates in the native
     territories. There may be here and there good magistrates, but
     the defects of the bad ones re-act on the good ones. Revolt is
     contagious and spreads rapidly among the natives.

     "4. One may say no supervision, in the full sense of the term,
     exists over the actions of magistrates in native territories.
     They report to headquarters what suits them, but unless some very
     flagrant injustice is brought to light, which is often condoned,
     the Government know nothing. The consequence is that a continual
     series of petty injustices rankle in the minds of the natives,
     eventually breaking out into a revolt, in the midst of which
     Government does not trouble to investigate the causes of such
     revolt, but is occupied in its suppression. The history of the
     South African wars is essentially, as Sir G. Cathcart puts it,
     "Wars undertaken in support of unjustifiable acts." Sir Harry
     Smith was recalled for supporting an inefficient official of the
     now Free State Territory. Any one who chooses can investigate the
     causes of the late wars, and will find out that they arose in a
     great measure from the ignorance of the Government, their support
     of incapable officials, and their weakness in not investigating
     causes before they proceeded to coercion.

     "5. Government by coercion is essentially rotten. The Duke of
     Wellington said that any fool could govern by that means. And it
     is still more rotten when Government governs by the rule of
     coercion without the power of coercion except at great expense.

     "6. A properly constituted Commission of independent men
     proceeding to the native territories, not accepting the
     hospitality of those whose conduct they _go_ to investigate, not
     driving through the territories in hot haste, as is the manner of
     some Ministers, but a Commission who would patiently and
     fearlessly inquire into every detail of administration, into
     every grievance, is the _sine quâ non_ of any quiet in the native
     territories. This Commission should detail on brass plates the
     _modus vivendi_, the limits of territory of each district chief,
     and a body of trustees should be appointed to watch over any
     infraction of such charter.

     "7. It must be borne in mind that these native territories cost
     the Colony for administration some £9000 per annum for
     administration of magistracies; the receipts are some £3000,
     leaving a deficit of some £6000 per annum. To this deficit has to
     be added some £150,000 for regular troops. The last rebellion of
     Transkei ended in capture of some £60,000 worth of cattle, and
     that from natives of Colony driven into rebellion, and cost
     Government of Colony with Basuto war nearly £4,000,000. It is
     surely worth while, from a financial point of view, to
     investigate the administration of the Transkei.

     "8. The present state of the Transkei is one of seething
     discontent and distrust which the rivalry of the tribes alone
     prevents breaking out into action, to be quelled again at great
     expense and by the ruin of the people, and upset of all
     enterprise to open up the country. Throughout the Transkei is one
     general clamour against the Government for broken promises, for
     promises made and never kept. Magistrates complain no answers are
     given to their questions; things are allowed to drift along as
     best they can. A fair open policy towards the Pondos would obtain
     from them all the Colony could require, but as things are now,
     the Pondos are full of distrust, and only want the chance to turn
     against the Colony. There are in Transkei 399,000 natives, and
     2800 Europeans. Therefore, for the benefit of these 2800
     Europeans, 399,000 natives are made miserable, and an expenditure
     of £210,000 is incurred by the Colony with the probability of
     periodical troubles.

     "9. However disagreeable it might be, the Commission of
     Investigation should inquire into the antecedents of each
     magistrate, and also his capabilities.

     "10. With respect to Basutoland, it is understood that no revenue
     from that country is to go to the Colony, therefore it can be no
     object to Colony to insist on the installation of magistrates in
     that country. If the magistrates of Transkei are the cause of
     discontent among the natives, then what object is there in
     insisting on their installation in Basutoland? The Pondos, a far
     inferior people, are happy under their own chiefs--far happier
     than the natives of Transkei. Why should the Colony insist on
     sending men who are more likely to goad the Basutos into
     rebellion than anything else? The administration of Basutoland is
     on a scale costing £30,000 per annum.

     "11. It is argued that should the Colony go to war with Masupha
     the other chiefs would hold aloof. This is quite erroneous. A war
     with Masupha means a war with the Basuto nation, with a rising in
     the Transkei, and perhaps in Pondoland, and would affect Natal
     and Her Majesty's Government.

     "12. The only remedy is the sending up of his Excellency the
     Governor, or of some high neutral officer, to Basutoland, and the
     calling together of the people to decide on their future
     government and connection with Colony. Or, should the British
     Government refuse this small concession, which could not involve
     it, then the Colony should send up an independent Commission to
     meet the Basuto people, and arrange a _modus vivendi_. Whichever
     course is followed it is a _sine quâ non_ that the present
     officials in Basutoland should be relieved at once, as they have
     lost the confidence both of Europeans and natives. The Basutos
     desire peace, and it is an error to describe their demeanour as
     aggressive. It is not unnatural that after what they have
     suffered from the hands of Colonial Government they should desire
     at least as nearly as much self-government as the Pondos enjoy.
     Certainly the present magisterial administration of the Transkei
     is very far from being a blessing, or conducive to peace.

     "13. Nothing can possibly be worse than the present state of
     affairs in native administration, and the interests of the Colony
     demand a vertebrate government of some sort, whoever it may be
     composed of, instead of the invertebrate formation that is now
     called a government, and which drifts into and creates its own
     difficulties.

                                             C. G. GORDON.

     "October 19, 1882.

     "_P.S._--Should Her Majesty's Government manage to arrange with
     Basutos in a satisfactory manner, 10,000 splendid cavalry could
     be counted on as allies in any contingencies in Natal, etc."

The vital part of Gordon's Cape experiences was the Basuto mission,
and as it is desirable that it should not be obscured by other
matters, I will only touch briefly on his work as Commandant-General,
apart from that he performed as Adviser to the Cape Government in the
Basuto difficulty. The post of Commandant-General was forced upon him
in the first weeks of his arrival from the Mauritius by the combined
urgency of Sir Hercules Robinson, the Governor, and Mr Merriman, then
Premier. Much against his inclination, Gordon agreed to fill the post
thus thrust upon him, but only for a time. It entailed an infinity of
work and worry. His instructions were to break up a red-tape system,
and such a task converted every place-holder into his enemy. Still
that opposition rather made his task attractive than otherwise, but in
a little time he found that this opposition would not stop short of
insubordination, and that to achieve success it would be necessary to
cashier a good many officers as a wholesome example. It was while
matters were in this preliminary stage that Mr Merriman's ministry
went out of office, and was succeeded by another under Mr Scanlan. The
measures which were favoured by the one were opposed by the other, and
Gordon soon saw that the desire for a thorough reorganisation of the
Cape forces, which, if properly supported, he could have carried out,
was no longer prevalent among the responsible Ministers. Still he drew
up an elaborate programme for the improvement of the Colonial Regular
forces, by which they might be increased in numbers and improved in
efficiency, at the same time that the annual expenditure was reduced.
This document shows that mastery of detail which was one of his most
striking characteristics, and if his advice had been taken, the Cape
would have acquired nearly 4000 troops at no greater cost than it
already expended on 1600. In a second memorandum, he not only showed
the necessity existing for that larger force, but also how, by
administrative alterations in the Transkeian provinces, its cost might
be diminished and most conveniently discharged. Although I do not
quote these two documents, I cannot help saying that Gordon, in the
whole course of his life, never wrote anything more convincing than
the advice he gave the Cape Government, which, owing to local
jealousies and the invincible bulwark of vested interests, was never
carried into effect, although the Basuto question was subsequently
composed on Gordon's lines by the Imperial Government, and there has
been peace there during all the other South African troubles.

The closing passages between Gordon and the Cape Ministers need only
be briefly referred to. Gordon resigned because he saw he could do no
good in Basutoland; the Cape Premier accepted his resignation because
Gordon "would not fight the Basutos." The intercommunications were
much more numerous, but that is their pith. Gordon came down to Cape
Town and sailed for England on 14th October, after having been five
and a half months in South Africa. He had been treated by the Cape
authorities without any regard for justice, and little for courtesy.
The leading paper even admitted this much when it observed that "at
least General Gordon was entitled to the treatment of a gentleman."
But the plain truth was that Gordon was summoned to South Africa and
employed by the Government, not as was ostentatiously proclaimed, and
as he himself believed, for the attainment of a just solution of the
Basuto difficulty, and for the execution of much-needed military
reforms, but in order that his military experience and genius might be
invoked for the purpose of overthrowing Masupha and of annexing
Basutoland, which two years of war and five millions of money had
failed to conquer. Hence their disappointment and resentment when
Gordon proclaimed that justice was on the side of Masupha; that under
no circumstances would he wage war with him; and that the whole origin
of the trouble lay in the bad policy, the incompetent magistrates, and
the insubordinate military officers of the Cape Government. The
indictment was a terrible one; it was also true in every line and
every particular.

Having thus vindicated his own character, as well as the highest
principles of Government, Gordon left the Cape a poorer and a wiser
man than he was on his arrival. I have explained the personal loss he
incurred through the inadequacy of his pay and the cutting-off of his
army allowance. It has been stated that when he had taken his passage
for England he was without any money in his pocket, and that he
quaintly said to a friend: "Do you think it is right for a
Major-General of the British Army to set out on a journey like this
without sixpence in his pocket?" There is nothing improbable in such
an occurrence, and it was matched only sixteen months later, when he
was on the point of starting for Khartoum in the same impecunious
condition.

Gordon arrived in England on 8th November, and after some
correspondence with the King of the Belgians, which will be referred
to later in connection with the Congo mission, he again left England
on 26th December. On this occasion he was going to carry out a
long-cherished desire to visit and reside in the Holy Land, so that he
might study on the spot the scenes with which his perfect knowledge of
the Bible--his inseparable companion--had made him in an extraordinary
degree familiar. In the best sense of the word, he was going to take a
holiday. There was to be absolute quiet and rest, and at the same time
a congenial occupation. He sailed for Jaffa as a guest on one of Sir
William Mackinnon's steamers, but he at once proceeded to Jerusalem,
where he lived alone, refusing to see any one, with his books as
companions, and "mystifying people as to what he was doing." During
his stay at Jerusalem he entered with much zest and at great length
into the questions of the various sites in the old Jewish capital. I
do not propose to follow the course of his labours in that pursuit, as
several works contain between them, I should say, every line he wrote
on the subject, and the general reader cannot be expected to take any
interest in abstruse and much-debated theological and topographical
questions. But even in the midst of these pursuits he did not lose his
quickness of military perception. After a brief inspection he at once
declared that the Russian Convent commanded the whole city, and was in
itself a strong fortress, capable of holding a formidable garrison,
which Russia could despatch in the guise of priests without any one
being the wiser. From Jerusalem, when the heat became great, he
returned to Jaffa, and his interest aroused in worldly matters by the
progress of events in Egypt, and the development of the Soudan danger,
which he had all along seen coming, was evoked by a project that was
brought under his notice for the construction across Palestine of a
canal to the head of the Gulf of Akabah. In a letter to myself he thus
dilates upon the scheme:--

     "Here is the subject which I am interested in if it could be
     done. The reasons are:--

     "1. We are in Egypt supporting an unpopular sovereign, whose
     tenure ends with departure of our troops. We offer no hope to the
     people of any solace by this support, and by the supporting of
     the Turco-Circassian Pashas, who I know by experience are
     _hopeless_. We neither govern nor take responsibility; yet we
     support these vampires.

     "2. We are getting mixed up with the question of whether the
     interest of £90,000,000 will be paid or not.

     "3. We are mixed up with the Soudan, where we provoked the
     rebellion, and of the responsibility of which government we
     cannot rid ourselves.

     "4. We are in constant and increasing hot water with the French,
     and we gain no benefit from it, for the Canal will remain theirs.

       *       *       *       *       *

     "On the other hand, if we get a Firman from Sultan for the
     Palestine Canal--

     "1. We lose the sacred sites of Jordan River, Capernaum,
     Bethsaida, and Tiberias, Jericho, not Engedi.

     "2. We swamp a notoriously unhealthy valley, where there are no
     missions.

     "3. We cut off the pest of the country of Palestine, the
     Bedouins.

     "4. We are free of all four objections _in re_ occupation of
     Egypt.

     "5. We gain the fertile lands of Moab and Ammon.

     "6. Cyprus is 150 miles from the Mediterranean _débouché_.

     "7. We get a waterway for large ships to within fifty miles of
     Damascus.

     "8. We can never be bothered by any internal commotion, except
     for the twenty-five miles from Haifa to Tiberias, for the
     waterway of the Canal would be ten miles wide, except in Arabah
     Valley, where there are on both sides wastes and deserts.

     "9. We get rid of unhealthiness of a narrow cut with no current,
     which is the case with Suez Canal now, where the mud is
     pestilential from ships' refuse and no current.

     "10. It would isolate Palestine, render it quiet from Bedouins;
     it would pave the way to its being like Belgium, under no Great
     Power, for religious views would be against Palestine ever being
     owned by a Great Power.

     "11. Up the ladder of Tyre to Gaza would be 10,000 square miles;
     population 130,000, quite a small country.

     "Do not quote me if you write this. Oddly enough, Ezekiel xlvii.
     10 seems to say the Dead Sea shall have fish like the great Sea
     (_i.e._ Mediterranean). Zechariah xiv. speaks of two rivers, one
     going to Dead Sea, the other to Mediterranean.

     "The cost would be--

          Canal from Haifa to Jordan,            £2,000,000
          Compensation to Jordan peoples,         1,000,000
          Canal through Akabah,                   6,000,000
          Ports at Haifa,                         1,000,000
          Ports at Akabah,                          500,000
                                                ___________

                                                £10,500,000
                                                ===========

     say, twelve to fifteen millions, and what a comfort to be free of
     Egypt and Soudan for ever!

     "Revenue, Palestine, £120,000, of which £80,000 goes to Sultan.
     Do not quote _me_, for I have written part of this to Mr W. (the
     late Sir William) Mackinnon of B.I.S.N.C., besides which H.M.
     Government may object. You may say you had a letter from a
     correspondent."

He wrote in a similar strain to other correspondents, but I have never
succeeded in discovering whether, from an engineering point of view,
the scheme was at all feasible. It seems to me that its suggestion is
somewhat destructive of Gordon's own declarations as to the superior
merits of the Cape route, nor does Sir Henry Gordon much strengthen
the case when, perceiving the inconsistency, he goes out of his way to
declare that Gordon only meant the Palestine canal to be a commercial
route. Any attempt to limit its usefulness could not destroy the
character claimed for it by its promoters, as an equally short and
more secure route than that by Suez. Yet it needs no gift of second
sight to predict that when any project of rivalry to the masterpiece
of Lesseps is carried out, it will be by rail to the Persian Gulf,
whether the starting-point be the Bosphorus or the Levant.

In the midst of his interesting researches near Mount Carmel, a
summons from the outer world reached Gordon in the form of a letter
from Sir William Mackinnon, telling him that the King of the Belgians
now called on him to fulfil a promise he had made some years before.

When Gordon first returned from the Cape the King of the Belgians
wrote, reminding him of his old promise, dating from 1880, to enter
into his service on the Congo, and stating that the difficulty of
having an internationally recognised Congo flag, which Gordon had made
a _sine quâ non_ of his appointment, could be most speedily solved by
Gordon joining him as counsellor at once. This Gordon could not agree
to, and he went to Palestine, there to await the King's summons,
which came by Sir William Mackinnon's note in October 1883. It then
became necessary for Gordon to obtain the official permission of his
Government to take up this post, of the exact nature of which the
Foreign Office had been already informed, both by General Gordon and
King Leopold.

Gordon at once telegraphed to the War Office for the leave rendered
necessary by his being on the active list, and that Department
replied, asking for particulars. When these were furnished through the
Foreign Office the decision was announced that "the Secretary of State
declines to sanction your employment on the Congo." The telegraph
clerk, more discerning or considerate than Her Majesty's Government,
altered "declines" into "decides," and Gordon, in happy ignorance of
the truth, proceeded with all possible despatch _via_ Acre and Genoa
to Brussels, which he reached on New Year's Day, 1884. That very night
he wrote me a short note saying, "I go (_D.V._) next month to the
Congo, but keep it secret." Such things cannot be kept secret, and
four days later a leading article in _The Times_ informed his
countrymen of Gordon's new mission.

On reaching Brussels the mistake in the telegram was discovered, and
Gordon here learnt that his Congo mission was vetoed. Then came the
difficulty to know what was to be done. Without leave he could not go
anywhere without resigning his commission; he was not qualified for a
pension, and there were engagements he had voluntarily contracted that
he would not see broken, and persons who would suffer by his death,
whose interests he was in every way bound to safeguard. Therefore, if
he was to carry out his engagement with the King of the Belgians, it
was obviously necessary that he should resign the British Army, and
that the King should compensate him for his loss. The King said at
once: "Retire from the army and I will compensate you," but in a
matter of such importance to others Gordon felt nothing should be left
to chance, and that a definite contract should be made. For this he
had neither the patience nor the business knowledge, and he delegated
the task of arranging the matter to his brother, Sir Henry Gordon, who
negotiated with the late Sir William Mackinnon as representing the
King. They agreed that the value of Gordon's pension if commuted would
be £7288, and the King of the Belgians was to provide that sum, which
was to be paid into a trust fund. In this and every other matter the
King behaved towards Gordon in the most generous and cordial manner,
furnishing a marked contrast with the grudging and parsimonious spirit
of the British Government towards Gordon in China, at the Cape, and
now again when destined for the Congo.

All the arrangements connected with this subject were made in three
days, and while Gordon gave instructions for his will to be prepared
for the disposal of the trust fund after his death, he wrote the same
day (6th January) to Mr H. M. Stanley, then acting for the King on the
Congo, announcing his own appointment, offering to "serve willingly
with or under him," and fixing his own departure from Lisbon for 5th
of February. _Dis aliter visum._ For the moment he worked up some
enthusiasm in his task. "We will kill the slave-traders in their
haunts"; and again, "No such efficacious means of cutting at root of
slave trade ever was presented as that which God has, I trust, opened
out to us through the kind disinterestedness of His Majesty," are
passages in the same letter, yet all the time there is no doubt his
heart and his thoughts were elsewhere. They were in the Soudan, not on
the Congo.

The night of this letter he crossed from Brussels, and went straight
to his sister's house, long the residence, and, practically speaking,
the home of his family, 5 Rockstone Place, Southampton. On the 7th of
the month--that is, the same day as he arrived--he wrote the formal
letter requesting leave to resign his commission in the Queen's army,
and also stating, with his usual candour, that King Leopold II. had
guaranteed him against any pecuniary loss. To that letter it may at
once be stated that no reply was ever sent. Even the least sympathetic
official could not feel altogether callous to a voluntary proposition
to remove the name of "Chinese" Gordon from the British army list, and
the sudden awakening of the public to the extraordinary claims of
General Gordon on national gratitude, and his special fitness to deal
with the Soudan difficulty warned the authorities that a too rigid
application of office rules would not in his case be allowed. By no
individual effort, as has been too lightly granted by some writers,
but by the voice of the British people was it decided that not only
should Gordon have leave to go to the Congo, without resigning his
commission, but also that he should be held entitled to draw his pay
as a British general while thus employed. But this was not the whole
truth, although I have no doubt that the arrangement would have been
carried out in any case. In their dilemma the Government saw a chance
of extrication in the person of Gordon, the one man recognised by the
public and the press as capable of coping with a difficulty which
seemed too much for them. The whole truth, therefore, was that the
Congo mission was to wait until after Gordon had been sent to, and
returned from, the Soudan. He was then to be placed by the British
Government entirely at the disposal of the King of the Belgians. As
this new arrangement turned on the assent of the King, it was vital to
keep it secret during the remainder of the 15th and the whole of the
16th of that eventful January.

When Gordon arrived at Waterloo Station, at a little before two
o'clock on 15th January, and was met there by myself, I do not think
that he knew definitely what was coming, but he was a man of
extraordinary shrewdness, and although essentially unworldly, could
see as clearly and as far through a transaction as the keenest man of
business. What he did know was that the army authorities were going to
treat him well, but his one topic of conversation the whole way to
Pall Mall was not the Congo but the Soudan. To the direct question
whether he was not really going, as I suspected, to the Nile instead
of the Congo, he declared he had no information that would warrant
such an idea, but still, if the King of the Belgians would grant the
permission, he would certainly not be disinclined to go there first. I
have no doubt that those who acted in the name of the Ministry in a
few minutes discovered the true state of his mind, and that Gordon
then and there agreed, on the express request of the Government of Mr
Gladstone, to go and see the King, and beg him to suspend the
execution of his promise until he had gone to the Soudan to arrest the
Mahdi's career, or to relieve the Egyptian garrisons, if the phrase be
preferred. It should also be stated that Gordon's arrangement with the
King of the Belgians was always coupled with this proviso, "provided
the Government of my own country does not require my services." The
generosity of that sovereign in the matter of the compensation for his
Commission did not render that condition void, and however irritating
the King may have found the circumstances, Gordon broke neither the
spirit nor the letter of his engagement with his Majesty by obeying
the orders of his own Government.

Late the same evening I was present at his brother's house to receive
an account for publication of his plans on the Congo, but surrounded
by so large a number of his relatives summoned to see their hero, many
of them for the last time, it was neither convenient nor possible to
carry out this task, which was accordingly postponed till the
following morning, when I was to see him at the Charing Cross Hotel,
and accompany him by the early boat train to Dover. On that night his
last will was signed and witnessed by his uncle, Mr George Enderby,
and myself. The next morning I was at the hotel before seven, but
instead of travelling by this early train, he postponed his departure
till ten o'clock, and the greater part of those three hours were given
to an explanation, map in hand, of his plans on the Congo. The
article, based on his information, appeared in _The Times_ of 17th
January 1884, but several times during our conversation he exclaimed,
"There may be a respite," but he refused to be more definite. Thus he
set out for Brussels, whether he was accompanied by his friend
Captain (now Colonel) F. Brocklehurst, who was undoubtedly acting as
the representative of the authorities. I believe I may say with
confidence that if he did not actually see the King of the Belgians on
the evening of the same day, some communication passed indirectly,
which showed the object of his errand, for although his own letter
communicating the event is dated 17th, from Brussels, it is a fact
within my own knowledge that late in the evening of the 16th a
telegram was received--"Gordon goes to the Soudan."

The first intimation of something having happened that his brother Sir
Henry Gordon received, was in a hurried letter, dated 17th January,
which arrived by the early post on Friday, 18th, asking him to "get
his uniform ready and some patent leather boots," but adding, "I saw
King Leopold to-day; he is furious." Even then Sir Henry, although he
guessed his destination, did not know that his departure would be so
sudden, for Gordon crossed the same night, and was kept at
Knightsbridge Barracks in a sort of honourable custody by Captain
Brocklehurst, so that the new scheme might not be prematurely
revealed. Sir Henry, a busy man, went about his own work, having seen
to his brother's commission, and it was not until his return at five
o'clock that he learnt all, and that Gordon was close at hand. He at
once hurried off to see him, and on meeting, Gordon, in a high state
of exhilaration, exclaimed, "I am off to the Soudan." Sir Henry asked
"When?" and back came the reply, "To-night!" He had got his respite.

To him at that moment it meant congenial work and the chance of
carrying out the thoughts that had been surging through his mind ever
since Egyptian affairs became troubled and the Mahdi's power rose on
the horizon of the Soudan. The reality was to prove far different. He
was to learn in his own person the weakness and falseness of his
Government, and to find himself betrayed by the very persons who had
only sought his assistance in the belief that by a miracle--and
nothing less would have sufficed--he might relieve them from
responsibilities to which they were not equal. Far better would it
have been, not only for Gordon's sake, but even for the reputation of
England, if he had carried out his original project on the Congo,
where, on a less conspicuous scene than the Nile, he might still have
fought and won the battle of humanity.

I am placed in a position to state that on the morning of the 17th, at
10 A.M., he wrote to his sister from Brussels, as follows--"Do not
mention it, but there is just a chance I may have to go to Soudan for
two months, and then go to Congo," and again in a second letter at two
o'clock, "Just got a telegram from Wolseley saying, 'Come back to
London by evening train,' so when you get this I shall be in town,
_but keep it a dead secret_, for I hope to leave it again the same
evening. I will not take Governor-Generalship again, I will only
report on situation." After this came a post-card--18th January, 6
A.M. "Left B., am now in London; I hope to go back again to-night."
That very night he left for Egypt.

That he was not detained the whole day in the Barracks is shown in the
following letter, now published for the first time, which gives the
only account of his interview with the members of the Government that
sent him out:--

                                                       "19. 1, 1884.

     "MY DEAR AUGUSTA,--I arrived in town very tired, at 6 A.M.
     yesterday, went with Brocklehurst to Barracks, washed, and went
     to Wolseley. He said Ministers would see me at 3 P.M. I went back
     to Barracks and reposed. At 12.30 P.M. Wolseley came for me. I
     went with him and saw Granville, Hartington, Dilke, and
     Northbrook. They said, 'Had I seen Wolseley, and did I understand
     their ideas?' I said 'Yes,' and repeated what Wolseley had said
     to me as to their ideas, which was '_they would evacuate
     Soudan_.' They were pleased, and said 'That was their idea; would
     I go?' I said 'Yes.' They said 'When?' I said 'To-night,' and it
     was over. I started at 8 P.M. H.R.H. The Duke of Cambridge and
     Lord Wolseley came to see me off. I saw Henry and Bob (R. F.
     Gordon); no one else except Stokes--all very kind. I have taken
     Stewart with me, a nice fellow. We are now in train near Mont
     Cenis. I am not moved a bit, and hope to do the people good. Lord
     Granville said Ministers were very much obliged to me. I said I
     was much honoured by going. I telegraphed King of the Belgians at
     once, and told him 'Wait a few months.' Kindest love to
     all.--Your affectionate brother,

                                             "C. G. GORDON."

As further evidence of the haste of his departure, I should like to
mention that he had hardly any clothes with him, and that Mrs Watson,
wife of his friend Colonel Watson, procured him all he required--in
fact, fitted him out--during the two days he stayed at Cairo. These
kindly efforts on his behalf were thrown away, for all his
baggage--clothes, uniforms, orders, etc.--was captured with the money
at Berber and never reached him. His only insignia of office at
Khartoum was the Fez, and the writer who described him as putting on
his uniform when the Mahdists broke into the town was gifted with more
imagination than love of truth.




CHAPTER XI.

THE LAST NILE MISSION.


When Gordon left Egypt, at the end of the year 1879, he was able to
truthfully declare in the words of his favourite book: "No man could
lift his hand or his foot in the land of the Soudan without me." Yet
he was fully alive to the dangers of the future, although then they
were no more than a little cloud on the horizon, for he wrote in 1878:
"Our English Government lives on a hand-to-mouth policy. They are very
ignorant of these lands, yet some day or other, they or some other
Government, will have to know them, for things at Cairo cannot stay as
they are. The Khedive will be curbed in, and will no longer be
absolute Sovereign. Then will come the question of these countries....
There is no doubt that if the Governments of France and England do not
pay more attention to the Soudan--if they do not establish at Khartoum
a branch of the mixed tribunals, and see that justice is done--the
disruption of the Soudan from Cairo is only a question of time. This
disruption, moreover, will not end the troubles, for the Soudanese
through their allies in Lower Egypt--the black soldiers I mean--will
carry on their efforts in Cairo itself. Now these black soldiers are
the only troops in the Egyptian service that are worth anything." The
gift of prophecy could scarcely have been demonstrated in a more
remarkable degree, yet the Egyptian Government and everybody else went
on acting as if there was no danger in the Soudan, and treated it like
a thoroughly conquered province inhabited by a satisfied, or at least
a thoroughly subjected population. From this dream there was to be a
rude and startling awakening.

It is impossible to say whether there was any connection direct or
indirect between the revolt of Arabi Pasha and the military leaders at
Cairo and the rebellion in the Soudan, which began under the auspices
of the so-called Mahdi. At the very least it may be asserted that the
spectacle of successful insubordination in the Delta--for it was
completely successful, and would have continued so but for the
intervention of British arms--was calculated to encourage those who
entertained a desire to upset the Khedive's authority in the upper
regions of the Nile. That Gordon held that the authors of the Arabi
rising and of the Mahdist movement were the same in sympathy, if not
in person, cannot be doubted, and in February 1882, when the Mahdi had
scarcely begun his career, he wrote: "If they send the Black regiment
to the Soudan to quell the revolt, they will inoculate all the troops
up there, and the Soudan will revolt against Cairo, whom they all
hate." It will be noted that that letter was written more than twenty
months before the destruction of the Hicks Expedition made the Mahdi
master of the Soudan.

It was in the year 1880 that the movements of a Mahommedan dervish,
named Mahomed Ahmed, first began to attract the attention of the
Egyptian officials. He had quarrelled with and repudiated the
authority of the head of his religious order, because he tolerated
such frivolous practices as dancing and singing. His boldness in this
matter, and his originality in others, showed that he was pursuing a
course of his own, and to provide for his personal security, as well
as for convenience in keeping up his communications with Khartoum and
other places, he fixed his residence on an islet in the White Nile
near Kawa. Mahomed Ahmed was a native of the lower province of
Dongola, and as such was looked upon with a certain amount of contempt
by the other races of the Soudan. When he quarrelled with his
religious leader he was given the opprobrious name of "a wretched
Dongolawi," but the courage with which he defied and exposed an
arch-priest for not rigidly abiding by the tenets of the Koran,
redounded so much to his credit that the people began to talk of this
wonderful dervish quite as much as of the Khedive's Governor-General.
Many earnest and energetic Mahommedans flocked to him, and among these
was the present Khalifa Abdullah, whose life had been spared by
Zebehr, and who in return had wished to proclaim that leader of the
slave-hunters Mahdi. To his instigation was probably due not merely
the assumption of that title by Mahomed Ahmed, but the addition of a
worldly policy to what was to have been a strictly religious
propaganda.

Little as he deemed there was to fear from this ascetic, the Egyptian
Governor-General Raouf, Gordon's successor, and stigmatised by him as
the Tyrant of Harrar, became curious about him, and sent someone to
interview and report upon this new religious teacher. The report
brought back was that he was "a madman," and it was at once considered
safe to treat him with indifference. Such was the position in the year
1880, and the official view was only modified a year later by the
receipt of information that the gathering on the island of Abba had
considerably increased, and that Mahomed Ahmed was attended by an
armed escort, who stood in his presence with drawn swords. It was at
this time too that he began to declare that he had a divine mission,
and took unto himself the style of Mahdi--the long-expected messenger
who was to raise up Islam--at first secretly among his chosen friends,
but not so secretly that news of his bold step did not reach the ears
of Raouf. The assumption of such a title, which placed its holder
above and beyond the reach of such ordinary commands as are conveyed
in the edicts of a Khedive or a Sultan, convinced Raouf that the time
had come to put an end to these pretensions. That conviction was not
diminished when Mahomed Ahmed made a tour through Kordofan, spreading
a knowledge of his name and intentions, and undoubtedly winning over
many adherents to his cause. On his return to Abba he found a summons
from the Governor-General to come to Khartoum. That summons was
followed by the arrival of a steamer, the captain of which had orders
to capture the False Mahdi alive or dead.

Mahomed Ahmed received warning from his friends and sympathisers that
if he went to Khartoum he might consider himself a dead man. He
probably never had the least intention of going there, and what he had
seen of the state of feeling in the Soudan, where the authority of the
Khedive was neither popular nor firmly established, rendered him more
inclined to defy the Egyptians. When the delegate of Raouf Pasha
therefore appeared before him, Mahomed Ahmed was surrounded by such an
armed force as precluded the possibility of a violent seizure of his
person, and when he resorted to argument to induce him to come to
Khartoum, Mahomed Ahmed, throwing off the mask, and standing forth in
the self-imposed character of Mahdi, exclaimed: "By the grace of God
and His Prophet I am the master of this country, and never shall I go
to Khartoum to justify myself."

After this picturesque defiance it only remained for him and the
Egyptians to prove which was the stronger.

It must be admitted that Raouf at once recognised the gravity of the
affair, and without delay he sent a small force on Gordon's old
steamer, the _Ismailia_, to bring Mahomed Ahmed to reason. This was in
August 1881. By its numbers and the superior armament of the troops
this expedition should have proved a complete success, and a competent
commander would have strangled the Mahdist phenomenon at its birth.
Unfortunately the Egyptian officers were grossly incompetent, and
divided among themselves. They attempted a night attack, and as they
were quite ignorant of the locality, it is not surprising that they
fell into the very trap they thought to set for their opponents.

In the confusion the divided Egyptian forces fired upon each other,
and the Mahdists with their swords and short stabbing spears completed
the rest. Of two whole companies of troops only a handful escaped by
swimming to the steamer, which returned to Khartoum with the news of
this defeat. Even this reverse was very far from ensuring the triumph
of Mahomed Ahmed, or the downfall of the Egyptian power; and, indeed,
the possession of steamers and the consequent command of the Nile
navigation rendered it extremely doubtful whether he could long hold
his own on the island of Abba. He thought so himself, and, gathering
his forces together, marched to the western districts of Kordofan,
where, at Jebel Gedir, he established his headquarters. A special
reason made him select that place, for it is believed by Mahommedans
that the Mahdi will first appear at Jebel Masa in North Africa, and
Mahomed Ahmed had no scruple in declaring that the two places were the
same. To complete the resemblance he changed with autocratic pleasure
the name Jebel Gedir into Jebel Masa.

During this march several attempts were made to capture him by the
local garrisons, but they were all undertaken in such a half-hearted
manner, and so badly carried out, that the Mahdi was never in any
danger, and his reputation was raised by the failure of the
Government.

Once established at Jebel Gedir the Mahdi began to organise his forces
on a larger scale, and to formulate a policy that would be likely to
bring all the tribes of the Soudan to his side. While thus employed
Rashed Bey, Governor of Fashoda, resolved to attack him. Rashed is
entitled to the credit of seeing that the time demanded a signal, and
if possible, a decisive blow, but he is to be censured for the
carelessness and over-confidence he displayed in carrying out his
scheme. Although he had a strong force he should have known that the
Mahdi's followers were now numbered by the thousand, and that he was
an active and enterprising foe. But he neglected the most simple
precautions, and showed that he had no military skill. The Mahdi fell
upon him during his march, killed him, his chief officers, and 1400
men, and the small body that escaped bore testimony to the formidable
character of the victor's fighting power. This battle was fought on
9th December 1881, and the end of that year therefore beheld the firm
establishment of the Mahdi's power in a considerable part of the
Soudan; but even then the superiority of the Egyptian resources was so
marked and incontestable that, properly handled, they should have
sufficed to speedily overwhelm him.

At this juncture Raouf was succeeded as Governor-General by
Abd-el-Kader Pasha, who had held the same post before Gordon, and who
had gained something of a reputation from the conquest of Darfour, in
conjunction with Zebehr. At least he ought to have known the Soudan,
but the dangers which had been clear to the eye of Gordon were
concealed from him and his colleagues. Still, the first task
he set himself--and indeed it was the justification of his
re-appointment--was to retrieve the disaster to Rashed, and to destroy
the Mahdi's power. He therefore collected a force of not less than
4000 men, chiefly trained infantry, and he entrusted the command to
Yusuf Pasha, a brave officer, who had distinguished himself under
Gessi in the war with Suleiman. This force left Khartoum in March
1882, but it did not begin its inland march from the Nile until the
end of May, when it had been increased by at least 2000 irregular
levies raised in Kordofan. Unfortunately, Yusuf was just as
over-confident as Rashed had been. He neglected all precautions, and
derided the counsel of those who warned him that the Mahdi's followers
might prove a match for his well-armed and well-drilled troops. After
a ten days' march he reached the neighbourhood of the Mahdi's
position, and he was already counting on a great victory, when, at
dawn of day on 7th June, he was himself surprised by his opponent in a
camp that he had ostentatiously refused to fortify in the smallest
degree. The Egyptian force was annihilated. Some of the local
irregulars escaped, but of the regular troops and their commanders not
one. This decisive victory not merely confirmed the reputation of the
Mahdi, and made most people in the Soudan believe that he was really a
heaven-sent champion, but it also exposed the inferiority of the
Government troops and the Khedive's commanders.

The defeat of Yusuf may be said to have been decisive so far as the
active forces of the Khedive in the field were concerned, but the
towns held out, and El Obeid, the capital of Kordofan, in particular
defied all the Mahdi's efforts to take it. The possession of this and
other strong places furnished the supporters of the Government with a
reasonable hope that on the arrival of fresh troops the ground lost
might be recovered, and an end put to what threatened to become a
formidable rebellion. A lull consequently ensued in the struggle.
Unfortunately, it was one that the Mahdi turned to the best advantage
by drilling and arming his troops, and summoning levies from the more
distant parts of the provinces, while the Khedive's Government,
engrossed in troubles nearer home--the Arabi revolt and the
intervention of England in the internal administration--seemed
paralysed in its efforts to restore its authority over the Soudan,
which at that moment would have been comparatively easy. The only
direct result of Yusuf's defeat in June 1882 was that two of the Black
regiments were sent up to Khartoum, and as their allegiance to the
Government was already shaken, their presence, as Gordon apprehended,
was calculated to aggravate rather than to improve the situation.

Matters remained very much in this state until the Mahdi's capture of
the important town of El Obeid. Notwithstanding the presence within
the walls of an element favourable to the Mahdi, the Commandant, Said
Pasha, made a valiant and protracted defence. He successfully repelled
all the Mahdi's attempts to take the place by storm, but he had to
succumb to famine after all the privations of a five months' siege. If
there had been other men like Said Pasha, especially at Khartoum, the
power of the Mahdi would never have risen to the height it attained.
The capture of an important place like El Obeid did more for the
spread of the Mahdi's reputation and power than the several victories
he had gained in the field. This important event took place in January
1883. Abd-el-Kader was then removed from the Governor-Generalship, and
a successor found in Alla-ed-din, a man of supposed energy and
resource. More than that, an English officer--Colonel Hicks--was given
the military command, and it was decided to despatch an expedition of
sufficient strength, as it was thought, to crush the Mahdi at one
blow.

The preparations for this fresh advance against the Mahdi were made
with care, and on an extensive scale. Several regiments were sent from
Egypt, and in the spring of the year a permanent camp was established
for their accommodation at Omdurman, on the western bank of the Nile,
opposite Khartoum. Here, by the end of June 1883, was assembled a
force officially computed to number 7000 infantry, 120 cuirassiers,
300 irregular cavalry, and not fewer than 30 pieces of artillery,
including rockets and mortars. Colonel Hicks was given the nominal
command, several English and other European officers were appointed
to serve under him, and the Khedive specially ordered the
Governor-General to accompany the expedition that was to put an end to
the Mahdi's triumph. Such was the interest, and, it may be added,
confidence, felt in the expedition, that two special correspondents,
one of whom was Edmond O'Donovan, who had made himself famous a few
years earlier by reaching the Turcoman stronghold of Merv, were
ordered to accompany it, and report its achievements.

The Mahdi learnt in good time of the extensive preparations being made
for this expedition, but he was not dismayed, because all the fighting
tribes of Kordofan, Bahr Gazelle, and Darfour were now at his back,
and he knew that he could count on the devotion of 100,000 fanatical
warriors. Still, he and his henchman Abdullah, who supplied the
military brains to the cause, were not disposed to throw away a
chance, and the threatening appearance of the Egyptian military
preparations led them to conceive the really brilliant idea of
stirring up trouble in the rear of Khartoum. For this purpose a man
of extraordinary energy and influence was ready to their hand in Osman
Digma, a slave-dealer of Souakim, who might truly be called the Zebehr
of the Eastern Soudan. This man hastened to Souakim as the delegate of
the Mahdi, from whom he brought special proclamations, calling on the
tribes to rise for a Holy War. Although this move subsequently
aggravated the Egyptian position and extended the military triumphs of
the Mahdi, it did not attain the immediate object for which it was
conceived, as the Hicks Expedition set out on its ill-omened march
before Osman had struck a blow.

The power of the Mahdi was at this moment so firmly established, and
his reputation based on the double claim of a divine mission and
military success so high that it may be doubted whether the 10,000
men, of which the Hicks force consisted when the irregulars raised by
the Governor-General had joined it at Duem, would have sufficed to
overcome him even if they had been ably led, and escaped all the
untoward circumstances that first retarded their progress and then
sealed their fate. The plan of campaign was based on a misconception
of the Mahdi's power, and was carried out with utter disregard of
prudence and of the local difficulties to be encountered between the
Nile and El Obeid. But the radical fault of the whole enterprise was a
strategical one. The situation made it prudent and even necessary for
the Government to stand on the defensive, and to abstain from military
expeditions, while the course pursued was to undertake offensive
measures in the manner most calculated to favour the chances of the
Mahdi, and to attack him at the very point where his superiority could
be most certainly shown.

But quite apart from any original error as to the inception of the
campaign, which may fairly be deemed a matter of opinion, there can be
no difference between any two persons who have studied the facts that
the execution of it was completely mismanaged. In the first place the
start of the expedition was delayed, so that the Mahdi got ample
warning of the coming attack. The troops were all in the camp at
Omdurman in June, but they did not reach Duem till September, and a
further delay of two months occurred there before they began their
march towards El Obeid. That interval was chiefly taken up with
disputes between Hicks and his Egyptian colleagues, and it is even
believed that there was much friction between Hicks and his European
lieutenants.

The first radical error committed was the decision to advance on El
Obeid from Duem, because there were no wells on that route, whereas
had the northern route _via_ Gebra and Bara been taken, a certain
supply of water could have been counted on, and still more important,
the co-operation of the powerful Kabbabish tribe, the only one still
hostile to the Mahdi, might have been secured. The second important
error was not less fatal. When the force marched it was accompanied by
6000 camels and a large number of women. Encumbered in its movements
by these useless impedimenta, the force never had any prospect of
success with its active enemy. As it slowly advanced from the Nile it
became with each day's march more hopelessly involved in its own
difficulties, and the astute Mahdi expressly forbade any premature
attack to be made upon an army which he clearly saw was marching to
its doom.

On the 1st November 1883, when the Egyptians were already disheartened
by the want of water, the non-arrival of reinforcements from the
garrisons near the Equator, which the Governor-General had rashly
promised to bring up, and the exhausting nature of their march through
a difficult country, the Mahdi's forces began their attack. Concealed
in the high grass, they were able to pour in a heavy fire on the
conspicuous body of the Egyptians at short range without exposing
themselves. But notwithstanding his heavy losses, Hicks pressed on,
because he knew that his only chance of safety lay in getting out of
the dense cover in which he was at such a hopeless disadvantage. But
this the Mahdi would never permit, and on 4th November, when Hicks had
reached a place called Shekan, he gave the order to his impatient
followers to go in and finish the work they had so well begun. The
Egyptian soldiers seem to have been butchered without resistance. The
Europeans and the Turkish cavalry fought well for a short time, but in
a few minutes they were overpowered by superior numbers. Of the whole
force of 10,000 men, only a few individuals escaped by some special
stroke of fortune, for nearly the whole of the 300 prisoners taken
were subsequently executed. Such was the complete and appalling
character of the destruction of Hicks's army, which seemed to shatter
at a single blow the whole fabric of the Khedive's power in the
Soudan, and rivetted the attention of Europe on that particular
quarter of the Dark Continent.

The consequences of that decisive success, which became known in
London three weeks after it happened, were immediate throughout the
region wherein it occurred. Many Egyptian garrisons, which had been
holding out in the hope of succour through the force that Hicks Pasha
was bringing from Khartoum, abandoned hope after its destruction at
Shekan, and thought only of coming to terms with the conqueror. Among
these was the force at Dara in Darfour under the command of Slatin
Pasha. That able officer had held the place for months under the
greatest difficulty, and had even obtained some slight successes in
the field, but the fate of the Hicks expedition convinced him that the
situation was hopeless, and that his duty to the brave troops under
him required the acceptance of the honourable terms which his tact and
reputation enabled him to secure at the hands of the conqueror. Slatin
surrendered on 23rd December 1883; Lupton Bey, commander in the Bahr
Gazelle, about the same time, and these successes were enhanced and
extended by those achieved by Osman Digma in the Eastern Soudan,
where, early in February 1884, while Gordon was on his way to
Khartoum, that leader inflicted on Baker Pasha at Tokar a defeat
scarcely less crushing than that of Shekan.

By New Year's Day, 1884, therefore, the power of the Mahdi was
triumphantly established over the whole extent of the Soudan, from the
Equator to Souakim, with the exception of Khartoum and the middle
course of the Nile from that place to Dongola. There were also some
outlying garrisons, such as that at Kassala, but the principal
Egyptian force remaining was the body of 4000 so-called troops, the
less efficient part, we may be sure, of those available, left behind
at Khartoum, under Colonel de Coetlogon, by Hicks Pasha, when he set
out on his unfortunate expedition. If the power of the Mahdi at this
moment were merely to be measured by comparison with the collapse of
authority, courage, and confidence of the titular upholders of the
Khedive's Government, it might be pronounced formidable. It had
sufficed to defeat every hostile effort made against it, and to
practically annihilate all the armies that Egypt could bring into the
field. Its extraordinary success was no doubt due to the incompetency,
over-confidence, and deficient military spirit and knowledge of the
Khedive's commanders and troops. But, while making the fullest
admission on these points, it cannot be disputed that some of the
elements in the Mahdi's power would have made it formidable, even if
the cause of the Government had been more worthily and efficiently
sustained. There is no doubt that, in the first place, he appealed to
races which thought they were overtaxed, and to classes whose only
tangible property had been assailed and diminished by the Anti-Slavery
policy of the Government. Even if it would be going too far to say
that Mahomed Ahmed, the long-looked-for Mahdi, was only a tool in the
hands of secret conspirators pledged to avenge Suleiman, to restore
Zebehr, and to bring back the good old times, when a fortune lay in
the easy acquisition of human ivory, there is no doubt that the
backbone of his power was provided by those followers of Suleiman,
whom Gordon had broken up at Shaka and driven from Dara. But the
Mahdi had supplied them in religious fanaticism with a more powerful
incentive than pecuniary gain, and when he showed them how easily they
might triumph over their opponents, he inspired them with a confidence
which has not yet lost its efficacy.

In 1884 all these inducements for the tribes of the Soudan to believe
in their religious leader were in their pristine strength. He had
succeeded in every thing he undertook, he had armed his countless
warriors with the weapons taken from the armies he had destroyed, and
he had placed at the disposal of his supporters an immense and
easily-acquired spoil. The later experiences of the Mahdists were to
be neither so pleasant nor so profitable, but at the end of 1883 they
were at the height of their confidence and power. It was at such a
moment and against such a powerful adversary that the British
Government thought it right to take advantage of the devotion and
gallantry of a single man, to send him alone to grapple with a
difficulty which several armies had, by their own failure and
destruction, rendered more grave, at the same time that they
established the formidable nature of the rebellion in the Soudan as an
unimpeachable fact instead of a disputable opinion. I do not think his
own countrymen have yet quite appreciated the extraordinary heroism
and devotion to his country which Gordon showed when he rushed off
single-handed to oppose the ever-victorious Mahdi at the very zenith
of his power.

In unrolling the scroll of events connected with an intricate history,
it next becomes necessary to explain why Gordon voluntarily, and it
may even be admitted, enthusiastically, undertook a mission that, to
any man in his senses, must have seemed at the moment at which it was
undertaken little short of insanity. Whatever else may be said against
the Government and the military authorities who suggested his going,
and availed themselves of his readiness to go, to Khartoum, I do not
think there is the shadow of a justification for the allegation that
they forced him to proceed on that romantic errand, although of course
it is equally clear that he insisted as the condition of his going at
all that he should be ordered by his Government to proceed on this
mission. Beyond this vital principle, which he held to all his life in
never volunteering, he was far too eager to go himself to require any
real stirring-up or compulsion. It was even a secret and unexpressed
grievance that he should not be called upon to hasten to the spot,
which had always been in his thoughts since the time he had left it.
He could think of nothing else; in the midst of other work he would
turn aside to discuss the affairs of Egypt and the Soudan as paramount
to every other consideration; and when a great mission, like that to
the Congo, which he could have made a turning-point in African
history, was placed in his hands, he could only ask for "a respite,"
and, with the charm of the Sphinx strong upon him, rushed on his fate
in a chivalrous determination to essay the impossible. But was it
right or justifiable that wise politicians and experienced generals
should take advantage of such enthusiasm and self-sacrifice, and let
one man go unaided to achieve what thousands had failed to do?

It is necessary to establish clearly in the first place, and beyond
dispute, the frame of mind which induced Gordon to take up his last
Nile mission in precisely the confiding manner that he did. Gordon
left Egypt at the end of 1879. Although events there in 1880 were of
interest and importance, Gordon was too much occupied in India and
China to say anything, but in October 1881 he drew up an important
memorandum on affairs in Egypt since the deposition of Ismail. Gordon
gave it to me specially for publication, and it duly appeared in _The
Times_, but its historical interest is that it shows how Gordon's
thoughts were still running on the affairs of the country in which he
had served so long. The following is the full text:--

     "On the 16th of August 1879, the Firman installing Tewfik as
     Khedive was published in Cairo. From the 26th of June 1879, when
     Ismail was deposed, to this date, Cherif Pasha remained Prime
     Minister; he had been appointed on the dismissal of the
     Rivers-Wilson and de Blignières Ministry in May. Between June and
     August Cherif had been working with the view of securing to the
     country a representative form of government, and had only a short
     time before August 16 laid his proposition before Tewfik.
     Cherif's idea was that, the representation being in the hands of
     the people, there would be more chance of Egypt maintaining her
     independence than if the Government was a personal one. It will
     be remembered that, though many states have repudiated their
     debts, no other ruler of those states was considered responsible
     except in the case of Ismail of Egypt. Europe considered Ismail
     responsible personally. She did not consider the rulers of
     Turkey, Greece, Spain, etc., responsible, so that Cherif was
     quite justified in his proposition. Cherif has been unjustly
     considered opposed to any reform. This is not so. Certainly he
     had shown his independence in refusing to acknowledge
     Rivers-Wilson as his superior, preferring to give up his position
     to doing so, but he knew well that reform was necessary, and had
     always advised it. Cherif is perhaps the only Egyptian Minister
     whose character for strict integrity is unimpeachable.

     "A thoroughly independent man, caring but little for office or
     its emoluments, of a good family, with antecedents which would
     bear any investigation, he was not inclined to be questioned by
     men whose social position was inferior to his own, and whose
     _parti pris_ was against him. In the Council Chamber he was in a
     minority because he spoke his mind; but this was not so with
     other Ministers, whose antecedents were dubious. Had his advice
     been taken, Ismail would have now been Khedive of Egypt. Any one
     who knows Cherif will agree to this account of him, and will rate
     him as infinitely superior to his other colleagues. He is
     essentially not an intriguer.

     "To return, immediately after the promulgation of the Firman on
     August 16, Tewfik dismisses suddenly Cherif, and the European
     Press considers he has done a bold thing, and, misjudging Cherif,
     praise him for having broken with the advisers who caused the
     ruin of Ismail. My opinion is that Tewfik feared Cherif's
     proposition as being likely to curtail his power as absolute
     ruler, and that he judged that he would by this dismissal gain
     _kudos_ in Europe, and protect his absolute power.

     "After a time Riaz is appointed in Cherif's place, and then
     Tewfik begins his career. He concedes this and that to European
     desires, but in so doing claims for his youth and inexperience
     exemption from any reform which would take from his absolute
     power. Knowing that it was the bondholders who upset his father
     he conciliates them; they in their turn leave him to act as he
     wished with regard to the internal government of the country.
     Riaz was so placed as to be between two influences--one, the
     bondholders seeking their advantages; the other, Tewfik, seeking
     to retain all power. Riaz of course wavers. Knowing better than
     Tewfik the feeling of Europe, he inclines more to the bondholders
     than to Tewfik, to whom, however, he is bound to give some sops,
     such as the Universal Military Service Bill, which the
     bondholders let pass without a word, and which is the root of the
     present troubles. After a time Tewfik finds that Riaz will give
     no more sops, for the simple reason he dares not. Then Tewfik
     finds him _de trop_, and by working up the military element
     endeavours to counterbalance him. The European Powers manage to
     keep the peace for a time, but eventually the military become too
     strong for even Tewfik, who had conjured them up, and taking
     things into their own hands upset Riaz, which Tewfik is glad of,
     and demand a Constitution, which Tewfik is not glad of. Cherif
     then returns, and it is to be hoped will get for the people what
     he demanded before his dismissal.

     "It is against all reason to expect any straightforward dealings
     in any Sultan, Khedive, or Ameer; the only hope is in the people
     they govern, and the raising of the people should be our object.

     "There is no real loyalty towards the descendants of the Sandjak
     of Salonica in Egypt; the people are Arabs, they are Greeks. The
     people care for themselves. It is reiterated over and over again
     that Egypt is prosperous and contented. I do not think it has
     altered at all, except in improving its finances for the benefit
     of the bondholders. The army may be paid regularly, but the lot
     of the fellaheen and inhabitants of the Soudan is the same
     oppressed lot as before. The prisons are as full of unfortunates
     as ever they were, the local tribunals are as corrupt, and Tewfik
     will always oppose their being affiliated to the mixed tribunals
     of Alexandria, and thus afford protection to the judges of the
     local tribunals, should they adjudicate justly. Tewfik is
     essentially one of the Ameer class. I believe he would be willing
     to act uprightly, if by so doing he could maintain his absolute
     power. He has played a difficult game, making stock of his fear
     of his father and of Halim, the legitimate heir according to the
     Moslem, to induce the European Governments to be gentle with him,
     at the same time resisting all measures which would benefit his
     people should these measures touch his absolute power. He is
     liberal only in measures which do not interfere with his
     prerogative.

     "It was inevitable that the present sort of trouble should arise.
     The Controllers had got the finances in good order, and were
     bound to look to the welfare of the people, which could only be
     done by the curtailment of Tewfik's power. The present
     arrangement of Controllers and Consul-Generals is defective. The
     Consul-Generals are charged with the duty of seeing that the
     country is quiet and the people well treated. They are
     responsible to their Foreign Offices. The Controllers are charged
     with the finances and the welfare of the country, but to whom
     are they responsible? Not to Tewfik; though he pays them, he
     cannot remove them; yet they must get on well with him. Not to
     the Foreign Office, for it is repeatedly said that they are
     Egyptian officials, yet they have to keep on good terms with
     these Foreign Offices. Not to the bondholders, though they are
     bound, considering their power, to be on good terms with them.
     Not to the inhabitants of Egypt, though these latter are taught
     to believe that every unpopular act is done by the Controllers'
     advice.

     "The only remedy is by the formation of a Council of Notables,
     having direct access to Tewfik, and independent of his or of the
     Ministers' goodwill, and the subjection of the Controllers to the
     Consul-Generals responsible to the Foreign Office--in fact,
     Residents at the Court. This would be no innovation, for the
     supervision exists now, except under the Controllers and
     Consul-Generals. It is simply proposed to amalgamate Controllers
     with Consul-Generals, and to give these latter the position of
     Residents. By this means the continual change of French
     Consul-Generals would be avoided, and the consequent ill-feeling
     between France and England would disappear. Should the Residents
     fall out, the matter would be easily settled by the Governments.
     As it is at present, a quadruple combat goes on; sometimes it is
     one Consul-General against the other Consul-General, aided by the
     two Controllers, or a Consul-General and one Controller against
     the other Consul-General and the other Controller, in all of
     which combats Tewfik gains and the people lose.

     "One thing should certainly be done--the giving of concessions
     ought not to be in the power of Controllers, nor if
     Consul-Generals are amalgamated with Controllers as Residents
     should these Residents have this power. It ought to be exercised
     by the Council of Notables, who would look to the welfare of the
     people."

The progress of events in Lower Egypt during 1881 and 1882 was watched
with great care, whether he was vegetating in the Mauritius or
absorbed in the anxieties and labours of his South African mission.
Commenting on the downfall of Arabi, he explained how the despatch of
troops to the Soudan, composed of regiments tainted with a spirit of
insubordination, would inevitably aggravate the situation there. Later
on, in 1883, when he heard of Hicks being sent to take the command and
repair the defeat of Yusuf, he wrote:--"Unless Hicks is given supreme
command he is lost; it can never work putting him in a subordinate
position. Hicks must be made Governor-General, otherwise he will never
end things satisfactorily." At the same time, he came to the
conclusion that there was only one man who could save Egypt, and that
was Nubar Pasha. He wrote:--"If they do not make Nubar Pasha Prime
Minister or Regent in Egypt they will have trouble, as he is the only
man who can rule that country." This testimony to Nubar's capacity is
the more remarkable and creditable, as in earlier days Gordon had not
appreciated the merit of a statesman who has done more for Egypt than
any other of his generation. But at a very early stage of the Soudan
troubles Gordon convinced himself that the radical cause of these
difficulties and misfortunes was not the shortcomings and errors of
any particular subordinate, but the complete want of a definite policy
on the part, not of the Khedive and his advisers, but of the British
Government itself. He wrote on this point to a friend (2nd September
1883), almost the day that Hicks was to march from Khartoum:--

     "Her Majesty's Government, right or wrong, will not take a
     decided step _in re_ Egypt and the Soudan; they drift, but at the
     same time cannot avoid the _onus_ of being the real power in
     Egypt, with the corresponding advantage of being so. It is
     undoubtedly the fact that they maintain Tewfik and the Pashas in
     power against the will of the people; this alone is insufferable
     from disgusting the people, to whom also Her Majesty's Government
     have given no inducement to make themselves popular. Their
     present action is a dangerous one, for without any advantage over
     the Canal or to England, they keep a running sore open with
     France, and are acting in a way which will justify Russia to act
     in a similar way in Armenia, and Austria in Salonica. Further
     than that, Her Majesty's Government must eventually gain the
     odium which will fall upon them when the interest of the debt
     fails to be paid, which will soon be the case. Also, Her
     Majesty's Government cannot possibly avoid the responsibility for
     the state of affairs in the Soudan, where a wretched war drags on
     in a ruined country at a cost of half a million per annum at
     least. I say therefore to avoid all this, _if Her Majesty's
     Government will not act firmly and strongly and take the country_
     (which, if I were they, I would not do), let them attempt to get
     the Palestine Canal made, and quit Egypt to work out its own
     salvation. In doing so lots of anarchy will take place. This
     anarchy is inseparable from a peaceful solution; it is the
     travail in birth. Her Majesty's Government do not prevent anarchy
     now; therefore better leave the country, and thus avoid a
     responsibility which gives no advantage, and is mean and
     dangerous."

In a letter to myself, dated 3rd January 1884, from Brussels, he
enters into some detail on matters that had been forgotten or were
insufficiently appreciated, to which the reported appointment of
Zebehr to proceed to the Soudan and stem the Mahdi's advance lent
special interest:--

     "I send you a small note which you can make use of, but I beg you
     will not let my name appear under any circumstances. When in
     London I had printed a pamphlet in Arabic, with all the papers
     (official) concerning Zebehr Pasha and his action in pushing his
     son to rebel. It is in Arabic. My brother has it. It is not long,
     and would repay translating and publishing. It has all the
     history and the authentic letters found in the divan of Zebehr's
     son when Gessi took his stockade. It is in a cover, blue and
     gold. It was my address to people of Soudan--Apologia. Isaiah
     XIX. 19, 20, 21 has a wonderful prophecy about Egypt and the
     saviour who will come from the frontier."

The note enclosed was published in _The Times_ of 5th January, and
read as follows:--

     "A correspondent writes that it may seem inexplicable why the
     Mahdi's troops attacked Gezireh, which, as its name signifies, is
     an isle near Berber, but there is an old tradition that the
     future ruler of the Soudan will be from that isle. Zebehr Rahama
     knew this, but he fell on leaving his boat at this isle, and so,
     though the Soudan people looked on him as a likely saviour, this
     omen shook their confidence in him. He was then on his way to
     Cairo after swearing his people to rebel (if he was retained
     there), under a tree at Shaka. Zebehr will most probably be taken
     prisoner by the Mahdi, and will then take the command of the
     Mahdi's forces. The peoples of the Soudan are very superstitious,
     and the fall of the flag by a gust of wind, on the proclamation
     of Tewfik at Khartoum, was looked on as an omen of the end of
     Mehemet Ali's dynasty. There is an old tree opposite Cook's
     office at Jerusalem in Toppet, belonging to an old family, and
     protected by Sultan's Firman, which the Arabs consider will fall
     when the Sultan's rule ends. It lost a large limb during the
     Turco-Russian war, and is now in a decayed state. There can be no
     doubt but that the movement will spread into Palestine, Syria,
     and Hedjaz. At Damascus already proclamations have been posted
     up, denouncing Turks and Circassians, and this was before Hicks
     was defeated. It is the beginning of the end of Turkey. Austria
     backed by Germany will go to Salonica, quieting Russia by letting
     her go into Armenia--England and France neutralising one another.

     "If not too late, the return of the ex-Khedive Ismail to Egypt,
     and the union of England and France to support and control the
     Arab movement, appears the only chance. Ismail would soon come to
     terms with the Soudan, the rebellion of which countries was
     entirely due to the oppression of the Turks and Circassians."

These expressions of opinion about Egypt and the Soudan may be said to
have culminated in the remarkable pronouncement Gordon made to Mr W.
T. Stead, the brilliant editor of the _Pall Mall Gazette_, on 8th
January 1884, which appeared in his paper on the following day. The
substance of that statement is as follows:--

     "So you would abandon the Soudan? But the Eastern Soudan is
     indispensable to Egypt. It will cost you far more to retain your
     hold upon Egypt proper if you abandon your hold of the Eastern
     Soudan to the Mahdi or to the Turk than what it would to retain
     your hold upon Eastern Soudan by the aid of such material as
     exists in the provinces. Darfour and Kordofan must be abandoned.
     That I admit; but the provinces lying to the east of the White
     Nile should be retained, and north of Sennaar. The danger to be
     feared is not that the Mahdi will march northward through Wady
     Halfa; on the contrary, it is very improbable that he will ever
     go so far north. The danger is altogether of a different nature.
     It arises from the influence which the spectacle of a conquering
     Mahommedan Power established close to your frontiers will
     exercise upon the population which you govern. In all the cities
     in Egypt it will be felt that what the Mahdi has done they may
     do; and, as he has driven out the intruder and the infidel, they
     may do the same. Nor is it only England that has to face this
     danger. The success of the Mahdi has already excited dangerous
     fermentation in Arabia and Syria. Placards have been posted in
     Damascus calling upon the population to rise and drive out the
     Turks. If the whole of the Eastern Soudan is surrendered to the
     Mahdi, the Arab tribes on both sides of the Red Sea will take
     fire. In self-defence the Turks are bound to do something to cope
     with so formidable a danger, for it is quite possible that if
     nothing is done the whole of the Eastern Question may be reopened
     by the triumph of the Mahdi. I see it is proposed to fortify Wady
     Halfa, and prepare there to resist the Mahdi's attack. You might
     as well fortify against a fever. Contagion of that kind cannot be
     kept out by fortifications and garrisons. But that it is real,
     and that it does exist, will be denied by no one cognisant with
     Egypt and the East. In self-defence the policy of evacuation
     cannot possibly be justified.

     "There is another aspect of the question. You have 6000 men in
     Khartoum. What are you going to do with them? You have garrisons
     in Darfour, in Bahr el Gazelle, and Gondokoro. Are they to be
     sacrificed? Their only offence is their loyalty to their
     Sovereign. For their fidelity you are going to abandon them to
     their fate. You say they are to retire upon Wady Halfa. But
     Gondokoro is 1500 miles from Khartoum, and Khartoum is only 350
     from Wady Halfa. How will you move your 6000 men from
     Khartoum--to say nothing of other places--and all the Europeans
     in that city through the desert to Wady Halfa? Where are you
     going to get the camels to take them away? Will the Mahdi supply
     them? If they are to escape with their lives, the garrison will
     not be allowed to leave with a coat on their backs. They will be
     plundered to the skin, and even then their lives may not be
     spared. Whatever you may decide about evacuation, you cannot
     evacuate, because your army cannot be moved. You must either
     surrender absolutely to the Mahdi or defend Khartoum at all
     hazards. The latter is the only course which ought to be
     entertained. There is no serious difficulty about it. The Mahdi's
     forces will fall to pieces of themselves; but if in a moment of
     panic orders are issued for the abandonment of the whole of the
     Eastern Soudan, a blow will be struck against the security of
     Egypt and the peace of the East, which may have fatal
     consequences.

     "The great evil is not at Khartoum, but at Cairo. It is the
     weakness of Cairo which produces disaster in the Soudan. It is
     because Hicks was not adequately supported at the first, but was
     thrust forward upon an impossible enterprise by the men who had
     refused him supplies when a decisive blow might have been struck,
     that the Western Soudan has been sacrificed. The Eastern Soudan
     may, however, be saved if there is a firm hand placed at the helm
     in Egypt. Everything depends on that.

     "What then, you ask, should be done? I reply, Place Nubar in
     power! Nubar is the one supremely able man among Egyptian
     Ministers. He is proof against foreign intrigue, and he
     thoroughly understands the situation. Place him in power; support
     him through thick and thin; give him a free hand; and let it be
     distinctly understood that no intrigues, either on the part of
     Tewfik or any of Nubar's rivals, will be allowed for a moment to
     interfere with the execution of his plans. You are sure to find
     that the energetic support of Nubar will, sooner or later, bring
     you into collision with the Khedive; but if that Sovereign really
     desires, as he says, the welfare of his country, it will be
     necessary for you to protect Nubar's Administration from any
     direct or indirect interference on his part. Nubar can be
     depended upon: that I can guarantee. He will not take office
     without knowing that he is to have his own way; but if he takes
     office, it is the best security that you can have for the
     restoration of order to the country. Especially is this the case
     with the Soudan. Nubar should be left untrammelled by any
     stipulations concerning the evacuation of Khartoum. There is no
     hurry. The garrisons can hold their own at present. Let them
     continue to hold on until disunion and tribal jealousies have
     worked their natural results in the camp of the Mahdi. Nubar
     should be free to deal with the Soudan in his own way. How he
     will deal with the Soudan, of course, I cannot profess to say;
     but I should imagine that he would appoint a Governor-General at
     Khartoum, with full powers, and furnish him with two millions
     sterling--a large sum, no doubt, but a sum which had much better
     be spent now than wasted in a vain attempt to avert the
     consequences of an ill-timed surrender. Sir Samuel Baker, who
     possesses the essential energy and single tongue requisite for
     the office, might be appointed Governor-General of the Soudan,
     and he might take his brother as Commander-in-Chief.

     "It should be proclaimed in the hearing of all the Soudanese, and
     engraved on tablets of brass, that a permanent Constitution was
     granted to the Soudanese, by which no Turk or Circassian would
     ever be allowed to enter the province to plunder its inhabitants
     in order to fill his own pockets, and that no immediate
     emancipation of slaves would be attempted. Immediate emancipation
     was denounced in 1833 as confiscation in England, and it is no
     less confiscation in the Soudan to-day. Whatever is done in that
     direction should be done gradually, and by a process of
     registration. Mixed tribunals might be established, if Nubar
     thought fit, in which European judges would co-operate with the
     natives in the administration of justice. Police inspectors also
     might be appointed, and adequate measures taken to root out the
     abuses which prevail in the prisons.

     "With regard to Darfour, I should think that Nubar would probably
     send back the family and the heir of the Sultan of Darfour. If
     subsidized by the Government, and sent back with Sir Samuel
     Baker, he would not have much difficulty in regaining possession
     of the kingdom of Darfour, which was formerly one of the best
     governed of African countries. As regards Abyssinia, the old
     warning should not be lost sight of--"Put not your trust in
     princes"; and place no reliance upon the King of Abyssinia, at
     least outside his own country. Zeylah and Bogos might be ceded to
     him with advantage, and the free right of entry by the port of
     Massowah might be added; but it would be a mistake to give him
     possession of Massowah which he would ruin. A Commission might
     also be sent down with advantage to examine the state of things
     in Harrar, opposite Aden, and see what iniquities are going on
     there, as also at Berbera and Zeylah. By these means, and by the
     adoption of a steady, consistent policy at headquarters, it would
     be possible--not to say easy--to re-establish the authority of
     the Khedive between the Red Sea and Sennaar.

     "As to the cost of the Soudan, it is a mistake to suppose that it
     will necessarily be a charge on the Egyptian Exchequer. It will
     cost two millions to relieve the garrisons and to quell the
     revolt; but that expenditure must be incurred any way; and in all
     probability, if the garrisons are handed over to be massacred and
     the country evacuated, the ultimate expenditure would exceed that
     sum. At first, until the country is pacified, the Soudan will
     need a subsidy of £200,000 a year from Egypt. That, however,
     would be temporary. During the last years of my administration
     the Soudan involved no charge upon the Egyptian Exchequer. The
     bad provinces were balanced against the good, and an equilibrium
     was established. The Soudan will never be a source of revenue to
     Egypt, but it need not be a source of expense. That deficits have
     arisen, and that the present disaster has occurred, is entirely
     attributable to a single cause, and that is, the grossest
     misgovernment.

     "The cause of the rising in the Soudan is the cause of all
     popular risings against Turkish rule, wherever they have
     occurred. No one who has been in a Turkish province, and has
     witnessed the results of the Bashi-Bazouk system, which excited
     so much indignation some time ago in Bulgaria, will need to be
     told why the people of the Soudan have risen in revolt against
     the Khedive. The Turks, the Circassians, and the Bashi-Bazouks
     have plundered and oppressed the people in the Soudan, as they
     plundered and oppressed them in the Balkan peninsula. Oppression
     begat discontent; discontent necessitated an increase of the
     armed force at the disposal of the authorities; this increase of
     the army force involved an increase of expenditure, which again
     was attempted to be met by increasing taxation, and that still
     further increased the discontent. And so things went on in a
     dismal circle, until they culminated, after repeated deficits, in
     a disastrous rebellion. That the people were justified in
     rebelling, nobody who knows the treatment to which they were
     subjected will attempt to deny. Their cries were absolutely
     unheeded at Cairo. In despair, they had recourse to the only
     method by which they could make their wrongs known; and, on the
     same principle that Absalom fired the corn of Joab, so they
     rallied round the Mahdi, who exhorted them to revolt against the
     Turkish yoke. I am convinced that it is an entire mistake to
     regard the Mahdi as in any sense a religious leader: he
     personifies popular discontent. All the Soudanese are potential
     Mahdis, just as all the Egyptians are potential Arabis. The
     movement is not religious, but an outbreak of despair. Three
     times over I warned the late Khedive that it would be impossible
     to govern the Soudan on the old system, after my appointment to
     the Governor-Generalship. During the three years that I wielded
     full powers in the Soudan, I taught the natives that they had a
     right to exist. I waged war against the Turks and Circassians,
     who had harried the population. I had taught them something of
     the meaning of liberty and justice, and accustomed them to a
     higher ideal of government than that with which they had
     previously been acquainted. As soon as I had gone, the Turks and
     Circassians returned in full force; the old Bashi-Bazouk system
     was re-established; my old _employés_ were persecuted; and a
     population which had begun to appreciate something like decent
     government was flung back to suffer the worst excesses of Turkish
     rule. The inevitable result followed; and thus it may be said
     that the egg of the present rebellion was laid in the three years
     during which I was allowed to govern the Soudan on other than
     Turkish principles.

     "The Soudanese are a very nice people. They deserve the sincere
     compassion and sympathy of all civilised men. I got on very well
     with them, and I am sincerely sorry at the prospect of seeing
     them handed over to be ground down once more by their Turkish and
     Circassian oppressors. Yet, unless an attempt is made to hold on
     to the present garrisons, it is inevitable that the Turks, for
     the sake of self-preservation, must attempt to crush them. They
     deserve a better fate. It ought not to be impossible to come to
     terms with them, to grant them a free amnesty for the past, to
     offer them security for decent government in the future. If this
     were done, and the government entrusted to a man whose word was
     truth, all might yet be re-established. So far from believing it
     impossible to make an arrangement with the Mahdi, I strongly
     suspect that he is a mere puppet, put forward by Elias, Zebehr's
     father-in-law, and the largest slave-owner in Obeid, and that he
     had assumed a religious title to give colour to his defence of
     the popular rights.

     "There is one subject on which I cannot imagine any one can
     differ about. That is the impolicy of announcing our intention to
     evacuate Khartoum. Even if we were bound to do so we should have
     said nothing about it. The moment it is known that we have given
     up the game, every man will go over to the Mahdi. All men worship
     the rising sun. The difficulties of evacuation will be enormously
     increased, if, indeed, the withdrawal of our garrison is not
     rendered impossible.

     "The late Khedive, who is one of the ablest and worst-used men in
     Europe, would not have made such a mistake, and under him the
     condition of Egypt proper was much better than it is to-day. Now,
     with regard to Egypt, the same principle should be observed that
     must be acted upon in the Soudan. Let your foundations be broad
     and firm, and based upon the contentment and welfare of the
     people. Hitherto, both in the Soudan and in Egypt, instead of
     constructing the social edifice like a pyramid, upon its base, we
     have been rearing an obelisk which a single push may overturn.
     Our safety in Egypt is to do something for the people. That is to
     say, you must reduce their rent, rescue them from the usurers,
     and retrench expenditure. Nine-tenths of the European _employés_
     might probably be weeded out with advantage. The remaining
     tenth--thoroughly efficient--should be retained; but, whatever
     you do, do not break up Sir Evelyn Wood's army, which is destined
     to do good work. Stiffen it as much as you please, but with
     Englishmen, not with Circassians. Circassians are as much
     foreigners in Egypt as Englishmen are, and certainly not more
     popular. As for the European population, let them have charters
     for the formation of municipal councils, for raising volunteer
     corps, and for organising in their own defence. Anything more
     shameful than the flight from Egypt in 1882 I never read. Let
     them take an example from Shanghai, where the European settlement
     provides for its own defence and its own government. I should
     like to see a competent special Commissioner of the highest
     standing--such a man, for instance, as the Right Honourable W. E.
     Forster, who is free at once from traditions of the elders and of
     the Foreign Office and of the bondholders, sent out to put Nubar
     in the saddle, sift out unnecessary _employés_, and warn
     evil-doers in the highest places that they will not be allowed to
     play any tricks. If that were done, it would give confidence
     everywhere, and I see no reason why the last British soldier
     should not be withdrawn from Egypt in six months' time."

A perusal of these passages will suffice to show the reader what
thoughts were uppermost in Gordon's mind at the very moment when he
was negotiating about his new task for the King of the Belgians on the
Congo, and those thoughts, inspired by the enthusiasm derived from his
noble spirit, and the perfect self-sacrifice with which he would have
thrown himself into what he conceived to be a good and necessary work,
made him the ready victim of a Government which absolutely did not
know what course to pursue, and which was delighted to find that the
very man, whom the public designated as the right man for the
situation, was ready--nay, eager--to take all the burden on his
shoulders whenever his own Government called on him to do so, and to
proceed straight to the scene of danger without so much as asking for
precise instructions, or insisting on guarantees for his own proper
treatment. There is no doubt that from his own individual point of
view, and as affecting any selfish or personal consideration he had at
heart, this mode of action was very unwise and reprehensible, and a
worldly censure would be the more severe on Gordon, because he acted
with his eyes open, and knew that the gravity of the trouble really
arose from the drifting policy and want of purpose of the very
Ministers for whom he was about to dare a danger that Gordon himself,
in a cooler moment, would very likely have deemed it unnecessary to
face.

Into the motives that filled him with a belief that he might inspire a
Government, which had no policy, with one created by his own courage,
confidence, and success, it would be impossible to enter, but it can
be confidently asserted that, although they were drawn after him _sed
pede claudo_ to expend millions of treasure and thousands of lives,
they were never inspired by his exhortations and example to form a
definite policy as to the main point in the situation, viz., the
defence of the Egyptian possessions. In the flush of the moment,
carried along by an irresistible inclination to do the things which he
saw could be done, he overlooked all the other points of the case, and
especially that he was dealing with politicians tied by their party
principles, and thinking more of the passage through the House of some
domestic measure of fifth-rate importance than of the maintenance of
an Imperial interest and the arrest of an outbreak of Mahommedan
fanaticism which, if not checked, might call for a crusade. Gordon
overlooked all these considerations. He never thought but that he was
dealing with other Englishmen equally mindful with himself of their
country's fame.

If Gordon, long before he took up the task, had been engrossed in the
development of the Soudan difficulty and the Mahdi's power, those who
had studied the question and knew his special qualifications for the
task, had, at a very early stage of the trouble, called upon the
Government to avail themselves of his services, and there is no doubt
that if that advice had been promptly taken instead of slowly,
reluctantly, and only when matters were desperate, there is no doubt,
I repeat, remembering what he did later on, that Gordon would have
been able, without a single English regiment, to have strangled the
Mahdi's power in its infancy, and to have won back the Soudan for the
Khedive.

But it may be said, where was it ever prominently suggested that
General Gordon should be despatched to the Soudan at a time before the
Mahdi had become supreme in that region, as he undoubtedly did by the
overthrow of Hicks and his force?

I reply by the following quotations from prominent articles written by
myself in _The Times_ of January and February 1883. Until the capture
of El Obeid at that period the movement of the Mahdi was a local
affair of the importance of which no one, at a distance, could attempt
to judge, but that signal success made it the immediate concern of
those responsible in Egypt. On 9th January 1883, in an article in _The
Times_ on "The Soudan," occurs this passage:--

     "It is a misfortune, in the interests of Egypt, of civilisation,
     and of the mass of the Soudanese, that we cannot send General
     Gordon back to the region of the Upper Nile to complete there the
     good work he began eight years ago. With full powers, and with
     the assurance that the good fruits of his labours shall not be
     lost by the subsequent acts of corrupt Pashas, there need be
     little doubt of his attaining rapid success, while the memory of
     his achievements, when working for a half-hearted Government,
     and with incapable colleagues, yet lives in the hearts of the
     black people of the Soudan, and fills one of the most creditable
     pages in the history of recent administration of alien races by
     Englishmen."

Again, on 17th February, in another article on the same subject:--

     "The authority of the Mahdi could scarcely be preserved save by
     constant activity and a policy of aggression, which would
     constitute a standing danger to the tranquillity of Lower Egypt.
     On the other hand, the preservation of the Khedive's sovereign
     rights through our instrumentality will carry with it the
     responsibility of providing the unhappy peoples of Darfour,
     Dongola, Kordofan, and the adjacent provinces with an equitable
     administration and immunity from heavy taxation. The obligation
     cannot be avoided under these, or perhaps under any
     circumstances, but the acceptance of it is not a matter to be
     entertained with an easy mind. The one thing that would reconcile
     us to the idea would be the assurance that General Gordon would
     be sent back with plenary powers to the old scene of his labours,
     and that he would accept the charge."

As Gordon was not resorted to when the fall of El Obeid in the early
part of the year 1883 showed that the situation demanded some decisive
step, it is not surprising that he was left in inglorious inaction in
Palestine, while, as I and others knew well, his uppermost thought was
to be grappling with the Mahdi during the long lull of preparing
Hicks's expedition, and of its marching to its fate. The catastrophe
to that force on 4th November was known in London on 22nd November.

I urged in every possible way the prompt employment of General Gordon,
who could have reached Egypt in a very short time from his place of
exile at Jaffa. But on this occasion I was snubbed, being told by one
of the ablest editors I have known, now dead, that "Gordon was
generally considered to be mad." However, at this moment the
Government seem to have come to the conclusion that General Gordon had
some qualifications to undertake the task in the Soudan, for at the
end of November 1883, Sir Charles Dilke, then a member of the Cabinet
as President of the Local Government Board, but whose special
knowledge and experience of foreign affairs often led to his assisting
Lord Granville at the Foreign Office, offered the Egyptian Government
Gordon's services. They were declined, and when, on 1st December 1883,
Lord Granville proposed the same measure in a more formal manner, and
asked in an interrogatory form whether General Charles Gordon would be
of any use, and if so in what capacity, Sir Evelyn Baring, now Lord
Cromer, threw cold water on the project, and stated on 2nd December
that "the Egyptian Government were very much averse to employing him."
Subsequent events make it desirable to call special attention to the
fact that when, however tardily, the British Government did propose
the employment of General Gordon, the suggestion was rejected, not on
public grounds, but on private. Major Baring did not need to be
informed as to the work Gordon had done in the Soudan, and as to the
incomparable manner in which it had been performed. No one knew better
than he that, with the single exception of Sir Samuel Baker, who was
far too prudent to take up a thankless task, and to remove the
mountain of blunders others had committed, there was no man living who
had the smallest pretension to say that he could cope with the Soudan
difficulty, save Charles Gordon. Yet, when his name is suggested, he
treats the matter as one that cannot be entertained. There is not a
word as to the obvious propriety of suggesting Gordon's name, but the
objection of a puppet-prince like Tewfik is reported as fatal to the
course. Yet six weeks, with the mighty lever of an aroused public
opinion, sufficed to make him withdraw the opposition he advanced to
the appointment, not on public grounds, which was simply impossible,
but, I fear, from private feelings, for he had not forgotten the scene
in Cairo in 1878, when he attempted to control the action of Gordon on
the financial question. There would be no necessity to refer to this
matter, but for its consequences. Had Sir Evelyn Baring done his duty,
and given the only honest answer on 2nd December 1883, that if any one
man could save the situation, that man was Charles Gordon, Gordon
could have reached Khartoum early in January instead of late in
February, and that difference of six weeks might well have sufficed to
completely alter the course of subsequent events, and certainly to
save Gordon's life, seeing that, after all, the Nile Expedition was
only a few days too late. The delay was also attended with fatal
results to the civil population of Khartoum. Had Gordon reached there
early in January he could have saved them all, for as it was he sent
down 2600 refugees, i.e. merchants, old men, women, and children,
making all arrangements for their comfort in the very brief period of
open communication after his arrival, when the greater part of
February had been spent.

The conviction that Gordon's appointment and departure were retarded
by personal _animus_ and an old difference is certainly strengthened
by all that follows. Sir Evelyn Baring and the Egyptian Government
would not have Charles Gordon, but they were quite content to entrust
the part of Saviour of the Soudan to Zebehr, the king of the
slave-hunters. On 13th December Lord Granville curtly informed our
representative at Cairo that the employment of Zebehr was inexpedient,
and Gordon in his own forcible way summed the matter up thus: "Zebehr
will manage to get taken prisoner, and will then head the revolt."

But while Sir Evelyn Baring would not have Gordon and the British
Cabinet withheld its approval from Zebehr, it was felt that the
situation required that something should be done as soon as possible,
for the Mahdi was master of the Soudan, and at any moment tidings
might come of his advance on Khartoum, where there was only a small
and disheartened garrison, and a considerable defenceless population.
The responsible Egyptian Ministers made several suggestions for
dealing with the situation, but they one and all deprecated ceding
territory to the Mahdi, as it would further alienate the tribes still
loyal or wavering and create graver trouble in the future. What they
chiefly contended for was the opening of the Berber-Souakim route with
10,000 troops, who should be Turks, as English troops were not
available. It is important to note that this suggestion did not shock
the Liberal Government, and on 13th December 1883 Lord Granville
replied that the Government had no objection to offer to the
employment of Turkish troops at Souakim for service in the Soudan. In
the following month the Foreign Secretary went one step further, and
"concurred in the surrender of the Soudan to the Sultan." In fact the
British Government were only anxious about one thing, and that was to
get rid of the Soudan, and to be saved any further worry in the
matter. No doubt, if the Sultan had had the money to pay for the
despatch of the expedition, this last suggestion would have been
adopted, but as he had not, the only way to get rid of the
responsibility was to thrust it on Gordon, who was soon discovered to
be ready to accept it without delay or conditions.

On 22nd December 1883 Sir Evelyn Baring wrote: "It would be necessary
to send an English officer of high authority to Khartoum with full
powers to withdraw the garrisons, and to make the best arrangements
possible for the future government of the country." News from Khartoum
showed that everything there was in a state verging on panic, that the
people thought they were abandoned by the Government, and that the
enemy had only to advance for the place to fall without a blow. Lastly
Colonel de Coetlogon, the governor after Hicks's death, recommended on
9th January the immediate withdrawal of the garrison from Khartoum,
which he thought could be accomplished if carried out with the
greatest promptitude, but which involved the desertion of the other
garrisons. Abd-el-Kader, ex-Governor-General of the Soudan and
Minister of War, offered to proceed to Khartoum, but when he
discovered that the abandonment of the Soudan was to be proclaimed, he
absolutely refused on any consideration to carry out what he termed a
hopeless errand.

All these circumstances gave special point to Sir Evelyn Baring's
recommendation on 22nd December that "an English officer of high
authority should be sent to Khartoum," and the urgency of a decision
was again impressed on the Government in his telegram of 1st January,
because Egypt is on the point of losing the Soudan, and moreover
possesses no force with which to defend the valley of the Nile
downwards. But in the many messages that were sent on this subject
during the last fortnight of the year 1883, the name of the one
"English officer of high authority" specially suited for the task
finds no mention. As this omission cannot be attributed to ignorance,
some different motive must be discovered. At last, on 10th January,
Lord Granville renews his suggestion to send General Gordon, and asks
whether he would not be of some assistance under the altered
circumstances. The "altered circumstances" must have been inserted for
the purpose of letting down Sir Evelyn Baring as lightly as possible,
for the only alteration in the circumstances was that six weeks had
been wasted in coming to any decision at all. On 11th January Sir
Evelyn Baring replied that he and Nubar Pasha did not think Gordon's
services could be utilised, and yet three weeks before he had
recommended that "an English officer of high authority" should be
sent, and he had even complained because prompter measures were not
taken to give effect to his recommendation. The only possible
conclusion is that, in Sir Evelyn Baring's opinion, General Gordon was
not "an English officer of high authority." As if to make his views
more emphatic, Sir Evelyn Baring on 15th January again telegraphed for
an English officer with the intentional and conspicuous omission of
Gordon's name, which had been three times urged upon him by his own
Government. But determined as Sir Evelyn Baring was that by no act or
word of his should General Gordon be appointed to the Soudan, there
were more powerful influences at work than even his strong will.

The publication of General Gordon's views in the _Pall Mall Gazette_
of 9th January 1884 had roused public opinion to the importance and
urgency of the matter. It had also revealed that there was at least
one man who was not in terror of the Mahdi's power, and who thought
that the situation might still be saved. There is no doubt that that
publication was the direct and immediate cause of Lord Granville's
telegram of 10th January; but Sir Evelyn Baring, unmoved by what
people thought or said at home, coldly replied on 11th January that
Gordon is not the man he wants. If there had been no other
considerations in the matter, I have no doubt that Sir Evelyn Baring
would have beaten public opinion, and carried matters in the high,
dictatorial spirit he had shown since the first mention of Gordon's
name. But he had not made allowance for an embarrassed and purposeless
Government, asking only to be relieved of the whole trouble, and
willing to adopt any suggestion--even to resign its place to "the
unspeakable Turk"--so long as it was no longer worried in the matter.

At that moment Gordon appears on the scene, ready and anxious to
undertake single-handed a task for which others prescribe armies and
millions of money. Public opinion greets him as the man for the
occasion, and certainly he is the man to suit "that" Government. The
only obstruction is Sir Evelyn Baring. Against any other array of
forces his views would have prevailed, but even for him these are too
strong.

On 15th January Gordon saw Lord Wolseley, as described in the last
chapter, and then and there it is discovered and arranged that he will
go to the Soudan, but only at the Government's request, provided the
King of the Belgians will consent to his postponing the fulfilment of
his promise, as Gordon knows he cannot help but do, for it was given
on the express stipulation that the claim of his own country should
always come first. King Leopold, who has behaved throughout with
generosity, and the most kind consideration towards Gordon, is
naturally displeased and upset, but he feels that he cannot restrain
Gordon or insist on the letter of his bond. The Congo Mission is
therefore broken off or suspended, as described in the last chapter.
In the evening of the 15th Lord Granville despatched a telegram to Sir
Evelyn Baring, no longer asking his opinion or advice, but stating
that the Government have determined to send General Gordon to the
Soudan, and that he will start without delay. To that telegram the
British representative could make no demur short of resigning his
post, but at last the grudging admission was wrung from him that
"Gordon would be the best man." This conclusion, to which anyone
conversant with the facts, as Sir Evelyn Baring was, would have come
at once, was therefore only arrived at seven weeks after Sir Charles
Dilke first brought forward Gordon's name as the right person to deal
with the Soudan difficulty. That loss of time was irreparable, and in
the end proved fatal to Gordon himself.

In describing the last mission, betrayal, and death of Gordon, the
heavy responsibility of assigning the just blame to those individuals
who were in a special degree the cause of that hero's fate cannot be
shirked by any writer pretending to record history. Lord Cromer has
filled a difficult post in Egypt for many years with advantage to his
country, but in the matter of General Gordon's last Nile mission he
allowed his personal feelings to obscure his judgment. He knew that
Gordon was a difficult, let it be granted an impossible, colleague;
that he would do things in his own way in defiance of diplomatic
timidity and official rigidity; and that, instead of there being in
the Egyptian firmament the one planet Baring, there would be only the
single sun of Gordon. All these considerations were human, but they
none the less show that he allowed his private feelings, his
resentment at Gordon's treatment of him in 1878, to bias his judgment
in a matter of public moment. It was his opposition alone that
retarded Gordon's departure by seven weeks, and indeed the delay was
longer, as Gordon was then at Jaffa, and that delay, I repeat it
solemnly, cost Gordon his life. Whoever else was to blame afterwards,
the first against whom a verdict of Guilty must be entered, without
any hope of reprieve at the bar of history, was Sir Evelyn Baring, now
Lord Cromer.

Mr Gladstone and his Government are certainly clear of any reflection
in this stage of the matter. They did their best to put forward
General Gordon immediately on the news coming of the Hicks disaster,
and although they might have shown greater determination in compelling
the adoption of their plan, which they were eventually obliged to do,
this was a very venial fault, and not in any serious way blameworthy.
Nor did they ever seek to repudiate their responsibility for sending
Gordon to the Soudan, although a somewhat craven statement by Lord
Granville, in a speech at Shrewsbury in September 1885, to the effect
that "Gordon went to Khartoum at his own request," might seem to infer
that they did. This remark may have been a slip, or an incorrect mode
of saying that Gordon willingly accepted the task given him by the
Government, but Mr Gladstone placed the matter in its true light when
he wrote that "General Gordon went to the Soudan at the request of
H.M.'s Government."

Gordon, accompanied by Lieutenant-Colonel Donald Stewart, an officer
who had visited the Soudan in 1883, and written an able report on it,
left London by the Indian mail of 18th January 1884. The decision to
send Colonel Stewart with him was arrived at only at the very last
moment, and on the platform at Charing Cross Station the acquaintance
of the two men bound together in such a desperate partnership
practically began. It is worth recalling that in that hurried and
stirring scene, when the War Office, with the Duke of Cambridge, had
assembled to see him off, Gordon found time to say to one of Stewart's
nearest relations, "Be sure that he will not go into any danger which
I do not share, and I am sure that when I am in danger he will not be
far behind."

Gordon's journey to Egypt was uneventful, but after the exciting
events that preceded his departure he found the leisure of his
sea-trip from Brindisi beneficial and advantageous, for the purpose of
considering his position and taking stock of the situation he had to
face. By habit and temperament Gordon was a bad emissary to carry out
cut-and-dried instructions, more especially when they related to a
subject upon which he felt very strongly and held pronounced views.
The instructions which the Government gave him were as follows, and I
quote the full text. They were probably not drawn up and in Gordon's
hands more than two hours before he left Charing Cross, and personally
I do not suppose that he had looked through them, much less studied
them. His view of the matter never varied. He went to the Soudan to
rescue the garrisons, and to carry out the evacuation of the province
after providing for its administration. The letter given in the
previous chapter shows how vague and incomplete was the agreement
between himself and Ministers. It was nothing more than the expression
of an idea that the Soudan should be evacuated, but how and under what
conditions was left altogether to the chapter of accidents. At the
start the Government's view of the matter and his presented no glaring
difference. They sent General Gordon to rescue and withdraw the
garrisons if he could do so, and they were also not averse to his
establishing any administration that he chose. But the main point on
which they laid stress was that they were to be no longer troubled in
the affair. Gordon's marvellous qualities were to extricate them from
the difficult position in which the shortcomings of the Egyptian
Government had placed them, and beyond that they had no definite
thought or care as to how the remedy was to be discovered and applied.
The following instructions should be read by the light of these
reflections, which show that, while they nominally started from the
same point, Gordon and the Government were never really in touch, and
had widely different goals in view:--

                              "FOREIGN OFFICE, _January 18th, 1884_.

     "Her Majesty's Government are desirous that you should proceed at
     once to Egypt, to report to them on the military situation in the
     Soudan, and on the measures which it may be advisable to take for
     the security of the Egyptian garrisons still holding positions in
     that country, and for the safety of the European population in
     Khartoum.

     "You are also desired to consider and report upon the best mode
     of effecting the evacuation of the interior of the Soudan, and
     upon the manner in which the safety and the good administration
     by the Egyptian Government of the ports on the sea-coast can best
     be secured.

     "In connection with this subject, you should pay especial
     consideration to the question of the steps that may usefully be
     taken to counteract the stimulus which it is feared may possibly
     be given to the Slave Trade by the present insurrectionary
     movement and by the withdrawal of the Egyptian authority from the
     interior.

     "You will be under the instructions of Her Majesty's Agent and
     Consul-General at Cairo, through whom your Reports to Her
     Majesty's Government should be sent, under flying seal.

     "You will consider yourself authorized and instructed to perform
     such other duties as the Egyptian Government may desire to
     entrust to you, and as may be communicated to you by Sir E.
     Baring. You will be accompanied by Colonel Stewart, who will
     assist you in the duties thus confided to you.

     "On your arrival in Egypt you will at once communicate with Sir
     E. Baring, who will arrange to meet you, and will settle with you
     whether you should proceed direct to Suakin, or should go
     yourself or despatch Colonel Stewart to Khartoum _viâ_ the Nile."

General Gordon had not got very far on his journey before he began to
see that there were points on which it would be better for him to know
the Government's mind and to state his own. Neither at this time nor
throughout the whole term of his stay at Khartoum did Gordon attempt
to override the main decision of the Government policy, viz. to
evacuate the Soudan, although he left plenty of documentary evidence
to show that this was not his policy or opinion. Moreover, his own
policy had been well set forth in the _Pall Mall Gazette_, and might
be summed up in the necessity to keep the Eastern Soudan, and the
impossibility of fortifying Lower Egypt against the advance of the
Mahdi. But he had none the less consented to give his services to a
Government which had decided on evacuation, and he remained loyal to
that purpose, although in a little time it was made clear that there
was a wide and impassable gulf between the views of the British
Government and its too brilliant agent.

The first doubt that flashed through his mind, strangely enough, was
about Zebehr. He knew, of course, that it had been proposed to employ
him, and that Mr Gladstone had not altogether unnaturally decided
against it. But Gordon knew the man's ability, his influence, and the
close connection he still maintained with the Soudan, where his
father-in-law Elias was the Mahdi's chief supporter, and the paymaster
of his forces. I believe that Gordon was in his heart of the opinion
that the Mahdi was only a lay figure, and that the real author of the
whole movement in the Soudan was Zebehr, but that the Mahdi, carried
away by his exceptional success, had somewhat altered the scope of the
project, and given it an exclusively religious or fanatical character.
It is somewhat difficult to follow all the workings of Gordon's mind
on this point, nor is it necessary to do so, but the fact that should
not be overlooked is Gordon's conviction in the great power for good
or evil of Zebehr. Thinking this matter over in the train, he
telegraphed from Brindisi to Lord Granville on 30th January, begging
that Zebehr might be removed from Cairo to Cyprus. There is no doubt
as to the wisdom of this suggestion, and had it been adopted the lives
of Colonel Stewart and his companions would probably have been spared,
for, as will be seen, there is good ground to think that they were
murdered by men of his tribe. In Cyprus Zebehr would have been
incapable of mischief, but no regard was paid to Gordon's wish, and
thus commenced what proved to be a long course of indifference.

During the voyage from Brindisi to Port-Said Gordon drew up a
memorandum on his instructions, correcting some of the errors that had
crept into them, and explaining what, more or less, would be the best
course to follow. One part of his instructions had to go by the
board--that enjoining him to restore to the ancient families of the
Soudan their long-lost possessions, for there were no such families in
existence. One paragraph in that memorandum was almost pathetic, when
he begged the Government to take the most favourable view of his
shortcomings if he found himself compelled by necessity to deviate
from his instructions. Colonel Stewart supported that view in a very
sensible letter, when he advised the Government, "as the wisest
course, to rely on the discretion of General Gordon and his knowledge
of the country."

General Gordon's original plan was to proceed straight to Souakim, and
to travel thence by Berber to Khartoum, leaving the Foreign Office to
arrange at Cairo what his status should be, but this mode of
proceeding would have been both irregular and inconvenient, and it was
rightly felt that he ought to hold some definite position assigned by
the Khedive, as the ruler of Egypt. On arriving at Port-Said he was
met by Sir Evelyn Wood, who was the bearer of a private letter from
his old Academy and Crimean chum, Sir Gerald Graham, begging him to
"throw over all personal feelings" and come to Cairo. The appeal could
not have come from a quarter that would carry more weight with Gordon,
who had a feeling of affection as well as respect for General Graham;
and, moreover, the course suggested was so unmistakably the right one,
that he could not, and did not, feel any hesitation in taking it,
although he was well aware of Sir Evelyn Baring's opposition, which
showed that the sore of six years before still rankled. Gordon
accordingly accompanied Sir Evelyn Wood to Cairo, where he arrived on
the evening of 24th January. On the following day he was received by
Tewfik, who conferred on him for the second time the high office of
Governor-General of the Soudan. It is unnecessary to lay stress on any
minor point in the recital of the human drama which began with the
interview with Lord Wolseley on 15th January, and thence went on
without a pause to the tragedy of 26th January in the following year;
but it does seem strange, if the British Government were resolved to
stand firm to its evacuation policy, that it should have allowed its
emissary to accept the title of Governor-General of a province which
it had decided should cease to exist.

This was not the only nor even the most important consequence of his
turning aside to go to Cairo. When there, those who were interested
for various reasons in the proposal to send Zebehr to the Soudan, made
a last effort to carry their project by arranging an interview between
that person and Gordon, in the hope that all matters in dispute
between them might be discussed, and, if possible, settled. Gordon,
whose enmity to his worst foe was never deep, and whose temperament
would have made him delight in a discussion with the arch-fiend, said
at once that he had no objection to meeting Zebehr, and would discuss
any matter with him or any one else. The penalty of this magnanimity
was that he was led to depart from the uncompromising but safe
attitude of opposition and hostility he had up to this observed
towards Zebehr, and to record opinions that were inconsistent with
those he had expressed on the same subject only a few weeks and even
days before. But even in what follows I believe it is safe to discern
his extraordinary perspicuity; for when he saw that the Government
would not send Zebehr to Cyprus, he promptly concluded that it would
be far safer to take or have him with him in the Soudan, where he
could personally watch and control his movements, than to allow him to
remain at Cairo, guiding hostile plots with his money and influence in
the very region whither Gordon was proceeding.

This view is supported by the following Memorandum, drawn up by
General Gordon on 25th January 1884, the day before the interview, and
entitled by him "Zebehr Pasha _v._ General Gordon":--

     "Zebehr Pasha's first connection with me began in 1877, when I
     was named Governor-General of Soudan. Zebehr was then at Cairo,
     being in litigation with Ismail Pasha Eyoub, my predecessor in
     Soudan. Zebehr had left his son Suleiman in charge of his forces
     in the Bahr Gazelle. Darfour was in complete rebellion, and I
     called on Suleiman to aid the Egyptian army in May 1877. He never
     moved. In June 1877 I went to Darfour, and was engaged with the
     rebels when Suleiman moved up his men, some 6000, to Dara. It was
     in August 1877. He and his men assumed an hostile attitude to the
     Government of Dara. I came down to Dara and went out to
     Suleiman's camp, and asked them to come and see me at Dara.
     Suleiman and his chiefs did so, and I told them I felt sure that
     they meditated rebellion, but if they rebelled they would perish.
     I offered them certain conditions, appointing certain chiefs to
     be governors of certain districts, but refusing to let Suleiman
     be Governor of Bahr Gazelle. After some days' parleying, some of
     Suleiman's chiefs came over to my side, and these chiefs warned
     me that, if I did not take care, Suleiman would attack me. I
     therefore ordered Suleiman to go to Shaka, and ordered those
     chiefs who were inclined to accept my terms in another
     direction, so as to separate them. On this Suleiman accepted my
     terms, and he and others were made Beys. He left for Shaka with
     some 4000 men. He looted the country from Dara to Shaka, and did
     not show any respect to my orders. The rebellion in Darfour being
     settled, I went down to Shaka with 200 men. Suleiman was there
     with 4000. Then he came to me and begged me to let him have the
     sole command in Bahr Gazelle. I refused, and I put him, Suleiman,
     under another chief, and sent up to Bahr Gazelle 200 regular
     troops. Things remained quiet in Bahr Gazelle till I was ordered
     to Cairo in April 1878, about the finances. I then saw Zebehr
     Pasha, who wished to go up to Soudan, and I refused. I left for
     Aden in May, and in June 1878 Suleiman broke out in revolt, and
     killed the 200 regular troops at Bahr Gazelle. I sent Gessi
     against him in August 1878, and Gessi crushed him in the course
     of 1879. Gessi captured a lot of letters in the divan of
     Suleiman, one of which was from Zebehr Pasha inciting him to
     revolt. The original of this letter was given by me to H.H. the
     Khedive, and I also had printed a brochure containing it and a
     sort of _exposé_ to the people of Soudan why the revolt had been
     put down--viz. that it was not a question of slave-hunting, but
     one of revolt against the Khedive's authority. Copies of this
     must exist. On the production of this letter of Zebehr to
     Suleiman, I ordered the confiscation of Zebehr's property in
     Soudan, and a court martial to sit on Zebehr's case. This court
     martial was held under Hassan Pasha Halmi; the court condemned
     Zebehr to death; its proceedings were printed in the brochure I
     alluded to. Gessi afterwards caught Suleiman and shot him. With
     details of that event I am not acquainted, and I never saw the
     papers, for I went to Abyssinia. Gessi's orders were to try him,
     and if guilty to shoot him. This is all I have to say about
     Zebehr and myself.

     "Zebehr, without doubt, was the greatest slave-hunter who ever
     existed. Zebehr is the most able man in the Soudan; he is a
     capital general, and has been wounded several times. Zebehr has a
     capacity of government far beyond any statesman in the Soudan.
     All the followers of the Mahdi would, I believe, leave the Mahdi
     on Zebehr's approach, for they are ex-chiefs of Zebehr.
     Personally, I have a great admiration for Zebehr, for he is a
     man, and is infinitely superior to those poor fellows who have
     been governors of Soudan; but I question in my mind, 'Will Zebehr
     ever forgive me the death of his son?' and that question has
     regulated my action respecting him, for I have been told he bears
     me the greatest malice, and one cannot wonder at it if one is a
     father.

     "I would even now risk taking Zebehr, and would willingly bear
     the responsibility of doing so, convinced, as I am, that Zebehr's
     approach ends the Mahdi, which is a question which has its pulse
     in Syria, the Hedjaz, and Palestine.

     "It cannot be the wish of H.M.'s Government, or of the Egyptian
     Government, to have an intestine war in the Soudan on its
     evacuation, yet such is sure to ensue, and the only way which
     could prevent it is the restoration of Zebehr, who would be
     accepted on all sides, and who would end the Mahdi in a couple of
     months. My duty is to obey orders of H.M.'s Government, _i.e._ to
     evacuate the Soudan as quickly as possible, _vis-à-vis_ the
     safety of the Egyptian employés.

     "To do this I count on Zebehr; but if the addenda is made that I
     leave a satisfactory settlement of affairs, then Zebehr becomes a
     _sine quâ non_.

     "Therefore the question resolves itself into this. Does H.M.'s
     Government or Egyptian Government desire a settled state of
     affairs in Soudan after the evacuation? Do these Governments want
     to be free of this religious fanatic? If they do, then Zebehr
     should be sent; and if the two Governments are indifferent, then
     do not send him, and I have confidence one will (_D.V._) get out
     the Egyptian employés in three or four months, and will leave a
     cockpit behind us. It is not my duty to dictate what should be
     done. I will only say, first, I was justified in my action
     against Zebehr; second, that if Zebehr has no malice personally
     against me, I should take him at once as a humanly certain
     settler of the Mahdi and of those in revolt. I have written this
     Minute, and Zebehr's story may be heard. I only wish that after
     he has been interrogated, I may be questioned on such subjects as
     his statements are at variance with mine. I would wish this
     inquiry to be official, and in such a way that, whatever may be
     the decision come to, it may be come to in my absence.

     "With respect to the slave-trade, I think nothing of it, for
     there will always be slave-trade as long as Turkey and Egypt buy
     the slaves, and it may be Zebehr will or might in his interest
     stop it in some manner. I will therefore sum up my opinion, viz.
     that I would willingly take the responsibility of taking Zebehr
     up with me if, after an interview with Sir E. Baring and Nubar
     Pasha, they tell 'the mystic feeling' I could trust him, and
     which 'mystic feeling' I felt I had for him to-night when I met
     him at Cherif Pasha's house. Zebehr would have nothing to gain in
     hunting me, and I would have no fear. In this affair my desire, I
     own, would be to take Zebehr. I cannot exactly say why I feel
     towards him thus, and I feel sure that his going would settle the
     Soudan affair to the benefit of H.M.'s Government, and I would
     bear the responsibility of recommending it.

                                   "C. G. GORDON, Major-General."

An interview between Gordon and Zebehr was therefore arranged for 26th
January, the day after this memorandum was written. On 25th it should
also be remembered that the Khedive had again made Gordon
Governor-General of the Soudan. Besides the two principals, there were
present at this interview Sir Evelyn Baring, Sir Gerald Graham,
Colonel Watson, and Nubar Pasha. Zebehr protested his innocence of the
charges made against him; and when Gordon reminded him of his letter,
signed with his hand and bearing his seal, found in the divan of his
son Suleiman, he called upon Gordon to produce this letter, which, of
course, he could not do, because it was sent with the other
incriminating documents to the Khedive in 1879. The passage in that
letter establishing the guilt of Zebehr may, however, be cited, it
being first explained that Idris Ebter was Gordon's governor of the
Bahr Gazelle province, and that Suleiman did carry out his father's
instructions to attack him.

     "Now since this same Idris Ebter has not appreciated our kindness
     towards him, nor shown regard for his duty towards God, therefore
     do you accomplish his ejection by compulsory force, threats, and
     menaces, without personal hurt, but with absolute expulsion and
     deprivation from the Bahr-el-Gazelle, leaving no remnant of him
     in that region, no son, and no relation. For he is a
     mischief-maker, and God loveth not them who make mischief."

It is highly probable, from the air of confidence with which Zebehr
called for the production of the letter, that, either during the Arabi
rising or in some other way, he had recovered possession of the
original; but Gordon had had all the documents copied in 1879, and
bound in the little volume mentioned in the preceding Memorandum, as
well as in several of his letters, and the evidence as to Zebehr's
complicity and guilt seems quite conclusive.

In his Memorandum Gordon makes two conditions: first, "if Zebehr bears
no malice personally against me, I will take him to the Soudan at
once," and this condition is given further force later on in reference
to "the mystic feeling." The second condition was that Zebehr was only
to be sent if the Government desired a settled state of affairs after
the evacuation. From the beginning of the interview it was clear to
those present that no good would come of it, as Zebehr could scarcely
control his feelings, and showed what they deemed a personal
resentment towards Gordon that at any moment might have found
expression in acts. After a brief discussion it was decided to adjourn
the meeting, on the pretence of having search made for the
incriminating document, but really to avert a worse scene. General
Graham, in the after-discussion on Gordon's renewed desire to take
Zebehr with him, declared that it would be dangerous to acquiesce; and
Colonel Watson plainly stated that it would mean the death of one or
both of them. Gordon, indifferent to all considerations of personal
danger, did not take the same view of Zebehr's attitude towards him
personally, and would still have taken him with him, if only on the
ground that he would be less dangerous in the Soudan than at Cairo;
but the authorities would not acquiesce in a proposition that they
considered would inevitably entail the murder of Gordon at an early
stage of the journey. They cannot, from any point of view, be greatly
blamed in this matter; and when Gordon complains later on, as he
frequently did complain, about the matter, the decision must be with
his friends at Cairo, for they strictly conformed with the first
condition specified in his own Memorandum. At the same time, he was
perfectly correct in his views as to Zebehr's power and capacity for
mischief, and it was certainly very unfortunate and wrong that his
earlier suggestion of removing him to Cyprus or some other place of
safety was not adopted.

The following new correspondence will at least suggest a doubt whether
Gordon was not more correct in his view of Zebehr's attitude towards
himself than his friends. What they deemed strong resentment and a
bitter personal feeling towards Gordon on the part of Zebehr, he
considered merely the passing excitement from discussing a matter of
great moment and interest. He would still have taken Zebehr with him,
and for many weeks after his arrival at Khartoum he expected that, in
reply to his frequently reiterated messages, "Send me Zebehr," the
ex-Dictator of the Soudan would be sent up from Cairo. In one of the
last letters to his sister, dated Khartoum, 5th March 1884, he wrote:
"I hope _much_ from Zebehr's coming up, for he is so well known to all
up here." I come now to the correspondence referred to.

Some time after communications were broken off with Khartoum, Miss
Gordon wrote to Zebehr, begging him to use his influence with the
Mahdi to get letters for his family to and from General Gordon. To
that Zebehr replied as follows:--

     "TO HER EXCELLENCY MISS GORDON,--I am very grateful to you for
     having had the honour of receiving your letter of the 13th, and
     am very sorry to say that I am not able to write to the Mahdi,
     because he is new, and has appeared lately in the Soudan. I do
     not know him. He is not of my tribe nor of my relations, nor of
     the tribes with which I was on friendly terms; and for these
     reasons I do not see the way in which I could carry out your
     wish. I am ready to serve you in all that is possible all my life
     through, but please accept my excuse in this matter.

     "Please accept my best respects.

                                             ZEBEHR RAHAMAH, Pasha.

     "CAIRO, _22nd January 1885_."

Some time after the fall of Khartoum, Miss Gordon made a further
communication to Zebehr, but, owing to his having been exiled to
Gibraltar, it was not until October 1887 that she received the
following reply, which is certainly curious; and I believe that this
letter and personal conversations with Zebehr induced one of the
officers present at the interview on 26th January 1884 to change his
original opinion, and to conclude that it would have been safe for
General Gordon to have taken Zebehr with him:--

                              "CAIRO [_received by Miss Gordon
                                  about 12th October 1887_].

     "HONOURABLE LADY,--I most respectfully beg to acknowledge the
     receipt of your letter, enclosed to that addressed to me by His
     Excellency Watson Pasha.

     "This letter has caused me a great satisfaction, as it speaks of
     the friendly relations that existed between me and the late
     Gordon Pasha, your brother, whom you have replaced in my heart,
     and this has been ascertained to me by your inquiring about me
     and your congratulating me for my return to Cairo" [that is,
     after his banishment to Gibraltar].

     "I consider that your poor brother is still alive in you, and for
     the whole run of my life I put myself at your disposal, and beg
     that you will count upon me as a true and faithful friend to you.

     "You will also kindly pay my respects to the whole family of
     Gordon Pasha, and may you not deprive me of your good news at any
     time.

     "My children and all my family join themselves to me, and pay you
     their best respects.

     "Further, I beg to inform you that the messenger who had been
     previously sent through me, carrying Government correspondence to
     your brother, Gordon Pasha, has reached him, and remitted the
     letter he had in his own hands, and without the interference of
     any other person. The details of his history are mentioned in the
     enclosed report, which I hope you will kindly read.--Believe me,
     honourable Lady, to remain yours most faithfully,

                                             ZEBEHR RAHAMAH."

                            REPORT ENCLOSED.

     "When I came to Cairo and resided in it as I was before, I kept
     myself aside of all political questions connected with the Soudan
     or others, according to the orders given me by the Government to
     that effect. But as a great rumour was spread over by the high
     Government officials who arrived from the Soudan, and were with
     H.E. General Gordon Pasha at Khartoum before and after it fell,
     that all my properties in that country had been looted, and my
     relations ill-treated, I have been bound, by a hearty feeling of
     compassion, to ask the above said officials what they knew about
     it, and whether the messenger sent by me with the despatches
     addressed by the Government to General Gordon Pasha had reached
     Khartoum and remitted what he had.

     "These officials informed me verbally that on the 25th Ramadan
     1301 (March 1884), at the time they were sitting at Khartoum with
     General Gordon, my messenger, named Fadhalla Kabileblos, arrived
     there, and remitted to the General in his proper hands, and
     without the interference of anyone, all the despatches he had on
     him. After that the General expressed his greatest content for
     the receipt of the correspondence, and immediately gave orders to
     the artillery to fire twenty-five guns, in sign of rejoicing, and
     in order to show to the enemy his satisfaction for the news of
     the arrival of British troops. General Gordon then treated my
     messenger cordially, and requested the Government to pay him a
     sum of £500 on his return to Cairo, as a gratuity for all the
     dangers he had run in accomplishing his faithful mission. Besides
     that, the General gave him, when he embarked with Colonel
     Stewart, £13 to meet his expenses on the journey. A few days
     after the arrival of my messenger at Khartoum, H.E. General
     Gordon thought it proper to appoint Colonel Stewart for coming to
     Cairo on board a man-of-war with a secret mission, and several
     letters, written by the General in English and Arabic, were put
     in two envelopes, one addressed to the British and the other to
     the Egyptian Government, and were handed over to my messenger,
     with the order to return to Cairo with Colonel Stewart on board a
     special steamer.

     "But when Khartoum fell, and the rebels got into it, making all
     the inhabitants prisoners, the Government officials above
     referred to were informed that my messenger had been arrested,
     and all the correspondence that he had on him, addressed by
     General Gordon to the Government, was seized; for when the
     steamer on board of which they were arrived at Abou Kamar she
     went on rocks, and having been broken, the rebels made a massacre
     of all those who were on board; and as, on seeing the letters
     carried by my messenger, they found amongst them a private letter
     addressed to me by H.E. Gordon Pasha, expressing his thanks for
     my faithfulness to him, the rebels declared me an infidel, and
     decided to seize all my goods and properties, comprising them in
     their _Beit-el-Mal_ (that is, Treasury) as it happened in fact.

     "Moreover, the members of my family who were in the Soudan were
     treated most despotically, and their existence was rendered most
     difficult.

     "Such a state of things being incompatible with the suspicion
     thrown upon me as regards my faithfulness to the Government, I
     have requested the high Government officials referred to above to
     give me an official certificate to that effect, which they all
     gave; and the enclosed copies will make known to those who take
     the trouble to read them that I have been honest and faithful in
     all what has been entrusted to me. This is the summary of the
     information I have obtained from persons I have reason to
     believe."

Some further evidence of Zebehr's feelings is given in the following
letter from him to Sir Henry Gordon, dated in October 1884:--

     "Your favour of 3rd September has been duly received, for which I
     thank you. I herewith enclose my photograph, and hope that you
     will kindly send me yours.

     "The letter that you wished me to send H.E. General Gordon was
     sent on the 18th August last, registered. I hope that you will
     excuse me in delaying to reply, for when your letter arrived I
     was absent, and when I returned I was very sorry that they had
     not forwarded the letter to me; otherwise I should have replied
     at once.

     "I had closed this letter with the photograph when I received
     fresh news, to the effect that the messengers we sent to H.E.
     Gordon Pasha were on their way back. I therefore kept back the
     letter and photograph till they arrived, and I should see what
     tidings they brought.... You have told me that Lord Northbrook
     knows what has passed between us. I endeavoured and devised to
     see His Excellency, but I did not succeed, as he was very busy. I
     presented a petition to him that he should help to recover the
     property of which I was robbed unjustly, and which H.E. your
     brother ordered to be restored, and at the same time to right me
     for the oppression I had suffered. I have had no answer up to
     this present moment.

     "Hoping that H.E. Gordon Pasha will return in safety, accept my
     best regards, dear Sir, and present my compliments to your
     sister.

                                                   "ZEBEHR.
     "_28th Oct. 1884._"

To sum up on this important matter. There never was any doubt that the
authorities in the Delta took on themselves a grave responsibility
when they remained deaf to all Gordon's requests for the co-operation
of Zebehr. They would justify themselves by saying that they had a
tender regard for Gordon's own safety. At least this was the only
point on which they showed it, and they would not like to be deprived
of the small credit attached to it; but the evidence I have now
adduced renders even this plea of doubtful force. As to the value of
Zebehr's co-operation, if Gordon could have obtained it there cannot
be two opinions. Gordon did not exaggerate in the least degree when he
said that on the approach of Zebehr the star of the Mahdi would at
once begin to wane, or, in other words, that he looked to Zebehr's
ability and influence as the sure way to make his own mission a
success.

On the very night of his interview with Zebehr, and within forty-eight
hours of his arrival in Cairo, General Gordon and his English
companion, with four Egyptian officers, left by train for Assiout, _en
route_ to Khartoum.




CHAPTER XII.

KHARTOUM.


Before entering on the events of this crowning passage in the career
of this hero, I think the reader might well consider on its threshold
the exact nature of the adventure undertaken by Gordon as if it were a
sort of everyday experience and duty. At the commencement of the year
1884 the military triumph of the Mahdi was as complete as it could be
throughout the Soudan. Khartoum was still held by a force of between
4000 and 6000 men. Although not known, all the other garrisons in the
Nile Valley, except Kassala and Sennaar, both near the Abyssinian
frontier, had capitulated, and the force at Khartoum would certainly
have offered no resistance if the Mahdi had advanced immediately after
the defeat of Hicks. Even if he had reached Khartoum before the
arrival of Gordon, it is scarcely doubtful that the place would have
fallen without fighting. Colonel de Coetlogon was in command, but the
troops had no faith in him, and he had no confidence in them. That
officer, on 9th January, "telegraphed to the Khedive, strongly urging
an immediate withdrawal from Khartoum. He said that one-third of the
garrison are unreliable, and that even if it were twice as strong as
it is, it would not hold Khartoum against the whole country." In
several subsequent telegrams Colonel de Coetlogon importuned the Cairo
authorities to send him authority to leave with the garrison, and on
the very day that the Government finally decided to despatch Gordon he
telegraphed that there was only just enough time left to escape to
Berber. While the commandant held and expressed these views, it is not
surprising that the garrison and inhabitants were disheartened and
decidedly unfit to make any resolute opposition to a confident and
daring foe. There is excellent independent testimony as to the state
of public feeling in the town.

Mr Frank Power had been residing in Khartoum as correspondent of _The
Times_ from August 1883, and in December, after the Hicks catastrophe,
he was appointed Acting British Consul. In a letter written on 12th
January he said: "They have done nothing for us yet from Cairo. They
are leaving it all to fate, and the rebels around us are growing
stronger!" Such was the general situation at Khartoum when General
Gordon was ordered, almost single-handed, to save it; and not merely
to rescue its garrison, pronounced by its commander to be partly
unreliable and wholly inadequate, but other garrisons scattered
throughout the regions held by the Mahdi and his victorious legions. A
courageous man could not have been charged with cowardice if he had
shrunk back from such a forlorn hope, and declined to take on his
shoulders the responsibility that properly devolved on the commander
on the spot. A prudent man would at least have insisted that his
instructions should be clear, and that the part his Government and
country were to play was to be as strictly defined and as obligatory
on them as his own. But while Gordon's courage was of such a quality
that I believe no calculation of odds or difficulties ever entered
into his view, his prudence never possessed the requisite amount of
suspicion to make him provide against the contingencies of absolute
betrayal by those who sent him, or of that change in party convenience
and tactics which induced those who first thought his mission most
advantageous as solving a difficulty, or at least putting off a
trouble, to veer round to the conclusion that his remaining at
Khartoum, his honourable but rigid resolve not to return without the
people he went to save, was a distinct breach of contract, and a
serious offence.

The state of feeling at Khartoum was one verging on panic. The richest
townsmen had removed their property and families to Berber. Colonel de
Coetlogon had the river boats with steam up ready to commence the
evacuation, and while everyone thought that the place was doomed, the
telegraph instrument was eagerly watched for the signal to begin the
flight. The tension could not have lasted much longer--without the
signal the flight would have begun--when on 24th January the brief
message arrived: "General Gordon is coming to Khartoum." The effect of
that message was electrical. The panic ceased, confidence was
restored, the apathy of the Cairo authorities became a matter of no
importance, for England had sent her greatest name as a pledge of her
intended action, and the unreliable and insufficient garrison pulled
itself together for one of the most honourable and brilliant defences
in the annals of military sieges. Yet it was full time. Two months had
been wasted, and, as Mr Power said, "the fellows in Lucknow did not
look more anxiously for Colin Campbell than we are looking for
Gordon." Gordon, ever mindful of the importance of time, and fully
impressed with the sense of how much had been lost by delay, did not
let the grass grow under his feet, and after his two days' delay at
Cairo sent a message that he hoped to reach Khartoum in eighteen days.
Mr Power's comment on that message is as follows: "Twenty-four days
is the shortest time from Cairo to Khartoum on record; Gordon says he
will be here in eighteen days; but he travels like a whirlwind." As a
matter of fact, Gordon took twenty days' travelling, besides the two
days he passed at Berber. He thus reached Khartoum on 18th February,
and four days later Colonel de Coetlogon started for Cairo.

The entry of Gordon into Khartoum was marked by a scene of
indescribable enthusiasm and public confidence. The whole population,
men, women, and children, turned out to welcome him as a conqueror and
a deliverer, although he really came in his own person merely to cope
with a desperate situation. The women threw themselves on the ground
and struggled to kiss his feet; in the confusion Gordon was several
times pushed down; and this remarkable demonstration of popular
confidence and affection was continued the whole way from the
landing-place to the _Hukumdaria_ or Palace. This greeting was the
more remarkable because it was clear that Gordon had brought no
troops--only one white officer--and it soon became known that he had
brought no money. Even the Mahdi himself made his contribution to the
general tribute, by sending General Gordon on his arrival a formal
_salaam_ or message of respect. Thus hailed on all hands as the one
pre-eminently good man who had been associated with the Soudan, Gordon
addressed himself to the hard task he had undertaken, which had been
rendered almost hopeless of achievement by the lapse of time, past
errors, and the blindness of those who should have supported him.

Difficult as it had been all along, it was rendered still more
difficult by the decisive defeat of Baker Pasha and an Egyptian force
of 4000 men at Tokar, near Souakim. This victory was won by Osman
Digma, who had been sent by the Mahdi to rouse up the Eastern Soudan
at the time of the threatened Hicks expedition. The result showed that
the Mahdi had discovered a new lieutenant of great military capacity
and energy, and that the Eastern Soudan was for the time as hopelessly
lost to Egypt as Kordofan and Darfour.

The first task to which Gordon addressed himself was to place Khartoum
and the detached work at Omdurman on the left bank of the White Nile
in a proper state of defence, and he especially supervised the
establishment of telegraphic communication between the Palace and the
many outworks, so that at a moment's notice he might receive word of
what was happening. His own favourite position became the flat roof of
this building, whence with his glass he could see round for many
miles. He also laid in considerable stores of provisions by means of
his steamers, in which he placed the greatest faith. In all these
matters he was ably and energetically assisted by Colonel Stewart; and
beyond doubt the other Europeans took some slight share in the
incessant work of putting Khartoum in a proper state of defence; but
even with this relief, the strain, increased by constant alarms of the
Mahdi's hostile approach, was intense, and Mr Power speaks of Gordon
as nearly worn out with work before he had been there a month.

When Gordon went to the Soudan his principal object was to effect the
evacuation of the country, and to establish there some administration
which would be answerable for good order and good neighbourship. If
the Mahdi had been a purely secular potentate, and not a fanatical
religious propagandist, it would have been a natural and feasible
arrangement to have come to terms with him as the conqueror of the
country. But the basis of the Mahdi's power forbade his being on terms
with anyone. If he had admitted the equal rights of Egypt and the
Khedive at any point, there would have been an end to his heavenly
mission, and the forces he had created out of the simple but
deep-rooted religious feelings of the Mahommedan clans of the Soudan
would soon have vanished. It is quite possible that General Gordon had
in his first views on the Mahdist movement somewhat undervalued the
forces created by that fanaticism, and that the hopes and opinions he
first expressed were unduly optimistic. If so, it must be allowed that
he lost not a moment in correcting them, and within a week of his
arrival at Khartoum he officially telegraphed to Cairo, that "if Egypt
is to be quiet the Mahdi must be smashed up."

When the British Government received that message, as they did in a
few days, with, moreover, the expression of supporting views by Sir
Evelyn Baring, they ought to have reconsidered the whole question of
the Gordon mission, and to have defined their own policy. The
representative they had sent on an exceptional errand to relieve and
bring back a certain number of distressed troops, and to arrange if he
could for the formation of a new government through the notabilities
and ancient families, reports at an early stage of his mission that in
his opinion there is no solution of the difficulty, save by resorting
to offensive measures against the Mahdi as the disturber of the peace,
not merely for that moment, but as long as he had to discharge the
divine task implied by his title. As it was of course obvious that
Gordon single-handed could not take the field, the conclusion
necessarily followed that he would require troops, and the whole
character of his task would thus have been changed. In face of that
absolute _volte-face_, from a policy of evacuation and retreat to one
of retention and advance, for that is what it signified, the
Government would have been justified in recalling Gordon, but as they
did not do so, they cannot plead ignorance of his changed opinion, or
deny that, at the very moment he became acquainted with the real state
of things at Khartoum, he hastened to convey to them his decided
conviction that the only way out of the difficulty was to "smash up
the Mahdi."

All his early messages show that there had been a change, or at least
a marked modification, in his opinions. At Khartoum he saw more
clearly than in Cairo or in London the extreme gravity of the
situation, and the consequences to the tranquillity of Lower Egypt
that would follow from the abandonment of Khartoum to the Mahdi. He
therefore telegraphed on the day of his arrival these words: "To
withdraw without being able to place a successor in my seat would be
the signal for general anarchy throughout the country, which, though
all Egyptian element were withdrawn, would be a misfortune, and
inhuman." In the same message he repeated his demand for the services
of Zebehr, through whom, as has been shown, he thought he might be
able to cope with the Mahdi. Yet their very refusal to comply with
that reiterated request should have made the authorities more willing
and eager to meet the other applications and suggestion of a man who
had thrust himself into a most perilous situation at their bidding,
and for the sake of the reputation of his country. It must be recorded
with feelings of shame that it had no such effect, and that apathy and
indifference to the fate of its gallant agent were during the first
few months the only characteristics of the Government policy.

At the same period all Gordon's telegrams and despatches showed that
he wanted reinforcements to some small extent, and at least military
demonstrations along his line of communication with Egypt to prove
that he possessed the support of his Government, and that he had only
to call upon it to send troops, and they were there to come. He,
naturally enough, treated as ridiculous the suggestion that he had
bound himself to do the whole work without any support; and fully
convinced that he had only to summon troops for them to be sent him in
the moderate strength he alone cared for, he issued a proclamation in
Khartoum, stating that "British troops are now on their way, and in a
few days will reach Khartoum." He therefore begged for the despatch of
a small force to Wady Halfa, and he went on to declare that it would
be "comparatively easy to destroy the Mahdi" if 200 British troops
were sent to Wady Halfa, and if the Souakim-Berber route were opened
up by Indian-Moslem troops. Failing the adoption of these measures, he
asked leave to raise a sum, by appealing to philanthropists,
sufficient to pay a small Turkish force and carry on a contest for
supremacy with the Mahdi on his own behoof. All these suggestions
were more or less supported by Sir Evelyn Baring, who at last
suggested in an important despatch, dated 28th February, that the
British Government should withdraw altogether from the matter, and
"give full liberty of action to General Gordon and the Khedive's
Government to do what seems best to them."

Well would it have been for Gordon and everyone whose reputation was
concerned if this step had been taken, for the Egyptian Government,
the Khedive, his ministers Nubar and Cherif, were opposed to all
surrender, and desired to hold on to Khartoum and the Souakim-Berber
route. But without the courage and resolution to discharge it, the
Government saw the obligation that lay on them to provide for the
security and good government of Egypt, and that if they shirked
responsibility in the Soudan, the independence of Egypt might be
accomplished by its own effort and success. They perceived the
objections to giving Egypt a free hand, but they none the less
abstained from taking the other course of definite and decisive action
on their own initiative. As Gordon quickly saw and tersely expressed:
"You will not let Egypt keep the Soudan, you will not take it
yourself, and you will not permit any other country to occupy it."

As if to give emphasis to General Gordon's successive
requests--Zebehr, 200 men to Wady Halfa, opening of route from Souakim
to Berber, presence of English officers at Dongola, and of Indian
cavalry at Berber--telegraphic communication with Khartoum was
interrupted early in March, less than a fortnight after Gordon's
arrival in the town. There was consequently no possible excuse for
anyone ignoring the dangerous position in which General Gordon was
placed. He had gone to face incalculable dangers, but now the success
of Osman Digma and the rising of the riparian tribes threatened him
with that complete isolation which no one had quite expected at so
early a stage after his arrival. It ought, and one would have expected
it, to have produced an instantaneous effect, to have braced the
Government to the task of deciding what its policy should be when
challenged by its own representative to declare it. Gordon himself
soon realised his own position, for he wrote: "I shall be caught in
Khartoum; and even if I was mean enough to escape I have not the power
to do so." After a month's interruption he succeeded in getting the
following message, dated 8th April, through, which is significant as
showing that he had abandoned all hope of being supported by his own
Government:--

     "I have telegraphed to Sir Samuel Baker to make an appeal to
     British and American millionaires to give me £300,000 to engage
     3000 Turkish troops from the Sultan and send them here. This
     would settle the Soudan and Mahdi for ever. For my part, I think
     you (Baring) will agree with me. I do not see the fun of being
     caught here to walk about the streets for years as a dervish with
     sandalled feet. Not that (_D.V._) I will ever be taken alive. It
     would be the climax of meanness after I had borrowed money from
     the people here, had called on them to sell their grain at a low
     price, etc., to go and abandon them without using every effort to
     relieve them, whether those efforts are diplomatically correct or
     not; and I feel sure, whatever you may feel diplomatically, I
     have your support, and that of every man professing himself a
     gentleman, in private."

Eight days later he succeeded in getting another message through, to
the following effect:--

     "As far as I can understand, the situation is this. You state
     your intention of not sending any relief up here or to Berber,
     and you refuse me Zebehr. I consider myself free to act according
     to circumstances. I shall hold on here as long as I can, and if I
     can suppress the rebellion I shall do so. If I cannot, I shall
     retire to the Equator and leave you the indelible disgrace of
     abandoning the garrisons of Senaar, Kassala, Berber, and Dongola,
     with the _certainty_ that you will eventually be forced to smash
     up the Mahdi under greater difficulties if you wish to maintain
     peace in, and, indeed, to retain Egypt."

Before a silence of five and a half months fell over Khartoum, Gordon
had been able to make three things clear, and of these only one could
be described as having a personal signification, and that was that the
Government, by rejecting all his propositions, had practically
abandoned him to his fate. The two others were that any settlement
would be a work of time, and that no permanent tranquillity could be
attained without overcoming the Mahdi.

Immediately on arriving at Khartoum he perceived that the evacuation
of the Soudan, with safety to the garrison and officials, as well as
the preservation of the honour of England and Egypt, would necessarily
be a work of time, and only feasible if certain measures were taken in
his support, which, considerable as they may have appeared at the
moment, were small and costless in comparison with those that had
subsequently to be sanctioned. Six weeks sufficed to show Gordon that
he would get no material help from the Government, and he then began
to look elsewhere for support, and to propound schemes for pacifying
the Soudan and crushing the Mahdi in which England and the Government
would have had no part. Hence his proposal to appeal to wealthy
philanthropists to employ Turkish troops, and in the last resort to
force his way to the Equator and the Congo. Even that avenue of safety
was closed to him by the illusory prospect of rescue held out to him
by the Government at the eleventh hour, when success was hardly
attainable.

For the sake of clearness it will be well to give here a brief summary
of the siege during the six months that followed the arrival of
General Gordon and the departure of Colonel Stewart on 10th September.
The full and detailed narrative is contained in Colonel Stewart's
Journal, which was captured on board his steamer. This interesting
diary was taken to the Mahdi at Omdurman, and is said to be carefully
preserved in the Treasury. The statement rests on no very sure
foundation, but if true the work may yet thrill the audience of the
English-speaking world. But even without its aid the main facts of the
siege of Khartoum, down at all events to the 14th December, when
Gordon's own diary stops, are sufficiently well known for all the
purposes of history.

At a very early stage of the siege General Gordon determined to try
the metal of his troops, and the experiment succeeded to such a
perfect extent that there was never any necessity to repeat it. On
16th March, when only irregular levies and detached bodies of
tribesmen were in the vicinity of Khartoum, he sent out a force of
nearly 1000 men, chiefly Bashi-Bazouks, but also some regulars, with a
fieldpiece and supported by two steamers. The force started at eight
in the morning, under the command of Colonel Stewart, and landed at
Halfiyeh, some miles down the stream on the right bank of the Nile.
Here the rebels had established a sort of fortified position, which it
was desirable to destroy, if it could be done without too much loss.
The troops were accordingly drawn up for the attack, and the gun and
infantry fire commenced to cover the advance. At this moment about
sixty rebel horsemen came out from behind the stockade and charged the
Bashi-Bazouks, who fired one volley and fled. The horsemen then
charged the infantry drawn up in square, which they broke, and the
retreat to the river began at a run. Discouraging as this was for a
force of all arms to retire before a few horsemen one-twentieth its
number, the disaster was rendered worse and more disheartening by the
conduct of the men, who absolutely refused to fight, marching along
with shouldered arms without firing a shot, while the horsemen picked
off all who straggled from the column. The gun, a considerable
quantity of ammunition, and about sixty men represented the loss of
Gordon's force; the rebels are not supposed to have lost a single man.
"Nothing could be more dismal than seeing these horsemen, and some men
even on camels, pursuing close to troops who with shouldered arms
plodded their way back." Thus wrote Gordon of the men to whom he had
to trust for a successful defence of Khartoum. His most recent
experience confirmed his old opinion, that the Egyptian and Arab
troops were useless even when fighting to save their own lives, and he
could only rely on the very small body left of black Soudanese, who
fought as gallantly for him as any troops could, and whose loyalty and
devotion to him surpassed all praise. Treachery, it was assumed, had
something to do with the easy overthrow of this force, and two Pashas
were shot for misconduct on return to Khartoum.

Having no confidence in the bulk of his force, it is not surprising
that Gordon resorted to every artifice within engineering science to
compensate for the shortcomings of his army. He surrounded
Khartoum--which on one side was adequately defended by the Nile and
his steamers--on the remaining three sides with a triple line of land
mines connected by wires. Often during the siege the Mahdists
attempted to break through this ring, but only to meet with repulse,
accompanied by heavy loss; and to the very last day of the siege they
never succeeded in getting behind the third of these lines. Their
efficacy roused Gordon's professional enthusiasm, and in one passage
he exclaims that these will be the general form of defence in the
future. During the first months of the siege, which began rather in
the form of a loose investment, the Nile was too low to allow of his
using the nine steamers he possessed, but he employed the time in
making two new ones, and in strengthening them all with bulwarks of
iron plates and soft wood, which were certainly bullet-proof. Each of
these steamers he valued as the equivalent of 2000 men. When it is
seen how he employed them the value will not be deemed excessive, and
certainly without them he could not have held Khartoum and baffled all
the assaults of the Mahdi for the greater part of a year.

After this experience Gordon would risk no more combats on land, and
on 25th March he dismissed 250 of the Bashi-Bazouks who had behaved so
badly. Absolutely trustworthy statistics are not available as to the
exact number of troops in Khartoum or as to the proportion the Black
Soudanese bore to the Egyptians, but it approximates to the truth to
say that there were about 1000 of the former to 3000 of the latter,
and with other levies during the siege he doubled this total. For
these and a civilian population of nearly 40,000 Gordon computed that
he had provisions for five months from March, and that for at least
two months he would be as safe as in Cairo. By carefully husbanding
the corn and biscuit he was able to make the supply last much longer,
and even to the very end he succeeded in partially replenishing the
depleted granaries of the town. There is no necessity to repeat the
details of the siege during the summer of 1884. They are made up of
almost daily interchanges of artillery fire from the town, and of
rifle fire in reply from the Arab lines. That this was not merely
child's play may be gathered from two of Gordon's protected ships
showing nearly a thousand bullet-marks apiece. Whenever the rebels
attempted to force their way through the lines they were repulsed by
the mines; and the steamers not only inflicted loss on their fighting
men, but often succeeded in picking up useful supplies of food and
grain. No further reverses were reported, because Gordon was most
careful to avoid all risk, and the only misfortunes occurred in
Gordon's rear, when first Berber, through the treachery of the Greek
Cuzzi, and then Shendy passed into the hands of the Mahdists, thus, as
Gordon said, "completely hemming him in." In April a detached force up
the Blue Nile went over to the Mahdi, taking with them a small
steamer, but this loss was of no great importance, as the men were of
what Gordon called "the Arabi hen or hero type," and the steamer could
not force its way past Khartoum and its powerful flotilla. In the four
months from 16th March to 30th July Gordon stated that the total loss
of the garrison was only thirty killed and fifty or sixty wounded,
while half a million cartridges had been fired against the enemy. The
conduct of both the people and garrison had been excellent, and this
was the more creditable, because Gordon was obliged from the very
beginning, owing to the capture of the bullion sent him at Berber, to
make all payments in paper money bearing his signature and seal.
During that period the total reinforcement to the garrison numbered
seven men, including Gordon himself, while over 2600 persons had been
sent out of it in safety as far as Berber.

The reader will be interested in the following extracts from a letter
written by Colonel Duncan, R.A., M.P., showing the remarkable way in
which General Gordon organised the despatch of these refugees from
Khartoum. The letter is dated 29th November 1886, and addressed to
Miss Gordon:--

     "When your brother, on reaching Khartoum, found that he could
     commence sending refugees to Egypt, I was sent on the 3rd March
     1884 to Assouan and Korosko to receive those whom he sent down.
     As an instance of your brother's thoughtfulness, I may mention
     that he requested that, if possible, some motherly European woman
     might also be sent, as many of the refugees whom he had to send
     had never been out of the Soudan before, and might feel strange
     on reaching Egypt. A German, Giegler Pasha, who had been in
     Khartoum with your brother before, and who had a German wife, was
     accordingly placed at my disposal, and I stationed them at
     Korosko, where almost all the refugees arrived. I may mention
     that I saw and spoke to every one of the refugees who came down,
     and to many of the women and children. Their references to your
     brother were invariably couched in language of affection and
     gratitude, and the adjective most frequently applied to him was
     'just.' In sending away the people from Khartoum, he sent away
     the Governor and some of the other leading Egyptian officials
     first. I think he suspected they would intrigue; he always had
     more confidence in the people than in the ruling Turks or
     Egyptians. The oldest soldiers, the very infirm, the wounded
     (from Hicks's battles) were sent next, and a ghastly crew they
     were. But the precautions he took for their comfort were very
     complete, and although immediately before reaching me they had to
     cross a very bad part of the desert between Abou Hamed and
     Korosko, they reached me in wonderful spirits. It was touching to
     see the perfect confidence they had that the promises of Gordon
     Pasha would be fulfilled. After the fall of Khartoum, and your
     brother's death, a good many of the Egyptian officers who had
     been with your brother managed to escape, and to come down the
     river disguised in many cases as beggars. I had an opportunity of
     talking to most of them, and there was no collusion, for they
     arrived at different times and by different roads. I remember
     having a talk with one, and when we alluded to your brother's
     death he burst out crying like a child, and said that though he
     had lost his wives and children when Khartoum was taken, he felt
     it as nothing to the loss of 'that just man.'"

The letters written at the end of July at Khartoum reached Cairo at
the end of September, and their substance was at once telegraphed to
England. They showed that, while his success had made him think that
after all there might be some satisfactory issue of the siege, he
foresaw that the real ordeal was yet to come. "In four months (that is
end of November) river begins to fall; before that time you _must_
settle the Soudan question." So wrote the heroic defender of Khartoum
in words that could not be misunderstood, and those words were in the
hands of the British Ministers when half the period had expired. At
the same time Mr Power wrote: "We can at best hold out but two months
longer." Gordon at least never doubted what their effect would be, for
after what seemed to him a reasonable time had elapsed to enable this
message to reach its destination, he took the necessary steps to
recover Berber, and to send his steamers half-way to meet and assist
the advance of the reinforcement on which he thought from the
beginning he might surely rely.

On 10th September all his plans were completed, and Colonel Stewart,
accompanied by a strong force of Bashi-Bazouks and some black
soldiers, with Mr Power and M. Herbin, the French consul, sailed
northwards on five steamers. The first task of this expedition was if
possible, to retake Berber, or, failing that, to escort the _Abbas_
past the point of greatest danger; the second, to convey the most
recent news about Khartoum affairs to Lower Egypt; and the third was
to lend a helping hand to any force that might be coming up the Nile
or across the desert from the Red Sea. Five days after its departure
Gordon knew through a spy that Stewart's flotilla had passed Shendy in
safety, and had captured a valuable Arab convoy. It was not till
November that the truth was known how the ships bombarded Berber, and
passed that place not only in safety, but after causing the rebels
much loss and greater alarm, and then how Stewart and his European
companions went on in the small steamer _Abbas_ to bear the tale of
the wonderful defence of Khartoum to the outer world--a defence which,
wonderful as it was, really only reached the stage of the miraculous
after they had gone and had no further part in it. So far as Gordon's
military skill and prevision could arrange for their safety, he did
so, and with success. When the warships had to return he gave them the
best advice against treachery or ambuscade:--"Do not anchor near the
bank, do not collect wood at isolated spots, trust nobody." What more
could Gordon say? If they had paid strict heed to his advice, there
would have been no catastrophe at Dar Djumna. These reflections invest
with much force Gordon's own view of the matter:--"If _Abbas_ was
captured by treachery, then I am not to blame; neither am I to blame
if she struck a rock, for she drew under two feet of water; if they
were attacked and overpowered, then I am to blame." So perfect were
his arrangements that only treachery, aided by Stewart's
over-confidence, baffled them.

With regard to the wisdom of the course pursued in thus sending away
all his European colleagues--the Austrian consul Hensall alone
refusing to quit Gordon and his place of duty--opinions will differ to
the end of time, but one is almost inclined to say that they could not
have been of much service to Gordon once their uppermost thought
became to quit Khartoum. The whole story is told very graphically in a
passage of Gordon's own diary:--

     "I determined to send the _Abbas_ down with an Arab captain.
     Herbin asked to be allowed to go. I jumped at his offer. Then
     Stewart said he would go if I would exonerate him from deserting
     me. I said, 'You do not desert me. I cannot go; but if you go you
     do great service.' I then wrote him an official; he wanted me to
     write him an order. I said 'No; for, though I fear not
     responsibility, I will not put you in any danger in which I am
     not myself.' I wrote them a letter couched thus:--'_Abbas_ is
     going down; you say you are willing to go in her if I think you
     can do so in honour. You can go in honour, for you can do
     nothing here; and if you go you do me service in telegraphing my
     views.'"

There are two points in this matter to which I must draw marked
attention. The suggestion for any European leaving Khartoum came from
M. Herbin, and when Gordon willingly acquiesced, Colonel Stewart asked
leave to do likewise. Mr Power, whose calculation was that provisions
would be exhausted before the end of September, then followed suit,
and not one of these three of the five Europeans in Khartoum seem to
have thought for a moment what would be the position of Gordon left
alone to cope with the danger from which they ran away. The suggestion
as to their going came in every case from themselves. Gordon, in his
thought for others, not merely threw no obstacle in their way, but as
far as he could provided for their safety as if they were a parcel of
women. But he declined all responsibility for their fate, as they went
not by his order but of their own free-will. He gave them his ships,
soldiers, and best counsel. They neglected the last, and were taken in
in a manner that showed less than a child's suspicion, and were
massacred at the very moment they felt sure of safety. It was a cruel
fate, and a harsh Nemesis speedily befell them for doing perhaps the
one unworthy thing of their lives--leaving their solitary companion to
face the tenfold dangers by which he would be beset. But it cannot be
allowed any longer that the onus of this matter should rest in any way
on Gordon. They went because they wanted to go, and he, knowing well
that men with such thoughts would be of no use to him ("you can do
nothing here") let them go, and even encouraged them to do so. Under
the circumstances he preferred to be alone. Colonel Donald Stewart was
a personal friend of mine, and a man whose courage in the ordinary
sense of the word could not be aspersed, but there cannot be two
opinions that he above all the others should not have left his
brother-in-arms alone in Khartoum.

After their departure Gordon had to superintend everything himself,
and to resort to every means of husbanding the limited supply of
provisions he had left. He had also to anticipate a more vigorous
attack, for the Mahdi must quickly learn of the departure of the
steamers, the bombardment of Berber, and the favourable chance thus
provided for the capture of Khartoum. Nor was this the worst, for on
the occurrence of the disaster the Mahdi was promptly informed of the
loss of the _Abbas_ and the murder of the Europeans, and it was he
himself who sent in to Gordon the news of the catastrophe, with so
complete a list of the papers on the _Abbas_ as left no ground for
hope or disbelief. Unfortunately, before this bad news reached Gordon,
he had again, on 30th September, sent down to Shendy three
steamers--the _Talataween_, the _Mansourah_, and _Saphia_, with
troops on board, and the gallant Cassim-el-Mousse, there to await the
arrival of the relieving force. He somewhat later reinforced this
squadron with the _Bordeen_; and although one or two of these boats
returned occasionally to Khartoum, the rest remained permanently at
Shendy, and when the English troops reached the Nile opposite that
place all five were waiting them. Without entering too closely into
details, it is consequently correct to say that during the most
critical part of the siege Gordon deprived himself of the co-operation
of these vessels, each of which he valued at 2000 men, simply and
solely because he believed that reinforcements were close at hand, and
that some troops at the latest would arrive before the end of November
1884. As Gordon himself repeatedly said, it would have been far more
just if the Government had told him in March, when he first demanded
reinforcements as a right, that he must shift for himself. Then he
would have kept these boats by him, and triumphantly fought his way in
them to the Equator. But his trust in the Government, notwithstanding
all his experience, led him to weaken his own position in the hope of
facilitating their movements, and he found their aid a broken reed. In
only one passage of his journal does Gordon give expression to this
view, although it was always present to his mind:--"Truly the
indecision of our Government has been, from a military point of view,
a very great bore, for we never could act as if independent; there was
always the chance of their taking action, which hampered us." But in
the telegrams to Sir Evelyn Baring and Mr Egerton, which the
Government never dared to publish, and which are still an official
secret, he laid great stress on this point, and on Sir Evelyn Baring's
message forbidding him to retire to the Equator, so that, if he sought
safety in that direction, he would be indictable on a charge of
desertion.

The various positions at Khartoum held by Gordon's force may be
briefly described. First, the town itself, on the left bank of the
Blue Nile, but stretching almost across to the right bank of the White
Nile, protected on the land side by a wall, in front of which was the
triple line of mines, and on the water side by the river and the
steamers. On the right bank of the Blue Nile was the small North Fort.
Between the two stretched the island of Tuti, and at each end of the
wall, on the White Nile as well as the Blue, Gordon had stationed a
_santal_ or heavy-armed barge, carrying a gun. Unfortunately, a large
part of the western end of the Khartoum wall had been washed away by
an inundation of the Nile, but the mines supplied a substitute, and so
long as Omdurman Fort was held this weakness in the defences of
Khartoum did not greatly signify. That fort itself lay on the left
bank of the White Nile. It was well built and fairly strong, but the
position was faulty. It lay in a hollow, and the trench of the
extensive camp formed for Hicks's force furnished the enemy with
cover. It was also 1200 yards from the river bank, and when the enemy
became more enterprising it was impossible to keep up communication
with it. In Omdurman Fort was a specially selected garrison of 240
men, commanded by a gallant black officer, Ferratch or Faragalla
Pasha, who had been raised from a subordinate capacity to the
principal command under him by Gordon. Gordon's point of observation
was the flat roof of the Palace, whence he could see everything with
his telescope, and where he placed his best shots to bear on any point
that might seem hard pressed. Still more useful was it for the purpose
of detecting the remissness of his own troops and officers, and often
his telescope showed him sentries asleep at their posts, and officers
absent from the points they were supposed to guard.

From the end of March until the close of the siege scarcely a day
passed without the exchange of artillery and rifle fire on one side or
the other of the beleaguered town. On special occasions the Khedive's
garrison would fire as many as forty or even fifty thousand rounds of
Remington cartridges, and the Arab fire was sometimes heavier. This
incessant fire, as the heroic defender wrote in his journal, murdered
sleep, and at last he became so accustomed to it that he could tell by
the sound where the firing was taking place. The most distant points
of the defence, such as the _santal_ on the White Nile and Fort
Omdurman, were two miles from the Palace; and although telegraphic
communication existed with them during the greater part of the siege,
the oral evidence as to the point of attack was often found the most
rapid means of obtaining information. This was still more advantageous
after the 12th of November, for on that day communications were cut
between Khartoum and Omdurman, and it was found impossible to restore
them. The only communications possible after that date were by bugle
and flag. At the time of this severance Gordon estimated that the
garrison of Omdurman had enough water and biscuit for six weeks, and
that there were 250,000 cartridges in the arsenal. Gordon did
everything in his power to aid Ferratch in the defence, and his
remaining steamer, the _Ismailia_, after the grounding of the
_Husseinyeh_ on the very day Omdurman was cut off, was engaged in
almost daily encounters with the Mahdists for that purpose. Owing to
Gordon's incessant efforts, and the gallantry of the garrison led by
Ferratch, Omdurman held out more than two months. It was not until
15th January that Ferratch, with Gordon's leave, surrendered, and then
when the Mahdists occupied the place, General Gordon had the
satisfaction of shelling them out of it, and showing that it was
untenable.

The severance of Omdurman from Khartoum was the prelude to fiercer
fighting than had taken place at any time during the earlier stages of
the siege, and although particulars are not obtainable for the last
month of the period, there is no doubt that the struggle was
incessant, and that the fighting was renewed from day to day. It was
then that Gordon missed the ships lying idle at Shendy. If he had had
them Omdurman would not have fallen, nor would it have been so easy
for the Mahdi to transport the bulk of his force from the left to the
right bank of the White Nile, as he did for the final assault on the
fatal 26th January.

At the end of October the Mahdi, accompanied by a far more numerous
force than Gordon thought he could raise, described by Slatin as
countless, pitched his camp a few miles south of Omdurman. On 8th
November his arrival was celebrated by a direct attack on the lines
south of Khartoum. The rebels in their fear of the hidden mines, which
was far greater than it need have been, as it was found they had been
buried too deep, resorted to the artifice of driving forward cows, and
by throwing rockets among them Gordon had the satisfaction of
spreading confusion in their ranks, repulsing the attack, and
capturing twenty of the animals. Four days later the rebels made the
desperate attack on Omdurman, when, as stated, communications were
cut, and the _Husseinyeh_ ran aground. In attempting to carry her off
and to check the further progress of the rebels the _Ismailia_ was
badly hit, and the incident was one of those only too frequent at all
stages of the siege, when Gordon wrote: "Every time I hear the gun
fire I have a twitch of the heart of gnawing anxiety for my penny
steamers." At the very moment that these fights were in progress he
wrote, 10th November: "To-day is the day I expected we should have had
some one of the Expedition here;" and he also recorded that we "have
enough biscuit for a month or so"--meaning at the outside six weeks.
Throughout the whole of November rumours of a coming British
Expedition were prevalent, but they were of the vaguest and most
contradictory character. On 25th November Gordon learnt that it was
still at Ambukol, 185 miles further away from Khartoum than he had
expected, and his only comment under this acute disappointment was,
"This is lively!"

Up to the arrival of the Mahdi daily desertions of his Arab and other
soldiers to Gordon took place, and by these and levies among the
townspeople all gaps in the garrison were more than filled up. Such
was the confidence in Gordon that it more than neutralised all the
intrigues of the Mahdi's agents in the besieged town, and scarcely a
man during the first seven months of the siege deserted him; but after
the arrival of the Mahdi there was a complete change in this respect.
In the first place there were no more desertions to Gordon, and then
men began to leave him, partly, no doubt, from fear of the Mahdi, or
awakened fanaticism, but chiefly through the non-arrival of the
British Expedition, which had been so much talked about, yet which
never came. Still to all the enemy's invitations to surrender on the
most honourable terms Gordon gave defiant answers. "I am here like
iron, and I hope to see the newly-arrived English;" and when the
situation had become little short of desperate, at the end of the
year, he still, with bitter agony at his heart, proudly rejected all
overtures, and sent the haughty message: "Can hold Khartoum for twelve
years." Unfortunately the Mahdi knew better. He had read the truth in
all the papers captured on Stewart's steamer, and he knew that
Gordon's resources were nearly spent. Even some of the messages Gordon
sent out by spies for Lord Wolseley's information fell into his hands,
and on one of these Slatin says it was written: "Can hold Khartoum at
the outside till the end of January." Although Gordon may be
considered to have more than held his own against all the power of the
Mahdi down to the capture of Omdurman Fort on 15th January, the Mahdi
knew that his straits must be desperate, and that unless the
expedition arrived he could not hold out much longer. The first
advance of the English troops on 3rd January across the desert towards
the Nile probably warned the enemy that now was the time to renew the
attack with greater vigour, but it does not seem that there is any
justification for the entirely hypothetical view that at any point the
Mahdi could have seized the unhappy town. Omdurman Fort itself fell,
not to the desperate onset of his Ghazis, but from the want of food
and ammunition, and with Gordon's expressed permission to the
commandant to surrender. Unfortunately the details of the most tragic
part of the siege are missing, but Gordon himself well summed up what
he had done up to the end of October when his position was secure, and
aid, as he thought, was close at hand:--

     "The news of Hicks's defeat was known in Cairo three weeks after
     the event occurred; since that date up to this (29th October
     1884) nine people have come up as reinforcements--myself,
     Stewart, Herbin, Hussein, Tongi, Ruckdi, and three servants, and
     not one penny of money. Of those who came up two, Stewart and
     Herbin, have gone down, Hussein is dead; so six alone remain,
     while we must have sent down over 1500 and 700 soldiers, total
     2200, including the two Pashas, Coetlogon, etc. The regulars, who
     were in arrears of pay for three months when I came, are now only
     owed half a month, while the Bashi-Bazouks are owed only a
     quarter month, and we have some £500 in the Treasury. It is quite
     a miracle. We have lost two battles, suffering severe losses in
     these actions of men and arms, and may have said to have
     scrambled through, for I cannot say we can lay claim to any great
     success during the whole time. I believe we have more ammunition
     (Remington) and more soldiers now than when I came up. We have
     £40,000 in Treasury _in paper_ and £500. When I came up there was
     £5000 in Treasury. We have £15,000 out in the town in paper
     money."

At the point (14th December) when the authentic history of the
protracted siege and gallant defence of Khartoum stops, a pause may be
made to turn back and describe what the Government and country which
sent General Gordon on his most perilous mission, and made use of his
extraordinary devotion to the call of duty to extricate themselves
from a responsibility they had not the courage to face, had been doing
not merely to support their envoy, but to vindicate their own honour.
The several messages which General Gordon had succeeded in getting
through had shown how necessary some reinforcement and support were at
the very commencement of the siege. The lapse of time, rendered the
more expressive by the long period of silence that fell over what was
taking place in the besieged town, showed, beyond need of
demonstration, the gravity of the case and the desperate nature of the
situation. But a very little of the knowledge at the command of the
Government from a number of competent sources would have enabled it to
foresee what was certain to happen, and to have provided some remedy
for the peril long before the following despairing message from Gordon
showed that the hour when any aid would be useful had almost expired.
This was the passage, dated 13th December, in the last (sixth) volume
of the Journal, but the substance of which reached Lord Wolseley by
one of Gordon's messengers at Korti on 31st December:--

     "We are going to send down the _Bordeen_ the day after to-morrow,
     and with her I shall send this Journal. _If some effort is not
     made before ten days' time the town will fall._ It is
     inexplicable this delay. If the Expeditionary forces have reached
     the river and met my steamers, one hundred men are all that we
     require just to show themselves.... Even if the town falls under
     the nose of the Expeditionary forces it will not in my opinion
     justify the abandonment of Senaar and Kassala, or of the
     Equatorial Province by H.M.'s Government. All that is absolutely
     necessary is for fifty of the Expeditionary force to get on board
     a steamer and come up to Halfiyeh, and thus let their presence be
     felt. This is not asking much, but it must happen _at once_, or
     it will (as usual) be too late."

The motives which induced Mr Gladstone's Government to send General
Gordon to the Soudan in January 1884 were, as has been clearly shown,
the selfish desire to appease public opinion, and to shirk in the
easiest possible manner a great responsibility. They had no policy at
all, but they had one supreme wish, viz. to cut off the Soudan from
Egypt; and if the Mahdi had only known their wishes and pressed on,
and treated the Khartoum force as he had treated that under Hicks,
there would have been no garrisons to rescue, and that British
Government would have done nothing. It recked nothing of the grave
dangers that would have accrued from the complete triumph of the
Mahdi, or of the outbreak that must have followed in Lower Egypt if
his tide of success had not been checked as it was single-handed by
General Gordon, through the twelve months' defence of Khartoum. Still
it could not quite stoop to the dishonour of abandoning these
garrisons, and of making itself an accomplice to the Mahdi's
butcheries, nor could it altogether turn a deaf ear to the
representations and remonstrances of even such a puppet prince as the
Khedive Tewfik. England was then far more mistress of the situation at
Cairo than she is now, but a helpless refusal to discharge her duty
might have provoked Europe into action at the Porte that would have
proved inconvenient and damaging to her position and reputation.
Therefore the Government fell back on General Gordon, and the hope was
even indulged that, under his exceptional reputation, the evacuation
of the Soudan might not only be successfully carried out, but that his
success might induce the public and the world to accept that
abnegation of policy as the acme of wisdom. In all this they were
destined to a complete awakening, and the only matter of surprise is
that they should have sent so well-known a character as General
Gordon, whose independence and contempt for official etiquette and
restraint were no secrets at the Foreign and War Offices, on a mission
in which they required him not only to be as indifferent to the
national honour as they were, but also to be tied and restrained by
the shifts and requirements of an embarrassed executive.

At a very early stage of the mission the Government obtained evidence
that Gordon's views on the subject were widely different from theirs.
They had evidently persuaded themselves that their policy was Gordon's
policy; and before he was in Khartoum a week he not merely points out
that the evacuation policy is not his but theirs, and that although he
thinks its execution is still possible, the true policy is, "if Egypt
is to be quiet, that the Mahdi must be smashed up." The hopes that had
been based on Gordon's supposed complaisance in the post of
representative on the Nile of the Government policy were thus
dispelled, and it became evident that Gordon, instead of being a tool,
was resolved to be master, so far as the mode of carrying out the
evacuation policy with full regard for the dictates of honour was to
be decided. Nor was this all, or the worst of the revelations made to
the Government in the first few weeks after his arrival at Khartoum.
While expressing his willingness and intention to discharge the chief
part of his task, viz. the withdrawal of the garrisons, which was all
the Government cared about, he also descanted on the moral duty and
the inevitable necessity of setting up a provisional government that
should avert anarchy and impose some barrier to the Mahdi's progress.
All this was trying to those who only wished to be rid of the whole
matter, but Gordon did not spare their feelings, and phrase by phrase
he revealed what his own policy would be and what his inner wishes,
however repressed his charge might keep them, really were.

Having told them that "the Mahdi must be smashed up," he went on to
say that "we cannot hurry over this affair" (the future of the Soudan)
"if we do we shall incur disaster," and again that, although "it is a
miserable country it is joined to Egypt, and it would be difficult to
divorce the two." Within a very few weeks, therefore, the Government
learnt that its own agent was the most forcible and damaging critic of
the policy of evacuation, and that the worries of the Soudan question
for an administration not resolute enough to solve the difficulty in a
thorough manner were increased and not diminished by Gordon's mission.
At that point the proposition was made and supported by several
members of the Cabinet that Gordon should be recalled. There is no
doubt that this step would have been taken but for the fear that it
would aggravate the difficulties of the English expedition sent to
Souakim under the command of General Gerald Graham to retrieve the
defeat of Baker Pasha. Failing the adoption of that extreme measure,
which would at least have been straightforward and honest, and
ignoring what candour seemed to demand if a decision had been come to
to render Gordon no support, and to bid him shift for himself, the
Government resorted to the third and least justifiable course of all,
viz. of showing indifference to the legitimate requests of their
emissary, and of putting off definite action until the very last
moment.

We have seen that Gordon made several specific demands in the first
six weeks of his stay at Khartoum--that is, in the short period before
communication was cut off. He wanted Zebehr, 200 troops at Berber, or
even at Wady Halfa, and the opening of the route from Souakim to the
Nile. To these requests not one favourable answer was given, and the
not wholly unnatural rejection of the first rendered it more than ever
necessary to comply with the others. They were such as ought to have
been granted, and in anticipation they had been suggested and
discussed before Gordon felt bound to urge them as necessary for the
security of his position at Khartoum. Even Sir Evelyn Baring had
recommended in February the despatch of 200 men to Assouan for the
moral effect, and that was the very reason why Gordon asked, in the
first place, for the despatch of a small British force to at least
Wady Halfa. It is possible that one of the chief reasons for the
Government rejecting all these suggestions, and also, it must be
remembered, doing nothing in their place towards the relief and
support of their representative, may have been the hope that this
treatment would have led him to resign and throw up his mission. They
would then have been able to declare that, as the task was beyond the
powers of General Gordon, they were only coming to the prudent and
logical conclusion in saying that nothing could be done, and that the
garrisons had better come to terms with the Mahdi. Unfortunately for
those who favoured the evasion of trouble as the easiest and best way
out of the difficulty, Gordon had high notions as to what duty
required. No difficulty had terrors for him, and while left at the
post of power and responsibility he would endeavour to show himself
equal to the charge.

Yet there can be no doubt that those who sent him would have rejoiced
if he had formally asked to be relieved of the task he had accepted,
and Mr Gladstone stated on the 3rd April that "Gordon was under no
orders and no restraint to stay at Khartoum." A significant answer to
the fact represented in that statement was supplied, when, ten days
later, silence fell on Khartoum, and remained unbroken for more than
five months. But at the very moment that the Prime Minister made that
statement as to Gordon's liberty of movement, the Government knew of
the candid views which he had expressed as to the proper policy for
the Soudan. It should have been apparent that, unless they and their
author were promptly repudiated, and unless the latter was stripped of
his official authority, the Government would, however tardily and
reluctantly, be drawn after its representative into a policy of
intervention in the Soudan, which it, above everything else,
wished to avoid. Gordon concealed nothing. He told them "time,"
"reinforcements," and a very considerable expenditure was necessary to
honourably carry out their policy of evacuation. They were not
prepared to concede any of these save the last, and even the money
they sent him was lost because they would send it by Berber instead of
Kassala. But they knew that "the order and restraint" which kept
Gordon at Khartoum was the duty he had contracted towards them when he
accepted his mission, and which was binding on a man of his principles
until they chose to relieve him of the task. The fear of public
opinion had more to do with their abstaining from the step of ordering
his recall than the hope that his splendid energy and administrative
power might yet provide some satisfactory issue from the dilemma, for
at the very beginning it was freely given out that "General Gordon
was exceeding his instructions."

The interruption of communications with Khartoum at least suspended
Gordon's constant representations as to what he thought the right
policy, as well as his demands for the fulfilment by the Government of
their side of the contract. It was then that Lord Granville seemed to
pluck up heart of grace, and to challenge Gordon's right to remain at
Khartoum. On 23rd April Lord Granville asked for explanation of "cause
of detention." Unfortunately it was not till months later that the
country knew of Gordon's terse and humorous reply, "cause of
detention, these horribly plucky Arabs." Lord Granville, thinking this
despatch not clear enough, followed it up on 17th May by instructing
Mr Egerton, then acting for Sir Evelyn Baring, to send the following
remonstrance to Gordon:

     "As the original plan for the evacuation of the Soudan has been
     dropped, and as aggressive operations cannot be undertaken with
     the countenance of H.M.'s Government, General Gordon is enjoined
     to consider, and either to report upon, or, if possible, to adopt
     at the first proper moment measures for his own removal and for
     that of the Egyptians at Khartoum who have suffered for him, or
     who have served him faithfully, including their wives and
     children, by whatever route he may consider best, having especial
     regard to his own safety and that of the other British subjects."

Then followed suggestions and authority to pay so much a head for
refugees safely escorted to Korosko. The comment Gordon made on that,
and similar despatches, to save himself and any part of the garrison
he could, was that he was not so mean as to desert those who had nobly
stood by him and committed themselves on the strength of his word.

It is impossible to go behind the collective responsibility of the
Government and to attempt to fix any special responsibility or blame
on any individual member of that Government. The facts as I read them
show plainly that there was a complete abnegation of policy or purpose
on the part of the British Government, that Gordon was then sent as a
sort of stop-gap, and that when it was revealed that he had strong
views and clear plans, not at all in harmony with those who sent him,
it was thought, by the Ministers who had not the courage to recall
him, very inconsiderate and insubordinate of him to remain at his post
and to refuse all the hints given him, that he ought to resign unless
he would execute a _sauve qui peut_ sort of retreat to the frontier.
Very harsh things have been said of Mr Gladstone and his Cabinet on
this point, but considering their views and declarations, it is not so
very surprising that Gordon's boldness and originality alarmed and
displeased them. Their radical fault in these early stages of the
question was not that they were indifferent to Gordon's demands, but
that they had absolutely no policy. They could not even come to the
decision, as Gordon wrote, "to abandon altogether and not care what
happens."

But all these minor points were merged in a great common national
anxiety when month after month passed during the spring and summer of
1884, and not a single word issued from the tomb-like silence of
Khartoum. People might argue that the worst could not have happened,
as the Mahdi would have been only too anxious to proclaim his triumph
far and wide if Khartoum had fallen. Anxiety may be diminished, but is
not banished, by a calculation of probabilities, and the military
spirit and capacity exhibited by the Mahdi's forces under Osman Digma
in the fighting with General Graham's well-equipped British force at
Teb and Tamanieb revealed the greatness of the peril with which Gordon
had to deal at Khartoum where he had only the inadequate and
untrustworthy garrison described by Colonel de Coetlogon. During the
summer of 1884 there was therefore a growing fear, not only that the
worst news might come at any moment, but that in the most favourable
event any news would reveal the desperate situation to which Gordon
had been reduced, and with that conviction came the thought, not
whether he had exactly carried out what Ministers had expected him to
do, but solely of his extraordinary courage and devotion to his
country, which had led him to take up a thankless task without the
least regard for his comfort or advantage, and without counting the
odds. There was at least one Minister in the Cabinet who was struck by
that single-minded conduct; and as early as April, when his colleagues
were asking the formal question why Gordon did not leave Khartoum, the
Marquis of Hartington, then Minister of War, and now Duke of
Devonshire, began to inquire as to the steps necessary to rescue the
emissary, while still adhering to the policy of the Administration of
which he formed part. During the whole of that summer the present Duke
of Devonshire advocated the special claim of General Gordon on the
Government, whose mandate he had so readily accepted, and urged the
necessity of special measures being taken at the earliest moment to
save the gallant envoy from what seemed the too probable penalty of
his own temerity and devotion. But for his energetic and consistent
representations the steps that were taken--all too late as they
proved--never would have been taken at all, or deferred to such a date
as to let the public see by the event that there was no use in
throwing away money and precious lives on a lost cause.

If the first place among those in power--for of my own and other
journalists' efforts in the Press to arouse public opinion and to urge
the Government to timely action it is unnecessary to speak--is due to
the Duke of Devonshire, the second may reasonably be claimed by Lord
Wolseley. This recognition is the more called for here, because the
most careful consideration of the facts has led me to the conclusion,
which I would gladly avoid the necessity of expressing if it were
possible, that Lord Wolseley was responsible for the failure of the
relief expedition. This stage of responsibility has not yet been
reached, and it must be duly set forth that on 24th July Lord
Wolseley, then Adjutant-General, wrote a noble letter, stating that,
as he "did not wish to share the responsibility of leaving Charley
Gordon to his fate," he recommended "immediate action," and "the
despatch of a small brigade of between three and four thousand British
soldiers to Dongola, so that they might reach that place about 15th
October." But even that date was later than it ought to have been,
especially when the necessity of getting the English troops back as
early in the New Year as possible was considered, and in the
subsequent recriminations that ensued, the blame for being late from
the start was sought to be thrown on the badness of the Nile flood
that year. General Gordon himself cruelly disposed of that theory or
excuse when he wrote, "It was not a bad Nile; quite an average one.
You were too late, that was all." Still, Lord Wolseley must not be
robbed of the credit of having said on 24th July that an expedition
was necessary to save Gordon, "his old friend and Crimean comrade,"
towards whom Wolseley himself had contracted a special moral
obligation for his prominent share in inducing him to accept the very
mission that had already proved so full of peril. In short, if the
plain truth must be told, Lord Wolseley was far more responsible for
the despatch of General Gordon to Khartoum than Mr Gladstone.

The result of the early representations of the Duke of Devonshire, and
the definite suggestion of Lord Wolseley, was that the Government gave
in when the public anxiety became so great at the continued silence of
Khartoum, and acquiesced in the despatch of an expedition to relieve
General Gordon. Having once made the concession, it must be allowed
that they showed no niggard spirit in sanctioning the expedition and
the proposals of the military authorities. The sum of ten millions was
devoted to the work of rescuing Gordon by the very persons who had
rejected his demands for the hundredth part of that total. Ten
thousand men selected from the _élite_ of the British army were
assigned to the task for which he had begged two hundred men in vain.
It is impossible here to enter closely into the causes which led to
the expansion of the three or four thousand British infantry into a
special corps of ten thousand fighting men, picked from the crack
regiments of the army, and composed of every arm of the service
compelled to fight under unaccustomed conditions. The local
authorities--in particular Major Kitchener, now the Sirdar of the
Egyptian army, who is slowly recovering from the Mahdi the provinces
which should never have been left in his possession--protested that
the expedition should be a small one, and if their advice had been
taken the cost would have been about one-fourth that incurred, and the
force would have reached Khartoum by that 11th November on which
Gordon expected to see the first man of it. But Major Kitchener,
although, as Gordon wrote, "one of the few really first-class officers
in the British army," was only an individual, and his word did not
possess a feather's weight before the influence of the Pall Mall band
of warriors who have farmed out our little wars--India, of course,
excepted--of the last thirty years for their own glorification. So
great a chance of fame as "the rescue of Gordon" was not to be left to
some unknown brigadiers, or to the few line regiments, the proximity
of whose stations entitled them to the task. That would be neglecting
the favours of Providence. For so noble a task the control of the most
experienced commander in the British army would alone suffice, and
when he took the field his staff had to be on the extensive scale that
suited his dignity and position. As there would be some reasonable
excuse for the dispensation of orders and crosses from a campaign
against a religious leader who had not yet known defeat, any friend
might justly complain if he was left behind. To justify so brilliant a
staff, no ordinary British force would suffice. Therefore our
household brigade, our heavy cavalry, and our light cavalry were
requisitioned for their best men, and these splendid troops were
drafted and amalgamated into special corps--heavy and light
camelry--for work that would have been done far better and more
efficiently by two regiments of Bengal Lancers. If all this effort and
expenditure had resulted in success, it would be possible to keep
silent and shrug one's shoulders; but when the mode of undertaking
this expedition can be clearly shown to have been the direct cause of
its failure, silence would be a crime. When Lord Wolseley told the
soldiers at Korti on their return from Metemmah, "It was not _your_
fault that Gordon has perished and Khartoum fallen," the positiveness
of his assurance may have been derived from the inner conviction of
his own stupendous error.

The expedition was finally sanctioned in August, and the news of its
coming was known to General Gordon in September, before, indeed, his
own despatches of 31st July were received in London, and broke the
suspense of nearly half a year. He thought that only a small force was
coming, under the command of Major-General Earle, and he at once, as
already described, sent his steamers back to Shendy, there to await
the troops and convey them to Khartoum. He seems to have calculated
that three months from the date of the message informing him of the
expedition would suffice for the conveyance of the troops as far as
Berber or Metemmah, and at that rate General Earle would have arrived
where his steamers awaited him early in November. Gordon's views as to
the object of the expedition, which somebody called the Gordon Relief
Expedition, were thus clearly expressed:--

     "I altogether decline the imputation that the projected
     expedition has come to relieve me. It has come to save our
     National honour in extricating the garrisons, etc., from a
     position in which our action in Egypt has placed these garrisons.
     I was Relief Expedition No. 1; they are Relief Expedition No. 2.
     As for myself, I could make good my retreat at any moment, if I
     wished. Now realise what would happen if this first relief
     expedition was to bolt, and the steamers fell into the hands of
     the Mahdi. This second relief expedition (for the honour of
     England engaged in extricating garrisons) would be somewhat
     hampered. We, the first and second expeditions, are equally
     engaged for the honour of England. This is fair logic. I came up
     to extricate the garrison, and failed. Earle comes up to
     extricate garrisons, and I hope succeeds. Earle does not come to
     extricate me. The extrication of the garrisons was supposed to
     affect our "National honour." If Earle succeeds, the "National
     honour" thanks him, and I hope recommends him, but it is
     altogether independent of me, who, for failing, incurs its blame.
     I am not _the rescued lamb_, and I will not be."

Lord Wolseley, still possessed with the idea that, now that an
expedition had been sanctioned, the question of time was not of
supreme importance, and that the relieving expedition might be carried
out in a deliberate manner, which would be both more effective and
less exposed to risk, did not reach Cairo till September, and had only
arrived at Wady Halfa on 8th October, when his final instructions
reached him in the following form:--"The primary object of your
expedition is to bring away General Gordon and Colonel Stewart, and
you are not to advance further south than necessary to attain that
object, and when it has been secured, no further offensive operations
of any kind are to be undertaken." These instructions were simple and
clear enough. The Government had not discovered a policy. It had,
however, determined to leave the garrisons to their fate, despite the
National honour being involved, at the very moment that it sanctioned
an enormous expenditure to try and save the lives of its
long-neglected representatives, Gordon and Colonel Stewart. With
extraordinary shrewdness, Gordon detected the hollowness of its
purpose, and wrote:--"I very much doubt what is really going to be the
policy of our Government, even now that the Expedition is at Dongola,"
and if they intend ratting out, "the troops had better not come beyond
Berber till the question of what will be done is settled."

The receipt of Gordon's and Power's despatches of July showed that
there were, at the time of their being written, supplies for four
months, which would have carried the garrison on till the end of
November. As the greater part of that period had expired when these
documents reached Lord Wolseley's hands, it was quite impossible to
doubt that time had become the most important factor of all in the
situation. The chance of being too late would even then have presented
itself to a prudent commander, and, above all, to a friend hastening
to the rescue of a friend. The news that Colonel Stewart and some
other Europeans had been entrapped and murdered near Merowe, which
reached the English commander from different sources before Gordon
confirmed it in his letters, was also calculated to stimulate, by
showing that Gordon was alone, and had single-handed to conduct the
defence of a populous city. Hard on the heels of that intelligence
came Gordon's letter of 4th November to Lord Wolseley, who received it
at Dongola on 14th of the same month. The letter was a long one, but
only two passages need be quoted:--"At Metemmah, waiting your orders,
are five steamers with nine guns." Did it not occur to anyone how
greatly, at the worst stage of the siege, Gordon had thus weakened
himself to assist the relieving expedition? Even for that reason there
was not a day or an hour to be lost.

But the letter contained a worse and more alarming passage:--"We can
hold out forty days with ease; after that it will be difficult." Forty
days would have meant till 14th December, one month ahead of the day
Lord Wolseley received the news, but the message was really more
alarming than the form in which it was published, for there is no
doubt that the word "difficult" is the official rendering of Gordon's,
a little indistinctly written, word "desperate." In face of that
alarming message, which only stated facts that ought to have been
surmised, if not known, it was no longer possible to pursue the
leisurely promenade up the Nile, which was timed so as to bring the
whole force to Khartoum in the first week of March. Rescue by the most
prominent general and swell troops of England at Easter would hardly
gratify the commandant and garrison starved into surrender the
previous Christmas, and that was the exact relationship between
Wolseley's plans and Gordon's necessities.

The date at which Gordon's supplies would be exhausted varied not from
any miscalculation, but because on two successive occasions he
discovered large stores of grain and biscuits, which had been stolen
from the public granaries before his arrival. The supplies that would
all have disappeared in November were thus eked out, first till the
middle of December, and then finally till the end of January, but
there is no doubt that they would not have lasted as long as they did
if in the last month of the siege he had not given the civil
population permission to leave the doomed town. From any and from
every point of view, there was not the shadow of an excuse for a
moment's delay after the receipt of that letter on 14th November.

With the British Exchequer at a commander's back, it is easy to
organise an expedition on an elaborate scale, and to carry it out with
the nicety of perfection, but for the realisation of these ponderous
plans there is one thing more necessary, and that is time. I have no
doubt if Gordon's letter had said "granaries full, can hold out till
Easter," that Lord Wolseley's deliberate march--Cairo, September 27;
Wady Halfa, October 8; Dongola, November 14; Korti, December 30;
Metemmah any day in February, and Khartoum, March 3, and those were
the approximate dates of his grand plan of campaign--would have been
fully successful, and held up for admiration as a model of skill.
Unfortunately, it would not do for the occasion, as Gordon was on the
verge of starvation and in desperate straits when the rescuing force
reached Dongola. It is not easy to alter the plan of any campaign, nor
to adapt a heavy moving machine to the work suitable for a light one.
To feed 10,000 British soldiers on the middle Nile was alone a feat of
organisation such as no other country could have attempted, but the
effort was exhausting, and left no reserve energy to despatch that
quick-moving battalion which could have reached Gordon's steamers
early in December, and would have reinforced the Khartoum garrison,
just as Havelock and Outram did the Lucknow Residency.

Dongola is only 100 miles below Debbeh, where the intelligence
officers and a small force were on that 14th November; Ambukol,
specially recommended by Gordon as the best starting-point, is less
than fifty miles, and Korti, the point selected by Lord Wolseley, is
exactly that distance above Debbeh. The Bayuda desert route by the
Jakdul Wells to Metemmah is 170 miles. At Metemmah were the five
steamers with nine guns to convoy the desperately needed succour to
Khartoum. The energy expended on the despatch of 10,000 men up 150
miles of river, if concentrated on 1000 men, must have given a
speedier result, but, as the affair was managed, the last day of the
year 1884 was reached before there was even that small force ready to
make a dash across the desert for Metemmah.

The excuses made for this, as the result proved, fatal delay of taking
six weeks to do what--the forward movement from Dongola to Korti, not
of the main force, but of 1000 men--ought to have been done in one
week, were the dearth of camels, the imperfect drill of the camel
corps, and, it must be added, the exaggerated fear of the Mahdi's
power. When it was attempted to quicken the slow forward movement of
the unwieldy force confusion ensued, and no greater progress was
effected than if things had been left undisturbed. The erratic policy
in procuring camels caused them at the critical moment to be not
forthcoming in anything approaching the required numbers, and this
difficulty was undoubtedly increased by the treachery of Mahmoud
Khalifa, who was the chief contractor we employed. Even when the
camels were procured, they had to be broken in for regular work, and
the men accustomed to the strange drill and mode of locomotion. The
last reason perhaps had the most weight of all, for although the Mahdi
with all his hordes had been kept at bay by Gordon single-handed, Lord
Wolseley would risk nothing in the field. Probably the determining
reason for that decision was that the success of a small force would
have revealed how absolutely unnecessary his large and costly
expedition was. Yet events were to show beyond possibility of
contraversion that this was the case, for not less than two-thirds of
the force were never in any shape or form actively employed, and, as
far as the fate of Gordon went, might just as well have been left at
home. They had, however, to be fed and provided for at the end of a
line of communication of over 1200 miles.

Still, notwithstanding all these delays and disadvantages, a
well-equipped force of 1000 men was ready on 30th December to leave
Korti to cross the 170 miles of the Bayuda desert. That route was well
known and well watered. There were wells at, at least, five places,
and the best of these was at Jakdul, about half-way across. The
officer entrusted with the command was Major-General Sir Herbert
Stewart, an officer of a gallant disposition, who was above all others
impressed with the necessity of making an immediate advance, with the
view of throwing some help into Khartoum. Unfortunately he was
trammelled by his instructions, which were to this effect--he was to
establish a fort at Jakdul; but if he found an insufficiency of water
there he was at liberty to press on to Metemmah. His action was to be
determined by the measure of his own necessities, not of Gordon's, and
so Lord Wolseley arranged throughout. He reached that place with his
1100 fighting men, but on examining the wells and finding them full,
he felt bound to obey the orders of his commander, viz. to establish
the fort, and then return to Korti for a reinforcement. It was a case
when Nelson's blind eye might have been called into requisition, but
even the most gallant officers are not Nelsons.

The first advance of General Stewart to Jakdul, reached on 3rd January
1885, was in every respect a success. It was achieved without loss,
unopposed, and was quite of the nature of a surprise. The British
relieving force was at last, after many months' report, proved to be
a reality, and although late, it was not too late. If General Stewart
had not been tied by his instructions, but left a free hand, he would
undoubtedly have pressed on, and a reinforcement of British troops
would have entered Khartoum even before the fall of Omdurman. But it
must be recorded also that Sir Herbert Stewart was not inspired by the
required flash of genius. He paid more deference to the orders of Lord
Wolseley than to the grave peril of General Gordon.

General Stewart returned to Korti on the 7th January, bringing with
him the tired camels, and he found that during his absence still more
urgent news had been received from Gordon, to the effect that if aid
did not come within ten days from the 14th December, the place might
fall, and that under the nose of the expedition. The native who
brought this intimation arrived at Korti the day after General Stewart
left, but a messenger could easily have caught him up and given him
orders to press on at all cost. It was not realised at the time, but
the neglect to give that order, and the rigid adherence to a
preconceived plan, proved fatal to the success of the whole
expedition.

The first advance of General Stewart had been in the nature of a
surprise, but it aroused the Mahdi to a sense of the position, and the
subsequent delay gave him a fortnight to complete his plans and assume
the offensive.

On 12th January--that is, nine days after his first arrival at
Jakdul--General Stewart reached the place a second time with the
second detachment of another 1000 men--the total fighting strength of
the column being raised to about 2300 men. For whatever errors had
been committed, and their consequences, the band of soldiers assembled
at Jakdul on that 12th of January could in no sense be held
responsible. Without making any invidious comparisons, it may be
truthfully said that such a splendid fighting force was never
assembled in any other cause, and the temper of the men was strung to
a high point of enthusiasm by the thought that at last they had
reached the final stage of the long journey to rescue Gordon. A number
of causes, principally the fatigue of the camels from the treble
journey between Korti and Jakdul, made the advance very slow, and five
days were occupied in traversing the forty-five miles between Jakdul
and the wells at Abou Klea, themselves distant twenty miles from
Metemmah. On the morning of 17th January it became clear that the
column was in presence of an enemy.

At the time of Stewart's first arrival at Jakdul there were no hostile
forces in the Bayuda desert. At Berber was a considerable body of the
Mahdi's followers, and both Metemmah and Shendy were held in his name.
At the latter place a battery or small fort had been erected, and in
an encounter between it and Gordon's steamers one of the latter had
been sunk, thus reducing their total to four. But there were none of
the warrior tribes of Kordofan and Darfour at any of these places, or
nearer than the six camps which had been established round Khartoum.
The news of the English advance made the Mahdi bestir himself, and as
it was known that the garrison of Omdurman was reduced to the lowest
straits, and could not hold out many days, the Mahdi despatched some
of his best warriors of the Jaalin, Degheim, and Kenana tribes to
oppose the British troops in the Bayuda desert. It was these men who
opposed the further advance of Sir Herbert Stewart's column at Abou
Klea. It is unnecessary to describe the desperate assault these
gallant warriors made on the somewhat cumbrous and ill-arranged square
of the British force, or the ease and tremendous loss with which these
fanatics were beaten off, and never allowed to come to close quarters,
save at one point. The infantry soldiers, who formed two sides of the
square, signally repulsed the onset, not a Ghazi succeeded in getting
within a range of 300 yards; but on another side, cavalrymen, doing
infantry soldiers' unaccustomed work, did not adhere to the strict
formation necessary, and trained for the close _melée_, and with the
_gaudia certaminis_ firing their blood, they recklessly allowed the
Ghazis to come to close quarters, and their line of the square was
impinged upon. In that close fighting, with the Heavy Camel Corps men
and the Naval Brigade, the Blacks suffered terribly, but they also
inflicted loss in return. Of a total loss on the British side of
sixty-five killed and sixty-one wounded, the Heavy Camel Corps lost
fifty-two, and the Sussex Regiment, performing work to which it was
thoroughly trained, inflicted immense loss on the enemy at hardly any
cost to itself. Among the slain was the gallant Colonel Fred. Burnaby,
one of the noblest and gentlest, as he was physically the strongest,
officers in the British army. There is no doubt that signal as was
this success, it shook the confidence of the force. The men were
resolute to a point of ferocity, but the leaders' confidence in
themselves and their task had been rudely tried; and yet the breaking
of the square had been clearly due to a tactical blunder, and the
inability of the cavalry to adapt themselves to a strange position.

On the 18th January the march, rendered slower by the conveyance of
the wounded, was resumed, but no fighting took place on that day,
although it was clear that the enemy had not been dispersed. On the
19th, when the force had reached the last wells at Abou Kru or Gubat,
it became clear that another battle was to be fought. One of the first
shots seriously wounded Sir Herbert Stewart, and during the whole of
the affair many of our men were carried off by the heavy rifle fire of
the enemy. Notwithstanding that our force fought under many
disadvantages and was not skilfully handled, the Mahdists were driven
off with terrible loss, while our force had thirty-six killed and one
hundred and seven wounded. Notwithstanding these two defeats, the
enemy were not cowed, and held on to Metemmah, in which no doubt those
who had taken part in the battles were assisted by a force from
Berber. The 20th January was wasted in inaction, caused by the large
number of wounded, and when on 21st January Metemmah was attacked, the
Mahdists showed so bold a front that Sir Charles Wilson, who succeeded
to the command on Sir Herbert Stewart being incapacitated by his, as
it proved, mortal wound, drew off his force. This was the more
disappointing, because Gordon's four steamers arrived during the
action and took a gallant part in the attack. It was a pity for the
effect produced that that attack should have been distinctly
unsuccessful. The information the captain of these steamers, the
gallant Cassim el Mousse, gave about Gordon's position was alarming.
He stated that Gordon had sent him a message informing him that if aid
did not come in ten days from the 14th December his position would be
desperate, and the volumes of his journal which he handed over to Sir
Charles Wilson amply corroborated this statement--the very last entry
under that date being these memorable words: "Now, mark this, if the
Expeditionary Force--and I ask for no more than 200 men--does not come
in ten days, _the town may fall_, and I have done my best for the
honour of our country. Good-bye."

The other letters handed over by Cassim el Mousse amply bore out the
view that a month before the British soldiers reached the last stretch
of the Nile to Khartoum Gordon's position was desperate. In one to his
sister he concluded, "I am quite happy, thank God, and, like Lawrence,
have tried to do my duty," and in another to his friend Colonel
Watson: "I think the game is up, and send Mrs Watson, yourself, and
Graham my adieux. We may expect a catastrophe in the town in or after
ten days. This would not have happened (if it does happen) if our
people had taken better precautions as to informing us of their
movements, but this is 'spilt milk.'" In face of these documents,
which were in the hands of Sir Charles Wilson on 21st January, it is
impossible to agree with his conclusion in his book "Korti to
Khartoum," that "the delay in the arrival of the steamers at Khartoum
was unimportant" as affecting the result. Every hour, every minute,
had become of vital importance. If the whole Jakdul column had been
destroyed in the effort, it was justifiable to do so as the price of
reinforcing Gordon, so that he could hold out until the main body
under Lord Wolseley could arrive. I am not one of those who think
that Sir Charles Wilson, who only came on the scene at the last
moment, should be made the scapegoat for the mistakes of others in the
earlier stages of the expedition, and I hold now, as strongly as when
I wrote the words, the opinion that, "in the face of what he did, any
suggestion that he might have done more would seem both ungenerous and
untrue." Still the fact remains that on 21st January there was left a
sufficient margin of time to avert what actually occurred at daybreak
on the 26th, for the theory that the Mahdi could have entered the town
one hour before he did was never a serious argument, while the
evidence of Slatin Pasha strengthens the view that Gordon was at the
last moment only overcome by the Khalifa's resorting to a surprise. On
one point of fact Sir Charles Wilson seems also to have been in error.
He fixes the fall of Omdurman at 6th January, whereas Slatin, whose
information on the point ought to be unimpeachable, states that it did
not occur until the 15th of that month.

When Sir Herbert Stewart had fought and won the battle of Abou Klea,
it was his intention on reaching the Nile, as he expected to do the
next day, to put Sir Charles Wilson on board one of Gordon's own
steamers and send him off at once to Khartoum. The second battle and
Sir Herbert Stewart's fatal wound destroyed that project. But this
plan might have been adhered to so far as the altered circumstances
would allow. Sir Charles Wilson had succeeded to the command, and many
matters affecting the position of the force had to be settled before
he was free to devote himself to the main object of the dash forward,
viz. the establishment of communications with Gordon and Khartoum. As
the consequence of that change in his own position, it would have been
natural that he should have delegated the task to someone else, and in
Lord Charles Beresford, as brave a sailor as ever led a cutting-out
party, there was the very man for the occasion. Unfortunately, Sir
Charles Wilson did not take this step for, as I believe, the sole
reason that he was the bearer of an important official letter to
General Gordon, which he did not think could be entrusted to any other
hands. But for that circumstance it is permissible to say that one
steamer--there was more than enough wood on the other three steamers
to fit one out for the journey to Khartoum--would have sailed on the
morning of the 22nd, the day after the force sheered off from
Metemmah, and, at the latest, it would have reached Khartoum on
Sunday, the 25th, just in time to avert the catastrophe.

But as it was done, the whole of the 22nd and 23rd were taken up in
preparing two steamers for the voyage, and in collecting scarlet coats
for the troops, so that the effect of real British soldiers coming up
the Nile might be made more considerable. At 8 A.M. on Saturday, the
24th, Sir Charles Wilson at last sailed with the two steamers,
_Bordeen_ and _Talataween_, and it was then quite impossible for the
steamers to cover the ninety-five miles to Khartoum in time. Moreover,
the Nile had, by this time, sunk to such a point of shallowness that
navigation was specially slow and even dangerous. The Shabloka
cataract was passed at 3 P.M. on the afternoon of Sunday; then the
_Bordeen_ ran on a rock, and was not got clear till 9 P.M. on the
fatal 26th. On the 27th, Halfiyeh, eight miles from Khartoum, was
reached, and the Arabs along the banks shouted out that Gordon was
killed and Khartoum had fallen. Still Sir Charles Wilson went on past
Tuti Island, until he made sure that Khartoum had fallen and was in
the hands of the dervishes. Then he ordered full steam down stream
under as hot a fire as he ever wished to experience, Gordon's black
gunners working like demons at their guns. On the 29th the
_Talataween_ ran on a rock and sank, its crew being taken on board the
_Bordeen_. Two days later the _Bordeen_ shared the same fate, but the
whole party was finally saved on the 4th February by a third steamer,
brought up by Lord Charles Beresford. But these matters, and the
subsequent progress of the Expedition which had so ignominiously
failed, have no interest for the reader of Gordon's life. It failed to
accomplish the object which alone justified its being sent, and, it
must be allowed, that it accepted its failure in a very tame and
spiritless manner. Even at the moment of the British troops turning
their backs on the goal which they had not won, the fate of Gordon
himself was unknown, although there could be no doubt as to the main
fact that the protracted siege of Khartoum had terminated in its
capture by the cruel and savage foe, whom it, or rather Gordon, had so
long defied.

I have referred to the official letter addressed to General Gordon, of
which Sir Charles Wilson was the bearer. That letter has never been
published, and it is perhaps well for its authors that it has not
been, for, however softened down its language was by Lord Wolseley's
intercession, it was an order to General Gordon to resign the command
at Khartoum, and to leave that place without a moment's delay. Had it
been delivered and obeyed (as it might have been, because Gordon's
strength would probably have collapsed at the sight of English
soldiers after his long incarceration), the next official step would
have been to censure him for having remained at Khartoum against
orders. Thus would the primary, and, indeed, sole object of the
Expedition have been attained without regard for the national honour,
and without the discovery of that policy, the want of which was the
only cause of the calamities associated with the Soudan.

After the 14th of December there is no trustworthy, or at least,
complete evidence, as to what took place in Khartoum. A copy of one of
the defiant messages Gordon used to circulate for the special purpose
of letting them fall into the hands of the Mahdi was dated 29th of
that month, and ran to the effect, "Can hold Khartoum for years."
There was also the final message to the Sovereigns of the Powers,
undated, and probably written, if at all, by Gordon, during the final
agony of the last few weeks, perhaps when Omdurman had fallen. It was
worded as follows:--

     "After salutations, I would at once, calling to mind what I have
     gone through, inform their Majesties, the Sovereigns, of the
     action of Great Britain and the Ottoman Empire, who appointed me
     as Governor-General of the Soudan for the purpose of appeasing
     the rebellion in that country.

     "During the twelve months that I have been here, these two
     Powers, the one remarkable for her wealth, and the other for her
     military force, have remained unaffected by my situation--perhaps
     relying too much on the news sent by Hussein Pasha Khalifa, who
     surrendered of his own accord.

     "Although I, personally, am too insignificant to be taken into
     account, the Powers were bound, nevertheless, to fulfil the
     engagement upon which my appointment was based, so as to shield
     the honour of the Governments.

     "What I have gone through I cannot describe. The Almighty God
     will help me."

Although this copy was not in Gordon's own writing, it was brought
down by one of his clerks, who escaped from Khartoum, and he declared
that the original had been sent in a cartridge case to Dongola. The
style is certainly the style of Gordon, and there was no one in the
Soudan who could imitate it. It seems safe, as Sir Henry Gordon did,
to accept it as the farewell message of his brother.

Until fresh evidence comes to light, that of Slatin Pasha, then a
chained captive in the Mahdi's camp, is alone entitled to the
slightest credence, and it is extremely graphic. We can well believe
that up to the last moment Gordon continued to send out
messages--false, to deceive the Mahdi, and true to impress Lord
Wolseley. The note of 29th December was one of the former; the little
French note on half a cigarette paper, brought by Abdullah Khalifa to
Slatin to translate early in January, may have been one of the latter.
It said:--"Can hold Khartoum at the outside till the end of January."
Slatin then describes the fall of Omdurman on 15th January, with
Gordon's acquiescence, which entirely disposes of the assertion that
Ferratch, the gallant defender of that place during two months, was a
traitor, and of how, on its surrender, Gordon's fire from the western
wall of Khartoum prevented the Mahdists occupying it. He also comments
on the alarm caused by the first advance of the British force into the
Bayuda desert, and of the despatch of thousands of the Mahdi's best
warriors to oppose it. Those forces quitted the camp at Omdurman
between 10th and 15th January, and this step entirely disposes of the
theory that the Mahdi held Khartoum in the hollow of his hand, and
could at any moment take it. As late as the 15th of January, Gordon's
fire was so vigorous and successful that the Mahdi was unable to
retain possession of the fort which he had just captured.

The story had best be continued in the words used by the witness. Six
days after the fall of Omdurman loud weeping and wailing filled the
Mahdi's camp. As the Mahdi forbade the display of sorrow and grief it
was clear that something most unusual had taken place. Then it came
out that the British troops had met and utterly defeated the tribes,
with a loss to the Mahdists of several thousands. Within the next two
or three days came news of the other defeat at Abou Kru, and the loud
lamentations of the women and children could not be checked. The Mahdi
and his chief emirs, the present Khalifa Abdullah prominent among
them, then held a consultation, and it was decided, sooner than lose
all the fruits of the hitherto unchecked triumph of their cause, to
risk an assault on Khartoum. At night on the 24th, and again on the
25th, the bulk of the rebel force was conveyed across the river to the
right bank of the White Nile; the Mahdi preached them a sermon,
promising them victory, and they were enjoined to receive his remarks
in silence, so that no noise was heard in the beleaguered city. By
this time their terror of the mines laid in front of the south wall
had become much diminished, because the mines had been placed too low
in the earth, and they also knew that Gordon and his diminished force
were in the last stages of exhaustion. Finally, the Mahdi or his
energetic lieutenant decided on one more arrangement, which was
probably the true cause of their success. The Mahdists had always
delivered their attack half an hour after sunrise; on this occasion
they decided to attack half an hour before dawn, when the whole scene
was covered in darkness. Slatin knew all these plans, and as he
listened anxiously in his place of confinement he was startled, when
just dropping off to sleep, by "the deafening discharge of thousands
of rifles and guns; this lasted for a few minutes, then only
occasional rifle shots were heard, and now all was quiet again. Could
this possibly be the great attack on Khartoum? A wild discharge of
firearms and cannon, and in a few minutes complete silence!" He was
not left long in doubt. Some hours afterwards three black soldiers
approached, carrying in a bloody cloth the head of General Gordon,
which he identified. It is unnecessary to add the gruesome details
which Slatin picked up as to his manner of death from the gossip of
the camp. In this terrible tragedy ended that noble defence of
Khartoum, which, wherever considered or discussed, and for all time,
will excite the pity and admiration of the world.

There is no need to dwell further on the terrible end of one of the
purest heroes our country has ever produced, whose loss was national,
but most deeply felt as an irreparable shock, and as a void that can
never be filled up by that small circle of men and women who might
call themselves his friends. Ten years elapsed after the eventful
morning when Slatin pronounced over his remains the appropriate
epitaph, "A brave soldier who fell at his post; happy is he to have
fallen; his sufferings are over!" before the exact manner of Gordon's
death was known, and some even clung to the chance that after all he
might have escaped to the Equator, and indeed it was not till long
after the expedition had returned that the remarkable details of his
single-handed defence of Khartoum became known. Had all these
particulars come out at the moment when the public learnt that
Khartoum had fallen, and that the expedition was to return without
accomplishing anything, it is possible that there would have been a
demand that no Minister could have resisted to avenge his fate; but it
was not till the publication of the journals that the exact character
of his magnificent defence and of the manner in which he was treated
by those who sent him came to be understood and appreciated by the
nation.

The lapse of time has been sufficient to allow of a calm judgment
being passed on the whole transaction, and the considerations which I
have put forward with regard to it in the chronicle of events have
been dictated by the desire to treat all involved in the matter with
impartiality. If they approximate to the truth, they warrant the
following conclusions. The Government sent General Gordon to the
Soudan on an absolutely hopeless mission for any one or two men to
accomplish without that support in reinforcements on which General
Gordon thought he could count. General Gordon went to the Soudan, and
accepted that mission in the enthusiastic belief that he could arrest
the Mahdi's progress, and treating as a certainty which did not
require formal expression the personal opinion that the Government,
for the national honour, would comply with whatever demands he made
upon it. As a simple matter of fact, every one of those demands, some
against and some with Sir Evelyn Baring's authority, were rejected. No
incident could show more clearly the imperative need of definite
arrangements being made even with Governments; and in this case the
precipitance with which General Gordon was sent off did not admit of
him or the Government knowing exactly what was in the other's mind.
Ostensibly of one mind, their views on the matter in hand were really
as far as the poles asunder.

There then comes the second phase of the question--the alleged
abandonment of General Gordon by the Government which enlisted his
services in face of an extraordinary, and indeed unexampled danger and
difficulty. The evidence, while it proves conclusively and beyond
dispute that Mr Gladstone's Government never had a policy with regard
to the Soudan, and that even Gordon's heroism, inspiration, and
success failed to induce them to throw aside their lethargy and take
the course that, however much it may be postponed, is inevitable, does
not justify the charge that it abandoned Gordon to his fate. It
rejected the simplest and most sensible of his propositions, and by
rejecting them incurred an immense expenditure of British treasure and
an incalculable amount of bloodshed; but when the personal danger to
its envoy became acute, it did not abandon him, but sanctioned the
cost of the expedition pronounced necessary to effect his rescue. This
decision, too late as it was to assist in the formation of a new
administration for the Soudan, or to bring back the garrisons, was
taken in ample time to ensure the personal safety and rescue of
General Gordon. In the literal sense of the charge, history will
therefore acquit Mr Gladstone and his colleagues of the abandonment of
General Gordon personally.

With regard to the third phase of the question--viz. the failure of
the attempt to rescue General Gordon, which was essentially a
military, and not a political question--the responsibility passes from
the Prime Minister to the military authorities who decided the scope
of the campaign, and the commander who carried it out. In this case,
the individual responsible was the same. Lord Wolseley not only had
his own way in the route to be followed by the expedition, and the
size and importance attached to it, but he was also entrusted with its
personal direction. There is consequently no question of the
sub-division of the responsibility for its failure, just as there
could have been none of the credit for its success. Lord Wolseley
decided that the route should be the long one by the Nile Valley, not
the short one from Souakim to Berber. Lord Wolseley decreed that there
should be no Indian troops, and that the force, instead of being an
ordinary one, should be a picked special corps from the _élite_ of the
British army; and finally Lord Wolseley insisted that there should be
no dash to the rescue of Gordon by a small part of his force, but a
slow, impressive, and overpoweringly scientific advance of the whole
body. The extremity of Gordon's distress necessitated a slight
modification of his plan, when, with qualified instructions, which
practically tied his hands, Sir Herbert Stewart made his first
appearance at Jakdul.

It was then known to Lord Wolseley that Gordon was in extremities,
yet when a fighting force of 1100 English troops, of special physique
and spirit, was moved forward with sufficient transport to enable it
to reach the Nile and Gordon's steamers, the commander's instructions
were such as confined him to inaction, unless he disobeyed his orders,
which only Nelsons and Gordons can do with impunity. It is impossible
to explain this extraordinary timidity. Sir Herbert Stewart reached
Jakdul on 3rd January with a force small in numbers, but in every
other respect of remarkable efficiency, and with the camels
sufficiently fresh to have reached the Nile on 7th or 8th January had
it pressed on. The more urgent news that reached Lord Wolseley after
its departure would have justified the despatch of a messenger to urge
it to press on at all costs to Metemmah. In such a manner would a
Havelock or Outram have acted, yet the garrison of the Lucknow
Residency was in no more desperate case than Gordon at Khartoum.

It does not need to be a professor of a military academy to declare
that, unless something is risked in war, and especially wars such as
England has had to wage against superior numbers in the East, there
will never be any successful rescues of distressed garrisons. Lord
Wolseley would risk nothing in the advance from Korti to Metemmah,
whence his advance guard did not reach the latter place till the 20th,
instead of the 7th of January. His lieutenant and representative, Sir
Charles Wilson, would not risk anything on the 21st January, whence
none of the steamers appeared at Khartoum until late on the 27th, when
all was over. Each of these statements cannot be impeached, and if so,
the conclusion seems inevitable that in the first and highest degree
Lord Wolseley was alone responsible for the failure to reach Khartoum
in time, and that in a very minor degree Sir Charles Wilson might be
considered blameworthy for not having sent off one of the steamers
with a small reinforcement to Khartoum on the 21st January, before
even he allowed Cassim el Mousse to take any part in the attack on
Metemmah. He could not have done this himself, but he would have had
no difficulty in finding a substitute. When, however, there were
others far more blameworthy, it seems almost unjust to a gallant
officer to say that by a desperate effort he might at the very last
moment have snatched the chestnuts out of the fire, and converted the
most ignominious failure in the military annals of this country into a
creditable success.

       *       *       *       *       *

The tragic end at Khartoum was not an inappropriate conclusion for the
career of Charles Gordon, whose life had been far removed from the
ordinary experiences of mankind. No man who ever lived was called upon
to deal with a greater number of difficult military and
administrative problems, and to find the solution for them with such
inadequate means and inferior troops and subordinates. In the Crimea
he showed as a very young man the spirit, discernment, energy, and
regard for detail which were his characteristics through life. Those
qualities enabled him to achieve in China military exploits which in
their way have never been surpassed. The marvellous skill, confidence,
and vigilance with which he supplied the shortcomings of his troops,
and provided for the wants of a large population at Khartoum for the
better part of a year, showed that, as a military leader, he was still
the same gifted captain who had crushed the Taeping rebellion twenty
years before. What he did for the Soudan and its people during six
years' residence, at a personal sacrifice that never can be
appreciated, has been told at length; but pages of rhetoric would not
give as perfect a picture as the spontaneous cry of the blacks: "If we
only had a governor like Gordon Pasha, then the country would indeed
be contented."

"Such examples are fruitful in the future," said Mr Gladstone in the
House of Commons; and it is as a perfect model of all that was good,
brave, and true that Gordon will be enshrined in the memory of the
great English nation which he really died for, and whose honour was
dearer to him than his life. England may well feel proud of having
produced so noble and so unapproachable a hero. She has had, and she
will have again, soldiers as brave, as thoughtful, as prudent, and as
successful as Gordon. She has had, and she will have again, servants
of the same public spirit, with the same intense desire that not a
spot should sully the national honour. But although this breed is not
extinct, there will never be another Gordon. The circumstances that
produced him were exceptional; the opportunities that offered
themselves for the demonstration of his greatness can never fall to
the lot of another; and even if by some miraculous combination the man
and the occasions arose, the hero, unlike Gordon, would be spoilt by
his own success and public applause. But the qualities which made
Gordon superior not only to all his contemporaries, but to all the
temptations and weaknesses of success, are attainable; and the student
of his life will find that the guiding star he always kept before him
was the duty he owed his country. In that respect, above all others,
he has left future generations of his countrymen a great example.


THE END.




INDEX.


  _Abbas_, steamer, ii. 144;
    loss of, 145-6.
  Abd-el-Kader, ii. 100, 102, 119.
  Abdulgassin, ii. 32.
  Abdullah, the present Khalifa, ii. 98, 102.
  Abdurrahman, ii. 45, 68.
  Abou Hamid, ii. 144.
  Abou Klea, ii. 163;
    battle of, 164;
    loss at, _ibid._, 166.
  Abouna, an, ii. 33.
  Abou Kru, ii. 164;
    battle of, 165, 169.
  Abou Sammat, ii. 29.
  Abou Saoud, i. 149.
  Abyssinia, the expedition to, i. 131-2; ii. 5, 32, 35, 70 _passim_.
  Academy, Royal Military, i. 5, 6, 7.
  Adye, Sir John, i. 137.
  Afghanistan, ii. 45, 68, 69, 70.
  Alagos, i. 40.
  Albert Lake, i. 155, 156.
  Alexandropol, i. 35.
  Alla-ed-Din, ii. 102.
  Alma, i. 8, 16.
  Amoy, i. 72.
  Anderson, W. C., i. 41.
  Anfina, i. 158.
  Ani, i. 37, 38.
  Arabi Pasha, ii. 97.
  Arabs as soldiers, i. 150.
  Ararat, Mount, i. 38, 39.
  Aras, i. 33.
  Arendrup, ii. 5.
  Arokol Bey, ii. 5.
  _Army and Navy Gazette_, ii. 70.
  Ashantee Expedition, i. 138.
  Assiout, ii. 133.
  Assouan, ii. 153.
  Athens, i. 15.
  Ayoob, ii. 68.

  Bahr Arab, ii. 27.
  Bahr Gazelle, ii. 25, 105, 128.
  Baker, Sir S., i. 142, 143, 145, 149, 157; ii. 113, 118, 139.
  Baker Pasha, ii. 105, 136.
  Balaclava, i. 15, 16.
  Bara, ii. 103.
  Bari tribe, i. 150, 151, 153.
  Baring, Sir Evelyn, _see_ Lord Cromer.
  Bashi-Bazouks, ii. 4, 9, 10, 141, 142, 144.
  Basutoland and its question, ii. 71, 72, 75 _et seq._;
    description of, 77-82.
  Basutos, as cavalry, ii. 87.
  Bayuda desert, ii. 161, 162, 163.
  Bedden, i. 153.
  Beechy, i. 90.
  Bellal Bey, i. 143.
  Berber, i. 147; ii. 96, 139, 140, 143, 145, 159, 163.
  Beresford, Lord Charles, ii. 166;
    rescues Sir C. Wilson, 167.
  Berzati Bey, ii. 65.
  Bessarabia, i. 32.
  Bismarck, Prince, ii. 54, 55.
  Bisson, General, ii. 137.
  Blignières, M. de, ii. 107.
  Bogos, ii. 5, 33.
  Bolgrad, i. 32, 33.
  Boma Sola, i. 32.
  Bombay, ii. 45.
  Bonham, Sir G., i. 76.
  Bonnefoy, Capt., i. 92, 102.
  Bordeen, ii. 147, 151, 167.
  Borgu, ii. 32.
  Brandt, Herr von, ii. 54-55.
  Brocklehurst, Colonel, ii. 95-96.
  Brown, General, i. 90.
  Brown, Major, i. 116.
  Bruce, Sir Frederick, i. 47, 110, 121.
  Brussels, ii. 92-95.
  Burgevine, i. 54-59, 78, 81, 89, 90, 92-93.
  Burgoyne, Sir John, i. 14.
  Burnaby, Colonel Fred., ii. 164.

  Cairo, i. 145;
    affairs at, 145-6; ii. 159, 161.
  Cambridge, Duke of, i. 112, 123; ii. 96, 122.
  Camel, the, ii. 11, 16.
  Camel Corps, the, ii. 164.
  Campbell, Mr J. D., ii. 49.
  Campbell, Major, i. 147.
  Candahar, ii. 45, 68-69.
  Cape Government, ii. 39, 75-76.
  Cape Town, ii. 76;
    opinion at, 88-89.
  Cardew, Lieut., i. 47.
  Cassim el Mousse, ii. 165, 172.
  Cathcart, Sir George, ii. 77, 86.
  Cave, Mr, ii. 19.
  Cere, Colonel, i. 20.
  Chagos Group, ii. 73.
  Chamberlaine, Sir N., ii. 48.
  Chan-chia-wan, i. 45.
  Changchufu, i. 113, 118.
  Chang Kwoliang, i. 66, 72, 74.
  Changsha, i. 67.
  Chanzu, i. 79-81, 93, 94.
  Chatham, Engineers' Headquarters, i. 7, 45.
  Cherif Pasha, ii. 2, 21, 31, 107, 139.
  Chesney, Sir George, i. 19, 116.
  China, scenery of, i. 53, 60-64.
  Ching, General, i. 57, 82, 84, 88-89, 91-93, 96-103, 113.
  Chinkiangfoo, i. 69.
  Chippendall, Lieut., i. 148.
  Cholin, i. 51.
  Chung How, ii. 50.
  Chung Wang, i. 50, 55-56, 71-76, 92-99, 113, 116, 118, 121.
  Chunye, i. 84-87.
  Clarke, Miss A. M., i. 3.
  Clayton, Capt., i. 84.
  Coetlogon, Colonel de, ii. 105, 119, 134-136.
  Congo, the, ii. 89, 91-95, 140.
  Constantinople, i. 33-41, 139.
  Cookesley, Colonel, i. 83.
  Corfu, i. 14.
  _Courbash_, the, abolished in Soudan, ii. 6.
  Crimea, i. 8-9, 14, 16, 138.
  Cromer, Lord, ii. 21;
    Gordon's scene with, _ibid._;
    opposes Gordon, 118-122, 125, 128, 137;
    his suggestion, 139, 140, 147, 153.
  Culloden, i. 3.
  Cumberland, Duke of, i. 3.
  Cuzzi, ii. 143.
  Cyprus, ii. 125.

  Danube, i. 136-7.
  Dara, ii. 10-12, 14, 27, 104.
  Dar Djumna, ii. 145.
  Dardanelles, i. 15.
  Darfour, i. 143-4; ii. 9-11, 17, 30-31, 113.
  Davidson, Capt., i. 85.
  De Norman, i. 45.
  Debbeh, ii. 161.
  Debra Tabor, ii. 34.
  Dem Idris, ii. 27.
  Dem Suleiman, ii. 28.
  Dent, Mr H., i. 108.
  Derby, Earl of, ii. 23.
  Devonshire, Duke of, first moves to render Gordon assistance, ii. 156;
    his preparations for an expedition, ii. 156-7.
  Dilke, Sir C., ii. 96, 117, 121.
  Dongola, ii. 98, 139, 157, 159, 160, 161.
  Donnelly, General J., i. 22; ii. 66.
  Dubaga, i. 160.
  Duem, i. 103.
  Duncan, Colonel, ii. 143-4.
  Durand, Sir M., ii. 47.

  Earle, Major-General, ii. 158-9.
  Eastern Question, the, ii. 40-42.
  Eden, Garden of, ii. 74.
  Egerton, Mr, ii. 147, 155.
  El Obeid, ii. 101, 103.
  Elphinstone, Sir Howard, ii. 72.
  Empress-Regents, the, i. 123, 133.
  Enderby, Elizabeth, Gordon's mot 3-4.
    _See_ also Mrs Gordon.
  Enderby, Mr George, i. 94.
  England, her hesitating policy, ii. 8;
    power of, 73.
  Equator, the, ii. 140, 147.
  Equatorial Province, the, i. 147, 151.
  Eristaw, Prince, i. 42.
  Erivan, i. 38.
  Erzeroum, i. 34.
  Etchmiazin, i. 40.
  Ever-Victorious Army, i. 56, 58-60.
  Expedition, the Relief, ii. 157-8.
  Eyre, General, i. 24.

  Fascher, ii. 10-11.
  Fashoda, i. 148.
  Ferratch Pasha, ii. 148.
  _Firefly_, the, i. 113.
  Fisher, Corporal, i. 39-40.
  Forrester, Colonel, i. 57.
  Forster, Rt. Hon. W. E., ii, 115.
  Foweira, i. 156.
  France, i. 62.
  Franco-Chinese, the, i. 92, 102.
  French soldiers, Gordon's opinion of, i. 17-8.
  Fusaiquan, i. 97.
  Fusham, i. 80-81, 116.

  Gagarin, Prince, i. 42.
  Galatz, i. 32, 136-8.
  Gandamak, i. 45.
  Gara, ii. 30.
  Gebra, i. 103.
  Geographical Society, Royal, i. 156.
  Gessi Romulus, i. 148, 155-7; ii. 26-31.
  Gezireh, i. 111.
  Giegler Pasha, ii. 143.
  Gladstone, Rt. Hon. W. E., ii. 94, 122;
    Gladstone and his Government, ii. 151;
    how they came to employ Gordon, ii. 151-2;
    undeceived as to Gordon's views, ii. 152-3;
    their indecision, ii. 153;
    statement in House, ii. 154;
    dismayed by Gordon's boldness, ii. 155;
    their radical fault, ii. 156;
    degree of responsibility, ii. 170;
    acquittal of personal abandonment of Gordon, ii. 171.
  Golden Fleece, the, i. 15.
  Gondar, ii. 34.
  Gondokoro, i. 146, 147, 155.
  Gordon, derivation of name, i. 1, 2.
  Gordon, Charles George:
      birth, i. 1;
      family history, 1-4;
      childhood, 4;
      enters Woolwich Academy, 5;
      early escapades, 5-6;
      put back six months and elects for Engineers, 6;
      his spirit, 7;
      his examinations, _ibid._;
      gets commission, _ibid._;
      his work at Pembroke, 8;
      his brothers, 9;
      his sisters, 10;
      his brother-in-law, Dr Moffitt, _ibid._;
      personal appearance of, 11-14;
      his height, 11;
      his voice, 12;
      ordered to Corfu, 14;
      changed to Crimea, _ibid._;
      passes Constantinople, 15;
      views on the Dardanelles' forts, _ibid._;
      reaches Balaclava, 16;
      opinion of French soldiers, 17, 18;
      his first night in the trenches, 18-19;
      his topographical knowledge, 19;
      his special aptitude for war, _ibid._;
      account of the capture of the Quarries, 21-22;
      of the first assault on Redan, 22-24;
      Kinglake's opinion of, 25;
      on the second assault on Redan, 26-28;
      praises the Russians, 28;
      joins Kimburn expedition, _ibid._;
      destroying Sebastopol, 29-31;
      his warlike instincts, 31;
      appointed to Bessarabian Commission, 32;
      his letters on the delimitation work, 33;
      ordered to Armenia, _ibid._;
      journey from Trebizonde, 34;
      describes Kars, 34-35;
      his other letters from Armenia, 35-39;
      ascends Ararat, 39-40;
      returns home, 41;
      again ordered to the Caucasus, 41, 42;
      some personal idiosyncrasies, 43, 44;
      gazetted captain, 45;
      appointment at Chatham, 45;
      sails for China, _ibid._;
      too late for fighting, _ibid._;
      describes sack of Summer Palace, 46;
      buys the Chinese throne, _ibid._;
      his work at Tientsin, 47;
      a trip to the Great Wall, 47-49;
      arrives at Shanghai, 49;
      distinguishes himself in the field, 50;
      his daring, 51;
      gets his coat spoiled, 52;
      raised to rank of major, _ibid._;
      surveys country round Shanghai, 52, 53;
      describes Taepings, 53;
      nominated for Chinese service, 54;
      reaches Sungkiang, 60;
      qualifications for the command, 78;
      describes his force, 79;
      inspects it, _ibid._;
      first action, 79, 80;
      impresses Chinese, 80;
      described by Li Hung Chang, _ibid._;
      made Tsungping, _ibid._;
      forbids plunder, 81;
      his flotilla, _ibid._;
      his strategy, _ibid._;
      captures Taitsan, 82;
      difficulty with his officers, 83;
      besieges Quinsan, _ibid._;
      reconnoitres it, 84;
      attacks and takes it, 85-87;
      removes to Quinsan, 87;
      deals with a mutiny, 88;
      incident with General Ching, 89;
      resigns and withdraws resignation, _ibid._;
      contends with greater difficulties, 90;
      undertakes siege of Soochow, 91;
      negotiates with Burgevine, 92, 93;
      relieves garrison, 94;
      great victory, _ibid._;
      describes the position round Soochow, 95;
      his hands tied by the Chinese, 96;
      his main plan of campaign, 97;
      his first repulse, _ibid._;
      captures the stockades, 98;
      his officers, 99;
      his share in negotiations with Taepings, _ibid._;
      difficulty about pay, 100;
      resigns command, _ibid._;
      guards Li Hung Chang's tent, _ibid._;
      enters Soochow, 101;
      scene with Ching, _ibid._;
      asks Dr Macartney to go to Lar Wang, _ibid._;
      questions interpreter, _ibid._;
      detained by Taepings, _ibid._;
      and then by Imperialists, 102;
      scene with Ching, _ibid._;
      identifies the bodies of the Wangs, _ibid._;
      what he would have done, _ibid._;
      the fresh evidence relating to the Wangs, 103 _et seq._;
      conversation with Ching, 103;
      and Macartney, _ibid._;
      relations with Macartney, 103, 104;
      offers him succession to command, 104, 105;
      letter to Li Hung Chang, 106;
      Li sends Macartney to Gordon, _ibid._;
      contents of Gordon's letter, 107;
      possesses the head of the Lar Wang, 107, 108;
      frenzied state of, 108;
      scene with Macartney at Quinsan, 108, 109;
      his threats, 109;
      his grave reflection on Macartney, 109, 110;
      writes to Macartney, 111;
      makes public retractation, 111;
      other expressions of regret, 112;
      refuses Chinese presents, _ibid._;
      suspension in active command, _ibid._;
      retakes the field, 113;
      "the destiny of China in his hands," _ibid._;
      attacks places west of Taiho Lake, 114-5;
      enrolls Taepings, 115;
      severely wounded, 116;
      second reverse, _ibid._;
      receives bad news, _ibid._;
      alters his plans, _ibid._;
      his force severely defeated, 117;
      retrieves misfortune, _ibid._;
      describes the rebellion, 118;
      made Lieut.-Colonel, _ibid._;
      his further successes, 119;
      another reverse, _ibid._;
      his final victory, 120;
      what he thought he had done, _ibid._;
      visits Nanking, _ibid._;
      drills Chinese troops, 121;
      appointed Ti-Tu and Yellow Jacket Order, 122;
      his mandarin dresses, 123;
      his relations with Li Hung Chang, _ibid._;
      the Gold Medal, _ibid._;
      his diary destroyed, 124;
      returns home, _ibid._;
      view of his achievements, 125-6;
      a quiet six months, 128;
      his excessive modesty, _ibid._;
      pride in his profession, 129;
      appointment at Gravesend, _ibid._;
      his view of the Thames Forts, 130;
      his work there, _ibid._;
      his mode of living, 131;
      supposed _angina pectoris_, _ibid._;
      wish to join Abyssinian Expedition, 132;
      described as a modern Jesus Christ, _ibid._;
      his mission work, 132-3;
      his boys, 133;
      sends his medal to Lancashire fund, _ibid._;
      his love for boys, 134;
      his kings, _ibid._;
      some incidents, _ibid._;
      his pensioners, 135;
      his coat stolen, _ibid._;
      his walks, 136;
      the Snake flags, _ibid._;
      leaves Gravesend, _ibid._;
      at Galatz, 137;
      no place like England, _ibid._;
      goes to Crimea, 138;
      attends Napoleon's funeral, _ibid._;
      casual meeting with Nubar, and its important consequences, 139-40;
      "Gold and Silver Idols," 140;
      appointed Governor of the Equatorial Province, 145;
      reasons for it, _ibid._;
      leaves Cairo, 146;
      describes the "sudd," _ibid._;
      his steamers, 147;
      his facetiousness, _ibid._;
      reaches Gondokoro, _ibid._;
      his firman, _ibid._;
      his staff, 148;
      his energy, _ibid._;
      establishes line of forts, _ibid._;
      collapse of his staff, 149;
      his Botany Bay, _ibid._;
      his policy and justice, 150;
      his poor troops, _ibid._;
      organises a black corps, 151;
      his sound finance, _ibid._;
      deals with slave trade, 152;
      incidents with slaves, _ibid._;
      makes friends everywhere, 153;
      his goodness a tradition, 153-4;
      his character misrepresented, 154;
      his line of forts, 155;
      the ulterior objects of his task, _ibid._;
      the control of the Nile, 156;
      shrinks from notoriety, _ibid._;
      describes the Lakes, 157;
      the question with Uganda, 157 _et seq._;
      proceeds against Kaba Rega, 158-60;
      his extraordinary energy, 161;
      does his own work, 161;
      incident of his courage, 161-2;
      views of Khedive, 163;
      returns to Cairo, 163;
      and home, _ibid._
      Decision about Egyptian employment, ii. 1;
      receives letter from Khedive, 2;
      consults Duke of Cambridge, _ibid._;
      returns to Cairo, _ibid._;
      appointed Governor-General of the Soudan, 2-3;
      appointed Muchir, or Marshal, etc., 3;
      sums up his work, 4;
      his first treatment of Abyssinian Question, 5-6;
      his entry into Khartoum, 6;
      public address, 7;
      first acts of Administration, _ibid._;
      proposes Slavery Regulations, 7;
      receives contradictory orders on subject, 8;
      his decision about them, 8-9;
      disbands the Bashi-Bazouks, 9;
      goes to Darfour, _ibid._;
      relieves garrisons, 10-11;
      enters Fascher, 11;
      recalled by alarming news in his rear, _ibid._;
      his camel described, _ibid._;
      reaches Dara without troops, 12;
      his interview with Suleiman, _ibid._;
      Slatin's account of scene, 12-13;
      his views on the Slave Question, 13;
      follows Suleiman to Shaka, 14;
      indignant letter of, 15;
      his decision about capital punishment, _ibid._;
      his views thereupon, 16;
      some characteristic incidents, _ibid._;
      what the people thought of him, _ibid._;
      "Send us another Governor like Gordon," _ibid._;
      his regular payments, 17;
      his thoughtfulness, _ibid._;
      summoned to Cairo, _ibid._;
      appointed President of Financial Inquiry, 18;
      his views of money, _ibid._;
      acts with Lesseps, 19;
      meets with foreign opposition, 20;
      scene with Lesseps, 21;
      scene with Major Evelyn Baring, _ibid._;
      Gordon's financial proposal, 22;
      last scenes with Khedive, 23;
      Gordon's bold offer, _ibid._;
      financial episode cost Gordon £800, 24;
      his way of living, _ibid._;
      leaves Cairo and visits Harrar, 25;
      his finance in the Soudan, 25-6;
      deals with Suleiman, 26 _et seq._;
      takes the field in person, 30;
      clears out Shaka, 31;
      again summoned to Cairo, _ibid._;
      proclaims Tewfik, _ibid._;
      returns to Cairo, 32;
      entrusted with mission to Abyssinia, _ibid._;
      receives letter from King John, 33;
      called "Sultan of the Soudan," _ibid._;
      enters Abyssinia, 34;
      goes to Debra Tabor, _ibid._;
      interview with King John, _ibid._;
      prevented returning to Soudan, 35;
      his opinion of Abyssinia, _ibid._;
      Khedive's neglect of, 36;
      called "mad," _ibid._;
      his work in the Soudan, 36-7;
      goes to Switzerland, 38;
      his opinion of wives, 38;
      first meeting with King of the Belgians, 39;
      offered Cape command, 40;
      his memorandum on Eastern Question, 40-2;
      accepts Private Secretaryship to Lord Ripon, 42;
      regrets it, 43;
      interview with Prince of Wales, _ibid._;
      his letters about it, 44;
      views on Indian topics, _ibid._;
      sudden resignation, _ibid._;
      the Yakoob Khan incident, 45-8;
      invited to China, 49;
      full history of that invitation, 49-50;
      letter from Li Hung Chang, 49;
      his telegrams to War Office, 50-1;
      leaves for China, 51;
      announces his intentions, 52;
      what he discovered on arrival in China, 53;
      ignores British Minister, _ibid._;
      stays with Li Hung Chang, 55;
      his reply to German Minister, 56;
      his letter on Li, 57;
      his advice to China, 58-61;
      baffles intrigues and secures peace, 59;
      further passages with War Office, 60;
      on the Franco-Chinese war, 61, 62;
      on the Opium Question, 63-4;
      arrives at Aden, 65;
      his Central African letters, _ibid._;
      visits Ireland, 65-6;
      letter on Irish Question in _Times_, 66-7;
      letter on Candahar, 68-70;
      opinion of Abyssinians, 70;
      his article on irregular warfare, 70-1;
      offers Cape Government his services for Basutoland, 71;
      takes Sir Howard Elphinstone's place in the Mauritius, 72;
      his work there, 72-3;
      views of England's power, 73;
      views on coaling stations, _ibid._;
      visits Seychelles, 74;
      views on Malta and Mediterranean, 74-5;
      attains rank of Major-General, 75;
      summoned to the Cape, _ibid._;
      leaves in a sailing ship, 76;
      financial arrangement with Cape Government, _ibid._;
      his pecuniary loss by Cape employment, _ibid._;
      his memorandum on Basutoland, 77-9;
      accepts temporarily post of Commandant-General, 80;
      drafts a Basuto Convention, 80-1;
      requested by Mr Sauer to go to Basutoland, 82;
      relations with Masupha, _ibid._;
      visits Masupha, 83;
      betrayed by Sauer, _ibid._;
      peril of, _ibid._;
      his account of the affair, 84-5;
      memorandum on the Native Question, 85-7;
      his project of military reform, 88;
      his resignation of Cape command, _ibid._;
      corresponds with King of the Belgians, 89;
      goes to the Holy Land, _ibid._;
      his view of Russian Convent at Jerusalem, 90;
      advocates Palestine Canal, 90-1;
      summoned to Belgium, 91;
      telegraphs for leave, 92;
      the mistake in the telegram, _ibid._;
      decides to retire, _ibid._;
      King Leopold's arrangement, _ibid._;
      his plans on the Congo, 93-4;
      public opinion aroused by his Soudan policy, 93-5;
      visit to War Office, 94;
      makes his will, _ibid._;
      goes to Brussels, _ibid._;
      Soudan not the Congo, 95;
      leaves Charing Cross, 95;
      final letters to his sister, 95-6;
      interview with ministers, 96;
      loses clothes and orders, _ibid._;
      his predictions about the Soudan, 97-8;
      the task imposed on him, 106;
      why he accepted it, 106-7;
      memorandum on Egyptian affairs, 107-9;
      opinions on Hicks's Expedition, 109;
      on English policy, 110;
      on the Mahdi, _ibid._;
      his interview with Mr Stead of _Pall Mall Gazette_, 111-5;
      his eagerness to go to the Soudan, 115;
      suggestions by the Press of his fitness for the post, 116-7;
      "generally considered to be mad," 117;
      Sir Charles Dilke puts his name forward, _ibid._;
      Lord Granville's despatch, _ibid._;
      Lord Cromer opposes his appointment, 118, _et seq._;
      consequences of that opposition, and the delay it caused, 118-21;
      the arrangement with King Leopold, 121;
      went to Soudan at request of Government, 122;
      his departure, _ibid._;
      his instructions, 123-4;
      doubts about them, 124;
      his views about Zebehr, 124 _et seq._;
      suggests his being sent to Cyprus, 125;
      change in his route, _ibid._;
      goes to Cairo, _ibid._;
      changed view towards Zebehr, 126;
      his memorandum on their relations, 126-8;
      wishes to take him, 128;
      a "mystic feeling," _ibid._;
      interview with Zebehr, _ibid._;
      final demands for Zebehr, 129-30;
      leaves Cairo, 133;
      the task before him, 134-5;
      hastens to Khartoum, 136;
      reception by inhabitants, _ibid._;
      his first steps of defence, _ibid._;
      his conclusion that "Mahdi must be smashed up," 137;
      his demands, 138;
      on our "dog in the manger" policy, 139;
      "caught in Khartoum," _ibid._;
      appeal to philanthropists, _ibid._;
      "you will eventually be forced to smash up the Mahdi," 140;
      his lost diary, 141;
      his first fight, _ibid._;
      bad conduct of his troops, 141-2;
      lays down three lines of mines, 142;
      his steamers, _ibid._;
      their value, _ibid._;
      force at his disposal, _ibid._;
      loses a steamer, 143;
      sends down 2600 refugees, _ibid._;
      his care for them, 143-4;
      Soudan Question _must_ be
      settled by November, 144;
      sends down _Abbas_, 145;
      full history of that incident, 144-6;
      left alone at Khartoum, 146;
      sends away his steamers to help the Expedition, 146-7;
      hampered by indecision of Government, 147;
      his telegrams never published, _ibid._;
      position at Khartoum, _ibid._;
      his point of observation, 148;
      cut off from Omdurman, _ibid._;
      anxiety for his steamers, 149;
      "To-day I expected one of the Expedition here," _ibid._;
      the confidence felt in Gordon, _ibid._;
      his defiance of the Mahdi, 150;
      his position, 150-1;
      his last Journal, 151;
      views on Soudan Question, 152-3;
      his relations with the Government, 152-6;
      effect of silence from Khartoum, 156;
      his view of the Relief Expedition, 159;
      his shrewdness, _ibid._;
      his last messages, 160;
      situation desperate, _ibid._;
      "the town may fall in ten days," 165;
      "quite happy, and, like Lawrence, have tried to do my duty,"
        _ibid._;
      "spilt milk," _ibid._;
      his last message of all, 168;
      death of, 169;
      details supplied by Slatin, 169-70;
      a great national loss, 173;
      his example, 173.
  Gordon, David, i. 2.
  Gordon, General Enderby, i. 8, 9.
  Gordon, Fred, i. 5, 138.
  Gordon, Sir Henry W., i. 4-6, 8-10, 60, 102, 134; ii. 19, 43, 91,
     92, 95, 132.
  Gordon, Miss Mary Augusta, i. 10; ii. 130;
    correspondence with Zebehr, 130-2, 143.
  Gordon, General Peter, i. 2.
  Gordon, William Augustus, i. 3.
  Gordon, William Augustus, junior, i. 5.
  Gordon, Mrs, mother of Charles Gordon, i. 127, 128;
    death of, 138.
  Gordon, William Henry, Lieut.-General, i. 3, 4.
  Gordon, Sir William, i. 131.
  Gordon, Sir William, of Park, i. 2.
  Goschen, Mr, ii. 19, 23.
  Graham, Sir G., i. 12, 13, 22, 24, 25; ii. 125, 128, 129, 153,
    156, 165.
  Grand Canal, the, i. 69.
  Grant, Colonel, ii. 51.
  Granville, Earl, ii. 96, 117-123, 155.
  Gravesend, i. 129, 132, 136.
  Gresswell, Mr, ii. 83.
  Griffin, Sir Lepel, ii. 45.
  Gubat, _see_ Abou Kru, ii. 164.
  Gura, ii. 34.
  Gura plateau, ii. 5.
  Guyon, General, i. 34.

  Hake, Mr Egmont, revives Gordon's retracted libel on Sir Halliday
    Macartney, 109.
  Halfiyeh, ii. 141, 167.
  Hamaçem, ii. 5.
  Hangchow, i. 116.
  Hankow, i. 68, 69.
  Hanyang, i. 68.
  Harcourt, Sir W., ii. 40.
  Harrar, ii. 25.
  Haroun Sultan, ii. 10, 32.
  Hart, Sir Robert, i. 113; ii. 49, 54, 55.
  Hartington, Marquis of, ii. 96.
    _See_ Devonshire.
  Hassan Helmi, ii. 11.
  Havelock, reference to, ii. 161, 172.
  Heang Yung, i. 71.
  Hensall, M., ii. 145.
  Herbin, M., ii. 144-46.
  Hicks, Colonel, ii. 102, 103, 109.
  Hienfung, Emperor, i. 47.
  Hill, Dr Birkbeck, ii. 11, 47, 65.
  Holland, Capt., i. 57-60.
  Holy Land, the, ii. 89-91.
  Hoo Wang, i. 74, 119.
  Hoonan, i. 67, 68.
  Hope, Admiral, i. 45, 49, 57.
  Hukumdaria, the, ii. 136.
  Hung-tsiuen, i. 62,
    _see_ Tien Wang.
  Huntly family, the, i. 2, 3.
  _Husseinyeh_, ii. 148, 149.
  Hwaiking, i. 69.
  Hwangho, the, i. 69.
  _Hyson_, steamer, i. 81, 83-87, 90-92, 94, 95.

  Ibrahim Pasha, i. 141.
  Idris Ebter, ii. 128.
  Inkerman, i. 16-7.
  Ireland, ii. 65-8.
  Ismail, Khedive, i. 106, 140;
    his alarm, 143-4;
    why he appointed Gordon, 145-7, ii. 1-3, 17, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23,
      24, 31;
    Gordon's opinion of, 114, and _passim_.
  Ismail Yakoob Pasha, ii. 144, 146-8.
  _Ismailia_, steamer, ii. 99, 148-9.

  Jaalin tribe, ii. 164.
  Jaffa, ii. 89.
  Jakdul, ii. 161-3;
    splendid force at, 163, 172.
  James, Sir H., i. 32.
  Jebel Gedir, ii. 100.
  Jebel Masa, ii. 100.
  Jefferies, Mr, i. 4.
  Jerusalem, ii. 89.
  John, King of Abyssinia, ii. 5-6, 32, 33-4.
  Jones, Captain, i. 92.
  Jones, Sir Harry, i. 31.
  Joubert, M., ii. 19.
  Journal, the, ii. 165.

  Kaba Rega, i. 155, 157-9, 162.
  Kabbabish tribe, the, ii. 104.
  Kachiaou, i. 56.
  Kahding, i. 50-2.
  Kahpoo, i. 91.
  Kaifong, i. 69.
  _Kajow_, the, i. 90-2, 94.
  Kalgan, i. 48.
  Kanghi, i. 122.
  Kars, i. 34, 36.
  Kassala, ii. 105, 134, 151.
  Katamori, i. 32.
  Kawa, i. 98.
  Kemp, Mr, i. 148.
  Kemp Terrace, i. 1.
  Khalifa Abdullah, ii. 169.
  Khartoum, advantageous position of, i. 141-2; ii. 6, 101-3, 105;
    panic at, ii. 119;
    position at, ii. 134-5;
    scene at, ii. 136;
    distance from Cairo, ii. 136, 140;
    position of, 147-8;
    the only relieving force to, ii. 150;
    anxiety in England about, ii. 156.
  Kherson, i. 28.
  Kimberley, Earl of, ii. 75, 80-1.
  Kimburn, i. 28.
  King William's Town, ii. 82.
  Kinglake, i. 9, 20, 22, 24;
    opinion of Gordon, i. 25.
  Kintang, i. 115-6.
  Kirkham, Major, i. 94.
  Kitchener, Sir H., Gordon's opinion of, ii. 158;
    his suggestion, _ibid._
  Kiukiang, i. 68-9.
  Kolkol, ii. 11.
  Kongyin, i. 116-8.
  Kordofan, i. 99, 102.
  Korosko Desert, i. 154; ii. 143, 155.
  Korti, ii. 158, 161-3.
  Kuldja, ii. 50.
  Kung Prince, i. 123.
  Kurds, the, i. 36.
  Kuyukdere, i. 34, 36.
  Kweiling, i. 66.

  Laguerre, Admiral, i. 72.
  Laing, Mr Samuel, ii. 22.
  Lar Wang, i. 98-9-100-2, 105, 108.
  Lardo, i. 155.
  Lausanne, ii. 38-39.
  Lazes, the, i. 37.
  Leeku, i. 97.
  Leopard tribe, ii. 11.
  Leopold, King of the Belgians, ii. 39, 89, 91, 92;
    agrees to compensate Gordon, _ibid._; 93-95, 121.
  Lerothodi, ii. 77, 83-85.
  Lesseps, M. de, ii. 19-23.
  Letsea, ii. 77, 82, 83, 85.
  Li Hung Chang, i. 57, 58;
    admires Gordon, 80;
    reconnoitres Quinsan, 84;
    opposes Burgevine, 89;
    relations with Macartney, 89, 90;
    energy of, 95;
    statement about Gordon, 99;
    withholds pay, 100;
    protected by Gordon, _ibid._;
    seeks shelter in Macartney's camp, 106;
    exonerates Gordon, 107;
    sends Macartney as envoy to Quinsan, 107;
    gives a breakfast to Gordon and Macartney, 111;
    summons Gordon to return, 116;
    solicitude for Gordon, _ibid._;
    supports Gordon, 119;
    lays wreath on Gordon's monument, 123; ii. 50, 53-59, 61, 63.
  Lilley, Mr W. E., i. 13, 135.
  Limming Pass, i. 70.
  Linant, M., i. 147, 150.
  Liprandi, General, i. 17.
  Livadia, ii. 50.
  Liyang, i. 114-116, 119.
  Long, Colonel, i. 147, 157.
  Loring, Colonel, ii. 5, 6.
  Low Mun, the, i. 97, 98.
  Lucknow Residency, resemblance between its siege and Khartoum,
    ii. 161, 172.
  Lupton Bey, ii. 105.
  Lytton, Lord, ii. 45.

  Macartney, Sir Halliday: sent to Gordon on a mission, i. 88-9;
    his work described by Gordon, 89-90;
    with Gordon on the wall of Soochow, 101;
    scene there, 103;
    requested by Gordon to go to Lar Wang's palace, _ibid._;
    his earlier relation with Gordon, 104;
    offered and accepts succession to command of army, 104-5;
    what he learnt at the palace, 105;
    tries to find Gordon, 106;
    and Li Hung Chang, _ibid._;
    discovers latter in his own camp, _ibid._;
    declines to translate Gordon's letter, _ibid._;
    sent to Quinsan by Li, 107;
    Gordon shows him the head of Lar Wang, _ibid._;
    scene at the breakfast-table, 108;
    his advice, 108-9;
    hastens back to Soochow, 109;
    Gordon's libel on, 110;
    explains facts to Sir Harry Parkes and Sir F. Bruce, 110-11;
    receives letter from Gordon, 111;
    Gordon's public apology and retractation, 111-12;
    a full _amende_, 112;
    happy termination of incident, 113; ii. 43.
  Mackinnon, Sir W., ii. 65, 89, 91, 92.
  Macmahon, Marshal, ii. 137.
  Magungo, i. 156, 157.
  Mahdi, the (or Mahomed Ahmed), ii. 98;
    his first appearance, _ibid._;
    defies Egyptian Government, 99;
    meaning of name, _ibid._;
    his first victory, 100;
    defeats Rashed, _ibid._;
    further victories, 101;
    captures El Obeid, 102;
    annihilates Hicks's expedition, 104;
    height of his power, 105;
    basis of his influence, 105-6;
    Zebehr on, 130, 135;
    salaams Gordon, 136;
    basis of his power, 137;
    learns of loss of _Abbas_, 146;
    arrives before Khartoum, 149;
    knowledge as to state of Khartoum, 150;
    exaggerated fear of, 161;
    aroused by Stewart's advance, 163;
    sends his best warriors to Bayuda, 164;
    captures Khartoum, 167;
    mode of that capture, 169.
  Mahe, i. 74.
  Mahmoud Khalifa, ii. 162.
  Maida, i. 3.
  Maiwand, ii. 45, 68.
  Majuba Hill, ii. 70.
  Malakoff, the, i. 21-23, 26.
  Malta, ii. 74.
  Mamelon, the, i. 21, 22.
  Mansourah, ii. 147.
  Markham, Mr, i. 80.
  Marseilles, i. 14, 15.
  Masindi, i. 157, 159.
  Massowah, ii. 25, 32-35.
  Masupha, ii. 77, 80, 82;
    character of, 83, 85-89.
  Mauritius, the, ii. 72-75.
  Mediterranean, the, ii. 74.
  Medjidieh Order, i. 160; ii. 3.
  Mehemet Ali, conquers Soudan, i. 141, 154.
  Menelik, ii. 6, 32.
  Merowe, ii. 160.
  Merriman, Mr, ii. 84, 85, 87, 88.
  Metemmah, ii. 17, 161-166;
    delay at, 166-7.
  Moffitt, Dr Andrew, i. 10.
  Moffitt, Mrs, i. 10.
  Molappo, i. 77, 82.
  Mombasa, i. 155.
  Monding, i. 94.
  Mow Wang, i. 75, 90, 93, 98-100.
  Mrooli, i. 158.
  Mtesa, i. 155, 157-60, 162.
  Muchir or Marshal, ii. 3.
  Munzinger Bey, ii. 5.
  Murchison Falls, i. 157.

  Najao, i. 51.
  Nanking, i. 49, 58, 68, 69, 72, 76, 120;
    capture of, 121.
  Nanning, i. 64.
  Napier of Magdala, Lord, i. 132.
  Naval Brigade, the, ii. 164.
  Negus, the, ii. 32.
  Nelson, references to, ii. 162, 172.
  _New York Herald_, ii. 62.
  Niam Niam, i. 151.
  Nile, the, ii. 142;
    "not a bad Nile," 157.
  _Nineteenth Century, The_, i. 14; ii. 129.
  Ningpo, i. 74, 81.
  Northbrook, Earl of, ii. 96, 132.
  _North China Herald_, the, i. 111.
  North Fort, the, ii. 147.
  Nubar Pasha, i. 139, 140, 145; ii. 109, 120, 128, 139.
  Nuehr Agha, i. 158, 159.

  O'Donovan, Edmond, ii. 102.
  Omdurman, i. 141; ii. 102, 103, 136;
    fort of, 147-8;
    isolated, 149;
    capture of, 149, 150, 163, 164;
    scene at, 169;
    date of fall, 166.
  Opium, ii. 63, 64.
  Orpen, Mr, ii. 80, 84, 85.
  Osman Bey, i. 35.
  Osman Digma, ii. 103, 105, 136, 139, 156.
  Outram, reference to, ii. 161, 172.

  Palestine Canal, the, ii. 90, 91.
  _Pall Mall Gazette_, the, ii. 111, 120, 124.
  Paoting-fu, i. 49.
  Parkes, Sir H., i. 110.
  Paskievitch, i. 34.
  Patachiaou, i. 91, 93.
  Pattison, Mr A., ii. 83.
  Peking, ii. 46, 47, 56, 70.
  Pelissier, General, i. 20, 22, 25.
  Pelissier, Colonel, i. 34.
  Pembroke Dock, i. 8, 14.
  Perry, Capt., i. 99.
  Pitso, A., ii. 79.
  Power, Mr Frank, ii. 134, 135, 137, 144;
    leaves on _Abbas_, _ibid._;
    death of, 145-6.
  Prestonpans, i. 2.
  Protet, Admiral, i. 50, 52.

  Quarries, the, i. 21.
  Quinsan, i. 78, 81, 82-88, 90, 107, 108.

  Rabi, ii. 29, 32.
  Raglan, Lord, i. 22, 23, 25.
  Ragouf Pasha, i. 147.
  Raouf Bey, i. 149.
  Raouf Pasha, ii. 25, 98-100.
  Ras Alula, ii. 33, 34.
  Ras Arya, ii. 34.
  Rashed Bey, ii. 100.
  Ratib Pasha, ii. 5, 6.
  Redan, the, i. 21-2;
    attack on, 22-4;
    second attack, 26-7.
  Redout, Kaleh, i. 41.
  Revenue, the, of Soudan, ii. 25-26.
  Riaz Pasha, ii. 108.
  Rionga, i. 157-158.
  Ripon, Marquis of, ii. 42-44, 47-49, 68.
  Rivers Wilson, Mr, now Sir Charles, ii. 19, 107.
  Roberts, Lord, ii. 68.
  Robinson, Sir Hercules, ii. 75, 87.
  Rockstone Place, i. 127.
  Rogers, Mr, i. 4.
  Russia, i. 54-55, 62.
  Russian Army, Gordon's opinion of, i. 28.
  Russian Convent at Jerusalem, ii. 90.

  Said Pasha, ii. 102.
  San Diego, ii. 74.
  San Tajin, i. 81-82, 95-97, 113, 116.
  Sankolinsin, i. 70.
  _Santals_, the, ii. 147-148.
  _Saphia_, ii. 147.
  Saubat, i. 148.
  Sauer, Mr, ii. 82;
    betrays Gordon, 83;
    his treachery, _ibid._;
    his misrepresentation, 84-85.
  Scanlan, Mr T., ii. 81-82, 88.
  Schweinfurth, Dr, i. 142-143, 156.
  Scotia, ii. 76.
  Sebastopol, i. 16-17, 28-30.
  Sennaar, ii. 134, 151.
  Seton, Sir Bruce, ii. 43.
  Seward, Mr, i. 93.
  Seychelles, ii. 72, 74.
  Shabloka, ii. 167.
  Shaka, ii. 12, 14, 27, 31.
  Shanghai, i. 49-50-55;
    Triad rising at, i. 72;
    loss of Chinese city, i. 73.
  Shekan, ii. 104.
  Shendy, ii. 17, 143, 145-147, 158.
  Shereef Said Hakim, ii. 6.
  Siaon Edin, i. 85-86.
  Simmons, Sir Lintorn, i. 33, 41.
  Siuen-hoa, i. 48.
  Slatin Pasha, i. 162; ii. 12-13, 16, 104-105, 166, 168-169;
    his epitaph on Gordon, ii. 170.
  Slave Trade, i. 148-149, 152-153;
    proposed regulations, ii. 7;
    Convention, ii. 8.
  Smith, Sir Harry, ii. 86.
  Snake flags, the, i. 136.
  Soady, Captain, i. 5.
  Soochow, i. 74-75, 78, 84-87, 91, 94-98, 100-102.
  Souakim, i. 146; ii. 25, 153.
  Soudan, meaning of name, i. 141;
    easily conquered, i. 142;
    slave trade in, _ibid._;
    situation in, ii. 97;
    the, Gordon's views on, ii. 111, _et seq._ _passim_;
    people of, ii. 114.
  Southampton, i. 127;
    the home at, ii. 93.
  Speke, Captain, i. 142.
  Stanley, Mr H. M., ii. 93.
  Stannard, Mr Arthur, i. 14, 129-130.
  Stanton, Colonel, i. 32-33; ii. 21.
  Staveley, Sir Charles, i. 19, 50-52, 54, 56, 58-60, 78, 132.
  Stead, Mr W. T., ii. 111.
  Steamers, the penny, ii. 142;
    bullet marks on, ii. 143, 147, 151.
  Stewart, Colonel Donald, ii. 122, 125, 137, 141, 144;
    leaves on _Abbas_, _ibid._;
    fate of, ii. 144-146;
    should not have left Gordon, ii. 146.
  Stewart, Sir Herbert, ii. 162;
    trammelled by his instructions, _ibid._;
    returns to Jakdul, 163;
    wounded, 164;
    death of, 165;
    his intention, 166.
  Stokes, Colonel, ii. 19.
  Strangeways, General, i. 9.
  "Sudd," the, i. 146.
  Suders, General, i. 31.
  Suleiman, Zebehr's son, ii. 10-14, 25-29;
    execution of, ii. 30; ii. 126-128.
  Sulina, i. 137.
  Sultan, proposal to surrender Soudan to the, ii. 119, 121.
  Sultan Idris, ii. 29.
  Summer Palace at Peking, i. 45-46.
  Sungkiang, i. 54-55, 60, 78-80, 83, 88, 90, 121.
  Sussex Regiment, the, ii. 164.

  Ta Edin, i. 85, 91.
  Taeping, meaning of name, i. 65.
  Taepings, the, i. 50, 53-54, 59 (_see_ Chapter IV.);
    capture Nanking, i. 68;
    march on Peking, i. 69-70;
    their military strength, i. 75;
    and the missionaries, i. 76.
  Taiho Lake, i. 95, 101-102, 113.
  Taitong, i. 48.
  Taitsan, i. 52, 59, 80-83.
  Taiyuen, i. 49.
  Takee, i. 54, 56-58.
  Taku Forts, i. 45, 47; ii. 59.
  _Talataween_, ii. 147, 167.
  Tamanieb, ii. 156.
  Taoukwang, i. 61.
  Tapp, Colonel, i. 119.
  Taunton, i. 4.
  Tayan, i. 119.
  Tchad, Lake, ii. 10.
  Tchernaya, i. 17, 26.
  Teb, ii. 156.
  Tewfik Pasha (Khedive), ii. 31-32, 36, 106-109, 118, 125, 139.
  Thaba Bosigo, ii. 77.
  Thames Forts, i. 129-130.
  Theodore, ii. 33.
  Tientsin, i. 45-47, 70.
  Tien Wang, i. 49, 62, 65;
    occupies Nanking, i. 68;
    retires into his palace, i. 71-72;
    death of, i. 120-121.
  _Times, The_, i. 124; ii. 40, 66, 68, 92, 94, 110, 116-117, 134.
  Ti-Tu, i. 122.
  Todleben, General, i. 17.
  Tokar, ii. 105, 136.
  Transkei, the, ii. 77.
  Travers, Colonel John, i. 6.
  Trebizonde, i. 34.
  Triads, the, i. 61, 66.
  Tseedong, i. 56.
  Tseki, i. 57.
  Tseng Marquis, ii. 59.
  Tseng Kwofan, i. 67-68, 72-73, 120.
  Tseng Kwotsiuen, i. 74.
  Tsing, i. 70.
  Tsinghai, i. 70.
  Tsingpu, i. 50-52, 54-55, 57.
  Tsipu, i. 50.
  Tung Wang, i. 71.
  Tunting, i. 67.
  Tuti Island, ii. 147, 167.

  Uganda, i. 155, 159.
  Unyoro, i. 155, 157.

  Victoria Lake, i. 155-156.
  Vivian, Mr (afterwards Lord), ii. 1-2, 20, 38.
  Vivian, Mrs, ii. 39.

  Wadelai, i. 155.
  Wade, Sir Thomas, ii. 53-55.
  Wady Halfa, i. 144; ii. 138-139, 154, 159, 161.
  Waiquaidong, i. 85-86, 95.
  Waisso, i. 117, 119.
  Walad el Michael, ii. 5, 6, 33.
  Wales, Prince of, ii. 43.
  Wales, Princess of, ii. 43.
  Wall, the Great, i. 47-9.
  Wangchi, i. 101.
  Wangs, the, i. 65.
  Wangs, execution of, i. 102.
  Wanti, i. 95.
  War Office, ii. 92, 93 _passim_.
  Ward, i. 54-57.
  Watson, Colonel Charles, i. 148; ii. 96, 128-30, 165.
  Watson, Mrs, ii. 96, 165.
  Willes, Capt., i. 51, 52.
  Wilson, Sir Charles, succeeds to the command, ii. 165;
    his book "Korti to Khartoum," _ibid._;
    not to be made a scapegoat, 166;
    the letter in his charge, _ibid._;
    sails for Khartoum, 167;
    under hot fire, _ibid._;
    wrecked, _ibid._;
    rescued by Lord C. Beresford, _ibid._;
    the letter in his charge, _ibid._;
    comparatively small measure of his responsibility, 172.
  Wittgenstein, Prince F. von, i. 102.
  Wokong, i. 94.
  Wolseley, Lord, ii. 95, 96, 121, 125, 138;
    receives message from Gordon, 151;
    his letter of 24th July, 157;
    largely responsible for Khartoum mission, _ibid._;
    his address to the soldiers, 158;
    his view of the expedition, 159;
    receives full news of Gordon's desperate situation, 160;
    his grand and deliberate plan, 161;
    perfect but for--Time, _ibid._;
    will risk nothing, 162;
    his instructions to Sir Herbert Stewart, _ibid._;
    sole responsibility of, 171;
    ties Stewart's hands, _ibid._;
    the real person responsible for death of Gordon and failure of
      expedition, 172.
  Wongepoo, i. 57.
  Wongkadza, i. 50, 56.
  Wood, Sir Evelyn, ii. 125.
  Woolwich Common, i. 1.
  Wouchang, i. 68.
  Wou Sankwei, i. 67, 122.
  Wuliungchow, i. 94, 95.
  Wurantai, i. 64, 66.
  Wusieh, i. 94, 95, 113, 116.

  Yakoob Khan, ii. 44-49, 68.
  Yalpukh, i. 32.
  Yangchow, i. 69.
  Yellow Jacket Order, its origin, i. 122.
  Yesing, i. 114, 115.
  Yungan, i. 66.
  Yusuf Pasha, ii. 101.

  Zanzibar, ii. 65.
  Zebehr Rahama, i. 143, 144; ii. 10, 13, 32, 98, 101, 105, 110, 111,
    118, 119, 124-26;
    interview with Gordon, 128-29;
    doubts as to his real attitude, 129-30;
    letters to Miss Gordon, 130-32;
    to Sir Henry Gordon, 132;
    his power, 133.
  Zeila, ii. 25.
  Zouaves, the, i. 20.


       *       *       *       *       *


[Transcriber's Notes:

The transcriber made the following changes to the text to
correct obvious errors:

  1. p. 110, Madhi's --> Mahdi's
  2. p. 137, opinons -->opinions
  3. p. 142, trooops --> troops
  4. p. 144, beween --> between
  5. p. 149, Thoughout --> Throughout
  6. p. 153, Madhi --> Mahdi
  7. p. 166, Madhi --> Mahdi
  8. p. 175, Burnaby, ... i. 164. --> Burnaby, ... ii. 164.
  9. p. 178, returns to Cairo, 164; --> returns to Cairo, 163;
 10. p. 180, Hicks, Colonel, 102 --> Hicks, Colonel, ii. 102
 11. p. 182, Outram, ... i. 161, 172. --> Outram, ... ii. 161, 172.
 12. p. 183, Suleiman ... 25-19 --> Suleiman ... 25-29

End of Transcriber's Notes]